Court Opinion

ID: 9524981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:58:56.934208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:28.165157
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff has filed a petition for rehearing, asserting that, in accord with Lee v. Illinois (1986), 476 U.S. 530, 90 L. Ed. 2d 514, 106 S. Ct. 2056, and Gibson v. Illinois (1986), 476 U.S. 1167, 90 L. Ed. 2d 974, 106 S. Ct. 2886, this court must determine: (1) whether the record shows that there was an independent basis for the admission of the codefendants’ statements under the “sufficient indicia of reliability” test; and (2) even assuming that this court finds the indicia of reliability insufficient, whether the admission of the codefendants’ statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In the original opinion in this case, this court cited People v. Lincoln (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 700, 510 N.E.2d 1026, in which the defendant’s conviction was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial where the trial court denied severance based on grounds subsequently rejected in Cruz v. New York (1987), 481 U.S. 186, 95 L. Ed. 2d 162, 107 S. Ct. 1714. The appellate court in Lincoln held that at the new trial, the State would be required to show an independent basis for admitting the codefendants’ statements, which incriminated the defendant. Plaintiff asserts in its petition for rehearing that contrary to the directive in Lincoln, the question of whether there is an independent basis for the admission of the codefendants’ confessions is one for the appellate court to determine rather than the trial court upon remand. Plaintiff cites Gibson v. Illinois (1987), 476 U.S. 1167, 90 L. Ed. 2d 974, 106 S. Ct. 2886, in which the Supreme Court directed that remandment be made to the Illinois Appellate Court for further consideration in view of the recently filed decision in Lee v. Illinois (1986), 476 U.S. 530, 90 L. Ed. 2d 514, 106 S. Ct. 2056. On remandment from the Supreme Court, the appellate court in People v. Gibson (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 459, 509 N.E.2d 563, found that the defendant’s confession had sufficient “indicia of reliability” to meet the Lee requirement. The court’s decision upholding the defendant’s conviction was based, however, on the court’s finding that admission of the codefendants’ statements was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Gibson, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 464. Similarly, in People v. Mahaffey (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 388, People v. Smith (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 94, 526 N.E.2d 849, and People v. Dixon (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 959, 523 N.E.2d 1160, the supreme and appellate courts of this State have applied the analysis set forth in Cruz and Lee based on the records before them, rather than remanding the cases to the trial court for those determinations. Accordingly, in the instant case we will address the questions raised in Lee and Cruz before remanding this case for further proceedings.  In the instant case, while the confessions of the codefendants “interlock” with regard to many of the actions that took place, the statements differ regarding the participation of each defendant in those actions. For instance, Ellis stated that Collins tackled the victim and raped her while Ellis put a belt around her neck. Cantre stated that Ellis strangled the victim. Cantre stated that Collins stood over the victim and that he saw Collins zipping up his pants. Ellis stated that while he and Collins were with the victim, Cantre looked through the victim’s purse. Collins stated that he looked through the victim’s belongings, while Cantre stated that he checked the victim’s dresser while the other defendants were with the victim. The defendants thus “pointed the finger” at their codefendants with regard to participation in certain of the acts. In addition, we must consider the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statements. The defendants provided oral statements'to the police upon being questioned. Defendants Collins and Cantre were arrested after being implicated in the offenses by defendant Ellis. Defendant Collins helped police to locate defendant Cantre, and identified Cantre as “Skoony,” the person to whom Ellis referred in his statement to the police. Each defendant knew that the others were being held and questioned by police.  Further, there was limited corroborating evidence. While the State presented evidence that a woman named Doris McCummit had observed Collins, “Skoony,” and a third person near the victim’s home, the defense presented evidence that there was no Doris Mc-Cummit living at the address McCummit allegedly gave police. Further, all three defendants presented alibi evidence at trial, thereby denying the truth of the pretrial statements. Our review of the record as a whole fails to show that the statements of the nontestifying codefendants had sufficient independent “indicia of reliability” to withstand the presumption that a codefendant’s statement implicating a defendant is unreliable and that, absent the opportunity for cross-examination, its admission against the defendant violates the confrontation clause. See Lee, 476 U.S. 530, 90 L. Ed. 2d 514, 106 S. Ct. 2056; Cruz, 481 U.S. 186, 95 L. Ed. 2d 162, 107 S. Ct. 1714; People v. Dixon (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 959, 523 N.E.2d 1160. Further, we find that even in view of a violation of the confrontation clause, admission of the codefendants’ statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Lee, 476 U.S. 530, 547, 90 L. Ed 2d 514, 530, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2065-66.) The evidence against the defendants included the police testimony regarding their investigation and the transcribed confessions of the defendants. Each of the defendants, however, presented alibi evidence in his defense at trial. Further, the defense impeached the State’s evidence, given through the testimony of a police officer, that Doris McCummit saw Collins, “Skoony,” and a third person run out from the victim’s yard. There were no other eyewitnesses and the victim was unavailable. In view of the evidence provided, and the limited amount of evidence corroborating the defendants’ confessions, we must conclude that the admission of the codefendants’ statements was prejudicial to each of the other defendants, such that their admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the foregoing reasons, we adhere to judgment previously entered by this court in the instant cause. McNAMARA* and RIZZI, JJ., concur.   Justice McNamara participated in the decision of this appeal prior to his assignment to the sixth division.