Court Opinion

ID: 9853494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:49:35.153591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:50.093967
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice.
This action was brought by a two year old child through his Guardian ad Litem to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been proximately caused by the negligent and reckless operation of a motor vehicle.
The defendants, who are the owner and operator of the motor vehicle, answered the complaint, setting forth in form four separate numbered defenses: 1. a general denial; 2. sudden emergency; 3. unavoidable accident; and 4. sole negligence, recklessneses and willfulness on the part of the parents of the plaintiff and/or of those persons in charge of him, in several particulars set out in the answer. There is no contention that contributory negligence on the part of the child or on the part of the parents is a defense, and contributory negligence is not alleged against either the child or his parents.
The case was tried before a jury, which could not agree on a verdict, and a mistrial resulted. During the course of that trial, on motion of counsel for the plaintiff, the fourth defense of sole negligence, recklessness and willfulness on *432the part of the parents and/or custodian was stricken from the answer. From this ruling the defendants appeal.
The only issue for the determination of this court is set forth in defendants’ brief as follows: “Was the trial court in error in striking from the defendants’ answer the entire fourth defense?”
A motion to strike is addressed to the discertion of the trial judge. J. M. S., Inc. v. Theo, 241 S. C. 394, 128 S. E. (2d) 697 (1962); Ellen v. King, 227 S. C. 481, 88 S. E. (2d) 598 (1955).
“Evidentiary matter need not, and should not, be pleaded.” Johnson v. Abney Mills, 219 S. C. 231, 64 S. E. (2d) 641 (1951).
Circuit Court Rule No. 18 states in part that “(i)n all cases of more than one * * * defense * * *, each shall be separately stated and numbered * *
The issue of sole negligence, recklessness and willfulness was separately stated and numbered so as to make it erroneously appear that it was a separate defense. We hold that the trial judge had the discretion, if not the duty, to grant the motion to strike. See Section 10-606 of the Code. In so ruling it should be distinctly understood that we are not holding that evidence of the conduct of the parents and/or the custodian of the child is inadmissible. The plaintiff, by bringing the action against the defendants, has assumed the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that wrongful conduct of the defendants was the proximate cause of his injuries. The defendants are entitled under their general denial to introduce in evidence that which tends to controvert what the plaintiff must prove to establish a cause of action. The allegations of the fourth defense were an unnecessary statement of that which the defendants were entitled to prove under the general denial.
In Long v. Mild, 347 Mo. 1002, 149 S. W. (2d) 853 (1941), the court held that the sole cause issue could be *433raised under a general denial. A defendant is entitled to submit evidence tending to prove that the conduct of some third party (parents here) was the sole cause of the injury, as it might tend to defeat plaintiff’s claim of actionable negligence and as it might exonerate defendants of all wrongdoing as a proximate cause of the alleged injury.
The question involved is treated in 71 C. J. S. Pleading § 529, p. 1093 (1951) :
“Evidence Admissible under General Denial — Any evidence which contradicts, or directly tends to contradict, facts which the adverse party is bound or permitted to establish to sustain his claim or defense is admissible under a general denial. Any fact which goes to destroy, not to avoid, plaintiff’s cause of action is provable under a general denial
The same question is treated in 41 Am. Jur. 541, Pleading § 366 (1942):
“Of General Denial — A general denial puts in issue every material allegation of the complaint, except those admitted. It goes to the root of the cause of action and permits the introduction of any proper evidence tending to controvert the facts which the plaintiff must establish to sustain his case.”
The contention that the injuries of the minor plaintiff were the proximate result of the sole negligence and willfulness of a third party rather than that of the defendants, is thus not properly treated as a separate defense to the cause of action. It is, however, evidence admissible under the general denial to controvert facts that the plaintiff must prove to establish a cause of action.
Affirmed.
Moss, C. J., and Lewis and Brailsford, JJ., concur.
Bussey, J., dissents.