Court Opinion

ID: 9542908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:40:08.528789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:14.412050
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
specially concurring.
Wyoming is both a “revelation” state1 and an “evidence of negligence” state.2 Neither label has any inherent significance, although both may enjoy a reputation for beauty depending upon the eye of the beholder. Neither would be universally acclaimed. It is difficult, though, to fathom a court which can subscribe to Mostert v. CBL & Associates, Inc., 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo.1987), and yet steadfastly cling to the “evidence of negligence” concept. Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, 731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo.1987).
The majority has reached a result in this instance with which I am generally in accord. In my judgment, however, the product of that decision leaves with the district judge a necessity for holding a trial to determine the question of immunity. I am of the view that a more incisive analysis results in the same appropriate solution to the problem posed by this case, but it offers a prospect of avoiding a trial simply for the purpose of determining whether a standard of care was violated so that available insurance may avoid the defense of governmental immunity.
The majority adopts a standard of reasonable care and apparently suggests that one may consider a violation of the statutes in determining whether that standard of reasonable care has been violated. This, of course, is simply an application of the classic labeling “evidence of negligence” as distinguished from “negligence per se.” Those labels do not really afford any precise analysis in any situation, however, and I suggest that they are historical relics that need to be re-examined.
We are resolving the issue in the context of a summary judgment. This court has said that no question of a “conflict of material facts” can exist in the absence of evidence establishing a standard of conduct or duty. Furthermore, the determination of the standard of care or duty is a matter of law and not within the province of the jury. Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo.1974), followed in Apperson v. Kay, 546 P.2d 995 (Wyo.1976). In Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., supra, this court quoted from W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 37, at 205 (4th Ed.1971), to make the point that there first must be proof of facts that give rise to a duty or standard of conduct. As I understand the record in this case, the only facts which would give rise to a duty or standard of conduct are found in the provisions of the statute. As the majority notes, § 18-5-301, W.S.1977, vests the regulation and control of the subdivision of land in unincorporated areas in the county in the Board of County Commissioners. The majority opinion assumes that the statute creates a private cause of action in these appellants, and I agree that the provisions of § 18-5-312, W.S.1977, are sufficiently narrowing to justify that assumption. I am in accord that we have identified facts which give rise to a duty.
In the course of its discussion, the majority alludes to:
<i * * »¡Tjhe following additional factors when the defendant is a governmental entity: (1) the scope of the public entity’s powers; (2) the role imposed on the public agency by law; (3) budget limitations; and (4) whether the enactment imposing the duty is designed to protect against the risk of a particular injury. 4 C. *268Sands & M. Libonati, Local Government Law § 27.13 at p. 27-93 (1982).” Ante at 265.
The proposition that a statute may impose a duty upon a public officer, the violation of which can result in liability if it is a cause of injury, is not new or novel. See, e.g., Oleszczuk v. State, 124 Ariz. 373, 604 P.2d 637 (1979); Powell v. Village of Mount Zion, 88 Ill.App.3d 406, 43 Ill.Dec. 525, 410 N.E.2d 525 (1980); Harvey v. Board of Commissioners of Wabash County, 416 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind.App. 2 Dist. 1981); Indiana State Highway Commission v. Rickert, 412 N.E.2d 269 (Ind.App. 3 Dist.1980), vacated by 425 N.E.2d 620 (1981); Howley v. Scott, 123 Minn. 159, 143 N.W. 257 (1913). But see Trianon Park Condominium Association, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1985). It is interesting to note that the factors recognized by the several courts in finding a duty on the part of a public officer, which is created by a statute, are quite similar to those identified in the passage of the majority opinion quoted above. In particular, they focus upon the fourth factor set forth in the quoted passage, and there is also a recognized dichotomy between discretionary functions and ministerial functions as to which no discretion exists. This court discussed that distinction in Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042 (Wyo.1980).
Once it is recognized that the statute in this instance structures a duty on the part of the public officer owed to an individual or an identifiable class of individuals, the logic of the “evidence of negligence” rule breaks down. At this point, the proposition is that the statute structures a ministerial duty, sufficiently narrowed to create a cause of action in an individual or a class of individuals because the statute was designed to protect them. This is essential in the summary judgment context or the appellants must lose. Yet, the majority goes on to say that the statute may or may not create a duty because the failure to comply with it may be found not to breach the duty owed to the appellants. There is absolutely no question that the statute was not complied with. If the statute does not establish the standard of conduct manifesting a duty to the appellants, it would seem that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment. In this circumstance, the evidence of negligence rule simply begs the question. The rule which holds that the statute creates a minimum standard, the violation of which results in the presence of the first two elements of a tort action is preferable and should be followed.
The tenor of the majority opinion then is that the duty here is a duty to proceed as a reasonable county commissioner would under the same or similar circumstances. I am persuaded that the thrust of § 18-5-306, W.S.1977, in certain respects, is to create a minimum standard of care. In part, this statute provides:
“(a) The board shall require the following information to be submitted with each application for a subdivision permit: * * * * * *
“(iv) Written certification of a licensed Wyoming engineer certifying as to the adequacy and safety of the sewage disposal system proposed for the subdivision, including the adequacy of the proposed system in relation to the topography of the subdivision, the proposed population density, soil conditions and watersheds located on or draining into or over the proposed subdivision. If no public sewage disposal system is proposed by the subdivider, the words “NO PROPOSED PUBLIC SEWAGE DISPOSAL SYSTEM,” in bold capital letters shall appear on all offers, solicitations, advertisements, contracts, agreements and plats relating to the subdivision; * * *.” Section 18-5-306(a)(iv), W.S.1977.
This is an apt way to say that no reasonable county commissioner would ever approve a subdivision application without that information. Simply put, the legislature has said that this is the minimum standard of care for a reasonable county commissioner.
I recognize that the majority is inhibited by the limitation of the labeling claimed by the concurring opinions in Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo.*2691987). My understanding of that opinion, Distad v. Cuban, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo.1981), and the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which are alluded to in those opinions, is that the suggested rule does nothing more than recognize the authority of a legislative or regulatory body to articulate a minimum standard of care. I perceive that to be something quite different from a rule of “negligence per se,” whatever that broad phrase may connote.
To reiterate, then, in this instance, I am satisfied that § 18-5-301, W.S.1977, and the following sections recognize an obligation owed by the Board of County Commissioners to the Pickles. Section 18-5-306(a)(iv), W.S.1977, provides a minimum requirement in order to honor that obligation. I understand that the record is clear that no written certification by a licensed Wyoming engineer, as required by the statute, was obtained. The parties do not argue otherwise. Given those circumstances, it would seem that a rational justification is present for concluding that the first two elements of the tort of negligence, duty and a violation of that duty, are present in this instance, and there is no genuine issue of material fact in that regard. The appellants, however, must still establish facts demonstrating the elements of proximate cause and their damages, but I believe those are the issues which the trial court should submit to the jury.
Acknowledging the right of the legislature to articulate a standard for all members of the community who are county commissioners, the breach of which is not permitted, and the conceded fact of deviation in this instance helps the trial court deal with the defense of immunity arising out of a claim of no insurance coverage. It would assist the trial court in deciding as a matter of law whether any of the insurance contracts offer coverage, and it will avoid the necessity of a trial to determine whether there is negligence before coverage, which avoids immunity, can be identified.
We live in a complicated and sophisticated society. The incidence of governmental regulation of many kinds of activities is proceeding at what might be described as a geometric rate. Since that is the direction taken in our society, it seems that it is essential to recognize the authority of a legislative or regulatory body to establish a minimum standard with which everyone is expected to comply. I even wonder, without offering any solution, whether the judicial branch of government honors the separation of powers doctrine found in Article 2 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming if it attempts to deny the authority of the legislative branch of government to adopt statutes setting forth a standard for all members of the community from which they may not deviate without a determination that there has been a breach of the appropriate standard of conduct. The analysis from that premise serves as a vehicle for avoiding a prospect criticized in Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., supra, letting the standard rest in the whim and personal views of the jurors. If the judicial branch insists that it is always up to the jury to consider whether a reasonable, prudent person would deviate from a statutory requirement, there really is no statutory duty susceptible of uniform enforcement.
It is noted in W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 36 at 221 (5th Ed.1984), that under federal law the question to be resolved is whether a private cause of action was implied in the enactment of a federal statute, which is perceived to be a question of legislative intent. As I initially noted, the court assumes an obligation giving rise to a cause of action in this instance which I think the statute justifies, even though the only facts and circumstances that are apparent are found in the statute. I believe that an analysis of the statute to determine whether it sets forth a minimum standard is substantially the same analysis that often occurs in the federal courts in determining whether there is an implied private cause of action. While such a rule might be undesirable for every enactment of a statute, ordinance, or regulation (see W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 36 at 231), the criteria suggested by Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 286, afford the adequate flexibility and do not seem to be a substantial departure *270from the succinct statement of the four factors identified by the majority to be considered when the defendant is a governmental entity.

. Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo.1987).

. Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo.1987) (special concurrences of Brown, C.J., and Urbigkit and Macy, JJ.).