Court Opinion

ID: 9555244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 14:08:37.282716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:01.337399
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 129453

                                            IN THE
                                   SUPREME COURT
                                                OF
                              THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                       (Docket No. 129453)

     DAN CAULKINS et al., Appellees, v. JAY ROBERT PRITZKER, in His Official Capacity
                  as Governor of the State of Illinois, et al., Appellants.

                                  Opinion filed August 11, 2023.

            JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

            Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville and Cunningham concurred in the
         judgment and opinion.

            Justice Holder White dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Overstreet.

            Justice O’Brien dissented, with opinion.

                                            OPINION

¶1           The Protect Illinois Communities Act (Act) restricts firearms and related items
         that the Act defines as “an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber
     rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge” (collectively, assault weapons) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(b)
     (West 2022)) and “large capacity ammunition feeding device[s],” commonly
     known as large capacity magazines (LCMs) (id. § 24-1.10(b)). Certain restrictions
     do not apply to (1) law enforcement agencies and individuals who complete
     firearms training as part of their employment in law enforcement, corrections, the
     military, and private security (trained professionals) (id. §§ 24-1.9(e), 24-1.10(e))
     and (2) individuals who possessed assault weapons or LCMs before the restrictions
     became effective (grandfathered individuals) (id. §§ 24-1.9(d), 24-1.10(d)).

¶2       The circuit court of Macon County entered declaratory judgment for plaintiffs
     on two claims that the restrictions are facially unconstitutional because the
     exemptions deny the “law-abiding public” equal protection (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
     § 2) and constitute special legislation (id. art. IV, § 13) under the Illinois
     Constitution. Defendants appeal directly to this court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a)(1) (eff.
     Oct. 4, 2011).

¶3       Plaintiffs defend the judgment on equal protection and special legislation
     grounds and allege for the first time that, regardless of the exemptions, the
     restrictions violate the second amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S.
     Const., amend. II. They further argue that Public Act 102-1116 (eff. Jan. 10, 2023),
     which added sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10 to the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS
     5/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)), violates the three-readings requirement of the Illinois
     Constitution and that the circuit court erred in ruling to the contrary. Ill. Const.
     1970, art. IV, § 8(d).

¶4       First, we hold that the exemptions neither deny equal protection nor constitute
     special legislation because plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that they are
     similarly situated to and treated differently from the exempt classes. Second,
     plaintiffs expressly waived in the circuit court any independent claim that the
     restrictions impermissibly infringe the second amendment. Third, plaintiffs’ failure
     to cross-appeal is a jurisdictional bar to renewing their three-readings claim.
     Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court and enter judgment for defendants on the
     equal protection and special legislation claims. We express no opinion on the
     potential viability of plaintiffs’ waived claim concerning the second amendment.

                                             -2-
¶5                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶6                                          A. The Act

¶7         The Act amended the Criminal Code of 2012 to restrict access to assault
       weapons and LCMs. Pub. Act 102-1116, § 25 (eff. Jan. 10, 2023) (adding 720 ILCS
       5/24-1.9, 24-1.10). The Act, effective January 10, 2023, prohibits the purchase and
       sale, manufacture, delivery, and import of firearms defined by the statute as “assault
       weapons,” except sales to persons in other States or to those authorized to acquire
       them under the Act’s enumerated exemptions for certain professionals. 720 ILCS
       5/24-1.9(b) (West 2022). The Act also prohibits possession of assault weapons
       beginning on January 1, 2024.

¶8         However, the Act contains two exemptions relevant here. A “grandfather”
       provision permits persons who lawfully possessed assault weapons before January
       10, 2023, to continue to possess them as long as they provide an endorsement
       affidavit to the Illinois State Police by January 1, 2024. Id. § 24-1.9(c), (d). Those
       who inherit a lawfully owned assault weapon may retain it upon providing an
       endorsement affidavit. Id. § 24-1.9(d)(2)(ii). An endorsement affidavit, which is
       executed electronically as a form through a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID)
       card account (430 ILCS 65/4.1 (West 2022)), identifies the weapon and affirms that
       the individual owned it before January 10, 2023. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(d) (West
       2022).

¶9         The Act also restricts the manufacture, delivery, sale, and purchase of LCMs,
       except the restriction on possession took effect on April 10, 2023, and the Act does
       not require endorsement affidavits for LCMs. Id. § 24-1.10(b)-(d).

¶ 10        In addition to the “grandfather” provision, the Act exempts seven enumerated
       classes from the restrictions on possession and purchase. Four of the exemptions
       apply to law enforcement agencies, peace officers, corrections officials, and active
       and retired law enforcement officers qualified under the federal Law Enforcement
       Officers Safety Act of 2004 (18 U.S.C. §§ 926B, 926C (2018)), as recognized under
       Illinois law. Those included in this law-enforcement exemption are required by law
       to receive firearms training and qualifications. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(e)(1)-(4), 24-
       1.10(e)(1)-(4) (West 2020).

                                               -3-
¶ 11        Three other exemptions apply to members of the armed services, the reserve
       forces, and the Illinois National Guard; licensed private security guards; and guards
       at nuclear facilities, all of whom also receive firearms training by virtue of their
       employment. The Act permits them to possess assault weapons and LCMs, but only
       to the extent required by their official duties. Id. §§ 24-1.9(e)(5)-(7), 24-1.10(e)(5)-
       (7).

¶ 12                                     B. The Complaint

¶ 13       Plaintiffs are a business, two separately named individuals, and a voluntary
       unincorporated association, consisting of hundreds of individuals and businesses.
       All plaintiffs allege they “possess or otherwise desire to deliver, sell, import, or
       purchase” assault weapons as defined by section 24-1.9(a) “and/or manufacture,
       deliver, sell, or purchase” LCMs as defined by section 24-1.10(a).

¶ 14       Plaintiff Decatur Jewelry is a licensed pawn broker engaged in intrastate and
       interstate commerce involving “the sale, possession, and transfer of firearms.”
       Decatur Jewelry, which as a pawn broker holds certain assault weapons as security,
       alleges sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10 criminalize the return of those weapons to their
       rightful owners.

¶ 15      Dan Caulkins and Perry Lewin are residents and citizens of Illinois who also
       “possess or otherwise desire to deliver, sell, import, or purchase” assault weapons
       “and/or manufacture, deliver, sell or purchase” LCMs.

¶ 16       Law-Abiding Gun Owners of Macon County is an association of “similarly
       interested members associated for the purpose of protecting the Second
       Amendment and Property rights of law-abiding gun owners.” Members must
       possess a valid FOID card.

¶ 17       The complaint alleged six counts seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and
       the parties filed opposing motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved for
       summary judgment only on counts IV and V, which alleged violations of the Illinois
       Constitution’s equal protection and special legislation clauses.

¶ 18       Count IV, the equal protection claim, alleged the trained professionals are
       “seemingly a protected class based upon their occupations” and “are wholly exempt

                                                -4-
       based on their employment status.” The claim alleged that “[c]reating an exempt
       status for those persons is not only irrational and completely lacking anything
       approaching common sense, there are no set of facts wherein it can survive a
       constitutional attack based upon equal protection regardless of the standard of
       review.” Count IV alleged, “At issue is the infringement of a right to bear arms as
       guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution” such that the restrictions “are indisputably
       in violation of the Plaintiffs [sic] equal rights to be treated the same as their fellow
       citizens who are similarly situated in regard to their individual and fundamental
       constitutional rights to bear arms for self-defense.” Count IV sought a judgment
       declaring sections 24-1.9(a) and 24-1.10(a) unconstitutional under the equal
       protection clause.

¶ 19        Count V, the special legislation claim, alleged “the 2nd Amendment protects
       the additional right to commercial and non-commercial sale of arms,” while
       sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10 “create an economic franchise for those excepted from
       its criminal provisions to engage commerce, commercial and non-commercial, in
       gun sales on a broader basis not available to all who own ‘assault weapons’ or desire
       to purchase, gift, receive or sell ‘assault weapons.’ ” Count V sought a judgment
       declaring sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10 unconstitutional for creating special
       classifications according to the excepted class, which enjoys “an economic
       franchise” in violation of the special legislation clause.

¶ 20       To the extent the complaint made isolated references to the right to keep and
       bear arms under either the second amendment or article I, section 22, of the Illinois
       Constitution, it was to claim that plaintiffs, as members of the law-abiding public
       with valid FOID cards, are similarly situated to the exempt classes for equal
       protection and special legislation purposes. Neither count IV nor count V alleged
       the restrictions violate the second amendment.

¶ 21                                     C. The Judgment

¶ 22       The circuit court determined that Accuracy Firearms, LLC v. Pritzker, 2023 IL
       App (5th) 230035, ¶ 65, which had upheld a temporary restraining order on an equal
       protection challenge to sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10, entitled plaintiffs to summary
       judgment on their equal protection and special legislation claims. The circuit court
       ruled that the rights to bear arms under the state and federal constitutions are

                                                -5-
       fundamental rights; therefore, the challenged legislation was subject to strict
       scrutiny, which the legislation did not satisfy.

¶ 23       The circuit court did not consider whether plaintiffs were similarly situated to,
       but treated differently from, the exempt classes. Instead, the circuit court ruled the
       restrictions (1) denied plaintiffs equal protection by infringing on their gun rights
       (count IV) and (2) constituted special legislation by conferring an arbitrary right
       upon those eligible for the exception while excluding plaintiffs (count V). The court
       entered judgment for defendants on the remaining counts, including plaintiffs’
       claim that the Act violates the three readings clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill.
       Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d).

¶ 24       Defendants filed a notice of direct appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
       302(a)(1) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). We granted the state’s attorneys of 33 counties leave
       to submit a brief amici curiae in support of plaintiffs, pursuant to Illinois Supreme
       Court Rule 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 25                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26                                  A. Standard of Review

¶ 27       This appeal arises from plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion for declaratory
       relief on the equal protection and special legislation claims. 735 ILCS 5/2-701(a)
       (West 2022).

          “[S]ummary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions,
          admissions and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to
          the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
          and that the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
          Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 29.

       See 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2022). We review a summary judgment de novo.
       Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 30.

¶ 28       We also review a constitutional challenge to a statute de novo because it
       presents a question of law. People v. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072, ¶ 23. Legislative
       enactments have a strong presumption of constitutionality, and this court must

                                                -6-
       uphold the constitutionality of a statute when reasonably possible. Id. Plaintiffs,
       who are on the side challenging the constitutionality of sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10
       of the Act, bear the burden to prove the statutes’ invalidity. Id.

¶ 29       Plaintiffs mount a facial challenge, which is the most difficult type of
       constitutional challenge. An enactment is invalid on its face only if no set of
       circumstances exists under which it would be valid. People v. One 1998 GMC, 2011
       IL 110236, ¶ 20. A facial challenge requires a showing that the statute is
       unconstitutional under any set of facts; the specific facts related to the challenging
       party are irrelevant. People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 117 (2006).

¶ 30                                B. The Second Amendment

¶ 31       As a preliminary matter, we address plaintiffs’ argument that, regardless of how
       the exemptions implicate equal protection and special legislation, the restrictions
       themselves violate the right to keep and bear arms under the second amendment to
       the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II). Notably, plaintiffs do not
       assert the restrictions violate the corresponding right to arms set forth in article I,
       section 22, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22). Plaintiffs’
       references to the Illinois right to arms are isolated and made only in opposition to
       subjecting the classifications to rational-basis scrutiny in the equal protection
       context. Plaintiffs contend in their brief that the second amendment—not article I,
       section 22—provides an independent basis for affirming the judgment.

¶ 32       Plaintiffs frame the second amendment as a threshold issue, asserting that, if
       the right to keep and bear arms does not tolerate the restrictions, the court need not
       decide whether the exemptions deny equal protection or constitute special
       legislation. Citing the principle that a reviewing court may sustain the decision of
       the circuit court on any grounds called for by the record (Landmarks Preservation
       Council of Illinois v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1988)), plaintiffs ask
       this court to affirm the summary judgment because defendants did not demonstrate
       that the restrictions are consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation.

¶ 33       The second amendment states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
       security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
       infringed.” U.S. Const., amend. II. “At its core, the second amendment protects the

                                                 -7-
       right of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home.”
       Guns Save Life, Inc. v. Ali, 2021 IL 126014, ¶ 28 (citing District of Columbia v.
       Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). The United States Supreme Court has stated, “it
       is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the
       right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system
       of ordered liberty.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010);
       Johnson v. Department of State Police, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 37.

¶ 34       Unlike equal protection, the second amendment does not concern the end that
       the government seeks to achieve and whether the means of doing so is an
       appropriate fit. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 507 U.S. ___, ___, 142
       S. Ct. 2111, 2127 (2022). Instead, second amendment claims involve a fact-
       intensive inquiry asking (1) whether a plaintiff has shown that the regulated items
       fall in the category of “bearable arms” (id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2132) that are
       “commonly used” for self-defense today (id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2138) and, if so,
       (2) whether the restrictions are consistent with “this Nation’s historical tradition of
       firearm regulation” (id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2126).

¶ 35       For two reasons, these issues were never raised or considered below. First,
       plaintiffs omitted a second amendment claim from the complaint and expressly
       disclaimed it in their pleadings. Second, equal protection and second amendment
       challenges are analyzed under different standards.

¶ 36       A summary judgment motion is confined to the issues raised in the complaint,
       and a plaintiff may not raise new issues not pleaded in his complaint to support or
       defeat a motion for summary judgment. 800 South Wells Commercial LLC v.
       Cadden, 2018 IL App (1st) 162882, ¶ 43; Filliung v. Adams, 387 Ill. App. 3d 40,
       51-52 (2008) (the purpose of a complaint is to define the claims in controversy, and
       if a party does not seek to amend his complaint, he cannot raise new claims in a
       summary judgment motion); Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 373 Ill.
       App. 3d 895, 900 (2007) (“A party cannot seek summary judgment on a theory that
       was never pled in the complaint.”).

¶ 37       The complaint did not allege the restrictions violate the second amendment to
       the United States Constitution, and none of the six counts were labeled that way.
       Counts I and II sought a declaratory judgment that the Act violates the Illinois
       Constitution’s single-subject rule and three-readings requirement, respectively. Ill.

                                                -8-
       Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d). Count III sought a declaratory judgment that the
       legislature’s noncompliance with these rules denied plaintiffs due process. Id. art.
       I, § 2. Count VI alleged Decatur Jewelry had suffered a due process violation and
       a regulatory taking. And the complaint generally requested an injunction to enjoin
       enforcement of sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10. Plaintiffs did not move for summary
       judgment on any of these claims, and none can be liberally construed as alleging a
       violation of the second amendment. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc.,
       174 Ill. 2d 77, 110 (1996) (“A complaint must be liberally construed, to the end that
       controversies may be quickly and finally determined according to the substantive
       rights of the parties.”); 735 ILCS 5/1-106 (West 2022).

¶ 38       The complaint mentioned the second amendment and article I, section 22, only
       in passing. Count IV cited article I, section 22, as it pertains to equal protection,
       and count V cited the second amendment as it pertains to special legislation. Both
       counts alleged the exemptions are subject to strict scrutiny because they impact a
       fundamental right. But invoking the right to keep and bear arms in the context of
       scrutinizing the Act’s classifications is not the same as alleging the restrictions
       violate the second amendment. Plaintiffs directed counts IV and V at the
       exemptions, not the restrictions themselves.

¶ 39        Furthermore, plaintiffs repeatedly disclaimed any second amendment violation.
       First, they explained in their memorandum for injunctive relief that “[t]his current
       litigation is not testing the contours of [weapons’] classification, per se—that
       debate is engaged in federal court—and a more fact intensive dispute regarding
       historical understandings of the Second Amendment.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 40       Second, plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion invoked the second amendment
       only to demonstrate they were similarly situated to the exempted classes for equal
       protection purposes. Acknowledging the difference between the equal protection
       clause and the second amendment, plaintiffs asserted “The question presented is
       not whether a weapon classification survives constitutional challenge. Rather, the
       question presented is whether citizens qualified to acquire and possess firearms and
       firearm ammunition can be treated differently in the application of the weapon
       classification.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 41      Plaintiffs made clear below that this dispute concerns equal protection and
       special legislation, but plaintiffs now attempt to piggyback a second amendment

                                               -9-
       claim onto those allegations to circumvent the fact-intensive Bruen analysis. The
       theory under which a case is tried in the circuit court cannot be changed on review,
       and an issue not presented to or considered by the circuit court cannot be raised for
       the first time on review. In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 172 (2005).
       Allowing a party to change his theory of the case on review would weaken the
       adversarial process and the system of appellate jurisdiction and could also prejudice
       the opposing party, who did not have an opportunity to respond to that theory in the
       circuit court. Id.

¶ 42       The record demonstrates plaintiffs omitted a stand-alone second amendment
       claim from the complaint and expressly disclaimed it in the circuit court, resulting
       in waiver. Allowing plaintiffs to argue a novel theory that was neither pleaded nor
       argued below would prejudice defendants and amount to improper advocacy on
       plaintiffs’ behalf. Plaintiffs chose not to present their case to the circuit court in
       second amendment terms, and we hold them to their decision. Plaintiffs are
       procedurally barred from challenging the weapon classification as violating the
       second amendment.

¶ 43       Moreover, even if we accepted plaintiffs’ distorted view of the complaint or
       excused their unambiguous waiver, genuine questions of material fact would
       preclude summary judgment on a second amendment claim. Ascertaining whether
       the restrictions unconstitutionally infringe on the public’s right to keep and bear
       arms requires consideration of whether the regulated items are bearable arms that
       are commonly used for self-defense and whether the regulations are consistent with
       this nation’s historical traditions. Unsurprisingly, the record contains no
       evidence—beyond news articles—relevant to these questions because plaintiffs
       never raised them in the circuit court. Even if the complaint alleged a second
       amendment claim, the record does not support affirming the judgment on that basis.
       As plaintiffs expressly disclaimed a second amendment claim below, we offer no
       opinion on the potential viability of such a claim.

¶ 44                       C. Equal Protection and Special Legislation

¶ 45      This appeal concerns plaintiffs’ assertion that the exemptions in sections 24-1.9
       and 24-1.10 deny them equal protection. Article I, section 2, of the Illinois
       Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

                                               - 10 -
       without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Ill.
       Const. 1970, art. I, § 2.

¶ 46       The equal protection clause guarantees that similarly situated individuals will
       be treated in a similar manner, unless the government can demonstrate an
       appropriate reason to treat those individuals differently. In re M.A., 2015 IL
       118049, ¶ 24. The equal protection clause does not forbid the legislature from
       drawing distinctions in legislation among different categories of people as long as
       the legislature does not draw those distinctions based on criteria wholly unrelated
       to the legislation’s purpose. Id. The analysis applied to equal protection claims is
       the same under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Jacobson v.
       Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996).

¶ 47       The threshold question in the equal protection analysis is whether the claimant
       is “similarly situated” to the comparison group. “ ‘Evidence of different treatment
       of unlike groups does not support an equal protection claim.’ ” M.A., 2015 IL
       118049, ¶ 25 (quoting In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶ 92). Two classes are
       similarly situated only when they are alike in all relevant respects. Id. ¶¶ 25, 33;
       In re Destiny P., 2017 IL 120796, ¶ 15.

¶ 48       The determination of whether two classes are similarly situated is not made in
       the abstract. Rather, the court must consider the purpose of the particular
       legislation. M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶¶ 26, 29. Assessing similarity

          “is not a contextless comparison of the classes within the broader group. To
          meaningfully assess whether a claimant is similarly situated to all others in all
          relevant respects, we examine the positions of the claimant and all others in
          light of the broad purpose and operation of the statute. Whether a claimant is
          ‘similarly situated’ to other persons cannot be decided based solely on the very
          classification challenged as violating equal protection. Stated another way, a
          classification does not pass equal protection muster simply because the
          Legislature created two classes. To do so would beg the question and render the
          equal protection principle meaningless.” Fletcher Properties, Inc. v. City of
          Minneapolis, 947 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. 2020).

¶ 49      The special legislation clause supplements the equal protection clause, and in
       many cases, the two clauses provide the same protection. In re Estate of Jolliff, 199

                                              - 11 -
       Ill. 2d 510, 519 (2002). The legislature enjoys broad discretion in making statutory
       classifications, but the special legislation clause prohibits the legislature from
       conferring a benefit or privilege upon one group while excluding other similarly
       situated groups. Id. The special legislation clause is intended to prevent legislative
       classifications without a sound and reasonable basis from discriminating in favor
       of a select group. Id. Plaintiffs concede the equal protection analysis in this action
       also applies to their special legislation challenge, as a special legislation challenge
       is generally judged under the same standards that apply to an equal protection
       challenge. Moline School District No. 40 Board of Education v. Quinn, 2016 IL
       119704, ¶ 24.

¶ 50                                  1. Legislative Purpose

¶ 51       To assess whether plaintiffs are similarly situated to but treated differently from
       the exempt groups, we examine the relative positions of the two classes in light of
       the broad purpose and operation of the statute. The Act does not state a legislative
       purpose motivating the restrictions and exemptions in section 24-1.9 and 24-1.10.
       Defendants infer from the statutory scheme that the Act is intended to reduce the
       number of assault weapons and LCMs in circulation because they are often used by
       perpetrators of mass shootings.

¶ 52       Plaintiffs respond that inferring a legislative purpose where none is expressed
       amounts to improper speculation. They rely on Accuracy Firearms, which held the
       legislature’s failure to articulate an express legislative purpose for the Act obviated
       the requirement for the equal-protection claimants to allege they were similarly
       situated to the exempt groups. Accuracy Firearms, 2023 IL App (5th) 230035, ¶ 61.
       The majority held,

          “Here, it is extremely relevant that no purpose of the legislation and no basis
          for the classifications was provided at the time plaintiffs’ pleadings were filed.
          As such, any allegation regarding similarity would be speculative, at best. ***
          As the basis for the exempted classification was unavailable, it is undeniable
          that a specific allegation as to how any plaintiff might be similarly situated to
          one of the exempted classes would be pure conjecture, beyond the fact that each
          plaintiff and all those now in an exempted class were similarly situated, and
          indeed possessed the same rights, prior to January 23, 2023.” Id.

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¶ 53       The Accuracy Firearms court was misguided in dispensing with the threshold
       question of whether the equal-protection claimants were similarly situated to the
       exempt groups. It is axiomatic that an equal-protection claimant must show he is
       similarly situated to the comparison group, and assessing the similarity requires an
       analysis of the legislation’s purpose. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072, ¶ 25. Sometimes,
       the legislative purpose is unclear, but that does not excuse the claimant from
       showing similarity. Justice Powell once observed in the equal protection context
       that “a legislative body rarely acts with a single mind” and “compromises blur
       purpose.” Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244 n.6 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting,
       joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.). “Therefore, it is appropriate to
       accord some deference to the executive’s view of legislative intent, as similarly we
       accord deference to the consistent construction of a statute by the administrative
       agency charged with its enforcement.” Id. “Ascertainment of actual purpose to the
       extent feasible, however, remains an essential step in equal protection.” Id.

¶ 54       When assessing a claimant’s similarity to the comparator class, a court may
       glean legislative purpose from the statutory scheme and the classifications
       themselves. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975) (an
       examination of the legislative scheme and its history may demonstrate that the
       purpose asserted by the government could not have been a goal of the legislation).

¶ 55        Here, the trained professionals comprise seven enumerated categories of
       individuals who are exempt from the purchase and possession restrictions based on
       their employment status and training. Four of the exemptions apply to law
       enforcement agencies, peace officers, corrections officials, and certain current and
       retired law enforcement officers. Those who qualify are required by law to receive
       firearms training and qualifications. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(e)(1)-(4), 24-1.10(e)(1)-(4)
       (West 2022).

¶ 56      Specifically, the restrictions on the purchase or possession of assault weapons
       and LCMs do not apply to “ ‘Peace officers’ ” (id. §§ 24-1.9(e)(1), 24-1.10(e)(1)),
       who are defined as

          “(i) any person who by virtue of his office or public employment is vested by
          law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses, whether
          that duty extends to all offenses or is limited to specific offenses, or (ii) any
          person who, by statute, is granted and authorized to exercise powers similar to

                                              - 13 -
          those conferred upon any peace officer employed by a law enforcement agency
          of this State” (id. § 2-13).

¶ 57       The exemption also applies to “Qualified law enforcement officers and
       qualified retired law enforcement officers,” defined under the federal Law
       Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (18 U.S.C. §§ 926B, 926C (2018)), as
       recognized under Illinois law, as employees of a governmental agency who are (or
       were) authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection,
       investigation, or prosecution of, or the incarceration of any person for, any violation
       of law and has statutory powers of arrest or apprehension under section 807(b) of
       Title 10 of the United States Code (article 7(b) of the Uniform Code of Military
       Justice) (10 U.S.C. § 807(b) (2018)). 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(e)(2), 24-1.10(e)(2) (West
       2022). Qualified law enforcement officers must be authorized by the agency to
       carry a firearm, must not be the subject of any disciplinary action that could result
       in suspension or loss of police powers, must meet agency standards that require the
       employee to regularly qualify in the use of a firearm, must not be under the
       influence of alcohol or another intoxicating or hallucinatory drug or substance, and
       must not be prohibited by federal law from receiving a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 926B
       (2018). Qualified retired law enforcement officers, though no longer authorized to
       engage in law enforcement, must have met these requirements before their
       separation from service, and they are further defined in part as having 10 years’
       aggregate service and continuing to maintain, at their expense, training on the
       standards for qualification in firearms for active law enforcement officers. Id.
       § 926C.

¶ 58       The exemption similarly allows acquisition and possession of restricted items
       by federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies for the purpose of equipping
       peace officers, qualified law enforcement officers, and qualified retired law
       enforcement officers. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(e)(3), 24-1.10(e)(3) (West 2022). Finally,
       the exemption applies to wardens, superintendents, and keepers of prisons,
       penitentiaries, and jails. Id. §§ 24-1.9(e)(4), 24-1.10(e)(4).

¶ 59       Three other exempt classes include members of the armed services, reserve
       forces of the United States, or the Illinois National Guard; licensed private security
       guards and their employers; and guards at nuclear facilities, who all receive
       firearms training by virtue of their employment. Id. §§ 24-1.9(e)(5)-(7), 24-

                                               - 14 -
       1.10(e)(5)-(7). The Act permits these three groups to possess assault weapons and
       LCMs, but only while “performing their official duties.” Id. §§ 24-1.9(e)(5)-(7),
       24-1.10(e)(5)-(7).

¶ 60       The Act’s grandfather provision permits persons who lawfully possessed an
       assault weapon before January 10, 2023, to continue to possess it as long as they
       provide an endorsement affidavit. Id. § 24-1.9(d). The affidavit must contain the
       person’s FOID card number and an affirmation that the affiant possessed the assault
       weapon before the Act’s effective date or inherited the assault weapon from an
       authorized person. Id. The provision restricts the transfer of an assault weapon to
       only an heir, an individual residing in another state and maintaining it in another
       state, or a federally licensed firearms dealer. Id. The grandfather provision similarly
       permits possession and restricts transfer of LCMs, but an endorsement affidavit is
       not required. Id. § 24-1.10(d).

¶ 61       The grandfather provision restricts where assault weapons and LCMs may be
       taken. A grandfathered individual may possess the restricted items only (1) on
       private property owned or immediately controlled by the person; (2) on private
       property that is not open to the public with the express permission of the person
       who owns or immediately controls such property; (3) while on the premises of a
       licensed firearms dealer or gunsmith for the purpose of lawful repair; (4) while
       engaged in the legal use of the assault weapon or LCM at a properly licensed firing
       range or sport shooting competition venue; or (5) while traveling to or from these
       locations, provided that the assault weapon or LCM is stored unloaded and enclosed
       in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container. Id. §§ 24-1.9(d),
       24-1.10(d).

¶ 62       Although the legislature did not state an express goal of the Act, the statutory
       scheme plainly implements firearms restrictions in furtherance of public health,
       safety, and welfare, with exceptions for those (1) who have undertaken specialized
       training as part of their employment in law enforcement, the military, or security or
       (2) who have a reliance interest in retaining possession of items legally acquired
       before such acquisition was prohibited and who adhere to new restrictions on
       possession and transfer. The Act attempts to balance public safety against the
       expertise of the trained professionals and the expectation interests of the
       grandfathered individuals.

                                               - 15 -
¶ 63       The restrictions and exemptions are consistent with defendants’ representation
       that “the Act seeks to accomplish the legislative goal of reducing the number of
       assault weapons and LCMs in circulation, because they are often used by
       perpetrators of mass shootings,” and the method of accomplishing that goal is
       “limiting the number of firearms and magazines most likely to result in a mass
       shooting—by restricting the sale, purchase, and possession of new ones.” This
       legislative purpose informs our analysis of whether plaintiffs have alleged they are
       similarly situated to but treated differently from the exempt groups.

¶ 64                               2. The Trained Professionals

¶ 65        Plaintiffs argue they were denied equal protection because “[t]he facial
       classification under the Act criminalizes acquisition or possession by some law-
       abiding citizens qualified to acquire or possess a firearm/bearable arm under the
       Second Amendment and immunizes from criminal penalty other law-abiding
       citizens qualified to acquire or possess under the Second Amendment. All are FOID
       card holders.”

¶ 66       Plaintiffs also make a parallel argument that the statutes constitute special
       legislation. Plaintiffs contend “the similarly situated comparator here are law-
       abiding gun-owners holding valid FOID cards qualified to acquire or possess
       firearms (bearable arms) in the home for defense under the preexisting fundamental
       right codified by the Second Amendment.”

¶ 67       Plaintiffs’ position is that as “law-abiding gun owners” they are similarly
       situated to the trained professionals because “[a]ll are FOID card holders” with
       second amendment rights. Plaintiffs’ position has intuitive appeal, but an
       examination of the FOID Act’s requirements demonstrates plaintiffs and the trained
       professionals are not similar in all relevant respects. See 430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq.
       (West 2022).

¶ 68       A FOID card applicant must submit to the Illinois State Police evidence of
       eligibility, based on his or her age, citizenship, criminal history, and several other
       factors. See id. § 4(a). But FOID card eligibility does not entail any kind of firearms
       training or qualification in furtherance of public safety. A FOID card holder does
       not have a duty to maintain public order; to make arrests for offenses; or to prevent,

                                               - 16 -
       detect, investigate, prosecute, or incarcerate a person for a violation of law. By
       contrast, each of the seven categories of trained professionals must undergo
       specialized firearms training pertaining to their employment to maintain their
       exempt status under the Act. This training supports the presumption that they
       exercise greater responsibility in the safe handling and storage of firearms. “The
       charge of protecting the public, and the training that accompanies that charge, is
       what differentiates the exempted personnel from the rest of the population.” Shew
       v. Malloy, 994 F. Supp. 2d 234, 252 (D. Conn. 2014), aff’d in part and rev’d in part
       sub nom. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir.
       2015). “Similarly, members of the military and government agency personnel who
       use the otherwise banned firearms and magazines in the course of their employment
       should also have an advantage while maintaining public safety ***.” Id. Because
       FOID card holders are not similar in all relevant respects to the trained
       professionals, plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged the similarly situated element,
       and their equal protection and special legislation challenges to the classification
       fail.

¶ 69                            3. The Grandfathered Individuals

¶ 70       Plaintiffs next argue they are denied equal protection because the grandfathered
       individuals are afforded preferential treatment. Plaintiffs and the grandfathered
       individuals can retain their previously acquired restricted items but may acquire no
       more. Plaintiffs allege they “possess or desire to” acquire additional assault
       weapons and LCMs as prohibited by sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10 of the Act.

¶ 71       The complaint alleges plaintiffs’ possession in the disjunctive. To the extent
       plaintiffs allege they do not already possess restricted items, they are prohibited
       from acquiring new ones, while the grandfathered individuals may retain theirs. But
       unlike plaintiffs who do not already possess restricted items, the grandfathered
       individuals have a reliance interest based on their acquisition before the restrictions
       took effect. By pointing out that those who already possess restricted items may
       retain them under the grandfather provision, the complaint makes clear that
       plaintiffs are not similarly situated to the exempt class. See Purze v. Village of
       Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding, in a challenge to a
       zoning decision, that the plaintiff was not similarly situated to others who received

                                               - 17 -
       different treatment for different reasons); Jucha v. City of North Chicago, 63 F.
       Supp. 3d 820, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (grandfather provision rendered the claimant
       dissimilar to the comparator).

¶ 72       To the extent plaintiffs allege they already possess restricted items, plaintiffs
       may retain them but may not acquire more, which matches the restrictions placed
       on those who are grandfathered under the Act. The statutes treat plaintiffs who
       already possess assault weapons and LCMs the same as the grandfathered
       individuals.

¶ 73       Plaintiffs also argue “[t]he grandfathered possess the assault weapon because
       of the codified preexisting fundamental right to keep and bear arms for self-defense
       at home, not because of a legislative act upon which reliance was placed.” Plaintiffs
       essentially contend the restrictions infringe plaintiffs’ second amendment rights,
       while the exemptions protect the grandfathered individuals’ second amendment
       rights. This is tantamount to arguing the restrictions violate the second amendment,
       which plaintiffs expressly disclaimed below.

¶ 74      Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge to the grandfather provision lacks merit,
       and by the same token, plaintiffs’ special legislation claim fails because sections
       24-1.9 and 24-1.10 do not improperly discriminate in favor of the grandfathered
       group and against plaintiffs.

¶ 75                                    D. Three Readings

¶ 76       Finally, plaintiffs argue count II of their complaint provides an independent
       basis for affirming the judgment. Count II alleged that Public Act 102-1116, which
       added sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10 to the Criminal Code of 2012, violates the three-
       readings requirement of the Illinois Constitution. The Constitution provides a “bill
       shall be read by title on three different days in each house.” Ill. Const. 1970, art.
       IV, § 8(d). Count II alleged that the legislature did not follow this procedure and
       that therefore the Act should be invalidated in its entirety. See Friends of the Parks
       v. Chicago Park District, 203 Ill. 2d 312, 328 (2003) (three readings violation
       would invalidate entire public act).

                                               - 18 -
¶ 77       As mentioned, a reviewing court may affirm the judgment on any grounds
       called for by the record, regardless of whether the circuit court made its decision
       on the proper ground. Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois, 125 Ill. 2d at
       174. But a party seeking to modify a partially adverse judgment must file a cross-
       appeal within 30 days of the judgment. Id. (“findings of the circuit court adverse to
       the appellee do not require that the appellee cross-appeal if the judgment of the
       circuit court was not, at least in part, against him”); Material Service Corp. v.
       Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1983) (an appellee’s failure to cross-
       appeal from the part of the judgment denying a claim for interest precluded
       consideration of the issue); see Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(3) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 78       Here, the circuit court invalidated sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10 but upheld the
       remainder of the Act, including provisions that are unrelated to this action. Besides
       adding sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10, Public Act 102-1116 amended section 2605-
       35 of the Illinois State Police Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois to
       clarify that the Division of Criminal Investigation may investigate human
       trafficking, illegal drug trafficking, and illegal firearms trafficking. See Pub. Act
       102-1116, § 5 (eff. Jan. 10, 2023) (amending 20 ILCS 2605/2605-35(a)(7)). Public
       Act 102-1116 also amended section 1-10 of the Illinois Procurement Code to
       exempt the Illinois State Police’s purchase of software to enforce the Firearm
       Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 2022)) and related
       statutes. See Pub. Act 102-1116, § 7 (eff. Jan. 10, 2023) (adding 30 ILCS 500/1-
       10(b)(21)). And Public Act 102-1116 amended sections 40, 45, and 55 of the
       Firearms Restraining Order Act to increase the initial duration of such orders to up
       to one year. See Pub. Act 102-1116, § 15 (eff. Jan. 10, 2023) (amending 430 ILCS
       67/40, 45, 55).

¶ 79       The judgment was partially adverse to plaintiffs because it did not invalidate
       the entire Act as requested in count II. Plaintiffs’ failure to cross-appeal from the
       part of the judgment denying relief on their three-readings claim is a jurisdictional
       bar to them arguing the Act is unconstitutional on that basis. Landmarks
       Preservation Council of Illinois, 125 Ill. 2d at 174.

                                              - 19 -
¶ 80                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 81       First, we hold the circuit court erroneously entered summary judgment for
       plaintiffs on their equal protection and special legislation claims. Plaintiffs are not
       similarly situated to the trained professionals. To the extent plaintiffs claim they
       possess restricted items, they are not treated differently from the grandfathered
       individuals. To the extent plaintiffs claim they do not possess restricted items, they
       are dissimilar to the grandfathered individuals, who have a reliance interest in
       retaining them.

¶ 82       Second, we hold that plaintiffs waived any second amendment challenge to the
       restrictions, as the complaint did not state a claim and plaintiffs explicitly and
       repeatedly disclaimed any such argument in the circuit court. Third, we hold
       plaintiffs’ failure to cross-appeal from the denial of relief under count II bars them
       from renewing their three-readings claim here. For these reasons, the judgment of
       the circuit court of Macon County is reversed.

¶ 83       Judgment reversed.

¶ 84       JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE, dissenting:

¶ 85       This great nation was founded on the premise that the right of law-abiding
       citizens to bear arms is essential to what it means to be a free people. The right of
       law-abiding citizens to possess firearms and to arm themselves to protect their
       families, their homes, and themselves must not be infringed. Belief in the
       previously mentioned precepts in no way diminishes the fact that all law-abiding
       citizens desire safe communities where schools, workplaces, houses of worship,
       and public gatherings are free from gun violence. The tension between the
       previously mentioned tenets are why this case is of such importance to the people
       of the state of Illinois. However, if this court is to adhere to the Illinois Constitution,
       we cannot address the question of the firearm restrictions at issue in this case.
       Important as this case is, constitutionally embedded process matters. Where the
       legislature fails to honor our constitutionally mandated process, this court is duty
       bound to adhere to our constitution and require the legislature to do the same. In
       my view, this court can and should consider the issue of the three-readings rule as

                                                 - 20 -
       well as the continued adherence to the enrolled-bill doctrine. In doing so, I would
       find the clear violation of the rule renders Public Act 102-1116 (eff. Jan. 10, 2023)
       unconstitutional in its entirety, thereby obviating the need to address the firearm
       restrictions at issue in this appeal. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 86                     A. Plaintiffs’ Claim on the Three-Readings Rule

¶ 87       As the majority notes and as this court has often found, “a reviewing court can
       uphold the decision of the circuit court on any grounds which are called for by the
       record regardless of whether the circuit court relied on the grounds and regardless
       of whether the circuit court’s reasoning was correct.” Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal
       Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 192 (2007); see also Material Service Corp. v.
       Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1983) (stating “[i]t is the judgment and
       not what else may have been said by the lower court that is on appeal to a court of
       review”).

¶ 88        In this case, plaintiffs alleged in count II of their complaint that Public Act 102-
       1116, which added sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10 to the Criminal Code of 2012 (720
       ILCS 5/24-1.9, 1.10 (West 2022)), violated the three-readings requirement of the
       Illinois Constitution. In their summary judgment motion, defendants argued they
       were entitled to summary judgment on the three-readings claim because the
       enrolled-bill doctrine foreclosed plaintiffs’ challenge. The circuit court entered
       judgment in defendants’ favor on the three-readings claim, as it was duty bound to
       follow this court’s precedent involving the enrolled-bill doctrine. The court did,
       however, find in plaintiffs’ favor on their equal protection and special legislation
       claims.

¶ 89       Defendants appealed. In light of the circuit court’s favorable ruling on the three-
       readings rule, they had no reason to raise the issue in their initial brief. Plaintiffs,
       however, did raise this issue in their responsive brief, arguing the violation of the
       three-readings rule presented an independent basis in the record to affirm the circuit
       court’s judgment. In their reply brief, defendants argued there was no violation of
       the three-readings rule and the enrolled-bill doctrine foreclosed plaintiffs’
       challenge. Defendants also addressed the three-readings rule and the enrolled-bill
       doctrine in their oral argument to this court.

                                                - 21 -
¶ 90        The majority says the circuit court invalidated certain sections of the Protect
       Illinois Communities Act (Act) (see Pub. Act 102-1116 (eff. Jan. 10, 2023)) and
       upheld others and thus contends the three-readings-rule issue is not now before us
       because plaintiffs should have cross-appealed from the denial of relief on that
       claim. However, plaintiffs are properly before this court, and both parties have had
       ample opportunity to address the procedural requirements of the Illinois
       Constitution and their impact on the validity of the Act here. Moreover, if the
       invalidated sections are before us (by way of the State’s appeal), then a finding of
       a three-readings-rule violation on those sections (as we may affirm on any basis in
       the record) requires a similar finding as to the entire Act because the Act was passed
       as one. Thus, I would find the long-standing principle cited above in Ultsch and
       numerous other cases allows us to consider the three-readings issue.

¶ 91                  B. The Three-Readings Rule and the Enrolled-Bill Doctrine

¶ 92       Article IV, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8)
       sets forth the requirements for the passage of bills in the legislature. Section 8(d)
       states as follows:

             “(d) A bill shall be read by title on three different days in each house. A bill
          and each amendment thereto shall be reproduced and placed on the desk of each
          member before final passage.

              Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or
          rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject. Appropriation bills
          shall be limited to the subject of appropriations.

             A bill expressly amending a law shall set forth completely the sections
          amended.

             The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
          shall sign each bill that passes both houses to certify that the procedural
          requirements for passage have been met.” (Emphases added.) Id. § 8(d).

¶ 93       For years, this court has followed the enrolled-bill doctrine. Friends of the
       Parks v. Chicago Park District, 203 Ill. 2d 312, 328 (2003). “This doctrine provides
       that once the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the

                                                - 22 -
       Senate certify that the procedural requirements for passing a bill have been met, a
       bill is conclusively presumed to have met all procedural requirements for passage.”
       Id. at 328-29. Under this precedent, this court has said it “will not invalidate
       legislation on the basis of the three-readings requirement if the legislation has been
       certified.” Id. at 329.

¶ 94       In People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 252 (1995), the defendant argued the
       public act at issue was not validly enacted because the legislature failed to comply
       with the three-readings requirement. This court refused to consider the argument,
       concluding the enrolled-bill doctrine precluded “this court from inquiring into the
       legislature’s compliance with the procedural requirements for passage of bills.” Id.
       at 253. This court cited the Committee on the Legislature of the Constitutional
       Convention, which explained the enrolled-bill doctrine would prohibit the judiciary
       from invalidating statutes on the ground that the legislature failed to comply with
       the procedural requirements in article IV, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution. Id.
       The court went on to state: “Whether or not a bill has been read by title on three
       different days in each house is a procedural matter, the determination of which was
       deliberately left to the presiding officers of the two houses of the General
       Assembly.” Id. at 254.

¶ 95      Justice Heiple dissented from that portion of the majority opinion that adopted
       and relied on the enrolled-bill doctrine. Id. at 256-58 (Heiple, J., concurring in part
       and dissenting in part). He stated, in part, as follows:

          “The interpretation of a constitutional provision depends, in the first instance,
          on the plain meaning of its language. Next, it depends on the common
          understanding of the citizens who, by ratifying the constitution, have given it
          life. A court looks to the debates of the convention delegates only when a
          constitutional provision is ambiguous. (Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove
          (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 483, 492-93.) There is no ambiguity in the provision
          requiring the legislature to read a bill on three different days in each house, the
          provision that a bill receive a majority vote in each house, or the provision
          requiring the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate to sign each
          bill to certify that the procedural requirements for passage have been met.

             If it were deemed desirable to foreclose inquiries into the regularity of the
          passage of bills, language similar to the enrolled-bill doctrine could have been

                                               - 23 -
          included within the constitution. There is no such language. Moreover, the
          Illinois Constitution was adopted at a referendum. It did not become the law of
          the State by either the discussions of the delegates or by their votes. The
          constitutional convention merely submitted the document to the public for a
          vote. There is no way that a voter could interpret the language of the constitution
          to mean that procedural requirements for the passage of a bill could be
          overridden by the signatures of two State officers. In truth, the signatures of the
          officers are merely prima facie evidence that the General Assembly has abided
          by the requirements of the constitution. In other words, it raises a rebuttable
          presumption that the requirements for passage have been met.

              A literal adherence to this so-called enrolled-bill doctrine means that a bill
          need never be read or presented in either house, need never receive a majority
          vote, and need never even be voted on. Two people, the Speaker of the House
          and the President of the Senate, need merely sign and certify a bill and, unless
          vetoed by the Governor pursuant to article IV, section 9, the bill becomes
          ipso facto the law of Illinois. Contrary to today’s ruling, I believe that the
          constitutional requirements for the enactment of a bill should be followed and
          enforced. While separation of powers is a valid doctrine and a presumption of
          legislative regularity is its proper corollary, this court should reserve the right
          of review to ensure the General Assembly’s compliance with constitutional
          mandates.” Id. at 257-58.

¶ 96       Since that case, this court has noted the legislature has “shown remarkably poor
       self-discipline in policing itself in regard to the three-readings requirement.”
       Friends of the Parks, 203 Ill. 2d at 329 (citing Geja’s Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier &
       Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 260 (1992) (noting that “ignoring the three-
       readings requirement has become a procedural regularity”); Cutinello v. Whitley,
       161 Ill. 2d 409, 425 (1994). That lack of legislative self-discipline continues to this
       day. See Orr v. Edgar, 298 Ill. App. 3d 432, 447 (1998) (leaving to this court “the
       issue of whether the state legislature may disregard constitutional requirements and
       maintain the legality of its actions under the auspices of the enrolled bill doctrine”);
       New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC v. Bower, 347 Ill. App. 3d 89, 100 (2004);
       McGinley v. Madigan, 366 Ill. App. 3d 974, 992 (2006); Doe v. Lyft, Inc., 2020 IL
       App (1st) 191328, ¶¶ 51-55; Accuracy Firearms, LLC v. Pritzker, 2023 IL App
       (5th) 230035, ¶¶ 36-46; First Midwest Bank v. Rossi, 2023 IL App (4th) 220643,

                                                - 24 -
       ¶¶ 220-41; Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 8 (noting the plaintiffs raised a three-
       readings rule claim in the circuit court 1).

¶ 97       In Friends of the Parks, 203 Ill. 2d at 329, this court noted it is “ever mindful
       of its duty to enforce the constitution of this state” and “urge[d] the legislature to
       follow the three-readings rule.” The court went on to state that, “[w]hile separation
       of powers concerns militate in favor of the enrolled-bill doctrine [citation], our
       responsibility to ensure obedience to the constitution remains an equally important
       concern.” Id.; see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 (1892) (stating it is “the
       duty of this court, from the performance of which it may not shrink, to give full
       effect to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the enactment of laws”). In
       Geja’s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 260, this court declined the invitation to abandon the
       enrolled-bill doctrine, feeling “the doctrine of separation of powers is more
       compelling.” However, this court deferred to the legislature “hesitantly” and
       “reserve[d] the right to revisit this issue on another day to decide the continued
       propriety of ignoring this constitutional violation.” Id.

¶ 98       Recently, in a case involving the very Act at issue in this case, the Fifth District
       in Accuracy Firearms addressed the serious concerns raised by the plaintiffs there
       as to the legislature’s repeated failure to adhere to the requirements of article IV,
       section 8(d), and the three-readings rule.

          “Unfortunately, the Illinois Supreme Court’s warnings regarding past
          legislative nonconformance with constitutional boundaries (see Friends of the
          Parks, 203 Ill. 2d at 328-29) appear to have gone unheeded and, instead, are
          now interpreted as the judiciary’s acceptance of, or the judiciary’s acquiescence
          in, the legislature’s continued failure to adhere to constitutional procedures
          when enacting legislation. While compliance with the enrolled-bill doctrine
          presumes the legislative procedure adhered to constitutional requirements
          (see Geja’s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 259), such presumption is readily overcome by
          evidence revealing the contrary posted on the General Assembly website.

             We question the sagacity of continued adherence to the Illinois Supreme
          Court precedent in light of the legislature’s continued blatant disregard of the

          1
              The Rowe plaintiffs did not raise the three-readings issue in their appeal to this court.

                                                        - 25 -
          court’s warnings and the constitutional mandates. The three-reading
          requirement ensures that the legislature is fully aware of the contents of the bills
          upon which they will vote and allows the lawmakers to debate the legislation.
          Equally relevant to the three-reading rule is the opportunity for the public to
          view and read a bill prior to its passage, thereby allowing the public an
          opportunity to communicate either their concern or support for proposed
          legislation with their elected representatives and senators. Taken together, two
          foundations of the bedrock of democracy are decimated by failing to require the
          lawmakers to adhere to the constitutional principle.

              To be sure, Illinois is not the only state that has faced or endured repeated
          ethical lapses associated with gut and replace legislation. However, other states
          have addressed this issue and demand compliance with the state constitutional
          mandates. See Washington v. Department of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania,
          188 A.3d 1135 (Pa. 2018); State ex rel. Ohio ALF-CIO v. Voinovich, 69 Ohio
          St. 3d 225, 1994-Ohio-1, 631 N.E.2d 582; Bevin v. Commonwealth ex rel.
          Beshear, 563 S.W.3d 74 (Ky. 2018); League of Women Voters of Honolulu v.
          State, 499 P.3d 382 (Haw. 2021).

              Our lawmakers take an oath of office to ‘ “support the constitution of the
          United States, and the constitution of the state of Illinois.” ’ 25 ILCS 5/2 (West
          2020); Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 3. The same is required for the circuit court
          judiciary (705 ILCS 35/2 (West 2020)) as well as the appellate and supreme
          courts and certain members of the executive branch (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII,
          § 3). Allowing lawmakers to continue to ignore constitutional mandates under
          the enrolled-bill doctrine, knowing full well the constitutional requirements
          were not met, belittles the language of the oaths, ignores the need for
          transparency in government, and undermines the language of this state’s
          constitution.” Accuracy Firearms, 2023 IL App (5th) 230035, ¶¶ 42-45.

¶ 99        Given the legislature’s repeated failures, continued adherence to the enrolled-
       bill doctrine should no longer be countenanced. The doctrine “is contrary to modern
       legal thinking, which does not favor conclusive presumptions that may produce
       results which do not accord with fact.” Association of Texas Professional Educators
       v. Kirby, 788 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. 1990); D&W Auto Supply v. Department of
       Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Ky. 1980) (stating the doctrine “frequently ***

                                               - 26 -
        produces results which do not accord with facts or constitutional provisions”).
        Moreover, “[t]he rule disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the
        truth and to provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of
        government.” D&W Auto Supply, 602 S.W.2d at 424.

¶ 100       Although this court has, in the past, found separation of powers to be a reason
        to decline abandoning the doctrine, it has not found it to be an absolute bar. This
        court has repeatedly reminded the legislature that it must comply with the bill-
        passage requirements of the constitution and, if it does not, this court reserves the
        right to act.

¶ 101       No doctrine can exempt from judicial review the requirements of the
        constitution. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
        say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

           “ ‘We may not abdicate this responsibility under the guise of our deference to
           a co-equal branch of government. While it is appropriate to give due deference
           to a co-equal branch of government as long as it is functioning within
           constitutional constraints, it would be a serious dereliction on our part to
           deliberately ignore a clear constitutional violation.’ ” City of Philadelphia v.
           Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 581 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Consumer Party of
           Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323, 333 (Pa. 1986)).

        See also D&W Auto Supply, 602 S.W.2d at 424 (disagreeing with “the premise that
        the equality of the various branches of government requires that we shut our eyes
        to constitutional failings and other errors of our coparceners in government”).

¶ 102       This court cannot cede the constitutionality of a statute to the Speaker of the
        House of Representatives and the President of the Senate. To turn a blind eye to
        repeated violations of the constitution suggests “that the courts must perpetually
        remain in ignorance of what everybody else in the state knows.” Power, Inc. v.
        Huntley, 235 P.2d 173, 181 (Wash. 1951) (en banc); see also D&W Auto Supply,
        602 S.W.2d at 423 (“To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices
        when confronted with violations of our constitution is not acceptable to this
        court.”).

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¶ 103       As Justice Heiple suggested and as other courts have advocated, “the signatures
        of the officers are merely prima facie evidence that the General Assembly has
        abided by the requirements of the constitution. In other words, it raises a rebuttable
        presumption that the requirements for passage have been met.” Dunigan, 165 Ill.
        2d at 28 (Heiple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Association of Texas
        Professional Educators, 788 S.W.2d at 829 (stating “the present tendency favors
        giving the enrolled version only prima facie presumptive validity, and a majority
        of states recognize exceptions to the enrolled bill rule”). That “presumption may be
        overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that
        constitutional requirements have not been met.” D&W Auto Supply, 602 S.W.2d at
        425.

¶ 104       Given the record here, including taking judicial notice of the history of the
        legislation on the General Assembly’s website, I would find the presumption is
        clearly overcome in this case. See Board of Education of Richland School District
        No. 88A v. City of Crest Hill, 2021 IL 126444, ¶ 5 (“ ‘Illinois courts often take
        judicial notice of facts that are readily verifiable by referring to sources of
        indisputable accuracy’ such as court records or public documents, including records
        on [a] government website.” (quoting People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶ 54)).

¶ 105       In this case, House Bill 5471 (HB 5471) (102d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill
        5471, 2022 Sess.) was first introduced in the Illinois House of Representatives on
        January 28, 2022, as “an Act concerning regulation,” seeking to amend the Illinois
        Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/1 et seq.). The synopsis for HB 5471, which was
        approximately 10 pages in length, indicated the subject of the bill focused on
        providing the e-mail address of the public adjuster as well as other provisions
        regarding an insurance contract. 102d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 5471, 2022 Sess.
        A second reading of HB 5471 occurred on March 1, 2022. Id. Then, along with 43
        other bills voted on at the same time as a group, HB 5471 received its third reading
        (as a bill for an act concerning regulation) on March 4, 2022, receiving 104 yeas
        and 0 nays. Id.

¶ 106       On March 7, 2022, HB 5471 arrived in the Illinois Senate and received its first
        reading before being referred to the assignments committee. The second reading
        took place on November 30, 2022. Id.

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¶ 107       On January 8, 2023, the President of the Senate filed Senate floor amendment
        No. 1, which, in its 110 pages, completely stripped the insurance provisions of HB
        5471 and replaced them with the “Protect Illinois Communities Act.” On January
        9, 2023, amendments 2, 3, 4, and 5, all of which addressed amendment 1, were
        presented in the Senate and passed on its third reading with 34 yeas and 20 nays.
        Id.

¶ 108       In its new form, HB 5471 was sent back to the House on January 10, 2023. HB
        5471, as amended, was not read three times prior to voting on the bill. On January
        10, 2023, the House voted to concur with Senate amendments 3, 4, and 5 with 68
        yeas and 41 nays on each one. That same day, the Speaker of the House of
        Representatives and the President of the Senate certified that the procedural
        requirements of the constitution had been met, and Governor Pritzker signed the
        111-page Act into law. Id.

¶ 109       Here, it is abundantly clear that the Protect Illinois Communities Act was not
        before the House or the Senate on three different days in each house. On January 8
        and 9, 2023, the original Insurance Code bill was gutted, and the new amendments,
        including the restrictions on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, were
        considered and approved in the Senate. The new bill setting forth the Protect Illinois
        Communities Act then only spent one day in the House before it was passed and
        signed into law.

           “[T]he three readings requirement serves three important purposes: it
           (1) provides the opportunity for full debate on proposed legislation; (2) ensures
           that members of each legislative house are familiar with a bill’s contents and
           have time to give sufficient consideration to its effects; and (3) provides the
           public with notice and an opportunity to comment on proposed legislation.”
           League of Women Voters of Honolulu v. State, 499 P.3d 382, 396 (Haw. 2021).

        See also Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396
        (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring, joined by Minton, J.) (noting the three-readings
        requirement is intended “to make sure that each House knows what it is passing
        and passes what it wants”). On the contrary, the practice of gutting and replacing
        legislation “discourages public confidence and participation,” “deprives the public
        of notice,” and “is antithetical to the intent of the three readings requirement.”
        League of Women Voters, 499 P.3d at 405.

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¶ 110       In this case, the Insurance Code bill that received votes on three different days
        in the House in 2022 was in no way the firearms bill that passed the House on one
        vote in 2023. That is undeniable. And concluding that simply reading the title of a
        completely different bill on three different days suffices to pass constitutional
        muster is an affront to the people of this state and renders the three-readings
        requirement essentially meaningless. No such conclusion—whether expressed or
        implied—should receive the imprimatur of this court.

¶ 111       Article IV, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution requires a bill be read by title
        on three different days in each house. Three different days in each house is all it
        would have taken for the legislators to consider the firearms bill before passage and
        thereby comply with the procedural requirements of the constitution. And three
        different days in each house is all it would take for the House and Senate to conduct
        the legislative process again if this court were to find a violation of the three-
        readings rule and declare the Act unconstitutional.

¶ 112       When, as in this case, the work of the legislature directly impacts a fundamental
        right, which this court has said the right to keep and bear arms is (Guns Save Life,
        Inc. v. Ali, 2021 IL 126014, ¶ 28), the people of Illinois deserve nothing less than
        the procedural requirements of the constitution be followed by their elected
        representatives and senators.

¶ 113       Because the procedural requirements of the constitution were not met in the
        passage of HB 5471, I would find the Act unconstitutional in its entirety. Thus,
        until this court has before it a validly passed act of the legislature, we should make
        no determination on the Act at issue in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 114       JUSTICE OVERSTREET joins in this dissent.

¶ 115       JUSTICE O’BRIEN, dissenting:

¶ 116       I respectfully dissent because I do not find that the classifications at issue in this
        legislation further its claimed purpose and it is thus violative of the special
        legislation provision in our state constitution.

¶ 117       The special legislation clause states:

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                “The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general
            law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made
            applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,
            § 13.

¶ 118       “This court has consistently held that the purpose of the special legislation
        clause is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in favor of
        a select group without a sound, reasonable basis.” Best v. Taylor Machine Works,
        179 Ill. 2d 367, 391 (1997). Under the clause, the General Assembly may not confer
        “a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to the
        exclusion of others similarly situated.” Id.

¶ 119       We employ a two-part test to determine whether a law is special legislation.
        Piccioli v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Retirement System, 2019 IL 122905,
        ¶ 18. The first determination is whether the classification discriminates in favor of
        a select group to the exclusion of a group similarly situated. Id. If the classification
        does discriminate, we next determine whether the classification is arbitrary. Id. We
        use the same standards applicable to equal protection challenges to decide if a
        classification is arbitrary. In re Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d 510, 520 (2002).

¶ 120       Unlike the majority, I would find that the plaintiffs are similarly situated in light
        of the purpose of the legislation. In re M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 29 (“The
        determination whether individuals are similarly situated generally can only be made
        by considering the purpose of the particular legislation.”). We do so by considering
        whether the classification is “based upon reasonable differences in kind or situation,
        and whether the basis for the classifications is sufficiently related to the evil to be
        obviated by the statute.” Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 394.

¶ 121        The majority finds that the plaintiffs are not similarly situated to the exempted
        classifications and ends its analysis on that basis. To make the similarly situated
        determination, this court must view the classifications in light of the purpose of the
        legislation and the evils it seeks to remedy. In re Belmont Fire Protection District,
        111 Ill. 2d 373, 380 (1986). The majority acknowledges that the legislation itself
        does not state a purpose but concludes that the defendants infer the intent of the
        Protect Illinois Communities Act (Act) (see Pub. Act 102-1116 (eff. Jan. 10, 2023))
        is “to reduce the number of assault weapons and LCMs in circulation” because they
        are often used in mass shootings. Supra ¶ 51. The majority correctly reiterates that,

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        to determine whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated, the legislative purpose of
        the Act must frame its analysis. Supra ¶ 53.

¶ 122       The majority, however, did not consider whether the classifications further the
        legislative purpose of reducing the number of assault weapons and large capacity
        magazines (LCMs) and consequently the number of mass shootings. I find they do
        not and will not reasonably remedy the evils the legislation was designed to combat.
        Importantly, exempting the professionals and grandfathered groups does nothing to
        prevent the proliferation of out-of-state assault weapon possession or prevent those
        weapons from being used for mass shootings in this state or elsewhere. The
        legislation does not prevent weapon manufacturers, some located within this state,
        from continuing to sell assault weapons and LCMs to out-of-state residents, who
        may then potentially perpetrate a mass shooting. Because 60% of the weapons used
        in crimes in Illinois come from out of state, the legislation does not further its
        purported goal of reducing the number of weapons in the state. See Violence
        Prevention and Public Safety, Office of the Ill. Attorney Gen., https://illinois
        attorneygeneral.gov/Safer-Communities/Violence-Prevention-and-Community-
        Safety/Crime-Connect/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2023) [https://perma.cc/JWG4-5874].

¶ 123       Similarly, the enumerated professional groups who are exempted based on their
        firearm training and roles as societal protectors are presumably not apt to engage in
        mass shootings, and their ability to possess assault weapons and LCMs does not
        reduce either the number of assault weapons and LCMs or the threat of mass
        shootings. They may continue to possess and purchase the items the legislation bans
        nearly everyone else from possessing and purchasing. Moreover, not all the
        professionals are limited in the possession and use of their assault weapons to on-
        duty conduct, which places them in the same circumstance as members of the
        general public who may also have weapons training. For example, retired peace
        officers may continue to purchase and possess assault weapons despite that they no
        longer have any peacekeeping responsibilities or obligations. They are no different
        from private citizens who hold Firearm Owner’s Identification cards, like the
        plaintiffs in this case, but are granted special treatment. Our constitution’s
        prohibition against special legislation does not allow a law to afford special
        treatment to one group of citizens without a rational basis to do so. The special
        legislation provision in the constitution prohibits the different treatment of people
        based on criteria unrelated to the legislation’s purpose. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 391.

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¶ 124       The professional group, albeit the recipients of firearm training, are not
        necessarily trained in assault weapons. Moreover, other nonexempted professionals
        and the general population may also have firearm and/or assault weapon training.
        According to an affidavit submitted by Caulkins in support of the plaintiffs’
        combined motion for declaratory judgment and/or temporary or permanent
        injunction, in his opinion, his gun shop customers are as skilled with their firearms
        as the exempted professional class. Limiting the possession and purchase of assault
        weapons to this group does not contribute to the reduction of mass shootings.

¶ 125       The grandfathered group, created because of their reliance interest in prior
        ownership of the banned weapons and magazines, are allowed to maintain their
        weapons, which also does little to reduce the number of assault weapons and LCMs
        or mass shootings. According to the plaintiffs, there are numerous Illinois residents
        who currently own assault weapons. Any one of these assault weapons owners
        could perpetrate a mass shooting.

¶ 126       When considering the challenged classifications in light of the purpose of the
        law, neither of the classifications furthers the purpose. In this way, I find the
        plaintiffs are similarly situated in light of the purposes of the legislation and the
        evils it was designed to remedy. It is not enough that the legislature classified the
        groups; the classifications must be based on “reasonable differences in kind or
        situation, and whether the basis for the classifications is sufficiently related to the
        evil to be obviated by the statute.” Id. at 394. The classifications must be founded
        on a rational or substantial difference of situation or condition. Cutinello v. Whitley,
        161 Ill. 2d 409, 427 (1994) (Freeman, J., dissenting).

¶ 127       Here, the classifications afford special treatment to two groups of individuals
        without a viable connection between the exempted groups and reasons for the
        legislation. When considered in light of the offered purpose for the legislation, to
        reduce the number of weapons in order to reduce the number of mass shootings,
        the exempted classifications are in all aspects like the general population.

¶ 128       In dissenting, I do not pass judgment on the intent of the legislation. Rather, I
        only consider whether it meets the constitutional requirements under the equal
        protection and special legislation provisions of our Illinois Constitution. When we
        limit people’s rights, even the rights we might not like, we have to do so in a way
        that honors the constitution.

                                                 - 33 -
               “Unless this court is to abdicate its constitutional responsibility to determine
           whether a general law can be made applicable, the available scope for
           legislative experimentation with special legislation is limited, and this court
           cannot rule that the legislature is free to enact special legislation simply because
           ‘reform may take one step at a time.’ ” Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 487
           (1972) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
           489 (1955)).

        Under the special legislation clause, the constitutional test is “whether a general
        law can be made applicable.” Id. I would find a general law could be made
        applicable.

¶ 129       Because the majority fails to undertake this appropriate analysis and finds the
        plaintiffs are not similarly situated, I respectfully dissent. I would find the
        legislation violates the constitutional prohibition against special legislation.

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