Court Opinion

ID: 9468728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:22:19.324118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:01.671380
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT
JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs Hortantsa Heredia and Gloria Schultze brought suit on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, alleging that defendant Edward A. Green, a Landlord and Tenant Officer (“L&T Officer”), violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (1979), and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“PUTPCPL”), 73 P.S. § 201-1, et seq. (Purdon 1971) by engaging in allegedly illegal collection activities. Specifically, plaintiffs object to the defendant serving copies of a document headed “Municipal Court Notice of Termination of Lease” (the “Notice”), on behalf of various landlords, to tenants who are allegedly delinquent in rental payments, and for charging tenants “unauthorized” fees for this service.
We must decide whether the defendant Green was acting in the performance of his official duties when he sent the Notices to the plaintiffs. Such a determination would, by virtue of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C), exempt his actions from the proscriptions of the debt collecting provisions of the FDCPA. The district court 504 F.Supp. 896 concluded that Green’s activities were in the performance of his official duties and were thus outside the scope of the FDCPA and declined to reach plaintiffs state law claims. We affirm.
FACTS
Defendant Green is a Landlord and Tenant Officer of the Pladelphia Municipal Court. He v/as appointed to the position by President Judge Glancey of that court on March 20, 1970. Over the past three years, Green has served the Notices in question upon many tenants in the City of Philadelphia.
The Notice sent to tenants is basically of the same form in all cases, but differs in the name of the landlord, the name of the tenants), and the amount of rent and late charges claimed due. Appendix at l-18a. The landlord provides Green with all the information necessary to complete the form. It is completed by Green soon after the landlord contacts him, whether by telephone or in person. The Notice, which contains a Municipal Court seal bearing the words “Landlord & Tenant Officers of Municipal Court,” demands full payment of all fees, late charges, and unpaid rent within five days. Payment is to be made by the tenants at Green’s office. The Notice states that eviction proceedings will then be instituted in Municipal Court, if payment is not received within five days.
President Judge Glancey expressly authorized Green to use the form of the Notice in question. The Notice was served upon both plaintiffs pursuant to separate written lease agreements. Although the Municipal Court does not provide the forms nor pay for them, they are approved for form and content by the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The Notice provides for certain fees for “services,” “travel” and “receiving payment.” Defendant Green has no authority to charge any fees other than those specifically authorized by the President Judge of the Municipal Court.
In the case of the named plaintiffs, defendant Green received a telephone call from each of their respective landlords. Plaintiff Heredia’s landlord called on January 4 and 18, 1980. For a fee of $9.50, Green agreed to send Heredia Notices which were mailed the same day. On January 18,1980, Green received a telephone call from Brunner Real Estate, landlord of plaintiff Schultze. For a fee of $8.00, he agreed to send her a Notice which was mailed the same day.
Both named plaintiffs received the Notices in question as a result of their failure to pay rentals in accordance with their writ*394ten lease agreements. That both named plaintiffs owe back-rent to their landlords is undisputed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action was brought by plaintiffs on April 4, 1980. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief for themselves and the unnamed members of the plaintiff class. In addition, they sought actual and statutory damages for themselves. Defendant Green filed an answer to the complaint on June 16,1980. It became apparent to the parties that the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(2) were met; on June 30, 1980 plaintiffs filed an uncontested motion for class certification which was approved by the district court. The class certified was “all individuals who have received or may receive forms entitled ‘Municipal Court Notice of Termination of Lease’ as part of an attempt by defendant Green to collect unpaid rent.” Appendix at l-40a.
On August 7, 1980, Green filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that his collection activities were outside the purview of both the FDCPA and PUTPCPL. Plaintiffs then filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment seeking judgment on the issues of liability, injunctive relief and statutory damages, and reserving the issue of actual damages for trial.
After considering the motion and cross-motion, the district court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order on December 1, 1980. Appendix at l-56a. The court concluded that Green’s activities were outside the scope of the FDCPA; therefore, it granted defendant’s motion and denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion. The district court refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claim and so never reached the merits of that issue.1 On December 22, 1980, plaintiffs filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
The FDCPA proscribes various activities of debt collectors, but excludes from the definition of “debt collector”
any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C). Green contends that the activities objected to by plaintiffs in this action are excluded from the FDCPA by this section. Plaintiffs argue that Green is not acting in his official capacity as an L&T Officer, but rather that his activities are in essence those of a private debt collector and are therefore subject to scrutiny under the FDCPA. The district court concluded that Green’s activities did constitute official activities, and were thus excluded from the proscription of the FDCPA. We agree. We also agree that because of this conclusion, we need not decide whether the activities in question would be proscribed by the FDCPA were they conducted by a private debt collector. Further, we need not consider plaintiffs’ pendent state claims. See Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 697 (3d Cir. 1980).
Plaintiffs argue that an L&T Officer has exactly the same duties as did a constable under the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, 68 P.S. § 250.101 et seq. They cite 17 P.S. 711.26 (Purdon 1970 Supp.) (repealed 1968; reenacted at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 325(e)(2), 1726, 2301 (1976))2 and the statutory definition of an L&T Officer’s duties in Act 2 of 1970 3 in support of their argument.
*395We reject this interpretation as too narrow. Under Pennsylvania’s new Judicial Code, “each . .. Court may appoint and fix the compensation and duties of necessary administrative staff....” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301(a)(2) (Purdon 1980) (emphasis added). The Code also provides that: “the President Judge of a court shall . . . promulgate all administrative rules and regulations....” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 325(e)(1). Construing the statutes cited by plaintiffs with the new Judicial Code leads to the conclusion that the duties of an L&T Officer are not exactly the same as those of a constable under the old statute.
Defendant Green was appointed a Landlord and Tenant Officer of the Philadelphia Municipal Court by President Judge Glancey pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.4 Thus, the defendant is appointed to and can be removed from his position by the President Judge, and performs his duties pursuant to orders and instructions from the President Judge. These factors all lead to the conclusion that Green’s serving of the Notices, as approved by President Judge Glancey, was one of his official duties.
Furthermore, the President Judge has specifically authorized his Landlord and Tenant Officers to serve the Notice in question. The L&T Officer has little discretion in this regard. The order from the President Judge authorized and instructed the Officer to serve the Notice when requested to do so by a private landlord in Philadelphia. Appendix at 2-108a.
Finally, it is important to note that not only the form of the notice in question but also the entire procedure involved in this case was designed and approved by the President Judge. There is an important governmental interest served by this procedure that we should not disturb. President Judge Glancey explained5 why the procedures attacked in this action were implemented. After Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F.Supp. 284 (E.D.Pa.1970), L&T Officers were no longer permitted to levy or sell personal property of tenants alleged to be delinquent in rental payments without a hearing pursuant to distraint provisions. As a result, a landlord’s only means of collecting delinquent rent was to send the tenant a notice to quit and then initiate eviction proceedings. Thus, the Municipal Court was flooded with an unmanageable number of such proceedings.
President Judge Glancey convened a task force to devise a procedure that would improve upon this system.6 Under this system the L&T Officer serves the Notice, which is then filed of record with the Administrator of the court. This action constitutes the first step for an eviction proceeding, service of Notice to Quit, thus providing the necessary predicate for such a proceeding should it later become necessary. If the tenant contests the issue, he can either contact the L&T Officer or await filing and then contest the eviction proceeding. Furthermore, if the rent is indeed delinquent, he can make payment to an L&T Officer before institution of an eviction proceeding. President Judge Glancey testified that following the initiation of this procedure, institution of eviction cases fell significantly.
*396The task force considered this procedure equitable, and following Judge Simmon’s7 approval L&T Officers were directed to serve the Notices by President Judge Glancey. Appendix at 2-89a, 2-101a, 2-108a. It is clear to us that the entire procedure involves the L&T Officer in his official capacity and that there is a real governmental interest served, in terms of efficiency and sound management policy, by the procedure. We are not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that because private landlords could send the notices themselves that therefore L&T Officers must be acting in a private capacity. The point is that the Notice is designed to impress upon tenants that the municipal court is involved, to assure the tenant’s attention and prompt response, and to explain clearly that unless the delinquency is paid, an eviction action will be commenced in the future.
Plaintiffs also argue that Green improperly charged them collection fees by listing fees as part of the amount due on the notices when collection of such fees is unauthorized. The amounts of the fees involved in this case are specifically authorized by the Constable Fee Bill, 13 P.S. § 61 et seq. (Purdon 1967 and 1980 Supp.), and President Judge Glancey authorized L&T Officers to collect those fees in a letter to L&T Officers pursuant to the Constable Fee Bill. Appendix at 2-109a to 2-llla. Again, we agree with the district court that defendant was clearly authorized by the city court to collect from plaintiffs the fees listed on the Notices sent to plaintiffs, and was performing an official duty when he did so.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court will be affirmed.

. Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court’s refusal to consider the state law claim as an abuse of discretion: “If the district court was correct in rejecting the federal claim, its failure to exercise pendent jurisdiction would not be an abuse of discretion.” Appellants’ Brief at 4. The granting of defendant’s motion obviated the need to reach any damages issues.

. 17 P.S. 711.26 provided in pertinent part that L&T Officers “shall perform the duties heretofore performed by constables under the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 ... . ”

. Act of February 10, 1970, P.L. 2, No. 2. Section 1 of Act 2 of 1970 may be found at 42 P.S. § 1062.1 (transferred to 13 P.S. § 15). Section 2 was never codified. The relevant section provides:
The duties heretofore performed by constables under the Act of April 6, 1951 (P.L. 69), known as “The Landlord and Tenant Act *395of 1951 (§ 250.101 et seq. of this title),“ shall be performed by the Landlord and Tenant Officers of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia.

. Section 2301 provides:
Appointment and removal of Landlord and Tenant Officers and Writ Servers for the Philadelphia Municipal Court shall be by the President Judge of that Court.
Significantly, this provision does not say “removal for cause.” The President Judge has a high degree of control over the L&T Officers. Under 17 P.S. § 711.26 (Purdon 1970 Supp.) (repealed 1978; reenacted at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 325(e)(2), 1726, 2301 (1976)) the legislature explicitly provided that “... landlord and tenant officers shall serve at the pleasure of the president judge of the municipal court.” (emphasis added). While the “at the pleasure” language does not appear in the reenacted version of the statute, neither does any “for cause” requirement.

. Glancey deposition, Appendix at 2-79a.

. The group consisted of President Judge Glancey, plaintiffs’ attorney in Santiago, the head of the landlord-tenant panel of the Community Legal Services of Philadelphia, and a representative of the interest of landlords.

. Judge Simmon was then head of the court’s Civil Rights Committee.