Court Opinion

ID: 9747572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:21:27.818995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:41.074359
License: Public Domain

*180YEGAN, J.
I respectfully dissent. The rule of Auto Equity Sales Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937], is well known and need not be repeated. Compliance, however, is not always easy. Here there is a legitimate debate within this division, this district, and in other districts with respect to the proper application of footnote 13 of People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628] as modified.
In Romero, our Supreme Court held that the trial court has discretion, pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, to strike a prior conviction which would otherwise result in a sentence pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law. As modified, footnote 13 reads: “Our holding, which relates only to sentencing, is fully retroactive. (See People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8 [193 Cal.Rptr. 882, 667 P.2d 686]; People v. Tenorio [(1970)] 3 Cal.3d [89,] 95, fn. 2 [89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993].) A defendant serving a sentence under the Three Strikes Law (§667, subds. (b)-(i); §1170.12) imposed by a court that misunderstood the scope of its discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations in furtherance of justice pursuant to section 1385(a), may raise the issue on appeal, or, if relief on appeal is no longer available, may file a petition for habeas corpus to secure reconsideration of the sentence. Such a petition should be filed in the sentencing court. (People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 95, fn. 2.) Such a petition may be summarily denied if the record shows that the sentencing court was aware that it possessed the discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations without the concurrence of the prosecuting attorney and did not strike the allegations, or if the record shows that the sentencing court clearly indicated that it would not, in any event, have exercised its discretion to strike the allegations. (People v. Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 348, fn. 8.)” (13 Cal.4th at p. 530.)
Our Supreme Court’s direction that for those cases on appeal which present a Romero issue, a defendant “may raise the issue on appeal. . .” is not necessarily a direction that the Court of Appeal is automatically required to grant relief. In my view, the footnote is significant for what it does not say.
Does the wording of footnote 13 mean that time-honored rules of appellate review are inapplicable on this issue? I don’t think so. As indicated in the recent case of People v. Alvarez (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 679, 694 [56 Cal.Rptr. 2d 814]: “It has long been settled that the burden is on an appellant to affirmatively show in the record that error was committed by the trial court. . . .” (See also Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [86 Cal.Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193].) It is equally well settled that even in those *181instances where error appears, the appellant has the burden of persuading an appellate court that reversal is appropriate by the appropriate standard of appellate review. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 325, pp. 335-336.) This traditional rule of appellate review applies to Romero. (People v. White Eagle (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1523 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 749]; People v. Davis (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 168, 172 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 659].)
Here, the trial court indicated that it had the power to reduce the sentence by theoretically finding that it would be cruel or unusual punishment to impose a 27-year-to-life sentence. It also indicated that it could not reduce the sentence by striking pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. That seemed to be a correct ruling at the time and I cannot fault the trial court for coming to that conclusion. While these two tests are separate and distinct, and even if it is more difficult to prove the former, to me it seems logical that had the trial court intended some lenience and indicated that its “hands were tied,” it would have said so. It did not. What inference should be drawn from this record? The inference that I draw and consistent with time-honored rules of appellate review is that it would not have stricken one or more priors pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. Thus, the judgment should be affirmed.
Nevertheless, the inference that I draw could be wrong. Why should an appellate court speculate, one way or another, when there is an adequate remedy alluded to in footnote 13 (13 Cal.4th at p. 530), i.e., a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. This was our original ruling and, to me, it makes sense. I have the highest regard for the integrity of our superior court judges. The sentencing judge who has such a petition and who looks at the file should be able to determine whether or not striking a prior is in the interests of justice. I presume that such petitions are now being filed and ruled upon in a timely fashion. However, an automatic resentencing is not appropriate. Our original opinion indicated: “Where the record shows that the trial court even hints at leniency, we reverse.” (People v. Sanders (Sept. 4, 1996) B096855 [nonpub. opn.], rehg. granted Sept. 26, 1996.) Without expressly saying so, this was a prejudicial error standard being applied.1 We then indicated that appellant could seek relief by the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. To me, this approach still makes sense. It does no violence to traditional appellate review, gives the defendant a fair opportunity to be resentenced, and is consistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of Romero.
*182I would affirm the judgment and allow appellant to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 19,1997. Yegan, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 23, 1997.

Some divisions are, without expressly saying so, employing a prejudicial error analysis, and precluding the trial courts from reconsidering sentence altogether. The theory here is that it would be an abuse of discretion to strike the prior. (E.g., People v. Askey (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 381 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 782].) This approach would preclude the latter filing of a habeas corpus petition.