Court Opinion

ID: 9949693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 14:08:30.690318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.634633
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1611-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SUSAN E. MAZZONE,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted January 31, 2024 – Decided March 12, 2024

                   Before Judges Susswein and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Cape May County, Indictment No.
                   18-10-0804.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Robert C. Pierce, Designated Counsel, on the
                   briefs).

                   Jeffrey H. Sutherland, Cape May County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Gretchen Anderson Pickering,
                   Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on
                   the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Susan Mazzone appeals from a January 30, 2023 Law Division

order denying her petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing.    After carefully reviewing the record in light of the

arguments of the parties and governing legal principles, we remand for the PCR

court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

      We discern the following procedural history from the record. In October

2018, defendant was charged by indictment with third-degree distribution of

fentanyl, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), 2C:35-5(b)(5); first-degree strict liability for

drug-induced death, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9(a); two counts of third-degree possession

of oxycodone and alprazolam with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35 -5(a)(1),

2C:35-5(b)(5); and third-degree conspiracy to possess controlled dangerous

substances   (CDS)     with   intent   to   distribute,   N.J.S.A.   2C:5-2(a)(1),

2C:35-5(a)(1), 2C:35-5(b)(5).1

      In February 2019, defendant pled guilty to first-degree strict liability for

drug-induced death pursuant to a plea agreement that provided she would be

sentenced as if convicted of a second-degree crime. The plea agreement further

provided the prosecutor would recommend a sentence of eight years in state

1
 The indictment also charged codefendants Lauren Dorff and Sherman Martin.
The codefendants are not part of this PCR petition or appeal.
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                                        2
prison subject to the No Early Release Act ("NERA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The

plea agreement also called for defendant to provide truthful testimony at

codefendants' trials, dismissal of all remaining counts, and the possibility of a

further downward departure of the sentence for any post-plea cooperation in

accordance with mitigating factor twelve, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(12).

      Defendant was sentenced on May 23, 2019. The prosecutor recommended

a one-year reduction in the prison term proposed in the plea agreement because

defendant agreed to an interview with the prosecutor's office. The court imposed

a seven-year term subject to NERA. The sentence provided a further downward

departure might be possible depending upon defendant's testimony and

cooperation.

      In November 2019, defendant appealed her sentence. On June 7, 2021,

we affirmed the sentence at a Sentencing Oral Argument (SOA) calendar,

pursuant to Rule 2:9-11. Defendant did not file a petition for certification.

      In August 2021, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition. She argued she

was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at the plea stage, claiming

counsel failed to move to dismiss the indictment as it was based on false

testimony, and failed to demand the State's autopsy report to challenge its

findings. Defendant also claimed she was not given the toxicology report and

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other documents to review prior to pleading guilty. An amended PCR petition

filed through counsel asserted if trial counsel had reviewed this information with

her, she would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial.

Defendant also claimed the plea was forced on her by counsel.

       Oral argument on the PCR petition was held on October 28, 2022. On

January 30, 2023, the court denied defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing

and petition for PCR, issuing a thirty-four-page written decision.

       This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following contentions for our

consideration in her initial appeal brief:

             POINT I

             THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING []
             [DEFENDANT'S] PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT
             AFFORDING HER AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
             TO FULLY ADDRESS HER CONTENTIONS THAT
             SHE FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL
             REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL, AS A
             RESULT OF WHICH HER ENSUING GUILTY PLEA
             WAS NOT FREELY, VOLUNTARILY AND
             KNOWINGLY ENTERED.

             POINT II

             THE STATE VIOLATED BRADY V. MARYLAND [2]
             AND    THERE    WAS   A     REASONABLE
             PROBABILITY THAT, BUT FOR THE STATE'S
             FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE TOXICOLOGY

2
    373, U.S. 83 (1963).
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                                         4
            REPORTS, [DEFENDANT] WOULD NOT HAVE
            PLE[]D GUILTY.

      Defendant    raises   the     following   contentions   for   our

consideration in her reply brief:

            POINT I

            REPLY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT "THE
            PCR COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
            PETITION FOR PCR WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY
            HEARING.["]

            POINT II

            REPLY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT "THE
            STATE DID NOT VIOLATE BRADY V.
            MARYLAND AND DID NOT WITHHOLD
            CRITICAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE
            CAUSE OF DEATH.["]

      We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing

this appeal. We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v.

Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.

of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). The de novo standard also applies to

mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 420. Where an evidentiary hearing has

not been held, we "conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and

legal conclusions of the PCR court." Id. at 421.

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                                          5
      PCR "is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State

v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459

(1992)). It is the vehicle through which a defendant may, after conviction and

sentencing, challenge a judgment of conviction by raising issues that could not

have been raised on direct appeal and, therefore, "ensures that a defendant was

not unjustly convicted." State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997).

      To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel,

defendant must satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which our Supreme Court adopted in

State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). "First, the defendant must show . . .

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'

guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment."         Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Defendant must then show counsel's "deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. To show prejudice, defendant must

establish by "a reasonable probability" that the deficient performance

"materially contributed to defendant's conviction. . . ." Id. at 58.

      A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if they present a prima

facie case supporting PCR, the court determines there are material issues of fact

that cannot be resolved based on the existing record, and the court finds an

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                                         6
evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims presented. Rule 3:22-10(b);

see also State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013).

      Applying these principles to the matter before us, we conclude an

evidentiary hearing is warranted. As the PCR court noted, defendant "plans to

call her trial counsel . . . to inquire as to why he did not demand an autopsy

report prior to her guilty plea and why he did not seek to obtain an expert report

to review and challenge the report [prepared by the Medical Examiner]."

      The PCR court determined defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary

hearing because she failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that her claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel would ultimately succeed on the merits. The

court concluded:

                   As previously stated, [defendant]'s arguments do
            not sufficiently pass under the first or second prong of
            the test. As such, ["]there are no material issues of
            disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the
            existing record." State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. [] 46,
            51 (App. Div. 1998). The basis for an evidentiary
            hearing must have existed when the facts of the case
            were established, the "[d]efendant may not create a
            genuine issue of fact, warranting an evidentiary
            hearing, by contradicting his prior statements without
            explanation." [State v. Blake], 444 N.J. Super. [285,]
            299 [(App. Div. 2016)].

                   Here, all the facts are laid out in the briefs,
            certifications, and transcripts. There is no evidence
            outside of the record that would be useful in resolving

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                                        7
             the issue at hand. The ineffective assistance of counsel
             claims cited by the [defendant] fail the Strickland test
             as explained above. The [defendant] has not cited to
             any undisputed facts requiring an evidentiary hearing.
             Because the [defendant] has not presented a prima facie
             claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an
             evidentiary hearing is not necessary. Preciose, 129 N.J.
             at 462; [State v. Jones], 219 N.J. [298,] 311 [(2014)].

      We agree the record belies defendant's contention her counsel did not

receive the autopsy and toxicology reports. We are concerned, however, with

the absence of a factual record as to the reason trial counsel did not retain an

expert to review the Medical Examiner's expert report that the State would have

relied upon at trial to establish causation for the strict liability for drug-induced

death prosecution. We acknowledge there was also non-scientific evidence

linking defendant to the pills that, according to the State, caused decedent's

death.3 We also acknowledge there is no per se rule that the failure to retain an

expert to rebut an adversary's expert constitutes ineffective assistance. But when

strict liability for drug-induced death is charged, we deem it reasonable to expect

counsel to have an explanation for not retaining an expert to determine whether

there is a basis to challenge the forensic testimony proffered by the State.

3
    For example, codefendant Dorff gave a recorded statement to police
identifying defendant as her sole supplier of oxycodone and the supplier of some
of the pills Dorff gave to the victim.
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                                         8
      Importantly, PCR counsel has presented an expert report challenging and

criticizing the autopsy and toxicology report findings. We offer no opinion on

whether the defense report is sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial. We

nonetheless deem it sufficient to establish a prima facie case for purposes of

defendant's entitlement to a hearing to explore why trial counsel did not retain a

defense expert before defendant pled guilty.

      In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that as a general proposition, it

is "quite difficult for petitioners who have acknowledged their guilt to satisfy

Strickland's prejudice prong." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 n.12

(2010). But defendant only needs to establish a prima facie case to be entitled

to a hearing. We add that a defendant in a drug-induced death case can admit to

distributing drugs to a victim without necessarily knowing from personal

knowledge whether those drugs caused the death for purposes of criminal

liability under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9.

      In sum, we are satisfied defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to

determine why her counsel did not retain an expert to challenge the State's

forensic evidence, and whether the failure to procure an expert opinion prior to

defendant's guilty plea meets the Strickland/Fritz framework for granting PCR.

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                                        9
      Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. We do not retain

jurisdiction.

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