Court Opinion

ID: 9571577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:51.381632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:39.087539
License: Public Domain

TONGUE, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority, but disagree with the basis upon which the majority has reached that result.
I believe that it is fair to say that while some other courts have intimated that the refusal of a trial judge to disclose to a criminal defendant the contents of a presentence report may, under some circumstances, violate the constitutional rights of the defendant, this may be the first decision which would squarely so hold. In my judgment; there is good *243reason for the hesitance of other courts to hold that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to know any part of the contents of a pre-sentence report. Once that door is opened, no matter how slightly, it may be extremely difficult to distinguish between the constitutional right of a defendant to see statements in a pre-sentence report relating to his prior convictions and his right to see any and all statements included in such a report.
This court has often stated the rule that a case will not be decided by holding a statute adopted by the legislature to be unconstitutional unless such a determination is necessary to a proper disposition of the case. See State v. Franzone, 243 Or 597, 415 P2d 16 (1966); Dodd v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 211 Or 99, 162, 310 P2d 324 (1957); State ex rel Bushman v. Vandenberg, 203 Or 326, 329, 276 P2d 432 (1955), among other eases.
The legislature of Oregon, by the adoption of ORS 137.090, has expressly conferred upon the trial judge the discretion whether or not to make available to counsel for the defendant all or any part of a presentence report. In my opinion, however, the discretion conferred upon the trial judge by that statute is a judicial discretion and is thus subject to reversal for abuse.
It is also my opinion that it would be an abuse of judicial discretion for a trial judge to refuse to disclose to counsel for the defendant what the majority describes as “that part of a pre-sentence report which relates to his prior criminal record.” Accordingly, I agree with the result reached by the majority, but on a different basis and one which makes it unnecessary to pass upon the constitutionality of OES 137.090.
*244The majority opinion rejects the contention that in providing that information included in pre-sentence reports “may be made available to counsel for defendant” OES 137.090 was intended to confer upon trial courts a judicial discretion which is subject to review by this court for abuse. This may be because the majority apparently construes that statute as conferring upon trial judges an absolute discretion, not subject to review by this court. Thus, the majority says (at p 1695) that “The language was intended to make plain that trial courts could make information available, not that they had to make it available or be guilty of an abuse of discretion, as has been suggested.”
In my opinion, however, all discretion conferred upon a trial judge, whether by statute or by rule of common law, is a judicial discretion and is thus subject to review for abuse of that discretion. Cf. Guedon v. Rooney, 160 Or 621, 645, 87 P2d 209 (1939).
The majority also says (at p 1710) “It would appear that the scope of review under a judicial discretion criterion would be broader than one limited to a claim that the defendant was denied his constitutional rights because he was not informed of his prior criminal record as it appeared in the presentence report.” This may be a matter on which reasonable minds may differ. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that once the “constitutional right” to any portion of a presentence report is recognized, the problem of denying the exercise of such a “right” to examine other portions of the report becomes much more difficult than under a rule which leaves the entire matter to the exercise of a judicial discretion which is reviewable only for abuse.
This is also consistent with what appears to be the practice of federal courts in the interpretation *245of a similar rule of criminal procedure (Fed R Grim P 32(c)), under which it is also provided that the trial judge “may disclose” all or part of a pre-sentence report. United States v. Dockery, 145 US App DC 9, 447 F2d 1178, 1183 (DC Cir 1971), cert den, 404 US 950, 92 S Ct 299, 30 L ed 2d 266 (1971); Good v. United States, 410 F2d 1217, 1221 (5th Cir 1969), cert den, 397 US 1002, 90 S Ct 1131, 25 L ed 2d 413 (1970); United States v. Knupp, 448 F2d 412, 413 (4th Cir 1971).
The majority would dismiss these cases with the following footnote comment (note 6):
“A federal rule means, of course, what federal courts say it does. We are dealing here with a statute enacted by the Oregon legislature.”
Aside from the question whether a statute or, indeed, a constitution may also mean what “courts say it does,” the statute involved in this case (ORS 137.080), by providing that the contents of presentence reports “may be made available to counsel for the defendant” clearly confers discretion upon the court to do so.
It may be that the right of a criminal defendant to information in pre-sentence reports is a subject which should be more precisely defined and provided for by statute or by rule of court. Indeed, specific proposals have been made for the revision of state and federal statutes and rules of criminal procedure on this subject, based upon considerable study of this most serious problem. See majority opinion, note 6. In particular, see Part TV, § 4.4, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice (1968). See also discussion in State v. Kuntz, 55 NJ 128, 259 A2d 895 (1969).
*246Thus, this is a most proper subject for consideration by the present Oregon Criminal Law Revision Commission, which is now studying proposals for a complete revision of Oregon’s criminal procedure statutes. Until that commission has completed its report, however, and until that report has been considered by the Oregon legislature, I am of the opinion that this is a subject which should be left to the judicial discretion of the trial judge, as presently provided by ORS 137.090, subject to review by this court.
I agree with the majority in its statement that the result reached by it does “not mean * * * that it is not good practice for a trial judge to disclose the balance of the pre-sentence report if, in his opinion, there are not valid reasons for its confidentiality.” Again, however, I am of the opinion that under the provisions of ORS 137.090 this is a matter within the judicial discretion of the trial court, subject to review by this court for possible abuse of that discretion.