Court Opinion

ID: 9939866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 22:00:50.240906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:05.721148
License: Public Domain

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                                                               [PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                          No. 21-12828 & No. 22-10135
                           ____________________

        ERIC ROBERT RUDOLPH,
                                                      Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                    Respondent- Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket Nos. 2:20-cv-08024-CLS,
                            2:00-cr-00422-CLS-TMP-1
                            ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court               21-12828

                             ____________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket Nos. 1:20-cv-02726-CAP,
                              1:00-cr-00805-CAP-1
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        GRANT, Circuit Judge:
               To avoid the death penalty, Olympic bomber Eric Rudolph
        pleaded guilty to six federal arson charges and four counts of use of
        a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence.
        As part of his plea deal, Rudolph waived the right to appeal his
        conviction and his sentence, as well as the right to collaterally
        attack his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including
        under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
               In spite of the plain language of his plea agreement, Rudolph
        ﬁled two petitions for habeas corpus, seeking to vacate several of
        his sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Those petitions—a result of
        the evergreen litigation opportunities introduced by the categorical
        approach—asserted that his convictions for using an explosive
        during a crime of violence were unlawful in light of new Supreme
        Court precedent. Whether or not that is true, Rudolph’s motions
        are collateral attacks on his sentences, so his plea agreements do
        not allow them.
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        21-12828              Opinion of the Court                      3

                                        I.
                                       A.
               Eric Rudolph committed a series of bombings in Atlanta and
        Birmingham between 1996 and 1998, killing two people and
        injuring many others. He used homemade explosives designed to
        maximize casualties.
               His ﬁrst target was the 1996 Centennial Summer Olympic
        Games in Atlanta. He speciﬁcally selected this location as a “good
        target” for his ﬁrst act of domestic terrorism because “the whole
        world would be watching.” On the night of July 26, 1996, more
        than 50,000 people were gathered in downtown Atlanta’s
        Centennial Olympic Park. Unbeknownst to them, Rudolph had
        placed a bomb under a bench near the main stage—three metal
        plumbing pipes covered with more than ﬁve pounds of three-inch
        cut masonry nails serving as homemade shrapnel. In the early
        morning hours, the bomb exploded, instantly killing Alice
        Hawthorne, a 44-year-old woman who had come to Atlanta with
        her daughter to participate in the Olympic festivities. More than
        100 other people were seriously injured, and a cameraman also
        died after suﬀering a heart attack during the commotion.
              Six months later, Rudolph attacked his next target. He
        placed one bomb on the ground ﬂoor exterior wall outside the
        operating room of Northside Family Planning Services (an
        abortion clinic in Sandy Springs, Georgia), and one on the ground
        under some shrubbery in the corner of the parking lot. The
        placement of the two bombs was intentional. The ﬁrst bomb
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                21-12828

        would trigger an evacuation of personnel and prompt the response
        of law enforcement, who would then be drawn within the blast
        range of the second. As planned, the ﬁrst bomb badly damaged the
        building and the clinic. The second bomb detonated about an hour
        later, seriously injuring two federal agents, sending ﬁve people to
        the hospital, and causing hearing loss in about ﬁfty others.
               Rudolph attacked again ﬁve weeks later. This time his target
        was the Otherside Lounge, an Atlanta nightclub with a “largely gay
        and lesbian clientele.” He again placed two bombs. The ﬁrst
        injured ﬁve patrons and caused extensive property damage. As for
        the second, this time an Atlanta police oﬃcer noticed a suspicious
        backpack in the parking lot and quickly initiated “render-safe”
        procedures. Though the bomb exploded, no one else was hurt.
        Just hours later, Rudolph mailed letters to four Atlanta news
        outlets claiming responsibility for the bombings on behalf of the
        “Army of God.” The letters explained his targets: the ﬁrst bombs
        were for supporters of abortion and homosexuality, and the second
        bombs were for federal agents. The letters, which concluded with
        the phrase “DEATH TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER,” also
        warned of more bombings against those targets in the future.
               Almost a year later, Rudolph committed what would turn
        out to be his last bombing. This time, he targeted the New Woman
        All Women Health Care Clinic—another abortion clinic—in
        Birmingham, Alabama. He hid the bomb under some shrubbery
        next to the walkway leading up to the clinic. True to form, this
        bomb contained over ﬁve and a half pounds of nails, but this time
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        21-12828               Opinion of the Court                        5

        Rudolph used a remote-control detonator. He waited until Robert
        Sanderson, a Birmingham Police Oﬃcer, was leaning over the
        bomb to detonate the device, killing him. Emily Lyons, the clinic’s
        head nurse, was seriously and permanently injured in the
        explosion. Again, Rudolph sent letters to two Atlanta news outlets
        claiming responsibility on behalf of the “Army of God” and
        threatening more violence.
                The next morning, Rudolph learned from a nationally
        televised news conference that he had been identiﬁed as a suspect
        in the Birmingham clinic bombing. He ﬂed into the mountains of
        western North Carolina where he remained a fugitive until his
        arrest in May of 2003, ﬁve years later.
                                         B.
               Rudolph was indicted in the Northern District of Georgia on
        twenty-one counts relating to the bombings. The indictment
        included ﬁve counts under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the federal arson
        statute. Section 844(i) provides that whoever “maliciously
        damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means
        of ﬁre or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or
        personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce” shall be
        imprisoned for between ﬁve and twenty years, or between seven
        and forty years if injury results, and up to life imprisonment or the
        death penalty if death results. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Based on those
        arson charges, Rudolph was also indicted on ﬁve counts of
        knowingly using and carrying a ﬁrearm (the bombs) during and in
        relation to a crime of violence (the arson) under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                21-12828

        Additionally, he was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) on four
        counts of transporting an explosive in interstate commerce with
        the intent that it would be used to kill, injure, and intimidate
        individuals and to unlawfully damage property. Finally, Rudolph
        was charged with seven counts of willfully making threats
        concerning an attempt to kill, injure, and intimidate and to
        unlawfully damage property with an explosive in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 844(e).
               The government also charged Rudolph in the Northern
        District of Alabama. There, the charges included one count of
        maliciously damaging property by means of an explosive resulting
        in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and one count of
        carrying a ﬁrearm during and in relation to that crime of violence,
        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The government also ﬁled a
        notice of its intent to seek the death penalty.
                Rudolph entered into simultaneous plea agreements in the
        Northern District of Georgia and the Northern District of Alabama
        on April 13, 2005. For the Georgia charges, Rudolph pleaded guilty
        to all ﬁve counts of arson under § 844(i) for the bombings, and to
        three counts of violating § 924(c) for using a destructive device
        during and in relation to a crime of violence. The government
        dropped all of the remaining counts under § 844(d) and § 844(e). As
        for the charges in Alabama, Rudolph pleaded guilty to both
        counts—the § 844(i) arson and the § 924(c) use of a destructive
        device in relation to that arson. In exchange, the government
        agreed not to seek the death penalty.
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        21-12828              Opinion of the Court                        7

                Each court entered judgment against Rudolph according to
        the terms of the respective plea agreements, which speciﬁed that
        he would be sentenced to “the maximum term of imprisonment
        allowed by law” for each count, except that the government agreed
        not to seek the death penalty. In Georgia, Rudolph was sentenced
        to four life sentences—one for the § 844(i) arson charge that
        resulted in Alice Hawthorne’s death and three for the § 924(c)
        charges for using an explosive device during a crime of violence.
        He was also sentenced to sixty years for the bombings at the Sandy
        Springs clinic, and another sixty years for the bombings at the
        Otherside Lounge. In Alabama, Rudolph received two more life
        sentences—one under § 844(i) for the bombing that killed Robert
        Sanderson, and one for using an explosive device during that crime
        of violence under § 924(c). All those sentences were to run
        consecutively, meaning that Rudolph would serve six consecutive
        life sentences, followed by 120 years imprisonment.
               Both plea agreements contain the same appeal waiver
        provision:
              In consideration of the Government’s recommended
              disposition, the defendant voluntarily and expressly
              waives, to the maximum extent permitted by federal
              law, the right to appeal his conviction and sentence in
              this case, and the right to collaterally attack his
              sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including
              motions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or 18 U.S.C.
              § 3771, on any ground.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12828

        Rudolph conﬁrmed in both courts that these waivers were
        voluntary. He also aﬃrmed in writing that he understood both his
        legal rights and the plea agreements’ eﬀects on those rights—
        including that the waiver would prevent him from appealing his
        conviction or sentence and from challenging his sentence in any
        post-conviction proceeding.
                                         C.
                Fifteen years came and went. In June 2020, Rudolph ﬁled
        pro se motions in both the Northern District of Alabama and the
        Northern District of Georgia. He sought to “vacate his 924(c)
        sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in light of U.S. v. Davis, 139
        S. Ct. 2319 (2019).” In each jurisdiction he was appointed counsel,
        who then ﬁled an amended motion and reply in Georgia, and a
        reply in Alabama. These motions all made the same basic
        argument: Rudolph’s sentences for using or carrying a ﬁrearm
        during a crime of violence were unlawful because in the wake of
        United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), his arson oﬀenses were
        no longer crimes of violence under the federal statute.
              Rudolph’s requested relief included vacatur of the life
        sentences imposed under § 924(c) and resentencing on his
        remaining counts: “Mr. Rudolph respectfully requests that this
        Court grant his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, vacate his conviction
        under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and set this case for a resentencing
        hearing on the remaining count of conviction.” Rudolph
        characterized these challenges as attacks on his convictions rather
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        21-12828                Opinion of the Court                          9

        than his sentences, presumably in an attempt to avoid the bar set
        in his plea agreement.
                Both district courts denied Rudolph’s § 2255 motions. The
        District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ﬁrst agreed
        that, after Davis, § 844(i) arson does not qualify as a crime of
        violence under § 924(c). But it also concluded that Rudolph’s
        appeal waiver barred his motion, because it “is not possible to
        collaterally attack only a conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which
        provides an avenue to attack the defendant’s sentence.” The District
        Court for the Northern District of Georgia did not opine on the
        merits of Rudolph’s argument. Instead, that court concluded that
        his motions were barred because he had procedurally defaulted by
        failing to raise the Davis issue sooner, or, in the alternative, because
        he had waived the right to collaterally attack his sentences in the
        plea agreement. Rudolph appealed both orders, and the cases were
        consolidated on appeal.
                                          II.
               When reviewing a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion,
        this Court reviews questions of law de novo and factual ﬁndings
        for clear error. Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.
        2004). The scope and validity of an appeal waiver are reviewed de
        novo. King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2022).
                                          III.
              “A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the
        Government and a criminal defendant.” Id. at 1367 (quotation
        omitted). And because it functions as a contract, a plea agreement
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12828

        “should be interpreted in accord with what the parties intended.”
        United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005)
        (collecting cases). In discerning that intent, the court should avoid
        construing a plea agreement in a way that would “deprive the
        government of the beneﬁt that it has bargained for and obtained in
        the plea agreement.” United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185, 1191
        (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). But make no mistake—the
        government is not the only party to beneﬁt from these deals.
        Defendants trade costly trials and the risk of lengthy sentences for
        the certainty oﬀered by a guilty plea to a lesser set of charges. And
        conﬁdence about the meaning of terms in a plea agreement helps
        defendants in the long run by reducing transaction costs and
        making plea agreements worthwhile for the government to strike.
        See King, 41 F.4th at 1367.
               One common provision in such agreements is a defendant’s
        waiver of the right to appeal his sentence or conviction. Likewise
        for collateral attacks, which are generally brought in a separate
        proceeding once the direct appeal is complete. See, e.g., id. at 1366.
        A § 2255 motion is one kind of collateral attack, enabling a prisoner
        who has already run the gamut of direct appeals to later claim the
        right to be released on separate grounds. Here, Rudolph insists
        that his § 2255 motions are collateral attacks on his convictions,
        while the government says that they are (and could only ever be)
        attacks on his sentences.
               The government has the better of the argument. The text
        of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the history of that same statute, and the habeas
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        21-12828               Opinion of the Court                         11

        corpus right that it codiﬁed, all point in the same direction: § 2255
        is a vehicle for attacking sentences, not convictions. Supreme
        Court precedents show the same, as does Rudolph’s requested
        relief.
                                         A.
              We start with the plain language of § 2255, which shows that
        any motion brought under that provision is necessarily an attack
        on the movant’s sentence:
              A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
              established by Act of Congress claiming the right to
              be released upon the ground that the sentence was
              imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
              the United States, or that the court was without
              jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence
              was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
              is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the
              court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside
              or correct the sentence.

        28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added).
                To begin, the statute lists four grounds on which a prisoner
        in custody “may move the court which imposed the sentence to
        vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” Id. (emphasis added). So,
        right from the start, the statute informs us that a motion ﬁled under
        this provision challenges a sentence.
              The ﬁrst three clauses each oﬀer the ability to challenge a
        speciﬁc problem with a sentence: (1) “that the sentence was
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  21-12828

        imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
        States”; (2) “that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
        sentence”; or (3) “that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
        authorized by law.” Id. The fourth is a catch-all, allowing a
        challenge to a sentence that (4) “is otherwise subject to collateral
        attack.” Id. Unlike the earlier clauses, this fourth one lacks a
        subject. But the only logical inference is that this clause refers to
        the same subject as the last—the movant’s sentence. Because the
        ﬁrst three enumerated grounds for a motion relate to inﬁrmities
        with the movant’s sentence, and no word besides “sentence” is
        available to serve as the subject, the fourth clause must be limited
        to the same class as the ﬁrst three—problems with sentences. The
        grammatical structure oﬀers no room for the clause to refer to
        anything else.
               Rudolph has no real response to this text. Instead, his
        argument rests on the next section of the statute, which outlines a
        sentencing court’s responsibilities once it receives what appears to
        be a facially valid motion for relief. According to Rudolph, that
        section extends the sentencing court’s habeas jurisdiction beyond
        sentences and into convictions. Why? Rudolph says it is because
        § 2255(b) “permits the reviewing court to grant relief if it ‘ﬁnds that
        the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction . . . or that there has
        been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of
        the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack,’
        and instructs the court ‘shall vacate and set the judgment aside and
        shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial
        or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.’”
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        21-12828              Opinion of the Court                       13

               It would be remarkable for a statute authorizing a challenge
        on one basis to give the court the authority to oﬀer relief for a
        diﬀerent violation. The fact that § 2255(b) uses the word
        “judgment” does not change the fact that this motion is ultimately
        a challenge to a sentence. Again, the only “judgment” the section
        refers to is the one referenced in the previous section—the
        judgment imposing the sentence. It would make no sense for the
        remedies in § 2255(b) to be completely diﬀerent than the ones that
        could be requested in the § 2255(a) motion.
               A few more clues in the text resolve any residual doubt that
        attacks under § 2255 are on sentences. The title of a statute is not
        dispositive, but it can inform the text’s meaning. See Essex Ins. v.
        Zota, 466 F.3d 981, 989–90 (11th Cir. 2006). Section 2255’s title is
        one that sheds light: “Federal custody; remedies on motion
        attacking sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Plus, only a “prisoner in
        custody under sentence of a court” can invoke the statute’s
        protections. Id. § 2255(a). In other words, a prisoner must still be
        serving a prison sentence to bring a § 2255 challenge; no motion
        can be ﬁled after release, which makes perfect sense for a challenge
        to a sentence. Moreover, the ﬁrst line of the statute says the
        prisoner is “claiming the right to be released” from a sentence on
        one of the enumerated grounds. Id. This provision likewise makes
        sense only in the context of a challenge to a sentence—not a
        conviction.
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                       21-12828

               The text of § 2255 points to one conclusion. These motions
        are collateral attacks on a movant’s sentence—the exact thing that
        Rudolph waived the right to do.1
                                               B.
                Lacking support in § 2255’s text, Rudolph turns to
        precedent. His primary argument is that Davis v. United States says
        that § 2255 can be used to challenge convictions rather than just
        sentences. 417 U.S. 333 (1974). But neither Davis nor the history it
        cites are on Rudolph’s side.
               First, Davis. The issue there was not whether § 2255 could
        be used to attack a conviction. Instead, the Court was deciding
        whether a change in a circuit court’s case law was enough to attack
        “the sentence imposed,” or whether the error needed to be of a
        “constitutional dimension.” Id. at 341–43. The majority thought a
        legal error was suﬃcient; the dissent thought habeas relief was
        available only to remedy a constitutional error. So the dispute was
        over the available grounds for attacking a sentence under § 2255.
        What the Court was not deciding was whether § 2255 is a vehicle
        for collaterally attacking sentences, convictions, or both.

        1 Rudolph points to two decisions (one unreported) of our sister circuits, both

        concluding that § 2255 enables a collateral attack on a conviction separately
        from a collateral attack on a sentence. See United States v. Loumoli, 13 F.4th
        1006, 1009–10 (10th Cir. 2021); In re Brooks, No. 19-6189, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS
        6371, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 28, 2020). Both of these decisions are under reasoned,
        and we are convinced that the textual and historical arguments outlined here
        justify departing from them.
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        21-12828                Opinion of the Court                         15

               Davis established that inmates have a right to attack their
        sentences by showing a legal-but-not-constitutional inﬁrmity in the
        convictions that led to those sentences. Rudolph focuses not on
        this holding, but on one sentence that suggests a diﬀerent
        implication from the case: “Nowhere in the history of Section 2255
        do we ﬁnd any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of
        collateral attack upon their convictions.” Id. at 344. This, he says,
        is enough to prove that § 2255 can be used to challenge not just his
        sentence, but his conviction too.
               To start, this part of the Davis opinion has little to do with
        the Court’s holding. As a rule, “a statement that neither constitutes
        the holding of a case, nor arises from a part of the opinion that is
        necessary to the holding of the case” is dicta. United States v. Gillis,
        938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). And dicta
        is “not binding on anyone for any purpose.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc.,
        602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010). Both of these points are
        crucial—not only to letting courts decide the cases before them,
        but also to avoiding the risk that stray language will take on
        importance in a new context that its drafters could not have
        anticipated.
               That is also why we “cannot read a court’s opinion like we
        would read words in a statute.” See Nealy v. Warner Chappell Music,
        Inc., 60 F.4th 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2023). Instead, we consider
        opinions in their context, including the questions presented and the
        facts of the case. Id. Here, the context shows that the Court was
        responding to the dissenting opinion’s attempt to conﬁne the
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                21-12828

        nature of the allowed challenge to constitutional errors—not
        addressing whether § 2255 motions attack convictions or
        sentences. See Davis, 417 U.S. at 343–44. An understanding had
        developed that prisoners could challenge their sentences by
        showing that the convictions that led to them were unlawful. And
        Davis resolved the debate about whether those inﬁrmities needed
        to be constitutional ones.
               Rudolph argues that we should also rely on Davis’s reference
        to the history of habeas corpus. We have no argument there—but
        the history does not support his expansionary view of the statute.
        Section 2255 maintained the historical rule of habeas corpus as a
        remedy for unlawful imprisonment.
               The “glory of the English law consists in clearly deﬁning the
        times, the causes, and the extent, when, wherefore, and to what
        degree, the imprisonment of the subject may be lawful.” 3 William
        Blackstone, Commentaries *133. And though the complete origins
        of habeas corpus are obscured by history, the writ is naturally
        connected with “those clauses of Magna Carta which prohibited
        imprisonment without due process of law.” 9 William S.
        Holdsworth, A History of English Law 111 (1926); see also George F.
        Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus: A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179,
        180–81 (1948). Here too, release from an illegal sentence was
        understood to be the reason for habeas corpus: “The decision that
        the individual shall be imprisoned must always precede the
        application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ must always be
        for the purpose of revising that decision.” See Ex parte Bollman, 8
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        21-12828                Opinion of the Court                         17

        U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807). Relief from illegal detention, in
        short, has long been a deﬁning feature of the Anglo-American legal
        landscape.
               To be sure, what qualiﬁes as illegal detention for these
        purposes has broadened over time. At the Founding, a conviction
        in a court of competent jurisdiction was suﬃcient evidence that
        due process had been given and imprisonment was lawful. See 3
        William Blackstone, Commentaries *131–32. Courts considering
        habeas petitions thus examined only the power and authority of
        the court to imprison the petitioner, not the correctness of that
        court’s legal conclusions. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
        193, 201–03 (1830); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 449–53
        (1806). “If the point of the writ was to ensure due process attended
        an individual’s conﬁnement, a trial was generally considered proof
        he had received just that.” Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 128
        (2022).
               In the latter half of the nineteenth century and into the early
        twentieth, however, this jurisdictional inquiry expanded into a
        more searching review for constitutional defects in the underlying
        conviction—but it did so within the original jurisdictional
        framework. In short, a constitutional defect at the trial level acted
        to rescind the jurisdiction of that court, rendering the sentence
        vulnerable to attack. So as the Court explained in Ex parte Siebold,
        a conviction under an unconstitutional law “is not merely
        erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of
        imprisonment.” 100 U.S. 371, 376–77 (1879) (emphasis added); see
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        18                        Opinion of the Court                      21-12828

        also Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 178 (1873) (writ granted
        because sentence “was pronounced without authority, and he
        should therefore be discharged”); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429
        (1885) (writ granted because trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction,
        and he is therefore entitled to be discharged”). But the courts never
        wavered from understanding habeas corpus as a remedy for an
        illegal sentence—not a second round of appeals for the purpose of
        vindicating an improper conviction. See George F. Longsdorf,
        Habeas Corpus: A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179, 188–90
        (1948).
               Enter § 2255, passed during an era of increased codiﬁcation.
        See generally Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes
        (1982). The Judicial Conference of the United States recommended
        two bills: one intended to curb abuse of the writ, and the other
        jurisdictional—enabling federal prisoners to bring collateral attacks
        in the courts that sentenced them, rather than the courts where
        they were conﬁned. 2 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 214–15

        2 This new habeas corpus statute oﬀered a solution to the discrete problem

        that habeas corpus petitions could be ﬁled only in the district of a prisoner’s
        conﬁnement. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385; see also United
        States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1952). That presented a problem in the
        modern era, with its interstate federal prison system. Relevant records
        remained in the original court of conviction and could be diﬃcult to obtain, a
        practical diﬃculty magniﬁed by the fact that most federal prisons were located
        in a handful of states. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212–14. That meant district courts
        in those states were ﬂooded with a disproportionate number of habeas
        petitions, “far from the scene of the facts, the homes of the witnesses and the
        records of the sentencing court.” Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
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        21-12828               Opinion of the Court                         19

        (1952). Indeed, the Conference underlined the fact that this second
        proposal (the precursor to § 2255) was about challenging sentences:
               This section applies only to Federal sentences. It
               creates a statutory remedy consisting of a motion
               before the court where the movant has been
               convicted. The remedy is in the nature of, but much
               broader than, coram nobis. The motion remedy
               broadly covers all situations where the sentence is
               “open to collateral attack.” As a remedy, it is intended
               to be as broad as habeas corpus.

        Comm. on the Judiciary, Regulating the Review of Judgments of
        Conviction in Certain Criminal Cases, S. Rep. No. 80-1526, at 2 (1948).
                “As broad as habeas corpus” does not mean “broader than
        habeas corpus,” which was always understood to be an attack on
        illegal imprisonment. Section 2255 fundamentally remains a
        procedure for prisoners to challenge their sentences. That is no less
        true when the method of attack is to show that a conviction was
        illegal. Even then, a motion under § 2255 is “a collateral attack on
        the proceeding or process of detention.” George F. Longsdorf,
        Habeas Corpus: A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179, 190 (1948).
               This understanding of § 2255 pervaded the Supreme Court’s
        entire opinion in Jones v. Hendrix, a recent case considering the
        scope of § 2255(e)’s so-called savings clause. 599 U.S. 465 (2023).
        In that opinion the Court noted that “Congress created § 2255 as a
        separate remedial vehicle speciﬁcally designed for federal
        prisoners’ collateral attacks on their sentences”; that § 2255 reroutes
        “federal prisoners’ collateral attacks on their sentences to the courts
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                   21-12828

        that had sentenced them”; and that § 2255 provides the “venue for
        a federal prisoner’s collateral attack on his sentence.” Id. at 473, 474,
        479 (emphasis added); see also id. at 469, 477, 478, 490, 492. We
        agree.
                                           C.
              As a practical matter, it is clear that Rudolph’s § 2255
        motions are exactly what his appeal waiver was intended to
        prevent. In fact, the waiver speciﬁcally contemplates motions
        under § 2255: Rudolph waived “the right to collaterally attack his
        sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including motions
        brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or 18 U.S.C. § 3771, on any
        ground.”
                Though he claims to be challenging the validity of his
        underlying convictions, the relief Rudolph sought in the district
        courts was tied entirely to his sentences. To start, he asked for the
        life sentences imposed for the § 924(c) convictions to be vacated.
        He also asserted that “because the multi-count sentence was
        negotiated and imposed as a package,” the courts should “set the
        case for resentencing” and “unbundle the sentencing package of
        the original judgment and revisit the prison terms on the remaining
        counts.” Rudolph thus sought to collaterally attack his sentences
        under § 2255—a right that he expressly waived in his plea
        agreement.
                                           D.
              Alternatively, Rudolph argues that his appeal waivers are
        unenforceable because he did not know that he was giving up the
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        21-12828               Opinion of the Court                        21

        right to collaterally attack his convictions when he entered into his
        plea agreements. If he had only known, he says, he would never
        have agreed to waive this right. But as we have already shown,
        Rudolph’s § 2255 motions are not collateral attacks on his
        convictions—they are collateral attacks on his sentences.
               There may be mechanisms by which Rudolph can
        collaterally challenge his convictions, but § 2255 is not one of them.
        Our precedent conﬁrms that “28 U.S.C. § 2255 was not enacted to
        provide the exclusive remedy for a prisoner to obtain
        postconviction habeas corpus relief in all circumstances,” and that
        “federal courts may properly ﬁll the interstices of the federal
        postconviction remedial framework through remedies available at
        common law.” United States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir.
        2005) (quoting United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir.
        1990)). Thus, as the government conﬁrmed, there are “ways to
        collaterally attack a conviction that are not 2255 motions.
        Arguably, Mr. Rudolph wouldn’t be prohibited from bringing
        those given the text of his plea agreement.” Habeas corpus may be
        the Great Writ, but it isn’t the only writ.
                                         E.
               In a last-ditch eﬀort, Rudolph urges us to adopt the so-called
        miscarriage of justice exception to the general rule that appeal
        waivers are enforceable. We have repeatedly declined to adopt
        that exception. Even if we were inclined to change course here—
        which we are not—Rudolph would not qualify for relief for any
        number of reasons.
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        22                        Opinion of the Court                      21-12828

               Our Circuit has long held that knowing and voluntary
        waivers of the right to appeal are enforceable, and we have “never
        adopted a general ‘miscarriage of justice’ exception to the rule that
        valid appeal waivers must be enforced according to their terms.”3
        King, 41 F.4th at 1368 n.3. Some of our sister circuits have adopted
        such an exception—overriding a valid waiver where “denying a
        right of appeal would work a miscarriage of justice”—but this
        exception has proved “inﬁnitely variable.” United States v. Teeter,
        257 F.3d 14, 25 & n.9 (1st Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Andis,
        333 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying the miscarriage of justice
        exception to an “illegal sentence”).
               Rudolph has suggested that we should adopt a miscarriage
        of justice exception and apply it to him because he is “actually
        innocent” of the § 924(c) crimes which charged him with using a
        destructive device while committing arson. That contention is
        preposterous. Rudolph argues that, for technical reasons, his arson
        convictions did not meet the categorical deﬁnition of a crime of
        violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because someone else,
        theoretically, could be convicted for setting a ﬁre on their own
        property, or for committing arson with recklessness rather than
        intent, neither of which would qualify as violent crimes.

        3 Though we have not adopted the miscarriage of justice exception, we have

        recognized that “there are certain fundamental and immutable legal
        landmarks within which the district court must operate regardless of the
        existence of sentence appeal waivers.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343,
        1350 n.18 (11th Cir. 1993). Such landmarks include, to start, the inviolability
        of statutory maximum sentences.
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        21-12828                   Opinion of the Court                                23

                That is a far cry from actual innocence. To establish actual
        innocence in the procedural default context, a prisoner must show
        that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
        convicted him.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)
        (quotation omitted). And “actual innocence” means “factual
        innocence, not mere legal insuﬃciency.” Id. In cases like
        Rudolph’s where the Government has forgone other, more serious
        charges in the course of plea bargaining, the petitioner must show
        that he is actually innocent of the forgone charges as well. 4 Id. at
        624.
               We cannot, in good conscience, seriously suggest that Eric
        Rudolph is “actually innocent” of using an explosive device during
        and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Let
        alone actually innocent of the dropped charges, which included
        four counts under 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) for transporting an explosive
        in interstate commerce with intent to kill, injure, and intimidate
        individuals and to unlawfully damage property, and seven counts
        under 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) for willfully making threats concerning an
        attempt to kill, injure, and intimidate and to unlawfully damage
        property with an explosive. It would defy all reason to contend
        that he is factually, rather than (potentially) legally, innocent of that

        4 There has been some disagreement as to whether a petitioner must show

        that he is also innocent of equally serious dropped charges, in addition to more
        serious charges, to defend against procedural default. See, e.g., United States v.
        Caso, 723 F.3d 215, 221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Because we reject the invitation
        to create an exception for Rudolph either way, we refrain from weighing in
        on the scope of actual innocence in this context.
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                21-12828

        crime for the purposes of habeas corpus. We decline to create this
        exception, or to apply it for Rudolph.
                                   *     *      *
               Eric Rudolph is bound by the terms of his own bargain. He
        negotiated to spare his life, and in return he waived the right to
        collaterally attack his sentences in any post-conviction proceedings.
        We will not disrupt that agreement. Because Rudolph’s § 2255
        motions are collateral attacks on his sentences, they are barred by
        his plea agreement.
              AFFIRMED.