Court Opinion

ID: 9750621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:12:21.285505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:14.631256
License: Public Domain

BELL, C.J.,
concurring, in which GREENE and CATHELL, JJ., join.
We granted the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner, Mohammad Abdul-Maleek, Abdul-Maleek v. State, 420 Md. 463, 23 A.3d 895 (2011), to decide whether, in referencing, at sentencing, the fact that the petitioner exercised his de novo appeal right, and subsequently increasing the sentence imposed by the District Court, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County violated Maryland Code (1957, 2006 Repl.Vol., 2011 Supp.) § 12-702(c) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.1 In the State’s answer to the Petition, it noted the *75petitioner’s failure to object to the court’s comments or the sentence itself and challenged the petitioner’s right to direct appellate review of his sentence.
Exercising our discretion, under Maryland Rule 8-131(a), to consider unpreserved issues,2 we rejected the State’s challenge *76and reached the merits of the issues presented. On the merits, we hold that the court erred and, accordingly, that the petitioner must be resentenced. We reason that “the court’s explicit reference to Petitioner’s exercise of his de novo appeal right could ‘lead a reasonable person to infer that [the court] might have been motivated’ by an impermissible consideration.” Abdul-Maleek v. State, Op. at 74, 43 A.3d at 391 (quoting Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 207, 772 A.2d 273, 281 (2001) (emphasis added)). Indeed, the Court expressly states, in that regard, that, upon review of the record, it does not believe “that the sentencing court actually considered the fact of Petitioner’s exercise of his right to a de novo appeal and imposed a more severe sentence as punishment for having done so.” Abdul-Maleek, Op. at 73, 43 A.3d at 391 (emphasis in original).
I agree with the result reached in this case and, therefore, join the judgment. The petitioner is, as the Court concludes, entitled to appellate review of his sentence and he is entitled to a resentencing. I do not agree with the rationale given by the Court for either conclusion. I write separately to explicate my reasons for believing that this case is correctly decided.
The petitioner’s objection to the court’s sentencing decision was, I believe, preserved. Accordingly, there was, and is, no need for the Court to exercise its discretion to reach the issue.
The purpose of the preservation rule, requiring an objection to preserve a matter for appellate review, is to guard against “sandbagging” the judge. See In Re Kaleb K, 390 Md. 502, 513, 889 A.2d 1019, 1025 (2006); Brice v. State, 254 Md. 655, 661, 255 A.2d 28, 31 (1969); Banks v. State, 203 Md. 488, 495, 102 A.2d 267, 271 (1954). There is no “sandbagging” here. *77See also Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985) (“When [a] trial court has allegedly imposed a sentence not permitted by law, the issue should ordinarily be reviewed on direct appeal even if no objection was made in the trial court.”). As judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it correctly, Thornton v. State, 397 Md. 704, 736, 919 A.2d 678, 697 (2007), the petitioner well could have assumed, and most probably, did assume, that the trial judge was saying what he meant and meant what he was saying. The question was ripe for appellate review when the trial judge stated his sentencing rationale. An objection at that point is, and in this case, would have been, an useless gesture. It also should be acknowledged that interposing an objection at this point, rather than having an ameliorating effect, could ensure that such violations of right are shielded from redress. If, for example, having been made aware of the petitioner’s specific concerns, the trial judge simply denied that he was using an improper consideration, the right to redress would be the victim; the petitioner’s right to redress will not be able to be vindicated.
The court’s reference to the petitioner’s exercise of his right to de novo appeal, clearly expressed displeasure with that decision and conveyed the assumption, not simply the implication, that it was just another way of further harassing the victim. It would be unreasonable to expect any defendant, already at an apparent disadvantage and aware of the court’s evident, if not explicit disapproval, under these circumstances, to lodge an objection, which has to, in effect, accuse the judge of acting inappropriately, the basis of which are the very same disapproval statements. Such an objection could antagonize the court and make it even more displeased, thus, subjecting the defendant to yet another, perhaps greater, risk. This is especially the case when the court’s critical remarks follow the State’s demand for a greater sentence and immediately precede the imposition of the increased sentence. This, it strikes me, is an equally important reason why this Court is not precluded from reviewing the merits of the petitioner’s appeal.
*78On the merits, I do not believe that this is a close case and I certainly do not believe that it is an “appearance” case. It is clear to me that the sentence imposed not only gave the appearance of being, but was, in fact, based on the petitioner’s exercise of his appeal right, which under the circumstances was an impermissible sentencing consideration. Indeed, it is my position that there was no conclusion that could be drawn from the trial judge’s remarks referencing the petitioner’s exercise of his right to appeal other than that the fact that the petitioner exercised his right to a de novo appeal was the basis for the enhanced sentence that the trial court imposed. The circumstances of the case bear this out.
After being tried in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County, of extortion, pursuant to Maryland Code (2002, 2010 Supp.), § 3-701(b) of the Criminal Law Article3 (“CR”), and theft, CR § 7-104(g)(2),4 and convicted only of the latter, receiving a period of incarceration, a suspended sentence, probation, a fine and being required to pay restitution, the petitioner exercised his right to de novo appeal and elected a jury trial in the Circuit Court. Following his conviction, the State, at sentencing, argued for incarceration, asserting that the nature of the petitioner’s actions, “tak[ing] *79advantage of someone under these circumstances,” warranted “executed incarceration,” greater than that imposed by the District Court. During the presentation of its argument and, in context, in support of its incarceration request, the State mentioned the petitioner’s de novo appeal:
“It’s in light of that, Your Honor, the State is asking for executed incarceration. To give you an idea, [the District Court Judge], gave the defendant 18 months, suspend all but 60 days. That’s neither here nor there. It’s a de novo appeal. I would ask for more than that, Your Honor. The defendant had the opportunity to sort of let that lie, take responsibility for his actions. He did not do that. I would ask the Court for an executed incarceration above and beyond the 60 days. How far above and beyond, I will leave in the Court’s sound judgment. Thank you.”
In imposing a sentence greater than that imposed by the District Court, the court also referenced the petitioner’s exercise of his appeal right:
“You have every right to go to trial in this case, which you did — not once, but twice. Ms. Monroy was victimized, and then she had to come back and testify in the Circuit Court, and she had to do that because you have every right to have all of those opportunities to put forth your position. I am at a total loss.”
(Emphasis added). It did so after expressing consternation at how the petitioner treated the victim, lamenting the lack of an explanation for his behavior and noting that the jury had little trouble, taking only five minutes to do so, sorting out what happened between the victim and the petitioner. A sentence was imposed immediately after the de novo appeal comments.
The crux of the petitioner’s arguments is that the sentencing court penalized him for having exercised his right to a de novo appeal. This is demonstrated, he submits, by the court’s reference to that fact during sentencing, and its increase of his sentence of executed incarceration by 400 percent. In this regard, the petitioner argues that the court’s comments did more than simply give “an appearance of bias” since, although *80it is not possible to discern, with certainty, the weight the court gave to the fact that the petitioner exercised his right to a de novo appeal, the very fact that the court referred to the petitioner’s exercise of this right twice, and the immediate proximity of these comments to the announcement of the petitioner’s sentence, demonstrate that it, at least, played a part in the Circuit Court’s ultimate sentence.
In response, the State asserts that it can not be said, based on a review of the record as a whole, that the Circuit Court impermissibly imposed a more severe sentence on those grounds. The circumstances surrounding the crime counsel otherwise, it submits. The State also notes that, pursuant to CJ § 12-702(c), a circuit court may impose an increased sentence after a de novo appeal. The state emphasizes that there is no constitutionally based presumption of vindictiveness in such a context.
While it is true that “a trial judge has ‘very broad discretion in sentencing,’ ” Jones v. State, 414 Md. 686, 693, 997 A.2d 131, 134-35 (2010) (quoting Jackson, 364 Md. at 199, 772 A.2d at 277), the judge must “ ‘fashion a sentence based upon the facts and circumstances of the crime committed and the background of the defendant, including his or her reputation, prior offenses, health, habits, mental and moral propensities, and social background.’ ” Jackson, 364 Md. at 200, 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 532, 671 A.2d 501, 505 (1996)). This Court may review such a sentence on three grounds: “(1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated by ill-will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and (3) whether the sentence is within statutory limits.” Jackson, 364 Md. at 200, 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 516, 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The petitioner’s contentions, as the Court correctly notes, Abdul-Maleek, Op. at 71-72, 43 A.3d at 390, fall under the second basis for review. Applying these principles to the facts *81of the case sub judice, I, like the petitioner, believe there is sufficient basis for this Court to conclude that the Circuit Court, in fact, actually, and impermissibly, based its decision of increased incarceration on the petitioner’s decision to exercise his right to appeal.
I do not disagree with the majority, that “the Circuit Court considered several permissible factors, including the facts and circumstances of the crime, Petitioner’s previous criminal record, and Petitioner’s family background.” Abdulr-Maleek, Op. at 73, 43 A.3d at 391. Indeed, had the sentencing judge simply ended his commentary after chastising the petitioner for his conduct, it is quite likely that this issue would not be here. Not satisfied with expressing consternation with respect to the petitioner’s conduct and finding it to be inexplicable, he went further, explicitly mentioning and, in so doing, I submit, faulting, the petitioner’s exercise of his de novo appeal right:
“You have every right to go to trial in this case, which you did — not once, but twice. Ms. Monroy was victimized, and then she had to come back and testify in the District Court; then she had to come back again and testify in the Circuit Court, and she had to do that because you have every right to have all of those opportunities to put forth your position.”
Viewing the court’s remarks in their entirety and in context, it is hard to imagine that it was not, at the very least, a basis for the Circuit Court’s sentencing decision. Indeed, read in the context of the entire sentencing proceeding, it is readily apparent from these statements that the sentencing court not only considered the fact of the petitioner’s exercise of his right to a de novo appeal, it used that fact to support the imposition of a more severe sentence as punishment. As a matter of fact, there is no other explanation for the references. There simply was no reason for the court to mention the petitioner’s exercise of appeal rights if it played no part in its sentencing analysis and imposition.
Even without the explicit references, it is hard to make a case that the court’s sentencing decision did not take account *82of, and factor in, the petitioner’s exercise of his appeal rights. It is one thing, and justifiable, to focus on, and take account of a victim’s treatment at the hands of her victimizer; it is quite another, and not justifiable, when that treatment is expanded to include post arrest activities of the then defendant, that are guaranteed and, thus, protected by law. In other words, I submit that it was enough to trigger “impermissible considerations” concerns when the court commented on the victim’s being forced to testify more than once when the only reason for that need was an action by the defendant that was authorized by law.
To be sure, judges are presumed to know the law and apply it correctly, Medley v. State, 386 Md. 3, 7, 870 A.2d 1218, 1220 (2005). That presumption does not, and should not trump a petitioner’s entitlement to resentencing if it even appears that the court’s comments “could cause a reasonable person to question the impartiality of the judge.” Jackson, 364 Md. at 207, 772 A.2d at 281-82. A defendant’s right to a fair trial should be afforded its due weight, and in those cases where there exists some ambiguity about a judge’s impartiality, we are, as the majority recognizes, bound to resolve any such doubt in the petitioner’s favor. Abdul-Maleek, Op. at 74, 43 A.3d at 391. Here, I do not believe that there exists any ambiguity as to the court’s statements. The comments made by the court in the case sub judice do more than raise a question as to the judge’s impartiality; they demonstrate that conclusively there is one and that it has substance.
Judges GREENE and CATHELL have authorized me to state that they join in this concurring opinion.

. The petitioner initially framed the issue as two separate questions:
I. Whether the circuit court violated Section 12-702(c) of the Maryland Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article when it in*75creased the defendant’s sentence based on the fact that he exercised his right to appeal and receive a de novo jury trial.
II. Whether the circuit court violated the defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 24 of Maryland Declaration of Rights as set forth in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) and Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972).
(Footnote omitted). The focus of both questions was the court’s reference to the petitioner’s exercise of one of his rights and its effect on the sentence it imposed. In his reply brief, the petitioner stated the argument more directly; he argues that the Circuit Court based its sentence on the impermissible consideration of the petitioner’s exercise of his de novo appeal right.

. The Court reasons:
“Despite the applicability of general preservation principles ... we are not precluded absolutely from reviewing Petitioner's claim. We have explained time and again that Rule 8-131(a) grants an appellate court discretion, nevertheless, to consider issues deemed to have been waived for failure to make a contemporaneous objection. See Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138, 148, 982 A.2d 348, 354 (2009) (plurality opinion) ("[A]n appellate court's review of arguments not raised at the trial level is discretionary, not mandatory. The use of the word 'ordinarily' clearly contemplates both those circumstances in which an appellate court will not review issues if they were not previously raised and those circumstances in which it will.” (quoting State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 188, 638 A.2d 107, 113 (1994)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). This discretion, however, should be exercised with caution. Chaney, 397 Md. at 468, 918 A.2d at 511. In deciding whether to review an issue that has been waived, we should "[fjirst ... consider whether the exercise of ... discretion will work unfair prejudice to either of the parties.... Second, the appellate court should consider whether the exercise of its discretion will promote the orderly administration of justice.” Bible, 411 Md. at 151-52, 982 A.2d at 356 (quoting Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 714-15, 843 A.2d 778, 784 (2004)) (final alteration in original).
“In the matter sub judice we see no prejudice to either party should we consider this issue. There is, of course, no prejudice to Petitioner, as he has sought and been granted review of his claim of error. See Bible, 411 Md. at 152, 982 A.2d at 356. And, there is only de minimis prejudice to the State, as our review would not broach the underlying judgment of conviction but rather would be confined to resentencing, *76at which the same sentence could be imposed, based on proper considerations. Moreover, by addressing the issue presented, we are able to comment on the sentencing issue in the context of de novo appeals and thereby promote the "orderly administration of justice.” See id., 982 A.2d at 356. We therefore choose to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of Petitioner's claim.”
Abdul-Maleek, Op. at 69-70, 43 A.3d at 389.

. § 3-701(b) of the Criminal Law Article provides:
"(b) Obtaining or attempting to obtain property prohibited.- — -A person may not obtain, attempt to obtain, or conspire to obtain money, property, labor, services, or anything of value from another person with the person's consent, if the consent is induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened:
"(1) force or violence;
"(2) economic injury; or
"(3) destruction, concealment, removal, confiscation, or possession of any immigration or government identification document with intent to harm the immigration status of another person.”

. 7-104(g)(2) of the Criminal Law Article provides:
"(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection, a person convicted of theft of property or services with a value of less than $1,000, is guilty of a misdemeanor and:
"(i) is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 18 months or a fine not exceeding $500 or both; and
"(ii) shall restore the property taken to the owner or pay the owner the value of the property or services.