Court Opinion

ID: 9740069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:27:22.526949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:15.905561
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HALL, concurring in part and dissenting in part: The majority correctly recognize the general rule that, ordinarily, a party owes no duty of care to protect another from the harmful or criminal acts of third persons. In upholding the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint, they further recognize and address two exceptions to the general rule, i.e., (1) when the parties are in a special relationship and the harm is foreseeable, and (2) when any party voluntarily or contractually assumes a duty to protect another from the harmful acts of third parties. However, the majority’s analysis of count I fails to address the applicability of a third exception to the general rule, namely, when a principal fails to warn his agent of an unreasonable risk of harm involved in the agency. Petersen v. US. Reduction Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 775, 779, 641 N.E.2d 845 (1994); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 471 (1958). Based on section 471 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, a duty for a principal to issue a warning to an agent would arise only where the risk is (1) unreasonable, (2) involved in the employment, (3) foreseeable, and (4) the agent is not likely to become aware of it. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 471 at 405 (1958); see MacDonald v. Hinton, 361 Ill. App. 3d 378, 386, 836 N.E.2d 893 (2005). Therefore, if the plaintiff was an agent of the defendants and faced an unreasonable risk of harm, known to the defendants, but unknown to him, the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff to warn him of the danger. See Petersen, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 775. The allegations of the third-amended complaint establish the necessary elements for the application of the principal/agent exception to the general rule. As the majority acknowledge, the plaintiff was an agent of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that he acted as real estate agent for the defendants as well as provided legal advice in the Leikam Farm Joint Venture. Mr. Slavin blamed his loss in connection with that venture on the plaintiff and communicated to the defendants that he would harm the plaintiff. As to foreseeability, the risk of a criminal assault on an employee is foreseeable if the employer knew or should have known of facts evidencing a threat of harm particular to his employees but not common to all persons in the area. MacDonald, 361 Ill. App. 3d 386. Here, the threats communicated to the defendants by Mr. Slavin were directed specifically against the plaintiff. Finally, since Mr. Slavin was no longer involved in the investment, it was unlikely that the plaintiff would have become aware of Mr. Slavin’s threats on his own. I agree that count II failed to establish a voluntary undertaking. However, I conclude that count I of the third amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to establish the principal/agent exception to the general rule that there is no duty to defend against criminal attacks by third parties. I would reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of count I of the third-amended complaint and remand for further proceedings. Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part.