Court Opinion

ID: 9467198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:41:27.547263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:13.305060
License: Public Domain

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because my brethren read a patina onto the clear surface of a statute that I would leave untarnished, I respectfully dissent. The statute provides “the Commission ... shall so notify the person aggrieved.” Then the ninety day period commences. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The E.E.O.C. regulation in effect at the time that notice was mailed to Ms. Decker was even more detailed in specifying that the party must, herself, receive notice. It provides:
In any instance in which the Commission is unable to obtain voluntary compliance ..., it shall so notify the respondent, the person filing a charge on behalf of the aggrieved person, the aggrieved person or persons, and any state or local agency to which the charge has been previously deferred ....
39 Fed.Reg. 10,123 (1974) (emphasis added).1 This clearly requires that the aggrieved person receive notice, even if counsel has been retained. The E.E.O.C.’s administrative interpretation is, of course, entitled to great deference. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). This action was commenced within ninety days from the time the statutory notice was given to Ms. Decker. Nonetheless, my brethren hold that suit was untimely because her lawyer had received notice 91 days before the complaint was filed.
The notice of right to sue does not merely convey information. It sets a time limit for the filing of suit that we have held en banc to be jurisdictional in nature. McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1978) but see 569 F.2d at 278 (Rubin, J., dissenting); see also Coke v. General Adjustment, Inc., 616 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1980) (rehearing en banc granted). The issue is not one of imputation of knowledge as a result of notice given an agent, even one who is an attorney at law. Nor is the *1225question one of normal incidents of the attorney-client relationship.2 We are concerned with interpreting a statute remedial in nature. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 495 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1974). Not only does the majority opinion fail to give the statute a liberal interpretation, it fails even to read the words of the statute literally and, instead, construes them unfavorably to the class intended as the statute’s beneficiaries.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act neither expressly nor impliedly incorporates common law notice rules into its statutory mandate. “The primary concern” of Section 2000e-5 “must be the protection of the aggrieved person’s option to seek a prompt remedy in the best manner available.” H.R.Rep.No. 92-238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1972] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2137, 2148 (emphasis added). The majority’s decision runs counter to this mandate that we protect a claimant’s right to bring suit in the absence of an explicit congressional directive to the contrary.
The Eighth Circuit has adopted a more sensible approach. In Craig v. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 581 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1978), the claimant’s attorney received notice more than ninety days before he filed suit; the claimant never actually received notice herself because her letter was lost in the mails. Citing the remedial purpose of the statute and regulations of the Civil Service Commission requiring that notice be sent directly to the aggrieved, the court held that notice to a representative would be sufficient only if the notice is “addressed in accordance with the specific directions of the employee” and the receipt is “acknowledged personally by the designated representative.” 581 F.2d at 193. While Craig was decided under Section 2000e-16(c), which governs complaints brought against the federal government, a recent district court case has applied the test to cases brought under Section 2000e-5(f)(1). See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 487 F.Supp. 429 (W.D.Mo.1980). Moreover, the shared remedial purpose compels the same interpretation.
We cannot resolve the issue on the basis that, because Ms. Decker’s lawyer had 91 days notice and Ms. Decker had 89 days notice, Ms. Decker was not prejudiced. Anheuser-Busch was no more prejudiced by the filing of the suit one day late than Ms. Decker was prejudiced by the absence of personal notice. Admittedly, this case presents appealing facts for adopting a doctrine of constructive notice. A claimant who waits 89 days before filing her claim evokes less sympathy than a claimant who never receives notice and whose attorney misplaces or ignores the notice received. The doctrinaire rule adopted by the majority would prevent the claimant from maintaining suit in either case.
In effect, my brethren substitute a malpractice claim against counsel for the statutory right to relief. It is unlikely that Congress, in attempting to compensate for the “vast array of resources and legal talent” available to employers, H.R.Rep.No. 92-238, supra, at 3, [1972] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2148, intended that such a swap be made. A malpractice claim is a paltry remedy; I would not thrust it on a claimant allegedly denied her statutory rights.3

. The current E.E.O.C. regulations no longer explicitly provide for notice to both counsel and the aggrieved party. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.-28 (1980). This omission may have been part of an attempt to make the regulation more concise. In any event, the present case is governed by the regulations in force at the time notice was given.

. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporate a special provision requiring all pleadings subsequent to the complaint to be filed on the attorney of a party represented by counsel. Rule 5(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. This is designed to expedite the trial process; it does not depend on imputation.

. The employer is likely solvent; counsel may not be. Proof in a malpractice suit requires proof both of negligence and of the likelihood of victory. Williams v. Bashman, 457 F.Supp. 322, 326 (E.D.Pa.1978). Thus, the claimant must prove two cases instead of one. Discovery against the employer as a party defendant is easier than discovery against it as a disinterested bystander to a client-attorney lawsuit.