Court Opinion

ID: 9856951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:08:07.287927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:35.552768
License: Public Domain

DONALDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
In my opinion, I.C. § 40-104, as it read prior to the 1963 amendments, governs this case. It provided:
‘‘Abandonment of Highways.—A road not worked or used for the period of five years ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever.”
That portion of Illinois Street in question was never opened or improved for the sixty-two years it was in Ada County, nor thereafter. It was therefore abandoned in 1907, five years after the plat was filed with Ada County. The city did not annex the subdivision until 1964. The majority opinion holds that I.C. § 40-104 does not apply because if the legislature had so intended, there was no purpose for the legislature to enact laws pertaining to the vaca*847tion of plats or of any of the streets and alleys laid out in plats. I would merely point out that one obvious purpose is that this method provides a much quicker and surer method of vacating streets, alleys, highways, etc., than having to wait for five years and then having to face the possibility of a court determination as to when and if the period of limitation has run.
In addition, I feel that the 1963 amendments to I.C. § 40-104 sustain my interpretation. In 1963, the legislature amended this section so that it read: “A road established by prescription not worked or used for the period of five (5) years ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever.” In construing statutes, it is generally held that a “change of language in a statute by amendment indicates a change of legislative intent * * 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 384, at 899 (1953). This Court, in the case of McKenney v. McNearney, 92 Idaho 1, 435 P.2d 358 (1967), spoke on this point, stating:
“ ‘When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended it to have a meaning different from that accorded to it before the amendment.’ Wellard v. Marcum, 82 Idaho 232, 239, 351 P.2d 482, 486 (1960). '* * * whenever the Legislature declares that an existing statute is to be amended “to read as follows,” etc., it thereby evinces an intention to make the new act a substitute for the old one and that so much only of the original act as is repeated in the new one is continued in force, and all portions omitted from the new act are repealed.’ Continental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete Co., 63 Mont. 223, 229, 230, 207 P. 116, 118 (1922). See also Employment Security Agency v. Joint Class “A” Sch.Dist., 88 Idaho 384, 400 P.2d 377 (1965); State ex rel. Anderson v. Rayner, 60 Idaho 706, 96 P.2d 244 (1939); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Bakes, 57 Idaho 537, 67 P.2d 1024 (1937); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58, etc., 34 Idaho 222, 200 P. 138 (1921); Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, §§ 1930, 1932.” 92 Idaho at 4, 435 P.2d at 361.
One further reason to adopt this interpretation is that the States of California, Washington, and Utah, with statutes identical or almost identical to that involved in this case, have held that the failure of a county to open a road within a five-year period after it was dedicated as a road operated as an abandonment thereof. In California, the first case was that of Myers v. Daubenbiss, 84 Cal. 1, 23 P. 1027, 1029 (1890). This was followed by the case of Ferroggiaro v. Board of Public Works, 52 Cal.App. 393, 198 P. 810 (1921). In the latter case, the California court, in interpreting an identical statute, said:
“But even if this was a sufficient dedication at the times when the maps were filed, failure to use the streets as such for a period of five years worked an abandonment under the provisions of section 2620 of the Political Code, which was in force until its repeal in 1883. “Thus, while this statute was the law of the state, applicable in the city and county of San Francisco as elsewhere, a five-year period of nonuser worked an abandonment of the street, and respondent having been in the adverse possession of the land during that period and continuously thereafter, as the trial court found, the judgment must be affirmed.” 198 P. at 811.
In Utah, a statute similar to Idaho’s was involved in the case of Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. 111 (1909), cited with approval in Mochel v. Cleveland, 51 Idaho 468, 5 P.2d 549 (1930). There, the Utah Supreme Court said:
“ * * * that section 1116 applies to all roads and highways outside of cities and towns irrespective of how they were established or created; and that any public road or highway of a county of this state if not used or worked for a period of five years whether from the time it was established or created or from the time it is no longer used! *848ceases to be a public highway, and the county authorities, after such time has elapsed, cannot open it, except in the manner provided by law for the establishment and opening of highways generally.” 104 P. at 117.
In the State of Washington, there are numerous cases which have reached the same result. In the case of Howell v. King County, 16 Wash.2d 557, 134 P.2d 80 (1943), which also involved a statute similar to ours, the Washington Supreme Court held:
“ * * * that the statute effected a vacation of streets in platted tracts which had remained unopened for public use for a space of five years prior to 1909. Tamblin v. Crowley, supra [99 Wash. 133, 168 P. 982], So, we are constrained to hold that the appellants Sandell are the owners of the vacated portion of Hume avenue in controversy by virtue of their ownership of the lots abutting it, freed from the public easement created by the plat and dedication of Kenwood Park.” 134 P.2d at 81-82.
While I.C. § 40-104 has never been construed by the Idaho courts, the Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Mosman v. Mathison, 90 Idaho 76, 408 P.2d 450 (1965), did indicate what the construction would most likely be when it, in construing another statute, used I.C. § 40-104 to illustrate the meaning of the word abandon. The Court said:
“ * * * the right to abandon the road is in the hands of the Commissioners, not in the public as where a road is not worked or used for a period of five years, as provided by I.C. § 40-104 (before it was amended, S.L. 1963, Ch. 267).” 90 Idaho at 84, 408 P.2d at 454 (emphasis ours).
This would seem to indicate a recognition by this Court that the statute would permit abandonment by non-usage.
It is my opinion that the County of Ada, by non-usage for a period of more than five years after the dedication of Illinois Street, abandoned its right to the dedicated street long before the area was annexed by the City of Boise; that I.C. § 40-104 was self-executing; and that the City of Boise has no right to open the abandoned street unless it desires to claim the right-of-way by eminent domain.
BAKES, J., concurs in the dissent.