Court Opinion

ID: 9390818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 17:08:38.364571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:37.238101
License: Public Domain

J-S09035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                :
                v.                              :
                                                :
                                                :
    MATTHEW ALLEN LAWTON                        :
                                                :
                       Appellant                :   No. 1264 WDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 3, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-53-CR-0000187-2010

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                           FILED: April 28, 2023

        Matthew Allen Lawton (“Lawton”) appeals pro se from the order

dismissing his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”)1 as untimely. We affirm.

        In light of our disposition, we need not summarize the facts underlying

Lawton’s convictions.       We briefly note that this Court affirmed Lawton’s

judgment of sentence in February 2014, and our Supreme Court denied his

petition for allowance of appeal on August 26, 2014. Lawton subsequently

filed three prior PCRA petitions to no avail. Relevantly, Lawton timely filed a

first PCRA petition, and the court appointed counsel (“first PCRA counsel”),

who filed an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA court denied relief, and this

Court affirmed the order on appeal.            In his second PCRA petition, Lawton

asserted that first PCRA counsel was ineffective, and the PCRA court dismissed
____________________________________________

1   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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that petition as untimely. This Court affirmed that order on appeal. Most

recently, in July 2021, this Court affirmed the dismissal of Lawton’s third PCRA

petition alleging newly discovered evidence, and our Supreme Court denied

allowance of appeal in January 2022. See Commonwealth v. Lawton, 260

A.3d 147, 305 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum at 1-

3) (summarizing the procedural history of Lawton’s convictions and prior PCRA

petitions), appeal denied, 270 A.3d 1105 (Pa. 2022).

      Lawton filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his fourth, in May 2022.

Therein, Lawton asserted that our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v.

Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), recognized a new constitutional right that

applies retroactively for collateral relief. The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P.

907 notice of intent to dismiss the petition as untimely.       Lawton did not

respond, and on October 3, 2022, the court entered an order dismissing

Lawton’s petition. Lawton timely appealed. The PCRA court did not order a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but filed a statement in lieu of a Rule 1925(a)

opinion.

      Lawton raises the following issues for review:

      1. Did [Lawton] file his [s]econd PCRA [petition] in the right
         juri[s]diction for PCRA ineffectiveness of PCRA Counsel?

      2. If [Bradley] is not retroactive[, i]t s[h]ould be for reasons
         stated in arguments.

Lawton’s Brief at 2.

      Our standard of review is well-settled:

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      Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining
      whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the
      record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
      error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the
      prevailing party in the PCRA Court. We are bound by any
      credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are
      supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court's
      legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

      Lawton’s issues hinge on whether the PCRA court properly dismissed his

instant fourth PCRA petition as untimely, and we address both issues together.

Under the PCRA, any petition “including a second or subsequent petition, shall

be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]”         42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).     A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the

expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The

PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may

not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely

filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

      As noted above, our Supreme Court, on August 26, 2014, denied

allowance of appeal from this Court’s order affirming Lawton’s conviction;

therefore, his judgment of sentence became final after the ninety-day period

for appeal to the United States Supreme Court expired, i.e., November 24,

2014. Accordingly, Lawton had until November 24, 2015, to file a timely PCRA

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petition.   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also Commonwealth v.

Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1247 (Pa. Super. 2019); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1.

Lawton’s present petition, filed in May 2022, is thus facially untimely.

       Pennsylvania courts may nevertheless consider an untimely PCRA

petition if the petitioner can plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth

in section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462,

468 (Pa. Super. 2013) (providing that a PCRA court must dismiss an untimely

petition if no exception is pleaded and proven).        Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)

provides an exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirement if the petition

asserts “a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of

the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period

provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.”

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).2

       Lawton’s arguments are sparse but they suggest that Bradley should

apply retroactively to allow the PCRA court to entertain the merits of his

second PCRA petition in which alleged first PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness.

The PCRA court concluded the timeliness exception at section 9545(b)(1)(iii)

did not apply because while the Bradley Court held that a PCRA petitioner

could raise claims of ineffectiveness at the first opportunity, including on

____________________________________________

2 Further, any PCRA petition invoking one of the timeliness exceptions in
section 9545(b)(1) “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could
have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Here, Lawton filed the
instant petition within one year of the date our Supreme Court issued its
decision in Bradley.

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appeal, it did not state that its holding applied retroactively. See Rule 1925(a)

Statement in Lieu of Opinion, 11/21/22, at 1-2.

      Initially, we note that Lawton’s arguments fail to address any of the

elements of the timeliness exception at section 9545(b)(1)(iii), and we may

affirm on that basis alone. See Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1094 (noting that the

appellant bears the burden of establishing that a PCRA timeliness exception

applies).   In any event, Lawton’s reliance on Bradley as a timeliness

exception is misplaced.      The Bradley Court did not recognize a new

constitutional right but addressed the procedures for considering claims of

ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel on appeal in the same PCRA

proceeding, not a subsequent PCRA petition. See Bradley, 261 A.3d at 403-

04 (stating that the Court’s decision did not sanction “extra-statutory serial

petitions”); see also Commonwealth v. Stahl, --- A.3d ---, ---, 2023 WL

1793571 at *4 (Pa. Super. 2023) (concluding that “[n]othing in Bradley

creates a right to file a second PCRA petition outside the PCRA’s one-year time

limit as a method of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel or permits

recognition of such a right”). Thus, the Bradley Court did not recognize a

new constitutional right nor did it hold that its decision would apply

retroactively in the manner Lawton asserts it should. Accordingly, we agree

with the PCRA court that Bradley does not constitute a timeliness exception

under section 9545(b)(1)(iii) and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider

Lawton’s fourth PCRA petition. See Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1093.

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/28/2023

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