Court Opinion

ID: 9774968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:39:48.880848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:18.295145
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Appellants have prepared and have requested that we adopt about twenty-six suggested additional findings of fact. Some of the -proposed findings are undisputed and we see no need for enlarging this opinion by a detailed enumeration of them. However in the hope that it may be of some assistance in clarifying the situation, we make the following additional findings and conclusions :
(1) The maximum space appellants are permitted to cover with structures under the Zoning Ordinance of the Town of Highland Park is 5,603 square feet.
(2) The following structures on the premises occupied the number of square feet of space shown:
Structure • Square feet
Residence 2,439
Porte-cochere 592
S. S. Miramar 1,028.
Bridge from house to ship 210'
Structure over swimming pool 1,225'
Bath house west of pool 165
Bamboo room east of pool 132
Enclosed driveway structure 540
Shed 584
Patios 891.75
Old garage and tool shed 1,000
Total 8,896.75.
(3) All of the above structures were on the premises in 1941 except the shed containing 584 square feet, the driveway structure of 540 square feet and the patios containing 981.75 square feet. Deducting the-area of these last three structures leaves. 6,791 square feet covered by structures on. the premises in 1941.
(4) The old garage and tool house were-removed in 1951, so that its square footage of 1,000 feet must be deducted from the: *279■8,896.75 total square feet shown in paragraph 2 above, leaving 7,896,75 square feet as the space covered by structures at the time of the trial.
(5) The structures described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h) of the trial court’s judgment violated sec. ■8 — (1) and (3) of the Town’s zoning ordinance.
(6) The shed referred'to in paragraph (j) of the trial court’s judgment violated sec. 8-(3); sec. 3-B-(l); sec. 12-(3) and sec. 8-7 of the Town’s zoning ordinance.
(7) The structures referred to in paragraphs (1) and (m) of the trial court’s judgment violated sec. 3-A-(l) and 8; and sec. 3-B-(2), (3) and (4) of the Town’s zoning ordinance.
(8) The porte-cochere, referred to in paragraph (g) of the court’s judgment was ordered removed by order of the Town’s Board of Adjustment, and appellants did not appeal from such order as provided in Art. lOllg, V.A.C.S.
(9) The structure known as the “S. S. Miramar” referred to in paragraph (k) of the trial court’s judgment violates sec. 3-A (structural design) and B (permissible outhouses) of the Town’s zoning ordinance.
Appellants say that sec. 3-A of the zoning ordinance is merely a limitation on the use of property and since they discontinued the illegal use of the “S. S. Miramar” in 1942, there is no violation of the zoning law.
We do not agree with appellants’ interpretation of the ordinance. We quote from the ordinance: “In a single family Dwelling District a building shall be used for the following but only the following purposes and every building erected or structurally altered shall be designed and arranged to be used, and thereby made adaptable to use, for only the following purposes.” (Emphasis supplied.) The “S. S. Miramar” is not structurally designed or adapted to use as a single family dwelling. It was designed and structurally suitable only for commercial purposes as a club room, museum, etc. That its design and structure is such is evidenced by appellants’ own printed announcement, which stated that the structure "could accommodate hundreds of persons and was available for private parties. Interested persons were invited to make arrangements with the purser, whose name and phone number were given in the announcement. Moreover appellants sought but were refused permission to use the structure as a club house for a proposed “International Club.”
Appellants pled the Town’s Ordinance No. 293, the zoning ordinance enacted July 3, 1929 “with amendments thereto.” This ordinance was amended May 15, 1936 by Ordinance No. 377 and on August 6, 1945 by Ordinance No. 463. Neither Ordinance No. 377 nor Ordinance No. 463 was offered in evidence separately. But there was introduced in evidence “Ordinance No. 293 as amended by Ordinance 377 and 463.” The original ordinance contained no open-space requirements. Such a provision was added in one of the amendments but it was not made certain whether it was added in the 1936 amendment or that of 1945. Appellants contend that under the circumstances only the structures built since August 6, 1945 could be said to have been erected in violation of the ordinance.
We overrule appellants’ contention. The point was not raised by appellants in their pleadings, or by objection during the trial, or in their motion for new trial in the trial court, or even in their original briefs on appeal. Appellants raise the point for the first time in this motion for rehearing. Their complaint comes too late. Under the 'circumstances we must consider the point as having been waived by appellants. Rule 374, T.R.C.P.; Western Auto Supply Co. v. Clark, Tex.Civ.App., 253 S.W.2d 929, at page 931; Donalson v. Horton, Tex.Civ.App., 256 S.W.2d 693; Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979, at pages 984-985. The case was tried on the theory that the provision in question was in effect at all times material to the inquiry. This appeal must be decided on the same theory as that on which the case *280was tried in the trial court. 3-B Tex.Jur. 275. ;
Appellants make a similar contention in regard to the Town’s Ordinance No. 516, the Building Code, enacted November 6, 1950. It is asserted that there is no evidence that a building code requiring a building permit was in effect prior to November 6, 1950, hence only structures erected after said date as a matter of daw could have been'erected in violation of any ordinance requiring a building permit.
We overrule this contention also. What we have said about appellants’ belated point with reference to the zoning ordinance applies here, too, so we shall not repeat it.
For another reason we consider untenable appellants’ contention that there is no evidence in the record as to a building permit requirement prior to November 6, 1950. Both the caption and Section 10 of Ordinance No. 516 recite that it repeals Ordinance No. 294 enacted July 3, 1929. Section 10 of the new ordinance reproduces verbatim the caption of the old ordinance being repealed, and plainly shows that the old ordinance did require a building permit. We here reproduce Section 10, of Ordinance 516: “Section 10. This ordinance shall as of the day it becomes effective repeal Ordinance No. 294, passed by the Town Council of the Town of Highland Park on the 3rd day of July, 1929, and recorded in Vol. 4, page 225, Minutes o.f the Town of Highland Park, captioned as follows: ‘An ordinance of the Town Council of the Town of Highland Park, Texas,,requiring the taking out of a building permit by any person, firm, corporation or .association desiring to erect, repair or demolish any building or structure within the Town of Highland Park; prescribing for the issuance of such permit by the building inspector and providing for public hearings before th.e Council where such permit is denied by the building inspector; prescribing a penalty for.the violation thereof and repealing building permit ordinance heretofore passed.’ ”
Since rendition of our original judgment on appeal appellees have filed a written declaration to the effect that they desire to abandon with prejudice their cause of action relating to the issue of nuisance occasioned by the umbrella on the roof of the front porch of the main dwelling, and the height of the rear and side fences, and that part of the mandatory injunction requiring; appellants to dismantle, raze and remove the structures named in paragraphs (i), (n), (p), and (q) of the trial court’s judgment. The abandonment covers all the parts of the judgment which we reversed and remanded for new trial. We therefore modify our former judgment and affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees Town of Highland Park and Kathleen Gibson, restraining appellants from excluding from the premises in question the Town’s building inspector, assistant building inspector,, fire marshal and health officer; and we affirm also the mandatory injunction granted by the trial court in so far as it requires, appellants to dismantle, raze and remove-certain structures as set out in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h),.' (j)„ (k), (1), (m), (o), (r), and (s).
Having so modified our judgment, we overrule appellants’ motion for rehearing.