Court Opinion

ID: 9718562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:27:15.682121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.364404
License: Public Domain

Opinion
LILLIE, Acting P. J.
By information defendant was charged in count I with possession for sale of heroin (§ 11351, Health & Saf. Code) and in count II with using and being under the influence of heroin (§ 11550, Health & Saf. Code). Evidence was taken at a joint hearing on a section 1538.5 motion and trial; the motion was denied. By stipulation the cause was submitted on this evidence. Motion for acquittal (§ 1118, Pen. Code) on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to support possession for sale was granted on count I after amendment to the information (by stipulation) adding count III charging possession of heroin (§ 11350, Health & Saf. Code); the motion was denied as to counts II and III, and defendant was found guilty on each count.
On June 23, 1975, at the time set for pronouncement of judgment and sentence, after denial of motion for new trial, defendant moved to invoke the provisions of section 654, Penal Code. After a substantial and primarily factual argument, the trial court found “654 does apply to this situation.” Thus, the court disposed of count III (possession of heroin) first; it suspended the proceedings and granted probation for a period of four years on certain conditions one of which was that defendant spend 120 days in the county jail, execution of said sentence to be stayed “until and if defendant is presented on violation matters involving facts occurring subsequent to 3/21/75.” On count II (using and being under the influence of heroin) the court pronounced judgment; it sentenced *801defendant to 90 days in the county jail then ordered the sentence suspended and stayed pending any appeal and during service of any sentence the Adult Authority should pronounce on count III, said stay to become permanent at the completion of such sentence.
The People appeal “from the order of June 23, 1975, as to the sentence imposed on said defendant”; and appellant’s opening brief recites “This is an appeal by the People, pursuant to Penal Code section 1238(a)(5), from the order of June 23, 1975 ... as to the sentence imposed on the defendant.” Appellant concedes that if section 654, Penal Code applies, the trial court took the proper procedure to implement the prohibition against multiple punishment, but disputes the trial court’s finding that Penal Code section 654 is applicable.
At the outset, respondent challenges the People’s right to appeal on the theory that they have appealed from the “sentence,” and argues that under section 1237, subdivision 1, Penal Code a sentence is deemed to be a final judgment and only a defendant may appeal therefrom, and nothing in section 1238, Penal Code authorizes an appeal from a judgment by the People. Although the People have recited in their notice of appeal that they appeal from the June 23, 1975, order “as to the sentence,” and normally an appeal from a sentence is the same as one from the judgment (People v. Spencer, 71 Cal.2d 933, 934, fn. 1 [80 Cal.Rptr. 99, 458 P.2d 43]), it is clear in the case at bench that this is an appeal from “[a]n order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the people.” (§ 1238, subd. (a) (5), Pen. Code.) On count II, the court first pronounced judgment and sentence, then made an order suspending the sentence and staying the same pending an appeal from and during service of any sentence on count III, the stay to become permanent upon completion of such sentence. It is from this order implementing the prohibition against multiple punishment in accord with the finding that section 654, Penal Code applies, made after pronouncement of judgment and sentence, that this appeal is taken. The order is one “affecting the substantial rights of the people” (§ 1238, subd. (a) (5), Pen. Code) in that it effectively relieves defendant, convicted of a violation of section 11550, Health and Safety Code,1 of the punishment *802prescribed therein. 2 The order is analogous to an order suspending sentence and granting probation made after pronouncement of judgment and sentence from which the People have a right to appeal. (People v. Villegas, 14 Cal.App.3d 700, 703, fn. 2 [92 Cal.Rptr. 663];3 People v. Beasley, 5 Cal.App.3d 617, 630 [85 Cal.Rptr. 501 ];4 People v. Orrante, 201 Cal.App.2d 553, 556 [20 Cal.Rptr. 480]; People v. Superior Court (Leslie) 118 Cal.App.2d 700, 703 [258 P.2d 1087].)5
The sole issue raised by appellant is whether the trial court erred in finding that section 654, Penal Code6 proscribing multiple punishment is applicable.
“By its terms, the section forbids multiple punishment for the commission of a single ‘act’ or ‘omission.’ The ‘act’ necessary to invoke section 654 need not be an act in the ordinary sense that it is a separate, identifiable, physical incident, but may be ‘a course of conduct which violates more than one statute and comprises an indivisible transaction punishable under more than one statute within the meaning of section 654. The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and *803objective of the actor, and if all the offenses are incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than one.’ (Id, p. 376.)” (In re Adams, 14 Cal.3d 629, 634 [122 Cal.Rptr. 73, 536 P.2d 473]; People v. Bauer, 1 Cal.3d 368, 375-376 [82 Cal.Rptr. 357, 461 P.2d 637, 37 A.L.R.3d 1398]; Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839].)
The judge who found section 654, Penal Code to be applicable herein is the same judge who heard the evidence and acquitted defendant on count I and found him guilty on counts II and III. On defendant’s motion to invoke section 654, the arguments of counsel were largely of a factual nature, and the court’s ruling that the statute “does apply to this situation” necessarily is predicated on a determination that the acts of which defendant was convicted constituted an indivisible course of conduct and that the several offenses were incident to only one objective, which is primarily a factual determination based on implied findings concerning defendant’s intent and objective in committing the acts. (People v. Ferguson, 1 Cal.App.3d 68, 74-75 [81 Cal.Rptr. 418].) Thus we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent and presume in support of the order the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal.3d 703, 712 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].)
Around 1 p.m. the police arrested three persons for being under the influence of heroin, one of whom the officers observed exit apartment 5. Officer Todd then went to the open door of apartment 5, saw defendant inside and ordered him to exit; Officer Kelley observed that defendant’s speech was slow and hesitant, his eyelids were drooping, he had dried saliva in each corner of his mouth and the pupils of his eyes were pinpointed. After giving defendant a pupil reaction test, Officer Kelley determined that defendant was under the influence of heroin, and arrested him; search of defendant revealed 16 balloons of heroin—15 in one pocket and 1 in another—each balloon contained less than half a gram of heroin although the normal balloon contains a half a gram; the gross weight of the 16 balloons was 2.12 grams, and the heroin had a street value of $160; no money was found on defendant’s person. It was Officer Kelley’s opinion “[i]n regards to fixes, some people use a half a balloon, some people use a full balloon.” Upon arrival at the jail, Officer Kelley examined defendant’s arms and observed twenty-two puncture wounds over veins; three of the wounds were of recent origin and one was still oozing a clear liquid and blood where a scab had not yet formed; the last *804wound indicated a recent injection; in his opinion defendant was “a moderate user of heroin.”
At trial, Officer Todd was asked by defense counsel to observe defendant’s arms; he did so and noted an “old track” (a series of puncture wounds along a vein area) on his arm and what appeared to be a collapsed vein; asked if the “track” along the arm would “indicate excessive usage” Officer Todd testified “Yes, sir, it would to me”; asked over what period of time defendant had been using, Officer Todd answered “I would say a track like that would probably be developed over maybe a year to a two-year period.”
In challenging the trial court’s finding, appellant advances an argument based primarily on facts from which we are asked to draw inferences contrary to those drawn by the trial judge.7 Appellant argues that the fact that defendant “possessed on his person 16 balloons of heroin suggests that the defendant’s possession of them may have been motivated by other than the single intent and objective to then use them to be under the influence.” This may be true but the trial court hearing the evidence found to the contrary.  When the evidence reasonably justifies the findings of the trier of fact, reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances may be reasonably reconciled otherwise. (People v. Beamon, 8 Cal.3d 625, 635 [105 Cal.Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905].)
“Since the divisibility of the transaction depends in part upon the intent of the defendant, a factual issue is presented. It is the function of the trial court, after seeing and hearing the witnesses, to determine this factual matter which controls the number of sentences to to be imposed. A reviewing court is not the place to try facts.” (People v. Scott, 247 Cal.App.2d 371, 375-376 [55 Cal.Rptr. 525]; People v. Williams, 244 Cal.App.2d 658, 663 [53 Cal.Rptr. 392]; People v. Ferguson, 1 Cal.App.3d 68, 75 [81 Cal.Rptr. 418].) The “determination will not be reversed on appeal unless unsupported by the evidence presented at trial.” (People v. Ferguson, 1 Cal.App.3d 68, 75.)  There is substantial evidence in the record to support the implied finding that defendant’s possession of 2.12 grams of heroin was incident to his objective of being under the *805influence of heroin. Defendant was not arrested with or in the same place as the other three persons and was not wandering the streets, he was in his own home; there is no evidence of a sale or transfer of heroin prior to his arrest and no money was found in defendant’s possession; he was under the influence of heroin when the 16 balloons of heroin were found on his person; among 22 needle marks on defendant’s arm, 3 were of recent origin and 1 was a fresh wound still oozing clear liquid and blood indicating a recent injection; and the “track” on defendant’s arm was such as “would probably be developed over maybe a year to a two-year period,” and the condition of his arm “indicated excessive usage.” The foregoing supports a finding that defendant was addicted to the use of heroin, was a heavy user and had been using heroin for a two-year period. Each balloon contained less than a half a gram of heroin; the total gram weight in the balloons was 2.12 grams, the street value of which was $160; and according to Officer Kelley “some people use a half balloon, some people use a full balloon” in taking a “fix.” From this the inference that the quantity could be consumed by an “excessive us[er]” in a relatively short time, is reasonable. These factual determinations support the conclusion that the heroin found in defendant’s pocket was possessed only for his own consumption and its use was necessary to satisfy his addiction and to his objective of being under the influence of heroin, and that defendant’s possession of the heroin was incident to his objective of being under the influence; and the acts of which defendant was convicted constituted an indivisible course of conduct. Obviously for the purpose of section 654, as well as for a determination of guilt or innocence on count I, the trial court rejected any opinion evidence that the heroin was possessed for sale or transfer.8
Defendant’s possession of heroin was simultaneous with his condition of being under the influence of heroin, and although we do not dispute that were 2.12 grams injected at one time, in all probability the result would be deadly, we do not read the cases as requiring a showing that under the circumstances here defendant must be able to immediately consume all of the narcotic before the court can find that the possession and his use and being under the influence9 constitute an indivisible *806course of conduct. In discussing the strained rationale that a test dependent on simultaneity would engender, as urged by the Attorney General in In re Hayes, 70 Cal.2d 604 [75 Cal.Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d 430], the court said at page 609, footnote 8: “As stated in People v. Pater (1968) supra, 267 Cal.App.2d 921, 926 [73 Cal.Rptr. 823], a ‘necessárily included offense’ case, ‘Neither clocks, calendars nor county boundaries convert one continuing course of conduct into a series of criminal acts.’ ” Absent any evidence concerning a time span over which a heavy user would consume 2.12 grams of heroin to sustain his condition of being under the influence, the inference drawn by the trial court is reasonable. And there is no evidence to support an argument that the number of balloons found on defendant, an addict and excessive user, contained a quantity of heroin which exceeded his need for personal use within a reasonable time.10 (See dictum in People v. Gomez, 229 Cal.App.2d 781, 784 [40 Cal.Rptr. 616].)
We are aware that where the question is whether a course of conduct constitutes a divisible or indivisible transaction, each case must be resolved on its own facts (People v. Camodeca, 52 Cal.2d 142, 148 [338 P.2d 903]), general principles applicable to one type of case may not apply to another (In re Adams, 14 Cal.3d 629, 633 [122 Cal.Rptr. 73, 536 P.2d 473]) and “ ‘there can be no universal construction which directs the proper application of section 654 in every instance’ ” (People v. Beamon, 8 Cal.3d 625, 636 [105 Cal.Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905]), nevertheless it is our view that controlling precedent vindicates the determination of the trial court as a matter of law (In re McGrew, 66 Cal.2d 685, 688 [58 Cal.Rptr. 561, 427 P.2d 161] [two counts of rape, violation of 288a, Pen. Code, and burglary]; In re Johnson, 65 Cal.2d 393, 394-395 [54 Cal.Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393] [two installment deliveries of heroin over a two-hour period, for one sale]; People v. Quinn, 61 Cal.2d 551, 556 [39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705] [theft and possession of narcotics, theft of money and robbery of a pharmacy in which narcotics and money were taken]; People v. Roberts, 40 Cal.2d 483, 491 [254 P.2d 501] [transportation, furnishing and *807possession of heroin]; People v. Venegas, 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 821 [89 Cal.Rptr. 103] [assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder and possession of a firearm by convicted felon]; People v. Johnson, 5 Cal.App.3d 844, 847 [85 Cal.Rptr. 238] [possession and transportation of amphetamines]; People v. Branch, 119 Cal.App.2d 490, 496 [260 P.2d 27] [possession of marijuana incidental to its sale or offer to sell]; see also In re Adams, 14 Cal.3d 629, 635 [122 Cal.Rptr. 73, 536 P.2d 473]).
The order is affirmed.
Thompson, J., concurred.

Section 11550, Health and Safety Code provides; “Any person convicted of violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for a period of not to exceed five years and shall in all cases in which probation is granted require as a condition thereof that such person be confined in the county jail for at least 90 days. In no event does the court *802have the power to absolve a person who violates this section from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.”

In light of the penalty prescribed in section 11550, it also appears, under the authority of People v. Villegas, 14 Cal.App.3d 700, 703 [92 Cal.Rptr. 663]; People v. Thatcher, 255 Cal.App.2d 830, 831-832 [63 Cal.Rptr. 492] and People v. Orrante, 201 Cal.App.2d 553, 556 [20 Cal.Rptr. 480], that the order is appealable as “[a]n order modifying the verdict or finding by reducing the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed.” (§ 1238, subd. (a) (6).)

“There is no question that the People would have an appeal had the trial court imposed sentence, but suspended the execution thereof before granting probation. The order granting probation would then be ‘[a]n order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the people.’ (Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (5); People v. Superior Court, 118 Cal.App.2d 700, 703 [258 P.2d 1087].)” (People v. Villegas, supra.)

“Such an order [granting probation] is appealable. Penal Code section 1238 designates the decisions from which the People have a right of appeal. Subdivision 5 of that section authorizes such an appeal ‘From an order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the people.’ It has been held that an order granting probation, as in Morris’ case, after pronouncement of judgment, imposition of sentence, and suspension of sentence is appealable by the People as such ‘an order made after judgment’ [citations].” (People v. Beasley, supra.)

The thrust of the People’s appeal is to the order made on count II implementing the prohibition against multiple punishment, thus we do not deem it necessary to discuss whether the order made as to count III, on which no judgment was pronounced, is appealable.

Penal Code section 654 provides in pertinent part: “An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this Code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; ...”

In particular appellant asks us to draw inferences “that the defendant . . . was possessing the 16 balloons of heroin with the intent and objective to use them in some manner other than by imminent injection into his own system. One who possesses 16 balloons of heroin, although the evidence may be insufficient to convict him of possession for sale . . . may yet traffic in that heroin, even if he does not intend to ‘sell’ them. He might give them away or trade them.”

In applying “the intent and objective test” the court said “A person could possess it for a lot of purposes not reflected in the—in the court’s finding or in the evidence. It certainly is conceded that one of those purposes, however, could be for his own use.”

The situation is analogous to that under which a defendant is convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (§ 23102, Veh. Code) and having in the vehicle with him an open bottle of whiskey (§ 23122, Veh. Code). The circumstances of these two offenses well might be sufficient to support the inference that the possession of *806the whiskey was incident to defendant’s objective of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Any analogy to People v. Fusaro, 18 Cal.App.3d 877 [96 Cal.Rptr. 368] is superficial. Defendant had been convicted of sale of amphetamines on October 30 and November 13, and possession for sale of amphetamines on November 19. The court held that the sales were separate criminal acts each with its own objective of sale to a different individual; and that the possession on November 19 was not a mere incident to the two sales; stating at page 894: “Where, as here, each sale consumes only part of his inventory he may be punished separately for the possession of his unsold stock in trade. [Citations.]”