Court Opinion

ID: 9870215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 19:51:42.975563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:02.137685
License: Public Domain

Sweeny, J.P.,
dissents in part in a memorandum as follows: The record clearly demonstrates that there is a material issue *513of fact whether plaintiff Claudio Vera was an employee entitled to the protections of Labor Law § 240 (1).
Defendant LIMC hired defendant NY Fast to demolish a building on its premises. NY Fast hired Vera Contracting, owned and operated by plaintiff, to deliver three empty dumpsters to the demolition site and to haul them away when full. Plaintiff stated that he was paid extra to assist with the loading of building debris into the dumpsters. He claimed that this work was done pursuant to an oral agreement with an employee of NY Fast. To perform this work, plaintiff stated that the site foreman unlocked the door to a scaffold erected next to the building by defendant Skyline in order to give him access. After filling two dumpsters and taking them to the dump, plaintiff began filling the third dumpster. He was standing atop the scaffold depositing debris into a dumpster when the scaffold planks collapsed under him, causing him to fall 6 to 10 feet, fracturing his heel bone.
Oscar Velasquez, the president and owner of NY Fast, testified at his deposition that Vera Contracting was hired pursuant to an oral contract “only to drive their truck, drop the container on the street and leave.” Vera was to return to pick up the container once it was filled by NY Fast employees. Velasquez testified that plaintiff was not an employee of NY Fast, had not been hired to work on the site, and did not have the right or permission to enter the demolition site or use the scaffolding. He also denied that plaintiff was paid for working on the demolition site beyond the delivery of the dumpsters. Although not present at the site at the time of plaintiff’s fall, he did see plaintiff deliver containers to the site on that day.
After the accident, plaintiff asked Velasquez to file a claim for him through NY Fast’s workers’ compensation policy but Velasquez refused since plaintiff did not work for NY Fast.
A Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) hearing was held on April 30, 2013. Both plaintiff and Velasquez testified at the hearing consistent with their deposition testimony. The WCB Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disallowed plaintiff’s claim, finding that there was no employer/employee relationship between plaintiff and NY Fast. The ALJ determined that plaintiff was “clearly an independent contractor” and was hired “just to drop off the dumpsters.”
The premise underlying the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff is entitled to invoke the protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) rests on the definitions contained in that statute. The majority contends that plaintiff “established that he was ‘employed’ within the meaning of the Labor Law, i.e., he was *514suffered and permitted to work at the job site,” as defined in Labor Law § 2 (7). As a result, the majority finds be is covered by the provisions of Labor Law § 240 (1). However, “[t]o come within the special class for whose benefit absolute liability is imposed upon contractors, owners and their agents to furnish safe equipment for employees under section 240 of the Labor Law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was both permitted or suffered to work on a building or structure and that he was hired by someone, be it owner, contractor or their agent” to perform that work (Whelen v Warwick Val. Civic & Social Club, 47 NY2d 970, 971 [1979]). Put another way, “[although the Labor Law defines an individual ‘employed’ as including one who is ‘permitted or suffered to work’ (§ 2, subd 7), this definition must be read in conjunction with that of ‘employee’, which is defined as ‘a mechanic, workingman or laborer working for another for hire' (§ 2, subd 5)” (id.). Evidence that a person is a hired employee, bringing him or her within the special protections of Labor Law § 240, includes the existence of a “voluntary undertaking of a mutual obligation—the employee agrees to perform a service in return for compensation” from the employer, who “may exercise authority in directing and supervising the manner and method of the work” and who usually “decides whether the task undertaken by the employee has been completed satisfactorily” (Stringer v Musacchia, 11 NY3d 212, 215-216 [2008]).
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, there is a material question of fact whether plaintiff falls within the protection of the statute.
The WCB ALJ found after a hearing that plaintiff had not been hired to load debris into the dumpster but had been hired solely to deliver dumpsters to the demolition site and that any other work he performed was done voluntarily. He also determined that no employee/employer relationship existed as between plaintiff and NY Fast. While a determination by the WCB after a hearing may have preclusive effect in subsequent litigation (Vogel v Herk El. Co., 229 AD2d 331, 332-333 [1st Dept 1996]), I agree with the majority that, under these facts, such preclusion is not warranted, since the definition of “employee” in the Workers’ Compensation Law, although substantially similar, differs from that in the Labor Law.* However, the facts here do not support the majority’s conclu*515sion that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was a covered employee under the Labor Law warranting summary judgment in his favor.
The only evidence plaintiff submitted to support his claim that he was working for NY Fast was a hearsay statement that he was “tasked” to help load the dumpster by a Mr. Barrero, a foreman for NY Fast. No affidavit or other evidence from Bar-rero or any other principal or employee of NY Fast was submitted in support of plaintiffs claim. Hearsay statements cannot be considered as evidence to support a motion for summary judgment (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 560, 563 [1980]; Batista v Santiago, 25 AD3d 326 [1st Dept 2006]). Additionally, no evidence of payment for plaintiff’s work by NY Fast or any other entity on the job site for this work appears in the record. Although the majority dismisses the testimony of Velasquez as “not probative” on the issue of employment, his testimony is equally compelling, if not more so, than that of plaintiff. Moreover, although not preclusive, I must note that despite the majority’s contention that the WCB made “no determination that plaintiff was in any way a ‘volunteer’ at the site” so as to remove him from the protection of section 240 (1), the ALJ specifically found that plaintiff was “hired just to drop off the dumpsters” and that whatever he did after that was “on his own.” It is certainly not illogical, as the majority suggests, for a person to properly be on a job site and yet not be an employee of one of the contractors at that site, particularly where, as here, plaintiff was clearly an independent contractor. This, conceededly, does not automatically make him a volunteer. However, at the very least, defendant NY Fast raises a material question of fact that requires the denial of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (International Customs Assoc. v Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 233 AD2d 161, 162 [1st Dept 1996]).
The cases cited by the majority do not support plaintiff’s position. In each of those cases, the injured plaintiff was performing the work for which he was hired, whether as an employee or independent contractor and thus, there was no question as to whether he was a “volunteer” or that he was covered by the protections of Labor Law § 240 (1).
I would therefore deny plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and leave this issue for determination at trial.

 The majority cites in support of this proposition Baker v Muraski (61 AD3d 1373 [4th Dept 2009]), a nonbinding memorandum decision which does not explain how, as a matter of law, the difference in definition would have an effect on our decision in any significant way. The Baker court provided no *515examples as to what these differences are. It found that there was no testimony at the WCB as to the element of payment, a requirement of coverage under Labor Law § 240 (1) and thus concluded, as we do here, that there was no identity of issue between the WCB hearing and the subsequent personal injury litigation (id. at 1373-1374).