Court Opinion

ID: 9720524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:33:57.232781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:19.024715
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Justice
(concurring specially).
I agree with the majority’s holding that habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy for reviewing allegations of impropriety in denying parole. This conclusion is supported by our earlier decision in State ex rel. Taylor v. Schoen, 273 N.W.2d 612 (Minn.1978). In that case an inmate challenged, among other things, the validity of the procedures followed in denying her parole by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Without reservation, we assumed jurisdiction of the matter and reviewed her claims. The Taylor case, therefore, provides ample authority for allowing petitioner to seek relief from an allegedly unlawful parole procedure by invoking the remedy of habeas corpus.
Additionally, I believe the court should take this opportunity to clarify the present viability of the Taylor decision relative to the procedures to be followed in the parole process. The standards adopted in Taylor, supra, were derived from the case of In*896mates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274 (8 Cir. 1978). Recently, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Greenholtz decision and ruled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, at least with respect to the Nebraska parole legislation, does not require all the procedural safeguards adopted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). In light of the uncertainty generated by this Supreme Court opinion, I believe the Taylor procedures for parole consideration should be reaffirmed on the basis of our state constitution.1 See, Minn.Const. art. 1, § 7. The Taylor decision manifests a strong conviction by this court that the procedures set out in that case are grounded on and, indeed, mandated by basic elements of fairness and equity. Therefore, I believe these interests should be protected under our state constitution by affording the Taylor procedural safeguards to prospective parolees.
TODD, Justice
(concurring specially).
I join in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Scott.
WAHL, Justice
(concurring specially).
I join in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Scott.

. We may, of course, go further in guaranteeing procedural safeguards under our constitutional provision than the Supreme Court does in interpreting the Federal constitution. State v. Oman, 261 Minn. 10, 21, 110 N.W.2d 514, 522 (1961), citing State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Co., 221 Minn. 246, 265, 21 N.W.2d 792, 800 (1946) (dissenting opinion).