Court Opinion

ID: 9400790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 14:09:05.585802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.895763
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Wishon, 2023-Ohio-1915.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                     :
                                                   :
       Appellee                                    :   C.A. No. 29664
                                                   :
 v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 03252
                                                   :
 JEFFERY LEE WISHON                                :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                   :   Court)
       Appellant                                   :
                                                   :

                                              ...........

                                              OPINION

                                        Rendered on June 9, 2023

                                              ...........

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by RICKY L. MURRAY, Attorney for Appellee

MICHAEL MILLS, Attorney for Appellant

                                             .............

LEWIS, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Jeffery Lee Wishon appeals from his conviction in the

Montgomery County Common Pleas Court following his no contest plea to one count of

having weapons while under disability. The sole issue Wishon raises on appeal is the

trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm the
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judgment of the trial court.

         I.   Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 2} On December 13, 2021, Wishon was indicted by a Montgomery County

grand jury on one count of having weapons while under disability (prior drug conviction),

in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a felony of the third degree; and one count of carrying

concealed weapons (loaded/ready at hand), in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), a felony

of the fourth degree.

       {¶ 3} On January 27, 2022, Wishon filed a motion to suppress, which alleged that

he had been unlawfully searched and seized and that any evidence found as a result of

the search should be suppressed. He further alleged that any statements he made

should be suppressed because his Miranda rights were violated and because he invoked

his right to counsel.

       {¶ 4} A hearing was held on March 4, 2022, at which Sergeant Todd Stanley

testified on behalf of the State. Sergeant Stanley was a 24-year veteran of the Butler

Township Police Department and had over 27 years of law enforcement experience. On

the afternoon of September 23, 2021, Sergeant Stanley and Officer Jackson, also of the

Butler Township Police Department, were dispatched to Walmart in Butler Township,

Ohio, on a report of individuals shoplifting. Both officers were wearing police uniforms

and drove marked police cruisers. Their body cameras were activated and submitted at

the hearing as State’s Exhibit 1.

       {¶ 5} At the outset, the officers were told that there were three people inside the

Walmart that loss prevention officers suspected may be shoplifting: a black male, a white
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female, and a white male; these individuals were later identified as Emmanuel Gray, Jr.,

Nicole VanDyke, and Wishon, respectively.       Loss prevention officers relayed to the

Butler Township police officers that Gray and VanDyke had been observed concealing

merchandise and price-swapping items at the self-checkout lane. Wishon had not been

seen taking any items but had followed VanDyke around the store. VanDyke obtained

men’s and women’s toiletries while in the store. According to the loss prevention officers,

they did not feel they had enough evidence to say Wishon was concealing merchandise;

they did not believe that he was not part of it, but he had not been observed concealing

anything.

      {¶ 6} Gray was the first to exit the store; he was detained immediately after getting

outside the store and was taken back inside to the loss prevention office.         Shortly

thereafter, VanDyke and Wishon walked out of the store together; VanDyke was stopped

but Wishon was told by Sergeant Stanley “you go because you’re not part of it, I know

you are, but you’re not.” Wishon continued on his way through the parking lot while

Sergeant Stanley spoke with VanDyke. VanDyke informed Sergeant Stanley that she

was staying at Sober Living, which was a drug/alcohol counseling group located at two

local motels approximately one eighth of a mile from the Walmart. According to Sergeant

Stanley’s statements later recorded on his body camera, he believed VanDyke was under

the influence of something based on their interaction.

      {¶ 7} Meanwhile, Officer Jackson was informed by Gray that Wishon had Gray’s

gun on his person. Gray explained that he had had Wishon hold his gun for him before

leaving the store. Officer Jackson immediately radioed to Sergeant Stanley that Wishon
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“potentially” had a firearm on him. Sergeant Stanley testified that he did not hear the

word “potentially” and that he understood the transmission to say that Wishon did have a

gun. In response, Sergeant Stanley got into his police cruiser and started driving around

the parking lot looking for Wishon. At the same time, Officer Jackson was inside the loss

prevention office watching Wishon on the security screens and providing a description of

Wishon’s clothing and the direction he was heading over the radio.

       {¶ 8} Sergeant Stanley located Wishon near the back of the parking lot near

Hooters. As Sergeant Stanley pulled up, he called out of his window to Wishon, “hey, I

do want to speak to you for a minute, ok?” Sergeant Stanley then asked Wishon to “do

me a favor and put your hands on top of the car.” As Sergeant Stanley was getting out

of the cruiser, he saw a weight in Wishon’s pocket and saw the butt of the handle of a

gun. At that point, Sergeant Stanley pulled his gun out, putting it in a low ready position,

and told Wishon not to move. Sergeant Stanley held Wishon at gun point until Lieutenant

Chris Guthrie arrived less than a minute later. Wishon was then handcuffed, and the

weapon was removed from his pocket. Wishon was asked if he had a CCW (meaning,

a license to carry a concealed weapon), which he denied. Wishon was also asked why

he had a gun on him, and he indicated that he was holding it for his friend. Wishon was

placed in the back of the cruiser and the gun was found to be loaded. Officers also

learned that Wishon had a prior felony drug conviction and was, therefore, under a

weapons disability.

       {¶ 9} Sergeant Stanley testified that any time a gun is involved, there is an issue

of officer safety. Stanley himself had previously been involved in two officer-involved
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shootings, in one of which the suspect was killed. Prior to stopping Wishon, Stanley did

not know who Wishon was or anything about his past; Stanley also did not know if Wishon

had a CCW permit prior to their interaction.

       {¶ 10} On June 8, 2022, the trial court overruled Wishon’s motion to suppress in

its entirety. Wishon subsequently entered a negotiated plea wherein he agreed to plead

no contest to the charge of having a weapon while under disability, and the State agreed

to dismiss the remaining charge. On December 1, 2022, Wishon was sentenced to

community control sanctions.

        II.   Assignment of Error

       {¶ 11} Wishon timely appealed and raises the following single assignment of error:

              THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE APPELLANT’S

       MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE APPELLANT’S STOP AND ARREST.

       {¶ 12} Wishon contends that he was unlawfully stopped and detained under

circumstances tantamount to an arrest without probable cause.             Although Wishon

challenged the admissibility of his statements in the trial court, he does not challenge that

portion of his motion to suppress on appeal. Therefore, we will contain our analysis to

the lawfulness of Wishon’s detention.

                 a. Standard of Review

       {¶ 13} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.

“The reviewing court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by

competent, credible evidence, and the court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions de
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novo.” State v. LaRosa, 165 Ohio St.3d 346, 2021-Ohio-4060, 179 N.E.3d 89, ¶ 17,

citing Burnside at ¶ 8.

                 b. Applicable Fourth Amendment Law

       {¶ 14} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Section 14,

Article I of the Ohio Constitution, protect individuals from unreasonable searches and

seizures conducted by police officers.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Ferguson, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153, ¶ 12. “The ultimate standard set forth in the

Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.

Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). “Thus, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from

only unreasonable government searches and seizures.”           (Emphasis sic.)    State v.

Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012-Ohio-1008, 964 N.E.2d 1037, ¶ 17, citing United States

v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

       {¶ 15} The Fourth Amendment, however, is not implicated every time a police

officer has contact with a citizen. State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 747, 667 N.E.2d

60 (2d Dist.1995), citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113

L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). “The law recognizes three types of police-citizen interactions: 1) a

consensual encounter, 2) a brief investigatory stop or detention, and 3) an arrest.” State

v. Millerton, 2015-Ohio-34, 26 N.E.3d 317, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 188 Ohio

App.3d 628, 2010-Ohio-2854, 936 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.).

       {¶ 16} “Consensual encounters are not seizures, and Fourth Amendment

guarantees are not implicated in such encounters.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Keister,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29081, 2022-Ohio-856, ¶ 27. “Consensual encounters occur
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when the police merely approach a person in a public place and engage the person in

conversation, and the person remains free not to answer and to walk away.” State v.

Lewis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22726, 2009-Ohio-158, ¶ 21, citing United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).

       {¶ 17} The second type of encounter is an investigatory detention, often referred

to as a “Terry stop,” which is more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less intrusive

than a formal custodial arrest.      Taylor at 748.      “Unlike consensual encounters, an

investigatory detention constitutes a seizure; therefore, Fourth Amendment protections

are implicated in an investigatory detention.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Shern, 2018-

Ohio-5000, 126 N.E.3d 322, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). “An individual is subject to an investigatory

detention when, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, by means of

physical force or show of authority, a reasonable person would have believed that he was

not free to leave or is compelled to respond to questions.”             Lewis at ¶ 22, citing

Mendenhall at 553 and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889

(1968). During investigatory detentions, “police officers may briefly stop and/or

temporarily detain individuals in order to investigate possible criminal activity if the officers

have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot[.]” (Citations

omitted.) State v. Swift, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27036, 2016-Ohio-8191, ¶ 10.

Therefore, an investigatory detention “does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as

the police have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Ramey,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26705, 2016-Ohio-607, ¶ 22, citing Taylor at 748-749, citing

Terry at 21.
                                                                                         -8-

       {¶ 18} “The determination whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct

a Terry stop must be based on the totality of circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of

the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they

unfold.’ ” State v. Hairston, 156 Ohio St.3d 363, 2019-Ohio-1622,126 N.E.3d 1132, ¶ 10,

quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991).              “An

assessment of the totality of the circumstances ‘does not deal with hard certainties, but

with probabilities.’ ” Id., quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct.

690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable

suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of

wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary

for probable cause.” (Citations omitted.) Kansas v. Glover, __ U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 1183,

1187, 206 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020).         Furthermore, “[a] determination that reasonable

suspicion exists * * * need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States

v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). “In permitting

detentions based on reasonable suspicion, ‘Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop

innocent people.’ ” State v. Hawkins, 158 Ohio St.3d 94, 2019-Ohio-4210, 140 N.E.3d

577, ¶ 22, quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570

(2000).

       {¶ 19} The final category of police encounters is a seizure that is the equivalent of

an arrest, which is constitutionally permissible “only if the police have probable cause to

arrest a person for a crime.” State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 595, 639 N.E.2d

498 (2d Dist.1994), citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229
                                                                                         -9-

(1983). “A seizure is equivalent to an arrest when (1) there is an intent to arrest; (2) the

seizure is made under real or pretended authority; (3) it is accompanied by an actual or

constructive seizure or detention; and (4) it is so understood by the person arrested.”

Taylor at 749. “Probable cause to arrest exists when a reasonably prudent person would

believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.” State v. Adams, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 24184, 2011-Ohio-4008, ¶ 7, citing State v. Timson, 38 Ohio St.2d 122,

311 N.E.2d 16 (1974). “A warrantless arrest that is based upon probable cause and

occurs in a public place does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Brown, 115

Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 66.

       {¶ 20} “Whether a law enforcement officer possessed probable cause or

reasonable suspicion to detain an individual must be examined in light of the totality of

the circumstances viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.”

(Citations omitted.) State v. Thornton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29653, 2023-Ohio-1404,

¶ 20. “Under this analysis, ‘both the content of information possessed by police and its

degree of reliability’ are relevant to the court's determination.”     City of Maumee v.

Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999), quoting Alabama v. White, 496

U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). Generally, this requires a

showing that the officer making the stop or arrest was personally aware of sufficient facts

to justify it. State v. Pickett, 2017-Ohio-5830, 94 N.E.3d 1046, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting

Weisner at 297.

       {¶ 21} The collective knowledge doctrine, however, “permits police officers to rely

on information provided to them by other officers in helping to establish probable cause
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or reasonable suspicion.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

23926, 2011-Ohio-1984, ¶ 20. “ ‘Reasonable suspicion [or probable cause] may exist

based upon the collective knowledge of the police when there is reliable communication

between the officer supplying the information and the officer acting on that information.’ ”

State v. Freeman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27617, 2015-Ohio-2501, ¶ 16, quoting State v.

Mook, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 97CA0069, 1998 WL 417461, *3 (July 15, 1998).

                 c. Analysis

       {¶ 22} There is no dispute that the contact between Wishon and Sergeant Stanley

was not a consensual encounter.        The question then is whether the initial contact

constituted a Terry stop, which requires only reasonable articulable suspicion, or an

arrest, which requires probable cause. Wishon contends that the level of force used at

the time of his detention was the equivalent of an arrest requiring the officers to have

probable cause to arrest him. He further contends that there was no evidence prior to

the stop that he was doing anything unlawful for the officers to have either reasonable

grounds to detain him or probable cause to arrest him.

       {¶ 23} The State responds that Sergeant Stanley had reasonable articulable

suspicion to detain Wishon based on the totality of the circumstances.           The State

suggests that the level of force used by Sergeant Stanley did not transform the detention

into an arrest as Wishon was not arrested until after Sergeant Stanley verified that Wishon

did not have a CCW permit.

       {¶ 24} Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that

Sergeant Stanley had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Wishon and that the
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show of force used by Sergeant Stanley was reasonable under the circumstances so as

not to convert the initial stop into an arrest.

       {¶ 25} At the time Wishon was detained, Sergeant Stanley was aware that Wishon

had been with two companions who were found shoplifting in Walmart. Although Wishon

was not personally observed stealing items, his association with the shoplifters was a

relevant consideration.     It was also known that VanDyke was obtaining drug and/or

alcohol treatment nearby and appeared to be under the influence during her interactions

with Sergeant Stanley. More importantly, Gray advised Officer Jackson that he had

provided his gun to Wishon and indicated that Wishon still physically possessed the gun

while walking away in the parking lot. Gray’s identity was known to the officers, and he

had just been with Wishon, an individual with whom he was familiar, such that Gray’s

information was sufficiently reliable for the officers to have reasonably relied upon it.

       {¶ 26} Upon Sergeant Stanley’s initial observance of Wishon, he did not see a gun

on Wishon’s person, meaning that it was concealed. Wishon did not advise Sergeant

Stanley that he had a permit to carry a concealed weapon, which the law required him to

do if he indeed had a valid permit. R.C. 2923.12(B)(1). As the trial court noted, at the

time this offense occurred, under Ohio law, only certain individuals could carry concealed

weapons. R.C. 2923.12. Although that limitation changed as of June 13, 2022, with the

enactment of Senate Bill 215, generally, the determination of reasonable articulable

suspicion is governed by the applicable law at the time the offense occurred. Therefore,

unless Wishon had a valid CCW permit, he was not permitted to carry a concealed firearm

on his person. Additionally, the fact that Wishon was with individuals who had been
                                                                                          -12-

committing thefts, at least one of whom was under the influence, and that he was alleged

to be holding Gray’s gun would lead a reasonable officer to temporarily detain Wishon to

investigate further.

       {¶ 27} When he initially stopped Wishon, Sergeant Stanley informed Wishon that

he wanted to talk to him and asked Wishon to put his hands on the car. Believing that

Wishon had a gun on his person, ordering Wishon to put his hands on the car was not

unreasonable for officer safety and was minimally intrusive. Then, when Stanley saw

that the gun was hanging out of Wishon’s pocket, it confirmed that Wishon did indeed

have a gun and that it had been concealed on Wishon’s person. Although Stanley did

not yet know whether Wishon had a valid CCW permit, based on the circumstances, he

had a reasonable suspicion that Wishon might be carrying a concealed weapon illegally.

See State v. Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92382, 2009-Ohio-5822, ¶ 8 (after observing

a gun handle, the officer had a reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant might

be carrying a concealed weapon illegally); State v. Vance, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 92AP-

1388, 1993 WL 85355, *1-2 (Mar. 18, 1993) (officers had reasonable articulable suspicion

to stop suspect for carrying a concealed firearm who matched description of individual

seen with a gun hidden in his waistband). The fact that Sergeant Stanley, who was by

himself, pulled his gun out and kept it at the “low ready” until another officer could arrive

also was not unreasonable.        “Police officers may take steps that are ‘reasonably

necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course

of [a] stop.’ ” Hairston, 156 Ohio St.3d 363, 2019-Ohio-1622, 126 N.E.3d 1132, at ¶ 21,

quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604
                                                                                       -13-

(1985). “The ‘mere use or display of force in making a stop will not necessarily convert

a stop into an arrest.’ ” Id., quoting United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 (6th

Cir.1986). “In fact, even a police officer's display of his weapon during an investigatory

stop does not convert the stop into an arrest.” State v. Pickett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

76295, 2000 WL 1060653, *5 (Aug. 3, 2000).           “Whether an investigative stop is

converted into an arrest depends on, first, whether the officers had reasonable suspicion

to make the stop, and second, whether the degree of intrusion into the suspect's personal

security was reasonably related to the officers' suspicions and the surrounding

circumstances.” Hairston at ¶ 21, citing Hardnett at 356, citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20,

88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.

      {¶ 28} Sergeant Stanley had over 27 years of law enforcement experience and

had previously been involved in two officer-involved shootings, including one in which the

suspect died. Stanley was aware of the dangers of suspects with firearms, and he had

personally observed a firearm sticking out of Wishon’s pocket. The assisting officer,

Lieutenant Guthrie, arrived less than a minute later, at which time Wishon was quickly

placed in handcuffs and his gun was safely removed from his pocket. “Where a police

officer, during an investigative stop, has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is

armed based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer may initiate a protective

search for the safety of himself and others.” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 524

N.E.2d 489 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. This is permitted in order for a police

officer to take “steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not

armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.” Terry at
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23. Observing a firearm on a suspect’s person provides more than enough reasonable

suspicion that the individual is armed in order to conduct a protective search for weapons.

         {¶ 29} Upon the removal of the firearm, Sergeant Stanley immediately verified his

suspicion that Wishon did not have a CCW permit and placed him under arrest. Stanley

took no longer than was necessary to safely remove the firearm and verify his suspicions.

Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Stanley’s actions were unreasonable.

Wishon’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

         III.   Conclusion

         {¶ 30} Having overruled the assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

                                       .............

WELBAUM, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.