Court Opinion

ID: 9840441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 16:09:10.909948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:27.751948
License: Public Domain

J-A19032-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  DAVID HATCHIGIAN AND JOAN                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  RANDAZZO                                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  NANCY C. GALLAGHER AND                       :
  DONEGAL INSURANCE GROUP                      :   No. 2359 EDA 2022
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: DAVID HATCHIGIAN                  :

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 220600194

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                      FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2023

       David Hatchigian (Hatchigian) and his wife Joan Randazzo (Randazzo),

(together, Appellants) appeal pro se from the order entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denying their “Motion for

Leave to Submit Pro Se Filing in Accordance with the Court’s Order Dated

October 22, 2021 Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1”1 in this breach of contract

action brought against Nancy C. Gallagher (Gallagher) and Donegal Insurance

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See Rule 233.1, infra (providing for dismissal of repetitive pro se actions).
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Group (Donegal) (together, Appellees). On appeal, Appellants challenge the

trial court’s application of Rule 233.1 in dismissing this case. We affirm.

                                       I.

                                      A.

      A brief review of the previous litigation between the parties is necessary

to our disposition.   On May 26, 2021, Hatchigian filed a complaint against

Gallagher and Donegal in the Philadelphia Municipal Court seeking damages

for home improvement work performed in February of 2011 by Gallagher’s

husband Neil Gallagher, who died in May of 2012 (Decedent).          Hatchigian

alleged that he hired Decedent to complete roofing work at a property he and

Randazzo owned in Philadelphia; Decedent warranted that the roofing work

would be free of defects for 20 years and that he was insured accordingly;

and the roofing material installed by Decedent collapsed eight years after

installation, necessitating extensive repair work.    Regarding Donegal, the

Decedent’s former insurer, Hatchigian alleged that the contractor liability

insurance policy Decedent carried covered his losses.

      The Municipal Court held a trial on the matter on July 9, 2021, at which

Hatchigian appeared pro se. Gallagher testified that Decedent had owned a

roofing business, but that she was not involved in its operations in any

capacity. She did not manage it, did not interact with customers, and did not

sign a roofing contract for any work performed by Decedent. Gallagher did

not continue Decedent’s business after he died and it was dissolved. (See

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N.T. Trial, 7/09/21, at 23, 27). She was separately employed during that time

period by Abington Memorial Hospital as a Community Health Manager.

Gallagher also testified that she had never met or heard of Hatchigian until

commencement of this litigation.      (See id. at 24).    She explained that

Decedent did not have a will and that they jointly owned their home as tenants

by the entireties during their marriage.

      Hatchigian testified that he was “seeking damages for Breach of

Contract based on Mrs. Gallagher being . . . the wife of Mr. Gallagher [and]

has assumed his estate.”     (Id. at 14).   With regard to Decedent’s roofing

company, Hatchigian stated, “under decent, [Mrs. Gallagher] would have been

next in line.” (Id. at 15). Hatchigian acknowledged that he never had an

insurance policy or a contract with Donegal and that it never issued him any

type of warranty for the work performed by Decedent. Hatchigian indicated

that Decedent had represented to him that he was insured. (See id. at 20).

      The exhibits submitted to the court showed that the Donegal insurance

policy Decedent carried terminated in May of 2012, just after he passed away.

(See id. at 31). At the conclusion of the hearing, the Municipal Court entered

judgment in favor of Gallagher and Donegal. Hatchigian filed an appeal from

the judgment on July 30, 2021, in the Court of Common Pleas, but that appeal

was struck because of his failure to file a complaint.

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                                               B.

        On September 14, 2021, Hatchigian and Randazzo filed a complaint in

the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against Gallagher and Donegal raising

the same allegations concerning Decedent’s liability for damages for the roof

work.    Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule

233.1,2 which the trial court granted on October 22, 2021.               The court

dismissed the complaint with prejudice and ordered that “Plaintiff David

Hatchigian shall not pursue additional pro se litigation against the same or

____________________________________________

2 Rule 233.1 sets forth the criteria for dismissal of frivolous, repetitive actions

filed by pro se litigants and provides as follows:

        (a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se
        plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a
        motion to dismiss the action on the basis that

               (1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims
        which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the same
        or related defendants, and

              (2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a
        written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.

        (b) The court may stay the action while the motion is pending.

        (c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the court
        may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se
        litigation against the same or related defendants raising the same
        or related claims without leave of court.

        (d) The court may sua sponte dismiss an action that is filed in
        violation of a court order entered under subdivision (c).

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 (a)-(d).

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related Defendants raising the same or related claims without leave of Court.”

(Order, 10/22/21).

      On June 2, 2022, Hatchigian and Randazzo initiated the instant action

by filing a writ of summons against Appellees without leave of court. On June

22, 2022, Appellees filed a praecipe and rule for Appellants to file a complaint

within 20 days or risk entry of a judgment of non pros.

      On July 19, 2022, Appellants filed the underlying pro se “Motion for

Leave to Submit Pro Se Filing in Accordance with the Court’s Order Dated

October 22, 2021 Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1” (Motion). They attached a

proposed complaint advancing the same claims raised in the previous litigation

concerning Decedent’s 2011 roofing work to their property. On July 26, 2022,

Appellees filed a praecipe for entry of judgment of non pros for failure to file

a complaint, which the Office of Judicial Records entered on that same day.

On August 11, 2022, after review of the proposed complaint, the trial court

denied the Motion. This timely appeal followed. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion,

the trial court stated that it properly denied the Motion pursuant to Rule

233.1(d), which permits a trial court to sua sponte dismiss an action filed in

violation of a court order. The trial court explained:

             Plaintiff’s June 2, 2022 Writ of Summons was filed in direct
      violation of this trial court’s October 22, 2021 order entered under
      subdivision(c) of Rule 233.1 Pro se Plaintiffs filed their June 2,
      2022 Writ of Summons without leave of court against ‘the same
      or related defendants’ raising, according to their proposed
      complaint attached to their Motion, ‘the same or related claims.’
      As such, pursuant to Rule 233.1(d), the trial court properly denied
      Plaintiffs’ Motion.

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(Trial Court Opinion, 1/04/23, at 3).

                                               II.

       Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion by applying

Rule 233.1 where this lawsuit does not involve the “same or related claims”

as the previous litigation.3 (See Appellants’ Brief, at 15-17). They point to

the fact that Randazzo was not a party to some of the previous proceedings

and maintain that the allegations contained in the proposed complaint have

not been fully adjudicated on the merits.

       We begin by observing that the explanatory comment to Rule 233.1

provides that it seeks to limit frivolous litigation and abuse of the legal system

by litigants who repeatedly file “new litigation raising the same claims against

the same defendant even though the claims have been previously adjudicated

either through settlement or through court proceedings. [The Rule] provides

relief to a defendant who has been subjected to this type of repetitive

litigation.” Pa.R.C.P. 233.1, Explanatory Comment.

       Rule 233.1 “was promulgated by our Supreme Court in 2010 to stem a

noted increase in serial lawsuits of dubious merit filed by pro se litigants

disaffected by prior failures to secure relief for injuries they perceived but

____________________________________________

3 “To the extent that the question presented involves interpretation of rules of

civil procedure, our standard of review is de novo.” Gray v. PennyMac
Corp., 202 A.3d 712, 715 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “To the extent
that this question involves an exercise of the trial court’s discretion in granting
a motion to dismiss, our standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Id.
(citation omitted).

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could not substantiate.”    Gray, supra at 716.     “Accordingly, the drafting

committee constructed the Rule with attention to potential manipulation of the

legal process by those not learned in its proper use, seeking to establish

accountability for pro se litigants commensurate with that imposed upon

members of the Bar.”       Id.   “Thus, the Rule operates to spare potential

defendants the need to defend spurious claims, first, by allowing the

expeditious dismissal of duplicative pro se actions and, second, by

empowering the trial court to ban the pro se litigant’s commencement of

further actions against such defendants.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Additionally, “Rule 233.1 does not require the highly technical

prerequisites of res judicata or collateral estoppel to allow the trial court to

conclude that a pro se litigant’s claims are adequately related to those

addressed in prior litigation.” Gray v. Buonopane, 53 A.3d 829, 838 (Pa.

Super. 2012), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 632 (Pa. 2013). “Nor does it require

an identity of parties or the capacities in which they sued or were sued.” Id.

“Rather, it requires a rational relationship evident in the claims made and in

the defendant’s relationships with one another to inform the trial court’s

conclusion that the bar the Rule announces is justly applied.” Id.

      Instantly, these rational relationships between the parties and the

claims made are fully evident in this third in a string of repetitive lawsuits

brought by Appellants. The record reflects that this is the type of case and

litigants for which Rule 233.1 was intended, as Appellants have repeatedly

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brought lawsuits where they have failed to demonstrate that they have any

non-frivolous claims against Appellees. Instead, they continue their effort to

litigate this mater despite the 2021 Municipal Court adjudication against them

and their subsequent failure to perfect an appeal. We agree with the trial

court that no extended litigation is warranted under these circumstances

where Appellants filed the writ of summons in direct contravention of the trial

court’s October 22, 2021 order, and the crux of their claims have already been

addressed in a substantive manner and resolved during the Municipal Court

proceeding.   That Randazzo and/or Hatchigian were not named parties in

some of the previous proceedings is of no moment, as Rule 233.1 does not

require highly technical prerequisites for a trial court to conclude that a pro se

litigant’s claims are adequately related to those addressed in prior litigation,

nor does it require an identity of parties or the capacities in which they sued

or were sued. See Gray, supra, 53 A.3d at 838. This flexibility protects

defendants from repeated baseless litigation in light of the potential for pro se

plaintiffs to manipulate our courts and introduce confusion into the system by

choosing not to name all parties or change slightly their claims in an attempt

to shield themselves from bar of their repetitive lawsuits.

      Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the August 11, 2022

order denying Appellants’ Motion and dismissing this action pursuant to Rule

233.1(d).

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/18/2023

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