Court Opinion

ID: 9928917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 17:00:39.633011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:45.611392
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Eighth Circuit
              ___________________________

                    No. 22-3262
           ___________________________

                    Peter David Davis

                                  Petitioner

                             v.

Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States

                               Respondent

                ------------------------------

        Immigration and Disability Law Scholars

                  Amicus on Behalf of Petitioner
            ___________________________

                    No. 23-1229
           ___________________________

                    Peter David Davis

                                  Petitioner

                             v.

Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States

                               Respondent

                ------------------------------

        Immigration and Disability Law Scholars

                    Amicus on Behalf of Petitioner
                                  ____________

                      Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals
                                  ____________

                         Submitted: November 15, 2023
                            Filed: February 1, 2024
                                ____________

Before COLLOTON, WOLLMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
                        ____________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

      Peter David Davis petitions for review of the dismissal of his appeal by the
Board of Immigration Appeals. Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a),
this Court grants that petition and remands to the BIA.

      Davis, a Liberian citizen, was admitted as an asylee to the United States in
2008. While living with family and working at a senior living facility, Davis
began using drugs and experiencing mental health symptoms—later diagnosed as
depressed, bipolar, schizophrenic, and posttraumatic stress disorder.

      By 2014, Davis was homeless and eventually arrested for shoplifting. Over
the next four years, he was convicted of multiple crimes, including a 58-month
sentence for aggravated robbery and fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle.
The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services sent a Notice of Intent to
Terminate Asylum Status.

       In April 2019, DHS began removal proceedings, alleging that his criminal
history made him removable and that his asylum status should be terminated.

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Davis conceded removability, stating that his mental health was “going great”
(despite not taking his prescribed medications). He sought a waiver of
inadmissibility for humanitarian purposes and to assure family unity.

      The IJ denied the waiver and ordered him removed. On the first appeal to
the BIA, it agreed that as a matter of discretion, a waiver was not warranted. The
IJ did not explicitly determine whether the respondent’s asylee status had been
terminated. The BIA remanded “for the sole issue as to whether the respondent’s
asylee status should be terminated.”

       While the case was on remand, Davis began to consistently take psychiatric
medications. He told his new counsel that due to his mental health struggles, it
had been difficult to share important aspects of his personal history with his
former lawyer. These struggles included hearing voices, confusing reality with
the imaginary, and failing to take the proceedings seriously. He described
hardships in Liberia where he was beaten by military groups, interrogated about
his tribal membership, sexually assaulted by an older man while living in a shelter
for children, and subject to other violent experiences.

       Before the IJ the second time, Davis submitted a brief that included a
request to reopen the case. He also requested a competency hearing, moved for a
mental disability accommodation, and sought to apply for withholding of removal
and CAT protection. He unsuccessfully tried to have his mother and his former
attorney testify before the IJ.

       The IJ concluded that the BIA’s remand was “narrowed … to the issue of
termination of the respondent’s asylum,” because “[t]he Board explicitly retained
jurisdiction.” In addition to finding that Davis was competent throughout the
proceedings, the IJ terminated his asylee status and ordered him removed to
Liberia. The IJ also stated that Davis’s post-remand testimony and his new

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attorney’s proffered testimony of Davis’s mother and previous counsel “d[id] not
change [his] decision.”

       On this appeal to the BIA, it recognized that it remanded the case to
determine Davis’s asylee status. However, it added that the IJ did have
jurisdiction over new claims and additional evidence. It affirmed the IJ’s
decision. The BIA referenced the motion-to-reopen standard, stating that Davis
“has not established that evidence of his mental health issues and of his past and
feared harm if returned to Liberia are new, previously unavailable, or would likely
change the result in his case.” Davis then petitioned for review with this Court.

                                         I.

       Davis argues that the BIA erred by failing to provide a reasoned explanation
for its application of the motion-to-reopen standard. The government asserts that
this Court lacks jurisdiction to review this determination due to the criminal alien
review bar. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). However, as the government
acknowledges, section 1252(a)(2)(C) does not prevent reviewing “constitutional
claims” or “questions of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The adequacy of
the BIA’s explanation is a question of law. See Lavira v. Att’y Gen., 478 F.3d 158,
164 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review
whether the BIA’s explanation was sufficient to allow meaningful appellate
review), overruled on other grounds by Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 189-90
(3d Cir. 2008); Garcia Gomez v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam) (same).

       This Court reviews the decision to reopen proceedings for an abuse of
discretion. Hailemichael v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 2006). This
court may find an abuse of discretion where a decision is without rational
explanation, departs from established policies, invidiously discriminates against a

                                        -4-
particular race or group, or where the agency fails to consider all factors presented
by the alien or distorts important aspects of the claim. Ramirez v. Sessions, 902
F.3d 764, 775 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal marks and citations omitted).

      Before the IJ, Davis requested to reopen his case. To grant a motion to
reopen, the IJ must be “satisfied that evidence sought to be offered is material and
was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former
hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3).

       In a similar case, the BIA had affirmed the IJ’s grant of a motion to reopen
(by the government). The IJ there gave a one-sentence explanation: “This court
rejects the [alien’s] argument that this evidence was available and could have been
discovered and presented at the former hearing.” Hailemichael, 454 F.3d at 884.
This Court held this was “insufficient” to permit “meaningful review.” Id. “The
IJ’s summary dismissal in one sentence of all of [the alien’s] arguments concerning
the prior availability of the proffered evidence” does not meet the “requirements”
for adequately reasoned decision making. Id.

       Here, the IJ’s decision does not reference the motion to reopen (or the
standard for considering it). The government believes that the IJ did so by stating
that “issues of mental health and substance abuse permeate and are very well made
on the record at the individual hearing originally made.” To the contrary, this
statement is addressing Davis’s decision not to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim. True, the IJ’s statement could support findings relevant to the
motion to reopen. But, the IJ concluded he lacked jurisdiction to entertain new
claims and ruled in the alternative that the claims should be dismissed.

      The BIA erred in affirming the IJ. The entirety of the BIA’s analysis about
the motion to reopen was that Davis “has not established that evidence of his
mental health issues and of his past and feared harm if returned to Liberia are new,

                                         -5-
previously unavailable, or would likely change the result in his case.” This one
sentence alludes to the elements of a motion to reopen, but does not explain how
they apply to Davis’s case. Neither the IJ nor the BIA met the requirements of
reasoned decision-making. See Hailemichael, 454 F.3d at 884.

      The government asserts that the BIA, in other parts of its order, provided
enough explanation of why Davis’s case should not be reopened. The BIA does
comment that: Davis’s “mental health issues were known … during his
competency hearings”; he discussed his mental health issues during his original
proceedings; and he had “documented mental health issues.” The BIA, however,
does not connect these general comments to the motion to reopen.

      Without an adequate explanation, this Court cannot conduct a meaningful
review of the BIA’s September 30, 2022 order. See Omondi v. Holder, 674 F.3d
793, 800-01 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that the BIA’s reasoning must be “specific”
enough to conduct judicial review), citing Singh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 553, 557
(8th Cir. 2007).

                                          II.

       While the petition was pending to review the BIA’s September order, Davis
moved for the agency to reconsider its prior decision, which was denied. In light
of the grant of the petition to review the BIA’s order, this Court denies the petition
to review the denial of reconsideration.

       Davis argues that the IJ deprived him of due process by, among other
reasons, not considering evidence relevant to the motion to reopen. In light of
granting the petition, this Court cannot address this argument until the BIA
reviews the IJ’s rulings.

                                         -6-
       Davis also argues that the BIA should have rejected the IJ’s finding that he
was competent. Because he concludes his argument with a request to submit new
evidence, this Court will not address this argument in light of the grant of the
petition to review the BIA’s order.

                                *******

      This Court grants Davis’s petition for review in case no. 22-3262, denies
the petition for review in case no. 23-1229, and remands for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
                         ______________________________

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