Court Opinion

ID: 9752544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:14:01.876271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:17.321342
License: Public Domain

OPINION
CRUMLISH, Jr., President Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent to this Court’s previous majority disposition in Can*323on-McMillan I. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s instruction to decide the legal question of whether a wood lathe constitutes realty or personalty, the law of fixtures places chattels used in connection with real estate into three classes. Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 167 A. 321 (1933). This lathe, physically connected with the real estate but so affixed as to be removable, falls into the third class, which may be realty or personalty, “depending upon the intention of the parties....” Id., 312 Pa. at 437, 167 A. at 322. (emphasis added). Intent, or state of mind, though not easily susceptible of proof, must be inferred from the facts.
I remain convinced that the jury properly performed its fact-finding function in determining that the School District intended the lathe as a fixture. While the opposite conclusion might also be drawn from the underlying facts, such a reweighing of the evidence is not the function of an appellate court where the jury’s conclusion is not patently unreasonable.
DOYLE, J., joins in this dissent.