Court Opinion

ID: 9399992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 00:00:46.012656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:41.343065
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40329        Document: 00516777128             Page: 1       Date Filed: 06/06/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-40329
                                    Summary Calendar
                                                                            FILED
                                                                         June 6, 2023
                                    ____________
                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Jonathan Limbrick,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Eastern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:20-CR-79-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Jonathan Limbrick pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea
   agreement to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a
   mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine,
   in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846. Approximately five months
   later, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion was denied.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40329      Document: 00516777128           Page: 2     Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                     No. 22-40329

   Limbrick was sentenced, inter alia, to the agreed-upon term of 144-months’
   imprisonment.
          Limbrick challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
   plea. We review for abuse of discretion. E.g., United States v. Lord, 915 F.3d
   1009, 1013 (5th Cir. 2019). “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases
   its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the
   evidence.” Id. at 1013–14 (citation omitted).
          A district court may grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea upon a
   showing of “a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal”. Fed. R.
   Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); see United States v. Strother, 977 F.3d 438, 443 (5th
   Cir. 2020).     “The burden of establishing a fair and just reason for
   withdrawing a guilty plea remains at all times with the defendant.” Lord, 915
   F.3d at 1014 (citation omitted). To meet his burden, defendant must show,
   based on the totality of the circumstances, that the below-discussed factors
   provided in United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343–44 (5th Cir. 1984),
   support withdrawal. Lord, 915 F.3d at 1014. Although the court “is not
   required to make explicit findings as to each of the Carr factors”, it did so in
   a comprehensive order. Id.
          Limbrick concedes he did not assert his innocence in his motion;
   therefore, the court correctly determined the first factor weighed against
   withdrawal.
          The court considered the second, fourth, and seventh factors
   together—whether       withdrawal     would      prejudice   the   Government,
   substantially inconvenience the court, or waste judicial resources. See id. It
   determined withdrawal would: cause the Government to have to “duplicate
   its efforts to prepare for trial once again” (Limbrick did not plead guilty until
   a few days before trial was to begin); waste the court’s resources that had
   been invested in preparing for trial; and disrupt the court’s docket.

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                                   No. 22-40329

   Therefore, it concluded each of these factors also weighed against
   withdrawal. Limbrick’s vague assertions in this court that these findings
   were unsupported are insufficient to show error.
          Regarding the third factor—timeliness of the motion—the court
   determined Limbrick’s delay was “unjustifi[ed]” and “without any
   explanation” because he presented no reason for waiting five months to file
   his motion.    Again, his general assertion that this determination was
   unsupported is insufficient to show error.
          The fifth factor considers whether defendant “received close
   assistance of counsel”, which is an inquiry “distinct from whether [he]
   received effective assistance of counsel”. United States v. Urias-Marrufo, 744
   F.3d 361, 365 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). Limbrick was initially
   appointed counsel by the court, but approximately four months later replaced
   appointed counsel with a retained attorney, who , approximately five weeks
   later, represented him during his entering of his plea (plea counsel). He
   subsequently replaced plea counsel with a third attorney, who filed the
   withdrawal motion.
          The court found Limbrick received close assistance of counsel
   because, although plea counsel was not physically present when Limbrick
   signed his plea agreement before the plea hearing, he was present via
   telephone; and Limbrick was given an opportunity to confer privately with
   plea counsel before signing the agreement. Further, the court noted that, at
   the plea hearing, Limbrick stated under oath: with plea counsel he discussed
   (and understood) the facts of the case and charges against him; he was
   satisfied with plea counsel’s representation and advice; and his plea was
   voluntary.    See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn
   declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”); see also
   United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 283–84 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Reviewing

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                                    No. 22-40329

   courts give great weight to the defendant’s statements at the plea
   colloquy.”). Additionally, the court observed that neither Limbrick nor plea
   counsel had mentioned plea counsel’s physical absence during the plea-
   agreement signing at any time prior to the withdrawal motion, and that plea
   counsel was present for the plea hearing, giving Limbrick an additional
   opportunity to discuss the plea with him. Although Limbrick contends he
   was unsatisfied with plea counsel’s performance, he does not show that the
   court clearly erred in finding this factor also favored denying his motion.
          Finally, the court found the sixth factor—whether the plea was
   knowing and voluntary—also favored denying withdrawal. In doing so, it
   relied on the above-referenced statements by Limbrick at the plea hearing. It
   added that, at the plea hearing: Limbrick “admitted his guilt in his own
   words and acknowledged that his conduct was wrong”; the court provided
   explanations regarding the elements of, and maximum punishments for, his
   charged crime, and the consequences of pleading guilty; the court advised
   him he could change his plea at any time during the hearing; and he “gave no
   indication that he had any reservations or questions about the plea
   agreement”. He once more fails to show clear error. See United States v.
   Benavides, 793 F.2d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 1986) (examining conduct of plea
   hearing and holding no clear error in court’s finding plea knowing and
   voluntary).
          Accordingly, based on the totality of the circumstances, including his
   sworn statements at the plea hearing regarding his understanding of the plea
   agreement and his satisfaction with counsel, Limbrick fails to show the court
   clearly erred in its assessment of the Carr factors or otherwise abused its
   discretion in denying Limbrick’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See
   Strother, 977 F.3d at 443–47; Lord, 915 F.3d at 1013–17.
          AFFIRMED.

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