Court Opinion

ID: 9463684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:13:07.762461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:13.778908
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The problem before us is to distinguish “petty” from “serious” offenses. Courts have focused on two criteria in distinguishing petty from serious crimes. The first criterion is the intrinsic nature of the crime regardless of the authorized punishment. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555-57, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888). It was thought at one time that the classification of an offense depended “primarily upon the nature of the offense.” District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73, 51 S.Ct. 52, 53, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930).1
There is a recent trend, however, which emphasizes the relevance of the maximum punishment authorized by the statute violated. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 480 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 2178, 45 L.Ed.2d 319 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511-12, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). This criterion provides a more objective and workable standard for determining when the right to jury trial at*281taches. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970) (plurality opinion).
Hamdan and Bush do not contend that their crime is intrinsically of a serious nature but that the maximum punishment authorized by section 1306(c) is sufficiently severe that the crime cannot be regarded as petty. In support of this proposition, they rely first on Baldwin v. New York, supra, 399 U.S. at 69, 90 S.Ct. 1886, which held that where the maximum punishment authorized exceeds six months’ imprisonment, there is a constitutional right to a jury trial. Although the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by section 1306(c) does not exceed six months, Hamdan and Bush argue that an authorized sentence of exactly six months plus a fine is equivalent to imprisonment in excess of six months and thus triggers the right to a jury trial.
I cannot accept this reasoning. The Supreme Court has never considered the relationship between authorized imprisonment and fines in determining which crimes are serious offenses. Indeed, I cannot conceive any basis for converting any given dollar fine into an equivalent number of days in prison. I conclude that a crime punishable by a petty term of imprisonment plus a petty fine is no more serious than if the only punishment authorized were the prison term or fine alone.
Because the six-month prison term authorized by section 1306(c) is clearly petty, Baldwin v. New York, supra, Hamdan and Bush must show that the $1,000 fine authorized by that statute is serious in order to prevail. For this purpose, they rely on a federal statute which, in classifying offenses, provides:
Notwithstanding any Act of Congress to the contrary:
(3) Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1. Hamdan and Bush argue that their violations of section 1306(c) are not petty offenses within this definition and, therefore, they are entitled to a jury trial.
The majority accepts this argument. In light of Muniz v. Hoffman, supra, I cannot. There, the Supreme Court affirmed our judgment that a labor union had no right to a jury trial even though it had been fined $10,000 for criminal contempt. 422 U.S. at 477, 95 S.Ct. 2178, aff’g Hoffman v. Longshoremen’s Local 10, 492 F.2d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 1974). In making this determination, the Court first analyzed the distinction between imprisonment and payment of a fine.
It is one thing to hold that deprivation of an individual’s liberty beyond a six-month term should not be imposed without the protections of a jury trial, but it is quite another to suggest that, regardless of the circumstances, a jury is required where any fine greater than $500 is contemplated. From the standpoint of determining the seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible deprivation faced by a contemnor, imprisonment and fines are intrinsically different.
422 U.S. at 477, 95 S.Ct. at 2191 (emphasis added). The Court then made a particularized analysis of the facts in the case.
[Although we do not reach or decide the issue tendered by the Government — that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in any criminal contempt case where only a fine is imposed on a corporation or labor union, Brief for Respondent 36 — we cannot say that the fine of $10,000 imposed on Local 70 in this case was a deprivation of such magnitude that a jury should have been interposed to guard against bias or mistake. This union, the Government suggests, collects dues from some 13,000 persons; and although the fine is not insubstantial, it is not of such magnitude that the union was deprived of whatever right to jury trial it might have under the Sixth Amendment.

Id.

I conclude from the Court’s particularized analysis of the facts before it and its reference to the significance of circumstances in *282determining the seriousness of a fine, that the Court requires a case-by-case evaluation of “the seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible deprivation” in determining whether a defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial. Rather than carrying out this mandate and evaluating this case on its particular facts, however, the majority establishes a rigid standard based on 18 U.S.C. § 1(3). This is inconsistent with the Muniz approach.
In addition, as a matter of historical analysis, 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) has little to recommend it as a standard for determining when a jury trial is constitutionally required. See generally Case Note, 1976 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 549, 557-59. The legislative history of the statute does not indicate that 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) was meant to define the crimes for which there is no right to a jury.2 The majority attempts to downplay the significance of this history by noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly relied upon section 1(3) in determining whether an offense is serious enough to require a jury trial. But this assertion is not supported by the cases. Muniz clearly indicates that while “the Court has referred to the relevant rules and practices followed by the federal and state regimes, including the definition of petty offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1(3),” that section has no “talismanic significance.” 422 U.S. at 476-77, 95 S.Ct. at 2190. Moreover, the majority’s claim that the Court has “repeatedly relied” upon the statute implies a constancy which is belied by an examination of the Supreme Court cases themselves. At times, the Court has referred to section 1(3) in its analysis without actually adopting its terms; at other times, it has ignored the section. Compare Baldwin v. New York, supra, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437, Frank v. United States, supra, 395 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162, and Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, with Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), and Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912. Thus, I see little historical basis for adopting the dollar figure in 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) to determine the constitutional right to a jury.
There is further mischief which results from the majority’s decision to draw a $500 line between fines where a jury trial is constitutionally required and fines where it is not. Although adoption of a definite dollar standard admittedly simplifies the judicial task, it also creates a rigidity which is unsuitable for measuring constitutional rights, considering the changing value of the dollar. As an illustration, if inflation continued and the value of the dollar dropped to 20% of its current value, a $501 fine would still require a jury trial, even though the real risk to the defendant, measured in current dollars, would be only $100.20. This would occur whether or not the risk involved bore any relation to contemporary judgments concerning the distinction between serious and petty offenses. This demonstrates that it is inappropriate to base a constitutional standard on a foundation which may be undermined by the vagaries of the economy.
The majority suggests that if the value of money changes, “Congress can be expected to adjust the monetary standard of section 1(3) so that it will continue to represent a fair judgment as to the appropriate line between petty and serious offenses.” I find little comfort in this easy prediction. First, Congress has not seen fit to alter the $500 figure established in 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) since that section was first passed in 1930, although there have been recodifications of the section since that time.3 No citation of authority is necessary to establish the fact that the value of the dollar has depreciated *283substantially in the last 47 years. Thus, there is little factual basis for assuming that Congress will adjust the monetary standard of 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) in the event of further changes in the value of the dollar.
More importantly, there are grave constitutional difficulties involved in the mere possibility that Congress could amend the statute and thereby modify the constitutional right to a jury trial. The Sixth Amendment acts as a check upon Congress as well as upon the other branches of the federal government. When Congress by statute distinguishes between serious offenses, requiring a jury trial, and petty offenses, requiring no jury trial, it is the duty of the courts to review the distinction made by Congress in order to determine whether it comports with the Sixth Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, 391 U.S. at 160, 88 S.Ct. 1444. The court abrogates its role as a check upon Congress when it establishes a test of constitutional validity which is contingent upon actions of Congress approved in advance. See Frank v. United States, supra, 395 U.S. at 156, 89 S.Ct. 1503 (Warren, C. J., dissenting). I find this unacceptable.
I conclude that the result arrived at by the majority not only is inconsistent with Muniz but also lacks support in either historical analysis or jurisprudential logic. To determine whether the $1000 fine authorized by section 1306(c) is enough to entitle Hamdan and Bush to a trial by jury on constitutional grounds, we should evaluate the particular facts of this case. With the record in its present state, however, it is not possible to evaluate the “seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible deprivation” to either Hamdan or Bush. It was their responsibility to demonstrate whether a possible $1000 fine imposes such a risk upon them that a jury trial is constitutionally required. Because they failed to meet that burden, I would affirm the judgment.

. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv.L.Rev. 917, 927 (1926).

. This definition of petty offense was added in 1930 in order to identify a special class of misdemeanors of minor gravity to be tried, as proposed by other legislation which failed, by United States Commissioners. See Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492, 494, 57 S.Ct. 835, 81 L.Ed. 1243 (1937).

. The $500 figure now incorporated in 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) was first added to the criminal code by the Act of Dec. 16, 1930, ch. 15, 46 Stat. 1029.