Court Opinion

ID: 9539999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:12:09.173337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:30.367361
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CASTILLE,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as I disagree that “send a message” arguments by counsel are per se prejudicial only in the capital penalty phase context.
The Majority notes that “this Court has stridently condemned prosecutorial statements urging a criminal jury to ‘send a message’ to the community or the criminal justice system,” explaining that such comments are at best extraneous and irrelevant to the jury’s task at hand and at worst create the potential for severe prejudice. Majority Op. at 314, 985 A.2d at 1287. The Majority notes a distinction between “send a message” statements by prosecutors that address the facts of the case at hand or the defendant directly, which are *318to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and statements that exhort the jury to “send a message” to the judicial system or the community at large, which exceed prosecutorial license. Id. at 1286-88. In doing so, the Majority quotes from Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 580 Pa. 303, 860 A.2d 102 (2004), which held that “send a message” statements by the Commonwealth are per se prejudicial in the context of the capital penalty phase. Majority Op. at 315, 985 A.2d at 1288. But the Majority declines to extend Dejesus’s per se rule to the non-capital penalty context. In the Majority’s view, a per se rule fits in the capital penalty context because the particular concerns and consequences of the death penalty inquiry must be shielded from “emotional appeals” that can “[upset] a death penalty jury’s unique task of weighing specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Id. By contrast, the Majority asserts, in “less emotional” non-capital cases, “evaluation of the allegedly offending statement may be done on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
I recognize that the distinctions articulated by the Majority — capital penalty cases versus non-capital cases and the intended target of the message — are legitimate, and the Majority’s rationale is well-expressed. Nevertheless, given this Court’s supervisory authority over the conduct of attorneys, in my view application of these distinctions forces courts to patrol too fine a line. For over two decades, this Court has warned against “send a message” statements by either side in a criminal case. See DeJesus, 860 A.2d at 115-17 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Crawley, 514 Pa. 539, 526 A.2d 334, 344 (1987)). DeJesus was, of course, a capital case and the Majority is correct in reiterating the particular concerns that “send a message” statements engender in the penalty phase of capital cases. But DeJesus also expressed a more generalized growing impatience respecting all “send a message” statements in the criminal arena. DeJesus quoted, with emphasis, the following language from Commonwealth v. Hall, 549 Pa. 269, 701 A.2d 190, 203 (1997), which could not be more clear: “[W]e advise all parties in criminal matters before any court in *319the Commonwealth to refrain from such exhortation in the future.” 860 A.2d at 117.
The persistence of such references, notwithstanding our repeated disapproval of exhortations invoking such “external irrelevancy,” (as characterized in Dejesus) suggests a need for a bright-line rule. The Court discussed at length the supervisory concerns implicated by such arguments in Dejesus:
This Court well appreciates the pressures and challenges of trying criminal cases, and particularly cases where the ultimate penalty is involved. We also recognize that there are many things that occur in the course of a trial which are beyond the control or anticipation of counsel and the trial judge — such as "witnesses, jurors or spectators acting inappropriately. But one aspect of a trial which is far more subject to rational control is the behavior of attorneys— officers of this Court whose professionalism is absolutely indispensable to the fair administration of justice in this Commonwealth. Lawyers have an obligation to be aware of, and to abide by, the law governing the conduct of the matters in which they are involved. This Court’s unambiguous directive in Hall was not aimed at the conduct of witnesses, or police officers, or jurors, or court staff, or judges: it was aimed directly at counsel. Moreover, it concerned a matter and stage of trial over which counsel have unique, indeed premeditated control: ie., what it is they intend to say to the jury. When this Court issues a directive concerning what is permissible at that stage, we expect officers of the Court to abide by that directive.
860 A.2d at 118.
Despite the foregoing, it appears that prosecutors still return to the “send a message” argument. The fact that resort continues to be made to such extraneous concerns suggests that lawyers employing the argument believe it is harmful or powerful enough to be worth the risk. Again, I believe that it is time that this Court send a message of its *320own to the criminal bench and bar that this rhetoric can no longer be tolerated.
Justices SAYLOR and TODD join this dissenting opinion.