Court Opinion

ID: 9654091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:05:49.414461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:05.814902
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Griffin
dissenting.
I agree with the majority opinion in the above cause except insofar as it holds that the burden to prove that the killing was not committed by the petitioner (who was defendant in the trial court) in his own self-defense was upon the respondent (who was plaintiff below). This holding is based upon the fact that the plaintiff must establish that the killing was “wrongful.” I agree that the burden was upon plaintiff to make out her case. This she did when she proved that the defendant intentionally shot the deceased, and that deceased died as a result of such wound.
The majority opinion says: “If he (plaintiff) proves an intentional killing, and nothing more, he has met that burden, and if the defendant offers no evidence raising the issue of self-defense, the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment. This for the reason that an intentional killing unexplained is presumed to be wrongful. When, however, in the example just above mentioned, the defendant pleads self-defense in justification of the killing and offers evidence supporting that plea, the authorities are in conflict on the question of placing the burden of proof on the issue of self-defense.” The opinion then proceeds to hold that since the evidence raising the issue of self-defense was developed by plaintiff as a part of her main case, the burden of proof on self-defense thereupon was upon the plaintiff.
The burden of proof (persuasion) is determined before the introduction of evidence begins, and never shifts. It is not changed by the evidence. Walker v. Money, 132 Texas 132, 120 S.W. 2d 428.
If the burden of proof is upon a plaintiff in a suit such as we have here, it must be a universal rule of law. The burden of proof cannot, with any justice, be upon a plaintiff to disprove self-defense in one case, but upon the defendant to establish self-defense in another. It cannot depend upon the proof offered in a particular case. The plea of self-defense is a plea in the nature of confession and avoidance. It admits the killing, but seeks to avoid the legal effect thereof by justification thereof.
*509Rule 94, T. R. C. P. provides, in part: “In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively * * * and any other matter constituting cm avoidance or affirmative defense * * (Emphasis added) Under this rule it is held that unless affirmative defenses are specifically pleaded, it is not error to refuse to submit an issue on them. City of Coleman v. Smith, Texas Com. App., (1943), 168 S.W. 2d 936, refused.
While the testimony of plaintiff herein showed an attack upon petitioner just prior to the killing, the attack was not made with a deadly weapon,-and such attack was not sufficient to justify or excuse the homicide and to raise the issue of self-defense unless it caused the defendant to have a reasonable ground to fear death or serious bodily injury at the hands of the attackers. Whether or not the attack raised such an apprehension in the mind of defendant was a defensive issue. He had no right to kill to repel the attack under any other circumstances. The plaintiff’s evidence most certainly did not establish these grounds, as a matter of law, and, at most, only served to raise the issue of self-defense. Raising the issue does not relieve defendant of the burden of establishing such grounds of justification or excuse for killing.
It is settled by our decisions that, with the exception of the rule of evidence which gives a person accused of a crime the benefit of a reasonable doubt, the law of self-defense is the same in both civil and criminal cases. March v. Walker, 48 Texas 372, 4 Texas Jur. 984, et seq., and authorities there cited. Fambrough v. Wagley, 140 Texas 577, 169 S.W. 2d 478.
It is also well settled that it is always unlawful for one person to intentionally kill another, unless such killing is justified or excused under the law. Self-defense is a justification for a killing, provided the person who does the killing is in fear of death or serious bodily injury at the hands of the deceased at the time of the killing. Mosley v. State, 149 Texas Crim. Rep. 523, 196 S.W. 2d 822; Brown v. State, 153 Texas Crim. Rep. 1, 216 S.W. 2d 226.
Article 1256, Penal Code, State of Texas, Ann., provides: “Whoever shall voluntarily kill any person within this State shall be guilty of murder. Murder shall be distinguished from every other species of homicide by the absence of circumstances which reduce the offense to negligent homicide or which excuse or justify the killing.” So far as I have been able to find there is no case prior to the majority opinion herein, which holds that, *510as a necessary part of the plaintiff’s case, the evidence on the part of the plaintiff must negative the existence of self-defense. A prima facie case is made out by plaintiff by showing an intentional killing. To escape liability under self-defense, the evidence must establish that the act was done by defendant while in fear of death or serious bodily injury at the hands of the deceased. Croft v. Smith, Texas Civ. App., (1899), 51 S.W. 1089, no writ history. This case has been cited and approved many times without question. In civil suits involving homicide, “the general rule is that self-defense is an affirmative defense for. the defendant to prove.” 17 A. L. R. 2d 601, and authorities therein cited.
Self-defense is not an issue evidentiary of a wrongful killing, but is an ultimate defense to liability. Such being the case, the burden of proof is not upon a plaintiff, but upon a defendant who is the one relying upon such defense. I believe in order to escape liability by virtue of such plea, the defendant must secure a finding favorable to him.
In the present case, the evidence does not show an attack upon defendant by either deceased or his brother with a deadly weapon. Therefore, it was for the jury to determine whether or not the self-defense plea was established to an extent to justify the killing. However, reprehensible as it may have been that deceased and his brother were drunk in a public place, the law does not provide death as a punishment for such offense. Neither does the law permit a killing to repel a threatened attack, except to prevent the infliction of injuries which may result in death or serious bodily injuries. Burns v. State, 157 Texas Crim. Rep., 183 (1954), 262 S.W. 2d 406.
The majority holding cannot be justified upon the ground that the action for wrongul death is given by the same statute that gives an action for death by negligence, etc. Croft v. Smith, Texas Civ. App., (1899), 51 S.W. 1089.
An illustration which quickly and clearly shows the difference between a negligent killing and a wrongful killing by shooting would be to consider a cause wherein the plaintiff sues the defendant for death due to an automobile collision. The plaintiff does not make a case by showing merely the collision between deceased’s automobile and defendant’s automobile, and the resulting-death of deceased. He must do more. In a wrongful killing casé, the plaintiff does make a prima facie case by showing that deferidant'interitiohally and Willfully shot deceaséd, and deceased died thérefrom. Of course, each would have to show damages *511sufered, but as to the main act the above illustrates the difference.
I think this case as to self-defense is ruled by Cameron Compress Co. v. Kubecka, Texas Civ. App., 283 S.W. 285, refused; and Sumner v. Kinney, Texas Civ. App., 136 S.W. 1192, no writ history. I also believe self-defense should be. submitted by- a separate special issue properly placing the burden of proof upoir the one seeking to escape liability thereunder.
Human life is a very precious and dear thing, and the policy of our laws is to protect it. Our laws require that one who intentionally kills another must be punished unless he can excuse or justify the act. I think this rule of law is a very salutary one. I can never agree to a rule of law which will say to one who intentionally kills another, ‘You go free from civil liability unless the one seeking to hold you can show you did not act in fear of death or serious bodily injury at the time you took away what you cannot return — the life of your victim.”
For the error in wrongfully placing the burden of proof upon the issue of self-defense, I would reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings.
Opinion delivered' July 14, 1954.
Rehearing overruled October 13, 1954.