Court Opinion

ID: 9566515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:40:20.682647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:12.357388
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, C. J.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, we should uphold the State Bar Court’s recommendation that petitioner be disbarred. Any lesser punishment for petitioner, convicted of drug dealing on a large scale, is both inadequate to protect the public and insufficient to deter similar offenses by petitioner and others.
According to the State Bar, the federal offenses of which petitioner was convicted involved the possession for sale of approximately 120,000 dosage units of LSD, and the interstate transportation of those drugs for sale. Petitioner played an active and willing role in the scheme, which was not an isolated occurrence but part of a pattern and practice by him to acquire and sell large quantities of illegal drugs (including heroin, cocaine and LSD) for *282personal gain. The State Bar observes that petitioner admitted engaging in at least eight such transactions over a two-year period.
In past cases, for the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession itself, we have disbarred attorneys who engaged in similar practices. (E.g., In re Giddens (1981) 30 Cal.3d 110, 115 [177 Cal.Rptr. 673, 635 P.2d 166] [conspiracy to distribute large quantities of amphetamines].) Disbarment is not, of course, a permanent condition—a disbarred attorney may apply for reinstatement within five years of his interim suspension. Thus, in the present case, petitioner may seek reinstatement as early as February 1988. But from the standpoint of protecting the public, the advantage of disbarment as opposed to a fixed period of suspension is that the burden will rest on petitioner, following the disbarment period, to demonstrate his rehabilitation and thereby establish his fitness to resume his law practice.
As we previously stated, rejecting a claim of rehabilitation by two disbarred attorneys convicted of grand theft and forgery, “evidence of any rehabilitation will be more persuasive if offered during any reinstatement proceedings after disbarment. At that time petitioners may be able to show by sustained exemplary conduct over an extended period of time that they have reattained the standard of fitness to practice law.” (In re Petty (1981) 29 Cal.3d 356, 362 [173 Cal.Rptr. 461, 627 P.2d 191].) We relied on Petty in disbarring the drug-dealing attorney in Giddens, supra.
The majority, pointing to the considerable mitigating evidence and “testimonials” marshalled by petitioner, suggests that the State Bar has had adequate time since petitioner’s suspension in which to evaluate his rehabilitation, and that no purpose is served in waiting a few more months to undertake that evaluation in the context of an application for reinstatement. This analysis appears to miss the point: The State Bar has concluded that petitioner should be disbarred, i.e., that thus far he has not adequately demonstrated his rehabilitation. As the State Bar observes, petitioner’s testimonials regarding his rehabilitative efforts cover only the two-year period following his release from federal custody. Petitioner must therefore await the passage of a more substantial period of time before seeking readmission to practice.
Petitioner had the burden of demonstrating that the State Bar’s disbarment recommendation is erroneous. (E.g., In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395, 399-400 [182 Cal.Rptr. 640, 644 P.2d 833, 26 A.L.R.4th 1077].) In my view, no such error has been demonstrated. Accordingly, I would accept the State Bar’s recommendation and disbar petitioner.
On March 3, 1988, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.