Court Opinion

ID: 9499622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:52:59.517165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:37.126791
License: Public Domain

FISHER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I do not quarrel with the majority’s conclusion that the district court had the authority to delegate to the magistrate judge the responsibility for presiding over the closing argument. Nor do I fault the district court for proposing to utilize the services of the magistrate judge under the circumstances here. But I do disagree that such a delegation of jurisdiction at this critical stage of the proceedings was proper without obtaining the knowing and informed consent (or acquiescence) of the defendant himself, not simply by way of a unilateral “tactical” decision by his attorney. See United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202, 1206 (11th Cir.1999). In that respect, I respectfully dissent.
*951I.
In Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989), the Supreme Court held that where the defendant had timely objected to the magistrate judge conducting voir dire, the “additional duties” a federal judge may assign to a magistrate judge under the Federal Magistrates Act (FMA) do not include the selection of a jury in a felony trial. Id. at 860, 871-72, 109 S.Ct. 2237. In Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991), the Court reaffirmed Gomez but held that “the defendant’s consent warrants a different result.” Id. at 925, 111 S.Ct. 2661. The question now before us is what constitutes the crucial “defendant’s consent.” The majority and I agree that presiding over closing arguments at a felony trial is a critical stage of the proceedings. See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 923, 111 S.Ct. 2661 (stating that “those specified duties [in the Federal Magistrate Act] that were comparable to jury selection in a felony trial could be performed only with the consent of the litigants”); see also United States v. Gomez-Lepe, 207 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that conducting a jury poll that calls into question the jury’s unanimity is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding due to the possibility the presiding judge will need to exercise discretion).
We also agree that Gamba had to consent to the magistrate judge substituting for the district judge, but the majority is content to rely solely on defendant’s trial counsel’s consent. I acknowledge that Peretz is not entirely clear as to how the defendant’s consent must be established. But, like the Eleventh Circuit in Maragh, I read the Supreme Court as requiring some evidence that the defendant has personally and knowingly agreed to the substitution of a magistrate judge for an Article III judge — evidence that is lacking here.
Peretz made clear that “the litigants’ consent makes the crucial difference” when “construing] the additional duties clause to include responsibilities of far greater importance than the specified duties assigned to magistrates.” Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933, 111 S.Ct. 2661. In doing so, the Court noted that the defendant’s due process right to have an Article III judge preside over the critical stages of his felony trial is an underlying concern when interpreting the “additional duties” proviso of the FMA. See id. at 932-33, 111 S.Ct. 2661. Congress specifically limited assignments to “such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). In interpreting the FMA, therefore, it is “settled policy to avoid an interpretation ... that engenders constitutional issues.” Peretz, 501 U.S. at 929, 111 S.Ct. 2661 (quoting Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864, 109 S.Ct. 2237). This framework controls our assessment of whether the “crucial” element of defendant’s consent to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction has been established.
Whatever ambiguity may exist in Peretz, the Supreme Court has never endorsed the legitimizing force of consent to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction on a record so devoid of any indication that the defendant himself understood and knowingly waived his right to have a “person with jurisdiction to preside” over all critical stages of his felony trial. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 876, 109 S.Ct. 2237. In Peretz, the Court noted that “both petitioner and his counsel” attended the pre-trial conference at which the counsel consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction and that the magistrate judge thereafter specifically asked counsel whether she had the “clients ’ consent to proceed with the jury selection.” 501 U.S. at 925, 111 S.Ct. 2661 (emphasis added). The Court did not specify whether the petitioner’s presence and failure to *952object were necessary components of his consent, but the Eleventh Circuit has understood them as such. See Maragh, 174 F.3d at 1206. Maragh noted that “[i]n Peretz, the specific consent that the Supreme Court approved consisted of (a) trial counsel’s agreement to the procedure, (b) trial counsel’s representation that the client was aware of and agreed to the procedure, and (c) the lack of any objection from the defendant in the district court.” Id. Maragh is buttressed by Peretz’s suggestion that the defendant, not just his attorney, must agree to a magistrate judge: “ ‘If a criminal defendant, together with his attorney, believes that the presence of a judge best serves his interests during the selection of the jury, then Gomez preserves his right to object to the use of a magistrate.’ ” Peretz, 501 U.S. at 935, 111 S.Ct. 2661 (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 311 (3d Cir.1989)) (emphasis added).
Here, neither the district judge nor the magistrate judge ever asked for or received consent in the presence of the defendant. The colloquy from the pretrial conference quoted by the majority makes clear that Gamba was not aware of, much less necessarily in agreement with, his attorney’s consent to the plan to allow the magistrate judge to preside over part of closing arguments. Gamba was not present at this conference — at which the idea of the magistrate judge’s participation was proposed for the first time — and when the district judge asked Gamba’s attorney if his client “was all right” with the plan, the attorney simply replied, “Yeah, he won’t care.” The judge did not seek consent at any other time, but stated in court only that “the parties ha[d] consented” to the magistrate judge’s role during closing arguments. The district court later concluded that Gamba’s attorney “fail[ed] to obtain [Gamba’s] personal consent to allow Judge Erickson to preside over closing arguments” and “fail[ed] to inform Gamba of his right to personally give or withhold consent to the magistrate’s jurisdiction.” As the district court found, “Gamba was presented with the magistrate’s jurisdiction as a fait accompli.” Thus, it is clear that Gamba did not know of his right to refuse the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction and that Gamba had no opportunity to “decline to consent to the magistrate’s supervision” had he “perceive[d] any threat of injury from the absence of an Article III judge” at closing argument. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 935, 111 S.Ct. 2661.
I disagree with the majority that Gam-ba’s right to refuse to consent to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction is one that his attorney may waive “as a matter of trial tactics or strategy.” Majority Op. at 947 (citing Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282, 288-89 (9th Cir.1965)). Indeed, its dictum that “even if Gamba’s counsel had not consented to Magistrate Judge Erickson’s supervision of closing argument, any failure to object to Judge Molloy’s absence would have been deemed a waiver of Gamba’s right to an Article III judge at critical stages of a felony criminal proceeding,” Maj. Op. at 949 n. 4 (emphasis added), is startling. This extension of Peretz, which went to great lengths to explain why a defendant’s consent was “crucial,” Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933-35, 111 S.Ct. 2661, is both inconsistent with the Court’s concern that there be some manifestation of consent and trivializes the nature and import of having an Article III judge preside over the critical phases of a felony trial.
First, Peretz’s reference to the right of “a criminal defendant, together with his attorney” to object to the use of a magistrate judge suggests that the Court contemplated that the defendant would personally participate in the decision to waive his right to an Article III judge. See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 935, 111 S.Ct. 2661. After all, it is “the defendant’s con*953sent[that] significantly changes the constitutional analysis” — legitimizing the delegation because “there is no Article III problem when a district court judge permits a magistrate [to preside] in accordance with the defendant’s consent.” Id. at 932, 111 S.Ct. 2661 (emphasis added).1 The majority invokes an attorney’s greater “understanding of] the importance of consistency in a trial proceeding” and ability to “make an immediate determination as to the risks or benefits of accepting a magistrate judge as a substitute for a district court judge.” Maj. Op. at 949. The majority is undoubtedly correct that an attorney will be “best equipped” to understand the “legal concerns at issue,” but such is the case in all legal decisions that we reserve to the defendant personally. Id. That a lawyer may have a better grasp of the risks and benefits of a bench trial rather than a jury trial does not mean that we allow attorneys to waive their client’s right to the latter.2 Nor is the decision regarding consent to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction “immediate” in the sense of some trial decisions, id., such as objections during witness testimony that must be made or waived. A district court must plan for the magistrate judge’s substitution and affirmatively obtain the litigants’ consent — probably during a conference, as was the case here and in Per-etz. Second, in construing the “additional duties” clause, we must not forget that “federal magistrates are creatures of statute, and so is their jurisdiction.” N.L.R.B. v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir.1994). The explicit, personal consent that Congress requires for a magistrate judge to assume jurisdiction over even misdemeanor trials counsels against the majority’s position. The Federal Magistrates Act incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b)’s provision that:
Any person charged with a misdemean- or, other than a petty offense may elect, however, to be tried before a district judge for the district in which the offense was committed. The magistrate judge shall carefully explain to the defendant that he has a right to trial, judgment, and sentencing by a district judge and that he may have a right to trial by jury before a district judge or magistrate judge. The magistrate judge may not proceed to try the case unless the defendant, after such explanation, *954expressly consents to be tried before the magistrate judge and expressly and specifically waives trial, judgment, and sentencing by a district judge. Any such consent and waiver shall be made in writing or orally on the record.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 3401 by reference) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court did not extend § 3401’s specific consent requirements to a magistrate judge’s assumption of jurisdiction over felony trial voir dire. See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 947, 111 S.Ct. 2661 n. 6 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the written consent requirements of § 3401 should be adopted). But neither did it endorse a finding of consent where it is clear that the defendant had neither the knowledge nor the opportunity to object. Defense counsel in Peretz was twice asked for, and twice gave, consent to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction — at least once in the presence of the defendant himself. See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 925, 111 S.Ct. 2661. Thus, Peretz was on notice that he could have objected to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction had he decided to do so.
Third, because closing argument is a critical stage of trial, it is important not to undermine Peretz’s consent requirement. When a magistrate judge presides over only a discrete portion of the trial — particularly closing arguments — there is the danger that the defendant will suffer from a fractured judicial approach and rulings inconsistent with prior proceedings. For example, objections during closing arguments, such as whether the government improperly argued facts not in evidence, would be difficult to adjudicate fairly without exposure to the entire trial. The importance of consistency and the presiding judge’s familiarity with the proceedings as a whole is underscored by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a)(2), which requires that an Article III judge who takes over for another Article III judge once trial has begun but before a verdict is rendered must “certif[y] familiarity with the trial record.” If the assumption of jurisdiction by an Article III judge requires such certification, the assumption of jurisdiction by an Article I judge — which is unaccompanied by any such certification— should at least be plainly consented to by the defendant.
Finally, the pressure that an attorney might feel to accommodate the judge’s schedule cuts against eliminating a defendant’s right to personally consent to or refuse a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction over a critical stage of his trial. Although there is no hint here that Chief Judge Molloy exerted any pressure on the attorneys to acquiesce, we should be careful not to eliminate possible checks on the inherent desire to stay in a judge’s good graces by consenting where the defendant himself — if asked — might not.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that Gamba did not give the requisite consent to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction during closing arguments of his trial.
II.
Given my view that there was no effective consent to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, the next question is whether this error requires reversal. It is tempting to conclude that we may apply harmless error analysis to what I believe was error here. The Supreme Court in Gomez held, however, that “harmless-error analysis does not apply in a felony case in which, despite the defendant’s objection and without any meaningful review by a district judge, an officer exceeds his jurisdiction by selecting a jury.” Gomez, 490 U.S. at 876, 109 S.Ct. 2237. There are key differences between voir dire and closing arguments — differences that arguably make harmless error analysis more appropriate in connection with the latter. A primary purpose of voir dire is to ferret *955out bias, see Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir.1981), and removing the district judge from supervising that process could compromise in untraceable ways an important check on assuring an impartial jury if the process is flawed, see Gomez, 490 U.S. at 876, 109 S.Ct. 2237. The potential for such hard-to-establish prejudice is much less during closing arguments, and indeed we routinely review errors during closing argument for harmlessness. See, e.g., Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 912 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that “prosecutor’s inappropriate comments” during closing arguments regarding defendant’s refusal to testify were harmless because they “were isolated statements, and ... minimal in comparison with the weight of the evidence presented”); United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir.2002) (reviewing a prosecutor’s allegedly inflammatory statement during closing argument under the harmless error standard). Here, there is no allegation that the magistrate judge’s participation caused any specific prejudice. No objections were raised during closing arguments, and the magistrate judge was not called upon to make any rulings. There is no indication that the magistrate judge interacted with the jury in any way that could have affected its impartiality.
Notwithstanding the practical appeal of applying harmless error analysis to the magistrate judge’s improperly assumed jurisdiction here, this route appears to be foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Gomez:
Among those basic fair trial rights that can never be treated as harmless is a defendant’s right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury. Equally basic is a defendant’s right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside.
490 U.S. at 876, 109 S.Ct. 2237 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus the Supreme Court has explicitly linked the right to have a person with jurisdiction to preside to the right to an impartial adjudicator and clearly indicated that neither right can ever “be treated as harmless.” Id. To be sure, in Peretz, the Court concluded that there was no structural error in the magistrate judge’s assumption of jurisdiction, see Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937, 111 S.Ct. 2661, suggesting that its earlier statement in Gomez may have been overly broad. However, the Court did not explicitly overrule this aspect of Gomez, and therefore we are still bound by it. See United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1080 n. 16 (9th Cir.2005) (“[W]e are bound to follow a controlling Supreme Court precedent until it is explicitly overruled by that Court.”).
Accordingly, I would reverse Gamba’s conviction and remand for a new trial. I agree with Gamba that he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel in his unsuccessful appeal. Gamba’s first appellate lawyer — who also served as his trial counsel— “ignored issues [that] are clearly stronger than those presented,” so “the presumption of effective assistance of counsel [is] overcome.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir.1986)). Because the district court’s error was not harmless, Gam-ba has also demonstrated prejudice, thus satisfying “both prongs of the Strickland test,” as he is required to do in order to prevail in this collateral attack on his conviction. Id. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 746.
For the foregoing reasons, I would decline to create a split in authority with the Eleventh Circuit and I respectfully dissent.

. The Court did note that some of "[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are ... subject to waiver,” citing numerous cases in which a defendant's failure to object constituted a waiver of the right at issue. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936-37, 111 S.Ct. 2661. Some of these failures — such as not objecting on Fourth or Fifth Amendment grounds — were obviously attributable to the defendants' lawyers rather than the defendants themselves. However, the Court was invoking these cases to illustrate that the right to an Article III judge at a critical stage of a criminal trial is subject to waiver if the defendant consents, not to resolve the nature of that consent in all cases. Significantly, unlike instances in which a court is obliged to address an issue only if raised, here delegation to the magistrate judge required the district court affirmatively to obtain the defendant’s consent. Thus, the most I would infer from the Court’s waiver discussion is that the defendant may knowingly acquiesce — which was not the circumstance here.

. I have more faith than the majority that even an unsophisticated defendant can grasp the distinction between appearing before the same person throughout his trial and appearing before a different person at different stages of the trial. It does not take a law degree or litigation experience to realize that there may be some risks and benefits to consenting to a lower-level judicial officer; even students know the difference between the regular teacher and the substitute. Our fine magistrate judges may well provide the same quality of trial administration more expeditiously than our overworked district judges, but that does not mean that we should allow a defendant’s attorney unilaterally to opt for the former.