Court Opinion

ID: 9948099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 15:11:51.720545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:05.236196
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Borough of Pleasant Hills                      :
                                               :
                 v.                            :   No. 621 C.D. 2023
                                               :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                  :   Argued: February 6, 2024
Department of Transportation,                  :
                  Appellant                    :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                         FILED: March 6, 2024

               The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
(PennDOT) appeals from the May 23, 2023 judgment (Modified Verdict) entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) in favor of the Borough
of Pleasant Hills (Borough) and finding that PennDOT is responsible for the stability
of the slope of, and maintaining safe sight distances in an area located within the
Borough adjacent to, State Route 51 (SR 51) and Pleasant Hills Boulevard. The trial
court also granted the Borough’s request for damages as to its eminent domain de facto
taking claim and referred the matter to the Board of Viewers to assess this award. On
appeal, PennDOT challenges the trial court’s decision on multiple bases, including that
the court lacked jurisdiction over this matter where original jurisdiction was vested in
the Commonwealth Court, that its determination conflicted with provisions of the State
Highway Law,1 and that the trial court erred in finding that PennDOT’s actions resulted

      1
          Act of June 1, 1945, P.L. 1242, as amended, 36 P.S. §§ 670-101 to 670-1102.
in a de facto taking under the Eminent Domain Code (Code).2 Upon careful review,
we affirm.
                                      I.      Background
                On January 17, 2018, the Borough filed a Complaint against PennDOT in
the trial court seeking declaratory relief that it was responsible for the continued
maintenance and repair of the slope located at the intersection of SR 51 and Pleasant
Hills Boulevard and to restore the sight distance for vehicles traveling in that area.
PennDOT filed preliminary objections to the Complaint, arguing that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions brought against
the Commonwealth and that such actions are properly brought before this Court. The
trial court granted the Borough leave to file an Amended Complaint, which the
Borough filed in April of 2018, stating claims for negligence (Count I), eminent
domain/de facto taking under the Code (Count II), alteration of lateral support (Count
III), negligent alteration of lateral support (Count IV), trespass (Count V) and a request
for a declaratory judgment (Count VI). (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 064a-080a.)
PennDOT then filed preliminary objections again challenging the trial court’s
jurisdiction over this matter, which the court overruled on June 11, 2018.
                The trial court granted the Borough leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint to request appointment of a Board of Viewers pursuant to Section 502 of
the Code,3 which the Borough filed on June 29, 2018.                      The Second Amended
Complaint included the same counts as its previous filing and amended the eminent
domain/de facto taking claim at Count II to request the appointment of a Board of

       2
           26 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-1106.

       3
         Section 502(c)(1) of the Code allows a property owner that asserts that its property interest
has been condemned without the filing of a declaration of taking to file a petition for the appointment
of a board of viewers setting forth the factual basis of the petition. 26 Pa. C.S. § 502(c)(1).

                                                  2
Viewers to assess appropriate damages. (R.R. at 112a-30a.) On July 19, 2018,
PennDOT filed an Answer, which included a New Matter and Preliminary Objections
to Count II of the Second Amended Complaint. PennDOT lodged several preliminary
objections to the Borough’s request for the appointment of a Board of Viewers and
requested that the trial court dismiss the petition with prejudice. (R.R. at 144a-62a.)
             The case proceeded to a one-day bench trial on May 29, 2019, at which
several witnesses testified including PennDOT engineer Dean Poleti, public works
superintendent for the Borough Jamie Smith and engineer for the Borough Jason
Stanton. Mr. Poleti testified that PennDOT widened SR 51 in the 1950s by increasing
its width from 30 to 54 feet as a result of a condemnation in the area of Pleasant Hills
Boulevard, and that this condemnation was recorded in the office of the Allegheny
County Recorder of Deeds. (R.R. at 208a-10a.) This modification changed the grade
of the area and altered the slope adjacent to SR 51 that supported Pleasant Hills
Boulevard, making the incline steeper. (R.R. at 210a-11a.) With respect to the sight
distances, Mr. Poleti recognized that there is impairment at the intersection, and the
traffic study PennDOT obtained showed that, whether a driver is entering or exiting
Pleasant Hills Boulevard onto SR 51, the sight distances in both the left and right
directions were inadequate. (R.R. at 214a-15a, 219a.)
             In addition to the issue of sight distance, Mr. Poleti relayed that PennDOT
removed the toe of the slope between SR 51and Pleasant Hills Boulevard and installed
a storm drain. Mr. Poleti testified that the slope provided lateral support for Pleasant
Hills Boulevard, that the area is located within PennDOT’s right-of-way, and that to
his knowledge the Borough had not taken any actions that would have altered or
affected the stability of the slope. (R.R. at 222a, 226a-31a.) Mr. Poleti confirmed that

                                           3
Pleasant Hills Boulevard existed prior to SR 51, and that when SR 51 was constructed
it cut the Boulevard in half.
             Mr. Smith testified that Pleasant Hills Boulevard is one of the roads that
he maintained and that, in his experience, drivers need to be as careful as possible when
trying to access or pull out of the roadway. He stated that because the steep slope
makes it difficult to see approaching traffic, turning out of the roadway for some
vehicles can be a “harrowing experience.” (R.R. at 238a.) Mr. Smith testified that he
reviewed records relative to whether the Borough had taken any action to alter the slope
or grade at the intersection, and he found no indication that the Borough had made
modifications. (R.R. at 239a-40a, 247a.) He recalled that the road began to deteriorate
to a substantial degree in June of 2017, and that the slope has continued to move
downhill. Mr. Smith relayed that PennDOT did not respond to the Borough’s requests
that it address the stability of the slope located within its right-of-way and that the
Borough has sustained damage to the berm and guardrail along Pleasant Hills
Boulevard necessitating the installation of orange safety fencing and lighted barricades
as the road continued to erode. (R.R. at 245a-46a, 248a.)
             Borough Engineer Mr. Stanton opined within a reasonable degree of
professional certainty that PennDOT’s widening of the roadway caused the dangerous
condition of sight distance impairment, and that PennDOT had a duty to fix that
condition. (R.R. at 314a-15a.) He saw no evidence that the Borough undertook any
action to cause the sight distance issue. (R.R. at 315a.) Mr. Stanton further opined that
PennDOT caused the dangerous condition of the erosion of the slope/removal of lateral
support, and that PennDOT was responsible for remediating this condition. (R.R. at
315a.) He explained that the Borough would not be able to perform any maintenance

                                           4
in this area without PennDOT’s permission, as it would need to obtain a highway
occupancy permit (HOP) to enter PennDOT’s right-of-way. (R.R. at 317a.)
             On April 18, 2022, after visiting the intersection, the trial court issued a
verdict granting the Borough’s request for a declaratory judgment providing that
PennDOT is solely responsible for the condition of the area, for the continued
maintenance and repair of the slope, and for restoring the sight distance. In the
alternative, the trial court granted relief in favor of the Borough and against PennDOT
in the amount of $350,000. The trial court additionally granted the Borough’s request
for damages pursuant to Count II of the Second Amended Complaint and referred this
matter to the Board of Viewers for an award of damages. (R.R. at 525a.)
             PennDOT filed post-trial motions which the trial court denied on May 23,
2023, with the exception of PennDOT’s request to strike the alternative relief. The trial
court amended the verdict “to reflect its agreement that the Borough was not seeking
monetary damages in the amount to effectuate repairs, only that PennDOT is
responsible for the repairs of the slope and correction of the sight distance deficiency.”
(PennDOT’s Br., App. A). The trial court’s Modified Verdict provided:

                    The [trial c]ourt finds in favor of the Borough of
             Pleasant Hills on the request for Declaratory Judgment.
             [PennDOT], and not the Borough of Pleasant Hills, is
             responsible for the condition of the area and for the continued
             maintenance and repair of the slope between State Route 51
             [SR 51] and Pleasant Hills Boulevard. [PennDOT] is solely
             responsible to restore the stability of this slope and to restore
             sight distance for vehicles entering and exiting Pleasant Hills
             Boulevard.

                   In addition, the Borough’s request for damages in
             Count II of the Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED
             and this matter is referred to the Board of Viewers for an

                                            5
               award of damages, as set forth in Count II of the Second
               Amended Complaint.

Id., App. B.
               PennDOT appealed from the Modified Verdict and complied with the trial
court’s order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The trial court filed its
Rule 1925(a) opinion on July 27, 2023.4
                                            II. Discussion
                                       A. Original Jurisdiction
                PennDOT first challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case and
argues that this Court, and not the trial court, had original jurisdiction to hear it.5
PennDOT argues that, pursuant to Section 761 of the Judicial Code,6 this Court has

       4
         With respect to the appealability of the Modified Verdict, we note that preliminary objections
are the exclusive method under the Code of raising objections to a petition for the appointment of a
board of viewers alleging a de facto taking. Genter v. Blair County Convention & Sports Facilities
Authority, 805 A.2d 51, 54 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); see also 26 Pa. C.S. § 504(d)(1) (providing that
“[a]ny objection to the appointment of viewers may be raised by preliminary objections filed within
30 days after receipt of notice of the appointment of viewers). In that regard, preliminary objections
in de facto taking cases render final and appealable a trial court order overruling preliminary
objections to a petition for the appointment of viewers, such that where a party fails to file preliminary
objections, we lack jurisdiction to consider that party’s appeal. Gerg v. Township of Fox, 107 A.3d
849, 852 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

        Here, PennDOT did file the requisite preliminary objections, albeit as part of the same
document as its Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. Because Section 504 of the Code does
not require any specific form of preliminary objections, we conclude that PennDOT has complied
with its obligation under the Code, and that the Modified Verdict referring this matter to the Board of
Viewers effectively overruled the preliminary objections and is a final, appealable order.

       5
           Because this appeal concerns issues of subject matter jurisdiction and statutory
interpretation, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Scott v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 284 A.3d 178, 185–86 (Pa. 2022).

        6
               Section 761 states in relevant part as follows:

(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                    6
exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions brought against the
Commonwealth, and that because the core of the Borough’s complaint is a declaratory
judgment action regarding the maintenance/sight distance responsibility of the slope
area, its complaint was improperly filed in the trial court. (PennDOT’s Br., at 15-21.)
                We begin by observing that this Court has original jurisdiction in only a
narrow class of cases. Stackhouse v. Commonwealth, 832 A.2d 1004, 1007 (Pa. 2003)
(plurality). That class is defined by Section 761 of the Judicial Code, which provides
that, as a general rule, the Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction in cases
asserted against “the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting
in his official capacity.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1). However, this rule is subject to
certain enumerated exceptions, including that this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over actions or proceedings conducted pursuant to Chapter 85 (setting forth
exceptions to sovereign immunity) relating to the creating of a dangerous condition7
and to actions concerning eminent domain proceedings.

                (a) General rule.—The Commonwealth Court shall have original
                jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

                (1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer
                thereof, acting in his official capacity except: . . .

                (ii) eminent domain proceedings;

                (iii) actions or proceedings conducted pursuant to Chapter 85 (relating
                to matters affecting government units)[.]

42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(ii)-(iii).
        7
       As the trial court observed, Section 8522(b)(4) of Chapter 85 is included in Section 761 as
an exception to the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction pursuant to which the
Commonwealth may be held liable for:

(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                   7
               Our Supreme Court’s decision in Stackhouse is instructive. In Stackhouse,
the plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against her employer, the Pennsylvania State
Police, alleging that her constitutional rights were violated by an improper internal
investigation by her supervisors, and she sought injunctive relief in addition to money
damages. Stackhouse, 832 A.2d at 1005-06. The court of common pleas concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction over the complaint and transferred the case to this Court
which disagreed, noting that the complaint was essentially a “tort action in the nature
of trespass for money damages as redress for an unlawful injury” and, therefore, fell
outside of this Court’s original jurisdiction. Id. at 1006.
               On appeal, our Supreme Court found that “the sum and substance of [the
plaintiff’s] complaint, then, [was] that her privacy and reputational interests were
invaded when state police officials unlawfully delved into her intimate inter-personal
relationship during an internal affairs investigation, and that she [was] entitled to
compensation accordingly.” Id. at 1008. The Supreme Court concluded that the equity
cause of action was based on the same factual allegations as the tort claims for
defamation/invasion of privacy and that under these circumstances, “the inclusion of a
count for declaratory or injunctive relief premised upon the same events cannot
properly be understood to transform the complaint from one sounding in trespass into
the type of matter contemplated . . . by the Legislature, as belonging within the

                      A dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate
               and sidewalks, including Commonwealth-owned real property,
               leaseholds in the possession of a Commonwealth agency and
               Commonwealth-owned real property leased by a Commonwealth
               agency to private persons, and highways under the jurisdiction of a
               Commonwealth agency, except conditions described in paragraph (5).

42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b)(4); (see also Trial Ct. Op., at 3.)

                                                   8
Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction.” Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
determined that the matter had properly been filed in the court of common pleas.
             Here, as in Stackhouse, the allegations and circumstances upon which the
Borough’s negligence, de facto taking, and equitable claims are based are the same.
The inclusion of a count for declaratory relief in a multi-count complaint cannot
transform this action from one sounding in negligence/de facto taking into one
belonging in this Court’s narrow original jurisdiction. Therefore, we conclude that the
core of the Borough’s complaint is a tort and eminent domain action seeking monetary
damages and, as such, is an action over which this Court lacks original jurisdiction
under Section 761 of the Judicial Code. See id.
             We also emphasize that in cases where the plaintiff seeks both equitable
relief and money damages that it “is not our function to ignore a portion of [the] request
for relief so that original jurisdiction can be vested in this Court, a court of limited
original jurisdiction, rather than in the common pleas court, a court of broad original
jurisdiction.” Miles v. Beard, 847 A.2d 161, 165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Adopting such
an approach would run contrary to the precept that in determining whether this Court
has original jurisdiction over a matter we must consider that such cases are appealable
as of right to our Supreme Court, and the efficient administration of justice is not well
served when that Court is forced to hear collateral matters because “such an
interpretation of its jurisdiction would crowd cases involving important and unique
issues from its allocatur docket.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that
jurisdiction was properly vested in the trial court on this basis as well.

                                            9
                                  B. State Highway Law
               PennDOT next argues that the trial court ignored the plain language of
Section 513 of the State Highway Law8 in assigning maintenance responsibilities for
the slope to PennDOT. According to PennDOT, this provision authorizes the Secretary
of Transportation to determine the scope and type of maintenance activities PennDOT
will perform on state highways located within boroughs and that PennDOT has
historically exercised this authority by assuming maintenance responsibility for
roadway features between curb lines—which it refers to as its “curb-to-curb policy.”
(PennDOT’s Br., at 21-27.)
               Section 513 of the State Highway Law provides that PennDOT “shall, at
the expense of the Commonwealth improve or reconstruct and maintain all State
highways within boroughs and incorporated towns, to such width and of such type as
shall be determined by the secretary.” 36 P.S. § 670-513. However, in asserting that
it is vested with exclusive authority to determine the extent of its own maintenance
responsibilities, PennDOT wholly ignores the testimony at trial which established that
it condemned the area at issue and that its modifications to the roadway caused the
dangerous conditions. As the trial court aptly explained:

               [PennDOT’s] position since at least 1999 is that neither [the
               slope nor sight distance] issues were PennDOT’s
               responsibility. [PennDOT] bases its position merely upon
               the law which restricts its maintenance responsibility in the
               Borough from “curb to curb.” That argument simply leaves
               an area outside the curb but within its own right of way that
               [PennDOT] need not maintain. However, in this case, it is
               not a question of general maintenance but of [PennDOT’s]
               direct damage to the slope’s lateral support that is the
               question.

      8
          36 P.S. § 670-513.

                                            10
(Trial Ct. Op., at 4.)
              We agree with the trial court’s assessment and find no merit in
PennDOT’s contention that the Modified Verdict assigning it responsibility to maintain
the condition of an area in its own right-of-way as a result of condemnation conflicts
with Section 513.
              With respect to the trial court’s ruling requiring PennDOT to restore safe
sight distances at the intersection, PennDOT contends that the trial court’s decision
runs contrary to Section 420 of the State Highway Law. (PennDOT’s Br., at 27-31.)
PennDOT points to the following provisions, which address the issuance of permits:

              (b) The secretary may issue permits for the opening of streets
              and driveways onto State highways and for the opening of
              the surface and occupancy of State highways on terms and
              conditions established in department regulations.
              ....

              (2) No person, municipality or municipality authority shall
              open a driveway onto a State highway or open the surface of
              or occupy a State highway without a permit.
36 P.S. § 670-420(b)(2).
              Despite its reliance on Section 420, PennDOT simultaneously maintains
that the “issuance of an HOP or the Borough’s unpermitted connection to the state
highway system are not at issue in the present matter” and that “what is at issue is the
question of which party has the responsibility for ensuring adequate sight distance[.]”
(PennDOT’s Br., at 29.) We agree. As the trial court explained with respect to the
responsibility for maintaining safe sight distance:

              [PennDOT’s] argument [] ignores the fact that it is not so
              much a condition of maintenance but [PennDOT’s] direct
              creation on the access by significantly reducing sight

                                           11
             distance safety when it widened SR 51 and reduced safe
             access to SR 51 from Pleasant Hills Boulevard. . . .

             [I]t has been recognized by PennDOT and validated by
             traffic studies performed at the behest of PennDOT that there
             has been a problem with sight distance since the widening.
             As a result of PennDOT’s study it was determined that
             whether entering or exiting Pleasant Hills Boulevard onto SR
             51, the sight distance on both the left and right direction was
             not sufficient. This is because of PennDOT’s widening of
             SR 51 as the sight distance was adequate prior to PennDOT’s
             alterations. . . .

             It is also expert witness opinion that PennDOT had a duty to
             maintain an area where [it] created a dangerous condition.
             And that the dangerous condition of the sight distance was
             created by PennDOT.
(Trial Ct. Op., at 4-6) (record citations omitted).
             Based on the foregoing, we conclude that PennDOT’s argument that the
trial court’s ruling on the sight distance issue somehow conflicts with Section 413
governing the issuance of permits lacks merit.
                                    C. De Facto Taking
             PennDOT next challenges the trial court’s decision with respect to the
Borough’s de facto taking claim at Count II of the Second Amended Complaint and
the trial court’s appointment of a Board of Viewers to assess damages. PennDOT’s
argument is twofold in that it asserts that the Borough was required to file a separate
action under the Code rather than include it in a multi-count complaint and that it failed
to meet its burden of proving a de facto taking as a result of PennDOT’s conduct.
(PennDOT’s Br., at 31-39.)
             With respect to its argument that the Borough was required to bring its de
facto taking claim as a separate action, PennDOT relies on a footnote in Peters

                                            12
Township v. Russell, 121 A.3d 1147, 1152 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), which states that
“a de facto condemnation claim is not an affirmative defense” and cannot “be presented
as a counterclaim but only as a separate petition that conforms to the Eminent Domain
Code.” (PennDOT’s Br., at 33.)
            Here, however, the underlying procedural posture did not involve a
defendant raising a de facto taking claim as an affirmative defense to a plaintiff’s
complaint or as a counterclaim. Rather, the Borough included it as one of several bases
for recovery in a multi-count complaint. As PennDOT has cited no authority to support
its contention that the Borough was prohibited from including its de facto taking claim
as part of its broader complaint resting on the same allegations, this issue merits no
relief.
            PennDOT lastly contends the trial court erred in finding that the Borough
met its heavy burden of establishing a de facto taking with regard to its property.
PennDOT describes the Borough’s damage claims as minimal at best and it argues that
the Borough failed to demonstrate that exceptional circumstances deprived it of the
beneficial use and enjoyment of its property or that any damages were caused by
PennDOT’s conduct. (PennDOT’s Br., at 34-39.)

            In order to prove a de facto taking, the property owner must
            establish exceptional circumstances that substantially
            deprived him of the beneficial use and enjoyment of his
            property. This deprivation must be caused by the actions of
            an entity with eminent domain powers. Also, the damages
            sustained must be an immediate, necessary and unavoidable
            consequence of the exercise on the entity’s eminent domain
            powers. A de facto taking is not a physical seizure of
            property; rather, it is an interference with one of the rights of
            ownership that substantially deprives the owner of the
            beneficial use of his property. The beneficial use of the

                                           13
              property includes not only its present use, but all potential
              uses, including its highest and best use.

              Property owners alleging a de facto taking bear a heavy
              burden of proof. . . . Further, there is no bright line test to
              determine when a government action results in a de facto
              taking; each case turns on its own facts.
York Road Realty Company, L.P. v. Cheltenham Township, 136 A.3d 1047, 1050-51
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citation and emphasis omitted).
              The trial court in the instant case found that the Borough met this standard
and explained its rationale as follows:

              It was conclusively established in testimony and
              documentary evidence at trial [] and not disputed that
              [PennDOT] condemned the area at issue which was widened
              and the condemnations were recorded in the recorder of
              deeds of Allegheny County. [PennDOT] condemned the
              area at issue and they are responsible for it. According to 26
              Pa.C.S. Section 714 of the Eminent Domain Code all
              condemners shall be liable for damages to the property
              abutting the area of the improvement resulting from change
              of a road or highway, permanent interference with access or
              injury to surface support, whether or not the property is
              taken.[9]

              Evidence at trial was more than adequate to establish that
              PennDOT exercised its control over the area it condemned
              for its improvements. It alone was responsible for the work
              there and for the extensive and permanent damage to the
              roadway in question and access to it. Those damages it left
              unaddressed as the department let the chips fall where they
              may. [PennDOT] denied any responsibility for creating
              these dangerous conditions in the face of overwhelming

       9
          Section 714 of the Code states: “All condemnors, including the Commonwealth, shall be
liable for damages to property abutting the area of an improvement resulting from change of grade of
a road or highway, permanent interference with access or injury to surface support, whether or not
any property is taken.” 26 Pa. C.S. § 714.

                                                14
             evidence to the contrary throughout the trial. In conclusion,
             the findings that [PennDOT] is responsible for the damage to
             the slope supporting Pleasant Hills Boulevard, and the
             dangerous sight distance problem at the access to SR 51
             should be affirmed.

(Trial Ct. Op., at 6-7.)
             After review, we agree with the trial court’s determination that
exceptional circumstances did exist that impacted the Borough’s beneficial use and
enjoyment of its property and that the dangerous sight distance at the intersection and
erosion to the slope were caused by PennDOT’s actions. Accordingly, the Borough
sustained its burden of establishing that a de facto taking occurred with respect to its
property. PennDOT’s argument to the contrary lacks merit.
             For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s May 23, 2023 Modified
Verdict.

                                           ________________________________
                                           PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

                                          15
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Borough of Pleasant Hills            :
                                     :
             v.                      :    No. 621 C.D. 2023
                                     :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,        :
Department of Transportation,        :
                  Appellant          :

                                 ORDER

            AND NOW, this 6th day of March, 2024, the May 23, 2023 judgment
entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                         ________________________________
                                         PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge