Court Opinion

ID: 9862507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:16:36.054482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:42.272621
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LYTTON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the Property Tax Code controls plaintiffs’ request for property assessment records from defendant. However, I dissent from the majority’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint and its refusal to address the reasonableness of defendant’s fees under the Code. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that (1) plaintiffs submitted a request to defendant pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, (2) defendant replied to the request by demanding that plaintiffs pay $2,456.70 as a “copying charge,” and (3) defendant refused to reconsider the copying charge. Plaintiffs sought an order compelling defendant to release the requested information at a cost “not to exceed the actual cost of reproduction as contemplated by law.” Although plaintiffs’ complaint references the Act, “the complaint essentially raised an allegation regarding the reasonableness of [defendant’s] charge.” Sage Information Services v. King, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1035, 910 N.E.2d 1180, 1189 (2009). The Code, which applies to plaintiffs’ record request, explicitly requires that all fees charged be “reasonable.” 35 ILCS 200/9—20 (West 2006). Thus, the majority erred in refusing to examine the reasonableness of defendant’s fees. Unlike the majority, I would review the trial court’s finding that the fees in this case were reasonable and find that the question of reasonableness of the $2,456.70 fee is “a substantial factual dispute.” King, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 910 N.E.2d at 1189. Summary judgment should not have been granted. In this case, plaintiffs compared the $2,456.70 fee defendant charged for reproducing the property tax records with the fees charged by other counties ($0 to $80) for similar record requests. In an attempt to justify his fees, defendant comes up with a complicated formula: he divides the total budget for his office by the total number of parcels, multiplies that number by a meaningless percentage, and then divides the result in half to reach $2,456.70. This perplexing and confusing explanation of defendant’s fees fails to establish that they were reasonable. Because I believe the trial court decided a controverted material issue of fact, I would reverse and remand. See King, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 910 N.E.2d at 1189. On remand, defendant would have to present evidence of (1) the amount of time and labor defendant and/or his staff spent on plaintiffs’ request, (2) the novelty and difficulty of responding to plaintiffs’ request, (3) the skill required to respond to plaintiffs’ request, (4) the fee customarily charged by similarly situated counties for similar requests, (5) any time limitations imposed by plaintiffs, and (6) defendant’s actual out-of-pocket costs associated ■with the request. Only after obtaining such information can the trial court properly determine if defendant’s fees are reasonable.