Court Opinion

ID: 9719339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:49:16.542757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:06.231678
License: Public Domain

KAUS, P. J.
I respectfully and very briefly dissent.
Does the net result of Tanner II—affirmance despite an illegal grant of probation—apply to other beneficiaries of the same error or does it not? Only the Supreme Court knows for sure.
Whatever the eventual rule turns out to be, it will be difficult to harmonize with some prior decision—the only question is “which”: cases such as People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678 [143 Cal.Rptr. 885, 574 P.2d 1237], the majority’s stumbling block, or Tanner II—-my problem?
I am not sure that I could do any better than the majority if I attempted to reconcile an affirmance with Warner, but neither can I find a rational distinction between Tanner, Gonzales and any other defendant who should have been sentenced to prison but, for reasons deemed adequate by the trial court, was granted probation.
If I had my choice, I would find it easier to explain to Warner why his grant of probation became unglued and Gonzales’ did not, than to unravel for Gonzales’ benefit why he, but not Tanner, must go to prison. After all, in Warner’s case the circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s prior “sorry history” were such that the Supreme Court took the almost unprecedented step of holding that a grant of probation, although authorized by statute, was an abuse of discretion. On the other hand, in the case of any defendant who is granted probation in spite of a statutory prohibition—Tanner, Gonzales, whoever—it must be assumed that for reasons personal to that defendant, the trial court deemed him particularly worthy of leniency.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 1, 1979. Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., and Newman, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.