Court Opinion

ID: 9497765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:59:37.84944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:24.432718
License: Public Domain

*1133TASHIMA, Circuit Judge,
with whom RYMER and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, join, concurring:
Even assuming that the dissent is correct that the parties continue to contest— with a monetary stake in the outcome' — -the issue of personal jurisdiction, that does not amount to an Article III “case or controversy.” The case or controversy at stake in this litigation was whether Gator’s pop-up ad program violated L.L. Bean’s trademark and other primary rights. As the court concludes — and the dissent does not challenge — that controversy has been concluded by the settlement agreement.
The remaining “controversy” of whether the California courts can assert personal jurisdiction over L.L. Bean will settle no dispute between the parties involving any of their primary rights. For it involves only the subsidiary, threshold issue of whether a California court has the power to adjudicate the parties’ dispute. But, under the settlement agreement, no dispute — no case or controversy — involving any of the parties’ primary rights remains. Thus, as the court’s opinion aptly states, the $10,000 is truly only a “side bet.” If we were to hold that the district court could assert personal jurisdiction over L.L. Bean, there remains no case or controversy over which that hypothetical jurisdiction could be asserted.
For these reasons, this case differs from Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982), the two cases on which the dissent primarily relies. In both of those cases, recovery of the reserved, contingent payment would vindicate a primary right of the plaintiff — in Havens, as damages for violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fair Housing Act, 455 U.S. at 371, 102 S.Ct. 1114 (“[Respondents continue to seek damages to redress alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act. The letter agreement ... would merely liquidate those damages.”), and in Fitzgerald, as damages for the wrongful termination of the plaintiffs employment, 457 U.S. at 743-44, 102 S.Ct. 2690 (characterizing the settlement agreement as “an agreement to liquidate damages,” and citing Havens ).1 Here, the outcome of the side bet would determine only whether the district court hypothetically could adjudicate a no-longer-existent dispute. No Article III case or controversy remains.
With this additional observation, I fully concur in Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion for the court.

. The dissent also relies on our cases asserting jurisdiction to decide attorneys' fees and costs after a case is settled and contends that if this case is moot, those cases, Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies v. Evans, 386 F.3d 879 (9th Cir.2004), and Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323 (9th Cir.1999), were “wrongly decided.” But, as the dissent’s quotation from Zucker itself makes clear, costs and fees clearly come under the district court's ancillary jurisdiction. See id. at 1329 (noting that attorneys' fees “are but an ancillary matter over which the district court retains equitable jurisdiction even when the underlying case is moot”). The dissent does not contend that the remaining "controversy” here over personal jurisdiction comes under the court's ancillary jurisdiction.