Court Opinion

ID: 9685769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:02:18.468597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:10.295972
License: Public Domain

R. H. Bell, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I disagree with the majority on three key points.
As the majority points out, the finding that defendant had constructive notice of the defect at the road’s edge was critical to plaintiffs case. Evidence that this alleged defect even existed on *804the day of plaintiff’s accident was controverted. The majority finds it reasonable to infer from evidence of defendant’s almost daily inspections of the road that the defect should have been discovered and was not. I believe instead that this evidence of frequent inspections supports a conclusion that the defect was discovered and repaired or that there was no defect. Nevertheless, I am reluctant to say that the trial court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C).
Even if defendant was negligent, however, in allowing the drop-off to remain uncorrected, I cannot agree that defendant was negligent in failing to remove the tree. These were alleged by plaintiff, and found by the trial court, to be two separate acts of negligence, but the majority blurs this distinction. This tree was not, as plaintiff insists, "lethal.” It did not violate the "four-wheel” rule discussed in the majority opinion. The tree was more than seventeen feet from the edge of the pavement. The trial court found that only the rear tires of plaintiff’s van were on the shoulder when the front of the van struck the tree. The trial court found that defendant should have kept the area beyond the shoulder of the highway clear, as it was when the highway was constructed in 1936, but there was no evidence of any requirement that it do so. Nor does the evidence of defendant’s roadside maintenance and mowing standards mandate removal of this tree. I cannot agree that the presence of this tree violated the defendant’s duty to maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the award of more than $4 million just for pain and suffering, in addition to more than $3 million for other damages, is not excessive. I find *805this award extraordinarily high and not in conformance with economic reality. However, under Precopio, it is extremely difficult for a reviewing court to lower or set aside an excessive award for noneconomic damages. I share the frustration this Court experienced in Radloff v Michigan (On Remand), 136 Mich App 457; 356 NW2d 31 (1984), lv den 422 Mich 910 (1985), where the panel reluctantly affirmed an award it deemed extraordinarily high because it was "unable to find that the trial court made a mistake.” It seems that I have no choice but to concur in affirming this award.