Court Opinion

ID: 9898832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 15:04:00.408089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:35.650974
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 522
                     ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                        DIVISION III
                                        No. CV-22-628

 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION                   Opinion Delivered November 15, 2023
 OF MINOR CHILD
                                           APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
 ADAM MCKIRCH                              COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                 APPELLANT [NO. 04PR-21-1067]

 V.                                              HONORABLE CHRISTINE
                                                 HORWART, JUDGE
 BRIAN MYERS                                     AFFIRMED
                                   APPELLEE

                             RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

       Adam McKirch appeals a Benton County Circuit Court decree of adoption entered

on June 27, 2022. On appeal, McKirch argues that the decree should be reversed and

dismissed because his consent was required. He also contends that the circuit court clearly

erred in finding that the adoption was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

       McKirch married Claudia Myers1 in December 2012. One minor child (MC) (DOB

12/20/16) was born during their marriage. It was an abusive marriage. Claudia sought an

order of protection in which she described the abuse: McKirch choked her, pushed her

“down to the ground a lot,” and they had heated arguments. Some of this abuse occurred in

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           Claudia married appellee Brian Myers on July 6, 2020.
MC’s presence, and some of it occurred while Claudia was pregnant with her. Claudia

separated from McKirch in August 2017 and subsequently filed for divorce.

          During the pendency of the divorce, Claudia had temporary custody of MC, and

McKirch had supervised visitation. Claudia also was required to provide McKirch with

periodic updates, which she accomplished by emailing him using an email address she

established specifically for that purpose. McKirch harassed her via email. His last supervised

visit was in July 2019, just prior to the final hearing in the divorce case, which he failed to

attend.

          McKirch and Claudia’s divorce decree was entered by the Faulkner County Circuit

Court on July 29, 2019. The decree vested primary custody of MC with Claudia. The decree

specifically provided that McKirch was to have no contact with either Claudia or MC. The

decree stated that in order for McKirch to receive future visitation with MC, he would have

to demonstrate not only that visitation with him is in MC’s best interest but also that he has

the ability to comply with court orders, has “learned healthy communication boundaries,

and has received intensive psychological treatment.” McKirch was ordered to pay child

support in the amount of $602 a month. Further, the decree explicitly provided the following

language in bold print: “Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. [§] 9-9-220(c), the non-custodial parent

is hereby notified that failure to pay child support or to visit the child for at least one (1) year

shall provide the custodial parent with the right to initiate proceedings to terminate the

parental rights of the non-custodial parent.”

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       On August 20, 2019, Claudia filed a petition seeking an order of protection. McKirch

continued to send harassing and abusive emails. The court entered an ex parte order on

April 9, 2020; McKirch did not comply as he continued to send threatening emails. The

Faulkner County Circuit Court entered a final order of protection on May 7. This order

directed McKirch to enroll in “batterer’s treatment with Conway Counseling as soon as he

is released from jail” and to complete that treatment within eight months of enrollment.

       On October 22, 2021, Claudia’s husband, Brian, filed a petition for a stepparent

adoption of MC, alleging that McKirch’s consent was not required because he had failed

substantially without justifiable cause to have any contact with, or provide any support for,

MC for a period in excess of one year. At the June 23, 2022 adoption proceeding, McKirch

did not testify, and there was no evidence presented to the circuit court as to whether he

complied with this requirement or the requirements in the divorce decree. Claudia testified

that she was not aware of any efforts made by McKirch to satisfy any of those requirements

or the requirements the divorce decree imposed on him were he to seek visitation privileges

after the finalization of the divorce.

       Claudia described Brian’s relationship with MC as that of a loving, involved father,

doing things such as going to the park, attending father-daughter functions, and reading her

bedtime stories. Brian participates in MC’s speech-disability therapy and assists in taking her

to and from preschool to the extent his work schedule permits. Claudia described MC’s

reaction to Brian’s engagement with her as that of a father. MC calls him “Daddy” and is

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excited to see him when he picks her up in the afternoon. She believed that it was in MC’s

best interest to be adopted by Brian.

       Brian’s mother, Karen Myers, testified in support of her son. She testified that Brian

and MC have a loving relationship and that they do a lot together, such as hiking and playing

games. She testified that Brian has a “good way” with MC, that MC loves him, and that the

adoption would be in MC’s best interest.

       Brian testified that he has lived in Bella Vista for six years and that he works as a field

supervisor for AAA Insurance, earning approximately $80,000 annually. His relationship

with MC is great, and he testified that he never knew that he could love someone as much

as he loves her. He, Claudia, and MC spend a lot of time together doing family activities.

Brian participates in, and was knowledgeable about, MC’s individual education plan and

stated that MC has made vast improvement in her speech disability. Brian treats MC as his

own child; contends that he has the capacity to give her love, affection, and guidance; and

desires to establish a parent-child relationship with her. He further stated his belief that the

adoption is in MC’s best interest.

       At the adoption hearing, McKirch contended that the no-contact provisions in the

divorce decree and order of protection excuse his failure to communicate with MC since July

2019. The evidence at the hearing showed that on March 29, 2021, the Faulkner County

Circuit Court entered an order on McKirch’s plea of nolo contendere to a charge of first-

degree terroristic threatening, a Class D felony; he was sentenced to sixty months’ probation.

The underlying offense occurred on April 27, 2020. Claudia testified that this charge arose

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because McKirch continued to contact her after the entry of the order of protection.

Furthermore, at the time of the hearing, McKirch was in custody at the Faulkner County jail

after his arrest on May 19, 2022.

       Having considered the testimony, the circuit court found that McKirch’s consent to

the adoption was not required because he had failed significantly without justifiable cause

to communicate with MC for a period in excess of one year. Because McKirch’s conduct that

gave rise to the no-contact prohibitions was unjustifiable, the circuit court ruled that his

consent to adoption was not required pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-

207(a)(2) (Repl. 2020). The circuit court further found that the adoption was in MC’s best

interest. McKirch has timely appealed this ruling.

       The standard of review applicable to the issues in this case is well settled: adoption

cases are reviewed de novo. In re Adoption of A.P., 2021 Ark. App. 440, at 8, 638 S.W.3d 293,

299. The decision of the circuit court will not be reversed on appeal unless that decision is

clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support it, the

reviewing court is left with the “firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.

       Ordinarily, the consent of a natural parent is required in an adoption case. Ark. Code

Ann. § 9-9-206 (Repl. 2020). However, this consent is not required “if the parent for a period

of at least one (1) year has failed significantly without justifiable cause (i) to communicate

with the child or (ii) to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or

judicial decree.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-207(a)(2). A significant failure is “one that is

meaningful or important,” and is “unjustifiable if it is voluntary and intentional, i.e.,

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arbitrary and without adequate excuse.” Gordon v. Draper, 2013 Ark. App. 352, at 6, 428

S.W.3d 543, 546.

       At the time Brian filed his petition for adoption, it had been over two years since

McKirch had any contact with MC, and at the time of the hearing, it had been nearly three

years. McKirch claims that he could not have communicated with MC without being in

violation of two court orders that prohibited such communication. In essence, he claims that

his parental duty to communicate with MC should be tolled while he was subject to the no-

contact orders. We are not persuaded by this argument. The circuit court was not clearly

erroneous when it found that McKirch’s consent to adopt was unnecessary.

       We agree with Brian’s assertion that this argument is analogous to one that might be

made by an imprisoned parent who claims that he was not able to have contact with his child

due to being incarcerated because, in both circumstances, the restraint is the direct result of

intentional misconduct. This court has held that

       [a]lthough imprisonment imposes an unusual impediment to a normal parental
       relationship, it is not conclusive on the termination issue. . . . Rather, in deciding
       whether to terminate the parental rights of a party, the trial court has a duty to look
       at the entire picture of how that parent has discharged his duties as a parent, the
       substantial risk of serious harm the parent imposes, and whether or not the parent is
       unfit.

Henderson v. Callis, 97 Ark. App. 163 (2006) (internal citation omitted) (citing In re Adoption

of K.M.C., 62 Ark. App. 95, 969 S.W.2d 197 (1998)).

       We apply the same analysis here. Both the decree of divorce and the order of

protection imposed conditions on McKirch that, if satisfied, would have put him in a

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position to petition the court to remove the prohibitions against him contacting MC and to

establish some sort of visitation with her. However, there is no evidence in the record that

McKirch took advantage of those opportunities, and there is no evidence in the record to

indicate that McKirch participated in any sort of psychological therapy or anger-management

program. See Gordon, 2013 Ark. App. 352, at 6, 428 S.W.3d at 546 (finding that a failure to

take action to obtain a visitation hearing was a relevant factor in the determination of

whether failure to communicate was significant and unjustifiable).

       In his brief, McKirch relies heavily on Martini v. Price, 2016 Ark. 472, 507 S.W.3d

486, for the proposition that his lack of communication with MC is excused by the no-

contact provisions of the divorce decree and the order of protection. However, the facts in

Martini are distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Martini, the child to be adopted was

approximately six years old at the time the petition for adoption was filed. Id. at 3, 507

S.W.3d at 488. Martini was barred by an order of protection from having any contact with

the child’s mother (but not the child). Id. at 2, 507 S.W.3d at 488. After that order expired,

Martini made efforts to reestablish visitation. Id. at 6, 507 S.W.3d at 490.

       The Martini court found that while the no-contact order applied only to the child’s

mother and not the child to be adopted, the child was of such a young age that any

communication with the child would necessarily have to go through the child’s mother,

which Martini could not do without violating a court order. Our supreme court further held

that Martini’s failure to communicate with the child for a period of a year or more was

justifiably excused.

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       Here, McKirch presented no evidence that he had demonstrated that he could comply

with court orders, had learned healthy communication boundaries, and had received

intensive psychological treatment, all as required by the divorce decree, or that he had

completed batterer’s treatment at Conway Counseling, as required by the order of

protection. In contrast, the father in Martini made every effort to obtain visitation with his

child, including exercising visitation to the fullest extent he was allowed, even though he

lived out of state and his attendance at the visits required extensive travel on his part.

Whereas in the case at bar, McKirch made no effort to establish any connection with MC.

       The evidence before the circuit court clearly and convincingly demonstrated that

McKirch is a dangerously violent individual whose intentional misconduct has resulted in

circumstances that justifiably prohibit him from contacting MC; therefore, we do not

sanction the use of that conduct as a shield from the application of Arkansas Code

Annotated section 9-9-207(a)(2).

       We note that although the circuit court heard evidence regarding McKirch’s failure

to provide financial support for MC, the decree of adoption does not address this prong of

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-207(a)(2). And as the concurrence addresses, the court

also heard argument that the prima facie evidence showed that McKirch’s withholding of

consent to the adoption was unreasonable, but the court did not find in the decree of

adoption that his consent was being unreasonably withheld contrary to the best interest of

the child.

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       McKirch’s final appellate argument is that the circuit court was clearly erroneous in

finding that the adoption was in MC’s best interest. The law favors natural parents, all other

things being equal. In re Adoption of T.A.D., 2019 Ark. App. 510, at 8, 588 S.W.3d 858, 863.

“However, parental rights are not proprietary and are subject to the performance of duties

and obligations of a parent to care for and support a child, and the law protects the rights of

parents only so long as the parent discharges these duties.” Id., 588 S.W.3d at 863.

       The evidence before the circuit court was that McKirch had engaged in violent and

threatening conduct toward Claudia that, at times, occurred in MC’s presence. There was

substantial evidence that he had a turbulent relationship with both mother and child. In

contrast, life with Brian is one of support and love, one within which MC was happy and

thriving. The circuit court’s decision that Brian’s adoption of MC was in her best interest

was the correct decision, and the entirety of the evidence clearly and convincingly supports

it. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s best-interest finding.

       Having reviewed the record before us, we hold that the circuit court correctly found

that McKirch’s consent was not required as a condition to adoption, and the adoption was

in MC’s best interest.

       Affirmed.

       WOOD, J., agrees.

       HIXSON, J., concurs.

       KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge, concurring. I concur with the result reached by the

majority. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that Adam McKirch’s consent

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to the adoption was not required because he failed significantly without justifiable cause to

communicate with MC for a period of one year. I vote to affirm the adoption based on

Brian Myers’ allegation made both in his petition and at the hearing that Adam’s consent to

the adoption was being unreasonably withheld contrary to the best interest of the child. In

my view, that allegation was conclusively proved, and I would affirm the trial court’s order

because it reached the right decision albeit for the wrong reason.

       In Brian’s petition, he alleged that the adoption should be granted because (1) Adam

failed significantly and without justifiable cause to communicate with MC for more than

one year; (2) Adam failed to provide care and support for MC for more than one year; and

(3) even if Adam refuses his consent to the adoption, the court should find that such consent was being

unreasonably withheld. Adam also argued that the adoption was in MC’s best interest. The

trial court granted the petition for adoption based on Brian’s first allegation, and the court

found, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-207(a)(2)(i) (Repl. 2020), that Adam’s consent to

the adoption was not required because he had failed significantly without justifiable cause

to communicate with MC for a period of one year. The trial court also found that the

adoption was in MC’s best interest. I agree with the trial court’s best-interest finding and

would affirm that finding as not clearly erroneous. However, I cannot agree with the trial

court’s finding that Adam’s failure to communicate with MC was unjustified when there was

an order of protection prohibiting such contact under penalty of criminal sanctions.

       In Martini v. Price, 2016 Ark. 472, 507 S.W.3d 486, the supreme court reversed an

adoption and held that, although the father had not had contact with his child for more

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than one year, his failure to contact the child was not without justifiable cause due to two

orders of protection entered against the father prohibiting him from having contact with his

ex-wife and the young age of the child, which would have required him to communicate with

his ex-wife to contact the child. In the present case, a protective order was in place that

prohibited Adam from having any contact with his ex-wife or his child for a period of ten

years. While I recognize that there are factual differences between Martini and the instant

case, the bottom line is that, in both cases, the father was under a protective order that, from

a practical and legal standpoint, made it impossible to contact his child without violating the

order. In my view, it should not be permissible for one court to order a father to not contact

his wife or child or face criminal penalties; and then for another court to find that his consent

to an adoption was not required because he did not contact the child for one year—during

which time the father was at all times under the no-contact order. Trying to unnecessarily

distinguish Martini and drawing blurred lines among these cases opens a Pandora’s box to

future litigants seeking to adopt when a natural parent is under such a protective order

prohibiting contact with his or her child. The majority has introduced the proverbial

slippery slope where none is needed. If there is to be a departure from the Martini holding,

I would submit that this is for the supreme court and not the court of appeals.

       Nonetheless, as previously stated, I would affirm the adoption in this case because

Adam’s consent to the adoption was being unreasonably withheld contrary to the best

interest of the child. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-220(c)(3) (Repl. 2020) provides

an alternate avenue for granting an adoption and states:

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          (c) In addition to any other proceeding provided by law, the relationship of parent
       and child may be terminated by a court order issued under this subchapter on any
       ground provided by other law for termination of the relationship, or on the following
       grounds:

       ....

           (3) That in the case of a parent not having custody of a child, his or her consent
       is being unreasonably withheld contrary to the best interest of the child.

In T.R. v. L.H., 2015 Ark. App. 483, this court affirmed an adoption after the trial court

found that the father had unreasonably withheld his consent. In T.R., 2015 Ark. App. 483,

at 6, we wrote:

               In making the decision whether to terminate the parental rights of a party, the
       trial court has the duty to look at the entire picture of how that parent discharged his
       duties as a parent, the substantial risk of serious harm the parent imposed, and
       whether or not the parent was unfit. Any evidence having probative value as to the
       present or prospective fitness of a parent is admissible to determine whether consent
       has been unreasonably withheld. Past actions over a meaningful period serve as good
       indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.

In T.R., the proof showed that the father lacked stability and the capacity to care for the child

and that, in contrast, the child was thriving in the care of the kind and loving adoptive

parents.

       Brian raised this issue in his adoption petition and argued it at length at the final

hearing. In response to Adam’s directed-verdict motion at the close of the evidence, Brian

argued that Adam’s consent was not required due to a failure of communication and a failure

of support for one year, and Brian then argued:

       The third prong is the wrongful withholding of consent contrary to the child’s best
       interest. The testimony has been that [Brian] is an outstanding parent, that he
       participates in MC’s activities, that he loves her, that he engages with her in all of the

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       things that the father of a five-year old daughter should be doing. And I think the
       most telling part of it is those photographs. In every photograph, that kiddo is smiling
       because she is part of a family that has a loving mother and a loving father. And what
       else could possibly be in the best interests of a minor child, to have a safe, functional,
       healthy, happy family, with a mother and father that actively engage, that actively love,
       that provide care and support, and discharge the duties of a parent. To me, as a child,
       that’s a fundamental right. And the evidence has been that all of these things are
       provided in [Brian’s] care. That’s what’s in MC’s best interest. And I think the prima
       facie evidence has been that [Adam’s] withholding of consent to this adoption is
       unreasonable.
       Although the trial court did not find in the decree of adoption that Adam’s consent

was being unreasonably withheld contrary to the best interest of the child, it has been stated

many times that we may affirm the trial court when it reached the right result, even though

it may have announced the wrong reason. See Hanlin v. State, 356 Ark. 516, 157 S.W.3d 181

(2004) (explaining that the appellate court may affirm for a different reason when that

alternative reason was raised and developed at the trial court level); Myers v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 46, 660 S.W.3d 357 (holding in a termination-of-parental-rights

case that this court may affirm the decision of the trial court if the right result was reached,

albeit for the wrong reason); Fenstermacher v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 88,

426 S.W.3d 483 (holding that we may affirm the trial court’s termination order if other

statutory grounds that were alleged in the petition for termination were proved, even when

the trial court found a statutory ground that was not).

       Here, the evidence showed that, at the time of the final adoption hearing, Adam had

not seen MC for almost three years. Moreover, because of Adam’s persistent threatening

behavior, he was under a protective order prohibiting him from having any contact with MC

                                              13
until May 2030. In contrast, the testimony showed that MC was doing very well in the care

of Claudia and Brian. There was testimony that Brian is very involved in MC’s life, that they

have what can be described as a typical loving father-daughter relationship, that Brian “never

knew he could love someone as much as he loves [MC],” and that MC calls Brian “Daddy.”

I would affirm the adoption because there was conclusive proof presented at the hearing that

Adam’s consent was being unreasonably withheld contrary to MC’s best interest.

       For these reasons, I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the decree of

adoption.

       Robert S. Tschiemer, for appellant.

       Burke Law Firm, P.A., by: Brian T. Burke, for appellee.

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