Court Opinion

ID: 9412490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-31 17:01:20.45604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:26.834371
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 31 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN JOSEPH DRISCOLL,                          No.    20-16025

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:18-cv-08341-JJT

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted July 31, 2023**

Before:      D. NELSON, BERZON, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

      Brian Joseph Driscoll appeals pro se the district court’s affirmance of the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review the district court’s decision de

novo and may reverse only if the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)’s decision is

not supported by substantial evidence or is based in legal error. Attmore v. Colvin,

827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

1.    The ALJ proffered specific, clear, and convincing reasons to discount

Driscoll’s symptom testimony as unsupported by and inconsistent with the medical

record, inconsistent with his driving activities, inconsistent with the ALJ’s

observations, inconsistent with his failure to undergo neuropsychological testing

when it was suggested by Dr. Barry Strasnick, and based on inconsistent symptom

reports. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th

Cir. 2008) (holding that an ALJ may reject a claimant’s subjective testimony if it

contradicts the medical record); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039–40

(9th Cir. 2008) (affirming that inconsistent symptom reporting and an unexplained

failure to follow through with prescribed treatment were clear and convincing

reasons to discount testimony); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007)

(ruling that an ALJ may discount a claimant’s symptom testimony based on

activities that contradict the claimant’s allegations and may rely on personal

observations as part of the overall credibility evaluation). Any errors in the ALJ’s

additional reasons for discrediting Driscoll’s testimony were harmless. See Ford v.

Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1157 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that error is harmless where it

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is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination).

2.    The ALJ did not ignore evidence, fail to address impairments, or otherwise

err in evaluating the medical record. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038 (holding

that this court may reverse only if the ALJ’s decision “contains legal error or is not

supported by substantial evidence” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014)

(concluding that an ALJ meets the substantial evidence standard “by setting out a

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,

stating [her] interpretation thereof, and making findings” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)); Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012

(9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of evidence.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

3.    The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons to discount the opinions of

treating physicians Dr. Michael Rogers and Dr. Christopher Trent and the opinions

of the nonexamining medical advisors as lacking support from the objective

medical record, inadequate for determining Driscoll’s specific limitations, and

inconsistent with Driscoll’s reported driving activity. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154–

55 (holding that an ALJ may reject opinions that are “inadequately supported by

clinical findings” or that are inconsistent with the claimant’s activity level).

Furthermore, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons to discount Dr.

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Rogers’ opinions by relying in part on the contradiction between Dr. Rogers’

account of Driscoll’s driving activity and the evidence in the record concerning

that activity, see Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (determining that an ALJ may

reject a medical opinion that is based on the claimant’s inaccurate reports), as well

as the fact that Dr. Rogers addressed an issue reserved to the Commissioner, see 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (stating a doctor’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability

is not entitled to “any special significance”). The ALJ provided an additional

specific and legitimate reason to discount Dr. Trent’s opinion, as it contained only

a generalized assessment of Driscoll’s condition. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1155

(holding that an ALJ may discount a medical opinion for lacking explanation).

Moreover, contrary to Driscoll’s claims, the ALJ did mention the “Best Doctors”

reports, which were not proper medical opinions as they did not provide an actual

diagnosis or assessment of Driscoll’s physical or mental limitations, but rather

suggested further diagnostic steps. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1) (defining

medical opinions). Therefore, Driscoll’s contentions that the ALJ failed to

consider medical opinions or otherwise erred in evaluating the medical opinion

evidence are unsubstantiated.

4.    Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding, at step two, that Driscoll’s

mental impairments were not severe. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038.

5.    The ALJ did not err in formulating the residual functional capacity (“RFC’),

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and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC formulation. See Howard ex rel.

Wolff, 341 F.3d at 1012 (ruling that the ALJ is responsible for “interpret[ing] the

medical evidence”); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t

is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual

functional capacity.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545).

6.    Driscoll fails to raise a colorable due process claim, where he does not show

that the alleged mailing errors, delays, and consideration of former counsel’s brief

disadvantaged his claim. See Klemm v. Astrue, 543 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir.

2008) (holding that an error must be material for a claimant to state a colorable

constitutional claim). Driscoll also fails to raise a colorable claim of ALJ bias. See

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth the

standard for bias and holding bias was not established where the ALJ provided

“detailed and reasoned written grounds for ruling”).

      AFFIRMED.

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