Court Opinion

ID: 9650306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:29:13.15926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:19.792942
License: Public Domain

WALSH, Justice,
with whom HOLLAND, J. joins, dissenting:
The majority ruling reverses a decision of the Superior Court that permitted recovery under an underinsured motorist policy for injuries sustained in a drive-by shooting. In so doing, the majority approves the trial court’s application of the legal standard for determining whether the injuries in question arose out of the use of a motor vehicle, but concludes that the underlying incident does not meet the legal test because the vehicle was not an “active accessory” to the assault. In my view, the Superior Court correctly applied the appropriate standard and its ruling should be affirmed.
The majority has characterized the incident giving rise to Royal’s claim as a drive-by shooting but does not dwell upon the importance the use of a motor vehicle played in this incident. Certain additional facts require recitation, if not emphasis, to aid in an understanding of the role a motor vehicle played in this tragic event.
In his effort to seek revenge against Baker, Downes was limited by his inability to drive. Accordingly, he enlisted, indeed hired, Mariner as his “chauffeur.” After ascertaining Baker’s location, Downes armed himself with a high-powered rifle and also instructed his chauffeur to proceed at a high speed past the trader while he fired several shots at the trailer. Royal, an innocent bystander, was severely injured by Downes’ use of a dangerous weapon. It is a fair inference that the risk of harm resulting from Downes’ conduct was heightened by his ability to fire several shots in a short period of time, with the assurance that he could quickly depart the scene.
In ruling that Royal’s injuries arose out of the use of the Mariner vehicle, the Superior Court applied the three pronged test fashioned by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Continental W. Ins. Co. v. King, Minn.Supr., 415 N.W.2d 876 (1987). The majority endorses the King approach as providing “a flexible framework” and one promotive of the goal of uninsured motorist coverage—“the protection of innocent persons from the negligence of unknown or impecunious tortfea-sors” (quoting Frank v. Horizon Assur. Co., Del.Supr., 553 A.2d 1199, 1201 (1989)).
The majority, however, parts company with the Superior Court holding that this case satisfies Klug’s fact prong—that the vehicle was an “ ‘active accessory' in causing the injury.” King, at 878. Respectfully, I believe the majority’s view of Klug’s active accessory prong is inconsistent with Klug’s caveat that active accessory is not to be equated with causation.
Over the past several decades our society has witnessed an increase in the use of guns to commit violent crimes. This phenomenon has been paralleled by the proliferation of automobiles in an increasingly mobile society. It is not surprising, therefore, that injuries inflicted through a combination of guns and cars have been the subject of considerable insurance coverage litigation. The legal issue of whether an accident arises out of the use or maintenance of an automobile is a question that defies a simple test, as a survey of “gun and car” cases attests.18 As is the case in other developing areas of tort law, the facts of the underlying claim often determine the outcome of the litigation rather than the rigid application of legal principles.
In this case, the Mariner vehicle was used in a manner that made it an “active accessory” in causing Royal’s injuries as contemplated by the King test. By definition a “drive-by” shooting requires the use of a motor vehicle to enable the tortfeasor to quickly come upon the scene, rapidly fire shots from a moving platform and then hurriedly leave the vicinity to avoid identification or arrest. When used in this manner the vehicle is no longer simply the situs of the act but, rather, significantly facilitates the infliction of inju*135ry.19 The vehicle adds an element of recklessness to the tortious conduct that would otherwise be absent and, as here, heightens the risk of injury to innocent parties. In speeding past the target, the tortfeasor, with no regard for accuracy, utilizes the element of surprise to spray bullets into an area potentially occupied by innocent and unsuspecting people. This increased danger is evidenced by the fact that Royal, an unintended victim, was severely injured as a result of the tortfeasor’s decision to use the Mariner vehicle to quickly and randomly shoot into the mobile home.
Although the majority found the absence of the “active accessory” prong fatal to Royal’s claim and, thus, ended its analysis there, the remaining prongs of King are also satisfied here. Under the second prong of the King test, it is clear that there was no intervening act of independent significance that would have broken the causal link between the vehicle and the injury. The facts presented in this case are distinguishable from those cases in which the vehicle has come to rest and, thus, was not an active accessory to the infliction of the injury. An example of the latter is the scenario of a disagreement between two motorists that results in the actors exiting their cars and committing an assault. Day v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 261 Pa.Super. 216, 396 A.2d 3 (1978). In such cases the vehicles merely transport the actors to the location and add nothing to the danger of the situation. Finally, the third prong of King is satisfied because the Mariner vehicle was directly being used for essential transportation purposes. The vehicle allowed Downes to maneuver into a position to fire the shots and then quickly escape the area.
Under the King standard now adopted by this Court, Royal’s injuries, in my view, can be said to have arisen out of the ownership, operation or use of the Mariner vehicle. Delaware’s uninsured/underinsured statute was designed to financially protect innocent insureds from individuals in our society who utilize their automobiles in a tortious way and without the ability to adequately compensate their victims. The statute’s remedial purpose should dispel doubt in borderline cases, such as this. I would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

. A comprehensive collection of cases involving automobiles and guns is contained in the ALR 4th. Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Automobile. Liability Insurance: What are Accidents or Injuries “Arising Out of Ownership, Maintenance, or Use" of Insured Vehicle, 15 A.L.R.4th 10 (1982).

. The need for a causal connection between the injury and the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle has been recognized. This requirement, however, does not mean that the vehicle needs to be the instrumentality that causes the injury. Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n. Ins. Co., Del.Super., C.A. No. 83C-JN-57, 1986 WL 13107, Walsh, J. (June 20, 1986). Rather, it is sufficient if there is a causal nexus between the injury and the operation of the vehicle. Id.