Court Opinion

ID: 9389546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 20:02:49.73472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:28.352113
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/25/23 In re R.C. CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 In re R.C., a Person Coming                                    B317429
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                Los Angeles County
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                             Super. Ct. No.
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                         20CCJP02267A
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 B.C.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
      Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Kimberly Roura, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _________________________
       When father’s daughter, R.C., was five weeks old, doctors
discovered she had a fractured femur that had partially healed.
Father speculated that the doctors or nurses had caused
the injury while examining the child, but he acknowledged
he may have handled her too roughly. The juvenile court took
jurisdiction over the child and removed her from her parents’
custody after finding the injury was of a nature as would
ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the
unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent.
On appeal, father contends the court erroneously presumed
he or the child’s mother had caused the injury. He also argues
the court erred by removing the child from his custody because
he was incarcerated. Finally, father contends the juvenile court
and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) failed to comply with their duties of
initial inquiry under state law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.)
implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA)
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).1 We affirm.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Father B.C. and mother J.C. have one child together, R.C.,
who was born in March 2020. About five weeks later, Father
took R.C. to a hospital emergency room because the child had
momentarily turned blue and stopped breathing. A doctor
wanted to perform further testing because the child had not been
seen by a pediatrician since birth. Father

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code. Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,”
we do the same for consistency. (In re Benjamin M. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

                                 2
 initially insisted on taking R.C. home without scheduling a
follow-up appointment. He eventually agreed that the child
could remain at the hospital overnight and doctors could perform
a skeletal exam. Father left the hospital, explaining he had
“ ‘things to do.’ ”
        Doctors performed a skeletal exam and took x-rays of
the child. Dr. Lori Taylor reviewed the x-rays and noted the
“imaging findings suggest a healing nondisplaced fracture”
of the left femur. According to another doctor, Katharine Walz,
the skeletal exam showed findings consistent with either a
“healing fracture of [left] femur” or osteomyelitis, which is
a bone infection. The doctor, however, found no other signs
of an infection. Dr. Walz described the results as “concerning,”
and she referred the case to the Department.
        A Department social worker visited R.C. in the hospital
and found the child appeared to be healthy. The social worker
tried to interview father, but he refused to cooperate, threatened
to file a lawsuit, and became hostile. Security guards escorted
father out of the hospital and handcuffed him. The police
arrested father for making threatening statements and gesturing
as though he had a weapon.
        During a subsequent interview with the social worker,
father said he took R.C. to the emergency room because she
had a runny nose, and he speculated that one of the nurses
had caused the fracture. Father said “[i]t was either me or the
hospital” that caused the injury. He acknowledged that he had
been “kind of rough with [R.C.]. I don’t mean no harm; like when
I pick her up.” The social worker pointed out that the fracture
had been healing by the time father took the child to the hospital,
to which father responded, “It’s going to fall back on me then. . . .

                                  3
Maybe I was rough.” Father clarified that, “[i]f I did it, it was
accidentally.”
       Mother said she had asked father to take care of the child
that night because she was tired and had a sore back; it was
father’s first night ever caring for R.C. Mother told father not
to take R.C. to the hospital, because she thought it was normal
for a baby to turn blue. Father, however, was nervous about R.C.
because, according to mother, he did not have experience caring
for a baby.
       Mother denied causing the injury to R.C., and she claimed
not to know how the child had suffered it. She speculated that
a nurse could have caused the fracture at the emergency room.
Later, mother said father told her a doctor had caused the
fracture and she believed him.
       Maternal grandmother told the Department that mother
struggles with depression and had recently been diagnosed with
bipolar disorder. She also suspected father had abused mother.
According to maternal grandmother, mother had bruises while
pregnant with R.C., and her explanations for the injuries did
not make sense. Maternal grandmother did not believe mother
would have harmed R.C.
       Dr. Kelly Phong reviewed the hospital discharge summary
and told the Department that R.C.’s fracture was “ ‘highly
suspicious for non-accidental.’ ” The doctor noted the fracture
would have been painful for the child. Dr. Phong suggested R.C.
was not suffering from osteomyelitis because there were no other
signs of an infection and osteomyelitis does not heal on its own.
       R.C. underwent additional x-rays and a follow-up skeletal
exam in June 2020. Dr. Catherine DeRidder reviewed the results
and reported the fracture appeared to have healed completely.

                                4
Dr. DeRidder noted that the original skeletal survey taken at
the hospital indicated the injury would have been between one
and three weeks old at that time. She said the signs of healing
to the bone were “very suspicious for physical abuse although
birth trauma cannot be completely ruled out.”
       The Department filed a petition asserting R.C. is a child
described by section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The petition
alleged two general bases for jurisdiction: (1) R.C. had suffered
a fractured femur; and (2) mother has a history of mental and
emotional problems, which endangered the child’s physical health
and safety. As to the first basis, the Department indicated it
intended to rely on the presumption found in section 355.1, which
provides that “[w]here the court finds, based upon competent
professional evidence, that an injury . . . sustained by a minor
is of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the
result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either
parent, the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody
of the minor, that finding shall be prima facie evidence that
the minor is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d)
of Section 300.” (§ 355.1, subd. (a).)
       The court detained R.C., and the Department placed her
with a paternal relative. Mother described the relative caregiver
as “pretty much” father’s cousin, “[f]or the most part.”
       Father was in custody throughout the dependency
proceedings, but it is not clear for what reason. In July 2020,
a court sentenced him to six years in prison. At father’s request,
the court continued the jurisdiction hearing several times so
he could appear at it.
       The court finally held a combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing on December 20, 2021. Father urged

                                 5
the court to dismiss him from the petition because the evidence
showed he was trying to care for R.C. and would not have hurt
her. He suggested a nurse could have caused the injury, or it
could have occurred during birth. Father alternatively asked the
court to place the child with him, with a plan that R.C. remain
with the paternal relative caregiver while he was incarcerated.
       R.C.’s counsel and the Department urged the court instead
to sustain the petition and remove R.C. from both parents’
custody. The Department argued that, even if the parents had
met their burden of rebutting the section 355.1 presumption,
they had not overcome the clear evidence showing they caused
the injury.
       The court sustained a single count under section 300,
subdivision (a), related to R.C.’s fractured femur, and it dismissed
the other counts. The court explained that it agreed with the
Department’s arguments with regards to R.C.’s injury, and it
found the parents’ speculation regarding the cause of the injury
insufficient to rebut the presumption under section 355.1.
       As to disposition, the court declared R.C. a dependent
and removed her from her parents’ custody, noting it relied on
the same facts that supported jurisdiction. The court explained
it was “concerned about the parents’ ability to care for this child
even at this time due to the parents’ lack of candor and their
engagement in minimization” regarding the femur injury.
       Father timely appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
1.     The court properly took jurisdiction over R.C.
       Father contends the juvenile court erred by taking
jurisdiction over R.C. based on the presumption found in
section 355.1. He contends the presumption did not apply

                                 6
because there was competent professional evidence that neither
he nor mother caused R.C.’s injury. Alternatively, he argues
there is sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.
       Under section 355.1, where “the court finds, based upon
competent professional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or
detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as
would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the
unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent,
the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the
minor, that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor
is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300.”
(§ 355.1, subd. (a).)
       The presumption “require[s] the trier of fact to assume
the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is
introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence,
in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence
or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and
without regard to the presumption.” (Evid. Code, § 604;
see In re Quentin H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 608, 614–615
(Quentin H.).) “Once rebutted, the presumed fact may still be
considered by the fact finder, as well as any reasonable inferences
to be derived therefrom [citation], but without regard to the
benefit of the presumption.” (Quentin H., at pp. 614–615.)
A parent may rebut a presumption under section 355.1 by
relying on information in the Department’s own reports. (See
Quentin H., at p. 616; In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th
1036, 1041.)
       Here, father concedes there is substantial evidence that
R.C. suffered a fractured femur. The only question, therefore,
is whether there is sufficient competent professional evidence to

                                  7
support the court’s finding that the fracture is a type of injury
ordinarily suffered as a result of a parent’s unreasonable
or neglectful acts. On that issue, Dr. Kelly Phong reviewed
the hospital discharge summary and stated R.C.’s injury was
“ ‘highly suspicious for non-accidental.’ ” Dr. Catherine DeRidder
similarly remarked that, based on the skeletal survey, the
fracture was “very suspicious for physical abuse.” Based on this
evidence—which father seems to concede is both professional
and competent—the juvenile court reasonably could have found
R.C.’s injury was of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained
except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts of her
parents. The court, therefore, properly applied the presumption
under section 355.1.
       Father contends the presumption did not apply because
there is equally competent professional evidence that R.C.
suffered the injury during childbirth. In support, he points to
Dr. DeRidder’s remark that “birth trauma cannot be completely
ruled out.”
       Although not stated explicitly, father is essentially arguing
that a court may not apply a section 355.1 presumption if there
is evidence in the record to rebut it. If that were the standard,
in any case in which the presumption could be rebutted, it would
be error to apply the presumption in the first instance. In effect,
this would render a section 355.1 presumption conclusive.
Section 355.1, however, creates a rebuttable presumption, not
a conclusive one. (Quentin H., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 610.)
Father’s argument, therefore, is not consistent with the statutory
scheme.
       Nor are we persuaded by father’s contention that
Dr. DeRidder’s remark was sufficient to rebut the presumption.

                                 8
In order to overcome a section 355.1 presumption, there must be
evidence to “support a finding of its nonexistence.” (Evid. Code,
§ 604.) Dr. DeRidder’s speculative remark that she could not
“completely rule[ ] out” the possibility that R.C. suffered the
injury during childbirth is far from sufficient to support a finding
that the injury was not the result of her parents’ unreasonable or
neglectful acts; at most, it would raise some doubt as to the issue.
In any event, father overlooks that Dr. DeRidder’s own report
rules out the possibility that R.C. suffered the injury during
childbirth. Specifically, Dr. DeRidder concluded R.C. sustained
the injury no more than three weeks before the hospital
performed the skeletal exam. R.C. was five weeks old when
the hospital performed the exam, meaning she could not
have sustained the injury during childbirth. On this record,
Dr. DeRidder’s passing remark about childbirth was not
sufficient to rebut the section 355.1 presumption.
       We also reject Father’s argument that he rebutted the
presumption by positing that he might have accidentally caused
the injury while handling R.C. roughly. Even if that were true,
handling a newborn in such a way as to cause a fractured femur
undoubtedly constitutes an unreasonable or neglectful act.
Moreover, it is irrelevant that father may not have intended
to cause the injury, as section 355.1 does not require a purposeful
intent.
2.     The court did not erroneously remove R.C. from
       father’s custody based on the fact he was
       incarcerated
       Father contends the juvenile court erred by relying on the
fact that he was incarcerated to remove R.C. from his custody.

                                 9
       Father correctly states the mere fact a parent is
incarcerated is insufficient to support dependency jurisdiction
if the parent makes arrangements for the child’s care and there
is no risk to the child. (§ 300, subd. (g); Maggie S. v. Superior
Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 662, 672; see In re S.D. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077 [there is no “ ‘[g]o to jail, lose your child’
rule in California”].) Here, however, there is nothing in the
record even to suggest the court removed R.C. from father’s
custody because he was incarcerated. Instead, the court
explicitly stated it removed R.C. based on the same facts
that supported jurisdiction—mainly R.C.’s fractured femur—
and because it was “concerned about the parents’ ability to care
for this child even at this time due to the parents’ lack of candor
and their engagement in minimization” regarding the femur
injury. Father does not challenge those bases for the court’s
dispositional orders. Accordingly, he has not shown the court
erred in removing R.C. from his custody.
3.     Substantial evidence supports the court’s ICWA
       findings
       Father contends the juvenile court’s ICWA findings must
be reversed because the Department failed to ask the relative
caregiver and maternal grandparents whether R.C. is, or may be,
an Indian child, as required under section 224.2, subdivision (b).
       a.    Background
       At the detention hearing, the court noted that mother
had submitted a Judicial Council form ICWA-020, Parental
Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020 form) indicating she
has no Indian ancestry. Based on that form, the court found it
had no reason to know or believe R.C. is an Indian child.

                                 10
      In July 2020, father filed an ICWA-020 form indicating he,
too, has no reason to know R.C. is an Indian child. At a hearing
the same month, the court appointed counsel to represent father
and found he is R.C.’s presumed father. Based on father’s
ICWA-020 form, the court found no reason to know or believe
R.C. is an Indian child through father’s family. The court
deferred making an ICWA finding with respect to mother. The
court did not address its prior ICWA findings from the detention
hearing.
      According to the Department’s reports, mother denied
having Indian ancestry in July 2020, and father denied having
Indian ancestry in September 2021. Mother told the Department
she was raised by maternal grandparents, and she described
her relationship with them as “ ‘perfect.’ ” Father said paternal
grandmother passed away when he was eight years old, and he
was subsequently raised by his sister, paternal aunt. Father
did not have a good relationship with paternal grandfather,
who passed away in 2013.
      b.     Governing law and standard of review
      Congress enacted ICWA to curtail “the separation of
large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes
through adoption or foster care placement” (Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30, 32), and “to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families
by establishing . . . standards that a state court . . . must follow
before removing an Indian child from his or her family” (In re
Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 881; In re Ezequiel G. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 984, 998 (Ezequiel G.), review den. Nov. 22, 2022,
S276223).

                                 11
       “California adopted conforming legislation in 2006
(Sen. Bill No. 678 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.)), which was amended
effective January 1, 2019 (Assem. Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.)). As currently written, the law provides that the
court and county welfare department have an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition
may be filed is or may be an ‘Indian child’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a))—
that is, an ‘unmarried person who is under age eighteen and
is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe’ (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); see § 224.1,
subd. (a) [adopting federal definition]).” (Ezequiel G., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 998.)
       “The state law duty to make an ICWA inquiry ‘begins
with the initial contact, including, but not limited to, asking
the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has
any information that the child may be an Indian child.’ (§ 224.2,
subd. (a).) If a child is removed from parental custody, the county
welfare department ‘has a duty to inquire whether that child
is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking
the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended
family members, others who have an interest in the child, and
the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is,
or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or
Indian custodian is domiciled.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)” (Ezequiel G.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 998.)
       “If the initial inquiry provides ‘reason to believe’ that
an Indian child is involved in a proceeding—that is, if the court
or social worker ‘has information suggesting that either the
parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible

                                12
for membership in an Indian tribe’—then the court or social
worker ‘shall make further inquiry’ regarding the child’s possible
Indian status as soon as practicable. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) Further
inquiry ‘includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: [¶]
(A) Interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended
family members . . . . [¶] (B) Contacting the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and the State Department of Social Services . . . . [and]
[¶] (C) Contacting the tribe or tribes and any other person that
may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the
child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.’ (Ibid.)”
(Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 999.)
       “If there is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child, the
agency shall provide notice to the relevant tribes and agencies
in accordance with section 224.3, subdivision (a)(5). (§ 224.2,
subd. (f).) There is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child
if any one of six statutory criteria is met—i.e., if the court is
advised that the child ‘is an Indian child,’ the child’s or parent’s
residence is on a reservation, the child is or has been a ward of a
tribal court, or either parent or the child possess an identification
card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.
(§ 224.2, subd. (d).)” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 999.)
       “If the juvenile court finds that ‘proper and adequate
further inquiry and due diligence as required in this section
have been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the
child is an Indian child,’ the court may make a finding that ICWA
does not apply to the proceedings, ‘subject to reversal based on
sufficiency of the evidence.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)” (Ezequiel G.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 999.)

                                 13
        c.     Analysis
        As we understand his argument, father contends there
is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s ICWA
findings because the Department failed to conduct a proper and
adequate inquiry of extended family members. He argues the
Department was statutorily mandated to interview all maternal
and paternal relatives who were available during the course of
the dependency proceeding—specifically, the relative caregiver
and maternal grandparents—and the juvenile court was
obligated to ensure those interviews occurred before it could
find ICWA did not apply to the case.
        At the outset, we do not agree with father that the
Department had a statutory duty to interview the relative
caregiver. Mother described the caregiver as “pretty much”
father’s cousin, “[f]or the most part.” Assuming the caregiver
is, in fact, father’s cousin, she would be R.C.’s first cousin
once removed. First cousins once removed, however, are not
considered extended family members for purposes of ICWA.
(See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)
        Even if the caregiver were an extended family member, or
the Department was required to interview her under some other
provision, we would still affirm. We considered a substantively
similar argument in Ezequiel G. The mother there argued the
juvenile court erroneously relied upon the parents’ declarations
that “they did not have Indian ancestry as far as they knew” in
finding ICWA did not apply, despite the availability of several
identified extended family members whom the Department failed
to ask about the child’s possible Indian heritage. (Ezequiel G.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 997–998.) Addressing the
contention, we considered the initial duty to inquire of “extended

                                14
family members” under the plain text of our state’s ICWA law
(§ 224.2, subd. (b)) and how a juvenile court should understand
that duty in assessing whether “proper and adequate further
inquiry and due diligence” have been conducted (§ 224.2, subd.
(i)(2)). (Ezequiel G., at pp. 1004–1006.) Because “complying with
the literal language of the statute—that is, making an initial
and further ICWA inquiry of every member of a child’s extended
family, including first and second cousins, plus every other
person who has an interest in the child—is absurd at best and
impossible at worst,” we determined a literal construction had
to be discarded to avoid absurd results and to give effect to the
manifest purposes of the statute. (Id. at pp. 1006, 1008–1009;
see Stokes v. Baker (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 946, 957.) Recognizing
that “the question at the heart of the ICWA inquiry” is “[w]hether
a child involved in a proceeding ‘is or may be an Indian child,’ ”
we held “the focus of the [juvenile] court’s analysis should not
be on the number of individuals interviewed, but on whether the
[Department’s] ICWA inquiry has yielded reliable information
about a child’s possible tribal affiliation.” (Ezequiel G., at
p. 1009, quoting § 224.2, subd. (a).)
        Applying that standard to the mother’s contention in
Ezequiel G., we concluded the parents’ denials of Indian ancestry
were alone sufficient to find the Department’s ICWA inquiry had
yielded reliable information about the child’s tribal affiliation.
(Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.) In reaching
this conclusion, we rejected “the suggestion made in some
recent appellate decisions that a parent may not have reliable
information about tribal membership.” (Id. at p. 1011, citing
In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 295.) As we explained,
“ ‘ICWA does not apply simply based on a child or parent’s Indian

                               15
ancestry’ ”; rather, “the ‘definition of “Indian child” ’ is ‘based on
the child’s political ties to a federally recognized Indian Tribe,
either by virtue of the child’s own citizenship in the Tribe, or
through a biological parent’s citizenship and the child’s eligibility
for citizenship.’ ” (Ezequiel G., at p. 1009, quoting U.S. Dept. of
Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for Implementing
the Indian Child Welfare Act (Dec. 2016) p. 10 
[as of July 29, 2022], archived at 
and Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed.Reg. 38778,
38795 (June 14, 2016) (BIA ICWA Proceedings), italics added.)
We emphasized, “ ‘Tribal citizenship (aka Tribal membership)
is voluntary and typically requires an affirmative act by the
enrollee or her parent,’ ” such as “ ‘the filing of an application’ ”
“ ‘for Tribal citizenship on behalf of the child.’ ” (Ezequiel G.,
at pp. 1009–1010, quoting BIA ICWA Proceedings, 81 Fed.Reg.
at p. 38783, italics added.) Thus, because tribal membership
typically requires an affirmative act, we held “a child’s parents
will, in many cases, be a reliable source for determining whether
the child or parent may be a tribal member,” and a juvenile court
may therefore “find an ICWA inquiry was adequate even if an
agency has not interviewed some available family members.”
(Ezequiel G., at p. 1010.)
        Applying the Ezequiel G. standard to the record in this
case, we agree with the Department that the parents’ repeated
denials of Indian ancestry constituted sufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply.
As in Ezequiel G., the evidence here shows mother had contact
with maternal grandparents throughout her childhood and into
her adult life. In fact, mother described their relationship as

                                  16
“ ‘perfect.’ ” Although father had a strained relationship with
paternal grandfather and paternal grandmother died while he
was a child, the record indicates he was raised by, and remained
in contact with, his family. (Cf. In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
542, 548 [mother was adopted and did not have information
about her biological relatives]; In re A.C. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
1009, 1015–1016 [“mother was the product of foster care and thus
may not have known her cultural heritage”].) Nor does father
explain why his cousin, the relative caregiver, might possess
information relevant to R.C.’s Indian status that the child’s
own parents do not.
       Under these circumstances, the possibility that mother
or father might unknowingly be a member of a tribe is “trivially
small.” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.) And,
critically, because the juvenile court could reasonably infer that
the parents would know whether they took the sort of affirmative
steps necessary to establish a political relationship to a tribe, the
court also could reasonably find their denials of Indian heritage
reliably established R.C. was not an Indian child within the
meaning of ICWA. (See id. at pp. 1009–1010.) On this record,
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s ICWA finding.
       Although we are affirming the juvenile court’s findings
and orders, we do not mean to suggest we are excusing the
Department or the court from their affirmative and continuing
duties of inquiry. (See § 224.2, subd. (a).) If the court receives
new information providing reason to believe the child is an
Indian child, it must reverse its initial ICWA determination
and order the Department to conduct further inquiry. (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(2).)

                                 17
                        DISPOSITION
      We affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and
disposition orders.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                     EGERTON, J.

I concur:

            EDMON, P. J.

                                18
LAVIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting:

       I agree that the juvenile court properly took jurisdiction
over the child. I also agree that the court did not err in removing
the child from father’s custody. For the reasons set forth in
my dissent in In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1015–
1025, however, I would reverse the court’s findings under the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) and related state law and remand for further proceedings.
The Department of Children and Family Services could easily
have asked the parents’ extended family members about the
child’s possible Indian heritage and documented those efforts. It
did not. Further, nothing in the record shows how those extended
family members would have responded to questions about the
child’s possible Indian heritage.

                                           LAVIN, J.