Court Opinion

ID: 9471814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:41:42.512564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:35.472892
License: Public Domain

NIES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would remand for imposition of no more than a 60-day suspension, the penalty imposed by the presiding official.
The MSPB correctly ruled that the agency had the burden to prove the appropriateness of the penalty by a preponderance of *1578the evidence. The only evidence on this aspect of the case consists of prior disciplinary action against petitioner and the agency’s table of penalties. What is lacking is any evidence of consideration by the agency of petitioner’s 12 years of service and his receipt of an out of the ordinary award.
Nevertheless, the MSPB held:
We cannot say that the agency failed to weigh these factors, nor can we say that the agency’s judgment clearly exceeded the limits of reasonableness. Therefore, it was not appropriate for the presiding official to mitigate the agency-imposed penalty of removal.
In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 MSPB 313, 332-33 (1981), the MSPB held:
[T]he Board’s review of an agency-imposed penalty is essentially to assure that the agency did conscientiously consider the relevant factors and did strike a responsible balance within tolerable limits of reasonableness.
In this case the agency offered no evidence that it considered mitigating factors and, therefore, the MSPB should have either affirmed the presiding official, who did take these mitigating factors into consideration, or have remanded so that the agency could prove its case in accordance with the standard adopted in the interim in Douglas. The latter course was followed in Jimenez v. Dept. of Army, decided with Douglas, 5 MSPB at 341. In any event, the MSPB had no evidentiary basis for the above finding and it must be overturned.1
Considering that the petitioner has had 12 years of service, that he has received special recognition by the agency, that this is a first offense of AWOL, that it was merely for four hours, and that the other offenses were widely spaced in time and demonstrated no pattern of misconduct,2 I agree with the presiding official that the severe penalty of removal is unduly harsh.
Moreover, the fact that Villela returned to the facility at approximately 11:35 p.m. the night of the incident to explain the circumstances, a fact not mentioned by the majority, shows, in my view, that there was no serious problem with his attitude or with the likelihood that a lesser penalty would have prevented future misconduct of this nature.
I would also draw a negative inference against the agency from its failure to question Martinez on whether the matter was reported to him the next day and that he approved leave, as testified to by three witnesses. Apparently the supervisor was absent, and granting leave was not wholly outside Martinez’s authority in such circumstances.
Finally, the agency failed to rebut petitioner’s showing that his absence had no serious effect on the work of the agency on the night in question. If an agency is to rely on a single very short absence as a ground for removal, in my opinion, it is incumbent on the agency to show that the employee’s absence created the possibility of serious consequences because of the nature of the position he held.
What has happened in this case is a wooden application by the MSPB and the majority of a table of penalties construed most unfavorably to an employee with no appreciation of the balance articulated so well in Douglas and recognized by the presiding official. I, therefore, dissent.

. Our standard of review of evidentiary matters is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the MSPB finding. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(3). In view of the burden of proof on the agency in this case, we must ascertain whether there is evidence which a reasonable person might find constitutes a preponderance of the evidence establishing that the agency considered mitigating factors. SSIH v. USITC, 718 F.2d 365, 383, 218 USPQ 678, 693 (Fed.Cir.1983). Clearly the answer is, “No.” In effect the MSPB shifted the burden of proof, an error of law.

. The two previous incidents involved a fight and drunkenness, entailing short suspensions. Contrary to the majority, the nature of a previous offense is pertinent although it need not be precisely the same.