Court Opinion

ID: 9378165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 18:02:20.715119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:19.045521
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/9/23 In re I.T. CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re I.T., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                D081216
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,                                                         (Super. Ct. No. J520899A)

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

D.E.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marissa A. Bejarano, Judge. Affirmed.
         Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      D.E. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her

parental rights to her son, I.T. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26.) She contends
the juvenile court erred in finding that the parental-benefit exception to the
statutory preference for adoption did not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
Because we conclude Mother has failed to affirmatively demonstrate error,
we affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Six-year-old I.T. came to the attention of the San Diego County Health
and Human Services Agency (Agency) in October 2021, when the Agency
received a referral that his one-year-old sister, D.E., had suffered severe
physical abuse.2 D.E. was admitted to the hospital and a child abuse expert,
Dr. Nienow, opined that her injuries met the criteria for a medical diagnosis
of torture. She sustained full thickness burns to multiple parts of her body,
several bone fractures, severe anemia, bruising to her face, and bald spots
indicative of forceful hair pulling. I.T. reported that he witnessed D.E. being
burned.
      D.E.’s burns covered 14.5 percent of her total body surface area. The
burn pattern raised significant concerns among her treatment team that she
had been intentionally scalded. Her doctors concluded the burns would likely
result in profound permanent scarring because of Mother’s negligence in
promptly seeking medical treatment.

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2     D.E. is not the subject of this appeal and we discussed her only to
provide relevant background to the issues concerning I.T.
                                        2
      D.E. also underwent skeletal imaging studies that revealed seven bone
fractures, including to the bilateral clavicle, bilateral scapular body, and tibia
and fibula injuries. The fractures were severe and would have been
excruciatingly painful at the time they were inflicted. A member of D.E.’s
treatment team opined that the force required to inflict these injuries could
have potentially been fatal. Mother claimed she was unaware that D.E. had
broken bones and did not know how they could have occurred. However,
Dr. Nienow stated that D.E.’s pain responses to the fractures would have
been obvious during normal caretaking activities. According to Dr. Nienow,
D.E.’s broken bones were likely the result of different types of force and
highly indicative of physical abuse. The scapular fractures, in particular, are
“highly associated with physical abuse as they require significant blunt force
trauma” to cause.
      Further medical testing and observation revealed other traumatic
injuries. D.E. had numerous bruises to both sides of her face, and
Dr. Nienow opined the bruising was likely the result of physical abuse. Her
bald spots were likely caused by forceful hair pulling and occurred before the
infliction of the burns and broken bones. She was also significantly
underweight and so severely anemic that she required a blood transfusion.3
Dr. Nienow concluded that D.E. would be placed at extraordinary risk of
ongoing severe abuse if she were returned to Mother’s care.
      Initially, Mother was not honest with D.E.’s doctors or the Agency
when providing a history of D.E.’s injuries. She first reported the burns
resulted accidentally during a bath at D.E.’s paternal great-grandmother’s

3      D.E. was seen by a doctor at Rady Children’s Hospital in July 2021 for
cold-like symptoms. At that time, she was in the 80th percentile on the
growth chart. Less than four months later, in October 2021, she had dropped
to the 20th percentile.
                                        3
home in Tijuana, Mexico. Mother said she left D.E. unattended during a bath
to retrieve a towel, and she believed D.E. kicked the sink’s hot water faucet

on.4 But D.E.’s treatment team believed the location of D.E.’s burns were not
consistent with Mother’s explanations. A detective also determined that,
based on the record of Mother’s travel across the United States-Mexico
border, Mother was not in Mexico on the date she alleged D.E.’s burns
occurred.
      Mother later admitted D.E.’s burns occurred at her home in San Diego
County, and not in Mexico. She disclosed that her boyfriend, B.R., gave D.E.
a bath in the sink while she cooked and I.T. played a videogame in the living
room. Mother heard D.E. crying from the sink and saw steam coming from
the water. B.R. was sitting on the couch on his cellphone while D.E.
remained in the hot water.
      Mother acknowledged D.E. was likely in pain following the incident,
but she decided not to seek medical care because she was afraid of the
Agency’s involvement. She claimed B.R. also dissuaded her from seeking
treatment for D.E. Mother explained she lied about B.R.’s involvement
because he had a criminal history, and she was afraid he would be blamed.
B.R.’s criminal history included charges involving domestic violence and child
cruelty. Although Mother initially denied that B.R. lived in her home, B.R.
confirmed he had been living with Mother since September 2021.

4     Mother also claimed she took D.E. to a hospital in Mexico when she
noticed blisters beginning to form, but she could not provide the name or
contact information for the doctor. A few days later, Mother took D.E. to a
surgeon in Mexico. The surgeon informed Mother that she had second-degree
burns that were bleeding abnormally, and that she was very anemic. A social
worker spoke with the surgeon, who reported that he refused to treat D.E.
because Mother’s account of the injuries did not make sense and he suspected
child abuse.
                                       4
      I.T. reported he had been abused by B.R. He stated that B.R. hurt him
by pulling his hair, hitting him on the head, and bending his fingers outward.
I.T. described B.R. as “ ‘crazy and bad,’ ” and repeatedly stated that he
burned D.E. in the bathtub. Although Mother acknowledged it was possible
that B.R. intentionally harmed D.E., she continued to have contact with him.
      During B.R. and Mother’s relationship, neighbors reported hearing a
man and a woman fighting and throwing things around the apartment. One
neighbor expressed concern because Mother’s apartment was a small one-
bedroom unit, and the children were likely exposed to the fighting.
Neighbors heard children crying from the apartment at all hours of the day
and night. They heard a little boy yelling, “ ‘don’t hurt me.’ ”
      Mother was eventually arrested for charges of torture, mayhem, and
child cruelty arising from D.E.’s injuries.5 In November 2021, the Agency
filed a dependency petition alleging I.T. fell within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court because his sibling had been severely abused or neglected, and
there was a substantial risk that he would be similarly abused or neglected.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court made prima facie findings on the
petition and I.T. was placed in out-of-home care.
      After I.T. and D.E. were removed from her custody, Mother completed
both a parenting and co-parenting course. She also reported that she
participated in an anger management course and began a 52-week child
abuse program, although a representative from the child abuse program
reported that Mother missed the first session of the course and left the second
session early.

5     According to the Agency’s reporting, at the time of the contested section
366.26 hearing in September 2022, Mother was facing criminal charges for
torture, mayhem and child abuse. The record on appeal does not reveal the
disposition of the criminal case.
                                        5
      Based on the severity of D.E.’s injuries and Mother’s refusal to be
truthful regarding the origins of D.E.’s injuries, and the physical abuse
endured by I.T. and the lasting trauma he would likely experience from
observing his sibling being tortured, the Agency recommended that the
juvenile court bypass reunification services. The juvenile court agreed and
denied reunification services to Mother. It made a true finding on the
petition and declared I.T. a dependent of the juvenile court.
      At the contested section 366.26 hearing in September 2022, the juvenile
court found that I.T. was generally and specifically adoptable. The court
determined that Mother had failed to carry her burden of establishing that
the parental-benefit exception to adoption applied. Accordingly, it
terminated Mother’s parental rights to free I.T. for adoption.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Mother’s sole contention in appealing the juvenile court’s termination
order is that the court erred by finding that the parental-benefit exception to
the statutory preference for adoption did not apply. She argues the evidence
“compelled” a finding that I.T. would suffer detriment from the loss of his
relationship with Mother, and the court’s error at the third step of the
analysis “infected” its finding on the parental-benefit exception’s final
balancing test. We conclude Mother has not met her burden of affirmatively
demonstrating error.
                                        I.
                            Section 366.26 Hearing
      At the section 366.26 hearing in September 2022, the juvenile court
received in evidence the Agency’s section 366.26 report and various addenda
reports. The Agency presented the case social worker for cross-examination;

                                        6
no other witnesses testified. We summarize the evidence from the Agency’s
reports and the social worker’s testimony.
      In November 2021, after he was removed from Mother’s custody, I.T.
was placed with his paternal aunt, P.L. (Aunt). Aunt took a twelve-week
leave of absence from work when she assumed care of I.T. A social worker
observed Aunt to be attentive and caring with I.T., and that I.T. appeared
comfortable with Aunt. Aunt reported that I.T. “does very well with her, they
do activities together, they go to places and he does well with routines in her
home.” Aunt, who has known I.T. “all his life,” was committed to adopting
I.T. I.T. said he wanted to stay in Aunt’s home, though he later said he
would also like to live with Mother, his maternal grandmother, and D.E.
      Since March 2022, Mother and I.T. had supervised visits every
Tuesdays for 90 minutes and a video call once or twice a week. By the time of
the hearing, the social worker had supervised eleven visits. During their
visits, Mother and I.T. played games and talked, and Mother often brought
food and toys for I.T. I.T. was usually “happy and excited” to see Mother,
greeting her with hugs. I.T. and Mother were affectionate with each other.
The social worker noted that “[M]other was very loving with [I.T.]” I.T. told
the social worker he enjoyed visits with Mother and that he wanted to
continue them.
      During one visit, I.T. told his Mother he was sad she “ ‘left’ ” him.
Mother explained she did not leave him. When Mother told I.T. she wanted
him to “come home,” I.T. asked “if he would be able to go home soon.” At
another visit, I.T. asked Mother “when they were going to be together,” and
Mother responded they would be together “in the future.” I.T. told the social
worker he missed Mother, and Aunt reported that he often asked when he

                                        7
would be able to visit with Mother again. But on one occasion, according to
Aunt, I.T. did not want to attend a visit with Mother.
      The social worker acknowledged “[t]here is no question that the mother
and [I.T.] have a parent-child relationship.”6 But she observed that I.T. did
not have any strong emotional reactions when his visits with Mother ended.
He was “able to exit the visit with no emotional concerns,” and would leave
Mother with hugs and kisses but without crying. I.T. also did not ask for
additional visits outside of their visitation schedule. “Days after the visit[s]
are held, [I.T.] continues to do well with no reported emotional concerns.”
The social worker noted I.T. was “thriving” in his current home and that
during the rest of the week, outside his visits with Mother, I.T. “is a happy
and stable 6-year old who is being a kid, playing, going to school, playing on
his tablet and going to the park.”
      The Agency also obtained information from third parties regarding
Mother’s relationship with I.T. His paternal grandmother reported that,
throughout I.T.’s life, he stayed with her often, including on most weekends.
Paternal grandmother expressed concern that I.T.’s speech was delayed, and
she was unsure if Mother had pursued an assessment to address his speech.
D.E.’s father alleged acts of violence by Mother, including an incident in
which Mother punched him while she was driving with I.T. in the car. He
also saw Mother pull I.T. by the arm and spank him when he soiled himself,
and he alleged that Mother gave I.T. sleeping pills.

6     The social worker also observed that I.T. has on several occasions
referred to Mother as “tia,” which is Spanish for aunt and a reference to his
current caregiver.
                                        8
      Mother’s counsel conducted a very brief cross-examination of the social
worker.7 The social worker testified Mother has never “displayed any bad
parenting” during her visits. I.T. was generally excited to see Mother and he
had “a couple times” expressed his desire to return to Mother’s care.
Although I.T. was sad when his visits with Mother ended, the social worker
believed he was sad because “he want[ed] to keep playing.” On redirect, the
social worker explained I.T. did not express sadness because Mother was
leaving. He had also not expressed any distress when he learned visits were
cancelled.
      The social worker had tried to explain to I.T. “there is a potential he
might never have visits with his mom again,” and his
response⎯“Okay”⎯suggested to her that I.T. has a hard time understanding
“forever” and “adoption.” The social worker expected I.T. to experience
sadness if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, but she did not believe
he would suffer in the long term. She explained that since his placement
with Aunt, he has experienced stability and was doing well. She concluded
that adoption was in I.T.’s best interest despite the sadness he may
experience at the discontinuation of visitation with Mother.
      The Agency conceded the evidence demonstrated that Mother and I.T.
shared a parent-child relationship with positive attributes. But it was the
Agency’s opinion that the benefits of adoption outweighed any detriment I.T.
would suffer if the relationship was severed. The Agency emphasized that
I.T. did not get upset when his visits with Mother were cancelled. It also
asserted that Mother presented no evidence that I.T. would suffer detriment
if their relationship was terminated, or that the benefits of adoption would

7     Cross-examination of the social worker filled five pages of the reporter’s
transcript.
                                       9
not outweigh any such detriment. In contrast, I.T. had made demonstrable
progress in a stable home with Aunt. Counsel for I.T. joined in the Agency’s
arguments that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated to free I.T. for
adoption.
      Mother’s counsel argued there was “an extraordinarily strong bond”
between Mother and I.T., and the court should not terminate her rights
because the parental-benefit exception applied. She emphasized that I.T.,
who had just turned 7 years old two days earlier, had spent over five years of
his life in Mother’s care. Counsel argued I.T. was too young to understand
“he may not see his mother ever again” and “voice a bar to adoption.” And
although Aunt reported that I.T. was not upset when his visits with Mother
were cancelled, under those circumstances I.T. presumably knew there would
be another visit.
      The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence established that
I.T. was generally and specifically adoptable. It then turned to “the true
issue before the court” and that is whether the parental-benefit exception
applied, noting that it does so only in “exceptional circumstances.” It
correctly observed the exception required Mother to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence three elements: “First, there has been regular visitation and
contact. Two, that there [is] a relationship with the parent, [the]
continuation of which would benefit the child such that, three, the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”
      The court agreed with the parties that the first and second elements of
the exception had been established by the evidence. It found there had been
regular visitation and contact, and the relationship between Mother and I.T.
was “a significant one,” which if continued would benefit the child.

                                      10
      The juvenile court turned to the third element to determine “whether it
would be detrimental to the child to sever the relationship [with Mother] and
choose adoption, when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home.”
Here, the court found the only evidence Mother presented on detriment from
termination of the parent-child relationship was that I.T. “would be sad.”
And it agreed with the Agency that this was not a sufficient showing of
detriment by Mother. The court found there was evidence that I.T.
“continue[d] to move forward in his life,” in Aunt’s home and care, when
“there are no visits” with Mother. For example, he is able to go to school and
“do well,” he has “supports in place,” and “there is no significant distress or
other emotional behavior” by I.T.
      The court concluded Mother failed to demonstrate termination of her
relationship with I.T. would be detrimental to him, and even assuming
detriment, it concluded the benefits of adoption would outweigh any
detriment because I.T. “would benefit from the stability and permanency that
adoption would provide to him.” The court terminated Mother’s parental
rights to free I.T. for adoption.
                                       II.
  Mother Has Failed to Affirmatively Demonstrate the Juvenile Court Erred
      A section 366.26 hearing is “designed to protect children’s ‘compelling
rights . . . to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the
caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child.’ ” (In re Celine
R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52−53.) At this stage of a dependency case, the
juvenile court must choose one of three permanent plans: adoption,
guardianship or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Of these options,
“[a]doption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the
Legislature.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.);

                                       11
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1) [When the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
the child is adoptable, “the court shall terminate parental rights and order
the child placed for adoption” unless a statutory exception applies].) The
parent has the burden of showing the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions to adoption. (See In re
Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534 (Fernando M.).)
      One of the statutory exceptions to the preference for adoption is the
parental-benefit exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception
applies where “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that
termination would be detrimental to the child,” including where “[t]he
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1), (B)(i).) There are three elements a parent must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, “to establish the exception: (1) regular
visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would
benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631
(Caden C.).) A “crucial aspect of the [juvenile] court’s responsibility” at the
section 366.26 hearing is deciding “whether the harm from severing the
child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of
placement in a new adoptive home. [Citation.] By making this decision, the
[juvenile] court determines whether terminating parental rights serves the
child’s best interests.” (Caden C., at pp. 631−632.)
      Here, the juvenile court found the evidence established the first two
elements. Since the Agency does not dispute these findings, we shall focus
our analysis on the third element, noting however that the second and third
elements of the exception “significantly overlap.” (In re Katherine J. (2022)

                                       12
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 317, fn. 7.) “For example, evidence that terminating the
parental relation would cause harm indicates that child would lose important
relational benefits if severed from her parent.” (Ibid.) “When the
relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and
stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be
‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a
parent.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633−634.)
      This third element⎯whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child⎯is the most difficult question for the juvenile court
to resolve. Where the court has found that regular contact and visitation
have continued, and that this contact has created a relationship that benefits
the child, the court must “decide whether the harm from severing the child’s
relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement
in a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632, citing
Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) As our Supreme Court
explained, determining the “harm associated with severing the relationship is
a subtle enterprise.” (Caden C., at p. 634.) A parent-child relationship
sometimes “involves tangled benefits and burdens” and “[i]n those cases, the
court faces the complex task of disentangling the consequences of removing
those burdens along with the benefits of the relationship.” (Ibid.)
      We review a juvenile court’s “ruling on the third element under a
hybrid standard, reviewing its factual determinations concerning the
detriment analysis for substantial evidence but its ultimate weighing of the
relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for an abuse of
discretion.” (In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1068, italics added;
accord Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639−640.) As our high court
explained in Caden C., “[a]t its core, the hybrid standard . . . simply embodies

                                       13
the principle that ‘[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a reviewing
court to substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child’s best interests
for the trial court’s determination in that regard, reached pursuant to the
statutory scheme’s comprehensive and controlling provisions.’ ” (Caden C., at
p. 641.) It is well established that a court abuses its discretion “ ‘ “ ‘by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ”
(Ibid.)
      Reviewing the court’s factual determinations for substantial evidence,
“ ‘we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th
622, 633.) We uphold the judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence,
“even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial
court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.”
(In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 230.)
      A parent challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal assumes
a difficult burden, as it “is generally considered the most difficult standard of
review to meet.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 595.)
Additionally, as Mother herself acknowledges in her opening brief on appeal,
this burden is even weightier where, as here, the issue on appeal turns on a
failure of proof by the party who bore the burden of proof. In such a case,
under the substantial evidence standard, the question “for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a
matter of law” or, put another way, “whether the appellant’s evidence was
(1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight

                                         14
as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528.)
      We agree that Mother and I.T. share a significant relationship, and
that its continuation would benefit I.T. It is obvious that Mother and I.T.
have a strong and loving bond, and Mother’s trial counsel was correct that
this is not the case of an infant who has had limited interactions with a
parent. I.T. had just turned seven years old and, although he spent
significant time in the care of other family members all his life, his
relationship with his Mother took root.
      However, Mother had the burden of proof to affirmatively demonstrate
that termination of the relationship would be detrimental to I.T. (Fernando
M., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.) Here, the juvenile court found the only
evidence Mother presented to show detriment was that I.T. “would be sad”
from the loss of the relationship, and that was not a sufficient showing.
Mother did not present any affirmative evidence, and her cross-examination
of the social worker was very brief, highlighting only that I.T. was generally
excited to see Mother; he had on a few occasions expressed his desire to
return to Mother’s care; and that he was “sad” when visits ended with
Mother. On the facts of this case, we agree with the juvenile court this was
an insufficient showing of detriment.
      As our sister court stated in a case involving the sibling bond exception
under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), “we do not believe that a child’s
‘sadness’ can never satisfy the substantial detriment test. ‘Sadness’ is often
all a young child can express. While an adult witness might be able to
differentiate between, ‘This will make me sad, but I can deal with it,’ and
‘This will devastate me; I can’t imagine life without my sibling and I don’t
think I want to live without him or her,’ a child is likely to describe both as

                                        15
making him, ‘sad.’ ” (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017, italics
added, disapproved on other grounds in In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529,
537.) But “never” does not mean always, and whether a child’s sadness is
indicative of substantial detriment is case-specific. (Cf. Jacob S., at pp. 1015,
1017−1018 [11- and 14- year old sisters, who lived their entire lives together,
“confided in one another and assumed leadership roles at a very young age
when their mother was unable to take care of them or their brothers”; under
those circumstances, 11-year old sibling’s expression that “she missed [her
sister] very much and would be very sad if she never saw [her] again” likely
indicates she would suffer detriment if she never saw her older sister again].)
      In this case, although I.T. was sad when some visits ended and he
expressed that he missed Mother, the juvenile court also found I.T.
experienced “no significant distress or other emotional behavior” when “there
are no visits” with Mother. The focus of the third element of the parental-
benefit exception is on the harm to a child in severing his or her relationship
with a parent and choosing adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
Here, the juvenile court must determine “how the child would be affected by
losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life” (ibid., italics
added). In that respect, the court found rather than experiencing distress
when he was without Mother, I.T. “continue[d] to move forward in his life,” in
Aunt’s home. Substantial evidence supported the court’s factual findings.
The social worker testified, based on her observations of 11 supervised visits,
that I.T. did not have any strong emotional reactions when his visits with
Mother ended, and days after the visits are held, he “continue[d] to do well
with no reported emotional concerns.” To the contrary, I.T. was “thriving,”
and was a “happy and stable 6-year old” in his current home with Aunt. The

                                        16
social worker testified that since the start of the dependency case, I.T. had
adjusted to life with Aunt whom he had known for his entire life.
      On the record before us, we cannot say that the evidence compels a
finding in favor of Mother on detriment, as a matter of law. Substantial
evidence supported the juvenile court’s factual determinations on the third
element of the parental-benefit exception to adoption. But even assuming
Mother met her burden of showing detriment, we conclude the juvenile court
was well within its discretion to find that the benefits of a stable adoptive

home outweighed any harm from termination of the parental relationship.8
      In the last step of the analysis, the juvenile court must examine
whether “the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh[s] ‘the
harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive,
emotional relationship with’ ” the parent. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 633.) Relevant here, I.T. was exposed to severe violence inflicted on his
younger sister by Mother’s boyfriend. Mother had also failed to protect I.T.
from physical abuse by the same perpetrator. The trauma he experienced
required I.T. to attend weekly therapy. But his prospective adoptive parent
ensured that he consistently attended therapy to address his needs, and she
maintained a safe home environment. In that stable environment, outside of
Mother’s care, I.T. made demonstrable progress, his speech improved, and it
was reported that he did well in school. He was in fact said to be “thriving.”
      Our focus on Aunt’s home environment is not to compare Mother’s
parental attributes with that of Aunt (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634

8      Mother argues the court’s final balancing of the relative harm and
benefits from the termination of the parental relationship was “infected” by
its erroneous finding that I.T. would not experience detriment. Although we
find no such error, the juvenile court assumed detriment in performing the
final balancing. The court expressly stated it “finds that the benefits of
adoption would outweigh any detriment.”
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[“[w]hen it weighs whether termination would be detrimental, the court is not
comparing the parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of
any potential adoptive parent(s)”]), but to see into what I.T.’s life looks like in
his prospective adoptive home, without a parental relationship with Mother.
At this step, the juvenile court is required to “determine, for the particular
child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even
counterbalance” the harm in terminating parental rights. (Id. at p. 640.) We
perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that for I.T., the
permanency and stability that adoption would give him would outweigh any
detriment he might experience from termination of his relationship with
Mother. We conclude the determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd. (See id. at p. 641.)
      In sum, we conclude Mother has not met her burden on appeal of
affirmatively demonstrating error in the court’s order terminating parental
rights. So we shall affirm.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.

                                                                   DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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