Court Opinion

ID: 9882292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 18:00:35.025304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:58.955786
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40373        Document: 00516921358             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/05/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                     October 5, 2023
                                      No. 22-40373                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Spencer Garod Elam,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Eastern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 6:11-CR-42-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Spencer Elam appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a
   sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). The court concluded that
   a non-retroactive change to the applicable sentencing framework did not
   qualify as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” to reduce Elam’s
   sentence. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40373         Document: 00516921358             Page: 2      Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                         No. 22-40373

                                               I.
           In 2012, a jury convicted Elam on six counts of various drug and
   firearm-related offenses. Two of those counts (counts 2 and 4) were for
   using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug
   trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 1
               Elam’s total prison sentence for all counts was 480 months. The two
   § 924(c) offenses accounted for 360 months—60 months on count 2 and 300
   months on count 4. The lengthier count 4 sentence arose from the fact that,
   under the version of § 924(c) then in effect, second or subsequent
   convictions triggered a 300-month minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)
   (2006). Moreover, another part of § 924(c) provided that the 360 months on
   counts 2 and 4 could not run concurrently with Elam’s other sentences. See
   § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). So, the 360 months for the two § 924(c) counts would be
   served consecutively to the 120 months for the other counts, yielding a total
   sentence of 480 months.
           In 2018, the First Step Act amended the sentencing framework for
   persons convicted of multiple § 924(c) offenses. As amended, the minimum
   300-month sentence for a second § 924(c) conviction is required only when
   the first § 924(c) sentence is “final” at the time of the second conviction. See
   First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221–22;
   § 924(c)(1)(C) (2022). So, had Elam been sentenced under the current
   framework, the mandatory minimum for his second § 924(c) conviction

           _____________________
           1
             In addition to counts 2 and 4, Elam’s convictions were for conspiracy to possess
   with intent to distribute hydrocodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(E) (count
   1); possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
   (b)(1)(E)(ii) (count 3); felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
   922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (count 5); and use of a communication facility to facilitate the
   commission of a felony in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (count 11).

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                                             No. 22-40373

   would have been only 60 months. Congress, however, did not make these
   changes retroactive. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(b),
   132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (specifying that the changes “shall apply to any offense
   that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for
   the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment” (emphasis added)).
           Nonetheless, after exhausting his administrative remedies, Elam filed
   a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) to reduce his prison term based on the
   2018 amendment. 2 He argued that the amendment presented an
   “extraordinary and compelling” reason warranting a reduction. See id.
   § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (allowing court to reduce prison term, if, inter alia,
   “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”). And
   pointing to his purported rehabilitation, Elam asked that his total sentence be
   reduced to either time served or 240 months to reflect the new 60-month
   mandatory minimum for successive § 924(c) offenses like his. The district
   court denied Elam’s motion, concluding that the non-retroactive change to §
   924(c)’s       sentencing       framework       was      neither    “extraordinary” nor
   “compelling.” 3
           Elam appealed. His only colorable argument is that the district court
   erred by concluding the non-retroactive amendment to § 924(c) did not
   amount to an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” for reducing his
   sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 4 We review that decision for abuse of

           _____________________
           2
               Elam had counsel in the district court but is pro se on appeal.
           3
             The district court also found that Elam’s purported rehabilitation did not affect
   its analysis, given the statute’s express provision that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant
   alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
   The court reasoned that “[t]wo ordinary reasons cannot combine to create an
   extraordinary one.”
           4
            Contrary to Elam’s argument, the district court did not treat as binding the
   Sentencing Commission’s policy statement on § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court stated

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Case: 22-40373         Document: 00516921358               Page: 4      Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                          No. 22-40373

   discretion. United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). “[A]
   court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an error of law or a clearly
   erroneous assessment of the evidence.” United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d
   283, 286 (5th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Chambliss, 948 F.3d
   at 693).
                                                II.
           A prisoner moving for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)
   must show the reduction is (1) warranted by “extraordinary and compelling
   reasons”; (2) consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s applicable policy
   statements; and (3) justified under the discretionary § 3553(a) factors. See
   § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir.
   2021). Instead of defining “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for
   purposes of § 3582, Congress delegated to the Commission the authority to
   promulgate policy statements describing what those reasons might be.
   Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 391 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)). Under current law,
   however, the Commission’s policy statements only govern motions brought
   by the Bureau of Prisons, not those brought by prisoners. Id. at 392.
           As noted, the district court concluded that the non-retroactive 2018
   change to § 924(c)’s sentencing regime did not count as an “extraordinary
   and compelling” reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Elam argues this was an
   abuse of discretion. There is a circuit split on this question. 5 While our circuit

           _____________________
   precisely the opposite. The policy statement merely “inform[ed] [the district court’s]
   analysis,” which is permissible. United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir.
   2021).
           5
             Compare United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048, 1055 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc),
   United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1198–99 (D.C. Cir. 2022), United States v. Crandall,
   25 F.4th 582, 586 (8th Cir. 2022), United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2021),
   and United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 575 (7th Cir. 2021), with United States v. Chen, 48
   F.4th 1092, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2022), United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 28 (1st Cir.

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                                        No. 22-40373

   has not authoritatively weighed in on the issue, a recent unpublished opinion
   concluded that such a non-retroactive change cannot warrant a reduced
   sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See United States v. McMaryion, No. 21-
   50450, 2023 WL 4118015, at *2 (5th Cir. June 22, 2023) (holding “a prisoner
   may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support a
   compassionate release motion, because such changes are neither
   extraordinary nor compelling”) (citing United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th
   1185, 1198–1200 (D.C. Cir. 2022), and United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048,
   1065–66 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc)). In light of McMaryion, we cannot say that
   the district court abused its discretion here.
           We note that a forthcoming policy statement from the Sentencing
   Commission would apply to sentence reduction motions by both the Bureau
   of Prisons and prisoners themselves. 6 That policy statement indicates that
   district courts “may” consider changes in law as part of the “extraordinary
   and compelling” reasons analysis, but “only” after “full[y] consider[ing]”
   the    prisoner’s      “individualized         circumstances.”      See     U.S.S.G.
   § 1B1.13(b)(6)(a) (2023). We express no view on whether Elam may file an
   additional motion based on the amended policy statement and his
   individualized circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826,
   833 n.2 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting “that § 3582(c) does not prevent prisoners
   from filing successive motions”). And, of course, we express no view on
   whether any such motion should be granted.
                                                                          AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
   2022), United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1047–48 (10th Cir. 2021), and United States
   v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 286 (4th Cir. 2020).
           6
             See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a) (2023) (https://perma.cc/7AXU-G63S). Barring
   contrary action from Congress, this amendment will go into effect on November 1, 2023.
   See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p).

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