Court Opinion

ID: 9629066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:36:29.678014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:15.106990
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Chief Judge (dissenting). I disagree with the majority decision which reverses the trial court’s apportionment of pension benefits. The key issue involved in this appeal concerns the rights of the parties to an increase in the amount of pension benefits accruing after the granting of a divorce. The court granted a divorce to the parties on February 4, 1980, but in the same case expressly reserved jurisdiction to divide the community property and adjudicate the debts of the parties. Subsequently, the court entered an order inter alia awarding the parties’ home to the wife, finding that it had an appraised value of $30,000, and awarding to the husband his benefits in a Kennecott pension payable in the sum of $215.23 per month. The husband appealed from the trial court’s division of community property. The supreme court reversed, ordering that the judgment dividing the property be vacated, that the trial court determine the present value of the pension, and “for further consistent proceedings if any are needed.” The supreme court mandate was issued January 3, 1983. Increases in the amount of the pension benefits were effected in January, 1981, to $245.36, and again in January, 1982, to $275.49. On remand the parties stipulated that the present value of the Kennecott pension was $20,370 as of February 4, 1980. A judgment was entered on November 14, 1983, awarding the pension to the husband but allowing the wife credit for one-half the value of the increase in pension benefits which accrued in January, 1981, and January, 1982. Under these circumstances, where the court has dissolved the marriage relationship but has reserved jurisdiction in the same case to divide the community property of the parties, I believe the court under its equitable powers, has the authority to give the wife credit for a portion of the increases in pension benefits and which accrued after the entry of the partial decree of divorce but prior to entry of a final decree adjudicating the property interests of the parties.1  The decisions in Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978) and Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 97 N.M. 133, 637 P.2d 564 (1981), were factually distinguishable from the situation here because in those cases the decrees granting the dissolution of the marriages were final orders. The instant case is similar to Ellett v. Ellett, 94 Nev. 34, 573 P.2d 1179 (1978), decided by the Nevada Supreme Court. In Ellett, the trial court entered a partial decree of divorce on January 29, 1976, which terminated the marital relationship; however, the court expressly reserved jurisdiction to issue a subsequent decree regarding the division of community property and community debts, and the award of alimony. The supplemental decree adjudicating the property rights of the parties was entered approximately three and one-half months later. In the interval between the award of the divorce and the time of entry of the order dividing the community property, additional pension benefits accrued in the husband’s retirement fund benefits. The court in Ellett held that it was not error for the trial court to award the wife an interest in the retirement fund benefits which accrued after the date of the supplemental decree of divorce, despite the fact that the marital relationship had been terminated by a partial decree of divorce entered several months earlier. The court stated: [Husband] does not question the trial court’s division of the nonvested retirement rights, thereby implicitly acknowledging the propriety thereof, see, In re Marriage of Brown, [15 Cal.3d 838] 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal.1976), however he does contend that it was error to credit respondent with the additional approximate four months’ equity in the benefits plan. [Footnote omitted.] Much of appellant’s error in this contention rests on his misconception of the partial decree [of divorce] as a final judgment. We need not reach the issue of the trial court’s claimed departure from NRS 125.150(3), since NRS 125.150(1) in relevant part empowers the trial court to “make such disposition of the community property of the parties, as appears just and equitable,” and the January decree being interlocutory by its express terms reserved jurisdiction of respondent’s community interest in the retirement rights pending final adjudication of the parties rights following the May proceeding. Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P.2d 355 (1950). An order or judgment which reserves a question for future consideration and determination is interlocutory and is not a final judgment. [Emphasis added.] Where a decree of divorce is entered and the court does not adjudicate the interests of the parties in the community property and community debts, but expressly reserves jurisdiction to subsequently make such apportionment, rights of the parties to any increases in the value of property in which the parties held interests do not terminate as of the date of divorce; only the nature of the interests of the parties in the property is transmuted. Generally, if a court reserves jurisdiction to make further adjudications in the same case, the judgment is only interlocutory. Ellett v. Ellett; Saul v. Basse, 399 So.2d 130 (Fla.App.1981). Where a trial court enters an order or decree granting a divorce, and reserves the right to adjudicate the respective property interests of the parties, but fails to make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay in entering the decree of divorce, the order is not final. Absent such express determination, any order or decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims is not a final order and does not terminate the action. The order or decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating the remainder of the claims. NMSA 1978, Civ. P.R. 54(b) (Repl.Pamp.1980). Since there existed a community interest in the pension prior to the divorce, and no division of property was effected at the time of the dissolution of the marriage, the wife continued to retain her interest in the pension. Cf. Hickson v. Herrmann, 77 N.M. 683, 427 P.2d 36 (1967); Harris v. Harris, 83 N.M. 441, 493 P.2d 407 (1972). The provisions of NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-20 (Repl.Pamp.1983) would seem to accord further support to this concept. See also NMSA 1978, § 40-3-8(A)(6) (Repl. Pamp.1983).2  I would affirm the trial court’s ruling.  . In apportioning community property between the parties, a court must consider the needs of the parties in light of all the circumstances, to determine an equitable apportionment. Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010 (1944); Campbell v. Campbell, 62 N.M. 330, 310 P.2d 266 (1957); Michelson v. Michelson, 86 N.M. 107, 520 P.2d 263 (1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638 (1976); Sparks v. Sparks, 84 N.M. 267, 502 P.2d 292 (1972); and Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).   . Increases in pension benefits would also accrue to both spouses where the trial court has ordered a percentage division of the pension between the parties on a "pay as it comes in basis” under one of the options recognized in Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978). See also Leckie v. Leckie, 101 N.M. 254, 680 P.2d 635, 23 SBB 579 (Ct.App.1984) and J.N. Rozsman, Distribution of Pension Benefits: Time Runs Out on the Time Rule, 10 Pac.L.J. 847 (1979). Similarly, both parties may be entitled to subsequent increases in pension benefits where the parties have expressly contracted in a property settlement agreement governing rights in the pension or any increases thereto. See Parks v. Parks, 91 N.M. 369, 574 P.2d 588 (1978).