Court Opinion

ID: 9586602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:13:14.915736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:44.868608
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
It should be noted, first of all, that the provision quoted from the policy includes a second sentence: “If a person insured is sued as the result of an auto accident [Allstate] must be notified immediately.” That is, there are two requirements for prompt notification.
1. By substituting the word “promptly” for the words “as soon as practicable” in the citation from Norfolk & Dedham &c. Ins. Co. v. Cumbaa, 128 Ga. App. 196, 198 (2) (196 SE2d 167) (1973), we are equating the two. Because “as soon as practicable” has been construed in that and other cases1 to allow for reasonable excuses and reasonable delays without penalizing the insured with non-coverage, these same factors are being carried into the concept of promptness. *409It is as though the condition precedent required that the insurer be promptly notified unless there is a reasonable excuse and notification within a reasonable time after knowledge of the accident and resulting injuries and damages. Strictly as written, the policy requires prompt notification after the accident happens, period, leaving no room for excuses for delay and excluding lack of knowledge of injuries and property damages as justification for lack of promptness.
Decided February 5, 1990.
Nall, Miller, Owens, Hocutt & Howard, Kelly D. Eulenfeld, for appellant.
Allen F. Harris, Fain, Major & Wiley, Charles A. Wiley, Jr., Arthur B. Seymour, Brian R. Neary, for appellees.
2. The underlying lawsuit for which coverage is sought is against only the driver Martin, who was an additional insured under the policy. It is undisputed that he knew of his collision with the bicycle at the time it occurred and that the child was injured. He told the car owner sometime thereafter. He received a traffic summons due to the collision. The case was dismissed not on the facts but because the witness did not appear. He gave no notice to the insurer whose contract with the car owner he now wishes to invoke the coverage of. The insurer was not notified of the collision until almost one year after-wards. It was not notified at all by Martin or the named insured.
No reason is given for the failure to comply with the policy requirements other than the owner’s judgment of triviality, so there is a question of fact with regard to whether the reasons were justified. Of course, “trustification for failure to give notice as soon as practicable, . . . may not include the insured’s conclusion ‘that he was free of fault and that there was no liability to the other party. That is the very issue which the company must have reasonable opportunity to investigate with promptness, and which requires a prompt notice of the occurrence.’ Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J. B. Forrest &c., Inc., 132 Ga. App. 714, 717 (209 SE2d 6).” Richmond v. Ga. Farm &c. Ins. Co., 140 Ga. App. 215, 220 (2) (231 SE2d 245) (1976).
Whether the terms of the policy have been complied with so that the additional insured Martin can elect coverage, has not been foreclosed as a matter of law. See, regarding additional insureds, Hicks v. Continental Ins. Co., 146 Ga. App. 124 (245 SE2d 482) (1978); Leventhal v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 159 Ga. App. 104, 105 (3) (283 SE2d 3) (1981).

 E.g., Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Clark, 148 Ga. App. 579, 582 (1) (251 SE2d 823) (1978); Richmond u. Ga. Farm &c. Ins. Co., 140 Ga. App. 215, 220 (2) (231 SE2d 245) (1976); Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Miller, 183 Ga. App. 261, 262 (358 SE2d 611) (1987).