Court Opinion

ID: 9902513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:18:12.078469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:52.715815
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                        STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                        Case No. 5D22-2029
                   LT Case No. 2018-DR-050123
                  _____________________________

AMBER R. BRATSCH,

    Appellant,

    v.

JOSEPH R. BRATSCH,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County.
Robert Segal, Judge.

Elizabeth Siano Harris, of Harris Appellate Law Office, Mims, for
Appellant.

Erin Pogue Newell and Shannon McLin, of Florida Appeals,
Orlando, and Maria Vaeth Henderson, of Henderson Law Group,
Viera, for Appellee.

                         October 27, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     In this marital dissolution appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
final judgment in all respects, except for its determination as to
the former wife’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in
the trial court proceedings.
     In denying both parties’ motions for litigation expenses, the
trial court stated that the wife has “borrowed significant funds
from her parents but presented no evidence, other than her
mother’s testimony, of a specific obligation to repay that money.”
The record evidence, however, is that although a written
agreement to repay the former wife’s mother did not exist, the
former wife specifically testified that she promised to pay all funds
loaned back (“I told them I would pay them back and I will do so.”).
In addition, her mother testified that she and her husband loaned
their daughter roughly $110,000 to pay for a portion of the
daughter’s attorneys’ fees (Q. “Is Amber expected to pay this
money back to you?” A. “She is.”) and that she has been repaying
the financial obligation. No evidence suggests that the borrowed
funds were a gift. Caryi v. Caryi, 119 So. 3d 508, 511 (Fla. 5th DCA
2013) (“While the evidence did establish that the former wife’s
parents had provided the funds to pay her litigation expenses, the
uncontroverted testimony was that those monies were provided as
a loan.”). We also note that the trial court stated that the litigation
costs were “almost entirely” attributable to the former wife’s
decision to relocate, but failed to mention that it was the trial
court’s sua sponte ruling, which overturned its finding that the
wife had relocated prior to the former husband’s filing of the
dissolution petition, that forced the former wife to incur these
substantial costs.

     In light of the record evidence establishing that the former
wife agreed to pay back the borrowed funds, that she has been
making payments, and that no evidence exists to contradict the
testimony of the former wife and her mother, the final judgment’s
determination that the former wife is not entitled to a contribution
from the former husband for her attorneys’ fees is vacated. On
remand, the trial court shall reconsider the former wife’s motion
for attorneys’ fees and costs and enter an appropriate order
consistent with this opinion.

    REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with instructions.

EDWARDS, C.J., and MAKAR and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur.

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          _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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