Court Opinion

ID: 9789975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:44:48.363622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:25.520960
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Doyle specially
concurring:
I concur without reservation in the opinion of the majority authored by Mr. Justice Day and these concurring remarks are offered only for. the purpose of brief personal supplementation.
The City of Colorado. Springs is a Twentieth Amendment home rule city and it derives power to legislate *219from the Constitution of Colorado. Section 6 of Article XX, supra, provides in part:
“Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.”
The scope and extent of these powers is further indicated by one of the concluding paragraphs of Article XX which declares:
“The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities and towns, except in so far as superseded by the charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.”
Thus, Colorado Springs has full, complete and unlimited legislative power with respect to matters local and municipal and this authority derives not from the General Assembly but from the organic law of Colorado. The distinction between a home rule city and what might be termed a legislative town or city is thus clear. The latter is a creature of the legislature and has only such powers as that body confers upon it. It is with respect to the legislative town or city that the doctrine of preemption familiar in the relationship of the federal government with states comes into play. In the preemption area the intention of the General Assembly to exercise jurisdiction in the entire legislative field is an important consideration. It is obvious, however, that this doctrine is inconsequential, at least as to matters strictly local and municipal, in the determining home rule legislative jurisdiction where the source of the power is the constitution itself. Hence, an expressed legislative intention of the General Assembly with respect to home rule cities can have no legal consequence.
Therefore, the sole issue in the case at bar is whether reckless driving is local and municipal within the boundaries of the home rule city of Colorado Springs, and is *220thus subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the city to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the General Assembly. In my opinion the subject is of this character. This conclusion is based on the fact that the problem differs in each city, and differs from the conditions which exists outside the cities because of traffic congestion inherent in the cities. The complexity of the problem varies in direct relation to the size of the city and the traffic congestion existing within its boundaries. There is, therefore, a valid basis for holding that the matter is local and municipal within the boundaries of home rule cities.
The question is not without difficulties. We have held that the regulation of intersection right-of-way is a matter of local and municipal concern. Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 38 P. (2d) 895. In People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P. (2d) 256, it was said that the regulation of motor vehicle traffic is a matter of both state and local concern and it was further held that the state statute declaring the act of departure from the scene of an accident to be a crime was effective within the City and County of Denver. In Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P. (2d) 614, drunken driving was determined to be a statewide problem and subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the General Assembly. Most recently in Davis v. City and County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P. (2d) 674, we held that the offense of driving a motor vehicle while operator’s license is suspended is statewide, and that the definition contained in the statute applies within the boundaries of a home rule city. In each of the cases in which it was determined that the matter was statewide in character there existed a uniform statewide problem unvaried by local circumstances. No similar uniformity is here present. As stated by Mr. Justice Hall herein the standard of recklessness is the same. The circumstances vary. But it is this factor which demands that home rule cities be free to adopt specific definitions adapted to their needs.
*221In my opinion, it was entirely competent for the city of Colorado Springs to legislate on this subject.