Court Opinion

ID: 9549371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:17:08.531673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:12.852182
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with either the result or the justification for that result which is encompassed in the majority opinion. It is my view that the decision of the majority unduly restricts the right of a passenger for hire to bring an action against his negligent driver. Because I find that to be an erroneous result under the law, as well as a bad result in terms of valid public policy considerations, I must voice my disapproval.
Most observers would agree that we now are living in a relatively complex society, and certainly it is much more complex than it was in the times of our fathers and grandfathers. In such a complex society relationships between parties may have more than one dimension, and in adjusting the rights of the parties that evolve from those relationships it behooves courts of law to carefully analyze the operative facts and adjust the rights of the parties in the context of the relationship which was being effectuated at the time the legal questions arose. See Barnette v. The Hartford Insurance Group, Wyo., 653 P.2d 1375 (1982). We should not insist that those who are employed by the same employer can only occupy the relationship of co-employees, but if, instead, their relationship has multiple facets, we must take the other facets into account and apply them when it is important to do so to adjust the rights of the parties.
I must ask, why is this not a tort case? What is present here which effectively serves to distinguish this case from any one of a number of others in which a driver is negligent, and his paying passengers are injured by that negligence? Can the case be distinguished simply because the driver and the passengers receive their paychecks from a common employer? I am persuaded that that is not a valid distinction nor should it be the basis for denial of the right of action by the passengers. The true relationship which existed between these parties at the time of the injuries was that of driver and passengers for hire.
This certainly is not the first instance in which a significant legal question comes to us in a perhaps unpalatable package. Recognizing that this case is one for contribution pursuant to our Wyoming Statutes (§§ 1-1-110 through 1-1-113, W.S.1977) by one tortfeasor, a corporation acting through its employee, against another tortfeasor, who is an individual, still the parties are in agreement that contribution is only available if the injured passengers could have brought an action against their driver. The decision will have its primary precedential value in those cases in which passengers seek to recover from drivers. The majority has chosen to apply the immunity provision found in our worker’s compensation statute, § 27-12-103(a), W.S.1977, and to hold that because of this statute the injured passengers for hire cannot bring the action against their driver.
*1238It is my judgment that the majority opinion applies the immunity provision too broadly, and in contravention of our oft-stated rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be narrowly and strictly construed. Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., Wyo., 426 P.2d 442 (1967). “There is a pervading rule that valuable common law rights shall not be deemed destroyed by a statute except by clear language.” Markle v. Williamson, Wyo., 518 P.2d 621, 623 (1974).
As part of its justification for the disposition of this case the majority holds that the words “scope of their employment” in § 27-12-103(a) are the same as and coterminous with the words “course of employment” found in § 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977. The majority then endeavors to match this conclusion with the prior decision of this court in Beard v. Brown, Wyo., 616 P.2d 726 (1980). For me the effort of the majority does not succeed. Beard v. Brown holds that an employee who is traveling to and from the work site even though compensated for travel time is not within the “scope of his employment” while engaged in that function. When the result in this case is compared with Beard v. Brown we discover that the negligent driver is not within the scope of his employment (for purposes of the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to his employer), but he is within the scope of his employment (when an action is brought against him by his paying passengers). I submit that it is illogical and confusing to find one engaging in a single activity while being not within and yet within the scope of his employment. The question of whether the employee is within the “course of employment” has been treated by this court historically as a separate and essentially unrelated matter. H.K. Ferguson Company v. Willey, Wyo., 571 P.2d 248 (1977); Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen’s Compensation Department v. Boston, Wyo., 445 P.2d 548 (1968); White Ditching Company v. Giddeon, Wyo., 413 P.2d 45 (1966); and Jensen v. Manning & Brown, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (1947).
Section 8-1-103, (a)(i), W.S.1977, states:
“Words and phrases shall be taken in their ordinary and usual sense, but technical words and phrases having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be understood according to their technical import.”
The phrase “scope of their employment” does have a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law in Wyoming. Beard v. Brown, supra; Combined Insurance Company of America v. Sinclair, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1034 (1978); Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Company, Wyo., 598 P.2d 20 (1979). I submit that under our Wyoming jurisprudence the legislature is presumed to have been aware of the difference between “course of employment” and “scope of employment,” and to have used the latter phrase designedly in limiting the immunity statute. A word which has a well-settled meaning in law at the time of its usage in a statute will be so understood unless a different meaning is unmistakably intended. Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031 (1979); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Wyo., 568 P.2d 908 (1977); Title Guaranty Company of Wyoming v. Belt, Wyo., 539 P.2d 357 (1975); and School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10, in County of Campbell v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751 (1967). Statutes are presumed to be enacted with full knowledge on the part of the legislature of the existing state of the law and with reference thereto. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979); White v. Board of Land Commissioners, Wyo., 595 P.2d 76 (1979); Brown v. State, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1312 (1979); DeHerrera v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d 479 (1977); Voss v. Ralston, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 (1976); and Board of the County Commissioners of the County of Albany v. White, 79 Wyo. 420, 335 P.2d 433 (1959). If the Wyoming Legislature had intended the words in the immunity provision of the worker’s compensation statute to mean “course of employment” and to extend to the facts of this case, the legislature knew the right words to use.
Counsel for the appellant has very capably called to our attention the similarity in jurisprudential history between Wyoming and the State of California. In Wyoming *1239the extension of immunity to a fellow employee followed upon the decision of this court in Markle v. Williamson, supra. As the majority opinion outlines, the progression then was from gross negligence to culpable negligence as an exception to the immunity. A similar history is reflected in the State of California in the case of Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal.2d 124, 45 Cal.Rptr. 144, 403 P.2d 400 (1965). I find the reasoning of the California court to be highly persuasive with respect to the conclusions to be drawn from this sequence of events, and it leaves me with my position that “scope of employment” for this purpose is different from “course of employment.” I then would apply the former phrase in accordance with well-recognized principles of tort law. Other states, while criticized by Professor Larson (2A Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 72.23 (1982)), have reached a similar conclusion. Molino v. Asher, 95 Nev. 33, 588 P.2d 1033 (1979), second appeal, 96 Nev. 814, 618 P.2d 878 (1980); Williams v. Bebbington, 247 S.C. 260, 146 S.E.2d 853 (1966); and Ward v. Wright, Tex.Civ.App., 490 S.W.2d 223 (1973). Such a result is entirely consistent with our policy of liberal construction of the worker’s compensation statute in order to provide coverage under its provisions, and yet is equally consistent with our rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.
Furthermore, the result I espouse is consistent with the decision of this court in Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 641 P.2d 1235 (1981). The majority opinion quotes from Meyer v. Kendig, emphasizing language in favor of immunity. Whether the factors there related really can be espoused to justify immunity from action for injuries resulting from the negligence of a driver carrying other workers to and from their place of employment for compensation is problematical. Certainly the purposes there related to be served by the Worker’s Compensation Act are not in any way furthered by insulating a driver such as Hansen from liability for negligent acts which he commits while carrying on his private profit-making activities. We must remember that in Meyer v. Kendig, supra, the issue was constitutionality of the statutory immunity; it clearly was factually applicable in that instance.
I harken back to Nehring v. Russell, Wyo., 582 P.2d 67 (1978), in which this court concluded that the Wyoming automobile guest statute violated the guaranty of uniform operation of laws established by § 34 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. This was true, we said, because the statute discriminated between paying passengers and nonpaying passengers by barring the nonpaying passengers from suits for ordinary negligence. We stated that in so doing the guest statute exceeded all bounds of rationality and for that reason it constituted a denial of uniform operation under the Wyoming Constitution. Conceivably one of Hansen’s passengers could have been employed by some other person or firm than Pathfinder Mines Corporation. Given that circumstance, how would we justify the right of one to sue while the other could not? To paraphrase what we said in Nehring v. Russell, supra, the immunity extended by the worker’s compensation statute to a driver whose negligence injures his passenger does not bear a substantial nor rational, relation to the worker’s compensation statute’s ascribed purposes of speedy relief for work-related injuries, maintaining harmony in the work place, and avoiding a plethora of legal actions. I only note the deleterious rather than salutary effect upon the soundness of the Worker’s Compensation Fund resulting from covering such injuries in favor of a tortfeasor who makes no payments into the fund in connection with his business of transporting passengers for hire.
In summary I am convinced that by calling a tort case a worker's compensation ease we have reached a result that will lead to future injustices. The result is not necessary to further the philosophy and statutory purposes of the Worker’s Compensation Fund. It is possible to recognize that the immunity provision would not extend to situations such as this without ignoring what I regard as the obvious intent of the legislature, and without creating confusion *1240with respect to the concept of “scope of employment.” I pause to note that the majority opinion even bolsters its reasoning by suggesting that widows must contribute out of their worker’s compensation benefits to payments imposed under the contribution statute. In light of the provisions of § 27-12-408, W.S.1977, that suggestion is erroneous and misleading. Furthermore, § 27-12-409, W.S.1977, provides a substantial protection for worker’s compensation benefits paid to an injured workman, who is the driver in this instance, since he is the guilty party. However, attempting to muster sympathy for him may not be a fruitful endeavor.
I must confess a lack of capacity to engage in the intellectual gymnastics manifest in the majority opinion. I think these efforts are inappropriate when the result is simply a windfall to a negligent driver and his insurance carrier without in any way furthering the purposes of the worker’s compensation system. I would reverse the district court in this case and would hold that the statute accommodates to a construction to the end that the negligent driver transporting his fellow employees to and from the work site is not within the scope of his employment, but instead is within the purview of his own profit-making activities, and therefore is not entitled to the benefit of the immunity provision in the statute. I would read the language from Meyer v. Kendig, supra, as limited to justifying the immunity in those situations in which the employees were working together in a common effort to further the business of their employer. I believe that is what worker’s compensation deals with, and in my view it has very little, if anything, to do with the relationship here, which was that of driver and passenger for hire. This is a tort case in which there are incidental overtones of worker’s compensation; it is not, as the majority holds, a worker’s compensation case in which there has been some incidental tortious conduct.