Court Opinion

ID: 9466477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:17:15.985588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:45.773869
License: Public Domain

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the judgment because in my opinion the district court made no error of law or fact.
Neithér the district court nor the EEOC should be faulted for not excluding from their statistical studies the current white employees hired before the effective date of Title VII. The burden of producing this evidence was on the bank. In Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1867, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), the Court explained this aspect of the requisites of a prima facie case and its rebuttal as follows:
At the initial, “liability” stage of a pattern-or-practice suit the Government is not required to offer evidence that each person for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer’s discriminatory policy. Its burden is to establish a prima facie case that such a policy existed. The burden then shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a pattern or practice by demonstrating that the Government’s proof is either inaccurate or insignificant. An employer might „show, for example, that the claimed discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination .
Since the bank did not rely on evidence of pre-Act hiring in its statistical analysis, it appears to me inappropriate for an appel*157late court to make the initial factual findings on this issue for the purpose of disparaging the district court’s ruling that the government had established a prima facie case.
Also, the analysis of the evidence reveals that in 1974 the number of black employees hired in clerical and office positions varied by more than two standard deviations from the number anticipated if race had not been a factor. If one assumes that the underlying data are accurate and approximate a normal distribution, this variance indicates that there was statistically at least a 95 percent certainty that the causes of the variance were factors other than random selection. See Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 475 F.Supp. 958, 962 (E.D.Ark.1979); W. Reichmann, Use and Abuse of Statistics 208-26 (1971); J. Freund, Statistics 148-50 (1964). While not conclusive, this analysis supports rather than refutes the district court’s conclusion that a prima facie case had been proven. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 n.17, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977).
While statistical data are probative in Title VII cases, they must be viewed in the context of all the other evidence. In this case, the statistics were not dispositive; however, they revealed a significant disparity in the bank’s work force. A court is obliged to consider statistical proof in light of the other “surrounding facts and circumstances,” just as it would any other form of evidence. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). The district court was faithful to this precept. It surveyed the racial composition of the bank’s personnel and found that there were no black employees in 43 of 60 job classifications. It found, for example, that as late as 1975 no black person was employed as administrative assistant and administrative clerk (39 positions); senior clerk I and II (9 positions); secretary and executive secretary (8 positions); and security guard (25 positions). Only two black employees served in a managerial capacity out of 109 positions. In contrast, all 14 custodial positions were filled by black workers.
The district court’s findings of fact, together with the evidence of racial slurs in job applicants’ files, fully sustain the conclusion that the government proved a prima facie case. Turning again to Teamsters for instruction, I believe that the burden was on the bank “to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation for the apparently discriminatory result” disclosed by the government’s proof. 431 U.S. at 360, 361 and n.46, 97 S.Ct. at 1867. The suggestion that the EEOC must establish its prima facie case by producing evidence that qualified black persons were denied employment does not comport with Teamsters. Nor was the EEOC required to show the seniority of white incumbents. This, too, if positions actually were filled by seniority, would be a part of the bank’s rebuttal.
The district court went on to rule that the bank successfully rebutted the government’s prima facie case. It found no proof of discrimination against any specific employee, and it accepted as credible the bank’s explanation for the apparent discrimination in the pattern of its employment. It also found that the bank had pursued a vigorous affirmative action recruiting program. My study of the record persuades me that the district court’s factual findings, on which it based its conclusion, are npt clearly erroneous. For this reason I concur in affirming the district court’s judgment.