Court Opinion

ID: 9777767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:23:50.970975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:01.410682
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I am of the opinion that the court of appeals rendered the correct judgment and that the writ should be dismissed as improvidently granted. Tex.R.Civ.P. 500.
I perceive a fundamental difference between an agreement concerning a suit and a suit concerning an agreement. In my judgment, Tex.R.Civ.P. 11 does not apply to an oral agreement concerning a suit when a party does not in good faith dispute the terms of that agreement. Since neither Kennedy nor his first attorney, who negotiated the settlement disputes the terms of the agreement, I am puzzled by my colleagues’ characterization of this case as one involving a “disputed” agreement. The only dispute concerns Kennedy’s refusal to be bound by the agreement.
The lack of dispute is evident in some brief excerpts of Kennedy's deposition which were introduced into evidence in his trial in 1982.
*531(Questions by Attorney Friedman, representing Herman Smith, Third Party Defendant):
Q Did you have any question in your mind about what you were doing when you agreed to settle; that is, you understood that you were agreeing to pay twelve thousand dollars that would end this lawsuit, as far as you knew; your claims and the claims against you? You understood that, didn’t you.?
A Yes. (S.F., p. 45)

Q ... But, when you left there that day, you believed it was settled and that there were no suits pending, going to be pending by you, or against you, as a result of the matters involved in this litigation, didn’t you?
A I presumed that was the case that day.
Q. Well, you know it was the case, don’t you?
A I presume so. I didn’t question it. Q You had agreed to execute a promissory note, and to relinquish all of your claims against everybody else, and they had agreed to relinquish them against you, in so far as this lawsuit is concerned.
So, you thought the whole thing was over, didn’t you?
A Providing that it all came about, then I would say, ‘Yes’. But, I had no assurance that it was all going to come about.
Q But, none of the terms that were eventually presented by way of the promissory note, or the Dismissal, or the Mutual Release were objectionable to you, were they?
A No, I did not object to the terms. (S.F., pp. 48-49)

Q ... Okay, Dr. Kennedy. If you take it all down to the basic facts, and don’t pay any attention to all of the legal technicalities at this point, what happened was, really, you agreed to settled (sic) on that date by executing a twelve thousand dollar promissory note, and by agreeing to execute dismissal and releases of all lititation involved, and then you subsequently “changed your mind, and decided not to do that at a later date, didn’t you?
A Yes. With — with the thought in mind that in the period of time as it went on, I did have a change of mind. (S.F., pp. 52-53).

Q Now, in reference to the fact that as you’ve mentioned awhile ago, that after the agreement had been reached, and so forth, that you, in fact, changed your mind. I’m talking about the October 5, 1978 transaction.
If you hadn’t changed your mind, you probably would have gone and signed the papers along with everybody else, isn’t that right?
A Yes, probably. (S.F., p. 54)

Q Okay, admit or deny this: That you agreed to execute a promissory note in the amount of twelve thousand dollars, payable to the Plaintiffs herein in the presence of Carl G. Quisenberry in exchange for all parties to the lawsuit at that time agreeing to relinquish all claims to each other arising from the subject matter of this litigation?
A As of precisely that date that’s true, but of course, as we testified earlier, there were a lot of reservations and discussions, but as of precisely that date, I would say yes. (S.F., p. 59).

Q And, you testified earlier, they subsequently handed you the documentation, and you didn’t read it, you just told them you weren’t going to do it, is that right?
A That’s true. I had already told them previously that I was not going to do it. Q And, so the documentation didn’t have a thing to do with it, did it?
A No.” (S.F., p. 60).

*532Q —What did you intend when you, as you say, ‘reluctantly’, agreed to settle on the terms we discussed in Carl Quisen-berry’s office in October of ’78, what did you intend?
A I intended to settle, provided that I found no other choice open, or nothing else. In fact, I asked him about taking it on a different arrangement.
As you may recall I had gone from a one-third fee splitting arrangement, and after the others agreed to settle, it left me with a three-thirds bill, which changed the whole complexion of economics in pursuing a lawsuit. So, reluctantly I had agreed to settle finally because I had no place to turn at that moment. (S.F., pp. 66-67).

As the court correctly recognizes, the purpose of Rule 11 is to require that agreements concerning suits “not be left to the fallibility of human recollection.” Wyss v. Bookman, 235 S.W. 567 (Tex.Comm’n App. 1921, holding approved); Matthews v. Looney, 132 Tex. 313, 319, 123 S.W.2d 871, 873 (1939). This is not a suit to construe the language of an unclear agreement, or one in which the court would be forced to supply absent terms. See Sergeant v. Goldsmith Dry Goods Co., 110 Tex. 482, 221 S.W. 259 (1920). The excerpts from Kennedy’s own testimony reveal that the terms were not in dispute. It is, therefore, my opinion that the underlying purpose of Rule 11 has been satisfied.
In Birdwell v. Cox, 18 Tex. 535, 537 (1857) this court stated that the rule requiring agreements concerning causes to be in writing “is a salutary one, and ought to be adhered to whenever counsel disagrees as to what has transpired between them.” (emphasis added). Further, this court has stated that the enforcement of an oral agreement lies within the discretion of the trial court, and such an agreement may be enforced to prevent unjust enrichment. Jenkins v. Adams, 71 Tex. 1, 8 S.W. 603 (1888). Williams v. Huling, 43 Tex. 113 (1875). Where the terms of an oral agreement or stipulation are undisputed or expressly admitted, the agreement should be enforceable even in the absence of a writing.
The court states that this ease closely parallels Matthews v. Looney, 123 S.W.2d 871. This reliance is misplaced because in Matthews there was a dispute between the parties and the attorneys that negotiated the agreement as to the terms of the agreement. There is no such dispute by the parties in our case.
To buttress its opinion, the court says that the “purported oral settlement agreement with Kennedy could easily have been reduced to writing and signed.” This assumption ignores the practical realities of modern trial practice. There is nothing easy about settling a multi-party, multi-suit controversy where charges and counter-charges have been exchanged. Suits are generally settled on broad terms on a “gentleman’s agreement.” Out-of-state witnesses may be released and juries discharged while the lawyers commence the process of drafting and getting the necessary signatures on the documente. Thereafter, the parties must arrange for court approval of the agreement. It is virtually impossible to complete these tasks in the space of one day or even a week. In a case such as this the process often takes several months.
This case has already been tried once to a jury. The jury answered special issues against Kennedy, and the trial court rendered judgment against him. The court of appeals correctly affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Once the announced purpose of Rule 11 has been satisfied, further adherence to its literal requirements becomes a “slavish adherence” to empty legal technicalities. I cannot condone the nullification by the majority of the results of a six day trial and a subsequent appellate review to require compliance with a procedural rule which, in this case, serves no apparent purpose. I would allow enforcement of this oral agreement and bring this matter to an end, avoiding further costly trials and appeals on this six-year old claim.
*533It used to be that a man’s word was his bond. I regret that the court’s opinion facilitates a further erosion of this value.
WALLACE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.