Court Opinion

ID: 9579317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:53:51.019352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:26.889547
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. I do not agree to the majority opinion as written, nor to the judgment of affirmance, although under my view of this case, the judgment would be affirmed in part and reversed in part. I therefore dissent, and state my views as follows:
1. The refusal to-'dismiss the third-party complaint was not error, as a defendant in an action at law now has the right to have other parties named as third-parties defendant, and brought into the case, upon his contention that such third-parties are liable for all or a part of the damages sought against him. See § 14, CPA (Code Ann. § 81A-114; Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 627; 1969, p. 979); Bill Heard. *188Chevrolet Co. v. G. M. A. C., 120 Ga. App. 328, 330 (170 SE2d 454); Ins. Co. of N. America v. Atlas Supply & Co., 121 Ga. App. 1, 4 (172 SE2d 632).
2. I next consider plaintiff’s prayer in the alternative, seeking to make a third-party defendant of Koch’s liability insurer, if her other motions were denied. This is a very grave question. The law was plainly spelled out prior to the adoption of the new Civil Practice Act of 1966, as amended, effective September 1, 1967, that insurance could npt be mentioned. See National Fire Ins. Co. v. Grace, 106 Ga. 264 (32 SE 100); Fields v. Continental Ins. Co. of N. Y., 170 Ga. 28 (152 SE 60); O’Neill Mfg. Co. v. Pruitt, 110 Ga. 577, 578 (36 SE 59); Sims v. Martin, 33 Ga. App. 486 (1, 2) (126 SE 872); Heinz v. Backus, 34 Ga. App. 203 (2) (128 SE 915); Decatur Chevrolet Co. v. White, 51 Ga. App. 362, 363 (180 SE 377); Minnick v. Jackson, 64 Ga. App. 554, 560 (13 SE2d 891); Westbrook v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 299, 302 (147 SE2d 819); Walker v. General Ins. Co., 214 Ga. 758, 761 (107 SE2d 836).
But the Civil Practice Act made many radical changes in our pleading and practice, and one of these is to be found in the following statute (§ 14 (b) CPA; Code Ann. § 81A-114 (b), supra), to wit: "When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this section would entitle a defendent to do so.” (Emphasis supplied.)
When may a defendant cause a. third-party to be brought in? The answer lies in the first part of this section of the Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. § 81A-114 (a), supra), to wit: "At any time after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is, or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him. ” (Emphasis supplied.)
This language is clear, cogent and convincing; it is not susceptible of any construction except that a defendant who is sued in an automobile injury case may bring his own liability insurer into the case should he so desire, because *189said insurer "is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him.”
Of course, ordinarily a defendant would not wish to bring his own insurer into the case, as there seems to be a general feeling prevalent that knowledge by the jury that a defendant is insured might increase the amount of damages, or make the jury more readily decide the question of liability against the defendant. (The writer is not in wholehearted agreement with that feeling). But whether the defendant wishes to bring his insurer in or not, this language clearly gives him the right to do so; and the plaintiff’s rights are measured by the rights of defendant, as Code Ann. §81A-114 (b) clearly states that if a countersuit is filed against plaintiff, then he "may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this section would entitle a defendant to do so.”
Thus, both the right of plaintiff and the -right of defendant to bring in a third party are measured by the same statute, to wit: Code Ann. § 81A-114. If the defendant can do it, the plaintiff can do it. This is so foreign to the present trend of authorities in Georgia, that it seems like heresy or sacrilege to suggest that a plaintiff can bring the defendant’s liability insurer into the case, if the defendant makes the mistake of asserting a counterclaim against plaintiff. But it must also be remembered that there is at present a trend in Georgia to go all out in following Federal practice and procedure. Our new Civil Practice Act was modeled in large part after the Federal law. So we turn to Federal authorities for their construction of the above statute, and in particular as to the right to bring an insurance company into a- tort action. In the case of Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 FSupp. 413 (D.C. Md.) it was squarely held that a defendant in a personal injury action may bring in his own liability insurer as a third-party defendant, but not the insurer of his co-defendant. This case was decided in 1939, before the 1948 amendment to Federal Rule 14, in which "plaintiff” was eliminated, leaving the right of bringing such third party defendant solely to defendant. (See Lester, *190supra, p. 800). But in the Tullgren case, defendant (not the plaintiff) is the one who brought in his own liability insurer, so we are not bothered or concerned by the change in the law in 1948. And, we repeat, our own Georgia statute, to wit,' Code Ann. §81A-114 (b), allows the plaintiff to bring in a third-party defendant "under circumstances which under this section would entitle the defendant to do so.” The Tullgren case, supra, has been cited in Federal appellate cases may times. It has not been overruled. Since the Georgia statute is patterned after the Federal statute, decisions by Federal courts, including District courts, are highly persuasive, through not absolutely binding, on this court. Ivester v. Gordon, 75 Ga. App. 207, 209 (42 SE2d 785); Morgan v. Limbaugh, 75 Ga. App. 663, 666 (44 SE2d 394).
There is nothing in Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794, 801 (165 SE2d 587) contrary to the above finding. That case on this point, ■ simply holds that: "... as the rule how reads, only a person who is secondarily liable to the original defendant may be brought in as a third-party defendant—as in case of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or warranty.” (Emphasis supplied.) That is exactly what is done here, that is, the insurer who is secondarily liable to defendant, as an indemnitor, is brbught in as a .third-party defendant. If the defendant is found not liable, there is no liability againist the insurer; if he is found liable, then the secondary liability of the insurer immediately becomes operative.
In Ins. Co. of North America v. Atlas Supply Co., 121 Ga. App. 1, 4, supra, this court allowed the impleading of a bank because of its secondary liability, and ably expounded the law with reference to this question and stated that: "A court should liberally construe the impleader provisions, to avoid multiplicity of actions, etc.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Bill Heard Chevrolet Co. v. G. M. A. C., 120 Ga. App. 328, 330, supra, this law is discussed, and the third-party defendant was dismissed because there was no secondary *191or other liability shown against said defendant.
I would reverse the court for denying plaintiff’s motion to add a third-party defendant alternatively.