Court Opinion

ID: 9785328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:15:49.164392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:15.952950
License: Public Domain

HASELTON, J.,
concurring.
Defendant’s contention on appeal regarding the insufficiency of the state’s proof of third-degree criminal mischief, ORS 164.345(1), was not raised and preserved for our review. Accordingly, I concur that defendant’s conviction for that crime must be affirmed.
Before the trial court, defendant’s entire argument in support of the motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on the criminal mischief charge was as follows:
“We would ask for a motion for judgment of acquittal on the criminal mischief, for damaging a—or kicking a car door and a window. There’s been no showing [that] there’s any damage to the vehicle of any kind. So we don’t believe there’s enough there.”
*437When the prosecutor asked whether there was any need to respond to defendant’s MJOA with respect to any of the five pending charges, the trial court replied, simply, “No, I think that there’s sufficient evidence for the jury to hear all five charges.” Thus, the only challenge that defendant raised in the trial court was that the state had failed to prove “any damage to the vehicle of any kind.” (Emphasis added.)
On appeal, defendant no longer contends that the state was required to prove “damage” to the patrol car but failed to do so. Indeed, defendant explicitly acknowledges that, “[wjhile Oregon courts have never addressed what constitutes tampering or interfering with the property of another, the legislative history of the statute indicates that actual damage to the property is not required.” (Emphasis added.) Instead, defendant now asserts, for the first time:
“[T]he plain language and legislative history of the statute suggests that the property must be affected somehow by the defendant’s conduct before he is deemed to have tampered or interfered with it. That is, the defendant’s conduct must prevent the utilization of the property.”
Defendant never raised that contention—viz., “Yes, damage to the property isn’t required, but impairment of the property’s function is required”—before the trial court.
We and the Oregon Supreme Court have consistently reiterated the requisites of preservation. Most recently, in O’Hara v. Board of Parole, 346 Or 41, 47, 203 P3d 213 (2009), the Supreme Court emphasized that
“[rlules of preservation in court proceedings serve several purposes, including encouraging the parties to sharpen the issues and to present them fully and fairly to the trial court in the first instance, so that the trial court has an opportunity to make an informed ruling and develop an adequate record and the opposing party and the reviewing court are not taken by surprise later.”
The Supreme Court in O’Hara, 346 Or at 47, repeated with approval its admonition in Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219, 191 P3d 637 (2008), that “[preservation gives a trial court the chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error altogether or correcting one already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an *438appeal.” See also State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (“[A] party must provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection that is specific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is warranted”).
Further, in the specific context of reviewing denials of motions for judgment of acquittal, we have consistently held that we will not consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the state’s proof that was not raised before the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 212 Or App 51, 55, 157 P3d 239, rev den, 343 Or 206 (2007) (the defendant’s contention on appeal regarding alleged insufficiency of state’s proof of coperpetrator’s “subjective purpose” held to be unpreserved where the defendant’s only argument before the trial court had been the “qualitatively different” contention that, “as a matter of law, the enhancement of third-degree robbery to second-degree robbery under ORS 164.405(l)(b) is not triggered when the coperpetrator’s participation (regardless of his or her ‘purpose’) is limited to facilitating the principal robber’s escape”); State v. Shields, 184 Or App 505, 509 n 1, 511 n 2, 56 P3d 937 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 355 (2003) (where the defendant’s MJOA raised only the argument that “the state had not presented evidence that his expressive conduct satisfied the narrowing construction of State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 977 P2d 379 (1999),” Court of Appeals declined to address contentions, raised for first time on appeal, that “state presented insufficient evidence of objectively reasonable alarm as required by ORS 163.732(l)(b)” and that “state failed to prove that [the] defendant made any hang-up calls to the victim”); State v. White, 53 Or App 856, 861, 632 P2d 1363 (1981) (where MJOA on theft charge was based solely on contention that there was insufficient evidence that the “defendant, rather than another individual, was responsible for the theft,” Court of Appeals refused to entertain the defendant’s newly advanced “wrong victim” challenge to sufficiency of state’s proof). See generally State v. Paragon, 195 Or App 265, 268, 97 P3d 691 (2004) (“A motion for judgment of acquittal *439does not automatically encompass a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The motion must state the specific theory on which the state’s proof was insufficient.”).
The prudential imperatives underlying those requirements were not satisfied here. Defendant, in moving for a judgment of acquittal on the criminal mischief charge, raised only one specific and unadorned contention: The state had failed to prove that “there’s any damage to the vehicle of any kind.” The trial court properly rejected defendant’s sole contention because, as defendant now acknowledges, ORS 164.345(1) does not require proof of “damage.” On appeal, defendant now raises the qualitatively different contention that the state’s proof was legally insufficient not because the state failed to prove “damage” (which it, concededly, was not required to prove) but, instead, because the state failed to prove impairment of the patrol car’s ordinary and intended function. Thus, juxtaposing defendant’s trial contention with his appellate challenge, it is patent that defendant did not give the trial court a fair opportunity (or, indeed, any opportunity) to consider his present contention and, concomitantly, to obviate the need for an appeal. See, e.g., O’Hara; Peeples; Wyatt.
Nor is defendant’s belated contention somehow salvaged by reference to the principles expounded and applied in Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77, 948 P2d 722 (1997). See Jackson, 212 Or App at 55 n 4; accord State v. Timmermann, 220 Or App 458, 187 P3d 744 (2008); State v. Smith, 184 Or App 118, 55 P3d 553 (2002). As we explained in Jackson, Stull’s principles, including, specifically, as applied in Smith, do not permit us to review an unpreserved contention for reversal of the denial of an MJOA where that contention “relates not only to the scope and meaning of statutory language but, even more, to whether particular proof was deficient for reasons never urged to the trial court.” Jackson, 212 Or App at 55 n 4; see also Timmermann, 220 Or App at 466-68 (reiterating Jackson’s distinction of Smith, but concluding that, “unlike in Jackson, except for his reliance on the wrong statute for his defense, [the] defendant’s argument about the deficiency in the state’s case—the undisputed evidence that *440he had a valid out-of-state license—was the same both at trial and on appeal” (emphasis added)).
Finally, both Judge Edmonds’s lead opinion and the dissent contend that, notwithstanding the foregoing principles and precedent, defendant’s appellate contention was preserved. The reasoning of both is unavailing.
The lead opinion asserts that “[w]hen defendant argued to the trial court that ‘there’s been no showing of any damage to the vehicle of any kind[,]’ he was essentially asking the trial court to address the legal significance of the failure of the state to offer any evidence of the causal effect, if any, of the force that he directed at the door and window of the police car.” 229 Or App at 429 (Edmonds, J., lead opinion) (emphasis in lead opinion). That opinion further posits that “[presumably, when the trial court ruled, it had the elements of ORS 164.345 in mind.” Id. at 429.
With respect, the lead opinion credits defendant’s use of the term “damage” with a much broader, and qualitatively different, content and function than does defendant himself. As noted, on appeal, defendant correctly acknowledges that “actual damage to the property is not required” to establish that a defendant has “tamper[ed] or interfered] with” property. That is, defendant correctly (now) understands that “damage” and “tampering] or interfering] with” are not coextensive. Rather, the latter is the statutorily requisite element, and evidence of the former is one means, but not the only means, of establishing the latter. The lead opinion impermissibly conflates that fundamental functional distinction.4
Further, and for similar reasons, the lead opinion’s invocation of the trial judge’s “presumptive” knowledge of the elements of the offense actually militates against preservation. The trial court may very well have understood that proof of “damage” was not required to establish the requisite “tamper[ing] or interfering] with” and, thus, have properly denied the motion based on that correct understanding. In all *441events, the premise that any challenge to the insufficiency of evidence can be deemed preserved for our review based on a trial court’s imputed knowledge of the substance of elements of an offense is irreconcilable with our consistent reiteration of the rigorous requirements of preservation with respect to MJOAs. See, e.g., Wyatt; Jackson; Shields.
Finally, the dissent asserts that defendant’s present contention is preserved because the MJOA alerted the trial court that defendant was disputing the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the “tampering] or interfering] with” element. 229 Or App at 444-45 n 1 (Sercombe, J., dissenting). The dissent’s discussion concludes with the admonition that to decline to review defendant’s present contention “slices the preservation onion too thinly.” Id.
To be sure, this court has sometimes been criticized, on occasion perhaps properly, for having applied principles of preservation with undue rigor. But this is not such a case. The preservation concern here is not one of “onion slicing” but, instead (to be comparably hackneyed), of “apples and oranges”—and misdirection.
A close hypothetical makes the point: In a prosecution for fourth-degree assault, ORS 163.160(l)(a),5 the defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state failed to prove that the victim had bled. The trial court denies the motion. On appeal, the defendant acknowledges, correctly, that the state, in proving “physical injury,” ORS 161.015(7),6 for purposes of ORS 163.160(l)(a), was not required to present evidence of bleeding—but argues, for the first time, that the state’s proof was deficient because the victim’s pain was of insufficient severity and duration to be “substantial pain” within the meaning of ORS 161.015(7).
In that hypothetical, as here, the defendant’s MJOA was explicit, precisely focused, and patently wrong—and, *442thus, properly denied by the trial court. In that hypothetical, as here, on appeal, the defendant, having acknowledged that the sole ground for the MJOA that was presented for the trial court’s consideration was wrong, raised an entirely different argument—thus, the misdirection. In that hypothetical, as here, if we were to reverse, we would be holding that a trial judge who had correctly denied the MJOA had somehow erred.
Consistently with the prudential imperatives of Wyatt, if faced with that hypothetical scenario, we would not countenance such misdirection. This case is no different.
The judgment of conviction for third-degree criminal mischief is properly affirmed.
Landau and Schuman, JJ., join in this concurrence.

 In that regard, “damage” is “damage”—and the lead opinion’s emphasized reliance on “of any kind,” 229 Or App at 429 (Edmonds, J., lead opinion), adds nothing to the preservation inquiry.

 ORS 163.160(l)(a) provides:
“A person commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree if the person:
“(a) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes physical injury to anotherf.]”

 ORS 161.015(7) defines “[pjhysical injury as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.”