Court Opinion

ID: 9939694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 15:10:23.342287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:49.863454
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-14

                         IRENE TABACHNIK & another1

                                       vs.

     CT INSTALL AMERICA, LLC2; FRANCIS M. PANACHELLI & another,3
                       third-party defendants.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       In March 2018, the plaintiffs, Irene and Paul Tabachnik,

 hired the defendant, CT Install America, LLC (CT Install), to

 install new windows and sliding glass doors in their home.                The

 project did not go well.        Six months later, in September 2018,

 the Tabachniks filed this lawsuit alleging breach of contract,

 negligence, and violations of G. L. c. 93A.            CT Install then

 brought a third-party complaint for, among other things,

 indemnification and contribution, against the subcontractor,

 Gerald Nolette, who CT Install had hired to do the work at the

 1 Paul Tabachnik.
 2 Doing business as Install America.
 3 Jerry Nolette doing business as Nolette Construction.  As is
 our custom, we use the spelling that appears on the complaint.
Tabachniks' house.4     Following a jury-waived trial, a Superior

Court judge found in favor of the Tabachniks on all their

claims, and in favor of Nolette on CT Install's third-party

claims.     CT Install appeals.

        Background.   We recite the facts, taken from the evidence

at trial, as follows.      The Tabachniks purchased their home in

2016.     The house was built in the 1950s and the Tabachniks

planned to renovate the house in stages.      To this end, on March

3, 2018, the Tabachniks entered into a contract with CT Install

for the purchase and installation of new windows and patio

doors.     The cost of the project was $16,000.   The Tabachniks

paid a deposit of $5,000, with the remainder due on completion

of the work.     With respect to the Tabachniks' den, the plan was

for CT Install to replace the existing windows with longer

windows.     Although the Tabachniks believed that employees of CT

Install would perform the work, CT Install hired Nolette, a

local contractor, for the project.      Soon after the project

began, the Tabachniks learned that the den wall was slanted due

to preexisting structural issues, and consequently, the new

windows could not be properly installed.

4 CT Install also brought counterclaims against the Tabachniks
and additional third-party claims against Francis M. Panachelli,
another subcontractor that had measured the windows. These
claims have been dismissed, and no issues are raised as to them
on appeal.

                                    2
     On May 23, 2018, Irene Tabachnik contacted CT Install,

expressed her concern that the longer windows would not be

appropriate due to the slant, and suggested that they instead

replace the windows with ones that would fit the current

openings.   A representative from CT Install came out to the

Tabachniks' home and told Irene that CT Install could fix the

slant in the den wall and install the longer windows.   The

Tabachniks agreed to proceed with the project, which now

included the additional work of fixing the den wall and the

removal of a stone floor in the den.

     After improperly installing some windows, which were not

the same ones as the Tabachniks had originally ordered,5 and

having subcontractors begin demolition work to fix the slant,

which ultimately also involved the Tabachniks paying Nolette an

additional $2,000 to demolish the den floor they wanted to keep,

CT Install concluded that the structural issues were too

extensive to fix and abandoned the project.6

5 The contract called for the installation of new construction
"677" windows. However, CT Install delivered a lesser grade of
windows referred to as "177" windows.
6 There were also problems with the building permits and

workmanship. On August 22, 2018, the town's building inspector,
Walter Avallone, conducted a site visit. He testified that he
saw work that did not fall within the purview of the building
permit for window replacement and that the windows that were
installed were not done so properly. In addition, the windows
did not have stickers on them, so Avallone could not verify
whether they met the applicable energy code. As a result of his
observations, Avallone rescinded the building permit. He

                                 3
     In September 2019, the Tabachniks hired a new contractor to

fix the problems.     They asserted that they had incurred damages

in the following amounts:     $50,000 paid to the new contractor;

$15,000 to replace a beam that CT Install had removed during the

demolition; the $5,000 deposit paid to CT Install; the $2,000 to

demolish the den floor; another $1,100 to rebuild the den floor;

and $2,750 for an architect.

     The case proceeded to trial before a judge of the Superior

Court on August 22, 2022.     On the first day of trial, the

parties filed a joint waiver of detailed findings of fact and

rulings of law, and, at the conclusion of the trial, the parties

submitted agreed on special questions for the judge to answer as

the finder of fact.     In response to those questions, the judge

found that for each of the Tabachniks' claims, they suffered

damages in the amount of $76,650.      Specifically, with respect to

the breach of contract claim, the judge answered "yes" to the

following two questions:     (1) "Did the parties orally amend the

contract, Ex.1, to reframe the slanted wall in the den after the

discovery of the slanted wall?;" and (2) "Are the damages

incurred by the Plaintiffs to structurally repair the den,

consequential damages which the Plaintiffs are entitled to?"

The judge then doubled the damages after finding that the

testified that the "work was in violation of code.     It was
inferior. It wasn't workmanlike installed."

                                   4
defendant's conduct was a willful or knowing violation of c.

93A.   An amended judgment entered for $153,300, plus attorney's

fees, costs, and prejudgment interest.

       Discussion.   a.   Breach of contract claim.   CT Install

argues that the judge erred in finding that there was a valid

oral modification of the parties' contract requiring CT Install

to reframe the slanted wall because the modification was not

supported by proper consideration.7     This argument ignores the

$2,000 payment made by the Tabachniks to Nolette to demolish the

den floor, which CT Install maintained had to be done in order

to fix the wall, and the demolishment of the floor itself, which

the Tabachniks wanted to keep.      Thus, while it is true, as CT

Install states, that the Tabachniks were not required to pay

additional money to CT Install to fix the den wall, the oral

modification was supported by adequate -– valuable --

consideration.    See A.L. Prime Energy Consultant, Inc. v.

Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 479 Mass. 419, 433 (2018).

       b.   Negligence claim.   CT Install next argues that the

Tabachniks' claim of negligence fails as a matter of law under

7 Relying on Sharon v. Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 102 (2002), the
Tabachniks argue that this argument is waived because CT Install
did not specifically raise lack of consideration as an
affirmative defense. Given our conclusion that the oral
modification was enforceable because it was supported by
consideration, we need not address this argument.

                                    5
the economic loss doctrine and for lack of causation.8   Neither

argument provides a basis for reversing the judgment.

     The economic loss doctrine (also known as the economic loss

rule) "establishes limitations on damages a plaintiff may plead

and recover in a negligence action.   It ensures that, '[i]n the

absence of personal injury or physical damage to property

[beyond the defective product itself], the negligent supplier of

a defective product is not ordinarily liable in tort for simple

economic loss.'"   Wyman v. Ayer Props., LLC, 469 Mass. 64, 69

(2014), quoting Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252, 267 (2002).

"Essentially, where the negligent design or construction of a

product leads to damage only to the product itself, the recovery

for economic loss is in contract, and the economic loss rule

bars recovery in tort."   Wyman, supra.   According to CT Install,

the economic loss doctrine bars recovery here because "there was

no evidence that . . . the installation of the windows performed

by Install led to any property damage to the structure, required

the rebuilding of the den or sunroom, or caused any other

damage."   The flaw in this argument is that it ignores the

8 The Tabachniks argue that CT Install failed to plead, and
thereby waived, the economic loss rule as an affirmative
defense. CT Install did not plead application of the rule as an
affirmative defense but did raise it in connection with its
motion for a directed verdict. There was no objection, and
therefore we do not deem the defense waived. See Wyman v. Ayer
Props., LLC, 469 Mass. 64, 69 n.13 (2014).

                                 6
evidence establishing that the installation of improperly-sized

windows was the reason for which the den wall needed repair and

the floor had to be demolished.   In other words, there was

physical damage to more than the product (the windows) itself.

Accordingly, the doctrine does not bar recovery here.

     CT Install's claim that there was no evidence of a causal

connection between its actions and the injury at issue suffers

from the same flaw described above; it ignores the evidence.

Although it is undisputed that structural issues including a

slant in the wall of the den existed before CT Install began the

project, the evidence established that CT Install caused the

harm complained of by attempting to install longer windows when

it was evident that it was not feasible to do so and attempting

to repair the slanted wall rather than reorder smaller windows

that would fit the existing spaces, thereby causing some parts

of the Tabachniks' home to be demolished.    Accordingly, the

evidence fully supports the judge's conclusion that the

additional repairs flowed directly from CT Install's negligence,

and that negligence was the proximate cause of the damages at

issue.    In sum, "but for" CT Install's negligence, the

Tabachniks would not have been forced to repair the preexisting

structural defects.

     c.   Chapter 93A.   CT Install argues that the judge

improperly found that its conduct violated c. 93A for two

                                  7
reasons.   First, CT Install claims that the parties' contract

required the application of Pennsylvania law and, therefore, the

Tabachniks cannot avail themselves of the protections c. 93A

affords to consumers in Massachusetts.   The judge properly

rejected this argument, observing that despite the choice of law

provision in the contract, the application of Pennsylvania law

"would be contrary to a fundamental policy" of Massachusetts

"which has a materially greater interest" in home renovations

done in Massachusetts than does Pennsylvania.    The judge further

noted that an application of Pennsylvania law would unfairly

deprive the Tabachniks of the protections of their home state's

consumer protection laws and concluded that Massachusetts law

applies in the circumstances of this case.   We agree with the

judge's analysis and conclusion in all respects.     See generally

Hodas v. Morin, 442 Mass. 544, 550 (2004).

     Second, CT Install argues that even if Massachusetts law

applies, there was no violation of c. 93A because, at best, all

that occurred was a "mere" breach of contract.     This argument

also was properly rejected by the judge, who, in denying CT

Install's motion for a directed verdict, noted that there was

sufficient evidence of a violation of c. 93A, "particularly

through violation of [G. L. c.] 142A," which addresses

prohibited acts by contractors and subcontractors.     See

Klairmont v. Gainsboro Restaurant, Inc., 465 Mass. 165, 173-176

                                 8
(2013).   Moreover, that the judge was not more specific

regarding which provisions of c. 142A were violated is

inconsequential given that CT Install waived its right to

detailed findings of fact and rulings of law at the start of the

trial.

     Next, CT Install asserts that the judge had no basis for

concluding that its conduct was willful or knowing and therefore

the judge erred in doubling the damages.   In support of this

argument, CT Install asserts there was no causal connection

between the alleged unfair or deceptive acts or practices and

the damages incurred in connection with fixing the preexisting

structural issues.   Again, CT Install ignores evidence that

demonstrates it acted willfully and knowingly when it installed

windows that were not properly sized for the existing openings,

violated the town's building code, and agreed to fix the slanted

wall in the den and then abandoned the project.

     Lastly, we turn to CT Install's argument that the

attorney's fees awarded to the Tabachniks under c. 93A were

excessive because the judge failed to reduce the amount of fees

requested for legal work that was separate and apart from the

c. 93A claim.   We review the judge's award of attorney's fees

for an abuse of discretion.   See Castricone v. Mical, 74 Mass.

App. Ct. 591, 603 (2009).

                                 9
     We acknowledge that the judge awarded the full amount of

attorney's fees requested by the Tabachniks and did not make

detailed findings indicating how and why he made the award.9

However, in his order allowing the Tabachniks' motion for

attorney's fees, the judge made clear that he had considered the

nature of the case and the issues presented, and was guided by

the "lodestar method" as set forth in Berman v. Linnane, 434

Mass. 301, 303 (2001), in reaching his conclusion that the

amount of fees requested was "reasonable for the necessary

services rendered . . . in preparation and presentation of this

case."   Furthermore, we agree with the Tabachniks that the

c. 93A claim was intertwined with the breach of contract and

negligence claims.   When the "same primary conduct or chain of

events" give rise to both the common law claims and the c. 93A

claim, a trial judge "may treat the entire work as an

indivisible contribution to the c. 93A accomplishment."

Castricone, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 604.   Here, the judge, who was

familiar with the case, was in the best position to determine

whether any reductions in the fee award were necessary.   His

conclusion that no deductions were warranted was not an abuse of

discretion.

9 The judge did not award the full amount of costs that were
requested.

                                10
     d.   Calculation of damages.      CT Install correctly notes

that there is a minor discrepancy in the calculation of damages.

The $50,000 spent on the den, $15,000 to replace the beam,

$5,000 deposit paid to CT Install, $2,000 to demolish the den

floor, $1,100 to rebuild the den floor, and $2,750 for an

architect equal $75,850, not $76,650 as the judge concluded.

This amounts to a difference of $800.

     Contrary to the Tabachniks' assertion that the defendant

waived this issue, a mathematical error of this type is

appropriately raised on appeal.     See EventMonitor, Inc. v.

Leness, 473 Mass. 540, 552 (2016).      Because the uncontroverted

evidence established damages in the amount of $75,850, which the

judge then doubled pursuant to c. 93A, the defendant is entitled

to the entry of a judgment in the amount of $151,700, to reflect

the $1600 discrepancy.10

     CT Install also claims that the award of damages should

have been reduced by $11,000, which represents the balance owed

on the original contract.   Given the circumstances of CT

Install's breach, including the fact that the windows in the

10The Tabachniks maintain that $400 of the $800 is attributable
to the cost of disposing of the windows that had been improperly
installed before CT Install left the project. However, the $400
was not included in the calculation of damages provided by the
Tabachniks' attorney at trial. As noted above, the amount
specified was $75,850.

                                  11
kitchen and the sliding glass door were never installed, we

discern no basis for this claim.

     We are similarly unpersuaded by CT Install's argument that

the award of damages should be reduced by the amount the

Tabachniks spent to fix the preexisting structural issues.      As

discussed previously, CT Install caused the harm by, among other

things, their negligent assessment of the situation.    Based on

the evidence presented at trial, the judge had a proper basis

for concluding that all the damages flowed from CT Install's

conduct and that CT Install was therefore liable for all the

expenses incurred to fix the structural issues.

     e.   CT Install's claim for indemnification.   The final

issue on appeal concerns CT Install's claim for indemnification.

CT Install argues that the indemnification clause in its

contract with Nolette is "unambiguous and clear" and the judge

erred in finding that Nolette had no duty to indemnify it.      This

argument ignores the well-settled principle that when a

subcontractor agrees to indemnify a general contractor, for the

subcontractor to be liable, there must be a causal connection

between the subcontractor's work and the injury.    See M.

Dematteo Constr. Co. v. A.C. Dellovade, Inc., 39 Mass. App. Ct.

1, 3 (1995).   See also G. L. c. 149, § 29C, on which the judge

relied in determining that the indemnity clause was not

                                12
enforceable.11   There was no evidence that Nolette caused the

injury which led to this lawsuit.      To the contrary, based on the

evidence presented at trial, which established that CT Install

improperly measured the windows, delivered windows that were not

the same ones the Tabachniks had intended to purchase, failed to

obtain the necessary building permits, and told Nolette not to

return to the jobsite, we discern no error in the verdict in

favor of Nolette.

     f.   Appellate attorney's fees.    The Tabachniks have

requested an award of their appellate attorney's fees.        They are

entitled to those fees for the appeal of the c. 93A claim.       The

Tabachniks may, within fourteen days of the issuance of the

rescript in this case, submit a detailed and supported

submission of the fees sought, in accordance with the procedures

set forth in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 11 (2004).      CT

Install will have fourteen days thereafter to file a response.

     Conclusion.    In all respects other than the damages award,

the amended judgment is affirmed.      The damages award is vacated

as to the amount of damages awarded to the Tabachniks.     The case

11General Laws c. 149, § 29C, provides in relevant part as
follows: "Any provision for or in connection with a contract
for construction, reconstruction, installation, alteration,
remodeling, repair, demolition or maintenance work, . . . which
requires a subcontractor to indemnify any party for injury to
persons or damage to property not caused by the subcontractor or
its employees, agents or subcontractors, shall be void."

                                 13
is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a new damages

award of $151,700.

                                       So ordered.

                                       By the Court (Vuono, Meade &
                                         Walsh, JJ.12),

                                       Assistant Clerk

Entered:    February 12, 2024.

12   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  14