Court Opinion

ID: 9839022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 14:08:19.856853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:15.639374
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued September 7, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00399-CR
                           ———————————
                 CHARLES EDWARD JOHNSON, Appellant
                                        V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 21st District Court
                         Washington County, Texas
                        Trial Court Case No. 19,199

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      The trial court found appellant, Charles Edward Johnson, guilty of the felony

offense of aggravated assault,1 and the trial court assessed his punishment at

1
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(1).
confinement for fifteen years. In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court

erred in not admitting certain defensive evidence.

      We affirm.

                                     Background

      The complainant, Charlene Hope Atkinson, testified that appellant is her

nephew and appellant’s mother, Benita Atkinson, is her sister. In October 2020, the

complainant lived in a house at 300 Barbee Street, Brenham, Washington County,

Texas, which was Benita’s house. Appellant lived on the same property in his sport

utility vehicle (“SUV”).     According to the complainant, Benita did not want

appellant living in the home, and the complainant did not have any knowledge of an

arrangement between Benita and appellant that would let appellant stay outside the

home in his SUV. Appellant would park his SUV next to the driveway in front of

the house.

      The complainant further testified that to get power to his SUV, appellant used

the complainant’s extension cord, which was connected to the house in the utility

room and ran to his SUV. Appellant also used the complainant’s water hose to

supply him with water. He did not pay rent or pay a portion of the utilities for the

house.

      At some point, in October 2020, while appellant was staying in his SUV at

the house, the complainant went outside and used her poultry shears to cut her water

                                           2
hose and her extension cord that were running to appellant’s SUV. The complainant

did so “to make a point” and to “save a little money” because she was “tired of”

paying the bills. Appellant was inside his SUV when the complainant cut the water

hose and the extension cord. The complainant was not close to the SUV. After the

complainant cut the water hose and extension cord, appellant started saying “some

profanities.” The complainant did not respond to anything appellant said.

      The complainant then started walking back to the front door of the house, still

holding the shears, and appellant got out of the SUV and followed her, walking “very

harshly” toward her. The complainant stated that she tried to go back inside the

house because appellant was “very violent” and she “needed to get out of [D]odge.”

When the complainant was halfway inside the door, she kind of fell down to her

knees, and appellant “physically made contact with” her.          Appellant hit the

complainant on the left side of her face next to her eye with his fist. Her glasses

broke “into [her] face.” The complainant then “blacked out” and was unconscious.

When she woke up, she “was in blood.” There was blood on the floor, and her hair

felt wet.   The complainant crawled to her cellular telephone and called for

emergency assistance.

      As to her injuries, the complainant testified that appellant broke two bones

around her eye and tore her right ear off. Appellant also stomped on her back and

broke the complainant’s teeth. The complainant lost a “bit of hearing” in her ear,

                                         3
and it had to be “stitch[ed] . . . back” on “all the way.” She had surgery to repair her

eye, and her facial bones were replaced with titanium plates to hold her eye in place.

      The complainant stated that she never threatened appellant with the shears,

and she never tried to poke him or cut him with them. She never “brandish[ed] them

toward” appellant, and she never told appellant that she was going to cut him or

shoot him. She never went toward appellant, and she never threatened to hurt him.

The complainant did not touch appellant’s SUV. She also did not say anything to

appellant when she cut the extension cord or the water hose, and she did not say

anything to appellant after she did it.    The complainant was walking away from

appellant when she was hit by appellant in the face. She did not recall “fighting

back” after she was hit.

      Brenham Police Department Officer A. Guerra testified that on October 20,

2020, she responded to a call for emergency assistance at 300 Barbee Street. When

Guerra arrived, she saw a single-story home and an SUV parked “on the side.” She

went inside the home and saw the complainant with extensive injuries to her face.

Guerra noted that part of the complainant’s ear had been separated from her head,

and it looked like “a piece of her scalp was hanging off of her head.” The

complainant also had bruising on her right shoulder.

      When Officer Guerra went back outside the home, she saw appellant walking

down the street toward her. Appellant was on his cellular telephone. When Guerra

                                           4
asked appellant what had happened, he stated that the complainant “had cut the

extension cord that was providing power to his [SUV]” and the complainant had

“pointed the [shears] at him and threatened him.” According to appellant, he then

went into “fight or flight” mentality and “flipped out” because he felt threatened.

(Internal quotations omitted.)       Appellant told Guerra that he punched the

complainant multiple times. Guerra noted that she saw a “cut extension cord” at the

property, which was “coming from the house and . . . was going into” appellant’s

SUV.

       Officer Guerra further testified that she also spoke to the complainant October

20, 2020, and the complainant stated that she had “cut the extension cord because

she ha[d] the right to because she pa[id] all the bills.” After she cut the extension

cord, appellant “started cussing at her,” and she walked toward the house. According

to the complainant, appellant “followed her and started hitting her from behind, and

she lost consciousness.” The complainant reported that appellant had “struck her

multiple times.” When Guerra asked the complainant “if she had ever pointed the

[shears] at [appellant] or threatened him,” the complainant said “no, she didn’t point

the [shears] at him, and she said no, she didn’t threaten him.” The complainant’s

injuries were consistent with appellant punching her.

       Melissa Fleeting, a forensic nurse at a hospital in Temple, Texas, testified that

she was trained to care for people who had been assaulted. On October 20, 2020,

                                           5
while working, she evaluated the complainant at the hospital.              As to the

complainant’s injuries, Fleeting stated that the complainant had an ear laceration and

bruising around her eye. She also had multiple bruises on her collarbone, chest,

lower back, and hands. She had abrasions on her arms. The complainant had a

subconjunctival hemorrhage, meaning that her eye was completely bruised or

reddened. And the complainant had an orbital wall fracture and an orbital floor

fracture. A person with an orbital wall fracture or an orbital floor fracture has “a

high chance of losing [an] eye” or “having disfigurement.” That type of injury can

cause “permanent loss” of an eye. A person usually suffers an orbital floor fracture

when something hits the eye with a lot of force, such as a baseball or a fist.

      According to Fleeting, the complainant reported that “she was in the process

of going into her house,” when appellant “walked up to her[] [and] punched her in

the face.” She then fell down and did not remembered what happened after that.

Fleeting asked the complainant if she was unconscious, and the complainant

confirmed that she was unconscious.        Fleeting did not see any evidence that

suggested that the complainant had hit anyone—the complainant did not have any

“busted knuckles or broken fingers.”

      Fleeting testified that the complainant later had surgery to “put in a titanium

mesh to hold all of the fractured pieces” around her eye together and to “hold her

eye up.”

                                          6
      Appellant testified that he previously lived at 300 Barbee Street “[o]n and off

for five years.” Benita, his mother, owned the home. Benita had given appellant

permission to stay on the property. On October 20, 2020, he was living in his SUV

at 300 Barbee Street. The SUV was not operational, and it was parked in the

driveway. Appellant stated that he lived in the SUV because he and the complainant

did not get along.

      Appellant further testified that he had an extension cord that ran from the

“washroom on the side of the house” to his SUV so that he had electricity in the

SUV. Appellant also had a water hose that was “plugged into” a waterspout in the

front of the house that ran to his SUV. Appellant received electricity and water from

the house, but he was not contributing to paying for those things because Benita told

him not to do so.

      According to appellant, on October 20, 2020, while appellant was watching a

show on his cellular telephone, the complainant came out of the house and cut the

extension cord. The complainant “looked like she had been drinking,” and “[s]he

was belligerent.” She was “acting erratic” and angry. Appellant then got out of his

SUV and asked the complainant “what she was doing.”              Appellant told the

complainant that he was “fixing to call [his] mother” because she would not “leave

[him] alone,” and the complainant “started walking back toward[] the house,”

“saying things.” Appellant called Benita, while the complainant was “pacing in the

                                         7
yard” with the shears in her hand and smoking. When Benita told appellant to give

the complainant the cellular telephone, the complainant “got threatening” and

“moved toward[] [appellant] with the [shears].” The complainant had the shears “on

her side” and was “moving in a threatening manner.” “Her posture started to change

as she was advancing toward[] [appellant] saying her threats.” The complainant was

in “an attack position,” and appellant “took it as a threat, a real threat.” Appellant

stated that the shears the complainant had in her hand were very sharp, and he felt

that the complainant was going to “try to attack [him] and try to stab [him] to death.”

The complainant told appellant that “she would stab [him] and finish the job that

another tried to do.”

      Appellant further testified that when the complainant “threatened to also grab

her gun,” he “struck her three times.” He punched her in the side of her face with a

closed fist and slapped her with an open hand on the side of her face. After appellant

slapped the complainant, she fell down. Appellant hit the complainant multiple

times because he thought she was going to get her firearm. After appellant “stepped

on” the complainant’s face, “her whole body went limp.” Appellant stated that he

was “trying to incapacitate an aggressor.” At that point, the complainant had

dropped the shears, and appellant walked away while the complainant “laid there”

unconscious.

                                          8
      Appellant noted that he had previously been stabbed and the complainant that

day reminded him of the person who had previously stabbed him. He believed that

he was going to be “stabbed or cut” by the complainant. He was afraid for his life.

      Appellant also testified that he caused the complainant’s injuries, and he knew

that he had punched her, slapped her, and stomped on her face. Appellant further

stated that the complainant had “made it all the way back to [the] door” to the house

before appellant made any physical contact with her, and he got out of his SUV and

followed her back toward the house. The shears hit the complainant’s face, which

is how her ear was cut. Appellant did not see the complainant’s firearm that day.

      Benita testified that appellant is her son and the complainant is her sister and

appellant’s aunt. Benita stated that the complainant was not a truthful person. Benita

testified that she owned the home at 300 Barbee Street.

      According to Benita, on October 20, 2020, appellant and the complainant

were both living at 300 Barbee Street. The complainant lived in the house, and

appellant lived in his SUV in the driveway. Benita was not at the home on October

20, 2020, but she was “on the phone with [appellant] when [the incident] took place.”

Appellant had called her that day, and she heard a confrontation between appellant

and the complainant.

                                          9
                        Right to Present Complete Defense

      In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not admitting

certain defensive evidence because the trial court’s rulings prevented appellant from

“presenting a complete defense.” See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.

      A criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause and the Sixth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; Anderson v.

State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).             However, “[e]rroneous

evidentiary rulings rarely rise to the level of denying the fundamental constitutional

right[] to present a meaningful defense.” Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 663 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2002); see also Harper v. State, 540 S.W.3d 223, 234 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d). A trial court’s exclusion of evidence may rise

to the level of a constitutional violation if the ruling excludes otherwise relevant and

reliable evidence which “forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion

effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense.” Wiley v. State, 74

S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). The fact that

a defendant was unable to present his case to the extent and in the form he desired

does not rise to constitutional error if he was not prevented from presenting the

substance of his defense to the trier of fact. See Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 666; see also

Harris v. State, 152 S.W.3d 786, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet.

                                          10
ref’d) (“A defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather

subject to reasonable restrictions.” (internal quotations omitted)).

      Appellant complains that the trial court erroneously sustained the State’s

objections to certain portions of his testimony and Benita’s testimony, and the trial

court erroneously sustained the State’s objections to Defendant’s Exhibits 2, 3, and

4 and did not admit them into evidence. Specifically, appellant complains about the

following rulings by the trial court.

      Ruling 1:

      [Appellant’s counsel]:                   . . . Where did [the complainant]
                                               come from?

      [Appellant]:                             She came from the front door.

      [Appellant’s counsel]:                   And where did she go?

      [Appellant]:                             She went into the middle, up
                                               into the driveway and close
                                               toward[] the door, and cut my
                                               power        cord,    complaining
                                               that . . . I didn’t take the trash
                                               out.

      [Appellant’s counsel]:                   Okay. What else was she saying
                                               to you?

      [Appellant]:                             So she was telling me --

      [State]:                                 Judge, I’m going to object to
                                               hearsay as to what [the
                                               complainant] said to him. She
                                               has testified and been subject to

                                          11
                              cross-examination, so anything
                              he says that she said is hearsay.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Judge, the witness has testified
                              to what she said and what he
                              said, and it’s only fair that he
                              gets to say his side of the story.
                              I mean, it’s not hearsay; she’s
                              subject to cross-examination for
                              anything that he said -- or she
                              said.

....

The Court:                    I’m sustaining his objection as
                              to hearsay, yes.

Ruling 2:

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Okay. And so you call [Benita].
                              Did she get on the phone?

[Appellant]:                  Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Did you explain to her what was
                              going on?

[Appellant]:                  Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        All right. At that point where
                              was [the complainant]? Where
                              was she?

[Appellant]:                  She was standing, pacing in the
                              yard with the -- she had the
                              [shears] in her hand. She was
                              smoking a cigarette. We’re not
                              allowed to smoke in the house.

                         12
[Appellant’s counsel]:        Okay. And then what happened
                              at that point?

[Appellant]:                  My mother told me to give her
                              the phone, so I walked up to give
                              her the phone, and she was like:
                              I don’t want to talk to her. I run
                              this. I --

[State]:                      Objection, Your Honor; it’s still
                              hearsay.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Again, Your Honor, she was
                              allowed to testify to what
                              happened.

The Court:                    Sustained.

Ruling 3:

[Appellant’s counsel]:        . . . I’m going to show you what
                              we have marked as Defendant’s
                              Exhibit 3, 2, and 4. Do you see
                              those numbers there?

[Appellant]:                  Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Okay. Do you recognize what
                              these documents are?

[Appellant]:                  Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        These are photographs; is that
                              correct?

[Appellant]:                  Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        And these are photographs that
                              were taken of you; is that
                              correct?
                         13
[Appellant]:                  Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Did     you       take     these
                              photographs?

[Appellant]:                  No, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        You were present when they
                              were taken, obviously?

[Appellant]:                  Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Because they are of you?

[Appellant]:                  Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Do       these     photographs
                              accurately and correctly depict
                              the scene as it existed when
                              these photographs were taken?

[Appellant]:                  Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Your Honor, I would offer
                              Defendant’s Exhibits 2, 3, and 4
                              into evidence.

[State]:                      Judge, I’m going to object to
                              relevance. These show injuries
                              from, presumably, [a] previous
                              assault and have no bearing on
                              our case.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        And Judge, I realize that they
                              are from a different case, but we
                              have spent quite some time
                              discussing that case. There was
                              no objection to that case. I
                              believe it’s relevant to the fact
                         14
                              that [appellant’s] in a very
                              unique position of knowing
                              what being assaulted by a knife
                              is, and I believe these pictures
                              are a good depiction of the fear
                              that this man has discussed and
                              the concerns that he had, like
                              I’m quite sure no one else in this
                              courtroom         has        ever
                              experienced, and that’s what I
                              would offer them for.

The Court:                    The objection is sustained. I’m
                              not going to admit them.

Ruling 4:

[Appellant’s counsel]:        . . . At that time on October 20,
                              there was an incident that
                              occurred with [the complainant]
                              and [appellant]; is that correct?

[Benita]:                     That is correct.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        . . . Were         you      there
                              [on] . . . the[]   day that that
                              happened?

[Benita]:                     I was not there, but I was on the
                              phone with [appellant] when it
                              took place.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Okay. But you were not there;
                              is that correct?

[Benita]:                     Not physically, no sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Okay. Now, on that day did you
                              get a phone call?

                         15
[Benita]:                     Yes sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        From [appellant]?

[Benita]:                     Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        And when you got the phone
                              call, what was he -- why did he
                              call you?

[Benita]:                     He called me because he said
                              that [the complainant] was
                              outside --

[State]:                      Objection, Your Honor; it’s
                              hearsay. What he told her is a
                              statement outside --

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Judge, this is all in evidence and
                              this is an eyewitness to the
                              event.

[State]:                      And in that case it’s just
                              repetitious.

The Court:                    I’m going to have to sustain it as
                              to hearsay as to what he told her.

Ruling 5:

[Appellant’s counsel]:        You were on the phone with
                              [appellant]?

[Benita]:                     Yes, sir.

[Appellant’s counsel]:        Did        you . . . hear       a
                              confrontation?

[Benita]:                     Yes, sir.

                         16
      [Appellant’s counsel]:                  Could you tell who the
                                              confrontation was between?

      [Benita]:                               Yes, sir.

      [Appellant’s counsel]:                  How could you tell who the
                                              confrontation was between?

      [Benita]:                               I have known [the complainant]
                                              my whole life and I’ve known
                                              [appellant] his whole life and I
                                              know their voices.

      [Appellant’s counsel]:                  You heard their voices?

      [Benita]:                               Yes, sir.

      [Appellant’s counsel]:                  Okay. And from what you
                                              heard, could you describe to the
                                              [c]ourt what you heard?

      [Benita]:                               [Appellant] was asking her not
                                              to keep coming at him.

      [State]:                                Objection,     Your      Honor;
                                              hearsay, “what did he say.”

      [Appellant’s counsel]:                  Judge, this is a witness.

      The Court:                              Sustained. It’s a telephone call.

      To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a defendant must show that he

first presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the

specific grounds for the desired ruling. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Griggs v. State,

213 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d 11, 13

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires that a
                                         17
defendant have “stated the grounds for the ruling that [he] sought from the trial court

with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of [his] complaint.” TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); cf. Carter v. State, No. 01-16-00799-CR, 2017 WL 4682187,

at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 19, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (Confrontation Clause complaint not preserved where

defendant did not refer to Confrontation Clause as basis for admitting exhibit into

evidence or as basis for questioning complainant about it). The rationale of rule 33.1

is that if a complaint is raised before the trial court as soon as error becomes

foreseeable, it may be addressed and the error possibly corrected or avoided. Moore

v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Pena v. State, 285

S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (it is imperative to avoid forfeiting

complaint on appeal that defendant “let the trial [court] know what he wants, why

he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the [trial court] to

understand him at a time when the [court] is in the proper position to do something

about it” (internal quotations omitted)). Even claims involving constitutional error

must be preserved or they are waived. See Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 176–79

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (stating failure to present particular argument to trial court

in support of admission of excluded evidence waives that argument for appeal);

Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696, 699–700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Briggs v. State,

789 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Harrell v. State, No.

                                          18
14-08-00028-CR, 2009 WL 5818564, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept.

1, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant waived

argument exclusion of hearsay testimony violated defendant’s right to present

complete defense where defendant did not first present argument to trial court).

      Here, appellant never informed the trial court that his constitutional right to

present a complete defense had been violated by the trial court’s rulings sustaining

the State’s objections nor did he ever object during trial that the trial court’s rulings

were depriving him of his constitutional right to present a complete defense.2 See

Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664, 670–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (explaining to

preserve argument that exclusion of defensive evidence violates constitutional

principles, defendant must state grounds for ruling sought with sufficient specificity

to make trial court aware of constitutional grounds); Saunders v. State, No.

03-19-00191-CR, 2021 WL 1031343, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 18, 2021, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated) (“While the right to present a complete defense is

rooted in constitutional protections, . . . even constitutional rights may be

waived . . . .”). Because appellant did not argue at trial that the trial court’s rulings

denying the admission of certain defensive evidence were precluding appellant from

“presenting a complete defense,” we hold that he did not preserve his sole issue on

2
      A defendant also fails to preserve error when the contention urged on appeal does
      not match with the specific complaint made in the trial court. Lovill v. State, 319
      S.W.3d 687, 691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

                                           19
appeal for our review. See Anderson v. State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009) (recognizing deprivation of meaningful opportunity to present complete

defense is right subject to forfeiture); Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1995) (complaint on appeal that defendant was denied right to present

defense and right to due process or course of law did not correspond to objection

made at trial, and thus defendant did not preserve complaint); Saunders, 2021 WL

1031343, at *4 (“At trial, [defendant never] . . . objected to [the evidence’s]

exclusion on the ground that his constitutional right to present a complete defense

was compromised by the exclusion of the evidence. Because [defendant] did not

articulate that his right to present a complete defense supported (or required) the

admission of the evidence . . . , the trial court never had the opportunity to rule on

this rationale.”); Houston v. State, No. 05-11-00016-CR, 2012 WL 2511588, at *1

(Tex. App.—Dallas July 2, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (defendant did not preserve complaint trial court’s rulings sustaining

State’s objection deprived him of right to present complete defense where defendant

did not object or advise trial court that his constitutional right to present complete

defense had been violated); Menjivar v. State, No. 01-10-00132-CR, 2011 WL

2183735, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 2, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (defendant waived argument that trial court violated

constitutional right to present complete defense because State’s relevancy objections

                                         20
were countered with arguments based on rules of evidence, not arguments based on

violation of defendant’s constitutional right to present complete defense).

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                Julie Countiss
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           21