Court Opinion

ID: 9858110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:14:48.788235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:38.133024
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion, but write specially to emphasize a lawyer’s ethical duty to conduct himself temperately and to respect the rights of others to unbiased, fair treatment.
Mr. Vitko’s attorney did not believe there was sufficient evidence to sustain the issuance of a pretrial, ex parte order awarding Ms. Vitko exclusive possession of the family home. In his closing argument to the trial court following a hearing on that interim order, Attorney Bosch told the court:
“Throwing a man out of his house in my opinion is justifiable homicide in some cases.”
This statement was uttered not in a bar or on a street corner, but in a court of law, by an attorney who is an officer of the court. It came at the end of a hearing which was riddled with inappropriate comments and behavior by Mr. Bosch, including racist epithets and obstreperous expressions of anger and disdain.
Rule 3.5 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct says that “A lawyer shall not ... [ejngage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.” Disruptive conduct includes abusive or obstreperous conduct by an attorney. Comment to Rule 3.5.
Rule 4.4, NDRProfCond, prohibits a lawyer from using “means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden a third person” in advocacy for a client. The comment to Rule 4.4 gives examples of prohibited conduct which include intentional degradation or harassment of others.
A violation of either Rule 3.5 or Rule 4.4 falls within the definition of professional misconduct under Rule 8.4, NDRProfCond. The underlying purpose of Rule 8.4 is to protect the public trust held by lawyers and to insure that licensed attorneys are competent and ethical in their service to the public. When an attorney engages in sexist or racist conduct, the public trust is violated and the attorney’s ability to serve clients warrants careful consideration. Matter of Swan, 833 F.Supp. 794 (C.D.Cal.1993); In re Plaza Hotel Corp., 111 B.R. 882 (Bkrtcy E.D.Cal.1990); Principe v. Assay Partners, 154 Misc.2d 702, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.1992). Gender-bias and racism interfere with the administration of justice and impugn the integrity of the judiciary. Id.1
It is not only a lawyer who has a duty to avoid sexist or racist remarks. A judge, too, has a duty to “require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, [or] sex ... against parties, witnesses, counsel or others.” Canon 3(B)(6), NDCJC. Although the boundaries of professional conduct allow wide latitude for lawyers to be advocates and to zealously promote their clients’ cause, these boundaries do not countenance gender-biased or racist expression. A judge should be vigilant in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system by putting a stop to an attorney’s misconduct in a manner that lets the attorney know the remarks or conduct, or both, will not be tolerated. The judge also has a duty to inform the Attorney Disciplinary Board of an attorney’s violation of any Rules of Professional Conduct “that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. ...” Canon 3(D)(2), NDCJC.
As the Preamble to our Rules of Professional Conduct makes clear, lawyers are the linchpin of our system of justice. They play “a vital role in the preservation of society.” To fulfill that role, lawyers must understand “their relationship to our legal system.” The *106Rules of Professional Conduct “define that relationship” and demand of attorneys faithful compliance. There is no room in our courtrooms for sexism or racism and lawyers and judges should make clear their hostility to any such manifestations.

. But one example of gender bias exhibited by Attorney Bosch during trial was his cross-examination of Ms. Vitko regarding the pregnancy of one of the Vitko daughters:
“Q. [A]nd she was only 12 years old when she became pregnant?
“A. She was raped.
“Q. That’s what they all say.”
The court iuterceded:
"Mr. Bosch, I can’t let you testify. I can certainly let you question."
The court did not inform the attorney that his remark was outrageous or otherwise indicate its disapproval about the substance of the statement. See Canon 3(B)(6), NDCJC.