Court Opinion

ID: 9827153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:13:50.638114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:24.946693
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[14] Counsel for appellant seems to have failed to understand the purport of certain language used in our original opinion. The deed of December 10, 1891, from J. M. Sullivan to his wife, being only a quitclaim, conveyed out of the community estate into the separate estate of Mrs. Sullivan only such title as J. M. Sullivan, or the community estate, had at the time of the conveyance. Rogers v. Burchard, 34 Tex. 442, 7 Am. Rep. 283.
[15,16] If as a matter of fact, as found by the trial court, and which finding is evidence to support, the consideration for the Parker deed was paid out of the community funds of the Sullivans, and the levy under the Parker judgment was made prior to the execution of the quitclaim deed from Sullivan to his wife, then the deed from Parker to Mrs. Sullivan would vest title in the community estate of the Sullivans. Nor would the fact that prior to this Parker deed Sullivan had executed a quitclaim deed to his wife cause the Parker deed to vest title in the separate estate of Mrs. Sullivan. An after-acquired title does not necessarily inure to the benefit of a prior conveyance under a quitclaim deed, nor is the grantor or his heirs under a quitclaim deed estopped from asserting such after-acquired title against such prior conveyance. Perrin v. Perrin, 62 Tex. 477; Willis v. Smith, 72 Tex. 573, 10 S. W. 686; 1 Devlin on Deeds, § 27. The motion for rehearing is overruled.