Court Opinion

ID: 9678058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:09:45.484773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:01.616803
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
Because counsel for the appellant inart-fully worded her ground of error, concerning the issue that was actually before the First Court of Appeals, this caused the train to get off the track back when the ease reached the train station that houses the First Court of Appeals. And it is still off the track.
Counsel asserted that “It was error for the trial judge not to allow appellant to call his co-defendant before the jury to assert his claim of fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination.” Of course, standing alone, this ground of error would be totally and wholly without merit. And counsel for appellant has recognized this in the briefs that she has filed in this cause.
However, counsel for appellant eventually gets to what I call the “nitty-gritty” issue that is in this cause, namely, whether the condition that the prosecutor placed on a plea bargain agreement he had made with appellant’s co-defendant, which plea bargain agreement consisted of the prosecutor agreeing to move to dismiss two of four charges of robbery and also agreeing to recommend to the trial judge that the co-defendant be assessed a 20 year sentence on each of the two charges to which he would plead guilty, effectively deprived the appellant of due process and due course of law as provided for in both the Federal and State Constitutions.1
The condition that was placed on the plea bargain agreement was that the co-defendant would not testify when appellant’s case came to trial. The prosecutor admonished the co-defendant that if he reneged on the agreement, then he, the prosecutor, would refile the two dismissed charges. The record reflects that the plea bargain agreement was in all things executed and carried out. When appellant called the co-defendant to testify he, the co-defendant, understandably, refused to testify.
I find that the conditional plea bargain agreement effectively deprived the appellant of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, as well as due course of law under the State Constitution.
Simply because of the legal muscle that a prosecuting attorney has in the State of Texas, the above conditional plea bargain agreement makes the facts in this case *385more egregious than those found in Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972). There, the facts reflected that the defendant called a witness to testify. Outside of the presence of the jury, the trial judge admonished the witness that he was not required to testify, that if he lied under oath when he testified, the court would personally see that his case went to the grand jury, that he could be convicted of perjury, that in that event he would probably have to serve more time than he was presently serving, and such would be held against him when he was considered for parole. The witness then declined to testify and was excused. The Supreme Court found that the trial judge committed federal constitutional reversible error.
Finding that the facts of this case cannot be distinguished from Webb v. Texas, supra, I am compelled to respectfully dissent.

. The evidence concerning the conditional plea bargain agreement was developed in the trial court through statements by the prosecutor and trial counsel for appellant.