Court Opinion

ID: 9838712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 17:01:27.832056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:43.240407
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-1213
JOHN GNUTEK,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

ILLINOIS GAMING BOARD, et al.,
                                               Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
           No. 1:17-cv-00808 — Martha M. Pacold, Judge.
                     ____________________

  ARGUED DECEMBER 8, 2022 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 7, 2023
               ____________________

   Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. John Gnutek filed a complaint al-
leging that he was unlawfully terminated from his position as
a Gaming Senior Special Agent with the Illinois Gaming
Board (the “Board”). His complaint alleged that his termina-
tion violated Title VII, the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and the Illinois Ethics Act. The district court dismissed
the Illinois Ethics Act claims against the Board and individual
defendants in their official capacities. Following discovery,
2                                                  No. 22-1213

Gnutek voluntarily dismissed the claims against individual
defendants Clinton Cobb and Isaiah Vega. Gnutek does not
appeal any of those dismissals. The district court then granted
summary judgment in favor of the Board and individual de-
fendants Mark Ostrowski, Karen Weathers, and Vincent Pat-
tara on the remaining claims, and Gnutek appeals that grant
of summary judgment.
    The Board is an Illinois state agency tasked with the en-
forcement of certain gaming laws in the state, including the
regulation of riverboat casino gambling and video gaming.
Gnutek began his employment as a Revenue Special Agent
Trainee in 1999 and progressed through a number of positions
to Gaming Senior Special Agent. As part of the duties of that
position, Gnutek “was an armed peace officer and had daily
interactions with members of the public while performing his
investigations and law enforcement duties.” Dist. Ct. Memo-
randum Op. and Order at 2 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
    On May 31, 2014, Gnutek was involved in an altercation
with the driver of a pickup truck and trailer, as a result of
which Gnutek was arrested and charged with battery. Ac-
cording to the police report, Gnutek was a passenger in his
car which was driven by his teenage son, and as the car passed
a truck, the driver of the truck threw a beer bottle at Gnutek’s
car, breaking his taillight. Both vehicles stopped in the road,
and Gnutek exited and approached the driver’s side of the
truck. Gnutek claimed that the seated truck driver punched
him through the open window and bit his hand, and that he
did not strike the driver. The driver denied throwing any-
thing at Gnutek’s vehicle and claimed that Gnutek came to his
window and began punching him. The driver of the truck
No. 22-1213                                                   3

sustained injuries to his face and chest which were visible to
the reporting officer and caused the officer to call for an am-
bulance. The officer also photographed injuries on Gnutek’s
hand which appeared consistent with punching someone or
something, and light damage to Gnutek’s car.
    Gnutek reported the arrest to his direct supervisor at the
Board, who in turn notified other supervisors up the chain of
command. He was subsequently placed on administrative
leave beginning on June 2, 2014. After a bench trial on No-
vember 6, 2014, Gnutek was found guilty of battery, a Class A
misdemeanor. In so finding, the judge found Gnutek’s testi-
mony as to his own actions incredible. Following that guilty
finding and an off-the-record conversation, the judge decided
to continue the case for a period of 90 days, at which point the
judge would consider a motion to vacate the guilty finding if
Gnutek successfully completed anger management counsel-
ing and paid the medical expenses of the truck driver.
    Following the trial, Gnutek informed the Board, by email-
ing Weathers, Pattara, and Ostrowski, that the judge found
him guilty of battery and had made a deferred adjudication,
ordering counseling and the payment of $2000 to the truck
driver, and that the case was continued until March 11, 2015,
and would be dismissed without entering a finding of guilt if
those conditions were met. The Board, on January 9, 2015, is-
sued a memorandum to Gnutek informing him that discipline
was contemplated based on the charge that he was arrested
for battery due to a physical altercation with another individ-
ual and found guilty, and that his conduct toward the indi-
vidual and the battery conviction violated the Illinois Gaming
Board Employee Handbook Chapter 4: Rules of Conduct,
Conduct Unbecoming an Employee, and Convictions. The
4                                                   No. 22-1213

memorandum attached the Rules of Conduct, Chapter 4 of the
Handbook. A subsection entitled “Convictions” discussed the
requirement to notify the employer of convictions incurred
during employment, and provided that “[f]or purposes of this
section, ‘convictions’ include all misdemeanors and felonies
committed as an adult for which you plead guilty, are found
guilty, are convicted, or agreed to an alternative sentencing
program or pretrial diversion program which required an ad-
mission, stipulation or finding of guilt, including court super-
vision and/or probation.” Dist. Ct. Order at 11. A subsection
entitled “Conduct unbecoming an employee” provided that
“[a]ll contact with fellow employees and the public must be
conducted in a manner that will not discredit the background,
character, or integrity of any individual and will not cause
discord with the public or fellow employees, disrupt official
business, or endanger public safety.”
    A pre-disciplinary meeting was held on January 14, 2015,
and on January 28, 2015, Gnutek submitted a written rebuttal.
In that rebuttal, he maintained that the altercation occurred
exactly as outlined in his trial testimony, and that he did not
batter the truck driver and merely defended himself. He fur-
ther asserted that he had not been convicted because the case
was continued for a final ruling.
   Pursuant to state procedures, the agency then recom-
mended Gnutek’s discharge, and the Director of Central Man-
agement Services approved the charges and terminated his
employment effective February 27, 2015. On April 29, 2015,
the Illinois state court entered an order finding Gnutek not
guilty of the battery charge.
   Gnutek filed suit in the district court alleging that the ter-
mination was unlawful under Title VII, the First Amendment,
No. 22-1213                                                       5

and the Illinois Ethics Act in that it was made in retaliation for
his history of litigation against the Board opposing unlawful
actions. The district court granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of the defendants. We review the grant of summary judg-
ment de novo, taking all reasonable inferences in favor of
Gnutek. Bless v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 9 F.4th 565, 571 (7th
Cir. 2021).
    A retaliation claim under Title VII requires enough evi-
dence to permit a reasonable jury to find that: (1) he engaged
in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the pro-
tected activity and that adverse employment action. Rozumal-
ski v. W.F. Baird & Assoc., Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2019).
Only the causal connection is at issue here. To demonstrate
such a connection, a plaintiff can present direct evidence, but
may also choose to rely on circumstantial evidence, which
may include “‘suspicious timing, ambiguous statements of
animus, evidence other employees were treated differently,
or evidence the employer’s proffered reason for the adverse
action was pretextual.’” Id., quoting Greengrass v. Int’l Mone-
tary Sys. Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 2015). Regardless of
the type of evidence presented, “[t]he key question is whether
a reasonable juror could conclude that there was a causal link
between the protected activity or status and the adverse ac-
tion.” Id.; Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765–66
(7th Cir. 2016). A retaliation claim under Title VII requires a
plaintiff to establish “that his or her protected activity was a
but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.”
Univ. of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S.
338, 362 (2013).
6                                                      No. 22-1213

     If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, an
employer may produce evidence that it had a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Robertson v. Dept. of Health Services, 949 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir.
2020). If that burden is met, in order to avoid summary judg-
ment, the plaintiff “must produce evidence that would permit
a trier of fact to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not
its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id. “In
determining whether the employer’s reason can be character-
ized as pretextual, we do not evaluate whether the employer’s
proffered justification was accurate or even whether it was
unfair. Our sole focus is on whether the employer’s stated rea-
son can be characterized as a falsehood rather than an hon-
estly held belief.” Id.
    Gnutek’s claim under § 1983, alleging a violation of the
First Amendment, similarly requires him to show that the
protected speech was a but-for cause of the employer’s action.
Milliman v. County of McHenry, 893 F.3d 422, 430 (7th Cir.
2018). The state law claim for public employees under the Eth-
ics Act, however, asks only whether a reasonable jury could
find that the protected activity was a “contributing factor” in
the adverse employment action. 5 ILCS 430/15-20 (West 2014);
Wynn v. Illinois Dept. of Human Services, 81 N.E.3d 28, 39 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2017). The employer can counter that show-
ing by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendants “would have taken the same unfavorable per-
sonnel action in the absence of that conduct.” Id. at 42.
   Gnutek points to his lengthy litigation history against the
Board and entities associated with it, including a 2006 lawsuit
under Title VII alleging gender discrimination and retaliation,
No. 22-1213                                                    7

a 2006 RICO lawsuit alleging improper influences in hiring
decisions at the Board, and a lawsuit alleging that a prior ter-
mination violated Title VII and the First Amendment. Gnutek
asserted in his complaint that he was terminated by the de-
fendants in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment
rights in pursuing the prior litigation. Other than pointing out
that he had previously engaged in the protected conduct of
litigation, however, Gnutek provides no link between the ter-
mination decision and his protected conduct. And in his reply
brief, Gnutek specifically disavows reliance on the timing as
evidence of retaliation, stating that he “has never argued that
there was suspicious timing.” Instead, Gnutek argues that
summary judgment was improper because a jury could
properly conclude that the justification for his termination
was not truthful.
    The Board argued that its termination decision was based
on his off duty conduct of May 31, 2014, which violated the
dual grounds of a criminal conviction and of conduct unbe-
coming an employee. Gnutek argued that the question is not
whether the battery incident provided cause for his termina-
tion, but whether that was the actual reason for his termina-
tion. He provides insufficient evidence, however, to allow a
jury to conclude that his termination was based on another
reason – and no evidence at all that the other reason was re-
taliation.
    As stated, he points to the history of his litigation against
the Gaming Board but disavows any argument that suspi-
cious timing is a sufficient basis to show the termination was
retaliatory. He instead argues that there was sufficient evi-
dence for a jury to conclude that Gnutek’s termination was
retaliatory because the defendants falsely pursued a narrative
8                                                 No. 22-1213

that Gnutek had been convicted of a crime, when they knew
the finding of guilt would be vacated. Gnutek argues that he
had made it clear to the Board that he was not ultimately go-
ing to be convicted of a crime and that despite that knowledge
of the procedural posture of the case, the Board led CMS to
the conclusion that there had been a conviction.
    As the district court properly found, the email to CMS did
not mischaracterize the status of the case. First, the Board
properly conveyed to CMS that there had been a finding of
guilt, but that there would be no final disposition until the
sentencing in March. Although Gnutek argues that the Board
knew that there was a good chance that Gnutek would never
be sentenced and that there would never be a conviction, the
only information before the Board at the time was that the
court had expressed a willingness to entertain a motion to va-
cate if certain conditions were met. Gnutek does not discuss
when those conditions were met and whether the Board was
kept informed, nor does Gnutek argue that the court had or-
dered the vacatur of the conviction which order it stayed
pending the completion of those conditions. Gnutek alleges
only that the court expressed a willingness to entertain a mo-
tion for vacatur upon fulfillment of the conditions. Therefore,
the Board’s communication did not misstate the status of the
pending criminal case to CMS. Moreover, the Rules of Con-
duct in the Employee Handbook (the “Handbook”) make
clear that the concept of a “conviction” for purposes of em-
ployee discipline is not the same as the determination of a fi-
nal judgment of conviction under Illinois law. In explaining
the requirement to report convictions to the Deputy Admin-
istrator, the Handbook defines “conviction” to include “all
misdemeanors and felonies committed as an adult for which
you plead guilty, are found guilty, are convicted, or agreed to
No. 22-1213                                                  9

an alternative sentencing program or pretrial diversion pro-
gram which required an admission, stipulation or finding of
guilt, including court supervision and/or probation.” The def-
inition of a conviction in the reporting requirement therefore
is more expansive than including only misdemeanors and fel-
onies for which one is convicted. Instead, it incorporates any
such charges for which there is a finding of guilt, including
offenses subject to an alternative sentencing program or pre-
trial diversion program. In light of that broad definition, the
finding of guilt by the court could constitute a conviction for
disciplinary purposes even if the court allowed the alternative
of vacatur upon the satisfaction of anger management coun-
seling and payment of a fine. In light of the broad definition
of “conviction,” the Board’s submission of that finding of
guilt to support discipline for a “conviction” cannot be con-
sidered such a mischaracterization of the facts as to support
an inference that the charge was a pretext to retaliate for the
prior litigation.
    Second, the disciplinary charge included “conduct unbe-
coming an employee,” and Gnutek makes no argument at all
that the conduct unbecoming charge would depend upon
whether a conviction was sought or a final judgment of con-
viction obtained. The undisputed evidence is that the judge
made a finding of guilt as to the battery charge, and the court
then gave Gnutek 90 days to attend counseling and pay the
victim’s medical bills, after which time the court vacated the
conviction. That opportunity to vacate the conviction does not
negate the finding by the court that Gnutek was incredible in
his testimony of the events of that day and that he was guilty
of the offense conduct, and it is that conduct that formed the
basis of the termination. Gnutek does not dispute that the de-
fendants saw the police report and the transcript of the bench
10                                                    No. 22-1213

trial prior to terminating him, and thus that the defendants
were aware of the nature of the charges and the credibility
findings. And as the district court noted, in the summary
judgment proceedings, Gnutek did not contest that he was in-
volved in a violent altercation with a member of the public,
resulting in an injury to the other driver, and that he was ar-
rested and charged with battery. Furthermore, the district
court noted that Gnutek failed to support, with any citation to
the record, his claim that he had a different version of events
and presented no additional facts contesting the court’s find-
ing of guilt. Gnutek never disputes that the conduct of bat-
tery, by a person in a law enforcement position, would fall
within the definition of conduct unbecoming an employee,
nor does he argue that the defendants did not believe that the
conduct fell within that definition. Because the charge of con-
duct unbecoming an employee does not depend on the status
of his conviction at all, his failure to contest that basis for the
termination alone supports the grant of summary judgment.
    Similarly, Gnutek’s claim that he was improperly placed
on administrative leave rather than suspension pending judi-
cial determination fails to address the charge of conduct un-
becoming an employee. He argues that suspension pending
judicial determination is the proper leave status in a case in
which criminal charges are pending, and that such a leave sta-
tus provides an automatic right of reinstatement if the crimi-
nal matter concludes without a conviction. Gnutek argues,
without much explanation, that a jury could conclude that the
deviation from the proper leave status was intended as a
means of harming Gnutek’s prospects of returning to work
and could infer a retaliatory intent in his termination as a re-
sult. That argument addresses the conviction charge, but not
the conduct unbecoming an employee charge, which does not
No. 22-1213                                                        11

include as an element any pending criminal charge. In fact,
Gnutek does not address whether administrative leave is
proper rather than suspension pending judicial determina-
tion where one of the charges does not depend upon any ju-
dicial proceeding. Accordingly, it provides an insufficient ba-
sis for a jury to infer pretext.
    Gnutek also briefly argues that two other persons who
committed misconduct relevant to their positions were
treated less harshly. The district court refused to consider
those alleged comparators because the argument was sup-
ported with factual assertions that did not appear in the Local
Rule 56.1 statements. If challenged, such a determination of a
Rule 56.1 violation would be reviewed only for an abuse of
discretion. Igasaki v. Ill. Dept. of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948,
957 (7th Cir. 2021). But Gnutek does not even address that
holding in his brief, and similarly did not respond to the ar-
gument in the defendant’s brief on appeal pointing out his
failure to challenge it and arguing that he therefore forfeited
any argument that the ruling was wrong. Because he failed to
challenge the district court’s holding, the comparators are not
before this court on appeal. Hackett v. City of South Bend, 956
F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 2020).
    Other than the bare fact that he had engaged in prior liti-
gation against the defendants, Gnutek has presented no evi-
dence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the ter-
mination in this case was retaliatory. Gnutek has failed to pre-
sent evidence sufficient to allow a jury to find that his pro-
tected conduct was either a necessary or even a contributing
factor in his termination. Therefore, the district court properly
granted summary judgment for the defendants.
   The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.