Court Opinion

ID: 9637663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:14:26.055101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:58.863636
License: Public Domain

Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
To the extent the majority concludes that the trial court’s refusal to provide its written instructions to the jury did not constitute plain error and, hence, “does not warrant our intervention!,]” ante at 540, 984 A.2d at 892, I concur. However, to the extent the majority is of the view that the questioning of defen*542dant and other witnesses by the trial judge exceeded the limits we recently reiterated in State v. Taffaro, 195 N.J. 442, 950 A.2d 860 (2008), I must respectfully dissent. I do so substantially for the reasons cogently expressed by the Appellate Division in affirming defendant’s convictions for the knowing and purposeful murder of his parents plus related weapons and theft offenses, but vacating and remanding defendant’s sentence.
As properly couched by the Appellate Division, the true issue before it—and before us—“is whether the trial judge’s intervention in the proceedings was improper and resulted in depriving defendant of a fair trial.” Noting that “[defendant’s trial counsel did not raise any objection to the trial judge posing questions to prosecution or defense witnesses[,J” the panel explained that an appellate court “may reverse defendant’s conviction only if [it] find[s] that the trial judge’s behavior constitutes plain error.” (citing R. 2:10-2). It explained that “[i]n determining whether an alleged error is plain error, courts must determine if the nature of the error is ‘clearly capable of producing an unjust result.’ ” (quoting ibid.). It cautioned that “[t]he possibility of an unjust result must be ‘sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.’ ” (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336, 273 A.2d 1 (1971)).
The Appellate Division reasoned that, although “trial judges possess ‘broad discretion’ as to when and how to participate in a given criminal case, ... a judge must maintain an impartial atmosphere and avoid the appearance of supporting either the defense or the prosecution.” (citing State v. Ray, 43 N.J. 19, 25, 202 A.2d 425 (1964)). Quoting Ray, supra—which, in turn, quoted State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191, 207, 191 A.2d 45 (1963)—the panel emphasized that
[the trial judge] should bear in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of wetnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward wetnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.
*543At bottom, the panel stated the operative rule succinctly: “[w]hen intervening to question witnesses, the trial judge should lead jurors to understand that the purpose of the intervention is to aid their understanding, not to advance the case of one side or the other.” (citing ibid.). It noted that “[ojne of the recognized purposes of judicial intervention in the questioning of witnesses is to clarify testimony for the jury.” (citing ibid.). In that vein, it repeated that “it is not an abuse of discretion to question a witness, even when those questions would have been better left to the prosecutor, so long as those questions are relevant and are not ‘beyond justification as attempts by the court to clarify the issues.’” (quoting State v. Kelly, 118 N.J.Super. 38, 51-54, 285 A.2d 571 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 350, 289 A.2d 795 (1972)). It summarized the governing principle in a clear and straightforward manner: “so long as a trial judge maintains an impartial atmosphere, and makes clear to the jury that credibility determinations are solely a jury function, the judge has not committed reversible error.” (citing State v. Ross, 162 N.J.Super. 47, 52, 392 A.2d 210 (App.Div.1978), affd in part, rev’d in part, 80 N.J. 239, 403 A.2d 457 (1979)).
Applying those principles, the Appellate Division found that “the trial judge questioned both prosecution and defense witnesses when he perceived an ambiguity in the witness’ testimony.” It further found that “|t]he judge also made a point of reminding the jury members that they were not to give any additional weight to the questions he asked and that they remained the sole finders of fact in the case[,J” observing that “Ltjhe trial judge intervened a total of four times during defendant’s six-day trial.” After reviewing the record at length—and without divining from the record the arbitrary and factually unfounded emphases that animate the majority’s opinion1—the panel concluded that “the trial judge did *544not act in a partisan manner, nor did he question the credibility of defense witnesses or impugn the defendant’s character.” (citing Guido, supra, 40 N.J. at 194-208, 191 A.2d 45; Ray, supra, 43 N.J. at 27-29, 202 A.2d 425). It also concluded that the trial judge “intervened at times when he felt that the witnesses’ testimony needed to be clarified and, therefore, acted within his discretion.” It remarked that, “[njotably, the trial judge questioned both prosecution and defense witnesses in an evenhanded manner and repeatedly instructed the jury that his questions should not be given more weight than those asked by the attorneys!,]” and that the trial judge “also repeatedly advised the jury that it was the sole finder of fact in the case.” The panel held that, “[ajfter consideration of the entire record, we do not find that the intervention of the trial judge indicated partiality or deprived defendant of a fair trial.”
That analysis and its corresponding conclusions are unassailable. To conclude on this sterile record, as the majority does, that “the judge’s questioning of defendant, his expert, and Investigator Mitchell falls squarely within the interdiction of Taffaro[,] ante at 536, 984 A.2d at 890-91, is an unwarranted and perilously amorphous limitation of principles well-founded in our jurisprudence. See N.J.R.E. 614 (explicitly authorizing trial judges to “interrogate any witness”). Therefore, for the reasons that undergird the judgment of the Appellate Division, I would affirm defendant’s convictions.2
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
*545For reversal and remandnient—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and HOENS—6.
Concuning in part and dissenting in part—Justice RIVERA-SOTO—1.

 Unlike Taffaro, supra, where the trial was videotaped and a video recording of the trial available for appellate review—thus permitting a full review of the "look and-feel” of the trial judge's questioning—the record in this case consists *544solely of the trial transcripts, absent any of the intonations expressly imputed in the majority's opinion.

 Defendant also challenged his sentence as excessive. The majority, by reason of its remand for a retrial, determined that issue to be moot. Ante at 541, 984 A.2d at 893. Again, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division that the trial court "incorrectly considered N.J.S.A. 2C:44—1 [(]a[)](12) as an aggravating factor and[, for that reason,! defendant's sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.”