Court Opinion

ID: 9956494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 14:09:23.711866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:33.990332
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2933-21

DAVID F. LIPTON,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TOWNSHIP COUNCIL OF
BERKELEY TOWNSHIP and
BERKELEY TOWNSHIP,

          Defendants-Respondents,

and

BERKELEY REDEVELOPERS,
LLC,

          Defendant/Intervenor-
          Respondent.

                   Argued January 24, 2024 – Decided April 2, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier and Susswein.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2614-21.
            Jeffrey Jay Brookner argued the cause for appellant
            (Brookner Law Offices, LLC, attorneys; Jeffrey Jay
            Brookner, of counsel and on the brief).

            John J. Novak argued the cause for respondents
            Township Council of Berkeley Township and Berkeley
            Township (The Law Offices of John J. Novak, PC,
            attorneys; John J. Novak, on the brief).

            Irina B. Elgart argued the cause for respondent
            Berkeley Redevelopers, LLC (The Weingarten Law
            Firm, LLC, attorneys; Douglas K. Wolfson and Irina B.
            Elgart, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      In this matter arising out of defendant Township Council of Berkeley

Township's (Council) adoption of an ordinance to amend a redevelopment plan,

plaintiff appeals from the February 18, 2022 order dismissing his complaint in

lieu of prerogative writs. We affirm.

                                        I.

      In 2003, after several public hearings, the Council adopted a resolution

delineating an area along the Route 9 corridor as one in need of redevelopment

(Route 9 property). The area, comprised of approximately 425 acres, was

described by the court as "a site of [environmental] contamination due to the

operation of a" previous asphalt plant. It also contained an abandoned shopping

center and was "in a general state of deterioration."

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      In 2009, the Township adopted a redevelopment plan for the site (2009

plan). Although a developer was designated to undertake the redevelopment,

the remediation and development did not take place.

      In 2015, the Township signed a redeveloper agreement with intervenor

Berkeley Redevelopers, LLC. That same year, in the aftermath of the extensive

damage caused by Hurricane Sandy, the Township ordered a reexamination of

its Master Plan. A Master Plan Reexamination report (2015 report) was adopted

by the Township in 2015. Because it was in response to the devastation caused

by Hurricane Sandy, the 2015 report only "recommended minor changes in order

to fine tune and synthesize existing planning concepts and goals."

      In 2019, the Township reexamined its 2015 report and adopted a new

Master Plan Reexamination report (2019 report). The 2019 report recommended

the consideration of alternate development patterns and revisions to the zoning

requirements of the redevelopment plan regarding the Route 9 property.

      In response to the 2019 report, the Township presented an ordinance to

amend the 2009 redevelopment plan. On June 28, 2021, during a public hearing,

the ordinance was read by title as copies had been made available to the public

upon request. The ordinance had been posted on the bulletin board in the Town

Hall and published in the newspaper as required under N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1(a).

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Although members of the public were invited to speak for or against the adoption

of the proposed ordinance, no one did. The Council voted to approve the

ordinance.

      In August 2021, the Township reintroduced the amendment of the

redevelopment plan under a new ordinance after plaintiff complained about a

lack of notice and an insufficient opportunity to object. The new ordinance

repealed and replaced the prior ordinance adopted in June.         It also added

additional design standards for the property.     The appropriate notices were

published twice in the newspaper. Plaintiff testified during the public hearing. 1

On August 23, 2021, the Council adopted the ordinance approving the amended

redevelopment plan.

                                       II.

      Plaintiff filed a nine-count complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the

Law Division. He subsequently filed an amended complaint. Plaintiff generally

alleged the Council did not follow procedural and substantive requirements

under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -89,

1
   During oral argument before the trial court on February 4, 2022, plaintiff
referenced the use of transcripts in the preparation of his complaint. Plaintiff
also refers to transcripts in his complaint. However, plaintiff did not provide
the transcripts of the public hearings on the ordinances to either the trial court
or this court.
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as well as other land-use statutes, regulations, and ordinances in its adoption of

the amended redevelopment plan. The court permitted Berkeley Redevelopers

to intervene in the action.

      Defendants and Berkeley Redevelopers filed motions to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 4:6-2(e). After hearing oral

argument, the court granted the motions in an oral decision and accompanying

orders on February 18, 2022.

      In the first count, plaintiff asserted the ordinance was invalid because it

was vague, and the notices were insufficient to satisfy his due process rights.

After reviewing the notices, the court found they were "adequate," "provided

notice that the [o]rdinance was introduced and passed on first reading in a

regular meeting of the . . . Council," "that [the ordinance] would be considered

on second reading and final passage on August 23, 2021," and the notices

advised the public the ordinance "would repeal and replace" the prior ordinance.

The court further noted the notice was published in a newspaper in general

circulation in the area and was placed on the Township website and its bulletin

board. Therefore, the court concluded the notice complied with the Municipal

Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163, and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 and -2.1(a)

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notice requirements. As plaintiff had not stated a claim, the court dismissed

count one.

      In count two, plaintiff contended the ordinance was illegal spot zoning

because it "was drafted for the purpose of appeasing . . . one potential tenant"

who could ultimately build a warehouse on the property. In dismissing count

two, the court noted the ordinance as a whole was enacted to "advance the

general welfare and include[d] a comprehensive plan." The court cited to Gallo

v. Mayor of Lawrence Township, 328 N.J. Super. 117, 127 (App. Div. 2000),

and found that even if an ordinance was proposed by a person or entity that

might ultimately benefit from it, that is not impermissible spot zoning. The

court dismissed count two.

      Under count three of the complaint, plaintiff alleged the Council

improperly exercised its discretion to amend the redevelopment plan because

the 2015 plan was missing certain language from the 2009 redevelopment plan.

Specifically, the 2015 plan did not include the provision that stated, "any

amendment to the redevelopment plan that materially affected the terms and

conditions of the redevelopment agreement between Berkeley Redevelopers and

the Township [was] . . . contingent upon [the] amendment of the redeveloper

agreement."

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      The court noted a municipal governing body is accorded wide discretion

regarding amendments made to original plans. In addition, the language was in

place to protect the redeveloper, and Berkeley Redevelopers could waive the

provision if it chose to do so. The court dismissed count three as it did not set

forth a cognizable cause of action.

      In count four, plaintiff alleged the ordinance was contrary to the goals of

the 2009 redevelopment plan and the 2015 redevelopment agreement. The court

found the allegations were related to site plan development issues and did not

address any deficiency in the ordinance or the redevelopment plan. Count four

was dismissed.

      Plaintiff contended in count five that the ordinance amounted to "contract

zoning" and there may have been negotiations that occurred outside of the open

meetings. In dismissing the count, the court stated, "[T]he law recognizes that

so long as the [Council] proceeds in the best interest of the public, . . . the fact

that they may be making modifications or amendments to accommodate a

potential beneficiary of that is not in and of itself improper contract zoning."

      In counts six, seven, and eight, plaintiff alleged violations of the Open

Public Meetings Act (OPMA), N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21. He contended the Council

refused to answer the public's questions regarding traffic and congestion, it

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failed to act fairly and objectively, and the Council did not discuss or read the

law he proffered. In dismissing the counts, the court stated, "[I]t's clear that at

every step of the way the public had an opportunity, including . . . plaintiff, to

participate in those hearings," and the Council had discretion as to how it

conducted the hearings. The court found that plaintiff had an opportunity to

testify and express his views in opposition to the amendment. Therefore, his

due process rights were not violated. Furthermore, some of the issues raised by

plaintiff in these counts appeared to be issues that would be considered by a

planning board with regard to a specific application.

      In count nine, plaintiff contended Berkeley Redevelopers had "to obtain a

use variance in connection with this process." The court dismissed the count,

finding the issue of whether a variance was required for a specific application

would be determined by the appropriate land use body such as the planning

board or board of adjustment.

      A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.           Plaintiff only

appeals from the February 18, 2022 order in the Notice of Appeal. He did not

raise any issues regarding the reconsideration motion in his appellate brief.

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                                       III.

      On appeal, plaintiff contends the court erred in dismissing his complaint

and, if the pleadings were insufficient, the complaint should have been

dismissed without prejudice.

      Our review of a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted is de novo. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son,

LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin,

Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)). In considering

the motion, "[a] reviewing court must examine '"the legal sufficiency of the facts

alleged on the face of the complaint,"' giving the plaintiff the benefit of '"every

reasonable inference of fact."'" Ibid. (quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at

107). The test for determining the adequacy of a pleading is "whether a cause

of action is 'suggested' by the facts." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs.

Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,

109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)).

      A motion to dismiss "should only be granted in 'the rarest of instances.'"

Kieffer v. High Point Ins. Co., 422 N.J. Super. 38, 43 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting

Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 772). However,

            a dismissal with prejudice is "mandated where the
            factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support

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            a claim upon which relief can be granted," Rieder v.
            State, Dep't of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App.
            Div. 1987), or if "discovery will not give rise to such a
            claim," Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107.

            [Mac Prop. Grp. LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
            473 N.J. Super. 1, 17 (App. Div. 2022) (citations
            reformatted), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 258 and 252 N.J.
            261 (2022).]

      In applying these principles to the trial court's determination of

defendants' Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, we are satisfied the court carefully searched

the complaint and correctly determined the allegations in each count did not

support a cause of action. The court discussed each count in turn and its reasons

for dismissal. In addition, considering the nature of the allegations, the court's

decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice was appropriate as any

amendment would be futile. See id. at 34.

      We affirm substantially for the reason expressed by the court in its

February 18, 2022 oral decision. We add only the following comments.

      As to count one, plaintiff's allegations regarding the lack of notice lacked

any merit. The notice was compliant with N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1(a).

      Under count two, the court correctly noted that under Gallo, "[a]n

ordinance enacted to advance the general welfare by means of a comprehensive

plan is unobjectionable even if the ordinance was initially proposed by private

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parties and these parties are in fact its ultimate beneficiaries." 328 N.J. Super.

at 127 (alteration in original) (quoting Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Twp., Inc.,

v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 18 (1976)).

         The redevelopment of this property, described as contaminated,

deteriorating, and in need of comprehensive remediation, will clearly benefit the

Township and its residents. Therefore, plaintiff has not established a cause of

action of impermissible spot zoning.

         The allegations in count three, that the Council improperly exercised its

discretion in passing an ordinance amending the redevelopment plan, lack all

merit.     "[A] municipality's adoption of . . . a redevelopment plan[] is a

discretionary decision . . . ." Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass'n v. City

Council of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 332 (App. Div. 2010). "A court

will uphold such an exercise of discretion unless 'arbitrary or capricious,

contrary to law, or unconstitutional.'" Ibid. (quoting Downtown Residents for

Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken, 242 N.J. Super. 329, 332 (App. Div. 1990)).

         Plaintiff presented no facts to support a claim that the action was arbitrary,

capricious, or illegal. To the contrary, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-9 does not require that

a redevelopment plan be amended to have similar provisions as the redeveloper's

agreement. Bryant v. City of Atlantic City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 618 (App. Div.

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1998). And Berkeley Redevelopers did not object to the discrepancy between

the amended redevelopment plan and the redevelopers agreement.

      Under count four, plaintiff again challenged the Township's discretionary

decision to adopt a redevelopment plan.        As stated, municipalities have

discretion to amend redevelopment plans. Powerhouse Arts, 413 N.J. Super. at

332. Modifications are not only common but also necessary due to the changing

needs of a municipality, the passage of time, different marketing conditions, and

even acts of nature, such as Hurricane Sandy in this case.

      In count five, plaintiff alleged the ordinance was contract zoning and

"there may have been negotiations which did not occur in an open meeting."

Contract zoning is an improper action

            by the governing body of the municipality, by contract
            with a property owner, to authorize the property owner
            to use [their] property in contravention of the zoning
            ordinance and without compliance with the statutorily
            established procedures for either obtaining a zoning
            variance or an amendment to the master plan and
            zoning ordinance.

            [Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use
            Administration, § 10-8.2(b), at 138 (2024).]

      Plaintiff cannot support this proposed cause of action as he presented no

evidence that when the Council adopted the ordinance, they were engaging in

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backroom negotiations in an attempt to circumvent the established procedural

safeguards.

      Plaintiff alleges OPMA violations under counts six, seven and eight. The

allegations are without merit. Under N.J.S.A. 10:4-7, "the right of the public to

be present at all meetings of public bodies, and to witness in full detail all phases

of the deliberation, policy formulation, and decision making of public bodies, is

vital to the enhancement and proper function of the democratic process."

However, "public bodies are given discretion in how to conduct their meetings."

Kean Fed'n of Tchrs. v. Morell, 233 N.J. 566, 571 (2018) (citing N.J.S.A. 10:4-

12(a)).

      N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(a) states:

              Nothing in this act shall be construed to limit the
              discretion of a public body to permit, prohibit, or
              regulate the active participation of the public at any
              meeting, except that a municipal governing body . . .
              shall be required to set aside a portion of every meeting
              of the municipal governing body . . . , the length of the
              portion to be determined by the municipal governing
              body . . . , for public comment on any governmental
              . . . issue that a member of the public feels may be of
              concern to the residents of the municipality . . . .

      There were several public meetings on the ordinance, which plaintiff

attended and voiced his concerns. The Township's Planning Board and the

Council had discretion on how long a resident could speak. The Council also

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has the discretion to determine what arguments and evidence it deems relevant.

Asserting the Council had a difference of opinion regarding plaintiff's claims

and concerns is not sufficient to establish a cause of action under OPMA. As

the trial court found, the Council had the discretion to run the meeting in the

manner it saw fit.

      The court correctly dismissed plaintiff's contention in count nine that

Berkeley Redevelopers was required to obtain a use variance in connection with

this process. It is well established that New Jersey has a strong preference for

municipal land use redevelopment by comprehensive planning, effectuated

through ordinances, rather than by use variance. Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J.

263, 284 (2013).

      Affirmed.

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