Court Opinion

ID: 9729858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:50:44.95253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:01.786112
License: Public Domain

LILLIE, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that the matters as to which admissions were requested are not deemed admitted because the warning was not placed at the end of the original request within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 2033 as strictly construed in order to prevent a forfeiture.
Nowhere in section 2033 does the word “forfeiture” appear. However, the question whether a statute imposes a forfeiture is not necessarily controlled by the designation which the Legislature has given to it; the determinative inquiry is whether the statute in fact results in a forfeiture. (See 36 Am.Jur.2d, Forfeitures and Penalties, § 9, p. 617.) “In law the word ‘forfeit’ means ‘to lose and surrender to an individual or the state something that belongs to one for misconduct or breach of duty .... The term implies that there must be some person, natural or artificial, who is entitled to receive the benefit of the forfeiture when it accrues, and a breach of duty on the part of the one losing his interest in the property. ’ ” (Kuhlemeier v. Lack (1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 802, 808 [123 P.2d 918]; italics omitted.) Under section 2033 if a party served with a request for admissions is given the specified warning and fails to respond to the request within the period designated in the statute, the matters of which an admission is requested will be deemed admitted. Where, as in the present case, plaintiff is the party served with a request for admissions and the matters deemed admitted negate his right to relief, he loses (or forfeits) his cause of action; the defendant thereby receives the benefit of the plaintiff’s breach of the statutory duty to respond timely to the request. In this sense, section 2033 may be said to work a forfeiture.
As the majority opinion points out, the law disfavors forfeitures and statutes imposing them are to be strictly construed. (People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 906 [98 Cal.Rptr. 57, 489 P.2d 1385].) It is also true, however, that courts give to statutes which provide for forfeitures a construction consistent with justice and reason (Datta v. Staab (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 613, 623 [343 P.2d 977]), and may not rewrite the clear provisions thereof under the guise of construction. (People v. One Pontiac 8 Sedan (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 503, 505 [71 P.2d 302].) “Although such statutes must be strictly construed, this does not mean that when the intent of the law is plain, it may be defeated by an overnice construction or that a statute may be so construed as to *292result in an absurdity that the legislature may not be presumed to have intended.” (34 Cal.Jur.3d, Forfeitures and Penalties, § 6, p. 328.)
Section 2033 provides in pertinent part: “Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted, provided that the original request contained substantially the following words at the end thereof: ‘If you fail to comply with the provisions of Section 2033 of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to this request for admissions, each of the matters of which an admission is requested will be deemed admitted’ . . . .” According to the majority opinion, “a close reading of the statute discloses that the term ‘original request’ is intended to refer to the introductory or request portion of the document.” In support of this proposition the majority cite Billings v. Edwards (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 238 [174 Cal.Rptr. 722], wherein it is stated: “Section 2033 provides that the original request must contain the magic words at the end thereof. We are satisfied that defendants complied with the section. (See exhibit A attached hereto.) The required statement is at the end of the request portion of the document. The numbered requests then follow. Plaintiff could not have been misled and would have been clearly warned in compliance with section 2033.” (P. 246; original italics.) In Billings the warning appeared after a paragraph which read: “For the purposes of these Requests for Admissions and Interrogatories, ‘accident’ means the incident, occurrence or omission upon which the action is based. ” In the present case, while the warning precedes an explanatory paragraph, it appears at the end of the original request for admissions.1 This is in literal compliance with the terms of section 2033. Under the guise of strictly construing section 2033 in order to prevent a forfeiture, we may not rewrite the statute to provide that the warning must be placed at the end of the “introductory portion” of the document rather than at the end of the original request. As Billings makes clear, the important consideration is that the *293party served with the request could not have been misled and was clearly warned in compliance with section 2033. Those requirements are met here. To hold that appellants were not adequately warned because of the insertion of a one-sentence paragraph between the warning and the numbered requests defies reason and leads to an absurd result which the Legislature may not be presumed to have intended.
In my view the summary judgment cannot be reversed on the ground that appellants are not deemed to have admitted the matters of which admissions were requested because they were not warned of that consequence in accordance with the provisions of section 2033.
Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 29, 1983.

Respondents’ request for admissions reads in pertinent part:
“To Plaintiffs:
“Defendants, Frank E. Temple and Federated Department Stores, request that plaintiffs, Samuel Hernandez, Elvia [szc] Hernandez, Josefina Hernandez and Esperanza Hernandez, pursuant to the provisions of C.C.P. Section 2033(a), admit, deny and/or answer the following Request for Admissions. Said responses are due within thirty (30) days after service hereof. If you fail to comply with the provisions of C.C.P. Section 2033 with respect to this request for admissions, each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.
“Whenever the word ‘intersection’ is used, it refers to the intersection of Main and Manchester.
“Dated: January 11, 1980
“Wells, Barber & Sherlock
“By_
Kenneth L. Powell Attorneys for Frank E.
Temple and Federated Department Stores”
Eleven numbered requests follow,