Court Opinion

ID: 9386598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 22:02:18.768143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.579912
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/12/23 Smith v. HashiCorp CA1/4
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 RYAN SMITH,
              Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                       A165389
 v.
 HASHICORP, INC.,                                                      (City & County of San Francisco
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. CGC-20-587383)
              Defendant and Respondent.

          Plaintiff Ryan Smith appeals a summary judgment entered on his
complaint against his former employer, defendant HashiCorp, Inc.
(HashiCorp), alleging, among other things, three causes of action for wrongful
termination and retaliation.1 He contends the trial court erred in concluding
that there could be no causation as a matter of law because the decision to
terminate his employment was made before he engaged in the “protected
activity” alleged in the complaint. He argues: (1) to reach this conclusion, the
court construed the amended complaint’s allegations concerning “protected
activity” too narrowly; (2) the court erroneously declined to consider

        Smith’s complaint also alleged claims for failure to pay wages when
          1

due, breach of oral contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and
promissory estoppel. On appeal, he challenges only the court’s summary
adjudication of the three causes of action for wrongful termination and
retaliation.

                                                                1
undisputed facts submitted in opposition to the motion that show he engaged
in other unpled protected activity before the decision to terminate was made
(such that those causes of actions were not temporally barred); and (3) the
court erred by refusing to grant his request for leave to amend his complaint
to add the unpled theories of liability.
      We find no error in the court’s summary adjudication of Smith’s first
two causes of action, which as pleaded were plainly limited to protected
activity that occurred after the decision to terminate his employment was
made. Nor did the court err in refusing to consider evidence going only to
unpled theories of liability. We agree with Smith, however, that his third
cause of action alleges retaliation based on his assertion of a bona fide right
to be paid and that triable issues of fact preclude summary adjudication of
this cause of action. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand with
instructions to deny the motion with respect to the third cause of action. On
remand, the court retains discretion to rule on a renewed motion by Smith for
leave to amend the complaint.
                                  Background
      Smith’s first amended complaint alleges that he began working for
HashiCorp in March 2019. His direct supervisor was the regional vice-
president of sales, Jason Flashberg. Between March and August 2019, Smith
was working to secure substantial purchase agreements with three of his
assigned clients: Venmo/PayPal,2 Oracle Corporation, and VMware, Inc. In
August 2019, as these agreements were approaching completion, Flashberg
advised Smith that he would need to give one of the above accounts to a

      2Although Smith was working on separate purchase agreements with
Venmo and PayPal, HashiCorp treated the companies as a single
account/client because of their shared ownership.

                                           2
coworker. On August 16, Smith “reluctantly” surrendered the Venmo/PayPal
account to his coworker. Smith was told he could split the commission on the
Venmo purchase agreement 50/50 with his coworker if he saw the purchase
agreement through to completion. As to the PayPal account, Smith would not
receive any share of the commission.
      On August 19, Smith was informed that the Oracle sale would not
proceed and, on November 6, Smith learned that the VMware sale would not
close, either. In the meantime, Smith completed the Venmo sale and his
coworker completed the PayPal sale.
      On November 7, 2019, Smith requested a meeting with Flashberg and
Flashberg’s supervisor, the vice-president of North America sales, “to discuss
what had occurred and the fact that he had received almost no commission
from the three accounts and purchase agreements he had been working on
prior to being forced to surrender the Venmo/PayPal accounts to [his
coworker]. Smith also wanted to discuss the possibility of retaining both the
Venmo and PayPal accounts as his Oracle and VMware deals fell through.”
      At that meeting, which took place on November 11, Smith learned that
the decision to surrender an account to his coworker had been made by
Flashberg, not Flashberg’s supervisor as Smith had been told. Smith did not
know why he had been required to surrender one of his accounts but, based
on information and belief, suspected it was because the coworker to whom he
transferred the account, who was under-performing, had a “close personal
relationship” with Flashberg.
      On November 20, Smith received a letter from defendant’s human
resources department notifying him that he was being placed on a
performance improvement plan. Smith was “blindsided” by the letter because
he had closed the last business quarter “at 425% of his quota attainment, had

                                       3
earned 159% of his total yearly quota, and was No. 1 in sales for the western
region.”
      On January 15, 2020, Smith requested a meeting with the human
resources department to discuss his concerns about the decision to place him
on a performance improvement plan. At the meeting on January 17, Smith
“expressed his frustrations and concerns with respect to how he had been and
was being treated, as detailed above.”
      Smith received a letter that afternoon terminating his employment.
      Smith’s first cause of action asserts his employment was terminated in
violation of Labor Code section 98.6 for making a bona fide complaint for
unpaid wages. He alleges that defendant “abruptly terminated [him] on
January 17, 2020 after [Smith] complained to the human resources
department about how he had and was being treated by his superiors at
HashiCorp, including the fact that he lost significant commissions because he
had been improperly forced to surrender his Venmo and PayPal accounts to
[his coworker]. [Smith] additionally complained that HashiCorp was
retaliating against him by putting him on a ‘Performance Plan’ . . . . [Smith]
further complained to Human Resources that his direct superior,
Mr. Flashberg, had lied to him about why he was being forced to surrender
these accounts, falsely representing that the directive had been issued by [the
vice-president of North America sales].”
      Smith’s second cause of action alleges his employment was terminated
in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, which prohibits an employer from
retaliating against and/or terminating an employee for disclosing information
about a superior which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a
violation of company policy. Smith alleges that he was terminated after he
complained to the human resources department as set forth above.

                                         4
      Finally, the third cause of action alleges HashiCorp violated the
California public policy, incorporated into Labor Code sections 200–300,
prohibiting retaliation against an employee who asserts a right to be paid by
“forcing him to surrender his valuable accounts, for which Mr. Smith would
have been owed commissions, ignoring [Smith’s] requests about these
commissions and to reinstate the Venmo and PayPal accounts, placing Smith
on a bogus ‘Performance Plan’, and the actions in terminating Mr. Smith in
retaliation for him asserting his legal rights.”3
      HashiCorp moved for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary
adjudication of the individual causes of action. As to the three retaliation
causes of action, HashiCorp asserted, inter alia, that the decision to
terminate Smith’s employment was made before his meeting with the human
resources department on January 17. Because the “decision to terminate
Smith’s employment cannot be retaliation for a complaint that Smith had not
yet made” and the complaint does not allege that he engaged “in any
protected conduct before HashiCorp made the decision to terminate him,”
there was no triable issue as to causation.
      In support of its motion, HashiCorp submitted the following undisputed
evidence that the decision to terminate Smith was made on January 7: On
October 2, 2019, Flashberg sent Smith an email expressing his concern that
“[a]fter 5 months on the job,” Smith had “limited . . . knowledge” of
HashiCorp’s basic products. Flashberg also indicated that he was “surprised
at how unprepared” Smith was for meetings and suggested they work “on a
plan to improve [his] product knowledge.” On November 11, Flashberg sent

      3 The common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy, first recognized by the California Supreme Court in Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, is often referred to as a Tameny
claim.

                                        5
another email to Smith regarding his “activity, his outbound pipeline
generation, his understanding of the company’s products, and his
relationship with leadership.” On November 20, Smith was placed on a
performance improvement plan that included benchmarks for three of the
four categories marked for improvement in the November 11 email (activity,
pipeline generation, product knowledge) and well as the added category of
business reporting. On December 19, Flashberg wrote to human resources
stating: “I continue to not be impressed with [Smith’s] skills, attention to
detail, etc. as a sales person. Culturally he’s not a perfect fit. . . . I am not
sure I see him here for the long-term.” On January 6, 2020, Flashberg sent an
email to Smith expressing concerns about the manner in which Smith had
handled an account and noting his insubordination. The email states: “This is
not the first time you’ve sent content/documents out w/o approval and
certainly not the first time you’ve embarrassed/challenged me in front of the
team. We will need to discuss in greater detail during our 1:1.” Also on
January 6, Flashberg emailed the vice-president of North America sales and
the human resources department recommending that Smith’s employment be
terminated by the end of the month. The email asserts, “As of now, [Smith] is
not meeting the expectations of his performance plan . . . and there are
already grounds for termination.” The decision was made the next day to
terminate Smith’s employment.
      In opposition, Smith asserted that he engaged in protected activity on
at least four separate occasions before HashiCorp decided to terminate his
employment: (1) when he made a “bona fide objection, beginning in late
July 2019, to Mr. Flashberg’s unjustified and patently improper demand that
he give one of his valuable accounts to [his coworker] and that she receive
commission without doing any of the work”; (2) when “he questioned

                                          6
Flashberg’s patently inappropriate decision” to arrange and pay for his team
to visit a strip club; (3) “when he again brought up the PayPal/Venmo account
transfer issue and resulting loss of commissions” with Mr. Flashberg during a
break in a November 2019 meeting; and (4) “when he discovered and brought
to HashiCorp’s attention a significant error in paying a ‘spiff’, or bonus, to
employees companywide on the ‘Consul’ product.”
      Smith included the following largely undisputed facts in his separate
statement: On July 28, 2019, Smith sent an email to Flashberg requesting
that they meet with Flashberg’s supervisor to discuss his having to surrender
one of his accounts. Flashberg did not set up the meeting but forwarded the
email to his supervisor. Flashberg’s supervisor indicated in response that
they would want to bring the human resources department up to speed “to
make sure we have our backs covered.” In his deposition, the supervisor
explained that because Smith was “highly frustrated” with the “account
transitions” it was important to make human resources aware of the
situation. The supervisor assumed Smith was upset because he would be
losing the commissions on the account.
      In August 2019, following a dinner that was part of a quarterly
business review meeting, Flashberg arranged for the transportation of some
of the group to a strip club. At the time, Smith suggested to Flashberg that
this was not a good idea, especially considering that one (female) member of
the group was very intoxicated. Flashberg, who was also intoxicated,
indicated that he did not appreciate Smith questioning his authority.4

      4HashiCorp did not dispute plaintiff’s evidence regarding the strip club
incident, but objected on the ground that it was irrelevant and offered on an
unpled theory of liability.

                                        7
      On August 20, Smith sent an email to Flashberg and Flashberg’s
superior advising them that the Oracle deal had fallen through and
requesting a call to address this issue and “me having to move one of my
deals,” which he had already complained about “a few weeks ago.” Rather
than scheduling a call, Flashberg responded by email that it had been
Smith’s choice about which account to surrender.
      On November 7, Smith participated in a team meeting in which some
participants attended by Zoom and others, including Smith and Flashberg,
attended in person. At a break, Smith complained to Flashberg about “being
forced to give up the PayPal/Venmo accounts and the fact that it cost him
significant commissions, while giving another employee commissions that
[Smith] had earned.” Unbeknownst to Smith, Flashberg had “neglected to
turn off the Zoom audio” during the break and Smith’s complaints were
overheard by various team members. Flashberg was upset with Smith for
challenging him in front of the sales team and felt Smith was being
insubordinate.
      Finally, on November 8, Smith “brought several errors in his
compensation to the attention of . . . HashiCorp, which errors were in favor of
HashiCorp,” including “the payment of a ‘spiff’, or bonus, for the sale of a
HashiCorp product called ‘Consul’, which error had been made companywide
with respect to all sales of Consul.” Flashberg admitted that they “botched
the payment of the spiff” and Smith was instructed to keep the mistake
confidential.5
      Prior to the hearing on HashiCorp’s motion, the court issued a tentative
decision indicating the court’s intent to grant the motion. The tentative

      5 Again, HashiCorp did not dispute the fact but objected on the ground
that it was irrelevant and improperly offered on an unpled theory.

                                        8
decision reads in relevant part: “The amended complaint alleges that plaintiff
engaged in protected activity by complaining to Human Resources on
January 17, 2020, regarding plaintiff’s placement on a ‘Performance Plan’
and HashiCorp’s mistreatment by reassigning plaintiff’s accounts to [his
coworker] and his subsequent loss of commissions. . . . Reading the amended
complaint liberally . . . , no other protected activity is alleged. Therefore,
plaintiff’s reference in his opposition to complaining about attending a work
event at the Gold Club (strip club), HashiCorp’s error regarding the ‘spiff’
bonus, etc. are irrelevant. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that
HashiCorp made the decision to terminate plaintiff on January 7, 2022. . . .
Given the time proximity, plaintiff cannot establish a causal nexus between
the protected activity and adverse employment action.” (Bold omitted.)
      At the hearing, Smith argued that the complaint alleged retaliation
based on protected activity occurring prior to January 7. The court disagreed.
Smith also argued that the court had discretion to consider the additional
evidence included in his separate statement (set forth above) because
HashiCorp had not objected to the evidence. The court declined to consider
the additional evidence noting that it “can’t reasonably resolve issues if
people are allowed to go beyond their complaint later on without amending.”
Smith’s counsel then requested leave to amend, which the court denied.
      HashiCorp’s motion was granted on April 1, 2022, and a judgment
entered in HashiCorp’s favor on April 14. Smith timely filed a notice of
appeal.
                                   Discussion
      “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] The defendant

                                         9
bears the initial burden of showing that the plaintiff cannot establish one or
more elements of the cause of action, or that there is an affirmative defense
to it. [Citations.] If the defendant makes one of the required showings, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a triable issue of material fact.”
(Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th
438, 443.) We review the trial court’s decision granting a motion for summary
judgment de novo. (Ibid.)
      “The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. ‘ “The
function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the
scope of the issues” ’ and to frame ‘the outer measure of materiality in a
summary judgment proceeding.’ [Citation.] The function of the affidavits or
declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact put in
issue by the pleadings. [Citation.] ‘Accordingly, the burden of a defendant
moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate the
theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need
not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the
pleadings.’ [Citation.] ‘In assessing whether the issues raised by plaintiff in
opposing summary judgment are encompassed by the controlling pleading,
we generally construe the pleading broadly [citation]; but the pleading must
allege the essential facts “ ‘ “with reasonable precision and with particularity
sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the]
cause of action.” ’ ” ’ ” (White v. Smule, Inc. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 346, 354.)
      Smith’s first three causes of action allege retaliation in violation of the
Labor Code and California public policy. All three causes of action have
similar requirements. To establish a prima facie case under each, Smith must
show (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) his employer subjected him to
an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the two.

                                        10
(St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 314.) The scope of
“protected activity” is defined by the statute under which the plaintiff relies.
(Ross v. County of Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 580, 592 [“An employee
engages in activity protected by [section 1102.5] when the employee discloses
‘ “reasonably based suspicions” of illegal activity.’ ”]; Garcia-Brower v.
Premier Automotive Imports of CA, LLC (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 961, 972
[“Section 98.6 prohibits an employer from retaliating against an applicant or
employee because the applicant or employee exercised a right afforded him or
her under the Labor Code.”].) An adverse employment action is one that
“materially affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, rather
than simply that the employee has been subjected to an adverse action or
treatment that reasonably would deter an employee from engaging in the
protected activity.” (McRae v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 377, 386.) With respect to the causal connection, the
employee is not required to show that retaliation was the “ ‘but for’ cause of
the employment decision” but must show that retaliation was at least a
“substantial motivating factor” for the decision. (Harris v. City of Santa
Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 230, 232.)
      California has adopted the federal burden shifting analysis enunciated
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802–805 for the
trial of claims of retaliatory termination. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) “[T]he McDonnell Douglas test places on the
plaintiff the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of [retaliation]. This
step is designed to eliminate at the outset the most patently meritless
claims.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.) “Once an
employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.

                                        11
[Citation.] If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse
employment action, the presumption of retaliation ‘ “ ‘drops out of the
picture,’ ” ’ and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional
retaliation.” (Yanowitz, supra, at p. 1042.)
      This shifting burden of proof is modified when a defendant employer
moves for summary judgment. (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 297, 309.) “ ‘ “ ‘If the employer presents admissible evidence
either that one or more of plaintiff’s prima facie elements is lacking, or that
the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory
factors, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the
plaintiff produces admissible evidence which raises a triable issue of fact
material to the defendant’s showing. In short, by applying McDonnell
Douglas’s shifting burdens of production in the context of a motion for
summary judgment, “the judge . . . determine[s] whether the litigants have
created an issue of fact to be decided by the jury.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
      As set forth above, the trial court granted summary adjudication of
these causes of action because Smith could not establish a prima facie case of
retaliation because there was no triable issue that the only protected activity
alleged, Smith’s complaint to the human resources department, occurred
after the only adverse employment action alleged, the termination of Smith’s
employment. Thus, the undisputed evidence established that there was no
causal link between the two.
      Smith contends the trial court read the allegations of his complaint too
narrowly, ignoring “other allegations of ‘protected activity’ that could
reasonably be interpreted to have led to HashiCorp’s retaliation.” He argues
that the complaint fairly alleges that he “began complaining about how he
was being mistreated as early as August 2019, when he was instructed to

                                         12
give up one of his accounts, and certainly by [the November meeting] and was
immediately placed on a Performance Plan, an obvious stepping stone to [his]
wrongful termination.” Alternatively, he argues that the court abused its
discretion by refusing to consider undisputed facts submitted in opposition to
the motion that, he asserts, establishes his participation in other unpled
protected activity before the decision to terminate was made and by refusing
to grant him leave to amend his complaint based on this assertedly newly
discovered evidence.
      1. The First and Second Causes of Action 6
      The first two causes of action both allege that HashiCorp “abruptly
terminated Mr. Smith on January 17, 2020 after [he] complained to the
human resources department about how he had and was being treated by his
superiors.” (Italics added.) The first cause of action alleges that HashiCorp’s
termination of Smith “was in violation of California Labor Code section 98.6
and public policy as all of Mr. Smith’s complaints to human resources were
protected activities under California law.” The second cause of action alleges
that HashiCorp’s termination of Smith “was in violation of California Labor
Code section 1102.5, the ‘whistleblower’ statute, as the termination was in
direct response to Mr. Smith’s complaints and disclosure of Mr. Flashberg’s
improper conduct.” Both causes of action allege Smith’s termination
“abruptly” followed his January 17, 2020 complaint, and neither identifies
any other protected activity as a cause. Contrary to Smith’s argument, even
liberally construed, neither encompasses retaliation claims based on
protected activity other than his January 2020 complaints to the human

      6 Although the parties address the court’s ruling on the three causes of
action collectively, significant differences in the pleading require individual
analysis.

                                       13
resources department. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that
the undisputed facts precluded any causal connection between the
termination of his employment and his complaints to the human resources
department.
      2. The Third Cause of Action
      Smith’s third cause of action alleges: “At all relevant times herein, the
public policy in California was and is to prohibit all forms of retaliatory
conduct by employers and supervisors against an employee who asserts his or
her rights to be paid. This well-established public policy is set forth in
California Labor Code sections 200–300. These statutes specifically declare
that California has a public policy prohibiting retaliation by employers
against employees asserting their rights under California’s Labor Code. . . .
[¶] . . . Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that defendant HashiCorp’s acts
of forcing him to surrender his valuable accounts, for which Mr. Smith would
have been owed commissions, ignoring plaintiff’s requests about these
commissions and to reinstate the Venmo and PayPal accounts, placing
plaintiff on a bogus ‘Performance Plan’, and the actions in terminating
Mr. Smith in retaliation for him asserting his legal rights constitute illegal
acts of . . . retaliation in violation of the public policy of the State of
California.” (Italics added.)
      Unlike the prior two causes of action, the third cause of action pleads
facts sufficient to put HashiCorp on notice that it was based at least in part
on his objections to commissions he lost as a result of beings forced to
surrender the PayPal/Venmo account.7 The complaint details the work Smith
performed on the account between May and August before he “reluctantly

      7 Indeed, defendant’s motion for summary judgment addressed this
claim separately from the prior two causes of action.

                                          14
surrendered” or was “forced” to surrender his PayPal/Venmo account in
August 2019. The complaint sets forth his understanding of how much
commission he was losing in the transfer—all of the PayPal commission and
half of the Venmo commission, and his motivations for requesting the
November 11 meeting—“to discuss what had occurred” and “to discuss the
possibility of retaining both the Venmo and PayPal accounts.” Although the
complaint contains limited details regarding what occurred at the November
meeting, the third cause of action expressly alleges HashiCorp “ignored”
Smith’s “requests” to reinstate the accounts. Given the requirement that we
construe the pleading broadly, this cause of action must be read as alleging
Smith’s participation in protected activity other than just his January 2020
complaint to human resources. Accordingly, the trial court erred in how it
construed the complaint with respect to this cause of action.
      HashiCorp contends the court’s error was not prejudicial because even
if the allegations of the complaint are construed more broadly, summary
adjudication of this cause of action was proper because Smith’s “questioning
and complaining about being ‘forced to surrender’ one of his valuable
accounts” does not constitute protected activity. HashiCorp argues: “As to the
change in accounts, Smith cites no law establishing that complaining about a
change in work assignments is protected conduct under any theory . . . .
Although Smith keeps insisting that HashiCorp had no right to reassign his
accounts, and that doing so breached his contract, he lost those claims and
has chosen not to appeal them. As the trial court found, the governing
contract also expressly allows HashiCorp to reassign accounts and split
commissions.” Whether HashiCorp had the contractual right to transfer
Smith’s accounts and require him to split the commissions is not
determinative of this issue. An employee may assert a claim for retaliation in

                                      15
violation of public policy based on a request for compensation if he has a bona
fide belief that he has a right to be paid, even if it ultimately turns out that
request was wrong and that no compensation is owed. (See Gould v.
Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1148
[employer’s discharge of employee “in order to avoid paying him the
commissions, vacation pay, and other amounts he had earned, . . . violated a
fundamental public policy of this state”]; § 98.6, subd. (a) [making it unlawful
to discharge an employee “because the employee . . . has filed a bona fide
complaint or claim” related to any rights under the jurisdiction of the labor
commissioner]; Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 87
[employee asserting retaliation claim under section 1102.5 “need not prove an
actual violation of law; it suffices if the employer fired him for reporting his
‘reasonably based suspicions’ of illegal activity”].)
      In moving for summary judgment, HashiCorp argued that Smith “did
not assert any ‘right to be paid’ additional PayPal/Venmo commissions before
management decided to terminate his employment.” HashiCorp suggested
that at most, Smith’s evidence established that he complained about “losing”
an account and therefore potentially “losing” commissions but not that he had
a right to be paid any then-owed commission. HashiCorp noted that Smith
“admitted at deposition that, prior to his termination, he never complained to
any manager that he had a contractual right to additional commissions on
the Venmo opportunity or that transferring the PayPal/Venmo account
violated the law or his contract.”
      HashiCorp’s characterization of Smith’s deposition testimony is
somewhat misleading. When asked if, prior to his termination, he ever told
“any manager at HashiCorp that [he] had a contractual right to get paid for
the Venmo commissions and they were breaking your contract,” Smith

                                        16
responded, “I don’t think so” and “I’m not sure.” At the same time, however,
he also claimed that he believed he was entitled to commissions on the
PayPal and Venmo deals because “he negotiated the contract” and he
repeatedly told Flashberg that transferring the account was not fair. Smith’s
undisputed facts, set forth more fully above, establish that he repeatedly
complained about being forced to surrender his valuable accounts and
specifically that he complained that it was unfair that he was being required
to complete the purchase agreement for the Venmo account but forfeit 50
percent of the commission. It was also undisputed that the agreement used in
the Pay Pal account, for which he received no commission, was the same
agreement he had negotiated and secured for the Venmo transactions.
Although not overwhelming, keeping in mind that we must “liberally
construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment
and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party” (Yanowitz
v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1037), this evidence is sufficient
to raise a triable issue as to whether Smith asserted a bona fide right to be
paid a commission for the work he performed on the PayPal and Venmo
accounts prior to HashiCorp’s decision to terminate his employment.
      In the trial court, HashiCorp argued that even assuming Smith could
establish a prima facie showing of retaliation, the undisputed facts establish
that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Smith’s
employment and Smith cannot show that those reasons were pretextual.
HashiCorp has not briefed this argument on appeal. Instead, it suggests
Smith forfeited the issue by failing “to present a complete analysis of the
summary judgment motion” and requests permission to submit supplemental
briefing on this issue “in the unlikely event” we disagree with the ground
relied upon by the trial court. We disagree that Smith forfeited any argument

                                       17
on appeal. The trial court’s failure “to adopt grounds for summary judgment
or summary adjudication urged by the respondent does not constitute an
error from an appellant’s point of view. The appellant therefore need not
address them in its opening brief (though it may do so).” (Orange County
Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 343,
380, fn. 13.) It was incumbent on HashiCorp, however, to brief all issues it
deemed necessary to support its judgment. Arguably, HashiCorp forfeited
any grounds for affirmance not briefed on appeal. In any event, given that the
issues were fully briefed in the trial court and are contained in the record on
appeal, we briefly address and reject HashiCorp’s remaining ground for
summary adjudication of this cause of action. No supplemental briefing is
required. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (m)(2) [supplemental briefs are
required “[b]efore a reviewing court affirms an order granting summary
judgment or summary adjudication on a ground not relied upon by the trial
court”].)
      We agree that HashiCorp’s undisputed facts suffice to establish a non-
retaliatory reason for the termination of Smith’s employment. Flashberg’s
emails to Smith in October and November detail Flashberg’s concerns about
Smith’s product knowledge and his lack of preparation for meetings. The
performance improvement plan instituted in November reiterates these
concerns. Finally, Flashberg’s emails to the human resources department in
December and early January, reassert Flashberg’s concerns with Smith’s
“account management skills.”
      The question, then, is whether Smith’s undisputed facts demonstrate
triable issues as to pretext. “In demonstrating that an employer’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reason is false or pretextual, ‘ “[an employee] cannot
simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the

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factual dispute at issue is whether [retaliatory] animus motivated the
employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.
. . . Rather, the [employee] must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ . . . and hence
infer ‘that the employer did not act for the [asserted] non-[retaliatory]
reasons.’ ” ’ ” (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at
p. 314.)
      Smith submitted evidence, undisputed by HashiCorp, disclosing
weaknesses in the proffered legitimate reasons for his termination and
suggesting an alternative, retaliatory motive for the termination of his
employment. First, quantitatively, Smith was performing well above
company expectations. Despite not closing the Oracle and VMware
agreements, he had closed other agreements and, as of the close of the third
quarter, he was the number one salesperson in the Western region. With
regard to the performance deficiencies described in his performance
improvement plan, Smith offered evidence that Flashberg and others were
aware prior to his termination that at least one ground was based on a
technical error, not a performance deficiency, but they continued to rely on
his asserted lack of compliance with the improvement plan as a ground for
terminating his employment. Smith’s coworker to whom his account was
transferred testified at deposition that, contrary to Flashberg’s assertion,
Smith’s behavior was neither unprofessional nor insubordinate. Smith’s
undisputed evidence also established that Flashberg provided a false
explanation for the transfer of his account and acknowledged that he was
frustrated and upset with Smith’s “outburst” and threats to go to Flashberg’s

                                       19
superiors “for resolution” on the account transfer situation, which he (unlike
at least one of his colleagues) perceived as insubordinate and disrespectful.
Flashberg’s final email to Smith on January 6, expresses this frustration,
noting, “This is . . . not the first time you’ve embarrassed/challenged me in
front of the team.” Combined, Smith’s evidence raises a triable issue as to
whether retaliation was a substantial motivating factor in the decision to
terminate his employment.
      Accordingly, the trial court erred in summarily adjudicating the third
cause of action.
      3. Evidence in Support of Unpled Theories of Liability
      Smith contends the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to
consider his unpled theories of liability, including that his employment was
terminated in retaliation for complaints he allegedly made regarding the
strip club visit and HashiCorp’s miscalculation of the bonus on the Consul
product. Although Smith characterizes this evidence as undisputed and
suggests that no objection was made to its admission, the record clearly
establishes that HashiCorp objected to the evidence as irrelevant as it only
supported unpled theories of liability. The court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to consider this evidence. In Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258, the court explained, “If a plaintiff wishes to expand
the issues presented, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to seek leave to amend
the complaint either prior to the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment, or at the hearing itself. [Citation.] To allow a party to expand its
pleadings by way of opposition papers creates, as it would here, an unwieldy
process.”

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      4. Leave to Amend
      Smith contends the court erred by denying his oral request, at the
hearing, for leave to amend to expand the scope of his retaliation claims. He
cites Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654 for the
general rule that a party wanting the trial court to consider a previously
unpled issue in connection with a motion for summary judgment, “may
request leave to amend” and “[s]uch requests are routinely and liberally
granted.” (Id. at pp. 1663–1664.) The general rule discussed in Bostrom
applies, however, when the motion for summary judgment challenges the
legal sufficiency of the complaint. (Id. at p. 1663 [“[I]f summary judgment is
granted on the ground that the complaint is legally insufficient, but it
appears from the materials submitted in opposition to the motion that the
plaintiff could state a cause of action, the trial court should give the plaintiff
an opportunity to amend the complaint before entry of judgment.”]; see also
Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120 [“When
a motion for summary judgment is in effect a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, it is better practice to grant the motion with leave to amend
. . . .”].) HashiCorp’s motion for summary adjudication was not based on the
sufficiency of the complaint, but rather on the inability of Smith to prove
causation. “Defendant[] filed a perfectly ordinary motion for summary
judgment, premised on the factual negation, by extrinsic proofs, of the central
allegation of the complaint . . . . This was not a facial challenge to the
complaint, but a classic ‘speaking motion,’ i.e., one resting on evidence
outside the pleadings.” (Dang v. Smith (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 646, 664–665

                                        21
[rejecting argument that defendant’s motion was “in effect one for judgment
on the pleadings” so that the court was obliged to grant leave to amend].)8
      In any event, the court in Bostrom acknowledged that the
determination is grounded in the trial court’s discretion and subject to
arguments regarding prejudice by the defendant. (Bostrom v. County of San
Bernardino, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1664, fn. 5 [“Given the trial court’s
discretion in ruling on a motion for leave to amend, plus the fact that the
Bostroms had waited until virtually the eve of trial before unveiling their
new theories, we express no opinion as to whether such a motion for leave to
amend would have had to be granted.”].) HashiCorp argues that the court
reasonably declined to grant Smith leave to amend given his failure to file a
proper motion and the untimeliness of his request. On the record before us,
we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of leave to amend. We note,
however, that given the reversal of the summary adjudication of third cause
of action, dictum in Bostrum suggests the trial court may retain discretion on
remand to rule on any renewed motion by Smith for leave to amend the
complaint. (See Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (1993) 6
Cal.4th 124, 129, fn. 2 [reversal of order granting summary judgment would
“entitle plaintiffs to renew their request for leave to amend on remand”];
Hartnett v. Crosier (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 685, 695 [following reversal of
summary judgment, if plaintiff “wishes to allege any new legal theories on
remand, he should formally seek leave to amend his complaint from the trial

      8 The additional authorities cited by Smith are also distinguishable, as
they implicate an exception allowing a defendant, moving for summary
judgment, to raise an unpled affirmative defense in the absence of a showing
of prejudice. (Cruey v. Gannett Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 356, 367; Nieto v.
Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60,
75.) Plaintiff was not moving for summary judgment.

                                      22
court, so the trial court may consider the merits of the matter in the first
instance”].)
                                  Disposition
      The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded with instructions
to deny HashiCorp’s motion for summary adjudication of the third cause of
action. The order summarily adjudicating the remaining causes of actions is
affirmed. Smith shall recover his costs on appeal.

                                            WHITMAN, J.*

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, Acting P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

      *Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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