Court Opinion

ID: 9668993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:36:04.834814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:51.034623
License: Public Domain

DIANE S. SYKES, J.
¶ 79. (dissenting). A majority of this court, like the majority in the court of appeals, has completely invalidated the Abbey Harbor Condominium Declaration. The majority in the court of appeals did so by declaring the entire "dockominium" concept to be a per se violation of the public trust doctrine. The majority here does so because it considers the condominium units to be invalid under the condominium statute's definition of "unit," Wis. Stat. § 703.02(15), so that they are nothing more than "sham" conduits for the illegal conveyance of riparian rights "by easement or by a similar conveyance" in violation of the public trust principles embodied in Wis. Stat. § 30.133.
¶ 80. Although it does not explicitly say so, by invalidating the condominium declaration, the majority extinguishes the real property rights of the 185 condominium owners who purchased "dockominiums" at the Abbey Harbor Marina. According to the majority opinion, those persons — heretofore condominium owners— have paid for, mortgaged, recorded title to, paid taxes on, insured, and (for the last six years) possessed and used, precisely nothing, because what they might otherwise have reasonably assumed was real property (because the statutes say so) was actually nothing more *522than a collection of "phantom units" unrecognized by the law (because a majority of this court now says so).
¶ 81. Incredibly, the majority obliterates the property rights of these condominium owners in the context of a Chapter 227 judicial review of a DNR permit proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 30.12 — a proceeding which the DNR had no statutory jurisdiction or authority to convene in the first place (more about that later). The majority has therefore not confined itself to merely affirming or reversing a regulation, restriction, or condition on a real property owner's use or improvement of his property, which is the usual business of land use regulatory agencies like the DNR, and which ordinarily defines the legitimate boundaries of judicial review of an agency's actions. The majority has instead used this permit proceeding as a vehicle to invalidate the entire condominium declaration itself, and therefore has eliminated each condominium owner's entire real property interest.
f 82. The majority has adopted an analysis that will in large part be unrecognizable to the participants in this proceeding. Certainly the court has the discretion to decide a case on grounds not advanced by the parties, but it should generally do so only when the law clearly requires it, which is hardly the case here. In any event, doing so in this case is simply not credible.
¶ 83. The DNR never argued that Wis. Stat. § 30.133 outright prohibits these condominiums, much less provides a basis for its exercise of permit jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Association of Lakes referenced Wis. Stat. § 30.133 only in passing in its brief in this court, and did not argue it here as grounds for denial of the permit. The Lake Monona Sailing Club, in its amicus curiae brief, invoked the statute with a little more fanfare, but not much. The administrative law *523judge ("ALJ") firmly rejected any suggestion that Wis. Stat. § 30.133 was implicated at all — either as a basis for the DNR's permit jurisdiction or substantively. And not a single party in this multiple-party, hotly contested permit proceeding ever argued that the condominium units at the Abbey Harbor Marina did not meet the definition of "unit" under Wis. Stat. § 703.02(15), or that the condominium declaration was otherwise invalid under Chapter 703.
¶ 84. Clearly, the majority disapproves of "docko-miniums," but apparently could not find anything persuasive in the arguments of those who oppose this particular form of marina ownership upon which to base its decision. What else could explain the majority's excursion into a novel theory asserted by no one? If anyone thought for a minute that these condominium units were invalid under Wis. Stat. § 703.02(15), we surely would have heard about it. The DNR and the ALJ both rejected the idea that Wis. Stat. § 30.133 was at all significant: it occupies two numbered paragraphs of the ALJ's opinion, which otherwise contains 92 numbered paragraphs of factual findings and 26 numbered paragraphs of legal conclusions, as well as a lengthy analysis.
¶ 85. We accepted review in this case on three highly important issues of state-wide impact, roughly paraphrased as follows: 1) does the filing of a permit application with an administrative agency while specifically objecting to the agency's jurisdiction and having obtained the agency's express agreement that the jurisdictional issue is not waived, nevertheless waive any objection to the agency's jurisdiction; 2) does the DNR have jurisdiction or authority under Wis. Stat. § 30.12 to require the owner of a validly permitted marina to apply for a new permit when the ownership of the *524marina changes to condominium form; and 3) is the condominium form of ownership or the condominium declaration in this case inconsistent with the public trust doctrine? The majority properly answers the first question "no." The majority's resolution of the latter two issues is seriously flawed.
f 86. The majority omits some important factual and procedural background, and sidesteps much of the legal analysis necessary to a proper resolution of the jurisdictional and public trust doctrine issues in this case. Abbey Harbor is a private, not public, marina, although it has always maintained a public boat launch. The marina's 407 boat slips were built pursuant to properly-issued permits that were not conditioned on maintaining seasonal rentals, not dependent in any way on the marina's ownership form, and not subject to any particular restrictions as to use or operation of the marina.
¶ 87. A majority of boaters who rented slips did so year after year; 85 percent of the slips had been rented for more than one year, 42 percent for more than ten years, 20 percent for more than 15 years. In addition to the docks, piers, and boat launch, the marina also includes 20 acres of upland real estate, a Harbor House, a seawall, a sidewalk, parking lots, a swimming pool, and 4,193 feet of shoreline on a man-made lagoon adjoining Lake Geneva that was created when the marina was first developed.
¶ 88. The condominium conversion involved a change of ownership only. It did not involve a change in use or any physical changes whatsoever at the marina. There is no change in the number, size, configuration, or layout of the marina or its docks, piers, or slips. No new docks, slips, piers, or structures of any kind were placed on the bed of the harbor as a result of the *525condominium conversion. There is no effect on the size or type of boat that can be moored at the marina. . The conversion does not alter or impede navigational channels or safety in the harbor. It has no adverse environmental impact on wildlife, water quality or pollution, flood flow capacity, fisheries, or the natural scenic beauty of the lake.
¶ 89. The Abbey Harbor Condominium Declaration defines the condominium "units" as the individual lock-boxes in the Harbor House, together with the standard riparian rights associated with ownership of waterfront property. It also provides that condominium owners own, as tenants in common, all of the real property and improvements at the marina, including the upland real estate, the shoreline, the seawall, the Harbor House, the sidewalk, the parking lots, the swimming pool, and the docks and piers, as condominium "common elements." The slips are denominated as "limited common elements" for purposes of allocating the right of exclusive use of individual slips among the condominium unit owners.
¶ 90. The ALJ included all of the foregoing in his findings of fact, and we are required to review factual findings deferentially. See Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6) (reviewing court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence" and does not disturb factual findings that are supported by "substantial evidence in the record"). "[T]he test is whether, taking into account all the evidence in the record, 'reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion as the agency.'" Responsible Use of Rural and Agricultural Land v. Public Service Comm'n and DNR, 2000 WI 129, ¶ 20, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 676, 619 *526N.W.2d 888; see also Sea View Estates Beach Club v. DNR, 223 Wis. 2d 138, 148, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998).
¶ 91. ABKA vigorously objected to the DNR's insistence that the condominium conversion required a new permit, inasmuch as nothing was changing at the marina besides its ownership. The parties negotiated the following compromise: ABKA would accede to the DNR's demand that it apply for a new permit under Wis. Stat. § 30.12 (the condominium association would later join as co-applicant); ABKA's objection to the DNR's jurisdiction to require a new permit was expressly preserved and would be an issue before the ALJ; ABKA was authorized to immediately begin selling 292 condominium units; 125 slips would be held back from sale and maintained as seasonal rentals pending the outcome of the permit proceeding, and if the ALJ required a greater number of set-asides for seasonal rental, ABKA would if necessary buy back the required number of condominium units.
¶ 92. At the time of the hearing, 185 condominium units at Abbey Harbor had been sold. The permit issued by the ALJ and affirmed by the circuit court authorized only 120 condominium units, and required ABKA to set aside 287 slips for seasonal rental, for terms not exceeding five years, for a "reasonable fee." The permit also imposed a requirement that the availability of rental slips be advertised "in the local newspaper of greatest circulation at least twice each spring," and that ABKA maintain a waiting list, and make that waiting list available for inspection by the DNR.
¶ 93. The threshold jurisdictional issue here is significant. Rather than deal with it directly, the majority manipulates it in order to facilitate the majority's *527preferred resolution, and then has the audacity to suggest that this dissent "misunderstands the jurisdictional question." Majority op. at ¶ 24 n.5.
¶ 94. I am compelled, therefore, to quote from this court's order accepting review insofar as it states the jurisdictional issue: "Has the legislature given the DNR authority in Wis. Stat. § 30.12 to require the owner of a permitted marina to apply for a new permit solely because of a change in the form of ownership of the property to condominium?" The majority has contorted this very specific jurisdictional question into a roving inquiry into whether there is generic DNR "jurisdiction to regulate" or "authority to regulate under the public trust doctrine" in order to give both the DNR and the majority some vaguely plausible jurisdictional cover. Majority op. at ¶¶ 12, 15.
¶ 95. No matter how it maneuvers, however, the majority cannot escape the obvious: if there is no statutory permit requirement for a marina condominium conversion that involves no new placement of structures or deposits in public trust waters, then the entire administrative proceeding below was without jurisdiction, superfluous, and void.
¶ 96. It is an accepted principle of administrative law that " 'an administrative agency has only those powers as are expressly conferred or necessarily implied from the statutory provisions under which it operates ....'" Grafft v. DNR, 2000 WI App 187, ¶ 6, 238 Wis. 2d 750, 756, 618 N.W.2d 897 (quoting Brown County v. DH&SS, 103 Wis. 2d 37, 43, 307 N.W.2d 247 (1981)); see also Wis. Power & Light v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 181 Wis. 2d 385, 392, 511 N.W.2d 291 (1994). Any doubts as to the existence of an implied power of an administrative agency must be resolved against the existence of authority. Grafft, 2000 WI App 187, ¶ 6.
*528¶ 97. Wisconsin Statute § 30.12 contains the legislature's grant of permitting authority to the DNR pertaining to structures and deposits on the beds of public trust waters:
30.12 Structures and deposits in navigable waters prohibited; exceptions; penalty. (1) GENERAL PROHIBITION. Except as provided under subs. (4) and (4m), unless a permit has been granted by the department pursuant to statute or the legislature has otherwise authorized structures or deposits in navigable waters, it is unlawful:
(a) To deposit any material or place any structure upon the bed of any navigable water where no bulkhead line has been established; or
(b) To deposit any material or place any structure upon the bed of any navigable water beyond a lawfully established bulkhead line.
(2) PERMITS TO PLACE STRUCTURES OR DEPOSITS IN NAVIGABLE WATERS; GENERALLY. The department, upon application and after proceeding in accordance with s. 30.02(3) and (4), may grant to any riparian owner a permit to build or maintain for the owner's use a structure otherwise prohibited under sub. (1), if the structure does not materially obstruct navigation or reduce the effective flood flow capacity of a stream and is not detrimental to the public interest.
Wis. Stat. § 30.12. This statute obviously contains no requirement that pre-existing, properly-permitted boat slips must be "re-permitted" upon a change of ownership. More specifically, Wis. Stat. § 30.12 does not require that an already-permitted marina undergoing conversion to the condominium form of ownership must obtain a new permit from the DNR where the *529conversion is a legal transaction only and involves no new placement of structures or deposits on the lake bed whatsoever. ^
¶ 98. The DNR permit proceeding at issue in this case was convened and conducted pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.12. The permit at the heart of this case was issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.12. Yet the majority refuses to engage in any analysis regarding the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 30.12.
¶ 99. Instead, the majority concludes that the DNR's authority to require a new permit resides somewhere in "the DNR's statutory authority to enforce the public trust doctrine" and "the reality of the regulation process." Majority op. at ¶ 16. The majority then proceeds to discover the DNR's permitting power in Wis. Stat. § 30.03(4), together with Wis. Stat. § 30.133, which it says "is included in the public trust doctrine and forms part of the basis for the DNR's jurisdiction over ABKA's proposed condominium project." Majority op. at ¶ 13.
¶ 100. As to Wis. Stat. § 30.133, the majority's position is remarkable, since no one else — not even the Wisconsin Association of Lakes or the Lake Monona Sailing Club — relied on that statute as providing a jurisdictional basis for the DNR's requirement that ABKA get a permit for its condominium conversion. Indeed, Wis. Stat. § 30.133 says nothing at all about permits. As the majority correctly notes later in the opinion, Wis. Stat. § 30.133 was the legislative response to this court's decision in Stoesser v. Shore Drive P'ship, 172 Wis. 2d 660, 494 N.W.2d 204 (1993), and prohibits the transfer of riparian rights to non-riparians "by easement or by a similar conveyance." Wis. Stat. § 30.133(1); majority op. at ¶¶ 13, 60. Whatever influence this statute might have on these proceedings, it *530cannot seriously be considered to confer upon the DNR any jurisdiction to require or issue permits when no new structures or deposits are being placed on the lake bed.
¶ 101. The majority refers to the statute's status as being "included in the public trust doctrine," as if to suggest that the public trust doctrine itself provides a jurisdictional basis for the DNR's power to require a permit. Majority op. at ¶ 13. If that were true, then the DNR would have plenary power to require a permit anytime it got a whiff of any activity that it thought might implicate the public trust doctrine, whether or not a permit was statutorily required or authorized. This is a radical departure from traditional administrative agency law, which, as noted above, requires a legislative grant of authority or power for administrative agency action.
¶ 102. Neither can Wis. Stat. § 30.03(4) serve as the source of the DNR's authority to require a new permit. That statute authorizes the DNR to initiate an enforcement action to enjoin "a possible violation of the statutes relating to navigable waters or a possible infringement of the public rights relating to navigable waters." Wis. Stat. § 30.03(4). It says nothing about permits.
¶ 103. Jurisdiction to initiate an enforcement action is not the same as jurisdiction to require a property owner to obtain a permit. If the DNR had grounds to initiate an enforcement action under Wis. Stat. § 30.03(4), it certainly would have done so. Had the DNR taken the majority's position that ABKA's condominium conversion constituted a violation of Wis. Stat. § 30.133, it might have initiated an enforcement action under Wis. Stat. § 30.03(4) to stop it. Had the DNR taken the court of appeals' position that ABKA's *531condominium conversion constituted a per se violation of the public's rights under the public trust doctrine, it might have initiated an enforcement action under Wis. Stat. § 30.03(4) to stop it. It did neither. Instead, the DNR invoked the permit provisions of Wis. Stat. § 30.12 and demanded that ABKA obtain a new permit, even though the condominium conversion involved no new placement of structures or deposits on the lake bed. The DNR had no authority to do so. We are confined to reviewing what the DNR did, not what it might have done. The majority's jurisdictional conclusions are analytically bankrupt.
¶ 104. Having badly botched the jurisdictional issue, the majority then evades the significant public trust doctrine questions surrounding both the "docko-minium" concept generally and the ALJ's permit in particular by simply invalidating the condominium declaration under the condominium statutes. The majority concludes that the lock-boxes have insufficient "independent use" to fit the definition of "unit" in Wis. Stat. § 703.02(15), which defines a condominium "unit" as "a part of a condominium intended for any type of independent use, including one or more cubicles of air at one or more levels of space. . . ." Wis. Stat. § 703.02(15) (emphasis added).
¶ 105. The majority's interpretation of the statutory definition of "unit" ignores the definition's use of the modifier "any," which means: "in whatever degree; to some extent; at all. . . in any manner whatever." Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language (rev. ed. 1996). The majority also ignores the only reported case that specifically construes Chapter 703's definition of "unit," which interpreted the term expansively to include vacant condominium land upon which nothing had yet been constructed. Aluminum Indus, v. *532Camelot Trails Condo. Corp., 194 Wis. 2d 574, 582-83, 535 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1995).
¶ 106. Finally, and perhaps most glaringly, the majority's interpretation of "unit" violates the explicit rule of construction contained in the condominium statutes:
SUBSTANTIAL CONFORMITY OF CONDOMINIUM INSTRUMENTS AND BYLAWS SUFFICIENT. The provisions of any condominium instruments and bylaws filed under this chapter shall be liberally construed to facilitate the creation and operation of the condominium. So long as the condominium instruments and bylaws substantially conform with the requirements of this chapter, no variance from the requirements shall affect the condominium status of the property in question nor the title of any unit owner to his or her unit, votes and percentage interests in the common elements and in common expenses and common surpluses.
Wis. Stat. § 703.30(2) (emphasis added); see also Rock Lake Estates Unit Owners Ass'n v. Lake Mills, 195 Wis. 2d 348, 359, 536 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1995).
¶ 107. Despite this legislative mandate of liberal construction favoring the creation of condominiums, the majority nevertheless concludes that the condominium declaration "fails to create valid units under § 703.02(15) because the units defined in ABKA's declaration have no independent use." Majority op. at ¶ 55. True, the lock-boxes are small, and therefore could not be put to a significant use. But the statute explicitly sanctions condominium units susceptible of any type of independent use, and the declaration must be liberally construed so as not to defeat the creation of the condominium. The majority, however, concludes *533that "[b]ecause there are no valid units, there is not a valid condominium conveyance of real property." Id.
¶ 108. Having invalidated the condominium declaration, there is really no reason for the majority to go any further, but it does. It concludes that the invalid condominium conveyance is tantamount to a conveyance of riparian rights "by easement or by a similar conveyance" contrary to Wis. Stat. § 30.133. But if the condominium conveyance is invalid under Chapter 703, how can it possibly form the basis for a violation of Wis. Stat. § 30.133? Stated differently, how can a legally ineffective condominium conveyance be deemed to violate Wis. Stat. § 30.133?
¶ 109. The majority has invalidated the condominium conveyance and therefore extinguished the property interests of the condominium unit owners. There is nothing left. There is no need to inquire into whether a legally defective condominium conveyance nevertheless accomplishes a conveyance of riparian rights "by easement or by a similar conveyance" in violation of Wis. Stat. § 30.133, requiring the attention of the DNR and this court.
¶ 110. The majority, of course, must reach this issue. Otherwise, its jurisdictional house of cards comes down. Having grounded the DNR's permit jurisdiction in large part on the notion that there is a potential violation of Wis. Stat. § 30.133 present here, the majority is bound to address the issue. In order to apply Wis. Stat. § 30.133, however, we must assume that a valid condominium conveyance occurred. It makes no sense to apply a statute that makes a certain sort of conveyance illegal to what the majority says is an already illegal conveyance; we have to assume an otherwise legal conveyance, and then apply the statute.
*534¶ 111. What the majority is really suggesting, then, is that a condominium is essentially the equivalent of an easement. This is preposterous.
¶ 112. A condominium constitutes a fee simple interest in real estate and by statute has the status of real property "for all purposes." Wis. Stat. § 703.04 (emphasis added) ("A unit, together with its undivided interest in the common elements, for all purposes constitutes real property."). Under no credible legal analysis can a condominium be relegated to the status of a mere easement or like conveyance.
f 113. An easement is an encumbrance on the property of another. "An easement 'is a permanent interest in another's land, with a right to enjoy it fully and without obstruction.1" Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 343, 254 N.W.2d 282 (1977). The "cases have repeatedly defined an easement as 'a liberty, privilege or advantage in land, without profit, and existing distinct from the ownership of the soil.'" Figliuzzi v. Carcajou Shooting Club of Lake Koshkonong, 184 Wis. 2d 572, 582, 516 N.W.2d 410 (1994); see also Stoesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 667.
¶ 114. Noting that the condominium owners collectively own the land and improvements at the Abbey Harbor Marina, and that "[ujnder Wisconsin law it is clear that a person 'can not maintain an easement over his own land,'" the ALJ concluded that the condominium declaration "is not the conveyance by 'easement or similar conveyance' of riparian rights within the meaning of sec. 30.133, Stats." Although the ALJ denominated this as a finding of fact, I read it as a conclusion of law.
¶ 115. An agency's conclusions of law are reviewed by reference to one of three levels of deference: "great weight," "due weight," or "de novo." RURAL v. *535PSC, 2000 WI129, ¶ 21. "De novo review is appropriate where there is no evidence that the agency used any special knowledge or expertise, the issue is clearly one of first impression, or the agency's position on an issue has been inconsistent." Id. at ¶ 22. No one has suggested that the agency lacked expertise or was inconsistent in its positions, and the issue of what constitutes an easement or like conveyance can hardly be characterized as one of first impression.
¶ 116. Accordingly, at least due weight, or possibly great weight deference is owed to the ALJ's conclusion that there is no violation of Wis. Stat. § 30.133 herd! It is very difficult to flunk either of these standards of review. Due weight deference means that any reasonable legal interpretation by an agency will be upheld, unless the court finds a more reasonable interpretation. Id. at ¶ 24 n.12. That is, the agency's legal interpretation will be upheld even if there is a different, equally reasonable interpretation — in other words, a tie goes to the agency. Great weight deference means what it says: the agency almost always wins. Under either of these standards, the ALJ's determination that Wis. Stat. § 30.133 was not violated must be upheld. Any suggestion that a condominium is akin to an easement is far from reasonable.
¶ 117. Apparently the majority is not bothered one bit by the gaping holes in and circularity of its analysis. Worse, by adopting this sua sponte, terribly misguided approach, the majority has completely failed to address the critically important administrative and water law issues that were actually presented in this case, and therefore has left them for another day.1 *536There are a number of other "dockominium" marinas around the state. Their legal status — called into question by the court of appeals' opinion — remains in substantial doubt. The majority has not only trampled on the private property rights of the individual condominium owners in this case (not to mention ABKA's), it has done significant damage to the law of condominiums, administrative agency jurisdiction, and the public trust doctrine. I dissent.
¶ 118. I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER joins this dissenting opinion.

 Both the ALJ's resolution of this case and the court of appeals' per se invalidation of the "dockominium" concept have *536significant implications for the public trust doctrine in this state, and also potentially for takings jurisprudence. See ABKA, Ltd. P'ship v. DNR, Dec. No. 3-SE-95-0080 (DNR 1996); ABKA, Ltd. P'ship v. DNR, 2001 WI App 223, 247 Wis. 2d 793, 635 N.W.2d 168; see also, R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 628 N.W.2d 781, cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 617 (2001).