Court Opinion

ID: 9765439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:02:49.943614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.843744
License: Public Domain

*95SPAETH, President Judge,
dissenting:
I am unable to agree with the majority that a three year-old’s act of placing an automobile in motion constitutes a “use” of the automobile by the child for which coverage is available under the automobile insurance policy. Rather, I am persuaded by the reasoning of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. O’Brien, 380 F.Supp. 1279 (D.Minn.1974), and Assurance Company of America v. Bell, 108 Ga.App. 766, 134 S.E.2d 540 (1963). In declining to follow these cases, the majority, it seems to me, has violated the principles of interpretation it cites: it has not given “use” its “ordinary meaning,” and it has “ ‘torture[d]’ the language to create an ambiguity where none exists.” Majority at 84-85. The FTC cases cited by the majority, id. at 85 et seq., are inapplicable, I suggest. We are construing an insurance policy, not an advertisement. If we apply the FTC cases, however, and ask, as the majority does, “[Wjhat was the intended impression created by the insurer[?],” id. at 86-87, still, the answer seems to me to be, “Not to cover what occurred here.”
I am also unable to agree with the majority regarding the homeowner’s policy. In my view, the policy does provide coverage. The exclusion quoted by the majority, see its op. at 81, does not apply for the same reason that the automobile insurance policy does not provide coverage: A three year-old cannot “use” an automobile. No argument having been made that any other exclusion applies, the conclusion follows that coverage is available. Since the exclusion does not apply, I do not reach the issue of negligent entrustment.
The order of the trial court should be reversed and an order entered requiring appellee, as the carrier on the homeowner’s policy, to provide coverage.