Court Opinion

ID: 2965522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:41:26.498352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:21.773521
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 98-1280

                        LORENZO Q. SCOTT,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

               WELLESLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL.,

                      Defendants, Appellees.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

            [Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                      Selya, Circuit Judge,
                Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                   and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                
                                

     Lorenzo Q. Scott on brief pro se.
     Douglas I. Louison, Stephen C. Pfaff, and Merrick and Louisonon brief for appellees.

September 24, 1998

                                
                                
                                
                                
           Per Curiam.  In connection with a rash of burglaries that
    plagued Wellesley, Massachusetts and neighboring communities in
    1994 and 1995, plaintiff Lorenzo Scott was convicted in state
    court of breaking and entering in the nighttime and sentenced
    to a lengthy prison term.  In 1996, he filed the instant
    damages action against four officers of the Wellesley Police
    Department (and the department itself), advancing vague
    allegations of Fourth Amendment violations and other
    improprieties surrounding his arrest and conviction.  From a
    judgment dismissing most of his claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 12(c) and the remaining ones pursuant to Rule 56, plaintiff
    now appeals.  We affirm. 
        Little discussion is required.  Plaintiff's contentions,
    as presented on appeal, reduce to the following three claims:
    that defendant Price violated the Fourth Amendment in
    connection with (1) the pre-arrest search of plaintiff's
    automobile, (2) the post-arrest search of his residence, and
    (3) the post-arrest search of a pawnshop.  The district court
    disposed of each of these allegations at the summary judgment
    stage.  We agree with the court that, to the extent they are
    not barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
    plaintiff's claims each fail on the merits. 
        The challenge to the car search was not properly raised
    below and so has been waived.  In any event, plaintiff has
    failed to call into question the state court's findings that
    probable cause and exigent circumstances existed.  At a
    minimum, he has failed to establish that the search was so
    unreasonable that qualified immunity would not apply. 
    Moreover, while it is undisputed that Price was present at the
    time (along with other officers from Wellesley and elsewhere),
    there is no indication that he participated in the decision to
    unlock the car or otherwise assisted in the search. 
        The search warrant for plaintiff's residence was obtained
    on the basis of an affidavit from a Lexington police officer,
    to which Price and others had contributed information.  The
    showing of probable cause made therein was easily sufficient to
    shield defendants from liability.  See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs,
    475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986) ("Only where the warrant
    application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
    render official belief in its existence unreasonable ... will
    the shield of immunity be lost.").  The charge that Price
    purposefully contributed false information to the affidavit
    proves unavailing, since it was not advanced in the complaint
    and lacks a proper evidentiary foundation in any event.
        Plaintiff's final claim--that the warrantless search of
    the pawnshop was unlawful--likewise fails as a matter of proof. 
    Plaintiff has not adequately called into question Price's
    averment that the pawnshop owner voluntarily turned over the
    jewelry in question to the Lexington police officers.
        Affirmed.