Court Opinion

ID: 9630518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:12:52.226763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:39.689888
License: Public Domain

OPINION
Opinion by
Justice WRIGHT.
Eugene Robert VanNortrick appeals his convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child. After appellant pleaded guilty before the jury, it assessed punishment at ninety-nine years’ confinement and a $2500 fine in each case. In two issues, appellant argues the trial court reversibly erred when it failed to admonish him of the possible deportation consequences of his guilty pleas as required by article 26.13(a)(4) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We agree, reverse the trial *491court’s judgments, and remand for further proceedings.
Appellant pleaded guilty to two offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age. The trial court orally admonished appellant regarding the punishment range and the sex offender registration requirements for the offenses. The written admonishment delivered to appellant addressed only the sex offender registration requirements.
Appellant’s original appellate counsel filed a brief that concluded his appeals were wholly frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). However, we concluded there was an arguable issue for appeal. See VanNortrick v. State, No. 05-03-01436-CR, 2005 WL 1594352 (Tex.App.-Dallas July 7, 2005) (not designated for publication). As a result, new appellate counsel was appointed by the trial court, and new briefing was filed.
In his first and second issues, appellant argues the trial court erred when it failed to admonish him of the possible deportation consequences of his guilty pleas as required by article 26.13(a)(4) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. According to appellant, because the record is silent regarding his citizenship and does not show he was aware of the consequences of his guilty pleas, we must reverse his convictions. The State concedes the trial court faded to admonish appellant of the deportation consequences of his guilty pleas but argues the error was harmless because the record shows appellant had a prior felony conviction for which he could have been deported if he were not a United States citizen. The State also maintains the error was harmless because the record does not show that he is a non-citizen subject to deportation.
Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court shall admonish the defendant of, among other things, the fact that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States of America, a plea of guilty may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization. Tex.Code CRiM. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon 2005). Substantial compliance by the court is sufficient unless the defendant shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court. Tex.Code CRiM. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c). When there is an insufficient admonition, whether by total failure to admonish or an admonition that is not in substantial compliance, the violation of article 26.13 comes within the standard of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). However, the reviewing court conducts the rule 44.2(c) harm analysis in conjunction with the article 26.13(c) directive. See Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 918; Carranza v. State, 980 S.W.2d 653, 658 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).
In Carranza, the court of criminal appeals declined to determine “the exact standard of review to be applied under rule 44.2(b)” when there is a complete failure to admonish. Carranza, 980 S.W.2d at 658. Instead, the court stated it understood “rule 44.2(b) to require that when there has been no substantial compliance with the admonishment requirements of article 26.13, a defendant is required to show no more than that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court.” Id.
Thereafter, the court of criminal appeals stated that in failure to admonish cases, a reviewing court must “independently examine the record for indications that a defendant was or was not aware of the consequences of his plea and whether he *492was misled or harmed by the trial court’s failure to admonish.” Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). The Burnett court went on to explain that to warrant a reversal on direct appeal, the record must support an inference that appellant did not know the consequences of his plea. A silent record supports such an inference. Id.
Recently, in Anderson, the court of criminal appeals reformulated the standard of review to be used in cases where there is a complete failure to admonish. According to the Anderson court, the question we must answer in such cases is, considering the record as a whole, do we have a fair assurance that the defendant’s decision to plead guilty would not have changed had the court admonished him? Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 919.
Here, the record is completely silent regarding appellant’s citizenship. And, although the State is correct that the record shows appellant was previously convicted of a felony in Michigan, that does not mean, as the State contends, that because he was not deported, the record “strongly suggests” he was a United States citizen. That could equally suggest that, were he subject to deportation, he was not deported through error or oversight, or he was deported and later reentered the country. With respect to the State’s argument that, because appellant does not assert he is a non-citizen subject to deportation, there is no basis to conclude the trial court’s error affected his substantial rights, we likewise disagree. Article 26.13 mandates that the trial court admonish all defendants who plead guilty, citizens and non-citizens alike. And, as the court of criminal appeals explained in Anderson, no party has the burden to prove harm. Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 918. In determining whether appellant’s substantial rights were affected, we independently review the record as a whole and decide if we have a fair assurance that the defendant’s decision to plead guilty would not have changed had the court admonished him. Id. at 919. After making such a review, we do not have such an assurance.
When the record shows a defendant is a citizen of the United States, any error in failing to admonish on deportation consequences is harmless because the admonition would not have changed a citizen’s decision to plead guilty. See id. If, however, the record shows a defendant is a non-citizen subject to deportation for other circumstances, the error is not harmless because the criminal conviction puts the defendant at a greater disadvantage than one subject to deportation on the basis of an expired permit. Id. And, when the record shows a defendant is a non-citizen, but is silent regarding whether the defendant knew the consequences of his plea, the error is not harmless because a silent record supports an inference that appellant did not know the consequences of his plea. Hwang v. State, 130 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. ref'd). Here, the record is silent regarding appellant’s status as a citizen or non-citizen and whether he was aware of the deportation consequences of his plea.
Under such circumstances, we cannot make any determination regarding appellant’s status as a citizen or non-citizen. Thus, unless we were to assume appellant is either a citizen or a non-citizen, we are unable to make any determination regarding whether appellant’s decision to plead guilty would have changed had the court admonished him. It then follows that we cannot have a fair assurance that the defendant’s decision to plead guilty would not have changed had the court admonished him.
Similarly, the record before this Court is silent regarding appellant’s immigration
*493status. Thus, we cannot agree with the dissent that appellant’s prior conviction renders any error in failing to admonish him harmless. Although the record shows appellant was convicted in Michigan in 1997 of attempted criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, it does not contain any finding or judgment by the immigration court ordering appellant removed from this country. That appellant has been convicted of a crime making him subject to deportation does not, without more, show appellant’s immigration status has been “permanently altered.” Just as we will not assume appellant is a citizen or non-citizen, we will not assume appellant’s conviction has permanently altered his immigration status, thus rendering the trial court’s error in failing to admonish appellant about the possibility of deportation harmless.
Because the record is silent regarding appellant’s status as a citizen or non-citizen, whether he was aware of the deportation consequences of his plea, and his immigration status, we cannot affirmatively answer the question articulated by the court of criminal appeals in Anderson. In other words, after considering the record before us, and in particular its lack of information, we cannot make any determination regarding whether appellant’s decision to plead guilty would have changed had the court admonished him. Because we cannot make such a determination, we cannot have a fair assurance that appellant’s decision to plead guilty would not have changed had the trial court admonished him, and we must sustain appellant’s issues.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgments and remand for further proceedings.
FITZGERALD, J. dissenting.