Court Opinion

ID: 9794582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:14.949835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.262437
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.—I respectfully dissent.
My colleagues hold that the registration provisions of Penal Code section 290 (further statutory references are to that code unless otherwise cited), impose a cruel or unusual punishment upon certain sex offenders who are subject to registration (namely, those who are convicted of lewd or dissolute conduct under § 647, subd. (a)). To the contrary, registration of sex offenders is not “cruel or unusual” nor is it “punishment” as those terms are used in our state Constitution (art. I, § 17).
The majority’s analysis depends upon premises which are unsupported by the record before us. Thus, the majority assumes that the registration requirement of section 290 involves substantial “compulsion and restraint” (ante, p. 920), is directed toward “relatively minor” offenders (id., p. 923), and may not be “effective in practice” as a law enforcement tool (id., p. 922). None of these propositions is established by evidence in this record. Rather than presume facts supporting the invalidity of section 290, we have repeatedly adopted a precisely opposite analytical approach in appraising the constitutionality of statutes: Legislation is presumed to be constitutional and must be upheld unless its invalidity “ ‘clearly, positively and unmistakably’ ” appears. (People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 317 [168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]; In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 628 [73 Cal.Rptr. 21,447 P.2d 117]; Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 549 [63 Cal.Rptr. 21, 432 P.2d 717].) No such showing was made here.
1. “ Compulsion and Restraint’ ’
Compliance with the registration requirement of section 290 involves only the barest minimum intrusion or restriction upon personal freedom or privacy. Under section 290, the registrant simply must provide a written statement containing identifying information, together with his fingerprints and photograph (subd. (d)). Upon changing his residence, the registrant must notify the appropriate agency of his new address. This may be done by mail (subd. (e)). All information furnished by the registrant is deemed confidential and may be disclosed only to law enforcement officers (subd. (h)).
The majority conjures a series of hypothetical circumstances, suggesting that registration entails “command performances” at lineups, along with other, unspecified “compulsion and restraint.” This frightening, but fictional, *928scenario is wholly unsupported by the record. Nothing contained in section 290 requires that registrants cooperate with police, or attend compulsory lineups, or otherwise waive their constitutional rights. Any “compulsion and restraint” experienced by a registrant is attributable to other factors unrelated to the registration process, such as a prior probation condition requiring his cooperation, or the existence of probable cause to detain or arrest him. The registration laws require neither arrest nor detention. They do aid in assuring that, once cause to detain or arrest is shown, the suspect may be located without undue effort. In short, the record simply does not support the majority’s suggestion that the registration requirement by itself leads to undue police harassment and, as previously noted, we cannot presume such a consequence.
Moreover, as the majority concedes, the obligation to register and re-register may be terminated upon completion of probation or in the interests of justice. (§ 1203.4.) Yet, my colleagues bemoan the fact that there appears to be no statutory method for expunging one’s registration, thereby relieving him of the “lifelong burden” of remaining a statistic in the police files. (Ante, p. 921.) Any such theoretical “burden” does not amount to “cruel or unusual punishment” in a constitutional sense.
The majority also suggests that section 290 “penalizes” registrants by allowing “employers” to require disclosure of the arrest records of prospective employees. (Ibid.) Not so. The majority misrepresents the scope of the statute. As I have previously noted, section 290 requires that registration information be kept confidential—there are no exceptions for employers. Another provision, Labor Code section 432.7, subdivision (e)(1), permits employers at health care facilities to require applicants for positions “with regular access to patients” to disclose their prior arrests for registrable offenses. But, contrary to the majority, the section does not apply to all “employers,” and in any event does not require disclosure of any information registered under section 290.
2. “Relatively Minor” Offenses
The majority attempts to minimize the sweeping effects of its decision, describing the sex offenses proscribed by section 647, subdivision (a), as “relatively minor” in nature, involving a mere “gesture” or “flirtation,” accompanied by a “touching” done in a public place. (Ante, p. 923.) The majority concedes (id., at p. 924) that section 290 is valid as applied to offenses which are “more heinous,” such as child molesting. (See People v. Mills (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 171, 176-182 [146 Cal.Rptr. 411].)
However, the majority’s characterization of lewd or dissolute conduct under section 647, subdivision (a), as a “relatively minor” offense reveals, in my view, a disturbing and dangerous naivete. That section requires proof of an of*929fensive touching of the genitals, buttocks or female breast for purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, annoyance or offense. (Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 244 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].) Such an offense frequently is the introductory or preparatory conduct to even more serious assaultive sex offenses. Doubtless, many offenders convicted under section 647, subdivision (a), may have been prematurely thwarted from committing aggravated sex offenses. They may have pleaded guilty to the lesser offense as part of a plea bargain. Although in a particular case the actor’s conduct may have stopped short of the completion of a more aggravated offense, surely the Legislature was entitled to conclude that, for policy reasons, registration should extend to all persons convicted of the lewd or dissolute conduct proscribed by section 647, subdivision (a).
Cataloguing various other offenses, such as prostitution, pimping, child pornography, and the like, the majority purports to draw strength from the fact that such offenders need not register. However, as the Mills court, supra, explains, “This is a matter in the first instance for the state Legislature to determine the different degrees of gravity, of danger, to society from various types of sex offenses.” (81 Cal.App.3d at p. 180.) Moreover, it is well established that the Legislature need not regulate the whole of a field at once. (Werner v. Southern Cal. etc. Newspapers (1950) 35 Cal.2d 121, 131 [216 P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d 252].) Section 290 serves the legitimate state purpose of facilitating police surveillance of certain convicted sex offenders who are deemed likely to be recidivists. (See Barrows v. Municipal Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 821, 825-826 [83 Cal.Rptr. 819, 464 P.2d 483].)
3. Registration Not “Effective in Practice”
Finally, the majority observes that “it is not clear that the [registration] measure is effective in practice” (id., at p. 922, fn. omitted); therefore, the “minimal” utility of the registration device is outweighed by the “excessive” penalty of registration. (Id., at p. 922.) This argument is based upon sheerest speculation. Whether or not registration is working, or is “effective,” is a conclusion to be reached by the Legislature, not us.
Even if the judgment was ours to make, obviously we cannot measure the effectiveness of a device such as registration of sex offenders in the absence of some evidence in the record directed toward that issue. In the present case, the appellate briefs of the Los Angeles District Attorney and amicus Los Angeles City Attorney reach differing conclusions on the point. Under such circumstances, we must presume that the legislative purposes were and are legitimate and useful. It is not an appropriate judicial function for us, in wandering along paths of our own conjecture, to substitute our views for that of the Legislature. It is perfectly reasonable for the Legislature to conclude that re*930quiring those persons convicted under section 647, subdivision (a), to register with the local police would accomplish either of two valid purposes: deterrence of those already once convicted from repeating the offense and assistance in the apprehension of those recidivist offenders who had not been so deterred. (See Barrows v. Municipal Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 825-826.)
4. Conclusion
The essence of cruel or unusual punishment, we have said, is that it “is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. ” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921], fn. omitted, italics added; see People v. Mills, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d 171, 177-179.) Considering the relatively minor burdens imposed by section 290, the potential and continuing danger to the public, especially the young, posed by persons who have been convicted under section 647, subdivision (a), and the presumed utility of the registration device, the unconstitutionality of section 290 does not “clearly, positively, and unmistakably” appear.
I would deny petitioner relief.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied July 20, 1983. Richardson, J., andKaus, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.