Court Opinion

ID: 9402917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-19 10:08:31.766946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.179379
License: Public Domain

In the
           Court of Appeals
   Second Appellate District of Texas
            at Fort Worth
         ___________________________
              No. 02-22-00291-CV
         ___________________________

HICKS AIRFIELD PILOTS ASSOCIATION, Appellant

                         V.

    HICKS ASSET PARTNERS, LLC, Appellee

      On Appeal from the 236th District Court
              Tarrant County, Texas
          Trial Court No. 236-292837-17

       Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.
      Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      After Appellant Hicks Airfield Pilots Association (the Association) decided to

reopen a vehicular entrance gate at Hicks Airfield (the Airfield), Appellee Hicks Asset

Partners, LLC (HAP), which owns property at the Airfield, sued for declaratory and

injunctive relief to stop it. After the close of evidence at a jury trial, the trial court

granted a directed verdict for HAP on the basis that the Association’s unilateral

reopening of the gate would violate the Airfield’s governing documents (the CCRs).

The Association complains on appeal that the trial court erred in directing a verdict by

(1) misinterpreting the CCRs, (2) awarding an injunction that exceeded the scope of

that requested by HAP, and (3) awarding HAP its attorney’s fees based on the court’s

misinterpretation of the CCRs. We will reverse the trial court’s judgment in part and

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

                                     A. THE CCRS

      It is undisputed that the Airfield’s CCRs govern this dispute. For our purposes,

the CCRs consist of the original Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and

Restrictions; the Association’s Bylaws; and the Fifth Amendment to the Declaration

of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The CCRs delegate to the Association

the “full power and authority” to enforce the CCRs and “to do all such things as are

necessary, or deemed by the Association to be advisable, in order to preserve and

                                            2
maintain Hicks Airfield, its runways, taxiways[,] and other [c]ommon [a]reas, as a

private airfield for the benefit of the Owners.”

      All of the Airfield taxiways and roadways are part of the common areas and

were conveyed to the Association through the Declaration. An easement was also

created over all taxiways and roadways to “assure full and reasonable vehicular access

and ingress and egress” to the Airfield:

      Declarant, its agents, customers and invitees, each Owner, and such
      other persons as may be designated by the Association from time to
      time, shall have an easement of ingress and egress for unrestricted
      vehicular and pedestrian access and ingress and egress to and from the
      [Airfield] and adjacent streets and roads, over the portions of the
      [Airfield] designated for use as the taxiway/roadway, subject to such
      reasonable Rules and Regulations as the Association may from time to
      time implement.

      There was also reserved with the Association a “construction easement over

and across all portions of the [Airfield] for the purpose of . . . making such repairs as

may be the responsibility of, or permitted to be made by,” the Association.

      The Association is tasked with levying certain fees from the owners, including

regular assessments and special group assessments. Among other items, these fees are

to be used for the “improvement and maintenance of the [c]ommon [a]reas . . . and

carrying out the various matters set forth or envisioned” in the CCRs. The amounts

of the regular assessments are to be set “as the Association may determine to be

necessary to pay the expenses of the Association (including reasonable reserves).”

Special group assessments may be levied by the Association only if two-thirds of the

                                            3
voting owners assent to them. These special assessments can be levied “for the

purpose of defraying, in whole or in part, the cost of any construction or

reconstruction, unexpected repair[,] or replacement of any capital improvement upon

the [c]ommon [a]reas.”

      Additionally, the Bylaws provide that

      [t]he omission or failure of the Association or any Owner to enforce the
      covenants, conditions, restrictions, easements, uses, limitations,
      obligations[,] or other provision of the Declaration, these By-Laws[,] or
      the regulations adopted pursuant thereto, shall not constitute or be
      deemed a waiver, modification[,] or release thereof, and the [Association]
      shall have the right to enforce the same thereafter.

      Finally, central to this dispute is the Fifth Amendment to the Declaration

(adopted in 1998),1 which created new voting requirements for amending the CCRs:

      The consent of 60% of the then Owners of Lots . . . shall be required in
      order to amend this Declaration or change the covenants, conditions[,]
      and restrictions in whole or in part . . . provided, however, that the
      following amendments will require the approval of 90% of the then
      Owners of Lots . . . : (a) Any amendment which materially changes the
      use to be made of any portion of the Common Areas[.]

                            B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

      The Airfield is a private airfield in Tarrant County comprised of approximately

270 privately owned lots, many of which contain airplane hangars. This dispute

concerns a previously open entrance to the Airfield (the North Gate) that was closed

      It appears that the Fifth Amendment was the last time that the CCRs were
      1

amended.

                                          4
in 2014. HAP owns Airfield Lot 61, which is directly adjacent to the North Gate.

When open, the North Gate serves as an access point onto an airfield roadway

(Aviator Drive) from Hicks-Avondale Road, a public roadway.2 Aviator Drive runs

directly in front of Lot 61.

       Prior to the North Gate being closed in 2014, it contained a plastic arm gate

that owners could open using a remote control for entrance onto the Airfield. But on

a nearly daily basis, “unauthorized people”3 or owners who did not have their remote

controls would manually lift the arm gate, which rendered it inoperable. Spurred by

safety concerns of unauthorized traffic on Airfield roadways and to quell the near-

daily maintenance required to fix the gate, the Association decided to close the North

Gate. The Association erected aluminum fencing over the entrance and placed plastic

barriers in front of it. The issue of the North Gate closure was never put to a vote of

the ownership, though there was disagreement at trial as to whether the closure was

meant to be permanent or temporary. It was during the time that the North Gate was

closed that HAP purchased Lot 61.

       In 2016, discussions started about reopening the North Gate.              These

discussions were prompted primarily by lot owners who claimed that the North

       There is also a 30-foot emergency-access easement on Aviator Drive.
       2

       3
        Residents of nearby neighborhoods who were not owners of lots at the
Airfield would often use the North Gate to enter the Airfield and use its roadways as
a shortcut to another destination.

                                          5
Gate’s closure had created a traffic bottleneck at other Airfield entrances and along its

roadways. The Association planned to install a more secure sliding-style gate at the

entrance in hopes that it would hinder unauthorized traffic through the North Gate if

and when it was reopened.4 Again, no vote of the Airfield ownership was taken on

the issue of reopening the North Gate. But the Association decided to reopen it

without taking a vote.

      Howard Cox, HAP’s president, testified that he relied on the North Gate’s

remaining closed when he purchased Lot 61. He believed that the lot’s value would

decrease if the North Gate was reopened because it would increase traffic in front of

this lot and crime throughout the Airfield.       After learning about the proposed

reopening of the North Gate, Cox repeatedly voiced his concerns to the Association,

but the Association stood firm in its decision.

                          C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In June 2017, HAP sued the Association for declaratory and injunctive relief to

stop it from reopening the North Gate. It alleged in its petition that the reopening of

      4
         The Association apparently purchased a new gate and was ready to install it at
the North Gate before the trial court enjoined them from doing so. It is not clear
from the record how the Association paid for the gate or how it planned to pay for its
installation. It is also unclear whether the Association would need to levy a special
assessment against the owners to pay for the installation, though a former president of
the Association testified that the Association “probably had funds” available to pay
for it. Regardless, there is no evidence in the record that the Association ever
attempted to levy a special assessment—with or without the appropriate ownership
approval—to defray the costs of reopening the North Gate.

                                           6
the North Gate would constitute a material change to the Airfield’s common areas

and would also be a capital expenditure requiring a special assessment—both of

which necessitate a consent vote of the Airfield’s owners that the Association did not

obtain. Specifically, HAP sought a judicial declaration that the proposed North Gate

reopening “is a capital project which would require approval of the requisite

percentage of the Hicks Airfield property owners and further that the required

approval has neither been sought nor obtained.” After the parties attended a failed

mediation, the Association countersued for fraud, alleging that Cox and a former

Association president had failed to disclose a real estate business relationship before

engaging in court-ordered mediation in this case. The Association alleged that this

“fraud by nondisclosure” materially affected the outcome of the mediation

proceedings and caused the proceedings “to fail to achieve disposition of the matter.”

      The trial court temporarily enjoined the Association from reopening the North

Gate, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, HAP moved for directed verdict

on the grounds that the evidence established as a matter of law “that the gate was

closed without membership approval of 90 percent as required by the governing

documents of the [A]ssociation.” It argued that this entitled HAP to a declaratory

judgment that “until and unless there is an affirmative vote of 90 percent of the

members of [the Association], the gate shall remain closed.” The trial court granted

HAP’s motion for directed verdict.

                                          7
      In its Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, the trial court stated that it

had directed a verdict because the Association had “failed to comply with the [CCRs]”

and “failed to produce any probative evidence supporting its fraud counterclaim.”

The trial court ordered that the Association be

      permanently restrained and enjoined from directly or indirectly
      modifying, constructing, repairing, removing, or in any way altering the
      existing roadway and closed gate and boundary fencing adjacent to [Lot
      61] and further from directly or indirectly modifying, constructing,
      repairing, widening, extending, or in any way altering the common area
      of Hicks Airfield, including, specifically, Aviator Drive from the current
      north gate located on Aviator Drive to Hicks Avondale School Road . . .
      until and unless [the Association] has fully and expressly complied with
      all terms, conditions, and conditions precedent provided in the [CCRs],
      which expressly mandate, in relevant part, as follows: “provided,
      however, that the following amendments will require the approval of
      90% of the then Owners of Lots . . . : (a) Any amendment which
      materially changes the use to be made of any portion of the Common
      Areas[.]”

      The trial court awarded HAP interest, court costs, and attorney’s fees pursuant

to Section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and it dismissed the

Association’s counterclaim with prejudice.5

                                 II. DISCUSSION

          A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED THE CCRS

      In its first issue, the Association complains that the directed verdict for

declaratory and injunctive relief rests on the trial court’s misinterpretation that the

CCRs require a 90% consent vote by Airfield lot owners before the North Gate can
      5
       The Association has not appealed the trial court’s dismissal of its counterclaim.

                                           8
be reopened. The Association argues that the 90% voting provision from the Fifth

Amendment applies only when the Association desires to amend the CCRs to

materially change the use of the common areas. Thus, says the Association, because

the CCRs currently require that the roadways and North Gate be used for ingress and

egress to and from the Airfield, reopening the North Gate does not constitute a

material change triggering the need to vote on an amendment to the CCRs.

      HAP counters that a directed verdict was warranted because the undisputed

evidence established that the Association never secured a 90% vote before moving to

reopen the North Gate. According to HAP, this failure precludes the Association

from reopening the North Gate because to do so would be a material change in the

use of the common areas—namely, changing a closed gate to an open gate.6 HAP

also asserts that the evidence established that “the construction of an additional north

entrance would have required the expenditure of significant capital.”

      We sustain the Association’s first issue because (1) the CCRs unambiguously

authorize it to maintain the common areas and easements and to ensure that the

roadways be open for ingress and egress to and from the Airfield and (2) no other

grounds support the directed verdict.

      6
        HAP also argues that the Association waived its first issue because it failed to
plead as an affirmative defense that the 90% voting provision was ambiguous. We
disagree. The Association does not argue that the 90% provision was ambiguous. In
fact, both parties seem to concede the opposite.

                                           9
                                1. Standard of Review

       Generally, we review a trial court’s grant of a directed verdict for legal

sufficiency of the evidence. Byrd v. Delasancha, 195 S.W.3d 834, 836 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2006, no pet.) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 809–28 (Tex.

2005)). However, the trial court’s interpretation of restrictive covenants is a legal

question that we review de novo. Raman Chandler Props., L.C. v. Caldwell’s Creek

Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 178 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet

denied). We construe restrictive covenants by applying the general rules of contract

construction. Id. at 391; see Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. 1998). A

restrictive covenant should be liberally construed to give effect to its purpose and

intent. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.003(a); Buckner v. Lakes of Somerset Homeowner’s

Ass’n, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

       “If the covenant has a definite or certain meaning, it is unambiguous as a

matter of law.” Raman Chandler, 178 S.W.3d at 391. Mere disagreement about the

interpretation of a restrictive covenant does not render it ambiguous.             Buckner,

133 S.W.3d at 297. “Words used in a restrictive covenant may not be enlarged,

extended, stretched, or changed by construction, but will be given their commonly

accepted meanings.” Id.; see Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 274,

285 (Tex. 2018) (“No construction, no matter how liberal, can construe a property

restriction into existence when the covenant is silent as to that limitation.”).

                                            10
      Further, we “must affirm a trial court’s directed verdict, regardless of the

grounds asserted by the movant or upon which the trial court granted the directed

verdict, if the record establishes any ground that entitles the movant to judgment as a

matter of law.” Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 152 S.W.3d 172, 191 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

         2. CCRs Authorize and Direct the Association to Maintain the
                      North Gate as an Access Point

      The CCRs unambiguously authorize the Association to maintain the North

Gate as an open gate. They explicitly imbue the Association with “full power and

authority to do all such things as are necessary” to “preserve and maintain” the

Airfield’s common areas—which include all roadways such as Aviator Drive—and to

enforce the provisions of the CCRs. One such provision creates an easement “over

all taxiways and roadways” to “assure full and reasonable vehicular access and ingress

and egress . . . to and from [the Airfield] and adjacent streets and roads.” There is a

further easement reserved with the Association “over and across all portions” of the

Airfield for the purpose of “making such repairs as may be the responsibility of” the

Association.

      These CCR provisions not only authorize the Association to maintain the

North Gate as an open gate but also place upon it a duty to ensure that all of the

roadways remain open for ingress and egress to and from the Airfield. Thus, it would

                                          11
not be a violation of these CCR provisions for the Association to reopen the North

Gate and install a new sliding gate without first putting it to a vote of the ownership.

      HAP effectively argues that the Association’s unilateral closing of the North

Gate in 2014 served to amend the CCRs by (1) materially changing the use of the

North Gate from an open gate to a closed gate common area, (2) removing the access

easements as to the North Gate, and (3) mandating that the Association maintain and

enforce the North Gate as a closed gate. The argument continues that, because the

CCRs were so amended to close the North Gate, that the Association cannot reopen

the North Gate until it obtains a 90% consent vote pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.

The trial court agreed with this interpretation of the CCRs and enjoined the

Association from reopening the North Gate until it secured a 90% vote of the owners

to do so.

      But this interpretation bypasses the principal question posed here: Does the

Association have the power, pursuant to the existing CCRs, to maintain and enforce

the North Gate as an open gate? For the reasons already explained, the answer to this

question is unambiguously, “Yes.” Even if we assume that the Association did not

have the power to close the gate in 2014 without a vote, that improper closure did not

serve to then amend the CCRs—both parties agree that no such amendment was ever

formally enacted. And, the Bylaws explicitly provide that the Association’s failure to

enforce any provision of the CCRs cannot be deemed a waiver of the Association’s

right to later enforce that provision. Thus, the trial court’s reading into the CCRs

                                           12
such an amendment “construe[d] a property restriction into existence” that

improperly limits the Association’s authority on the issue. Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 285.

Accordingly, we hold that this interpretation cannot support the directed verdict.

               3. No Other Grounds Support the Directed Verdict

      Our inquiry does not end there, however, because we “must affirm a trial

court’s directed verdict, regardless of the grounds asserted by the movant or upon

which the trial court granted the directed verdict, if the record establishes any ground

that entitles the movant to judgment as a matter of law.” Westchester Fire Ins. Co.,

152 S.W.3d at 191. There is only one additional ground raised in the record to

potentially support the directed verdict: that the Association cannot reopen the North

Gate because the expense of doing so would constitute a “capital improvement upon

the [c]ommon [a]reas” that first requires a two-thirds vote of the ownership for the

levying of a special assessment. But this ground cannot support the directed verdict

because it does not present a live controversy ripe for declaratory or injunctive relief.

      To be entitled to declaratory relief, the movant must present the court with a

ripe controversy, and the declaration sought must actually resolve that controversy.

Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 685 (Tex. 2020). Likewise, “[a] trial court

cannot grant injunctive relief based upon a hypothetical or contingent situation that

might or might not arise at a later date.” Schroeder v. Rancho Escondido Cmty. Improvement

Ass’n, 248 S.W.3d 415, 417 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (citing Camarena v.

Tex. Emp. Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988)).

                                            13
       The CCRs provide that the Association “may levy” a special assessment to

defray the costs of a capital improvement if it first obtains a two-thirds vote of the

ownership approving that assessment. But there is no evidence in the record that the

Association ever attempted to levy a special assessment to defray the costs of

reopening the North Gate. And if the Association has not attempted to levy a special

assessment, HAP’s argument related to what the Association must do in the event

that it decides to levy a special assessment raises a purely hypothetical dispute that is

not ripe for declaratory or injunctive relief.

       Further, HAP’s interpretation of the CCRs’ special-assessment provisions is

misguided. It essentially construes them to require the Association to levy a special

assessment (with the proper ownership vote) when any potential project might

constitute a capital improvement to the common areas. The plain language of the

CCRs does not allow for such an interpretation and cannot sustain the trial court’s

directed verdict.

       For these reasons, we sustain the Association’s first issue and reverse the trial

court’s judgment insofar as it awarded declaratory and injunctive relief to HAP.7

       Because this holding also disposes of the Association’s second issue—that the
       7

permanent injunction was beyond its allowable scope—we need not consider it. See
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

                                             14
                                  B. ATTORNEY’S FEES

       In its third issue, the Association argues that the trial court erred in awarding

HAP its attorney’s fees because they were not equitable and just given the trial court’s

misinterpretation of the CCRs, or, alternatively, because they were not supported by

sufficient evidence. We sustain the Association’s third issue and reverse and remand

as to the award of attorney’s fees.

       The trial court awarded HAP its attorney’s fees pursuant to the Declaratory

Judgments Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009. Section 37.009 of

the Act provides that a trial court may award “reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees

as are equitable and just.” Id. It is within the trial court’s discretion to decide what is

equitable and just, and a party is not entitled to its attorney’s fees based simply on

whether it prevailed at trial. Mitchell v. Ballard, 420 S.W.3d 122, 134–35 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2012, no pet.). Further, “[w]hen a judgment is reversed on appeal, the

reversal may affect whether the award of attorney’s fees is equitable and just.” Moore

v. Jet Stream Invs., Ltd., 261 S.W.3d 412, 432 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied).

Thus, a reversing court may remand the case back to the trial court to reconsider the

award of attorney’s fees in light of its decision. Id.

       Because our opinion might affect the trial court’s fee determination, we will

reverse and remand the award of attorney’s fees to the trial court for a determination

of whether, in light of our opinion, the award is equitable and just. See Mitchell,

420 S.W.3d at 134.

                                             15
                               III. CONCLUSION

      Having sustained the Association’s first and third issues, we (1) reverse that

portion of the trial court’s judgment that awarded declaratory and injunctive relief to

HAP and (2) reverse the award of attorney’s fees and remand to the trial court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                     /s/ Brian Walker

                                                     Brian Walker
                                                     Justice

Delivered: June 15, 2023

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