Court Opinion

ID: 9948086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 15:08:47.423935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:04.700525
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0791-22

JAN DASHER,

         Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED AIRLINES, RICK
HOEFLING, KELLY TOLBERT,
GEORGE HENDY,

         Defendants-Respondents,

and

R.D.,1

     Defendant.
___________________________

                   Submitted February 5, 2024 – Decided March 6, 2024

                   Before Judges DeAlmeida and Berdote Byrne.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-4151-18.

1
  We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of the alleged
rape victim in these proceedings.
            Luretha M. Stribling, attorney for appellant.

            Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, PC, attorneys for
            respondents (Michael D. Hall, of counsel and on the
            brief; Leonard V. Jones, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff, Jan Dasher, appeals from the trial court's award of summary

judgment in favor of defendants United Airlines, Inc. (United), Rick Hoefling,

Kelly Tolbert, and George Hendy, and from the trial court's dismissal of his

complaint against R. D. after a proof hearing.

      We affirm for the reasons expressed in the well-reasoned, twenty-five-

page, written opinion of the Honorable Mayra V. Tarantino.            We add the

following comments.

      United produced sufficient evidence of its race neutral justification for its

decision to terminate plaintiff, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate a disputed

material issue precluding summary judgment.         As aptly detailed by Judge

Tarantino, plaintiff maintained a sexual relationship with R.D., his subordinate,

without reporting the relationship to United as required by United's Code of

Ethics and Business Conduct (Code of Ethics). When questioned about the

relationship, he prevaricated, in contravention of United's Working Together

Guidelines (WTG). After United obtained definitive proof of the relationship,

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including sexually explicit text messages and videos between plaintiff and R.D.,

he prevaricated again during United's investigation of R. D.'s allegations. Later,

while internally appealing the decision to terminate him, plaintiff admitted in

writing he acted inappropriately and United had a valid basis for his termination.

      Plaintiff, who is Black, alleges United's justification for his termination

was a pretext for race discrimination because non-minority supervisors who

maintained sexual relationships with subordinates were not terminated , but he

failed to offer any evidence to support that allegation. And, although plaintiff

now vehemently denies having been R.D.'s supervisor, he testified to the

contrary during his deposition. We need not credit a "sham affidavit" when it is

proffered solely to preclude summary judgment in the movant's favor. Metro

Mktg., LLC v. Nationwide Vehicle Assurance, Inc., 472 N.J. Super. 132, 148

(App. Div. 2022) (quoting Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185, 194 (2002)).

Plaintiff's affidavit does not provide a reasonable explanation for the

contradiction and fails to clarify any existing confusion from his deposition; it

serves only to patently contradict his prior deposition testimony and was

properly disregarded by the trial court. Id. at 149 (quoting Shelcusky, 172 N.J.

at 201-02).

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                                        3
      Similarly, plaintiff's claim that he was transferred from the bag room to

the Transfer of Bags (TOB) area because of his race is belied by the record. The

employee responsible for plaintiff's transfer is Black.        Three of the four

employees that plaintiff identified in his complaint as never having been

transferred are also Black.      Defendants testified managers and the entire

leadership team were directed to be proficient in different work areas for

succession and planning purposes. Plaintiff acknowledged the benefit of this

practice. He also confirmed there was no monetary or hourly discrepancy

between a bag room and a TOB area assignment. Plaintiff testified he previously

worked in the TOB area as a supervisor, undermining his claim that the practice

was unusual. Although plaintiff claims the transfer was a demotion because

there were fewer employees to supervise and other employees viewed the TOB

area as a demotion, plaintiff produced no evidence to support this allegation,

other than his own opinion.

      In sum, there is no evidence defendants acted with discriminatory intent,

and hence, no evidence United's legitimate reason for terminating plaintiff was

pretextual. In a disparate treatment claim, as plaintiff raises here, we utilize the

burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330

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                                         4
(2010). Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must present a

prima facie case of discrimination. If demonstrated, the burden shifts to the

defendant to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action

complained of and, if this burden of production is satisfied, the burden reverts

to the plaintiff to prove defendant's reason was pretextual. Id. at 31 (quoting

Dixon v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 442 (1988)). At the

second stage, although there is an inference of discrimination, Zive v. Stanley

Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 449 (2005), the burden on the employer is "relatively

light," Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994); see A.D.P. v.

ExxonMobil Rsch. & Eng'g Co., 428 N.J. Super. 518, 535 (App. Div. 2012)

(noting the McDonnell Douglas framework shifts the burden of production, not

the burden of persuasion, to the defendant). As noted by Judge Tarantino, there

is ample evidence in the record to support United's legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff. Plaintiff's termination letter

stated plaintiff was terminated because of his violations of United's Code of

Ethics and WTG.       Hoefling, Hendy, and Tolbert each provided the same

explanation for plaintiff's termination in their depositions.

      Plaintiff was terminated for disregarding the Code of Ethics by failing to

disclose his relationship with R.D. and violating multiple expectations in the

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                                         5
WTG when he prevaricated about the relationship and the videos and texts in

the subsequent investigation.

      Plaintiff also claims the trial court erred by dismissing his claims against

R.D. after a proof hearing. R.D. failed to answer the complaint and default

judgment was entered against her. Where a defendant has defaulted, a court

must nevertheless hold a proof hearing and a plaintiff must establish his claims.

R. 4:43-2; see also Chakravarti v. Pegasus Consulting Grp., Inc., 393 N.J. Super.

203, 210 (App. Div. 2007) ("Judgment should not be entered without a proof

hearing . . . ."). Although, in the context of a proof hearing "trial courts have

been directed to view a plaintiff’s proofs 'indulgently,'" Heimbach v. Mueller,

229 N.J. Super. 17, 20 (App. Div. 1988), a plaintiff may be held to the burden

of establishing liability as well as damages, despite defendant's default, see

Johnson v. Johnson, 92 N.J. Super. 457, 465 (App. Div. 1966) (explaining

"[e]ven though a defendant’s answer is stricken for failure to make discovery,

the plaintiff may be . . . precluded from recovery where the proof which he offers

in support of his own case reveals a legal defense to his claim").

      The trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff's NJLAD claims against R.D.

despite entry of the default judgment. Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from

relitigating those issues at the proof hearing. Summary judgment, unlike a

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                                        6
default judgment, is a judgment on the merits and given preclusive effect. See

Adelman v. BSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 453 N.J. Super. 31, 40 (App. Div. 2018) (first

quoting Slowinski v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 264 N.J. Super. 172, 183 (App. Div.

1993); and then quoting Allesandra v. Gross, 187 N.J. Super. 96, 106 (App. Div.

1982)).   Plaintiff's NJLAD claims against defendants were identical to the

claims he asserted against R.D., were litigated during defendants' motion for

summary judgment, decided on the merits, and plaintiff was a party to the

summary judgment proceedings. Ibid. (quoting Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208

N.J. 114, 137 (2011)).

      Lastly, the trial court did not err in failing to award any damages in

plaintiff's defamation claim against R.D. Plaintiff was not terminated because

of R.D.'s allegation of rape or sexual assault. Rather, he was terminated for

violations of United's Code of Ethics and WTG. Plaintiff failed to show his

specific economic or pecuniary loss – termination of his employment – stemmed

from R.D.'s statement and thus no damages are available to him. Plaintiff's

testimony at the proof hearing did not establish his reputation or standing in the

community was impaired. Although plaintiff testified other United employees

heard R.D.'s allegation, he failed to present any evidence his reputation or

standing among those employees was adversely affected.

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Affirmed.

                A-0791-22
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