Court Opinion

ID: 9911955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 15:03:01.50116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:30.754037
License: Public Domain

FIRST DIVISION
                                BARNES, P. J.,
                             GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                              December 21, 2023

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A24A0389. COOPER et al. v. POLLARD et al.
 A24A0449. MORGAN v. COOPER et al.
 A24A0450. POLLARD v. COOPER et al.

      PIPKIN, Judge.

      These consolidated appeals challenge orders entered by the Superior Court of

Mitchell County in a quo warranto action. More specifically, Case Nos. A24A0449

and A24A0450 challenge the trial court’s order entering default judgments in the quo

warranto action, and Case No. A24A0389 is an appeal from an order in which the

court refused to rule on a motion for contempt of the default judgment due to the

automatic supersedeas set out in OCGA § 5-6-46 (a). We have expedited these

appeals and, as more fully set forth below, affirm in all three cases.

      1. Pertinent to these appeals, the record shows that Corey B. Morgan and

Venterra Pollard (collectively “Respondents”) were elected as District 1 council
members for the City of Camilla, Georgia (“City”) on December 31, 2019 and 2021,1

respectively. In November 2022, David Cooper and Joe Bostick (collectively

“Petitioners”) filed an “Application for Leave of Court to File an Information in the

Nature of a Petition for Quo Warranto” and a “Verified Petition for Quo Warranto”

seeking to remove Respondents from the council on the basis that they did not meet

the residency requirements imposed by Georgia law and the Charter for the City.2 The

petition sought a declaration concerning Respondents’ ability to serve as council

members under both OCGA § 9-6-60, the quo warranto statute, and OCGA § 9-4-1,

the declaratory judgment statute.

       Petitioners request to proceed with a quo warranto inquiry was granted;

thereafter, Petitioners served Respondents with the quo warranto petition, along with

interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Respondents, both of whom

       1
       This means that Morgan’s term ends on December 31, 2023, and Pollard’s
term ends on December 31, 2025.
       2
         Under these provisions, Respondents were required to be residents of the
district they serve for a continuous period of twelve months prior to being elected to
the council, and to continue to live in their elected district during the period they
served on the council. Petitioners alleged that, during at least parts of the relevant time
period, Morgan resided in Pelham, Georgia, and Pollard resided in Albany, Georgia.
The District 1 residence Morgan claimed as his permanent residence was owned by
his grandmother, and Pollard’s alleged District 1 residence was owned by his sister.
                                            2
appeared pro se, filed answers to the petition and unverified responses and objections

to the discovery requests. As explained more fully below, Respondents resisted

Petitioners’ discovery efforts, and Petitioners filed several motions to compel and

motions to strike Respondents’ answers and defenses based on discovery violations.

After several hearings and the entry of several orders compelling discovery, the trial

court, in a 30-page order, granted Petitioners’ motion to strike and entered a default

judgment on their quo warranto petition (“final judgment”). In addition to extensive

fact-finding and determinations about Respondents’ discovery violations, the order

also contained specific declarations that Respondents were not residents of the City,

that they lacked the authority to act as members of the council, and that their positions

were vacant. Respondents, who have continued to represent themselves throughout

these proceedings, timely filed separate notices of appeal from the final judgment3;

Morgan’s appeal was docketed in this Court as Case No. A24A0449, and Pollard’s

appeal was docketed in this Court as Case No. A24A0450.

      After the trial court entered its final judgment, Petitioners believed that

Respondents continued to participate in council activities as if they had not been

      3
       Respondents originally filed their notices of appeal to the Supreme Court of
Georgia. The Supreme Court transferred the appeals to us after they determined that
this Court had jurisdiction of the appeals.
                                           3
removed from office, prompting Petitioners to file an emergency motion for contempt,

as amended, in the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order to

the effect that it had been divested of jurisdiction to rule on the motion when

Respondents filed their notices of appeal and paid costs and, accordingly, refused to

entertain the motion (“supersedeas order”). Petitioners filed a notice of appeal from

that order, and that appeal has been docketed in this Court as Case No. A24A0389.

                                  Case No. A24A0389

       2. We turn first to Petitioners’ challenge to the trial court’s supersedeas order.4

In pertinent part, OCGA § 5-6-46 (a) provides that “[i]n civil cases, the notice of

appeal . . . shall serve as supersedeas upon payment of all costs in the trial court by the

appellant[.]” Thus, “‘[a]s a general rule, in civil actions other than injunctions, a trial

court, upon the filing of a notice of appeal, loses jurisdiction to modify or enforce a

judgment which is the subject of the appeal during the period of supersedeas.’ Davis

       4
          Neither Morgan nor Pollard has filed an appellee’s brief in Case No.
A24A0389. The City of Camilla has, however, filed an amicus brief in support of the
trial court’s supersedeas order. We also note that, although we affirm the final
judgment in Case Nos. A24A0449 and A24A0450, this issue is not moot. “An
appellate court maintains jurisdiction over a case until it has issued the remittitur and
the remittitur has been received and filed in the clerk’s office below. Only then does
the trial court regain jurisdiction to take further action with respect to the judgment
appealed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fred Jones Enterprises, LLC v.
Williams, 331 Ga. App. 481, 485 (2) (771 SE2d 163) (2015).
                                            4
v. Harpagon Co., 281 Ga. 250, 253 (8) (637 SE2d 1) (2006).” Mughni v. Beyond Mgmt.

Group, Inc., 349 Ga. App. 398, 402 (3) (825 SE2d 829) (2019).

      (a) Petitioners acknowledge the general applicability of OCGA § 5-6-46, but,

citing Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Cravey, 209 Ga. 274 (71 SE2d 659) (1952) and other

mandamus cases, they argue that the automatic supersedeas provisions of OCGA §

5-6-46 (a) do not apply to cases involving extraordinary remedies. We disagree that

Bankers should be read so broadly. First, and without belaboring the point, Bankers

was decided prior to the adoption of both the Appellate Practice Act in 1965 and the

Georgia Constitution of 1983, and it is apparent that the Court’s analysis based on the

then-existing supersedeas statute and since-revised constitutional provision would be

materially different today. Bankers, 209 Ga. at 275-277. More importantly, we cannot

simply engraft the reasoning in Bankers, or any other mandamus case, onto this case

because the statute governing mandamus appeals specifically says – as it said at the

time Bankers was decided – that those appeals “shall be heard . . . under the same laws

and rules as apply in injunction cases.” OCGA § 9-6-28 (b). Bankers, 209 Ga. at 277

(same). And our law is clear that there is no automatic supersedeas in an appeal from

an order granting an injunction. See OCGA § 9-11-62 (a) (“Unless otherwise ordered

by the court, an interlocutory or final judgment in an action for an injunction or in a

                                           5
receivership action shall not be stayed during the period after its entry and until an

appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal.”).5

      There is no comparable language, however, in the statutes governing quo

warranto. OCGA § 9-6-64 (a) directs a party dissatisfied with the final decision in a

quo warranto proceeding to “file an appeal as in other cases[.]” While this language

also appears in the mandamus statute, see OCGA § 9-6-28 (a), as explained above, the

mandamus statute goes on to say in subsection (b) that appeals in those cases are

“under the same laws and rules as apply in injunction cases[,]” while the quo

warranto statute merely goes on to say that “the duties of the clerk shall be the same

as in other cases” where appeals are filed. OCGA § 9-6-64 (a). Moreover, there is no

doubt that the legislature knows how to exempt classes of cases from the automatic

supersedeas provisions because not only did it do so in injunction and mandamus

cases, but it also has done so in election contest cases, which often concern issues

similar to those adjudicated in quo warranto cases. See OCGA § 21-2-528. But

Petitioners have not cited, and we have not found, anything in the specific statutes

      5
        There are numerous appellate cases holding that there is no automatic
supersedeas in an appeal from an order granting an injunction. E.g. Barnes v. Channel,
303 Ga. 88, 92 (1), n.3 (810 SE2d 549) (2018); Burton v. Glynn County, 297 Ga. 548,
549 (4) (776 SE2d 179) (2015); Brown v. Spann, 271 Ga. 495, 496 (520 SE2d 909)
(1999)
                                          6
governing quo warranto proceedings, or any other statute, that exempts a judgment

issued in a quo warranto proceeding from the automatic supersedeas provisions of

OCGA § 5-6-46 (a). Accordingly, because we have found neither a statute nor

controlling decisional law specifically exempting quo warranto proceedings from the

automatic supersedeas provisions of OCGA § 5-6-46 (a), the trial court’s order is not

subject to reversal on this basis.

       (b) Petitioners also argue that the automatic supersedeas provisions of OCGA

§ 5-6-46 do not apply because they sought, and the trial court granted, injunctive

relief. Although, as stated above, it is true that orders granting injunctive relief are not

subject to the automatic supersedeas set out in OCGA § 5-6-46 (a), we disagree that

injunctive relief was granted here. The difference between a declaratory judgment and

an injunction has been explained before: “A declaratory judgment is a means by which

a superior court simply declares the rights of the parties or expresses its opinion on a

question of law without ordering anything to be done. An injunction, by contrast,

imposes an affirmative duty on the party enjoined to either perform – or refrain from

performing – a specified act.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Burton, 297 Ga.

at 549-550 (4). In their quo warranto petition, Petitioners sought a “Declaration of

Quo Warranto Judgment” specifically referencing both OCGA § 9-6-60 (quo

                                             7
warranto statute) and 9-4-1 (declaratory judgment statute). And in their “Prayer for

Relief,” Petitioners sought “declaratory relief,” judgment in quo warranto, attorney

fees, expenses of litigation, and “such other and further relief as justice requires.” In

the final judgment, the trial court set out the relief granted as a series of adjudications

and declarations and did not mention injunctive relief.6 Further, Petitioners raised this

argument in the trial court in support of their motion for contempt, and, although the

trial court did not specifically address this issue in its supersedeas order, the trial court

implicitly rejected this argument by concluding the automatic superseadeas applied

here. Burton, 297 Ga. at 550 (4) (in deciding whether automatic supersedeas applied,

trial court properly interpreted its order as declaratory judgment, not injunction).

Accordingly, this argument is also unavailing and the supersedeas order is affirmed.

                                    Case No. A24A0449

       3. We turn now to the Respondents’ challenges to the final judgment. In Case

No. A24A0449, Morgan raises three enumerations of error: (a) that the trial court

abused its discretion by striking his answer and defenses, (b) that the trial court erred

       6
        Any claim that injunctive relief was granted because the final judgment
ordered Respondents to return books, papers, electronic devices, and other items
belonging to the City is unavailing since that remedy is specifically provided for in the
quo warranto statute. See OCGA § 9-6-66.
                                             8
by refusing to allow him to introduce certain evidence at one of the hearings, and (c)

that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. We address each

enumeration in turn.

      (a) We first consider Morgan’s contention that the trial court abused its

discretion in striking his answer and defenses and entering a default judgment. We

start with our standard of review.

      [R]ulings on motion to strike and for entry of default judgment are
      reviewed by this Court using an abuse of discretion standard. Indeed, a
      trial judge has broad discretion in the enforcement of the discovery
      provisions of the Civil Practice Act, and we will not interfere with the
      exercise of that discretion absent clear abuse. Nevertheless, dismissal and
      default are the harshest sanctions available for the trial court to impose,
      and we have cautioned against the use of these harsher sanctions except
      in extreme cases.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Potts v. Clowdis, 360 Ga. App. 581, 583 (1) (859

SE2d 875) (2021). Likewise, “[a] trial court has wide discretion in adjudicating

spoliation issues, and such discretion will not be disturbed absent abuse.” (Citation

omitted.) Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386, 397 (II) (774 SE2d 596) (2015). In addition

to our standard of review, it is also important to note that our law specifically provides

that “the provisions of [the Civil Practice Act] governing . . . discovery and

                                            9
depositions . . . apply” to all “[special] proceedings[,]” such as quo warranto

proceedings. See OCGA § 9-11-81.

      In order to address this enumeration, it is necessary to set out in detail the

discovery history between the parties. The record shows that Petitioners deemed

Respondents’ initial responses to their written discovery requests inadequate and sent

Respondents a Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.4 letter in an effort to work out the

dispute. Respondents did not reply, and, on January 25, 2023, Petitioners filed a

motion to compel discovery. Respondents replied and argued, among other things,

that since it was Petitioners’ burden to prove that Respondents resided outside

District 1, Respondents should not be compelled to present evidence to prove

Petitioners’ claims.

      A hearing was held on the motion to compel on February 13, 2023. During the

hearing, the trial court attempted to explain to the Respondents the parties’ discovery

rights under the Civil Practice Act and later cautioned them that, in the event the

court issued an order compelling their responses and they failed to respond, the court

could then strike their answers. On February 20, 2023, the trial court entered an order

                                          10
on the motion to compel,7 wherein the court made item-by-item rulings on the

interrogatories the Respondents were compelled to answer and the documents they

were compelled to produce. Respondents purported to comply with the trial court’s

order on the motion to compel by filing verified interrogatory responses and producing

certain documents, including photographs of their rooms at their respective District

1 residences.

      Petitioners then noticed Respondents’ depositions for April 12, 2023.

Respondents filed a motion to quash and, although they had not sought a protective

order or otherwise obtained a ruling from the trial court excusing them from attending

their depositions, Respondents failed to appear for their depositions on April 12. On

May 5, 2023, Petitioners filed a motion to strike Respondents’ answers and defenses

based on discovery violations, specifically their failure to attend their depositions. On

June 28, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to strike. After noting that

Respondents had resisted discovery “from the outset of the proceedings” and while

reserving the right “to more fully impose sanctions” at a later date, the trial court

ordered Respondents to attend and answer questions at any properly-noticed

      7
        Although the trial court entered a joint order on the two motions, the order
was separately entered as to the two Respondents and the discovery rulings were
specific to each of them.
                                           11
deposition scheduled prior to July 15, 2023, which was two days before the case had

been set for trial. Petitioners sent Respondents notices to take their video depositions,

and Respondents were deposed on July 11, 2023.

      During their depositions, Respondents were questioned extensively about

where they resided, when they stayed at their District 1 residence, and various other

questions designed to garner information about the central issue in this case. On many

occasions, Respondents gave almost identical responses to the effect that they could

not answer the questions because “I don’t keep a record of that.”8 Further, both men

referred to notes or their discovery responses when answering questions; when asked

why they could not answer without referring to their notes, they explained that they

wanted to remain “consistent as a pro se litigant” and to answer truthfully.9

      8
        To be clear, Respondents were deposed separately but, as set out above, they
often used the same phrasing in answering, or refusing to answer, similar questions.
      9
         For instance, when Morgan was shown a picture of a bed, he had to refer to
his “notes” before he could testify that it was the bed at his District 1 home. And
Pollard had to refer to his notes before testifying who else lived at his District 1
“permanent residence.” Pollard was requested by counsel to show him the notes he
was referring to during the deposition, but Pollard refused, and the trial court was
contacted by telephone; the trial court informed Pollard that opposing counsel had the
right to see any documents he reviewed in answering questions during his deposition.
The court also reminded Pollard that he had not yet ruled on Petitioners’ motion for
sanctions and that the court might look to what occurred during the deposition as
dispositive of that motion.
                                           12
Respondents were also questioned extensively about the photographs they provided

in response to Petitioners’ requests for production of documents. Pollard10 testified

that he could not say when the picture that he purported to be his bedroom at his

District 1 residence was taken and explained that although he took the pictures with

his phone, he could not use his phone to find the date he took it because the pictures

were no longer on his phone. When repeatedly asked if he had deleted the pictures

from his phone, Pollard would only respond that he took the pictures but “I do not

have those pictures in my phone” or similar words without being able to offer any

explanation of why the photographs were no longer on his phone.11 When Morgan was

asked if he had any pictures of his Pelham apartment,12 he testified that he was sure he

      10
          Although this Division deals with Morgan’s enumeration of error, Pollard
makes the same arguments in his appeal, which we address in Division 4, and it is
helpful to set out examples from both Respondents’ depositions to show the similarity
of their responses.
      11
         Some of Petitioners’ questions about the photographs were formulated to
show that the photographs Respondents provided of their District 1 residences were
staged. They also deposed family members on this issue. During her deposition,
Morgan’s grandmother testified that she did not recognize the items in the
photograph that Morgan submitted as a photograph of his room at his District 1
address. Pollard’s sister also testified in her deposition that she did not recognize the
items in the photograph supposedly taken in Pollard’s bedroom at her house.
      12
       Although he had been ordered to do so by the trial court, Morgan did not
produce any photographs of his Pelham apartment.
                                           13
had taken photographs but he did not have any on his phone now because it was a new

phone. When pressed about his answer, Morgan said that he knew his new phone

“was not present or on [his] person at the time he rented the Pelham apartment,” but

that he could not recall when he got his new phone.

      The day after Respondents’ depositions, Petitioners filed an emergency

renewed motion to strike Respondents’ answers and defenses based on various

discovery violations, including their evasive and non-responsive deposition testimony,

spoliation of evidence, and manufacturing evidence. The trial court held a hearing on

the motion on July 17, 2023, during which various parts of Respondents’ recorded

depositions were played for the court. Following the hearing, the trial court entered

the final judgment at issue here.

      Morgan argues that the trial court abused its discretion in entering its final

judgment because, in his view, he merely violated “the spirit of the law.” But the trial

court did not find that Respondents merely violated the spirit of the law. The trial

court entered a lengthy and detailed order setting out Respondents’ “willful and

intentional discovery violations,” while also emphasizing its own repeated warnings

to Respondents about the right of each party to conduct discovery as well as the

consequences of the failure to provide requested discovery. The court observed that

                                          14
Respondents’ stance appeared to be that they were exempt from discovery because

they were pro se litigants and did not have the burden to prove Petitioners’ claims.

The trial court noted that it had assessed Respondents’ credibility in relation to all

discovery issues and in particular the spoliation issues based on the court’s

observations of Respondents’ attitudes displayed in the courtroom and during their

depositions. The trial court also set out specific findings with respect to Respondents’

deposition testimony, including that they repeatedly evaded and refused to answer

critical and relevant questions pertaining to their domicile, the authenticity of

photographs, and other questions relating to the spoliation of evidence. Based on these

and other findings, the trial court determined that severe sanctions were warranted

based on “Respondents’ express defiance of this Court’s Orders as well as their

willful and intentional discovery violations. The Respondents have breached their

obligations not to spoliate evidence, violated the Court’s order compelling discovery

of photographic evidence, and further violated the Court’s order compelling their

depositions.” The court further determined that Respondents’ actions resulted in

prejudice to Petitioners in a number of ways, including the prejudice they suffered as

a result of not being able to prove their claim that Respondents manufactured

evidence. On appeal, Morgan does not take issue with any of the trial court’s specific

                                           15
findings. Clearly, as set out in the trial court’s order, Respondents’ actions amounted

to more than merely violating the spirit of the law.

      Morgan, however, posits another argument – that the severe sanction of striking

his pleadings was “not ripe for adjudication” because, Morgan says, he timely

complied with all court orders. For this same reason, Morgan claims that his actions

or failure to act cannot be considered intentional or willful. This argument – that he

complied with the trial court’s orders compelling discovery – is belied by the record,

as discussed above. Indeed the trial court cited several bases for its order, including

statutes, any of which would have warranted the striking of Morgan’s answer and

entry of a default judgment, and none of which Morgan challenges on appeal. For

example, Morgan’s failure to attend his first deposition, especially coupled with his

evasive and nonresponsive testimony when he appeared at his second deposition,

clearly warranted the imposition of sanctions, including the extreme sanction of

striking his answer and entry of a default judgment. See OCGA § 9-11-37 (d) (1)

(authorizing the striking of pleadings and the entry of a default judgment against a

party who failed to attend their duly noticed deposition); Dyer v. Spectrum Eng., Inc.,

245 Ga. App. 30 (2) (537 SE2d 175) (2000) (same). And, contrary to Morgan’s

assertions, his pro se status and the alleged improper motives of the Petitioners did not

                                           16
excuse his discovery violations. See OCGA § 9-11-37 (d) (2) (explaining that the

failure to appear at a properly noticed deposition “may not be excused on the ground

that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to attend has applied

for a protective order”). Further, an order compelling attendance at a deposition is

not necessary to authorize sanctions under OCGA § 9-11-37 (2), as long as the failure

to attend was wilful. Dyer, 245 Ga. App. at 31-32 (2). Wilful in this circumstance

simply means a conscious or intentional failure to act, id. at 32 (2), and Morgan makes

no claim that his failure to attend his first deposition was due to accident or

inadvertence.13

      Lastly, it is important to note that the trial court gave Morgan every opportunity

to avoid discovery sanctions; it was only when he demonstrated his unwillingness to

participate in his deposition by giving evasive and non-responsive answers that the

trial court imposed sanctions. See OCGA § 9-11-37 (a) (3) (providing that an evasive

or incomplete answer in a deposition shall be treated as a failure to answer). Based on

the foregoing, Morgan has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its

      13
         Further, although Morgan argues “[i]n considering the issue of willfulness,
the entire period beginning with service of the interrogatories” should be considered,
see Smith v. Nat. Bank, 182 Ga. App. 55, 57 (2) (354 SE2d 678) (1987), he fails to
recognize that this is exactly what the trial court did, as clearly set out in the final
order.
                                           17
discretion by imposing the extreme sanction of striking his answer and entering a

default judgment on the quo warranto petition.

      (b) Next, Morgan contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him

to introduce evidence at the June 28, 2023 hearing regarding the Petitioners’ allegedly

improper motive in requesting “more” discovery and insisting on taking his

deposition. First, it is clear to us that, despite the trial court’s repeated attempts to

explain the discovery process, Morgan failed to appreciate both the nature and scope

of discovery.14 As our Supreme Court explained in General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan,

313 Ga. 811 (874 SE2d 52) (2022), “the scope of discovery under the Civil Practice

Act is broad.” Id. at 814 (2). To this end, “[t]he discovery procedure is to be

construed liberally in favor of supplying a party with the facts.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Id. Morgan’s assertions that Petitioners somehow had to offer

definitive proof of their claims before they were entitled to discovery simply

misapprehends the discovery process. And, as the trial court properly determined,

what Morgan deems his “concerns that this case had political and other overtones”

      14
        The trial court also repeatedly advised Respondents about the benefits of
obtaining counsel, including at the June 28 hearing.
                                           18
was irrelevant to the discovery sanction issues that were the subject of the June 28,

2023 hearing.15 This enumeration is thus also without merit.

       (c) Lastly, Morgan contends the trial court erred by denying his first motion to

dismiss.16 The record shows the first motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to OCGA

§ 9-11-12 (b) (6) and asserted that “[t]he preponderance of the evidence shows that

Petitioners . . . have not and cannot produce enough probative evidence” to overturn

their elections. The trial court denied the first motion to dismiss, finding that the quo

warranto petition presented issues of fact that should be determined by a jury. Morgan

alleges that this was error, arguing, in essence, that Petitioners were required to

demonstrate that they will ultimately prevail in order to survive a motion to dismiss.

That is incorrect.

      15
         We make clear, however, that a party’s right to discovery is not without
boundaries. To that end, a party can seek a protective order for good cause shown. See
OCGA § 9-11-26 (c). However, “[t]he movant has the burden of showing [his]
entitlement to a protective order under this rule.” Buchanan, 313 Ga. at 815 (2). We
again stress that Respondents never moved for a protective order.
      16
         The record shows that Respondents filed two motions to dismiss. Although
Morgan does not specify, within this enumeration, whether he is challenging the
denial of his first or second motion to dismiss, based on his arguments, it seems clear
that this enumeration is limited to the denial of the first motion to dismiss. We will,
therefore, confine our discussion accordingly.
                                           19
      It is well settled that a trial court may not grant relief on a 12 (b) (6) motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim unless

      (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claims
      would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted
      in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant
      could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the
      complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. . . . In
      deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most
      favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such
      pleadings must be resolved in the filing party’s favor.

      (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Scouten v. Amerisave Mtg. Corp., 283 Ga.

72, 73 (1) (656 SE2d 820) (2008). Viewing the petition, which set out specific

allegations concerning Morgan’s activities or non-activities with respect to his District

1 address and his apartment outside the district, as well as the law applicable to

Petitioners’ claims, it is clear that the trial court did not err in denying the motion.

Accordingly, the final judgment is affirmed in Case No. A24A0449.

                                              20
                                 Case No. A24A0450

      4. Turning to the claims raised by Pollard in his appeal, Pollard mostly echoes17

Morgan’s enumerations that the trial court erred by striking his answer and entering

a default judgment,18 by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence concerning

Petitioner’s motives, and by denying his first motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated

in Division 3 (a), (b) and (c) above, Pollard’s enumerations are also without merit.

      5. Pollard also argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to

present testimony from his sister, Angel Williams, to rebut Petitioners’ counsel’s

statements at the July 17, 2023 hearing concerning Williams’ deposition testimony and

the spoliation issue. The transcript from the hearing shows that Pollard was vague

about why he wanted the witness to testify at the hearing, indicating he wanted the

      17
        Any minor differences in the arguments Pollard asserts are not material to our
analysis.
      18
          We note that most of the trial court’s findings and determinations were
entered jointly against “Respondents.” However, with the respect to the spoliation
of evidence, it is worth clarifying that Morgan testified he no longer had the
photographs at issue because he had a new phone, while Pollard repeatedly testified
that the photographs were no longer on his phone but refused to answer any questions
concerning whether or not he had deleted the compelled photographic evidence and
refused to provide any other explanation concerning why the photographs were no
longer on his phone.
                                          21
witness to rebut “things that have been mentioned in the depositions that pertains to

this proceeding and . . . some clarification that need[s] to be done” and never directly

said that he wanted to rebut counsel’s statements as it related to the spoliation issue.

The trial court asked Pollard whether Williams’ testimony went to the merits of where

he lived, and Pollard responded, “yes, indeed.” The trial court then disallowed

Williams’ testimony, but assured Pollard that the court would ignore hearsay

statements made by counsel. Pollard then withdrew his request to call the witness.

Under these circumstances, where Pollard never clearly articulated why he wanted the

witness to testify and then withdrew his request to call the witness, he cannot now

complain that the trial court erred by refusing to allow the witness to testify. The final

judgment is also affirmed in Case No. A24A0450.

      Judgments affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Gobeil, J., concur.

                                           22