Court Opinion

ID: 9691459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:33:49.299092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:14:54.093516
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(dissenting). We are once again faced with interpreting the relative roles of the various *512administrative and judicial parties in the worker’s compensation arena. I must write separately because I find the majority is rewriting the statutory rules regarding these roles.
In this case, we are asked to determine whether the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission has the authority to make initial findings of fact when the magistrate fails to do so. The magistrate found that there were arthritic changes in the plaintiff’s entire spine that predated his injury and that the injury contributed to plaintiff’s arthritic condition. The magistrate, therefore, granted plaintiff an open award of benefits.1 On appeal, the commission found that the magistrate had failed to make a factual finding regarding whether plaintiff’s undisputed preexisting, degenerative arthritis was a “condition[] of the aging process” under MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2).2 *513In the absence of such a finding by the magistrate, the commission found that plaintiff suffered from a preexisting arthritic “conditionf] of the aging process,” which should have been evaluated under the “significant manner” test of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301) (2). The commission then reversed the award of open benefits because it found that the plaintiffs work-related injury did not contribute to his disabled status in a significant manner.
I agree with the majority that the magistrate failed to specifically find that plaintiffs arthritis was a condition of the aging process. I write separately, however, because I disagree with its conclusion that the magistrate is the only proper person to make additional fact findings in this and “other cases where fact findings are incomplete.” Ante at 509. Incredibly, the majority refuses to acknowledge the commission’s authority to make findings of fact despite the plain language of MCL 418.861a et seq.; MSA 17.237(861a) el seq. and this Court’s recent opinions in Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257; 484 NW2d 227 (1992), and Goff v Bil-Mar Foods, Inc (After Remand), 454 Mich 507; 563 NW2d 214 (1997).3 The majority’s opin*514ion in this regard is inconsistent with, and marks a clear retreat from, this Court’s recent recognition of the commission’s authority to find facts.
I would hold that the commission did not err in finding that plaintiff suffered from a preexisting arthritic “condition[] of the aging process,” which must be evaluated under the “significant manner” test. I would further hold that the commission had authority to apply this test and to make the requisite fact findings in doing so.4
*515I. THE COMMISSION’S FACT-FINDING AUTHORITY
I agree with the majority that the magistrate failed to make a specific fact finding regarding whether plaintiff’s arthritis was a condition of the aging process. Ante at 504. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s assertion that
[w]hether a plaintiff’s arthritis is part of the aging process is the type of medical factual inquiry that is reserved for the magistrate’s fact-finding powers. Without a finding by the magistrate, the commission is not entitled to invoke the significant-manner test. [Id,.]
That the Legislature has provided the commission with fact-finding powers cannot be disputed. MCL 418.861a(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(14) clearly refers to the commission’s role as factfinder by providing:
The findings of fact made by the commission acting within its powers, in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive. [Emphasis added.]
*516Further evidence of the commission’s role as finder of fact appears in subsections 861a(10) and (12), which state in relevant part:
(10) The commission . . . may adopt, in whole or in part, the order and opinion of the worker’s compensation magistrate as the order and opinion of the commission.
# H* *
(12) The commission . . . may remand a matter to a worker’s compensation magistrate for purposes of supplying a complete record if it is determined that the record is insufficient for purposes of review. [MCL 418.861a(10), (12); MSA 17.237(861a)(10), (12) (emphasis added).]
Subsection 10 allows the commission to adopt any part of the magistrate’s findings.5 This provision would impliedly allow the commission to both disagree with and make additional findings where so required. Further, subsection 12 vests discretion regarding the sufficiency of the record with the commission. Under this subsection, remands are appropriate only where the record is incomplete or insufficient for review. Where requisite facts exist on the record, there is no need to remand.
The commission’s fact-finding role was acknowledged by this Court in Holden and Goff, supra, and Woody v Cello-Foil Products (After Remand), 450 Mich 588; 546 NW2d 226 (1996). Holden has neither been expressly overruled nor limited in regard to its *517recognition of the commission’s statutorily prescribed fact-finding function. The majority is, therefore, incorrect in its assertion that:
[a]ny interpretation of Holden as permitting the commission to make original fact finding on issues overlooked by the magistrate is refuted by our subsequent decision in Woody. [Ante at 506.]
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the Woody majority did not hold that the commission is without authority to make fact findings in the absence of initial findings by the magistrate. Rather, it held that, where the magistrate’s opinion is so unclear that administrative appellate review becomes a guessing game,6 the commission should remand for clarification from the magistrate instead of speculating.7 This is a far cry from the majority’s interpretation of Woody’s holding that would always disallow original fact finding by the commission even where, as here, the magistrate’s opinion is clear and intelligible, but incomplete.
Because the commission in this case did not have to engage in speculation, this case is factually distinguishable from Woody. Indeed, in this case, the magistrate’s opinion is clear, but incomplete because the magistrate did not make any finding regarding the relationship of plaintiff’s condition to the aging process. Such a determination was necessary given the *518uncontested evidence of plaintiffs preexisting arthritic condition. In light of the magistrate’s failure, the commission in this case, as in Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201; 501 NW2d 76 (1993), had the authority to make the requisite fact findings.8
Furthermore, the majority’s claim that the magistrate is in a better position to make fact findings because the majority can observe “live testimony and argument”9 is disingenuous and inapplicable to the facts of this case, in which three of the four experts to testify did so by deposition. See 439 Mich 286. In Weiss v Jewish Home for the Aged, the companion case to Holden, supra, this Court affirmed the commission’s finding of fact and explained that “the magistrate is not in a better position than the [commission] to assess the evidence,” which in that case, as in the instant case, primarily consisted of expert medical testimony by deposition. Id. at 286. Just as in Weiss, where the magistrate’s failure to make factual findings did not preclude the commission from making such requisite findings, so too in the instant case, the magistrate’s failure to make a finding regarding whether plaintiff’s arthritis was a condition of the aging process does not preclude the commission from making such findings.10
*519n. THE COMMISSION’S FINDINGS IN THIS CASE
It is well established that findings of fact made by the commission are conclusive upon appellate review and may not be set aside by this Court if supported by any competent evidence. MCL 418.861a(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(14); Holden, supra at 263. In the absence of findings by the magistrate, the commission found that plaintiff suffered from the type of arthritis that is a “condition[] of the aging process” and that plaintiffs claim failed to survive the significant-manner test of subsection 301(2). This Court reviews these factual findings by the commission for “any competent evidence.” MCL 418.861a(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(14). Because the commission’s findings are supported by competent evidence, this Court should affirm.
A
The record in this case contains testimony from four doctors, all of whom recognized plaintiff’s preexisting, arthritic condition and indicated that it was related to aging. From this deposition testimony, the commission concluded, “There is no dispute that plaintiff suffers from a type of arthritis which is a condition of the aging process.” 1995 Mich ACO 1389, 1391.
*520Specifically, in support of this conclusion, the commission quoted the following facts and findings of the magistrate.
“Dr. Christopher Schaiberger, M.D., saw plaintiff on June 3, 1992 on referral for a neurological examination of plaintiff’s lower back and extremities. The examination proved normal. However, the doctor found significant “lumbar degenerative arthritic” changes, which in his opinion, preexisted October 17, 1991. Spurring at L5-S1 was observed. Dr. Schaiberger said that trauma could have initiated plaintiff’s problems; but, he also noted that they could have developed spontaneously. Plaintiff, the physician said, should be limited to no bending, twisting and no lifting over 50 pounds without help. The doctor was surprised that plaintiff expressed a desire to return to work. Dr. Schaiberger admitted that plaintiff had degenerative changes throughout his entire spine. He would encourage plaintiff to lose weight. Plaintiff was said to be approximately 70 pounds overweight.
* * *
“Dr. Harvey Andre, M.D., in a report based upon an examination of March 25, 1993 found degenerative changes at L3, L4-5. . . .
“There is agreement between Drs. Ross and Schaiberger that plaintiff has arthritic changes in his entire spine which predated October 17, 1991. I so find.” [1995 Mich ACO 1391.]
The record provides further evidence that plaintiffs arthritic condition was age related. Indeed, two of the three experts quoted by the commission found arthritic degeneration of the whole spine, not just of the area that was directly injured in the October 1991 incident. Dr. Schaiberger found the degeneration to be significant, and he implied that plaintiffs overweight condition was a factor. Dr. Ross estimated the *521significant degeneration to have started approximately ten years before, a date that was not associated with a prior injury or discovery of arthritis. Dr. Schaiberger testified that a majority of individuals plaintiffs age, in their mid-fifties, would have similar arthritic changes. Drs. Warner and Ross also testified and shared the opinion that plaintiff suffered from degenerative changes common in individuals of plaintiffs age.
I would find that these facts serve as competent evidence that plaintiffs arthritis was a condition of age. Therefore, because the record itself contains sufficient facts from which to make the requisite findings, there is neither any need nor statutory requirement that this Court, or the commission, remand to the magistrate.
B
In the absence of any finding by the magistrate, the commission found that the plaintiffs condition was related to the aging process and applied the significant-manner test of subsection 301(2) to conclude:
[Plaintiff’s work was not a significant factor in causing his disability.
We are not persuaded that the workplace incidents plaintiff complained of were of such a nature that they would have significantly contributed to plaintiff’s already existing complaints caused by his degenerative arthritic condition. Certainly, when the record below is reviewed as a whole, it does not support a finding of a significant or pathological aggravation of plaintiff’s longstanding arthritic condition. [1995 Mich ACO 1393, 1395.]
*522The commission started its review by noting a critical fact to which the magistrate failed to give much attention — plaintiff was treated by one of the experts, his chiropractor Dr. Warner, “for the same lower back pain on several occasions,” five to be exact, before the 1991 injury. 1995 Mich ACO 1393. The commission then found Dr. Schaiberger’s testimony failed to prove significant aggravation. Rather, it considered both Drs. Schaiberger’s and Warner’s testimony to be equivocal regarding the cause of plaintiff’s increased pain after the 1991 injury. Indeed, Dr. Warner testified that the pain was greater immediately following the 1991 injury, but also found plaintiff’s persisting pain was caused by his degenerative arthritic condition. Dr. Warner further testified that plaintiff suffered from stenosis, which is most commonly a degenerative change fairly common to individuals who, like plaintiff, are in their mid-fifties. Further, the doctor acknowledged that, because he did not review any pre-1991 medical examinations or reports, he could not measure the degree or extent of plaintiff’s degenerative condition. Dr. Warner did testify, however, that he treated plaintiff for back pain that plaintiff claimed to have suffered from for twenty years or so.
In contrast to this, the commission found Dr. Ross’ testimony to be unequivocal in its conclusion that plaintiff’s work-related injury “at most caused a temporary symptomatic aggravation.” 1995 Mich ACO 1395. Indeed, Dr. Ross’ medical report projected that
[t]he hypertrophy of the facets and the degenerative joint disease changes will continue to predispose this patient to lower back complaints. However, these findings are preexisting prior to patient’s work related injury of October 17, 1991.
*523Drs. Ross and Warner noted that plaintiff had been improving until he visited a chiropractor for an independent medical examination on December 2, 1991, at which time plaintiff claimed he was reinjured by a Dr. Hamilton. Finally, Dr. Ross concluded that plaintiff had “reached pre-accident status” when he saw him, and that “the patient’s present diagnosis [was] not related to his work injury . . . .”
The significant-manner test under subsection 301(2) further required the commission to consider the totality of both occupational and nonoccupational factors, such as plaintiff’s weight, age, diet, and prior injuries. Farrington, supra at 217, n 17. There is competent evidence in the record to suggest weight and age, as previously discussed, were significant causes of plaintiff’s current arthritic condition. Indeed, Dr. Schaiberger recognized that plaintiff was overweight by roughly seventy pounds and that this “excess baggage” increased both the level of symptoms, or pain, and the deterioration of plaintiff’s spine. Dr. Ross also indicated that some of plaintiff’s back problems were caused by his excess weight. Furthermore, there is also competent evidence that an independent, subsequent injury could have caused or significantly contributed to plaintiff’s on-going back complaints. Dr. Warner testified that plaintiff was reinjured during a December 2, 1991, independent medical examination. This examination, according to Dr. Warner, resulted in “approximately 13 additional orthopedic findings” of injury.
I would find that these facts and the evidence on the record constitute the requisite competent evidence to support the commission’s factual finding that plaintiff’s injury did not contribute to or aggra*524vate his arthritic condition in a significant manner as required by subsection 301(2) of the act. Accordingly, I would affirm the commission’s reversal of the magistrate’s open award under subsection 301(2).
Taylor, J., concurred with Weaver, J.

 The magistrate acknowledged that plaintiff had arthritic changes throughout his spine that predated the 1991 injury. As to causation, the magistrate found:
[T]he experience of October 17, 1991, combined with plaintiffs arthritic condition and resulted in his current low-back disability. [Emphasis added.]
The magistrate’s opinion merely noted the preexistence of an arthritic condition, but failed to probe the matter further, presumably applying MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301)(1). Subsection 301(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act requires that an employee “who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer” subject to the act “shall be paid compensation

 Subsection 301(2), which sets forth the significant-manner test, imposes a higher burden of proof and requires a closer causal nexus than an award under subsection 301(1). Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). Subsection 301(2) provides, in relevant part:
Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the *513employment in a significant manner. [MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) (emphasis added).]

 I partially concurred and partially dissented in Goff, supra. While I recognize the majority’s opinion to be controlling law, I am compelled to reaffirm my adherence to the principles, interpretations, and findings set forth in my partial concurrence and dissent in that case.
I also note that, while I disagreed with the majority in Goff, it at least recognized the commission’s fact-finding authority. The Goff majority stated:
“If it appears on judicial appellate review that the [commission] carefully examined the record, was duly cognizant of the deference to be given to the decision of the magistrate, did not ‘misapprehend or grossly misapply’ the substantial evidence standard, and gave an *514adequate reason grounded in the record for reversing the magistrate, the judicial tendency should be to deny leave to appeal, or, if it is granted, to affirm, in recognition that the Legislature provided for administrative appellate review by the seven-member [commission] of decisions of thirty magistrates, and bestowed on the [commission] final fact-finding responsibility subject to constitutionally limited judicial review.” [454 Mich 516-517, quoting the “four-part guide” established in Holden, 439 Mich ,269 (citations omitted).]
The Goff majority further noted:
If in its review the [commission] finds that the magistrate did not rely on competent evidence, it must carefully detail its findings of fact and the reasons for its findings grounded in the record. If after such careful review of the record the [commission] finds that the magistrate’s determination was not made on the basis of substantial evidence and is therefore not conclusive, then it is free to make its own findings. In such circumstances, the findings of fact of the [commission] are conclusive if the commission was acting within its powers. [Id. at 538.]
The Court’s holding today undermines these prior acknowledgments in Goff that the commission may make findings of fact from the record and further erodes the worker’s compensation system crafted by the Legislature and amended in 1985 to ameliorate the very serious and threatening backlog of cases in this area

 Such authority, as discussed in more detail below, can be found in MCL 418.861a(10), (12), (14); MSA 17.237(861a)(10), (12), (14), which provide in relevant part:
(10) The commission or a panel of the commission, may adopt, in whole or in part, the order and opinion of the worker’s compensation magistrate as the order and opinion of the commission.
*515(12) The commission or a panel of the commission may remand, a matter to a worker’s compensation magistrate for purposes of supplying a complete record if it is determined that the record is insufficient for purposes of review.
(14) The findings of fact made by the commission acting within its powers, in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive. The court of appeals and the supreme court shall have the power to review questions of law involved with any final order of the commission, if application is made by the aggrieved party within 30 days after the order by any method permissible under the Michigan court rules. [Emphasis added.]

 Such a determination must, however, comport with MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3) which provides:
[F]indings of fact made by a . . . magistrate shall be considered conclusive by the commission if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

 Id. at 597.

 Even the majority concludes that the magistrate failed to make a fact finding regarding age-relatedness. In so doing, the majority is acknowledging the distinction between the instant case, where we can adequately evaluate the magistrate’s opinion, and Woody, where the majority thought it could not.

 In Farrington, supra, this Court held that the plaintiff met his burden of proof under the significant-manner test even though the magistrate failed to “specif[y] whether he was imposing the significant maimer test.” Id. at 222.

 Ante at 508.

 This Court, in discussing Professor St. Antoine’s recommendations, which were largely adopted by the Legislature in 1985 PA 103, noted that St. Antoine found that the administrative appellate board, currently the commission, should be
*519“streamlined,” by creating a new five- or possibly seven-member board, which should be able to handle the anticipated reduced number of appeals, given the substantially reduced record-reading and fact-finding responsibilities .... [Civil Service Comm v Dep’t of Labor, 424 Mich 571, 585; 384 NW2d 728 (1986).]
The Court, thereby, acknowledged that the commission still had fact-finding authority and responsibility.