Court Opinion

ID: 9811350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:18:21.772006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:59.543434
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority holds that Appellant was not entitled to inquire about the venire’s bias against an area of the law upon which Appellant was entitled to rely, I must respectfully dissent.
Section 8.04 of the penal code provides in pertinent part:
(b) Evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication may be introduced by the actor in mitigation of the penalty attached to the offense for which he is being tried.
(c) When temporary insanity is relied upon as a defense and the evidence tends to show that such insanity was caused by intoxication, the court shall charge the jury in accordance with the provisions of this section.1
As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has pointed out, it is well established in the law that
*329[t]here are three possible purposes for the voir dire examination of veniremen. The first purpose is to elicit information which would establish a basis for a challenge for cause because the venireman is legally disqualified from serving or is biased or prejudiced for or against one of the parties or some aspect of the relevant law.2
As the Sadler Court reiterates, both the defendant and the State may challenge for cause any juror who has a bias or prejudice against the law that either party is entitled to rely upon.3 “Bias against the law is refusal to consider or apply the relevant law. It exists when a venireper-son’s beliefs or opinions would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath.”4
Appellant was properly inquiring whether the venire members had a bias against the law upon which Appellant was entitled to rely. A juror who believes so strongly that temporary insanity caused by voluntary intoxication could never be a mitigating factor at punishment has such a bias and is subject to a challenge for cause.5 Appellant was absolutely entitled to inquire into the existence of such bias, and the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the proper question.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.

. Tex. Penal Code Ann § 8.04(b), (c) (Vernon 2003).

.Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 710-11 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (emphasis added); see also Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.16(b)(3), (c)(2) (Vernon Supp.2005); Sadler v. State, 977 S.W.2d 140, 142 & n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Smith v. State, 907 S.W.2d 522, 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).

. Sadler, 977 S.W.2d at 142 & n. 3; see also Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.16(b)(3), (c)(2).

. Sadler, 977 S.W.2d at 142 (citations and quotations omitted).

. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 3 5.16 (c) (2).