Court Opinion

ID: 9731830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:59:22.490559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:21.496100
License: Public Domain

Braucher, J.
(dissenting) I agree that the police did not have probable cause to seize the bonds until they had probable cause to believe that the bonds had been stolen. They acquired such probable cause only after they made a telephone call to an owner named on one of the bonds.
I also agree that the police had a right to look into the brown envelope in their search for drugs. But they were under a duty to keep the defendant’s belongings in order and were therefore justified in noting that the articles were United States savings bonds with names and addresses different from that of the defendant. Compare Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236. Such bonds are not transferable. 31 U. S. C. § 757c (a) (1970). 31 C. F. R. (1971) § 315.15. McDonald v. Hanahan, 328 Mass. 539, 540. Their presence in a small .apartment being searched for narcotics warranted a further threshold inquiry. See Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 204; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 360 Mass. 557, 559-560; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22-23; Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 69 (concurring opinion of White, J.).
If a threshold inquiry is unreasonably extended, there is danger to the security guaranteed by the Fourth *389Amendment. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 569-572 (concurring opinion by Stewart, J.), where Federal agents spent some fifty minutes exhibiting a discovered lewd film, using the defendant’s premises and his projector. But in the present case the police made a telephone call which could have taken only a few minutes. There is no indication that it prolonged the concurrent search for narcotics. The telephone call was likely to produce a less serious invasion of an innocent defendant’s privacy than the alternative of sending an officer out to investigate and to bring back a new warrant.
The record indicates that the police took the bonds from one room to another before they had probable cause. It does not indicate a definitive “seizure” until afterwards. Compare United States v. Berkowitz, 429 F. 2d 921, 924 (1st Cir.); State v. Moriarity, 268 F. Supp. 546, 566 (D. N. J.). Once they had probable cause they were “not required to close . . . [their] eyes to the realities of the situation,” but could lawfully seize the bonds. Seymour v. United States, 369 F. 2d 825, 826-827 (10th Cir.), cert. den. 386 U. S. 987. United States v. Berkowitz, supra, at 924-925. See Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236; United States v. Palmer, 435 F. 2d 653, 654-655 (1st Cir.).
I do not believe that it is proper for either the police or this court to base a judgment on the assumed wealth or poverty of the defendant. If police, acting lawfully in searching a millionaire’s mansion, found in a bureau drawer in his bedroom United States savings bonds bearing the names of several other people, they would have solid reason for making further inquiry. Millionaires have no more right to steal than anyone else.