Court Opinion

ID: 9852727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:35:30.416613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:33.026854
License: Public Domain

dissenting.
I concur in the opinion affirming the conviction for possession of cocaine. However, I dissent from the holding that the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of larceny of the vehicle.
“At common law, larceny was deemed to be a ‘continuing offense’ and ‘is being committed every moment of the time during which the thief deprives the owner of the stolen property or its possession.’ ” Hope v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 381, 387, 392 S.E.2d 830, 834 (1990) (quoting Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 521, 525, 35 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1945)).
When the police arrived at 1:15 a.m. on December 12, 1990, in the parking lot of the McThrift Inn, Police Officer Mezo testified that Turner was behind the wheel of the vehicle and Burgess “was either getting in or getting out [of] it. . . . standing next to it with the door open with his arm on the window.” The police approached the vehicle and questioned Burgess and Turner. They asked Burgess his name and he said that he was Robert Swift. When asked whose vehicle it was, Burgess said it belonged to Lewis Johnson, who had brought them in the vehicle to the McThrift Inn. Burgess said that he did not know where Johnson went. The police then discovered Burgess’s true identity and that the vehicle belonged to Ann Smith, not Lewis Johnson. After the *1025police learned that the vehicle was stolen, Burgess told them that he did not know who Johnson was or where he lived. The automobile had been stolen nine days earlier by someone punching out the ignition so that it could be started with a screwdriver. This condition was apparent at the time the police arrived. An instrument of the type used to punch out the ignition was found in the trunk.
On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The trial court was not required to accept the defendant’s statement as to how he came to be at a crime scene “simply because the defendant [explained it] that way and no witnesses testified to the contrary.” See Crumble v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 231, 236, 343 S.E.2d 359, 362 (1986) (quoting Randolph v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 256, 263, 56 S.E.2d 226, 229 (1949)). “[A court] is not required to accept in toto an accused’s statement, but may rely on it in whole, in part, or reject it completely.” Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 547, 399 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1991) (citations omitted). Furthermore, where a defendant gives a false account of circumstances surrounding a crime, the trial court is entitled to infer that the defendant lied to conceal his guilt. See Speight v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 83, 88, 354 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1987) (citations omitted).
Based upon the evidence, the trial court reasonably could have inferred the following: Burgess rode to the McThrift Inn in the stolen vehicle which had its ignition cylinder removed. The vehicle had to be started and operated with something other than the key. Burgess was standing next to the open passenger door of the vehicle when the police arrived. When questioned, Burgess first gave false identification to the police and told the police that the automobile belonged to Lewis Johnson, when in fact the automobile was stolen from someone else. The court could have inferred that the name Lewis Johnson was a fabrication and could have in- . ferred that Burgess’s false statements to the police were made to conceal from the police the fact that the vehicle had been stolen. The court further could have inferred that Burgess lied in order to facilitate the continuing larceny and to hide his own guilt.
*1026Here, we have more than a defendant’s mere presence at the scene of the crime. We have presence plus concealment of the crime and deception as to the defendant’s true identity. The evidence was not only consistent with Burgess’ guilt but inconsistent with his innocence. Thus, I believe the evidence was sufficient for a rational finder of fact to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Burgess was, at a minimum, aiding and abetting in the continuing larceny. Since larceny is a continuing offense, any person assisting, aiding and abetting in the larceny is guilty of larceny. See Speight, 4 Va. App. at 89, 354 S.E.2d at 99.