Court Opinion

ID: 9884029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:32:06.10013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:34.510777
License: Public Domain

HUSPENI, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would remand for entry of a current support order consistent with Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859 (Minn.1986) and applicable statutes.
The circumstances in this matter are not unlike those in Evans v. Evans, 402 N.W.2d 158, (Minn.Ct.App.1987), and the reservations which I expressed in the Dissent in Evans are present here also:
Although there exist in this case both a dissolution decree and a separate proceeding under Minn.Stat. § 256.87 (Supp. 1985), the only order even remotely concerned with support of the minor children is one designated [reimbursement]. If tomorrow the minor children were to cease receiving AFDC benefits, there would be no permanent current support available to assist them in meeting their ongoing needs. Such a circumstance cannot possibly serve their best interests. Instead, it seems the interests of the county are being protected at the expense of the children.
Ideally in a fact situation such as this, both mother and father should have independent counsel and the decree of dissolution should be amended to include a reasonable support order that would reflect current receipt of AFDC benefits, *876but would continue during the minority of the children irrespective of AFDC involvement. With such protection, the custodial parent would be assured of ongoing support without having to return to court for a support order when AFDC benefits ended.
Entry of a permanent support order would be consistent with the philosophy expressed by this court in Hennepin County v. Geshick, 387 N.W.2d 439 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), when it observed that “[t]he county was obligated to seek a current support order not only to protect its own rights but also to protect the rights of the mother, whom it represented.” Id. at 441. Here the county also represents the mother (and the minor children). They deserve to be protected in their own right in the manner directed by this court in Geshick.
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The order approved by the majority today escapes scrutiny under critical statutory and case law standards. The interests of both these parents and their minor children are poorly served by an affirmance in this matter.
Id. at 162.
I urge here, as I did in Evans, that this matter be remanded.