Court Opinion

ID: 9700523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:33:37.512308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:10.234566
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(concurring specially).
Defendant’s second issue and argument is that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the insurance contract results in superfluous language. In my opinion, this argument merits discussion and consideration but is effectively countered by Plaintiffs’ reply brief as follows:
*660Defendant argues that, under Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the contract, the “limit of liability” and the “amount to be paid for the actual damage to the property” would always be equal, resulting in an additional 5% of the limit of liability for debris removal expense in every case. Defendant argues that such a result [is] not consistent with the policy language, which contemplates cases wherein the limit of liability would be greater than the amount paid for actual damage. In such cases the debris removal expense would be included in the limit of liability.
This argument is flawed because the Defendant presumes that any loss under the policy would be a total loss. SDCL 58-10-10 operates to merge the limit of liability and the value of the property only in cases where the “property insured is wholly destroyed.” In cases involving partial destruction of the premises, the measure of damage would be “the replacement cost of that part of the building damaged.” ...
Therefore, in the event of a partial loss, where the repair costs are less than the policy limits, all of the debris removal expense would usually be included within the limit of liability and the additional 5% would not be needed. Only in cases where the difference between the repair costs and the policy limits was insufficient to cover the debris removal expense would the additional 5% be needed to pay the balance.
Accordingly, when the policy and SDCL 58-10-10 are read together, the additional 5% of coverage for debris removal expense will come into play in all cases involving total destruction of the property, but in most cases of partial loss will not be involved. All of the contract terms retain their plain meaning, are internally consistent and are, further,' consistent with the governing statute. There is no strained reading or superfluous language. Rather, it is Defendant’s reading which is strained, and in contradiction of SDCL 58-10-10, [which would render] that statute superfluous or a nullity.
I agree with Plaintiffs’ argument and I concur.