Court Opinion

ID: 9556265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 19:01:01.138663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:42:09.366767
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 19-15024   Document: 175-1    Date Filed: 08/16/2023   Page: 1 of 43

                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                               No. 19-15024
                          ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        ANTARIOUS CALDWELL,
        a.k.a. Fat,
        a.k.a. Phat,
        KEVIN CLAYTON,
        ALONZO WALTON,
        a.k.a. Spike,
        VANCITO GUMBS,
        DONALD GLASS,
        a.k.a. Smurf,
        a.k.a. Dred,
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                      19-15024

                                                           Defendants-Appellants.

                                ____________________

                    Appeals from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-00145-TWT-JKL-39
                              ____________________

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, and
        COOGLER,* Chief District Judge.
        WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
                This appeal arises from a multiple-count indictment against
        dozens of members of the Gangster Disciples. Five of them,
        Alonzo Walton, Kevin Clayton, Donald Glass, Antarious Caldwell,
        and Vancito Gumbs, appeal their convictions and sentences follow-
        ing a joint trial. Some argue that the district court should have sup-
        pressed wiretap evidence against them. Some argue that their en-
        hanced sentences under the Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Or-
        ganizations Act violate the Sixth Amendment because the jury
        failed to ﬁnd that the conspiracy involved murder. Several argue
        that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to play
        a video about unconscious bias, excluded a professor of social
        work’s expert opinion testimony, secured the defendants with

        * Honorable L. Scott Coogler, Chief United States District Judge for the North-
        ern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
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        19-15024               Opinion of the Court                        3

        ankle restraints at trial, allowed the prosecution to store eviden-
        tiary ﬁrearms in the courtroom, and questioned a witness. And
        they also bring individual procedural and sentencing challenges.
        We vacate one of Caldwell’s convictions and his sentence due to an
        intervening precedent, but we otherwise aﬃrm the convictions and
        sentences.
                                I. BACKGROUND
                We divide our review of the background into three parts.
        First, we explain the Gangster Disciples gang and the defendants’
        roles within it. Second, we describe the crimes relevant to this ap-
        peal. Third, we recount the relevant parts of the pretrial proceed-
        ings, trial, and sentencing.
                              A. The Gangster Disciples
               The Gangster Disciples began as a loosely aﬃliated network
        of street gangs in Chicago but later became a hierarchical national
        organization. At the times relevant to this appeal, that hierarchy
        consisted of a “Chairman” and “national board” for the country,
        “Governors of Governors” in charge of multi-state regions, “Gov-
        ernors” in charge of each state, “Regents” in charge of counties,
        and “Coordinators” in charge of municipal-level divisions or, in
        larger cities, subdivisions called “counts” or “decks.” Other leaders
        had speciﬁc portfolios within the gang. For example, the “Chief
        Enforcer” managed a team of “Enforcers” who exacted punish-
        ments for violations of the gang’s rules, such as the prohibition
        against cooperating with the police.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                19-15024

               The investigation that led to this trial and appeal focused on
        the activities of a group called the “Hate Committee.” The com-
        mittee served as an “enforcement” team for the gang in Georgia.
        Donald “Smurf ” Glass led the Hate Committee.
                The defendants held a variety of posts within the Georgia
        Gangster Disciples. Alonzo “Spike” Walton was Governor. In that
        role, he approved all “greenlights” of violent acts by subordinates.
        He “stamped”—that is, approved the formation of—the Hate
        Committee and integrated it in his chain of command. Kevin
        “K.K.” Clayton was Chief Enforcer, responsible for countering in-
        ternal threats. In 2013, he earned the dubious distinction of “En-
        forcer of the Year.” Clayton had the authority to issue a “green-
        light” to punish a Disciple for a violation of the gang’s rules. Don-
        ald “Smurf ” Glass was the leader of the Hate Committee and, in
        Clayton’s words, his “right hand guy.” In that role, he maintained a
        close relationship with committee members. For example, one
        member, Quantavious Hurt, lived in his home. Antarious “Fat”
        Caldwell was a committee member. Finally, Vancito Gumbs, a po-
        lice oﬃcer, was a Disciple who worked directly with Clayton.
        Quantavious Hurt identiﬁed Gumbs as a Disciple, and another po-
        lice oﬃcer said that Gumbs confessed to being a member and had
        Disciple tattoos. A month after the crimes we recount below,
        Gumbs expressed remorse for being a “gd hitman” in a text to his
        girlfriend.
               In November 2013, the Federal Bureau of Investigation se-
        cured judicial authority to wiretap Walton’s phone. In the required
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        19-15024               Opinion of the Court                          5

        aﬃdavit explaining the necessity for the wiretap, Agent William K.
        Murdock explained that no human source had been able to inﬁl-
        trate the gang and secure the trust of key members, though three
        conﬁdential human sources and four cooperating defendants had
        provided some helpful information. In January 2014, the Bureau
        requested a 30-day extension of the wiretap. Agent Murdock pro-
        vided a similar aﬃdavit, explaining that alternatives to wiretapping
        were not viable and that “no viable conﬁdential human sources
        have been identiﬁed that are able to inﬁltrate the gang.” He did not
        discuss the speciﬁc human sources he had mentioned in the ﬁrst
        aﬃdavit. The district judge approved the extension.
                                  B. Relevant Crimes
              The indictment charged an array of criminal activities. We
        narrate those relevant to this appeal. And we review them in chron-
        ological order.
                        1. Carjacking of Mildred Frederick
               Alonzo Walton volunteered to help his friend Mildred Fred-
        erick after she damaged her car by failing to put oil in it. His “help”
        was insurance fraud: Walton destroyed the car, and Frederick re-
        ported it stolen.
              Frederick started dating Walton’s friend Laderris Dickerson.
        But in March 2014, after Frederick and Dickerson started having
        troubles with their relationship, Dickerson and Walton decided to
        rob Frederick of the proceeds from the insurance fraud and other
        savings.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                19-15024

                Later that month, Walton and Dickerson lured Frederick to
        a parking lot with the promise that someone would meet her there
        to sell her a car for a good price. The co-conspirators arranged for
        another Disciple whom Dickerson did not know to arrive at the
        scene and demand Frederick’s cash and rental car at gunpoint. Wal-
        ton assured Dickerson that he would use his authority as Governor
        to ensure that Frederick would not be harmed.
               The plan succeeded. Frederick and Dickerson drove to the
        site, and the robber demanded Frederick’s money at gunpoint.
        When Frederick said she had only ﬁve dollars, Dickerson revealed
        that $14,000 was in the glove compartment. Frederick then at-
        tacked the robber and wrestled with him for a few seconds before
        he took control of her car, kicked her out of it while it was moving,
        and sped away. Walton, Dickerson, and the robber split the pro-
        ceeds. Dickerson and Frederick surmised that the robber had been
        instructed not to use the gun because he had allowed Frederick to
        resist without shooting her.
                       2. Attempted Robbery of Eric Wilder
              On June 27, 2015, Caldwell and another Hate Committee
        member invaded Eric Wilder’s home to rob him of drugs and
        money. The robbers knocked on Wilder’s door and pointed a gun
        at him when he cracked it open. Wilder slammed the door shut.
        Caldwell ﬁred through the door and hit Wilder in the chest. The
        robbers then forced their way into the apartment, stole a small
        amount of marijuana, and ﬂed.
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        19-15024               Opinion of the Court                        7

                         3. Murder of DeMarco Franklin
                Hate Committee member Quantavious Hurt murdered De-
        Marco Franklin on July 1, 2015. Hurt sparked a dispute with mem-
        bers of the Bloods gang when he leaned on one of their cars at a
        gas station. After members of the rival gang opened ﬁre, Hurt ﬂed
        to a friend’s house. Hurt later went to Glass’s home to inform him
        of the situation.
               Glass said that the committee needed to “do something
        about the situation”—per Hurt’s later trial testimony—because
        Hurt’s ﬂight made the committee look bad. Glass apparently pre-
        ferred that Hurt’s colleague “handle” the situation—Hurt took this
        to mean “shoot somebody.” But Hurt also understood Glass to al-
        low Hurt to “handle” the situation if he wanted to. Glass gave Hurt
        a symbolic black ﬂag, to remove any ﬁngerprints from the gun he
        would use and to cover his face.
               Hurt returned to the gas station and found DeMarco Frank-
        lin, whom he believed was involved in the ﬁrst incident. Hurt fol-
        lowed Franklin and murdered him in front of his girlfriend and her
        four-year-old child. When Hurt reported back, Glass was “in
        shock” that Hurt had personally settled the score, but also said that
        Hurt “did what [he was] supposed to do.” Hurt later learned that
        Franklin had nothing to do with the earlier incident.
              4. Stone Mountain Inn and Central Avenue Shootings
               The spree of violence continued two days later on July 3.
        Glass planned a robbery of the Stone Mountain Inn, where a drug
        dealer named “Zay” based his operations. Zay was a member of
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 19-15024

        the Stone Mountain “deck” of the Gangster Disciples who came
        from North Carolina. These Disciples were not “plugged in”—that
        is, not “stamped oﬃcial” or initiated “full member[s]” of the gang.
        The Hate Committee aborted its initial attempt to rob the drug
        dealer at the Inn because police oﬃcers were there. Some Hate
        Committee members returned in the evening to “chill” with the
        Stone Mountain Gangster Disciples. A dispute broke out over the
        status of the out-of-town Disciples as “plugged in.” Acting on a
        standing order from Glass against Disciples who were not plugged
        in, the Hate Committee attacked the Stone Mountain Disciples and
        killed Edward Chadmon. A member of the Hate Committee, Ro-
        dricious Gresham, was wounded in the ﬁreﬁght.
                The Hate Committee held a meeting to discuss the injury of
        one of its own. At the meeting, the ranking Disciple decided that
        the Stone Mountain deck was to blame for the incident. That deck
        would be “put on hold,” or excommunicated, and the Hate Com-
        mittee was given an “S.O.S.,” or “smash on [sight],” order to “[k]ill,
        beat, [and] assault” any members of the deck. Glass provided weap-
        ons and ammunition for the attack and passed along the directive
        to “apply pressure” by killing and assaulting people.
              Members of the Hate Committee opened ﬁre on a crowd on
        Central Avenue in the Stone Mountain area and injured a by-
        stander. When the members returned to Glass’s home afterward,
        he appeared to approve of their actions and encouraged them to
        “continue” with the same activity. The committee members went
        back to Central Avenue, murdered Rocqwell Nelson, and injured a
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        19-15024              Opinion of the Court                        9

        woman standing with Nelson on her patio. When they returned to
        Glass, he again praised their actions and encouraged them to con-
        tinue. Again the group went out, greeted “White Boy”—a member
        of the “on hold” Stone Mountain deck—, then shot him in the
        stomach at point-blank range. Again, Glass was “pleased” with the
        result.
                            5. Murder of Robert Dixon
               The last crime relevant to this appeal was Glass’s killing of
        Robert “Rampage” Dixon in August 2015. Dixon was accused of
        stealing from another Disciple in violation of gang rules. Accord-
        ing to Gresham, a Hate Committee member and prosecution wit-
        ness, Glass gave a “greenlight” to punish Dixon for this violation.
        Glass recruited other Disciples to “go holler” at Rampage. He
        brought Dixon outside the apartment where Dixon was staying to
        “talk,” but after a few minutes of talking, according to a witness,
        Glass pulled out his gun and shot Dixon in the head, killing him.
                          C. Pretrial and Trial Proceedings
               The principal charge against all the defendants was count
        one, which charged that the defendants conspired to “conduct and
        participate directly and indirectly in the conduct of [the Gangster
        Disciples] through a pattern of racketeering activity” in violation
        of the Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
        U.S.C. § 1962(c). The indictment also charged the defendants with
        the enhanced sentencing provision of the Act, see id. § 1963(a), for
        joining and remaining in the conspiracy “knowing and agreeing
        that members of the enterprise engaged in acts involving murder,
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         10                     Opinion of the Court                19-15024

         in violation of Oﬃcial Code of Georgia 16-5-1.” The indictment
         named 34 defendants, and this appeal concerns the joint trial of
         Alonzo Walton, Kevin Clayton, Donald Glass, Antarious Caldwell,
         and Vancito Gumbs, who were convicted, and Perry Green, who
         was acquitted.
                Before trial, Gumbs moved the district court to show pro-
         spective jurors a video on unconscious bias prepared by the district
         court for the Western District of Washington. See Unconscious Bias
         Juror Video, United States District Court for the Western District of
         Washington,          https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/jury/uncon-
         scious-bias. He also proposed a list of voir dire questions about
         their possible unconscious biases and requested that the prospec-
         tive jurors be given accompanying jury instructions. The instruc-
         tions told the jurors that they “must not be inﬂuenced by” their
         unconscious biases—the same biases the instructional video as-
         serted were “automatic” and inevitable.
                 The district court denied the motion. It described “a lot of
         this discussion” about unconscious bias as “politically correct non-
         sense . . . not based on any valid scientiﬁc or empirical study.” It
         doubted that the Western District of Washington could know that
         the jurors in Georgia were unconsciously biased and worried about
         telling the jurors at the outset that they were biased. The district
         court expressed concern that the video would “cause jurors to
         question their ability to make judgments based upon their com-
         mon sense”; would “suggest that jurors of one race . . . should
         think that the opinions of a juror of another race are based on bias
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         19-15024               Opinion of the Court                         11

         and prejudice” to the detriment of collective deliberation; and
         would be ineﬀective in ameliorating the cultural diﬀerences be-
         tween the prospective jurors and the defendants.
                 The district court later denied Gumbs’s motion, ﬁled six
         business days before trial, to admit Dr. Roberto Aspholm as an ex-
         pert witness. Aspholm, a professor of social work, researched and
         taught about the Gangster Disciples. Gumbs said that Aspholm’s
         testimony would illuminate the structure of the Gangster Disci-
         ples, on which the prosecution’s theory of a uniﬁed criminal organ-
         ization depended. He did not explain the basis of Aspholm’s pro-
         posed testimony except that it would be “based on his years of ﬁrst-
         hand (particularly university/academic-based) investigations.” The
         district court denied Gumbs’s motion as untimely and because the
         explanation of the proﬀered testimony was inadequate. See FED. R.
         CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(C) (2018). When the prosecution introduced non-
         expert testimony about the structure of the Gangster Disciples,
         Gumbs moved again to be allowed to call Aspholm to rebut that
         testimony, but the district court denied the request.
                The district court ordered that all the defendants be secured
         with ankle restraints throughout the trial. Over the defendants’ ob-
         jections, the district court accepted the marshal’s request to restrain
         the defendants “because of the number of the defendants and the
         diﬃculty of preventing an incident if they collectively decided that
         something was going to happen.” The district court ordered that
         the chains be muﬄed, that no restraints be visible, and that the de-
         fendants enter the courtroom before the jurors and remain seated
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         12                     Opinion of the Court                 19-15024

         so that the jury would never see the chains. And at the outset of
         trial, the district court requested that a defendant stand up to test
         whether the restraints would be audible when the defendants rose
         and sat. The defendants were each seated next to their counsel, so
         they could consult with them despite the restraints.
                 The district court allowed the prosecution to bring ﬁrearms
         as evidence. The prosecution was permitted to bring the ﬁrearms
         into the courtroom and store them in boxes next to the counsel
         table for the duration of the day in which they would be used. The
         district court denied Gumbs’s request to keep the boxes outside the
         jury’s sight.
                 The district court denied a motion to suppress the fruits of
         the extension of the wiretap of Walton’s phone. Clayton argued
         that the extension was unlawful because the underlying supporting
         aﬃdavit was incomplete and the application did not provide the
         court with statutorily mandated information. See 18 U.S.C.
         § 2518(1)(c). The district court denied the motion to suppress on
         the ground that the application was adequate despite any omission.
         It concluded, in the alternative, that suppression was not justiﬁed
         because there was no allegation that the aﬃdavit was intentionally
         deceptive or reckless with respect to the truth or that the failure to
         discuss the human sources was material to the statutory criteria for
         a wiretap. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978). The
         district court also ruled that the good-faith exception to the exclu-
         sionary rule foreclosed suppression of the fruits of the wiretap. See
         United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–24 (1984).
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         19-15024               Opinion of the Court                       13

                At the end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the district
         court asked Agent Murdock whether DeKalb County, in which the
         events to which he had testiﬁed took place, was within the North-
         ern District of Georgia. Murdock said yes; no one objected; and the
         government rested.
                The verdict form proposed by the district court asked
         whether each defendant was guilty of “Count One of the indict-
         ment charging RICO conspiracy” and whether “the RICO conspir-
         acy involve[d] murder.” The second question corresponded to the
         notice of enhanced sentencing in the indictment, which depended
         on a ﬁnding that “members of the enterprise engaged in acts in-
         volving murder, in violation of Oﬃcial Code of Georgia 16-5-1.”
         See GA. CODE § 16-5-1 (deﬁning malice and felony murder and set-
         ting the maximum penalty at death); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
                Walton, in an objection all the defendants joined, argued
         that the district court should specify that “to ﬁnd the Enhanced sen-
         tence for murder,” the jury must ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt
         that “the Defendants joined and remained in the RICO conspiracy
         charged in Count One knowing and agreeing that members of the
         enterprise engaged in acts involving murder.” Gumbs contended
         that his verdict form should ask whether he was guilty of “conspir-
         acy to commit murder.” The district court overruled the objec-
         tions. The ﬁnal verdict form for each defendant included an inter-
         rogatory that asked whether “the RICO conspiracy involve[d] mur-
         der.”
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         14                     Opinion of the Court                 19-15024

                 The relationship between the two questions for count one
         was muddled in the jury instructions. For count one, the jury had
         to ﬁnd a “pattern of racketeering activity” to convict, which meant
         that it had to ﬁnd that at least two racketeering acts were commit-
         ted by members of the criminal enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c),
         1961(5). The indictment alleged ten types of racketeering acts. In
         its instructions, the district court labeled three of these categories
         of racketeering acts—Georgia-law actual murder, attempted mur-
         der, and conspiracy to commit murder—as “acts involving mur-
         der.” The district court deﬁned “murder” to mean only actual mur-
         der, not any inchoate version of that oﬀense. The enhanced sen-
         tencing provisions applied to the defendants only if a racketeering
         act on which the conviction was based was actual “murder” because
         the enhanced sentencing provisions require a racketeering act pun-
         ishable by life imprisonment. See id. § 1963(a); GA. CODE §§ 16-5-
         1(e)(1), 16-4-6, 16-4-8. In closing arguments, the prosecution elided
         this distinction and argued that the special interrogatory in the ver-
         dict form asked whether the Gangster Disciples “engaged in acts
         involving murder, which includes murder and attempted murder.”
                The jury returned mixed verdicts. Walton was convicted of
         the racketeering conspiracy, carjacking Frederick, and using a ﬁre-
         arm during that carjacking. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119; id. § 924(c)(3)(A).
         Clayton was convicted of the racketeering conspiracy only. Glass
         was convicted of the racketeering conspiracy, acquitted of the mur-
         der of Robert Dixon, convicted of carrying a ﬁrearm during a
         crime of violence, namely the killing of Robert Dixon, id.
         § 924(c)(3)(A), convicted of causing the death of Robert Dixon
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         19-15024              Opinion of the Court                       15

         with a ﬁrearm, see id. § 1111, and acquitted of two marijuana pos-
         session charges. Caldwell was convicted of the racketeering con-
         spiracy, the attempted Hobbs Act robbery of Eric Wilder, see id.
         § 1951, and carrying a ﬁrearm during a crime of violence, the at-
         tempted robbery, see id. § 924(c)(3)(A). Vancito Gumbs was con-
         victed of the racketeering conspiracy. For each of the convicted de-
         fendants, the jury found that “the RICO conspiracy involve[d] mur-
         der.” The jury acquitted a sixth codefendant, Perry Green.
                 At sentencing, the defendants objected to the recommenda-
         tion in the presentence investigation report that they receive en-
         hanced sentences under the Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Or-
         ganizations Act. The Act provides for a maximum sentence of life
         imprisonment instead of only 20 years if “the violation is based on
         a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life
         imprisonment.” Id. § 1963(a). The defendants argued that the ver-
         dict form question whether “the RICO conspiracy involve[d] mur-
         der” asked the jury whether the conspiracy involved either actual
         murder or inchoate versions of that oﬀense. Because the jury ver-
         dict did not distinguish between actual murder, which can support
         a life sentence under Georgia law, and inchoate forms of murder,
         which cannot, they argued that their sentences could not exceed 20
         years. See id. They styled this objection as an argument that a sen-
         tence based on the ﬁnding of actual Georgia-law murder would vi-
         olate the Sixth Amendment. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
         476 (2000).
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         16                      Opinion of the Court                    19-15024

                 The district court disagreed. It reasoned that the verdict
         form said “murder” without mentioning the inchoate forms, so the
         district court was “convinced beyond any doubt that . . . the jury
         meant . . . malice murder.” It sentenced the defendants under the
         enhanced sentencing provisions.
                The district court imposed lengthy sentences of imprison-
         ment. Walton received 384 months of imprisonment. Clayton re-
         ceived 396 months of imprisonment. Glass received a sentence of
         life imprisonment plus 120 months. Caldwell received 360 months
         of imprisonment. And Gumbs received 180 months of imprison-
         ment.
                            II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
                 Several standards of review govern this appeal. We review
         the conduct of voir dire, the refusal to admit expert opinion testi-
         mony, the decision to shackle the defendants, the regulation of the
         use of ﬁrearms as courtroom evidence, and the judge’s decision to
         question a witness for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hill, 643
         F.3d 807, 836 (11th Cir. 2011) (conduct of voir dire); St. Louis Condo.
         Ass’n, Inc. v. Rockhill Ins. Co., 5 F.4th 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 2021) (ex-
         pert testimony and evidentiary rulings); United States v. Baker, 432
         F.3d 1189, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005) (shackling determination), abro-
         gated on other grounds by Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006);
         United States v. Day, 405 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005) (judge’s
         engagement with witness testimony).
               When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress wire-
         tapped communications, we review legal conclusions de novo and
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         19-15024               Opinion of the Court                         17

         factual ﬁndings for clear error. United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d
         1178, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 2021). Preserved Apprendi challenges are
         reviewed de novo. United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 1306
         (11th Cir. 2001). We review the legal correctness of jury instruc-
         tions de novo, but the district court has “wide discretion as to the
         style and wording employed.” Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo.
         Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
         And “[w]e reverse only where we are left with a substantial and in-
         eradicable doubt as to whether the district court properly guided
         the jury.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Suf-
         ﬁciency of the evidence is reviewed de novo, and we ask whether
         “no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
         the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Morel, 63
         F.4th 913, 917 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
                 We “review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
         discretion using a two-step process.” United States v. Feldman, 931
         F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). First, we deter-
         mine whether there was a “signiﬁcant procedural error,” including
         failing to consider the statutory factors, ignoring or miscalculating
         the guideline range, or “failing to adequately explain the chosen
         sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). Second, we evaluate the substan-
         tive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. At that stage, the defendant
         “has the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable in
         light of the entire record, the [section] 3553(a) factors, and the sub-
         stantial deference aﬀorded sentencing courts.” United States v. Fox,
         926 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation
         marks omitted). The interpretation of statutory terms like “crime
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         18                     Opinion of the Court                  19-15024

         of violence” is reviewed de novo. United States v. Johnson, 399 F.3d
         1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005).
                 Issues that are not properly preserved by timely objection
         are reviewed for plain error. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129,
         134–35 (2009). We can correct such errors if they are plain, if they
         aﬀect a substantial right, and “if the error seriously aﬀects the fair-
         ness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
         States v. Laines, 69 F.4th 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omit-
         ted).
                                  III. DISCUSSION
                 We divide our discussion into 13 parts. In the ﬁrst ﬁve parts,
         we explain why the district court did not abuse its discretion in its
         pretrial and trial procedural decisions. In the next two parts, we ad-
         dress the defendants’ arguments that their convictions must be
         overturned because the wiretap evidence should have been sup-
         pressed and because the defendants should not have been subject
         to enhanced sentencing provisions. We then turn to ﬁve individual
         challenges to convictions and sentences. And ﬁnally, we brieﬂy ex-
         plain that Caldwell’s sentence must be vacated because of United
         States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022).
         A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Declined to
                          Play a Video about Unconscious Bias.
               The defendants argue that the district court should have re-
         quired the jury venire during voir dire to watch a video about un-
         conscious bias to mitigate potential racial bias against them and
         that the district court should have given corresponding jury
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         19-15024                Opinion of the Court                          19

         instructions. Although the district court sometimes has an obliga-
         tion to permit defendants “to ask questions about racial bias during
         voir dire,” Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017); see
         also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526–27 (1973), it retains
         “broad discretion to manage voir dire,” United States v. Tsarnaev, 142
         S. Ct. 1024, 1036 (2022). We have never held that a district court
         must conduct unconscious bias training or allow unconscious bias
         questioning during voir dire.
                The district court did not abuse its discretion. Jurors are en-
         titled—indeed, expected—to make inferences based on common
         sense. See, e.g., United States v. Marino, 562 F.2d 941, 944–45 (5th Cir.
         1977); Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 11th Cir. BI B4 (2020) (“In consider-
         ing the evidence you may use reasoning and common sense to
         make deductions and reach conclusions.”). The proﬀered video, in
         contrast, labels all deeply ingrained judgments based on experi-
         ence, even those not based on racial, religious, or other protected
         characteristics, as “biases.” And it encourages jurors to second-
         guess their conclusions and to engage in counterfactual thought
         experiments ﬂipping the age, race, or gender of various trial partic-
         ipants. The district court reasonably determined that the video
         could “cause jurors to question their ability to make judgments
         based upon their common sense and experience.” The video en-
         courages jurors to doubt their own conclusions and the conclu-
         sions of their peers, and to presume that any decision is tainted by
         an “automatic” and unavoidable bias. It was also not an abuse of
         discretion to conclude that it would be harmful to jury delibera-
         tions to suggest to the jurors that they should be suspicious of their
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         20                     Opinion of the Court                  19-15024

         prospective colleagues’ decisions based on the possibility of uncon-
         scious racial bias. And, insofar as racial biases stemming from cul-
         tural diﬀerences could have tainted the trial, the district court rea-
         sonably doubted “that a ten-minute video from the district court
         in Washington is going to ameliorate in any way th[ose] cultural
         diﬀerences.” See United States v. Mercado-Gracia, 989 F.3d 829, 839–
         41 (10th Cir. 2021) (upholding a rejection of the same video).
                The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it
         declined to ask questions during voir dire about unconscious bias.
         The choice of procedure to identify and respond to bias on the part
         of potential jurors is left to the “sound discretion” of the district
         court. Hill, 643 F.3d at 836 (citation omitted). The district court
         highlighted serious concerns with juror education materials and in-
         structions that simultaneously tell each potential juror that he has
         inevitable unconscious biases and that he has a legal duty not to let
         these unconscious biases inﬂuence him. Gumbs does not dispute
         that the district court allowed some questions that explicitly
         touched on potential racial bias by jurors; it barred only the uncon-
         scious-bias line of questioning.
         B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Declined to
                         Admit Dr. Aspholm’s Expert Testimony.
                The defendants next argue that the district court abused its
         discretion when it declined to admit the expert opinion testimony
         of Dr. Roberto Aspholm about the nature and structure of the
         Gangster Disciples. The district court found that Gumbs’s disclo-
         sure was untimely and inadequate. The defendants contend that
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         19-15024              Opinion of the Court                       21

         Gumbs’s disclosure was timely because it gave the prosecution sev-
         eral weeks of notice before Aspholm would testify even though it
         had only six business days before trial began. And they contend that
         even if Gumbs’s initial disclosure was untimely, Aspholm should
         have been allowed to testify to rebut the prosecution’s portrayal of
         the gang. The defendants argue that the disclosure was speciﬁc
         enough to provide the prosecution fair notice of the content of As-
         pholm’s testimony. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(C) (2018). The dis-
         trict court’s decision was not “manifestly erroneous,” United States
         v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citation
         omitted), with respect to any ground, so we aﬃrm.
                 It was not an abuse of discretion to ﬁnd that Gumbs did not
         provide timely notice of the testimony. Gumbs ﬁled his notice only
         six business days before trial began. The district court determined
         that six business days before a complicated multidefendant trial was
         insuﬃcient time for the prosecution to prepare a rebuttal of As-
         pholm’s testimony or to secure a comparable expert witness to re-
         spond to his testimony. And it reasonably concluded that it was un-
         fair to ask the government to formulate its response after the trial
         had started.
                Although not in eﬀect when the trial occurred in 2019, the
         revised Rules explicitly adopt this commonsense proposition. The
         current version of Rule 16, eﬀective as of December 1, 2022, re-
         quires that notice of expert opinion testimony come “suﬃciently
         before trial” for adequate preparation and does not measure time-
         liness based on the expected date of the testimony. FED. R. CRIM. P
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         22                     Opinion of the Court                  19-15024

         16(b)(1)(C)(ii) (2022) (emphasis added). We are loath to condemn
         as an abuse of discretion a decision of the district court that accords
         with the rule that would apply today, particularly where the earlier
         rule was silent on the issue.
                The defendants’ defense for Gumbs’s late disclosure—that
         he did not realize until shortly before trial that the prosecution
         would portray the Gangster Disciples as a hierarchical criminal
         conspiracy—is frivolous. The second paragraph of the indictment
         alleges that the Gangster Disciples “employ a highly structured or-
         ganization” to commit their crimes. That portrayal was never in
         doubt. For the same reason, the district court did not abuse its dis-
         cretion when it declined to reconsider admitting Aspholm after the
         prosecution presentation of the structure of the Gangster Disci-
         ples.
                The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it
         ruled that Gumbs failed to provide an adequate description of As-
         pholm’s testimony and “the bases and reasons for those opinions.”
         FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(C) (2018). Gumbs never informed the
         prosecution of the sources on which Aspholm would base his tes-
         timony. The best explanation of Aspholm’s testimony came in
         Gumbs’s reply to the government’s opposition to his admission.
         That document states Aspholm’s conclusions that “the Gangster
         Disciples is not and has not been the unitary, tightly organized,
         structured, coordinated, and controlled organization that the Gov-
         ernment characterizes it as” and that the organization “sometimes
         serves political, philosophical, cultural, and even quasi-religious
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         19-15024                Opinion of the Court                           23

         functions” instead of criminal ones. The district court did not abuse
         its discretion when it found vague references to “interviewing and
         ﬁeld work . . . and statistical analysis” and “research, analysis, and
         teaching,” on gangs in general to be an inadequate explanation of
         the basis for Aspholm’s opinions.
             C. The Ankle Restraints Did Not Violate the Defendants’ Rights.
                Gumbs, Glass, and Caldwell argue that the district court
         abused its discretion when it ordered them to be restrained at the
         ankles throughout trial. They argue that the district court failed to
         conduct an individualized inquiry into their dangerousness and to
         give notice of the grounds for its decision. This argument fails.
                 Our legal tradition strongly disfavors visibly restraining
         criminal defendants. As the Supreme Court explained, “Blackstone
         wrote that ‘it is laid down in our antient books, that, though under
         an indictment of the highest nature,’ a defendant ‘must be brought
         to the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds; un-
         less there be evident danger of an escape.’” Deck v. Missouri, 544
         U.S. 622, 626 (2005) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
         COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *322). “[T]he use of
         physical restraints visible to the jury” is prohibited “absent a trial
         court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are
         justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” Deck, 544
         U.S. at 629. This rule exists to prevent prejudice to the presumption
         of innocence, the right to counsel, and the dignity of criminal pro-
         ceedings. Id. at 630–31.
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         24                      Opinion of the Court                   19-15024

                 The common-law rule against shackling prevents creating
         an unfair impression of guilt for the jury and is limited to contexts
         that implicate that danger. We have held the rule does not apply to
         proceedings in which the jury is not present, such as sentencing.
         United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 2015). In re-
         jecting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we have explained
         that Supreme Court precedents about shackling “are not applicable
         to security devices or measures that are not visible.” Nance v. War-
         den, Ga. Diag. Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2019). And we
         have never reversed a conviction based on the use of restraints in-
         visible to the jury. See, e.g., Baker, 432 F.3d at 1246; United States v.
         Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bat-
         tle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 1999).
                 We reject the defendants’ challenge because the record
         makes clear that the ankle restraints were not perceptible to the
         jury and no defendant alleges that he lacked access to counsel. The
         district court ordered that the restraints be placed on the defend-
         ants’ legs only, that they be muffled to prevent clanking, that a cur-
         tain around the defense table conceal them from the jury, and that
         the defendants enter and exit the courtroom outside the presence
         of the jury. The defendants unpersuasively complain that the dis-
         trict court could have done more to investigate the possibility of
         prejudice. They also make the unsubstantiated assertion that the
         ankle restraints “very probably caused fear of the defendants.” The
         district court took steps to verify that the restraints were impercep-
         tible, so we do not credit the defendants’ speculation about the ju-
         rors’ perceptions.
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         19-15024               Opinion of the Court                         25

          D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Regulating the
                             Use of Firearms as Evidence.
                Gumbs, Glass, and Caldwell argue that the prosecutors’ use
         of firearms as physical evidence at trial violated their right to due
         process by undermining the presumption of innocence. They con-
         tend that the district court should have granted Gumbs’s motion
         to “prohibit the storing of weapons in the courtroom, in boxes,
         from which boxes various of those weapons regularly were ex-
         tracted, paraded around the court room, and handed to the jurors
         to pass amongst themselves.” They argue that there was “no real
         reason” for this procedure except to paint the defendants as “dan-
         gerous renegade[s].” We disagree.
                 The district court followed a reasonable procedure for han-
         dling the weapons. The prosecution showed the weapons as evi-
         dence to prove the charged crimes that involved firearms at trial.
         The defendants fail to substantiate their accusation that the weap-
         ons were stored in this manner solely to prejudice them. And they
         fail to mention any specific instances where the prosecution used
         the guns in an inappropriate way. The district court reasonably bal-
         anced the inconvenience of storing the weapons in a separate room
         against the prejudice of piling up weapons in the courtroom and
         struck a sensible balance in which the guns were kept out of view
         in boxes and the boxes were limited to those needed that day. The
         district court did not abuse its discretion.
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         26                      Opinion of the Court                  19-15024

           E. The District Court Did Not Impermissibly Depart from Neutrality
                             When It Questioned a Witness.
                Caldwell, Gumbs, and Walton contend that the district court
         committed plain error and deprived them of a fair trial when it
         asked a prosecution witness whether DeKalb County—the loca-
         tion of some of the criminal activity he described—is in the North-
         ern District of Georgia. That DeKalb County is within the North-
         ern District of Georgia established venue, see United States v. Snipes,
         611 F.3d 855, 865–66 (11th Cir. 2010), so the defendants contend
         that the question unfairly helped the prosecution. We disagree.
                 The trial judge is “more than a referee to an adversarial pro-
         ceeding.” United States v. Harris, 720 F.2d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 1983).
         Consistent with the common-law tradition, the judge may “com-
         ment on the evidence” and “question witnesses and elicit facts not
         yet adduced or clarify those previously presented.” Moore v. United
         States, 598 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1979). This questioning is limited
         only by the principle that a judge must maintain neutrality between
         the parties. See id. (approving a trial judge’s decision to ask 105
         questions of the defendant).
                The district judge stayed well within these bounds. He asked
         a single question without commenting on the veracity or relevance
         of the witness’s testimony. The legal status of DeKalb County is a
         “legislative fact” not particular to the parties, so the district court
         was entitled to instruct the jury that the county was within the
         Northern District of Georgia. See FED. R. EVID. 201, advisory com-
         mittee notes to 1972 proposed rules; United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d
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         19-15024                Opinion of the Court                           27

         527, 530–31 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The district court did not err, let
         alone clearly err, when it asked a witness for that information.
         F. The District Court Correctly Declined to Suppress the Fruits of the Ex-
                                     tended Wiretap.
                Clayton and Walton argue that the district court should have
         suppressed the fruits of the January 2014 extension of the wiretap
         on Walton’s phone. They argue that Murdock failed to provide the
         required “full and complete statement as to whether or not other
         investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they rea-
         sonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dan-
         gerous,” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), because his extension application
         did not discuss the seven human sources mentioned in the initial
         application. They also argue that Franks v. Delaware does not limit
         the suppression of the fruits of wiretaps and that the good-faith
         exception to the suppression remedy also does not apply to wiretap
         cases. Because the district court properly applied Franks and the
         good-faith exception to the motion to suppress, we do not reach
         the argument that its ruling on section 2518(1)(c) was erroneous.
                Franks addressed the suppression of evidence obtained pur-
         suant to a warrant obtained through an aﬃdavit containing false
         information. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV
         (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). The
         Court held that a factual error requires suppression of the evidence
         the warrant produced only if the defendant establishes “deliberate
         falsehood or . . . reckless disregard for the truth” by the aﬃant and
         “if, when material that is the subject of the . . . falsity or reckless
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         28                      Opinion of the Court                  19-15024

         disregard is set to one side,” probable cause would not support the
         warrant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72; see also id. at 156. The defend-
         ants argue that Franks does not limit the statutory suppression rem-
         edy that applies to wiretaps obtained through a defective applica-
         tion. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i).
                We have consistently applied Franks to motions to suppress
         the evidentiary fruits of wiretaps. See United States v. Capers, 708
         F.3d 1286, 1296 n.6 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The rule in Franks has since
         been held applicable to aﬃdavits submitted in support of court-or-
         dered electronic surveillance.”); accord United States v. Malekzadeh,
         855 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Novaton, 271
         F.3d 968, 984, 986 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Votrobek, 847 F.3d
         1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 581
         n.18 (11th Cir. 2011). Based on this binding precedent, we reject the
         defendants’ challenge because they have failed to allege that Mur-
         dock asserted “deliberate falsehoods” or exhibited “reckless disre-
         gard for the truth.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. And we aﬃrm on the
         alternative ground that, as the defendants concede, our precedent
         also bars suppression of evidence obtained in good-faith reliance
         on a court-approved wiretap. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–24; Malekza-
         deh, 855 F.2d at 1496–97 (applying Leon to a motion to suppress the
         fruits of a wiretap). The defendants do not dispute the district
         court’s determination that law enforcement acted in good faith.
                       G. The Sentences Do Not Violate Apprendi.
               Walton, Clayton, Glass, and Caldwell contend that their sen-
         tences are unconstitutional because they rest on enhanced
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         19-15024                Opinion of the Court                         29

         sentencing provisions of the Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Or-
         ganizations Act for which, they argue, the jury did not make the
         requisite ﬁndings. Gumbs joins this argument insofar as it bears on
         the district court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing him. The de-
         fendants contend that the district court’s alleged misreading of the
         jury’s verdicts violates the Sixth Amendment requirement that
         “any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the penalty
         for a crime” must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
         Candelario, 240 F.3d at 1303 (citations omitted and alterations
         adopted); see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. We disagree.
                 This argument involves an unpreserved objection to the ver-
         dict form and jury instructions masquerading as an Apprendi chal-
         lenge. Apprendi forbids a district court from making a factual ﬁnd-
         ing necessary for an increased criminal penalty; only a jury may
         make that ﬁnding. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. Here, the relevant fac-
         tual ﬁnding was that the conspiracy involved actual murder, not at-
         tempted murder or conspiracy to commit murder. See supra Part
         I.C. The district court did not purport to ﬁnd this fact when it ap-
         plied the enhanced sentencing provisions. It instead determined
         that the jury’s verdict form reﬂected that the jury had made that
         ﬁnding beyond a reasonable doubt. Clayton argues that because the
         verdict form was unclear—an objection we address below—the dis-
         trict judge had to “speculat[e]” about what the jury found and that
         Apprendi forbids that kind of speculation. But Apprendi does not ad-
         dress the district court’s duty to interpret jury verdicts. It addresses
         a trial judge’s inability to make factual ﬁndings that alter the pen-
         alty for a crime. See, e.g., Candelario, 240 F.3d at 1304. The
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         30                     Opinion of the Court                19-15024

         defendants argue that the district court misread the jury verdict and
         then applied the wrong statutory punishment based on that mis-
         take. That argument does not implicate Apprendi.
                 The jury found that the conspiracy included actual, not in-
         choate, murder as part of its racketeering activities. Although the
         prosecutor in closing arguments elided the diﬀerence between the
         “acts involving murder” that could serve as predicate racketeering
         activities for conviction on count one and the actual “murder” re-
         quired for the enhanced sentencing provision, the district judge did
         not make the same mistake. He instructed the jury that “acts in-
         volving murder” for the purposes of ﬁnding the two racketeering
         activities needed for conviction extended to Georgia-law conspir-
         acy to commit murder and attempted murder. But the district court
         never said that the jury should read the phrase “involve murder” to
         mean “involve acts involving murder.” The district court speciﬁ-
         cally deﬁned “murder” to include only actual murder under Geor-
         gia law, which is “a racketeering activity for which the maximum
         penalty includes life imprisonment,” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a); see GA.
         CODE § 16-5-1(e)(1). And the verdict form asked whether the con-
         spiracy “involve[d] murder,” not “acts involving murder.” The plain
         meaning of this phrase is that the question concerns what the dis-
         trict court deﬁned as murder, not what the district court deﬁned as
         acts involving murder. Any other reading would render the interrog-
         atory purposeless; if it asked about “acts involving murder,” it
         would not have any implications for the defendants’ convictions or
         sentences. The district court correctly concluded that the jury
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         19-15024                Opinion of the Court                          31

         found that the conspiracy involved actual murder, as required for
         the enhanced sentencing provision.
                As the government suggests, one could understand the de-
         fendants to argue that the jury verdict form was so unclear that the
         jury was confused about what it was being asked, but that chal-
         lenge is unpreserved and meritless at this late stage. A challenge to
         jury instructions or the verdict form after the jury has delivered its
         verdict is too late. United States v. Mitchell, 146 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th
         Cir. 1998). None of the defendants raised the ambiguity on which
         they now rely before jury deliberations. Walton, in an objection the
         other defendants joined, speciﬁcally argued that the verdict form
         ought to ask whether the conspiracy included “acts involving mur-
         der.” We explain in the next section why the district court did not
         err when it rejected Gumbs’s requested verdict form, but his objec-
         tions to the proposed verdict forms did not rely on the diﬀerence
         between actual and inchoate murder. So the defendants never ade-
         quately brought the problem to the district court’s attention, and
         our review is for plain error. Id.
                 “Meeting all four prongs [of the plain-error test] is diﬃcult,
         as it should be,” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (citation and internal quo-
         tation marks omitted), and the defendants do not even attempt to
         establish that the district court plainly erred in a way that preju-
         diced them. The defendants oﬀer no caselaw that establishes that it
         was “obvious or clear under current law,” Candelario, 240 F.3d at
         1309 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), that the ver-
         dict form should have been phrased diﬀerently or that a speciﬁc
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         32                     Opinion of the Court                 19-15024

         clarifying instruction was necessary. Nor have they established a
         “reasonable probability,” United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325,
         1331–32 (11th Cir. 2005), that the jury would have found that the
         conspiracy involved only attempted murder or a conspiracy to
         commit murder. And the record was replete with evidence of ac-
         tual murders by members of the Gangster Disciples. Because of
         these deﬁciencies, we need not address the other elements of the
         plain-error test.
          H. Gumbs’s Challenges to His Jury Verdict Form and Conviction Fail.
                Gumbs contends that the district court should have used his
         preferred verdict form and that the failure to do so resulted in his
         being convicted on legally insuﬃcient evidence. Glass agrees that
         the district court should have given Gumbs’s proposed instructions.
         Gumbs’s proposed verdict form asked whether he was guilty of
         “conspiracy to commit murder” and required the jury to name the
         intended victim of the murder if it answered aﬃrmatively. Gumbs
         contends that there was no evidence from which the jury could
         have reasonably found that he was involved in the Gangster Disci-
         ples conspiracy before the murders alleged in the indictment took
         place. He argues that a properly instructed jury would not have
         found that he was part of a conspiracy in which actual murder was
         involved, so his sentencing guidelines calculation was erroneous.
         We disagree.
                The district court acted within its “wide discretion” when it
         rejected Gumbs’ proposed verdict form and jury instructions.
         Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1285. For the enhanced sentencing ﬁnding,
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         19-15024               Opinion of the Court                         33

         Gumbs wanted the district court to ask the jury whether Gumbs
         was guilty of “conspiracy to commit murder.” That question could
         have easily misled the jury to believe that the object of the conspir-
         acy had to be murder, when the relevant question was whether
         Gumbs was vicariously liable for a murder that was part of the pat-
         tern of racketeering activity that supported the conspiracy in
         which he was involved. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1963(a). Moreover,
         Gumbs identiﬁes no precedent supporting his request that the jury
         name the victim murdered. And as we have explained above, the
         district court gave accurate instructions and provided a verdict
         form for which no plain error has been established.
                Gumbs has also not established that there was insuﬃcient
         evidence that he was a member of a conspiracy that involved mur-
         der. He maintains that two key pieces of evidence tying him to the
         conspiracy—the wiretapped conversations between him and Wal-
         ton and the text messages to his girlfriend in which he described
         himself as a “gd hitman”—took place after the murders alleged in
         the indictment. But this fact does not allow us to set aside the jury’s
         verdict. Even on its own terms, Gumbs’s argument does not make
         sense; a jury could fairly infer that if Gumbs expressed regret for
         being a hitman for the Gangster Disciples in August 2015, then he
         was already a Disciple only a month earlier during the July 2015
         wave of violence. And other evidence presented at trial could sup-
         port the ﬁnding that he was in the Gangster Disciples earlier than
         he argues. Quantavious Hurt testiﬁed that he knew Gumbs was
         part of the gang, and Gumbs joined the police force with what at
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         34                      Opinion of the Court                  19-15024

         least one witness identiﬁed as preexisting Gangster Disciples tat-
         toos.
              I. Clayton’s Sentence Was Not Based on Clearly Erroneous Facts.
                 Clayton argues that we should vacate his sentence because
         it rested on clearly erroneous ﬁndings of fact. The district court
         explained that his 33-year prison sentence was “appropriate” be-
         cause of the violent acts that the Gangster Disciples committed and
         because Clayton “was a high-ranking oﬃcial” in the organization
         and had a role “of encouragement, recruitment, and applauding
         acts including murder that took place by others.” Clayton argues
         that this description of his role was clearly erroneous because he
         did not personally recruit certain members of the Hate Committee
         nor encourage the Central Avenue murders in advance. But the dis-
         trict court committed no clear error.
                 Clayton’s objection to the description of his role as “a high-
         ranking oﬃcial” who was involved in recruiting criminals and en-
         couraging murder is frivolous. Clayton admits that he was at one
         time “Chief Enforcer” for the Gangster Disciples—and indeed “En-
         forcer of the Year” in 2013. Ample testimony supported a ﬁnding that
         this role required violence, up to murder, to enforce gang disci-
         pline. Clayton also misses the mark when he argues that he did not
         initially recruit the individuals the prosecution mentioned at sen-
         tencing and did not know about the Central Avenue murders in ad-
         vance. Wiretap evidence establishes that Clayton consistently held
         himself out as responsible for Hate Committee activities and for
         recruiting younger members of the Gangster Disciples to new roles
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         19-15024               Opinion of the Court                          35

         in the gang. Clayton called Glass, the leader of the Hate Commit-
         tee, his “right hand guy.” He referred to the younger members of
         the Hate Committee as “KK shooters,” a reference to his nickname,
         and he boasted that he “brought the shooters to the . . . eastside.”
         Likewise, Clayton’s argument that the prosecution did not know
         exactly when he was Chief Enforcer is irrelevant to the ﬁndings un-
         derpinning his sentence; the district court did not rest its sentenc-
         ing on a ﬁnding that Clayton was Chief Enforcer at a particular
         time.
            J. Suﬃcient Evidence Supported Glass’s Racketeering Conviction.
                Glass challenges his conviction for the racketeering conspir-
         acy on the ground that the jury acquitted him of the only predicate
         racketeering activities for which he was indicted. See United States
         v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1257 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a
         racketeering conviction requires finding at least “two predicate
         racketeering acts”). He argues that because the jury acquitted him
         of the murder of Robert Dixon and for possessing drugs with intent
         to distribute them—the only crimes that were predicate “racket-
         eering activities”—there must have been insufficient evidence for
         his conviction for the racketeering conspiracy. We disagree.
                 The jury was instructed that to convict on the racketeering
         conspiracy, it had to find two predicate acts on the list of several
         acts alleged in count one, which included many more crimes be-
         sides those specifically charged as traceable to Glass. We presume
         the jury followed this instruction. See United States v. Kennard, 472
         F.3d 851, 858 (11th Cir. 2006). It could have relied on any two of
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         36                     Opinion of the Court                 19-15024

         the acts described in count one. And settled precedent bars Glass’s
         argument that there must not have been sufficient evidence for
         count one based on acquittal on the other counts. “[I]nconsistency
         between verdicts on different counts of the indictment does not vi-
         tiate convictions on those counts of which the defendant is found
         guilty.” United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir.
         1986).
                           K. Glass’s Sentence Is Reasonable.
                 Glass challenges his prison sentence of life-plus-ten-years as
         procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He argues that his
         sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court
         miscalculated the guidelines range, based his sentence on clearly
         erroneous factual findings, and failed to consider the statutory fac-
         tors for sentencing. He argues that his sentence is substantively un-
         reasonable because the district court impermissibly weighed the
         statutory sentencing factors and sentenced him unfairly compared
         to his co-defendants. Each challenge fails.
                            1. Procedural Reasonableness
                 Glass reiterates, in the form of a guidelines challenge, the
         supposed Apprendi argument that we have already rejected. A sen-
         tence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court miscalcu-
         lated the relevant guidelines range for a defendant. Gall v. United
         States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Glass argues that the district court
         miscalculated his guideline range because it misread the verdict
         form to mean that the jury found the conspiracy involved actual,
         not inchoate, forms of murder. We reject this argument for the
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         19-15024               Opinion of the Court                        37

         reasons we explained in Part III.G. He also argues that the district
         court must have relied on the Dixon murder to calculate his base
         offense level as corresponding to that of murder, but he misunder-
         stands the record: the district court based his offense level on his
         conviction on count one for a conspiracy that “involve[d] murder,”
         regardless of the Dixon killing.
                 Aside from his guideline challenge, Glass argues that the dis-
         trict court sentenced him based on clearly erroneous factual find-
         ings. See id. (explaining that a sentence can be procedurally unrea-
         sonable if it is “select[ed] based on clearly erroneous facts”). Glass
         argues that the district court clearly erred when it said that he was
         the person in the case most responsible for “a trail of murder, may-
         hem, maiming and destruction of life” and found that he “physi-
         cally murder[ed] Robert Dixon” and “directed [the Hate Commit-
         tee’s] teenage assassins to go out and simply randomly shoot, mur-
         der and maim people who were doing nothing other than just go-
         ing about their lives.”
                None of these findings is clearly erroneous. Glass’s only re-
         sponse to the findings is that he did not “corrupt[] an entire gener-
         ation of teenagers” but rather “provided encouragement and sup-
         port to local youth, including [Quantavious] Hurt.” This assertion
         does not establish that the district court clearly erred. Ample evi-
         dence supported the finding that Glass led the Hate Committee
         that perpetrated the Central Avenue murders: multiple witnesses
         so identified him. Glass’s assertion that he was a positive influence
         on local youth is belied by the uncontradicted evidence that he, for
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         38                      Opinion of the Court                  19-15024

         example, encouraged the Hate Committee to continue the Central
         Avenue crimes after their first sortie and that he helped secure the
         weapons for the crimes. So it was not clearly erroneous to find that
         he was uniquely responsible for the violence and “directed” the
         Hate Committee to commit violent crimes.
                Although Glass asserts that he was “disappointed” to learn
         that Hurt killed Demarco Franklin, Hurt testified that Glass told
         him that he did what he was “supposed to do.” In any event, noth-
         ing contradicts Hurt’s testimony that Glass ordered that someone
         engage in a reprisal killing after Hurt’s dispute with the Bloods at
         the gas station. And notwithstanding Glass’s acquittal of Dixon’s
         murder under Georgia law, a district court is entitled to rely on ac-
         quitted conduct at sentencing if it finds that the conduct occurred
         based on a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Faust,
         456 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006). Multiple witnesses testified
         that Glass killed Dixon. Moreover, the jury found that Glass
         “cause[d] the death of Robert Dixon” in violation of federal law.
                 Glass’s assertion that the district court failed to consider his
         individual characteristics is likewise meritless. See 18 U.S.C.
         § 3553(a)(1) (requiring that the district court consider “the history
         and characteristics of the defendant”). Glass complains that the dis-
         trict court did not “mention[ his] personal history and characteris-
         tics,” such as his difficult childhood. But the district court need not
         discuss each factor under section 3553(a), see United States v. Wil-
         liams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008). And the district court
         stated that it did consider Glass’s history and characteristics,
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         19-15024                Opinion of the Court                         39

         presumably including the very facts he now cites, in selecting his
         sentence.
                            2. Substantive Reasonableness
               Glass argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable
         because it relied solely on one factor—protecting the public—in
         neglect of all other sentencing factors and because his sentence is
         much harsher than those of his codefendants. He also reiterates his
         argument that his sentence could not be based on the murder of
         Robert Dixon. We reject Glass’s substantive challenge.
                Our review is highly deferential. United States v. Irey, 612
         F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). A district court has dis-
         cretion to assign relative weight to different sentencing factors, and
         the defendant has the “burden of showing that the sentence is un-
         reasonable in light of the entire record, the [section] 3553(a) factors,
         and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” Fox, 926
         F.3d at 1282 (citation omitted). Glass has not satisfied this heavy
         burden.
                As we explained above, the district court did not clearly err
         when it found that Glass led the murderous Hate Committee and
         killed Robert Dixon. Glass received a harsher sentence than other
         leaders of the gang and other murderers, but he was the only de-
         fendant who combined leadership in the Gangster Disciples with
         personal commission of murder. It was not an abuse of discretion
         to give him the harshest sentence.
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         40                      Opinion of the Court                   19-15024

           L. Suﬃcient Evidence Supports the Finding that Walton Intended to
            Cause Death or Serious Bodily Harm in the Frederick Carjacking.
                 Walton argues that his carjacking conviction and related
         firearm conviction must be vacated because there was insufficient
         evidence that he intended for Frederick to be seriously harmed or
         killed in the plot to rob her at gunpoint. The carjacking statute pro-
         hibits “tak[ing] a motor vehicle” involved in interstate commerce
         “with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.” 18 U.S.C.
         § 2119. Walton concedes that he conspired to rob Frederick, but he
         denies that the prosecution proved that he intended to “cause
         death or serious bodily harm.” But “drawing all reasonable infer-
         ences and credibility choices in the Government’s favor,” Browne,
         505 F.3d at 1253, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported
         the jury’s finding that Walton had the requisite intent for his con-
         viction.
                 The prosecution can prove the “intent to cause death or se-
         rious bodily harm,” 18 U.S.C. § 2119, by proving that when the de-
         fendant demanded or took control of the car, he “possessed the in-
         tent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car.”
         Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999) (emphasis added). It
         is not necessary that the defendant expect or desire that serious
         harm or death would result. Id. at 7. Frederick was robbed without
         being seriously harmed or killed, so the prosecution had to prove
         that the conspirators intended that she be seriously harmed or
         killed if, counterfactually, it had been necessary.
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         19-15024               Opinion of the Court                         41

                 Walton acknowledges that he and Dickerson planned to
         bring a gang member who did not know Frederick to rob her at
         gunpoint, but he argues that the jury could not have reasonably
         found that his intent was that the robber use that gun if necessary.
         Dickerson testified that Walton assured him that he would use his
         authority as Governor to ensure that Frederick would not be
         harmed. And Walton argues that a robber who intended to use
         deadly force to ensure the success of the robbery would have shot
         Frederick when she attacked him. Both Frederick and Dickerson
         testified that they thought the robber would have used his gun if
         he had not been instructed that he could not.
                Pointing a gun at someone and demanding money is the
         kind of evidence on which prosecutors may rely to prove the mens
         rea for carjacking. See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 489 F.3d 1117,
         1128 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by Perry v.
         New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237–38 (2012); United States v. Diaz,
         248 F.3d 1065, 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2001). And drawing all inferences
         against Walton, as we must, Browne, 505 F.3d at 1253, the jury’s
         verdict was reasonable, even if it was “not inevitable,” id. A jury
         was not required to credit the testimony of Dickerson about the
         importance of protecting his girlfriend when he orchestrated a
         scheme to have her robbed at gunpoint. Dickerson’s testimony was
         probative of Walton’s intent only if the jury believed both Dicker-
         son’s account of what Walton said and that Walton told Dickerson
         the truth.
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         42                      Opinion of the Court                  19-15024

                Nor is Frederick’s resistance—or the lack of a more forceful
         response to it—decisive. The robber knew that Dickerson was in
         on the plan, so he knew that Dickerson would not assist Frederick,
         who was not as much of a threat by herself. He was also willing to
         use enough force to kick her out of the car while it was moving,
         suggesting he did not share Dickerson’s supposed concern for Fred-
         erick’s safety. A jury could have reasonably found that the robber
         declined to use force sufficient to seriously harm or kill Frederick
         only because it was unnecessary, not because he was told he could
         not use that force.
         M. Caldwell’s Conviction Under the Armed Career Criminal Act and His
                               Sentence Must Be Vacated.
                After briefing closed in this appeal, we granted Caldwell per-
         mission to file a supplemental brief based on intervening precedent
         to challenge his conviction for using a firearm “during and in rela-
         tion to a crime of violence, that is[,] the robbery of E[ric] W[ilder].”
         Count 17 of the indictment contemplated that the offense of at-
         tempted Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, is a “crime of vio-
         lence” within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act, id.
         § 924(c)(3)(A). But the Supreme Court recently held in Taylor that
         attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under
         section 924(c). 142 S. Ct. at 2020. So we must vacate Caldwell’s con-
         viction. We remand for the district court to resentence Caldwell
         for his remaining counts of conviction. See United States v. Fowler,
         749 F.3d 1010, 1017 (11th Cir. 2014).
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         19-15024            Opinion of the Court                   43

                              IV. CONCLUSION
               We VACATE Caldwell’s conviction on count 17 of the in-
         dictment and his sentence and REMAND for resentencing. We
         AFFIRM all the other convictions and sentences.