Court Opinion

ID: 9733511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:09:30.350723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:42.124351
License: Public Domain

SHINN, P. J.
I dissent.
I cannot agree to an interpretation of the will which would defeat the purposes of the testator as I understand them. It is clear to me that the purpose of Warner, Sr., was that there should vest in his son interests in the trust estate as to one-fourth thereof if he survived distribution to the trustees, one-fourth thereof five years thereafter and one-fourth ten years thereafter. This purpose should not be defeated by mere vagueness or ineptitude of expression.
I take it that one who has given to another the right to take and use for himself specific property without restriction or limitation has given the latter that property. Certainly no one could have taken away the right of Warner, Jr., to take and use the interest as he saw fit. The direction to the trustees that they should pay over and distribute to the son portions of the fund, which would include the whole of it until it was exhausted, was superfluous. They would have had that duty anyway. I construe this direction as mere legal tautology and not in any sense a condition to the vesting of ownership. Although one may have full ownership of property he may not be entitled to possession until he has demanded it; but the right to immediate possession should not be confused with ownership.
I cannot permit the unfortunate use of unnecessary and meaningless language to influence my belief as to the intentions of the testator. I believe there were conditions attached, namely, that as to one-quarter interest, the son should survive distribution to the trustees, and that as to the other quarter interests, it was not intended that title should vest unless the son should be living at the respective dates, namely, five years and ten years after distribution.
The son's interest was an entire present ownership from *860the time of distribution, unless it was subject to some clearly-expressed restriction or limitation. If the testator had desired that there should be less than absolute ownership he would have expressed that desire in his will. A customary method is to permit the withdrawal of portions of the corpus of trust property in stated circumstances, or for particular purposes, or in the discretion of the trustee. The statement that the trustees should pay over and distribute whatever of the share was demanded was clearly not one which qualified or was intended to qualify the son’s complete ownership.
If the son’s ownership came into existence only with the duties of the trustees to pay over and distribute to him upon his demand and as a result of a demand then I say that neither in law nor equity should his right be forfeited by the absence of a demand for its enforcement, when such a demand would have been utterly useless and ineffective. To say that the son and his estate lost all interest in the fund because he did not demand of the trustees something that they were restrained from doing, and could not do, is as unreasonable as it is unjust.
Although I do not agree that the vesting of the one-fourth interest was conditioned upon the making of a demand, I do believe that as between the son and the trust estate whatever was necessary, if indeed anything was necessary, should be regarded as having been done when nothing whatever remained to be done except to make a demand which could not be complied with. (Allan v. Guaranty Oil Co., 176 Cal. 421 [168 P. 884]; Prichard v. Kimball, 190 Cal. 757 [214 P. 863] ; 1 Cal.Jur.2d 605-606.)
I do not find support for the majority view in the provision that upon the death of the son one-fourth (the final one-fourth) of the trust should go to his then living issue “and that the residue of said fund shall go to augment and become a part of trust fund No. 3.” As I have previously stated, it is my view that the son would have to survive distribution for the respective periods of five and ten years before he would be vested with the interests which would be distributable to him at those times. In the event of his earlier death these shares would represent “the residue of said fund” that would go into trust fund Number 3.
Finally, I am of the opinion that the cases relied upon by the majority for their interpretation of the will do not support it. Constructions placed by other courts upon wills containing patently different testamentary schemes, expressed in different *861phraseology, do not aid me in the interpretation of Mr. Warner’s will.
I would affirm the order and decree.
Respondents' petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 13,1960.