Court Opinion

ID: 9718610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:27:54.760932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.671114
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
dissenting. The majority concludes that a judge may preside over a criminal trial even though the judge is married to a state police officer who works in the same small barracks as the investigating officers in the case. Today’s decision, rather than simply requiring Judge DiMauro’s disqualification in every case in which officers of the Rockingham barracks are involved as investigators, arresting officers, or witnesses, instead requires a fact-specific determination in every such case in which the defendant seeks Judge DiMauro’s disqualification. Because I believe the majority’s decision encourages defendants to pry into the personal lives of Judge DiMauro and her husband, creates an unnecessary administrative burden for the administrative judge and this Court, and, most importantly, permits the public and criminal defendants to entertain doubt as to the integrity of the criminal process, I respectfully dissent.
Both the majority and the administrative judge emphasize the lack of a detailed factual record showing any relationship between Judge DiMauro or Trooper DiMauro and the officers involved in this case, other than Trooper DiMauro’s position as a fellow officer in the twelve-officer Rockingham barracks. Yet the “heart of the decision of the administrative judge,” 164 Vt. at 560, 675 A.2d at 423, includes an acknowledgment that “it may be reasonable to believe that personal, as well as professional relationships exist” and, moreover, that “the *567existence of a personal relationship between either Judge DiMauro and/or her husband and a potential witness . . . would be relevant.” 164 Vt. at 560, 675 A.2d at 423. The majority apparently accepts that (1) a personal relationship between Judge DiMauro or Trooper DiMauro and an officer involved in the case might be enough to require Judge DiMauro’s disqualification, and (2) a reasonable person would likely believe, under these circumstances, that such relationships do exist. Nonetheless, the majority holds that Judge DiMauro may preside over defendant’s case.
Although I have no reason to doubt Judge DiMauro’s fairness and integrity, in this or any other case, I believe that these two propositions, which I also accept, compel an opposite result. Our first priority in resolving a difficult question such as this must be the preservation of public trust in the judiciary. For a number of reasons, permitting Judge DiMauro to preside over criminal cases that involve officers from her husband’s barracks raises an appearance of impropriety and unnecessarily exposes the judiciary to public criticism.
Of critical importance is the fact that this is not an ordinary civil trial, and the officers involved are not ordinary witnesses. The appearance, as well as the reality, of fair and impartial proceedings is especially important in a criminal trial. Criminal defendants have more at stake than a possible monetary loss. They face a possible loss of liberty. What stands between a defendant and the power of the state is the judge and, if the case goes to trial, the jury.1 An apparent connection between a presiding judge and the agents of the state who are prosecuting a case undermines the judge’s function as an impartial arbiter between the defendant and the state.
The majority maintains that defendant is seeking Judge DiMauro’s disqualification merely “because a person who works in the same office as the judge’s husband may be a witness, giving unspecified testimony.” 164 Vt. at 563, 675 A.2d at 425. This characterization of the facts is disingenuous. Police officers who testify in criminal eases are not ordinary witnesses. As a result of both the officers’ official duties and the typical collaboration between investigating officers and prosecutors, police officers in criminal cases appear to be an arm of the state. I see little difference between this case and one in which the presiding judge is married to a member of the state’s attorney’s office. Indeed, in one way the connection is more troubling: because of *568the importance of police investigatory work in criminal trials, Judge DiMauro will likely be called upon in some of these cases to make rulings that turn on the competence and credibility of Trooper DiMauro’s fellow officers.
I am concerned as well by the practical consequences of the majority’s decision. By requiring defendants to produce evidence showing that either Judge DiMauro or Trooper DiMauro has some specific connection to the officers involved in their cases, the Court encourages future defendants to probe the private lives of Judge DiMauro and her husband, in the hope of unearthing relevant information. Judge DiMauro’s social relationships will be the subject of routine investigations by defendants.
Not only will the DiMauros’ privacy be invaded, but our scarce judicial resources will be expended on future motions like this one. The administrative judge will be forced to hold lengthy evidentiary hearings as defendants attempt to make out a sufficient factual record to support disqualification. Review of these motions will also absorb the time of this Court, while unnecessarily delaying the underlying criminal proceedings.
Defendant urges this Court to avoid these problems by adopting a “per se” rule requiring Judge DiMauro’s disqualification in cases involving officers from the Rockingham barracks. Rejecting this approach, the majority makes two arguments: first, that fashioning a per se rule in this case is inappropriate, because the Code of Judicial Conduct provides the fist of circumstances in which the Court has decided that disqualification is always required; and second, that by entrusting disqualification decisions to the discretion of the administrative judge, we signaled a shift away from rigid disqualification rules.
Although it is true that this case does not fit within any of the disqualification rules of the Code, A.0.10, Canon 3E(1)(a)-(d), I see no reason to conclude that the Code’s list of disqualification rules is exhaustive. In a state of this size, conflicts are certain to occur frequently. If such questions were typically litigated, we would quickly find that the specific rules contained in the Code of Judicial Conduct barely scratch the surface of this issue. For example, those rules do not cover situations in which a judge has a social relationship with a party, yet we have found such a situation troubling enough to require disqualification. See Richard v. Richard, 146 Vt. 286, 288, 501 A.2d 1190, 1191 (1985) (requiring disqualification of assistant judges based on social relationship with plaintiff). This Court does not face *569these questions often, however, because judges usually go beyond the requirements of the rules, either simply recusing themselves for any reason that might cast doubt on their impartiality, or disclosing the information and then recusing themselves if a party so requests.
Fortunately, this informal system works well, and permits this Court, and the administrative judge, to avoid most sticky disqualification questions. Nonetheless, troubling situations may develop that, like this one, are difficult to pigeonhole within the rules, but are best resolved with a simple and straightforward requirement of disqualification. This approach is not inconsistent with our decision in Ball v. Melsur Corp., 161 Vt. 35, 39-40, 633 A.2d 705, 710 (1993), in which this Court recognized that the administrative judge has discretion in deciding disqualification issues. That discretion is appropriate when the administrative judge reaches a decision after weighing evidence and resolving disputed factual questions. Here, however, I believe the best approach is to establish a rule that prevents such fact-based disputes from ever reaching the administrative judge.
I would reverse the decision of the administrative judge, and require Judge DiMauro’s disqualification in this case, and any case involving officers from the barracks where Trooper DiMauro is stationed as investigators, arresting officers, or witnesses.2

 A marital relationship between a juror and an officer in the Rockingham barracks would likely entitle defendant to strike the juror for cause.

 If both parties agree, of course, they may notify the court clerk that Judge DiMauro may preside over a case that involves officers from the Rockingham barracks.