Court Opinion

ID: 9786671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:00:32.2565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:11.795196
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40285     Document: 00516878174        Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/30/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                               FILED
                                                                    August 30, 2023
                                No. 22-40285
                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                               Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                      versus

   Juan Pelayo-Zamarripa,

                                           Defendants—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 7:20-cr-161
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
         Juan Pelayo-Zamarripa appeals the terms of his supervised release
   arguing that there is an impermissible conflict between the district court’s
   oral pronouncement and written judgment. Finding no conflict, we
   AFFIRM.
                                        I.
         Juan Pelayo-Zamarripa was arrested in 2020 for distributing cocaine.
   A grand jury charged Pelayo-Zamarripa with one count of conspiracy to
   possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and three
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                                    No. 22-40285

   counts of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine.
   Pursuant to a plea agreement, Pelayo-Zamarripa pleaded guilty to one count
   of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
   cocaine. The district court accepted Pelayo-Zamarripa’s guilty plea.
          In the presentence report, the probation officer recommended various
   mandatory and standard conditions of supervision. The probation officer also
   recommended a special condition, as Pelayo-Zamarripa was a legal alien
   permanent resident, but his arrest would have rendered him subject to
   deportation proceedings. It read:

          You must surrender to U.S. Immigration and Customs
          Enforcement and follow all of their instructions and reporting
          requirements until any deportation proceedings are completed.
          If you are ordered deported from the United States, you must
          remain outside the United States unless legally authorized to
          reenter. If you reenter the United States, you must report to
          the nearest probation office within 72 hours after you return.

          The district court imposed a guidelines sentence of imprisonment for
   95 months with three years of supervised release. The court orally adopted
   the special conditions recommended in the presentence report and orally
   informed Pelayo-Zamarripa that he must be legally authorized to reenter the
   country, as is reflected in the written judgment.
          The written judgment also included a condition that was not
   recommended in the presentence report or announced at sentencing. This
   “work-authorization     condition”    reads:    “You      must   seek   proper

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                                            No. 22-40285

   documentation from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
   authorizing you to work in the United States.”
           Pelayo-Zamarripa           timely appealed,          arguing        that the work-
   authorization condition in the written judgment conflicts with the oral
   pronouncement of his sentence and that the written judgment should be
   amended to conform to the oral pronouncement. We disagree.
                                                  II.

               “When a defendant objects for the first time on appeal, we usually
   review only for plain error”, but not when the defendant had no opportunity
   to object in the trial court. 1 So, “when a defendant appeals a court’s failure
   to pronounce a condition that later appears in the judgment,” the standard
   of review is abuse of discretion. 2
           “A district court abuses its discretion in imposing a special condition
   of supervised release if the condition in its written judgment conflicts with
   the condition as stated during its oral pronouncement.” 3 However, if the
   discrepancy between the two is “merely an ambiguity,” then we examine the
   entire record to determine the sentencing court’s intent in imposing the
   condition. 4

           _____________________
           1
               United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2020).
           2
               Id.
           3
            United States v. Flores, 664 F. App’x 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (per
   curiam) (citing United States v. Vega, 332 F.3d 849, 852 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).
           4
               Id.

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                                           No. 22-40285

          Although Pelayo-Zamarripa raises this issue for the first time on
   appeal, there is no indication he was informed of the work-authorization
   condition at any point before it appeared in the written judgment. We then
   review for abuse of discretion.
                                                 III.

          The district court must orally pronounce a sentence. 5 While at first
   glance it might seem trivial, “[t]he pronouncement requirement is not a
   meaningless formality.” 6 This Court recently explained that the
   pronouncement requirement is in service of defendants’ right to be present
   for sentencing that itself springs from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
   Clause. 7 At heart, the pronouncement requirement girds a defendant’s right
   to defend themselves. 8

          “Where there is an actual conflict between the district court’s oral
   pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment, the oral
   pronouncement controls.” 9 This said, not all unpronounced conditions arise
   to the level of an actual conflict. When reviewing the discrepancies between
   an oral pronouncement and a written judgment, “[t]he key determination is
   whether the discrepancy between the [two] is a conflict or merely an

          _____________________
          5
              See Diggles, 957 F.3d at 556–59.
          6
              Id. at 560.
          7
              Id. at 557.
          8
              See id. at 558.
          9
              United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2006).

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   ambiguity that can be resolved by reviewing the rest of the record.” 10 In
   differentiating conflict and ambiguity, we ask whether “the written judgment
   broadens the restrictions or requirements of supervised release, or impos[es]
   a more burdensome requirement than that of the oral pronouncement.” 11

           Turning to the matter at hand, we find that there is no conflict
   between the district court’s oral pronouncement of Pelayo-Zamarripa’s
   sentence and its written judgment. The work-authorization condition does
   not broaden the restrictions in Pelayo-Zamarripa’s supervised release already
   in place under the oral pronouncement. The district court stated in open
   court that Pelayo-Zamarripa must be legally authorized to reenter the
   country. The district court adopted the presentence report, which stated that
   “[i]f you are ordered deported from the United States, you must remain
   outside the United States unless legally authorized to reenter.” The written
   judgment, which required Pelayo-Zamarripa to obtain the proper
   documentation from ICE in order to work in the United States, only
   “clarifies that one avenue for legal reentry is work authorization.” 12

           This purported “conflict” is then best described as an ambiguity—
   one that can be resolved by looking to entire record to determine the
   sentencing court’s intent in imposing the condition. The record makes

           _____________________
           10 Flores, 664 F. App’x at 398 (citing Mireles, 471 F.3d at 558 (5th Cir. 2006)).

           11
                Id. at 398 (quotations marks and citation omitted).
           12
             United States v. Garcia Miguel, 829 F. App’x 36, 41 (5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished)
   (per curiam).

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                                   No. 22-40285

   sufficient reference to Pelayo-Zamarripa’s immigration history to discern the
   district court’s efforts to ensure that Pelayo-Zamarripa complied with the
   relevant immigration laws. Without a conflict, Pelayo-Zamarripa’s appeal
   must fail.

                                      ****
          The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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