Court Opinion

ID: 9541926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:29:46.687341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:21.972778
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, P. J.,
dissenting.
The critical facts in this case are that a person identifying him or herself as a member of “Salem REACT” called the police, reported having seen a drunk driver on the road, described the vehicle’s color, size and number of occupants, and provided the vehicle’s license plate number. An officer saw the car, stopped and talked to the driver — who was already standing outside his car — and ascertained that the driver was indeed intoxicated. The driver (defendant) was arrested for and ultimately convicted of DUII.
The majority holds that defendant’s conviction must be reversed because the caller did not provide his or her name and phone number and did not specify the location of defendant’s car or the direction that it was traveling, and because the officer who arrested defendant did not observe any traffic infractions. To reach that conclusion, the majority relies on the legal principle that a “stop” is not supported by reasonable suspicion unless the informant’s report, which gave rise to the stop, contained “some indicia of reliability.” 132 Or App at 115, citing State v. Shumway, 124 Or App 131, 133, 861 P2d 384 (1993), rev den 318 Or 459 (1994). The majority then proceeds to explain how the three factors that are “important in determining the reliability of a citizen informant’s report” were not present in this case. 132 Or App at 115.
*120Although I agree that the three factors discussed by the majority are “important” in determining whether an informant’s report was rehable enough to be relied on by a police officer, I would distinguish between “important” and “dispositive” factors. The majority opinion inadvertently establishes a per se rule that, in the absence of those three factors, any stop will be deemed “not reasonable.” That, however, is not the law. Factors are just that — factors—and as such, they should be viewed as no more than components that we may consider in reaching a decision. The “factors” identified by the majority are not essential ingredients. That is, they do not determine the outcome that we must reach.
Having considered whether the informant’s report in this case contained “indicia of reliability,” and having contemplated the meaning of the statement that “there is no set formula to determine when an unidentified informant’s tip gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a crime,” State v. Vanness, 99 Or App 120, 123, 781 P2d 391 (1989), I would hold that there were indicia of reliability in this case. First, I believe that it should be of no consequence that the informant failed to specify the location of defendant’s car or the direction in which it was traveling. Although that type of information will assist officers in apprehending suspects, it says little about the reliability of an informant’s report that the suspect has committed a crime. Also, it is the type of information that is too susceptible to change to serve as a firm basis for ascertaining the informant’s credibility. After all, the suspect could stop traveling north on 1-5 and could begin traveling east on Highway 405. It is sufficient that the police dispatcher in this case could infer, from the callér’s reference to his or her membership in ‘ ‘ Salem REACT, ’ ’ that the caller saw defendant driving in the city of Salem. Second, the caller’s failure to provide his or her name should not be deemed a fatal flaw, in light of the fact that the officer understood “Salem REACT” to be a community watchdog group which, in the officer’s experience, had made a number of reports that in each case had led to an arrest. Third, the fact that the officer observed no traffic infractions being committed by defendant is of little import, because the officer’s first contact with defendant took place after defendant had already left his car, an act which did not *121take place at the behest of the officer. At that time, the officer noticed that defendant was intoxicated.
I would hold that the informant’s report in this case was reliable and provided a sufficient basis for the officer to make contact with defendant to ascertain whether he was drunk. Accordingly, I dissent.