Court Opinion

ID: 9712308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:51:11.096846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.434205
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Oliphant, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, setting aside and declaring null and void a decree of divorce granted on June 30, 1952 to the appellant on his counterclaim in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe. The judgment below contains other provisions which we must consider on this appeal but their resolution largely depends on the validity of the Nevada decree.
This appeal was certified here on our own motion. B. B. 1:10-1 (a).
The premise and rationale of the lower court in setting aside the decree of divorce granted to the appellant in the *341State of Nevada is that it was fraudulently obtained and therefore not entitled to full faith and credit in this State under the doctrine of our decision in Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N. J. 380 (1951). We are not in accord with the conclusion of the trial court that the Staedler case is controlling here.
 This is a bitterly contested case and the record is disjointed and prolix. But a careful reading of the record leads us to the conclusion that the action of the respondent in filing for a divorce in Nevada was voluntarily taken after she had the advice of independent counsel of her own choosing, both in New Jersey and in Nevada. It is true that both the parties immediately returned to the State of New Jersey upon the entry of the decree in Nevada and that both went to Nevada solely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. That this latter fact is offensive to the public policy of this State is clear both under our statute and our decisions, N. J. S. 2A:34-22; Pef v. Peff, 2 N. J. 513, 522, 523 (1949); Shepherd v. Ward, 5 N. J. 92, 103 (1950); Judkins v. Judkins, 22 N. J. Super. 516, 523 (Ch. 1952). But on the jurisdictional facts as shown by the record in this case, under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court we are not permitted to challenge their validity except under the doctrine of the second Williams case, Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577 (1945), which is only applicable to cases where the jurisdiction of the Nevada court is based upon an order of publication and substituted service and the decree is entered in an ex parte proceeding.
The difficulty arises out of trying to apply the legal fiction of domicile, and it is a fiction, as the basis of jurisdiction of the subject matter and person in this type of case. We must confess that we share the difficulty of most persons in comprehending how a parent with a spouse and minor children is as free to establish a domicile away from the home shared with the spouse and children, as the wild goose of fable and story whose habitation is where it momentarily alights in flight. See Judkins v. Judkins, supra; “Haddock Re*342Visited,” 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417. We likewise have difficulty in reconciling the cases on divorce under the Pull Faith and Credit Clause with the cases on workmen’s compensation under the same clause where the question of conflict in public policy in the statutes of two sovereign states presently seems to be controlling over other legal considerations in such fully litigated cases. Cf. Buccheri v. Montgomery Ward Co., 19 N. J. 594 (1955).
But in the situation here presented under the cases above cited our public policy must bow to the constitutional principles set forth in those cases by the United States Supreme Court.
It appears from the record in this case, and it seems to be conceded by both sides, that between the dates of May 12, 1952 and June 30, 1952 the respondent had established a bona fide residence in the State of Nevada sufficient under the Nevada statute to sustain her suit for divorce from her husband on the grounds of extreme cruelty. In her complaint she alleged she was a resident of the State of Nevada and she had taken up her home there with an intent to remain permanently. The husband filed an answer denying knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the wife’s allegation of residence and filed a cross-complaint for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty setting forth, inter alia, a separation agreement entered into in Reno, Nevada, on June 30, 1952. A trial was had on the complaint and cross-complaint before the court sitting without a jury. The respondent testified as to her residence but was not cross-examined with respect thereto, and her residence was corroborated by the owner of the motel in which she resided. The defendant likewise testified and the court awarded him a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty and incorporated in its decree the provisions of the separation agreement. The respondent was represented by counsel of her own choice and she had the opportunity to raise the domicile question if she so desired, but she did not and we cannot be impressed by her protestation that she was foreclosed from fully contesting the case.
*343The United States Supreme Court has held that full faith and credit must be accorded a decree divorce of a sister sovereign state if a defendant-spouse appeared in the divorce proceedings and contested the issues; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 1097, 92 L. Ed. 1429 (1948); or appeared and admitted the domicile, Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094, 92 L. Ed. 1451 (1948); or was personally served with process in the state which awarded the decree, Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581, 71 S. Ct. 474, 95 L. Ed. 552 (1951); and if the spouse either admits or contests the issue of plaintiffs domicile or is personally served in the divorce state he is barred from attacking the decree in a sister state, Cook v. Cook, 342 U. S. 126, 72 S. Ct. 157, 96 L. Ed. 146 (1951).
In Isserman v. Isserman, 11 N. J. 106 (1952), we held that a decree of the Nevada court was entitled to full faith and credit in this State where the wife through her independently selected counsel, recommended by her New Jersey counsel, appeared in the divorce proceeding instituted by her husband, pleaded to the complaint, filed a cross-complaint and contested the jurisdictional question of the residence of her husband.
The case here presents even a stronger situation under the holdings of these decisions in that it was the respondent-wife who instituted the proceedings in Nevada based upon her residence there which met the statutory jurisdictional requirement of the Nevada court and the case proceeded to final judgment with both sides represented by independent counsel with an opportunity to test the jurisdictional question. Under these principles the final decree of divorce entered in the Second Judicial District Court for the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe, on June 30, 1952, granting a divorce to the defendant-husband on his counterclaim on the ground of extreme cruelty is entitled to full faith and credit in this State insofar as it dissolves the marriage relation of the appellant and respondent here, Robison v. Robison, 9 N. J. 288, 291 (1952); Isserman v. Isserman, supra; Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 11 N. J. 225, *344228 (1953); Stultz v. Stultz, 15 N. J. 315, 319 (1954); Whitehead v. Villapiano, 16 N. J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 1951), unless it can be said that the situation here presented comes within the rule of Staedler v. Staedler, supra.
In Isserman v. Isserman, supra, we carefully distinguished the Siaedler case, but we find it necessary again to point out that the Staedler case was based upon specific and particular facts peculiar to it and on those facts we found and stated that every step taken by the wife in the Elorida proceeding was under the direct control of her husband and counsel retained by him, and made it clear that it was not a true adversary proceeding to which the rule of Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra, and Coe v. Coe, supra, and other analogous cases were applicable.
We now specifically point out two important facts in the Siaedler case that are apparently casually passed over in the application of the principle of that case. The proofs in that case showed clearly and undisputedly, and this court so found, that the husband was not a resident in Elorida on September 18, 1947, and that he did not reside in Elorida for 90 days next preceding the institution of the action in that state, which was a requisite jurisdictional requirement under the statutes of Elorida, and that the plan conceived by him and his counsel in which the wife participated had for its purpose the intent to defraud the Elorida court with respect to this fundamental requisite of jurisdiction. Eurther, the divorce in Elorida was instituted pursuant to an agreement which, inter alia, provided and required that the wife would enter “any appearance required in the divorce proceeding” and that should she “oppose said divorce proceeding the said trust shall become inoperative and the monies deposited thereunder shall be returned to the party of the first part.”
We came to the conclusion such an agreement was an integral part of the fraud perpetrated on the courts of Elorida since it was patently a bargain to bring a divorce suit in which no defense was to be entered and was per se unlawful. Such a situation is clearly distinguishable from the *345one before the court here, where the respondent-wife established a residence in the State of Nevada sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement of the statute of that state on divorce, and there is nothing in the written agreement incorporated into the final decree that prevented her of and on her own volition at any time to contest her husband’s counterclaim in the State of Nevada or to withdraw her own complaint and withdraw from the suit. These facts bring this case within the decision in Isserman v. Isserman, supra, rather than Staedler v. Staedler, supra.
The respondent insisted below and insists here that the entire proceeding in Nevada was a result of a fraudulent scheme in which she and her husband and counsel in New Jersey, independently chosen by each, conspired to commit a fraud upon the Nevada court. The argument is premised in part on the fact that her New Jersey counsel recommended Judge Souter in Nevada as a lawyer who could represent her when she went to Nevada to institute the suit and that subsequently the New Jersey lawyer was consulted and did advise with respect to the property arrangements being entered into by the separation agreement executed in Nevada on June 30, 1952, which is incorporated as part of the Nevada decree.
We have carefully examined the conflicting testimony with respect to the negotiations, advice, and the part played by the New Jersey attorney in representing the respondent’s interest both before and after the entry of the Nevada decree. He was dealing with an extremely difficult and explosive situation and it appears he was at all times attempting to protect the respondent’s interest to the very best of his ability. He carefully explained and advised as to the law of New Jersey with respect to such cause of action for divorce as the respondent had, particularly as to the quantum of proof required to prove a case on the ground of adultery. He attempted to work out an agreement of separation with adequate security to guarantee that it could be enforced, but this effort came to nothing.
*346On the possibility that the respondent contemplated instituting an action in Nevada for a divorce on a ground that was not recognized in this State, he had the duty to advise her as to her right to institute such a suit subject to the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court together with their limitations and the general uncertainty of the law in that field and the dangers incident to such a step if she took it. All of which has now come home to roost insofar as the respondent here is concerned. This he did and he made it equally clear that if the respondent did go to Nevada she would be going on her own responsibility and would be bound by any judgment entered there.
Once an attorney has done thi^and leaves it to the voluntary decision of the client as to whether such a proceeding is to be instituted by the client in a foreign jurisdiction, counsel may suggest the name of a reputable attorney in such other state so that his client may be advised by such lawyer who has the competence to give the necessary legal advice with reference to the contemplated action. We deem it advisable to state this warning, however, that at that point the attorney should terminate the relationship of attorney and client, present his bill and be paid for his services. Any participation thereafter in the divorce proceeding in the foreign state may form a foundation of a charge that the New Jersey attorney is particeps criminis when subsequently a fraud is perpetrated upon the courts of the foreign state and thus bring the rule of the Staedler case into play.
As we have said, the filing of the suit in Nevada was the voluntary act of the respondent and the proofs do not sustain the charge that the attorney advised the respondent to seek the remedy in Nevada. We have merely the uncorroborated statements of the respondent.
There is testimony that during the negotiations here in New Jersey the respondent took the position she merely wanted a separation and not a divorce on the ground of adultery, and she had a reluctance to go forward with a suit for divorce on the ground of adultery in this State because of the notoriety and unfavorable publicity it might bring *347down upon her and her children. This is a valid reason and such a choice was hers. Cf. Drayton v. Drayton, 54 N. J. Eq. 298, 304 (Ch. 1896). She must have been aware at the time she went to Nevada that she had proof sufficient to support a cause of action for adultery in this State if she chose to institute one. The appellant very brazenly testified below he occupied an apartment in Red Bank, New Jersey, with the third woman and one of his sons over a considerable period of time. We cannot assume that respondent was unaware of these facts, but rather we must assume that she knew where this son was since he was living separate and apart from her and her other boy. All this is indicative that her decision to institute the action in Nevada was hers and hers alone, made voluntarily for reasons that were sufficient for her purposes and not a part of any scheme concocted by her New Jersey attorney to aid her in her attempt to commit a fraud upon the courts of Nevada.
The fraud charged by her here goes to the essence of the divorce proceeding and* not to the agreement of separation entered into in Nevada on June 30, 1952. Her New Jersey attorney on request undertook to represent the respondent by advising her and her Nevada lawyer as to the legal effect of such agreement in New Jersey and as to the method and means by which it could be enforced. We feel that in so doing he was discharging a duty in giving his client representation as to her rights and liabilities under this agreement on which he or any other New Jersey lawyer was and could give competent advice which was not available to her in Nevada. This latter feature does not take this case out of the rule of Isserman v. Isserman, supra, and bring the rule of Staedler v. Staedler, supra, into play.
The final fact relied on by the respondent is that her Nevada lawyer was paid by funds forwarded to her from New Jersey by her husband. The mechanics of this transaction are not clear in the record but we see nothing that offends the public policy of this State simply because a lawyer of her independent choosing is remunerated by her husband. Such orders are entered each day as a matter of routine in divorce *348proceedings in this State, and she was legally entitled to have her husband pay this counsel fee.
This leads to the conclusion that the final decree of divorce entered in Nevada on June 30, 1952 is entitled to full faith and credit in this State and that the trial court was in error in setting it aside.
 We turn now to the other provisions of the judgment entered below. The trial court ordered the appellant to pay maintenance in the sum of $100 a week to the wife in addition to the sum of $25 per week for each of the infant children of the marriage. Since we have concluded that the Nevada decree is valid and entitled to full faith and credit, the court below was without jurisdiction to award maintenance to a wife who has been adjudged guilty of a marital offense by a court of competent jurisdiction. Maintenance is based upon the duty of support arising out of a subsisting marriage. O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 12 N. J. 222, 231 (1953).
 The two infant children are not bound by the provisions of the Nevada decree relating to their support since they were not represented in the proceeding. Isserman v. Isserman, supra, 11 N. J., at page 115. The cause is therefore remanded with respect to the infants for the trial court to determine on proper proof whether the provisions for the support of the children incorporated in the Nevada decree are adequate and proper under all the circumstances or whether further provision should be made for them. The provisions of the agreement incorporated in the Nevada decree are enforceable in this State under the principles stated in O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 6 N. J. 170 (1951); O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 12 N. J. 222 (1953); Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 17 N. J. 409, 417 (1955); Whitehead v. Villapiano, supra.
The trial court further found and adjudged that the appellant was indebted to the respondent in the sum of $18,750, representing a one-half interest in the proceeds of the sale of certain premises in Colts Neck, New Jersey, which was held by the appellant and respondent as a tenancy *349by the entirety and conveyed by a deed signed by both to third parties on March 29, 1951. The effect of this conveyance signed by both parties was to terminate the estate by the entirety and change their holdings to that of tenants in common in the equity in the property. The closing statement is a bit ambiguous and obscure, and the oral testimony by which the items were attempted to be explained was conflicting, with the result that there is a difference of some $6,506.16 in the figures arrived at by both sides as of the time of closing. The testimony further is that the money proceeds were deposited in a joint account in a Parmingdale bank. That account is not before the court, but we must point out that what the court is called upon to adjudge and decree is the interest the wife had in the proceeds at the time this suit was filed. The cause is remanded so that this can be determined in an accounting based on the wife’s right as a tenant in common and the establishment of any debits or credits in that sum which may have arisen since that time. Obviously the wife is entitled to a credit for any withdrawals made by her from the joint account which were required to provide support for herself and her children in accordance with her station in life if such had not been provided in the interim by the husband.
The order further adjudged and decreed that the wife was a full partner in Nappe-Smith Manufacturing Company and the Parmingdale Eealty Company and required the appellant to execute deeds of conveyance to be made of any and all real estate owned by both corporations conveying said property to the appellant and respondent as equal partners.
This part of the order seems to be without any foundation. The only interest that the wife ever had was one share of qualifying stock in one of the companies and two in the other, the certificates for which were never delivered to her, and this, she says was in consideration of her husband’s promise to give her a half interest in the business. But her contention in this regard goes without corroboration; it is on its face so vague and indefinite as to offer no basis for a finding of a legal obligation. If a partnership in a corpora*350tion could be established on such shadowy testimony it could lead to untold mischief in the law of corporations. While each case is different the fundamental principles applicable were discussed in Farris v. Farris Engineering Corp., 7 N. J. 487, 498 et seq. (1951); 12 Fletcher Corporations, sec. 5683 et seq. We find the testimony as to equal access to a safe deposit box or to certain indefinite joint bank accounts to be totally insufficient to establish a perfected inter vivos gift of corporate stock or interests.
The trial court below awarded a counsel fee of $6,600 to the respondent’s attorney. This was in addition to a counsel fee of $1,000 allowed on a pendente lite application. We have carefully considered this and have come to the conclusion that at this stage of the proceedings a counsel fee of $3,000 in addition to the pendente lite allowance is adequate. Isserman v. Isserman, supra, 11 N. J., at page 116. Any further allowance must wait the final disposition of the cause.
Finally, as to the United States Saving Bonds which are deposited with the First National Bank of Farmingdale, which were deposited in a proceeding in the Monmouth County Court, Probate Division, for the appointment of a guardian; since this matter has nothing in common with the respective rights of the parties to this suit that cause should be remanded to the Monmouth County Court for trial and a guardian ad litem appointed for the infants in view of the possible conflict of interest between the children and their mother as their natural parent. It appears that these bonds were not purchased with any funds supplied by the husband or wife but by their grandparents on their maternal side, and that originally the bonds were in the names of the children but since have been changed to the names of the children or their mother.
Those parts of the judgment of the trial court setting aside and vacating the decree of the Nevada court dated June 30, 1952, and further declaring the respondent a full partner in Nappe-Smith Manufacturing Company and Farmingdale Eealty Company, and allowing her maintenance *351under the statute, are reversed. The balance of the judgment is modified and remanded to be proceeded with consistent with this opinion. No costs.