Court Opinion

ID: 9640381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:04:57.471498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:37.513904
License: Public Domain

NEBEKER, Associate Judge
(concurring in the result).
I concur in the result and the directive to eliminate for the future the need for proof of corroboration in rape and lesser included offenses where the victim is a mature woman.
*345On the question of who is an adult female. I believe it is correct to say that my colleagues agree that chronological age is not the only touchstone. Surely we ought not draw the age at sixteen — the age under which nonconsent is presumed in rape under D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2801, and also the age limit under D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3501 (indecent acts on children). While eighteen years of age may be considered majority, there might be some cases where the victim, though chronologically an adult, may be in reality as immature as a child. Whatever the cause, e. g., mental retardation or other condition of social immaturity militating against independent credibility, such women may well be viewed as children for purposes of requiring corroboration. (Wilson v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 226, 271 F.2d 492 (1959).) These issues we cannot now resolve with a broad-brush approach. In my view, considerable latitude should rest with the trial court to require corroboration in some instances where the victim is not a mature woman.
The importance of our supervisory holding for future trials (Winters v. United States, D.C.App., 317 A.3d 530, 532 (1974))' is not only in abolishing the corroboration instruction, but also in eliminating the requirement that corroborative evidence is necessary to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal. In this case the corroboration issue arose only in the context of the instructional request. Over objection, the trial judge admitted evidence viewed as corroborative and then denied a motion for judgment of acquittal. The issue of the need for adequate corroboration was not addressed on this motion. Being convinced that a miscarriage of justice through conviction of an innocent man has not occurred, I do not consider reversal and acquittal to be warranted. See Richardson v. United States, D.C.App., 276 A.2d 237, 238 (1971) ; Battle v. United States, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 220, 221, 206 F.2d 440, 441 (1953).
I also concur in our harmless error holding for no different result can reasonably be foreseen had a corroboration instruction been given.
. . . Judicious application of the harmless-error rule does not require that we indulge assumptions of irrational jury behavior when a perfectly rational explanation for the jury’s verdict, completely consistent with [proper] instructions, stares us in the face. See Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 504-505, 77 S.Ct. 443, 447, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 [498] (1957). [Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431-32, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 31 L.E.3d 340 (1972).]
See Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D. C. 11, 15 n. 7, 16, 331 F.2d 85, 89 n. 7, 90 (1964); State v. Moore, 278 So.2d 781, 787 n. 6 (La.1972). See also Fed.R. Evidence 404(b); Uniform R. Evidence 404(b); and United States v. Wilkerson, D.C.Cir.,No. 75-1111, decided April 27, 1976.