Court Opinion

ID: 9825721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:00:50.856364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:18.540393
License: Public Domain

Mehaeey, J. Caroline Watkins, one of the appel-lees, filed suit against Lenwood Watkins, another of the appellees, for unlawful detainer for the recovery of the possession of certain described iands in Chicot county, Arkansas. Thereafter, the appellant, Odie Miller, filed an intervention and complaint in ejectment against Caroline Watkins, Lenwood Watkins, Claude Watkins, Lester Watkins, Eosie Watkins Howard, Moeast Watkins, individually, and Moeast Watkins,, administrator of the estate of Willie Watkins, deceased. He alleged that he was the owner of the lands involved and that the defendants were not entitled to possession; that Caroline Watkins is the widow of Willie Watkins, deceased; that she and the other appellees constitute the sole heirs-at-law of Willie Watkins, deceased, and as such are proper parties defendant herein for the complete adjudication of the rights of the parties to said lands. He alleged that he was the owner and entitled to possession of said property; that the Eudora-Western Drainage District was duly and legally created and organized under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Arkansas, and that said lands were • situate in said district and were impressed with a lien securing the payments of certain bonded indebtedness against the lands; that the defendants wholly failed and refused to pay the installments levied on said lands for the years 1923, 1924 and 1925, and that the district caused said lien to he foreclosed in the Chicot chancery court on November 5, 1929, and that the defendants wholly failed and refused to redeem said lands within the time prescribed by law, and the commissioner of the court sold said lands to said improvement district. On April 9, 1935, appellant purchased said lands from the receiver and received a deed conveying- said lands to him. Caroline Watkins filed separate answer. She admitted that she was the widow of Willie Watkins, deceased; that the improvement district was legally created and that the lands involved in this suit are embraced in said district; that said lands were assessed with certain benefits to be paid in annual installments; she admits that the drainage taxes were extended against said lands for the years 1923, 1924 and 1925, and admits that there was a foreclosure .in Chicot chancery court and a decree entered and deed made as alleged by appellant; admits that the receiver for the district conveyed the lands to appellant on April 9, 1935; denies that appellant is the owner of said lands or has any interest or right to the possession, and states that the foreclosure decree and sale thereunder and the deed are void for the following reasons: first, that the lands involved were forfeited to the state on June 9, 1924, for the taxes of 1923 and was duly certified to the state on July 31, 1926; that the title remained in the state from that time until July 30, 1931, when the same was purchased by Willie Watkins, her former husband; that at all times mentioned above, the title to said lands was in the state of. Arkansas. Appellee then mentions several other reasons why the sale by the district was void. That appellee’s husband acquired the lands 35 or 40 years ago, built a home on said lands, and occupied said 40 acres as a homestead continuously until the fall of 1933, when he died, and that appellee has remained in continuous possession of the land since his death, occupying the same as her homestead. The evidence shows that the foreclosure suit by the district and the sale and deed to appellant were all during, the time the title to the land was in the state of Arkansas. The amount of the taxes for which the land was sold by the district was very small, somewhere between $30 and $40. The appellees had not paid either the state and county taxes, or the improvement district taxes. It was the duty of Willie Watkins and the appellees to pay the taxes on said land. The parties waived a jury and submitted the case to the court sitting as a jury, and the court found in favor of Caroline Watkins and dismissed the intervention and complaint of the appellant, Odie Miller, and from this judgment appellant prosecutes an appeal. There is no conflict in the evidence. The facts may be stated briefly as follows: Willie Watkins, 30 or 40 years ago, acquired this land and built his home on it and lived there the rest of his life, and Caroline Watkins, his widow, continued to occupy, the place as her homestead, and is still occupying it. The land was forfeited for state and county taxes, and purchased by the state in 1924 for the taxes of 1923. Suit to foreclose by the district was filed April 9, 1927. The suit was to foreclose for the taxes for 1923, 1924 and 1925. The land was sold and the district became the purchaser, and the receiver of the district executed to Odie Miller a deed to the lands on April 9, 1935. The foreclosure decree was dated November 5, 1929, the sale was reported on January 27, 1930. The deed was made by the state to Willie Watkins, husband of appellee, on July 30, 1931. The appellant, in his intervention and. complaint, prayed judgment that he be adjudg-ed the lawful owner of said land and premises, and for possession of the same. He did not testify in the case. The only question involved here is who has the paramount title, the appellant or the appellee, Caroline Watkins. The court has repeatedly held that when lands are forfeited and sold to the state, that improvement district taxes are suspended during the time the state has title, but they are not extinguished. As soon as an individual purchases from the state, the lien of the improvement district for assessments attaches. It is undisputed that at the time of the foreclosure by the district, the title-to the lands was in the state of Arkansas, and that a deed was received by Watkins from the state in 1931. Under all of our decisions on this question the state had the paramount title, and all liens for assessments were suspended during the time the state had title. Appellant relies on the case of Tallman v. Board of Commissioners Northern Rd. Imp. Dist. of Ark. County, 185 Ark. 851, 49 S. W. (2d) 1039. But we quoted with approval in that case tlie case of Turley v. St. Francis County Rd. Imp. Dist. No. 4, 171 Ark. 939, 287 S. W. 196, as follows: “Of course, the forfeiture to the state of lands for general taxes necessarily suspends -the enforcement of the special tax lien as long as the title remains in the state, but, as the lien, under the terms of the statute, is not extinguished, and continues until the special taxes are paid, the same can be enforced when the land goes back into private ownership. This construction of the statute gives full recognition to the state’s paramount right of taxation, and in nowise detracts from the dignity and power of the state as against subordinate governmental agencies.” Another case to the same effect is Wyatt v. Beard, 179 Ark. 305, 15 S. W. (2d) 990. In the case of Hooper v. Chandler, 183 Ark. 469, 36 S. W. (2d) 398, we announced the same doctrine. We said in the Tallman case, supra, that the lien for assessment taxes was suspended and could be enforced after the lands went back to private ownership, but we announced that this -meant a valid sale, and stated that a void sale would not suspend the statute, because if void, it is a nullity, binding on no one. But, when lands have been sold to the state, the state has a paramount lien, and, if sold, as they were in this case, for improvement district taxes, they are still subject to the paramount right of the state. One of our latest decisions is in the case of Stringer v. Conway County Bridge Dist., 188 Ark. 481, 65 S. W. (2d) 1071. We there said: “When lands are forfeited to the state for nonpayment of taxes, and confirmation is had under act 296 of 1929, all irregularities and infor-malities connected with the forfeiture and sale for taxes are cured, and in all cases where the state had the power to sell, the title may be confirmed in the state. If the state did not have the power to sell for taxes, then, of course, the sale would be absolutely void, and a confirmation would be void. If taxes on a tract of land had already been paid, the sale would be void, or if the property was not subject to taxation; but in all cases where the state has power to sell, and a decree has been entered in accordance with the provisions of act 296 of 1929', although the sale may be void for irregularities and informalities, all persons are barred by the decree of confirmation, and cannot thereafter take advantage of any informality or irregularity. ’ ’ In the instant case it is conceded that the sale to the state was valid, and, if so, the lien for improvement district assessments was suspended while the state had title; but when purchased by an individual, the lien for the assessment attached. Willie Watkins was under the duty to pay the taxes and assessments. After the time for redemption expires, where there is a valid sale to the state, the original owner or any other person may purchase from the state; but where the person whose duty it was to pay the taxes, purchases from the state the lien of the improvement district attaches, and while such person is entitled to the premises, the lands are subject to the lien for the improvement district assessments. In this case, after the time for redemption expired, Willie Watkins, the original .owner, purchased from the state. It being his duty to pay the taxes, he could not let it forfeit to the state and then purchase it, and thereby evade the payment of the improvement district taxes. The title of the appellant, Odie Miller, was void because there had been a valid sale to the state. The court correctly held that Caroline 'Watkins was entitled to the possession, but the land is subject to the improvement district taxes. The judgment is affirmed.