Court Opinion

ID: 9394913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 16:08:23.085885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.041935
License: Public Domain

J-S09016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: J.M., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: M.M., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1395 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered October 25, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
                       No(s): CP-02-AP-0000119-2022

    IN THE INTEREST OF: C.M., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: M.M., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1396 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered October 25, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                       No(s): CP-02-AP-0000060-2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                  FILED: May 16, 2023

       M.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the October 25, 2022 orders that

involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her sons, C.M., born in October

of 2020, and J.M., born in October of 2021.1 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of the putative father
of both children, G.H., and any unknown father of J.M. Neither G.H. nor any
unknown father appealed.
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      We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the

certified record. Mother has a history of mental health problems, drug and

alcohol abuse, and intimate partner violence (“IPV”) involving her paramour,

G.H., who is the putative father of C.M. and J.M. See N.T., 9/30/22, CYF

Exhibit 1 at ¶ 14. The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth, and Families

(“CYF”) first became aware of Mother’s state of affairs in October of 2018,

shortly after the birth of an older child, who is not a subject of this appeal.

Id. Two years later, at the time of C.M.’s birth, CYF received a report that

reiterated the same issues with Mother and alleged that Mother admitted

having “thoughts of harming” C.M. Id. at ¶ 15.

      The trial court placed C.M. in shelter care and, on January 20, 2021, it

adjudicated C.M. dependent.     In furtherance of C.M.’s permanency goal of

reunification, the court ordered Mother to participate in: (1) a drug and alcohol

assessment at the Pennsylvania Organization for Women in Early Recovery

(“POWER”); (2) random drug screens;         (3) mental health treatment; (3)

supervised visitation and coached visitation; and (4) an IPV program at the

Women’s Center and Shelter. Id. at ¶¶ 26-28.

      Less than one year after C.M.’s adjudication, Mother gave birth to J.M.,

at which time she tested positive for cocaine. The court placed J.M. in CYF’s

emergency custody three days after birth. Id. at ¶ 29. The children have

remained together in a pre-adoptive foster home since their respective

placements. Id. at 158.

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       On November 8, 2021, the court held a combined adjudicatory hearing

for J.M. and permanency review for C.M. Id. at ¶ 35. The court adjudicated

J.M. dependent and, in furtherance of J.M.’s permanency goal of reunification,

required Mother to maintain sobriety, cooperate with her mental health team,

and attend coached visitations.            Id. at ¶ 36.   With respect to C.M.’s

permanency review, the court found that Mother’s compliance with her

objectives and her progress toward reunification were minimal. Specifically,

Mother continued to abuse cocaine, failed to attend random drug screens,

avoided the IPV program, and participated in only twelve out of a possible

twenty-two supervised visits with C.M. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 35. In fact, at every

permanency review hearing with respect to C.M. and J.M., the court concluded

that both Mother’s compliance and her progress were minimal. Id. at ¶ 40.

       On May 5, 2022, CYF filed a petition for the involuntary termination of

Mother’s parental rights to C.M. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8),

and (b). Four months later, it filed a petition to terminate Mother’s rights to

J.M. pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (b). The evidentiary hearings on the

petitions occurred on September 30, 2022, and October 21, 2022,

respectively.2

____________________________________________

2  C.M. and J.M., then one and two years old, respectively, were represented
by legal counsel who advocated in favor of terminating Mother's parental
rights. Counsel also filed a brief with this Court in support of the termination
orders.

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       CYF presented the testimony of Gregory Lobb, Ph.D., the court-

appointed forensic psychologist who performed an evaluation of Mother in May

and June of 2022 and diagnosed her with unspecified bipolar disorder,

generalized anxiety disorder, cannabis use disorder, stimulant use disorder,

and alcohol use disorder.        See N.T., 9/30/22, at 20-21.   In addition, the

agency called to the stand the assigned CYF caseworker, Erin Snyder, and

Sara Kohnfelder from TRAC Services for Families. Mother testified, and she

presented the testimony of Shawna Copeland, her family support partner from

Allegheny Family Network.

       On October 25, 2022, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated

Mother’s parental rights to C.M. and J.M. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2),

(5), (8), and (b).3 Mother timely filed notices of appeal along with concise

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).4        The orphans’ court filed its 1925(a) opinion on

December 19, 2022.

       Mother presents the following issue for our review:

       Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter
       of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear
       and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental

____________________________________________

3 To the extent that the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights to
J.M. pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), it erred because CYF did not plead this
subsection in its petition. See In Interest of: T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d 618, 629
(Pa.Super. 2018).

4   This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte.

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      rights would serve the needs and welfare of [C.M. and J.M.]
      pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?

Mother’s brief at 4.

      We consider Mother’s issue mindful of our well-settled standard of

review. “In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the

termination court is supported by competent evidence.” In re Adoption of

C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021).        Appellate courts must accept the

orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if the record

supports them. See Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021).

An appellate court may disturb a ruling supported by competent evidence in

the record only upon discernment of an error of law or abuse of discretion.

See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).

      In this context, “an abuse of discretion does not result merely because

the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts

could support an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-

27 (Pa. 2012).    Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of

discretion “only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. at 826. This standard of review reflects the

deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand

across multiple hearings. See Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24.

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of

the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.       See 23 Pa.C.S.

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§ 2511. The trial court must initially determine whether the conduct of the

parent warrants termination under § 2511(a). Only if the court determines

that the petitioner established grounds for termination under § 2511(a) does

it then engage in assessing the petition under § 2511(b), which involves a

child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

      To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove

grounds under both § 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing evidence, which

is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” C.M., supra at 359 (quoting Matter of Adoption

of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)). It is axiomatic that we

need only agree with any one subsection of § 2511(a), along with § 2511(b),

to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re Adoption of K.M.G.,

219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en banc) (citation omitted).

      Mother challenges the orphans’ court’s needs and welfare analysis

pursuant to § 2511(b), which provides as follows:

      (b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

      Our Supreme Court explained that when examining the effect upon a

child of severing a bond, courts must examine whether the termination of

parental rights will destroy a “necessary and beneficial relationship,” thereby

causing a child to suffer “extreme emotional consequences.” In re E.M., 620

A.2d 481, 484-485 (Pa. 1993).         The High Court also recognized that

“[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must also

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they

have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M., supra at 268.

      It is beyond cavil that, “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with his or

parent is a major aspect of the [s]ubsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it

is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when

determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re M.M., 106 A.3d

114, 118 (Pa.Super. 2014). In this vein, the In re E.M. Court highlighted,

“[i]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the

safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as

the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster

parent.” In re E.M., supra at 484-485. Similarly, the court may consider

the effect of the parent’s conduct upon the child and contemplate “whether a

parent is capable of providing for a child’s safety and security or whether such

needs can be better met by terminating a parent’s parental rights.” Interest

of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 (Pa.Super. 2021). Finally, in weighing the parent-

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child bond pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of

childhood ever in mind.”      In re T.S.M., supra at 269.       The T.S.M. Court

observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.               When courts

fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

      Instantly, Mother argues that the record evidence does not support

termination under § 2511(b) because C.M. and J.M. have a beneficial bond

with her and there is no evidence regarding “the impact that termination”

would have on them. Mother’s brief at 13. The certified record belies both

aspects of this contention.

      In terminating Mother’s parental rights, the orphans’ court concluded:

      At best, the testimony and evidence demonstrated that [C.M. and
      J.M.] were merely familiar and comfortable in Mother’s presence
      for brief periods of supervised time.       In weighing whether
      termination would cause extreme, irreparable emotional
      consequences to [C.M. and J.M.], there was no evidence that
      [they] would suffer such consequences. Moreover, the evidence
      supported that any potential detriment or consequences would be
      mitigated by the positive, loving, supportive, and secure
      relationship [C.M. and J.M.] established with the foster parents.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/19/22, at 14. The evidence supports the court’s

findings.

      During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Lobb testified about (1) his forensic

psychological   evaluation    of   Mother;   (2)   the   respective   interactional

evaluations of Mother with C.M. and J.M., and between the children with the

foster parents; and (3) whether he observed any meaningful parent-child

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bonds.   In short, Dr. Lobb did not believe that it would be emotionally

detrimental to C.M. or J.M. if the court terminated Mother’s parental rights.

N.T., 9/30/22, at 37-38. In fact, he recommended adoption because it could

be detrimental to C.M. and J.M. if permanency was not achieved as soon as

possible. Id. at 37. His analysis follows.

      Dr. Lobb observed a bond between Mother and both children but was

unable to assess the significance of the bond because Mother became upset

and terminated the interactional evaluation prematurely after C.M. referred to

the foster mother as “Mommy.” Id. at 33. He explained, “I think there was

a bond there, for sure. Again, it was cut short with only half of what I normally

have. Sometimes as the interactional goes on . . . other things do sort of

occur in the last half hour that would provide additional information. . . . My

biggest concern with [Mother] is her stability.       Id. at 36.     He further

highlighted his doubts about Mother’s “ability to be able to take care of these

kids in an unstructured, unsupervised kind of setting by herself, when she was

only able to last thirty minutes in my office.” Id. at 34.

      In contrast to Mother’s truncated interactional evaluation, Dr. Lobb

characterized the children’s interaction with foster parents as excellent,

noting, “They were both very engaged with the kids.          They worked well

together. . . .” Id. at 35. Dr. Lobb identified “a strong bond” between both

children and the foster parents. Id. at 36. Significantly, Ms. Snyder, the CYF

caseworker, shared Dr. Lobb’s assessment of the bond the children have with

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the foster parents, who the children refer to as “Mom” and “Dad.” Id. at 159.

Ms. Snyder testified that the primary bond of C.M. and J.M. “appears to be

with the foster family[.]” Id. at 162.

      To the extent that Mother argues that Dr. Lobb’s recommendation in

favor of the termination of parental rights was based “in part on the foster

parents’ indication that they would allow future contact between Mother” and

C.M. and J.M., that assertion misrepresents the substance of his testimony.

Mother’s brief at 12.   On cross-examination by Mother’s counsel, Dr. Lobb

testified:

      Q. [I]f I heard you correctly, you weren’t concerned [about] the
      children suffering any detriments if Mother’s rights were
      terminated. But I thought I heard you say something about the
      foster parents being willing to allow contact. Is that why you feel
      there wouldn’t be any detriment, because there would be post[-
      ]adoption contact?

      A. No. I don’t think there would be detriment because . . . foster
      parents . . . are the primary caregivers of these children at this
      point. . . .

Id. at 46.    Hence, the record not only belies Mother’s contention that

Dr. Lobb’s support of terminating parental rights was contingent upon

Mother’s continued post-adoption contact with the children, insofar as

Dr. Lobb did not identify any detriments if Mother’s rights were terminated, it

further bolsters the orphans’ court’s conclusion that the children did not share

a necessary and beneficial relationship with Mother.

      Moreover, Dr. Lobb testified that Mother’s alcoholism and drug addiction

remained unstable. While Mother participated in a rehabilitation program and

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self-reported attaining approximately two months of sobriety, Dr. Lobb

indicated that “it seemed like her substance use was not completely under

control at th[e] point” he evaluated her. He explained, “I don’t consider [it]

to be stable[.] [I]t’s positive but there is a long road ahead. . . .” Id. at 24.

      As it relates to the effect of Mother’s behaviors on the children, Dr. Lobb

testified, “I am concerned that while mom appears to make progress in certain

areas and h[as] been working at times to address her substance abuse issues

[and] mental health issues, I’m concerned about her stability and these kids

continue to wait without permanency because of that.” Id. at 37.

      Like Dr. Lobb, Ms. Kohnfelder, the caseworker from TRAC Services for

Families, the foster care agency which placed C.M. and J.M., also noted her

concerns about the damaging effect of Mother’s mental health problems on

the children. She confirmed that Mother ended visitations early on at least

six occasions “stating that she was feeling anxious or upset on that day on

June 18, 2021; September 1, 2021; January 5, 2022; May 30, 2022; April 13,

2022; [and] May 20, 2022[.]” Id. at 92. With respect to the supervised visit

on May 20, 2022, Mother responded to one child’s temper tantrum by

bemoaning,

      “I don’t know what to do when they get like this . . . I just can’t
      do this. I think I’m going to leave after they eat because I just
      mentally cannot right now. I know that sounds bad, but if CYF
      never took them then I would be used to this, but I’m not.”

Id. at 92, 93.

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      Similarly, Ms. Kohnfelder described an incident during an earlier

supervised visit that occurred on August 11, 2021, when C.M. “had fallen and

. . . hit his lip on the ground and it started bleeding. Mother stated, ‘I’m a

horrible mother and this wouldn’t have happened if he wasn’t in foster care.’

She was unable to remain calm in a stressful situation and she left the

visitation.” Id. at 93. Crucially, Ms. Kohnfelder indicated that Mother never

demonstrated an ability to overcome stressful parenting situations and

complete the visitations as scheduled. Id.

      In sum, the foregoing evidence supports the court’s conclusion that

terminating Mother’s parental rights will serve the developmental, physical,

and emotional needs and welfare of C.M. and J.M. The witnesses consistently

testified both that it would not be detrimental to sever any bond between

Mother and C.M. or J.M. and that the primary bonds of both children are with

their foster parents, not to Mother. Critically, C.M. and J.M. have lived virtually

the entirety of their young lives with their foster parents, who are a pre-

adoptive resource. Moreover, the certified record demonstrates that Mother

is not capable of providing for a child’s safety and security.        Specifically,

Mother’s unresolved substance abuse and mental illness continue to impact

her parenting skills as outlined in the revealing discussions about her lack of

composure during the supervised visitations.

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      Accordingly, having discerned no abuse of discretion by the orphans’

court, we affirm the orders involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights

to C.M. and J.M.

      Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/16/2023

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