Court Opinion

ID: 9559239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:24:51.511814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:11.378139
License: Public Domain

IRWIN, Justice
(dissenting).
I feel compelled to express my views concerning the difference between this case and Perry v. Perry, Okl., 551 P.2d 256 (1976).
In Perry, the divorce decree contained this proviso:
“It is further provided that pursuant to the agreement of the parties that said alimony payments shall not be discharge-able other than upon the death of the plaintiff herein (wife) notwithstanding provisions of the statute to the contrary.”
In Perry we held that where a husband and wife, in contemplation of a divorce, enter into an agreement concerning the termination of alimony for support, and that agreement is subsequently incorporated into the divorce decree, they waive those rights granted them under 12 O.S.1971, § 1289(b) which are inconsistent with the terms of the decree.
In the case at bar the property settlement agreement was incorporated and merged into the divorce decree but the divorce decree did not designate the $480,000.00 as a division of property but specifically designated it as alimony for support and maintenance. However, the divorce decree was silent concerning whether or not it would terminate upon remarriage of the wife.
Therefore, in Perry we considered a divorce decree specifically providing that the alimony payments for support would not terminate upon remarriage of the wife; and in the case at bar the divorce decree is silent concerning whether the alimony for support would terminate upon remarriage.
Courts may not be divested of their jurisdiction by contracts of the parties. The rights of the parties under a property settlement agreement which is incorporated into a divorce decree merge into a decree. The property settlement is extinguished and the rights of the parties no longer are based on contractual rights. Rights become determinable and enforceable based upon the judgment and decree and not upon the agreement of the parties. Mills v. Mills, Okl., 512 P.2d 143, 146 (1973); Hicks v. Hicks, Okl., 417 P.2d 830 (1966); Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 462 P.2d 49, 53 (1969).
In my opinion, the termination provisions of 12 O.S.1971, § 1289(b) are operar tive in the case at bar and I respectfully dissent.