Court Opinion

ID: 9851049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:06:34.125294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:47.791275
License: Public Domain

Eberhardt, Judge,
concurring specially. I join in Judge Hall’s special concurrence. I must say, however, that when a ruling is made by the trial court that would raise the question dealt with in Division 2 of the majority opinion I would have to agree that the majority has reached the correct result. See my concurring opinion in Lucas v. Continental Cas. Co., 120 Ga. App. 457, 460 (170 SE2d 856) and in Chester v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 599.
Whitman, Judge, dissenting.
1. The jurisdiction of a juvenile court, being civil in nature, extends only to those minors who are residents of the county. Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87 (1) (78 SE2d 32); Ingle v. Rubenstein, 112 Ga. App. 767, 768 (146 SE2d 367); Whitman v. State, 96 Ga. App. 730 (1) (101 SE2d 621). If the judicial power of a court to determine a cause is defined so as to specify, among other things, that it can adjudicate only with regard to persons residing within a particular geographical area, then the residential requirement becomes as much a part of its subject matter jurisdiction as the type of causes it is authorized to entertain. Thus where, as here, a juvenile court had in the past entered an order suspending a minor’s driver’s license for 60 days, but the minor'was a *591resident of a different county, the order and suspension was null, void and of no effect. It is true that the minor in this case abided the suspension of his driver’s license, and the suspension period has long since passed. But that fact does not serve to validate the suspension. One may not confer jurisdiction of the subject matter upon a court where it is without such jurisdiction as a matter of law (Chapman v. Silver & Brother, 18 Ga. App. 476 (2) (89 SE 590)), and any judgment entered where there is a lack of such jurisdiction is absolutely void. Code § 110-709. A void judgment may be impeached in any action, direct or collateral. Jowers & Son v. Kirkpatrick Hardware Co., 21 Ga. App. 751 (2) (94 SE 1044); Code Ann. § 81A-160 (a) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 662; 1967, pp. 226, 239).
The suspension in this case was void and of no dignity as we all apparently agree. It was of no more legal effect than if it had been “suspended” by a police officer or a next door neighbor.
Therefore, I must take issue with the basic premise of the first division of the majority opinion which is, as there stated: “ [A] lthough the suspension was void, the license was as a matter of fact suspended, there was no appeal from the judgment, it was complied with, and therefore the statement in the application for insurance that no license or permit to drive had been suspended was in fact inaccurate.” Does not this premise conflict with itself on its face?
If the suspension was void (and no appeal need be taken from a void judgment) and of no legal dignity, how then, when the time comes to apply the law to the facts, can the void suspension be given such legal recognition as to say it “exists factually”- and that “the license was as a matter of fact suspended” with the legal consequence of voiding the policy of insurance?
The trial judge did not err in finding that the order of the Clarke County Juvenile Court suspending the driver’s license of Michael Anderson was void and in finding for the defendants in the action for declaratory judgment.
I am authorized to state that Judge Evans concurs in this dissent.