Court Opinion

ID: 9955603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 20:03:36.908685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:06.889188
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION THREE

                                      B330106
 In re S.G., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.              (Los Angeles County
                                      Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP02623A)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

 M.G.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
      Jonathan Soglin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       M.G. (mother) appeals from juvenile court orders denying
her petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 388 and terminating her parental rights under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Mother contends the
proceedings violated her substantive due process rights because
the juvenile court was not required to consider her potential, as a
teenager, for further brain development, or her capacity to
change. Guided by the California Supreme Court’s decision in In
re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295 (Marilyn H.), we reject
mother’s arguments. We conclude that, even as applied to
mother as a teenage parent, sections 366.26 and 388, and the
shift in the focus of the proceedings to permanence and stability
for the child, did not violate mother’s due process rights.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In June 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) detained minor S.G. from
mother. At the time, mother was 17 years old and a dependent of
the juvenile court. DCFS filed a dependency petition alleging
S.G. was a person described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
due to the inability of mother and alleged father S.K.G. to provide
two-month-old S.G. with adequate supervision, protection, or
regular care. At the initial hearing, the juvenile court detained
S.G. The court ordered DCFS to provide services to mother and
S.K.G., including visitation and a Multidisciplinary Assessment
of S.G. and the family to assess “needs and linkage to services.”

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                2
       DCFS referred mother to an outpatient substance abuse
treatment program and scheduled her for an Expectant and
Parenting Youth Conference. DCFS also linked mother to drug
testing, substance abuse treatment programs, and wraparound
services, which included individual and group therapy,
psychiatric evaluations, and parenting classes.
       In November 2021, the court found true the petition’s
allegations that mother’s marijuana abuse and unaddressed
mental health issues placed S.G. at substantial risk of serious
physical harm.2 The court continued the disposition hearing,
expressly taking into account that “the statutory scheme tells
courts . . . to make special provisions for the barriers facing minor
parents.” The court noted, for example, that mother “wasn’t able
to test on a voluntary basis because she’s a minor,” and that
“[s]he is herself a minor who has not had the appropriate family
support that she probably should have had.”
       In January 2022, the juvenile court held a contested
disposition hearing. The court acknowledged that mother “is a
young parent who is growing up really fast because . . . she’s
already a parent,” and that mother had been forced “to take on
more responsibility to take care of not only her baby but also her
minor sibling.” Nonetheless, the court found DCFS met its
burden to show S.G. would be at substantial risk of harm if
returned home and ordered him removed from mother’s custody.
The court ordered DCFS to provide mother family reunification

2      Around this time, a DNA test revealed S.K.G. was not
S.G.’s biological father. S.K.G.’s counsel indicated there was no
basis for him to assert a claim of paternity. The court made a
non-paternity finding and ordered that S.K.G. be stricken from
the petition. Mother did not identify any other potential fathers.

                                 3
services, including individual counseling and drug and alcohol
counseling. The court granted mother unlimited unmonitored
visitation at the caregiver’s home and up to three hours of
visitation per week outside the home. The court structured the
case plan “in the hope . . . that mother will keep visiting more
and more, and essentially make a gradual transition to taking
care of her child full time.”
       In March 2022, DCFS filed a section 388 petition to modify
the court’s orders to require monitored visitation because of
mother’s continued marijuana use, failure to drug test, unstable
housing situation, and untreated mental health issues. Mother
opposed the petition, asking the juvenile court to consider that
her situation was now more complicated. Mother had recently
turned 18 and, as a result, her dependency case was closed and
she no longer had wraparound services. The court granted
DCFS’s section 388 petition in part, allowing mother to continue
having unmonitored visits at the caregiver’s home as long as the
caregiver was present. The court gave DCFS the discretion to
liberalize mother’s visits.
       In July 2022, the court held a six-month review hearing
under section 366.21, subdivision (e). Because S.G. was under
three years old at the time of detention, mother was only entitled
to six months of reunification services. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B),
366.21, subd. (e)(3).) DCFS’s written report recommended that
the court terminate reunification services. Mother opposed the
recommendation. She asked the court to consider her young age,
her loss of services as a dependent child when she turned 18, and
her loss of family support after her mother (S.G.’s maternal
grandmother) moved out of state.

                                 4
       The court found mother had not made substantial progress
toward alleviating the causes that had necessitated the removal
of S.G. from her custody. Mother had not submitted to drug
testing. She had not participated in regular mental health
services and individual counseling. She attended some sessions
of a substance abuse awareness program for teens, but was
discharged for lack of participation. In addition, her visits
outside the caregiver’s home remained monitored.
       However, the court recognized the “multiple challenges”
mother faced, such as homelessness, a brief period of
incarceration, and the lack of family support. The court further
acknowledged mother was a young parent and expressed its
belief that mother “has what it takes to reunify with her child.”
The court therefore extended family reunification services for
another six months, again expressly considering “the particular
barriers to accessing court-ordered services and maintaining
contact with the child faced by minor parents,” and that mother
had “only recently turned 18.”
       In January 2023, the court held a combined 12- and 18-
month review hearing under sections 366.21, subdivision (f)(1)
and 366.22, subdivision (a)(1). By this time, S.G. had been out of
mother’s custody for over 18 months. Mother asked the court to
extend reunification services for another six months. DCFS’s and
S.G.’s counsel asked the court to terminate mother’s reunification
services. S.G.’s counsel pointed out that S.G. was initially
detained at two months old. He was now almost two years old
and also had special needs. S.G.’s counsel reminded the court
that the dependency scheme timelines were intended to prevent
children from waiting too long for permanency.

                                5
       The court stated it was “considering [mother’s] age. She is
a young mom. She was a teen and she was a minor when the
child was detained.” However, mother failed to consistently drug
test, only sporadically attended her substance abuse program and
counseling sessions, and did not consistently visit S.G. The court
found mother had again failed to substantially comply with the
case plan and continuing services would not be in S.G.’s best
interest. It determined there was no legal basis to continue
reunification services, even after considering the challenges
mother faced as a young parent. The court terminated
reunification services and set the case for a section 366.26
permanency planning hearing (section .26 hearing).
       In May 2023, mother filed a petition pursuant to
section 388 asking the court to reinstate reunification services or
select legal guardianship as the permanent plan instead of
adoption. Mother contended modification was warranted because
she had “created a more stable life” for herself by enrolling in
drug treatment programs, consistently attending therapy, taking
her prescribed psychotropic medications, and visiting her son
regularly.
       DCFS opposed the request for further reunification services
and continued to recommend termination of mother’s parental
rights. Although mother was “attempting to reengage in her
services and cares about her child,” she failed to consistently visit
S.G. She had not submitted to drug and alcohol testing and was
discharged from her drug treatment program in February 2023
for failing to attend for more than 30 consecutive days. DCFS
also reported mother continued “to struggle with following
through with mental health services and to address mental
health treatment, unresolved trauma and/or current, medication

                                 6
treatment services, and substance abuse awareness and testing.”
DCFS further noted S.G. attended weekly services “three times
per week to assist with speech delay, developmental delays and
behavioral concerns,” and the agency opined that it was in S.G.’s
best interest to have stability in the form of adoption to protect
his safety and wellbeing.
       The juvenile court considered mother’s section 388 petition
on the day of the section .26 hearing. After receiving testimony
from mother, considering the documentary evidence, and hearing
argument from all counsel, the court denied mother’s section 388
petition. The court explained that mother’s “circumstances are
still changing,” but they had not changed enough for the court to
find it would be in S.G.’s best interest to grant mother additional
reunification services. The court proceeded to the section .26
hearing, terminated mother’s parental rights, and selected
adoption as S.G.’s permanent plan, with the current caregiver as
the prospective adoptive parent.
       Mother timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
       Mother contends the application of sections 366.26 and 388
to her, as a teenage parent, violated her substantive due process
rights.3 Although mother did not raise this issue below, we

3      At various points in her opening brief, mother describes the
class of individuals whose rights are at issue as “young persons,”
“young people,” “young adults,” “teen parents,” and “minor
parents.” She also refers to different ages—from teenage years to
25—as benchmarks for “youth” throughout her briefing. We use
the phrase “teenage parents” generally to describe this group, or
“minor parents” when that term is used by the statute. Since we

                                 7
exercise our discretion to consider it, as it is a purely legal
question, involving no disputed facts, which we review de novo.
(In re C.P. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 17, 24, fn. 5, 27.)
          The federal and state Constitutions prohibit states from
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 7.)4 Substantive due process protects fundamental liberty
interests by “ ‘prevent[ing] government from enacting legislation
that is “arbitrary” or “discriminatory” or lacks “a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose.” ’ [Citations.]” (Chan v.
Judicial Council of California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 194, 201.)
          As one court has recognized, “[t]he concept of ‘substantive
due process’ is slippery in its application,” and “[w]ith no definite
test to determine whether a statute satisfies the ‘notions of
fairness’ which populate the concept of ‘substantive due process,’
and no definite test to determine whether a statute is
‘unreasonable’ or ‘arbitrary,’ courts must proceed cautiously so as
not to overstep the boundaries of separation of powers. . . .
‘ “ . . . [A] legislature does not violate due process so long as an
enactment is . . . reasonably related to a proper legislative goal.
The wisdom of the legislation is not at issue in analyzing its
constitutionality, and neither the availability of less drastic
remedial alternatives nor the legislative failure to solve all

find no merit to mother’s claim, we need not grapple with the
specific age range her arguments might implicate.

4     The California Constitution’s due process provision “has
been held to be identical in scope and purpose with the due
process clause of the federal Constitution.” (Gray v. Whitmore
(1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1, 20; see Armstrong v. County of San Mateo
(1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 597, 617, fn. 14.)

                                  8
related ills at once will invalidate a statute.” ’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Rodriguez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 157, 175.) Further,
“ ‘the doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this
field.’ [Citations.]” (Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 302.)
       We need not break new ground in this case. As we explain
below, the California Supreme Court has already largely
addressed the fundamental due process issues mother raises in
this appeal.
I.     The California Supreme Court Has Rejected Due
       Process Challenges to the Post-Reunification
       Dependency Scheme
       In 1993, the California Supreme Court decided a pair of
cases that raised both procedural and substantive due process
challenges to the dependency scheme and, in particular,
section 366.26. Although mother does not assert a procedural
due process challenge here, both cases provide in-depth analysis
of the legislative objectives of sections 366.26 and 388. We
therefore consider both decisions in some detail.
       In Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242
(Cynthia D.), the California Supreme Court addressed a
procedural due process challenge to the dependency scheme. The
mother argued the statutory framework, including
section 366.26, violated due process because it allowed
termination of parental rights based on “a finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that return of the child to parental
custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child,”
rather than requiring a finding by clear and convincing evidence.
(Id. at p. 250.)

                                  9
       To address the argument, our high court reviewed the
history and purpose of the legislation enacting the modern
dependency scheme. The scheme was part of California’s effort to
comply with new federal funding conditions that required states
to select permanent plans for children “in a timely fashion” if
reunification efforts failed. (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at
p. 246.) In 1982, the California Legislature enacted “a more
structured framework” for dependency cases, including a clear
and convincing standard for removing children from parental
custody, status review hearings, reunification services, and
permanency planning hearings for children who could not be
returned to a parent within 12 to 18 months. Adoptions,
however, were carried out in a separate proceeding in superior
court. (Id. at pp. 246, 248–249.)
       The new process still resulted in “lengthy delays, especially
when adoption was selected as the permanent plan.” (Cynthia
D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 247.) Thus, the Legislature, on the
recommendations of a task force, revised the statutory scheme to
eliminate the separate adoption proceeding “and brought
termination of parental rights for dependent children within the
dependency process through a selection and implementation
hearing pursuant to section 366.26.” (Ibid.) This hearing
required juvenile courts to “only make two findings: (1) that there
is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted;
and (2) that there has been a previous determination that
reunification services shall be terminated.” (Id. at pp. 249–250,
quoting Sen. Select Com. on Children & Youth, SB 1195 Task
Force Rep. on Child Abuse Reporting Laws, Juvenile Court
Dependency Statutes, and Child Welfare Services (Jan. 1988)
p. 11 (Task Force Report).) The task force intended “ ‘to

                                10
eliminate duplication between the regular review hearings and
the termination hearing. Therefore, the decisions made at the
review hearing regarding reunification are not subject to
relitigation at the termination hearing. This hearing determines
only the type of permanent home.’ [Citation.]” (Cynthia D., at
p. 250, quoting Task Force Report, supra, p. 12.)
       Considering this context, our high court rejected the
mother’s due process challenge to the preponderance of evidence
standard at section .26 hearings. With respect to the parent’s
fundamental liberty interests, the court reasoned that “the
purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is not to accumulate further
evidence of parental unfitness and danger to the child, but to
begin the task of finding the child a permanent alternative family
placement. By the time dependency proceedings have reached
the stage of a section 366.26 hearing, there have been multiple
specific findings of parental unfitness.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5
Cal.4th at p. 253.) As a result, “[a] parent whose conduct has
already and on numerous occasions been found to grievously
endanger his or her child is no longer in the same position as a
parent whose neglect or abuse has not so clearly been
established. At this point the interests of the parent and child
have diverged, and the child’s interest must be given more
weight. Because section 366.26 contemplates termination of
parental rights only when there is clear and convincing evidence
that the child is likely to be adopted, the child’s fundamental
interest in the opportunity to experience a stable parent-child
relationship is very much at stake at the section 366.26 hearing.
In this setting, a burden of proof standard that tilted the
evidentiary scales in favor of the parent . . . would have the

                               11
inevitable effect of placing a greater risk on the child than on the
parent.” (Id. at p. 254.)
       The court further reasoned: “Considered in the context of
the entire process for terminating parental rights under the
dependency statutes, the procedure specified in section 366.26 for
terminating parental rights comports with the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because the precise and
demanding substantive and procedural requirements the
petitioning agency must have satisfied before it can propose
termination are carefully calculated to constrain judicial
discretion, diminish the risk of erroneous findings of parental
inadequacy and detriment to the child, and otherwise protect the
legitimate interests of the parents. At this late stage in the
process the evidence of detriment is already so clear and
convincing that more cannot be required without prejudice to the
interests of the adoptable child, with which the state must now
align itself.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 256.)
       Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th 295, addressed a substantive
due process challenge to section 366.26. In the lower court
proceedings, the juvenile court terminated reunification services
and set a section .26 hearing after finding, at the 18-month
hearing, that returning the two children to their mother would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the minors. (Id. at
p. 299.) The mother subsequently reunified with another child in
a different dependency proceeding. (Ibid.) Although the mother
did not file a section 388 petition, at the section .26 hearing she
asked the court to return her two children to her custody,
alleging her reunification with a different child was a changed
circumstance. (Ibid.) The juvenile court concluded it could not
consider the mother’s request because it was limited to

                                12
determining “whether [the] minors were to be adopted, placed in
long-term foster care, or placed under guardianship.” (Ibid.) The
court selected legal guardianship as the permanent plan. (Id. at
pp. 299–300.) The mother challenged the order by arguing that
“to the extent the statutes preclude consideration of return to
parental custody at the section 366.26 hearing, those provisions
violate her and her children’s due process rights under the
federal and state Constitutions.” (Id. at p. 300.)
       The California Supreme Court held section 366.26 did not
violate the mother’s due process rights. Similar to its decision in
Cynthia D., the court reviewed the history of the dependency
statutes and the Legislature’s intent to expedite a minor’s
permanent placement by eliminating a separate action for
adoption and limiting the scope of the section .26 hearing.
(Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 303.) As the court observed,
because “the sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to
select and implement one of the listed permanent plans” in the
statute, “the focus of the case shift[s] away from reunification to
providing a permanent, stable placement for the children.” (Id.
at p. 304.)
       With respect to mother’s substantive due process claim, the
Marilyn H. court held: “A parent’s interest in the companionship,
care, custody and management of his children is a compelling
one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights. [Citation.]
Likewise, natural children have a fundamental independent
interest in belonging to a family unit [citation], and they have
compelling rights to be protected from abuse and neglect and to
have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that [which]
allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the

                                13
child. [Citation.] The interests of the parent and the child,
therefore, must be balanced.
       “Substantive due process prohibits governmental
interference with a person’s fundamental right to life, liberty or
property by unreasonable or arbitrary legislation. [Citation.] In
substantive due process law, deprivation of a right is supportable
only if the conduct from which the deprivation flows is prescribed
by reasonable legislation that is reasonably applied; that is, the
law must have a reasonable and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained. [Citation.]
       “The objective of the dependency scheme is to protect
abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof
and to provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot
be returned home within a prescribed period of time. [Citations.]
Although a parent’s interest in the care, custody and
companionship of a child is a liberty interest that may not be
interfered with in the absence of a compelling state interest, the
welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a state has
not only a right, but a duty, to protect. [Citations.] The
Legislature has declared that California has an interest in
providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been
removed from parental custody and for whom reunification
efforts with their parents have been unsuccessful. [Citations.]
This interest is a compelling one. [Citation.] The state’s interest
requires the court to concentrate its efforts, once reunification
services have been terminated, on the child’s placement and well-
being, rather than on a parent’s challenge to a custody order.
Requiring the parent to petition the court to hear a challenge to a
custody order after reunification services have been terminated

                                14
does not violate substantive due process.” (Marilyn H., supra, 5
Cal.4th at pp. 306–307.)
       The court further found that section 388, which allows a
parent to seek reinstatement of reunification services upon a
showing of changed circumstances, further supported the validity
of section 366.26. Section 388 “accommodate[s] the possibility
that circumstances may change after the reunification period
that may justify a change in a prior reunification order.”
(Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) In light of the “ ‘escape
mechanism’ ” available in section 388, the court concluded
section 366.26 does not violate parents’ substantive due process
rights “merely because the juvenile court’s dispositional options
do not include return to parental custody.” (Id. at pp. 309, 310.)
       Since our high court’s decisions in Cynthia D. and Marilyn
H., courts have applied their analysis to due process challenges to
the dependency statutes arising in different contexts, including
when a parent challenges a juvenile court’s decision to terminate
reunification services. (See, e.g., In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8
Cal.4th 398, 415–422 (Jasmon O.); Daria D. v. Superior Court
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 606, 611–613 (Daria D.); In re Alanna A.
(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 566; Nickolas F. v. Superior Court
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 117–118.)
II.    Section 366.26 Did Not Violate Mother’s Substantive
       Due Process Rights
       A.    Marilyn H. applies to this case
       Mother fails to meaningfully distinguish Marilyn H. She
argues that teenage parents need more time to reunify with their
children, but she does not challenge the statutory time limits on
reunification services available to her as a minor and teenage

                                15
parent prior to the termination of reunification services.5
Instead, as the mother argued in Marilyn H., mother contends
that after reunification services have been terminated, the court
should still be required to consider factors about the parent that
may make it possible in the future for the child to safely return to
parental custody—in this case, mother’s youth. Mother also
argues that the juvenile court’s inability to reject a permanent
plan of adoption at the section .26 hearing based on mother’s
youth violated her right to due process. The mother in Marilyn
H. similarly contended that the limitation on the court’s options
at the section .26 hearing which excluded return to a parent
violated her substantive due process rights. The mother’s
arguments in Marilyn H., like mother’s arguments in this case,
all essentially challenged the shift in the focus of the dependency
proceedings away from reunification with the parents to
permanence and stability for the child with a different caretaker.
The Marilyn H. court rejected the mother’s arguments,
concluding that shift of focus does not violate a parent’s due
process rights. We are bound by that decision. (Auto Equity

5     Indeed, mother did not file a petition for extraordinary writ
review of the juvenile court’s orders terminating her reunification
services and setting the section .26 hearing. (§ 366.26, subd. (l).)
In keeping with the limited nature of her arguments, mother’s
proposals for remedying the due process violation she alleges
relate only to the selection of a permanent plan and termination
of parental rights. Mother suggests this court should hold that:
the juvenile court must apply a presumption favoring legal
guardianship instead of adoption when a teenage parent is
involved; a section .26 hearing may not be held until a teenage
parent is over 21 years old; or the teenage parent’s interest in the
care and custody of the child must predominate instead of the
needs of the child for permanence and stability.

                                16
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57
Cal.2d 450, 455 (Auto Equity).)
       Mother asserts Marilyn H. is inapplicable because the
relevant scientific and psychological research about juvenile
brain development was not available when the case was decided,
and, further, the issue of teenage parents was not presented to
the court. She contends that since teenagers’ ongoing
neurological development gives them a greater capacity to change
than older adults, due process requires that a teenage parent’s
fundamental interest in the care and custody of a child must
remain paramount.
       We disagree. Mother’s argument ignores the fundamental
holding of Marilyn H., which is that once reunification efforts
have been exhausted, turning the court’s focus to the compelling
state interest of achieving permanence and stability for the
dependent child does not violate a parent’s due process rights.
Notwithstanding the parent’s circumstances, the post-
reunification dependency scheme’s shift of focus is substantially
and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in
protecting the welfare of dependent children.
       As the Cynthia D. court explained, once reunification
services are terminated, subsequent hearings are not concerned
with finding a parent unfit. The shift of focus from reunification
to permanence is a recognition that reunification efforts have not
been successful, and the state must now prioritize its duty to
protect abused and neglected children by expediently facilitating
a permanent and stable placement. Mother fails to articulate
why or how a teenage parent’s developmental immaturity or
greater capacity for change renders it constitutionally
impermissible for the law to take steps to meet the state’s

                               17
obligation to protect dependent children after reunification efforts
with a teenage parent have failed.
       B.    Under the Marilyn H. analytical framework,
             there was no substantive due process violation
       Moreover, even if mother’s status as a teenage parent
undermined the applicability of the Marilyn H. court’s ultimate
conclusion, the case still models the analysis we must follow to
evaluate mother’s arguments. (Daria D., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th
at p. 612.) That analysis indicates that the section 366.26
proceedings did not violate mother’s due process rights.
       Marilyn H. explained that the deprivation of a fundamental
right “is supportable only if the conduct from which the
deprivation flows is prescribed by reasonable legislation that is
reasonably applied; that is, the law must have a reasonable and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.” (Marilyn
H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 306–307.)6 The Marilyn H. court

6      Since the California Supreme Court has announced the
applicable standard to review a parent’s challenge to the
constitutional sufficiency of the post-reunification procedures in
sections 366.26 and 388, we must reject mother’s argument that
we should instead apply strict scrutiny. Mother supports her
argument only with out-of-state cases and Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57. Neither
out-of-state authorities, nor a concurrence of one Supreme Court
justice opining on an issue not decided by a majority of the Court,
is binding precedent. (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408,
412–413). Nor are we permitted to follow such authorities as
persuasive when the California Supreme Court has reached a
different result on the issue. Auto Equity again applies here:
“The decisions of [the California Supreme Court] are binding
upon and must be followed by all the state courts of California.”

                                18
further reasoned that “[i]n evaluating whether a parent is denied
due process by limiting the issues at a section 366.26 hearing, it
is important to examine the entire statutory scheme.” (Marilyn
H., at p. 307.) We need not repeat the Marilyn H. and Cynthia D.
courts’ examination of the general dependency scheme (id. at
pp. 301–304, 307–309; Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 246–
250), but there are additional aspects of note specific to teenage
parents like mother.
       At various points before a section .26 hearing, the law
requires juvenile courts to give special consideration to teenage
parents, who, like mother, are themselves under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court.7 That consideration begins with attempts to
prevent the child of a minor parent from ever becoming a juvenile
dependent.

(Auto Equity, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455.) However, we also note
that given the compelling state interests involved (Marilyn H.,
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 307) and California’s narrowly crafted
dependency scheme, we would reach the same conclusion using
strict scrutiny.

7     Section 16002.5, subdivision (h) defines a “minor parent” as
“a dependent child who is also a parent.” Section 361.8,
subdivision (d) incorporates that definition. Although not specific
to young adult parents, the law also includes special provisions
for youths who reach the age of majority while they are
dependents of the juvenile court. This system of extended foster
care allows young adults to voluntarily continue receiving
services as “nonminor dependents.” (§§ 391, 11403, subd. (a).)
Many of the provisions regarding minor parents also apply to
nonminor dependent parents. The record does not indicate that
mother participated in extended foster care.

                                19
       The Legislature has expressed its intent “to maintain the
continuity of the family unit and to support and preserve families
headed by minor parents” by placing them together in “as family-
like a setting as possible . . . .” (§ 16002.5.) The law mandates
that a child welfare agency provide minor parents with access to
services “that are specifically targeted at supporting,
maintaining, and developing both the parent-child bond and the
dependent parent’s ability to provide a permanent and safe home
for the child.” (Id., subd. (a).) Minor parents must also be given
the opportunity to participate in activities that will further their
own development, such as attending school. (Id., subd. (c).)
       Foster care placements for minor parents and their
children “shall demonstrate a willingness and ability to provide
support and assistance to minor parents . . . and their children,
shall support the preservation of the family unit, and shall refer
a minor parent . . . to preventive services to address any concerns
regarding the safety, health, or well-being of the child, and to
help prevent, whenever possible, the filing of a petition to declare
the child a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to
Section 300.” (§ 16002.5, subd. (e).)
       The statutory scheme further imposes stricter standards on
courts and agencies before making findings or taking actions
adverse to minor parents. Social workers must employ “a
strengths-based approach” to support minor parents, even when
they are investigating whether a minor parent’s child is at risk of
abuse or neglect. (§ 361.8, subd. (b)(4).) A juvenile court may not
find the child of a minor parent is “at risk of abuse or neglect
solely on the basis of information concerning the [minor parent’s]
placement history, past behaviors, or health or mental health
diagnoses occurring prior to the pregnancy . . . .” (Id., subd. (a).)

                                 20
       If the court removes a child from a minor parent’s custody,
the court cannot deny reunification services to the minor parent
solely because the parent failed to reunify with another child or
had parental rights to another child terminated. (§ 361.8,
subd. (b)(1), § 361.5, subd. (b)(10), (11).) At the six-month, 12-
month, and 18-month review hearings, the court must take into
account “the particular barriers to a minor parent” when
considering parents’ efforts or progress and the extent to which
they availed themselves of services. (§§ 366.21, subds. (e)(1) &
(f)(1)(C), 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) The juvenile court in this case
expressly referenced this provision and considered the barriers
mother faced, even though she was no longer a minor by the time
of the first review hearing.
       At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court may
continue reunification services for another six months for a
parent who was a minor parent at the time of the initial hearing
and who has demonstrated “significant and consistent progress in
establishing a safe home for the child’s return . . . .” (§ 366.22,
subd. (b)(1).) These young parents may thus receive a total of 24
months of reunification services.
       If the child welfare agency seeks termination of parental
rights over a child born to a minor parent, it must show
reasonable efforts were made to provide remedial services to
prevent the removal of the child from the minor parent, including
resources available to the child and minor parent’s “extended
family,” and that those efforts were unsuccessful. (§ 361.8,
subd. (b)(2), (3).)
       Thus, for mother, who was a minor and a juvenile
dependent when S.G.’s dependency case began, the dependency
scheme expressly took into account factors related to her youth at

                                21
several stages of the proceedings prior to the termination of
reunification services. The juvenile court repeatedly referenced
these factors in mother’s case.
       We disagree with mother that these youth-focused efforts
are irrelevant because “the brain science considerations are too
fundamental and the termination of parental rights too serious
and permanent to conclude that omission of those considerations
at the section 388 and permanency hearing is constitutional
because other aspects of the scheme provide some protections.”
The Marilyn H. court determined section 366.26 and section 388
should not be viewed in isolation in determining whether they
violate a parent’s substantive due process rights. Considering
the dependency scheme as a whole, including the safeguards that
address and protect the fundamental rights of adult parents and
of minor parents like mother, shifting the focus to the needs of
the child for permanency and stability once reunification services
are terminated is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or fundamentally
unfair.8 (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 307–309.)
       Irrespective of mother’s youth, we find no basis to depart
from the Marilyn H. court’s conclusion that “[s]ections 366.26 and

8      Marilyn H. described safeguards such as a parent’s
entitlement to up to 18 months of reunification services; regular
review hearings; the statutory presumption that the child will be
returned to parental custody at the disposition hearing and at
each review hearing; a parent’s entitlement to the assistance of a
social worker and an attorney throughout the proceedings; and
the requirement that the juvenile court continue a child’s
removal from parental custody only after repeatedly determining
that return to the parent would be detrimental. (Marilyn H.,
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 308.) All of these safeguards applied in
mother’s case.

                                22
388, when construed together and with the legislative scheme as
a whole, are reasonable and bear a substantial relation to the
objective sought to be attained. The parent’s interest in having
an opportunity to reunify with the child is balanced against the
child’s need for a stable, permanent home. The parent is given a
reasonable period of time to reunify and, if unsuccessful, the
child’s interest in permanency and stability takes priority. Even
after the focus has shifted from reunification, the scheme
provides a means for the court to address a legitimate change of
circumstances while protecting the child’s need for prompt
resolution of his custody status. Thus, both substantive and
procedural due process are satisfied.” (Marilyn H., supra, 5
Cal.4th at p. 309.)
III. Neither the Legislative Preference for Adoption Nor
       Section 388’s Changed Circumstances Requirement
       Violated Mother’s Due Process Rights
       Mother also argues the legislative preference for adoption
violated her due process rights as a teenage parent. Yet, the
statutory preference also bears a reasonable and substantial
relation to the legislative objectives of balancing each party’s
competing interests at the permanency planning stage. “The
Legislature has . . . determined that, where possible, adoption is
the first choice. ‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because
it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional
commitment from a responsible caretaker.’ [Citation.]” (In re
Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) The preference itself has a
clear reasonable and substantial relation to the proper legislative
objective of providing abused or neglected children with
permanence and stability when they cannot be reunified with a
parent. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573;

                                 23
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 535,
546 (Heather B.); accord, In re Tamneisha S. (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 798, 804.) A parent’s youth does not change or
lessen a child’s need for permanence and stability.
       Moreover, “[i]t is critical to secure stable placement for a
dependent child as soon as possible, consistent with the parents’
rights. [Citation.] Conversely, a child’s need for permanency and
stability cannot be delayed for an extended time without
significant detriment.” (Daria D., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at
p. 611.) Mother suggests that teenagers’ parental rights should
not be terminated until they reach an age of relative maturity,
such as over 21. However, this proposal would result in children
potentially lingering in foster care without a permanent plan for
several years. In Marilyn H., the court explained that
“[c]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate,”
and legislative changes were made specifically to prevent
adoptable minors from having to “ ‘wait months and often years
for the opportunity to be placed with an appropriate family on a
permanent basis.’ ” (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 310,
303.) Mother fails to establish that the legislative preference for
adoption or the requirement that the permanent plan be selected
and implemented expeditiously lacks a substantial relation to a
proper legislative objective. (Heather B., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 558–559.)
       The same is true of section 388’s requirement that a parent
demonstrate changed circumstances before the juvenile court
may grant a petition seeking further reunification services or a
return to parental custody at the section .26 hearing.
Eliminating the requirement of changed circumstances in favor of
a showing that a teenage parent has the potential to change, as

                                24
mother appears to suggest, would create duplication and invite
delay in permanency planning, subordinating the needs of the
child to the interests of the parent. This would undermine the
purpose of section 388 as a safeguard against “last-minute . . .
attempt[s] by a parent to delay permanency for” children who
have already spent considerable time in an unsettled living
situation. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.)
       The absence of a requirement that the court also consider a
teenage parent’s potential for future change does not render the
law arbitrary, discriminatory, or lacking a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose. The section 388 changed
circumstance requirement, when viewed in connection with the
rest of the dependency scheme, provides a teenage parent “due
process and fundamental fairness while also accommodating the
child’s right to stability and permanency.” (Marilyn H., supra, 5
Cal.4th at p. 307.)
IV. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Regarding
       Juvenile Offenders Does Not Apply to the
       Dependency Context
       To support her arguments, mother relies on several United
States and California Supreme Court decisions finding severe
criminal penalties unconstitutional when imposed on juvenile
offenders. She asserts the reasoning of these decisions “applies
with equal force to teen parents seeking to reopen services or
seeking to retain their parental rights.” We disagree. While the
underlying scientific and psychological research may describe
youth irrespective of the context, mother’s argument ignores that
the objectives and interests of the criminal justice system are
vastly different from those of the juvenile dependency system.

                                25
       The cases mother cites concern the constitutionality of the
most severe criminal punishments and sentencing schemes for
juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 575
(Roper) [death penalty for offenders under 18 was excessive
under Eighth Amendment]; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S.
48, 79 (Graham) [Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing
juveniles to life without parole for nonhomicide offenses]; Miller
v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 489 (Miller) [mandatory scheme
sentencing all juvenile offenders convicted of homicide to life
without parole violated the Eighth Amendment]; People v.
Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Caballero) [110-years-to-
life sentence for a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment].)9
       The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
punishments. “ ‘[E]mbodied in the Constitution’s ban on cruel
and unusual punishments is the “precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to

9      We note that in this area of criminal law, the United States
Supreme Court has distinguished between minors and offenders
who are legal adults. (See, e.g., Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at
pp. 555–556.) As a result, courts have concluded that despite
research indicating that young adults continue to experience
significant neurological development into their early 20s,
imposing the most severe punishments on young adults does not
violate the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1169, 1234–1235; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 437–
439.) Thus, even if the reasoning of cases concerning juvenile
offenders applied equally to dependency cases—which we
conclude it does not—that reasoning would not necessarily assist
mother in this case, since she was a legal adult by the time of the
section .26 hearing.

                                26
[the] offense.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Coley (2012) 55
Cal.4th 524, 538, quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 59.)
“ ‘[T]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth
Amendment . . . .’ ” (In re Coley, at p. 538, quoting Graham, at
p. 59.)
       The Eighth Amendment analysis thus requires
consideration of the penological justifications for imposing a
harsh sentence. These typically include the defendant’s moral
culpability; the defendant’s prospects for reform; retribution,
which is related to blameworthiness; deterrence; incapacitation of
an incorrigible defendant; and rehabilitation. (See, e.g., Miller,
supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 472–473; Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at
pp. 571–573.) The Supreme Court concluded in a series of cases
that attributes of the juvenile brain such as “transient rashness,
proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences” are
relevant to determining the proportionality of punishment
because they “diminish the penological justifications for imposing
the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they
commit terrible crimes.” (Miller, at p. 472.)
       In contrast, the state’s objective in the juvenile dependency
system is not to punish parents for their conduct. (In re Sade C.
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 991.) Instead, it is to protect children from
abuse and neglect and, after efforts to reunify the family have
been unsuccessful, to ensure children have stable and permanent
placements. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 307.) After the
juvenile court asserts dependency jurisdiction over a child, the
court’s decision at each review hearing is based on its assessment
of harm or risk of harm to the child, not on the moral culpability
of the parent. Once reunification services are terminated, the

                                27
proceedings that follow are not concerned with parental
unfitness. (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 253.)
       While in criminal matters the system of punishment
focuses on the offender, in juvenile dependency cases, a single
system must protect and address the fundamental rights of
individual parents and individual children. (Marilyn H., supra, 5
Cal.4th at p. 307.) Mother contends criminal courts must still
balance a juvenile offender’s dangerousness to “others” with its
decision to impose mitigated punishments in recognition of an
offender’s youth. Yet, the decisions mother cites do not stand for
this proposition and did not engage in any balancing of
individual, competing rights. The courts limiting the criminal
penalties children may face categorically held that because of the
unique attributes of youth, severe punishments did not serve
legitimate penological goals and were grossly disproportionate to
the crimes committed. (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 571;
Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 72–73; Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at
pp. 476–477; Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 266–268.)
       Shifting the focus from reunification to permanency,
requiring that a parent demonstrate changed circumstances to
disrupt that shift of focus, and preferring adoption as a
permanent plan, are all legislative choices that significantly
impact a teenage parent’s rights, but their goal is not to punish
the parent. They instead reflect a policy decision to focus on
children’s rights in proceedings where expediency is critical to the
protection of their interests. (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th
664, 674 [“In deciding what services or placement are best for the
child, time is of the essence”].) There is no basis to conclude that
a child’s need for permanence and stability becomes less
compelling when the child’s parent is still experiencing

                                28
significant neurological development. Decisions invalidating
criminal penalties for juvenile offenders under the Eighth
Amendment therefore apply standards and consider interests
that are inapposite in the dependency context.10
       Finally, we note that mother fails to even make a pretense
of arguing that any of the changes to the dependency scheme she
proposes would promote the welfare of dependent children. She
does not mention that prolonged dependency proceedings are
detrimental to dependent children. She asserts that her rights as
a teenage parent should have remained “paramount” after
reunification efforts failed, without acknowledging S.G.’s
fundamental rights as a dependent child. We are not free to
disregard the dual interests at stake. “Children are not simply
chattels belonging to the parent, but have fundamental interests
of their own that may diverge from the interests of the parent.”
(Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 419.) Certainly, the
Legislature could weigh the competing interests differently and
prescribe further differential treatment for minor and young
adult parents in the dependency scheme. But there is no basis
for us to conclude that the balance it has currently drawn as
reflected in section 366.26, section 388, or the legislative
preference for adoption, is arbitrary, discriminatory, or bears no
reasonable relation to well-established and proper legislative
objectives.

10     Similarly, mother refers to several non-criminal contexts in
which state and federal laws extend services to young adults
after they turn 18 or impose age minimums at 21. She does not
explain, however, how a “consensus” that young adults continue
to experience neurological development invalidates the
Legislature’s balancing of competing interests between parents
and children in the dependency post-reunification context.

                                29
                        DISPOSITION
     The juvenile court orders are affirmed.
     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                         ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                 EDMON, P. J.

                 EGERTON, J.

                              30