Court Opinion

ID: 9606460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:49:57.286981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:17.211219
License: Public Domain

Justice Martin
dissenting.
Believing as I do that the law of North Carolina requires a conclusion that the death of Timothy Roberts arose out of his employment with Burlington Industries, I dissent from the holding of the majority to the contrary.
In determining whether a death by accident arose out of the employment, the basic question is whether the employment was a contributing cause of the injury. In this case the decision of the Court of Appeals finding that the death did arise out of the employment can be supported upon two theories.
Employer Benefit Theory
In Guest v. Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E. 2d 596 (1955), this Court held that if the acts of the employee benefit his employer to any appreciable extent, then the injury or death is compensable. “Appreciable” means “noticeable.” The American Heritage Dictionary 64 (1980). It is not necessary that the benefit be measured in dollars or cents or by other quantitative methods. In our case, the assistance of Timothy Roberts to Mr. Winters, the man previously struck by an automobile, was related to his employment because Burlington Industries was benefited to an appreciable extent. The actions of Mr. Roberts, in which he tried to save the life of a stranger injured on the highway, benefited Burlington Industries by increasing the employer’s goodwill.
*361To me, it is indisputable that Burlington’s goodwill was benefited by the tragic events in question. This is demonstrated by the local and regional newspapers that carried the story.
The Lexington Dispatch printed:
A designer for Burlington Furniture in Lexington was killed on rain-slick Interstate 85 Thursday night after he stopped to direct traffic around the body of a pedestrian who had been fatally injured moments before.
John Buckner, division personnel manager at Burlington, said this morning that Roberts had worked as a furniture designer for Burlington since July. “It is going to be a tragic loss for us. I just do not know the facts at this time ... we are trying to gather facts at this time.”
The Thomasville newspaper printed: “Roberts was a graduate of Fieldale-Collinsville High School and Kendall School of Design in Grand Rapids, Mich. He was employed as a furniture designer with Burlington Industries.” Similar articles appeared in the Greensboro Daily News, the Greensboro Record, and the High Point Enterprise.
Also, in the December issue of Furniture Today, an article appeared concerning this accident which stated: “A 29-year-old staff designer for Burlington Furniture in Lexington, N.C., in the act of being a good Samaritan, was struck and killed as he attempted to aid a man lying on a busy interstate highway.” The article was of three columns and contained a headline stating, BURLINGTON’S TIM ROBERTS [ — ] DESIGNER KILLED WHILE AIDING Hurt Man. Furniture Today is a trade publication generally circulated throughout the furniture industry. The majority’s holding that these articles are too remote and too immeasurable to result in any benefit to Burlington is simply unsupported by this record. The goodwill of Burlington can only have been benefited by the publications presenting its employee in heroic proportions to the public and to the furniture industry.
Employee At Risk
Under this theory, where a claimant’s employment places him in a position of risk, injuries arising therefrom are compensable. *362This is sometimes referred to by the scholars in workers’ compensation as the positional risk doctrine. 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 6.50 (1985). The United States Supreme Court, in reviewing an award under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, adopted the view that where injuries are sustained during acts in emergency, they are compensable if the employment places the employee in the emergency. O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 95 L.Ed. 483 (1951). The employee in O’Leary was waiting for his employer’s bus to take him from the work area when he saw or heard two men standing on the reefs beyond a channel off the coast of Guam signaling for help. He plunged into the water in an effort to swim the channel to rescue the two men but was overcome by the current and drowned. The Court approved the awarding of benefits, holding that the death arose out of the employment. The Court stated that workers’ compensation is not confined by common law concepts of the scope of employment. The Court further held that a reasonable rescue attempt may be one of the risks of the employment and so covered by the Act. I find O’Leary to be a very convincing case in support of the claimant’s argument in our case.
The employee at risk theory is no stranger to the law of North Carolina on workers’ compensation. It was relied upon by the Court of Appeals in Felton v. Hospital Guild, 57 N.C. App. 33, 291 S.E. 2d 158, aff’d per curiam without precedential value, 307 N.C. 121, 296 S.E. 2d 297 (1982). See Powers v. Lady’s Funeral Home, 57 N.C. App. 25, 290 S.E. 2d 720 (Martin, J., dissenting), rev’d & remanded, 306 N.C. 728, 295 S.E. 2d 473 (1982). In Pittman v. Twin City Laundry, 61 N.C. App. 468, 300 S.E. 2d 899 (1983), the court held that for an accident to “arise out of’ the employment, it is necessary that the conditions or obligations of the employment put the employee in the position or at the place where the accident occurs. See 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 6.50. See also White v. Battleground Veterinary Hosp., 62 N.C. App. 720, 303 S.E. 2d 547, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 325, 307 S.E. 2d 170 (1983). This Court in Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E. 2d 350 (1972), held that to be compensable the accident need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. See also Harden v. Fur*363niture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930). So, contrary to the majority’s intimation, this theory has long been a part of workers’ compensation law in North Carolina.
In applying the test to this case, it is clear that the conditions and obligations of Mr. Roberts’ employment put him in the position where he was killed. He was required by his employment with Burlington to visit a furniture plant in Asheville, and to do so he had to fly from Greensboro to Asheville. He was required to drive himself to and from the airport. It was while he was on his way home that he encountered Mr. Winters, a stranger, in a dangerous position on the highway which required assistance from others. Mr. Roberts was killed in providing that assistance.
It is clear that an emergency existed and that Mr. Roberts perceived the situation to be an emergency.
Justice Cardozo made the famous pronouncement which is applicable to this case. “Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief.” Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 437 (1921). Here the act of Tim Roberts in going to the rescue of Mr. Winters was the child of the occasion. Clearly Mr. Roberts’ presence and actions were a result of his employment placing him in the position of risk. I have no quarrel with Bartlett v. Duke University, 284 N.C. 230, 200 S.E. 2d 193 (1973), relied upon by the majority, or cases of similar import. Bartlett and other such cases do not deal with situations where the claimant is injured by a risk not shared by the general public. Any member of the general public is likely to choke on a piece of meat or be bitten by a dog or injured by a criminal. These are all hazards common to the general public. However, Mr. Roberts’ act was not a hazard common to the general public. His action was an affirmative act responding to the danger existing with respect to Mr. Winters. The very fact that the claimant’s employment placed him at the place and under the conditions which caused him to respond to the emergency situation differentiates the case from those such as Bartlett. Here, Roberts’ employment placed him at the scene of the dangerous emergency that invited rescue by him, which led to his death.
This Court has often held that when an employee’s duties require him to travel, the hazards of the journey are risks of the employment. E.g., Hinkle v. Lexington, 239 N.C. 105, 79 S.E. 2d *364220 (1953). Such is the case here. The majority’s aberrant statement that Mr. Roberts’ decision to render aid created the danger is contrary not only to law but to the facts and to human nature. The facts are that Mr. Winters had previously been struck by an automobile and was lying on the highway. The danger was that another vehicle might strike Winters as he lay on the highway and further injure him or perhaps even cause injuries to the occupants of such other automobile. That is the dangerous situation which Mr. Roberts faced and which in the conduct of human affairs cried out to him for rescue. The law recognizes these reactions of the human mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. Mr. Roberts’ reaction was a normal reaction; he did what was natural and probable. The risk that Mr. Roberts might be faced with such a danger on his return home while about his employer’s business was a hazard of the journey and is compensable. Id.
Allowing recovery in cases such as this supports a sound public policy that encourages employees to undertake “good Samaritan” acts of humanitarianism desirable in any enlightened society. Luke 10:30-36. Such a holding is also in accord with the principle of liberal construction of the Workers’ Compensation Act that benefits should not be denied upon technical, narrow, and strict interpretation, Henry v. Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E. 2d 760 (1950), and with the following decisions: O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 95 L.Ed. 483; Food Products Corp. v. Indus. Com’n, 129 Ariz. 208, 630 P. 2d 31 (Ct. App. 1981); D’Angeli’s Case, 369 Mass. 812, 343 N.E. 2d 368 (1976); Big “2” Engine Rebuilders v. Freeman, 379 So. 2d 888 (Miss. 1980). See also 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 28.23 (1985). I vote to affirm the Court of Appeals.