Court Opinion

ID: 9590587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:56:15.38232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:44.841224
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur with the majority except for the discussion regarding the determination of a reasonable attorney fee under RCW 19.86.090, the Consumer Protection Act. I would award plaintiffs an attorney fee of $19,261.
RCW 19.86.090 provides for an attorney fee by the prevailing party,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, and the court may in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages sustained: Provided, That such increased damage award for violation of RCW 19.86.020 may not exceed one thousand dollars.
(Italics mine.) RCW 19.86.090 limits the court to determining only a "reasonable" attorney fee and in its discretion awarding an additional amount for damages, up to $1,000.
The subject case involved a maximum recovery of $35,0001 and the plaintiffs' attorneys took the case on a contingent fee of one-third of the recovery, or $11,666. 2 The motion judge's written memorandum opinion indicates the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion was won on established case law. See Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 91 Wn.2d 48, 586 P.2d 870 (1978); In re Droker, 59 Wn.2d 707, 370 P.2d 242 (1962); Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn.2d 40, 614 P.2d 184 *603(1980). Attorney fees were awarded under the Consumer Protection Act.
After Superior Court Judge Clarke granted plaintiffs summary judgment for $35,000, a 2%-day trial was conducted for the purpose of awarding damages and a reasonable attorney fee. Superior Court Judge Shields granted $1,000 in punitive damages, the maximum under the statute. He also awarded a reasonable attorney fee of $19,261, which he doubled to $38,522 for the attorneys who attained the original judgment before Judge Clarke, then awarded an additional attorney fee of $4,283 to plaintiffs' attorneys for their services in the 2 Vi-day trial. After reading all the evidence and testimony, and liberally construing the words "reasonable attorney's fee," the trial court found that a reasonable attorney fee under RCW 19.86.090 was $19,261. This amount was then doubled because it was a contingent fee and constituted quality work. RCW 19.86.090 provides only for a "reasonable" attorney fee and an additional $1,000 for punitive damages. This statute is thus unlike the federal antitrust act, which triples damages without limitation.
RCW 19.86.090 does not authorize enhancement of a "reasonable attorney's fee" by 50 percent because it was a contingent fee, plus additional enhancement of 50 percent because of the quality of the work.
The subject case was never a $100,000 case, but only a $35,000 one. In an action not brought under the Consumer Protection Act, plaintiffs' attorneys would have received a fee of $11,666. If the contingent fee was enhanced 100 percent, they would have received a fee of $23,332. The trial court awarded a fee of $19,261 as a reasonable fee, raising the amount of plaintiffs' attorneys' agreed contingent fee in excess of 50 percent. The court then enhanced this fee another 50 percent because it is a contingent fee. I find this a "manifest abuse of discretion," requiring an overturning of the court's award under State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wn.2d 298, 314, 553 P.2d 423 (1976).
*604State law prohibits punitive damages.3 Yet Judge Shields, in making his award for attorney fees, stated:
The deceptiveness in this situation about not referring to a lawyer does not warrant punitive damages in one sense, and yet in another sense it does.
(Italics mine.) Second Supplemental Clerk's Papers, at 81.
He concluded he would assess punitive damages, and did so up to the $1,000 as provided in the Consumer Protection Act. He also awarded a reasonable attorney fee of $19,261. He had no additional authority to do anything further under RCW 19.86.090. It was inappropriate to use the award of a "reasonable" attorney fee as a vehicle to assess punitive damages.
In the present case, I would affirm an award of $19,261, the amount the trial judge found to be a reasonable attorney fee. I would deny plaintiff the additional $4,283 awarded for presenting evidence as to the reasonableness of the fee. Plaintiffs' attorneys have already received a generous fee for a relatively modest judgment, without the burden of a trial. The contingent fee of $11,666 has already been enhanced more than 50 percent by increasing it to $19,261.
The majority here awards attorney fees in the subject case in the area of $32,000 to $35,000 for a $35,000 judgment. Liability was established on the summary judgment calendar without a trial. The majority says this is a reasonable attorney fee. I wonder if they would say the same thing if the client had to pay it rather than a large corporate defendant.
Conclusion
As the result of these large fees, the practice of law in our state for the poor and middle-income person is becoming so expensive that in many cases it is prohibitive, and such *605people are looking for other means to resolve their legal problems. One wonders whether the adversary system can continue or whether we should look to a faster, cheaper method of disposing of claims such as arbitrations and settlement conferences. Hopefully such arbitrations and settlement conferences of the future will be under the auspices of lawyers and judges. However, as some lawyers continue to price themselves out of the market, we may discover too late that laymen can effectively handle arbitrations and settlement conferences with minimum help from the legal profession.
I would remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with the provisions of this opinion.

The real estate contract provided for a purchase price of $45,000; however, $10,000 was paid down so seller's loss was $35,000.

The Contingent Fee Agreement (exhibit 54) states:
"A. 33% of the total recovery or attorneys fees computed upon the total number of hours expended at the hourly rate of $60.00 per hour, whichever is less.”

On March 11, 1961, the Legislature passed a law providing for punitive damages (Laws of 1961, ch. 97). This statute remained on the books only 19 days and was repealed in its entirety on March 30, 1961 (Laws of 1961, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 27).