Court Opinion

ID: 9689736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:45:18.845062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:51.473976
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I concur in the interim adoption of *276the ABA standards, I disagree with the Court’s decision that the adb erred when it concluded that the law of the case doctrine barred it from increasing respondent’s discipline beyond a forty-five-day suspension. Because the multiple proceedings below have already involved consideration of the specific aba standards governing reprimand, suspension, and permanent disbarment, rather than remanding this case yet again, I would reinstate the hearing panel’s forty-five-day suspension and terminate this eight and a half year ordeal.
Initially, the sequence of events in this case is key to the application of the law of the case doctrine. This case began when respondent was charged with several counts of misconduct, resulting in a reprimand from an agc hearing panel. Both respondent and the Grievance Administrator appealed to the adb, and the reprimand was affirmed. Next, both parties appealed to this Court, and we remanded to the hearing panel with specific instructions, retaining jurisdiction. On remand, the hearing panel believed that respondent’s misconduct justified a harsher sanction, so it imposed a forty-five-day suspension. Both parties again appealed, challenging several of the panel’s actions. This Court remanded to the adb, directing it to consider respondent’s arguments that the discipline was inappropriate, and denied both parties’ appeals and cross appeals in all other respects. On second remand, the Grievance Administrator argued that respondent’s sanction should be increased, but the ADB believed that it was barred by the law of the case doctrine from increasing the sanction beyond a forty-five-day suspension because this Court had denied the Grievance Administrator’s appeal on that question. Thus, the ADB entered an order that it believed would finally resolve this case.
*277The majority concludes that the adb erred, and that the ADB was not barred from increasing respondent’s discipline. Because this Court denied leave on the question of increasing respondent’s sanction, the majority asserts that the issue was not implicitly or explicitly decided, so the law of the case doctrine does not apply. Thus, it concludes that the adb was free to order whatever sanction it believed appropriate. Ante at 259-261.
However, in a procedurally analogous case, this Court held that the law of the case doctrine does bar reconsideration of issues denied leave. In Johnson v White, 430 Mich 47; 420 NW2d 87 (1988), the plaintiff appealed a jury verdict of no cause of action, raising issues involving admitted testimony and jury instructions. The Court of Appeals held that the challenged testimony was properly admitted, but that the jury instructions were erroneous, so it vacated the verdict and remanded for a new trial. Both parties appealed, with the plaintiff challenging on the testimonial issue, and the defendant challenging on the instructional issue. This Court remanded Johnson to the Court of Appeals on the instructional issue in light of a new decision, but the plaintiff’s cross appeal on the testimonial issue was denied “for failure to persuade that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.” Id. at 52. On remand, the Court of Appeals upheld its prior decision on the instructional issue, but, additionally, it revisited the testimonial issue and reversed its earlier decision.
Defendant appealed to this Court once more, and this Court agreed to consider whether the jury instruction was error, but more importantly to the instant case, we agreed to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by revisiting the testimonial issue. Id. We held that the Court of Appeals was barred by *278the law of the case doctrine from revisiting the testimonial issue on remand. In our decision in Johnson, we reasoned:
Where a case is taken on appeal to a higher appellate court, the law of the case announced in the higher appellate court supersedes that set forth in the intermediate appellate court. Rulings of the intermediate appellate court, however, remain the law of the case insofar as they are not affected by the opinion of the higher court reviewing the lower court’s determination. 5B CJS, § 1964, p 574.
In the case at bar, this Court’s order denying leave to appeal the plaintiff’s cross appeal which concerned the [testimonial issue] left undisturbed the Court of Appeals adjudications of those issues. Those adjudications are the law of the case and were not subject to further review by the Court of Appeals on remand from this Court. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals decision as to these issues must be vacated. [Id. at 53.]
Thus, when this Court denied leave on one issue but remanded on another, the issue on which leave was denied could not be revisited on remand. Further, if the Court of Appeals had been allowed to reconsider the issues for which this Court had already denied leave, then the order denying leave would have been rendered a nullity. Id. at 54.
Like the Court of Appeals in Johnson, the ADB was barred in the instant case from reconsidering issues for which this Court denied leave.1 The majority offers that this Court did not decide the issue of increasing respondent’s sanction because this Court denied leave, but, as we stated in Johnson, rulings of the intermediate court remain the law of the case *279when they are unaffected by the higher court’s action. An opinion was not necessary to foreclose this issue, because “a court speaks through its orders and judgments and not through its opinions.” Id. at 53. The majority is certainly correct that the denial of leave was not a decision on the merits, but the issue of increasing the sanction was decided by the ADB, and when this Court denied leave, that decision became final.2 Pipe Fitters Union Local No 392 v Kokosing Construction Co, Inc, 81 Ohio St 3d 214, 218; 690 NE2d 515 (1998) (“where this court refuses jurisdiction following the issuance of an opinion by a court of appeals, the court of appeals’ opinion becomes the law of the case”). As in Johnson, holding that the ADB was free to reconsider increasing discipline beyond the forty-five-day suspension would render a nullity this Court’s order denying the Grievance Administrator leave on the same issue.
The majority also offers that this Court remanded for consideration of the level of discipline, so the ADB had discretion under MCR 9.118(D) to order the discipline it believed appropriate. Ante at 261. However, we remanded specifically for consideration of respondent’s arguments concerning the appropriateness of the increased level of discipline. Respondent did not argue that he should receive increased discipline, so the adb’s discretion was limited by the remand order.
*280Thus, under this Court’s decision in Johnson v White, the ADB was correct that it was barred by the law of the case doctrine from considering whether respondent’s sanction could be increased beyond a forty-five-day suspension. When we denied leave on this issue, the adb’s decision became the law of the case, and if we now reconsidered it, our prior denial would' be a nullity. Therefore, rather than prolong this case with yet another remand, I would reinstate the forty-five-day suspension and bring this lengthy ordeal to a conclusion.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 The adb provides intermediate review in attorney discipline cases. See MCR 9.118.

 Additionally, any argument that the decision did not become final because of the partial remand is undercut by Johnson. There, this Court did not revisit the merits of the issue for which leave was denied. We did offer a discussion of that issue, but only to refute the dissent’s contention in that case that the Court of Appeals initial error was reason not to follow the law of the case doctrine. We held that our denial of leave on the issue foreclosed further review of that issue. The partial remand did not change that finality. Johnson, supra at 53-58; 5 CJS, Appeal and Error, § 849, p 354 (“the conclusiveness of the first judgment on appeal does not depend upon the character of the judgment as final or otherwise”).