Court Opinion

ID: 9664167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:05:17.319558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:02.744199
License: Public Domain

T. G-. Kavanagh, J.
(dissenting). This matter comes to us under that provision of Const 1963, art 4, § 6 which reads:
“The supreme court shall determine which plan complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements and shall direct that it be adopted by the commission and published as provided in this section.”
We are not asked to determine whether the present apportionment of the Michigan Legislature is valid. If we have any function at all, it is to determine which of the plans submitted by the commission “complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements” and order its adoption.
Because I am persuaded the provisions of art 4 which would place this responsibility on us are invalid as in contravention of the US Const, I conclude that we have no proper function at all in the premises.
As written, § 6 created a commission consisting of representatives of some political parties to ap*493portion the legislature after each decennial census according to a method relating population and territory in a specified ratio.
When the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506 (1964) struck down nonpopulation factors in apportionment it became apparent art 4 could not stand as written.
I agree with Justice Souris who said in In re Apportionment of Legislature, 373 Mich 247, 258 (1964):
“Having concluded that the apportionment and districting provisions for both the senate, and house of representatives were violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was my conclusion * * * that section 6 of article 4 which established the commission * * * likewise had to be held void. Section 6, in my view, was so dependent upon the continuing validity of the preceding sections by which the commission’s duties were specified and expressly limited, that it could not survive alone.”
I too am convinced that the parts are not sever-able and that § 6’s commission fell with the prior provisions of art 4. But since all of my colleagues would simply prune the unconstitutional limitation from the commission and thus accord life to a commission not defined by the people, it is necessary to examine the commission they would create.
As I view it, even this cannot stand.
The commission described in § 6 is an apportioning agept comprised of representatives of political parties. To be sure the people are under no constraint to select such an apportioning agent. They could have selected a single officer to perform the task or provided for a committee to be selected by the Governor or provided for any other nonrepresentative group. But when they did seek to create *494a representative group for this work they were obliged to observe the constitutional requirement that if a class be recognized there may be no legal discrimination in favor of part of that class. Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535; 62 S Ct 1110; 86 L Ed 1655 (1942).
The provision in § 6 requiring a third party to receive more than 25% of the Gubernatorial vote in order to obtain representation on the commission and making no provision for representation for other parties receiving less than 25% but still representing a significant number of voters, is invidious discrimination offensive to both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23; 89 S Ct 5; 21 L Ed 2d 24 (1968).
There is no valid commission under art 4 and hence there is no need to review their work. Indeed it is wholly improper.
To decide this case as presented to us and to select any of their plans is to make a political decision. In this setting the parties do not come to this Court asking for justice — they ask for a campaign issue.
It is difficult to conceive of anything better calculated to undermine public confidence in this Court and destroy our credibility.
Today this is a tragic error of the first magnitude.