Court Opinion

ID: 9404140
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Date Created: 2023-06-22 14:03:48.694185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:12.047916
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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 20-CO-0509

                        DAVID A. SHEPHERD, APPELLANT,

                                          V.

                            UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

                         Appeal from the Superior Court
                          of the District of Columbia
                              (2012-CF1-009602)

                    (Hon. William W. Nooter, Motions Judge)

(Submitted November 16, 2021                              Decided June 22, 2023)

      Richard S. Stolker for appellant.

      Channing D. Phillips, Acting United States Attorney at the time, and
Elizabeth Trosman, Chrisellen R. Kolb, Grace Richards, and Katherine M. Kelley,
Assistant United States Attorneys, for appellee.

      Before BECKWITH and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and GLICKMAN, * Senior
Judge.

      EASTERLY, Associate Judge: In this opinion we address once again whether

and when an individual seeking post-conviction relief under D.C. Code § 23-110 is

      *
         Judge Glickman was an Associate Judge at the time of submission. His
status changed to Senior Judge on December 21, 2022.
                                         2

entitled to a hearing. David Shepherd was convicted of first-degree murder while

armed and related charges in connection with the shooting death of Henry Charles

Miller (“Chuck”), which Mr. Shepherd claimed was in self-defense. After this court

affirmed his convictions on direct appeal, Shepherd v. United States, 144 A.3d 554,

564 (D.C. 2016), Mr. Shepherd, who until then had been represented by attorneys

from the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia (“PDS”), was

appointed new counsel and filed a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110 alleging that

he had been provided with ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) and requesting

a hearing. The motions court summarily denied him relief. Mr. Shepherd timely

appealed. We incorporate the facts as set forth in our opinion resolving Mr.

Shepherd’s direct appeal. See Shepherd, 144 A.3d at 557-58. Reviewing the

motions court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, Bellinger v. United States, 127 A.3d

505, 514 (D.C. 2015), which includes an assessment of whether it relied on correct

legal principles, McFerguson v. United States, 870 A.2d 1199, 1203 (D.C. 2005),

we discern a number of analytic errors and conclude that remand is required.

                                  I.    Analysis

      When an incarcerated person files a motion challenging their conviction under

D.C. Code § 23-110, the motions court must hold a hearing “[u]nless the motion and
                                          3

files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no

relief.” D.C. Code § 23-110(c) (emphasis added). Interpreting this text, this court

has long held that the statute creates a default rule 1 in favor of a hearing (assuming

no predicate procedural bar) with only three exceptions for: “(1) vague and

conclusory allegations, (2) palpably incredible claims, and (3) assertions that would

not merit relief even if true.” Rice v. United States, 580 A.2d 119, 122 (D.C. 1990)

(quoting the exceptions set forth in Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d 142, 147

(D.C. 1990), and explaining that those exceptions “set forth the principles which

control the application of this [statutory] provision”); see also Ramsey, 569 A.2d at

147 (acknowledging these “three categories of claims that do not merit hearings”

and citing Pettaway v. United States, 390 A.2d 981, 984 (D.C. 1978)); Pettaway,

390 A.2d at 984 (explaining that, to “giv[e] practical effect to [the text of]

§ 23-110[(c),] . . . courts have developed [these] three categories of claims which do

not merit hearings” and citing inter alia Gibson v. United States, 388 A.2d 1214,

      1
        Although we have often referred to this as a “presumption,” see, e.g., Bethea
v. United States, 170 A.3d 192, 194 (D.C. 2017), it is more accurately termed a
“default rule” subject to enumerated exceptions, cf. In re Chaganti, 144 A.3d 20, 23
n.3 (D.C. 2016) (explaining that an attorney discipline rule we previously described
as setting forth a “rebuttable presumption” was more accurately categorized as a
“rule subject to exceptions”). Compare Presumption, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019) (defining a presumption as a “legal inference or assumption that a fact
exists”), with Rule, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining a rule as a
“general norm mandating . . . action in a given type of situation”).
                                            4

1215-16 (D.C. 1978)); 2 Gibson, 388 A.2d at 1215-16 (explaining that § 23-110

“requires an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations of the motion itself are vague

and conclusory, are wholly incredible, or even if true, would merit no relief.”). 3

Thus, “[w]hile the decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a § 23-110

[motion] . . . is committed to the trial court’s discretion, the extent of that discretion

is quite narrow,” Bellinger, 127 A.3d at 514-15 (internal quotation marks omitted),

and “any non-frivolous question whether a hearing is appropriate should be resolved

in the affirmative,” Joseph v. United States, 878 A.2d 1204, 1209 (D.C. 2005)

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

      2
        By also citing to several earlier cases in which the denial of a hearing was
upheld without express reference to these three exceptions, Pettaway indicated that
it was aggregating the rationales of these decisions in the three exceptions it
recognized. See Pettaway, 390 A.2d at 984. Gibson (cited by Pettaway) similarly
synthesized the rationales of these earlier cases in setting out the three exceptions.
See Gibson, 388 A.2d at 1215-16 (explaining that the exceptions are drawn from
precedent).
      3
        Although Pettaway and Gibson standardized the language of these three
exceptions, some of the older non-standard descriptions lingered. See, e.g., Sykes v.
United States, 585 A.2d 1335, 1339 (D.C. 1991) (explaining that no hearing is
required if a claim “fail[s] to withstand initial checking for verity, or at the least, the
probability of verity” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Pettaway, 390
A.2d at 984 & n.2 (explaining such claims are “a subcategory” of claims that are
“palpably incredible,” one of the three recognized exceptions).
                                          5

  A.        The Motions Court’s Flawed Bases for Denying a § 23-110 Hearing

       Although the motions court acknowledged that a § 23-110 movant is generally

entitled to a hearing, for multiple reasons it determined that a hearing was not

warranted in this case. We conclude that the court’s reasoning was flawed in several

respects.

       The court first concluded that a hearing was not warranted by relying on the

following train of logic: (1) Mr. Shepherd’s § 23-110 motion was procedurally

barred under Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C. 1987) (generally

requiring a § 23-110 motion to be brought during the pendency of a defendant’s

direct appeal); (2) although Mr. Shepherd had shown the necessary cause to

overcome the procedural bar (the continued representation by PDS attorneys on

appeal), he had failed to show the requisite prejudice, id. at 1281-82; and (3) having

failed to overcome the procedural bar, Mr. Shepherd was not entitled to a hearing.

The trial court’s analysis was faulty at the first step: although a procedural bar may

obviate a hearing, 4 Mr. Shepherd’s § 23-110 motion was not procedurally barred

       4
        See Bradley v. United States, 881 A.2d 640, 645 (D.C. 2005) (“We have
often and consistently upheld the denial of a second or successive § 23-110 motion
without a hearing, at least in the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, which
appellant has not made.”); cf. Sullivan v. United States, 721 A.2d 936, 937 (D.C.
                                           6

under Shepard. When a defendant has been “represented on direct appeal by the

same counsel that represented him at trial, he is not procedurally barred from making

a collateral attack based upon claims of ineffective assistance of counsel although

the issue was not raised during the pendency of his direct appeal.” Little v. United

States, 748 A.2d 920, 923 (D.C. 2000); accord Hardy v. United States, 988 A.2d

950, 960 (D.C. 2010) (“Failure to raise the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel

during the pendency of the direct appeal does not constitute procedural default . . .

where the appellant was represented on direct appeal by the same counsel that

represented him at trial . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Terry v.

United States, 114 A.3d 608, 630 n.10 (D.C. 2015) (“[B]ecause [the defendant] was

represented by the same counsel during the trial and on appeal, any § 23-110

challenge he raises [based on IAC] will not be burdened by a showing of cause and

prejudice . . . .”).   The motions court should not have relied on a perceived

procedural bar to deny Mr. Shepherd a hearing.

1998) (affirming trial court’s denial of a § 23-110 motion without a hearing based
on Shepard where pro se movant had not informed the motions court that court-
appointed counsel had represented movant at trial and on direct appeal, but
authorizing movant to file a new motion to be considered on the merits). But see
Arrington v. United States, 238 A.3d 218, 221 n.2 (D.C. 2020) (acknowledging that
under § 23-110, trial courts have the discretion “to decline to invoke a procedural
bar”).
                                           7

      The motions court alternatively ruled that, in addition to the three exceptions

to the default hearing rule established in our § 23-110 case law, it could deny a

hearing on a fourth basis, explaining that “a hearing is not automatically required if

the defendant’s claims . . . (4) can otherwise be disposed of on the existing record.”

But where there is a § 23-110 motion before the court, there are, as explained above,

only three legitimate reasons for denying a § 23-110 hearing: if the claims are (1)

vague and conclusory, (2) palpably incredible, or (3) would merit no relief even if

they were true. See Gaston v. United States, 535 A.2d 893, 899 (D.C. 1988)

(explaining that “[o]nly three categories of claims do not merit hearings” (emphasis

added)); Bellinger, 127 A.3d at 515 (reaffirming that “[w]e will affirm the trial

court’s denial of a § 23-110 motion without a hearing only if the claims” fall within

one of the three established exceptions (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Separately assessing that a claim can be resolved on the existing record

is not a valid fourth basis for denying a § 23-110 movant a hearing. See Dorsey v.

United States, 225 A.3d 724, 728 (D.C. 2020) (acknowledging that “[e]choing the

language of the statute, we have said that a hearing is not required when the motion

is ‘capable of resolution on the existing record,’” but explaining that the “particular”

circumstances in which a hearing could be denied were limited to the three
                                          8

established exceptions to the default rule (citation omitted)). 5 Indeed, endorsing an

additional exception that no hearing is required when a movant’s claims can be

resolved “on the existing record” would swallow the other three exceptions, do little

to reinforce the default rule that a hearing should be held, and would instead

encourage courts to resolve gaps in the record against § 23-110 movants rather than

recognizing that those gaps necessitate a hearing. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,

385 A.2d 742, 744 (D.C. 1978) (remanding for a hearing because the “motions, files

and records in [the] case do not conclusively rebut appellant’s assertions” (emphasis

added) (interpreting D.C. Code § 23-110)); McCrimmon v. United States, 853 A.2d

154, 165 (D.C. 2004) (remanding for a hearing where the “record raise[d]—but [did]

not answer” questions about the appellant’s claims); Bethea v. United States, 170

      5
         Granted some of our opinions—including Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d
233 (D.C. 1993), on which the motions court relied—have been less clear that the
three exceptions are exclusive, see id. at 234 (listing the three exceptions as
additional circumstances, rather than the only circumstances, under which the court
can deny a hearing), or have even indicated that the default rule is not to hold a
hearing, see, e.g., Ellerbe v. United States, 545 A.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. 1988) (stating
that a § 23-110 “movant is entitled to a hearing on his claims regarding the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel only when the claims cannot be disposed of by
resort to the files and records of the case because the claims involve matters outside
of the record”). But to the extent that later cases have contradicted or misstated
Pettaway and Gibson and their progeny, our earlier cases interpreting § 23-110
control. See Wheeler v. United States, 977 A.2d 973, 986 n.34 (D.C. 2009) (“[W]e
have ruled on several occasions that, when decisions of this court are in conflict, the
earlier decision applies.”).
                                           9

A.3d 192, 195-96 (D.C. 2017) (remanding for a hearing where “the trial court

conflated the procedural question of whether there is a reason to deny [the appellant]

a hearing on his motion with the distinct merits question of whether the [appellant’s]

claims warrant relief (once all evidentiary questions have been resolved, typically

through a hearing)”). The court should not have relied on a nonexistent fourth

exception to the default rule to deny Mr. Shepherd a hearing. 6

      B.     Whether the Motions Court Had Other Legitimate Bases for
                             Denying a Hearing

      This leaves the question whether any of the three established exceptions to the

default rule justified the denial of a hearing in this case. We look first to the claims

of ineffectiveness regarding trial counsel’s investigation and questioning of the

government’s three eyewitnesses: Mr. White, the only eyewitness without ties to the

decedent; as well as Ms. Ingram, the decedent’s cousin, and Mr. Dickerson, who was

“like family” to Ms. Ingram. We then look to Mr. Shepherd’s claim regarding his

      6
         The fact that there is no fourth exception to the default hearing rule that
allows the trial court to deny a § 23-110 movant a hearing when the claims “can
otherwise be disposed of on the existing record” does not mean that courts should
disregard the existing record in evaluating the three established exceptions to the
statute’s hearing requirement. See, e.g., infra Section I.B. (relying inter alia on the
existing record to assess whether any of the three established exceptions to the
default rule justified the denial of a hearing in this case).
                                          10

trial counsel’s self-proclaimed unreadiness for trial.

      The motions court concluded that Mr. Shepherd’s allegations regarding his

attorney’s investigation and questioning of Mr. White, Ms. Ingram, and Mr.

Dickerson would not merit any relief even if they were true; in other words, “defense

counsel acted reasonably and did not prejudice [Mr. Shepherd’s] case in any way.” 7

Because “we owe no deference” to these legal conclusions, we review them de novo,

see Jones v. United States, 918 A.2d 389, 402 (D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted), and conclude that some of Mr. Shepherd’s claims merit a hearing on

remand. As for Mr. Shepherd’s remaining claim regarding his trial counsel’s

unspecified unreadiness, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying a hearing on that “vague and conclusory” claim.

      7
         The motions court stated that the “showing of prejudice required to
overcome procedural default on collateral review is significantly greater than that
necessary to establish plain error on direct review,” quoting a nonbinding federal
court opinion, United States v. Pettigrew. See 346 F.3d 1139, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see St. John v. United
States, 227 A.3d 141, 144-46 (D.C. 2020) (analyzing prejudice in a procedural
default case under Strickland’s “reasonable probability” standard). We see no
indication, however, that the motions court imposed some sort of heightened
prejudice analysis based on its misunderstanding that Mr. Shepherd’s claims were
procedurally barred. And Mr. Shepherd has not challenged the motions court’s
ruling on that basis.
                                         11

             1.   Trial Counsel’s Efforts to Investigate and Discredit Mr.
             White’s Testimony

      At trial, Mr. White testified that he saw, from his bedroom window across the

street, Mr. Shepherd walk up to and shoot the decedent, Shepherd, 144 A.3d at 558;

and he made a similar statement when he called 911, the recording of which was

admitted without objection. Mr. Shepherd asserted in his motion that Mr. White had

previously told a PDS investigator, Nic Gerschman, that he “was not looking out the

window when the gun[] went off”—Mr. Gerschman, by then a law student, so

testified at trial—but the defense team failed to “aggressively follow up” after Mr.

White failed to sign a written statement to this effect and waited over nine months

to send any other investigators. Mr. Shepherd further asserted that the two additional

investigators, Sidney Scully and Paige Whidbee, who went to re-interview Mr.

White, could have corroborated Mr. Gerschman’s trial testimony that Mr. White had

admitted that he did not see the actual shooting. Mr. Shepherd additionally asserted

that Mr. White’s wife was present with Mr. White in their bedroom and should have

been interviewed to see if she could have provided further corroboration. The

motions court adopted the government’s argument that Mr. White’s statements to

the 911 operator and statement to the first PDS investigator were not necessarily

inconsistent and could be reconciled, and observed that counsel nonetheless “was

diligent in investigating [Mr.] White’s testimony” and further that whether Mr.
                                          12

White “want[ed] to sign a written statement was not within the defense counsel’s

control.” The motions court did not acknowledge Mr. Shepherd’s argument that his

counsel had failed to call the other two investigators as witnesses or to interview Mr.

White’s wife as a potential witness.

      The most powerful aspect of this claim is whether Mr. Shepherd’s trial

counsel should have presented testimony from the two PDS investigators who re-

interviewed Mr. White. Assuming the failure to call these individuals as defense

witnesses at trial constituted deficient performance under Strickland, 8 it is at least

plausible at this point—before Mr. Shepherd has been given an opportunity to

present his evidence at a hearing—that additional evidence discrediting Mr. White’s

testimony that he saw the shooting would have had a “reasonable probability” of

      8
         See Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1123 (D.C. 2007) (en banc)
(explaining counsel’s performance is deficient if it “fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
The government contests this in passing, but the motions court did not make a
determination to the contrary, nor did it have a basis to do so. See Long v. United
States, 910 A.2d 298, 309 (D.C. 2006) (“It is well settled that counsel’s unexplained
failure to present . . . testimony [bolstering the defendant’s “actual defense”]
constitutes deficient performance. Perhaps there are good reasons why trial counsel
did not call [the] proffered witnesses, but on the existing record, without holding a
hearing, the motions judge was not in a position to make such a finding—nor did
[he] profess to do so.” (footnote omitted)).
                                         13

changing the jury’s mind. 9 Mr. White was the only eyewitness without ties to the

decedent’s family, and Ms. Ingram and Mr. Dickerson had been significantly

impeached or discredited at trial in other respects. For example, Ms. Ingram

admitted that her previous statements to police contradicted her testimony about

whether the decedent was drunk and where Mr. Dickerson was during the shooting;

she also admitted she had lied in her grand jury testimony about whether her husband

was present just before the shooting.         Similarly, Mr. Dickerson admitted to

misleading prosecutors when they were investigating the incident and his testimony

contradicted the testimony given by other government witnesses. See infra Section

I.B.3. We cannot discount the possibility that additional testimony from the two

investigators could have forced Mr. White to confront his inconsistent statements to

multiple defense witnesses and possibly persuaded the jury that Mr. White did not

see the shot and (like Ms. Ingram and Mr. Dickerson) could not be trusted to have

seen Mr. Shepherd shoot Mr. Miller without provocation or without the need for

self-defense. In other words, pre-hearing, these allegations do not strike us as

palpably incredible or vague and conclusory; and they are claims that, if true, might

      9
         The motions court quoted from our decision in Mr. Shepherd’s direct appeal
that the “the evidence of appellant’s guilt was very strong.” See Shepherd, 144 A.3d
at 563. But when reviewing an IAC claim brought via collateral attack, the court
must take into account that “the asserted strength of the government’s case may itself
be a product of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Rice, 580 A.2d at 123.
                                            14

merit relief. 10 See, e.g., Bruce v. United States, 617 A.2d 986, 995 (D.C. 1992)

(remanding for a hearing where appellant proffered evidence that would help “nail

down the uncontested but elusive fact” of who fired a gun and could “potentially

cast doubt on the accuracy of . . . witnesses’ descriptions of other aspects of this

encounter”); see also Forrester v. United States, 707 A.2d 63, 64 (D.C. 1998)

(“[C]orroborative witnesses may cause a factfinder to credit testimony by a single

witness . . . whose testimony would otherwise fail to persuade.”). 11

       10
           As noted above, the motions court never grappled with whether counsel’s
failure to call the two additional investigators as defense witnesses constituted
deficient performance. Although the court noted that “[t]he jury already had access
to the recording of [Mr. White’s] 911 call, his statements to [one] investigator, and
his statements under cross-examination,” it was focused on whether earlier
investigation would have secured a written statement from Mr. White, not whether
additional witnesses diminishing his credibility would have made a difference at
trial. While we would not necessarily view Mr. Shepherd’s claim that his trial
counsel failed to “aggressively” investigate Mr. White and lock him into a sworn
statement as warranting a hearing on its own, Mr. Shepherd should be allowed to
advance that related claim at the hearing on remand as well. See Dorsey v. United
States, 225 A.3d 724, 733 (D.C. 2020) (“We cannot conclude at this point that an
evidentiary hearing is warranted on this aspect of appellant’s claim, but the trial court
should reconsider the issue in conjunction with the hearing on whether the Strickland
test is satisfied as it applies to [the § 23-110 movant’s related] claim . . . .”); see also
Bellinger, 127 A.3d at 518 (“Deficient investigation cannot be excused on the
ground that a competent attorney . . . could have made an informed judgment to
pursue an alternative strategy. . . .” (cleaned up)).
       11
         Although we affirmed the denial of a hearing despite three proffered witness
affidavits in Forrester, we explained that it was not an “ordinar[y]” case because the
motions judge had also presided over the bench trial and was uniquely positioned
“as trier of fact” to determine that the proffered witnesses would not have changed
her verdict. 707 A.2d at 64. Here, Mr. Shepherd had a jury trial and the motions
judge was not the trial judge.
                                           15

      On this record, then, we cannot assess whether the failure to call the two

additional investigators might amount to Strickland prejudice. See Rice, 580 A.2d

at 123 (explaining that the court could not “rule at this point that, as a matter of law,

the evidence of appellant’s guilt was so strong that there can be no reasonable

probability that the exculpatory evidence proffered in appellant’s § 23-110 motion,

whatever its strength, could have raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the

jurors”). Any assessment of prejudice will turn on the precise details and the

credibility of these individuals’ testimony about their interaction with Mr. White;

but such “credibility determinations . . . may be resolved only by recourse to a full

evidentiary hearing.” Long v. United States, 910 A.2d 298, 310 (D.C. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Rice, 580 A.2d at 122-23 (cautioning that

deciding credibility on the record “assume[s] the answer to the very question which

an evidentiary hearing could illuminate”).

      For the first time on appeal the government argues that we should not consider

this possible contradictory evidence when assessing Mr. Shepherd’s ineffective-

assistance claim because he “provided no affidavits or other credible proffers to

establish what, if anything, the [additional PDS] investigators could recall regarding

what [Mr.] White told them in the 2013 interview.” But the proffer of potential

witness testimony pre-hearing is not a formalistic requirement; rather, an “affidavit
                                          16

or other credible proffer” is a tool for the court to ensure the § 23-110 petitioner has

some basis for their claims. See Pettaway, 390 A.2d at 984 (“A § 23-110 motion

will be vulnerable to dismissal as ‘vague and conclusory’ when a prisoner does not

present a factual foundation in some detail.”); Lanton v. United States, 779 A.2d

895, 903-04 (D.C. 2001) (likening a § 23-110 motion to an initial pleading);

Johnson, 385 A.2d at 743-44 (explaining that “appellant’s only burden, prior to

hearing, is to adequately allege facts which, if demonstrated, would establish

[IAC]”). Accordingly, we have held that assertions from an appellant within the

§ 23-110 motion itself, Lanton, 779 A.2d at 903-04, or signed but unsworn

statements from the potential witnesses, Rice, 580 A.2d at 121 & n.3, among other

documents, may constitute credible proffers. 12

      12
         But see Strozier v. United States, 991 A.2d 778, 786 (D.C. 2010) (stating
that our court “require[s]” an attachment to the motion from the potential witness).
Strozier cites to a line of cases that appear to have incorrectly interpreted Sykes v.
United States, 585 A.2d 1335, 1340 (D.C. 1991), and others as a bright-line rule that
the court can deny a hearing for a failure to call witnesses claim if there is no
“credible proffer” outside the motion itself. See, e.g., Reaves v. United States, 694
A.2d 52, 57 n.6 (D.C. 1997) (citing Sykes to require “[m]ore formal proof” than
“assert[ing] in the moving papers the substance of the testimony”). Many of these
cases are distinguishable, including both Strozier—where the trial court found the
claims “vague and conclusory” since the motion contained no information about the
potential testimony, 991 A.2d at 786-87—and Sykes—where the court ultimately
denied a hearing because the witness proffered in the motion would have had to
incriminate herself to provide exculpatory testimony, 585 A.2d at 1340; see also
Lanton, 779 A.2d at 903 (explaining this distinction). More to the point, to the extent
our cases appear to construe such a formalistic requirement as an independent
ground to deny a § 23-110 movant a hearing outside of the three enumerated
                                         17

      Here, Mr. Shepherd’s motion contained sufficient information (seemingly

based on materials from trial counsel’s file) to support his request for a hearing. He

provided the full names—Sidney Scully and Paige Whidbee—of the two PDS

investigators who re-interviewed Mr. White; a specific time frame for when these

investigators spoke to Mr. White; and the corroborating information they could

provide. There is also corroborating evidence in the trial record that Mr. White

spoke with at least one additional investigator multiple times after Mr. Gerschman

interviewed him, although the exact content of these conversations is unknown. See

Gillis v. United States, 586 A.2d 726, 728-29 & n.1 (D.C. 1991) (remanding for a

hearing where appellant’s allegations of counsel’s failure to investigate could be

consistent with a brief mention of evidence in a transcript).

      Indeed, the government implicitly conceded the pre-hearing sufficiency of

Mr. Shepherd’s proffer by failing to raise this argument before the motions court.

Had it felt that Mr. Shepherd needed to provide additional documentation, it could

have argued in its opposition that Mr. Shepherd’s request was inadequately

supported and the court—at the government’s request or sua sponte—would have

been well within its discretion to ask Mr. Shepherd to supplement his motion before

exceptions noted above, they contradict the language in the statute itself requiring
the record to “conclusively” show the movant is not entitled to relief.
                                           18

holding a hearing. Cf. Jones, 918 A.2d at 407-08 (“[W]here . . . impediments in the

motion and files and records of the case present credibility problems if unresolved,

providing the appellant with an opportunity to supplement his initial motion . . .

could be a prudent course of action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Steward

v. United States, 927 A.2d 1081, 1090 (D.C. 2007) (“[W]e think it may be

appropriate for the trial court, before determining whether to set a hearing date, to

afford appellant an opportunity to supplement his motion.”); Metts v. United States,

877 A.2d 113, 120 (D.C. 2005) (noting that the trial court provided defendant with

time to clarify statements from witnesses submitted with his initial § 23-110

motion). Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by the government’s late-stage objection

to Mr. Shepherd’s request for a hearing on the grounds that he had “provided no

affidavits or other credible proffers” to support it.

      We conclude remand is required to hold a hearing on Mr. Shepherd’s claim

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Sidney Scully and Paige

Whidbee at trial. 13 In remanding this claim to the trial court, “we do not address [its]

      13
        We agree with the government that Mr. Shepherd’s claim that his attorney
was deficient for failing to interview or call Mr. White’s wife to the stand is
unsupported on the current record. Mr. Shepherd has not put forth any evidence
about what Mr. White’s wife would say; he has stated only that she was present in
the bedroom with Mr. White when the events to which he testified occurred. But
given that we are remanding on other grounds, we direct that he be given the
                                          19

[ultimate] merits.” Jones, 918 A.2d at 412 (second alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “We decide only that . . . [appellant] makes a colorable

claim which, if true, would provide a basis for relief, [and so] the trial court should

not decide the matter summarily.” Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 262

(D.C. 1997).

               2.   Trial Counsel’s Use of Mr. Dickerson’s Prior Convictions

      Mr. Shepherd also asserts that his trial counsel should have resolved earlier

whether trial counsel could impeach Mr. Dickerson with prior convictions 14 and

should have cross-examined Mr. Dickerson about these convictions rather than

allowing the jury to hear about them in a litany of stipulations many days after Mr.

Dickerson testified. We have acknowledged that immediate live testimony has

“significant advantages” over stipulations, Dorsey, 225 A.3d at 733 n.8 (internal

quotation marks omitted), and that “a party may not be forced to accept a stipulation

opportunity to attempt to support this claim on remand as well. See Ramsey, 569
A.2d at 148 n.15 (allowing appellant to pursue less plausible claims on remand
where already remanding more plausible claims for a hearing).
      14
         The record does not specify which statute was at issue in these mid-trial
discussions, but it appears to be D.C. Code § 14-305(b)(2)(B), which restricts
impeachment via criminal convictions if more than ten years have elapsed since
certain dates dictated by statute.
                                         20

in lieu of testimonial or tangible evidence,” Rollerson v. United States, 127 A.3d

1220, 1229 (D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is therefore possible

that trial counsel’s actions or lack thereof in failing to resolve the questions

surrounding Mr. Dickerson’s impeachable convictions earlier and ultimately

agreeing to a stipulation of these convictions, in lieu of directly confronting Mr.

Dickerson directly with them, “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”

Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1123 (D.C. 2007) (en banc) (quoting

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). On the other hand, it is

possible that in the context of the timing of disclosures regarding Mr. Dickerson and

the restrictions on scheduling of witnesses, stipulating to Mr. Dickerson’s prior

convictions was a reasonable, strategic decision for defense counsel to make. See

id. at 1127. The record is silent on this question, however, because the government

did not proffer any explanations from counsel nor was counsel ever called to testify

at a hearing to explain their thinking. We therefore remand for the motions court to

hold a hearing on this claim as well. 15 See Bruce, 617 A.2d at 995 (remanding for a

      15
         We acknowledge that Mr. Shepherd may face difficulty in showing that, but
for this alleged deficiency alone, there was a “reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different.” Cosio, 927 A.2d at 1132. But
because the prejudice inquiry for ineffectiveness claims must take into account the
“cumulative effect” of counsel’s errors, it would be premature for us to assess the
prejudice prong before Mr. Shepherd’s hearing. Matthews v. United States, 629
A.2d 1185, 1196 (D.C. 1993); see also Asbell v. United States, 436 A.2d 804, 807
(D.C. 1981) (“In determining whether trial counsel’s performance blotted out the
                                         21

hearing where the trial judge concluded a decision was tactical “without hearing any

testimony from the attorney, and without [the movant’s] new counsel having been

accorded an opportunity to cross-examine”); cf. Smith v. United States, 608 A.2d

129, 132-33 (D.C. 1992) (remanding for a hearing where trial counsel’s decision

was “inexplicable on the record”).

             3.   Mr. Shepherd’s Additional Claims Regarding Impeachment
             of Mr. Dickerson

      Mr. Shepherd additionally claims that trial counsel (1) failed to “utilize [Ms.

Ingram’s] two prior statements [saying Mr. Dickerson was not in the truck at the

time of the shooting] to interrogate [Mr.] Dickerson regarding his involvement and

his ability to witness the events as he described them,” 16 and (2) failed to impeach

Mr. Dickerson’s testimony that he did not hear an argument preceding the shot by

using Mr. White’s testimony to the contrary. Like the motions court, we discern no

deficient performance by trial counsel on these grounds.

essence of a substantial defense we apply a totality of the circumstances test. . . .
[E]ven though any one specific error by counsel may not constitute ineffective
assistance, the totality of the omissions and errors may be sufficient.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
      16
        Mr. Shepherd categorizes this as a claim regarding impeachment of Ms.
Ingram, but then proceeds to discuss this claim regarding Mr. Dickerson.
                                          22

      Trial counsel could not impeach Mr. Dickerson with statements by Ms.

Ingram of which he had no personal knowledge. See Smith v. United States, 583

A.2d 975, 983-84 (D.C. 1990) (“[A] witness may not testify to a matter unless

evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal

knowledge of the matter.” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 602)); cf. Foreman v. United

States, 114 A.3d 631, 639 (D.C. 2015) (providing that a prior identification

statement must come in through testimony of someone with personal knowledge of

it being made). Nor could trial counsel have asked Mr. Dickerson about the

truthfulness or credibility of Mr. White’s testimony. See Lloyd v. United States, 64

A.3d 405, 412 (D.C. 2013) (“What is prohibited is seeking to have one witness

comment or opine on the credibility of a prior witness, however phrased.” (emphasis

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). An attorney’s performance cannot be

deficient due to a failure to take steps at trial that would not have been allowed as a

matter of law. Cf. Bell v. United States, 677 A.2d 1044, 1048-49 (D.C. 1996)

(rejecting a claim of deficient performance where the proposed objections were not

legally meritorious).

      In any event, Mr. Shepherd’s counsel highlighted throughout the trial the

substance of the contradictions that Mr. Shepherd now emphasizes. Trial counsel
                                           23

cross-examined Mr. Dickerson about his location during the incident (he said he was

sitting in a truck with Ms. Ingram, but Ms. Ingram had placed him outside the truck

in prior statements) and his assertion (inconsistent with Ms. Ingram’s and Mr.

White’s testimony) that he did not hear anyone arguing before the shooting. Trial

counsel also emphasized in closing that Mr. Dickerson’s testimony was “not

corroboration at all” of Ms. Ingram’s testimony, but rather they gave “two opposing

stories that happen to end the same way.” Mr. Shepherd admitted in his motion that

counsel “duly impeached” Ms. Ingram as well. Thus the motions court did not abuse

its discretion in denying a hearing on this claim.

             4.     Trial Counsel’s General Unreadiness for Trial

      Lastly, we agree with the motions court’s assessing as “vague and conclusory”

Mr. Shepherd’s claim 17 that his trial counsel was unprepared for trial by virtue of

their unreadiness statements just prior to trial. Trial counsel informed the court of

      17
         It is not clear to us that Mr. Shepherd intended this to be a standalone claim
for relief as opposed to serving as contextual background. But since the motions
court treated it as a standalone claim, we do the same.
       Mr. Shepherd also argues for the first time before this court that the trial court
erred by not granting trial counsel’s motion for a continuance in full. But we decline
to consider this non-IAC claim that was raised neither on direct appeal, Head v.
United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C. 1985), nor in Mr. Shepherd’s § 23-110
motion, see Sharps v. United States, 246 A.3d 1141, 1159 (D.C. 2021).
                                         24

their unreadiness after they received late disclosures from the government

concerning the DNA evidence in the case, as well as miscellaneous documents from

Mr. Shepherd’s jail cell, medical and firearms examiner reports, and hours of

recordings of jail calls. Counsel requested a one- or two-week continuance; the trial

court ultimately gave them a day. But as the motions court observed, in his § 23-110

motion Mr. Shepherd failed to tie counsel’s pretrial statements to any act or omission

by counsel at trial; meanwhile, the record reflects that trial counsel vigorously

argued that the DNA evidence was inconclusive but could be consistent with the

defense theory—a point Mr. Shepherd appears to reinforce both in his § 23-110

motion and his brief to this court. The other last-minute revelations have no obvious

bearing on the outcome of Mr. Shepherd’s trial because they comprised information

duplicative of the information the defense already had, information the government

did not intend to use, or information the trial court otherwise determined was

peripheral to Mr. Shepherd’s defense. We thus cannot say that the motions court

abused its discretion in concluding that this claim fell within an exception to the

hearing requirement.

                                 II.    Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the motions court’s denial of Mr.
                                       25

Shepherd’s § 23-110 motion and remand this case for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

                                     So ordered.