Court Opinion

ID: 9425213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:14:04.455884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:54.044651
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the result.
I concur only in the result, for I hesitate to join what, for me, is the Court’s unnecessary observation that “the 50-day registration period approaches the outer constitutional limits in this area.” I also concurred in the result in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), and said,
“It is, of course, a matter of line drawing, as the Court concedes, ante, at 348. But if 30 days pass constitutional muster, what of 35 or 45 or 75? The resolution of these longer measures, less than those today struck down, the Court leaves, I suspect, to the future.” Id., at 363.
I am not prepared to intimate at this point that a period of time in excess of 50 days cannot be sustained, no matter how supportive the record may be. In Blumstein, the Court struck down Tennessee’s 90-day county durational residency requirement in part, I suppose, because it exceeded the State’s 30-day registration period. Had the latter been 60 days, rather than 30, I suspect the Court would have indicated approval of a corresponding 60-day *688durational residency requirement. See 405 U. S., at 345-349. I feel that each case in this area should be decided on its own record unrestricted by an arbitrary number-of-days figure.