Court Opinion

ID: 9959780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:10:34.301773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:53.248903
License: Public Domain

J-S09038-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KENNETH ABRAHAM COPELAND                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2447 EDA 2023

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 28, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-15-CR-0002054-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 12, 2024

       Kenneth Abraham Copeland (“Copeland”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County following

his conviction of harassment.1 Copeland’s counsel, Attorney Scott J. Werner

(“Counsel”), seeks to withdraw from representation pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978

A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).           Upon review, we grant Counsel’s petition to

withdraw and affirm Copeland’s judgment of sentence.

       On July 7, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information

charging Copeland with one count each of harassment and terroristic threats.

The charges stemmed from an incident on February 10, 2022, during which

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4).
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Copeland called Nayah King (“King”) through a Facebook Messenger video

call. During the call, Copeland yelled and cursed at King, who was pregnant,

telling King to abort her pregnancy, and threatening to punch King in the

stomach, kill her baby, and hurt her family members.

      Following a bench trial on January 26, 2023, the trial court found

Copeland guilty of harassment and not guilty of terroristic threats. On April

28, 2023, the trial court imposed a sentence of one year of probation, to be

served consecutively to Copeland’s sentence imposed at Docket CP-15-CR-

0002173-2022. Copeland filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the

sufficiency and weight of the evidence to sustain his convictions and the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. After the trial court denied his post-

sentence motion, Copeland filed a timely notice of appeal.

      The trial court ordered Copeland to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

1925(b).   In response, Counsel filed a statement of intent to withdraw

pursuant to Anders/Santiago in lieu of a Rule 1925(b) statement.           See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) (“If counsel intends to seek to withdraw in a criminal

case pursuant to Anders/Santiago …, counsel shall file of record and serve

on the judge a statement of intent to withdraw in lieu of filing a Statement.”).

      On December 22, 2023, Counsel filed an Anders brief and petition to

withdraw as counsel in this Court. When faced with an Anders brief, we may

not review the merits of the underlying issues or allow withdrawal without first

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deciding whether counsel has complied with all requirements set forth in

Anders and Santiago. Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d 379, 382

(Pa. Super. 2008).    There are mandates that counsel seeking to withdraw

pursuant to Anders must follow, which arise because a criminal defendant

has a constitutional right to a direct appeal and to be represented by counsel

for the pendency of that appeal. Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896,

898 (Pa. Super. 2007). We have summarized these requirements as follows:

             Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders
      must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious
      examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly
      frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth
      issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any
      other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation
      thereof.

             Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders
      petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the
      right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional
      points worthy of this Court’s attention.

             If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical
      requirements of Anders, this Court will deny the petition to
      withdraw and remand the case with appropriate instructions (e.g.,
      directing counsel either to comply with Anders or file an
      advocate’s brief on [a]ppellant’s behalf).

Id. (citations omitted).

      Additionally, Santiago sets forth precisely what an Anders brief must

contain:

            [T]he Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
      counsel’s petition to withdraw … must: (1) provide a summary of
      the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2)
      refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
      supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the

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      appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding
      that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant
      facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
      have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. If counsel has satisfied the above requirements,

it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s

proceedings to determine whether there are any other non-frivolous issues

that the appellant could raise on appeal. Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187

A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

      Instantly, we conclude that Counsel has complied with the requirements

outlined above. Counsel has filed a petition with this Court stating that after

reviewing the record, he finds this appeal to be wholly frivolous. Petition to

Withdraw as Counsel, 12/22/2023. In conformance with Santiago, Counsel’s

brief includes summaries of the facts and procedural history of the case and

discusses the issues he believes might arguably support Copeland’s appeal.

See Anders Brief at 5-15. Counsel’s brief further sets forth his conclusion

that the appeal is frivolous and includes discussion of, and citation to, relevant

authority in support of his conclusion. Id. Finally, Counsel attached to his

petition to withdraw the letter he sent to Copeland, which enclosed Counsel’s

petition and Anders brief. Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 12/22/2023, Exh.

A. Counsel’s letter advised Copeland of his right to proceed pro se or with

private counsel, and to raise any additional issues that he deems worthy of

this Court’s consideration.    Id.   Because Counsel has complied with the

procedural requirements for withdrawing from representation, we turn our

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attention to the issues Counsel raised in the Anders brief: (1) whether the

evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether the verdict was

against the weight of the evidence; and (3) whether the trial court abused its

discretion in sentencing Copeland. Anders Brief at 9-15.

      For his first issue, Copeland argues that there is insufficient evidence to

sustain his harassment conviction.      Anders Brief at 11-13.      Our Court’s

standard of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well

settled:

      In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
      determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
      elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the
      evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
      finder. The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
      links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

      A person is guilty of harassment, in pertinent part, “when, with intent

to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person ... communicates to or about

such other person any lewd, lascivious, threatening or obscene words,

language, drawings or caricatures[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4).

      The record reflects that on February 10, 2022, Copeland contacted King

through a Facebook Messenger video call. N.T., 1/26/2023, at 6-8. Copeland

already knew King was pregnant before he called her. Id. at 8-9, 16. During

the call, Copeland told King that he “wanted to kill [her] baby.” Id. at 8. King

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testified that Copeland was very angry and agitated, yelling that he did not

want King to be pregnant and to abort the pregnancy. Id. at 9-11. Copeland

threatened to hurt King and the baby, saying he was “going to punch [her] in

[her] stomach [and] make sure the baby died,” and that he was “going to kill

[her] and [her] F’ing baby.” Id. at 13-14. Copeland also threatened to hurt

King’s mother and younger sisters. Id. at 13-14, 31-34.

      Based on the foregoing, the evidence at trial, as well as all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to sustain Copeland’s

conviction. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 144 A.3d 926, 938 (Pa. Super.

2016) (holding evidence was sufficient to sustain a harassment conviction

under section 2709(a)(4) where Walls shouted at an assistant district attorney

that she caused his grandmother’s death and that she should be next). We

therefore agree that the claim is frivolous.

      For his second issue, Copeland argues that the verdict is against the

weight of the evidence. Anders Brief at 11-12. The following legal principles

apply to a trial court’s consideration of a challenge to the weight of the

evidence supporting a conviction:

             An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new
      trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the
      testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have
      arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than
      reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would
      not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges,
      in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the

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      evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the
      trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
      certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
      or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

             Thus, to allow an appellant to prevail on a challenge to the
      weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague
      and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the trial
      court.

Juray, 275 A.3d at 1046-47 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

      Our standard of review for weight of the evidence claims, however,

differs from that of the trial court:

      Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
      discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
      is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has
      had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
      appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
      and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
      court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
      denying a new trial is the lower court’ s conviction that the verdict
      was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new
      trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

Id. at 1047 (citation omitted).

      The trial court, sitting as factfinder in a bench trial, “is free to believe

all, part, or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Williams,

302 A.3d 117, 120 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The record reflects that the trial court had the opportunity to hear and see the

testimony of King. Through its guilty verdict for harassment the trial court

chose to find King credible. Id. The record confirms that the trial court did

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not abuse its discretion in rejecting Copeland’s challenge to the weight of the

evidence. We therefore agree with Counsel that the claim is frivolous.

       For his third issue, Copeland argues that the trial court imposed an

inappropriate sentence under the Sentencing Code. Anders Brief at 13-15.

This issue challenges the discretionary aspects of Copeland’s sentence.

       “A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be

considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a

claim is not absolute.”      Commonwealth v. Baker, --- A.3d ---, 2024 WL

505083 at *4 (Pa. Super. Feb. 9, 2024) (citation omitted). To invoke this

Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence,

an appellant must satisfy a four-part test:

       We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
       appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
       and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
       sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
       Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
       Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
       that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
       Sentencing Code.

Baker, --- A.3d ---, 2024 WL 505083 at *4 (citation and brackets omitted).

       Instantly, Copeland filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved the

issue in a timely post-sentence motion.2         Copeland has not complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Nevertheless, because the Commonwealth does not object

____________________________________________

2  Copeland incorrectly stated in his post-sentence motion that he was
sentenced to eleven and one-half to twenty-three months of incarceration.
See Post-Sentence Motion, 5/5/2023, at ¶¶ 1-2.

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to Copeland’s failure to include a Rule 2119(f) statement, we may ignore the

omission. Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530, 533 (Pa. Super. 2004).

However, Copeland’s bald claim the trial court imposed an inappropriate

sentence under the Sentencing Code does not raise a substantial question.

See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 289 A.3d 1121, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(noting that a “substantial question exists when the appellant makes a

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were inconsistent with

a specific provision of the Sentencing Code”); Commonwealth v. Radecki,

180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting that “this Court does not accept

bald assertions of sentencing errors”).

      In any event, we note that the record confirms that the trial court

sentenced Copeland to a mitigated range sentence of one year of probation.

See N.T., 4/28/2023, at 5, 13. “[W]here a sentence is within the standard

range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate

under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171

(Pa. Super. 2010) . Counsel is therefore correct that raising this issue on

appeal would be frivolous.

      Our independent review of the record reveals no other non-frivolous

issues that Copeland could raise on appeal. See Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272.

We therefore grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Copeland’s

judgment of sentence.

      Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 4/12/2024

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