Court Opinion

ID: 9692613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:58:45.313281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:35.661676
License: Public Domain

*121Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy:
While I concur with the conclusion in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Jones that the victim’s statement to her mother was admissible into evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule and was not exeludible as being an opinion, I do not agree that the “present sense impression” exception to the hearsay rule is the basis of the admissibility of the challenged declaration. Assuming that this exception would be a useful addition to the law of Pennsylvania relative to hearsay evidence, it is not, in my view, applicable to the case at bar. On the other hand, I am satisfied that the challenged statement is admissible under the so-called “excited utterance” exception, another variant of the res gestae exception, and I am at a loss to explain the conclusion to the contrary in the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court.
In the case of Allen v. Mack, 345 Pa. 407, 28 A.2d 783 (1942), this Court defined what is known as the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule: “A res gestae declaration may be defined as a spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been suddenly made subject to an over-powering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occurrence, which that person has just participated in or closely witnessed, and made in reference to some phase of that occurrence which he perceived, and this declaration must be made so near the occurrence both in time and place as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated in whole or in part from his reflective faculties.” 345 Pa. at 410, 28 A.2d at 784. The opinion of the Chief Justice concludes, and I agree, that as so defined, this exception is preferably described as the “excited utterance” exception. McCormick, Evidence §297 at 704 (2d ed. 1972).
Professor McCormick has said that there are two basic requirements for the applicability of this exception: “First, there must be some occurrence or event *122sufficiently startling to render normal reflective thought processes of an observer inoperative. Second, the statement of the declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought.” McCormick, op. cit., supra. See also A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence, Eule 512(b); proposed Eules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, Eule 803(2) (1973).*
From the evidence in the case at bar it is manifest that both elements of the “excited utterance” exception are present: a sufficiently shocking or (in McCormick’s word) “startling” occurrence and a statement which is a “spontaneous reaction” to that occurrence. The victim’s mother testified that her daughter, Diane McCarthy, telephoned her on the morning she died and told her mother that she had just been awakened by the defendant punching her seven times in the face. The mother further testified that throughout the call she could hear Coleman yelling loudly and angrily in the background. Certainly this episode in which Diane was caught up may be truly characterized as “sufficiently startling to render normal reflective thought processes . . . inoperative.” McCormick, op. cit. supra. In Commonwealth v. Noble, 371 Pa. 138, 88 A.2d 760 (1952), this Court said “[spontaneous exclamations or declarations uttered during or immediately preceding or following the actual infliction of wounds or springing out of the actual commission of the crime, are admissible as within the res gestae rule.” 371 Pa. *123at 145. See also Commonwealth v. Edwards, 431 Pa. 44, 244 A.2d 683 (1968); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 409 Pa. 268, 186 A.2d 5 (1962). In the present case, Diane’s declaration immediately followed defendant’s first assault upon her and preceded only by moments the further threatened attack. Again, such an attack and such a threat surely qualify as “startling” (McCormick) or as “shocking” (Allen v. Mack, supra).
The element of “spontaneity” is likewise present here. The victim’s mother testified that when she suggested to Diane that she would hang up and call the police, her daughter begged her not to do so “‘[because as soon as the phone is hung up,’ he was going to kill her.” The conclusion is irresistible that this declaration was the victim’s spontaneous reaction to the attack upon her only minutes before. There was no evidence that the statement was premeditated or in any way the product of design on the declarant’s part. The fact that her fear was indeed justified was tragically borne out by the fact that only minutes after her frantic telephone call to her mother, Diane McCarthy was found dying of 102 stab wounds.
Since it is my belief that the challenged statement did come within the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule, I think the other opinion is mistaken in using this case as a vehicle for the adoption of the “present sense impression” exception. In its effort to get away from the “res gestae” label for the hearsay exception applicable to a fact situation such as this case presents, Mr. Chief Justice Jones has, in my opinion, unnecessarily adopted a new and, on these facts, inapplicable exception.
For the above reason, I concur that, hearsay though it was, the statement was properly admitted into evidence.
Mr. Justice Robeets and Mr. Justice Nix join in this concurring opinion.

 The proposed Rules of Evidence were adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States on December 18, 1972, as an amendment of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective July 1, 1973, and transmitted to the Congress in accordance with the provisions of Title 28, U.S.O. §2072. By virtue of P. L. 92-12 enacted by the 92nd Congress, however, the Rules will not take effect until approved by Congress, which has yet to take final action.