Court Opinion

ID: 999871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:32:15.385111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:51.602655
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 99-4001

RICHMOND WALL, III,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge.
(CR-98-177-A)

Submitted: September 21, 1999

Decided: October 8, 1999

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Kenneth M. Robinson, Cameron Robinson-Kourtesis, THE ROBIN-
SON LAW FIRM, Washington, D.C.; William Jackson Garber,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States
Attorney, Justin W. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charles P. Rosenberg, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

After his first trial ended in a mistrial, Richmond Wall was retried
and convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute and to distribute controlled substances in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). At his first trial, Wall was also acquitted
on four substantive charges. On appeal, Wall contends that the district
court erred by: (1) allowing evidence concerning the acquitted
charges to be admitted at the second trial; (2) allowing evidence of
Wall's drug use; and (3) improperly determining the amount of drugs
attributed to Wall for sentencing purposes. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.

We find that the admission of evidence from the prior trial was not
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the prior acquit-
tals "did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case." Dowling
v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348 (1990); see also Gil v. United
States, 142 F.3d 1398, 1401-02 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Brackett, 113 F.3d 1396, 1398 (5th Cir. 1997). We also find that the
district did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Wall's
drug use. Such evidence was relevant to Wall's motive to engage in
a drug conspiracy and the nature of the relationships among the con-
spirators. See United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 647 (4th Cir. 1995).

Furthermore, we find that the district court did not clearly err in
determining the amount of heroin attributable to Wall for sentencing
purposes. See United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 210 (4th Cir.
1999). The district court properly considered the evidence at trial and
the statements made to the probation officer. We also find that Wall's
contention that the court denied him the opportunity at sentencing to
cross-examine witnesses is without merit.

We affirm the conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-

                     2
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3