Court Opinion

ID: 9706270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:38:09.164909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:51.491212
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the result with respect to the denial of Appellant’s guilt-phase claims. However, as to Appellant’s claim of ineffective stewardship on the part of his trial and direct-appeal counsel related to the alleged failure to investigate and present available mitigation evidence, I would remand for a further hearing, as well as findings of fact and conclusions of law from the PCRA court.
In reviewing claims of deficient stewardship associated with the presentation of mitigating evidence, an evaluation of the adequacy of counsel’s underlying investigation is a threshold inquiry. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 454, 856 A.2d 767, 784 (2004). This is so because strategic judgments made by counsel are assessed in light of the reasonableness of the investigation performed. See id. at 460, 856 A.2d at 788 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2539, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)). See generally Williams *419v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 364, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1498, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that capital counsel have the “obligation to conduct a thorough investigation”).
In the present matter, Appellant has submitted witness declarations presenting a factual issue concerning the adequacy of his trial counsel’s investigation. According to various witnesses, counsel spent less than an hour meeting with Appellant’s family, did not explain the family’s potential role as mitigation witnesses at the penalty phase of trial, and did not inquire about Appellant’s childhood or background. For example, Appellant’s younger sister indicated as follows:
[Trial counsel] never explained the purpose of the sentencing hearing beyond telling us to beg for Danny’s life. He never told us anything about mitigation, the possibility of a sentencing hearing, or what it meant to Danny’s case. There was no preparation, no questions asked or answered and no explanation of what we could say beyond asking for his life. In fact, [trial counsel] never asked us anything about [Appellant].
Affidavit of Regina Cook at ¶ 6. Appellant has also submitted evidence concerning additional life-history and mental-health mitigation, which I believe warrant assessment, in the first instance, by a fact finder. These include accounts of abuse and neglect, expert opinion of a psychiatrist and a psychologist concerning the impact of the abuse on Appellant’s mental health, and opinion evidence that Appellant suffered from major mental-health disorders. Notably, the weighing decision in a capital case by definition involves matters of degree, see Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 429, 648 A.2d 1177, 1186 (1994), and although life-history mitigation was introduced at Appellant’s capital sentencing hearing, his post-conviction proffer contains a good deal more information.1
*420The majority summarily rejects Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim as previously litigated on direct appeal. See Majority Opinion, at 950. It fails, however, to address the substance of Appellant’s associated claim that his counsel on direct appeal rendered deficient stewardship by failing to investigate and adduce the life-history and mental-health mitigation which he now seeks to present to a fact finder. Under the Collins decision, which the majority references, this is a separate and distinct claim that is not subject to the previous litigation bar and warrants independent treatment. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 60-61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (“ineffectiveness claims are distinct from those claims that are raised on direct appeal. The former challenge the adequacy of representation rather than the conviction of the defendant.”). While,Collins noted that the controlling reasoning on direct appeal may be dispositive, it also clearly required a fresh look in addressing derivative claims. See id. (“Ultimately, the claim may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal, but a Sixth Amendment claim raises a distinct issue for purposes of the PCRA and must be treated as such.”).
In a footnote responsive to this opinion, the majority indicates that the derivative claim was not set forth with sufficient detail to avoid waiver. See id. at 950 n. 9. There has always been a conceptual tension involved in such conclusions, since a primary method of demonstrating deficiencies in the stewardship of appellate counsel lies in demonstrating the obviousness and strength of the underlying claim that such counsel is alleged to have overlooked. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 567 n. 5, 782 A.2d 517, 526 n. 5 (2001). Indeed, viewed from this perspective, Appellant in fact has advanced a *421substantially developed argument concerning his appellate counsel’s performance in his appellate brief. For this reason, I generally had favored affording a degree of leeway in the application of the waiver doctrine in such situations, particularly given the significance of the petitioner’s interests involved. See Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 589 Pa. 682, 714, 910 A.2d 672, 690-91 (2006) (Saylor, J., concurring). I recognize, however, that the Court adopted a more formalistic approach to derivative claims in Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 832 A.2d 1014 (2003), as a compromise designed to overcome various differences among Justices concerning the degree of required development. Nevertheless, I also have favored the allowance of some time for McGill to become institutionalized among the capital bar, as we certainly have not seen immediate, consistent, or even ordinary compliance. However, my personal tolerance expired in November 2006, with the issuance of Marinetti, in which I indicated that I would no longer maintain a minority position supporting temporary leeway for briefs failing to meet McGill’s specific requirements. See Marinelli, 589 Pa. at 714-15, 910 A.2d at 691 (Saylor, J., concurring).2 In this regard, however, the present matter was submitted well before Marinetti was rendered. Accordingly, I have reviewed Appellant’s claims regarding appellate counsel’s stewardship and remain of the belief that a remand for further proceedings is warranted.
Justice TODD joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. Although the Court on direct appeal highlighted that nine witnesses testified at the penalty phase of Appellant’s trial, the testimony from several of those witnesses was very brief and limited in scope. For example, after merely confirming that Appellant had lived with her, the balance of the testimony from Appellant’s grandmother proceeded as follows:
*420Q. Is there anything that you want to say to this jury at this time in order to influence that jury to spare your grandson’s life?
A. Yes.
Q. You tell them. Speak loud and clear.
A. Yes. He’s not a bad person. So I just wish they would spare his life.
Q. You have to speak louder.
A. I said he’s not a bad person so I ask they spare his life. That’s all.
N.T., November 6, 1995, at 38-39.

. It should be noted, however, that in these cases in which the Court is criticizing capital post-conviction counsel for the inability even to attempt to frame a claim in the only established manner in which review can be obtained, we are openly confirming a patent deficiency in such counsel's stewardship. It certainly remains arguable that ineptitude of this sort and magnitude should not redound to the detriment of an indigent petitioner pursuing what is likely to be his single opportunity to secure state post-conviction appellate review of his sentence of death.