Court Opinion

ID: 9685174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:25:22.753793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:03.028467
License: Public Domain

PAULSON, Justice
(concurring and dissenting).
I agree with the majority opinion by which it affirmed the district court on Issues 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
However, I disagree with the majority opinion with reference to the majority’s reasoning and conclusion on Issue No. 1, which is set forth as follows:
“1. Whether the court erred in refusing defendant’s motion to dismiss the prosecution for the reason that a hearing for revocation of probation on a prior offense was held before the trial in the present ease, and was based on the same facts for which he was prosecuted in the present case, thereby forcing the defendant to waive his constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination at the subsequent criminal trial if he testified in the probation-revocation hearing.”
There are three cogent reasons for disagreeing with the majority. First, this court in a prior decision, State v. Hass, 264 N.W.2d 464 (N.D.1978), held that even though Hass was faced with a difficult strategy decision of whether to answer the charges against him by use of his own testimony or whether to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege at the risk that the State would thereby have sufficient evidence to sustain its burden of persuasion, the fact that Hass was required to make such a choice, regardless of how difficult, did not render his testimony unconstitutionally “compelled” by the State. “It is not contended, nor could it be successfully, that the mere force of evidence is compulsion of the sort forbidden by the [Fifth Amendment] privilege.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971) [cited in State v. Hass, supra 264 N.W.2d at 471].
The majority opinion then unequivocally states that the same criminal act should rarely be used as the basis for both an independent prosecution for a substantive crime and as a basis for revoking probation or parole or sentencing of a defendant who has been granted a deferred imposition of sentence. The majority further makes the categorical statement that the pursuit of both procedures would unnecessarily create a constitutional tension between the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at the first hearing and the danger that defendant’s testimony at the first hearing may be used to convict or revoke a deferred imposition of sentence, as the ease may be, thus raising the issue of fairness and procedural due process.
In State v. Hass, supra 264 N.W.2d at 471, we adopted the rationale of McGautha v. California, supra, 402 U.S. at 213, 91 S.Ct. 1454, in which the United States Supreme Court stated:
“ ‘The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring “the making of difficult judgments” as to which course to follow. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. [759] at 769, 90 S.Ct. [1441] at 1448, [25 L.Ed.2d 763]. Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose. The threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.’
and the North Dakota Supreme Court held in Hass, supra 264 N.W.2d at 472:
“In the instant case, Hass’ difficult decision of whether or not to testify at the probation revocation hearing is essentially the same type of decision that defendant was required to make in McGautha, supra. The circumstances required Hass to make a difficult decision, but neither his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination nor his due process right to testify was violated thereby.”
The decision in State v. Hass, 264 N.W.2d 464 (N.D.1978), was unanimous; yet less than three months have elapsed since that *466decision and the majority, without any valid reason, is in effect abortively attempting to reverse such decision.
Secondly, the majority by its decision virtually eliminates the provisions of § 12-53-13, N.D.C.C. The trial courts will no longer be of the opinion that they may continue to use § 12-53-13, N.D.C.C., as a viable aid in determining the future of defendants who appear before them, especially when considering the impact of the majority opinion as to future disposition of criminal cases.
Thirdly, the decision will remove and eliminate the prosecutorial discretion in future proceedings against those individuals who violate the criminal laws of our State. The decision as enunciated by the majority will seriously hamper the prosecutory and judicial processes, and will deprive the law enforcement officials, the judges, the defendants, and the public of their respective roles in seeing that justice is still flexible.
The majority opinion has indicated that the trial judge’s statement at the time of sentencing was based upon impermissible factors. State v. Rudolph, 260 N.W.2d 13 (N.D.1977); State v. Smith, 238 N.W.2d 662 (N.D.1976). The cases cited by the majority are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. A perusal of the judge’s remarks conveys an entirely different interpretation than the one adopted by the majority. The judge indicated only that Hass had been placed on probation after the first conviction and that the judge was not going to place the defendant on probation again after his commission and conviction of a second crime. A review of the court’s remarks does not imply that Hass jeopardized his position by going to trial. No one can doubt the impartiality and fairness of the trial court in the instant case. As stated by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Chief Justice Warren E. Burger who joined in the dissent, in United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 452, 92 S.Ct. 589, 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972):
“On remand the case presumably will go once again to Judge Harris, and undoubtedly the same sentence once again will be imposed. Perhaps this is all worthwhile and, if so, I must be content with the Court’s disposition of the case on general principles. I entertain more than a mild suspicion, however, that this is an exercise in futility, that the Court is merely marching up the hill only to march right down again, and that it is time we become just a little realistic in the face of a record such as this one.”
I would affirm the judgment of conviction of the district court and its sentencing of the defendant.