Court Opinion

ID: 9396473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 18:00:57.887849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.272739
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                 No. 21-10233

              Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. Nos.
                                          3:20-cr-00026-
 v.                                       MMD-WGC-1
                                          3:20-cr-00026-
GUSTAVO CARRILLO-LOPEZ,                    MMD-WGC

              Defendant-Appellee.           OPINION

       Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Nevada
      Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

        Argued and Submitted December 8, 2022
                 Pasadena, California

  Before: Carlos T. Bea, Sandra S. Ikuta, and Morgan
               Christen, Circuit Judges.

                 Opinion by Judge Ikuta
2               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

                          SUMMARY*

                         Criminal Law

    In a case in which the government charged Gustavo
Carrillo-Lopez, a citizen of Mexico, with illegally reentering
the United States following prior removal in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326, the panel reversed the district court’s order
granting Carrillo-Lopez’s motion to dismiss the indictment
on the ground that § 1326 violates the equal protection
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and is therefore facially
invalid.
    Carrillo-Lopez asserted that § 1326 violates the Fifth
Amendment because it discriminates against Mexicans and
other Central and South Americans. The district court held
that Carrillo-Lopez established that § 1326 was enacted with
a discriminatory purpose, and that the government failed to
prove that § 1326 would have been enacted absent such
motive.
    Because Carrillo-Lopez’s equal protection challenge
fails even under the usual test for assessing such claims set
forth in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the panel declined to address
whether immigration laws should be evaluated through a
more deferential framework.
   As drafted, § 1326 is facially neutral as to race. The
panel therefore turned to the question whether Carrillo-

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ               3

Lopez carried his burden of showing that racial
discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting § 1326.
     Because the most important evidence of legislative intent
is the relevant historical evidence, the panel started with the
history of § 1326, which was enacted in 1952 as part of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The panel
disagreed with Carrillo-Lopez’s argument that a Senate
Report, the basis for the 1952 legislation, is replete with
racism. The panel held that the district court clearly erred
when it relied on Congress’s decision to override President
Truman’s veto of the INA as evidence that § 1326 was
enacted in part by discriminatory animus. The panel rejected
as attenuated Carrillo-Lopez’s contention that Congress’s
intent to discriminate against Mexicans and other Central
and South Americans can be inferred from the Department
of Justice’s use of the word “wetback” in a letter
commenting on the INA.
    The panel then addressed the legislative history of a prior
immigration law, the Act of March 4, 1929 (“the 1929 Act”),
which the parties did not dispute was motivated in part by
racial animus against Mexicans and other Central and South
Americans. The panel rejected Carrillo-Lopez’s arguments,
with which the district court largely agreed, that (1) the
discriminatory purpose motivating the 1929 Act tainted the
INA and § 1326 because some of the legislators were the
same in 1952 as in 1929, (2) the fact that the 1952 Congress
did not expressly disavow the 1929 Act indicates that
Congress was motivated by the same discriminatory intent,
and (3) the INA constituted a reenactment of the 1929 Act.
   In addition to the legislative history, Carrillo-Lopez
argued that § 1326's disproportionate impact on Mexicans
and other Central and South Americans is evidence that
4             UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

Congress was motivated by a discriminatory intent in
enacting the statute. The panel wrote that evidence that
legislation had a disproportionate impact on an identifiable
group is generally not adequate to show a discriminatory
motive, and here, the evidence that § 1326 had a disparate
impact on Mexicans and other Central and South
Americans—and that Congress knew of this impact and
enacted § 1326 because of the impact—is highly
attenuated. The panel held that the district court clearly
erred when it relied on the evidence of disproportionate
impact without further evidence demonstrating that racial
animus was a motivating factor in the passage of the INA.
    The panel concluded that the district court clearly erred
in its finding that Congress’s enactment of § 1326 was
motivated in part by the purpose of discriminating against
Mexicans or other Central and South Americans. Rather
than applying the strong presumption of good faith on the
part of Congress, the district court construed evidence in a
light unfavorable to Congress, including finding that
evidence unrelated to § 1326 indicated that Congress
enacted § 1326 due to discriminatory animus against
Mexicans and other Central and South Americans. The
panel held that the district court also erred in finding that
Congress’s failure “to repudiate the racial animus clearly
present in 1929” was indicative of Congress’s
discriminatory motive in enacting the INA.
    The panel concluded that Carrillo-Lopez did not meet his
burden to prove that Congress enacted § 1326 because of
discriminatory animus against Mexicans or other Central
and South Americans. The panel therefore reversed the
district court’s order of dismissal and remanded.
              UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ            5

                       COUNSEL

Scott A.C. Meisler (argued), Attorney; Lisa H. Miller,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Kenneth A. Polite Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General; Appellate Section, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice; Washington,
D.C.; Peter H. Walkingshaw and Robert L. Ellman,
Assistant United States Attorneys; Elizabeth O. White,
Appellate Chief; Jason M. Frierson, United States Attorney
for the District of Nevada; Reno, Nevada; for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Erwin Chemerinsky (argued), UC Berkeley School of Law,
Berkeley, California; Lauren Gorman, Ellesse Henderson,
Amy B. Cleary, and Wendi L. Overmyer, Assistant Federal
Public Defenders; Rene L. Valladares, Federal Public
Defender of the District of Nevada; Federal Public
Defenders’ Office; Las Vegas, Nevada; for Defendant-
Appellee.
Christopher J. Hajec, Center for Individual Rights,
Washington, D.C.; Gina M. D’Andrea, Immigration Reform
Law Institute, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae
Immigration Reform Law Institute.
Philip L. Torrey, Attorney; Rachel Landry, Certified Law
Student; Harvard Law School Immigration and Refugee
Clinical Program; Cambridge, Massachusetts; for Amicus
Curiae Dr. S. Deborah Kang.
Ann Garcia and Khaled Alrabe, National Immigration
Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Washington, D.C.;
Sarah Thompson, National Immigrant Justice Center, San
Diego, California; for Amici Curiae Legal Service Providers
and Immigrant Rights Organizations.
6            UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

Max S. Wolson, National Immigration Law Center,
Washington, D.C.; Nicholas David Espiritu, National
Immigration Law Center, Los Angeles, California; Lourdes
Rosado, Andrew Case, and Nathalia Varela, Latinojustice
PRLDEF, New York, New York; for Amici Curiae Basic
Legal Equality, Justice Strategies, Latinojustice PRLDEF,
Legal Aid Justice Center, Massachusetts Law Reform
Institute, National Immigration Law Center, and Office of
the Marin County Public Defender.
Bradley S. Phillips, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Los
Angeles, California; Sarah Weiner, Munger Tolles & Olson
LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Asian Americans
Advancing Justice, Conference of Asian Pacific American
Law Faculty, Human Rights First, Northwest Immigrant
Rights Project, and UNLV Immigration Clinic.
Amanda Valerio, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Alexia D. Korberg, Melina
Meneguin Layerenza, and Patrick McCusker, Paul Weiss
Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York, New York;
for Amici Curiae Immigration Scholars.
Ahilan Arulanantham, UCLA School of Law, Los Angeles,
California; Eric Fish, UC Davis School of Law, Davis,
California; Yaman Salahi, Edelson P.C., San Francisco,
California; for Amici Curiae The Aoki Center of Critical
Race and Nation Studies, the Center for Immigration Law
and Policy, and the Southern Poverty Law Center.
               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ              7

                         OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

    Gustavo Carrillo-Lopez, a citizen of Mexico, was
indicted for illegally reentering the United States following
prior removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He
successfully moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that § 1326 violates the equal protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment and is therefore facially invalid. Because
Carrillo-Lopez did not carry his burden of proving that
§ 1326 was enacted with the intent to be discriminatory
towards Mexicans and other Central and South Americans,
and the district court erred factually and legally in holding
otherwise, we reverse.
                              I
    Carrillo-Lopez is a citizen of Mexico. He was removed
from the United States twice, once in 1999 and once in 2012.
Before his removal in 2012, he was convicted of felony drug
possession and misdemeanor infliction of corporal injury on
a spouse. On some date after 2012, he reentered the United
States. On June 13, 2019, a search of his residence
uncovered two firearms and plastic bags containing
methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. Carrillo-Lopez was
arrested and subsequently pleaded guilty to a single count of
trafficking a controlled substance. On June 25, 2020, he was
indicted for illegal reentry following prior removal, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and subject to enhanced
penalties under § 1326(b) due to his prior convictions.
Under § 1326(a), “any alien who . . . has been denied
admission, excluded, deported, or removed . . . and
thereafter . . . enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time
found in, the United States,” without proper authorization, is
8                   UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

subject to criminal penalties. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).1 Section
1326(b) imposes enhanced criminal penalties for aliens who
have previously been convicted of specified offenses. Id.
§ 1326(b).
    Carrillo-Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that § 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment because it
discriminates against Mexicans and other Central and South
Americans.2 The district court granted the motion in a

1
    Section 1326(a) provides in full:

           Subject to subsection (b) [(imposing enhanced
           penalties)], any alien who—
           (1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or
           removed or has departed the United States while an
           order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is
           outstanding, and thereafter
           (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in,
           the United States, unless (A) prior to his
           reembarkation at a place outside the United States or
           his application for admission from foreign contiguous
           territory, the Attorney General has expressly
           consented to such alien’s reapplying for admission; or
           (B) with respect to an alien previously denied
           admission and removed, unless such alien shall
           establish that he was not required to obtain such
           advance consent under this chapter or any prior Act,
           shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more
           than 2 years, or both.

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
2
  In his brief, Carrillo-Lopez primarily refers to Latinos, and states that
“‘Latino’ refers to people from Latin American countries, including
Mexico.” Elsewhere in the record, this population group is variously
referred to as Hispanics, Latinx, and Central and South Americans. For
                 UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ                    9

detailed opinion, holding that Carrillo-Lopez established
that § 1326 was enacted with a discriminatory purpose, and
that the government failed to prove that § 1326 would have
been enacted absent such motive. The government timely
appealed.
    We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and we
review de novo “the constitutionality of a statute as a
question of law,” United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d
1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2006), as well as “the dismissal of an
indictment on the ground that the underlying statute is
unconstitutional,” United States v. Rundo, 990 F.3d 709, 713
(9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). A determination that a statute
was enacted in part due to discriminatory animus is a factual
finding reviewed for clear error. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct.
2305, 2326 (2018).
                                  II
                                 A
    The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme
Court has determined that “the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component
prohibiting the United States from invidiously
discriminating between individuals or groups.” Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). The “Court’s approach
to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been
precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420

purposes of consistency and clarity, we refer to the group that § 1326
allegedly targets as Mexicans and other Central and South Americans.
10               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).3 Therefore, cases analyzing
claims of state discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause are equally applicable to claims of federal
discrimination under the equal protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93
(1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment
area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
    Assessing an equal protection challenge requires a court
to “measure the basic validity of [a] legislative
classification.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 272 (1979). When a statute makes an express
classification on the basis of race, it “is presumptively
invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary
justification.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643–44 (1993)
(quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272).
     A statute that is facially neutral may also violate equal
protection principles, but only if a discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor for the legislation. See Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265–66 (1977). “Whenever a challenger claims that
a . . . law was enacted with discriminatory intent, the burden
of proof lies with the challenger.” Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324.
To establish that the lawmakers had a discriminatory
purpose in enacting specific legislation, it is not enough to
show that the lawmakers had an “awareness of [the]
consequences” of the legislation for the affected group, that
those consequences were “foreseeable,” Feeney, 442 U.S. at
278–79, or that the legislature acted “with indifference to”

3
 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ               11

the effect on that group, Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665, 670 (7th
Cir. 2020). Rather, the lawmaking body must have “selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group.” Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. Therefore,
the plaintiff must “prove by an evidentiary preponderance
that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating
factor in enacting the challenged provision.” Harness v.
Watson, 47 F.4th 296, 304 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1985)).
    There is no bright-line rule for determining whether the
plaintiff has carried this burden. Rather, the Supreme Court
has recognized that “[d]etermining whether invidious
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available.” Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 266. Courts must consider the totality of the
evidence presented by the plaintiff in light of certain
presumptions and principles established by the Supreme
Court.
    The most important evidence of legislative intent is the
historical evidence relating to the enactment at issue. The
Court considers factors such as (1) the “historical
background of the decision,” (2) the “specific sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision,” (3)
“[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence,” (4)
“[s]ubstantive departures,” and (5) “legislative or
administrative history.” Id. at 267–68.
    This evidence must be considered in light of the strong
“presumption of good faith” on the part of legislators. Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). It is “the plaintiffs’
burden to overcome the presumption of legislative good faith
12              UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

and show that the [legislature that enacted the current law]
acted with invidious intent.” Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2325. We
must also consider the evidence in context. In evaluating
“contemporary statements by members of the
decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports,”
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268, a court must be aware
that the statements of a handful of lawmakers may not be
probative of the intent of the legislature as a whole. See
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (“What
motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is
not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact
it . . . .”); see also League of Women Voters of Fla. Inc. v.
Fla. Sec’y of State, 66 F.4th 905, 939 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[A]
statement or inquiry by a single legislator would constitute
little evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the
legislature.”). And the views of an earlier legislature are
generally not probative of the intent of a later legislature, see,
e.g., Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2325; United States v. Dumas, 64
F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995), particularly when the
subsequent legislature has “a substantially different
composition,” Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S.
Ct. 2321, 2349 n.22 (2021) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
    Because “[p]ast discrimination cannot, in the manner of
original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself
unlawful,” Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324 (quoting City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (plurality opinion)), “the
presumption of legislative good faith [is] not changed by a
finding of past discrimination,” id. In Abbott, for instance,
the Texas legislature enacted a 2013 redistricting plan in
response to a challenge to its original 2011 plan. Id. at 2316–
17. A three-judge Texas court invalidated the 2013 plan on
the ground that it was tainted by the legislature’s
               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ              13

discriminatory intent in passing the predecessor 2011 plan.
Id. at 2318. The Supreme Court reversed, stating “there can
be no doubt about what matters: It is the intent of the 2013
Legislature.” Id. at 2325. Because “it was the plaintiffs’
burden to overcome the presumption of legislative good faith
and show that the 2013 Legislature acted with invidious
intent,” the Texas court erred in reversing the burden of
proof and imposing on the state “the obligation of proving
that the 2013 Legislature had experienced a true ‘change of
heart’ and had ‘engage[d] in a deliberative process to ensure
that the 2013 plans cured any taint from the 2011 plans.’”
Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, there is no requirement that
the government show that a subsequent legislature
“somehow purged the ‘taint’” of a prior legislature, such as
by expressly disavowing the earlier body’s discriminatory
intent. Id. at 2324. Rather, as stated in Abbott, all that
matters is the intent of the legislature responsible for the
enactment at issue, and it is the “plaintiffs’ burden to
overcome the presumption of legislative good faith and show
that” the legislative body “acted with invidious intent.” Id.
at 2325.
    In addition to historical evidence relating to the
enactment at issue, courts may consider evidence that the
legislation at issue has a disproportionate impact on an
identifiable group of persons. But while “[d]isproportionate
impact is not irrelevant,” it is generally not dispositive, and
there must be other evidence of a discriminatory purpose.
Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. “[E]ven if a neutral law has a
disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if
that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.”
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. A court may not infer a
discriminatory motive based solely on evidence of a
14             UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

disproportionate impact except in rare cases where “a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges
from the effect of the state action.” Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 266. Moreover, if the enactment of the legislation
and the disproportionate impact are not close in time, the
inference that a statute was enacted “because of” its impact
on an identifiable group is limited. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
Thus, “unless historical evidence is reasonably
contemporaneous with the challenged decision, it has little
probative value.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298
n.20 (1987); see also Johnson v. Governor of the State of
Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1222 n.17 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(rejecting reliance on “present” day evidence of disparate
impact where the plaintiffs challenged a 1986 law as
discriminatory).
    If the challenger satisfies the burden of showing a
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor, the burden
then shifts to the government to show that “the same decision
would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not
been considered.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
If the government carries this burden, there is no equal
protection violation even if there is evidence that the
legislature had a discriminatory motive. Id.
    If the challenger succeeds in showing that the legislation
or official action is motivated in part by discrimination based
on race or national origin, and the government would not
have enacted the same legislation absent such motivation,
the enactment violates equal protection principles unless the
government has a compelling reason for enacting it. See City
of Cleburne. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
              UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ             15

                             B
    The government contends that the standard described
above is inapplicable to immigration laws. Rather, it argues,
such laws should be evaluated through a more deferential
framework because the Court has held that courts must defer
“to the federal government’s exclusive authority over
immigration matters.”
     It is true that the Court has “long recognized the power
to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government’s political
departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).
More recently, the Court has stated that “[b]ecause decisions
in these [immigration] matters may implicate ‘relations with
foreign powers,’ or involve ‘classifications defined in the
light of changing political and economic circumstances,’
such judgments ‘are frequently of a character more
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive.’”
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418–19 (2018) (quoting
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)). Further, the Court
has (without precise explanation) applied a deferential
standard, akin to rational basis review, in some contexts
involving immigration cases. See, e.g., Fiallo, 430 U.S. at
792–96 (giving minimal scrutiny to a gender-based
distinction in an immigration law); cf. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at
2441 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority,
“without explanation or precedential support, limits its
review of the [Presidential Proclamation barring entry of
aliens from countries that were predominantly Muslim] to
rational-basis scrutiny”).
16                UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

    Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has also (again,
without precise explanation) applied higher scrutiny to
immigration actions. For instance, in considering whether
the Executive Branch’s rescission of an administrative
immigration relief program violated the equal protection
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, the Court considered
whether the plaintiffs raised “a plausible inference that an
‘invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor’
in the relevant decision.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915 (2020) (quoting
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266). Neither the Supreme
Court nor we have directly addressed the issue regarding
which standard of review applies to equal protection
challenges to immigration laws.4 We decline to address this
issue, because (as explained below), Carrillo-Lopez’s equal
protection challenge fails even under the usual test for
assessing such claims set forth in Arlington Heights.
                                   III
    We now turn to the question whether the district court
erred in concluding that Carrillo-Lopez carried his burden of
proving that § 1326 is invalid under equal protection
principles because it discriminates against Mexicans and
other Central and South Americans.

4
  Ramos v. Wolf also held that a higher standard of scrutiny applies to a
congressional enactment and the lower standard of scrutiny is limited to
enactments by the Executive Branch. 975 F.3d 872, 895–96 (9th Cir.
2020). But that decision has been vacated and scheduled for rehearing
en banc, see Ramos v. Wolf, 59 F.4th 1010, 1011 (9th Cir. 2023), and
therefore has no precedential effect. See, e.g., Durning v. Citibank, N.A.,
950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] decision that has been
vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever.”).
              UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ             17

                             A
    Section 1326 provides that “any alien who . . . has been
denied admission, excluded, deported or removed” from the
United States and, without permission, later “enters,
attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United
States” shall be imprisoned for up to two years. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a).
    As drafted, § 1326 is facially neutral as to race.
Therefore, we turn to the question whether Carrillo-Lopez
has carried his burden of showing “that racial discrimination
was a substantial or motivating factor in” enacting § 1326.
Hunter, 471 U.S. at 225 (citation omitted). Because the most
important evidence of legislative intent is the relevant
historical evidence, we start with the history of § 1326,
which was enacted in 1952 as part of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. S. 2842, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., § 276 (1952);
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101
et seq. [hereinafter INA].
                             B
    The history of the INA began in 1947, when the Senate
directed the Senate Committee on the Judiciary “to make a
full and complete investigation of [the country’s] entire
immigration system” and to provide “recommendations for
changes in the immigration and naturalization laws as it may
deem advisable.” S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 803 (1950)
[hereinafter Senate Report]. This effort was “a most
intensive and searching investigation and study over a three
year period.” Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d
785, 790 (9th Cir. 1968). The subcommittee tasked with this
investigation examined “a great volume of reports, exhibits,
and statistical data,” examined officials and employees of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and
18               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

various divisions of the State Department, and made field
investigations throughout Europe and the United States, as
well as at the Mexican border, in Canadian border cities, and
in Havana, Cuba. Senate Report, at 2–4. Recognizing that
the immigration law of the United States was established by
“2 comprehensive immigration laws which are still in effect”
and “over 200 additional legislative enactments,” as well as
“treaties, Executive orders, proclamations, and a great many
rules, regulations and operations instructions,” the
subcommittee determined that it would “draft one complete
omnibus bill which would embody all of the immigration
and naturalization laws.” Id. at 4.
    The extensive 925-page Senate Report provided a
comprehensive analysis of immigration law. Part 1 set out a
detailed review of the immigration system, providing
(among other things) a description of the “[r]aces and
peoples of the world,” a “[h]istory of the immigration policy
of the United States,” a “[s]ummary of the immigration
laws,” and a discussion of the “characteristics of the
population of the United States.” Id. at iii–iv. It included a
discussion of excludable and deportable classes of aliens, as
well as discussing admissible aliens, with special focus on
so-called “quota” and “nonquota” immigrants.5 Id. at iii, 68–
71.
    In connection with the discussion of the characteristics
of the population of the United States in Part 1, the Senate
Report provided an overview of specified characteristics of
different population groups in the Americas, including

5
 A “quota immigrant is . . . an alien entering for permanent residence”
who is “subject to numerical restriction, as distinguished from the
nonquota immigrant who is likewise entering for permanent residence
but who is not subject to numerical restriction.” Senate Report, at 420.
               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ             19

Canadians and Mexicans. These sections all followed the
same template for each population group. In discussing
Mexicans, the Senate Report covered (among other things)
the population change since 1820 due to Mexican
immigrants who had legally and illegally entered the United
States, the geographical distribution of native-born and
foreign-born     Mexicans,     the    “naturalization     and
assimilation” of Mexicans, and employment and crime data.
Id. at 149–50. This section also included this data for “other
Latin Americans.” Id. at 150–52.
    One of the longest sections in Part 1, covering some 173
pages, discussed whether to continue “the numerical
restriction of immigration through the imposition of quotas.”
Id. at 417. As explained in the Senate Report, the existing
quota system fixed the number of persons from each covered
nation who could enter the United States for permanent
residence at the “number which bears the same ratio to
150,000 as the number of inhabitants in the United States in
1920 of that nationality bears to the total number of
inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920.” Id. at
420. Historically, “[t]he first numerical restriction” on
immigration into the United States “was imposed by the
Quota Act of May 19, 1921,” to address concerns “in the
period immediately following [World War I], as a result of
growing labor unrest, increasing unemployment, and general
alarm over the potential flood of ‘newer’ immigrants from
war-torn Europe.” Id. at 419. Over the decades, limitations
on quota immigrants changed, such as the removal of the bar
to Chinese immigration. See id. at 422, 426. Immigrants
from Western Hemisphere countries (including Mexico and
other countries in Central and South America) were
excluded from this national-origin quota system. Id. at 459.
20             UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

    The Senate Report acknowledged that the national-
origin quota system was controversial because some
opponents labeled it as “discriminatory in the treatment of
certain nationalities of Europe,” id. at 448, and therefore
attempted to “examine this controversial subject objectively
in order to present an unbiased appraisal of the quota
system.” Id. at 417. The Senate Report ultimately
recommended retaining the quota system, but making
“changes in existing law both with respect to the manner in
which quotas [were] established for intending immigrants
and the determination of preferences within the quotas.” Id.
at 588.
    Part 1 also included a chapter on procedures relating to
immigrants and nonimmigrants. Id. at viii–ix. This section
discussed procedures for admission, exclusion, expulsion,
bonds, and immigration offenses. Id. at 612–56. In the
section on immigration offenses, the Senate Report
discussed illegal reentry after deportation, and explained that
a prior immigration law, the Act of March 4, 1929, “ma[de]
it a felony for any deported alien who ha[d] not received
permission to reapply for admission to enter or attempt to
enter the United States.” Id. at 646 (citation omitted). In
making “[s]uggestions relating to criminal provisions,” the
Senate Report noted that statements from witnesses and field
offices of the INS stressed the “difficulties encountered in
getting prosecutions and convictions, especially in the
Mexican border area” because “many flagrant violators of
the immigration laws [were] not prosecuted or, if prosecuted,
[got] off with suspended sentences or probation.” Id. at 654.
The Senate Report recommended that “enact[ing] legislation
providing for a more severe penalty for illegal entry and
smuggling, as suggested by many, would not solve the
problem.” Id. at 654–55. Instead, it recommended that the
                UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ                   21

“provisions relating to reentry after deportation . . . be
carried forward in one section and apply to any alien
deported for any reason and provide for the same penalty.”
Id. at 656.
    Part 2 of the Senate Report provided a detailed overview
of the naturalization system, including the history of
naturalization laws and citizenship. See id. at x–xii. In the
context of discussing eligibility for naturalization, the Senate
Report stated that the subcommittee had held “special
hearings” on “[t]he subject of racial eligibility to
naturalization.” Id. at 710. The subcommittee concluded
that “in consideration of our immigration laws, the
subcommittee fe[lt] that the time ha[d] come to erase from
our statute books any discrimination against a person
desiring to immigrate to this country or to become a
naturalized citizen, if such discrimination [was] based solely
on race.” Id. The subcommittee recommended that “all
prerequisites for naturalization based solely on the race of
the petitioner be eliminated from our naturalization laws,” as
set forth in the Senate Report. Id.6
    After the issuance of the Senate Report, Senator Pat
McCarran introduced S. 3455 in the Senate, which provided
for the repeal of then-current immigration and naturalization
laws and the enactment of a completely revised immigration
and naturalization code. Off. of the Historian, U.S. Dep’t of
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54,
General: Economic and Political Matters, Vol. 1, Pt. 2, at
1569–70 (William Z. Slany ed., 1983). After input from the
staff of the Senate Immigration Subcommittee as well as

6
  Part 3 of the Senate Report discussed communism and “subversive”
aliens, and Part 4 contained appendices. Senate Report, at xii–xviii.
22             UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

experts from the INS and the Department of State, and
extensive revisions, Senator McCarran introduced S. 716, a
revised version of S. 3455, and Representative Francis E.
Walter introduced an identical companion House bill, H.R.
2379. Id. at 1570. Extensive joint hearings were conducted
by various House and Senate subcommittees. Id.
    Following the joint hearings, and in the course of
numerous       conferences,     Senator     McCarran        and
Representative Walter introduced the final versions of the
bill in the Senate and the House (S. 2550 and H.R. 5678,
respectively). Id. According to a Senate Judiciary
Committee Report, the revised bill made several significant
changes from prior law. The changes included a “system of
selective immigration within the national origins quota
system.” S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 3 (1952) [hereinafter
Senate Judiciary Committee Report]. The national-origin
quota system was revised to use a new formula and with an
alteration in quota preferences to aliens with specified skills
and relatives of United States citizens and alien residents. 98
Cong. Rec. 5796 (1952); id. at 4996 (statement of Sen. Thye)
(stating that he was impressed with the argument that quotas
should be given “to facilitate reunion of families and
relatives” and “provide needed workers and desirable skills
for this country”). The bills also removed “[r]acial
discriminations and discriminations based upon sex.”
Senate Judiciary Committee Report, at 3; see also 98 Cong.
Rec. 5765 (1952) (statement of Sen. McCarran) (“Under the
provisions of S. 2550, no one will be inadmissible to the
United States solely because of race and since the bill is
removing discriminations from the law in this regard, it
cannot be said that new racial discriminations are being
introduced.”). Further, “[s]tructural changes [were] made in
the enforcement agencies for greater efficiency;” and the
                   UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ                   23

bills strengthened “[t]he exclusion and deportation
procedures.” Senate Judiciary Committee Report, at 3. The
Senate Judiciary Committee Report made only one mention
of the reentry provisions. It stated: “In addition to the
foregoing, criminal sanctions are provided for entry of an
alien at an improper time or place, for misrepresentation and
concealment of facts, for reentry of certain deported aliens,
for aiding and assisting subversive aliens to enter the United
States, and for importation of aliens for immoral purposes.”
Id. at 37.7 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report did not
specifically reference the provision that penalized reentry
after removal (Section 276 of Senate Bill 2550).
    Congressional debates over the final bill focused on the
national-origin quota system. Critics argued that this system
was arbitrary because it favored the “so-called Nordic strain”
of immigrants but disfavored “people from southern or
eastern Europe.” 98 Cong. Rec. at 5768 (1952) (statement
of Sen. Lehman). Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator
Herbert Lehman sponsored a competing bill, S. 2842, which
aimed at making “the entire quota system more flexible and
more realistic,” id. at 2141, but the bill did not garner enough
support to be given a hearing, id. at 5603.

7
    A House Report on H.R. 5678, states only:

           In addition to the foregoing, criminal sanctions are
           provided for entry of an alien at an improper time or
           place, for misrepresentation and concealment of facts,
           for reentry of certain deported aliens, for aiding and
           assisting subversive aliens to enter the United States,
           and for importation of aliens for immoral purposes.

H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 68 (1952).
24            UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

    Congressional debates did not mention the illegal reentry
provision, Section 276. “An exhaustive reading of the
congressional debate indicates that Congress was deeply
concerned with many facets of the [INA], but §§ 1325 and
1326 were not among the debated sections.” United States
v. Ortiz-Martinez, 557 F.2d 214, 216 (9th Cir. 1977).
Carrillo-Lopez concedes that “[c]ongressional debate
focused on the national-origins provisions, not the illegal
reentry statute.” There was no discussion of Section 276’s
impact on Mexicans or other Central and South Americans.
     The controversy over the national-origin quota system
continued even after the bill (now referred to as H.R. 5678)
passed both houses of Congress, because President Truman
vetoed the bill due to his opposition to the national-origin
quota system. See Veto of Bill to Revise the Laws Relating
to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 441–45 (June 25, 1952). In his veto statement,
President Truman first made clear that the bill “contains
certain provisions that meet with my approval,” including
removing “[a]ll racial bars to naturalization.” Id. at 441.
Nevertheless, President Truman opposed a number of the
bill’s features, most significantly its provisions continuing
“the national origins quota system.” Id. at 442. President
Truman explained that he had “no quarrel” with the general
idea of quotas, but stated that the national-origin quota
system was “too small for our needs today and . . . create[d]
a pattern that [was] insulting to large numbers of our finest
citizens, irritating to our allies abroad, and foreign to our
purposes and ideals.” Id. According to President Truman,
the system perpetuated by the bill discriminated against
people of Southern and Eastern Europe, in favor of
immigrants from England, Ireland, and Germany, which
President Truman argued was improper both on moral and
                   UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ                   25

political grounds. Id. at 442–43. In particular, President
Truman noted the United States’ alliance with Italy, Greece,
and Turkey, and the need to help immigrants from Eastern
Europe who were escaping communism. Id. at 443.
President Truman did not mention Mexicans or other Central
and South Americans, to whom the national-origin quota
system did not apply.8 Nor did he mention the provision
criminalizing reentry, Section 276. Congress enacted the
INA over President Truman’s veto. 98 Cong. Rec. 8253–68
(1952).

    As enacted, Section 276 (subsequently codified as 8
U.S.C. § 1326), replaced the reentry offenses set forth in
three prior statutory sections.9 In creating a single offense,

8
  The 1924 Act, which introduced the national-origin quota system,
exempted all Western Hemisphere countries from the system.
9
    The Supreme Court explained that
           [b]efore § 1326 was enacted, three statutory sections
           imposed criminal penalties upon aliens who reentered
           the country after deportation: 8 U.S.C. § 180(a) (1946
           ed.) (repealed 1952), which provided that any alien
           who had been “deported in pursuance of law” and
           subsequently entered the United States would be guilty
           of a felony; 8 U.S.C. § 138 (1946 ed.) (repealed 1952),
           which provided that an alien deported for prostitution,
           procuring, or similar immoral activity, and who
           thereafter reentered the United States, would be guilty
           of a misdemeanor and subject to a different penalty;
           and 8 U.S.C. § 137–7(b) (1946 ed., Supp. V) (repealed
           1952), which stated that any alien who reentered the
           country after being deported for subversive activity
           would be guilty of a felony and subject to yet a third,
           more severe penalty.
26               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

it also eliminated the three different criminal penalties
imposed by these three prior statutes, and instead subjected
all reentry defendants to the same penalty: two years’
imprisonment and a fine. H.R. 5678, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 276 (Apr. 28, 1952); see United States v. Mendoza-Lopez,
481 U.S. 828, 835–36 (1987). The new Section 276 also
added a new basis for liability: “being ‘found in’ the United
States” after a prior deportation—a “continuing” offense that
“commences with the illegal entry, but is not completed
until” the defendant is discovered. United States v. Ruelas-
Arreguin, 219 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000). Finally,
§ 1326 eliminated the language that would permit aliens to
bring collateral challenges to the validity of their deportation
proceedings in subsequent criminal proceedings. See
Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 836.10
                                   C
   We now turn to Carrillo-Lopez’s arguments that
Congress was motivated in part by discrimination against
Mexicans and other Central and South Americans in
enacting § 1326 as part of the INA in 1952.

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 835 (1987) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 82-1365, at 219–20 (1952)).
10
   After the Supreme Court ruled that precluding such collateral
challenges would violate an alien’s due process rights, see Mendoza-
Lopez, 481 U.S. at 832, 839, “Congress responded by enacting §
1326(d),” which “establishe[d] three prerequisites that defendants facing
unlawful-reentry charges must satisfy before they can challenge their
original removal orders.” United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 141 S. Ct.
1615, 1619 (2021) (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), § 441, 110 Stat. 1279).
               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ              27

                              1
    Because historical evidence relating to the enactment at
issue is most probative, we first consider Carrillo-Lopez’s
arguments relating to the legislature’s enactment of § 1326
in 1952. Carrillo-Lopez begins by arguing that the Senate
Report, the basis for the 1952 legislation, is “replete with
racism.” He points to certain statements in Part 1 of the
Senate Report, which discussed different population groups.
In the subsection on Mexicans, the Senate Report stated that
since 1820, “over 800,000 immigrants have legally entered,”
and “it has been reliably estimated that Mexican aliens are
coming into the United States illegally at a rate of 20,000 per
month.” Senate Report, at 149. Later in Part 1, a chapter
discussing the historical background and current law
regarding excludable and deportable classes of aliens noted
that a 1917 immigration law excluded from admission aliens
who were previously deported from the United States. Id. at
335–36. The Senate Report stated that “[t]he largest number
of persons, who as aliens are deported twice, are deported to
Mexico. The problem appears, therefore, to be principally a
southern border problem and is discussed in the section on
deportation problems.” Id. at 365.
    Carrillo-Lopez argues that the statements that “Latino
immigrants were ‘coming into the United States illegally at
a rate of 20,000 per month,’ and the statement that people
entering illegally after being deported is ‘principally a
southern border problem,’” evince racism. Carrillo-Lopez
also describes statements in Part 1 as “denigrat[ing] Latino
immigrants as particularly undesirable due to alleged: low-
percentage of English speakers; inability to assimilate to
‘Anglo-American’ culture and education, with Latino
28                UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

students believed to be ‘as much as 3 years behind’; and a
high number receiving ‘public relief.’”11
    We disagree. In context, the statements Carrillo-Lopez
identified in the Senate Report merely provided a factual
description of Mexicans and other Latin Americans, along
with all other “races and peoples.” There is no language that
“denigrates Latino immigrants as particularly undesirable.”
Indeed, neither Carrillo-Lopez nor the district court
identified any racist or derogatory language regarding
Mexicans or other Central and South Americans in these
pages, or anywhere else in the 925-page Senate Report.
    Second, Carrillo-Lopez contends that Congress’s
discriminatory intent in enacting § 1326 can be inferred from
Congress’s decision to enact the INA over President
Truman’s veto. The district court agreed with this
argument.12 But President Truman’s opposition to the
national-origin quota system, the central reason for his veto,
sheds no light on whether Congress had an invidious intent

11
  The district court did not identify any language in either the Senate
Report or congressional record that evinced racism, but rather relied on
the 1952 Congress’s failure to repudiate a prior immigration law, Act of
March 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, 45 Stat. 1551 (the “1929 Act”), as
well as other historical evidence discussed below.
12
  The district court concluded that Congress’s “failure to heed President
Truman’s call to ‘reimagine’ immigration while simultaneously making
the INA, and particularly Section 1326, more punitive in nature, is
evidence of at least indifference to the nativist motivations of the
statute’s predecessor,” and therefore “contribute[d] to [the] finding that
Carrillo-Lopez [had] met his burden” of showing that enacting § 1326
was motivated by discriminatory intent. This conclusion ignores the
presumption of legislative good faith, which compels the conclusion that
indifference to prior legislation is not evidence of discriminatory animus.
Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2325.
               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ             29

to discriminate against Mexicans and other Central and
South Americans in enacting § 1326. Mexicans and other
Central and South Americans were not part of the national-
origin quota system, see Senate Report, at 472, and as the
district court conceded, “President Truman did not explicitly
address racism as to Mexican[s] or” other Central and South
Americans, and “did not address Section 1326 specifically.”
Further, President Truman’s opinion on the legislation is not
evidence of Congress’s motivation in enacting § 1326. See
United States v. Barcenas-Rumualdo, 53 F.4th 859, 867 (5th
Cir. 2022). The district court clearly erred when it relied on
Congress’s decision to override President Truman’s veto as
evidence that § 1326 was enacted in part by discriminatory
animus.
    Finally, Carrillo-Lopez contends that Congress’s intent
to discriminate against Mexicans and other Central and
South Americans can be inferred from the Department of
Justice’s use of the word “wetback” in a letter commenting
on the INA. The district court agreed. The record shows
that after Senator McCarran introduced S. 716 (a revised
version of S. 3455), the Senate Judiciary Committee
“request[ed] the views of the Department of Justice” relating
to this draft. Letter from Peyton Ford, Deputy Att’y Gen., to
Sen. Pat McCarran, Chairman of the Comm. on the Judiciary
(May 14, 1951). As requested, Deputy Attorney General
Peyton Ford provided a comment letter. Id. In commenting
on Sections 201 and 202, which removed racial ineligibility
from the quota system, the Ford letter stated that the
“Department of Justice favors the removal of racial bars to
immigration.” Id. Next, in commenting on Section 276 (the
provision at issue here), the Ford letter stated that Section
276 “adds to existing law by creating a crime which will be
committed if a previously deported alien is subsequently
30               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

found in the United States,” and observed that “[t]his change
would overcome the inadequacies in existing law which
have been observed in those cases in which it is not possible
for the [INS] to establish the place of reentry.” Id. The Ford
letter recommended some clarifications in the language of
this section. Id. Finally, in commenting on Section 287 of
the proposed act, which granted authority to officers of the
INS to conduct searches of applicants for admission under
certain circumstances, the Ford letter asked that Congress
give specific authority to immigration officers to go onto
private property to search for “aliens or persons believed to
be aliens.” Id. In making this suggestion, the letter quoted
a 1951 “report of the President’s Commission on Migratory
Labor,” which recommended that immigration officers be
given authority to investigate private farms, in order to assist
in “taking action against the conveyors and receivers of the
wetback,” referring to alien smugglers and employers who
harbor aliens. Id. Carrillo-Lopez argues that this letter is
probative of Congress’s discriminatory intent because it
refers to Mexicans as “wetback[s],” which shows an animus
that Carrillo-Lopez claims should be imputed to Congress.
    We reject this attenuated argument. The Ford letter’s use
of the term “wetback” sheds no light on Congress’s views.
The Ford letter quoted a separate report that employed that
term when recommending that Congress clarify immigration
officers’ search authority to assist in enforcing the law
against smugglers and persons who harbored illegal
entrants.13 And contrary to Carrillo-Lopez’s argument, the

13
   The district court also erred in relying on the passage of an act some
dubbed the “Wetback Bill” as evidence of Congress’s discriminatory
intent. The district court held that “both the derogatory nickname of the
Wetback Bill and its criminalization of Mexican immigrant laborers
while shielding employers evidence[d] the racially discriminatory
                  UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ                      31

Ford letter did not recommend that Congress add a provision
allowing enforcement when an alien was “found in” the
United States that was then adopted by Congress. Rather,
both prior drafts of the bill that became the INA included this
offense; the Ford letter merely suggested clarifying
language.14 Because the Ford letter did not evince
discriminatory intent, the argument that it shows Congress’s
discriminatory intent fails.
    Given the lack of historical evidence that the Congress
that enacted § 1326 in 1952 was motivated in part by a desire
to discriminate against Mexicans or other Central and South

motives and intent of the same Congress who enacted Section 1326 only
two months later.” But individual lawmakers’ name for a separate bill
is not sufficient evidence to meet Carrillo-Lopez’s burden of showing
that Congress acted with racial animus when it enacted § 1326. Further,
the district court’s depiction of the act was erroneous. The act provided
that any person who knowingly transports into the United States,
harbors, or conceals a person in the country illegally, or encourages such
a person to enter the United States, is guilty of a felony, and included a
proviso that “employment (including the usual and normal practices
incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring.”
Act of Mar. 20, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-283, 66 Stat. 26 (1952). Based on
the statement of senators in the congressional record, the act was enacted
in connection with negotiations with Mexico to secure an extension of
an existing migratory-labor agreement, because Mexico wanted the
United States to strengthen its immigration laws to restrict migration of
Mexicans to the United States. See 98 Cong. Rec. 791–92, 795 (1952).
The act did not impose criminal penalties on Mexicans or other Central
and South Americans.
14
   Thus, the district court erred in indicating that the Ford letter’s
“recommendation” to include a “found in” clause was adopted by
Congress as “the only substantive change made to Section 1326 in
1952.” Rather, the Ford letter merely suggested clarifying language for
the proposed bill’s “found in” clause, and as explained above, the new
§ 1326 made multiple changes to the 1929 Act.
32            UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

Americans, Carrillo-Lopez next turns to the legislative
history of a prior immigration law, the 1929 Act. The 1929
Act was one of three statutes that “imposed criminal
penalties upon aliens who reentered the country after
deportation.” Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 835. The parties
do not dispute that the 1929 Act was motivated in part by
racial animus against Mexicans and other Central and South
Americans.
    Carrillo-Lopez argues that the discriminatory purpose
motivating the 1929 Act tainted the INA and § 1326 because
some of the legislators were the same in 1952 as in 1929. In
particular, Carrillo-Lopez observes that two of the members
of Congress who had participated in enacting the 1929 Act
praised the 1952 Congress for protecting American
homogeneity and keeping “undesirables” away from
American shores. See 98 Cong. Rec. 5774 (1952) (statement
of Sen. George) (stating that the purpose of the 1924
immigration law was to “preserve something of the
homogeneity of the American people”); id. at 4442
(statement of Rep. Jenkins) (stating that the House debate
had “been reminiscent of the days of 20 years ago when the
wishes of the Members was to keep away from our shores
the thousands of undesirables just as it is their wish now”).
Carrillo-Lopez also argues that the fact that the 1952
Congress did not expressly disavow the 1929 Act indicates
that Congress was motivated by the same discriminatory
intent.    Finally, Carrillo-Lopez argues that the INA
constituted a reenactment of the 1929 Act. The district court
largely agreed with each of these points.
    This interpretation of the legislative history is clearly
erroneous. The INA was enacted 23 years after the 1929
Act, and was attributable to a legislature with “a
substantially different composition,” in that Congress
                 UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ                      33

experienced a more than 96 percent turnover of its personnel
in the intervening years. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2349 n.22
(citation omitted).      The statements of Representative
Thomas Jenkins and Senator Walter George, which in any
event were made in the context of debating the national-
origin quota system rather than in discussing § 1326, are not
probative of the intent of the legislature as a whole. O’Brien,
391 U.S. at 384; see also League of Women Voters of Fla.
Inc., 66 F.4th at 931–32, 939.
    Further, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument
that a new enactment can be deemed to be tainted by the
discriminatory intent motivating a prior act unless legislators
expressly disavow the prior act’s racism. See Abbott, 138 S.
Ct. at 2325–26. Contrary to Carrillo-Lopez and the district
court’s reasoning, a legislature has no duty “to purge its
predecessor’s allegedly discriminatory intent.” Id. at 2326.15
The district court suggested that it “might be persuaded that

15
   Further weakening the claim that § 1326, in its current form, was
motivated by discriminatory animus, is the fact that § 1326 has been
amended multiple times since its enactment. See Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 7345, 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (1988); Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 543, 104
Stat. 4978, 5059 (1990); Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130001(b), 108 Stat.
1796, 2023 (1994); Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 441(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1279
(1996); Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 305(b), 308(d)(4)(J), (e)(1)(K), (14)(A),
324(a), (b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-606, 3009-618 to 3009-620, 3009-629
(1996). Carrillo-Lopez does not allege that each successive Congress
was motivated by discriminatory purpose. The district court recognized
that § 1326 had been amended four times after its enactment. But based
on its mistaken belief that a subsequent legislature must disavow an
earlier body’s discriminatory intent, the district court focused on
Congress’s failure to provide such a disavowal in enacting the
amendments, and thus failed to recognize that “by amendment, a facially
neutral provision . . . might overcome its odious origin.” Barcenas-
Rumualdo, 53 F.4th at 866 (citation omitted).
34             UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

the 1952 Congress’ silence alone is evidence of a failure to
repudiate a racially discriminatory taint,” but stopped short
of reaching this issue, and such a ruling would be contrary
to Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the evidence of the
discriminatory motivation for the 1929 Act lacks probative
value for determining the motivation of the legislature that
enacted the INA. See, e.g., id. at 2325–26; Dumas, 64 F.3d
at 1430 (examining the legislative debates of the crack
cocaine criminal legislation at issue in 1986, not the
legislative debates from the first law criminalizing cocaine
in 1914).
    Finally, the INA was not a “reenactment” of the 1929
Act, but rather a broad reformulation of the nation’s
immigration laws, which included a recommendation “that
the time ha[d] come to erase from our statute books any
discrimination against a person desiring to immigrate to this
country or to become a naturalized citizen, if such
discrimination [was] based solely on race.” Senate Report,
at 710. Section 1326 itself incorporated provisions from
three acts and made substantial revisions and additions, H.R.
5678, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., § 276 (Apr. 28, 1952); see supra
pp. 25–26 & n.9; see also Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 835–
36. The district court therefore clearly erred in stating that
§ 1326 was not “substantially different” from the 1929 Act.
                              2
    In addition to the legislative history, Carrillo-Lopez
argues that § 1326’s disproportionate impact on Mexicans
and other Central and South Americans is evidence that
Congress was motivated by a discriminatory intent in
enacting the statute. Evidence that legislation had a
disproportionate impact on an identifiable group is generally
not adequate to show a discriminatory motive, and here, the
                UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ                   35

evidence that § 1326 had a disparate impact on Mexicans and
other Central and South Americans—and that Congress
knew of this impact and enacted § 1326 because of the
impact—is highly attenuated.
    Carrillo-Lopez does not provide direct evidence of the
impact of § 1326 on Mexicans and other Central and South
Americans in the years following the 1952 enactment of the
INA. Rather, Carrillo-Lopez points to evidence that
Mexicans were apprehended at the border and subject to
immigration laws. He first points to the Senate Report’s
statements (in a subsection on problems with deportation
procedures) that “[i]n 1946 and 1947 the percentages of
voluntary departures were 90 percent and 94 percent
Mexicans, respectively,” Senate Report, at 633, and that
“[d]eportations and voluntary departures to Canada were
very small, since approximately 90 percent of the cases were
Mexicans,” id. at 635 (footnote omitted). In the same vein,
the district court stated that the 1952 Congress knew that
§ 1326 would “disparately impact Mexican[s]” and other
Central and South Americans because the Senate Report
discussed “difficulties encountered in getting prosecutions
and convictions, especially in the Mexican border area.”
While these statements indicate that Mexicans and other
Central and South Americans were apprehended at the
border and deported when they entered illegally, and that
there was a lack of enforcement of immigration laws at the
Mexican border area, the statements do not show that a
statute criminalizing illegal reentry disproportionately
impacted Mexicans and other Central and South
Americans.16

16
  Carrillo-Lopez and the district court rely on a declaration by UCLA
Professor Kelly Lytle Hernandez, which states that in the late 1930s,
36                UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

    Carrillo-Lopez also provides information about the
current impact of § 1326. Before the district court, Carrillo-
Lopez provided statistics regarding border apprehensions
from 2000 to 2010, which showed that the majority of
persons apprehended at the border during that period were
of Mexican descent, and argued that the Department of
Justice had a policy of prosecuting apprehensions. On
appeal, Carrillo-Lopez cites additional information from the
United States Sentencing Commission in 2020 for the
proposition that 99% of prosecutions for illegal reentry are
against Mexican or Central and South American
defendants.17 He also argues that in 2018, the Department
of Justice’s policy was to prosecute “100% of southern

before the enactment of the INA, “the U.S. Bureau of Prisons reported
that Mexicans never comprised less than 84.6 percent of all imprisoned
immigrants” and that “[s]ome years, Mexicans comprised 99 percent of
immigration offenders.” The declaration concludes that “[t]herefore, by
the end of the 1930s, tens of thousands of Mexicans had been arrested,
charged, prosecuted, and imprisoned for unlawfully entering the United
States.” But the declaration does not provide a source for its statements
or conclusion, or any basis for the conclusion that Mexicans had been
imprisoned for illegal reentry, and so provides little support for Carrillo-
Lopez’s claims.
17
  This statistic comes from two United States Sentencing Commission
“Quick Facts” sheets, which state “99.1% of illegal reentry offenders
were Hispanic” in fiscal year 2020, and “99.0% of illegal reentry
offenders were Hispanic” in fiscal year 2019. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n,
Quick Facts: Illegal Reentry Offenses, Fiscal Year 2020, at 1 (May
2021),         https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/quick-facts/Illegal_Reentry_FY20.pdf;        U.S.     Sent’g
Comm’n, Quick Facts: Illegal Reentry Offenses, Fiscal Year 2019, at 1
(May 2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/quick-facts/Illegal_Reentry_FY19.pdf.
                 UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ                     37

border crossings.”18 This data has little probative value,
however, because it relates to a period that is more than 45
years after the INA was enacted. After such a long passage
of time, this information does not raise the inference that
Congress enacted § 1326 in 1952 because of its impact on
Mexicans and other Central and South Americans. See, e.g.,
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 n.20; Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1222
n.17. The district court’s reliance on this contemporaneous
data was clearly erroneous.
    But even if Carrillo-Lopez had provided direct evidence
that § 1326 had a disproportionate impact on Mexicans and
other Central and South Americans in the years following
the enactment of the INA, he would still not carry his burden
of showing that Congress enacted § 1326 because of its
impact on this group, because the clear geographic reason
for disproportionate impact on Mexicans and other Central
and South Americans undermines any inference of
discriminatory motive. “The United States’ border with
Mexico extends for 1,900 miles, and every day thousands of
persons . . . enter this country at ports of entry on the
southern border.” Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 746
(2020). Therefore, it is “common sense . . . that it would be
substantially more difficult for an alien removed to China to
return to the United States than for an alien removed to

18
   This statement does not appear to be correct, as it refers to a press
release announcing “a new ‘zero-tolerance policy’ for offenses under 8
U.S.C. § 1325(a).” Off. of Pub. Affs., Dep’t of Just., Attorney General
Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6,
2018),      https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-
zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry. Section 1325 relates to
improper entry by an alien. The press release does not indicate a policy
of prosecuting “100% of southern border crossings,” as Carrillo-Lopez
contends.
38               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ

Mexico to do so.” United States v. Arenas-Ortiz, 339 F.3d
1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court has explained that
“because Latinos make up a large share of the unauthorized
alien population,” Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1915, “virtually any
generally applicable immigration policy could be challenged
on equal protection grounds” if disproportionate impact
were sufficient to state a claim, id. at 1916. Therefore, the
claim that a law has a “disparate impact . . . on Latinos from
Mexico” is not “sufficient to state” a “plausible equal
protection claim.” Id. at 1915–16. Applied here, the fact
that § 1326, which criminalizes reentry, has a greater impact
on the individuals who share a border with the United States,
and “make up a large share of the unauthorized alien
population,” id. at 1915, than those who do not, does not
prove that penalizing such individuals was a purpose of this
legislation.19 The district court clearly erred when it relied
on the evidence of disproportionate impact without further
evidence demonstrating that racial animus was a motivating
factor in the passage of the INA.

19
   The district court stated it was “unpersuaded by the government’s
argument that geography explains [§ 1326’s] disparate impact” because
a group can raise an equal protection challenge against legislation that
has a disproportionate impact on a racial group even when “‘geography’
might arguably explain the disparity.” To the extent the district court
meant that a group may succeed on such a claim merely because the
challenged legislation “bears more heavily on” one race than another, it
was incorrect. The Supreme Court has made clear that a group may raise
an equal protection claim only if a discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor for the legislation, see Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at
265, and evidence that a disproportionate impact was not “because of” a
discriminatory purpose may defeat the claim, Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
               UNITED STATES V. CARRILLO-LOPEZ               39

                               3
    We hold that the district court clearly erred in its finding
that Congress’s enactment of § 1326 was motivated in part
by the purpose of discriminating against Mexicans or other
Central and South Americans. The strong “presumption of
good faith” on the part of the 1952 Congress is central to our
analysis. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. Rather than applying this
presumption, the district court construed evidence in a light
unfavorable to Congress, including finding that evidence
unrelated to § 1326 indicated that Congress enacted § 1326
due to discriminatory animus against Mexicans and other
Central and South Americans. The district court also erred
in finding that Congress’s failure “to repudiate the racial
animus clearly present in 1929” was indicative of Congress’s
discriminatory motive in enacting the INA.
    We conclude that Carrillo-Lopez did not meet his burden
to prove that Congress enacted § 1326 because of
discriminatory animus against Mexicans or other Central
and South Americans.            “This conclusion ends the
constitutional inquiry,” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267,
and we reject Carrillo-Lopez’s equal protection claim. In
reaching this conclusion, we join the Fifth Circuit, which in
a case raising substantially identical arguments and relying
on the same evidence, held that the evidence was
“insufficient to establish that Congress enacted § 1326 with
racial animus.” Barcenas-Rumualdo, 53 F.4th at 866–67.
   REVERSED AND REMANDED.