Court Opinion

ID: 9548615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:06:06.792079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:11.868365
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J.
I respectfully dissent for reasons similar to those expressed in my separate opinion in People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] (cone, and dis. opn. of Baxter, J.).
As Justice Brown observes in her dissent, “By its terms, Penal Code section 22, subdivision (b) . . . does not apply to aider and abettor liability. An aider and abettor’s mental state is not a ‘specific intent’ within the meaning of section 22(b). Moreover, the very language of section 22(b) [as amended in 1982 and applicable here] limits the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication to situations in which ‘a specific intent crime is charged.’ ” (Dis. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 1138.)
Under the majority’s rationale and holding, an aider and abettor can introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the mental state required of aiding and abetting liability even where he is charged with only a general intent crime. That result is clearly contrary to legislative intent and policy, and contrary to the policy limitations which this court, in People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370], placed on the availability of a voluntary intoxication defense where only general intent crimes are charged.
Under the majority’s rationale and holding, an aider and abettor can introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication and ultimately obtain a total acquittal of the general or specific intent crime with which he is charged. That result is patently at odds with this court’s recent acknowledgment that the distinction between specific and general intent crimes “ ‘is a device to “permit evidence of intoxication to reduce the crime to a lower degree, but not to admit evidence of self-induced intoxication if it would result in total acquittal.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Whitfield, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 451.) Negation of the specific mental state required for aiding and abetting would necessarily require “total acquittal” of a defendant who, like Valdez, is charged only on an aiding and abetting theory of liability—a result inconsistent with the very purpose for which the distinction between specific and general intent crimes was drawn in People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d 444, a distinction adhered to by the Legislature in its recent amendments of subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 22. *1138Valdez was tried solely on an aiding and abetting theory of vicarious liability. As the late Justice Broussard observed, “Accomplice liability depends upon a general criminal intent, not upon shared intent to commit the target offense.” {People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 797 [254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419] (cone, and dis. opn. of Broussard, J.).) As the majority in this case acknowledge, “[t]he mental state necessary for conviction as an aider and abettor ... is different from the mental state necessary for conviction as the actual perpetrator.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1122.) Such is the only conclusion to be drawn from the many decisions of this court that have sought to define the concept of aider and abettor liability referenced in Penal Code section 31. (See, e.g., People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, fn. 5 [221 Cal.Rptr. 592, 710P.2d 392] [Where a defendant is charged as an áider and abettor “[i]t is the intent to encourage and bring about conduct that is criminal, not the specific intent that is an element of the target offense, which [People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318]] holds must be found by the jury.”].)
It is settled that the prosecution in this case was not required to establish that Valdez shared Valencia’s specific intent to murder or attempt to murder when Valencia fired the shots through the warehouse door. By its express terms, the limited voluntary-intoxication diminished-actuality defense provided for in Penal Code section 22, subdivision (b), as worded and applicable at the time of commission of the crimes and trial in the instant case, was therefore unavailable to Valdez because he was not charged with a specific intent crime for which the prosecution had to prove that he harbored that same specific intent. “In my view this is all we need to decide. Given the particular difficulty of this area of law, wisdom counsels against saying more than is absolutely necessary. . . .” {People v. Whitfield, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. All (cone, and dis. opn. of Baxter, J.).)
I would affirm the judgment of the majority of the Court of Appeal on this issue.