Court Opinion

ID: 9883828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:21:18.061397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:31.676959
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Presiding Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion where it reverses on the question of permanent maintenance. I would uphold the trial court on both issues, property valuation and spousal maintenance.
The case, either for or against permanent spousal maintenance, is a close one. As the majority opinion properly states, Trial Court Finding XI points out that respondent produced expert testimony indicating no capacity to tolerate full time permanent employment. However, the majority goes on to assume that Trial Court Finding XIV supplements and corroborates Finding XI. I do not read the same correlation into the two. Trial Court Finding XIV seems to indicate that, despite the expert testimony in Finding XI, respondent is not in need of lifetime maintenance but only in need of rehabilitative spousal maintenance so as to allow her “to acquire training and work experience to be able to adequately support herself in the commercial market place.”
The majority opinion refers to the two recent Supreme Court cases addressing this issue, namely McClelland v. McClelland, 359 N.W.2d 7 (Minn.1984) and Abuzzahab v. Abuzzahab, 359 N.W.2d 12 (Minn. 1984). I find the question of permanent versus lengthy rehabilitative spousal maintenance to be uniquely within the discretion of the trial court judge and not to be set aside on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion. This is settled law and the dissent (not the part challenged by the majority) in Abuzzahab discusses Minnesota’s long history of allowing courts discretion to award alimony (maintenance) both permanently, Cashman v. Cashman, 256 N.W.2d 640 (Minn.1977); and Arundel v. Arundel, 281 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.1979), and for lesser periods of time, Ruzic v. Ruzic, 281 N.W.2d 502 (Minn.1979) (6 years) but not as a matter of right, Cooper v. Cooper, 298 Minn. 247, 214 N.W.2d 682, 685 (1974). Included in these cases are repeated references to the sound discretion of the trial court to consider whether maintenance should be awarded at all and, if so, for how long.
The controlling statute cited by the majority, Minn.Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (1982) sets out in part:
The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time, either temporary or permanent, as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant factors including: * * *
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court awarded respondent rehabilitative spousal maintenance of $1200 per *96month ($14,400 a year) starting July 1, 1984, and ending January 31, 1990. If the homestead is not sold prior to 1990, respondent is guaranteed 66 months of maintenance amounting to $79,200. If the homestead is sold prior to 1990, respondent is still guaranteed $900 per month ($10,800) a year). The most years that she could be receiving the slightly reduced sum is five years and four months, thus she is guaranteed .$60,000 maintenance (2 months X $1200 + 64 months x $900).
Further, the triggering event for the reduced maintenance is the sale of the homestead, which sale will instantly result in substantial cash to respondent. Pursuant to the terms of the dissolution decree, upon the sale of the homestead, respondent will receive 50% of the adjusted net proceeds plus $25,750 from appellant’s 50% share of those proceeds. That $25,750 represents her court awarded marital interest in respondent’s law practice, which cash the court deferred requiring appellant to give respondent until the homestead is sold. Thus, the first $50,000 net from the sale of the homestead goes to respondent, and appellant will only share in his homestead should it net a sum in excess of $50,000. All the net over $50,000, of course, additionally benefits respondent equally with appellant.
The expert’s testimony related to respondent’s incapacity to tolerate full-time permanent employment. The expert did not deny the possibility of part-time employment, and the trial court’s Finding of Fact X showed respondent grossing approximately $300 a month from part-time receptionist work at $5.00 per hour.
The trial court did order appellant to pay temporary spousal maintenance for a period of five and one-half years, which will bring him to age 65, the normal age of retirement.
Taking into account the fact that appellant was required to pay spousal maintenance in substantial sums from age 59 to age 65, and the respondent’s possible capacity for part-time work, and the substantial cash she will receive upon the sale of the homestead, I feel the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion relative to the length of spousal maintenance.
I would affirm on all issues.