Court Opinion

ID: 9399859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 17:05:28.0133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.366438
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 190219-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                        NOTICE
 Decision filed 06/06/23. The
                                                                             This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-19-0219
                                                                             Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Peti ion for                                                not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                        limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                   under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Jackson County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 17-CF-289
                                                )
RAHSAAN D. GRAHAM JR.,                          )     Honorable
                                                )     Ralph R. Bloodworth III,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.
         Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Moore concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1       Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other crimes evidence where
               its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect; no abuse of discretion in
               denying defendant’s motion to continue where there was no prejudice to defendant;
               evidence supported finding of severe bodily injury; no ineffective assistance found
               where defendant did not rebut presumption that defense counsel engaged in trial
               strategy.

¶2       The defendant, Rahsaan D. Graham, was charged by information with aggravated

discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2016)) and unlawful use of weapons by a

felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)). Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty and subsequently

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 13 years with a period of 2 years of mandatory supervised

release for count I, and a term of imprisonment of 5 years for count II, to be served consecutively

to count I, with a period of 1-year mandatory supervised release. Trial counsel for the defendant

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filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The defendant obtained new posttrial counsel

who filed an amended motion for a new trial and a motion to reconsider the sentence, both of

which were denied. The defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence imposed. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

¶3                                        I. Background

¶4     The defendant’s jury trial was scheduled to begin on November 6, 2017. On November 2,

2017, the trial court granted the State’s motion to continue due to late discovery being provided

by the Carbondale Police Department. On March 5, 2018, the State filed a second motion to

continue the jury trial because they were still attempting to locate a witness. That motion was

granted over the defendant’s objection.

¶5     On June 19, 2018, two days before the scheduled jury trial, the State filed a motion in limine

wherein it sought to introduce evidence of other crimes or bad acts committed by the defendant

directed at Victoria Wilson, who was the State’s main witness. In this motion, the State maintained

that the other crimes or bad acts included attempts by the defendant to intimidate and influence

witness Wilson during the weeks leading up to trial on five different occasions, between May 28,

2018, and June 17, 2018. Specifically, the State sought to admit the following testimony from

Wilson: that on May 28, 2018, while the defendant was a passenger in a car that drove by her, she

observed the defendant “clack” two guns together while looking at her through his open car

window; that on the morning of June 16, 2018, the defendant contacted her through a fake

Facebook account offering to pay her $5000 not to testify against him; that on the night of June

16, 2018, she observed on multiple occasions the defendant, a passenger in a car, form a gun with

his hands while driving by in a silver Mustang and looking at her as she stood outside of a bar; and

that on the same night, as she was backing out of her parking spot attempting to leave a bar, the

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defendant fired a weapon in her direction. In its motion, the State asserted that the evidence of

other crimes or bad acts was not being sought to establish the defendant’s propensity to commit

crime but rather to establish a continuing narrative of the offenses charged and the defendant’s

consciousness of guilt. The State further asserted that the probative value of the evidence far

outweighed any prejudice.

¶6     At the pretrial hearing on June 20, 2018, the State acknowledged that the events that formed

the basis of the motion in limine had resulted in another pending case against the defendant and

were “a developing set of circumstances and a developing situation” that occurred just days before

the trial was to start. The State committed to continue to update the defendant if new evidence

were to come to light.

¶7     The defendant objected to the motion in limine, arguing in general that the new evidence

was unfairly prejudicial in relation to any probative value it may have. The defendant specifically

objected to the first allegation in the State’s motion in limine which was based on a threatening

gesture made by the defendant on May 28, 2018, almost a month prior to trial, but which had not

been disclosed to the defendant until one day prior to trial.

¶8     Acknowledging that the circumstances of the other crimes and bad acts evidence was a

developing situation, the trial court granted the State’s motion and allowed the evidence to be

presented at trial over the continuing objection of the defendant. The trial court found that the

danger of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence and stated that a

limiting jury instruction would be given as required.

¶9     The trial court next addressed the defendant’s motion to continue the jury trial which had

been filed on June 20, 2018. In support of the defendant’s motion, defense counsel asserted that

since the State had filed the motion to admit other crimes and bad acts the previous day, she needed

                                                  3
additional time to determine if there were witnesses that could possibly discount the evidence that

the State was asking to admit at trial the following day. Defense counsel reasoned that since the

defendant was in custody on a different case, a speedy trial demand had not been filed so there

would be no problem continuing the trial to a later date.

¶ 10   In response, the State acknowledged that most of the defendant’s acts outlined in the

motion in limine had occurred the day before the defendant was due in court for his trial and that

they were “serious in nature.” The State reported that there was an ongoing investigation into the

matter. The State argued that most of the witnesses involved in the most recent events for which

the State was seeking to admit the prior bad acts/crimes were also witnesses in the case that was

set for trial. Although the State acknowledged that the other crimes or bad acts evidence contained

in their motion were still part of an ongoing investigation, it argued that the defendant’s own

actions the day before trial should not cause a delay in the trial. After hearing the arguments, the

trial court stated that it had “considered the situation, the circumstances of everything,” and denied

the defendant’s motion to continue. The jury trial started the following day.

¶ 11   At trial, Tinece Rattler testified that on June 10, 2017, at around 11 a.m. she was with her

brother, Montavious Burton, and her cousin, Victoria Wilson. The three of them drove to a gas

station in Wilson’s car to get some snacks. Wilson was driving, Burton was sitting in the passenger

seat, and Rattler was in the back seat. After arriving at the gas station, Burton saw the defendant,

and they began to argue. Rattler did not know what they argued about. At some point the argument

died down, and Rattler, Burton, and Wilson left the gas station to go back to Rattler’s

grandmother’s house. The defendant left the gas station in a red car at about the same time.

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¶ 12    After leaving the gas station, Rattler noticed that they were being followed by the defendant

and two other individuals, Jody Pullen and “Waco.” Rattler testified that at some point the red car

passed Wilson’s car and pulled into the driveway of a blue house.

¶ 13    As Wilson, Burton, and Rattler were approaching the blue house, there were two other

people outside in back of the house near some trees. The red car’s passenger door was open. Rattler

saw that the defendant was standing in the passenger door of the car, leaning across the hood.

Pullen was getting out of the car on the driver’s side. Rattler heard a horn honk and saw people

shooting. Although she did not know how many people were shooting, Rattler saw the defendant

and Pullen shooting at Wilson’s car.

¶ 14    When the shooting started, Rattler ducked down in the back seat and could no longer see

outside. The first bullet came through the back passenger’s window and glass shattered

everywhere, some of it hitting Rattler on the side of her face. Rattler recalled hearing

approximately eight shots. Wilson drove to the hospital because Burton had been shot. Rattler saw

blood on Burton’s forehead and a hole in his wrist with blood dripping down. Wilson was having

trouble driving the car because the tire was flat. Rattler jumped out of the car after they dropped

Burton off at the emergency room.

¶ 15    Wilson testified on the second day of trial that she had moved to Carbondale to attend

college because she had some family who lived there. On June 10, 2017, at approximately 11 a.m.

Wilson, Burton, and Rattler went to a convenience store. When they arrived, Wilson saw the

defendant enter the store. Wilson later learned that an incident had occurred between Burton and

the defendant the evening before Wilson arrived in Carbondale. Burton and the defendant got into

a verbal altercation at the store.

                                                 5
¶ 16   After the conversation simmered down, the parties got into their separate cars and “pulled

off and everybody left.” The defendant was in the passenger seat in the car that Pullen was driving.

After leaving the convenience store parking lot, Wilson noticed Pullen’s car very close behind her

car. At some point, Pullen’s car speeded past Wilson’s car and pulled into the driveway of a blue

house. As they were approaching the blue house, Wilson heard the horn from Pullen’s car and saw

some people come out of the house. Wilson testified that she saw the defendant shooting at her

car, but she could not say for sure that Pullen was also shooting at them. After they drove away,

Wilson took Burton to the hospital and called the police. She later identified the defendant as the

shooter from a police photo lineup.

¶ 17   On cross-examination, when asked how she knew the defendant, Wilson testified that she

knew him from “around town.” Wilson testified that after she left the convenience store, the red

car in which the defendant was a passenger passed her car and pulled into the driveway of the blue

house. She testified that after she heard the shot, she heard the glass from the back window shatter

and turned around to check on her cousin as she was speeding away.

¶ 18   Prior to Wilson’s testimony of the other bad acts evidence that occurred in May and June

2018, the trial court gave the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI), Criminal, No. 3.14 modified

instruction to the jury over the continuing objection of defense counsel. The trial court informed

the jury that it was up to them to determine whether the defendant was involved in the offenses

testified to by Wilson, and if so, what weight to give to the evidence on the issues of identification,

intent, motive, consciousness of guilt, and continuing narrative of events.

¶ 19   Wilson testified that at approximately 3:30 p.m. on May 28, 2018, she was at her cousin’s

house when she saw the defendant’s car approach. The defendant was a passenger in his car with

                                                  6
two other people when he proceeded to “clack” two guns together as they drove by Wilson with

his window down. Wilson took the defendant’s actions as a threat and made a report to the police.

¶ 20   On June 16, 2018, at approximately 9:53 a.m., Wilson was contacted through Facebook

Messenger from a new account by a person named “Sarah McIntosh.” The message read, “Want

to make 5K? Stay put is all you have to do.” Wilson did not recognize this person’s name, and

when she searched for “Sarah McIntosh” online, she could not find anything about her. Wilson

believed it was the defendant who had sent her the message. When Wilson asked “Sarah McIntosh”

what was meant by the statement, the response read, “The situation you know about on the east

side. I need you to not know about it no more. It’s 5K for you to forget and take vacation until

July.” On cross-examination, Wilson conceded that she did not know but rather suspected that it

was the defendant who was sending her the messages.

¶ 21   On the evening of June 16, 2018, Wilson went to a local bar with her cousin and her aunt.

While standing in a crowd outside of the bar, she noticed the defendant in the passenger seat of a

silver Mustang as it was driving by. The silver Mustang drove past Wilson multiple times. At one

point the silver Mustang stopped in front of the crowd where Wilson was standing. Wilson

testified, “When I noticed that [the defendant] seen me in the crowd, I backed up, you know, out

of his vision. And he proceeded to ride past me again. So I know he still seen me out there.” Wilson

saw the defendant make the form of a gun with his hands “countless times” while he was looking

at her, and she took the defendant’s actions as a threat.

¶ 22   Wilson, her cousin, and her aunt left the bar early in her aunt’s car after seeing the

defendant. Wilson decided to drive past the bar one more time when she saw the defendant and his

friends standing in the middle of the alley. As she was driving past them, the defendant’s friend

                                                  7
Jermaine flashed Wilson his gun and she felt threatened. The silver Mustang the defendant had

been in earlier was backed into a parking spot in the Amtrak parking lot.

¶ 23   As Wilson was attempting to leave, she heard shots being fired. Wilson testified that she

had no doubt in her mind that the defendant was the one shooting. She stated that she had a clear

view of him and that the defendant was shooting towards her car. After pulling out of the Amtrak

parking lot, Wilson saw the silver Mustang pulling up on the right side of her car. She saw the

defendant, Nardo, and possibly Jermaine in the car. Wilson heard gunshots start again and started

driving fast. As she was fleeing, she was involved in a traffic accident as she ran through a red

light and was struck by another vehicle. Wilson saw the silver Mustang turn right at the

intersection. Wilson was interviewed by the police about the events that occurred that night at the

bar.

¶ 24   Officer Timothy Lomax testified at trial that on June 10, 2017, at approximately 11 to 11:15

a.m., several officers were dispatched to the house where shots had been fired into a vehicle.

Officer Lomax observed broken glass and possibly bullet fragments in the roadway, approximately

35 to 40 yards west of the driveway. Officer Lomax described the driveway as not very deep and

approximately two car lengths wide. He located five .40-caliber and one 9-millimeter shell casings

in the gravel driveway. Officer Lomax testified that police also searched the entire roadway and

intersection for evidence.

¶ 25   When Officer Lomax later examined Wilson’s vehicle at the police department, he

observed bullet strikes on the rear passenger’s side, along the rear tire well, and the trunk as well

as a bullet strike along the pillar between the front and back seat. The officer noted that the rear

passenger’s side window had been broken out. He also observed a bullet strike on the front of the

vehicle.

                                                 8
¶ 26   At the request of defense counsel, the trial court read the limiting instruction to the jury

prior to Officer Zach Whitecotton’s testimony regarding the prior bad acts or other crimes

evidence. Officer Whitecotton testified that on Sunday, June 17, 2018, he was on duty, monitoring

the crowds behind the bars after closing. At approximately 2:17 a.m., Officer Whitecotton was

responding to reports of an altercation in the area when he heard four gunshots coming from the

area of the Amtrak station. When the officer responded to that area, he saw a large group of people

scattering, and he tried to ascertain where the gunshots were coming from. The officer determined

that the gunshots seemed to be coming from the area where a silver Mustang was backed into a

parking stall at the Amtrak station. As the officers enclosed the area, Officer Whitecotton observed

a male who was running display a handgun and fire two rounds directly to the east, which was the

area where the silver Mustang was backed in. As the officer was taking the shooter into custody,

he observed the silver Mustang leave the parking area very quickly and proceed north toward the

Amtrak lot. The officer was unable to identify the individuals in the Mustang. As the silver

Mustang exited the parking lot, the officer heard a second gunshot coming from the direction the

Mustang had traveled.

¶ 27   At trial the defendant testified that when they left the convenience store, a silver car

followed them to the house. The silver car pulled up by the curve. There were two or three other

people outside in the yard when he pulled up. When they pulled into the driveway, someone was

coming out of the house. By the time the defendant got out of Pullen’s car, he heard a shot go off

and he ducked. After he heard a couple more shots go off, they got back into Pullen’s car and left.

The defendant denied creating the Facebook profile for Sarah McIntosh and denied offering

Wilson money not to testify. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both

charges.

                                                 9
¶ 28   Following his conviction, the defendant obtained new posttrial counsel who filed an

amended motion for a new trial and for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict along

with a motion to reconsider the sentence. At the hearing, the defendant argued that consecutive

sentences were improper because the State failed to prove that Burton suffered severe bodily injury

where the only evidence produced was two photographs of Burton’s injuries and testimony from

Wilson and Rattler. In support of his argument, the defendant noted that neither Burton nor any

medical provider testified, so there was no evidence of the extent, nature, or effect of the injuries

to support a finding of severe bodily injury. Additionally, the defendant contended that although

Burton’s sister gave a brief description of his injuries in her testimony, she did not provide

sufficient detail other than to state that the injuries were not present before “the incident” and that

she observed blood dripping.

¶ 29   The State countered that mandatory consecutive sentences should be imposed pursuant to

section 5-8-4(d)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2016)),

because the defendant committed “severe bodily harm” against Burton as seen in the two

photographs, People’s Exhibits 30 and 31. Although Burton did not testify, Exhibit 30 showed

blood dripping from Burton’s forehead, while Exhibit 31 showed a bloody hole in his wrist.

¶ 30   After hearing arguments, the trial court found that consecutive sentences were mandatory

pursuant to the statute. The trial court based its findings on the fact that Burton was transported

directly to the hospital for treatment following the shooting and on the photographic evidence of

Burton’s wounds as seen in People’s Exhibits 30 and 31. In pronouncing sentence, the trial court

stated that it found “great bodily harm” had been caused to Burton. The State asked the trial court

if “severe bodily harm” was being found rather than “great bodily harm.” The trial court responded

that he “may have misspoke[n] and used the incorrect language” and then clarified that “it was

                                                  10
sufficient to trigger mandatory consecutive sentencing in this situation.” The defendant’s motion

to reconsider the sentence was denied. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 31                                      II. Analysis

¶ 32                               A. Other Crimes Evidence

¶ 33   The defendant’s first claim of error is that the trial court abused its discretion and denied

him a fair trial when it granted the State’s motion in limine to admit other crimes or bad acts where

the probative value of the evidence was outweighed the prejudicial effect. The defendant also

contends that the State failed to sustain its burden to adequately associate the defendant with the

other bad acts or crimes alleged in the motion in limine where the only evidence was the unreliable

witness testimony from Victoria Wilson.

¶ 34   “The term ‘other-crimes evidence’ encompasses misconduct or criminal acts that occurred

either before or after the allegedly criminal conduct for which the defendant is standing trial.”

People v. Spyres, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1112 (2005). A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of

other crimes evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127,

136 (2005). The decision on whether to admit or exclude evidence must be made by the trial court

responsible for evaluating the probative value of the evidence on a case-by-case basis, and a

reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on matters within the trial

court’s discretion. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 370-71 (1991).

¶ 35   Generally, evidence of other crimes is not admissible to prove a defendant’s propensity to

commit a crime. Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011); People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137

(1980). Other crimes evidence is admissible if it is relevant to show intent, knowledge, identity,

motive, absence of mistake, or modus operandi; or “if relevant to establish any material question

other than the propensity to commit a crime.” Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011); People v.

                                                  11
Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 452 (1991). However, even where evidence of other crimes is

admissible for a permissible purpose, the evidence should be excluded “where the probative value

of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect on defendant’s right to a fair

trial.” People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 62-63 (1995).

¶ 36   Here, the other crimes evidence was testimony from Wilson that on five different occasions

prior to trial, the defendant attempted to bribe and intimidate her into not testifying against him.

The defendant’s argument on appeal is not that the other crimes evidence was not probative, but

rather that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We disagree. While

Wilson’s testimony was prejudicial, the probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect and,

therefore, was admissible to prove the defendant’s consciousness of guilt as to the earlier shooting

incident for which he was being tried. Evidence of an attempt to bribe a witness allows an inference

of guilty knowledge. People v. Perry, 21 Ill. App. 3d 18, 23 (1974). “Any attempted intimidation

of a witness in a criminal case is properly attributable to a consciousness of guilt and is thus

relevant.” People v. Jones, 82 Ill. App. 3d 386, 393 (1980).

¶ 37   The defendant next maintains that the State did not sustain its burden to adequately

associate the defendant with the other bad acts or crimes alleged in the motion in limine where the

only evidence was “unreliable witness testimony” from Victoria Wilson. “[B]efore introducing

evidence of other crimes, the State must meet the threshold requirement of showing that a crime

took place and the defendant either committed it or participated in its commission.” People v.

Barnes, 2013 IL App (1st) 112873, ¶ 50. While it is not necessary to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant committed or participated in the crime, there must be more than a mere

suspicion regarding the defendant’s involvement. Id.

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¶ 38    Here, the jury heard testimony from Wilson that she knew the defendant from “around

town” and identified him from a police photo lineup. Additionally, she testified regarding the

defendant’s actions in the weeks leading up to the trial, which testimony was offered as support

for other crimes evidence. The jury also heard the defendant deny offering Wilson money not to

testify. “The jury, as the triers of fact, have the responsibility to determine which of the conflicting

testimony of the witnesses is to be believed.” People v. Oestringer, 24 Ill. App. 3d 185, 187 (1974).

¶ 39    Moreover, the jury was instructed by the trial court that it was up to them to determine

whether the defendant was involved in the acts testified to by Wilson, and if so, what weight to

give to the evidence on the issues of identification, intent, motive, consciousness of guilt, and

continuing narrative of events. “When the trial court admits other-crimes evidence for a non-

propensity purpose, it should instruct the jury to consider the evidence only for that purpose.”

(Emphasis in original.) People v. Potts, 2021 IL App (1st) 161219, ¶ 175. The appropriate limiting

instruction, which was given by the trial court at the end of the trial, is set forth in Illinois Pattern

Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14. Id. ¶¶ 175-76. The limiting instruction given by the trial

court substantially reduced the prejudicial impact, if any, which may have resulted by virtue of the

admittance of such evidence. “A jury is presumed to follow a trial court’s jury instructions.” People

v. Tapley, 2020 IL App (2d) 190137, ¶ 81. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in allowing the other crimes evidence to be admitted.

¶ 40                                 B. Motion to Continue

¶ 41    The defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the

defendant’s motion to continue the jury trial after granting the State’s motion in limine, which

prevented him sufficient time to investigate and respond to the alleged other crimes evidence.

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¶ 42   There is no absolute right to a continuance. People v. Davenport, 133 Ill. App. 3d 553, 556

(1985). “[T]he granting or denial of a continuance is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the

trial court, and a reviewing court will not interfere with that decision unless there has been a clear

abuse of that discretion.” People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 241 (2000). “A conviction will not

be reversed by a reviewing court because of the denial of a continuance, unless the denial resulted

in prejudice to the defendant.” People v. Johnson, 220 Ill. App. 3d 550, 559 (1991). The burden to

establish prejudice is on the defendant. Id.

¶ 43   In support of his argument on appeal, the defendant relies on People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d

113 (2009). In Walker, defense counsel, admitting she was unprepared to try the defendant’s

double-murder case because she had inadvertently miscalendared the defendant’s trial date,

requested a continuance to allow her time to prepare for trial. Id. at 126. In response to her request

for a continuance, the trial court, without further discussion, ruled: “ ‘[T]his has been set. I am

sorry. We will pass this case for trial [today].’ ” Id. at 126-27. When defense counsel once again

stated that she was not ready for trial, the trial court informed her that it was “ ‘irrelevant’ ” and

allowed no further explanation. Id. at 127. The trial court later remarked to defense counsel that

her request for a continuance was “ ‘a dirty shame’ ” and suggested that it was merely a delay

tactic. Id. at 128. On appeal, the Walker court delineated factors that a trial court may consider in

determining whether to grant a motion to continue filed by a defendant in a criminal case, and then

held that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to continue the

trial where the record was “devoid of evidence showing that the circuit court considered any of the

relevant factors in denying the continuance.” Id. at 126.

¶ 44   Contrary to the defendant’s argument, there is no mandate that a trial court must consider

the factors listed in Walker in determining whether to grant or deny a motion to continue. Indeed,

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there is no mechanical test to determine the point at which the denial of a defendant’s motion to

continue in the interest of advancing the judicial proceedings violates the defendant’s substantive

right to properly defend himself. People v. Lott, 66 Ill. 2d 290, 297 (1977). “The circumstances of

each case must be weighed, particularly the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the

request is denied.” Id.

¶ 45   Here, there is nothing in the record to suggest that defense counsel was not prepared for

trial. Rather, the defendant requested additional time to investigate and respond to the allegations

in the State’s motion in limine. We cannot say under these circumstances that the trial court abused

its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to continue the jury trial. Trial courts are cautioned

not to allow the admittance of other crimes evidence to lead to a mini-trial on the collateral offense.

People v. Nunley, 271 Ill. App. 3d 427, 432 (1995) (courts should carefully limit details to what is

necessary to illuminate issue for which other crime was introduced).

¶ 46   Moreover, Wilson was the only witness to provide other crimes evidence in the form of

her testimony. 1 Defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Wilson and, in fact, was

successful in getting Wilson to concede that, contrary to her trial testimony, she did not actually

know whether it was the defendant who was sending her messages over social media. Additionally,

the defendant rebutted Wilson’s testimony regarding at least some portions of the other crimes

evidence. We find that the defendant has failed to establish prejudice that resulted due to the trial

court’s denial of his motion to continue.

       1
         Although Officer Whitecotton testified regarding a separate shooting that occurred on Sunday,
June 17, 2018, at no time did he provide evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant.
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¶ 47                               C. Consecutive Sentences

¶ 48   Next, the defendant argues that consecutive sentences were improperly imposed as the

evidence did not support a finding of severe bodily injury. The defendant further argues that the

trial court confused “great bodily injury” with “severe bodily injury” and failed to make a specific

finding of severe bodily injury. We disagree.

¶ 49   Where a defendant has been convicted of a Class X felony and has been found to have

inflicted “severe bodily injury” during the commission of that felony, consecutive sentencing is

mandated. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2016). The determination by a trial court that a particular

injury is “severe” for purposes of consecutive sentencing is a question of fact and may be reversed

only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332

(2008). Under the manifest weight standard, deference is given to the trial court as the finder of

fact because the trial court is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties

and witnesses. Id. “A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court

regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to

be drawn.” Id. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite

conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the

evidence presented.” Id.

¶ 50   The defendant correctly notes that not all gunshot wounds rise to the level of severe bodily

injury: a “nick or cut” on the arm, caused by a gunshot, which required no medical attention

(People v. Durham, 312 Ill. App. 3d 413 (2000)); a “grazed” right cheek, caused by a gunshot,

which did not require medical treatment beyond the application of a Band-Aid (People v. Jones,

323 Ill. App. 3d 451 (2001)); a fractured big toe, caused by a gunshot, when the victim was released

after 2½ hours of treatment (People v. Murray, 312 Ill. App. 3d 685 (2000)).

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¶ 51   Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding of “severe

bodily injury.” Photographic evidence graphically displayed a bullet hole in the victim’s wrist

which was obviously more “serious” than a nick, cut, graze to the skin, or a broken toe. With

respect to People’s Exhibits 30 and 31, a picture is truly worth a thousand words. Although the

defendant contends there was no testimony or medical records regarding the victim’s wounds and

subsequent treatment, he fails to cite any authority to support the proposition that such evidence is

required before the trial court can make a finding of “severe bodily injury.” Based upon the totality

of the record, we cannot say that an opposite conclusion was clearly evident or that the trial court’s

finding was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.

¶ 52   Additionally, the defendant argues that the consecutive sentences were also improper

because the trial court confused “great bodily harm” with “severe bodily injury.” The defendant

correctly notes that the trial court must make a specific finding of severe bodily injury to support

a consecutive sentence. Here, the trial court acknowledged that it initially misspoke when it stated

that “great bodily harm” had been found. The trial court then clarified that the harm found was

“sufficient to trigger mandatory consecutive sentencing in this situation.” Accordingly, we find

that the trial court did, in fact, make a specific finding of severe bodily injury.

¶ 53                          D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 54   Finally, the defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when

counsel failed to call Montavious Burton as a witness and failed to impeach the testimony of

witness Victoria Wilson.

¶ 55   A defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the two-pronged

test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649,

¶ 29. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show that

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counsel’s performance was (1) deficient and (2) prejudicial.” People v. Westfall, 2018 IL App (4th)

150997, ¶ 61. “Failure to satisfy either prong negates a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

People v. Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 88. “[T]o establish deficient performance, the

defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction may have

been the product of sound trial strategy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Manning,

241 Ill. 2d 319, 327 (2011). “Generally, the decision whether or not to cross-examine or impeach

a witness is a matter of trial strategy which will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.” People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 326 (1997). “Defendant can only prevail on an

ineffectiveness claim by showing that counsel’s approach to cross-examination was objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 327. “[N]either mistakes in strategy nor the fact that another attorney with

the benefit of hindsight would have handled the case differently indicates the trial lawyer was

incompetent.” People v. Vera, 277 Ill. App. 3d 130, 138 (1995).

¶ 56   With respect to the defendant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to call

Montavious Burton as a witness, the defendant failed to develop an argument on this point and has

therefore forfeited this argument under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7), (i) (eff. Nov. 1,

2017) (“Points not argued are forfeited ***.”).

¶ 57   The defendant’s next assertion of ineffectiveness is that trial counsel did not impeach the

testimony of Wilson either with her alleged inconsistent statements made to an investigating

officer, or by use of surveillance video from a neighboring business that would have shown the

defendant’s vehicle leaving the convenience store parking lot first, contrary to Wilson’s testimony

of being chased from the parking lot. The defendant submits that had trial counsel used the

surveillance video to show that Wilson’s testimony was not credible, there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome may have been different. The defendant reasons that the guilty verdict

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hinged on the testimony and credibility of Wilson and, therefore, trial counsel’s failure to introduce

the surveillance video severely prejudiced him.

¶ 58   Regarding Wilson’s alleged inconsistent statements, the defendant points out that in her

interview with the police on June 18, 2018, she reported that she, her aunt, and her cousin were

sitting in back of a big group when she saw the car in which the defendant was a passenger drive

by. Wilson stated that when the car drove past, she saw the defendant, but he did not see her at

first. Wilson told the police that at some point the defendant saw her in the crowd that evening. At

trial, Wilson testified that she saw the defendant in the passenger seat of the silver Mustang as it

drove past her multiple times that night and that when she noticed the defendant look at her in the

crowd, she backed up out of his vision. We do not find these statements to be inconsistent.

¶ 59   Assuming, arguendo, that there were minor discrepancies in Wilson’s testimony regarding

the exact moment that the defendant saw her outside of the bar on the night in question, it is not

unreasonable to find that trial counsel, in the exercise of her professional judgment, concluded that

whatever benefit might have been derived from impeaching Wilson’s testimony on this issue

would not be worth the inherent harm caused by allowing the jury to hear Wilson once again

describe the defendant’s threatening behavior that night. To the extent that inconsistent testimony

existed, we find no ineffective assistance of counsel where the defendant failed to rebut the

presumption that trial counsel engaged in trial strategy.

¶ 60   Regarding trial counsel’s failure to use the surveillance video to show the jury which

vehicle left the convenience store parking lot first, there could be no impeachment where Wilson

never testified at trial as to which car left first. Rather, her trial testimony was that the parties

“pulled off” in separate cars, and at some point after leaving the convenience store, she noticed

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Pullen’s car behind her. Accordingly, we cannot find that trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine

Wilson on this issue was objectively unreasonable.

¶ 61                                   III. Conclusion

¶ 62   For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and the imposition of

consecutive sentences.

¶ 63   Affirmed.

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