Court Opinion

ID: 9927734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 21:02:40.255913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:24.263225
License: Public Domain

COURT OF CHANCERY
                                          OF THE
                                    STATE OF DELAWARE
SELENA E. MOLINA                                                       LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
MAGISTRATE IN CHANCERY                                                  500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 11400
                                                                               WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3734

                               Final Report: January 29, 2024
                              Date Submitted: October 23, 2023

   Jason C. Powell, Esquire                        Aaron E. Moore, Esquire
   Thomas J. Reichert, Esquire                     Marshall Dennehey Warner
   The Powell Firm, LLC                            Coleman & Goggin
   1813 North Franklin Street                      1007 North Orange Street, Suite 600
   Wilmington, DE 19802                            Wilmington, DE 19899

                                                  Joseph H. Huston, Jr., Esquire
                                                  Stacy A. Scrivani, Esquire
                                                  Stevens & Lee, P.C.
                                                  919 North Market Street, Suite 1300
                                                  Wilmington, DE 19801

            Re:     Dan Nestor v. Karen Poore, Ellen Donahue, and Creative Planning,
                    LLC, C.A. No. 2022-0066-SEM

   Dear Counsel:

            This report addresses the entity defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to

   state a claim. For the reasons that follow, I find the plaintiff failed to provide

   adequate notice of, or plead sufficient factual predicate to support, the claims against

   the entity defendants. The entity defendants should, thus, be dismissed from this

   action.
Dan Nestor v. Karen Poore, Ellen Donahue and Creative Planning, LLC,
C.A. No. 2022-0066-SEM
January 29, 2024
Page 2 of 7

I.        BACKGROUND

          This decision follows my May 31, 2023 final report (the “First Report”),

which provides the background, and definitions, on which I rely. 1

          In the First Report, in pertinent part, I stayed my ruling on the arbitration

arguments pending further inquiry and briefing and declined to address the

arguments for dismissal under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) until that

jurisdictional gating exercise was complete. 2 But, after I resolved a dispute about

how that exercise would proceed, the moving parties mooted the issue. 3 On October

16, 2023, the remaining members of the CFG Defendants withdrew their argument

that the Arbitration Agreement renders the Court without subject matter

jurisdiction. 4 MMLIS followed suit on October 23, 2023, advising that it withdrew

its motion to compel arbitration.5 Thus, on October 24, 2023, I took all remaining

portions of the Motions under advisement.

          This is my final report.

1
    Docket Item (“D.I.”) 46.
2
    Id.
3
    See D.I. 47, 49.
4
    D.I. 50.
5
    D.I. 51.
Dan Nestor v. Karen Poore, Ellen Donahue and Creative Planning, LLC,
C.A. No. 2022-0066-SEM
January 29, 2024
Page 3 of 7

II.      ANALYSIS

         CFG and MMLIS (the “Entity Defendants”) seek dismissal of all claims

against them for failure to state a claim under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The

standard of review under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) is settled:

         (i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; (ii) even
         vague allegations are “well-pleaded” if they give the opposing party
         notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable inferences
         in favor of the non-moving party; and [(iv)] dismissal is inappropriate
         unless the “plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any
         reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.” 6

Applying this standard, I find the Complaint fails to provide notice to the Entity

Defendants of the claims against them and fails to support a reasonably conceivable

theory of respondeat superior liability.

         Initially, Nestor’s practice of group pleading makes it difficult to discern

which of Nestor’s eight (8) counts are pled against the Entity Defendants. “Although

group pleading is not prohibited under Delaware law, it is generally disfavored.” 7

Such disfavor supports dismissal when the group pleading leaves the defendants

unable to discern the claims pled against them. 8

6
    Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002) (citations omitted).
7
 In re Swervepay Acq., LLC, 2022 WL 3701723, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2022) (cleaned
up).
8
  Id. at *10 (finding group pleading failed to support imputing conduct of one defendant
to others).
Dan Nestor v. Karen Poore, Ellen Donahue and Creative Planning, LLC,
C.A. No. 2022-0066-SEM
January 29, 2024
Page 4 of 7

      Here, Nestor’s group pleading injects ambiguity into the Complaint. For

example, the Complaint defines “Defendants” as the Entity Defendants plus the

individual defendants, Poore and Donahue. Then, in Nestor’s first count, Nestor

pleads that “Defendants” owed fiduciary duties to him and breached them. Yet

Nestor concludes his first count with a specific reference to the Entity Defendants,

averring the Entity Defendants should be liable as employers. Other counts continue

this group pleading, alleging misconduct by “Defendants,” collectively, while

purporting to incorporate by reference the earlier employer-liability language.

Reviewing the Complaint as a whole, I find Nestor’s use of group pleading fails to

provide the Entity Defendants sufficient notice of the claims purportedly pled

against them.

      Additionally, and insufficient notice aside, Nestor fails to plead sufficient

factual predicate supporting the Entity Defendants’ purported liability. Nestor seeks

to hold the Entity Defendants liable under the theory of respondeat superior.

Thereunder, an “employer is subject to liability for torts committed by employees

while acting within the scope of their employment.” 9 An employee acts within the

scope of their employment if “(1) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (2) it

9
 Verrastro v. Bayhospitalists, LLC, 208 A.3d 720, 724 (Del. 2019) (quoting Restatement
(Third) of Agency § 2.04; citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958)).
Dan Nestor v. Karen Poore, Ellen Donahue and Creative Planning, LLC,
C.A. No. 2022-0066-SEM
January 29, 2024
Page 5 of 7

occurs within the authorized time and space limits; (3) it is activated, in part at least,

by a purpose to serve the master; and (4) if force is used, the use of force is not

unexpectable by the master.” 10 Thus, to state a claim for the Entity Defendants’

liability Nestor needed to plead factual predicate making it reasonably conceivable

that the challenged actions of Poore and Donahue were within the scope of their

employment with the Entity Defendants. Nestor failed to do so.

           The Complaint provides that Poore and Donahue “are business partners

working together within [the Entity Defendants] to provide services to clients in a

variety of areas including offering financial services of [MMLIS].” 11 And, Nestor’s

“information was obtained and utilized by [Poore and Donahue] as part of their

relationship with [MMLIS] and in reliance on the expertise that is provided by their

employment with [MMLIS].” 12 Further, “while in their employment with [the

Entity Defendants], [Poore and Donhue] attempted to blackmail [Nestor],

threatening to distribute incriminating/sensitive photographs and/or videos of

[Nestor] if he takes any action to protect his rights.” 13 Finally, Nestor pleads that

10
  Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc., 115 A.3d 1187, 1200 (Del. 2015) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Agency §228)).
11
     D.I. 22 ¶ 10.
12
     Id.
13
     Id. ¶ 13.
Dan Nestor v. Karen Poore, Ellen Donahue and Creative Planning, LLC,
C.A. No. 2022-0066-SEM
January 29, 2024
Page 6 of 7

Poore and Donahue “as part of their employment with [the Entity Defendants]

agreed to, and did in fact, act as Plaintiff’s financial advisor from 1998 and rendered

services on Plaintiff’s behalf. [MMLIS] or its predecessors in interest were an active

participant in the services rendered during this time period.”14

          These averments fail to support a reasonably conceivable claim that the

alleged bad acts by Poore and Donahue were within the scope of their employment

with the Entity Defendants. At most, Nestor pleads merely that Poore and Donahue

were employed by the Entity Defendants and their challenged conduct happened

while so employed. Nestor’s conclusory allegations that conduct was “within the

scope of” such employment are unsupported and insufficient to withstand the

Motions. With an unsupported theory of liability and lack of sufficient notice from

disfavored group pleading, Nestor’s claims against the Entity Defendants should not

survive the pleadings and the Entity Defendants should be dismissed from this

action.

III.      CONCLUSION

          For the above reasons, I find that the remaining portions of the Motions should

be granted. The claims against the Entity Defendants should be dismissed, leaving

14
     Id. ¶ 44.
Dan Nestor v. Karen Poore, Ellen Donahue and Creative Planning, LLC,
C.A. No. 2022-0066-SEM
January 29, 2024
Page 7 of 7

Donahue as the sole remaining defendant. This is my final report and exceptions

may be filed under Court of Chancery Rule 144. The stay of exceptions to the First

Report is hereby lifted.

                                            Respectfully submitted,

                                            /s/ Selena E. Molina

                                            Magistrate in Chancery