Court Opinion

ID: 9898340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:03.897829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:43.739264
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                      Washington State
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Division Two

                                                                                       August 1, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                        DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                             No. 56692-3-II

                              Respondent,

        v.

 LEVAUGHN LAFAYELLE MCVEA,                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                              Appellant.

       GLASGOW, C.J. — LeVaughn McVea pointed a gun at his 13-year-old daughter and

threatened her. The jury convicted McVea of felony harassment and second degree assault and

also returned special verdict findings that he was armed with a deadly weapon for both counts. At

sentencing, the trial court imposed firearm sentencing enhancements, rather than deadly weapon

enhancements, and ordered McVea to register as a felony firearm offender.

       McVea appeals. He argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior

threats and violent interactions with family members and that the State presented insufficient

evidence to support his convictions. McVea also argues the trial court erred by imposing firearm

enhancements and registration when the jury found that he was armed with a deadly weapon. The

State concedes we should remand for resentencing on the enhancements.

       We accept the State’s concession and we reverse in part and remand for the trial court to

strike the firearm sentencing enhancements and impose deadly weapon enhancements instead. We

otherwise affirm.
No. 56692-3-II

                                               FACTS

                                          I. BACKGROUND

       OL, McVea’s daughter, lived in Tacoma with her younger brother and her maternal

grandmother, Linnea Rushforth. One afternoon, when OL was 13 years old, she found McVea

standing on the porch. McVea asked OL to come with him and OL refused several times. The

situation escalated, McVea began yelling, he pointed a gun at OL and at some point during the

incident said, “‘I’m going to pop you all’” if OL did not go with him. 3 Verbatim Rep. of Proc.

(VRP) at 242. OL’s grandmother called 911. OL’s uncle arrived and fought with McVea while OL

ran next door to a neighbor’s house, which prompted the neighbor to also call 911. McVea left

after Rushforth yelled the police were coming.

       The State charged McVea with felony harassment and second degree assault, both with

firearm enhancements. The State later added charges for witness tampering and several violations

of pretrial no contact orders, which are not at issue in this appeal.

                                            II. PRETRIAL

       Felony harassment based on a threat to kill requires proof that the defendant threatened to

kill another person and that the victim had a reasonable fear the threat would be carried out. RCW

9A.46.020; State v. C.G., 150 Wn.2d 604, 612, 80 P.3d 594 (2003). Before trial, the State moved

to admit evidence of four incidents of McVea’s past violent behavior that OL either had witnessed

or had knowledge of. The State asserted that OL would testify that she was afraid McVea would

kill her, and McVea’s prior acts were admissible to show that OL’s fear of death was reasonable

under ER 404(b). Specifically, the State moved to admit evidence of three assaults that had

occurred within the two months leading up to the alleged incident. These incidents included an

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No. 56692-3-II

assault on OL’s stepmother in the driveway, when McVea pushed OL’s stepmother and OL

watched; a separate assault on her stepmother that OL witnessed; and an assault on OL’s uncle

that OL learned about from Rushforth. The State also moved to admit evidence of an incident

where OL watched McVea shoot a gun at another person’s vehicle when she was between seven

and eight years old.

       McVea opposed the State’s motion and filed a motion to exclude the evidence of prior acts,

arguing they did not meet any exception under ER 404(b) and were extremely prejudicial. He

asserted that the prior acts were not relevant because they were not directed towards OL and three

of the incidents did not involve a weapon.

       The trial court found that the incident in the driveway, the incident with OL’s stepmother,

and the incident with OL’s uncle, were “close in time” to when the alleged incident occurred and

were admissible pursuant to ER 404(b) for the specific purpose of proving the reasonableness of

OL’s fear. 1 VRP at 23.The trial court reasoned that evidence of “a real assault that [OL] either

witnessed or had direct knowledge about” was relevant to understanding whether OL had a

reasonable basis for believing that McVea would carry out his alleged threat. 1VRP at 17. The trial

court also found that because the evidence was necessary to prove an element of felony harassment,

it would not be overly prejudicial with a proper limiting instruction. The trial court excluded

evidence of the fourth incident involving the shooting into a car because it was too remote in time

to lend any real viability to the reasonableness of OL’s fear and it was too prejudicial.

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No. 56692-3-II

                                            III. TRIAL

A.     Evidence Presented

       1.       Testimony about the current incident

        At trial, OL testified that when McVea arrived at her grandmother’s house, he seemed

“[a]ngry” and did not look like his normal self. 3 VRP at 149-50. When McVea told OL to come

with him, she said that she could not because she had plans to meet a friend. McVea repeated his

request to “come with [him] now.” 3 VRP at 150. OL testified that after she refused a second time,

McVea became angry and said, “‘I’m your pop,’” then he accused OL of helping her stepmother

cheat on him. Id.

       Rushforth joined OL at the front door when she heard McVea’s raised voice. She heard OL

say she could not go with McVea because she had other plans. She heard McVea again ask OL to

come with him, but it was “like he was in another zone,” and he did not respond to OL’s replies.

3 VRP at 217.

       OL testified that McVea pulled a gun out of his front pocket and pointed it at her. The

prosecutor asked OL to confirm what McVea said while holding the gun: “And you said that he

said that he was pop off? . . . Is that what you said?” 3 VRP at 151. OL responded, “Yes.” 3 VRP

at 152. Rushforth testified that she heard McVea say, “‘I’m going to pop you all.’” 3 VRP at 218,

242. She understood that to mean that “[h]e was going to kill us . . . or kill -- do something to my

granddaughter.” 3 VRP at 218.

       OL described the gun as looking “like a cowboy gun,” similar to one “off of the movies.”

3 VRP at 152. OL said that she felt scared that McVea would shoot the gun at her or her brother.

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No. 56692-3-II

OL yelled to Rushforth, “‘He’s got a gun. He’s going to kill something. . . . Call the police.’” 3

VRP at 259.

       Rushforth testified that McVea walked away. When he did, he repeated the “pop

statement,” and she noticed the flash of a gun tucked in the back of his pants. 3 VRP at 219. While

Rushforth was still on the phone with 911, she heard McVea yell, “‘You took my gun.’” 3 VRP at

221. He eventually found a gun in his car, “but it wasn’t the same gun [Rushforth] saw in his

pocket” on the porch. 3 VRP at 222.

       OL testified that her uncle arrived, and McVea and her uncle started yelling and fighting

in the driveway. Rushforth testified that while they were fighting in the driveway, a gun dropped

to the ground. OL ran to the neighbor’s house. The neighbor testified that she opened the door to

find OL looking very “fearful,” with “tears in her eyes.” 3 VRP at 296. OL told the neighbor that

“she needed to call 911” and that “her dad was there . . . to take her somewhere . . . and that he had

a gun.” 3 VRP at 296-97. Rushforth eventually yelled that the police were coming and McVea left.

       2.      Testimony about prior incidents of violence against family members

       The trial court instructed the jury that part of OL’s testimony and part of Rushforth’s

testimony could be used only to decide whether OL was placed in reasonable fear that the alleged

threat would be carried out. The trial court told the jury that they may not consider the answers to

specific questions posed to both OL and Rushforth for any other purpose.

       After this instruction, OL testified that there had been events in the months before the

incident that made her more afraid of McVea’s behavior that day. OL testified that on one occasion,

she witnessed McVea push her pregnant stepmother. On another occasion, OL returned home with

her other grandmother and stepmother to find McVea in the driveway. McVea accused the three

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No. 56692-3-II

of them of helping OL’s stepmother cheat. McVea repeatedly tried to hit OL’s stepmother and

said, “‘Don’t make me pop off.’” 3 VRP at 162. OL testified that she was scared during that

incident because she didn’t know what McVea was going to do. OL also testified that she heard

from Rushforth that OL’s uncle was in the hospital because McVea “busted” his head open. 3 VRP

at 163. OL stated that these incidents changed the way she felt about McVea because before these

incidents she “didn’t think he would [have done] it to [her].” 3 VRP at 164.

       After the trial court gave the same limiting instruction during Rushforth’s testimony,

Rushforth said that a few months before the charged incident, she learned that McVea’s brother

was in the hospital with bleeding on the brain after a fight with McVea. Rushforth also testified

that OL had talked to her about the incidents in the driveway and her stepmother’s home and that

all of these events were upsetting to OL.

B.     Jury Instructions, Closing Argument, and Verdict

       At the conclusion of trial, the trial court reminded the jury that to find McVea guilty of

felony harassment, it could consider evidence relating to McVea’s prior misconduct only “to the

extent you find it relevant to the issue of whether [OL] was placed in reasonable fear that the threat

to kill would be carried out.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 85. The trial court also instructed the jury that

to find McVea guilty of second degree assault, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that

McVea assaulted OL “with a deadly weapon.” CP at 95. The trial court instructed that “[a] firearm,

whether loaded or unloaded, is a deadly weapon.” CP at 97. The court also gave the jury special

verdict forms asking the jurors to determine whether McVea was armed with a deadly weapon at

the time of the crimes.

                                                  6
No. 56692-3-II

       In closing argument, the State explained to the jury that in order to convict McVea of felony

harassment, the State had the burden to prove all of the elements. With regard to whether OL’s

fear was reasonable, the State reminded the jury that this was not the first time that OL had “seen

her father lose control and get violent.” 4 VRP at 346. The State recounted OL’s testimony about

McVea’s prior violence against family members. The State argued that these incidents were “in

her mind” and that they added to the already reasonable fear of OL having a gun pointed at her. 4

VRP at 346.

       The jury found McVea guilty of felony harassment and second degree assault, both with

deadly weapon enhancements, violations of the pretrial no-contact orders, and witness tampering.

C.     Sentencing

       McVea appeared pro se at sentencing. The trial court imposed a sentence at the top of the

standard range of 84 months for the assault conviction, 42 months for the felony harassment

conviction, and 60 months for the witness tampering conviction to be served concurrently. The

trial court also imposed 54 months of consecutive firearm enhancements, even though the jury

answered only deadly weapon special verdicts. The total sentence was 138 months.

       The trial court also ordered McVea to register as a felony firearm offender. McVea

questioned the felony firearm registration form. He stated that he never had to register before. The

trial court instructed the State that McVea did not need to sign the form, the State could just

indicate that he was refusing to sign. McVea asserted, “I’m not going to register.” 5 VRP at 408.

The prosecutor stated, “We will say you refused,” and McVea confirmed that he refused. 5 VRP

at 408-09.

       McVea appeals his convictions and sentence.

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No. 56692-3-II

                                          ANALYSIS

                                I. ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR ACTS

       McVea argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting McVea’s prior bad acts

under ER 404(b). He asserts that the prior acts were not relevant because they all concerned adult

family members and this incident concerned his “own young daughter.” Opening Br. of Appellant

at 35. We disagree.

A.     Legal Principles

       We review a trial court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Gunderson,

181 Wn.2d 916, 922, 337 P.3d 1090 (2014). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “‘trial court’s

decision is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds.’” Id. (quoting State v.

Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 572, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)).

       ER 404(b) bars evidence of prior bad acts “for the purpose of proving a person’s character

and showing that the person acted in conformity with that character.” State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d

405, 420, 269 P.3d 207 (2012). Evidence of prior bad acts may, however, “be admissible for any

other purpose, depending on its relevance and the balancing of its probative value and danger of

unfair prejudice.” Id.

       When determining whether prior bad acts are admissible, a court considers whether the

prior conduct occurred by a preponderance of the evidence, the purpose for which the evidence is

sought to be introduced, its relevancy to the crime charged, and whether its probative value

outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. Gunderson, 181 Wn.2d at 923. Evidence is relevant if it

has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” ER 401.

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No. 56692-3-II

       To prove felony harassment based on a threat to kill, the State had to establish “that the

person threatened was placed in reasonable fear that the threat to kill would be carried out.” C.G.,

150 Wn.2d at 612. If the evidence shows the victim’s subjective fear, we consider whether the fear

was reasonable using an objective standard considering the context of the case. State v. Cross, 156

Wn. App. 568, 582, 234 P.3d 288 (2010). Evidence of what the victim knew of the defendant’s

past violent acts is relevant to determine whether the victim’s fear was objectively reasonable. See

State v. Ragin, 94 Wn. App. 407, 411-12, 972 P.2d 519 (1999).

       In Ragin, the defendant called the victim from jail and threatened to murder the victim and

his family. Id. at 410. At Ragin’s trial for felony harassment, the trial court admitted evidence of

Ragin’s previous statements to the victim including “that he could build bombs, had access to guns

. . . , and that he could level the City Church and ‘waste’ the pastors.” Id. On appeal, Division One

held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements because the prior

acts put the threats in context in order to allow the jury to determine whether the victim’s fear was

reasonable. Id. at 411-12.

B.     Prior Acts in this Case

       Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when admitting evidence of some of

McVea’s prior bad acts under ER 404(b). It was not disputed that the prior acts occurred. The trial

court found that evidence of “a real assault that [OL] either witnessed or had direct knowledge

about” was relevant to proving the reasonableness of OL’s fear. 1 VRP at 17. The trial court

acknowledged that this evidence would be prejudicial, but found that because the State was

required to prove OL’s fear was objectively reasonable as an element of felony harassment, the

probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effects. And the trial court excluded a

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No. 56692-3-II

prior shooting incident that it determined was too remote to be probative and would be too

prejudicial.

          At trial, the State only referred to McVea’s prior bad acts to argue the reasonableness of

OL’s fear. The State asked OL what impact these prior bad acts had on her. She responded that

they changed the way she felt about her father. Rushforth also testified as to the effect of the prior

events on OL, stating that OL had talked about them and they were upsetting to her. During closing

arguments, the State referred to the elements of felony harassment before reminding the jury that

this was not the first time that OL had “seen her father lose control and get violent.” 4 VRP at 346.

The State asserted that all of the prior acts were “in [OL’s] mind” at the time of the incident and

provided context to the reasonableness of OL’s fear. 4 VRP at 346-47. The State never argued that

these events showed McVea’s propensity for violence.

          The trial court also mitigated the prejudicial effect of McVea’s prior bad acts by providing

both oral and written instructions directing the jury to consider evidence of McVea’s prior bad acts

only for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of OL’s fear. We presume the jury followed

the trial court’s instructions. State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 928, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). The

prior acts in this case helped show that OL knew her father could be violent with immediate family

members, including his own wife and brother. See Ragin, 94 Wn. App. at 412. We hold that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of McVea’s prior bad acts under ER

404(b).

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No. 56692-3-II

                                II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       McVea argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction

for felony harassment. McVea also argues that the State failed to prove that he was armed with a

deadly weapon for purposes of his second degree assault conviction and the deadly weapon

sentencing enhancements. We disagree.

        Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if any rational trier of fact, “viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the elements of the charged crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 265, 401 P.3d 19 (2017).

“In claiming insufficient evidence, the defendant necessarily admits the truth of the State’s

evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it.” State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d

102, 106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v.

Miller, 179 Wn. App. 91, 105, 316 P.3d 1143 (2014). We defer to the trier of fact on issues of

conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and the persuasiveness of evidence. State v. Ague-

Masters, 138 Wn. App. 86, 102, 156 P.3d 265 (2007).

A.     Felony Harassment

       To convict for felony harassment, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant knowingly made a threat to kill and that the person threatened reasonably feared that the

defendant would carry out the threat. RCW 9A.46.020(1)(b),(2)(b)(ii). McVea contends that the

State did not provide sufficient evidence to support his felony harassment conviction. Specifically,

McVea argues that the State failed to prove that McVea threatened to kill OL, that OL subjectively

feared that McVea would carry out the threat, or that any such fear was objectively reasonable.

We disagree.

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No. 56692-3-II

                1.      Threat to kill

        McVea argues that OL only referred to McVea as her “‘pop’” and the prosecutor put words

in her mouth when they asked her to confirm he said something about popping off. Opening Br.

of Appellant at 20. Additionally, McVea argues that even if McVea did say he would “‘pop off’”

as the prosecutor inferred, that did not constitute a threat to kill. Id. He asserts that threatening to

“‘pop off’” likely meant that he would become “louder and angrier if [OL] did not come with

him.” Id. at 21. But McVea ignores that we must take the State’s evidence as true, there was

evidence he pointed a gun at OL, and Rushforth heard him threaten to “‘pop you all.’” 3 VRP at

218, 242.

        “[T]he plain meaning of ‘threaten’ as used in RCW 9A.46.020 includes all threats, whether

or not verbalized.” State v. Pinkney, 2 Wn. App. 2d 574, 580, 411 P.3d 406 (2018). Gestures or

conduct can convey a threat as that term is defined. Id. at 581. “[T]he nature of a threat depends

on all the facts and circumstances, and it is not proper to limit the inquiry to a literal translation of

the words spoken.” C.G., 150 Wn.2d at 611. It is not relevant that the speaker does not intend to

carry out the threat. State v. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36, 38, 84 P.3d 1215 (2004).

        Here, the circumstances show that McVea arrived at the house agitated and not acting like

himself. When OL refused to go with him, he pulled out a gun and pointed it at her. In a claim of

insufficient evidence, the defendant necessarily admits the truth of the State’s evidence and we

must draw all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. Homan, 181 Wn.2d at 106. OL testified

that McVea pointed a gun at her when he became angry that she could not go with him, and

Rushforth heard McVea threaten, “‘I’m going to pop you all. ’” 3 VRP at 218. Assuming this

testimony is true, as we must, and resolving conflicting evidence about what McVea said in the

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No. 56692-3-II

State’s favor, we conclude this was sufficient evidence to establish that McVea threatened to kill

OL. When considering all of the circumstances, a rational jury could have found that McVea

threatened OL’s life.

        2.      OL’s fear

        McVea argues both that OL did not subjectively fear he would kill her, and that even if she

did experience such fear, her fear was not reasonable. With respect to the former contention,

McVea argues that OL testified only that she was scared that McVea would “‘shoot the gun at her

or [her brother],’” but did not say she feared that McVea would actually try to kill her. Opening

Br. of Appellant at 22 (alteration in original). With respect to the latter contention, McVea asserts

that although he had displayed a temper in the past, there was no evidence that McVea had ever

been violent with or directly threatened OL. Thus, he contends, her fear was not reasonable.

        To prove felony harassment based on a threat to kill, the State must show that the person

threatened was placed in reasonable fear that the threat to kill would be carried out. C.G., 150

Wn.2d at 612. Thus, the victim must subjectively fear that the threat will be carried out, and the

fear must be objectively reasonable. State v. E.J.Y., 113 Wn. App. 940, 952-53, 55 P.3d 673 (2002).

The reasonableness of the victim’s fear is a question for the trier of fact in light of the total context.

State v. Trey M., 186 Wn.2d 884, 906, 383 P.3d 474 (2016).

        Here, while it is true that OL did not directly say that she feared McVea would kill her, OL

did testify that when McVea pointed the gun at her, she felt “scared,” and she thought McVea was

going to shoot her or someone else. 3 VRP at 154. As discussed above, there was evidence that

OL witnessed or knew about multiple incidents where McVea physically attacked close family

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No. 56692-3-II

members, including his pregnant wife. And there is little meaningful distinction between a fear of

being shot versus a fear of being killed.

          The fact that McVea had a history of violence against adults, does not render a 13-year-

old’s fear unreasonable—to the contrary, it supports that fear. We conclude that there is sufficient

evidence that OL’s testimony established subjective fear when she said she was afraid McVea

would shoot her, and her fear was objectively reasonable in light of all of the circumstances. There

was sufficient evidence to establish McVea committed felony harassment.

B.        Second Degree Assault with a Deadly Weapon and the Deadly Weapon Enhancement

          McVea argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove that the object

McVea pointed at OL was a “‘gun in fact’ rather than a ‘toy gun.’” Therefore, the State failed to

prove that McVea was armed with a deadly weapon for the purposes of his second degree assault

conviction and the sentencing enhancements. Opening Br. of Appellant at 26. We disagree.

          The trial court instructed the jury that to convict McVea of second degree assault, the State

had to prove that McVea assaulted another person with a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c).

The jury was also told that the relevant definition of “assault” was “an act done with the intent to

create in another apprehension and fear of bodily injury, and which in fact creates in another a

reasonable apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury.” CP at 96; see State v. Abuan, 161

Wn. App. 135, 154, 257 P.3d 1 (2011). A “deadly weapon” includes any “loaded or unloaded

firearm.” RCW 9A.04.110(6); CP at 97. A “firearm” is defined as “a weapon or device from which

a projectile or projectiles may be fired by an explosive such as gunpowder.” RCW 9.41.010(12)1.

1
    We cite to the current statute because the relevant language has not changed.

                                                   14
No. 56692-3-II

       The State was not required to prove that the firearm was operable. State v. Olsen, 10 Wn.

App. 2d 731, 738, 449 P.3d 1089 (2019). Both parties discuss Tasker, where Division Three

recognized, “[e]vidence that a device appears to be a real gun and is being wielded in committing

a crime is sufficient circumstantial evidence that it is a firearm.” State v. Tasker, 193 Wn. App.

575, 594, 373 P.3d 310 (2016).

       In Tasker, the defendant challenged whether the device he used against the victim was a

“firearm” for purposes of the firearm sentencing enhancement. Id. at 580-81. Division Three held

that the State presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Tasker committed his crime

with a firearm based on the victim’s description of the gun as “dark” and “small.” Id. at 578, 595.

The court reasoned that the victim saw the gun at close range, in broad daylight, with good

visibility and was unwavering in her testimony that it was a gun. Id. at 595. Despite having no

experience with guns “‘in real life,’” she had seen guns in photographs, on the news, in television

programs and in movies. Id. Division Three held that “[c]ollectively, the evidence was sufficient

to establish the gun met the definition of a “firearm.” Id.

       Here, as in Tasker, OL saw the gun at close range, with good visibility on a sunny

afternoon. Despite not having much experience with guns, OL described the gun as a “cowboy

gun” similar to one “off of the movies.” 3 VRP at 152. Her testimony was also consistent, telling

both her grandmother and neighbor within an hour of the incident that McVea had a gun. Rushforth

also testified to the presence of a gun, asserting that she saw a flash of a gun tucked in the back of

McVea’s pants when he was walking away.

       In sum, two different witnesses testified that they saw a gun, and OL described the gun

McVea pointed at her by comparing it to guns she had seen in movies. We defer to the trier of fact

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No. 56692-3-II

on the persuasiveness of the evidence. Ague-Masters, 138 Wn. App. at 102. Construing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find

that McVea was armed with a deadly weapon for purposes of the assault conviction and the deadly

weapon sentencing enhancements. We affirm McVea’s convictions as well as the jury’s findings

that he used a deadly weapon when he committed the assault and the felony harassment.

                                          III. SENTENCING

A.      Firearm Sentencing Enhancement

        McVea next argues, and the State concedes, that we should remand for resentencing to

strike the firearm enhancements from his judgment and sentence and replace them with deadly

weapon enhancements because the jury found that McVea was armed with a deadly weapon.

        Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, sections

21 and 22 of the Washington Constitution, the right to a jury trial requires that a sentence be

authorized by the jury’s verdict. State v. Williams-Walker, 167 Wn.2d 889, 896, 225 P.3d 913

(2010). “For purposes of sentence enhancement, the sentencing court is bound by special verdict

findings, regardless of the findings implicit in the underlying guilty verdict.” Id. at 900. Thus, even

where a firearm is used in the commission of a crime, the only way to determine whether a deadly

weapon enhancement or a firearm enhancement is authorized, is to look at the jury’s special

findings. Id.

        Here, the trial court imposed firearm enhancements at sentencing despite the deadly

weapon special verdicts. The only way to determine which enhancement was authorized is to look

at the jury’s special verdicts, and here, the jury found McVea committed the felony harassment

and second degree assault with a deadly weapon. We accept the State’s concession and remand for

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No. 56692-3-II

the trial court to vacate the firearm enhancements and impose deadly weapon enhancements

instead. RCW 9.94A.533(4)(b),(c).

B.     Firearm Offender Registration

       McVea argues that the trial court also erred by requiring him to register as a felony firearm

offender because the jury found that McVea was armed with a deadly weapon, not a firearm.

McVea asserts that making him register without a jury determination violated his Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial.2

       The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence at

trial demonstrated that McVea was “armed with a firearm” during his offenses. Br. of Resp’t at

40. We affirm the firearm registration requirement.3

       A person convicted of a felony firearm offense must register as a firearm offender in certain

circumstances including when the “offense [was] committed against a child under the age of

eighteen.” RCW 9.41.330(3)(b). Otherwise, the court’s order to register as the result of a felony

firearm offense is discretionary. RCW 9.41.330(1). A “felony firearm offense” includes “[a]ny

felony offense if the offender was armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense.” RCW

2
  Although the relevant assignment of error refers to a violation of statutory authority, McVea’s
argument appears to be only that the registration requirement violates the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial.
3
  The State challenges whether McVea can raise this issue for the first time on appeal. If McVea
is correct that the felony firearm registration is punishment, then the issue can be raised for the
first time on appeal because the issue would implicate the trial court’s authority to enter the order
being challenged. See RAP 2.5(a); Neilson ex rel. Crump v. Blanchette, 149 Wn. App. 111, 115,
201 P.3d 1089 (2009) (“Generally, we may refuse to review a claim of error not raised in the trial
court. However, where . . . the asserted error concerns the trial court's authority to act, we may
elect to review the issue” (citation omitted)).

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No. 56692-3-II

9.41.010(11)4. The statute does not state that a jury must find that the defendant was armed with a

firearm in order for the crime to constitute a felony firearm offense. Here, because McVea’s crimes

were committed against a child, the registration requirement was mandatory if he committed his

felonies with a firearm. RCW 9.41.330(3)(b).

          A defendant’s Sixth Amendment jury trial right requires that any fact, other than the fact

of a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury. Apprendi, v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct.

2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). The “statutory maximum” is the maximum sentence a judge may

impose based on facts either admitted by the defendant or reflected in the jury’s verdict. Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). But the Washington

Supreme Court has held that the firearm registration requirement is a collateral consequence that

does not enhance the sentence or punishment. State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d 473, 484-85, 474 P.3d

539 (2020). As such, the requirement to register is not punitive, but rather a regulatory

consequence, and a jury determination is not required. See State v. Felix, 125 Wn. App. 575, 578-

79, 105 P.3d 427 (2005) (concluding that a judge-made finding that a crime involved domestic

violence did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights because consequences were

regulatory, not punitive). Because the registration requirement is not punitive, McVea’s

constitutional rights were not violated when the trial court imposed a registration requirement

without a jury finding.

          The trial court checked a box on the judgment and sentence indicating in part that felony

firearm registration was required because McVea committed felonies against a person under the

4
    We cite to the current statute because the relevant language has not changed.

                                                  18
No. 56692-3-II

age of 18 while armed with a firearm. McVea’s argument is that the registration requirement

violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial because the jury did not specifically find he was armed

with a firearm when he committed felony harassment and second degree assault. For the reasons

explained above, we disagree, and McVea raises no other basis to challenge the firearm registration

requirement imposed on him.

                                         CONCLUSION

       We reverse McVea’s sentencing enhancements and remand for the trial court to strike the

firearm sentencing enhancements and replace them with deadly weapon enhancements. We

otherwise affirm.

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No. 56692-3-II

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                  Glasgow, C.J.
 We concur:

 Maxa, J.

 Cruser, A.C.J.

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