Court Opinion

ID: 9565282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:18:21.630543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:31.439112
License: Public Domain

McGRAW, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
Motions for summary judgment are viewed with caution in this state, Price v. Bennett, 171 W.Va. 12, 297 S.E.2d 211 (1982), and granting summary judgment is seldom appropriate in complex cases or in cases where issues involving motive and intent are present, Karnell v. Nutting, 166 W.Va. 269, 273 S.E.2d 93 (1980). Any doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact must be resolved against the party moving for summary judgment, Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co., 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). If varying inferences may be drawn from the nonmovant’s evidence, when accepted as true, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Id. Even if the trial judge feels that a directed ver-diet will be granted at trial, he should not try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment. Syl. Pt. 1, Masinter v. Webco Co., 164 W.Va. 241, 262 S.E.2d 433 (1980).
The trial judge prematurely disposed of the appellant’s case at the summary judgment stage and this Court has compounded that injustice by articulating a stringent standard for establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Not only does the majority’s opinion confuse the standards for disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination cases, it confuses the requirements for setting out a prima facie case with the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof. The “but for” formulation is useful only in determining whether the plaintiff has proven his case by a preponderance of the evidence, considering not only his prima facie case, but also the employer’s showing of some nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse decision and any rebuttal showing by the plaintiff that the reason advanced by the employer is mere pretext. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 n. 10, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1432 (4th Cir.1985).
The majority explains its “but for” requirement, saying that “the plaintiff is to show some evidence ... so as to give rise to an inference” of discrimination or that he must show a “nexus between the employer’s decision and a discriminatory reason.” Neither of these statements articulates a traditional application of the “but for” rule (normally used in determining proximate cause in tort cases), which is that “[t]he defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct; or, conversely, the defendant’s conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have *173occurred without it.” Rudeck v. Wright, 218 Mont. 41, 709 P.2d 621 (1985).
In its rush to adopt a general test for determining whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the majority has further confused an already murky area of the law and, if the “but for” test is applied in a traditional fashion, has made the plaintiffs task more difficult. I, therefore, must respectfully dissent.