Court Opinion

ID: 9698839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:01:06.962249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:43.827720
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
dissenting. The majority decides today that a mentally retarded defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to counsel and to remain silent, even though one of the interrogating officers knew defendant was mentally retarded and made no effort, other than reciting the language of the standard waiver form, to assure that he understood both the nature of the rights and the consequences of waiving them. *415My view is that a person with mental retardation cannot waive Miranda rights unless the State shows that the person understood the significance of the rights, the language used by the officers in explaining them, the concept of waiver, and the immediate and ultimate consequences of a waiver of those rights. Because the State’s evidence failed to meet that standard here, I dissent from that part of the majority opinion affirming the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress statements made to police.
I.
A more detailed statement of facts than that supplied by the majority is necessary to fully explore the question of whether defendant made a knowing waiver of his constitutional rights. Defendant, who was twenty-six years old at the time of the alleged offense, is a mentally retarded man with an IQ of sixty-five, placing him in the bottom two percent of the population. He attended special education classes from the ages of eleven to seventeen but reads at approximately a second-grade level. The court-appointed psychiatrist who testified at the suppression hearing, Dr. Linder, estimated defendant’s mental age to be between ten and twelve, while defendant’s former mental health services counselor estimated his mental capacity to be that of a seven- or eight-year-old child and his emotional level to be that of a four or five-year-old child.
On October 26,1990, approximately an hour after the assault that led to the charges in this case, defendant was stopped by a state’s attorney’s criminal investigator and a police officer and questioned in their cruiser for over an hour. Although at least one of the interrogators had dealt with defendant before and was aware that a court had found him to be incompetent to stand trial due to mental retardation, they merely read defendant his rights from the standard Miranda waiver form, without providing any further explanation of the nature of the rights involved or the consequences of waiving those rights. The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he made no attempt to elaborate on, or simplify, the language used on the form even though he knew a court had found defendant to be incompetent because:
There was no question in his mind, as far as I was concerned. He didn’t question it. They were read very clearly *416to him, and each question is: Do you understand? And like the first one was: Yep. So forth and so on.
Defendant’s response to each of the seven questions listed on the waiver form was a single word, “Yes.” Neither the officers’ explanation of the form nor the subsequent interrogation was recorded.
Dr. Linder testified at the suppression hearing that defendant did not have the mental ability to comprehend the significance or potential consequences of speaking to the police and would have said almost anything to please the officers and extricate himself from the immediate situation he faced. Regarding his first point, Dr. Linder testified:
[Defendant] has difficulty in thinking in anything but very concrete terms. He has a poor ability or no ability at all to think in abstractions. He is not able to anticipate events very well. He is not able to really evaluate the potential outcomes of situations that he gets himself involved in.
Dr. Linder elaborated on the depth of defendant’s understanding of each of the rights the court ruled defendant knowingly waived. For instance, Dr. Linder testified that although defendant would understand that the right to remain silent meant he did not have to talk, he would not understand “[w]hat protection it is providing him.” According to Dr. Linder, defendant would not understand the relevance of the fact he did not have to talk or the ramifications of deciding one way or another whether to talk. When asked whether defendant would understand the long-term effect or consequences of speaking to the officers, he answered, “Not at all.” Similarly, Dr. Linder testified that defendant would understand that he could stop talking at any time and that he could speak to a lawyer, but he would not understand how those rights protected him.
Regarding the statement that “anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law,” Dr. Linder opined that defendant would not understand that this meant the officers could tell the jury what he told the officers and the jury could then use these statements to convict him. Dr. Linder explained that defendant would not be able to look beyond his immediate concerns to a future court proceeding in which comments he had made earlier would be used against him. According to Dr. *417Linder, defendant, who was susceptible to suggestion, would speak to police in order to achieve what he perceived as the shortest route to accomplish his immediate needs and desires— to please the officers, to make himself feel better, and to go home. Dr. Linder further testified that defendant would stop talking only if he felt uncomfortable about what he had done or about what the officers thought of him, not out of concern that what he was saying could be used against him later.
The majority states that Dr. Linder’s testimony regarding defendant’s understanding of the consequences of his waiver is “at best equivocal.” This statement, which is based on one exchange during cross-examination of Dr. Linder, is farfetched. The colloquy following the majority’s quoted exchange makes it abundantly clear that Dr. Linder believed that any understanding defendant had regarding the significance of talking to police was nothing more than a “pseudo-capacity” to understand. According to Dr. Linder, defendant’s prior experiences with police merely made him familiar with various legal “buzzwords,” a familiarity that belied his limited ability to comprehend his rights.
Defendant’s own testimony at the suppression hearing reinforces the limited nature of his understanding. He answered in the affirmative when the prosecutor asked him if he had understood that he did not have to talk to the officers, that he could speak with a lawyer, and that he could change his mind and stop talking. He also testified, however, that he spoke to the officers because he thought they would help him and because he could not leave until he spoke to them. At various times during his testimony, defendant stated he talked to the officers because they just kept sitting there and “talking to me until I did talk.”
Defendant testified as follows regarding his understanding of the consequences of waiving his right to remain silent:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And then [the officer] said: Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. What does that mean, Donald?
A: I’m not sure.
Q: Did you know what it meant then?
A: I don’t remember.
Q: What’s a court of law?
A: I don’t know.
*418Q: Where are we right now?
A: In court.
Q: Is this a court of law?
A: I guess so.
At another point, the following colloquy took place:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Donald, why are we in court today?
A: I know why I’m in here for, but I don’t know how to say it.
Q: Can you try?
A: Because I got in trouble in Wolcott.
Q: But what about this particular day? Why are we here? What particular thing are we trying to do today?
A: I have been told, but I can’t remember the name of it.
Q: Did you know that if you told [the officer] something, that he could talk about it in court?
A: No. I thought they were going to try to help me.
Q: When he told you that anything you said could be used against you in court, what did you think that meant?
A: I wasn’t sure.
Q: What would be the reason to maybe ask to talk to a lawyer before you talked to the officers?
A: I’m not sure I understand what you’re saying.
Q: Well, if the officers said you could talk to a lawyer if you wanted one, why would you maybe want to talk to one?
A: Get some help if I could.
In ruling that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, the court noted that during his testimony at the suppression hearing defendant responded “quickly to questions when he understood the question and knew what the question was,” that he had been read Miranda rights on two prior occasions, that he had invoked his right to remain silent on one of those occasions, and that a tape of the custodial interrogation made on the other occasion showed his ability to comprehend the subject matter at hand. The court then concluded:
His responses to questions asked [during the custodial interrogation] were pertinent and in context. He knew that *419with respect to his conduct he could go to jail. He knew what his behavior had been and that that is why he was in trouble. He’s been in contact with the justice system in the past. The more he comes in contact with it the better he understands it. He understands that the consequences of his behavior in this instance is or could be jail, probation or a fine. He understands that when he’s told he has the right to remain silent, that he doesn’t have to talk. He does appear to like to cooperate with people. He does appear to want to receive some help for the — he calls it “a mess” he got in. And I conclude from this totality of circumstances that the defendant did understand the rights that were explained to him by [the officer] when he stopped him for the October 26,1990 questioning. And I further conclude that no threats or promises were made to him at that time to induce him to waive his rights or to speak or to answer questions. And I conclude that he knowingly waived these rights and that he understood the consequences of doing so.
II.
The preceding facts demonstrate that there is no substantial credible evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that the State met its heavy burden of showing a knowing and intelligent waiver. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (if interrogation continues without presence of counsel, State has heavy burden to show knowing and intelligent waiver); State v. Malinowski, 148 Vt. 517, 519-20, 536 A.2d 921, 922-23 (1987) (State bears heavy burden of proving knowing and intelligent waiver and trial court must engage in every reasonable presumption against waiver). On the contrary, the evidence creates, at minimum, substantial doubt as to whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights. See State v. Flower, 539 A.2d 1284, 1288 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (doubt concerning whether mentally retarded defendant knowingly waived Miranda rights must be resolved in favor of defendant), aff’d, 539 A.2d 1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
The State had the burden of showing defendant’s “full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, *420475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). The critical question for courts in determining whether a defendant understood the consequences of a waiver of Miranda rights is whether the defendant was fully aware that any statement he made could be used to convict him in subsequent criminal proceedings. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988). Here, the court found defendant understood that “the consequences of his behavior in this instance is or could be jail, probation or a fine.” But concluding that defendant understood he could go to jail for the charged offense is a far cry from concluding that he was aware that his statements to police concerning that offense could be used against him in a court of law. There is no testimony suggesting defendant’s understanding of this concept, and the court made no finding on this point. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 321 N.E.2d 822, 827-28 (Mass. 1975) (reversing lower court’s denial of mentally retarded defendant’s motion to suppress and remanding for new trial to consider whether defendant was fully aware of consequences of waiver of rights).
As noted, the court found the following in support of its conclusion that defendant made an effective waiver: (1) defendant “responded] quickly to questions when he understood the question and knew what the answer was,” and (2) he had been read Miranda rights on two prior occasions. Regarding the second point, the court noted that defendant invoked his right to counsel on one of those prior occasions and that the taped interview of the other occasion demonstrated defendant’s ability to understand and respond to the Miranda questions. Neither point is significant. First, although the court may consider its own observance of a defendant’s communications skills in determining whether the defendant is capable of waiving Miranda rights, its statement here that defendant would answer quickly questions that he understood says absolutely nothing about whether defendant understood the abstract concepts underlying Miranda rights and waiver of those rights.
Second, the mere fact that defendant said he did not want to talk to an officer during a past interrogation does not demonstrate that he understood the concept or the consequences of waiver either at that time or at some later interrogation. There was virtually no testimony regarding this past incident, other than that defendant said he did not want to talk. There was *421little testimony regarding the circumstances of the interview or the extent of the warning provided on that occasion. All we know is that an officer contacted a public defender on one occasion when defendant said he did not want to talk.
Further, the court’s reliance on the prior interrogation, in which defendant talked to police, is even more questionable. Rather than focus on the warning provided to defendant before the interrogation, the court stressed defendant’s ability to answer questions during the interrogation itself concerning his actions at the time of the offense. Again, defendant’s responses to such questions say little about whether he has the ability to make a knowing waiver of his rights or whether he was fully aware of the consequences of making statements to the police at the time of that prior interrogation or, more importantly, at the time of the interrogation in the instant case.
The ultimate purpose of the Miranda warnings is to assure that all suspects, particularly those susceptible to coercion, are aware that they do not have to speak to the police before obtaining the advice of counsel, and that, if they do, their statements may be used to convict them of a crime. Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. 500, 504-05 (M.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, Smith v. Zant, 887 F.2d 1407 (11th Cir. 1989). In situations involving a mentally retarded suspect, this assurance will be difficult to satisfy unless the suspect is adequately assisted by counsel or an independent and interested adult. See Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1981) (police must painstakingly determine that suspects with limited mental abilities understand Miranda rights and must obtain counsel for such suspects absent an unmistakable knowing waiver of those rights). Compare Flower, 539 A.2d at 1287-88 (adults with limited intelligence, like juveniles, are protected class; mentally retarded person with mental age of six- or seven-year-old child did not knowingly waive his Miranda rights in absence of counsel), with In re E.T.C., 141 Vt. 375, 379, 449 A.2d 937, 940 (1982) (juvenile’s valid waiver of Miranda rights requires prior consultation with attorney or interested adult).
Absent the presence of counsel, courts have, at minimum, required the State to show that police were careful in assuring that mentally retarded defendants knowingly and intelligently waived Miranda rights. For instance, in Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. *422Supp. at 505, the district court concluded that a mentally retarded defendant with an IQ of sixty-five and a mental age of ten or eleven did not knowingly waive his Miranda rights, considering his level of intelligence and the fact that the police failed to provide the kind of detailed explanation that expert witnesses testified he needed to understand the implication of a waiver of his rights.
Similarly, in State v. Bushey, 453 A.2d 1265, 1266, 1268 (N.H. 1982), the court reversed the lower court’s finding that a defendant with an IQ of sixty-six intelligently waived his Miranda rights, despite the fact that the officers took forty-five minutes to explain the rights. The court held that although defendant appeared to understand some of the rights, he did not fully understand the concept of waiving rights. Id. at 1267. As the court stated: “Although he ultimately was able to state that waiver meant that he did not have to say anything unless [he] want[ed] to,. .. [t]here [was] no evidence in the transcript that the defendant made a choice to waive his rights after considering the consequences of a waiver,” and the State failed to introduce any expert testimony rebutting other expert testimony that defendant did not understand the concept of waiver. Id. at 1268.
That is precisely the situation here. Defendant openly testified he understood that he did not have to speak and that he could speak to an attorney. But there was no evidence suggesting he understood the concept of waiver or any consequences beyond the immediate that would result from his speaking to police. Indeed, the only testimony at the suppression hearing on this point, provided by a neutral expert, indicated otherwise. The court was not bound by the expert’s opinion, but when a neutral expert provides detailed testimony indicating that a mentally retarded defendant had no understanding of the consequences of waiving his constitutional rights, the court’s finding of an effective waiver must be based on evidence that erases any doubt as to whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent. The evidence relied on by the court — such as the interrogating officer’s self-serving testimony that defendant appeared to understand his rights — fell far short of that here. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 321 N.E.2d at 827 (simple assertions of “yes” by mentally retarded defendant did not establish knowing waiver of Miranda rights).
*423This case is particularly disturbing because at least one of the interrogating officers was aware that a court had previously found defendant to be incompetent due to mental retardation. Knowing what he did, the officer should have either obtained counsel for defendant before any interrogation, cf. In re E.T.C., 141 Vt. at 379, 449 A.2d at 940, or, at minimum, engaged defendant in a detailed colloquy regarding his rights to assure that he was fully aware of the consequences of waiving them.* See People v. Higgins, 607 N.E.2d 337, 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“whenever the police know that they have a subnormally intelligent suspect the police should take extra care to ensure that this person understands the Miranda warnings and that the *424alleged confession obtained is not simply a repetition of what the police desire to hear in order to solve the crime”).
In my view, a mentally retarded defendant cannot effectively waive Miranda rights absent a showing that the defendant understood the basic concept of waiver and the legal ramifications, both immediate and ultimate, of providing statements to the police. Such a showing should entail a context-specific inquiry into the defendant’s cognitive limitations and how those limitations affect the defendant’s understanding of the language used to obtain a waiver of rights and the abstract concepts underlying both the rights and the waiver of those rights. See State v. Lockwood, 160 Vt. 547, 568-70, 632 A.2d 655, 668-69 (1993) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (context-specific inquiry into nature of decision required to protect mentally retarded defendant’s rights). There was no such showing in the record here. Indeed, the record is devoid of any substantial evidence demonstrating that defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. Rather, the evidence, including the testimony of the court-appointed expert, indicates that defendant had no real understanding of the consequences of speaking to the police. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.
The majority states that the more rigorous standard I propose is impractical and would give mentally retarded suspects an unfair advantage over other suspects. I believe that my proposed standard would assure only that mentally retarded suspects are provided the same protection afforded by the fifth amendment to all suspects. See Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. at 507 (in ruling that mentally retarded defendant did not make knowing and intelligent waiver absent presence of counsel, court stated that “rationale for the Miranda decision was to put all criminal defendants on equal (or nearly so) footing when deciding whether to talk to the authorities before getting the advice of a lawyer”); cf. In re E.T.C., 141 Vt. at 379, 449 A.2d at 940 (juvenile’s valid waiver of Miranda rights requires prior consultation with attorney or interested adult). As for the “practicality” of my position, our determination of whether defendant was afforded his constitutional rights should be based on the relevant legal criteria, not on the capability of the current system to handle certain types of offenders.
*425Finally, I emphasize that I do not presume to assume the role of the trial court in weighing the evidence or determining the credibility of witnesses. Rather, I suggest that the trial court did not consider all of the relevant questions in determining whether this mentally retarded defendant waived his constitutional rights. I propose a more rigorous standard for determining whether mentally retarded persons have waived their rights, not a less deferential standard of review of the trial court’s determination.

 In a situation such as this, where the police were aware of defendant’s mental limitations, courts must also carefully consider whether the confession was voluntary. See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 446 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (court considered fact that police knew defendant had subnormal intelligence in determining that his statement to police was product of coercion); cf. State v. Cumber, 387 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (confession held to be involuntary where evidence showed, among other things, that defendant with subnormal intelligence regarded interrogating officer as friend who would help him get out of trouble). Because persons with mental retardation are susceptible to suggestion and have difficulty understanding abstract concepts or projecting into the future, they can be exploited so subtly that normally acceptable police tactics are, in reality, quite coercive. See Note, Constitutional Protection of Confessions Made by Mentally Retarded Defendants, 14 Am. J.L. & Med. 431, 453 (1989); Daniels, 321 N.E.2d at 826 (“circumstances and techniques of custodial interrogation which pass constitutional muster when applied to a normal adult may not be constitutionally tolerable as applied to one who is immature or mentally deficient”). Virtually no inquiry was made as to whether this confession was voluntary.
The majority’s only response to this point is that “[t]he issue of voluntariness was not raised below or on appeal nor are there facts in the record to indicate that plain error may have occurred.” It would be difficult to conceive of a more apparent example of plain error than the court’s failure to consider the voluntariness of a confession of a person known to be mentally retarded by the interrogators who elicited the confession. The issue should be addressed head-on regardless of whether it was raised at the suppression hearing or briefed on appeal. See State v. Moran, 141 Vt. 10, 20, 444 A.2d 879, 884 (1982) (under plain error rule, Court will address manifestly improper argument by prosecution on its own motion because of possible adverse effect on fair administration of justice and rights of defendant).