Court Opinion

ID: 9567212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:50:38.826152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:25.786518
License: Public Domain

HOLOHAN, Justice,
dissenting.
The method by which the crime was committed is set forth in the majority opinion. The meat price tag was the essential means by which the criminal scheme was accomplished. Other price tags in the possession of the appellant or his codefendant were clearly relevant as evidence of the means, instrument, or device by which the crime was accomplished.
The fact that the Bayless price tag suggests a bad act is not the issue. It has served to cloud the real issue which is the question of relevancy. If evidence is admissible for any purpose the fact that it discloses or suggests incidentally incompetent matters does not exclude it. Lawrence v. State, 29 Ariz. 247, 240 P. 863, rehearing denied, 29 Ariz. 318, 241 P. 511, certiorari denied, 269 U.S. 585, 46 S.Ct. 201, 70 L.Ed. 425; State v. Vidalez, 89 Ariz. 215, 360 P.2d 224 (1961).
Evidence showing the possession of an instrument or means by which the crime was committed has long been recognized as admissible. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 611; 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 83 (3d ed. 1940). Evidence admissible under this rule is most often burglary tools. See cases annotated in 143 A.L.R. 1194. However, the types of instruments are by no means limited to burglary tools. The items range from abortion instruments, People v. Stone, 89 Cal. App.2d 853, 202 P.2d 333 (1949), to weapons, Morton v. U.S., 183 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir., 1950).
The fact that the price tag was from a Bayless market and the crime involved a Lucky market does not change the relevancy of the Bayless price tag. The items are sufficiently similar so that the possession of one is competent evidence of the knowledge and intent of the appellant and his codefendant. There is no requirement for the item to have been used in the crime charged. The Indiana Supreme Court in England v. State, 249 Ind. 446, 233 N.E.2d 168 (1968) which involved the charge of passing a forged instrument, upheld the admissibility of two other forged checks which had been found in the defendant’s automobile. That court rejected the defendant’s claim that because the checks • were not used in the crime for which he was charged they were not admissible. The Indiana Supreme Court quoted with approval the rule from 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 288 which states in part:
“It is a well-established principle of criminal law that evidence of guilt found upon a person under legal arrest for a crime may be used in evidence against him. Whatever is found upon his person or in his possession which was a part of the means by which he accomplished the *309crime, whether an instrument, device, or token, is legitimate evidence for the prosécution and may be taken from him and used for that purpose . . . .”
The Indiana Court of Appeals was confronted with a situation similar to that in England in Reid v. State, 298 N.E.2d 480 (Ind.App.1973). Reid was charged with uttering a forged check. At the time of his arrest Reid was found to be in possession of other similar checks. The Indiana Court of Appeals noted:
“It is our opinion that the trial court did not commit error when it permitted the introduction of other checks found in Reid’s possession at the time he was arrested.
“Reid’s objection to these checks is that they were not relevant to the question of his guilt. The answer is that the checks found in his possession were similar to the uttered check and were therefore evidence of Reid’s knowledge that the uttered check was false and of his intent to defraud. These similar checks could be considered part of the means by which he accomplished the crime.” Reid v. State, 298 N.E.2d 483.
The Bayless meat tag was also admissible on the question of intent. One of the necessary elements to be proved was whether the appellant formed the criminal intent before or after he entered the grocery store. All of the tags, including the Bayless tag, were relevant evidence from which the jury could infer a prior scheme or plan which establishes the intent to defraud prior to his entry into the market. The question which would occur to a reasonable juror is: Why would the appellant and his partner keep or have a Bayless tag in their possession unless it was part of a scheme or plan to defraud?
In my judgment the admission of the Bayless price tag was not error, and I therefore dissent from the position of the majority. I would affirm the conviction,
STRUCKMEYER, V. C. J., concurs.