Court Opinion

ID: 9473205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:22:55.148909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:23.372951
License: Public Domain

BORK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority’s decision in this case undermines the traditional authority of trial judges to grant summary judgment in mer-itless cases. Even though the plaintiff has no admissible evidence on an essential element of her case, the majority today allows her to survive a motion for summary judgment. This decision will probably lead to an unnecessary trial followed by a directed verdict for defendant Celotex. More generally, the precedent established today will waste trial court time and energy and unnecessarily add to the costs and procedural burdens faced by litigants.
The issue here is whether a trial judge may use summary judgment procedures to require a plaintiff, who has had ample time for discovery, to show that she has some admissible evidence to support an essential element of her case. The alternatives are that the defendant, which is the moving party, must prove a negative — that the plaintiff can never find evidence — or that the ease go forward so that the plaintiff has still more time to cure her lack of evidence. The latter alternative apparently means that the plaintiff need never proffer evidence until she faces a motion for a directed verdict at trial. It seems to me better that summary judgment be awarded where, as here, the plaintiff has had two years for discovery and knew that she was expected to show her evidence in response *188to defendant’s claim that she had none. The majority thinks otherwise.
In my view, the majority opinion rests on a flawed premise: that a district judge can never grant summary judgment, even in an obviously meritless case, unless a party first makes a motion pursuant to Rule 56 and supports that motion with admissible evidence. The result in this case is that the plaintiff is granted an unsought extension of time to cure the defects in her proof. The premise being wrong, the result is gratuitous.
I.
The majority errs in supposing that a party seeking summary judgment must always make an affirmative evidentiary showing, even in cases where there is not a triable, factual dispute. The cases the majority cites hold only that a moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a material, factual dispute, even on issues where his opponent would have the burden of proof at trial. Maj. op. at 5 nn. 10, 11. These eases do not consider the central question here: whether that showing must invariably be made with evidence.
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between a plaintiff’s burden of proof on the merits and a defendant’s burden of proof on summary judgment. The standards of proof by which each burden is satisfied are not necessarily the same. A plaintiff must prove his case by an affirmative, preponderance of the evidence. However, a defendant seeking summary judgment need only convince the trial judge that a reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiff, even if all disputed issues of fact and inferences were resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. There is no requirement that the trial judge must always become convinced of this by a positive evidentiary showing. Several principles of summary judgment law demonstrate that while a positive evidentiary showing will usually be necessary, it is not always required.
First, it is hornbook law and the law of this circuit that a trial judge should grant summary judgment if the plaintiff has so little evidence on an essential element of his claim that it is clear that a directed verdict would have to be granted at trial. 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2713.1, at 616 (1983); United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 441-42 (D.C.Cir.1975); Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J.). As Judge Leventhal has said, a party seeking summary judgment “is entitled to the benefit of any relevant presumptions, and if the established facts and relevant presumptions would have entitled him to a directed verdict at trial, he is entitled to a summary judgment under Rule 56.” General Motors, 518 F.2d at 441-42. There is no point in sending a case to trial only to have the judge direct a verdict. In this case, a directed vérdict would clearly be required since the plaintiff lacks any admissible evidence of causation, an essential element of her case.
In this respect, a motion for summary judgment is like a motion for a directed verdict. In neither is an evidentiary showing invariably required.1 In both the moving party’s burden is satisfied if he persuades the trial judge that his opponent must lose as a matter of law even when all disputed facts and inferences are resolved in his opponent’s favor.2
The analogy between summary judgment and directed verdicts has been emphasized by Wright & Miller.
*189[I]t [is] clear that the movant may discharge his burden by demonstrating that if the case went to trial there would be no competent evidence to support a judgment for his opponent. If no evidence could be mustered to sustain the non-moving party’s position, a trial would be useless and the movant therefore is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this sense the theory underlying summary judgment is similar to that of the directed verdict motion.
10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727, at 130 (1983). Pursuant to these principles and to our decision in General Motors, 518 F.2d at 441-42, defendant Celotex is clearly entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff’s total lack of affirmative, admissible evidence of causation would result in a directed verdict at trial and should therefore warrant a grant of summary judgment now. The majority’s refusal to uphold that grant represents a clear failure to follow General Motors3 and overlooks this functional identity between summary judgment and directed verdicts.4
A second principle of law also shows that the majority has erred. Under some circumstances, trial judges may grant summary judgment sua sponte so long as the losing party was on notice that he had to come forward with all his evidence. 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra, § 2720, at 28. This rule clearly means that summary judgment does not require affirmative evidentiary proof of the absence of a factual dispute. Rather the trial judge need only notice this absence and demand that it be corrected. If it is not corrected after notice,5 it becomes the trial judge’s duty to grant summary judgment to conserve scarce judicial resources and avoid a useless trial. If the district court, on its own motion, may grant summary judgment whenever it concludes that required evidence cannot be produced, it necessarily follows that a defendant may obtain summary judgment when it brings that situation to the court’s attention.6
A third relevant legal principle is the substantial pretrial discretion trial judges enjoy to manage their caseloads. It is hard to see how that discretion is abused if a judge, at the defendant’s request, asks a plaintiff to show that he has minimal evidence to support his case before he can go forward to trial. Indeed, district judges have broad pretrial authority to force the parties to narrow issues in order to reduce trial time by isolating the particular factual disputes that are to be tried. Fed.R.Civ.P. *19016. This authority would be mocked if plaintiffs could not be obligated before trial to reveal that they had at least some evidence supporting the essential elements of their lawsuit.7
Finally, Rule 56 itself imposes no obligation on parties seeking summary judgment always to introduce positive evidence proving the absence of a factual dispute. Although the framers of the rule probably thought such evidence would be necessary in most cases, see Advisory Committee Note to Rule 56, they imposed no ironclad requirement. Indeed, Rule 56 specifically allows for summary judgment on motion without a supporting affidavit. Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(b). This is appropriate in cases like the present one where even accepting the non-moving parties’ factual allegations one must still enter judgment for the movant. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 227 (8th Cir.1966); Hubicki v. ACF Industries Inc., 484 F.2d 519, 522 (3d Cir.1973); Ramsey v. United States, 329 F.2d 432 (9th Cir.1964); Reynolds v. Needle, 132 F.2d 161, 162 (D.C.Cir.1942); Seago v. North Carolina Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 388 F.2d 987 (1966). Here as in Chambers “no factual dispute exists and the complaint [absent evidence of causation] does not state a cause of action.” 357 F.2d at 227.
Since this case lacks a triable, factual dispute, even if Celotex were to stipulate to the truthfulness of all of Mrs. Catrett’s admissible evidence, Celotex would still prevail as a matter of law. The majority believes there is a triable, factual dispute in this case solely because Mrs. Catrett alleged causation in her complaint. Bare allegations in a complaint are not admissible at trial, however, and would not support a jury verdict for Mrs. Catrett.8
Rather than properly focussing its inquiry on whether a triable, factual dispute exists in this case, the majority has become entangled in the interplay between the defendant’s burden of proof on the summary judgment motion and the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion in this lawsuit, which she retains at all times. The majority has required the defendant to prove in effect the negative of the plaintiff’s case, even though the plaintiff has no evidence on an essential element of her claim. This temporarily switches the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion in the lawsuit to the defendant which now must prove that it could not conceivably have caused the plaintiff’s injury. The majority should have required the defendant only to persuade the trial judge that there is no triable, factual dispute on causation.9
I agree with the majority that in most cases defendants will only be able to establish the absence • of a factual dispute by producing positive evidence that undermines the plaintiff’s factual showing. So long as the plaintiff has even one iota of weak inferential evidence, defendants will have the burden of affirmatively attacking that evidence to prove that there is no factual dispute suitable for trial. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at 160, 90 *191S.Ct. at 1609. Here, however, the plaintiff has made no factual showing whatsoever. Accordingly, there can be no doubt as to the absence of a triable, factual dispute in this case.
II.
The majority also objects to the grant of summary judgment in this case on the ground that plaintiff Catrett should be given an additional opportunity to produce admissible evidence on causation. I disagree. This case is just like one in which, after discovery, the judge holds a pre-trial conference, asks the plaintiff how he intends to prove each element of his case, and learns that the plaintiff has no admissible evidence of an indispensable element of that case. That ease would be ripe for disposition by summary judgment. Here, Mrs. Catrett has had almost two years to prepare her case for trial. The motion for summary judgment put her on notice that Celotex claimed she had no evidence of causation. Mrs. Catrett was represented by counsel who were certainly aware that the district judge could consider only admissible evidence in determining the existence of a triable, factual dispute.10 6 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice K 56-11[1 — 8] (2d ed. 1972), Government of Republic of China v. Compass Communications Corp., 473 F.Supp. 1306 (D.D.C.1979). Any trained attorney should have known that what was offered was inadmissible. Counsel not only failed to produce any admissible evidence of causation but failed at the summary judgment hearing to seek additional time to produce such evidence. Under these circumstances, the district judge clearly acted within his discretion in granting summary judgment without giving Mrs. Catrett an additional, unrequested opportunity to produce admissible evidence essential to her case. As appellate judges, we should leave the district court substantial discretion to manage the litigation before it. That discretion includes the discretion to determine when a summary judgment is ripe.
It would have been better if the majority reached the result it does by holding that plaintiff should have been given a new deadline to produce admissible evidence of causation. That would, for the reasons just given, be wrong, but at least it would not damage the utility of Rule 56. I understand the judicial impulse to save a plaintiffs case from what may have been careless preparation, but the deformation of summary judgment procedures is too high a price to pay for the gratification of that impulse.

. A directed verdict may be granted at the close of plaintiffs case even before defendant has introduced any evidence at all. This is appropriate when the plaintiffs case and the evidence supporting it are legally insufficient to support a favorable verdict. We have exactly this situation in this case at the summary judgment stage.

. This is not to suggest that the standards for granting summary judgments and directed verdicts are absolutely identical. Where competing inferences from the alleged facts are fairly possible, judges should be more charitable to non-moving parties on summary judgment especially until demeanor evidence can come out. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (Harlan, J.). However, where competing inferences are not possible and especially where there is a complete absence of proof, the standards governing summary judgment and directed verdicts largely coincide.

. It is true that in General Motors the party seeking summary judgment was only able to benefit from the relevant presumptions after it had established certain facts. In this case, however, it is not necessary for the defendant to establish any facts to benefit from the presumption that the plaintiff must prove causation. The need to establish facts in support of a summary judgment motion will depend on the nature of the presumptions at issue.

. The majority suggests that a passage in Moore’s supports its position that the summary judgment directed verdict equivalency breaks down in the case at hand. 6 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice jj 56.15[3] (2d ed. 1972) (footnote omitted). I think this passage irrelevant to the present case because it clearly contemplates a situation where the plaintiff has at least a shred of evidence with which to go to trial. In that circumstance a moving defendant would have to produce contrary evidence to prove the absence of a triable, factual dispute. Here, however, the plaintiff has made no factual showing whatsoever. Accordingly, but for the unsought and indefinite extension of time the majority improperly grants the plaintiff, there would be no question but that the plaintiff could not possibly prevail.

. See infra Part II for a discussion of the adequacy of the notice given in this case.

. The majority agrees that a trial judge is empowered to grant summary judgment sua sponte when he concludes that a plaintiff has not produced any admissible evidence on an essential element of her claim. In this case, however, the majority finds the trial judge stripped of his power to act solely because the defendant Celo-tex filed an unsupported motion. I do not understand why this action by a party to the law suit diminishes the authority the trial judge would otherwise possess. I also do not understand why the majority continues to focus on Celotex's motion papers and does not focus instead on the absence here of a triable, factual dispute.

. It should be noted that Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 does make available various sanctions where a party improperly resists discovery. However, the availability of those sanctions does not also preclude a party from seeking summary judgment where the plaintiff has failed to fulfill his obligation to make out a prima facie case. The problem here is not resistance to discovery but inability to provide evidence.

. It is, of course, conceivable that on remand Mrs. Catrett will eventually find admissible evidence of causation and possibly even prevail at trial. This would not in any way change my conclusion that we should affirm the grant of summary judgment before us now. It is settled law that courts should not allow a party to get to trial merely in the hope that he will obtain evidence at that time. 10A C. Wright, supra, § 2727, at 163.

. The majority cites Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) as support for its view. This provision does indicate that when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported by affidavits it must be answered with rebutting affidavits. Clearly, Mrs. Catrett need not produce rebutting affidavits since Celotex has not produced any affidavits in support of its motion. Nonetheless, Mrs. Catrett is still obligated to produce some admissible evidence supporting the essential elements of her case. I do not see why she should be able to get to trial just because she was not obligated to produce rebutting evidence under Rule 56(e).

. In a departure from the established rules, the majority suggests that the district judge could consider inadmissible evidence of causation because the admissibility problems with the evidence might eventually be cured. This holding destroys any incentive that parties now face to put evidence into admissible form prior to trial, and diminishes the utility of pre-trial efforts to narrow and isolate the factual issues that are to be tried. The majority’s holding will inevitably lead to pointless trials where anticipated factual disputes fail to materialize because admissible evidence cannot be found. The majority’s innovation on this point will substantially undermine the utility of summary judgment procedures while yielding no concomitant benefits.