Court Opinion

ID: 9631867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:53:38.238663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:53.580687
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
In a whole series of instructions the jury was told that the pilot of a car being towed must do all that an operator of a car must do and more to escape the charge of contributory negligence when he is being towed across a grade *639railroad crossing. The jury was told that more care was required than of the operator of the towing ear, because, as will later be shown, he was expected to exercise the highest degree of care. Nevertheless the majority holds that the instructions were not erroneous and therefore the trial court was wrong in granting a new trial after verdict for defendant railroad company. It must be remembered that in this case there are three persons involved. The railroad employees operating the train, Benson, who was driving the car which was doing the towing, and the deceased, who was in the towed car. Benson is not a party defendant or plaintiff and any negligence of his is not imputed to the deceased. Hence, the only instructions pertinent would be those dealing with the situation as between the railroad crew and the deceased, the occupant of the towed car.
The trial court gave the following instruction (quoted in the majority opinion) : “A traveler approaching a railway crossing with the intent of crossing thereover on a public highway is required, if he does not stop, to approach the tracks with his vehicle under control so as not to render ineffective other precautions required of him, such as looking and listening for the approach of a train, and so that he may be able to stop or turn aside while still in a position of safety upon ascertaining that a train is approaching which might endanger his passage over said track.” (Italics added.) (Instruction No. 24.) In addition, the jury was advised: “The railway train has the right of way and in their operation of a train toward and over a crossing, the trainmen have the right to assume that every person will approach the crossing exercising ordinary care to avoid collision, and will look and listen for an approaching train and stop, if necessary, before he or she crosses to let the train go by.” (Instruction No. 17.) “It is the rule in respect of the right-of-way at a railroad crossing that a vehicle or person approaching a steam railroad crossing, with the intention of going over the tracks, is under the duty to yield the right-of-way at that crossing to any railroad train which may be approaching the crossing.” (Italics added.) (Instruction No. 18,) “You are instructed that in approaching a railroad crossing, a continuous duty is imposed upon the driver of an automobile to maintain a lookout in the directions from which danger is anticipated.” (Instruction No. 19.) “The tracks of a railroad, such as that involved in this case, are in themselves a warning of *640danger. The view of the tracks and intersection in this case was unobstructed and under these conditions before one drives a vehicle into the space which would be occupied by a train if it were to pass over such tracks, it is his duty to use every reasonable opportunity to look and listen for the approach of train, engine or ear on the tracks. What is included in the term 1 every reasonable opportunity’ depends on all the surrounding circumstances, as they would be met and viewed by a person of ordinary prudence, if he occupied the same position as-the one whose conduct is in question.” (Instruction No. 23.) Summarized, those instructions informed the jury that plaintiff was in exactly the same position as the driver of a car, in full control thereof, approaching a railroad crossing and must do all the things such a person could do; that the train crew may assume he will look, listen, and if necessary stop; that he must yield the right of way to the train, and maintain a continuous lookout; that by implication he must stop, approach the crossing with the vehicle under control and be able to stop or turn aside.
The jury was told in effect that the mere fact alone that the car is being towed constitutes contributory negligence, because the things the deceased was required to do could be done only by someone who was operating the towing car.
It should be obvious that when a person is in control of a car being towed he is practically helpless. He cannot stop or swerve and thus cannot yield the right of way. To expect him to look and listen is also unreasonable. All his attention must be focused on the towing operation if he is to avoid running into the towing car, fouling the tow line, or having his car upset. Certainly, he is in a more helpless position than a passenger in a car. While a passenger may not have a brake at his foot or a steering wheel in his hand, he can communicate with the driver and inform him of approaching danger. In the instant case to require the deceased to put on the brake (assuming that would be safe) would demand making the choice between his life and that of the driver of the towing car, for otherwise he would stop the towing car in the path of the train. If he attempted to brake his' ear the result might well be to stall the towing car. It is asserted that deceased could have blown his horn, but there is no showing that the horn was operating. In any event the driver of the towing car would not have known of the reason for blowing the horn.
*641For the foregoing reasons, judges taking a common sense view with regard to the operation of a towed car have commented : “One sitting behind a steering wheel of a towed car is utterly helpless so far as directing the course or conduct of such car. He is not the driver either in the statutory sense or in any sense. No amount of turning of the steering wheel by him will alter its course.” (Fairman v. Mors, 55 Cal.App.2d 216, 219-220 [130 P.2d 448].)
The effect of the foregoing clearly erroneous instructions was magnified by another faulty instruction which in effect told the jury that even slight negligence on decedent’s part would bar recovery; that is to say it was advised that he was required to use extraordinary care. The instruction reads: “Contributory negligence is such an act or omission of a person killed or injured, amounting to want of ordinary care in the circumstances of the case, as concurring or cooperation with a negligent act of a defendant, was a proximate cause of the death complained of. If, in this case, there was any conduct on the part of the person who was killed, amounting to negligence, no matter how slight, and if such negligence in any degree proximately contributed to the injury, no recovery can he had, and it will be your duty to return a verdict in favor of the defendants.” (Italics added.) (Instruction No. 7.) It is settled that such an instruction is faulty because it tells the jury that only slight contributory negligence will bar recovery when it is the degree of contribution that may be slight. It is error to instruct the jury that contributory negligence, no matter how slight, will bar recovery by plaintiff, because it is in effect saying that contributory negligence is not ordinary negligence, which is the doing of. something or the failure to do something which a reasonably prudent person would or would not have done under like circumstances. (Clark v. State of California, 99 Cal.App.2d 616 [222 P.2d 300] ; Strong v. Sacramento & P. R. R. Co., 61 Cal. 326; Polk v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 519 [159 P.2d 931] ; Robinson v. Western Pac. R. R. Co., 48 Cal. 409; Rush v. Lagomarsino, 196 Cal. 308 [237 P. 1066] ; Morgan v. Los Angeles R. & G. Corp., 105 Cal.App. 224 [287 P. 152].) In Clark v. State of California, supra, the court said: “But appellant more justly complains of a group of instructions given by the court at defendants’ request which as to the point now under consideration may be summarized as follows: The court told *642the jury that if the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence, no matter how slight, which proximately contributed to the accident their verdict must be for the defendants. Again the court said that in determining whether or not decedent was guilty of contributory negligence ‘if you believe from the evidence that she was guilty of the slightest degree of .negligence . . . and that such negligence proximately contributed to the accident and her death’ the verdict must be for the defendants. As said by the Supreme Court of California in Strong v. Sacramento & P. R. R. Co., 61 Cal. 326, 328: ‘The rule is, not that any degree of negligence, however slight, which directly concurs in producing the injury will prevent a recovery; but, if the negligence of the plaintiff, amounting to the absence of ordinary care, shall contribute proximately, in any degree, to the injury, the plaintiff shall not recover.’ . . .
“While the lawyer and also the layman recognize that there are differing degrees of negligence, here ordinary negligence was the only degree of negligence involved, and to permit the jury to continue in their mistaken belief that they were concerned with the degree of negligence as distinguished from the degree of proximate contribution of that negligence to the happening of the accident and the infliction of the injury, was detrimental to plaintiff’s interests, to say the least.”
It is conceded by the majority that where instructions are erroneous the question of prejudice and whether bad instructions are cured by others is for the discretion of the trial court on motion for a new trial. (Fennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 10 Cal.2d 538 [76 P.2d 104] ; Mathers v. County of Riverside, 22 Cal.2d 781 [141 P.2d 419]; Brignoli v. Seaboard Transp. Co., 29 Cal.2d 782 [178 P.2d 445].)
That the jury was misled in the instant case is clear. I would, therefore, affirm the order granting a new trial.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied April 17, 1952. Gribson, C. J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.