Court Opinion

ID: 9670825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:26:48.232022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:06.676851
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
These convictions should be reversed and the cases remanded for new jury trials for this reason: Prejudicial effect of the joinder of both defendants in a single trial. State v. Dixon, 419 N.W.2d 699 (S.D.1988). Both defendants made timely motions for severance. SDCL 23A-8-3.
Neither defendant testified. Neither (therefore) were able to confront and cross-examine each other. Out of court statements, made by either defendant, were hearsay evidence and admissible only against the declarant. State v. Best, 76 S.D. 220, 76 N.W.2d 913 (1956).
Two days of jury trial are reflected by the record with 48 exhibits offered by the State of South Dakota.* Twelve pertained to the marijuana charge. Only eight of these twelve were admitted. Perforce, the lion’s share of the evidence pertained to Possession of a Controlled Substance charge lodged against Christine Johnson. Thereby, Brent Johnson’s rights to a fundamentally fair trial were devoured. The underlying purpose of the judicial system is justice — not efficiency. Here, two trials were crowded into one trial. In State v. Andrews, 393 N.W.2d 76 (S.D.1986), cited by the majority opinion, there were common charges. Not true in this case. Brent Johnson was not charged, as was his wife, with Possession of a Controlled Schedule II Substance, namely methamphetamine.
A scalpel is a sharp instrument which can cleave flesh in one stroke. And cleanly. Not so with evidence in a criminal case. A juror’s mind is not a scalpel; it cannot finely excise evidence. Where complicated exhibits and evidence are produced in one trial, requiring frequent admonitions of a trial judge that this evidence pertains to one defendant and not to the other defendant, a juror’s mind does not have the capacity “... to keep, separate, collate and appraise evidence relevant to each Defendant.” See Andrews, 393 N.W.2d at 79. Recall the number of exhibits and witnesses in this “simple” trial. Counsel for Brent Johnson raised objection to 36 exhibits introduced by South Dakota to the methamphetamine charge; trial court admonished on the first three objections but not the other 33.
Another two-day trial — would it have been so time consuming, expensive, or duplicitous? Surely not. Here, the marijuana charge involved just three witnesses and four exhibits. Brent Johnson was engulfed in an avalanche of methamphetamine evidence. My viewpoint is supported by a quote in Dixon, 419 N.W.2d at 702, which refers to 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Joinder of Offenses & Defendants § 143 (1982), which I quote “... a trend is developing that ‘the most important consideration is whether evidence of one offense would have been admissible at a trial of the other offense, ...’ ” Applying that statement of law to this set of facts, the answer is NO.
Lastly, the admission of Brent Johnson’s statements against both of these defendants violated Christine Johnson’s right to confrontation. We have, before us, a violation of what has become known as the Bruton Rule. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In Iron Shell v. Leapley, 503 N.W.2d 868, 872 (S.D.1993), a unanimous opinion handed down by this Court on August 11, 1993 (just 4 months ago), Justice Amundson wrote for this Court:
Since the Confrontation Clause’s purpose is to assist a defendant in receiving a fair although not perfect trial, this pollution certainly undermines the reliability of the result in this prosecution and is prejudicial to Iron Shell. Adams v. Leapley, 489 N.W.2d 381 (S.D.1992).
These statements contributed to a criminal conviction. There was no harmless error. It was prejudicial error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Accord Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, *692—, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1893, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991).

The Phony Postman

Additionally, a reversal is warranted to remedy the effects of the alleged possession of methamphetamine by Christine and search of her home.
One morning, Christine Johnson was standing outside her mobile home when a United States postal employee approached her. After asking for her name, he handed Christine an Express Mail package addressed to her. She accepted and signed for the special delivery, a task familiar to most people. What happened next is not so typical. Standing in front of her home holding a sealed, unopened piece of mail fresh from the postman’s hands, Christine suddenly heard the words: “You’re under arrest.”
After expressing her disbelief, the postman, a/k/a undercover DCI agent Dalziel, remarked, ‘“Cause you know what’s inside there.” He took the still unopened package from her without revealing “what’s inside there.” Following Christine so she could inform her husband of the arrest, Dalziel carried the package inside the house. Inside, neither Christine nor her husband touched the package. After two other agents arrived to secure the premises, Dalziel departed, placed the package in his trunk, and obtained a search warrant for the house based upon Christine’s possession of methamphetamine in her home. This is remarkable. No such possession occurred. Only law enforcement agent Dalziel possessed the drug package within the Johnson home. In fact, Christine did not pick up drugs even when she stood outside her home that day. She picked up her mail!
In State v. Engel, 465 N.W.2d 787 (S.D.1991), Engel accepted a package from an undercover drug enforcement agency officer posing as a UPS deliveryman and took it inside. The package, containing cocaine, remained in Engel’s home for thirty minutes before law enforcement officers took action on Engel’s possession. We upheld the arrest and warrant stating:
[O]nce Engel had possession for half an hour, officers had probable cause not only to believe that the delivered cocaine was on the premises, but also to believe that the delivery was no mistake and that other items associated with drug use might be found there as well.
Engel, 465 N.W.2d at 790. DCI adhered to this procedure in State v. Baysinger, 470 N.W.2d 840 (S.D.1991). After a DCI agent was unable to make a UPS delivery, he left a note instructing the addressee to pick up the package at the UPS office. Later, the defendant did so and returned home. Thereafter, a search warrant request was made and executed before law enforcement officials.
Dalziel put the cart before the horse. He intuitively knew an illegal activity had occurred, but blew his cover before he had the evidence. I do not propose that Christine Johnson be exonerated from a crime due to a technicality; rather I wish to protect citizens of this Republic from facing prosecution for merely accepting mail from the U.S. Postal Service. In both Engel and Baysinger, the defendant had physical possession of the contraband within his home and had sufficient time to check the packages’ contents and act on a mistaken delivery. Christine held for a few moments a cardboard envelope decorated with the U.S. mail logo of one of this country’s great symbols: the bald eagle. At no time did the State establish that she had knowledge of this misuse of our mail system. Frankly, the employee at Citibank who first mistakenly opened the package and discovered the drugs demonstrated more constructive possession than Christine. Her possession is clearly against the weight of the evidence. State v. Brings Plenty, 459 N.W.2d 390, 399 (S.D.1990).
The controlled substance was in the house under Dalziel’s controlled possession. Christine held the Express Mail for only a few seconds and never acknowledged so much as an “I’ve been expecting this” remark. In order for the warrant to properly issue, some evidence of constructive possession should exist. Dalziel skipped that detail. Because the trial court’s decision was “exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence,” State v. Fly*693ing Horse, 455 N.W.2d 605, 608 (S.D.1990), it abused its discretion.

 State called 11 witnesses. It attempts to portray this as a simple trial. It was not.