Court Opinion

ID: 9895858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:10:37.552289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:13.048916
License: Public Domain

J-S27036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRIAN KEITH MOREHART                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 58 MDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 23, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000156-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                         FILED NOVEMBER 08, 2023

       Brian Keith Morehart (“Morehart”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence1 entered after his negotiated guilty plea to one count each of rape

of a child and aggravated indecent assault of a child.2 We affirm.

       In 2021, the Commonwealth charged Morehart with fourteen offenses

related to the 2014 on-going sexual abuse of his then eight-year-old daughter.

See Trial Court Opinion, 3/6/23, at 1; N.T., 6/28/22, at 2, 5, 7-9. Morehart

subsequently entered a negotiated guilty plea to the above-cited charges.

____________________________________________

1 Although Morehart purports to appeal from the order finding him to be a
sexually violent predator (“SVP”), an appeal properly lies from the judgment
of sentence of which the imposition of SVP status is a component. See
Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
have corrected the caption accordingly.
2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3125(b).
J-S27036-23

See N.T., 6/28/22, at 1-11.           Following the completion of a pre-sentence

investigation report and an assessment by the sexual offender assessment

board (“SOAB”), the trial court held the combined sentencing/SVP hearing.

See N.T., 12/19/22, at 2, 25. SOAB assessor C. Townsend Velkoff (“Velkoff”)

testified Morehart met the criteria for a sexually violent predator. See id. at

3-7. The court sentenced Morehart, in accordance with the terms of the plea

agreement, to an aggregate fifteen-to-forty-year term of incarceration,

followed by three years of probation, and found that the Commonwealth had

proved by clear and convincing evidence Morehart was an SVP. See id. at

31-32.    Morehart did not file a post-sentence motion.       This timely appeal

followed.3

       Morehart raises one issue for our review:

       Did the trial court err in finding that [Morehart] was a[n SVP] since
       the Commonwealth failed to prove by clear and convincing
       evidence that [Morehart] met the criteria to be classified as a[n
       SVP]?

Morehart’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       On appeal, Morehart challenges his SVP designation. See Morehart’s

Brief at 11-18. Morehart argues the trial court erred in designating him as an

SVP because Velkoff‘s testimony regarding his assessment of the statutory

____________________________________________

3 Morehart and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.                   The
Commonwealth did not file a brief on appeal.

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factors and how he arrived at the conclusion that “Morehart was an SVP failed

to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.” Id. at 11, 16-18.

      In considering the evidence supporting an SVP designation, we

recognize:

      In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court,
      must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and
      convincing evidence that the individual is an SVP. . . . [W]e view
      all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
      most favorable to the Commonwealth. We will reverse a trial
      court’s determination of SVP status only if the Commonwealth has
      not presented clear and convincing evidence that each element of
      the statute has been satisfied.

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. Super.

2015) (citation    and      brackets    omitted,   emphasis      added); see

also Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 219 (Pa. 2006) (“The clear

and convincing standard requires evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty,

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,

without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” (citation and

brackets omitted)).      We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our

judgment for that of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97

A.3d 337, 356 (Pa. Super. 2014). Further, “an expert’s opinion which is

rendered to a reasonable degree of professional certainty is, itself,

substantive evidence.”       Commonwealth v. Aumick, 97 A.2d 770, 782

(Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc) (emphasis added).

      The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42, requires a trial court to order an individual

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who has been convicted of a “sexually violent offense” to be assessed by the

SOAB. Id. at § 9799.24(a); see also id. at § 9799.12 (defining “sexually

violent offense”).   Following the entry of such an order, the SOAB is

responsible for conducting an assessment to recommend whether the

individual should be classified as an SVP. See id. at § 9799.24(b).         The

assessment involves a consideration of the following fifteen factors:

      whether the instant offense involved multiple victims; whether the
      defendant exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense;
      the nature of the sexual contact with the victim(s); the
      defendant’s relationship with the victim(s); the victim(s)’ age(s);
      whether the instant offense included a display of unusual cruelty
      by the defendant during the commission of the offense; the
      victim(s)’ mental capacity(ies); the defendant’s prior criminal
      record; whether the defendant completed any prior sentence(s);
      whether the defendant participated in available programs for
      sexual offenders; the defendant’s age; the defendant’s use of
      illegal drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental
      illness, mental disability, or mental abnormality; behavioral
      characteristics that contribute to the defendant’s conduct; and any
      other factor reasonably related to the defendant’s risk of
      reoffending.

Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b)(1)-

(4) (listing the statutory factors).   There is no requirement that all the

statutory factors or any number of them be present or absent to support an

SVP designation; the factors are not “a check list with each one weighing in

some necessary fashion for or against SVP designation.” Commonwealth v.

Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 863 (Pa. Super. 2010). After the SOAB completes its

assessment, the trial court holds a hearing to “determine whether the

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Commonwealth has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the

individual is a[n SVP].” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(e)(3).

      SORNA defines an SVP as someone who has been convicted of one of

the enumerated offenses, and “who is determined to be a[n SVP]

under section 9799.24 (relating to assessments) due to a mental abnormality

or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory

sexually violent offenses.” Id. at § 9799.12. An act is considered “predatory”

under SORNA if it is “directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a

relationship has been initiated, established, maintained or promoted, in whole

or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.” Id.

      Morehart claims during his guilty plea he only admitted:

      the offenses he was pleading to occurred with an individual under
      the age of thirteen (the individual was eight years old) and [] the
      individual was his daughter. Further, [Morehart] admitted []
      “there was no penetration, but it [his penis] may have rubbed the
      area to constitute that aspect of it . . . from the rear side may
      have rubbed” from her anus to the front of her body. Finally,
      [Morehart] admitted [] he may have “as a result of that
      unintentional activity . . . inserted or rubbed [his] hand near her
      vagina so that it would have penetrated the outer area of it.”

Morehart’s Brief at 11-12 (citations omitted), citing N.T. 12/19/22, at 5, 8-9.

At the SVP hearing, Morehart’s counsel argued Morehart:

      [p]led guilty to two of 14 counts and only two. . . . [A]ny . . .
      conduct that has not been proven in the court of law [should be]
      disregarded in this case. He pled to episodic events over a couple
      of weeks in 2014, not to a year plus, not to what an eight-year-
      old remembered five years later. . . . [M]r. Velkoff . . . relied on
      the [Pennsylvania State Police] records. Well, Trooper [Matthew]
      Miller wrote the probable cause affidavit. He wrote the complaint.
      That information was turned into an information by the District

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        Attorney’s Office with no additional records. So really[,] he’s
        relying on what Trooper Miller did. Mr. Velkoff admitted he did
        not watch the videos of either [Morehart] or the [victim] give their
        testimony in his assessment.

N.T., 12/19/22, at 21.

        The trial court determined that viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth it established by clear and convincing

evidence that Morehart is an SVP. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 3; N.T.,

12/19/22, at 23-24.

        Because there is record support for the trial court’s determination, we

will not disturb it. At the SVP hearing, Mr. Velkoff testified Morehart “engaged

in sexual conduct with his [eight-year-old] daughter … and that behavior

occurred over several times over a time span of more than six months[.]” Id.

at 6.    Mr. Velkoff explained this behavior met the definition of “pedophilic

behavior” and Morehart meets “the mental abnormality aspect of the SVP

designation[.]”     Id. at 6-7.    Mr. Velkoff highlighted Morehart displayed

predatory behavior by “cultivating a physically intimate relationship with his

daughter that began with drying her off after a shower and then having her in

his bed with him and engaging in escalating sexual behavior with her.” Id. at

7. Mr. Velkoff concluded Morehart’s “risk for sexual re-offense is greater than

other individuals, other men his age that display those characteristics.” Id.

This is sufficient to establish Morehart is an SVP. See Commonwealth v.

Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034, 1041-42 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding evidence was

sufficient to sustain trial court’s SVP determination where SOAB evaluator

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diagnosed the defendant with pedophilia and found the defendant’s conduct

to be predatory because he intentionally engaged in a relationship with a child

for the purpose of sexual victimization). Accordingly, Morehart is not entitled

to relief.

       Although Morehart asserts the absence of sworn testimony of the victim

and other proofs of “offense conduct,” those limitations are the result of

Morehart’s election to plead guilty rather than proceed to trial. This Court has

explained:

       The statute governing the SVP assessment does not limit the
       expert’s consideration of information only to that admitted at trial
       or at the guilty plea proceedings. In fact, the statute requires
       state, county, and local agencies, offices or entities to provide
       copies of records and information as requested by the SOAB in
       connection with an SVP assessment, without limitation on the
       “admissibility” of that information. As a result, it stands to reason
       that some if not many of the facts necessary to perform
       the SVP assessment might not have been proven beyond a
       reasonable doubt. Thus, we hold an SOAB expert opinion falls
       within the general rules regarding expert witnesses. As such, an
       SOAB expert’s opinion may be based on facts or data that the
       expert has been made aware of or personally observed so long as
       experts in the particular field reasonably rely on those kinds of
       facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject; the facts or
       data consulted need not be admissible for the expert’s opinion to
       be admitted. The SOAB expert must state the facts or data on
       which the opinion is based. Then, the rules of evidence place the
       full burden of exploration of facts and assumptions underlying the
       testimony of an expert witness squarely on the shoulders of
       opposing counsel’s cross-examination. Opposing counsel bears
       the burden of exposing and exploring any weaknesses in the
       underpinnings of the expert’s opinion.

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Prendes, 97 A.3d at 360–61 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9979.24(c), Pa.R.E. 702,

703, and 705 and Comment) (some quotation marks and citations omitted,

emphasis added).

     In our recent decision in Aumick, applying Prendes, this Court

confirmed that an SOAB evaluator could consider this type of out-of-court or

hearsay evidence. We stated:

     Based on the reasoning expressed in Prendes, we conclude that
     [the SOAB evaluator] was permitted to consider the affidavit of
     probable cause, criminal information, criminal complaint,
     preliminary hearing transcript, and the investigative reports
     prepared by Child Protective Services when assessing [the
     offender]. Pursuant to revised Subchapter H, the SOAB must
     undertake a comprehensive assessment of a defendant convicted
     of a sexually violent offense by considering the fifteen factors set
     forth in section 9799.24(b)(1)-(4). Section 9799.24(c) expressly
     requires that “[a]ll State, county and local agencies, offices and
     entities in this Commonwealth, including juvenile probation
     officers, shall cooperate by providing copies of records and
     information as requested by the board in connection with
     the court-ordered assessment . . . .” Moreover, within ninety
     days of a defendant’s qualifying conviction, the SOAB must
     prepare a written report regarding its assessment which includes,
     at a minimum, the following information: (1) a concise narrative
     of the individual’s conduct; (2) whether the victim was a minor;
     (3) the manner of weapon or physical force used or threatened;
     (4) if the offense involved unauthorized entry into a room or
     vehicle occupied by the victim; (5) if the offense was part of a
     course or pattern of conduct involving multiple incidents or
     victims; and (6) previous instances in which the individual was
     determined guilty of an offense subject to this subchapter or of a
     crime of violence as defined in section 9714(g) (relating to
     sentences for second and subsequent offenses).

Aumick, 297 A.3d at 781-82 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).

     The Aumick Court concluded that, in light of these statutory mandates,

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     it is clear the legislature intended that the SOAB member
     consider more than the limited facts included in a plea
     colloquy, and that the SOAB member undertake to review and
     consider the information contained in records provided by state,
     county and local agencies, offices and entities in this
     Commonwealth when making an SVP assessment and preparing
     a statutorily compliant written report. To be sure, it would be the
     rare occasion on which the SOAB member would be able to fulfill
     its statutory obligations if its SVP assessments and written reports
     were limited to facts contained in a plea colloquy, admitted into
     evidence, or determined by the trier of fact.

           Moreover, in the context of an SVP hearing, the judge is not
     tasked with evaluating the veracity of the facts underlying the
     expert’s testimony. Indeed, the facts presented at an SVP hearing
     are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, as would
     be the case in a true hearsay scenario. Instead, they constitute
     information, gleaned from records which are reasonably relied on
     in SOAB evaluations, that is presented to the trial court solely to
     supply the basis for the expert’s opinion in accordance with our
     Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, the otherwise inadmissible facts
     reasonably relied upon by [the SOAB evaluator] to explain the
     basis of her opinion, including the allegations of sexual abuse
     asserted by [a victim], do not constitute substantive evidence.

           On the other hand, an expert’s opinion which is rendered to
     a reasonable degree of professional certainty is, itself, substantive
     evidence. . . .

Id. at 782 (citations and footnote omitted, emphasis added).

     Instantly, at the SVP hearing, the trial court stated:

     Under [42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 9799.24[(e)], the [c]ourt is required when
     the Commonwealth files a praecipe to schedule a hearing and the
     ultimate decision for the [c]ourt is to determine whether the
     Commonwealth has proved by clear and convincing evidence that
     the individual is a sexually violent predator. One of the things
     that I’ve learned over the many years of doing this job and some
     other things that I’ve done is that diagnosis is not a science[] but
     an art based upon years of experience and training as well as

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       considering the elements of, for example, the DSM,[4] the criteria,
       and/or the information that’s provided. I think what struck me
       and has continued to strike me about this case is while [Morehart]
       wishes to accept responsibility, he minimizes . . . or he does just
       enough to establish what he believes happened . . . to be able to
       go forward with this plea. I think that is a factor that the [c]ourt
       considers in determining whether or not [Morehart] is [an SVP]
       that he would be willing to . . . engage in this activity with his child
       and despite the fact that his child was an eight-year[]-old[.] . . .
       [I]n considering the details that Mr. Velkoff has pointed out . . . it
       troubles me that [Morehart] may not truly accept and understand
       the fact that what he did was inappropriate. . . . [I] was also
       struck with the grooming behaviors that were highlighted in Mr.
       Velkoff’s report. So, bottom line, basically in reviewing everything
       and the testimony of Mr. Velkoff, I’m going to find that he’s [an
       SVP]. . . .

N.T., 12/19/22, at 23-24 (footnote added). Accordingly, Morehart’s challenge

to the evidence the trial court considered merits no relief.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/8/2023

____________________________________________

4 The DSM is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders
published by the American Psychiatric Association. See Commonwealth v.
Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 906 (Pa. 2021).

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