Court Opinion

ID: 9747576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:21:33.537913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:41.450417
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
dissenting. I join with the Chief Justice in concluding that Senator Wiley is eligible for appointment to this Court. However, I wish to emphasize my disagreement with Part I of the majority’s opinion.
The four-member majority which joins in this section of the Court’s opinion holds Senator Wiley’s appointment invalid solely for the reason that the Salary Increase Act violates the special laws provision, N. J. Const. (1947), Art. IV, § 7, ¶ 9, cl. (5). I believe that its treatment of this question seriously distorts the limited function of this constitutional provision and applies a test which is wholly at odds with logic and precedent. This novel interpretation *334would permit the Court to strike down any statute whenever it disagreed with the legislative purpose.
I
The majority' finds that the Salary Increase Act, N. J. S. A. 2A:1A — 6 et. seq. is an unconstitutional “special law”; it purportedly saves the law by excising section eight (salary exemption for legislator-appointees) from the act. Because the majority’s decision ensures that the salary increase will thereby be applicable to any legislator appointed to a judicial post, the constitutional disqualification clause bars the appointment. I believe that the initial link in this chain of reasoning — that the Salary Increase Act is a “special law” — is erroneously conceived.
The majority’s holding that the act is a “special law” rests on two premises: (1) that since all justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court perform the same work and have the same responsibilities, they must be classified within the same category for salary purposes; and (2) that the Salary Act had, and constitutionally could only have had, the single objective of increasing the salaries of members of the Judiciary. Neither premise is correct.
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The majority’s initial premise, that the statutory classification must result in all justices on the Court being treated alike, misconceives the concept of special legislation. The correct inquiry under that constitutional provision is whether persons prevented from receiving the salary increase under the act have some definable characteristic which makes their exclusion rational when measured in terms of the purposes which the law seeks to accomplish. Alfred Vail Mut. Assoc. v. Bor. of New Shrewsbury, 58 N. J. 40, 49 (1971); Roe v. Kervick, 42 N. J. 191, 233 (1964); Harvey v. Essex County Bd. of Freeholders, 30 N. J. 381, 389 (1959); 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3 ed. rev. 1973), § 40.01 et seq. *335Thus, the Legislature is free to create any classification in salary structures, as long as the categories which are chosen further some legitimate interest of the State. If any “conceivable state of facts” exists which would support the legislative classification as a reasonable means of achieving the statutory purposes, the law will be sustained against a challenge that it is “special.” Harvey v. Essex County Bd. of Freeholders, supra; Wilson v. Long Branch, 27 N. J. 360 (1958), cert. den. 358 U. S. 873, 79 S. Ct. 113, 3 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1958).
While explanations of what does and what does not constitute special legislation have been stated and restated by our courts, it is well established that it is not what a law includes that makes it special, but what it excludes. Budd v. Hancock, 66 N. J. L. 133, 135 (Sup. Ct. 1901). This principle was stated by the Court in Harvey v. Essex County Board of Freeholders, supra:
In deciding whether an act is general or special, it is what is excluded that is the determining factor and not what is included. ^ * * If no one is excluded who should be encompassed, the law is general.
[30 N. J. at 389; citation omitted]
And its application was explained by the court in Budd v. Hancock:
Within this distinction between a special and a general law, the question in every ease is whether an appropriate object is excluded to which the law, but for its limitations, would apply. If the only limitation contained in a law is a legitimate classification of its objects, it is a general law. Hence, if the object of a law have characteristics so distinct as reasonably to form, for the purpose legislated upon, a class by itself, the law is general, notwithstanding it operates upon a single object only; for a law is not general because it operates upon every person in the state, but because every person that can be brought within its predicament becomes subject to its operation.
[66 N. J. L. at 135-136]
See also, Kline v. N. J. Racing Comm., 38 N. J. 109, 117-118 (1962); Koons v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Atlantic City, 134 N. J. L. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff’d o. b. 135 N. J. L. 204 (E. & A. 1946).
*336But the majority fails to focus upon whether there is any characteristic of persons prevented from receiving the salary increase which would justify such an exclusion, and instead emphasizes the fact that there are characteristics which would justify their inclusion within the Act. It attempts to measure the impact of the statutory classification after the legislator-appointee assumes a position on the Court, finding that any justice who would be denied the salary increase would differ "in no significant respect from the other five Associate Justices.” See ante at 300. While the nature of the justices’ duties would have supported a decision by the Legislature to classify all associate justices within the same category for salary purposes, its failure to focus on that factor alone is not a sufficient reason for striking down the act. As the court stated in Equitable Beneficial Ass’n v. Withers, 122 N. J. Eq. 134 (Ch. Div. 1937) :
[T]he mere fact that the legislature has exempted certain specified classes from the operation of what would otherwise be an act of general application, is not in itself sufficient to invalidate the statute, unless it appears that such an exemption is arbitrary and lacking in a reasonable basis and foundation.
[122 N. J. Eq. at 138.]
Moreover, as long ago as 1878, Chief Justice Beasley conclusively rejected the majority’s approach of ascertaining whether a law had the effect of creating disparities among persons having, to some extent, similar characteristics. He noted in Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1878) that a broad interpretation of the words "special” and “local” in terms of the effect or applicability of a statute “would render almost every attempt at useful legislation abortive.” [Id. at 8].
The Court’s analysis in Harvey v. Essex County Bd. of Freeholders, supra, demonstrates the foregoing principles. There the Court reviewed a statute imposing a mandatory retirement age of 65 for court attendants. Although the statute applied generally to all court attendants, it exempted *337from the retirement requirement those persons who were not members of the county employees’ retirement system. The claim in that ease presented the same argument as that which .is raised today — that Art. IV, §7, ¶9, cl. (5) prohibited the classification. The Court rejected the challenge to the statute even though the distinguishing legislative characteristic (membership in a county retirement system) was unrelated to the tasks or the duties of court attendants. Unanimously, we held:
It is well established that the Legislature has a wide range of discretion in determining classifications and distinctions will be presumed to rest upon a rational basis “if there be any conceivable state of facts which would afford reasonable support for them.” * * * A “conceivable state of facts,” and one reasonably assumed, although not explicitly stated in the record, could be that the Legislature decided to exclude from retirement those over 65 and not members of the retirement system because the non-members would have no pension upon which to rely. A classification based on the ground of financial ability to care for oneself and a policy judgment as to the desirability of limiting those over 65 in this type of hazardous work are reasonable approaches to a serious problem for the individuals concerned and for the welfare of the county.
[30 N. J. at 390-91; citations omitted.]
Similarly, in Ervolini v. Camden County, 127 N. J. L. 473 (Sup. Ct. 1941) the court upheld an enactment which failed to classify persons according to the work that they performed. That case involved a statute setting salary scales for constables and court attendants who performed the same services in counties of the same population class. The court held that basing differences in salary upon whether or not the individual was employed by a county which had adopted the Civil Service Act did not violate the special laws provision, stating:
A law to be general must operate equally upon all of a group of objects which, having regard to the purposes of the legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves.
[Id. at 475; emphasis added.]
*338Accord, Lynch v. Borough of Edgewater, 8 N. J. 279, 292 (1951).
Hence, the test is not whether all justices on the Court perform the same work and assume the same responsibilities, but whether the Legislature could have rationally excluded legislator-appointees from receiving the salary increase during their elected terms. The Court is required to uphold the legislative classification if there is “any conceivable state of facts” which would suggest a rational reason for the statutory exemption.
Applying these principles to the Salary Increase Act, the Court must, first, determine whether the persons excluded from receiving the salary increase are marked by characteristics which are sufficiently distinct to set them apart from the general class of justices who would receive the increase. Clearly, the statutory exemption applies only to legislator-appointees who served in elected office when the Salary Increase Act was passed. Second, the exemption must be rationally related to the purposes of the legislation. The “conceivable state of facts” justifying the exemption is precisely the same as that which prompted the framers of our Constitution to adopt the disqualification clause. That constitutional provision was intended to eliminate the personal bias which might affect a legislator’s vote on a salary increase bill, without entirely excluding legislators from appointive office during their elected terms. Hence, the compromise which finally emerged as our present constitutional provision balanced two related but somewhat conflicting goals. The Legislature, in enacting the Salary Increase Bill, has rationally exempted legislator-appointees in section eight in order to accomplish the same competing goals and to ensure that the act would not be passed for improper reasons. Hot only is the exemption rationally tailored to meet the purpose of the section, but it is the only means by which this legislative purpose could have been accomplished.

*339
B

However, the majority refuses to consider whatever reasons the Legislature might have had in enacting section eight. Mr. Justice Mountain finds that the statute had only one object, to raise judicial salaries, and that therefore, any classification must further that sole objective. See ante at 298. He states that even if the legislation did have the corollary objective of comporting with the disqualification clause, this “in no way can be said to create a valid classification within the framework of this legislation.”
Initially, the factual conclusion that the Salary Increase Act was only intended to raise judicial salaries, and nothing more, is erroneous. Committee amendments to the Salary Increase Act indicate that the act was passed with the intent of comporting with the constitutional disqualification clause, and preventing legislator-appointees from receiving the increase. See Senate Judiciary Committee statement accompanying the committee amendments to what is now L. 1974, c. 57. Moreover, this Court is not required to inquire into legislative motives if there is any state of facts which would support a classification. Harvey v. Essex County Bd. of Freeholders, supra; Wilson v. Long Branch, supra. Thus, the Court stated in Washington National Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Review, 1 N. J. 545 (1949), that:
[T]he Legislature may, . . ., make distinctions of degree having a rational basis; and they will be presumed to rest on that basis if there be any conceivable state of facts which would afford reasonable ground for its action.
[Id. at 552.]
But the majority suggests that any attempt by the Legislature to draft the Salary Increase Act to comport with the constitutional disqualification clause would violate Art. IY, §7, ¶4, which cautions against a law embracing more than one object. Once again, the law does not support this conclusion.
*340Art. IV, §7, ¶4 has never been held to prevent the enactment of a statute merely because it included within its terms an exemption. That constitutional provision is simply irrelevant to this entire controversy. Its true application is made clear in numerous decisions holding that it is intended to prevent “logrolling,” and to give notice to the public and legislators of the subject to which an act relates. See e. g., Kline v. New Jersey Racing Comm’n, supra; State v. Zelinski, 33 N. J. 561 (1961); State v. Czarnicki, 124 N. J. L. 43 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Burlington v. Pennsylvania, 104 N. J. L. 649 (E. & A. 1928). Thus, Sutherland writes that:
The constitution is complied with if the various provisions relate to, and are a means of carrying out the general purpose of an enactment. * * * If there is any reasonable basis for grouping the various matters together, and if the public will not be deceived, the act will be sustained.
[1A, Sutherland, supra § 17.03 at 6; footnotes omitted]
Most courts, in considering challenges that an act dealt with more than one object, have simply focused upon whether the title of the act in question sufficiently gave notice of the general purpose of the legislation. Eor instance, referring to challenges that a statute embraced more than one object in violation of this same provision, Mr. Justice Mountain stated for a unanimous Court in Painter v. Painter:
As has been often noted, the title of a statute is intended to be a label and not an index. * * * The constitutional requirement is satisfied when the title gives notice to the Legislature and to the public of the general purpose of the Act and is not in any way misleading.
[65 N. J. 196, 206.]
In that case, and in the companion case of Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N. J. 186 (1974), the Court held that a statute dealing with both dissolution of a marriage and distribution of assets was one object within the meaning of *341Art. IV, § 7, ¶ 4. In the Chalmers case, Mr. Justice Sullivan wrote for the Court, noting that the Constitution required only that the statutes provisions relate to the general purpose of the legislation and be adequately expressed in the title. 65 N. J. at 195.
One would think that this case would be easily covered by the general rule in General Public Loan Corp. v. Director of Division of Taxation, 13 N. J. 393 (1953), that:
exceptions and provisos [in legislative enactments] are not objectionable unless it can be shown that they have no reasonable connection with the purpose of the statute ....
[Id. at 403.]
Are we to believe that the provision restricting a legislator-appointee from receiving the salary increase is unrelated to the Salary Increase Act?
II
There is nothing to support the majority’s conclusion that the Salary Increase Act is a special law. Its argument, based, in part, on the “one-object” rule is wholly unpersuasive, and brings to mind a passage in an article entitled “No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject”:
When the one-subject rule is examined from the purely pragmatic point of view of the advocate, the rule appears as a weak and undependable arrow in a quiver. The most remarkable fact that emerges from this investigation is that, while the rule has been invoked in hundreds of cases, in only a handful of cases have the courts held an act to embrace more than one subject. This seems to justify the courthouse lore to the effect that an argument based on the one subject rule is often the argument of a desperate advocate who lacks a sufficiently sound and persuasive one.
[1A Sutherland, supra at 523; emphasis added.]
I would hold Senator Wiley’s appointment constitutional in all respects.
Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Schheibeb join in this dissent.
*342For affirmance — Justices Mountain, Sullivan and Clifford and Judge Carton — 4.
For reversal — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Pashman and Sohreiber — 3.