Court Opinion

ID: 9905895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:11:03.035933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:59.904887
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Q.A.-E v. S.G, 2023-Ohio-4318.]
                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

Q.A-E.,                                          :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,             :
                                                              No. 112616
                v.                               :

S.G.,                                            :

                Defendant-Appellee.              :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 30, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                                Case No. FA-18-112728

                                           Appearances:

                Q.A-E, pro se.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:

                Plaintiff-appellant Q.A-E. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s decision

granting legal and residential custody of minor child, D.G., to defendant-appellee

S.G. (“Father”). We affirm the trial court’s decision.
I.    Facts and Procedural History

            On October 16, 2018, Father filed a motion for shared parenting. At the

time, Mother was incarcerated at the Cuyahoga County Corrections Center. A letter

was mailed to Mother, advising her of the trial date. Mother alleged she never

received the letter. However, the trial court determined that proper service was

completed and issued a default judgment granting full custody to Father after

Mother failed to appear.

            According to Mother, over the next three years, she filed several

motions against Father in order to regain residential and physical custody of D.G.

On July 29, 2022, Mother filed a motion to modify custody; on August 3, 2022, she

filed a motion to show cause; and on August 26, 2022, she filed another motion to

show cause regarding mental health and therapy. On February 27 and 28, 2023,

the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. According to the judgment entry,

Mother’s witnesses testified that Father was good about visitation or extra visits

with Mother and her family when Mother was incarcerated.

              The trial court also noted that Mother and her husband filed

numerous unfounded and unsubstantiated complaints for civil protection orders

against Father, complaints with children services, and complaints with the police

department.     However, Mother was indicted and incarcerated for burglary,

violation of a protection order, domestic violence, criminal endangering, and
felonious assault. In 2021, Mother served two weeks in jail after pleading guilty to

interference of custody.

            According to the trial court’s judgment entry, the guardian ad litem

(“GAL”) observed the parents fighting all the time and determined that they were

not good role models. The GAL also found that D.G. is not at risk of imminent

danger and recommended that Mother have unsupervised parenting time every

weekend. The GAL also suggested that the parents attend counseling to improve

their communications and stop fighting for the betterment of D.G.

            The trial court found that Mother did not show a change of

circumstances or best interest under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) and (F)(1). The trial

court ordered that Father remain the residential and legal parent and Mother shall

have weekly parenting time. The trial court also ordered Mother, Father, and their

significant others to engage in counseling or therapy to learn how to communicate

to support D.G. The trial court stated that Mother’s motion to modify custody and

both motions to show cause were not proved and were denied.

            Mother filed this appeal assigning one error for our review:

      1. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in determining
      custody for the minor child.

II.   Law and Analysis

            In Mother’s appeal, she did not file a transcript.        “Pursuant to

App.R. 9(B), the appellant has a duty to file the transcript from any lower court
proceedings to the extent it is necessary for evaluation of the judgment being

appealed.”    Farmer v. Healthcare Bridge, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110469,

2021-Ohio-3207, ¶ 6. “This court has consistently held that ‘[f]ailure to file the

transcript prevents an appellate court from reviewing an appellant’s assigned errors.

* * * Thus, absent a transcript or alternative record under App.R. 9(C) or (D), we

must presume regularity in the proceedings below.’” Id., quoting Lakewood v.

Collins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102953, 2015-Ohio-4389, ¶ 9.

             Mother raised two issues under her assignment of error regarding

custody of D.G. First, Mother argued that the trial court failed to ensure that

proper service was completed regarding the 2019 custody case.            Mother was

incarcerated and contends that she was not properly served or notified about the

hearing that granted Father residential and legal custody of D.G.

              The trial court found that service requirements were met. “‘Where

the plaintiff follows the civil rules governing service of process, courts presume that

service is proper unless the defendant rebuts this presumption with sufficient

evidence of nonservice.’”     Hathaway Brown School v. Cummings, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 111566, 2023-Ohio-374, ¶ 11, quoting Midland Funding, L.L.C. v.

Cherrier, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108595, 2020-Ohio-3280, ¶ 12.

             Under App.R. 3(A) and 4(A)(1), Mother was required to file a notice

of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the trial court’s judgment. “The failure to

timely file a notice of appeal deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal.’” Earth Mobile, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111851,

2023-Ohio-3354, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Hamberg, 2015-Ohio-5074, 53 N.E.3d 918,

¶ 8 (1st Dist.), citing State ex rel. Curran v. Brookes, 142 Ohio St. 107, 50 N.E.2d

995 (1943), paragraph seven of the syllabus. Accordingly, because Mother did not

file a timely notice of appeal, this court is without jurisdiction to consider any of

the trial court’s rulings regarding the decision of the trial court in the 2019 custody

case. See id.

                Therefore, Mother’s first issue is dismissed.

                Second, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

determining the custody of D.G. “We review a trial court’s order regarding legal

custody of a child under an abuse of discretion standard.” In re C.D.Y., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 108355, 2019-Ohio-4987, ¶ 8, citing In re S.E., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 96031, 2011-Ohio-2042, ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court

exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which

it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-

Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

                “Legal custody and permanent custody are alternative disposition

choices. Compare R.C. 2151.011(B)(21) with R.C. 2151.011(B)(31).” In re C.D.Y. at

¶ 10. “‘Although there is no specific test or set of criteria set forth in the statutory

scheme [regarding legal custody cases], courts agree that the trial court must base
its decision on the best interest of the child.’” Id., quoting In re N.P., 9th Dist.

Summit No. 21707, 2004-Ohio-110, ¶ 23.

              “A party must demonstrate the existence of changed circumstances;

that modification is in the child’s best interest; and that the advantages of granting

the modification outweigh any harm likely to be caused by the change.” In re A.Z.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108627, 2020-Ohio-2941, ¶ 32, citing In re S.R.L., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 98754, 2013-Ohio-3236, ¶ 19, citing R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a).

              “R.C. 3109.04 ‘“creates a strong presumption in favor of retaining the

residential parent.”’”   Id. at ¶ 34, quoting Sites v. Sites, 4th Dist. Lawrence

No. 09CA19, 2010-Ohio-2748, ¶ 17, quoting Alessio v. Alessio, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 05AP-988, 2006-Ohio-2447, ¶ 11. “‘The statute prohibits a trial court from

modifying a prior allocation of parental rights and responsibilities unless the court

makes a threshold finding that a change in circumstances has occurred.’” Id.,

quoting id. “‘Without this threshold change in circumstances finding, a court need

not proceed with an analysis of the child’s best interests under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)

or with any of the factors outlined in R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a).’” Id., quoting id., citing

Cowan v. Cowan, 4th Dist. Washington No. 04CA5, 2004-Ohio-6119, ¶ 16.

              Additionally,

      [a] change in circumstances generally means that an event, occurrence,
      or situation has arisen since the prior decree that has materially and
      adversely affected the child. However, this change in circumstances
      cannot be slight or inconsequential. Rather, it must be substantive and
      significant. The requirement for finding a substantive and significant
       change in circumstances is to “‘spare children from a constant tug of
       war between their parents who would file a motion for change of
       custody each time the parent out of custody thought he or she could
       provide the children a “better” environment. [R.C. 3109.04(E)] is an
       attempt to provide some stability to the custodial status of the children,
       even though the parent out of custody may be able to prove that he or
       she can provide a better environment.’” Davis [v. Flickinger], 77 Ohio
       St.3d [415,] 418, [674 N.e.2d 1159 (1997)], quoting Wyss v Wyss, 3 Ohio      Commented [EM1]: Per OSC writing manual quotes
       App.3d 412, 416, 445 N.E.2d 1153 (1982).                                     must be attributed.

Id. at ¶ 35.

               Mother argues that the trial court did not fully consider the best

interest of D.G. Mother’s assertions are misplaced. The trial court stated that

Mother has not shown a change of circumstances in accordance with

R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), which provides:

       (a) The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights
       and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on
       facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to
       the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in
       the circumstances of the child, the child’s residential parent, or either
       of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree, and that the
       modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In
       applying these standards, the court shall retain the residential parent
       designated by the prior decree or the prior shared parenting decree,
       unless a modification is in the best interest of the child and one of the
       following applies:

       (i) The residential parent agrees to a change in the residential parent or
       both parents under a shared parenting decree agree to a change in the
       designation of residential parent.

       (ii) The child, with the consent of the residential parent or of both
       parents under a shared parenting decree, has been integrated into the
       family of the person seeking to become the residential parent.

       (iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is
       outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the
       child.
              As previously stated, a court does not need to proceed with an analysis

of the child’s best interest if it finds there is no change in circumstances. However,

the trial court continued and did consider the best interest of the child, although not

required. The trial court stated in its judgment entry that any modification must

serve the best interest of the child in accordance with R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), which

provides:

      (1) In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this section,
      whether on an original decree allocating parental rights and
      responsibilities for the care of children or a modification of a decree
      allocating those rights and responsibilities, the court shall consider all
      relevant factors, including, but not limited to:

             (a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;

             (b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant
             to division (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and
             concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and
             responsibilities concerning the child, the wishes and concerns
             of the child, as expressed to the court;

             (c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s
             parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly
             affect the child’s best interest;

             (d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and
             community;

             (e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the
             situation;

             (f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-
             approved parenting time rights or visitation and
             companionship rights;

             (g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support
             payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that
             parent pursuant to a child support order under which that
             parent is an obligor;
            (h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of
            either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty
            to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child
            being an abused child or a neglected child; whether either
            parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated an
            abused child or a neglected child, previously has been
            determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act
            that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent or any
            member of the household of either parent previously has been
            convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2919.25
            of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense involving a
            victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a
            member of the family or household that is the subject of the
            current proceeding; whether either parent or any member of
            the household of either parent previously has been convicted of
            or pleaded guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the
            time of the commission of the offense was a member of the
            family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding
            and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission of
            the offense; and whether there is reason to believe that either
            parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an
            abused child or a neglected child;

            (i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject
            to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully
            denied the other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance
            with an order of the court;

            (j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is
            planning to establish a residence, outside this state.

              The trial court found that Father is employed and provides a home,

education, medical treatment, and subsistence. The trial court also determined that

Father’s home is stable and an appropriate structure. The trial court determined

that Mother continuously filed unsubstantiated complaints against Father, and

mother was previously incarcerated for numerous incidents. Given the facts of this
case, we determine that Mother has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its

discretion. Mother’s second issue lacks merit.

             Therefore, Mother’s assignment of error is overruled.

             Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR