Court Opinion

ID: 9919287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 21:00:36.020349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:30.718580
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4414      Doc: 34         Filed: 01/16/2024     Pg: 1 of 8

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4414

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ANTHONY DEWAYNE DAYE,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Statesville. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (5:21-cr-00030-KDB-DSC-1)

        Submitted: September 29, 2023                                     Decided: January 16, 2024

        Before QUATTLEBAUM and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Melissa S. Baldwin, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
        CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States
        Attorney, Elizabeth M. Greenough, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4414      Doc: 34          Filed: 01/16/2024     Pg: 2 of 8

        PER CURIAM:

               Anthony Dewayne Daye appeals his convictions and 151-month sentence imposed

        following his guilty plea to dealing in firearms without a license and aiding and abetting,

        in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), 924(a)(1)(D), and eight counts of

        possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

        On appeal, Daye contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent and that his

        sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the following reasons, we

        affirm his convictions and sentence, and we remand for correction of a clerical error in the

        judgment.

               We first consider the validity of Daye’s guilty plea. Prior to accepting a guilty plea,

        a court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and determines

        that the defendant understands, the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty, any

        applicable mandatory minimum sentence, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the

        various rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United

        States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). We “accord deference to the trial

        court’s decision as to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the defendant.”

        United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 295 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

        omitted).

               Because Daye neither raised an objection during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 proceeding

        nor moved to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, we review the plea colloquy

        only for plain error. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). To establish

        plain error, Daye “must show that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the

                                                      2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4414      Doc: 34         Filed: 01/16/2024      Pg: 3 of 8

        error affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 191 (4th

        Cir. 2020) (en banc).

               Daye argues that the magistrate judge failed to comply with the requirements of

        Rule 11 in advising him of the maximum penalty he faced as a result of his guilty plea. We

        disagree. First, while the magistrate judge did not explicitly advise Daye that his sentences

        could run consecutively, Rule 11 “does not require a district court to inform the defendant

        of [even] mandatory consecutive sentencing.” United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 395

        (4th Cir. 2002). Indeed, as “[n]umerous other courts” have held, “a district court’s failure

        to advise a defendant that sentences could run consecutively does not render a guilty plea

        invalid” so long as the district court advises the defendant of the maximum statutory

        penalty on each count, because “the logical inference from a listing of the maximum terms

        of imprisonment for the individual counts is that the terms of imprisonment for each could

        run consecutively.”     United States v. Adams, 955 F.3d 238, 245-46 (2d Cir. 2020)

        (collecting cases). Here, we conclude that the magistrate judge properly advised Daye of

        the maximum statutory penalty as to each count of conviction and, thus, complied with the

        rule’s mandate regarding the possible term of imprisonment that Daye could receive.

               Daye further argues that the magistrate judge was obliged to advise him of the

        possible penalties he could face if he violated the terms of his supervised release. Contrary

        to Daye’s assertions, there is no requirement that a district court inform a defendant at a

        Rule 11 hearing as to the potential revocation sentencing penalties that could be imposed

        upon violation of a condition of supervised release. See United States v. Nicholson, 676

        F.3d 376, 381-82 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that defendants need not be made aware of

                                                     3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4414      Doc: 34          Filed: 01/16/2024     Pg: 4 of 8

        collateral consequences of guilty plea and defining collateral consequences as those

        “beyond the direct control of the court” (emphasis omitted)). Here, the magistrate judge

        properly informed Daye of the significance of supervised release by advising him that he

        could be subject to an additional term of imprisonment if he violated the terms of his

        supervised release.    We reject Daye’s contention that potential revocation penalties

        constituted part of the maximum term of imprisonment for his criminal offenses, as a

        revocation sentence—imposed to punish a breach of the sentencing court’s trust—is

        separate and distinct from any punishment imposed for underlying criminal conduct. See

        United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-38 (4th Cir. 2006).

               Daye next argues that the magistrate judge failed to advise him of the maximum

        term of supervised release that he could receive for his § 922(g)(1) convictions. While the

        magistrate judge informed Daye that he would be subject to a term of supervised release

        for these convictions, he did not advise Daye of the three-year maximum for that term; this

        was error. United States v. Thorne, 153 F.3d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 1998). However, a vacatur

        of Daye’s guilty plea is not warranted because he has not shown that this error affected his

        substantial rights. In the guilty plea context, a defendant can establish that his substantial

        rights are affected by showing a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded

        guilty but for the Rule 11 omission. Sanya, 774 F.3d at 816. Daye points to no evidence

        in the record suggesting that he would not have pleaded guilty absent the error, and we

        conclude that he has failed to make the required showing. The magistrate judge properly

        advised Daye that he was subject to a three-year term of supervised release due to his

        conviction for selling firearms without a license, and the district court ultimately sentenced

                                                      4
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4414      Doc: 34         Filed: 01/16/2024     Pg: 5 of 8

        Daye to that term. Therefore, the magistrate judge correctly informed Daye of the

        maximum term of supervised release he could be subject to based on his plea. See 18

        U.S.C. § 3624(e) (mandating that multiple terms of supervised release run concurrently).

        Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s error did not affect Daye’s substantial rights.

               Turning to Daye’s sentence, we review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a

        deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).

        This review entails consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of

        the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider whether

        the district court properly calculated the defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range, gave the

        parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C.

        § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-51. We then

        consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, evaluating “the totality of the

        circumstances.” Id. at 51. A sentence is presumptively substantively reasonable if it “is

        within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range,” and this “presumption can only

        be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18

        U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

               Daye first contends that two statements by the district court—regarding the

        likelihood that illegally sold firearms will be used to commit additional crimes as well as

        the court’s understanding of Daye’s criminal history—were factually erroneous, thus

        rendering his sentence procedurally unreasonable. We review the district court’s factual

        findings for clear error. United States v. McDonald, 28 F.4th 553, 561 (4th Cir. 2022). A

        factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court “on the entire evidence” is

                                                     5
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4414      Doc: 34          Filed: 01/16/2024      Pg: 6 of 8

        “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United

        States v. Hasson, 26 F.4th 610, 626 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 310 (2022) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). Further, as Daye did not challenge either of these findings in

        the district court, we review these claims only for plain error.

               We have reviewed the record and conclude that, even assuming that the district court

        erred by sentencing Daye based, in part, on clearly erroneous factual findings, the

        Government has shown that the alleged errors did not affect Daye’s substantial rights. See

        United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2010) (in sentencing context, defendant

        must show “that he would have received a lower sentence had the error not occurred”).

        The district court’s consideration of Daye’s criminal history and recidivism and its concern

        with protecting the public by deterring illegal firearm sales were both aggravating

        sentencing factors that the court properly considered. Even without the statements to which

        Daye now objects, the court’s concerns regarding those factors were valid and supported

        by the record. Daye is therefore not entitled to relief on these claims.

               Next, Daye argues that the district court failed to adequately address his

        nonfrivolous mitigating arguments in explaining his sentence. “A district court is required

        . . . to explain adequately the sentence imposed to allow for meaningful appellate review

        and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240,

        243 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation

        should provide some indication that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors . . . and also

        that it considered [the] defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for a lower sentence.” United

        States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212-13 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). However, “in a routine

                                                      6
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4414      Doc: 34         Filed: 01/16/2024     Pg: 7 of 8

        case, where the district court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the explanation need

        not be elaborate or lengthy.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir.

        2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, when the court has fully addressed the

        defendant’s “central thesis” in mitigation, it need not “address separately each supporting

        data point marshalled on its behalf.” Nance, 957 F.3d at 214. We have reviewed the record

        and conclude that the district court adequately considered the parties’ arguments and

        explained its rationale for imposing Daye’s 151-month sentence.

               Finally, Daye argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. However, he

        fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness attached to his within-Guidelines-range

        sentence. See Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306. We further discern no plain error resulting from

        the district court’s failure to vary downwardly based on Daye’s policy disagreement with

        the Sentencing Guidelines. * “Although a sentencing court [is] entitled to consider policy

        decisions underlying the Guidelines, including the presence or absence of empirical data .

        . . it is under no obligation to do so,” United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 101

        (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In any event, the district court plainly had a rational

        basis for adhering to the advisory sentencing range, as “semiautomatic weapons are likely

        more dangerous than other kinds of weapons.” United States v. Barron, 557 F.3d 866, 870-

               *
                 We recognize that Daye preserved a challenge to the substantive reasonableness
        of his sentence by arguing for a lower sentence than the one he received. However, plain
        error review applies to Daye’s argument regarding his policy disagreement with the
        Guidelines because Daye’s objection below “was too general to alert the district court” to
        the specific challenge he now raises on appeal. United States v. Hope, 28 F.4th 487, 495
        (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                                    7
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4414       Doc: 34         Filed: 01/16/2024      Pg: 8 of 8

        71 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting substantive reasonableness

        challenge based on policy disagreement with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

        § 2K2.1); see also United States v. Ibanez, 893 F.3d 1218, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2018)

        (rejecting challenge based on same policy disagreement with the Guidelines). We thus

        discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s imposition of a 151-month term of

        imprisonment.

               Accordingly, we affirm Daye’s convictions and sentence. We remand, however,

        for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical error in the judgment, which incorrectly lists

        the § 922(g)(1) offense charged in Count Nine as occurring on February 26, 2020, rather

        than February 26, 2021. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 (governing clerical errors). We dispense

        with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

        materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                     AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

                                                      8