Court Opinion

ID: 9794552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:07:50.556423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:50.219371
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge,
dissenting.
To paraphrase Lincoln, the world will little note nor long remember a dispute over street names and address numbers; but it cannot forget the legal principles invoked here. Because my view of these principles differs from that of my colleagues, I respectfully dissent.
This case does not call upon us to decide, as a matter of policy, whether a county should have authority to set standards for street names and address numbers within a highway district. If that were the issue before us, I would join in the well-written comments by the majority on the subject. However, the true issue is not one of policy; it is one of statutory construction.
Justice Holmes once noted a distinction between the meaning of a statute and the intent of the Legislature. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv.L. Rev. 417, 419 (1898). In modern parlance, the meaning of a statute is the message received by the reader. The intent of the Legislature is the message contemplated by the sender. When we interpret a statute, our initial focus should be upon the message received. Where the message is clear from the statute itself, we need not inquire further. Only if the message is garbled— through ambiguity, conflicting language, *838incompleteness or patent absurdity — need we inquire as to what was contemplated by the sender.
In this case we are asked to interpret the message contained in a body of statutes relating to highways. The term “highway” is defined to include any public street. I.C. § 40-107. Control over public streets, in unincorporated areas, is shared by counties and highway districts. I.C. § 40-1611, which dates back to 1911, grants highway commissioners “exclusive general supervision and jurisdiction over all highways within their district.” The statute also provides that, “in addition to the powers and duties conferred by this chapter ... [the highway commissioners shall have] all of the powers and duties that would by law be vested in the county commissioners of the county ... if such highway district had not been organized.” I.C. § 40-1613 emphasizes that, “[i]n respect to all highways included within such district, the power and jurisdiction of the highway board shall be exclusive. ...” Moreover, I.C. § 40-1615 provides that the powers granted to highway districts shall be “liberally construed.”
In contrast, county authority over highways is prescribed in more limiting terms. In 1885 counties were vested with certain enumerated powers unrelated to the instant case. See I.C. § 40-501. In 1943, the counties were authorized to rename any highway if necessary to “eradicate confusion.” I.C. § 40-501(12). In 1951, counties were given a broader charge of “general supervision over all highways in the county road system.” I.C. § 40-133. However, the definition of “county road system” was narrowed by a provision that “highway districts ... shall have jurisdiction over the highways in their respective districts.” I.C. § 40-109.
In 1975 the Legislature passed the Local Planning Act. This legislation dealt primarily with land use regulation, not highways; but it contained language authorizing cities and counties to include “recommendations on . . . street naming and numbering” in their comprehensive plans, and to establish standards for “street numbers and names.” I.C. §§ 67-6508(g), 6518. The bill embodying the Local Planning Act contained no provision for repeal of any prior, inconsistent laws. See 1975 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 188. Moreover, at § 67-6528, the Legislature directed special purpose districts to “comply with allplans and ordinances adopted under this chapter unless otherwise provided by law [emphasis supplied].”
In my view, the message received from these statutes is clear. A highway district has “exclusive” authority over public streets within its jurisdiction. The subject matter of this authority extends not only to powers expressly granted by the highway district laws, but also to powers that would be exercised by the county commissioners had the highway district not been organized. The authority of highway districts embraces the naming of streets and numbering of addresses. By subsequent enactment, the Legislature has given counties specific authority to rename streets where confusion exists — a fact situation not presented by this case. The Legislature also has given counties general authority to set standards for street names and address numbers. However, the corresponding authority granted to highway districts has not been expressly repealed, and the obligation of any special purpose district to comply with county-established standards is conditioned by the phrase “unless otherwise provided by law.” Upon a plain reading of the statutes, I would conclude that general standards adopted by a county do not control the selection of street names and address numbers within a highway district.
The majority opinion focuses not upon the message received from the statutes as written, but upon a message which the Court surmises the Legislature intended to-send. The opinion ascribes to the Local Planning Act the legislative purpose of establishing county-wide standards. The powers claimed by the highway district are *839inconsistent with this ascribed purpose. The majority resolves the “conflict” by deeming counties to have “broad powers” of planning, while characterizing the powers of highway districts as the “construction, maintenance and day-to-day operation of highways.” My reading of I.C. §§ 40-1611, 40-1613 and 40-1615 does not support such a whittled-down view of highway district powers. But more fundamentally, it strikes me as circular reasoning to treat the statutes as conflicting, and therefore in need of judicial construction, on the basis of any court-ascribed purpose.
Even if a conflict were deemed to exist, the next task in statutory construction should be to harmonize the statutes if possible. See, e.g., Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 49 S.Ct. 52, 73 L.Ed. 170 (1928). When the Legislature passes a statute, it is presumed to be aware of existing statutes. First American Title Co. of Idaho, Inc. v. Clark, 99 Idaho 10, 576 P.2d 581 (1978). Absent an express provision for repeal or amendment of the existing statutes, the new provision is presumed to be enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in the prior statutes; and they should be construed together. E.g., Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 74 S.Ct. 745, 98 L.Ed. 933 (1954). In the present case, I believe that all the statutes, taken together, reflect two legislative policies — the recent policy of encouraging planning, and the historical policy of preserving the authority of highway districts within their boundaries. In my view, the statutes can be harmonized by recognizing that they embody a balance of these competing legislative concerns. Planning with respect to highways is not the sole province of counties.
Moreover, as noted earlier, I.C. § 40-1611 not only contains a general grant of authority to highway districts but also gives each district all of the powers relating to highways that would be exercised by the county commissioners if' the district did not exist. The majority opinion suggests that this “flow through” provision does not apply to “street naming and numbering” powers conferred upon counties by the Local Planning Act because the Act did not expressly provide for § 40 — 1611 to remain in force. The majority has not cited, and I am unable to find, any authority to support the proposition that a statute loses its force if it is not expressly reaffirmed by a subsequent statute. I believe the law is to the contrary. Repeal of a statute by implication is not favored. Such repeal will be avoided if, by reasonable construction, effect can be given to both statutes. E.g., Golconda Lead Mines v. Neill, 82 Idaho 96, 350 P.2d 221 (1960); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 68 Idaho 185, 191 P.2d 359 (1948). The same principle applies to partial repeal, or amendment, of a statute by implication. C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.30 (4th ed. 1972). I would hold that I.C. § 40-1611 retains its potency unless and until it is expressly repealed by the Legislature or comes into actual and irreconcilable conflict with a subsequent statute. In my view, neither of those events yet has occurred.
I re-emphasize that it may be desirable, from a planning perspective, to give counties the authority to impose their standards for street names and address numbers within highway districts. However, such a determination turns upon a weighing of competing public policies. That is a legislative task. This Court, restrained by sound rules of statutory construction, should not invade the legislative domain.