Court Opinion

ID: 9841413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 13:04:16.236266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:08.030622
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                       WILLIAM DELEON-PEREZ,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                 Appellee.

                              No. 2D22-746

                           September 22, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Anthony Johnson,
Senior Judge, and Stephen M. Whyte, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Terrence E. Kehoe, Special
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

VILLANTI, Judge.
     William DeLeon-Perez appeals his convictions and sentences for
three counts of capital sexual battery on a child under twelve years and
one count of lewd or lascivious molestation. While this appeal was
pending, Mr. DeLeon-Perez filed a motion to correct sentencing error,
alleging that he was due one additional day of jail credit that awarded in
his sentence. We affirm Mr. DeLeon-Perez's convictions without further
comment, but for the reasons discussed below, we reverse his sentence
and remand for recalculation of his jail credit.
     Mr. DeLeon-Perez was arrested and taken into custody by law
enforcement on January 29, 2020, after being charged with the
aforementioned crimes. He remained in the Manatee County jail while
awaiting his trial, which began on March 2, 2022, and concluded with
delivery of the jury's verdict and sentencing in the late afternoon on
March 4, 2022. Mr. DeLeon-Perez was sentenced to life imprisonment on
each of the three sexual battery counts and to twenty-five years'
imprisonment on the lewd or lascivious molestation count, all to run
concurrently. It is undisputed that Mr. DeLeon-Perez was in custody of
the Manatee County Sheriff all day on March 4, 2022, prior to his
transport to prison.
     On August 12, 2022, Mr. Deleon-Perez filed his "Motion to Correct
Sentencing Errors Pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)," alleging that he
was entitled to 766 days of jail credit against his sentences but that he
only received 765 days. Relying on Florida Administrative Code Rule 23-
21.011(1) (2022), section 921.161, Florida Statutes (2022), and
Valdespino v. State, 209 So. 3d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), the postconviction
court concluded that " 'credit for time served' only refers to time spent in
the county jail prior to sentencing; any time a defendant spends in the
county jail on the day of or following sentencing is counted toward his
prison sentence."
     The application of days served in jail as a credit against a prison
sentence involves the interpretation of a statute, section 921.161, which
is subject to de novo review. See Bevans v. State, 291 So. 3d 591, 593
(Fla. 4th DCA 2020). Section 921.161(1) provides:

                                     2
      A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the
      date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall
      allow a defendant credit for all of the time she or he spent in
      the county jail before sentence. The credit must be for a
      specified period of time and shall be provided for in the
      sentence.

(Emphasis added.) "[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no
occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and
construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning."
Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass,
Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)), abrogated on other
grounds by Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 n.3 (Fla. 2022).
      Section 921.161(1) clearly and unequivocally provides that a
defendant must be given credit for all of the time served in the county jail
before sentencing. The statute also provides the procedure for crediting a
defendant for time spent in the county jail "between sentencing and
being placed in custody of the department." Because Mr. DeLeon-Perez
was not placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections until the
end of the day on March 4, 2022, the credit for time served should have
been allocated to the time he spent in the county jail and not his prison
sentence, as the State argues.
      The postconviction court's reliance on Florida Administrative Code
Rule 23.21-011 was in error. Chapter 23 governs the operations and
procedures of the Florida Commission on Offender Review, a committee
comprised of members appointed by the governor and cabinet who review
state prison inmates' eligibility for parole. See § 947.02(1), Fla. Stat.
(2022). The Commission on Offender Review functions alongside the
Florida Department of Corrections. See id.; see also ch. 2014-191, Laws

                                      3
of Fla. (§ 947.13, Fla. Stat.). Thus, rule 23.21-001, "calculating time in
custody," refers to a defendant's time incarcerated in the state prison,
not the county jail.
      Additionally, the trial court cited Valdespino, 209 So. 3d at 65, for
the premise that credit of postsentencing jail time is the function of the
Department of Corrections and not the trial court. Valdespino is
distinguishable because the defendant in that case was awarded jail
credit for the time he spent in jail after his arrest until the day of his
sentencing, but he remained in the county jail for a month following
sentencing. Id. He subsequently filed a motion in the trial court for an
award of jail credit for the month he remained in the county jail after his
sentencing. Id. In this case, Mr. DeLeon-Perez remained in custody of
the Manatee County Sheriff on the day of his sentencing and was
transported to the state prison later that evening. He has not requested
any credit for time served following his sentencing.
      Accordingly, we reverse Mr. DeLeon-Perez's sentence and remand
for recalculation of jail credit as explained in this opinion.
      Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings.

NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs.
LUCAS, J., Concurs in result only with separate statement.

LUCAS, J., Concurring in result only with separate statement.

      I concur in result only on the decision to reverse. Mr. DeLeon-
Perez's motion was not facially sufficient and was incorrectly filed under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b). Because he has not had an
opportunity to file a procedurally proper motion under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.801—and the court below has not had an

                                       4
opportunity to consider the merits of such a motion if it were to be filed—
we need not, and should not, go any further in our disposition of this
case but should simply remand it back to the postconviction court for
further proceedings.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

                                      5