Court Opinion

ID: 9399835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 16:11:48.498207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.172861
License: Public Domain

J-S12033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    AUSTIN PATRICK HAITOS                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1291 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 11, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-38-CR-0000526-2017

BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                FILED: JUNE 6, 2023

        Appellant, Austin Patrick Haitos, appeals from the order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Lebanon County (trial court) that denied his first petition

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1     After careful review, we

affirm.

        On February 28, 2018, Appellant was convicted by a jury of involuntary

deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), sexual assault, and two counts of indecent

assault. These convictions arose out of an incident that occurred in the early

morning of January 1, 2017, following a New Years’ Eve party, when Appellant

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
J-S12033-23

put his penis in the mouth of a woman (Victim) while she was sleeping. The

evidence at trial showed the following:

      [O]n December 31, 2016, [Victim’s] family held a New Year’s Eve
      party at the family house…, to which [Victim] and her four siblings
      had invited approximately forty to fifty friends. There was alcohol
      at the party and the house had been accommodated for the
      attendees to sleep over. While some attendees arrived earlier,
      most began to arrive between 9 P.M. and 9:30 P.M. [Victim]
      admitted that she had been drinking on the night of the party as
      well. [Victim] testified that attendees began to go to sleep or leave
      the party around 2:30 A.M.

      [Victim] went to sleep in the lower basement on a couch with a
      friend laying behind her. [Victim] then woke up and felt a penis
      being thrusted into her mouth. [Victim] did not see the face of the
      person who had inserted his penis into her mouth while she was
      asleep, but she saw his legs and she saw the person pull his pants
      up, turn around and begin rapidly walking away. [Victim] was able
      to identify the individual as Appellant from the unique outfit he
      was wearing the night of the party and from his unique gait.
      [Victim] has known Appellant most of her life and Appellant lived
      within walking distance of the family home. As Appellant was
      walking away, [Victim] called out after him to stop and come back,
      but Appellant continued to walk [a]way.

                        *            *           *

      [One of the partygoers] testified at trial that he and Appellant
      were going to watch a movie at about 4 a.m. As he was setting
      up the movie, Appellant mentioned to him that [Victim] “looked
      hot” that night. Shortly thereafter, [the partygoer] excused
      himself to go to the restroom, and when he returned, Appellant
      was gone. Ten to fifteen minutes later, [the partygoer] heard
      [Victim] screaming and crying as she moved throughout the
      house. Appellant reentered the living room from the rear of the
      house mumbling about his coat and exited through the front door.
      [The partygoer] observed [Victim] as she went to the front door
      and yelled at Appellant.

                                      -2-
J-S12033-23

Commonwealth v. Haitos, No. 1788 MDA 2018, slip op. at 1-3 (Pa. Super.

filed July 25, 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (citations and brackets

omitted).

     Victim’s mother took Victim to a hospital, where the police were notified

and Victim’s mouth was swabbed for evidence. Haitos, No. 1788 MDA 2018,

slip op. at 2. Later that day, Appellant’s clothing was collected, and swabs

were taken of Appellant’s genitals. Id.; N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 157-59. DNA

testing was performed on the swabs from Victim’s mouth and Appellant’s

genitals and on a cutting of Appellant’s underpants. N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at

195-200; Commonwealth Ex. 4. The testing did not find sufficient DNA other

than Victim’s DNA on Victim’s swab to identify any person other than Victim

as a contributor and did not find sufficient DNA other than Appellant’s DNA on

the swabs of Appellant’s genitals and his underpants to identify any other

person as a contributor.       N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 197-200, 203-04;

Commonwealth Ex. 4.

     On June 13, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 4 to 10 years’

imprisonment for the IDSI conviction and the other convictions merged with

the IDSI conviction for sentencing purposes. Sentencing Order. Appellant

filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. Appellant timely

appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of a

female partygoer, S.B., concerning a sexual advance by Appellant earlier on

the night of the party, and that the verdict was against the weight of the

                                    -3-
J-S12033-23

evidence.   On July 25, 2019, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of

sentence.   Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on January 7, 2020.

      Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on January 5, 2021, and on June

9, 2021, filed an amended PCRA petition asserting eight claims for PCRA relief,

including all of the claims that are the subject of this appeal. The trial court

held hearings on this PCRA petition on December 6, 2021 and February 1,

2022 at which Appellant’s trial counsel and Appellant testified. On August 11,

2022, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition. Trial

Court Order and Opinion, 8/11/22, at 1. This timely appeal followed.

      Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

      1. Whether the PCRA court committed error when it ruled that
      Appellant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of
      Counsel was not violated by his trial attorney’s failure, during trial,
      to take the necessary steps to discredit [Victim]?

      2. Whether the PCRA court committed error when it ruled that
      Appellant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of
      Counsel was not violated by his trial attorney’s failure to request
      a limiting instruction following [S.B.’s] testimony?

      3. Whether the PCRA court committed error when it ruled that
      Appellant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of
      Counsel was not violated by his trial attorney’s failure to object
      and move for a mistrial after the Commonwealth’s closing
      statement?

      4. Whether the PCRA court committed error when it rejected
      Appellant’s claim that his Sixth Amendment Right to Effective
      Assistance of Counsel was violated by the cumulative effect of the
      attorney errors alleged in his PCRA Petition?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5 (suggested answers omitted).

                                       -4-
J-S12033-23

      Our review of an order denying a PCRA petition is limited to determining

whether the record supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its decision

is free of legal error.   Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa.

2015); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 63, 68 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en

banc); Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1174 (Pa. Super. 2018).

We must view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record in a

light most favorable to the prevailing party.      Mason, 130 A.3d at 617;

Commonwealth v. Mojica, 242 A.3d 949, 953 (Pa. Super. 2020); Johnson,

236 A.3d at 68. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, if supported by

the record, are binding on this Court. Mason, 130 A.3d at 617; Mojica, 242

A.3d at 953, 956; Commonwealth v. Orlando, 156 A.3d 1274, 1280 (Pa.

Super. 2017).

      All of Appellant’s issues are claims that trial counsel was ineffective. To

be entitled to relief under the PCRA on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, the defendant must prove: (1) that the underlying claim is of

arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s action or inaction had no reasonable basis

designed to effectuate her client’s interest; and (3) that he suffered prejudice

as a result of counsel’s action or inaction.       Mason, 130 A.3d at 618;

Commonwealth v. Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 15 (Pa. Super. 2020);

Commonwealth v. Ligon, 206 A.3d 515, 519 (Pa. Super. 2019).                  The

defendant must satisfy all three prongs of this test to obtain relief under the

                                      -5-
J-S12033-23

PCRA. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Commonwealth v. Burno, 94 A.3d 956,

972 (Pa. 2014); Smith, 181 A.3d at 1175.

      In his first issue, Appellant argues that his trial counsel’s cross-

examination of Victim was inadequate in two respects. First, Appellant asserts

that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to question Victim on whether she

told a friend that Appellant had lured her into another room before assaulting

her, which would be inconsistent with her testimony that Appellant assaulted

her while she was sleeping on the couch next to her friend. The other claimed

deficiency is that trial counsel allegedly failed to sufficiently cross-examine

Victim concerning her intoxication. These arguments fail because the trial

court found that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for her actions, Trial

Court Order and Opinion, 8/11/22, at 5-6, and those findings are supported

by the record and legally correct.

      Trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that she cross-examined

Victim concerning her drinking at the party in order to show that her

perception may have been impaired. N.T. PCRA, 12/6/21, at 14-15, 21. Trial

counsel testified that she did not cross-examine Victim further because she

elicited sufficient evidence from Victim concerning her drinking and because

she concluded from Victim’s composure on the stand and her responses that

continuing to cross-examine Victim would not produce any beneficial answers

and that “it would have been dangerous to press her further.” Id. at 21, 31-

33.

                                     -6-
J-S12033-23

      The record from the trial supports the trial court’s conclusion that the

decision not to cross-examine Victim further concerning her alcohol

consumption was reasonable.     The trial transcript shows that trial counsel

cross-examined Victim concerning both the amount of alcohol she had

consumed and the drinking games in which she participated at the party. N.T.

Trial, 2/27/18, at 46-58. In this cross-examination, Victim admitted that she

was drinking for five hours and consumed several beers and at least four

glasses of champagne sangria that contained both champagne and red wine.

Id. at 47-50.    In addition, trial counsel cross-examined other witnesses

concerning Victim’s drinking and level of inebriation, some of whom testified

that Victim was significantly intoxicated. Id. at 79-80, 91, 108-10, 118, 126-

27.

      The record also supports the trial court’s conclusion that there was a

reasonable basis for trial counsel’s actions concerning Victim’s alleged prior

inconsistent statement. While trial counsel did not ask Victim whether she

had told a friend that Appellant had lured her into another room before

assaulting her, she did bring this inconsistent statement into evidence in her

cross-examination of the friend and used this inconsistency in her closing

argument. N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 114-16; N.T. Trial, 2/28/18, at 22. The

decision to question the friend on this statement, rather than Victim, was

reasonable, since the claim that Victim made the inconsistent statement was

based on a statement that the friend made to an investigator and trial counsel

                                    -7-
J-S12033-23

used the statement to the investigator to cross-examine the friend on this

subject. N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 115-16.

      Appellant’s second issue concerns trial counsel’s actions with respect to

the testimony of witness S.B. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth had sought to

introduce evidence from several witnesses, including S.B., concerning

instances of prior nonconsensual sexual touching by Appellant. Haitos, No.

1788 MDA 2018, slip op. at 3 n.1; Commonwealth Notice to Introduce

Evidence of Prior Bad Acts at 3-5.      Appellant’s trial counsel opposed the

Commonwealth’s attempt to introduce any of this bad act evidence, and the

trial court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce only S.B.’s bad act

testimony.    Haitos, No. 1788 MDA 2018, slip op. at 3 n.1; N.T. PCRA,

12/6/21, at 21-22.     Appellant’s counsel in his direct appeal argued that

admission of S.B.’s bad act testimony was reversible error, but this Court held

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the

Commonwealth to introduce this evidence under Pa.R.Crim.P. 404(b) for the

purpose of showing Appellant’s state of mind, to prove that Appellant’s contact

with Victim was for sexual gratification. Haitos, No. 1788 MDA 2018, slip op.

at 4-9.   In this appeal, Appellant’s only claim on this subject is that trial

counsel was ineffective because she did not request that the jury be given a

limiting instruction concerning its consideration of S.B.’s testimony.

      This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for the same reason

as Appellant’s first issue. The trial court found that trial counsel had a

                                     -8-
J-S12033-23

reasonable basis for not requesting a limiting instruction. Trial Court Order

and Opinion, 8/11/22, at 6-7. That determination, like its ruling on Appellant’s

first issue, is supported by the record and legally correct.

      Trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that she made a strategic

decision not to request a limiting instruction because S.B.’s testimony was

very brief and a limiting instruction would have both highlighted it and made

the testimony, which was relatively minor, more damaging.           N.T. PCRA,

12/6/21, at 22. That judgment was reasonable. S.B.’s only testimony on this

subject was indeed brief, consisting of less than three pages of the trial

transcript, and was that Appellant put his hand on her thigh and stroked her

thigh under her dress without her consent when she was sitting next to him

during the party, that she got up and walked away, and that she “just thought

[Appellant] was being a dumb drunk kid.” N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 130-31, 133.

Where the testimony is brief and not extraordinarily harmful to the defendant,

a decision to not request a limiting instruction to avoid calling additional

attention to that testimony is a reasonable strategic choice that does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Solano, 129

A.3d 1156, 1178 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 811 A.2d 556,

561-62 (Pa. 2002). Moreover, the limited purpose for which S.B.’s testimony

was admissible was to show that Appellant was acting for sexual gratification.

Haitos, No. 1788 MDA 2018, slip op. at 8. Counsel could reasonably conclude

that an instruction that focused the jury on viewing Appellant’s inappropriate

                                      -9-
J-S12033-23

touching of S.B. through the lens of sexual gratification could be more harmful

than helpful to Appellant’s defense.

      Appellant’s   third   claim   of    error   concerns   statements   by   the

Commonwealth in its closing argument about Appellant’s behavior when he

was at the police station and the hospital on the day of the incident waiting

for a swab of his genitals to be performed for DNA testing. At trial, the officer

who was with Appellant testified that after he told Appellant that his genitals

would be swabbed, Appellant repeatedly rubbed his genitals with his hand,

both under and over the Tyvek suit he was wearing while awaiting the

swabbing. N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 214-19. The officer testified that he asked

Appellant what he was doing and that Appellant said that he “was adjusting

himself” and that it was a nervous habit. Id. at 215, 217. The officer testified

that he told Appellant to stop doing that because it made the officer

uncomfortable, but that Appellant continued to periodically rub his genitals.

Id. at 215-17. The Commonwealth in its closing argued that the jury could

conclude from this evidence that Appellant was trying to destroy evidence by

wiping Victim’s DNA off his genitals. N.T. Trial, 2/28/18, at 58-60. Appellant

contends that trial counsel’s failure to object to these closing arguments

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We do not agree.

      It is proper for a prosecutor to summarize the admitted evidence, offer

reasonable deductions and inferences from the evidence, provide fair rebuttal

to defense arguments, and argue that the evidence establishes the

                                         - 10 -
J-S12033-23

defendant’s guilt. Burno, 94 A.3d at 974; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 54

A.3d 332, 338 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119 A.3d 1058, 1068

(Pa. Super. 2015).       The Commonwealth’s argument here asserted a

reasonable inference that the jury could draw from the evidence that Appellant

repeatedly rubbed his genitals after he was told that they were going to be

swabbed for DNA testing. In addition, this assertion was a fair response to

Appellant’s counsel’s closing argument, as Appellant’s counsel asserted in her

closing that the evidence of Appellant rubbing his genitals “has nothing to do

with anything” and was brought out by the Commonwealth just to make

Appellant look bad. N.T. Trial, 2/28/18, at 26. Because the Commonwealth’s

closing argument was not improper, Appellant cannot satisfy the requirement

that an objection to the closing argument would have had arguable merit, and

trial counsel’s failure to object cannot constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel.   Burno, 94 A.3d at 975-76; Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 165

A.3d 34, 42-44 (Pa. Super. 2017); Riggle, 119 A.3d at 1068.

       Appellant’s only remaining claim of error is that the cumulative effect of

the above-described alleged deficiencies of trial counsel in her cross-

examination of Victim, her failure to request a limiting instruction, and her

failure to object to the Commonwealth’s closing argument deprived him of

effective assistance of counsel. That is without merit. The cumulative effect

of multiple actions or inactions of counsel may only be considered where those

PCRA    claims   have   been   rejected   solely   due   to   lack   of   prejudice.

                                     - 11 -
J-S12033-23

Commonwealth v. Simpson, 112 A.3d 1194, 1205–06 (Pa. 2015);

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 161 (Pa. 2012); Smith, 181 A.3d

at 1187.    “[N]o number of failed ineffectiveness claims may collectively

warrant relief if they fail to do so individually.” Simpson, 112 A.3d at 1205.

Here, all of Appellant’s claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel failed for

reasons other than lack of prejudice.

      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly held

that Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA

petition.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/06/2023

                                     - 12 -