Court Opinion

ID: 9352232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 17:08:18.233941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:59:28.495425
License: Public Domain

J-S38029-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRIAN RUSH                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1468 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 3, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
                 Criminal Division at CP-09-CR-0003077-2021

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                             FILED JANUARY 05, 2023

        Brian Rush (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

after he pled nolo contendere1 to two counts of criminal conspiracy2 related to

drug smuggling at the Bucks County Correctional Facility. Appellant claims he

did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea. We affirm.

        The trial court explained:

              This case arises from Appellant[’s] … involvement in a
        conspiracy and criminal organization involving eleven co-
        defendants engaged in smuggling suboxone into the Bucks County
        Correctional Facility between May 26, 2020, through December
        31, 2020. On December 19, 2021, Appellant was charged with
        the following: Count 1, corrupt organizations — employee, a
        felony of the first degree, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 911(b)(3); Count 2,
____________________________________________

1“In pleading nolo contendere, the defendant does not admit his guilt, but
merely consents to being punished as if he were guilty.” Commonwealth v.
Gunter, 771 A.2d 767, 773 (Pa. 2001).
2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
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     dealing in unlawful proceeds with the intent to promote the
     unlawful activity, a felony of the first degree, id. § 5111(a)(1);
     Count 3, conspiracy to deal in unlawful proceeds, a felony of the
     first degree, id. § 903; Count 4, manufacture, delivery or
     possession with the intent to manufacture or deliver [a controlled
     substance], an ungraded felony, 35 P[.S.] § 780-113(a)(30);
     Count 5, conspiracy to manufacture [a controlled substance],
     delivery, or possession with the intent to manufacture or deliver[],
     an ungraded felony, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903; Count 6,
     contraband/controlled substance, a felony of the second degree,
     id.   §    5123(a);     Count     7,   conspiracy    to   [commit]
     contraband/controlled substance, a felony of the second degree,
     id. § 903; Count 8, criminal use of a communication facility, a
     felony of the third degree, id. § 7512(a); and Count 9, conspiracy
     to [commit] criminal use of a communication facility, a felony of
     the third degree. Id. § 903.

           Appellant … was scheduled for a jury trial to commence on
     May 2, 2022, along with one of the co-defendants, Tyreak
     Harrington. Counsel for both [Appellant] and Mr. Harrington
     engaged in substantial plea negotiations with the District Attorney
     on the morning of May 2, 2022.              N.T., 5/3/2022, p. 3.
     Furthermore, at the request of counsel …[, the trial] court
     conducted a colloquy of both defendants on the charges they were
     facing, the sentencing guidelines pertaining to those charges,
     along with the potential maximum penalties each defendant was
     facing, and the offers that had been extended by the
     Commonwealth respectively. Id. at p. 9. However, no agreement
     was reached on May 2, 2022, and as such the court and all parties
     proceeded with voir dire. On May 2, 2022, nearly 8 hours of voir
     dire was conducted and a jury of 12 primary jurors and 3 alternate
     jurors was selected. On May 3, 2022, [the trial] court, along with
     counsel and the jury, were prepared to begin the trial. Id. at p.
     2. However, at the request of both [Appellant’s] counsel and Mr.
     Harrington’s counsel, [the trial] court granted all counsel and the
     defendants time to engage in additional desired plea negotiations.
     Id. at pp. 2-11. Ultimately, Appellant … through his counsel[,]
     indicated to [the trial] court that he wished to enter an open nolo
     contend[e]re plea. Id. at pp. 2-12. As indicated more specifically
     … [T]here had been discussions between counsel that the court
     would be imposing a sentence of not more than two to four years
     and that the sentence might run concurrent to a sentence
     [Appellant] was already serving, or the sentence might run
     consecutive to the sentence the [Appellant] was already serving.

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      [The trial] court then conducted an extensive colloquy of
      Appellant, both in writing and orally, … to ensure that
      [Appellant was] entering [his] plea voluntarily, knowingly, and
      intelligently.   Id. at pp. 12-50.     [The trial court accepted
      Appellant’s plea as knowingly and voluntarily entered. See id. at
      16, 35-38, 45-47.] Following argument by Appellant’s counsel
      and counsel for the Commonwealth regarding sentencing[, the
      trial] court eventually imposed sentence. Id. at pp. 51-62. In
      addition, the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to nolle
      pros Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9. Id. at p. 69. Th[e trial] court
      imposed a sentence on Appellant as follows: on Count 7 Appellant
      was sentenced to a term of incarceration in a state correctional
      institution of not less than two (2) nor more than four (4) years,
      running consecutive to the sentence Appellant was currently
      serving, with no further penalty being imposed on Count 5. Id.
      at pp. 70-73.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/15/22, at 1-3 (emphasis added; citations modified;

some footnotes moved to body, others omitted). The trial court concluded

Appellant’s sentence “was supported by the Sentencing Guidelines, it was

entirely consistent with the plea discussions, and it was a legal sentence in

that it was within the permissible maximum sentencing ranges.”). Id. at 3.

      Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or request to

withdraw his nolo contendere plea. On June 2, 2022, Appellant timely

appealed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents a single issue for review:

      Did the trial court err by promising Appellant a specific sentence,
      thereby inducing the [A]ppellant to plead nolo contendere
      resulting in an involuntary, unknowing and/or unintelligent plea?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

      Appellant argues that the trial court improperly induced his plea. See

id. at 11-14. Appellant emphasizes the trial court’s statement at the plea

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hearing in addressing the negotiations between defense counsel and the

prosecutor:

      [THE COURT:] [In Appellant’s] case, the idea is that I would be
      imposing a sentence of 2 to 4 years [in prison,] and the
      discussions in the conference have been that [the court] would
      decide whether that sentence is to run concurrent with the
      sentence [Appellant is] currently serving or consecutive to the
      sentence [he is] currently serving.

Appellant’s Brief at 13 (citing N.T., 5/3/22, at 6).

      Appellant posits:

      Although not deliberate, [the] lengthy plea colloquy resulted in a
      promise, or the functional equivalent thereof, that Appellant would
      receive a two-to-four-years concurrent sentence. As a result,
      the plea was not knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently entered.

Id. at 14 (emphasis added); see also id. at 13 (“The record reflects that the

word ‘concurrent’ in regard to sentencing was used seven times, four times

by the [trial court].”).

      Pertinently,

      … a plea of nolo contendere is treated the same as a guilty plea.
      Commonwealth v. Boatwright, 590 A.2d 15, 19 (Pa. Super.
      1991). Further, [where, as here, an a]ppellant’s challenge to the
      nolo contendere plea was made after sentencing, [] the standard
      for withdrawing a plea is manifest injustice. Jackson, supra. A
      plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it was entered
      into     involuntarily,    unknowingly,      or    unintelligently.
      Commonwealth v. Kephart, 594 A.2d 358 (Pa. Super. 1991). …

      …

             “Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is
      presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the
      burden of proving involuntariness is upon him.” Commonwealth
      v. Myers, 642 A.2d 1103, 1105 (Pa. Super. 1994) (quotation and
      citations omitted).     “Therefore, ‘where the record clearly

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      demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was conducted, during
      which it became evident that the defendant understood the nature
      of the charges against him, the voluntariness of the plea is
      established.’” Id. (quotations omitted). A defendant is bound by
      the statements he makes during his plea colloquy, and may not
      assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict
      statements made when he pled.

Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations

modified). In addition, the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere waives

all non-jurisdictional defects, other than the legality of sentence and the

validity of the plea. Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1275 (Pa.

2014).

      We first address whether Appellant preserved the challenge to his plea.

The trial court and the Commonwealth claim Appellant waived the issue

because he did not raise it with the trial court.    See Trial Court Opinion,

7/15/22, at 4 (“Appellant never filed a post-sentence motion seeking to

withdraw or otherwise challenge the validity of his plea”); Commonwealth’s

Brief at 4. We agree. This Court has explained:

      A defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea
      on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file
      a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Failure to employ either
      measure results in waiver. Commonwealth v. Tareila, 895
      A.2d 1266, 1270 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2006). Historically, Pennsylvania
      courts adhere to this waiver principle because “it is for the court
      which accepted the plea to consider and correct, in the first
      instance, any error which may have been committed.”
      Commonwealth v. Roberts, 352 A.2d 140, 141 (Pa. Super.
      1975)….

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J-S38029-22

Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-10 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citations modified). Appellant’s issue is waived because he never raised it

with the trial court. See id.; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) and (B)(1).

     In the absence of waiver, we would conclude that the issue lacks merit.

The trial court “conducted an extensive colloquy.”       Trial Court Opinion,

7/15/22, at 6. The court expounded:

     [T]his] court went over the charges that Appellant was pleading
     nolo contendere to, the nature of the open plea he was entering
     into – specifically that pursuant to the negotiations amongst
     counsel[,] the court would not impose a sentence in excess of two
     (2) to four (4) years, but that the decision to run said sentence
     concurrent or consecutive to the sentence Appellant was
     already serving was a decision left to the discretion of the
     court[,] for which the court would hear argument from counsel.
     N.T., 5/3/2022, pp. 5-17. Furthermore, this [c]ourt explained to
     Appellant that if the court deviated from the negotiations and
     imposed a sentence greater than the agreement of two (2) to four
     (4), then Appellant would have the right to withdraw his plea. Id.
     at pp. 7-8. However, this [c]ourt also explained that if th[e]
     court ran that sentence consecutive to the sentence
     Appellant was already serving, that this would be
     consistent with the agreement Appellant’s counsel and the
     prosecutor had reached. Id. at p. 8 [(trial court confirming
     Appellant’s understanding that if the court elects to sentence
     Appellant to “2 to 4 and I run them consecutive – I haven’t decided
     -- … that too is consistent with all of our discussions and the plea
     would go forward.”).] This [c]ourt then reiterated to Appellant
     that based on the sentencing guidelines and the potential
     maximum sentences, which this [c]ourt went over with Appellant
     on May 2, 2022, the offer being extended was significantly
     lower than the potential penalty Appellant could receive.
     Id. at pp. 9-10 [(trial court informing Appellant, inter alia, “I
     would remind you … -- despite what you might think, I’m not
     trying to intimidate or coerce anybody into anything. But I went
     over with you yesterday in detail the maximum sentence structure
     that is available … if you are [] convicted…. [A] 2 to 4-year
     sentence     even    [running]    consecutive     is  phenomenally
     advantageous to [Appellant].”).] Appellant also completed the

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     eleven-page written nolo contendere plea colloquy which
     was admitted into the record as proof that Appellant was entering
     his plea knowingly and to which Appellant had no objection. Id.
     at pp. 19-20.

            Throughout the colloquy, Appellant answered that he
     understood the charges that he was pleading to, the potential
     maximum sentence he might receive, that he understood the
     negotiations that had taken place, and that he understood that he
     was entering an open plea, which meant that neither his attorney
     nor the prosecutor could promise him the sentence [the trial]
     court would impose. Id. at pp. 5-8, 9-13, 14-40. In fact,
     Appellant specifically responded that he understood that
     the decision of whether or not to run Appellant’s sentence
     concurrent or consecutive to the sentence Appellant was
     already serving, was for the court to make and
     [Appellant’s] counsel could not promise him which the
     Court would impose. Id. at p. 16. Throughout the colloquy
     Appellant answered that he understood the charges against him,
     the nature of an open nolo contendere plea, the consequences of
     entering a plea of nolo contendere as opposed to the potential
     benefits and risks of proceeding to a jury trial, and that he still
     wished to enter a plea of nolo contendere. Id. at pp. 14-40, 45.
     Moreover, the court made clear to Appellant that he did not
     have to enter this plea, that he had the absolute right to a jury
     trial, that the court and counsel had spent the entire day prior
     selecting a jury, [and] that the jury was now waiting in the
     jury room ready to proceed with the trial, to which Appellant
     responded that he understood. Id. at pp. 21-29. This [c]ourt
     further explained to Appellant that by the nature of a nolo
     contendere plea, the court does not require Appellant to make a
     factual admission relating to the facts and circumstances
     surrounding the charges against him. Id. at pp. 31-33. The court
     then asked Appellant if he had had enough time to discuss all of
     his options with his attorney and whether he was satisfied with
     her representation, to which Appellant responded he had sufficient
     time and he was satisfied with her representation. Id. at pp. 33-
     34.

           [The trial] court then once again went over the potential
     maximum sentences and sentencing guidelines for the charges
     against Appellant, along with reiterating the current negotiations
     between counsel, that [the trial] court’s sentence would not
     exceed two (2) to four (4) years, and asked Appellant if he still

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     wanted to go forward with the plea, to which Appellant responded
     that he did wish to proceed. Id. at pp. 35-38. In fact, Appellant
     specifically answered that, based on both the oral and written
     colloquy, he agreed that he was entering his plea knowingly,
     voluntarily, and intelligently. Id. at p. 35. The written
     colloquy, the colloquy addendum and the State Rules and
     Regulations of Probation and Parole, were all reviewed, completed
     and signed by Appellant and then were received and admitted into
     evidence without objection. Id. at pp. 46-47; [Exhibits] D-1, D-
     2, D-3. Accordingly, this [c]ourt accepted Appellant’s plea and
     found that Appellant had entered this plea knowingly, intelligently,
     and voluntarily. N.T., 5/3/2022, pp. 45-47.

           [T]he probable cause affidavit was incorporated into the
     record and the District Attorney briefly summarized the factual
     basis for the open nolo contend[e]re plea, after which [the trial]
     court explained to Appellant that he did not need to make a factual
     admission but that these were the facts the court will consider in
     imposing sentence, to which Appellant responded that he
     understood. Id. at pp. 47-50. The District Attorney then made
     argument seeking for [the trial] court to impose a consecutive
     sentence to the one Appellant was already serving, while counsel
     for Appellant argu[ed] the court should impose a concurrent
     sentence. Id. at pp. 53-62. During Appellant’s argument and
     presentation, Appellant stated to the court that “I own up to my
     mistakes I make. I like to apologize to everybody. I thank you
     for your assistance. I thank you, Your Honor.” Id. at p. 61. This
     [c]ourt then imposed a sentence on Count 7 of not less than two
     (2) nor more than (4) years to run consecutive to the sentence
     Appellant was already serving, because as this court explained, a
     concurrent sentence would have essentially allowed
     Appellant to receive the equivalent of no further penalty on
     this case, because he had already received a penalty, and
     was serving time for it, in an entirely different case. Id. at pp.
     70-71[; see also Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 341
     (Pa. Super. 2015) (defendants are “not entitled to a volume
     discount for [their] crimes,” and separate felony offenses
     committed against separate victims can appropriately call for
     consecutive sentences).]

             In sum, Appellant knew at all times that a jury was waiting
     and ready to proceed with trial, he understood everything about
     the nature of the negotiations, and that the decision before [the
     trial] court once Appellant entered his plea was regarding running

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      his sentence consecutive or concurrent to his current term of
      incarceration, and most importantly, Appellant stated both orally
      on the record and in the written colloquy that he agreed that he
      was entering his plea knowingly, intelligently, [and] voluntarily.
      Id. at pp. 5-50.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/15/22, at 6-9 (emphasis added; some citations

modified).

      In the absence of waiver, the record would support the trial court’s

detailed analysis, and belie Appellant’s claim that the court induced his plea

by “promis[ing] … that Appellant would receive a two-to-four-years concurrent

sentence.” Appellant’s Brief at 14.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/5/2023

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