Court Opinion

ID: 9904598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:41:40.297819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:49.652385
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                          FIFTH DISTRICT

                                   NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                   FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                   DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

MEAGAN CORBETT,

     Petitioner,

v.                                             Case No. 5D21-3166
                                               LT Case No. 21-MM-002429-A-O

STATE OF FLORIDA,

     Respondent.

________________________________/

Opinion filed May 13, 2022

Petition for Writ of Prohibition,
Evellen H. Jewett, Respondent Judge.

Robert Wesley, Public Defender, and
Robert Thompson Adams, IV, and Ali
Almamluk, Assistant Public Defenders,
Orlando, for Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Richard A. Pallas, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM

     Petitioner, Meagan Corbett, charged with one count of simple battery,

filed a motion in county court seeking to dismiss that charge based on
Florida’s Stand Your Ground immunity, section 776.032, Florida Statutes

(2021). At the hearing on Corbett’s motion, the defense argued that the State

had the burden of proof. The State, however, argued that the burden of proof

was on Corbett to show by a preponderance of evidence that she was

entitled to immunity under the statute. The court agreed with the State,

required Corbett to present evidence, and following the hearing, concluded

that Corbett did not meet her burden of proving that immunity attached and

denied her motion to dismiss.

      Corbett filed a petition for writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court

incorrectly ruled that she had the burden to prove that she was entitled to

statutory immunity, that she did not establish a prima facie claim of immunity,

and incorrectly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard used by

an older version of the Stand Your Ground statute. We agree with Corbett

that the trial court employed an incorrect procedure when ruling on her

motion, but for the reasons set forth below, we are compelled to deny relief.

      Corbett argues before our Court that the use of prohibition has been

the established method when one seeks to review orders denying motions

to dismiss based on Stand Your Ground immunity. Specifically, since

Bretherick v. State, 135 So. 3d 337, 339–40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), aff’d, 170

So. 3d 776 (Fla. 2015), prohibition has been the recognized vehicle for

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challenging Stand Your Ground denials, even when the denials were based

on procedural grounds. Corbett further relies on Heilman v. State, 135 So.

3d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), in which we granted a petition for writ of

prohibition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing where the trial court

denied the Stand Your Ground motion without an evidentiary hearing.

      Typically, a writ of prohibition is the appropriate method for obtaining

review before trial of the denial on the merits of a motion to dismiss under

the Stand Your Ground statute. Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2012). This is because a “lower court has no authority to proceed

against an immunized defendant.” Jefferson v. State, 264 So. 3d 1019, 1023

(Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (citing Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 216 n.1 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2013) (explaining that “the supreme court has consistently held” that

prohibition “is an appropriate vehicle to review orders denying motions to

dismiss criminal prosecutions based on immunity”)).

      However, within the last few years, the Second District has recognized

in a series of cases that where the issue is procedural, e.g., whether the trial

court applied the correct evidentiary burden, rather than substantive, e.g.,

whether the defendant is entitled to immunity, then prohibition is not the

appropriate remedy. See Rich v. State, 311 So. 3d 126, 130 (Fla. 2d DCA

2020) (“Recently, our court expanded the circumstances in which immunity

                                       3
claim rulings under section 776.032 may alternatively be considered in

certiorari . . . . However, an elemental requisite of our court’s certiorari

jurisdiction is a definitive ruling on the merits by the lower tribunal of whatever

it is the petitioner would have us review.”); Garcia v. State, 286 So. 3d 348,

350 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (“[B]ecause the trial court erred in its construction of

the Stand Your Ground statute, we are unable to determine whether Mr.

Garcia is entitled to immunity on the merits. Thus, prohibition is not the

appropriate vehicle under which to proceed. We best proceed under our

certiorari jurisdiction.”); Jefferson, 264 So. 3d at 1023 (“[Where] petitioner

challenges the procedure the circuit court employed in denying his motion to

dismiss . . . we cannot discern whether petitioner is entitled to immunity on

the merits, and therefore prohibition is not the proper vehicle to review the

alleged error.”); Figueroa v. State, 247 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)

(treating petition for writ of prohibition as petition for writ of certiorari and

granting because trial court departed from essential requirements of law by

not applying section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2017)).

      The Third and First Districts have also issued recent opinions in which

the courts addressed Stand Your Ground procedural errors in petitions for

writ of certiorari. Penalver v. State, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D320 (Fla. 3d DCA

Feb. 2, 2022) (reviewing order dismissing motion to dismiss based on Stand

                                        4
Your Ground immunity by petition for writ of certiorari); Bailey v. State, 333

So. 3d 761, 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“This court has certiorari jurisdiction to

review the denial of a motion for statutory immunity.”); Casanova v. State, 46

Fla. L. Weekly D2326 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 27, 2021); Rogers v. State, 301 So.

3d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

      This Court, however, has not directly addressed the issue of when a

petitioner should file a petition for writ of prohibition or a writ of certiorari to

review orders denying Stand Your Ground immunity. As Corbett notes in this

case, confusion on the issue may derive from our opinion in Bretherick,

where we held that “the appropriate vehicle to obtain review before trial of

the denial of a ‘Stand Your Ground’ motion invoking self-defense immunity

is by petition for writ of prohibition.” Bretherick, 135 So. 3d at 339–40.

Bretherick dealt with which party had the burden of proof (pre-statutory

amendment), but it also discussed the merits of the immunity claim and

whether the findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence.

      We take this opportunity to clarify our position on this issue by joining

the majority of our sister courts and holding that the determination of whether

the order denying Stand Your Ground immunity is reviewable by certiorari or

prohibition rests on the judicial acts challenged in the petition. If the

defendant asserts that on the merits he or she is entitled to immunity, is

                                         5
challenging the legal determinations and factual findings of immunity or lack

of immunity, and the relief to be afforded is prohibition against further

prosecution, then a petition for writ of prohibition is appropriate to review the

claim. “[P]rohibition’s ‘purpose is to prevent the doing of something, not to

compel the undoing of something already done. It cannot be used to revoke

an order already entered.’” Stokes v. Jones, 319 So. 3d 166, 170−71 (Fla.

1st DCA 2021) (quoting Hamlin v. E. Coast Props., Inc., 616 So. 2d 1175,

1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)).

      However, if the defendant asserts that the trial court applied the wrong

procedure, and the relief requested would require remand for further

proceedings on the defendant’s motion, then prohibition is not appropriate

because the defendant is seeking correction of an order. An appellate court

cannot determine whether the trial court’s legal conclusions on immunity are

correct when the trial court employs the wrong evidentiary burdens. While

the defendant may seek a writ of prohibition to prevent further prosecution in

this scenario, the appropriate relief in such situations is for the order under

review to be quashed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Therefore, certiorari relief is more appropriate.

      Here, because the trial court applied both an improper procedure and

the wrong evidentiary burden, and both the court’s oral and written rulings

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are ambiguous as to what burden it applied when “weighing all the evidence,”

this Court cannot determine the merits of the immunity decision. The relief

Corbett seeks is another hearing as required by section 776.032. A writ of

certiorari is the proper mechanism to provide this relief.

      By this opinion, we express our agreement with the series of cases

holding that procedural errors regarding Stand Your Ground motions should

be raised in a petition for writ of certiorari rather than a petition for writ of

prohibition. Because Corbett’s petition challenges the procedure employed

below, we treat it as a petition for certiorari. However, doing so compels us

to dismiss the petition as untimely.1

   PETITION DISMISSED.

COHEN, HARRIS and SASSO, JJ., concur.

      1
        We acknowledge the absence of prior delineation from this Court as
to which petition should be filed and under what circumstances when
challenging the denial of a Stand Your Ground motion. However, we note
that the cases and analysis adopted by our opinion today in holding that
certiorari is the proper vehicle when challenging the lower court on
procedural grounds were not only in existence at the time Corbett filed her
petition but were in fact cited by her at length therein. See, e.g., Jefferson,
264 So. 3d at 1023; Rich, 311 So. 3d at 129.

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