Court Opinion

ID: 9901601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 06:05:56.64691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:35.652177
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                     November 21, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   9:00 a.m.

v                                                                    No. 361770
                                                                     Delta Circuit Court
BOBBI JO GODFREY,                                                    LC No. 19-009876-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and CAMERON and PATEL, JJ.

CAMERON, J.

       Defendant appeals as of right the trial court’s April 28, 2022 judgment of sentence ordering
defendant to serve 12 months’ imprisonment and to pay court costs. Defendant specifically
challenges the imposition of $615 in tether fees. We conclude these fees are statutorily permissible
under MCL 769.1k(2), and that the trial court did not violate defendant’s substantial rights by
imposing them. Therefore, we affirm.

                 I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Defendant was previously convicted of possession of methamphetamine, MCL
333.7403(2)(b)(i). She was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11(1)(a), and
was ordered to serve 3 to 20 years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed leave to appeal in this Court,
which we granted. People v Godfrey, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued April 7, 2022 (Docket No. 355826), p 1.

        While the appeal was pending, defendant moved the trial court to be released on bond. The
trial court granted defendant’s request for bond pending her appeal, explicitly stating “bond must
be sufficient to guarantee the appearance of the defendant.” The court ordered, in relevant part,
that defendant be “outfitted with a GPS Tether within 24 hours of her release from the Michigan
Department of Corrections [(MDOC)].” It also ordered that “the installation fee as well as a
payment of 2 months of tether fees be paid up front prior to the Tether being installed and prior to
the Defendant’s release from MDOC.” This Court later upheld defendant’s conviction, but we
vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. Godfrey,
unpub op at 1-2.

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        At defendant’s resentencing hearing, defendant acknowledged that she owed $615 in tether
fees. The trial court then sentenced defendant to 12 months in jail, with credit for 913 days served,
and declined “to impose any additional probation given [defendant’s] performance on bond.” The
trial court further stated: “I’ll add a sixty-eight dollar state cost and the crime victim assessment of
one hundred and thirty dollars.” The trial court later entered an amended judgment of sentence,
which waived attorney fees, but ordered defendant to pay the state minimum cost, the crime victim
rights assessment, and $615 for her tether fees. Defendant paid the tether fees soon after
sentencing. This appeal followed.

                                         II. TETHER FEES

        Defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing tether fees because these fees are not
authorized by statute. Alternatively, she claims that reversal is warranted because the trial court
failed to state on the record the entire sentence imposed. We disagree.

                     A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

       A criminal defendant preserves an issue concerning the imposition of costs, fines, and
assessments by objecting in the lower court. People v Konopka, 309 Mich App 345, 356; 869
NW2d 651 (2015). Although the trial court did not specifically state on the record that the sentence
would include defendant’s tether fees, defendant did not object to these fees after the judgment of
sentence was entered. Therefore, this issue is unpreserved for our review. Id.

         Because this issue is unpreserved, our review is for plain error affecting substantial rights.
Id. “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must
have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected
substantial rights.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). An error affects
substantial rights when it “affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id. But, reversal
is at the discretion of the appellate court. Id. And “[r]eversal is warranted only when the plain,
forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent
of the defendant’s innocence.” Id. at 763-764 (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).

        This case also involves the interpretation of statutes and court rules, which we review de
novo. People v Lee, 489 Mich 289, 295; 803 NW2d 165 (2011). Courts interpret statutes and
court rules in the same manner. People v Traver, 502 Mich 23, 31; 917 NW2d 260 (2018).

       [T]he primary goal when interpreting a statute is to ascertain and facilitate the intent
       of the Legislature. Under the rules of statutory construction, the Legislature is
       presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. Where the language
       of a statute is clear, there is no need for interpretation and courts must apply the
       statute as written. [People v Roseburgh, 215 Mich App 237, 239; 545 NW2d 14
       (1996) (citations omitted).]

                                    B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

       “In Michigan, a court cannot impose penalties or costs in a criminal case unless specifically
authorized by statute.” In re Killich, 319 Mich App 331, 336; 900 NW2d 692 (2017). MCL 769.1k

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allows the trial court to impose fines, costs, and assessments at sentencing. Under MCL 769.1k(2),
“the court may order the defendant to pay any additional costs incurred in compelling the
defendant’s appearance.” The issue in this case is whether MCL 769.1k(2) permits the trial court’s
imposition of fees related to defendant’s GPS tether.

        A GPS tether device is a tool used by courts to remotely surveil defendants. See People v
Britt, 202 Mich App 714, 717; 509 NW2d 914 (1993). Given this capability, a tether may also
secure a criminal defendant’s appearance at later court hearings. Because it is a device that can be
used to compel a defendant’s appearance, requiring a defendant to bear the cost of a GPS tether is
statutorily permissible under MCL 769.1k(2). That said, there must also be evidence
demonstrating that the GPS tether was imposed for the purpose of securing a defendant’s
appearance.

        In determining whether defendant was entitled to bond, the trial court stated: “[B]ond must
be sufficient to guarantee the appearance of the defendant . . . .” It went on to order the GPS tether
and the cost associated with it. Given this context, there were sufficient facts demonstrating the
GPS tether was to secure defendant’s appearance at later court hearings, and the trial court did not
err when it imposed this fee at defendant’s resentencing. Thus, there is nothing patently erroneous
with the trial court’s imposition of tether-related fees in defendant’s sentence.

        At any rate, the trial court failed to state on the record its intention to impose fees related
to defendant’s tether. “At sentencing, the court must, on the record . . . state the sentence being
imposed . . . .” MCR 6.425(D)(1)(d). The trial court plainly erred when it did not state on the
record that it was imposing $615 related to defendant’s tether fees.

         The question then is whether this error warrants our reversal. Again, reversal is only
warranted when the error results in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant, or where the
error “affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Carines, 460
Mich at 763-764. This error did not result in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant.
Similarly, it did not affect “the fairness, integrity or public reputation” of the proceedings. Id. The
$615 tether fee was discussed at length at the resentencing hearing and defendant admitted to
owing the fee. Further, defendant promised to pay the fee, and promptly paid it the following day.
Because defendant acknowledged—and satisfied—her obligation to pay these fees, the trial court’s
failure to state on the record its imposition of tether fees is not a reversible error.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                                                               /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                               /s/ Sima G. Patel

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