Court Opinion

ID: 9582710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:30:35.163208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:15.677869
License: Public Domain

Qxjillian, Judge,
concurring specially. Though the majority opinion follows the earlier case of Todd v. Armour & Co., 44 Ga. App. 609 (162 S. E. 394) and the view that a fireman is a licensee when he enters upon the owner’s premises to extinguish a fire is also' supported by the weight of foreign authority, I cannot agree that under Georgia law that it is correct.
In the case, of Anderson v. Cooper, 214 Ga. 164, 167 (104 S. E. 2d 90) the Supreme Court held: “Therefore, since it is agreed that we are dealing with a plain and unambiguous statute, it is not necessary to search for any intention the, legislature might have had in adopting it. It is only necessary to follow the words of the Code section. The applicants contend *672that it is clear that the injured child in this case is neither a ‘customer nor a servant, nor a trespasser, and does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises’, and that, therefore, he is a licensee under Code § 105-402. This argument completely overlooks the last half of the definition of a licensee, which is just as much a part of the definition as the first half, and the portion to which the courts have attached the greater significance. Even if it is admitted, for the purpose of discussion, that the child in question was in none of those classes listed in the above Code section, he is also not one who is ‘permitted expressly or impliedly to go thereon merely for his own interest, convenience, or gratification.’ Obviously this can not be ignored, and just as obviously, when it is considered, the injured child in this case is not included in the definition because the child did not go on the premises in question merely for his own ‘interest, convenience, or gratification.’ He did go on the premises for the benefit of the occupant and his father. It must be remembered that the section in question does not attempt to define an invitee, but simply says that one who fits the description contained therein, is a licensee—and he must fit the entire description. Otherwise, he is something other than a licensee, and the court must look elsewhere to determine the: status of such a person.”
However, in deciding what constitutes ordinary care consideration must be given to the lawful use to which the premises are put and their normal condition at the time in question. Where an apartment house is being constructed it is necessary and usual during the progress of the construction that excavations be made to accommodate water mains, sewer lines, gas lines and for other purposes. That there be such excavations during the course of the building process or that they remain open is not unusual or negligent.
Applying the, rule stated I am of the opinion that the petition does not show negligence on the part of the defendant.