Court Opinion

ID: 9640841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:16:41.622085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:52.458964
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Joslin,
with whom Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua, joins, dissenting. By his own admission, Folcarelli neglected a legal matter that was entrusted to him. He is punished by the majority, however, not only for that neglect, but also because he refused to divulge to us, as he had refused to divulge to the Disciplinary Board, the identity of the attorney to whom he had referred the matter.
In disciplinary proceedings an attorney is entitled to procedural due process. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1968). Thus, at the very least, he should receive reasonable notice of the charge against him and an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 22 L. Ed. 205 (1873); see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948). Folcarelli did not receive such notice nor opportunity to be heard with respect to the charge of refusing to reveal the name of the second attorney. The punishment imposed by the majority is in part for that refusal.
The majority contends that Folcarelli may be punished for a disciplinary violation despite his lack of notice of the charge. To support that proposition, they rely on the United States Supreme Court case of Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 *675Wall.) 523, 19 L. Ed. 285 (1868), that was cited in In re Ruff alo. They conclude that notice and an opportunity to be heard are not required before disciplining an attorney for those “matters occurring in open court, in the presence of judges.”1 I disagree with the majority’s application of Randall to the circumstances here.
Clearly, courts have power to punish any disruptive or disrespectful conduct summarily and without notice of hearing when it occurs in open court in view of the judge. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275-76, 68 S. Ct. at 509, 92 L. Ed. at 695. In that kind of situation, immediate punishment is essential to prevent a public degradation of the court’s authority. In effect, the power there being exercised is derived from the power to punish for contempt.2 Except in a narrowly limited category of contempts, however, due process requirements may not be ignored. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275-76, 68 S. Ct. at 508-09, 92 L. Ed. at 695; State v. Costantino, 107 R.I. 215, 219, 266 A.2d 33, 35 (1970).
In this case, however, Folcarelli was not charged with contempt, nor did he disrupt the proceedings. Furthermore, *676the proceedings were in chambers rather than in open court, and the court’s authority was not in danger of being denigrated in the eyes of the public. Folcarelli was unaware that his refusal to divulge the name of his fellow attorney would provoke a stiffer sanction. Indeed, his first knowledge of that will come with the publication of this opinion.
Frank A. Carter, Jr., pro se, for petitioner.
Gerard P. Cobeligh, for respondent.
Despite Folcarelli’s adamant refusal to identify the forgetful attorney, we will never know what he would have done if charged with a violation of DR 1-103 for failing to comply with our request. It may well be that, had he known that a guilty finding on that charge would precipitate a more severe sanction than we have ever imposed on an attorney for missing a statute of limitations, he would have been dissuaded from persisting in this attitude that “I’m going to die with it [the identity of the attorney].” Fair play demands that he should have been given an opportunity to make that choice. Absent that opportunity he should be punished only for neglecting to comply with the statute of limitations and for that offense I would not vote for anything beyond a private censure.

 To the extent that a Randall exception does exist, it seems clear that, although notice to the errant attorney may not be required, a hearing is still mandatory. This was the position taken by Mr. Justice Field, the author of Randall, in the later case of Ex parte Robinson, where he said, speaking for the Court:
“There may be cases undoubtedly of such gross and outrageous conduct in open court on the part of the attorney, as to justify very summary proceedings for his suspension or removal from office; but even then he should be heard before he is condemned.” 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 513, 22 L.Ed. at 208.
The difficulty in describing a Randall situation was discussed in In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Society, 217 F.2d 190, 195 (Chambers, J., concurring) (1954):
“Most of the cases on ‘off the handle’ disbarment carefully recognize that there is an inherent power to disbar an attorney in a proper case, without notice or any other formality, but the cases neglect to describe a ‘proper case.’ Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 74 U.S. 523, 19 L. Ed. 285; In re Claiborne, 1 Cir., 119 F.2d 647. Venturing into the unknown, Isuggestthat if [an attorney] had come into court with six-guns at his side and with fingers on triggers demanded that a district judge sign an order, the district judge would have power then and there without formality to disbar [the attorney].”

 It is derived as well from the court’s inherent power to discipline attorneys.