Court Opinion

ID: 9929471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 18:10:01.1965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:23:28.102733
License: Public Domain

J-S45018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE ADOPTION OF: A.G.R., A                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF T.R., MOTHER                       :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1223 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered August 7, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at
                            No(s): 2021-2199

  IN RE ADOPTION OF: A.T.R., A                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: T.R., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1224 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered August 7, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at
                           No(s): 2021-02200

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                           FILED: FEBRUARY 2, 2024

       T.R. (Mother) appeals1 from the decrees, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans’ Court Division, granting a

petition for adoption and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 On September 18, 2023, our Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals at

1223 MDA 2023 and 1224 MDA 2023. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.
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two minor children, A.G.R. (born 1/2014) and A.T.R. (born 3/2008)

(collectively, Children).     After careful review, we reverse and remand with

instructions.

       Mother and A.R. (Father) began dating in 2000; they had three children

together, A.R.,2 A.T.R., and A.G.R. In July 2019, the parties separated. In

February 2020, Father filed a protection from abuse (PFA) petition against

Mother.    On February 24, 2020, the court entered a temporary PFA order

requiring Mother to stay away from Father’s residence, but permitting the

parties to mutually agree that Mother have contact with Children “through a

third-party.”3 Temporary PFA Order, 2/24/20, at ¶¶ 3, 5. During the time

that the temporary PFA was in effect (2/24/20-9/2/20), Mother was charged

with indirect criminal contempt for contacting Father in violation of the PFA.

       On February 28, 2020, Mother filed a pro se custody complaint seeking

custody of Children.         Mother failed to appear at a scheduled custody

conference on June 15, 2020, and, as a result, Father was awarded sole legal

and physical custody of Children, with Mother being granted partial physical

custody as agreed to by the parties.

       Following a PFA hearing, on September 2, 2020, the court entered a

final PFA order, by agreement and without admission of wrongdoing, against

Mother protecting Children and Father. The order, which was in effect until

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2 A.R. is over the age of 18 and, thus, not a party to this matter.

3 Paternal grandmother and paternal aunt were the designated intermediaries.

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September 2, 2021, incorporated the terms of the June 15, 2020 custody

order and also included the following provision:        “Non-harassing, non-

threatening, email communication about the [C]hildren only is authorized

between the parties.” Final PFA Order, 9/2/20, at ¶ 5 (Father’s Exhibit 5).

       On October 25, 2020, Father and Stepmother married. Children have

resided with Father and Stepmother since July 2019.       On August 4, 2021,

Father and Stepmother filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s

parental rights to Children and for Stepmother to adopt Children. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2512(a)(1). On August 8, 2021, A.T.R. signed a consent to be

adopted by Stepmother.

       Four hearings were held on March 15, 2022, November 22, 2022,

January 27, 2023, and April 14, 2023. On August 7, 2023, the trial court

entered decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children

pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(1) and (b) of the Adoption Act.4 The court

found that Mother “did not demonstrate reasonable firmness in attempting to

overcome any obstacles Father implemented to prevent her from seeing

Children.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/26/23, at 18.

       Mother filed a contemporaneous notice of appeal and court-ordered

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).          Mother raises the following issues for our

consideration:

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4 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.

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          (1)   Whether the [c]ourt erred in finding that Petitioner[]s
                met their burden under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)
                when Petitioner Father places obstacles in Mother’s
                path [to] prevent [her having] contact with
                [C]hildren?

          (2)   Whether the [c]ourt erred in finding that terminati[ng
                Mother’s] parental rights met the needs and welfare
                of [C]hildren under § 2511(b)?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

      Before turning to Mother’s claims on appeal, we must first sua sponte

address Children’s right to counsel in the underlying contested termination of

parental rights proceedings. Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313:

      (a) Child. — The court shall appoint counsel to represent the child
      in an involuntary termination proceeding when the proceeding is
      being contested by one or both of the parents. The court may
      appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent any child who
      has not reached the age of 18 years and is subject to any other
      proceeding under this part whenever it is in the best interests of
      the child. No attorney or law firm shall represent both the child
      and the adopting parent or parents.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) (italics added). Moreover, “a single attorney cannot

represent a child’s best interest and legal interest if those interests conflict.”

In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020) (citation

omitted). While “a child’s legal interests . . . are synonymous with the child’s

preferred outcome,” a child’s best interests must be determined by the trial

court, with guidance from “statutes and rules.” In re Adoption of L.B.M.,

161 A.3d 172, 174-75 (Pa. 2017). See also In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082

n.2 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted) (legal interests involves attorney expressing

child’s   wishes   regardless   of   whether   attorney    agrees   with   child’s

recommendation and best interests involves guardian ad litem expressing

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what guardian ad litem believes is best for child’s care, protection, safety, and

wholesome physical and mental development, regardless of whether child

agrees).

       By order, effective January 11, 2022, the court appointed Catherine I.

Roland, Esquire, as guardian ad litem for Children, stating that Attorney

Roland was “to notify the [c]ourt and Petitioners, within 20 days, whether

separate legal counsel needed to be appointed to represent Children.” See

Order, 1/14/22.5       When Attorney Roland later requested that counsel be

appointed to represent Children’s legal interests, the court appointed Jeffrey

Shank, Esquire, on November 4, 2022, as legal counsel for Children. However,

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5 However, at a November 3, 2022 proceeding, almost 10 months later, the

court acknowledged the following:

       [I]n a circumstance where there is a contest going on, we have to
       appoint a guardian ad litem for the [Children], and, potentially, a
       legal interest attorney as well. This complicates this.

                                       *       *   *

       The first step would be that of a [g]uardian ad litem. If the
       [g]uardian ad litem determines that either child[] ha[s] an
       intended outcome and that differs from what the [g]uardian ad
       litem would be supporting, that triggers the need for the legal
       interest attorney.

       It's a two-step process. We’ll get a [g]uardian ad litem on board
       first. You can obviously[] inform stepmom and dad that they will
       be hearing from an attorney that would like to speak to the
       children in private.

N.T. Proceeding, 11/3/22, at 10-11 (emphasis added).

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on April 20, 2023, Attorney Shank was removed as legal counsel for A.G.R.,

when it became apparent that Children’s legal interests diverged. See N.T.

Termination Hearing, 11/22/22, at 6 (Attorney Roland stating “early on I

thought I could do both[, I later] thought there was a conflict” between

A.T.R.’s best interests and legal interests) (emphasis added).6

       In K.M.G., supra, our Supreme Court addressed the appointment of

counsel to represent children in contested termination of parental rights

proceedings, with a focus on the trial court’s role in appointing an attorney to

represent the child’s legal interest and an appellate court’s scope of review of

those appointments.        The Court concluded that “while an appellate court

should verify that the orphans’ court appointed counsel to represent the child’s

legal interests, it may not assess sua sponte the performance of that

representation.” Id., 240 A.3d at 1223. In reaching its holding, the Court

made the following pronouncements specifically with regard to the trial court’s

role in such matters:

       [W]here an orphans’ court has appointed a GAL/Counsel to
       represent both the child’s best interests and legal interests,
       appellate courts should review sua sponte whether the
       orphans’ court made a determination that those interests
       did not conflict. We emphasize that appellate review of this
____________________________________________

6 Then, because A.G.R.’s legal interests aligned with her best interests,
Attorney Roland was appointed to represent A.G.R.’s legal interests. See In
the Int. of H.H.N., 296 A.3d 1258 (Pa. Super. 2023) (where child’s legal and
best interests do not diverge in termination proceeding, attorney-GAL
representing child’s best interests can also fulfill role of attorney appointed
under section 2313(a) to represent child’s legal interests).

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       question    does    not    involve   second-guessing      whether
       GAL/Counsel[,] in fact[,] had a conflict . . . as discussed in the
       next section of this opinion, but solely whether the orphans’
       court made the determination in the first instance.

                                       *       *   *

       Accordingly, in fulfilling its duty under [s]ection 2313(a) as
       construed by this Court, the orphans’ court must determine
       whether counsel can represent the dual interests before
       appointing an individual to serve as GAL/Counsel for a
       child. Given the essential nature of the GAL/Counsel’s ability to
       represent a child without conflict and this Court’s mandate that
       the orphans’ court make that determination prior to
       appointment, we conclude that appellate courts should verify
       that the orphans’ court indicated that the attorney could
       represent the child’s best interests and legal interests without
       conflict.

Id. at 1235-36 (emphasis added).

       Here, the Orphans’ Court delegated its prescribed role of determining

whether counsel could represent the dual interests of Children to Attorney

Roland.7 See N.T Termination Proceeding, 11/22/22, at 8 (Attorney Roland

stating to A.T.R. that she “represent[s] what [she] think[s] is best,” to which

trial judge responded, “Whatever you think it best.”).             This is in direct

contravention     of   Supreme      Court      precedent   mandating   that   such   a

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7 We note that the mandated appointment of counsel for children in contested

termination cases is satisfied by the appointment of a guardian ad litem who
is an attorney. See L.B.M., supra at 174. Interestingly, however, the court’s
appointment of Attorney Roland was specifically stated to fulfill the role of
guardian ad litem, not legal counsel, the latter of which is mandated in section
2313(a). Thus, based on the language in the court’s order, it appears that
the court intended her to act as a guardian ad litem advocating for Children’s
best interests.

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determination is to be made by the Orphans’ Court “in the first instance.” Id.

at 1236. Thus, in light of our duty to conduct a limited sua sponte review of

the matter, id. at 1223, we must reverse and remand to the Orphans’ Court

to comply with the procedure as set forth in K.M.G. prior to appointing a GAL

or counsel for Children and holding a new termination proceeding.8 See In

the Interest of K.N.L., 284 A.3d 121, 151 (Pa. 2022); see also L.B.M.,

supra at 183 (“In . . . t[ermination of] p[arental] r[ights] cases[,] critical

rights are at stake. . . . [O]ur General Assembly has decided that counsel for

the child is required because of the primacy of children’s welfare, the

fundamental nature of the parent-child relationship[,] and the permanency of

termination.”).

       Decrees reversed.       Case remanded to Orphans’ Court for hearing de

novo and proceedings consistent with this decision.9 Jurisdiction relinquished.

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8 We are also mindful of the fact that at least one hearing was started in the

matter on March 15, 2022, prior to Attorney Shank being appointed as
Children’s legal counsel, where Attorney Roland presumably represented
Children. Again, we question whether Children’s legal and best interests were
in conflict at that point, a question that should have been determined, prior
to any proceeding, by the trial court.

9Because we are remanding the matter, we need not reach the merits of
Mother’s issues on appeal.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/2/2024

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