Court Opinion

ID: 9642418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:57:19.009488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:47.234412
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Smith,
joined by Justice Garwood, dissenting.
The majority opinion completely ignores certain findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the trial court in this case. The opinion fails to discuss in any manner the intention of the Legislature in enacting Senate Bill 274, Acts 44th Leg., Ch. 112, being Article 2756b, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes. It does not discuss the purpose of the Act. I believe a thorough study of the record made in this case, a review of the history of the Act, and a discussion of the manifest intention of the Legislature is essential to a correct solution of the important question involved in this suit.
First, I think it should be made clear that respondent did not bring this suit for any purpose of Senate Bill 274. Its prayer *68and its contention is that it be awarded $315,000 under Article 2922-16. In fact, respondent’s real contention is that the purpose of the purported inclusion orders of 1939 and 1949 by the State Board of Education was to allow it additional local fund credit under the minimum Foundation Program.
The trial court found that no portion of the Fort Bliss Military Reservation is included within the geographical boundaries of the El Paso District and that all of the Fort Bliss Military Reservation territory is included within the Smeltor, Socorro, Cooley, Winkler and Ysleta Districts of El Paso County, Texas. The trial court further found that the portion of Senate Bill 274 which reads: “And provided, that whenever in the opinion of the State Board of Education, the number of children resident upon any military reservation is not sufficient to warrant the establishment of a separate school district, that such military reservation shall for the purpose of this Act be included in any other school district under such regulations as the Board of Education may determine” gives statutory authority to the Board only to transfer children and not to transfer territory. (Emphasis added)
The majority opinion has held that the orders of the State Board of Education of 1939 and 1949 were authorized by the above quoted portion of Senate Bill 274, and that such orders effectively detached the Fort Bliss Military Reservation from the districts of which it was a part, and made it a part of the El Paso Independent School District. There is no language in the statute under consideration giving the State Board of Education authority to transfer territory from one school district to another, unless you construe the Act in the manner as reflected by the majority opinion by completely ignoring the phrase “for the purpose of this Act.” •
Authority to change school districts and school boundaries has always been vested in local school district boards, in county school boards, in local officials, or in the patrons of local school districts by the ballot. Section 5 of Article 2654-7 V.A.C.S., a provision of the Gilmer-Aiken law (S.B. 115, Acts 1949), provides that “No provision in this Act shall be interpreted to give to the State Board of Education, the State Department of Education, the State Commissioner of Education, or anyone whomsoever, the power to close, to consolidate, or cause by regulation or rule to be closed or consolidated, any independent or common school district in this State * * *.” The final report of the *69Gilmer-Aiken Committee, dated January 25, 1949, contains Section 1, Article 1, which reads: “There is hereby established a central education agency composed of the. State Board of Education, the State Commisisoner of Education, and the State Department of Education. It shall carry out such educational functions as may be assigned to it by the Legislature, but all educational functions not specifically delegated to the Central Education Agency shall be performed by county boards of education, county school superintendents, or district boards of trustees.” (Emphasis added)
It was never the intention of the Legislature to give to the State Board of Education statutory authority by the enactment of Senate Bill 274 to transfer territory and the interested parties did not so construe it. This statement is borne out by the record. When the State Board of Education passed its original order in 1989 finding that there was not a sufficient number of children of Fort Bliss to warrant the establishment of a separate school district and attached that reservation to the El Paso District, the Commanding General of Fort Bliss in his letter of consent to such action, stated he was informed that “the State Board of Education adopted a resolution formally including the scholastics residing on the Fort Bliss Military Reservation in the El Paso Independent School District.” (Emphasis added) The letter then advised that the military authorities “concur in the above action taken by the State Board of Education”. This, together with other evidence, supports the finding of the trial court that this 1939 attachment was only for the purpose of Senate Bill 274 and consequently was only an inclusion of scholastics.
The respondent wants this Court to turn away from the common-sense view, the practical view, and adopt a theory which would enrich the El Paso Independent School District to the injury of the other school districts of Texas. It wants us to elect, and apparently the majority of this Court has elected to brush aside the real purpose of the Act which was to enable children on military reservations to share in the only monetary contribution by the State for education, the annual apportionment of the State available school fund. Until the enactment of Senate Bill 274 our laws were wholly inadequate in this respect. Scholastics on a military reservation where, because there were not sufficient children to establish a school district, were unable to share in the available school fund. Secondly, no provision had been made for children on a reservation where a *70school district had been established but where they had to go to school in another district because it was not feasible to provide all grades in the military reservation. Senate Bill 274 repealed House Bill 21 and solved the two problems just mentioned by the inclusion and adoption of the following provision:
“And provided, that wherever in the opinion of the State Board of Education, the number of children resident upon any military reservation is not sufficient to warrant the establishment of a separate school district, that such military reservation shall for the purpose of this Act be included in any other school district under such regulations as the Board of Education may determine. Provided further, that the Board of Trustees of such district shall have the authority to transfer to any other independent or common school district maintaining adequate facilities and standards for elementary, junior or senior high schools, as set up by the State Department of Education and Southern Association, any school children tuho cannot be provided for by the district of their residence.” (Emphasis added)
It is manifest that the Legislature had a definite purpose in the enactment of Senate Bill 274, and that all of its provisions from the caption to the-emergency clause harmonized with the idea that the lawmakers had no intention to disturb the territory of a military reservation which had always been in a school district.
The Legislative intent in enacting Senate Bill 274 is clearly revealed by the emergency clause of the Act. It reads:
“The fact that the children within the scholastic age who reside on military reservations located within this state are not accorded the same privileges of and opportunities for public free school education as is accorded other children living within the State, * *
This purpose of providing educational opportunities is also made crystal clear by the caption, which states:
“An Act authorizing the State Board of Education to establish independent school districts upon any military reservations located within the State of Texas, upon such terms and conditions which may be agreed upon by the State Board of Education, and the military authorities; provided such districts may be entitled to enumerate scholastics to share in the State per capita apportionment; providing what children may attend such *71schools; further provided that the children of such military reservations may be included in other school districts; providing that such children may be transferred to other schools, * * (Emphasis added)
An eminent text writer has said that the practical inquiry in litigation is usually to determine what a provision, clause, or word means. To answer it one must proceed as he would with any other composition. Construe it with reference to the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument. The case of Huntsville Independent School District v. McAdams, 148 Texas 120, 221 S.W. 2d 546, 549, quotes with approval the following language in Walker v. Haley, 110 Texas 50, 214 S.W. 295: “The modern cases also indicate that courts today rather than beginning their inquiry with the formal words of the act consider from the start the legislative purpose and intention. This tendency is to be commended for it is more consonant with the proper judicial use of statutory materials.”
Again it has been said that a literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the Legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention. The intention should always prevail over the letter, and the letter must if possible be read so as to conform to the spirit of the Act. “While the intention of the Legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words. * * * The particular inquiry is not what is the abstract force of the words or what they may comprehend, but in what sense were they intended to be used in the Act.” The sense in which they were used by the Legislature furnishes the rules of interpretation and when this cannot be determined from the context of the Act, the court may resort to extrinsic aids. Obviously, if the statute specifically declares its intention and meaning, and I contend the language of the caption under consideration permits no other construction than one of a declaration of policy so as to include children of'a military reservation, and not territory, in other school districts, then all other provisions of the Act are controlled by it and the policy section will be given and justly should be given primary importance in interpreting the remainder of the law. Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition, Vol. 2, p. 339.
*72The title or caption of Senate Bill 274 conforms to Section 35 of Article III of our Texas Constitution which provides in effect that the various subjects of a bill shall be expressed in its title. One of the main purposes of this constitutional provision is to advise the Legislature and the people of the nature of each particular bill. I was not surprised when, during oral argument of this case, Mr. Justice Calvert propounded to one of the attorneys for respondent the following question: “What part of the caption authorizes the provisions for attachment of territory ?” The answer of counsel seems to indicate that respondent relies on that portion of the caption which reads: “* * * to establish Independent School Districts upon any military reservations located within the State of Texas * * *,” to support its contention that territory was meant to be included and not just the children.
An analysis of the caption will give the correct answer to the question. Looking at the caption of the statute involved, it may be seen that the only portions authorizing military reservation children to go to schools in districts outside the military reservation are those which state:
“* * * further provided that the children of such military reservations may be included in other school districts; providing that such children may be transferred to other schools;***.”
These provisions deal specifically with transfer of children, not territory. It will be noticed that the Legislature used a form of caption which is narrow and restricted, and not a broad general caption which would give notice of a provision in the body allowing a transfer of territory. For each provision in the caption there is a corresponding provision in the body of the Act. The caption mentions establishment, and the body provides for establishment of a military reservation school district, specifying the manner of establishment. The caption mentions transfer of children, and the body provides for transfer by the Board of Trustees of a reservation school district. The caption mentions inclusion of children in other school districts, and the body provides for inclusion by the State Board of Education for the purpose of the Act.
I cannot concur with the position assumed by respondent that the caption provision in Senate Bill 274 which deals with “establishing” military reservation independent school districts is notice of a provision in the body allowing the detaching of territory from one school district and its attachment to another. *73The correct view, in my opinion, is further found by comparing that part of the caption with the first two paragraphs of Section 1. By this comparison it will be found that the establishment is for an independent school district on a military reservation and that if a school district is established only children of military reservation personnel may attend the school so established. Nothing is said in the caption about transferring territory from one school district to another “for all purposes” or for any purpose. ,
The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals contains the following paragraph: “It is suggested that the decision which we have reached will result in an unjust enrichment of the El Paso schools. If so, the reward will be to the authorities who received and educated these school orphans rather than to those districts which did nothing in this regard.” Since when, may I ask, has it become the province of a court to pass out rewards, especially where there is no foundation in fact or law for such action. The findings of the trial court clearly show that the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals will enrich the El Paso District and financially injure the five school districts in which the Fort Bliss Military District is located.
The record refutes the idea that the El Paso school district has made a supreme sacrifice without compensation in order to educate the children residing on Fort Bliss Military Reservation. In the first place, El Paso District asked for and accepted this responsibility. At the time of the trial it had received from the United States government $148,801.67 for the education of the children residing upon the Fort Bliss Military Reservation and attending school in the Independent School District, and had applied for an additional sum of $103,705.28 for the years 1949-50 and 1950-51. It had applied for a sum “in excess of two million dollars from the United States government for buildings and improvements based upon the number of scholastics from the Fort Bliss Military Reservation attending plaintiff’s schools.” The trial court made the further finding: “Should plaintiff be successful in this suit, the local fund contribution of the Independent School District of the City of El Paso, Texas, would be approximately $78,972.24.” Whereas, the present local fund charged against El Paso County is $408, 972.24. This finding simply means a saving to the City of El Paso of $330,000.00, and likewise a charge against the State of the same amount. In other, words,'in the event the respondent should be successful, in this suit' the sum "of $330,000.00 will be *74added to the $2,516,886.70, which is the present amount the State contributes in El Paso County. Breaking this down a step further, El Paso County maintains a tax rate of $.30 on each $100.00 evaluation of taxable property in El Paso County to raise the $408,972.24. Should it be successful in this litigation, the tax necessary to support the minimum program in the El Paso district would be reduced to $.05 per $100.00. On the other hand, the present tax rate throughout the State to support just tjhe minimum Foundation Program averages $.60 per $100.00 evaluation. The majority opinion does not attach any significance to the facts recited above as well as the subsequent facts referred to in this opinion, and the Court of Civil Appeals after rewarding the El Paso District for its efforts in educating the “orphans” of the military reservation, recites in its opinion that the following facts are “relatively unimportant.” (1) The County Tax Assessor-Collector of each county is, under Section 5, Article 2922-16, required to certify to the State Commissioner of Education the “total area of each school district” within the county and that such officer of El Paso County has made conflicting certificates concerning the inclusion of the Fort Bliss area in the El Paso District. (2) The school districts of Ysleta, Smelter, Socorro, Cooley and Winkley “have issued bonds in the amount of over Five Hundred Thousand ($500,-000.00) Dollars since the first resolution of 1939, certifying with such bond issue that the territory of the Fort Bliss Military Reservation is included within the boundaries of such school districts.”
Now I turn to the question of injury to the five school districts directly involved, as well as all other districts in Texas occupying a similar situation. I first direct attention to the provision of Article 2922-16, Section 5, Vernon’s Civil Statutes, a portion of what is commonly known as the Gilmer-Aiken Bill, which reads:
“Provided, however, that in any district containing State University-owned land, State-owned prison land, Federal-owned forestry land, Federal-owned Military reservations or Federal-owned Indian reservations, the amount assigned to such school district shall be reduced in the proportion that the area included in the above-named classifications bears to the total area of the district, * *
Next, bear in mind we are directly concerned with a military reservation which has been expanded from an area of 8.98 square miles in 1939, the date of the original order of the Board, *75to 101.125 square miles in 1949, the date of the second order affecting the districts, was passed. Contrary to the intention of the Legislature this vast tax-free area has been lifted out of its geographical location and attached of annexed to El Paso School District by the passage of a simple resolution by the State Board of Education, and the Court of Civil Appeals, as well as the majority opinion has sanctioned such action. The pertinent language of the order is as follows:
“* * * all Federal-owned lands in El Paso County, Texas, * * * constituting the Fort Bliss Military Reservation be, and the same hereby are, included in the El Paso Independent School District of the City of El Paso, Texas, and same shall hereafter be a part of the El Paso Independent School District of the City of El Paso, Texas, for all purposes * * * and that the children of scholastic age residing on said Fort Bliss Military Reservation shall be enumerated in the scholastic census as being in the El Paso Independent School District and shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges as other children of scholastic age residing within said El Paso Independent School District, * * (Emphasis added)
The Court of Civil Appeals and the majority opinion by this Court has held that this order effectively annexed the entire Fort Bliss Military Reservation- to El Paso District thereby causing the five districts heretofore named to suffer a loss of the credit provided for by Section 5, of Article 2922-16 supra, as well as the support which the outstanding bonds of these districts (amounting to $584,000.00) would receive from the levy and collection of taxes on any part of the area withdrawn from them and annexed to the El Paso District which may in the future be abandoned by the government as a military reservation and sold to private ownership.
A review of the legislation affecting the public school system of Texas from the days of the Republic to the present time, a consideration of such enactments as Articles 2742a, 2742b, 2742c, 2742c-l, 2742e, 2742e-l, 2742f, 2742Í, 2766, 2767, 2783c, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes, wherein detailed provision has been made for the transfer of territory from one school district to another completely justifies the observation contained in the Amicus Curiae argument filed in this Court by the five districts wherein it said:
“It does not seem likely that a state whose legislative policy for a century has been to make the school district the basis of *76the public school system and to provide by statute in elaborate detail the means for taking territory from one district and placing it in another district, would so summarily provide for taking territory from one district and giving it to another as would be involved in Article 2756b, if it were construed to mean that the State Board of Education could by simple resolution transfer territory from one school district to another school district ‘for all purposes’, as the language appears in the resolution of the State Board of Education adopted in 1949 and here relied on by respondent.”
The majority opinion holds that previous to the two orders of the State Board of Education made in 1939 and 1949, respectively, the Fort Bliss Military Reservation was within and a part of the five districts, and, but for such orders the territory would have remained in, and as a part of, these districts. There are no Texas decisions concerning the status of Texas land in a school district acquired by the Federal Government, and the majority opinion cites none from this or any other jurisdiction supporting its holding. The petitioner relies on the rule stated in 56 Corpus Juris 207, Schools and School Districts, Section 54, as follows:
“The acquisition by the United States of land situate within a school district for military purposes does not detach such territory from the district or remove it therefrom, but it remains a part thereof * *
In the case of Hufford v. Herrold, (1920) 189 Iowa 853, 179 N. W. 53, the question of the status of military reservation territory was involved, and the Court held in part:
“Appellants also maintain that, even if it were conceded that the original incorporation of the district was in all respects valid, yet because of the matters set forth in the petition, and admitted by the demurrer, it has ceased to have a valid existence. The acquisition by the United States government of a portion of the territory included within said district for military purposes, it is true, deprived the district of the right to levy and collect taxes therefrom, but our attention is called to no statutory provision or other authority to the effect that such action changed the boundaries of said district, or took the land thus acquired by the government out of the territorial limits of the district * * *. If the United States government shall in the future restore land taken to private ownership, it would doubtless
*77be subject to the payment of taxes, the same as though the government had not acquired it for military purposes.”
Being firmly convinced that the majority opinion is contrary to the intention of the Legislature and will work an irreparable injury to many of the school districts of Texas, I respectfully enter this dissent. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be reversed and that of the trial court affirmed.
Opinion delivered: January 14, 1953.
Associate Justice Garwood joins in this dissent.