Court Opinion

ID: 9424812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:12:49.288968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:51.228513
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal we review the decision of the three-judge District Court holding a Massachusetts loyalty oath unconstitutional.
The appellee, Richardson, was hired as a research sociologist by the Boston State Hospital. Appellant Cole is superintendent of the hospital. Soon after she entered on duty Mrs. Richardson was asked to subscribe to the oath required of all public employees in Massachusetts. The oath is as follows:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States *678of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional method.”1
Mrs. Richardson informed the hospital’s personnel department that she could not take the oath as ordered because of her belief that it was in violation of the United States Constitution. Approximately 10 days later appellant Cole personally informed Mrs. Richardson that under state law she could not continue as an employee of the Boston State Hospital unless she subscribed to the oath. • Again she refused. On November 25, 1968, Mrs. Richardson’s employment was terminated and she was paid through that date.
*679In March 1969 Mrs. Richardson filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The complaint alleged the unconstitutionality of the statute, sought damages and an injunction against its continued enforcement, and prayed for the convocation of a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§2281 and 2284.
A three-judge District Court held the oath statute unconstitutional and enjoined the appellants from applying the statute to prohibit Mrs. Richardson from working for Boston State Hospital.2 The District Court found the attack on the “uphold and defend” clause, the first part of the oath, foreclosed by Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (SDNY 1967), aff’d, 390 U. S. 36 (1968). But it found that the “oppose the overthrow” clause was “fatally vague and unspecific,” and therefore a violation of First Amendment rights. The court granted the requested injunction but denied the claim for damages.
Appeals were then brought to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We remanded for consideration of whether the case was moot in light of a suggestion that Mrs. Richardson’s job had been filled in the interim. 397 U. S. 238 (1970). On remand, the District Court concluded that Mrs. Richardson’s position had not been filled and that the hospital stood ready to hire her for the continuing research project except for the problem of the oath. In an unreported opinion dated July 1, 1970, it concluded that the case was not moot and reinstated its earlier judgment. Appellants again appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 403 U. S. 917 (1971).
We conclude that the Massachusetts oath is constitutionally permissible, and in light of the prolonged liti*680gation of this case we set forth our reasoning at greater length than previously.
A review of the oath cases in this Court will put the instant oath into context. We have made clear that neither federal nor state government may condition employment on taking oaths that impinge on rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments respectively, as for example those relating to political beliefs. Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U. S. 1 (1971); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U. S. 207, 209 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in result). Nor may employment' be conditioned on an oath that one has not engaged, or will not engage, in protected speech activities such as the following: criticizing institutions of government; discussing political doctrine that approves the overthrow of certain forms of government; and supporting candidates for political office. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278 (1961). Employment may not be conditioned on an oath denying past, or abjuring future, associational activities within constitutional protection; such protected activities include membership in organizations having illegal purposes unless one knows of the purpose and shares a specific intent to promote the illegal purpose. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U. S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952). Thus, last Term in Wadmond the Court sustained inquiry into a bar applicant’s associational activities only because it was narrowly confined to organizations that the individual had known to have the purpose of violent overthrow of the government and whose purpose the individual shared. And, finally, an oath may not be so vague that “ ‘men of common in*681telligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, [because such an oath] violates the first essential of due process of law.’ ” Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S., at 287. Concern for vagueness in the oath cases has been especially great because uncertainty as to an oath’s meaning may deter individuals from engaging in constitutionally protected activity conceivably within the scope of the oath.
An underlying, seldom articulated concern running throughout these cases is that the oaths under consideration often required individuals to reach back into their past to recall minor, sometimes innocent, activities. They put the government into “the censorial business of investigating, scrutinizing, interpreting, and then penalizing or approving the political viewpoints” and past activities of individuals. Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S., at 192 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Several cases recently decided by the Court stand out among our oath cases because they have upheld the constitutionality of oaths, addressed to the future, promising constitutional support in broad terms. These cases have begun with a recognition that the Constitution itself prescribes comparable oaths in two articles. Article II, § 1, cl. 8, provides that the President shall swear that he will “faithfully execute the Office . . . and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Article VI, cl. 3, provides that all state and federal officers shall be bound by an oath “to support this Constitution.” The oath taken by attorneys as a condition of admission to the Bar of this Court identically provides in part “that I will support the Constitution of the United States”; it also requires the attorney to state that he will “conduct [himself] uprightly, and according to law.”
*682Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116 (1966), involved Georgia’s statutory requirement that state legislators swear to “support the Constitution of this State and of the United States,” a paraphrase of the constitutionally required oath. The Court there implicitly concluded that the First Amendment did not undercut the validity of the constitutional oath provisions. Although in theory the First Amendment might have invalidated those provisions, approval of the amendment by the same individuals who had included the oaths in the Constitution suggested strongly that they were consistent. The Court’s recognition of this consistency did not involve a departure from its many decisions striking down oaths that infringed First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court read the Georgia oath as calling simply for an acknowledgment of a willingness to abide by “constitutional processes of government.” 385 U. S., at 135. Accord, Knight v. Board of Regents, 390 U. S. 36 (1968) (without opinion). Although disagreeing on other points, in Wadmond, supra, all members of the Court agreed on this point. Mr. Justice Marshall noted there, while dissenting as to other points,
“The oath of constitutional support requires an individual assuming public responsibilities to affirm . . . that he will endeavor to perform his public duties lawfully.” 401 U. S., at 192.
The Court has further made clear that an oath need not parrot the exact language of the constitutional oaths to be constitutionally proper. Thus in Ohlson v. Phillips, 397 U. S. 317 (1970), we sustained the constitutionality of a state requirement that teachers swear to “uphold” the Constitution. The District Court had concluded that the oath was simply a “ 'recognition that ours is a government of laws and not of men,’ ” and that the oath involved an affirmation of “organic law” and rejection of “the use of force to overthrow the govern*683ment.” Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (Colo. 1969).
The District Court in the instant case properly recognized that the first clause of the Massachusetts oath, in which the individual swears to “uphold and defend” the Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth, is indistinguishable from the oaths this Court has recently approved. Yet the District Court applied a highly literalistic approach to the second clause to strike it down. We view the second clause of the oath as essentially the same as the first.
The second clause of the oath contains a promise to “oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional method.” The District Court sought to give a dictionary meaning to this language and found “oppose” to raise the specter of vague, undefinable responsibilities actively to combat a potential overthrow of the government. That reading of the oath understandably troubled the court because of what it saw as vagueness in terms of what threats would constitute sufficient danger of overthrow to require the oath giver to actively oppose overthrow, and exactly what actions he would have to take in that respect. Cf. Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp., at 1154 and n. 4.
But such a literal approach to the second clause is inconsistent with the Court’s approach to the “support” oaths. One could make a literal argument that “support” involves nebulous, undefined responsibilities for action in some hypothetical situations. As Mr. Justice Harlan noted in his opinion concurring in the result on our earlier consideration of this case,
“[A]lmost any word or phrase may be rendered vague and ambiguous by dissection with a semantic scalpel. . . . [But such an approach] amounts to *684little more than verbal calisthenics. Cf. S. Chase, The Tyranny of Words (1959); W. Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity (1955).” Cole v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 238, 240 (1970).
We have rejected such rigidly literal notions and recognized that the purpose leading legislatures to enact such oaths, just as the purpose leading the Framers of our Constitution to include the two explicit constitutional oaths, was not to create specific responsibilities but to assure that those in positions of public trust were willing to commit themselves to live by the constitutional processes of our system, as Mr. Justice Marshall suggested in Wadmond, 401 U. S., at 192. Here the second clause does not require specific action in some hypothetical or actual situation. Plainly “force, violence or . . . any illegal or unconstitutional method” modifies “overthrow” and does not commit the oath taker to meet force with force. Just as the connotatively active word “support” has been interpreted to mean simply a commitment to abide by our constitutional system, the second clause of this oath is merely oriented to the negative implication of this notion; it is a commitment not to use illegal and constitutionally unprotected force to change the constitutional system. The second clause does not expand the obligation of the first; it simply makes clear the application of the first clause to a particular issue. Such repetition, whether for emphasis or cadence, seems to be the wont of authors of oaths. That the second clause may be redundant is no ground to strike it down ; we are not charged with correcting grammar but with enforcing a constitution.
The purpose of the oath is clear on its face. We cannot presume that the Massachusetts Legislature intended by its use of such general terms as “uphold,” “defend,” and “oppose” to impose obligations of specific, positive action on oath takers. Any such construction would *685raise serious questions whether the oath was so vague as to amount to a denial of due process. Connolly v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S., at 287.
Nor is the oath as interpreted void for vagueness. As Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out in his opinion on our earlier consideration of this case, the oath is “no more than an amenity.” 397 U. S., at 240. It is punishable only by a prosecution for perjury3 and, since perjury is a knowing and willful falsehood, the constitutional vice of punishment without .fair warning cannot occur here. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 413 (1950). Nor here is there any problem of the punishment inflicted by mere prosecution. See Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S., at 284. There has been no prosecution under this statute since its 1948 enactment, and there is no indication that prosecutions have been planned or begun. The oath “triggered no serious possibility of prosecution” by the Commonwealth. Cole v. Richardson, 397 U. S., at 241. Were we confronted with a record of actual prosecutions or harassment through threatened prosecutions, we might be faced with a different question. Those who view the *686Massachusetts oath in terms of an endless “parade of horribles” would do well to bear in mind that many of the hazards of human existence that can be imagined are circumscribed by the classic observation of Mr. Justice Holmes, when confronted with the prophecy of dire consequences of certain judicial action, that it would not occur “while this Court sits.” Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (dissenting).
Appellee mounts an additional attack on the Massachusetts oath program in that it does not provide for a hearing prior to the determination not to hire the individual based on the refusal to subscribe to the oath. All of the cases in this Court that require a hearing before discharge for failure to take an oath involved impermissible oaths. In Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551 (1956) (not an oath case), the State sought to dismiss a professor for claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege in a United States Senate committee hearing; the Court held the State’s action invalid because the exercise of the privilege was a constitutional right from which the State could not draw any rational inference of disloyalty. Appellee relies on Nostrand v. Little, 362 U. S. 474 (1960), and Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U. S. 207 (1971), but in those cases the Court held, only that the mere refusal to take the particular oath was not a constitutionally permissible basis for termination. In the circumstances of those cases, only by holding a hearing, showing evidence of disloyalty, and allowing the employee an opportunity to respond might the State develop a permissible basis for concluding that the employee was to be discharged.
Since there is no constitutionally protected right to overthrow a government by force, violence, or illegal or unconstitutional means, no constitutional right is infringed by an oath to abide by the constitutional system in the future. Therefore, there is no requirement that *687one who refuses to take the Massachusetts oath be granted a hearing for the determination of some other fact before being discharged.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

 The full text of the two relevant statutes is as follows:
Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 264, § 14. Oath or affirmation; form; filing; exemptions
“Every person entering the employ of the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, before entering upon the discharge of his duties, shall'take and subscribe to, under the pains and penalty of perjury, the following oath or affirmation:—
“ T do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional method.’
"Such oath or affirmation shall be filed by the subscriber, if he shall be employed by the state, with the secretary of the commonwealth, if an employee of a county, with the county commissioners, and if an employe of a city or town, with the city clerk or the town clerk, as the case may be.
“The oath or affirmation prescribed by this section shall not be required of any person who is employed by the commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof as a physician or nurse in a hospital or other health care institution and is a citizen of a foreign country.”
C. 264, § 15. Violation of section 14; penalty
“Violation of section fourteen shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.”

 Richardson v. Cole, 300 F. Supp. 1321 (Mass. 1969).

 The District Court interpreted Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 264, § 15, which punishes a "[violation of section fourteen,” see n. 1, supra, as “presumably” punishing “a failure to ‘live up’ to the oath.” We see no basis for this interpretation. The clear purpose of § 15 is to punish the failure to comply with the directive aspects of § 14, which requires that every person entering the employ of the Commonwealth subscribe to the oath and file it with a certain state employee. Section 14, which includes the oath, says that it is taken upon the penalty of perjury but mentions nothing about a continuing criminal responsibility to “live up” to it.
The time may come when the value of oaths in routine public employment will be thought not “worth the candle” for all the division of opinion they engender. However, while oaths are required by legislative acts it is not our function to evaluate their wisdom or utility but only to decide whether they offend the Constitution.