Court Opinion

ID: 9659353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:41:46.69666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:06.871289
License: Public Domain

COCHRAN, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
I respectfully dissent because the result in this case should be controlled by our recent unanimous decision in Griffith v. State.1 Applicant's sentence is not illegal, and his trial attorney was not ineffective for declining to object to enhancement with the 1990 “involuntary manslaughter” conviction because that offense had been renamed in 1994 as “intoxication manslaughter.” Applicant’s attorney accurately predicted this Court’s decision in Griffith. A rose by any other name is still a rose. Involuntary manslaughter under former section 19.05(a)(2) is exactly the same offense that is currently titled “intoxication manslaughter” under section 49.08.2
In Griffith, this Court exercised common-sense and logic in concluding that just because “rape” and “aggravated rape” had changed their names to “sexual assault” and “aggravated sexual assault,” the offenses themselves had not changed one whit. Thus, a prior conviction for “rape” could be used for enhancement purposes under section 12.42(c)(2) “even though those offenses are not specifically enumerated in the statute.”3 In Griffith, we concluded that if the enhancement statute were read literally, the result would be an absurd one that the legislature never could have intended.4 We stated:
The literal language of the provision dictates that defendants convicted of a prior rape or aggravated rape avoid an automatic life sentence simply because they committed the crime when it was titled differently in the Penal Code.... This would lead to disparate treatment of repeat sex offenders. The plain language dictates that prior convictions for “substantially similar” offenses from all forty-nine other states are available for such enhancements, but the statute does not explicitly refer to the enhancement for “substantially similar” offenses in Texas. Under the construction proposed by the appellant, prior convictions for rape and aggravated rape from any other state could be used to enhance a later offense, but prior convictions for rape and aggravated rape from Texas could not be used.5
Today, we fail to follow our own unanimous precedent and fail to distinguish it in any meaningful way.
If “rape” and “aggravated rape” are the same crimes as “sexual assault” and “ag*900gravated sexual assault,” why is “involuntary manslaughter” under former section 19.05(a)(2) not the same crime as “intoxication manslaughter” under section 49.08? A strict literal reading of section 49.09, the enhancement provisions for intoxication offenses, would lead to exactly the absurd results that this Court unanimously rejected in Griffith. The Court suggests that because the Legislature did remember to mention the statutory predecessor of intoxication manslaughter in one section of the DWI enhancement law, its omission in another section must have been intentional. Therefore, according to the majority, this situation is different from that in Griffith because the statutory predecessors of sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault were not mentioned at all in the Griffith enhancement sections. Thus, complete forgetfulness is forgivable, but partial forgetfulness is not.
Under section 49.09(b) a DWI offense is a felony of the third degree if the defendant has previously been convicted “one time of an offense under Section 49.08 [intoxication manslaughter] or an offense under the laws of another state if the offense contains elements that are substantially similar to the elements of an offense under Section 49.08.”6 Thus, any prior conviction from any other state for any offense which had substantially similar elements to intoxication manslaughter under section 49.08 can be used to enhance an intoxication offense under section 49.09. Such prior involuntary/intoxication manslaughter convictions from Maine, California, or North Dakota may be used to enhance a Texas DWI, but, according to the majority, the Legislature intentionally forbade the use of a Texas prior conviction for involuntary manslaughter even though the elements are exactly the same as intoxication manslaughter. We rejected this logic in Griffith, and we should reject it today. It leads to absurd results which assume that the Texas Legislature intended a statute that discriminates against its own prior laws.
The incomparable Judge Learned Hand once admonished that statutes “should be construed not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.”7 Courts normally recognize that the purposes in drafting a statute control their interpretation rather than the application of algebraic formulae.8 Indeed, we recently reiterated that the first command in statutory interpretation is to use common sense in divining the evident purpose of the statute:
When we interpret a statute, we try to give effect to the collective intent or purpose of the legislature. We interpret a statute according to the literal meaning of the words in the statute, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result that the legislature could not have in*901tended. If the literal meaning of the words in the statute produce absurd results, we resort to extratextual factors to arrive at a sensible interpretation of the statute and bring about the legislature’s intent.9
In this case we suggest that maybe the Legislature intended to exclude musty old pre-1994 Texas involuntary manslaughter convictions from being used for enhancement purposes, even though it did explicitly include musty old pre-1994 involuntary/intoxication manslaughter convictions from any other state for enhancement purposes. I see nothing in the statute to support this suggestion.10 Alternatively, we rap the legislature’s knuckles for its less-than-perfect draftsmanship with the schoolmarm’s admonition to “alter the statute accordingly.”11 I think we should give greater deference to the statutory purpose and not make a fortress out of the grammarian’s correction book.
I conclude that applicant’s DWI charge was properly enhanced with his 1990 involuntary manslaughter conviction. He is not serving an illegal sentence.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. 116 S.W.3d 782 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (concluding that the defendant’s prior convictions for “rape” and "aggravated rape,” although not entitled "sexual assault” or "aggravated sexual assault” were the predecessors of those offenses and statutorily indistinguishable except in name; holding that those predecessor offenses are included in the enhancement provisions of Penal Code).

. The elements of involuntary manslaughter under former section 19.05(a)(2) were: "(a) A person commits an offense if he ... by accident or mistake when operating a motor vehicle, airplane, helicopter, or boat while intoxicated and, by reason of such intoxication, causes the death of an individual.”
The elements of intoxication manslaughter under current section 49.08 are:
"(a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) operates a motor vehicle in a public place, operates an aircraft, a watercraft, or an amusement ride, or assembles a mobile amusement ride; and (2) is intoxicated and by reason of that intoxication causes the death of another by accident or mistake.”

. 116 S.W.3d at 784.

. See, e.g., Ex parte Ervin, 187 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (noting that courts do not apply the literal meaning of the words in a statute if the result would be absurd).

. Griffith, 116 S.W.3d at 786.

. Tex. Penal Code § 49.09(b).

. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir.1914).

. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) ("The canon in favor of strict construction is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose.”); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Co., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51, 64 S.Ct. 120, 88 L.Ed. 88 (1943) (courts “construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominant general purpose, will read text in the light of the context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy”); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F.Supp. 407, 411 (E.D.La.1969) ("It is an axiom of statutory interpretation that the purpose of a law furnishes the best guide to its application. It is no longer meet, ... to attempt to construe a statute by the literal reading of its words, as if the statute were a tape measure to set beside a length of cloth.”).

. Ex parte Ervin, 187 S.W.3d at 388 (footnote omitted).

. Indeed, the explicit inclusion of former section 19.05(a)(2) as an "Offense relating to the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated” under section 49.09(c)(1)(E) is an excellent indication that the legislature did intend to include — and did in fact include — • these pre-1994 Texas involuntary manslaughter convictions in its felony enhancement scheme. The argument, apparently, is that the legislature explicitly intended these pre-1994 involuntary manslaughter convictions to be used to enhance a current DWI from a Class B misdemeanor to a Class A misdemeanor, but not to a third degree felony as are post-1994 intoxication manslaughter or out-of-state pre- or post-involuntary manslaughter convictions.

. Majority op. at 890.