Court Opinion

ID: 9753315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:07:32.352649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:43.099153
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/28/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION EIGHT

A.S., a Minor, etc.                        B318012

       Plaintiff and Appellant,            Los Angeles County
                                           Super. Ct. No. 20AVCV00136
       v.

PALMDALE SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

       Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Wendy Chang, Judge. Affirmed.

      Law Offices of Martin E. Stearn and Martin E. Stearn for
Plaintiff and Appellant.

      Carpenter, Rothans & Dumont, Louis R. Dumont and John
J. Stumreiter for Defendant and Respondent.

                       _________________________

       After an elementary school teacher grabbed and twisted
A.S.’s arm, his mother (and guardian ad litem) filed a complaint
form with the Palmdale School District (District) on his behalf.
They then filed a lawsuit for damages against the District, its
superintendent, the assistant superintendent, the elementary
school principal, and the teacher. 1 The trial court sustained the
District’s demurrer to appellant’s third amended complaint
without leave to amend, on the ground appellant failed to file a
claim with the District in compliance with Government Code
section 910. 2 Appellant appeals from the subsequent judgment of
dismissal, contending his complaint form substantially complied
with the requirements of section 910 and the District was
estopped from raising defects in the form. We affirm the
judgment. 3
                          BACKGROUND
      The third amended complaint alleges that on March 5,
2019, a teacher grabbed appellant’s arm and twisted it, resulting
in an injury requiring medical treatment. In an exhibit attached
to the original complaint, appellant’s mother stated she took him
to the emergency room, where doctors gave him a sling and told
him to stay home for the remainder of the week.
      The next day, appellant’s mother went to the school to file a
complaint. The school receptionist told her she would have to
request a form at the District offices. Appellant’s mother then
went to the District offices and spoke with a receptionist there.

1    The trial court overruled the demurrer as to the individual
defendants and they are not parties to this appeal.
2    Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.
3     Appellant includes in his opening brief an argument that
the District is liable for the acts of its employees. In light of our
ruling, we need not and do not consider this issue.

                                  2
The receptionist left, then returned and told the mother that
Ryan Beardsley, the assistant superintendent, had instructed her
to give the mother a form entitled “COMPLAINT FORM—
EMPLOYEE STUDENT ISSUE.” Appellant’s mother asked if
there were any other forms she needed to complete and the
receptionist said Beardsley had only instructed her to provide the
complaint form.
       As directed, appellant’s mother took the complaint form
home, completed it and returned the next day to meet with
Beardsley. She gave the form to Beardsley. She told him she
had taken appellant to the hospital for treatment of his injuries
and had filed a police report. She asked Beardsley if there were
any other documents or paperwork she needed to complete.
Beardsley said there were none and he promised a full inquiry
would be made into the incident. He said he would be in touch
with her.
       On February 25, 2020, A.S., now represented by counsel
and acting through his mother as his guardian ad litem, filed this
lawsuit seeking monetary damages. He alleged he had complied
with the requirements of the Government Claims Act (Act) (§ 810
et seq.) and attached a copy of the complaint form his mother had
given to Beardsley. The District demurred twice to appellant’s
complaint. The demurrers were sustained, but with leave to
amend. The District’s third demurrer, to appellant’s third
amended complaint, was sustained without leave to amend. The
trial court entered a judgment of dismissal and this appeal
followed.

                                3
                         DISCUSSION
A.    Standard of Review
       “An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is
reviewed de novo. The court exercises its independent judgment
to determine whether or not the complaint states facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citation.] We
assume the truth of properly pleaded factual allegations, facts
that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and
matters that are judicially noticeable. [Citation.] We construe
the pleading in a reasonable manner and read the allegations in
context. [Citation.] However, courts will not close their eyes in
situations where a complaint contains allegations of fact
inconsistent with attached documents/exhibits, or allegations
contrary to facts which are judicially noticed. [Citation.] Where
facts appearing in attached exhibits or judicially noticed
documents contradict, or are inconsistent with, the complaint’s
allegations, we must rely on the facts in the exhibits and
judicially noticed documents.” (Genis v. Schainbaum (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1014–1015.)
       When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff
can amend the complaint to cure the defect. (Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) If the defect can be cured, the trial
court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has
been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. (Ibid.) The plaintiff
has the burden of proving such reasonable possibility. (Ibid.)

                                4
B.    Applicable Law
        The Act requires any person seeking monetary damages
from a public entity to file a claim with that entity. (§ 905.) The
claim must include the information specified in section 910.
A complaint is deficient and subject to a general demurrer if it
fails to allege facts showing compliance with the claims
requirement. (See, e.g., Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist.
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 211, 218.)
        “The essential elements of a claim are set forth in
Government Code section 910.” (Loehr v. Ventura County
Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1082
(Loehr).) A claimant must show “[t]he amount claimed if it totals
less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of
presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any
prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at
the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis
of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed
exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be
included in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the
claim would be a limited civil case.” (Gov. Code, § 910, subd. (f).)
        “[A] claim under Government Code section 910 is sufficient
if (1) there is ‘some compliance with all of the statutory
requirements’; and (2) the claim discloses sufficient information
to enable the public entity adequately to investigate the merits of
the claim so as to settle the claim, if appropriate. [Citation.] The
latter inquiry is known as the substantial compliance test.”
(County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th
353, 360.)
        “The doctrine of substantial compliance cannot cure the
total omission of an essential element from the claim or remedy a

                                 5
plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully with the statute.” (Dilts
v. Cantua Elementary School Dist. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 27, 37;
Loehr, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1083.) Thus, a failure to even
estimate the amount of damages on the claim document cannot
be remedied by application of the doctrine. (See Loehr, at p. 1083
[claim document did not satisfy the doctrine where “[a]t most, the
letter was merely a demand that the Board reinstate plaintiff as
superintendent of the district or face possible legal action. The
only mention of damages appears as a passing reference to the
availability of such relief under the federal Civil Rights Act.
Nowhere in the letter is there a claim for money damages, nor,
for that matter is there even an estimate of the amount of any
prospective injury, damage or loss.”].)
C.    Analysis
      1.    The Complaint Form Does Not Substantially Comply
            with the Requirements of the Government Code.
       In his original complaint and every subsequent amended
complaint, appellant alleged he had complied with the Act by
filing a complaint form with the District on March 6, 2019. The
form was attached as an exhibit to the original and second
amended complaint. Appellant contends this complaint form
substantially complied with the requirements of the Act, and the
trial court erred in not finding such compliance.
       The complaint form includes a number of prompts and
questions. As relevant here, the form requests responses to two
prompts: “Describe Incident/Complaint” and “What is your
suggestion to resolve the problem?” Appellant’s mother replied to
both, “Please see back.”

                                 6
       On the back of the form, appellant’s mother described the
incident as follows: “On Tueday, March 5, 2019, [A.S.] was
physically manhandled by [his teacher] Mr. Parisio. This assault
& battery left bruises on [A.S.’s] arm. Because of the swelling &
pain to [his] arm, he was taken to the emergency room where the
physician deemed it necessary for [A.S.] to wear a sling for
support, as well as to remain home from school for the remainder
of the week. I am also aware that the investigation being done at
the site is biased, as it seems the principal is attempting to
influence the investigation. To other adults on campus, the
principal has made statements, such as ‘[A.S.] is not without
fault. The family wants people to think he is hurt. Mr. Parisio
has a family to support.’ Please know that this is a complaint
against staff (Mr. Parisio, and the principal) as well as a uniform
complaint.”
       In the next paragraph, the mother stated: “I suggest that a
thorough district level, unbiased and professional investigation
be conducted regarding, not only, this incident but the entire
school culture, especially the leadership at the site. I suggest
that Mr. Parisio receive appropriate discipline for physically
attacking a student. I truly believe that Mr. Parisio is a danger
to [A.S.] as well as the population of students in general.”
       In sustaining the District’s demurrer to the first amended
complaint, the trial court addressed whether the first amended
complaint substantially complied with the requirements of the
Government Code. The court found: “While the form submitted
by Plaintiff informed Defendant of the incident that led to
Plaintiff’s injuries, there are no indications that Plaintiff was
seeking to hold Defendant liable for damages for the incident.
[Citation.] All indications from the form are that Plaintiff was

                                 7
seeking discipline against [the teacher] for the incident, not
damages.” 4
      Appellant specified several administrative actions which he
wanted the District to take, but did not state he was seeking
monetary damages and made no attempt at all to estimate, even
roughly, an amount of damages or state whether or not the claim
would be a limited civil case.
      The complaint form does not substantially comply with
section 910.
      2.    The District Has Not Waived Noncompliance as an
            Affirmative Defense
       Our determination that the complaint form did not
substantially comply with the requirements of section 910 does
not end our inquiry, however. “[I]f a claim presented does not
substantially comply with the claim filing requirement, the public
entity must advise the claimant of the deficiencies or lose the
right to assert the noncompliance as an affirmative defense.”
(Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
1228, 1234.) As appellant’s reply brief indicates, albeit indirectly,

4      We note that, in its ruling on the demurrer to the second
amended complaint, the trial court appeared to backtrack on this
ruling, finding that appellant had alleged compliance in the
complaint and his “general allegations of compliance with the
claim requirement is sufficient to survive a demurrer.” At the
hearing for the demurrer to the third amended complaint, the
trial court, on its own motion, asked for briefing on the issue of
whether the district was estopped from raising a lack of
compliance. We view this as an implicit re-adoption of the court’s
earlier ruling that the complaint form did not substantially
comply with the Act.

                                 8
section 910.8 requires a public entity, in some circumstances, to
notify a claimant of insufficiency in his claim.
       Appellant contends his statements in the complaint form
that he was “manhandled” and injured in an “assault and
battery” by a teacher and then treated in an emergency room
“would clearly demonstrate that [he] was very likely to seek
monetary compensation for his personal injuries as well as pain
and suffering.”
       “There is a recognized and important distinction . . .
between a claim that is inadequate because it does not
substantially comply with the requirements of section 910 and a
document that is not a claim at all. ‘A claim that fails to
substantially comply with sections 910 and 910.2 may still be
considered a “claim as presented” if it puts the public entity on
notice both that the claimant is attempting to file a valid claim
and that litigation will result if the matter is not resolved.’
[Citation.] A ‘claim as presented’ is also sometimes called a
‘trigger-claim’ because its receipt by a public entity ‘triggers a
duty by the public entity to notify the potential claimant of the
claim’s insufficiency stating, with particularity, the defects or
omissions.’ (Green v. State Center Community College Dist.
(1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1354, 1358 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 140]
(Green); see § 910.8 [requiring notice of insufficiency of claim]; see
also § 911.3, subd. (a) [notice requirement for claims returned as
untimely].) ‘If the public entity fails to send this notice, it waives
any defenses as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect
or omission.’ (Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358; see § 911
[waiver by failure to give notice of insufficiency]; see also § 911.3,
subd. (b) [waiver by failure to give notice of untimeliness].)”

                                  9
(Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare Dist. (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 391, 400–401 (Simms).)
      An indication that litigation might ensue if the defendant
does not comply with the terms under discussion is “the most
essential element of a ‘claim as presented,’ because it satisfies the
primary purposes of the Government Claims Act: facilitating the
investigation of disputes and their settlement without trial if
appropriate.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007)
42 Cal.4th 730, 744–745 [finding correspondence did not
constitute a claim as presented because “it points to nothing that
would have specifically alerted defendants to weigh the
alternatives of litigation or compromise.”]; compare Simms,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 401–402 [plaintiff’s letter was a
“claim as presented” because it “expressly threatened litigation if
Simms’s ‘concerns’ about being ‘defamed, harassed, mistreated
and ignored’ were not otherwise resolved.”].)
      This District Court of Appeal has emphasized the
requirement that a “claim as presented” must “ ‘disclose the
existence of a “claim” [against the defendant] which, if not
satisfactorily resolved, will result in [litigation].’ ” (Olson v.
Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th
1052, 1062 (Olson) [grievance which described breach of contract
claim involving evaluation process not a claim as presented
because “nowhere does the grievance threaten litigation if the
contractual breaches are not remedied.”].) 5

5     The Olson Court summarized past law: “(Compare Schaefer
Dixon Associates v. Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority (1996)
48 Cal.App.4th 524, 534 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 698] [letter to public
entity advising of monetary dispute did not constitute ‘claim [as]
presented,’ as ‘the plain import of the letter was merely to

                                 10
      Appellant’s complaint form in no way suggested that he
was seeking compensation for his injury. More important, there
is nothing in appellant’s complaint form threatening litigation if
appellant’s demands, monetary or otherwise, were not met. His
complaint form does not satisfy the requirements of a “claim as
presented.”
      3.    Equitable Estoppel Does Not Apply
         Appellant contends his mother relied on statements by
Beardsley that the only form she needed to file was the complaint
form and therefore the District should be estopped from asserting
that the complaint form is insufficient. The trial court stated at
the hearing on this issue: “I find it significant that at the time
that the actual complaint was filed, there was still time left to
apply for leave to file a late claim, and so I think that does
address the estoppel argument, and so I am going to sustain as to
[the District] without leave to amend.” We see no error.
         “The required elements for an equitable estoppel are:
‘ “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts;

provide information and to request negotiation of an ongoing
dispute, and not to advise of imminent litigation over a “claim” ‘],
and [Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1359] [counsel’s letter
informing public entity that an accident had occurred and counsel
had been retained was not a ‘ “claim as presented,” ’ as nothing in
counsel’s letter suggested ‘that a demand was being made on
respondent or that counsel would initiate litigation if appellant’s
demand was not satisfied’ ], with Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist.
[1989] 49 Cal.3d [699,] 703, 709 [counsel's letter advising public
entity that counsel “intends to commence an action” for medical
malpractice and was seeking ‘ “damages for loss of consortium
and . . . mental and emotional suffering” ’ constituted ‘ “claim as
presented” ’ ].)” (Olson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.)

                                11
(2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must
so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe
it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the
true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his
injury.’ ” ’ ” (Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 715–716 (Santee).)
       “ ‘ “ The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel
in the same manner as a private party when the elements
requisite to such an estoppel against a private party are present
and, in the considered view of a court of equity, the injustice
which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of
sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or
policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel.” ’
[Citation.]” (Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education,
supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 715.) The California Supreme Court
has emphasized that such circumstances are “unusual.” (Hughes
v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 793.)
       Even if we assume that all of the elements of equitable
estoppel were initially present, the law recognizes that
circumstances may change and render estoppel no longer
appropriate. (See Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 716 [party
to be estopped corrected its initial erroneous representation].)
A plaintiff “cannot rely on an estoppel if there is still ample time
to take action within the statutory period after the circumstances
inducing delay have ceased to operate.” (Ibid.)
        Here, the circumstances changed when appellant acquired
counsel. “In general, the law ‘particularly’ disfavors estoppels
‘where the party attempting to raise the estoppel is represented
by an attorney at law.’ [Citation.] For purposes of analyzing
estoppel claims, attorneys are ‘charged with knowledge of the law

                                12
in California.’ (Tubbs v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1967)
67 Cal.2d 671, 679 [63 Cal.Rptr. 377, 433 P.2d 169] [rejecting
claim of estoppel to assert statute of limitations].)” (Steinhart v.
County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1316 (Steinhart).)
       Here, the complaint form filed by appellant’s mother with
the District was attached as an exhibit to the original complaint
in this matter, showing appellant’s attorney had actual
acknowledge of the contents of the complaint form submitted on
appellant’s behalf. Counsel is charged with the knowledge that
appellant needed to file a claim for damages with the District and
with the knowledge of what was required for such a claim.
Indeed, appellant’s attorney appears to have had actual
knowledge of the requirements, as he cited the relevant
Government Code statutes in the original complaint.
       Appellant is charged with that knowledge as well.
(Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1317 [charging client with
attorney’s knowledge of the law for purposes of estoppel].)
       As the California Supreme Court has explained, “one who
acts with full knowledge of plain provisions of law and their
probable effect on facts within his or her knowledge, especially
where represented by counsel, may claim neither ignorance of the
true facts nor detrimental reliance on the conduct of the person
claimed to be estopped, two of the essential elements of equitable
estoppel.” (Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1317 [charging
client with attorney’s knowledge of the law].)
       Although the exact date when appellant and his mother
retained his attorney is not shown in the record, the original
complaint, filed by counsel, is dated February 25, 2020. The
incident occurred on March 5, 2019, allowing appellant and his
attorney approximately a week to file a compliant claim within

                                13
the mandated one-year period. Given that counsel possessed the
relevant facts about the incident, had the original complaint
form, and was actually aware of the statutory requirements for
suing a governmental entity, this was ample time.
                          DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed. Appellant to pay costs on
appeal.

     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                        STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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