Court Opinion

ID: 9901599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 06:05:54.952804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:35.657889
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     November 21, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 365294
                                                                     Ingham Circuit Court
CHAD MICHAEL VANEPPS,                                                LC No. 21-000255-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: HOOD, P.J., and JANSEN and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Following a plea of guilty to one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-
II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) and (2)(b) (sexual contact with victim less than 13 years of age; defendant
17 years of age or older), defendant was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL
769.11, to serve 365 days in jail, followed by 60 months of probation. After defendant violated
the terms of his probation, the trial court revoked defendant’s probation and resentenced defendant
to serve 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment, a 12-year upward departure from the applicable guidelines
range. Defendant appeals his sentence by leave granted.1 We conclude that the trial court failed
to articulate why the sentencing guidelines did not adequately account for the penetration that
occurred, the victim’s psychological injuries, and defendant’s exploitation of the victim’s mental
disabilities, and we remand for the trial court to either resentence defendant or further articulate
its reasoning for imposing the departure sentence.

                   I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The victim in this case was defendant’s former girlfriend’s 11-year-old daughter, who is
mentally challenged and has learning disabilities. From 2018 to 2019, the victim lived with

1
 People v VanEpps, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 18, 2023 (Docket
No. 365294).

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defendant and her mother. After the victim’s mother passed away, the victim went to live with her
father.

        In November 2020, the victim disclosed to family members that defendant had sexually
abused her by penile-vaginal penetration on several occasions. A forensic interview was
completed, and the victim reported that defendant raped her several times when she was sleeping.
In the first incident, the victim woke up, on her back, with a sharp pain in her stomach from
“defendant putting his ‘thingy inside’ her.” The victim noted that her mother found defendant in
her bedroom the next morning, and defendant stated that he was giving the victim “a tickle-itch.”
The victim reported that defendant would come into her room and “put his thingy in her a lot.”
The victim clarified that “thingy” was a reference to a boy’s private part, and that “inside me”
meant “inside my stomach.” When defendant was initially interviewed, he denied engaging in
sexual activity with the victim. However, during a later polygraph examination, defendant
admitted that he touched the victim’s bare vagina twice, in her bedroom.

         Defendant was originally charged with two counts of CSC-II as a third-offense habitual
offender. In exchange for defendant pleading guilty to one count of CSC-II and to the third-offense
habitual offender enhancement, the prosecutor dismissed one count of CSC-II and agreed to a
minimum guidelines range of 12 to 36 months with a “county-jail cap.” At the sentencing hearing,
the trial court sentenced defendant to 365 days in jail, followed by 60 months of probation. The
court explained the conditions of defendant’s probation and explained to defendant that he “must
not have verbal, written, electronic, or physical contact with any individual age 17 or under or
attempt to do so either directly or through another person.”

       Defendant violated his probation by having contact with two minor children, by being in
the company of someone who had a felony record, and by having video contact with a minor child
while in jail. Defendant entered a guilty plea to the probation violations concerning contact with
minor children, and the additional probation violation charge was dismissed. The trial court
revoked defendant’s probation, departed from the recommended guidelines range of 12 to 36
months, and sentenced defendant to serve 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the CSC-II conviction.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

        Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by departing from the advisory
guidelines range of 12 to 36 months and imposing a minimum term of 15 years’ imprisonment on
the basis of factors that were given adequate weight by the guidelines. We conclude that the trial
court did not sufficiently justify its sentencing decision and, therefore, we remand for the trial court
to either resentence defendant or further articulate its justification for the sentence imposed.

        We review a sentence that departs from the applicable sentencing guidelines range for
reasonableness. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). “[T]he standard
of review to be applied by appellate courts reviewing a sentence for reasonableness on appeal is
abuse of discretion.” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017) (Steanhouse
II). “A trial court abuses its sentencing discretion when the sentence imposed by the trial court is
disproportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances involving the offense and the offender.”
People v Dixon-Bey, 340 Mich App 292, 296; 985 NW2d 904 (2022) (Dixon-Bey II). Additionally,
“[t]he existence of a departure factor is a factual question reviewed for clear error on appeal.” Id.

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Clear error is present when this Court “is left with a definite and firm conviction that an error
occurred.” People v McChester, 310 Mich App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).

        When a trial court imposes a departure sentence, it must “justify the sentence imposed in
order to facilitate appellate review,” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392, and explain “why the sentence
imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence would have
been,” People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017) (Dixon-Bey I)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In reviewing a departure sentence, this Court “must
evaluate whether reasons exist to depart from the sentencing guidelines and whether the extent of
the departure can satisfy the principle of proportionality.” People v Steanhouse (On Remand), 322
Mich App 233, 239; 911 NW2d 253 (2017) (Steanhouse I) (emphasis omitted), vacated in part on
other grounds 504 Mich 969 (2019).

        In this case, the trial court identified several appropriate factors for the departure sentence.
The trial court referred to defendant’s criminal history for CSC offenses, and the court opined that
defendant did not take advantage of or benefit from previous programming. The court concluded
that it would not be protecting society if it let defendant out. A defendant’s extensive criminal
history and likelihood to reoffend are appropriate considerations supporting a departure sentence.
See People v Odom, 327 Mich App 297, 318; 933 NW2d 719 (2019). Furthermore, “a trial court
has been given broad discretion, within limits fixed by law, to tailor a sentence to the circumstances
of each case and each offender, in an effort to balance society’s need for protection against its
interest in rehabilitation of the offender.” People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App
656, 661; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).

        Next, the trial court considered defendant’s probation violations, and the court determined
that defendant needed more punishment and more help. Our Supreme Court has determined that
“a defendant’s conduct while on probation” may constitute an appropriate justification for
departing from the applicable guidelines range. People v Hendrick, 472 Mich 555, 565; 697 NW2d
511 (2005). The trial court also properly considered the need to deter others who want to take
advantage of little girls. See People v Masroor, 313 Mich App 358, 392; 880 NW2d 812 (2015),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds by Steanhouse II, 500 Mich 453 (2017). See also
People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972) (“the deterrence of others from
committing like offenses” is a proper consideration in determining an appropriate sentence).

        However, the trial court also identified several additional factors that are contemplated by
the sentencing guidelines, but the court did not explain why the guidelines did not adequately
account for those factors, and, further, the court did not assess points for one of the relevant offense
variables. The trial court justified defendant’s departure sentence, in part, on the fact that
defendant penetrated the victim several times but was not charged with CSC-I. OV 11 addresses
“criminal sexual penetration.” MCL 777.41(1). A trial court is required to assess 25 points for
OV 11 if “[o]ne criminal sexual penetration occurred,” MCL 777.41(1)(b), while 50 points are
assessed if “[t]wo or more criminal sexual penetrations occurred,” MCL 777.41(1)(a). “Even
though the guidelines ranges are now advisory, the scoring of the guidelines themselves is
mandatory, and the OVs must be assigned the highest number of points applicable.” People v
Geddert, 500 Mich 859, 859; 884 NW2d 575 (2016). The trial court did not score points for OV
11, as it was required to do if applicable, but instead imposed a departure sentence on the basis

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that defendant had sexually abused the victim by penile-vaginal penetration on several occasions.
In addition, the justification provided by the court does not explain why OV 11 would not
adequately account for the criminal sexual penetration, or penetrations, that occurred.

         Furthermore, the trial court did not address why OV 4 and OV 10 did not account for the
victim’s psychological injury and defendant’s exploitation of the victim’s mental disabilities. In
this case, 10 points were assessed for OV 4, “psychological injury to a victim,” MCL 777.34(1),
and 10 points were assessed for OV 10, “exploitation of a vulnerable victim,” MCL 777.40(1).
Ten points are assessed for OV 4 if “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional treatment
occurred to a victim.” MCL 777.34(1)(a). Ten points are assessed for OV 10 if “[t]he offender
exploited a victim’s physical disability, mental disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic
relationship, or the offender abused his or her authority status.” MCL 777.40(1)(b). The trial court
failed to explain why the victim’s psychological injury and defendant’s exploitation of the victim’s
mental disability were not adequately accounted for by defendant’s OV score.

        We conclude that remanding is necessary for the trial court either to resentence defendant
or to articulate appropriate reasons supporting imposition of a sentence that exceeded the top end
of the guidelines range by 12 years, and to address the proportionality of the extent of the particular
departure sentence imposed. Although defendant’s criminal history, his failure to comply with the
terms of his probation, the need to protect society from defendant’s likelihood to reoffend, and
deterrence of others from committing similar offenses constituted appropriate factors supporting a
departure sentence, the trial court failed to articulate why the sentencing guidelines did not
adequately account for the penetration that occurred, the victim’s psychological injuries, and
defendant’s exploitation of the victim’s mental disabilities. When a trial court’s reasons for
departing from the sentencing guidelines range are unclear, this Court “cannot substitute its own
judgment about why the departure was justified.” People v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 304; 754 NW2d
284 (2008). “Nor may [this Court] speculate about conceivable reasons for departure that the trial
court did not articulate or that cannot reasonably be inferred from what the trial court articulated.”
Id. at 318. Furthermore, our Supreme Court has directed that, when “[not all] reasons articulated
by the trial court for departing from the sentencing guidelines w[ere] valid, . . . it [is] unclear
whether it would have departed solely [on the basis of the valid reasons], and . . . its reasoning for
the extent of departure [is] difficult to ascertain,” this Court should remand “for the trial court to
either resentence or to further articulate its reasons for departure.” People v Steanhouse, 504 Mich
969, 969 (2019).

        Accordingly, we remand this case for the trial court to either resentence defendant or
further articulate its reasoning for the out-of-guidelines sentence imposed. We retain jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Noah P. Hood
                                                               /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                               /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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                              Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

                                                ORDER
                                                                               Noah P. Hood
 People of MI v Chad Michael Vanepps                                             Presiding Judge

 Docket No.     365294                                                         Kathleen Jansen

 LC No.         21-000255-FH                                                   Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                                                 Judges

               Pursuant to the opinion issued concurrently with this order, this case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court. We retain jurisdiction.

                 Proceedings on remand in this matter shall commence within 56 days of the Clerk’s
certification of this order, and they shall be given priority on remand until they are concluded. As stated
in the accompanying opinion, we remand this case for the trial court to either resentence defendant or
further articulate its reasoning for the out-of-guidelines sentence imposed. The proceedings on remand are
limited to this issue.

               The parties shall promptly file with this Court a copy of all papers filed on remand. Within
seven days after entry, appellant shall file with this Court copies of all orders entered on remand.

               The transcript of all proceedings on remand shall be prepared and filed within 21 days after
completion of the proceedings.

                                                             Presiding Judge

                                 November 21, 2023