Court Opinion

ID: 9404931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 19:01:19.139814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:18.088136
License: Public Domain

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                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-12562
                           ____________________

        A.P.,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        FAYETTE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
        DR. JOSEPH BARROW, JR.,
        in his oﬃcial capacity
        DR. DAN LANE,
        DR. CURTIS ARMOUR, JR.,
        DR. BRANDI JOHNSON,
        in their oﬃcial and individual capacities,

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                  21-12562

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00109-TCB
                            ____________________

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and ED CARNES, Cir-
        cuit Judges.
        LUCK, Circuit Judge:
                A.P., a high school student in the Fayette County School
        District, reported to a teacher and counselors that she was sexually
        assaulted by fellow student J.B. After investigating, counselors and
        administrators concluded that the sexual conduct was consensual,
        and A.P. and J.B. were expelled for violating a school policy pro-
        hibiting consensual sexual conduct at school. A.P. sued the school
        district for discriminating and retaliating against her, in violation of
        Title IX, and the school district and principal for violating her equal
        protection rights. The district court granted summary judgment
        for the school district and principal. After oral argument and care-
        ful review of the record and the briefs, we affirm.
            FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               A.P. and J.B. met during their ﬁrst year at Fayette County
        High School in the 2016–2017 academic year. They were “ac-
        quaintances”—that is, they didn’t have “actual conversation[s]” or
        interact on social media, but they said hello in the hallway.
              At the beginning of their second year, J.B. approached A.P.
        “out of the blue” and asked “why [she] looked so lonely.” This was
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        21-12562               Opinion of the Court                       3

        their ﬁrst interaction of the 2017–2018 academic year, and A.P.
        “was kind of iﬀy about it” because she didn’t “really associate with
        him like that.” J.B. asked A.P. for her Instagram handle. They mes-
        saged and video chatted that day.
               The next day, the two walked together “around the school
        building” and “hallways.”
              The day after that, J.B. told A.P. to stay after school. A.P.
        “stayed after school because he told [her] to,” but when the school
        day ended, A.P. hadn’t heard from J.B., so she went to her science
        teacher for extra credit work. While A.P. was doing extra credit,
        J.B. messaged her to “come out” of the classroom. A.P. asked,
        “Why?” J.B. said, “Say yo mom here[.] Just come on.” A.P. re-
        sponded, “My mom not here.” J.B. replied, “SAY YO MOM HERE
        AND WALK OUT.” A.P. said, “Ok hold on.” J.B. insisted that she
        “HURRY” and told A.P. to meet him “[w]here [they] were last
        time.” A.P. understood him to mean the place where they’d walked
        around the day before. She agreed to meet J.B. because she
        “thought he just wanted to talk or hang out.”
               Surveillance footage shows that A.P. met J.B. near the school
        gym. A.P. and J.B. were mostly out of camera view in an alcove,
        but the footage shows that they “embrace[d], exchange[d] a kiss,”
        and held hands. The footage also shows that A.P. emerged from
        the alcove to “look[] down the hallway” at least eight times within
        the span of an hour.
              After about ﬁfty-three minutes, A.P. and J.B. came back into
        the camera’s view. The footage shows that the students picked up
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12562

        their belongings and walked down a hallway. They talked, hugged
        twice, and then A.P. reached out for a third hug to “keep him okay
        with [her]” before they went their separate ways.
               A.P. didn’t tell anyone that night what had happened with
        J.B. She messaged him, “Hey” and “Ft,” asking him to FaceTime,
        but he didn’t answer. A.P. sent these messages to “be cordial with
        him so he wouldn’t tell anybody what happened.”
               A.P. messaged J.B. again the next morning. This time he an-
        swered. He said, “Stop textin me,” and told A.P. they were not “a
        thing” so she shouldn’t “go around skoo tellin people” they were
        because she’d “look stupid.” A.P. texted back, “Never said we was,”
        and J.B. responded, “Good and . . . don’t look at me or speak to
        me.” A.P. asked, “Why?” J.B. replied, “Cuz I said so.” A.P. said, “So
        you used me,” and J.B. answered, “Used u for wat? . . . We never
        did shii so wtf u talkin bout . . . I never liked u.”
                                  The Investigation
               The same day J.B. told A.P. to stop texting him, a teacher A.P.
        trusted, Aminah Mitchell, saw A.P. and noticed “she looked visibly
        upset.” “[I]t was deﬁnitely clear” to Ms. Mitchell that, if A.P.
        “hadn’t been crying” already, “she was about to cry.” Ms. Mitchell
        brought A.P. into her classroom to talk privately. A.P. told Ms.
        Mitchell that J.B. “made her do things that she didn’t want to do,”
        and that J.B. “put his hand around her neck.” A.P. also showed
        Ms. Mitchell “some text messages” J.B. sent.
              Ms. Mitchell thought A.P. may have been sexually assaulted
        and so she “tried to convince” A.P. to “talk to a counselor.”
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        21-12562               Opinion of the Court                         5

        Although A.P. “didn’t want to,” Ms. Mitchell convinced her that she
        “need[ed] to talk to somebody about it.”
                Ms. Mitchell tried to report A.P.’s incident to the lead coun-
        selor, but she wasn’t available. The lead counselor sent Counselor
        Jazzmon Parham to speak to Ms. Mitchell instead. Ms. Mitchell
        relayed A.P.’s report that J.B. “made [A.P.] do things she didn’t want
        to do,” and Ms. Mitchell “mentioned speciﬁcally the comment
        [A.P.] made about [J.B.’s] hand around her neck.”
                Counselor Parham told Assistant Principal Curtis Armour
        that they “might have had a rape in [the] school.” Counselor Par-
        ham said that “it was reported to him that a student may have been
        forced to do something that she didn’t want to do.” Assistant Prin-
        cipal Armour directed Counselor Parham “to get a female counse-
        lor, interview the student,” and report back if he needed to “take
        further action.”
               Counselor Parham “went to physically get” J.B., because “if
        there was a situation of sexual assault or misconduct,” Counse-
        lor Parham “didn’t want [J.B.] to be lost in the shuﬄe of [school]
        dismissal.” Counselor Parham brought J.B. to a conference room
        and asked J.B. if he’d “been physically involved with a student at
        the school, and he said no.”
               Meanwhile, Counselor Jennifer Travis met with A.P., and
        Counselor Parham joined after he ﬁnished speaking with J.B. A.P.
        told the counselors she “did something [she] didn’t want to do” but
        “didn’t feel comfortable saying” more. Counselor Travis assured
        A.P. that anything she said wouldn’t “leave the room,” so A.P. “felt
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-12562

        more comfortable talking.” Eventually, A.P. agreed to write on a
        sticky note what she did; A.P wrote a slang term for oral sex.
               A.P. told the counselors that she “wasn’t going to name” the
        male student involved and “just wanted everything to end.” A.P.
        “wasn’t trying to get him in trouble,” she said, because she didn’t
        like “confrontation.” But when Counselor Parham asked A.P.
        whether the male student was J.B. because “other students ha[d]
        complained” about him, A.P. conﬁrmed it was.
                Counselor Parham observed that A.P. was “upset” with J.B.
        during the meeting. Counselor Parham recalled that he asked A.P.
        whether J.B. made her “do something [she] didn’t want to do, or”
        whether she did “something that [she] wouldn’t normally do be-
        cause [she] like[d] him?” According to Counselor Parham, A.P. “re-
        sponded that she liked him” and “did something she wouldn’t nor-
        mally do.” Counselor Parham also recalled that A.P. said “she
        wanted to do something because it was his birthday” and she
        “didn’t really want to, but she did it because she really liked him.”
        But, according to A.P., Counselor Parham never asked her ques-
        tions like that, and she was “never down for [J.B.].” A.P. explained
        she hadn’t even known it was J.B.’s birthday until he told her that
        day, and she never oﬀered him oral sex.
                Based on these statements, the counselors concluded that
        the school was “dealing with a consensual sexual act”—that A.P.
        liked J.B., “wanted him to be her boyfriend,” and was “upset that
        he wasn’t talking to her as much either that day or the day before.”
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        21-12562               Opinion of the Court                         7

        “[I]t just seemed that it was maybe a relationship gone awry,”
        Counselor Travis explained.
               The counselors told the lead counselor what they’d learned
        from meeting with A.P., and the lead counselor relayed the coun-
        selors’ ﬁndings to Assistant Principal Armour. The lead counselor
        reported that A.P. and J.B. “had seemed to engage in a consensual
        sexual act in the school building” and that A.P. told Counselor
        Travis it was consensual. Based on this information, Assistant Prin-
        cipal Armour believed the sexual act was consensual.
               A day later, Assistant Principal Armour spoke with Assistant
        Principal Brandi Johnson about the “consensual sexual relation-
        ship” between A.P. and J.B. The assistant principals went to Ms.
        Mitchell and spoke with her. Ms. Mitchell said A.P. “had reported
        to her that someone made her do something that she didn’t want
        to do.”
               Assistant Principal Johnson removed A.P. from class and
        took her to Assistant Principal Armour’s oﬃce. The assistant prin-
        cipals asked A.P. “what happened,” but A.P. said she “wasn’t going
        to talk” and “just want[ed] everything to be done with.” Because
        the assistant principals couldn’t convince A.P. to talk, they took her
        phone and put her in the in-school suspension room as “a holding
        area so that [they] could investigate with the male student.” A.P.
        wasn’t technically suspended at that point, but she wasn’t “allowed
        to return to her regular classes.”
               While A.P. waited in the in-school suspension room, the as-
        sistant principals questioned J.B. At ﬁrst, J.B. said he met up with
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                21-12562

        A.P. because of “something to do with a birthday present,” and
        “she put her hands in his boxer shorts, but they didn’t do anything.”
        But J.B. ultimately admitted that A.P. performed oral sex on him,
        and he gave the impression that the sexual encounter was consen-
        sual.
               The assistant principals reviewed the surveillance footage
        and reported the incident to Principal Dan Lane. They told the
        principal the footage showed two students going into the gym al-
        cove, both students coming out “to see if people were around,” and
        “the two students at the end of the video holding hands and kissing
        on the stairs.”
             The assistant principals spoke to A.P. and J.B. to let them
        know they’d “viewed the video.” A.P. admitted that “she had per-
        formed oral sex on [J.B.]” but said “she didn’t want to do” it.
               After the students “separately admitted that the act had
        taken place,” the assistant principals called their parents and told
        the principal that “both students had admitted to [the] oral sex
        transaction.” The principal reviewed the surveillance footage him-
        self. He found that in “the last ten minutes of the video” the stu-
        dents embraced, hugged, and kissed, and that when J.B. tried to
        leave, A.P. “pull[ed] him back” and “they embrace[d] again” before
        going “their separate ways.”
              The principal concluded the sexual act was “consensual.”
        “There was nothing to substantiate or to make us believe that there
        had been any type of physical coercion,” he explained. The princi-
        pal contacted the assistant superintendent of operations to discuss
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        21-12562                Opinion of the Court                           9

        appropriate discipline for the students. The principal outlined
        “how the investigation unfolded,” and told the assistant superinten-
        dent that A.P. had initially “claimed that it was not consensual” be-
        fore “quickly admitt[ing] to . . . a counselor[] that she did it because
        she wanted to” and because “she liked him.” The principal ex-
        plained that he was thinking “a ten-day out-of-school suspension
        and referral to disciplinary tribunal was appropriate.” The assistant
        superintendent conﬁrmed with the principal that A.P. had “admit-
        ted” the act was consensual. The principal was “very adamant”
        that she had. The assistant superintendent then “agreed with” the
        principal’s decision to suspend the students and proceed with disci-
        plinary tribunals.
                         The Disciplinary Tribunal and Appeal
                The principal directed the assistant principals to “assign the
        discipline.” The assistant principals informed A.P. that she was sus-
        pended for ten days and would have “a tribunal hearing” under
        Georgia’s Public School Disciplinary Tribunal Act. See O.C.G.A.
        § 20-2-750. The principal charged A.P. with violating rule 28 of the
        Fayette County student code of conduct and recommended expul-
        sion. Rule 28 prohibits, at all hours, the “commission of an act of
        sexual contact” on school grounds. A.P. received notice of the dis-
        ciplinary hearing and was represented by counsel.
                At the start of the hearing, the principal told the tribunal that
        he’d “prove with surveillance camera video and testimony of sev-
        eral [school] staﬀ members” that A.P. violated rule 28 “by commit-
        ting sexual impropriety” in the school building. He showed the
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                     21-12562

        tribunal the surveillance footage and explained there was “a lot of
        time on the 90-minute video” during which the students were hid-
        den from view in the alcove.
               Ms. Mitchell, Counselor Parham, Counselor Travis, and As-
        sistant Principal Armour testiﬁed for the school. Counselor Par-
        ham testiﬁed that A.P. told him she performed the sexual act “be-
        cause she liked” J.B. Counselor Travis testiﬁed that A.P. never sug-
        gested she’d been assaulted and instead “seemed bothered” that
        after the sexual act occurred “the relationship” with J.B. hadn’t
        “continued.” A.P., however, testiﬁed that she repeatedly told J.B.
        she wouldn’t perform oral sex and that J.B. grabbed her throat and
        kept telling her to do it “over and over and over.”
               At the end of the hearing, the principal declared, “There was
        no coercion here, only a young lady who chose to give another stu-
        dent a gift and became angry after the incident when the young
        man” didn’t give “her the aﬀection that she felt she deserved.” Af-
        ter the hearing, the tribunal concluded that A.P. violated rule 28 by
        committing “sexual improprieties” and expelled her for the rest of
        the academic year.1 A.P. appealed to the county school board, but
        the board aﬃrmed her expulsion.
              A.P. then appealed to the state board of education. She ar-
        gued that her expulsion for violating rule 28 should be overturned
        because there wasn’t evidence that she’d (1) meant to violate rule

        1
         J.B. waived his right to a disciplinary hearing and accepted the same punish-
        ment.
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        21-12562                Opinion of the Court                         11

        28, (2) “caused a disruption or danger at school,” or (3) consensu-
        ally engaged in sexual conduct.
               The state board aﬃrmed A.P.’s suspension and expulsion.
        The board concluded that a rule 28 violation didn’t require a show-
        ing that the student meant to violate the code of conduct or did
        anything disruptive or dangerous. The board also found that there
        was evidence in the record showing that A.P. engaged in a consen-
        sual sexual act. The board explained that, although A.P. initially
        told Counselors Travis and Parham that J.B. “forced her to perform
        oral sex,” she then later admitted that “she did it because she liked
        him.” The board noted that both counselors (and an assistant prin-
        cipal) had testiﬁed at the tribunal that A.P. “admitted that she per-
        formed oral sex on a male student because she liked him” and never
        “t[old] them that she was coerced into performing the sexual act.”
        This evidence, the board determined, provided enough support to
        ﬁnd that A.P. had violated rule 28.
                                     The Lawsuit
               A.P. sued the school district and principal in his oﬃcial and
        individual capacities. She brought a Title IX sex discrimination
        claim against the school district, alleging that it was deliberately in-
        diﬀerent to her sexual assault report by refusing to take “eﬀective
        steps to address [it].” A.P. also asserted a Title IX retaliation claim
        against the school district, alleging that, instead of appropriately
        addressing her sexual assault report, the school district retaliated
        against her by kicking her out of school. Finally, A.P. alleged that
        the school district and principal violated her equal protection rights
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12562

        by “maintain[ing] a policy, custom, and practice” of responding to
        sexual assault reports with “deliberate indiﬀerence.”
               The school district and principal moved for summary judg-
        ment. As to the Title IX sex discrimination claim, the school district
        argued that A.P. hadn’t been subjected to “pervasive” discrimina-
        tion; nor had the school district been “deliberately indiﬀerent” be-
        cause it investigated her sexual assault complaint and found that
        the sexual act was consensual. And because the investigation
        showed that A.P. had engaged in consensual sexual conduct on
        school grounds, the school district maintained that “its decision to
        go through the disciplinary tribunal process” wasn’t Title IX retali-
        ation; it was discipline for violating rule 28. The school district’s
        and principal’s “thorough[] investigat[ion]” in response to A.P.’s
        sexual assault report—“a far cry from doing ‘virtually nothing’” or
        responding with “deliberate indiﬀerence”—showed that neither
        defendant violated A.P.’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
                The district court granted summary judgment for the school
        district and principal. As to A.P.’s Title IX sex discrimination claim,
        the district court concluded that J.B.’s conduct was not “pervasive”
        because the school district had received no reports of prior sexual
        misconduct. The district court also found that the school district
        hadn’t responded with “deliberate indiﬀerence” to A.P.’s sexual as-
        sault report because it “investigat[ed]” the report and “ultimately
        concluded that A.P. engaged in consensual oral sex at school in vi-
        olation of the code of conduct.” As to the Title IX retaliation claim,
        the “evidence show[ed],” the district court explained, “that A.P. was
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        21-12562               Opinion of the Court                       13

        punished based on” the code of conduct violation and not, as she
        alleged, “because she reported a sexual assault.” Finally, A.P.’s
        equal protection claim failed, the district court noted, because A.P.
        hadn’t demonstrated that the school district and principal ever
        “acted with deliberate indiﬀerence” to known sexual assaults.
                            STANDARD OF REVIEW
               “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, apply-
        ing the same standard as the district court.” Newcomb v. Spring Creek
        Cooler Inc., 926 F.3d 709, 713 (11th Cir. 2019). “We must view all of
        the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
        draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Id. (cleaned
        up). “Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘there is no genu-
        ine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
        judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
                                  DISCUSSION
               We break our discussion into three parts, tracking A.P.’s
        three claims. First, we consider whether the district court properly
        granted summary judgment for the school district on A.P.’s Title
        IX sex discrimination claim because the discrimination A.P. faced
        wasn’t “pervasive” and the school district hadn’t been “deliberately
        indifferent” to it. Next, we discuss whether the district court cor-
        rectly granted summary judgment for the school district on A.P.’s
        Title IX retaliation claim because she was suspended and expelled
        for violating the student code of conduct—not in retaliation for re-
        porting a sexual assault. Finally, we review whether the district
        court was right to grant summary judgment for the school district
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12562

        and principal on A.P.’s equal protection claim because they were
        not deliberately indifferent to reports of sexual assault.
                       A.P.’s Title IX Sex Discrimination Claim
                Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, “[n]o
        person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
        from participation in, be denied the beneﬁts of, or be subjected to
        discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
        [f ]ederal ﬁnancial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The Supreme
        Court has said that this statute creates a private cause of action for
        “student-on-student” sex discrimination. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D.
        v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). Federal fund-
        ing recipients are liable for student-on-student sexual assaults if the
        recipients are “deliberately indiﬀerent” to incidents, “of which they
        have actual knowledge, that [are] so severe, pervasive, and objec-
        tively oﬀensive that [they] can be said to deprive the victims of ac-
        cess to the educational opportunities or beneﬁts provided by the
        school.” Id. at 650.
               The Supreme Court “imposed this high standard to guard
        against the imposition of ‘sweeping liability.’ Unlike an adult work-
        place, children ‘may regularly interact in a manner that would be
        unacceptable among adults.’” Hill v. Cundiﬀ, 797 F.3d 948, 969 (11th
        Cir. 2015) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 651–52). “Some risk” of sexual
        misconduct “is inherent to the enterprise of public education, in
        particular, because public schools must educate even the most trou-
        blesome and deﬁant students.” Id. “The high burden of Davis en-
        sures [that] school districts are not ﬁnancially crippled merely
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        21-12562                Opinion of the Court                          15

        because immature kids occasionally engage in immature sexual be-
        havior.” Id. at 970.
               Here, the district court concluded A.P. had not met Davis’s
        high burden. J.B.’s conduct, the district court explained, was not
        “pervasive”; nor was the school “deliberately indiﬀerent” to A.P.’s
        report of sexual assault.
                                       Pervasive
               We ask, ﬁrst, whether the sex discrimination, of which the
        school district had actual knowledge, “was suﬃciently ‘severe, per-
        vasive, and objectively oﬀensive.’” Id. at 972 (quoting Davis, 526
        U.S. at 651). The behavior must be pervasive “enough to have a
        ‘systemic eﬀect’ of denying equal access to an education.” Id.
        (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 652). “We take this to mean that gender
        discrimination must be more widespread than a single instance of
        one-on-one peer [sex discrimination] and that the eﬀects of the
        [misconduct] touch the whole or entirety of an educational pro-
        gram or activity.” Hawkins v. Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279,
        1289 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (noting that,
        generally, a “single instance” of one-on-one sex discrimination
        won’t have “a systemic eﬀect on educational programs”).
                Only in “unique” circumstances—when sexual assaults were
        part of a “continuous series of events” constituting a larger
        scheme—have we found a single sexual assault incident suﬃcient
        to satisfy Title IX. See, e.g., Hill, 797 F.3d at 972–73; Williams v. Bd.
        of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2007). In Williams, for
        example, “a ringleader . . . lured the victim to his territory and then
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12562

        conspired” with two other student-athletes “to commit two sepa-
        rate acts of sexual assault” (and a third attempted assault) “over two
        hours.” Williams, 477 F.3d at 1298. This “gang rape,” we con-
        cluded, “diﬀer[ed] markedly from the rarely actionable . . . single
        incident mentioned in Davis and Hawkins” because it featured “a
        continuous series of events” and was therefore pervasive. Id. at
        1288 n.3, 1298.
                Similarly, in Hill, we found a single sexual assault incident
        suﬃciently pervasive because school “administrators eﬀectively
        participated” in it by setting the plaintiﬀ up in a “botched rape-bait
        scheme” to “catch” the perpetrator “in the act.” 797 F.3d at 972–
        73. We reviewed the perpetrator’s documented past sexual as-
        saults; the perpetrator’s two weeks of sexually propositioning the
        plaintiﬀ; the plaintiﬀ’s complaints about the perpetrator to the
        school board; the board’s “‘catch in the act’ policy that motivated”
        the bungled “sting operation”; and, “after the rape, the [b]oard’s
        utter failure to respond to [the plaintiﬀ]’s traumatic injury and ex-
        perience.” Id.
               The assault in Hill, we said, was “materially diﬀerent” from
        “the rarely actionable, theoretical single incident mentioned in Da-
        vis.” Id. at 973 (citation omitted). “Like the rape in Williams,” a
        jury could ﬁnd the perpetrator’s rape “was the culmination of a
        continuous series of events”—two weeks of sexual harassment by
        the perpetrator, followed by additional sex discrimination by the
        school when it used the plaintiﬀ as “bait”—and therefore “perva-
        sive.” Id. (cleaned up). But we cautioned that our decision rested
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        21-12562                Opinion of the Court                        17

        on Hill’s “highly unique and extreme” facts, which we hoped would
        “never again be repeated.” Id.
                They were not repeated here. The facts of this case (even
        when viewed in A.P.’s favor) are unlike the highly unique and ex-
        treme facts in Williams and Hill. The summary judgment evidence
        here showed that J.B. did not engage in a conspiratorial “scheme to
        target, isolate, and ultimately assault A.P.” through “a continuous
        series of events.” There was no “gang rape” conspiracy, like in Wil-
        liams, or a school-orchestrated “sting operation” alongside prior
        documented sexual assaults, like in Hill. J.B.’s disciplinary record
        didn’t include prior sexual assault incidents. And there was no sum-
        mary judgment evidence showing that A.P. felt harassed by J.B. be-
        fore the reported assault or that J.B. talked to A.P. as part of a pre-
        meditated scheme to assault her. In short, this appeal involves the
        severe single incident the Supreme Court has said isn’t actionable
        under Title IX. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 652–53.
                A.P. responds that she “need not” show that the discrimina-
        tion was “pervasive” because the school district’s “conduct here—
        punishing and ultimately expelling [her]—itself directly denied her
        equal access to the institution’s resources and opportunities.” But,
        for peer-to-peer sex discrimination to be actionable under Title IX,
        the Supreme Court has said that the discrimination itself—not the
        school’s response to it—must be “pervasive.” See id. at 650; accord
        Hill, 797 F.3d at 972; Hawkins, 322 F.3d at 1288–89. The single in-
        stance here falls short of that “high standard.” Hill, 797 F.3d at 969.
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  21-12562

                               Deliberate Indiﬀerence
               A.P. also failed to establish that the school district was “de-
        liberately indiﬀerent” to her sexual assault report. See Hill, 797 F.3d
        at 973. “[F]unding recipients are deliberately indiﬀerent ‘only
        where the recipient’s response to the [misconduct] or lack [of re-
        sponse] is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circum-
        stances.” Id. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648) “A clearly unreasona-
        ble response causes students to undergo” sex discrimination “or
        makes them more vulnerable to it.” Id.
                 But a school district is not deliberately indiﬀerent when, af-
        ter it receives a sexual assault report, it conducts a reasonable inves-
        tigation and determines, based on the record, that there’s not
        enough evidence to support the allegation. See, e.g., Doe v. Sch. Bd.
        of Broward Cnty., 604 F.3d 1248, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2010); Davis v.
        DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1367, 1373–74 (11th Cir. 2000); Sauls
        v. Pierce Cnty. Sch. Dist., 399 F.3d 1279, 1285–87 (11th Cir. 2005). In
        Doe, for example, a student complained that she had been sexually
        harassed by her teacher. 604 F.3d at 1260. The student’s “complaint
        was the ﬁrst allegation of sexual misconduct against” the teacher
        by a student at the school. Id. The school board investigated. Id.
        It “obtained written statements” from the student and teacher;
        “timely reported the incident” to the school board’s special investi-
        gative unit; “placed [the teacher] on administrative leave for the re-
        mainder of the semester”; and had an investigator interview the
        student and teacher, obtain sworn statements, and ﬁle a report with
        the school board’s professional standards committee. Id. The
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        21-12562               Opinion of the Court                        19

        committee then reviewed the report and “concluded that there was
        insuﬃcient evidence to support . . . further disciplinary action.” Id.
        It was “unlikely,” we said, “that this investigation, though imper-
        fect, could be viewed as clearly unreasonable” because, “though
        the investigator” and the school district “arguably” should’ve taken
        additional measures, those “omission[s]” and “deﬁciencies” didn’t
        amount to a decision by the school board not to remedy the viola-
        tion. Id. at 1260, 1262 (cleaned up).
               Likewise, in DeKalb County, the school district received a sex-
        ual assault complaint from a student against a teacher. 233 F.3d at
        1372. It was the ﬁrst allegation of sexual misconduct against the
        teacher. Id. The school started an investigation and interviewed
        the teacher, the victim, and other students. Id. at 1373. The prin-
        cipal—after wrongfully but reasonably “conclud[ing] that nothing
        of a sexual or inappropriate nature had taken place”—“instituted
        corrective measures.” Id. at 1375. We found that, under these cir-
        cumstances, the school district had “responded with anything but
        deliberate indiﬀerence” to the student’s complaint. Id. at 1373.
               Sauls is similar. There, the school district received several
        sexual assault reports against a teacher. 399 F.3d at 1285. It re-
        sponded by “investigating the allegations and interviewing the rel-
        evant parties.” Id. The investigator shared his ﬁndings with his su-
        pervisor, and the school district took “corrective action” by admon-
        ishing the teacher and directing her to avoid being alone with male
        students. Id. at 1286. These actions, we concluded, showed that
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12562

        the school district’s response was reasonable and not deliberately
        indiﬀerent. Id. at 1285.
               Here, the school district’s response to A.P.’s sexual assault
        report was in line with the reasonable responses in Doe, DeKalb
        County, and Sauls. Right after A.P. suggested to Ms. Mitchell that
        she’d been sexually assaulted, she was referred to school counselors
        and J.B. was removed from the student body and segregated from
        A.P. The counselors investigated, met with A.P. and J.B., and in the
        end concluded that they were “dealing with a consensual sexual
        act.” They reported their ﬁndings to the lead counselor, who re-
        layed them to an assistant principal. Two assistant principals then
        followed up with A.P. and J.B., spoke with Ms. Mitchell, and re-
        viewed the surveillance footage. They concluded that A.P.’s “claim
        didn’t have substantiation and that [she and J.B.] had had consen-
        sual sex.” They shared their ﬁndings with the principal, who re-
        viewed the footage himself. Only then, after the school had inves-
        tigated and concluded that the sexual conduct was consensual, did
        the principal suspend A.P. and refer her to the disciplinary tribunal.
                Although the school’s investigation may not have been “per-
        fect,” it was no less “thorough” than the ones we found reasonable
        in Doe, DeKalb County, and Sauls. See Doe, 604 F.3d at 1260–61. The
        school responded reasonably to A.P.’s report by diligently investi-
        gating and reaching a conclusion supported by the results of the
        investigation. The school was not deliberately indiﬀerent.
              We’re unconvinced by A.P.’s two counterarguments. First,
        she argues that the state board of education was deliberately
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        21-12562               Opinion of the Court                        21

        indiﬀerent to her sexual assault report because it interpreted rule
        28 to “treat[] consensual and nonconsenual sexual contact as the
        same for disciplinary purposes.”
                But A.P. misreads the state board’s decision. The state board
        distilled A.P.’s appeal down to three arguments: that her punish-
        ment should be overturned because there wasn’t evidence that she
        (1) consented to oral sex, (2) intended to violate the student code
        of conduct, or (3) caused a disruption or danger at school. The
        state board addressed all three arguments. It began with the second
        and third, which it explained were irrelevant because rule 28 didn’t
        require evidence of intent to violate the code of conduct or evi-
        dence “that the prohibited conduct caused a disruption of or dan-
        ger to the school.”
               The state board then pivoted to the ﬁrst argument: consent.
        The state board explained that, “at the disciplinary hearing, two
        school counselors and an assistant principal testiﬁed” that A.P. “did
        not tell them that she was coerced” but instead “admitted that she
        performed oral sex on a male student because she liked him.” The
        state board found that this evidence supported the school district’s
        ﬁnding that A.P. had engaged in sexual conduct consensually. The
        state board never adopted an interpretation of rule 28 that read out
        a consent requirement.
               Second, A.P. argues that, if a student reports that she was
        sexually assaulted, the school district is prohibited by Title IX from
        ever disciplining her for engaging in that sexual act—regardless of
        evidence showing the conduct was consensual. Even if the
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                   21-12562

        evidence shows that the report was more likely than not false, A.P.
        contends that any lingering possibility that the report was true pro-
        hibits disciplinary action. A.P. insists that discipline is appropriate
        only when there’s “incontrovertible evidence” that the student’s re-
        port was false.
               This “incontrovertible evidence” standard is not the law.
        The law, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Davis, is that so long
        as a school district’s response to a sexual assault report isn’t “clearly
        unreasonable in light of the known circumstances,” the school re-
        tains “ﬂexibility” to make whatever “disciplinary decisions” it con-
        siders appropriate. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. And we must “refrain
        from second-guessing” those decisions. Id.
                As in Doe, DeKalb County, and Sauls, A.P.’s school received a
        sexual assault report, investigated it, examined the evidence,
        reached a determination based on that evidence, and only then im-
        posed corrective measures. See 604 F.3d at 1260–66; 233 F.3d at
        1373–74; 399 F.3d at 1285–87. That’s not clearly unreasonable. The
        district court didn’t err in entering summary judgment on A.P.’s
        Title IX sex discrimination claim.
                            A.P.’s Title IX Retaliation Claim
               “Retaliation against a person because that person has com-
        plained of sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex dis-
        crimination encompassed by Title IX’s private cause of action.”
        Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005). “[W]hen
        a funding recipient retaliates against a person because [s]he
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        21-12562                 Opinion of the Court                          23

        complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional ‘dis-
        crimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX.” Id.
                Title IX retaliation claims are analyzed under the same
        framework that we use for Title VII retaliation claims. See, e.g.,
        Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 694 (4th Cir. 2018)
        (“Like our sister circuits, we thus apply familiar Title VII retaliation
        concepts to the requirements of a Title IX retaliation claim.”);
        Emeldi v. Univ. of Or., 698 F.3d 715, 724 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Until
        now, we have not had occasion to say what a plaintiﬀ must prove
        to prevail on a retaliation claim under Title IX. We join our sister
        circuits in applying the familiar framework used to decide retalia-
        tion claims under Title VII.”); see also Theidon v. Harvard Univ., 948
        F.3d 477, 505 (1st Cir. 2020); Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of
        Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2011); Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med.
        Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 564 (3d Cir. 2017); Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710
        F.3d 668, 673 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Univ.
        of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013); Milligan v. Bd. of
        Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 686 F.3d 378, 388 (7th Cir. 2012); Hiatt v. Colo.
        Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307, 1315 n.8 (10th Cir. 2017).
                To prevail on a Title IX retaliation claim, the plaintiﬀ must
        establish a prima facie case that: (1) she reported the discrimina-
        tion; (2) she suﬀered an adverse action; and (3) there’s a causal con-
        nection between the report and adverse action. See Jackson, 544 U.S.
        at 174. If the plaintiﬀ establishes her prima facie case, the burden
        shifts to the defendant “to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory
        reason for the adverse action.” Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult
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        24                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12562

        Cummings, LLP, 997 F.3d 1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2021). If the defend-
        ant does so, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiﬀ to establish that
        the reason oﬀered by the [defendant] was not the real basis for the
        decision, but a pretext for retaliation.” Id. (citation omitted).
               The “inquiry into pretext” turns on the decisionmaker’s sub-
        jective “beliefs” and reasons for taking the adverse action—even if
        those beliefs and reasons turn out to diverge from “reality as it ex-
        ists outside of the decisionmaker’s head.” See id. at 1299 (quoting
        parenthetically Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266
        (11th Cir. 2010)). Thus, the retaliation claim will fail unless the
        plaintiﬀ can show that the decisionmaker’s true beliefs and reasons
        were retaliatory. Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121,
        1148 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). The plaintiﬀ must demonstrate
        that the legitimate reasons proﬀered by the defendant are suﬃ-
        ciently riddled with “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
        incoherencies, or contradictions” to allow a reasonable factﬁnder
        to “ﬁnd them unworthy of credence.” Id. at 1136 (citation omit-
        ted).
               Applying that framework here, we assume (without decid-
        ing) that A.P. established a prima facie case of retaliation. But, even
        with that assumption, the school district rebutted the prima facie
        case by articulating a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for disciplin-
        ing A.P.: her violation of rule 28. And A.P. failed to show that rea-
        son was pretextual. The principal gave a speciﬁc factual basis—
        stemming from the ﬁndings of the investigation and his personal
        review of the surveillance footage—to support his belief that A.P.
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        21-12562                Opinion of the Court                         25

        engaged in consensual sexual conduct at school in violation of rule
        28. The principal concluded that the sexual conduct was “consen-
        sual” because “[t]here was nothing to substantiate” A.P.’s initial
        claim of sexual assault or otherwise cause him to “believe” that A.P.
        had been coerced.
               When the investigation ended and the principal consulted
        the assistant superintendent about disciplining the students, the
        principal was “very adamant” that, although A.P. had initially
        claimed the sexual act “was not consensual,” she had “quickly ad-
        mitted” to a counselor that it in fact was consensual. The principal
        asked the assistant superintendent what discipline would be appro-
        priate for A.P.’s rule 28 violation, explaining that he was leaning to-
        ward “a ten-day out-of-school suspension and referral to discipli-
        nary tribunal.”
               Because the principal’s subjective belief that A.P. engaged in
        consensual sexual conduct at school—even if mistaken—could’ve
        motivated a reasonable decisionmaker to take disciplinary action,
        A.P. needed to address the principal’s “reason head on and rebut it.”
        See Patterson v. Georgia Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1352 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (explaining that a plaintiﬀ cannot establish pretext “by simply quar-
        reling with the wisdom of [a] reason” that might motivate a rea-
        sonable decisionmaker (citation omitted)). But A.P. didn’t do so.
        The summary judgment evidence showed that the principal disci-
        plined A.P. because he believed she violated rule 28 by engaging in
        consensual sexual conduct at school. There’s no evidence that he
        believed anything else. A.P. never argued otherwise.
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                  21-12562

               Instead, A.P. insists that the “close temporal connection” be-
        tween her sexual assault report and her discipline showed that the
        rule violation was a pretext for retaliation. But temporal proximity
        can’t, by itself, show pretext. See Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1137 n.15
        (“While close temporal proximity between the protected conduct
        and the adverse . . . action can establish pretext when coupled with
        other evidence, temporal proximity alone is insuﬃcient.”).
               Because the school district disciplined A.P. for engaging in
        consensual sexual conduct at school—and A.P. hasn’t shown the
        school district’s reason was pretextual—her Title IX retaliation
        claim can’t survive summary judgment.
                             A.P.’s Equal Protection Claim
                “Section 1983 allows persons to sue individuals or munici-
        palities acting under the color of state law for violations of federal
        law.” Hill, 797 F.3d at 976. “One such law is the Equal Protection
        Clause, which confers a federal constitutional right to be free from
        sex discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted).
                To establish a sex discrimination claim against a municipality
        under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiﬀ must show that a mu-
        nicipal oﬃcial acted with “deliberate indiﬀerence” by “disre-
        gard[ing] a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. at
        977 (citation omitted). A similarly “stringent standard of fault” ap-
        plies to a municipal oﬃcial’s individual liability. Id. at 977–78 (cita-
        tion omitted). An oﬃcial may only be held personally “liable under
        section 1983 upon a showing of deliberate indiﬀerence to known
        sexual harassment.” Id. at 978 (citation omitted). The “plaintiﬀ
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        21-12562                  Opinion of the Court                             27

        must prove the individual defendant actually knew of and acqui-
        esced in the discriminatory conduct.” Id. (cleaned up).
               In other words, A.P.’s equal protection claim against the
        school district and principal—like her Title IX sex discrimination
        claim against the school district—required a showing of “deliberate
        indiﬀerence” to her sexual assault report. See id. at 976–78. But, as
        we explained earlier, the summary judgment evidence (even when
        viewed in A.P.’s favor) showed that the school district and principal
        were not deliberately indiﬀerent to A.P.’s report. For the same rea-
        sons, the school district and principal were not deliberately indiﬀer-
        ent for purposes of A.P.’s equal protection claim. Summary judg-
                                              2
        ment was appropriately entered.
               AFFIRMED.

        2
         Because A.P. didn’t show that the school district and principal were deliber-
        ately indifferent to her sexual assault report, we don’t need to address their
        additional arguments that the principal wasn’t a final policymaker and that he
        was protected by qualified immunity.