Court Opinion

ID: 9819185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:19:34.231363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.253145
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’BRIEN, specially concurring: My concurrence today signals a dramatic change from my concurrence in Golladay v. Allied American Insurance Co., 271 Ill. App. 3d 465, 648 N.E.2d 157 (1995), and requires comment. After much thought and debate, I admit my error in Golladay and am convinced that Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 5, 666 N.E.2d 909 (1996), Hathaway v. Standard Mutual Insurance Co., 285 Ill. App. 3d 67, 673 N.E.2d 725 (1996), and Koperski v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 494, 678 N.E.2d 734 (1997), are the better view on two issues: (1) the interpretation of the first sentence of the statute in question; and (2) inquiry into legislative intent if the statute is not ambiguous. In Golladay, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 468, we held: "The limit of liability provision in the second sentence of section 143a — 2(4) is determinative of the amount the UIM insurer is ■required to pay under its policy if the tortfeasor’s vehicle is in fact underinsured; it is not determinative of the status of the tortfeasor’s vehicle as underinsured. "Whether a vehicle is underinsured is determined solely by application of the first sentence of section 143a — 2(4). (Moriconi, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 908.)” However, Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d at 9-10, states: "We are obligated to read a statute as a whole, not one or two sentences selectively or with undue emphasis. The first sentence defining 'underinsured motor vehicle’ includes the term 'limits of liability.’ That term is defined in the second sentence *** clearly modifying the first and defining the term as to the insurer’s position. Read together, the insurer is subject to a liability limit of its coverage, less whatever funds are actually received from the underinsured vehicle’s insurer.” In Golladay, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 469, we held: "Plaintiff, arguing the public policy considerations behind the enactment of the underinsured motorist provisions of the Illinois Insurance Code, invites this court to adopt his interpretation of section 143a — 2(4) and to reject the holding in Moriconi (193 Ill. App. 3d 904, 550 N.E.2d 637). We cannot. An inquiry into public policy in an attempt to construe a statute is unnecessary where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. (Chapman v. Richey (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 243, 399 N.E.2d 1277.) Where, as here, the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for judicial construction; the only proper function of a court is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature according to the plain meaning of the words used. County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 485 N.E.2d 1076.” The better view is elucidated in Hathaway v. Standard Mutual Insurance Co., 285 Ill. App. 3d at 70-71: "Most of the courts that have construed the statute have focused on the first sentence and found it unambiguous. Consequently, they have ignored the legislative history and ruled in the insurance companies’ favor. Although ambiguity in a statute is one reason for a court to examine the legislative history, it is not the only reason. An examination of the legislative history is also appropriate if the examination helps to prevent an absurd result. See W. Eskridge, Legislative History Values, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 365 (1990).” The analysis of the legislative intent of this statute in Hathaway is definitive, persuasive and, as noted by Justice Gallagher in his concurrence, reasonable and fair. Accordingly, I concur.