Court Opinion

ID: 9584957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:54:17.305842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:19.384259
License: Public Domain

Judge BECTON,
concurring in the result.
Being bound by authoritative decisions of this Court and of our Supreme Court which hold that the fact that a defendant does not flee immediately “after the commission of a crime goes only to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility,” State v. Murvin, 304 N.C. 523, 527, 284 S.E. 2d 289, 292 (1981), I concur in the result. See also State v. Self, 280 N.C. 665, 187 S.E. 2d 93 (1972) (flight sixteen days after crime held to be competent) and State v. DeBerry, 38 N.C. App. 538, 248 S.E. 2d 356 (1978) (flight from courtroom when case called for trial held to be competent).
I write this concurring opinion to point out that the probative value of flight evidence has been seriously questioned.
Its probative value as circumstantial evidence of guilt depends upon the degree of confidence with which four inferences can be drawn; (1) from the defendant’s behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged. See generally Miller v. United States, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 45, 48, 320 F. 2d 767, 770 (1963); 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 173, p. 632 (3d ed. 1940). The use of evidence of flight has been criticized on the grounds that the second and fourth inferences are not supported by common experience and it is widely acknowledged that evidence of flight or related con*426duct is ‘only marginally provative as to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.’
United States v. Myers, 550 F. 2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 439 U.S. 847, 58 L.Ed. 2d 149, 99 S.Ct. 147 (1978). See also United States v. Jackson, 572 F. 2d 636, 639-40 (7th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Foutz, 540 F. 2d 733, 740 (4th Cir. 1976). Recently, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Beahm, 664 F. 2d 414 at 419 (4th Cir. 1981) quoting United States v. Foutz, 540 F. 2d at 740, stated: “ ‘The inference that one who flees from the law is motivated by guilt is weak at best. . . ” I conclude with an older and more elaborate statement by the United States Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483 n. 10, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441, 452 n. 10, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415 n. 10 (1963):
[W]e have consistently doubted the probative value in criminal trials of evidence that the accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime. In Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511, this Court said: “. . . it is not universally true that a man, who is conscious that he has done a wrong, ‘will pursue a certain course not in harmony with the conduct of a man who is conscious of having done an act which is innocent, right and proper; since it is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.’ ”