Court Opinion

ID: 9542773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:38:30.188655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:56.236725
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
by Me. Justice Pomeeoy:
I believe that the majority opinion misreads the portion of Rule 4019 of Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure which is here applicable, viz., paragraph (a)(3). That paragraph permits “an appropriate order” if the party “refuses ... to obey” an order to produce any tangible thing for inspection. In contradistinction to paragraph (a)(2), dealing with failure of a party to appear for a deposition, paragraph (a)(3) does not require the failure to be “willful”. The cases relied on by the Court (Rapoport v. Sirott, 418 Pa. 50, 209 A. 2d 421 (1965), and Calderaio v. Ross, 395 Pa. 196, 150 A. 2d 110 (1959)) are inapposite, concerned as they are only with the deposition situation.
In the case at bar, appellees’ expert Ghering (who died before he could testify at trial), inspected and analyzed 104 pieces of glass from the broken bottle and submitted a report of findings to appellees. The glass pieces were then returned to the possession of appellant who subsequently lost all but two small fragments. *48Since appellant could not comply with appellees’ motion to produce the broken bottle pieces for inspection by its second expert, appellee Owens Illinois Glass Co., Inc., moved that the case be dismissed as to it. The pretrial judge refused this drastic relief, but “without prejudice to defendant’s right to offer into evidence . . . any factual statements from the [Gehring] report. . . .” The trial judge followed this order and allowed fact statements from the report to be introduced.
Even though appellant’s inability to produce the missing pieces in compliance with the court’s order could not be considered willful, I believe that paragraph (a)(3) of Pa. R. C. P. 4019 does not preclude the court making an “appropriate order”. The question is, therefore, whether the order allowing into evidence “factual statements” (as distinguished from opinion statements) taken from the deceased expert’s report, was “appropriate” under the circumstances.
In my view, this was a fair and reasonable exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court. That some of the facts in the report may have been hearsay did not render them automatically and under any circumstances inadmissible. They were subject to refutation by appellant if he deemed them untrue or inaccurate, and appellees’ second expert, giving his opinion on the basis of the factual statements, was fully subject to cross-examination and refutation. This somewhat makeshift evidence may have been entitled to less weight than had the original expert not died, but weight was a matter for the jury. The court’s order, in my view, was a fair and equitable solution to a unique problem of proof, well within its discretion and the letter and intent of our Rule. I would affirm the order refusing a new trial.
Mr. Justice Jones joins in this dissenting opinion.