Court Opinion

ID: 9671089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:30:50.462103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.807409
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 45. {concurring). The majority incorrectly concludes that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) "evidences the legislature's intent to preclude use of the seat belt defense in a contribution action." Majority op. at 451. No such legislative intent can be found in the words of the statute or in its history. To the contrary, both the words and the legislative history of the statute evidence its sole true purpose: to limit to 15 percent the potential reduction in plaintiffs' recoverable damages. To impute to this statute a legislative intent that is not legitimately evidenced invades the legislative arena.
¶ 46. While I agree with the mandate of the court, I write separately to express my agreement with Justice Geske's dissent (the dissent) that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) does not bar a common law cause of action for contribution against a driver that violates *458Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c). However, I also write to express my disagreement with her dissent that under current law the negligent driver in this case can pursue a common law cause of action for contribution against the host driver that violates Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(c).
¶ 47. The majority in this case concludes that the legislature intended Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) to bar claims for contribution made "in cases involving negligence for failure to restrain another with a seat belt----" Majority op. at 439. The dissent responds that the limited design of Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) "is to cap the reduction of an unrestrained plaintiffs recoverable damages," and that the "statute does not address any limitation or reduction of a party's negligence." Dissent at 466. The dissent then concludes that Gaertner violated a safety statute, that the violation enhanced Justin's injuries, and that Gaertner is accordingly liable to Holcka for a significant portion of Justin's damages under the laws of contribution.
¶ 48. As indicated, I agree with the analysis of the dissent that Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g) does not bar contribution actions under the facts presented here. I leave discussion of that point to the dissent. However, I do not join the dissent's determination that in this case Gaertner is a joint tortfeasor with Holcka. Even if I assume that Gaertner violated a safety statute or a coordinate common law duty, under current law and the stipulated facts the parties to this action are not joint tortfeasors.
¶ 49. There are three requirements for a contribution claim in Wisconsin. First, the parties must be joint tortfeasors, also known as "joint negligent wrongdoers." Second, the parties must be in common liability to the injured party. Finally, one of the parties must have borne an unequal proportion of the common bur*459den. See General Accident Ins. Co. v. Schoendorf & Sorgi, 202 Wis. 2d 98, 103, 549 N.W.2d 429 (1996).
¶ 50. Determination of liability in seat belt negligence cases is not an easy task. As the court indicated in Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983):
[I]t is helpful to think of the automobile accident involving seat-belt negligence as involving not one incident but two. The first incident is the actual collision. . . .The second incident, which is set in motion by the first and would not occur without it, occurs when the occupant of the vehicle hits the vehicle's interior. Wearing seat belts is relevant only to the second collision and. . .may aggravate some of the damages caused by the first collision.
Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
¶ 51. To the extent that car accident injuries can be characterized only as one injury, the dissent is correct in finding joint liability. However, Foley qualified its initial aggravation statements by also indicating that the "[fjailure to wear seat belts may also cause additional injuries." Id.
¶ 52. In scenarios where independent torts result in separate injuries, the tortfeasors are successive. Generally, such tortfeasors are liable only for the injuries attributable to each of them. "Since successive torts are involved, no joint liability occurs and thus contribution is not allowed." Wis JI — Civil 1723 cmt.; see Butzow v. Memorial Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d 281, 287, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971). Distinguishing separate injuries from those injuries which are only aggravated would also be consistent with the law of torts that where two negligent acts "concur[ ] in time but result[ ] in distinguishable separate injuries to the same subject, there *460are separate torts rather than joint liability." Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 302, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
¶ 53. I note that the very stipulation offered by the parties plays into the two-accident, potentially divisible injury framework created by Foley and institutionalized by the resulting standard jury instruction for enhanced injuries. See Wis JI — Civil 1723. The stipulation in this case reads in pertinent part:
2. The accident was caused solely by the conduct of Gertruda Holcka.
12. Seventy-five percent of Justin Koldeway's injuries were caused by the failure to wear a safety belt and twenty-five percent were caused by the accident.
13. Robin Gaertner's operation of her automobile without reasonably believing or ensuring that Justin Koldeway was wearing a safety belt caused 70 percent of Justin Koldeway's enhanced injuries due to the failure to wear a safety belt and Justin Koldeway's failure to wear a safety belt caused 30 percent of his enhanced injuries due to the failure to wear a safety belt.
¶ 54. The stipulation indicates that Holcka's negligence in operating her vehicle caused an accident with Gaertner's car. At the time of that accident Justin suffered injuries that when viewed after the fact constituted 25% of his total injuries. The stipulation provides that after the collision between the two cars, both Gaertner's failure to restrain Justin and Justin's failure to wear a safety belt enhanced Justin's injuries.
¶ 55. The parties further buttress my view of existing law by incorporating the stipulation offered to the court into the standard enhanced injury jury *461instruction. As special verdict question and answer number nine in the defendant's brief indicate:
9. Assuming the combined negligence that caused Justin Koldeway's enhanced injuries totals 100 percent, what percentage of such negligence is attributable to:
Justin Koldeway 30%
Robin Gaertner 70%
TOTAL 100%
Once again it is noteworthy that a tortfeasor whose conduct caused the initial collision and whose negligent conduct may be a substantial causal factor of the victim's enhanced injuries is not credited with any responsibility for those injuries.
¶ 56. The dissent views the injury here as one injury and the tortfeasors as having concurring responsibility for that injury. Yet, a tension arises between the dissent's view and the apportionment of responsibility for the enhanced injury. Neither the special verdict questions nor the stipulation apportions any percentage of responsibility to Holcka for this separate second injury.
¶ 57. In referring to Foley, the committee comments to the failure to use safety belt jury instruction acknowledge this tension. "It has been suggested that seat belt negligence should instead be treated as a concurrent tort.... After reviewing the Foley decision, the Committee concludes that formulating the instruction and special verdict under the concurrent tort theory would be inconsistent with the Foley decision...." Wis JI — Civil 1277 cmt.
*462¶ 58. The dissent resolves the quandary presented by Foley by essentially ignoring it. The dissent instead relies upon another line of enhanced injury cases which revolve around crashworthiness and products liability claims. See, e.g., Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 359, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984). While I may agree with the dissent that the general principles of such non-seat belt negligence cases should control in seat belt cases as well, Foley cannot be ignored.
¶ 59. The Foley court created its two-crash analysis to divorce consideration of the plaintiffs seat belt negligence from inclusion in the initial comparative fault calculation then existing under Wisconsin law. See Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 485-86; Michael K. McChrystal, Seat Belt Negligence: The Ambivalent Wisconsin Rules, 68 Marq. L. Rev. 539, 544 (1985). However, in attempting to partition the seat belt negligence away from the primary tortfeasor's negligence, it appears that the Foley court may have also partitioned the primary tortfeasor's negligence away from the seat belt negligence in determining responsibility for enhanced injuries. The Foley court seems to have immunized initial tortfeasors from the full consequences of their negligence. See McChrystal, at 544.
¶ 60. In response to the Foley decision the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(g). Although the legislature limited the reduction of the injured person's damages for failure to wear a seat belt and thereby exposed the initial tortfeasor to liability for the seat belt injury, it did not affect the issue before the court today. Under the stipulated facts of this case only Gaertner and Justin are responsible for the seat belt injury. The 15 percent reduction set forth in Wis. Stat. *463§ 347.48(2m)(g) does nothing to alter the successive tortfeasor status between Gaertner and Holcka.1
¶ 61. I believe this court should revisit that part of the two-accident framework of Foley which eliminates concurrent responsibility between the primary negligent tortfeasor and other tortfeasors responsible for lack of seat belt restraint in automobile accident cases, as well as the enhanced injury jury instruction. If after revisiting Foley this court determines that the negligent parties are joint tortfeasors with common liability, then this court should also address, and not ignore, the policy questions inherent in the certified questions from the court of appeals. See, e.g., Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 425, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995).
¶ 62. Accordingly, I agree with the comment to the standard jury instruction for enhanced injuries, Wis JI — Civil 1723, "[sjince successive torts are involved, no joint liability occurs and thus contribution is not allowed. However, the accident causing tortfeasor would be entitled to equitable subrogation to the extent he or she paid for those damages attributable by the jury to the enhancing tortfeasor." Wis JI — Civil 1723 cmt. Under existing law, because the tortfeasors in this case are "successive tortfeasors," not "joint tortfeasors," Holcka's claim in contribution must fail.

 The dissent of Justice Geske is incorrect in stating our position. The legislature by operation of statute makes negligent drivers like Holcka hable without addressing the common law concept of joint or successive tortfeasors.