Court Opinion

ID: 7714571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-30 19:17:20.054198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:02.760803
License: Public Domain

The appellant, Tony Alan Walls, appeals his conviction for receiving stolen property in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-8-16, Code of Alabama 1975. The appellant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment; that sentence was suspended, and he was ordered to serve five years on probation and to perform 200 hours of community service, and he was fined $10,000.
The state's evidence tended to show that on the morning of October 4, 1994, the Albertville Police saw Ladon Orville Haygood running from the Gilbert-Baker Ford automobile dealerships lot. Haygood testified that when he saw the police, he dropped three radios he was carrying, and ran into the woods adjacent to the dealership. The Albertville Police later apprehended him and arrested him for breaking and entering. After questioning Haygood, police learned that Haygood had planned to sell the three stolen radios to the appellant. Detective Alan Whitten spoke with Richard Baker, president of Gilbert-Baker Ford, about assisting the Albertville Police in setting up the appellant. Baker gave Detective Whitten permission to use the three radios that Haygood had stolen and an additional eight radios from the dealership for the attempted sale to the appellant. Before the sale, the Albertville Police obtained an "anticipatory search warrant" for the appellant's place of business based on the fact that the appellant would be in possession of the stolen property.
The next day, Haygood, wired with an electronic monitoring device, entered the appellant's place of business and proceeded to sell the appellant the eleven radios. Immediately after the sale was completed, the appellant's place of business was searched pursuant to the search warrant and the radios were seized. The appellant was charged with receiving stolen property.
 I
The appellant first contends that the trial court incorrectly charged the jury as a matter of law that the property was stolen. Specifically, he contends that the oral instruction deprived him of his right to have each element of the charge proved beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby depriving him of his right to a trial by jury.
Following the presentation of all the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury as follows with respect to the charged offense of receiving stolen property:
 "I do instruct you that the property, the three radios in issue, were stolen property. You will not have to make that determination. You can consider from the evidence that the property was stolen; therefore, the only thing you'll — elements that you'll have to decide are those that I have told you about the Defendant himself."
(Emphasis added.)
The appellant argues in his original brief to this court and in his reply brief that the trial court's instruction "resulted in a deprivation of appellant Walls' right to have the prosecution prove the charge against him beyond a reasonable doubt." Rule 18.1(a), Ala.R.Crim.P, expressly states, "Defendants in all criminal cases shall have the right to be tried by a jury." It is a recognized right to have a jury determine each element of the charged offense.
Section 13A-8-16, Code of Alabama 1975, provides the following definition for the offense of receiving stolen property:
 "(a) A person commits the crime of receiving stolen property if he intentionally receives, retains or disposes of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen or having reasonable grounds to believe it has been stolen, unless the property is received, retained or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner. *Page 485
"(b) If a person:
 "(1) On two separate occasions within a year prior to the commission of the instant offense of receiving stolen property is found in possession or control of stolen property; or
 "(2) Possesses goods or property which have been recently stolen; or
 "(3) Regularly buys, sells, or uses or handles in the course of business property of the sort received, and acquired the property without making reasonable inquiry whether the person selling or delivering the property to his had a legal right to do so, this shall be prima facie evidence that he has the requisite knowledge or belief.
 "(c) The fact that the person who stole the property has not been convicted, apprehended or identified is not a defense to a charge of receiving stolen property."
Section 13A-8-17, Code of Alabama 1975, provides:
 "(a) Receiving stolen property which exceeds $1,000.00 in value constitutes receiving stolen property in the first degree.
 "(b) Receiving stolen property in the first degree is a Class B felony."
This Court in Ladd v. State, 363 So.2d 1017, 1018
(Ala.Cr.App. 1978) stated:
 "To establish the offense of buying, receiving, or concealing stolen property, the following elements must be proved by the State: (1) the property must have been stolen; (2) the accused must have bought, received, concealed, or aided in concealing the property with the knowledge that it was stolen; and (3) the accused must have had no intention of returning the property to the owner."
As this court further stated in Eldridge v. State,415 So.2d 1190, 1197 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982):
 "To sustain a charge of receiving stolen property, the State must prove that the property has been previously stolen. However, this and all elements of the crime need not be proved by direct evidence. The corpus delicti 'may be proven by facts and circumstances from which the jury may infer that the offense has been committed.' Tanner v. State, 37 Ala. App. 256, 261, 66 So.2d 827
(1952), cert. granted, 259 Ala. 306, 66 So.2d 836
(Ala. 1953)."
Apparently, the trial court believed that the state's evidence showed, as a matter of law, that the property at issue was stolen when the appellant purchased it. Here, the instruction given by the trial court denied the appellant his right to have the elements of the charge proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
 " 'The jury's overriding responsibility is to stand between the accused and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government that is in command of the criminal sanction. For this reason, a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict, regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction.' "
Deming v. City of Mobile, 677 So.2d 1233 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995), quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,572, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1355, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977).
Having found that the instruction was erroneous and that it deprived the appellant of his constitutional right to due process of law, we review the state's argument that the error was merely harmless.
 " 'The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 [95 S.Ct. 2160, 2166, 45 L.Ed.2d 141] (1975), and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.' "
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3105,92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall,475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).
In Beard v. State, 612 So.2d 1335, 1346 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), we analyzed the harmless-error doctrine as follows.
 "The Rose v. [Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] Court recognized that '[the Court has] repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise *Page 486 
valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. at 576, 106 S.Ct. at 3105 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674
(1986)). The Court cautioned, however, that although it ' "plainly ha[s] the authority" to decide whether, on the facts of a particular case, a constitutional error was harmless under the Chapman standard, [it] "does so sparingly." Id. at 584, 106 S.Ct. at 3109 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1981, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983)). It further held that an erroneous jury instruction is harmless when all the evidence adduced at trial establishes the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, so that the reviewing court can conclude that the erroneous presumption did not contribute to the jury's verdict." Id. at 576, 106 S.Ct. at 3105."
After a thorough review of the record, we cannot hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As we stated in Beard: "We cannot confidently conclude, on the entire record, that the erroneous presumption that took from the jury's consideration all the elements of the crime of murder-burglary did not contribute to the jury's verdict." 612 So.2d at 1347 (emphasis in original).
Because the fact that the property in question is stolen is one of the elements of the offense of receiving stolen property, we conclude that the erroneous presumption took away from the jury's responsibility as trier of fact to evaluate all the elements of the crime.
For these reasons, the appellant's conviction and sentence for receiving stolen property in the first degree must be reversed. In the interest of judicial economy, however, we will address another issue that may arise in subsequent proceedings.
 II
The appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress certain evidence, specifically the allegedly stolen radios which were seized as a result of the execution of the "anticipatory search warrant." The appellant contends that the anticipatory search warrant was not authorized under Alabama law. "In general, a search warrant based upon 'an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of a crime will be located at a specific place' is referred to as an anticipatory search warrant." 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c) (2d ed. 1987). "In other words, an anticipatory search warrant anticipates that certain specific events will occur after the issuance of the warrant, those future events creating the probable cause that supports the warrant. If the future events do not occur, the warrant is void." Ex parte Oswalt,686 So.2d 368, 372 (Ala. 1996), citing United States v. Garcia,882 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943, 110 S.Ct. 348,107 L.Ed.2d 336 (1989).
The Alabama Supreme Court recently addressed the validity of "anticipatory search warrants," stating:
 "[I]n order to determine whether a search warrant is authorized under Alabama law, we look to the specific language of Rule 3.8. The Rule reads:
 "A search warrant authorized by this rule may be issued if there is probable cause to believe the property sought:
"(1) Was unlawfully obtained;
 "(2) Was used as the means of committing or attempting to commit any offense under the laws of the State of Alabama or any political subdivision thereof;
 "(3) Is in the possession of any person with intent to use it as a means of committing a criminal offense, or is in the possession of another to whom he may have delivered it for the purpose of concealing it or preventing its discovery; or
 "(4) Constitutes evidence of a criminal offense under the law of the State of Alabama or any political subdivision thereof."
Ex parte Oswalt, 686 So.2d at 373. (Emphasis in original.) *Page 487
The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Oswalt, noted that anticipatory search warrants are not per se unconstitutional. The question is whether the anticipatory search warrant at issue was authorized by Rule 3.8, Ala.R.Crim.P.
The appellant contends that anticipatory warrants are not allowed under the language of Ala. Code § 15-5-2, Code of Alabama 1975, and Rule 3.8, because, he says, the statute and the rule require probable cause to believe that a violation of the law has occurred or is occurring at the time the warrant is issued, not at some future point.
Here, the affidavit supporting the search warrant stated, in pertinent part:
 "AFFIANT RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM [LADON] ORVILLE HAYGOOD THAT ORVILLE HAYGOOD HAS STOLEN RADIOS/TAPE PLAYERS FROM AUTOMOBILES IN THIS AREA AND SOLD THE RADIOS/TAPE PLAYERS TO TONY WALLS. THE RADIOS/TAPE PLAYERS STOLEN BY ORVILLE HAYGOOD ARE EACH VALUED AT APPROXIMATELY $400.00 AND ORVILLE HAYGOOD SOLD THE RADIOS/TAPE PLAYERS TO TONY WALLS FOR $50.00 EACH. THESE TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN ORVILLE HAYGOOD AND TONY WALLS HAVE OCCURRED AT THE BUSINESS OF TONY WALLS LOCATED AT 5370 U.S. HWY 431 SOUTH, ALBERTVILLE, ALABAMA, KNOWN AS WALLS ACCESSORIES. ORVILLE HAYGOOD HAS TOLD YOUR AFFIANT THAT HE SOLD A RADIO/TAPE PLAYER THAT HE STOLE FROM A VEHICLE AT GILBERT-BAKER FORD TO TONY WALLS DURING THE WEEKEND OF OCTOBER 1-3, 1994 FOR $50.00. AFFIANT STATES THAT ORVILLE HAYGOOD WAS APPREHENDED ON OCTOBER 4, 1994 AT APPROXIMATELY 6:20 A.M. WHILE STEALING RADIOS/TAPE PLAYERS FROM GILBERT-BAKER FORD AND HAD IN HIS POSSESSION THREE RADIOS/TAPE PLAYERS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO POSSESSION OF YOUR AFFIANT AND THAT AFFIANT HAS MARKED THESE THREE ITEMS AS FOLLOWS: E-5, E-7, AND E-9.
 "ORVILLE HAYGOOD HAS STATED TO AFFIANT THAT HE HAD INTENDED TO SELL THESE THREE RADIOS/TAPE PLAYERS TO TONY WALLS. AFFIANT HAS OBTAINED AN ADDITIONAL EIGHT RADIOS/TAPE PLAYERS FROM GILBERT-BAKER FORD WITH A VALUE OF APPROXIMATELY $400.00 EACH WHICH ORVILLE HAYGOOD EXPECTS TO BE ABLE TO SELL TO TONY WALLS FOR APPROXIMATELY $50.00 EACH. THE 8 ADDITIONAL RADIOS/TAPE PLAYERS HAVE BEEN MARKED WITH THE INITIALS A.W. ORVILLE HAYGOOD HAS AGREED TO BE WIRED WITH AN ELECTRONIC MICROPHONE SO THAT AFFIANT MAY MONITOR ANY CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN TONY WALLS AND ORVILLE HAYGOOD AND THAT BASED UPON ORVILLE HAYGOOD'S PRIOR DEALINGS WITH TONY WALLS, HE EXPECTS TO SELL THE ELEVEN RADIOS/TAPE PLAYERS TO TONY WALLS FOR A SMALL PORTION OF THEIR ACTUAL VALUE.
 "Affiant shows that based on the foregoing facts and information and based upon his ability to observe and monitor a future transaction between Orville Haygood and Tony Walls which is scheduled
to occur within the next 48 hours, Tony Walls will have in his possession three radios/tape players stolen from Gilbert-Baker Ford and eight radios/tape players belonging to Gilbert-Baker Ford but which have been released to your affiant for the purpose of allowing Orville Haygood to sell to Tony Walls, Directions are as follow: from the Intersection of Hwy 75 and Hwy 431 travel south on Hwy 431 to the intersection of Chloris Street and Hwy 431. Turn Left off Hwy 431 on the Chloris Street. The building is on the left at the corner/intersection of Chloris Street and Hwy 431. The building is grey in color with the name "Walls Accessories" on the front of the building. The address of the building to *Page 488 
be searched is 5370 U.S. Hwy 431 South, Albertville, Alabama."
The order entered stated:
 "THIS WARRANT FURTHER IS TO BE ISSUED ONLY UPON THE HAPPENING OF THE EVENTS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH # 2 OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WHICH ARE FUTURE EVENTS FROM THE TIME OF SIGNING. THAT OFFICERS ARE TO EXECUTE THE SEARCH WARRANT ONLY AFTER BELIEVING THEY HAVE FULL PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEIZE THE ITEMS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH # 2 OF THE SEARCH WARRANT."
(Emphasis added.)
Whether probable cause to issue a warrant exists is to be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate. Any probable cause supplied by this affidavit is merely based on events that would occur in the future. The "anticipatory search warrant" inEx parte Oswalt was substantially similar to the one in the present case. The affidavit supporting the warrant in Ex parteOswalt stated:
 " 'My name is N.E. Willingham, I am a law officer with thee following law enforcement agency: Alabama Department of Public Safety, Narcotics Division.
" '. . . .
 " 'FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION IN TUSCALOOSA COUNTY, ALABAMA, FOCUSING ON RONALD ERIC OSWALT . . . WHO RESIDES AT THE PREMISES KNOWN AS 1801 HARPER ROAD, LOT 6, QUAIL RIDGE TRAILER PARK, NORTHPORT, ALABAMA. YOUR AFFIANT HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS IDENTIFIED OSWALT AS BEING A PERSON INVOLVED IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF [A] CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
 " 'ON TUESDAY, 07-28-92, THE COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL STATED TO YOUR AFFIANT THAT HE HAD HAD A CONVERSATION WITH OSWALT, IN WHICH OSWALT STATED THAT HE WAS LOOKING TO PURCHASE A QUANTITY OF COCAINE AND MARIJUANA.
 " 'AT THE DIRECTION OF THE AFFIANT, THE COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL MET WITH OSWALT ON WEDNESDAY, 07-29-92. AT THAT TIME THE COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL TOLD OSWALT THAT HE KNEW SOMEONE WHO HAD COCAINE AND MARIJUANA TO SELL. THE COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL TOLD OSWALT THAT THE COCAINE SOLD FOR $ 1,100 [AN] OUNCE AND THAT THE MARIJUANA SOLD FOR $ 1,400 A POUND.
 " 'ON THURSDAY, 07-30-92, THE COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL STATED THAT OSWALT TOLD HIM THAT HE WANTED TO PURCHASE AN OUNCE OF COCAINE. OSWALT REQUESTED THAT THE TRANSACTION TAKE PLACE AROUND 10:00 A.M. ON SATURDAY, 08-01-92, AT OSWALT'S RESIDENCE IN NORTHPORT, ALABAMA.
 " 'ON SATURDAY, 08-01-92, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF [PUBLIC] SAFETY NARCOTIC AGENT PAUL JOHNSON WILL BE WORKING IN [AN] UNDERCOVER CAPACITY POSING AS A DRUG DEALER. AGENT JOHNSON WILL HAVE A QUANTITY OF COCAINE IN HIS POSSESSION AND WILL TRAVEL TO THE RESIDENCE OF RONALD ERIC OSWALT IN NORTHPORT, ALABAMA. AGENT JOHNSON WILL HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH OSWALT CONCERNING OSWALT'S DESIRE TO PURCHASE A QUANTITY OF COCAINE. AGENT JOHNSON WILL CONDUCT A COCAINE TRANSACTION WITH OSWALT.
 " 'AGENT JOHNSON WILL HAVE ON HIS PERSON AN ELECTRONIC TRANSMITTER TO ALLOW THE MONITORING OF CONVERSATION. UPON COMPLETION OF THE COCAINE TRANSACTION AGENTS ON SURVEILLANCE WILL GO TO THE RESIDENCE OF OSWALT AND CONDUCT A SEARCH OF OSWALT AND *Page 489 
HIS PREMISES FOR THE COCAINE AND EVIDENCE OF DRUG DISTRIBUTION.
 " 'Your affiant shows that based on the above and foregoing facts and information, he has probable cause to believe that the aforesaid property is concealed upon the aforesaid persons, property and/or vehicles and is subject to seizure and makes this affidavit so that a warrant may issue to search the aforesaid persons, property, and/or vehicles." '
(Emphasis in original.)
The Alabama Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Oswalt
requires that we hold that the anticipatory search warrant in this case is invalid. The Ex parte Oswalt analysis of the rules governing anticipatory search warrants states as follows:
 "[We] conclude that the plain and unambiguous language of § 15-5-2 would not provide for the anticipatory search warrant at issue in this case. The plain language of subsections (1) and (2) of § 15-5-2, which are echoed by subsections (1) and (2) of Rule 3.8, require that the evidence to be seized be evidence of a criminal offense that has already occurred. Although subsection (3) of § 15-5-2, which is mimicked by subsection (3) of Rule 3.8, requires only the intent to commit a criminal offense rather than the actual commission of a crime, it requires that the evidence be presently in the possession of the person whose premises are to be searched. Thus, we conclude that when the legislature enacted § 15-5-2, and when much of the language of that statute was adopted by this Court into one of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, without any expression of a differing, more expansive intent, there was no intent to allow the issuance of a search warrant where, as in this case, the crime to which the evidence at issue relates has not yet occurred and the evidence to be seized is not presently in the possession of the person whose premises are to be searched.
 "Even though the Rules of Criminal Procedure are 'intended to provide for the just and speedy determination of every criminal proceeding,' Rule 1.2, Ala.R.Crim.P., that charge alone does not lead us to so expand the meaning of the clear language of Rule 3.8 so as to allow for the anticipatory search warrant at issue. That is our conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that Rule 3.8 added subsection (4), which has no equivalent in § 15-5-2. Like subsections (1) and (2) of Rule 3.8, subsection (4) also requires that the criminal offense have been committed before the search warrant may be issued."
(Emphasis in original.)
In this case, the appellant's purchase and possession of the stolen radios had not yet occurred and the evidence was not in his possession when the search warrant was issued. Accordingly, the requirements of Rule 3.8 had not been met when the search warrant was issued, and therefore, the warrant was not valid under Alabama law. Ex parte Oswalt.
In the alternative, the State contends that if the warrant fails, the search was still lawful because, it argues, the officers were relying on this court's ruling in Oswalt v.State, 686 So.2d 361 (1994), in which we held that such anticipatory search warrants were valid. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Leon,468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Arizona v.Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995); andEx parte Morgan, 641 So.2d 840 (Ala. 1994), the state argues that the evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should not be excluded from the state's case-in-chief. The state contends that if the officer executing the warrant acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant, then, based upon the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the evidence should not be suppressed.
State v. Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986), summarized the good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule as first recognized by the United States Supreme Court inLeon as follows:
 "Noting that the exclusionary rule is not an express provision of the Fourth Amendment but instead is a judicially created remedy, 468 U.S. at 906-08, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, the Court, evaluating the costs and *Page 490 
benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence came down on the side of admitting inherently trustworthy tangible evidence rather than upon the side of uncertain deterrence of police misconduct. The teaching of [United States v.] Leon's
[468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)] good-faith exception is that evidence pursuant to a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate should not be excluded, irrespective of the actual validity of the warrant, so long as the officer conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on that warrant."
708 S.W.2d at 145.
Applying the good-faith exception to the facts presented in this case, we bold that it was lawful to receive into evidence the items seized in this case. After a diligent search of the caselaw regarding the good-faith exception as it applies to anticipatory search warrants, we have found four cases addressing this issue. A number of courts, both state and federal, have upheld the validity of anticipatory search warrants under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The appellate courts in this state have never directly addressed this issue.
In Pazos v. State, 654 So.2d 1000 (Fla.Ct.App.), review denied, 662 So.2d 932 (Fla. 1995), the Florida Court of Appeals upheld a search warrant under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule carved out in United States v. Leon,468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986). Before Florida's ruling, the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Wright,115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250 (Idaho App. 1989), had held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to an anticipatory search warrant issued without probable cause. The Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Brown also held that it was proper to admit items seized pursuant to a search warrant, even assuming that it was an invalid anticipatory warrant. The New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376,653 A.2d 1097 (1995) stated the following, quoting Leon regarding "anticipatory search warrants":
 "In United States v. Leon, the Court concluded that the fourth amendment does not require the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a constitutionally defective warrant, so long as the police acted in good faith reliance upon the warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. The Court held that evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, although ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause, may be admitted in the government's case in chief."
139 N.H. at 384, 653 A.2d. at 1103. The Canelo Court invalidated the warrant based on the New Hampshire Constitution.
When the warrant in question was issued, Alabama caselaw upheld "anticipatory search warrants" identical to the one involved in this case. We hold, as did other courts inPazos, Wright, and Brown, that the good-faith exception applied because the officers' reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable.
Based on the discussion in Part I of this opinion, the appellant's conviction is reversed and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Marshall County.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All the Judges concur.