Court Opinion

ID: 9542958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:40:38.884315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:20.736719
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with only so much of the Opinion of my learned colleague as concludes that the most distinguished trial court, the Honorable William J. Franks, did not unconditionally accept the defendant’s pleas of guilty. This being the case, we should limit our analysis to the application of the statutory law to the facts of this case.
Judge Franks directs this court to 18 Pa.C.S. § 109 as the correct source of double jeopardy analysis in this Commonwealth. That section provides, in pertinent part:
§ 109. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense
When a prosecution for a violation of the same provisions of the statutes is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
*580(3) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in ... a plea of guilty accepted by the court, [emphasis added].
Judge Franks succinctly summarized his reasoning as follows:
We hold that a fair reading of the above-quoted provision shows that defendant has not been convicted of any of the crimes charged. It is true defendant did enter pleas of guilty pursuant to a plea bargain; however, those pleas were not accepted in this Court. Unless the pleas are accepted, there is no conviction. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 109(3). Because there was no prior conviction, prior acquittal, or the possibility of being subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense, jeopardy has not attached.
Opinion, Franks, J., filed December 13, 1991, page 4.
On this appeal, Leroy Branch, through his counsel, seeks to persuade this court that the basic issue to be determined is whether or not “a plea was entered.” Brief for Appellant, Summary of Argument, page 5. In the argument section of his Brief, however, Branch fails to distinguish between the “entry” of a guilty plea and its “acceptance” by the court. That distinction is crucial. I agree with Judge Franks that Branch is not in danger of being put twice in jeopardy by virtue of his tendering guilty pleas as the pleas were not accepted and, consequently, no conviction resulted.
I conclude that this appeal is controlled by the plain meaning set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 109(3). I also conclude that the plea in this case was tendered, but not accepted. Therefore, I would not find occasion to cite cases in this, or other jurisdictions, which consider factual circumstances involving accepted pleas. Nor would I speculate on whether acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense might carry with it an implied acquittal of a greater offense.
On this submitted appeal, I would agree with my colleagues that the order denying Branch’s motion to dismiss *581on double jeopardy grounds must be affirmed. I therefore concur in the result.