Court Opinion

ID: 9684645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:07:06.7549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:39.207595
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13397

      IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF THERESA A. JABLONSKI.

            Middlesex.    May 1, 2023. – August 24, 2023.

 Present:    Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                            & Georges, JJ.

Devise and Legacy, Residuary interests, Remainder interests,
     Extrinsic evidence affecting construction, Intestacy. Dog.
     Trust, Construction, Remainder interests, Termination.
     Will, Construction, Extrinsic evidence. Charity.

     Petition filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and
Family Court Department on June 19, 2019.

     A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Elaine
M. Moriarty, J.; a motion for reconsideration was heard by her;
and the remaining issues were also heard by her.

     The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

    David M. Levy for the objectors.
    Penelope A. Kathiwala for the proponent.

    CYPHER, J.     The decedent, Theresa A. Jablonski, executed a

will that left her entire estate to a testamentary trust,

pursuant to G. L. c. 203E, § 408, for the benefit of her fifteen
                                                                    2

year old cocker spaniel, Licorice, and any other pet she might

have at the time of her death.    According to the terms of the

trust, after the death of all beneficiaries, the trustees were

obligated to designate a charity to receive the remainder of any

and all funds in the trustees' control.   At the time of the

decedent's death, however, neither Licorice nor any other pet

survived the decedent.   This case presents the issue whether the

remainder of the decedent's estate to charity is valid despite

Licorice having predeceased the decedent or, alternatively,

whether Licorice's failure to survive the decedent renders the

pet trust void, such that the decedent's property is to pass

through intestacy to the decedent's heirs.   Where we conclude

that the provisions for Licorice in the testamentary trust

lapsed, and where there exists a genuine issue of material fact

whether there was a clear intention that the charitable

remainder not be conditioned on Licorice's survival of the

decedent, the judge erred in awarding partial summary judgment.

Accordingly, we vacate the decree and order, and we remand the

matter for further proceedings.

    Background.    We recite the facts in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.   See Huang v. Ma, 491 Mass.

235, 239 (2023) (evidence viewed in light most favorable to

nonmoving party on review of decision on motion for summary

judgment).   On August 13, 2013, the decedent, Theresa A.
                                                                      3

Jablonski, executed a will that left her entire estate in trust

to her cocker spaniel, Licorice.   At the time the will was

executed, the decedent's niece, Ann M. Jablonski,1 retained a

durable power of attorney, and she managed the decedent's

affairs.   The will had been prepared by Ann's attorney at Ann's

request.   According to the attorney, the decedent's "main

concern" in executing the will was to ensure care for Licorice.

     Article V of the will created the "Licorice Testamentary

Trust" (trust), pursuant to the requirements of G. L. c. 203E,

§ 408.   The trust's beneficiaries were limited to the decedent's

dog, Licorice, as well as any other pets the decedent may have

in her possession at the time of her death.   According to the

terms of the trust, it was to be funded on the decedent's death.

The trustees, not designated by the trust instrument, were to

use the funds of the trust to provide for the "health, care,

maintenance, and appearance" of the trust beneficiaries.      After

the death of all beneficiaries, i.e., Licorice and any other pet

who survived the decedent, the trustees then retained the "power

and authority to designate a charity to receive the remainder of

any and all such funds that shall be in [the trustees']

possession, custody or control."

     1 Because some parties share a surname, we will refer to
them by their first names.
                                                                         4

    Article V of the will, which contained the provisions that

established the instant trust, was the only bequest in the will.

Article IV of the will, however, contained the will's residuary

clause.   According to Article IV, all remaining property,

including "all lapsed legacies and devises or other gifts made

by this [w]ill which fail for any reason" would be given in

trust to the trustees of the trust that was established in

Article V of the will.

    Approximately six years after the execution of the will, on

May 24, 2019, the decedent died at the age of eighty-three.        She

died without a surviving spouse, child, parent, or sibling.    Her

next of kin were her four nieces and nephews:   Joseph J.

Jablonski, Jr., Paul A. Jablonski, Sally E. Jablonski, and Ann

M. Jablonski.   Licorice, the decedent's only named beneficiary,

had been euthanized approximately two years earlier, on March

15, 2017, and thus predeceased her.   No other pets survived her.

    On June 19, 2019, Ann filed a petition in the Probate and

Family Court to probate the decedent's will and to be appointed

as personal representative, in accordance with the will.     The

decedent's other three surviving heirs (objectors), Joseph,

Paul, and Sally, objected to the purported will and to Ann's

appointment as personal representative of the estate.   The

objectors argued that the only bequest in the will, i.e., the

trust set up for the care of Licorice, lapsed because no pet had
                                                                    5

survived the decedent.2   Ann moved to strike the objections,

arguing that the decedent intended to leave her entire estate to

the trust for the benefit of Licorice and then to charity on

Licorice's death, even if Licorice predeceased her.   The motion

was denied.   After the case was reassigned to the court's

fiduciary litigation session, the parties agreed to resolve on

summary judgment the issue whether the bequest to the trust had

lapsed.

     Following the objectors' motion for summary judgment, the

judge granted partial summary judgment in favor of Ann on the

validity of the charitable remainder provision.   The judge held

that, as a matter of law, the trust provision for Licorice

failed because Licorice predeceased Theresa.   See G. L. c. 203E,

§ 408 (a) ("A trust for the care of animals alive during the

settlor's lifetime shall be valid.   Unless the trust instrument

provides for an earlier termination, the trust shall terminate

upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to

provide for the care of more than [one] animal alive during the

settlor's lifetime, upon the death of [the] last surviving

animal").   Despite the failure of the trust, the judge awarded

partial summary judgment in favor of Ann because the charitable

     2 The objectors also alleged that the decedent lacked
testamentary capacity and that the will was procured by undue
influence from Ann.
                                                                    6

remainder provision was to be given effect under the doctrine of

acceleration of remainders.   See Thompson v. Thornton, 197 Mass.

273, 275 (1908) ("The death of the life tenant before the

testator simply accelerates the time when the devise over

becomes operative").

    The objectors sought timely reconsideration of the judge's

award of partial summary judgment in favor of Ann.   The motion

for reconsideration was denied.   In denying the motion for

reconsideration, the judge determined that the decedent

"intend[ed] for the charitable remainder to take effect

regardless of whether her pet survived her."   The judge

determined that the lack of an intent to condition the

charitable remainder on Licorice's survival of the decedent was

"clear" from the fact that the Article V trust was the sole

bequest in the will.   The judge also emphasized that the lack of

an alternative gift under the will, in the event Licorice

predeceased the decedent, was an indication that the decedent's

intent was for her estate to pass through the Article V trust

regardless of whether Licorice predeceased her.   Moreover, the

judge determined that, although the Article IV residuary clause

of the decedent's will did not "save" the Article V provision by

itself and prevent intestacy, it did indicate some intent to

avoid intestacy.
                                                                    7

     Following summary judgment, the case proceeded to trial to

determine whether the will was the product of undue influence

and whether Ann improperly diverted the decedent's assets before

her death.3   The judge issued a decision that the objectors had

proved neither claim.    Following the judge's decision, a final

decree entered admitting the will to probate and appointing Ann

as personal representative.   The objectors filed a timely notice

of appeal, and we transferred the case to this court on our own

motion.

     Discussion.    Pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as

amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002), summary judgment is appropriate

only where there exists no genuine issue of material fact, such

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law.

"Our review of a decision on a motion for summary judgment is de

novo."    HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 326

(2022), quoting Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 636

(2021).

     At the summary judgment stage, the objectors argued that,

because Theresa died without any pets in her possession, the

trust necessarily failed and her estate must pass by intestate

succession.   They renew this argument on appeal.   Ann, however,

claims that the charitable remainder provision in Article V of

     3 The objectors withdrew their claim that Theresa lacked
testamentary capacity.
                                                                      8

the will is valid and survives, despite the failure of the trust

provisions for Licorice.

    General Laws c. 203E, § 408, the so-called "pet trust

statute," governs the requirements for a valid trust for the

care of an animal.    "We review questions of statutory

interpretation de novo."    Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa,

488 Mass. 325, 331 (2021), citing Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass.

553, 556 (2020).     "In interpreting a statute, we follow the

plain language when it is unambiguous and when its application

would not lead to an absurd result, or contravene the

Legislature's clear intent" (quotations omitted).     Desrosiers v.

Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 376 (2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 83

(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 689

(2015).   The actual words of the statute generally are the main

source from which we ascertain legislative purpose.       Kelly,

supra at 688.

    Pursuant to the statute's plain language, "[a] trust for

the care of animals alive during the settlor's lifetime shall be

valid."   G. L. c. 203E, § 408 (a).    Under the requirements

created by § 408, "[u]nless the trust instrument provides for an

earlier termination, the trust shall terminate upon the death of

the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care

of more than [one] animal alive during the settlor's lifetime,

upon the death of [the] last surviving animal" (emphasis added).
                                                                      9

Id.   Licorice died on March 15, 2017, and thus predeceased the

decedent.     The trust was created for the benefit of both

Licorice "and/or any pets that [the decedent] ha[d] in [her]

possession at the time of [her] death."     Neither Licorice nor

any other pet survived Theresa.     According to the plain language

of the statute, where Licorice was the last surviving animal,

the trust terminated on the date of Licorice's death.     See id.

Thus, the trust terminated before Theresa's death.4     See id.

      On termination of a trust pursuant to G. L. c. 203E, § 408

(a), the trustee is required to "transfer the unexpended trust

property in the following order:     (1) as directed in the trust

instrument; (2) to the settlor, if living; (3) if the trust was

created in a nonresiduary clause in the transferor's will or in

a codicil to the transferor's will, under the residuary clause

in the transferor's will or codicil; or (4) to the settlor's

heirs in accordance with [G. L. c. 190B]" (emphasis added).

G. L. c. 203E, § 408 (d).     Ann argues that the trust instrument

explicitly directs that the remainder of the funds, following

the death of all beneficiaries of the trust, be given to a

charity that is to be named by the trustees.

      The trust instrument explicitly states that the trustees

"shall have the power and authority to designate a charity to

      4   Theresa died approximately two years after Licorice.
                                                                   10

receive the remainder of any and all such funds that shall be in

their possession, custody or control" (emphasis added).

However, no such funds existed in the possession, custody, or

control of the trustees at the time of the trust's termination.

The trust was a testamentary trust; and, like any testamentary

disposition, the trust only was to be funded and become

effective on Theresa's death,5 an event that had yet to occur at

the time of the trust's termination according to G. L. c. 203E,

§ 408 (a).   See Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 52

(1950) ("A testamentary disposition becomes operative only upon

and by reason of the death of the owner who makes it" [citation

omitted]).   See also W.J. Brisk; M.A. Hoag, M. MacLaughlin-

Barck, Massachusetts Elder Law § 4.06[8][a] (2023)

("Testamentary trusts are funded upon the grantor's death").

     Therefore, where Licorice predeceased Theresa, the trust

provisions in Article V that created the Licorice Testamentary

Trust for the benefit of Licorice lapsed.   See Hahn vs. Estate

of Stange, Tex. Ct. App., No. 04-07-00253-CV (Feb. 13, 2008)

(where beneficiary cat predeceased trust settlor, and no other

living beneficiary cat could be identified or located,

     5 The actual language of the Licorice Testamentary Trust
also supports the principle that it was to be funded and become
effective only on the decedent's death. Specifically, the trust
instrument stated: "It is anticipated that this [t]rust will be
funded upon the death of the [t]estator."
                                                                  11

testamentary pet trust failed).   Because the trust lapsed, it

falls into the residue, unless the will provides otherwise.      See

Flannery v. McNamara, 432 Mass. 665, 669 (2000) ("it [is]

settled law that, when a beneficiary predeceases the testator,

the legacy lapses and falls into residue if there is one;

otherwise it must pass as intestate property").   See also

Sutherland v. Flaherty, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 388, 389-390 (1973)

("It is well settled that if a legatee not a relation of the

testator predeceases a testator, the legacy lapses unless the

will provides otherwise" [emphasis added]); G. L. c. 190B, § 2-

604 ("a devise, other than a residuary devise, that fails for

any reason becomes a part of the residue" [emphasis added]).

    Ann argues, and the motion judge agreed, that although the

trust provisions failed, and the gifts for the benefit of

Licorice lapsed, the remainder to the to-be-named charity must

be given effect under the doctrine of acceleration of

remainders.   See Thompson, 197 Mass. at 275 ("The death of the

life tenant before the testator simply accelerates the time when

the devise over becomes operative").   See also Estate of

McNeill, 230 Cal. App. 2d 449, 451-452, 454 (1964) (where it

"was the clear intention" of decedent that remainder of her

estate be gifted to both "the Los Angeles branch" and "the San

Francisco branch" of "the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty

to Animals," court accelerated charitable remainder despite pets
                                                                   12

having predeceased testator); In re Mills' Estate, 111 N.Y.S. 2d

622, 625-626 (Sur. Ct. 1952) (intended remainder to New York

Women's League for Animals may be given effect after invalid pet

trust because of decedent's clear intent that gift was in no way

conditional on caring for pets).

    However, unlike Estate of McNeill and In re Mills' Estate,

both of which serve only as nonbinding authority from other

jurisdictions, the decedent's will does not demonstrate a "clear

intent" that the charitable remainder be awarded to the yet-to-

be-named charity in the event Licorice were to predecease the

decedent.   In both Estate of McNeill, 230 Cal. App. 2d at 451,

and In re Mills' Estate, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 625, the testator had

named a specific charity, both of which were animal charities.

Here, no such explicit charity was named.   While the failure to

name a charity does not by itself invalidate the charitable

remainder, see G. L. c. 203E, § 405 (b), such failure at least

creates ambiguity whether the decedent wanted the remainder to

go to charity or, alternatively, her primary concern was the

well-being of Licorice following her death.   See Flannery, 432

Mass. at 668 ("latent ambiguity emerges when the words of a will

appear to be unambiguous on their face, but certain extrinsic

facts render their meaning uncertain" [citation omitted]).

    Furthermore, while we agree with the motion judge that the

possibility that Licorice would predecease Theresa was
                                                                  13

reasonably foreseeable, the omission of whether the to-be-named

charity was to receive the remainder in the event Licorice

predeceased the decedent, whether intentional or unintentional,

ultimately is a question of fact -- one not best suited to be

resolved on summary judgment.    See White v. White, 322 Mass. 30,

33-34 (1947) (omission in will, whether intentional or

unintentional, is question of fact).    We disagree with the

motion judge's conclusion that the mere creation of a residuary

clause in the will, coupled with the lack of an alternative gift

apart from the Article V trust, demonstrates a clear intent from

the decedent that the charitable remainder was not conditioned

on Licorice's survival of her.

     "The fundamental rule for the construction of wills 'is to

ascertain the intention of the testator from the whole

instrument, attributing due weight to all its language,

considered in the light of the circumstances known to him at the

time of its execution and to give effect to that intent unless

some positive rule of law forbids.'"    Hershman-Tcherepnin v.

Tcherepnin, 452 Mass. 77, 84 (2008), quoting Fitts v. Powell,

307 Mass. 449, 454 (1940).   "Although the interpretation of a

will begins with the four corners of the instrument, " extrinsic

evidence may be necessary to resolve ambiguities that arise in a

will.   Hershman-Tcherepnin, supra at 84-85.
                                                                   14

     Here, extrinsic evidence is necessary to resolve the

ambiguity whether, at the time of the making of the will, the

decedent intended that the to-be-named charity was to receive

the remainder notwithstanding Licorice's failure to survive her.

Thus, there exists a genuine issue of fact, such that the award

of summary judgment was improper.6    See Adams v. Schneider Elec.

USA, 492 Mass. 271, 280 (2023) ("Summary judgment is appropriate

where there is no material issue of fact in dispute" [citation

omitted]); Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass.

805, 809 (1991) (when state of mind questions, such as intent,

are at issue, summary judgment often is inappropriate); Mass. R.

Civ. P. 56 (c).    Cf. Hershman-Tcherepnin, 452 Mass. at 86-87

(court properly could resolve ambiguity on summary judgment

record because no party raised genuine dispute of material facts

surrounding will's execution to warrant resolution at trial).

     If, following remand, there is no clear intention that the

charitable gift was to be accelerated in the event Licorice

predeceased the decedent, then the lapsed trust will fall into

the will's residue, as we explained supra.     See Flannery, 432

Mass. at 669.     Article IV of the will contains the residuary

clause.   It states, in pertinent part, "I hereby give . . . all

     6 "The written instrument is the final and unalterable
expression of the purpose of the testator. The power of the
court is limited to interpretation and construction. It cannot
make a new will." Polsey v. Newton, 199 Mass. 450, 454 (1908).
                                                                   15

lapsed legacies and devises or other gifts made by this [w]ill

which fail for any reason, tangible or intangible, including any

property over which I have a power of appointment, in trust to

the [t]rustees of the LICORICE TESTAMENTARY TRUST established

herein" (emphasis added).   Under the express terms of the

decedent's will, any lapsed gifts fall into the residuary of the

will.

    The residuary of the will, however, leaves all lapsed gifts

to a lapsed and invalid trust, as discussed supra.    Therefore,

in the event there exists no clear intent that the charitable

remainder was to be accelerated on Licorice's failure to survive

the decedent, the entire trust lapses into the residue, and the

residue also lapses because the residue leaves everything to the

invalid Licorice Testamentary Trust.    As a result, the gift then

will pass as intestate property.   See Bray v. Bray, 359 Mass.

439, 441 (1971) ("Where a gift lapses which is itself part of

the residue, it must pass as intestate property"); Crocker v.

Crocker, 230 Mass. 478, 482 (1918) ("Where a legacy lapses which

is a part of the residue it cannot fall again into the residue.

It must pass as intestate property").
                                                                 16

     Accordingly, we vacate the decree and order on the petition

for formal adjudication dated January 13, 2022, and remand the

matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.7

                                   So ordered.

     7 Where we have determined that the judge erred in granting
partial summary judgment and, as a result, are vacating the
decree and order on the petition for formal adjudication of the
will, we need not address the objectors' argument that the trial
judge made a clearly erroneous finding at trial that Ann had not
misappropriated the decedent's assets. See Tenczar v. Indian
Pond Country Club, Inc., 491 Mass. 89, 107 n.17 (2022)
(unnecessary to reach merits of appellant's arguments that $3.4
million jury award was excessive where judgment was vacated,
verdict was set aside, and matter was remanded for new trial).