Court Opinion

ID: 9775703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:07:40.001592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.509283
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Justice.
Although Donna Maria Williams asserts six points of error in this appeal of her conviction of voluntary manslaughter, this opinion is concerned only with her fifth point. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her the right to cross-examine the prosecutor about the prosecutor’s explanations for exercising peremptory challenges on veniremen who were members of a racially cognizable group. We agree, abate this appeal, and remand this case to the trial court for a Batson1 hearing.
At trial appellant complained that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated because the State exercised its challenge to exclude a member of the venire from the jury on the basis of race. The court held a Batson hearing and required the prosecutor to articulate her reasons for peremptorily challenging a particular juror. Upon completion of the prosecutor’s testimony, counsel for appellant requested the opportunity to inquire of the prosecutor. The court refused, stating it would not allow cross-examination of the prosecutor. Appellant complains that she was denied a fair opportunity to prove unlawful racial discrimination by the State in peremptorily challenging the prospective juror because of the trial court’s refusal to allow her to cross-examine the prosecutor during the Batson hearing. She contends that her constitutional rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel entitled her to such cross-examination. We agree that her right to a fair trial entitles her to such cross-examination.
In order to invoke the protections set forth in Batson, a defendant must estab*874lish purposeful discrimination by showing that:
1. he was a member of a cognizable racial group;
2. the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the ve-nire members of the defendant’s race (peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice which permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate); and
3. these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude the veniremen on account of their race.
See Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
If the defendant raises an inference of purposeful discrimination through the State’s use of its peremptory strikes and the trial court determines that a prima facie case of discrimination exists, then and only then does the burden shift to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation as to why peremptory strikes were exercised on the veniremen who were struck. See Tompkins v. State, No. 68,870, slip op. at 5, (Tex.Crim.App. Oct. 7, 1987) (not yet reported).
A prima facie case represents the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true. The party with the burden of proof must produce at least this much evidence to avoid a finding that the allegation is not true as a matter of law. Once produced, however, the allegation must be found true unless it is contradicted, impeached, or rebutted by other evidence. In the context of a Batson hearing, such other evidence must include a racially neutral explanation by the prosecuting attorney and must be legally adequate to support a judgment in favor of the State. It is still, however, the burden of the accused to persuade the trial judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations of purposeful discrimination are true in fact. See Tompkins v. State, slip op. at 7; TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 35.261 (Vernon Supp.1988).
Thus, the issue is whether the refusal of the trial court to permit cross-examination of the prosecutor by an accused curtails or otherwise inhibits an accused’s attempt to carry the ultimate burden and thereby denies an accused his right to a fair trial. We conclude that it does.
Although jeopardy does not attach until a jury is impaneled and sworn 2 the selection of a fair and impartial jury to hear the case on the merits is of such vital importance to an accused that we conclude and hold the selection process is part and parcel of the “adversarial” nature of the trial on the merits. When a Batson motion is timely made, the trial court should conduct the hearing in an adversarial manner.
An accused, when going forward with his burden of producing evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination, should have the right to adduce evidence sufficient to establish the criteria required by Bat-son. This right should include the opportunity to call witnesses, including the prosecutor as an adverse witness for direct examination,3 in the accused’s attempt to satisfy the prima facie burden imposed upon him. If the trial court concludes that the accused has established a prima facie case under Batson and requires the prosecutor to offer racially neutral explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges, then an accused should not be denied the right to cross-examine the prosecutor to attempt to rebut those explanations offered by the prosecutor. Since the accused bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trial judge that the discrimination allegations are true, the denial or improper curtailment of cross-examination, in our view, denies to an accused the right to a fair trial.
*875We hasten to add that conduct of the Batson hearing, the admission or exclusion of evidence, and the limitation, if any, of cross-examination are all subject to the applicable Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence and the trial court’s inherent authority to control the conduct of the hearing.
We observe that the State contends, in its response to appellant’s argument on this point, that appellant failed to preserve this error by failing to object and assert the constitutional right to cross-examine and that therefore any error was waived. Because of the substantial right of the accused that is affected, we are of the view that this contention begs the question, and the argument is rejected. Also, insofar as the conclusions reached by this Court in Dewberry v. State, 743 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, pet. granted), conflict with the conclusions reached here, they are overruled.
We therefore abate this appeal and remand this case so that the trial court may conduct a Batson hearing. This hearing should be conducted in conformity with this opinion. If the court determines that appellant has established a prima facie case, the trial court should then require the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for the use of its strike. The appellant should have the opportunity to rebut evidence offered by the State, including cross-examination of the prosecutor. The trial court should then decide whether appellant has established purposeful discrimination, reduce that decision to writing, and enter its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The record of those proceedings together with the results and the findings of fact and conclusions of law are to be forwarded to this Court. See Keeton v. State, 12A S.W.2d at 66.
WHITHAM, HOWELL, McCLUNG, STEWART, ROWE and THOMAS, JJ., agree with the majority opinion.
ENOCH, C.J., and LaGARDE and OVARD, JJ., dissent with opinions.
KINKEADE and BURNETT, JJ., agree with dissenting opinion of ENOCH, C.J.
ENOCH, C.J., and BURNETT, J., agree with dissent of LaGARDE, J.
WHITTINGTON, J., concurs with dissent of ENOCH, C.J., and dissents in a separate opinion.

. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

. See Garza v. State, 658 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863, 104 S.Ct. 194, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983).

. However, prior to a finding that an accused has established a prima facie case under Batson, any attempt to require the prosecutor to explain his peremptory challenges would be improper. See Tompkins, slip op. at 5.