Court Opinion

ID: 9550132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:30:13.907042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:35.418166
License: Public Domain

Wright, J.
(dissenting)—This case presents a specific question of whether a contract for payment of a commission to a real estate broker must contain a full legal description of the property to be sold. This case also presents a deeper question of whether a court should be bound by prior decisions if such prior decisions are wrong.
The Court of Appeals in House v. Erwin, 5 Wn. App. 737, 490 P.2d 883 (1971) reversed the trial court and held for defendants. We granted review. House v. Erwin, 80 Wn.2d 1004.
The facts are set out in the majority opinion. Possibly better understanding will be aided by some clarification on *350one matter. The majority mentions “There was a deed on record of other Okanogan County farm lands owned by defendant Erwin.” The other property in the county owned by one of the defendants could not possibly by any stretch of imagination have caused confusion herein, and is not relevant to this litigation.
Three matters were raised at the trial in defense. Defendants contended the listing agreement was not signed by Effie M. Albrecht, wife of Chris E. Albrecht. She was present at the signing, and at several conversations. Furthermore, she talked to plaintiff on the telephone on occasions. The trial court found she ratified the agreement. That finding was not challenged and, therefore, is not now before the court.
Defendants also contended plaintiff was not the procuring cause of the sale. The trial court found “the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale.” The Court of Appeals did not consider the matter, saying: “. . . it is unnecessary for us to decide whether plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale.” The finding of the trial court was based on substantial evidence and we are firmly committed to the rule that a finding of fact by the trial court will not be disturbed if based on substantial evidence. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959); Coy v. Raabe, 77 Wn.2d 322, 462 P.2d 214 (1969).
Defendants’ third contention, relating to the lack of an adequate description, was considered by the Court of Appeals and is the only matter now before the court.
The contract or “listing agreement” is shown in the accompanying illustration.
Defendants contend this description is inadequate to comply with RCW 19.36.010, which reads in part:
In the following cases, specified in this section, any agreement, contract and promise shall be void, unless such agreement, contract or promise, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized, that is to say: . . . *351(5) An agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to sell or purchase real estate for compensation or a commission.
This statute was enacted, for the purpose of preventing fraud. The statute of frauds enacted by the legislature of Washington Territory in 1854, Laws of 1854, § 2, p. 403, did not contain subsection (5) which is involved here. That was added by Laws of 1905, ch. 58, § 1, p. 110.
The purpose of the enactment was well stated by Finley, J. in Miller v. McCamish, 78 Wn.2d 821, 828, 479 P.2d 919 (1971) wherein it was said:
As we have previously noted, there can be little question as to the intent of the legislature in the enactment of RCW 19.36.010 and RCW 64.04.010. The clear purpose and intent behind these statutes of frauds is the prevention of fraud. To apply these statutes in such a manner as to promote and encourage fraud would be to defeat the clear and unambiguous intent of the legislature in their enactment.
Clearly, the fraud sought to be prevented by RCW 19 .36.010(5) relates to disputes as to the amount of commission or compensation, the term of the listing agreement, if exclusive or nonexclusive, and most important, if any agreement existed at all. It seems scarcely conceivable for a dispute to arise over the identity of property listed with a broker.
A better rule was stated in Pray v. Anthony, 96 Cal. App. 772, 777, 274 P. 1024 (1929), wherein it was said:
As uniformly held by numerous decisions in this state upon the subject, the essential part of a contract to employ a real estate broker, so far as the statute of frauds is concerned, is the matter of the employment and consequently need not describe the land specifically, if the terms of the employment can be made definite without it.
An even more interesting case is Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306, 442 P.2d 442 (1968), which involved a contract on exactly the same printed blank as is involved herein. Idaho, just as Washington, had a long line of cases holding a perfect description of the property was *352essential to a real estate broker’s contract of employment. The Idaho court overruled several cases inconsistent with the Central Idaho Agency case stating at page 311:
A contract employing a broker to find a purchaser of real property, is not a contract to sell, convey, or encumber real property or any interest therein. It is purely a contract of employment for services to be performed by the broker for a commission to be paid upon the occurrence of certain specified events. Ordinarily such a contract would not support an action to compel conveyance of the property involved. The present action does not seek any such relief. It was brought solely for the recovery of the commission provided for in the agreement. In such a case the description in the agreement is sufficient where it is shown that there is no misunderstanding between the property owner and the broker as to the property to be offered for sale, and where it is sufficient to enable the broker to locate the property, show it, and point out its boundaries to the prospective purchaser. In this case both plaintiff and defendant knew from the description contained in the agreement that the property .to be sold was the entire “Clara Turner farm.” The farm was well known in the neighborhood. Its exact acreage and location as to county and section numbers was readily available and could be established by parol or other extrinsic evidence without varying, adding to, or subtracting from the agreement which the parties intended to make. Such evidence would apply the description to the land in harmony with the manifest intention of the parties.
We conclude that the description in the brokerage agreement involved herein was sufficient for the purposes of this action.
A real estate broker’s employment contract need not contain a complete legal description of the property being listed in order to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds, ECW 19.36.010(5), if the contract is clearly understandable. The language of the statute requires “such agreement, contract or promise, or some note or memorandum thereof, [to] be in writing, . . .”. The writing herein satisfied the requirement of the statute.
To the extent they are in conflict herewith, the following cases, and all other cases in conflict herewith, should be *353specifically overruled: Cushing v. Monarch Timber Co., 75 Wash. 678, 135 P. 660 (1913); Thompson v. English, 76 Wash. 23, 135 P. 664 (1913); Salin v. Roy, 81 Wash. 261, 142 P. 679 (1914); Nance v. Valentine, 99 Wash. 323, 169 P. 862 (1918) ; Rogers v. Lippy, 99 Wash. 312, 169 P. 858 (1918); Larue v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank, 102 Wash. 434, 172 P. 1146 (1918), adhered to on rehearing, 104 Wash. 693, 176 P. 331 (1918); Kuh v. Lemcke, 107 Wash. 45, 180 P. 889 (1919) ; Big Four Land Co. v. Daracunas, 111 Wash. 224, 190 P. 229 (1920); White v. Panama Lumber & Shingle Co., 129 Wash. 189, 224 P. 563 (1924); Black v. Milliken, 143 Wash. 204, 255 P. 101 (1927); Farley v. Fair, 144 Wash. 101, 256 P. 1031 (1927); Grammer v. Skagit Valley Lumber Co., 162 Wash. 677, 299 P. 376 (1931); Leo v. Casselman, 29 Wn.2d 47, 185 P.2d 107 (1947); Geoghegan v. Dever, 30 Wn.2d 877, 194 P.2d 397 (1948); Heim v. Faulstich, 70 Wn.2d 688, 424 P.2d 1012 (1967).
In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, I wish to make it absolutely clear I am dealing with and construing the real estate broker’s commission provision contained in RCW 19.36.010(5) and not with requirements of any other statute or statutes.
The Court of Appeals should be reversed and the judgment of the superior court should be reinstated.
Hunter and Utter, JJ., concur with Wright, J.