Court Opinion

ID: 9959644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:06:13.658952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:42.788855
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                 No. 22–1367

             Submitted January 23, 2024—Filed March 22, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellee,

vs.

SCOTT RANDOLPH LUKE,

      Appellant.

      On review from Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Karen

Kaufman Salic, District Associate Judge.

      A defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision affirming

his prison sentence for domestic abuse assault second, contending that the

district court abused its discretion and failed to give reasons for consecutive

sentences. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT

AFFIRMED.
      Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen,

C.J., and McDonald, Oxley, and May, JJ., joined. McDermott, J., filed a

dissenting opinion, in which Waterman, J., joined.

      Karmen R. Anderson of Anderson & Taylor, PLLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant

Attorney General for appellee.
                                        2

MANSFIELD, Justice.

      Antipholus of Syracuse. Shall I tell you why?

      Dromio of Syracuse. Ay, sir, and wherefore, for they say every why
      hath a wherefore.

William Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors act 2, sc. 2, ll. 44–46.

      I. Introduction.

      Iowa law gives district courts the discretion to determine if sentences

should be served concurrently or consecutively. But the law also requires the

court to state its reasons—the whys and wherefores—for doing so.

      In this case, the defendant committed domestic abuse assault while on

probation for previously committing two other domestic abuse assaults. After he

pleaded guilty, the district court sentenced him to two years in prison for the

latter offense, revoked his probation and sent him to prison on the earlier

offenses, and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. The defendant

appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to

prison on the current domestic abuse assault charge. He also argued that the

district court failed to adequately state its reasons for running the sentences

consecutively. The court of appeals affirmed. It held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing a prison term for the latest offense. It also

held “by the slimmest of margins” that the district court’s statement of reasons

for consecutive sentences was sufficient.

      On further review, we affirm the district court and the court of appeals. At

the sentencing hearing, the district court gave the defendant a detailed and

personalized explanation for why it was sending him to prison. Although the

district court did not specifically discuss reasons for running that sentence

consecutively to the sentence imposed on the probation revocation, it cured that
omission in the written sentencing order, which referenced the reasons “stated
                                         3

on the record” as a ground for consecutive sentences. Additionally, the sentence

imposed was well within the district court’s broad discretion. Accordingly, we

find no error in the defendant’s sentence.

      II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      In 2021,    Scott Luke pleaded guilty to        domestic abuse     assault

(strangulation) and domestic abuse assault (second offense), both aggravated

misdemeanors, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.2A(2)(d) (2021) and

708.2A(3)(b). On the strangulation charge, Luke was sentenced to an

indeterminate prison term not to exceed two years. On the second offense charge,

he was sentenced to 365 days in jail. All but thirty days were suspended, and he

was placed on probation for two years.

      The following year, Luke violated the terms of his probation by committing

another domestic assault. On the evening of April 6, 2022, at around 9:00 p.m.,

the Mason City Police Department received a call regarding a domestic dispute

between Luke and A.L.

      Officer Tiedemann was the first to arrive at the residence, less than ten

minutes later. He knocked on the door multiple times before Luke and A.L.

answered together. According to Officer Tiedemann, A.L. “immediately came out
and started showing [him] red marks around her collar bone area” and “some

scratches on her neck.” A.L. also had visible bruising on her side. A.L. reported

that Luke had choked her to the point where she briefly became unconscious.

Luke had also asked her if she wanted to die. Meanwhile, Luke claimed that he

“never touched her.” He suggested the scratch marks had come from the children

and the bruises from the dog.

      Luke was arrested and transported to the Cerro Gordo County jail. He was

booked on one count of domestic abuse assault, strangulation with bodily injury.
                                         4

A.L. went to the hospital that evening. Photographs showed injuries to A.L.’s

elbow, hand, ribcage, neck, and chest.

      Luke was later charged by trial information with domestic abuse assault

impeding breathing or circulation of blood causing bodily injury, a class “D”

felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(a) (2022), 708.2A(1), and

708.A(5).

      In July 2022, the State and Luke entered into a written plea agreement

that was approved by the district court. The current charge against Luke was

reduced to domestic abuse assault second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor.

Iowa Code § 708.2A(3)(b). Luke pleaded guilty to that charge without an

agreement as to disposition.

      On August 15, the district court held a combined hearing on Luke’s

probation revocation and his sentencing on the current charge. The State asked

for the original sentence to be imposed on the probation revocation and for a

two-year sentence to be imposed on the current domestic abuse assault second

charge. Luke requested contempt as a sanction for the probation violation and

no more than a suspended sentence. Luke waived his right of allocution.

      The district court revoked probation on the earlier charges and imposed
the original prison term; the court also sentenced Luke to two years in prison on

the current domestic abuse assault second charge. Before orally pronouncing

sentence on the current charge, the district court stated that it would consider

Luke’s need for rehabilitation and the need to protect the community. The

district court then commented specifically on Luke’s reaction to the reading of

the victim-impact statement, stating:

            Mr. Luke, you know, obviously during the reading of the
      Victim Impact Statement, you had difficulty even listening to that
      and kind of restraining yourself. I totally get that you don’t agree
      with some of the things that she said. I’m unable to attribute any
                                              5

       sort of cause for PTSD on your victim’s part or any of those sorts of
       things so, I mean, there’s limited things in that that I can consider,
       but I certainly can consider your almost inability to contain yourself
       despite your attorney’s efforts. You’ve committed at this point at
       least with these two cases I have here two assaults against this
       woman and you appear to have no remorse for that.

              ....

              You appear to minimize your behavior.1

       Regarding Luke’s potential for rehabilitation, the court added,

               At some point you have to interact with people differently than
       you do. That may be impacted if you aren’t taking your medications
       or whatever is going on, I don’t have any clue on those things, but,
       you know, that’s something that’s within your control whether you
       take your medications as prescribed or not. You obviously need
       them, they’re beneficial when you take them, and I don’t know if that
       factored into the situation or not. You obviously have a lot of things
       going on in your family dynamic. The department is involved; you’ve
       lost a child, which is heartbreaking for any parent. You’re obviously
       without the coping mechanisms to deal with that in a healthy, law-
       abiding way. Those circumstances have been in place for a long time
       with the department. I think it’s even something that I was told when
       we had your sentencing on your other case, which was I think a year
       ago tomorrow, and things are not improving. The idea of continuing
       to try to handle this where you do something illegal, you get arrested,
       you sit in jail for a while, you get out, it’s just going to keep repeating
       itself until you make some significant changes, and I recognize, you
       know, . . . all those other things that [your attorney] listed, doing the
       [Iowa Domestic Abuse Program], but, you know, none of that was
       sufficient to keep us from getting back in here and having the same
       thing all over again, and, you know, there’s a point at which the
       scale kind of tips on whether we believe we can address your issues
       in the community or whether you need to be in prison, and, you
       know, Mr. Luke, we’re at that point.

       A few moments later, after addressing the no-contact order and some other

matters, the district court also ordered that the probation revocation sentence

and the current sentence be served “consecutively to each other” without further

       1Although Luke claimed to have remorse, moments earlier Luke had characterized his

own behavior as merely “yelling at [A.L.] and causing her emotional damage.”
                                         6

explanation. Subsequently, the court entered a written sentencing order that

stated,

             IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that taking into account
      Defendant’s age, attitude, criminal history, and employment,
      financial and family circumstances, as well as the nature of the
      offense, including whether a weapon or force was used in the
      commission of the offense, the recommendations of the parties, and
      other matters reflected in the Court file and record, for the protection
      of society and rehabilitation of Defendant:

             Prison. Pursuant to Iowa Code Sections 901.5, 902.3 and
      902.9, Defendant is committed to the custody of the director of the
      Iowa Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term, not to
      exceed two years. The Sheriff shall transport Defendant to the
      reception center designated by DOC. Defendant shall be given credit
      for time previously served in connection with this offense. For the
      reasons set forth above and/or stated on the record, the
      sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY to the sentence(s)
      imposed in [the probation revocation case].

      Luke appealed this sentence. He argued that the district court abused its

discretion when it sentenced him to a period of incarceration and that it also

failed to articulate the reasons for running the sentence consecutively to, rather

than concurrent with, his sentence on the probation revocation. We transferred

the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court,

although it did so unenthusiastically with respect to the reasons given for

consecutive sentences. After quoting the written sentencing order, the court

observed,

      We find this statement of reasons sufficient—by the slimmest of
      margins—to explain the decision to impose consecutive sentences
      . . . . The spirit of the requirement of giving reasons for imposing
      consecutive sentences would be better met by stating specific
      reasons on the record rather than in nonspecific language in the
      written sentencing order that follows.

      We accepted Luke’s application for further review.
                                               7

       III. Standard of Review.

       We review challenges to sentences within the statutory limits for an “abuse

of discretion.” State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v.

Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2015)). “A district court abuses its discretion

when it exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent

clearly unreasonable.” State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 2016). A “ground

or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when

it is based on an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (quoting State v. Putman,

848 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2014)).

       IV. Legal Analysis.

       As we have noted, Luke appeals his sentence on the April 2022 domestic

abuse assault second on two grounds.2

       A. Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing a Prison

Sentence? First, Luke argues that the district court abused its discretion in

sentencing him to two years in prison rather than time served. According to him,

the court should have considered “other, less invasive options” like “halfway

houses, work release programs, and intensive probation” and “the amount of

pretrial incarceration” before sending him to prison.
       To shape this argument, Luke emphasizes that he “spent more than four

months incarcerated” before being sentenced. According to Luke, this was a

significant punishment and “would have taught him a valuable lesson about

cause and effect and suffering the consequences of your actions.” Further, he

        2Generally, Iowa law bars defendants who have pleaded guilty from appealing absent good

cause. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). We have said “that the good-cause requirement is satisfied
in this context when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed
to in the plea bargain.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020). As the State concedes,
Luke is appealing his sentence, and his sentence was not mandatory or agreed to in the plea
agreement. Thus, Luke has good cause to appeal.
                                             8

points to potentially mitigating personal facts to argue that no further

imprisonment was warranted. These include his history with bipolar disorder,

lack of access to proper medications, age, education level, criminal history, and

the fact that one of his children had recently passed away. While Luke advances

reasons why he believes a prison sentence was not warranted, Luke does not

claim that the district court considered an improper factor in making its

sentencing decision.

       In our judicial system, district court sentencing decisions are given “a

significant amount of latitude because of the ‘discretionary nature of judging and

the source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.’ ” State v. McCalley,

972 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 133

(Iowa 2021)). “Sentencing decisions that fall within the statutory limits are

‘cloaked with a strong presumption in [their] favor.’ ” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting Fetner, 959 N.W.2d at 134).

       We find that the reasons given orally by the district court at the sentencing

hearing speak for themselves and demonstrate that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in sentencing Luke to two years in prison.

       B. Did the District Court Fail to Give Adequate Reasons for
Consecutive Sentences? Next, Luke argues that the district court failed to

provide sufficient reasons for ordering his sentence to be served consecutively to

the sentence resulting from his probation revocation.

       At the time Luke was sentenced, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23

provided, “The court shall state on the record its reason for selecting the

particular sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d) (2022).3 This rule has been

       3The rule was recently revised as part of the comprehensive review and revision of the

Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consistent with prior caselaw, it now provides, “The court
                                                 9

interpreted as requiring district courts to give reasons for imposing consecutive

sentences. See Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 273 (“Rule 2.23(3)(d) applies to the district

court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences.”).

       Rule 2.23(3)(d)—now rule 2.23(2)(g)—serves two purposes in our view.

First, it “ensures defendants are well aware of the consequences of their criminal

actions.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 2014). Second, it

“affords our appellate courts the opportunity to review the discretion of the

sentencing court.” Id.

       In State v. Hill, we held that rule 2.23(3)(d) required the district court to

state the reasons for consecutive sentencing even when the underlying statute

set forth a presumption of consecutive sentences. 878 N.W.2d at 273.

       The defendant in Hill had been convicted of burglary and assault with

intent to commit sexual abuse and had served time in prison. Id. at 271. While

on parole, he then committed a string of acts that violated the sex offender

registration requirements and was charged accordingly. Id. The defendant

pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years in prison to be served

consecutively with his parole revocation. Id. at 272.

       The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court “failed to provide
adequate reasons for the consecutive sentence.” Id. On the record, the court had

orally stated, “The reason for the sentence is protection of the community,

seriousness of the crime, and the nature and circumstances of the offense.” Id.

In the sentencing order, the court simply wrote that the sentence was “to run

consecutive to the parole revocation.” Id. We concluded that the district court

did enough to justify the two-year sentence but not enough to explain why that

sentence would be consecutive to the sentence resulting from the parole

shall state on the record the basis for the sentence imposed and shall particularly state the reason
for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g) (2023) (emphasis added).
                                        10

revocation. Id. at 274. Although the same reasons could support both an

underlying sentence and a consecutive-sentencing decision, here “the district

court, when giving reasons for [the defendant’s] sentence, did not explicitly state

the same reasons supported making the sentence consecutive.” Id. at 274.

      Again, we stated in Hill that “[s]entencing courts should also explicitly

state the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence, although in doing so the

court may rely on the same reasons for imposing a sentence of incarceration.”

Id. at 275.

      Hill did not come out of the blue. Our precedent required district courts to

state reasons for consecutive sentences. See State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679,

690 (Iowa 2000); State v. Harrington, 349 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Iowa 1984),

abrogated on other grounds by Ryan v. Arneson, 422 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1988);

State v. Jason, 779 N.W.2d 66, 77 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).

      Separately, we have held that a “boilerplate” statement of reasons does not

satisfy rule 2.23(3)(d) and that something more specific is required. See State v.

Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001) (en banc). For example, in State v.

Lumadue, the court utilized “a pre-printed ‘Prison Order’ which included the

following statement: ‘The Court has determined that this sentence will provide
reasonable protection of the public. Probation is denied because it is

unwarranted.’ ” Id. We held that this “boilerplate” did not meet the requirements

of the rule. Id.

      The outcome in Lumadue makes sense because otherwise courts could

sidestep the requirements of rule 2.23 and avoid making any explanation for the

sentence simply by reusing a one-size-fits-all form. See also State v. Cooper,

403 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (“The present record, far from

articulating the rationale behind the court’s choice of sentence, states only
generalized, vague considerations which we may assume advise every court in
                                         11

making every sentencing decision: the circumstances of the offense and the

defendant’s background.”).

      In State v. Thacker, we again condemned a standardized sentencing order.

862 N.W.2d 402, 408–10 (Iowa 2015). There too, the written sentencing order

was the only statement of reasons for the defendant’s sentence. See id. at 404.

The order stated, “The following sentence is based on all of the available

SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS set out in Iowa Code Section 907.5.” Id.

Additionally, the district court had checked a box on the order that said “The

Plea Agreement” was “the most significant [factor] in determining [the] particular

sentence.” Id. (second alteration in original). Nothing else in the record indicated

that the parties’ plea agreement included an agreement as to sentence. Id. at

410. We upheld the defendant’s challenge to her sentence. Id. at 408–10.

      Likewise, in State v. Thompson, we held that a check-the-box form for the

sentencing did not meet rule 2.23 standards unless specific boxes were actually

marked. 856 N.W.2d at 921. Again, the written order was the only record of the

sentence. Id. at 917. The order stated that the sentence was “based on all the

available SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS set out in Iowa Code Section 907.5.”

Id. at 918. It then read, “The court finds the following factors the most significant
in determining this particular sentence: . . . .” Id. Underneath, the order listed

fifteen options with checkboxes. Id. It was intended that the district court would

mark the most relevant boxes. See id. The list included items such as “the nature

and circumstances of the crime,” “protection of the public from further offenses,”

and the like. Id.

      Yet, the district court had failed to mark any of the options. Id. We held

that under the circumstances, this did not amount to a valid statement of

reasons. See id. at 921. Still we added that if properly filled out, such a
                                       12

check-the-box form would be an acceptable way to express the reasons for a

sentence. Id. As we explained,

      In this age of word processing, judges can use forms, such as the
      one available in this case, to check the boxes indicating the reasons
      why a judge is imposing a certain sentence. . . . If the sentencing
      order does not have boxes similar to the ones in this case, the judge
      can use his or her word processor to insert the reasons for a
      particular sentence.

Id.

      Applying these principles here, we conclude that the district court went

significantly beyond what we criticized in Lumadue, Thacker, and Thompson. For

the most part, it did what a sentencing court should do. The court gave an

on-the-record explanation, based on appropriate factors and tailored to the facts

and circumstances of the specific case, for why it was sending Luke to prison.

Its only oversight was that it failed to give any reasons at the hearing for

consecutive sentences. But this omission was cured in the written sentencing

order, where the court said that “[f]or the reasons set forth above and/or stated

on the record, the sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY to the sentence(s)

imposed in [the probation revocation case].”

      The court was entitled to rely on the same reasons it had previously given
for a prison term as reasons for consecutive sentences. Hill, 878 N.W.2d at

274–75. Furthermore, the oral colloquy and the written sentencing order may be

combined to determine whether sufficient reasons have been given. Lumadue,

622 N.W.2d at 304 (noting that in a prior case “the sentencing colloquy, in

combination with the written judgment entry, formed a sufficient basis for

appellate review of the sentence for abuse of discretion”). Thus, we find the

district court provided sufficient reasons for ordering the domestic assault abuse

second sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed on
revocation of probation.
                                       13

      We are not saying that the written order by itself would have been

sufficient. But here, the issue is simply whether a standardized written order

can bridge the only gap that remained when an individualized on-the-record

colloquy set forth the reasons for the sentence and indicated that the sentence

would be consecutive to probation revocation. This situation strikes us as not

materially different from the judge stating as follows at the end of the hearing:

“If I forgot to give reasons for consecutive sentences, those are the same reasons

as I gave for the underlying sentence itself.” Because sentences are “cloaked with

a . . . presumption in [their] favor,” McCalley, 972 N.W.2d at 676 (alteration in

original) (quoting Fetner, 959 N.W.2d at 134), we read the statement “[f]or the

reasons . . . stated on the record, the sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY”

as meaning that whatever reasons were stated on the record will be deemed the

reasons for consecutive sentences.

      We reiterate our guidance from Hill and “encourage sentencing courts to

give more detailed reasons for a sentence specific to the individual defendant and

crimes and to . . . explicitly state the reasons for imposing a consecutive

sentence.” 878 N.W.2d at 275.

      V. Conclusion.
      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and

sentence.

      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
      Christensen, C.J., and McDonald, Oxley, and May, JJ., join this opinion.

McDermott, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which Waterman, J., joins.
                                          14

                                                        #22–1367, State v. Luke

MCDERMOTT, Justice (dissenting).
      When a judge decides that sentences for two different crimes will run

consecutively (one after the other) and not concurrently (at the same time), the

judge is required to state the reasons for that decision. The majority finds that

although the judge in this case didn’t provide a reason for ordering consecutive

sentences at the sentencing hearing, the written order filed afterward, when

combined with statements at the hearing, satisfied the requirement.

      But the written order didn’t fix the problem. That order—whether by

referring to statements from the hearing or on its own—discloses nothing about

the reasons for the consecutive sentences. We’re left without any explanation, as

our sentencing rules require, for why the sentences must run consecutively. I

thus respectfully dissent.

      Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23 requires that “[t]he court shall state

on the record the basis for the sentence imposed and shall particularly state the

reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g)

(2023) (emphasis added). This requirement existed under prior versions of our

criminal rules as well. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 2016)
(requiring district courts to give reasons for imposing consecutive sentences

under an earlier version of rule 2.23).

      As we’ve explained, the requirement primarily serves two important

purposes. The first is obvious: it “ensures defendants are well aware of the

consequences of their criminal actions.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915,

919 (Iowa 2014). The second is perhaps less obvious, but no less important: “to

give appellate courts the opportunity to review the discretionary nature of

sentencing.” State v. Alloway, 707 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Iowa 2006), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 197–98 (Iowa 2010); see also
                                         15

State v. Horton, 231 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Iowa 1975) (en banc) (McCormick, J.,

concurring) (noting increasing the rationality of sentencing, the therapeutic

value of sentencing on the defendant, ensuring meaningful appellate review, and

informing correctional authorities of the reasoning behind the sentence as

reasons for this requirement).

      “When a court is given discretion in sentencing, a statement of the reasons

for the sentence is necessary to allow appellate courts to determine if the

discretion in imposing one form of sentence over another form was abused.”

Alloway, 707 N.W.2d at 584. We defer to sentencing judges in part because they

see individual defendants up close and are best positioned to assess credibility

and   weigh   facts   such   as   the   defendant’s   criminal   history,   personal

characteristics, the nature of the offense, and so on. Sentencing judges must

balance an array of factors—prospects for rehabilitation, risks for recidivism,

and the need for deterrence, among others—when determining a defendant’s

sentence. Iowa Code § 901.5 (2024).

      Appellate courts are poorly positioned to reassess or rebalance most of

these factors. Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Perspective on Federal Sentencing

After Booker and Rita, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 79, 84 (2007). We insist on an
explanation from the sentencing court partly because we’re ill-equipped to offer

meaningful review without it. Id. When appellate courts fail to ensure that

sentencing courts disclose the reasons for their sentences, appellate courts lose

the capacity to provide a meaningful check on criminal sentencing. “[B]y

requiring sentencing judges to articulate the facts on which they rely,” it

“encourages judicial candor, transparency, and predictability in exercising the

discretion that inevitably remains.” Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth

Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 775, 784 (2008). The
                                       16

deferential abuse of discretion standard might be thought of as “earned” by a

sentencing court only when the sentencing court shows its work.

      The concurrent-or-consecutive decision at the center of this appeal often

stands as the most important component of a judge’s sentencing decision. A

defendant sentenced to ten years, for instance, on each of two separate

convictions will serve only up to ten years total if the sentences are ordered to

run concurrently. But he’ll serve up to double that time—twenty years—if the

sentences are ordered to run consecutively. The potential magnitude of the

concurrent-or-consecutive decision demands adherence to the requirement

imposed on courts to state reasons for the sentences imposed.

      Indeed, sentencing courts are required not just to state reasons, but to

“particularly” state them. Iowa Rule Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). To “particularly” state

something means to do so “to a higher degree than is usual or average” or “so as

to give special emphasis to a point; specifically.” Particularly, New Oxford

American Dictionary 1240 (2d ed. 2005).

      The State concedes, and the majority agrees, that the sentencing judge did

not provide any reason for ordering consecutive sentences at the sentencing

hearing. The judge simply stated that the sentences would be served
consecutively to each other. The written order filed after the hearing said this

about consecutive sentences: “For the reasons set forth above and/or stated on

the record, the sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY to the sentence(s)

imposed in FECR030393 [(the probation revocation case)].” (Emphasis omitted.)

Unpacking this sentence, the reasons, we’re told, are found in potentially three

places: the record transcript of the hearing, the written order, or a combination

of the transcript and written order.

      We start with the reasons “stated on the record” for imposing consecutive
sentences. Again, there were none. Although the district court detailed its
                                        17

reasons for the sentence imposed on the assault charge—a two-year prison term

with a protective order—it stated no reasons when it ordered the sentence to run

consecutively with the separate two-year prison sentence imposed in the

probation-revocation case. The court’s statement of reasons for the sentence

imposed on the assault conviction doesn’t satisfy the distinct requirement to

“particularly state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa

R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g) (emphasis added).

      The majority reads the written order as saying that the reasons for the

assault sentence will perform double duty; in other words, that the reasons the

court stated for imposing the two-year prison term on the assault conviction also

serve as the reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. But the written order

doesn’t say that. It simply states: “For the reasons set forth above and/or stated

on the record, the sentence shall be served consecutively . . . .” (Emphasis

omitted.) Reference to “the reasons . . . stated on the record” logically refers to

the reasons stated on the record for ordering consecutive sentences. The

majority’s reading adds words to the written order, such that we would read

something like: “For the same reasons stated on the record for the sentence

imposed on the assault conviction, the sentence shall be served consecutively.”
But none of the italicized words appear in the written order. Nor can we assume

them if we are to give meaning to the separate requirement that “[t]he court shall

state on the record the basis for the sentence imposed and shall particularly

state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P.

2.23(2)(g) (emphasis added).

      The majority finds daylight between this case and our reasoning in State

v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 269. I don’t see it. In Hill, we noted that the same reasons

could support both a defendant’s underlying sentence and the consecutive
sentencing decision. Id. at 274. But we vacated the sentence after concluding
                                         18

that “the district court, when giving reasons for Hill’s sentence, did not explicitly

state the same reasons supported making the sentence consecutive.” Id.

(emphasis added). We noted that we were “unsure whether the stated reasons

for the sentence applied to both the decision [on the underlying] sentence and

the decision to make his sentence consecutive.” Id. In closing, we stated that

sentencing judges “should also explicitly state the reasons for imposing a

consecutive sentence,” even if they were “rely[ing] on the same reasons for

imposing” the underlying sentence. Id. at 275. The majority’s reliance on the

written order’s reference to the hearing record as establishing the reasons for

consecutive sentences suffers from the same fatal defects we discussed in Hill.

      When a sentencing court states no reason on the record for imposing

consecutive sentences and then enters a written order that simply refers to the

reasons already stated on the record as the basis for the consecutive sentences,

the court hasn’t given any reason for its decision. There are no “reasons” stated

for consecutive sentences to refer to. As the old song goes, “Nothing from nothing

leaves nothing.” Billy Preston, Nothing from Nothing, on The Kids & Me (A&M

1974). It’s notable that the State, for its part, doesn’t even make the argument

that the majority latches onto to affirm the sentences here. Because the reasons
stated on the record do not include reasons for consecutive sentences, the

written order’s reference to the hearing record fails to satisfy the rule.

      So we turn to “the reasons set forth above” in the written order to see if

the court provided written reasons for consecutive sentences. The order stated:

             IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that taking into account
      Defendant’s age, attitude, criminal history, and employment,
      financial and family circumstances, as well as the nature of the
      offense, including whether a weapon or force was used in the
      commission of the offense, the recommendations of the parties, and
      other matters reflected in the Court file and record, for the protection
      of society and rehabilitation of Defendant:
                                        19

             Prison. Pursuant to Iowa Code Sections 901.5, 902.3 and
      902.9, Defendant is committed to the custody of the director of the
      Iowa Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term, not to
      exceed two years. The Sheriff shall transport Defendant to the
      reception center designated by DOC. Defendant shall be given credit
      for time previously served in connection with this offense.

The State’s actual argument in its brief is that the above-quoted language in the

written order satisfies rule 2.23—not, as the majority finds, that the statements

on the record were sufficient. The court of appeals declared this written language

sufficient “by the slimmest of margins.”

      The lengthy recitation of sentencing considerations in the order reads like

an all-inclusive list. The list nearly mirrors the factors set forth in Iowa Code

§§ 901.3(1) and 901.5. A reader is left wondering: Is there any criminal sentence

for which this all-encompassing list would not apply?

      And therein lies the problem with the sentencing court’s blanket recitation.

As C.S. Lewis wrote: “If you see through everything, then everything is

transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To ‘see

through’ all things is the same as not to see.” C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man 81

(HarperCollins 2001) (1944). Similarly, to state every reason is to state no reason.

When the sentencing court provides a list that recites every reason for a criminal

sentence—a list that could apply to every defendant for every crime in every

case—the court has provided no explanation for the sentence imposed in this

case against this defendant.

      As the majority notes, we’ve addressed boilerplate language in written

sentencing orders before. In State v. Lumadue, for instance, we held that such

language alone doesn’t satisfy our rules. 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001) (en

banc). To hold otherwise would allow sentencing courts, in the majority’s own

words, to “sidestep the requirements of rule 2.23 and avoid making any
explanation for the sentence simply by reusing a one-size-fits-all form.”
                                        20

      In State v. Thacker, the written order recited that the sentence “is based

on all of the available SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS set out in Iowa Code

Section 907.5.” 862 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Iowa 2015). We noted our prior rejection

of “a boilerplate-language approach that does not show why a particular

sentence was imposed in a particular case.” Id. at 408. When considering “what

motivated the district court to enter a particular sentence,” we said that an

appellate court “cannot guess or simply calculate the rough probabilities.” Id. at

410. We held that the court failed to adequately state the reasons for its

sentence, and we thus vacated the sentencing order and remanded for

resentencing. Id.

      In State v. Thompson, the district court used a form that similarly recited

that the sentence “is based on all the available SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS

set out in Iowa Code Section 907.5.” 856 N.W.2d at 918 (emphasis omitted). The

form included a check-the-box menu of reasons (“criminal history,” “propensity

for further criminal acts,” and so on) that the court could individually mark. Id.

The court, however, left every box unchecked. Id. We held that this resulted in a

failure to provide reasons for the sentence, and we thus vacated the sentencing

order and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 921.
      The majority follows the thread in each of these cases before abruptly

concluding that the sentencing defects in them are distinguishable from this

case. I don’t see how. The order in this case is not a check-the-box form; it is a

precheck-every-box form. Like the forms in Thacker and Thompson, the all-

encompassing list in the written order here fails to particularly disclose the

reasons for imposing consecutive sentences.

      The majority begins by proclaiming the need for “whys and wherefores,”

but in the final analysis insists on neither. The written order’s bare reference to
“reasons . . . stated on the record” doesn’t permit the “if I forgot to mention any
                                        21

reasons for consecutive sentences, then I meant all the same ones as I said for

the sentence imposed on the underlying crime” interpretation that the majority

offers up. That sort of purpose aligns more with what the all-encompassing list

in the written order seems intended to accomplish (and, for the reasons

explained, it doesn’t). If the statement in the court’s written order saves this

sentence from violating rule 2.23(2)(g), then the bar for a sentencing court to

clear to “particularly state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence”

rests on the floor. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). No reasons were stated, let alone

particularly stated, for running the sentences consecutively. I would vacate the

sentence and remand for resentencing.

      Waterman, J., joins this dissent.