Court Opinion

ID: 9553483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:30:14.666378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:13.271561
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge (concurring in part; dissenting in .part). I concur in the decision affirming the order of the district court which dismissed the charge of criminal libel against Defendant and determined that New Mexico’s criminal libel statute, NMSA 1978, Section 30-11-1 (Repl.Pamp.1984), is unconstitutional on its face. I disagree, however, with the rationale relied upon by the majority to arrive at its decision and which bases its decision in part upon grounds not argued before the district court. I would limit our decision to the arguments presented to the district court and affirm the district court’s ruling based upon its determination that our criminal libel statute is unconstitutional as it relates to Defendant herein, and that it conflicts with the protections accorded under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The order of the district court striking down Section 30-11-1 found, among other things, that this state’s criminal libel statute “is unconstitutional on its face and * * * is unconstitutional as it applies to public officials or public figures and that the alleged crime charged herein involved a public figure * * The majority opinion does not address the grounds relied upon by the district court, and instead concludes “that the statute is unconstitutional insofar as it applies to a public statement involving a matter of public concern and that the alleged public libel in this ease involved a matter of public concern.” Id. at 396-97, 839 P.2d at 140-141. At the hearing in the district court on Defendant’s appeal de novo from the magistrate court, the text of the material alleged to constitute criminal libel was not introduced into evidence, no stipulations were offered, and no testimony was presented. At best, we can glean some concessions concerning the facts from the briefs filed herein. The allegations of the criminal complaint also provide some insight to the alleged factual issues. However, neither the briefs nor the record herein contain the full text of the alleged libelous publication nor provide sufficient evidence to permit a factual determination of the truth or falsity of the statement in question. Similarly, the record is insufficient to permit a determination of whether the alleged defamatory statement, if false, was published with “actual malice” as required under Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). Moreover, absent the full text of the alleged defamatory material in the record and an indication as to the manner of its publication, it is difficult to determine as a matter of law whether the publication in question involved an issue of public concern. See Furgason v. Clausen, 109 N.M. 331, 785 P.2d 242 (Ct.App.1989) (whether publication involves a matter of public concern is a question of law). Under Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2946, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985), whether speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the “ ‘content, form, and context’ ” of the publication as revealed by the record. (Quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983).) In the district court, only legal argument was presented in support of Defendant’s constitutional challenge to Section 30-11-1. Despite my disagreement with the rationale relied upon by the majority to affirm the result reached by the district court, an analysis of the language of our criminal libel statute, Section 30-11-1, I conclude, indicates that the district court correctly determined that the statute is facially inconsistent with the protections accorded under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. A statute is constitutionally overbroad and facially invalid if it encompasses constitutionally protected, as well as unprotected, speech. See State v. Gattis, 105 N.M. 194, 730 P.2d 497 (Ct.App.1986); City of Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wash.2d 923, 767 P.2d 572 (1989) (en banc); see also Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1978); People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo.1991) (en banc). The principal defect in Section 30-11-1 is that the statute permits an individual to be convicted of the offense of criminal libel by showing .that the statement alleged to be defamatory was false and that the publication by Defendant was made “without good motives and justifiable ends.” § 30-11-1. The term “malicious” is defined in the statute as an act done “with an evil or mischievous design.” Id. These statutory provisions omit any requirement that the statement be proven to have been published by Defendant with “actual malice.” The constitutional requirement of “actual malice” necessitates proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was false and that Defendant published such statement either knowing that it was false or published the statement with a reckless disregard of whether such statement was false. Garrison v. Louisiana. Thus, the statute as worded permits criminal prosecution of constitutionally protected speech as well as unprotected speech. Criminal libel statutes are subject to the same constitutional limitations as civil libel laws where criticism of public officials or public figures is concerned. See id.; see also People v. Heinrich, 104 Ill.2d 137, 83 Ill.Dec. 546, 470 N.E.2d 966 (1984). The definition of “malice,” as used in our criminal libel statute, was based upon the common-law definition of malice as set forth in the New Mexico Constitution, Article II, Section 17, and provides, in part: In all criminal prosecutions for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted. N.M. Const, art. II, § 17 (Repl.Pamp.1992). Although “malice” is an element required to be proven under our criminal libel statute, the term “malicious” as embodied in Section 30-11-1 is at odds with the requirement of proof of “malice” as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Garrison in criminal libel proceedings. Section 30-11-1 defines the term “malicious” as signifying “an act done with evil or mischievous design.” In contrast with this definition, the Court held in Garrison that, in order to establish the offense of criminal libel, the prosecution must prove that the statement in question was false and that the statement was published with “ ‘actual malice,’ ” i.e., the defendant published the statement knowing “ ‘that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’ ” Id. 379 U.S. at 67, 85 S.Ct. at 212 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). The common-law definition of “malice” which involves publication of a false statement while motivated by ill-will or evil purpose has been overtaken by decisions of the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) and Garrison. See also Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 86 S.Ct. 1407, 16 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966). These decisions recognize that the protection accorded by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution precludes the imposition of either criminal or civil liability without proof that the alleged defamatory statement involved (1) a matter of public concern, (2) the statement was false, (3) was published with actual malice, and (4) that the person alleged to be defamed was a public official or public figure. Garrison v. Louisiana. As observed by the Court in Garrison, the “actual malice” requirement necessary to establish a claim of civil libel is also applicable to a charge of criminal libel: In [New York Times,] we held that the Constitution limits state power, in a civil action brought by a public official for criticism of his official conduct, to an award of damages for a false statement “made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 376 U.S., at 279-280, [84 S.Ct. at 725-26]. At the outset, we must decide whether, in view of the differing history and purposes of criminal libel, the New York Times rule al..c limits state power to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public officials. We hold that it does. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 67, 85 S.Ct. at 212. The distinction between the type of malice required under Section 30-11-1 to prove a charge of criminal libel and that recognized by the Court in Garrison clearly renders New Mexico’s criminal libel statute facially invalid. I agree that this variance cannot be cured by promulgation of a jury instruction as urged by the state. Jury instructions may not properly modify the elements of a crime where the elements of the offense have been prescribed by the legislature. See People v. Ryan. Although the protection accorded under the First Amendment for freedom of speech and press does not protect every publication, such as obscene, fraudulent or untrue defamatory statements published with actual malice, the Supreme Court in Garrison makes clear that “actual malice” is a necessary element of proof in prosecutions for criminal libel where the complainant is a public official or public figure and the statement involves a matter of public concern. 379 U.S. at 67, 85 S.Ct. at 212. In the case before us, as shown by the complaint, the complainant is a “public official.” While the courts in some states in determining the validity of their criminal libel statutes have applied such laws differently depending upon whether the person alleged to have been libeled was a “public official,” “public figure,” or “private person,” see Janet Boeth Jones, Annotation, Validity of Criminal Defamation Statutes, 68 A.L.R.4th 1014 (1989), I conclude that Article II, Section 17 of the New Mexico Constitution requires proof of the same standard of malice in any prosecution for criminal libel when the publication involves a matter of public concern, irrespective of the status of the person alleged to have been defamed. I concur in upholding the decision of the district court determining that Section 30-11-1 is constitutionally invalid.