Court Opinion

ID: 9750646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:15:54.120761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:14.636545
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
BOWES, J.:
I believe that Appellee’s discovery request, wherein he sought to uncover what he purported would be exculpatory evidence, was baseless; hence, I dissent.
On April 23, 2003, a jury convicted Ap-pellee of first degree murder, arson, receiving stolen property, and tampering with evidence. These charges arose from the May 26, 2002 death of Hopethan Johnson, who sold crack cocaine to Appellee, and Appellee’s subsequent actions of hiding the body and destroying a car used to transport it. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth was as follows. On the date in question, which was the Sunday of Memorial Day weekend, Stacey Farmer’s neighbor heard two gunshots and, after a pause, three more gunshot blasts emanating from a wooded area behind Farmer’s house. The neighbor reported the matter to police, who went to Farmer’s house and found nothing unusual. At that time, police did see a truck registered to Appellee in Farmer’s driveway. After Appellee was arrested for Johnson’s murder and in jail awaiting trial, Farmer was shot in the head and killed.
The Commonwealth’s evidence established that Appellee believed that Johnson was overcharging him for drugs and wanted to kill him. First, just prior to the murder, Appellee had conversations with David Holloway, who also sold Appellee drugs. Holloway reported that Appellee was irate with Johnson, believed that Johnson and Holloway had cheated him financially, and said that he planned to “get a shotgun and start taking mother f_s out.” N.T. Trial, 4/21-25/03, at 156.
Darin Stump testified similarly. He was Appellee’s friend and met Johnson in 2000. He recalled that prior to the Memorial Day weekend of 2002, Appellee was “upset with some of the dealings that [Appellee and Johnson] had between them.” Id. at 176. Appellee felt either that he was not provided a sufficient amount of drugs for the money that he was paying Johnson or that Johnson was charging him too much money for the drugs that Appellee bought. Appellee told Stump that, “he was going to get the n_r.” Id. at 178.
Chad Snyder knew Farmer, Appellee, and Johnson in 2002. On one occasion, Appellee and Snyder purchased drugs from Johnson, and immediately after Johnson left the area, Appellee told Snyder, “I’d like to kill him.” Id. at 195. Appellee also said that, “he had a shotgun behind the seat” of his car, and that “he was going to shoot [Johnson] with it.” Id. at 196.
Commonwealth witness Holly Straus-baugh testified as follows. She was Stacey Farmer’s girlfriend in May 2002 and was living at his home. About one-half hour after the murder, Stacey Farmer “was like all freaked out,” and told Strausbaugh that Appellee shot Johnson and that “he[, Farmer,] was out in the back yard and he saw it.” Id. at 333.1 After this conversa*615tion occurred, Appellee left Farmer’s house and returned later that day. At that time, Appellee started “looking for any of [Johnson’s] stuff. He got his helmet and there was a jacket laying there and he got that.” Id. at 339. Appellee said, “that he had shot him for nothing because he didn’t find no money or no crack.” Id. at 340. After Appellee looked through Johnson’s jacket, he found some crack and that “seemed to make him a little happier.” Id. Strausbaugh also overheard Appellee tell Farmer that he took Johnson’s car “to Pittsburgh to get rid of it.” Id. at 347. A couple of days after the shooting, Strausbaugh, Appellee, and Farmer were in Appellee’s truck together when Farmer asked Appellee what he did with the body and told Appellee that he should give it to Johnson’s family. In response, Appellee “just freaked out, just started saying don’t ever £_g ask me again what I did with it,” and that “nobody would ever know where it was.” Id. at 348^49.
Appellee confessed to police that he had murdered Johnson. Specifically, Appellee told police that he owed Johnson money and that he was afraid of Johnson because Johnson had pointed a gun at him and his girlfriend. Appellee informed police that he shot Johnson with a twenty gauge shotgun while Johnson was in Stacey Farmer’s backyard. However, Appellee refused to tell police where Johnson’s body was located. Detective Donald Hopple, Jr., heard Appellee make a second confession. Specifically, Detective Hopple observed an interaction between Appellee and his mother in the courtroom. Appellee’s mother hugged Appellee and told him not to take the blame for a murder that he did not commit. At that point, Appellee “leaned down to her and told her that he did it, that he killed him.” Id. at 513.
The Commonwealth also established the following. On the day of the murder, Johnson borrowed Stephanie Summer’s car in order to ride a motorcycle that he stored in Stacey Farmer’s garage. That was the last time anyone saw Johnson. Ms. Summer’s car was later discovered destroyed by fire. Police also found Johnson’s motorcycle hidden under tarps behind Appellee’s place of employment. There were twelve gauge shotgun pellets recovered from the odometer and speedometer of Johnson’s motorcycle and an area behind Farmer’s house. Twelve gauge shotgun shells were located in Ap-pellee’s truck and residence. Both a twelve gauge and a twenty gauge shotgun were discovered in Appellee’s home after the murder.
Based on this evidence, Appellee was found guilty of the above-described crimes. On May 19, 2003, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, and, on appeal, we affirmed. Commonwealth v. Frey, 872 A.2d 1270 (Pa.Super.2005) (unpublished memorandum). After our Supreme Court denied review, Appellee filed a timely PCRA petition, counsel was appointed, and the PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing. PCRA relief was denied, and, on appeal, we affirmed and rejected seven allegations of error. Commonwealth v. Frey, 998 A.2d 1024 (Pa.Super.2010) (unpublished memorandum).
On July 20, 2010, Appellee filed a counseled motion for a new trial based upon after-discovered evidence alleging the following. On June 2, 2010, Appellee discovered through a news outlet that a body was recovered on March 25, 2008, and in 2010, it was identified as Johnson’s remains through DNA testing. Appellee asked for a copy of the autopsy, which he received on June 8, 2010. Appellee con*616tended that the autopsy results demonstrated that he was entitled to a new trial and that the motion for such was timely under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) because it was filed within sixty days of Appellee’s receipt of the autopsy.
Appellee posited that the autopsy provided exculpatory evidence that would likely compel a different verdict in the following respects. First, the coroner stated that the date of death was anywhere between six months to several years prior to the 2008 discovery of the remains and Appellee therefore could not have murdered Johnson in 2002. Second, two sizes of pellets were found on either side of the body. Appellee noted that there was a disparity in the evidence about what size shotgun he used to murder Appellee and thus, the different sized pellets found in the skeletal remains was a critical fact. Third, Appellee noted that there was evidence that Johnson was killed on his motorcycle but the skeletal remains demonstrated no evidence of trauma that would accompany a fall from a moving motorcycle.
Then, on October 29, 2010, Appellee filed a “Supplemental Motion for New Trial Based upon After-Discovered Evidence under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(h) and (b)(2).” In this petition, Appellee claimed that he discovered on August 30, 2010, that Farmer’s death was a homicide and the fact that Farmer’s death was a homicide would likely compel a different verdict in this matter on the following basis:
29. At the time of Farmer’s death, Defendant was in custody.
30. Defendant could not have been responsible for Farmer’s death.
31. As the police had ruled Farmer’s death a homicide, Farmer’s killer still remains in the community.
32. Because investigators only recently determined that Farmer was murdered, the jury was unable to hear testimony concerning Farmer’s death.
33. Had the jury heard this evidence, it is likely that they would have concluded that the deaths of Farmer and Johnson were related.
34. Because Defendant could not have killed Farmer, and because the jury heard testimony that Farmer killed Johnson [from Appellee’s girlfriend] it is likely that a jury could have inferred that Farmer’s killing was in retaliation for his killing Johnson.
35. In the alternative, had the jury known that Farmer, too, had been murdered they could have easily and correctly reasoned that the individual that killed Johnson also came back to the same location and killed Farmer.
36. This would have led to reasonable doubt that Defendant killed Johnson and would have compelled a not guilty verdict.
Supplemental Motion for New Trial Based upon After-Discovered Evidence under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2), 10/29/10, at ¶¶ 29-36.
It was in connection with this second, October 29, 2010 motion for a new trial that Appellee was granted discovery; specifically, he was granted access to Farmer’s murder investigation file based on the above allegation that the information was necessary for him to show similarities between the deaths of Farmer and Johnson and that the same person shot both men.
Discovery in the PCRA context is governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 902, which states in relevant part that “(1) Except as provided in paragraph (E)(2), no discovery shall be permitted at any stage of the proceedings, except upon leave of court after a showing *617of exceptional circumstances.” Pa. R.Crim.P. 902(E)(1). Our Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to interpret this rule in the death penalty context, which is covered by Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2). That portion of the rule indicates, “On the first counseled petition in a death penalty case, no discovery shall be permitted at any stage of the proceedings, except upon leave of court after a showing of good cause.” Our Supreme Court has consistently concluded that good cause for discovery in the PCRA context, a lesser standard than exceptional circumstances, is not present based upon unsubstantiated allegations that the requested information might reveal potentially exculpatory evidence.
A recent example is Commonwealth v. Hanible, — Pa. -, 30 A.3d 426 (2011). Therein, the defendant claimed that he should have been granted access to ballistic reports and his homicide file. The Supreme Court observed that a “showing of good cause requires more than just a generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 484 (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 598 Pa. 397, 957 A.2d 237, 272 (2008)). With respect to the ballistics report, the defendant argued that it might have been exculpatory to him. In response, the Commonwealth noted that the defendant’s position that the ballistics report could provide exonerating material was completely speculative and that the defendant did not provide any basis for his position that the report might reveal exculpatory information. The Court agreed that the defendant was not permitted access to the ballistics report because he “failed to make any showing of good cause why this information, if it existed, would have been exculpatory to him.” Hanible, supra at 484.
The Supreme Court similarly dismissed the defendant’s request for access to his homicide file, which was sought due to the fact that it might contain evidence exculpatory to him, information that could have impeached the credulity of Commonwealth witnesses, and might have proven another individual guilty of the crime. Again, the Court denied the defendant access to the file because the defendant’s position that any of the delineated evidence existed was conjectural. It stated, “As with the previous claim, [the defendant] has not made a showing of good cause as he is unaware whether exculpatory information even exists.” Id. (footnote omitted).
Hanible is merely the latest in a series of decisions wherein the Supreme Court has upheld a refusal to grant discovery in the PCRA setting. The Supreme Court cases are marked by a uniform position: discovery is unwarranted when the defendant presents a conjectural and unsubstantiated allegation that the requested material might prove him innocent. In Commonwealth v. Collins, supra, the PCRA court denied the defendant’s discovery request of his homicide file because his position that it might reveal possible trial court errors or exculpatory evidence was speculative. Our Supreme Court affirmed, noting the “PCRA discovery request was the same sort of generic plea for hypothetical evidence that we have rejected as falling far short of the ‘good cause’ requirement of Rule 902(E)(2).” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 913 A.2d 220 261 (2006) (“speculation that requested documents will uncover exculpatory evidence does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 902(E)(2)”); Commonwealth v. Bridges, 584 Pa. 589, 886 A.2d 1127 (2005) (unsubstantiated position that a Commonwealth witness was a paid informant and drug trafficker did not warrant discovery because there was no factual basis for the position). The predecessor to Pa. R.Crim.P. 902 was Pa.R.Crim.P. 1502, *618which contained identical language, and was interpreted consistently. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167 (1999).
In the present case, Appellee has leveled unsubstantiated allegations that the investigatory files of Stacey Farmer might reveal that Farmer’s murderer is identical to the man who murdered Johnson. Not only does Appellee fail to offer a scintilla of support for this conjecture, the claim borders on the absurd. Appellee told three of his friends he wanted to kill Johnson. Appellee confessed to police to killing Johnson with a shotgun. Farmer told his girlfriend that he saw Appellee killed Johnson. Appellee also made incriminatory remarks to Farmer’s girlfriend following the murder. Detective Hopple overheard Appellee admit to his mother that he killed Johnson. There was physical evidence linking Appellee to the crime. Johnson’s motorcycle, embedded with shotgun pellets, was found behind Appel-lee’s place of employment, and police observed Appellee’s truck parked at the murder scene immediately after Johnson was killed.
In my view, Appellee has utterly failed to establish good cause for discovery of Farmer’s murder file, much less the higher standard of exceptional circumstances applicable in this case. His position that Farmer’s murderer and Johnson’s murderer might be the same person is untenable. Hence, I respectfully dissent.

. Farmer’s statement to Ms. Strausbaugh was admitted into evidence as an excited utterance, and, on direct appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s ruling in this respect. Common*615wealth v. Frey, 872 A.2d 1270 (Pa.Super.2005) unpublished memorandum).