Court Opinion

ID: 9850445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:57:33.641529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:37.377678
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
After one of the State’s most important witnesses, Mickey Barrett, refused to testify at trial, the State introduced a videotaped statement from him that he had given to police on a prior occasion. The majority concludes that Barrett’s videotaped statement was not inadmissible hearsay because it was properly introduced as a prior inconsistent statement. Because Barrett did not give any testimony at trial that conflicted in any manner with the substance of his prior videotaped statement, however, the improper introduction of Barrett’s videotaped statement violated Wilson’s right to confrontation. *119Therefore, I dissent.
In the videotaped statement, Barrett told police that Wilson had informed him that she had committed the crime. Barrett gave police the statement because he sought favorable treatment from the State with respect to his own 90-year sentence for child molestation. At trial, however, Barrett was absolutely uncooperative and refused to testify. At one point while he was on the stand, Barrett said that he had not given the police any statement. When confronted by the existence of the videotaped statement, Barrett said “If you’ve got a recording, why do you need me here?” The overall effect of Barrett’s testimony was not to deny that he had been involved in the investigation, but only that he refiised to cooperate any further.
The majority erroneously concludes that Barrett’s videotaped statement qualifies as a prior inconsistent statement. Although Barrett did testify that he had not given a prior statement to police, at no point during his trial testimony did Barrett contradict the substance of his prior statement. In Gibbons v. State, relied upon by the majority, this Court upheld the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement after the witness testified that he had never given any prior statement to police and that the defendant had never incriminated himself to the witness.5 In the prior statement in that case, the witness told police that the defendant had told him of his involvement in the crime.6 Therefore, the testimony in Gibbons was inconsistent not only with the fact that a prior statement had been given, but also with the substance of that statement. In this case, Barrett never contradicted the substance of his prior statement.
This situation is also distinguishable from the one we addressed in Gordon v. State, also relied on by the majority.7 In Gordon, this Court affirmed a trial court’s decision to allow a witness to testify that the defendant’s cousin had told her that the defendant had committed the crime.8 The defendant’s cousin had previously testified and had denied having that specific conversation with the witness about the defendant.9 In effect, therefore, the defendant’s cousin told the jury that he had never told the witness that the defendant committed the crime, thus casting doubt on whether or not the incriminating conversation had ever occurred. In this case, however, Barrett never told the jury that Wilson had not incriminated herself to him. The conversation that was denied in Gordon was very different, therefore, from the one Barrett denied having in this case. In addi*120tion, Barrett’s limited testimony would not have left the jury with the impression that he never spoke to police about Wilson, but rather, that he simply refused to cooperate with the State any further.
This situation is properly controlled by Barksdale v. State, in which this Court reversed a conviction because the trial court erroneously allowed the introduction of a witness’s prior statement after that witness refused to testify at trial.10 We reasoned that “because [the witness] refused to answer any questions and thus gave no testimony in court with which the prior statement could be judged to be inconsistent, [the witness’s] videotaped statement was inadmissible as a prior inconsistent statement under Gibbons.”* 11 Under the Barks-dale rationale, that Barrett not only refused to testify but also halfheartedly denied giving a prior statement to police does not render the substance of that prior statement admissible. If Barrett had also stated that the defendant had not incriminated herself to him, his prior statement would be admissible under Gibbons. Because Barrett gave no testimony that contradicted his prior statement to police, that prior statement was inadmissible hearsay.
The majority is correct that the admission of a declarant’s out-of-court statement does not violate the defendant’s right to confrontation if the out-of-court statement meets the requirements of a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or was made under circumstances demonstrating particular guarantees of trustworthiness.12 The statement introduced in this case from an incarcerated child molester serving a 90-year sentence and seeking favorable treatment from the State, however, contains no such guarantees of reliability. Therefore, it qualifies under no exception to the hearsay rule, and Wilson’s right to confrontation was violated by the admission of the videotaped statement.
The majority also concludes that the admission of hearsay testimony from Mickey Barrett’s nephew, Herschel Barrett, did not violate Wilson’s right to confrontation because the circumstances under which the statements were allegedly made to Herschel demonstrated particular guarantees of trustworthiness. The circumstances described by the majority, however, do not create the inherent indicia of reliability necessary to overcome the defendant’s right to confrontation.
Because Mickey Barrett’s videotaped statement to police did not qualify as a prior inconsistent statement, Wilson’s right to confrontation was violated by the improper admission of that statement. Accordingly, I dissent.
*121Decided September 22, 2003.
Jennifer E. Hildebrand, for appellant.
Herbert E. Franklin, Jr., District Attorney, Chris A. Amt, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Jason C. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins in this dissent.

 248 Ga. 858, 863 (286 SE2d 717) (1982).

 Id. at 861.

 273 Ga. 373, 377 (541 SE2d 376) (2001).

 Id.

 Id.

 Barksdale v. State, 265 Ga. 9 (453 SE2d 2) (1995).

 Id. at 11; see also Farmer v. State, 266 Ga. 869 (472 SE2d 70) (1996).

 Barksdale, 265 Ga. at 13.