Court Opinion

ID: 9781883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:34:55.816206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:41.011212
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ,
dissenting:
I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that Becker, who was told he was being detained, moved to a secluded location, and escorted through the store, was not in custody. Instead, I agree with the trial court that a reasonable person in Becker's position would believe his freedom of action restricted to a degree associated with formal arrest. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision.
Immediately after watching Becker receive the filled prescription from the pharmacist, Detective DeFusco approached Becker, produced his badge and seized the prescription by removing it from Becker's hands. De-Fusco informed Becker that, while not under arrest, he was "being detained for investigation."1 The majority does not even mention the fact that Becker was specifically told he was "detained"; however, this statement is highly significant because it explicitly informed Becker that he was not free to conclude the questioning and leave the pharmacy.
After seizing the prescription, DeFusco stated he and Becker "needed to talk" about an allegedly altered prescription. DeFusco then moved Becker to a semi-secluded employee lounge area not open to the public. When store employees entered the lounge area, DeFusco asked them to leave. After a brief discussion in the lounge, DeFusco escorted Becker back into the store to locate Becker's wife. During the time they were outside of the employee lounge, DeFusco remained with Becker. DeFusco then escorted Becker and his wife back to the lounge area and commenced the interrogation.
Miranda warnings must be administered any time an individual is subjected to custo*268dial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). Here, it is not disputed that DeFuseo's questioning of Becker constituted interrogation. Therefore, the focus of the analysis is on Miranda's custody requirement. "Custodial interrogation" is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The "ultimate inquiry for determining whether a person is 'in custody' for purposes of receiving Miranda protection" is whether "there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983).
In order to determine what cireumstances constitute a restraint on freedom "to a degree associated with formal arrest," a court must ask how a "reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 464 (Colo.2002) (internal citations omitted). Factors considered when determining whether a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would feel that his freedom of movement is restrained "to a degree associated with formal arrest" focus on the degree of authority and control the police officer exerted during the questioning.
The majority asserts that under a totality of the cireumstances analysis, a reasonable person in Becker's situation would not have found the restriction on his freedom of action to be "equivalent to a formal arrest." They come to this conclusion by analogizing the present situation to that in Matheny. There, police had information implicating the involvement of the defendant in several murders. Four officers appeared at the defendant's place of employment and asked if he would accompany them to the police station to "talk." Id. at 456. The defendant agreed and drove himself and one of the officers to the police station. Id. The defendant's mother arrived approximately twenty minutes after the defendant and the officer reached the police station. Id. Soon after her arrival, the officer conducting the questioning informed the defendant and his mother that "they were free to leave at any time, and defendant was not under arrest." Id. at 456-57 (internal quotations omitted). The questioning lasted for an hour and a half and concluded with the officers placing the defendant under arrest. Id. at 457.
This court concluded Matheny was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes until the police placed him under formal arrest. Id. at 467. The factors we used to come to this conclusion were: 1) the defendant was asked, not told, to discuss the investigation; 2) he voluntarily drove himself to the police station for the questioning; 3) onee at the station, he was informed he was not under arrest, and was free to leave at any time. Id.
The situation in the present case differs significantly from that in Matheney. Detective DeFusco did not tell Becker he was free to leave at any time. In fact, while Becker was informed that he was not under arrest, he was explicitly told he was being "detained." By definition, the word "detain" means that a person is not free to leave at any time. Merriam-Webster defines "detain" as "to hold or keep as in custody" and "to restrain, especially from proceeding." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 340 (11th Ed.2003). The Oxford English Dictionary defines "detain" as "to keep from proceeding; delay" and alternatively as to "keep in official custody." Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 703 (6th Ed.1973). Therefore, based on ordinary usage, when an individual is informed by a police officer that he is being "detained," a reasonable person necessarily believes that he is not free to leave the premises and disregard a request to answer the officer's questions.
Here, when DeFusco approached Becker, removed the prescription from his hands, informed him that he was being "detained," led him to the employee lounge, and maintained a close physical distance between himself and Becker, this amounted to a significant show of authority on DeFuseco's part. When told that he is being "detained," a reasonable person would conclude that he *269must comply with the officer's requests until released from the "detention."
In cireumstances different from Becker's, courts have found that individuals were not in custody for Miranda purposes when they were briefly detained by police officers during routine traffic stops or voluntarily went to police stations for questioning. In the vehicle stop context, a short detention of the vehicle's occupants does not amount to custody under Miranda; however, the present situation is vastly different When police officers stop a vehicle and "detain" the driver and passengers, there is an expectation on the part of the occupants that the detention will be brief and last only so long as is necessary for the traffic issue to be resolved. See People v. Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.3d 141, 147 (Colo.2001). This may involve a brief investigation into the vehicle's registration, driver's license status, prior traffic violations, or outstanding citations or warrants.
Because this kind of short detention is expected by the occupants of the vehicle, and necessary to resolution of traffic infractions, a show of authority on the part of the police may be tolerated without a reasonable person feeling that this restraint on movement is to a degree associated with formal arrest. Therefore, during traffic stops, the vehicle cecupants are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes.
Similarly, in voluntary station house questionings, a defendant agrees to go to that particular location. Even if the defendant is accompanied there by police officers, or the questioning occurs in an access-restricted area, the defendant is not in custody because he could elect to leave at any time.
Finally, the analysis and conclusion of the majority implies that if an individual "detained" for questioning is not formally arrested at the conclusion of the questioning, that "detention" does not amount to custody for Miranda purposes. The majority emphasizes that an individual is only in custody when his freedom of movement is restricted in a manner "equivalent to formal arrest," and ignores that Becker was told he was detained. The majority thereby incorrectly asserts that an arrest, or its equivalent, is required for a finding of Miranda custody. However, the proper inquiry instead looks more to whether a reasonable person would feel restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest. Accordingly, the focus of the analysis is not the end result of arrest, but rather the level of restraint a reasonable person would feel during the police interrogation. In the cireumstances here, which are not those of a traffic stop, a reasonable person would understand he was detained, not free to end the detention, and subject to interrogation. The majority fails to explain how a reasonable person would perceive this detention as differing from the restraint of formal arrest.
Because I would affirm the trial court's suppression of Becker's statements made to Detective DeFuseo as the product of ecustodial interrogation without proper Miranda warnings, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state Chief Justice Mul-larkey and Justice Bender join in this dissent.

. The trial court found that Becker was informed he was "detained for investigation." This finding is supported by evidence in the record.