Court Opinion

ID: 9908685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:09:36.545908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:26.713690
License: Public Domain

J-E02004-23

                                   2023 PA Super 261

    CHANEL GLOVER                              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    NICOLE JUNIOR                              :
                                               :
                       Appellee                :       No. 1369 EDA 2022

                   Appeal from the Order Entered May 4, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                    Domestic Relations at No(s): D22048480

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BOWES, J., OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN,
        J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

CONCURRING OPINION BY KING, J.:                     FILED DECEMBER 11, 2023

       I agree with the Majority’s holding that Junior1 has a contract-based

right to parentage based on the oral contract between Glover and Junior.2 I

write separately to emphasize my view that the facts of this case fit squarely

within an “intent-based” parentage approach as contemplated by the

concurring opinions in C.G. v. J.H., 648 Pa. 418, 193 A.3d 891 (2018).

Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has declined to expressly adopt such an

____________________________________________

1 Junior’s preferred pronouns are “they/them.” (See Junior’s Brief at 3).
Thus, I will utilize Junior’s preferred pronouns throughout this writing, in
accordance with their gender identification.

2 I also agree with the Majority’s initial determinations that the trial court had

jurisdiction to adjudicate Junior’s petition for pre-birth establishment of
parentage, and that the matter was ripe for review before Glover gave birth
to Child. I further agree with the Majority that the marital presumption of
parentage did not apply to the facts of this case where there is no longer an
intact marriage to preserve.
J-E02004-23

approach when considering the parentage of children conceived through

Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”). As I believe adoption of an intent-

based approach is a task better left for our legislature or Supreme Court, I

depart from the Majority’s reliance on this doctrine as a basis for Junior’s relief.

      To me, the only contract establishing Junior’s legal parentage in this

case is the oral contract between the parties.         The Majority convincingly

describes how the elements of an oral contract were satisfied. (See Maj. Op.

at 26-30). Nevertheless, I share the concern of Justice Wecht’s concurring

opinion in C.G. that “ART requires us to hypothesize other scenarios, cases in

which an intent analysis would not foreclose a valid claim to parentage while

a contract-based approach would.”       C.G., supra at 459, 193 A.3d at 915.

While one could argue that any successful claim to parentage under an intent-

based approach would necessarily evidence an oral contract to same, that may

not always be the case. The Supreme Court noted in C.G. that it was “not

tasked with defining the precise parameters of contracts regarding [ART].”

Id. at 441 n.11, 193 A.3d at 904 n.11.

      Rather than having to define or evaluate such parameters under a

contract-based theory for relief, I believe that an intent-based approach is the

proper lens from which courts can and should evaluate claims of legal

parentage in the ART context.        Our High Court declined to adopt such a

standard in C.G., however, because that “case [did] not present an

opportunity for such recognition, as the trial court found as fact that the

                                       -2-
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parties did not mutually intend to conceive and raise a child, and the parties

did not jointly participate in the process.” Id. at 441 n.11, 193 A.3d at 904

n.11.

        In this case, the Majority holds that the record supports a finding of

“intent-based parentage.” (Maj. Op. at 31). The Majority decides that such

an approach offers Junior an avenue for relief, even if contract principles do

not afford them relief. (Id.) I am inclined to agree with the Majority that this

record contains ample evidence supporting parentage under an intent-based

approach. But I reach a different conclusion because it is not this Court’s

function to create new law. As we have explained:

          We are bound by decisional and statutory legal authority,
          even when equitable considerations may compel a contrary
          result. We underscore our role as an intermediate appellate
          court, recognizing that the Superior Court is an error
          correcting court and we are obliged to apply the decisional
          law as determined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
          It is not the prerogative of an intermediate appellate court
          to enunciate new precepts of law or to expand existing legal
          doctrines. Such is a province reserved to the Supreme
          Court.

Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 986 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

        In my view, the Majority’s adoption of the intent-based approach as an

alternative ground for relief exceeds our authority as an intermediate

appellate court. See id. The Majority insists that this Court can review the

“intent-based” approach to parentage as an issue of “first impression.” (Maj.

Op. at 33 n.11). The issue in this case is whether a non-biologically related

                                     -3-
J-E02004-23

intended parent can claim legal parentage to a child conceived through ART.

This issue is not one of first impression, as evidenced by C.G. and the other

cases discussed in the Majority Opinion which make clear that parentage can

be bestowed in this context under contract principles. To endorse the theory

of intent-based parentage, we would essentially be expanding the already

existing legal doctrines applied in this context. Although the Majority cites

Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 619 Pa. 680,

62 A.3d 380 (2012), I find that case to be distinguishable. There, this Court

considered “the contested disposition of frozen pre-embryos in the event of

divorce [as] an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 1134. While

there were no cases in Pennsylvania providing any precedent for deciding that

issue (such that this Court found guidance in the case law from our sister

states), here, there is precedent in this Commonwealth for establishing

parentage under the facts of this case—just not under an intent-based

approach.

      Further, our High Court confronted the possibility of an intent-based

approach in C.G. but chose not to adopt such an approach in light of the facts

of that case.   Of course, the Court could have endorsed an intent-based

analysis as an alternative avenue for relief to applying contract principles in

these types of cases, even if the Court decided such an approach would not

have afforded C.G. relief in that case. The Court declined to do so. Rather,

the Court indicated that it “must await another case with different facts before

                                     -4-
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we may properly consider the invitation to expand the definition of

‘parent.’” C.G., supra at 441 n.11, 193 A.3d at 904 n.11 (emphasis added).

The Court later reiterated that it was “unnecessary at this time to expand the

definition of parent or endorse a new standard under the facts before this

Court.” Id. at 443 n.13, 193 A.3d at 906 n.13 (emphasis added). Thus, I do

not consider this issue one of “first impression” but an invitation to expand

the already existing doctrines applicable in cases involving parentage where a

child is conceived through ART. I repeat that “[s]uch is a province reserved

to the Supreme Court.” Matter of M.P., supra.

      Instead, I would urge the Supreme Court to take a close look at this

case and decide whether our Commonwealth should employ an intent-based

approach to determining parentage in cases involving ART. As the Majority

observes, “this appeal is the paradigm of intent-based parentage in cases

involving ART where the couple not only evidenced their mutual intent to

conceive and raise the child, but they also participated jointly in the process

of creating a new life.” (Maj. Op. at 35). In his concurring opinion, Justice

Wecht described C.G. as “a missed opportunity for this Court to address the

role of intent in analyzing parental standing in ART cases.” C.G., supra at

464, 193 A.3d at 918.     The case before us should not serve as a similar

“missed opportunity” for the Supreme Court to address the intent-based

approach.

      Accordingly, I concur in the result.

                                     -5-
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     President Judge Panella and Judge Murray joined this Concurring

Opinion.

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