Court Opinion

ID: 9475885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:41:37.254601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:00.544273
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, concurring.
Defendants were indicted for assault with intent to commit murder contrary to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 113(a), 1151 & 1153. They were convicted of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. § 113(f), a lesser included offense option given to the jury sua sponte by the district court. I agree with the result of the lead opinion, but on slightly different grounds.
At common law, the lesser included offense doctrine aided the prosecution “when its proof did not fully live up to expectation.” United States v. Markis, 352 F.2d 860, 866 (2d Cir.1965), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 387 U.S. 425, 87 S.Ct. 1709, 18 L.Ed.2d 864 (1967). As the doctrine has developed, it may be to a *1287defendant’s advantage by providing an opportunity for the jury to acquit him on the offense charged in the indictment, while finding him guilty on the lesser offense. United States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 2947, 64 L.Ed.2d 827 (1980); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 515 (1982). An instruction on a lesser included offense affords the jury a less drastic alternative between conviction or acquittal on the offense charged. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2387, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). Under Fed.R. Crim.P. 31(c),1 a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction “if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.” Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1995, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973). Conviction on a lesser included offense operates as an implied acquittal on the greater offense. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 1761, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-91, 78 S.Ct. 221, 225, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).2
Under our prior decisions, whether an offense was a necessarily included lesser offense under rule 31 depended upon an examination of the statutory elements of the greater offense to determine whether it was impossible to commit the greater without first having committed the lesser. Larson v. United States, 296 F.2d 80, 81 (10th Cir.1961); United States v. Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 498-99 (10th Cir.1985).
In United States v. Pino, 606 F.2d 908, 916 (10th Cir.1979), we followed an approach developed by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314 (D.C.Cir.1971), which provides that the availability of lesser included offenses depends upon the evidence developed in each case rather than a strict application of the past rule for determining lesser included offenses. See also United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851, 98 S.Ct. 162, 54 L.Ed.2d 119 (1977). The trial judge must determine whether there is an “inherent relationship” between the greater and lesser offense and whether the facts might support conviction on the lesser but not on the greater. The greater and lesser offenses must relate to the protection of the same interests. Under this approach, it may be possible to commit the greater offense without having committed an element of the lesser offense. United States v. Pino, 606 F.2d at 915.
Before analyzing the challenged lesser included offenses, it is helpful to look at the statute involved. 18 U.S.C. § 113 prohibits numerous types of assault and has widely differing penalties:
§ 113(a) Assault with intent to commit murder or rape, by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.
§ 113(b) Assault with intent to commit any felony, except murder or rape by fine of not more than $3,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
§ 113(c) Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, and without just cause or excuse, by fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.
§ 113(d) Assault by striking, beating, or wounding, by fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.
§ 113(e) Simple assault, by fine of not more than $300 or imprisonment for not more than three months, or both.
*1288§ 113(f) Assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
Defendants did not object to lesser included offense instructions on §§ 113(d) & (e) which carry relatively minor penalties (maximum terms of imprisonment of six months and three months, respectively). Defendants did object to the inclusion of §§ 113(c) & (f) which carry more severe penalties (maximum terms of imprisonment of five years and ten years, respectively).
While it is true that assault with intent to commit murder does not require proof of serious bodily injury, under the inherent relationship test it may be a lesser included offense. This is because §§ 113(a) and (f) both protect bodily integrity and the facts of this case indicate that a jury could find that the actions of defendant Walter (as a principal) and defendant Raymond (as an aider and abettor) did result in great bodily harm. The victim received a gunshot wound to the chest; he remained in the hospital for a month and a half. It is beyond dispute that the victim's injuries were serious.
Defendant Raymond suggests that requiring defendants to stand trial on lesser included offenses violates due process because a defendant that is charged with a greater offense may not have sufficient' notice to defend against a lesser offense if the lesser has a different element than the greater. This argument is hypothetical as defendant has failed to show any prejudice. United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir.1984). He also argues that the court is without jurisdiction to instruct on offenses other than those in the indictment. This argument is unpersuasive. After hearing the evidence, the grand jury returns an indictment charging an offense. Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c), the trial jury may then consider lesser offenses incorporated into the offense contained in the indictment. It may not go beyond what the grand jury charges.
In Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d 1069, 1071 (10th Cir.1983), we indicated that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction when: 1) there has been a proper request; 2) the lesser included offense consists of some, but not all, of the elements of the offense charged; 3) the element differentiating the offenses is in major dispute; and 4) a jury could rationally convict the defendant of the lesser and acquit of the greater.
. With the exception of a proper request, I think that the above elements were satisfied in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the sua sponte origin of the lesser included offense instructions does not constitute reversible error. This is not a situation where both the government and defendant objected to their inclusion. Rather, the record reflects that the government did not object to the court’s instructions, and the defendant objected to instructing on § 113(c) & (f) on the grounds that they were not lesser included offenses of § 113(a). Record vol. II at 239, 240. As noted, there is lack of sufficient prejudice which would warrant reversal due to the sua sponte origin of the instructions. Given the government’s acquiescence in the instructions, the defendants’ failure to properly object and the adequate notice inherent in the circumstances, the trial court’s inclusion of four lesser included offense instructions on its own motion was not an abuse of discretion. United States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635, 640 (10th Cir.1982).3
In some limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for a trial court to give instructions sua sponte even though the choice as to instructions should ordinarily lie with the parties. See e.g. Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.1985). In this situation, however, I think it preferable for counsel to initiate requests for any instructions on lesser included offenses. As the court said in Walker v. United States, 418 F.2d 1116, 1119 (D.C.Cir.1969):
*1289In general the trial judge should withhold charging on lesser included offenses unless one of the parties requests it, since that charge is not inevitably required in our trials, but is an issue best resolved, in our adversary system, by permitting counsel to decide tactics____ If it is not requested by counsel, it is properly omitted by the trial judge—
Notwithstanding, once a trial court instructs sua sponte, the party dissatisfied with the instruction must make an objection in accordance with Fed.R.Crim.P; 30, stating the precise grounds of the objection.
In addition, I conclude that the trial court’s lesser included offense instructions were not improper because an important element differentiating the greater offense from the lesser offenses was in dispute. Specifically, the element of specific intent to commit murder required in § 113(a) was in dispute because the defendants were impaired by alcohol. Just as there was evidence which would allow the jury to infer that the defendants were not capable of forming the specific intent to commit murder, record vol. II at 86, 144, so too was there contrary evidence, record vol. II at 166, 173. Thus, there was a factual dispute concerning the state of their impairment due to alcohol. The government did not concede that the defendants were incapable of forming specific intent; to the contrary, the government in its closing argument suggested that although the defendants had been drinking, they were still capable of forming specific intent due to their tolerance for alcohol. Record vol. II at 199. Thus I cannot agree with the statement in the lead opinion that “[t]he parties agree that by reason of the intoxication of the defendants they were not capable of forming the specific intent required in § 113(a), which, as mentioned, was the charge in the indictment.” Lead Opinion at 812 F.2d at 1284. If this statement were correct, it would raise a serious question about relying upon a greater offense (for which the parties would have agreed that there was insufficient evidence, see Fed. R.Crim.P. 29 (motion for judgment of acquittal)) in order to convict upon a lesser included offense.

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 31 provides:
(c) Conviction of Less Offense. The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense.

. Under the "inherent relationship” test for determining whether an offense is a necessarily included lesser offense, the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment would prevent retrial on one or more greater offenses to the extent that the conviction on the lesser offense operated as an implied acquittal on one or more of the greater offenses for which instructions were given. See 8A R. Cipes, I. Hall & M. Waxner, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 31.03[4], see also, United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1240 (9th Cir.1980) ("inherent relationship" test not incompatible with double jeopardy concerns).

. Defendants did not object to the instructions on the grounds that they interfered with the defense prerogative to stand trial only on the greater offense and waive the right to have all lesser offenses considered.