Court Opinion

ID: 9391586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 18:00:33.852251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:40.969307
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60074     Document: 00516734333         Page: 1     Date Filed: 05/02/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                  FILED
                                                                           May 2, 2023
                                 No. 22-60074                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                  Clerk

   Jose Rangel Perez,

                                                                       Petitioner,

                                       versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                     Respondent.
                  ______________________________

                     Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A098 355 522
                  ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Ho, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
          Jose Rangel Perez has been ordered removed from the United States
   to Mexico. Perez concedes that he is removable but seeks cancellation of
   removal based on the hardship his removal would cause his family. An
   Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Perez’s
   application for cancellation, and Perez now petitions this court for review.
          Perez’s challenge is twofold. First, he contends that the IJ and the
   BIA failed to use the proper legal standard to assess his eligibility for
   discretionary relief. Second, he argues that the BIA erred by failing to
Case: 22-60074      Document: 00516734333              Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/02/2023

                                     No. 22-60074

   remand his case to the IJ for consideration of new evidence as well as a
   potential grant of voluntary departure. Binding circuit precedent requires us
   to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
                                           I
          Jose Rangel Perez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United
   States on an unknown date. In 2011 he was charged with removability under
   8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being an alien present in the United States
   without having been admitted or paroled by an immigration officer. He
   conceded removability as charged.
          Perez then filed an application for cancellation of removal based on
   the hardship his removal would cause his wife and three minor daughters, all
   of whom are United States citizens.                   He submitted supporting
   documentation, including medical records relating to his own health and that
   of his youngest daughter, who suffers from asthma. The IJ held a hearing on
   his application, at which Perez and his wife provided the sole testimony.
          The IJ did not take issue with Perez’s characterization of the hardship
   his family would face upon his removal. To the contrary, the IJ found Perez
   and his wife credible and accepted their description of the facts. The IJ
   nevertheless denied Perez’s application, concluding that “the hardship to
   [Perez’s] qualifying relatives does not satisfy the high standard of hardship
   required.”
          Perez appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ applied the wrong legal
   standard in evaluating whether the facts presented amounted to undue
   hardship. He also presented newly available evidence that his wife was
   pregnant with their fourth child and that his middle daughter was being
   treated for ADHD, evaluated for speech deficiencies, and placed in special
   education classes.

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          The BIA dismissed the appeal after adopting and affirming the IJ’s
   decision. With respect to Perez’s new evidence, the BIA concluded that a
   remand was not warranted because the new evidence would not change the
   result in the case.
          Perez timely petitioned for review. He maintains that the IJ and BIA
   used the wrong legal standard to determine his eligibility for cancellation of
   removal under the hardship statute, at times characterizing this failure as a
   violation of his due process rights. He also argues that the BIA erred by
   failing to remand to the IJ for consideration of new evidence and a potential
   grant of voluntary departure.
                                         II
          We begin, as we always must, with jurisdiction. We also end there.
   Binding circuit precedent compels us to conclude that we lack jurisdiction to
   review the BIA’s hardship determination.
          To explain why, we must first explain how the hardship statute
   operates. The hardship statute grants the Attorney General discretion to
   “cancel removal of” individuals who meet certain criteria.           8 U.S.C.
   § 1229b(b)(1). The central, eponymous criterion is “that removal would
   result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse,
   parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
   admitted for permanent residence.” Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
          The hardship statute thus sets forth a two-step process. The IJ and
   BIA, acting under the delegated authority of the Attorney General, must first
   determine which applicants are eligible for cancellation. Then, if an applicant
   is deemed eligible, they must decide whether to grant cancellation. “Even if
   an alien satisfies the conditions to qualify for relief, the Attorney General
   retains discretion to grant or deny the application.” Mireles-Valdez v.

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   Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sad v. INS, 246 F.3d 811,
   819 (6th Cir. 2001)).
          In coordination with this two-step process, Congress instituted a
   scheme of limited judicial review. A separate statute states that “no court
   shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of
   relief under section . . . 1229b.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
          This language is notably broad. “Here, ‘any’ means that the provision
   applies to judgments ‘of whatever kind’ under [§ 1229b(b)(1)], not just
   discretionary judgments or the last-in-time judgment.” Patel v. Garland, 142
   S. Ct. 1614, 1622 (2022) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5
   (1997). “Similarly, the use of ‘regarding’ ‘in a legal context generally has a
   broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its
   subject but also matters relating to that subject.’” Id. (quoting Lamar, Archer
   & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1760 (2018))
          But Congress did not entirely strip this court of jurisdiction. To the
   contrary, § 1252(a)(2)(B) is subject to a significant carveout preserving
   judicial review of “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C.
   § 1252(a)(2)(D).
          In Patel, the Supreme Court explicated the interplay between the
   jurisdiction-stripping provision of § 1252(a)(2)(B) and the carveout of
   § 1252(a)(2)(D), ultimately concluding that the net of these two statutes is to
   strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over factual findings relevant to the
   hardship determination. The Court explained that “if Congress made”
   constitutional claims and questions of law “an exception” to its jurisdiction-
   stripping provision, “it must have left something within the rule”—i.e., the
   federal circuits must have been stripped of jurisdiction over some aspect of
   the judgments relevant to the granting of relief under § 1229b. Id. at 1623.
   That “major remaining category is questions of fact.” Id. Therefore, the

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   Supreme Court concluded, “[f]ederal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts
   found as part of” these decisions. Id. at 1627.
           Our circuit has understood Patel to categorically foreclose review of
   hardship determinations. Castillo-Gutierrez v. Garland, 43 F.4th 477, 481
   (5th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he BIA’s determination that a citizen would face
   exceptional and extremely unusual hardship is an authoritative decision
   which falls within the scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and is beyond our
   review.”). It follows that we also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
   decision not to remand to the IJ to consider new evidence. “[W]here a final
   order of removal is shielded from judicial review . . . so, too, is the BIA’s
   refusal to reopen that order.” Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 474 (5th Cir.
   2004) (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted).
           But even if we were to read Patel as some other circuits have, 1 and
   assuming arguendo that there were no other jurisdictional problem with

           _____________________
           1
              See Alzaben v. Garland, ---F.4th---, No. 22-1561, 2023 WL 2945069 *3 (1st Cir.
   April 14, 2023) (“[U]nlike the factual findings at issue in Patel—which pertained to the IJ’s
   assessment of the petitioner’s credibility and whether the petitioner had subjectively
   intended to misrepresent his immigration status—the determination of whether a marriage
   was made in good faith requires applying a statutory standard to evidence.” (internal
   citation omitted)); Cortez-Amador v. Attorney General, ---F.4th---, No. 22-1249, 2023 WL
   3067041 *4 (3d Cir. April 25, 2023) (“We lack jurisdiction to review factual findings on an
   adjustment application [citing Patel]. Thus, the narrow question within our jurisdiction is
   whether the agency made an error of law or Petitioner makes a constitutional claim.”);
   Hernandez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 762, 767–8 (6th Cir. 2023) (stating that after Patel “we have
   jurisdiction over any purely legal question” such as whether “the Board improperly
   interpreted the phrase ‘good moral character’ to allow consideration of an immigrant’s
   ‘expunged’ prior convictions.”); Cruz-Velasco v. Garland, 58 F.4th 900, 903 (7th Cir.
   2023) (“The Patel Court explicitly clarified that it was dealing only with ‘judicial review of
   factfinding,’ not the application of a legal standard to undisputed facts under section
   1252(a)(2)(D).”); Garcia-Pascual v. Garland, 62 F.4th 1096, 1101 (8th Cir. 2023) (“In
   summary, ‘Patel makes clear that the [Board’s] determination that a citizen would face
   exceptional and extremely unusual hardship is an authoritative decision which . . . is beyond
   our review.’ Nevertheless, ‘a petitioner can raise a question of law . . . in two ways: (1) by

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                                           No. 22-60074

   Perez’s petition, 2 Perez’s arguments would fail on the merits. Contrary to
   Perez’s assertions, the IJ and BIA thoroughly considered each of Perez’s
   hardship arguments and applied the appropriate legal standard. The BIA also
   considered the new evidence presented by Perez but concluded that this
   evidence was unlikely to change the IJ’s decision. The record supports the
   conclusion that Perez failed to show that the consequences of his removal are
   “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a
   close family member leaves his country.” Juarez v. Garland, No. 22-60904,
   2022 WL 3282228 *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 11, 2022) (quoting Trejo v. Garland, 3
   F.4th 760, 775 (5th Cir. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Castillo-Gutierrez,
   43 F.4th at 481). See also Aguirre-Cano v. Garland, No. 21-60468, 2022 WL
   2208396 *1 (5th Cir. June 21, 2022).
           That leaves Perez’s argument that the BIA should have remanded his
   case to the IJ for a possible grant of voluntary departure. Perez did not
   present this argument to the BIA, and a petitioner “must fairly present an
   issue to the BIA to satisfy § 1252(d)’s exhaustion requirement.” Omari v.
   Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 321 (5th Cir. 2009).
           We DISMISS the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.

           _____________________
   advancing a statutory-construction argument, or (2) by disputing the application of a legal
   standard to undisputed or established facts.’” (internal citations omitted)); Flores-Alonso
   v. Attorney General, 36 F.4th 1095, 1100 (11th Cir. 2022) (noting Patel and stating that
   “[b]ecause we cannot disturb . . . factual finding[s], we are left to see if Flores-Alonso has
   identified any legal error with respect to the application of the law to those facts established
   in the BIA’s decision.”).
           2
              Cf. Martinez-Guevara v. Garland, 27 F.4th 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2022) (stating that
   claims that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review, breached a procedural
   requirement, and violated due process protections must be exhausted in a motion to
   reconsider before the BIA); Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 82 (2022) (granting
   certiorari to consider this issue).

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