Court Opinion

ID: 9706257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:37:42.998171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:20.904818
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE ROMITI, dissenting: Because I believe the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish the offense of murder but not voluntary manslaughter, I dissent. Section 9 — 1(a) (2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(a) (2)) provides that one who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual. Defendant admitted at trial that he stabbed Clarence Williams, but claimed to have done so in self-defense. The trial court found that defendant “performed the act of stabbing the victim knowing that such an act creates a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim” and convicted him of murder, thus clearly rejecting defendant’s version of the occurrence. Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that at most the evidence supports a finding that he was acting under a sudden and intense passion at the time he stabbed the victim. It is clear the trial judge, as the finder of fact, believed the testimony of the State’s witnesses and that testimony does not support defendant’s claim. When the stabbing occurred the physical struggle between defendant and Williams had been over for fully five minutes. Defendant had indicated his intention to leave; indeed, his testimony was that he told his companion, Sanders, that they should leave. They then entered the kitchen, which was the location of a rear exit. The testimony of the State’s witnesses indicated no reoccurrence of the fight there. The victim even conversed with Sanders about a job possibility. Even in defendant’s testimony there is no indication that he was acting under a sudden and intense passion when he then stabbed Williams. He claimed to be acting in self-defense, out of fear for his life, not out of continuing anger at Williams. As this was a bench trial it became the province of the trial judge to determine if defendant acted in self-defense or whether his actions constituted murder, manslaughter or justifiable homicide. (People v. Crawford (1944), 387 Ill. 616, 56 N.E.2d 805; People v. Dillon (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 11, 327 N.E.2d 225.) The trial court rejected defendant’s self-defense claim and the majority accept that rejection, but they do not accept the court’s implicit determination that the remaining evidence only supported a murder conviction. Under the circumstances outlined I cannot agree with this court’s rejection of that determination. Defendant’s conviction for murder should be affirmed.