Court Opinion

ID: 9892604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 16:15:12.337489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:02.838204
License: Public Domain

J-A10025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  DAVID HATCHIGIAN                             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  ABCO, EMERSON CLIMATE                        :
  TECHNOLOGIES, CHASE BANK, USA,               :
  N.A.                                         :
                                               :
                       Appellees               :      No. 1358 EDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered May 18, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                       Civil Division at No(s): 180400158

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                              FILED OCTOBER 24, 2023

       Appellant, David Hatchigian, appeals pro se from the order entered in

the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment

in favor of Appellees ABCO and Emerson Climate Technologies. We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

May 4, 2017, Appellant purchased from ABCO a new compressor for the air

conditioning unit in his duplex. Appellant purchased the compressor with a

credit card issued by JP Morgan Chase (“Chase”).         Appellant subsequently

hired a plumber and rented a scissor lift so that he and the plumber could

install the compressor. After installation, Appellant started the air conditioning

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A10025-23

unit and the compressor failed, tripping a circuit breaker which could not be

reset. Appellant returned the compressor to ABCO and was provided a second

compressor. Appellant and the plumber then installed the second compressor,

which also failed, again tripping a circuit breaker which could not be reset.

      Appellant contacted ABCO, who referred him to Emerson Climate

Technologies (“Emerson”), the manufacturer of the compressor.         Emerson

provided another compressor (“the third compressor”), which Appellant and

the plumber installed. This third compressor worked upon installation and

continued to work as of the date of Appellant’s deposition.

      When Appellant received each compressor from ABCO, he received a

receipt that contained the following language: “ALL SALES ARE SUBJECT TO

AND EXPRESSLY CONDITIONED UPON ABCO’S STANDARD TERMS AND

CONDITIONS       OF    SALE     &    WARRANTY       AS     SET    FORTH         AT

WWW.ABCOHVACR.COM.” (Amended Complaint at Ex. C). ABCO’s Terms and

Conditions of Sale and Warranty provided, in relevant part, “ABCO extends to

the Purchaser and/or End-User all warranties, if any, granted by the

manufacturer.… No warranty of merchantability or fitness, and no other

warranties or representations, express or implied, are made by ABCO with

respect to any product.”    (Id. at Ex. I, ¶14).   The Terms and Conditions

specifically excluded the purchaser’s ability to recover consequential damages,

stating: “ABCO shall not be responsible for any labor charges or

consequential damages due to defects therein.” (Id.) (emphasis added).

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The Terms and Conditions further stated: “ABCO shall in no event be

responsible in contract or in tort, or otherwise, for loss or damages sustained

as a result of the use of the product, loss of profit or revenues, or any other

indirect, incidental, special, punitive, exemplary, or consequential loss or

damage, arising from any cause whatsoever.” (Id. at ¶18).

      Emerson’s Terms and Conditions of Sale also provided a limited

warranty stating that the compressor was free from defects and limiting the

purchaser’s remedy for a breach of the warranty to “repair, replacement,

credit or refund of the purchase price.” (Amended Complaint at Ex. G, ¶7).

Emerson’s Terms and Conditions specifically disclaimed any implied warranties

and excluded recovery for consequential damages. (Id. at ¶¶6, 8).

      The parties agree that neither ABCO nor Emerson charged Appellant any

fees for the second or third compressor.        However, Appellant incurred

approximately $3,000.00 in costs related to installation of the compressors,

which included renting the scissor lift, hiring the plumber, and purchasing

supplies. Appellant sought reimbursement of these costs from both ABCO and

Chase, but neither provided the requested reimbursement.

      On January 23, 2018, Appellant filed the instant action in Philadelphia

Municipal Court to recover the costs of installing the second and third

compressors. After the Municipal Court ruled in favor of defendants, Appellant

appealed to the Court of Common Pleas on April 1, 2018. Appellant filed his

initial complaint on August 31, 2018, and filed an amended complaint on

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November 30, 2018, against ABCO, Emerson, and Chase.             The amended

complaint asserted a breach of written product warranty and breach of implied

warranty claims against ABCO; violation of the federal Magnuson-Moss

Warranty Act1 claim against all defendants; breach of contract claim against

Chase; unjust enrichment claim against all defendants; Truth in Lending Act

(“TILA”) Regulation Z, and other cardholder laws against Chase; violation of

the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) Article 2 against all defendants;

violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law

(“UTPCPL”) against all defendants; and negligence with negligent design

against Emerson. The case proceeded to compulsory arbitration, and on May

22, 2019, an arbitration panel found in favor of defendants.       On June 28,

2019, Appellant appealed the arbitration award to the Court of Common Pleas.

       After a lengthy discovery and motion practice,2 all parties filed motions

for summary judgment.3 On March 9, 2020, the trial court denied Chase’s

____________________________________________

1 See Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-
2312).

2 During this time, the trial court twice issued revised case management
orders to extend the time for discovery.

3 ABCO filed its motion for summary judgment on January 7, 2020.     Chase
filed its motion for summary judgment on January 28, 2020. Appellant filed
his motion for summary judgment on January 30, 2020, and Emerson filed its
motion for summary judgment on February 3, 2020. On February 6, 2020,
Emerson and Chase entered into a join stipulation wherein Emerson dismissed
all cross-claims against Chase.

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motion for summary judgment as to Appellant’s claim. On May 4, 2020, the

trial court entered orders denying Appellant’s motion for summary judgment;

granting ABCO’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing all of

Appellant’s claims against ABCO; granting Emerson’s motion for summary

judgment and dismissing all of Appellant’s claims against Emerson; and

granting summary judgment in favor of Chase on Emerson’s cross-claims.

Appellant    filed   an   immediate      appeal,   which   this   Court   quashed   as

interlocutory.4 On May 11, 2022, Appellant and Chase stipulated to dismiss

all remaining claims.

       On May 18, 2022, Appellant filed the instant notice of appeal seeking

review of the court’s May 4, 2020 orders. Appellant complied with the trial

court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) order and on June 13, 2022, he filed three concise

statements of errors, one for each order from which he appeals.

       Appellant raises the following sixteen issues on appeal:

          I. Based on seller’s failure to pay for successive
          replacements of the units due to epidemic failures occurring
          with the relevant warranty period of units bearing the same
          manufacturing defect, was summary judgment proper
          irrespective of the working unit ultimately provided, or
          should the court have awarded Breach of Warranty damages
          to [Appellant]?

          II. Did the trial court prematurely deny summary judgment
____________________________________________

4  As noted, the court had previously denied Chase’s motion for summary
judgment as to Appellant’s claims, and those claims remained. Therefore,
when Appellant filed his initial notice of appeal, this Court quashed the appeal
as interlocutory. See Hatchigian v. ABCO, No. 1412 EDA 2020 (Pa.Super.
filed Aug. 3, 2021).

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       on [Appellant’s] Magnuson Moss Warranty Act claim against
       ABCO?

       III. Even without re-deposing ABCO, was [Appellant]
       entitled to summary judgment in his favor based on the
       documentary evidence alone?

       IV. Did the [UCC] require ABCO to craft a remedy that
       restored the original bargain for a functioning compressor?

       V. Were Unjust Enrichment damages due on Count Five
       based on the documentary evidence of Defendants’ breach
       of the written warranties?

       VI. Was it a deceptive business practice to represent free
       replacements under the Terms of Sale when Seller had
       notice of the manufacturing defect in the 2-ton HVAC
       compressor?

       VII. Was Magnuson Moss Warranty Act claim against the
       manufacturer (Emerson) prematurely dismissed absent first
       [deposing] seller ABCO?

       VIII. Even without re-deposing the seller, did the
       documentary evidence attached to the Complaint support
       damages      for   breach   of   the   Warranty     of
       fitness/merchantability?

       IX. Was restitution required under the U.C.C. in the event
       the remedy provided did not restore the purchaser’s original
       bargain for a working compressor?

       X. Regardless of the discovery withheld by the seller’s
       [corporate representative], was it error to grant Emerson
       summary judgment as to Negligent Design?

       XI. Was [Appellant] entitled to summary judgment on his
       alternative count for Unjust Enrichment (Count Five), based
       on failure to pay for successive replacements of the units
       due to epidemic failures from the same manufacturing
       defect occurring within the relevant warranty period?

       XII. Was summary judgment [proper] on [Appellant’s]
       consumer protection law claim against Emerson?

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         XIII. Was summary judgment proper as to Breach of
         Warranty damages irrespective of the working unit
         ultimately provided to buyer [Appellant], or should the court
         have awarded reimbursement based on epidemic
         occurrences of the known manufacturing defect within the
         relevant warranty period?

         XIV. Did the trial court prematurely deny summary
         judgment on [Appellant’s] Magnuson Moss Warranty Act
         claim?

         XV. Even without re-deposing ABCO, should the court have
         awarded damages as a matter of law for breach of the
         implied warranty of fitness or merchantability/Fitness based
         on the documents attached to [Appellant’s] complaint?

         XVI. Was [Appellant] entitled to [be] made whole/restitution
         under the U.C.C. where the seller’s remedy failed to restore
         his original bargain for a working compressor?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6-9).

      Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment requires

us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an

error of law. Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 908 A.2d 344, 347 (Pa.Super.

2006).

         Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on
         facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing
         and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its
         discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies
         the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking
         reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it
         does not follow legal procedure.

Miller v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 753 A.2d 829, 832 (Pa.Super. 2000) (internal

citations omitted). Our scope of review is plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa.

407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct.

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2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002). In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary

judgment:

        [W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing
        all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists
        a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the
        light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts
        as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must
        be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is
        no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that
        the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
        law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the
        existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be
        resolved against the moving party.

        Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly
        implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of
        action.    Summary judgment is proper if, after the
        completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including
        the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will
        bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce
        evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense
        which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted
        to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine
        issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the
        cause of action or defense, which could be established by
        additional discovery or expert report and the moving party
        is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary
        judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports
        summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are
        undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to
        make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.

        Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s
        conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.

Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

     In his first and fourth issues, which we discuss together for purposes of

disposition, Appellant argues that he purchased the compressor because of

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ABCO’s promise of free replacements, and his belief that he would not incur

extra costs to receive a working unit. Appellant asserts that there exists a

material ambiguity on the record concerning the scope of the limitation on

liability in the event the initial compressor failed.     Additionally, Appellant

challenges the limitation of remedy clause which barred him from recovering

consequential damages under his breach of warranty claim.              Specifically,

Appellant insists that the limitation was not authorized under the UCC because

limiting consequential damages caused the warranty to fail its essential

purpose and was an unconscionable limitation.                 Therefore, Appellant

concludes that summary judgment was improper concerning his breach of

warranty claims. We disagree.

      Pennsylvania law permits contracting parties to limit the damages

recoverable in the event of breach as long as such limitations do not cause a

warranty to    fail    its   essential purpose,   and   the   limitations   are   not

unconscionable.       Metalized Ceramics for Electronics, Inc. v. National

Ammonia Co., 663 A.2d 762 (Pa.Super. 1995). See also 13 Pa.C.S.A. §

2719(a)-(c). Specifically, Section 2719(b) of the UCC states: “(b) Exclusive

remedy failing in purpose.—Where circumstances cause an exclusive or

limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided

in this title.” 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2719(b). This Court has explained that situations

where an exclusive remedy will fail of its essential purpose are rare:

         There are probably relatively few situations where a remedy
         can fail of its essential purpose. Section 2–719(2) [Section

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           2719(b)] has been called into action most often in cases ...
           when the exclusive remedy involves replacement or repair
           of defective parts, and the seller because of his negligence
           in repair or because the goods are beyond repair, is unable
           to put the goods in warranted condition. Section 2–719(2)
           might also apply when the exclusive remedy requires
           performance of an act by the buyer that is precluded by the
           seller’s breach.

New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d

919, 929 (Pa.Super. 1989) (internal citation omitted). “Section 2719(b) has

most frequently been applied to defeat an exclusive remedy provision where

the provision limited the buyer’s remedy to repair or replacement and the

seller either refuses or is unable to provide this remedy within a reasonable

time.” Id.

     Consequential damages are other damages which naturally and

proximately flow from a breach of contract. Cresci Const. Services, Inc. v.

Martin, 64 A.3d 254, 265 n.15 (Pa.Super. 2013).               Under the UCC,

“[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or

exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury

to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but

limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.” 13 Pa.C.S.A. §

2719(c).

           In determining whether a clause is unconscionable, the
           court should consider whether, in light of the general
           commercial background and the commercial needs of a
           particular trade, the clause is so one-sided that it is
           unconscionable under the circumstances. The burden of
           proof lies with the party who alleges unconscionability. In
           commercial settings, a limitation of damages clause will

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         rarely be found unconscionable.

Borden, Inc. v. Advent Ink Co., 701 A.2d 255, 264 (Pa.Super. 1997)

(citations omitted). “Moreover, it is settled law that mere unequal bargaining

power between the parties to a contract does not render the contract, or a

provision thereof, unconscionable.” Id.

      Instantly, the trial court explained:

         The plain language of…ABCO’s warranty and Emerson’s
         warranty provided that in the event of a defect, [Appellant]
         was entitled to 1) have the compressor repaired by ABCO
         and/or Emerson, 2) receive a replacement compressor free
         of charge, 3) a credit in the amount of the cost of the
         compressor, or 4) a refund. It is undisputed ABCO did not
         charge [Appellant] any fees when it provided him
         the…replacement compressor or the [second] replacement
         compressor.      Since ABCO provided [Appellant] with a
         working compressor and did not charge [Appellant] any fees
         for the provision of the working compressor, ABCO fulfilled
         its obligations under the warranties.

         Nevertheless, [Appellant] argued he was entitled to recover
         his installation costs for two reasons. First [Appellant]
         argued the costs he seeks to recover are direct damages,
         not consequential damages. Second, [Appellant] argued
         that if the costs are considered consequential damages, the
         warranties’ disclaimer of consequential damages is
         unconscionable.      Neither of [Appellant’s] arguments is
         supported by the law or the facts.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/8/22, at 8-9) (record citations omitted). The trial

court then explained that the installation costs constituted consequential

damages because they were costs that the manufacturer and seller would

reasonably expect the purchaser to incur, and some costs, including the fees

paid to the plumber and to rent the scissor lift were consequential damages

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as a matter of law. (Id. at 9).

       Thereafter, the court turned to Appellant’s claim concerning the

limitation of damages clause. The court found that the limitation of damages

clause was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. Concerning

substantive unconscionability, the court explained that “[Appellant] has not

been left without any remedy; rather, the clause at issue only prevents the

recovery of consequential damages above and beyond the cost of the

compressor.” (Id. at 12) (emphasis in original). The court observed that it

was not unreasonable for ABCO to limit the “potentially staggering monetary

liability” for consequential damages which could result from an otherwise

routine sale. (Id.) (citation omitted). Further, the court noted that Appellant

“is not an unsophisticated consumer who has been taken advantage of by

ABCO.    He is a union electrician with more than 40 years of experience

working, and purchasing supplies for use, in the construction trades.” (Id. at

13).

       Ultimately, the court found that ABCO’s warranty provided Appellant

with a complete remedy and that ABCO’s disclaimer of consequential damages

did not rise to the level of substantive unconscionability. Therefore, the court

concluded that “ABCO fulfilled its warranty obligations when it provided

[Appellant] the second…compressor and third…compressor free of charge” and

entered summary judgment in favor of ABCO and against Appellant on

Appellant’s breach of warranty claims. (Id.)

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      We agree with the trial court that Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Under the terms of ABCO’s warranty, Appellant was entitled to 1) have the

compressor repaired by ABCO and/or Emerson, 2) receive a replacement

compressor free of charge, 3) obtain a credit in the amount of the cost of the

compressor, or 4) receive a refund. Appellant has not demonstrated that any

of these options were unavailable to him. Although he argues that neither

ABCO nor Emerson could provide a working unit, the record belies this claim.

Appellant was ultimately provided a replacement working unit. Consequently,

the warranty did not fail in its essential purpose. See New York State Elec.

& Gas Corp., supra.

      Regarding Appellant’s claim for consequential damages, Appellant

makes only a general argument that the clause limiting consequential

damages was unconscionable. He summarily suggests that because he was

not reimbursed for his out-of-pocket costs, the clause deprived him of the

value of his bargain.    However, the UCC specifically permits clauses to

contracts which limit consequential damages. See 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2719(c).

Further, as noted by the trial court, Appellant has substantial experience in

purchasing equipment of use in the construction trades. The record does not

support Appellant’s contention that “the clause is so one-sided that it is

unconscionable under the circumstances.” See Borden, supra. As such, the

trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of ABCO on

Appellant’s breach of warranty claims.       Accordingly, Appellant’s first and

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fourth issues merit no relief.

      In his second issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment concerning his Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims

without giving Appellant a chance to conduct an additional deposition of

ABCO’s corporate representative. We disagree that relief is due.

      “[O]n review of an order concerning discovery, an appellate court

applies an abuse of discretion standard.” Anthony Biddle Contractors, Inc.

v. Preet Allied Am. St., LP, 28 A.3d 916, 922 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting

Lockley v. CSX Transp. Inc., 5 A.3d 383, 388 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal

denied, 613 Pa. 668, 34 A.3d 831 (2011)). “An abuse of discretion is not

merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is

overridden   or   misapplied,    or   the   judgment   exercised   is   manifestly

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by

the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.” Geise v. Nationwide Life

and Annuity Co. of America, 939 A.2d 409, 417 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal

citation omitted). “In Pennsylvania, parties must be given reasonable time to

complete discovery before a trial court entertains any motion for summary

judgment[.]” Anthony Biddle Contractors, supra at 928 (internal citation,

quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).

      Here, the trial court did not rule on the motions for summary judgment

until after allowing the parties a lengthy discovery period, during which the

court twice extended the time for discovery at Appellant’s request.          (See

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Revised Case Management Orders dated 10/11/19, 11/19/19). Further, the

record shows that the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s request to

conduct an additional deposition of ABCO’s corporate representative, at which

time the court considered Appellant’s request, and the concerns that Appellant

had with the prior deposition.            (See N.T. Hearing, 1/2/20, at 4-16).

Essentially, Appellant complained at the hearing that he was unable to elicit

the testimony he wanted from the ABCO representative, but after reviewing

all objections made by ABCO’s counsel at the deposition, the court confirmed

all objections were properly sustained.5 (Id. at 25-40). Ultimately, the court

decided that Appellant had a fair opportunity to depose ABCO’s representative,

and he was simply trying to get the proverbial second bite at the apple

because the witness did not testify as Appellant had hoped. Consequently,

the court denied Appellant another chance to depose ABCO’s corporate

representative. (Id. at 40).

       Under these circumstances, we conclude that the parties were given

reasonable time to complete discovery, and the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Appellant’s request for an additional deposition of ABCO’s

corporate representative.          See Anthony Biddle Contractors, supra.

Therefore, Appellant’s second issue merits no relief.

       In his third issue, Appellant argues that based on the proof attached to

____________________________________________

5 Appellant does not challenge on appeal any specific ruling made by the court

on any objection during the deposition for ABCO’s representative.

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his complaint, the facts were sufficient to award Appellant his out-of-pocket

costs. This claim is waived.

      Notably, an appellant’s pro se status does not relieve him of the duty to

follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d

206, 213 n.11 (Pa.Super. 2008). Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of

Appellate Procedure provides:

         (a) General rule. The argument shall be divided into as
         many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall
         have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type
         distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein,
         followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are
         deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Additionally, Rule 2101 makes clear:

         Rule 2101. Conformance with Requirements

         Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material
         respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as
         the circumstances of the particular case will admit,
         otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if the defects are
         in the brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are
         substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or
         dismissed.

Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

      “The argument portion of a brief must include pertinent discussion of

the point raised as well as citations to relevant authority. This Court will not

consider the merits of an argument which fails to cite relevant case or

statutory authority.”   Iron Age Corp. v. Dvorak, 880 A.2d 657, 665

(Pa.Super. 2005) (citations omitted). “Failure to cite relevant legal authority

constitutes waiver of the claim on appeal.” Eichman v. McKeon, 824 A.2d

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305 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 576 Pa. 712, 839 A.2d 352 (2003).

       Instantly, Appellant’s argument on his third issue consists of one

sentence, without citation to the record or a discussion of pertinent supporting

caselaw. Appellant cites to only one case, without any development of the

issue in a manner capable of review. Accordingly, this issue is waived. See

Iron Age Corp., supra; Eichman, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Pa.R.A.P.

2119(a).

       In his fifth and eleventh issues, Appellant claims that he is entitled to

reimbursement of his out-of-pocket expenses under the theory of unjust

enrichment because Appellees were enriched at his expense.6 We disagree

that relief is due.

       To establish a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show some

benefit conferred on defendants by the plaintiff, appreciation of such benefits

by defendants, and acceptance and retention of such benefits under

circumstances where it would be inequitable for defendants to retain the

particular benefit without payment of value.          Durst v. Milroy Gen.

Contracting, Inc., 52 A.3d 357, 360 (Pa.Super. 2012).

       Here, Appellant has not established or even alleged that he conferred

some benefit on Appellees, which they retained without payment of value.

____________________________________________

6 These issues are also arguably waived based on Appellant’s failure to develop

these arguments with citation to and discussion of pertinent authority. See
Iron Age Corp., supra; Eichman, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a).

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Appellant paid for a working compressor, and he ultimately received a working

compressor. There is no evidence to support his claim that ABCO or Emerson

were enriched at Appellant’s expense. See id. Therefore, the court did not

err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees on his claim of unjust

enrichment. See Chenot, supra. Appellant’s fifth and eleventh issues are

meritless.

      In his sixth issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of Appellees on his claims of violations of the UCC

based on alleged deceptive business practices. The crux of his argument is

the same argument that he has presented throughout other issues, namely,

that Appellant expected reimbursement of all costs in the event of a failed

compressor, including the ancillary costs he incurred. We disagree that relief

is due.

      We reiterate that the warranty at issue in this case excluded recovery

of consequential damages, as is permitted under the UCC. See 13 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2719(a)-(c).     Here, Appellees supplied Appellant with replacement

compressors. Although they did not reimburse the installation costs Appellant

incurred while installing the replacement compressors, the terms and

conditions of sale were clear that the warranties excluded recovery of

consequential damages.    Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting

summary judgment in favor of Appellees on Appellant’s claim of a violation of

the UCC. See Chenot, supra. Appellant’s sixth issue is meritless.

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       In his seventh issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in

entering summary judgment in favor of Emerson with respect to Appellant’s

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim. However, aside from baldly stating that

the trial court erred (in the heading of his brief), Appellant’s discussion

contains no relevant argument concerning the facts of the instant case.

Accordingly, Appellant has waived this issue. See Iron Age Corp., supra;

Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

       Regarding issues eight and nine, Appellant has not included any

discussion with respect to these claims, but rather states “See IV, supra.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 25). As such, these issues are waived. See Iron Age

Corp., supra; Eichman, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

       In his tenth issue, Appellant claims that Emerson was not entitled to

summary judgment on his claim of negligent design. Once again, aside from

one conclusory sentence without citation to any caselaw or statutory

authority, Appellant has not developed this argument in his brief. Thus, it is

waived.    See Iron Age Corp., supra; Eichman, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 2101;

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

       In his twelfth and thirteenth issues,7 Appellant argues that the court

erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Emerson on his claim of a

____________________________________________

7 In his thirteenth issue, Appellant has failed to cite to any authority.
                                                                   Thus,
his thirteenth issue is waived on this basis. See Iron Age Corp., supra;
Eichman, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

                                          - 19 -
J-A10025-23

violation of the UTPCPL based on Emerson’s deceptive business practices.

Specifically, he alleges that Emerson knew of problems with the compressor

and hid them from the public. Appellant suggests that Emerson and ABCO

engaged in a deceptive joint return protocol which hid the cost of successive

replacements. We disagree that relief is due.

      To defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must

“come forward with sufficient evidence essential to preserve the cause of

action.”   InfoSAGE, Inc. v. Mellon Ventures, L.P., 896 A.2d 616, 625

(Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting McCarthy v. Dan Lepore & Sons Co., Inc., 724

A.2d 938, 940 (Pa.Super. 1998)). “[T]he evidence relied upon by the non-

moving party need not be direct evidence, but may be circumstantial evidence

and the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom.” Id. at 626. However,

“a court reviewing the propriety of a summary judgment motion must be

mindful that a jury may not be permitted to reach its verdict on the basis of

speculation or conjecture.” Id.

      The UTPCPL provides relief to consumers for various deceptive business

practices and lists 20 enumerated practices which constitute actionable “unfair

or deceptive acts or practices,” (see 73 P.S. § 201–2(4)(i)–(xx)), in addition

to one catchall clause for “[e]ngaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive

conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding” (see

id. at § 201-2(4)(xxi)). To bring a private cause of action under the UTPCPL,

an individual must establish that,

                                     - 20 -
J-A10025-23

          (1) they purchased or leased goods or services primarily for
          a personal, family, or household purpose; (2) they suffered
          an ascertainable loss of money or property; (3) the loss
          occurred as a result of the use or employment by a vendor
          of a method, act, or practice declared unlawful by the
          [UTPCPL]; and (4) the consumer justifiably relied upon the
          unfair or deceptive business practice when making the
          purchasing decision.

Gregg v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., ___ Pa. ___, ___. 245 A.3d 637, 646

(2021).   The test for deceptive conduct is “whether the conduct has the

tendency or capacity to deceive.”     Id. at ___, 245 A.3d at 650.       As our

Supreme Court has explained, “liability for deceptive conduct under the

[UTPCPL] cannot be excused if consumers rely upon that conduct to their

financial detriment.” Id.

     Instantly, Appellant has generally alleged that in selling the compressor,

and in providing a warranty for sale, Emerson and ABCO deceived him into

believing that he would be reimbursed not only for the compressor, but also

for his out-of-pocket installation costs. However, Appellant has produced no

evidence of any conduct by Emerson or ABCO that would form the basis of his

assumption that he would be reimbursed for these costs. See Gregg, supra.

To the contrary, the terms of sale made clear that Appellant would not be

reimbursed for consequential damages. Further, any claim that ABCO and

Emerson conspired to hide the allegedly defective nature of the compressors

from the public is nothing more than speculation without record support.

Therefore, we see no error with the court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of Emerson. See InfoSAGE, supra. See also Chenot, supra.

                                     - 21 -
J-A10025-23

      In his fourteenth issue, Appellant has not included any discussion, but

rather states “See II. (supra) and XIII (supra).” (Appellant’s Brief at 28).

Consequently, this issue is waived. See Iron Age Corp., supra; Eichman,

supra; Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

      In his fifteenth issue, Appellant again claims that he was entitled to

damages as a matter of law based on the breach of warranty. As discussed

above, this claim is meritless because there was no breach of warranty.

      In his sixteenth issue, Appellant once again does not include any

discussion and has accordingly waived this issue.     See Iron Age Corp.,

supra; Eichman, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Accordingly,

Appellant’s claims merit no relief, and we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 10/24/2023

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