Court Opinion

ID: 9513875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:41:46.273757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:04.675333
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 18]I respectfully dissent. The tip the officer received was reliable and specific. Therefore, the traffic stop was justified. Although the majority ultimately declares them to be dicta, the majority’s statements obscure established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, blurring the standards between a citizen informant and a criminal informant and between reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Then, in its penultimate paragraph, the majority returns to what it has told us does not matter in order to erroneously conclude that because the officer did not corroborate the tip, the stop was not justified. I would affirm.
I
[¶ 19] The majority misstates the standard of review in administrative appeals. At ¶ 8, citing Bjerklie v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2005 ND 178, ¶ 9, 704 N.W.2d 818, and Gray v. N.D. Game and Fish Dep’t, 2005 ND 204, ¶ 7, 706 N.W.2d 614, the majority says, “We give deference to the Department’s sound findings, but review questions of law de novo.” But that is not the standard enunciated in either Bjerklie or Gray. The majority’s attempt to limit deference to “sound findings” is inconsistent with this Court’s jurisprudence ever since the standard — based on constitutional separation of powers — was set forth in Power Fuels v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, 222 (N.D.1979):
In construing the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to permit us to apply the weight-of-the-evidence test to the factual findings of an administrative agency, we do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency. We deter*439mine only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions reached were proved by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.
II
[¶20] “The reasonable and articulable suspicion standard requires more than a ‘mere hunch,’ but less than probable cause.” Lapp v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2001 ND 140, 11, 632 N.W.2d 419. “ ‘Reasonable suspicion to justify a stop exists when “a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect potential criminal activity.” ’ ” Kappel v. Dir., N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 1999 ND 213, ¶ 7, 602 N.W.2d 718 (quoting City of Fargo v. Ovind, 1998 ND 69, ¶ 8, 575 N.W.2d 901). “[T]he reasonable suspicion standard does not require an officer to see a motorist violating a traffic law or to rule out every potential innocent excuse for the behavior in question before stopping a vehicle for investigation.” Id. at ¶ 10.
[¶ 21] “As the reliability of the tip moves up on the scale, the quantity of the information sufficient to raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion is less.” Anderson v. Dir., N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2005 ND 97, ¶ 18, 696 N.W.2d 918. In the context of an anonymous informant’s tip, “our cases have required that the officer corroborate the tip by observing some behavior on the part of the driver, either illegal or indicative of impairment, that alerts the officer to a possible violation.” State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 642 (N.D.1994). In the context of a known informant’s tip, however, our cases have held that the information a tip provides can itself be sufficient to raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion. Miller, at 640-41. As the United States Supreme Court said in Adams v. Williams:
In reaching this conclusion, we reject respondent’s argument that reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer’s personal observation, rather than on information supplied by another person. Informants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability. One simple rule will not cover every situation. Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized. But in some situations — for example, when the victim of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his assailant, or when a credible informant warns of a specific impending crime — the subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate police response.
407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
III
[¶ 22] The majority argues that because the informant had a criminal record, implying he was a member of the “criminal milieu,” Officer Kapp had to corroborate the known informant’s tip before she could have a reasonable and articulable suspicion. The majority states, at ¶ 12, “Officer Kapp testified she knew the informant in her ‘professional capacity’; she believed he had a criminal record.” In misdirected dicta in State v. Anderson, the opinion differentiated between a member of the “criminal milieu” and a citizen informant. 2006 ND 44, ¶15, 710 N.W.2d 392. “A member of the ‘criminal milieu’ is someone ‘who is himself involved in criminal activity or is, at least, someone who enjoys the confidence of criminals.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Dahl, 440 N.W.2d 716, 718 (N.D. 1989)). But Dahl related to probable *440cause, not reasonable suspicion. Anderson did not discount reasonable suspicion because of the so-called “criminal milieu” argument. The majority is unable to cite any case in the United States in which a tip from a known informant discounted reasonable suspicion because a known informant was part of the “criminal milieu.” Nor can the majority cite any other case in the United States that says a “criminal record,” without more, equals being part of the “criminal milieu.” We said, however, that a citizen informant is someone who volunteers the information, seeks nothing in return, and is not at risk or in fear of going to jail. Id. Although we did not need to decide whether the informant was a member of the “criminal milieu” or a citizen informant, Id. at ¶ 16, we held the informant was reliable because of the quality of his information:
Greg’s information has a higher indi-cia of reliability because he was a known informant who voluntarily gave Deputy Gress information on prior occasions. Deputy Gress testified that, except for the one occasion, Greg was always truthful. The information Greg gave in this case also had a higher indicia of reliability because Greg was in Jamestown and the information involved events in Fargo, which Officer Crane verified. Greg volunteered the information knowing his son, Daniel, could be arrested if law enforcement learned about Jesse and Daniel’s plan. Greg contacted Deputy Gress because he was worried about Jesse and Daniel’s safety and he wanted Deputy Gress’ help. Greg did not ask for anything in exchange for the information, and he was not at risk of going to jail in connection with this incident.
Id. at ¶ 17.
[¶ 28] Applying the facts of the present case to the definition of “criminal milieu” and citizen informant, this case’s informant is a citizen informant. He volunteered the information. The record contains no evidence that he somehow sought something in return for the tip. Finally, he was at no risk of going to jail, unless he made a false report to law enforcement. The record contains no evidence that the informant was presently involved in criminal activity or enjoyed the confidence of criminals. Therefore, to imply that Mr. Steele was somehow a member of the “criminal milieu,” thus requiring validation of his tip, is baffling. The record does not contain any evidence of what his criminal history was. The majority has basically categorized all informants with a criminal past into the “criminal milieu” without consideration of what the criminal past is or how that past is relevant to the case at hand. The logical conclusion of this premise is that anyone with a criminal past, no matter how long ago or how irrelevant, cannot be a citizen informant. The majority, at ¶ 12, states, “The officer was only able to corroborate the location of the vehicle and its license plate but unable to corroborate any illegal activity or other suspicious activity that would confirm the reliability of Steele’s tip.” Corroboration in this case is not required, because the tip was from a known citizen informant, not a member of the “criminal milieu.” The tip provided sufficient information to give Kapp a reasonable and articulable suspicion.
[¶ 24] The majority is also inconsistent in its conclusions. At ¶ 12, the majority first states, “Here, the content and quality of the officer’s information when she made the stop was insufficient to justify a stop of Gabel’s vehicle.” Five sentences later, however, the majority tells us that it is all dicta, stating, “we need not determine the reliability of Steele, because, even assuming he was a reliable informant, his tip of a vehicle speeding up and slowing down, not allowing a car to pass is insufficient to support a traffic stop absent corroboration *441of otherwise illegal activity or suspicious conduct.” The majority answered the question of whether the informant was reliable in the negative when it said the quality of the information was insufficient. Validation of the tip is required when the reliability, i.e., the quality of the information is poor. See Anderson, 2006 ND 44, ¶ 13, 710 N.W.2d 392 (emphasis added) (“In evaluating the factual basis for an investigatory stop, we must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the quantity, or content, and quality, or degree of reliability, of the officer’s information.”).
[¶ 25] The majority, at ¶ 15, states, “Officer Kapp did not independently observe or corroborate Gabel speeding up and slowing down nor did she view Gabel impede the ability of others to pass his vehicle.” The majority again confuses the standards that apply to a citizen informant and a criminal informant and to a known informant and an anonymous tip. Officer Kapp could base her reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion on the information provided by the informant. Furthermore, the majority, at ¶ 15, states, “Based upon the information conveyed, there is only a possibility that a violation had occurred. This is the functional equivalent of the ‘possible reckless driver or drunk driver’ held to be insufficient....” Under the reasonable-suspicion standard, however, a “possibility” of a violation is all that is required as long as “ ‘a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect potential criminal activity.’ ” Kappel, 1999 ND 213, ¶ 7, 602 N.W.2d 718 (quoting Ovind, 1998 ND 69, ¶ 8, 575 N.W.2d 901). The majority has confused the standards for a known citizen informant and a criminal informant.
TV
[¶ 26] The majority wrongly concludes that this case is indistinguishable from Anderson v. Dir., N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2005 ND 97, 696 N.W.2d 918. This case is different from Anderson, in which the report communicated to the officer, “possible reckless driver or drunk driver,” was con-clusory in nature, lacking any specified conduct. As in Anderson, the tip in this case was reliable. See Anderson, at ¶ 18 (the tip was of greater reliability because “the deputy was aware before the vehicle stop that the informant could be identified because dispatch had described the informant’s vehicle to him, and in addition, he observed the informant’s vehicle pull over as he stopped Anderson and he knew an assisting officer was interviewing the informant”). Here, the dispatcher communicated the informant’s name and information to Officer Kapp. Officer Kapp knew who the informant was, allowing her to measure the tip’s credibility. Also, the informant was following Gabel’s car, was providing more information to the dispatcher, and was available to be interviewed after the traffic stop was made. Thus, the tip was of greater reliability. In this case, unlike in Anderson, however, the information relayed to the dispatcher and Officer Kapp was far more specific, providing the officer with a reasonable and articulable suspicion. See id. at ¶ 21 (“the communication by the dispatcher to the deputy of the bare assertion of a ‘possible reckless driver or drunk driver,’ is not of sufficient quantity to provide the reasonable and ar-ticulable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop of Anderson’s vehicle”). Here, Officer Kapp was told that “the vehicle, JAYBIRD, would speed up, slow down, [and] would not allow Mr. Steele to pass him.” This information addressed specific conduct, lending more reliability to the informant’s tip. The conduct also described a specific type of erratic driving: impeding a faster moving car’s lawful pass. Section 39-10-11(2), N.D.C.C., specifically requires *442that an overtaken car allow a faster moving car to pass:
Except when overtaking and passing on the right is permitted, the driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on audible signal and may not increase the speed of that driver’s vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle.
The majority attempts to ignore this specific, erratic driving by stating, at ¶ 14, “Based on the record we have before us, it is not entirely clear the information Steele conveyed amounted to a violation of this statute. There was no information to suggest Steele made an ‘audible signal’ that he intended to pass.” The fact that every element of the violation may not have been met, however, is irrelevant when measuring Officer Kapp’s reasonable and articula-ble suspicion, because she was not required to know, for a fact, that Gabel had committed a violation. Her job was to respond to a known informant’s specific tip of erratic driving. When Officer Kapp arrived, she observed Gabel driving forty-seven miles per hour in a sixty-five mile-per-hour zone. If “JAYBIRD” was speeding up and slowing down, a slow speed would logically be suspicious conduct to corroborate the tip. Steele’s tip was more than the “functional equivalent” of the tip in Anderson.
V
[¶ 27] Ultimately, Officer Kapp was given a specific, rehable tip from a known informant. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Kapp observed Gabel driving forty-seven miles per hour in a sixty-five mile-per-hour zone, which, although not illegal, is unusual and would logically be the conduct that might be observed if someone were driving slowly, speeding up to prevent a pass, and then slowing down again. One cannot logically expect, however, that Gabel would continue speeding up to prevent a pass after an officer had arrived on the scene. Therefore, corroboration of the exact conduct Gabel was accused of, in addition to being unnecessary, was unlikely to happen. Officer Kapp did not have to corroborate the tip or observe illegal conduct to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion; the reliable tip alone was enough.
VI
[¶ 28] I would reverse the district court and reinstate the Department’s order.
[¶ 29] Dale V. Sandstrom