Court Opinion

ID: 9838308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 21:04:29.582592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:27:58.554574
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                     2023 IL App (4th) 220979-U
                                                                                         FILED
This Order was filed under
                                            NO. 4-22-0979                            September 5, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                            Carla Bender
not precedent except in the                                                         4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed       IN THE APPELLATE COURT
                                                                                          Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                            OF ILLINOIS

                                         FOURTH DISTRICT

   THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                      )   Appeal from the
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                             )   Circuit Court of
             v.                                              )   McLean County
   TERRANCE E. GROVES,                                       )   No. 20CF820
             Defendant-Appellant.                            )
                                                             )   Honorable
                                                             )   William A. Yoder,
                                                             )   Judge Presiding.

                   JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
                   Justices Harris and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER
  ¶1      Held: The appellate court dismissed defendant’s appeal where he failed to comply with
                the motion requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).

  ¶2               In a negotiated plea agreement, defendant, Terrance E. Groves, pleaded guilty to

  attempted theft by deception (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 16-1(a)(2) (West 2020)). The circuit court of

  McLean County sentenced him to the agreed-upon sentence of imprisonment for eight years.

  Defendant appeals.

  ¶3               The Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) has moved for our permission

  to withdraw from representing defendant in this appeal, because OSAD can raise no reasonable

  argument in support of this appeal. OSAD has filed a supporting memorandum, which explores

  potential issues and which explains why each issue is unarguable. We notified defendant that if he
wished, he might respond by a certain date with additional points and authorities. He has not done

so.

¶4             Because the record appears to lack a motion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), we agree with OSAD that this appeal from a judgment on a guilty

plea is unarguable. Therefore, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw, and we take the only action

that case law allows: we dismiss this appeal.

¶5                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶6             The circuit court set bond at 10% of $70,000. Defendant filed two pro se notices of

appeal from denials of his motions to reduce the bond. Apparently, these notices of appeal were

not transmitted to the appellate court (until now, as part of the common-law record in the present

appeal).

¶7             Afterward, on April 25, 2022, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to count

VI of the indictment, the count charging him with attempted theft by deception. The State nol-

prossed the remaining counts, and the circuit court imposed the sentence to which the parties had

agreed: imprisonment for eight years.

¶8             On May 18, 2022, while represented, defendant filed another pro se notice of

appeal, designating the order of April 25, 2022, as one of the orders from which he appealed.

Apparently, until now, this notice of appeal was not transmitted to the appellate court.

¶9             On May 25, 2022, while still represented, defendant filed an “Emergency Motion

to Vacate Judg[]ment.”

¶ 10           On June 14, 2022, after admonishing defendant, the circuit court acceded to his

wish to represent himself, and the court allowed defense counsel to withdraw.

                                                -2-
¶ 11           On September 2, 2022, defendant filed a pro se “Motion to Reconsider

Sentence/Motion to Reduce Sentence” and a pro se “Motion to Withdraw Plea and Vacate

Judg[]ment.”

¶ 12           At a hearing on October 27, 2022, the circuit court denied the postplea motions.

The court then asked defendant if he wished to appeal and if he wished for the appointment of

appellate counsel. Defendant answered yes to both inquiries.

¶ 13           On November 3, 2022, the circuit clerk filed, on defendant’s behalf, a notice of

appeal, which designated the order of October 27, 2022, as the order from which defendant

appealed. This notice of appeal is the one that was transmitted to us and which purportedly serves

as the basis of the present appeal.

¶ 14                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15           In the common-law record before us, we count four notices of appeal. The first

three were pro se, and the fourth was filed by the circuit clerk on defendant’s behalf.

¶ 16           The first two notices of appeal, which defendant filed on July 15, 2021, and January

26, 2022, were appeals from the circuit court’s repeated refusal to reduce the bond and to release

defendant on his own recognizance. These first two notices of appeal were ineffective and did not

confer jurisdiction on the appellate court, because to appeal from an order refusing to modify bail,

defendant was required to file a verified motion for review in the appellate court (see Ill. S. Ct. R.

604(c)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017)), not a notice of appeal in the circuit court.

¶ 17           The third notice of appeal, which defendant filed on May 18, 2022, was an appeal

from the final judgment of April 25, 2022—that is to say, it was an appeal from the sentence. See

People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 51 (1984) (holding that “[t]he final judgment in a criminal

case is the sentence” and that, “in the absence of the imposition of a sentence, an appeal cannot be

                                                 -3-
entertained”). This third notice of appeal was pro se, and at the time defendant filed it, he was

represented by counsel.

¶ 18            We are aware of case law forbidding a represented defendant from filing pro se

motions. See, e.g., People v. James, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1202, 1205 (2006); People v. Handy, 278 Ill.

App. 3d 829, 836-37 (1996). However, we are unaware of any case law forbidding the filing of a

pro se notice of appeal by a represented defendant. A notice of appeal is significantly different

from a motion. Whether to file a motion is a strategic decision and, as such, belongs solely to

defense counsel, who, because of his or her superior legal ability, is entrusted with exclusive

“control over the day-to-day conduct of the defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) James,

362 Ill. App. 3d at 1206. Even when represented, though, the defendant retains the “fundamental

right[ ]” to decide whether to appeal. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also People v.

Phillips, 217 Ill. 2d 270, 281 (2005). Accordingly, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(a) (eff. Mar.

12, 2021) provides that “[t]he notice [of appeal] may be signed by the appellant or his attorney.”

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 19            The third notice of appeal, which defendant filed pro se on May 18, 2022, was

signed by defendant, as Rule 606(a) allowed; the notice was filed within 30 days after the final

judgment, as Rule 606(b) required; and it specified the final judgment—the sentencing order of

April 25, 2022—as the subject of the appeal (see People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 21 ( “A

notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the reviewing court to consider only the judgments or

pertinent parts specified in the notice.”)). Therefore, on May 18, 2022, when defendant filed the

third notice of appeal, “the appellate court’s jurisdiction attache[d] instanter,” and the circuit court

was “divest[ed] *** of jurisdiction to enter additional orders of substance in the case.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Scheurich, 2019 IL App (4th) 160441, ¶ 17.

                                                 -4-
¶ 20           To slightly complicate the jurisdictional analysis, Rule 606(b) provides:

               “When a timely posttrial or postsentencing motion directed against the judgment

               has been filed by counsel or by defendant, if not represented by counsel, any notice

               of appeal filed before the entry of the order disposing of all pending postjudgment

               motions shall have no effect and shall be stricken by the trial court.” Ill. S. Ct. R.

               606(b) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021).

To be timely, such a motion would have had to be filed within 30 days after the imposition of the

sentence. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). It is true that, on the thirtieth day after

sentencing, on May 25, 2022, defendant filed a motion directed against the judgment, a motion

titled “Emergency Motion to Vacate Judg[]ment.” The trouble is, this was a pro se motion that

defendant filed while he still was represented by defense counsel. Under Rule 606(b), the motion

directed against the judgment must be filed either (1) “by counsel” or (2) “by defendant, if not

represented by counsel.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (Mar. 12, 2021). A defendant

represented by counsel lacks authority to file pro se motions, and a circuit court is supposed to

disregard any pro se motion filed by a represented defendant. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 836. It

follows that, as an attempt at “some sort of hybrid representation,” the “Emergency Motion to

Vacate Judg[]ment” is to be “ignored.” Id. It further follows that the third notice of appeal was

effective and that any substantive order the circuit court entered after May 25, 2022, when the third

notice of appeal was filed, is void for lack of jurisdiction. See People v. Mutesha, 2012 IL App

(2d) 110059, ¶ 20. The fourth notice of appeal is an appeal from a void order, the order the circuit

court entered on October 27, 2022, denying the pro se motions that defendant filed after the third

notice of appeal. Consequently, we vacate the circuit court’s order of October 27, 2022. See People

                                                -5-
v. Anderson, 2023 IL App (4th) 220357, ¶ 18 (“We have an independent duty to vacate void

orders.”).

¶ 21           In short, of the four notices of appeal, the only one that confers jurisdiction upon

us is the third notice of appeal. And we are obliged to dismiss this third notice of appeal because

of the lack of a timely motion pursuant to Rule 604(d). That rule provides as follows:

               “No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the

               defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial

               court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged,

               or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate

               the judgment.

                       No appeal shall be taken upon a negotiated plea of guilty challenging the

               sentence as excessive unless the defendant, within 30 days of the imposition of

               sentence, files a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.”

               Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).

The supreme court has explained:

                       “The filing of a Rule 604(d) motion is a condition precedent to an appeal

               from a judgment on a plea of guilty. [Citation.] The discovery that a defendant has

               failed to file a timely 604(d) motion in the circuit court does not deprive the

               appellate court of jurisdiction over a subsequent appeal. [Citation.] As a general

               rule, however, the failure to file a timely Rule 604(d) motion precludes the appellate

               court from considering the appeal on the merits. Where a defendant has failed to

               file a written motion to withdraw his plea of guilty or to reconsider his sentence,

               the appellate court must dismiss the appeal [citation], leaving the Post-Conviction

                                                 -6-
                 Hearing Act as the defendant’s only recourse [citation].” People v. Flowers, 208

                 Ill. 2d 291, 300-01 (2003).

¶ 22             Because the “Emergency Motion to Vacate Judg[]ment” did not count, given that

it was a pro se motion that defendant filed while he was represented, the record appears to lack a

Rule 604(d) motion that was filed within the 30-day period after the imposition of the sentence.

Consequently, the circuit court lost jurisdiction on May 25, 2022, when the third notice of appeal

was filed (see Scheurich, 2019 IL App (4th) 160441, ¶ 17), and Flowers gives us no alternative

but to dismiss this appeal for noncompliance with Rule 604(d) (see Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 301).

¶ 23             It might be argued, though, that because the “Emergency Motion to Vacate

Judg[]ment” criticizes defense counsel, this motion makes a pro se claim of ineffective assistance,

otherwise known as a Krankel claim (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)). For Krankel

claims, case law makes an exception to the rule against hybrid representation. See People v. Bell,

2018 IL App (4th) 151016, ¶ 28. This argument would be unavailing because defendant filed the

third notice of appeal before he filed his “Emergency Motion to Vacate Judg[]ment” (with its

Krankel claim). The supreme court has cautioned that, “once a notice of appeal has been filed, the

trial court loses jurisdiction of the case and may not entertain a Krankel motion raising a pro se

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 39. So, the embedded

Krankel claim does not save the “Emergency Motion to Vacate Judg[]ment” from being

disregarded as an attempt at hybrid representation. There is no cognizable Rule 604(d) motion,

and this appeal must be dismissed. See Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 301; People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d

67, 74 (1999).

¶ 24                                     III. CONCLUSION

                                               -7-
¶ 25           For the foregoing reasons, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw, and we dismiss

this appeal.

¶ 26           Appeal dismissed.

                                            -8-