Court Opinion

ID: 9369942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 13:01:57.046645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.229735
License: Public Domain

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    ROBERT D. RUSSO, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF
     THOMAS F. THORNTON), ET AL. v. BRETT
             W. THORNTON ET AL.
                  (AC 45070)
                       Alvord, Prescott and Moll, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia,
    breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the defendant B’s alleged
    tortious interference with the business expectancies of the plaintiff
    companies, T Co. and H Co. The decedent, T, founded the plaintiff
    companies and, following T’s death, R was elected as their sole director.
    While employed by the plaintiff companies, B established the defendant
    companies, W Co. and D Co., to engage in the same business as the
    plaintiff companies. B covertly removed equipment and records from
    the plaintiff companies’ place of business and, subsequently, R termi-
    nated B’s employment. Before trial, the court granted the plaintiffs’
    application for temporary ex parte relief, ordering, inter alia, that the
    defendants were enjoined from transferring the defendant companies’
    assets. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary
    receiver to monitor the defendants’ compliance with the terms of the
    temporary injunction. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs
    against B as to certain counts of the complaint. The remaining counts
    were tried to the court, which determined that the plaintiffs had not
    established a prima facie case for a claim under the Connecticut Unfair
    Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) against the defendant
    companies. The court, in a supplemental memorandum of decision,
    concluded that B had violated CUTPA and that the plaintiffs were entitled
    to punitive damages. The court thereafter awarded punitive damages
    against B in the form of attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiffs filed
    an application for a financial institution execution directed to B. B filed
    a motion to vacate the execution and a judgment lien encumbering his
    real property, arguing that the court had not rendered a final judgment
    because the temporary injunction and temporary receivership had not
    been made permanent or further modified, and because there had been
    no ‘‘formal entry of judgment.’’ The court denied B’s motion, concluding
    that it rendered a final judgment when it awarded punitive damages
    and that the defendants failed to appeal within the ensuing twenty day
    appeal period. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ application for a
    turnover and charging order. On the defendants’ appeal to this court,
    held:
1. D Co. was not aggrieved by the trial court’s denial of B’s motion to vacate
    or by the court’s turnover and charging order and, accordingly, this
    court dismissed the portion of the appeal filed by D Co.; D Co. did not
    have a specific personal and legal interest that had been specially and
    injuriously affected by the judgment from which the defendants
    appealed, as the execution and the judgment lien affected only B’s
    property interests and the turnover and charging order imposed obliga-
    tions only on B and W Co.
2. The trial court correctly concluded that it had rendered a final judgment
    that gave rise to the postjudgment enforcement remedies pursued by
    the plaintiffs: the court rendered a final judgment when it determined
    the amount of the punitive damages awarded to the plaintiffs with
    respect to their CUTPA claim against B because, at that juncture, all of
    their claims had been resolved, no appeal had been filed on or before
    the expiration of the appeal period and, accordingly, the plaintiffs were
    authorized to seek postjudgment enforcement remedies in the form of
    the execution, the judgment lien, and the turnover and charging order,
    all of which originated following the expiration of the appeal period
    and the automatic appellate stay of execution; moreover, contrary to
    the claim of B and W Co., no legal authority mandates that, as a prerequi-
    site for the rendering of a final judgment in a civil case, a trial court
    must issue a ‘‘formal written and signed judgment.’’
3. The trial court properly ordered injunctive relief and continued a receiver-
   ship as part of its turnover and charging order:
  a. B and W Co. could not prevail on their claim that the turnover and
  charging order improperly subjected them to injunctive relief; B and W
  Co. conflated the plaintiffs’ prejudgment requests for injunctive relief
  with their postjudgment request for temporary injunctive relief in connec-
  tion with their application for a turnover and charging order, and the
  court did not abuse its discretion in temporarily enjoining B and W Co.
  from taking certain actions relating to W Co.’s operations pending B’s
  turnover of his interest in W Co. to the plaintiffs or the satisfaction of
  the judgment debt.
  b. B and W Co.’s claim that the turnover and charging order improperly
  continued the receivership pending B’s turnover of his interest in W Co.
  to the plaintiffs or the satisfaction of the judgment debt was unavailing
  because an application for a receiver is a civil action sounding in equity
  and, thus, the court did not require express statutory authorization to
  continue the receivership temporarily.
   Argued November 15, 2022—officially released February 14, 2023

                           Procedural History

   Action seeking damages for, inter alia, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk,
where the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint; there-
after, the case was transferred to the Complex Litigation
Docket; subsequently, certain counts of the complaint
were tried to the jury before Lee, J.; verdict and judg-
ment in part for the plaintiffs; thereafter, the plaintiffs
withdrew certain counts of the complaint; subse-
quently, the remaining counts of the complaint were
tried to the court, Lee, J.; judgment in part for the
plaintiffs; subsequently, the court, Ozalis, J., awarded
the plaintiffs attorney’s fees and costs; thereafter, the
court, Ozalis, J., granted the plaintiffs’ application for
a turnover and charging order and denied the named
defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment lien and finan-
cial institution execution, and the defendants appealed
to this court. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.
 Harold F. McGuire, Jr., with whom was Daniel F.
McGuire, for the appellants (defendants).
 Joseph DaSilva, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was
Marc J. Grenier, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
                         Opinion

   MOLL, J. The defendants, Brett W. Thornton (Brett),
ProxySoft Worldwide, Inc. (ProxySoft Worldwide), and
ProxySoft Direct, Inc. (ProxySoft Direct), appeal from
the judgment of the trial court (1) granting an applica-
tion for a turnover and charging order filed by the plain-
tiffs, Home Dental Care, Inc., Thornton International,
Inc., and Robert D. Russo, acting in his capacity as
executor of the estate of Thomas F. Thornton, and (2)
denying Brett’s motion to vacate a judgment lien and
a financial institution execution. On appeal, the defen-
dants claim that the court (1) incorrectly concluded
that it had rendered a final judgment that gave rise to
the postjudgment enforcement remedies pursued by
the plaintiffs, and (2) improperly ordered injunctive
relief and continued a receivership as part of the turn-
over and charging order. We conclude that ProxySoft
Direct is not aggrieved by the judgment from which the
defendants have appealed, and, therefore, we dismiss
the portion of the appeal filed by ProxySoft Direct.
As to the remainder of the appeal, filed by Brett and
ProxySoft Worldwide, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
   The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. The decedent, Thomas F. Thornton, was the
founder of Thornton International, Inc., and Home Den-
tal Care, Inc. (collectively, plaintiff companies), which
were involved in the manufacture and distribution of
dental floss. Following the decedent’s death, Russo was
appointed as the executor of the decedent’s estate. On
April 9, 2014, in accordance with the decedent’s will,
Russo was elected as the sole director, secretary, and
treasurer of the plaintiff companies, and Brett was
elected as the president of the plaintiff companies.
While employed by the plaintiff companies, Brett estab-
lished ProxySoft Worldwide and ProxySoft Direct (col-
lectively, defendant companies) to engage in the same
business as the plaintiff companies. In late April, 2015,
Brett covertly removed, inter alia, equipment and
records from the plaintiff companies’ place of business
and transported those items to the defendant compa-
nies’ place of business. By correspondence dated May
4, 2015, Brett informed Russo that he intended to start
his own company engaging in the same lines of business
as the plaintiff companies. On May 6, 2015, Russo dis-
covered Brett’s removal of the plaintiff companies’
assets, and, on the same day, Russo terminated Brett’s
employment as president of the plaintiff companies.
  On May 14, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an application
for an ex parte temporary injunction and an order to
show cause, as well as a verified complaint. In an
amended verified complaint dated February 12, 2016,1
the plaintiffs alleged claims of breach of fiduciary duty
(count one), statutory theft in violation of General Stat-
utes § 52-564 (count two), conversion (count three),
violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(CUTSA), General Statutes § 35-50 et seq. (count four),
tortious interference with contract and business expec-
tancies (count five), violation of § 1125 (a) of the Lan-
ham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (count six), injunctive
relief pursuant to the common law (count seven), and
violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
(CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. (count
eight). The defendants filed a verified answer and spe-
cial defenses, and the plaintiffs filed a reply to the spe-
cial defenses.
   On April 12, 2016, the trial court, Heller, J., granted
the plaintiffs’ application for temporary ex parte relief,
ordering, inter alia, that the defendants were enjoined
from transferring the defendant companies’ assets. The
same day, the court granted a motion that the plaintiffs
had filed on October 23, 2015, seeking to appoint a
temporary receiver vis-à-vis the defendant companies.
The court appointed Attorney Frederic S. Ury to serve
as the temporary receiver. Ury’s duties included, inter
alia, monitoring the defendants’ compliance with the
terms of the temporary injunction, but Ury was not
responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of
the defendant companies. The court further ordered
that the defendant companies would incur the cost of
Ury’s fees and expenses.
   On September 20, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion
requesting that the court conduct a court trial as to
counts six through eight concomitantly with a jury trial
that had been scheduled as to counts one through five.
On October 6, 2017, the court, Lee, J., granted the plain-
tiffs’ motion.
   The evidentiary portion of the jury trial on counts
one through five commenced on October 11, 2017, and
concluded on October 25, 2017. On October 31, 2017,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs
against Brett, which the court accepted and recorded
on the same day. The jury also answered interrogatories
as part of the verdict as follows. With respect to the
plaintiffs’ claims against Brett, encompassed in counts
one through five, the jury awarded a total of $3,592,000
in damages as to the claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
statutory theft, and tortious interference with contract
and business expectancies, but it awarded no compen-
satory damages as to the conversion or CUTSA claims.2
Although the jury did not award compensatory damages
vis-à-vis the conversion claim against Brett, it deter-
mined that the plaintiffs were entitled to common-law
punitive damages as to that claim. With respect to the
plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant companies,
encompassed in counts three through five, the jury
found the defendant companies liable only on the
CUTSA claim, but it awarded no damages as to that
claim.
   On January 2, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to
dissolve the temporary injunction and to discharge the
temporary receiver. On January 19, 2018, the plaintiffs
filed an objection. On February 1, 2018, the court (1)
denied without prejudice the portion of the defendants’
motion seeking to discharge the temporary receiver and
(2) granted in part and denied in part the portion of the
defendants’ motion seeking to dissolve the temporary
injunction, ordering in relevant part that the defendant
companies continue to be enjoined from transferring
any of their assets.3
  On March 22, 2018, the court granted in part a motion
to set aside the verdict that the defendants had filed
on November 7, 2017, and ordered a remittitur reducing
the damages awarded against Brett from $3,592,000 to
$2,276,000. The plaintiffs accepted the remittitur by way
of a notice filed on April 9, 2018.4 On July 23, 2018, the
plaintiffs withdrew counts six and seven.
   On April 1, 2019, the court issued a supplemental
decision addressing count eight, which alleged that the
defendants had violated CUTPA.5 The court determined
that the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case
for a CUTPA claim against the defendant companies.
As to Brett, however, the court reserved the questions
of (1) whether Brett was liable under CUTPA and, (2)
if so, whether, under CUTPA, the plaintiffs were entitled
to punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.6
   On April 5, 2019, the defendants filed another motion
to discharge the temporary receiver, to which the plain-
tiffs filed an objection on the same day. On May 30,
2019, the court ordered that the temporary receivership
‘‘should continue in place’’ except that, going forward,
the plaintiffs would be responsible for the cost of the
receiver’s fees and expenses and it would be ‘‘within
[the plaintiffs’] discretion to decide if they want to con-
tinue to do it.’’7
   On May 21, 2020, the court issued a memorandum of
decision8 concluding that (1) the plaintiffs had demon-
strated that Brett had violated CUTPA and (2) the plain-
tiffs were entitled to punitive damages pursuant to Gen-
eral Statutes § 42-110g (a) of CUTPA in the form of
attorney’s fees and costs, the amount of which would
be determined following an evidentiary hearing.9 On
March 4, 2021, after several evidentiary hearings, the
court, Ozalis, J., awarded the plaintiffs punitive dam-
ages under CUTPA against Brett in the total amount of
$177,615.90, comprising $151,740.50 in attorney’s fees
and $25,875.40 in costs.10 Electronic notice of the March
4, 2021 decision issued on the same day.
  Prior to April 1, 2021, no appeal had been filed by
the defendants in the present case.11 On April 1, 2021, the
plaintiffs filed an application for a financial institution
execution directed to Brett as the judgment debtor. The
execution identified the date of the judgment as March
4, 2021, and the amount of the judgment to be
$2,453,615.90. On May 25, 2021, the execution was
issued.
   On June 10, 2021, Brett filed a motion to vacate the
execution, as well as a judgment lien that the plaintiffs
had recorded on the land records of the town of Wilton
on April 1, 2021, encumbering real property owned by
Brett (motion to vacate). Brett argued that the execu-
tion and the judgment lien were premature because the
court had yet to render a final judgment. Specifically,
Brett asserted that there remained ‘‘open’’ matters, in
particular, the temporary injunction and temporary
receivership ordered by the court that, as Brett argued,
had not been made permanent or further modified. Brett
further contended that there had been no ‘‘formal entry
of judgment’’ in the present case ‘‘detailing the defen-
dants, the counts of the complaint that are involved, the
amounts awarded, the costs, and any interest awarded,’’
and that no notice of such judgment had ever issued.
   On July 20, 2021, the execution was returned partially
satisfied.12 On July 23, 2021, the plaintiffs filed an objec-
tion to Brett’s motion to vacate. The same day, pursuant
to General Statutes § 52-356b,13 the plaintiffs filed an
application seeking (1) a turnover order directing Brett
to turn over to the plaintiffs 100 percent of his shares,
stock certificates, or other indicia of his ownership of
interest in ProxySoft Worldwide, and (2) a charging
order providing that, until Brett had complied with the
turnover order or until the satisfaction of the judgment
debt, any and all distributions to which Brett may be
entitled in connection with his interest in ProxySoft
Worldwide would be transferred to the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs also requested the appointment of a receiver
‘‘to control the affairs and [to] operate . . . ProxySoft
Worldwide . . . until such time as the judgment refer-
enced herein has been satisfied in full.’’ On August 24,
2021, the defendants filed a combined reply brief to the
plaintiffs’ objection to Brett’s motion to vacate and an
objection to the plaintiffs’ application for a turnover
and charging order. On September 22, 2021, the court
held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ application for a turn-
over and charging order.
   On October 21, 2021, the court denied Brett’s motion
to vacate, determining that (1) it had rendered a final
judgment on March 4, 2021, and (2) the defendants had
failed to file an appeal within the ensuing twenty day
appeal period, such that, as of March 25, 2021, the
plaintiffs were free to pursue postjudgment enforce-
ment remedies. In a separate decision issued on Octo-
ber 21, 2021, the court granted the plaintiffs’ application
for a turnover and charging order, ordering that (1)
Brett’s interest in ProxySoft Worldwide was charged
with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment
debt, plus costs, (2) Brett was to turn over to the plain-
tiffs his sole shareholder’s interest in ProxySoft World-
wide, and (3) until Brett had turned over his interest
in ProxySoft Worldwide to the plaintiffs or until the
judgment debt was paid in full, inter alia, (a) ProxySoft
Worldwide could neither acquire nor alienate any capi-
tal asset without court approval, (b) ProxySoft World-
wide could not issue any loans, and (c) neither
ProxySoft Worldwide nor Brett could ‘‘undertake, enter
into, or consummate any sale, transfer, encumbrance,
hypothecation, split, dilution, or other modification of
[Brett’s] interest in [ProxySoft Worldwide] or in
[ProxySoft Worldwide’s] structure and/or ownership.’’
The court further ordered that, pending Brett’s compli-
ance with the turnover order or the satisfaction of the
judgment debt, ProxySoft Worldwide was required to
supply future financial documents within ten days fol-
lowing their issuance or the close of any respective
accounting period to Ury, ‘‘whose appointment as the
receiver . . . [was] . . . continued and renewed.’’14
This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
                             I
  As a preliminary matter, we address the issue of
whether ProxySoft Direct is aggrieved by the trial
court’s denial of Brett’s motion to vacate or by the
court’s turnover and charging order. We conclude that
ProxySoft Direct is not aggrieved by either of these
decisions, and, therefore, we dismiss the portion of the
appeal filed by ProxySoft Direct.15
   ‘‘ ‘Aggrievement, in essence, is appellate standing.
. . . It is axiomatic that aggrievement is a basic require-
ment of standing, just as standing is a fundamental
requirement of jurisdiction. . . . There are two general
types of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory;
either type will establish standing, and each has its own
unique features. . . . The test for determining [classi-
cal] aggrievement encompasses a well settled twofold
determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement
must demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest
in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished
from a general interest shared by the community as a
whole; second, the party claiming aggrievement must
establish that this specific personal and legal interest
has been specially and injuriously affected by the deci-
sion.’ . . . In re Ava W., 336 Conn. 545, 554–55, 248
A.3d 675 (2020); see also General Statutes § 52-263
(establishing as prerequisite to party filing appeal that
‘party is aggrieved by the decision of the court or judge
upon any question or questions of law’). ‘Aggrievement
is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished
from a certainty, that some legally protected interest
. . . has been adversely affected.’ ’’ Healey v. Mantell,
216 Conn. App. 514, 524, 285 A.3d 823 (2022).
  We conclude that ProxySoft Direct does not have a
specific personal and legal interest that has been spe-
cially and injuriously affected either by the court’s
denial of Brett’s motion to vacate or by the court’s
turnover and charging order.16 Both the execution and
the judgment lien affect only Brett’s property interests,
such that the court’s denial of Brett’s motion to vacate
has no cognizable bearing on ProxySoft Direct. Simi-
larly, the turnover and charging order makes no men-
tion of ProxySoft Direct; rather, it concerns Brett’s
interests in ProxySoft Worldwide and imposes obliga-
tions only on Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide. Accord-
ingly, ProxySoft Direct is not aggrieved by the judgment
from which the defendants have appealed, and, there-
fore, we dismiss the portion of this appeal filed by
ProxySoft Direct.
                             II
   With respect to the trial court’s denial of Brett’s
motion to vacate, as well as the court’s turnover and
charging order, Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide claim
that the court incorrectly concluded that it had rendered
a final judgment and, therefore, the plaintiffs were not
entitled to pursue postjudgment enforcement remedies
in the form of the execution, the judgment lien, and the
turnover and charging order. We disagree.
   Whether the trial court correctly concluded that it
had rendered a final judgment that gave rise to postjudg-
ment enforcement remedies presents a question of law
subject to plenary review. See Williams v. Mansfield,
215 Conn. App. 1, 10, 281 A.3d 1263 (2022) (‘‘[w]hen
. . . a court’s decision is challenged on the basis of a
question of law, our review is plenary’’).
   ‘‘The right of appeal is purely statutory, and . . .
§ 52-26317 provides that parties may appeal to this court
from the final judgment of the trial court.’’ (Footnote
in original.) Kazemi v. Allen, 214 Conn. App. 86, 102,
279 A.3d 742 (2022), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 971, 286
A.3d 906 (2023); see also Practice Book § 61-1 (‘‘[a]n
aggrieved party may appeal from a final judgment,
except as otherwise provided by law’’). ‘‘ ‘When judg-
ment has been rendered on an entire complaint . . .
such judgment shall constitute a final judgment.’ Prac-
tice Book § 61-2. As a general rule, however, a judgment
that disposes of only a part of a complaint is not final,
unless it disposes of all of the causes of action against
the appellant. Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410,
417–18 n.8, 862 A.2d 292 (2004); Cheryl Terry Enter-
prises, Ltd. v. Hartford, 262 Conn. 240, 246, 811 A.2d
1272 (2002); see also Practice Book § 61-3 (party may
appeal if partial judgment disposes ‘of all causes of
action . . . against a particular party or parties’).’’ Mer-
ibear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709, 717,
183 A.3d 1164 (2018).
  ‘‘Unless a different time period is provided by statute,
an appeal must be filed within twenty days of the date
notice of the judgment or decision is given.’’ Practice
Book § 63-1 (a). ‘‘If notice [of the judgment or decision]
is given only by mail or by electronic delivery, the appeal
period shall begin on the day that notice was sent to
counsel of record by the clerk of the trial court.’’ Prac-
tice Book § 63-1 (b). ‘‘Except where otherwise provided
by statute or other law, proceedings to enforce or carry
out the judgment or order shall be automatically stayed
until the time to file an appeal has expired.’’ Practice
Book § 61-11 (a).
   In denying Brett’s motion to vacate, the court con-
cluded that it had rendered a final judgment on March
4, 2021, when it determined the amount of the punitive
damages awarded to the plaintiffs vis-à-vis their CUTPA
claim against Brett. The court explained that, ‘‘[a]s all
of the causes of action asserted against the defendants
in the amended [verified] complaint were adjudicated
when this court issued its memorandum of decision on
March 4, 2021, judgment was final on that date.’’ The
court further determined that the defendants did not
file an appeal within the ensuing twenty day appeal
period, such that the ‘‘judgment was final for all pur-
poses, including but not limited to, for collection pur-
poses on March 25, 2021.’’ Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that there was no basis to vacate the execution,
which was issued on May 25, 2021, or the judgment
lien, which was recorded on April 1, 2021.18
   We agree with the court’s reasoning insofar as the
court concluded that, as of March 25, 2021, the plaintiffs
were permitted to pursue postjudgment enforcement
remedies to collect the full amount of the damages
that they had been awarded. The court rendered an
appealable final judgment on March 4, 2021, when it
determined the amount of statutory punitive damages
to which the plaintiffs were entitled pursuant to their
CUTPA claim against Brett. At that juncture, all of the
plaintiffs’ claims had been resolved in full.19 Electronic
notice of the March 4, 2021 decision issued on the same
day, thereby commencing the twenty day appeal period
and invoking the attendant automatic appellate stay of
execution. See Practice Book §§ 61-11 (a) and 63-1 (a)
and (b). No appeal was filed on or before March 24,
2021, when the appeal period and the automatic appel-
late stay of execution expired. See Practice Book §§ 61-
11 (a) and 63-1 (a). Accordingly, the plaintiffs were
authorized to seek postjudgment enforcement remedies
in the form of the execution, the judgment lien, and the
turnover and charging order, all of which originated
following the expiration of the appeal period and of
the automatic appellate stay of execution vis-à-vis the
March 4, 2021 decision, in order to collect the full
amount of damages awarded to them.
  Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide claim that, as a mat-
ter of law, in order to render a final judgment, the
court was required to issue a ‘‘formal written and signed
judgment’’ that was ‘‘sufficiently detailed to identify
within the four corners of the document all the issues
that have been decided during the litigation,’’ including
the ‘‘amount of the judgment debt, the date that judg-
ment was entered on a jury verdict, and any associated
costs, with reference to underlying interim decisions,’’
and to ‘‘eliminate the need for extraneous references.’’20
Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide maintain that ‘‘[t]he
written judgment in this case should have included all
that information in sufficient detail to enable appellate
review on a complete record. [They] were entitled to
assume that a judgment with those characteristics
would be rendered before their time to appeal began
to run and before judgment enforcement proceedings
commenced,’’ and yet, ‘‘[t]he trial court’s various rulings
were never consolidated in a single dispositive final
judgment’’ as per ‘‘[t]he usual practice in this state
. . . .’’21
   Put simply, Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide’s proposi-
tion is without merit. There is no legal authority of
which we are aware mandating that, as a prerequisite
for the rendering of a final judgment in a civil case, a
trial court in this state must issue a ‘‘formal written and
signed judgment’’ as described by Brett and ProxySoft
Worldwide.22 On at least one occasion, this court has
eschewed the notion that the finality of a judgment is
conditioned on the entry of a ‘‘formal judgment’’ follow-
ing the filing of a motion for judgment. See Heyman
Associates No. 5, L.P. v. FelCor TRS Guarantor, L.P.,
153 Conn. App. 387, 396 n.11, 102 A.3d 87 (determining
that, notwithstanding lack of ‘‘formal judgment’’ ren-
dered at time that appeal was filed, defendant had
appealed from final judgment ‘‘insofar as at the time
the appeal was taken the court had adjudicated the
entirety of the plaintiffs’ complaint’’), cert. denied, 315
Conn. 901, 104 A.3d 106 (2014). Moreover, our case
law does not reflect that parties have struggled to file
appeals in cases involving complaints with multiple
counts that are disposed of in segments without the
entry of a single document comprehensively detailing
the proceedings. See, e.g., Campbell v. Porter, 212 Conn.
App. 377, 386–87, 387 n.10, 275 A.3d 684 (2022) (appeal
filed in case in which portions of revised complaint
were disposed of in myriad ways, including by way of
motion to strike, following jury trial, and withdrawal
of certain counts); Brady v. Bickford, 179 Conn. App.
776, 784–86, 183 A.3d 27 (2018) (appeal filed in case in
which portion of amended complaint was disposed of
by way of summary judgment and remainder of
amended complaint was adjudicated following court
trial).23
  In sum, we conclude that the court properly denied
Brett’s motion to vacate, and we reject Brett and
ProxySoft Worldwide’s initial challenge to the court’s
turnover and charging order.
                            III
  Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide also claim that, in
the turnover and charging order, the trial court improp-
erly (1) ordered injunctive relief and (2) continued the
receivership. We address each claim in turn.
                           A
   Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide contend that the turn-
over and charging order improperly subjected them to
injunctive relief, including a prohibition on ProxySoft
Worldwide’s ability to transfer assets or to make loans
pending Brett’s turnover of his interest in ProxySoft
Worldwide to the plaintiffs or the satisfaction of the
judgment debt. Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide main-
tain that the court was not authorized to order injunc-
tive relief as part of the turnover and charging order
because (1) the plaintiffs had abandoned their claim
for injunctive relief under the common law, as alleged in
the withdrawn seventh count of their amended verified
complaint, and (2) the court and the jury had rejected
the plaintiffs’ claims against ProxySoft Worldwide.24
This claim is unavailing.
   ‘‘The issuance of an injunction and the scope and
quantum of injunctive relief [rest] in the sound discre-
tion of the trier. . . . [T]he court’s ruling can be
reviewed only for the purpose of determining whether
the decision was based on an erroneous statement of
law or an abuse of discretion. . . . In determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the
correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is
required only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest
or [when] injustice appears to have been done.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New-
town v. Gaydosh, 211 Conn. App. 186, 205, 272 A.3d
206, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 920, 275 A.3d 213 (2022).
   Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide appear to conflate the
plaintiffs’ prejudgment requests for ex parte temporary
injunctive relief and injunctive relief under the common
law with the plaintiffs’ postjudgment request for tempo-
rary injunctive relief in connection with their applica-
tion for a turnover and charging order. The former is
not germane to the latter. We discern no abuse of discre-
tion by the court, ostensibly in an effort to protect
the integrity of the turnover and charging order, in its
decision to enjoin Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide tem-
porarily from taking certain actions relating to
ProxySoft Worldwide’s operations pending Brett’s turn-
over of his interest in ProxySoft Worldwide to the plain-
tiffs or the satisfaction of the judgment debt. Accord-
ingly, Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide’s claim fails.
                           B
  Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide also assert that the
turnover and charging order improperly continued the
receivership pending Brett’s turnover of his interest in
ProxySoft Worldwide to the plaintiffs or the satisfaction
of the judgment debt. Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide
contend that there is no statutory authority that permit-
ted the continuation of the receivership as part of the
turnover and charging order.25 This claim, which raises
a question of law subject to our plenary review; Wil-
liams v. Mansfield, supra, 215 Conn. App. 10; merits
little discussion. ‘‘The Superior Court is a court of gen-
eral equitable jurisdiction and as such has power to
appoint receivers and make such orders in the receiver-
ship proceedings as the exigencies of the case may
require.’’ Bassett v. Merchants Trust Co., 115 Conn. 530,
534, 161 A. 789 (1932); see also W. Horton et al., 1
Connecticut Practice Series: Superior Court Civil Rules
(2021–2022 Ed.) c. 21, authors’ comments, p. 938
(‘‘[a]bsent statutory provisions, an application for a
receiver is a civil action sounding in equity’’ (emphasis
added)). Thus, we reject Brett and ProxySoft World-
wide’s proposition that the court required express statu-
tory authorization to continue the receivership tempo-
rarily as part of the turnover and charging order.
   The portion of the appeal filed by ProxySoft Direct,
Inc., is dismissed for lack of aggrievement; the judgment
is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     On January 26, 2016, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60 (a) (3), the
plaintiffs filed a request for leave to file an amended verified complaint, to
which the defendants did not file an objection within fifteen days. See
Practice Book § 10-60 (a) (3) (‘‘[i]f no party files an objection to the request
[for leave] within fifteen days from the date it is filed, the amendment shall
be deemed to have been filed by consent of the adverse party’’).
   2
     Brett admitted liability as to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, and the
jury found him liable as to the statutory theft, conversion, CUTSA, and
tortious interference with contract and business expectancies claims.
   3
     The court granted the defendants partial relief by terminating certain
portions of the temporary injunction, which we need not detail.
   4
     The jury awarded $3,592,000 in compensatory damages against Brett,
comprising (1) $1,721,000 as to count one, (2) $185,000 as to count two,
which was trebled to $555,000, and (3) $1,316,000 as to count five. The court
determined that the compensatory damages awarded against Brett as to
count five were duplicative of the compensatory damages awarded against
him as to count one. Accordingly, the court set aside the jury’s verdict as
to count five and concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to $2,276,000
in compensatory damages collectively as to counts one and two.
   5
     In its April 1, 2019 supplemental decision, the court also addressed, and
rejected, a request by the plaintiffs for injunctive relief or royalties vis-à-
vis count four, which asserted that the defendants had violated CUTSA.
   6
     The court determined that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover
compensatory damages under CUTPA because such damages would be
duplicative of damages already awarded by the jury.
   7
     Between June 30, 2016, and April 30, 2019, in his capacity as receiver,
Ury filed reports with the court on a nearly monthly basis. Following the
court’s May 30, 2019 order, Ury did not file another report until January 10,
2022, after this appeal had been filed.
   8
     By way of additional background to the court’s May 21, 2020 memoran-
dum of decision, the plaintiffs indicated in posttrial briefing that they had
rested as to the CUTPA claim following the presentation of evidence at the
jury trial on counts one through five and did not seek to present any addi-
tional evidence to the court. On June 29, 2019, at the defendants’ request,
the court held an evidentiary hearing to allow them to present additional
evidence on the CUTPA claim.
   9
     In light of its award of punitive damages under § 42-110g (a) of CUTPA,
the court determined that awarding the plaintiffs separate attorney’s fees
pursuant to § 42-110g (d) would be duplicative and, therefore, it declined
to do so.
   10
      As reflected in the jury’s interrogatory answers, the jury determined
that the plaintiffs were entitled to common-law punitive damages vis-à-vis
their conversion claim against Brett as alleged in count three. In its March
4, 2021 decision, the court explained that, ‘‘[o]n July 19, 2019, prior to [the
May 21, 2020] decision, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of attorney’s
fees, which requested reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $26,355
. . . for the development of and prosecution of the CUTPA claim. . . . At
the same time, the plaintiffs also submitted a separate attorney’s fees request
related to the jury’s common-law punitive damages award. . . . The plain-
tiffs requested $485,987.87 in attorney’s fees . . . and requested costs of
$25,817.40. After [the court’s] May 21, 2020 decision relating to the award
of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the development and prosecution
of the plaintiffs’ CUTPA claim, the plaintiffs combined these prior requests,
and filed an affidavit of attorney’s fees, which requested $511,942.50 in
attorney’s fees and $25,875.49 in costs for the development of and prosecu-
tion of their CUTPA claim.’’ (Citations omitted.) We construe the court’s
March 4, 2021 decision to reflect that the plaintiffs abandoned their pursuit
of the common-law punitive damages awarded by the jury, instead opting
to pursue attorney’s fees and costs only as punitive damages under CUTPA.
   11
      On September 15, 2017, two proposed intervenors, Katherine Thornton
and Laura Thornton, appealed from the denial of an amended and renewed
motion to intervene that they had filed in the present action. That appeal
was withdrawn.
   12
      The state marshal recovered $2741.62 from the financial institution and
deducted $411.25 from that amount in marshal’s fees.
   13
      General Statutes § 52-356b provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) If a judgment
is unsatisfied, the judgment creditor may apply to the court for an execution
and an order in aid of the execution directing the judgment debtor, or any
third person, to transfer to the levying officer either or both of the following:
(1) Possession of specified personal property that is sought to be levied on;
or (2) possession of documentary evidence of title to property of, or a debt
owed to, the judgment debtor that is sought to be levied on.
   ‘‘(b) The court may issue a turnover order pursuant to this section, after
notice and hearing . . . on a showing of need for the order. . . .’’
   14
      The language of the turnover and charging order largely tracked that
of a proposed order filed by the plaintiffs.
   15
      On December 19, 2022, we ordered, sua sponte, the parties to file simulta-
neous supplemental briefs addressing this aggrievement issue. The parties
filed briefs in accordance with our order. The parties are in agreement that
ProxySoft Direct is not aggrieved by the court’s denial of Brett’s motion to
vacate or by the court’s turnover and charging order.
   16
      In addition, there is no basis on which to conclude that ProxySoft Direct
is statutorily aggrieved by the court’s decisions.
   17
      ‘‘General Statutes § 52-263 provides in relevant part: ‘[I]f either party is
aggrieved by the decision of the court . . . upon any question or questions
of law arising in the trial . . . he may appeal to the court having jurisdiction
from the final judgment of the court . . . .’ ’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Kazemi
v. Allen, 214 Conn. App. 86, 102 n.6, 279 A.3d 742 (2022), cert. denied, 345
Conn. 971, 286 A.3d 906 (2023).
   18
      The finality of judgment argument was raised by Brett in his motion to
vacate, as well as by Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide in their objection to
the plaintiffs’ application for a turnover and charging order. The court did
not address the finality of judgment argument in the turnover and charging
order, which was issued on the same day as the court’s denial of Brett’s
motion to vacate. We conclude that the court necessarily rejected the finality
of judgment argument in issuing the turnover and charging order. Accord-
ingly, as framed by Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide on appeal, we consider
the finality of judgment argument in connection with both the court’s denial
of Brett’s motion to vacate and the court’s turnover and charging order.
   19
      We note that the court had rendered a final judgment disposing of the
plaintiffs’ causes of action against the defendant companies nearly two
years earlier. On April 1, 2019, the court issued a supplemental memorandum
of decision addressing the plaintiffs’ two unresolved claims at the time: (1)
the plaintiffs’ CUTPA claim against the defendants, as alleged in count eight;
and (2) the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and royalties vis-à-vis the
plaintiffs’ CUTSA claim against the defendants, as alleged in count four.
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ request for relief as to their CUTSA claim.
In addition, the court determined that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate
a prima facie case to support their CUTPA claim against the defendant
companies. The April 1, 2019 supplemental memorandum of decision dis-
posed of the plaintiffs’ final claims directed to the defendants companies,
and, therefore, it constituted a final judgment vis-à-vis the plaintiffs’ causes
of action against the defendant companies. See Practice Book § 61-3.
    20
       In their appellate brief, the plaintiffs contend that a judgment file is
‘‘[t]he closest analog to the summary that [Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide]
seek . . . .’’ ‘‘The judgment file . . . is a clerical document, which, even if
missing, does not prevent a judgment from having been rendered. . . . The
issues of an appeal may be considered even if there is no judgment file.’’
(Citation omitted.) Gorelick v. Montanaro, 94 Conn. App. 14, 25, 891 A.2d
41 (2006). In their reply brief, Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide clarify that
the ‘‘formal written and signed judgment’’ that they assert the court should
have issued and a judgment file are not one and the same.
    21
       The statement of issues section of Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide’s
principal appellate brief sets forth four issues, including the following: ‘‘While
pivotal issues regarding a temporary injunction and a temporary receivership
remained unresolved, should the trial court have held that there was a final
judgment in the case?’’ Additionally, the argument section of Brett and
ProxySoft Worldwide’s principal appellate brief contains a heading that
reads: ‘‘Point 3: Outstanding issues as to the temporary injunction and the
receivership should have been decided before judgment issued.’’ Nowhere
in their principal appellate brief, however, do Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide
provide any legal analysis in support of these assertions. The crux of Brett
and ProxySoft Worldwide’s contentions under the ‘‘Point 3’’ heading is that,
in its turnover and charging order, the court improperly ordered injunctive
relief and continued the receivership, which we address in part III of this
opinion and which has no bearing on the question of whether the court
correctly concluded that it had rendered a final judgment giving rise to
postjudgment enforcement proceedings. Thus, insofar as Brett and
ProxySoft Worldwide attempt to assert on appeal that there were ‘‘[o]ut-
standing issues’’ regarding the ex parte temporary injunction and temporary
receivership ordered by the court that precluded the rendering of a final
judgment that gave rise to postjudgment enforcement proceedings, we
decline to review this issue. See Hebrand v. Hebrand, 216 Conn. App. 210,
224 n.11, 284 A.3d 702 (2022) (‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not
required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court
through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract asser-
tion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues
but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive
discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)). In their reply brief, Brett and ProxySoft World-
wide include a little more than one page of analysis under the following
heading: ‘‘Point 3. Important issues remained open on March 4, 2021.’’ The
analysis in the reply brief does not prove helpful, and, in any event, ‘‘we
consider an argument inadequately briefed when it is delineated only in the
reply brief.’’ Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 378 n.6, 3
A.3d 892 (2010).
    22
       Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide cite Practice Book § 64-1 to support
their argument. Their reliance on this rule of practice is misplaced.
    Practice Book § 64-1 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The trial court shall
state its decision either orally or in writing . . . in making any . . . rulings
that constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal under Section 61-1,
including those that do not terminate the proceedings. The court’s decision
shall encompass its conclusions as to each claim of law raised by the parties
and the factual basis therefor. . . .
    ‘‘(b) If the trial judge fails to file a memorandum of decision or sign a
transcript of the oral decision in any case covered by subsection (a), the
appellant may file with the appellate clerk a notice that the decision has
not been filed in compliance with subsection (a). . . . The appellate clerk
shall promptly notify the trial judge of the filing of the appeal and the notice.
The trial court shall thereafter comply with subsection (a).’’
    Practice Book § 64-1 does not operate to inform the issue of whether a
judgment is final; rather, its purpose is to help create an adequate record
for appellate review. See Stechel v. Foster, 125 Conn. App. 441, 445, 8 A.3d
545 (2010) (‘‘[w]hen the record does not contain either a memorandum of
decision or a transcribed copy of an oral decision signed by the trial court
stating the reasons for its decision, this court frequently has declined to
review the claims on appeal because the appellant has failed to provide
the court with an adequate record for review’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 904, 12 A.3d 572 (2011). Indeed, to cure
a trial court’s failure to comply with § 64-1 (a), subsection (b) provides for
the filing of a notice after an appeal has been filed. Thus, § 64-1 does not
advance Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide’s argument.
   23
      Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide relatedly argue that the court never
issued notice of a ‘‘formal written and signed judgment’’ rendered in the
present case. This argument is untenable in light of our rejection of the
‘‘formal written and signed judgment’’ requirement proposed by Brett and
ProxySoft Worldwide. Moreover, in their principal appellate brief, Brett and
ProxySoft Worldwide acknowledge that they received electronic notice of
the March 4, 2021 decision determining the amount of the plaintiffs’ punitive
damages award under CUTPA. Thus, Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide
received notice of the final judgment rendered on that date.
   24
      Additionally, Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide claim that the plaintiffs
failed to proffer evidence to justify injunctive relief in the turnover and
charging order and that the court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing
on that issue. Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide do not provide any appreciable
legal analysis in support of this claim. Accordingly, we conclude that this
claim is inadequately briefed, and we decline to review it. See Onofrio v.
Mineri, 207 Conn. App. 630, 637, 263 A.3d 857 (2021) (‘‘ ‘Both this court
and our Supreme Court ‘‘repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through
an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue
properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims
of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth
their arguments in their briefs. . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal
principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case
and the law cited.’’ . . . State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868
(2016); see also Parnoff v. Mooney, 132 Conn. App. 512, 518, 35 A.3d 283
(2011) (‘‘[i]t is not the role of this court to undertake the legal research and
analyze the facts in support of a claim or argument when it has not been
briefed adequately . . . .’’).’ Seaport Capital Partners, LLC v. Speer, 202
Conn. App. 487, 489–90, 246 A.3d 77, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 942, 250 A.3d
40 (2021); see also Practice Book § 67-4.’’).
   25
      Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide also cursorily assert that the court
continued the receivership with no supporting evidence submitted by the
plaintiffs and without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We decline to
review this claim because, like Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide’s similar
claim concerning the court’s order of injunctive relief in the turnover and
charging order, we conclude that it is inadequately briefed. See footnote 24
of this opinion.