Court Opinion

ID: 9458692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:59:41.689056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:52.034406
License: Public Domain

SIMPSON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
With deference, I dissent. I think that summary judgment was improvidently granted below in favor of Allstate Insurance Company.
Mr. and Mrs. Smith suffered personal injuries to an extent assessed by a State Court jury at $150,000. These injuries were caused when the Smiths, pedestrians at the time, were struck by a Ford Thunderbird automobile driven by Sandra Wolf, a 19 year old University of Texas co-ed, and concededly a permanent North Dakota resident. If Sandra Wolf was (1) a resident member of her father’s Bismarck, North Dakota, household, temporarily sojourning in Texas, *109and if (2) the Ford Thunderbird was a non-owned car not regularly furnished for her use, then, under her father’s Allstate Insurance Company liability policy, Allstate owed a duty to defend the State Court suit and to pay the Smith’s judgment. Allstate did neither.
Determination of the ownership or non-ownership of the Thunderbird by Sandra Wolf at the time the accident occurred required resolution of factual disputes, not simply questions of law. These were for a jury, not a court, on summary judgment motion, to decide. The trial court and the majority of the panel as well equate Sandra’s taking physical possession of the Thunderbird from Steve Simmons on April 12, 1969 (the day before the accident) with her becoming its owner on that day. Terry Sehnell had redelivered physical possession of the car to the president of Austin Motor Company, Steve Simmons, under an oral agreement that he would sell the car in return for extinguishment of the lien balance Sehnell then owed Austin for the car. Steve Simmons had the legal right to handle this as a repossession by filing a written repossession affidavit, but deliberately chose not to do so. Had this occurred, title could have been delivered by Austin to Sandra Wolf. Sandra paid Steve Simmons $325.00 cash and departed with the car. The injury to the Smiths occurred the following day.
On April 12 Steve Simmons had no power or authority to convey ownership of the Thunderbird, because under the Texas Certificate of Title Act, ownership can be conveyed only pursuant to written authority in the form o,f a written power of attorney or written assignment of the certificate of title.1 See Texas Certificate of Title Act, Sections 33, 40 and 53.2 Section 53 provides that sales made in violation of the act shall be void and no title shall pass until the provisions of the act have been complied with. Admittedly, ownership and title are not necessarily the same under Texas cases, but ownership is at least presumptively established by title. At best, on April 12, Steve Simmons had naked possession of the car with an oral promise from Sehnell to convey title, but this was a question of fact to be demonstrated on proof. It was not until May 2, 1969, that Simmons was authorized to convey ownership of Schnell’s vehicle. Authorization came only after bargaining between Simmons and Sehnell on that date.
The Texas cases as I understand them hold that under these and similar circumstances ownership is a question of fact to be passed upon by a jury, not a matter to be disposed of by summary judgment. See, e. g., Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., Tex.1971, 465 S.W.2d 933; Freeberg v. Securities Inv. Co. of St. Louis (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1960, writ ref’d.) 331 S.W.2d 825; Guinn v. Lokey, Tex.1952, 249 S.W.2d 185.3
*110I am persuaded that a jury could properly find in the present case that Terry Schnell was the owner of the Ford Thunderbird on April 12, 1969. He had never assigned the title to any dealer or individual. He signed no power of attorney for Simmons to sell his ear until May 2, 1969, and then only on condition that his alleged indebtedness to Simmons be cancelled. Simmons had neither ownership nor title, merely naked possession, to convey on April 12, 1969 when he delivered the Thunderbird to Sandra Lynn Wolf. Summary judgment was not warranted in this case.
There is another theory postulated by the appellant which would also require factual findings by a jury. If it is determined by a jury (or by the court, as was done below and as the majority approves) that ownership of the Thunderbird actually passed to Sandra Lynn Wolf, the evidence may well justify a jury determination that Sandra Lynn acquired ownership as agent for her father, and that the Thunderbird thereby became an owned vehicle covered under his policy with Allstate.4
Miss Wolf’s deposition testimony with respect to the source of the money used to pay Steve Simmons for the Ford Thunderbird was as follows:
“Q. Where had that money come from, Miss Wolf ?
A. Partially from my earnings as a cocktail waitress, partially my mother had sent me periodically small sums that she was able to send me; because of the large family she doesn’t have much money, but she sent what she could.
Q. All right. And would it be a fair statement that before the collision of April 13, 1969, you had had discussions with your parents about buying a car ?
A. Yes, I had talked of the possibility.
Q. All right. And of course since
A. This was by letters.
Q. Since you only possessed the Thunderbird for approximately one day — and I will get to that in just a moment — but you had discussed with them the possibility of just buying a car?
A. Yes.
*111Q. You didn’t specify a particular ear that you were going to buy?
A. No.
Q. Is that a correct statement?
A. Yes.
Q. And did your parents seem to approve of the idea of your buying a car?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they know that it was going to be bought partially with the money that they had sent you, that you had saved?
A. Yes. That was mine, to do what I wanted to with.
Q. And, of course, you had been without transportation for over or right at two years, and this would aid you in getting to and from your job, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And they understood?
A. Yes.
Q. I will ask you, Miss Wolf, to state whether or not it was your intention to notify your parents, upon purchase of the car, so that it would be carried on your Allstate insurance policy?
A. Yes.” (Sandra Lynn Wolf’s deposition pages 14 and 15.)
It is thus indicated that her parents knew of the purchase beforehand and further that the car was a necessity in connection with her attendance at class and her work as a cocktail waitress. Her parents had sent money which was used in part to purchase the car and they had prospectively approved of its purchase. A proper subject for jury decision is whether or not the automobile was in fact a necessary for Sandra Lynn to earn income to help pay her way through college. If so the Thunderbird was an additional car acquired by her father, the named insured, if the factual determination eventually is that she acquired an ownership interest in the car. She and her parents notified Allstate within a few days of the purchase of the car.
The property right in articles purchased for or furnished to a minor child is presumptively held by the parent. Speer, Marital Rights in Texas, Section 126, and Miss Wolf’s earnings were subject to her parents’ control. Texas Family Code, Section 5.24, Y.T.C.A. The parent is under a duty to support a minor child and to furnish necessaries for her. His failure to discharge this duty renders him liable to any person who provides necessaries to the minor child. Texas Family Code, Section 4.02, V.T.C.A. The obligation to provide necessaries for a child or wife is responsible for the Texas doctrine of an implied agency relationship of child or wife as agent for the parent or husband as principal, when the dependent’s purchase is necessary. The theory is that the dependent purchasing a necessary merely provides herself with an item which the principal owed a legal obligation to provide. See, e. g., Daggett v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 348 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1961, no writ history); Crosby v. A. Harris & Co., 234 S.W. 127 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1921, rehearing denied 1921); Gabel v. Blackburn Operating Corp., 442 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1969, no writ history); Graham v. McCord, 384 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, rehearing denied 1964).
In Daggett, supra, Mrs. Daggett’s $1959.90 balance to Neiman was found (as a matter of fact) to be for necessaries and the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals said: “We think the evidence warrants the presumed findings of the Court of implied agency (of wife for husband) . ”. In order to imply an agency relationship it must appear to the satisfaction of the court and jury that the articles are necessaries, that is reasonable and proper for the dependent. Daggett, supra.
The one hundred year old Texas case of Fowlkes v. Baker, 29 Tex. 135 (1867), is cited at 44 Tex.Jur.2d, page 97, for the proposition that the parent’s liability may be established by showing the general practice of the child in pur*112chasing goods on the credit of the parent and the habit of the parent in paying therefor, and that a child’s authority to bind his parent may be proved by showing the conduct or course of dealings of the parties in similar transactions. The following quotation from Fowlkes is instructive :
“The only portion of the charge assigned for error, is that in reference to what would be sufficient evidence of an authority given by a parent to a child to purchase necessaries for himself. The court instructed the jury on this point that, if the articles were necessaries, slight evidence would be sufficient; such as where the father knows of the purchase, and makes no dissent; or knows of the child’s purchasing on credit, and does not within a reasonable time forbid further credit being extended to him; or where he sees the child wearing the clothes, or knows that he had received them, and made no objection.” 29 Tex. at page 135.
Further, the Texas Supreme Court continued :
“The question, therefore, as to whether the articles purchased by the minor are necessaries or not becomes important only as it regulates the amount of evidence necessary to establish the father’s liability. The authority of the parent to make the purchases must be proved in the one case, and in the other it is inferred, unless rebutted by circumstances showing that the parent had supplied the infant himself, or was ready to supply him. The charge of the court, then, so far as it decides that the father’s authority to purchase necessaries might be inferred from slight evidence, is correct as an abstract principle of law. We think, also, that the circumstances mentioned in the charge are sufficient to amount to the evidence required in such cases.”
29 Tex. at pages 137-138.
To summarize, I think that the question of ownership was one for a jury, but that whatever the determination was with respect to ownership jury questions were present as to the coverage vel non of the Allstate policy issued to Miss Wolf’s father. If she acquired ownership, as the majority is at pains to demonstrate, I think a jury should decide whether the ear was a necessary, and if she acquired ownership as agent for her father. It was erroneous to dispose of the factual issues in this case by summary judgment.
I would reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings below.

. Absent the filing of a repossession affidavit.

. Article 1436-1 et seq., Vernon’s Texas Penal Code. Appellant’s brief also cites Section 52, but my research indicates that this section was repealed by the Texas Legislature in 1967. This is immaterial from the standpoint of appellant's right to a reversal.

. In Phillips Ford, Inc., one Dignan attempted to transfer ownership of a car to Phillips Ford, Inc. and gave that dealer a written power of attorney to transfer the certificate of title. The original title was held by a lienholder and so could not be assigned by Dignan. In holding that no ownership rights passed to Phillips Ford, Inc. and that the sale was void, the Texas Supreme Court observed :
“Dignan gave Phillips his power of attorney and certainly Phillips had the right to take all necessary steps to comjdy with the statute and transfer the certificate of title from Dignan to Ford or another. See, Freeberg v. Securities Investment Co., 331 S.W.2d 825 (Tex.Civ.App.1960, writ ref.). The certificate of title is in this record, and it shows that Phillips did not exercise his power and took none of the steps necessary to effect a transfer.
“As to SIC, Dignan’s sale to Ford was void. Art. 1436-1, Sec. 53, Vernon’s Ann.Penal Code; Ballard v. As*110sociates Investment Co., 368 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Civ.App.1963, writ ref. n.r.e.). Ford at no time acquired title to the automobile, and title was still in Dig-nan at the time of the repossession.”
The rules for determining ownership in a three-party transaction were set out by Justice Pope in Freeberg as follows:
“There may be a valid sale between the owner and purchaser though the certificate is not immediately delivered and while the papers are being processed, but those cases do not excuse the processing of papers indefinitely and do not countenance sales by non-owners.
“This is not the situation of a purchaser buying from an owner, followed by a temporary lapse of time before the papers are processed. To hold that a purchaser complies with the law by making a request for the certificate of title, whether the request is made of the owner or someone else who falsely poses as owner would make a ritual of and leave very little in the protective features of the Act.”
Ghvinn involved another three-party transaction where the Texas Supreme Court held attempted sales of a motor vehicle void for failure to comply with the Texas Certificate of Title Act, stating:
“From the findings made, Wally Ma-han did not comply with Sections 27, 33, 51, and 52 of Article 1436-1. Since Wally Mahan did not comply with the statute, he cannot be a bona fide purchaser, for he holds under an illegal contract of sale. * * * Section 51 required that Wally Mahan have ‘in his possession the proper receipt or certificate of title covering the motor vehicle so offered.’ Not having had this, the sale to J. A. Dokey was void under Section 53.”

. The majority give this theory short shrift indeed: “The Smiths’ further contention that Sandra purchased the car as an agent for her father, and was therefore driving a ear ‘owned’ by him and covered under the policy is wholly without merit.” Page 108.