Court Opinion

ID: 9591246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:03:12.321876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:08.777345
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY
concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the court’s judgment affirming the district court but I do not join in the majority opinion. The majority holds that a criminal defendant may assert that he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment if the defendant’s counsel failed to file a timely petition for certiorari from an adverse decision of the court of appeals. According to the majority, the validity of such claim *412must be tested under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Because I believe that the result reached by the majority is not compelled by the federal constitution, the state constitution, or the precedents of this court, I cannot join the majority opinion.
In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974), the Court held that a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to the appointment of counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals or applications for review in the United States Supreme Court. In Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982), the Court made it clear that because a defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to seek discretionary state appellate review,1 he cannot claim that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel in seeking such review. Torna, 455 U.S. at 587-88, 102 S.Ct. at 1301-02.2
In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985), the Court held that a defendant had a right to effective assistance of counsel in pursuing his appeal before the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The Court distinguished “discretionary review,” such as that present in Ross, from an “appeal as of right,” which the Court found to exist under Kentucky law with respect to appellate review in that state’s court of appeals. The Court noted that:
Under any reasonable interpretation of the line drawn in Ross between discretionary appeals and appeals as of right, a criminal defendant’s appeal of a conviction to the Kentucky Court of Appeals is an appeal as of right. Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that “[i]n all cases, civil and criminal, there shall be allowed as a matter of right at least one appeal to another court.” Unlike the appellant in the discretionary appeal in Ross, a criminal appellant in the Kentucky Court of Appeals typically has not had the benefit of a previously prepared trial transcript, a brief on the merits of the appeal, or a previous written opinion. In addition, petitioners fail to point to any source of Kentucky law indicating that a decision on the merits in an appeal like that of respondent — unlike the discretionary appeal in Ross — is contingent on a discretionary finding by the Court of Appeals that the case involves significant public or jurisprudential issues; the purpose of a first appeal in the Kentucky court system appears to be precisely to determine whether the individual defendant has been lawfully convicted. In short, a criminal defendant bringing an appeal to the Kentucky Court of Appeals has not previously had “an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State’s appellate process.”
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. at 401-402, 105 S.Ct. at 838-839 (citations omitted).
Unlike the criminal appellant pursuing an appeal before the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Evitts, the defendant here has had his case decided by an appellate court prior to seeking certiorari review. He has had the benefit of a previously prepared trial transcript, a brief on the merits of the appeal, and a previous written opinion. He has had the opportunity to present his claims fairly before the Colorado Court of Appeals and that court has determined that he was lawfully convicted. In short, he has had an appeal as of right.
Further, his appeal as of right does not extend to petitioning for certiorari review. *413Our certiorari process under C.A.R. 49 is quite similar to the statute construed in Ross, which governed review by the North Carolina Supreme Court.3 The granting of a petition for writ of certiorari is purely discretionary with this court; it will be granted only where there are “special and important” reasons therefor.4 Thus, under the clear holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Ross, Torna, and Evitts, the defendant here had no federal constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in his effort to seek review in this court and therefore cannot base a claim for relief under Crim.P. 35(c) on the theory that, contrary to the federal constitution, he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his petition for writ of certiorari was not timely filed.5
The majority apparently construes our certiorari process as part of a criminal defendant’s first appeal as of right. It relies on Article VI, Section 2(2) of the state constitution as interpreted in Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970), and People v. Williams, 736 P.2d 1229 (Colo.App.1986). Maj. op. at 408-409. Neither is dispositive.
In Bill Dreiling, we considered whether the transfer of the petitioner’s case from this court to the court of appeals following the creation of the court of appeals by the legislature violated Article VI, Section 2(2) of the state constitution. That provision states:
Appellate review by the supreme court of every final judgment of the district courts, the probate court of the city and county of Denver, and the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver shall be allowed, and the supreme court shall have such other appellate review as may be provided by law.
The question presented in Bill Dreiling was whether review by certiorari is appellate review. Bill Dreiling, 171 Colo, at 452, 468 P.2d at 39. We concluded that it was. We further considered the petitioner’s contention that certiorari was not a writ of right, noting that this argument “begs the question of whether our procedure contravenes the constitutional provi*414sions.” Bill Dreiling, 171 Colo, at 453, 468 P.2d at 40. We went on to state that:
The petition provided in Colorado Appellate Rules for a writ of certiorari is an application of right. The study by this court of that petition and of the record on appeal to determine whether to grant or deny the petition constitutes a review. As to petitions for certiorari which are denied, we hold that this review is “appellate review” as that term is used in the Colorado constitution.
Id. (emphasis in original).
The majority reasons that because the petition for writ of certiorari is an “application of right” and thus satisfies the “appellate review” requirement of Article VI, Section 2, the right to effective assistance of counsel is applicable in this case. Maj. op. at 408. I disagree with this conclusion. Our holding that certiorari review satisfies the state constitutional requirement that “appellate review” by the supreme, court “shall be allowed,” does not determine the issue of whether the Sixth Amendment right6 to effective assistance of counsel applies to seeking certiorari review. To state that the petition for writ of certiorari is an application of right does no more than state the obvious: any aggrieved party may ask this court to review a decision of a lower court but this court is free to grant or deny such request at its discretion. In this respect, this court is no different from the United States Supreme Court and the North Carolina Supreme Court in Ross v. Moffitt. Parties aggrieved by a North Carolina lower court decision or by a lower federal court decision obviously have a “right” to ask the relevant higher court, the North Carolina Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, to review the decision. Characterizing this opportunity to take advantage of the certiorari procedure as a “right” does not, however, transform such procedure into an “appeal as of right” subject to the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to effective assistance of counsel.
In reaching its conclusion that the right to effective assistance of counsel applies to certiorari petitions, the majority also cites the court of appeals’ decision in People v. Williams, 736 P.2d 1229 (Colo.App.1986). In Williams, the court of appeals accepted the defendant’s assertion that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal because his attorney failed to file a petition for rehearing of the court of appeals’ decision. It stated:
While there is no right to effective assistance of counsel to pursue strictly discretionary appeals, [citation omitted], under Colo. Const., art. VI, § 2(2), review by a petition for writ of certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court is an application of right, not discretion. See Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970). Thus, defendant had a constitutional right to effective assistance of [his] attorney in the filing of a petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals which is a prerequisite for an application for a writ of certiorari.
Williams, 736 P.2d at 1231.
In addition to the fact that this court is not bound by the decision of the court of appeals, I would note that its statement implying that a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in seeking review before this court is mere dicta. The only question before the court of appeals in Williams was whether the defendant had the right to effective assistance of counsel in filing his petition for rehearing before the court of appeals. The court of appeals’ implication that review in this court is not “discretionary” and thus a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in seeking such review is offered without any analysis, apparently in reliance on our decision in Bill Dreiling. As discussed above, Bill Dreiling did not consider that question and the court of appeals’ reliance on that case was misplaced.
It is anomalous that the majority relies entirely on federal Sixth Amendment juris*415prudence, including Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, to define the defendant’s right to counsel when petitioning for certiorari but rejects the United States Supreme Court’s conclusion that the right to counsel does not extend to the certiorari process. In the absence of clear constitutional language compelling such a result, I am reluctant to find that the state constitution requires that which the federal constitution does not. In this case, the majority opinion has the potential to create great mischief by removing the incentive for attorneys to follow the rules of appellate procedure and the orders of this court with respect to the prompt preparation and proper filing of requests for certiorari review. Further, I see no principled way to separate a claim such as that presented in this case, where the defendant’s counsel failed to follow the procedural requirements respecting the timely filing of the certiorari petition, from a claim that an attorney was ineffective because the attorney failed to make the most of the substantive issues presented to this court. Thus, we are faced with the prospect of relitigation of each failed petition as a defendant claims that his previous attorney ineffectively argued his case and, therefore, that another opportunity for review must be allowed.
To avoid such results and because I see no reason to reject the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court with respect to the right under the federal constitution to the effective assistance of counsel on discretionary appeals, I would hold that the defendant in this ease had no right under either the federal or the state constitution to assistance of counsel in seeking the discretionary review of this court and, accordingly, the defendant cannot make a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in seeking such review in this court. On this basis, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
ERICKSON and ROVIRA, JJ., join in this concurrence.

. The phrase "right to counsel” is somewhat inaccurate. No one suggests that a criminal defendant can be denied the right to secure counsel through his own means or that a criminal defendant as a client may not pursue civil remedies if counsel commits malpractice. The Supreme Court in Ross merely held that an indigent defendant did not have a right to have counsel appointed on his behalf to pursue a discretionary appeal. It logically followed, in Wainwright v. Torna, that if the defendant did not have a constitutional right to have an attorney appointed to represent him in seeking a discretionary appeal, then the fact that an attorney who actually represented a defendant in such a capacity did so ineffectively does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

. As in this case, defendant’s counsel in Torna failed to make a timely application for a writ of certiorari.

. At the time the Ross case was heard, discretionary appeals to the Supreme Court of North Carolina were governed by N.C.Gen.Stat. § 7A-31 (1969), which in relevant part allowed the state supreme court to accept a case when in its opinion "(1) The subject matter of the appeal [had] significant public interest, or (2) The cause involve[d] legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or (3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appealed] likely to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court.” Ross, 417 U.S. at 613-14, 94 S.Ct. at 2445-46.

. Colorado Appellate Rule 49(a) states:
Rule 49. Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari, (a) Addressed to Judicial Discretion. A review in the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari as provided in section 13-4-108, C.R.S., and section 13-6-310, C.R.S., is a matter of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Supreme Court’s discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(1)Where the district or superior court on appeal from the county court has decided a question of substance not heretofore determined by this court;
(2) Where the Court of Appeals, or district or superior court on appeal from the county court, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(3) Where a division of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of another division of said court; the same ground applies to judgments and decrees of district courts on appeal from the county court when a décision is in conflict with another district court on the same matters;
(4) Where the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such procedure by a lower court as to call for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of supervision.

.The defendant in his brief merely cites Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970), and People v. Williams, 736 P.2d 1229 (Colo.Ct.App.1986), for the proposition that appellate review in this court is not discretionary for purposes of determining whether the right to effective assistance of counsel is applicable. He offers no argument or analysis supporting the recognition of such right on a basis independent of the federal constitution.

. I note that the Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 16 also recognizes the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution "to appear and defend in person and by counsel....” However, the majority does not offer this provision as the basis for its holding. In any case, I do not believe this provision supports a broader interpretation of the right to counsel than that provided for under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution.