Court Opinion

ID: 9561739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:14:55.260866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:19.386760
License: Public Domain

RUFFIN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent and disagree with the judgment and the majority’s reasoning in Division 2. OCGA § 24-9-61 provides: “[I]n all cases either party shall have the right to have the witnesses of the other party examined out of the hearing of each other. The court shall take proper care to effect this object as far as practicable and convenient, but no mere irregularity shall exclude a witness.” This Court has long recognized several exceptions to the right of sequestration, including the right of the chief investigating officer to remain and assist in the orderly presentation of the State’s case. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 671, 673 (5) (431 SE2d 450) (1993). However, under the rule of sequestration, “[t]he burden of showing an exception (where the witness is needed to advise the district attorney, or where the absence of an official witness would impair the efficiency of the court) is on the [S]tate. [Cit.]” James v. State, 143 Ga. App. 696 *882(2) (240 SE2d 149) (1977). If the State fails to meet this burden, the trial court abuses its discretion in permitting a witness to remain in the courtroom throughout the testimony. Montos v. State, 212 Ga. 764, 765 (3) (95 SE2d 792) (1956) (the State made no contention that it needed the officers’ assistance in the conduct of the case, nor was ■any reason given other than'that they were officers, thus harmful error resulted); compare Wilson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 174, 176 (7) (279 SE2d 345) (1981) (prosecutor stated his need for the services of the witness during trial, thus no abuse of discretion).
In the present case, Mitchell’s counsel asked that all witnesses, specifically investigating officer James Perry, be sequestered. Mitchell argued that Perry was not the true case agent and, therefore, could not assist the prosecutor. While it is apparent from the colloquy that Perry had remained in the courtroom during Mitchell’s first trial, we do not know the reasons for this exercise of the court’s discretion, and that issue is not before us. What is before us is Mitchell’s request for sequestration in the present case, and the court’s denial of this request as it applied to Perry because “[i]n view of the fact that everybody’s testimony is basically fixed at this point because they have already testified under oath at the prior trial, I think I will deny your request and not interfere with the State’s decision about how to orderly present their case.” Significantly, the State, through the district attorney, did not speak during the entire exchange.
It follows that I cannot conclude that the State met its burden to show an exception. There is nothing in the record before us to support any contention that Perry was needed to assist the State in its presentation of the case. Not only is the colloquy insufficient to support this contention, but I do not believe the colloquy is sufficient absent an affirmative contention by the State that an individual is necessary to assist the prosecutor in the case. Accordingly, I believe the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Perry to remain in the courtroom.
Likewise, I cannot agree that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in permitting Perry to testify multiple times after the first witness testified. While it is clear a trial court has discretion in such matters, this discretion must be based upon a showing by the State of some need not to call the unsequestered witness first. Croom v. State, 165 Ga. App. 676 (2) (302 SE2d 598) (1983); Stuart v. State, 123 Ga. App. 311, 312 (1) (180 SE2d 581) (1971). Failure to present the unsequestered witness first or to offer a sufficient reason for not doing so constitutes an abuse of discretion. James, supra at 697 (2); Stuart, supra at 313. “The state here showed no reason why [Perry] should not have been called to testify first, . . . and it was an abuse of discretion for the court to permit this sequence of testimony without such a showing.” (Emphasis in original.) Whitfield v. State, 143 *883Ga. App. 779, 780 (240 SE2d 189) (1977).
Decided September 5, 1996
Reconsideration denied September 25, 1996.
Word & Mitchell, Gerald P Word, for appellant.
Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Jeffery W. Hunt, Kevin W. Drummond, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
The two cases cited by the majority in support of its position, Johnson v. State, 198 Ga. App. 316 (4) (401 SE2d 331) (1991), and Dunbar v. State, 209 Ga. App. 97 (1) (432 SE2d 829) (1993), contain insufficient facts to determine whether the State offered a sufficient reason for not sequestering the witness or for recalling the unsequestered witness, but I would assume that both cases applied the correct law and required the State to prove these exceptions.
While the State correctly argues that a violation of the rule of sequestration “goes to the credibility rather than the admissibility of [Perry’s] testimony,”1 this case does not involve a violation of the rule. Rather, it involves an abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to implement the rule to include Perry. An error which possesses the power of harm portends the promise of correction. Since the trial court’s error deprived Mitchell of a substantive right, a new trial should be granted. See, e.g., Massey v. State, 220 Ga. 883, 891 (5) (142 SE2d 832) (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U. S. 36 (87 SC 241,17 LE2d 36) (1966); Poultryland v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549, 561 (2) (37 SE2d 785) (1946).
I concur in the court’s judgment in all other respects.
I am authorized to state that Judge Blackburn joins in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.

 Johnson v. State, 258 Ga. 856, 857-858 (376 SE2d 356) (1989). See also Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 347 (10) (276 SE2d 224) (1981); Nelson, supra at 673. In Jordan, the Supreme Court held as follows: “In the interest of clarity and uniformity, in conformity with the trend toward witness competency, and in view of the constitutional rights of a defendant to call witnesses in his or her defense, we hold that a witness who has violated the rule of sequestration in a criminal case shall not be prevented from testifying. [Cits.]” Jordan, supra at 347. “A party’s remedy for a violation of the rule is to request the trial court to charge the jury that the violation should be considered in determining the weight and credit to be given the testimony of the witness. [Cit.]” Johnson, 258 Ga. at 857-858.