Court Opinion

ID: 9452468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:41:35.861211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:13.717820
License: Public Domain

DANAHER, Circuit Judge,
(dissenting) :
This appellant on July 19, 1965 was serving as a special police officer in a nightclub owned by one Minkow. Jackson drew his revolver during an altercation and from a distance of some five feet, shot Minkow in the mouth. The appellant on February 15, 1966 was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon. He testified that he fired his revolver when he thought that Minkow was going to draw a weapon.
Jackson on October 1, 1965 had entered a plea of not guilty. He was represented then and throughout the trial by his own retained attorney. The appellant was at liberty on bail at all pertinent times. He was free to have secured the presence of any witnesses he chose to call.
On February 25, 1966, the appellant’s trial attorney moved for á new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. That motion was denied on March 3,1966. Clearly he had failed to meet the requirements spelled out in Thompson v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 235, 236, 188 F.2d 652, 653 (1951).
On March 22,1966, through his present counsel the appellant filed his “Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of New Trial.” He asserted he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial.
Just prior to sentence on April 1, 1966, it developed that the trial attorney was ill and was not in court. Jackson’s present attorney did not demand the presence of trial counsel and stated “We’d be perfectly willing to go with the matter today without [trial counsel].”
The judge pointed out that the earlier motion had been based upon newly discovered evidence which “was in fact not newly discovered at all.” Jackson’s attorney replied “That’s right, Your Honor.” He continued that he did not “relish” saying “that another member of the bar has failed to effectively assist and defend the defendant in every way possible.”
So, in colloquy with the judge — in the absence of trial counsel — Jackson’s attorney argued from the affidavits as to what might have been the testimony of the various affiants had they been called at trial. At the April hearing, no testimony was offered; Jackson was not called to the stand; the trial attorney heard none of the claims as to his alleged dereliction.
The judge pointed out that Jackson, the special officer, was not some “untutored, ignorant dropout.” He had made no representations at trial concerning the absence of witnesses he might wish to call or as to what might have been their testimony.
“The Court: We just can’t have this business of people employing counsel and putting on half of their case and then if they are convicted, coming in and asking for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. They would all get two trials if we adopt that principle.”
I think the trial judge was completely correct. Cf. Moore v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 92, 220 F.2d 198 (1955).
There was no error at the trial. There was no error in the denial of the motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
I think the judgment of conviction should be affirmed. Thereupon, if appellant can properly state a claim for collateral relief under section 2255, he is free to pursue that course. Mitchell v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81, 3 L.Ed.2d 86 (1958); cf. Jones v. Huff, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 152 F.2d 14 (1945). Then, the trial counsel whose conduct has been impugned can become a witness. He can explain why he did not call the witnesses whom Jackson knew and for whose presence he could readily have made arrangements *964over the eight months' period before the trial. Counsel may have had very excellent reasons for not calling any of the witnesses whose testimony my colleagues are making the subject of their remand.
I think we should require that cases such as this be dealt with in an orderly way.1 If a judgment is properly open to collateral attack and an accused can sustain his burden of demonstrating the invalidity of his conviction, so be it. In my view no error has been shown on the present record.

. Compare the dissenting opinion in Holmes v. United States, - U.S.App.D.C. -, -, 370 F.2d 209, 211 (1966).