Court Opinion

ID: 9641685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:37:54.014741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:39.102068
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Associate Justice
(dissenting).
I concur in the view of the majority that the instrument in question in this case is a sealed instrument.
As to the sufficiency of the affidavit of defense, however, I dissent: The only substantial difference between the defendant’s plea and his affidavit of defense was that the latter was supported by his oath, that is, was in affidavit form, the plea being supported only by the signature of counsel. Otherwise, the plea and the affidavit of defense were in substantially the same terms, each setting up that the consideration of the note sued on had wholly failed; that the note was barred by the statute of limitations ; that there was no demand for payment or presentment; that plaintiff paid nothing of value for the note; that plaintiff is not a holder for value or any consideration in due course; and that he acquired the note after maturity and dishonor. In my view the purpose of Rule 73 was to require more than the mere addition of an oath to a plea. As stated by Mr. Justice Robb in Bulow v. Jenkins, 63 App.D.C. 38, 68 F.(2d) 783, the purpose of Rule 73 was “to promote justice by preventing, so far as possible, fictitious defenses”; and it seems to me that the language of Rule 73, requiring the defendant to file with his plea “an affidavit of defense, denying the right of the plaintiff as to the whole or some specified part of his claim, and specifically stating also, in precise and distinct terms, the grounds of his defense, which must be *890such as would, if true, he sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s claim in whole or in parf"1 may very well be said to require more than a mere oath attached to conclusions. Unless the rule requires a statement of the facts which, if true, would constitute a defense, so that the court can determine whether such facts when proved would as a matter -of law support a conclusion that the defendant is not liable, it can be of little help to the court. The phrase “specifically stating also, in precise and distinct terms” may well be said to mean a statement of the facts. The rule, of course, cannot be construed to require the defendant to state his evidence, but, on the other hand, it ought to require, and I think properly construed does require, a statement of more than conclusions of law or of immaterial or conflicting matter. The affidavit of defense in this case consisted in large part of such items. Certainly the state-r ment that the consideration had wholly failed is a conclusion of law. The assertion that the note was barred by the statute of limitations is a conclusion of law which could be determined, indeed had been determined adversely to the defendant, from the face of the declaration. The assertion that there had been no demand for payment of the note was unnecessary since the note is payable “on or before one year after date” and it is obvious from the face of the note that more than one year had expired. The assertion that there had been no presentment of the note would seem to be in conflict with the later statement that the plaintiff had acquired the note after maturity and dishonor. This casts doubt upon the genuineness of either of such asserted defenses. It is to be noted also that the assertion of lack of presentment is a defense good when asserted for an endorser, not for a maker, and the defendant is one of the makers.2 Therefore, this statement was immaterial. The whole assertion that “said plaintiff is not a holder of said notes for value, or any consideration, in due course of business,' and that said plaintiff acquired said notes after maturity and dishonor” is but a general conclusional assertion that the plaintiff is not a bona fide holder in due course for value before maturity and that he is therefore charged with notice of defects or defenses. But apparently from the affidavit the only defenses are failure of consideration and running of the statute of limitations. The facts, supporting the asserted failure of consideration are not set out, and as above stated, the defense of the statute of limitations had been determined.
I am of. the view, therefore, that the judgment for the plaintiff should be sustained.
Mr. Justice ROBB joins in this dissent.

 Italics supplied.

 It is to be noted further on the subject of presentment and demand that the note specifically provides “the maker and endorser of this note further agree to waive demand, notice of non-payment * *