Court Opinion

ID: 9707787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:21:07.971675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:53.846467
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
dissenting.
This case tells a sad tale of parents who failed to parent and school administrators who failed to administer. As a result, a child who should have been disciplined at home and at school, instead, was restrained by a district court from saying “Dumbo” to another child, building snowmen with big ears, and threatening and harassing the other child. He faces up to one year in prison if he violates the restraining order. NDCC § 12.1 — 31.2—01(7)(b).
Between August 1, 1993, the effective date of NDCC § 12.1-31.2-01, and April 13, 1994, the date of the hearing on the restraining order, Anthony Stamness, born August 27, 1977, with other children, built a series of three snowmen, each with large ears and each meant to tease and ridicule Christian Svedberg, also a minor child, and classmate of Anthony and the others. Apparently, Christian has large ears and suffered the indignity of the community nickname of “Dumbo.” Christian’s parents have talked to school board members about the “Dumbo”name calling incidents at school, but to no avail. Apparently, Anthony’s parents have failed to prohibit Anthony from teasing Christian and have’not punished him when he did, or otherwise sought to deter him. Understandably, Christian’s parents would like to stop Anthony from holding their son up to public ridicule and causing him pain and suffering.
The statute at issue here was passed in response to the growing community awareness of domestic violence and the need to control stalking. See S.Jud.Comm.Minutes, H.B. 1238 (March 8, 1993) [hereinafter Minutes], testimony of Ms. Bonnie Palacek and Senator Judy L. DeMers. There was a need for a statute authorizing the issuance of a civil restraining order against the frequently employed tactics of intimidation by stalking, engaged in by expartners of broken relationships, who had not perpetrated physical violence and, therefore, could not be restrained under NDCC § 14-07.1-02, because there was no imminent threat of physical harm. As Ms. Palacek explained:
“Currently, only those with a history of physical abuse and who are in ‘imminent threat of physical harm’ may petition the court for a Protection Order. [NDCC § 14-07.1-02.] Although in some parts of the state this language has been stretched to cover victims who don’t have such a history, in other parts of the state they have no protection at all.
“For example, in the Fargo area, victims from Minnesota who are clients of the Rape and Abuse Crisis Center have access to such Orders, but clients who live on the North Dakota side of the river don’t.” Minutes, supra.
*686The hope was that the option of a civil restraining order would obviate the need for victims of stalking to rely on state’s attorneys to initiate criminal prosecutions with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Minutes, supra (testimony of Bonnie Palacek and James Vukelic). A civil restraining order against stalking would be quicker, simpler, and accomplish the goal of protection from the intimidation and fear caused by the stalker. Minutes, supra. It is clear to me from the legislative history and the language of NDCC § 12.1-31.2-01, that the intent of the legislature was to protect the victims of stalking and intimidation from conduct by perpetrators which had put them in fear for their lives, their safety, their security.
It is not only through the statute but also through its legislative history, that the facts of this case must be filtered. The transcript reveals that a mean and insensitive teenager teased and made fun of another teenager. On one occasion, Christian says, Anthony said he would kill him. On one other occasion, Christian says, Anthony followed him in the car. Those are the facts.
In City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808, 810-11 (N.D.1991), we traced the evolution of the fighting words doctrine from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) [freedom of speech does not protect “insulting or ‘fighting’ words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”], through Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 895, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949) [speech that is “shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest” may not be punished], to Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1107, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972) [words that convey disgrace or insult the listener are not fighting words because they do not “by their very utterance ... tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”]. We concluded that fighting words are not those that simply inflict emotional injury but must be “ ‘personally abusive epithets which ... as a matter of common knowledge [are] inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.’ ” Id. 469 N.W.2d at 811-12 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971)). See also UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 114, F.Supp. 1163 (E.D.Wis.1991).
The point is that fighting words are to be interpreted “narrowly,” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2567, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 347 (1992), not expansively, as the majority construes them. And fighting words are to be measured by an objective standard, not by an individualized subjective one. See Cohen, supra; see also, e.g., State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42, 385 A.2d 642 (1978). So the fact that Anthony was hurt, offended and upset by being called “Dumbo,” and by seeing snowmen with big ears, is not the determining, or even relevant, fact. It is how ordinary people would react. And, if the first amendment protects “virulent ethnic and religious epithets,” United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 2409, 110 L.Ed.2d 287 (1990), and threats to “break your damn neck ... [if you go into racist stores]”, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3419, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982), how can it be possible that it does not protect saying “Dumbo” and making snowmen? 1
I do not disagree that context is important in looking at whether words are fighting words and that ordinary teenage children may react differently than older, ordinary folks. But I cannot agree that given the context of this case, that erecting three snowmen with big ears and calling someone “Dumbo” can be constitutionally prohibited by a court. I am sure that the derisive name, “Dumbo,” and the snowmen with big ears caused Christian to suffer humiliation and pain and embarrassment. What they did not cause and what they were not likely to cause was the risk of an immediate breach of the peace.
*687I have no difficulty at all agreeing with the proposition that a threat of violence is not protected speech. E.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 598 (1994). I have greater difficulty taking seriously the utterance of an insensitive, teenage clod, a type my children would have described as a “meante,” especially in the context of this case. Anthony did not engage in any pushing, shoving, hitting, punching, slapping, tripping, brandishing of arms, or any other physical bullying. With the exception of the one occasion, he did not make any verbal threats. Hyperbole and bluster do not constitute a “true” threat. Cf. State v. Haugen, 392 N.W.2d 799 (N.D.1986). Anthony simply did not engage in any discernible pattern of threatening behavior. Instead, he cruelly made fun of Christian by calling him “Dumbo” and by building three snowmen. Not the stuff that violence is made of. But, even so, I might not object if the restraining order only forbade threats of violence. It goes much farther than that.
Instead of proceeding with caution to narrowly construe the meaning of “disorderly conduct” in NDCC § 12.1-31.2-01, in applying the statute to these facts, the majority’s treatment turns it into an overbroad, unconstitutional statute, at least, as applied. That is distressing, given the great need for the legislation and all of the cases in which it could and, I hope, "will be applied constitutionally. After all, we must remember that the United States Supreme Court looks to the construction given to an allegedly over-broad state statute by the state’s supreme court in determining whether the statute passes constitutional muster. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 94 S.Ct. 970, 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974).
This case cries for the exercise of parental responsibility and school responsibility. It goes without saying that parents and school authorities have considerable power to control children. Rather than encourage the exercise of that control, the court steps into the breach. I think that is a mistake and that “[pjarents should be discouraged from resorting to the courts to resolve ordinary problems of daily living.” Stephanie L. v. Benjamin L., 158 Misc.2d 665, 602 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Sup.1993).
The only order that should have issued in this case, aside from dismissal, is one directed to Anthony’s parents to parent Anthony and to Anthony’s school principal and teachers to control Anthony.
I respectfully dissent.

. Because the majority’s analysis makes no distinction between pure speech, i.e., saying "Dumbo,” and expressive conduct, i.e., building a snowman with big ears, see Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974), neither does mine.