Court Opinion

ID: 9777698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:20:06.909317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:59.611218
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would grant the petitions for writ of prohibition. The first matter at issue is whether the statutory enforcement scheme for criminal violations of the campaign finance laws, set forth in KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5), gives the Registry for Election Finance (Registry) exclusive jurisdiction to make a judicial determination of probable cause for a felony prosecution. If this question is answerable in the affirmative, the second issue which must be addressed is whether such a scheme violates the United States and Kentucky constitutions.
The majority concludes that the Registry’s power to determine probable cause under KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) is non-exclusive and does not restrict the authority of the *431grand jury to render an indictment. The majority fails, however, to address the General Assembly’s invasion of this Court’s rule-making power by purportedly removing from the district court the authority to determine probable cause for criminal felony prosecution and removing from the grand jury the power to indict for felonies committed. Neither does the majority find it necessary to address the issue of whether KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) violate the constitutional requirement of separation of governmental powers, Ky. Const §§ 27, 28 and 116, or the due process guarantees of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 and Ky. Const. § 2.
For the reasons discussed below, I believe the majority’s interpretation, which fails to strike down the General Assembly’s attempt to vest an exclusively judicial power in an executive agency, is in error. The General Assembly has created a statutory enforcement scheme that superimposes the Registry over the district court or the grand jury in determining whether criminal campaign finance law violations may be prosecuted. This scheme impermissibly grants a core judicial power to the executive branch of government in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. As a necessary corollary to my disagreement, I believe this statutory scheme clearly violates sections 27, 28, and 116 of the Kentucky Constitution and the due process guarantees of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions, U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 and Ky. Const. § 2.
Moreover, even if the majority’s interpretation were correct, it would still leave in place a statutory enforcement scheme that confers on an executive agency power which is solely judicial in nature. The General Assembly created the campaign finance laws. In turn, it created the process for investigating and prosecuting violations of those laws. And, finally, it created the penalties for such violations. The General Assembly was charged with the knowledge when it amended KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) that, constitutionally, probable cause to prosecute determinations can be decided only by the district courts and that only the grand jury has jurisdiction to indict for felony crimes committed. Ky. Const. §§ 12 and 116.1 The General Assembly nonetheless either tried to remove those constitutional powers from the judiciary, or (as the majority believes) acted to supplement those powers, by vesting them in an executive administrative agency: the Registry. The General Assembly is not constitutionally empowered to enact, by statute, judicial rules limiting the ability of the grand jury to issue indictments or removing from the district court the power to determine probable cause for criminal felony prosecution. Accordingly, the issue of the constitutionality of these statutes is properly before us and should be decided.
Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s opinion that the Registry and the judiciary share jurisdiction to determine probable cause to criminally prosecute knowing campaign finance law violations. I would find that KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) unconstitutionally vest exclusive jurisdiction to determine probable cause in the Registry. I would also hold that the power of the grand jury to indict is unconstitutionally abridged by KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) since that power is contingent upon a probable cause finding being made by the Registry. Further, because the criminal punishments of KRS 121.990 are essentially and inseparably connected to, contingent upon, and thus not *432severable from this three-step statutory enforcement scheme, the penalties of KRS 121.990, except KRS 121.990(5) (injunctive relief) and KRS 121.990(13) (civil penalties), should be stricken as unconstitutional. I would grant the petitions for writ of prohibition regarding any action of the grand jury based on alleged violations of the campaign finance laws.
I. STATUTORY ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The majority maintains that the General Assembly empowered the Registry to share jurisdiction with traditional law enforcement agencies to investigate suspected criminal violations of the campaign finance laws. As noted above, I disagree. KRS 121.120(5), 121.140(5) and 121.990, when read in pari materia, purport to vest the Registry with exclusive jurisdiction to make a judicial probable cause determination as to whether a knowing campaign violation has occurred. This determination is not a common administrative probable cause determination analogous to an agency stating its reasonable belief that its statutes or regulations have been violated. See, e.g., KRS 75.130 (fire protection distriets-employee discipline); KRS 212.620(1) (local public health programs-abatement of public health nuisance orders); KRS 250.601(3) (Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station-criminal offenses regarding agricultural seeds, feeding stuffs, and fertilizers); ICRS 325.360(1) (Board of Accountancy-accountant discipline); KRS 344.200(2) (Comm’n on Human Rights-civil rights violations); and, KRS 344.610(1) and 344.625(1) (Comm’n on Human Rights-fair housing violations). See also the discussion below regarding rule-making powers. Rather, the probable cause determination contemplated by KRS 121.140(5) was meant by the General Assembly to replace the probable cause to prosecute finding that constitutionally must be made by a judicial officer prior to referring a criminal matter for grand jury investigation. See Ky Const. § 116; RCr 3.14. Because the Registry’s determination is a prerequisite to grand jury investigation, the statutes in question have the effect of stopping criminal investigations cold unless the Registry makes such a finding.
The issue of whether the Registry is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether willful (now knowing) campaign finance violations may be criminally prosecuted was first addressed in 1985, in Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Moulton, 773 F.2d 692 (6th Cir.1985). In Naegele, the Kentucky State Police investigated, and the Commonwealth Attorney subsequently prosecuted, Naegele for campaign finance violations but did not first obtain from the Registry a probable cause determination of willful campaign finance violations. Id. at 693-94.
At that time, KRS 121.140(5) stated: If “the Registry [, after investigating a complaint,] concludes that there is probable cause to believe that the [campaign finance] law has been violated willfully, it may refer such violation to the attorney general or to the appropriate local prosecutor for investigation and prosecution.” Naegele construed this provision to require the Registry to notify the subject of a complaint and hold a due process hearing determining probable cause before a willful campaign violation could be referred for prosecution. Id. at 694. The trial court agreed. On review, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held KRS 121.140(5) did not restrict “the traditional powers of law enforcement,” but merely added a specific administrative procedure to be followed by the Registry in investigating its own complaints, allowing for the Registry to turn over a matter for prosecution if it determined that criminal law had been violated. Id. at 699.
In an obvious response to Naegele, the General Assembly amended the campaign finance law statutes. In 1988, KRS 121.140(5) was amended to strengthen the power of the Registry to prosecute willful campaign violations. It removed from the Attorney General the power to investigate campaign finance violations, 1988 Ky.Acts ch. 341, § 42(3), while specifically granting the Attorney General and local prosecutors power to both investigate and enforce violations of other elections laws, 1988 Ky.Acts ch. 341, § 1. The general grant of authority to the Attorney General was limited by the specific grant- of authority to the Registry. Cf. Hancock v.
*433Schroering, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 57 (1972) (noting how the authority of the Attorney General to intervene in a ease is limited by the statutory process requiring initiation by the governor.) See also the legislative history of 1992 Ky. Acts ch. 288, below. The 1988 amendments also vested power in the Registry’s attorney to prosecute willful campaign violations on its own, if after referral to an attorney general (or local prosecutor) for prosecution, prosecution was not undertaken in a timely manner.
In 1992, the General Assembly further strengthened the power of the Registry by setting forth a three-step process in KRS 121.140 for the Registry to follow in enforcing campaign finance law violations: 1) a preliminary complaint investigation resulting in a determination of probable cause that some violation occurred; 2) a required conciliation agreement process for non-knowing violations; and 8) for knowing violations, after determination of probable cause, referral for prosecution. 1992 Ky.Acts ch. 288, § 46(1) — (2), (5). The 1992 amendments increased the majority of the criminal penalties for knowing (formerly willful) violations from misdemeanors to Class D felonies and criminalized knowing violations of other parts of the campaign finance law. See generally 1992 Ky.Aets eh. 288, § 30, amending KRS 121.990. The General Assembly also empowered the Registry with “ultimate responsibility” for “[a]ll policy and enforcement provisions” and created criminal penalties for those who would attempt to improperly influence the enforcement process. 1992 Ky.Acts eh. 288, § 44(5) (adding KRS 121.120(5)) and § 30(19) (adding KRS 121.990(18)). Moreover, the General Assembly considered and rejected the creation of a special deputy attorney general to prosecute violations of both elections and campaign finance laws, thus leaving jurisdiction to criminally enforce the statute squarely in the hands of the Registry.1992 Leg. Record Senate Bill 221 Amendments, history of House Floor Amendment 9, p. 64.
Finally, in addition to looking to the language of these statutes and the legislative history of their enactment, it is helpful to look to the Registry’s own construction of KRS 121.120(5), 121.140(5) and 121.990 to understand the statutes’ meaning. Beshear v. Kentucky Utilities Co., Ky.App., 648 S.W.2d 535, 537 (1982). The Kentucky Registry of Election Finance construes KRS 121.120(5) to preclude the Attorney General and the grand jury from seeking indictments on campaign finance matters without- first referring the matter to the Registry for a probable cause determination. In General Drivers, Warehouseman & Helpers Local Union No. 89 v. Chandler, Ky.App, 968 S.W.2d 680 (1998), the Registry, in a letter from its chair to the Attorney General, warned that the General Assembly had created a “specific administrative procedure for enforcement of campaign finance statutes” and that bypassing that procedure could invalidate any later criminal.proceedings because the offender would have been “deprived of the opportunity to be heard at the administrative level.” Id. at 681-82.
To recap, the wording of the statutes, the scheme they set forth, and the legislative history of KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) demonstrate that each time the General Assembly amended the campaign finance laws, it gave greater and greater power to the Registry to determine the course of prosecution for violations of the campaign finance laws. The Registry’s own administrative interpretation more accurately agrees that KRS 121.120(5) and KRS 121.140(5) confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance to determine whether criminal prosecution of the campaign finance laws will be undertaken. It is beyond cavil that the General Assembly intended to place exclusive control of the enforcement of the campaign finance laws with the Registry. Under these circumstances, I firmly disagree with the majority’s statutory interpretation, which has the unwarranted effect of giving jurisdiction both to the Registry and the grand jury.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Because KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5), when read in pari materia, give the Registry exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a knowing campaign finance law violation will be criminally prosecuted, the statutory scheme violates the Kentucky Constitution in *434four ways: it gives expressly judicial power to an executive branch agency, Ky. Const. §§ 27 and 28; it divests the grand jury of its constitutional jurisdiction to indict for felony crimes committed, Ky. Const. § 12; it usurps the constitutional power of the Supreme Court of Kentucky to prescribe “rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice,” Ky. Const. § 116; and, it violates the due process guarantees of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 and Ky. Const. § 2.
A. Separation of Powers
Separation of powers is a doctrine which has a very real meaning within the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Legislative Research Comm’n v.. Brown, Ky., 664 S.W.2d 907, 911-15 (1984). Each of the three branches of the Commonwealth’s tripartite system of government has powers which may not be wielded by the other branches under any circumstances. Id.; Sections 27 and 28 Ky. Const. Any statute which purportedly violates the separation of powers doctrine is subject to a “strict construction of those time-tested provisions.” Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 914.
By enacting the statutory scheme of KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5), the General Assembly violated the separation of powers doctrine by giving expressly judicial powers to an executive branch agency. Under the legislation in question, the Registry maintains exclusive power to make a probable cause to prosecute finding. The authority to make such a finding, however, is unique to the judicial branch. RCr 3.14. Granting one branch a core power of another is unconstitutional. Horn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 173,176 (1995).
In addition, since the grand jury cannot indict unless the Registry first finds probable cause of a knowing campaign violation, this unconstitutional grant of power violates Ky. Const. § 12. It divests the grand jury, which is an arm of the this Court, Bowling v. Sinnette, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 743, 745 (1984), of its constitutional jurisdiction to indict for felony crimes committed. Ky. Const. § 12. The “ancient role” of the grand jury is to determine whether “there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and [to protect] citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 33 L.Ed.2d 626, 643 (1972), aff'g Branzburg v. Meigs, Ky., 503 S.W.2d 748 (1971) and Branzburg v. Pound, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 345 (1970). A grand jury possesses significant investigative powers and resources: it is an “inquisitorial and accusing body” that exercises extensive opportunities to discover and evaluate relevant facts before it decides whether to issue an indictment. Matthews v. Pound, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 7, 9-10 (1966). There is no question that a grand jury is part of the Court of Justice and a session of the grand jury is a proceeding in circuit court. Bowling v. Sinnette, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 743, 745 (1984).
If, then, KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Registry to determine whether to prosecute knowing criminal violations of campaign finance laws, the grand jury is improperly stripped of its constitutional jurisdiction to indict for felony crimes committed. Ky. Const. § 12. Moreover, a finding of no probable cause to prosecute by the Registry is not subject to judicial review by any court. KRS 121.140(7) permits review of final Registry action by “any person directly involved or affected” by that action except for determinations to refer violations for prosecution. Even if KRS 121.140(7) could be read to permit judicial review of determinations finding no probable cause, who would be the properly affected party to appeal the determination? The Attorney General? The Commonwealth Attorney? Certainly not the alleged violator.
As the Court stated in Legislative Research Comm’n v. Brown, Ky., 664 S.W.2d 907, 914 (1984), “[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted .” Id. (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2784, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983)). I would resist the intrusion' urged by KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) and hold the statutory scheme unconstitutional since it *435grants a core power of the judiciary to the executive. Id.
B. Invasion of rulemaking power
A second and distinct, but related, issue created by the statutory scheme is the invasion of this Court’s authority by the General Assembly in the form of prescription of rules of “practice and procedure” in violation of section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Supreme Court of Kentucky has the sole authority to regulate the “rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice.” Ky. Const. § 116. This Court has repeatedly upheld its exclusive authority to generate such rules. See, e.g., O’Bryan v. Hedges-peth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 571, 576 (1995) (holding that statute mandating admissibility of collateral source payment information in tort actions contravened the rules of evidence and impermissibly encroached on the rule-making authority of this Court); Gaines v. Commonwealth, Ky., 728 S.W.2d 525, 527 (1987) (holding that a statute which permitted “testimony from a child who [had] not been declared by the trial court competent to testify as a witness [was] an unconstitutional infringement on the inherent powers of the judiciary”)
Thus, the General Assembly is not constitutionally empowered to enact, by statute, judicial rules limiting the ability of a grand jury to issue an indictment or removing from the district court the power to determine probable cause for criminal felony prosecution. A determination of probable cause, as contemplated by KRS 121.140(5), in effect adds an element to the various criminal campaign finance offenses not contained in the substantive statutes setting forth those offenses. In order to prosecute a supposed violator, KRS 121.140(5) requires the Registry make a judicial determination of probable cause that the violation is knowing. As stated above, this is not the typical administrative probable cause finding that is akin to an agency stating its reasonable belief that its statutes or regulations have been violated. See, e.g., KRS 344.200(2) (stating that the Commission on Human Rights decides whether there is probable cause to believe civil rights violations has occurred) and KRS 324.350 (authorizing the State Board of Accountancy to conduct investigations to determine whether there is probable cause to commence proceedings against anyone violating KRS ch. 325).
Rather, the determination of probable cause contemplated by KRS 121.140(5) either replaces the probable cause determination that must be made by a judicial officer prior to referring a criminal matter to the grand jury for investigation, RCr 3.14, or preempts direct submission to a grand jury. Even where agencies are empowered to determine that probable cause exists to believe a criminal violation of their statutes has occurred, that determination is not a prerequisite to grand jury investigation nor does it require a determination of mens rea (see section 11(C)). Further, it does not replace the function of the district court in determining probable cause for criminal felony prosecution. See, e .g., KRS 250.601(3) (stating that when the Director of the Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station, in the course of investigating a possible statutory violation, has probable cause to believe a criminal offense has occurred, the Director shall refer it to the county attorney for prosecution). Therefore, KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) unconstitutionally invade this Court’s rulemaking authority to govern the practice and procedure of the grand juries and district courts.
This Court has nonetheless allowed a statute impermissibly invading its rulemaking power to stand if the statute comprises a statutorily acceptable substitute for current judicially mandated procedures, Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380, 382 (1990), or if it can be “tolerated in a spirit of comity” because it does not unreasonably interfere with the “orderly functioning of the courts.” Commonwealth v. Reneer, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 794, 797 (1987). Neither of these exceptions apply because the statutory scheme of KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) goes to the very heart of our system of criminal justice system. Through the passage of KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5), the General Assembly generated new rules for the operation of grand juries and district courts, replacing existing rules established by this court. See RCr 5.02 — .24 (grand *436juries) and RCr 3.14 (district courts). Accordingly, I would hold that the General Assembly has impermissibly invaded this Court’s rulemaking authority. Moreover, this situation is not one where this Court may waive the requirements of section 116 and extend comity to the General Assembly.
C. The Scheme Violates KRS 500.070(1) and the Due Process Guarantees of United States and Kentucky Constitutions.
In addition to the problems I have already outlined, there is a final, fatal flaw in the statutory scheme enacted by the General Assembly: it violates the due process guarantees of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions by reducing the burden of proof required of the Commonwealth in a criminal proceeding. KRS 500.070(1) requires the Commonwealth to prove every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt, including the mental state of the crime. KRS 121.120(5), 121.140(5) and 121.990 set forth “knowing” as the mental state requisite for felony violations of the campaign finance law. These statutes empower the Registry to make the finding of whether a knowing violation has occurred.
Thus, this statutory scheme makes it easier for the Commonwealth to meet its burden of proving mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt: it authorizes an administrative agency-the Registry-to make that finding based on a preponderance of the evidence. See 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (Chadbourne rev. 1981) & Supp.1996 (Best rev.) (stating “The traditional standard of proof in a civil or administrative proceeding is the preponderance standard.”) “[T]he mens rea requirement under a criminal statute,” however, “is a question of law, to be determined by the court.” Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600, 612 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1800, 128 L.Ed.2d 608, 621 (1994). It cannot be adjudicated by an administrative agency. By empowering the Registry to determine whether a violation is knowing, KRS 121.120(5), 121.140(5) and 121.990 not only violate-the procedural protections of KRS 500.070(1), but the due process guarantees of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Ky. Const. § 2. These statutes allow an accused to be convicted without the Commonwealth proving beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged and thus should be stricken as unconstitutional. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 373-75 (1970).
III. CONCURRENT OR NON-EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IS ALSO UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Even if the majority’s interpretation were correct, it still leaves in place a statutory enforcement scheme that confers a power which is solely judicial in nature on an executive agency. The analysis set forth in the introduction and section 11(B) of this dissent applies with equal force: the probable cause determination made by the Registry is not the common administrative-type determination of probable cause reflecting an agency’s reasonable belief that its statutes or regulations have been violated. In fact, just the opposite is true: this administrative finding is a judicial-type determination comparable to an information. See RCr 6.04, 6.10. It sets forth the facts comprising each felony offense, then refers the matter for prosecution. See KRS 121.140(5) and 32 Ky. Admin. Regs 2:030 § 4, 2:040 §§ 8-9. But prosecution of a felony crime may not be commenced by information; instead, a grand jury indictment is constitutionally required. Ky. Const. § 12. Therefore, under the majority’s construction, KRS 121 .120(5) and 121.140(5) effectively make the grand jury unnecessary, which the Constitution does not permit. Furthermore, as stated above, the decision of the Registry is not reviewable by any court. KRS 121.140(7). It logically follows that if no court can overturn the Registry’s decision, neither can the grand jury. The end result of this dilemma is that the grand jury could be totally dispossessed of its constitutional power to indict for felony crimes committed. Therefore, even under the majority’s interpretation, KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) cannot stand.
IV. SEVERABILITY
Finally, we must determine what portions of the statutes in question are severable so *437that the valid portions may be saved and the invalid portions stricken. “It is a fundamental principle that a statute may be valid in one part and invalid in another part, and if the invalid part is severable from the rest, the part which is valid may be sustained.” Burns v. Shepherd, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 685 (1953) (citing State Bd. of Election Commissioners v. Coleman, 235 Ky. 24, 29 S.W.2d 619 (1930)). KRS 446.090 provides in part that
if any of the statute be held unconstitutional the remaining parts shall remain in force, unless the statute provides otherwise, or the remaining parts are so essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon the unconstitutional part that it is apparent that the General Assembly would not have enacted the remaining parts without the unconstitutional part....
Thus, the question to be addressed is whether the criminal penalties of this statutory enforcement scheme can be severed and stand alone.
The structure of the statutory enforcement scheme does not lend itself to severability. Because the Registry has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a knounng campaign violation has occurred, the grand jury may not indict absent such a determination. The language of the statutory scheme makes an administrative finding by a politically appointed executive branch commission a prerequisite to indictment by the grand jury operating under the direction of the Court of Justice. Thus, the prosecution of knowing campaign finance violations is “essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon” the Registry’s prior probable cause determination of a knowing violation. Bailey v. Runyon, Ky., 293 S.W.2d 631, 633 (1956). If, under this scheme, the Registry decides a violation is not knowing, no further action may be taken. This is an illegal and unacceptable result.
Even if it is true that the statutes in question grant non-exclusive jurisdiction to the Registry, to sever KRS 121.140(5) from the rest of the statutory scheme destroys the regulatory process created by the General Assembly as it removes the Registry from enforcement of knowing violations of the statutes. For example, if the Registry were to find that no knowing violation had occurred, yet a grand jury decided to indict anyway, the grand jury would effectively be acting in contravention of KRS 121.140(7) which prohibits appeals of the Registry’s probable cause determinations. This renders KRS 121.140(7) meaningless in contravention of the principle that all of the language of a statute is to be given effect. Combs v. Hubb Coal Corp., Ky., 934 S.W.2d 250, 252 (1996).
Moreover, even if KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) could be severed, the remainder of the campaign finance laws are not enforceable because the criminal penalties cannot stay in place. To be enforceable, what is left after severance would have to be “fully operable as law.” Tri-City Turf Club, Inc. v. Public Protec. & Reg. Cabinet, Ky.App., 806 S.W.2d 394, 397 (1991), dis. rev. denied. I find that what is left after the severance is not fully operable. Only knowing violations of the campaign finance laws may be criminally prosecuted. KRS 121.140(5) and 121.990. Thus, whether one views the jurisdictional issue as exclusive or non-exclusive, under the terms of these statutes a crime is not created unless the Registry makes a determination that a knowing violation occurred. According to KRS 121.140, the General Assembly set forth the three-step investigatory process to be used by the Registry culminating in referral for prosecution of knowing violations after the Registry makes the appropriate finding. The penalties of KRS 121.990 for knowing violations are predicated upon the Registry’s finding that a knowing violation occurred.
If, then, the Registry is removed from the process, the felony and misdemeanor punishments for knowing violations, as defined in these statutes, would be removed from the penalties of KRS 121.990. The remaining statutes would create a some sort of crime for their violation, but the crime would have no penalty. Nor could this Court impose a penalty to bridge the gap. Courts cannot impose common law punishments, but are restricted to imposing only the penalties prescribed by the statute. See Huyser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 116 Ky. 410, 76 S.W. 174, *438176 (1903). A court may not graft a penalty onto a statute that has no penalty. Cf. Commonwealth v. McClure, Ky.App., 593 S.W.2d 92, 96 (1979), dis. rev. denied (1980).
Given these facts, I believe that there can be no question that the General Assembly would not have permitted the criminal penalties of this statute to stand alone. The General Assembly enacted a clearly unconstitutional statute and created a crime which can only be prosecuted by means of that statute; these statutes are inexorably intertwined. Accordingly, since the criminal penalties are “essentially and inseparably connected and dependent upon” the enforcement scheme set forth in KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5), I would strike as unconstitutional KRS 121.120(5), KRS 121.140(5) and KRS 121.990, except KRS 121.990(5) (injunctive relief) and KRS 121.990(13) (civil penalties). See Commonwealth v. Cullum, Ky., 494 S.W.2d 521, 521 (1973); Engle v. Bonnie, 305 Ky. 850, 854, 204 S.W.2d 963, 965 (1947).
V. CONCLUSION
To summarize, I would hold that this statutory scheme is unconstitutional on several bases. First, the separation of powers doctrine is violated by the granting of a uniquely judicial power, the finding of probable cause to prosecute, to the executive. Second, the inherent rulemaking power of this Court is usurped by the General Assembly in modifying our established procedures with regard to both findings of probable cause and the operation of grand juries. Third, the statutory scheme impermissibly dispossesses the grand jury of its constitutionally awarded powers. Fourth, it violates the due process guarantees of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. Since I believe that the General Assembly would not have enacted the criminal penalties without the limitation on their use, I would hold them non-severa-ble. For these reasons I would strike as unconstitutional KRS 121.120(5), KRS 121.140(5) and KRS 121.990, except KRS 121.990(5) (injunctive relief) and KRS 121.990(13) (civil penalties). I would grant the petitions for writ of prohibition regarding any action of the grand jury based on alleged violations of the campaign finance laws. It is the function of the judiciary to declare the law, not to make it. While it is unfortunate that the unconstitutionality of this statutory scheme renders it unenforceable, only the General Assembly can correct the problem, not this Court.

. The majority opinion suggests that the power of the Registry to make a probable cause finding does not pose any constitutional issues because a preliminary hearing in district court pursuant to RCr 3.14 can be bypassed by making a direct submission to the grand jury. I believe that the majority fails to address issue of whether it is constitutionally valid to grant the power to Registry to make a probable cause finding. This is a core judicial power.
The issue is not whether a preliminary hearing in district court is the sole means by which an indictment may issue. The question here is whether it is constitutionally permissible for the Registry to be permitted to replace a district court.
While I certainly agree with the majority that whenever possible a statute should be construed in the fashion which renders it constitutional, I cannot find any way to do so in the instant case. There is no way I can reconcile the grant of an express judicial power to an executive branch agency.