Court Opinion

ID: 9368303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 17:07:36.767976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.780049
License: Public Domain

J-S25041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    LARRY BENEFIELD FASON                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 224 WDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 2, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000168-2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023

       Appellant, Larry Benefield Fason, appeals from the order entered in the

Cambria County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition brought

under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

       A prior panel of this Court set forth the facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

          On November 5, 2017, Johnstown Police Department
          officers and detectives were dispatched to the area of Bell
          Place and Messenger Street in Johnstown, Pennsylvania,
          after a report of a deceased body. When they arrived on
          the scene, they observed a deceased female lying in an
          apartment complex’s trash receptacle area. The deceased,
          later identified as Angela Lunn (Victim), a known
          acquaintance of Appellant, was partially clothed and had
          multiple contusions on her face and head.

          Upon investigation, detectives noticed droplets of blood
____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546
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       “leading from [Victim] up to the staircase to the rear of an
       apartment complex.” N.T., 7/16/19, at 78. The blood trail
       led to a third floor apartment, where Appellant resided.
       Appellant allowed police to enter the apartment to remove
       some of Victim’s personal belongings. Once inside, police
       immediately were “hit with a very strong smell of cleaning
       products; ammonia, like Clorox type smell.” N.T., 7/17/19,
       at 59. The police also noticed blood stains around the
       kitchen sink and droplets of blood on the floor, which
       appeared “to be the same blood trail leading out the door.”
       N.T., 7/16/19, at 81.

       Police obtained a “body warrant” for Appellant, seeking
       photographs of his body, as well as samples of his blood,
       DNA samples, pubic hair, hair follicles, and fingernail
       clippings. Appellant was transported to a local hospital
       where a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) examined
       Appellant and found blood on his finger, right foot, left toes,
       and underneath his left foot toenails. The officers also
       obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s apartment, where
       they recovered a “jug” of ammonia and a “jug” of detergent
       from the kitchen, and a tire iron, which was sticking out of
       a water jug in the master bedroom.

       Upon noticing a surveillance camera facing the trash bin
       area, Detective Sergeant Corey Adams contacted the
       manager of the Elks Lodge to view the video beginning at
       midnight the night before. … The recording, which was
       played for the jury at trial, showed Victim arrive at the
       apartment complex at 4:15 a.m. on November 5th. At
       approximately 5:30 a.m., Appellant could be seen placing
       two “shopping bags” inside a dumpster. An hour later, the
       video showed Appellant positioning Victim’s body in the
       trash bin area before returning to his apartment. … The
       detective later retrieved the shopping bags from the
       dumpster and discovered “numerous rags and towels
       soaked with blood, clumps of hair, … a pillowcase saturated
       in blood, and other pieces of garbage.” [N.T., 7/16/19, at
       142.]

                                *    *    *

       The trial court summarized the testimony of forensic
       pathologist Dr. Kevin Whaley regarding Victim’s injuries as

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       follows:

          [Dr.] Whaley testified that [Victim] suffered numerous
          defensive and blunt force traumas that resulted in a
          variety of injuries and that three of those injuries
          would have been fatal with one being immediately
          fatal.

          [Dr.] Whaley testified that [Victim’s] injuries from the
          blunt force trauma included: a fracture to her
          mandible; a right and left basilar skull fracture; diffuse
          subgaleal hemorrhaging, where blood pools under the
          scalp; [subarachnoid] hemorrhaging where blood
          pools around the brain; cerebrospinal fluid leaking
          from the left ear canal through the left side basilar
          fracture across the petrous ridge; a green stick
          fracture to her right arm’s ulna; a comminuted
          fracture of her right wrist bones; a fracture to the left
          arm’s ulna bone; fractures to the front and sides of
          her left ribs numbers 3-7; a punctured left upper lung
          lobe resulting from a broken rib entering the lung;
          fractures to the front and sides of her right ribs
          numbers 2 and 6-10; her right ear being partially torn
          off; a lacerated spleen resulting from a broken rib
          piercing the organ; vaginal and rectal tearing; her left
          ear being damaged; hair torn from the scalp; and
          multiple abrasions, lacerations and bruises over her
          body. [Dr.] Whaley explained that [Victim’s] injuries
          to her arms were consistent with defensive injuries
          that result when a person attempts to shield the head
          or body with their forearms.

          [Dr.] Whaley testified that the bruising on [Victim’s]
          buttocks, chest, abdomen, thighs, arms, and chin
          suggested it had been caused by a weapon since the
          bruising showed a tram track pattern…. Based on the
          bruises here [Dr.] Whaley concluded [Victim] had
          been struck repeatedly and with significant force by a
          long and narrow diameter object, such as a rod or
          board, on her head, chest, abdomen, arms, legs,
          buttocks, and chin….

          [Dr.] Whaley explained, that of the injuries [Victim]
          sustained three would be fatal with one resulting in

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          immediate death. [Dr.] Whaley noted that both the
          punctured lung and lacerated spleen would have
          resulted in [Victim’s] death unless immediate medical
          aid was provided. He noted that there was little blood
          loss from [Victim’s] lung or spleen injury into the body
          cavity    indicating that the injuries occurred
          immediately prior to or after [Victim’s] death when
          her blood pressure was minimal to nonexistent. [Dr.]
          Whaley explained that a person with a left side basilar
          fracture like [Victim’s] would be able to survive for a
          period of time without medical attention but would
          eventually die without aid[.] He explained that a
          similar right side basilar fracture would be “most
          immediately lethal” as it would result in damage to the
          brain stem resulting in the shutdown of a person’s
          autonomic functions such as heart rate and
          respiration. [Dr.] Whaley testified that it would take
          a significant blow to cause such a right side basilar
          fracture as the bone in that area is the thickest in the
          body. He opined that based upon the autopsy[,] it
          was likely caused by the blow to [Victim’s] chin with
          the force resulting in the fractured jaw and traveling
          through the skull to cause the two basilar fractures
          and injury to the brain stem…. Finally, he opined that
          such a right side basilar fracture could not be caused
          by a simple fall or a normal fall down stairs.

       Trial Ct. Op., 1/27/20, at 8-10.

       Forensic testing revealed one hair fragment, but no blood
       on a tire iron recovered from Appellant’s apartment. With
       regard to the items sent for DNA testing, Appellant’s DNA
       matched DNA found under the nails of Victim’s hands.
       Victim’s DNA matched the blood sample recovered from
       Appellant’s left toes and boxer shorts, as well as various
       blood samples recovered from Appellant’s apartment.
       Moreover, “DNA from the four human hairs recovered from
       the clumps located in the dumpster contained one DNA
       profile that was a match to [Victim].”

       Appellant testified to the following in his own defense at
       trial. In the early morning hours of November 5, 2017,
       Victim came to his apartment with “bruises on her face, …
       [h]er lip was busted[, and s]he was leaking blood from her

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       mouth.” N.T., 7/18/19, at 52. Victim asked to use his
       bathroom, and borrowed some towels so she could “wash
       up.” The two then smoked “weed” and “crack cocaine.”
       Appellant started to get “piss[ed] off” when Victim neglected
       to use an ashtray, and let the ashes from her cigarettes fall
       on the floor. As he attempted to sweep up the ashes, he
       and Victim had words, and she bit his finger. At that point,
       Appellant pushed her “kind of rough.” Appellant explained:
       “She came back — she like had her head on my chest, …
       and then I pushed her off me again a little harder[, and] she
       fell and hurt herself on the wall.” [Id. at 57.]

       He told the detectives that he “just F-ing snapped out”
       because he was angry at Victim for messing up his
       apartment. Appellant then put the bloody rags Victim used
       to clean herself in a garbage bag, and took them to the
       dumpster.      He also began cleaning the blood spots
       throughout the apartment with disinfectant.             Shortly
       thereafter, Appellant discovered Victim “broke [his] weed
       plant[,]” at which point, he told her she “really [had] to go.”
       As Victim started down the steps, “[s]he got her feet
       messed up on the top of the step, and . . . fell backwards”
       to the second floor landing. Id. at 61. Appellant helped her
       up, and as she was holding his arm for support, she lost her
       grip, and fell “straight down” the rest of the steps, and
       struck her head on a pillar. Victim got up and walked a few
       steps before collapsing.        Appellant admitted he then
       dragged her to the dumpster area before returning to his
       apartment. He claimed he never meant to hurt her, and he
       “thought she was okay” because she was still mumbling
       when he left her. On cross-examination, Appellant stated
       he “told a lot of pieces of lies” to the police because he was
       scared and “in shock” because they had just gotten him out
       of bed and told him Victim was dead. N.T., 7/18/19, at 69.
       He also claimed he was afraid the police would charge him
       with a crime simply because he is black and Victim was
       white.

       The Commonwealth presented one rebuttal witness,
       biochemical engineer and accident reconstructionist, Dr.
       Andrew Rentschler, who opined the basilar skull fracture
       and other injuries Victim sustained were “inconsistent with
       a backward fall down the steps[.].” See N.T., 7/18/19, at
       123. See also id. at 115 (explaining Victim did not have

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        “any depressed or comminuted or splintered-type fractures
        to her skull [that] you would expect with enough force
        striking the skull” to cause the basilar skull fracture). Dr.
        Rentschler testified his opinion would not change even if
        Victim had been pushed down the steps.

Commonwealth v. Fason, 255 WDA 2020, unpublished memorandum at 1-

4 (Pa.Super. January 6, 2021) (some internal citations to the record omitted).

     On July 19, 2019, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and

aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment

on September 17, 2019. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on

January 6, 2021, and Appellant did not petition for allowance of appeal with

our Supreme Court. See id. Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on

April 1, 2021. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA

petition on July 28, 2021.   The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on

September 16, 2021, and denied PCRA relief on February 2, 2022.            On

February 15, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a voluntary

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

     Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

        Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellant’s prior
        trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to call an expert
        witness to contradict and/or challenge the Commonwealth’s
        medical expert?

        Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellant’s prior
        trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to call a medical
        expert to rebut the Commonwealth’s claim that he caused
        the decedent’s death, as Appellant contends that at the time
        of the incident which led to the victim’s death, that he was
        in no physical condition to harm or injure the victim as the
        Commonwealth so alleged?

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         Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellant’s prior
         trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to call his next-
         door neighbor to testify at his trial?

         Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellant’s prior
         trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to call former
         Johnstown Police Detective Dan Fisher to testify at his trial,
         as well as a female police officer to testify?

         Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellant’s prior
         trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the
         jury pool hardly having any minorities?

         Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellant’s prior
         trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a
         change in venue?

         Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellant’s prior
         trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to prepare him to
         testify at trial?

         Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellant’s prior
         trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to investigate his
         nephew, DeShawn Jones, as a potential suspect in the
         matter.

         Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellant’s prior
         trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the
         constant display of the autopsy photographs by the
         Commonwealth to the jury.

(Appellant’s Brief at 4-5) (reordered for purpose of disposition).

      “Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination

and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty,

207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 482, 218

A.3d 850 (2019). This Court grants great deference to the factual findings of

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the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings.

Commonwealth v. Howard, 249 A.3d 1229 (Pa.Super. 2021). “[W]e review

the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater, 256 A.3d

1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021). Further, “we must defer to the PCRA court’s

findings of fact and credibility determinations, which are supported by the

record.”   Commonwealth v. Diaz, 183 A.3d 417, 421 (Pa.Super. 2018),

aff’d, 657 Pa. 618, 226 A.3d 995 (2020).

      In his first four issues combined, Appellant contends trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to call various witnesses in Appellant’s defense.

Specifically, Appellant asserts that trial counsel failed to call an expert witness

to challenge and contradict the Commonwealth’s medical expert, Dr. Whaley.

Appellant argues that due to trial counsel’s failure in this regard, “the jury had

no choice but to believe the unchallenged and uncontradicted testimony of Dr.

Whaley.” (Appellant’s Brief at 12). Additionally, Appellant argues that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to call a medical expert to opine on

Appellant’s weakened physical state. Appellant contends that such an expert

would have demonstrated to the jury that Appellant, who was suffering from

cancer at the time, was physically incapable of inflicting the injuries that

caused Victim’s death.

      Further, Appellant asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call

Appellant’s neighbor to testify. Appellant claims he informed trial counsel “of

the existence of his next-door neighbor; however, [trial counsel] failed to take

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the affirmative steps to contact her in order to get her to testify.” Id. at 24-

25. Additionally, Appellant objects to trial counsel’s failure to call Detective

Dan Fisher, who gathered evidence at the crime scene in Appellant’s case and

later resigned from the Johnstown Police Department after pleading guilty to

obstruction of justice in an unrelated case. Appellant insists he was prejudiced

because “Detective Fisher’s testimony could have been impeached based on

his subsequent criminal charges and resignation from the Johnstown Police

Department.”     Id. at 25.    Appellant also asserts that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to call a female police officer, whose name is unknown,

because “it is not known what evidence, or lack thereof, she was in possession

of.” Id. at 26-27. Appellant maintains that trial counsel’s failure to call these

witnesses   prejudiced   Appellant     because   their   testimony    would   have

corroborated Appellant’s account of events. Appellant concludes trial counsel

was ineffective for these reasons, and this Court must vacate the order

denying PCRA relief. We disagree.

      “Counsel   is   presumed    to   have   rendered    effective   assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

         [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
         defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
         ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
         of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
         process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
         could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
         prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
         claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no

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         reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
         and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
         a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
         proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).    The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

      “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175,

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524,

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004).

      “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his

client’s interests.”   Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

         The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
         basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
         counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
         alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
         potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be

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           considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
           interests.  We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
           comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
           have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

      “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).          “[A] criminal

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3,

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).

      For claims of ineffectiveness based upon counsel’s failure to call a

witness:

           A defense attorney’s failure to call certain witnesses does
           not constitute per se ineffectiveness.       In establishing
           whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call
           witnesses, a defendant must prove the witnesses existed,
           the witnesses were ready and willing to testify, and the
           absence of the witnesses’ testimony prejudiced petitioner
           and denied him a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Cox, 603 Pa. 223, 267-68, 983 A.2d 666, 693 (2009)

(internal citations omitted).    A petitioner “must show how the uncalled

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witnesses’ testimony would have been beneficial under the circumstances of

the case.” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 441, 951 A.2d 1110,

1134 (2008).

      Instantly, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

call medical expert witnesses to contradict the Commonwealth’s medical

expert testimony on Victim’s injuries and to opine on Appellant’s physical state

at the time of the murder.      Nevertheless, Appellant failed to identify any

medical experts that were available and willing to testify in a manner that

would have been beneficial to Appellant’s defense. See Cox, supra; Gibson,

supra. Appellant’s contention that a medical expert retained by trial counsel

would have come to a different conclusion than the Commonwealth’s medical

expert about Victim’s injuries is pure speculation. Similarly, Appellant did not

present any evidence other than his own self-serving testimony to establish

that there was a medical expert who was available and willing to opine that

Appellant was too physically weak to cause Victim’s injuries.       This claim is

particularly dubious because of the surveillance video evidence showing

Appellant maneuvering Victim’s body on the night of the murder.           On this

record, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant failed to meet his burden

of proof to establish ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the failure to

call medical experts. See id.; Beaty, supra.

      Further, the PCRA court found trial counsel was not ineffective for failing

to call Appellant’s neighbor to testify.      The record supports the court’s

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conclusion. There is no dispute that Appellant’s neighbor passed away prior

to Appellant’s trial, making her unavailable to testify. Appellant provides no

relevant authority or evidence to demonstrate that counsel was unreasonable

for failing to preserve the neighbor’s testimony prior to her death. We also

note that Appellant is again merely speculating that the neighbor saw or heard

anything that would have been beneficial to Appellant’s defense. See Gibson,

supra.

      Likewise, Appellant failed to demonstrate that either of the police

officers Appellant fault trial counsel for failing to call as witnesses knew

information that was relevant or beneficial to Appellant’s defense. Appellant

fails to provide a name for the female officer and offers no evidence about

what information to which she could have testified in support of Appellant’s

defense. Regarding Detective Fisher, the PCRA court credited trial counsel’s

testimony that he interviewed Detective Fisher and determined that Detective

Fisher did not have any relevant information that would be helpful to

Appellant’s case and would only serve to be a distraction. Appellant does not

refute trial counsel’s assessment of Detective Fisher’s testimony but merely

asserts that trial counsel could have impeached him based on infractions in an

unrelated case. As such, Appellant failed to establish that Detective Fisher’s

testimony would have been beneficial for his defense. See id. Accordingly,

we discern no error in the PCRA court’s determination that Appellant’s claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to call witnesses were

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without merit. See id.; Beaty, supra.

      In his fifth issue, Appellant contends that the process utilized by Cambria

County to select jurors systematically excludes minorities from the jury pool,

which resulted in a disproportionately low number of minorities in the jury

pool for Appellant’s trial. Appellant argues that trial counsel’s failure to object

to the disproportionate number of minorities in the jury pool was

unreasonable.    Appellant asserts that trial counsel’s failure compromised

Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to have a fair and impartial trial heard by

a jury of his peers. Appellant concludes trial counsel’s failure in this regard

amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel and we should vacate the order

denying his PCRA petition. We disagree.

      To establish a prima facie violation of the requirement that a jury array

fairly represent the community, Appellant must show:

         (1) the group allegedly excluded is a distinctive group in the
         community; (2) the representation of this group in venires
         from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
         relation to the number of such people in the community;
         and (3) this underrepresentation is due to systematic
         exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.
         “Systematic” means caused by or inherent in the system by
         which juries were selected. Proof is required of an actual
         discriminatory practice in the jury selection process, not
         merely under-representation of one particular group. The
         defendant bears the initial burden of presenting prima facie
         evidence of discrimination in the jury selection process.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 576 Pa. 23, 55, 838 A.2d 663, 682 (2003),

cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1008, 125 S.Ct. 617, 160 L.Ed.2d 471 (2004) (internal

citations omitted).

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        Instantly, trial counsel testified that he did not believe a challenge to

the racial composition of the jury pool was warranted because the African

American population in Cambria County was relatively small and there were

several African Americans in the jury pool. Appellant failed to produce any

evidence to refute counsel’s assessment of the merits of such a challenge

other    than   unsupported conclusory statements        that   Cambria   County

systematically excludes minorities from the jury pool. See id. Accordingly,

we agree with the PCRA court that there was no arguable merit to an objection

to the racial composition of the jury pool and as such, Appellant’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim fails. See id.; Sandusky, supra; Poplawski,

supra.

        In his sixth issue, Appellant avers that the extensive pre-trial publicity

regarding his trial tainted the jury pool such that a change in venue was

warranted. Appellant claims trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing

to request a change in venue. Appellant concludes that trial counsel’s failure

prevented him from having a fair and impartial jury, and the PCRA court erred

in concluding that trial counsel provided effective assistance. We disagree.

        “As a general rule, for a defendant to be entitled to a change of venue

because of pretrial publicity, he or she must show that the publicity caused

actual prejudice by preventing the empaneling of an impartial jury.”

Commonwealth v. Bardo, 629 Pa. 352, 409, 105 A.3d 678, 712 (2014)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Briggs, 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291 (2011), cert.

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denied, 565 U.S. 889, 132 S.Ct. 267, 181 L.Ed.2d 157 (2011)). “The mere

existence of pretrial publicity alone, however, does not constitute actual

prejudice.” Id.

         Nevertheless, our [Supreme] Court has recognized that
         there are some instances in which pretrial publicity can be
         so pervasive and inflammatory a defendant does not have
         to prove actual prejudice. Prejudice will be presumed
         whenever a defendant demonstrates that the pretrial
         publicity: (1) was sensational, inflammatory, and slanted
         toward conviction, rather than factual and objective; (2)
         revealed the defendant’s prior criminal record, if any, or
         referred to confessions, admissions or reenactments of the
         crime by the defendant; or (3) derived from official police
         or prosecutorial reports. However, if the defendant proves
         the existence of one or more of these circumstances, a
         change of venue will still not be compelled unless the
         defendant also demonstrates that the presumptively
         prejudicial pretrial publicity was so extensive, sustained,
         and pervasive that the community must be deemed to have
         been saturated with it, and that there was insufficient time
         between the publicity and the trial for any prejudice to have
         dissipated.

Bardo, supra at 409-10, 105 A.3d at 712-13.

      Instantly, Appellant once again merely makes conclusory statements

that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a change of venue based

on pretrial publicity.   Appellant failed to present any evidence of actual

prejudice as a result of pretrial publicity or evidence regarding the nature,

extent and content of pretrial publicity such that prejudice could be presumed.

See id. Additionally, trial counsel testified that he discussed the possibility of

requesting a change of venue with Appellant and made a strategic choice to

not do so because of the risk that the case could be transferred to a county

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with an even smaller African American population. On this record, we agree

with the PCRA court that Appellant failed to establish that a change of venue

request would have been meritorious or that trial counsel’s actions were

unreasonable under the circumstances. See id.; King, supra; Sandusky,

supra; Poplawski, supra.

      In his seventh issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel failed to prepare

him to testify for trial and did not properly advise him “of the potential harms

and dangers he may face from cross-examination by the Commonwealth.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 21).   Appellant avers that trial counsel only informed

Appellant that he would be testifying at the beginning of trial and failed to

discuss the content of Appellant’s testimony with him before he got on the

stand. Appellant argues that trial counsel’s failure to prepare him to testify

“constituted a total abandonment of counsel, as well as an abdication of the

minimum performance required of defense counsel”. Id. at 22. Appellant

concludes the PCRA court erred in finding that trial counsel did not provide

ineffective assistance of counsel and we should vacate the order denying PCRA

relief. We disagree.

      Here, the PCRA court credited trial counsel’s testimony contradicting

Appellant’s claims regarding his testimony at trial. Trial counsel testified that

he believed Appellant needed to testify and had multiple discussions with

Appellant about his testimony prior to trial. Trial counsel further testified that

he properly prepared Appellant to testify, noting that they went over all the

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areas that trial counsel would ask him on direct examination and discussed

the possible issues that the Commonwealth may raise on cross examination.

As it is strictly within the purview of the PCRA court to make credibility

determinations, we discern no error in the court’s determination that

Appellant’s claim is without merit. See Diaz, supra; Beaty, supra.

      In his eighth issue, Appellant asserts that trial counsel failed to

investigate his nephew, DeShawn Jones, as a potential suspect in Victim’s

murder. Appellant submits that he told trial counsel that Mr. Jones periodically

resided in Appellant’s apartment, but trial counsel made no effort to

investigate whether Mr. Jones was present on the night of the murder.

Appellant claims that Mr. Jones suspiciously disappeared right after the

murder and trial counsel “should have made an effort to contact or locate this

individual, so that he could have been used in Appellant’s defense.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 31). Appellant concludes that trial counsel’s failure to

investigate Mr. Jones was ineffective assistance of counsel and we should

vacate the order denying PCRA relief. We disagree.

      This Court has explained:

         A claim that trial counsel did not conduct an investigation or
         interview known witnesses presents an issue of arguable
         merit where the record demonstrates that counsel did not
         perform an investigation. It can be unreasonable per se to
         conduct no investigation into known witnesses. A showing
         of prejudice, however, is still required.

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 712 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal

citations omitted).

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      Here, the PCRA court found that trial counsel attempted to investigate

Mr. Jones as a possible suspect and/or witness. Trial counsel testified that

after Appellant raised his suspicions about Mr. Jones, trial counsel made

inquiries about Mr. Jones but was unable to find any evidence that Mr. Jones

was at the apartment on the night of the murder. Additionally, despite trial

counsel’s efforts, he could not locate Mr. Jones prior to trial.       Appellant

admitted that Mr. Jones disappeared after Victim’s murder and his

whereabouts were still unknown at the time of the PCRA hearing. On this

record, we discern no error in the court’s determination that Appellant failed

to demonstrate arguable merit on this claim.         See id.; Beaty, supra.

Additionally, we note that there is no evidence that Mr. Jones was present on

the night of the murder or had any relevant information to help Appellant’s

defense. Accordingly, Appellant failed to establish that he suffered prejudice,

and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. See Sandusky, supra;

Spotz, supra.

      In his ninth issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object when the Commonwealth displayed autopsy photographs of

Victim to the jury.      Appellant contends the photographs were highly

inflammatory and trial counsel admitted that he should have objected when

they were presented to the jury. Appellant concludes the PCRA court erred in

finding that trial counsel’s failure to object was not ineffective assistance of

counsel and we should vacate the order denying PCRA relief. We disagree.

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J-S25041-22

      The principles that govern the admittance of post-mortem photographs

of the victim are as follows:

         Photographs of a murder victim are not per se inadmissible.
         The admission of such photographs is a matter within the
         discretion of the trial judge. The test for determining the
         admissibility of such evidence requires that the court
         employ a two-step analysis. First a court must determine
         whether the photograph is inflammatory. If not, it may be
         admitted if it has relevance and can assist the jury’s
         understanding of the facts.         If the photograph is
         inflammatory, the trial court must decide whether or not the
         photographs are of such essential evidentiary value that
         their need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the
         minds and passions of the jurors.

         In addition, this Court has observed that [a] criminal
         homicide trial is, by its very nature, unpleasant, and the
         photographic images of the injuries inflicted are merely
         consonant with the brutality of the subject of inquiry. To
         permit the disturbing nature of the images of the victim to
         rule the question of admissibility would result in exclusion
         of all photographs of the homicide victim, and would defeat
         one of the essential functions of a criminal trial, inquiry into
         the intent of the actor. There is no need to so overextend
         an attempt to sanitize the evidence of the condition of the
         body as to deprive the Commonwealth of opportunities of
         proof in support of the onerous burden of proof beyond a
         reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 574 Pa. 202, 222, 830 A.2d 519, 531 (2003),

cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1045, 124 S.Ct. 2161, 158 L.Ed.2d 736 (2004) (internal

citations omitted).

      Instantly, the PCRA court observed:

         [C]alling the photographs “autopsy photographs” is a
         pejorative misnomer.     The photographs do not depict
         [Victim]’s autopsy procedure or the condition of her body
         during or after the autopsy. Rather, the photographs were
         taken at the location where the autopsy was performed and

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J-S25041-22

            prior to the autopsy being conducted to show the condition
            of [Victim’s] body and document her injuries.

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed 2/2/22, at 21). The record supports the court’s

assessment.         Additionally, the nature of Victim’s injuries and how she

sustained them was a significant dispute at Appellant’s trial.           Pictures of

Victim’s injuries were important pieces of evidence for the jury to determine

the   credibility    of     Appellant’s   testimony   and   evaluate   whether   the

Commonwealth met its burden of proof.              Therefore, despite trial counsel’s

testimony that in hindsight he should have objected to the photographs, we

hold that such an objection would not have been meritorious. See Tharp,

supra. As such, we discern no error in the PCRA court’s conclusion that this

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was without merit.           See Beaty,

supra. Accordingly, Appellant has failed to succeed on any of his claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel and we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying

relief.

          Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/3/2023

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