Court Opinion

ID: 9850819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:03:17.693174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:44.179414
License: Public Domain

Six, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part: I dissent from syllabus ¶ 10 and the corresponding portion of the majority opinion. I concur in the result reached by the remainder of the opinion.
*268My dissent relates to the interpretation extended to K.S.A. 40-256 and attorney fees on appeal under the facts of this case. The Court of Appeals remanded with directions to award post-judgment interest and, under K.S.A. 40-256, reasonable attorney fees for appellate work. I agree with the unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals.
The majority opinion has established a post-appeal travel schedule for the parties. The first stop is at the district court, followed by a trip to the Court of Appeals, and finally to this court, “if further consideration is desired.” The plan is implemented by a vehicle characterized as “a unique double remand.”
K.S.A. 40-256 provides:
“That in all actions hereafter commenced, in which judgment is rendered against any insurance company as defined in K.S.A. 40-201, and including in addition thereto any fraternal benefit society and any reciprocal or interinsurance exchange on any policy or certificate of any type or kind of insurance, if it appears from the evidence that such company, society or exchange has reiused without just cause or excuse to pay the lull amount of such loss, the court in rendering such judgment shall allow the plaintiff a reasonable sum as an attorney’s fee for services in such action, including proceeding upon appeal, to be recovered and collected as a part of the costs. Provided, however, That when a tender is made by such insurance company, society or exchange before the commencement of the action in which judgment is rendered and the amount recovered is not in excess of such tender no such costs shall be allowed.” (Emphasis added.)
The phrase “including proceeding upon appeal” was added by the legislature in 1967. L. 1967, ch. 257, § 1.
The majority opinion discusses Rule 7.07 (1990 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 37).
Rule 7.07 was amended in 1989 to add current subsection (b) relating to the award of attorney fees for services on appeal in any case in which the trial court had authority to award attorney fees. Prior to the 1989 amendment, subsection (b) addressed frivolous appeals only.
Before the Supreme Court’s 1989 amendment to Rule 7.07, the Court of Appeals had held in Vogel v. Haynes, 11 Kan. App. 2d 454, 457-58, 730 P.2d 1096, rev. denied 240 Kan. 806 (1986), and in Stafford v. Karmann, 2 Kan. App. 2d 248, 252, 577 P.2d 836 (1978), that it had authority on appeal to award fees for appellate work to carry out the intent of the statute involved in *269each case. Karmann related to mandatory awarding of fees in automobile negligence actions under what is now K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 60-2006. Haynes concerned mandatory awarding of fees under K.S.A. 61-2701 et seq., the Kansas Small Claims Procedure Act.
K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 60-1610(b)(4) relates to costs and fees in domestic actions. Under that statute, the trial court may award attorney fees, in its discretion, based on justice or equity. Although attorney fees were requested in In re Marriage of Arndt, 239 Kan. 355, 357, 719 P.2d 1236 (1986), we held the appeal (involving a property settlement agreement in a divorce case) was not frivolous and, consequently, under Rule 7.07(b) attorney fees for services on appeal could not be awarded.
In my view, the 1989 amendment to Rule 7.07 was effected to clarify and authorize a procedure for attorney fees for appellate work in discretionary situations.
Kansas has always adhered to the American rule, which reasons that attorney fees are not recoverable absent statutory authority. We departed from the English rule, which provided that the prevailing party must normally pay the attorney fees of both parties, early in our history. Swartzell et al. v. Rogers, 3 Kan. *380, *383 (1866). See Leslie, Recovery of Attorney Fees — An Historical Perspective, 53 J.K.B.A. 154 (1984).
The legislature, under the American rule, has provided in K.S.A. 40-256 for attorney fees in cértain actions against insurance companies. K.S.A. 40-256 was specifically amended in 1967 to provide for appellate fees.
I would follow the statute and shorten the trip for the parties with a one-stop disposition at the trial court level.
LOCKETT, J., joins in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.