Court Opinion

ID: 9518900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:04:42.5914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:20.261438
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Lybrook, J.—
I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority, remaining unconvinced that Sullivan incurred the risk of his injuries as a matter of law.
The majority opinion correctly states the doctrine of incurred risk as set forth in Stallings et al. v. Dick (1965), 139 Ind. App. 118, 210 N.E.2d 82. For the doctrine to be applicable the plaintiff must act voluntarily and either know and understand the risk or in the exercise of reasonable care should know and understand the risk. While the facts in the case at bar are not complex and while the doctrine of incurred risk is clearly stated, my difficulty arises in applying the doctrine to the facts as a matter of law. While the facts might well have supported a jury finding that Sullivan incurred the risk, it does not necessarily follow that he did so as a matter of law.
The mere fact that both the goal post assembly and the 2 x 4’s were in plain view of the plaintiff does not compel the conclusion that any danger and risk should have been obvious as a matter of law.
In Coleman et ux. v. DeMoss (1969), 144 Ind. App. 408, 246 N.E.2d 483 the court rejected the doctrine of incurred risk as a matter of law where plaintiff and his wife were crossing a ditch on defendant’s land. The court held that the issue of whether the dangers of the ditch were so glaring that a reasonably prudent man should have abandoned the premises was for the jury:
“Admittedly, though it cannot be said that appellee and his wife did not assume the risk, as was discussed, supra, it can be contended that with knowledge of the defect and their voluntary persistence to cross the ditch for a period *604of months, appellee and his wife may have incurred the risk. Plowever, under the evidence of record there appears the issues of whether the dangers of the ditch were so glaring that a reasonably prudent man should have abandoned the premises to keep from encountering them and whether no reasonable man would have made the decision to cross the ditch under the circumstances. These were proper issues for the jury and they absolved those issues in favor of appellee. We will not substitute our judgment for theirs. Therefore, we conclude that appellants were not entitled to a directed verdict nor can it be said that the verdict entered, was contrary to law.”
Under the facts of the case at bar, I am unable to conclude that the dangers incident to the proposed operation were so glaring that a reasonably prudent person should have abandoned the activity to keep from encountering them. I am also unable to conclude that no reasonable person would have made the decision to continue under the circumstances.
The jury should have been permitted to consider and decide whether plaintiff should have realized the dangers of the defendant’s method of operation, including plaintiff’s own inability to support the goal pole with a 2 by 4 which proved too short. Further, the jury should have passed upon the questions of whether plaintiff did in fact voluntarily expose himself to the danger and whether there was any doubt as to his understanding and appreciation of the danger in a reasonable time in order to withdraw therefrom. Was defendant’s warning sufficient and timely under all the circumstances? The Stallings standard dealing with what “could be readily discernable by a reasonable and prudent man under like and similar circumstances” implies submission to the jury where a reasonable inference could be drawn that the plaintiff did in fact act reasonably.
While a “Monday morning quarterback” endowed as he is with 20/20 hindsight could easily conclude that Sullivan should have adopted a different and wiser course, this does not necessarily mean that Sullivan did not act as a reasonable man. That question was for the jury. In my opinion the court’s action in directing the verdict in favor of the defendant *605cannot be sustained under the doctrine of incurred risk as a matter of law.