Court Opinion

ID: 9947945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 22:03:08.847527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:47.972007
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/5/24
                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION TWO

 HEE SHEN CEMETERY AND
 BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,            A165514

 v.                                           (San Francisco County
 YEONG WO ASSOCIATION et al.,                 Super. Ct. No. CGC-21-592116)
         Defendants and Appellants.

       Under California law, courts intervene only sparingly in disputes
involving how private associations choose to govern themselves. (California
Dental Assn. v. American Dental Assn. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 346, 353 (California
Dental).) Here, Hee Shen Cemetery and Benevolent Association (Hee Shen)
asked the trial court to intervene in a disputed election for the leadership of
Yeong Wo Association (Yeong Wo), of which Hee Shen is one of 12 member
organizations. Hee Shen convinced the trial court to void Yeong Wo’s
presidential election for its 2021-2022 term and order a new election for a full
two-year term. The trial court found that Yeong Wo’s bylaws were clear and
unambiguous, and that the bylaws restricted the candidates for Yeong Wo’s
presidential elections in a manner advocated by Hee Shen.
       We conclude that the trial court’s finding was not supported by
substantial evidence and that the remedy it ordered was inappropriate as a
matter of law. The trial court misapplied California Dental, which mandates
a two-part framework for courts to determine whether they should wade into
                                        1
the “ ‘dismal swamp’ ” of disputes within a private voluntary association
regarding its own bylaws. (California Dental, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 353.)
Judicial intervention is appropriate only if an association has abused its
discretion by unreasonably construing a plain and unambiguous provision of
its bylaws. (Id. at p. 354.) If an association has done so, then the extent to
which judicial relief is available depends on balancing the interests of the
aggrieved party against the burden on the courts and infringement on the
association’s autonomy. (Ibid.) The trial court should not have intervened.
The court also lacked substantial evidence to order a new presidential
election for a new term. We therefore reverse the judgment.
                          FACTUAL BACKGROUND
   A. Yeong Wo and its Bylaws
        Yeong Wo is a private cultural and charitable association that serves as
an umbrella group for 12 constituent organizations, called “tangs.” The
president of Yeong Wo serves a two-year term and is elected among
candidates from one of the tangs; the specific nominating tang is determined
on a rotating basis. Hee Shen is one of Yeong Wo’s 12 tangs. Hee Shen
supports traditional Chinese burial sites. Anyone who is a descendant of
someone from China’s Huang Ling Dao District may become a member of Hee
Shen.
        Yeong Wo’s bylaws are written in Chinese. Hee Shen submitted an
English translation of the bylaws to the court, which the court admitted into
evidence at trial. The translation of the provision relating to the election of
Yeong Wo’s president reads, in relevant part:

                                        2
      “[T]he positions of Chairperson[1] and Secretary shall be elected in
rotating order from each of the Benevolent Society (aka: Association). If a
certain Benevolent Society (aka: Association) is next in turn to elect
member(s) as candidate(s), the current Chairperson shall openly notify said
Benevolent Society (aka: Association) next in turn by mid-September, that it
must openly recruit qualified candidates and conduct selection of its
candidates in a fair and equitable manner by providing written
recommendations of two or more nominees for each of the positions. . . . And,
list out [the nominee(s)]’s resume(s) in a report, so that the Yeong Wo
Benevolent Association may call upon a board meeting and vote by the entire
body of the attending Board Members, elect one person each for respective
position(s) to fill the post(s). The nominee who has the most votes shall be
elected.”
      The operation of these provisions in the election for president of Yeong
Wo in the 2021-2022 term became the basis for the underlying lawsuit.
   B. Hee Shen and its Recommended Candidates
      In September 2020, Yeong Wo notified Hee Shen of its turn in the
rotation among the 12 tangs to have a member serve as Yeong Wo’s president
for the 2021-2022 term. Pursuant to the tang’s own bylaws, Hee Shen
published a notice in Chinese newspapers of an “open[] call for capable
candidates for the office.” Hee Shen received four applications, including one
from Kwok Yin Leung. Leung had been a member of Hee Shen for
approximately 35 years and served as its vice chairman, vice director, and
treasurer.

      1 We refer to this position as “president” for consistency with the

terminology used by the parties and trial court. The interpreter at trial
clarified that the Chinese term is “literally translated as chairperson,” but
“can also be known as the president.”

                                       3
      At an October 5, 2020 meeting, Hee Shen’s board voted in favor of
recommending only two candidates instead of all four applicants. Hee Shen’s
board held a vote among the four candidates, with two other members (not
Leung) receiving the highest number of votes. According to testimony from a
Hee Shen board director, the board used this process “to make sure we are
going to recommend the strongest candidate.” Another Hee Shen director
testified that nothing disqualified Leung from being president, and the board
just wanted to employ a process that would allow it to propose the two “best”
candidates.
      Hee Shen notified Yeong Wo that the two members who received the
most votes in the Hee Shen board’s election were the “recommended
presidential candidates.” Hee Shen also stated that anyone “self-
recommended to run for the office without authorization in Yeong Wo
Benevolent Association would not be qualified to run in the election, and the
vote should be void.”
      After the Hee Shen board failed to pick him as a recommended
candidate, Leung submitted his application directly to Yeong Wo. He
complained that Hee Shen’s vote to only recommend two candidates was
unfair.
      Yeong Wo formed an election evaluation committee. A committee
member, who was also Yeong Wo’s president at the time, testified that, based
on Yeong Wo’s bylaws, the committee reviewed the applications and
determined that all four applicants should be allowed to run for president.
   C. Vote for the 2021-2022 Term Yeong Wo President
      At an April 18, 2021 meeting, Yeong Wo’s board announced the
recommendation by its election evaluation committee. Members of Hee Shen
unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the voting process. A majority of the Yeong

                                      4
Wo board voted to confirm that all four candidates were eligible to participate
in the election.
      At a May 16, 2021 meeting, Yeong Wo’s board voted for its president for
the 2021-2022 term. According to the meeting minutes, members of Hee
Shen blocked entrance into the meeting and police arrived to maintain order.
Yeong Wo directors used chairs to block Hee Shen members while ballots
were counted. Leung received the highest number of votes and became Yeong
Wo’s 2021-2022 term president.
                      PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
   A. This Action
      In June 2021, Hee Shen filed this action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against Yeong Wo and Leung (then acting as Yeong Wo’s
president). Hee Shen specifically sought a declaration and injunction that
(1) the resolution after the election confirming Leung as president for the
2021-2022 term be deemed invalid; and (2) Leung “should not (acting on
behalf of Plaintiff) conduct business affairs of Yeong Wo as [its] President for
2021 and 2022.”
   B. Denial of Preliminary Injunction
      Hee Shen moved for a preliminary injunction in July 2021. Yeong Wo
opposed the motion, arguing that the court should refrain from intervening in
this dispute because Yeong Wo did not plainly contravene its bylaws. It
interpreted the bylaws as providing that Hee Shen may make
recommendations on candidates for president, but Yeong Wo’s board has the
ultimate power to choose its own president. In Yeong Wo’s view, its bylaws
did not mandate that the election be limited exclusively to only Hee Shen’s
recommended candidates.
      The trial court denied the preliminary injunction. It concluded that

                                       5
Hee Shen had failed to show Yeong Wo plainly contravened its bylaws and,
relying on California Dental, that “the policy of judicial restraint therefore
controls the instant motion.” The court explained that even if Hee Shen’s
interpretation was “more plausible,” the bylaws “ambiguously state” that Hee
Shen may make “recommendations,” but Yeong Wo may choose its president.
      Hee Shen moved for reconsideration of the order. It argued that the
original translation attached to its complaint misinterpreted a phrase in the
Yeong Wo bylaws. The original translation read that Yeong Wo could “select
from” the entire body of attendees of its board meeting to elect the president.
The revised translation replaced the phrase “select from” with the phrase
“vote by.” The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. It reasoned
in part that even the updated translation “still does not clearly provide that
[Yeong Wo] was obligated to choose a President from [Hee Shen’s] slate of
nominees.”
   C. Judgment
      The trial court subsequently held a bench trial before a different judge.
On May 11, 2022, the court issued a statement of decision and judgment. It
characterized the dispute as a “very simple” one: whether or not defendant
Yeong Wo violated its own bylaws by not voting upon “whoever was
successfully nominated by [Hee Shen] as a candidate” for president of Yeong
Wo. The trial court first found that Yeong Wo’s bylaws were “clear and
unambiguous.” It then found that Yeong Wo had violated its bylaws by
“choosing to add additional candidates to the voting list that were not
recommended/approved by [Hee Shen].”
      The court further found that “the interest of [Yeong Wo] regarding the
election does not outweigh the aggrieved interests of [Hee Shen], and
therefore exercises its jurisdiction on this matter.” It stated: “When a court

                                        6
finds that an election violated the corporate bylaws, the court will properly
find that the officers/directors elected thereafter were not entitled to hold
office and that . . . the election is void and order a new meeting for the
purpose of electing officers/directors.”
      The trial court entered judgment that “(1) Defendant Yeong Wo
violated its bylaws; (2) the election of the Yeong Wo President for the 2021-
2022 term violated Defendant Yeong Wo’s bylaws and was improper and
therefore void; (3) Defendant Kwok Yin Leung is not entitled to hold office
and is removed as President of Yeong Wo; and (4) an immediate new election
for Yeong Wo President for the full two-year term is to be held and [Hee
Shen’s] approved nominees be voted on by the Yeong Wo Board of Directors
as required under Article XXI of Defendant Yeong Wo’s bylaws.”
      Yeong Wo appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Yeong Wo argues that the trial court erred in reaching its conclusions
concerning both steps of the California Dental framework, by finding that
(1) Yeong Wo had abused its discretion by unreasonably construing a plain
and unambiguous provision of its bylaws, and (2) the balancing of interests
warranted a new election with Hee Shen’s approved nominees for a full two-
year term. We agree.
      The California Dental framework reflects “general common law
principles that govern disputes within private organizations.” (California
Dental, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 353.) “[B]y-laws of a voluntary unincorporated
association constitute a contract between the association and its members,
and the rights and duties of the members as between themselves and in their
relation to association, in all matters affecting its internal government and
the management of its affairs, are measured by the terms of [its] constitution

                                           7
and by-laws.” (Dingwall v. Amalgamated Assn. of Street Railway Employees
(1906) 4 Cal.App. 565, 569; California Dental, at p. 353 [quoting excerpt of
same].) Accordingly, courts “ ‘properly exercise[] only a limited role of
review’ ” in challenges to the association’s interpretation of its own rules.
(California Dental, at p. 353, quoting Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of
Orthodontists (1974) 12 Cal.3d 541, 558.)
      The courts play only a very limited role in adjudicating disputes
concerning the affairs of private clubs and associations. “In many disputes in
which such rights and duties are at issue . . . the courts may decline to
exercise jurisdiction. Their determination not to intervene reflects their
judgment that the resulting burdens on the judiciary outweigh the interests
of the parties at stake. One concern in such cases is that judicial attempts to
construe ritual or obscure rules and laws of private organizations may lead
the courts into what Professor Chafee called the ‘dismal swamp.’ ”
(California Dental, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 353, quoting Chafee, The Internal
Affairs of Associations Not for Profit (1930) 43 Harv. L.Rev. 993, 1023–1026.)
Our Supreme Court highlighted another concern: “preserving the autonomy
of such organizations.” (Ibid., citing Note, Developments in the Law—
Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations (1963) 76 Harv. L.Rev.
983, 990–991.) It observed that courts “must guard against unduly
interfering” in a private association’s “autonomy by substituting judicial
judgment for that of the [association] in an area where the competence of the
court does not equal that of the” association. (California Dental, at p. 354.)
      The standard for any court intervention in cases concerning a private
association’s affairs is therefore quite high. Courts will accept jurisdiction
over a private voluntary association only where the association abused its
discretion by unreasonably construing a plain and unambiguous provision of

                                        8
its bylaws. (California Dental, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 353.) We review the
trial court’s finding on this threshold question for substantial evidence. (Id.
at p. 356.)
      Here, the trial court decided the Yeong Wo bylaws were “clear and
unambiguous” based on the revised translation of the bylaws alone. Based on
our review, however, the trial court’s construction of the bylaws does not
follow from the text. In our reading, the translation provides that the
nominating tang could “recruit qualified candidates” and “conduct selection of
its candidates in a fair and equitable manner by providing written
recommendations of two or more nominees for each of the positions.” The
trial court’s earlier orders denying Hee Shen’s motion for preliminary
injunction and then denying reconsideration, finding the revised translation
of the bylaws ambiguous, should have raised red flags in any analysis
suggesting the relevant bylaw was clear and unambiguous. The language
requiring the nominating tang to make “recommendations” of two or more
nominees for Yeong Wo president was unchanged in the proffered
translations between the preliminary injunction and the trial.
      Hee Shen relies on dictionary definitions of the term “recommend”—“to
present as worthy of acceptance or trial” or “to endorse as fit, worthy, or
competent”—to argue that the trial court properly interpreted the bylaws to
preclude Yeong Wo from having any power to select additional nominees. It
would be entirely reasonable, however, to interpret this provision to mean
that the nominating tang recommends, but does not mandate, nominees for
Yeong Wo’s president. (See, e.g., Association of Irritated Residents v. County
of Madera (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1396 [provision setting out
additional recommended studies that might be helpful “does not mean that
they are required”].)

                                        9
      The bylaws also provide that, after receiving the tang’s nominees,
Yeong Wo may vote to elect “one person” for the position of president. It does
not state that Yeong Wo must elect one of the tang’s recommended
candidates. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to interpret this provision to
mean that Yeong Wo is not limited to only the tang’s recommended
candidates, but any qualified applicant from the tang. Alternatively, the
provision could be read more broadly to mean that Yeong Wo could elect any
member of the tang.
      At a minimum, the Yeong Wo bylaws are not a vision of clarity. “ ‘An
ambiguity exists when a party can identify an alternative, semantically
reasonable, candidate of meaning of a writing.’ ” (Benedek v. PLC Santa
Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357.) The bylaws were ambiguous at
best as to whether Yeong Wo was obligated to elect a president from Hee
Shen’s recommended candidates, from among Hee Shen qualified applicants,
or from a larger pool of Hee Shen members. Hee Shen and Yeong Wo offered
competing interpretations of an ambiguous bylaw provision. We conclude
that the interpretation advanced by Yeong Wo does not “plainly contravene”
its bylaws. (California Dental, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 354.)
      California Dental and California Trial Lawyers Association v. Superior
Court (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 575 (California Trial Lawyers), another leading
case concerning judicial intervention in the disputes of a voluntary
association, provide helpful points of comparison. In California Dental, the
California Dental Association (CDA) expelled one of its dentists after finding
him guilty of violations of the codes of ethics of both the CDA and its parent
organization, the American Dental Association (ADA). (California Dental,
supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 351.) The dentist appealed to the ADA, which reversed
most of the charges and reduced the penalty to a suspension. (Ibid.) The

                                      10
trial court granted CDA’s petition for writ of mandate seeking to vacate the
ADA decision and directing it to consider the charges and facts in light of the
CDA’s code of ethics. (Ibid.)
      Our Supreme Court concluded that the ADA’s refusal to consider the
CDA’s code of ethics plainly contravened the ADA bylaws, which provided
that “ ‘the code of ethics adopted by the constituent society shall be the code
of ethics of that constituent society for governing the professional conduct of
its members’ ” and empowered a constituent society to discipline members for
violations of its own code of ethics. (California Dental, supra, 23 Cal.3d at
p. 354.) Here, unlike California Dental, there is no provision that
unambiguously restricted Yeong Wo from adding candidates not
recommended by Hee Shen to its presidential election.
      In California Trial Lawyers, the California Trial Lawyers Association
(CTLA) held its annual election for president. (California Trial Lawyers,
supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.) The CTLA bylaws provided that a
candidate must have served as an officer of the association for at least one
year in the preceding five years. (Ibid.) One of the two candidates was
challenged because he was serving as an officer that year and would be five
days short of a full year if elected. (Ibid.) The CTLA president formed a
committee to investigate the issue and recommended that the candidate be
deemed qualified. (Id. at p. 578.) The board adopted the recommendation,
and the candidate was elected. (Ibid.) The trial court granted a petition
directing the CTLA to disqualify that candidate and install the other
candidate. (Ibid.)
      The appellate court reversed, concluding that the pertinent provisions
of the CTLA bylaws were not “so clear and unambiguous that the question of
who shall assume the office of president-elect may be answered without

                                       11
engaging in an interpretation of those provisions.” (California Trial Lawyers,
supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 580.) It cited other provisions in the bylaws that
required the board to select officers at its annual meeting, which may occur
later than the date specified in the bylaws from which each term began to
run. (Ibid.) The appellate court explained that interpretation of these
ambiguous bylaws constitutes the type of judicial interference that California
Dental cautioned against: “interfering with an organization’s autonomy by
substituting ‘judicial judgment’ for that of the association’s in an area where
the association is more competent.” (California Trial Lawyers, at pp. 579–
580.) So too here. Given the ambiguous language of the bylaws, including
that Hee Shen makes “recommendations” and Yeong Wo then elects a
“person” for its president, the policy of judicial restraint controls.
      None of Hee Shen’s other arguments are persuasive. First, Hee Shen
contends that Yeong Wo and Leung failed to argue the interpretation of the
bylaw provision regarding “recommendations” at trial. We disagree.
Defendants’ trial brief, for example, advanced Yeong Wo’s interpretation that
“the Bylaws provide that Yeong Wo elects the president, not the rotating
constituent organization, and that Yeong Wo should make the final decision
on president.” Defendants argued that the 2021-2022 election did not plainly
contravene Yeong Wo’s bylaws because “the constituent organization may
recommend nominees, but the Bylaws do not require that Yeong Wo elect a
recommended nominee.” During closing argument, defense counsel
reiterated: “The constituent organization makes recommendations and puts
the recommendations in a report. [¶] The bylaws do not state that Yeong Wo
is required to elect a recommended person.” He continued: “[A]
recommendation is not a requirement, and it cannot be said that Yeong Wo
plainly contravened the bylaws. Hee Shen was allowed to make its

                                        12
recommendations, and that’s what the bylaws provide. . . . But it does not
say that Yeong Wo is required to pick from one of those two nominees. And I
believe that leaves an ambiguity in the bylaws that Yeong Wo is allowed to
interpret and determine.”
      Second, Hee Shen points to other portions of the bylaws to argue that
Yeong Wo’s interpretation is “unreasonable.” Hee Shen cites the provision
that the nominating tang can “elect member(s) as candidate(s)” for the
position of Yeong Wo president. But that language describes the process for
how a nominating tang selects its recommended candidates, not necessarily
how Yeong Wo conducts its own election. Hee Shen cites another paragraph
in the bylaws that provides, if recommended candidates are not qualified and
Yeong Wo rejects their nomination, the nominating tang must be notified to
recommend a different candidate. Again, this language describes a process
for the nominating tang to recommend candidates—it does not
unambiguously limit Yeong Wo’s election to only those recommended
candidates.
      Hee Shen also cites the bylaw provision that the nominating tang
conduct a “fair and equitable” selection of its candidates. According to Hee
Shen, Yeong Wo reasoned it could add candidates to the 2021-2022 election
because Hee Shen’s selection was not “fair and equitable,” but the trial court
ultimately found the selection was fair and equitable here. Again, this
provision relates to Hee Shen’s process for recommending candidates (and the
aspirational intent to do so fairly and equitably). It does little to provide
clarity concerning the ambiguity at issue. Hee Shen does not identify
evidence or argument that Yeong Wo’s power to add other candidates was
triggered only if Hee Shen had not conducted a fair and equitable selection.
Yeong Wo’s president testified that it “could” have held its election with only

                                        13
the two Hee Shen recommended candidates if Yeong Wo had not received any
complaints about Hee Shen’s selection process. But the reasoning behind
Yeong Wo’s decision to exercise its potential authority under the ambiguous
bylaw provision does not restrict that authority.
      Finally, Hee Shen contends there was no evidence at trial that Yeong
Wo adopted its interpretation of the bylaw provision regarding
“recommendations” prior to the commencement of this litigation. As a
preliminary matter, Hee Shen offers no authority to support its position that
an association is limited in challenging judicial review of its bylaw
interpretations to only those interpretations that have already been explicitly
adopted. California Dental did not so hold, as the parties in that case were
not “engaged in a dispute concerning the interpretation of the [association’s]
bylaws.” (California Dental, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 355, fn. 3.) Nor do cases
after California Dental appear to suggest such a limitation. (Cf. Berke v. Tri
Realtors (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 463, [“Here, our review is limited solely to
whether the board’s action in declining to arbitrate the [dispute] plainly
contravened its bylaws”].) Even if they did, there was evidence at trial
regarding Yeong Wo’s interpretation that it was not required to limit its
election to only Hee Shen recommended candidates. At trial, counsel asked
Yeong Wo’s president at the time of the election: “And isn’t it correct that the
Yeong Wo decided to override the Hee Shen Tang’s decision to nominate just
two people because you didn’t agree that only—there should only be two
candidates?” He answered: “Not that. According to Yeong Wo’s bylaw, as
long as the person is upstanding person and have not made any mistakes,
that this person is eligible to become a candidate.”
      Moreover, the trial court excluded evidence relevant to Yeong Wo’s
interpretation of the provision regarding candidate recommendations. Hee

                                       14
Shen moved in limine to exclude evidence of prior Yeong Wo elections under
Evidence Code section 352. Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that
past elections were relevant to how Yeong Wo interpreted its bylaws.
Specifically, defendants identified elections for (1) Yeong Wo secretary in the
2017-2018 term where Hee Shen had recommended only two of the five
applicants, Yeong Wo’s board voted to allow all five candidates to run, and a
non-recommended candidate served in the position; and (2) Yeong Wo
president in the 2019-2020 term, where another tang had recommended only
two of the four applicants, and Yeong Wo’s board (including its Hee Shen
members) voted to allow all four candidates to run. The members then
elected a non-recommended candidate (with supporting votes from Hee Shen
members).
      The trial court granted the motion to exclude this evidence, stating that
the issue was “time specific to this particular situation” and, “I just don’t
think it’s relevant to this particular proceeding.” But “[t]he use of ‘course of
performance’ evidence as extrinsic evidence is acknowledged in case law and
was ultimately codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1856.” (Employers
Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 906, 920.) “As
with all extrinsic evidence, course of performance evidence can be used not
only to interpret an ambiguity, but also to reveal one in language otherwise
thought to be clear.” (Ibid.; see also Scheire v. International Show Car Assn.
(ISCA) (9th Cir. 1983) 717 F.2d 464, 466 [explaining that ISCA’s action was
consistent with past practice and its “desire to act in accordance with
precedent was not unreasonable”].) We agree with defendants that the trial
court abused its discretion in excluding this course of performance evidence

                                        15
relevant to Yeong Wo’s interpretation of its bylaws.2 (See Employers
Reinsurance, at pp. 919–920.)
      In sum, we are not persuaded there was substantial evidence to
support the finding that Yeong Wo’s bylaws were clear and unambiguous
such that the process it employed to pick its president for the 2021-2022 term
was an abuse of Yeong Wo’s own discretion. The trial court should not have
intervened under the first step of the California Dental framework and we
reverse the judgment.3
      We decline to reach the parties’ arguments regarding the second step of
the California Dental framework: the extent to which judicial relief is
available based on balancing the interests of the aggrieved party against the
burden on the courts and infringement of the association’s autonomy.
(California Dental, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 354.) We note that the trial record
concerning the second step is a morass. For example, the trial court excluded
evidence relevant to the balancing test: when defense counsel attempted to
question a witness about the effect an invalidated election would have on

      2 We note that we do not see any merit in defendants’ other argument

that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted a motion in limine
to exclude evidence regarding a Hee Shen membership dispute. Consideration
of such a dispute may have been relevant to the reason Yeong Wo exercised its
purported authority, but not the authority itself. Nor do we see merit in
defendants’ argument that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining
relevance objections to (1) the questioning of a witness who was a non-voting
“advisor” to Yeong Wo on his opinion of the bylaws; and (2) the questioning of
another witness on the bylaws, when defense counsel presented contradictory
and confusing offers of proof, ultimately stating the testimony sought to
explain a “cultural understanding” of the Chinese language phrase in the
bylaws that had been translated into English as “two or more.”
      3 Given this conclusion, we need not address Yeong Wo and Leung’s

alternate request that we reverse and remand for a new trial because the
trial court abused its discretion on the evidentiary rulings described above.

                                      16
Yeong Wo, Hee Shen’s counsel objected and stated, “It doesn’t matter what
effect is on the defendant.” The court sustained the objection.4 The trial
court instead appeared focused only on the perceived equities, explaining that
the relief awarded was “a just result in this case” because Yeong Wo’s actions
were “willful.”
      The statement of decision included the bare conclusion that the court
“finds that the interest of Defendant Yeong Wo regarding the election does
not outweigh the aggrieved interests of Plaintiff, and therefore exercises its
jurisdiction on this matter.” But two months later, the trial court issued
rulings on defendants’ objections, which had been lodged before the
statement of decision became final. The court overruled defendants’ objection
that it did not apply the balancing test required under the second step of
California Dental and stated: “This case requires no balancing test.” It is
difficult to say whether the trial court actually applied the correct balancing
test. It is apparent that the court lacked substantial evidence that any
balancing supported a judgment requiring a new election with Hee Shen’s
approved nominees for a new, full two-year term, entered as the 2021-2022
term was nearing its conclusion.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of defendants. Yeong Wo and Leung are entitled to their
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

      4 Hee Shen has moved to strike this argument for failure to raise it in

the opening brief. The motion is denied, as the opening brief argues that the
trial court erred on the second step because it excluded evidence and cites the
relevant page of the record.

                                       17
                                         _________________________
                                         Markman, J.*

We concur:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

Hee Shen Cemetery and Benevolent Association v. Yeong Wo Association et al.
(A165514)

     * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                    18
Trial Court:               San Francisco County Superior Court

Trial Judge:               Hon. Sylvia Lee Husing

Attorneys for Plaintiff    Law Office of Gerald Clausen
and Respondent:            Gerald Clausen

                           Breall & Breall, LLP
                           Joseph M. Breall
                           Christina Q. Nguyen

Attorneys for Defendants   Essential Law Group, PC
and Appellants             Charlie W. Yu

                            19