Court Opinion

ID: 9789319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:34:06.849189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:50.090537
License: Public Domain

BARKER, Judge,
concurring specially.
¶ 20 I join fully in the foregoing opinion, but write separately as to the Apprendi issue.
¶ 21 Apprendi is new, controversial, and subject to much discussion in the legal community. E.g. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L.J. 1097, 1123 (2001) (noting “massive practical problems that the elements rule would cause at jury trials, at sentencing, and on habeas corpus”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Expert Advice: Apprendi Bankruptcy and Disability Law, California Lawyer, Feb. 2001, at 31 (“The only certainty at this point is that every lawyer who practices criminal law and every judge who hears criminal cases must deal with Apprendi on a regular basis from here on.”).
¶ 22 It is clear that the contours of the rule Apprendi established, and the exception it preserved, have not been defined. My analysis of Apprendi as applied to a release status determination under A.R.S. § 13-604.02(B), goes beyond that set forth in the majority opinion. Thus, while I agree with the foregoing opinion, and join in it fully, I also set forth my analysis here.
¶ 23 As the majority notes, Apprendi is not applicable to A.R.S. § 13-604.02(B) as there *470is no increase in the statutory maximum. Majority Opinion at ¶¶ 16-18. I also find Apprendi to be inapplicable for a more fundamental reason: a finding of being on parole4 under § 13-604.02(B) has the same underlying foundation as the finding of a prior conviction under the statute at issue in Almendarez-Toires5 that was expressly excluded from the rule announced in Apprendi. Thus, I would find Apprendi inapplicable here even if the sentencing scheme for § 13-604.02(B) provided for an increase in the statutory maximum. A release status determination under § 13-604.02(B) falls within the exception for recidivist statutes approved in Apprendi.
The Various Statutes
¶ 24 The statutory scheme at issue in Apprendi was a New Jersey “hate crime” statute.6 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Under that statute, the trial court was charged with determining whether the conduct forming the basis of the crime was done “with a purpose to intimidate ... because of race” or other specified categories. Id. If proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial judge could increase the penalty beyond what the statute otherwise provided. Id. The New Jersey sentencing statute was based on facts inextricably intertwined with those of the charged offense.
¶ 25 On the other hand, the statute at issue in Almendarez-Torres, which Apprendi left in place, provided for an increase in the statutory sentence if a defendant was proved to have a prior felony conviction.7 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229, 118 S.Ct. 1219. It was a recidivist statute: “At the outset, we note that the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism.” Id. at 230, 118 S.Ct. 1219. Additionally, the inquiry for determining whether a defendant had a prior felony conviction was factually distinct from that for the charged offense.
¶26 Lastly, the statute here, § 13-604.02(B), provides for an enhanced sentence if another offense is committed “while the person is on probation for a conviction of a felony offense or parole, work furlough, community supervision or any other release or escape from confinement for conviction of a felony offense____” A.R.S. § 13-604.02(B). The “statutory subject matter” of A.R.S. § 13-604.02(B) is likewise recidivism. The entire basis for a sentencing factor predicated upon release status — such as being on parole as alleged here — is that a defendant has committed a subsequent offense while already on some form of sanction for a prior offense. This is recidivism. The determination of release status is also factually distinct from the determination of the charged offense.
¶ 27 It is apparent that the statute here is much closer in kind to the statute for which Apprendi preserved the exception than to the statute for which Apprendi established the'rule.

The Apprendi Rule and Exception

¶ 28 In dealing with the New Jersey hate crime statute, Apprendi stopped short of announcing a full-scale rule providing that any fact that increased the statutory maximum *471must be tried to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The exception that Apprendi carved out was based on the statute in Almendarez-Torres. Id. at 489-90, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The most frequently cited passage states:
Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. I recognize the language above states that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction,” any fact that increases the statutory maximum is subject to the announced rule. Id. The context of this language, however, is the uncontroverted fact that the statute in Almendarez-Torres was based on a prior conviction. Apprendi left Almendarez-Torres in place. Other language in Apprendi supports the view that the rationale underlying the AlmendarezTorres exception must be considered to determine whether a statute falls within or without that exception.
¶ 29 Por instance, in Apprendi the State of New Jersey relied on Almendarez-Torres to attempt to exclude its hate crime statute from the rule Apprendi announced. Rather than rebuff the argument with a curt response that the exception only applies to “the fact of a prior conviction,” the Court noted as follows:
New Jersey’s reliance on AlmendarezTorres is also unavailing. The reasons supporting an exception from the general rule for the statute construed in that case do not apply to the New Jersey statute.
530 U.S. at 496, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). Thus, like any exception, there are reasons for it. When the “reasons supporting an exception from the general rule” apply to a statute, logic suggests the exception should be considered as to that particular statute. Id. The reasons for the exception did not apply to the New Jersey hate crime statute at issue in Apprendi; the reasons for the exception do apply to a release status determination under the recidivist statute at issue here.8

The Reasons for the Exception

¶ 30 The reasons for the exception that are pertinent to the statute here include the following:
¶ 31 i.) Recidivism. That the Almendarez-Torres statute was based on recidivism was a key factor. Apprendi 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (“[Rjecidivism ... is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an offender’s sentence.” (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243, 118 S.Ct. 1219)).
¶ 32 ii.) A Factually Distinct Inquiry. Another key factor was that the sentencing statute required evaluation of a set of circumstances that was distinct from the charged offense. Apprendi 530 U.S. at 496, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (“Whereas recidivism ‘does not relate to the commission of the offense’ itself, New Jersey’s biased purpose inquiry goes precisely to what happened in.the ‘commission of the offense.’ ” (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244, 118 S.Ct. 1219)).
¶ 33 Hi.) Separate Procedural Safeguards. The procedural safeguards inherent in recidivist statutes, i.e., the court proceedings undertaken in the prior criminal matter, were another rationale for the AlmendarezTorres exception. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (explaining that prior convictions “had been entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of their own”).
¶ 34 Each of these bases for the exception carved out in Apprendi is applicable to a release status determination under § 13-*472604.02(B): (1) the statute is a recidivist statute based on a prior criminal offense involving the placement of defendant on probation, parole or some other statutorily defined restriction, (2) the inquiry as to whether defendant was on probation, parole or otherwise restricted is factually distinct from the inquiry involved in the “commission of the offense,” and (3) there are procedural safeguards involved in placing a person on probation, parole or the other statutory restrictions specified. The procedural safeguards here also include the fact that placing an individual on probation would typically be done in open court with a court reporter present and an official record created to affirmatively show that the defendant either was or was not on probation.9
¶ 35 For these reasons, and those that follow, I find that a release status determination under § 13-604.02(B) falls within the exception that Apprendi expressly provides.

Recent Arizona Court of Appeals Decision

¶ 36 I recognize that another department of this court has applied a contrary view of Apprendi in a similar case. State v. Gross, 201 Ariz. 41, 31 P.3d 815 (App.2001). In Gross, a different department of this court was asked to decide whether A.R.S. § 13-604(R)(2001) fell within the exception to Apprendi ’s general rule. Section 13-604(R) increases the statutory maximum for an offense “while the person is released on bail or on the defendant’s own recognizance on a separate felony offense or while the person is escaped from preconviction custody for a separate felony offense.” A.R.S. § 13-604(R).
¶ 37 In considering Apprendi with regard to § 13-604(R), that department focused on the language from Apprendi that described the exception to the general rule as a “narrow” one. 201 Ariz. at 45, ¶¶ 17-19, 31 P.3d at 819. Apprendi does in fact call the exception “narrow.” 523 U.S. at 490, 118 S.Ct. 1428. Apprendi however, applies to fifty states with no doubt countless forms of sentencing statutes that increase statutory máximums based on a multitude of factors. The New Jersey hate crimes statute is but one example. With that broad statutory universe in mind, limiting the exception to statutes that meet the same criteria as the statute in Almendarez-Torres is indeed “narrow.”
¶ 38 For instance, a brief sampling of Arizona’s statutes reveals sentencing statutes that increase statutory máximums based on a wide variety of factors: the amount of drugs (A.R.S. § 13-3401(36) (2001)), the use of a deadly weapon (A.R.S. § 13-604(F) (1999)), the infliction of serious physical injury (Id.), the age of a victim (A.R.S. § 13-1404(B) (2001)), and promoting a criminal street gang (A.R.S. § 13-604(T) (1999)). This is only a partial listing. None of those statutes fall within the rationale for the exception that Apprendi approves. The restrictions imposed by Apprendi based on the reasons for the exception set forth above, truly work to create a “narrow exception.”
¶39 Thus, differing from those who authored Gross, I believe that the proper course to follow in determining whether § 13-604.02(B), § 13-604(R), or any other statute falls within the exception carved out in Apprendi is to analyze the particular stat*473ute in terms of the reasons or factors that underlie the exception that Apprendi affords. Those factors include (1) a statute based on recidivism, (2) facts distinct from the underlying offense, and (3) separate procedural safeguards. Courts must analyze the basis for the sentencing statute in determining whether a particular statute falls within the exception or is subject to the general rule.

The Contours of the Exception

¶40 As stated at the outset, Apprendi leads through uncharted waters. Bibas, supra ¶ 21 at 1123. One of the difficulties in applying Apprendi to other sentencing statutes is that the New Jersey hate crimes statute on which Apprendi is based bears little resemblance to other sentencing statutes to which the Apprendi rule arguably applies. Because Apprendi is so recent, there has been little opportunity to establish the contours of either the Apprendi rule or the exception it provides.
¶ 41 A statute with characteristics such as § 13-604.02(B) (or § 13-604(R) for that matter) was simply not at issue in Apprendi. Other than the fact that § 13-604.02(B) affects sentencing, it bears little relationship to the New Jersey hate crimes statute at issue in Apprendi. It bears a closer resemblance to the Almendarez-Torres statute on virtually any criteria, not just the factors discussed above.
¶42 Thus, in addition to the foregoing analysis as to the scope of the AlmendarezTorres exception, I believe it is important to bear in mind that the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on, and did not consider in Apprendi, statutes that are far closer to the recidivist statute in Almendarez-Torres than the hate crimes statute from New Jersey. The contours of the exception set by the five-member majority have simply not been fully established. As Chief Justice Marshall observed long ago, the general expressions in a case “are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). He cautioned that if expressions “go beyond the case they may be respected but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision.” Id. (emphasis added).
¶ 43 While I am loathe to consider (and do not suggest) that Apprendi could not establish the general rule that it did, it bears repeating that Apprendi specifically reserved an exception. When the statute being presented for consideration (such as § 13-604.02(B)) more closely resembles the statute Apprendi preserved than the statute it struck, I believe there is wisdom in considering Chief Justice Marshall’s maxim that we have not had a decision “when the very point is presented for decision.” Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 399. Thus, there may be other factors that come into play in establishing the contours of the Almendarez-Torres exception to the Apprendi rule. These will depend on the specific statute at issue. The legislature’s historical reasons for a particular statute, though not necessary to develop here, may also be a key factor to consider in determining whether a statute falls within the Almendarez-Torres exception.

Conclusion

¶ 44 These are my additional reasons for finding Apprendi inapplicable to § 13-604.02(B).

. The release status under § 13-604.02(B) which the state alleges is that defendant was on parole.

. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 229-235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998).

. The New Jersey statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
The court may, upon application of the prosecuting attorney, sentence a person who has been convicted of a crime of the first, second or third degree to an extended term of imprisonment if it finds that
The defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e). The "extended term of imprisonment” provided for a statutory maximum in excess of what would otherwise be applicable.

. The pertinent portion of the statute increased the statutory maximum for an alien "(1) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for [certain misdemeanors], or a felony (other than an aggravated felony) ... or (2) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony____” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b).

. A determination of “escape” under § 13-604.02(B) requires a different analysis from the other factors listed in that statute. State v. Powers, 154 Ariz. 291, 742 P.2d 792 (1987) (holding that defendant had a right to trial by jury under a reasonable doubt standard on the issue of "escape” before sentencing court could use escape under § 13-604.02(B)). "Escape" is a separate, substantive offense. 154 Ariz. at 294, 742 P.2d at 795. "Escape” involves more than a release status determination. Id. Under our state constitution, a finding of escape was required to be made by a jury prior to Apprendi. Id. Escape is not at issue here. Release status, on the other hand, can be determined by the court upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987).

. In State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 127, 741 P.2d 257, 260 (1987), the Arizona Supreme Court dealt with the identical statutory language: "committed while the person is on probation for a conviction of a felony offense or parole, work furlough, community supervision or any other release.” A.R.S. § 13-604.02(A). The court noted that objective, documentary evidence is typically controlling in determining a defendant’s release status when a subsequent offense is committed:
The question of release status, unlike a subjective determination of intent, ordinarily will require objective evidence and will entail few, if any, disputed facts. Documents ordinarily will be the best evidence of status. 154 Ariz. at 127, 741 P.2d at 263. Hurley held, in a constitutional challenge based on McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), that proof by clear and convincing evidence to the court was sufficient under the constitution. Hurley, of course, is a preApprendi decision and subject to analysis under Apprendi. Without engaging in a full discussion of the Hurley rationale, I believe that the result reached in Hurley falls within the Apprendi exception for the reasons set forth in this concurrence. The foregoing excerpt as to the type of evidence typically utilized in determining release status is accurate regardless of the view one takes of Apprendi.