Court Opinion

ID: 9782871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:26:53.654464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:15.536699
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MURPHY, specially concurring: I concur with the majority’s ultimate conclusion in this case but write separately because I take a broader view of the case law regarding corpus delicti and the corroboration rule. Quite simply, I believe that Sargent and Salinas may be reconciled and that the case law requires that the evidence presented in corroboration must tend to show the crime was committed, not prove every element. From the record presented, it is difficult to find a direct question and answer during the interview and testimony of the victim concerning whether defendant inserted his finger and penetrated, “however slight[ly],” the victim’s vagina. However, I concur because there was testimony that the victim responded “outside” one time when she may have been asked whether she was touched inside or outside her private part. This was consistent with her other statements that she was touched on or outside her private area and sufficiently raises doubt of whether there was penetration. Detective Faraday could not recall the specific question of whether the victim was touched inside or outside her private area, but noted several times that question normally “would be a part of the questioning.” Faraday’s recollection was refreshed and she stated her notes indicated “hand go inside or outside of private” and the victim stated “I felt it outside.” While there is no evidence of a specific denial, I agree the record sufficiently supports the concerns outlined by the majority that led to the creation of the corroboration rule. For the purposes of this case, this testimony acts essentially as a denial of the key element of penetration. I agree with the majority that the element of penetration is obviously not an immutable characteristic such as the age of a defendant as explained in Dalton and we must consider the corpus delicti rule. Unlike the majority, I believe that Sargent and Salinas may be reconciled. There is no dispute that it is well established that proof of the corpus delicti may not rest exclusively on the extrajudicial confession, admission, or other statement of the defendant. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 183 (2010) (citing People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d 434, 446 (1990)). However, the Furby court noted that the rule does not require absolute corroboration, but requires that “the prosecution must present evidence aliunde the defendant’s confession that tends to show the commission of the offense and is corroborative of the circumstances related in the statement.” Furby, 138 Ill. 2d at 446. Accordingly, the corroborative evidence “ ‘need not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense did occur.’ ” Furby, 138 Ill. 2d at 446 (quoting People v. Willingham, 89 Ill. 2d 352, 361 (1982)). In fact, the majority includes the language used by the Sargent court noting that “where a defendant confesses to multiple offenses, the corroboration rule requires that there be independent evidence tending to show that defendant committed each of the offenses for which he was convicted” and “[tjhere may be circumstances where criminal activity of one type is so closely related to criminal activity of another type that corroboration of one may suffice to corroborate the other.” Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 185. Unlike this case, in Sargent, the defendant was convicted of multiple counts of PCSA and ACSA for placing his finger in the anus of both his minor stepsons, M.G. and J.W., and for fondling the penis of M.G. for the purpose of his own sexual gratification. The statements by the minor children only corroborated the defendant’s confession that he inserted his finger into the anus of the first stepson. At trial, M.G. testified that he did not remember the defendant doing anything that he did not like, but his extrajudicial statements included allegations that defendant “put his finger in [my] butt.” Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 171. J.W.’s extrajudicial statements included allegations that the defendant regularly “tried to put his penis in my butt,” but that he had not been touched in any other way. At trial, J.W. testified that defendant had been successful in his attempts to insert his penis in his anus. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 174. The court rejected the State’s argument that J.W.’s corroboration and the evidence of the defendant’s insertion of his finger into M.G.’s anus were sufficient proof that the defendant also fondled M.G.’s penis. These were separate acts which gave rise to separate charges and where a defendant confesses to multiple offenses, the corroboration rule requires independent evidence of each offense. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 185. The court concluded that there was evidence that the defendant penetrated M.G.’s anus on one occasion and this only supported the one conviction for PCSA and the other convictions were reversed. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 187. The majority applies that holding to this case in requiring corroboration on all elements. In doing so, it rejects the State’s citation to People v. Salinas, 347 Ill. App. 3d 867, 881 (2004), and that court’s holding that case law requires only a showing that “ ‘a’ ” crime occurred and it need not be the specific crime for which the defendant is charged. Salinas, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 881 (quoting People v. Holmes, 67 Ill. 2d 236, 240 (1977)). It also rejects that court’s holding that where independent evidence proves an offense occurred, then those facts corroborative of the confession “ ‘may be considered along with the confession in establishing the corpus delicti.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Salinas, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 882 (quoting Willingham, 89 Ill. 2d at 361). The majority reasons that if Salinas’ statement of the corroboration rule is correct, our supreme court decided Sargent wrongly. Therefore, the majority rejects the State’s argument that in this case the evidence presented corroborated defendant’s statement that he touched J.O.’s vagina and that evidence is so closely related to the penetration issue, that it served to corroborate that portion of his statement. In Salinas, the defendant was convicted of two counts of solicitation of murder for hire. The defendant argued that the State failed to corroborate his confession and prove the corpus delicti. Unlike Sargent, where there was no corroborating evidence to the defendant’s statement that he touched the victim’s penis, in Salinas, there was “a great deal of evidence that corroborates the confession” to prove the corpus delicti. Salinas, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 882. Accordingly, the Salinas court considered the various pieces of evidence with the confession and the conviction was affirmed. In the instant matter, there was not complete corroboration of defendant’s statement that he penetrated J.O.’s vagina with his finger, while I would not find this fatal on its own, as in Sargent, there is testimony of record that J.O. indicated that she only felt defendant’s finger on her private area. J.O.’s out-of-court statements and testimony and the testimony of Pagan and Cordero were consistent and consistent between the two incidents. Defendant did indicate that the victim was asleep when he touched her the first time, and one could parse words that the victim only stated “I felt it outside,” leaving open the question of whether penetration occurred while she slept. However, since the record does not provide an answer to that question, but does contain the victim’s consistent statements that she was touched outside or on her private area, I must concur with the ultimate finding here. But for that evidence, I cannot think of a better situation to apply the Sargent court’s statement that there “may be circumstances where criminal activity of one type is so closely related to criminal activity of another type that corroboration of one may suffice to corroborate the other.” Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 185. Sargent does not abandon the long-standing language that independent evidence must tend to show the crime did occur and that if the confession is corroborated, the confession and corroborating evidence may be considered together to determine whether there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I fear that requiring evidence of every element may essentially flip the corroboration rule on its head — requiring the independent evidence include every element of the crime in order to use the confession. Essentially, this would make the confession corroboration for the victim’s testimony, thereby requiring the State to prove the crime twice over, a vexing proposition given the very nature of PCSA and available evidence. Of course, the contrary concern of allowing an improper confession in as evidence with insufficient investigation or evidence raises other serious concerns. While an understandable reading of the discussion in Sargent, I fear that this opinion will provide further confusion for underlying courts considering this issue. Unfortunately, if read too strictly, I fear this may require the prosecution to prove its case two times over. Accordingly, I believe the holding in this case should be limited to situations where evidence such as the testimony of a victim specifically denies or rejects an element at issue.