Court Opinion

ID: 9881089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:09:38.602658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:02.707369
License: Public Domain

J-S28003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: T.W., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: M.Q., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 350 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered February 27, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
               Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000089-2022

  IN THE INTEREST OF: C.R., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: M.Q., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 351 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered February 27, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
               Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000087-2022

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED: September 29, 2023

       M.Q. (“Mother”) appealed from the orders1 granting the petition of the

Allegheny County Children and Youth Families (“CYF”) and involuntarily

terminating her parental rights to her minor, dependent children, T.W., a male

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals.
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born in June 2019, and C.R., a female born in December 2010 (collectively,

“Children”) pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b).2 We affirm.

       Mother has seven children, all of whom have been a part of dependency

proceedings. In 2013, the Washington County Children and Youth Services

removed C.R. from Mother’s care following her arrest on a robbery charge.

Child was returned to Mother’s care in 2014, and the case was subsequently

closed.

       However, in February 2018, CYF reopened a case relating to C.R. CYF

alleged that a CYF caseworker discovered that Mother’s home was in terrible

condition, as it had no beds for her children, no heat, and exposed wires

hanging from the ceiling. CYF implemented emergency services, including

providing housing for Mother and her children. Despite the services, C.R. failed

to attend school on a regular basis. As a result, CYF filed a dependency

petition. Mother stipulated to the presence of trash in the residence, as well

as the lack of heat and running water. Mother also stipulated that her children

had “missed a lot of school.” The trial court adjudicated C.R. dependent in

November 2018, though she remained in Mother’s care. The trial court then

terminated supervision in 2019.

       On November 26, 2019, via an emergency custody authorization, CYF

removed Children from Mother’s home, after alleging that Mother and M.D.W.

____________________________________________

2 The trial court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of C.R.’s
father, J.T.Q., and T.W.’s father, M.D.W.

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engaged in a physical altercation in front of Children. Notably, when Children

were removed, a CYF caseworker alleged that Mother’s home was cluttered

and included several bags of garbage; several bags of clean and dirty clothing;

dishes on the floor; the children’s clothes, bedding, and blankets were dirty;

and rodent droppings and dog feces were seen throughout the home. The

caseworker also noted that C.R. was truant from school.

       Mother stipulated that she had a physical altercation with M.D.W. in the

presence of Children, and that truancy was still an issue with C.R. Thereafter,

the trial court adjudicated Children dependent. The trial court also ordered

Mother to engage in intimate partner violence services, drug and alcohol

treatment, and mental health treatment.3 In February 2020, CYF authorized

T.W.’s return to Mother, as long as she had proper childcare arrangements.

Nevertheless, while Mother had some unsupervised visitation with T.W., he

was not returned to Mother’s care. C.R. remained in placement after being

removed from Mother’s home.

       On July 11, 2022, CYF filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental

rights. The trial court held hearings on the petition, at which numerous

witnesses testified. Following the hearings, the trial court involuntarily

terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children. Mother filed this timely

appeal.

____________________________________________

3 Mother had two driving under the influence charges in 2020.

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      On appeal, Mother raises the following questions for our review:

      1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
         law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s
         parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (8)?

      2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
         law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear
         and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental
         rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child
         pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

      Here, we will address Mother’s claims simultaneously. In her first claim,

Mother contends that CYF failed to produce clear and convincing evidence to

terminate her parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). See id. at 27, 32.

Mother argues that the evidence did not establish her continued incapacity to

provide care for Children. See id. at 29, 31-32. Mother further argues that

she could remedy the conditions that led to Children’s removal, noting that

she was taking part in mental health treatment, completed an intimate partner

violence program, attended therapeutic visitation, and secured a stable home.

See id. at 29-30. Mother also asserts that she has maintained her sobriety.

See id. at 31.

      In her second claim, Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding

that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence that the termination of her

parental rights would meet the best interest of Children under Section

2511(b). See Appellant’s Brief at 33. Mother claims that she loves Children

and adds value to their lives. See id. at 34. Mother asserts that termination

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would deprive Children of a relationship with her, which is not in their best

interests. See id.

      In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our

standard of review

      requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only    upon    demonstration      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

Int. of H.H.N., 296 A.3d 1258, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

“[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented,

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

      The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination

followed by an assessment of the needs and welfare of the child.

      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
      termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the

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      needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
      of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). “It is well

established that a court must examine the individual circumstances of each

and every case and consider all explanations offered by the parent to

determine if the evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly

warrants termination.” Id. (citation omitted).

      This Court may affirm a decision regarding the termination of parental

rights with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as a

consideration of Section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439,

442 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      Here, we will consider the trial court’s termination orders pursuant to

subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

                                     ***

      (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
      refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential
      parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
      mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,

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      abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
      parent.

                                     ***

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      With regard to termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2),

we have stated that

      [i]n order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
      § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
      repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
      such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
      be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
      necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
      causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
      not be remedied.

Int. of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 912 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). “The

grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied

are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” Id. at

913 (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827

(Pa. 2012) (explaining that “a parent who is incapable of performing parental

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duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.”).

“Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt

assumption of full parental responsibilities. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after

a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re Z.P.,

994 A.2d 1108, 1117-18 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation marks and citations

omitted).

      Here, in finding grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights as

to T.W. pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court stated the following:

            [T.W.] was removed from Mother’s care at five months old.
      Since then, Mother has struggled with ongoing drug and alcohol
      abuse and intimate partner violence, as well as an inability to
      understand and take accountability for how those issues affected
      her reunification with [T.W.] Although Mother did complete an
      intimate partner violence program and eventually began engaging
      in the appropriate recommended level of drug and alcohol
      treatment, Mother both took too long and failed to make sufficient
      progress to demonstrate capacity to appropriately parent [T.W.]

            Mother hindered her own progress in working toward
      reunification with her lack of candor to the [trial c]ourt and delay
      in meeting the [trial c]ourt’s expectations, all while [T.W.] was
      growing up in someone else’s care. Despite the [trial c]ourt’s
      repeated emphasis on the need for complete separation from
      [M.D.W.], Mother continued her relationship with him and still
      remained in contact with him in July of 2022. Mother failed
      repeatedly to engage in the appropriate level of drug and alcohol
      treatment. Mother’s consistent compliance with treatment did not
      even begin until November 2021, two years after [T.W.’s]
      removal, and CYF’s concerns regarding Mother’s drinking
      continued well into 2022. Mother’s own testimony during review
      hearings, as well as video footage of Mother in a bar in February
      2021, confirmed CYF’s ongoing concerns. Additionally, once given
      the opportunity to have supervised visits with [T.W.] in her home,

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     it still took Mother almost a year to have her home assessed by
     the CYF caseworker.

            During the termination hearing, Mother’s own testimony
     demonstrated her ongoing failure to appreciate the issues
     identified by the [trial c]ourt or to take accountability. Mother
     continued to minimize and deny any alcohol problem, reporting
     that she is now working as a bartender despite being in early
     sobriety. Mother also testified that she would not drink now
     “unless [she] was just having one of those days.” Similarly, during
     her individual evaluation with Dr. Pepe, Mother continued to
     deflect and minimize her behavior. Mother failed to demonstrate
     accountability, reporting she felt she was being punished because
     [T.W.] had not been reunified with her. Ultimately, Dr. Pepe
     concluded that Mother has not made the necessary personality
     changes required to establish capacity to parent [T.W.].

            The evidence presented during the termination hearing
     clearly established the chronic nature of the issues that have
     caused Mother to be unable to provide essential care to [T.W.].
     The [trial c]ourt recognizes Mother’s recent progress. Mother has
     maintained her drug and alcohol treatment at SHORES, has had
     several consecutive clean drug screens…. However, the [trial
     c]ourt considers that progress too tenuous to overcome Mother’s
     long history of chronic problems, the length of time it has taken
     Mother to attain the progress she has achieved, and Mother’s own
     statements at the termination hearing that reveal her continued
     lack of insight and accountability. The [trial c]ourt cannot delay
     permanency for [T.W.] forever so that Mother can demonstrate
     she is capable of maintaining her recent progress.

           As such, the record justified the [trial c]ourt’s conclusion
     that Mother cannot or will not remedy the problems that have
     made her incapable of parenting [T.W.].

Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/23, at 18-20 (footnote omitted).

     Likewise, with respect to C.R., the trial court found grounds for

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2):

           Mother and [C.R.] have been active with the child welfare
     agency in both Allegheny and Washington County since 2011.
     Since then, Mother has struggled with basic neglect, inadequate

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     supervision of her children, and truancy issues. Most importantly,
     Mother exhibits a long-standing inability to establish a healthy
     parent-child relationship. Despite consistently engaging in the
     TRAC services specifically designed with goals to address the
     causes of her incapacity to parent [C.R.], Mother has not
     succeeded in remedying the [trial c]ourt’s concerns. Indeed, Ms.
     Tuttle testified during the hearing that Mother continues to regress
     during visitation with [C.R.] and is not currently able to meet
     [C.R.’s] emotional needs on a daily basis. Similarly, Dr. Pepe
     observed Mother to continue to lack empathy and opined that she
     does not currently have the capacity to parent [C.R.]

           The evidence clearly established the chronic nature of the
     issues that have caused Mother to be unable to provide essential
     care [C.R.]. Given over ten years of chronic difficulties, the [trial
     c]ourt justifiably concluded that Mother cannot or will not remedy
     the problems that have made her incapable of parenting [C.R.]

Trial Court Opinion, 5/5/23, at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).

     Our review of the record confirms that the trial court’s findings and

determinations are supported by competent, clear, and convincing evidence,

and we otherwise discern no abuse of discretion or error of law. See Int. of

H.H.N., 296 A.3d at 1263. The record reveals that Mother failed to fully

complete court-ordered services aimed at reunification with Children. Most

importantly to the trial court, although Mother completed intimate partner

violence treatment, she continued to have a relationship with M.D.W., and

further reported violent incidents with partners in February 2021, March 2022,

and January 2023. See N.T., 2/15/23, at 232, 245-46, 283-84.

     Moreover, Mother is unable to provide the essential care to Children,

despite the involvement of child agencies for over 10 years. Notably, Mother

would repeatedly leave Children without adult supervision, and Children

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displayed poor personal hygiene when in Mother’s care. See id. at 246-48;

see also N.T., 12/16/22, at 95. Additionally, Tuttle stated that Mother could

not meet the emotional needs of Children, and Dr. Pepe opined that Mother

did not have the capacity to care for Children. See N.T., 12/16/22, at 69-70,

140.

       As this Court has repeatedly stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in

abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume

parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of

progress and hope for the future.” Int. of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d at 914 (citation

omitted). The record substantiates the conclusion that Mother’s repeated and

continued incapacity, neglect, or refusal has caused Children to be without

essential parental control or subsistence necessary for their physical and

mental well-being. See id. at 912. Moreover, Mother cannot or will not remedy

this situation. See id. Therefore, we can find no error or abuse of discretion

in the trial court’s finding that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) was

proper.

       Because CYF met its burden under Section 2511(a), the trial court “shall

give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional

needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). “Notably, courts

should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing her

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for

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the parent.” Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023) (citation omitted).

“[T]he determination of the child’s particular developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Id.

(citation omitted).

      “The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly

interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and

stability.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citation, brackets, and

quotation marks omitted). Determining a child’s needs and welfare “requires

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.” Id.

(citation omitted). However, “analysis of the parental bond is but one part of

the overall subsection (b) analysis, which includes a determination of whether

the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the

bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and

welfare.” Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113.

      The Section 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration of
      other important factors such as: the child’s need for permanency
      and length of time in foster care …; whether the child is in a
      preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether
      the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and
      emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, comfort,
      security, safety, and stability. These factors and others properly
      guide the court’s analysis of the child’s welfare and all her
      developmental, physical, and emotional needs. Trial courts have
      the discretion to place appropriate weight on each factor present
      in the record before making a decision regarding termination that
      best serves the child’s specific needs.

Id. (citations and footnote omitted).

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      Here, in finding that T.W.’s emotional needs and welfare favor

termination pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court stated the following:

      In this matter, the evidence amply supported the [trial c]ourt’s
      conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights served
      [T.W.]’s needs and welfare. [T.W.] was removed from Mother’s
      care when he was five months old. Following interactional
      evaluations between [T.W.] and Mother, and [T.W.] and his foster
      parents, Dr. Pepe opined that [T.W.’s] primary attachment is to
      his foster parents who have been providing care for [T.W.] for
      over two years. Dr. Pepe noted that [T.W.] is “exceptionally
      happy” and “developmentally thriving.” During the interactional
      evaluation between [T.W.] and his foster parents, Dr. Pepe
      observed [T.W.] to display spontaneous affection and multiple
      bonding behaviors such as close physical proximity and ongoing
      eye contact. In contrast, during the interactional evaluation
      between [T.W.] and Mother, Dr. Pepe observed no bonding
      behaviors and noted [T.W.] was “sullen” and “emotionally shut
      down.” Notably, Dr. Pepe expressed no concern regarding any
      emotional distress [T.W.] may feel as a result of severing his
      relationship with Mother, yet opined that [T.W.] could suffer
      psychological problems and experience developmental losses
      should he be removed from the care of his foster parents. Given
      Mother’s delay in addressing the needs identified by the [trial
      c]ourt, the length of time [T.W.] has been in placement, and
      [T.W.’s] substantial progress and secure attachment with his
      foster parents, the [trial c]ourt justifiably concluded that [T.W.’s]
      need for safety, permanency, and stability outweighs the possible
      benefit to him of maintaining his relationship with Mother and,
      further, that termination of Mother’s parental rights served
      [T.W.’s] needs and welfare.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/23, at 21-22 (footnotes omitted).

      Additionally, the trial court found that termination would best serve the

needs and welfare of C.R.:

            The evidence in this matter supports the court’s conclusion
      that [C.R.’s] bond with Mother is unhealthy, that [C.R.] will not
      suffer extreme emotional consequences from termination of
      Mother’[s] parental rights, and that instead terminating Mother’s
      rights will enable [C.R.] to develop healthy relationships moving

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     forward. Consequently, the evidence supports the [trial c]ourt’s
     ultimate conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights
     served [C.R.’s] needs and welfare.

           Given that th[e trial c]ourt identified the nature of Mother
     and [C.R.’s] relationship as the primary concern at the time of
     adjudication, it necessarily called into question the nature of the
     bond between Mother and [C.R.]. The evidence presented at the
     termination hearing revealed that, although Mother participated
     in the therapeutic visitation and her own individual therapy, she
     was unable to gain enough insight into and accountability for how
     her own past trauma affects her parenting. Without this insight
     and accountability, Mother has been unable to change the
     dynamic of her relationship with [C.R.] and to make herself
     emotionally available as a parent.

           Over the life of the case, the [trial c]ourt has noted the
     impact the nature of the bond has had on [C.R.] and that it causes
     her confusion with her role as a child and not a caregiver. [C.R.]
     has demonstrated parentified behavior and a desire to take
     responsibility for Mother’s emotions. Dr. Pepe observed [C.R.] to
     be “on-edge” and attempting to assert control during her
     interactional evaluation with Mother and a sibling.

           In contrast, [C.R.] was relaxed and comfortable with her
     foster parents. [C.R.] feels foster parents satisfy her basic needs,
     acknowledging a sense of commitment and safety in their care,
     and commenting that they do not yell at her, hit her, or throw
     things at her. Following the interactional evaluations, Dr. Pepe
     opined that [C.R.] has a positive primary attachment to her foster
     parents, and that to remove her from their care would cause
     [C.R.] to regress into her former behaviors.

            [C.R.’s] substantial progress in her foster parents’ care
     supports the [trial c]ourt’s conclusion that [C.R.] will not
     experience extreme emotional consequences as a result of the
     Court’s decision in this matter. The record reflects that [C.R.] has
     already come to terms with the possibility of less contact with
     Mother. Considering whether termination of Mother’s rights would
     negatively impact [C.R.], Dr. Pepe opined that the strength and
     stability of [C.R.’s] relationship with her foster parents will help to
     alleviate any potential detrimental effects.

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             Given Mother’s inability to develop a healthy relationship
      with [C.R.], and [C.R.’s] substantial progress and secure
      attachment with her foster parents, the [trial c]ourt justifiably
      concluded that [C.R.’s] need for safety, permanency, and stability
      outweighs the possible benefit to her of maintaining her
      relationship with Mother and, further, that termination of Mother’s
      parental rights served [C.R.’s] needs and welfare.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/5/23, at 22-24 (footnotes omitted).

      Upon review, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, as the

record supports the finding that Children’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare favor termination of Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to Section 2511(b). See Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. At the time

of the hearings, Children had been in care for over three years, and C.R., who

was 12-years-old, indicated her preference that Mother’s parental rights be

terminated and foster parents adopt her. See N.T.,12/16/22, at 152 (wherein

Dr. Pepe stated C.R.’s strong preference was to be adopted by her foster

parents and that she understood Mother’s rights would be terminated as a

result); see also N.T., 2/15/23, at 349. Furthermore, T.W. was clearly bonded

with foster parents, and Dr. Pepe opined that T.W. would experience

developmental and psychological problems if he was removed from foster

parents. See N.T., 12/16/22, at 133, 140.

      As we have repeatedly stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on

hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the

responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1125 (citation omitted);

see also Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1108 (noting that when considering a

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termination petition, courts “must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in

mind. Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.” (citation and emphasis

omitted)). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and

rearing of … her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill … her parental

duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or

her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856

A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Moreover, while Mother

professes to love Children, her feelings of love and affection for her children

will not preclude termination of her parental rights. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d

at 1121 (“A parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do

not prevent termination of parental rights.” (citation omitted)). Therefore, we

conclude that the trial court’s findings pursuant to Section 2511(b) are

supported by the record.

      Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of

discretion, and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Mother’s

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

      Orders affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/2023

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