Court Opinion

ID: 9725687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:00:08.67266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:17.956636
License: Public Domain

Gribbs, J.
We concur in that part of Judge O’Connell’s opinion finding a fraudulent conveyance as discussed in part A of § vm of his opinion. However, the overwhelming evidence establishes fraud and an ample basis to pierce the corporate veil and permit plaintiff to recover the $697,952 for unpaid grocery products.* 1
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in not piercing the corporate veil of Metropolitan Grocery, Inc (New Metro), thereby permitting plaintiff to reach the assets of Amir Al-Naimi, Sandra Al-Naimi, and Atour Abro. We agree. In light of plaintiff’s evidence and the entire spectrum of relevant facts, the trial court should have pierced the corporate veil and per*456mitted plaintiff to recover against all individual defendants.
An appellate court’s review of a decision not to pierce the corporate veil is de novo because of the equitable nature of the remedy. Law Offices of Lawrence J Stockler, PC v Rose, 174 Mich App 14, 43; 436 NW2d 70 (1989).
As a general proposition, the law treats a corporation as an entirely separate entity from its stockholders, even where one person owns all the corporation’s stock. Kline v Kline, 104 Mich App 700, 702; 305 NW2d 297 (1981). This fiction is a convenience, introduced to serve the ends of justice. Allstate Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co of America, 118 Mich App 594, 600; 325 NW2d 505 (1982). However, when this fiction is invoked to subvert justice, it may be ignored by the courts. Id., citing Paul v Univ Motor Sales Co, 283 Mich 587, 602; 278 NW 714 (1938). See also Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 421 Mich 641, 650, 651; 364 NW2d 670 (1984). The traditional basis for piercing the corporate veil has been to protect a corporation’s creditors where , there is a unity of interest of the stockholders and the corporation and where the stockholders have used the corporate structure in an attempt to avoid legal obligations. Allstate, swpra at 600.
There is no single rule delineating when the corporate entity may be disregarded. Papo v Aglo Restaurants of San Jose, Inc, 149 Mich App 285; 386 NW2d 177 (1986). As the Court held in Klager v Robert Meyer Co, 415 Mich 402, 411-412; 329 NW2d 721 (1982), “[t]he entire spectrum of relevant fact forms the background for such an inquiry, and the facts are to be assessed in light of the corporation’s economic *457justification to determine if the corporate form has been abused.” More recently, this Court has upheld the following standard for piercing the corporate veil:
“First, the corporate entity must be a mere instrumentality of another entity or individual. Second, the corporate entity must be used to commit a fraud or wrong. Third, there must have been an unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff.” [SCD Chemical Distributors, Inc v Medley, 203 Mich App 374, 381; 512 NW2d 86 (1994) (citation omitted).]
I
In the instant case, there was an abundance of evidence to show that New Metro was a “mere instrumentality” of Amir. There was evidence that Atour, New Metro’s president, took little, if any, active role in the business, and the trial court so found. The evidence was overwhelming that everyone knew that Amir was the de facto owner and operator of New Metro. Amir admitted that, over several years, his wholesale operations and his brothers’ stores loaned money back and forth to each other. Most importantly, New Metro assumed $400,000 in debt with no consideration as part of a package restructuring Amir and Sandra’s personal debt, and the trial court so found. Thus, upon review de novo, we conclude that New Metro was a “mere instrumentality” of Amir.
n
The second element required to pierce the corporate veil is that the corporate entity must be used to commit a fraud or wrong. This is, of course, the central issue of this appeal. It is true that fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence and must never be presumed. See, e.g., Hi-Way Motor Co *458v Int’l Harvester Co, 398 Mich 330, 336; 247 NW2d 813 (1976). However, fraud may be established by circumstantial evidence. Goldberg v Goldberg, 295 Mich 380, 384; 295 NW 194 (1940). In other words, fraudulent or wrongful conduct may be inferred from other evidence. In light of this standard, the following evidence is relevant to the issue whether New Metro was used to commit a fraud or wrong upon plaintiff: .
(1) An extraordinary $400,000 inventory shortage in a three-month period. This is almost the entire portion of the total inventory received by New Metro during this time. Jerry Payne (plaintiff’s vice president of finance) testified that this was almost a one hundred percent inventory shortage and “typical” inventory shortages, in his experience, are in the neighborhood of one-tenth of one percent;
(2) Amir’s unpersuasive explanation that the inventory loss was due to “theft,” or labor problems.
(3) The dollar volume of New Metro’s orders increased dramatically (two to four times the prior weeks) in January 1991, and New Metro ceased paying for purchases. At the same time, Amir was facing foreclosure on his home if a restructuring of his and Sandra’s personal debt could not be reached; in less than a four-week period,.New Metro ran up a debt to plaintiff of about $690,000.
(4) Amir’s brothers owned and operated retail grocery stores that sometimes stored their grocery product at the Holden Street warehouse (increasing the likelihood that the $400,000 inventory was sold on the shelves of Amir’s brothers’ stores, even though no financial records of New Metro reflect this).
(5) In 1991, Amir’s expenses exceeded his reported income by over $200,000, based upon Van Conway’s *459calculations (Conway was plaintiff’s expert witness, a certified public accountant with forensic accounting experience).
(6) Even assuming that Amir’s testimony about borrowing funds from friends and family in 1991 is true, Amir’s personal lifestyle seemed unaffected by the major downturns in his business suggests that he was either incredibly optimistic or that he had another, unreported source of income (such as a $400,000 inventory would provide), and
(7) Amir negotiated a restructuring of his personal debt, in an agreement that saddles New Metro with $400,000 additional debt, at a time when New Metro’s own financial future was very uncertain (i.e., Amir had to know that putting a $675,000 debt load on New Metro was going to put it out of business).
It is generally held that fraud must be proved by “clear and convincing” evidence, rather than by the preponderance of the evidence. The voluminous transcript in this case reveals more than sufficient evidence to show fraud by a clear and convincing evidence standard. Fraud may be proved with “ ‘facts which are inconsistent with an honest purpose.’ ” Daugherty v Park, 289 Mich 561, 565; 286 NW 829 (1939) (citation omitted). In our view, certain of the individual transactions at issue (i.e., the inventory shortage, the increased purchases, the loans between Amir’s businesses and his brothers’ stores, and the discrepancy between Amir’s income and his expenses) when viewed with the portion of the restructure agreement that saddled New Metro with $400,000 in increased debt for no consideration, leads to but one conclusion: fraud. See Herman v Mobile Homes Corp, 317 Mich 233, 246; 26 NW2d 757 (1947):
*460“But after all it comes down to a question of good faith and honesty in the use of the corporate privilege for legitimate ends. If a corporation is owned and controlled by another and is manipulated by the owner for its own purposes and in its own interests to the prejudice of innocent third parties, or the public welfare, it may be necessary to limit such abuse of the corporate capacity or shield.” [Citation omitted.]
See also Papo v Aglo Restaurants, supra at 302, n 15, and the additional cases cited therein for the proposition that the corporate veil can be pierced even in the absence of fraud.
in
Finally, the third element necessary to pierce a corporate veil is that there must have been an unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff. The testimony reveals that New Metro placed orders in the $50,000 range for many months and that New Metro always timely paid its account from the inception of the business relationship until problems arose eight months later, in January 1991. Thus, the January incident was the first time any such problems had arisen. Additionally, as plaintiff notes, one accused of fraud may not raise as a defense the carelessness of the party defrauded. Rood v Midwest Matrix Mart, Inc, 350 Mich 559, 570; 87 NW2d 186 (1957). Plaintiff’s complaint seeks payment of $697,952 for unpaid grocery products.
The trial court clearly erred in its findings and conclusions. In light of plaintiff’s evidence and “[t]he entire spectrum of relevant fact,” Klager, supra at 411, the overwhelming evidence established fraud and an ample basis to pierce the corporate veil and permit plaintiff to recover against individual defendants Amir Al-Naimi, Sandra Al-Naimi, and Atour Abro.
*461Reversed and remanded. The trial court shall enter a judgment for plaintiff consistent with this opinion.
T. Pickard, J., concurred.

 For a detailed summary of the facts of this case, see sections i-vn of Judge O’Connell’s opinion.