Court Opinion

ID: 2965580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:42:14.524838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:07.346850
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 98-1548

                          LINDA KEATING,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                        SHIRLEY S. CHATER,

                       Defendant, Appellee.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

           [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                     Selya, Stahl and Lynch,
                        Circuit Judges.
                                
                                

     Francis X. Quinn, Jr., Benjamin T. King and Boynton, Waldron,
Doleac, Woodman & Scott, P.A. on brief for appellant.
     Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney and Christopher M.
Tauro, Assistant U.S. Attorney on brief for appellee.

December 14, 1998

                                
                                

            Per Curiam.  Claimant Linda J. Keating appeals from
    the judgment of the district court which affirmed the decision
    of the Commissioner of Social Security that she was not
    entitled to Social Security disability benefits.  On appeal,
    claimant argues that the determination of the administrative
    law judge (ALJ) that her impairments did not prevent her from
    performing the full range of sedentary work was not supported
    by substantial evidence.  However, in support of this
    contention, claimant raises on appeal arguments that were not
    presented, in the first instance, to the district court. 
    "Ordinarily, an appellant who has not proffered a particular
    claim or defense in the district court may not unveil it in the
    court of appeals."  National Ass'n of Social Workers v.
    Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).  We nonetheless briefly address,
    and reject, these new arguments.
              1.  Claimant's argument that her alleged inability to
    work full-time precludes a finding that she retained the
    capacity for the full range of sedentary work is based on the
    report of the physical therapist.  However, contrary to
    claimant's assertion, this report is not uncontradicted.  In
    particular, Dr. Marini did not limit claimant to part-time work
    when he opined that she was a candidate for retraining for a
    sedentary job and the RFC assessment completed by the
    consulting physician assumed that claimant could work full-
    time.   These reports provide substantial evidence to support
                                  -2-
    the ALJ's use of the grid based on her decision that claimant
    had the ability to perform a wide range of sedentary work.  SeeRodriguez Pagan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 819
    F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that the
    Secretary did not act unreasonably in crediting the RFC
    assessment of a consulting physician which established that
    claimant could perform sedentary work, rather than the
    conflicting reports of two of claimant's treating physicians;
    also affirming the Secretary's use of the grid).
              2.  Claimant next contends that the uncontradicted
    evidence in the record shows that the limitations on the use of
    her right hand prevent her from being able to perform the full
    range of sedentary work.  This argument fails for the simple
    reason that the record, in fact, contains conflicting evidence
    regarding the problems with claimant's right hand.  See Irlanda
    Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 955 F.2d 765,
    769 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (conflicts in the evidence are
    for the Commissioner, not the courts).
              Significantly, the EMG conducted in March 1992
    revealed no evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome or neuropathy in
    claimant's hands.  Further, in his discharge summary, Dr.
    Marini, claimant's treating chiropractor, did not note any
    problems with claimant's right hand when he opined that
    claimant could perform sedentary work.  Similarly, Dr. Krutt,
    in September 1993, stated that claimant had no objective
    findings which would prevent her from engaging in normal
    activities and Dr. McCann's December 1992 physical examination
    did not reveal any pathological reflexes, weakness or sensory
    disturbances.  Finally, although the physical therapist
    determined that claimant had limited use of her right hand, she
    concluded only that this limitation prevented claimant from
    performing her past work as a chef; the physical therapist did
    not state that the limitation prevented claimant from doing any
    other kinds of work.
              3.  Claimant again relies on the report of the
    physical therapist for the argument that there is
    uncontradicted evidence in the record that she needs to
    alternate positions frequently.  However, as with the
    contention regarding the limitations in the use of her right
    hand, claimant ignores the rest of the record.  Specifically,
    the residual functional capacity assessment of the consulting
    physician did not state that claimant is limited by any need to
    alternate positions; rather, this physician opined that
    claimant could sit and stand for up to six hours each in an
    eight-hour day.  This assessment, then, provides conflicting
    evidence on which the ALJ was entitled to rely.  See Rodriguez
    Pagan, supra, 819 F.2d at 2-3.
              Based on the foregoing, the ALJ's reliance on the
    grid was appropriate and a vocational expert was not required
    to testify regarding what jobs claimant could perform despite
    her impairments.  See Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human
    Services, 890 F.2d 520, 524-25 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam).  
              The judgment of the district court is therefore
    affirmed.