Court Opinion

ID: 9891132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 16:10:15.67831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:09.875719
License: Public Domain

J-S22027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 WILLIAM M. DANIELS                      :
                                         :
                     Appellant           :   No. 1226 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 11, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
            Criminal Division at Nos: CP-02-CR-0002083-1997,
            CP-02-CR-0002235-1996, CP-02-CR-0016251-1995

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                   FILED: October 17, 2023

      Appellant, William M. Daniels, appeals pro se from the order entered

October 11, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, denying

as untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.

      The PCRA court summarized the relevant background of the instant

appeal as follows.

      [Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA petition on March 17, 2022[,]
      arising out his judgment of sentence of life in prison entered on
      November 23, 1998. On . . . July 20, 2022[,] an order was
      entered notifying [Appellant] of the [PCRA court]’s intent to
      dismiss his PCRA Petition without a hearing. On August 15,
      2022[,] Appellant filed objections to the Notice of Intent to
      Dismiss. On October 11, 2022[,] an order was entered dismissing
      the PCRA Petition. On October 13, 2022[,] [Appellant] filed a
J-S22027-23

       Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court.[1] On October 27, 2022[,]
       an order was entered directing [Appellant] to file a Concise
       Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. [Appellant] filed
       his Concise Statement on November 7, 2022. The Concise
       Statement consists of six pages and 17 subparagraphs of alleged
       errors related to [newly] discovered evidence or unknown facts.
       [Appellant]’s Concise Statement alleges that it was error to
       dismiss his petition without a hearing as untimely because he
       established an exception to the one-year time limitation for filing
       a PCRA petition pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)[ii].
       [Appellant] alleges that certain new measurements at the crime
       scene as described in a March 1, 2022 report of Rodney Troupe of
       Finley Consulting & Investigations, a private investigator hired by
       [Appellant], were previously unknown facts that he could not have
       ascertained with the exercise of due diligence and, therefore, his
       petition was timely filed.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/17/23, 1- 2 (footnote omitted).

       On appeal,

       [w]e review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
       light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
       Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super.
       2010). This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and
       the evidence of record. Id. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
       ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
       error. Id. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any
       grounds if the record supports it. Id. We grant great deference
       to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
       findings unless they have no support in the record.
       Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011).
       However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.
       Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011);
       Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007).
       Further, where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard

____________________________________________

1 Appellant filed three notices of appeal, one on each docket, listing all three

dockets on each notice of appeal. Appellant, therefore, has substantially
complied with the requirements of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969
(Pa. 2018). See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa.
Super. 2020) (en banc).

                                           -2-
J-S22027-23

       of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
       Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010).

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

       All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final,”2 unless an

exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).3       “The PCRA’s

time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is

untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the

petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to

address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. (Frank) Chester, 895

A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

____________________________________________

2 It is undisputed that the underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely.
Appellant was sentenced on November 23, 1998. On November 27, 2000, we
affirmed the judgment of sentence. On June 22, 2001, our Supreme Court
denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. If no petition for writ of
certiorari is filed with the United States Supreme Court, like in the instant
case, the judgment of sentence becomes final at the expiration of the 90-day
period available to petition the United States Supreme Court. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.1. Accordingly, Appellant’s
judgment of sentence became final for purposes of the PCRA on September
20, 2001. Appellant had one year to file a timely PCRA petition (i.e.,
September 20, 2002). The underlying petition was filed on March 17, 2022,
which is more than 19 years after his conviction became final. Thus, the
underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely.

3 The one-year time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and

proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of
the PCRA, and (2) files a petition raising this exception within one year of the
date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

                                           -3-
J-S22027-23

(overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267

(Pa. 2020)).     As timeliness is separate and distinct from the merits of

Appellant’s underlying claims, we first determine whether this PCRA petition

is timely filed. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008). If

it is not timely, we cannot address the substantive claims raised in the

petition. Id.

       On appeal, the thrust of Appellant’s claims for our review can be

summarized as follows.           Appellant first argues that the measurement

inconsistencies noted in the Troupe report qualify as newly-discovered facts

for purposes of the timeliness exception set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A.

9545(b)(1)(ii).4       Appellant     next      argues   that   the   discovery   of   said

inconsistencies also shows that the Commonwealth engaged in a Brady5

violation by failing to disclose to Appellant the true and correct measurements,

which, in Appellant’s estimation, qualifies as governmental interference for

purposes of the PCRA. Finally, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in

____________________________________________

4 At trial, Detective Canovari testified that the distance between the
eyewitness (Tina Banks) and the location of the shooting (252 Alpine Avenue)
was 413 feet. According to Private Investigator Troupe, the distance between
Banks and the scene of the shooting was 510 feet and 5 inches.

5 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A Brady claim requires a
petitioner to show that (1) the prosecutor has suppressed evidence, (2) the
evidence, whether exculpatory or impeaching, is helpful to the defendant, and
(3) the suppression prejudiced the defendant. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Carson, 913 A.2d 220, 244 (Pa. 2006). As explained below, the merits of
Appellant’s Brady claim are not at issue here, only its timeliness.

                                            -4-
J-S22027-23

not holding a hearing on his petition. We will address the above claims ad

seriatim.

      The newly-discovered fact exception requires a petitioner to plead and

prove two components: (1) the facts upon which the claim was predicated

were unknown, and (2) these unknown facts could not have been ascertained

by the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d

618, 638 (Pa. 2017). Due diligence does not require “perfect vigilance nor

punctilious care, but rather it requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner,

based on the particular circumstances to uncover facts that may support a

claim for collateral relief.” Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 A.3d 553, 558

(Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As such, “the due diligence inquiry is

fact-sensitive and dependent upon the circumstances presented.” Id.

(citation omitted). “A petitioner must explain why he could not have obtained

the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth

v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      As aptly noted by the PCRA court, Appellant cannot meet the

requirements of the newly-discovered facts exception. The PCRA court found,

and we agree, that Appellant

      has made absolutely no showing as to how or why the distance
      between [the location of the eyewitness and scene of the
      shooting] is a fact that could not have been discovered by the
      exercise of due diligence. There are no allegations that the
      location of Tina Banks was unknown; that the location of 252
      Avenue was unknown; that the location of the garage door frame
      where the bullets were removed was unknown; or that any of

                                    -5-
J-S22027-23

      these locations changed or moved between the time of shooting
      in 1994 and 2021 when Troupe made his measurements.

      [Appellant] argues that Troupe’s measurements indicate that the
      witnesses were not 413 feet away from the scene, but 501 feet
      and 5 inches away. However, there is nothing to support the
      contention that this fact could not have been ascertained by the
      exercise of due diligence and presented at the time of trial, or at
      any time in the intervening years. It was not information that was
      exclusively within the possession or control of the Commonwealth
      or prosecutor. . . . In this case, the issue of ability of the witnesses
      to observe the scene at night, the perspective of the witnesses
      and the distance of the witnesses from the scene were all issues
      raised at the time of trial and throughout [Appellant]’s various
      PCRA petitions.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/17/23, at 7-8 (footnote omitted).

      Because Appellant failed to explain why he could not have learned of

the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence, we conclude that

Appellant failed to prove the applicability of the newly-discovered facts

exception.

      Similarly, Appellant fails to meet the governmental interference

exception.   “Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental

interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to

previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government

officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the

exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263,

1268 (Pa. 2008). In other words, a petitioner is required to show that but for

the interference of a government actor “he could not have filed his claim

earlier.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008). Here,

                                       -6-
J-S22027-23

Appellant failed to explain (i) how the Commonwealth prevented him from

raising the claim earlier, and (ii) why he could not have obtained the

information about the Commonwealth’s alleged misconduct earlier with the

exercise of due diligence. Appellant, therefore, failed to prove that his Brady

claims meets the governmental interference exception.

      Because Appellant failed to prove either the newly-discovered facts or

the governmental interference exception, the PCRA court did not err in not

holding a hearing on Appellant’s petition. See Commonwealth v. Marshall,

947 A.2d 714, 723 (Pa. 2008) (defendant was not entitled to evidentiary

hearing on petition for post-conviction relief that was untimely filed, and which

did not establish any statutory exception to one-year limitations period for

filing petition).

      Because the underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely, and because

Appellant failed to prove the applicability of any exception to the PCRA time

bar, we affirm the order of the PCRA court denying as untimely the underlying

petition.

      Order affirmed.

                                      -7-
J-S22027-23

10/17/2023

              -8-