Court Opinion

ID: 9783635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:53:28.239683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:27.877088
License: Public Domain

NOBLE, J.,
dissenting:
This case presents a difficult tension between well-recognized tort claims such as wrongful use of civil proceedings, defamation, tortious interference with the right to work, and important policy considerations related to attorney discipline proceedings, which serve to protect the public. The majority is clearly correct that the Supreme Court determines how attorney discipline matters proceed and the policy behind such proceedings. On the other hand, Justice Scott is equally correct in his assessment of how tort proceedings that deal with reputational matters have developed through ancient common law principles, modern ease law, and statutes. Both opinions offer strong arguments. Nevertheless, I cannot fully agree with either position, though ultimately I conclude that Justice Scott would reach the correct result in allowing some of the Appellee’s claims to proceed. My biggest disagreement, therefore, is with the reasoning and result of the well-written majority opinion, which I will address first.
The majority errs primarily in extending the judicial statements privilege so that it bars even actions related to the filing of a complaint or initiation of suit or prosecution.
I must agree with Justice Scott, who notes that at least some of Appellee’s claims — specifically his claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings and outrageous conduct — are not based on the “judicial statements” in this case. Instead, they stem directly from the act of wrongfully filing the bar complaint, regardless of the complaint’s content. Assuming the Appel-lee’s claims are true, which we must at this point, the filing of the bar complaint resulted in Appellee’s being temporarily suspended from the practice of law, which substantially affected his income and led to other civil claims being brought against him, and in his having to pay to defend himself at the disciplinary proceedings — all of which the majority dismisses as “minimal and ... little more than mere inconvenience.” So, if the judicial statements privilege only extends to those claims based on the content of the judicial statements, e.g., a defamation claim for statements in the bar complaint, at least some of Appellee’s other claims must survive.
The next question, then, is the proper scope of the judicial statements privilege (also known as the judicial proceedings privilege). That privilege extends only to bar tort claims stemming directly from the content of the judicial statements themselves, such as a defamation claim based on a witness’s testimony at trial. While no *607action lies because of the content of statements made in a judicial proceeding, an action can lie for the fact that the speaker instituted the proceedings wrongfully— that is, maliciously and without probable cause — through wrongful institution of a civil proceeding, a form of malicious prosecution. In such a case, the statements in the pleading, which are privileged, are not the tortious acts; rather, the initiation of the action itself, regardless of the content of the pleadings, is the tortious act. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Serio, 496 So.2d 412, 415 (La.Ct.App.1986) (“The affirmative defense of absolute privilege applies only to statements communicated to third person. Malicious prosecution, however, is not concerned with the statements made during a proceeding but rather with the intent of the parties in instituting the original proceeding. Therefore, we can not hold that absolute privilege is an affirmative defense to a malicious prosecution action.”). The need for the immunity privilege for a speaker in a judicial proceeding and the right of an individual to sue that speaker for wrongful institution of a civil proceeding are therefore not legally mutually exclusive.
The majority, however, concludes that the privilege “extends to any claim relating to the act of filing the bar complaint, such as abuse of process, wrongful use of civil proceedings, or malicious prosecution.” In so holding, the majority refers to the decisions of several other states that have extended a privilege to bar complaints. In so doing, the majority errs in two ways. First, it calls the new privilege an extension of the judicial statements privilege, which it cannot be. Second, even assuming that this Court can manufacture a wholly new privilege as part of its power to regulate the profession of law, it should not do so.
The judicial statements privilege can apply only when the claim stems from the statements made in the judicial proceeding, not from the act of wrongfully bringing the action without probable cause. See Smith v. Hodges, 199 S.W.3d 185, 192 (Ky.App.2005) (reviewing cases applying privilege to malicious prosecution claims and noting they are “based upon grand jury testimony”). In deciding if the privilege applies, the focus must be on the allegedly tortious act — either a false statement or the wrongful institution of an action. If the tort claim, whether for defamation, perjury, or even malicious prosecution, is based on a false statement, the privilege can bar it. But if the tort claim is based on the institution of the action, the privilege has no applicability whatsoever. To hold otherwise would subsume entirely the torts of malicious prosecution and wrongful institution of civil proceedings in the privilege, even outside the context of bar complaints. The majority’s reading of the privilege would effectively destroy the torts of malicious prosecution and outrage in other contexts.3
*608This understanding of the privilege as limited only to statements, and not the act of wrongfully initiating a claim lacking probable cause, comports with the history and policy behind the privilege, in addition to the cases applying it. The judicial statements privilege originated in English common law, and has always applied in American courts. An excellent and scholarly discussion of the development of the privilege to its present state in Kentucky law is set forth by Court of Appeals Judge Guidugli in Smith v. Hodges, 199 S.W.3d 185 (Ky.App.2005), and thus will not be discussed at length here. However, the basis for the privilege is a matter of public policy supporting fundamental justice by assuring participants in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings that they can speak freely in presenting their claim, or by a lawyer presenting his or her client’s claim, without fear of suit or liability for defamation. See 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 1154 (2001). The fact that this sometimes results in a grant of immunity to malicious liars has been considered justified by the need for honest testimony without fear of reprisals. See Schmitt v. Mann, 291 Ky. 80, 163 S.W.2d 281 (1942). Viewed another way, very old Kentucky case law states:
A party to a judicial proceeding may, by himself or counsel, write or say anything of and concerning the case, or of a witness who testifies in the case, that is pertinent and material to the controversy, and he can not be held to answer for scandalous words, unless, under the pretense of pleading his cause, he designedly wanders from the point in question, and maliciously heaps slander upon the party whose conduct or evidence is under consideration; and so long as it can be said that such party confines himself to that which is pertinent and material, he is under no obligation to show that his words are absolutely true; and can not be made to answer for maliciously saying that which the law permits him to say.
Morgan v. Booth, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 480, 483-84 (1877) (internal citations omitted).
Clearly, our state constitution gives the Supreme Court authority to regulate the practice of law and to discipline attorneys through procedures it sets. Ky. Const § 116. Thus, because they are required by the Supreme Court’s established procedure, hearings before the disciplinary agents enumerated in the Supreme Court Rules can only be “judicial or quasi-judicial” in nature. And, as the majority points out, “Judicial proceedings include all proceedings in which an officer or tribunal exercises judicial functions.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587 (1977). Therefore, the Court’s agents enjoy a form of “judicial” immunity as set forth in SCR 3.160(4). Similarly, a claimant has absolute immunity for statements made in the course of such a judicial proceeding under the judicial statements privilege, even though the claim relies on false or malicious statements, if they are material and relevant to the proceedings. Schmitt v. Mann, 291 Ky. 80, 163 S.W.2d 281, 283 (1942).
However, in his dissent Justice Scott points out that the tort of wrongful institution of a civil proceeding is not based on the fact that false or malicious statements have been made, but rather that the attorney has been wrongfully subjected to a claim at all. He argues that there has *609been no immunity for this type of claim heretofore, and that to allow such is to effectively nullify the tort. Such claims arise through a civil action brought against a person who has previously filed what is claimed to be a “frivolous” suit resulting in damages to the plaintiff. These damages can cover the cost of the previous litigation and other damages, including damage to reputation. While today’s nomenclature uses the term wrongful institution of a civil proceeding, this is merely a form of malicious prosecution, which has historically applied to both criminal and civil proceedings. Woods v. Finnell, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 628 (1878). The action may be brought when a judicial proceeding has been mali ciously instituted against a person withou t probable cause. Historically, as well as today, “[pjrobable cause means less than prima facie evidence of guilt, namely, such circumstances as warrant suspicion.” Branham v. Berry, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 412 (Ky.Super.1882) (citing Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 7 Cranch 339, 3 L.Ed. 364 (1813)).
Thus, I must conclude that the judicial statements privilege cannot extend to the act of wrongfully filing a claim which arguably lacks probable cause or to statements made outside the context of a judicial proceeding. What the majority seeks to do is create an entirely new privilege, one based on this Court’s power and duty to regulate attorney conduct, as other states have done. See, e.g., Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671, 676 (1955). But we should acknowledge that we are creating an entirely new privilege, one that works only to disadvantage attorneys, rather than stretching an established privilege to the breaking point. There is a strong basis for a debate about whether such a new privilege is sound policy or even permissible under the Kentucky Constitution.
Justice Scott has emphasized this latter issue, finding that the majority’s position is in tension with the Constitution’s guarantee to the right to sue for damage to one’s reputation. Though I am somewhat sympathetic to the position, I do not think it is necessary to reach the constitutional question because sound policy disfavors the creation of a new privilege for bar complainants.
Justice Scott discusses Section 114 of the Kentucky Constitution, known as the Open Courts Clause, which does say that “every person” shall have a remedy “by due course of law” for an injury done to his or her reputation, among other things; but I cannot read Section 114 to make it unconstitutional to apply the judicial statements privilege for claims made in a lawyer discipline action even though such an application precludes the reputational torts of slander and libel. That privilege, much like the torts of malicious prosecution and wrongful use of civil proceedings, albeit under a different name, existed at the time Section 114 was enacted. So I think the privilege continues to apply to the contents of statements made during a judicial proceeding and is not barred by the Constitution. By the same token, I believe malicious prosecution or wrongful institution of a civil proceeding remain viable torts — for all Kentucky citizens.
Thus, instead of looking to the Constitution, this case should be resolved by deciding whether a new privilege, one related to this Court’s constitutional power to regulate attorney conduct and discipline, should or can be created. The real tension here comes from public policy that affects all the governed and an individual’s right to a cause of action. The fact that the individual having the cause of action for wrongful institution of a civil proceeding or the tort of outrageous conduct is a lawyer does not make a justifiable difference.
I acknowledge that lawyers are members of a profession, with the attendant *610responsibilities of professional conduct, and that the Supreme Court has been charged with regulating that conduct. But it is simply overreaching with that power when the Court creates a new privilege which applies only to the detriment of lawyers. Doing so reflects an overly cynical view of attorneys in favor of claimants that presupposes that clients must not be harmed, but that it is acceptable for clients to inflict harm on innocent counsel.
Since the judicial statements privilege is only related to statements made in a judicial proceeding, any grant of immunity for other causes of action must be created out of whole cloth. This Court must not do this absent extremely compelling reasons. It is true that some states have found the possibility of chilling bar complaints to be sufficiently compelling, but I find their positions to be poorly supported.
Close examination of the factors that must be considered weighs against creating such a broad-sweeping immunity. First, what is the justification for treating attorneys more harshly than any other professional in Kentucky? Physicians, counselors, social workers, and other professions that are governed by licensure boards may bring a wrongful institution of civil proceedings or an outrageous conduct claim against the client who has wrongly accused them. Under the majority’s opinion, lawyers would be the only professional group in Kentucky who would be denied these causes of action. All plaintiffs are denied a cause of action for slander and libel due to the judicial statements privilege. The same cannot be said for this new, unnamed privilege, unless the Court means to effectively abolish the torts of outrage and wrongful institution of a civil proceeding by saying the new privilege applies to all such cases where the judicial statements privilege applies. Is there a true, overweening justification for this disparate treatment of attorneys?
Second, while this Court is charged with governing the practice of law, an attorney who is exercising his or her right to access to the courts is not engaging in the practice of law. If filing a personal law suit is the practice of law, then the courts will be overwhelmed with illegal practice claims, as that is essentially what every unlicensed plaintiff would be doing. While this analogy may sound absurd, it illustrates that the Court’s only constitutional authority here is to govern the actual practice of law. Unless exercising one’s right to access to the courts is somehow unethical so as to impact an attorney’s actual practice of law, this Court has zero authority to tell an attorney or any other citizen that he or she cannot file a lawsuit absent overwhelming public interest to the contrary.
Third, creating and applying this privilege only to attorneys simply is not justified by any substantial evidence, though the privilege certainly impacts an attorney’s substantial rights. There is only supposition that allowing an attorney to bring a wrongful institution of civil proceedings or outrageous conduct action would result in legitimate claims not being made. No studies have been presented, not even rudimentary surveys. Applying a privilege to these causes of action requires acting on a possibility of chilling but results in a certainty of deprivation of rights.
Additionally, this concern over a possible chilling effect presumes that all such clients are the so-called “little guy,” who is unsophisticated, perhaps uneducated, and therefore stands powerless next to the attorney, who is learned in the law and an officer of the courts. But, as amply illustrated by this case, clients are frequently at least on an equal footing with their counsel, if not in a superior position, having the resources of large multinational corporations. Allowing such a client an absolute privilege to file a bar complaint *611would invite abusive practices by which the client seeks to bend the attorney to its will and force him to take (or not to take) a course of action that he or she deems prudent. Moreover, this Court cannot take the position of splitting hairs, so as to allow the privilege for the “little guy” but not for the powerful or sophisticated client. Interestingly, there is little or no likelihood that an attorney will even bring a malicious prosecution claim against the sort of client who the privilege is intended to protect. Such a suit would rarely be worthwhile.
Fourth, this Court must guard against a knee jerk reaction that, of course, an attorney must not sue his client, even though the attorney may be seriously harmed by a client’s antics, just because the attorney was previously in a trust relationship with a client. To have value, trust must be a two-way street, and in no other area of the law do we deny a person the right to remedy a breach of trust by an opponent. Though a distasteful concept, a client who makes a bar complaint against an attorney is in the posture of an opponent. And while attorneys remain ethically bound to preserve their clients’ secrets, they are not required to stand by helplessly while their careers are ruined. The trial court is perfectly capable of screening what is appropriate evidence and what remains ethically shielded. Nor must this Court jump on the bandwagon that because other state courts are granting such immunity, we must do likewise, at least not without sufficient consideration of how our jurisprudence is affected generally by this decision. In many ways Kentucky is unique, and our Court is sworn to be cognizant of our own law and needs first.
Finally, this Court must be cognizant of the reputation of our profession, which is often determined based on negative publicity about lawyer wrongdoing, with very little said about all the right things lawyers do. Over history, lawyers have defended our liberties, supported causes that bring better government, given of their time to the needy, and been a lifeline to clients lost in a morass of legalities. Many do pro bono work, or work in public service jobs. Indeed, our oath of office requires Kentucky attorneys to swear to uphold the principles put forth in our constitutions and statutes. When an attorney fails in this duty, this Court has a strong interest in appropriate discipline, even as much as denying the right to practice law. But when an attorney has done no wrong, and a bar complaint is dismissed against him or her, there is no remedy to let the public know, or to get recompense for a damaged reputation, other than to bring suit for the causes of action available to them such as wrongful institution of civil proceedings or outrageous conduct, though it is true that most attorneys do not choose to bring these actions. It is nonetheless their choice. These actions can serve the attorney individually, but can also serve the bar in general because a negative impression of the practice of law can be corrected.
This Court must act circumspectly and carefully. We must not undermine either the respect of the public or of the attorneys who practice before us. I do not believe that allowing attorneys the same right to act individually as is enjoyed by all other citizens will undermine public respect or understanding, but will certainly keep the respect and willingness of attorneys to practice.
Consequently, I dissent from the majority opinion and would instead allow Appel-lee’s claims not covered by the judicial statements privilege, as described above, to proceed.

. Though the majority does not address it, beyond noting that the trial court did, it is clear that SCR 3.160(4) is no help in creating a privilege for a bar complainant. It is questionable whether such a rule can create a substantive privilege, as noted by the trial court.
But that issue need not be resolved, since this rule does not extend a privilege to a bar complainant. The rule purports only to grant immunity to "the Association, the Board, the Director, the Inquiry Commission, the Trial Commission, the Office of Bar Counsel, [and] their officers, employees, agents, delegates, or members” from liability to a person who initiates a complaint or to any attorney against whom a complaint is made. SCR 3.160(4). The rule makes no mention of immunity for the complainant. It is intended to protect the direct participants in the disciplinary process itself, that is, those who marshal the evidence (e.g., Bar counsel) and those who decide the case (e.g., the trial commissioner, the Board of Governors), who in all likeli*608hood would enjoy judicial or quasi-judicial immunity under the common law anyway. Bar Complainants do not fall within this category of direct participants in the disciplinary process.
That the complainant also happens to be a ‘'member" of the KBA, i.e., an attorney, does not garner any immunity. Such a reading stretches the rule beyond the point of reasonable interpretation.