Court Opinion

ID: 9887030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 17:00:46.677491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:11.913816
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        OCT 6 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    21-30128

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. Nos.
                                                4:19-cr-00029-BMM-1
 v.                                             4:19-cr-00029-BMM

LUKE JOHN SCOTT, Sr.,
                                                MEMORANDUM*
                Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    21-30129

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. Nos.
                                                4:19-cr-00030-BMM-1
 v.                                             4:19-cr-00030-BMM

LUKE JOHN SCOTT, Sr.,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the District of Montana
                    Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted August 23, 2023
                                Portland, Oregon

Before: BENNETT, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      This is a consolidated appeal of two criminal cases. In Appeal No. 21-

30128, a jury convicted Luke Scott of assault resulting in serious bodily injury and

felony child abuse. In Appeal No. 21-30129, a jury convicted Scott of aggravated

sexual abuse and assault by striking, beating, or wounding. Scott raises several

challenges to his conviction and sentence in both cases. We address two of Scott’s

challenges in our concurrently filed opinion.1 We address the remainder in this

memorandum disposition.

      We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In

Appeal No. 21-30128, we affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand

for resentencing. In Appeal No. 21-30129, we affirm the conviction, vacate the

sentence in part, and remand for resentencing.

I.    Appeal No. 21-30128: Child Assault Case

      A.     Sufficiency of the Evidence. Scott argues that the evidence was

insufficient to prove that he committed an assault resulting in serious bodily injury

under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6). “Serious bodily injury” includes “bodily injury

which involves . . . a substantial risk of death.” 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3); see also

1
 In the opinion, we address (1) whether the government had jurisdiction to
prosecute the felony child abuse offense under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153, and Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-212; and (2) whether the district court’s
imposition of the serious bodily injury enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2A3.1(b)(4)(B) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.], resulted in improper double counting.

                                          2
18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(2). We review de novo claims of insufficient evidence,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. United States

v. Odom, 329 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003).

      As Scott concedes, the evidence showed that “the marks on [Doe’s] neck”

were inflicted on March 17, 2019. Doe testified that those marks or

bruises were caused by Scott. Scott choked Doe by grabbing and pulling the back

of Doe’s shirt with so much force that Doe lost consciousness. Dr. Stephens

testified that the marks on Doe’s neck were consistent with strangulation by

ligature—something being wrapped around Doe’s neck and pulled tightly. Dr.

Stephens also testified that strangulation presents a serious risk of death because

“[s]trangulation cuts off both the air supply to the body and the blood flow to the

brain,” and if “continued for long enough, . . . results in death.” Viewing this

evidence in the prosecution’s favor, a juror could have easily found that Scott’s

choking of Doe involved “a substantial risk of death,” 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3), and

thus that Scott committed an assault resulting in serious bodily injury.

      B.     Lesser Included Offense. Scott appeals from the district court’s

refusal to instruct the jury that assault resulting in substantial bodily injury under

18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(7) is a lesser included offense of assault resulting in serious

bodily injury under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6). We review this issue de novo. United

States v. Pierre, 254 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2001).

                                           3
      “[A]n offense is not ‘lesser included’ unless (1) the elements of the lesser

offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense, and (2) it is impossible

to commit the greater offense without first having committed the lesser.” Id. Our

inquiry focuses on only “a comparison of statutory elements.” Id. The elements of

§ 113(a)(7) are not a subset of the elements of § 113(a)(6). Section 113(a)(7)

requires injury “to a spouse or intimate partner, a dating partner, or an individual

who has not attained the age of 16 years,” but that element is not an element of

§ 113(a)(6). Thus, § 113(a)(7) is not a lesser included offense of § 113(a)(6).

      C.     Subpoena. Scott argues that the district court improperly denied his

motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b) to subpoena his 10-year-

old son to testify at trial. We review the district court’s denial for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Sims, 637 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 1980).

      Even assuming Scott’s son spent more time with Doe than the other

witnesses, Scott never claimed that his son observed any of the events that caused

Doe’s injuries. His son’s proposed testimony boiled down to general testimony

about Doe’s alleged untruthful character and reckless behavior. The district court

denied Scott’s motion both because it found the testimony cumulative and because

the motion was made very close to the trial date—about a week before trial. The

proposed testimony would have been cumulative, as the district court had granted

several subpoenas directed at Scott’s family members who would have provided

                                           4
similar testimony. The district court thus properly denied the motion to subpoena.2

See id.

       D.      Warnings. After the government rested, Scott made offers of proof as

to the witnesses he planned to call. Scott explained that he would be asking a

witness about the veracity of Doe’s statements about his injuries, and the court

then warned Scott that doing so would “open the door” for the prosecutor to ask

the defense witnesses about Scott’s character for untruthfulness, whether or not

Scott testified.3 Scott told the court that he understood the warnings and made no

objection. Scott called his witnesses but did not directly ask them about Doe’s

credibility.

2
  The district court also reasonably found that the motion was filed too close to
trial. Scott offered no reason why the motion was filed so late. However, we do
not need to determine whether the late filing, standing alone, would have justified
denial of the motion.
3
  Although the district court stated at some points that Scott’s character for
truthfulness could only be attacked if he testified, the district court also gave
several warnings without this qualification: “If you are going to attack [Doe’s]
character and you choose to testify, you’ve opened up your character to attack as
well.” “[I]f [the prosecutor] wants to cross-examine your witnesses now, if you
open the door, then she can ask them about your character . . . and your reputation
in the community.” “[I]f you’re going to attack [Doe’s] truthfulness and reputation
for truthfulness and honesty in the community, [the prosecutor] can attack yours . .
. through cross-examination of your witnesses or cross-examination of you, if you
choose to testify.” “So . . . you’re attacking [Doe’s] credibility there. So if you
want to present that testimony, understand [that the prosecutor] is going to be able
to cross-examine [your witness] about your character and credibility.”

                                          5
       On appeal, Scott argues that the court’s warnings amounted to reversible

error, as they effectively prevented him from eliciting testimony under Federal

Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 608(a)4 about Doe’s character for untruthfulness from

his defense witnesses. We review Scott’s evidentiary challenge for plain error,

United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012), assuming that

such a challenge is reviewable.5

       Scott makes no argument that he can satisfy the plain-error requirements.

But even if he had, any such argument would fail because there is no “reasonable

probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different.” United States v. Michell, 65 F.4th 411, 414 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021)).

       The district court’s multiple warnings to Scott were wrong on several levels.

First, the court’s warnings wrongly informed Scott that if he asked his witnesses

4
       A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony
       about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or
       untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that
       character. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after
       the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.

Fed. R. Evid. 608(a). Rule 608(a) applies in both civil and criminal cases. Fed. R.
Evid. 1101.
5
  The government argues that Scott’s challenge is unreviewable under Luce v.
United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984). We do not reach this issue, as Scott’s challenge
fails even if we assume that it is reviewable.

                                          6
about Doe’s credibility, then the government would be allowed to ask about Scott’s

credibility even if Scott did not testify. Nothing in Rule 608(a) provides that a non-

testifying criminal defendant utilizing Rule 608(a) to undermine a testifying

witness’s credibility “opens the door” for the government to elicit testimony about

that defendant’s credibility. As relevant here, Rule 608(a) only covers testifying

witnesses and may not be used to attack the credibility of a person who doesn’t

testify.6

        Second, the court’s warnings also wrongly informed Scott that, if he

testified, the government’s ability to attack his credibility depended on whether he

asked his witnesses about Doe’s credibility. The government’s ability to elicit

evidence about a testifying defendant’s credibility has nothing to do with whether a

defendant invokes Rule 608(a) to draw out evidence about a separate witness’s

reputation for untruthfulness. If Scott had testified, the government would have

been free to try to use Rule 608(a)—but not because Scott had (or hadn’t) opened

the door.

6
 While Rule 608(a) may be used to attack the credibility of an out-of-court
declarant whose statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted, that was
not the situation here. See Fed. R. Evid. 806 (“When a hearsay statement . . . has
been admitted in evidence, the declarant’s credibility may be attacked, and then
supported, by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the
declarant had testified as a witness.”).

                                           7
       The court’s warnings amounted to obvious errors. Indeed, even the

government’s brief does not dispute that the court committed a plain error.7

       But Scott cannot show the required prejudice. The district court required

offers of proof as to each of Scott’s witnesses, which Scott made. Based on those

offers of proof, none of Scott’s witnesses would have testified about Doe’s

character for untruthfulness. So Scott couldn’t have been deterred from asking

such “credibility” questions, because there were none that he described in his

offers of proof.8 Thus, there is no reasonable probability that, but for the errors,

the outcome would have been different.9 See Michell, 65 F.4th at 414.

       E.    Crime of Violence. The district court imposed a 10-year minimum

sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(3) because it determined that assault resulting

in serious bodily injury under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6) qualified as a crime of

violence. Scott argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erred

because assault resulting in serious bodily injury lacks the required element of

7
 The government also conceded at oral argument that at least part of the court’s
warnings was error. Oral. Arg. at 27:32–28:03.
8
 There were many areas covered in Scott’s offers of proof as to which the
government made no objection, and which the district court permitted.
9
 For this reason, we also reject Scott’s argument that the district court’s warnings
violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense. See United States v.
Chi Mak, 683 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[C]onstitutional issues not
originally raised at trial are reviewed for plain error.”).

                                           8
intent needed to qualify as a crime of violence. The government agrees in light of

the intervening decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), and

our precedent in United States v. Loera, 923 F.2d 725, 727–28 (9th Cir. 1991)

(holding that assault resulting in serious bodily injury can be committed by

reckless conduct).10 Given the government’s concession, we vacate the sentence

and remand for resentencing.

II.   Appeal No. 21-30129: Sexual Abuse Case

      A.     Preindictment Delay. Scott challenges the district court’s refusal to

dismiss the indictment for preindictment delay. We review the district court’s

refusal for abuse of discretion. United States v. Barken, 412 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th

Cir. 2005). But “[c]lear error is the standard for reviewing a district court’s finding

with respect to prejudice.” Id.

      To establish unconstitutional preindictment delay, a defendant “must prove

[he] suffered actual, non-speculative prejudice from the delay.” United States v.

Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1989). The district court’s finding that

Scott failed to show actual, non-speculative prejudice was not clearly erroneous.

See Barken, 412 F.3d at 1134. Scott’s generalized statements explaining what his

witnesses would have testified to if the trial had been held earlier are insufficient to

10
  The government confirmed its position at oral argument. Oral Arg. at 36:00–
36:50.

                                           9
show prejudice. See United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th

Cir. 2007). Plus, Scott’s own motion undercuts his claim of actual prejudice, as it

and his investigator’s report stated that the witnesses’ memory losses were also

caused by heavy drinking on the day of the incident. Thus, even without the delay,

it remains uncertain whether the witnesses would have been able to recall the

events on the day of the attack. Because the district court did not clearly err in

finding that Scott failed to establish actual prejudice, it did not abuse its discretion

in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment. See United States v. Doe, 149

F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1998).

        Contrary to Scott’s argument, the district court properly ended its analysis

after determining that Scott had failed to show actual prejudice. See Barken, 412

F.3d at 1134. We also reject Scott’s argument that prejudice should be presumed

based on the length of the delay alone, as it conflicts with the requirement that a

defendant must prove actual prejudice from the delay. See Sherlock, 962 F.2d at

1353.

        B.    Obstruction of Justice Enhancement. Scott challenges the district

court’s imposition of an obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1. We review the “district court’s characterization of a defendant’s conduct

as obstruction of justice within the meaning of § 3C1.1 . . . de novo.” United

                                           10
States v. Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 2014). We review the district

court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. Id. at 821.

      The district court may apply the obstruction of justice enhancement when

the defendant “provid[ed] a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer

that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of

the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(G). The court may also apply the

enhancement when a defendant commits perjury during trial “if such perjury

pertains to conduct that forms the basis of the offense of conviction.” Id. § 3C1.1

cmt. n.4(B). Here, the district court’s basis for imposing the enhancement is

unclear.

      At sentencing, the court stated that the enhancement was proper given the

“nature of [Scott’s] testimony.” But as the government pointed out below, Scott’s

testimony could have arguably supported either that he lied to investigators (by

stating that he had consensual sex with the victim) or committed perjury (by

testifying at trial that he never had sex with the victim). The district court’s stated

reason leaves us guessing as to which basis (or bases) the court believed supported

the enhancement. Thus, we vacate the obstruction of justice enhancement and

remand so that the court can clarify its basis for the enhancement.

      Because the issue may arise on remand, we reject Scott’s argument that the

standard of proof for criminal perjury convictions (including the “two witness” or

                                          11
“one witness plus corroboration” rule) should apply. Such a rule would conflict

with our precedent that an obstruction of justice enhancement based on perjury

need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Compare United States

v. Armstrong, 620 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that the standard for

obstruction enhancement based on perjury is preponderance of the evidence), with

United States v. Brandyberry, 438 F.2d 226, 227 (9th Cir. 1971) (noting that the

standard for criminal perjury is “clear, convincing and direct evidence”).

      We also note that on remand the district court must make adequate findings

if it reimposes the enhancement. To support the enhancement based on a

materially false statement to investigators, the court must find that the statement

(or statements) “significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or

prosecution of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(G); see also United

States v. McNally, 159 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1998). To support the

enhancement based on perjury at trial, the district court must expressly find that

“1) defendant gave false testimony; 2) the testimony was on a material matter; and

3) defendant had ‘willful intent’ to provide false testimony.” United States v.

Jimenez-Ortega, 472 F.3d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.

Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)); see also Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d at 823

(holding that the findings must be explicit).

                                          12
     Appeal No. 21-30128: Conviction AFFIRMED; sentence VACATED; and

REMANDED for resentencing.

     Appeal No. 21-30129: Conviction AFFIRMED; sentence VACATED in

part; and REMANDED for resentencing.

                                   13