Court Opinion

ID: 9658026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:44:37.969982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:50.763097
License: Public Domain

I would respectfully decline to grant Governor Janklow’s request. His request belongs in the legislative arena and should not be answered by this Court. We, in the *828judicial branch, owe a constitutional duty not to simply accommodate the executive branch of government, but, rather, to check on it. Separate but equal. That is the watchword. We need not “accommodate” requests from the Governor’s office for legal opinions. This Court has historically spurned ex parte opinions where the rights of private parties (a) exist or (b) could later be involved.
QUESTION ONE
As concerns the first question, the clear import of the statute answers the question. Its import was also peripherally addressed in Holland v. Yankton Sch. Dist. 63-3, 375 N.W.2d 199 (S.D.1985). Therefore, I would decline to render an advisory opinion to the Governor. This Court, except as provided in South Dakota Constitution Article V, § 5, is not the legal advisor of the Governor. The Attorney General is the Governor’s legal advisor, see In re House Resolution No. 30, 10 S.D. 249, 251, 72 N.W. 892, 892 (1897), and SDCL 1-11-1(6), and he receives a salary therefor. SDCL 1 — 11— 2. The Attorney General has a staff of competent attorneys and the Governor should address his questions to the Attorney General rather than to short-circuit the orderly process of law and usual judicial channels. This Court should not bind itself and either lock in or lock out legal rights in the future, in factual situations which have not been tried in a court of law.
QUESTION TWO
As concerns the second question, this question is vague and deals with hypothetical facts geared toward future legislation. Although this question is couched in terms of the executive department’s implementation of defense procedures and establishment of monies for claims, and although the Governor constructs and submits the state’s budget, SDCL ch. 4-7, and may recommend measures he considers necessary, S.D. Const, art. IV, § 3, it is axiomatic that the legislature controls the purse strings and that any appropriation for such defensive procedures and monies must be accomplished by an in futuro legislative act. The form and content of any such act and/or appropriation is entirely unknown at the present time and this Court cannot “render any opinion as to the general constitutionality or validity of future legislative action, the exact terms of which necessarily rest entirely in speculation and conjecture.” In re Opinion of the Judges, 50 S.D. 324, 326, 210 N.W. 186, 187 (1926). See also, Opinion of the Judges, 61 S.D. 107, 114, 246 N.W. 295, 297 (1933). This Court should not render opinions on questions which would bind it, in precedent, on legislative acts which the legislature might pass in the future. Therefore, I would decline to render an advisory opinion based on speculation and conjecture. When accommodating gubernatorial requests, this Court is to exercise great caution. In re Opinion of the Supreme Court, 87 S.D. 399, 402, 209 N.W.2d 668, 670 (1973); In re Chapter 6, Session Laws of 1890, 8 S.D. 274, 276, 66 N.W. 310, 311 (1896). The Governor’s second question, however, implies many hypothetical situations such as “procedure for the defense” and “establishes monies for the payment of claims” which have such a vague meaning, in the future, that it would be exceedingly dangerous for this Court to bind itself by precedent.
FRANK E. HENDERSON
Associate Justice