Court Opinion

ID: 9902287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 22:00:53.416724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:48.568979
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12593   Document: 60-1    Date Filed: 11/24/2023   Page: 1 of 34

                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-12593
                         ____________________

        RICHARD ROSE,
        an individual,
        BRIONTE MCCORKLE,
        an individual,
        WANDA MOSLEY,
        an individual,
        JAMES MAJOR WOODALL,
                                                   Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
        versus
        SECRETARY, STATE OF GEORGIA,
                                                 Defendant-Appellant.
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        22-12593                   Opinion of the Court                                 2

                                 ____________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Georgia
                        D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-02921-SDG
                              ____________________

        Before BRANCH and GRANT, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,∗
        District Judge.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               The Georgia Public Service Commission (“PSC”) consists of
        ﬁve commissioners elected through statewide, at-large elections.1
        Plaintiﬀs—four black residents of Fulton County, Georgia—sued
        the Georgia Secretary of State (“Secretary”) alleging that this
        election system constitutes unlawful vote dilution under Section 2
        of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”). In short, plaintiﬀs allege that
        black Georgians have been unable to elect their preferred PSC
        candidates because the statewide electoral system forces them to
        go head-to-head with the preferences of white Georgians across
        the State. Plaintiﬀs contend that single-member districts would be

        ∗ The Honorable Harvey Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the

        Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
        1
          As the district court recognized in its order, Georgia’s PSC elections are
        “statewide” because they are open to every registered Georgia voter and “at-
        large” because all voters are eligible to vote directly for all five commissioners
        (instead of electing a single commissioner that then represents their district on
        the PSC). For ease of reference, we refer to this as a “statewide” system.
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        22-12593                  Opinion of the Court                              3

        less dilutive and, therefore, are required. The Secretary argues that
        partisanship—not race—has driven the PSC’s electoral outcomes.
        He also argues that plaintiﬀs’ requested remedy (single-member
        districts) would impermissibly alter Georgia’s chosen form of
        government—a statewide body designed to avoid provincialism in
        the tough business of regulating energy. The district court agreed
        with plaintiﬀs and enjoined the Secretary from administering
        statewide PSC elections and from certifying any commissioner
        elected via such method.2 For the reasons below, and with the
        beneﬁt of oral argument, we reverse.
                                   I.      Background
               A. The PSC’s Functions and Method of Election
                The Georgia Constitution requires a ﬁve-member PSC for
        utility regulation. Ga. Const. Art. IV, § 1, ¶ I(a) (“There shall be a
        [PSC] for the regulation of utilities which shall consist of ﬁve
        members who shall be elected by the people.”). The PSC’s
        signiﬁcant responsibilities are wide-ranging. At a basic level, the
        PSC determines, or at least monitors, the prices consumers pay for
        utilities—including electricity, natural gas, and some telephone
        services. The PSC also controls permitting for power plant
        construction and it has some jurisdiction over internet connectivity
        and rural broadband, among other functions. Simply put, the PSC
        is important to the State and its citizens.

        2
         This order also cancelled elections for two PSC seats that were scheduled for
        November 2022.
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        22-12593                     Opinion of the Court                        4

               The PSC carries out its responsibilities as an “administrative
        body” that performs “quasi-judicial” and “quasi-legislative”
        functions. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 99
        S.E.2d 225, 233 (Ga. 1957). That is, it conducts some of its
        proceedings as an adjudicatory body that “hears rate cases, holds
        hearings, listens to witnesses, makes evidentiary rulings, and
        weighs testimony from stakeholders”—similar to the judicial role.
        But it also sets utility rates, controls permitting for power plant
        construction, and regulates pole attachments and landlines for
        communications—similar to the legislative role.
               The PSC dates back to 1879 when the Georgia General
        Assembly adopted an act establishing its predecessor, the Railroad
        Commission. In 1922, the General Assembly changed the name of
        the Railroad Commission to the PSC and expanded its powers and
        duties. Since 1906, Georgia’s PSC commissioners—railroad
        commissioners prior to 1922—have been elected statewide to
        staggered six-year terms. When the PSC achieved constitutional
        status in 1945, the General Assembly retained the same election
        system. 3 In fact, in over 100 years, there has only been one change
        to PSC elections. Speciﬁcally, in 1998, under Governor Roy Barnes,
        the Georgia General Assembly created a ﬁve-district system with a
        residency requirement that remains in place today. Under this
        system, PSC commissioners must live in the district they represent,

        3
            Before 1945, the PSC was only a creature of statute.
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        22-12593                   Opinion of the Court                             5

        but they are still elected through statewide elections.4 For example,
        to represent the PSC’s third district (Clayton, DeKalb, and Fulton
        Counties), a PSC commissioner must live in one of those three
        counties; however, Georgians in all 159 counties will vote on that
        commissioner’s candidacy. The residency requirement did not
        alter the electoral system (i.e., statewide elections are still used), but
        it did change the candidate pool (i.e., a PSC candidate must live in
        the district that he would represent if he were to win the statewide
        election).
               The PSC’s statewide electoral structure was deliberately
        chosen to advance policy interests that the Georgia General
        Assembly deemed important. For example, the PSC’s statewide
        elections allow each commissioner to prioritize the “best interest[s]
        of the whole state” without logjams from regionalized disputes.
        As PSC Chair Tricia Pridemore testiﬁed below:

        4
         The Georgia Constitution requires that the PSC be “elected by the people,”
        Ga. Const. Art. IV, § 1, ¶ I(a), leaving room for the Georgia General Assembly
        to spell out the specifics of the electoral system by statute. Since 1998, the
        governing law has provided:
               The [PSC] shall consist of five members to be elected as
               provided in this Code Section. . . . [M]embers elected to the
               commission shall be required to be residents of one of five
               [PSC] Districts as hereafter provided, but each member of the
               commission shall be elected state wide by the qualified voters
               of this state who are entitled to vote for members of the
               General Assembly.
        O.C.G.A. § 46-2-1(a).
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        22-12593                  Opinion of the Court                             6

               [T]he one thing about the ﬁve commissioners is that
               we don’t ﬁght over where things go. We don’t ﬁght
               over which district gets a new gas plant or . . . a solar
               farm. . . . The way [PSC elections are] structured
               enables us to . . . maximize the needs for the state.
        If each commissioner represented only a district, then important
        questions of utility regulation—such as the location of energy and
        infrastructure—could turn into a zero-sum game between
        commissioners beholden to their districts instead of a collaborative
        eﬀort to reach the best result for the entire State. Similarly,
        Pridemore testiﬁed that the statewide electoral system discourages
        ﬁghts over rate setting, one of the PSC’s most important functions:
        “We don’t ﬁght and argue amongst the ﬁve of us . . . over [whether]
        District 5 customers pay less than District 3 or District 3 electric
        customers pay more.” Other PSC commissioners provided similar
        views.5 At the end of the day, the Georgia General Assembly
        selected a statewide election system that allows PSC
        commissioners to focus on the needs of Georgia as a whole.
               B. Section 2 of the VRA
              An upfront understanding of the framework of Section 2 of
        the VRA helps contextualize plaintiﬀs’ allegations, the Secretary’s
        counter arguments, and the district court’s various rulings.

        5
          Commissioner Tim Echols, for example, provided that he “think[s] it’s
        important that commissioners understand the issues of constituents all across
        [Georgia] regardless of where they live.”
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        22-12593                      Opinion of the Court                                 7

               The text of Section 2 is straightforward:6 It forbids “any
        State or political subdivision” from imposing any “voting
        qualiﬁcation or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
        procedure . . . which results in a denial or abridgement of the right
        of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
        color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). The right protected by Section 2 is
        “equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for
        minority-preferred candidates of whatever race.” Johnson v. De

        6
            The pertinent text of Section 2 provides:
                  (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
                  standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
                  any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in
                  a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
                  States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention
                  of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as
                  provided in subsection (b).
                  (b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
                  totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
                  processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
                  political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
                  members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
                  that its members have less opportunity than other members of
                  the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
                  representatives of their choice. The extent to which members
                  of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or
                  political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
                  considered: Provided, [t]hat nothing in this section establishes a
                  right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
                  equal to their proportion in the population.
        52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)–(b).
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        22-12593                Opinion of the Court                           8

        Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 n.11 (1994). Notably, Section 2 explicitly
        disclaims a right to proportionality. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)
        (“[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
        protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
        population.”).
               In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, (1986), the Supreme
        Court laid the foundation for assessing at-large voting systems for
        vote dilution under Section 2. Id. at 43–51. “[A]t-large elections”
        are not “per se violative of § 2,” but the Supreme Court has “long
        recognized that . . . at-large voting schemes may operate to
        minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial minorities in
        the voting population.” Id. at 46–47 (quotation omitted) (alteration
        adopted). In such a case, at-large districts are prohibited. Id. at 48.
               To establish vote dilution under Section 2, plaintiﬀs must
        ﬁrst satisfy the three Gingles preconditions:
               First, the minority group must be suﬃciently large
               and [geographically] compact to constitute a majority
               in a reasonably conﬁgured district. Second, the
               minority group must be able to show that it is
               politically cohesive. And third, the minority must be
               able to demonstrate that the white majority votes
               suﬃciently as a bloc to enable it . . . to defeat the
               minority’s preferred candidate.”
        Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 18 (2023) (brackets in original) (ellipses
        in original) (quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted) (citing
        Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51).
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        22-12593                Opinion of the Court                         9

               Importantly, we have interpreted the ﬁrst Gingles
        precondition—a minority group being suﬃciently large and
        geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably
        conﬁgured district—to require plaintiﬀs to “oﬀer[] a satisfactory
        remedial plan.” Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Registration,
        979 F.3d 1282, 1302 (11th Cir. 2020). Without a satisfactory
        remedial plan, plaintiﬀs “cannot succeed.” Id.; see also Nipper v.
        Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1530 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[T]he issue of
        remedy is part of the plaintiﬀ’s prima facie case in section 2 vote
        dilution cases.”); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1199
        (11th Cir. 1999) (“We have repeatedly construed the ﬁrst Gingles
        factor as requiring a plaintiﬀ to demonstrate the existence of a
        proper remedy.”). Further, plaintiﬀs’ remedial plan cannot be
        fundamentally at odds with the state’s chosen model of
        government because “[n]othing in the Voting Rights Act suggests
        an intent on the part of Congress to permit the federal judiciary to
        force on the states a new model of government.” Nipper, 39 F.3d at
        1531.
               Our interpretation of the ﬁrst Gingles precondition has
        attracted support in other circuits. See Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d
        1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The inquiries into remedy and liability,
        therefore, cannot be separated: A district court must determine as
        part of the Gingles threshold inquiry whether it can fashion a
        permissible remedy in the particular context of the challenged
        system.”(quoting Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1530–31)); Bone Shirt v.
        Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1025 (8th Cir. 2006) (Gruender, J.
        concurring) (same). Even circuits that do not assess the viability of
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        22-12593                    Opinion of the Court                                10

        the proposed remedy as part of the ﬁrst precondition inquiry
        recognize that proper remedies are critical in Section 2 vote
        dilution cases. See generally Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 831
        (6th Cir. 1998) (“Therefore, even if we found that plaintiﬀs’
        showing met the Gingles pre-conditions or satisﬁed the totality of
        the circumstances test, we would not approve the imposition of
        such a remedy.”). Thus, especially in a case like this one, where
        plaintiﬀs oﬀer only a single, dramatic remedy—transforming a
        cumulative voting statewide system into a single-member
        districted plan—it makes no diﬀerence whether a claim fails for the
        lack of a permissible remedy at the precondition stage or after the
        totality of the circumstances analysis.
              If plaintiﬀs can satisfy each Gingles precondition, the analysis
        then proceeds to a totality of the circumstances test 7 to determine

        7
         As part of the totality of the circumstances analysis, we traditionally consider
        the “Senate factors,” which include:
                1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state
                or political subdivision that touched the right of the members
                of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to
                participate in the democratic process;
                2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
                political subdivision is racially polarized;
                3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
                unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements,
                anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or
                procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
                discrimination against the minority group;
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        22-12593                    Opinion of the Court                            11

        whether the voting system “result[s] in unequal access to the
        electoral process.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46; see also Wright, 979 F.3d
        at 1288 (“Once all three Gingles requirements are established, the
        statutory text directs us to consider the totality of the
        circumstances to determine whether members of a racial group
        have less opportunity than do other members of the electorate.”
        (quotation omitted)). “[I]t is the plaintiﬀ’s burden to establish each
        of the Gingles preconditions and to show, under the totality of the
        circumstances, that members of a protected class suﬀer unequal

               4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members
               of the minority group have been denied access to that process;
               5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the
               state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination
               in such areas as education, employment and health, which
               hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political
               process;
               6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by
               overt or subtle racial appeals; and
               7. the extent to which members of the minority group have
               been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
               ...
               8. whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
               part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
               members of the minority group; and
               9. whether the policy underlying the state or political
               subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to
               voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
        Wright, 979 F.3d at 1289.
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        22-12593                 Opinion of the Court                           12

        access to the political process.” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1307 (emphasis
        in original).
                Putting these pieces together, the traditional Section 2 vote
        dilution case challenges the operative boundaries of an electoral
        system and seeks to redraw those boundaries so that the minority
        population’s voting strength is no longer diluted across the
        aggregated voting population. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46–47. Often,
        these cases challenge multi-member, at-large districts used by
        governmental subunits within a state—such as city councils,
        county commissions, or school boards—and allege vote dilution
        because white voters get to vote for every board member which, in
        turn, drowns out the preferences of minority voters. See generally
        United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1552 (11th Cir.
        1984) (county commission and school board); Sanchez v. Bond, 875
        F.2d 1488, 1489–90 (10th Cir. 1989) (county commission); Badillo v.
        City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884, 885–86 (9th Cir. 1992) (city council);
        Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 71 F.3d 1382, 1385 (8th Cir. 1995)
        (school board); McNeil v. Springﬁeld Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 938 (7th
        Cir. 1988) (school board and park district); Clarke v. City of
        Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 808 (6th Cir. 1994) (city council); Washington
        v. Tensas Par. Sch. Bd., 819 F.2d 609, 610–12 (5th Cir. 1987) (school
        board and policy jury which was the “parish governing authority”);
        Holloway v. City of Va. Beach, 42 F.4th 266, 270–71 (4th Cir. 2022)
        (city council); Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d
        1103, 1111–12 (3d Cir. 1993) (school board); Goosby v. Town Bd. of
        Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1999) (town board); Uno v. City
        of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 977–78 (1st Cir. 1995) (city council). In these
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        22-12593                Opinion of the Court                          13

        cases, plaintiﬀs essentially allege that there are no “safe” districts in
        which minority voters have an enhanced opportunity to elect their
        preferred candidates. If vote dilution is found in these multi-
        member, at-large electoral systems, then the traditional remedy
        entails imposing a single-member districted system with some
        allocation of “majority-minority” districts in which “a minority
        group composes a numerical, working majority of the voting-age
        population.” Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009); see Connor v.
        Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971) (“[S]ingle-member districts are
        preferable to large multi-member districts as a general matter.”).
                Section 2 vote dilution challenges have also been brought
        against electoral systems that employ single-member districts.
        Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 157–58 (1993) (“In [Growe v. Emison,
        507 U.S. 25, 40–42 (1993)], however, we held that the Gingles
        preconditions apply in challenges to single-member as well as
        multimember districts.”); see, e.g., De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1000.
        Plaintiﬀs in these cases generally allege that their votes are diluted
        because the operative electoral map has an insuﬃcient number of
        majority-minority districts. In the context of these single-member
        districts, if vote dilution is found, the traditional remedy is to
        redraw the boundaries of the already-existing single-member
        districts to remove the plan’s dilutive eﬀect. See League of United
        Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 495 (2006) (Roberts, J.,
        concurring) (“[I]n the context of single-member districting
        schemes, we have invariably understood [Section 2 of the VRA] to
        require the possibility of additional single-member districts that
        minority voters might control.” (emphasis in original)).
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        22-12593                   Opinion of the Court                                14

               In these two types of traditional Section 2 cases, plaintiﬀs
        have experienced mixed levels of success depending—of course—
        on the facts of the case. Importantly, however, despite the
        extensive and litigious history of Section 2, it had never been used
        to invalidate a statewide election system on vote dilution grounds
        until the district court reached such a holding in this case.8
                C. Procedural History
               Plaintiﬀs ﬁled this lawsuit in the Northern District of
        Georgia in July 2020. They alleged that Georgia’s statewide PSC
        elections dilute their votes in violation of Section 2 of the VRA
        because black voters have been consistently unable to elect their
        preferred candidates over the voting strength of white voters across
        Georgia.9 Plaintiﬀs maintained that this electoral ineﬀectiveness

        8
          We are unaware of—and plaintiffs failed to provide—any case that has
        invalidated a statewide election system under the Section 2 framework. When
        asked at oral argument if plaintiffs’ counsel was “aware of any case where § 2
        renders a statewide election illegal,” counsel admitted that “[he thought] the
        answer [was] no.” The district court recognized the unprecedented nature of
        this case as well, noting that “[t]his case presents the novel question of whether
        there can be vote dilution in violation of Section 2 of the [VRA] when the
        challenged election is held on a statewide basis.”
        9
         Plaintiffs do not cabin their argument to the PSC’s unique statewide system
        that is coupled with a residency requirement—rather, they take aim at the
        statewide system in general. That is, even without the live-in-the-district
        requirement, plaintiffs would put forth the same vote dilution argument, as
        they made clear during proceedings at the district court:
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        22-12593                Opinion of the Court                             15

        was despite the fact that “African Americans in Georgia [were]
        suﬃciently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a
        majority of the voting-age population in at least one single-
        member district.” Accordingly, plaintiﬀs sought a remedy that
        would change Georgia’s statewide system to single-member
        districts—including one Atlanta-based district with a black
        majority.
              The Secretary moved to dismiss. The district court denied
        the Secretary’s motion in full.
               Then, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In
        particular, plaintiﬀs argued that they were entitled to partial
        summary judgment because they satisﬁed the three preconditions
        for a Section 2 vote dilution claim as set forth in Gingles. 478 U.S.
        at 50–51. The Secretary again argued that plaintiﬀs lacked standing
        or that, at least, plaintiﬀs “failed to demonstrate they have a
        suﬃcient remedy” because “the undisputed evidence demonstrates
        the State has a strong interest in maintaining its form of
        government for the PSC as a statewide elected body.”

              District Court: So you’re saying that even if there was no
              residency requirement your challenge would still be viable?
              Your challenge is to the statewide at-large nature of election?
              [Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Absolutely, Your Honor. In a nutshell,
              our claim is that African-American voters votes are diluted by
              the at-large nature of elections for the [PSC] because of the
              presence of racially-polarized voting.
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        22-12593                    Opinion of the Court                           16

               While the Secretary’s motion was denied in its entirety,
        plaintiﬀs’ motions were granted in part. The district court agreed
        that plaintiﬀs satisﬁed the Gingles preconditions and were entitled
        to summary judgment on those points. However, it determined
        that plaintiﬀs were not entitled to summary judgment on their
        proposed remedy, and the case was set for trial. After a ﬁve-day
        bench trial, the district court found that Georgia’s statewide PSC
        elections diluted the voting strength of black voters in violation of
        Section 2 and permanently enjoined the Secretary from
        administering or certifying future PSC elections under this
        method. The district court also found that plaintiﬀs’ proposed
        remedy (single-member districts) was viable.
                The Secretary appealed, and “move[d] for a stay pending
        appeal of the district court’s . . . order permanently enjoining him
        from conducting state-wide elections on November 8, 2022, for
        Districts 2 and 3 of the Georgia [PSC].” A panel of this Court
        granted a stay, ﬁnding that the district court should not have altered
        the rules of an election that was about to occur under the “Purcell
        principle.” See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006). The Supreme
        Court, however, vacated the stay, concluding that we erred in
        failing to analyze the request under the traditional stay factors.10
        Rose v. Reﬀensperger, 143 S. Ct. 58, 59 (2022).

        10
             The Supreme Court stated:
                  The August 12, 2022 order of the United States Court of
                  Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit staying the district court’s
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        22-12593                      Opinion of the Court                                17

               Accordingly, we ordered the Secretary to “ﬁle a
        supplemental brief addressing whether a stay pending appeal is
        appropriate under the traditional stay factors.” Instead, the
        Secretary ﬁled an “Unopposed Motion to Withdraw Emergency
        Stay Injunction Pending Appeal,” which was granted, and the PSC
        elections at issue did not occur in November 2022. We then heard
        oral arguments on the merits of the Section 2 vote dilution claim.
                                II.      Standard of Review
               We review a district court’s “ﬁnding of vote dilution under
        § 2” of the VRA for “clear error.” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1288.
        Similarly, a “district court’s determination regarding one of the
        Gingles prongs is entitled to considerable deference.” Johnson v.
        Hamrick, 296 F.3d 1065, 1074 (11th Cir. 2002). We have emphasized,

                injunction is vacated. Respondent’s emergency motion for a
                stay pending appeal relied on the traditional stay factors and a
                likelihood of success on the merits, see Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
                418 (2009), yet the Eleventh Circuit failed to analyze the
                motion under that framework. Instead, it applied a version of
                the Purcell principle, see Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per
                curiam), that respondent could not fairly have advanced
                himself in light of his previous representations to the district
                court that the schedule on which the district court proceeded
                was sufficient to enable effectual relief as to the November
                election should applicants win at trial. The Eleventh Circuit
                may reconsider whether a stay pending appeal is appropriate,
                subject to sound equitable discretion.
        Rose v. Raffensperger, 143 S. Ct. 58 (Mem), 213 L. Ed. 2d 1143 (2022)
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        22-12593               Opinion of the Court                        18

        however, that clear error review is not a “rubber stamp,” Wright,
        979 F.3d at 1301, and we always retain the power to “correct a
        district court’s errors of law and its ﬁndings of fact based upon
        misconceptions of law,” United States v. Jones, 57 F.3d 1020, 1022
        (11th Cir. 1995).
                                 III.   Discussion
                This vote dilution challenge is not a traditional one. Rather,
        plaintiﬀs ask us to ﬁnd—for the ﬁrst time ever—that statewide
        elections constitute vote dilution under Section 2. And, as a
        remedy, plaintiﬀs ask that we replace Georgia’s chosen form of
        government (ﬁve statewide commissioners) with a completely
        diﬀerent system (one commission with ﬁve single-member
        districts) that does not protect the statewide interests the Georgia
        General Assembly deemed important. Simply put, plaintiﬀs’
        request strains both federalism and Section 2 to the breaking point.
               Nonetheless, in a novel decision, the district court ruled that
        Georgia’s statewide PSC elections constitute vote dilution in
        violation of Section 2. But, because it is clear to us that plaintiﬀs’
        proposed remedy is a unique application of Section 2 that would
        upset Georgia’s policy interests that are aﬀorded protection by
        federalism and our precedents, we hold that plaintiﬀs have not
        proposed a viable remedy and have failed to satisfy Gingles’s ﬁrst
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        22-12593                  Opinion of the Court                             19

        precondition. See, e.g., Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1529. Thus, we conclude
        that the district court made a mistake of law, and we reverse.11
               A. Plaintiﬀs’ proposed remedy
               Plaintiﬀs propose converting PSC elections from statewide
        to single-member districted elections. Speciﬁcally, under plaintiﬀs’
        proposal, the State of Georgia would be divided into ﬁve districts
        and PSC commissioners would be elected by voters in their district
        rather than by every voter in the State. Plaintiﬀs’ proposed map
        includes one majority-minority district. That district (proposed
        District 1) would span the Atlanta area and include all of Clayton,
        DeKalb, Fayette, Henry, Newton, and Rockdale Counties as well as
        the southern half of Fulton County. This district would have a 54%
        black voting-age population. The other four districts would be
        largely rural and majority white.
               B. Plaintiﬀs’ proposed remedy is not viable
               As an initial matter, we agree with plaintiﬀs that Section 2
        applies because it explicitly protects against voting “standard[s],
        practice[s], or procedure[s]” imposed by “any State or political
        subdivision” that “result[] in a denial or abridgement of the right
        of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C.
        § 10301(a); see Milligan, 599 U.S. at 24–25. Nonetheless, plaintiﬀs

        11
          Because we decide this appeal on the remedy requirement at the first Gingles
        precondition, we do not consider the Secretary’s argument that the district
        court’s finding of racial vote dilution was clearly erroneous, and we do not
        proceed to analyze the “Senate factors” at Gingles’s totality of the
        circumstances stage.
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        22-12593                Opinion of the Court                         20

        cannot satisfy the ﬁrst Gingles precondition because their novel
        application of Section 2 relies on a remedy that is not viable.
        Wright, 979 F.3d at 1302 (“A section 2 plaintiﬀ cannot succeed
        without oﬀering a satisfactory remedial plan.”).
               To reiterate a critical point, plaintiﬀs’ proposed remedy asks
        us to wade into uncharted territory. Plaintiﬀs do not bring a
        routine challenge to an at-large voting structure at the municipal
        or county level and seek a single-member districted plan as the
        remedy. Nor do they seek to redraw an already-existing single-
        member districted system into a less dilutive single-member
        system. We have considered those challenges. See generally Wright,
        979 F.3d at 1287; De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1000. Instead, plaintiﬀs’
        novel proposal is that we dismantle Georgia’s statewide PSC
        system and replace it with an entirely new districted system. But
        we have never gone this far.
               We start by laying out the applicable legal framework
        established by three of our precedents and then we apply our
        precedent to the instant case. See Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1497; S. Christian
        Leadership Conf. v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 1995)
        [hereinafter SCLC] (en banc); Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1416
        (11th Cir. 1998).
               Nipper is the ﬁrst case of the trifecta. 39 F.3d at 1496. In
        Nipper, this Court—sitting en banc—expressly limited our reach in
        certain Section 2 vote dilution cases. Id. In that case, plaintiﬀs
        “challenge[d] the [at-large election] system used to elect the judges
        of Florida’s Fourth Judicial Circuit Court [comprised of three
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        22-12593                   Opinion of the Court                                21

        counties] . . . and the judges of the Duval County Court.” Id. They
        sought “a remedy, such as the creation of subdistricts, that [would]
        ensure their ability to elect black judges of their choice.” Id. at
        1497. A majority of the Court12 interpreted the ﬁrst Gingles
        precondition to require “a remedy within the conﬁnes of the state’s
        judicial model.” Id. at 1531 (emphasis added). Without such a
        remedy, plaintiﬀs could not succeed because “[n]othing in the
        [VRA] . . . permit[s] the federal judiciary to force on the states a
        new model of government; moreover, from a pragmatic
        standpoint, federal courts simply lack legal standards for choosing
        among alternatives.” Id. Then, after examining the alternative
        models proposed by the plaintiﬀs, we held that plaintiﬀs’ claim
        failed because each alternative would threaten important state
        interests and “undermine the administration of justice.” Id. at

        12
          Due to recusals, eight judges sat en banc for Nipper. 39 F.3d at 1496 n.*. Judge
        Tjoflat’s plurality opinion was joined by one judge. Id. at 1496–1547. Judge
        Edmondson concurred and was joined by three judges. Id. at 1547
        (Edmondson, J., concurring). As such, the portions of the plurality opinion
        that were concurred to (specifically Parts III(A) and III(B)(1)) are binding
        because they were joined by a six-judge majority. Id. For Judge Edmondson
        (and the three judges that joined his concurrence), the case was open and shut:
                For me, the point that determines the outcome of the case is
                this one: The State of Florida’s legitimate interest in
                maintaining linkage between jurisdiction and the electoral
                bases of its trial judges is, as a matter of law, great and
                outweighs (either at the vote-dilution-finding stage or at the
                remedy stage) whatever minority vote dilution that may
                possibly have been shown here.
        Id.
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        22-12593               Opinion of the Court                        22

        1543, 1546–47 (“Florida’s current model of trial court elections
        embodies a state judgment that the voters in a judge’s jurisdiction
        should have the right to hold that judge accountable for his or her
        performance in oﬃce.”).
               The logic of Nipper was quickly reaﬃrmed, this time in a
        challenge to Alabama’s at-large elections for trial judges. SCLC, 56
        F.3d at 1281. Sitting en banc again, we had the power to revisit the
        legal standards employed in Nipper—but did not. Id. at 1294.
        Instead, after aﬃrming the district court’s ﬁnding that there was no
        vote dilution, we went on to hold that “no remedy [was] available.”
        Id. We reiterated that “[w]hen determining whether the remedy a
        plaintiﬀ seeks is a feasible alternative to the challenged electoral
        system, a state’s interest in maintaining the challenged system is a
        legitimate factor to be considered.” Id. Then, we considered
        Alabama’s interests in “maintaining the link between a trial judge’s
        electoral base and jurisdiction,” protecting against “favoritism
        concerns” that arise when smaller districts are created, and
        “ensuring a reasonable pool of qualiﬁed potential candidates.” Id.
        at 1297. In sum, we held that “the many state policy
        interests . . . preclude[d] the remedies appellants[] propose[d].” Id.
        Thus, SCLC cemented the analysis of Nipper.
               Finally, in Davis, in aﬃrming the district court’s rejection of
        a proposed remedy in a Section 2 vote dilution suit challenging an
        at-large judicial election system in Florida, a panel of this Court
        reiterated our prior holdings regarding impermissible remedies:
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        22-12593               Opinion of the Court                         23

              In Nipper and SCLC, we ruled that a state’s interest in
              maintaining its judicial model and in preserving such
              linkage outweighed the plaintiﬀs’ interest in
              ameliorating the eﬀects of racial polarization in at-
              large judicial elections. . . . Based on these precedents,
              we hold that Davis’s [proposed remedy] would not be
              a proper remedy . . . .
        139 F.3d at 1423 (citations omitted). In fact, this holding was the
        only possible outcome because our case law “has placed . . . an
        insurmountable weight on a state’s interest in preserving its
        constitution’s judicial selection system and in maintaining linkage
        between its judges’ jurisdictions and electoral bases.” Id.
                The primary takeaway from this line of precedent is that
        general principles of federalism undergird our decisions—as they
        must. Id. (“[W]e must consider Florida’s interest in maintaining the
        challenged electoral system. . . . Of primary importance in this
        case, our adoption of Davis’s plan would require us to contravene
        Florida’s Constitution and to substantially break the link between
        the aﬀected judges’ jurisdictions and electoral bases.”); see also
        SCLC, 56 F.3d at 1298 (Edmondson, J., concurring) (“The basic
        structure of Alabama’s judicial branch of government, including
        the shape of its judicial jurisdictions and the manner of selecting
        trial judges, is in the hands of Alabama’s people.”). This signiﬁcant
        respect for a state’s decisions on matters involving its governmental
        structure stems from our federalist system of government which
        necessitates respect for states that are “residuary sovereigns and
        joint participants in the governance of the Nation.” Alden v. Maine,
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        22-12593                Opinion of the Court                         24

        527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19
        (1997) (“Although the States surrendered many of their powers to
        the new Federal Government, they retained ‘a residuary and
        inviolable sovereignty.’” (quoting The Federalist No. 39, at 245
        ( James Madison)). Thus, while the Fourteenth Amendment and
        VRA overcome state sovereignty in certain factual situations in the
        voting rights arena, we must remain mindful of state authority,
        which is a hallmark of American government. See, e.g., League of
        United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 871 (5th Cir. 1993)
        (“The substantiality of the state’s interest has long been the
        centerpiece of the inquiry into the interpretation of the Civil War
        Amendments and their interplay with the civil rights statutes.”).
                Building on federalism, the second critical takeaway is that
        we must assess a plaintiﬀ’s proposed remedy early and strongly
        consider the state’s interest in maintaining its form of government
        when making that assessment. Speciﬁcally, “there must be a
        remedy within the conﬁnes of the state’s [PSC] model[.]” Nipper, 39
        F.3d at 1531. And we must consider “a state’s interest in
        maintaining the challenged system” when “determining whether
        the remedy a plaintiﬀ seeks is a feasible alternative to the
        challenged electoral system.” SCLC, 56 F.3d at 1294; see also Davis,
        139 F.3d at 1423; Houston Lawyer’s Ass’n v. Att’y Gen., 501 U.S. 419,
        426–27 (1991) (recognizing the importance of considering the
        state’s interest in assessing a plaintiﬀ’s proposed remedy). We must
        be mindful that “[i]mplicit in this ﬁrst Gingles requirement is a
        limitation on the ability of a federal court to abolish a particular
        form of government and to use its imagination to fashion a new
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        22-12593                   Opinion of the Court                               25

        system.” Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1531; Wright, 979 F.3d at 1302 (“A section
        2 plaintiﬀ cannot succeed without oﬀering a satisfactory remedial
        plan,” because “the issue of remedy [at the ﬁrst Gingles
        precondition] is part of the plaintiﬀ’s prima facie case.”).
               The Georgia General Assembly determined that the PSC—
        a state commission with statewide authority and statewide
        responsibilities—should be elected on a statewide basis. O.C.G.A.
        § 46-2-1(a). It did so for race-neutral reasons, and plaintiﬀs do not
        suggest otherwise. Indeed, there is no evidence that race
        motivated Georgia’s choice of electoral format at all. To the
        contrary, the State’s deliberate choice was informed by signiﬁcant
        policy considerations that would be undermined by a forced
        change in the Commission’s structure—from a statewide body to
        a single-member districted body. Thus, an adequate remedy has
        not been proposed. See SCLC, 56 F.3d at 1297 (“[T]he many state
        policy interests we have discussed . . . preclude the remedies
        appellants[] propose; moreover[,] these interests outweigh
        whatever possible vote dilution may have been shown in this
        case.”).
              We reach this conclusion because plaintiﬀs’ proposed
        remedy would fundamentally change the PSC’s structure and
        operations. 13 A change from statewide to single-member districted

        13
          To combat this point, plaintiffs point to the dissent to our grant of a stay in
        this case in August 2022. In pertinent part, the dissent argued that the district
        court did not permit a remedy that altered Georgia’s chosen form of
        government because “[t]he district court didn’t, for instance, add a branch of
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        22-12593                  Opinion of the Court                              26

        elections would clearly aﬀect the inner-workings of the PSC
        because commissioners would be serving a new constituency—
        their respective districts rather than the State as a whole. 14 As PSC
        Chair Pridemore testiﬁed, the current system allows
        commissioners to focus on the needs of the entire State, whereas a
        districted plan has the potential to disconnect commissioners from
        that critical statewide mission. See Id. at 1296 (recognizing, in the
        judicial context, an important state interest in “linkage,” which
        preserves accountability by “[l]inking a trial court judge’s territorial
        jurisdiction and electoral base”); Cousin, 145 F.3d at 827 (same).
               Plaintiﬀs’ proposed remedy would also undo a fundamental
        component of Georgia’s current PSC electoral system—its
        insulation from localized special interests. Our precedents make
        clear that this concern is not only relevant, but also can be the
        deﬁning feature of an elected body. See, e.g., Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1544.

        government, or move a power from one branch to another” or “change how
        any of the three branches must conduct themselves.” Rose v. Sec’y, No. 22-
        12593, 2022 WL 3572823, at *11 (11th Cir. 2022) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
        This test sets an arbitrarily high threshold such that nearly every conceivable
        proposal would pass muster (i.e., no proposed remedy will be as significant as
        offering a fourth branch of government). Such a test does not comport with
        our precedents that expressly protect a state’s chosen form of government.
        And moving from a statewide electoral system to a districted one is, in any
        event, a change of significant magnitude.
        14
          Because the PSC’s electoral map is already drawn into residency districts,
        plaintiffs argue that single-member districted elections would be consistent
        with the State’s chosen model of government. This argument ignores that
        each commissioner is still elected statewide.
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        22-12593                    Opinion of the Court                                 27

        As we have stated, “[t]he implementation of subdistricts would
        increase the potential for ‘home cooking’ by creating a smaller
        electorate and thereby placing added pressure on elected [oﬃcials]
        to favor constituents—especially as election time approaches.” Id.;
        see also SCLC, 56 F.3d at 1297 (“Subdistricting would also increase
        the specter of ‘home cooking’: Creating a smaller electorate would
        increase the pressure to favor constituents.”). And the concern over
        provincialism is merited because “[e]veryone agrees that in some
        politically volatile and controversial cases it is beneﬁcial to have the
        electorate come from the entire circuit rather than some smaller
        portion.” SCLC, 56 F.3d at 1297.
               The provincialism concerns discussed in our precedents are
        magniﬁed when dealing with a statewide body like the PSC.
        Compared to county commission districts, for example, there is
        much greater potential for divisive problems to arise across an
        entire state—especially one as large as Georgia—and the pertinent
        issues are more likely to be large-scale with huge signiﬁcance.15

        15
          Just one example of a hugely divisive and significant issue with which the
        PSC is involved is the construction of Plant Vogtle near Augusta, Georgia.
        The total project “nears $35 billion” in cost. Jeff Amy, Utilities Begin Loading
        Radioactive Fuel into a Second New Reactor at Georgia Nuclear Plant, Assoc. Press
        (Aug. 17, 2023), [https://perma.cc/2PZY-7YTG]. And soon there will be “a
        hearing . . . by the PSC to determine how much customers will pay versus
        Georgia Power.” Erica Van Buren, Georgia Power to Start Loading Fuel into Plant
        Vogtle Unit 4, Test the Reactor, Augusta Chron. (Aug. 18, 2023),
        [https://perma.cc/AYD3-D4G9]. It is easy to see how such a project—which
        carries large costs and directly affects one specific area of the state (in order to,
        in theory, reduce energy costs across the entire state)—would implicate
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        22-12593                Opinion of the Court                        28

        Thus, while changing an at-large electoral system to a single-
        member districted system may be a permissible remedy at the
        county level where there is little risk of provincialism due to the
        county’s size, such a remedy can be impermissible at the State level
        where provincialism concerns merit considerable weight. And the
        State’s interest is all the stronger where, as here, the PSC’s
        statewide body furthers important race-neutral goals. Accordingly,
        the need to prioritize the State’s interests over local concerns
        supports the State’s policy-based decision to have its PSC elected
        statewide. And ﬁnally, while it does not play a determinative role
        in our analysis, we note that Georgia is not the only state to
        undertake this calculus and conclude that statewide elections are
        best for state boards like the PSC. Rather, nine other states—of
        varying regions and political majorities—employ statewide
        elections for their state commissions. Plaintiﬀs’ counsel admitted
        as much at oral argument: “there are . . . seven states . . . including
        Georgia, that use [statewide] at-large elections for some or all of
        their utility regulators,” as well as “two states . . . that use
        [statewide] at-large elections for some or all of their boards of
        education[],” and “Hawaii . . . uses [statewide] at-large elections for
        a native Hawaiian board.” And there is no reason that if the
        statewide PSC—justiﬁed by a legitimate desire to avoid
        provincialism in the regulation of utilities and untainted by even a
        suggestion of racial bias in its creation—could be converted by this

        “home cooking” concerns in a way that would negatively affect the PSC’s
        mission to protect the interests of the entire State.
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        22-12593                Opinion of the Court                        29

        Court into a multidistrict body, that the State Supreme Courts and
        other multi-member statewide entities could not be converted as
        well.
                Here, plaintiﬀs have failed to put forward an alternative less-
        dilutive voting practice that can be implemented to elect
        commissioners to the statewide PSC. Plaintiﬀs instead propose
        adopting an election scheme that would eﬀectively change the
        structure of the PSC itself from a statewide body to a body that
        comprises single-member districts. This extraordinary remedy is
        not viable given Georgia’s strong interests in maintaining the PSC
        as a statewide body.
               We do not mean to suggest that Section 2 plaintiﬀs could
        never prevail when asserting a Section 2 vote dilution claim against
        a statewide body. Instead, we merely reaﬃrm the principle that
        plaintiﬀs must propose a remedy within the conﬁnes of the state’s
        chosen model of government when bringing such a claim.
               Further supporting our decision is the diﬃculty in selecting
        a reasonable benchmark to evaluate the challenged voting practice.
        As the Supreme Court has explained, sometimes selecting a
        reasonable benchmark is easy, sometimes it is hard. Holder v. Hall,
        512 U.S. 874, 880–81 (1994). Here, plaintiﬀs simply state, without
        citing any case, that their proposed remedy is the benchmark. But
        that cannot be right. If we accepted plaintiﬀs’ argument that a
        proposed remedy is the benchmark, we would never struggle to
        ﬁnd one. And, in fact, in Holder, the Supreme Court wrestled with
        the issue of how to choose an appropriate benchmark. Id. at 881.
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        22-12593                Opinion of the Court                         30

        In that case, the plaintiﬀs challenged the size of a county
        commission and argued that a ﬁve-member commission should
        serve as the benchmark over the single member commission that
        was in place. Id. The Supreme Court held that “there [was] no
        principled reason why one size should be picked over another as
        the benchmark for comparison.” Id. Similarly, here, plaintiﬀs have
        not provided a principled reason why a PSC comprising single-
        member districts should be picked as the benchmark.
                We turn now to plaintiﬀs’ counterarguments—and reject
        them.
               To start, despite plaintiﬀs’ argument to the contrary, the
        Nipper line of precedent is binding on the instant case. Of course,
        we are fully aware that Nipper, SCLC, and Davis involve judicial
        elections. But the application of these decisions is not limited to
        judicial elections only. Even if that were the case, these decisions
        would still have equal force here because the PSC is a “quasi-
        judicial” administrative body. Tamiami Trail, 99 S.E.2d at 233 (“It
        has been recognized by this court and by the courts of other
        jurisdictions that an administrative body such as the Public Service
        Commission may, in matters which come before it for
        determination, perform quasi-judicial functions as well as quasi-
        legislative functions.”). This categorization is not hollow. Rather,
        the PSC operates in a distinctly judicial fashion. It “hears rate cases,
        holds hearings, listens to witnesses, makes evidentiary rulings, and
        weighs testimony from stakeholders to come to a decision.”
        Further, the reasons that we respect a state’s decision regarding its
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        22-12593                  Opinion of the Court                              31

        judicial election system (i.e., linking the electoral and jurisdictional
        districts for accountability, protecting against “home cooking,” and
        promoting fairness) apply just the same in the “quasi-judicial”
        context (as analyzed above). See generally Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1544.
               We also recognize that Davis references a state’s
        “constitutional” model at multiple points. 139 F.3d at 1423. We do
        not read Davis to mean, however, that only constitutionally
        enshrined models of government are entitled to judicial respect.
        To the contrary, as explicated in Davis, “[u]nder Nipper . . . this
        court must carefully consider the impact that any remedial
        proposal would have on the judicial model enshrined in a state’s
        constitution or statutes.” 139 F.3d at 1421 (emphasis added). As
        such, we do not analyze whether the Georgia General Assembly
        chose its form of government by constitutional or statutory means
        because it makes no diﬀerence. 16 Compare Ga. Const. Art. IV, § I, ¶
        I(a), with O.C.G.A. § 46-2-1(a). Either way, Georgia chose the
        statewide electoral model for the PSC, and plaintiﬀs’ proposed
        remedy would alter that choice in contravention of the principles
        of federalism.

        16
          We recognize that the district court interpreted the Georgia Constitution’s
        requirement that the PSC be “elected by the people” to require only that the
        PSC be elected—instead of appointed by the governor, for example. See Ga.
        Const. Art. IV, § I, ¶ I(a). In other words, the district court found that the
        specific form of those elections (statewide) is not constitutionally prescribed
        and is rooted only in statute. See O.C.G.A. § 46-2-1(a). As such, the district
        court concluded that plaintiffs’ proposed remedy would not require the
        alteration of Georgia’s chosen form of government.
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        22-12593                   Opinion of the Court                                32

                Next, plaintiﬀs argue in a Federal Rule of Appellate
        Procedure 28(j) letter that the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v.
        Milligan supports their argument because the Supreme Court
        rejected Alabama’s arguments which “echoe[d] the Secretary’s
        state-interest argument.” 599 U.S. at 24–26. Milligan counsels
        against a “single-minded view of § 2” and quotes Wisconsin
        Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 595 U.S. 398, 405 (2022),
        to provide that a court cannot “improperly reduc[e] Gingles’
        totality-of-circumstances analysis to a single [Senate] factor.”
        Milligan, 599 U.S. at 24–26. Critically, however, our analysis is not
        “single-minded”; rather, in conformance with precedent, we
        analyze plaintiﬀs’ proposed remedy and look to a state’s policy
        interests and rationales as one part of that larger undertaking. 17
        Similarly, Wisconsin Legislature does not change our analysis—we
        are not weighing the Senate factors because we do not reach
        Section 2’s totality of the circumstances test (i.e., step two of the
        Section 2 analysis once the Gingles preconditions are satisﬁed).
        Rather, we go no further than the ﬁrst Gingles precondition as
        interpreted by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent. See League of
        Women Voters of Fla., Inc. v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 66 F.4th 905, 943 (11th
        Cir. 2023) (describing our binding commitment to our Circuit’s
        precedent). At this ﬁrst step, we conclude that plaintiﬀs’ lack of an
        adequate remedial proposal means that their claim cannot proceed.

        17
          A state’s interest, however, is not infallible. See, e.g., SCLC, 56 F.3d at 1297
        (“[T]hese interests outweigh whatever possible vote dilution may have been
        shown in this case.”).
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        See Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18 (“To succeed in proving a § 2 violation
        under Gingles, plaintiﬀ must satisfy three preconditions.” (italics
        added) (quotations omitted)).
                  Finally, plaintiﬀs argue that other evidence—such as
        testimony from other commissioners that their duties would not
        change and testimony from the “long-time director of the
        Secretary’s Center for Election Systems” that transitioning to
        single-member districts would be feasible—proves that “switching
        to single-member districts would not even aﬀect the
        commissioners’ day-to-day work.” 18 As to whether the PSC will be
        aﬀected by the potential change in electoral format, the district
        court dismissed the State’s interests, such as its “linkage” concern
        (i.e., its interest in promoting accountability by having an oﬃcial’s
        territorial jurisdiction mirror his electoral base). But the district

        18
          Despite their own reliance on lay opinion testimony, plaintiffs also argue
        that PSC Chair Pridemore’s “lay opinion” regarding the State’s policy interest
        in maintaining its statewide election system is insufficient. The district court
        agreed, finding that Pridemore’s testimony was “not tethered to any objective
        data” and “lacked foundation.” It is unclear to us what “data” could be offered
        to better support Georgia’s policy interests. To the extent that the district
        court preferred “arguments buried in legislative history” over Pridemore’s
        testimony, we disagree that such forms of evidence would be more
        compelling or instructive. All in all, we understand the principal reasons that
        Georgia adopted a statewide elected PSC were a concern for avoiding conflicts
        amongst the PSC’s commissioners in order to achieve cohesive utility policy
        that favors Georgians in each region of the State equally and the desire to
        dodge the “home cooking” problem (issues that we have highlighted as
        important in our precedents). We find these rationales are properly
        considered.
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        court’s reasoning was premised on discounting our Nipper line of
        precedent because those cases concerned judicial elections. We
        have already explained how this conclusion rests on a mistake of
        law. See Jones, 57 F.3d at 1022 (“We may correct a district court’s
        errors of law and its ﬁndings of fact based upon misconceptions of
        law.”). And because the district court also mistook other critical
        parts of our law—including our Circuit’s emphasis on Gingles’s ﬁrst
        precondition and the eﬀect that federalism and our precedent have
        in a novel Section 2 case—we must reverse. Id.
                                IV.    Conclusion
                The Georgia General Assembly determined that the State’s
        PSC—a constitutionally created state commission with statewide
        authority and statewide responsibilities—should be elected
        statewide. Georgia chose this electoral format to protect critical
        policy interests and there is no evidence, or allegation, that race
        was a motivating factor in this decision. On the facts of this case,
        we conclude that plaintiﬀs’ novel remedial request fails because
        Georgia’s chosen form of government for the PSC is aﬀorded
        protection by federalism and our precedents. In simple terms,
        plaintiﬀs have failed to propose a viable remedy and cannot satisfy
        the ﬁrst Gingles precondition as we understand it. Because the
        district court made mistakes of law, we reverse.
              REVERSED.