Court Opinion

ID: 9551110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:47:55.417166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:04.799754
License: Public Domain

MOISE, Justice (concurring specially). While agreeing with the conclusion reached in the opinion, I have difficulty with the reasoning adopted in arriving there. The opinion indicates there is no ambiguity in the contract and interprets the language used as being clear that the $8,000.00 note and mortgage were not intended as a down payment, but were in lieu thereof. It seems to me that an ambiguity is present by virtue of the statement that purchasers are “not at this time able to make a down payment" but are “willing to give a second mortgage * * * for the sum of $8,000.00, which note and mortgage will be executed on the same date as this contract” and the language appearing in paragraph 1 that “ * * * $8,000.00 of which (the total purchase price of $17,500.-00) is being paid by the execution of a note and second mortgage. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied). As already suggested, the contract is ambiguous as to the exact intent of the parties in the event of default. It is universally recognized that forfeitures are not favored in the law, and this being true it follows naturally that ambiguous language in a contract will be construed, if possible, so as to avoid a forfeiture. I quote the following pertinent language from Ballard v. MacCallum, 15 Cal.2d 439, 101 P.2d 692, 695: “In the instant case we are not required to apply this doctrine (permitting relief from forfeiture provisions) and grant relief from express and unmistakable language compelling a forfeiture. The problem here is much simpler. We have two possible constructions, one of which leads to a forfeiture and the other avoids it. In such a case the policy and rule are settled, both in the interpretation of ordinary contracts and instruments transferring property, that the construction which avoids forfeiture must be made if it is at all possible.” To like effect are Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal.2d 751, 128 P.2d 665; O’Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal.2d 794, 167 P.2d 483, 163 A.L.R. 894; Abercrombie v. Stoddard (1924) 39 Idaho 146, 228 P. 232; Manson v. Dayton (C.C.A. 8, 1907) 153 F. 258. In Hogg v. Forsythe, 198 Ky. 462, 248 S.W. 1008, 1011, is found the following language: “Forfeitures are not favored either at law or in equity. A forfeiture from its nature implies the taking away from one of some pre-existing right, and this the courts will never do unless the equities of the situation are such there is no way to avoid it. “Not only so, courts are always slow and reluctant to declare or enforce a forfeiture, and in the interpretation of a forfeiture clause in a contract will strictly construe it against the party who has invoked it and claims the right of forfeiture. * * * ” If we analyze the forfeiture clause in the present contract wherein it states that “payments made hereunder” may be retained, to determine if the ambiguous provisions require or demand that the note be included thereunder, as “payments,” it becomes clear that the language used does not necessarily require such a result and, accordingly, we should determine otherwise. I would dispose of the case on this basis and not on the doctrine announced in Portner v. Tanner, 30 Wyo. 85, 216 P. 1069, 30 A.L.R. 624, and followed in the opinion of the majority. We have several times recognized the principle that forfeitures are not favored. Stamm v. Buchanan, 55 N.M. 127, 227 P.2d 633; Patten v. Santa Fe Nat. Life Ins. Co., 47 N.M. 202, 138 P.2d 1019; Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 30 N.M. 400, 234 P. 673, 40 A.L.R. 406. The reasons for denying forfeiture here where the contract does not clearly require us to-do otherwise is in accord with the law cited above. There is a line of cases holding that even where a check (or note) is given, upon termination of the contract, and resale of the property, there can be no recovery on the check (or note). The leading case so holding is Portner v. Tanner, supra. This case has been cited consistently and followed by a number of courts, and is relied upon by the majority. However, other courts-have come to a contrary conclusion. Typical is Branwell Inv. Co. v. Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P.2d 913, wherein the conflict is plainly shown and cases on both sides are cited. Gray v. Mitchell, 145 Or. 519, 28 P.2d 631, and Adamczik v. McCauley, 89 Mont. 27, 297 P. 486, and particularly the latter, probably are the best expositions of the rule. On the other side of the proposition are Brodsky v. Linder (D.C.Mun.App.1955) 118 A.2d 803, and Andresen v. Simon, 171 Minn. 168, 213 N.W. 563. Horton v. Hedberg, 143 Colo. 62, 351 P.2d 843, cited in the opinion, and Weitzel v. Alles, 137 Colo. 165, 322 P.2d 698, seemingly coming to a contrary conclusion, also point up the conflict in the cases. For the reasons stated, I concur that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.