Court Opinion

ID: 9747171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:00:05.44046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:20.682280
License: Public Domain

CATHELL, Judge.
Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, petitioner, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-773(b),1 filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Randy A. Weiss, respondent, for violation of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC).2 The petition alleged that the respondent violated MRPC 8.4 sections (b), (c) and (d)3 by converting funds due to his law firm in fifty-four separate transactions from 1993 to 1996, in the total amount of $676,465.99.
In accordance with Maryland Rule 16-752(a)4 this Court assigned the matter to Judge Louise G. Scrivener of. the *536Circuit Court for Montgomery County for an evidentiary hearing and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. In accordance with Maryland Rule 16-757,5 Judge Scrivener held a hearing and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. There is no dispute as to the facts of this case and neither party filed exceptions to Judge Scrivener’s findings.
I. Facts
Respondent was admitted as a member of the Bar of this Court on May 1, 1982. He maintained an office in Washington, D.C. for the practice of law and presently works in the same firm in the position of a legal clerk. The Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action is based upon the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ finding that respondent violated the rules of professional conduct of that jurisdiction when he converted funds belonging to his law firm. That court suspended him from the practice of law in the District of Columbia.
Judge Scrivener’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are as follows:
“At the hearing it was determined that the underlying facts leading to the suspension of Respondent, Randy A. Weiss, by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals are not in dispute. Also not in dispute are certain remedial actions taken by respondent both before and after the hearing before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals Board on Professional Responsibility, which made Findings of Fact relied upon by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
*537“FINDINGS OF FACT
“These findings of fact are based upon the undisputed Findings of Fact of the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility, Respondent’s Designation of Documents, and argument by counsel.
“1. Respondent was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar in December 1981. He also is a member of the Maryland, Virginia, Florida, and Colorado Bars. Respondent has not been subject to any prior disciplinary proceedings.
“2. At the time of the conduct at issue here, Respondent was a partner in the law firm [ ] (the ‘Firm’), where he specialized in real estate, refinancings, and real estate settlements. Respondent was also a licensed underwriting title attorney and serves as an agent for title insurance companies represented by the Firm.
“3. The misconduct found concerns the conversion of funds owed to the Firm as a result of Respondent’s involvement as title insurance agent on real estate transactions. When Respondent served as counsel to a party in a transaction involving the sale of real property, his Firm was paid a fee for his work. The fee would be reflected on the settlement sheet summarizing the payments involved in the transaction. On some, but not all, real estate sale transactions on which he performed legal work, Respondent also served as the title insurance agent. On such transactions, Respondent was compensated by the title insurance company through the insurance premiums paid by the entity acquiring the insurance. These payments also were reflected on the settlement sheet. Under the agreements with the title insurance companies, Respondent retained 80% of the premium and 20% was passed on to the insurance company to cover the risk. Because the premiums were based on the selling price of the real estate, in large commercial transactions the amount was substantial. Respondent acknowledges that all of the legal fees and title insurance fees paid to Respondent were due and payable to the Firm.
*538“4. Starting in April, 1993, Respondent converted a portion of the title insurance fees in a number of transactions he handled to his own money market account. The record is not clear as to precisely how Respondent diverted the funds, since he indicated that at times checks were made payable to him personally, while other evidence indicates that the funds were placed in a Firm escrow account over which Respondent had effective control. Respondent further testified that, on several occasions, he deposited the title insurance fees into his own professional corporation operating account. The checks from the Firm were signed by Respondent and/or one of Respondent’s partners in the Firm. During the period from 1993 to 1996, Respondent paid to the Firm the legal fees that resulted from the real estate transactions but retained for himself the title insurance fees in approximately one third of the transactions. The Firm’s account receivable system did not tie into the system that produced the settlement sheets and title insurance premiums are negotiable and, therefore, vary by transaction. So, for example, on a real estate sale transaction on which Respondent performed legal work and served as the title insurance agent, if Respondent turned over to the Firm the check for the legal fees, the Firm would not detect a shortfall if Respondent simply kept a portion of the check for the title insurance fee. The Respondent testified that there was never a time that he took the entire title insurance premium for himself. The Respondent always gave the firm some of the premium and, according to the Respondent’s testimony, the firm was ‘not able to determine, because of the volume of work, whether or not [he was] gypping them on that, whether or not [he was] not turning over the correct amount.’ [Brackets in original.]
“5. Respondent took funds due to the Firm a total of 54 times from April 1993 through September 1996. The amounts covered ranged significantly, from under $1,000 to $128,745.21. According to the report of an auditor the Firm retained to examine Respondent’s activities, the total con*539verted equaled $676,465.99. None ol‘ the funds involved client funds; they were all funds due to the Firm.
“6. Respondent placed the converted funds in a money market account and paid taxes on the funds. The money market account in which Respondent deposited these funds also contained funds from other sources. Respondent stated that he never spent the money he diverted, although, it is not clear from the record [that] the Respondent was aware of the full amount taken. The Respondent testified that he was unable to readily identify the total amount that had been diverted from the firm as the account into which the diverted funds were deposited also contained other funds and from at least one of those accounts, withdrawals were made for living or other purposes.
“7. The record shows that he did not use the funds to change his lifestyle. He remained in the same house, drove the same car, took the same vacations and otherwise continued to live as he had prior to taking the money. His wife continued to work at the job she had prior to Respondent’s conversion of funds. He, however, was secretive about the funds, and did not disclose to his wife the existence of the money market account. There is no evidence that Respondent has a drug, alcohol, or gambling addiction.
“8. After the Jewish High Holidays in 1996, Respondent began to come to terms with his conduct and why it was wrong. Respondent was an adult Bar Mitzvah in 1996, and has involved himself increasingly as an adult in the religious aspects of his Jewish heritage. After consultation with his Rabbi, in May 1997 he advised his Firm, through counsel, of his conversion of funds. The Firm was unaware of Respondent’s misconduct. Respondent also suggested that the Firm advise D.C. Bar Counsel. Upon learning of his conduct, the Firm retained an accountant, paid for by Respondent, to audit the relevant books and an outside counsel to advise the Firm. On May 27, 1997, Respondent and the Firm advised Bar Counsel of Respondent’s misconduct.
“9. When Respondent advised the Firm of his diversion of funds, he expressed his intention to return the money. *540He believed, based on his own limited review of his records, that he had taken between $300,000 and $450,000. He immediately returned $450,000 to the Firm in May 1997, pending the audit results. The audit revealed, however, that he had taken an additional $226,465.99, which Respondent promptly paid in August and October 1997. He also paid for the costs of the audit and the fees of the Firm’s outside counsel. Respondent also did not retain the 17.2% to which he would have been entitled as his partner share if he had paid the money into the Firm initially.
“10. After advising the Firm of his conversion of funds, Respondent was instrumental in revising the Firm’s financial practices to reduce the risks that similar conduct might occur again. Respondent insisted the Firm adopt a two-signature practice for checks and took the steps necessary to make that change when others in the Firm were slow to do so. Respondent no longer has check signing authority with the Firm.
“11. In January 1998, as the result of the events, Respondent ceased to be a partner in the Firm. He has remained associated with the Firm since the day he gave notice to his partners....
“13. According to the Report of Dr. Thomas C. Goldman, a psychiatrist retained by Respondent, Respondent’s decision to confess voluntarily of his offenses is rooted in his discussion with his Rabbi and his ‘sense of himself as a religious man.’ Respondent claims, supported by his Rabbi and both of the psychiatrists who examined him, that he has fully accepted responsibility for his misdeeds, is sincere in his desire to make amends, and has taken meaningful steps to avoid repeating his admittedly wrongful conduct. Beginning in 1997, Respondent undertook personal psychotherapy with Ralph Barocas, Ph.D. and has voluntarily placed himself under the professional supervision of [the Firm’s managing partner].
“14. The reports of D.C. Bar Counsel’s psychiatrist, Dr. Richard A. Ratner, and Respondent’s psychiatrist are basi*541cally consistent. Both stated that Respondent suffers from no mental disease or illness. Both relate Respondent’s conversion of funds to a psychological need for security borne of his father’s depression-era fear of poverty. Because of psychological ties to his father, Respondent felt that it was his responsibility to help others in his family, including his parents, his older brother who suffers from schizophrenia, and his sister. Both psychiatrists describe Respondent as someone who could not say no and is overly solicitous towards friends. His willingness to help his family has been a cause of friction in his marriage as has his secrecy in financial matters, particularly with respect to the funds at issue here.
“15. D.C. Bar Counsel’s psychiatrist, Dr. Ratner, summarized:
‘I find it impossible to avoid the conclusion that Mr. Weiss’ misdeeds represent an extended period of acting out of his psychological conflicts. Mr. Weiss, though on the surface a stable member of the community and his profession, was clearly beset by conflicting emotions within himself and conflicting claims on his loyalties and his resources by his family.’ [Indentation and numbering in original.]
“Both psychiatrists also state that Respondent has made significant changes in his life since he took the funds and both indicated that it was unlikely that he would repeat these misdeeds. Dr. Ratner stated in his report that Respondent has learned to say no and to place more confidence in others, which has made him more secure.
“15. [sic] After hearings on March 18 and May 6, 1999 before the Hearing Committee of the Board on Professional Responsibility (the ‘Hearing Committee’), the Committee determined that Respondent had violated the rules as charged. The D.C. Bar Counsel initially sought a suspension of six months based upon Respondent’s voluntary disclosure, remorse, cooperation, restitution, and rehabilitation. Thereafter, the Committee issued its recommendation that Respondent be suspended for one year, with no fitness *542requirement, and then be placed on two years of probation with conditions. The full D.C. Board of Professional Responsibility (‘the Board’) considered the matter and recommended Respondent be suspended for three years with one year suspended in favor of probation for a period of two years or until his therapist advises the D.C. Bar Counsel that therapy is no longer necessary. The Board did not impose any additional conditions for reinstatement to the Bar. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals then considered the matter and adopted the recommendation of the Board and ordered that Randy A. Weiss, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, with one year suspended in favor of probation for a period of two years or until his therapist concludes that therapy is no longer necessary, for illegally taking funds from his law firm. The suspension does not require a showing of fitness. Judge Ruiz dissented and noted the unusual facts of the Respondent’s case.
“17. After his voluntary disclosure, Mr. Weiss sought counseling from psychotherapist, Dr. Ralph Barocas. In relation to the charges brought by D.C. Bar Counsel, Mr. Weiss sought an independent psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Thomas Goldman, who concluded that while Mr. Weiss ‘does not suffer from a major mental illness or from a substance abuse disorder, he does suffer from a significantly neurotic personality disorder which provides a basis for understanding both his offenses and his need for self-examination and personal growth.’ Dr. Goldman opined that ‘at the time of his commission of the offenses with which he is charged, he was acting under a sense of compulsion without any understanding of his own unconscious appreciation of the enormous self-destructive risk he was undertaking.’
“18. The psychiatrist for D.C. Bar Counsel, Dr. Richard Ratner, reported that ‘though the illegal diversion of funds took place over a very substantial period of time, the entire episode would appear to be an aberration in the context of Mr. Weiss’s life.’
*543“19. Mr. Weiss’s actions would likely not have been discovered if he had not come forward to inform his Firm and D.C. Bar Counsel of his conduct.
“22. Mr. Weiss has been cooperative with the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland and the Office of Bar Counsel....
“26. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court for the State of Colorado, and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland imposed a sanction reciprocal to the discipline imposed by the D.C. Court of Appeals.[6] ...
“FINDINGS OF LAW
“1. Respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct:
“(i) Rule 8.4(b), in that Respondent committed a criminal act (theft) that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness of a lawyer in other respects; and
(ii) Rule 8.4(c), in that Respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and/or misrepresentation.” [Alterations added.] [Citations omitted.]
Because the facts of this case are undisputed, and the parties did not file exceptions, we are left to determine the proper sanction for respondent’s violation of the MRPC.
After Judge Scrivener’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, respondent and petitioner filed recommendations for sanctions pursuant to Rule 16-758(b).7 Respondent asks us to *544impose a sanction reciprocal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ sanction. He argues that such a result is warranted because the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and this Court share identical goals in discipline, that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals carefully considered all the mitigating circumstances, and that, as a matter of public policy, attorneys should be encouraged to self-report wrongful conduct.
Petitioner, on the other hand, asks for disbarment. It is undisputed that, over a period of three years and in fifty-four separate transactions, respondent stole over $670,000 from his law firm violating Rules 8.4(b) and (c). Petitioner argues that, although we ordinarily give deference to the decisions of the court of original jurisdiction in reciprocal discipline cases, this Court’s pronouncements concerning misappropriation and theft require substantially different discipline in this case. We agree.
II. Standard of Review
It is clear that “[t]his court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tayback, 378 Md. 578, 585, 837 A.2d 158, 162 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 293, 818 A.2d 219, 230 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 539, 810 A.2d 457, 474 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 354 Md. 346, 354, 731 A.2d 447, 452 (1999); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gavin, 350 Md. 176, 189, 711 A.2d 193, 200 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 349 Md. 86, 93, 706 A.2d 1080, 1083 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470, 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kent, 337 Md. 361, 371, 653 A.2d 909, 914 (1995); *545Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 287, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992). We conduct an independent review of the record and “determine whether the findings of the hearing judge are based on clear and convincing evidence.” Tayback, 378 Md. at 585, 837 A.2d at 162; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92, 100 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, 349 Md. 623, 629, 709 A.2d 1212, 1214-15 (1998) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kemp, 335 Md. 1, 9, 641 A.2d 510, 514 (1994)).
In reciprocal discipline cases, the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the original jurisdiction are conclusive evidence of an attorney’s misconduct. Maryland Rule 16-773(g); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Scroggs, 387 Md. 238, 249, 874 A.2d 985, 992 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. 44, 56, 838 A.2d 1238, 1245 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cafferty, 376 Md. 700, 703, 831 A.2d 1042, 1045-46 (2003). In our independent review of the record, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Tayback, 378 Md. at 585, 837 A.2d at 162; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 763 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 288, 793 A.2d 535, 542 (2002); White, 354 Md. at 365, 731 A.2d at 458; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997). Conclusions of law are reviewed “essentially de novo.” Tayback, 378 Md. at 585, 837 A.2d at 162; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dunietz, 368 Md. 419, 428, 795 A.2d 706, 711 (2002). As a result, it is this Court who decides whether a lawyer has violated the MRPC. Tayback, 378 Md. at 585, 837 A.2d at 162; White, 354 Md. at 365, 731 A.2d at 458; Garland, 345 Md. at 392, 692 A.2d at 469; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 599, 667 A.2d 659, 663 (1995).
III. Discussion
Respondent admits that he has violated the provisions of MRPC 8.4 sections (b) and (c). The only issue in dispute is *546the extent of the sanction to be imposed. In answering this question we must balance our tendency to follow the original jurisdiction’s sanction under our reciprocal discipline doctrine, against our prior cases and the sanctions imposed upon members of this Bar for similar misconduct committed in this jurisdiction, always with a view towards the protection of the public.

A. Reciprocal Sanctions

The Maryland Constitution has vested this Court with the power to “adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this state.” Md. Const, art. .IV, § 18(a). Pursuant to that power this Court adopted Maryland Rule 16-773 governing reciprocal discipline. That rule provides in pertinent part:
“(e) Exceptional circumstances. Reciprocal discipline shall not be ordered if Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that:
(3) the imposition of corresponding discipline would result in grave injustice; [or]
(4) the conduct established does not constitute misconduct in this State or it warrants substantially different discipline in this State”
In determining what constitutes grave injustice or if the conduct warrants substantially different discipline in this State we turn to our reciprocal discipline cases.
It is a well established principle in this State that this Court is “inclined, but not required, to impose the same sanction as that imposed by the state in which the misconduct occurred. We are required to assess for ourselves the propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction and that recommended by the Commission.” Scroggs, 387 Md. at 254, 874 A.2d at 995 (citations omitted); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 385 Md. 696, 704 n. 9, 870 A.2d 603, 608 n. 9 (2005) (stating that “ ‘[w]e are prone, but not *547required, to impose the same sanction’ ”) (citations omitted); Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. at 57, 838 A.2d at 1246; Cafferty, 376 Md. at 727, 831 A.2d at 1058 (stating that “[w]e tend to, but are not required to, impose the same sanction”) (citations omitted); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Roberson, 373 Md. 328, 355, 818 A.2d 1059, 1076 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McCoy, 369 Md. 226, 236, 798 A.2d 1132, 1137-38 (2002) (stating that “[t]his Court has often imposed sanctions, in reciprocal discipline cases, of facially equal severity to those imposed by a sister state. We have pointed out, however, that there is no requirement that this should be done”) (citations omitted); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ruffin, 369 Md. 238, 253, 798 A.2d 1139, 1148 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dechowitz, 358 Md. 184, 192, 747 A.2d 657, 661 (2000); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 371, 712 A.2d 525, 533 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 83, 710 A.2d 926, 934 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 325, 697 A.2d 83, 88 (1997); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217, 221-22, 665 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1995); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Saul, 337 Md. 258, 267, 653 A.2d 430, 434 (1995). The fact that we are “inclined,” “prone,” or “tend to” and “often” impose the same sanction is not determinative in this case. The explicit reluctance of the Court to adopt a blanket rule of reciprocity provides that we must look at each case individually and decide whether to deviate from the original jurisdiction’s sanction, and in this case we do so.
In most reciprocal discipline cases, we have held that, ordinarily, when the purpose for the discipline in the original jurisdiction is congruent with ours, we follow the original jurisdiction’s sanction. In Maryland “[t]he purpose of the sanction imposed on an attorney following disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public rather than to punish the attorney....” Steinberg, 385 Md. at 703, 870 A.2d at 607; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 380 Md. 180, 191, 844 A.2d 397, 404 (2004); Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. at 58, 838 A.2d at 1246; Cafferty, 376 Md. at 727, 831 A.2d at 1059; Roberson, 373 Md. at 356, 818 A.2d at 1076; Attorney Griev*548ance Comm’n v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 686, 802 A.2d 1014, 1027 (2002); McCoy, 369 Md. at 237, 798 A.2d at 1138; Ruffin, 369 Md. at 254, 798 A.2d at 1148; Dechowitz, 358 Md. at 192, 747 A.2d at 661; White, 354 Md. at 365, 731 A.2d at 458; Gittens, 346 Md. at 325, 697 A.2d 83, 88 (1997). We often find that most jurisdictions have the same purpose and yield to their determinations because they do not view the misconduct as of any lesser importance than we do. See Steinberg, 385 Md. at 704 n. 9, 870 A.2d at 608 n. 9; Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. at 58, 838 A.2d at 1246; Cafferty, 376 Md. at 727, 831 A.2d at 1059. It is our duty, however, to ensure that this purpose is properly served. In upholding that duty
“ ‘we have recognized that the public interest is served when this Court imposes a sanction which demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of conduct that will not be tolerated.... Moreover, such a sanction represents the fulfillment by this Court of its responsibility “to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent the transgression of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute.” ... Therefore, the public interest is served when sanctions designed to effect general and specific deterrence are imposed on an attorney who violates the disciplinary rules....’”
Sperling, 380 Md. at 191, 844 A.2d at 404 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 447, 635 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994)); see also White, 354 Md. at 365, 731 A.2d at 458. In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142, 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987) this Court stated:
“When the Court considers the appropriate sanction in a case of reciprocal discipline, we look not only to the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction but to our own cases as well. The sanction will depend on the unique facts and circumstances of each case, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for similar misconduct.”
This standard is in agreement with our duty to protect the public, gives appropriate deference to our sister jurisdictions and ensures that every member of the Maryland Bar is subject to the same sanctions for similar conduct. Although, *549“a view toward consistent dispositions for similar misconduct” 8 is an important part of this equation, a proper review of our own cases is just as important in order to ensure that all members of the Maryland Bar are subject to the same standards. It is conceivable that adopting a strict reciprocal discipline policy, in some instances, would result in grossly unfair results and might encourage some Maryland attorneys to turn themselves in to the disciplinary authorities of other jurisdictions where they are a member of the bar, to avoid the results of direct action by Maryland’s processes.
In reciprocal discipline cases where we impose the original jurisdiction’s sanction, we usually find that the same discipline would be given in Maryland. In Wittcher, for example, an attorney was appointed to represent an indigent defendant. Willcher, 340 Md. at 220, 665 A.2d at 1060. The attorney demanded that the defendant pay $1,500.00 for the representation. Such conduct was prohibited in the District of Columbia and as a result he was disbarred. In that case, we agreed with the District of Columbia that such conduct constituted a fraud upon the indigent client and the judicial system and we disbarred the attorney stating that “[t]his Court has consistently stated that offenses infected with fraud, deceit, and dishonesty will result in disbarment in the absence of evidence of compelling reasons to the contrary.” Id. at 222, 665 A.2d at 1061. In cases involving theft or misappropriation of client funds we have reciprocally disbarred attorneys after finding that such conduct results on disbarment in this State. Roberson, 373 Md. at 357, 818 A.2d at 1077; Cafferty, 376 Md. at 728, 831 A.2d at 1059. See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Moore, 301 Md. 169, 171, 482 A.2d 497, 498 (1984) (holding that disbarment, the sanction imposed in the District of Columbia, was the appropriate sanction for misappropriation of client funds for Maryland attorneys); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bettis, 305 Md. 452, 455, 505 A.2d 492, 493 (1986) *550(holding that, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, disbarment is the appropriate sanction for misappropriation of funds where the District of Columbia had imposed the same sanction).
In some cases, on the other hand, we have yielded to the original jurisdiction when we might have imposed a different sanction had the proceedings originated in this jurisdiction. See Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. at 59, 838 A.2d at 1247; Gittens, 346 Md. at 327, 697 A.2d at 88-89. In Ayres-Fountain, an attorney filed Certificates of Compliance with the Delaware Supreme Court. The Certificates falsely stated that the attorney had timely filed and paid all taxes. The attorney was suspended from the practice of law in Delaware. In applying the same sanction imposed by the Delaware court we held that
“where a respondent’s most serious misconduct involves misrepresentations, and those misrepresentations are to the Supreme Court of the State in which he or she principally practices and that sanctioned him or her, it ordinarily is appropriate to defer to that court, notwithstanding that the sanction it imposed is not identical to the one that may have been imposed by this Court were the same conduct to have occurred in this State.”
Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. at 59, 838 A.2d at 1247. In another case, an attorney convicted for the theft of $88,837.92 from client’s funds entrusted to him was suspended by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Gittens, 346 Md. at 322, 697 A.2d at 86.9 We imposed the same sanction acknowledging that we may have decided differently as the original jurisdiction had the misconduct occurred in Maryland. Id. at 327, 697 A.2d at 89. In adopting the District of Columbia’s sanction, we said:
*551“There is no basis for supposing that the District of Columbia treats these matters less seriously or wholly inconsistently with the manner exercised by this Court. On the contrary, deference should be paid to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as demonstrated by the fact that it is loath to mitigate misconduct on the basis of drug or other substance addiction or abuse.”
Id. at 327, 697 A.2d at 88. We did not provide any more guidance as to which factors were considered by the Court in making that determination. Since that time, however, we have become much less lenient towards any misconduct involving theft, misappropriation, fraud, or deceit.
It is appropriate to address some occasions where we have declined to follow the original jurisdiction’s sanction. In Parsons, 310 Md. at 142, 527 A.2d at 330, an older 1987 case, two attorneys were suspended from practice in the District of Columbia for six months. We imposed a less severe sanction finding that, in Maryland, their conduct only warranted a 90-day suspension. Id. The attorneys in that case forged 10 a client’s signature on a complaint for divorce, they then notarized the complaint and filed it with the court in the District of Columbia. The Court did not follow the District of Columbia’s sanction because a Maryland case on point and decided a year earlier, sanctioned such conduct with only a 90-day suspension.11
When the conduct is more serious, we sometimes have not followed the original jurisdiction and have imposed more severe sanctions. In a post Gittens case, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dechowitz, 358 Md. 184, 747 A.2d 657 (2000) (per curiam), the Supreme Court of California suspended an attor*552ney when he was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Id. at 191, 747 A.2d at 660. We found that such conduct is grounds for disbarment in this State and declined to follow California’s sanction. Id. In another post Gittens case, an attorney, among other infractions, gave false testimony under oath. White, 354 Md. at 367, 731 A.2d at 459. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland suspended Ms. White indefinitely and Bar Counsel filed a petition for reciprocal discipline. Id. at 351, 731 A.2d at 450. We found that giving false testimony is so serious in nature that it often warrants disbarment. Id. at 367, 731 A.2d at 459. We declined to impose an indefinite suspension, as imposed by the original jurisdiction, and found that disbarment was the appropriate sanction due to the serious nature of the offense. Id. As these cases illustrate, although we usually do not deviate from the original jurisdiction’s sanction, we will do so when the conduct involved is of such nature that it would not be tolerated from any member of the Bar in this State if the conduct occurred here. As a result we now turn to the nature of the respondent’s misconduct and why it leads to disbarment.

B. Misconduct and Sanction

Theft and the misappropriation of funds is one of the most egregious breaches of an attorney’s duty as a member of this Bar. To illustrate the graveness of this type of conduct we have stated:
“[I]t is essential that all members of the legal fraternity be strongly and constantly impressed with the truism that in handling moneys and properties belonging to their clients or others that they accept them in trust and are strictly accountable for their conduct in administering that trust, so they dare not appropriate those funds and properties for their personal use. The misappropriation by an attorney of funds of others entrusted to his care, be the amount small or large, is of great concern and represents the gravest form of professional misconduct.”
*553Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 519, 307 A.2d 677, 682 (1973). In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 328 Md. 412, 417, 614 A.2d 955, 958 (1992) we stated that “misappropriation of funds by an attorney ‘is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty and ordinarily will result in disbarment in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction.’ ” (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991)). And in Vanderlinde we held:
“in cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as ‘compelling extenuating circumstances,’ anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the ‘root cause’ of the misconduct [and] that also result in an attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the MRPC. Only if the circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment in cases of stealing, dishonesty, fraudulent conduct, the intentional misappropriation of funds or other serious criminal conduct, whether occurring in the practice of law, or otherwise.”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001) (alteration added) (emphasis added).
Since Vanderlinde we have continued to impress upon the Maryland Bar the importance of honesty, in particular, the handling of other people’s money or property. In Vlahos, over a period of one year an attorney took payments from the firm’s clients and kept them for himself. Vlahos, 369 Md. at 186, 798 A.2d at 556. We held that disbarment is the proper sanction when an attorney engages in the misappropriation of funds, regardless of the source of the money. Id.; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Spery, 371 Md. 560, 810 A.2d 487 (2002) (attorney was disbarred for conversion of money from his partners); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 839 A.2d 718 (2003) (attorney was disbarred for two *554instances of misappropriation of funds); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goodman, 381 Md. 480, 850 A.2d 1157 (2004) (attorney was disbarred after intentionally impersonating another attorney).
Respondent’s case is similar to Vanderlinde. Ms. Vanderlinde’s conduct took place over a period of six months, respondent’s lasted three years. Ms. Vanderlinde stole $3,880.67. The respondent stole $670,465.99. Both Ms. Vanderlinde and respondent made full restitution of the funds. While Ms. Vanderlinde returned the money before being caught, respondent self-reported to his firm and the commission and he then returned the funds. They both returned the money because they realized their conduct was wrong. In this case respondent’s divine afflatus was the cause of his coming to terms with his conduct and why it was wrong.
Respondent’s case is also similar to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 541 A.2d 966 (1988). In Ezrin, the attorney stole $200,000.00 from his partners over a period of three years. Id. at 604, 541 A.2d at 966. The attorney returned the money after his partners discovered the fraud. Id. As a result of the thefts in their respective cases, Ms. Vanderlinde and Mr. Ezrin were disbarred. Id. at 609, 541 A.2d at 969; Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 419, 773 A.2d at 488.
Respondent asks us to take into consideration a number of mitigating circumstances in deciding which sanction shall be imposed. In that respect, we have clearly stated that, in theft or misappropriation cases, we will consider imposing a less severe sanction than disbarment only when “compelling extenuating circumstances” are the “root cause” of the misconduct. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 414, 773 A.2d at 486. Respondent’s sole evidence of the cause of his misconduct is his alleged emotional and mental problem evidenced by the psychiatrists’ testimony. These experts agree that respondent does not suffer from any specific mental disease or illness. Their only explanation for his conduct is that he had a “psychological need for security borne out of his father’s depression-era fear of poverty.” Respondent was a very successful lawyer able to *555generate large amounts of revenue for his firm and for himself. He was able to misappropriate over half a million dollars from title insurance proceeds alone, which most likely amounted to a very small part of the firm’s revenue from the real estate transactions he handled. Respondent does not claim that he was having family problems at the time or any specific hardships. In Vanderlinde, the attorney had a history of depression, her second marriage was falling apart, her daughter was suffering from psychological problems, she had lost her job and was unsuccessful as a real estate agent, and she began taking the money because she needed to pay her bills. We found that all those circumstances were not sufficient to meet the required “compelling extenuating circumstances” standard and Ms. Vanderlinde was disbarred. It is clear that respondent has not met his burden with respect to prior mitigating circumstances and should be disbarred.
Respondent offers a number of additional mitigating circumstances, all of which took place after his misconduct. In light of Vanderlinde’s requirement that only “compelling extenuating circumstances” being the “root cause” of the misconduct will be considered in applying a lesser sanction in cases involving theft, we do not address respondent’s subsequent conduct.
IV. Conclusion
Maryland Rule 16-773 requires the application of reciprocal discipline unless there is clear and convincing evidence that such application will result in grave injustice or that the conduct warrants a different sanction in this State. There is no doubt that this Court will not tolerate theft by a member of the bar from clients, partners, or third-parties. It would be grave injustice in allowing a member of this Bar to commit such an offense and be given a lesser sanction because another jurisdiction did so, while other members of the Maryland Bar would be sanctioned more severely. The current state of the law in this State warrants substantially different discipline than that imposed by the District of Columbia for offenses of the nature extant in the instant case.
*556Disbarment is the appropriate sanction.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-715(0, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST RANDY A. WEISS.
Dissenting Opinion by BELL, C.J., which RAKER, J. joins.

. Maryland Rule 16-773(b) provides:
“(b) Petition in Court of Appeals. Upon receiving and verifying information from any source that in another jurisdiction an attorney has been disciplined or placed on inactive status based oil incapacity, Bar Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 16 — 751(a)(2). A certified copy of the disciplinary or remedial order shall be attached to the Petition, and a copy of the Petition and order shall be served on the attorney in accordance with Rule 16-753.”

. This Court adopted a new version of the Maryland Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct, effective 1 July 2005. The MRPC sections applicable to this case are identical to the sections they replaced.

. MPRC 8.4 provides:
"Rule 8.4. Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; [or]
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice” (alteration added).

. Maryland Rule 16-752(a) states:
“(a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for *536maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing.”

. Rule 16-757 provides in pertinent part:
“(c) Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law.”

. The Supreme Court of Florida has also imposed a sanction reciprocal to the discipline imposed by the D.C. Court of Appeals.

. That rule provides:
*544' ‘Rule 16-758. Post-hearing proceedings.
(b) Exceptions; recommendations. Within 15 days after service of the notice required by section (a) of this Rule, each party may file (1) exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge and (2) recommendations concerning the appropriate disposition under Rule 16-759(c).“

. We have interpreted this language to mean that attorneys being disciplined should be able to expect similar sanctions lor the specified offense.

. We distinguished Gittens in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001), stating that Gittens was a reciprocal discipline case and it did not apply to an original misappropriation case like Vanderlinde. Id. at 413, 773 A.2d at 484-85. With this decision we decline to follow further the reasoning in Gittens.

. The Court noted that, although the attorneys forged the signature, they were not prosecuted or convicted of criminal forgery.

. In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maxwell, 307 Md. 600, 516 A.2d 570 (1986), this Court "imposed a 90-day suspension on an attorney for his ‘deliberate falsification of [a] notary certificate, and his knowing attestation of a false signature on a deed as genuine.' Id. at 604, 516 A.2d at 572.” Parsons, 310 Md. at 142, 527 A.2d at 330.