Court Opinion

ID: 9678627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:26:01.273116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:06.293056
License: Public Domain

Andree LAYTON Roaf, Justice, dissenting. I do not agree that the police officers who interrogated Johnson complied with Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.3. As his incriminating statement was given while he was unlawfully seized, and before he was advised of his Miranda rights, I would reverse. The majority opinion discusses the circumstances of Johnson’s three interrogations on April 26, May 1, and May 2, 1994. I do not dispute the recitation of the facts. However, Johnson made his confession on May 2, not April 26 or May 1. A law enforcement officer requested on May 1 that Johnson come to the police station on May 2; this request triggers the application of Rule 2.3. There is no indication that any further statements were made to Johnson at the time of this request; therefore, the officer failed to comply with Rule 2.3. The majority correctly states that Officer Howard testified that he advised Johnson on May 2 that he was not under arrest and that he was “there of his own free will.” However, we have held that advising a suspect that his cooperation is voluntary does not satisfy the positive duty to make it clear that there is no legal obligation to comply with the officer’s request. Prowell v. State, 324 Ark. 335, 921 S.W.2d 585 (1996); Addison v. State, 298 Ark. 1, 763 S.W.2d 566 (1989). The majority further states that Officer Reese testified that “Johnson was free to leave, but did not do so.” This is also correct, but this testimony in no way informs us what Reese, or any other officer, told Johnson. The same can be said for the testimony of Officer Howard, who stated that Johnson knew where the restrooms, water fountains, and coffee pot were located, and was free to “come and go” as he pleased, presumably to get water, coffee and to use the restroom during his “interview” on May 2. This testimony again falls short of the standard for Rule 2.3 compliance. I am most troubled by the majority’s conclusion, without authority, that Rule 2.3 need only be complied with at the initial request, when there are repeated requests to come to the police station. This is perhaps a concession that the officers’ testimony does not support a holding that the rule was complied with on May 1 or May 2. Although I agree that we are to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether Johnson’s confession should be suppressed, to do so in this case entails consideration of the entire record, including the officers’ testimony at trial. Hignite v. State, 265 Ark. 866, 581 S.W.2d 552 (1979). At trial, the officers testified that Johnson was interrogated at the police station on May 2 from approximately 9:00 a.m. to 1:00; he was unshod and was only told, for the purpose of Rule 2.3, that “you’re here of your own free will.” I respectfully dissent. Newbern, J., joins in this dissent.