Court Opinion

ID: 9553926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:37:31.244394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:36.386551
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Judge,
dissents:
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of my colleagues. Although I agree that because of the peculiar facts of this case, it is one of “First Impression” in Oklahoma, I find sufficient Oklahoma authority upon which to rest my opinion *124without resort to Texas law, which is sufficiently different from Oklahoma that I do not find it persuasive.
Unlike Texas, Oklahoma has a Statute, 16 O.S. 1981 § 19, which provides, in pertinent part:
A warranty deed made in substantial compliance with the provisions of this chapter, shall convey to the grantee, his heirs or assigns, the whole interest of the grantor in the premises described, * * *
This statute was construed in Beaton v. Pure Oil Co., 483 P.2d 1145 (Okl.1971), wherein it was said:
In Cutright v. Richey, 208 Okl. 413, 257 P.2d 286 (1953), a case involving a quiet title action to a mineral interest, we said a deed of general warranty purporting to convey to grantee the fee title of described lands without exception or qualification transfers to such grantee every existing right of the grantor pertaining to the premises described. We further stated a grantor is presumed to have made all the reservations he intended to make and is not permitted to derogate from his grant by showing that some reservation was intended but not expressed.
The opinion also noted that Appellants relied on Texas cases but, as Appellees pointed out, “Texas does not have a statute such as our 16 O.S. 1961 Section 19”.
No contention is made that the instrument in question is ambiguous and no evidence was offered to show the intention of the parties other than expressed in the writing itself. Where a written contract is complete in itself, and viewed in its entirety, is unambiguous, its language is the only legitimate evidence of what the parties intended. Every case must be approached for a concrete solution upon its individual facts. Meeks v. Harmon, 207 Okl. 459, 250 P.2d 203 (1952).
The issue before us, in its simplest terms, is: Under the language used by the grantors, by not mentioning bonus and delay rental payments, were they reserved or were they conveyed by fair implication?
In my opinion, the interest reserved by the grantors was a non-participating mineral interest. That it was a mineral interest rather than a royalty interest is indicated by the language “in and to the oil and natural gas in, to and under the above described lands.” Jolly v. Wilson, 478 P.2d 886 (Okl.1970). That it was a non-participating mineral interest is clearly indicated by the conveyance to the grantee of the “exclusive, sole and absolute rights to explore for, develop, produce, transport and market and/or lease for said purposes, all of the oil, gas and other minerals ...”
At this point, I must also take exception to the majority’s statement that the “language of the deed given by Appellants granted to Appellees’ successors only the right to execute mineral leases on the entire property; that deed did not specifically grant to Appellees’ successors (or to Appel-lees by the subsequent conveyance) any of the other ‘incidents of ownership.’ ”. The fact of the matter is that the clear and unambiguous language of the deed specifically granted all the incidents of ownership and reserved none unless we can find that the right to participate in bonus and delay rentals was withheld by silence!
In Carroll v. Bowen, 180 Okl. 215, 68 P.2d 773 (1937) we find the following:
The words ‘bonus,’ ‘rental,’ and ‘royalty’ are words of common use in this state in connection with oil and gas leases, conveyances, and reservations. Each has a definite meaning and will be construed in the ordinary and popular sense. Section 9468, O.S.1931 (15 Ok.St.Ann. § 160).
The word ‘bonus’ has a definite meaning in the oil and gas industry. It is defined in Bouvier’s Law Diet. (Rawles 3rd Rev.) as a ‘premium paid to a grantor or vendor’ and strictly is the cash consideration or down payment, paid or agreed to be paid, for the execution of an oil and gas lease. (Citations omitted).
The term ‘rental’ as used in oil and gas leases refers to the consideration paid to the lessor for the privilege of delaying drilling operations. (Citations omitted).
In Swearingen v. Oldham, 195 Okl. 532, 159 P.2d 247 (1945), the grantors reserved to themselves one-sixteenth (Vw) of all oil, *125gas or other minerals in and under this land but conveyed unto grantee full rights to lease this land for any purpose and to collect and retain all rentals and bonuses. The Supreme Court held in Swearingen that the reservation was one of a mineral interest even though the executive rights were specifically conveyed. However, the Court said the interest reserved was a ¾6 of the ⅛ royalty where oil is produced under a lease subsequently executed to a third party wherein the lessee was granted the customary 7/s of the oil. Thus, without using the term, the Court effectively held the interest to be a “non-participating” mineral interest.
As day follows night, the inverse is true that night precedes day. If the owners of a reserved interest would have to be parties to a lease, it follows that they are entitled to exact a share of the bonus and rentals. But on the other hand, where the owners of the interest need not be made parties to the lease they are not entitled to any consideration therefor except which has been expressly agreed upon. Carroll v. Bowen, supra. It has been held that conveying the right to bonus and rentals impliedly conveys the right to execute leases. Anderson v. Mayberry, 661 P.2d 535 (Okl.App.1983). It logically follows then that conveying the sole and exclusive right to lease also, by fair implication, conveys the right to bonus and rentals which are considerations for executing and extending the lease. Carroll v. Bowen, supra.
For these reasons I would affirm that part of the trial court’s judgment which finds the Appellee/Cross-Appellant entitled to all of the bonus money and reverse that part which finds the Appellant/Cross-Ap-pellee entitled to one-half of the delay rentals.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS.