Court Opinion

ID: 9365716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 19:02:46.8232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:47.143346
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/24/23 City of Santa Ana v. Yuh CA4/3

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 CITY OF SANTA ANA,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                          G060889

           v.                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 30-2017-00955499)

 LUNDAR YUH,                                                             OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
David A. Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Westen Law and Tin Westen for Defendant and Appellant.
                   Ring Bender, Patrick K. Bobko; Sonia R. Carvalho, City Attorney, and
Kyle Nellesen, Assistant City Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                             *               *               *
              Defendant Lundar Yuh challenges the trial court’s postjudgment award of
attorney fees against him and in favor of plaintiff, the City of Santa Ana. Defendant
argues the trial court erred by permitting plaintiff to bring two separate attorney fee
motions, one for each of the two firms that represented plaintiff during the proceedings,
and by awarding excessive fees. We conclude plaintiff suffered no prejudice from any
procedural irregularity and there was no abuse of discretion in the amount of fees
awarded. Accordingly, we affirm.

                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
              Defendant was the lessee of a commercial property located in Santa Ana,
California, from which defendant operated two illegal marijuana dispensaries. Plaintiff
filed a petition against defendant and others seeking abatement of the property as a
nuisance. The matter was tried in two phases, with judgment ultimately entered in
plaintiff’s favor and against defendant. The judgment enjoined the use of the property for
any purpose relating to marijuana and awarded abatement costs of $19,999.62 to plaintiff
from defendant.
              Plaintiff then filed a motion for attorney fees. The motion was brought by
the Ring Bender firm and sought $160,625 in fees (the “Ring Bender motion”).
Plaintiff’s former counsel, the Jones & Mayer firm, which had represented plaintiff at
earlier phases of the litigation (albeit not at trial) filed a second motion for attorney fees
on plaintiff’s behalf, seeking an additional $207,990 (the “Jones & Mayer motion”).
Both motions were supported by declarations and attorney billing records.
              Defendant opposed the motions, arguing plaintiff’s fees were excessive in
light of the low dollar amount of the judgment and that the second motion was barred by
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Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, subdivision (a). The trial court granted the

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              All further statutory references are the Code of Civil Procedure.

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motions and allowed an additional $2,170 requested by the Ring Bender firm for
supplemental briefing, but reduced the Ring Bender fees by $12,108 and the Jones &
Mayer fees by $17,775, for a total award of $358,133.56. Defendant timely appealed.

                                        DISCUSSION
              On appeal, defendant raises two arguments: (1) the Jones & Mayer motion
was improper because it was brought by Jones & Mayer, a nonparty which did not
represent plaintiff at the time of the motion; and (2) the amount of fees awarded was
excessive.
              Defendant’s first argument is based on section 128.7, subdivision (a),
which requires any “pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper”
filed in an action to “be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s
individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, . . . by the party.” The
principal purpose of section 128.7 is to ensure motions, pleadings, or petitions are not
filed “primarily for an improper purpose,” that their legal contentions are “warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law,” and “factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” (§ 128.7, subd. (b).) It is
not at all clear to us that section 128.7 was intended to govern who has standing to make
requests of the court in a civil action, and defendant cites no authority applying section
128.7 in this manner.
              Regardless, we need not even reach the merits of this question. Article VI,
section 13 of the California Constitution prohibits us from reversing the trial court’s
judgment based on “any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination
of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” Defendant suggests the proper

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procedure was for plaintiff to include the fees requested in the Jones & Mayer motion
within the Ring Bender motion but does not suggest how following this procedure would
have made it easier for defendant to respond to the motion. In fact, Defendant fails to
identify any tangible prejudice or harm he suffered from this alleged procedural defect.
Accordingly, it cannot be a basis for reversal.
              We evaluate defendant’s second argument, that the amount of fees awarded
was excessive, under the abuse of discretion standard. (Karton v. Ari Design &
Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 743.) “An experienced trial judge is in the
best position to evaluate the value of professional services rendered in the trial court. We
presume the fee approved by the trial court is reasonable. We will not disturb the trial
court’s judgment unless it is clearly wrong. The burden is on the objector to show error.”
(Ibid.)
              Defendant falls well short of meeting this burden. First, defendant argues
plaintiff incurred unnecessary additional fees by switching attorneys just before trial.
But, as the trial court pointed out, and as remains true in defendant’s briefing before this
court, defendant fails to identify any particular line item or portion of the bills where
these unnecessary additional fees can be found. Defendant’s failure to do so is fatal to
his argument on this point; “[g]eneral arguments that fees claimed are excessive,
duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v.
California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)
              Second, defendant argues plaintiff obtained abatement warrants relatively
early in the litigation process, which defendant contends “effectively resolved” the
nuisance. Much of the fees were incurred after this point, in litigation defendant argues
was unnecessary. Plaintiff counters that obtaining these warrants did not fully and finally
resolve the problem, and that it was entitled to pursue a permanent injunction controlling
the use of the property. Defendant argued in the trial court he had offered, early in the
case, to stipulate to a permanent injunction, but provided no evidence to support this

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contention, and has not pursued this argument on appeal. In the absence of any evidence
demonstrating the duplicative or unnecessary nature of the litigation, we cannot conclude
the trial court abused its discretion.

                                         DISPOSITION
              The postjudgment order is affirmed. Plaintiff shall recover costs on appeal.

                                                  SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

BEDSWORTH, J.

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