Court Opinion

ID: 9516390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:41:48.298715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:31.700432
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
I would deny leave to appeal, and dissent from the peremptory reversal of the Court of Appeals. I could join in an order granting leave to appeal to consider the jurisprudentially significant issue, decided without oral argument or plenary consideration in the majority opinion.
i
While the majority prefers the approach of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals in Michigan ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dizzy Duck, 203 Mich App 250; 511 NW2d 907 (1994), the determination of the majority of the Court of Appeals in *348that case was not so devoid of reason as to justify peremptory reversal. The majority’s decision to peremptorily reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals belittles its efforts, in the disposition of thése cases, as reflected in its carefully written published opinion in Dizzy Duck, and deprives Larry N. Warren and Robin M. Anger and their counsel of an opportunity to fully brief and orally argue in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Today’s peremptory decision reflects an increasingly common method of deciding cases, a method that does not provide safeguards against hasty and ill-considered decisions, a method that is unsafe.
When this Court grants leave to appeal, there is an opportunity to educate the justices concerning the state of the record and the law through oral argument, as well as visually through briefs. A justice who may have missed a significant point of law or fact on perusal of the materials considered before voting for peremptory reversal might be enlightened and persuaded in the course of oral argument.
Peremptory disposition, without plenary consideration, full briefing, oral argument, and an opportunity for the profession to file briefs as amici curiae, should be reserved for cases in which the law is settled and factual assessment is not required.1 In the instant case, factual and legal *349assessment is required. Peremptory disposition is not appropriate.
n
Because the majority has determined to decide this case peremptorily, I venture the following dissenting opinion on the merits.
Larry N. Warren and Robin M. Anger cannot properly be convicted of accepting the earnings of a prostitute2 or conspiracy to commit that offense3 because a woman working in a massage parlor is *350not a prostitute within the meaning of the Penal Code.
In Dizzy Duck, a majority of the Court of Appeals held that prostitution refers to sexual intercourse for hire, meaning vaginal intercourse. The majority in this Court reverses.
Because the activity in the massage parlor did not include oral sex4 or anal sex, we need not decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in not including oral and anal sex for money within the definition of prostitution.
While it is indeed arguable that the legislative purpose in proscribing prostitution and receiving the earnings of a prostitute includes prohibiting not only vaginal intercourse for money but also oral and anal sex for money, it is unclear whether that legislative purpose included prohibiting, with the same penalty structure for violation, manual sex for money. Massage parlors are a post-World War II phenomenon, appearing long after the enactment of the Penal Code provisions on which this prosecution is based.5
The Legislature distinguished between "sexual contact”6 and "sexual penetration”7 in defining *351criminal sexual conduct, imposing significantly lesser penalties for proscribed sexual contact as compared with proscribed sexual penetration. The majority exceeds this Court’s proper function in taking upon itself equating sexual penetration for money with sexual contact for money. Unmarried teenagers understand that there is a difference between manual sex and "going all the way.”
One of the purposes of legislation proscribing prostitution and receiving the earnings of a prostitute is to protect women from exploitation and degradation. Just as the Legislature saw greater need, by imposing greater penalties, for protecting against unconsented or underage sexual penetration than unconsented or underage sexual contact, the Legislature might conclude that there is a need for greater protection, and a correspondingly more severe penalty structure, where there is sexual penetration (vaginal, anal, or oral) for hire than where there is sexual contact (manual) for hire.
Where there is unlawful sexual penetration, there is greater danger of physical abuse beyond that involved in the sexual penetration, and greater risk of sexually transmitted diseases than where there is unlawful sexual contact. Since those risks are present to a considerably lesser extent where manual sex is involved, it is beyond our proper role to conclude that the Legislature intended or would intend that prostitution include manual sex for hire. I would leave it to the Legislature to consider and decide whether the regulation or proscription of massage parlors should be dealt with at the state or local level, as well as the penalty structure for manual sex for hire and for receiving the earnings of a woman engaged in that activity.
Warren and Anger are also charged with viola*352tion of § 452 of the Penal Code constituting maintenance of a house of ill fame for the purpose of lewdness, but no issue in that regard is presented in this appeal. In the companion Dizzy Duck case, I agree with the majority that the civil abatement statute8 may be employed to abate as a nuisance an establishment, such as the Dizzy Duck, where men are stimulated by women hired for that purpose to masturbate to orgasm. In so ruling, the meaning of "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution” for the purposes of a civil abatement statute has been expanded.
The Court’s role in construing a penal statute is more limited than in construing legislation not involving the imposition of prison sentences. I do not wish to be understood as having expressed an opinion whether § 452 may properly be read as including the imposition of penal sanctions for maintaining a massage parlor.

 People v Wright, 439 Mich 914, 914-915 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Roek v Chippewa Valley Bd of Ed, 430 Mich 314, 322; 422 NW2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v Amerisure Ins Co, 434 Mich 867, 868-875 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 769-770; 456 NW2d 237 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Wrenn, 434 Mich 885, 885-886 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Harkins v Northwest Activity Center, Inc, 434 Mich 896, 899 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, 435 Mich 508, 515; 460 NW2d 194 (1990) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Yahr v Garcia, 436 Mich 872, 872-873 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Universal Underwriters Ins Co v Vallejo, 436 *349Mich 873, 873-874 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Stephens, 437 Mich 903, 903-910 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Berkey, 437 Mich 40, 54; 467 NW2d 6 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Turner v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 437 Mich 35, 38-39; 467 NW2d 4 (1991) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Lepior v Venice Twp, 437 Mich 955, 956-966 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Rochester Hills v Southeastern Oakland Co Resource Recovery Authority, 440 Mich 852, 852-856 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of Eston (Grievance Administrator v Eston), 440 Mich 1205, 1205-1207 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of Callanan, 440 Mich 1207, 1207-1209 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); McFadden v Monroe Civil Service Comm, 440 Mich 890, 890-891 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Holly Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources (Holly Twp v Holly Disposal, Inc), 440 Mich 891, 891-893 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Marzonie v ACIA, 441 Mich 522, 535-539; 495 NW2d 788 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Waleed, 441 Mich 902, 902-903 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Hardison, 441 Mich 913, 914-916 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Justice, 441 Mich 916, 917-919 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v LaClear, 442 Mich 867, 867-871 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); Auto-Owners Ins Co v City of Clare, 446 Mich 1, 16-18; 521 NW2d 480 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting); Weisgerber v Ann Arbor Center for the Family, 447 Mich 963, 964-969 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting); Howard v White, 447 Mich 395, 405-410; 523 NW2d 220 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting).
See Schweiker v Hansen, 450 US 785, 791; 101 S Ct 1468; 67 L Ed 2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error”); Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 457-458; 99 S Ct 698; 58 L Ed 2d 717 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Summary reversal 'should be reserved for palpably clear cases of . . . error.’ Eaton v Tulsa, 415 US 697, 707 [94 S Ct 1228; 39 L Ed 2d 693 (1974)] [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]”).

 MCL 750.457; MSA 28.712.

 MCL 750.157a, 750.457; MSA 28.354(1), 28.712.

 But see People v Lino, 447 Mich 567, 584, n 8; 527 NW2d 434 (1994) (Levin, J.).

 Chapter LXVII of the Penal Code, 1931 PA 328, concerns prostitution. Sections 452 and 457 were included in that enactment.

 "Sexual contact” includes the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. [MCL 750.520a(k); MSA 28.788(l)(k).]

 "Sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required. [MCL 750.520a(1); MSA 28.788(1)(1).]

 MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801.