Court Opinion

ID: 9720972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:45:43.928518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.584423
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I concur with divisions II and III of the majority opinion relating to the scope of review and with much of what is said in division I on the merits, but I am unable to agree wholly with the court’s construction of section 144.34 or the result.
The statute is complete. I agree with what Justice Harris says in division I of his dissent about that. Disinterments are allowed “only when reasonable cause is shown that someone is criminally or civilly responsible for such death, after hearing, upon reasonable notice prescribed by the court . . . .” Before ordering exhumation the court must give due consideration “to the public health, the dead, and the feelings of relatives.” I believe all these statutory criteria are limitations on the right to order disinterment, rather than mere caveats. The legislature made this clear in the statute which was in effect when our prior statutory cases were decided. At that time the statute provided:
No application for a permit to disinter for the purpose of holding an autopsy shall be granted by the court or state department except under circumstances such as to cause the belief that someone is criminally or civilly liable for such death. A proper showing shall be made in every case and due consideration shall be given to the public health, the dead, and the feelings of relatives and friends. The limitations of this section shall not apply when the application is made by the surviving spouse or next of kin.
§ 141.25, The Code 1950 (emphasis added). This statute was revised into what is substantially its present form by a comprehensive act relating to vital statistics which was enacted in 1970. See 1970 Sess., 63rd G.A., ch. 1081, § 35. By eliminating the last sentence of the prior statute, the legislature extended its restrictive requirements; it did not reduce them.
I believe a “proper showing” must still be made in every case. A preliminary showing is made when evidence is adduced that the disinterment would be likely to produce material and relevant evidence on the issue of whether “someone is criminally or civilly responsible for such death.” Nevertheless, disinterment should not be ordered unless the other limitations are also satisfied.
In this case we are concerned about the court’s duty to give due consideration to the dead. I agree with Justice Harris that the legislature has manifested an intent that the sanctity of the grave ought not to be disturbed except for the most cogent reasons. Unreasonable delay in seeking disinterment bears on this issue. So should the question of the necessity of obtaining the evidence through disinterment and autopsy. Out of due consideration for the dead, the applicant should be required to demonstrate that the truth of the disputed fact cannot reasonably be obtained through other evidence. See Roepke v. Rice County, 66 Oil, 260 N.W.2d 464, 466-67 (Minn.1977).
It is on this point that I reach a factual conclusion different from that of the majority. Under my reading of the record, I find no evidence to show the unavailability of other evidence to determine the cause of death. Was discovery pursued of decedent’s next of kin, his treating physician, or the doctor who executed the death certificate? No showing was made that these alternatives or others were exhausted. Therefore I believe there was no showing of necessity.
Even though this reasoning differs from that of the trial court, I would hold the court was right in ruling that due consideration of the dead required denial of the disinterment petition.