Court Opinion

ID: 9635457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:50:59.276288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:29:15.022204
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, Judge,
dissenting:
Since, unlike my colleagues, I do not perceive such reflections of equity or of contract law or of protection against double jeopardy that would serve to bar prosecution of appellant by the Commonwealth, I most respectfully dissent.
Appellant was arrested on November 18, 1981, at the scene of a motor vehicle accident after he failed a field sobriety test and registered 0.22% on a breathlyzer. As a result, he was charged with violation of Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. Soon after his preliminary hearing in January, 1982, appellant received the following letter:

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Appellant a few days thereafter received the following further letter concerning the offense with which he was charged:

*535

Appellant completed the questionnaire enclosed with this letter of January 25 and returned it personally to the Office of the District Attorney on February 1, 1982, just hours prior to attending the first of the four safe driving classes he would eventually attend.
Appellant was thereafter notified by letter on February 25, 1982, that his application for the ARD program had been denied due to two prior convictions in Philadelphia. Appellant entered a not guilty plea on March 2, 1982, and then retained counsel for institution of the proceedings at issue.
The lead opinion finds that principles of double jeopardy preclude prosecution. Jeopardy had, however, in my view, never attached. The concurring opinion finds that principles of contract law and fairness preclude prosecution but I am unable to agree.
While appellant attended four two and one-half hour driving clinic classes, for which he was charged $50.00, he had been made aware before he attended even the first class, by the letter of January 25 from the District Attorney, that he had not been admitted to the ARD program since it was necessary to first complete two procedures, specifically, appellant had to complete an application for inclusion in the program and the District Attorney had to *536determine whether appellant was eligible for the program. The letter made clear that if appellant filed the application, “[t]he matter will then be carefully reviewed and a final determination made, of which you will be notified.”
Twenty-five days after appellant submitted his application, he was notified of his ineligibility for the program. The only hardship occasioned as a result of the confusion by the initial letter of January 18, 1982, was appellant’s attendance at four safe driving classes and the payment of a $50.00 fee. While under certain circumstances principles of fairness might operate to preclude prosecution, the facts of the instant case do not compel such a conclusion. I, therefore, dissent.