Court Opinion

ID: 9444284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 20:55:05.145548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:47.744427
License: Public Domain

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge,
(dissenting).
In my opinion, the statements by plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Deacy, during his closing argument, regarding the special interrogatory put to the jury, constituted reversible error. Here is the interrogatory:
Was the driver of the defendant’s motor vehicle, Herman Malacoff, guilty of negligence as defined in these instructions, which proximately contributed to cause the occurrence in question?
The record shows the following proceedings during said closing argument:
“Mr. Deacy: * * * Now, there is a special interrogatory in respect to the negligence of Mr. Malacoff, which, of course, is the reason for the liability of the Yellow Cab Company. To make your verdict consistent,—
“Mr. Jacobs: To this line of argument I object, your Honor.
“Mr. Deacy: You made the same argument.
“Mr. Jacobs: I did not.
“Mr. Deacy: I want to point it out to you.
“The Court: What is your objection?
*617“Mr. Jacobs: My objection is he cannot explain to the jury about the interrogatories.
“The Court: Why not? Somebody ought to explain it. Certainly, the objection is overruled.
“Mr. Jacobs: I would like to go here, your Honor.
“The Court: All right, here.
(Whereupon the following took place outside of the hearing of the jury.)
“Mr. Jacobs: I believe it is in error to explain that to the jury because they would always return a verdict in favor of the defendant (sic). If he explains it to the jury, the courts in Illinois have held that that is an error.
“Mr. Deacy: You have to explain it to the jury.
“The Court: I will overrule the objection. (Whereupon the following took place in the presence and hearing of the jury.)
“The Court: Go ahead with your argument.
“Mr. Deacy: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, this interrogatory should be answered, ‘Yes,’ consistent with your verdict in favor of Mr. Willits.”
The record also shows that although defendant’s counsel, Mr. Jacobs, made reference to the interrogatory in his argument, he in no way attempted to explain its effect. He merely said:
“ * * * The Court will have a special interrogatory asking you, was Mr. Malacoff guilty of negligence, and I ask you in all fairness to him and to us and to justice to us, so that you can say when you leave here, T believe in the system of trial by jury, I know what I did and what the other eleven jurors sitting with me tried to do was to give everybody a fair hearing’.”
The court, in its instructions to the jury, made no reference to this interrogatory except the following: “Now, there are two forms of verdict in this case and one special interrogatory. This is the interrogatory: (The court then read it.) You will answer that either ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’ and that will be signed by the twelve jurors, and then you will sign the verdict.”
The jury answered the interrogatory “Yes”, and returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff.
Defendant contends, and I must agree, that it was prejudicial error to permit plaintiff’s counsel, over objection, to explain to the jury the effect of the interrogatory and its answer thereto.
Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict”. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the court gave no explanation to enable the jury to make answer to the interrogatory. He merely directed them to answer “Yes” or “No”. Moreover, during the closing argument for plaintiff, by overruling defendant’s objection and telling plaintiff’s counsel to go ahead with his argument which dealt with making the answer to the interrogatory consistent with the general verdict, the court clearly indicated to the jury that counsel’s explanation on this point was the correct explanation. The court had already remarked in the jury’s presence that “Somebody ought to explain it”. I cannot assume that this error did not influence the jury.
The real purpose of a special interrogatory is to require the jury’s answer as to one or more issues of ultimate fact. To that extent it then becomes the exclusive province of the court to determine whether the general verdict is in harmony with the jury’s own interpreta*618tion of the evidence as revealed by its answer to the interrogatory. Either party has a right to submit a special interrogatory calling for a finding as to a proper issue of fact. Either party has a right to argue to the jury the evidence in the record and to indicate therefrom whether the answer should be “Yes” or “No”. Neither has a right to ignore the evidence and tell the jury that its answer should be “Yes” (or “No”) solely because the effect of that answer will be consistent with a certain general verdict. The whole purpose of a special interrogatory is defeated if the jury is in effect told that its general verdict will stand only if its answer to the special interrogatory is consistent therewith. In this case, it is not improbable that the jury may have answered the special interrogatory as it did in order to protect the general verdict, rather than as the result of a consideration of the evidence as to Malacoff’s alleged negligence.
In Westbrook v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, 248 Ill.App. 446, at page 450 the court said:
“We think the statements of counsel and the overruling of the objections thereto by the court were prejudicial to the rights of appellant. It is improper for counsel to ask the jury to answer the special interrogatories so that they may agree with their general verdict or to discuss the legal effect of their answers to special interrogatories or their bearing on their general verdict. (Southern Indiana R. Co. v. Fine, 163 Ind. 617 [72 N.E. 589]; Snider v. Washington Water Power Co., 66 Wash. 598 [120 P. 88].) It can be readily seen that the very purpose of submitting special interrogatories can be destroyed by such discussion and we are in thorough accord with the authorities cited on this point.”
There is no real basis on which the West-brook case can be distinguished from the case at bar. The mere fact that in the Westbrook case there were two special interrogatories and four counts in the complaint, thus giving the jury multiple choices and combinations of findings, to me presents no logical ground for distinction. Nor can that case be distinguished on the ground that counsel there practically conceded that his remarks in this connection were not proper. That fact only shows that the court’s opinion is fortified by the views of counsel on both sides. The reasoning of the opinion in the Westbrook case is just as applicable under Federal Rule 49(b) as it is under Illinois law.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.