Court Opinion

ID: 9699979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:01:56.156768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:01.306257
License: Public Domain

Clifford, J.
(dissenting). The arguments marshalled by the majority in support of its reversal of the judgment terminating plaintiff’s parental rights are persuasive, as is the analysis of the underlying law upon which that deter*227mination is based. But I am left with a nagging misgiving that in attempting to ameliorate a result which it feels is harsh, the Court has not only visited tragic consequences upon the child involved here but has also done a disservice to others who may in the future find themselves in the unfortunate position of these parties. No longer can there be any certainty when a natural mother freely, voluntarily and understandingly surrenders her child, as did Margaret Sees, with a present resolution to abandon rights and obligations in and to the child, that at some future date the arrangement may not be undone.
Such a condition of uncertainty tends to raise in the natural parents false expectations that they can simply have a change of heart or mind and reclaim the child, while at the same time dooming the putative adoptive parents to a state of suspense, waiting for the knock on the door that signals the end of their parenthood. While it is true that only two days elapsed in this ease before plaintiff sought to renege on her voluntary agreement to surrender (preceded, as it was, by counseling and information from a doctor, a nurse, a caseworker and an attorney), the fact remains that the child involved is now almost 13 months old and a complete stranger to his natural mother as, more importantly, she is to him. See n. 2, infra. If the arrangement can start to become unravelled after two days, what about after two weeks? Two months (see In re Adoption by P., 114 N. J. Super. 584 (App. Div. 1971)) ? Longer ? The potential for disruption implicit in these uncertainties seems to underlie the concerns, which I share, expressed by the court in In re Adoption of a Child by R. D., 127 N. J. Super. 311, 319 (App. Div. 1974);
If the normal emotional distress of a surrendering parent or the inherent pressures of a situation involving the giving up of her child by an unwed mother shortly after its birth were held sufficient, months later, to vitiate an otherwise voluntary decision, few surrenders for adoption by unwed mothers would stand. See In re Surrender of Minor Children, 344 Mass. 230, 181 N. E. 2d 836, 839 *228(Sup. Jud. Ct. 1962) ; In Re Adoption of F., 26 Utah 2d 255, 488 P. 2d 130, 131, 134 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
But, I repeat, the arguments to the contrary of this position, as set forth in the opinion of the Court, have considerable force. Were this the only point of departure from the majority viewpoint, I might ordinarily incorporate my reservations in a concurring opinion.
However, on a different phase of the case I find myself in profound disagreement with the majority. For even if the courts below were in error in reversing the judgment terminating plaintiff’s parental rights, it does not at all follow that as an immediate — even abrupt — consequence of today’s decision the only child these defendants have ever had should be wrenched from the only home he has ever known, and this without so much as a by-your-leave of a Sorentino hearing to determine whether such an obviously drastic change will be accompanied by “the probability of serious harm to the child,” Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc. of Elizabeth, 72 N. J. 127, 133 (1976) — a hearing, incidentally, readily conceded by plaintiff’s attorney at oral argument before us to be not inadvisable. Were we adjudicating rights in a ’57 Plymouth or an egg-beater, we would not give such short shrift to a hearing.1 Certainly no less solicitude and protection should attend the disposition of flesh and blood.
This is, unhappily, one more situation2 calling for this *229Court’s exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction with respect to the custody of this child. I see the case as indistinguishable in principle from Sorentino, supra, which the Court undertakes to differentiate. While readily acknowledging that a Sorentino hearing would produce testimony to the effect that “a filial relationship takes root in the earliest stages of child development and this cannot be destroyed or changed without some risk of emotional harm to the child,” and that “the psychological aspect of parenthood js more important in terms of development of the child and its mental and emotional health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood,” ante at 222, the majority then veers off the track by concluding that none of this applies — or can be established — with respect to an infant just one year old, presumably because common experience is to the contrary.
But I do not understand either “common experience” or the weight of scientific authority to be to that effect at all. As far as “common experience” is concerned, I suppose all we have to go on is our own fallible perceptions of what is good or bad for a child of this age. Mine differ from the majority’s, cf. Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N. J. 231, 253 (1974) (Clifford, J., dissenting), and based thereon I can conclude only that the course definitively charted by the Court may very well put this child in shoal waters. As for authority, much of the literature on the subject expresses serious doubts about the advisability of effecting a transfer of custody after a child has achieved an age of 4 to 6 months.3 This infant, *230now two to three times that age, should not precipitously be exposed to the hazardous uncertainties of such a transfer without any exploration of its probable consequences.
None of this is undercut in the least by the additional factor upon which the Court relies to determine the custody issue, namely, the method of placement, said to have “some impact on the deeper question of whether the custodial claims of the natural mother do not outweigh those of defendants.” Ante at 224. Assuming that we are to shift our gaze from the child’s best interest and focus upon the placement factor, it seems to me that at best the scales come down no more on the side of the plaintiff than on that of defendants. This tragic dilemma was set in motion by plaintiff, who knowingly, unmistakably, and voluntarily undertook to relinquish all parental rights. In measuring her custodial claim I would not think it amiss to hold plaintiff accountable for the consequences of her own conduct. The participation of the physician and attorney is no worse than neutral; in attempting to effectuate plaintiff’s express intention they were hardly Svengali-type interlopers. And defendants’ sole offense seems to lie in their opening their hearts to the infant, taking him into their home in good faith and refusing to relinquish him when plaintiff changed her mind.
At stake here is nothing less than the destiny and well-being of a non-actor, the innocent child. I think his interests have been badly short-changed and the significant risks attendant upon his transfer overlooked. It is my respectful *231view that as law the majority’s result is aberrational and as social policy it is most unfortunate.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman, Soheeibee and Handles — 6.
Dissenting — Justice Clieeoed — 1.

The analogy', while imperfect, is not entirely inapposite. It is clear that secured creditor has a right to reclaim chattels, subject to the security, from a defaulting debtor. However, when in the exercise of that right the creditor utilizes the power of the state to secure the chattel, due process requires a hearing on the issue of the asserted right. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 80-81, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 570 (1972).

We seem recently to be encountering a spate of cases, most of them requiring Solomon-like judgment, in which this Court is called upon to make custody determinations. See Sorentino v. Family & Children’s Soc. of Elizabeth, 72 N. J. 127 (1976) ; Doe v. Downey, 73 N. J. 52 (1977). This is unfortunate not so much on account *229of the complex or emotion-laden character of the cases as because the judicial machinery has thus far proven incapable of avoiding the unhappy consequences brought on by the passage of time required for litigation to run its course. See Sorentino, supra, 72 N. J. at 132. One can only hope that with the clarification these decisions should bring to this area of the law, the cases henceforth may be expeditiously and correctly decided so as to minimize the movement of children from one home and family to another.

See J. Bowlby, 1 Attachment and Loss 233 (1969) ; J. Goldstein, A. Freud, & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 19, 22, 32, 21, 42, 57 (Free Press 1973) ; R. G. Patton, Growth Failure *230in Maternal Deprivation 38 (1963) (“The gravest effects of separation are seen between the age of three months and two years and then gradually decrease in severity until the age of 7 or 8 when the child is able to tolerate long periods of separation without any lasting major damage to personal structure.”) ; Foster, “Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?”, 22 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 13 (1972). See also, Comment, “Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing on the Child”, 14 Journal Family L. 547, 550-58 (1976) ; Comment, “Alternatives to ‘Parental Right’ in Child Custody Disputes involving Third Parties”, 73 Yale L. J. 151, 158 et seq. (1963).