Court Opinion

ID: 9519128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:09:54.487539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:47.752144
License: Public Domain

Tauro, C.J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons.
The defendants’ rather simplistic argument is to the effect that if the plaintiff had received workmen’s compensation, evidence of this would have been inadmissible as irrelevant. Therefore, the defendants contend, evidence that the plaintiff did not receive workmen's compensation was also irrelevant and its admission was so prejudicial to the defendants as to require a new trial.
Even assuming that the disputed evidence was irrelevant, it is difficult to rationalize how its admission was so prejudicial as to constitute reversible error unless it can be argued that the defendants were entitled to have the jury speculate rather than to have the facts about this phase of the case. I believe the existence of workmen’s compensation is a matter of common knowledge in all such actions. When the jury are left in the dark as to whether the plaintiff has or has not received workmen’s compensation, it is likely that at least some of the jurors would contend, in mitigation of damages, that the plaintiff had been compensated for a substantial portion of his loss of earnings and for his medical bills. Other jurors *817could argue that the action was really a fight between two insurance companies — one the workmen’s compensation carrier to recoup its payments to the plaintiff and the other the insurance company covering the motor vehicle. It is conceivable, of course, that the jury might scrupulously follow the instructions of the judge and give no consideration to anything except the evidence submitted to them in open court.
The majority tend to the latter proposition. In my opinion the sounder view is one which avoids the “ostrich head in the sand” approach but, instead, permits the jury, in arriving at a verdict, to know the truth, namely, that the plaintiff received no workmen’s compensation. I cannot perceive how this could improperly add one iota to the jury’s verdict. I respectfully submit that the majority opinion has opted for the path which invites speculation and conjecture on the part of the jury in arriving at a verdict and I must note my disagreement.
The majority opinion notes that the “verdict appears large” leaving the possible inference that it would have been less if the jury had not been aware that the plaintiff had not collected workmen’s compensation. If this is the inference intended its logic escapes me. Moreover, the amount awarded for the total and permanent loss of the use of one arm, resulting in almost total disability as to future employment and very substantial medical bills, together with pain and suffering, does not appear to be unreasonable or excessive.
The majority opiniort points out that the plaintiff could have accepted workmen’s compensation and still retained his right of action against the defendants if the workmen’s compensation insurance carrier did not initiate the action within the statutory period. This requires a discussion of some of the practical aspects of the situation. Had the plaintiff collected workmen’s compensation his negligence claim against the defendants, if exercised by the compensation carrier, would have been in the exclusive control of the latter. It is understandable that a plaintiff, especially with injuries as serious as those in the instant case, would prefer to control his own litigation rather than leave it in the hands of an in*818surance carrier whose primary interest would be to recoup its expenses.1 The mere fact that a settlement in such cases ■must be approved by the Industrial Accident Board or by a judge of the court does not give the plaintiff the same feeling of security and protection that he has when the control of the litigation, whether in settlement or trial, is essentially his.
A further point is urged by the majority opinion; namely, that the plaintiff’s election in some way unduly influenced the jury in thinking that the plaintiff had an overabundance of confidence as to the righteousness of his claim against the defendants. Again, the logic and rationale of this contention elude me. Admittedly, the plaintiff in electing to proceed against the defendants, rather than initially collecting his workmen’s compensation, took the risk of losing everything if he failed to prevail against the defendants.
I think a more logical conclusion is that the plaintiff had carefully weighed the possibilities and probabilities and decided that it was in his best interest economically to proceed against the person who caused his injuries.
*819It is a risk that most plaintiffs take when they opt for a jury trial after refusing what they consider an unsatisfactory settlement. A jury verdict should not be vacated absent a prejudicial error or a possible miscarriage of justice. I perceive neither in this case. In my view the injustice lies in depriving the plaintiff of his verdicts for no valid reason and compelling him to undergo the delay and expense of another long trial.

Where there is a close case on liability such as the instant case, there could be a serious conflict between the interests of the injured plaintiff (employee) and those of the workmen’s compensation carrier. Having paid a very substantial sum of money to the employee by way of medical bills and compensation and in order to protect its own interests, the compensation insurance carrier could make out a strong case (especially where the liability of the third-party defendant is questionable) for a settlement of the case against the tortfeasor for substantially less than its potential value. In such circumstances, it would be reasonable for the Industrial Accident Board or a Superior Court judge to approve the settlement. Here it should be noted that the lawyer who brings the action on behalf of the employee represents him in name only. His real client is the compensation insurance carrier.
On the other hand, if the employee waives compensation and proceeds on his own against the third-party defendant, he has complete control of the case from its very inception. He can adjust the case or try it to a conclusion according to what he believes to be his own best interests.
As to an election by the employee between a claim for compensation and a personal injury action against a third-party defendant, see extensive revision of § 15 of G. L. c. 152, by St. 1971, c. 888, applicable to injuries occurring after January 12, 1972. The employee from that date on is entitled, without election, to the compensation and other benefits provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The employee can maintain complete control over the right to initiate the third-party action by bringing the actioti at law before he claims or accepts compensation. The insurer has no right to initiate a third-party action unless the employee has filed a claim for compensation or has accepted compensation “under an agreement. ” This legislative history further underpins the rationale of permitting the jury to know, in the interests of fairness and justice, of the employee’s election not to accept workmen’s compensation in cases where injuries occurred prior to January 12, 1972.