Court Opinion

ID: 9902389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-26 23:02:12.35058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:49.803039
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 Harris v. Jiminez CA4/2

                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
     publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
                               publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 CLIFTON HARRIS,

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       E079547

 v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. CIVSB2211063)

 MICHAEL JIMINEZ, as Interim                                              OPINION
 Registrar of Voters et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. David Cohn,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Law Office of Robert D. Conaway and Robert D. Conaway for Plaintiff and

Appellant.

         Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Jolena E. Grider, Deputy County Counsel for

Defendants and Respondents Michael Jiminez, as Interim Registrar of Voters et al.

         No appearance for defendant and respondent Shannon Dicus.

                                                              1
       Plaintiff and appellant Clifton Harris (Harris), an approved candidate for Sheriff

of San Bernardino County (the County), sought a writ of mandate in the trial court,

directing defendants and respondents, including Michael Jiminez as Interim Registrar of

Voters, to conduct the election for sheriff during the general election in November

(Elec. Code, § 324, subd. (a)(1))—not during the primary election in June—as allegedly

required by Article III, section 303 of the Charter of San Bernardino County, California

(the Charter). Relying on Elections Code section 1300, the trial court denied the writ

petition. Harris contends the trial court erred because, per the Charter, the election for

sheriff must be held in November. We affirm.

                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The County held its election for sheriff on June 7, 2022, which was the day of the

statewide primary election (Elec. Code, § 316). Harris filed his writ petition in the trial

court on June 9, 2022.

       In June 2022, Elections Code section 1300, on which the trial court relied, read,

in relevant part, “[A]n election to select county officers shall be held with the statewide

primary at which candidates for Governor are nominated. In the event that county

officers are not elected pursuant to Sections 8140 and 8141, this election shall be

deemed a primary election and a county general election shall be held with the statewide

general election to select county officers.”

                                               2
                                       DISCUSSION

       At the outset, we will explain why we are not resolving the case by simply citing

Elections Code section 1300. “The provisions of a charter are the law of the State and

have the force and effect of legislative enactments.” (Cal. Const., art. 11, § 3(a).)

Therefore, “[w]henever any county has framed and adopted a charter, . . . the general

laws adopted by the Legislature . . . shall, as to such county, be superseded by said

charter as to matters for which, under this section it is competent to make provision in

such charter.” (Cal. Const., art. 11, § 4(g).) “County charters shall provide for: . . . [¶]

An elected sheriff, an elected district attorney, an elected assessor, other officers, their

election or appointment, compensation, terms and removal.” (Cal. Const., art. 11,

§ 4(c).) In other words, county charters supersede general laws on the topics delineated

by our state Constitution, such as the election of sheriff. Therefore, we must interpret

the Charter.

       We apply the de novo standard of review. (Lindelli v. Town of San Anselmo

(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1104.) “[W]e construe the [C]harter in the same manner

as we would a statute. [Citations.] Our sole objective is to ascertain and effectuate

legislative intent. [Citation.] We look first to the language of the [C]harter, giving

effect to its plain meaning.” (Domar Electric, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 9

Cal.4th 161, 171-172.)

       The Charter provides: “All elective County officers shall be elected at the general

election at which the Governor is elected . . . . All such elective County officers shall be

nominated and elected in the manner provided by general laws for the nomination and

                                              3
election of such officers.” (The Charter, art. III, § 303.) The plain language of the

Charter contemplates a “nomination and election.”

       The Charter provides that the “nomination” shall occur as “provided by general

laws.” Therefore, we look to the Elections Code for the definition of “nominate.” The

Elections Code provides: “ ‘Nominate’ means the selection, at a state-conducted

primary election, of candidates who are entitled by law to participate in the general

election for that office.” (Elec. Code, § 332.5) In defining ‘primary election,’ the

Election Code reflects: “ ‘Primary election’ includes all primary nominating elections

provided for by this code.” (Elec. Code, § 341.) Thus, nominations occur at the

primary election. Accordingly, we interpret “nomination” in the Charter to refer to

primary elections.

       The manner of the nomination/primary election is controlled “by general laws.”

(The Charter, art. III, § 303.) The general laws provide that “[a]ny candidate for a

nonpartisan office who at a primary election receives votes on a majority of all the

ballots cast for candidates for that office shall be elected to that office. . . . Where a

candidate has been elected to a nonpartisan office at the primary election, that office

shall not appear on the ballot at the ensuing general election.” (Elec. Code, § 8140.)

This statute means that, if a nonpartisan candidate receives more than 50 percent of the

vote in the primary election, then the candidate wins the office and need not appear on

the general election ballot.

                                              4
       In sum, we interpret the Charter as follows: Candidates for nonpartisan county

offices are to appear on the primary election ballot. If a candidate receives a majority of

the votes, then the candidate wins the office and need not appear on the general election

ballot. In regard to the portion of the Charter that reads, “All elective County officers

shall be elected at the general election at which the Governor is elected” (the Charter,

art. III, § 303), we interpret that as referring to the particular four-year interval at which

the County’s elections must take place.

       The Governor is “elected every fourth year at the same time and places as

members of the Assembly.” (Cal. Const. Art 5, § 2.) Members of the Assembly are

elected “on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of even-numbered

years unless otherwise prescribed by the Legislature.” (Cal. Const. Art 4, § 2.)

Correspondingly, nonpartisan officers of the County must be elected every fourth year

of even-numbered years, in the same intervals as the Governor. If a nonpartisan county

candidate wins a majority of the votes at the primary election, then, for that particular

office, the primary election legally transmutes into a general election. (Pini v. Fenley

(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 67, 72; see also Fields v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, 325, fn. 1.) In

that legal transmutation, the candidate has effectively participated in a general election

on the same election cycle as the governor.

       Harris contends that the specific language in the Charter, requiring “all elective

County officers [to] be elected at the general election at which the Governor is elected”

(the Charter, art. III, § 303), prevails over the general language regarding nominations

and elections being conducted in accordance with the general laws. (Code Civ. Proc.,

                                              5
§ 1859.) The legal principle that the specific prevails over the general only applies

when the two subjects “cannot be reconciled.” (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th

284, 293.) We have reconciled the portion of the Charter disputed by Harris.

Therefore, we need not rely on the principle favoring the specific over the general.

       Harris cites to Government Code section 24200, subdivision (a), which reads,

“Except as otherwise provided, all elective county officers shall be elected at the general

election at which the Governor is elected.” (Govt. Code, § 24200 [eff. through Dec. 31,

2022].) The Charter is in agreement with that statute, in that the Charter requires “all

elective County officers shall be elected at the general election at which the Governor is

elected.” (The Charter, art. III, § 303.) As explained ante, we interpret that provision of

the Charter as referring to the particular four-year interval at which the County’s

elections must take place.

       Harris relies on Elections Code section 1003, subdivision (b), which provides:

“This chapter shall not apply to the following: [¶] . . . [¶] Elections held in chartered

cities or chartered counties in which the charter provisions are inconsistent with this

chapter.”

       There are four statutes in the chapter. The first statute pertains to establishing

election dates, i.e., “The first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each

year.” (Elec. Code, § 1000, subd. (e).) The Charter provides, “All elective County

officers shall be elected at the general election at which the Governor is elected.” (The

Charter, art. III, § 303.) The Charter does not set elections for a particular day of a

                                             6
particular month, so there is no inconsistency giving the Charter priority over the

statute.

         The second statute concerns establishing statewide election dates, i.e., “An

election held in November of an even-numbered year.” (Elec. Code, § 1001, subd. (a).)

Again, the Charter does not set elections for a particular day of a particular month, so

there is no inconsistency giving the Charter priority over the statute.

         The third statute provides, “Except as provided in Section 1003, notwithstanding

any other provisions of law, all state, county, municipal, district, and school district

elections shall be held on an established election date.” (Elec. Code, § 1002.) The

Charter provides that “County officers shall be elected at the general election at which

the Governor is elected.” (The Charter, art. III, § 303.) Thus, the statute and the

Charter are in harmony. The statute and the Charter require the elections to be held on

an established election date. The fourth statute is section 1003, which we set forth ante.

Because there is not an inconsistency between the Charter and the statutes in the

chapter, the exception set forth in Elections Code section 1003, subdivision (b), does not

apply.

                                              7
                                      DISPOSITION

       The order denying the writ petition is affirmed. Respondents Michael Jiminez,

as Interim Registrar of Voters et al., are awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,

rule 8.278(a)(1).)

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                       MILLER
                                                                              Acting P. J.

We concur:

FIELDS
                                 J.

MENETREZ
                                 J.

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