Court Opinion

ID: 9882865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:21:11.089199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:05.050376
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Lanza v. Lanza, 2023-Ohio-3531.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  LAKE COUNTY

MICHELLE S. LANZA,                              CASE NO. 2023-L-024

                 Plaintiff-Appellee/
                 Cross-Appellant,               Civil Appeal from the
                                                Court of Common Pleas,
        - vs -                                  Domestic Relations Division

FRANKLIN C. LANZA, et al.,
                                                Trial Court No. 2016 DR 000595
                 Defendant-Appellant/
                 Cross-Appellee.

                                            OPINION

                                  Decided: September 29, 2023
                                       Judgment: Affirmed

Gary S. Okin, Dworken & Bernstein Co., LPA, 60 South Park Place, Painesville, OH
44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant).

James B. Rosenthal, Cohen Rosenthal & Kramer LLP, 3208 Clinton Avenue, Cleveland,
OH 44113 (For Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

        {¶1}     Appellant/cross-appellee,    Franklin   C.   Lanza,   (“Husband”),   and

appellee/cross-appellant, Michelle S. Lanza, (“Wife”), appeal the judgment overruling

their objections to a magistrate’s decision, denying their respective motions to show

cause, and awarding Wife a portion of her attorney fees. We affirm.

        {¶2}     In 2016, Wife initiated divorce proceedings.    In late 2018, the parties

resolved the outstanding issues in the divorce case and read their agreement on the
record in court.    In January 2019, the trial court approved a divorce decree that

incorporated a transcript of the in-court settlement.

       {¶3}   Later that year, the parties began engaging in post-decree litigation as

follows. Husband moved the court to order Wife to appear and show cause as to why she

should not be held in contempt for: (1) failing to pay her own attorney fees as ordered in

the divorce decree, (2) failing to leave the marital residence in “broom clean condition”

and causing waste to the residence in violation of the decree, and (3) breaching her

warranty that there was not, and would not be, damage to the marital residence prior to

her vacating the residence. Wife filed a motion to compel discovery, and she thereafter

moved the court to order Husband to appear and show cause as to why he should not be

held in contempt for failing to indemnify and hold her harmless on a debt owing to the

parties’ landscaper. Both parties requested attorney fees.

       {¶4}   These matters proceeded to hearing before a magistrate in February and

August 2020. On February 11, 2022, the magistrate issued a decision determining that

neither party should be held in contempt and that Husband should pay wife $21,000.00

toward her attorney fees. Both parties objected to the magistrate’s decision. On January

30, 2023, the trial court ruled on the objections, denying the objections relative to the

magistrate’s determination that neither party should be held in contempt, and issued

judgment that recalculated the attorney fees awarded to Wife to $20,971.80.

       {¶5}   In his appeal, Husband assigns six errors to the trial court’s January 30,

2023 judgment, and, in her cross-appeal, Wife assigns two errors. We consolidate and

take out of order certain assigned errors to facilitate our discussion.

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       {¶6}   At the outset, we note that, as to all the assignments of error save for

Husband’s sixth assigned error, the appeal and cross-appeal pertain to the trial court’s

rulings on the parties’ objections to the magistrate’s decision. In such a case, “any claim

of trial court error must be based on the actions of the trial court, not on the magistrate's

findings or proposed decision; the focus is on the trial court's actions and not the actions

of the magistrate.” Obradovich v. Horvath, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2008-T-0096, 2009-

Ohio-3176, ¶ 38, citing W.R. Martin, Inc. v. Zukowski, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2006-L-028

and 2006-L-120, 2006-Ohio-6866, ¶ 32. We generally review a trial court’s action on a

magistrate’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Walsh v. Walsh, 11th Dist. Ashtabula

No. 2022-A-0030, 2022-Ohio-3373, ¶ 31. “An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s

‘“failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.”’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting

State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62, quoting Black’s

Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004). Where the issue on review has been entrusted to

the discretion of the trial court, “the mere fact that the reviewing court would have reached

a different result is not enough, without more, to find error.” Walsh at ¶ 32, citing Beechler

at ¶ 67. “When a pure issue of law is involved in appellate review, however, the mere

fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue differently is enough to find error.”

Walsh at ¶ 32, citing Beechler at ¶ 67.

       {¶7}   Next, we note that Husband’s first four assigned errors and Wife’s first

assigned error pertain to the trial court’s denial of their respective motions requesting the

court to hold the other in contempt for failure to abide by terms of the divorce decree. We

also generally review a trial court’s ruling on a contempt motion for an abuse of discretion.

Miller v. Miller, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2019-T-0048, 2020-Ohio-6914, ¶ 10. “Contempt

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is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the orders or commands of judicial authority.

Indirect contempt may include the disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful order,

judgment, or command of a court officer.” (Footnote omitted). Miller at ¶ 8, quoting State

v. Flinn, 7 Ohio App.3d 294, 295, 455 N.E.2d 691 (9th Dist.1982); and Dozer v. Dozer,

88 Ohio App.3d 296, 302, 623 N.E.2d 1272 (4th Dist.1993); and citing R.C. 2705.02.

Where the contempt allegation is based on violation of a court order, the order must be

clear and definite with respect to the precise conduct constituting disobedience. Does v.

Univ. Hosps. Health Sys., Inc., 2023-Ohio-2120, --- N.E.3d ----, ¶ 18-19 (11th Dist.); Cain

v. Cain, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2017-P-0084, 2019-Ohio-184, ¶ 21.

       {¶8}   In such a case, “[t]he party moving to hold another in civil contempt of court

has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a valid court

order and the other’s noncompliance.” Miller at ¶ 12, quoting Carroll v. Detty, 113 Ohio

App.3d 708, 711, 681 N.E.2d 1383 (4th Dist.1996). Clear and convincing evidence is

evidence that “will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to

the facts sought to be established.” Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid, 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 331,

708 N.E.2d 193 (1999), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118

(1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶9}   Mindful of these principles, we first address Husband’s assigned errors

regarding the trial court’s judgment denying his contempt motion. In his first and second

assigned errors, Husband argues:

              [Husband’s First Assigned Error:] The trial court committed
              prejudicial error in denying Defendant-Appellant Franklin
              Lanza’s Motion to Show Cause as to Michelle’s failure to pay
              her own attorney fees and expenses as ordered in the final
              Judgment Entry of Divorce based on the merger doctrine set
              forth in Colom v. Colom, 58 Ohio St.2d 245, 389 N.E.2d 856
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                (1979) when Franklin is not seeking to enforce prior
                interlocutory orders or to appeal them.

                [Husband’s Second Assigned Error:]             The trial court
                committed prejudicial error in denying Defendant-Appellant
                Franklin Lanza’s Motion to Show Cause as to Michelle’s
                failure to pay her own attorney fees and expenses by “finding”
                that the amounts Franklin previously paid were from marital
                assets when no such determination was made prior to or in
                the final Judgment Entry of Divorce, the issue was never tried,
                the Court did not reserve jurisdiction over the parties’ property
                settlement, and the Court’s “finding” that an asset was marital
                property, without prior notice or opportunity to be heard,
                constitutes a new ruling in this case nearly four years after the
                Judgment Entry of Divorce.

       {¶10} Husband’s first and second assigned errors pertain to funds paid during the

divorce proceedings for Wife’s attorney fees and expenses from a PNC account that was

held in Husband’s name. While the parties’ divorce was pending, the trial court restrained

the parties from using this PNC account. However, during the divorce proceeding, the

restraining order was partially lifted several times by court orders, two of which are

relevant to Husband’s argument. First, in 2017, the magistrate lifted the restraining order

to allow for $20,000.00 in distributions to each party from the PNC account, stating that

the parties were to use the money as follows: “$10,000.00 (each) for their living expenses

and $10,000.00 (each), which shall be paid directly to their present divorce attorneys.”

The order further stated that the distributions were “subject to re-allocation and/or in

consideration as spousal and child support calculations at the final disposition herein.

Further, the payment of attorney fees herein is also subject to re-allocation at the final

disposition.”

       {¶11} In 2018, the magistrate again lifted the restraining order as to the PNC

account, “to allow each party to receive $5,000 for their litigation expenses. Further, the

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plaintiff is to receive an additional $2,500 as a deposit for the payment of her vocational

expert. The payment of litigation costs, court costs, attorneys’ fees and experts’ costs

are all subject to further allocation at the final disposition herein.” (Footnote omitted.)

       {¶12} As noted in our recitation of the procedural history, final disposition of the

divorce was made by way of an in-court settlement agreement and an agreed divorce

decree. The decree ordered that “the Plaintiff, Michelle Lanza, shall pay her own attorney

fees and expenses, and the Defendant, Franklin Lanza, shall pay his own attorney fees

and expenses.”

       {¶13} In his motion to show cause, Husband maintained that the decree’s

requirement that each party pay their own attorney fees and expenses necessarily

required Wife to pay him the $17,500.00 that she received for attorney fees and expenses

from the PNC account pursuant to the two interlocutory orders set forth above. Husband’s

argument is based on at least two necessary premises: first, that the decree’s order as to

attorney fees encompassed fees that had already been paid, and, second, that the PNC

account was Husband’s separate property.            The magistrate disagreed with these

premises and determined that the portion of Husband’s motion relating to Wife’s failure

to reimburse him for interim attorney fees should be denied.

       {¶14} In overruling Husband’s objection to this aspect of the magistrate’s decision,

the trial court noted as “an aside,” that the PNC account was marital property. The court

determined that the decree’s provisions regarding attorney fees was prospective, and

nothing in the decree or the transcript of the in-court settlement provided that Wife would

pay any sum to Husband for interim attorney fees paid from the PNC account. In support,

the court noted that the merger doctrine extinguished the interim orders.

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Case No. 2023-L-024
       {¶15} On appeal, Husband first challenges the court’s application of the merger

doctrine. As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Colom v. Colom, 58 Ohio St.2d 245,

389 N.E.2d 856 (1979), syllabus, “In a domestic relations action, interlocutory orders are

merged within the final decree, and the right to enforce such interlocutory orders does not

extend beyond the decree, unless they have been reduced to a separate judgment or

they have been considered by the trial court and specifically referred to within the decree.”

       {¶16} Husband maintains that the court misapplied this doctrine because

Husband was not attempting to enforce the interlocutory orders, and he, in fact, had

already complied with these orders for the payment of attorney fees. Rather, he was

referencing the interlocutory orders to calculate the amounts of fees and expenses that

had been paid from the PNC account and to provide context to the decree. Husband

maintains that the trial court erred in applying the merger doctrine to treat the interlocutory

orders as though they “are erased from the record as if they never happened.”

       {¶17} However, we do not read the court’s decision in the same manner as

Husband. The court noted that each interlocutory order stated that the attorney fees and

expenses could be allocated or reallocated. The court relied on the merger doctrine to

demonstrate the decree’s silence as to allocation or reallocation of the interim attorney

fees. Because the decree contained no provision as to payment of interim attorney fees

previously ordered, Husband could not rely on the statement that each party pay their

own attorney fees as retroactively amending fees already paid. The trial court did not

misapply the merger doctrine. Accordingly, Husband’s first assigned error lacks merit.

       {¶18} Moreover, the parties’ decree incorporated the parties’ agreement

regarding division of property. The decree does not designate the PNC account as

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Case No. 2023-L-024
“marital” or “separate” property but ultimately awards the account to Husband. See R.C.

3105.171(A)(3)(a) (defining marital property) and R.C. 3105.171(A)(6) (defining separate

property).     In his second assigned error, Husband challenges the trial court’s “aside”

note that the PNC account constituted marital property.

        {¶19} Regardless of the propriety of the trial court’s statement in the ruling on

objections, it was Husband’s burden to establish the basic premises of his claim. The

decree does not contain any determination that the PNC account constituted Husband’s

“separate property.” Notwithstanding Husband’s attempts to categorize the PNC account

as “separate property” through the post-divorce proceedings and this appeal, our

disposition of Husband’s first assigned error renders his second assigned error moot, and

we decline to further address it. 1 See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

        {¶20} Next, with respect to the denial of his motion to show cause, in Husband’s

third and fourth assigned errors, he argues:

                [Husband’s Third Assigned Error:] The trial court committed
                prejudicial error by denying any and all relief to Franklin on his
                motion to show cause as it related to waste and damage to
                the marital residence and “broom clean” condition when the
                parties’ contractual, in court settlement, unambiguously
                imposed liability on Michelle for waste and damage to the
                premises that occurred during her occupancy and
                unambiguously imposed on her a duty to leave the premises
                in “broom clean” condition.

                [Husband’s Fourth Assigned Error:] The trial court committed
                prejudicial error by denying any and all relief to Franklin on his
                motion to show cause as it related to waste and damage to
                the marital residence and “broom clean” condition when the
                manifest weight of the evidence established that both parties

1. Wife observes that Husband’s appellate brief contains factual representations not in the record regarding
the PNC account. Factual representations lacking a foundation in the record are not appropriately
considered by this court; however, we need not rely on any of these representations to resolve Husband’s
assigned errors.
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              agreed at least some of the waste and damage occurred while
              Michelle’s warranty applied and undisputed evidence showed
              that Franklin paid to haul trash and debris that Michelle had
              left behind.

       {¶21} Husband’s third and fourth assigned errors pertain to the condition of the

marital residence once Wife vacated the residence. Relative to this issue, the divorce

decree provided as follows:

              * * * Michelle Lanza, shall vacate the * * * Sanctuary Drive,
              Kirtland Hills, Ohio 44060 residence on or before March 1,
              2019. The Plaintiff, Michelle Lanza, warrants and represents
              that she has not caused an[y] waste or damage to [the]
              residence. The Plaintiff, Michelle Lanza, shall not cause any
              waste or damage to the residence and shall ensure that the
              residence is in broom clean condition when she vacates the
              residence. The parties acknowledge there is existing damage
              to a wall caused by the minor child, which shall not be
              considered waste or damage created by Plaintiff, Michelle S.
              Lanza, and which shall not be her obligation to repair.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶22} This provision in the divorce decree differs somewhat from the transcript of

the in-court agreement attached to the decree. The transcript provides that wife “warrants

and represents there hasn’t been any waste or destruction caused to the residence. She

also warrants and represents she will not cause any waste or destruction to the residence,

and she will also leave the residence in what is known as broom clean condition.”

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶23} In the proceedings before the magistrate, Husband maintained that this

provision in the transcript controlled over the terms of the divorce decree, and that Wife’s

warranty that there was no waste or destruction caused to the residence was not specific

to damage arising from her own conduct. However, Wife maintained that the terms of the

decree prevailed over the in-court settlement transcript, and, thus, Wife had warrantied
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Case No. 2023-L-024
that she had not caused waste or damage to the residence and that she would not

thereafter cause any waste or damage.

       {¶24} In the magistrate’s decision, the magistrate determined that the terms of the

decree prevailed over the terms of the in-court settlement transcript with regard to

damage to the residence. The magistrate concluded that much of the alleged damage to

the residence was normal wear and tear, due to actions of the parties’ children, or existed

while Husband and Wife were still residing in the home together.

       {¶25} The magistrate further determined that, in general, Wife’s pictures of the

home which were entered into evidence at the hearing, reflected “a completely clean and

vacuumed residence.”       However, the pictures Husband entered into evidence

demonstrated some trash in drawers, items left on shelves and in closets, and trash that

was pulled from behind and beneath furniture and displayed in the middle of a room. The

magistrate deemed the most notable of the “trash” that was left in the marital residence

was located behind and/or beneath furniture in the parties’ then minor son’s bedroom.

Further, the magistrate noted that Husband designated certain items as “trash” or “waste”

that Wife should have removed despite the items not being listed as property that she

was permitted to remove pursuant to a joint exhibit attached to the decree.

       {¶26} The magistrate determined that Wife had substantially complied with the

decree’s requirement to leave the residence in broom-clean condition. Further, the

magistrate noted that contempt must be based on a clear order of what is required by the

alleged contemnor. Ultimately, the magistrate determined that Husband failed to prove

that Wife was in contempt for damage to the residence or failure to leave it in broom-

clean condition.

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Case No. 2023-L-024
        {¶27} In his objections, Husband again advanced his argument that the in-court

settlement transcript provision regarding damage to the residence controlled over the

provision in the divorce decree, citing several cases in support. The trial court overruled

this objection, stating the cases on which Husband relied pertained to discrepancies

between a “separation agreement” filed with the court and incorporated in a decree and

the provisions of the decree. Here, no separation agreement was filed. Accordingly, the

court overruled Husband’s objection.

        {¶28} Husband also objected to the magistrate’s failure to find Wife in contempt

when trash was left in the home, and it was not in “broom[-]clean condition” under any

definition of that phrase. However, the trial court noted that the parties did not define

“broom[-]clean condition,” and the phrase was open to interpretation. The court also

noted that Husband had provided no “case law” supporting the interpretation of “broom

clean.” Moreover, the court determined that the items left in closets and shelves which

were not on the parties’ joint exhibit as items to be removed by Wife were properly left at

the residence. Accordingly, the trial court overruled Husband’s objection.

        {¶29} In his third assigned error, Husband argues that the trial court erred in

interpreting Wife’s warranty in the decree as warrantying only that she personally had not

and would not damage the marital residence, contending that such an interpretation leads

to an absurd result. 2       Husband likewise asserts that the trial court “imposed an absurd

result” in its interpretation of Wife’s promise to leave the residence in “broom[-]clean”

2. As previously quoted, the transcript of the in-court settlement indicated that Wife warrantied that “there
has not been any waste or destruction caused to the residence.” Husband appears to equate the term
“damage” to either “waste” or “destruction.” We need not, and do not, reach the issue of whether the term
“damage” is synonymous with these terms.
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Case No. 2023-L-024
condition as not requiring Wife to remove her personal items unless they were listed on

the parties’ joint exhibit.

       {¶30} However, Wife responds that the manifest absurdity doctrine on which

Husband relies on appeal was not the basis of Husband’s objections below with regard

to the damage provision. In his reply brief, Husband maintains that his written closing

argument and his objections did raise his position regarding contract interpretation.

However, the objection to which Husband cites in his reply, although providing a general

reference to contract interpretation, does not advance the “absurd results” argument that

he raises on appeal.

       {¶31} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) provides, “An objection to a magistrate’s decision shall

be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection.” Civ.R. 53(B)(3)(b)(iv)

provides, “Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the

court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically

designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless

the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).”

Accordingly, Husband has forfeited all but plain error argument with respect to whether

the court’s interpretations of the provisions in the divorce decree results in an absurdity.

       {¶32} “In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be

applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error,

to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of

the underlying judicial process itself.” (Citations omitted.) Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio

St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), syllabus. Here, Husband has not advanced a plain

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Case No. 2023-L-024
error argument with respect to the absurd results doctrine, and we conclude this is not

the extremely rare case to which the plain error doctrine is appropriately applied.

Moreover, we note, as previously stated, to hold a party in contempt for violation of a court

order, the order must be clear and unambiguous as to the conduct constituting the

violation. Does, 2023-Ohio-2120, at ¶ 18-19; Cain, 2019-Ohio-184, ¶ 21.

       {¶33} For the foregoing reasons, Husband’s third assigned error is overruled.

       {¶34} With respect to his fourth assigned error, Husband argues that the court

erred in denying him any relief because the manifest weight of the evidence established

that at least some of the damage to the residence occurred while Wife’s “warranty applied”

and undisputed evidence showed that Husband paid to remove trash and debris that Wife

had left at the residence.

       {¶35} Husband maintains that he presented unrebutted evidence of waste, trash,

and unwanted personal items left in the residence. However, our resolution of Husband’s

third assigned error limits our discussion of his fourth, as Husband failed to establish

certain bases on which his fourth assigned error is premised. Namely, Husband has not

established that the court erred in its determination that Wife properly left personal

property in the residence that was not listed on the joint exhibit for her removal. Husband

has also not established that the trial court erred in applying the damage warranty in the

decree to only damage that was caused by Wife. Husband does not contend that the

manifest weight of the evidence establishes that Wife caused the damages he identifies.

       {¶36} With respect to trash left at the residence, we agree that there was

unrefuted evidence that trash and debris were located in the residence when Husband

regained occupancy.      The magistrate also acknowledged that trash was left in the

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residence; however, the magistrate determined the trash to be of “an insignificant

amount,” and that it “could be easily removed with little trouble, time, and expense.”

Further, the magistrate’s decision sets forth case law for the proposition that substantial

compliance may excuse a technical violation of a court order in certain cases. And, here,

the magistrate determined that Wife substantially complied with her promise to leave the

residence in broom-clean condition.

       {¶37} Husband objected to the findings regarding the insignificance of the trash,

maintaining that the findings mischaracterized the evidence. The trial court overruled the

objection because Husband did not support it with specificity to the record as required by

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii).

       {¶38} On appeal, Husband does not explain how the trial court erred in overruling

his objection to the insignificance of the trash. Further, Husband did not object below to

the magistrate’s determination that substantial compliance may excuse technical

violations of a court order.

       {¶39} Accordingly, Husband’s fourth assigned error lacks merit.

       {¶40} We next take out of order and address Wife’s first assigned error, wherein

she argues that the court should have found Husband in contempt, maintaining:

              [Wife’s First Assigned Error:] The trial court’s denial of
              Michelle’s Motion to Show Cause was against the manifest
              weight of the evidence where the evidence surrounding her
              payment of the landscaping costs w[as] unrebutted and
              credible.

       {¶41} The parties’ decree of divorce ordered “that the Defendant, Franklin Lanza,

shall indemnify and hold the Plaintiff, Michelle Lanza, harmless on any and all debt due

and owing to the landscaper(s) associated with the real properties located at * * *

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Sanctuary Drive, Kirtland Hills, Ohio 44060 and * * * Chatham Way, Mayfield Heights,

Ohio 44124.”

        {¶42} At the hearing before the magistrate, Wife testified that she paid the

landscaper a negotiated settlement of $4,000.00. However, Husband maintained that he

was not required to reimburse Wife for moneys she paid to the landscaper because she

provided him no notice of the amount of the outstanding debt prior to her payment of the

debt. Wife argued that she was not required to provide Husband notice of the debt by

the terms of the divorce decree.

        {¶43} The magistrate determined that Wife was not required to provide Husband

notice prior to making payment.3 However, the magistrate determined that Wife had failed

to establish her contempt claim with clear and convincing evidence.

        {¶44} Wife objected, arguing the uncontroverted testimony of Wife and the

landscaper established that Wife paid the landscaper $4,000.00 as a compromised

amount of what was owed, and she was entitled to indemnification from Husband

pursuant to the decree. The trial court overruled the objection, finding that, although Wife

was not required to provide Husband notice of the debt prior to settling the debt, she was

required to provide Husband proof of payment to trigger Husband’s responsibility to

indemnify prior to litigating this issue in a motion to show cause.

        {¶45} On appeal, Wife contends that the court’s ruling overlooks the testimony of

the landscaper, who maintained that he contacted Husband regarding his charges, and

Husband directed the landscaper to Wife.                 However, Husband’s knowledge of an

3. Husband did not object to this portion of the magistrate’s decision that concluded Wife was not
required to notify Husband prior to paying the landscaping bill.
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Case No. 2023-L-024
outstanding landscaping debt does not provide Husband notice that Wife has paid the

debt or the amount she paid. In her brief, Wife maintains that if Husband “wasn’t aware

of the amount prior to the filing of” Wife’s motion, “he certainly was as of that date.”

Although this may be true, Wife does not explain how the trial court erred in determining

that she was required to provide Husband some notice of payment prior to seeking to

hold him in contempt for failing to indemnify her. Accordingly, Wife’s first assigned error

lacks merit.

       {¶46} Having addressed the assignments of error pertaining to the merits of the

parties’ respective motions for contempt, we address together Husband’s fifth assigned

error and Wife’s second assigned error, which both involve attorney fees. In these

assigned errors, the parties contend:

               [Husband’s Fifth Assigned Error:] The court committed
               prejudicial error in denying Franklin’s motion for attorney fees
               and awarding Michelle attorney fees on the basis that she
               should not have had to defend against Franklin’s claims for
               the $17,500 and damage to the property/broom-clean
               condition when the issue of the $17,500 was submitted solely
               on briefing, occupied no hearing time and should have been
               decided in Franklin's favor, and when it is undisputed that
               Michelle did leave behind trash which Franklin disposed of at
               his expense and did leave the home with waste and damage
               in violation of her warranty.

               [Wife’s Second Assigned Error:] The trial court erred in only
               awarding Michelle 60% of her attorney fees when equity
               demanded that Franklin should pay all of her attorney fees in
               defending against his Motion to Show Cause and in
               prosecuting hers.

       {¶47} Pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(B):

               In any post-decree motion or proceeding that arises out of an
               action for divorce, dissolution, legal separation, or annulment
               of marriage or an appeal of that motion or proceeding, the
               court may award all or part of reasonable attorney’s fees and
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              litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the award
              equitable. In determining whether an award is equitable, the
              court may consider the parties’ income, the conduct of the
              parties, and any other relevant factors the court deems
              appropriate, but it may not consider the parties’ assets.

       {¶48} “The statute gives a trial court wide latitude to award attorney fees and

litigation expenses if it finds the award equitable.” (Citation omitted.) Lindsey v. Lindsey,

2021-Ohio-2060, 174 N.E.3d 458, ¶ 44 (11th Dist.).

       {¶49} Here, in ruling on the parties’ objections, the trial court determined that

Husband’s contempt claim regarding interim attorney fee reimbursement was “baseless.”

In addition, the court agreed with the magistrate that Husband failed to provide reliable,

consistent, and credible testimony and evidence regarding his claim that Wife should be

held in contempt for not leaving the residence in broom-clean condition. The court

ultimately agreed with the magistrate that Husband’s request for attorney fees be denied

and that Wife be awarded 60% of her attorney fees, and the court recalculated that

percentage to the precise figure of $20,971.80.

       {¶50} On appeal, Husband argues that based on the trial court’s reasoning,

because Wife did not prevail on her contempt claim, she should likewise have been

denied attorney fees, and, because Husband should have prevailed on his claims, he

should have been awarded attorney fees. However, the trial court did not award fees to

Wife on Husband’s claims solely because he did not prevail, it did so because it

determined that Husband’s claim as to reimbursement of interim fees was “baseless,” and

because his testimony regarding Wife’s failure to leave the residence in broom-clean

condition and the clean-up of the residence was unreliable and inconsistent. Further, as

addressed above in our discussion of Husband’s first through fourth assigned errors,

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Husband has not established that the court erred in denying his motion to hold Wife in

contempt.

       {¶51} Wife argues that the trial court should have awarded her the entirety of her

attorney fees because the evidence submitted at the hearings before the magistrate

demonstrated that Husband pursued frivolous actions against her for the sole purpose of

ruining her financially. However, the trial court did find Husband’s claim regarding the

interim attorney fees to be baseless, and the award of attorney fees included time that

Wife’s counsel estimated that he spent on defense of this claim. In addition, the trial

court’s award of the attorney fees to her includes time spent on defense of Husband’s

claim that she failed to leave the home in broom-clean condition. We cannot say the trial

court abused its discretion in failing to award Wife attorney fees incurred due to her

unsuccessful motion to hold Husband in contempt or for her motion to compel production

of documents that the trial court concluded were irrelevant.

       {¶52} Further, the parties raise arguments regarding stipulations as to when their

attorney fee affidavits were to be submitted, whether there existed a stipulation as to the

reasonableness and necessity of fees, whether evidence should have been considered

relative to a separate case, and whether the evidence demonstrated ill-intent on behalf of

Husband in filing his motions. However, given the trial court’s bases for awarding Wife

attorney fees on two of Husband’s claims, and because there exists no challenge to Wife’s

attorney fee affidavit, the court’s ruling on the remaining issues argued by the parties in

the present assigned errors do not bear on the ultimate award of attorney fees.

Accordingly, neither party has demonstrated that the court’s denial of Husband’s request

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for attorney fees and the partial granting of Wife’s request for attorney fees constituted an

abuse of discretion.

       {¶53} Accordingly, Husband’s fifth assigned error and Wife’s second assigned

error lack merit.

       {¶54} In his sixth assigned error, Husband argues:

       {¶55} “In ruling on Franklin’s objections to the Magistrate’s ruling, the Court

committed prejudicial error by failing to undertake an independent review of the record.”

       {¶56} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), “In ruling on objections, the court shall

undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the

magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.”

       {¶57} Husband first maintains that, had the trial court independently reviewed the

record, it would have agreed with him that certain damages occurred to the residence

during the period of Wife’s occupancy.        Further, Husband maintains that, had an

independent review occurred, the trial court would have determined that the parties’ joint

exhibit did not relieve Wife of her duty to remove personal items, as she testified that she

did remove personal items not listed on the joint exhibit. However, the trial court’s

disagreement with Husband’s position on these issues does not establish that the court

failed to independently review the objected matters.

       {¶58} Further, Husband cites instances where he maintains the trial court made

statements inconsistent with the testimony. First, Husband maintains that the court found

he was not present at the residence on the day his movers removed items from the home

after Wife had vacated the residence. Husband maintains that his testimony established

he was only not present when certain items were thrown out, but he did testify that he

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was present that day. Next, Husband maintains that the trial court incorrectly stated in its

decision that the magistrate did not use the term “pristine condition” in the magistrate’s

decision. Husband references the portion of the magistrate’s decision wherein the term

was used. Although these statements in the court’s ruling may have been inaccurate, it

does not establish that the trial court failed to independently review the objected matters.

       {¶59} Husband further cites to the trial court’s determinations that (1) he was on

notice of damage to the kitchen floor caused by a water cooler prior to entering into the

in-court settlement, and (2) the damage was noted on an appraisal conducted in 2017.

Husband maintains that these statements are inconsistent with an independent review

because the trial court excluded the testimony of the appraiser, and the damage occurring

to the kitchen floor that was included in the appraisal was different damage to the floor

than the water cooler damage, which occurred during Wife’s occupancy. Although the

trial court appears to have incorrectly identified the floor damage, we conclude, again,

that this misidentification does not establish that the trial court failed to independently

review the objected matters.

       {¶60} Last, Husband maintains that the trial court inaccurately characterized his

claim for contempt on the interim attorney fee award as “consum[ing] much of the trial

transcript.” Husband maintains that the transcript contains no testimony regarding this

argument, as he had agreed to submit this issue on written argument, and only a small

portion of argument at the hearings was devoted to this issue.

       {¶61} The transcript does indicate that there was no “testimony” advanced on the

issue of interim attorney fees and expenses, as counsel for both parties agreed that it

constituted a legal issue. Approximately 12 pages of transcript contain the parties’

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arguments pertaining to this claim. The trial court’s characterization of this as “much” of

the transcript may not have been the most appropriate term, but, again, it does not

demonstrate that the trial court failed to conduct an independent investigation.

       {¶62} Despite the above nonprejudicial misstatements or mischaracterizations,

the trial court’s 18-page decision assessed each of the numerous objections raised and

appears to independently review each objection.

       {¶63} Accordingly, Husband’s sixth assigned error lacks merit.

       {¶64} The judgment is affirmed.

MATT LYNCH, J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.

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