Court Opinion

ID: 72726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-26 07:42:53+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:18.245673
License: Public Domain

PUBLISH

                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

                           -------------------------------------------

                                        No. 97-8021

                           --------------------------------------------

                       D. C. Docket No. 1:94-CV-2964-HTW

JULIETTE IRVING, as Guardian of the Persons
and Property of BRYANA BASHIR, and as
Administratrix of the Estate of BONITA L.
IRVING, Deceased,
                                                              Plaintiff-Appellant,

     versus

MAZDA MOTOR CORP. a.k.a. Mazda Motors Corp.
f.k.a. Toyo Kogyo, Ltd., MAZDA (NORTH
AMERICA), INC., et al.,

                                                              Defendants-Appellees,

                 ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Georgia
                 ----------------------------------------------------------------

                                      (March 5, 1998)

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges.

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:
   Plaintiff appeals the district court’s

grant      of    summary          judgment    for

Defendants. The district court decided that

Plaintiff’s     state   law        claims    were

preempted by federal law. We conclude that

Federal   Motor    Vehicle   Safety     Standard

(“FMVSS”) 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, (enacted

under     the   authority    of   the   National

Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of

1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq.) does preempt

                        2
Plaintiff’s   state   law   claims.    And,    we

affirm the grant of summary judgment.

                 Background

   Plaintiff   Juliette     Irving    filed   suit

against       Defendant      Mazda       Motor

Corporation on behalf of her daughter,

Bonita Irving.        Bonita was killed in a

single-car accident while driving a 1990

Mazda MX-6.      After her daughter’s death,

                        3
Plaintiff filed this suit claiming that the

seat belts in the MX-6 were defectively

designed and that Mazda failed to warn

consumers adequately of the risks of not

utilizing all portions -- particularly the

manual lap belt portion -- of the safety

belt system.

   The     safety   belt    system     used   in     the

Mazda MX-6 included a two-point passive

shoulder restraint (automatic shoulder belt)

with   a   manual     lap      belt.   This   kind   of

                           4
restraint   system       was       one   of   three

options provided to car manufacturers by

FMVSS 208. Plaintiff contends the design

represented by this option was defective.

   Defendants        filed   a      motion      for

summary judgment claiming that FMVSS

208 both expressly and impliedly preempts

state law (including common-law) claims

and that no recovery can be had on a

claim   based   on    the    use    of   a    design

permitted by the federal standards.              The

                        5
district court granted this motion and --

concluding that Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn

claim was dependent upon the design-defect

claim -- also dismissed Plaintiff’s failure-to-

warn claim.

                 Discussion

   Whether Plaintiff’s state law claims are

preempted     under   the   federal   law    is

reviewed by this Court de novo.       Lewis v.

                      6
Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1498 (11th Cir.),

cert. granted, 118 S.Ct. 439 (1997).

I.   Preemption: Defective-Design Claim

     The   Supremacy   Clause   of   the   United

States’ Constitution provides that the laws

of the United States “shall be the supreme

Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the

Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding.”             U.S. Const.

                       7
art. VI. Thus, state law that conflicts with

federal law is “without effect.” Cipollone v.

Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617

(1992) (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 101

S.Ct. 2114, 2128 (1981)).   And, “common law

liability may create a conflict with federal

law, just as other types of state law can.”

Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1122

(3d Cir. 1990); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v.

Easterwood, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993).

                       8
   Whether federal statutes or regulations

preempt     state      law        is    “a     question    of

congressional intent.”                 Perry v. Mercedes

Benz of North America, Inc., 957 F.2d

1257,    1261    (5th        Cir.       1992);    see     also

Medtronic,      Inc.    v.    Lohr,      116   S.Ct.   2240,

2250 (1996) (“The purpose of Congress is the

ultimate touchstone in every preemption

case.”) (internal quotations and citation

omitted).   Congress -- through federal laws

and     regulations          --     may          effectively

                             9
preempt    state   law     in   three   ways:   (1)

express preemption; (2) field preemption

(regulating the field so extensively that

Congress clearly intends the subject area

to be controlled only by federal law); and (3)

implied    (or     conflict)      preemption.

Defendants    claim      that    the    National

Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of

1966 (“the Act”) both expressly and impliedly

preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims.

   A.   Express Preemption

                      10
      “[A] strong presumption exists against

finding           express     preemption          when    the

subject matter, such as the provision of

tort remedies to compensate for personal

injuries, is one that has traditionally been

regarded as properly within the scope of

the           states’   rights.”        Taylor   v.   General

Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 823 (11th cir.

          1
1989)          (citation    omitted).        Thus,    express

      Our pronouncements in Taylor were
      1

partially abrogated by Myrick v. Freuhauf
Corp., 13 F.3d 1516, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1994),
where we wrote that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Corp.,
112 S.Ct. 2608 (1992), would not permit an

                                   11
preemption     clauses     must    be   construed

narrowly.    Taylor, 875 F.2d at 823-24.

   Defendants       first     contend        that

Plaintiff’s design-defect claim is expressly

preempted by the preemption clause of the

Act.   That clause makes this statement:

analysis of implied preemption where an
express preemption clause existed in the
relevant federal law.       But, the Supreme
Court   reviewed   Myrick     on    appeal   and,
although affirming the outcome, stressed
that implied preemption is possible despite
the presence of an express preemption
clause. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S.Ct.
1483, 1487 (1995). Thus, Taylor is correct and
can be used for evaluating preemption of
state law.

                      12
       When        a   motor          vehicle    safety
standard is in effect
       under this chapter, a State or a
political subdivision of
       a State may prescribe or continue
in effect a standard
       applicable      to    the      same   aspect    of
performance of a
       motor       vehicle       or    motor     vehicle
equipment only if the
       standard        is        identical      to    the
standard prescribed under
       this chapter. . . .

49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (formerly 15 U.S.C. §

1392(d)).   But,   the      Act    also   contains     a

savings     clause       which        provides       that

“[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety

standard prescribed under this chapter does

                            13
not exempt a person from liability at

common law.” 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (formerly

15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)).      Thus, “[t]he question of

express pre-emption is properly analyzed

only after considering both § 1392(d) and §

1397(k).”    Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1120 (citing

American        Textile    Mfrs.     Inst.,   Inc.    v.

Donovan, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 2492 (1981)).

    In      Taylor,   after      reading    these   two

sections together, we determined that the

conflict       between           them      made      the

preemption            of   common-law          claims

                            14
ambiguous.   Thus, the presumption against

preemption    controlled;   and    no   express

preemption could be found. Taylor, 975 F.2d

at 825.

     We also considered express preemption

for the Federal Boat Safety Act (“FBSA”), in

Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494.    The

FBSA contains language similar to that of

the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle

Safety Act, containing both a preemption

                               2
clause and a savings clause.

 The pertinent portions of the FBSA read
 2

this way:

                     15
    Again        we    (as    in    Taylor)    read   the

preemption clause narrowly and said that

the FBSA’s preemption clause did not cover

    [A] State or a political subdivision of a
State may not                establish, continue in
effect, or enforce a law or regulation
    establishing a recreational vessel or
associated equipment
    performance or other safety standard
or imposing a
    requirement for associated equipment
. . . that is not      identical to a regulation
prescribed under . . . this title.
46 U.S.C. § 4306.      The FBSA further provides
that “[c]ompliance with this chapter or
standards,            regulations,        or     orders
prescribed       under       this   chapter    does   not
relieve      a    person           from   liability    at
common law or under State law.”                 46 U.S.C.
§ 4311(g).

                              16
common-law claims. Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1501.

Taylor    and   Lewis   point     to    the   same

                              3
conclusion for this case.         So, Plaintiff’s

defective-design   claim     is   not   expressly

preempted by the Act.

   B.    Implied Preemption

    3
     This conclusion is the same as that
reached by other circuits.        See, e.g., Perry,
957 F.2d at 1264; Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1121;
Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d
787, 789 (10th Cir. 1989) (adopting Wood v.
General Motors Corp.); Wood v. General
Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir.
1988).

                        17
     Conflict preemption exists where state

law   actually       conflicts      with      federal    law,

making it impossible to comply with both,

or    where    the    state       law     “stands   as   an

obstacle      to     the     accomplishment              and

execution       of     the        full     purposes      and

objectives of Congress.”                 Lewis, 107 F.3d at

1500 (internal quotations and citation

omitted).

     The      existence           of        an      express

preemption clause does not necessarily

preclude       the      presence             of     implied

                             18
preemption.           Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,

115   S.Ct.   1483,    1487-88     (1995).        Thus,   if

Plaintiff’s state law claim conflicts with

FMVSS 208 or if her claim would hinder

Congress’s objectives in passing the Act,

the state law will be preempted.

      FMVSS 208 directly addresses the kinds

of restraint systems permitted to be used

by     car     manufacturers.                It     allows

manufacturers            to    choose     from       three

options: (1) a complete passive restraint

system        (automatic       seat     belts     with    or

                              19
without air bags); (2) passive protection

for   frontal   crashes     (for     example,

automatic shoulder belts or air bags) plus

manual lap belts for lateral crashes and

rollovers with a seat belt warning system;

or (3) manual lap and shoulder belts with a

seat belt warning system.       FMVSS 208;

Perry, 957 F.2d at 1260.

   Defendants chose the second option --

installing   two-point     passive   shoulder

restraints with manual lap belts.        That

Congress specifically intended the standard

                    20
to   give   manufacturers   a   choice   should

preempt     common-law   claims   that    two-

point passive shoulder belts, paired with

manual lap belts, constitute inherently a

design defect. See Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1123

(actual conflict exists with the Act and

FMVSS 208 to the extent a claim would

stand for a manufacturer’s choice of an

option provided by the standards).

                    21
      i.   An argument made for the first

time on appeal.

      As we understand the record, Plaintiff’s

claim in district court was not that a

differently designed two-point system with

a manual lap belt would have been without

           4
defect.        On the contrary, Plaintiff based

  If a claim was asserted that two-point
  4

systems        (such   as   that   installed   in   the
Mazda          MX-6)   were      not   defective    in
general, but that the specific design selected
by Mazda for its two-point system was
unreasonably dangerous, preemption would
be less clear.

                            22
her claim on the allegation that the option

provided    in     the     standards      represented

inherently a defective design.               “Plaintiff

allege[d] that the option selected by Mazda

is    defective.”          Plaintiff’s      Brief    in

Opposition       to    Defendants’        Motion    for

Summary Judgment at 12.

      Plaintiff, however, seems to argue for

the    first   time        in    this     appeal    that

different, nondefective designs could have

been    selected      by   Defendants       under    the

same      regulatory            option:     automatic

                            23
shoulder belt with manual lap belt.                          Thus,

Plaintiff           now   argues       that       she   is    not

challenging            Defendants’            choice     of     a

regulatory option.             This argument differs

from Plaintiff’s argument in the district

         5
court.         Too often our colleagues on the

        5
         The        option    selected       by   Defendants
permitted passive protection for frontal
crashes        --    either    air     bags       or    passive
shoulder       harnesses        --    plus    lap   belts     for
lateral       crashes.         The     only       alternative
designs put forward by Plaintiff in the
district court were three-point seat belts,
fully        automatic        belts,     and        restraint
systems        with       more       elaborate         warning
systems.            These alternatives do not fall
within the regulatory option exercised by
Defendants.               A   three-point           seat      belt

                               24
system would have to be either fully passive
(for example, the seat belt is attached to
the car door and is positioned upon closing
the    door)    or   fully    manual       (requiring
passenger        action         to    position     the
restraint), which would place that system
in either of the two options not selected by
Defendants.          The     option    exercised   by
Defendants allowed for a partially passive,
partially manual restraint system.                 For
the same reason, a fully automatic belt
system also would not fall under the same
option selected by Defendants. Finally, the
warning systems proposed by Plaintiff
would    have    been        different     from    the
warning system specifications set out for
the option selected by Defendants, with
which         specifications           Defendants
undisputably complied.
      In the district court, Plaintiff stated
that    she    was   “not     suggesting    that   the
options be taken away; rather, Plaintiff
alleges that the option selected by Mazda is

                           25
district courts complain that the appellate

cases about which they read were not the

cases argued before them. We cannot allow

Plaintiff to argue a different case from

the case she presented to the district court.

Because   Plaintiff       failed   to    make      this

argument in the district court, we decline

defective.” Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition
to   Defendants’        Motion     for    Summary
Judgment     at    12    (emphasis       added).    To
sharpen this point more, Plaintiff went so
far as to challenge the appropriateness of
FMVSS 208.        See id. at 2 (“[A]lthough the
restraint system may comply with the
minimum standards, the standards are
inadequate   and        should   not     impede    the
progress towards improved designs.”).

                         26
to consider it here. See Narey v. Dean, 32

F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1994).

     ii.    The   argument   made       in    district

court.

     When considering implied preemption,

no         presumpt io n     exis t s        ag ainst

preemption. “Under the Supremacy Clause

of the Federal Constitution, ‘[t]he relative

importance to the State of its own law is

not material when there is a conflict with

                       27
a valid federal law,’ for ‘any state law,

however     clearly          within       a     State’s

acknowledged power, which interferes with

or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”

Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1502 (citation omitted).

     Because Plaintiff sued Defendants for

exercising an option explicitly permitted

by   Congress,    a    conflict       exists   between

state and federal law if Plaintiff goes

forward    with       this    state    law     claim   of

defective design.       Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827

(“[A] state cannot impose common law

                             28
damages on individuals for doing what a

federal act or regulation ‘authorized them

to do.’”) (quoting Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v.

Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1131 (1981)).

Therefore,      Plaintiff’s      suit     against

Defendants      for   their    exercise    of   an

option provided to Defendants by FMVSS

208 conflicts with federal law and, thus, is

preempted.

II.   Failure-to-Warn Claim

                        29
   In addition to granting Defendants’

motion        for   summary        judgment      on

Plaintiff’s claim of defective design, the

district   court    also    dismissed    Plaintiff’s

failure-to-warn claim.          The district court

said   that    “[s]ince    plaintiff’s    defective

design claims are preempted, the court will

not address plaintiff’s failure to warn

claim, as it is premised on a defective

design.”   District

Court Order at 8 n.8 (emphasis added).

                           30
   Plaintiff     argues        on     appeal   that   a

failure-to-warn claim is separate from

and not dependent upon a defective-design

claim.   As a general statement of law,

Plaintiff’s proposition is often correct.

See, e.g., Michael v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.,

74 F.3d 271 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying Georgia

law); see also Sheckells v. AGV-USA Corp., 987

F.2d   1532,   1533   (11th    Cir.   1993)   (applying

Georgia law); Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy

Indus., Ltd., 608 F.2d 571, 572-73 (5th Cir.

1979) (applying Georgia law).             But, in this

                          31
case Plaintiff (not the district court or

Defendants) tied the claims of defective

design and failure to warn together.                   In

Plaintiff’s           opposition     to       Defendants’

motion for summary judgment, she argued

that she would ask the jury to find that “the

1990 Mazda MX-6 equipped with the two-

point motorized shoulder belt and manual

lap       belt    option      is   defective      without

                                          6
plaintiff’s desired warning.”                  Plaintiff’s

      Plaintiff presented several warning
      6

systems          as   safer    alternatives       to   the
system present in the 1990 Mazda.                      The
Mazda warning system included a buzzer,

                              32
Brief    in      Opposition      to   Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment at 23.

   Because        Plaintiff’s defective-design

claim is preempted by FMVSS 208, there

was     no    defect   about    which    to   warn.

Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim -- which is,

in this case, dependent on the preempted

a light indicating a failure to secure the
lap belt, and a written warning on the
sun     visors    on    both    the   driver    and
passenger sides of the car. Plaintiff alleges
these   warnings       were    inadequate.      But,
Plaintiff     does     not     dispute   that   the
warnings provided in the 1990 Mazda fully
complied with the federal standards.            See
FMVSS 208 at S7.3; 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S.5.

                         33
defective-design   claim   --   was   properly

dismissed.

   AFFIRMED.

                     34