Court Opinion

ID: 9533140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:28:51.61838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:55.887764
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Judge.
This appeal results from a partial denial of post conviction relief.
On August 20, 1980, Hennings was charged with one count of rape and one count of burglary in Cause No. 8080. He was arrested either that same day or on August 21st. On December 15, 1980 in Cause No. 8110, he was charged with an attempted burglary (not the burglary referred to in No. 8080). On December 18, 1980 the state amended No. 8080 by adding, as a third count, unlawful deviate conduct.
On December 18, 1980 with the filing of the third count in No. 8080, as the result of a plea bargain Hennings entered a guilty plea to the charge of unlawful deviate conduct and the other two counts were dismissed. He then, also as the result of a plea bargain, entered a guilty plea to the charge of criminal trespass as a lesser included offense in Cause No. 8110.
At these guilty plea proceedings the court failed to advise Hennings of any possibility for the imposition of consecutive sentences. In No. 8080 the court imposed a six (6) year determinate sentence. In No. 8110 the court imposed a one year sentence and then ordered that the sentences be served consecutively.
Subsequently, Hennings petitioned for post conviction relief in both causes asserting the trial court’s failure to advise him of the potential for consecutive sentences as required by IC 35-4.1-1-3, amended and recodified as IC 35-35-1-2, effective September 1, 1982. The pertinent portion of the statute requires that the court shall not accept a guilty plea without informing the defendant “of any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences.” The statutory requirements are to be strictly complied with. Johnson v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 975.
After hearing the trial court granted the petition in No. 8110 and set aside the guilty plea therein but refused to grant relief in No. 8080. This appeal from the refusal in No. 8080 followed.
We believe the trial court acted correctly. Our decisions have held that the court must strictly comply with the statute. Johnson, supra. On the other hand, we deem it equally clear that no reversible error occurs where the accused is not advised of some matter that has no application to his case. See, e.g., Jamerson v. State (1979), Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 222; Likens v. State (1978), 177 Ind.App. 101, 378 N.E.2d 24.
Here the statute required the court, before accepting a guilty plea, to advise Hennings of “any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences.” IC 35-50-1-2 governs the imposition of consecutive sentences. It provides:
“(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively.
(b) If a person commits a crime:
(1) after having been arrested for another crime; and
(2) before the date he is discharged from probation, parole, or a term of imprisonment imposed for that other crime;
the terms of imprisonment for the crimes shall be served consecutively, regardless of the order in which the crimes are tried and sentences are imposed.”
It is at this point that the fact of Hen-nings’ prosecution in two separate cases is of critical importance. No motion to consolidate was ever made and no consolidation was ordered.
As to Cause No. 8080 the plea bargain offered by the state and accepted by the *1144court proposed to dismiss counts one and two in exchange for the guilty plea to count three. Accordingly, as to this cause there was nothing for the consecutive sentencing statute to operate on. See Banton v. State (1979), 180 Ind.App. 698, 390 N.E.2d 687. It was therefore not error to omit reference to consecutive sentencing.1 This, however, was not the case with respect to Cause No. 8110. In that case subsection (b) of the statute was invoked because Hennings had been arrested for the offenses charged in No. 8080 and had not been discharged thereon. Thus, in No. 8110 the court was required to advise Hen-nings about consecutive sentencing and the post conviction court correctly set aside the guilty plea therein.
Since there was no potential for consecutive sentencing involved in Case No. 8080 the court correctly denied post conviction relief.
Affirmed.
HOFFMAN, J., concurs.
STATON, P.J., dissents and files separate opinion.

. Our decision deals only with whether reversible error was committed under these circumstances. We recognize, however, that it would be better practice for the court in guilty plea proceedings to inquire of the accused whether he or she had any other charges pending in any court or was then on probation or parole from some other offense. Then any potential significance of the consecutive sentencing statute can be explored, any change for less than complete understanding on the part of the accused will be minimized, and needless appeals and post conviction proceedings may be averted.