Court Opinion

ID: 9559997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:40:30.718084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:57.643051
License: Public Domain

MANNHEIMER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the decision reached by Judge Stewart, and I write separately to clarify my view of the issues involved in this case.
Although the parties’ briefs and Judge Stewart’s opinion discuss the doctrine of “strict construction” (the doctrine that ambiguous penal statutes shall be construed *893against the government), this case does not involve that doctrine — because there is no ambiguity in the statutes and regulations at issue in this case.
AS 12.63.010(a) states that “[a] sex offender ... who is physically present in [this] state shall register as provided in this section.” AS 12.63.100(4) defines “sex offender” as “a person convicted of a sex offense ... in this state or another jurisdiction regardless [of the date of the offense].”
One question is not directly answered by these statutes: What does it mean when the statutes refer to a person “convicted” of a sex offense? Specifically, does this term include defendants who were convicted of a sex offense but who received a suspended imposition of sentence and who later successfully completed their probation and had their conviction set aside under AS 12.55.085(e)? Although the statutes do not answer this question, 13 AAC 09.900(a)(2) clearly does. This regulation, promulgated by the Department of Public Safety, unambiguously declares that “conviction” includes a criminal judgement that has been set aside under AS 12.55.085.
Because there is no ambiguity, there is no need to invoke the doctrine of “strict construction”. The question, instead, involves the scope of authority that the legislature vested in the Department of Public Safety.
In AS 18.65.087(a), the legislature authorized and directed the Department of Public Safety to “maintain a central registry of sex offenders”. .This same statute also authorized . the Department to “adopt regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of ... AS 12.63.” The question presented in this appeal is whether 13 AAC 09.900(a)(2) — the regulation defining “conviction” — falls within the scope of this legislative authorization. Can 13 AAC 09.900(a)(2) be deemed “necessary to carry out the purposes of ... AS 12.63”?
This court has recognized that the term “convicted” can have different meanings, depending on the context.1 For some purposes, defendants are deemed “convicted” when a jury or a judge finds them guilty.2 For other purposes, 'defendants are not “convicted” until the court formally enters judgement against them following the sentencing hearing.3
These distinctions ultimately are based on legislative policy. If the legislature has provided the pertinent definition, then a court will apply this definition. If the legislature has left the term undefined, then a court will arrive at the applicable definition based on legislative intent and the rules of statutory construction.4
The defendants do not seriously dispute the Alaska Legislature’s 'authority to define “conviction” to include set-aside convictions. But in this case the definition was enacted, not by the legislature, but by the Department of Public Safety. The question, then, is whether the legislature authorized the Department of Public Safety to make this sort of policy decision.
As explained above, AS 18.65.087(a) authorizes the Department to promulgate regulations “necessary to carry out the purposes” of the sex offender registration act. By this grant of authority, the legislature empowered the Department to issue regulations that clarify the reach or the scope of the underlying legislation. The resulting regulations are valid even though they arguably extend or restrict the coverage of the sex offender registration act.
The Alaska Supreme Court addressed a similar legal problem in Alaska Department *894of Revenue v. Cosio.5 The legislature has authorized the Department of Revenue to “adopt regulations ... for determining the eligibility of individuals for permanent fund dividends.”6 The question in Cosio was whether the Department of Revenue could lawfully promulgate a regulation that “excludes] ... applicants who arguably fall within the statutory definition of eligible applicants.”7 The supreme court ruled that the Department did have this authority, so long as the regulatory “exclusion ... [is] consistent with the statutory purpose” and so long as the exclusion is “reasonable and not arbitrary”.8
In the present case, the purpose of the sexual offender registration act is to protect the public by alerting them to the presence of persons who have been convicted of sex offenses. The Department of Public Safety has determined that the legislature’s purpose will be advanced if the term “convicted” is defined to include defendants who received suspended impositions of sentence and whose convictions were later set aside. The Department’s decision is “consistent with the statutory purpose”, and it is a reasonable policy choice. This court must therefore uphold the challenged regulation.

. See Larson v. State, 688 P.2d 592, 597-98 (Alaska App.1984); Kelly v. State, 663 P.2d 967, 971 (Alaska App.1983).

. See Alaska Bar Rule 26(1).

. See Wells v. State, 706 P.2d 711, 715 (Alaska App.1985) (holding that, for purposes of construing the penalty-enhancing provision of AS 12.55.025(e) (requiring consecutive sentences), a person is "previous[ly] ... convict[ed]” only when their crime was committed after the entry of judgement from their prior crime).

.See, e.g., Tulowetzke v. Dept. of Public Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 743 P.2d 368, 370-71 (Alaska 1987); Mancini v. State, 904 P.2d 430, 432-33 (Alaska App.1995) (the legal meaning or the legal effect of a "conviction” is a question of policy, and it is to be decided by construing the pertinent Alaska statutes).

. 858 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1993).

. See AS 43.23.015(a).

. Cosio, 858 P.2d at 625.

. Id. (citation omitted). For a recent affirmation of Cosio, see Church v. Alaska Department of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1999) (upholding a regulation restricting "allowable absences” for purposes of determining a person’s eligibility for the Permanent Fund dividend).