Court Opinion

ID: 9904802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 22:00:48.932967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:28.437161
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 23a0485n.06

                                          No. 23-3105

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                  FILED
                                                                                   Nov 27, 2023
                                                                            KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
WEIJIE LU,                                       )
                                                 )
        Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                 )        ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                 )        UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v.
                                                 )        COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON,                            )        DISTRICT OF OHIO
                                                 )
        Defendant-Appellant.                     )
                                                                                  OPINION
                                                 )
                                                 )
                                                 )

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; CLAY and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

       CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Weijie Lu appeals the district court’s decision to grant in

part Defendant University of Dayton’s motion for summary judgment. Lu contends that he

presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. Specifically, Lu claims that

Defendant: (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his race and/or national origin, and

(2) retaliated against him for reporting alleged discrimination against a Dayton graduate student

and/or filing charges with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. For the reasons set forth below, we

AFFIRM the district court’s order granting in part Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

                                       BACKGROUND

                                    I. Factual Background

       Plaintiff Weijie Lu is an experienced physics teacher of Chinese descent. From 2014 to

2020, Lu taught introductory physics classes as an adjunct professor at the University of Dayton.

However, the facts underlying this case begin in 2012, prior to Lu’s employment by Defendant,
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

when Lu served as a technical advisor through the Air Force Research Laboratory (“AFRL”) at

the Wright Patterson Air Force Base. Dayton offers graduate students the opportunity to apply for

the Defense Associated Graduate Student Innovators program (“DAGSI”), which is funded

through the Ohio Department of Education and the United States Air Force. A Dayton graduate

student, Sorrie Ceesay, participated in this fellowship program and worked on DAGSI-funded

research under Lu’s mentorship. For the majority of Lu’s time serving as Ceesay’s advisor at the

AFRL, he was not employed as an adjunct professor at Dayton. Towards the end of his mentorship

of Ceesay, Lu started working as an adjunct professor at Dayton in August 2014.

        The AFRL terminated Lu in 2018. After his termination, he sent an e-mail to the Dayton

Equity Compliance Office, stating, “I am an adjunct faculty in physics, and I lost my job and career

at the Air Force Res Lab due to government corruption and discrimination . . . . Would you please

[] educate me on the EEO laws . . . . (I have an attorney).” Bakota Aff., R. 8-1, Page ID #44. Amy

Zavadil, the then-current Title IX Coordinator in the Equity Compliance Office at Dayton, replied

and directed Lu to the local EEOC office. Nonetheless, Lu continued to reply, “seeking advice on

[his] case with Air Force Res Lab.” Id. Kimberly Bakota, a civil rights investigator at Dayton,

subsequently replied in September 2018, also advising Lu to contact the local field office and

explaining that Dayton could not assist with a claim against the AFRL, as the two entities operated

as separate institutions.

        Then, during his time as an adjunct professor in 2019, Lu learned that his former mentee

Ceesay was terminated from his research position with the AFRL because he was allegedly not a

United States citizen when, in fact, Ceesay was a United States citizen. Believing such treatment

was due to Ceesay’s African-American race, Lu e-mailed Dayton on January 28, 2020, and

expressed his concern regarding the AFRL’s allegedly discriminatory acts. In relevant part, Lu

                                               -2-
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

claimed that “[t]he termination of Mr. Sorrie[] Ceesay was a typical Jim Crow civil rights violation

and a constitutional violation, and it was at US Air Force in 2014.” Id. at Page ID #47. Bakota

once again replied that Dayton could not advise Lu or Ceesay on issues pertaining to discrimination

claims against AFRL and directed him to the local field office of the EEOC. In addition to

Bakota’s reply, Scott Segalewitz, Associate Dean for Experiential Learning and Student Success,

accidentally replied all and copied Lu, stating that “Mr. Lu just called and gave me an earful. . . .

Good Luck, Paul.”1 Id. These e-mails from Lu to various Dayton administrators regarding the

alleged discrimination towards Ceesay occurred between January 28, 2020 and February 7, 2020.

       About a month later, March 2020 marked the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. The

adjunct professors, including Lu, were notified in April that “[a]djuncts are currently under review

by the Dean and the Provost” because of the uncertainty caused by the pandemic. Erdei Aff., R.

9-1, Page ID #60–61. The former chair of the Physics Department, John Erdei, e-mailed Lu about

the undetermined future for adjuncts, stating: “I need you to know that the fall is now uncertain.

Most certainly, if I learn anything I will certainly let you know.” Id. at Page ID # 61. Erdei also

followed up with Lu in June, advising him that fall adjunct contracts were still unsettled and

explaining he may know more in July.

       Concrete answers finally arrived in July 2020, and Lu was informed that a tenured

professor would be teaching his previously assigned physics classes for the upcoming fall 2020

semester due to COVID-19 uncertainty and budgetary constraints. Dayton made the decision in

summer 2020 to replace all Physics adjunct professors with tenured ones in order to minimize

       1
          “Paul” refers to Dayton’s former Provost and Executive Vice President of Academic
Affairs, Paul H. Benson. Unsatisfied with Dayton’s replies, Lu stated he was going to escalate his
complaints to the Provost, which caused Segalewitz to state “Good Luck, Paul.” Aff. Bakota, R.
8-1, Page ID #47.

                                                -3-
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

costs, as the tenured professors were already covered within the university’s budget. Accordingly,

a tenure-track professor, Ivan Sudakow, took over Lu’s introductory physics class. Lu’s loss of

his adjunct teaching contract, while Dayton allegedly retained other similarly-situated temporary

professors, forms the basis for his first adverse employment action allegation. Lu also believes

that this first adverse employment action constituted retaliation for his report regarding the AFRL’s

discrimination towards Ceesay.

       After Lu’s adjunct professor contract was not renewed, Erdei encouraged him to apply for

a full-time professor position. As suggested, in February 2021, Lu applied for a professor position

in Dayton’s Electro-Optics and Photonics department. After reviewing about 40 applications, Lu’s

application was rejected in the initial screening phase along with 29 other candidates due to his

“[w]eak research record.” Sarangan Aff., R. 10-1, Page ID #70–71, 79. According to his

application, Lu’s last publication was over five years ago, and the position required “[a] very good

record of refereed journal and conference publications,” among other listed “Minimum

Qualifications.” Id. at Page ID #71, 74.

       Lu disputes that he was unqualified and further claims that the candidate ultimately selected

for the professor position did not meet the qualifications. Therefore, Lu also points to the search

committee’s failure to hire him as a second adverse employment action, highlighting that he is

Chinese, while the successful candidate, Swapnajit Chakravarty, is Indian. Lu believes this

ultimate employment decision was based on either national origin discrimination or was in

retaliation for his discrimination complaint regarding Ceesay.

                                     II. Procedural History

       Based on the non-renewal of Lu’s adjunct professor contract in the summer of 2020 and

his non-selection for the full-time professor position in February 2021, Lu filed a complaint in the

                                                -4-
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on April 8, 2022, alleging race and national

origin discrimination in contravention of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (hereinafter “Title VII”); retaliation in contravention of Title VII; and promissory

estoppel claims. The complaint explains that Lu filed two charges with the Ohio Civil Rights

Commission (“OCRC”) and the EEOC: (1) the first charge, filed on January 5, 2021, alleged that

the termination of his adjunct professor contract stemmed from discrimination on the basis of race,

age, and/or retaliation regarding Lu’s complaint about Ceesay; (2) the second charge, filed on

March 30, 2021, alleged that Dayton’s failure to hire was due to discrimination on the basis of age

and/or retaliation regarding Lu’s complaint about Ceesay.2

        Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims the same day it answered Plaintiff’s

complaint. Following additional limited discovery, Lu responded in opposition to the motion. The

district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in part as to the Title VII claims

and denied the motion as to Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim. With the Title VII claims

dismissed, no federal question remained. Therefore, the district court declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the promissory estoppel claim alone and dismissed the complaint

without prejudice for refiling in state court. Plaintiff thereafter filed a timely appeal in this Court.

        In dismissing Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claims, the district court viewed

Plaintiff’s failure to establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination as dispositive and

declined to address whether Lu exhausted his administrative remedies.3 For the non-renewal of

        2
         Although Lu brings age discrimination claims in his OCRC charges, he abandons these
claims in his complaint and on appeal.
        3
         This Court will likewise assume without deciding that Lu exhausted his administrative
remedies. Regardless of whether Lu exhausted his administrative remedies as to his failure to hire
claim, this Court may dispose of the claim on the merits. See Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S.

                                                 -5-
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

his adjunct professor contract, the district court held that Lu “cannot establish that he was qualified

for the position nor can he show that [Dayton] treated him differently than a similarly-situated,

non-protected employee.” Order, R. 28, Page ID #317–18. Because Dayton did not retain any

adjunct faculty in the Physics Department and because visiting professors were not similarly

situated to adjunct professors, the court dismissed Lu’s Title VII claims related to his loss of his

adjunct professor position. For Lu’s failure to hire claim, the district court held that Lu did not

establish that he was qualified for the position. Because Lu did not have a “very good record of

refer[eed] journal and conference publications,” he was fairly eliminated from the applicant pool

during the initial screening. Id. at Page ID #320. Therefore, the court also dismissed Lu’s Title

VII claims related to his non-selection for the full-time professor position.

       Finally, the court turned to Lu’s retaliation claims and dismissed them for both the non-

renewal of his contract and failure to hire claim because Lu failed to demonstrate pretext for both

adverse employment actions. Persuaded by Dayton’s reasoning for both actions, the district court

held that Lu failed to create a genuine issue of material fact demonstrating that the COVID-19

pandemic did not inform the decision to decline to renew his adjunct contract, or that his lack of a

publication record did not inform the decision to select an alternate candidate for the Photonics

job.

                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       This Court reviews de novo a district court’s decision granting summary judgment. George

v. Youngstown State Univ., 966 F.3d 446, 458 (6th Cir. 2020). A court may grant summary

judgment if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the moving party “is entitled

Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019) (“Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a processing rule, albeit a
mandatory one, not a jurisdictional prescription delineating the adjudicatory authority of courts.”).

                                                 -6-
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is a genuine dispute of material fact

when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The moving party bears the burden

of showing that no genuine issues of material fact exist.” Rafferty v. Trumbell County, 915 F.3d

1087, 1093 (6th Cir. 2019). When considering a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence is

construed and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Wright v.

City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 864 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burgess v Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 471

(6th Cir. 2013)). “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not . . . to reweigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

                                          DISCUSSION

                                 I. Lu’s Discrimination Claims

       Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect

to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Because Lu relies only

on circumstantial evidence, as opposed to direct evidence, of discrimination, the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 802–03 (1973); Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014).4

       4
         A Title VII plaintiff “may establish a claim of discrimination either by introducing direct
evidence of discrimination or by presenting circumstantial evidence that would support an
inference of discrimination.” Laster, 746 F.3d at 726. The only allegedly direct evidence
introduced in this case is Segalewitz’s statement that Lu “gave [him] an earful.” Bakota Aff., R.
8-1, Page ID #42, 47. Although this statement may have been offensive to Lu, such a statement
was not tied to a protected characteristic. Therefore, we analyze this case through the lens of the
burden-shifting framework, which requires Lu to articulate a prima facie case of discrimination.

                                               -7-
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

       To establish a prima facie case of race or national origin discrimination, Lu must show that

he: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position and performed it

satisfactorily; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by a person outside

of the protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside of

the protected class. Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2000). The

district court held that Lu could not make out a prima facie case that he was discriminated against,

and its analysis thus stopped at this first phase of the burden-shifting framework.

       Assuming a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the

burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

adverse employment action. Id. at 573. If the defendant carries the burden, then the plaintiff has

the opportunity to prove that the proffered reason was actually pretext to hide unlawful

discrimination. Id.

           A. Non-renewal of Lu’s Adjunct Contract

       In response to the uncertainties posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, Dayton did not renew

Lu’s adjunct contract to teach introductory physics for the 2020 fall semester. Contesting Dayton’s

motivations, Lu argues that Dayton did not renew his adjunct teaching contract on the basis of his

race or national origin. We evaluate each prong of Lu’s prima facie case in turn.

                      i. Protected Class

       The parties do not dispute that Lu is a member of a protected class for purposes of Title

VII. Lu is an Asian American of Chinese descent and would therefore be protected under the

national origin and/or race categories.

                                               -8-
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

                   ii. Qualified for the Position

       On appeal, the parties do not dispute that Lu was qualified to teach the introductory physics

classes at Dayton. In fact, Lu taught these types of classes for the past six years, indicating he was

both qualified and performing his job satisfactorily.

                  iii. Adverse Employment Action

       The parties do not dispute that Lu faced an adverse employment action—the failure to

renew his adjunct professor contract for the fall 2020 semester. Failure to renew a contract, even

a contract to which an individual has no future entitlement, might still qualify as an adverse

employment action. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 500–01 (1st Cir. 2009)

(holding that the nonrenewal of a university employee’s contract was an adverse employment

action despite the fact that the employer’s decision was completely discretionary). Neither party

argues that the failure to renew Lu’s contract is not an adverse employment action.

                   iv. Similarly Situated Individual Outside of The Protected Class

       The crux of the parties’ dispute regarding Lu’s prima facie case lies in the fourth and final

prong. Without pointing to any evidence, Lu argued in front of the district court that he was the

only adjunct professor who was not extended a contract for the fall 2020 semester. Lu further

claimed that he was treated differently than a visiting professor whose teaching contract was

renewed, despite not having prior budget approval, for the fall 2020 semester. Lu did not argue

that the visiting professor was outside of his protected class; he solely contended that he was

similarly situated and treated differently.

       Dayton countered that the Physics Department did not extend any contracts to adjunct

professors for the fall 2020 semester or the spring 2021 semester, and several other departments

also lost adjuncts in the wake of the pandemic. Additionally, Dayton hired the visiting professor

                                                -9-
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

in 2019 on a two-year contract that included 2020 to substitute for a full-time faculty member

pursuing a fellowship in Europe. Finally, Dayton explicitly highlighted that Lu failed to illustrate

the visiting professor was both similarly situated and outside of his protected class.

       Importantly, the record reflects that Lu’s department at Dayton did not retain any adjunct

professors for the fall 2020 semester. As for the comparator visiting professor, both parties cite

the same pages of the deposition of John Erdei to support their contentions, indicating a factual

dispute between the possible interpretations. In relevant part, Erdei’s deposition states:

              Q: So in summer 2020, did the physics department hire any visiting
       professors?
               A: We had an existing visiting professor at that time . . . .
               Q: And you said there was one visiting professor for the summer of 2020?
              A: Again, he didn’t teach in the summer of 2020. He taught during the
       academic year, but he was hired the year before. We had a faculty member that
       was a Madame Curie fellow, went to Europe for two years . . . . The visiting
       professor was, in fact, hired to cover the load for the guy that went to the
       fellowship. . . .
               Q: And he was hired in the summer of 2020?
               A: No. He was hired before that. I think Bob went on his internship before
       that, so I would guess that he was hired for the fall of maybe ’19, possibly.
               Q: Is the fall of 2019 the only time he taught classes?
             A: No. They are hired for a full year, and he was renewed again. Bob
       Greco was on an internship for two years.
               Q: So Dr. Ojha taught in the spring of 2020?
               A: Yes.
               Q: And he taught in the fall of 2020?
               A: Yes.

Erdei Dep., R. 20, Page ID #190–93.

       There are at least two possible interpretations of this deposition testimony: one would

indicate that visiting professor, Dr. Ojha, was hired in fall 2019 for a two-year contract, ending in

the fall semester of 2021; the second would indicate that Dr. Ojha was hired in fall 2019 for a

                                               - 10 -
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

contract that was re-considered and renewed for fall 2020 (to continue filling in for the absent

tenured professor). The former interpretation would be easily distinguishable from an adjunct

professor’s contract, while the latter interpretation may be similar, which would potentially allow

Lu to point to Dr. Ohja as a similarly situated comparator. The answers to these ambiguities are

not apparent from the record. However, Lu fails to recognize an essential distinguishing factor—

Dr. Ojha was hired to fill the shoes of a tenured professor on a multi-semester leave, while Lu was

contracted on a semester basis.

        Even resolving this ambiguity in favor of Lu, he failed to produce any facts that visiting

professor Dr. Ojha was outside of his protected class. Lu did not state that Dr. Ojha was outside

of his protected class in his complaint, his response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

his initial brief on appeal, or his reply brief. Both the district court and Lu fixated on the differences

(or lack thereof) between visiting professors and adjunct professors, neglecting altogether to

merely state that the visiting professor was of any other national origin than Chinese.5 The prima

facie case is not adequately stated for this claim if Lu cannot establish that he was treated

differently than a similarly situated individual outside of his protected class. See Mitchell v. Toledo

Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment against plaintiff’s race

and age discrimination claims for failure to present affirmative evidence that similarly situated

non-minority employees were treated differently). Regardless of whether an adjunct professor and

a visiting professor are similarly situated, failure to point to facts indicating that the visiting

        5
          Further, Lu clearly understood how to adequately plead this element of the prima facie
case, as he did so explicitly for his failure to hire claim. (Pl.’s Response to Mot. Summ. J., R. 23,
Page ID #253 (“Finally, Dr. Lu satisfies the last prong of the prima facie case because Dr.
Chakravarty is a person outside of Dr. Lu’s protected class and was similarly qualified for the
Photonics Job.”)).

                                                  - 11 -
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

professor was outside of Lu’s protected class is fatal to his prima facie case for this portion of his

Title VII discrimination claim.6

       Therefore, the district court reached the correct result as to Lu’s first discrimination claim.

Lu failed to make the necessary showing that he was replaced by an individual outside of his

protected class or that a similarly situated individual outside of his protected class was treated

differently than him.

           B. The Full-time Professor Position

       Lu’s second discrimination claim alleges that Dayton did not select him for the full-time

professor position on the basis of his race or national origin. Instead, Dayton’s hiring committee

selected Swapnajit Chakravarty for the associate professor position in February 2021. We again

evaluate each prong of Lu’s prima facie case in turn.

                    i. Protected Class

       As with Lu’s first discrimination claim, the parties do not dispute that Lu is a member of a

class protected by Title VII.

                   ii. Qualified for Position

       The parties heavily contest whether Lu was qualified for the full-time teaching job to which

he applied. Lu argued that he “met the minimum qualifications for the Photonics job because he

holds a Ph.D. in Physics and had a successful record of teaching.” Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Summ. J.,

R. 23, Page ID #253. In support, Lu attached as an exhibit to his opposition to Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment the original job posting he found online for the Photonics teaching position.

       6
        Lu also fails to show that the full-time professor, who took over his fall 2020 classes due
to budgetary concerns, was outside of his protected class.

                                                - 12 -
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

       Dayton submitted the rubric under which the selection committee made its hiring decisions

for the full-time Photonics teaching position. This qualifications rubric is largely identical to the

online posting, but it includes additional sub-bullets where the committee further defined the

qualifications prior to evaluating any applicants. For example, the rubric states under “Minimum

Qualifications” that candidates must possess “[a] very good record of refereed journal and

conference publications.” Sarangan Aff., R. 10-1, Page ID #71. The rubric further defines this

qualification in a sub-bullet: “[i]f coming from academia, average of 1 top journal paper per year

in the last 3 years; if coming from industry, we will consider patent as comparable publication

record.” Id.

       Not only did Lu lack any publications within the past five years, but he also lacked any

recent patents, as his last two patents were from 2004. Lu does not offer any evidence to dispute

that he did not meet either of these criteria as defined by the search committee’s more specific

rubric. Therefore, Lu has not shown that he was objectively qualified, as the evidence viewed in

the light most favorable to Lu indicates that he did not have any recent publications or patents,

which is a required component of a graduate professor’s credentials. See Alexander v CareSource,

576 F.3d 551, 563 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564,

575–76 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc)) (“The prima facie burden of showing that a plaintiff is qualified

can . . . be met by presenting credible evidence that his or her qualifications are at least equivalent

to the minimum objective criteria required for employment in the relevant field.”).

       Lu then argues that, even if he did not meet the qualifications of the job, neither did the

candidate ultimately selected. The Minimum Qualifications also required applicants to possess a

“very good record of effective teaching as instructor at the graduate level in EOP, ECE or related

disciplines.” Sarangan Aff., R. 10-1, Page ID #74. As with the research qualification, the search

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No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

committee further defined this teaching qualification to require “[e]vidence of teaching at least one

graduate level course,” as well as a “[d]emonstration of communication via video interview

presentations.” Id.

       To illustrate that Chakravarty did not meet this Minimum Qualification, Lu points to a

spreadsheet that includes each member of the search committee’s thoughts and notes on

Chakravarty’s interviews. In relevant part, one search committee member pointed out in the

“cons” section of his notes that Chakravarty had “NO demonstrated teaching experience.” Pl.’s

Resp. to Mot. Summ. J., R. 23-9. This same search committee member’s notes change on the

second interview to state that Chakravarty does not have “much real teaching experience,” instead

of no teaching experience, indicating that Chakravarty at least had some type of teaching

experience. Id. All other search committee members state or imply that Chakravarty has some

form of teaching experience, including that he “[was a] TA while grad student,” “[h]as taught with

Ray Chen,” “[is or was] a sub teacher,” or “[had] limited experience.” Id.

       A plaintiff may make out a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of an unequal

application of the search committee’s hiring rubric. See Brown v. Babcock & Wilcox, No. 90-

3918, 1991 WL 112813, at *4 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[A] plaintiff who actually is ‘unqualified’ for the

position may state a prima facie case for discriminatory discharge under Title VII if other

employees who would also be deemed unqualified under an employer’s rules are not also

discharged.”); Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 465 (6th Cir. 2003). However, as in

Brown,7 Lu has not produced evidence which, interpreted most strongly in his favor, “shows that

       7
         Further, unlike in Seay, neither Chakravarty’s nor Lu’s curriculum vitae or resumes are
in the record. Based on the evidence and the deposition testimony in Seay, the plaintiff
demonstrated that two applicants who were not screened out of the interview pool were
unqualified. 339 F.3d at 465–68. Neither applicant had the required degree, and one of the
applicants did not have the required six years of health and safety experience. Id. at 466. Further,

                                               - 14 -
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

more than a scintilla of evidence exists to support his claim of unequal application.” 1991 WL

112813, at *4; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

       Lu leans heavily on one search committee member’s initial mental impression that

Chakravarty had “[no] demonstrated teaching experience,” ignoring that all of the other members

indicated he had some type of teaching experience. However, on appeal, Lu acknowledges that

“the search committee noted Chakravarty was a substitute teacher during graduate school.” Pet’r’s

Reply Br., ECF No. 18, 8. Additionally, Lu fails to recognize that these were the search

committee’s mental impressions during Chakravarty’s call back interviews—not during the initial

assessment of candidates’ applications to eliminate those who do not meet the Minimum

Qualifications. Therefore, Lu did not produce any evidence that supports his claim of unequal

application at the initial screening phase. See Brown, 1991 WL 112813, at *4. There is no

evidence in the record to indicate Chakravarty’s application and curriculum vitae did not meet the

Minimum Qualifications and should have been similarly screened out prior to receiving an

interview. Additionally, there is no evidence that Dayton applied its specific “research experience”

qualification in a way that was inconsistent, arbitrary, or pretextual.

                  iii. Adverse Employment Action

       The parties do not dispute that failure to hire may be considered an adverse employment

action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see, e.g., Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 35 F.4th

1053, 1061 (6th Cir. 2022).

the manager who reviewed the applications conceded he could not point to the relevant experience
required by the posted job’s qualifications on one applicant’s resume. Id. at 467. Lu has not
submitted any evidence that parallels the evidence in Seay and illustrates the qualifications were
disparately applied. The selection committee’s mental impressions of Chakravarty’s interview
each differ and change over the course of the two interviews and indicate that he had some type of
teaching experience.

                                                - 15 -
No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

                   iv. Similarly-Situated Individual Outside of The Protected Class

        Unlike Lu’s argument regarding the non-renewal of his adjunct professor contract, Lu

successfully pleads that an individual outside of his protected class was selected for the full-time

Photonics teaching position. The candidate selected, Chakravarty, was of Indian descent—a

different national origin than Lu. Regardless, because Lu cannot show that he was qualified for

the Photonics job, he has failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based on Dayton’s

failure to hire him.

                                   II. Lu’s Retaliation Claims

        In addition to Title VII’s discrimination provision, Title VII also prohibits an employer

from retaliating against an employee because of the employee’s assertion of his Title VII rights.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Similarly to a Title VII discrimination claim, a Title VII retaliation claim

can be established “either by introducing direct evidence of retaliation or by proffering

circumstantial evidence that would support an inference of retaliation.” Imwalle v. Reliance

Medical Prods., 515 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008). In this case, Plaintiff has presented the latter.

Thus, we analyze Plaintiff's retaliation claims under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-

shifting framework. 411 U.S. 792.

        To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Lu must show: (1) that he engaged in activity

protected by Title VII; (2) that the relevant decisionmakers at Dayton knew that Lu engaged in the

protected activity; (3) that Dayton subsequently took an adverse employment action against him;

and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 595 (6th Cir. 2007). Once a plaintiff

successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to identify a

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for taking the adverse employment action. See id. at 597.

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No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

Finally, the plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered non-retaliatory reason

was mere pretext. Id.

        Lu could demonstrate that Dayton’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons were pretext in

several different ways, including by illustrating (1) the proffered reason has no basis in fact; (2) the

proffered reason did not actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct; or (3) the proffered

reason was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct. Id. The ultimate inquiry in using any

of these three methods is an assessment of whether the “employer made up its stated reason to

conceal intentional retaliation.” Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 2012)

(alteration omitted). The plaintiff’s burden is not heavy, as summary judgment is warranted solely

if no reasonable juror could conclude that the employer’s offered reason was pretextual. George,

966 F.3d at 462.

        The district court assumed that Lu could make out a prima facie case and granted summary

judgment in favor of Dayton on both retaliation claims by reasoning that Lu could not show

pretext. We agree.

        A. Non-Renewal of Lu’s Adjunct Professor Contract

        Lu argues that, because “everyone from Provost Benson down to Dr. Lu’s supervisor,

Dr. Erdei, [was] aware Dr. Lu made a discrimination report,” his Ceesay discrimination complaint

resulted in the termination of his adjunct teaching contract. Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Summ. J., R. 23,

Page ID #256. Although Lu likely could not make out the causation prong of his prima facie case,

the analysis of causation and pretext significantly overlap. See Cantrell v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.,

145 F. App’x 99, 107 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that evidence offered to establish causation can also

serve to establish pretext). Therefore, we begin, as the district court did, with the assumption that

Plaintiff has shown a prima facie case.

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No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

       Dayton proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason by explaining that budgetary

constraints and uncertainty imposed upon the university by COVID-19 caused the non-renewal of

Lu’s adjunct professor contract. Lu has not shown that these concerns were pretextual. At the

beginning of 2020, Dayton conditionally set Lu’s classes for the fall 2020 semester, after his

complaints of alleged discrimination and prior to the budgetary concerns raised by the pandemic

arose.8 Adjunct professor contracts are approved after this preliminary class schedule “somewhere

in the July timeframe.” Erdei Dep., R. 20, Page ID #165. Between March and July 2020, the

pandemic’s uncertainties caused Dayton to have “town hall meetings about the pandemic, and

budget problems, and freezes on hiring,” as there existed “a real concern in the town halls that the

students . . . were not going to return in the fall out of fear of the pandemic.” Id. at Page ID #171–

72. Erdei e-mailed Lu twice, keeping him apprised of the developing situation and warning him

that adjunct contracts were not guaranteed.

       To show pretext, Lu argues, without providing any corresponding evidence, that Dayton

did not let go of any other faculty due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the record contains

unrebutted evidence that Dayton terminated the contracts of all adjunct professors in the Physics

Department, as well as the contracts of certain adjunct professors in other departments—not just

Lu’s or those who engaged in protected activity.

       Lu also attempts to show pretext by highlighting purported inconsistencies within Dayton’s

financial reasons for his contract non-renewal. Lu argues that, because the Dayton budget office

never officially denied a request to renew his adjunct contract, Dayton’s justification was pretext.

Lu fails to explain the salience of a formal budget denial from Dayton’s budget office. With or

       8
        This timeline undercuts any purported causal connection, indicating that Dayton intended
to renew Lu’s contract before the pandemic intervened.

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No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

without a formal denial from Dayton’s budget office, the record indisputably shows Erdei was

instructed to redistribute the adjunct faculty classes to tenured professors, out of respect for the

ongoing budgetary fears. Because Erdei was instructed to redistribute courses, no ultimate budget

approval was needed, as no adjunct contracts were issued. Following the non-renewal of Lu’s

contract, Erdei even offered to stay in touch with Lu after the fall 2020 semester and encouraged

Lu to apply for a full-time job with the university—these are not the actions of an employer acting

with a retaliatory motivation.

       B. Photonics Job

       Lu argues that both his discrimination complaint regarding Ceesay, as well as his January

OCRC charge, illegally informed Dayton’s decision to not hire him. Lu’s OCRC and EEOC

charges are undisputedly protected activity under Title VII. See Weeks v. Mich., Dept. of Comm.

Health, 587 F. App’x 850, 858 (6th Cir. 2014). Additionally, we will assume without deciding

that Lu engaged in protected activity when he reported perceived discrimination by the AFRL to

Dayton. See Laster, 746 F.3d at 730 (noting that the opposition clause portion of Title VII protects

less formal protests of discriminatory employment practices).

       The Photonics professor job search committee was composed of Andrew Sarangan and six

additional professors, none of whom are individuals that received Lu’s e-mailed complaints

regarding Ceesay and the AFRL program. At the time of the initial screening of the applicants’

qualifications, Sarangan and the search committee did not discuss and were not aware of Lu’s

pending charge against Dayton or any OCRC case. Sarangan first learned of any OCRC or EEOC

charge against Dayton when Lu filed his complaint in district court. Lu does not offer any evidence

disputing that the search committee for the Photonics position was completely unaware of any

protected activity in which he engaged. Cf. Slusher v. USPS, 731 F. App’x 478, 480–81 (6th Cir.

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No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

2018) (affirming summary judgment where, although there may have been institutional knowledge

as to the plaintiff’s protected activity, the three ultimate decisionmakers were unaware).

        Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the search committee was aware Lu

engaged in any form of protected activity. His prima facie case for retaliation as related to his

failure to hire claim thus falters at the second prong. Additionally, the search committee’s lack of

knowledge as to Lu’s OCRC charge or Lu’s Ceesay complaints breaks the causal chain, as they

could not make a decision based upon facts of which they were unaware.

        Even assuming, as the district court did, that Lu could make out a prima facie case of

retaliation for his failure to hire claim, he cannot establish pretext. Dayton has offered a legitimate,

non-retaliatory reason for Lu’s non-selection—he had no recent publications or patents. In fact,

the selection committee’s notes illustrate that they eliminated multiple candidates for “[w]eak

research record[s].” Sarangan Aff., R. 10-1, Page ID #79. In response, Lu argues a disparate

application of the qualifications rubric shows that his lack of recent scholarship is pretextual. Lu

contends that “[t]hroughout the committee review process and interview process, [Dayton] faculty

noted Dr. Chakravarty had no teaching or mentoring experience which was clearly listed as a

minimum qualification.” Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Summ. J., R. 23 Page ID #255.

        Lu fails to address that Chakravarty did meet the minimum qualifications. Teaching

experience, under the rubric, required an applicant to have taught just one graduate level course.

Chakravarty did teach at least one graduate level course, and evidence is in the record indicating

as much. Even assuming that Chakravarty taught at the level of a substitute teacher or TA (which

may be less experience than desirable), Lu does not offer evidence indicating Chakravarty should

have been screened out at the initial stage, instead of being offered an interview. Lu offers

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No 23-3105, Lu v. Univ. of Dayton

insufficient evidence to dispute that Chakravarty was qualified, or to prove that he himself was

qualified.

       The university that encouraged Lu to apply for a full-time position did not invent an

assessment criterion to retaliate against Lu or apply the criteria in a disparate manner—

Chakravarty was qualified; Lu was not. Therefore, the evidence supports Dayton’s non-retaliatory

reason for not offering Lu the full-time professor job. See Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355

F.3d 444, 462 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that the role of federal courts is “to prevent unlawful

hiring practices, not to act as a super personnel department that second guesses employers’

business judgments”) (quotation omitted); Browning v. Dep’t of Army, 436 F.3d 692, 698 (6th Cir.

2006) (“[T]he law does not require employers to make perfect decisions, nor forbid them from

making decisions that others may disagree with.”).

                                         CONCLUSION

       The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dayton

related to Plaintiff Lu’s discrimination and retaliation claims. For the reasons set forth above, we

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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