Court Opinion

ID: 9445781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:38:11.709959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:24.503299
License: Public Domain

. LUMBARP, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).'
I think the reasoning and decision of the majority are contradicted by the record of the hearings on the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty entered before Judge Knight, and to reargue the denial of that motion, and by the decisions of Judge Morgan.
The majority’s position seems to be that because the trial judge, Judge Knight, failed adequately .to ascertain whether Lester’s waiver of counsel was with “full understanding of the likely consequences” of his plea of guilty, we must send the case back for Judge Morgan to decide this. More specifically, the remand is for the sole purpose of determining whether “the defendant pleaded guilty .reasonably relying on representations made by the prosecutor that a prison sentence would not be imposed.” If the representations alleged by Lester were made, and if his interpretation, though wrong, was reasonable and he was therefore misled into pleading guilty, then, the majority holds, the plea of guilty may be withdrawn.
The trouble with this reasoning is that the record is clear that Judge Morgan made just this determination and expressly found against the defendant. At the conclusion of the first hearing (and by implication, after the second) Judge Morgan specifically concluded as follows:
“The Court: As I understand it, there is no absolute right to withdraw a plea, but the application is addressed to the discretion of the District Court, and where the Court feels a defendant knew the consequence of his plea and there was no circumstance of ¡coercion or compulsion, the motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and again enter a piea of not guilty may be properly denied. The Court feels there was no fraud or compulsion or any mistake, or any coercion, and the application to withdraw the plea of guilty entered before the late Honorable John -Knight, Judge of this court, on July 13th, 1954, is denied.” [Emphasis added.]
I do not see how it is possible to conclude otherwise than that Judge Morgan considered the very issues which the court now implies were not considered. As the quotation clearly shows, Judge Morgan did not limit himself to whether Lester thought he was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor rather than a felony, as the majority opinion seems to indicate, but clearly examined the -whole question of “fraud * * * compulsion * ' * * any mistake, or * * * coercion.”
And the record of the proceedings amply substantiates this. At the first hearing the prosecutor was asked specifically whether he had “ofifer[ed] or promise [d] him anything in exchange for a plea.” He replied: “I did not.” Moreover, there was testimony that Lester was told that the penalty “might ■ be a fine or suspended sentence or might be a prison term.” [Emphasis added.] Thus, the precise issue which the majority say must be considered, was before the district judge. There was further testimony that the prosecutor had explained to him all the consequences of his plea.
Although it is clear that the felony-misdemeanor argument was considered by Judge Morgan, it is also clear, from the continual questions as to any statements as to inducement and the references to prison sentence,- that Judge Morgan sought to ascertain whether the ■government “offered him * * * any .promises or inducements that he-wou-lfl receive by reason of such activity [cooperation- with the government] a fine, suspended-sentence or any other dispo*503sition than any other defendant tried for a similar crime.” [sic]
Moreover, the record shows that denial of the motion was the only correct decision. On a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, the burden is on the defendant to prove the grounds alleged. Friedman v. United States, 8 Cir., 200 F.2d 690, 696, certiorari denied, 1958, 345 U.S. 926, 73 S.Ct. 784, 97 L.Ed. 1357, rehearing denied, 3953, 345 U.S. 961, 73 S.Ct. 937, 97 L.Ed. 1381. Here, the prosecutor flatly denied making any representations as to leniency and there is no contradictory evidence. We have only Lester’s conclusory allegation in an affidavit and his statement that he was told he “would get full consideration from the court.” Certainly that statement in itself is not enough to carry the burden of proof. Moreover, when Judge Morgan called him as a witness at the hearing he claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused. No evidentiary weight should be given to the affidavit of a party who, in the first place, asserts very little beyond conclusory allegations, and, in the second place, refuses to allow these allegations and his whole case to be tested by direct and cross-examination. Indeed, the law is well settled that in any judicial proceeding when a witness is not available for cross-examination or refuses to be cross-examined his entire testimony should be stricken. 5 Wigmore § 1391 (3d Ed. 1940). Cf. Brown v. United States, 6 Cir., 234 F.2d 140, 144-145, certiorari granted, 1956, 352 U.S. 908, 77 S.Ct. 152, 1 L.Ed.2d 116.
In any event, the refusal to testify has reduced Lester’s case to little more than the merely conclusory allegations which Judge Morgan rightly found to be insufficient.
However, the majority does not purport to deal with the merits, but rules only that issues, which I believe have already been considered quite thoroughly, must be considered again, with the certainty of exactly the same result.