Court Opinion

ID: 9491066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:02:54.588731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:29.499893
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur fully in Judge Merritt’s opinion in this case. I write separately to respond to Judge Moore’s dissent.
Judge Moore seems to concede that the Younger abstention under the circumstances of this case has support, directly or indirectly, in the First, Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. She points to two cases that would seem to disagree with this rather overwhelming precedential authority. Judge Moore relies most heavily on Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709 (5th Cir.1995).
Alexander, however, in my view, is distinguishable. The basis for the holding is that Younger abstention should not apply when the plaintiff in the federal § 1983 action is suing for damages alone.
The Younger abstention is not appropriate in the instant case. We have previously observed that the Younger abstention doctrine does not apply to a suit seeking only damages ... .her federal § 1983 suit seeks only monetary relief for the Defendants’ delay in instituting a forfeiture proceeding. Thus, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion
Alexander, 62 F.3d at 713 (footnote omitted). Alexander sought “only monetary relief,” unlike the plaintiff in the instant case.
The Second Circuit decision, relied upon in the dissent, also represents dubious authority to weigh against the overwhelming view of seven other circuits, not counting our own circuit.
However, a federal court is not precluded, in the exercise of its discretion, from staying proceedings in the action before it pending a decision by the state court, with a view to avoiding wasteful duplication of judicial resources and having the benefit of the state court’s views. Ungar v. Mandell, 471 F.2d 1163, 1166 (2d Cir.1972); Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1341 n. 5 (2d Cir.1971); Klein v. Walston & Co., 432 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir.1970); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir.1949). Indeed, the state court decision might under some circumstances provide a defendant in the federal action with the defense of collateral estoppel, see Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 71 S.Ct. 408, 95 L.Ed. 534 (1951); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578, 68 S.Ct. 237, 239, 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948); Klein, supra, since the mutuality-of-parties doctrine would not apply, Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., et al. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971). On this record such a stay would represent an exercise of sound discretion.
Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir.1981).
I believe further that enforcement of local zoning laws with potential penalties, such as cessation of ongoing activity and fines, is akin and comparable to enforcement of a state or local criminal misdemeanor prosecution. I find that application of the principles of equitable abstention are particularly applicable in this situation.
I, therefore, concur and find the dissent to be “off the mark” in this factual situation.