Court Opinion

ID: 9949295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 09:09:56.049761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:26.006965
License: Public Domain

In the
                  Court of Appeals
          Second Appellate District of Texas
                   at Fort Worth
              ___________________________

                   No. 02-23-00269-CR
              ___________________________

DERRICK QUENTIN DONNELL MORGAN A/K/A DERRICK QUENTIN
              MORGAN DONNELL, Appellant

                             V.

                   THE STATE OF TEXAS

            On Appeal from the 43rd District Court
                   Parker County, Texas
                Trial Court No. CR20-0026

             Before Kerr, Womack, and Walker, JJ.
            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                  I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

      In June 2020, Appellant Derrick Quentin Donnell Morgan a/k/a Derrick

Quentin Morgan Donnell pleaded guilty to the state-jail felony offense of possession

of less than one gram of methamphetamine. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial

court placed Donnell on four years’ deferred adjudication. The State then moved to

proceed with Donnell’s adjudication, alleging that he had violated numerous terms

and conditions of his community supervision. Donnell pleaded true to the allegations

and asked the trial court to assess his punishment. After a hearing at which Donnell

testified, the trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated Donnell guilty, and

sentenced him to fifteen months’ confinement. Donnell appeals from that judgment.

We will affirm.

                                 II. DISCUSSION

      In two issues, Donnell complains that the trial court abused its discretion by

imposing a sentence that was cruel and unusual and grossly disproportionate to the

offense that he committed. He concedes that this sentence was within the range

prescribed by the legislature for a state-jail felony offense, but he asks this court to

“find as a matter of law that a 15[-]month sentence for a state[-]jail felony revocation

where the range of punishment is 180 days to two years in state jail . . . is excessive

and disproportionate.” The State contends that Donnell failed to preserve these

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issues for appellate review because he did not object to the sentence at the hearing

when it was imposed or later through a motion for new trial. We agree with the State.

      Generally, an appellant may not complain about his sentence for the first time

on appeal. Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Mercado v. State,

718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Means v. State, 347 S.W.3d 873, 874 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); Laboriel-Guity v. State, 336 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d). This includes complaints that a sentence is cruel

and unusual or grossly disproportionate. Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see Vasquez v. State, No. 02-16-00194-CR, 2017

WL 2178876, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). To preserve such complaints for appellate review, a

defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating

the specific grounds for the ruling desired. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); see Rhoades v. State,

934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that complaint of cruel and

unusual punishment under Texas constitution was waived because defendant

presented his argument for the first time on appeal); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144,

151–52 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that when appellant

failed to object to his sentence at the punishment hearing or to complain about it in

his motion for new trial, he failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment complaint that

the punishment assessed was “grossly disproportionate and oppressive”); see also

Mercado, 718 S.W.2d at 296 (stating that as a general rule, appellant may not assert

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error pertaining to his sentence or punishment when he failed to object or otherwise

raise such error in the trial court).

       Donnell concedes that he did not lodge an objection or file a motion for new

trial to preserve any purported sentencing error, and our review of the record

confirms this. Instead, he asks that we consider his issues “in the interest of justice.”

But, preservation of error is a “systemic requirement”; it is axiomatic that an appellate

court may not address unpreserved error. State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901, 909 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007); DeBlanc v. State, 799 S.W.2d 701, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); see

Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475; Ramos v. State, 819 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 1991, pet. ref’d).

       Even if we could reach the merits of Donnell’s arguments, a punishment

imposed within the statutory limits, as here, is generally not subject to challenge for

excessiveness. See Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475. Except under a very limited, “exceedingly

rare,” and somewhat amorphous Eighth Amendment gross-disproportionality review,

a punishment falling within the legislatively prescribed range and based on the

sentencer’s informed normative judgment is unassailable on appeal. Id. at 475–76; see

White v. State, No. 02-16-00158-CR, 2017 WL 1089691, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Mar. 23, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication).

       For these reasons, we overrule Donnell’s two issues.

                                   III. CONCLUSION

       Having overruled Donnell’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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                               /s/ Brian Walker

                               Brian Walker
                               Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 7, 2024

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