Court Opinion

ID: 9674813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:35:47.204709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:29.785400
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I would affirm the order denying the motion to dismiss. As stated in the affidavit of plaintiff’s counsel in resistance to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s attending physician, whom plaintiff intended to call for the new trial, was out of the United States for an extended period of time during 1981 and thus would not have been available to testify had the trial been held prior to the expiration of the one-year period from date of remand of the original appeal. Likewise, the record reveals that plaintiff’s counsel made several attempts to arrange with defense counsel a time for taking new depositions from the defendants. I would hold, therefore, on the basis of this unchallenged evidence that plaintiff had established as a matter of law good cause for the denial of the motion to dismiss. In reaching this conclusion, I of necessity disagree that SDCL 15-30-16 makes no allowance for the concept favoring a litigation of claims on the merits. To the extent that the cases cited in the majority opinion may manifest a chary view of the concept favoring litigation of claims, I would depart from such a restrictive view, given this court’s liberal attitude towards setting aside default judgments so that claims may be litigated on their merits. See, e.g., Davis v. Interstate Motor Carriers Agency, 85 S.D. 101, 178 N.W.2d 204 (1970). In the same vein, we have held that the sanction of striking a defendant’s pleadings and entering a default judgment pursuant to SDCL 15-6-37(b) for failure of a defendant to comply with a discovery order is a remedy so drastic that it “should be applied only in extreme circumstances, and should not be liberally implemented in order to eliminate the actual trial of cases.” Chittenden & Eastman Co. v. Smith, 286 N.W.2d 314, 316 (S.D.1979).
My more liberal interpretation of SDCL 15-30-16 is also influenced by the fact that in recent years this court has authorized by rule the dismissal of civil cases for want of activity during a one-year period unless good cause is shown to the contrary. SDCL 15-11-11. Can it be imagined that under the circumstances of this case any trial court would have been justified in granting a motion to dismiss based upon that rule? I think not, and I think the same liberal interpretation should be given to the good cause exception set forth in SDCL 15-30-16, all in keeping with our long-standing rule favoring the litigation of claims on their merits.
I would affirm the order appealed from.