Court Opinion

ID: 9900345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:19.507492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.601184
License: Public Domain

No. 507            September 27, 2023                   363

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                STATE OF OREGON,
                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                           v.
            CLAUDE LEONARD JOSEPH III,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
              Marion County Circuit Court
                 18CR52707; A174920

  J. Channing Bennett, Judge.
  Argued and submitted December 7, 2022.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, argued the cause for
appellant. Also on the briefs was Mary Reese, Deputy Public
Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  PAGÁN, J.
   Counts 1 through 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, and 19 through 21
reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.
  Mooney, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
364                                                          State v. Joseph

          PAGÁN, J.
          Can a discovery letter identifying potential wit-
nesses and physical evidence, which was never intended
to make known “the particulars” of how the prosecutor
planned to introduce and rely on child hearsay statements
during a jury trial, be construed as satisfying the require-
ments of OEC 803(18a)(b) when considered in context?1 The
answer is no. Relying on the fact that the interviews of two
children had been “central” to the case from the beginning,
the trial court determined that the discovery letter, when
considered in the context of other information generally pro-
vided to defendant, provided sufficient notice under OEC
803(18a)(b). But defendant’s presumed awareness of the
state’s intention to rely on the interviews did not relieve the
state of its express statutory obligation to provide timely
notice of the state’s intention “to offer the statement and the
particulars of the statement.” OEC 803(18a)(b). In State v.
Chase, 240 Or App 541, 248 P3d 432 (2011), we set forth the
minimum requirements for an OEC 803(18a)(b) notice, and
the discovery letter here, even considered in context, did not
convey that information. Because the discovery letter was
too general to satisfy that obligation, the trial court erred
by admitting the hearsay statements, and the error was
not harmless. We therefore reverse and remand defendant’s
convictions.
                             FACTS
          The relevant facts are largely procedural. Defendant
was charged with numerous sex crimes involving his girl-
friend’s children, A and M, and he was also charged with
crimes against his girlfriend, two other children, and family
pets. A was nine years old at the time of trial and M was
seven years old. A and M were referred to Liberty House,
   1
     OEC 803(18a)(b) provides, in part, that:
       “A statement made by a person concerning an act of abuse as defined in
   ORS 107.705 or 419B.005, * * * is not excluded by ORS 40.455 if the declarant
   either testifies at the proceeding and is subject to cross-examination, or is
   unavailable as a witness but was chronologically or mentally under 12 years
   of age when the statement was made * * *. No statement may be admitted
   under this paragraph unless the proponent of the statement makes known
   to the adverse party the proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the
   particulars of the statement no later than 15 days before trial, except for good
   cause shown.”
Cite as 328 Or App 363 (2023)                                                 365

a child abuse assessment center, for interviews regarding
possible sexual abuse. The Liberty House interviews of A
and M were video recorded.
        In December 2018, defendant filed a pretrial motion
to exclude evidence of other bad acts, including statements
made by A and M during their Liberty House interviews
that concerned defendant’s mistreatment of family pets and
physical abuse of the two other children.2 The trial court
granted in part and denied in part the motion to exclude
evidence of other bad acts.3
        Defendant’s trial date was set for February 12,
2019. On January 10, 2019, the prosecutor sent defendant a
discovery letter, pursuant to ORS 135.815(1),4 that outlined
potential witnesses and physical evidence that the state
might offer at trial. The relevant part of the letter stated:
        “The State may offer the following physical evidence at
    trial:
        “Recorded interview of defendant
        “Liberty House interview of [M]
        “Liberty House interview of [A.]”
         On January 31, 2019, the state filed two, far more
detailed, notices for certain statements made by A and M to
a child interviewer and medical examiner at Liberty House.
Each one was called, “Notice of Intent to Rely on Hearsay
Evidence pursuant to OEC 803(18a)(b).” The notices indi-
cated that the state intended to rely on statements made by
A and M to

     2
       In preparing the motion to exclude evidence of prior bad acts, defense coun-
sel appears to have relied on either a transcript of the Liberty House interviews,
or reports prepared by Liberty House. At the later hearing on the state’s motion
to continue the trial and defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of child hearsay,
defense counsel stated that she did not obtain the video recordings of the Liberty
House interviews until two days prior to the hearing. At the same time, defen-
dant was opposed to the state’s request to continue the trial, which was scheduled
to begin on February 12.
     3
       The court’s ruling on the admissibility of that evidence was limited to ques-
tions of relevancy under OEC 401, other acts evidence under OEC 404(3), and
whether the evidence should be excluded under OEC 403.
     4
       ORS 135.815 addresses required disclosures that the prosecutor must
make to a represented defendant.
366                                             State v. Joseph

   “a child interviewer at Liberty House. A copy of the child
   victim’s statements is included on pages 9-12 of a 14 page
   report, which was written by [the child interviewer and a
   medical examiner.] The victim is referred to by name in the
   report. The victim’s statements made to [the interviewer]
   were also video recorded. * * * Her statements include a
   description of the acts of abuse that occurred, as well as
   the location of where the abuse occurred.”
The notices also indicated that the state intended to rely on
statements made by A and M to
   “a medical examiner at Liberty House. A copy of the child
   victim’s statements is included on pages 12-13 of a 14 page
   report, which was written by [the child interviewer and the
   medical examiner.] Her statements include a description of
   the acts of abuse that occurred.”
         On February 1, 2019, the state moved to continue
the trial to a later date and included an affidavit acknowl-
edging that the hearsay notices were not timely filed, given
the statute’s requirement of notice “15 days before trial.”
Defendant objected to delaying the trial, and he filed a
motion in limine to exclude the hearsay statements for lack
of required notice under OEC 803(18a)(b).
         A hearing was held on February 7, 2019. Having
acknowledged that the hearsay notices filed on January 31,
2019, were untimely, the state decided to rely on the “trial
letter dated January 10th as the notice” for OEC 803(18a)(b)
purposes. Although the hearsay notices addressed evidence
that went beyond the scope of the statements made by A and
M in the Liberty House interviews, the state did not pursue
admission of hearsay statements other than those recorded
during the interviews. The state argued that the January 10
discovery letter was sufficient to serve as notice of the state’s
intent to offer those statements at trial.
         After argument from both sides, the trial court
ruled that the hearsay statements from the Liberty House
interviews were admissible. The trial court noted that the
January 10 discovery letter “standing alone” was not suffi-
cient, but that because the “central heart of the case” was
the Liberty House report, “there has been lots of notice of the
intent to use” the Liberty House interviews. In its written
Cite as 328 Or App 363 (2023)                             367

notes from the hearing, the trial court stated that notice
was sufficient “under the combined efforts” and the “totality
of these circumstances.”
          After the state rested, the trial court granted the
state’s motion to dismiss Count 11, and it granted defendant’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal on Counts 8, 9, 13, 14, 17,
and 18. The court also granted the motion as to Count 20,
but it found that there was sufficient evidence of the lesser-
included offense of attempted second-degree animal abuse
for trial to proceed on that offense. The jury found defendant
guilty of five counts by nonunanimous verdicts. The jury
found defendant guilty of nine counts by unanimous ver-
dicts, including two counts of first-degree sodomy against A
(Counts 1 and 2), three counts of first-degree sexual abuse
against A (Counts 3, 4, and 5), one count of luring a minor
(Count 6), and one count of first-degree sexual abuse against
M (Count 10). In addition, the jury found defendant guilty by
unanimous verdict of second-degree animal abuse (Count
19) and attempted second-degree animal abuse (Count 20).
The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years in prison.
Defendant appeals.
                         ANALYSIS
        Preliminarily, we address defendant’s convictions
that were based on nonunanimous verdicts. For the rea-
sons expressed in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___, 140 S Ct
1390, 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020), and State v. Ulery, 366 Or 500,
464 P3d 1123 (2020), those convictions must be reversed
and remanded. The specific counts that must be reversed
because of nonunanimous jury verdicts are Count 7 (stran-
gulation), Count 12 (strangulation), Count 15 (first-degree
criminal mistreatment), Count 16 (fourth-degree assault),
and Count 21 (strangulation constituting domestic violence).
         Turning to defendant’s other assignments of error,
we review the trial court’s determination that the Liberty
House statements were admissible under OEC 803(18a)(b)
for legal error. State v. Juarez-Hernandez, 316 Or App 741,
744, 503 P3d 487, rev den, 369 Or 856 (2022). Hearsay “is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testi-
fying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
368                                              State v. Joseph

truth of the matter asserted.” OEC 801(3). Hearsay is gen-
erally not admissible. OEC 802. However, OEC 803(18a)(b)
makes an exception that permits, among other things,
admission of hearsay statements concerning complaints of
sexual misconduct or abuse. The issue raised on appeal con-
cerns the notice requirement in the statute:
   “No statement may be admitted under this paragraph
   unless the proponent of the statement makes known to the
   adverse party the proponent’s intention to offer the state-
   ment and the particulars of the statement no later than 15
   days before trial, except for good cause shown.”
OEC 803(18a)(b).
         It is uncontested that the state’s January 31 notice
was not timely relative to the scheduled trial date of Febru-
ary 12. Thus, we must determine whether the January 10
discovery letter made known the state’s “intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of the statement.” In deter-
mining whether that letter was sufficient, we are guided by
our decisions in Chase, 240 Or App at 546-47, State v. Riley,
258 Or App 246, 256, 308 P3d 1080, rev den, 354 Or 597
(2013), and State v. Phillips, 266 Or App 240, 248, 337 P3d
190 (2014).
         In Chase, 240 Or App at 546, we emphasized that
“OEC 803(18a)(b) requires that the state give notice of the
particulars of the statements.” (Emphasis in original.) We set
out to establish the floor, or minimum requirements, for that
notice: “the rule’s requirement that the proponent identify
the particulars of the statement requires at a minimum that
the state identify in its notice the substance of the statement
sought to be introduced and also identify the witness or the
means by which the statement would be introduced.” Id. at
546-47. In Chase, the state provided the defendant with
“approximately 53 pages of discovery, including the tran-
script of the CARES interview of the victim and statements
made by the victim to [others].” Id. at 544. The state notified
the defendant of its intent to rely on those “reports,” but we
concluded that the notice was insufficient. As we explained,
   “[t]here were multiple hearsay statements in the 53 pages
   of discovery. It was not sufficient for the state to notify
   defendant of its intention to potentially offer any of those
Cite as 328 Or App 363 (2023)                                   369

   statements. Although * * * the notice was not required to
   set forth the statements verbatim, simply providing discov-
   ery and notice of an intention to offer at trial hearsay state-
   ments contained in discovery is not sufficient.”
Id. at 546.
         By contrast, in Riley and Phillips, we concluded that
the notices were sufficient. In Riley, 258 Or App at 249, the
state notified the defendant of its intent to offer statements
from the “ ‘video recording of the CARES interview.’ ” The
notice also consisted of an attached affidavit, which pro-
vided that the state intended to offer “[s]tatements made on
November 18th, 2008 at CARES Northwest program ref-
erenced (among other potential places) on discovery pages
80-91 and on the recorded (DVD) interview previously made
available to the defense.” Id. at 249. We explained that
   “the state identified in its affidavit (1) the date on which
   the statements were made, (2) the place at which the state-
   ments were made, and (3) the particular item that con-
   tained the statements (the DVD). The DVD contained a
   finite number of statements by the victim, and defendant
   possessed the DVD and could easily ascertain the sub-
   stance of the statements. Moreover, the notice and affidavit
   both explicitly referred to the DVD; under those circum-
   stances, the state properly identified the means by which
   the statements would be introduced, i.e., introduction of the
   DVD itself into evidence.”
Id. at 256.
         We reached a similar conclusion in Phillips, 266
Or App at 248. In that case, in its second notice to the defen-
dant, the state indicated that it intended to offer“ ‘[t]he com-
plete statement made by [the victim] to [the interviewer] at
the Kid[s’] First Center on or about October 14, 2010 as cap-
tured in the discovered DVD and previously discovered.’ ” Id.
at 244. As we explained,
   “That notice provided defendant with the date on which the
   statements were made, the place at which the statements
   were made, and where the particular statements could be
   found in the previously provided discovery. The statements
   were contained on a single DVD encompassing a single
   interview with M, and the notice indicated that the entire
370                                              State v. Joseph

   interview would be introduced at trial. Moreover, the notice
   indicated that the statements would be offered ‘as captured
   in the discovered DVD,’ indicating that the state intended
   to introduce the statements through the recording itself.
   All told, the notice did not require defendant to guess what
   statements would be introduced, nor how.”
Id. at 248.
          Considered in light of our reasoning in Chase, Riley,
and Phillips, we conclude that the trial court erred when it
ruled that the January 10 discovery letter, which was never
intended to satisfy the requirements of OEC 803(18a)(b),
was nevertheless sufficient to do so when considered in con-
text. First of all, the January 10 letter, which was provided
to defense counsel pursuant to the state’s discovery obliga-
tions, does not satisfy the minimum requirements set out
in Chase. By generally indicating that the state “may” offer
“physical evidence,” including the “Liberty House inter-
view[s]” of two children, that letter failed to identify “the
substance of the statement sought to be introduced and * * *
the witness or the means by which the statement would be
introduced.” Chase, 240 Or App at 546-47. Unlike the far
more detailed notices in Riley and Phillips, the January 10
discovery letter does not mention DVDs, or the state’s inten-
tion to play the recorded interviews to the jury, or what parts
of the interviews it intended to play. Cf. Riley, 258 Or App
at 256 (“[T]he notice and affidavit both explicitly referred
to the DVD[.]”); Phillips, 266 Or App at 248 (“[T]he notice
indicated that the entire interview would be introduced at
trial. Moreover, the notice indicated that the statements
would be offered ‘as captured in the discovered DVD,’ indi-
cating that the state intended to introduce the statements
through the recording itself.”). Of course, with the benefit of
hindsight, the January 10 discovery letter may appear suffi-
ciently particular. But the letter itself identified no substan-
tive statements, no dates, no names of particular witnesses,
or any other limiting information that would provide the
defense with what we could reasonably call the “particulars”
of what the state intended to offer at trial. We recognize
that the facts of this case are at least close to, albeit dis-
tinguishable from, those in Riley and Phillips. Those cases
may represent the outer edge of what we consider to be an
Cite as 328 Or App 363 (2023)                                            371

offer of a “statement and the particulars of the statement”
under OEC 803(18a)(b). However, if we were to extend that
case law to the circumstances presented here, the propo-
nents of the hearsay statement could simply point to prior
required discovery disclosures and exchanges, which were
never intended as notices under OEC 803(18a)(b), to satisfy
the rule. Such an expansive reading would undermine the
purpose of the rule, which is to provide notice of particular
hearsay statements in advance of trial.
         At the hearing, the trial court acknowledged that
“standing alone” the letter did not satisfy the requirements of
OEC 803(18a)(b). However, according to the trial court, when
the January 10 discovery letter was considered in context,
it was sufficient to provide notice under OEC 803(18a)(b),
because “[t]he central heart of this case has been the Liberty
report, we’ve had a motion to suppress, we fleshed out a
number of issues, there has been lots of notice of the intent
to use this[.]”5
        We are not persuaded that defense counsel’s prior
awareness of the interviews carries the day, or that the trial
court can cure a defective notice under OEC 803(18a)(b) by
pointing to the totality of the circumstances. On appeal,
relying on a reference to the two “Lib House videos” in
the notes from an earlier status hearing, as well as defen-
dant’s motion to exclude evidence of prior bad acts, the state
argues that “defense counsel was well-aware that the state
intended to offer the statements of the children that were
recorded at Liberty House.” However, we have rejected sim-
ilar arguments in the past.
        In State v. Hernandez-Fabian, 264 Or App 26, 29,
330 P3d 675 (2014), the state’s OEC 803(18a)(b) notice was
untimely, and the state sought to rely instead on discov-
ery “cover sheets” provided earlier in the case. In arguing
that those cover sheets provided sufficient notice, the state
emphasized that “defendant was, in fact, aware of the state-
ments that he seeks to exclude.” Id. at 30. We rejected that
argument.

   5
      When the trial court referred to a motion to suppress, it appears to have
had in mind the motion to exclude evidence of prior bad acts.
372                                               State v. Joseph

   “Leaving aside the issue of the statements’ particulars,
   the state’s notice did not identify, for example, whether S’s
   statements would be offered through the video recording of
   her CARES interview, through the testimony of the CARES
   staff member who had conducted the interview, or through
   the testimony of law enforcement officers who had observed
   the interview while it was being conducted. That defendant
   was, ultimately, aware of the statements and their sub-
   stance does not compensate for the state’s failure to comply
   with the notice requirements in OEC 803(18a)(b).”
Id. The same reasoning applies here regarding the state’s
attempt to rely on the January 10 discovery letter to satisfy
its obligations under OEC 803(18a)(b).
         Similarly, in State v. Leahy, 190 Or App 147, 149, 78
P3d 132 (2003), the state failed to provide timely notice of
its intent to rely on the victim’s hearsay statements. Based
on a list of witnesses furnished by the state earlier in the
case, the trial court ruled that the defendant had “ ‘implicit
knowledge’ ” of the fact that the state intended to offer evi-
dence under OEC 803(18a)(b). Id. at 150. We rejected that
argument too, noting that “merely providing discovery of the
statements does not comply with the literal requirements of
the rule.” Id. at 150-51. As we stated in State v. McKinzie,
186 Or App 384, 393, 63 P3d 1214, rev den, 336 Or 16 (2003),
“[w]hether defense counsel believed that the prosecutor
intended to offer the evidence at trial misses the point of the
statute. The statute makes no exception for the requirement
of timely notice based on defense counsel’s state of mind[.]”
(Emphasis in original.)
          In other words, whether or not defense counsel
was generally aware of the Liberty House interviews, that
awareness cannot cure the state’s failure to provide timely
notice of the substance of the statement and its “particu-
lars,” including, for example, information regarding how the
state intended to offer the hearsay statements into evidence
at trial. In hindsight, it may seem obvious that the state
intended to play the video recordings to the jury, but defense
counsel could not have known that from the January 10
discovery letter, even coupled with prior awareness of the
interviews.
Cite as 328 Or App 363 (2023)                                          373

         Accepting the state’s argument that such context
or presumed knowledge is sufficient would create a gener-
alized exception that swallows the particular rule. If the
state could metaphorically wave its hand towards its volu-
minous discovery and suggest that it “may” offer statements
hidden within the documents and videos, the purpose of
using the word “particulars” in the statute would be wholly
defeated. See State v. Iverson, 185 Or App 9, 14, 57 P3d 953
(2002), rev den, 335 Or 655 (2003) (One purpose of timely
notice under the rule is “to enable a party to know about the
other party’s proposed hearsay evidence long enough before
trial to be able to prepare to respond to it. That response
could include developing other evidence or, if the declarants
will testify, preparing to cross-examine them.”); see also
State v. Edblom, 257 Or App 22, 32, 303 P3d 1001 (2013)
(“[D]iscovery does not constitute notice for the purposes of
OEC 803(18a)(b).”).
         In its memorandum filed in the trial court, the state
had argued that “[t]he two DVDs were made available to
defense counsel in August 2018.” At the hearing, defense
counsel explained that, although she had written reports
from earlier, she did not obtain the video of the Liberty
House interviews until two days prior to the hearing. Noting
that “a picture’s * * * worth a thousand words,” the trial
court indicated that it was willing to continue the trial date
if defendant needed additional time to review the videos.
But defendant, who faced multiple charges, was opposed to a
continuance of the trial date. The court therefore declined to
continue the trial date and deemed the January 10 discov-
ery letter sufficient, when considered in context, to satisfy
the state’s obligation under OEC 803(18a)(b).6 In so ruling,
the trial court erred.
          Notwithstanding the error, we must affirm if there
is little likelihood that the error affected the verdict. State
v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003). The question
is not whether the lack of particularity in the January 10
discovery letter prejudiced defendant; rather, the question
is whether defendant was prejudiced by admission of the

    6
      The state does not argue on appeal that defendant invited the error by
objecting to a continuance of the trial date.
374                                           State v. Joseph

hearsay statements from the Liberty House interviews.
Chase, 240 Or App at 547.
          We readily conclude that admission of the hearsay
statements was not harmless. The evidence was not merely
cumulative of other evidence offered. At trial, M testified
briefly about a range of topics including sex abuse, physical
abuse of M and her siblings, and animal abuse, and that
testimony was not always consistent with what she said
during the Liberty House interview. For instance, M testi-
fied at trial that defendant made M touch defendant’s penis
“once.” In the Liberty House interview, M disclosed that she
touched defendant’s penis more than one time. Although
A’s Liberty House interview and trial testimony were gen-
erally consistent, the Liberty House interview described
defendant’s conduct in more graphic detail. Likewise, the
Liberty House interviews included significant graphic detail
regarding the animal abuse charges. We cannot say that
there is little likelihood that the erroneous admission of the
hearsay statements affected the verdict. See State v. Wood,
253 Or App 97, 101, 289 P3d 348 (2012) (“In the absence
of overwhelming evidence of guilt, * * * where * * * errone-
ously admitted hearsay evidence significantly reinforces the
declarant’s testimony at trial, the admission of those state-
ments constitutes error requiring reversal of the defendant’s
conviction[.]”). We therefore reverse defendant’s convictions.
        Counts 1 through 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, and 19 through
21 reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.
        MOONEY, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part.
         I agree that it was error for the trial court to have
entered convictions on Counts 7, 12, and 21 (strangulation),
Count 15 (first-degree criminal mistreatment), and Count
16 (felony fourth-degree assault) because those convictions
were based on nonunanimous jury verdicts. I therefore join
the majority in accepting the state’s concession, and I agree
that reversal of those convictions is the appropriate disposi-
tion. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 1395,
206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020); State v. Ulery, 366 Or 500, 503, 464
P3d 1123 (2020).
Cite as 328 Or App 363 (2023)                              375

         I write separately because I would address the
question of sufficient notice under OEC 803(18a)(b) differ-
ently than the majority. The prosecutor’s January 10, 2019,
letter notified defense counsel that the state intended to
offer the “Liberty House interview of [M]” and the “Liberty
House interview of [A]” as evidence at trial. We evaluate
the sufficiency of that letter under OEC 803(18a)(b) in the
context in which it was written and conveyed. To meet the
minimum notice requirements of OEC 803(18a)(b), the state
must have placed defendant in a position where he did not
have to “guess what statements would be introduced, [or]
how.” State v. Phillips, 266 Or App 240, 248, 337 P3d 190
(2014).
         This case was formally commenced on August 8,
2018, when defendant was arraigned on the charging
instrument. He was assigned legal counsel at that time.
One month later, the trial court held a status hearing that
resulted in the creation of a status sheet and the filing of
a scheduling order. The status sheet is a pre-printed form
that was filled in by hand. It includes information germane
to setting the trial date and estimating the number of days
that would be needed to complete the trial. In particular, the
status sheet reflects that defendant expected to call three to
four witnesses and that the state intended to call six wit-
nesses “w/2 Lib House Videos.” The importance of the status
sheet is simply that it reflects that the court and counsel dis-
cussed the state’s intention to offer the Liberty House DVDs
at the first status conference, within one month of arraign-
ment. Ten weeks later, another status hearing was held.
The status sheet reflects that a motion hearing date was set
for January 30, 2019. The notes section of the status sheet
indicates that defendant needed “more time to file [motions];
interesting issues,” and it set up a briefing schedule.
         Three weeks later, defendant filed a motion in
limine seeking to exclude evidence of “other bad acts.” That
motion clearly describes, and quotes, things that A and M
“told the Liberty House interviewer” and leaves no doubt
that defense counsel was aware of the content of those inter-
views. It is clear that defense counsel had reviewed and
analyzed the interviews from an evidentiary point of view.
376                                           State v. Joseph

Indeed, the motion in limine carefully identified information
provided by A and M in their Liberty House interviews, and
then sought to exclude evidence associated with the topics
so identified. The hearing on defendant’s motion in limine
occurred after the January 10, 2019, letter was sent by the
state, but there can be no question that the Liberty House
interviews were the topic of ongoing discussion over the
course of the several months leading up to trial. Given that
ongoing dialogue, the January 10 letter advising defense
counsel that the state intended to offer the “Liberty House
interview of [M]” and the “Liberty House interview of [A]”
as evidence at trial could not have come as a surprise.
         When the prosecutor sent the January 10 letter to
counsel notifying her that the state intended to offer the
two Liberty House DVDs into evidence, it was against the
working backdrop of the case including the status confer-
ences, motions, and interactions between counsel that had
already occurred as they moved through the pretrial phase
of the case. This record leaves no doubt that defense counsel
was aware of the interviews and the DVDs and that she
was familiar with them as well. She knew the interviews
had been conducted at Liberty House, and she knew what
was said. They had already litigated defendant’s relevance
objections to portions of the interviews. It is in that context
that the letter was received and should be evaluated for its
sufficiency under OEC 803(18a)(b).
         Notice under OEC 803(18a)(b) is sufficient if it pro-
vides the date of the statements, the person who made the
statements, and the person to whom the statements were
made, with enough information about where the statements
were made “to allow defendant to discern their substance.”
State v. Ashkins, 263 Or App 208, 216, 327 P3d 1191 (2014),
aff’d, 357 Or 642, 357 P3d 490 (2015). This case is not like
State v. Chase, 240 Or App 541, 547-48, 248 P3d 432 (2011),
where the state’s notice amounted to no more than declaring
that the particular statements that it sought to introduce
were contained somewhere within the 53 pages of discovery
that it had provided to defense counsel. Here, the state said
that it intended to offer the DVDs of the two interviews.
Defense counsel knew where and when those interviews had
Cite as 328 Or App 363 (2023)                             377

been conducted and the parties to the interviews, and she
was aware of the content of the interviews because she had
already argued about the relevance of some of it.
         This case is like Phillips, where we held that the
state’s notice that it would introduce a single DVD encom-
passing a single interview, and that it would introduce the
entire interview, was sufficient under OEC 803(18a)(b).
266 Or App at 248. I cannot reconcile the majority’s asser-
tion that “defense counsel could not have known” that the
state intended to play the DVDs for the jury with the fact
that there would be no point in offering the DVDs unless
the state intended to play them for the jury. 328 Or App
at 372. Defendant was not put in the position of having to
guess about that at all. Indeed, they had been litigating the
admissibility of various statements made in the interviews
for months. Under Phillips, the state’s notice was sufficient.
         The majority characterizes Phillips as representing
“the outer edge” of what the state must include in its OEC
803(18a)(b) notice in terms of “the particulars of the state-
ment” to be offered. Id. at 370-71. I do not disagree. But this
case does not wander beyond the contours of that outer edge.
I do not share the majority’s worries about a future where
“the state could metaphorically wave its hand towards its
voluminous discovery” and comply with its OEC 803(18a)(b)
notice obligations by simply saying that it might offer “state-
ments hidden within” those volumes of discovery. Id. at 373.
This case does not concern anything of the sort. There is no
large volume of discovery, no waving hand, and no hidden
documents or DVDs.
          I would affirm the convictions on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 10, 19, and 20.