Court Opinion

ID: 9529989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:56:06.44886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:58.195336
License: Public Domain

Brown, J.
(dissenting) — I adhere to my dissent stated in State v. Carol M.D., 89 Wn. App. 77, 948 P.2d 837 (1997). *359In view of the Supreme Court’s remand to reconsider in light of In re Dependency of A.E.P., 135 Wn.2d 208, 956 P.2d 297 (1998), I believe we must simply eliminate any requirement for a separate taint hearing. This would provide the necessary procedural guidance for our trial courts while awaiting the outcome of the State’s petition for review of the remaining issues.
A.E.P. is significantly different than our case because there the child was found incompetent at a competency/ hearsay hearing and therefore, unavailable to testify at trial. Accordingly, corroborating evidence was required for her statements to be admissible. Id. at 227. Here, M.D. was twice found competent by separate judges at competency/ hearsay hearings and, therefore, available to testify against both defendants. This is an important difference because no corroborating evidence was required before admitting the hearsay statements at trial, the reversible error in A.E.P. Id. at 234.
Being found competent to testify signifies M.D.’s minimal ability to know, recollect and communicate facts, plus the ability to understand the duty to tell the truth. State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 171-72, 691 P.2d 197 (1984). Accordingly, M.D. was permitted to testify about what she remembered at trial. Those relating her hearsay also testified at trial. All were available for cross-examination on whether her memory was tainted, as well as other matters bearing on credibility and weight. This record indicates the memory taint issue was raised before the jury, but apparently rejected. Directing a third or fourth competency hearing is unwarranted.