Court Opinion

ID: 9956218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 15:07:37.734143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.273141
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13458

            COMMONWEALTH   vs.   JOHN T. CAPPELLUCCI, JR.

                           April 1, 2024.

Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Evidence, Blood
     alcohol test. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress.
     Consent.

     The defendant, John T. Cappellucci, Jr., was charged with
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of both
alcohol and drugs causing serious bodily injury (OUI-SBI)
pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24L. A judge allowed the defendant's
motion to suppress the analysis of his blood samples based on
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) (§ 24 [1] [e]), which conditions the
admissibility of a defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) in a
prosecution for a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (i.e.,
"simple OUI") on the defendant's consent to conduct the
analysis. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the
defendant's blood test results are admissible because the
consent requirement of § 24 (1) (e) applies only to the
prosecution of simple OUI. We agree with the Commonwealth and
therefore reverse.

     1. Facts and prior proceedings. We summarize the
undisputed facts from the pleadings. On December 9, 2021, the
defendant was involved in a head-on automobile accident in
Wayland. The driver of the other car told officers that the
defendant had veered onto her side of the road causing the
collision. The officers noted that the defendant's eyes
appeared bloodshot and glassy and that he smelled of alcohol.
The defendant was arrested on the scene, and both he and the
other driver were transported to the hospital.
                                                                    2

     Although the defendant refused to consent to a test of his
BAC, law enforcement officers applied for and obtained a search
warrant for blood samples that had been taken in the ordinary
course of treatment. The State police crime laboratory later
determined that the defendant's BAC was .09 percent1 and that his
blood tested positive for both fentanyl and tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC).

     The defendant was charged with, among other offenses, two
counts of OUI-SBI, the first under a theory of intoxication by
alcohol, and the second under a theory of intoxication by drugs.
See G. L. c. 90, § 24L (2).2 The defendant successfully moved to
suppress the results of tests performed "at the direction of
police" on blood samples drawn at the hospital, arguing that he
did not consent to the analysis. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e).
The Commonwealth appealed to a single justice of this court, who
allowed the Commonwealth's application for interlocutory appeal
to proceed in this court.

     2. Discussion. This case is governed in all material
respects by our decision today in a companion case, Commonwealth
v. Zucchino, 493 Mass.     (2024), where we concluded that the
clear and unambiguous consent requirement in § 24 (1) (e)
applies only to prosecutions for violations of simple OUI.3
Here, because the defendant has not been charged with a
violation of § 24 (1) (a), the consent provision of § 24 (1) (e)
does not come into play. The defendant's BAC test result thus
is admissible subject to the ordinary rules of evidence.

     1 A blood alcohol content of .08 percent or above is over
the legal limit. See G. L. c. 90, § 24L (2).

     2   General Laws c. 90, § 24L (2), states in pertinent part:

     "Whoever . . . operates a motor vehicle with a percentage,
     by weight, of alcohol in their blood of eight one–
     hundredths or greater, or while under the influence of
     intoxicating liquor, or of marihuana, narcotic drugs,
     depressants or stimulant substances, all as defined in
     [G. L. c. 94C, § 1], . . . and by any such operation causes
     serious bodily injury, shall be punished . . . ."

     3 Because we conclude that the consent requirement of
§ 24 (1) (e) is not applicable to the offenses with which the
defendant has been charged, we need not address the defendant's
secondary argument that the provision also requires a
defendant's consent to test for substances other than alcohol.
                                                                 3

     We reverse the grant of the motion to suppress and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                   So ordered.

     Melissa W. Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney (Daniel
Bolcun, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the
Commonwealth.
     Mark W. Helwig for the defendant.