Court Opinion

ID: 9897748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:24:36.293708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.191867
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges AtLee, Causey and Callins
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

              TERRANCE DELVON LINDSEY
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.      Record No. 0987-22-1                                  JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS
                                                                                  OCTOBER 3, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                  FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
                                               David W. Lannetti, Judge

                               J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

                               Tanner M. Russo, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                      A jury convicted Terrance Delvon Lindsey of unlawful wounding. On appeal from that

              conviction, he challenges the trial court’s admission of photographs depicting the victim’s injuries at

              the hospital and the trial court’s denial of his motion to strike the evidence. For the following

              reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                        BACKGROUND1

                      On November 22, 2019, Old Dominion University (ODU) Officer Jasmine Rogers was

              patrolling the ODU campus in a marked police vehicle when she observed a loud group of people

              causing a “commotion” outside a 7-Eleven convenience store. Officer Rogers and her partner

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                      1
                        We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing
              party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting
              Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires us to “discard the evidence
              of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible
              evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Cady, 300
              Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).
parked behind the parking spaces fronting the store and investigated. Some of the individuals

outside the store referred to “fighting” and, after noticing an “obviously irate” male pacing in the

parking spaces outside the store entrance, Officer Rogers summoned him toward her patrol car.

Officer Rogers’s partner, dressed in uniform, approached the lighted store entrance and spoke to the

individuals gathered outside the door.

       Officer Rogers, also dressed in uniform, questioned the “irate” male, Nicholas Cardona.

She noted that Cardona was visibly “upset,” and, as he spoke with Officer Rogers, he gestured with

his hands, which were empty, and lifted his shirt. He appeared to be unarmed. Cardona’s wife and

mother were nearby. His mother was “yelling” as she ran back and forth between Officer Rogers

and her partner.

       As Officer Rogers questioned Cardona, Lindsey exited the front entrance of the 7-Eleven.

Turned at an angle, his back toward the parking lot, Lindsey walked backward slowly on the

storefront sidewalk in the direction of Cardona, Officer Rogers, and Officer Rogers’s patrol car.

While Cardona’s back was turned to the store to address Officer Rogers, Lindsey approached from

behind, lifted his arm above his head, and struck Cardona in the face with a wine bottle, knocking

him to the ground.

       Officer Rogers immediately arrested Lindsey. At trial, the jury watched footage of the

incident taken from Officer Rogers’s body-worn camera. After viewing the footage, Officer Rogers

reiterated her observation that Cardona had nothing in his hands when Lindsey approached and

struck him with the bottle.

       ODU Detective Christopher Jones, who was working on November 22, 2019, traveled to a

Norfolk hospital to assist Officer Rogers with interviewing Cardona and his wife. Detective Jones

testified that, when he arrived at the hospital, Cardona had undergone “some procedures” and was

still “groggy.” Detective Jones observed that Cardona’s “eye, nose area was swollen and blue.”

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Detective Jones photographed Cardona’s face when he “first made contact with him . . . in the

hospital.” Over Lindsey’s objection, the trial court admitted the photographs. They depicted a deep

cut above Cardona’s right eye, both before and after it was sutured. The photographs also showed

bruising around Cardona’s right eye, blood on his face, and an oxygen tube in his nose.

        Later, when Officer Rogers reviewed surveillance footage from the 7-Eleven store, the

footage showed Cardona visiting the store twice before the incident with Lindsey on the evening of

November 22, 2019. Although the Commonwealth did not introduce the footage at trial, Officer

Rogers recalled seeing that, during the first visit, Cardona’s wife approached the store entrance and

Lindsey was “trying to open the door for her.” Cardona’s wife did not enter the store; instead, she

left the scene with Cardona. Later, Cardona returned in a van with his wife and his mother, one of

whom was brandishing a firearm.

        Lindsey testified on his own behalf. He maintained that Cardona’s “girlfriend” entered, then

exited, the store. When she exited, “[s]omebody in the crowd across” from the store called her a

“B-I-T-C-H.” Lindsey stated that Cardona exited the van and accused Lindsey of swearing at his

girlfriend. An altercation ensued, and, after bystanders separated the two men, Cardona left the

scene. Cardona returned to the 7-Eleven, his third visit that evening, and exited his van with a gun.

According to Lindsey, Cardona threatened to kill the people gathered outside the store. Lindsey

offered a still photograph of Cardona from the store surveillance footage, which he claimed depicted

Cardona holding a firearm outside the store entrance. Lindsey testified that Cardona’s threat caused

the group to scatter, and Lindsey to flee inside the store.

        Lindsey maintained that he asked the store clerk for assistance in calling the police, but the

store clerk declined. “Ten to fifteen seconds” passed before Lindsey seized a wine bottle and

returned outside. Lindsey testified that he had “no idea” why he took the bottle. Once outside,

Lindsey stood next to a trash can and watched Cardona speaking with someone; he denied being

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aware that the individual was a police officer. Lindsey claimed that he was focused on whether

Cardona had a gun in his hands. Less than 30 seconds after exiting the store, Lindsey “walk[ed]

backwards” toward Cardona and struck him in the face with the wine bottle. Lindsey claimed that

he hit Cardona because “[his] state of mind was still into [Cardona] putting [Lindsey] in danger.”

After watching the footage from Officer Rogers’s camera, Lindsey agreed that Cardona was not

armed. Lindsey admitted that he was a convicted felon.

       Lindsey moved to strike the evidence at the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence and

again after the close of the defense’s evidence. The trial court denied both motions. The jury

ultimately convicted Lindsey of unlawful wounding. Lindsey appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

                                    I. Admission of Photographs

       Lindsey contends that the trial court erred by admitting the photographs of Cardona’s

injuries at the hospital because the Commonwealth offered no foundation to establish that the

depicted injuries resulted from Lindsey striking him with the bottle; therefore, the images were

“irrelevant.” He stresses that Detective Jones did not witness Lindsey’s assault on Cardona and no

evidence established the nature of Cardona’s injuries at the 7-Eleven store. Absent “a satisfactory

nexus” between his injuries and the assault, including “the amount of time elapsed” between the

photographs and the assault, Lindsey argues that the photographs lacked any probative value.

Moreover, he contends that any probative value in the photographs was substantially outweighed by

their prejudicial impact because they misled the jury about the nature of Cardona’s injuries.2

       2
         We disagree with the Commonwealth’s argument that Lindsey raises a different
evidentiary argument on appeal than he presented below. Although the Commonwealth
contends that Lindsey never argued at trial that the evidence failed to demonstrate a “sufficiently
close temporal link” between the photographs and the assault, Lindsey asserted at trial that
Detective Jones could not testify that the injuries depicted in the photographs were sustained
during the 7-Eleven incident. We conclude that this argument encompasses the “lack of nexus”
argument raised on appeal. Therefore, Lindsey’s evidentiary argument was preserved.
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        “The ‘admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court,’ and an

appellate court will not reject such decision absent an ‘abuse of discretion.’” McBride v.

Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 556, 569 (2022) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App.

462, 487 (2020)). “In evaluating whether a trial court abused its discretion, . . . we do not

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Rather, we consider only whether the record

fairly supports the trial court’s action.” Kenner v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 414, 423 (2021)

(alteration in original) (quoting Carter v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 537, 543 (2017)). Under the

abuse-of-discretion standard, “the [trial] court has a range of choice, and . . . its decision will not

be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.”

Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352 (2011).

        “The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of establishing . . . the facts necessary to

support its admissibility.” Church v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 107, 122 (2019) (alteration in

original) (quoting Perry v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 502, 509 (2013)). The measure of this

burden is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. So long as this threshold is met, “any

gaps in the evidence” go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the proposed evidence.

Id. at 122-23. “The scope of relevant evidence in Virginia is quite broad, as ‘[e]very fact, however

remote or insignificant, that tends to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in issue is

relevant.’” Id. at 123 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Proffitt, 292 Va. 626, 634

(2016)). “Relevant evidence may be excluded if ‘the probative value of the evidence is

substantially outweighed by . . . the danger of unfair prejudice.’” Fields v. Commonwealth, 73

Va. App. 652, 672 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Va. R. Evid. 2:403(a)(i)). “Rule 2:403’s

requirement that only unfair prejudice may be considered as grounds for non-admission ‘reflects the

fact that all probative direct evidence generally has a prejudicial effect to the opposing party.’” Id.

at 673 (quoting Lee v. Spoden, 290 Va. 235, 251 (2015)). “The responsibility for balancing the

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probative value versus the prejudicial effect rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Kenner,

299 Va. at 424.

           A. The preponderance of the evidence established a sufficient nexus between the injury and
              the assault so that the photographs bore some probative value.

           Although Detective Jones did not witness Lindsey’s assault on Cardona, he was working

on the date of the offense and assisted Officer Rogers by going to interview Cardona at the

hospital where he was being treated. Detective Jones testified that he photographed Cardona’s

face when he “first made contact with him . . . in the hospital.” The photographs include depictions

of an un-sutured wound over Cardona’s right eye, permitting a fair inference that Cardona’s injury

had occurred a short time earlier. Detective Jones’s testimony that when he saw him, Cardona had

recently undergone procedures on his eye further supported the inference, as did the swelling and

bruising around Cardona’s eye and blood-stained face. Moreover, Officer Rogers’s body-worn

camera footage showed Lindsey striking the right side of Cardona’s face with the bottle, consistent

with the location of the injuries depicted in the photographs. Based on Detective Jones’s testimony,

the footage of the assault, and the nature of the injuries, the Commonwealth established by a

preponderance of the evidence that the photographs depicted injuries sustained from Lindsey’s

assault.

           B. Unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the photographs.

           The degree and scope of Cardona’s injuries were probative of the force used by Lindsey,

and thus probative of whether Lindsey struck Cardona with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or

kill Cardona. The photographs of Cardona’s injuries were not so inflammatory that their prejudicial

impact substantially outweighed their probative value. See Conley v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App.

658, 673 (2022) (“[R]elevant evidence will only be excluded if its prejudicial nature substantially

outweighs its probative value.”). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its

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discretion in deciding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by

any unfair prejudice and thus admitting the photographs.

                                   II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       Code § 18.2-51 provides:

               If any person maliciously shoot, stab, cut, or wound any person or
               by any means cause him bodily injury, with the intent to maim,
               disfigure, disable, or kill, he shall, except where it is otherwise
               provided, be guilty of a Class 3 felony. If such act be done
               unlawfully but not maliciously, with the intent aforesaid, the
               offender shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.

       Lindsey contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted with the intent to

maim, disfigure, disable, or kill Cardona because his actions were “motivated by extreme

provocation and fear” rather than deliberation. He emphasizes that Officer Rogers’s review of the

store surveillance footage corroborated Lindsey’s testimony that Cardona had been the aggressor in

an altercation with Lindsey and that, following a brief departure, Cardona had returned to the scene

and threatened him with a firearm. Citing his own testimony, Lindsey stresses that, when he exited

the store and approached Cardona, he was unaware that police officers were present. He also notes

that he threw the bottle at Cardona “seconds” after exiting the store, suggesting he lacked the

opportunity to deliberate.

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support

it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting

Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the

relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting
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Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the

conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion

might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72

Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

          “Intent is the purpose formed in a person’s mind which may, and often must, be inferred

from the facts and circumstances in a particular case.” Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 330

(2018) (quoting Burton v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 622, 626-27 (2011)). “Circumstantial evidence

of intent may include the conduct and statements of the alleged offender.” Adams v.

Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 463, 471 (2000). “Determining a defendant’s intent ‘is a factual

question, which lies peculiarly within the province of the [fact finder].’” Barnett v. Commonwealth,

73 Va. App. 111, 120 (2021) (quoting Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 510, 519 (1994) (en

banc)). “It is proper for a [fact finder] to consider not only the method by which a victim is

wounded, but also the circumstances under which that injury was inflicted in determining whether

there is sufficient evidence to prove an intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill.” Burkeen v.

Commonwealth, 286 Va. 255, 260-61 (2013). In determining whether a defendant acted with the

requisite intent, a “fact finder may infer that a person intends the immediate, direct, and necessary

consequences of his voluntary acts.” Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 706-07 (1998).

Moreover, a “fact finder is entitled to draw inferences from those facts proven to be true, so long as

the inferences are reasonable and justified.” Cottee v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 546, 555

(2000).

          Accordingly, “when a person without any provocation strikes another with a deadly weapon

. . . and thereby maims or disfigures him, he is presumed to have intended to maim or disfigure

because that was the natural and probable consequence of his act.” Banovitch v. Commonwealth,

196 Va. 210, 216 (1954). In Pannill v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 244 (1946), the Supreme Court

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indicated that, under appropriate circumstances, rocks, bricks, and beer glasses may be deemed

deadly weapons. See id. at 254 (“Among other instruments which may under the circumstances of

their use be regarded as deadly weapons [are] . . . sticks and cudgels, . . . rocks, bricks, [and] beer

glasses . . . .”).

         “Self-defense is an affirmative defense which the accused must prove by introducing

sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt.” Hughes v. Commonwealth, 39

Va. App. 448, 464 (2002) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 68, 71 (1993)). “The trier

of fact determines the weight of evidence in support of a claim of self-defense.” Commonwealth v.

Needham, 55 Va. App. 316, 326 (2009) (quoting Gardner v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 418, 426

(1986)). “Whether an individual establishes that he acted in self-defense is ‘an issue of fact.’” Id.

(quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 979 (1977)).

         Here, Lindsey claimed that Cardona was the aggressor in their initial altercation and that,

after bystanders separated them, Cardona left and returned with a firearm, threatening to kill

Lindsey. Although Officer Rogers corroborated Lindsey’s testimony that Cardona initially had a

gun, the evidence is undisputed that Cardona had nothing in his hands when Lindsey assaulted him

with the bottle. The evidence is also undisputed that Lindsey approached Cardona with a weapon

upon leaving the store rather than retreating from the scene. Although Lindsey testified that he

threw the bottle at Cardona out of fear and because he did not realize that police officers were

present, a rational fact finder was entitled to reject Lindsey’s self-serving testimony. See Flanagan

v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011) (“In its role of judging witness credibility, the fact

finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the

accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” (quoting Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10

(1998))). As depicted in the body-worn camera footage, Officer Rogers’s partner was in plain sight

in front of the store entrance only moments before Lindsey exited with a wine bottle. The footage

                                                   -9-
showed Lindsey walking backward as he approached Officer Rogers and Cardona, concealing the

wine bottle until he drew close enough to assault Cardona.

       Viewed as a whole, the circumstances reasonably supported the conclusion that Lindsey

waited until Cardona was distracted and unarmed before surreptitiously approaching him and

striking him in the face with a wine bottle at close range. Based on the nature of the attack and the

injuries depicted in Cardona’s hospital photographs, the evidence supported a reasonable conclusion

that Lindsey struck Cardona with great force, permitting a rational inference that Lindsey intended

to maim, disfigure, or disable Cardona. Accordingly, the evidence was competent, credible, and

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lindsey was guilty of unlawful wounding.

                                           CONCLUSION

       For the reasons stated, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                             Affirmed.

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