Court Opinion

ID: 9677822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:01:13.891027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:58.775543
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that Ruby Gray’s claim for loss of consortium is barred for failure to file within one year of the date of the occurrence.
In my judgment, there are two reasons why the majority opinion is in error: First, under KRS 304.39-230(6), a claim for loss of consortium is “an action for tort liability” timely when “commenced not later than two (2) years after the injury.” Second, under CR 15.03(1), the rule of relation back of amended pleadings to the date of filing of original pleadings, the complaint filed by Thomas Gray two months after the accident tolled the statute of limitations on Mrs. Gray’s claim for loss of consortium.
The issue in this ease is a narrow one. The statute of limitations formerly applicable to all actions for damages resulting from personal injury from whatever cause was one year. KRS 413.140(a). The question is whether the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) extends this one year statute to two years for all tort actions resulting from motor vehicle accidents not foreclosed by the threshold section or whether it extends the statute of limitations only in those cases where the claimant is not only entitled to no-fault benefits but also has a claim for tort liability.
The “Policy and Purpose” of MVRA is set out in KRS 304.39-010. MVRA is intended • “to correct the inadequacies of the present reparation system.”
The “Limitations of Actions” section, KRS 304.39-230, has six different subsections. The one at issue here is subsection 6, which provides:
“An action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.39-060 may be commenced not later than two (2) years after the injury, or the death, or the last basic or added reparation payment made by any reparation obligor, whichever later occurs.”
Fann v. McGuffey, Ky., 534 S.W.2d 770, 775 (1975), paraphrases this section as covering “an action for tort recovery not foreclosed by KRS 304.39-060.” This indicates a broad and general application of the statutory language.
KRS 304.39-060 is the so-called threshold section. For those who have not rejected “no-fault,” it abolishes tort liability from a motor vehicle accident for a personal injury that is deemed negligible because it is less than certain minimum thresholds set out in MVRA. The threshold section has no application in the present case in which everyone concedes the injury to Mr. Gray exceeds the threshold.
*941A spouse’s right to damages for loss of consortium is an “action for tort liability” and, just like the claim for the injured spouse from which it derives, it is not abolished by KRS 304.39-060 so long as the underlying claim crosses the threshold.
In my judgment the language of KRS 304.39-230(6) is not ambiguous. There is no need to add words to give it meaning. If the legislature meant to extend the statute of limitations to two years only in those cases where the “action for tort liability” was on behalf of a person to whom no-fault benefits were paid or payable, it needed only to say so. It did not say so and neither does Farm v. McGuffey, supra, which addresses the scope of the statute.
The basic problem with the majority opinion is failure to recognize the true nature of the action for damages for loss of consortium. Such an action is derivative in nature, arising out of and dependent upon the right of the injured spouse to recover. Mrs. Gray’s claim arises out of the same personal injury as does her husband’s claim. It is from the same cause. It is subject to all of the same defenses as are available against her husband, such as the contributory negligence claim that the jury rejected. Limitations is simply one of those defenses, statutorily provided.
When a person sustains personal injury in a motor vehicle accident, the injury may give rise to multiple claims for tort liability deriving from the same injury. This occurs when there is a spouse who suffers from loss of consortium from that same injury. It is illogical to suppose that the legislature intended separate statutes of limitations for two claims arising out of one injury. We should not suppose that the legislature intended to be intentionally illogical, nor should we interpret the statute to bring about an obviously illogical result.
The situation is analogous to Blackburn v. Burchett, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 342 (1960). In Blackburn we held that the parent’s claim for loss of services and medical expenses incurred by reason of injuries inflicted on his child was limited by the statute of limitations pertaining to personal injury. We stated at p. 343:
“Plaintiff takes the position that an infant has one cause of action for his injuries and his parent has a separate cause of action for loss of services and medical expenditures. This is true. However, the parent’s cause of action arises out of an injury to his child.”
The Kentucky Court of Appeals decided the present case following as precedent a published opinion in an earlier case squarely in point, decided by the same court — Tucker v. Johnson, Ky.App., 619 S.W.2d 496 (1981). In Tucker we denied discretionary review. Clyde Tucker was injured in a motor vehicle accident on June 13, 1978. Clyde and Gladys Tucker filed Clyde’s personal injury claim and Gladys’ loss of consortium claim 22 months later. The complaint setting out the claim for loss of consortium on behalf of Mrs. Tucker has been filed in the “Appendix” to the Grays’ Brief in the present case. The claim is the same as Mrs. Gray’s claim. In Tucker the Court of Appeals analyzed the “limitations of actions” section of MYRA and the language of this Court in Fann v. McGuffey, supra, and concluded (as I have) “that KRS 304.39-230(6) was not another statute limiting commencement of actions brought for no-fault benefits, but rather was designed for a separate purpose. That purpose is to provide a statute of limitations for those actions involving motor vehicle mishaps (not excluded by the “no-fault” statute) thereby making tort recovery possible.” 619 S.W.2d at 497.
Speaking to both the husband’s claim and the wife’s claim for loss of consortium, Tucker states at p. 497:
“This is such a case. The damages allegedly received by the Tuckers exceed-the thresholds, and thus they have sought tort recovery as a remedy. Their action was initiated within two years after the injuries received in the accident.... (T)he action of the Tuckers was not barred.”
*942The majority opinion suggests that the claim for loss of consortium arising out of personal injury to one’s spouse is somehow different by referring to it as “the statutory tort of loss of consortium .... an independent cause of action authorized by KRS 411.145(2).” Loss of consortium is an ancient and historical right. The statute codifying it, KRS 411.145, was for no other purpose but to recognize that a wife has such a claim as well as a husband. As a matter of fact, at about the same time this statute was enacted, this Court recognized that the common law right of consortium should extend to a wife as well as a husband in Kotsiris v. Ling, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 411 (1970).
In sum, loss of consortium derives out of the spouse’s injury. Whatever the source of the injury to the spouse, it gives rise to a cause of action in two persons. If the source is a motor vehicle accident, it is “tort liability” arising out of the motor vehicle accident, and as such is covered with specificity by the language of KRS 304.39-230(6).
The majority opinion fails to address the fact that Mrs. Gray’s claim for loss of consortium was presented in an amended complaint. The original complaint for personal injury on behalf of her husband was filed two months after the accident occurred. Under CR 15.03(1) the rule that covers relation back of amendments to the pleadings for a claim arising out of the occurrence set forth in the original pleading, the complaint filed by Thomas Gray two months after the accident tolled the statute of limitations as to Mrs. Gray’s claim for loss of consortium.
It is a new claim for a new party. But it derives from the same injury. The test, as set out in Rule 15.03(1), is whether the new claim “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” When it does, as it does here, “the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.”
In Perkins v. Read, Ky., 616 S.W.2d 495 (1981), we held that an amended complaint asserting a claim for a wife’s damages arising from personal injuries she sustained in an automobile collision related back to the date of an original pleading wherein “the relief sought was limited to a claim of damages for (husband’s) wrongful death and destruction of the Perkins automobile.”
In Perkins the original claim for wrongful death filed on behalf of the husband’s estate was designated a complaint filed by the widow individually and in her capacity as executrix of her husband’s estate. But naming herself individually was surplusage because the wrongful death claim on behalf of her husband’s estate could be filed only in her capacity as personal representative. The decision turned on the fact that the defendants “were apprised of her personal injuries from the outset even though this claim was not asserted in the original complaint.” We concluded that the amended complaint should be allowed because “it cannot be said that (the defendants) will be unduly prejudiced by allowing the complaint to be amended.” In Perkins we state at p. 496:
“Hence the important consideration is not whether the amended pleading presents a new claim or defense, but whether the amendment relates to the general factual situation which is the basis of the original controversy. Clay, Ky.Prac.3rd Ed. Civil Rule 15.03.”
The opinion in Perkins cites an earlier case, Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co., Ky., 414 S.W.2d 908 (1967), in which we held that a claim that asserted a cause of action only for wrongful death of the wife and property damage to the husband’s automobile could be amended to present an additional claim for personal injuries to the husband from the same accident, even though the husband’s personal injury claim would have been otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. The principle of relation back under CR 15.03 was applied.
In Wimsatt we said at p. 911:
“There was only one cause of action, and that arose by reason of the negligently induced collision.” (emphasis added).
*943The test in deciding when to permit the amended pleading stating the new claim and apply the principle of relation back is simply this: did the defendant receive sufficient notice of the existence of the claim within the period provided by law so that he is not prejudiced by permitting the new claim? In the present case, if there were two separate claims for personal injury by two people separately injured, CR 15.03 would not apply because it would not be fair to state the defendant was on notice of the existence of the claim within the period provided by law for the commencement of the action. But where, as here, the additional claim is for loss of consortium, it derives from the same personal injury as to which the defendant is on notice from the beginning. CR 15.03 should apply.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
GANT, J., joins in this dissent.