Court Opinion

ID: 9786976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:07:04.531564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:50.690892
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
119 I agree with the majority that the trial court was obliged to state, at the time of sentencing, whether Jaramillo's sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively. I therefore have no problem with our vacating the imposition of consecutive sentences that the trial court tried to effect much later, in connection with the revocation of probation. I must dissent, however, from the decision of my colleagues to provide the trial court and the parties with no practical help about what this decision means for them. Because it was not stated at sentencing which way the sentences were to be served-consecutively or concurrently-does it follow that, by default, they are to be served concurrently? Or consecutively? Or do my colleagues mean to suggest Jaramillo's sentence was illegal and void? Or voidable?
€20 I assume they must believe it follows from vacating "the portion of the trial court's order that directed Jaramillo's sentences to be served consecutively" that the sentences necessarily must be deemed to run concurrently. Surely if something more far-sweeping were intended, like the conclusion that Jaramillo was never lawfully sentenced and therefore improperly served months of jail time, they would have said so.
{21 The difficulty with this position is partially made clear by the majority's own thesis: It is incumbent upon the trial court to expressly pick one or the other, concurrent or consecutive, when multiple sentences are imposed. Here, the trial court did neither at the time of sentencing, mistakenly thinking it could make that decision later. While it is intuitively attractive to assume that sentences are to run concurrently unless they are explicitly mandated at the time of sentencing to be served consecutively, such a default rule is, in my mind, no longer possible given that the Legislature rather recently rescinded just such a statutory presumption. See Consecutive Sentencing Act, ch. 129, § 1, 2002 Utah Laws 419, 419 (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (20083)).
[22 A layer of uncertainty is added by the majority's eryptic reference to remanding "for any further proceedings that may be necessary." The permissive verb "may" will no doubt be frustrating for the trial court and the parties. If the result of vacating the trial court's order that belatedly tried to make the sentences consecutive is that they just run concurrently, further proceedings on remand are simply not necessary. If my colleagues instead intend that the trial court is required to now specify whether the sentences run concurrently or consecutively-a sound result given that there is no self-effecting default rule in place-then further proceedings on remand are manifestly required. But it must be one or the other.
*844128 I simply am baffled at the use of the word "may," as though the trial court is in a better position to know what this court's decision means, and at the general reluctance of my colleagues to offer at least a modicum of guidance to the trial court about what, if anything, that court is supposed to do now. This disinclination to be helpful is especially curious in view of the oft-repeated and sound prescription, underpinned by considerations of efficiency and judicial economy, that appellate courts should offer guidance to trial courts on issues likely to surface on remand. See, e.g., Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ¶ 22, 20 P.3d 388 ("[Where an appellate court finds that it is necessary to remand a case for further proceedings, it has the duty of 'pass[ing] on matters which may then become material. ") (quoting LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615, 617 (1966)); State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ¶ 42, 52 P.3d 451 ("Because on remand the issue [defendant] raises concerning consecutive sentences may again become germane, we address [defendant's] argument on this issue."). See also Utah R.App. P. (80)(a) ("The court may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and nee-essary to the final determination of the case.").