Court Opinion

ID: 9799568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 07:17:35.480312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:57.147143
License: Public Domain

CROTHERS, Justice,
specially concurring.
[¶ 41] I agree with the majority decision concluding exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless search of Kuruc and Larson’s hotel room. I also concur in affirming this case under the independent source doctrine. But I am concerned that our doing so will mistakenly be read as a new, lower, minimal standard for information supporting issuance of a warrant.
[¶ 42] The majority explains the legal standard for reliance on the independent source doctrine. Majority ■ opinion at ¶¶ 17-18. I fully embrace the analysis of the second prong of the doctrine that the search warrant must not be prompted by information or observations made during an illegal search. My reservation is with the application of the first part of the analysis concluding sufficient information existed for the warrant.
[¶ 43] This Court has explained that conclusory statements are not sufficient to support issuance of a search warrant. “ ‘[Sufficient information, rather than “bare bones” information must be presented to the magistrate’; ‘[a]n affidavit expressed in conclusions without detailing underlying information is insufficient for probable cause.’ ” State v. Thieling, 2000 ND 106, ¶ 11, 611 N.W.2d 861 (quoting State v. Rangeloff, 1998 ND 135, ¶ 19, 580 N.W.2d 593).
[¶ 44] At the same time, in the context of smelling marijuana and officer training and experience, we have stated:
“The mere smell of marijuana, as detected by a trained and experienced officer, has been held by this Court to create a sufficient factual basis upon which to establish probable cause. See, e.g., [State v.] Overby, [1999 ND 47, ¶ 13, 590 N.W.2d 703]. (‘[T]he officer was well-trained in identifying the odor of marijuana. Under Binns and the particular facts of this case, we conclude Officer Nagel had probable cause to arrest Overby....’); State v. Binns, 194 N.W.2d 756, 758 (N.D.1972) (‘We believe, in this case, that the circumstances justified a warrantless search of the automobile, since the odor of burning mari*326juana which the officer recognized, and which he knew was coming from the automobile, gave him probable cause to believe that a felony was being committed.’).”
State v. Sehmalz, 2008 ND 27, ¶ 20, 744 N.W.2d 734.
[¶ 45] In this case, the search warrant affidavit indicated that the entire useful independent basis for issuance of the search warrant was:
“On 01/09/2013, the Cass County Sheriffs Office received a complaint from staff at the Day’s Inn hotel in Casselton for an odor of marijuana. Upon arrival Deputy Eric Swenson and Deputy Tonya Grabinger were able to smell what they know through their training and experience as a police officer to be the odor of marijuana coming from Room 104. Room 104 is currently being rented by Brian Alan Kurec [sic].”
Majority opinion at ¶ 19. The affidavit, also stated that “there was an overpowering odor of what Deputy Grabinger knows through Deputy Grabinger’s training and experience as a police officer to be the odor of marijuana.” Id. at ¶ 20. However, this observation was made after the Deputy unlawfully entered the room and cannot be used in application of the independent source doctrine. Id.
[¶ 46] The search warrant affidavit was presented to the magistrate by a detective in Fargo who had not been in the Cassel-ton motel. The detective’s affidavit reads in the third-person voice that “their training and experience” provides probable cause for issuance of a warrant. The affi-ant spoke in the third-person voice because he had not smelled burning marijuana. The affiant-detective in Fargo uses more than three paragraphs in describing his training and experience. But his training and experience are irrelevant to the question whether deputies on the scene could identify what they smelled. To that point, the affidavit contains no information about any training and experience of the two deputies who were actually at the motel. The magistrate therefore was provided with nothing concerning the two deputies’ training and experience or their ability to identify the smell.
[¶ 47] Under our case law, the lack of explanation of the deputies’ training and experience arguably is not fatal to validity of this warrant because a licensed peace officer might be reasonably presumed to be able to identify the smell of burned marijuana. To that extent, identification of the smell might be a foundational or predicate fact requiring less detail.
[¶ 48] In the broader context, I caution against reading this decision to represent the rule that bare statements of officer “training and experience” can serve as proxy for factual details. See State v. Deviley, 2011 ND 182, ¶27, 803 N.W.2d 561 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he phrase ‘officer’s training and experience’ should not be used to mask what was operating in this case — the officer simply had a strong hunch that these individuals, driving a vehicle with an out-of-state license, were engaged in criminal activity. We have to be mindful not to let ‘officer’s training and experience’ become a substitute for a showing of a true reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity.”). Rather, I join this decision based on the understanding that we are preserving the requirement that search warrant affidavits must contain more than bare-boned assertions or conclusory factual statements, at least as to the ultimate basis constituting probable cause for issuance of a warrant.
[¶ 49] DANIEL J. CROTHERS