Court Opinion

ID: 9946773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 15:15:33.629972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:41.160997
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 23, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0868-MR

DAVID CORBIN                                                         APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
v.      HONORABLE SAMUEL TODD SPALDING, SPECIAL JUDGE
                    ACTION NO. 19-CR-00097

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND GOODWINE,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: David Corbin, pro se, appeals from an order of the

Adair Circuit Court which denied his Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)

60.02 motion. In his motion, Appellant alleged that the trial court sentenced him to

an illegal term of imprisonment. After reviewing the record and the arguments of

the parties, we find no error and affirm.
                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                From 2010 to 2016, Appellant was convicted and sentenced pursuant

to multiple criminal indictments. All told, Appellant received a total sentence of

fifteen years in prison. In November of 2017, Appellant was released from prison

and put on parole. On May 9, 2019, Appellant was indicted for numerous

additional crimes. He was eventually convicted of four Class D felony charges and

he received a five-year sentence for each. The sentences were also ordered to run

consecutively. These sentences were then enhanced pursuant to Appellant being a

persistent felony offender in the first degree. Appellant was ultimately sentenced

to a twenty-year term of imprisonment.1 In addition, because Appellant was on

parole when the new convictions occurred, his new sentence was mandated to be

served consecutively with the prior fifteen-year sentence.2 This resulted in

Appellant being imprisoned for thirty-five years.

                Appellant appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Supreme Court,

which affirmed. Corbin v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-SC-0496-MR, 2022 WL

243937 (Ky. Jan. 20, 2022). Appellant did not raise a sentencing issue before that

Court. In June of 2023, Appellant filed the underlying CR 60.02 motion in which

1
  This was the maximum term of imprisonment that Appellant could receive as will be discussed
later in this Opinion.
2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 533.060(2).

                                              -2-
he alleged his sentence of thirty-five years was illegal. The trial court disagreed

and denied the motion. This appeal followed.

                                    ANALYSIS

              Appellant’s argument on appeal is that he should have only received a

sentence of twenty years in prison as opposed to the thirty-five-year term he

ultimately received. We review a trial court’s denial of a CR 60.02 motion for

abuse of discretion. Priddy v. Commonwealth, 629 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Ky. App.

2021).

              Appellant’s argument revolves around the interpretation of three

statutes and how they apply to each other. The first statute is KRS 532.110, which

states in pertinent part:

              (1) When multiple sentences of imprisonment are
              imposed on a defendant for more than one (1) crime,
              including a crime for which a previous sentence of
              probation or conditional discharge has been revoked, the
              multiple sentences shall run concurrently or
              consecutively as the court shall determine at the time of
              sentence, except that:

                 ...

                 (c) The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms
                 shall not exceed in maximum length the longest
                 extended term which would be authorized by KRS
                 532.080 for the highest class of crime for which any
                 of the sentences is imposed.

The next statute at issue is KRS 532.080, which states in relevant part:

                                         -3-
             (6) A person who is found to be a persistent felony
             offender in the first degree shall be sentenced to
             imprisonment as follows:

                ...

                (b) If the offense for which he presently stands
                convicted is a Class C or Class D felony, a persistent
                felony offender in the first degree shall be sentenced
                to an indeterminate term of imprisonment, the
                maximum of which shall not be less than ten (10)
                years nor more than twenty (20) years.

The final statute at issue is KRS 533.060(2), which states:

             When a person has been convicted of a felony and is
             committed to a correctional detention facility and
             released on parole or has been released by the court on
             probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge, and
             is convicted or enters a plea of guilty to a felony
             committed while on parole, probation, shock probation,
             or conditional discharge, the person shall not be eligible
             for probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge
             and the period of confinement for that felony shall not
             run concurrently with any other sentence.

             Appellant argues that when read together, these statutes require that

he only receive a twenty-year sentence. Appellant was convicted of four Class D

felonies. He received a sentence of five years for each felony and they were to be

served consecutively with one another. These sentences were then enhanced to

twenty years each pursuant to his status as a first-degree persistent felony offender.

This would have resulted in a sentence of eighty years; however, KRS

532.110(1)(c) caps the number of years Appellant may receive.

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            When sentencing a defendant to multiple consecutive sentences, KRS

532.110(1)(c) limits the total number of years a defendant may receive to the

“longest extended term which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest

class of crime for which any of the sentences is imposed.” KRS 532.080(6)(b)

states that the maximum term for an enhanced Class D felony is twenty years.

KRS 532.110(1)(c) and KRS 532.080(6)(b) explain why Appellant, who was given

an eighty-year sentence, only received a twenty-year sentence.

            The reason Appellant received a thirty-five-year sentence stems from

KRS 533.060(2). As mentioned above, this statute mandates that any new

sentence a defendant receives while on probation or parole must run consecutively

with any previous sentences. In the case of Appellant, his twenty-year sentence

was required to run consecutively with his previous fifteen-year sentence.

            Appellant argues that, even though his two sentences were required to

run consecutively pursuant to KRS 533.060(2), his multiple terms of imprisonment

could not exceed twenty years pursuant to KRS 532.110(1)(c) and KRS

532.080(6)(b). In other words, even though he had thirty-five years to serve, this

was an excessive term of imprisonment and should have been reduced to twenty

years.

            Appellant relies on the recent case of Kimmel v. Commonwealth, 671

S.W.3d 230 (Ky. 2023), to support his argument. In Kimmel, David Kimmel

                                        -5-
shoplifted from a Walmart in March of 2020. He was later released on bond

pending trial. Six months later, Kimmel shoplifted from a Rural King. All charges

from the two crimes were then tried together and he was convicted of four criminal

counts and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The highest class of

felony Kimmel was convicted of was a Class D. He was sentenced to two twenty-

year terms of imprisonment and they were ordered to run consecutively, for a total

term of forty years. Kimmel then appealed.

             Kimmel argued on appeal that the forty-year sentence he received was

illegal and should have been reduced to twenty years pursuant to KRS

532.110(1)(c) and KRS 532.080(6)(b). The Commonwealth argued that KRS

533.060(3) applied and the forty-year sentence was appropriate. KRS 533.060(3)

states:

             When a person commits an offense while awaiting trial
             for another offense, and is subsequently convicted or
             enters a plea of guilty to the offense committed while
             awaiting trial, the sentence imposed for the offense
             committed while awaiting trial shall not run concurrently
             with confinement for the offense for which the person is
             awaiting trial.

The Court held that Kimmel’s sentences must run consecutively as required by

KRS 533.060(3); however, they could not exceed the twenty-year maximum

mandated by KRS 532.110(1)(c) and KRS 532.080(6)(b). Kimmel, 671 S.W.3d at

239.

                                        -6-
              Appellant argues that we should come to a similar conclusion and

sentence him to a maximum term of twenty years in prison. We disagree. Kimmel

involved KRS 533.060(3), but this case involves KRS 533.060(2); therefore, the

two cases are distinguishable and we are not required to follow Kimmel. What we

are required to follow is the case of Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 395

(Ky. 2011). In that case, the Kentucky Supreme Court, citing KRS 533.060(2),

made clear that courts must not run subsequent conviction sentences concurrent

with paroled offense sentences. Id. at 401. The trial court relied on Blackburn in

its order denying Appellant’s CR 60.02 motion. We too must rely on Blackburn to

affirm. “[A]n intermediate appellate court . . . is bound by established precedents

of the Kentucky Supreme Court. [Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court (SCR)]

1.030(8)(a). The Court of Appeals cannot overrule the established precedent set by

the Supreme Court or its predecessor court.” Smith v. Vilvarajah, 57 S.W.3d 839,

841 (Ky. App. 2000) (citation omitted).3

                                      CONCLUSION

              Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Appellant’s CR 60.02 motion. If Appellant believes the

3
 This Court recently held that Blackburn still controls in relation to maximum sentences and
KRS 533.060(2) in the case of Thornton v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-CA-001421-MR, 2020
WL 2609966 (Ky. App. May 22, 2020).

                                              -7-
holding in Kimmel should apply to his case, he must petition our Supreme Court to

change its precedent.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

David Corbin, pro se                     Daniel Cameron
Pineville, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                         Courtney J. Hightower
                                         Assistant Attorney General
                                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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