Court Opinion

ID: 9636664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:37:25.259957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:47.929287
License: Public Domain

HOOD, Associate Judge
(dissenting).
In 1879 the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia held invalid an act of the legislative assembly on the ground that it “was an act of legislation which it was only competent for the Congress of the United States to pass.” Roach v. Van Riswick, MacArthur & Mackey, 11 D.C. 171, 187. In the following year the same court, construing its previous opinion, said: “All that was decided there was that Congress had no right to bestow upon the legislative assembly of the District any powers which were not necessary for it as a municipality.” Cooper v. The District of Columbia, MacArthur & Mackey, 11 D.C. 250, 251. In 1889 the Supreme Court of the United States, holding an act of the legislative assembly invalid, said: “But, as the repository of the legislative power of the United States, congress, in creating the District of Columbia ‘a body corporate for municipal purposes,’ could only authorize it to exercise municipal powers, and this is all that congress attempted to do.” Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, *265147, 9 S.Ct. 256, 257, 32 L.Ed. 637. In 1901 the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, holding an act of the legislative assembly invalid, said: “It is not a mere local regulation within the scope of the, powers ordinarily delegated to munci-pal corporations, but an attempt at the exercise of a general legislative power over the freedom of contracts.” Smith v. Olcott, 19 App.D.C. 61, 75. In 1905 the Court of Appeals, in referring to the powers of the Commissioners of the District, said: “Congress has reserved to itself, not only the power of legislation in the strict sense of the term, which it cannot constitutionally delegate to anyone or to any bo.dy of men, but even the power of enacting municipal ordinances, such as are within the ordinary scope of the authority of incorporated municipalities.” Coughlin v. District of Columbia, 25 App.D.C. 251, 254. In 1908, upholding an act of the legislative assembly, the Court of Appeals, citing the Stoutenburgh case, said: “We think it clear that the two sections of the act above referred to, which, it will be observed, are complete in themselves, are mere police regulation, and therefore within the scope of powers delegated to the municipality by Congress.” Johnson v. District of Columbia, 30 App.D.C. 520, 522.
In the face of these expressions of the highest courts of this jurisdiction, stated over a period of many years, I think we must hold that the legislative power of the legislative assembly was limited to the passage of police regulations and-municipal ordinances, and I understand, my colleagues, as well as counsel for the District, to agree, -at least to some extent, with this conclusion.
While the distinction between general legislation and police or municipal regulation is not always clear,1 it seems rather obvious to me that the legislation' here in question was civil rights legislation, rising to a higher plane oj- dignity than mere regulation of restaurants and other places of public entertainment. The many cases, both federal and state, dealing with civil rights legislation, make it plain that such legislation concerns itself with rights rather than regulation, although such rights may be guaranteed or enforced through regulation.2
Certain briefs filed with us assert that legislation of this type has been commonly enacted by municipalities, but no case is cited -upholding the 'enactment of civil rights legislation by municipal ordinance. In the only case I have found where a municipality attempted to pass such a regulation, it was held to be beyond the' power of the city. Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773.
If, as I read the cases, the legislative assembly was limited in ' its legislative power to the enactment of police and municipal regulations, and if, as I believe, the enactments in question cannot be properly classified as such, then it follows that such enactments were ineffective. Reaching this conclusion, I find it, unnecessary to discuss other points raised in the case.

. United States v. Cella, 37 App.D.C. 433, certiorari denied, 223 U.S. 728, 32 S.Ct. 626, 56 L.Ed. 633.

. E. g., The Civil Rights Cases (U. S. v. Stanley), 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835; People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245, 1 L.R.A. 293; Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31; Piluso v. Spencer, 36 Cal.App. 416, 172 P. 412; Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 P. 813; Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. People of State of Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 68 S.Ct. 358, 92 L.Ed. 455.