Court Opinion

ID: 9797911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:32:09.208989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:42.919679
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Judge,
Dissent.
11 I dissent to the sustaining of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. As pointed out in the majority opinion, 47 O.S.Supp. 2005, § 2-117 sets out the powers and duties *102of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol and this Court has no reported cases on the authority of a Highway Patrol Trooper to initiate a criminal investigation and arrest any person believed to be violating a law of the state. However, I disagree with the majority's interpretation of the language in § 2-117.1 The verbal gymnastics utilized to reach the desired result defy basic logic and common sense based on the statutory language which controls. It is a well established principle of statutory construction that statutes are to be construed according to the plain and ordinary meaning of their language. King v. State, 2008 OK CR 13, ¶ 7, 182 P.3d 842, 844; State v. Young, 1999 OK CR 14, ¶ 27, 989 P.2d 949, 955. "A statute should be given a construction according to the fair import of its words taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision." Howrey v. State, 2002 OK CR 22, ¶ 8, 46 P.3d 1282, 1284 citing State v. Anderson, 1998 OK CR 67, ¶ 3, 972 P.2d 32, 33. Statutes are to be construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, reconciling provisions, rendering them consistent and giving intelligent effect to each. Young, 1999 OK CR 14, 127, 989 P.2d at 955. The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute. Id.2
2 Applying these principles, a plain, common sense reading of the statute shows that Highway Patrol Troopers are "peace officers" of the State of Oklahoma and "have the powers and authority ... vested by law in other peace officers, including the right and power of search and seizure, ... and the right and power to investigate and prevent crime and to enforce the criminal laws of this state."3 The authority of Highway Patrol Troopers extends to the power "to arrest without writ, rule, order or process any person detected by them in the act of violating any law of the state." 47 O.S.Supp.2005, § 2-117(B)(2)
T3 In King v. State, 2008 OK CR 13, 182 P.3d 842 this Court recently ruled that agents of the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs have the statutory authority to make traffic stops as required to carry out the purposes of the Uniform Dangerous Substances Act, 68 0.98.2001, § 2-101. Applying the basic principles of statutory construction, this Court found that the specific language of the Uniform Dangerous Substances Act set out the duties and authorities of the agents in enforcing its provisions. Applying those same principles discussed in *103King to the present case, the specific language of 47 0.8.S8Supp.2005, § 2-117(A) and (B)(2) clearly authorized Trooper McMillan's actions.
1 4 I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that because the Catoosa Campus Police Department had no interdepartmental agreement for assistance with the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, Trooper MeMillan could not rely on a request from the Campus Police for authority to initiate the investigation and therefore the trooper acted beyond his jurisdiction. Even if the Campus Police was limited to asking only the Catoosa Police Department for assistance and had no specified authority to ask the Oklahoma Highway Patrol for assistance based on its agreement with the Catoosa Public Schools, there is no reason to completely throw out the information received from the Campus Police by Trooper McMillan. The information received from the Campus Police is the same as that received from a known informant. Trooper McMillan testified he received information from the Campus Police that an underage drinking party was in process at the Crowley residence. McMillan testified he was familiar with the residence having received previous call-ins about underage drinking parties occurring at the residence. In addition, he observed an individual he knew to be a juvenile in the kitchen drinking from one of the Styrofoam cups being used by the group, together with beer cans and liquor bottles in plain view. This information was sufficient to provide the Trooper with probable cause that a crime was in progress. Mollett v. State, 1997 OK CR 28, 114, 939 P.2d 1, 7 ("[the existence of probable cause is a common sense standard requiring facts sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is being committed"). See also United States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 475 (lith Cir.1996) ("[plrobable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be discovered in a particular place"). Therefore, pursuant to his authority as a peace officer of the state and his statutory right and power to investigate and prevent crime and to enforce the criminal laws of this state, Trooper McMillan had the legal authority to initiate the investigation into the report of an underage drinking party at the defendant's home. However, based on the majority opinion analysis, Trooper MeMillen would not have had the authority to act even if the information reported to him was that a woman was being assaulted at that very moment because he is not empowered to initiate an investigation based on third party information. That does not seem logical to me, nor does it seem to be the intent of the Legislature. Even a private citizen has the power to act in that situation. See 22 0.98.2001, § 202. So, why doesn't a Highway Patrol Trooper? This decision is certainly hard to harmonize with our recent decision in State v. Kieffer-Roden, 2009 OK CR 18, 208 P.3d 471, where we held that a sheriff's failure to comply with 19 0.98.8upp.2005, § 548, in the appointment of his deputies did not deprive them of the ability to make a citizen's arrest under § 202.
T5 Based upon the above, the ruling of the trial court sustaining the defendants' motion to suppress should be reversed and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
T6 I am authorized to state that Judge Arlene Johnson joins in this writing.

. Title 47 O.S$.Supp.2005, § 2-117 provides in pertinent part:
A. The Commissioner of Public Safety and each officer of the Department of Public Safety, as designated and commissioned by the Commissioner, are hereby declared to be peace officers of the State of Oklahoma and shall be so deemed and taken in all courts having jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of the state. Such officers shall have the powers and authority now and hereafter vested by law in other peace officers, including the right and power of search and seizure, except the serving or execution of civil process, and the right and power to investigate and prevent crime and to enforce the criminal laws of this state.
B. The officers of the Department shall have the following authority, responsibilities, powers and duties:
1. To enforce the provisions of this title and any other law regulating the operation of vehicles or the use of the highways, including, but not limited to, the Motor Carriers Act of this state, or any other laws of this state by the direction of the Governor;
2. To arrest without writ, rule, order or process any person detected by them in the act of violating any law of the state;
3. When the officer is in pursuit of a violator or suspected violator and is unable to arrest such violator or suspected violator within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol Division, to continue in pursuit of such violator or suspected violator into whatever part of the state may be reasonably necessary to effect the apprehension and arrest of the same, and to arrest such violator or suspected violator wherever the violator may be overtaken;
(emp'l'lajléis added)(omitted).

. The Court relies on an Attorney General's opinion, 2006 OK AG 14, 111 (April 21, 2006), however the Attorney General's opinion does not even mention the specific grant of authority in 47 0.S.Supp.2005, § 2-117(B)(2).

. ''The term 'peace officer' means any sheriff, police officer, federal law enforcement officer, or any other law enforcement officer whose duty it is to enforce and preserve the public peace." 21 ©.$.2001, § 99.