Court Opinion

ID: 8124347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 15:04:14.27762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:09.607948
License: Public Domain

Wales, J.,
concurring. On the eighth of May, 1869, a contract under seal was made by and between Thomas 0. Hambly and the Junction & Breakwater Railroad Company, and this action was brought by the plaintiff against that company for the breach of its covenants. After the issuing of the writ, the company, by acts of the legislatures of Delaware and Maryland, became consolidated with two other railroad companies, the three becoming one corporation under the name of the Delaware, Maryland & Virginia Railroad Company, and all debts and liabilities of either of said original companies, upon their consolidation, attached to the new corporation, and became enforceable against it to the same extent as if said debts and liabilities had been contracted or incurred by it; and by proceedings had in this court the new company was made party defendant in lieu of the Junction & Breakwater Company, and has appeared by its attorneys and pleaded to the declaration.
By this contract the plaintiff agreed to furnish the requisite mate-. rials and perform the necessary work in laying down the cross-ties and iron rails on the third division of the company’s road, extending from Georgetown to the shore of the Delaware bay, near Lewes, in the state of Delaware, a distance of 17 miles, and on the projecting wharf or pier to be constructed by him in connection therewith. The said division had already been graded and bridged. The materials and work were to be furnished and done under the direction of the company’s engineer, “the said third division of the road of the said company to be ballasted, finished, and completed in a good and workmanlike manner, to the depot grounds at Lewes, by the first day of August next, if the ties and rails can be had by that time.” The said plaintiff also agreed to build the said wharf in conformity with the plan and design as set out in the contract; “the said wharf or pier and the whole of the said division of the said road to be finished and ballasted, and the work thus contracted to be done and performed by the said party of the first part, is to be finished and completed by the thirty-first day of October next.” “The whole compensation” to be paid to the plaintiff by the company was the sum of $326,000, payable in stocks and bonds as follows: The sum of $176,000 in bonds authorized by the state of Delaware to be issued to the company, and the sum of $150,000 in certificates of full-paid stock of the company. The first payment or installment was to be made as soon as materials had been supplied and work performed on the said railroad or pier, *551“or on either,” to the amount of $60,000, according to the estimate of the company’s engineer; and at the end of each month thereafter, as the work progressed, further payments were to be made by the delivery of bonds and stocks, in amounts estimated to be due by the engineer, and in the same proportions of bonds to stocks as provided for the payment of the whole compensation.
The plaintiff further agreed to begin the work in 30 days from the date of the contract, and to have all the piles of the wharf driven by the last day of July following, and, immediately upon signing the contract, to subscribe for $150,000 in shares of the stock of the company, the same to he paid for in work and materials. This is a brief summary of the terms and provisions of t-ho contract.
The declaration contains seven counts, each one setting forth the articles of agreement in full, and assigning breaches. The defendant has demurred generally and specially to all of the counts, excepting the fourth and seventh, to which he has pleaded. The cause of the demurrers to the first two counts are alike in substance, and may be considered together. These counts assign breaches of the defendant’s covenants (first count) “to pormit the said plaintiff to carry on, prosecute, and perform the work by him in said articles of agreement covenanted and agreed to be done until the work so covenanted and agreed to be done should be fully done, performed, finished, and completed by the said plaintiff in manner as provided by said articles of agreement, and in the plan, design, and specifications therein referred to, or until the thirty-first day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine, whichever should first happen;” and (second count) “to permit the said plaintiff to fully do, perform, finish, and complete, by the thirty-first day of October,” etc., “the work by him in said articles of agreement covenanted and agreed to be done and performed.”
The causes of demurrer are (1) that the company did not make the covenants declared on; (2) that the said covenants are inconsistent with and repugnant to the express provisions of the articles of agreement; (3) that the breaches do not correspond with the covenants as set forth in the said counts. By these demurrers the defendant denies the existence of the implied covenants declared on, and also contends that if such covenants can he implied they are not absolute, but subject to certain conditions precedent, to-wit: (1) That the plaintiff should subscribe for the stock upon the execution of the contract, May 8, 1869; (2) that he should begin work in 30 days from that date; (3) have all the piles of the wharf driven by the last day of July; and (4) ballast, finish, and complete the third division by the first of August, if the rails and ties could be bad by that time.
The first question, then, is, do those articles contain the implied covenants declared on? No particular words are necessary to create a covenant. Any words in a sealed instrument by which a parly *552manifests an intention to do or not to do an act, either by himself or a third person, if the act be lawful, will make a covenant, and the law will hold him to his undertaking. Implied covenants depend for their existence on the intendment and construction of law. There are some words which do not of themselves import an express covenant; yet, being made use of in certain contracts, have a similar operation and are called covenants in law, and are as effectually binding on the parties as if expressed in the most unequivocal terms. There may be irajilied covenants in a deed m which there are express covenants, but there can be none contradictory to or inconsistent with or repugnant to express covenants. Platt, Cov. 40; Randel v. C. & D. Canal Co. 1 Har. 270. It follows, from an application of these elementary principles, that where ons party employs another to perform certain work, and they enter into a contract by which one covenants to do the work and the other promises to pay for it, there arises an implied covenant that the promisor will permit the work to be begun and carried on according to' the terms of the contract. There is no necessity, therefore, for making any express covenant for doing what was clearly understood by the contracting parties should be done, and without which the covenants on either side could not be performed. If, on the faith of these articles of agreement, the plaintiff had expended time and money in collecting materials and engaging laborers, and was actually employed in carrying on and prosecuting the work he had agreed to perform, and was ready, willing, and able to complete the same when he was stopped by the company, it is no answer to plaintiff’s claim for damages by reason of such stoppage, to say that there was no express covenant on the part of the company to permit him to go on. The law will imply such a covenant; and this principle is nowhere more clearly stated than by Justice Clifford in Hudson Canal Co. v. Penn. Coal Co. 8 Wall. 276:
“Undoubtedly, necessary implication is as much a part of an instrument as if that which is so implied was p. ainly expressed; but omissions or defects in written instruments cannot be supplied by virtue of that rule, unless the implication results from the language employed in the instrument, or is indispensable to carry the intention of the parties into effect; as, where the act to be done by one of the contracting parties can only be done upon something of a corresponding character being done by the opposite party, the law, in such a case, if the contract is so framed that it binds the party contracting to do the act, will imply a correlative obligation on the. part of the other party to do what is necessary on his part to enable the party so contracting to accomplish his undertaking and fulfill his contract.” “So, if one person engages to work and render services which require great outlay of money, time, and trouble, and he is only to be paid according to the work he performs, the contract necessarily implies an obligation on the part of the employer to supply the work.”
And the same court; in U. S. v. Behan, 110 U. S. 316, speaking through Justice Bradley, says:
“It is to be observed that when it is said in some of the books that where one party puts an end to the contract, the other party cannot sue on the con* *553tract, but must sue for the work actually done under it, as upon a quantum meruit, this only means that he cannot sue the party in fault upon the stipulations contained in the contract, for he himself lias been prevented from performing his own part of the contract upon which the stipulations depend. But surely the willful and wrongful putting an end to a contract, and preventing the other parly from carrying it out, is itself a broacli of the contract, for which an action will lie for the recovery of all damage which the injured party has sustained. The distinction between those claims under a contract which result from a performance of it on the part of the claimant, and those claims under it which result from being prevented by the other parry from performing it, has not always been attended to.”
The plaintiff in the present case claims not compensation for pérformance, hut damages for prevention. Each count is a declaration of itself, and the two which we have been considering are on covenants by the company which are plainly implied by intendment of law from the words of the contract and the intention of the parties as therein expressed. But conceding the existence of the implied covenants on the part of the company to permit the plaintiff to carry on, prosecute, and complete the work in maimer and form as provided by the contract, or by the thirty-first of October, the defendant objects to the plaintiff’s right of action because those counts do not set out or allege certain dependent covenants, or conditions precedent, and their performance by him or a waiver of performance by the company. The prevention complained of was on the twentieth of August, 1869, and the question arises, what, if any, were the covenants to he performed by the plaintiff before that time in order to entitle him to maintain this action? The defendant relies on the stock subscription, the beginning of the work in 30 days, the driving of the piles by the last day of July, and the completion of the third división by the first of August, as conditions precedent to the plaintiff’s right to go on and finish the w'ork.
As in the case of implied covenants, no precise technical words are required to constitute a condition precedent. Whether a condition be precedent or subsequent, or a covenant be dependent or independent, must be gathered from the words and nature of the agreement, which is to be construed according to the intention of the parties as far as that can be collected from the instrument, to which intention, when once discovered, all the technical forms of expression must give way; and, however transposed the covenants may be, their precedence must depend on the order of time in which the intent of the transaction requires the performance. 1 Selw. N. P. 533, tit. “Covenant.” Covenants have been divided into three general classes: First, covenants which are conditions and dependent, in which the performance of one depends on the prior performance of another, and therefore, until the prior condition be performed, the other party is not liable to an action on his covenant. Second, covenants which are mutual conditions to he performed at the same time; and in those, if one party is ready and offers to perform his part, and the other neglects *554or refuses to perform his, he who is ready and offers, has fulfilled his engagement and may maintain an action for the default of the other, though it is not certain that either is obliged to do the first act. The third class are called mutual or independent covenants, where either party may recover damages from the other for the injury he may have sustained by a breach of the covenants in his favor, and where it is no excuse for the defendant to allege a breach of the covenants on the part of the plaintiff. There is no unvarying rule by which the distinction between covenants and conditions can be accurately ascertained, since no particular words are required to create either, and it is immaterial, in point of construction, whether the clause in the instrument be placed-before or after others. Platt, Cov. 71, 72.
The plaintiff was to complete the whole work by the thirty-first day of October, supposing that to be the ultimate period of time allowed him under the contract; and we are to discover, if we can, from its language, the circumstances attending the transaction and the objects for which the contract was entered into,—whether the parties intended and understood that every time stipulation mentioned in the contract was to be considered as a condition precedent, the non-performance of which would deprive the plaintiff of his right of action for the defendant’s prevention of the performance of work to be done thereafter. For instance, in order of time, the first thing to be done was the subscription for the stock. Was it the intention of the parties that if, without immediately subscribing, the plaintiff should begin the work in 30 days after the date of the contract, and be actually employed in the performance of all the other covenants contained in it, though he was ready and willing to subscribe, and would have subscribed except for the prevention by the company, he should not have the right to maintain this action for his prevention by the company of the performance of the other covenants ? The subscription was for the plaintiff’s benefit, and was in no manner essential to his beginning or carrying on the work. The stock was to be paid for by work and materials, and the certificates for the same could not be delivered to him until he had subscribed for it on the books of the company. The company could in nowise be injured by his delay or neglect to perform the subscription covenant, and it had no necessary connection with covenants to be performed subsequently in point of time; whether he subscribed before or after beginning the work could, make no difference. It cannot, therefore, be implied that this was a condition precedent. So, also, in relation to the driving of the piles for the wharf and completing the third division by the last of July and first of August, respectively, the plaintiff might fail in point of time to perform these covenants, and yet be able and have the right to perform the whole work on or before the thirty-first day of October. These time stipulations were not so necessarily and indissolubly connected that one should be made dependent on the other. The company was well secured against the default or the neglect of the plain*555tiff, who was to receive no compensation until he had furnished work and materials to the amount of $60,000 under the estimate of their own engineer, and until the materials and product of the plaintiff’s work had become their property permanently invested for their use. Had the parties intended that these time stipulations should be considered as conditions precedent, in the manner now claimed by the defendant, it would have been easy for them to have expressed that design. But, not only was the company secure in retaining the compensation agreed to be paid at the end of each month; it also had the power of annulling the contract, on reasonable notice to the plaintiff, by reason of his misconduct, delay, or neglect, and holding him liable for the breach of any of his covenants in an action for damages. Supposing the main purpose of the contract was the completion of the whole work by the thirty-first of October, and that the plaintiff was in fact ready and willing and able to perform that covenant, and that the interpretation wo have given to this contract in reference to what have been called the time stipulations be correct, it follows that the prevention by the company was wrongful, and the plaintiff is entitled to his action.- P., W. & B. R. Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 339.
There is no doubt of the truth of the legal propositions stated in the defendant’s argument, that, where there are dependent covenants, a party cannot recover without averring that he has performed, or was ready and willing to perform, or was prevented from performing by the other party; and that, where several things are to he done by the plaintiff precedent to the performance of the defendant’s part of the agreement, it is necessary for the plaintiff to aver performance of all the things to be done by him, unless the same has been excused or waived. But conceiving, as we do, that the covenants we have been considering are mutually independent ones, we are of the opinion that the demurrers to the first two counts cannot be sustained.
The third count is on the company’s covenant to pay the full sum of $326,000 in bonds and stock for the work and materials contracted for, and the breach assigned is for the non-delivery of the said bonds and stock, or any part thereof. This count also alleges that, while the plaintiff was engaged in good faith in carrying on the work, and was ready, able, and willing to finish it according to the terms of "the contract, and was ready and willing to subscribe for the stock, and would have subscribed but for the wrongful prevention by the company, the company, on the twentieth of August, 1869, and before any estimate had been made by its engineer, wrongfully prevented the plaintiff from further carrying on the said work, and from subscribing for the stock, and thereby wholly discharged him from the performance of his covenant, and prevented the making of any estimate, etc. The plaintiff, by this count, seeks to recover the whole amount of the compensation agreed upon as the consideration for all the materials and work which were to be furnished and performed in the completion of the entire work. His assumption is that the *556wrongful prevention by tbe company, under the circumstances, was equivalent to a full performance by him of-what he had contracted to do, and therefore entitles him to the whole amount of compensation named in the contract. The claim is not for materials or work actually furnished and done, but is made on the basis of a theoretical and technical performance of the plaintiff’s covenant to complete the laying of the ties and rails, and constructing the pier, on or before the thirty-first of October.
We think that this demand is too broad. It does not appear reasonable that the defendant should be compelled to pay for labor and materials which exist only in the imagination, nor do we find any principle or authority which supports the plaintiff’s proposition to this extent. It is not like the case of the sale and delivery of a chattel, where the seller has delivered, or is ready to deliver, and the purchaser refuses to pay for or to take the article. Justice may require that the plaintiff should be pat into as favorable a position as he would have been had he been permitted to go on and finish the work under the contract; that is, he should receive all the advantages and profits that he could have gained if the contract had been fully performed on both sides; but that would be a measure of damages for losses actually sustained, and of the deprivation of profits which might have accrued, and which would rarely or never equal in amount the whole consideration, especially in a contract of this nature, where the work and materials would necessarily involve a large outlay of time and money.
In Laird v. Pim, 7 Mees. & W. 4-73, the plaintiff sought to recover from the defendants the whole amount of the purchase money of a lot of land of which the defendants had gone into possession under an agreement to pay for it as soon as the conveyance should be completed. The plaintiff averred that he offered to execute a conveyance, and would have tendered a proper conveyance, but that the defendants discharged him from so doing. The plaintiff had a verdict for £680, and on a rale to show cause why the damages should not be increased by the sum of £4,125, the amount of the purchase money, it was held that “the measure of damages in an action of this nature is the injury sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendants’ not having performed their contract. The question is, how much worse is the plaintiff by the diminution in the value of the land, or the loss of the purchase money, in consequence of the nonperformance of the contract? It is clear that he cannot have the land and its value, too. A party cannot recover the full value of a chattel, unless under circumstances which import that the property has passed to the defendant; as in the case of goods sold and delivered, where they have been absolutely parted with, and cannot be sold .again.”
In Cort v. Ambergate, etc., Ry. Co. 79 E. C. L. 126, it was held . that, on a contract for the manufacturing and supply of goods from *557time to time, to bo paid for after delivery, if the purchaser, having paid for and accepted a portion of the goods, gives notice to the vendor not’to manufacture any more, proof of such notice will entitle the plaintiff to recover on a count alleging that lie was ready and willing to perform the contract, and that the defendant refused to accept the residue of the goods, and prevented and discharged the plaintiff from supplying them, and from further executing the contract. Such notice is prevention and discharge, and tho vendor, having been desirous and able to complete tho supply, unay, without manufacturing and tendering the rest of the goods, maintain an action for breach of the contract; and the jury were directed to give such damages as would leave the plaintiff in the same situation as if file defendants had fulfilled tlioir contract. In that case it was not claimed that the plaintiff was entitled to receive tire whole consideration, but that the prevention and discharge wore equivalent to a performance on his part, in so far that it enabled him to maintain an action for breach of contract. But in the third count we understand tho plaintiff to go fur'dier, and to claim the full compensation named in the contract, without reference to what he has actually done, or to what might be judged on the evidence to bo a just and reasonable award for his damages. For these reasons we think this count bad.
The fifth count alleges the performance of the work, and that the same was done and ail the materials furnished in manner required in the articles of agreement on or before the thirty-first day of August, 1870, and that the same were accepted by the defendant. Breach, that tho company had not, within a reasonable time thereafter, paid or delivered the said bonds or stock, or any portion of then). The objections taken to the sufficiency of this count by tiro defendant are that the time stipulations wore not observed by the plaintiff as required by the contract, the omission to state that these stipulations were waived by the company, and that it does not appear that any estimate or estimates were made by the engineer.
The time stipulations having been disposed of, wo are brought to a consideration of tho effect of the acceptance of the work and of the question of the time of completion. Whether time is or is not of the essence of a contract depends on the expressions and intentions of the parties. The rule is, where the work has been commenced, the completion of it by a day named will not, in general be a condition precedent to tho workman’s right to tho stipulated hire. Thus, in the case of a contract to build a house, where the employer furnishes the land, which is the principal material for the work, if the house is not built by the time specified in the contract, but is afterwards completed, the employer, who has got the house, and has had the value of his land increased by its erection thereon, can never be permitted to free himself from his obligation to pay for it by alleging that the work was not done by the time appointed. The stipulation as to time is not, *558in such a ease, a condition going to the essence of the contract. The parties never could have contemplated that if the house were not completed by the day named the builder should have no remuneration. At all events, if an engagement so unreasonable was contemplated, the parties should have expressed themselves with a precision that could not be mistaken. Add. Cont. 447. Here the company does not object that the work was not done according to the plan and specifications, nor is there any denial of the alleged fact of acceptance by them on the thirty-first of August, 1870. Admitting these facts, on what principle should the company be exonerated from their covenant to pay the compensation agreed on, or the plaintiff be debarred from maintaining his action to recover the same ? They have the materials furnished by the plaintiff and the product of his labor, and the main purpose of the articles of agreement has been accomplished, so far as they were concerned, in the laying of the ties and rails, and the construction of the pier by the pla,intiff, whereby their property has been permanently increased in value; but because the work was not completed by the day named in the contract the defendant denies the right of the plaintiff to recover. In the absence of any expression of intention of the parties that a failure to complete the work by that day should be a forfeiture of the compensation, coupled with the uncontradicted fact of acceptance, and with the inference that the company must have permitted and consented to the plaintiff’s carrying it on after that day, the fair conclusion is that the completion of the work on the thirty-first of October, 1869, was not intended to be a condition precedent to the delivery of the stock and bonds. The reasonable implication is that within a reasonable time after the completion, whether on the thirty-first day of October, 1869, or on a subsequent day, the company would pay.
The supreme court of the United States, in Van Buren v. Digges, 11 How. 461, and in P., W. & B. R. Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 339, has decided that a failure of performance by the time fixed in the contract does not necessarily deprive the party who does the work of the right to demand and receive the contract price for what has been done under the contract. In the last-named case the plaintiff had contracted to finish certain work by the first of November, 1836; but, failing in this, he continued the work until January 18, 1838, when the contract was determined by the company; and the question was whether the covenant to pay was dependent on the covenant to finish the work by the first day of November. The court, speaking through Justice Cubtis, says;
“We do not deem it needful to review the numerous authorities, because we hold the general principle to be clear, that covenants are intended to be considered dependent or independent, according to the intention of the parties, which is to be deduced from the whole instrument; and in this case we find no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the covenants were throughout independent. There are in th is instrument no terms which import a condition, or expressly make one of these covenants in any particular *559dependent on the other. There is no necessary dependency between them, as the pay for work done may be made though the work be done after the day. The failure to perform on the day does not go to the whole consideration of the contract, and there is no natural connection between the amount to be paid for work after the day and the injury or loss indicted by a failure to perform on the day. Still, it would have been competent for the parties to agree that the contractor should not receive the monthly installment due in November, if the work should not then be finished, and that he should receive nothing for work done after that time.”
Supposing, however, that tlio time i'or completion was essential, the plaintiff contends that it is not now competent for the company, after its acceptance of all the work performed after October 31,1869, and treating the contract as continuing in force thereafter, to plead in bar the failure to perform by that day. The company might have annulled the contract; but, not having done so, and having elected to allow the plaintiff to go on with it, they cannot now be permitted to set up the plaintiff’s failure to perform in time as a complete defense to this action. The time originally appointed for performance may be waived by the conduct and acts of the parties, and by the contract being treated and acted upon as a continuing contract after the appointed time. Add. font. 176. The acts of the parties thus render an express waiver on tlie part of the company unnecessary, and a statement or description of such acts as amount to a virtual waiver will be all that is requisite. This the plaintiff has done in the fifth count. The only remaining objection to this count is its omission to allege tlio making of the estimates by the engineer as the work progressed or on its final completion. This allegation was not necessary, because those estimates were to bo made only for the purpose of ascertaining when the plaintiff should have earned $60,000, and the amounts of the monthly payments thereafter, and do not apply to the compensation as a whole. The plaintiff had the option of receiving his pay monthly, after the first installment had been paid, on the engineer’s estimate of the value of the materials supplied and work done for each month, or of waiting until the whole work had been done under the contract and receiving the total contract price. This was fixed at $326,000, and the plaintiff could receive no portion of it as the work progressed, except on the engineer’s estimates; but these estimates do not relate to or affect the final payment to be made of any balance that might have been due or the payment of the whole sum, if no portion of it had been previously paid, on the full performance of the contract. Payment was at no period to be made in advance of the work. The estimates were to fix the amounts of the monthly installments, but could not control, increase, or diminish the whole compensation agreed upon to be paid.
The demurrer to tho sixth count rests on tlie same grounds as those taken to the fifth count, with the exception of the estimates, and must be overruled for the same reasons.
Demurrers to the pleas lo the fourth count. The second plea tra*560vers.es the allegation that at the time of the alleged wrongful prevention the plaintiff was in “good faith” engaged in carrying on, prosecuting, and performing said work. The plaintiff objects to this plea that, the “good faith” was not & condition precedent to his right to maintain this action; that the plea seeks to raise an immaterial issue; and that it is evasive and argumentative in that it only indirectly denies the wrongful prevention. The plea is bad for the reason that it attempts to set up as a fact that winch is properly only a matter of evidence, namely, whether or not the plaintiff was acting in good faith on the twentieth of August, 1869, when the defendant stopped him. from, going on with the work. It goes to the intention of the plaintiff, and not to his acts. It offers an immaterial issue, and does not directly deny the wrongful prevention complained of.
Third. The third plea denies that the plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to further carry on the work at the time when he was prevented, etc. This is a direct traverse of the plaintiff’s statement, and is a good plea in bar; for, unless he was ready, willing, and able to go on and finish the work at the time when, etc., he is certainly not entitled to maintain this action. His right to the recovery of any damages for the alleged wrongful prevention depends wholly on his willingness and ability to perform what he had agreed to. Cort v. Ambergate, etc., Ry. Co. 79 E. C. L. 143. His want of ability to go on and finish the work was a good and sufficient cause for stopping him.
Sixth. The sixth plea, that the company did not wrongfully discharge the plaintiff, does not confess and avoid, or traverse and deny, the matter set forth in the count. The averment is that the plaintiff was wholly discharged by the company by reason of its wrongful prevention. The plea is therefore argumentative, because, while not directly traversing the wrongful prevention or the discharge, it offers a different issue, viz., whether the plaintiff was rightfully or wrongfully discharged.
Seventh. Eor the same reasons, the seventh plea, being of like character and nature as the sixth, is also demurrable.
Eighth. This plea traverses what is not contained in the count. There is no allegation of a wrongful prevention of the making of the estimates in this count. The averment is that the plaintiff was wrongfully prevented from, going on with the work, whereby the making of any estimate was prevented. The plea presents a negative pregnant, by inferentially acknowledging that the making of the estimates was prevented by the company, though such prevention was not wrongful. The plea is therefore bad on this ground. Gould, PI. c. 6, §§ 29-33.
Tenth and Eleventh. These pleas set up the failure of the plaintiff to subscribe for the stock on the signing of the articles, and that he did not begin work within 30 days after the date of the contract. These matters have been decided not to be conditions precedent to *561the plaintiff’s right of action, and the demurrers to these pleas are therefore sustained.
Twelfth. That the plaintiff did not, with reasonable diligence, and within a reasonable time after the date of the contract, in good faith begin the work, etc. It is objected that these were n'ot conditions precedent, and that the plea, being in the nature of a plea in confession and avoidance, does not in terms confess or admit any of the allegations contained in the count. This plea, if intended to be in justification of the company’s acts, should expressly or tacitly confess the act which it is intended to justify. Avoidance cannot be pleaded unless the act complained of be admitted. Gould, PL c, 6, § 111.
The defendant might have pleaded abandonment on the part of the plaintiff, or his intention of abandonment, and given the want of beginning in reasonable time and the want of reasonable diligence in evidence of such abandonment, or of the intention to abandon the work.
Fourteenth and Fifteenth. These pleas, depending on the non-performance by the plaintiff of the subordinate time stipulations as a bar to this action, cannot be sustained, since wo have already decided that those stipulations are not conditions precedent.