Court Opinion

ID: 9749533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:49:24.986039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:51.082732
License: Public Domain

Cotter, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree. The report in question was offered and admitted as a hospital report, not as a doctor’s report, although it allegedly contained the opinion of a doctor. Section 52-180 of the General Statutes, pursuant to which the report was offered,1 is similar to the model act on the subject and specifically provides that the record shall be admissible as evidence “if the trial judge finds” that three requirements are present, viz., (1) the memorandum was made in the regular course of business, (2) it was the regular course of business to make such a memorandum and (3) the memorandum was made at the time when the event occurred or was written a reasonable time thereafter. (Emphasis supplied.) Szela v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 145 Conn. 714, 723, 146 A.2d 910; 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 930. There is no finding in the printed record on appeal to satisfy the third requirement. The evidence printed in the finding clearly shows that no attempt was made to satisfy this ground necessary to qualify the proffered report as a full exhibit. No appendices were filed so that the only available evidence is contained in the finding. This element or requirement as to time was one link in the chain of circumstances which the state had the burden of proving but did not. Where a party offers no evidence as to one of the essential prerequisites to reception of the hospital record, it is *27inadmissible since there is noncompliance with the statute. Weller v. Fish Transport Co., 123 Conn. 49, 60, 192 A. 317; 32 C.J.S. 1035 n.77, Evidence, § 728b. We have stated, for instance, that “the general trustworthiness” of statements made by public officials in a public record made for public use pursuant to law “is found in the circumstances under which the statements are made” and that therefore they are admitted because of the aura of respectability surrounding them which emanates from the circumstances under which they were made, all of which ineluctably leads to a presumption of trustworthiness. State v. Torello, 103 Conn. 511, 517, 131 A. 429. Evidence of the pertinent circumstances under which the controversial entry was made in the hospital record before us is lacking. There is therefore plain error on the face of the report without satisfactory proof of the relevant and material steps taken in the laboratory which lead in proper sequence to the ultimate expression of opinion found in the report and sought to be admitted as part of that report.
It is axiomatic that proof of connecting or preliminary facts must be shown in order to lay a proper foundation for the admission as an exhibit of a report such as the one under consideration. Steiber v. Bridgeport, 145 Conn. 363, 366, 367, 143 A.2d 434; see note, 21 A.L.R.2d 1216, entitled “Proof of identity of person or thing where object, specimen, or part is taken from a human body, as basis for admission of testimony or report of expert or officer based on such object, specimen, or part.” The writing in ink on the front of the offered report states the surgeon to be Dr. Buloang and is different in character from the writing in pencil on the reverse side, which is signed B. Hough, the doctor, it was *28testified, who allegedly made the examination. It was Dr. Louis Tonkin, a police physician, who advised that the victim be taken to McCook Hospital for a smear: The report was introduced through Dr. Gerald Skopek, the director of laboratory services at McCook, who held a Ph.D. degree and not an M.D. degree and who did not make the “report.” There is nothing in the record or the evidence before us to show how the “special stain for sperm” was obtained, what was done with it, and whether safeguards were employed to protect the stain to ensure that Dr. Hough examined the same stain. Nor was there any evidence as to how and when Dr. Hough examined what he did. Real evidence must in some way be connected in the manner suggested to establish relevancy and materiality, and its identity must be shown to be that of the article or substance which it purports to be. Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.) § 675. The admissibility depends upon the substance being connected with or traced in the train of events to the crime charged. State v. Groos, 110 Conn. 403, 408, 148 A. 350; see State v. Reenstierna, 101 N.H. 286-88, 140 A.2d 572. The situation arising because of the paucity of the evidence of this chain of circumstances and the ambiguity in the contents of the offered report is further compounded because Dr. Hough was in Scotland at the time of trial and was therefore unavailable as a witness for either direct or cross examination.
The defendant objected to the admission of the report on what appeared to be four grounds. Two of these were “that it is not a proper business entry” and “that it is hearsay.” The report did not meet the admissibility requirements of the statute in at least one respect since the time when the examination of the stain for sperm was made was not indi*29cated on the record, nor was the omission corrected at the trial through testimony or other evidence. The report, without the benefit of the statute to ensure its competency as evidence and to vouch for its trustworthiness, was hearsay and inadmissible.
The exception to the hearsay rule which renders memoranda, made in the regular course of business and under circumstances calculated to ensure accuracy and precluding any motive of misrepresentation, admissible is grounded on the probability of the trustworthiness of records which are the routine reflections of day-to-day business operations. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113, 114, 63 S. Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645; Smith v. Baer, 237 F.2d 79, 89 (2d Cir.); 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 927.
A failure in any respect to satisfy the distinct requirements of the statute, established as safeguards for the introduction of records which would otherwise violate the hearsay rule, affects the very element of trustworthiness which is the basis of the rule. Palmer v. Hoffman, supra, 113.

 See also General Statutes § 4-104, concerning admission of hospital records, which is not in issue.