Court Opinion

ID: 9412005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:11:11.090042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:25.246277
License: Public Domain

J-A10034-23

J-A10035-23

                           2023 PA Super 142

 ANTOINE H. LESLIE,                     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF         :        PENNSYLVANIA
 RENEE D. GILYARD, DECEASED             :
                                        :
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT               :   No. 2267 EDA 2021
 CORPORATION D/B/A WORDSWORTH           :
 ACADEMY, TURNING POINTS FOR            :
 CHILDREN,TURNING POINTS CUA 3,         :
 LLC, THE TURNING POINTS FOR            :
 CHILDREN CHARITABLE                    :
 FOUNDATION, TURNING POINTS CUA         :
 9, LLC, DEBORAH CROSTON AND            :
 JOHN AND JANE DOE 1-10                 :

             Appeal from the Order Entered October 21, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                           No(s): 210501900

 ANTOINE H. LESLIE,             :           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE    :                PENNSYLVANIA
 OF RENEE D. GILYARD, DECEASED  :
                                :
                                :
            v.                  :
                                :
                                :
 PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT       :           No. 662 EDA 2022
 CORPORATION D/B/A              :
 WORDSWORTH ACADEMY, TURNING :
 POINTS FOR CHILDREN, TURNING   :
 POINTS CUA 3, LLC, THE TURNING :
 POINTS FOR CHILDREN CHARITABLE :
 FOUNDATION, TURNING POINTS CUA :
 9, LLC, DEBORAH CROSTON, AND   :
 JOHN AND JANE DOE 1-10         :
J-A10034-23

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              Appeal from the Order Entered January 31, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 210501900

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                           FILED JULY 28, 2023

       These consolidated interlocutory appeals1 are taken from two discovery

orders entered by different judges of the Court of Common Pleas of

Philadelphia presiding over the present wrongful death and survival action

brought on behalf of the estate of Renee D. Gilyard, a foster care parent

murdered by her then 17-year-old foster child, Xavier Johnson. After careful

review, we vacate the orders at issue and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this decision.

       The pertinent facts and procedural history are that on May 21, 2021,

Antoine Leslie (“Administrator”), the son of Ms. Gilyard and administrator of

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The grant of jurisdiction to this Court is codified in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742 and

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a). An interlocutory appeal may be taken as of right when
the order appealed from "is an order separable from and collateral to the main
cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review
and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final
judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost." Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
Herein, this Court has jurisdiction to decide the present appeals because an
order requiring disclosure of allegedly privileged material or confidential
medical information is an appealable collateral order under Rule 313(b).
Pasquini v. Fairmount Behavioral Health System, 230 A.3d 1190, 1194
(Pa. Super. 2020); Buckman v. Verazin, 54 A.3d 956, 959 (Pa. Super.
2012); V.B.T. v. Family Services of Western Pennsylvania, 705 A.2d
1325, 1329 n.6 (Pa. Super. 1998), aff'd, 728 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1999).

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her estate brought this action against Defendants/Appellants,2 alleging in the

Complaint that the Turning Points Defendants were a foster family care agency

under contract with the Philadelphia Department of Human Services.

Complaint ¶¶ 14, 24-26.          The Complaint alleged that the Turning Points

Defendants and Deborah Croston (collectively, “Defendants/Appellants”) and

the Doe defendants placed 17-year-old foster child, Xavier Johnson, with

foster care parent Renee Gilyard and that Johnson murdered Gilyard within

days after he was placed in her home. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28, 36, 42. The Complaint

alleged further that Defendants/Appellants and the Doe defendants knew at

the time of the placement that Johnson had history of violence and, therefore,

are liable in negligence for her death because they failed to disclose that

history   of violence      to   Gilyard.       Id.   ¶¶ 37-39, 41, 50-55, 60-63.

Appellants/Defendants in their answer denied these allegations. Answer and

New Matter ¶¶ 37-39, 41, 50-55, 60-63.

       Pursuant to the Administrator’s discovery requests, the trial court’s

discovery orders directed Defendants/Appellants to produce both Johnson’s

foster care case record and additional information that Defendants/Appellants

contend are also part of Johnson’s foster care case record.           Specifically,

Defendants/Appellants argued that they are prohibited by law from disclosing

____________________________________________

2 Most of Defendants/Appellants’ briefs in these appeals list the Philadelphia

Parking Authority as a defendant-appellant in the caption. That is an error.
The Philadelphia Parking Authority is not a party to this case and is not in the
caption of either appeal.

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any of the requested records and information and that some of the documents

sought are protected medical and mental health records.

       The first appeal (under 2267 EDA 2021) concerns the Administrator’s

service for production of documents on Defendants/Appellants on May 24,

2021, that requested that they produce complete copies of any records that

were in their possession prior to and during Johnson’s placement with Gilyard

“that contain any information concerning Xavier Johnson’s medical history,

mental health diagnosis, general behaviors, relationships between him and his

parents, educational history, life experiences, and previous and/or prospective

circumstances.”      Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set I),

Requests Nos. 1-2.3

       Defendants/Appellants filed objections to these document requests,

asserting that the documents sought are protected from discovery by 55 Pa.

Code § 3130.44, the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability

Act of 1996 medical privacy regulations (HIPAA), and the Pennsylvania Mental

Health Procedures Act (MHPA).            Turning Points Defendants’ Response to

Request for Production of Documents (Set I), Response to Requests Nos. 1-2.

       The Administrator filed a motion to compel production of these

documents and Defendants/Appellants, in addition to filing an opposition to

the Administrator’s motion, filed a motion for a protective order seeking a
____________________________________________

3 Plaintiff had previously unsuccessfully sought similar documents in pre-
complaint discovery in an earlier action against the Turning Points Defendants
commenced by summons and the discovery was denied in those actions
without opinion.

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ruling that the requested documents were protected from discovery unless an

authorization     to     release     the    records      was     given   by     Johnson.

Defendants/Appellants           asserted,   in    both   their     opposition   to   the

Administrator’s motion and their motion for a protective order, that those

records contain details related to Johnson’s juvenile court proceedings,

medical history, mental and behavioral health history, and foster care and

placement history, that 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44 and the Juvenile Act, 42

Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375, prohibit disclosure of such documents, and that HIPAA

and the MHPA, 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503 prohibit production of the medical

records     and        mental      health    and      behavioral      health    records.

Defendants/Appellants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion

to Compel at 31-38; Defendants’/Appellants’ Motion for Protective Order ¶¶

6, 19-27.

      On September 1, 2021, Johnson moved to quash a subpoena that had

been issued seeking production of his criminal lawyer’s files asserting, inter

alia, that his foster care case record was protected from discovery and that he

did not consent to its disclosure. Johnson Motion to Quash Subpoena ¶¶ 5-8.

On October 21, 2021, the trial court judge (Judge Sean F. Kennedy) entered

both an order denying Defendants/Appellants’ motion for a protective order

and an accompanying order granting the Administrator’s motion to compel

and directing the Turning Points Defendants to produce all documents

requested in the Administrator’s first set of document requests without any

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limitation concerning the types of documents and without any confidentiality

order as to any of the documents to be produced. Trial Court Order, 10/21/21.

Defendants/Appellants appealed the order granting the Administrator’s

motion to compel on November 3, 2021, at 2267 EDA 2021.

        The second appeal (under 662 EDA 2021) concerns the Administrator’s

second and third sets of interrogatories and document requests served upon

Defendants/Appellants on October 25, 2021, just four days after the October

21, 2021, order that is the subject of the 2267 EDA 2021 appeal. The second

set interrogatories sought information concerning insurance coverage for the

claims in the Administrator’s action and the second set document requests

sought        documents   concerning    such   insurance   coverage.    Plaintiff’s

Interrogatories (Set II) at 4-6; Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents

(Set II) at 3. The third set interrogatories sought identification of witnesses

and information concerning witness statements and investigations of the

claims in the Administrator’s action, reports concerning Johnson’s behavior

prior    to    his   placement   with   Gilyard,   Defendants/Appellants’   factual

contentions, and evidence that Defendants/Appellants intended to use at trial.

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories (Set III) at 3-8. The third set document requests

sought only documents identified in their response to the third set

interrogatories. Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set III) at 3.

Defendants/Appellants did not file responses to this discovery.

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      On December 14, 2021, while the 2267 EDA 2021 appeal was pending,

the Administrator moved to compel answers in its second and third set

interrogatories and production of the documents requested by the second and

third set document requests.       Defendants/Appellants did not object to

providing responses to the second set insurance interrogatories and document

requests, Defendants’/Appellants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Second Motion to

Compel at 4 n.4, but they opposed providing any answers or documents in

response to the third set interrogatories and document requests.

      On January 31, 2022, the trial court (Judge Dennis B. Cohen) entered

an order granting the Administrator’s motion to compel and ordering

Defendants/Appellants to provide full and complete responses to the

Administrator’s third set interrogatories other than Interrogatories 12 and 14,

and to produce the documents requested by the third set document requests.

Trial Court Order, 1/31/22.   Defendants/Appellants appealed this order on

February 25, 2022, at 662 EDA 2022.

      "Generally, on review of an order concerning discovery, an appellate

court applies an abuse of discretion standard."    Berkeyheiser v. A- Plus

Investigations, Inc., 936 A.2d 1117, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations

omitted)." To the extent that the question involves a pure issue of law, [the

Court's] scope ... of review [is] plenary." Id. "Whether an order is appealable

under Rule 313 is a question of law." Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 A.3d

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771, 781 (Pa. 2014).     As such, the standard of review as to that issue is

plenary. Id.

      In their first appeal, Defendants/Appellants ask this Court to determine

whether the foster care case record is protected from disclosure in its entirety.

They argue that their records of Johnson’s medical history, mental health

diagnosis, general behaviors, relationships between him and his parents,

educational history, life experiences, and previous and/or prospective

circumstances are contained in his foster care case record and that Section

3130.44 of Pennsylvania’s children and youth social service regulations, 55

Pa. Code § 3130.44, governing the confidentiality of foster care case records,

and Section 6307 of the Juvenile Act prohibit disclosure of those records.

      Section 3130.44 provides in relevant part:
      (a) Information that may be used to identify the child or the
      parents by name or address, and information contained in the
      case record, is confidential. A staff person may not disclose
      or make use of information concerning the child or the
      parents other than in the course of the performance of his
      duties.

      (b) Federal authorities, the Commonwealth and the Department
      or respective authorized agents officially charged with
      administrative supervision, review, evaluation or audit
      responsibilities may have access to and the right to use
      information ….

      (c) Members of the administrative review panels, volunteers,
      another county agency and other providers of services to
      children and families who are accepted for service by the
      county agency may have access to and the right to use
      information identifying recipients of children and youth
      services. The amount and type of information to be
      released shall be determined by the county agency and
      shall be limited to information needed by the service

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      provider to carry out its responsibilities. The decision to
      release information shall be based on the county agency’s
      assessment of the individual case record and the responsibilities
      of a service provider. Information released may include part or all
      of the case record.

      (d) Information contained in case records shall be released upon
      request to:
      (1) Parents and legal guardians.
      (2) Children’s and parents’ attorneys.
      (3) The court and court staff.
      (4) County executive officers.
      (5) The child, if 14 years of age or older. The county agency may
      withhold information from a child which it has reason to believe it
      will be harmful to the child. The basis for withholding information
      from a child shall be recorded in the child’s case record.

      (e) Information in case records may not be released to a
      person or agency other than those specified in subsections
      (b)-(d) without prior authorization of the court.

      (f) Information from a case record may be made available
      only if the information released does not contain material
      which violates the right to privacy of another individual or is
      protected or made confidential by law. This may not be
      construed to protect the right to privacy of a county agency
      employe.

55 Pa. Code § 3130.44 (emphasis added). These confidentiality restrictions

apply to foster family care agencies. V.B.T. v. Family Services of Western

Pennsylvania, 705 A.2d 1325, 1333-34 n.13 (Pa. Super. 1998), aff'd, 728

A.2d 953 (Pa. 1999).

      The Administrator argued and the trial court held that this regulation

does not prohibit the disclosure of Johnson’s foster care case record that the

trial court ordered because Gilyard was entitled, as a foster parent, to the

information that the document requests seek and her estate succeeds to her

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rights under the Survival Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8302.          Section 3700.38 of

Pennsylvania’s foster family care agency regulations, provides that a foster

parent has a right to otherwise confidential information from the foster care

case record. 55 Pa. Code § 3700.38(c). The documents governing Gilyard’s

relationship with the Turning Point Defendants provided that she had a right

to receive information regarding her foster child’s “medical history, mental

health diagnosis, general behaviors, relationships between [him] and [his]

parents, educational history, life experiences, and previous and/or prospective

circumstances.” Turning Points for Children Resource Parent Rights and

Responsibilities ¶5. In addition, Section 3130.44 expressly permits disclosure

of foster care case record information to providers of services to foster

children. 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44(c). Under these provisions, Gilyard thus had

a right to receive information from Johnson’s foster care case record while he

was under her care. V.B.T, 705 A.2d at 1333-34 n.13.

      These provisions, however, limit the disclosure to the situation where

the foster parent can use the information in providing care for the foster child

at the time of the disclosure. 55 Pa. Code § 3700.38(c) (“Foster families shall

be provided information from the case record which is necessary to protect

the child’s health and safety and to assist in the child’s successful

accomplishment of necessary educational, developmental or remedial

tasks”) (emphasis added); Turning Points for Children Resource Parent Rights

and Responsibilities ¶5 (providing that foster parent has a right to such

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information “to facilitate the care of the child”); 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44(c)

(“The amount and type of information to be released … shall be limited to

information needed by the service provider to carry out its responsibilities”).4

Disclosure to the Administrator does not satisfy these limitations because

Gilyard at the time of disclosure was no longer providing care to Johnson. This

is not merely a result of her death, as it would be equally true if she were alive

and was no longer providing foster care for Johnson.

       Even if Administrator is not a person authorized to receive information,

however, that not does not mean that Section 3130.44 immunizes the foster

care case record from all discovery. Section 3130.44(e) expressly permits

disclosure of foster care case record information pursuant to court order

without restricting the parties to whom a court may order disclosure. 55 Pa.

Code § 3130.44(e) (“Information in case records may not be released to a

person or agency other than those specified in subsections (b)-(d) without

prior authorization of the court”) (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that

Section 3130.44 only limits Defendants/Appellants’ ability to disclose foster

care records without court order and is not a prohibition of court-ordered

disclosure or a complete privilege or protection against court-ordered

disclosure to a plaintiff in a personal injury action.

____________________________________________

4 Plaintiff argues that the foster parent is entitled to receive information to
decide whether to accept the placement. It appears from the language of 55
Pa. Code § 3700.38(c) and the resource parent document that the purpose of
providing the information is to improve the care of the child, not to benefit the
foster parent in deciding whether to accept the placement.

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      Two Pennsylvania cases and one federal district court case have

considered whether foster care records are protected from discovery in a

personal injury action. See V.B.T., S.M. v. Children and Youth Services

of Delaware County, 686 A.2d 872 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), and L.W. v.

Lackawanna County, 2015 WL 1499865 (M.D. Pa. 2015). None of these

cases resolves either of the above issues.

      In V.B.T., 728 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1999) the Supreme Court affirmed by Per

Curiam order based on this Court’s opinion that records of a foster child who

allegedly injured the plaintiff were protected from discovery in a personal

injury suit against the foster family agency and the foster parents of the

assailant. V.B.T., 705 A.2d at 1331-37. The Court ruled that the plaintiff’s

need for the documents and information did not overcome the statutory

privileges that applied in that case because the disclosure that was sought did

not further the aims of the statutes involved. Id. at 1334-37.

      The Court, however, did not hold or suggest that Section 3130.44 bars

discovery of foster care records. Rather, the records sought concerned the

assailant’s history of being a victim of abuse, and the privileges that the Court

held barred discovery were the Sexual Assault Counselor Privilege, 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 5945.1, the Protection from Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6117, the

Juvenile Act, and the Child Protective Services Law, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6385,

none of which had provisions permitting court-ordered disclosure without

limitation on the parties who may receive such disclosure. 705 A.2d at 1329-

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34 & nn.7, 9, & 12. The only mention of Section 3130.44 in V.B.T. consisted

of a citation to Section 3130.44(c) as authority for the proposition that foster

care agencies are required to disclose protected information to foster parents.

705 A.2d 1325, 1333-34 n.13.        Moreover, the Court in V.B.T. made no

determination as to the scope of the documents and information that were

protected from discovery by the statutory privileges that it addressed. Id. at

1329, 1330-33 nn. 8, 11, & 13.

      In S.M., the Commonwealth Court held that Section 3130.44 did not

protect a foster care case record from discovery in an action brought by the

foster child and his legal guardian and natural parents for injuries allegedly

inflicted by a former foster parent when he was in her home. S.M., 686 A.2d

at 873-76. The court held that Section 3130.44 did not prohibit the disclosure

that the plaintiffs in that case sought because the plaintiffs were parties who

were entitled to receive information from the foster care case record on

request under Section 3130.44(d). Id. at 875-76. A foster parent is not listed

in Section 3130.44(d) as a party entitled to receive information from a foster

care case record, and the right to receive information under Section

3130.44(d) is different from the provisions that permit a foster parent to

receive information, as Section 3130.44(d) requesters are entitled to the

information without limitation as to the need for or use of the information.

      The S.M. court did not address whether or under what circumstances a

court has a right to order disclosure under Section 3130.44(e). The S.M. court

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also held that Section 6339(b) of the Child Protective Services Law, which

governs the confidentiality of child abuse reports, did not prohibit the

disclosure because the Child Protective Services Law gave the abused child a

right to receive the documents upon written request. Id. at 875.

      In L.W., as in S.M., the foster child brought the action seeking

discovery, and the federal court held that the documents in question were not

protected from discovery because the plaintiff was statutorily entitled to the

documents upon written request. 2015 WL 1499865 at *2-*4. In addition,

the only privilege considered in L.W. was Section 6339(b) of the Child

Protective Services Law, not a claim that Section 3130.44 protected

documents or information from discovery, and the court only referenced

Section 3130.44 in passing as one of the bases for the decision in S.M. 2015

WL 1499865 at *2-*3 & n.1.

      One federal district decision, Dreibelbis v. Young, 2007 WL 9761596

(M.D. Pa. 2007), has considered whether Section 3130.44(e) permits court-

ordered discovery of records that are otherwise protected as confidential by

Section 3130.44.     In Dreibelbis, a suit alleging that the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were violated in a state child custody action, the court

denied discovery of case records on the ground that they were protected from

disclosure by Section 3130.44. 2007 WL 9761596 at *2. The court noted

that Section 3130.44(e) permits authorization of disclosure by court order and

stated that it “appears to create an exception for disclosure authorized by

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courts handling custody cases.”   Id. at *1 n.3.    The court concluded that

Section 3130.44(e) did not provide grounds to order the disclosure because

the case over which it was presiding was an ancillary action and not the

custody action itself. Id. at *1-*2 nn.3 and 5.

     The Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq., also bears on the present

issue. Section 6307(a) of the Juvenile Act provides:

     (a) General rule.--All files and records of the court in a
     proceeding under this chapter are open to inspection only
     by:

     (1) The judges, officers and professional staff of the court.

     (2) The parties to the proceeding and their counsel and
     representatives, but the persons in this category shall not be
     permitted to see reports revealing the names of confidential
     sources of information contained in social reports, except at the
     discretion of the court.

     (3) A public or private agency or institution providing supervision
     or having custody of the child under order of the court.

     (4) A court and its probation and other officials or professional
     staff and the attorney for the defendant for use in preparing a
     presentence report in a criminal case in which the defendant is
     convicted and who prior thereto had been a party to a proceeding
     under this chapter.

     (4.1) A court in determining custody, as provided in 23 Pa.C.S. §§
     5328 (relating to factors to consider when awarding custody) and
     5329.1 (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
     with protective services).

     (5) A judge or issuing authority for use in determining bail,
     provided that such inspection is limited to orders of delinquency
     adjudications and dispositions and petitions relating thereto,
     orders resulting from disposition review hearings and histories of
     bench warrants and escapes.

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      (6) The Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts.

      (6.1) The judges, officers and professional staff of courts of other
      jurisdictions when necessary for the discharge of their official
      duties.

      (6.2) Officials of the Department of Corrections or a State
      Correctional Institution or other penal institution to which an
      individual who was previously adjudicated delinquent in a
      proceeding under this chapter has been committed, but the
      persons in this category shall not be permitted to see reports
      revealing the names of confidential sources of information
      contained in social reports, except at the discretion of the court.

      (6.3) A parole board, court or county probation official in
      considering an individual’s parole or in exercising supervision over
      any individual who was previously adjudicated delinquent in a
      proceeding under this chapter, but the persons in this category
      shall not be permitted to see reports revealing the names of
      confidential sources of information contained in social reports,
      except at the discretion of the court.

      (6.4) The board for use in completing assessments.

      (6.5) The Department of Human Services for use in determining
      whether an individual named as the perpetrator of an indicated
      report of child abuse should be expunged from the Statewide
      database.

      (7) With leave of court, any other person or agency or
      institution having a legitimate interest in the proceedings
      or in the work of the unified judicial system.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6307(a) (emphasis added).

      The only category of persons to which disclosure is permitted under

Section 6307(a) that arguably could encompass a plaintiff in a personal injury

suit is Subsection (a)(7), supra. This Court held in V.B.T. that Subsection

(a)(7) permits disclosure only to a person who has direct involvement in the

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juvenile court proceeding or dependency proceedings as to which disclosure

is sought and that a plaintiff in a personal injury case is not such a party and

is barred by the Juvenile Act from discovery of juvenile court and dependency

proceeding records. 705 A.2d at 1331.5 The trial court’s conclusion that foster

parents—and therefore Gilyard—are persons “having a legitimate interest in

the proceedings,” Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/22, at 9, is therefore error.

       This does not, however, protect the entire foster care case record from

discovery. The Juvenile Act’s restriction on disclosure applies only to “files

and   records     of   the   court”   in   delinquency   proceedings,   dependency

proceedings, related proceedings involving other states, transfers from

criminal proceedings, and summary offense proceedings against a juvenile

relating to delinquency proceedings. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6303(a), 6307(a), (b).

Plaintiff’s request for documents concerning “medical history, mental health

diagnosis, general behaviors, relationships between [Johnson] and his

parents, educational history, life experiences, and previous and/or prospective

circumstances,” Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set I),

Requests Nos. 1-2, plainly encompasses at least some documents in

Appellants’ possession that are not court files or court records.          Indeed,

Appellants concede that the placement of a child in a foster home is not a

____________________________________________

5 Section 6307 of the Juvenile Act has been amended multiple times since
V.B.T. was decided. None of those amendments, however, changed the
language of Subsection (a)(7), see 705 A.2d at 1331 n.9, and none of the
additional categories of persons entitled to disclosure that have been added,
Subsections 4.1 and 6.1-6.5, have any possible applicability to Plaintiff.

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proceeding under the Juvenile Act and the Juvenile Act does not apply to all

the documents that Plaintiff sought. Appellants’ Brief at 39-40.

      In addition, Section 6307(b) of the Juvenile Act, which was added by

amendment after V.B.T. in 2006, permits public disclosure of limited

information if the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent for certain violent

criminal conduct committed when he was 14 or older. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6307(b).

If Johnson had any juvenile adjudications satisfying Section 6307(b)’s

requirements, the Juvenile Act would not bar disclosure of the “offenses

charged and the disposition of the case” and Johnson’s age at the time. 42

Pa.C.S. § 6307(b)(2).

      To the extent, therefore, that the trial court ruled that Johnson’s entire

foster care case record is not protected from discovery, we agree. It remains

for us to examine, however, whether the trial court erred in ordering

production of all the requested documents and ordering such production

without any confidentiality order.

      Defendants/Appellants argue that the trial court’s order is overbroad

because it required production of all documents and some of the documents

are protected from disclosure even if the foster care case record is not entirely

protected from discovery.      Specifically, they maintain that even if the

Administrator has a right to information from the case record based on

Gilyard’s status as a foster parent and regardless of whether the court has the

power to order disclosure in a personal injury action under Section

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3130.44(e), Section 3130.44(f) permits disclosure “only if the information

released does not contain material which … is protected or made confidential

by law.” 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44(f). Production therefore cannot be ordered

as to documents that are protected by other privileges. As discussed above,

any court files or court records from delinquency or dependency proceedings

that are in Defendants/Appellants’ possession are protected from discovery

except to the limited extent of disclosures permitted by Section 6307(b) of

the Juvenile Act. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6307(a), (b); V.B.T, 705 A.2d at 1331.

      Defendants/Appellants also argue that the foster care case record

contains    documents       protected    by     HIPAA       and   the     MHPA.

Defendants/Appellants’ contention that HIPAA bars the trial court from

ordering production of medical information concerning Johnson is without

merit. The HIPAA provision on which Defendants/Appellants rely, 45 C.F.R. §

164.508(a), applies only to health plans, health care clearinghouses, and

health care providers. 45 C.F.R. § 164.103, 164.500(a). In addition, HIPAA

permits disclosure of medical information in litigation in response to a

subpoena or discovery request where notice has been given to the patient, as

long as a protective order is in place that prohibits the parties from using or

disclosing the health information for any purpose other than the litigation and

requires the return or destruction of all copies of the health information at the

end of the litigation. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)-(v).

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      It is possible that some of the documents ordered produced are

protected by the MHPA. The MHPA protects mental health treatment records

from disclosure and is not limited to patient communications.     50 P.S. §

7111(a); M.M. v. L.M., 55 A.3d 1167, 1174 (Pa. Super. 2012). The MPHA,

however, applies only to involuntary treatment and voluntary inpatient

treatment. 50 P.S. § 7103; M.M., 55 A.3d at 1174. There is nothing in the

record from which it can be determined whether Defendants/Appellants’ files

concerning Johnson contain records from involuntary mental health treatment

and voluntary inpatient mental health treatment.

      In addition to requiring disclosure without regard to whether some

portions of Appellants’ documents are protected from disclosure by privileges

other than 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44, the trial court did not impose any

confidentiality order or restriction on the Administrator’s use of the

documents. While it does not appear that Defendants/Appellants specifically

requested a confidentiality order, the bases on which the discovery order can

be permissible under Section 3130.44 require that the production be subject

to a confidentiality order.

      Gilyard was not a person entitled to information from the foster care

case record under Section 3130.44(d) regardless of the purpose for which it

was to be used, and her right to obtain case record information as a foster

parent was subject to an obligation of confidentiality.   V.B.T, 705 A.2d at

1333-34 n.13.    Moreover, the overriding purpose of Section 3130.44 is to

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require that information from the foster care case record be treated as

confidential. 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44(a). The court’s authority under Section

3130.44(e) to order disclosure, therefore, should be construed in light of this

overriding confidentiality purpose and permit an order to produce documents

or information from the foster care case record only under an order keeping

those documents confidential.

      Accordingly, in the first appeal (under 2267 EDA 2021), we vacate and

remand to the trial court, which shall exclude Johnson’s juvenile court records

of delinquency and dependency proceedings, except for limited public

disclosure permitted by Section 6307(b) of the Juvenile Act, exclude Johnson’s

involuntary mental health treatment and voluntary inpatient mental health

treatment records, and require entry of a confidentiality order prior to

disclosure.

      In the second appeal (under 662 EDA 2022), the only claim of error that

Defendants/Appellants raise is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter

its January 31, 2022, order requiring Defendants/Appellants to provide full

and complete responses to the Administrator’s third set interrogatories other

than Interrogatories 12 and 14 and to produce the documents requested by

the third set document requests.

      Rule 1701 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

      (a) General rule.--Except as otherwise prescribed by these
      rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order
      is sought, the trial court or other government unit may no
      longer proceed further in the matter.

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      *           *           *

      (c) Limited to matters in dispute.--Where only a particular
      item, claim, or assessment adjudged in the matter is
      involved in an appeal, or in a petition for review proceeding
      relating to a quasijudicial order, the appeal or petition for review
      proceeding shall operate to prevent the trial court or other
      government unit from proceeding further with only such
      item, claim, or assessment, unless otherwise ordered by
      the trial court or other government unit or by the appellate
      court or a judge thereof as necessary to preserve the rights
      of the appellant.

Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a), (c) (emphasis added).       Accordingly, a collateral order

appeal divests the lower court of jurisdiction only as to the issue on appeal

and matters related to or intertwined with that issue. Commonwealth v.

McClure, 172 A.3d 668, 685, 698-99 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      As discussed, the first appeal was a collateral order appeal involving

only the trial court’s October 21, 2021, order that Defendants/Appellants

produce documents “that contain any information concerning Xavier Johnson’s

medical history, mental health diagnosis, general behaviors, relationships

between him and his parents, educational history, life experiences, and

previous and/or prospective circumstances.”      Trial Court Order, 10/21/21;

Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set I), Requests Nos. 1-2.

The trial court did not enter any order staying the action.

      The third set interrogatories and document requests that are the subject

of the trial court’s January 31, 2022, order do not request information or

documents concerning Johnson’s medical history, mental health diagnosis,

behaviors, relationships with parents, educational history, life experiences, or

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prospective circumstances. Rather, the interrogatories seek identification of

witnesses    (Interrogatories   1-5),    interviews   and   statements   obtained

concerning    the   action   (Interrogatories    6-7),   information   concerning

investigations conducted by Defendants/Appellants or others concerning

Johnson’s placement with Gilyard and Gilyard’s murder (Interrogatories 8-11),

information concerning statements of witnesses and parties (Interrogatory

13) and identification of admissions of a party and documents that

Defendants/Appellants intend to use at trial (Interrogatories 15 and 16).

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories (Set III) at 3-8. The document requests are limited

to the scope of these interrogatories, as they seek only documents that

Defendants/Appellants identify in their third set interrogatory answers.

Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set III) at 3.

      Defendants/Appellants argue that the discovery sought in the second

motion to compel involves the same privilege issues that are the subject of

the first appeal. Discovery that requests different information or documents

is closely intertwined with an appeal from a prior discovery order if it is subject

to the same privilege objection that is at issue in the pending appeal and the

issues as to the applicability of the privilege are the same. McClure, 172 A.3d

at 685. A court therefore lacks jurisdiction during the pendency of the appeal

to order further discovery that is subject to a privilege objection that is at

issue in a pending appeal if the issues as to the applicability of the privilege

are the same as in the appeal. Id.

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      Here, although the privilege that Defendants/Appellants asserted was

the same, whether it applied to the third set discovery involved additional,

different issues. In the first appeal, the discovery sought documents from

Defendants/Appellants’ foster care case record and the issue is whether

documents and information in the foster care case record are protected from

discovery. On the Administrator’s second motion to compel, the issues were

whether the third set discovery sought information and documents in the

foster care case record and, as to information and documents that are both in

the case record and available outside the case record, whether, assuming that

the case record is protected from discovery, the requested discovery was

within the scope of that protection. The trial court ordered the discovery, not

based on the privilege ruling that was on appeal, but on the ground that the

discovery did not seek information from the foster care case record. Trial

Court Opinion, 6/22/22, at 6.

      That conclusion is largely correct with respect to Interrogatories 6-11

and 13, as they appear to primarily seek information created after Gilyard was

murdered and Johnson was no longer in the foster care system, and

Interrogatories 15 and 16, which seek information concerning admissions of

the Administrator and books and magazines that Appellants intend to

introduce at trial. Plaintiff’s Interrogatories (Set III) at 5-8. It is possible,

however, that some information that those interrogatories seek could pre-date

the murder and be in or from the case record. Interrogatories 1-5, concerning

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identification of witnesses, appear to encompass information that could be

obtained both from the case record and from other sources and the

information and documents sought by Interrogatories 2(c), and 3-5 are likely

to include confidential case record information, some of which may not be

available from sources outside the case record.

      The mere fact that information available from non-privileged sources is

also in a file that is protected from discovery does not shield it from discovery.

Pasquini v. Fairmount Behavioral Health System, 230 A.3d 1190, 1197-

99 (Pa. Super. 2020) (MHPA did not apply to request for admission concerning

defendant’s knowledge of patient’s sex offender status even if that information

was in patient’s privileged file because that information was publicly available

information). But because the order required full responses, and some of the

interrogatories could include information that is only in the case record, the

order did compel discovery that involves the same issue as in the first appeal.

      Although this problem could have been avoided by limiting the required

responses to information and documents not obtained from the case record,

and it appears that the Administrator and the trial court at the hearing may

have intended to so limit the order, N.T., 1/26/22, at 6, 11-12, 25, other than

excluding two interrogatories that clearly sought information from the foster

care case record, Interrogatories 12 and 14, the order that the trial court

entered had no such limitation. Trial Court Order, 1/31/22. On this record,

we determine that the trial court had jurisdiction to order some of this

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discovery, but the overlap between the discovery order and the issue in the

first appeal creates a jurisdictional issue.

      Accordingly, in the second appeal (under 662 EDA) we vacate the order

and remand for further discovery proceedings to be conducted consistent with

this decision and without prejudice to Defendants/Appellants to raise

objections of admissibility.   In this regard, Defendants/Appellants shall file

with the trial court a detailed list of what documents and information it

possesses and which among that list it considers privileged. At the conclusion

of such proceedings, the trial court shall enter an order permitting the

Administrator to obtain the information and documents to which he is entitled.

      Orders vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

 Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/28/2023

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