Court Opinion

ID: 9658927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:22:25.455942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:01.722476
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 76. (dissenting). This case comes to the court against a disturbing backdrop of school violence. Over the past eight years, American education has endured an unprecedented outbreak of shooting incidents and other violence at schools across the United States. Parents, teachers, school administrators, and students have become hauntingly familiar with such names as Grayson, Kentucky (2 deaths, 1993); Lynnville, Tennessee (2 deaths, 1995); Blackville, South Carolina (3 deaths, 1995); Redlands, California (1 death, 1995); Moses Lake, Washington (3 deaths, 1996); Bethel, Alaska (2 deaths, 1997); Pearl, Mississippi (2 deaths, 1997); West Paducah, Kentucky (3 deaths, 1997); Jonesboro, Arkansas (5 deaths, 1998); Edinboro, Pennsylvania (1 death, 1998); Fayetteville, Tennessee (1 death, 1998); and Springfield, Oregon (2 deaths, 1998), all of which occurred before the incident in this case and all of which preceded the 15 deaths at *253Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999.1 A number of these shooting deaths were perpetrated by boys between 12 and 14 years of age.
¶ 77. Most schools have responded to the specter of violence with additional planning and precaution. In 1998, United States Attorney General Janet Reno and Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley asked school principals and teachers to make sure that "every school in this nation has a comprehensive violence prevention plan in place." Letter from Richard W. Riley and Janet Reno, to Principal and Teachers (Aug. 22, 1998) (a letter widely distributed to schools throughout the nation), reprinted in Critical Incident Response Group, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective (1999) [hereinafter The School Shooter]. The two cabinet officers warned against "over labeling" — that is, stigmatizing all children who display danger signs. Nevertheless, they put school officials on alert to prepare for contingencies and watch for trouble.
¶ 78. Teachers and students are now encouraged to report all threats so that they can be evaluated, because the ability to act on early warning signs has repeatedly headed off additional tragedy.2
*254¶ 79. School officials must contemplate not only those troubled youngsters who may precipitate a violent episode but also students who may act as copycats. In addition, they must prepare for the bomb threats that may appear as aftershocks to incidents of school violence. Having a clear obligation to protect students and teachers, school officials may not safely assume that any school is immune from danger.
THREAT ASSESSMENT
¶ 80. In July 1999, the FBI's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime convened a national symposium on school violence. The symposium led to publication of The School Shooter, a valuable resource to help school officials and others assess the seriousness of student threats. This threat assessment manual makes the point that:
All threats are NOT created equal. However, all threats should be accessed [sic] in a timely manner and decisions regarding how they are handled must be done quickly.
Threat assessment seeks to make an informed judgment on two questions: how credible and serious is the threat itself? And to what extent does the threatener appear to have the resources, intent, and motivation to carry out the threat?
The School Shooter, supra, at 5.
¶ 81. The report explains that threats are made for a variety of reasons:
A threat may be a warning signal, a reaction to fear of punishment or some other anxiety, or a demand for attention. It may be intended to taunt; to intimidate; to assert power or control; to punish; to manipulate or coerce; to frighten; to terrorize; to *255compel someone to do something; to strike back for an injury, injustice or slight; to disrupt someone's or some institution's life; to test authority, or to protect oneself. The emotions that underlie a threat can be love; hate; fear; rage; or desire for attention, revenge, excitement, or recognition.
Id. at 6.
¶ 82. The report categorizes threats as direct threats, indirect threats, veiled threats, and conditional threats.3 It suggests that there are three levels of threats ranging in severity from low to high. Id. at 8-9. The first task for officials is to assess the threat itself.
¶ 83. The report also proposes a four-pronged assessment model, based upon the "totality of the circumstances," for assessing the threatener. The four prongs are listed as follows:
Prong One: Personality of the student
Prong Two: Family dynamics
Prong Three: School dynamics and the student's role in those dynamics
Prong Four: Social dynamics
Id. at 10-14.
¶ 84. The analysis in The School Shooter is useful in reviewing this case. The publication states unequivocally that "[a]ll aspects of a threatener's life must be considered when evaluating whether a threat is likely to be carried out." Id. at 10.
*256DOUGLAS D.
¶ 85. The record before this court reveals much more about Douglas D. than the majority has disclosed. This information is highly relevant to how persons who knew Douglas and his background reacted to his alleged threat.
¶ 86. In October 1998, 13-year-old Douglas D. was a troubled young man. He was [-]. He had [-]. He had developed a pattern of skipping school and [-]. On [-], he was adjudicated delinquent for [-]. This adjudication occurred in [-] 1998.4
¶ 87. Douglas began a new school term on August 24, 1998. His eighth-grade English teacher, Mrs. [C.], was starting her first full year of teaching. Mrs. [C.], who was known to her students as Mrs. C., had disciplinary problems with Douglas.
¶ 88. On Monday, October 5,1998, Mrs. [C.] commenced a creative writing project in her English class. She asked each student to write a story. After reviewing the stories, Mrs. [C.] was to give each story to another student who would add to it, then to a third student, and finally to a student who would finish the story. Douglas was not given this assignment until Wednesday, October 7, because he was absent from class on Monday and Tuesday.
¶ 89. . "Doug refused to start the story," Mrs. [C.] later testified. "He wanted to talk and visit with his friends and disrupt the class." Mrs. [C.] said that Doug*257las "was disrupting the other students in the class, continually talking.. .and making gestures and saying funny things. . .and clowning around." Consequently, Mrs. [C.] sent him out into the hallway to work on the assignment.
¶ 90. When Douglas returned to class, he gave Mrs. [C.] his story. She "panicked" when she saw what he had written. "He wrote that he was going to cut my head off with a machete," she said. "I had. . .never received anything like that before. .. .1 felt my life was in danger."
¶ 91. Immediately after class, Mrs. [C.] called vice principal [-] to explain the situation. [The vice principal] read the story and considered it a veiled threat. "In my opinion the paper rose to the level of threatening one of our staff members," he said at trial.5
¶ 92. [The vice principal] promptly notified [-], the juvenile caseworker for the Oconto County Department of Human Services who had been assigned to Douglas as a result of [-]. [The caseworker] did not interview Douglas until the following day, however, because Douglas had run away. When Douglas was taken into custody, he was placed in secure detention. [The caseworker] said at trial that Douglas admitted to him that the "Mrs. C." in his story was Mrs. [C.]. Shortly thereafter, in a different proceeding, [the caseworker] recommended to the court that [-].
*258¶ 93. These are the facts. All these facts were known to Judge Delforge before trial because of Douglas's prior delinquency proceeding in front of the same judge, which included [-].6 There is explicit discussion of Douglas's prior delinquency in the trial record. Even if Mrs. [C.] had been unaware of Douglas's entire history and prior delinquency determination, she was certainly cognizant of his discipline problems in class and his frequent truancy. Plainly, [the vice principal] had knowledge of Douglas's juvenile record.
¶ 94. At trial, Douglas denied that his story mentioning "Mrs. C." was directed at Mrs. [C.], although at one point he blurted out, "I was meaning it for her," before he corrected himself. He admitted he "wasn't happy she kicked me out in the hall," but he claimed under oath that he wasn't really sure if Mrs. [C.] went by the name of "Mrs. C." "I never really heard her be called that," he testified.
¶ 95. At the conclusion of the trial the circuit judge made the following determination:
[T]here is absolutely no social value achieved by the juvenile's conduct in completing an assignment. . .that makes a direct threat to his teacher. That is not the type of activity that is allowed either under the First Amendment or any other right that a student has in a classroom....
*259There is no question that this is a direct threat to the teacher. . . .It's not the type of action that we're going to allow in our classrooms.
The court found that Douglas's writing "did cause and provoke a disturbance as Mrs. [C.] was very upset at receiving" and reading Douglas's story. The court said there was no other way it could view Douglas's story than "as a direct threat to his teacher, Mrs. [C.]. Mrs. C and Mrs. [C.] are one in the same."
¶ 96. The threat assessment analysis in The School Shooter tends to substantiate the circuit court's determinations, particularly when the focus is placed upon Douglas, the "threatener." For instance, The School Shooter lists many factors to consider in evaluating a student under Prong One of its threat assessment test:. Personality Traits and Behavior. Some of these factors include:
(1) Low tolerance for frustration; (2) "Injustice Collector" (The student nurses resentment over real or perceived injustices.); (3) Narcissism (The student is self-centered, lacks insight into others' needs and/or feelings, and blames others for failures and disappointments.); (4) Exaggerated Sense of Entitlement; (5) Exaggerated or Pathological Need for Attention; (6) Externalizes Blame (The student consistently refuses to take responsibility for his or her own actions and typically faults other people, events or situations for any failings or shortcomings.); (7) Anger Management Problems; (8) Inappropriate Humor; (9) Change of Behavior; (10) Unusual Interest in Sensational Violence; and (11) Behavior Appears Relevant to Carrying Out a Threat.
The School Shooter, supra, at 17-21 (numerals added and factors omitted).
*260¶ 97. Some of the factors to consider under Prong Two of the threat assessment test, Family Dynamics, include:
(1) Turbulent Parent-Child Relationship (The student's relationship with his parents is particularly difficult or turbulent. This difficulty or turbulence can be uniquely evident following a variety of factors, including recent or multiple moves, loss of a parent, addition of a step parent, etc. He expresses contempt for his parents and dismisses or rejects their role in his life. There is evidence of violence occurring within the student's home.); (2) Lack of Intimacy (The family appears to lack intimacy and closeness. The family has moved frequently and/or recently.).
Id. at 21 (numerals added and factors omitted).
¶ 98. Mrs. [C.], [the vice principal], [the caseworker], and Judge Delforge all had first-hand knowledge of Douglas D. Judge Delforge had a full report on Douglas's family history before the trial in this case because of the prior proceedings dealing with Douglas. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to believe that Judge Delforge and the other principal figures in this case considered many of the factors enumerated in the threat assessment manual as each of them evaluated Douglas's conduct. Most of the listed factors are applicable to Douglas's case. It is manifest that the teacher, the vice principal, the juvenile caseworker, the assistant district attorney, the circuit judge, and the court of appeals took Douglas's story seriously and considered it to be a threat to Mrs. [C.].
*261STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 99. In State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762, decided today, we assert that courts have viewed "the question whether an alleged statement constitutes a true threat, unprotected by the First Amendment, as an issue of fact for the fact finder unless a court can determine that the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the defendant's conviction under the statute." Perkins, 2001 WI 46 at ¶ 48 (citations omitted). A circuit court's findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).7
¶ 100. To get around this deference to the circuit court, the majority concludes that Douglas's story "unquestionably is protected by the First Amendment. . .[and as a matter of law] cannot be prosecuted under § 947.01." Majority op. at ¶ 41. Even so, the majority opinion opens a second front by quibbling with some of the circuit court's common-sense factual determinations.8
*262¶ 101. The majority's analysis is confusing. As a result, it is not clear what impact the court's decision will have on safety and discipline in Wisconsin schools. Because I do not believe that Douglas's story is "unquestionably" protected by the First Amendment or that this court has satisfactorily justified its reversal of Douglas's delinquency determination, I respectfully dissent.
TRUE THREATS
¶ 102. This case is part of a trilogy of decisions in which the court has wrestled with the doctrine of "true threats." In State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ¶ 29, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762, the court examines true threats in the context of a specific threat statute criminalizing "pure speech." See Wis. Stat. § 940.203(2). The court concludes that a true threat is determined using an objective reasonable person standard. "A true threat is a statement that a speaker would reasonably foresee that a listener would reasonably interpret as a serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm, as distinguished from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views or other similarly protected speech." Perkins, 2001 WI 46 at ¶ 29. The court explains that it is not necessary that the speaker have the ability to carry out the threat and that, in evaluating whether a statement is a true threat, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. The court then lists some of the factors *263that may be considered in assessing both the threat itself and the relevant circumstances.
¶ 103. The second case, In the Interest of A.S., 2001 WI 48, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712, and this third case attempt to apply the new true threat test to delinquency proceedings in which the alleged acts of delinquency are alleged violations of the disorderly conduct statute, Wis. Stat. § 947.01. In A.S., the juvenile challenged his delinquency petition, arguing that the petition sought to punish protected speech and, in any event, his speech did not constitute a violation of the disorderly conduct statute. Here, Douglas challenged the constitutionality of the court's determination at trial that the product of his "creative writing" constituted disorderly conduct. The opinions in this case and A.S. are intended not only to flesh out the meaning of "true threats" but also to clarify when a true threat amounts to disorderly conduct under the statute.
¶ 104. The court's serious objective in this case does not yield a clear analysis. The majority opinion correctly dispatches the argument that speech cannot be prosecuted as disorderly conduct. Majority op. at ¶ 25. It eloquently concludes that "we cannot imagine how a student threatening a teacher [in the classroom] could not be deemed conduct that tends to menace, disrupt, or destroy public order." Id. at ¶ 28. But then it abandons this good work in an unpersuasive application of the law.
¶ 105. The majority faults the circuit judge for using the phrase "direct threat" several times, rather than the judicially-approved label of "true threat": "Assuming arguendo that the circuit court correctly found that Douglas's story is a 'threat' to Mrs. C," the majority writes, "this finding did not warrant the court *264to make the logical jump to conclude that Douglas's story necessarily constitutes a 'true threat,' unprotected by the First Amendment." Majority op. at ¶ 30.
¶ 106. In determining that Douglas's writing did not constitute a true threat, the majority must be saying that Douglas's story is not "a statement that a [writer] would reasonably foresee that a [reader] would reasonably interpret as a serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm, as distinguished from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views or other similarly protected speech." Unfortunately, the majority fails to explain with laser-like analysis how the circuit court went astray.
¶ 107. According to this court's new test, the circuit court was expected to apply an objective reasonable person standard. It was also expected to put Douglas's story in the proper context and to consider the totality of the circumstances. Hence, looking backward, the question the circuit court faced was whether a speaker or writer in Douglas's position (a 13-year-old boy, already an adjudicated delinquent, who had clashed with his teacher about discipline matters in the past and who was angry because his teacher had sent him out into the hall during an English class) would reasonably foresee that a listener or reader in the teacher's position (a new teacher, beginning her first full year of teaching in a public school, in a national environment of apprehension about school violence, who is handed a crude piece of fiction that insults teachers, names and criticizes her thinly-veiled fictional equivalent, draws a parallel to a disciplinary incident in which the teacher was involved moments before, and then implies that the student will cut off her head with a machete because he is angry at her discipline) would reasonably interpret the writing as a *265serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm (actual injury, intimidation, or fear of injury, thereby disrupting her emotional tranquility and her ability to teach in the classroom), as opposed to hyperbole and exaggeration or jest that would make a person smile at the student's imagination and cleverness.
¶ 108. It is quite wrong for this court to sift through the factual circumstances, minimizing the factors that are present and emphasizing factors that are not there. Douglas's story named "Mrs. C." The circuit court found that Mrs. C. and Mrs. [C.] were one in the same. Thus, the majority has no business referring to Mrs. [C.] as "the alleged victim of the threat." Majority op. at ¶ 37. Douglas handed the story directly to Mrs. [C.] and Mrs. [C.] became frightened. The direct communication is noteworthy. These facts are far more important than the fact that Douglas had apparently not threatened Mrs. [C.] in the past.
¶ 109. The majority argues that "there is no evidence that.. .Mrs. C believed Douglas had a propensity to engage in violence." Majority op. at ¶ 37. There is a very good chance, however, that Mrs. [C.] — at least after she talked with [the vice principal] — knew something of Douglas's troubles with the law, or that she had her own reasons for being afraid of him. These are reasonable inferences. The majority also errs in speculating that "Douglas could have expected another student to end his grisly tale as a dream or otherwise imagined event." Majority op. at ¶ 39. Attributing this high-minded motivation to Douglas is inconsistent with the circuit court's findings. Speculation of this sort is at odds with an appellate court's traditional methodology in reviewing a circuit court's findings of fact. We have repeatedly said that "we will not reverse the circuit court's findings of fact, that is, the underly*266ing findings of what happened, unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 634, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985); see also State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 266, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997).
¶ 110. The essence of the majority's opinion is that Douglas's story should be given First Amendment protection because it was a piece of fiction "in the context of a creative writing class." Majority op. at ¶ 39. The majority complains that the story does not contain language in which Douglas personally addresses a threat to Mrs. [C.].9 Rather, it is written in the third person. Of course, in third-person fiction, the writer is not an actor; the writer stands apart manipulating the characters such as "Dick" and "Mrs. C." to do his bidding. The writer is thus capable of conveying a threat through the words and actions of his characters. Commentators have noted the importance of recognizing veiled threats in preventing school violence. See Kelly A. Zinna, After Columbine: A Schoolplace Violence Prevention Manual 56-57 (1999); John Nicoletti et al., Violence Goes to School: Lessons Learned from Columbine 42-44 (1999).
¶ 111. The majority is also impressed by Douglas's hyperbole (beheading by machete instead of homicide by handgun) and his jest (Mrs. C. "stood for crab"). Majority op. at ¶ 39.10 But the majority under*267mines its position by acknowledging that the result might have been different had Douglas penned the same story in a math class. It forgets that an English class is not the only place in school where a student can engage in creative writing, for example, in study hall, the library, or the cafeteria.
¶ 112. At first blush, Douglas's use of a machete rather than a gun appears to take his story into pure fiction. A machete attack is seemingly implausible. Inherent in the majority's analysis is the notion that the depiction of a machete in the story as opposed to a firearm is too "creative" to constitute a true threat. Unfortunately, the reality is that while this case was pending, a man attacked and injured nine people at a Winterstown, Pennsylvania school with a machete.11 In November 1996, a 15-year-old student at Vancouver Technical Secondary School in British Columbia attacked a 14-year-old with a machete. The victim was slashed three times across the back and had nine tendons in his wrists severed as he tried to protect himself.12 These are only two of a number of relatively recent machete incidents, several of which involved students.13 The machete appears to be a particularly *269lurid weapon for inflicting injury.14 In short, there is no reason to dismiss the seriousness of a threat merely because it involves use of a machete.
¶ 113. In February 2000, a large group of people attended a meeting about school safety in Fort Gibson, Oklahoma, where four students had been shot in a violent incident two months earlier. A teenage student was called upon to demonstrate the problem of weapons at school. According to the newspaper report:
The teen-ager standing on stage. . .in short sleeves and jeans looked like he had nothing to hide — until he pulled a knife from his pocket.
And then came a machete. And another. He drew a handgun from a front pocket, and three more from his waistband. He reached down his baggy pants leg and up came a rifle.
By the time Chris Dorn's pockets were empty, an arsenal lay before the high school sophomore. And the audience of school, police and emergency officials had a better idea of what they face in their efforts to keep schools safe.
Kelly Kurt, Lesson in School Safety: Teen Produces Arsenal from Clothing, The Daily Oklahoman, Feb. 23, *2702000, at 8D. This news story dispels the notion that a student could not "conceal" a machete.
¶ 114. In The School Shooter, the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime discusses "leakage." "Leakage" occurs, according to the report, "when a student intentionally or unintentionally reveals clues to feelings, thoughts, fantasies, attitudes, or intentions that may signal an impending violent act." The School Shooter, supra, at 16.
These clues can take the form of subtle threats, boasts, innuendoes, predictions, or ultimatums. They may be spoken or conveyed in stories, diary entries, essays, poems, letters, songs, drawings, doodles, tattoos, or videos.
An example of leakage. . .could be recurrent themes of destruction or violence appearing in a student's writing or artwork. The themes may involve hatred, prejudice, death, dismemberment, mutilation of self or others, bleeding, use of excessively destructive weapons, homicide, or suicide. Many adolescents are fascinated with violence and the macabre, and writings and drawings on these themes can be a reflection of a harmless but rich and creative fantasy life.
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).15
¶ 115. Macabre writings may reflect a harmless fantasy life. Then again, they may be a true threat. The facts are best determined by fact-finders on the scene, not appellate judges.
*271FUTURE UNCERTAINTY
¶ 116. The majority concludes that Douglas's story, although "offensive and distasteful, unquestionably is protected by the First Amendment." Majority op. at ¶ 41. Having made this determination, the majority should provide reasonable guidance to school officials, law enforcement authorities, and the courts about how to deal with future threats in a school setting. For instance, if Douglas had written essentially the same story, including passages regarded as "jokes," but had "Dick" use a concealed Colt .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun to terminate Mrs. [C.], would the court have reached the same result? Suppose Douglas's story had unmistakably alluded to one or more of his eighth-grade classmates, making them Dick's target, in place of his teacher. Would the court have reached the same result? What makes the threat inA.S. a "true threat" as opposed to the threat here?
¶ 117. To reassure school authorities, the majority announces an important principle of constitutional law. It writes that the First Amendment prohibits law enforcement officials from prosecuting protected speech but does not prohibit school officials from disciplining the same protected speech. Majority op. at ¶ 42.16
¶ 118. The proposition that protected speech may lose its protection when uttered in a different context of time or place is well understood. The proposition that speech uttered in the exact same context — same speaker, same words, same time, same place — is fully protected by the First Amendment against some state action but not against other state action, is less estab*272lished. To give speech a dual character (protected/unprotected) depending upon who is seeking to punish it or how severe the punishment may be, will eliminate certainty in the law and create a chilling effect upon both speech and discipline.
¶ 119. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Supreme Court stated that: "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. At the same time, the Court emphasized "the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the school." Id. at 507.
¶ 120. The Court distinguished the students' use of black armbands in Tinker — "direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech'" — from "aggressive, disruptive action." Id. at 508. The Court then stated:
A student's rights. . .do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects. . .if he does so without "materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" and without colliding with the rights of others. But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior — materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder *273or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
Id. at 512-13 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
¶ 121. Since 1969, the Court appears to have stepped back somewhat from the position set out in Tinker. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988), the Court said that the First Amendment rights of students in public schools " 'are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.'" Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). They must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). The Court said bluntly: "A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission,' even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (citation omitted).
¶ 122. These Supreme Court decisions appear to draw a distinction between First Amendment rights in public schools and First Amendment rights elsewhere, implying that the First Amendment treats speech in public schools different from speech outside public schools because of the special educational environment in public schools.
¶ 123. The majority opinion asserts that some speech in public schools is protected from criminal prosecution but may be suppressed by rules and punished through internal school discipline. When? Are school officials expected to know the answer by instinct? The majority's untested thesis deserves authority and additional discussion.
*274AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS
¶ 124. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."17 With these words, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. summed up his view that the law is not permanent, fixed, and unchangeable; rather, it evolves over time to reflect practices and events from the present and past. In an earlier article, Holmes wrote that, "The secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life," is in fact "considerations of what is expedient for the community."18
¶ 125. Holmes appears to have applied his dynamic legal philosophy in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), a case in which the Court sustained the conviction of two defendants for violations of the Espionage Act, in part for circulating printed leaflets urging young men to resist conscription. Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. . . .The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. . . .The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in *275time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
¶ 126. In conceiving his memorable aphorism of the man falsely shouting "fire" in a theater, Holmes was writing in the shadow of sensational events. In December 1876, 295 people perished in a fire at a Brooklyn theater. In December 1881, 850 people died in a fire at a theater in Vienna. In December 1903, 602 people died at the Iroquois Theatre fire in Chicago. In January 1908, 170 people were killed in a fire at the Rhoads Theater in Boyertown, Pennsylvania.19 Three years before the Schenck decision, the Tremont Thea-tre in Boston, Holmes's hometown, was burned.20 A year before the Schenck decision, fire destroyed Dane Hall at Harvard University, where Holmes went to school.21 Fires made up several of the gravest catastrophes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They were regarded with real fear. Moreover, news reports in 1917 and 1918 suggested that German terrorists and sympathizers were the source of an outbreak of serious fires in the United States after this country entered the war.22 Holmes's theater aphorism, *276then, appears to be an accurate reflection of contemporary concerns.
¶ 127. Today our country is consumed by the outbreak of violence in public schools. Threats of violence in schools must be taken seriously.23 Almost inevitably these threats produce fear among students and teachers. They inflict harm and impair the atmosphere for learning. Sometimes they create panic.24 "Panic" is the *277word Justice Holmes used in Schenck. "Panic" is the reaction Mrs. [C.] described when she received Douglas's story. The potential for panic suggests an alternative analysis that the parties and the courts in this case have not explored.
¶ 128. Threats of violence against students, teachers, or administrators in schools "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). They "materially disrupt classwork," Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513, and therefore are not "immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." Id.
¶ 129. I am influenced in these views by society's reaction to terrorism and air piracy. No person should expect to benefit from a "true threat" analysis if he or she jokes at an airport about hijacking an airplane or carrying bombs or weapons onto a plane. See United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the court said: "The legislative history [of 49 U.S.C., Sec. 1472(m)(l)] makes clear that Congress was concerned with the prankster as well as with the individual acting out of malice, and has decreed that the conveyance of such false information is no joking matter."
¶ 130. Intentional bomb scares also fall outside protected speech. As the Supreme Court of Louisiana said in State of Louisiana, In the Interest of RT.:
*278Words which by their very utterance may cause alarm, public disruption, or constitute a signal to prompt unlawful action fall within the principle of the false cry of "fire" in a crowded theater and are characterized as verbal acts unprotected by constitutional prohibitions against restraint of free speech. . . .We have no trouble concluding that the state has a legitimate interest in criminalizing apparently serious, albeit false, bomb threats, notwithstanding that the crime is committed through the medium of speech. The First Amendment does not protect criminal activity, even when carried out with words.
In the Interest of RT., 781 So. 2d 1239, 2001WL 170927 at 3 n.5 (La. 2001) (citation omitted).
¶ 131. Because of the epidemic of violence in public schools, threats against students, teachers, and administrators in a school setting should not be afforded First Amendment protection. Based upon a "falsely shouting fire in a theatre" or "panic" analysis, school threats are incendiary per se. Whether these threats also violate some criminal statute depends upon the evidence in each situation.
CONCLUSION
¶ 132. Having carefully reviewed the facts and record in this case, I am persuaded that the circuit court's determination of delinquency should be affirmed. The two elements of disorderly conduct were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

 See Amanda Bower, Scorecard of Hatred, Time, Mar. 19, 2001, at 31 — 32. The article offers thumbnail sketches of 20 incidents of violence or potential violence since Columbine, several of which were "foiled" when students or teachers reported students who signaled lethal intentions. The events described in In the Interest of A.S., 2001 WI 48, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712, also occurred after the Columbine tragedy, but they were not included in the Time article.

 The majority opinion acknowledges that ambiguous or conditional language may constitute a threat. It implies that, in appropriate circumstances, such a threat may constitute a "true threat." Majority op. at ¶ 34 n.12.

 See majority op. at ¶ 30 n.ll and concurring op. of Justice Crooks at ¶¶ 72 — 73. It is more than ironic that this court is formulating constitutional principles about freedom of speech while suppressing highly relevant information upon which others have relied.

 On cross examination, [the vice principal] said he viewed the story as a veiled threat: "There were several points that came very close to home, to reality, and that in turn threatened Mrs. [C.].. . .1 believe if a student. . .is allowed to go unchecked with this sort of a threat, it can be a threat to all of the staff members."

 The dispositional report prepared after the court's finding of delinquency in this case summarizes Douglas's family history. The report states that it is summarizing the family history because a prior dispositional report, prepared for the same judge in Douglas's earlier adjudication of delinquency, fully recounts the juvenile's family history.

 When a jury renders its verdict:
No motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law to support a verdict. . .shall be granted unless the court is satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a finding in favor of such party.
Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1).

 The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence is for the trier of fact. In reviewing the evidence to challenge a finding of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding. Reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence can support a finding of fact and, if more than one reasonable infer*262ence can be drawn from the evidence, the inference which supports the finding is the one that must be adopted.
State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d, 493, 504, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990) (quoting Bautista v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 218, 223, 191 N.W.2d 725 (1971)).

 Once again, the story was handed directly to Mrs. [C.].

 There is a line between sarcasm and jest. They are not equivalent and may derive from substantially different motivations. In my view, it would not be clearly erroneous for a fact finder to conclude that a story about a student beheading a teacher with a machete as retribution for the teacher's discipline of the student was something other than "playful," "amusing," "frolicsome," or "witty," words normally associated with "jest."

 Peter Jackson, Machete Attack at School Injures 3 Adults, 6 Children, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Feb. 3, 2001, at Al.

 See Jim Hutchison, Is Your Child Safe at School? at http:// www.readersdigest.ca/mag/1997/09/think_01.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2001).

 Numerous incidents in recent years in this country have involved machetes. See Charles A. Radin, Anti-Gang Group Faces Growing Problems, B. Globe, June 1,1998, at C12 (youth severely injured in machete attack by gang members); Beth Daley, Mass. Schools Pressed to Oust Unruly Students, B. Globe, Jan. 6, 2000, at Al (describing arrest of high school junior for accumulating weapons, including machete); Jennifer *268Ackerman-Haywood & Lisa Johnson, Teen Suspended for Machete in Car, Grand Rapids Press, Apr. 12, 2000, at B2 (high school student suspended from school for carrying a machete in the trunk of his car); Denise Zoldan, Weapons: Violence in Collier County's Schools, Naples Daily News, July 25, 1999, http.7 lwww.naplesnews.com/today/local/d232005a.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2001) (describing how a fifth-grade student threatened a third-grade student with a machete "because the third-grader called him fat"); Maria Elena Fernandez, School Violence: 'Were Tired of Feeling Unsafe'; D.C. Teens, Others Question Security, Wash. Post, May 5,1998, at B1 (listing weapons confiscated in Washington, D.C. schools, including a machete); Peter Larsen, Columbine High Shooting Conjures Memories of Close Call in O.C. School, Orange County Reg., Apr. 26, 1999, at A14 (detailing foiled plot by three students to take their shop class hostage with a machete and two pistols); Ellen O'Brien, 'A Sense of Innocence was Lost' Jonesboro Buries Shooting Victims and Tries to Heal, B. Globe, Mar. 28, 1998, at A1 (noting that boys who killed five people at Jonesboro in 1998 stockpiled weapons in a stolen van, including machetes); Jules Crittenden & Joe Chojnacki, Columbine's Legacy Lingers; Schools Still Struggle to be Vigilant, B. Herald, Feb. 6, 2000, at 22 (teen reported by fellow students for "love" of weapons, including machete with which he hit them); Diane Smith, Irving Mother and Officials Grapple with Gang Shooting, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Sept. 7, 1997, at 1 (listing incidents of gang violence including a machete attack in which "a man's arms and back were severely hacked"); Tom Topousis, Schools Chief Calls for War on Violence, Wants Statewide Campaign Against Escalating Assaults, The Record (Northern New Jersey), Apr. 13, 1994, at A1 (citing teacher saying "she saw a student attacked repeatedly with a machete").
See also Daryl Nerl, Liberty High Student is 6th Charged with Violence Threats, Allentown Morning Call, June 6,1998, at B6 (student threatens teacher, saying: "You know what's in my head, a machete to slice you up with."). According to the news
*269account, the student was charged by authorities with making a threat to the teacher. Id.

 In an article discussing the prevalence of weapons among today's youth, the author quoted numerous teens describing their personal choice in weapons. One teen said: "When I was growing up I used my fists. I had my first gun at nine or ten. My favorite was a .45 — compact and with a kick that's unheard of. Then I packed machetes — three foot long. You haven't seen fear until you've pulled a machete on someone." Sandy Close, Weapons of Choice on the Street — The Mouth, God, the Machete, July 11, 1996, at www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/2.14/960711-weapons. html (last visited October 13, 2000, but article no longer accessible).

 In Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2.d 967 (Mass. 2001), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed a determination of delinquency based upon a drawing that depicts a student pointing a gun at his teacher.

 The scope of discipline here must contemplate suspension and expulsion from school.

 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881) (based upon 1880 Lowell Lectures).

 Gary J. Aichele, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: Soldier, Scholar, Judge 111 (1989).

 See Fires: 1835-194 at http://www.swishweb.com/ Disasters /Fires / disaster01f.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2001).

 Tremont Theatre Burned: Old Boston Playhouse and "Daddy Long-Legs" Suffer $75,000 Loss, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1916, at 12.

 Students Risk Lives, Save Shells at Fire, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,1918, at 6.

 6 The N.Y. Times Index No. 3, at 137 (1918); 6 The N.Y. Times Index No. 2, at 143 (1918); 6 The N.Y. Times Index No. 1, at 156-57 (1918); 5 The N.Y. Times Index No. 4, at 139-41 *276(1917); 5 The N.Y. Times Index No. 3, at 131 (1917); 5 The N.Y. Times Index No. 2, at 152 (1917); 5 The N.Y. Times Index No. 1, at 161-62 (1917).

 "In light of the violence prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified in taking very seriously student threats against faculty and students." Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996).

 This court has previously recognized the epidemic of school violence and the panic that it can create in school officials, teachers, and students. See In the Interest oflsiah B., 176 Wis. 2d 639, 650-51, 500 N.W.2d 637 (1993) ("Our holding is an example of adaptation of constitutional principles to a modern crisis. As noted by the Supreme Court in [New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, (1985)], the presence of dangerous weapons in schools is a recent and extremely serious problem. On February 12, 1993, a Milwaukee Sentinel article indicated that 37% of male, Wisconsin high school students carry weapons. The article also indicated that '35% of the weapons.. .carried were guns, 49% knives or razors, [and] 16% clubs, bats[,]. . .pipes or other weapons.'"); id. at 651 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring and dissenting) ("Safety in the schools is a matter of utmost concern and growing urgency. The facts of this case illustrate the very real dangers to which modern-day students are exposed and the serious obstacles school officials confront in keeping school environments safe and conducive to learning."); id. at 662 (Bablitch, J., concurring) ("The problems in our public schools have turned deadly, and students, teachers and administrators have real and justifiable fears concerning their schools. 'School children are inflicting violent harms upon each other at an alarming *277rate.'") (citations omitted). Justice Bablitch's concurrence went on to cite numerous articles for the proposition that violence in schools is a major problem. Id. at 663 (Bablitch, J., concurring).