Court Opinion

ID: 9400608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 17:03:52.608182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:46.810466
License: Public Domain

FILED
                           NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                            JUN 8 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESUS VILLEGAS; et al.,                         No.     21-56376

             Plaintiffs-Appellants,             D.C. No.
                                                2:20-cv-07469-SB-JC
 v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,                    MEMORANDUM*

             Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                 Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted June 5, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: WALLACE and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District
Judge.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
      Plaintiffs Jesus Villegas, Lucio Villegas, Karla Jinez, Jan Breidenbach, and Dan

Stormer (“Plaintiffs”) appeal from the district court’s denial of their Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law brought after a jury

returned a verdict in favor of Defendants City of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles

Police Department, Former Police Chief Michael Moore, and Officers Jose Diaz,

Miguel Diaz, Kevin Wong, and Victor Figueroa (“Defendants”) on Plaintiffs’ 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the individual defendants, § 1983 municipal liability

claim, and California Bane Act claim brought pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52 and

52.1.1 All of Plaintiffs’ claims are based on allegations that Plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amendment rights were violated when law enforcement entered their residence at

approximately 1:30 a.m. after receiving a static 911 call from the residence and

purportedly suspecting an emergency. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and, reviewing de novo, Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah Cnty., 556 F.3d 797, 802 (9th

Cir. 2009), we affirm.

      1
        Because Plaintiffs did not move for Rule 50(b) judgment as a matter of law on
their municipal liability or California Bane Act claims, we will limit our discussion to
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the individual defendants. See, e.g., Steam Press
Holdings, Inc. v. Hawaii Teamsters, Allied Workers Union, Loc. 996, 302 F.3d 998,
1005 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing In re E.R. Fegert, Inc., 887 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1989))
(“[A]s a general rule courts of this circuit will not consider arguments on appeal that
were not properly raised at the lower court level . . . .”).
                                           2
      1. The district court properly denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 50(b) motion because the

jury’s verdict was based on a reasonable interpretation of the evidence. The jury was

presented evidence that law enforcement received a static 911 call at approximately

1:00 a.m., law enforcement found the front door of the residence to be unlocked, and,

despite the fact that two cars were parked outside the residence, no one came to the

door when law enforcement rang the doorbell three times and announced their

presence through the open front door. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could

have found that the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement permitted law enforcement’s warrantless entry into Plaintiffs’ residence.

See United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2008); Martin v. City of

Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, because a reasonable

jury could have found that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the

district court properly denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter

of law.

      AFFIRMED.

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