Court Opinion

ID: 9548927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:10:47.176112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:38.121373
License: Public Domain

Petrie, J.
(dissenting) — I am compelled to dissent from the opinion of the majority. I viewed an indisputably obscene film appraised under the Miller guidelines (Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973)) or under the Memoirs guidelines (Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1, 86 S. Ct. 975 (1966)).
I do agree with my associates that in terms of running time approximately one-half of the film contains material which would be considered constitutionally protected; the *65other one-half of the running time is clearly a presentation of “feast-your-eyes-on-this” type of hard core pornography, in color, with maximum exposure in detail to genitalia accompanied by titillating music augmenting the actors’ gyrations, trundling, moaning, groaning and sighing. I have no hesitancy in asserting that the constitutionally protected segments of the film, interspersed somewhat haphazardly throughout its length, constitute a mere facade to mask its true purpose — the presentation of hard core pornographic “entertainment.” The viewer, for example, is advised of the food value contained in the average male sperm. Presumably, this enhances the viewer’s scientific knowledge. Then several scenes follow demonstrating in nauseating detail how the viewer may ingest these nutritional elements into his system.
Now let us turn to the “redeeming social value” of this film. The film was intended to be shown as a unit. Hence, its social value, if any, must be measured in terms of its whole content — not its separate parts. Far from having any redemptive social worth, I found the film as a whole to be despicably degrading and not worthy of any social importance.
However, prescinding entirely from my view that the film is obscene under both Miller and Memoirs, the jury in the case at bench was instructed consistently with Memoirs formulation of obscenity. The jury found Mr. Mushkin guilty of the crime charged. Our task on review is to ascertain simply whether or not the jury could constitutionally find the film obscene under the Memoirs test — if that test is applied; Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590, 94 S. Ct. 2887 (1974); and under the Miller test — if that test is to be applied; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 41 L. Ed. 2d 642, 94 S. Ct. 2750 (1974).
The test, therefore, is not strictly whether or not we find the film obscene, but whether or not, in our view, the jury can reasonably so find it. Obviously, also, just because the jury does find it obscene is not sufficient indication that it is constitutionally obscene. Jenkins v. Georgia, supra. The *66test to be applied is whether or not we find the evidence arguably establishes the constitutional fact of obscenity under the appropriate guidelines. Clearly, I would so find.
Furthermore, I find no merit to Mr. Mushkin’s other assignments of error. Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction.