Court Opinion

ID: 9372813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:51.055864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.851806
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BILLY WRIGHT,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  NY-1221-17-0078-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                          DATE: February 21, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Christina Quashie, Esquire, Alan Lescht, Esquire, and Jack Jarrett, Esquire,
             Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Jennifer A. Weger, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     REVERSE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Board’s New York
     Field Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant holds a Supervisory Criminal Investigator position with the
     agency’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Miami
     Field Division, Puerto Rico I Field Office in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico.          Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 12 at 56, 152. The appellant filed a complaint with the
     Office of Special Counsel (OSC) against the agency and included a declaration. 2
     IAF, Tab 10 at 14-34. He provided OSC with a timeline of events in response to
     OSC’s request for additional information. IAF, Tab 5 at 11-14. In two separate
     letters dated December 20, 2016, OSC notified the appellant that it had closed the
     file on his complaint and that he may have a right to file an IRA appeal seeking
     corrective action from the Board for alleged prohibited personnel practices under
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id. at 7-9. OSC summarized his complaint as alleging
     that, after he disclosed that agency officials mismanaged a specific program and
     that a subordinate employee failed to submit timely credit card statement s and
     justifications, the agency proposed to both demote and suspend him for 14 days,
     mitigated the proposed penalty to a 14-day suspension, reassigned him to a
     nonsupervisory position, and did not select him for a position. Id. at 8.
¶3        On February 13, 2017, the appellant filed this IRA appeal and requested a
     hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 1-7. In an Order on Jurisdiction and Proof Requirements,
     the administrative judge informed the appellant that there was a question whether
     the Board has jurisdiction over his appeal, apprised him of the elements and
     burden of establishing jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, and ordered him to file a
     statement with accompanying evidence on the jurisdictional issue. IAF, Tab 7.

     2
      The agency does not dispute that the appellant submitted a declaration with his OSC
     complaint. Compare IAF, Tab 12 at 9-10, with IAF, Tab 10 at 14-34.
                                                                                       3

     After the appellant filed an 89-page response, the administrative judge ordered
     him to supplement and clarify his pleading. IAF, Tabs 10 -11.
¶4         In his clarified response, the appellant claimed that he made the following
     five disclosures:   (a) on March 19, 2013, he emailed the Chief of the Equal
     Employment Opportunity (EEO) office to request a meeting concerning the
     subordinate employee; (b) on or around March 19, 2013, he met with the deciding
     official for his 14-day suspension and told him that the subordinate employee had
     not submitted credit card documentation in over a year and abused agency
     regulations related to travel restrictions and credit card limits ; (c) on March 21,
     2013, he met with agency officials in the Internal Affairs Division (IAD)
     regarding the subordinate employee’s violations of the agency’s credit card
     policies; (d) on April 18, 2013, an IAD official emailed Deputy Assistant Director
     (DAD) B.Z. and the deciding official, forwarding IAD’s conclusion that the
     subordinate employee had violated agency policies; and (e) on September 10,
     2013, he met with the Special Operations Division Deputy Chief and DAD T.A.
     regarding the subordinate employee’s violations of regulations.       IAF, Tab 14
     at 4-5.   The appellant further asserted that he engaged in the following three
     protected activities: (a) in August 2015, during a meeting with the proposing
     official for his proposed demotion and suspension, he discussed his request to
     transfer offices from Kansas City to San Juan and the subordinate employee’s
     regulatory violations; (b) in his January 30, 2016 response to the agency’s
     proposed demotion and suspension, he raised a whistleblower reprisal claim; and
     (c) on March 2, 2016, he filed a grievance of the agency’s suspension decision
     and raised a whistleblower reprisal claim. Id. at 5. In addition, the appellant
     alleged that the agency took the following five actions as a result of the
     disclosures and activities described above:       (a) in July 2013, DAD B.Z.
     transferred the subordinate employee out of his chain-of-command; (b) DAD T.A.
     pressured him to transfer offices from Washington, D.C., to Kansas City; (c) the
     agency appointed an employee from the Washington, D.C., office to serve as the
                                                                                            4

     Special Agent in Charge of the San Juan office “over” him; (d) the agency
     proposed his demotion and 14-day suspension; and (e) the agency suspended him
     for 14 days. Id. at 6.
¶5         Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an
     initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 20, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 1, 8. Specifically, she found that the appellant failed to prove
     exhaustion of his OSC remedies regarding alleged disclosures (a) 3 and (d),
     protected activities (a)-(c), and actions (a)-(c). 4 ID at 5-6. She further found that
     the appellant proved exhaustion of his OSC remedies regarding the alleged
     disclosures (b) and (c) of the subordinate employee’s improper credit card usage
     and documentation to the deciding official and IAD in March 2013, and the
     alleged actions (d) and (e) of his proposed demotion and suspension, and the
     imposed 14-day suspension. Id. In addition, the administrative judge found that
     the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that he made a protected disclosure
     because he alleged that he reasonably believed that he disclosed a violation of
     law, rule, or regulation when he reported the subordinate employee’s violation of
     credit card policies.    ID at 6.   She concluded that he failed to nonfrivolously
     allege that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the proposed
     demotion and suspension, or imposed 14-day suspension. ID at 7.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review challenging the administrative
     judge’s jurisdictional findings.    Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.          The
     agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

     3
       The administrative judge referred to the appellant’s alleged disclosure to the deciding
     official in March 2013 as disclosure (a). ID at 5. This was a typographic error , and the
     initial decision should instead reference disclosure (b).
     4
      The administrative judge did not address alleged disclosure (e), and the appellant does
     not raise it as an issue on review. Petition for Review File, Tab 1; ID at 5. Thus, we
     decline to consider whether alleged disclosure (e) is within our jurisdiction as a
     protected disclosure. However, as discussed below, we find that it is relevant to our
     analysis of the contributing factor criterion.
                                                                                             5

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         To establish jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, an appellant generally must
     show by preponderant evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies
     before OSC and make nonfrivolous allegations 5 that (1) he made a disclosure
     described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in a protected activity
     described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and (2) the
     disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision
     to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 6
     Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016).
     Once an appellant establishes jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, he is entitled to a
     hearing on the merits of his claim, which he must prove by preponderant
     evidence.     Rebstock Consolidation v. Department of Homeland Security ,
     122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 9 (2015). For the following reasons, we reverse the initial
     decision and remand the appeal for further adjudication because we find that the
     appellant has established jurisdiction over this IRA appeal. 7

     The appellant proved by preponderant evidence that he exhausted his OSC
     remedies regarding alleged disclosures (a)-(d), protected activities (b) and (c),
     and actions (d) and (e).
¶8         In his petition for review, the appellant asserts that he exhausted alleged
     disclosures (a)-(d) and protected activities (a)-(c) before OSC. PFR File, Tab 1

     5
       A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at
     issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
     6
       Pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), Pub. L.
     No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465, effective December 27, 2012, Congress expanded the
     grounds on which an appellant may file an IRA appeal with the Board. Rebstock
     Consolidation v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 5 (2015). The
     alleged actions at issue in the instant appeal occurred after the effective date of the
     WPEA. The relevant holdings of pre-WPEA case law that we have cited in this
     Remand Order have not been affected by the WPEA.
     7
       We have reviewed the relevant legislation amending the whistleblower protection
     statutory scheme that was enacted during the pendency of this appeal and have
     concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal, nor does it affect the
     relevant holdings of the case law cited in this Remand Order.
                                                                                        6

       at 6. He does not challenge the administrative judge’s finding that only alleged
       actions (d) and (e), his proposed demotion and suspension, and imposed 14-day
       suspension, were properly exhausted before OSC. Id. at 10 n.3; ID at 6. Thus,
       we decline to address alleged actions (a)-(c).
  ¶9        Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an employee is required to “seek corrective
       action from [OSC] before seeking corrective action from the Board” through an
       IRA appeal. Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 122 M.S.P.R. 3,
       ¶ 6 (2014), aff’d, 626 F. App’x 261 (Fed. Cir. 2015).             The substantive
       requirements of exhaustion are met when an appellant has provided OSC with a
       sufficient basis to pursue an investigation.           Chambers v. Department of
       Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. The Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA
       appeal is limited to those issues that have been previously raised with OSC , but
       appellants may give a more detailed account of their whistleblowing activities
       before the Board than they did to OSC.           Id.   Appellants may demonstrate
       exhaustion of their OSC remedies with evidence regarding their initial OSC
       complaint and other communications with OSC concerning their allegations. See
       Baldwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 8 (2010).
¶10         Based on our review of the appellant’s submissions to OSC, we find that he
       proved by preponderant evidence that he exhausted his OSC remedies regarding
       alleged disclosures (a)-(d), protected activities (b) and (c), and actions (d) and
       (e). In his declaration and timeline of events submitted to OSC, the appellant
       claimed, in relevant part, the following: on March 18, 2013, he emailed the Chief
       of the EEO office regarding the subordinate employee; 8 in March 2013, he met
       with the deciding official and disclosed the subordinate employee’s policy
       violations; on March 21, 2013, he met with IAD officials regarding the
       subordinate employee’s credit card usage and documentation; on April 18, 2013,
       he received an email from IAD referring the matter regarding the sub ordinate
       8
         The appellant identified the Chief of the EEO office as “ATF counsel.” IAF, Tab 5
       at 12.
                                                                                             7

      employee to management; on December 1, 2015, the proposing official proposed
      his demotion and 14-day suspension; on January 25, 2016, he provided to the
      deciding official an oral and written response to the proposed demotion and
      suspension, and he alleged reprisal for disclosing the subordinate employee’s
      violation of agency regulations; on February 12, 2016, the deciding official issued
      a decision to suspend him for 14 days; and on March 2, 2016, he filed a grievance
      of his suspension and raised a whistleblower reprisal claim. IAF, Tab 5 at 12-14,
      Tab 10 at 29-30, 32-34. Thus, we find that the appellant provided OSC with a
      sufficient basis to pursue an investigation into his claim that the agency retaliated
      against him for disclosing potential violations of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and
      (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).     See Briley v. National Archives and Records
      Administration, 236 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that the appellant
      proved exhaustion when her letters to OSC contained the core of her retaliation
      claim, giving OSC a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation). 9
¶11         Further, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant
      failed to prove exhaustion regarding alleged protected activity (a), that he met
      with the proposing official in August 2015 regarding his request to transfer to the
      San Juan office and discussed the subordinate employee’s regulatory violations.
      ID at 5-6; see Miller, 122 M.S.P.R. 3, ¶ 10 (finding that the appellant failed to
      prove that he sought corrective action with OSC regarding new allegations of
      protected activity that were separate from the core of his retaliation claim
      described in his submissions to OSC).          Although the appellant disputes that
      finding on review, there is no evidence that he informed OSC that he discussed

      9
        Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to
      the All Circuit Review Act, Pub. L. No. 115 195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file
      petitions for judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any
      circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek
      review of this decision before any appropriate court of appeal.
                                                                                                8

      the subordinate employee’s regulatory violations with the proposing official in
      August 2015. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. The appellant did not allege meeting the
      proposing official in August 2015 in his initial OSC complaint or timeline of
      events, nor was a meeting described in OSC’s letters. However, the appellant
      asserted in his declaration to OSC that, on August 20, 2015, he had a meeting
      with the proposing official regarding opportunities for a lateral reassignment to
      San Juan and that the proposing official stated his intention to facilitate further
      conversation on the matter with other agency officials. IAF, Tab 10 at 32. We
      find that this assertion failed to give OSC a sufficient basis to pursue an
      investigation of potential violations of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or (b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
      (C), or (D). 10

      The appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that he made protected
      disclosures that were contributing factors in personnel actions.
¶12         The next jurisdictional inquiry is whether the appellant has made a
      nonfrivolous allegation that he made a protected disclosure or engaged in a
      protected activity that was a contributing factor in a personnel action.                See
      Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8.          A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected
      disclosure is an allegation of facts that, if proven, would show that the appellant
      disclosed a matter that a reasonable person in his position would believe
      evidenced one of the categories of wrongdoing spe cified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
      Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 6 (2016).
¶13         To satisfy the contributing factor criterion at the jurisdictional stage, an
      appellant only need raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact of, or content of,
      the protected disclosure or activity was one factor that tended to affect the
      personnel action in any way.        Id., ¶ 13.   Under the knowledge-timing test, an

      10
         Even assuming that the appellant proved exhaustion regarding alleged protected
      activity (a), we find that he has failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that activity (a)
      constitutes protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 8-9; IAF, Tab 14 at 5.
                                                                                          9

      appellant may nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure or activity was a
      contributing factor in a personnel action through circumstanti al evidence, such as
      evidence that the official who took the personnel action knew of the disclosure or
      activity and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a
      reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure or activity was a
      contributing factor in the personnel action. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Salerno,
      123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 13. In addition to the knowledge-timing test, there are other
      possible ways for an appellant to satisfy the contributing factor criterion. See
      Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶¶ 14-15 (2012)
      (explaining that other evidence relevant to the contributing factor criterion
      includes the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel
      action, whether the whistleblowing was personally directed at the proposing or
      deciding officials, and whether those officials had a desire or motive to retaliate).
¶14         Here, the appellant does not dispute, and we find no reason to disturb, the
      administrative judge’s finding that alleged disclosure (a), his email to the Chief
      of the EEO office requesting a meeting, is not a protected disclosure. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 7; ID at 5 n.5; IAF, Tab 14 at 7-10.           Further, we agree with the
      administrative judge’s finding that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation
      that he reasonably believed he disclosed a violation of law, rule, or regulation
      when he reported the subordinate employee’s alleged violation of credit card
      policies to the deciding official and IAD officials in March 2013 . ID at 6; see
      Rusin v. Department of the Treasury, 92 M.S.P.R. 298, ¶¶ 2-3, 18-19 (2002)
      (finding that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he reasonably believed that
      his disclosure of his supervisor’s improper credit card purchases evidenced a
      violation of a rule under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)). Thus, we find that the appellant
      has nonfrivolously alleged that disclosures (b) and (c) are protected disclosures
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i). Moreover, we find no reason to disturb the
      administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous
      allegation that disclosure (d), an email from an IAD official forwarding IAD’s
                                                                                      10

      conclusion that the subordinate employee violated agency policies, is a protected
      disclosure. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-8; ID at 5 n.5. The appellant’s submission of the
      email chain at issue shows that he received, but did not send, an email. IAF,
      Tab 10 at 36-39. Thus, we find that he has failed to nonfrivolously allege that he
      made a communication or transmission meeting the definition of a “disclosure”
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(D).
¶15         Further, we find that alleged protected activity (c), filing a grievance that
      raises a whistleblower reprisal claim, constitutes a nonfrivolous allegation of
      protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i).      However, because the
      appellant filed an administrative grievance after the agency proposed his
      demotion and 14-day suspension and imposed his 14-day suspension, his
      protected activity could not have been a contributing factor to those actions. IAF,
      Tab 10 at 32-34, Tab 12 at 51-56, 97-102, Tab 15 at 4-6; see Bradley v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 8 n.3 (2016) (affirming
      the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s alleged disclosures that
      occurred after the personnel actions at issue could not have been a contributing
      factor in those actions). In addition, we find that alleged actions (d) and (e) are
      personnel actions because demotions and 14-day suspensions are “action[s] under
      chapter 75 of [Title 5] or other disciplinary or corrective action[s].” 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii).
¶16         Regarding alleged protected activity (b), we find that the appellant has
      failed to nonfrivolously allege that providing an oral and written reply to the
      agency’s proposed demotion and 14-day suspension constitutes protected activity
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).     PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-9.
      However, we find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that he
      made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i) of a violation of
      the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), as amended, by raising a whistleblower
      reprisal claim in his oral and written reply to the proposed demotion and
      suspension.    IAF, Tab 12 at 57, 94-95; cf. Pulcini v. Social Security
                                                                                      11

      Administration, 83 M.S.P.R. 685, ¶ 8 (1999) (explaining that, at the jurisdictional
      stage of an IRA appeal, an appellant need not correctly label a category of
      wrongdoing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)), aff’d, 250 F.3d 758 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
      (Table). We further find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation of
      a contributing factor between his disclosure of a WPA violation and his
      suspension through the knowledge-timing test. The deciding official stated in his
      February 2016 decision to impose the 14-day suspension that he considered the
      appellant’s oral and written replies, and the deciding official made his decision
      only 1 month after the appellant presented his replies in January 2016.       IAF,
      Tab 15 at 4-6.
¶17        In contrast,    we find that     the   appellant   has failed   to   meet the
      knowledge-timing test regarding alleged disclosures (b) and (c) because more
      than 2 ½ years passed between when the appellant allegedly made those
      disclosures in March 2013, and when the agency proposed his demotion and
      suspension in December 2015 and decided to suspend him in February 2016.
      IAF, Tab 12 at 97-102, Tab 15 at 4-6; see Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 14
      (recognizing that the Board has held that a personnel action taken within
      approximately 1 to 2 years of an appellant’s disclosures satisfies the timing
      component of the knowledge-timing test). However, the knowledge-timing test is
      not the only way for an appellant to satisfy the contributing factor criterion.
      Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14.
¶18        Here, the subordinate employee filed an EEO complaint against the
      appellant in August 2013 asserting, among other things, that , in late March 2013,
      he reported her to IAD for misuse regarding credit card purchases and travel
      requests. IAF, Tab 12 at 105, 131. The agency’s Complaint Adjudication Office
      (CAO) issued a decision on her complaint and found, among other things, that the
      appellant subjected her to a hostile work environment by referring her for an IAD
      investigation. Id. at 140, 142. Based on the CAO decision, the agency proposed
      the appellant’s demotion and suspension and decided to impose his 14-day
                                                                                       12

      suspension. IAF, Tab 12 at 97-101, Tab 15 at 4-5. In particular, the proposal
      notice quoted the part of the CAO decision discussing the appellant’s referral of
      the subordinate employee to IAD. IAF, Tab 12 at 98. Moreover, the appellant
      explicitly raised his report of the subordinate employee’s expenditures and travel
      spending to IAD as a protected disclosure in his written reply to the proposal
      notice, which the deciding official considered in making his decision.         IAF,
      Tab 12 at 94-95, Tab 15 at 4. Based on the above, we find that the appellant has
      made a nonfrivolous allegation that both the deciding and proposing officials
      gave weight to alleged disclosure (c) to IAD. See Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480,
      ¶ 15 (finding that, any weight given to a whistleblower disclosure, either alone or
      in combination with other factors, can satisfy the contributing factor criterion ).
      We further find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that the
      deciding official had a motive to retaliate against him based on his assertions that
      the deciding official was involved with overseeing the program for which the
      subordinate employee served as a Program Manager and that DAD T.A. told him
      that he had upset management officials because he had expressed his opinion that
      the subordinate employee’s failure to follow agency regulations reflected a failure
      of management. IAF, Tab 5 at 12, Tab 10 at 30-31, Tab 12 at 60, 68-69; see
      Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15. Therefore, we find that the appellant has made a
      nonfrivolous allegation that alleged disclosures (b) and (c) were contributing
      factors in his proposed demotion and suspension, and imposed suspension .
¶19        Accordingly, we find that the appellant has established jurisdiction over his
      claim that the agency proposed his demotion and suspension and imposed his
      14-day suspension for disclosing the subordinate employee’s credit card usage
      and documentation to the deciding official and IAD, and for disclosing a violation
                                                                                             13

      of the WPA in his oral and written reply. Thus, we remand this IRA appeal for a
      hearing on the merits. 11

                                              ORDER
¶20         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the field office for
      further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                               /s/ for
                                                   Jennifer Everling
                                                   Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      11
         An issue that the administrative judge may need to address on remand is whether the
      appellant’s disclosures were made during the normal course of his duties. Section 101
      of the WPEA provided that disclosures “made during the normal course of duties of an
      employee” are protected if the agency “took, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail
      to take a personnel action with respect to that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.”
      This provision was initially codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2). On October 26, 2017,
      Congress enacted the Dr. Chris Kirkpatrick Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017,
      Pub. L. No. 115-73, 131 Stat. 1235, which recodified the provision at 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(e)(2). Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
      2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283 (2017) (NDAA for 2018), amended and
      recodified the provision at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2). The NDAA for 2018 amendment to
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) applies retroactively. Salazar v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      2022 MSPB 42, ¶¶ 15-21. The administrative judge should consider what effect, if any,
      the aforementioned pieces of legislation have on this appeal.