Court Opinion

ID: 9634292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:14.024828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:00.397431
License: Public Domain

RAKER, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result affirming the conviction because I believe that although the trial court erred in permitting the cross-examination of the alibi witness, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 578-80, 602 A.2d 677, 689-90 (1992); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 646-61, 350 A.2d 665, 670-79 (1976). I do not believe there was any reasonable possibility that evidence of Mr. Bey’s failure to come forward to the police contributed to the jury’s decision to find Petitioner guilty. We must credit jurors with a modicum of common sense. It is unlikely that jurors would conclude that Mr. Bey lacked credibility simply because he did not go to the police or the State’s Attorney *351with exculpatory evidence. See Dissenting op. at 354. This testimony had little, if any, bearing on the witness’s credibility. The witness provided a plausible explanation for his failure to come forward to the authorities. The eyewitness, Mr. Spain, testified to his extensive opportunity to observe Petitioner at the time of the crime, and he identified Petitioner on the street immediately prior to and at the time of the arrest. The police officer testified to Petitioner’s flight. There was no reasonable possibility that this evidence contributed to the guilty verdict.
Whether the failure of an alibi witness to go to the authorities with exculpatory evidence has any probative value has been the subject of many appellate opinions. See Annot., Impeachment of Defense Witness in Criminal Case by Showing Witness’ Prior Silence or Failure or Refusal to Testify, 20 A.L.R.4th 245 (1983). I agree with the observation of the Court of Special Appeals that there are some people who would shout from the rooftops in an effort to exculpate a friend or a relative whom they believe has been wrongfully accused. Williams v. State, 99 Md.App. 711, 719, 639 A.2d 180, 184 (1994). As Judge Eldridge notes, however, some would not do so. Dissenting op. at 354. Other appellate courts have also recognized that many citizens might not go to the authorities out of mistrust or fear, or because they feel their efforts would be futile, or because they were instructed not to come forward by the defendant’s attorney. See, e.g., People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914, 920-22, 406 N.E.2d 771, 777-78 (1980). This conflict does not mean, however, that an alibi witness’s pre-trial silence may never be the basis for impeachment. See State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 621 A.2d 17, 22 (1993) (agreeing with Dawson court that although witness’s silence may have low probative value, no sound reason exists to flatly prohibit this type of cross-examination). The difficulty is in fashioning an appropriate test.
I cannot subscribe to the evidentiary test crafted by the majority, nor can I find that the test is satisfied by the record in this case. Indeed, under any test, the evidence was not *352relevant. The alibi witness hardly knew Petitioner. In fact, when asked how long he had known Petitioner, Mr. Bey testified:
Well, actually I don’t really know him. I seen him a few times. Within a week I seen him about three or four times. First time is when he helped me across the street and every other time I seen him in passing, so I don’t know him well.
I agree with Judge Eldridge when he observes that this is hardly the type of relationship warranting the finding of a “natural impulse.” Dissenting op. at 355-356. Applying the Dawson test, or the majority’s test, the cross-examination should not have been permitted. In addition to the lack of a sufficient relationship between the witness and Petitioner, the witness lacked the knowledge of the “reporting” procedure. Moreover, the witness disclosed the information to Petitioner’s fiancee, with an offer to testify at trial.1
I do not disagree that the nature of the relationship between a defendant and an alibi witness is a key factor in determining whether the witness would have been motivated to contact the authorities to disclose exculpatory evidence. I believe, however, that the additional foundational requirements set forth by the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914, 921 n. 4, 921-23, 406 N.E.2d 771, 777 n. 4, 778-79 (1980), constitute a better test than that adopted by the majority today. See also State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 523 A.2d 451, 466 (1987); Commonwealth v. Egerton, 396 Mass. 499, 487 N.E.2d 481, 486-88 (1986); State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 621 A.2d 17, 22 (1993). In Dawson, the Court of Appeals observed:
In most cases, the District Attorney may lay a “proper foundation” for this type of cross-examination by first demonstrating that the witness was aware of the nature of the *353charges pending against the defendant, had reason to recognize that he possessed exculpatory information, had a reasonable motive for acting to exonerate the defendant and, finally, was familiar with the means to make such information available to law enforcement authorities.
Dawson, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 921 n. 4, 406 N.E.2d at 777 n. 4. The Dawson test takes into account the notion that there may be explanations about why a witness would not go to the police with exculpatory evidence. The test created by the majority is far too limited. I believe the Dawson test will better assist the trier of fact in determining whether the testimony of the alibi witness “is an accurate reflection of the truth or is, instead, a ‘recent fabrication.’ ” Id. 428 N.Y.S.2d at 921, 406 N.E.2d at 777.

. The record reflects the following facts. When asked whether he tried to talk to the police when he came to court, Mr. Bey responded: "I don't understand the procedure.” This is not a case of pre-trial silence. Mr. Bey testified that he told Petitioner’s fiancee that "she can tell him that he can, you know, use me as a witness.”