Court Opinion

ID: 9941653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 17:11:49.070606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:50.571396
License: Public Domain

J-S45003-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  TODD A. ABROMITIS, JR.                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KAYLA J. ABROMITIS                           :   No. 1138 MDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered July 14, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s):
                            2015-CV-03393-DC

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 16, 2024

       Todd A. Abromitis, Jr. (“Father”) appeals the July 14, 2023 order that

awarded Kayla J. Abromitis (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) primary

physical custody of Parents’ daughter, A.A., born December 2013, during the

school year while granting Parents equally shared physical custody during the

summer months. We affirm.

       We glean the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter from

the certified record.     Parents were married in May 2013, and separated in

February 2015. They reached an agreement concerning custody of A.A. in

June 2015, which provided Parents would share legal custody. See Order,

6/4/15, at ¶ 1.      Under this agreement, Mother exercised primary physical

custody of A.A., with Father having partial custody rights on alternating

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S45003-23

weekends and one weekday. Id. at ¶¶ 2-5. The parties reaffirmed these

general custody parameters in a subsequent agreement in November 2015.

See Order, 11/9/15, at ¶¶ 1-4. Ultimately, Parents’ divorce was finalized in

August 2016. Thereafter, the parties generally abided by the dictates of the

above-referenced agreements and were co-parenting successfully from

approximately August 2016 through January 2022.

       Following     Parents’     divorce,     Father   relocated   to   Middletown,

Pennsylvania, where he currently resides with his wife (“Stepmother”). Father

and Stepmother share their home with their son, L.A., who was born in

November 2022, and Stepmother’s daughter, J.B., who was twelve years old

at the time of the custody hearings in this case.           See N.T., 3/1/23, at 5.

Mother lives in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania with A.A., maternal grandmother, and

Mother’s son, B.J.S., who was five years old at the time of the hearings.1 See

N.T., 7/7/23, at 4, 8, 12.

       A.A. attends private school at West Shore Christian Academy (“West

Shore”), where she has been enrolled for several years after concerns arose

regarding her progress in public school. Id. at 12-13. Specifically, A.A. was

found to be approximately one and one-half years “behind” educationally upon

her enrollment at West Shore. Id. at 12. Consequently, A.A. was receiving

____________________________________________

1 B.J.S. is not Father’s child. Mother testified that she shares physical custody
of B.J.S. with a different ex-husband on an approximately equal basis. See
N.T., 7/7/23, at 12.

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tutoring services from both an organization, Best Brains, and from Father’s

sister for a period of time. Id. at 13.

       Against this backdrop, the relationship between the parties grew

increasingly acrimonious. Sometime in 2020, an incident occurred between

A.A. and J.B., wherein J.B. had “held down” A.A. in a locked bathroom in

Father’s house and kissed her. See N.T., 3/1/23, at 49; N.T., 7/7/23, at 25,

29-30. This incident sparked significant concern and led to the adoption of

informal rules by the parties to prevent future incidents, i.e., prohibiting the

girls from being in the same room with closed doors. Id.

       Due to the breakdown in the parties’ relationship, A.A. ceased being

tutored by Father’s sister and Mother began to advocate for enrolling the child

in supplemental classes through Sylvan Learning Center (“Sylvan”), which

became a source of conflict for the parties due to logistics and cost concerns.2

       In January 2021, Father filed a child abuse report with Child Protective

Services (“CPS”) claiming Mother had struck A.A. with a spatula. See N.T.,

3/1/23, at 10-14. Thereafter, in July 2021, Father submitted a second referral

claiming that Mother had “slapped” A.A. across her face. Id. at 15-18. Both

claims were deemed to be unfounded. Id. at 18, 52.

____________________________________________

2 Although Mother referred to this organization several times in her testimony
as “Sullivan Learning Center,” the custody court eventually clarified that the
correct name is “Sylvan Learning Center.” See N.T., 7/7/23, at 70.

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       Several days after Father’s second CPS referral, Mother contacted law

enforcement and alleged that J.B. was sexually abusing A.A. in Father’s home.

See N.T., 3/1/23, at 19; N.T., 7/7/23, at 25-26. Specifically, Mother claimed

that J.B. was “touching” A.A. and showing A.A. sexually inappropriate

materials, such as drawings and pictures. Id. Ultimately, police determined

that no abuse had occurred and no charges were filed in connection with

Mother’s report. See N.T., 3/1/23, at 19; N.T., 7/7/23, at 27.

       Due to these allegations, Mother refused to allow Father to exercise

physical custody of A.A. in his home while J.B. was present between July 4

and August 10, 2022. See N.T., 3/1/23, at 19-20. However, Mother did not

prevent Father from exercising custody outside of his home, which included

at least one instance when Father picked up A.A. from Mother’s home for

several hours. See N.T., 3/1/23, at 52-53; N.T., 7/7/23, at 28.

       On July 14, 2022, Father filed a petition to modify custody seeking “sole

physical custody” of A.A. on the basis that Mother was an unfit and unsafe

parent.3    Petition to Modify Custody, 7/14/22, at ¶¶ 21-22.      Specifically,

Father’s petition largely relied upon the same allegations set forth in the

unfounded CPS reports he had filed earlier in the year. Id. at ¶¶ 7-11. Mother

____________________________________________

3 The same day, Father also filed an emergency petition for special relief,
which raised identical allegations and requested the same relief. Compare
Petition to Modify Custody, 7/14/22, at ¶¶ 1-22 with Emergency Petition for
Special Relief, 7/14/22, at ¶¶ 1-18. On July 22, 2022, the custody court
denied Father’s request for an emergency custody modification. No appeal
was filed from this order denying emergency relief.

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filed an answer and a counterclaim that, inter alia, requested that the court

deny Father’s request and permit Mother to maintain “primary physical

custody” of A.A. See Answer and Counterclaim, 8/1/22, at ¶ 24.

      On August 16, 2022, the court entered an interim custody order that

maintained the status quo, i.e., shared legal custody with Mother exercising

primary physical custody of A.A. and Father having partial physical custody

on alternating weekends and one day per week.          This arrangement was

confirmed in a second order entered in September 2022.

      On March 6, 2023, the court appointed Allison Hastings, Esquire, to

serve as guardian ad litem (“the GAL”) to represent A.A.’s best interests at

the custody hearings. To that end, the GAL met with A.A. on several occasions

and interviewed various individuals involved with this case. She also prepared

and filed a report memorializing what she believed was in A.A.’s best interests.

Specifically, she recommended that Mother be awarded primary physical

custody of A.A. during the school year and that Parents share custody equally

on a weekly basis during her summer break. See N.T., 7/7/23, at 81-82.

      The court held a custody trial on March 1, 2023, and July 7, 2023.

During these proceedings, Mother, Father, Stepmother, the GAL, and the

paternal and maternal grandmothers each testified.       Separately, the court

interviewed A.A. in camera. Between the first and second days of the custody

trial, we note that A.A. was formally diagnosed with attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). See N.T., 7/7/23, at 22.

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       On July 14, 2023, the trial court entered an order, which:              (1)

maintained shared legal custody between Parents; (2) awarded Mother

primary physical custody during the school year and Father partial physical

custody on alternating weekends and each Tuesday evening; and (3) provided

for equally shared physical custody during summer break on an alternating

weekly basis. The order also directed that A.A. be enrolled at Sylvan and

provided that Mother would be responsible for the “initial” costs with the

option to seek future “allocation” from Father through separate domestic

relations litigation. The same day, the trial court also filed a memorandum

opinion detailing its findings as to the factors set forth at 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).

       Father filed a timely notice of appeal along with a concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

The trial court responded by filing a responsive opinion pursuant to Rule

1925(a)(2)(ii).      On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our

consideration:

       1.     Whether the [trial] court’s conclusions were against the
              weight of the evidence presented through trial regarding
              custody factors one, two, four, six, eight, ten, thirteen, and
              sixteen?

       2.     Whether the evidence presented to the court was
              insufficient to deny Father 50/50 custody and give [Mother]
              primary physical custody during the school year?[4]
____________________________________________

4 As set forth in his original request for modification, Father initially requested
“sole physical custody” of A.A. See Petition to Modify Custody, 7/14/22, at
¶¶ 21-22. At the July 7, 2023 custody hearing, however, Father abandoned
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Father’s brief at 1-2 (cleaned up).5

       Our standard and scope of review in this context is well-established:

       Our standard of review over a custody order is for a gross abuse
       of discretion. Such an abuse of discretion will only be found if the
       trial court, in reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the
       law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or
       reaches a conclusion that is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias,
       or ill-will as shown by the evidence of record.

       In reviewing a custody order, we must accept findings of the trial
       court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our
       role does not include making independent factual determinations.
       In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the
       evidence, we must defer to the trial court who viewed and
       assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by
       the trial court’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings.
       Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are
       unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject
       the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of
       law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the
       trial court.

Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 60-61 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up).

       As with all custody-related matters, this Court’s “paramount concern is

the best interest of the child involved.”        Id. at 61 (internal citation and

____________________________________________

this position and instead requested equally shared physical custody between
the parties. See N.T., 7/7/23, at 117 (“Essentially this is coming down to
whether or not [Father] is capable and should be given the opportunity to
have week on/week off to start on the right foot with [A.A.] regarding her
education.”). This apparent revision to the scope of Father’s requested relief
does not materially impact our holding in this matter.

5 Mother has filed a motion to dismiss based upon Father’s failure to comply

with various Rules of Appellate Procedure pertaining to the reproduced record
and his brief. As these transgressions have not impeded our ability to review
the issues raised on appeal, we deny Mother’s motion.

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quotation omitted). Indeed, Pennsylvania law provides that the court is only

empowered to change an existing custody order if the modification will “serve

the best interest of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5338(a). To that end, the Child

Custody Act sets forth sixteen factors at § 5328(a) that a court must consider

prior to modifying an existing custody order. See E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451,

460 (Pa.Super. 2019).     While a court’s consideration of these factors is

mandatory, “it is within the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to

determine which factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.”

Id. (cleaned up).

      The statute provides as follows:

      (a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
      determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
      factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
      affect the safety of the child, including the following:

         (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
         frequent and continuing contact between the child and
         another party.

         (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
         member of the party’s household, whether there is a
         continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
         which party can better provide adequate physical
         safeguards and supervision of the child.

         (2.1) The information set forth in [§] 5329.1(a) (relating to
         consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective
         services).

         (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
         of the child.

         (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
         education, family life and community life.

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         (5) The availability of extended family.

         (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

         (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
         child’s maturity and judgment.

         (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
         other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
         reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
         child from harm.

         (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
         consistent and nurturing relationship with the child
         adequate for the child’s emotional needs.

         (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
         physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
         needs of the child.

         (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

         (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability
         to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

         (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
         willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
         another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
         another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
         cooperate with that party.

         (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
         member of a party’s household.

         (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
         member of a party’s household.

         (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). In order to evidence its consideration of these required

factors, a custody court must set forth its best-interest determination “prior

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to the deadline by which a litigant must file a notice of appeal.” A.V. v. S.T.,

87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa.Super. 2014).

       Instantly, the trial court provided a timely and complete assessment of

the   relevant     §   5328(a)      factors     in   a    memorandum        opinion    filed

contemporaneously with the July 14, 2023 order. See Memorandum Opinion,

7/14/23, at unnumbered 1-4. Specifically, the court found that the factors

set forth at subsections (a)(3), (4), (10), and (11) favored Mother.                   The

remaining factors were either neutrally weighted or irrelevant. As we discuss

infra, the court noted that A.A.’s need for academic intervention was an

additional,    relevant    factor    that      informed    its   decision   pursuant     to

§ 5328(a)(16), but did not militate in favor of either parent. Essentially, the

court called upon Parents to do better for their daughter. See id. at 4. No

custody factors favored Father.

       Father’s first claim for relief challenges the trial court’s findings with

respect to the factors at § 5328(a)(1), (2), (6), (8), (10), (13), and (16).6

See Father’s brief at 6-20. Of the challenged considerations, the trial court

____________________________________________

6 Although Father also purports to challenge the trial court’s findings pursuant

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(4), his brief contains no salient discussion or mention
of this statutory provision aside from being listed in Father’s statement of
questions presented. See Father’s brief at 1, 5. Accordingly, we find that
Father has waived this claim pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119 for failure to cite any
relevant authorities or submit any pertinent discussion. See Coulter v.
Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088-89 (Pa.Super. 2014) (“The Rules of Appellate
Procedure state unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be
supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority. . . . [A]rguments
which are not appropriately developed are waived.”).

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determined that all but the tenth factor were either neutral or inapplicable.

We will address each subsection in turn.

        The factor at § 5328(a)(1) concerns which party is “more likely to

encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the child and

another party,” which the trial court determined favored neither parent.

Father asserts that the court erred in finding this factor neutral since Mother

prevented A.A. from being in Father’s house between July 4 and August 10,

2023.     See Father’s brief at 6-7; see also N.T., 3/1/23, at 19 (Father

testifying that this interlude lasted for only one month).7         Instead, Father

contends that this factor should favor him.

        While acknowledging that Mother interfered with Father exercising

unfettered physical custody of A.A. at his home between July 2022 and August

2022, the trial court concluded that Mother was justified in doing so while the

allegations concerning J.B. were being investigated.            See Memorandum

Opinion, 7/14/23, at unnumbered 2 (“The [c]ourt would have preferred that

Mother file her own petition for modification rather than engage in self-help.

Nonetheless,        the    court     believes      the   incident   with   Father’s

stepdaughter warranted a separation at the time.” (emphasis added)).

Given the nature of the allegations concerning J.B. and the history between

her and A.A., we do not find the trial court’s determination to be unreasonable.

____________________________________________

7 To the extent Father asserts that this non-custodial period lasted for longer

than approximately one month, his own testimony belies such a claim.

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      Furthermore, it is also clear from Parents’ respective testimony that

Father was able to exercise physical custody of A.A. outside of his home

during this time period.    See N.T., 3/1/23, at 52-53; N.T., 7/7/23, at 28.

Finally, Mother’s short-lived restriction ended once the investigation into J.B.’s

alleged abuse of A.A. concluded without a finding of objectionable behavior.

Our review indicates that this one-month interlude was the only instance in

which physical custody became an intractable dispute.

      Based on the foregoing, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion

that § 5328(a)(1) did not weigh in favor of either party. Accordingly, we will

not disturb its determination.

      Father’s next argument concerns § 5328(a)(2), which pertains to

“present and past abuse committed by a party or member of the party’s

household, whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused

party and which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards and

supervision of the child.” In his brief, Father essentially seeks to re-litigate

the unfounded child abuse allegations he leveled against Mother in 2022,

arguing that the court should have credited these claims in its weighing of

§ 5328(a)(2). See Father’s brief at 9-11.

      In considering the trial court’s analysis of this factor, we emphasize that

the instant case included multiple claims of abuse implicating Parents’

respective households.       Specifically, Father accused Mother of using

inappropriate   corporal    punishment,       while   Mother   accused   Father’s

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stepdaughter of sexually abusing A.A.              See N.T., 3/1/23, at 10-20; N.T.,

7/7/23, at 25-27. Although Mother admitted that she had struck A.A. with a

spatula in January 2022, Father similarly conceded that an inappropriate

episode occurred between J.B. and A.A. in his home.8 Compare N.T., 7/7/23,

at 49 with N.T., 3/1/23, at 49. Furthermore, the competing allegations of

abuse advanced by the parties were deemed to be universally unfounded by

the investigating agencies. Id. Contrary to Father’s arguments, there are no

substantiated allegations of “present or past” abuse in the case sub judice.

Since the trial court’s determination of neutrality is supported by the certified

record, we observe no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s

conclusion that § 5328(a)(2) favored neither Mother nor Father.

       Next, Father challenges the court’s finding as to § 5328(a)(6), which

addresses “[t]he child’s sibling relationships.” Father submits that the court

should have found this factor to be in his favor because awarding Mother

primary custody during the school year will negatively impact A.A.’s

____________________________________________

8  After interviewing A.A., the GAL testified concerning her belief that the
incident in which Mother struck the child with a spatula was an isolated
incident wherein Mother and A.A.’s relationship reached a “boiling point.” See
N.T., 7/7/23, at 84. The GAL reported that A.A. was very “communicative”
about this episode and reported that nothing similar had happened since in
Mother’s care. Id. The trial court credited this testimony in rendering its
decision. See Memorandum Opinion, 7/14/23, at unnumbered 2 (“The child’s
recent escalation of poor behavior resulted in Mother using inappropriate force
on [A.A.] last year. The [c]ourt believes that Mother has altered this
practice.”). We observe no basis upon which to overturn this credibility finding
since it is well-supported by the record.

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relationship with L.A., her newborn half-brother. See Father’s brief at 12 (“By

not allowing [Father] to have shared custody during the school year, this

impedes the relationship with [A.A.] and her youngest sibling as he gets older,

hits new milestones, and becomes more playful.”).

         As detailed in the factual recitation above, A.A. has relevant half-sibling

relationships in both of her respective households. While Father asserts in

this Court that the trial court should have allotted more weight to A.A.’s

relationship with L.A., our review of the certified record reveals little evidence

to support such an assessment. Aside from noting that L.A. had been born in

November 2022, there is virtually no further testimony concerning him. See

N.T., 3/1/23, at 5-6. Furthermore, Father has cited no such evidence in his

brief.    By contrast, Mother testified that A.A. has a close relationship with

B.J.S. See N.T., 7/7/23, at 37 (“They’re best friends.”). Overall, Father’s

argument on this point amounts to little more than a bald assertion that the

trial court should have accorded more weight to A.A.’s prospective relationship

with L.A.

         Based upon the foregoing, we observe no abuse of discretion or error of

law in the trial court’s findings pursuant to § 5328(a)(6). From the limited

information available, we gather that the certified record supports the court’s

finding that this factor was neutral, i.e., that A.A. has equally valid concerns

with respect to her sibling relationships in both households. Accordingly, no

relief is merited on this aspect of Father’s claim.

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      We now turn to Father’s arguments pursuant to § 5328(a)(8), which

concern any “attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other parent,

except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable safety measures are

necessary to protect the child from harm.” Although the trial court concluded

that this factor was neutral, it was “quite certain” that A.A. was being provided

with inappropriate information concerning the proceedings.        Memorandum

Opinion, 7/14/23, at unnumbered 3. Father submits that this factor should

have “strongly” favored him. See Father’s brief at 12-15.

      Father has largely mischaracterized the testimony of record, which

establishes that Parents were engaging in mutual attempts to influence A.A.’s

opinion and, thereby, gain an advantage in the custody proceedings. Indeed,

the trial court’s in camera interview of A.A. led it to conclude that both Mother

and Father were engaging in mutually inappropriate behavior, leading it to

issue the following admonition to the parties: “Cautionary message to both

of you: She knows what’s going on. She has got everything as far as – I

mean, she – she really knows what’s going on. So just be careful. These

types of adult things bleed into a child’s life and can irreparably shape her for

years to come.” N.T., 3/1/23, at 3.

      Our review of A.A.’s in camera averments supports this finding.

Specifically, she disclosed that Mother had shared disparaging information

that was critical of Stepmother, including Stepmother’s history of drug abuse,

criminal behavior, and medical history. See N.T., 2/28/23, at 24-25, 27-28.

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However, A.A. concomitantly averred Father had attempted to bribe her into

providing testimony beneficial to his custody modification request by

promising to buy her a hamster. Id. at 21-22, 53-55.

      In sum, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law upon which to

overturn the trial court’s finding with respect to § 5328(a)(8). As discussed

above, the certified record reflects effectively equal efforts by Parents to turn

A.A. against the other. Therefore, no relief is due.

      Father also challenges the court’s findings as to § 5328(a)(10), which

addresses “[w]hich party is more likely to attend to the daily physical,

emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the child.” Unlike

the other factors that father challenged on appeal, the trial court actually

weighed this consideration in Mother’s favor, reasoning that she is the “point

person” for A.A.’s tutoring arrangements and has a better record in contacting

and communicating with A.A.’s school. See Memorandum Opinion, 7/14/23,

at unnumbered 3. By contrast, Father asserts that this factor “should favor

him and that [A.A.] would be better off with him for stability and continuity in

[her] education.” Father’s brief at 17.

      Contrary to Father’s arguments, the trial court’s finding pursuant to

§ 5328(a)(10) is amply supported by the certified record. The GAL relayed

without contradiction that Father has a poor reputation for timely and effective

communication with A.A.’s educational providers.       See N.T., 7/7/23, at 97

(“[T]he school counselor, the teacher – I don’t want to use the word

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complained, but indicated that [F]ather was not responsive to their

messages.”). Although Father complains that Mother unilaterally enrolled A.A.

in tutoring programs without his consent or input, Father’s own testimony

reflects he failed to take any significant action concerning tutoring when

confronted with A.A.’s educational issues. See N.T., 3/1/23, at 44-46; see

also N.T., 7/7/23, at 105 (“I vaguely looked at Sylvan, but that was about

it.”).    Moreover, there are concerns about A.A.’s educational priorities in

Father’s home.      Specifically, A.A. testified in camera that Stepmother has

forged documentation attesting that A.A. had completed assignments that

she, in fact, had not finished. See N.T., 2/28/23, at 43-44. Overall, we find

no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s weighing of the factor

at § 5328(a)(10). Therefore, no relief is due.

         Father’s next line of argument concerns § 5328(a)(13), which implicates

“[t]he level of conflict between the parties and the willingness and ability of

the parties to cooperate with one another.” The trial court determined that

the conflict was mutually attributable to Parents. See Memorandum Opinion,

7/14/23, at unnumbered 4 (“[N]either parent trusts each other on any

level.”). Father attempts to frame Mother as the sole bad actor, heaping upon

her all of the blame for the parties’ inability to co-parent. See Father’s brief

at 18 (“[T]he only reason the parties do not get along anymore is because

[Mother] will make decisions without consulting [Father] or giving him enough

time to respond.”).

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      Father’s effort to recast Mother as a lone villain falls immediately flat

when confronted with the testimony of record. As detailed above, Parents’

testimony indicates that they have both advanced unfounded reports of child

abuse against one another. See N.T., 3/1/23, at 10-19; N.T., 7/7/23, at 25-

27. Similarly, A.A.’s testimony indicates that both parties are responsible for

undertaking efforts to turn A.A.’s opinion against the other parent. See N.T.,

2/28/23, at 21-22, 24-25, 27-28, 53-55. There is little question that Parents

are jointly responsible for creating the extraordinary level of conflict in their

relationship. To the extent Father contends that Mother is solely responsible

for their co-parenting conflicts, the record does not support his position.

Therefore, no relief is due on this claim.

      Father’s final argument respecting the custody factors concerns the

court’s findings pursuant to § 5328(a)(16), which provides the court with the

opportunity to consider “[a]ny other relevant factor” not already explicitly

listed in the statute. Here, the trial court utilized this supplemental factor to

essentially call upon Parents to, collectively, do a better job of cooperating

with respect to A.A.’s education, as follows:

      This child was failing school during the [first] and [third] quarter
      of the 2022-2023 school year which resulted in her being . . .
      placed on academic probation. That has since been lifted. She
      has a recent diagnosis of ADHD. She has not been placed on any
      medications yet. She needs to be evaluated for an [individualized
      educational plan]. Her parents need to give her the tools to
      succeed and must put their current animosity aside in order
      to do so.

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Memorandum Opinion, 7/14/23, at unnumbered 4 (emphasis added). Thus,

we discern that this custody factor was deemed to be neutral.

      Although styled as such, Father does not explicitly challenge the trial

court’s finding with respect to § 5328(a)(16). Instead, he utilizes this portion

of his argument to impugn the court’s directive concerning A.A.’s enrollment

at Sylvan on financial grounds. See Father’s brief at 19 (“The [c]ourt also

ordered, as part of custody, that [A.A.] must go to [Sylvan] and that [Mother]

can file for a deviation with support. . . . Father already pays child support

and struggles with the [o]rder that does not include paying for [Sylvan].”).

Thus, Father contends this part of the order should be stricken.

      Father’s argument concerning potential financial hardship is premature.

The court’s order provided that Mother, alone, would bear the initial costs of

A.A.’s enrollment at Sylvan. See Order, 7/14/23, at ¶ 25 (“The child will be

enrolled in tutoring through [Sylvan]. Mother will initially pay the costs

and may seek an allocation of this cost through Domestic Relations.”

(emphasis added)).     Any arguable financial burden upon Father that may

accrue due to A.A.’s enrollment at Sylvan is entirely dependent upon facts that

have not, and may not, come to pass. Specifically, the certified record does

not disclose that Mother has sought any financial contribution from Father in

connection with this specific custody finding. More importantly, no trial-level

court has yet ruled upon any such request on its relative merits.         Thus,

Father’s claim on this point is purely speculative.

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      We decline Father’s invitation to issue an impermissible advisory opinion

concerning circumstances not squarely before this Court.              See, e.g.,

Somerset County Children and Youth Services v. H.B.R., 155 A.3d 627,

631 (Pa.Super. 2017) (holding that “it would be premature to reach the merits

of a hypothetical situation” concerning an agency’s potential entitlement to

financial reimbursement before it had sought remuneration).

      To the extent that Father intends to dispute the trial court’s findings with

respect to § 5328(a)(16), we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in

the court’s finding that both parties need to put aside their differences in order

to better provide for A.A.’s educational development. As detailed throughout

this writing, the conflict and acrimony of Parents’ relationship is attributable

to both of their actions in equal measure. Thus, we also affirm the trial court’s

finding pursuant to § 5328(a)(16).

      Having found no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s

weighing of the factors set forth at § 5328(a), we conclude that Father’s first

bevy of claims for relief is without merit.

      Although framed as a separate matter, Father’s second issue is simply

a restatement of his earlier arguments. See Father’s brief at 20-24. The

gravamen of these claims is that the trial court should have credited the

evidence favoring Father instead of the evidence favoring Mother. Id. at 20

(“In pointing out particular matters in each of the aforementioned factors,

[Father] avers that the evidence in fact favored him.”).

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      As discussed at length above, we have determined that Father’s

numerous specific challenges to the trial court’s findings are meritless since

the court’s conclusions are supported by competent evidence. Accordingly,

we are bound by these findings and may not overturn them. See Saltz v.

Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 512 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“[O]n the issues of credibility

and weight of the evidence, we defer to the findings o[f] the trial judge. . . .

[A]ppellate interference is allowed only where it is found that the custody

order is manifestly unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.”).

Therefore, Father’s second issue does not merit relief.

      Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in

the trial court’s order. Thus, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/16/2024

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