Court Opinion

ID: 9698660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:56:42.548273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.553884
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the majority’s result and resolution of the first three issues. As to the fourth issue, I agree with the result of the majority but would adopt the reasoning of Judge Clinton W. Smith of Lycoming County.
Since the trial judge stated his reasons so cogently, I take the liberty of quoting from his opinion at pages 7-9:
The next error which the defendant assigns to his trial is that the ‘in the business of’ counts should not have been given to the jury. The substance of this allegation is that the “in the business of” goes to the grading of the offense and should have been decided by the Court. The defendant further contends that to submit this issue to the jury was prejudicial in that it concerned prior criminal activity which is usually inadmissible evidence.
To back its contention that the ‘in the business of’ counts should not have been given to the jury the defendant cites to the case of Commonwealth v. Coleman, 289 Pa.Superior Ct. 221, 433 A.2d 36 (1981). In Coleman the defendant was convicted of Retail Theft, third offense. During the trial the Commonwealth, in addressing the jury, referred to the prior convictions of the defendant. The Superior Court upheld the grant of a new trial on the basis that the prior conviction evidence should not have been given to the jury. The Court held that such information was prejudicial and that since it went solely to *213grading for the purposes of sentencing and not to an essential element of crime it was inadmissible.
At first blush it may appear that the statute at issue in Coleman and that at issue in the present case are similar. Both have sections labeled “grading” which describe the occasions when one convicted of the offense will receive a more severe sentence. However, there are distinctions between the two statutes which render the logic used by the Court in Coleman inapplicable to the present case. The statute at issue in Coleman was one designed to deal with the recidivist. Under such a statute the only determination necessary to assign a grade to the offense is how many prior convictions of the same offense are on record. This is a determination easily made by the judge. There is no question of fact for a jury to decide. Further, evidence of prior conviction is not relevant to a determination of whether the defendant is guilty of the Retail Theft charge for which he is being tried.
The distinction between the two types of grading sections is that while the grading section of the Retail Theft statute provides greater penalties for a greater number of convictions, the grading section of the Theft by Receiving statute provides for greater penalties for the more severe offense. The offense is more severe if the defendant is “in the business of buying or selling stolen property”. Whether defendant is “in the business of” can only be established by the introduction of evidence relating to acts by the defendant from which such activity can be inferred. The believability of such evidence will depend on the credibility of the witnesses and on the amount and content of the testimony. Clearly, such factual determinations are to be made by the jury. Evidence of prior occasions when the defendant received stolen goods is relevant to the determination by the jury of whether the defendant is “in the business of.”
The defendant, in effect, is arguing that simply because an element of the crime is found in the grading section of the statute it automatically falls under the Coleman *214precedent and, therefore, it becomes a determination for the Court at the time of sentencing. However, the Court will not assume such a motive on the part of the legislature. The particular language of a statute is often chosen for purposes of convenience, clarity or economy. Legislation framed with these aims in view is often lacking in consistency. A review of Pennsylvania’s statutes will show that in some cases the grading occurs within the paragraph defining the offense while in other cases the offense is defined in the grading section. A review of the Theft by Receiving statute indicates that it is of the latter type. The legislature could not have intended to replace the judgment of the jury with the judgment of the Court in such factual determinations simply by locating particular elements of the offense in the grading section of the statute.
The logic of locating elements of an offense dealing with the severity of the offense in the grading paragraph of the section is obvious. The Court will not interpret a statute to permit the Court to usurp the traditional function of the jury simply because elements of the crime are found in a paragraph of the statute labeled “grading”. For the above stated reasons [this] ... assignment of error will be dismissed.
The majority appears to base its resolution of this issue, in part, on the due process guarantee embodied in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Insofar as the majority is asserting that due process requires the fact finder to determine whether appellant was “in the business of” receiving stolen property, I agree. However, given the posture of the appeal sub judice, I find In re Winship inapposite since, contrary to the In re Winship principle, the instant appellant is arguing that the trial judge erred in submitting to the jury the factual question of “in the business.” Thus, appellant is not asserting a violation of the In re Winship principle but, if anything, he is requesting the court to contravene or disregard In re Winship.