Court Opinion

ID: 9467820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:57:25.017624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:32.745352
License: Public Domain

POOLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority opinion holds that the values underlying the rule established by the Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Sykes are not implicated by Myers’ claim of error in certain of his jury instructions, and that therefore the Sykes rule does not apply to that claim. The majority further holds that, even if Sykes is applicable, its require*364ments are satisfied: in its view, Myers has made out a sufficient showing of “cause” and “prejudice” to overcome the Sykes bar to habeas review. From both holdings, I respectfully dissent.
I. Applicability of Sykes to Myers’ Claim
Baldly stated, the majority’s position is that where a constitutional claim “had not yet been identified” and was, in fact, “unknown” at the time of trial or direct appeal, the federal interests that prompted adoption of the Sykes rule are not involved, and that rule ought therefore not to be applied. The objection to this murky epistemology is that it is not at all clear what is meant by the word “unknown.” If the majority truly means by this word to single out those constitutional arguments for which there is no record that they had yet been made or thought of, that is not the case before us. Although the state of Washington accepted such jury instructions as were given in this case at the time of Myers’ trial, there was at that same time a significant controversy elsewhere as to the constitutionality of such instructions. See, e. g., Annot., 162 A.L.R. 495, 500 (1946). Indeed, it would not overstate to say that this issue was clearly on the frontier of the criminal law of the time. To suggest that Myers’ current constitutional claim was truly “unknown” at the time of his trial simply mischaracterizes the facts.
If the point be pressed to further analysis, I suspect that what the majority really means by “unknown” is something like “unacceptable to that particular court at that particular time.” If so, then the majority’s formulation stands revealed as an exception to Sykes that will surely devour it. The majority has, in effect, absolved defense counsel of the need to establish at trial the basic record heretofore considered natural to professionalism by giving assurance that ripe objections on constitutional grounds need not be made where it seems they will be overruled in the forum, and that Sykes will not bar raising them in later habeas proceedings because it is sufficient that trial counsel did not have them in mind, or thought it pointless to give them voice. Such encouragement to “sandbagging” surely frustrates the principles set forth in Sykes.
Moreover, it should be remembered that the boundaries of constitutional rights have historically been redefined, patient mete and meter, largely by the efforts of diligent and thoughtful attorneys who search for and raise “new” but logical and reasonable extensions of previously established, or at least suggested, doctrines. This is important to the values we place on competence in advocacy in the larger aim for fair trial. The majority, it seems to me, ignores or denigrates these fundamental aspects of our legal system by the suggestion that it is unreasonable to expect the defense to raise objections at trial that are thoughtful and creative, rather than mere rote recitations of hornbook legal principles. The majority also takes too limited a view of the comity interests involved in this situation: unless the objection was truly so far ahead of its time that its conception would have been visionary, I think that the state trial court is entitled to an opportunity to consider it before it may provide the basis for reversal on federal habeas. Foresight of this level does not, as the majority seems to fear, accrue only to legal prophesy: it hallmarks also the able defender.
In sum, it is my opinion that the values underlying Sykes are clearly implicated in these circumstances, and that the majority opinion has dealt airily with those values. I would require Myers to satisfy the Sykes cause and prejudice requirements before raising his claim in this habeas proceeding.
II. The Sykes Requirements
The majority offers an alternative basis for reversal in this case, perhaps reflecting uneasiness with its holding above. It holds that Myers has satisfied the Sykes cause and prejudice requirements. “Cause” exists for Myers’ failure to raise his objection because, the assertion goes, the utility of any such objection would depend on changes in the prevailing law. I do not agree that this *365constitutes adequate cause under Sykes. The Supreme Court in that case sought to establish a rule that would ensure that all reasonable arguments be raised in the trial court. For the reasons given above, I believe that the issue Myers now brings could reasonably have been expected to be raised in the trial court. That the courts of the state had expressed their disinclination to sustain the objection can only serve to satisfy the cause requirement of Sykes if we propose henceforth, under today’s convenient analysis, to except that requirement out of existence.
I would affirm the denial of the writ to Myers on the grounds indicated above.