Court Opinion

ID: 9965083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 17:04:04.083596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.635106
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2023-0798
                  _____________________________

MARIO COTO,

    Appellant,

    v.

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON
OFFENDER REVIEW,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
John. C. Cooper, Judge.

                            May 1, 2024

WINOKUR, J.

     Mario Coto challenges the circuit court’s denial of his petition
for a writ of mandamus. Treating the instant petition for certiorari
review as an appeal, see Green v. Moore, 777 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla.
1st DCA 2000), we affirm.

     Coto is serving two life sentences for second-degree murder,
which are to be followed by a sentence for aggravated assault.
Following an initial parole interview in 1982, Coto’s presumptive
parole release date (PPRD) was set at April 1, 2007. Over time,
subsequent interviews resulted in revision of his PPRD to October
2, 2062.
     In 2016, Coto succeeded in having his sentence for aggravated
assault reduced. He raised that fact at his parole interview in
2021. But the Commission on Offender Review (the Commission)
did not alter his PPRD. Coto then sought a writ of mandamus in
the circuit court requesting that the Commission conduct another
parole interview, consider the reduced sentence, and alter his
PPRD accordingly. The circuit court, invoking its review capacity,
denied the petition on the merits. It concluded that the
Commission did not deprive Coto of a fair parole proceeding. The
instant petition for certiorari followed.

     Coto’s mandamus petition did not trigger the circuit court’s
review capacity, and thus we treat his petition for certiorari as an
appeal, see Green, 777 So. 2d at 426, and affirm. But because the
circuit court went further and addressed the merits of Coto’s
petition, we take this opportunity to further explain Fla. Dep’t of
Corr. v. Gould, 344 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), rev. granted,
SC22-1207, 2022 WL 17347630 (Fla. Dec. 1, 2022).

                                  I.

     Traditionally, “for a court to issue a writ of mandamus, a
plaintiff must establish ‘that he has a clear legal right to the
performance of a clear legal duty by a public officer and that he
has no other legal remedies available to him.’” James v. Crews, 132
So. 3d 896, 899 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting RHS Corp. v. City of
Boynton Beach, 736 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). When
traditional mandamus is sought, the circuit court’s initial task is
to “assess[] the legal sufficiency of the allegations.” Holcomb v.
Dep’t of Corr., 609 So. 2d 751, 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). If the circuit
court finds the allegations were insufficient, “it will deny the
petition . . . or dismiss those claims that are factually insufficient.”
Id. (citing Gibson v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 450 So. 2d 553
(Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Adams v. Wainwright, 512 So. 2d 1077 (Fla.
1st DCA 1987)).

     However, in limited circumstances, “[w]hen a trial court
considers a mandamus complaint that challenges the
constitutional sufficiency of a quasi-judicial prison or parole
commission proceeding,” mandamus may be used as a tool of
judicial review. Gould, 344 So. 3d at 504; see also Sheley v. Fla.
Parole Comm’n, 720 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 1998) (“Mandamus is an

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accepted remedy for reviewing an order of the Florida Parole
Commission.” (emphasis supplied)); Courtney v. Fla. Comm’n on
Offender Rev., 371 So. 3d 418, 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023)
(Tanenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Not
every final order of a trial court on a prisoner’s mandamus
complaint is one rendered by the court in its ‘review capacity.’”)
(citations omitted)).

     Here, Coto’s petition did not come in the form of review
mandamus. Rather, Coto sought an order directing the
Commission to conduct a new parole interview, where it should
consider his reduced aggravated assault sentence and lower his
PPRD. Thus, Coto sought traditional mandamus relief. See
Holcomb, 609 So. 2d at 753. Accordingly, the circuit court should
have determined only the legal sufficiency of the petition’s
allegations. See Gould, 344 So. 3d at 505. But the circuit court did
not stop there. It should have.

                                II.

     Coto’s petition was ripe for dismissal because he failed to
establish that he had a “clear legal right” to the performance of a
“legal duty” owed by the Commission. See Crews, 132 So. 3d at 899.

      Section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes, states that “[e]very person
who has been convicted of a felony . . . shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, be eligible for interview for parole consideration
. . . .” (emphasis supplied). And section 947.174(1)(b), Florida
Statutes, states that “[f]or any inmate convicted of murder . . . and
whose [PPRD] is more than 7 years after the date of the initial
interview, a hearing examiner shall schedule an interview for
review of the PPRD.” (emphasis supplied). The subsequent
interview “shall take place once within 7 years after the initial
interview and once every 7 years thereafter . . . .” Id. (emphasis
supplied). Coto does have a right to a subsequent parole interview,
but only once every seven years.

    Coto, however, did not seek to have the Commission conduct
the seven-year statutorily prescribed parole interview. Instead,
Coto requested an additional interview—separate and distinct
from the one granted to him in statute—for the Commission to

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consider his reduced aggravated assault sentence and lower his
PPRD. No right to such an additional interview exists in statute.

     Section 947.174(2), Florida Statutes states that “[t]he
[C]ommission, for good cause, may at any time request that a
hearing examiner conduct a subsequent hearing according to the
procedures outlined in this section.” (emphasis supplied).
Similarly, section 947.16(5), Florida Statutes, states, in pertinent
part, that “[s]ubsequent to the establishment of the [PPRD], the
[C]ommission may, at its discretion, review the official record or
conduct additional interviews with the inmate.” (emphasis
supplied). Thus, the plain language of the statutes shows that the
Commission can decide when to hold a required parole interview
that is not required by statute at its discretion.

    Accordingly, given the Commission has discretion in deciding
when to hold this type of parole interview, Coto cannot show that
he had a right to enforce the performance of a legal duty.

    AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS and LONG, JJ., concur.
               _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Mario Coto, pro se, Appellant.

Rana M. Wallace, General Counsel, and Mark J. Hiers, Assistant
General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender Review,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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