Court Opinion

ID: 9776128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:19:16.232717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:34.626403
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellee was interrogated by law enforcement officials, while in custody after being given Miranda1 warnings, until she invoked her right to counsel. The interrogation subsequently ceased, and appellee was later released from custody and permitted to return to her home. Two days later, law enforcement officials reinitiated questioning and obtained incriminating statements. Holding that the police had violated the Edwards ’2 rule against reinitiating conversations after a suspect’s invocation of her right to counsel under Miranda, the trial court suppressed the statements. The State appealed the trial court’s ruling, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
One of the grounds for review that we granted concerned whether the Edwards ’ reinitiation rule applied to police initiation of questioning after a break in custody. The State did not advance this legal argument *904before the trial court or the court of appeals, and that failure may well be the reason the majority dismisses the State’s petitions as improvidently granted. Nevertheless, I believe we should address this ground.
We have held recently that the State may procedurally default grounds for upholding a search when those grounds are not articulated to the trial court. State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). In that case, the State urged at trial that the search fell within the inventory search exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 76. The trial court ruled against the State. Id. On appeal, the State argued that the search was proper as a search incident to arrest. Id. We held that the State procedurally defaulted this legal theory for upholding the search by failing to advance it before the trial court. Id. at 78. In so holding, we distinguished State v. Klima, 934 S.W.2d 109 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), which held that a person’s standing to attack the validity of a search could be challenged by the State for the first time on appeal. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d at 77-78. We explained that the defendant bears the burden of establishing his expectation of privacy, but that once the defendant has met that burden, the government must establish the validity of the search under Fourth Amendment law. Id. at 78. But because standing is part of the defendant’s burden in initially establishing a Fourth Amendment claim, the State could raise the issue on appeal even though not raised by the State in the trial court. Id.
The present case falls within the rule announced in Klima. As with the defendant who must show that the Fourth Amendment is implicated by showing a reasonable expectation of privacy, appellee must show that Miranda is implicated by showing the existence of a relevant custodial setting. Hence, whether a break in custody occurred is an issue that falls within the proof requirements for establishing an Edwards /Miranda claim. Therefore, the State did not procedurally default this question by failing to raise it in the trial court.
And, while we may decline to review an issue presented in a State’s petition for discretionary review on the ground that the issue was not addressed by the Court of Appeals, we also have discretion to address such an issue, as long as it was not procedurally defaulted in the trial court. The issue in the present case is an important one and one of first impression in this state. The Supreme Court has indicated that the protections in Edwards are not implicated when there has been a break in custody. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). Having granted review on this issue, received briefs, and heard oral arguments, I believe this Court should address the issue.
Hence, I respectfully dissent.
McCORMICK, P.J., and MANSFIELD and HOLLAND, JJ., joined.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).