Court Opinion

ID: 9769692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:58:51.86663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:56:07.871790
License: Public Domain

In note 1 the majority opinion sets out rationale of the Dallas Court of Appeals in finding that V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 21.13 "does not contemplate the admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct for impeachment purposes unless the evidence is in the form of a prior felony conviction."Allen *Page 938 v. State, 666 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1984). This Court did indeed grant review to determine whether that finding is a correct interpretation of the statute, and the majority now says the court of appeals reached its conclusion through "a misreading of the entire statute and particularly subsection (d)."
Nowhere in its opinion does the majority delineate its own reading of the statute to demonstrate that "evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct" is admissible "to attack her credibility, to impeach her, if it does." That smacks of a global challenge to general credibility by showing specific acts of sexual conduct. Yet, the Court has "consistently rejected evidence of specific acts of unchastity when offered to attack the credibility of a female witness," Ray, Texas Law of Evidence (Third Edition) § 655, 1 Texas Practice 581.1 The law review comment from which the majority quotes does not support its position; the comments editor merely says that such evidence "should be
admissible to rebut testimony of the complainant . . ."2 My concern is that in rejecting rationale of the Dallas Court of Appeals the majority opinion is laying down a proposition for admitting testimony of prior sexual activity even broader than any extant before enactment of § 21.13.
A coauthor of the bill that metamorphosed ultimately into § 21.13 certainly intended to take care "to preserve the right of the defendant to impeach the victim's credibility by showing any prior felony convictions involving sexual conduct on her record." Weddington, Rape Law in Texas: H.B. 284 And the Road to Reform, 4 Am.J.Crim. Law 1, at 6 (1975) (Weddington). By the clear tenor of her explanation of purpose, development and evaluation of the legislation,Weddington strongly implies that other testimony of prior sexual activity is not admissible to launch an attack against the general credibility of a testifying victim.
The law review editor also examined Weddington and from that account and other sources concluded that a major change made along the way "evinces a legislative intent to exclude evidence of prior sexual conduct in most circumstances," Comment, at 320. With that in mind he further observes:
 "In the past chastity was equated with veracity while unchastity was associated with dishonesty. As societal values about sexual activity have changed, the legal community has recognized 'a proper skepticism for the view that sexual activity can be equated with moral character and thus with testimonial reliability.' Under section 21.13 evidence of prior unchastity would probably not be material to a fact at issue. 'Insight into the sexual mores of a witness is rarely a help to a jury in determining if the witness is disposed towards untruthfulness.' "
*Page 939 Id., at 325-326.3
In Young v. State, 547 S.W.2d 23 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977), the trial court excluded evidence of an abortion and an act of sexual intercourse the night before the alleged rape. Contending that existing case law was "still good authority" despite enactment of § 21.13, Young urged that such prior sexual conduct was "relevant on the issue of consent and thecredibility of the alleged victim, the immoral character ofthe woman and the mitigation of punishment." SeeComment, supra, at 320-321. Though alluding particularly to "consent," the Young Court held the trial court correctly excluded that proffered evidence because "not germane to the issue of the victim's acquiescence, or any other issue raised by the evidence," Young,
supra, at 25. See also Wilson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 51
(Tex.Cr.App. 1977): matters revealing prior sexual conduct accused sought to introduce "not germane to the issue of the victim's acquiescence, or any other fact at issue in thecase as required by § 21.13, supra. See Young v.State, [supra] and cases there cited."
In my view Wilson and Young were correctly decided and should be followed; they are not due the criticism leveled against them.4
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and now turn to address State v.Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct.App. 1978), and other perceptions of its meaning. As shall be seen, Comment errs in its understanding of Herrera, as does the majority in believing that Herrera somehow supports admitting evidence of past sexual conduct to attack credibility.
Comment states that the New Mexico shield statute precludes evidence of past sexual conduct unless it is "material to the case" and "its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value." Id., at 322. In terms the statute does not mention "relevancy," but the opinion of the Herrera
court does and dwells on it at length. What the Comment writer did was to read the statement in Herrera — that an offering party must first make a preliminary showing of relevancy of evidence as to past sexual behavior — to mean something other than "material to the case." Then, returning to terms of the statute itself he came up with a three part test: the first from Herrera and the second and third from the statute. However, he misapprehends the opinion in Herrera.
Patently all Herrera does is to explain that as used in the statute "material to the case" means "relevant." After discussing and defining "relevancy" — "exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in a case" and to raise an issue of relevancy there must be shown "a reasonable basis for believing that past sexual conduct is pertinent to [an issue in the case]" — the Herrera court concludes:
 "Absent a showing sufficient to raise an issue as to relevancy, questions concerning past sexual conduct are to be excluded. Once such a showing is made, the balancing test of Evidence Rule 403 and [the statute] is to be applied in determining admissibility."
582 P.2d at 393.5 Thus only one step need be taken to apply the prescribed balancing test. See note 8,infra.
Our statute allows a trial judge to admit evidence described upon a finding that it is *Page 940 
"material to a fact at issue in the case" and then applying the prescribed balancing test. Though it uses the term "material," taken as a whole that statutory language formulates a matter more of "relevancy" than "materiality."6
Professor Ray has articulated a statement of the former: to be relevant, evidence must "tend to establish the truth of a proposition material to the issues." Ray, op cit., § 1481, 2 Texas Practice 167. The Supreme Court experimented for a while with a "Test of Relevancy" that respectively defined "materiality" and "relevancy," and made up a test for admissibility. See former rule 401, Texas Rules of Evidence. Recently the Supreme Court abandoned dual definitions in favor of one all encompassing definition,viz:
 "`Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."7
Any currently acceptable definition of "relevancy" includes the notion of "materiality." Therefore it is consistent to require "a preliminary showing of the relevancy of the victim's sexual conduct;" that is, the proffered evidence must be pertinent to a disputed material issue in the case. Correctly read the opinion in Herrera does not convert the New Mexico statutory provisions into a three part test;8
rather it is an aid in generally construing own statute.
Herrera dealt with an offer of prior sexual conduct on a defensive issue of consent, and the appellate court found the trial court correctly excluded the proffer for that purpose. The decision does not support the finding of the majority here that such evidence is admissible to attack the general credibility of a testifying victim. Nor does any other opinion in this jurisdiction which acknowledges in the legal community that "proper skepticism for the view that sexual activity can be equated with moral character and thus with testimonial reliability." See ante. at p. 938.9
Because the majority would have this Court lay down a rule which pierces our own rape victim shield law, I respectfully dissent to that as well.
1 Reflecting existing practice in Texas, Rule 608(b) of Texas Rules of Evidence bars inquiry on crossexamination and proof by extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct for the purpose of attacking or supporting credibility of a witness, other than showing conviction of crime as provided by Rule 609. Rule 608(b) of Criminal Rules of Evidence proposed by the Senate-House Select Committee on the Judiciary is an identical prohibition. See Vol. 48, No. 8 Texas Bar Journal (September 1985) 928, at 938 (hereafter Bar Journal).
2 The text appears in Part II, entitled "Future Effects." At the threshold the writer explains his endeavor,viz:
 "As a result of a lack of statutory clarity, the scarcity of appellate interpretation and the absence of other explanatory sources, the ramifications of section 21.13 remain largely unknown. In an attempt to stimulate meaningful guidelines, some suggestions concerning the aspects of evidence of sexual conduct — consent, credibility, and physical evidence — are offered."
Comment, 31 Baylor L.Rev. 317, at 323 (1979) (Comment). (All emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise indicated.)
3 Emphasis added in original. Notes omitted, but seePeople v. Dawsey, 76 Mich. App. 741, 257 N.W.2d 236, at 238, 239 (1977).
4 The law review writer perceives Wilson "as simply requiring the evidence be germane" — an interpretation he believes "provides little guidance in determining if prior sexual conduct is admissible." His preference is "the three-fold test provided by the New Mexico court in Herrera," cited in the majority opinion in this cause, in that it "establishes more meaningful guidelines." Comment, at 322-323.
5 New Mexico Evidence Rule 403 is the functional equivalent of part of Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 403, and of our own general rule to the effect that probative value of tendered evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. SeeRay, op cit., § 1481, 2 Texas Practice 167-168; see also Rule 403, proposed Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, Bar Journal, at 932.
6 A shorthand rendition often used is that to be admissible evidence must be relevant to a material issue in the case.
7 At least three subsequent opinions confirm thatHerrera requires a preliminary showing of relevancy and, if relevant, then immediately subjecting that evidence to a balancing test by weighing its probative value against prejudicial effect: State v. Fish, 101 N.M. 329,681 P.2d 1106, 1110 (S.Ct. 1984); State v. Gillette,102 N.M. 695, 699 P.2d 626, 632 (Ct.App. 1985); State v.Romero, 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Ct.App. 1980).
8 The current definition is, of course, the same as in Federal Rule 401. Proposed Rule 401, Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence is identical.
9 If promulgated as presently written, Rule 412 of proposed Rules of Criminal Evidence replaces and repeals § 22.065. The rule excludes "reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such [prescribed] crime," but allows "evidence of specific instances of an alleged victim's past sexual behavior" if admitted in accordance with control provisions similar to § 21.13(b) and it is evidence:
 (A) that is necessary to rebut or explain scientific or medical evidence offered by the state;
 (B) of past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior which is the basis of the offense charged;
 (C) that relates to the motive or bias of the alleged victim;
 (D) admissible under rule 609 [Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime]; or
 (E) that is constitutionally required to be admitted; and
 its probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.
 Bar Journal, at 933-934. *Page 941