Court Opinion

ID: 9712768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:59:29.515031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.286417
License: Public Domain

KERN, Associate Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree that respondent’s misconduct necessitates suspension from the practice of law in the District of Columbia but I disagree with the length of time adopted by the Court for that suspension.
Preliminarily, I note that Disciplinary Rule XI, Section 4(3) prescribes that the Disciplinary Board review the findings and recommendations of its hearing committee and then prepare and forward to this court “its own findings and recommendations.” The rule provides that thereafter this court “shall review such findings and recommendations on the basis of the record and shall enter an appropriate order determining the *185proceedings.” Thus, I view this court as having the ultimate responsibility for making the “appropriate” determination in each disciplinary proceeding; further, I believe that determination necessarily depends on the facts peculiar to each such proceeding.
The record in the instant case reflects that respondent pled guilty to a criminal offense, the elements of which were described by the federal judge accepting the plea as follows:
You being an officer and Vice President of Gulf Oil, consented to the making by that corporation of a contribution in the amount of $100,000 to the Finance Committee for the Reelection of the President ... in violation of the statute.
The applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), proscribes “any corporation” from making a contribution in any political election and provides that “every officer” of any corporation consenting to a contribution is guilty of a misdemeanor, or “if the violation was willful,” a felony. The special prosecutor in respondent’s case advised the federal trial court that respondent “came forward voluntarily . . . and disclosed the contributions charged . and in light of that cooperation which has been complete and voluntary” had been charged only with a misdemeanor violation.
The record before us further reflects the circumstances of the corporate contributions to which respondent consented.1 He was aware of their illegality when made, and he acknowledged “I should have been stronger in resisting . . . what could be characterized as a form of extortion in a way.” When asked before the hearing committee to “be a little more specific about the type of reprisal that you thought was possible if you didn’t make the requested contribution,” respondent under oath replied:
[KJnowing something of the attitudes of those in power, the first four years of that, the Nixon Administration, it was desirable not to get on their blacklist, so to speak and . . . there are many things I suppose they could do . . . .
******
I knew others were being approached and that if they made a contribution and I didn’t, where does that put me in relationship to my competitors? There are 60-some agencies in the government that are important to the oil business
Respondent, in his sworn testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, which is a part of the record before us, related that in 1971 an agent of the Committee to Reelect the President (CREP), Mr. Nunn, visited respondent and asked for a contribution of $100,000 from Gulf Oil for the 1972 election, suggesting that he contact the then Attorney General Mitchell to varify the bona fides of CREP. Respondent met with the Attorney General at the Department of Justice who confirmed the existence of CREP as a reelection operation, Mr. Nunn’s participation in that operation and that “he [Mitchell] had full confidence in Mr. Nunn.” Respondent, concluding “that this is something I had better do,” obtained $50,000 in cash from one of the many foreign and wholly owned subsidiaries of Gulf (which amount was charged to “miscellaneous expenses”), and gave the money to Nunn.
In 1972, according to respondent, he was contacted by the then Secretary of Commerce Stans who indicated his hope of obtaining $100,000 from large American corporations and $50,000 more from Gulf; respondent, who “considered it considerable pressure when two Cabinet officers and an *186agent of one of the committees [were] asking me for funds,” obtained the cash in the same way as before and delivered it to Stans. Subsequently, when asked by Stans how to report the source of the $100,000 contribution in order to conceal the fact it was a corporate contribution, respondent suggested it be listed as coming from “employees of Gulf.”
The denouement of the criminal case was that CREP gave Gulf back the $100,000 contribution; Gulf also received $25,000 from respondent, “to repay the corporation for the legal expenses involved and the fine which they had to pay,” thus apparently making Gulf and its stockholders financially whole. On the other hand, respondent’s employment as Vice-President with Gulf was terminated, he pled guilty to committing a crime, and he was fined $1,000.
Absent extraordinary circumstances, which are not present here, the commission of a crime by an attorney requires both for the maintenance of the integrity of the profession and the protection of the public against future misconduct by other attorneys, the termination of his licensure to practice law. Cf. District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst, D.C.App., 345 A.2d 146 (1975). The critical issue becomes then the nature of that termination, i. e., disbarment or suspension.2 The Board’s hearing committee and the Board itself recommended suspension for respondent and I agree upon the record here; this was not a case of a corporation, at the instigation of one of its officers, pumping streams of money into the political process to pollute it but rather in my view an extortion conducted by politicos occupying important executive department offices and armed with considerable governmental might vis-a-vis businesses. (As Senator Ervin pointed out in the Senate hearings during respondent’s testimony, the Secretary of Commerce “has quite a voice” in fixing oil quotas.) While respondent at first concealed the violation of law, he did come forward voluntarily, according to the Special Prosecutor, and cooperated completely.
If suspension seems appropriate here to protect the Bar’s reputation and to discourage illegal acts by lawyers in the future, the question becomes then for how long a period that suspension should be. In determining that issue I believe attention should be given to the nature of respondent’s misconduct and both his past history and possible future in the profession. Respondent did knowingly violate a statute but the violation occurred in that murky area of political fund-raising, where apparently it is not more blessed to give than to receive,3 and where considerable reformation has seemingly occurred. Respondent in no way was guilty of over-reaching his client or failure to advance his client’s cause; if anything, his zeal to protect his client’s interest was excessive.
The record further reflects that upon graduation from law school he became a “legislative assistant” to a trade association and during that employment was not involved in “legal representation in any way.” Thereafter, he was a “legislative representative” for Gulf, ultimately becoming Vice-President for Government Relations, and has never “engaged in the active practice of law in the District of Columbia.” As of the time of respondent’s testimony before the Board’s hearing committee he testified that he was setting up an office and going to hold himself out as “a consultant in legislative governmental affairs or business consultant generally. I do not intend to'practice law in the sense which you are familiar with.”
*187It seems clear that respondent, while licensed to practice law and practicing law within the meaning of the broadly-worded definition in our rules, has in fact been out of the mainstream of the profession for some time. Accordingly, I think some period of time for reflection and reorientation to the dictates of the profession would be salutary and justified. On balance, considering the nature of the misconduct and the history of respondent, I deem suspen-' sion for six months as adequate to insure henceforth respondent’s fitness “to be entrusted with professional . . . matters.” The longer period of 12 months adopted by the majority in my view carries with it punitive considerations which this court has heretofore rejected as improper. See District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst, supra.

. The record indicates that other senior Gulf officials were unaware of the contributions.

. I note parenthetically that both disbarment and suspension (1) become matters of public record and (2) require the attorney so disciplined to notify his clients of that fact and advise them to seek legal advice elsewhere.

. Both the federal court and the Senate Committee expressed concern at the absence of prosecutions of persons and organizations who received corporate contributions — a violation of law, also.