Court Opinion

ID: 9950590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 15:08:29.980913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:26.774471
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A
COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION.
                                                RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2024
                                                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

              Supreme Court of Kentucky
                              2023-SC-0189-MR

ANTHONY OWENS                                                       APPELLANT

                ON APPEAL FROM SPENCER CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE MELANIE BRUMMER, JUDGE
                            NO. 10-CR-00014

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                 AFFIRMING

      This appeal arises from a motion filed pursuant to CR 60.02(f)

challenging a final sentence of 35 years Anthony Owens received following a

jury trial on charges of Sodomy 1st Degree, Sexual Abuse 1st Degree and

Assault 4th Degree. This Court previously affirmed the judgment and

conviction in a direct appeal of Owens’ trial in 2014. Owens v. Commonwealth,

No. 2012-SC-000790-MR, 2014 WL 2807996 (Ky. June 19, 2014). The current

CR 60.02 motion, filed nine years after the November 2012 judgment in this

case, was a supplement to a pro se RCr 11.42 motion filed in 2016. The sole

issues raised in the CR 60.02(f) motion are: 1) the presentence report reviewed

at sentencing was incorrectly prepared by the Department of Probation and

Parole rather than the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ); and 2) the trial
court’s failure to consider probation or alternative sentencing options prior to

sentencing Owens to prison.

      After a hearing before the trial court, Owens prevailed in his argument

regarding the preparation of the presentence report by DJJ and consideration

of probation. As a result, on August 30, 2022, the trial court entered an order

vacating the prior sentence and ordering a new sentencing hearing. On March

29, 2023, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing. After the hearing, the

trial court entered an amended judgment again sentencing Owens to 35 years

imprisonment. The current appeal is from the new judgment. After careful

review, we affirm.

                     Factual and Procedural Background

      Owens was charged with three counts of Sodomy I (victim under 12),

three counts of Sexual Abuse I (victim under 12) and one count of Assault IV

(child abuse). These charges were based upon an incident that happened on or

about February 9, 2010, when Owens babysat B.H., his neighbor’s three-and-

a-half-year-old child. Owens watched the child approximately 2 hours. Upon

return from their business, B.H.’s parents noted that their child was asleep but

wearing different clothes than when they left. Shortly thereafter, B.H. began

vomiting. B.H.’s parents changed his clothes, and they noticed bruises and

sores on his body that had not existed prior to Owens’ babysitting. When

asked about the injuries, Owens relayed that B.H. had fallen down some stairs.

      The minor was taken to the hospital by his parents where medical

personnel identified additional injuries. These included bruising on his sides,

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left cheek, abdomen, hips, thighs, legs, and buttocks as well as linear

abrasions across his back. Importantly, there was trauma to his salivary

glands and severe trauma to his genitalia. The hospital contacted law

enforcement, and after speaking with hospital staff and B.H.’s parents,

Kentucky State Police Detective Mitch Harris (Det. Harris) contacted Owens.

      Det. Harris interviewed Owens regarding the incident. Owens was

accompanied by his mother. Owens and his mother were read a Statement of

Rights, and both signed a waiver voluntarily after the rights were explained.

After obtaining the waiver, Det. Harris independently interviewed Owens, and

he admitted to ejaculating on B.H., anally penetrating B.H., orally sodomizing

B.H., forcing oral sodomy on B.H., and punching B.H. up to five times. A

Spencer County Grand Jury indicted Owens on three counts of Sodomy 1st

Degree (victim under 12), three counts of Sex Abuse 1st Degree (victim under

12), and one count of Assault 4th Degree (child abuse). There was a pre-trial

motion to suppress Owens’ statement arguing he had not understood his

rights. The trial court denied the motion ruling that, considering the totality of

the circumstances, Owens’ statements were knowingly and voluntarily made.

After a trial, the jury found Owens guilty of two counts of Sodomy 1st , one

count of Sexual Abuse 1st, and one count of Assault 4th. The remaining counts

were dismissed pre-trial. On November 14, 2012, the court sentenced Owens

to imprisonment for thirty-five years consistent with the jury’s

recommendation. Owens, 2014 WL 2807996, at *1.

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      On June 6, 2016, Owens filed a pro se motion to vacate pursuant to RCr

11.42. Upon filing this motion, the trial court appointed the Department of

Public Advocacy (“DPA”) to represent Owens. His attorney filed a supplement to

the original RCr 11.42 motion pursuant to CR 60.02 alleging the new attacks

on his sentencing procedure. On July 28, 2021, the trial court held an

evidentiary hearing on the motion for ineffective assistance of counsel and the

sentencing issues. Following that hearing, the trial court entered an order on

August 30, 2022, denying the RCr 11.42 relief but granting a new sentencing

hearing for the defendant. The purpose of the new proceeding was to have the

benefit of a presentence investigation report prepared by DJJ and for Owens to

make argument for probation. Owens thus prevailed in his CR 60.02 request

for relief. Prior to the new proceeding, the trial court ordered DJJ to prepare a

new presentence report and a sexual offender assessment.

      Notably, at the beginning of this second sentencing hearing, the trial

judge expressly noted that the case was on for a “corrective sentencing

hearing.” Owens was present and represented by counsel. At the new hearing,

the trial judge heard evidence from two witnesses. The first, Dr. Dennis

Wagner, was a licensed psychologist in private practice. Dr. Wagner performed

an evaluation of Owens and submitted a report based upon his findings. Dr.

Wagner met with Owens two times at the Green River Correctional Facility. He

gave testimony in favor of release for Owens. Next, the court heard from a Ms.

Brenda Mills, who was an alternative sentencing worker in Shelby County

employed by DPA. She also gave testimony about the best plans for Owens’

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treatment and prospects. In addition to the witness testimony, as part of the

hearing, the trial judge specifically directed counsel for Owens to review the

sentencing report prepared by DJJ. The attorney and Owens read through the

newly provided document at counsel table real-time during the hearing.

       In addition to the testimony of the two witnesses, counsel for Owens

argued against any notion that he was not eligible for probation because of

being a violent offender. Counsel stated that because of Owens’ status as a

juvenile at the time of the offense, the court should appropriately consider

probation. Counsel argued that the 35-year sentence was contrary to the goals

of the Juvenile Code and emphasized that rehabilitation should be the guiding

principle in sentencing her client. The Commonwealth’s arguments centered on

the gravity of the offense, the harm to the victim and community safety.

      At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated, after having heard the

testimony and considered the new reports, it was sentencing Owens to 35 years

to serve in the penitentiary. The court further stated it would follow-up with a

written order. The April 5, 2023, written order states in part: “After testimony

from Defense witnesses and hearing statements from the Defendant and

Commonwealth as to probation, and given consideration to the PSI, the Sex

Offender Risk Assessment, and to the nature and circumstances of the crime,

as well as the history, character, and the condition of the Defendant . . . ” the

court sentenced Owens to 35 years (emphasis added). We pause again to note,

for the purposes of the current review, that this Court in a previous order

affirmed the direct appeal of Owens’ suppression issue and the initial trial

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process. Accordingly, the sole issue before the Court is whether the trial court

properly exercised its discretion in denying the request for probation and

sentencing Owens to serve.

                              Standard of Review

      The Court finds the issue of probation is preserved as the trial court

specifically granted Owens’ motion for a new sentencing hearing based upon

the error in preparation of the presentence report and probation issues raised

in the supplemental CR 60.02 motion. Further, the decision of whether to grant

probation is wholly within the discretion of the trial court. Burke v.

Commonwealth, 506 S.W.3d 307, 314 (Ky. 2016). A trial court’s decision to

deny probation is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. The test

for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was “arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). This Court will

analyze these issues using an abuse of discretion standard.

                                    Analysis

      The issue raised by this appeal is whether the second amended trial

judgment violated youthful-offender laws because of the trial court’s failure to

properly consider probation. In support, Owens highlights the directives of

Kentucky’s Juvenile Code that require consideration of probation, conditional

discharge, or alternative sentencing prior to imposing a sentence of

imprisonment. KRS 533.010(2). This mandate applies unless the defendant is

a violent felon as defined in KRS 439.3401 or another statute that prohibits

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probation. KRS 533.010(2). Owens spends a significant amount of time in his

papers arguing the prohibitions against violent-offender probation outlined in

KRS 439.3401 and KRS 533.060 do not apply to him as a youthful offender.

Thomas v. Commonwealth, 605 S.W.3d 545, 566 (Ky. 2020) (holding that the

violent offender statute is not applicable to youthful offenders for the purposes

of consideration of probation), abrogated on other grounds by Abbott, Inc. v.

Guirguis, 626 S.W.3d 475 (Ky. 2021). 1 The Commonwealth concedes this point.

Therefore, this Court will not further address this issue. In addition, it is

undisputed that Owens was transferred to circuit court as a youthful offender

under KRS 600.020(72); KRS 635.020.

      Owens states the court record is silent as to whether he was considered

appropriately for probation. Owens’ counsel argued that releasing Owens on

probation would best serve the goals of our Commonwealth’s youthful offender

laws. In support of his position, Owens argues the record shows he was 16

years old at the time of the alleged crime. Counsel argued, given his relative

youth at the time of the offense, he should be allowed a second chance. Owens’

counsel emphasizes that neither the oral judgment nor written amended

sentence outline specific reasons on the record for denying probation. Owens

       1 Like adults, youthful offenders convicted of certain sexual offenses that also

involve both certain enumerated statutory aggravators (such as use of force, bodily
injury, or kidnapping) and 1) commercial sexual activity, 2) incest, or 3) use of a minor
in a sexual performance, or promotion of or use of minors in distributing material
portraying such performances, are ineligible for probation. KRS 532.045; Bloyer v.
Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 219 (Ky. 2022). However, because Owens’ sexual offenses
did not involve commercial sexual activity, incest, or the enumerated forms of child
sexual performance conduct, he was eligible to be considered for probation.
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argues this lack of verbal or written findings regarding probation are

tantamount to a finding that the trial court ignored or failed to consider

probation in the case.

       We disagree. Based upon a review of the record and a review of the

hearing in its totality, the Court finds no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Owens cites to no authority requiring courts to use specific language regarding

probation consideration in a sentencing document. While admittedly, detailed

findings are not listed by the trial judge, the issue of probation was a key part

of the additional step of resentencing Owens. The trial court’s language in

granting the new sentencing entered on August 30, 2022, agrees with Owens

that the court is required to consider probation. The trial court asks the parties

to place this matter on a mutually convenient future criminal docket in

Spencer Circuit Court so that Owens will have the opportunity to present any

alternative sentencing plans, treatment plans, and/or plans should he be

granted probation. Op. and Order, 7-8, Aug. 30, 2022. Simply stated, it is not

tenable to argue probation was not considered by the trial court when the

express purpose of holding a second hearing was to allow Owens to make

argument for probation. The trial court acknowledged from the outset in its

opening statement that this was a corrective sentencing hearing. She further

stated in her written judgment that she heard witnesses and listened to

statements from the defendant and Commonwealth “as to probation”.

       Owens’ attorney had ample time to present factors she believed weighed

in favor of giving him an opportunity to improve himself and become a

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functioning member of the community. She repeatedly discussed the difficulty

her client faced getting in the appropriate treatment in prison. She also

pointed to the lack of any similar offenses since his time incarcerated awaiting

the second sentencing. She argued his age at the time of the offense. She called

two witnesses to discuss these issues.

       The court stated both orally and in its subsequent written order that it

considered all the information presented when arriving at its sentencing

decision. The trial court states in her decision she based her ruling on the

consideration of the PSI, the Sex Offender Risk Assessment, the nature and

circumstances of this crime, as well has the history and character of the

defendant. These are all appropriate considerations for determining whether to

probate an individual. This Court does not find sufficient evidence of failure by

the trial court to properly consider the presentence report by DJJ or the

alternative options available when sentencing and does not find an abuse of

discretion. For these reasons, the trial court’s sentence is affirmed.

                                    Conclusion

      For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s amended judgment

and sentence of 35 years for two counts of Sodomy 1st Degree (victim under

12), one count of Sexual Abuse 1st Degree (victim under 12), and one count of

Assault 4th Degree (child abuse).

      All sitting. All concur.

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Jennifer Wade
Assistant Public Advocate

Kathleen K. Schmidt
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Stephanie L. McKeehan
Assistant Attorney General

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