Court Opinion

ID: 9963633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 22:04:43.782414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:55.231534
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 232351
                                        No. 1-23-2351B
                                   Opinion filed April 25, 2024
                                                                                     Third Division
 ______________________________________________________________________________

                                            IN THE
                                APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                       FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                                             )    Appeal from the
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                        )    Circuit Court of
                                                             )    Cook County.
          Plaintiff-Appellee,                                )
                                                             )    Nos. 19 CR 12258
     v.                                                      )         19 CR 12259
                                                             )         19 CR 13576
 CHRISTOPHER MANSOORI,                                       )
                                                             )    Honorable
          Defendant-Appellant.                               )    Michael J. Hogan,
                                                             )    Judge, presiding.

          JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
          Justice R. Van Tine concurred in the judgment and opinion.
          Presiding Justice Reyes dissented, with opinion.

                                          OPINION

¶1     Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act,

amended article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West

2022)) and effected sweeping changes to the laws governing pretrial release and detention. See

Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 & n.1 (noting neither “(SAFE-T) Act” nor “Pretrial Fairness

Act” are “official” names but common shorthand for sequence of public acts). The circumstances
No. 1-23-2351B

under which the State may file a petition for pretrial detention continue to be a subject of significant

debate among the appellate districts and even among divisions in the First District. This case,

which arises from defendant Christopher Mansoori’s appeal of the trial court’s order of detention

pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), introduces a new

wrinkle to that debate in the form of the State filing a petition for detention against an individual

who is already detained––a scenario for which the Code prescribes a different procedure.

¶2      For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for

additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶3                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On September 5, 2019, the State charged defendant with two separate indictments under

case numbers 19 CR 12258 and 19 CR 12259. Each indictment alleged two counts of domestic

battery 1 against the same person that took place on April 22, 2019, and June 7, 2019, respectively.

On October 7, 2019, the State subsequently charged defendant in a third indictment under case

number 19 CR 13576, alleging two counts of armed violence, two counts of possession of a

controlled substance, and two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, all of which

occurred on August 2, 2019. Defendant was arrested on August 2, 2019. Details in the record are

sparse, but defendant was released on bail in early August 2019, with a bail amount of $150,000-

D. His bail was revoked in September 2019, after a hearing where the State claimed that defendant

used a third party to attempt contact with the complaining witness in his domestic battery cases.2

Defendant has remained detained since then.

        Due to a prior domestic battery conviction, these charges are a Class 4 felony. See 720
        1

ILCS 5/12-3.2(b) (West 2018).
      2
        The record does not contain any filings or transcripts from this time period.

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No. 1-23-2351B

¶5     On October 10, 2023, defendant filed a pro se “Motion for Bond Review and/or Reduction

of Bail” that was captioned to encompass all three of defendant’s cases. That motion invoked the

prior version of section 110-6(f) of the Code, which governed the time frame in which a defendant

must be tried for certain offenses following the revocation of bail. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(f) (West

2020). In response, the State filed three petitions for pretrial detention, one for each case number.

On October 16, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion and the three petitions

for detention. As article 110 of the Code contemplates, the State made a factual proffer.

¶6     The State first claimed that, on one occasion, defendant allegedly struck his girlfriend about

the body and stomped on her legs. On the other occasion, defendant allegedly struck his girlfriend

in the head and pulled her hair. The State provided no other details for these offenses.

¶7     At the time of defendant’s arrest on August 2, 2019, an order of protection involving an

unspecified person, presumably defendant’s girlfriend, had been issued but not served. The State

did not recount the circumstances of defendant’s arrest, but apparently his car played some role,

as a search of defendant’s car yielded an AR-15 rifle, for which defendant did not have a Firearm

Owner’s Identification card, and 19.5 grams of suspected cocaine. The State claimed that

defendant was released on bond but was returned to custody because he was attempting to “contact

the victim or harass the victim” through a third party. The State provided no details.

¶8     Regarding prior criminal history, the State claimed that defendant had misdemeanor

convictions for domestic battery in 2011, assault in 2009, resisting a peace officer in 2007, and

telephone harassment in 2015. Defendant also had four failures to appear.

¶9     Based on those facts, the State argued that the proof was evident or the presumption great

that defendant committed the charged offenses, that defendant poses a threat to the safety of the

community, and that defendant should be detained.

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¶ 10   Defendant, representing himself pro se, proffered that the complaining witness lives in

another state and that he had no contact with her for 40 days leading up to his arrest. Defendant

also claimed that he had no felony convictions, and his written motion claimed that his failures to

appear were the result of misunderstandings about his court dates or issues with transportation and

were not willful.

¶ 11   In its oral ruling, the trial court found that proof was evident or the presumption was great

that defendant committed the charged offenses and that defendant poses a real and present threat

to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on specific articulable facts “in that

defendant committed multiple acts of violence against another and has a prior history of violence

and has an arrest for guns or drugs on a separate case as has been pointed out here.”

¶ 12   The trial court then stated, “the Court finds that there [is] no condition or combination of

conditions *** that can mitigate that risk.” It made specific mention of the fact that, “[a]lthough

the defendant indicates that the complaining witness in at least one of the cases is no longer in the

State of Illinois, that does not mean that they can’t be in the State of Illinois and, therefore, this

defendant is to remain detained on these three cases.”

¶ 13   The trial court’s written orders for each case were virtually identical and contained little

detail. Regarding whether the proof was evident or the presumption great, the order said,

“Domestic battery bodily harm” or “armed violence/drugs and 2 domestic battery cases.” In the

space to address whether defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person, the

trial court wrote, “2 Domestic Battery and weapons/drug case AR 15 + coc[aine].” In the space

provided for whether any conditions can mitigate the threat posed by defendant, despite the

requirements of section 110-6.1(h)(1) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022)), the trial court

wrote, “See above.”

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¶ 14    Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 15                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16    Defendant asks us to decide whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence

that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the threat posed by defendant. This

ostensibly straightforward question presents a conundrum of appellate review where answering

that question would require us to accept that the Code operates in a way that we have repeatedly

said it does not.

¶ 17   This appeal arises out of the trial court granting the State’s petitions for pretrial detention.

Section 110-6.1(e) of the Code presumes that all defendants are eligible for pretrial release and

places the burden of justifying pretrial detention by clear and convincing evidence on the State. Id.

§ 110-6.1(e). The State may file these petitions at a defendant’s first appearance before a judge or

within 21 days of his arrest and release. Id. § 110-6.1(c). To justify the pretrial detention of a

defendant, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or

the presumption great that the defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) the defendant poses

a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the

specific, articulable facts of the case, and (3) no condition or combination of conditions found in

section 110-10 of the Code can mitigate that real and present threat. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3).

¶ 18   However, the Code prescribes a different procedure for individuals like defendant who are

already detained. Defendant was originally released on bond but was then detained following a

violation of his bail bond. For detained individuals, at every court date, the trial court must make

a finding that “continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of

any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to

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No. 1-23-2351B

prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” Id. § 110-6.1(i-5). Notably, this portion

of the Code, unlike the portions dealing with petitions for detention, does not prescribe a quantum

of evidence or place a burden of proof on any party. This determination also does not contemplate

the filing of a petition for detention.

¶ 19    People v. Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, presents a moderately similar factual scenario.

There, the trial court granted a petition for pretrial detention, and the defendant later filed a motion

seeking his release. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. The trial court rejected that request and correctly applied section

110-6.1(i-5) of the Code, finding that continued detention was necessary. Id. ¶ 9. On appeal, the

defendant argued that the State failed to meet its burden of proof contained in subsection (e), but

we observed that the proper analysis was whether continued detention was necessary under

subsection (i-5), which contains no burden of proof. Id. ¶ 13. We affirmed, holding that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in finding that continued detention was warranted. Id. ¶ 14.

¶ 20    The instant case differs slightly from Casey, and therein lies our conundrum. Like in Casey,

the parties have presented us with an issue that is at odds with the procedure prescribed for detained

individuals. But more importantly, the trial court’s orders giving rise to this appeal were premised

on a procedure at odds with the Code, namely that the trial court took up the State’s petitions even

though those petitions were untimely and where the Code provides a different procedure to follow.

¶ 21    This court has previously addressed the timeliness of petitions for pretrial detention when

filed against those who were ordered released but remained in custody because they could not

satisfy some requirement of their release. People v. Watkins-Romaine, 2024 IL App (1st) 232479,

¶ 34; People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (1st) 231890, ¶ 13. In Watkins-Romaine, we strictly

interpreted the timing requirements of section 110-6.1(c) of the Code and rejected three other

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No. 1-23-2351B

interpretations of that subsection that created unwritten exceptions that would allow the State to

file petitions for detention at times outside of the limitations enumerated in the Code. Watkins-

Romaine, 2024 IL App (1st) 232479, ¶¶ 34-48.

¶ 22    The trial court here entertained the State’s petitions for detention, which were not filed at

defendant’s first appearance before a judge or within 21 days of his arrest and release. By the logic

in Brown and Watkins-Romaine, the State’s petitions here were not timely. Indeed, unlike those

cases, defendant was not an individual who had been ordered released but remained in custody

because he could not satisfy a condition of his release. Defendant’s bail was revoked in 2019

because he allegedly attempted to contact the complaining witness through a third party. He was

detained in the most literal sense of the word, though maybe not under the standard now

enumerated in section 110-6.1(e) of the Code. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Because the

State’s petitions were untimely and should not have been entertained by the trial court and because

the Code requires a different procedure, we decline to answer the question of whether the State

met its burden of proof.

¶ 23    The dissent disagrees with this analysis, and points instead to subsection 110-7.5(b) of the

Code as justification for the State’s petition for pretrial detention. Subsection 110-7.5(b) first states

that “[o]n or after January 1, 2023, any person who remains in pretrial detention after having been

ordered released with pretrial conditions, including the condition of depositing security, shall be

entitled to a hearing under subsection (e) of Section 110-5.” 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022).

Section 110-5(e), consequently, provides for a hearing to determine the reasons for a defendant’s

continued detention and whether the conditions of release can be altered to ensure “the appearance

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No. 1-23-2351B

of a defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and the likelihood of compliance by the

defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(e) (West 2022).

¶ 24   The second portion of subsection 110-7.5(b) states, “[o]n or after January 1, 2023, any

person, not subject to subsection (b), who remains in pretrial detention and is eligible for detention

under Section 110-6.1 shall be entitled to a hearing” according to a schedule based on the

detainable offense with which they are charged. 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022).

¶ 25   The only hearing referenced in subsection 110-7.5(b) is the aforementioned subsection

110-5(e) hearing. The dissent’s position that the phrase “any person, not subject to subsection (b),

who remains in pretrial detention and is eligible for detention under Section 110-6.1 shall be

entitled to a hearing” refers to a section 110-6.1 detention hearing makes little sense within the

context of the Code. The clause in question refers to the individual at issue as one who “remains

in pretrial detention.” Id. A hearing on the subject of pretrial detention for an individual that the

statute recognizes to already be detained is nothing if not redundant. A more common sense

reading of this section is that the legislature intended to afford individuals detained prior to the

effective date of the amended Code, such as defendant here, an opportunity to re-visit whether

their detention is necessary.

¶ 26   Additionally, if the “hearing” referenced in this second part of subsection 110-7.5(b) was

a detention hearing, it would be odd, to say the least, that a detained defendant would be “entitled”

to a proceeding at which the State seeks to justify his detention. It makes more sense to think that

a detained defendant is entitled to a hearing to determine if changes can be made to his detention

status, especially given that this hearing must take place within a set number of days after he files

a motion for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions. Id.

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No. 1-23-2351B

¶ 27   The dissent also seizes upon the language that the aforementioned hearing is for any

defendant “who is eligible for detention under Section 110-6.1,” interpreting this to mean that they

are eligible to have a petition for detention filed against them. Infra ¶ 42. But the more sensible

interpretation once again looks to the context of the Code. Every defendant is presumed eligible

for pretrial release, and only a subset of defendants charged with specific offenses are ever eligible

for detention. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022). Thus, when determining which detained

individuals are entitled to the hearing contemplated by subsection 110-7.5(b)––a hearing to

determine if they may be released––the qualifier is those eligible for detention under section 110-

6.1. 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022). This is because a hearing would be superfluous for those

who are not eligible for detention under the amended Code. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a), (e) (West

2022). They must be released. Id.

¶ 28   Finally, the dissent also takes the position that subsection 110-6.1(i-5) does not apply

because defendant was never detained pursuant to the detention scheme that now exists in section

110-6.1. Infra ¶ 43. But there is no magic to the phrase “pretrial detention.” Pretrial detention is

not new to our system of justice, whether it be detention resulting from the revocation of bail, “no

bail” orders, or even those detained because they cannot satisfy a condition of their release. To say

that subsection 110-6.1(i-5) does not apply to defendant because his detention was not the right

kind of pretrial detention is fundamentally at odds with the plain language of the Code. If the

legislature wished the amended Code to effectively “reset” the detention status of all defendants

and to afford protections like subsection 110-6.1(i-5) only after a detention hearing under section

110-6.1 took place, it surely would have been explicit about such a sweeping change. More

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No. 1-23-2351B

importantly, section 110-7.5, which deals explicitly with those defendants whose cases straddle

the prior versions of our bail provisions and the new amended Code, would not exist.

¶ 29   The question before the trial court, either on its own motion or prompted by defendant’s

request for a reduction in bail, should have been only whether defendant’s “continued detention is

necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community,

based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from

prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022).

¶ 30   We are cognizant that the timeliness of the State’s petitions is not an issue before us. A

fundamental principle of appellate review is, as the United States Supreme Court once said, that

“ ‘[courts] do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. We wait for cases

to come to us, and when they do we normally decide only questions presented by the parties.’ ”

Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244 (2008) (quoting United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d

1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)).

¶ 31   “[A]s a general rule, ‘[o]ur adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties

know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling

them to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in judgment, joined by Thomas, J.)).

¶ 32   However, as our supreme court has said, this is not an absolute rule and we may address

unbriefed errors in limited instances where a clear error occurred. People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d

311, 325 (2010). In Givens, the question was whether the appellate court erred in reversing a

defendant’s conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel where that issue was not

raised or briefed. Id. at 325-26. The supreme court reasoned that reviewing courts should refrain

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No. 1-23-2351B

from addressing unbriefed issues when it would transform the court’s role from that of jurist to

advocate. Id. at 328. But that is not the effect that our decision has here. We are not reversing and

ordering defendant’s release based on an unbriefed issue, advocating on behalf of one party or the

other, or indeed, prejudicing the State in any way. Rather, our decision simply declines to sanction

disregard of the procedure that the trial court is required to follow at each and every court date,

and declines to endorse a procedure that is at odds with this division’s precedent. Watkins-

Romaine, 2024 IL App (1st) 232479, ¶ 34; Brown, 2023 IL App (1st) 231890, ¶ 13. Thus, while

we typically should not address an issue not raised by the parties, we also cannot say that our rules

of criminal procedure are contingent on the parties’ acquiescence to them. Defendant was detained

following the revocation of his bail. The Code instructs what should be done with individuals who

are detained, and that procedure was not followed here. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022).

¶ 33   Although the required finding in section 110-6.1(i-5) shares some commonalities with the

burden the State must meet at an initial detention hearing, we elect not to decide whether

defendant’s continued detention was necessary. The most prudent course appears to be to remand

this case so that the trial court can make the appropriate finding as required by the statute: whether

defendant’s continued detention is necessary under section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code (id.). Upon

remand, the trial court should hold a hearing and make the finding required by the statute. The

dissent argues that principles of judicial economy make remand unnecessary because the required

finding in subsection 110-6.1(i-5) is less stringent than the burden the State must meet at a

detention hearing under subsection 110-6.1(e), which the trial court already found to be met. Infra

¶ 44. But in this particular instance, there would be no savings with respect to judicial economy.

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No. 1-23-2351B

The trial court is required to consider the necessity of continued detention at each and every court

date, regardless of what we decide here. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022).

¶ 34   Additionally, the record indicates that defendant’s charges have been pending since

September and October 2019. Defendant has been in custody for approximately 4½ years. The

charges, domestic battery, possession of a controlled substance, aggravated unlawful use of a

weapon, and armed violence, are not complicated––defendant is accused of committing a battery

on two occasions against the same person and possessing a firearm and illegal narcotics. While the

record offers no insight into why these cases remain unresolved or how the reasons for the delay

might be apportioned, we believe it would behoove the parties to expedite the resolution of these

matters.

¶ 35                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the State’s petition

for pretrial detention and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 37   Reversed and remanded.

¶ 38   REYES, P.J., dissenting:

¶ 39   The majority finds that the State’s detention petition was untimely and therefore reverses

the trial court’s decision to detain the defendant. I believe that both the majority’s analysis and its

interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Code are flawed and, accordingly, I must

respectfully dissent.

¶ 40   First and foremost, the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s detention order based

on timeliness is inappropriate where the defendant has not raised this issue, either on appeal or

below, a fact which the majority acknowledges. Supra ¶ 30. See People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311,

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No. 1-23-2351B

323 (2010) (“Illinois law is well settled that other than for assessing subject matter jurisdiction, a

reviewing court should not normally search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to

reverse a trial court judgment.” (Emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted.)). The

majority, however, proceeds to ignore what it recognizes as “[a] fundamental principle of appellate

review” (supra ¶ 30) and instead chooses to consider an unraised, unbriefed issue sua sponte and

ultimately reverses on that issue. Its decision to do so is even more egregious where it suggests

that its choice to address the issue “simply declines to sanction disregard of the procedure that the

trial court is required to follow at each and every court date, and declines to endorse a procedure

that is at odds with this division’s precedent.” Id. ¶ 32 (citing People v. Watkins-Romaine, 2024

IL App (1st) 232479; People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (1st) 231890); see also id. ¶ 16 (suggesting

that resolving the issue raised on appeal “would require us to accept that the Code operates in a

way that we have repeatedly said it does not”). The majority’s framing of the issue in this way

implies that the question of the Code’s procedures is settled, which is far from the case, as I explain

below. Given that the issue which the majority chooses to raise sua sponte is one subject to

disagreement, its decision to rest its opinion on this basis is therefore problematic. See Givens, 237

Ill. 2d at 326 (where “the issue identified sua sponte by the appellate court did not amount to

obvious error controlled by clear precedent,” the appellate court erred in addressing the issue).

¶ 41   Even if this issue was properly before us, however, I would disagree with the majority’s

analysis on the matter. As noted by the majority, the defendant in the instant case was arrested

prior to the effective date of the amendments to the Code and was ordered released with pretrial

conditions, but his bail was revoked in 2019 and he has remained in custody since then. In October

2023, defendant filed a motion for bond review, and in response, the State filed petitions for pretrial

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No. 1-23-2351B

detention under section 110-6.1 of the Code. Defendant, therefore, falls within the provisions of

section 110-7.5 which provide that “[o]n or after January 1, 2023, any person, *** who remains in

pretrial detention and is eligible for detention under Section 110-6.1 shall be entitled to a hearing”

within 90 days of his motion for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions. 725 ILCS 5/110-

7.5(b)(2) (West 2022).

¶ 42   The only way in which a defendant may be eligible for detention under section 110-6.1 is

through the filing of a petition for pretrial detention, at which the State bears the burden of

establishing the defendant’s eligibility by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 110-6.1(e).

Importantly, section 110-7.5 is not limited to defendants “who have been found eligible for

detention under Section 110-6.1,” which would suggest a prior pretrial detention hearing; instead,

it governs any defendant “who is eligible for detention under Section 110-6.1” (emphasis added)

(id. § 110-7.5(b)), suggesting that the State may file its pretrial detention hearing in connection

with the defendant’s motion for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions, as occurred in the

instant case. The majority disagrees with this interpretation, asserting that “[t]he only hearing

referenced in subsection 110-7.5(b)” is a hearing under section 110-5(e), in circumstances which

are not applicable here. Supra ¶ 25. The subsection, however, also expressly contemplates a

defendant filing a “motion for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions” and a hearing on the

matter, a fact which the majority seems to recognize. 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b)(1) (West 2022). I

agree with the majority’s position that, at this hearing, the defendant is entitled to an opportunity

to revisit the terms of his detention status; to the extent that the majority suggests otherwise, such

a reading reflects a misunderstanding of my position. In my view, however, the State is also

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No. 1-23-2351B

entitled to file a pretrial detention petition in response, especially where the section providing for

the hearing expressly references such a petition.

¶ 43    I also disagree with the majority’s reliance on section 110-6.1(i-5), which concerns

defendants who are already detained pursuant to section 110-6.1. Id. § 110-6.1(i-5). Defendant,

however, was never detained pursuant to section 110-6.1—he is in custody due to the revocation

of his pretrial release, which is governed by section 110-6. See id. § 110-6. The majority’s analysis

of section 110-6.1(i-5) is therefore inapplicable to the instant case. The majority claims that “there

is no magic to the phrase ‘pretrial detention,’ ” suggesting that section 110-6.1(i-5) applies to all

forms of pretrial detention, “whether it be detention resulting from the revocation of bail, ‘no bail’

orders, or even those detained because they cannot satisfy a condition of their release.” Supra

¶ 28. This is simply not an accurate statement of the law, however; each of those situations is

subject to specific statutes and procedures, which are not always identical. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6

(West 2022) (governing revocation of pretrial release); 110-6.1 (governing denial of pretrial

release); 110-5(e) (governing defendants who have been unable to satisfy conditions of pretrial

release).

¶ 44    Furthermore, even if the majority’s position concerning the applicability of section 110-

6.1(i-5) was correct, such a result would not necessitate reversal. As the majority notes, section

110-6.1(i-5) does not set forth a quantum of evidence necessary to find continued detention

appropriate. See also People v. Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13 (noting that a section 110-

6.1(i-5) determination does not require the same “clear and convincing” proof as in the initial

section 110-6.1 detention hearing). There is no indication, however, that the decision as to

continued detention is subject to stricter requirements than are necessary in an initial detention

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No. 1-23-2351B

hearing under section 110-6.1. By conducting a hearing pursuant to the requirements of section

110-6.1, then, the trial court in the instant case necessarily found that the State had satisfied a more

stringent standard of proof than would be otherwise required. Reversing the trial court’s decision

and remanding for the trial court to hold a hearing at which the State is required to make less of a

showing than it already has would be an unnecessary use of judicial time and resources.

¶ 45    As a final matter, I must note that the majority’s decision appears intended to reaffirm its

position as to the timing requirements of section 110-6.1 and its applicability to defendants who

remained in custody at the time the new provisions of the Code became effective. While the

majority understandably relies on its own prior decisions on the matter (Brown and Watkins-

Romaine), other appellate courts considering this question have overwhelmingly come to the

opposite conclusion, with near unanimity about the ability of the State to seek pretrial detention,

at a minimum, where the defendant has sought to reopen the conditions of his release. See, e.g.,

People v. McDonald, 2024 IL App (1st) 232414, ¶ 28; People v. Davidson, 2023 IL App (2d)

230344, ¶ 18; People v. Gray, 2023 IL App (3d) 230435, ¶ 15; People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th)

230837, ¶ 24; People v. O’Neal, 2024 IL App (5th) 231111, ¶ 18. In fact, other than Brown and

Watkins-Romaine, only one case has adopted the majority’s approach, and several courts have

expressly declined to follow the reasoning set forth in Brown. See People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App

(1st) 232418-U, ¶ 18; People v. Stone, 2024 IL App (1st) 232359-U, ¶ 20; McDonald, 2024 IL

App (1st) 232414, ¶ 27; People v. Haisley, 2024 IL App (1st) 232163, ¶ 20; People v. Watson,

2024 IL App (1st) 232143-U, ¶ 19. But see People v. Watson, 2024 IL App (1st) 240207-U, ¶ 17

(in a divided decision, “chang[ing] its mind” and declining to follow its prior decision in

McDonald, which had been decided less than three weeks earlier). Even the Fifth District, which

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No. 1-23-2351B

interprets the timing requirements of section 110-6.1 similarly, appears to contemplate the

possibility of pretrial detention where the defendant has chosen to reopen the conditions of his

pretrial release. See, e.g., People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶¶ 16-17 (finding that a

defendant may elect to stay in detention under the previously-set conditions instead of requesting

a hearing under section 110-5(e), “after which they might be detained without any possibility of

pretrial release”); People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 22 (same); People v. Swan,

2023 IL App (5th) 230766, ¶ 24 (same). While a full discussion of the timing requirements of

section 110-6.1 is beyond the scope of the decision in this matter, to the extent that the majority’s

decision may be read as further support for its position as to the timeliness of section 110-6.1

petitions for pretrial detention, I must make clear that I do not agree with this position.

¶ 46   As the majority’s sua sponte decision to reverse and remand the trial court’s detention order

based on timeliness is inappropriate for a variety of reasons, as set forth above, I must respectfully

dissent.

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No. 1-23-2351B

                    People v. Mansoori, 2024 IL App (1st) 232351

Decision Under Review:     Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 19-CR-
                           12258, 19-CR-12259, 19-CR-13576; the Hon. Michael J.
                           Hogan, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                  James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Benjamin Wimmer,
for                        of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                  Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Liv K.
for                        Grewal, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.
Appellee:

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