Court Opinion

ID: 9894653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 17:05:57.306476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:16.364139
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                        Docket No. 49510

 MORANDA I. MORLEY,                 )
                                    )
    Claimant-Appellant,             )                          Boise, September 2023 Term
                                    )
 v.                                 )                          Opinion filed: November 2, 2023
                                    )
 RS UNLIMITED, INC., dba JALAPENOS, )                          Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
 Employer; YOKES FOODS, INC., dba )
 YOKES FRESH MARKET, Major Base )
 Employer; and IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF )
 LABOR,                             )
                                    )
    Defendants-Respondents.         )

       Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho.

       The decision of the Industrial Commission is affirmed.

       Moranda I. Morley, Appellant pro se, submitted argument on the briefs.

       Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. M. Scott Keim
       submitted argument on the briefs.
             _______________________________________________

MOELLER, Justice.
       Moranda Morley lost one of her two jobs due to the economic impact of the COVID-19
pandemic in March 2020. Morley applied for and received state unemployment compensation
benefits and federal pandemic unemployment assistance through the Idaho Department of Labor.
However, it was later determined that Morley was ineligible for benefits because she was still
employed full-time at her other job.
       Morley appealed that determination to the Appeals Bureau of the Idaho Department of
Labor, which affirmed her ineligibility. Morley then appealed to the Idaho Industrial Commission
(“the Commission”), which dismissed Morley’s initial appeal and later denied her request for
reconsideration, finding both to be untimely. Morley then appealed to this Court, but her notice of
appeal was timely only as to the denial of her request for reconsideration. Thereafter, we issued an

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order dismissing the appeal as to the issues that were determined to be untimely. What remains is
a limited review of whether the Commission properly denied her request for reconsideration. For
the reasons explained below, we affirm the Commission’s denial of reconsideration.
                          I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In March 2020, Moranda Morley (“Morley”) was working for two different employers in
northern Idaho. One of those employers, Jalapenos restaurant, closed due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Morley was “told to apply for unemployment insurance by her management [at
Jalapenos] and was given a form with instructions to do so.” Thereafter, Morley applied for
unemployment benefits with the Idaho Department of Labor (“the IDOL”) and began receiving
benefits. However, Morley was still working full-time for her other employer.
       In July 2021, Morley received a personal eligibility determination explaining she was not
eligible for previously disbursed unemployment benefits because she had been working full-time
during the reporting period. Beyond being ineligible, the IDOL also determined that Morley either
(1) willfully made false statements or misrepresentations or (2) willfully failed to report her second
job.
       Morley protested the eligibility determination to an Appeals Examiner from the IDOL. The
Appeals Examiner reversed the finding that the “claimant willfully made a false statement or
willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits.” Nevertheless, the Appeals
Examiner still affirmed the finding that Morley had continued to work full-time; therefore, she was
ineligible for benefits. Thus, while the original decision was modified in part, the Appeals
Examiner ultimately affirmed the Department’s determination of ineligibility. Because Morley
was not eligible for benefits, the Appeals Examiner also affirmed the conclusion that Morley had
been overpaid. Further, the Appeals Examiner also concluded that the repayment requirement was
not waived, relying on Idaho Code section 72-1369(5).
       In attempting to appeal the Appeals Examiner’s decision, Morley ultimately missed three
successive filing deadlines: first, her appeal from the Appeals Examiner’s decision to the
Commission; second, her request for reconsideration by the Commission; and third, her later
appeal to this Court from the Commission’s order dismissing her appeal.
       Regarding her appeal to the Commission, the date of mailing listed on the original decision
from the Appeals Examiner was September 16, 2021. Thus, under the Commission’s rules, the

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decision identified the last day for Morley to protest as September 30, 2021. The Appeals
Examiner’s decision included an explanation of Morley’s right to appeal and specified that:
“Appeals transmitted by email must be received by the Commission no later than 12:00 a.m.
(midnight) Mountain Time, on the last day to appeal. An email received after 12:00 a.m., Mountain
Time, will be deemed received by the Commission in the next business day.” However, Morley’s
emailed appeal was received by the Commission at 1:01 a.m. Mountain Time on October 1, 2021,
and filed that same day. Based on the late filing, the Commission issued an order dismissing
Morley’s appeal on November 9, 2021.
       Twenty-two days later, on December 1, 2021, Morley sent an email asking the Commission
to reconsider its order dismissing her appeal. Thereafter, on December 20, 2021, the Commission
issued an order denying Morley’s request for reconsideration as untimely. The Commission
explained that Morley was required to have filed her request for reconsideration “on or before
November 29, 2021.” Since the record reflected that Morley filed her request for reconsideration
on December 1, 2021, the Commission concluded that Morley’s “request was made two (2) days
beyond the expiration of the statutory deadline. Thus, [Morley’s] request for reconsideration is
untimely.”
       Subsequently, on January 5, 2022, Morley again asked for reconsideration, which the
Commission construed as an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Upon receipt of Morley’s appeal,
we determined that it was untimely as to the Commission’s initial order dismissing her appeal
since it had not been filed within 42 days from the date of the order (November 9, 2022). See I.A.R.
14. Thus, on March 2, 2022, this Court issued an order conditionally dismissing the appeal and
allowing Morley 21 days to file a response with this Court, “showing why the appeal as to the
[Industrial Commission’s] Order Dismissing Appeal should not be dismissed.” Order
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal, Morley v. RS Unlimited, Inc., No. 49510-2022 (Idaho March 2,
2022). Morley did not file a response. Thereafter, on March 25, 2022, this Court issued an “Order
re: Conditional Dismissal,” which dismissed Morley’s appeal of the Industrial Commission’s
initial Order Dismissing Appeal. This Court then ordered that this “case shall proceed as to the
appeal from the Order Dismissing Request for Reconsideration entered by the Industrial
Commission on December 20, 2021, only.” Order Re: Conditional Dismissal, Morley v. RS
Unlimited, Inc., No. 49510-2022 (Idaho March 25, 2022).

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                                    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
       “This Court exercises free review over the Industrial Commission’s legal conclusions.
However, the Commission’s factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal so long as they are
supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Sheehan v. Sun Valley Co., 171 Idaho 248, 519
P.3d 1188, 1191–92 (2022) (quoting Obenchain v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137
P.3d 443, 444 (2006)).
                                          III. ANALYSIS
       The facts of this case are similar to those in this Court’s recent decision in Sheehan v. Sun
Valley Co., 171 Idaho 248, 519 P.3d 1188 (2022). The claimant in Sheehan not only faced similar
misfortune in losing his job due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but he also faced similar procedural
concerns on appeal. Despite the sympathetic circumstances presented in that case, we explained
that “[w]e have long held that pro se litigants are ‘held to the same standards and rules as those
represented by an attorney.’ ” Sheehan, 171 Idaho at ___, 519 P.3d at 1192 (first quoting Suitts v.
Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005); then citing Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387,
392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990); and then citing Scafco Boise, Inc. v. Rigby, 98 Idaho 432, 566 P.2d
381 (1977) (distinguished on other grounds)). Importantly, we explained that “[s]uch standards
and rules include timely filing requirements.” Id.
       Here, as in Sheehan, Morley presents an unfortunate narrative; however, we are still
“bound to follow the rules and law of jurisdictional authority.” Sheehan, 171 Idaho at ___, 519
P.3d at 1190. Morley does not dispute the facts pertaining to her untimely request for
reconsideration and now acknowledges that she misunderstood the rules with which she attempted
to comply. However, she offers no explanation in her opening brief for how the Commission erred
in dismissing her request for reconsideration. Instead, Morley explains that “[t]he circumstances
in which [she] understood the calculation of time made the request for Reconsideration timely.”
(Emphasis added). In other words, she appears to suggest that if the rules had coincided with her
misunderstanding, her filings would have been timely. Sadly, that is not the way “rules” work.
       As to the nature of her misunderstanding, Morley explains in her Reply Brief that she
“concluded that weekends and holidays did not count for the IDOL, the Commission, or this Court.
Therefore, those non-judicial days did not count in the calculation of the 14 days.” However, there
is nothing in the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Employment Security

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Law (“R.A.P.P.” or “Commission Rules”) to lead one to that conclusion. For example, the
Commission Rules state that “[a]n appeal … must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the service
by mail or otherwise of a final decision of the Appeals Examiner.” R.A.P.P. 2(B) (Idaho Indus.
Comm’n, Jul. 1, 2021), https://iic. idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/RAPP-July-2021.pdf.
Likewise, Rule 8 simply says that “the request for reconsideration must be made within twenty
(20) days from the date of filing of the Commission’s decision and order.” R.A.P.P. 8(F); see also
I.C. § 72-1368(7) (“[W]ithin twenty (20) days from the date of filing the [Commission’s] decision,
any party may move for reconsideration of the decision or the commission may rehear or
reconsider its decision on its own initiative.”). There are no qualifications in the Commission Rules
limiting the accrual to “business days” or any other type of classification. Further, Rule 2 clarifies
that “[a]n email received after 12:00 a.m., Mountain Time, will be deemed received by the
Commission [on] the next business day.” Importantly, there is nothing in the rules, nor in the
notices sent to Morley, that suggest that weekends should be excluded from the computation of
time.1 Thus, Morley did not comply with the relevant filing rules.
         Additionally, while Morley acknowledges that she misinterpreted the rules, she argues that
any misunderstanding was in good faith and should justify this Court in deeming her untimely
filings to be timely. In Morley’s view, her good faith misinterpretation of the filing requirements
should excuse her late filing. Supporting this assertion, Morley cites Cheek v. United States for the
principle that “[a] good faith misunderstanding of the law or a good faith belief that one is not
violating the law negates willfulness, whether or not that claimed belief or misunderstanding is
objectively reasonable.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203–04 (1991). However,
understood in proper context, the United States Supreme Court held in Cheek that a reasonable
misunderstanding may negate willfulness in the context of federal criminal law. Id. The late filing
appealed in this case does not require a showing of willful tardiness to be late. In other words, one
does not have to intend for a filing to be late for the filing to be, in fact, late. Thus, this proffered
authority is inapplicable.

1
  We note that the rules do not provide for emails transmitted on weekends and holidays. The pertinent rule explains,
in the context of a fax, that “an appeal transmitted by facsimile and received by the Commission on a weekend,
holiday, or after 12:00 a.m. on a business day shall be deemed filed on the next business day.” R.A.P.P. 2(D)(2) (Idaho
Indus. Comm’n Jul. 1, 2021). While the rule relating to email does not make a similar allowance, Morley’s submission
did not fall on a weekend. Thus, assuming arguendo there was an ambiguity here, it would be inapplicable to Morley.

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          Morley also cites the Commission Rules. Specifically, Morley relies on the comments to
Rule 8, which provide:
          Subsection (F) contemplates that a request for reconsideration will ask that the
          Commission reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change
          in law, a misinterpretation of law, or an argument or aspect of the case that was
          overlooked. A request for reconsideration that is based on a legal argument which
          could have been raised earlier in the proceeding will not ordinarily be granted. The
          intent is to provide a format for legal critique, but discourage reactionary motions
          when a party merely wants the Commission to “think it over again.”
R.A.P.P. 8(F) cmt. (Idaho Indus. Comm’n Jul. 1, 2021). Morley misreads this section to conclude
that a request for reconsideration under Rule 8 should be granted when the claimant has
misinterpreted the relevant law. However, the language in Rule 8 clearly only applies if the
Commission misinterpreted or misapplied the law pertaining to a claimant’s case. If the claimant
misinterprets the relevant law, there is no need for the Commission to reconsider its decision. Since
the Commission properly interpreted and applied the relevant rules, reconsideration was properly
denied.
          We note that Morley’s Reply Brief contains new arguments and is supported with
significantly more legal authority than her opening brief; however, a responsive brief may not be
used as a mechanism to raise additional issues on appeal. Myers v. Workmen’s Auto Ins. Co., 140
Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004) (“A reviewing court looks to the initial brief on appeal
for the issues presented on appeal. Consequently, ‘this Court will not consider arguments raised
for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief.’ ”) (Internal citations omitted) (first citing
Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687, 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995); then citing State v. Raudebaugh,
124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993); and then citing State v. Killinger, 126 Idaho 737,
740, 890 P.2d 323, 326 (1995)). Therefore, any additional appellate issues that could be construed
from Morley’s Reply Brief have been waived. Id.
          Ultimately, Morley does not challenge the factual or legal basis for the Commission’s
ruling in this case. Instead, she asks this Court to simply excuse her failure to comply with the
rules because she misunderstood them and acted in good faith. However, “[a]s this Court has
consistently held to be axiomatic, ‘ignorance of the law is not a defense.’ ” State v. Pool, 166 Idaho
238, 246, 457 P.3d 890, 898 (2020) (citing State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183
(1993)). Further, and as mentioned above, “[w]e have long held that pro se litigants are ‘held to

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the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney.’ ” Sheehan, 171 Idaho at ___,
519 P.3d at 1192 (quoting Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005) (citations
omitted)). This also includes “timely filing requirements.” Id. Since Morley’s request for
reconsideration was untimely, the Commission’s order denying reconsideration must be affirmed.
                                       IV. CONCLUSION
       For the reasons explained above, we affirm the Commission’s denial of Morley’s request
for reconsideration.

       Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, STEGNER and ZAHN CONCUR.

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