Court Opinion

ID: 9570616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:24:41.894544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:09.620111
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would present a slightly different recitation of the facts than that noted by the majority.
*975Myrtle Hazen testified that on May 16th, 17th, and possibly the 18th of 1983, during a “grand-opening,” she lifted between eighteen and twenty-four cases of pop weighing thirty to thirty-five pounds each and carried them thirty to thirty-five feet as part of her duties at the General Store where she was employed. These were the heaviest items she carried at any time during her employment. Her ordinary duties involved lifting canisters of pop and stocking the store’s shelves.
Hazen began experiencing sharp pain in her right leg on May 17th or 18th, twelve to forty-eight hours after carrying the cases of pop. She also had pain in her lower back. She never had any problem with leg or back pain prior to May 17,1983. After two to three weeks, the pain became severe. She first went to see a chiropractor, Dr. Squires, who recommended her to Dr. Michael O’Brien, whom she saw on August 25, 1983. Dr. O’Brien diagnosed a herniated disc in her back. He testified it probably resulted from her work, however, he could not identify any particular time at which the herniation occurred. He further testified it was not abnormal for the pain from a herniation to increase gradually, as it did. On August 29, 1983, Hazen underwent surgery for the herniated disc. On April 12, 1984, Dr. Ercil Bowman examined Hazen on behalf of the General Store. Dr. Bowman testified the rupture came on gradually and was not due to any particular incident, but rather to wear and tear. However, his opinion was not based on the fact that Hazen started getting sharp pains within about twenty-four hours after the heaviest lifting she ever did at the store. When he took this into account, he admitted the onset of pain was not inconsistent with a herniation at the time of the lifting.
In Hazen’s application to the commission for a hearing, she claimed her injury occurred between July 9 and July 16, 1983, due to the lifting of crates of food for stocking the store’s shelves. She later amended the application to say the injury occurred between May 13 and May 23, 1983,1 as a result of lifting the cases of pop. Nevertheless, she told her employer in August of 1983 she had a back problem, but that it was not due to an injury on the job.
After the hearing upon Hazen’s application for Worker’s Compensation benefits the Industrial Commission held Hazen failed to prove she suffered an accident as defined by I.C. § 72-102(14)(b) (1983). The commission reasoned that this Court had, in Wynn v. J.R. Simplot Company, 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983), retained the requirement that an accident be “definitely” located as to time and place. The commission concluded Hazen could not recover because she failed to prove the injury causing mishap occurred at a particular time and place.
The majority opinion twice states that the commission found that the herniated disc was caused by the aging process — my search of the Findings and Conclusions reveals no such finding. The key finding which the referee did make was:
The Referee is persuaded by the bulk of the evidence whereby the Claimant testified she was not able to identify a specific incident and the various statements she told both the physicians and her supervisor at work that, in essence, the pain “came on gradually,” that the Claimant’s personal injury occurred over a substantial period of time.
The Referee finds that the Claimant's herniated disc was not the result of an accident but rather occurred over a longer period of time and “came on gradually.”
Thus, it is apparent that the referee was mistaken of the belief that to qualify as an accident there must be an “instantane*976ous” event. A reading of the questions and answers of the doctors indicates they were operating under the same misapprehension. It is to be regretted that the attorneys did not define “accident” in the terms of their questions with more precision — it is more regrettable that the commission did not have time to review the transcript more carefully to detect and correct this lack of precision.
In Wynn, the commission denied a claim for Worker’s Compensation benefits on grounds the claimant failed to show a distinct mishap caused the injury. This Court reversed, finding the evidence established that the mishap occurred at a particular time and place entitling the claimant to relief under the Worker’s Compensation Act. Wynn, 105 Idaho at 104, 666 P.2d at 631. The commission below interpreted Wynn as establishing the legal definition of “accident” under the Worker’s Compensation Act. Hazen, on the other hand, asserts Wynn’s determination that the injury occurred at a particular time and place was merely a finding of fact which fell well within the broad legal standard of I.C. § 72-102(14)(b) (1983), which requires only that the injury causing mishap be “reasonably” established as to time and place.
Wynn does not attempt to define the term “accident” for purposes of the Worker’s Compensation Act. Wynn’s facts and holding are consistent with the definition of accident in I.C. § 72-102(14)(b) (1983). No language in Wynn justifies the commission’s interpretation of the case as altering that statutory definition.
The commission applied the same legal standard as that set forth in the Worker’s Compensation Act (Act) from 1939 until 1971:
“Accident,” as used in this law, means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, happening suddenly and connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be definitely located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury, as defined in this law. I.C. § 72-201 (1939-70) (emphasis added).
In 1971, the legislature substituted the word “reasonably” for the word “definitely” and omitted the word “suddenly.”
“Accident” means an unexpected, undesigned and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury. I.C. § 72-102(14)(b) (1971-83) (emphasis added).
In substituting the word “reasonably” for the word “definitely” and omitting the word “suddenly,” the legislature rejected the standard applied by the commission and adopted the standard urged upon us by Hazen. The change in statutory language demonstrates legislative recognition of medical reality. Bones may break “suddenly” and completely, giving immediate notice of injury, thereby allowing the accident to be “definitely located as to time and place.” On the other hand, more flexible internal tissues and organs may be incrementally damaged, not suddenly, but over a period of time, such as hours, days, or in some cases, weeks. The time and place of the accident may not be definitely locatable because sufficient damage has to occur before symptoms are triggered warranting medical attention, such as substantial or continuing pain.
By way of illustration, a worker might be injured over the course of a few days. Symptoms might not arise for a few more days, and the need for medical attention might not become apparent for still another week or more. The injury causing event was not sudden and the lapse of time between the event and the need for medical attention may make it impossible to definitely locate the time and place of the event, due to the worker’s failure of memory, for example. Nevertheless, proof of an “accident" is still possible if the time and place of the “untoward event” can be “reasonably located.” I.C. § 72-102(14)(b). Proof of an “untoward event” depends on factors such as the seriousness and type of injury, presence of an unusual degree or *977type of stress, and the degree of connection between the stress and the injury.
It is apparent the commission applied the pre-1971 legal standard. I would therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. Hazen consistently maintained that the injury occurred during the grand-opening and explains her having given her attorney the incorrect July date by the fact that she met with her attorney only a few hours after returning from the hospital where she had been advised that her husband was terminally ill.