Court Opinion

ID: 9531716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:14:09.052525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:34.285309
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority that LIRC’s order is not subject to judicial review under sec. 102.23(l)(a), Stats. This appeal is controlled by Schneider Fuel & Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm., 224 Wis. 298, 272 N.W.25 (1937) and Berg v. Industrial Comm., 236 Wis. 172, 294 N.W. 506 (1940). In each of these cases, it was held that an order of the commission setting aside an examiner’s findings and award and ordering the matter scheduled for further hearing was not subject to judicial review under sec. 102.23(1).
Schneider Fuel involved a commission order under what is now sec. 102.18(4)(c), Stats., setting aside its own order upon grounds of mistake and scheduling the matter for further hearing. The court held that a petition under sec. 102.23(1) to review the order was premature. The court said:
It is our opinion that the orderly and proper course to pursue, and that which the legislature intended should be pursued, is not to bring an action to review an order setting aside an award until further hearing is had and an order or award is made. Such an order may then be reviewed.
Schneider Fuel, 224 Wis. at 301-302, 272 N.W. at 26 (emphasis added). In Berg, 236 Wis. at 179, 294 N.W. at 509, the emphasized language was withdrawn but the court reaffirmed that an action does not lie under sec. 102.23(1) to review an order of the commission setting aside an order of the department or commission and scheduling or directing the scheduling of further hearings.
*672I write separately to emphasize that LIRC does not have unreviewable authority to set aside or reverse the department and remand for further proceedings. I reject that proposition as contrary to LIRC’s delegated authority and the dictates of due process.
Section 102.18(3), Stats., empowers LIRC to either affirm, reverse, set aside or modify the department’s findings or order, or direct the taking of additional evidence. The statute further provides that, "This action shall be based on a review of the evidence submitted.” It is not sufficient for the agency to state that its action is based on a review of the evidence; it must explain its reasons for the decision which it reaches, based on the evidence submitted. Transport Oil, Inc. v. Cummings, 54 Wis. 2d 256, 263, 195 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1972). LIRC has an obligation under the Worker’s Compensation Act to state the reasons for its conclusions. Id. In Burton v. ILHR Department, 43 Wis. 2d 218, 228a, 170 N.W.2d 695, 695 (1969), the court, on rehearing, stated:
We point out ... it is not the law that the department can set aside an examiner’s findings "for any reason or for no reason.” The commission’s fact-finding process and each step therein are subject to the dictates of due process and review by this court in passing upon the findings made by the department. [Emphasis added.]
The result in this case depends principally upon an evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. In Carley Ford, Lincoln, Mercury v. Bosquette, 72 Wis. 2d 569, 575, 241 N.W.2d 596, 599 (1976), the court said:
It is the rule in Wisconsin that where the department differs with its hearing examiner, acting as *673an appeal tribunal, in regard to material findings of fact based on an appraisal of the credibility of witnesses, it must (1) consult of record with the examiner to glean his impressions of the credibility of witnesses and (2) include in a memorandum opinion an explanation for its disagreement with the examiner. [Footnote omitted.]
LIRC’s order is contrary to sec. 102.18(3), Stats., and the dictates of due process because LIRC does not state its reasons for or the evidence which supports its conclusions and does not explain why it disagrees with the department’s appraisal of the credibility of the witnesses.
The respondents’ right to insist that LIRC comply with sec. 102.18(3), Stats., and the dictates of due process will be forever lost if they are denied a present remedy to insist that LIRC give "some indication why the testimony believed by the examiners who heard it presented was deemed not worthy of belief by the agency heads and similarly some indication as to why the testimony not believed by its examiners was believed by the agency heads.” Burton, 43 Wis. 2d 218, 225, 168 N.W.2d 196, 199, modified, 43 Wis. 2d 228a, 170 N.W.2d 695 (1969).
I conclude that mandamus will lie to compel LIRC to comply with sec. 102.18(3), Stats., and the requirements of due process. See Chevrolet Division, G.M.C., v. Industrial Comm., 31 Wis. 2d 481, 486, 143 N.W.2d 532, 535 (1966) (where letter was not an order reviewable under sec. 102.23(1), mandamus was the proper remedy to review the commission’s failure to consider or act upon the employer’s petition). Mandamus will not lie to prevent LIRC from reversing the department and remanding for further proceedings. It will lie, however, to compel LIRC to state its reasons for its *674conclusions and explain why it disagrees with the administrative law judges. Section 102.18(3) and due process do not entitle the respondents to more.