Court Opinion

ID: 9859353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:15:05.798149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:40:08.522163
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.
(dissenting). This is a companion case to State v. Ruiz, 68 N. J. 54 (1975) and State v. Jester, 68 N. J. 87 (1975), also decided today. It differs from the others only in that it involves separate convictions for possession and sale of a narcotic drug, both in violation of N. J. S. A. 24:18-4, since repealed, L. 1970, c. 226, § 47, *87rather than possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute and distribution, in violation of N. J. S. A. 24:21-19(a) (1).1 The legislative intent behind this statute is no more clear than that behind N. J. S. A. 24:21-19 (a) (1), which I have discussed at length in my dissent in State v. Ruiz, supra, 68 N. J. at 54. I would vacate the convictions for possession as having merged into the convictions for sale for the same reasons set out in my dissent to State v. Ruiz, supra. The latter convictions would, of course, be unaffected by this disposition.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Sullivan and Cliefobd and Judge Kolovsky — 4.
For reversal — Justice Pashman — 1.

Defendant Davis made three sales of heroin to a police undercover agent over a period of five weeks. He was indicted on separate counts of possession and sale for each transaction, a total of six counts. He has not raised in this Court the issue of whether he could be separately convicted and punished for sale for each of the transactions. Although this Court presumably could decide that issue anyway, R. 2:12-11; see State Farm Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 62 N. J. 155 (1973), it need not do so. I do not understand the majority opinion to have decided the issue, either expressly or siib silentio.