Court Opinion

ID: 9519369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:15:06.258229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:19.026270
License: Public Domain

NORTON, Judge
(concurring specially).
While I concur in the decision to reverse the trial court in this instance, I would do so with a different rationale.
The majority makes reference to another case involving deliberate lies by the investigating police officer, State v. C.J.M., 409 N.W.2d 857 (Minn.App.1987), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987). In that case, our court indicated an intention to re-examine a conviction involving similar tactics in the future. Id. at 861. The majority points out this is such a case, but reverses the trial court on the rationale contained in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
While I believe the trial court should be reversed, I would do so based upon the approach of Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969). In that case, the United States Supreme Court indicated that the totality of the circumstances involved should be the basis for dealing with the impact of police misrepresentation. Id. at 739, 89 S.Ct. at 1425. Here, we have a respondent who has had multiple contacts with the criminal justice system, having been arrested more than sixteen times. Because of this extensive experience with police, I would not suppress his admission of this crime as I do not believe the defendant’s will was overborne by this police trickery. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 920, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963); see also State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 106-07 (Minn.1978).