Court Opinion

ID: 9383001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 15:00:32.625403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.061871
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-8030     Document: 010110834557      Date Filed: 03/29/2023    Page: 1
                                                                 FILED
                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                      March 29, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                      Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                          Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                              No. 22-8030
  v.                                               (D.C. No. 2:15-CR-00101-SWS-5)
                                                               (D. Wyo.)
  HAROLD CREIGHTON, a/k/a Creature,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       In this appeal, Harold Creighton challenges the district court’s denial of his

 motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Also before us is his

 counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

 asserting there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. Upon independent review of

 the record, we conclude there are no grounds for appeal that are not “wholly

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-8030    Document: 010110834557         Date Filed: 03/29/2023      Page: 2

 frivolous.” Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we dismiss the

 appeal.

                                 I.     BACKGROUND

       In 2015, a jury found Mr. Creighton guilty of one count of conspiracy to

 possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, over 500 grams of

 methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846. Based on the

 quantity of methamphetamine and Mr. Creighton’s criminal history, including prior

 drug-related felonies, the district court sentenced him to the mandatory term of life

 imprisonment.

       In December 2021, Mr. Creighton filed a motion requesting sentence reduction

 under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Pursuant to this provision, on a defendant’s motion,

 the district court may reduce the defendant’s sentence, once he has exhausted his

 administrative remedies, if it finds that such a reduction is (1) warranted by

 “extraordinary and compelling reasons”; (2) “consistent with applicable policy

 statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”1; and (3) supported by

 consideration of the relevant factors set forth in § 3553(a), as applicable to the

 circumstances of the case. United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir.

       1
         This court has previously held that the Sentencing Commission’s most recent
 policy statement, which was issued prior to the amendment of § 3582(c)(1)(A) in
 2018, is “applicable only to motions for sentence reductions filed by the Bureau of
 Prisons, and not to motions filed directly by defendants.” United States v. McGee,
 992 F.3d 1035, 1050 (10th Cir. 2021). Thus, Mr. Creighton need not demonstrate that
 his sentence reduction would be consistent with this policy statement.
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 2021). A district court may deny the defendant’s motion for sentence reduction

 “when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking[.]” Id. at

 1043 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       In moving for reduction of his sentence, Mr. Creighton argued he had

 exhausted his administrative remedies and that statutory reforms since his sentencing

 in 2015 have created “a huge disparity in sentencing” constituting “extraordinary and

 compelling reasons[] that warrant a reduction in sentence[.]” ROA Vol. I at 40.

 Specifically, Mr. Creighton argued that, were he sentenced today, he would “be

 subject to 25 years under the new statutory penalties” rather than life imprisonment.

 Id. Mr. Creighton further argued he no longer posed a danger to the community,

 highlighting his work as a tutor, his lack of disciplinary incidents since 2019, and his

 participation in educational programing while incarcerated. Id. at 41–42, 86. Lastly,

 Mr. Creighton asked the court to consider his interest in being present as a caregiver

 for his disabled mother, ailing stepfather, and five-year-old son. Id. at 43, 85–86.

       The Government agreed that Mr. Creighton had exhausted his administrative

 remedies and that, if sentenced today, “he would not have received a mandatory life

 sentence.” Id. at 75. Applying today’s Sentencing Guidelines, the Government

 calculated Mr. Creighton would probably “be[] subject to a mandatory fifteen year

 minimum, with an advisory guideline range of 168–210 months[.]” Id. However, the

 Government argued that disparity alone was insufficient to demonstrate extraordinary

 and compelling reasons for sentence reduction absent some “individualized, special

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 circumstances that might separate out [Mr. Creighton’s] case as one specially

 deserving of consideration.” Id. at 79. Additionally, the Government argued

 consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors “as they relate to [Mr. Creighton]

 and his crime would not favor his motion even had he otherwise established an

 extraordinary and compelling reason.” Id. at 80. Specifically, the Government noted

 Mr. Creighton’s extensive criminal history, including three prior drug felonies; his

 ostensibly unresolved substance abuse issues; and his “concerning” behavior before

 and during his trial “attempting to influence and/or intimidate witnesses against

 him[.]” Id. at 80–82.

       Ultimately, the district court denied Mr. Creighton’s motion for sentence

 reduction. In doing so, the court concluded Mr. Creighton had not satisfied any of the

 necessary requisites for sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). As a threshold

 matter, the court concluded Mr. Creighton had not satisfactorily exhausted his

 administrative remedies. It found his email to the warden, stating in total, “‘[I] would

 like to be considered for compassionate release. [T]hank you[,]’” did not provide the

 Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) with an “opportunity to consider [Mr. Creighton’s]

 claimed extraordinary and compelling reasons underlying his request for relief.” Id.

 at 102–03 (quoting id. at 45).

       Next, even assuming Mr. Creighton had exhausted his administrative

 remedies, the court concluded he had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling

 reasons to support sentence reduction. The district court agreed that, if sentenced

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 under today’s statutory guidelines, Mr. Creighton would face a 25-year mandatory

 minimum. But the court concluded that disparity alone was insufficient to justify a

 sentence reduction and that “[t]he combination of factors presented by Mr. Creighton

 [did] not amount to extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Id. at 104.

       Lastly, the district court decided that, even if Mr. Creighton had demonstrated

 extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, the § 3553(a) factors

 would not support modifying his sentence. The court concluded the nature and

 circumstances of his offense, as well as his extensive criminal history which

 “suggest[ed] the only times he wasn’t actively committing crimes as an adult were

 during periods of incarceration,” weighed against any sentence reduction. Id. at 107.

 The court also determined that “a sentence reduction would fail to reflect the

 seriousness of the offense, fail to promote respect for the law, and fail to provide just

 punishment for the offense.” Id. at 107. It concluded that, “[b]ased on

 Mr. Creighton’s criminal history and current lack of intensive drug treatment, his

 continued imprisonment [was] necessary to protect the public from further criminal

 conduct.” Lastly, the court noted Mr. Creighton’s behavior during trial when he (1)

 allegedly requested that a relative make a Facebook post regarding government

 witness CW3’s testimony, saying in essence, “thanks [CW3] for lying”; (2) mailed a

 law enforcement report summarizing CW3’s proffer to his mother; and (3) gestured

 to a defense witness while the witness was on the stand, but before the jury entered,

 including at one point “pressing his index finger to his lips in a ‘shh’ motion.” Id. at

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 107–08. The court concluded these attempts to intimidate witnesses or obstruct their

 testimony demonstrated Mr. Creighton’s “need for a very high level of rehabilitation

 before [the] court might consider him to present an acceptably low risk of

 recidivism.” Id. at 108. In sum, the district court held that “the life imprisonment

 required by Congress at the time of Mr. Creighton’s misconduct and sentencing is

 sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the goals of sentencing in this case.”

 Id.

       Mr. Creighton filed a timely notice of appeal of the district court’s judgment

 denying his sentence reduction. Mr. Creighton’s counsel now moves to withdraw

 because there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal.

                           II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Under Anders, counsel may “request permission to withdraw where counsel

 conscientiously examines a case and determines that any appeal would be wholly

 frivolous.” United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing

 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). “[C]ounsel must submit a brief to the client and the

 appellate court indicating any potential appealable issues based on the record.” Id.

 Then, in his own submission to the court, the client may also raise any points he

 chooses. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. We must then independently examine the record to

 determine whether appeal would be “wholly frivolous.” Id. If we conclude there are

 no non-frivolous grounds for appeal, we may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and

 dismiss the appeal. Id.

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        This court “review[s] a district court’s order denying relief on a

 § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15

 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it

 relies on an incorrect conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id.

 (quotation marks omitted). The broad discretion district courts hold in determining

 whether to modify a sentence “counsels in favor of deferential appellate review.”

 Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022). Thus, “[w]e do not

 disturb decisions entrusted . . . to the discretion of a district court unless we have a

 definite and firm conviction that the [] court made a clear error of judgment or

 exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” United States v.

 Chavez-Meza, 854 F.3d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018).

                                   III.   DISCUSSION

        Counsel’s Anders brief acknowledges there are non-frivolous arguments that

 could be made regarding the district court’s determinations that Mr. Creighton had

 not exhausted his administrative remedies and had not established extraordinary and

 compelling reasons for sentence reduction. But counsel asserts the same cannot be

 said of the court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors. Counsel notes the district

 court’s ruling was based on consideration of the correct § 3553(a) factors and that

 there are no non-frivolous arguments that the ruling was based on any incorrect

 conclusions of law. Counsel also acknowledges the fact the court expressly discussed

 some, but not all, of the § 3553(a) factors is not a basis for alleging any legal error.

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 Further, Counsel states there is no non-frivolous basis for arguing any of the district

 court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. Counsel then concludes that the fact

 no non-frivolous arguments can be made against the district court’s application of the

 § 3553(a) factors “is fatal to Mr. Creighton’s appeal.” Counsel’s Anders Br. at 10.

       In his pro se submissions to us, Mr. Creighton argues the district court erred in

 its conclusion that the § 3553(a) factors did not support reducing his sentence. First,

 Mr. Creighton argues the district court erred by failing to consider relevant § 3553(a)

 factors, including: whether the sentence “reflected the seriousness of the offense,”

 “promote[d] respect for the law, provide[d] just punishment, afford[ed] adequate

 deterrence, or provide[d] [him] with necessary training and care”; “the kinds of

 sentences available”; the “sentencing range established”; and “the need to avoid

 unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have

 been found guilty of similar conduct[.]” Appellant’s Nov. 22, 2022, pro se Br. at 16.

 Second, Mr. Creighton argues the district court “abused its discretion [by] not

 allowing it self [sic] to see past [his] criminal record of minor assaults and drug

 cases, relating to his drug addiction” and in doing so “completely ignored Pepper v.

 United States.” Id. at 15 (citing 562 U.S. 476 (2011)). Third, Mr. Creighton argues

 the district court relied on “erroneous findings of fact” in its assessment of his

 behavior during trial. Id. at 17. We consider each argument in turn.

       As discussed, the district court may deny a defendant’s motion for sentence

 reduction “when any of the [] prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking[.]”

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 McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, even if Mr. Creighton

 does have non-frivolous arguments regarding his exhaustion of administrative

 remedies and demonstration of extraordinary and compelling circumstances, the

 district court’s denial of his motion would still stand on its determination that the

 § 3553(a) factors did not warrant a reduction. To sustain his appeal, Mr. Creighton

 must have some non-frivolous ground for reversal of the district court’s analysis of

 the § 3553(a) factors.

       In relevant part, § 3553(a) sets forth the following factors to be considered:

       (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
       characteristics of the defendant;

       (2) the need for the sentence imposed--

              (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
              the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

              (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

              (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

              (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
              training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
              effective manner;

       (3) the kinds of sentences available;

       (4) the kinds of sentences and the sentencing range established for--

              (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
              category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . .

       (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
       with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct[.] . . .

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  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “[T]he weighing of the § 3553(a) factors is committed to the

  discretion of the district court[.]” United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 949 (10th Cir.

  2021). Thus, “we cannot reverse unless we have a definite and firm conviction that

  the [] court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible

  choice in the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In considering

  the § 3553(a) factors, the district court “need not expressly discuss every § 3553(a)

  factor or every fact a defendant marshals in support” of his motion for sentence

  reduction. United States v. Chavez-Cadenas, No. 21-3156, 2021 WL 6071559, at *3

  (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 2021) (citing Hald, 8 F.4th at 948 (rejecting argument “that the

  district court erred by failing to mention some of [defendant’s] mitigating

  arguments”)). Overall, the district court “need only set forth enough to satisfy the

  appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned

  basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Hald, 8 F.4th at 948

  (quoting Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1964).

        Here, the district court expressly grounded its conclusion that the § 3553(a)

  factors counseled against sentence reduction, in “the nature and circumstances of

  th[e] offense and Mr. Creighton’s history and characteristics[,]” and the need for the

  sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, [] to promote respect for the law,

  and [] to provide just punishment for the offense.” ROA Vol. I at 107. The court

  expressly considered Mr. Creighton’s new offense; his extensive criminal history,

  which included three prior drug felonies, several instances of violence, and

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  possession of a firearm as a felon; and the sentencing range applicable at the time of

  Mr. Creighton’s criminal acts and sentencing. In concluding that “continued

  imprisonment is necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct, the

  court noted there was no record of Mr. Creighton having participated in “intensive

  drug treatment” while incarcerated. Id. Additionally, Mr. Creighton’s criminal

  history “suggest[ed] the only times he wasn’t actively committing crimes as an adult

  were during prior periods of incarceration.” Id. Lastly, the court discussed

  Mr. Creighton’s behavior during trial, as chronicled in the Probation Office’s

  Presentence Investigation Report, as a “consideration militating against a sentence

  reduction[.]” Id. (citing ROA Vol. II at 36–37).

        Thus, contrary to Mr. Creighton’s argument on appeal, the district court did

  consider whether his sentence reflected the seriousness of his offense, promoted

  respect for the law, and provided just punishment, as well as the then-applicable

  sentencing range. The court found these factors weighed against modifying

  Mr. Creighton’s sentence.

        Mr. Creighton’s objection that the court did not discuss other potentially

  relevant § 3553(a) factors is also unavailing. The court need not expressly discuss all

  of the § 3553(a) factors in announcing its decision on a defendant’s motion for

  sentence reduction. Based on the record before us, it is apparent the district court

  considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and found the weight of those factors did

  not support reducing Mr. Creighton’s sentence. Nothing in the court’s discussion of

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  those factors suggests it “made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of

  permissible choice[.]” Hald, 8 F.4th at 949.

        Further, the district court considered Mr. Creighton’s conduct since sentencing

  as permitted by Pepper v. United States. In Pepper, the Supreme Court held “a

  district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant’s

  postsentencing rehabilitation and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases,

  support a downward variance” from the recommended sentencing range. 562 U.S. at

  481. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that a district court ruling on a motion for

  sentence reduction may “consider intervening changes of law or fact[,]” including

  postsentencing “evidence of rehabilitation” or “evidence of violence or prison

  infractions[.]” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2403–05. Importantly, the Court also

  emphasized that § 3582(c)(1)(A) “does not require a district court to accept a

  movant’s argument that evidence of rehabilitation or other changes in law counsel in

  favor of a sentence reduction[.]” Id. at 2404–05.

        Here, the district court considered evidence of Mr. Creighton’s postsentencing

  rehabilitation as well as his postsentencing prison infractions. Nothing in the record

  or the district court’s opinion suggests the court abused its discretion in determining

  Mr. Creighton’s criminal record and evidence of postsentencing infractions

  outweighed the evidence of his postsentencing rehabilitation.

        Lastly, the record does not support Mr. Creighton’s argument that the district

  court relied on “erroneous findings of fact” in its consideration of his behavior during

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  trial. “A finding of fact is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to

  support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

  conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,

  333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). As an initial matter, Mr. Creighton did not raise his

  concerns with the Government’s account of his conduct during trial before the district

  court. Because Mr. Creighton failed to raise this issue before the district court, he

  may not raise it on appeal other than through the lens of plain error. See Calderon,

  428 F.3d at 932. Mr. Creighton does not argue plain error, and so this issue is

  waived. See United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019). Even

  considering his argument on its merits, it does not demonstrate the district court

  relied on clearly erroneous findings of fact. The district court’s chronicle of

  Mr. Creighton’s conduct during trial drew directly from the Probation Office’s

  Presentence Investigation Report. While Mr. Creighton made particularized

  objections to other contents of the Report, he made no objection to its description of

  his alleged conduct during trial. Before this court, Mr. Creighton argues that he

  (1) “was incarcerated with no internet access” and therefore should not bear blame

  for a Facebook post “calling a cooperating witness a ‘rat’” and (2) was merely

  communicating with the witness “using a common prison method of sign language”

  to “say[] hello and catch[] up.” Appellant’s Nov. 22, 2022, pro se Br. at 17. These

  arguments are without support from the record and are not factually inconsistent with

  the Government’s account of Mr. Creighton’s conduct. On review of the record and

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  the entire evidence, this court is not left with a definite and firm conviction that the

  district court made a mistake.

        In whole, Mr. Creighton’s disagreement with how the district court weighed

  the § 3553(a) factors is not sufficient to establish an abuse of discretion or to supply

  grounds for reversal. The district court concluded that Mr. Creighton’s criminal

  history, the nature and circumstances of his offense, his conduct during trial, and his

  prison infractions outweighed those factors militating in favor of sentence reduction.

  On our independent review of the record, we conclude the district court’s analysis

  and weighing of the § 3553(a) factors was within “the bounds of permissible choice”

  given the facts and circumstances of the case. Chavez-Meza, 854 F.3d at 659; see

  also United States v. Williams, 848 F. App’x 810, 813 (“[I]t is not our place to

  reweigh the factors and come to a different conclusion than the district court[.]”).

  Thus, the district court’s decision would stand on its conclusion that “the § 3553(a)

  factors [] counsel against any [] reduction[,]” even if Mr. Creighton demonstrated he

  had indeed exhausted his administrative remedies and that extraordinary and

  compelling reasons justified sentence reduction. ROA Vol. I at 108.

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                                IV.   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Creighton lacks any non-frivolous grounds for reversal. We therefore

  GRANT counsel’s request to withdraw, and we DISMISS the appeal.

                                           ENTERED FOR THE COURT

                                           Carolyn B. McHugh
                                           Circuit Judge

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