Court Opinion

ID: 9607284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:57:03.436421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:23.169008
License: Public Domain

Eberhardt, Judge,
concurring specially. There was a demurrer seeking to have stricken from the petition the inclusion or attaching of a copy of the public liability policy of insurance which the defendant, a charitable institution, carried. The demurrer was overruled and that ruling is urged as error.
Defendant’s position is that since the petition alleges that it was engaged in the commercial activity of operating the swimming pool for cash admissions it was neither necessary nor proper to include, attach or make reference to the matter of insurance.
In Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438 (96 SE 887) the court dealt with the question of whether a corporation chartered as the “Savannah Poor-house and Hospital ... to conduct only an institution primarily or altogether eleemosynary in character, for the public benefit,” could be sued by a patient who paid for his hospital care and suffered injury because of the negligence of its employees. It was held that the hospital could be sued, although it did not operate for pecuniary gain or benefit to its managers, officers or others, and any recoveiy obtained would be restricted to income derived from noncharitable sources *499since the general trust and charitable funds could not be depleted by subjecting them to liability for negligence. The basis for the ruling was that it appeared that the defendant was engaged in an activity by which it received noncharitable income—the pay of some of its patients, including the plaintiff. No other noncharitable asset was mentioned in the petition. No liability insurance was mentioned or pleaded. Morton was followed in Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 (155 SE 194), Robertson v. Executive Com. of the Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469 (190 SE 432), Young Women’s Christian Assn. v. Barnett, 93 Ga. App. 322 (91 SE2d 381); Executive Com. of the Baptist Convention v. Ferguson, 95 Ga. App. 393 (98 SE2d 50), and perhaps others, though it was recognized that if the charitable institution had no noncharitable income or property it could not be held. Butler v. Berry School, 27 Ga. App. 560 (109 SE 544). In keeping with the principle of Morton productive property held by a charity is taxable. Linton v. Lucy Cobb Institute, 117 Ga. 678 (45 SE 53).
Defendant urges that when it appears from the petition that it was engaged in an activity from which it received noncharitable income this deprives the defendant of its charitable immunity from liability for negligent injury that may be inflicted on one of its customers or patrons and that there is no further reason or necessity for any pleading of noncharitable assets for the purpose of showing the right to maintain the action, relying upon Morton and cases following it. It also urges that a different conclusion is not required by the rulings in Cox v. DeJarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664 (123 SE2d 16) and Morehouse College v. Russell, 219 Ga. 717 (135 SE2d 432), asserting that in Cox the plaintiff was injured when slipping on the steps of a church, that in Morehouse College the suit was based upon the negligence of a college while engaged in a purely charitable function, and that under these circumstances it could not be held that Cox and Morehouse were intended to authorize the pleading of the existence of a liability insurance policy in all cases against all charities.
There is much logic in defendant’s position, for if the courts in Cox and Morehouse did intend that in all cases against all *500charities it would be proper to plead the existence of a liability insurance policy it would obviously have the effect of placing charities in a far worse position in the defense of the action than the ordinary noncharitable defendant, against whom it is well settled that it is improper to mention the existence of insurance in the pleadings or the evidence. Indeed, it has been held that the trial court should require a recasting of pleadings to eliminate any reference to insurance or other prejudicial matter. Shaw v. Miller, 215 Ga. 413, 414 (110 SE2d 759); Perkins v. Publix Theatres Corp., 47 Ga. App. 641 (7) (171 SE 147); McBee v. Atlanta Paper Co., 84 Ga. App. 181 (65 SE2d 832); Rodgers v. Styles, 100 Ga. App. 124 (110 SE2d 582); Ray Clanton’s East Ga. Motors, Inc., 100 Ga. App. 650 (112 SE2d 218); Shook v. Southern R. Co., 101 Ga. App. 128, 130 (113 SE2d 155); C.T.C. Finance Corp. v. Longmire, 106 Ga. App. 326 (126 SE2d 714); Shapiro Packing Co. v. Landrum, 109 Ga. App. 519, 523 (136 SE2d 446). It would be little short of judicial sciamachy to suppose that when a liability policy is pleaded or attached to the petition the jury is likely to distinguish it from an accident policy. “The voluntary introduction by the plaintiff of ‘the insurance company’ into the evidence was calculated to suggest to the jury that any damages found in favor of the plaintiff would be paid by the insurance company and not by the defendant, and was highly prejudicial to the defendant’s cause. . .” Decatur Chevrolet Co. v. White, 51 Ga. App. 362, 363 (180 SE 377). “If the damage done by the mention of insurance cannot be remedied a mistrial must be granted. . .” Steinmetz v. Chambley, 90 Ga. App. 519, 528 (83 SE2d 318). If counsel mention it in argument to the jury it is ground for mistrial. O’Neill Mfg. Co. v. Pruitt, 110 Ga. 577, 579 (36 SE 59).
Charitable immunity and governmental immunity have been the law’s “Gold Dust Twins” since the earliest days of the common law. Doubtless they originated in what was conceived to be a necessity to preserve the ability of the church and the King’s government to perform their functions. There is little difference in the rationale of the doctrines. But when a governmental agency engages in nongovernmental functions it is generally held subject to liability for injury which may result. For *501example, there is the well settled proposition that a municipality-engaged in the maintenance of its streets, or in the distribution of electricity for profit may be sued by one who is injured through negligence of the municipality or its agents in the performance of those functions. When it appears from the petition that the activity of the defendant complained about was nongovernmental in character, the suit is maintainable.
The General Assembly has authorized political subdivisions of the State to procure liability insurance and to the extent of any insurance carried has removed governmental immunity as a defense; but recognizing that the reference to insurance in a law suit would be prejudicial to the defense of any action where the liability may be covered thereby, it is specifically provided that “No attempt shall be made in the trial of any action brought against a municipal corporation, county or any other political subdivision of this State to suggest the existence of any insurance which covers in whole or in part any judgment or award which may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and if the verdict rendered by the jury exceeds the limits of the applicable insurance, the court shall reduce the amount of said judgment or award to a sum equal to the applicable limits stated in the insurance policy.” Code Ann. § 56-2437. Here is a legislative declaration of public policy against reference to insurance in this type of situation. A similar result would seem to obtain in suits against charities under the doctrine of Morton, unless the courts have intended and held otherwise in Cox and Morehouse College. It may well be that they did not so intend and that the ruling was intended, as defendant contends, to apply only when it does not otherwise appear that the suit could be maintained. Language in Cox lends credence to this position when it was there asserted: “But where, as here, the existence of the cause of action is based upon, indeed is dependent upon, the liability policy as a noncharitable asset, it is essential that it be set forth in the petition.” I should be content to hold that such was the effect of Cox, but it would take a strained construction of the answer to the third certified question in Morehouse College to reach that conclusion, and we are bound by it. Perhaps the remedy may lie in the amending of Code Ann. § 56-2437 to include charities along with governmental subdivisions.
*502We do not reach the question of whether it is wise to continue charitable or governmental immunity. Many of the jurisdictions have abolished it altogether. The area of governmental immunity is diminishing. A study of that matter may reveal the wisdom of taking that course, either legislatively or by an overruling of the doctrine. See Friedman, Charitable Institutions—A Re-Examination of the Doctrine of Immunity from Tort Liability, 24 G.B.J. 201. But, as yet, we have not launched out upon a program of social insurance, and until we do, it would seem that the policy of keeping this- matter out of pleadings as well as evidence in the trial of a law suit, recognized both by the courts and the legislature, should be observed.
On the basis of Morehouse only I must agree with the majority that the overruling of the demurrer was proper.
I am authorized to state that Bell, P. J., and Hall, J., join in this special concurrence.