Court Opinion

ID: 9885627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:08:26.007619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:55.400578
License: Public Domain

Kassal, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
This was a marriage of extremely short duration, the parties having actually resided together for less than one year. When they were married on May 17,1980, plaintiff was 35 and defendant was 63 years of age, truly a May-December marriage. Each had been married previously, plaintiff for a little more than 2 years, defendant, a widower after 37 years of marriage, with grandchildren. It appears that this was a rather weak marriage, without any real foundation. In fact, they separated 2 weeks after the marriage and they resumed living together 4 months later. The final separation occurred 11 months thereafter. There was no opposition to the divorce, which was granted to plaintiff on the ground of constructive abandonment, based upon defendant’s refusal to have sexual relations.
Contrary to the implication by the majority, my observation that this was a “rather weak marriage” does not attribute fault to either party. Fault has played no part in my determination and is not in issue in this case. However, I differ with the majority’s interpretation of the holding in Blickstein v Blickstein (99 AD2d 287) as to the role of fault in regard to spousal maintenance. The court carefully limited its decision to the facts which were only concerned with equitable distribution of marital property. The opinion expressly states: “[W]e recognize that the role of marital fault may be different in the context of fixing an award of maintenance * * * However, in view of the fact that an award of maintenance was not sought in the case at bar, we do not pass upon the issue” (emphasis added).
At the time the parties were married, plaintiff worked as an administrative assistant at Lenox Hill Hospital, earning $16,120 annually, plus health insurance. She lived in a small apartment with a monthly rental of $263. Defendant. at the time of the trial was the purchasing agent at Lenox Hill Hospital, earning $63,500 per year, which was subject *547to a yearly increase of 6%. He received several substantial additional benefits, including major medical insurance, pension and annuity, limousine service, theatre tickets, entertainment, etc. His assets included a bank account of $12,000, $35,000 in tax free bonds and life insurance with a cash surrender value of $3,500.
After their separation, plaintiff obtained a secretarial position at the Hewitt School, with an annual salary of $15,600, plus annual increments of 10%. She also receives major medical coverage and disability insurance as incidents of employment. Her school day ends at 4:00 p.m., on Friday at 3:00 p.m. and, in the summer, at 3:00 p.m. and on Friday at 2:00 p.m., shorter hours than when she had worked at Lenox Hill Hospital. She also works 4 or 5 hours per week as a typist for a doctor at $7.50 per hour, earning $30 to $37.50 per week or about $1,500 per annum. Her new apartment has a monthly rental of $387, which is $125 more than the rent for her previous apartment.
I agree that plaintiff should be entitled to maintenance for a very limited period of time. However, I disagree with my colleagues and find this to be an inappropriate case for any equitable distribution award. I also find the amount awarded to be excessive and unwarranted. On this record, there should be a maintenance award, consisting of a lump sum sufficient to permit the wife to re-establish herself as well as an adequate weekly sum to supplement her income for a limited period of time. For the lump amount, I would award a sum of $10,000, which, together with the personal property awarded by Special Term, will enable her to refurbish and refurnish her apartment and replace any other personal property she had prior to the marriage. Limited weekly maintenance will enable her to re-establish herself to her pre-existing standard, taking into account, salary, medical and similar benefits. I would award her the weekly sum of $100 for a period of two years. In my judgment, these would fairly and adequately restore her to her previous condition. Maintenance should be limited to a lump-sum payment of $10,000 and a weekly sum of $100 for a period of two years.
The several factors which lead me to this conclusion are: the brief duration of the marriage, less than one year; *548plaintiff’s present salary at Hewitt School, almost comparable to the previous salary but with less hours and with the mandated 10% salary increases, plus her part-time employment, results in total earnings about the same as she would be earning at Lenox Hill Hospital; the parties’ ages, the defendant is 65 years of age, has 1 child and 6 grandchildren, while plaintiff is 37 years of age; and, the fact that there are no children of this marriage. Her reasonable needs remained essentially unchanged as a result of the marriage; she has sufficient income with the limited weekly maintenance awarded to provide for her needs; her earning capacity and potential have not suffered and the marriage was too brief for plaintiff to have been greatly dependent on defendant; no period of readjustment or training is required for her to be self-supporting as before. Finally, consideration must be given to essential fairness and equity to both sides, incorporated within the “catch-all” factor, “any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper” (Domestic Relations Law, § 236, part B, subd 5, par d, cl [10]; subd 6, par a, cl [10]).
It is patently clear that this is a marriage which, quite simply, did not work out, without any real fault attributable to either party. Concededly, the necessary elements for a permanent and lasting relationship were lacking. On the basis of the sums which I would award to plaintiff, she will have two years to rehabilitate herself (although financially she has almost done that now), build a new life and, with the undisturbed direction by the Trial Justice that she receive all of the personal property specified in the judgment, at the end of two years, she will be more than adequately compensated and rehabilitated. She is still young and her present and future earning capacity have not been impaired since she requires no period of time or training to enable her to be self-sufficient. She already is.
The record does not support a lump-sum award and annual maintenance to the extent directed by the majority. Equitable distribution was not intended to be a bonanza. For equitable distribution purposes, the fact of marriage, in and of itself, does not automatically vest property rights in the other spouse’s estate, irrespective of consideration of *549fairness and equity and the factors enumerated in part B of section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law. Rather, equitable distribution has, as its basis, the distribution of marital property, keeping in mind the “direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party” (Domestic Relations Law, § 236, part B, subd 5, par d, cl [6]). Here, the record does not reflect any such effort or contribution by the plaintiff. Quite simply, this is a marriage of short duration which did not work and should not result in either a penalty or a reward. The only equitable disposition would be to return the parties to status quo ante.
The trial court’s award of $99,600 ($45,000 lump sum and $350 in weekly maintenance for three years, or a total of $54,600) is clearly excessive. The majority’s reduction of this award to $46,200, consisting of a lump-sum payment of $15,000 as “equitable distribution” and $200 in weekly “spousal maintenance” (also for three years) is also disproportionate and unwarranted in applying the statutory factors.
Asch, J. P., Silverman and Lynch, JJ., concur with Fein, J.; Kassal, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in an opinion.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on April 27, 1983, modified on the law and the facts to reduce the lump-sum payment required to be paid by defendant to plaintiff, to $15,000, payable 30 days after service of a copy of this court’s order, and to reduce the weekly maintenance payments to the sum of $200 per week retroactive to January 4, 1982, and to continue for a period of three years and to eliminate the direction for maintenance of health and dental insurance for plaintiff’s benefit and to remove the direction that plaintiff be designated a beneficiary under defendant’s life insurance and retirement/pension plan, and otherwise affirmed, without costs and without disbursements.