Court Opinion

ID: 9554195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 00:00:31.445108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:19.871474
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60537         Document: 00516849195             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/07/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                      August 7, 2023
                                        No. 22-60537
                                      ____________                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk
   Leonel Padilla Tello,

                                                                                 Petitioner,

                                             versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                                Respondent.
                      ______________________________

                         Petition for Review of an Order of the
                             Board of Immigration Appeals
                               Agency No. A046 265 889
                      ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge: *
          Leonel Padilla Tello petitions for review of a decision by the Board of
   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA found that his prior conviction for
   interfering with an emergency call under Texas Penal Code § 42.062 was a
   crime involving moral turpitude, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of
   removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The BIA correctly determined that

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60537      Document: 00516849195          Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/07/2023

                                    No. 22-60537

   § 42.062 is a divisible statute, so we DENY Padilla Tello’s petition for
   review.
                                I. Background
          Padilla Tello is a native and citizen of Mexico who became a lawful
   permanent resident of the United States on May 16, 1997. On either April 5
   or 6, 2004, he committed the offense of interfering with an emergency call
   under Texas Penal Code § 42.062 and pleaded guilty on May 12, 2004. On
   May 10, 2005, he was convicted of violating Texas Health and Safety Code §
   481.115(b) for possessing less than one gram of a controlled substance. On
   September 3, 2013, the Department of Homeland Security placed Padilla
   Tello in removal proceedings for the controlled substance offense. Padilla
   Tello requested cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), but
   the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found he was ineligible for cancellation because
   he committed a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”)—his conviction
   under Texas Penal Code § 42.062(a)—before he had accrued seven years of
   continuous residence. Padilla Tello appealed the decision, but the BIA
   agreed that § 42.062(a) is categorically a CIMT and dismissed his appeal.
   After Padilla Tello filed a petition for review with this court, the Government
   requested a remand, and this court granted its motion.
          On remand, the IJ found that § 42.062 is divisible and that the record
   established that Padilla Tello was convicted under § 42.062(a). Concluding
   that § 42.062(a) categorically constitutes a CIMT, the IJ again denied Padilla
   Tello’s application for cancellation of removal. Padilla Tello appealed to the
   BIA. The BIA agreed that the statute is divisible and that the IJ “properly
   concluded that [the] criminal information read in conjunction with the
   judgment indicate that [Padilla Tello] was convicted of violating TPC §
   42.062(a).” It also concluded that § 42.062(a) categorically constitutes a

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   CIMT, so it dismissed the appeal. Padilla Tello timely filed this petition for
   review.

                          II. Standard of Review
          When reviewing a BIA decision, we consider legal questions de novo
   and findings of fact for substantial evidence. Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588,
   594 (5th Cir. 2007). While our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, we
   will consider the IJ’s decision to the extent it influenced the BIA. Singh v.
   Sessions, 880 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2018).
                                III. Discussion
          The only issue Padilla Tello raises on appeal is whether the BIA erred
   in determining that § 42.062 is divisible. At the time of his conviction, the
   statute read in relevant part:
          (a) An individual commits an offense if the individual
          knowingly prevents or interferes with another individual’s
          ability to place an emergency telephone call or to request
          assistance in an emergency from a law enforcement agency,
          medical facility, or other agency or entity the primary purpose
          of which is to provide for the safety of individuals.
          (b) An individual commits an offense if the individual
          recklessly renders unusable a telephone that would otherwise
          be used by another individual to place an emergency telephone
          call or to request assistance in an emergency from a law
          enforcement agency, medical facility, or other agency or entity
          the primary purpose of which is to provide for the safety of
          individuals.
   Tex. Penal Code § 42.062 (2003).
          Padilla Tello argues that “knowingly prevent[ing] or interfer[ing]
   with another individual’s ability” and “recklessly render[ing] unusable a

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   telephone that would otherwise be used by another” are merely alternative
   means for committing the same offense and are not distinct elements.
          A statute is divisible if it lists out alternative elements, rather than
   alternative means. Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 514–15 (2016)
   (citation omitted). We have explained this distinction in the following way:
          [I]f a statute only sets out alternative means of committing a
          crime, such that the jury need not agree which of the various
          possible means was actually employed in committing the
          crime, then the statute states only one crime and consequently
          is indivisible. . . But if the statute lays out alternative elements
          of the crime, such that the jury must agree which of the two or
          more potential alternatives is satisfied, the statute is divisible.
   United States v. Garrett, 24 F.4th 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing United
   States v. Howell, 838 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2016)). To determine whether a
   statute is divisible, we consider the statutory text, state court decisions, and
   if necessary, the record documents for the sole purpose of determining
   whether the listed items are elements. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 518–19.
          First, the text of the statute. Mathis lists three ways in which a “statute
   on its face may resolve” the means or elements question. Id. at 518. These
   are: (1) whether the alternatives carry different punishments (making them
   elements); (2) whether the alternatives are illustrative examples (making
   them means); and (3) whether the statute identifies “which things must be
   charged (and so are elements) and which need not be (and so are means).”
   Id. None of these considerations answer the question here.
          Second, state court decisions. The Government points us to several
   cases in which Texas courts have identified § 42.062(a) as a separate offense
   from § 42.062(b). For instance, both the Fort Worth Court of Appeals and
   the Houston Court of Appeals (1st Dist.) have stated that an offense under §
   42.062(a) comprises the following elements: “(1) an individual (2) knowingly

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   (3) prevents or interferes with (4) another individual’s (5) ability to place an
   emergency call or to request assistance, including a request for assistance
   using an electronic communications device, (6) in an emergency (7) from a
   law enforcement agency.” Schumm v. State, 481 S.W.3d 398, 399–400 (Tex.
   App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.); Williams v. State, 582 S.W.3d 692, 701
   (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (quoting Schumm, 481
   S.W.3d at 399–400). By requiring a jury to find that the conduct was knowing,
   these holdings exclude the possibility of a conviction when some jurors think
   the defendant merely acted recklessly. The Amarillo Court of Appeals also
   construed § 42.062(a) as a separate offense by stating that “[t]he only
   culpable mental state applicable to interference with a request for emergency
   assistance is ‘knowingly.’” Alcoser v. State, 596 S.W.3d 320, 337 (Tex.
   App.—Amarillo 2019), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 663 S.W.3d 160
   (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). As to § 42.062(b), the Austin Court of Appeals
   likewise implicitly construed it as a separate offense by referring only to that
   subsection’s language when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
   support a conviction under it: “Penal code section 42.062 provides in
   pertinent part that an individual commits an offense if he ‘recklessly renders
   unusable a telephone that would otherwise be used by another individual to
   place an emergency telephone call or to request assistance in an emergency
   from a law enforcement agency.’” Armstrong v. State, No. 03-10-00046-CR,
   2011 WL 1466856, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 14, 2011, no pet.) (quoting
   Tex. Penal Code § 42.062(b)) (emphasis added).
          However, Padilla Tello directs us to an Austin Court of Appeals
   decision that appears to construe both subsections as one crime. In Urtado v.
   State, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by excluding
   impeachment evidence that a witness had been convicted of the
   misdemeanor offense of interference with an emergency telephone call. 333
   S.W.3d 418, 428 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing Tex. Penal

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   Code § 42.062). Notably, the court did not state whether the witness’s
   conviction was under subsection (a) or (b). Id. Addressing whether this
   conviction was a crime of moral turpitude under state law, the court found
   that a conviction under the statute “does not require an act of violence or
   deception. Further, the statute requires no more than a reckless mental state,
   as an individual commits an offense under the statute by ‘recklessly
   render[ing] unusable a telephone that would otherwise be used’ to place
   emergency telephone calls.” Id. (quoting Tex. Penal Code § 42.062(b)).
   It therefore concluded that the witness’s conviction was not a crime of moral
   turpitude. Id. at 428–29. While state case law weighs in favor of divisibility,
   it does not “definitively answer[] the question” because Urtado appears to
   support Padilla Tello’s argument. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 517.
          Since our inquiry into the statutory text and existing case law is
   inconclusive, we now take a “peek” at the record documents for “the sole
   and limited purpose of determining whether [the listed items are] element[s]
   of the offense.” Id. at 518 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
   The criminal information states that “on or about 05 April, 2004, [Padilla
   Tello] did then and there knowingly prevent or interfere with the ability of
   Juana Ortiz, to place an emergency telephone call to a law enforcement
   agency, against the peace and dignity of the State.” As the Supreme Court
   has instructed, “an indictment and jury instructions could indicate, by
   referencing one alternative term to the exclusion of all others, that the statute
   contains a list of elements, each one of which goes toward a separate crime.”
   Id. at 519; see also Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 272 (2013) (“A
   prosecutor charging a violation of a divisible statute must generally select the
   relevant element from its list of alternatives.”). Padilla Tello’s criminal
   information references the language in subsection (a) and excludes any
   reference to “recklessly render[ing] unusable a telephone” under subsection
   (b). Accordingly, we conclude that the record documents “speak plainly”

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   that § 42.062(a) is a separate crime with separate elements from § 42.062(b).
   Mathis, 579 U.S. at 519. Therefore, we agree that § 42.062 is divisible with
   respect to subsections (a) and (b).
                               IV. Conclusion
          Finding no error in the BIA’s conclusion that § 42.062 is divisible
   with respect to subsections (a) and (b), we DENY the petition for review.

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