Court Opinion

ID: 9662311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:05:37.059294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:34.647757
License: Public Domain

On Motion eo-r-Rehearing
PER CURIAM:
Respondents’ motion for rehearing does not challenge our basic finding “that general revenue of the city which is jd-evoted to-special purposes or allocated into special funds by virtue of -.the'-city-.’s charter (and ordinances) is to be included in reckoning one-.sixth-of the general revenue fund under § 84.730, unless such charter provisions or ordinances placing such funds to a special purpose or into special funds were enacted pursuant to express or clearly implied constitutional or statutory authority.” But they do strenuously urge us to relieve them of the rigors of said statute by judicially legislating *400exceptions to its provisions. In answer to this insistence, we must say, as we said in the original opinion, that is not onr function. If, due to modern methods of municipal operation and financing', § 84.730 has become archaic or is oppressive, the problem is political and relief can be had only from the legislature; the courts are without jurisdiction in the premises.
Bearing these postulates in mind, we have given careful consideration to each of the assignments of respondents’ motion and, with the exceptions hereinafter stated, have concluded that the motion should be overruled.
I.
Respondents say that in “deciding that airport receipts (Items 27-28, $443,765), unpledged for the payment of revenue airport bonds prior to the date the Police Board certified its needs, could not be excluded from general revenue, the implication seems to be that if the revenue is pledged, under authority of Section 27, Article YI of the Constitution, it should be excluded. If this implication is warranted we respectfully suggest that the opinion be clarified.”
The opinion does imply and, considered in its entirety, holds in effect that whenever revenues of the city are devoted or pledged to a special purpose or fund pursuant to express or clearly implied constitutional or legislative authority, as is the case with these funds, Items 27-28, then such funds must thenceforth throughout the succeeding years of their encumbrance be excluded from general revenue to the extent of the encumbrance in reckoning the city’s liability under § 84.730.
II.
Respondents call our attention to the failure of the original opinion to pass upon certain city expenditures in reckoning its liability under § 84.730. The opinion did overlook a paragraph in respondents’ brief reading as follows:
“By direction of state statute, the City will contribute $341,000 to police and firemen’s pension fund, by federal statute $150,000 to FICA (social security), and by state statute $193,548, to costs of elections. All of this money should be deducted from the fund appropriable for police purposes. Otherwise, to that extent, the City and its Citizens would be burdened with double taxation, and property would be taken without due process of law, in violation of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”
Of these items, respondents now say:
“In addition to the contribution to the Firemen’s Pension Fund from vehicle licenses mentioned in Item 6 of the opinion, the City made additional contributions of $198,500.00 to the Firemen’s Pension Fund, by the direction of the same Statute, Section 86.657, R.S.Mo. 1949, and, as well by direction of Section 86.653.
*401“By direction of Section 86.297, R.S.Mo. 1949, the City contributed to the Police Pension Fund the sum of $120,000.00.
“By direction of Section 117.140, R.S.Mo. 1949, the City contributed for elections, other than municipal, and for the maintenance of the •Election Board, the sum of $193,548.00.
1 “By direction of Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 3, Laws Missouri, 1951, [530] Page 788, and particularly Section 4(1) Page 793, and in compliance with a contract authorized thereby between the City and the Division of Budget and Comptroller of the State of Missouri, * * * the City contributed to the FICA (Social Security) Fundi the sum of $182,749 for employees employed in departments the revenues of which you hold to be General Revenues. ’ ’
• It is to be noted that respondents have abandoned their contention of double taxation and deprivation of due process, and now resort to the provisions of certain statutes.
Section 86.297 does require the city to make contributions of portions of its revenue to the police pension fund and it is clear, therefore, that any contributions máde by the city in accordance with saidl statute should be excluded from general revenue under § 84.730, and we so hold. .Section.86.657 authorizes the city to set aside certain portions of its revenues for pensioning its firemen and certain of their dependents. Section 86.653 creates the fire department pension fund and requires, among other things, that all moneys received! by the city from’ certain sources shall be paid into that fund. It is clear that any payments made by the city in accordance with these statutes should be excluded from general revenue under § 84.730, and we so hold.
Any moneys, paid out by the city for its share of the salaries and expenses of . the Board of Election Commissioners for the conduct of elections (which.includes general, special and primary elections, unless otherwise specified, § 117.010) under the provisions of § 117.140 are but a general charge upon the city in the course of its operation, payable out of general revenue. No special fund is created nor is any of the general revenue of the city “earmarked” for such purpose. Hence, such payments are not to be excluded in reckoning the city’s liability under § 84.730, and we so hold.
A different .situation exists, however, with regard to payments made by the city under Laws 1951, pp. 788-796, §§ 105.300 to 105.460, V.A.M.S., relating to social security. Under that Act, when put into operation by the city, the city is required to pay into a contribution fund, by such Act created in § 6 (105.390) thereof, certain moneys; and it is further required that such funds be kept separate from other public funds. It seems clear, therefore, that funds allocated by the city to and paid into such fund should be excluded from general revenue under § 84.730, and! we so hold.
*402III.
Respondents say that through error not chargeable to the court there was a duplication of figures in an exhibit on which Item 84, Estimated Prior Years’ Revenue, was computed, which, on its face, subjected $496,967 to “two appropriations # * * from this particular amount of money”. They also say that through error not chargeable to the court substantially one-half of an item of $45,485 should have been excluded from the general revenue fund. These matters are now immaterial and moot. It is conceded, as we understand, that the police department operated during the fiscal year ending May 1, 1955, within the funds appropriated for its maintenance and, due to express limitations placed upon the peremptory writ ordered issued herein, actually will take nothing, other than its costs, under the, judgment rendered. Consequently, respondents cannot be hurt by the duplication or the other erroneous addition to general revenue referred to. To further consider them can be of no aid to any one.
IY.
In holding that actual surpluses available during any fiscal year rather than prior estimates thereof should be considered current revenue for the purpose of reckoning the city’s liability under § 84.730, we further said: “As unappropriated surpluses came into the treasury or became freed of any charge, trust or pledge to special use during the fiscal year, they became available [531] for appropriation and were appropriated to such general public use as the council decided. ’ ’
Respondents say that the quoted language may be interpreted to mean that the police department would be entitled during such year to one-sixth of any such surplus becoming available during the fiscal year even though it had been allowed one-sixth thereof earlier in the same year. Such language is, of course, not to be so interpreted". Any such surplus becoming available during the fiscal year would be reckoned in computing the city’s liability for such year only when it came from funds not included in the original estimate. And that is precisely what we did in computing the liability of the city under § 84.730, as our opinion, when read, will reveal.
The opinion is modified to the extent above set forth and the motion for rehearing is overruled.