Court Opinion

ID: 9542066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:30:59.189038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:16.891115
License: Public Domain

*1054THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I can see no conclusion but that the case must be returned to the district court for a jury to properly try factual issues relating to the liability of the defendants Beardall and Boone (and Combined Insurance Company as Boone’s employer or master). I cannot agree that the erroneous admission of evidence of Boone’s intoxication and the erroneous giving of an instruction concerning the presumption of intoxication were not prejudicial.
The majority opinion treats the situation as if the only issue of negligence, and its resulting liability, existed between the plaintiff, Carol Sinclair, and Boone and Combined Insurance Company. This approach ignores the right of contribution available in the State of Wyoming since 1973, and now found in § 1-1-110, W.S. 1977. Since the adoption of that statute, in negligence cases in which there is more than one defendant, a defendant has additional opportunities with respect to liability. As always he can attempt to defeat the claim of the plaintiff, but if he is found to be liable he has an opportunity to spread the damages to any other tort-feasor. In this instance Carol Sinclair pleaded the negligence of the two drivers, Beardall and Boone. The respective defendants cross-claimed against one another for their right of contribution, and those issues remained present in the case up through its submission to the jury and the return of the special verdict.
It is unfortunate that counsel have not been afforded an opportunity to present this aspect of the case, but since the result of the jury verdict was such that Beardall was completely excused and Boone, being found guilty of gross negligence, probably enjoyed no right of contribution pursuant to § l-l-llO(c), W.S.1977, there really was no reason for the parties to pursue the matter. The necessity for consideration arises only because of the substitution by this court of a verdict of ordinary negligence for a verdict of gross negligence.
I am not certain that the authorities cited in the majority opinion necessarily say that ordinary negligence is included in gross negligence. I am certain, however, that if a verdict of gross negligence must be set aside because of the erroneous admission of evidence, there is nothing left in which to include a finding of ordinary negligence by the jury. I read the majority opinion as recognizing that but justifying the affirmance of the judgment by a conclusion that Boone was guilty of ordinary negligence as a matter of law, and a directed verdict of liability against him in favor of Carol Sinclair would have been inappropriate. For me this does represent an injudicious invasion of the province of the jury.
The majority approach ignores the right of Boone to contribution if Beardall also were negligent in accordance with § 1-1— 110, W.S.1977. The majority opinion looks only to the evidence of Boone’s negligence in justifying this result, and the proper rule for viewing the evidence in such a case is not recognized. I quote from Barnes v. Fernandez, Wyo., 526 P.2d 983, 985 (1974), a case cited in the majority opinion, as follows:
“In determining the question of whether a verdict should have been directed, under Rule 50(a), W.R.C.P., we must consider the evidence favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed, giving to it all reasonable inferences. Brennan v. Laramie Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 493 P.2d 1044, 1048; Svalina v. Big Horn National Life Insurance Co., Wyo., 466 P.2d 1018, 1020; Holstedt v. Neighbors, Wyo., 377 P.2d 181; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2524, Vol. 19, p. 544.”
With respect to the portion of the evidence that is to be considered in performing this function, the rule set forth in 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2529, p. 573 (1971), appears to me to be sound:
“The correct rule seems to be that the court may consider all of the evidence favorable to the position of the party opposing the motion as well as any unfa*1055vorable evidence that the jury is required to believe. Thus it may take into account evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that the evidence comes from disinterested witnesses. But statements that all of the evidence is to be considered are too broad. Unfavorable evidence that contradicts the favorable evidence must be disregarded as must evidence that is admitted for a limited purpose, such as impeachment.” [footnotes omitted]
It must be recognized that if the judgment is to be affirmed in this instance by a holding that Carol Sinclair was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of negligence as against Boone and his employer it also follows that result also encompasses a directed verdict against Boone and his employer and in favor of Beardall on the issue of Beardall’s negligence. The majority opinion analyzes only the evidence of Boone’s negligence. There is a good deal of evidence favorable to the position of Boone and his employer which under the proper view of the evidence must be taken into account. Beardall had arisen about eight or nine o’clock the preceding morning, and had been up 15 to 16 hours at the time of this accident. He had engaged in water skiing during the day, and had traveled in the automobile something more than 300 miles since seven or eight o’clock in the evening. He and his companion had stopped in Ev-anston for dinner, and Beardall had been driving from Evanston on. Beardall has no recollection of the accident. This is also true of the plaintiff and Beardall’s passenger, both of whom were asleep at the time of the accident. Beardall’s vehicle made no brake or skid marks prior to the collision. The left gouge mark as discernable on a blown-up photograph appears to almost contact the center line of the highway, and it was made by a part of the vehicle that would be more than 12 inches inside the left fender of the Beardall vehicle. The Bear-dall vehicle was across the center line when it came to rest. The rotational forces of the collision would have pulled the left front side of the Beardall vehicle closer to the center line than it had been at the time of impact. The parts of the Beardall vehicle which made the gouge marks could have been as much as five feet behind the front of the vehicle.
The majority points to the conclusions of the highway patrolman relative to the place of the gouge marks, but the clearest evidence is found in the photograph. The jury was instructed as follows:
“The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of a witness to be received as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of an EXPERT WITNESS, who by education, study and experience has become expert on a particular subject and may be permitted to testify as to his opinion on any matter in which he is so versed. The ultimate weight which is to be given to the testimony of expert witnesses is a question to be determined by the jury, and there is no rule of law which requires you to surrender your own judgment to that of any person testifying as an expert witness, or to give controlling effect to the opinions of such witnesses; in other words, the testimony of an expert, like that of any other witness, is to be received by you and given such weight as you think it is properly entitled to; but you are not exclusively bound or concluded by the testimony of any witness, expert or otherwise.” [Emphasis added.]
If the testimony of the highway patrolman is to be regarded as unfavorable to Boone, the conclusory aspects are the most significant unfavorable evidence, and according to the instruction, which I submit is accurate, the jury was not required to believe that testimony.
All this leaves me with a sure conviction that there was evidence from which a jury reasonably could conclude that Beardall also was negligent. If we are concerned with a statute prohibiting driving in the other lane, the same rule would apply to both Beardall and Boone. Under these circumstances I see no choice but to submit the matter to the jury, the proper body under our law in Wyoming to decide issues *1056of fact relating to the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. There is no other way to avoid the prejudicial effect of the evidence of intoxication and the corollary instruction as it pertains to liability between Boone and his employer and Bear-dall. A jury in weighing the relative negligence of Boone and Beardall must have been influenced by the evidence and the instruction relative to intoxication, and the verdict as returned satisfactorily establishes that the jury was so influenced. That prejudice is not abated by the majority result.
For these reasons I am persuaded the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.