Court Opinion

ID: 9673155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:07:23.940271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.422688
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. The majority has obviously decided this case in the manner they feel it ought to be decided in spite of the fact that the law reads quite to the contrary. I do not feel we are authorized to make a decision based upon what we feel the law ought to be when it is clearly stated otherwise. The General Assembly clearly expressed its intent, and I do not feel we are justified in interpreting it in the manner which we believe they ought to have expressed their intent on the subject. I have no reason to think the General Assembly is incapable of expressing its intent in a criminal matter such as we have before us. The statute has been accurately stated in the majority opinion and I have no trouble at all in understanding the words used therein even though Noah Webster did not see fit to use such words in his dictionary in 1828. It seems the majority decided there was no intent to change the statutes which have been on the books since 1838. If no changes were intended, then why were the statutes rewritten? No doubt, most members of the legislature know the meaning of “penis,” “vagina,” and “intercourse.” These words are not foreign in Arkansas today even though they may have been Latin in origin. I cannot see the consequence of giving these words their ordinary meaning would verge on the ridiculous. Neither do I consider them to be nebulous or impractical. I understand appellant’s argument to be that the evidence produced at the trial did not prove appellant had violated the law relating to rape. Since the law, as it is clearly expressed, states the penis must penetrate the vagina before a rape has occurred, I think appellant is arguing the evidence does not support a conviction or that the evidence does not support the finding by the jury that his penis entered her vagina. The majority appear to agree with this last statement; however, they go on to state the legislature did not mean what it expressly stated in the statutes. Instead, they say the legislature really meant to say a penis need only penetrate the labia. A doctor who examined the girl immediately after the incident testified that he found evidence of tenderness into the inner surface of the labia up to the hymen at the opening of the vagina. He found no evidence of penetration past the hymen which was still intact. The doctor stated it was possible that there was penetration into the labia up to the hymen by a penis. He stated: I cannot tell the jury that that little girl’s vagina had been penetrated. *** I couldn’t find that she had had sex. Appellant was charged with rape pursuant to 1975 Ark. Acts No. 280, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1803 (Repl. 1977), which reads: (1) A person commits rape if he engages in sexual intercourse . . . with another person: (a) . . . (b) . . . (c) who is less than eleven (11) years old. The statute under which the appellant was charged requires that there must have been sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse is defined in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1801 (Repl. 1977), as follows: (9) “Sexual intercourse” means penetration, however slight, of a vagina by a penis. There is a great difference in the present statute and the former statute relating to rape. The statutes prior to § 41-1801 and § 41-1803 were Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-3401 and 41-3402 (Repl. 1964), which read: 41-3401: Rape is the carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly, and against her will. 41-3402: Proof of actual penetration into the body, shall be sufficient to sustain an indictment for rape. Under the former statutes penetration into the body certainly included penetration into the labia because they are part of the body. There is no need to cite any of the voluminous cases which upheld convictions for rape under the former statute because penetration, however slight, into the body, was sufficient to complete the crime of rape. However, that has been changed by the present statute which became effective in 1976. We have not been required to rule upon the particular issue of penetration as it relates to the present statue. Sexual abuse in the first degree is defined in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1808 (Repl. 1977), as follows: (1) A person commits sexual abuse in the first degree if: (a) he engages in sexual contact with another person by forcible compulsion; or (b) . . . (c) being eighteen (18) years or older, he engages in sexual contact with a person not his spouse who is less than fourteen (14) years old. The Commentary following the last mentioned statute contains the following statement: This section is intended to proscribe intimate bodily contact under circumstances that would constitute rape or carnal abuse if the participants engaged in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity. *** the conduct might, depending on the facts, have been punishable as assault with intent to rape, simple assault, or sodomy. In the new statute the language is definite. It clearly states there must be a penetration of the vagina by a penis in order to complete the offense of rape. Therefore, we necessarily have to make certain determinations relating to the female genitals before deciding whether a rape has in fact occurred. The Attorneys’ Textbook of Medicine, Third Edition, Gordy-Gray, Chapter 291, deals with the parts of the anatomy involved in this case. The hymen is described as follows: The hymen is a thin fold of mucous membrane separating the vulva from the vagina. The vagina is the muscular tube lined with mucous membrane and extends from the hymen to the cervix uteri. The textbook further describes the labia as being exterior to the hymen. Therefore, there can be penetration of the labia without penetration of the vagina. Since the uncontradicted facts in this case show this child’s hymen to be still intact and the doctor’s statement clearly shows there was only possible penetration of the labia, there can be no rape as defined by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1803. Criminal attempt is defined in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-701 (Repl. 1977), as follows: (1) A person attempts to commit an offense if he: (a) . . . (b) purposely engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of an offense whether or not the attendant circumstances are as he believes them to be. It is obvious an attempt to commit rape is present in the facts and circumstances in the record before us. This “attempt” statute is clearly a replacement for a former attempted rape statute. Penalty under the present statute for attempted rape is from 3 to 20 years. The penalty for sexual abuse in the first degree is up to 5 years. Since the legislature used the term “sexual intercourse” in one statute and “sexual contact” in another, I have no reason to believe they did not know the difference. Additionally, the two expressions are defined one immediately following the other in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1801 (Repl. 1977). Also, “deviate sexual activity” is defined in a manner that a first year law student would have no trouble understanding. The legislature certainly went to a lot of trouble and expense needlessly if a change or clarification of the statutes were not intended. Perhaps it is not the legislature that does not understand what the statutes clearly express. In most cases, the female would be able to state she had been penetrated. In such cases such statement would support a conviction for rape. However, here we have a most unusual case as the uncontradicted evidence shows there was no penetration of the vagina. It is not our duty or responsibility to substitute our opinion for that of the legislature when there is no uncertainty or ambiguity. It is not up to us to change the laws so long as they are constitutional. Whether this law should have been changed is for the legislature to decide, not the courts. Strict statutory construction of penal statutes is perhaps the most formidable rule of law in existence today. It has existed for over a hundred years without interruption. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly in favor of those upon whom the penalty is to be imposed. In construing penal provisions, nothing will be taken as intended which is not clearly expressed, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. White v. State, 260 Ark. 361, 538 S.W. 2d 550 (1976). We have stated it is a well-settled rule that penal statutes are strictly construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the defendant, and nothing is taken as intended which is not clearly expressed. State v. Scarmardo, 263 Ark. 396, 565 S.W. 2d 414 (1978). There has never been any attempt to change the strict construction rule. A rule so long in existence has surely found favor by the courts and the legislature. No doubt the legislature acted with due deliberation when enacting the present statutes. Obviously, it had in mind to create several classes of criminal offenses which it defined rape, sexual abuse in the first degree, criminal attempt, and others. The distinction is not without reason. It is manifestly more appropriate that a man who assaults a female to the extent he inserts his penis into her vagina, perhaps destroying the hymen, should receive a more severe sentence than one who intended to accomplish the same act but failed. No doubt justice requires a different sentence in the two types of offenses. No doubt the legislature had in mind the effect it would have on the victim as well as the offender. The stigma attached to a rape victim is great indeed. No doubt the stigma attached to the victim of sexual abuse, or attempted rape, where there is no rape is less severe. The victim in this case is still a virgin in the sense that her hymen is still intact. Had her vagina been penetrated this would no longer be true. We are not unaware of the fact that displacement of the hymen is often accomplished by means other than by sexual intercourse. It is obvious from the facts of this record that appellant attempted to rape this little girl but, for reasons not know to us, he did not complete the dastardly act. Whether he was unable to do so or changed his mind about it is not for us to decide. However, we should apply the proper law to the case. Therefore, I would reverse and remand for the purpose of having appellant tried pursuant to the appropriate statute. I am authorized to state that Mays, J., joins me in this dissent.