Court Opinion

ID: 9689704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:43:39.033488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:51.541638
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, JUSTICE
¶ 68. (dissenting). I dissent. The majority holds "that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel protected Dagnall from police interrogation about the homicide once Dagnall was formally charged and once an attorney represented him on that charge." Majority op. at ¶ 67.
¶ 69. Such a bright-line rule means that law enforcement officials may not even question a person such as Dagnall once charges are filed and the person has an attorney. According to the majority, it makes no difference that such an individual is given Miranda warnings, waives his or her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and agrees to talk to police officers about the crime charged.
¶ 70. The majority holds that such a waiver is of no consequence and that incriminating statements resulting from such questioning must be suppressed. Majority op. at ¶ 4. The result is that, in this case, Dagnall's statements detailing his involvement, with co-defendant Christopher E. Murray, in beating a man to death with baseball bats will not be allowed in evidence. His conviction of first degree intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, party to a crime, will be set aside.
¶ 71. The majority's holding is contrary to the position taken by the United States Supreme Court and is contrary to Wisconsin legal precedent as well.
¶ 72. I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and allow Dagnall's conviction for the first-*377degree intentional homicide of the victim, Norman Gross, to stand.
¶ 73. The United States Supreme Court has identified the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as two sources of a defendant's right to counsel. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-77 (1991); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986). The Fifth Amendment provides protection against self-incrimination, and because of that, the right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). The Fifth Amendment does not expressly provide the protection of counsel; it is the protection against self-incrimination that allows a suspect the right to stop an interrogation until the assistance of counsel can be procured. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447-49 (1974); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70. Once the Fifth Amendment right has been invoked, a suspect may not be questioned further unless that suspect reinitiates such questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
¶ 74. In most significant respects, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments have been accorded similar treatment in regard to the right to counsel. In Jackson, Alb U.S. at 636, the Supreme Court extended the Fifth Amendment ruling in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981), to apply to the Sixth Amendment. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be accorded "at least as much protection as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel at any custodial interrogation." Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632. Therefore, as in a Fifth Amendment context, the Sixth Amendment guarantees that questioning must immediately cease after a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel. Id. at 626; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
*378¶ 75. The Sixth Amendment right provides charged suspects the right to counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings against them. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964). This right to counsel attaches automatically "at the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. . . ." United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984). See also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion). In Patterson v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel comes into effect with formal charges, but that the right must be affirmatively invoked by the defendant. 487 U.S. 285, 290-91 (1988).
¶ 76. The Patterson decision also made it clear that while different policies are involved in the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment right to counsel, one right is not superior to the other, and it is not more difficult to waive the Sixth Amendment right than the Fifth Amendment right. Id. at 297-98. Dagnall was required to invoke the right personally. Id. at 290-91. Dagnall offers two facts, a letter and a statement, to support his claim that he had invoked his Sixth Amendment right and therefore, he argues, his proffered incriminating testimony in connection with the intentional homicide should be suppressed.
¶ 77. The letter from Dagnall's attorney, a third party, was insufficient to invoke Dagnall's Sixth Amendment rights. Dagnall had neither signed the letter, nor retained the attorney himself. Because a defendant must personally invoke his or her rights to be afforded Sixth Amendment protection, Dagnall's argument concerning this letter fails. Id.
¶ 78. Also, the statement made by Dagnall to the officers that "[m]y lawyer told me that I shouldn't talk to you guys" fails to establish a personal invocation of *379his Sixth Amendment right. Majority op. at ¶ 2. This statement was merely a reiteration of the words of Attorney Connors and, as such, did not serve to invoke Dagnall's rights. Further, Dagnall's "my lawyer" statement made by him to the officers was ambiguous. It did not indicate whether Dagnall was either choosing to follow Connors' advice, or if he was reiterating a statement that he remembered his attorney making just hours before.
¶ 79. The central issue in this case is whether, under the totality of circumstances, the letter from Attorney Connors combined with the "my lawyer" statement made by Dagnall, constituted a clear invocation to the officers of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. If so, the incriminating statements gained through officer questioning, which was initiated for the purpose of clarifying the defendant's ambiguous statement, should be suppressed. If not, then the suppression motion was properly denied by Dane County Circuit Court Judge Patrick J. Fiedler.
¶ 80. A matter involving a similar statement, where clarification by officers was not only allowed but appears to be encouraged, can be found in State v. Long, 190 Wis. 2d 386, 526 N.W.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1994). In Long, the defendant stated before the interrogation began that "[m]y attorney told me I shouldn't talk unless he is here." Id. at 391. The court of appeals held that the defendant's statement was merely "an indication of what Long's attorney told him not to do." Id. at 397. The court further held that the officers were correct in their attempt to clarify whether Long was invoking his right to counsel because the defendant's statement "was not a clear assertion of his desire to have counsel present." Id. In Long, the court of appeals stated that "[a] reasonable police officer could have *380understood only that Long might be invoking his right to counsel. His statement reflected indecision and uncertainty and was not an invocation of his right to consult with counsel. ..." Id. The court held "that because Long's request for counsel was ambiguous, the police were under no obligation to cease the interrogation." Id. at 390. The desire to have counsel present "must be made 'sufficiently clearly [so] that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. . . .'" Id. at 395 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)).
¶ 81. It is well established that when a defendant's statement is ambiguous or equivocal as to whether he or she wishes to invoke the right to counsel, officers are not required to cease the questioning of the individual unless it is clear that the defendant wishes to have an attorney present. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's comment, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was not an unambiguous, unequivocal request for counsel. Id. at 455. See also State v. Walkowiak, 183 Wis. 2d 478, 486, 515 N.W.2d 863 (1994) (finding the statement, "Do you think I need an attorney?" equivocal and ambiguous).
¶ 82. I believe such is the case here, where the "my lawyer" statement by Dagnall did not unambiguously or unequivocally indicate to the officers with sufficient clarity exactly what he wanted to do. In accordance with Davis, the officers read Dagnall his Miranda rights and assured him that they would honor the defendant's decision about whether or not to proceed with questioning. Thereafter, Dagnall said he would talk to them and he voluntarily offered a statement to the officers, which certainly supports the *381conclusion that the "my lawyer" comment was not made with the intention to invoke his Sixth Amendment rights. During the interview no request was made for an attorney, nor did the officers make any threats or promises. Majority op. at ¶ 11. Dagnall's subsequent statements support the conclusion that his statement was indeed ambiguous, since the actions taken by Dagnall were contrary to those that the defendant now asserts he really intended. His actions demonstrated the very indecision and uncertainty alluded to in Long. There the court decision allowed the officers to continue questioning a suspect, in order to gain clarification of the intention as to whether or not he wished to invoke his rights.
¶ 83. The majority asserts that Dagnall's "my lawryer" statement, coupled with his stated concern about self-incrimination, shows that he was "not equipped to navigate the legal system alone." Majority op. at ¶ 58. On the contrary, his statement about not wanting to incriminate himself demonstrates that he was aware of his rights when he started talking to the officers.
¶ 84. The bright-line rule adopted by the majority prohibiting police interrogation where there has been an ambiguous or equivocal Sixth Amendment invocation, or no invocation at all by the accused, could be disastrous for law enforcement officials in Wisconsin. The majority's rule, which requires only formal charges and representation by an attorney and nothing more, flies in the face of the applicable legal precedent.
¶ 85. I conclude that Dagnall did not personally and unambiguously invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and, therefore, his proffered incriminating statements to the officers were properly obtained and should not be suppressed. The totality of the circum*382stances leads me to this conclusion. The letter from Attorney Connors was from a third party, was not signed or joined in by Dagnall, and, therefore, it cannot be said that Dagnall had personally invoked his rights through that letter. The "my lawyer" statement made by Dagnall to the officers did not personally and unambiguously invoke Dagnall's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because not only did the statement merely reiterate the advice given to Dagnall by his attorney, but it was also ambiguous and equivocal. Finally, the subsequent questioning by the sheriffs officers, for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity of Dagnall's initial "my attorney" statement, was proper and praiseworthy as good police practice, in light of the precedent discussed in this dissent.
¶ 86. The holding of the majority that all that is needed to prohibit police officers from questioning an accused such as Dagnall is formal charges and representation by an attorney on the charge does not withstand scrutiny when United States Supreme Court and Wisconsin case law are applied here. The majority's holding that despite the giving of the Miranda warnings by the officers to Dagnall, and despite the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights by him, that his incriminating statements must be suppressed is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson. In that case, the Court stated:
As a general matter, then, an accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in Miranda, 384 U.S., at 479, 86 S.Ct., at 1630, has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one. We feel that our conclusion in a *383recent Fifth Amendment case is equally apposite here: "Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State's intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law."
Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296-97 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422-23, 106 S.Ct. at 1142 (1986)). The majority opinion appears to be based on a foundation of footnotes, while ignoring the central holding of Patterson.
¶ 87. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals, and thereby affirm the decision of the circuit court to deny the suppression motion. For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 88. I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX joins this dissent.