Court Opinion

ID: 9674553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:30:28.855773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:28.112446
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellee complains in his Motion for Rehearing that this Court erred in reversing the trial court’s summary judgment because our reversal was based upon a fact issue found in appellant’s affidavit which was not timely filed. The judgment in the case reflects that appellee’s motion for summary judgment was heard on November 24, 1986. Appellant filed her response to the motion and her second amended petition on November 18, 1986. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166-A provides, in part:
Except on leave of court, with notice to the opposing counsel, the motion and any supporting affidavits shall be filed and served at least twenty-one days before the time specified for hearing. Except on leave of court, the adverse party, not later than seven days prior to the day of the hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response, [emphasis added]
It is clear from the record that the response was not filed timely. The record does not reflect that leave of court to file a late response was requested or granted.
The question before us is how we are to consider the late filed affidavit which was on file in the case when we reviewed the record. The defect was not raised by the appellee in his brief.
In a regular case, tried on its merits, it is our duty to sustain the trial court’s judgment if it is correct on any theory of law. Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co. of Dallas, 516 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tex.1974); Texas Real Estate Commission v. Howard, 538 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Tex.Civ.App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). However, the presumptions and burden of proof for an ordinary trial are immaterial and are not relevant to the burden that a movant for summary judgment must bear. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. City of Dallas, 623 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex.1981). The burden of demonstrating lack of a genuine issue of material fact is upon the movant, and all doubts are resolved against the movant in our review. Roskey v. Texas Health Facilities Commission, 639 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.1982); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979).
Rule 166-A specifically makes it the non-movant’s burden to obtain leave of court to file a late response. The rule also provides that the judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits, if any, on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue of material fact. A trial court is charged with the duty of only considering the record as it properly appears before it when the motion for summary judgment is heard. Metze v. Entman, 584 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ). An untimely response has been considered in at least one case as the same as no response at all. Wynn v. Kensington Mortgage and Finance Corp., 697 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex.App.—Austin 1985, no writ).
The rule clearly places the burden on the party seeking the late filing to obtain leave *510of court. There is no indication that leave to file was granted. We therefore presume, (since there was no mention of the affidavit in the judgment), that the trial court did not consider appellant’s affidavit in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment. It would be improper of us to resolve this procedural issue in favor of appellant, given the clear mandate of Rule 166-A. This is in accordance with the rule and a plethora of case law which establish that we must resolve all doubts against the movant. We interpret Rule 166-A to mean that the trial court need only consider the evidence which was properly before it at the time the motion for summary judgment is heard. Likewise, it is proper for us to review only the evidence which was properly before the trial.court at the time of hearing. We now hold that appellant’s affidavit should not have been considered as summary judgment evidence.
However, it is still appellee’s burden to show his entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. Appellee moved for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations in Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp.1987). His summary judgment evidence supports the following timetable:
Breast Reconstruction Surgery 9-14-81
Date of last treatment 1-25-82
Statute Ran (at latest) 1-24-84
Notice of Claim 5-21-85
Suit filed [first amended petition] 9-06-85
Article 4590i, § 10.01, provides, in part, “notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim ...is completed ...”.
To support appellee’s motion for summary judgment, he attached portions of appellant’s deposition. In it, appellant stated that appellee doctor told her her nipple would grow back “within about six months.” At one point in her deposition, appellant said she tried calling within about six weeks after that date because her condition was worse, but she was told he was no longer in the office. Later in her deposition, she testified that on numerous occasions since the implant surgery she tried to get in contact with Dr. Conlee and eventually she was told he was no longer available. She said within a few months after that she decided something needed to be done. This testimony was in response to a question inquiring why she waited until June 1985 to reach a decision to sue Dr. Conlee. We find that this testimony, although it may conflict with another portion of her deposition, is sufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether appellant was aware of facts, conditions, or circumstances which would cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire about the true nature of her condition.
Appellee has established as a matter of law that the suit was barred by limitations, which was his burden under law. See Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex.1983). In response, it was appellant’s burden to support the allegations by which she sought to avoid the defense of limitations. Nichols v. Smith, 507 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 518). The non-movant plaintiff, relying on a fraudulent concealment theory to avoid a summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense, has the burden of coming forward with proof raising a fact issue on its theory. This she did. The aforementioned evidence is sufficient to raise a fact issue.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.