Court Opinion

ID: 9671267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:33:48.57198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.129805
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

BAIRD, Judge.
A jury convicted appellant of capital murder and the trial court assessed punishment at life. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03. The Court of Appeals affirmed Fritz v. State, No.04-94-00659-CR, 1995 WL 624569 (Tex. App. — San Antonio, decided October 25, 1995) (unpublished). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the State improperly exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude from the jury veniremembers on the basis of gender. We will reverse.
I.
During jury selection, the State peremptorily challenged seven male veniremembers. Appellant objected, contending the State’s challenges discriminated on the basis of gender. In response, the prosecutor stated he removed all males under the age of thirty because of their potential bias or shared identity with appellant. The trial judge overruled appellant’s objection.
On direct appeal, appellant contended the State’s peremptory challenges violated the Fourteenth Amendment ban on gender discrimination as applied to jury selection in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). The Court of Appeals found the State’s explanation to be facially neutral and because appel*845lant presented no evidence in rebuttal, the Court held: “Because the findings of the trial judge are supported by the record, we do not find the findings to be ‘clearly erroneous.’” Fritz, Slip op., pg. 5.
II.
A.
The Supreme Court first applied the Equal Protection Clause to the jury selection process in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879), where it declared unconstitutional a statute which excluded citizens from jury service on the basis of race. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), the Supreme Court expanded Strauder to peremptory challenges. Twenty years later, the Supreme Court delivered the landmark case of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and removed Swain’s “crippling burden” which had the effect of immunizing prosecutors from constitutional scrutiny. Id., 476 U.S. at 92, 106 S.Ct. at 1721. The Batson Court held: “Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” Id., 476 U.S. at 86, 106 S.Ct. at 1717.
In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), the Supreme Court held the defendant had standing to object to the race based challenges of venire-members on equal protection grounds under Batson even if the defendant was not of the same race as the challenged veniremembers. Batson was subsequently applied to civil cases in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991). One year later, the Supreme Court held the prohibition against exercising a racially motivated peremptory challenge applied to defendants as well as prosecutors. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992).
Subsequently, the Supreme Court considered gender under the equal protection framework. In J.E.B., the Court held the same harm caused by racial discrimination in the jury selection process occurs with gender discrimination as well. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139, 114 S.Ct. at 1427.
B.
In Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 67 S.Ct. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181 (1946), the Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of a California statute regarding women and jury service. Although women qualified for jury service, their inclusion was not obligatory. The Court considered the effect this statute had on the federal court system and held because both the grand jury and petit jury were drawn from an improper all male venire, the indictments had to be dismissed. The Court held:
... The systematic and intentional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a racial group, deprives the jury system of the broad base it was designed by Congress to have in our democratic society. It is a departure from the statutory scheme. As well stated in United States v. Roemig, “Such action is operative to destroy the basic democracy and classlessness of jury personnel.” It “does not accord to the defendant the type of jury to which the law entitles him. It is an administrative denial of a right which the lawmakers have not seen fit to withhold from, but have actually guaranteed to him.” The injury is not limited to the defendant — there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts. (Internal citations omitted.)
Id., 329 U.S. at 195, 67 S.Ct. at 265.
In Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 82 S.Ct. 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 118 (1961), the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from Ballard in considering a Florida statute. The Hoyt Court held it was not unconstitutional for states to “relieve” women from jury service, unless they did not want to be relieved. Id., 368 U.S. at 62, 82 S.Ct. at 162. Courts allowed such exclusions because women were regarded as the center of the home and family and requiring them to sit on a jury would interfere with their familial responsibilities. Ibid.
However, the Court later disavowed Hoyt in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 *846S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), and held distinctive groups in the community, such as women, could not be excluded by statute. Such an exclusion would not be fairly representative of the community as a whole. “If the fair-cross-section rule is to govern the selection of juries, as we have concluded it must, women cannot be systematically excluded from jury panels from which petit juries are drawn.” Id., 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 699. The Court went on to state:
... [W]e think it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded to given automatic exemptions based solely on sex if the consequence is that criminal jury venires are almost totally male. To this extent we cannot follow the contrary implications of the prior cases, including Hoyt v. Florida.
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537, 95 S.Ct. at 701. The reasoning in Taylor was founded on the requirement that the jury should be made up of a fair cross-section of the community which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id., 419 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 697. “Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage, but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.” Id., 419 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 698.
Finally, in J.E.B., the Supreme Court held the harm caused by gender discrimination in the jury selection process is equivalent to the harm caused by racial discrimination.
Failing to provide jurors the same protection against gender discrimination could frustrate the purpose of Batson itself. Because gender and race are overlapping categories, gender can be used as a pretext for racial discrimination. Allowing parties to remove racial minorities from the jury not because of their race, but because of their gender, contravenes well-established equal protection principles and could insulate effectively racial discrimination from judicial scrutiny.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145, 114 S.Ct. at 1430.1
C.
A major tenet of the Supreme Court’s decision prohibiting the peremptory challenge of veniremembers on the basis of gender and race is due to the negative and inaccurate stereotyping that accompanies such a challenge. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137, 114 S.Ct. at 1426. The Supreme Court has repeatedly shunned the use of stereotypes; such imaginary biases are not acceptable excuses for excluding, either by statute or peremptorily, citizens from jury service. As early as Strauder, the Supreme Court has recognized the negative effects of stereotyping distinctive groups in the community.
... The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. In Taylor, the Supreme Court has also condemned stereotyping because of gender. The Court held that allowing women to serve on juries is no more burdensome to the court system than the process of sorting out the possible men to serve. Taylor, 419 U.S.at 534, 95 S.Ct. at 700.
The Batson Court also commented about the effects of stereotyping.
... The core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise solely from the jurors’ race.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Again, in Powers, the Supreme Court stated: “[r]ace cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or competence. We may not accept as a defense to racial discrimination the very stereotype the law condemns.” Powers, 499 U.S. at 410, 111 S.Ct. at 1370.
A few months later in Edmonson, the Court stated, “[I]f race stereotypes are the *847price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high to meet the standard of the Constitution.” Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630, 111 S.Ct. at 2088. Again, in McCollum, the Supreme Court stated: “This Court firmly has rejected the •view that assumptions of partiality based on race provide a legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an impartial juror.” McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59, 112 S.Ct. at 2359.
After rejecting the use of race-related veniremember challenges, the Court applied the Batson ruling, rejecting gender-related challenges in J.E.B.
In view of these concerns, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the bases of gender, or on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to be a man.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146, 114 S.Ct. at 1430.
This Court has also forbidden stereotyping. In Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 106 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), we stated:
... the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant’s prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant’s race on the assumption — or his intuitive judgment — that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.
In Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), the state challenged a venire-member because he “felt like he would identify with the defendant.” This Court held the veniremember’s shared bias or common ground with the defendant was not a neutral explanation. We held:
Thus the alleged identity between the veniremen and appellant, based only on the shared sex and shared race of the venireman and appellant, does not escape Bat-son’s prohibition against making the assumption that because the defendant and the venireman are of the same race they would identify with each other.
Id., 827 S.W.2d at 869.
III.
In the instant ease, the State peremptorily challenged several veniremembers who were male and under the age of thirty upon the assumption that such male venire-members would possess a “potential bias” or “common ground” with the defendant. As a result, the issue is whether or not the State’s peremptory challenges of male venire-members were constitutional.
In J.E.B., the Supreme Court held that challenging a veniremember because of gender is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Examining this case in the light of J.E.B., the complained of peremptory challenges fail to satisfy the burden to articulate a gender-neutral explanation. Whenever a veniremember is excluded on the basis of gender, the Equal Protection Clause is violated. We, therefore, hold the State’s peremptory challenges violated the requirements of J.E.B.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court.
WOMACK, J., joins the judgment of the Court and, except for Part II.B., its opinion.
KELLER and HOLLAND, JJ., dissent.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.