Court Opinion

ID: 9535067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:45:14.92881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:09.865641
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority argues that when an insurance policy defines a term in a manner that differs from ordinary understanding, the policy definition controls. The policy, however, does not contradict the common understanding that loss of services is not a bodily injury. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the policy does not define loss of services as a “bodily injury.”
The entire coverage section reads:
“Allstate will pay for all damages a person insured is legally obligated to pay — because of bodily injury or property damage meaning:
“(1) Bodily injury, sickness, disease or death to any person, including loss of services: and
“(2) Damage to or destruction of property, including loss of use.”
The policy does not state that bodily injury means “bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, including loss of services.” A comma and the words “to any person” separate “loss of services” from the definition of bodily injury. The significance of the placement of the words “to any person” is clear when the entire coverage section is examined. It covers bodily injury and property damage. The words “including loss of services” in subsection 1 and “including loss of use” in subsection 2 qualify the word “damages” in the lead clause. Neither phrase follows directly after the word “damages” because the section covers both bodily injury and property damage. An accurate reading of the coverage section is:
1. Allstate will pay for all damages, including loss of services, a person insured is legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury, meaning bodily injury, sickness, disease or death to any person; and
2. Allstate will pay for all damages, including loss of use, a person is legally obligated to pay because of damage to or destruction of property.
This reading is consistent with the policy section on Limits of Liability. The words “including loss of services” are not used in that section. It only mentions “bodily injury, sickness, disease or death.” If loss of services was a “bodily *269injury” those words should be repeated. They are not. The majority seeks to account for this omission by reading the Limits of Liability section to include the missing words. (See 70 Or App at 267, n. 3.) But they are not there.
The Gregorys argued below and in their opening brief that the policy is not ambiguous. I agree. See Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Wallis, 289 Or 303, 308, 613 P2d 36 (1980). The majority asserts that the “policy, at best, is confusing and we interpret it in favor of extending coverage to the insured.” 70 Or App at 267. The “confusion” results from the majority’s misreading of the policy and provides no basis for the result the majority reaches.
Under the coverage section, the policy protects the insured for damages to the limits of liability that he is legally obligated to pay “because of bodily injury.” (Emphasis supplied.) Mr. Gregory lost his wife’s services “because of’ her bodily injury, not his. See United Services Automobile Association v. Warner, 64 Cal App 3rd 957, 135 Cal Rptr 34, 37 (1976). Mr. Gregory’s claim for loss of his wife’s consortium, therefore, is covered and limited by the $50,000 liability limit for each person and not by the $100,000 liability limit for each occurrence. There was no issue of fact. Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. ORCP 47.
Richardson and Warden, JJ., join in this dissent.