Court Opinion

ID: 9673211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:08:27.59634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.779896
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
Defendant alleges that his guilty plea was induced by his attorney’s representation that the prosecutor had promised to recommend a minimum sentence of ten years. Defendant and his attorney told the circuit judge at the plea proceeding that the plea was not the result of any promises. Defendant was in fact sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years.
A different circuit judge later conducted an evidentiary hearing on his claim. Defense counsel testified that the prosecutor and an assistant prosecutor had said they would probably not recommend more than a ten-year minimum. He relayed this exact information to the defendant. Defendant testified that the attorney did not use the word "probably”; he admitted he lied at the plea, when confronted with his denial at that time of any promise or inducement. Defendant’s mother testified that the attorney had told her that the defendant would not get more than a ten-year minimum.
The prosecutor and an assistant denied any promise to defendant’s attorney. Both said that only the prosecutor made minimum sentence recommendations, these were disclosed only in writing, and they so informed defense counsel before the plea. The record also discloses that the prosecutor recommended more than a ten-year minimum, that defense counsel was aware of that fact before sentencing but did not advise the defendant to withdraw his plea, and that neither defense *290counsel nor defendant objected at the sentencing to this recommendation by the prosecutor.
In re Valle, 364 Mich 471; 110 NW2d 673 (1961), involved a defendant who alleged his guilty plea was induced by the prosecutor’s promise as to his sentence, stated by defendant’s attorney on the record at the plea proceeding. The prosecutor later denied any promise was made. We vacated defendant’s conviction:
"If the evidence establishes that the prosecutor or the judge has made a statement which fairly interpreted by the defendant (in our case of foreign extraction and with only an eighth-grade education, presumably in court for the first time) is a promise of leniency, and the assurance is unfulfilled, the plea may be withdrawn and the case proceed to trial.” 364 Mich 471, 477-478.
We recently reaffirmed this principle where the record disclosed that the plea was induced by a promise of leniency, later unfulfilled, by the prosecutor of an adjoining county. People v Brooks, 396 Mich 118; 240 NW2d 1 (1976).
The Court of Appeals concluded in this case:
"On the basis of the entire transcript, the affidavits and the inferences drawn from both, it is our opinion that the defendant was told that the prosecutor would recommend a ten-year minimum, that he relied upon that representation; but the recommendation was, in fact, for a 20-year minimum, which recommendation was adopted by the trial court and the defendant sentenced thereon.” 68 Mich App 32, 36; 241 NW2d 750 (1976). (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals relied upon Justice Levin’s concurring opinion in People v Byrd, 12 Mich App 186, 229-230; 162 NW2d 777 (1968):
*291"[T]he test should not be whether the defendant establishes the truth of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, his claim should be deemed established, and the plea set aside, if the evidence causes the judge to entertain a reasonable doubt whether the plea was 'encouraged’ by a false promise of leniency in sentencing. Under a reasonable doubt standard, the court need not wholly adopt the defendant’s story, or wholly reject the attorney’s story. He may simply conclude that, on the evidence, he is in doubt, and, the defendant being entitled to the benefit of that doubt, he will set aside the plea and allow the defendant to stand trial.” 12 Mich App 229-230.
We specially note, however, Justice Levin’s language above "if the evidence causes the judge to entertain a reasonable doubt”. As Chief Judge Danhof noted in dissent:
"[T]he trial court is in the best position to determine whether or not the plea of guilty was induced by promises of leniency because it can observe the demeanor of the conflicting witnesses in determining their credibility.” 68 Mich App 32, 38.
The circuit judge in this case concluded that no promise had in fact been made by the prosecutor or any member of his staff. He thought the sentencing record belied a conclusion that a promise of a ten-year minimum recommendation had even been suggested to defendant. He therefore denied the motion to withdraw the plea.
The Court of Appeals majority erred in substituting its judgment for that of the circuit judge. It was the circuit judge’s responsibility to determine whether the plea was induced by a promise of leniency which went unfulfilled. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 127; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).
In lieu of leave to appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, *292853.2(4), we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s conviction and sentence. The prosecutor’s emergency motion for stay becomes moot thereby and is denied.
Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, Lindemer, and Ryan, JJ., concurred.