Court Opinion

ID: 9914966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 20:04:07.540628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:46.082351
License: Public Domain

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                                                         Electronically Filed
                                                         Supreme Court
                                                         SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                         03-JAN-2024
                                                         09:20 AM
                                                         Dkt. 11 OP

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

                              ---o0o---

                        STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
                 Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                 vs.

                        DYLAN RIVER JAMES,
                  Respondent/Defendant-Appellee.

                          SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

         CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
           (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 5CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

                          JANUARY 3, 2024

          RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, AND EDDINS, JJ.,
      AND CIRCUIT JUDGE CATALDO AND CIRCUIT JUDGE MALINAO,
                 ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCIES

               OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.

                         I.    Introduction

    The State of Hawai‘i (“the State”) appeals a pretrial

suppression order of the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit
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(“circuit court”).        The circuit court1 suppressed text message

evidence in the sexual assault prosecution of defendant Dylan

River James (“James”).        During an interview of the complaining

witness (“CW”), police detectives directed her to contact James

to discuss the incident.         CW tried to call James while with the

officers, but James did not pick up.           CW later texted James, who

responded; James apparently made admissions during the text

conversation with CW.

        The circuit court granted James’s motion to suppress the

text messages, reasoning (1) CW was acting as a government agent

when she texted James; therefore (2)(a) James’s rights against

self-incrimination under the federal and Hawaiʻi constitutions

were violated because no Miranda warnings were given; and

(b) James’s rights to counsel under the federal and Hawaiʻi

constitutions were violated because he was not advised of his

right to counsel.       The circuit court also denied the State’s

motion for reconsideration.

        The State appealed and the ICA affirmed.         State v. James,

No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2023 WL 3017974 (Haw. App. Apr. 20, 2023)

(SDO).      The ICA held that pursuant to the bright-line rule of

State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘i 107, 34 P.3d 1006 (2001), Miranda

warnings were required before James was “interrogated” because
1       The Honorable Randal G.B. Valenciano presided.

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probable cause existed at the time CW texted James.      James, 2023

WL 3017974, at *6 (citing State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i 33, 36,

526 P.3d 558, 561 (2023)).     The ICA did not address the right to

counsel issue.   2023 WL 3017974, at *1 n.4.    The ICA also held

it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the circuit court’s denial

of the State’s motion for reconsideration.     2023 WL 3017974, at

*1 n.1.

     The circuit court and ICA erred.     Under the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of

the Hawaiʻi Constitution, Miranda warnings are only required for

“custodial” interrogations.    Although CW was acting as a

government agent, James was not “in custody” when there was no

stop or detention or other deprivation of his freedom of action

by law enforcement.

     Therefore, there was no custodial interrogation requiring

Miranda warnings and advisement of a right to counsel.      The

circuit court also erred by suppressing the texts based on

James’s Sixth Amendment and Hawaiʻi Constitution article I,

section 14 right to counsel.     At the time of the text exchange,

adversarial judicial criminal proceedings had yet to be

initiated against James.     Therefore, his right to counsel had

not attached.

     We also hold that the ICA erred by concluding it did not

have appellate jurisdiction over the circuit court’s order

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denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.      The State’s

right to appeal from an order granting a defendant’s motion to

suppress under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 641-13(7)

(2016) “encompasses a right” to appeal from a related order

denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.      See State v.

Bohannon, 102 Hawaiʻi 228, 234, 74 P.3d 980, 986 (2003).

     Hence, we vacate the ICA’s May 31, 2023 judgment on appeal

as well as the circuit court’s March 28, 2022 findings of fact,

conclusions of law and order granting motion to suppress text

messages (“FOF/COL/Order”) and April 4, 2022 order denying the

State’s motion for reconsideration.    We remand to the circuit

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                          II.   Background

A.   Factual background

     On July 2, 2015, James allegedly sexually assaulted CW.

Later that day, Kaua‘i Police Department detectives Ray M.

Takekawa (“Detective Takekawa”) and Darren Rose (“Detective

Rose”) (together, “the detectives”) interviewed CW.

     At the end of the interview, the detectives directed CW to

contact James to discuss the alleged sexual assault.      CW was

recorded saying to the detectives, “Wait.     So, like, first I

should just, like, get him to admit that we, like, had sex and

then after that be like, well, I was like –”     CW then tried to

call James, but he did not pick up.    CW asked the detectives,

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“Do I leave a message?”         Detective Takekawa responded, “You want

to try a text?” and Detective Rose said, “Give it a few minutes,

about five minutes, and we’ll try one more time.”              CW tried to

call James a second time but he did not pick up.

        CW then texted James.      James responded with various texts

to CW about the incident.         Among other things, he apparently

admitted they had sex and that it was “rough.”2

B.      Grand jury proceedings

        CW testified about the above events to a grand jury.

On March 11, 2020, the grand jury returned an indictment

charging James with five counts of sexual assault in the first

degree in violation of HRS § 707-730(1)(a) (2014).3

2     CW texted James that she was “thinking about the other night.” During
the course of their text conversation, James stated, “I do remember it being
very rough.” When CW later texted, “You really don’t take no for an answer,”
James responded,

              Woah! I couldn[’]t tell if you were being serious or no[t]
              to be honest . . . Thought it was some kind of ‘role
              playin[g’] or something? Sorry about that, [I] was a
              li[ttle] confused about that as well . . . .

              . . . .

              When you were screaming and crawling away by the lifeguard
              tower . . . Couldn[’]t tell if you were serious or w[h]at
              was goin[g on]. I was pretty confused . . . And sorry to
              put you in that situation, [it] wasn[’]t my intention at
              the time[.]

3     HRS § 707-730(1)(a) provided: “(1) A person commits the offense of
sexual assault in the first degree if: (a) The person knowingly subjects
another person to an act of sexual penetration by strong compulsion[.]”

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C.   Circuit court proceedings

     1.   Motion to suppress text messages

     On December 21, 2021, James filed a motion to suppress the

text messages between James and CW (“motion to suppress”).

Defense counsel initially argued the texts should be suppressed

because the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and

article I, section 7 of the Hawai‘i Constitution ensure an

“individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy will not be

subjected to unreasonable governmental intrusions.”

     Citing State v. Kahoonei, 83 Hawai‘i 124, 925 P.2d 294

(1996), James argued that, under the totality of the

circumstances, CW was acting as a government agent at the time

she texted James.   James characterized CW’s texts as “pretext

calls.”   “Pretext calls” are calls “made by a witness at the

direction of the police to a suspect or somebody else involved

in the investigation.   The investigators tape-record the

telephone conversation and instruct the witness on what to say.

The detectives use pretext calls to gather evidence and/or

incriminating statements.”    People v. Wahlert, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d

603, 614 (Ct. App. 4th Div. 2005) (cleaned up).      James cited the

Montana Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Stewart, 291 P.3d

1187, 1198 (Mont. 2012).   According to James, Stewart held

“‘pretext calls’ made by the complainant to the defendant at the

direction of a detective had violated the defendant’s right to

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privacy under the Montana constitution” because they constituted

state action.4

        2.    Hearing on and oral order granting James’s motion to
              suppress

        At the February 24, 2022 hearing on the motion to suppress,

the circuit court cited Kahoonei, which held that whether a

private individual was acting as a government agent when

effectuating a search is to be analyzed under a “totality of

circumstances.”      83 Hawaiʻi at 131-32, 925 P.2d at 301-02

(holding a defendant’s mother was a government agent when she

retrieved a firearm and ammunition from her son’s bedroom in an

officer’s presence after an officer told her a search warrant

could be obtained and a search would inevitably occur).             The

circuit court concluded CW was acting as a government agent, and

orally granted James’s motion to suppress.

4     As noted in Stewart, the Montana Supreme Court had held in State v.
Allen, 241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010), that a defendant has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a cellular telephone conversation with a
confidential police informant, and that the warrantless recordation of the
conversation violated defendant’s Montana constitutional right to privacy.
Stewart, 291 P.3d at 1195. In other words, Montana, along with 14 other
states, requires consent of all parties to a conversation for a warrantless
recordation. See, e.g., Stewart, 291 P.3d at 1195. In contrast, Hawaiʻi is
one of 36 states that does not require a search warrant when one party to a
face-to-face or telephonic conversation consents to recordation. See, e.g.,
State v. Graham, 70 Haw. 627, 780 P.2d 1103 (1989) (holding the recording of
a private conversation with the consent or cooperation of a participant is
not subject to constitutional regulation). See generally Recording Phone
Calls and Conversations: 50-State Survey, JUSTIA (Jan. 2018),
https://www.justia.com/50-state-surveys/recording-phone-calls-and-
conversations/ [https://perma.cc/529D-8XGR].

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    3.    Order granting James’s motion to suppress

    On March 28, 2022, the circuit court issued its

FOF/COL/Order.

    The circuit court’s conclusions of law (“COLs”) were that:

                3.    Under the totality of the circumstances, the
          governmental involvement in this case was significant and
          extensive enough to render CW an instrumentality of the
          State, i.e. a government agent, when she called and texted
          [James]. Kahoonei, 83 Hawai‘i at 132, 925 P.3d at 302. . .
          .

                4.    At the point when CW called and texted [James],
          he was the only suspect and the investigation had focused
          on him. If the detectives had sought to question [James]
          at that point they would have been required to advise him
          of his rights, including his right to remain silent and his
          right to an attorney, and obtain a waiver of those right[s]
          prior to proceeding with the questioning. Miranda v.
          Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 . . . (1966); State v. Santiago, 53
          Haw. 254, 266, 492 P.2d 657, 665 (1971).

                5.    As CW was acting as a government agent when she
          called and texted [James], the actions of the detectives
          violated James[’s] right to an attorney under the [S]ixth
          [A]mendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section
          14 of the Hawai‘i Constitution and [James’s] right to remain
          silent under the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 10.

    Thus, although the circuit court relied on Kahoonei, which

was a Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 warrantless

search case, the circuit court based its suppression ruling on

alleged violations of James’s Fifth Amendment and article I,

section 10 right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment

and article I, section 14 right to counsel.

    4.    The State’s motion for reconsideration

    On February 28, 2022, the State had filed a motion to

reconsider the circuit court’s oral ruling (“motion for

reconsideration”).    The State argued that even if CW was acting

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as a State agent, the content of the text messages was

admissible.   It argued James had no reasonable expectation of

privacy in his text message exchange with CW, even if she was

acting as a State agent, so the text messages should not have

been suppressed.

    The State pointed out that in Graham, 70 Haw. 627, 780 P.2d

1103, this court held a recorded private conversation with the

consent of one party (otherwise known as “consensual

eavesdropping” or “participant monitoring”) was not a

constitutional violation.   The State also cited to State v. Roy,

54 Haw. 513, 510 P.2d 1066 (1973), in which this court held

there was no unconstitutional search or seizure where an

undercover government agent entered a private home to purchase

marijuana by invitation but without a warrant.      Similar to the

defendants in those cases, the State argued, James had no

reasonable expectation of privacy in his text message exchange

with CW, even if she was acting as a State agent, so the text

messages should not have been suppressed.

    James’s memorandum in opposition to the State’s motion for

reconsideration distinguished Graham, and changed his position

to argue he was not asserting a violation of his right to

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privacy.5      Rather, James said he was asserting a violation of his

rights to counsel and to remain silent, since the police “used

CW to attempt to avoid the constitutional constraints placed

upon them if they had conducted a custodial interrogation.”

James also distinguished this case from Roy, arguing that in

Roy, unlike here, “there was no requirement that the defendant

be advised of his rights by police.”

        James argued Kahoonei, 83 Hawai‘i at 131, 925 P.2d at 301,

“held that the police cannot actively recruit a private

individual to engage in conduct which the police would have been

prohibited from doing.”       James argued that at the time of the

text messages, the detectives’ investigation had focused solely

on him as a suspect, and they already had probable cause to

arrest James based on CW’s statements, so “any questioning of

James conducted by the detectives would have constituted

5     James initially based his motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment and
article I, section 7 grounds. In concluding James’s Miranda rights were
violated, the circuit court cited case law construing these constitutional
provisions. Because the issue is not properly before us, we do not address
whether James had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages.
We note that State v. Walton, 133 Hawaiʻi 66, 93-97, 324 P.3d 876, 903-07
(2014), overruled some Hawaiʻi cases holding information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties automatically loses article I, section 7 privacy protection;
Walton also set forth factors courts should consider in determining whether a
defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy that information provided
to a third party would not be shared with others, including whether that
information reveals “intimate details of a person’s life.” 133 Hawaiʻi at 96-
97, 324 P.3d at 906-07. But consent to a search provides an exception to the
warrant requirement; the record suggests CW consented to the detectives
reading her text exchange with James. It is not appropriate, however, for
this court to determine as a matter of law the presence and scope of consent
when it was not litigated in the trial court. See State v. Phillips, 138
Hawaiʻi 321, 351, 382 P.3d 133, 163 (2016).

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‘custodial interrogation,’” and the detectives would have been

required to advise James of his rights.     James argued that,

based on the totality of the circumstances, CW was acting as a

government agent when she texted James.     Therefore, James

maintained, the detectives violated James’s right to remain

silent under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and

article 1, section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution.

     James also asserted the detectives’ actions violated his

right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution and article 1, section 14 of the Hawaiʻi

Constitution.

     At the hearing on the State’s motion for reconsideration,

the State pointed out that “there is no precedent in Hawai‘i or

anywhere else that a defendant is in custody, [when] he is miles

away from the police [and] not incarcerated, even assuming . . .

that the police possess probable cause to arrest.”

     On April 4, 2022, the circuit court entered an order

denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.

D.   ICA proceedings

     On April 11, 2022, the State filed a notice of appeal to

the ICA.   The State asserted the circuit court erred (1) by

finding CW induced James via text message to admit he had

sexually assaulted her (FOF 7); (2) in concluding the detectives

violated James’s Miranda rights under the federal and/or Hawai‘i

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constitutions because it is undisputed that James was not in

police custody (COL 4); (3) in concluding the detectives

violated James’s right to counsel under the federal and/or

Hawaiʻi constitutions because James had not yet been charged; (4)

by suppressing James’s text messages sent to CW’s phone; and (5)

by denying the State’s motion to reconsider.

     In its April 20, 2023 summary disposition order, the ICA

affirmed the circuit court’s order granting James’s motion to

suppress.    James, 2023 WL 3017974, at *7.

     Relevant here, the ICA determined it did not have appellate

jurisdiction over the circuit court’s order denying the State’s

motion for reconsideration; hence, it did not address the

State’s point of error concerning that order.6           2023 WL 3017974,

at *1 n.1.    The ICA reasoned that in civil cases, under Hawai‘i

Rules of Appellate Procedure (“HRAP”) Rule 4(a)(3) (eff. 2020),

a notice of appeal is “deemed to appeal the disposition of all

post-judgment motions that are timely filed after entry of the

judgment or order.”      James, 2023 WL 3017974, at *1 n.1 (quoting

HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)).      HRAP Rule 4(b) (eff. 2020) governing

6     The ICA concluded the circuit court’s FOF 7, that CW induced James via
text message to admit he had sexually assaulted her, was not clearly
erroneous. James, 2023 WL 3017974, at *5. This point is not at issue on
certiorari.

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appeals from criminal cases, however, does not contain a similar

provision.   James, 2023 WL 3017974, at *1 n.1.

     The ICA noted Miranda warnings are required when a

defendant is (1) under interrogation and (2) in custody.       James,

2023 WL 3017974, at *6 (citing State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawaiʻi 207,

210, 10 P.3d 728, 731 (2000)).     The ICA then said Hewitt held

Miranda warnings are required by article 1, section 10 of the

Hawaiʻi Constitution whenever probable cause to arrest has

developed.   James, 2023 WL 3017974, at *6 (citing Hewitt, 153

Hawai‘i at 36, 526 P.3d at 561).      The ICA noted the State does

not dispute the text messages constituted “interrogation” or the

circuit court’s finding that at the time of the interrogation,

James was the “only suspect” and the investigation had “focused

on him.”   Id.   The ICA concluded that the detectives therefore

had probable cause to arrest James at the time of the text

messages and that Miranda warnings were required before

interrogation.   James, 2023 WL 3017974, at *6.

     The ICA also addressed the State’s assertion that the text

messages should not have been suppressed because James received

the texts from CW, not law enforcement.      Id.   The ICA reasoned

the State’s position was inconsistent with the purposes of

Hawai‘i’s exclusionary rule.   Id.    Quoting State v. McKnight, 131

Hawai‘i 379, 398, 319 P.3d 298, 317 (2013), the ICA noted that

the exclusionary rule’s purposes include “(1) judicial

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integrity, (2) the protection of individual privacy, and (3)

deterrence of illegal police misconduct.”     James, 2023 WL

3017974, at *6.    The ICA determined that these purposes are not

furthered by allowing circumvention of Miranda warnings by

permitting law enforcement to engage in the undercover

interrogation of suspects by directing the sending and dictating

the content of text messages using a government agent’s personal

mobile device.    James, 2023 WL 3017974, at *6.

     Because the ICA concluded the circuit court properly

suppressed the text messages based on article I, section 10 of

the Hawaiʻi Constitution, the ICA declined to address point of

error (3) concerning James’s right to counsel.      James, 2023 WL

3017974, at *1 n.4.

E.   Certiorari proceedings

     The State presents the following two questions on

certiorari:   whether the ICA gravely erred by concluding (1)

Miranda warnings were required before CW, at police suggestion,

sent text messages to James, “who was neither in proximity to a

police officer nor confined in a correctional facility”; and (2)

that it did not have appellate jurisdiction over the State’s

motion for reconsideration.

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                        III. Standards of Review

A.     Appellate jurisdiction

       “The existence of [appellate] jurisdiction is a question of

law and is reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard.”

State v. Uchima, 147 Hawaiʻi 64, 72, 464 P.3d 852, 860 (2020)

(citation omitted).

B.     Motion to suppress

       “An appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion to

suppress de novo to determine whether the ruling was ‘right’ or

‘wrong.’”    Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 40, 526 P.3d at 565 (cleaned

up).

C.     Constitutional issues

       “Questions of constitutional law are reviewed under the

right/wrong standard.”      State v. Borge, 152 Hawaiʻi 458, 464, 526

P.3d 435, 441 (2023) (citation omitted).

D.     Interpretation of statutes and court rules

       “The interpretation of a statute [or court rule] is a

question of law which this court reviews de novo.”            State v.

Mortensen-Young, 152 Hawai‘i 385, 392, 526 P.3d 362, 369 (2023)

(cleaned up).    Our statutory interpretation is guided by the

following principles:

                  First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
            interpretation is the language of the statute itself.
            Second, where the statutory language is plain and
            unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain
            and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of
            statutory construction is our foremost obligation to

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          ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
          legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
          language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when
          there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness
          or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an
          ambiguity exists.
                When there is ambiguity in a statute, the meaning of
          the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context,
          with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may
          be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.
          Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in
          determining legislative intent, such as legislative
          history, or the reason and spirit of the law.

State v. Abihai, 146 Hawai‘i 398, 406, 463 P.3d 1055, 1063 (2020)

(citation omitted).

     “When interpreting rules promulgated by the court,

principles of statutory construction apply.”         Mortensen-Young,

152 Hawai‘i at 392, 526 P.3d at 369 (citation omitted).

                            IV.    Discussion

A.   Miranda warnings were not required because James was not
     “in custody” at the time of his text exchange with CW

     The State correctly asserts the circuit court and ICA erred

in concluding Miranda warnings were required before CW texted

James at the detectives’ suggestion.

     The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I,

section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution guarantee the right

against self-incrimination.       Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 43, 526 P.3d

at 568 (citation omitted).     Miranda warnings help safeguard this

right:

                     The Miranda rule is, at core, a
               constitutionally prescribed rule of evidence that
               requires the prosecution to lay a sufficient
               foundation — i.e., that the requisite warnings were
               administered and validly waived before the accused

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                gave the statement sought to be adduced at trial —
                before it may adduce evidence of a defendant’s
                custodial statements that stem from interrogation
                during [their] criminal trial.

                      The prosecution’s burden of establishing that
                the requisite warnings were given, however, is not
                triggered unless the totality of the circumstances
                reflect that the statement it seeks to adduce at
                trial was obtained as a result of “custodial
                interrogation,” which, as the United States Supreme
                Court defined it in Miranda, consists of “questioning
                initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
                has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
                their freedom of action in any significant way.” In
                other words, the defendant, objecting to the
                admissibility of their statement and, thus, seeking
                to suppress it, must establish that their statement
                was the result of (1) “interrogation” that occurred
                while they were (2) “in custody.”

Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 43, 526 P.3d at 568 (cleaned up).

       Under the federal constitution, Miranda warnings are

required when a suspect is subjected to “custodial

interrogation,” which is “questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody

or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant way.”    United States v. Eide, 875 F.2d 1429, 1433

(9th Cir. 1989) (cleaned up).      James was not in custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant

way.    Thus, James was not “in custody” for Fifth Amendment

purposes and Miranda warnings were not required by the federal

constitution.

       This court provides criminal defendants with greater

protection under Hawai‘i’s article I, section 10 privilege

against self-incrimination than provided by the federal courts

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under Miranda and its progeny.      Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 44, 526

P.3d at 569 (citation omitted).      Our Miranda rights case law,

however, has consistently adhered to the two foundational

requirements for Miranda rights to be triggered:

“interrogation” and “in custody.”        See, e.g., Ah Loo, 94 Hawaiʻi

at 210, 10 P.3d at 731 (citation omitted).

     The ICA misconstrued Hewitt and its reference to Ketchum,

in which we held a person is “in custody” for the purposes of

Miranda rights under article I, section 10 of the Hawai‘i

Constitution:

          [I]f an objective assessment of the totality of the
          circumstances reflects either (1) that the person has
          become impliedly accused of committing a crime because the
          questions of the police have become sustained and coercive,
          such that they are no longer reasonably designed briefly to
          confirm or dispel their reasonable suspicion or (2) that
          the point of arrest has arrived because either (a) probable
          cause to arrest has developed or (b) the police have
          subjected the person to an unlawful “de facto” arrest
          without probable cause to do so.

Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 43, 526 P.3d at 568 (quoting Ketchum, 97

Hawai‘i at 126, 34 P.3d at 1025).

     The circuit court and ICA appear to have construed Hewitt

and Ketchum to mean that any time probable cause has developed,

a defendant is “in custody,” even when a defendant is nowhere

near a law enforcement official.        In Hewitt, however, we

reiterated the basic framework that “a statement made by a

defendant under custodial interrogation without a Miranda

warning must be suppressed as unconstitutionally elicited.”

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Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 43, 526 P.3d at 568 (emphasis added).        Our

analysis concerning whether Miranda warnings were required in

Hewitt was centered on whether the defendant, who was confined

to a hospital bed with serious injuries, was “in custody” when

questioned by police officers.    See Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 43-46,

526 P.3d at 568-71 (holding that if a person is unable to leave

a place of interrogation due to circumstances incident to

medical treatment, determining whether the person is “in

custody” under a totality of circumstances for purposes of

article I, section 10 requires an inquiry into whether the

person was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and cause

officers to leave).

     Hewitt clearly reiterated that Ketchum’s bright-line rule

for when a suspect is “in custody” applies “when probable cause

to arrest exists upon an initial stop or detention.”      Hewitt,

153 Hawai‘i at 43, 526 P.3d at 568 (emphasis added) (citing

Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘i at 126, 34 P.3d at 1025).     Hewitt also said

that if a detained person’s responses to a police officer’s

questions provide the officer with probable cause to arrest,

“the officer is – at that time – required to inform the detained

person” of their Miranda rights.      Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 43, 526

P.3d at 568 (second emphasis added) (citation omitted).

     Thus, the Ketchum bright-line rule does not apply where

probable cause exists but the police have not stopped or

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detained the suspect, or have not otherwise deprived the suspect

of freedom of action in any significant way.           See Hewitt, 153

Hawai‘i at 43, 526 P.3d at 568; Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘i at 117-18, 34

P.3d at 1016-17 (“[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is

jeopardized when an individual is taken into custody or

otherwise deprived of [their] freedom by the authorities in any

significant way and subjected to questioning[.]” (cleaned up)).

        Here, the detectives directed CW to contact James, and

James apparently made incriminating statements.           CW was acting

as a government agent, but there was no “initial stop or

detention” or other deprivation of freedom of action at the time

James made the statements.        See Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 43, 526

P.3d at 568; Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘i at 117-18, 34 P.3d at 1016-17.

Therefore, regardless of whether probable cause to arrest

existed at the time CW contacted James, James was not “in

custody” and there was no “custodial” interrogation.7            Hence,

Miranda warnings were not required under either the federal or

state constitutions.

7     The State posits that we should set forth a bright-line rule that a
suspect must be in the presence of, or in proximity to, law enforcement or
“confined in a correctional facility” to be “in custody.” Because we need
not do so in this case and because it is possible to envision circumstances
in which a suspect could be interrogated while deprived of freedom in a
significant way by authorities without being in their presence, such as
through use of technology, including electric fences, we decline to adopt the
State’s suggestion.

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B.   James’s right to counsel had not attached

     Because it upheld the circuit court’s suppression order

based on the alleged violation of James’s Miranda rights, the

ICA did not address the circuit court’s alternative ruling that

James’s right to counsel had been violated.         James, 2023 WL

3017974, at *1 n.4.    If James’s right to counsel was violated,

the circuit court’s suppression order would be affirmed on this

alternative ground.    We therefore address that issue.

     Even when a defendant is not subject to custodial

interrogation:

          An individual has a right to counsel under the [S]ixth
          [A]mendment to the United States Constitution and article
          I, section 14 of the Hawaiʻi State Constitution which
          guarantees an accused the right to assistance of counsel
          for [the accused’s] defense. However, this right attaches
          at critical stages of the criminal prosecution, only at or
          after the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal
          proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
          hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.

State v. Luton, 83 Hawai‘i 443, 448, 927 P.2d 844, 849 (1996)

(cleaned up).

     Thus, the right to counsel attaches only after the

initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings.           Such

proceedings had yet to be initiated at the time of the text

messages between CW and James.      Therefore, the circuit court

erred by suppressing the text messages based on its erroneous

conclusion that James was entitled to counsel under the Sixth

Amendment and article I, section 14.

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C.      The ICA erred by concluding it did not have appellate
        jurisdiction over the circuit court’s order denying the
        State’s motion for reconsideration

        Finally, we also address the State’s question regarding the

ICA’s holding that it did not have appellate jurisdiction over

the State’s appeal of the circuit court’s denial of the motion

for reconsideration.

        The “right of appeal in a criminal case is purely statutory

and exists only when given by some constitutional or statutory

provision.”      Bohannon, 102 Hawai‘i at 236, 74 P.3d at 988

(citation omitted).        HRS § 641-138 enumerates when the State may

appeal a criminal case from the district and circuit courts.

Bohannon, 102 Hawai‘i at 236, 74 P.3d at 988.            “As a general

rule, we strictly construe HRS § 641-13[.]”             State v. Timoteo,

87 Hawai‘i 108, 112, 952 P.2d 865, 869 (1997) (cleaned up).

                    However, this strict construction rule, like the rule
              applicable to penal statutes generally, does not permit the
              court to ignore legislative intent in the face of statutory
              ambiguity, nor require the court to reject the construction

8       HRS § 641-13 provides in relevant part:

              An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the State from
              the district or circuit courts to the intermediate
              appellate court, subject to chapter 602, in all criminal
              matters, in the following instances:

                     . . . .

                    (7) From a pretrial order granting a motion for the
                    suppression of evidence, including a confession or
                    admission, or the return of property, in which case
                    the appellate court shall give priority to the appeal
                    and the order shall be stayed pending the outcome of
                    the appeal[.]

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          that best harmonizes with the design of the statute or the
          end sought to be achieved.

State v. Fukusaku, 85 Hawai‘i 462, 492, 946 P.2d 32, 62 (1997)

(citations omitted).

     Section 641-13 does not expressly provide for a right of

appeal from a motion for reconsideration.

     We agree with the State that, pursuant to Bohannon, the ICA

nonetheless had appellate jurisdiction over the circuit court’s

order denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.           In

Bohannon, the State’s notice of appeal concerning the district

court’s order granting the defendant’s motions to suppress and

to dismiss did not expressly refer to the district court’s

related order denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.

102 Hawai‘i at 235, 74 P.3d at 987.       We held the prosecution’s

notice of appeal was nonetheless sufficient to appeal that order

because the State’s “intent to appeal” from the order denying

its motion for reconsideration could be “reasonably inferred

from its notice of appeal.”     Id.     We agreed with the State that

its “right to appeal from the order granting [the defendant’s]

motion to suppress under HRS § 641-13(7) encompasses a right to

appeal from the order denying its motion to reconsider the

district court’s order granting the motion to suppress.”             102

Hawai‘i at 234, 74 P.3d at 986 (cleaned up).        We noted that the

district court’s order denying the motion for reconsideration

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was “merely an extension of its order granting [the defendant’s]

motions to suppress and to dismiss.”       102 Hawai‘i at 235, 74 P.3d

at 987.

    Here, pursuant to Bohannon, the ICA had appellate

jurisdiction over the circuit court’s order denying the State’s

motion for reconsideration.     Although HRS § 641-13 does not

expressly authorize appeals by the State from orders denying

motions to reconsider pretrial orders granting the suppression

of evidence, we have held HRS § 641-13(7) implicitly encompasses

a right to appeal from such orders.       Bohannon, 102 Hawai‘i at

234, 74 P.3d at 986.

    The ICA determined it did not have jurisdiction over the

order denying the State’s motion for reconsideration based on

HRAP Rule 4.   James, 2023 WL 3017974, at *1 n.1.         HRAP Rule

4(a), which applies to appeals of civil cases, contains a

provision expressly addressing post-judgment motions.          It

provides in relevant part,

           (3) Time to appeal affected by post-judgment motions. If
          any party files a timely motion . . . to reconsider . . .
          and court or agency rules specify the time by which the
          motion shall be filed, then the time for filing the notice
          of appeal is extended for all parties until 30 days after
          entry of an order disposing of the motion. The presiding
          court or agency in which the motion was filed shall dispose
          of any such post-judgment motion by entering an order upon
          the record within 90 days after the date the motion was
          filed. If the court or agency fails to enter an order on
          the record, then, within 5 days after the 90th day, the
          clerk of the relevant court or agency shall notify the
          parties that, by operation of this Rule, the post-judgment
          motion is denied and that any orders entered thereafter
          shall be a nullity. The time of appeal shall run from the
          date of entry of the court or agency’s order disposing of

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              the post-judgment motion, if the order is entered within
              the 90 days, or from the filing date of the clerk’s notice
              to the parties that the post-judgment motion is denied
              pursuant to the operation of the Rule.
                    The notice of appeal shall be deemed to appeal the
              disposition of all post-judgment motions that are timely
              filed after entry of the judgment or order.
                    The 90-day period shall be computed as provided in
              Rule 26 of these Rules.

HRAP Rule 4(b),9 which applies to appeals of criminal cases,

contains no similar provision.

9       HRAP Rule 4(b) provides in full:

                    (b) Appeals in criminal cases.
                    (1) Time for filing. In a criminal case, the notice
              of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the
              judgment or order appealed from. However, if the notice of
              appeal is mailed, the notice of appeal shall be deemed
              timely filed if the mailing is postmarked within the time
              fixed for filing and is received by the clerk no later than
              5 days after the postmarked date. For the purposes of
              calculating other deadlines in these Rules, the date of
              filing under this Rule shall be the date the document is
              received by the clerk.
                    A motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal
              from an order of the circuit court must be filed within 30
              days of the court’s entry of the order. If such a motion
              is filed and granted, then the notice of appeal shall be
              filed within 30 days after entry of the circuit court’s
              order granting permission for leave to file an
              interlocutory appeal.
                    (2) Effect of motions in arrest of judgment or for
              new trial. If a timely motion in arrest of judgment under
              Rule 34 of the Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure or for a new
              trial under Rule 33 of the Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure
              has been made, an appeal from a judgment of conviction may
              be taken within 30 days after the entry of any order
              denying the motion.
                    (3) Entry of judgment or order defined. A judgment
              or order is entered within the meaning of this subsection
              when it is filed with the clerk of the court.
                    (4) Premature notice of appeal. A notice of appeal
              filed after the announcement of a decision, sentence or
              order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be
              deemed to have been filed on the date such judgment or
              order is entered.
                    (5) Extensions of time to file a notice of appeal.
              Upon showing of good cause, the circuit, district, or
              family court may, no later than 30 days after the time has

                                                                (continued. . .)

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      HRAP Rule 4(b), however, merely governs timing requirements

for filing appeals in criminal cases.         See Bohannon, 102 Hawai‘i

at 235, 74 P.3d at 987.       In this case, there is no

jurisdictional issue related to the timing of the State’s filing

of the notice of appeal.10      The State’s April 11, 2022 notice of

appeal expressly and timely appealed both the March 28, 2022

order granting James’s motion to suppress and the April 4, 2022

order denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.             And

pursuant to Bohannon, HRS § 641-13(7) “encompasses a right” for

the State to appeal from the circuit court’s order denying the

State’s motion for reconsideration.         See Bohannon, 102 Hawai‘i at

234, 74 P.3d at 986.

      Therefore, the ICA erred in ruling it lacked appellate

jurisdiction over the circuit court’s order denying the State’s

motion for reconsideration of the order granting motion to

suppress.    Based on our reasoning in Sections IV.A and B above,

(. . .continued)

            expired, on motion and notice, extend the time for filing a
            notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from
            the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this
            subdivision (b). Any such motion that is filed before
            expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless
            the court otherwise requires.

10    As noted supra, the State filed its notice of appeal on April 11, 2022,
less than 30 days after the filing of both the circuit court’s order granting
James’s motion to suppress the text messages (filed on March 28, 2022) and
order denying the State’s related motion for reconsideration (filed on April
4, 2022). See HRAP Rule 4(b)(1).

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the circuit court also erred by denying the State’s motion for

reconsideration.

                          V.    Conclusion

    For the reasons explained above, we vacate the ICA’s May

31, 2023 judgment on appeal as well as the circuit court’s March

28, 2022 FOF/COL/Order and April 4, 2022 order denying the

State’s motion for reconsideration.    We remand to the circuit

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tracy J. Murakami               /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
                                /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
Christian G. Enright
for respondent                  /s/ Todd W. Eddins

                                /s/ Lisa W. Cataldo

                                /s/ Clarissa Y. Malinao

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