Court Opinion

ID: 9375515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 23:00:15.20755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.385248
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARVIN HAGAN,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DC-0752-16-0705-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: February 27, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Marvin Hagan, APO, pro se.

           Kim E. Dixon, Esquire, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     upheld his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.       Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petition er has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to analyze the appellant’s discrimination claim under the
     appropriate standard, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed as a Supervisory Traffic Management
     Specialist, GS-2130-12, with the agency’s Transportation Brigade in Izmir,
     Turkey.   Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 14.      On February 8, 2016, the
     agency proposed the appellant’s removal on one charge of lack of candor (three
     specifications). IAF, Tab 8 at 43-46. The agency alleged that when the appellant
     initially pursued his position, he completed the Optional Form (OF) 306,
     Declaration for Federal Employment and answered question 12 untruthfully,
     which read:
           During the last 5 years, have you been fired from any job for any
           reason, did you quit after being told that you would be fired, did you
           leave any job by mutual agreement because of specific problems, or
           were you debarred from Federal employment by the Office of
           Personnel Management or any other Federal agency? If “Yes,” use
           item 16 to provide the date, an explanation of the problem, reason for
           leaving and the employer’s name and address[.]
     Id. at 43. Specification one alleged that the appellant marked the “no” box in
     response to question 12, but was previously terminated from a probationary
                                                                                       3

     appointment at the U.S. Army Garrison Dugway, at Dugway Proving Ground,
     Utah, on March 14, 2012. Id. at 43-44. Specification two alleged that despite
     answering “no” to question 12, he had an additional termination from a position
     at the Pensacola Navy Air Station in May 2010. Id. at 44. Specification three
     alleged that, on his Standard Form 144, completed at the same time as the
     OF-306, the appellant certified that “[t]he prior Federal civilian and uniformed
     service listed on my application/résumé and listed above constitutes my entire
     record of Federal employment,” and that he failed to list his prior Federal service
     with the agency at the Dugway Proving Ground between November 7, 2011, and
     March 14, 2012. Id.
¶3        In his response to the proposal, the appellant explained that he answered
     “no” to the question because of a previous conversation he had with a human
     resources   representative   at   the   Dugway   Proving   Ground,   wherein    the
     representative told the appellant that the termination did not constitute a firing,
     and therefore, the appellant believed that he did not need to include it on the
     OF-306. IAF, Tab 8 at 5. To support this explanation, the appellant provided the
     deciding official with a February 2016 email between himself and the human
     resources representative wherein the two discussed the nature of a probationary
     termination and how it relates to an application for unemployment compensation.
     Id. at 7-8; IAF, Tab 10 at 87-88.       To verify the email, the deciding official
     contacted the human resources representative to inquire about the alleged
     conversation. IAF, Tab 10 at 73.
¶4        The deciding official provided the appellant with a notice of consideration
     of additional material, which included the February 2016 email from the human
     resources representative and a previous OF-306 that the appellant completed in
     2011, after his termination from the Pensacola Navy Air Station in 2010, on
     which he marked “yes” to question 12. Id. at 73-76. The appellant responded,
     reiterating his claim that the human resources representative told him that his
     termination was not considered a firing, but acknowledging that the conversation
                                                                                                 4

     also     included    a      discussion     regarding    applications       for   unemployment
     compensation.       Id. at 55-56.        In his response, he also challenged the human
     resources representative’s memory of the conversation. Id. at 56. The appellant
     also submitted an additional email from the human resources representative ,
     written after the deciding official’s notice of consideration of additional material ,
     wherein the human resources representative confirms that his February 2016
     email was intended to communicate his understanding of the rules applicable to
     applications for unemployment compensation. Id. at 71-72.
¶5            Approximately one week later, the deciding official issued a second notice
     of consideration of additional material, including another OF-306 for a position at
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for which the appellant applied after the probationary
     termination from the Dugway Proving Ground but before completing the OF-306
     at issue in this appeal.           Id. at 49-52.     The form showed that the appellant
     answered “yes” to question 12, indicating that he had been fired from a position.
     Id. at 51. The appellant responded to the notice and claimed that he marked “yes”
     on the Guantanamo Bay OF-306 “to keep things simple and address questions on
     [the] OF-306 in more detail by calling the hiring official.” Id. at 34. He also
     stated     that   despite    his    earlier    conversation   with   the     human   resources
     representative from the Dugway Proving Ground, he “did not feel [he] had
     sufficient knowledge” regarding the differences between a firing and a separation
     during a probationary period. Id. The appellant also stated that it was only after
     his time at Guantanamo Bay that he gained the information and experience that
     led him to answer “no” on the OF-306 at issue in this appeal. Id.
¶6            On June 13, 2016, the deciding official issued a decision finding that the
     agency proved specifications one and two but dismissing specification three as
     unsupported by the evidence. 2                IAF, Tab 10 at 15-17.         He stated that he

     2
      The deciding official issued a final decision on June 10, 2016, IAF, Tab 10 at 26 -28,
     but, at the request of the appellant, rescinded the decision to allow the appellant to
                                                                                            5

     considered the appellant’s written and oral responses and concluded that the
     penalty of removal was reasonable and promoted the efficiency of the service. Id.
     at 15.
¶7            The appellant timely appealed his removal action to the Board , arguing that
     the agency committed harmful procedural error and engaged in prohibited
     personnel practices and that the removal was in retaliation for other protected
     activities under 5 U.S.C. § 2302. IAF, Tab 1 at 3. After holding a hearing, IAF,
     Tab 36, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD), the administrative judge issued an initial
     decision sustaining specifications one and two, and therefore, the single charge of
     lack of candor, IAF, Tab 37, Initial Decision (ID) at 9-10. The administrative
     judge also found that the penalty of removal was reasonable and promoted the
     efficiency of the service. ID at 12-15. He found, moreover, that the appellant
     failed to prove his discrimination claim. ID at 10-12.
¶8            The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition
     for Review (PFR) File, Tab 5. The appellant argues that the administrative judge
     improperly sustained a charge of falsification rather than lack of candor and that
     he erred in his credibility determinations. Id. at 5-6, 9-11. The appellant also
     makes various arguments regarding due process, procedural error, discrimination,
     and the appropriateness of the penalty of removal. Id. at 6-9, 11-20. The agency
     has filed a response to the appellant’s petition. PFR File, Tab 7.

                        DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge properly found that the agency proved its charge.
¶9            Generally, an agency is required to prove its charges in an adverse action
     appeal by preponderant evidence. 3 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B). To prove lack of

     return from overseas before the effective date of the removal, id. at 23-25. The
     deciding official reissued an updated final decision on June 13, 2016. Id. at 15-22.
     3
      A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
     person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
     contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                          6

      candor, the agency must demonstrate that the employee gave incorrect or
      incomplete information and that he did so knowingly. Fargnoli v. Department of
      Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 17 (2016). Although it is a broader and more
      flexible concept than falsification and does not require an affirmative
      misrepresentation, lack of candor does involve an element of deception. Ludlum
      v. Department of Justice, 278 F.3d 1280, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
¶10         There is no dispute that the appellant was terminated from two different
      positions or that he checked “no” to question 12 on the OF-306 at issue here.
      IAF, Tab 8 at 48-50, 52, 57.        Rather, the crux of this case deals with the
      appellant’s intentions and explanations for why he answered “no” on that form.
¶11         To resolve that question, the administrative judge considered hearing
      testimony from the human resources specialist at the Dugway Proving Ground
      regarding the conversation he had with the appellant concerning that termination.
      ID at 3-5; HCD (testimony of the human resources specialist).           That witness
      testified that it was unlikely that he told the appellant he was not fired and that it
      was not uncommon to speak with a terminated employee ab out unemployment
      compensation. HCD (testimony of the human resources specialist) . He discussed
      the February 2016 emails between him and the appellant and explained that the
      rules applicable to unemployment compensation applications differ from those
      applicable to Federal employment applications. Id. He further testified that if he
      had been a terminated probationer completing a subsequent OF-306, he would
      find it necessary to answer “yes” to question 12. Id. The administrative judge
      also considered testimony from the director of the agency’s civilian pe rsonnel
      office regarding the OF-306.      ID at 5-6; HCD (testimony of the director of
      civilian personnel). She testified that answering “yes” to question 12 would not
      automatically result in the withdrawal of an employment offer and that she would
      consider a probationary termination a firing. Id.
¶12         The administrative judge also considered testimony from the appellant, who
      stated that the human resources specialist from the Dugway Proving Ground told
                                                                                            7

      him that he had not been fired and could answer “no” to a question of whether he
      had been fired on any unemployment compensation forms.                 ID at 6; HCD
      (testimony of the appellant). He further testified th at after his termination from
      the Dugway Proving Ground, he applied to a position at Guantanamo Bay and
      answered “yes” to question 12 on the OF-306 to “keep things simple,” despite his
      earlier conversation with the human resources specialist. Id. He stated that it
      was only after his time at Guantanamo Bay that he formed the belief that he could
      answer “no” to question 12 on subsequent Federal employment applications. Id.
¶13         The administrative judge did not credit the appellant’s explanations of his
      varying responses to question 12 and found that “there are too many contradictory
      events in his own behavior” to conclude that he made his representation
      unknowingly. 4 ID at 7. Accordingly, the administrative judge issued an initial
      decision finding that the agency proved specifications one and two by
      preponderant evidence and sustained the charge. However, instead of referring to
      the charge as “lack of candor,” the administrative judge wrote that “the charge of
      falsification is sustained.” ID at 9.
¶14         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in
      sustaining a falsification charge. PFR File, Tab 5 at 5-6. He argues that he was
      not on notice of a falsification charge and that, for the administrative judge to
      sustain a falsification charge, the agency would have had to prove that he
      intended to defraud the agency, which it did failed to do. Id.; see O’Lague v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 340, ¶ 6 (2016), aff’d per curiam,
      698 F. App’x 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2017).          We agree with the appellant that the
      administrative judge erred in his finding, but only to the extent that he mislabeled
      the charge by referring to it as a charge of “falsification ,” rather than one of “lack

      4
        The administrative judge’s finding regarding the appellant’s credibility reads: “There
      are too many contradictory events in his own behavior to conclude that he made the
      representation, “YES,” unknowingly.” ID at 7. We find the administrative judge’s
      using the word “yes” to be a typographical error.
                                                                                         8

      of candor.” In the initial decision, the administrative judge correctly discussed
      the charge of lack of candor, ID at 2-10, and explained that it requires proof that
      the appellant gave incorrect or incomplete information and that he did so
      knowingly, ID at 9 (citing Fargnoli, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 17). Moreover, prior to
      the hearing, the administrative judge issued a summary of the telephonic
      prehearing conference wherein he provided the parties with their burdens of
      proof, including the correct standard for the agency to prove a lack of candor
      charge. IAF, Tab 28 at 2. Therefore, we find that the administrative judge’s
      error did not prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights and provides no basis for
      reversing the initial decision.   See Panter v. Department of the Air Force,
      22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984).
¶15        The appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations regarding his own testimony and the human resources specialist’s
      testimony. PFR File, Tab 5 at 9-11. Specifically, the appellant argues that he had
      no reason to mislead the agency for his own gain because he was hired for two
      other positions despite answering “yes” to question 12 on the respective OF-306s.
      Id. at 10.   He also argues that the human resource specialist’s testimony is
      inconsistent and reflects “a poor memory.” Id. at 9-10. When an administrative
      judge has made credibility determinations that were explicitly or implicitly based
      on the witness’s demeanor while testifying at the hearing, the Board must defer to
      those credibility determinations and may overturn such determinations only when
      it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.       Purifoy v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Haebe v. Department
      of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, the administrative judge
      appropriately relied on the factors set forth in Hillen v. Department of the Army,
      35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), to assess witness credibility and found the appellant
      to be not credible.    ID at 6-10.     Given the administrative judge’s implicit
      demeanor-based findings and our considering the appellant’s arguments on
                                                                                            9

      review, we find that the appellant has failed to provide a “sufficiently sound”
      reason to disturb these conclusions.
¶16            Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved
      the charge of lack of candor by preponderant evidence, and we will not disturb
      the initial decision in that regard.

      The appellant failed to prove that any ex parte communications violated his due
      process rights.
¶17            The appellant appears to argue on review that there may have been ex parte
      communications between his previous employer at the Dugway Proving Grounds
      and the proposing and deciding officials in this case. 5 PFR File, Tab 5 at 8, 19.
      He asserts that these communications had an adverse impact against him. Id. at 8.
      He also argues that the proposing and deciding officials considered statements
      from his coworkers regarding his “manner of operating and [] conduct” and
      details surrounding a ship loading mission. Id. at 14; IAF, Tab 8 at 44. The
      appellant argues that these communications created a negative opinion of him in
      the proposing and deciding officials’ minds and that he had no opportunity to
      address the coworkers’ statements, which constituted a due process violation. 6 Id.
      at 15.
¶18            Although an appellant’s right to due process can extend to ex parte
      information provided to a deciding official, only ex parte communications that

      5
        On review, the appellant alleges that the proposing official stated in his proposal
      notice that “previous employers” complained about the appellant. PFR File, Tab 5 at 6.
      However, upon review of the proposal notice, the proposing official referenced
      “co[]workers and multiple employees.” IAF, Tab 8 at 44. Nonetheless, we will address
      the appellant’s allegations regarding communications with previous employers.
      6
         The agency argues in its response to the appellant’s petition for review that the
      appellant failed to raise this issue below, and therefore, the Board should not consider
      it. PFR File, Tab 7 at 19; see Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268,
      271 (1980). We have reviewed the record, and although the appellant did not actively
      pursue a due process claim as an affirmative defense, his prehearing submission briefly
      discussed his concern regarding the coworkers’ statements and his inability to rebut
      them. IAF, Tab 26 at 3-4. Accordingly, we will consider his due process claim here.
                                                                                          10

      introduce new and material evidence to the deciding official constitute due
      process violations. Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Fed.
      Cir. 2011); Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368,
      1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The ultimate question is whether the information is “so
      substantial and so likely to cause prejudice that no employee can fairly be
      required to be subjected to a deprivation of property under such circumstances.”
      Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377.
¶19         Regarding the appellant’s speculation that the proposing or deciding official
      spoke with his previous employer at the Dugway Proving Grounds, the appellant
      has failed to present any evidence that any communications occurred at all. He
      did not provide any names of the parties involved in the alleged communications,
      nor did he provide evidence of the contents of the alleged communications.
¶20         Regarding the appellant’s allegation that the deciding official relied on
      statements made by the appellant’s coworkers concerning his manner of operating
      and conduct and an incident regarding a ship loading mission, the deciding
      official stated in his Douglas 7 factor analysis that he did not consider those
      statements for the purpose of the instant removal action, IAF, Tab 10 at 19, and
      the appellant did not question the deciding official on this matter at the hearing to
      establish otherwise, HCD (the appellant’s questioning of the deciding official).
      Based on the foregoing, we find that the appellant has failed to prove that any ex
      parte communications occurred or that, if any communications did occur, they
      introduced new and material evidence or information tha t was so substantial and
      so likely to cause prejudice to the appellant that he could not fairly be re quired to
      be subjected to a deprivation of property under the circumstances.               Ward,
      634 F.3d at 1279-80; Stone, 179 F.3d at 1376-77.        Therefore, we find that the
      appellant has failed to prove that the agency violated his due process rights.

      7
        In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board
      established criteria to consider when imposing a penalty.
                                                                                           11

      The appellant failed to prove that the agency engaged in any harmful procedural
      error.
¶21         The appellant also argues on review that the agency committed various
      procedural errors. Specifically, he alleges that, despite it being standard agency
      procedure, the agency never asked him to recertify his OF-306. PFR File, Tab 5
      at 6. He also argues that the agency failed to exercise due diligence when it did
      not contact prior employers as references, id. at 6-7, and that it mishandled his
      security clearance paperwork, id. at 8.        Regarding the appellant’s first two
      arguments, it does not appear that he raised these issues below, and generally, the
      Board will not consider an argument raised for the first time on review absent a
      showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available
      despite the party’s due diligence.       Banks v. Department of the Air Force,
      4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980).      Here, the appellant has failed to prove that any
      evidence surrounding the agency’s alleged errors was not available to him below
      despite his due diligence.
¶22         Regarding the appellant’s assertion that the agency mishandled his security
      clearance paperwork, the appellant appears to have raised the issue briefly in his
      prehearing submission, IAF, Tab 26 at 5, and we will consider it here. For a
      procedural error to warrant reversing an agency action, the appellant must
      establish that the agency committed a procedural error that likely had a harmful
      effect on the outcome of the case before the agency. Powers v. Department of the
      Treasury, 86 M.S.P.R. 256, ¶ 10 (2000); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c).               Here, the
      appellant has failed to show that any error in the agency’s proces sing of his
      security clearance occurred at all or that it had a harmful effect on the outcome of
      his removal. 8 Therefore, we find that the appellant has failed to prove that the
      agency committed harmful procedural error.

      8
        As to the appellant’s argument that the agency committed harmful procedural error
      when it failed to ask him to recertify his OF-306, PFR File, Tab 5 at 6, we find that he
      has failed to show that it had a harmful effect on the outcome of his removal action.
                                                                                            12

      The appellant failed to prove his discrimination claim.
¶23         The appellant also argues that his removal was the result of discrimination
      based on his race and religion.      PFR File, Tab 5 at 18-21.        He claims that,
      although he may have engaged in unrelated misconduct, other employees of
      another race and religion had engaged in the same conduct. Id. He argues that
      the agency, however, chose to remove him on the lack of candor charge so that it
      would not have to remove the other employees for the same unrelated
      misconduct. Id. at 18. He also asserts that because the proposing official had
      been in contact with a previous employer, and that employer allegedly had
      discriminated against the appellant in the past, it was reasonable to assume that
      the   employer’s   communication      influenced   the    proposing   official   in    a
      discriminatory way. Id. at 7-8.
¶24         The administrative judge considered the appellant’s discriminat ion claim
      and found that the appellant failed to present preponderant evidence that the
      agency’s action was due to racial discrimination. ID at 12. In analyzing the
      appellant’s discrimination claim, he applied the burden-shifting analysis of
      McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). ID at 20-21.
¶25         Because the administrative judge did not also consider the appellant’s
      discrimination claim under the motivating factor framework set forth in Pridgen
      v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, we modify the initial
      decision to do so. 9 Based on our review of the record, we find that the appellant
      failed to meet his initial burden of showing by preponderant evidence that any
      prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in his removal. He has failed to
      provide any evidence that the agency declined to impose discipline for the

      Notably, he has not even alleged that he would have changed his answer on question 12
      from “no” to “yes” if given the opportunity to recertify.
      9
        In the summary of the telephonic prehearing conference, the administrative judge
      correctly informed the appellant of his burden of proof. IAF, Tab 28 at 2-4. Thus, the
      appellant was on proper notice of what he was required to prove. See Burgess v. Merit
      Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
                                                                                      13

      unrelated misconduct in which several employees allegedly engaged simply to
      avoid disciplining employees of a different race or religion than the appellant. He
      also has failed to present any evidence showing that the agency lied about its
      reasons to remove him for lack of candor, and he has failed to present any
      incriminating statements from agency employees in support of this claim. He has
      failed, moreover, to provide any evidence that the agency’s general treatment of
      employees in the same protected classes as the appellant differs from any other
      class of employees who have committed similar misconduct.             See Pridgen,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25. Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge’s
      finding that the appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense.
¶26         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge restricted his
      examination of the proposing and deciding officials to exclude questions
      regarding discrimination. PFR File, Tab 5 at 7. We find the appellant’s argument
      to be meritless.    Regarding the proposing official, the administrative judge
      explicitly informed the appellant on the record that one of the reasons the
      proposing official was approved as a witness to testify at the hearing was to
      respond to the appellant’s questions concerning discrimination. HCD (statement
      of the administrative judge). Further, we have reviewed the hearing testimony
      from the deciding official, and it appears that the appellant did not pursue any
      line of questioning directed at his discrimination claim. HCD ( the appellant’s
      questioning of the deciding official). Therefore, we find that the administrative
      judge provided the appellant with a sufficient opportunity to question those two
      witnesses on the issue of discrimination.
¶27         The appellant further argues on review that the administrative judge erred
      when he only considered the appellant’s allegation of race discrimination and that
      he also should have considered religious discrimination. PFR File, Tab 5 at 8.
      To the extent that the administrative judge limited his review of the appellant’s
      discrimination claim, we find no reversible error. The appellant failed to provide
      any evidence of a prohibited consideration—racial or religious—and the
                                                                                           14

      appellant’s burden of proof as established in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 is the same
      regardless of whether the alleged discrimination was based on race or on religion.
      Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the initial decision in this regard. See
      Panter, 22 M.S.P.R. at 282 (stating that an adjudicatory error that is not
      prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for revers ing an initial
      decision). 10

      The penalty of removal was reasonable.
¶28         In his petition for review, the appellant renews his arguments concerning
      the penalty of removal. PFR File, Tab 5 at 11-17. When all of the agency’s
      charges are sustained, the Board will review the agency-imposed penalty only to
      determine if the agency considered all relevant factors and exercised management
      discretion within the tolerable limits of reasonableness. Ellis v. Department of
      Defense, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11 (2010). In determining whether the selected
      penalty is reasonable, the Board defers to the agency’s discretion in exercising its
      managerial function of maintaining employee discipline and efficienc y. Archerda
      v. Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 25 (2014). The Board recognizes
      that its function is not to displace management’s responsibility or to decide what
      penalty it would impose, but to assure that management’s judgment has been
      properly exercised and that the penalty selected by the agency does not exceed
      the maximum limits of reasonableness.         Id.   Thus, the Board will modify a
      penalty only when it finds that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or
      that the penalty the agency imposed clearly exceeded the bounds of
      reasonableness. Id.

      10
         The appellant also argues on review that he did not file an equal employment
      opportunity (EEO) complaint with the agency’s EEO office because it informed him
      that any discrimination claim could be adjudicated by the Board. PFR File, Tab 5 at 18.
      However, the appellant has failed to provide any evidence of this assertion.
      Additionally, he argues that he did not strenuously pursue his discrimination claim
      before the Board because he feared that the Board may view his appeal negatively due
      to his religion. Id. We find this argument unpersuasive, as the appellant has offered no
      legal or logical reason for his presumption.
                                                                                          15

¶29         In the removal notice and hearing testimony, the deciding official
      emphasized the nature of the appellant’s supervisory position, which meant that
      he was held to a higher standard of conduct. HCD (testimony of the deciding
      official); IAF, Tab 10 at 18-19. He also stated that the appellant’s potential for
      rehabilitation was low because there was no way to avoid the lack of trust and
      confidence that the appellant’s actions created. HCD (testimony of the deciding
      official); IAF, Tab 10 at 20-21.       The deciding official also considered lesser
      penalties, but he believed that there would still be a lack of confidence. HCD
      (testimony of the deciding official). Based on the deciding official’s testimony
      and the decision notice, the administrative judge found that he properly
      considered the Douglas factors, that the penalty of removal was within the
      tolerable bounds of reasonableness, and that it promoted the efficiency of the
      service. ID at 15.
¶30         On review, the appellant argues that the penalty of removal was too harsh
      and that the deciding official did not correctly consider the Douglas factors. PFR
      File, Tab 5 at 12-17. He argues that it was “a stretch” for the deciding official to
      claim he lost trust and confidence in him and that the deciding official provided
      no basis for concluding that he lacked the potential for rehabilitation.           Id.
      at 13-14, 16. He also argues that the deciding official ignored mitigating factors
      such as the alleged discrimination. Id. at 16-17.
¶31         We have reviewed the record and, like the administrative judge, find no
      error in the deciding official’s selecting removal as the appropriate penalty. The
      deciding official provided a sufficient discussion regarding why he lost trust and
      confidence in the appellant, explaining that the appellant was in a supervisory
      position   serving   overseas   and,     therefore,   “his   ethical   character   and
      trustworthiness must be beyond reproach” and “his integrity and candor cannot be
      compromised.”     IAF, Tab 10 at 30.      The deciding official also explained his
      conclusion that the appellant lacked the potential for rehabilitation and stated that
      the appellant’s decision to omit information when applying to the position made
                                                                                      16

      him unsure that he would not omit information in the performance of his daily
      duties. Id.
¶32         Insofar as the appellant argues that the alleged discrimination should be
      considered a mitigating factor, we already have considered that allegation as an
      affirmative defense. Supra ¶¶ 23-25. To the extent that he is attempting to assert
      a disparate penalty argument on the bases of race and religion, the Board has held
      that appropriate comparators must have engaged in the same or similar offense as
      the appellant.   Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 10.       Here, the
      appellant alleges that he and other employees of a different race all engaged in
      conduct unrelated to a charge of lack of candor. PFR File, Tab 5 at 18. He
      asserts that, if the agency had disciplined the appellant for that misconduct ,
      instead of for lack of candor, it would have been required to discipline the other
      employees of a different race as well. Id. Thus, the appellant argues that the
      agency’s charging him with lack of candor indicates he was treated differently
      from other employees so that the agency could properly remove him without
      having to remove others of a different race. Id. The appellant’s argument fails,
      however, because the relevant inquiry for a disparate penalty analysis
      concentrates on the conduct charged in the disciplinary action and not on any
      ancillary misconduct in which the appellant and others may have engaged. See
      Singh, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶¶ 10, 17; Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305.           There is no
      evidence, nor has the appellant asserted, that the alleged comparators engaged in
      lack of candor or any conduct similar thereto.         Accordingly, we find the
      appellant’s argument to be meritless.
¶33         Next, the appellant argues that the penalty of removal is not consistent with
      the agency’s table of penalties. PFR File, Tab 5 at 11. Specifically, he argues
      that agency’s table of penalties has no section that includes “lack of candor,” and
      that its reliance on a category of misconduct concerning a refusal to cooperate in
      an authorized inquiry or investigation is misplaced. Id. at 12. He states that he
      was “completely open, honest, and straight forward” during an October 2015
                                                                                         17

      Army Regulation 15-6 investigation. Id. We find the appellant’s argument to be
      meritless.    The agency’s charge does not reference or include any intern al
      investigation, but rather relies solely on the appellant’s Federal employment
      application form.     Moreover, the Board is not bound by an agency’s table of
      penalties, and it is only one factor to be considered in assessing the
      reasonableness of a penalty. Phillips v. Department of the Interior, 95 M.S.P.R.
      21, ¶ 17 (2003), aff’d, 131 F. App’x 709 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
¶34         After considering the appellant’s arguments related to the penalty on
      review, we agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the deciding
      official properly considered the Douglas factors before selecting the penalty of
      removal.     Further, given the seriousness of a lack of candor charge and the
      appellant’s supervisory role, we also agree with the administrative judge that the
      penalty of removal is within the tolerable bounds of reasonableness and promotes
      the efficiency of the service.      See Wrocklage v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 769 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that lack of candor is a
      serious charge that carries with it the possibility of sever e penalties); Edwards v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 173, ¶ 14 (2010) (expressing that agencies are
      entitled to hold supervisors to a higher standard than nonsupervisors because they
      occupy positions of trust and responsibility).        Although the appellant may
      disagree with the penalty, none of his arguments on review provide any basis to
      disturb the initial decision. 11
¶35         We have considered the appellant’s other arguments on review, but we
      conclude that a different outcome is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the
      initial decision.

      11
         The appellant also argues on review that the deciding official only relied on one
      Douglas factor in arriving at his decision to remove the appellant. PFR File, Tab 5
      at 14. He points to the Douglas factors worksheet wherein the deciding official states
      that he “decided this removal action for the reasons stated in Douglas factor #1 [sic]
      only.” Id.; IAF, Tab 10 at 19. However, the worksheet itself makes clear that the
      deciding official considered multiple factors. Id. at 18-21.
                                                                                     18

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 12
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

12
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      19

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving    a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
                                                                                20

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, cos ts, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     21

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 13   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

13
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           22

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.