Court Opinion

ID: 9671183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:32:31.422246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.421177
License: Public Domain

*284Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in parf). I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erroneously restricted the scope of Dr. Watson’s testimony. However, I do not share its sentiment that this error was harmless. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion.
This Court recently adopted the “highly probable” standard for analyzing the harmlessness of nonconstitutional error. People v Gearns, 457 Mich 170, 203; 577 NW2d 422 (1998). Thus, an error is harmless only when it can be said that it is “highly probable that the [evidentiary error] did not contribute to the verdict . . . .” Id. at 205. While it does not reference the highly probable standard, the majority apparently believes that the evidentiary error did not contribute to the verdicts in this case. It devotes the following paragraph to the harmless error analysis:
However, though the circuit court’s rulings would have, if complied with, limited Dr. Watson’s testimony, we find that the error was harmless. Despite the objections of the prosecutor and the trial court sustaining those objections, Dr. Watson provided full and detailed testimony in which he explained his views at length. Notably, the defendant has made no offer of proof regarding testimony that should have been admitted, and we have located no point in Dr. Watson’s testimony where he was effectively precluded from making his point. Indeed, the jury’s decision to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, with regard to the killing of his father, bespeaks the jury’s full understanding of Dr. Watson’s views. [Ante at 279.]
I do not share the majority’s certainty on this issue. Indeed, I believe a review of the record in this case, does not support its conclusion.
The strongest evidence of the effect of the restrictions placed on Dr. Watson lies in the two different *285verdicts with respect to the two different victims in this case. I cannot agree with the majority that the jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity with regard to the killing of defendant’s father truly “bespeaks the jury’s full understanding of Dr. Watson’s views.” Id. Defendant was found both guilty and not guilty of two murders that took place simultaneously. Nothing in Dr. Watson’s testimony supports finding defendant insane at one instant, when he was shooting at his father, but sane the next, when he was shooting at Ms. Bateman.1 Rather, Dr. Watson’s diagnosis was that defendant was insane at the time of both murders. The logical inconsistency of the jury’s verdicts tends to indicate that Dr. Watson was not able to bring out all the facts necessary for the jury to understand that he believed the defendant was insane at the time he shot both victims.
In particular, Dr. Watson was prevented from testifying about the contents of the items he reviewed in making his diagnosis, from testifying about any diagnosis contained in any of the items attached to his report, from discussing certain aspects of the defend*286ant’s familial relations, and from connecting his opinions to the other testimony produced at trial. Such testimony is crucial to the factfinder’s ability to evaluate an expert’s opinions and diagnosis. As Justice Boyle explained in People v Dobben, 440 Mich 679, 697; 488 NW2d 726 (1992):
Uncovering the facts and circumstances on which an expert’s opinion is based is essential to enable other experts to determine whether the opinions expressed by the witness are correct, and to contradict them if wrong. Most importantly, without examination of the foundation of the opinion, the factfinders’ evaluation of the relative value of the opinions offered is necessarily circumscribed and the reliability of its ultimate determination correspondingly compromised.
Simply stated, the “probative value of an opinion of sanity depends on the facts upon which it is based." [Quoting People v Murphy, 416 Mich 453, 465; 331 NW2d 152 (1982) (emphasis added).]
Dr. Watson expressed similar sentiment during a colloquy following one of the prosecutor’s objections to his testimony:
Now, if we could not use [the background material referenced in the report] to explore as launching points, to explore his proposition and find out what his behavior means, we might as well fold up our basket and go home.
* * *
And as I say, I don’t mind being challenged whether or not I read this right; that’s legitimate enough. I’ve got all the documents here that I used. They are the clinical material that I used in addition to my interview. And to me it would be impossible to do an adequate communication to the jury so they can decide whether they want to believe me or whoever if I don’t allude to these kinds of materials. I would be forced to say I believe so and so, take it or leave *287it. I think that’s the absolute anathema on all these kinds of explorations. And, in fact, that they can follow what we do and how we do it, then they can make a reasonable decision [about] which expert they want to believe. That’s the only way that experts can be tested for whether you want to believe them or not, in my opinion. I can’t see how we cannot do that. [Emphasis added.]
For all these reasons, I am unable to conclude that it is “highly probable” that the restrictions placed on Dr. Watson’s testimony did not contribute to the jury’s seemingly inconsistent verdicts. Rather, I believe that it is highly probable that the error in this case did contribute to the verdicts. Thus, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 In fact, defendant’s testimony at trial indicates that he never actually aimed the gun to specifically hit either one of the victims:
Q. Did you aim the gun before you fired it?
A. I held the gun up and started shooting.
Q. Did you shoot your dad and Susan and then wait and shoot them again?
A. It was all one right after another. I fired the shots one right after another.
Unfortunately, Dr. Watson was not able to testify about this or any other testimony occurring at trial because such testimony was not contained within his written report. The only time he attempted to refer to defendant’s testimony during trial, his answer was subject to an immediate objection by the prosecutor.