Court Opinion

ID: 9566879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:44:15.425464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:56.532881
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring in the result) — Mr. Seijas was convicted and sentenced for violation of § 145 (b) of the internal revenue code. Specifically, he was charged with ■filing fraudulent income tax returns.
The majority opinion recognizes that the decisions of the Federal courts are controlling as to whether or not the element of moral turpitude is involved in the crime committed by Mr. Seijas. I agree. At the present time, however, there is a significant conflict among the Federal decisions as to whether moral turpitude is inherent in the commission of crimes involving violation of § 145 (b); i. e., whether moral turpitude is an essential element to be proved to sustain every conviction of a charge of willful evasion of income tax in violation of § 145 (b).
In United States v. Carrollo (1939), 30 F. Supp. 3, a United States district court held that a violation of § 145 (b) was not a crime involving moral turpitude. Precisely the opposite result was reached by another United States district court in Chanan Din Khan v. Barber (1957), 147 F. Supp. 771. In the Barber case, the court clearly held that a specific intent to defraud the government is a necessary element to be proved to sustain a conviction under § 145 (b), and that any tax fraud involves moral turpitude. In arriving at this result, the district court attempted to distinguish or explain away the decision of the United States supreme court in United States v. Scharton, infra.
In Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner (1954), *5216 F. (2d) 844, three judges of the ninth circuit of -the United States court of. appeals indicated their views quite clearly, but by way of dictum, that fraud, and hence moral turpitude, is not an essential element of every crime committed under § 145(b). •'
In Tseung Chu v. Cornell (1957), 247 F. (2d) 929 (C. A. 9th), three judges of the ninth circuit, including one who participated in the Lardner decision, supra, indicated their views that fraud is an essential element in the commission of the crime as charged in the indictment in the Cornell case.
The conflicting decisions of the two district courts in Carrollo, supra, and Barber, supra, are certainly not too helpful on the question of whether fraud or moral turpitude is inherent in every violation of § 145 (b). Á careful reading of the opinion in the Barber case, supra, raises serious doubts as to its analysis of the decision in United States v. Scharton, 285 U. S. 518, 76 L. Ed. 917, 52 S. Ct. 416. The Scharton case is the only decision in which the question of fraud in relation to crimes committed under § 145 (b) has been passed upon by the United States supreme court. In it the court did not pass directly upon the question of whether moral turpitude is inherent in every conviction of crime involving violation of § 145 (b). The specific question presented to the court wás whether a prosecution for violation of § 145 (b) was controlled by a three-year statute of limitations applicable to nonfraud cases rather than a six-year statute of limitations applicable to fraud cases. The court held that the six-year statute of limitations (relating to fraud cases) was not applicable; that it applied only in cases involving those statutes which made fraud an essential element in violations thereof. However, in reaching the indicated result, the inference seems to me inescapable that the court had to decide that fraud is not inherent in every violation of § 145(b).
It is a fact which may or may not be too obvious that different views exist among the several United States courts of appeal regarding the extent to which a decision of a three-*6judge- panel in a particular circuit is binding upon other judges of the circuit. Apparently, there is no uniform procedure by which the decision of a panel is presented to all judgés of a circuit for their approval or disapproval before the decision becomes a matter of public record. This raises considerable doubts in my mind as to the binding effect of the Cornell case, supra, (a) upon other judges of the ninth circuit, and (b) as to its persuasiveness as authority generally.
' It is my best judgment that we are dealing in the instant case with a phase of the law which is in a state of flux. As indicated above, I think, insofar as possible, we must rely upon the decisions of the Federal courts to determine whether or not fraud or moral turpitude is involved in violations of § 145 (b). It seems to me that there is more than a little confusion and doubt on this question — so much so that it cannot be said positively on the basis of the Federal decisions that every violation of § 145 (b) involves moral turpitude.
On the other hand, there is no conflict in the Federal cases that fraud must be proved as an essential element in every case in which the indictment alleges that the method of defeating or evading Federal tax was by filing a false and fraudulent income tax return. Berra v. United States (1955), 351 U. S. 131, 100 L. Ed. 1013, 76 S. Ct. 685; Achilli v. United States (1957), 353 U. S. 373, 1 L. Ed. (2d) 918, 77 S. Ct. 995; United States v. Rosenblum (1949, C. A. 7th), 176 F. (2d) 321; United States v. Raub (1949, C. A. 7th), 177 F. (2d) 312; Norwitt v. United States (1952, C. A. 9th), 195 F. (2d) 127.
In the Cornell case, supra, the court said:
“Thus whether the crime to which the appellant plead guilty by plea of nolo contendere falls within categories one or three of the Twentieth Century-Fox decision is not decisive. He was here charged with making in each of four years ‘a false and fraudulent income tax return.’ Fraud may not be an essential element of the crime of wilful attempt to defeat or evade the income tax (United States v. Schar-ton, 285 U. S. 518, 52 S. Ct. 416, 76 L. Ed. 917), but it can be *7an essential part of that crime. Here fraud was charged as part and parcel of the crime, and to that crime so involving appellant’s alleged fraudulent acts, appellant .plead, nolo.” (Italics mine.)
As emphasized in the majority opinion, there is other language in the Cornell case, supra, which can be interpreted to mean that all crimes under § 145 (b) involve fraud or moral turpitude. But this language is immediately qualified by the statement, “where such fraud is charged in the indictment.” I am convinced that the Cornell case, supra, stands for the proposition that only where the method of tax evasion charged in the indictment necessarily involves fraud is a conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere conclusive as to fraud or moral turpitude. When it is construed in this manner, I am content to rely upon the Cornell case as authority for the end result reached by the majority in the case at bar: namely, that, since the method of tax evasion charged in the indictment necessarily involves fraud, the issue of fraud and moral turpitude was determined in the criminal trial of Mr. Seijas for tax evasion in violation of § 145(b). It follows that he has no constitutional right to be reheard on this issue in the disciplinary proceedings, and that the summary action by the board of governors in the instant case was appropriate. On the basis stated herein, I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion: that this court should approve the recommendation of the board of governors for the disbarment of Mr. Seijas.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Finley, J.
July 1, 1958. Petition for rehearing denied.