Court Opinion

ID: 9667424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:45:19.844381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:37.753066
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
Mr. Chief Justice Hickman
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In connection with their motion for rehearing the petitioners have tendered for filing a certificate by the District Judge before whom the case was tried, certifying that both the written contract of sale and the warranty deed mentioned in our original opinion were introduced and admitted in evidence upon the trial of the case, and that each of those instruments was duly examined and considered by him. Attached to the certificate are photostatic copies of the contract and the deed. There is also attached a stipulation by the parties that the photostatic *267copies are true copies of the instruments which were, in fact, introduced in evidence. Under the provisions of Rules 428 and 491, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, leave is granted petitioners to file the certificate with its exhibits.
A consideration of the contract and deed has led us to the conclusion that it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the oral contract declared upon by respondent was not collateral to the written contract and deed. In the written contract, following a typed recital of the consideration, there is inserted in writing this provision: “House to be completed as agreed and curb and gutter on Lake St.” That insertion is initialed “L.H.T.,” doubtless the initials of L. H. Tucker, one of the petitioners. At the time the contract was made, the house was being erected upon the premises. That insertion discloses in writing that there was a collateral oral agrément, and we cannot say, as a matter of law, that obligations alleged are not within the purview of the agreement to complete the house. That insertion was not made in the deed, but it is one which ordinarily would not be placed in a deed. It appeared in the only written instrument in which a provision of that nature would be expected to appear. Considering the two instruments together, it is our view that the case is not one in which a summary judgment should have been rendered.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion delivered October 10, 1956.
Second motion for rehearing overruled November 14, 1956.