Court Opinion

ID: 9882916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:21:53.071561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:20.457597
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Yost v. Combs, 2023-Ohio-3295.]

                                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                            TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                           CLERMONT COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO, EX REL. DAVE YOST,                       :
 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
                                                         :   CASE NO. CA2022-12-090
        Appellee,
                                                         :        OPINION
                                                                   9/18/2023
     - vs -                                              :

                                                         :
 DONALD COMBS,
                                                         :
        Appellant.

        CIVIL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                           Case No. 2018 CVH 01272

Casey L. Chapman and Cameron F. Simmons, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Donald Combs, pro se.

        S. POWELL, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Donald Combs, appeals an entry of the Clermont County Court of

Common Pleas granting the state of Ohio's motion to modify the trial court's previous entry
                                                                            Clermont CA2022-12-090

granting summary judgment and imposing injunctive relief.1 For the reasons discussed

below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

        {¶ 2} In 2018, the state, on behalf of the Ohio EPA and Clermont County Public

Health Department, filed a civil complaint alleging that Combs violated Ohio's environmental

laws by filling roughly 12 acres of land, across two separate sites in Goshen Township, with

mountains of solid waste and then catching a portion of it on fire. On February 11, 2021,

the trial court granted the state's motion for summary judgment for liability and found Combs

liable for violations of Ohio's environmental laws. A civil penalty hearing was held and the

trial court awarded a penalty of $1,490,000 against Combs on March 3, 2021.

        {¶ 3} To date, Combs has not cleaned up either site. In an effort to abate the

nuisance, Goshen Township began exploring funding options to assess and clean up the

two dumping sites.          Funding was potentially available through the Department of

Development, however the grant administrator needed clarity that the township had access

to the dumping sites. In support of these efforts, on September 14, 2021, the state filed a

motion to modify the court's February 11, 2021 summary judgment entry to add six words:

                14. Provide Ohio EPA, the Clermont County Public Health
                Department, and local municipalities and political subdivisions,
                their contractors, agents, and assigns, access to the Parker
                Road Site and the Route 28 Site, for the following purposes:
                inspecting Defendant's compliance with R.C. Chapters 3704,
                3714, and 3734, the rules adopted thereunder, and this
                Judgment Entry; obtaining samples at the Sites; developing
                plans for the Sites; and remediating the Site if the State
                determines it has the authority to collect clean-up costs from
                Defendants and sufficient funds to remediate * * *.

(emphasis added.)

        {¶ 4} On October 27, 2022, Combs filed a motion in opposition to the state's motion

1. The original trial court case, 2018 CVH 01272, was filed in 2018 and captioned as State of Ohio, ex rel.
Michael DeWine Ohio Attorney General v. Donald Combs, et al. We have modified the caption in this appeal
to reflect that the current office holder is Dave Yost and Donald Combs is the sole appellant.
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                                                                   Clermont CA2022-12-090

to modify the entry, which also included a "Cross Complaint to Void the Summary Judgment

and Imposing Injunctive Relief.” On November 28, 2022, the trial court granted the state's

motion and modified its summary judgment entry with the proposed changes. Additionally,

the trial court construed Combs's "cross complaint" as a motion for relief from judgment

under Civ. R. 60(B) and denied it as both untimely and without merit.

       {¶ 5} On appeal, Combs, acting pro se, raises two assignments of error for our

review.

       {¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 1:

       {¶ 7} THE COMMON PLEAS COURT WRONGLY MODIFIED THE ORDER WHEN

THE TOWNSHIP WAS NOT A JOINDER AND WRONGLY AGREED WITH THE STATE

IN CONVERTING THE CROSS COMPLAINT INTO A 60(B)(1)(2)(3), WHEN THE REASON

FOR THE CROSS COMPLAINT WAS VOID AB INITIO DUE TO BEING PROCURED FOR

FRAUD UPON THE COURT WHICH WOULD BE UNDER 60(B)(5), AND WAS FILED

WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE FRAUD. THIS DENIED

COMBS' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, COMPULSORY PROCESS, CONFRONTATION

CLAUSES, FAIR TRIAL, AND EQUAL PROTECTIONS UNDER COMBS' FIFTH, SIXTH,

AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.

       {¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, Combs claims that the trial court lacked the

authority to modify its February 11, 2021 Entry Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment and Imposing Injunctive Relief. Combs argues that Goshen Township was not

joined as a party in the case, and therefore modifying the order is barred by res judicata. In

the same assignment of error, Combs also claims that the trial court erred by denying his

"cross complaint,” which the court construed as a motion for relief from judgment under

Civ.R. 60(B). We find no merit to either of these arguments.

                             Modification of Injunctive Decree

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                                                                   Clermont CA2022-12-090

       {¶ 9} As this court has previously explained, "'A court issuing [an] injunction has

inherent authority to modify or vacate its own injunctive decree.'" Lykins Oil Co. v. Corbin,

12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-07-036, 2021-Ohio-1126, ¶ 27, quoting Cleveland v. Ohio

Dept. of Mental Health, 84 Ohio App.3d 769, 773 (10th Dist.1992). "'A court must never

ignore significant changes in the law or circumstances underlying an injunction lest it

becomes inequitable that the injunction should have prospective application.'" Id. Appellate

courts have upheld modifications of injunctive relief based upon a change in circumstances.

Lykins Oil at ¶ 28, citing Ormet Aluminum Mill Prods. Corp. v. USW, AFL-CIO, Local 5760,

7th Dist. Monroe Nos. 05-MO-1, 05-MO-2, 05-MO-10, and 05-MO-11, 2006-Ohio-3782, ¶

7; see also Bd. of Trustees v. Baumgardner, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2006-G-2721, 2007-

Ohio-1783, ¶ 38 (noting that a change in circumstances may warrant a modification of

injunctive relief).

       {¶ 10} This court reviews a decision on injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. Total

Quality Logistics, LLC v. Tucker, Albin and Assocs., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2021-06-

031, 2022-Ohio-1802, ¶ 28. Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or

judgment; it implies that the trial court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

       {¶ 11} In the present case, the grant administrator working with Goshen Township

was concerned that the trial court's original February 11, 2021 entry did not adequately

establish that the local township had legal authority to access the property for purposes of

remediation. On the state's motion to modify the entry, the trial court found that the grant

administrator's concerns constituted a sufficient change of circumstances to warrant

modification and granted the motion.

       {¶ 12} The modification remedied the grant administrator's concerns by simply

clarifying that "local municipalities and subdivisions," such as Goshen Township, along with

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                                                                    Clermont CA2022-12-090

those state entities already listed (as well as their contractors, agents and assigns), have

access to Combs' property to remediate the dumping sites. It requires no further action

from Combs, nor does it impose any additional penalties. Therefore, contrary to Combs'

assertion, Goshen Township's status as a party to the original civil action is irrelevant.

       {¶ 13} Therefore, we find that the trial court did not act in an unreasonable, arbitrary,

or unconscionable fashion in granting the state's motion to modify the entry and thus did

not abuse its discretion.

                              Motion for Relief from Judgment

       {¶ 14} Combs argues that the trial court improperly construed his "cross complaint"

as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion pursuant to subsections (1), (2), or (3), and that it was actually

pursuant to subsection (5) for alleging fraud upon the court. Nevertheless, because Combs'

arguments have no merit, are untimely, and are otherwise barred by res judicata, the trial

court did not err in denying his motion.

       {¶ 15} Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), "the court may relieve a party or his legal

representative from a final judgment, order or proceedings" for the following reasons:

              (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2)
              newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
              have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
              59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
              extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
              party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
              discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
              reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
              the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any
              other reason justifying relief from the judgment.

       {¶ 16} In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, the moving party must

demonstrate that (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is

granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)

through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time. GTE Automatic Electric

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                                                                      Clermont CA2022-12-090

v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. Where a

motion is made pursuant to subsections (1), (2) or (3), Civ.R. 60(B) requires that it be filed

"not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken."

The decision to grant or deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion lies within the trial court's discretion,

and the decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Purcell v. Schaefer, 12th

Dist. Preble No. CA2013-09-007, 2014-Ohio-4894, ¶ 26; Bowman v. Leisz, 12th Dist.

Warren No. CA2014-02-029, 2014-Ohio-4763, ¶ 17.

       {¶ 17} In the usual case, a party complaining of fraud must resort to a motion under

Civ.R.60(B)(3), to obtain relief. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-06-

089, 2014-Ohio-1322, ¶ 15, citing Coulson v. Coulson, 5 Ohio St.3d 12, 15 (1983).

However, where an officer of the court, such as an attorney, actively participates in

defrauding the court, then the court may entertain a Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion for relief from

judgment. Id. Examples of fraud upon the court include egregious misconduct such as

bribery of a judge or jury, or fabrication of evidence by counsel. Wilkerson at ¶ 16.

       {¶ 18} Combs' "cross complaint" alleges, and his appellate brief reasserts, that the

state withheld a guidance document entitled "Best Management Practices for Construction

and Demolition Debris Recycling Facilities in Ohio" and withheld expert testimony from a

man named Aaron Shear. However, as the state points out in its brief, the allegedly withheld

document is publicly available online, and Mr. Shear was not an affiant or witness in this

civil case. These arguments are without merit. Overall, Combs' arguments appear to be

an attempt to relitigate both this civil matter and his separate criminal cases involving the

illegal dumping, and to that extent they are either irrelevant or barred by res judicata.

       {¶ 19} Even if Combs' arguments had merit, they still fail for procedural reasons. The

trial court's entry of liability was entered January 29, 2021, its entry for injunctive relief was

entered February 11, 2021, and its civil penalty order entry was entered March 3, 2021.

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                                                                   Clermont CA2022-12-090

Combs' motion was filed on October 27, 2022, outside the one-year window for Civ.R. 60(B)

claims pursuant to subsections (1), (2), and (3). Combs argues that his allegations support

a claim of fraud upon the court, and therefore fall under subsection (5), which is not subject

to the one-year time limit. However, Combs' allegations are at most fraud between the

parties, not fraud upon the court, and accordingly must fall under subsection (3). Thus,

Combs' claims are also untimely.

       {¶ 20} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in construing Combs' "cross

complaint" as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion and denying the motion.

       {¶ 21} Combs' first assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶ 22} Assignment of Error No. 2:

       {¶ 23} THE STATE WITHHELD THE BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR

C&DD RECYCLING FACILITIES GUIDANCE DOCUMENT AND THE EPA'S EXPERT,

AARON SHEAR, TESTIMONY FROM THE COURT AND COMBS THAT WOULD HAVE

SHOWN COMBS WAS/IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATES RULES AND

STATUTES. THIS WAS A BRADY VIOLATION THAT DENIED COMBS' RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS, COMPULSORY PROCESS, CONFRONTATION CLAUSES, FAIR TRIAL,

AND EQUAL PROTECTIONS UNDER COMBS' FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENTS.

       {¶ 24} In his second assignment of error, Combs argues that the state committed a

Brady violation by withholding the "Best Management Practices for Construction and

Demolition Debris Recycling Facilities in Ohio" document and the expert testimony of Aaron

Shear. We disagree.

       {¶ 25} The obligation Brady imposes on the government is "'the obligation to turn

over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt

or punishment.'" State v. Widmer, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-02-008, 2013-Ohio-62, ¶

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                                                                    Clermont CA2022-12-090

33, quoting United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1281 (6th Cir.1988). However, as the

state correctly points out, Brady is almost never applied in civil cases except in very rare

and limited circumstances which do not apply here. One such rare example is when a

person's liberty is at stake. Brodie v. HHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 108, 118-119 (D.D.C.2013) citing

United States v. Project on Govt. Oversight ("POGO"), 839 F. Supp.2d 330, 342-43 (D.D.C.

2012). Although Mr. Combs is incarcerated, it is not a result of the trial court's orders in the

civil case under appeal here. Brady simply does not apply in this case.

       {¶ 26} Even if Brady did apply to this case, Combs did not serve discovery requests

on the state—the state did not withhold any discovery because no discovery was requested.

       {¶ 27} Combs' second assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶ 28} Judgment affirmed.

       PIPER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.

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