Court Opinion

ID: 9579021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:50:43.478598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:11.617351
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. The first new trial was
granted in this case for the reason that there was no proof of a demand which could be the basis of a recovery of a penalty and attorney’s fees. On the hearing of the motion for a new trial after the last trial, the trial judge approved the principal amount of the damage. His order as to damages and attorney’s fee was to the effect (a) that there was a substantial and bona fide difference of opinion between the parties as to the true amount of the loss and that the company had a right to contest the amount (not the fact) of the plaintiff’s claim, and (b) that there was no satisfactory evidence of any demand on the defendant after thirty days from the date of the fire. Nobody disputes his ruling on the principal damage. The difference of opinion of the parties as to the amount of damages was from $150 to $170, approximately. It is clear to me that the company had a legal right to contest the amount of the damages without penalty.
On direct examination the plaintiff testified that the proof of loss was filled in by an adjuster for the defendant and the proof filed on August 29th. The following questions and answers to *662and by the plaintiff appear of record: “Q. He came out there and filed a proof of loss? What day was that? A. It was on the 29th of August. Q. The 29th of August? A. Yes, sir. I think it was now, the 29th of August.” Honorable 0. Frank Brant, attorney for the plaintiff, testified that he made -a demand on a representative of the defendant on September 29, 1956, which he testified was exactly 30 days from the time the car was burned. However, Mr. Brant did not testify definitely that he made the demand on September 29th. He fixed the time by the date of a letter written to him by a representative of the defendant. The letter was dated September 27th. He was asked how he went by his letters to fix the date of demand as September 29th. His answer was that it was because it was a day after he received the letter and that he remembered the representative was in the witness’s office the next day and that the letter was written on the 27th and he must have gotten it on the 28th. Furthermore, the attorney did not testify on the question of a demand on the first trial and the claim for damages and attorney’s fees was not sustained because the proof failed to show that one was made 30 days after proof of loss was filed under policy provisions. It seems to me that the judge was exercising a proper and permissible discretion in granting a new trial. The plaintiff was uncertain as to when the proof of loss was filed and his attorney did not testify positively that the demand was made on the 29th of September. The proof on the question of demand was' not the same as on the former trial and whatever reason in general there is for decreasing the latitude of a judge’s discretion on a second motion for a new trial the reason is not present here and the facts put it in the same category as the first grant of a new trial. .,

Townsend, J:, concurs in the dissent.