Court Opinion

ID: 9478766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:57:30.561312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:36.480880
License: Public Domain

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
With the reservations expressed below, I concur in Parts I and II of the opinion, and in the result reached in Part III.
Resolution of the Franklin-Penry-Hitchcock issues turns on whether these issues may now be considered when they were not raised at trial; if they may not now be considered, whether trial counsel was ineffective in not raising them; and if the issues may now be considered, whether the Texas capital sentencing procedure is constitutional.
The State argues, and the State habeas court found, that King’s failure to raise these issues at trial constituted a procedural default under Texas law that precludes him from raising them in this post-conviction proceeding.1
The law of our circuit is that “a federal habeas court cannot review a claimed error in the conduct of a state criminal trial when the state has refused review in reliance on its contemporaneous objection rule, absent cause and prejudice for failure to object.”2
Unfortunately, the decisions of this circuit on the cause-and-prejudice issue have not been clear and consistent. In Williams *1407v. Lynaugh,3 this court found the procedural barrier not to preclude its consideration of Williams’ Franklin/Penry claim despite Williams’ failure to comply with the Texas contemporaneous-objection rule. We stated that “[w]e cannot close our eyes to the fact that the granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court in Franklin has at least raised the possibility that what had become accepted as established legal authority may be modified, at least to some extent.”4
Since Williams, however, several panels of this circuit have followed a different course and have declined to rule on the merits of the Franklin/Penry claim due to the absence of legal cause for trial counsel’s failure to object to the court’s charge at the punishment phase of the trial and the failure of trial counsel to request an instruction on mitigating evidence.5 In the Bridge cases, cited in the preceding footnote, the court initially followed the Williams line of reasoning and addressed the merits of Bridge’s Franklin/Penry claim despite the absence of a contemporaneous objection by Bridge’s trial counsel. In Bridge I, the court stated:
The second reason not to accept the procedural bar in this case is that the issue of mitigation under the Texas statute seemed to have been settled favorably to the state in the case upholding the constitutionality of the Texas capital punishment statute. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). But the issue of the constitutionality of the Texas plan was revived by the Supreme Court grant of certiorari in Franklin v. Lynaugh, cert. granted, — U.S -, 108 S.Ct. 221, 98 L.Ed.2d 180 (1987), aff'd in _ U.S _, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) and Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.1987), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2896, 101 L.Ed.2d 930 (1988). To deny Bridge the right to raise this revived issue in this capital case would be highly prejudicial. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977).
This case, therefore, falls within the established exception to the procedural bar through the failure of the state courts to rely fully upon it and by the extreme prejudice resulting from a later revival of what was considered to be a settled question. Thus, we can decide this appeal on the merits of the motion for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial by the Federal District Court of his petition for habeas corpus.6
In Bridge II, the court reaffirmed the above holding.7 Thereafter, in a one paragraph opinion, the panel in Bridge III withdrew its earlier reasoning in Bridge I and Bridge II and, without referring to Williams, rested its denial of habeas relief as to the Franklin/Penry claim on the absence of legal cause for the failure of Bridge to raise the “Franklin ” issue at trial.8
At this stage, I would follow the Williams opinion, as the earlier decision on this point, and decline to apply the contemporaneous-objection rule to King’s Franklin/Penry/Hitchcock claims and address the merits of these issues.
On the merits of these claims, I am bound by the precedents of this circuit and, therefore, concur in the opinion denying the application for a stay on those issues.
As I have already noted, however, the Supreme Court has granted an application for a writ in Penny v. Lynaugh,9 rendered an opinion in Franklin v. Lynaugh10 in *1408which the concurring opinion of Justices O’Connor and Blackmun is particularly relevant,11 and granted stays pending consideration of writ applications in Selvage v. Lynaugh,12 Bridge v. Lynaugh,13 Bell v. Lynaugh,14 and Hawkins v. Lynaugh.15
The cumulative effect of these actions seems to me to undermine the continuing validity of the Fifth Circuit precedents and demonstrates that reasonable jurists might find both that the Supreme Court decisions in those cases would be dispositive of the issues in this capital case and that a stay should be granted pending the outcome of those events. I, therefore, urge the Supreme Court to grant a stay pending its determination of Penry and the writ applications in Selvage, Bridge, Bell, and Hawkins.

. Compare Harris v. Reed, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989).

. Selvage v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 89, 93 (5th Cir.1988).

. 837 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir.1988).

. Williams, 837 F.2d at 1296.

. See Selvage v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.1988); Bridge v. Lynaugh, 863 F.2d 370 (5th Cir.1988) (Bridge III), replacing Bridge v. Lynaugh, 860 F.2d 162 (5th Cir.1988) (Bridge II), replacing Bridge v. Lynaugh, 856 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.1988) (Bridge I).

. Bridge I, 856 F.2d at 714.

. See Bridge II, 860 F.2d at 163-64.

. See Bridge III, 863 F.2d 370.

. 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.1987), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2896, 101 L.Ed.2d 930 (1988).

. — U.S. - 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988).

. 108 S.Ct. at 2332-35.

. 842 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.), stay granted, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1283, 99 L.Ed.2d 494 (1988).

. 856 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.), stay granted, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 20, 101 L.Ed.2d 972 (1988).

. 858 F.2d 978 (5th Cir.), stay granted, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 254, 102 L.Ed.2d 243 (1988).

. 862 F.2d 482 (5th Cir.), stay granted, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 569, 102 L.Ed.2d 593 (1988).