Court Opinion

ID: 9941680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 18:03:41.099344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:51.745080
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/24 Terranova v. Simba Growth CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 CLINT TERRANOVA,

       Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and                                   E078764
 Appellant,
                                                                         (Super. Ct. No. CVPS2102798)
 v.
                                                                         OPINION
 SIMBA GROWTH, LLC,

       Defendant, Cross-complainant, and
 Respondent;

 ANGEL GARCIA,

          Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ronald L. Johnson,

Judge. (Retired judge of the San Diego Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant

to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.

         Law Office of Brian C. Unitt, and Brian C. Unitt, for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant

and Appellant.

                                                             1
      Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, and Wendy S. Dowse, Defendants, Cross-

complainant and Respondents.

                                            I.

                                   INTRODUCTION

      Clint Terranova entered into a contract with Simba Growth, LLC, agreeing to sell

his property to Simba for $470,000. A week later, Terranova backed out of the agreement

because he learned the fair market value (FMV) of the property was $600,000. He then

sued Simba and its managing member, Angel Garcia, for various claims all sounding in

fraud. Simba and Garcia (collectively, Defendants) responded by filing a cross-complaint

against Terranova alleging one cause of action for specific performance. After Terranova

amended his complaint, the trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to Terranova’s

operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) without leave to amend. The trial court then

granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on their cross-complaint and entered

judgment for them on the cross-complaint and the FAC.

      Terranova appeals, and we affirm.

                                           II.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                                             1
      A. The FAC’s Allegations and Defendants’ Demurrers

      1
          We assume the truth of the facts as alleged in the FAC unless contradicted by
judicially noticeable facts. (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.)

                                            2
      Terranova owns a house on North Avenida Caballeros in Palm Springs. In March

2021, Armand Arello and Oscar (last name unknown) came to Terranova’s home and

discussed buying it on behalf of Simba. During the discussions, Arello and Oscar

represented the FMV of the property to Terranova. They explained that they worked

with a real estate agent (Garcia) and “their own market comparisons of other properties in

the area proved the [FMV]” of Terranova’s property.

      Terranova later spoke with Garcia by phone. Garcia, as an agent of Simba,

offered to buy Terranova’s house for $470,000. Garcia explained that the offer was FMV

based on market comparisons that he and his staff had compiled, as well as his own

experience as an experienced real estate agent and his own market comparisons. Garcia

said that Terranova did not need to hire a real estate agent because Simba’s offer was

FMV and he would save money by not hiring an agent.

      Terranova accepted Garcia’s offer and the parties entered into a purchase

agreement for Terranova to sell his property to Simba for $470,000. Terranova signed

the agreement with the understanding that, based on Garcia’s representations, the FMV

for the property was $470,000.

      A few days after signing the purchase agreement, however, other parties contacted

Terranova and told him the FMV of the property was $600,000, or $130,000 more than

Garcia represented. Terranova thus determined that Garcia had lied to him about the

FMV of the property to induce him into selling it at a below-FMV price. Terranova

demanded that escrow be canceled, but Simba refused and moved forward with the sale.

                                            3
       Terranova responded by suing Defendants for (1) breach of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) fraud, and (4) rescission and cancellation

of instruments based on fraud. The thrust of the complaint and its four causes of action is

that Defendants fraudulently misrepresented the FMV of Terranova’s property.

       Defendants demurred to the complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer,

with leave to amend, because Terranova “failed to allege facts other than a representation

of the seller’s opinion of fair market value.”

       Terranova then filed the operative FAC, alleging the same four causes of action

based on the same material allegations. Like the complaint, the thrust of the FAC and its

four causes of action is that Defendants fraudulently misrepresented the FMV of

Terranova’s property.

       Defendants demurred again, arguing that the FAC failed to state a viable cause of

action because its four claims “are based solely on the allegation that [they] were

obligated to provide their opinion as to the fair market value of the parcel of real property

owned by [Terranova].” The trial court sustained the demurrer, this time without leave to

amend.

       B. Cross-Complaint and Summary Judgment

       While their first demurrer was pending, Defendants filed a cross-complaint against

Terranova alleging one cause of action for breach of contract and seeking specific

performance of the parties’ purchase agreement. After the trial court sustained their

                                                 4
demurrer to the FAC without leave to amend, Defendants moved for summary judgment

on their cross-complaint.

       Defendants argued in their summary judgment motion that Terranova breached the

purchase agreement—a valid and enforceable contract—by backing out of it during

escrow without justification. They presented evidence that Terranova had bought five

properties in the past, as well as text messages between him and Garcia from before their

phone conversation. During that exchange, Terranova said Garcia’s offering price of

between $430,000 and $530,000 was in Terranova’s “ballpark range.” Defendants also

submitted a declaration from Garcia stating that Simba offered $470,000 for Terranova’s

property, but the declaration did not mention anything about FMV beyond generically

stating that representations about FMV are opinions.

       Terranova opposed the motion on several grounds, including that Garcia

fraudulently induced him to sign the purchase agreement by falsely representing the FMV

and that the agreement was invalid due to mutual and unilateral mistake. Terranova did

not dispute that the parties had entered into a contract, but argued that it was

unenforceable because of Garcia’s fraud and/or mistake.

       Terranova submitted a declaration in support of his opposition largely mirroring

the FAC’s allegations. Among other things, Terranova declared that Garcia represented

that the FMV for the property was $470,000, and that Garcia reached this figure based on

his “experience in the area and expertise as a licensed professional.” Terranova thus

                                              5
signed the purchase agreement based on his understanding that Garcia’s offer accurately

reflected the property’s FMV.

       In a supplemental declaration submitted with Defendants’ reply, Garcia stated that

he never told Terranova his opinion as to the FMV of Terranova’s property. Garcia

denied that anyone from Simba, including himself, would use their professional judgment

to determine the FMV of the property. Instead, Garcia (on behalf of Simba) only offered

to buy the property for $470,000. Garcia also denied that Armand and Oscar visited

Terranova’s property or spoke to him about selling it.

       The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court

found that Defendants met their burden of proving Terranova breached the purchase

agreement, and then found that Terranova failed to prove a valid defense. In rejecting
                                              2
Terranova’s fraudulent inducement defense, the court found that Garcia’s

representations as to the FMV of the property were not actionable as fraud because “a

statement regarding the fair market value of a property is only actionable as fraud if it is

accompanied by other material false misrepresentations,” and “[a] statement regarding

the fair market value of property by itself is not enough to support a claim for fraud.”

       2
         The trial court’s rulings on Terranova’s other defenses are not relevant because
he has abandoned them on appeal.

                                              6
       The trial court thus entered judgment for Defendants on their cross-complaint and

the FAC. Terranova timely appealed.

                                             III.

                                       DISCUSSION

       Terranova argues the trial court erroneously sustained the demurrer to the FAC

without leave to amend because (1) the FAC stated a valid claim for fraud and thus he

was entitled to rescission, and (2) he should have been granted leave to amend to allege

additional facts to support his claims and an additional cause of action under the unfair

competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200). He argues the trial court

erroneously granted summary judgment because (1) Defendants failed to plead and prove

adequacy of consideration, a necessary element for specific performance, and (2) there

are triable issues of fact as to his defense of fraud. We find no error and affirm.

       A. Standards of Review

       “‘On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer

without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. The reviewing court gives

the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all

material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the

truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (McAllister v. Los Angeles

Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1206.) When a trial court has

sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, “we decide whether there is a reasonable

possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has

                                              7
abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we

affirm.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The plaintiff bears the burden of

proving the complaint may be amended to state a viable cause of action. (Dudley v.

Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 259-260.)

       “A party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion there is no

triable issue of material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.]

We strictly construe the moving party’s affidavits and liberally construe the opposing

party’s affidavits. We accept as undisputed facts only those portions of the moving

party’s evidence that are not contradicted by the opposing party’s evidence.” (City of San

Diego v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 21, 25.) Thus, “[w]hen deciding

whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth

in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most

favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente

Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

       B. Demurrer to FAC

       Defendants argued, Terranova agrees, and the trial court found that the FAC’s four

causes of action turn on Terranova’s allegation that Defendants fraudulently induced him

into signing the purchase agreement by misrepresenting the FMV of his property.

Terranova thus concedes (if implicitly) that the FAC’s claims, all of which sound in

fraud, rise and fall with that allegation. We agree with Defendants that the FAC fails to

                                              8
state a viable claim for fraud, and thus the trial court properly sustained their demurrer to

the FAC.

       The elements of fraud are: “‘(1) misrepresentation of a material fact (consisting of

false representation, concealment or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter);

(3) intent to deceive and induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation;

and (5) resulting damage.’” (Bower v. AT&T Mobility, LLC (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th

1545, 1557.) “Fraud allegations ‘involve a serious attack on character’ and therefore are

pleaded with specificity. [Citation.] General and conclusory allegations are insufficient.

[Citation.]” (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.) The

normal policy of liberally construing pleadings against a demurrer will not be invoked to

sustain a fraud cause of action that fails to set forth such specific allegations. (Lazar v.

Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

       Defendants argue the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the first and

fourth elements of fraud (misrepresentation and justifiable reliance) because the

statements Garcia and Simba employees made about Terranova’s property’s FMV are

nonactionable opinions and, even if they made a misrepresentation, Terranova did not

justifiably rely on them. We agree on both points.

       Expressions of opinion are generally not considered statements of fact and

therefore they usually cannot support a fraud claim. (Neu-Visions Sports, Inc. v.

Soren/McAdam/Bartells (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 303, 308 (Neu-Visions).) “A

representation is an opinion ‘“if it expresses only (a) the belief of the maker, without

                                              9
certainty, as to the existence of a fact; or (b) his judgment as to quality, value . . . or other

matters of judgment.”’” (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 606-607) Statements concerning a product’s value thus are generally nonactionable

statements of opinion, not fact. (Neu-Visions, supra, at p. 308.) Instead, “[a] statement

of value may become a basis for fraud claims only if coupled with other facts,

circumstances or false representations.” (Kahn v. Lischner (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 480,

488 (Kahn).)

       For instance, misrepresentations about a rental property’s value, coupled with false

statements about the income it produced the year before, supported a fraud claim.

(Stumpf v. Lawrence (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 373.) In another case, allegations that a

defendant fraudulently appraised a property using outdated, incomparable home sales to

induce a plaintiff to buy the property with a mortgage more favorable to the defendant,

stated a viable claim for fraud. (Fuller v. First Franklin Financial Corp. (2013) 216

Cal.App.4th 955, 959.) On the other hand, allegations that a home appraised higher than

the defendant’s appraisal from five years before did not support a fraud claim. (Cansino

v. Bank of America, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1471-1472.)

       The FAC makes no allegations about other “facts, circumstances, or false

representations” that suggest Defendants’ statements about the FMV of Terranova’s

property were anything other than their opinion. The FAC alleges only that Defendants

told Terranova that the FMV of his property was $470,000 based on their market analysis

and expertise. This, without more, fails to allege sufficient facts showing that

                                               10
Defendants’ statements were actionable misrepresentations of fact instead of

nonactionable statements as to the property’s value, which is “quintessentially a matter of

opinion, not a statement of fact.” (Neu-Visions, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 310; see also

id. at pp. 308-310 [accountant’s statement that property would appraise at $3 million was

nonactionable opinion in part because plaintiffs knew the accountant was not a

professional appraiser]; Padgett v. Phariss (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1270 [real estate

agents’ misrepresentations about property’s FMV not actionable because they were

opinions].) This is particularly true given that Terranova had the opportunity and ability

to verify the accuracy of Defendants’ statements. (See Alberda v. Smith (1934) 2

Cal.App.2d 74, 79 [“It is the general rule that statements as to value, where they are given

as mere matters of opinion and where the opportunity is present to ascertain the truth

thereof and to ascertain the real value, are matters of opinion only.”].) These principles

apply with greater force in the context of home values, which are inherently based in part

on opinion. (See Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 607

[“An appraisal is ‘an opinion as to the market value’ of a property . . . .”]; see also Kahn,

supra, 128 Cal.App.2d at p. 487 [noting that property owner may testify to property’s

value “even though experts have testified to widely varying valuations”].) In short, the

FAC fails to allege sufficient facts suggesting that Defendants’ statements were

statements of fact, not opinion.

                                             11
        Terranova points to an exception to the general rule that a statement purporting to

express an opinion may support a fraud claim when made by someone with “superior

knowledge or special information.” Putting aside our conclusion that the FAC fails to

allege facts showing that Defendants’ representations were anything other than their

opinions, this exception applies only “‘when one of the parties possesses, or assumes to

possess, superior knowledge or special information regarding the subject matter of the

representation, and the other party is so situated that he may reasonably rely upon such

supposed superior knowledge or special information.’” (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance,

LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 893, italics added.) Neither element is alleged in the

FAC.

        Examples where a defendant’s superior knowledge of the subject matter made the

defendant’s purported opinion actionable include (1) a sales agent’s representations that a

condominium building with serious, hazardous structural problems was nonetheless

“luxurious” and “outstanding investment” (Cooper v. Jevne (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 860,

865), (2) a realtor’s opinion that the purchaser of a particular lot had an enforceable

access easement (Southern California etc. Assemblies of God v. Shepherd of Hills etc.

Church (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 951, 959), and (3) credit rating agencies’ ratings of

investment products based on non-public, confidential information (Public Employees’

Retirement System v. Moody’s Investors Services, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 643, 646-

666).

                                             12
        Here, however, the FAC fails to allege facts showing that Defendants had superior

knowledge about the value of Terranova’s own property. Terranova points to the FAC’s

allegations that Garcia claimed his offer was based on his real estate expertise and

research, but the value of a property for sale is “generally [contingent upon] factors

within the knowledge of the seller or easily ascertainable by the seller.” (Greif v. Sanin

(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 412, 435; see Evid. Code, § 813, subd. (a) [property owner may

testify as to property’s value]; Kahn, supra, 128 Cal.App.2d at p. 487 [“[T]he law

generally assumes one will have some knowledge of the value of that which he owns.”].)

Simply put, there are no allegations that suggest an “inequality of knowledge” between

Defendants and Terranova about his own property that would render Defendants’

opinions actionable misrepresentations of fact. (Neu-Visions, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p.

310.)

        What’s more, Terranova did not reasonably rely on Defendants’ statements,

regardless of whether they were Defendants’ honest opinions or misrepresentations.

Justifiable reliance exists only when the circumstances make it reasonable for the plaintiff

to accept the defendant’s statements without an independent inquiry or investigation.

(OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157

Cal.App.4th 835, 864.) “The reasonableness of the plaintiff’s reliance is judged by

reference to the plaintiff’s knowledge and experience.” (Ibid.) “[I]f the conduct of the

[plaintiff] in the light of his own intelligence and information, or ready availability of

information, was manifestly unreasonable, he will be denied a recovery.” (Kahn, supra,

                                             13
128 Cal.App.2d at p. 489, italics added.) “Justifiable reliance is ordinarily a question of

fact that is not properly determined on demurrer, but ‘whether a party’s reliance was

justified may be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one

conclusion based on the facts,’ which facts include consideration of ‘the knowledge,

education and experience’ of the person whose reliance is at issue.” (Amiodarone Cases

(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1111.)

       As pled in the FAC, Terranova’s reliance on Defendants’ statements about his

property’s FMV was unreasonable as a matter of law. According to the FAC, Simba

employees Armand and Oscar approached Terranova unprompted and told him that their

employer, a real estate agent (Garcia), wanted to buy his property. Garcia then spoke

with Terranova and stated that the property’s FMV was $470,000. Based on these

interactions—and nothing more—Terranova agreed to sell his property for $470,000,

believing it was a fair offer. Terranova then signed the purchase agreement, which stated

in relevant part: “[Terranova] understand(s) that [Simba] is a private investment

company that is buying real estate to make a profit and may be purchasing the Property

for immediate resale and profit even as soon as the day of closing . . . [Simba] is a

professional real estate investor that holds an active real estate license. Neither [Simba]

nor any of [its] officers or employees represents [Terranova] in this transaction.”

       The FAC thus makes clear that Defendants were trying to buy Terranova’s

property to make a profit. In our view, it was entirely unreasonable as a matter of law for

Terranova to blindly rely on their representations about the FMV of his own property

                                             14
without taking any steps to verify whether their offer was fair before signing the purchase

agreement. (See Konda v. Fay (1913) 22 Cal.App. 722, 726 [a party “should not be

permitted to blindly rely upon statements of interested parties when means of correct

information was at hand.”].) As the FAC states, Terranova learned from “other parties”

days after signing the agreement that his property’s FMV was considerably higher, which

suggests he could have easily learned the true value of his property before agreeing to sell

it to Simba, making his reliance on Defendants’ representations even more unreasonable.

(See Kahn, supra, 128 Cal.App.2d at p. 489 [reliance on representation not justifiable

when readily available information refutes it].) “When the parties have an equal

opportunity to determine value, and both are of common intelligence, the fact that one

party neglects to take an opportunity to determine the property’s value does not allow that

party to avoid the contract merely because the other party has fixed an inflated value to

the property . . . . The transaction does not become fraudulent merely because a party

made a bad bargain.” (1 Miller & Star, Cal. Real Est. § 1:152; Kahn, supra, at p. 490.)

These principles fully apply here.

       Because we conclude the FAC failed to sufficiently plead a misrepresentation of

material fact and justifiable reliance, none of its causes of action states a valid claim. The

trial court thus properly sustained Defendants’ demurrer to it.

       We also conclude the trial court properly denied Terranova leave to amend. When

opposing Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC, Terranova asked for leave to amend if the

trial court sustained the demurrer, so that he could allege additional facts concerning “(1)

                                             15
his right to cancel the [purchase] agreement; (2) the specifics of the fraud allegations . . . ;

and (3) . . . an unfair businesses practice claim disgorging any unjust enrichment.” On

appeal, Terranova notes that he made this argument in the trial court, but only argues that

he should have been granted leave to amend to allege a UCL claim. We therefore

address only that issue.

       “‘[T]he UCL prohibits as unfair competition “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent

business act or practice.” [Citation.] The statute has been found to prohibit “wrongful

business conduct in whatever context such activity might occur.” [Citation.]’” (People

ex rel. City of Santa Monica v. Gabriel (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 882, 888.) The statute

“‘“borrows” violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as

unfair competitive practices.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 889.) Any actionable violation of the

law is actionable under the UCL. (See People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins.

Co. (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 508; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court

(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102-1103 [“Virtually any law—federal, state or local—can

serve as a predicate for a section 17200 action.”].)

       Terranova argues Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations violated a realtor’s duty

not to misrepresent the value of real property (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10117.3, subd. (a)

[“No [real estate] licensee shall knowingly or intentionally misrepresent the value of real

property”]), and the realtor’s statutory duty of candor imposed by Business and

                                              16
                                                  3                  4
Professions Code section 10176, subdivisions (a) , (b), (c), and (g). Terranova thus

seeks to assert a UCL claim against Defendants based on their alleged violations of these

statutes.

       For the reasons outlined above, the FAC fails to allege facts suggesting that

Defendants’ representations were statements of fact, not their opinion. The FAC also

alleges no facts (and Terranova does not offer any he could allege) showing that

Defendants knew that their representations about the FMV value of Terranova’s property

were false or misleading. The FAC’s conclusory allegation that Defendants “had lied to”

Terranova about the property’s FMV to induce him to sell at a lower price is insufficient

to show that Defendants knowingly or intentionally made false representations, because

the allegation does not identify how Defendants knew their offer misrepresented the

property’s true FMV. (See Cansino v. Bank of America, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p.

1472; Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 347 [conclusory allegations that

omissions were intentional and for the purpose of defrauding plaintiffs to purchase stock

       3
          Terranova’s opening brief first cites “subdivision (1)” of the statute, which does
not exist. We assume he meant to cite subdivision (a).
       4
          These provisions state that the Real Estate Commissioner may, under certain
circumstances, suspend or revoke a realtor’s license if the licensee is “guilty” of “(a)
Making any substantial misrepresentation,” “(b) Making any false promises of a character
likely to influence, persuade, or induce,” (c) “A continued and flagrant course of
misrepresentation or making of false promises through licensees,” and “(g) The claiming
or taking by a licensee of any secret or undisclosed amount of compensation,
commission, or profit or the failure of a licensee to reveal to the buyer or seller
contracting with the licensee the full amount of the licensee's compensation, commission,
or profit under any agreement . . . .”

                                             17
insufficient to state fraud claim].) Terranova’s proposed UCL claim turns on the same

general, conclusory, and insufficient allegations of fraud, and likewise fails to state a

viable claim under the UCL based on purported violations of Business and Professions

Code sections 10117.3 and 10176.

       Because Terranova’s proposed UCL claim rests on the same premise as his

insufficiently pled fraud claims, and because he fails to show how he could plead

additional facts to cure these deficiencies and state a viable UCL claim, we conclude the

trial court properly denied him leave to amend. We therefore affirm the judgment

sustaining Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC without leave to amend.

       C. Summary Judgment

       The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants on their cross-complaint

alleging one claim for breach of contract, finding that the parties had a valid contract (the

purchase agreement), Terranova breached it by refusing to go forward with the sale of his

property, and he had no valid defenses that would excuse his nonperformance or permit

him to rescind the contract. The court thus ordered specific performance of the purchase

agreement. We find no error.

       Terranova effectively conceded in his opposition to Defendants’ summary

judgment motion that Defendants had met their initial burden of proving their breach of

contract claim. He instead raised various defenses to enforcing the contract, including

that (1) the contract was unenforceable due to fraud, bilateral mistake, and unilateral

mistake, (2) he was entitled to cancel the contract because it was a unilateral option to

                                             18
purchase, and (3) Garcia violated his duty as Terranova’s agent. Terranova also argued

Defendants’ motion should be denied because their separate statement was deficient.

        On appeal, Terranova argues for the first time that Defendants failed to meet their

initial burden because they did not plead and prove adequate consideration, which is a

necessary element for specific performance. He also reasserts his argument that the

purchase agreement is unenforceable because he was fraudulently induced into it by

defendants’ misrepresentations.

        Terranova forfeited his adequate-consideration argument because he did not raise

it in the trial court. We therefore decline to consider it. (See DiCola v. White Brothers

Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 676.)

        As for Terranova’s argument that defendants fraudulently induced him into

signing the purchase agreement, we conclude he failed to show a triable issue of material

fact.

        A party to a contract may rescind the contract if that party was fraudulently

induced into it. (Civ. Code § 1689, subd. (b)(1); Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center

(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 301.) Like a cause of action for fraud, the contract defense

of fraudulent inducement requires a showing of justifiable (reasonable) reliance.

(Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 974.) Whether a

plaintiff’s reliance was reasonable is a question of fact except when the undisputed facts

do not permit a reasonable difference of opinion. (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

(2007) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 794.)

                                             19
       Even assuming Terranova’s version of events is accurate and that Defendants

misrepresented the FMV of his property to induce him to sell it at a discounted price, the

record shows that his reliance on their alleged misrepresentations was unreasonable as a

matter of law. A plaintiff’s experience, intelligence, and sophistication are relevant

factors in determining whether the plaintiff relied on a defendant’s misrepresentations.

(Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1196.) Terranova has

bought at least five properties since 1995. He thus knew, or should have known, that the

sale of property—particularly when it involves a sale approaching half a million

dollars—is a significant transaction that requires each party to do its own due diligence.

Assuming Defendants made the representations Terranova claims they made, Terranova

unreasonably relied on them without doing any research into his own property’s FMV.

Terranova “knew or should have known the value of his own property before selling it.”

(Greif v. Sanin, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.)

       Text messages between Terranova and Garcia reinforce our conclusion that

Terranova’s reliance on Defendants’ purported misrepresentations was unreasonable.

Garcia texted Terranova asking if he was interested in selling his property, to which

Terranova replied, “Which house are you making an offer on and how much?” Garcia

responded that he wanted to buy the Caballeros property and make an offer on it.

Terranova replied, “I am not looking to sell unless someone offers me a price that will

make me get out of bed. [¶] I get at least 3 offers a week on my house. If anything

might just talk to a real estate agent and put it on the market as is.” Garcia explained,

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“As Investors we will pay for all the closing costs so you [won’t] have to worry about

tens of thousands of dollars in junk fees and commissions. Our offer would have to be in

the range of $430,000 - $530,000. Are we in your ballpark range?” Terranova replied,

“That seems within the ballpark since [I] would [have] put it up for 580k since people

like to talk down a little and then paid the fees myself.”

       This exchange shows that Terranova (1) owned at least two properties at the time,

(2) people routinely made offers on his property before Defendants made theirs, (3)

$470,000 seemed like a fair price to Terranova, (4) he knew he would save money if he

sold the property without a real estate agent, and (5) he knew that property buyers

generally offer below the seller’s asking price. All of this suggests that Terranova knew

well how property sales usually work—including that buyers often want to pay less than

the seller asks—which makes his blind acceptance of Defendants’ offer and purported

representations about the property’s FMV all the more unreasonable.

       Because we conclude Terranova’s reliance on Defendants’ alleged

misrepresentations was unreasonable as a matter of law, he failed to show that he was

fraudulently induced into the purchase agreement such that it was unenforceable or he

was entitled to rescind it. The trial court thus properly granted Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment and entered judgment for them on their cross-complaint.

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                                        IV.

                                  DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed. Defendants may recover their costs on appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                          CODRINGTON
                                                                               J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
             Acting P. J.

MENETREZ
                       J.

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