Court Opinion

ID: 9568727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:07:02.612261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:05:09.128005
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
concurring specially.
While I am in accord with the majority’s conclusion that the habeas court did not err v:hen it determined that the parties’ child should be returned to appellee/father, I disagree with the analysis employed to reach that conclusion.
In this appeal from the grant of a writ of habeas corpus, the majority devotes its attention to the question of whether another court, the juvenile court, had subject matter of another case, a deprivation proceeding, from which no appeal has been taken. The majority uses as its springboard into these uncharted waters our recent decision in Murphy v. Murphy, 263 Ga. 280 (430 SE2d 749) (1993). In that case, we held that “there is no time limitation on attacking a judgment ‘void on its face,’ due to lack of [subject matter or personal] jurisdiction.” Id. at 283. However, we limited the judicial scrutiny to be given such an attack when we quoted from Nicholson v. State, 261 Ga. 197, 199 (403 SE2d 42) (1991):
Jurisdiction of the subject-matter does not mean simply jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying the attention of the court, but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which that particular case belongs. As applied to the subject-matter of a suit, jurisdiction is always conferred by law, and it is incorrect to suppose that the power to decide in any case rests solely on the averments of a pleading, but on the contrary the jurisdiction of a court in no way depends on the sufficiency or insufficiency of the pleadings, and if the pleadings state a case belonging to a general class over which the authority of the court extends, then jurisdiction attaches and the court has power to hear and determine the issues involved.
It is undisputed that the juvenile court is the only court in which an action alleging deprivation of a child may be instituted. OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (1) (C). The juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction of “the class of cases” to which the particular case (a deprivation peti*464tion) belonged, and the pleadings stated a case belonging to the general class over which the authority of the juvenile court extended. The inquiry into the juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction of the deprivation petition should go no further. The majority’s continued investigation of the juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction of this particular deprivation petition exceeds the limited scope of an attack on a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and produces the very result this court sought to circumvent in Murphy — one court delving into the record of another case filed in another court, performing a studied review of the other court’s case and, in effect, reversing the judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction without an appeal having been filed.
The basis, in the case at bar, for the majority’s protracted review of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court is the majority’s attempt to distinguish this court’s holding in Chastain v. Smith, 243 Ga. 262 (253 SE2d 560) (1979), a case on which appellant relies heavily. In that case, the maternal grandmother filed in juvenile court an action to terminate the father’s parental rights. The father was served by publication. Following that service, the trial court entered an ex parte order giving temporary custody to the grandmother. The father then filed a habeas action against the grandmother. The habeas court held that habeas relief was not available because the grandmother was holding the child pursuant to an unchallenged, valid juvenile court order. This court affirmed, holding:
Where the petition in the juvenile court alleges deprivation of the child and if the service of summons is made by publication, the Juvenile Court is authorized to enter an interlocutory order of disposition. [OCGA § 15-11-29.] Any challenge to the service or to the temporary order must be made by the appellant in the juvenile court where the proceedings are still pending.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. By its very holding, Chastain was limited by this court to situations involving the special statutory proceeding available when a party is served by publication.1 The case at bar is not controlled by that limited holding. Rather, the superior court entertaining the habeas petition filed by appellee had jurisdiction to grant the writ despite the juvenile court’s earlier entry of an order *465awarding interim temporary custody to appellant/mother because the mandatory hearing on the deprivation petition had not been held. See Chaffins v. Lowndes County DFCS, 243 Ga. 528 (255 SE2d 360) (1979). Since the juvenile court order on which appellant relies was not issued after notice and a hearing, it was not an order that prevented the habeas court from granting relief. Compare West v. Cobb County DFCS, 243 Ga. 425 (254 SE2d 373) (1979).
Decided October 25, 1993.
Kirbo & McCalley, William C. McCalley, Jon V. Forehand, for appellant.
Rodney L. Allen, for appellee.
Instead of giving appellate review of the juvenile court’s action where no such review has been sought, I would affirm the action of the habeas court by holding that the order issued by the juvenile court did not divest the habeas court of jurisdiction to grant the writ.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this special concurrence.

 OCGA § 15-11-29 (a) provides, in such cases, for the entry of an “interlocutory order of disposition.” OCGA § 15-11-29 (b) provides that the findings of fact and order of disposition “shall have only interlocutory effect pending final hearing on the petition.” The party served by publication is given another chance to appear — at the “final hearing” on the petition.