Court Opinion

ID: 9906793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 13:06:14.340483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:20.488622
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                     No. COA22-950

                               Filed 5 December 2023

Mecklenburg County, No. 15 CVD 17121

JENNIFER GROSECLOSE, Plaintiff/Mother,

             v.

ALAN GROSECLOSE, Defendant/Father.

      Appeal by defendant from order entered 16 December 2021 by Judge Tracy H.

Hewett in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5

September 2023.

      James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Preston O. Odom, III, Haley E. White, and
      Kristin J. Rempe, for plaintiff-appellee.

      Wofford Burt, PLLC, by J. Huntington Wofford and Rebecca B. Wofford, for
      defendant-appellant.

      ZACHARY, Judge.

      Defendant Alan Groseclose (“Father”) appeals from the trial court’s order

denying his motion for modification of permanent child support and permanent

alimony, and granting Plaintiff Jennifer Groseclose’s (“Mother”) motion for contempt.

After careful review, we affirm in part and remand for additional findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

                                I.     Background

      Mother and Father were married in 2000, separated in 2014, and divorced
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                                  Opinion of the Court

thereafter. One child was born of the marriage. On 3 December 2015, the trial court

entered a temporary support order addressing postseparation support and child

support (together, “temporary support”). The court ordered Father to pay:

             $726.37 per month in ongoing temporary child support; . . .
             $11,848.52 in child support arrears at the rate of $300.00
             per month; . . . $400.00 per month in ongoing
             postseparation support; . . . $800.00 in postseparation
             support arrears at the rate of $100.00 per month; and . . .
             $7,444.50 in attorney’s fees to [Mother]’s counsel at the
             rate of $200 per month.

      Father filed his first motion to modify 20 days later, alleging that he suffered

a substantial decrease in income and seeking a reduction in his temporary support

obligations. Father was then late in paying his temporary support and attorney’s fees

for several months of 2016, and failed to make any payments in October, November,

or December of that year. Mother filed her first motion for contempt. On 3 January

2017, the trial court entered a permanent support order, denying Father’s motion to

modify, granting Mother’s motion for contempt, and ordering Father to pay

             $2,579 in temporary support arrears and $600 in attorney’s
             fees obligations; . . . $803.61 per month in permanent child
             support; . . . $1,000 per month in alimony until December
             30, 2020; and . . . $18,000 in attorney’s fees at the rate of
             $225 per month until paid in full.

      Father filed two more motions to modify his support obligations in 2017, while

the parties’ equitable distribution action reached its conclusion. On 19 September

2017, the trial court entered its equitable distribution order, awarding Mother “a

distributive award of $158,141.00 [payable by Father] at a rate of $1,000 per month

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                                   Opinion of the Court

until paid in full in order to achieve an equal distribution of the marital estate.” The

trial court made a finding of fact that Father “had the ability to pay such a

distributive award.”

      On 3 December 2018, Father filed his fourth motion to modify, again alleging

a substantial decrease in his income and requesting that the trial court reduce his

child support and alimony obligations. On 18 June 2020, Mother filed another motion

for contempt, alleging that Father had failed to pay his child support, alimony,

attorney’s fees, and distributive award payments.

      On 12 February and 3 March 2021, the parties’ motions came on for hearing in

Mecklenburg County District Court. On 16 December 2021, the trial court entered an

order denying Father’s motion to modify and granting Mother’s motion for contempt.

The trial court also ordered Father to pay Mother an additional sum in

reimbursement for her attorney’s fees. On 14 January 2022, Father timely filed notice

of appeal.

                                 II.   Discussion

      Father argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to modify his

child support and alimony obligations and by granting Mother’s motion for contempt.

A. Modification of Child Support and Alimony

      Father first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his

motion   for   modification   “where    the   findings    of   fact   supported   changed

circumstances[,]” namely, “an involuntary decrease in [Father’s] income” and

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Father’s persistent health concerns. We do not find Father’s arguments as to this

issue to be persuasive. Father also argues that the trial court’s “findings of fact lacked

detail to support the finding” of his actual monthly income. On this issue, we agree

and remand for additional findings of fact.

   1. Standard of Review and Applicable Legal Principles

       Generally, the amount of child support and alimony is “left to the sound

discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been

a manifest abuse of that discretion.” Shirey v. Shirey, 267 N.C. App. 554, 559, 833

S.E.2d 820, 824 (2019) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 376 N.C. 675, 853

S.E.2d 159 (2021). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it renders a decision that

is manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been

the result of a reasoned decision.” Id. at 560, 833 S.E.2d at 825 (cleaned up).

       “When the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on appeal is

whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and

whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.” Id. at 559–60, 833

S.E.2d at 824–25 (citation omitted). “When the trial judge is authorized to find the

facts, [its] findings, if supported by competent evidence, will not be disturbed on

appeal despite the existence of evidence which would sustain contrary findings.” Kelly

v. Kelly, 228 N.C. App. 600, 605, 747 S.E.2d 268, 275 (2013) (citation omitted). While

“the trial court need not recite all of the evidentiary facts[,]” it still “must find those

material and ultimate facts from which it can be determined whether the findings

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                                  Opinion of the Court

are supported by the evidence and whether they support the conclusions of law

reached.” Id. at 606–07, 747 S.E.2d at 276 (citation omitted). We review de novo the

trial court’s conclusions of law. Shirey, 267 N.C. App. at 560, 833 S.E.2d at 825.

      An order for child support or alimony may be modified “upon motion in the

cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat.

§§ 50-13.7(a), -16.9(a) (2021). The movant bears the burden of showing a change of

circumstances in order to modify either child support or alimony. Thomas v. Thomas,

134 N.C. App. 591, 592, 518 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1999) (child support); Britt v. Britt, 49

N.C. App. 463, 470, 271 S.E.2d 921, 926 (1980) (alimony).

      In both contexts, the change of circumstances must be substantial. For

example, for the purposes of modifying alimony, this Court has made clear that

             not any change of circumstances will be sufficient to order
             modification of an alimony award; rather, the phrase is
             used as a term of art to mean a substantial change in
             conditions, upon which the moving party bears the burden
             of proving that the present award is either inadequate or
             unduly burdensome.

Britt, 49 N.C. App. at 470, 271 S.E.2d at 926. Meanwhile, the “modification of a child

support order involves a two-step process. The court must first determine a

substantial change of circumstances has taken place; only then does it proceed to

apply the [Child Support] Guidelines to calculate the applicable amount of support.”

McGee v. McGee, 118 N.C. App. 19, 26–27, 453 S.E.2d 531, 536 (emphasis added),

disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 359, 458 S.E.2d 189 (1995).

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                                Opinion of the Court

   2. The Trial Court’s Findings of Fact

      In its order, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact

regarding the lack of a substantial change of circumstances for the purposes of

modifying child support and/or alimony:

               23. The Court does not find that there has been a
                   substantial change in circumstances such that
                   permanent child support or alimony should be
                   modified.

               24. In the January 3, 2017 Permanent Support Order,
                   the Court found as follows:

                      a. [Mother]’s income from her full-time job at
                         Calvary Church is $2,594.73 gross per month
                         and $1,974.45 net per month.

                      b. Two-thirds (2/3) of [Mother]’s shared family
                         expenses should be attributed to [Mother].
                         Thus, [Mother]’s portion of the shared family
                         expenses is $1,699.90 per month.

                      c. [Mother]’s monthly individual expenses are
                         $1,493.83.

                      d. [Mother]’s total monthly needs and expenses
                         are $3,193.73, plus her child support
                         obligation of $305.89 pursuant to the North
                         Carolina Child Support Guidelines.

                      e. [Mother] has a monthly shortfall in excess of
                         $2,300.

                      f. [Father]’s testimony regarding his income
                         was not credible.

                      g. [Father]’s income from employment          is
                         $6,067.90 gross per month.

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      h. [Father] received money from friends to help
         him pay his living expenses and attorney’s
         fees in the average amount of $750 per month.
         [Father] testified that this monetary support
         from friends was a “loan” or series of “loans.”
         However, [Father] failed to present any
         evidence to support his contention that the
         additional monetary support were loans.

      i. [Father]’s portion of the shared family
         expenses is $1,740.95 per month. [Father]’s
         individual expenses are $583.00 per month.
         [Father]’s total monthly needs and expenses
         are $2,323.95, plus his child support
         obligation of $803.61.

      j. After mandatory deductions listed on his
         paystub, [Father]’s total monthly net income
         is $6,273.26. After subtracting his total
         monthly needs and expenses and his child
         support obligation, [Father] has a monthly
         surplus of $3,145.70.

25. The Permanent Support Order awarded [Mother]
    monthly alimony of $1,000 per month for a period of
    five (5) years or sixty (60) months.

26. [Father]’s current Fourth Motion to Modify was filed
    on December 3, 2018 after he became unemployed
    due to his employer in Virginia Beach, Virginia
    changing management or otherwise reorganizing
    such that the “last in was the first out” and [Father]
    was the “last in.” The Court does not find that
    [Father]’s income changed substantially at that time
    as he received unemployment benefits, severance
    pay, and his living expenses were paid by his sister.
    Additionally, [Father] began receiving financial
    assistance from his girlfriend . . . in 2018. The Court
    acknowledges and finds as fact that when [Father]
    was employed in Virginia Beach, he paid his court-
    ordered obligations.

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                  Opinion of the Court

27. In April 2019, [Father] moved in with [his girlfriend]
    and continued living a lifestyle with no substantial
    economic difference, except the majority of his
    income came from [his girlfriend] by way of her
    payment of his living expenses and alleged “loans,”
    which this Court finds were actually regular,
    recurring gifts and not loans.

28. The Court does not find that either of the “loans”
    evidenced by promissory notes signed by [Father]
    and [his girlfriend] are truly loans for the following
    reasons:

      a. Though the terms call for payments to begin,
         no payments have ever been made, despite
         the fact that [Father] had voluntary
         deductions totaling $1,093.31 from his Lowe’s
         pay which would have covered either or both
         of the “loan” payments cited in the promissory
         notes.

      b. [Father] has experience with the courts such
         that he knew that he would need to have
         evidence that money given to him is to be paid
         back (i.e., a loan) and therefore, he attempted
         to create evidence of such.

      c. Despite his experience with the courts,
         [Father] never disclosed any other gifts paid
         on his behalf, nor that he lived with [his
         girlfriend], and had access to her bank
         account via his own debit card attached to
         that account, despite being asked in
         discovery.

      d. During his testimony, [Father] cited his
         advanced age (64 years old), his poor health
         (which he also cited 4 years ago at the
         equitable distribution trial), his inability to
         secure a better paying job, no savings, no
         property, no investments, and little credit
         available. Accordingly, the Court finds that

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                  Opinion of the Court

          [Father] and [his girlfriend] could not, in good
          faith, have signed the promissory notes
          setting forth 5 and 10 year terms for
          repayment and intended that [Father] would
          repay the loans according to the terms in the
          promissory notes.

      e. The loans are unsecured with no penalty for
         non-payment or late payment.

      f. The loan documents and promissory notes
         were prepared just prior to the deadline for
         the filing of Financial Affidavits, wherein the
         parties are required to disclose debts and
         provide documentation evidencing such debts.

      g. See Lowe v. Lowe, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1025
         (2005), which provides that loans from close
         family members should be closely scrutinized
         for legitimacy and failure to make payments
         on loans for several years when funds are
         available to do so is evidence that the loans
         are illusory. The alleged “loans” from
         [Father’s girlfriend] to [Father] do not pass
         such scrutiny and the evidence shows that the
         “loans” are illusory.

29. In addition to the purported “loans” from [Father’s
    girlfriend] (which the Court finds were not loans at
    all, but were gifts which should be included in
    [Father]’s income) almost all of [Father]’s living
    expenses were either paid directly by [his girlfriend]
    or by the authorized use of her bank account and
    debit card.

          ....

32. [Father] has a cavalier and entitled attitude toward
    money that became apparent though his testimony
    and actions, including, but not limited to:

      a. When questioned about his failure to pay

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           Opinion of the Court

   support to [Mother], [Father] responded: “If I
   pay her, I can’t pay something else.”

b. [Father]’s Financial Affidavit listed voluntary
   deductions from his paycheck totaling
   approximately $1,093.31 per month. [Father]
   listed a monthly garnishment of $568.90 on
   his Financial Affidavit, and he testified that
   the garnishment had been satisfied in
   January 2021, prior to the filing of his verified
   Financial Affidavit.

c. [Father] spent significant amounts of money
   on alcohol and shopping at higher end grocery
   stores and gourmet shops.

d. The last entry in [Father]’s job search log was
   May 6, 2019. [Father] has not continued to
   search for higher paying employment in line
   with his skills and abilities.

e. [Father]’s Financial Affidavit states that his
   average monthly net income is $640.38 and
   his monthly needs and expenses are
   $1,921.31. [Father]’s statement that “no one
   can live on $640.38 per month” further
   demonstrates his attitude of entitlement to a
   certain lifestyle.

f. [Father] took a 6 week leave of absence from
   his job at Lowe’s because he “thought” he had
   COVID. Notably, this was right around the
   same time that [Father] received a tax refund.

g. The Court previously found that [Father]
   incorporated and ran several coin businesses,
   and that fact has not changed. In fact,
   [Father]’s most recent well-paid employment
   was in the coin business.

h. [Father] earned his real estate license, which
   is a difficult undertaking. This demonstrates

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                  Opinion of the Court

          to the Court that even if [Father] was unable
          to sell houses and subsequently let his real
          estate license lapse, that he has the ability to
          earn more than he is earning at his current
          job.

      i. The history of this case shows that [Father]
         did not make any support payments to
         [Mother] until he was court ordered to do so.

      j. [Father] has filed multiple motions to modify
         support and there have been multiple motions
         for contempt filed against him. [Mother] has
         prevailed on her motions for contempt.
         [Father]’s motions to modify support have
         either been voluntarily dismissed by [Father]
         or denied by the Court.

      k. Prior Court Orders have found as a fact that
         [Father] is not entirely credible.

      l. [Father]’s actions show a pattern of
         fluctuating income but a consistent relatively
         high standard of living.

33. At present, the Court finds [Father]’s gross monthly
    income to be $6,526.18 per month. This is comprised
    of (a) $2,355.43 from Lowe’s; (b) $2,758.75 from
    monetary “loans” from [his girlfriend], which the
    Court finds to be gift income; (c) $1,412 from
    additional regular, recurring gifts by way of [his
    girlfriend] paying [Father]’s living expenses, directly
    and through [Father]’s use of her bank account.
    After mandatory deductions set forth on [Father]’s
    paystub, [Father]’s net monthly income is $5,904.44.
    This income is [Father]’s actual income from all
    sources. The Court does not find bad faith such that
    it will impute income to [Father].

34. At present, the Court finds that [Father]’s shared
    monthly expenses are $500 per month that he pays
    to [his girlfriend]. [Father]’s individual expenses are

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                  Opinion of the Court

   $71.00 per month. Additionally, his court ordered
   obligations including a monthly child support
   obligation of $803.61, the Equitable Distributive
   award of $1,000 per month, and attorney’s fees
   payment of $225.00 per month. [Father]’s monthly
   expenses total $2,599.61, leaving him a monthly
   surplus of $3,304.83. [Father] therefore has the
   ability to pay $1,000 each month in alimony.

          ....

37. [Mother] has a monthly shortfall of $1,027.52. Her
    current monthly shortfall is lower than what the
    Court found in the January 3, 2017 Permanent
    Support Order and approximately 2.8% more than
    the amount of alimony that was originally ordered
    in the Permanent Support Order.

38. The Court finds that [Mother] had no choice but to
    reduce her personal expenses in November 2018
    when [Father] unilaterally began paying only $50
    per month toward his alimony obligation, which is
    only 5% of the court-ordered amount. After [Father]
    reduced his support payments, [Mother] took on a
    temporary part-time job as a delivery driver for Uber
    Eats for a few months to help make ends meet. The
    Court does not consider [Mother]’s temporary
    income for these calculations.

          ....

                      Alimony

41. This Court considered two possible calculations for
    alimony, neither of which the Court finds to be a
    substantial change in circumstances such that
    alimony should be modified.

42. For both calculations, the Court used [Father]’s
    income as set forth above.

      a. The first calculation is based on [Mother]

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              Opinion of the Court

       receiving the entire distributive award
       payment of $1,000 per month from [Father].
       [Mother]’s monthly income is $3,744.27 when
       she receives the entire $1,000 distributive
       award payment. [Mother]’s reasonable
       monthly expenses of $2,861.89, plus her
       monthly child support obligation of $442.60,
       equals $3,304.49. In this scenario, there is no
       shortfall, but only a slim $347 per month left
       over after her expenses. This Court finds that
       alimony of $1,000 per month would still be
       awarded and appropriate. This Court is
       constrained from reconsidering dependency
       that was already established by the
       Permanent Support Order. See Cunningham
       v. Cunningham, 345 N.C. 430, 480 S.E.2d 403
       (1997). The Court considers the following:

i.        [Father]’s marital misconduct, i.e.,
          abandonment, under N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3A
          according to the Permanent Support
          Order, Finding of Fact No. 19, “[Father]
          moved to Hawaii without informing
          [Mother] or the minor child of his
          intentions or whereabouts,” which left
          [Mother] without any financial support
          ([Father] did, however, leave her with
          debt) or even knowledge as to where
          [Father] was living;

ii.       The extent to which the earning power,
          expenses, or financial obligations of a
          spouse will be affected by reason of serving
          as the custodian of the minor child; and

iii.      That the standard of living during the
          marriage was significantly higher than
          the modest $2,861.89 cited in [Mother]’s
          Financial Affidavit, which is the result of
          [Mother] being forced to reduce her
          expenses from the standard of living she

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                 Opinion of the Court

             enjoyed during her marriage.

      b. The second calculation is based on [Father]
         only paying a fraction of the distributive
         award payment. Since November 1, 2018,
         [Father] has only been paying $50 (or 5%) of
         the distributive award payment such that
         [Mother]’s income for alimony purposes would
         only be increased by $50 per month, which
         results in a shortfall of $997.52, which is
         approximately 3% less than what is currently
         ordered in the Permanent Support Order.

43. [Father] has failed to show a substantial change in
    circumstances such that his alimony obligation
    should be modified.

                  Child Support

44. The Court considered [Mother]’s income including
    the $1,000 per month alimony payment and the
    $1,000 distributive award payment (even though she
    has not been receiving the court-ordered amounts of
    those payments since November 2018) and
    determined that the calculation does not result in a
    15% or more decrease to [Father]’s child support
    obligation.

      a. [Father]’s gross monthly income is $6,526.18.
         If the $1,000 monthly alimony payment is
         added to [Mother]’s gross income for child
         support purposes, the North Carolina Child
         Support Guidelines have her child support
         obligation at $442.60. [Father]’s child support
         obligation would be $771.44 which is
         approximately only 4.2% lower than the
         current ordered amount of $803.61.

      b. If the Court adds both the $1,000 monthly
         alimony payment and the $1,000 distributive
         award payment to [Mother]’s gross income,
         her child support obligation would be $552.30.

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                                 Opinion of the Court

                         [Father]’s child support obligation would be
                         $759.74 which is approximately 5.8% lower
                         than the current ordered amount of $803.81.

                      c. If the Court considers what [Mother] has
                         actually received since November 1, 2018 (i.e.,
                         $50 in monthly alimony and $50 in monthly
                         distributive award payments), her gross
                         income would be $2,844.27, which results in a
                         child support obligation of $453.38. [Father]’s
                         child support obligation would be $818.22,
                         which is approximately 2% higher than the
                         court ordered amount of $803.81.

                45. [Father] failed to present evidence of a substantial
                    change in circumstances sufficient to justify a
                    downward modification of his alimony obligation
                    and permanent child support obligation and his
                    Motion to Modify should be denied.

   3. Substantial Change of Circumstances

      Father first argues that the trial court erred by failing to find a substantial

change of circumstances where he met his burden of showing such a change “based

on an involuntary decrease in his income.” As Father notes, it is undisputed that he

“lost his job in October 2018, and then remained unemployed until he found a new

job paying significantly less than he earned prior to his unemployment.” Father

contends that he suffered “a decrease of more than 60% from his income from

employment when the Support Order was entered. Such a decrease in income is

clearly substantial and should have been sufficient for the trial court to find a

substantial change in circumstances and to modify [his] support obligation.”

      However, this Court has repeatedly recognized that “[t]he fact that a husband’s

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                                  Opinion of the Court

salary or income has been reduced substantially does not automatically entitle him

to a reduction” of either child support or alimony. Wolf v. Wolf, 151 N.C. App. 523,

526, 566 S.E.2d 516, 518 (2002); see also Britt, 49 N.C. App. at 470, 271 S.E.2d at 926

(“[A] conclusion of law that there has been a substantial change of circumstances

based only on income is inadequate and in error.”). “There cannot be a conclusion of

substantial change in circumstances based solely on change in income. The overall

circumstances of the parties must be compared with those at the time of the award.”

Patton v. Patton, 88 N.C. App. 715, 719, 364 S.E.2d 700, 703 (1988) (citation omitted).

In the instant case, the trial court made that comparison and determined that Father

failed to show a substantial change of circumstances.

      Father primarily contends that “[t]he trial court improperly made findings of

fact under a capacity to earn analysis and then made an inconsistent ultimate finding

of fact that [its] analysis was based on” his “actual income[.]” This assertion is

misplaced.

      “The trial court may refuse to modify support and/or alimony on the basis of

an individual’s earning capacity instead of his actual income when the evidence

presented to the trial court shows that a husband has disregarded his marital and

parental obligations . . . .” Wolf, 151 N.C. App. at 526, 566 S.E.2d at 518. “When the

evidence shows that a party has acted in ‘bad faith,’ the trial court may refuse to

modify the support awards. If a husband has acted in ‘good faith’ that resulted in the

reduction of his income, application of the earnings capacity rule is improper.” Id. at

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                                    Opinion of the Court

527, 566 S.E.2d at 519 (citation omitted).

      Father specifically highlights those portions of the trial court’s finding of fact

32 that seem to address his “intent with regard to income and spending money” to

argue that the trial court improperly conducted an earning-capacity analysis, despite

its seemingly contradictory finding that Father had not acted in bad faith.

“[H]owever, the trial court never reached the step of calculating [Father]’s child

support [or alimony] obligation, since the trial court found no change of circumstances

warranting a modification of [his] current obligation. Therefore, [Father]’s discussion

of the earning capacity rule is incorrect.” Armstrong v. Droessler, 177 N.C. App. 673,

677–78, 630 S.E.2d 19, 22 (2006).

      Rather than conducting an earning-capacity analysis, the trial court’s

extensive findings concerning Father’s “cavalier and entitled attitude toward money”

provide an illustrative context for the trial court’s finding that Father “continued

living a lifestyle with no substantial economic difference, except the majority of his

income came from” his girlfriend. Indeed, the final two paragraphs of finding of fact

32, which Father does not specifically challenge in his appellate brief, state that

Father “is not entirely credible” and that his “actions show a pattern of fluctuating

income but a consistent relatively high standard of living.”

      We conclude that “[i]n the present case, the trial court did not impute income

to [Father] as a result of voluntary unemployment or underemployment, but rather

was merely attempting to determine what [Father] actually earned in [2021].

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Consequently, the law of imputation is inapplicable.” Diehl v. Diehl, 177 N.C. App.

642, 650, 630 S.E.2d 25, 30 (2006).

   4. Calculation of Father’s Income

      Father next complains that the trial court “did not use [his] actual income as

a basis for the calculation of his income.” First, the North Carolina Child Support

Guidelines explicitly state that a parent’s income includes “gifts . . . or maintenance

received from persons other than the parties to the instant action.” N.C. Child

Support Guidelines, at 3 (2019).

              When income is received on an irregular, non-recurring, or
              one-time basis, the court may average or prorate the
              income over a specified period of time or require an obligor
              to pay as child support a percentage of his or her non-
              recurring income that is equivalent to the percentage of his
              or her recurring income paid for child support.

Id. Additionally, this Court has observed that “[t]here appears to be no good reason

to employ a different definition of income for the purposes of a child support award

than for an alimony award.” Glass v. Glass, 131 N.C. App. 784, 788, 509 S.E.2d 236,

239 (1998).

      Mother submits in her brief on appeal that the facts of this case resemble those

of Onslow County v. Willingham, in which the defendant-father testified that a female

“friend” with whom he shared a joint bank account “contributed about $800.00 per

month into the joint [bank] account and that she had been giving him this financial

assistance in the form of a loan for about three months.” 199 N.C. App. 755, 687

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                                        Opinion of the Court

S.E.2d 541, 2009 WL 2929305, at *5 (2009) (unpublished).1 The trial court, however,

did not find the defendant-father’s “assertion that said deposits were loans to be

credible[,]” and this Court recognized that the trial court “was not bound to accept

[the defendant-father’s] assertion that any of the recurring, financial assistance

provided to him was in the form of loans.” Id. Indeed, the defendant-father “did not

produce any documentation or other evidence to show that these deposits were loans.”

Id., at *6. Therefore, we concluded that “[i]n accordance with the Guidelines, these

deposits could be classified as ‘gifts’ or ‘maintenance received from persons other than

the parties to the instant action.’ ” Id.

       Although an unpublished decision of this Court, and therefore not binding

authority, we find our previous decision in Willingham to be persuasive in guiding

our analysis of the trial court’s findings in the case at bar. As quoted above, the trial

court found that the “alleged ‘loans’ . . . were actually regular, recurring gifts and not

loans[,]” and made extensive findings of fact as to why it did “not find that either of

the ‘loans’ evidenced by promissory notes signed by [Father] and [his girlfriend]

[we]re truly loans.” Just as in Willingham, the trial court’s findings support its

conclusion that these “alleged ‘loans’ ” were properly classified as income to Father.

Moreover, as in Willingham, the trial court here concluded that Father’s testimony

       1 Although unpublished opinions do not have precedential value, “an unpublished opinion may

be used as persuasive authority at the appellate level if the case is properly submitted and discussed
and there is no published case on point.” Zurosky v. Shaffer, 236 N.C. App. 219, 234, 763 S.E.2d 755,
764 (2014).

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                                   Opinion of the Court

was not credible, a determination by which this Court is bound. See Asare v. Asare,

281 N.C. App. 217, 243, 869 S.E.2d 6, 25 (2022) (“The trial court is the sole judge of

the credibility and weight of the evidence.”).

   5. Father’s Health

      Father also argues that “[t]he trial court failed to consider [his] health” in

denying his motion to modify. Father cites this Court’s opinion in Kelly in support of

his contention that “[w]orsening health, although not automatically a changed

circumstance, must be considered in a modification proceeding as it may affect the

obligor’s ability to earn income or be reason for a decline in income.” However, as

Father acknowledges, “the relevance of [the Kelly] defendant’s medical condition was

his claim that it was contributing to his reduction in income” and yet, in Kelly, “the

trial court found that his income was not substantially reduced.” 228 N.C. App. at

611, 747 S.E.2d at 278. The trial court in this case similarly did not find that Father’s

income was substantially reduced, “and thus the trial court did not err in not making

detailed findings as to [Father]’s health.” Id.

      In sum, the trial court did not err by determining that Father’s decrease in

income from employment alone was not sufficient to show a substantial change of

circumstances; finding that Father’s actual income included the gift income from his

girlfriend; or declining to make detailed findings as to Father’s health.

   6. Sufficiency of the Findings of Fact

      Nonetheless, while “the trial court need not recite all of the evidentiary facts[,]”

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                             GROSECLOSE V. GROSECLOSE

                                   Opinion of the Court

it still “must find those material and ultimate facts from which it can be determined

whether the findings are supported by the evidence and whether they support the

conclusions of law reached.” Id. at 606–07, 747 S.E.2d at 276 (citation omitted).

      “There are two kinds of facts: Ultimate facts, and evidentiary facts. Ultimate

facts are the final facts required to establish the plaintiff’s cause of action or the

defendant’s defense; and evidentiary facts are those subsidiary facts required to prove

the ultimate facts.” Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 451, 290 S.E.2d 653, 657 (1982)

(citation omitted), superseded in part on other grounds, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(f)(9)

(1983).

             [W]hile Rule 52(a) does not require a recitation of the
             evidentiary and subsidiary facts required to prove the
             ultimate facts, it does require specific findings of the
             ultimate facts established by the evidence, admissions and
             stipulations which are determinative of the questions
             involved in the action and essential to support the
             conclusions of law reached.

Id. at 452, 290 S.E.2d at 658. Our Supreme Court has explained that this requirement

is not a formality, but rather is essential to the process of appellate review:

             The purpose of the requirement that the court make
             findings of those specific facts which support its ultimate
             disposition of the case is to allow a reviewing court to
             determine from the record whether the judgment—and the
             legal conclusions which underlie it—represent a correct
             application of the law. The requirement for appropriately
             detailed findings is thus not a mere formality or a rule of
             empty ritual; it is designed instead to dispose of the issues
             raised by the pleadings and to allow the appellate courts to
             perform their proper function in the judicial system.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

Id. (cleaned up).

      Father contends that the trial court’s “findings of fact lacked detail to support

the finding” that Father’s actual gross income was $6,526.18 per month. For example,

Father argues that “the trial court did not make findings that would allow this [C]ourt

to see how the trial [court] calculated the ultimate monthly amount of $1,412.00” in

“regular, recurring gifts[.]” Although we have concluded that the trial court did not

err in determining that Father’s actual gross income included this gift income, and

the record amply supports the trial court’s determinations as to what to include or

not to include in calculating Father’s actual gross income, we agree with Father that

the trial court’s findings of fact leave us unable to determine precisely how it

calculated Father’s actual gross income.

      “The findings of fact should address . . . how [the trial court] calculated

[Father’s actual] gross income based upon its consideration of the evidence

presented.” Craven Cty. ex rel. Wooten v. Hageb, 277 N.C. App. 586, 590, 861 S.E.2d

571, 574–75 (2021). Accordingly, because we cannot determine how the trial court

used the evidence presented to calculate Father’s actual gross income, we remand for

additional findings of fact concerning this issue.

B. Contempt

      Father further argues that “[t]he trial court erred in holding [him] in contempt

of court based on an ultimate conclusion that he has at all times had the ability to

comply, but not making findings of fact supported by the evidence that he had the

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                              GROSECLOSE V. GROSECLOSE

                                   Opinion of the Court

ability to comply during the specific time periods at issue.”

      The trial court found as fact that Father was in substantial compliance with

his child support obligation, but that he “has willfully failed to pay his court ordered

financial obligations as to alimony, equitable distribution distributive award, and

attorney’s fee award, and is therefore in civil contempt.” The trial court also found

that Father “has, at all times, been fully aware of the Permanent Support [and

Equitable Distribution] Order[s], has had full knowledge and understanding of the

requirements of the Order[s], and has had the ability to comply with the Order[s].”

The court determined that Father’s failure to comply with those orders “is willful,

wanton, deliberate, without justification, and constitutes a civil contempt of Court[,]”

and set the following purge conditions:

                a. In addition to his ongoing obligations to pay
                   prospective alimony, attorney’s fee award payments,
                   and distributive award payments, [Father] shall pay
                   arrears to [Mother] as follows:

                       i.     $5,000 within thirty (30) days of the entry
                              of this Order;

                       ii.    $5,000 within sixty (60) days of the entry
                              of this Order;

                       iii.   $5,000 within ninety (90) days of the entry
                              of this Order;

                       iv.    $5,000 within one hundred and twenty
                              (120) days of the entry of this Order.

                b. After payment of $20,000 as set forth above, [Father]
                   will owe $43,184.50 in arrears as of September 30,
                   2021. Beginning on the first (1st) day of the first (1st)

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                             GROSECLOSE V. GROSECLOSE

                                   Opinion of the Court

                    month after the last $5,000 payment is due as set
                    forth above, [Father] shall continue paying $2,500
                    per month towards his arrears until paid in full.

                c. [Father] shall pay to [Mother] the sum of $17,919.15
                   as attorney’s fees. The Court will hold a hearing at a
                   later date to determine a payment schedule for
                   [Father]’s payment of attorney’s fees once he has
                   satisfied his arrearages as set forth above.

   1. Standard of Review

      Appellate review of “contempt proceedings is limited to whether there is

competent evidence to support the findings of fact and whether the findings support

the conclusions of law.” Adkins v. Adkins, 82 N.C. App. 289, 292, 346 S.E.2d 220, 222

(1986). “Findings of fact made by the judge in contempt proceedings are conclusive on

appeal when supported by any competent evidence and are reviewable only for the

purpose of passing upon their sufficiency to warrant the judgment.” Hartsell v.

Hartsell, 99 N.C. App. 380, 385, 393 S.E.2d 570, 573, appeal dismissed in part and

disc. review denied in part, 327 N.C. 482, 397 S.E.2d 218 (1990), aff’d per curiam, 328

N.C. 729, 403 S.E.2d 307 (1991).

   2. Ability to Pay

      It is well established that “the trial court cannot hold a defendant in contempt

unless the court first has sufficient evidence to support a factual finding that the

defendant had the ability to pay, in addition to all other required findings to support

contempt.” Cty. of Durham ex rel. Wilson v. Burnette, 262 N.C. App. 17, 22, 821 S.E.2d

840, 846 (2018) (citation omitted), aff’d per curiam, 372 N.C. 64, 824 S.E.2d 397

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                              GROSECLOSE V. GROSECLOSE

                                    Opinion of the Court

(2019). Father compares this case to Burnette, in which the defendant “presented

substantial evidence regarding his medical condition, his minimal living expenses,

and his lack of income[,]” but the plaintiff “presented no evidence other than the

amount of arrears owed, including any evidence regarding [the] defendant’s ability to

work, income, potential income, or assets.” Id. at 23, 821 S.E.2d at 846. Father asserts

that he similarly “presented evidence of his inability to pay and it was not refuted by”

Mother; according to Father, “[t]he trial court’s finding are, in essence, that she did

not believe what he was saying to be true, but this is insufficient.”

      Indeed, it is axiomatic that “the trial court is the sole judge of credibility and

weight of the evidence[.]” Id. Nonetheless, “although the trial court could find [the]

defendant’s evidence not to be credible, this does not create evidence for [the] plaintiff.

The absence of evidence is not evidence.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Therefore, the

Burnette Court concluded that “even if the trial court determined not one word of [the

defendant’s evidence] to be true, we are then left with no evidence from [the] plaintiff

other than the amount owed.” Id.

      However, Father’s reliance on Burnette is misplaced. Unlike the facts

presented in Burnette, Father’s own evidence in the case at bar evinces his ability to

pay. Here, the trial court found as fact that Father’s “Financial Affidavit listed

voluntary deductions from his paycheck totaling approximately $1,093.31” and that

despite a “pattern of fluctuating income” Father has maintained “a consistent

relatively high standard of living.” Further, the trial court noted that Father “spent

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                                   Opinion of the Court

significant amounts of money on alcohol and shopping at higher end grocery stores

and gourmet shops,” evidencing his “cavalier and entitled attitude toward money[.]”

These findings are supported by competent evidence in the record, and in turn

support the trial court’s conclusion that Father had the ability to pay for the purposes

of civil contempt. Adkins, 82 N.C. App. at 292, 346 S.E.2d at 222.

      “Given the extensive evidence presented and findings made regarding

[Father]’s income and expenses, we hold that the trial court’s finding on present

ability to pay is adequate.” Gordon v. Gordon, 233 N.C. App. 477, 483, 757 S.E.2d

351, 355 (2014). Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that Father is in contempt

is affirmed.

   3. Purge Conditions

      Finally, Father argues that the trial court’s “findings of fact are insufficient to

warrant the purge conditions” because there was no showing that he had the present

ability to satisfy the purge conditions. We agree, and remand for the trial court to

consider this issue.

      “To justify conditioning [a] defendant’s release from jail for civil contempt upon

payment of a large lump sum of arrearages, the district court must find as fact that

[the] defendant has the present ability to pay those arrearages.” Tigani v. Tigani, 256

N.C. App. 154, 160, 805 S.E.2d 546, 551 (2017) (citation omitted); see also Burnette,

262 N.C. App. at 38–39, 821 S.E.2d at 856 (remanding for additional findings of fact

and conclusions of law, including conclusion as to the defendant’s “present ability to

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                                   Opinion of the Court

pay the full amount of any purge payments ordered”); Bishop v. Bishop, 90 N.C. App.

499, 502, 369 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1988) (“Since the instant order allows [the] defendant

to purge his contempt by paying the entire $2,230 arrearage, the trial court would . . .

be required to conclude [that the] defendant had the [present] ability . . . to pay the

entire $2,230 arrearage in order to hold him in civil contempt.”).

      In the present case, although the trial court made sufficient findings of fact

regarding Father’s ability to pay his court-ordered support obligations, it failed to

make a conclusion of law that he had the present ability to satisfy the purge

conditions that it imposed. Accordingly, we must remand for the entry of a new order

“including the required findings of fact . . . and conclusions of law for [Father’s]

present ability to pay the full amount of any purge payments ordered. The trial court

may, in its discretion, receive evidence on remand.” Burnette, 262 N.C. App. at 38–

39, 821 S.E.2d at 856. “On remand, if the trial court holds [Father] in civil contempt,

new evidence will be necessary to determine if [Father] has the present ability to pay

any purge payments ordered.” Id. at 39 n.11, 821 S.E.2d at 856 n.11.

C. Attorney’s Fees

      Lastly, Father concludes his appellate brief with the following paragraph: “The

trial court entered an award of attorney fees [sic] in its order. Her consideration of an

award of such fees was based in significant part on her prior erroneous rulings as set

forth herein. The attorney fees [sic] award should, therefore, be vacated.” Father cites

no authority nor makes any substantive argument other than summarily relying

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                                  Opinion of the Court

upon his previous arguments, already discussed in this opinion.

       “Issues not presented in a party’s brief, or in support of which no reason or

argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.” N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). “An

appellant avoids abandonment when it complies with the rule’s mandate that ‘[t]he

body of the argument . . . shall contain citations of the authorities upon which the

appellant relies.’ ” K2HN Constr. NC, LLC v. Five D Contr’rs, Inc., 267 N.C. App. 207,

213, 832 S.E.2d 559, 564 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting N.C.R. App. P.

28(b)(6)). “This Court has routinely held an argument to be abandoned where an

appellant presents argument without such authority and in contravention of the

rule.” Id. Father cites no legal authority in his argument concerning the trial court’s

award of attorney’s fees; accordingly, this issue is “taken as abandoned.” N.C.R. App.

P. 28(b)(6).

                               III.   Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order in part and remand

for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law (1) detailing the court’s

calculation of Father’s actual income, and (2) stating whether Father has the ability

to satisfy the purge conditions. The court may hear additional evidence on either

issue, in its discretion.

       AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED.

       Judges HAMPSON and FLOOD concur.

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