Court Opinion

ID: 9586941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:16:43.425654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:57.112414
License: Public Domain

*528Justice EXUM
dissenting.
The majority’s holding that a criminal defendant’s request for voluntary discovery automatically tolls the running of the statutory speedy trial period until the state voluntarily responds finds no support in the statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-701, or in reason; and it seriously undercuts the policy of the Speedy Trial Act and the criminal discovery statutes, N.C. Gen. Stat. § ISA-902, et seq.
The majority relies on that part of the Speedy Trial Act which provides:
(b) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time within which the trial of a criminal offense must begin:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant including, but not limited to, delays resulting from:
a. A mental or physical examination of the defendant, including all time when he is awaiting or undergoing treatment or examination, or a hearing on his mental or physical capacity; or
b. Trials with respect to other charges against the defendant;
c. Interlocutory appeals; or
d. Hearings on any pretrial motions or the granting or denial of such motions.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-701(b). All of the listed “proceedings” involve court action. This is what makes them “proceedings.” A request for voluntary discovery and the state’s voluntary response thereto is not a “proceeding” within the meaning of the statute inasmuch as it involves no court action.
The statute requires that the proceeding be, in fact, the cause of a period of delay before that period is excluded from the statutory period. It provides that the period of delay must result from the proceeding in question. In holding that a motion for change of venue tolled the running of the statutory period until *529the motion could be determined, we noted in State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 42, 274 S.E. 2d 183, 192 (1981):
The state is in fact stymied in its scheduling of any case for trial until a ruling is made on such a motion. A motion for change of venue so long as it is pending must necessarily delay the setting of a case for trial until it is determined, and this is so whether the determination be soon after the 120-day period begins to run or at some later time within the period. We believe the legislature intended through G.S. 15A-701(b)(l)(d) to exclude from the 120-day speedy trial period all time reasonably required to determine any motion the determination of which must be made before a case can be scheduled for trial. A motion for change of venue, as we have noted, is such a motion.
A request for voluntary discovery does not necessarily delay the setting of any case for trial. Certainly it is clear in this case that the request did not in fact delay the scheduling of trial.
Should either the state or defendant be required to move the court for a discovery order so that discovery does become a court proceeding and if this proceeding results in a delay in scheduling the trial, I would have no quarrel with excluding the delay from the running of the speedy trial statutory period. This, however, is not the case before us.
To hold that defendant’s mere request for voluntary discovery which did not in fact result in any delay in scheduling the trial nevertheless tolls the running of the Speedy Trial Act period both emasculates the act and places an extraordinarily high price on engaging in voluntary discovery, particularly for a defendant who, as here, is in jail awaiting trial. I am confident the legislature never envisioned such results when it provided for speedy trials and criminal discovery.
I note that the state did not assert either at trial or in the Court of Appeals that the Speedy Trial Act period should be tolled upon defendant’s filing a motion for voluntary discovery. The state never contended in the trial court that the trial was delayed because of defendant’s request for voluntary discovery. It makes the argument for the first time in this Court.
*530My vote, therefore, is to conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the matter should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether to dismiss the indictment with or without prejudice because trial was not had within the 120-day period prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
Justice Frye joins in this dissenting opinion.