Court Opinion

ID: 9893085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 20:06:53.736412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:54.811339
License: Public Domain

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Donald Dorin Davis, AG No. 28,
September Term, 2022. Opinion by Eaves, J.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTION — INDEFINITE SUSPENSION
Respondent, Donald Dorin Davis, violated several provisions of the Maryland Attorneys’
Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) when he failed to fully render agreed-upon
legal services and communicate with his client; abandoned the client, forcing the client to
seek successor counsel; failed to refund any unearned fees; made intentional
misrepresentations to his client and the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“the
Commission”); and failed to cooperate with the Commission during the investigatory
process.
Respondent’s conduct violated the following MARPC: 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence),
1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8.1 (Bar
Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4 (Misconduct). These violations warranted
an indefinite suspension.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. C-16-CV-22-000681
Argued: Oral argument waived/submitted on papers
                                                                     IN THE SUPREME COURT
                                                                         OF MARYLAND

                                                                                 AG No. 28

                                                                        September Term, 2022

                                                                ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
                                                                        OF MARYLAND

                                                                                    v.

                                                                      DONALD DORIN DAVIS

                                                                   Fader, C.J.
                                                                   Watts,
                                                                   Hotten,
                                                                   Booth,
                                                                   Biran,
                                                                   Gould,
                                                                   Eaves,

                                                                                    JJ.

                                                                          Opinion by Eaves, J.

                                                                   Filed: October 23, 2023

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this
document is authentic.

                 2023-10-25 15:32-04:00

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
                                        I
                                  INTRODUCTION

       On November 3, 2022, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland

(“Petitioner” or “the Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for

Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) in this Court, alleging that Donald Dorin

Davis, Respondent, violated the following Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional

Conduct (“MARPC”)1:

   •   19-301.1: Competence (1.1);
   •   19-301.3: Diligence (1.3);
   •   19-301.4: Communication (1.4);
   •   19-301.5: Fees (1.5);
   •   19-301.16: Declining or Terminating Representation (1.16);
   •   19-308.1: Bar Admissions and Disciplinary Matters (8.1); and
   •   19-308.4: Misconduct (8.4).

       Pursuant to Maryland Rules 19-722(a) and 19-727(e), this Court referred the matter

to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and designated the Honorable Carol A.

Coderre (the “hearing judge”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and provide findings of

fact and conclusions of law. After a one-day hearing held on May 25, 2023,2 the hearing

judge found clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rules 1.1; 1.3; 1.4;

1.5(a); 1.16(d); 8.1(a)–(b); and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).     Neither Respondent nor the

       1
        Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct,
which employed the numbering format of the American Bar Association Model Rules,
were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive modification in Title 19,
Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules. For ease of reference and comparison with our prior
opinions and those of other courts, we will refer to the MARPC using the numbering of the
model rules, as permitted by Rule 19-300.1(22).
       2
         As will be discussed in greater detail, Respondent did not participate in much of
the disciplinary process, including the evidentiary hearing.
Commission has filed exceptions with this Court.          Petitioner recommends that we

indefinitely suspend Respondent from the practice of law. For the reasons discussed below,

we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions and with the Commission’s

recommendation.

       Before discussing the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we discuss some pertinent

procedural history. On February 17, 2023, Bar Counsel served Petitioner with a copy of

the Petition, interrogatories, and requests for both production of documents and admissions

of fact and genuineness of documents, including 29 attached exhibits.3 Having received

no response, on March 20, 2023, Petitioner moved for an order of default, which the

hearing judge granted. Despite the order of default, the hearing judge stated that she would

allow the Commission to “present such evidence as it deem[ed] necessary to allow the

[hearing judge] to carry out her assigned function as set forth in Maryland Rule 19-727.”

Respondent neither moved to vacate that order of default nor participated in the disciplinary

hearing. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-424(b), the hearing judge deemed admitted the

averments contained in Petitioner’s request for admissions and subsequently issued her

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. No exceptions—from either party—have been

filed, so we may treat the hearing judge’s “findings of fact as established.” Md. Rule 19-

       3
         The hearing judge signed an order permitting alternate service after Bar Counsel
made numerous, unsuccessful attempts to serve Respondent. When Bar Counsel asked if
he would accept alternative service, Respondent indicated via a reply email that he was
unaware of anyone trying to serve him in person, would accept service via mail, and was
neither practicing law nor maintaining a law license in Maryland.
                                             2
740(b)(2)(A); see also Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Parris, 482 Md. 574, 585 (2023). We

now summarize those findings.

                                  II
                  THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT

A.     Background

       Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar in December 2019 and maintained

an office for the practice of law in Washington, D.C., until sometime in 2021 when he

closed that office due to hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.4

B.     Representation of Jeremy McGilvrey

       Jeremy McGilvrey and Natalie Treurniet (collectively referred to as “the Parents”)

had a child together—T.T.5—but the Parents never married. In November 2018, Mr.

McGilvrey filed against Ms. Treurniet and in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County a

complaint for custody, access, and visitation. The Parents eventually entered into a custody

agreement whereby Ms. Treurniet would retain physical and legal custody of T.T.; the

Parents agreed that Mr. McGilvrey would remain a de facto parent but consented to T.T.’s

       4
         The hearing judge found that Respondent “closed his law practice and ceased
practicing law[]” “sometime in 2020[.]” This finding was, however, an oversight by the
hearing judge. As she also noted in her findings (discussed more fully below), Respondent
was practicing law at least through January 6, 2021. Therefore, the closing of Respondent’s
law practice and the cessation of his practicing law could not have occurred until sometime
in 2021.
       5
        Consistent with our usual practice, we use initials to protect the identity of the
minor child.
                                             3
adoption by Ms. Treurniet’s husband.6 The latter point of agreement was conditioned on

Mr. McGilvrey’s ability to seek custody and visitation.

       Believing that Ms. Treurniet was violating the custody agreement by impeding his

reunification with T.T., Mr. McGilvrey retained Respondent on August 4, 2020, to assist

in the “execution and fulfillment of” the Parents’ custody agreement. Respondent’s

retainer agreement required a retainer of $3,000, and Mr. McGilvrey paid Respondent

$2,500 via cashier’s check that same day. To seek enforcement of the custody agreement,

Respondent drafted for Mr. McGilvrey a motion alleging that Ms. Treurniet was in

contempt of the court order enforcing that agreement (the “contempt motion”), and both

Respondent and Mr. McGilvrey signed the contempt motion on December 15, 2020. In a

January 6, 2021, email (the “January 6 email”) to Mr. McGilvrey, Respondent knowingly

and intentionally misrepresented that he filed that motion:

       You[r] motion was filed yesterday with the clerk. The clerk will review the
       document, confirm it is correct, accept it and then assign a judge. This takes
       a day. I will send you the stamped, accepted copy as soon as I receive it.
       Then we will get a scheduling notice and we can discuss next steps.

       Respondent closed his law practice that same month shortly after sending the

January 6 email due to constraints from the COVID-19 pandemic, but he never advised

Mr. McGilvrey of that decision. On four different days in January 2021, Mr. McGilvrey

attempted to contact Respondent, asking for an update on the contempt matter; Respondent

never replied, and there was no further communication between the two. The hearing judge

       6
        It is unclear from the record in this disciplinary matter whether any court granted
Mr. McGilvrey the status of a de facto parent or whether that simply was a term used by
the Parents in the custody agreement.
                                             4
also found that Respondent never provided any billing invoices to Mr. McGilvrey, nor did

Respondent refund any portion of the $2,500 Mr. McGilvrey paid to Respondent.

C.     Bar Counsel’s Investigation

       After Mr. McGilvrey filed a complaint with the Commission, Bar Counsel emailed

Respondent on July 12, 2021, requesting a written response by July 27. Respondent replied

on July 27, misrepresenting the scope of the work he performed for Mr. McGilvrey and

claiming—without evidence—that his fees associated with the contempt matter exceeded

the $2,500 Mr. McGilvrey paid. Thus, according to Respondent, Mr. McGilvrey was not

owed a refund.

       By an August 10 email, Bar Counsel requested within 14 days additional

information from Respondent. Respondent did not comply, so Bar Counsel again sent its

request on September 8 (via email and certified first-class mail), requesting a reply by

September 22. Respondent replied that same day, indicating that he was in California,

would be back in Maryland the following week, and, at that point, would review Bar

Counsel’s request. On September 29, Respondent provided incomplete responses and

failed to provide any of the documents requested by Bar Counsel. Based on what little

information Respondent did provide, however, the hearing judge found that Respondent

knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel that he never sent the January

6 email to Mr. McGilvrey.

       On December 8 and 29, 2021, and January 7 and 27, 2022, Bar Counsel sent

Respondent a request for additional information. The first three requests all were received

by Respondent, but Bar Counsel never received a reply. Respondent replied to Bar

                                            5
Counsel’s January 27 request on February 4, but his responses were incomplete, and he

indicated that all future requests should be sent via regular mail, as he no longer was

monitoring his email address.

       Dissatisfied with his February 4 responses, Bar Counsel sent on February 10 via

regular mail a request for additional information with a reply date of February 25. Bar

Counsel sent subsequent letters dated March 7 and April 21, but Respondent did not reply

to any of those requests.

       Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

                                  III
                THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

       The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MARPC 1.1; 1.3; 1.4; 1.5(a);

1.16(d); 8.1(a)–(b); and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).

       The hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s failure to file the motion for

contempt or communicate with Mr. McGilvrey constituted a violation of Rule 1.1. And as

to Rule 1.3, the hearing judge relied on the same reasons for her conclusion as to the Rule

1.1 violation (as well as the reasons for Respondent’s Rule 1.4 violation discussed

immediately below).

       According to the hearing judge, Respondent violated Rule 1.4 when he failed to (1)

reply to Mr. McGilvrey’s emails dated January 12, 13, 18, and 20, 2021, and (2) provide

periodic billing statements to Mr. McGilvrey.

       Although the hearing judge acknowledged that Respondent drafted the contempt

motion for Mr. McGilvrey, she concluded that Respondent’s failure to file the motion and

                                                 6
obtain any meaningful results for Mr. McGilvrey constituted a Rule 1.5(a) violation. The

hearing judge also concluded that Respondent’s failure to refund any portion of the $2,500

paid by Mr. McGilvrey also constituted a violation of Rule 1.5(a).

        Concerning Rule 1.16(d), the hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated that

Rule when he failed to notify Mr. McGilvrey that Respondent was shutting down his law

practice and provide Mr. McGilvrey with sufficient time to retain successor counsel.

Additionally, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s failure to substantiate the time

he spent on Mr. McGilvrey’s matter, render any services of value, and issue a refund to

Mr. McGilvrey all constituted a violation of Rule 1.16(d).

        The hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s September 29, 2021,

correspondence to Bar Counsel, wherein he stated that he did not send the January 6 email

to Mr. McGilvrey, was a knowing misrepresentation, constituting a violation of Rule

8.1(a). Respondent also violated Rule 8.1(b), the hearing judge concluded, when he

routinely failed to reply to Bar Counsel’s correspondences from August 2021 to April

2022.

        Because the hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated numerous MARPC,

she also concluded that he violated Rule 8.4(a). Respondent’s knowing and intentional

misrepresentation (in the January 6 email) to Mr. McGilvrey that Respondent filed the

contempt motion also violated Rule 8.4(c). Lastly, the hearing judge concluded that

Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) by failing to (1) provide prompt and complete responses

to Bar Counsel during the investigatory process; (2) keep Mr. McGilvrey apprised of his

case; and (3) return unearned fees to Mr. McGilvrey after abandoning the representation.

                                             7
The hearing judge concluded that these violations brought the legal profession into

disrepute.

                                       IV
                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

       While this Court has original jurisdiction over an attorney disciplinary proceeding,

Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ekekwe, 478 Md. 688, 708 (2022), we may refer the matter to

any circuit court judge, Md. Rule 19-722(a), who then is required to issue written findings

of fact and conclusions of law, Md. Rule 19-727(e). When we do so, this Court ordinarily

analyzes a hearing judge’s findings of facts using the clearly erroneous standard. Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. White, 480 Md. 319, 352 (2022); Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B). As

previously noted, however, because no exceptions were filed in this case, we “may treat

the [hearing judge’s] findings of fact as established[,]” Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A)

(emphasis added), and we exercise our discretion to do so in this case. We review the

hearing judge’s conclusions of law under the de novo standard (without deference), Md.

Rule 19-740(b)(1), and Bar Counsel bears the burden of establishing by clear and

convincing evidence a violation of the MARPC, Md. Rule 19-727(c).

                                         V
                                  RULE VIOLATIONS

       We now conduct a de novo review of the hearing judge’s legal conclusions based

upon her established findings of fact.

A.     Rule 1.1

       Rule 1.1 states: “An attorney shall provide competent representation to a client.

Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and

                                            8
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” “An attorney violates Rule 1.1

when he or she fails ‘to apply the requisite thoroughness and/or preparation in representing

a client . . . .’” White, 480 Md. at 366 (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Karambelas,

473 Md. 134, 159 (2021)). A lack of such thoroughness and preparation, we have said,

includes an outright failure to file necessary pleadings and motions. Parris, 482 Md. at

592 (citing Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bellamy, 453 Md. 377, 393 (2017)).

       We agree with the hearing judge that Respondent violated Rule 1.1 because he

failed, despite drafting the contempt motion, to formally initiate the matter with the circuit

court for which he was retained. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Hoerauf, 469 Md. 179,

208–09 (2020) (sustaining Rule 1.1 violation because attorney, among other things, “failed

to file a motion for modification of sentence . . ., after informing [the client that] she would

do so, and then failed to advise [the client] that she did not file such a motion[]”); Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. Brady, 422 Md. 441, 452 (2011) (sustaining Rule 1.1 violation

where attorney, even though he filed both a complaint and amended complaint, failed to

file a response to a motion to dismiss); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505,

522 (2003) (“Respondent violated Rule 1.1 when he failed to file the requisite appeal and/or

motion to reconsider within the time period, which reflected a lack of skill and

thoroughness.”). In essence, Respondent failed to pursue any meaningful course of action

for Mr. McGilvrey. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Aita, 458 Md. 101, 118 (2018)

(sustaining Rule 1.1 violation where attorney “fail[ed] to pursue any relief . . . all while

allowing the client to rely on [the attorney’s] representations that [the attorney] would do

                                               9
so”). Thus, we agree with the hearing judge that clear and convincing evidence exists to

support a violation of Rule 1.1.

B.     Rule 1.3

       Rule 1.3 states that “[a]n attorney shall act with reasonable diligence and

promptness in representing a client.” “In its simplest form, an attorney violates Rule 1.3

when he or she does nothing whatsoever to advance the client’s cause or endeavor.” White,

480 Md. at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.

Moawad, 475 Md. 424, 469 (2021)).

       The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 1.3 for the same reasons

articulated for the Rule 1.1 violation (and Rule 1.4, as discussed below), and we agree. It

is well settled in our jurisprudence that the facts that form the basis for a Rule 1.1 violation

also may serve as the basis for a Rule 1.3 violation. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Jones, 484

Md. 155, 197 (2023); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Hensley, 467 Md. 669, 685 (2020);

Bellamy, 453 Md. at 395. Thus, we likewise agree with the hearing judge that clear and

convincing evidence exists to support a Rule 1.3 violation.

C.     Rule 1.4

       In its entirety, Rule 1.4 states:

       (a) An attorney shall:

              (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with
              respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 19-
              301.0(g) (1.0), is required by these Rules;

              (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;

              (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and

                                              10
               (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the
               attorney’s conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects
               assistance not permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of
               Professional Conduct or other law.

       (b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
       permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

       “Rule 1.4 is violated when an attorney communicates nothing or fails to

communicate crucial information to the client regarding the status of a case.” Karambelas,

473 Md. at 162. The hearing judge cited both Rule 1.4(a) and Rule 1.4(b), but she

concluded that Respondent “violated Rule 1.4[]” without specifying any subsection. But

her specific conclusions state that Respondent “failed to respond in any manner to Mr.

McGilvrey’s reasonable requests for information[]” and that Respondent’s failure to

communicate “severely limited[]” Mr. McGilvrey’s “ability to make informed decisions

about his case[.]” The former seems to speak to Rule 1.4(a), while the latter seems aimed

at Rule 1.4(b). But whether the hearing judge’s conclusion was made under subsection (a),

subsection (b), or both is irrelevant. Respondent’s conduct satisfies both subsections, and

our sanction would not change even if the violation were predicated on only one

subsection.7

       7
         We made a similar point in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Farmer where the
hearing judge concluded that, as to Rule 8.4, the attorney violated subsection (a). 484 Md.
107, 146 (2023). In its recommendation for sanction, Bar Counsel noted that, “[t]o the
extent this Court finds that the hearing judge concluded the Respondent did not violate
Rule 8.4(b) and (c), the[n] Petitioner excepts.” Id. We noted that it was “unclear” whether
the hearing judge made findings regarding violations of Rule 8.4(b) and (c). Id.
Ultimately, “because resolution of the matter would not [have] affect[ed] the sanction in
[that] case, we decline[d] to address the Commission’s exception.” Id. While no party has
excepted here, our rationale and sentiment from Farmer apply all the same.
                                            11
       Mr. McGilvrey made four separate attempts in January 2021 to contact Respondent,

and each time Respondent ignored Mr. McGilvrey’s request for an update. Respondent

ceased all communication with Mr. McGilvrey after Respondent’s January 6 email. That

conduct—or the lack thereof—violates Respondent’s ethical requirement to keep Mr.

McGilvrey reasonably informed about the status of Mr. McGilvrey’s matter or promptly

comply with Mr. McGilvrey’s requests for information. Thus, clear and convincing

evidence shows that Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a).

       Respondent’s failure to disclose to Mr. McGilvrey the closure of Respondent’s law

practice violated Rule 1.4(b) because it delayed and impeded Mr. McGilvrey from making

informed decisions regarding Respondent’s representation and whether Mr. McGilvrey

should secure new counsel. This too is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent

violated Rule 1.4(b).8

       8
         We certainly agree with the hearing judge that an attorney can violate Rule 1.4 for
failing to provide a client with periodic billing invoices, Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Green,
441 Md. 80, 98–99 (2014); see also Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Brooks, 476 Md. 97, 134
(2021) (sustaining Rule 1.4(a)(2) and 1.4(a)(3) violations where attorney did not provide
estate beneficiaries invoices for six months despite “repeated requests for such accountings
and [the attorney’s] repeated assurances that he would provide them[]”); Att’y Grievance
Comm’n v. Rand, 445 Md. 581, 628–29 (2015) (sustaining Rule 1.4 violation where
attorney requested and received $1,000 to replenish initial retainer without providing client
with agreed-upon invoices detailing services), but such a violation did not occur here. The
hearing judge did not make any findings of fact regarding a request by Mr. McGilvrey to
receive any billing invoices, and Respondent’s retainer agreement does not contemplate
that he would send to Mr. McGilvrey any such periodic billing invoices. Thus, we do not
agree that Respondent’s failure to provide periodic billing invoices was a violation of Rule
1.4 based on the record here. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Conwell, 462 Md. 437, 461–
62 (2019) (overruling Bar Counsel’s exception that Respondent did not violate Rule 1.4
because the client did not request invoices regarding escalating fees, and the retainer
agreement did not contemplate that the client would receive automatic statements).
                                             12
D.     Rule 1.5

       Rule 1.5(a) states in its entirety:

       An attorney shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an
       unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be
       considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
              (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
              questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
              properly;

              (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
              particular employment will preclude other employment of the
              attorney;

              (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
              services;

              (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

              (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

              (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
              client;

              (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys
              performing the services; and

              (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

       “An advance fee given in anticipation of legal service that is reasonable at the time

of the receipt can become unreasonable if the attorney does not perform the agreed-upon

services.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Smith-Scott, 469 Md. 281, 344–45 (2020) (quoting

Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Blair, 440 Md. 387, 403 (2014)). Failing to earn the fee itself,

along with a failure to refund any unearned portion of the fee, can constitute a Rule 1.5(a)

                                             13
violation. Id. at 345 (citing Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Garrett, 427 Md. 209, 224–25

(2012)).

       We agree with the hearing judge that, although Respondent drafted the initial

contempt motion, Respondent’s combined failure to file the motion and to refund any

portion of the $2,500 fee transformed what initially may have been a reasonable fee into

an unreasonable one. Respondent was retained to assist in the “execution and fulfillment

of [a] ‘parentage agreement’” between the Parents. While the motion for contempt

arguably has some value with respect to a fee for legal services, Respondent’s failure to

file that motion left Mr. McGilvrey without the services for which he bargained. See Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 217 (2020) (sustaining Rule 1.5(a) violation

where attorney’s work “failed to culminate in obtaining any meaningful results on behalf

of” the client). Respondent’s failure to then refund any portion of the $2,500 also supports

a Rule 1.5(a) violation. See Jones, 484 Md. at 208 (holding that attorney violated Rule

1.5(a) where he failed to refund an appropriate portion of a flat fee after his services were

terminated). Clear and convincing evidence exists to support a Rule 1.5(a) violation.

E.     Rule 1.16

       Rule 1.16(d) states:

       Upon termination of representation, an attorney shall take steps to the extent
       reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving
       reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of another
       attorney, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and
       refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned
       or incurred. The attorney may retain papers relating to the client to the extent
       permitted by other law.

“An attorney violates Rule 1.16(d) when the attorney abandons representation of a client,

                                             14
fails to return records, and refuses to communicate with the client or successor counsel.”

Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Viladegut, 473 Md. 38, 61 (2021).

       We agree with the hearing judge that Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d). First,

Respondent completely abandoned Mr. McGilvrey immediately after sending the January

6 email despite Mr. McGilvrey’s multiple attempts to contact Respondent. Respondent

gave no notice to Mr. McGilvery that Respondent was terminating his law practice and

contravened the heart of Rule 1.16(d). Second, as noted above, Respondent failed to return

any unearned portion of the $2,500 fee. This too constitutes a violation of Rule 1.16(d).

See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Wescott, 483 Md. 111, 126 (2023) (“Considering our

conclusion that Mr. Wescott did not earn the $7,000 fee that he collected from [the client]

and did not return any portion of that fee to [the client] after his representation was

terminated, Mr. Wescott violated Rule 1.16(d).”); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Taniform,

482 Md. 272, 313 (2022) (“We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing

judge’s conclusion that Mr. Taniform violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to return unearned

fees.”). Thus, we are satisfied that clear and convincing evidence exists to support that

Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d).

F.     Rule 8.1

       Rule 8.1 provides that
       [a]n applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or an attorney in
       connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
       disciplinary matter, shall not:
       (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or

       (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by
       the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a

                                            15
       lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
       except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
       protected by Rule 19-301.6 (1.6).

       “An attorney violates [Rule 8.1(a)] when they have ‘knowingly misrepresented

material facts in response to Bar Counsel’s requests for information.’” Att’y Grievance

Comm’n v. O’Neill, 477 Md. 632, 652 (2022) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Yi, 470

Md. 464, 497 (2020)). A Rule 8.1(b) violation “occurs when an attorney fails to timely

respond to lawful requests for information from Bar Counsel.” Id.

       The hearing judge found that Respondent “knowingly and intentionally

misrepresented to Bar Counsel that he did not send the January 6, 2021[,] email to Mr.

McGilvrey.” As noted, because no exceptions have been filed in this case, that finding is

deemed established. See Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). We hold that there is clear and

convincing evidence to support the Rule 8.1(a) violation.

       As to the Rule 8.1(b) violation, the hearing judge concluded that, due to his July 27,

2021, reply to Mr. McGilvrey’s complaint, Respondent “was aware that Bar Counsel was

conducting an investigation” into his conduct. Thus, Respondent’s decision—on multiple

occasions—to ignore Bar Counsel’s requests for information and documents, as well as

his, at best, incomplete responses, constitute a Rule 8.1(b) violation. See Att’y Grievance

Comm’n v. Shuler, 454 Md. 200, 215 (2017) (sustaining Rule 8.1(b) violation where

attorney failed to “meaningfully answer” correspondence from Bar Counsel based on

attorney’s belated and “incomplete” answers).

       Thus, we agree with the hearing judge that clear and convincing evidence exists to

support a violation of both Rule 8.1(a) and 8.1(b).

                                             16
G.     Rule 8.4

       In pertinent part, Rule 8.4 states that

       [i]t is professional misconduct for an attorney to:

       (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of
       Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
       through the acts of another;
                                       *         *     *
       (c) engage in conduct           involving      dishonesty,   fraud,   deceit    or
       misrepresentation; [or]

       (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]

       “Plainly and simply, an attorney violates ‘Rule 8.4(a) when he or she violates other

Rules of Professional Conduct.’” White, 480 Md. at 381 (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n

v. Powers, 454 Md. 79, 107 (2017)). By virtue of Respondent’s other sustained violations

herein, we agree with the hearing judge that Respondent also violated Rule 8.4(a).

       Rule 8.4(c) “applies to a ‘broad universe’ of misconduct.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n

v. Daley, 476 Md. 283, 304 (2021) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437

Md. 1, 39 (2014)). Simply making a false statement that an attorney knows to be untrue is

enough to constitute conduct involving a misrepresentation and thus a violation of Rule

8.4(c). Karambelas, 473 Md. at 167–68; Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Young, 473 Md. 94,

124 (2021). The hearing judge found that Respondent knowingly and intentionally

misrepresented in the January 6 email that Respondent filed the contempt motion, which

constituted a violation of Rule 8.4(c). We agree that this satisfies Petitioner’s burden to

prove this violation by clear and convincing evidence. We also hold that, by virtue of

Respondent’s 8.1(a) violation, he also violated Rule 8.4(c). See Daley, 476 Md. at 304

                                                 17
(“We have previously held that violations of Rule 8.1(a) also constitute violations of Rule

8.4(c).”).

       For purposes of Rule 8.4(d), whether conduct is prejudicial to the administration of

justice “turns on whether the conduct would negatively impact [the] perception of the legal

profession of a reasonable member of the public[.]” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Maiden,

480 Md. 1, 18–19 (2022) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). The hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s failure to (1) provide prompt

and complete responses to Bar Counsel, (2) keep Mr. McGilvrey abreast of his case, and

(3) refund any unearned fees all was conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of

justice. All that conduct having been established, see Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A), our

caselaw supports that each instance is enough, alone, to support a Rule 8.4(d) violation.

See Blair, 440 Md. at 404 (“An attorney can also violate 8.4(d) by failing to pursue his or

her client’s objectives, failing to communicate with his or her client, or withholding

unearned fees.” (emphasis added)); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Fox, 417 Md. 504, 538

(2010) (sustaining Rule 8.4(d) violation where attorney “failed to respond in a timely

manner to Bar Counsel’s inquiries”); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209,

222 (2006) (“Failure to represent a client in an adequate manner and lying to a client

constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(d).”). Thus, clear and convincing evidence supports the

Rule 8.4(d) violation.

                                  VI
                  AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS

       So that we may “devis[e] the appropriate sanction[,]” we consider in every attorney

                                            18
disciplinary matter the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factors. Att’y Grievance

Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 584 (2022).

A.     Aggravating Factors

       Aggravating factors are ones that “militate in favor of a more severe sanction.” Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. Culberson, 483 Md. 294, 324 (2023) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). It is Petitioner’s burden to prove any aggravating factor by clear and

convincing evidence. White, 480 Md. at 386; Md. Rule 19-727(c).

       The hearing judge found the presence of eight aggravating factors: a dishonest or

selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple rule violations, bad faith obstruction of

the disciplinary proceeding, submission of false evidence or statements, a refusal to

acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature, indifference to making restitution, and a

likelihood of repeating the misconduct.

       The hearing judge concluded that Respondent evinced a selfish or dishonest motive

when he made a knowing and intentional misrepresentation to Mr. McGilvrey regarding

the status of the contempt motion; and failed to notify Mr. McGilvrey of the closure of

Respondent’s law practice, engage in the services for which he was retained, and refund

any unearned fees. The hearing judge likewise concluded that this conduct constituted a

“sustained course of misconduct” and that Respondent committed multiple rule violations.

       The hearing judge concluded that Respondent engaged in bad faith obstruction of

the disciplinary proceeding by “intentionally failing to comply with the rules and orders of

the disciplinary agency” and the circuit court. Specifically, Respondent did not timely and

completely fulfill any of Bar Counsel’s requests or participate in the disciplinary process.

                                             19
Respondent made false statements to both Bar Counsel and Mr. McGilvrey, and he

“displayed a complete refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct and has

failed to demonstrate remorse.” According to the hearing judge, Respondent’s failure to

both respond to Bar Counsel or refund unearned fees demonstrates that he does not “accept

responsibility for his misconduct and illustrate[s] that he is indifferent to making

restitution.”

       Lastly, due to the “breadth and extent of the misconduct and Respondent’s refusal

to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature[,]” the hearing judge concluded that

Respondent was likely to repeat his misconduct.

       For the reasons articulated by the hearing judge, and because we have sustained all

MARPC violations, as alleged by the Commission, we conclude that clear and convincing

evidence exists to support the presence of the articulated aggravating factors.9

B.     Mitigating Factors

       On the other hand, mitigating factors counsel “in favor of a less severe sanction.”

Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Trezevant, 484 Md. 34, 54 (2023). Respondent must prove

any mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. White, 480 Md. at 386; Md.

       9
          We make one minor, clarifying point. The hearing judge concluded that an
applicable aggravating factor was Respondent’s bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the Maryland Rules or orders from the
circuit court. The hearing judge, however, cited as facts to support that aggravating factor
only Respondent’s failure to completely and timely respond to Bar Counsel’s lawful
requests. The hearing judge made no findings regarding whether Respondent intentionally
violated any order from the circuit court. Thus, we agree with the hearing judge’s
conclusion that this aggravating factor applies, but only because Respondent flouted Bar
Counsel’s requests—not as to a violation of any order from the circuit court.
                                             20
Rule 19-727(c).

       Because Respondent did not participate in the disciplinary process or appear for the

disciplinary hearing, the hearing judge found that Respondent did not prove by a

preponderance of the evidence any mitigating factor. We agree. The burden allocated to

Respondent to prove any applicable mitigation necessarily contemplates, at the very least,

appearance at and involvement in the evidentiary hearing. Indeed, we have stated that “the

availability for consideration of mitigating factors cannot be undertaken where an attorney

neither attends his or her evidentiary hearing nor responds to Bar Counsel’s requests for

written responses to the client’s complaint[.]” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kremer, 432

Md. 325, 340 (2013). Thus, “[m]itigation usually is not on the table” if the attorney fails

to provide “supporting evidence of the existence of [any mitigating] factors.” Id. at 339.

It follows that, where the attorney elects not to appear for his or her evidentiary hearing,

he or she forgoes the opportunity to submit any such evidence. Thus, there are no

mitigating factors applicable for our consideration.

                                         VII
                                    THE SANCTION

       In fashioning the appropriate sanction, we must consider “the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including consideration of any mitigating [and

aggravating] factors.” Bonner, 477 Md. at 607 (quoting Miller, 476 Md. at 223). Our goal

is not to punish the attorney; rather, we are guided—primarily—by “our interest in

protecting the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession[,]” id. (quoting

McDonald, 437 Md. at 45), as well as our need to “effect general and specific deterrence[]”

                                            21
of future rule violations, id. (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Shapiro, 441 Md. 367,

395 (2015)).

       The Commission asks that we indefinitely suspend Respondent, primarily claiming

support for such a sanction from our opinion in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kirwan,

450 Md. 447 (2016). We agree that Kirwan is sufficiently analogous to provide a basis for

the sanction of an indefinite suspension without specifying a time at which Respondent

may petition for reinstatement to the Bar of Maryland.

       In Kirwan, the attorney violated the same rules that Respondent has here, except for

Rules 1.5(a), 8.1(a) and 8.4(c). 450 Md. at 454. There, the attorney failed to “take any

meaningful action towards pursuing her client’s claim[,]” which resulted in the claim being

barred by the statute of limitations, id. at 458, and “responded to only one of [her client’s]

numerous attempts to contact her from December 2013 to September 2014[,]” failing to

provide any further updates, id. at 460. The attorney in Kirwan also abandoned her client

when she ignored the client’s inquiry into whether the attorney was still handling the matter

and refused to communicate with successor counsel. Id. at 461–62. The attorney failed to

respond to four letters from Bar Counsel, and the manner in which she handled her client’s

case was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Id. at 462, 463. In Kirwan, five

aggravating factors were present (almost all overlapping with Respondent’s), and the

attorney likewise presented no evidence of any mitigating factors. Id. at 463–66. We

sanctioned the attorney with an indefinite suspension without specifying a minimum time

before application for reinstatement because her actions did “not involve dishonesty,” id.

at 466, and because there was “nothing in the record that would allow this Court to ‘divine

                                             22
an appropriate minimum “sit-out” period[,]’” id. at 467 (quoting Green, 441 Md. at 102).

       True enough, Respondent’s conduct, as far as we can tell, did not result in the

permanent prejudice that the client in Kirwan suffered. See id. at 458. Fortunately, despite

Respondent’s lack of competence, diligence, and communication, Mr. McGilvrey was able

to retain successor counsel, and there is no evidence that Respondent’s actions resulted in

any permanent prejudice vis-à-vis the contempt motion. See id. Nevertheless, unlike the

attorney in Kirwan, Respondent’s violations entail dishonesty—to both his client and the

Commission. See id. at 466. Additional aggravating factors that are present here but absent

from Kirwan are Respondent’s refusal to acknowledge his misconduct’s wrongful nature

and a likelihood that he would repeat his misconduct. See id. at 463–65. Lastly, as

Respondent was almost wholly absent from the disciplinary process, we likewise have no

evidence in the record from which we can discern an appropriate amount of time that

Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. See id. at 467; see also Att’y

Grievance Comm’n v. Ibebuchi, 471 Md. 286, 310 (2020) (noting that the Court could not

discern an appropriate “sit-out” time); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Moore, 447 Md. 253,

274 (2016) (“[W]e decline to set a minimum length for this indefinite suspension, because

we cannot say with any certainty how long it will take for Mr. Moore to make the necessary

progress toward being able to handle intimidating or confrontational situations with

techniques other than avoidance. It may be soon, or it may be never.”); Green, 441 Md. at

102 (“Because there is nothing in the record plumbing the reasons for Green’s misconduct

or the likelihood that recidivism is not a concern, . . . an open-ended indefinite suspension

is appropriate.”).

                                             23
      Thus, we are satisfied that the conduct we sanctioned in Kirwan—while slightly

differing from Respondent’s—is sufficiently analogous to Respondent’s conduct to merit

the same sanction: an indefinite suspension without specifying a minimum duration of time

after which Respondent may petition for reinstatement to the Bar of Maryland.

                                         IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
                                         SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
                                         THE   CLERK   OF    THIS  COURT,
                                         INCLUDING    COSTS     OF   ALL
                                         TRANSCRIPTS,    PURSUANT     TO
                                         MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d), FOR
                                         WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED
                                         IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
                                         GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST
                                         DONALD DORIN DAVIS.

                                           24
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/28a22agcn.pdf