Court Opinion

ID: 9573658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:57:29.550925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:42:17.171265
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part):
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the trial judge’s denial of appellant’s motion for continuance and in its conclusion that the trial judge did not follow the recommendation enunciated by this Court in State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E. (2d) 701 (1987).
First, I respectfully dissent from so much of the majority’s opinion as concludes that the trial court erred in ruling that the solicitor’s stated reason for striking Juror Stanley V. Anderson was racially discriminatory. Second, I dissent on the basis of my view that a ruling prior to the hearing pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. (2d) 69 (1986), would not preclude the trial court from proceeding under a subsequent antithetical finding on the same issue formed as a result of holding a Batson hearing. Third, I would dissent from the majority’s implicit finding that merely conducting a cursory Batson hearing without affording the relief indicated extends to minority defendants the protection intended in Batson.
During jury selection, the trial judge denied appellant’s motion for a Batson hearing on the ground that a prima facie case1 had not been established. Subsequent to its ruling, “as a precautionary measure,” the judge required the state to ex*535plain its strikes of black prospective jurors Frances Alston and Stanley V. Anderson. Upon hearing the state’s explanations, the court found that the solicitor’s articulated reason for striking Juror Anderson was not racially neutral. Despite such finding, the trial court determined that its prior ruling that no prima facie case had been established acted as a bar to relief.
As I read the majority’s opinion, it’s holding turns upon their interpretation of the solicitor’s articulated reason that Juror Anderson was excluded because of the juror’s demeanor. The trial judge was similarly situated as the solicitor to observe the juror’s demeanor during the three-day period referred to by the solicitor. The trial judge presided over the jury selection process and, based upon his observations in relation to the solicitor’s perception and articulated reason, determined that the exclusion of the juror was racially discriminatory.
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution must articulate a racially neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. The trial court will then have a duty to determine if the accused has established purposeful discrimination. The trial court’s determination in the context under consideration turns on an evaluation of credibility. Therefore, a reviewing court should ordinarily give such findings great deference. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. at 1724. See also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. (2d) 518 (1985).
I would hold that once the trial judge found that the state’s articulated reason for striking Juror Anderson was not racially neutral, the jury selection process should have commenced de novo. I am of the opinion that this record more than adequately reflects that the appellant’s trial was rendered fundamentally unfair and that he is entitled to a new trial. State v. Butler, — S.C. —, 397 S.E. (2d) 87 (1990), cert, denied, — U.S. —, 111 S. Ct. 442, 112 L. Ed. (2d) 425 (1990). I would reverse.