Court Opinion

ID: 9939545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:32.812317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:24.335260
License: Public Domain

J-A01040-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: P.A.B., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: DEPARTMENT OF                     :
  HUMAN SERVICES                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2133 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered July 19, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000305-2022

  IN THE INTEREST OF: S.N.B., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: DEPARTMENT OF                     :
  HUMAN SERVICES                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2135 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered July 19, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000306-2022

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E, and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                             FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2024

       The Department of Human Services of the City of Philadelphia (“DHS”)

appeals from the orders denying its petitions to terminate the parental rights

of B.B. (“Mother”) to her twin sons, P.A.B. and S.N.B. (collectively,

“Children”). We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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     Children first came to the attention of DHS on the date of their birth in

August 2020 when DHS received a general protective services report alleging

that Children had tested positive for PCP at the hospital. DHS obtained an

order of protective custody for Children within days of their birth, and they

were placed in the care of Mother’s godmother (“Godmother”). On October

7, 2020, Children were adjudicated as dependent. Children have remained in

Godmother’s care throughout these proceedings.          Permanency review

hearings occurred on January 27, May 27, and October 13, 2021, and March

2, 2022.

     DHS filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother and

unknown father on May 10, 2022. The grounds for termination for Mother

were Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) of the Adoption Act.          After

continuances on July 20, October 14, and December 14, 2022, and March 1

and April 19, 2023, an evidentiary hearing occurred on July 19, 2023. At the

hearing, Patricia Garvey, case manager for the Community Umbrella Agency

(“CUA”) testified for DHS.   Mother also testified at the hearing, and she

presented the testimony of Aisha Bryant, Mother’s case manager at Northeast

Treatment Center (“NET”).

     At the hearing, Garvey testified that after Children came into DHS’s

care, a case plan was prepared for Mother that required her to take parenting

classes, have mental health evaluation, obtain adequate housing, provide CUA

with a lease for her housing and allow CUA to examine the suitability of her

home, provide CUA with employment information, and sign all of the releases

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requested by CUA. N.T., 7/19/23, at 10-11, 21. Garvey testified that Mother

was not initially required to complete drug and alcohol services but was later

referred for those services after she tested positive for marijuana on August

20, 2021. Id. at 10-13, 28-29; DHS Exhibit 1. Mother also tested positive

for marijuana during an April 19, 2023 drug screen. N.T., 7/19/23, at 13;

DHS Exhibit 1.

      CUA requested that Mother complete random drug screens on eighteen

occasions over the course of her case, and Mother did not attend any of the

drug screens.    N.T., 7/19/23, at 14.    According to Garvey, Mother at first

indicated that she did not have public transit fare to get to the testing location,

but after being supplied with transit passes Mother still did not attend or

provide an explanation for why she could not attend. Id. at 14-15. Garvey

testified that Mother was referred to NET for drug and alcohol services in 2021

and 2022; she was discharged on August 20, 2021 for failing to complete the

program and she did not attend any sessions in 2022. Id. at 15-16.

      Garvey testified that Mother provided CUA with information that she had

begun treatment at NET for drug and alcohol abuse on March 17, 2023,

although Garvey was not aware whether Mother had completed the program.

Id. at 16. Garvey testified that Mother was also enrolled in mental health

treatment at NET in March 2023. Id. at 17. On cross-examination, Garvey

stated that Mother completed a drug and alcohol assessment on October 7,

2020, which indicated that drug and alcohol treatment was not needed at that

time; similarly, Garvey admitted that Mother’s October 13, 2021 mental

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health evaluation showed that she was not then required to undergo mental

health treatment. Id. at 28-29.

      Garvey testified that she never received documentation to show that

Mother had obtained a job despite asking for proof of employment throughout

the life of the case. Id. at 17-18. Garvey stated that Mother was referred to

ARC for parenting, housing, education, and job placement services, and

Mother had completed those services by 2021. Id. at 17, 32. Garvey stated

that Mother refused to sign any of the consents requested by DHS, on the

basis that her signature could be used to take Children away from her. Id. at

19.

      Garvey testified that Mother had until recently been residing in the same

residence that DHS had determined was inadequate at the beginning of the

case. Id. at 18-19. According to Garvey, Mother’s referral to the Fresh Start

Program, a three-step transitional housing program for individuals with

substance abuse issues, had been refused, but Mother was placed in Fresh

Start transitional housing just prior to the hearing.      Id. at 18, 36-37.

Nevertheless, Garvey stated that Mother was not compliant with her housing

objective. Id. at 25.

      Garvey testified that Mother’s visitation remained bi-weekly as of the

date of the hearing because Mother did not attend any visits during 2021 and

her visitation in 2022 was inconsistent.    Id. at 19-20, 24-26.     However,

Garvey admitted on cross-examination that Mother’s attendance at visits had

been consistent since the previous court hearing on April 19, 2023, she missed

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only visit from the time of the next most recent hearing on March 1, 2023,

and prior to that she had “missed visits here and there.” Id. at 39-40. When

the visits were initially in Godmother’s home, various visits were cancelled or

virtual due to Mother’s diagnosis with COVID-19 and Godmother’s husband’s

recovery from surgery requiring Godmother and Children to reside temporarily

out of Pennsylvania. Id. at 34-35, 37. In addition, at a certain point Mother

had a falling out with Godmother and requested that the visits be supervised

at CUA’s offices; the visits remained supervised as of the date of the hearing.

Id. at 24-25, 34. Garvey had supervised all but one of the visits at CUA’s

offices; she stated that Mother brings food and toys for Children but that

Children are “all over the place,” “they’re not engaging” with Mother, and they

“go off and play by themselves.” Id. at 20-21. Garvey stated that Children

“first they used to call [Mother] girl[,] then they started calling her homie,”

adding that Children “call everybody mom and homie.” Id. at 21.

      Garvey stated that Mother has “a relationship” with Children but not a

parent-child relationship or as strong of a bond as Godmother has with

Children.   Id. at 21-22.   Garvey testified that Children clearly know who

Mother is, but whereas Godmother soothes Children and Children cry when

Godmother puts them down, Children “cry and [] spaz out” when Mother picks

them up and they do not cry when the visits with her finish. Id. at 21-24.

      Garvey stated that Children are thriving and happy in Godmother’s

home, she attends all their medical and dental appointments, and they are

safe in her home. Id. at 23-24, 27. On the other hand, Garvey was only

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aware of one medical appointment that Mother had attended. Id. at 25-26.

Garvey conceded that Mother did provide Children with food, toys, and

clothing and did celebrate their birthdays with them. Id. at 28.

      Garvey opined that it would be in best interests for Mother’s parental

rights to be terminated to allow Children to be adopted by Godmother, with

whom they have had a bond since birth and to whom they look for all their

needs. Id. at 23-24. Garvey testified that she did not believe that Children

will suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Id.

      Mother testified that she is currently residing at Bridge House, a

transitional home that provides her assistance in finding permanent housing,

employment, and educational services. Id. at 42. Since March 2023, Mother

has been participating in intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment at

NET at least three times a week, with weekly drug testing. Id. at 42-45, 53.

Mother has also elected to participate in mental health therapy through that

facility and she was recently diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and PTSD.

Id. at 43, 51. Mother stated that NET intended that she complete treatment

two days prior to the hearing, but the center had elected for her to continue

treatment based upon conversations with CUA. Id. at 44, 47, 49.

      Mother admitted that she was active in her addiction from 2020 until

some point in 2022. Id. at 48-49. Mother stated that she previously missed

numerous drug screens requested by CUA because she was not prepared to

confront her issues, whereas now she is able to do so. Id. at 44. Mother

stated that, while she was using drugs, she “did not voluntarily give [her]

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urine.” Id. at 52. With respect to Mother’s positive test for marijuana on

April 19, 2023, she stated that she has a medical marijuana card, which she

had provided to CUA. Id. at 45.

     Mother testified that she is not currently employed as she was informed

during her time in the Fresh Start program that she should not focus on

employment until she had handled her substance abuse and mental health

issues. Id. at 43. Mother hoped to obtain employment within a month of the

hearing.    Id. at 51.   She had previously been employed at various jobs,

including as a canvasser. Id. at 43-44.

     Mother testified that visits with Children “go very well”; Mother brings

coloring books, puzzles, and flashcards, and Children and Mother laugh and

play together. Id. at 45. Mother stated that, contrary to Garvey’s testimony,

Children call her “mommy.” Id. Mother testified that she has not missed any

visits since the April 19, 2023 court date.   Id. at 46.   Mother felt “very

uncomfortable” when the visits took place at Godmother’s home and “[t]here

were issues,” including the fact that Children were not called by their birth

names in that home. Id. at 45-46.

     When asked about Garvey’s testimony that Mother only attended one

medical appointment for Children, Mother responded that she was only

informed of one of the appointments and she did go to that appointment. Id.

at 46-47.    Mother stated that she had asked CUA for documentation on

Children’s appointments for two years without receiving a response until the

month prior to the hearing; Godmother also did not provide Mother with

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information that would have allowed her to attend Children’s appointments.

Id. at 47. Mother testified that she is currently able to perform her duties as

caregiver to Children but that she is not able to take Children at present

because she does not currently have suitable housing. Id. at 54.

      Aisha Bryant, Mother’s case manager at NET, testified that Mother has

been in intensive drug and alcohol outpatient treatment at the facility since

March 2023, which includes three group sessions per week as well as one-

one-one sessions. Id. at 57-58. Mother has been regular with her attendance

at the programs and receptive to the instructions she has received. Id. at 58-

59. Mother also had recently participated in a psychological evaluation at NET

and will continue with mental health services there. Id. at 59. Bryant testified

that Mother’s most important improvement was in her outlook and her ability

to effectively communicate her feelings; Mother was “broken” when she

arrived at NET and blamed others for her misfortunes, whereas now she holds

herself accountable and acknowledges her role in improving her life. Id. at

58-60, 65.

      Bryant testified that, when Mother was residing at the Fresh Start

recovery home, no issues were reported and she never missed a curfew. Id.

at 60-61. According to Bryant, Mother’s current residence at Bridge House is

not suitable for Children but the facility is attempting to place Mother in a

location that would allow for reunification. Id. at 60. Bryant testified that

Mother has been providing monthly drug screens at NET and Mother’s results

are consistent with her maintenance of sobriety. Id. at 61. Bryant stated

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that she did not believe that termination of Mother’s parental rights was

appropriate. Id. at 63. Bryant testified that potential reunification between

Mother and Children would be possible within three to six months of the

hearing depending on Mother’s progress. Id. at 63-64.

       On July 19, 2023, after the hearings, the trial court entered orders

denying the petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights.1 DHS filed timely

notices of appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal,

as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).          On September 21, 2023, the trial

court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), addressing DHS’s

appellate claims.

       DHS presents the following issues on appeal:

       1. Whether the trial court erroneously denied the petitions for the
       involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights where the
       uncontroverted evidence established that Mother did not initiate
       efforts to address the conditions that led to the children’s
       placement until ten (10) months after the petitions were filed and
       thirty-one (31) months after the children entered care?

       2. Whether the trial court impermissibly considered efforts by
       Mother that were initiated after the filing of the petition in violation
       of Section 2511(b)?

       3. Whether the trial court erroneously failed to consider the strong
       and beneficial bond that the children have with their pre-adoptive
       foster mother, who is the only caregiver they have ever known?

DHS Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted; emphasis in original).

____________________________________________

1 The trial court entered decrees terminating unnamed Father’s parental rights

on that same date.

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      We conduct our review in light of the following:

      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In the Interest of J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013)).

      The burden is on the petitioner in the lower court to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking termination of

parental rights are valid. In the Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 522 (Pa.

Super. 2021).    The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as

“testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Under Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, the trial court must first

determine whether the particular conduct of a parent warrants involuntary

termination of their parental rights under any one of the the eleven grounds

enumerated in subsection (a). 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11); In re Adoption

of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021); T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. If the trial

court determines the petitioner established grounds for termination under any

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one of the Section 2511(a) grounds by clear and convincing evidence, the

court then must proceed to assess the petition under subsection (b), which

focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); C.M., 255

A.3d at 359; In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second

part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b). C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 261-

262 (citation omitted).

      Here, DHS sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), and subsection (b).         The statute

provides

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

           (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
           six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
           either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
           parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
           parental duties.

           (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
           or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
           essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
           his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
           causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
           will not be remedied by the parent.

           *        *        *

           (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
           by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
           for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
           to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,

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         the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
         a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
         reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
         the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
         child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
         the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
         of the child.

         *         *       *

         (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
         agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
         removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
         removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
         termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
         and welfare of the child.

         *     *       *

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b).

      DHS’s first appellate issue concerns whether the trial court abused its

discretion by finding that the agency did not meet its burden of proof to show

that Mother’s parental rights to Children should be terminated under Section

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) of the Adoption Act.         DHS presents two

overarching arguments with respect to Section 2511(a). It first contends that

the trial court did not engage in the required bifurcated analysis under Section

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2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires the consideration of whether

termination was proper under each of the raised grounds for termination under

subsection (a) before proceeding to an analysis under subsection (b). C.M.,

255 A.3d at 359; C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 261-262.             We disagree.   At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally announced its findings as to

the specific element that DHS failed to satisfy as to each of the raised

subsection (a) grounds.     N.T., 7/19/23, at 82.    In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)

opinion, the trial court then expanded on its Section 2511(a) analysis by

making findings as to credibility and weight of the evidence and engaging in

a detailed discussion of the facts presented. Trial Court Opinion, 9/21/23, at

7-11. The trial court then engaged in a separate Section 2511(b) analysis,

concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights would not best serve

Children’s needs and welfare. Id. at 11. In this respect, we find the trial

court’s Section 2511 analysis adequate.

      DHS also argues that the trial court erred by considering Mother’s efforts

to alleviate the conditions that led to Children’s removal that were initiated

after DHS filed its petition.   We agree with DHS in part.     Section 2511(b)

provides that: “With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to

remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent

to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.”   23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)

(emphasis added); see also In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super.

2010). “The court, however, may consider post-petition efforts if the efforts

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were initiated before the filing of the termination petition and continued after

the petition date.”.   Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Here, the trial court did not

distinguish between Mother’s efforts before or after May 10, 2022, the date of

filing of the termination petitions as to Children and the provision of notice of

same, in its analysis under subsections (a)(1) and (8).

      However, with respect to DHS’s argument that the limitation on

consideration of post-petition conduct also applies to subsections (a)(2) and

(5), which are not included in the aforementioned proviso of subsection (b),

we reject this contention. Section 2511(b) clearly limits its effect to certain

grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), and there is nothing in the

text of the statute indicating that a petitioner’s decision to proceed under

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8)—the grounds for termination mentioned in

subsection (b)—requires that the trial court not consider conduct first initiated

after the petitions’ filing as relevant to any other subsection (a) ground for

termination included in that same petition. Accordingly, to the extent the trial

court considered Mother’s conduct initiated after May 10, 2022 in its analysis

under subsections (a)(1) and (8), we will disregard that evidence and focus

on whether there was sufficient additional support for the trial court’s

determination that DHS did not meet its burden of proof on those grounds.

However, we do not likewise limit our review as to the trial court’s analysis

under subsections (a)(2) and (5).

      To terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), the petitioner

“must demonstrate by competent, clear and convincing evidence [that] [t]he

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parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately

preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform

parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 363-64 (Pa. 2021)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). While parental duties are not defined

in the Adoption Act,

      our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the
      needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support.
      Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions and
      develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of
      such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and
      association. The performance of parental duties requires that a
      parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance
      in the child’s life.

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 592 (Pa. 2021) (internal quotation

marks, brackets and internal citations omitted).

      A court addressing a petition filed under Section 2511(a)(1) shall

“examine the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the

parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances,

clearly warrants permitting the involuntary termination of parental rights.”

Id. at 593 (citation and brackets omitted). “Consideration of the totality of

the circumstances includes evaluation of the following: (1) the parent’s

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between

the parent and child, if any, including any efforts made by the parent to

reestablish contact with the child; and (3) the effect that termination of

parental rights would have on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” Id.

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While courts must not engage in a mechanical application of the terms of the

Adoption Act, the “most critical period for evaluation [under Section

2511(a)(1)] is six months immediately preceding the filing of the termination

petition.” Id. at 592.

      Here, the trial court found that DHS had not proved that Mother had

evinced a settled purpose of relinquishing a parental claim to Children or had

refused or failed to perform her parental duties. N.T., 7/19/23, at 82. The

trial court began its analysis by focusing on the deficiencies in DHS’s case,

noting that the DHS only presented one witness, Mother’s CUA case manager,

Garvey, without testimony from an expert, Children’s current caregiver, or

any other person. Trial Court Opinion, 9/21/23, at 7. The court found that

Garvey spoke of Mother’s lack of progress “in an overly broad and conclusory

manner” on direct, “describ[ing] Mother as largely uncooperative, apathetic,

and non-compliant,” while only on cross-examination did “a more complete,

detailed, and positive” picture of Mother come into view. Id. at 7-8. The

court noted that Mother had made progress towards the goals established by

DHS, including on housing and visitation.    Id. at 8.   The court recounted

Mother’s description of her “beautiful” visits with Children where they laugh,

play, and do puzzles and flashcards together, and Children call Mother

“mommy”; the court specifically found that Mother’s description of her

relationship with Children was more credible than Garvey’s and accorded

Mother’s account greater weight. Id. at 10-11.

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      The trial court further discussed Mother’s “strained relationship with”

Children’s current caregiver, Godmother, who has requested that Children call

Godmother and her husband “mom” and “dad” and does not use Children’s

birth names. Id. at 10. The court also described the “concerning” situation

regarding   Mother   not   having   been     advised   of   Children’s   medical

appointments; the court found that Mother credibly testified that she had

asked to be involved in Children’s care but was stymied by Godmother and

CUA from doing so. Id. at 10. The court found that Mother explained the

reasons for “her missing drug screens in an accountable[] and honest

manner,” which the court found reflected positively on “Mother’s honesty” and

was “an important sign of personal growth and positive development.” Id. at

11.

      DHS argues that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, the evidence

presented at the termination hearing demonstrated that Mother had a settled

purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to Children during the six-month

period prior to May 10, 2022. DHS notes that Mother did not attend drug and

alcohol services in 2021 and 2022, she failed to visit Children during 2021 and

in 2022 her attendance at visits was inconsistent, she was admittedly in active

addiction during 2020 and 2021 and only became sober in 2022, and she had

not obtained employment or adequate housing for Children at any point during

the case. DHS contends that, disregarding “Mother’s eleventh-hour attempt

to address her substance abuse issues” in March 2023, as the court was

required to do by Section 2511(b), DHS Brief at 24, Mother demonstrated no

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intent or effort to provide Children with parental care during the six months

leading up to May 10, 2022.

       Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in finding that DHS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that

Mother’s parental rights should be terminated under Section 2511(a)(1).

First, we emphasize that the trial court found Garvey’s sweepingly negative

characterization on direct of Mother’s compliance with CUA’s goals to be a

mischaracterization of the case history and belied by the more nuanced

account on cross-examination; the court also found Mother’s testimony to be

credible and genuine and specifically credited Mother’s testimony regarding

her relationship with Children over Garvey’s account of the relationship. Trial

Court Opinion, 9/21/23, at 7-8, 10-11. We find that the court’s credibility and

weight-of-the-evidence findings are supported by the record, and, as such,

they are binding on this Court. J.R.R., 229 A.3d at 11.

       We also note that the record at the hearing reveals a general lack of

clarity as to the timeline of events and specifically whether certain key events

fell within the six-month period prior to the filing of the termination petitions

on May 10, 2022.2           For example, the testimony revealed that Mother
____________________________________________

2 Rather than presenting testimony regarding the history of the case at the

termination hearing, DHS relied in large part on a “Statement of Facts”
attached to each termination petition to describe the history of the case, which
the trial court adopted in part in its opinion. Termination Petitions, 5/10/22,
Exhibit A; Trial Court Opinion, 9/21/23, at 2-4. However, allegations in
pleadings are not facts, and absent a stipulation or admission by Mother that
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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completed services offered through ARC in parenting, housing, education, and

job placement services in 2021 without indication of whether she completed

these classes in the final two months of that year and therefore would fall

within the critical period under Section 2511(a)(1). N.T., 7/19/23, at 17, 32.

Additionally, Mother testified that she achieved sobriety during 2022, but her

testimony did not indicate whether that occurred before or after May 10, 2022.

Id. at 48-49. In light of the fact that the petitioner bears the burden of proof

to present clear and convincing evidence supporting termination, L.W., 267

A.3d at 522, the ambiguities regarding the dates of the evidence should be

resolved against DHS and therefore it is appropriate to consider this evidence

in the Section 2511(a)(1) analysis, notwithstanding Section 2511(b)’s

restriction with respect to post-petition evidence.

       With these considerations in mind, we find ample support in the record

for court’s conclusion that Mother did not have a settled purpose of

relinquishing her parental claim to Children and she did not refuse to perform

her parental duties. At the time that the termination petition was filed, Mother

had completed the parenting, housing, education, and job placement services

that were offered to her by the agency, and she had attained sobriety. While

Mother was inconsistent in visitation during this period, as the court noted and

Garvey testified, this was in part attributable to friction with Godmother,

____________________________________________

the case history contained within the “Statement of Facts” is accurate, neither
the lower court nor this Court can rely on DHS’s summary of the case history.

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Mother’s COVID-19 illness, and Godmother’s husband’s recovery from surgery

which required the family to reside out of state for a time. Moreover, Mother

maintained a positive relationship with Children, their visits were full of play

and educational activities, and Children referred to her as their mother.

Mother also attempted to attend Children’s medical appointments and

otherwise involve herself in their lives, but she was prevented from doing so

by CUA and Godmother. In sum, the record shows that, although Mother was

not fully compliant with the agency’s reunification goals as of the date that

the termination petition was filed, she was actively attempting to provide

Children with the necessary love, protection, guidance, and support and

maintain a place of importance in their lives such that she did not have a

settled purpose or refuse to be Children’s parent. L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592.

      Turning to the asserted grounds for termination under Section

2511(a)(2), this provision requires proof “by clear and convincing evidence

that there is (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”

Id. at 600.

      [S]ubsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a parent’s refusal or
      failure to perform parental duties, but instead emphasizes the
      child’s present and future need for essential parental care,
      control[,] or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
      being. Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be
      read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home
      and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy of restraint

                                     - 20 -
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      in state intervention is intended to protect. This is particularly so
      where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is
      no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117 (citation and emphasis omitted).

      The trial court found that DHS did not meet its burden under Section

2511(a)(2) because Mother had demonstrated through her actions that she

would remedy the causes of her incapacity to provide Children with essential

parental care, as shown by the testimony of Mother and Bryant, her case

manager at NET, regarding her intensive outpatient treatment at that facility

commencing in March 2023. Trial Court Opinion, 9/21/23, at 8-9. The trial

court cited Bryant’s testimony that Mother had made “notable improvement”

since starting drug and alcohol and mental health treatment at NET four

months prior to the hearing, including by holding herself accountable for her

failings and acknowledging her faults, working on the issues that led to her

need for treatment, becoming a better communicator, and adopting a more

realistic outlook. Id. The court also discussed Mother’s “credible and genuine”

testimony regarding her treatment at NET, as well as her progress in obtaining

suitable housing, including her residence at Fresh Start for three months, her

current placement in the Bridge House, and her anticipated transition towards

permanent housing. Id. at 9-10. The court further noted that Mother had a

perfect attendance record at visitation sessions in the months prior to the

hearing. Id. at 8.

      DHS argues that the evidence presented showed that Mother could not

remedy her repeated and continued incapacity to provide Children with proper

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and    necessary     parenting,     which      specifically   arose   out   of   Mother’s

longstanding, untreated substance abuse issues. DHS contends that the trial

court could not consider Mother’s efforts to address her addiction after the

termination petition was filed, but see supra; even assuming the post-

petition evidence could be considered, however, the agency asserts that the

trial court abused its discretion in finding in favor of Mother on subsection

(a)(2) because there was no “rational prospect of timely reunification” for

Mother and Children.          Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1126.            DHS maintains that,

notwithstanding Mother’s intensive outpatient treatment at NET, there was no

definite testimony as to when Mother would be discharged from the program

or when reunification was possible with Children.

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that DHS did not

meet its burden under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother made substantial progress

towards remedying the issues that led to Children’s removal as of the date of

the termination hearing by achieving sobriety,3 she had completed the

services offered to her by the agency, and she was attending all of her

supervised visits with Children. In addition, as illustrated by the testimony of

Bryant, her case manager at NET, Mother had successfully engaged in
____________________________________________

3 While Mother tested positive for marijuana on a CUA drug screen on April

19, 2023, she testified that she had received a medical marijuana card by that
date and DHS did not present evidence to rebut this contention. N.T.,
7/19/23, at 45, 61. Furthermore, while DHS asserts that Mother also tested
positive for trace amounts of cocaine on that same drug screen, Id. at 12;
DHS Brief at 7, the test report submitted by the agency showed that the screen
was negative for cocaine. DHS Exhibit 1.

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outpatient drug and alcohol and mental health treatment at that facility since

March 2023, which had resulted in improvements to her communication style,

her outlook, and her ability to address her addiction. While DHS contends

that there was no realistic prospect for reunification at the time of the hearing,

the testimony of Mother and Bryant revealed that reunification was possible

in as little as three months4 and depended in large part on Mother’s placement

in suitable housing, which NET and CUA were working on as of the date of the

hearing. As these findings are supported by the record, we conclude that the

trial court properly found that the causes of Mother’s incapacity to provide

Children with essential care were being remedied at the time of the

termination hearing. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 600.

       DHS combines its argument and only briefly addresses the remaining

two Section 2511(a) grounds for termination that it raised in the termination

petition, subsections (a)(5) and (a)(8). DHS argues that all elements were

met with respect to these two subsections: Children were in care for 34

months at the time of the termination hearing, far exceeding the six-month

and twelve-month periods set forth in the two subsections; the conditions

leading to Children’s removal—Mother’s substance abuse issues—continued to

____________________________________________

4 DHS argues that Bryant testified that reunification would not be possible
until at least seven months after the hearing. DHS Brief at 7. However, this
misconstrues Bryant’s testimony; she testified that Mother could be eligible
for reunification within seven months of Mother’s commencement of treatment
in March 2023, which would be three months after the date of the hearing on
July 19, 2023. N.T., 7/19/23, at 63-64.

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exist; and termination would best serve Children’s needs and welfare. We

disagree.

      To demonstrate that a parent’s parental rights should be terminated

under Section 2511(a)(5), the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that “(1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least

six months; (2) the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child

continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the

needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.B., 230 A.3d 341, 348 (Pa. Super.

2020) (quoting Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1118). In addressing whether the conditions

which led to removal and placement of the child continue to exist, courts

should consider whether the parent cannot or will not remedy the conditions

within a reasonable period of time and whether the services reasonably

available to the parent are unlikely to remedy the conditions within a

reasonable period of time. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1273

(Pa. Super. 2003).

      Here, the trial court concluded that DHS had not shown that Mother

would not remedy the conditions that led to Children’s removal within a

reasonable period of time, citing Bryant’s testimony that Mother may be in a

position that would allow for reunification within three to six months of the

hearing. N.T., 7/19/23, at 82. We discern no basis to disturb the trial court’s

ruling. As described above, at the time of the termination hearing Mother was

no longer abusing the drugs that had led to Children’s removal, she was

receiving intensive outpatient substance abuse and mental health treatment,

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she was residing in transitional housing, and she regularly participated in

appropriate, beneficial visitation with Children.         Furthermore, Bryant

estimated that Mother could potentially reunite with Children in as few as three

months depending on her successful completion of treatment at NET and her

placement in permanent housing suitable for Children. The court’s finding

that a three-to-six-month period constituted “a reasonable period of time” for

Mother to fully remedy the conditions that led to Children’s placement is not

an abuse of discretion. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5); M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1273.

      Finally, with respect to Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner bears the

burden of showing: “(1) that the child has been removed from the care of the

parent for at least twelve months; (2) that the conditions which led to removal

or placement of the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.” Interest of M.E., 283

A.3d 820, 832 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court found

that DHS had not met its burden as to the second element, and we likewise

focus on this requirement. N.T., 7/19/23, at 82. Unlike other Section 2511(a)

subsections, subsection (a)(8) “does not require the court to evaluate a

parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the

placement” of the child. M.E., 283 A.3d at 832. While the lower court may

not consider post-petition efforts undertaken by the parent in its analysis

under Section 2511(a)(8), see 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), our courts have stated

that the relevant inquiry under the second element of subsection (a)(8) “is

whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus

                                     - 25 -
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whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the

hearing.” M.E., 283 A.3d at 832; see also In re C.B., 230 A.3d 341, 348-

49 (Pa. Super. 2020).

      The lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding that DHS did not

prove that the conditions that led to Children’s removal continued to exist. As

of the date that the termination petitions were filed, Mother had achieved

sobriety—the primary condition that led to Children’s removal. In addition,

Mother had completed the parenting, housing, education, and job placement

services offered by CUA, she was engaged in visitation with Children and had

a positive relationship with them, and she was attempting to attend Children’s

medical appointments and otherwise be more involved in their lives, but she

was stymied by their caregiver and CUA. Moreover, as of the date of the

hearing, the evidence showed that Mother’s reunification with Children could

happen in as little as three months. The lower court was within its authority

to find that reunification with Children was “imminent[].” M.E., 283 A.3d at

832; C.B., 230 A.3d at 348-49. Therefore, the court properly found that DHS

did not meet its burden as to subsection (a)(8).

      Accordingly, we conclude that DHS did not meet its burden as to any of

the asserted grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) of the Adoption

Act. Because a petitioner is required to prove a subsection (a) ground for

termination before the court addresses whether termination serves the child’s

needs and welfare under Section 2511(b), see C.M., 255 A.3d at 359; C.M.K.,

203 A.3d at 261-262, we need not address DHS’s second and third issues

                                    - 26 -
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relating to subsection (b). We therefore affirm the lower court’s order denying

the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Children.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 2/9/2024

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