Court Opinion

ID: 9533426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:31:45.162256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:02.931173
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the reversal as to count one but dissent from the reversal as to count two. In my opinion, the case of Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 [77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639], is not authority for the majority’s reversal as to both counts, but on the contrary, clearly indicates that the judgment of conviction on the second count should be affirmed.
In the Eoviaro case, the two charges were (1) sale of narcotics and (2) illegal transportation of narcotics. Both charges arose out of a single transaction occurring on August 12, 1954. The Government did not “defend the nondisclosure of Doe’s identity with respect to Count 1, which charged a sale of heroin to John Doe, ’ ’ but it sought ‘ ‘ to sustain the judgment on the basis of the conviction on Count 2, charging illegal transportation of narcotics.” (Pp. 58-59.) The court there held that, under the circumstances, it was reversible error as to both counts for the trial court to deny disclosure of the identity of the informer.
In so holding with respect to the second count, the court, after stating that “no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable” (p. 62), was careful to point out that the second count there did not “charge mere possession” (p. 63); that the informer had “been present with the accused at the occurrence of the alleged crime” of illegal transportation (p. 55) ; and that “the Government’s informer was the sole participant, other than the accused, in the transaction charged” (p. 64). In the present case, count two did charge “mere possession”; the informer was not “present with the accused at the occurrence of the alleged crime” charged in count two; and the informer was not a participant in the offense of “mere possession” on November-27, 1956, as distinguished from the prior offense of sale on November 26, 1956.
If, as declared in the Eoviaro case, the problem is one of “balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense”; and if the question of error in refusing disclosure depends *812“on the particular circumstances of each case” (p. 62), I am of the view that the balance here is clearly in favor of the public interest. The compelling reasons for preventing disclosure of the identity of informers, except where the interests of justice demand it, are forcefully stated in the dissent of Mr. Justice Clark in the Eoviaro ease. Here, however, we have only to follow the implications of the majority opinion in that ease in order to sustain the judgment of conviction as to count two.
I would therefore reverse as to count one but affirm as to count two.
Shenk, J., concurred.