Court Opinion

ID: 9682548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:13:11.120741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:40.030504
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing, appellee contends that this Court erred in holding that where a foreign default judgment appears to be a valid, final, and subsisting judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, a presumption of validity and regularity exists which can only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence of want of jurisdiction. Appellee cites four eases which seem to adopt the view that there are no presumptions in favor of a foreign default judgment. See Bayne v. Heid, 638 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ); Mathis v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 583 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1979 [1st Dist] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Jackson v. Randall, 544 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ); and Country Clubs Inc., v. Ward, 461 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1970, writ ref’d n.r. e.). These cases conflict with the great weight of Texas authority and appear to confuse the various rules which apply to direct and collateral attacks on default judgments. This continuing confusion necessitates a review of the various rules.
Our research shows that three different rules are applicable, one for direct attacks on judgments, one for collateral attacks on Texas judgments, and still another for attacks on foreign states’ judgments.
In direct attacks on default judgments, the rule is that no presumptions will be indulged in support of the judgment’s validity. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.1965); Stylemark Construction, Inc. v. Spies, 612 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1981, no writ); Grasz v. Grasz, 608 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, no writ).
Where an attack is collateral, however, the above rule has no application. In an attack on a Texas default judgment, the rule is that a clear and definite recital in the judgment on jurisdictional matters is conclusive of the issues of jurisdiction, and imports absolute verity and no evidence of *318any kind, not even the remainder of the record, will be considered in contradiction thereof, even though such evidence would show that jurisdiction was not, in fact acquired. Treadway v. Eastburn, 57 Tex. 209 (1881); Imatani v. Marmolejo, 606 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) and cases cited therein.
When an attack is on the judgment of another state, which is by its very nature a collateral attack, the rule is that recitals in the foreign judgment are presumed to be valid and the burden is on the attacker to produce evidence of lack of jurisdiction. Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.1975); Hart v. Calkins Manufacturing Company, Inc., 623 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1981, no writ); Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 620 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1981, no writ); Callaway v. Mahaguna, 620 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1981, no writ); Reiff v. McGuire, 616 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1981, no writ); Woolhouse v. Tolchin Instruments, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, no writ); Colson v. Thunderbird Building Materials, 589 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Still v. Liberty Leasing Co., Inc., 570 S.W.2d 93 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco, rev’d and remanded); Liberty Leasing Co., Inc. v. Still, 582 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ); A & S Distributing Company, Inc. v. Providence Pile Fabric Corporation, 563 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
In the ease before us, appellant’s proof consisted of an authenticated copy of the judgment from the Michigan Court and an order authorizing issuance of alias summons and service upon the defendants by first class mail. Prior to the issuance of this order, the Michigan Court had found that the appellee was willfully evading service of process. Appellant also introduced the sheriff’s return showing no service despite a diligent effort, and returned and refused certified letters. Our original opinion details the various methods of service attempted by appellant and their consequent lack of success. The Michigan Court’s final judgment decrees “the Defendants have been served in the manner prescribed by statute, court rule, and order of this Court.” Appellee, however, made no effort to show that the judgment was not final and subsisting or that the Court did not have jurisdiction to render it. Mitchim v. Mitchim, supra.
Appellee merely testified that he was “not served” with process and had no notice of the suit pending against him in Michigan. He did not introduce Michigan law to show that the Court had failed to comply with the appropriate statutes and rules. In our opinion, appellee’s testimony did not rebutt the presumption in favor of the Michigan judgment or shifted the burden back to the appellant to prove compliance with Michigan law. But see, Still v. Liberty Leasing Co., Inc., supra.
In Dowden v. Fischer, 338 S.W.2d 534 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1960, no writ) it was said “the burden of undermining the verity which (the foreign judgment) decrees import rests heavily upon the assailant.” (emphasis ours).
The appellee had the heavy burden of showing lack of jurisdiction. If Michigan law was violated, it was the appellee’s burden to show how, and we hold that his burden could only be met with clear and convincing evidence of want of valid service.
It is sometimes held that Texas law is presumed to be the law of the foreign jurisdiction when foreign law is not introduced. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, supra. It has, however, also been held that the presumed validity of a foreign judgment cannot be overthrown by the presumption that foreign law is the same as that of Texas. Dowden, supra. Compare Moorhead v. Transportation Bank of Chicago, Ill., 62 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1933, no writ). This being the case, the burden was on appellee to introduce Michigan law and to show noncompliance with the appropriate statutes and rules. Appel-lee failed to do this. We adhere to our original disposition.
*319Appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.