Court Opinion

ID: 9596275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:47:52.53747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:34.667349
License: Public Domain

JELaymond, Judge,
dissenting:
For the reasons stated later in this opinion, I dissent from the judgment of the majority of the Court which reverses the judgment of the circuit court and remands the case to the court of common pleas for a new trial at the instance of the plaintiffs.
Though I do not question the legal principles enunciated in the majority opinion, I challenge their application to the facts of this case as disclosed by the evidence. In my opinion there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant and the trial court was not warranted in setting aside the verdict and its action in so doing is unjustified and erroneous.
There were only three eyewitnesses, in addition to the plaintiff Myrtle Young, to the collision in which she sustained the injuries and the property damages of which the plaintiffs complain; and the questions involved are whether the defendant was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury and damage and whether the plaintiff Myrtle Young was guilty of contributory negligence.
One witness, who was walking north on Thirty-third Street near the intersection with Noyes Avenue where the collision occurred and who saw the automoblie of the defendant approaching the intersection while leaving the hospital parking lot west on Thirty-third Street, testified that the defendant approached and came upon the intersection at a slow rate of speed and that he did not stop before entering the intersection. Even if the defendant did not stop his automobile before entering the intersection and even though the automobile driven by the plaintiff Myrtle Young was upon the intersection before the automobile driven by the defendant came upon the intei’section, the fact that the defendant did not stop his automobile of itself may or may not have been the proximate cause *293of the collision, and was clearly a question for the jury. The prior arrival of the automobile driven by the plaintiff Myrtle Young upon the intersection gave her the right of way but though she had the right of way over the approaching automobile of the defendant that did not reheve her of her duty to exercise due care to avoid the collision, Burdette v. Henson, 96 W. Va. 31, 122 S. E. 356, 37 A. L. R. 489; Vaughan v. Oates, 128 W. Va. 554, 37 S. E. 2d 479; and Adkins v. Smith, 142 W. Va. 772, 98 S. E. 2d 712. The defendant testified positively that he did stop his automobile before entering Thirty-third Street and on that material question the evidence of the witness who saw him and the evidence of the defendant is conflicting. The evidence of the sister of Myrtle Young, who was riding in the right front seat of the automobile, was that she did not see the automobile of the defendant until just before the collision, in which the front end of the automobile of the defendant and the right rear fender of the automobile of the plaintiff were damaged. The plaintiff Myrtle Young testified that she did not see the automobile of the defendant before the collision, although it was clearly in her fine of vision and almost directly in front of her. Who can say, except a jury, that, if she had seen the automobile of the defendant she could not have avoided the collision by the exercise of due care in the operation of her automobile. And even assuming that the defendant was negligent in not stopping his automobile, it is fair to assume that, if the plaintiff Myrtle Young had seen the automobile of the defendant and exercised due care in the operation of the automobile in which she was riding, no collision would have occurred. From the foregoing evidence it is clear to me that the questions of negligence upon the part of the defendant and contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff Myrtle Young were for the jury, and on that evidence the jury found for the defendant, which indicates that the jury, believed that the defendant was not guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury or if he was guilty of such negligence that the plaintiff Myrtle Young was guilty of contributory negligence. As indicated the testimony of the plaintiff Myrtle Young that she did not see the auto*294mobile of the defendant before the collision, although she testified that she looked, was not disputed.
This Court has held in many cases that when the evidence is conflicting or when the facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for jury determination, Sydenstricker v. Vannoy, 151 W. Va. 177, 150 S. E. 2d 905, and the many cases cited in the opinion in that case.
This Court has also said that a person is required to look not casually but effectively to see an approaching vehicle which is plainly visible and should have been seen by such person if in looking he had exercised the care of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances, Brake v. Cerra, 145 W. Va. 76, 112 S. E. 2d 466. It is obvious that if the plaintiff Myrtle Young had looked effectively, as she came down Noyes Avenue and as she approached its intersection with Thirty-third Street, she would have seen the automobile of the defendant, which was almost in front of her, as it came slowly out of the hospital parking lot and approached and came upon the intersection. One witness saw it clearly and described it in detail. The plaintiff Myrtle Young, whose automobile was driven toward the automobile of the defendant, would necessarily have seen it if she had looked properly. It can not be assumed, if she had seen the automobile of the defendant which she must have done if she had looked effectively, that she could not have avoided the collision by the exercise of due care. A person can not escape liability or be heard to say that he did not see a plainly visible object which he would have seen if he had looked effectively, Brake v. Cerra, 145 W. Va. 76, 112 S. E. 2d 466. The undisputed evidence that she did not see the automobile of the defendant before the collision tends to establish contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff Myrtle Young as a matter of law; but in any event the effect of her failure to see the automobile of the defendant, a plainly visible object, was clearly a question for the jury and the verdict rendered by the jury could reasonably be interpreted as a finding that she was guilty of contributory negligence.
*295The majority opinion speaks of physical facts and gives them dominant if not controlling effect. In my opinion there are no important physical facts, except the permanent objects at or near the scene of the accident and the damage to the front end of the automobile of the defendant and the damage to the right rear fender of the automobile of the plaintiff Myrtle Young, and such facts are not controlling on the question of the matter in which the collision occurred. The damaged condition of each automobile of itself does not prove negligence or contributory negligence or proximate cause. There were no fixed objects or marks to indicate the position of the automobiles when they collided, or how the collision happened, or who was at fault. The establishment of all these facts was by the oral testimony and not by any controlling physical facts. All the facts adverted to in the majority opinion as physical were established by and dependent on oral testimony of the witnesses and none of them, in my judgment, is decisive or should be given controlling effect upon the question of the manner in which the collision occurred or the liability of the persons involved in it. All such matters are dependent upon the testimony of the witnesses which, upon the question of negligence of the defendant, is conflicting, and which, upon the question of contributory negligence of the plaintiff Myrtle Young, though undisputed, is such that reasonable minds may draw different conclusions from it.
Inasmuch as under the evidence disclosed by the record the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were clearly for the jury and inasmuch as the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant is supported by sufficient evidence, the action of the trial court, in setting aside the verdict and awarding a new trial, was erroneous and unwarranted; and the action of the circuit court in reversing the judgment of the trial court was correct and proper. For the reasons indicated I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
I am authorized to state that Judge Berry concurs in the views expressed in this dissent.