Court Opinion

ID: 9551670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:56:59.877881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:21.870355
License: Public Domain

NOBLE, Justice (dissenting). In my view, the majority holding that jurisdiction to review motions filed under Rule 93 lies exclusively in the Supreme Court is erroneous. First, because it appears to be implicit in the reasoning that the post-conviction remedy afforded by Rule 93 simply provides in the sentencing court a remedy which had previously been available by habeas corpus 'in the court of the county where the prisoner is confined; and secondly, in holding the proceeding seeking release from custody under Rule 93 to be a civil proceeding or one in the nature of a civil proceeding rather than criminal. The basis of the majority opinion lies in the conclusion that the Rule 93 proceeding is civil and, accordingly, not within the language of the appellate jurisdiction granted to the court of appeals. I not only find no basis for that conclusion, -but I am convinced that the proceeding under our rule is criminal in nature," providing only a method of seeking relief from a criminal conviction. The majority opinion rests upon the general rule that-in adopting a statute of another jurisdiction, it will be presumed that we adopted the prior construction of the statute by the federal courts including its designation as a civil proceeding. I recognize the force of our decisions so holding, but in McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 85 P.2d 78, 120 A.L.R. 250, this court said: “It will not be presumed that the legislature intended to adopt a construction not in accord with sound reasoning, common sense, or that would render the statute inconsistent with other laws intended to be retained, or the public policy of the adopting state.” See, also, Smith v. Meadows, 56 N.M. 242, 242 P.2d 1006; White v. Montoya, 46 N.M. 241, 126 P.2d 471; State v. Reed, 39 N.M. 44, 39 P.2d 1005, 102 A.L.R. 995; and Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 P. 780. In determining whether the federal decisions construing § 2255 to be a civil proceeding are persuasive, we must start with an analysis of those- decisions and 'compare the power -of ’the federal courts in habeas corpus with that of the New Mexico courts. The federal courts have said that procedure for vacation of criminal sentences provided by § 2255 was designed to serve the same purpose as the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus, and was intended to provide the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court where the prisoner was confined. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417; Arellanes v. United States, 353 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1965). It was because of this similarity and because habeas corpus had always been designated as a civil proceeding rather than criminal that the federal courts held the § 2255 proceeding to be a civil proceeding to attack a criminal judgment. I think there can be no doubt but that the right to habeas corpus at common law, and its restrictions and limitations, is exactly the same as the writ in this state. At common law, habeas corpus is not an available remedy to attack a criminal sentence or conviction, save for want of jurisdiction appearing upon the face of the record of the convicting court. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969, where it was said: “ * * * The rule at the common law, and under the act 31 Car. II. chap. 2, and other acts of Parliament prior to that of July 1, 1816 (56 Geo. III. chap. 100, § 3), seems to have been that a showing in the return to a writ of habeas corpus that the prisoner was held under . final process based upon a judgment or 'decree of a court of competent jurisdiction closed the inquiry. * * * ” See, also, Janiec v. McCorkle, 52 N.J.Super. 1, 144 A.2d 561. The Territorial Supreme Court of this State recognized that our habeas corpus statutes are a codification of the common law in In re Peraltareavis, 8 N.M. 27, 41 P. 538, and this court held that errors or irregularities in the course of proceedings at or prior to the trial are not grounds for the release of a prisoner upon application for writ of habeas corpus. See Ex parte Selig, 29 N.M. 430, 223 P. 97; Ex parte Kelley, 57 N.M. 161, 256 P.2d 211; Smith v. Abram, 58 N.M. 404, 271 P.2d 1010; and Johnson v. Cox, 72 N.M. 55, 380 P.2d 199. It is, accordingly, apparent that habeas corpus has "never been available as a collateral attack on a criminal judgment, and that prior to the adoption of Rule 93, prisoners had no post-conviction remedy by which errors or violation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution could be redressed except by direct appeal. Unlike § 2255, Rule 93 has no relation to the habeas corpus proceeding but actually provides a method of attacking criminal judgments not theretofore available in the courts of this State. The function of the writ of habeas corpus is entirely different in the federal system, and is not dependent on common-law concepts. Chief Justice Vinson was especially qualified to speak on the history of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy in the federal system and of the reasons and purpose of § 2255, since he was chairman of the committee appointed to study the problems arising in federal courts under habeas corpus and which recommended enactment of the statute to alleviate some of the problems. He fully discussed the function and history of the writ and of § 2255 as a remedy to permit collateral attack on a criminal judgment in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232. The Chief Justice pointed out that habeas corpus in the federal courts rests, not upon the common law, but upon a special grant of power from Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82, and in 1867 by 14 Stat. 385, where Congress changed the common law writ by providing for inquiry into the facts of detention so that by virtue of the federal statute, United States Courts have power to act on a collateral attack on criminal judgments, even though the vice does not appear on the face of the judgment. Challenge of convictions by habeas corpus was permitted on facts de hors the record. Section 2 of the federal act itself described the purpose of the Act as creating a remedy “intended to be as broad as habeas corpus.” A review of the history of § 2255, as outlined by Hayman, shows it to have been enacted to meet the practical difficulties encountered in administering habeas corpus, “by affording the same rights as habeas corpus in another and more convenient forum.” While the federal decisions are not in complete harmony as to whether the federal post-conviction proceeding is a civil proceeding, they all make it abundantly clear that their designation of it stems entirely from the fact that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and that the federal post-conviction remedy performs the identical function in a different forum. Because of the difference of the function of habeas corpus and the § 2255 and rule 93 post-conviction procedure in the federal system and in New Mexico, the federal interpretation as to whether the remedy is civil or criminal in its nature is not persuasive in an interpretation of our rule, and considering the purpose of our rule, would not be in accord with sound reasoning. I have found no federal decision, except those designating the applicable court docket, that turned on whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. Merely because we may decline to follow the federal interpretation that the procedure is civil does not deprive us of the force of the federal decision in their interpretation in other respects of the similar federal statute. I think that since our rule has no similarity to rights afforded by habeas corpus, and because it provides a means of collaterally attacking a criminal judgment, it should be filed in the criminal action it seeks to attack, and be denominated a criminal proceeding. Giving it that interpretation I believe the court of appeals has jurisdiction to review, on appeal, district court judgments on rule 93 motions. I, therefore, dissent from the majority view. COMPTON, J., concurs.