Court Opinion

ID: 9859880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:53:00.496774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:09:07.231967
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NEVILLE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent because I believe the majority has misconstrued the substitution of judge for cause provision in the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1001(a)(3)(iii) (West 2002). The substitution of judge provision provides that, “[u]pon the filing of a petition for substitution of judge for cause, a hearing to determine whether the cause exists shall be conducted as soon as possible by a judge other than the judge named in the petition.” 735 ILCS 5/2— 1001(a)(3)(iii) (West 2002). It is axiomatic that when construing a statute, the judiciary is to apply the statute’s clear and unambiguous language as written. Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill. 2d 103, 117 (2007). Therefore, because the statute clearly and unambiguously provides that a judge other than the judge named in the petition shall conduct a hearing to determine whether cause exists to substitute the judge named in the petition, I believe the trial court erred when it denied the petition for substitution of judge for cause without transferring the matter for a hearing to be conducted by a judge other than the judge named in the petition. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1001(a)(3)(iii) (West 2002). The majority affirms the trial court by reading into the statute a “threshold” review of the petition’s substitution grounds by the judge named in the petition. However, there is no language found in the statute that permits a review of the petition by the judge named in the petition. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1001(a)(3) (West 2002). As the Illinois Supreme Court has directed, a court must not depart from the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent. Town & Country Utilities, Inc., 225 Ill. 2d at 117, citing Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 215 Ill. 2d 219, 238 (2004). Furthermore, the majority’s position makes superfluous the mandatory directive in the statute that a hearing shall be conducted by a judge other than the judge named in the petition to determine whether cause exists “upon the filing of the petition.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1001(a)(3)(iii) (West 2002). The majority’s construction of the statute is at odds with one of the most basic interpretive canons, that “ ‘[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’ ” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101, 159 L. Ed. 2d 172, 186, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2286 (2004), quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes & Statutory Construction §46.06, at 181-86 (6th ed. 2000). Accordingly, I would follow the majority in In re Estate of Wilson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 771 (2009), and vacate the order denying the motion for substitution of judge for cause and remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the substitution motion by some judge other than the judge named in the petition.