Court Opinion

ID: 9548005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:56:14.213186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:21.695406
License: Public Domain

Fatzer, J.,
dissenting: The district court had before it all the pleadings as well as the parties’ written stipulation of facts. The *252facts therein disclosed the following: At about 10:30 a. m. on January 21, 1965, the plaintiffs’ residence was destroyed when it collapsed as the result of the sudden subsidence of their property into an existing underground mine formerly operated by the third party defendant, American Rock Crusher Company. Many years prior to January 21, 1965, American had mined vast quantities of limestone from beneath the plaintiffs’ property and that of other landowners in the vicinity. American failed to leave sufficient subjacent support in the subterranean cavity created by the removal of limestone and had also negligently failed to maintain the mine, its roof and support structures. Preferred Fire Insurance Company’s third party petition alleged that the collapse of the subterranean cavity into which the plaintiffs’ home subsided was proximately caused by the theretofore unknown wrongdoing of American.
In my opinion, the fair and reasonable construction of the phrase “any earth movement” as used in the insurance policy’s special exclusion clause means any such movement resulting from natural phenomenon, but does not include earth movements which result in a direct unbroken sequence from the negligence or wrongdoing of a third party.
In Fire Association v. Taylor, 76 Kan. 392, 91 Pac. 1070, it was said:
“The general rule seems to he that a policy of insurance, being an instrument prepared by the insurer, should in case of doubt be construed strictly against the insurer, who prepares it, and liberally in favor of the insured, even though the intent of the company may be otherwise. The object of the contract being to afford indemnity, it will be so construed, in case of doubt, as to support, rather than defeat, the indemnity provided for. If there is any doubt or uncertainty under the terms of the policy as to the intent of the parties, it is to be resolved in favor of the insured, or, if a policy is susceptible of two constructions, that construction is to be adopted which is favorable to the insured . . .” (1. c. 398.)
To construe the special exclusion clause any other way is to favor the insurance company to the detriment of the insured. Such construction is the least artificial and best conforms to the facts of this case. In Pfiester v. Insurance Co., 85 Kan. 97, 116 Pac. 245, speaking through Mr. Justice Rousseau A. Rurch, this court said:
“The other principal theory of the formation of the insurance contract is based upon facts. Everybody knows what the facts are. The insurance company sends out its agents for the purpose of procuring insurance. They are usually experts in the business and are frequently paid large bonuses for securing extra large volumes of insurance. New persons solicited to take policies *253understand the subject of insurance or the rules of law governing the negotiations, and they have no voice in dictating the terms of what is called the contract. They are clear upon two or three points which the agent promises to protect, and for everything else they must sign ready-made applications and accept ready-made policies carefully concocted to conserve the interests of the company. The agent in fact prepares the contract when he writes the application, because the policy, which the applicant does not see until delivered and does not sign, follows an acceptance of the application as a matter of course. In writing the application the agent does what the company sent him out to do. He negotiates for the company, asks questions for the company, writes down answers for the company, and makes the return for the company. It is not carelessness or imprudence in fact, as people in general understand those terms, for the applicant to take it for granted that the agent will accurately and truthfully set down the result of the negotiations. If he fail to do so good sense and common justice regard the company as responsible and not the insured. The subject, therefore, is sui generis, and the rules of a legal system devised to govern the formation of ordinary contracts between man and man cannot be mechanically applied to it.
“It is not necessary to review the decisions in which the foregoing conflicting views are maintained. This court favors the one which is least artificial and best conforms to the facts.” (1. c. 101, 102.)
I would reverse the case and direct the district court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.