Court Opinion

ID: 9404620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 16:09:56.930167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.796220
License: Public Domain

J-S14002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    OF: N.C.H., MINOR                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: T.M.H., THE MOTHER              :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1335 WDA 2022

                Appeal from the Decree Entered October 17, 2022
                  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
                      Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-00052

    IN THE MATTER OF: THE ADOPTION             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    OF: P.G.T.H., MINOR                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: T.M.H., MOTHER                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1336 WDA 2022

                Appeal from the Decree Entered October 17, 2022
                  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
                 Orphans' Court at No(s): 52 In Adoption 2022

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                         FILED: June 23, 2023

        T.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees dated October 13, 2022, and

entered October 17, 2022, in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas,

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her son, N.C.H., born in

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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January 2022, and her daughter, P.G.T.H., born in June 2020 (collectively,

“the Children”).1      Further, counsel for Mother, Emily M. Merski, Esquire

(“Counsel”), has filed petitions to withdraw and briefs pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).2 After review, we grant the petitions to withdraw and

affirm the termination decrees.

       Erie County Office of Children and Youth (“the Agency”) obtained

emergency protective custody of P.G.T.H. on July 2, 2021, due to concerns

regarding the family’s homelessness, as well as Mother’s untreated mental

health and substance abuse, and placed P.G.T.H. in kinship care. See Order

(Emergency Protective Custody), 7/2/21. The court adjudicated P.G.T.H.

dependent on July 16, 2021, and maintained her commitment and placement.

See Recommendation for Adjudication and Disposition, 7/16/21, at 1-2.

During P.G.T.H.’s dependency, Mother gave birth to N.C.H., who was declared

dependent in March 2022, shortly after his birth.

____________________________________________

1 By separate decrees, also dated October 13, 2022, and entered October 17,
2022, the court terminated the parental rights of N.C.H.’s and P.G.T.H.’s
respective fathers, C.L.J. and K.R.L. Neither father filed a separate appeal,
and neither are a participating party to the instant appeals.
2 This Court extended the Anders procedure to appeals from decrees
involuntarily terminating parental rights in In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275
(Pa. Super. 1992).

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       On July 27, 2022, the Agency filed petitions for the involuntary

termination of parental rights as to the Children.3 Specifically, the Agency

sought termination as to N.C.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2),

(5), (6), and (b), while requesting termination regarding P.G.T.H. pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The orphans’ court held a

hearing on the petitions on October 13, 2022, wherein Mother, who arrived

late, was represented by counsel. N.C.H. and P.G.T.H., then nine months and

twenty-eight months old, respectively, were represented by Steven George,

Esquire.4 The Agency presented the testimony of caseworker Kayla Stewart

and introduced Exhibits 1 through 14, which were admitted into the record

____________________________________________

3The Agency filed an amended termination petition as to N.C.H. on August
17, 2022. Upon review, we do not discern any distinction.

4 Attorney George, the Children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) in the underlying
dependency proceedings, was appointed to serve as legal counsel on August
1, 2022. Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to verify sua sponte
that the court appointed counsel to represent a child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2313(a), and if counsel served in a dual role, that the court determined
before appointment that there was no conflict between a child’s best and legal
interests. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020).
However, if a child is “too young to be able to express a preference as to the
outcome of the proceedings,” there is no conflict between a child’s legal and
best interests, and a child’s subsection 2313(a) right to counsel is satisfied by
an attorney- GAL who represents the attorney-GAL’s view of the child’s best
interests. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018). At the hearing,
Attorney George indicated that the Children were “too young to express a
preference as to what their preferred outcome is.” N.T., 10/13/22, at 37. As
such, we conclude that their statutory right to counsel was satisfied by the
dual appointment of Attorney George.

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without objection. See N.T., 10/13/22, at 4. Finally, Mother testified on her

own behalf.

        Pursuant to decrees dated October 13, 2022, and entered October 17,

2022, the court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights as to N.C.H.

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (6), and (b), and terminated

Mother’s parental rights as to P.G.T.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),

(2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother filed timely notices of appeal in both cases. In

lieu of a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, Counsel

submitted accompanying statements of intention to file an Anders brief

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).5             See re J.T., 983 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa.

____________________________________________

5   Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) provides:

        (c) Remand.
                                           ...

        (4) If counsel intends to seek to withdraw in a criminal case
        pursuant to Anders/Santiago or if counsel intends to seek to
        withdraw in a post-conviction           relief appeal pursuant
        to Turner/Finley, counsel shall file of record and serve on the
        judge a statement of intent to withdraw in lieu of filing a
        Statement. If the appellate court believes there are arguably
        meritorious issues for review, those issues will not be waived;
        instead, the appellate court shall remand for the filing and service
        of a Statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), a supplemental
        opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), or both. Upon remand, the
        trial court may, but is not required to, replace an appellant’s
        counsel.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).

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Super. 2009) (holding that the decision of counsel to follow Pa.R.A.P.

1925(c)(4) procedure in a termination of parental rights case was proper).

This Court subsequently consolidated Mother’s appeals sua sponte on and the

orphans’ court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 9, 2023.

       Counsel filed petitions to withdraw, as well as Anders briefs, in both

cases. By order of February 14, 2023, this Court vacated the existing briefing

schedule and struck Counsel’s Anders brief and directed Counsel to file briefs

that comply with all of the relevant procedural and substantive requirements

of Anders and Santiago, or submit advocate’s briefs on or before February

21, 2023. On February 16, 2023, Counsel filed new Anders briefs and

petitions to withdraw.6

       When counsel files an Anders brief, this Court may not review the

merits of the appeal without first addressing counsel’s request to withdraw.

See Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 797, 800 (Pa. Super. 2013).

To procedurally withdraw, counsel must:

       1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
       making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
       determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
       of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
       [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
       or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
       of the court’s attention.

____________________________________________

6Despite the consolidation of Mother’s appeals and the orphans’ court filing of
a singular Rule 1925(a) opinion, Counsel filed separate Anders briefs and
petitions to withdraw.

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Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc) (citation omitted). Counsel must also “attach to their petition to

withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their

rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

       Additionally, our Supreme Court has set forth the following requirements

for Anders briefs:

       counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history
       and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the
       record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set
       forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4)
       state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
       Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
       case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
       that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

       Instantly, Counsel filed petitions to withdraw certifying her conscientious

review of the record and determination that Mother’s appeals are frivolous.

Counsel further attached copies of Millisock letters informing Mother of her

rights with respect to her petitions. Likewise, Counsel has filed Anders briefs

that substantially comply with the requirements set forth in Santiago,

supra.7 While we note with displeasure Counsel’s failure to cite to the certified

record, we remain cognizant that the framework of Anders and Santiago

____________________________________________

7  Mother has not responded to counsel’s petition to withdraw
and Anders/Santiago brief. Further, the Agency filed letter briefs with this
Court joining in the opinion of the orphans’ court.

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require substantial, not perfect performance. See Commonwealth v.

Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2007).

      Having   concluded    that   Counsel   complied   with   the   procedural

requirements of Anders/Santiago, we must next “conduct a review of the

record to ascertain if on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel,

intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188

A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

      Counsel raises challenges as to the sufficiency of the evidence in the

Anders briefs. Counsel’s Anders brief as to N.C.H. presents the following

issues:

      A. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or
      abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
      parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence
      pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), & (6)]?

      B. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or
      abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
      parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence
      pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(b)]?

Anders Brief (N.C.H.) at 3 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answers

omitted).

      Similarly, Counsel’s Anders brief as to P.G.T.H. presents the following

issues:

      A. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or
      abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
      parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence
      pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), & (8)]?

      B. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or
      abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of

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      parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence
      pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(b)]?

Anders Brief (P.G.T.H.) at 3 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested

answers omitted).

      We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion,

which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of

whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent

evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When

applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings

of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. See

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial

court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may

not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or

abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021)

(citation omitted). An abuse of discretion in this context exists only upon

“demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or

ill-will.” Id. (citation omitted).

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section

2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The trial court must initially determine whether the

conduct of the parent warrants termination under Section 2511(a). Only if the

court determines that the petitioner established grounds for termination under

Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section

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2511(b), which involves an assessment of a child’s needs and welfare. See In

re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental

rights, the petitioner must prove grounds under both Section 2511(a) and (b)

by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M.,

255 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted).

      In the case sub judice, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental

rights to N.C.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (6), and (b),

and, likewise, terminated her parental rights to P.G.T.H. pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm a termination

of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one

subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W.,

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004). Instantly, we will analyze the court’s

termination decrees pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as

follows:

           (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
           child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
           following grounds:

                                      ...

              (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
              neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
              to be without essential parental care, control or
              subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
              being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
              abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
              remedied by the parent.

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                                      ...

          (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
          rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
          developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
          of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
          solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
          inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
          medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
          With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
          (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
          the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
          are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
          filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      To terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), we have

indicated that

      the following three elements must be met: (1) repeated and
      continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
      incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be
      without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
      for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the
      incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
      remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). Parental incapacity is not limited to affirmative misconduct. See In

re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021). “To the contrary, those

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental

duties.” Id. (citations omitted). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts

towards     the    reasonably     prompt       assumption    of   full      parental

responsibilities.” Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As such, “A parent’s vow to cooperate, after

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a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re S.C.,

247 A.3d at 1105 (citation omitted).

      In concluding that CYS satisfied the statutory grounds to terminate

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to, inter alia, Section 2511(a)(2), the

orphans’ court emphasized Mother’s failure to complete those goals aimed at

reunification and services offered. The court stated:

             A review of the evidence details a mother either incapable
      or refusing, or both, to take an active role in seeking the return of
      her children. All the programs designed specifically to address
      [Mother]’s personal and parenting deficiencies were rejected by
      her. [M]other continues to deny a drug or alcohol problem even
      though she tested positive prior to a court hearing after she
      requested the test. [Mother] was unwilling to participate in
      random drug testing and refused on 103 occasions to show up.
      Her excuse-she was “angry[,”] even though that refusal meant
      she could not visit her baby. The simplest way to alleviate the
      invalid concerns over drug use, as [Mother] characterized them,
      was to attend the testing to prove the Agency wrong. [Mother]
      refused.

            [Mother] complained her treatment programs were
      overwhelming and that no one person could do all that was
      ordered and succeed. There were numerous components of the
      plans. However, [M]other just got “angry” and did nothing. The
      plans were implemented to put her in a position to parent two
      children safely. There are innumerable challenges to parenting
      young children. The treatment plans were developed so [Mother]
      would have the mental stability, a drug free life, and stable
      environment to meet [] all those challenges. Support systems
      were offered in order to put [M]other on a path to achieving the
      return and safe upbringing of her young children. [Mother]’s
      response-it’s too much so I’m going to do nothing.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/9/23, at 14.

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     A review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s finding of grounds

for termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Significantly, the record reveals

that Mother has a history of unstable housing, unresolved substance abuse,

and untreated mental illness. Stewart testified that P.G.T.H. came into the

Agency’s care in July 2021 due to these specific issues. See N.T., 10/13/22,

at 6. Thereafter, N.C.H. also came into care in February 2022, after Mother

tested positive for methamphetamines at a court hearing on February 16,

2022. See N.T., 10/13/22, at 9, 33.

     Throughout the underlying dependency matters, Mother missed over

100 total requested urine screens. See N.T., 10/13/22, at 8, 33, 35; see also

Exhibit 13 (urine screens). Further, although Mother obtained mental health

and drug and alcohol assessments, she failed to follow through with suggested

treatments as she only attended two follow-up appointments thereafter. See

N.T., 10/13/22, at 11, 13, 26, 28. In addressing her failure to comply with

and submit to urine screens as requested, Mother acknowledged her serial

failures and indicated that she was angry and overwhelmed. See N.T.,

10/13/22, at 24, 27, 33, 35.

     While the record reveals a period of compliance and negative screens,

from October 26, 2021, to January 12, 2022, the Agency was then unable to

corroborate her lack of substance use due to her lack of testing. See Exhibit

13 (urine screens); see also Exhibit 8 (Court Summary (6/8/22)), at 14.

Furthermore, Mother missed over 40 urine screens since February 16, 2022,

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alone. See Exhibit 13 (urine screens); see also N.T., 10/13/22, at 8, 33-35.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding her

compliance had not improved.

      As such, Stewart testified, “[Mother] has not secured stable housing. . .

. [S]he has still untreated and unstable mental health and has not [sought]

sobriety.” N.T., 10/13/22, at 13; see also id. at 14. Further, Stewart averred

that Mother flatly refused the Agency’s efforts to assist her in obtaining help

with her substance abuse and mental health issues. See id. at 18.

      Moreover, Mother declined all accountability and denied the existence of

any substance abuse issues. Mother testified:

      Q. Ma’am, I guess, can you help shed some light. Is it your
      position that you never had a drug problem or that -- I guess, just
      let me ask that. Do you have a drug and alcohol problem?

      A. I don’t. I have done drugs. I did have an alcohol problem in
      2016.

      Q. While this case was open, did [you] have a drug and alcohol
      problem?

      A. No.

      Q. So your assertions are that, though it was a basis for your
      children being removed, drug use concerns, those were never
      valid and you never had any drug use concerns?

      A. No. . . .

Id. at 32. Relatedly, Mother denied she was using drugs in February 2022,

despite testing positive for methamphetamines, incredulously blaming

P.G.T.H.’s father. Mother stated, “[T]he week of the court hearing, I have

numerous messages from [P.G.T.H.’s father] stating that that was going to

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happen and that my son was going to be taken because of it. So. . . . I feel

like he had everything to do with it[.]” Id. at 25.

      Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court

in concluding that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) is warranted

with respect to the Children. Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity due

to unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues is evident from the

face of the record, which caused the Children to be without essential parental

care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being.

Further, given Mother’s refusal to acknowledge these concerns, it is evident

that the conditions and causes of Mother’s incapacity cannot or will not be

remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. We remain

mindful that, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts

to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The

court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for

permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the

future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2), we next must determine whether termination was proper under

Section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration to the developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See In re T.S.M., 71

A.3d at 267. The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly

interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.

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See id. The determination of the child’s needs and welfare requires

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. Id. The

utmost attention should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of

permanently severing the parental bond. Id.

      The evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task. “In cases

where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is

reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis,

therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

      When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal

citations omitted). Nevertheless, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment

of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination

petition.”   T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. In weighing the bond considerations

pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood

ever in mind.” Id. at 269. “Children are young for a scant number of years,

and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When

courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted

children.” Id.

      Moreover,

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      while a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
      aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
      nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
      court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

            [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
            equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
            should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
            comfort, security, and stability the child might have
            with the foster parent. . . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

      Here, the trial court recognized the lack of a bond between Mother and

the Children. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/9/23, at 15. The court stated:

      [T]he testimony provided by Kayla Stewart, the Agency’s
      evidence, and [M]other’s attitude expressed in her testimony,
      established that there is no parental bond between [M]other and
      [the C]hildren. The [C]hildren are in [a] good, stable home and
      have bonded well with the potential adoptive parents. The
      termination of [Mother]’s parental rights is in the best interest of
      [the Children] consistent with the guidelines established in 23
      Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (b).

Id.
      Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion. The record supports the

finding that the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and

welfare favor termination of parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). See

T.S.M., supra at 267.

      Significantly, as noted supra, Mother had no visits with N.C.H. following

his removal. See N.T., 10/13/22, at 11-12. Further, while Mother participated

in fourteen total visits with P.G.T.H. through JusticeWorks from November

2021 through May 2022, see Exhibit 14 (JusticeWorks reports), following the

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court changing the Children’s permanency goals to adoption in June 2022, the

Agency was no longer required to offer any services, including visitation, see

Permanency Review Orders, 6/13/22. Stewart testified that there have been

no negative effects since the Children stopped having contact with Mother.

See N.T., 10/13/22, at 21.

      Moreover, Stewart testified that the Children were placed together in a

pre-adoptive foster home where they were doing “exceptionally well.” Id. at

12. She indicated that N.C.H. was in a “tracking program to ensure that he

develops appropriately.” Id. Nevertheless, she stated, “[h]e’s thriving. He’s

gaining weight. He’s starting to crawl, figure out those movements.” Id.

      Stewart also noted that P.G.T.H. was adjusting well to daycare. Id. As

a result, she opined that it was in the Children’s best interests for Mother’s

parental rights to be involuntarily terminated. See id. at 12-14. She further

testified that there would be no negative consequences to the Children. See

id. at 13-14. Accordingly, the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that termination best serves the Children’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b).

      Based on the foregoing independent analysis of the orphans’ court’s

termination of Mother’s parental rights, we agree with Counsel that the appeal

from the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2) and (b) is wholly frivolous and our review of the record does not

reveal any overlooked non-frivolous issues.

                                    - 17 -
J-S14002-23

     Counsel’s petitions to withdraw granted. Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/23/2023

                                  - 18 -