Court Opinion

ID: 9688909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:11:51.270534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:25.571256
License: Public Domain

Stephan, J.,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the paternity, custody, visitation, and child support claims in this action are not time barred, and I concur in the affirmance as to those issues. I also agree with the majority that Karen cannot be considered a “putative spouse” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-378 (Reissue 1998) because her marriage to James was never void. If I could reach the merits of the constructive trust claim, I would agree with the majority and the *964district court that it is supported by the evidence. I cannot reach the merits, however, because in my opinion, the constructive trust claim is barred by the 4-year limitations period prescribed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 (Reissue 1995).
While this case involves highly unusual facts, it must nevertheless be considered and adjudged by applying the basic rules of pleading and proof which we apply in all civil actions. The issues in a case are framed by the pleadings. City State Bank v. Holstine, 260 Neb. 578, 618 N.W.2d 704 (2000). Nebraska law defines pleadings as the written statements by the parties of the facts constituting their respective claims and defenses. Sydow v. City of Grand Island, ante p. 389, 639 N.W.2d 913 (2002); Christianson v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16, 243 Neb. 553, 501 N.W.2d 281 (1993). The purpose of pleadings is to frame the issues upon which a cause is to be tried, and the issues in a given case will be limited to those which are pled. V.C. v. Casady, 262 Neb. 714, 634 N.W.2d 798 (2001); Alegent Health Bergan Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Haworth, 260 Neb. 63, 615 N.W.2d 460 (2000).
In her petition, Karen alleged that James concealed the fact of their 1980 divorce and that because of the trust she placed in him, she did not discover the truth concerning the divorce until the fall of 1994. Her right to maintain an action for recovery based upon a constructive trust theory accmed at the time of this discovery, but her petition was not filed until August 13,1999, well outside the 4-year limitations period. A petition which makes apparent on its face that the cause of action it asserts is ostensibly barred by the statute of limitations fails to state a cause of action and is demurrable unless the petition alleges some excuse which tolls the operation and bar of the statute. Tilt-Up Concrete v. Star City/Federal, 261 Neb. 64, 621 N.W.2d 502 (2001); Giese v. Stice, 252 Neb. 913, 567 N.W.2d 156 (1997); Vanice v. Oehm, 247 Neb. 298, 526 N.W.2d 648 (1995). Karen’s petition alleged no specific reason why she was prevented or legally excused from filing her petition within 4 years after discovering that she and James were divorced. Therefore, in my opinion, James’ demurrer to the petition should have been sustained.
When the demurrer was overruled, James filed an answer alleging that all of Karen’s claims were barred by the statute of *965limitations. The record does not reflect that Karen filed a reply denying this allegation or alleging any factual basis or theory upon which the running of the limitations period would be tolled. At trial, Karen admitted that she became aware of the divorce in the fall of 1994 when she consulted a lawyer who determined from court records that the decree had been entered in 1980. Karen was not asked, and she did not testify, why she waited until August 1999 to initiate this action.
In concluding that James was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense, the district court and the majority focus on the fact that after Karen learned of the divorce, James told her that public disclosure of that fact would cause problems with the Internal Revenue Service and his employer. While the record reflects that these statements were made, there is no evidence to suggest that they influenced Karen’s decision to forgo filing this lawsuit in a timely manner. Karen testified unequivocally that upon learning of the divorce in 1994, she distrusted and disliked her former spouse, and that beginning in the fall of 1994, she asked him on several occasions to move out of the family home, which he eventually did in 1998. After learning of the divorce, Karen declined James’ offers of remarriage because, in her words, “I didn’t trust him, I didn’t — I mean after that, you just don’t believe anything he’s ever going to say.” She admitted that she was at all times free to speak with a lawyer and in fact did obtain legal advice concerning the status of her marriage after James first mentioned the divorce in 1994. She also discussed the divorce with her sister and a personal friend in 1994. At trial, Karen was not asked why she waited more than 4 years after learning of the divorce to initiate this action, and she offered no testimony which could fairly be interpreted as an explanation or justification for the delay. On appeal, Karen did not argue equitable estoppel as a basis for tolling the limitations period, but, rather, contended that “a putative spouse is not subject to any statute of limitations.” Brief for appellee at 20.
Based upon my reading of the record, the issue of whether James was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense to the claim for distribution of property under a constructive trust theory was neither framed by the pleadings *966nor resolved in Karen’s favor by the evidence adduced at trial. Because it is undisputed that the claim was filed outside the limitations period and no grounds for tolling were alleged or proved, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the award of personal property to Karen. I recognize that this result runs contrary to how many might view the equities of this case, but for the reasons stated, I believe it is nevertheless required by the law.