Court Opinion

ID: 9612758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:11:10.489337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:22.863264
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, J.,
dissenting.
Assuming, as does the majority, that ORS 131.615 is inapplicable, because the police did not reasonably suspect that defendant had committed a crime, there is no statutory authorization for the stop.
The majority, however, concludes that ORS 133.310(3) impliedly authorizes such a stop. It relies on State *631v. Morris, 56 Or App 97, 641 P2d 77, rev den 293 Or 340 (1982), where we stated:
“[T]he legislature, in enacting a curfew statute, intended police officers to have authority to stop persons suspected of being minors violating curfew laws, and that ORS 131.615 is not the exclusive authority for peace officers stopping persons.” 56 Or App at 102.
The court then held that the stop was constitutional. It analyzed the constitutional issues by balancing “society’s interest in the well-being of its youth” against “the minimal intrusion upon defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights for the purposes of determining his age and activities.” 56 Or App at 104.
Nothing in Morris supports the majority’s statutory conclusion that ORS 133.310(3) impliedly authorizes police officers to stop persons reasonably suspected of violating abuse prevention restraining orders. ORS 133.310(3) authorizes a police officer to “arrest and take into custody a person without a warrant when the police officer has probable cause to believe” that the person has violated an existing abuse prevention restraining order. In Morris, however, the text of the curfew statute that the court there considered refers to ORS 419.569, which provides for temporary custody under certain circumstances and does not contain the explicit language of ORS 133.310(3) regarding arrest and probable cause.
Moreover, we should also look to other provisions of ORS 133.310. ORS 133.310(1) provides:
“A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed any of the following:
“a. A felony;
“b. A Class A misdemeanor.”
The language of ORS 133.310(3) parallels the language of ORS 133.310(1) in its reference to the authority of a police officer to arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has engaged in the prohibited behavior.
If ORS 133.310(3) impliedly authorizes a police officer, without further statutory authorization, to stop a person reasonably suspected of violating an abuse prevention order, why would not ORS 133.310(1) also authorize a peace *632officer to stop a person whom he reasonably suspects has committed a crime without the statutory authorization contained in the provisions of ORS 131.615? In neither Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or 97, 743 P2d 692 (1987), nor State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or 845, 618 P2d 423 (1980), did the Supreme Court suggest that ORS 131.615 is superfluous. It is not. ORS 133.310(1) does not support the implication that the legislature implicitly authorized stops based on reasonable suspicion, and neither does ORS 133.310(3).
I dissent.