Court Opinion

ID: 9398877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 16:03:19.501673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:37.228560
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14098    Document: 19-1     Date Filed: 06/01/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14098
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       SANDRA J. STATEN,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       DR HORTON INC.,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-01178-AMM
                          ____________________
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                        22-14098

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Sandra Staten, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district
       court’s dismissal of her complaint alleging fraud, bad faith, and un-
       just enrichment against D.R. Horton, Inc. In response, D.R. Hor-
       ton moved for summary affirmance of the district court’s order,
       and Staten responded by moving for summary reversal of the or-
       der. After careful review, we grant D.R. Horton’s motion for sum-
       mary affirmance and deny Staten’s motion for summary reversal.
              Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
       the essence, like in “situations where important public policy issues
       are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,” or
       where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter
       of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out-
       come of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the ap-
       peal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,
       1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1 A motion for summary affirmance postpones
       the due date for the filing of any remaining brief until our Court
       rules on the motion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).
             We review a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
       de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and

       1In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
       adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October
       1, 1981.
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       22-14098               Opinion of the Court                          3

       construing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
       party, here the plaintiff. Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th
       Cir. 2019). We also review de novo the district court’s determina-
       tion of its own subject matter jurisdiction. Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v.
       APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005). We review
       for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for a default judg-
       ment. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309,
       1316 (11th Cir. 2002). And we review the denial of a motion for
       reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Corwin v. Walt Disney Co.,
       475 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007).
               Federal courts exercise limited jurisdiction and generally can
       only hear actions that involve a federal question or meet the re-
       quirements for diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332; Tay-
       lor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994). A district court
       has jurisdiction over a civil matter where the amount in contro-
       versy exceeds $75,000, and is between “citizens of different States.”
       28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
       “[c]itizenship is equivalent to domicile.” McCormick v. Aderholt,
       293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). Corpo-
       rations are “citizens” for diversity purposes wherever they are in-
       corporated and have their principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. §
       1332(c)(1); Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330,
       1346 (11th Cir. 2011).
               Because diversity jurisdiction is measured when an action is
       filed, events occurring after the filing of an action cannot create or
       destroy diversity jurisdiction. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp.,
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-14098

       L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 575–76 (2004) (holding that, if complete diversity
       of citizens did not exist at the time of filing, subsequent events, like
       a change in the domicile of a party will not create diversity jurisdic-
       tion); PTA-FLA, Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc., 844 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir.
       2016) (explaining diversity of citizenship, or domicile, must exist at
       the time the action is filed in order to be proper); Wright Transpor-
       tation, Inc. v. Pilot Corp., 841 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting
       that diversity jurisdiction “is not destroyed by post-filing changes
       to party citizenship”).
              A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. Fortner v.
       Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 1993). Under Fed. R. Civ. P.
       55(a), a court may enter a default judgment against a party when
       the party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend” the claims
       against that party. However, the entry of a default judgment “is a
       drastic remedy which should be used only in extreme situations.”
       Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985). We’ve held
       that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a
       motion for a default judgment when the defendant filed a motion
       to dismiss “a short time after the deadline for responsive plead-
       ings.” Mitchell, 294 F.3d at 1317.
               “We hold the allegations of a pro se complaint to less strin-
       gent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Campbell
       v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). “[I]ssues
       not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned,”
       and “we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro
       se litigant’s reply brief.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th
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       22-14098               Opinion of the Court                          5

       Cir. 2008). An appellant forfeits a claim when she either makes
       only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner
       without supporting arguments and authority. Sapuppo v. Allstate
       Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United
       States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (hold-
       ing that issues not properly presented on appeal are deemed for-
       feited and will not be addressed absent extraordinary circum-
       stances), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022). Further, “[t]o obtain re-
       versal of a district court judgment that is based on multiple, inde-
       pendent grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated
       ground for the judgment against [her] is incorrect.” Sapuppo, 739
       F.3d at 680. “When an appellant fails to challenge properly on ap-
       peal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judg-
       ment, [s]he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that
       ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Id.
               Here, D.R. Horton is entitled to summary affirmance of the
       district court’s dismissal of Staten’s amended complaint because
       she has not challenged on appeal each of the district court’s inde-
       pendent, alternative grounds for dismissal on that basis. Groendyke
       Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162; Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680. Even liberally
       construed, Staten fails to challenge the district court’s determina-
       tion that she did not adequately plead her claim in Count One for
       fraud in conformity with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), so she has abandoned
       the issue. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Similarly, Staten fails to ar-
       gue on appeal that the district court erred by dismissing her
       amended complaint for failure to state a claim for bad faith in
       Count Two and unjust enrichment in Count Three. Id. Because
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14098

       she has abandoned these issues, the district court order dismissing
       her claims is due to be affirmed. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
              Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion
       when it denied Staten’s motions for entry of default judgment
       against D.R. Horton. Mitchell, 294 F.3d at 1316. The district court
       properly denied Staten’s motions because, at the time that she filed
       them, D.R. Horton’s time to file a responsive pleading had not yet
       elapsed. Although D.R. Horton subsequently failed to timely an-
       swer Staten’s amended complaint, Staten did not file another mo-
       tion for an entry for default judgment at that time. In any event,
       although Staten is correct that a motion to dismiss is not a respon-
       sive pleading, D.R. Horton did not “fail[] to plead or otherwise de-
       fend” itself against Staten’s claims because it filed a motion to dis-
       miss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ. P.
       55(a); Fortner, 983 F.2d at 1032. Nor has Staten shown that she was
       entitled to the drastic remedy of default judgment. Wahl, 773 F.2d
       at 1174. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order denying her
       motions for entry of default judgment against D.R. Horton.
               As for Staten’s argument on appeal that the district court
       lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case because she moved
       to Alabama after D.R. Horton removed the case from the Alabama
       state court to the federal district court, we disagree. When Staten
       filed her complaint in the Alabama state court, she noted that she
       was domiciled in Detroit, Michigan, and D.R. Horton was domi-
       ciled in Arlington, Texas. Whether Staten lived in Michigan or Al-
       abama when D.R. Horton removed the case to federal court does
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       22-14098              Opinion of the Court                        7

       not affect the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over her
       case. This is because, at all times, D.R. Horton was incorporated
       in Delaware and its principal place of business was Arlington,
       Texas, both of which are diverse from Michigan and Alabama. 28
       U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at
       1346. Thus, the parties were diverse, and the district court had di-
       versity jurisdiction over Staten’s action. McCormick, 293 F.3d at
       1257.
            Accordingly, we GRANT D.R. Horton’s motion for sum-
       mary affirmance of the district court’s dismissal of Staten’s pro se
       complaint and DENY Staten’s motion for summary reversal.
             AFFIRMED.