Court Opinion

ID: 9749378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:40:48.047575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:47.557650
License: Public Domain

FORD ELLIOTT, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with Judge Rowley’s resolution of the issue involving Comment c to § 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s grant of a new trial based upon its conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a post-accident remedial measure.
I can find no error in the trial court’s resolution of this issue for the following reasons: (1) Loblaws “opened the door” to the introduction of the use of a carpet, a post-accident remedial measure; and (2) Loblaws effectively waived any objection on appeal based on its failure to request limiting instructions.
Appellee, Miller, was not the first to broach the subject of Loblaws’ use of a carpet as a subsequent remedial measure. Counsel for Miller pursued a line of questioning directed to establishing that carpets, among other precautionary measures, could have been utilized by Loblaws at little cost to prevent the kind of accident which occurred. During ques*525tioning of Mr. Edinger, counsel for Miller asked if there was a rug in front of the ice machine on the day in question. Such questioning is not improper, and it does not suggest that Loblaws was using a carpet as a subsequent remedial measure.
Mr. Edinger’s testimony was followed by that of Earl Rosenquist, the store manager, who was asked the following question by Loblaws’ counsel:
Has anything changed about the way [Mr. Edinger] makes his deliveries since [Ms. Miller’s] accident, as far as his deliveries are concerned?
With this question, counsel for Loblaws “opened the door” for further testimony regarding subsequent remedial measures. What followed were several more questions of Mr. Rosenquist, by counsel for Loblaws pertaining to the feasibility of rugs or mats as precautionary measures.
When counsel for appellee Edinger cross-examined Mr. Rosenquist, he asked if the ice machine was in the same location as it had been at the time of the accident. Mr. Rosenquist replied that it was not. In response to the question of whether Loblaws was now using mats or carpets in front of the machine; Mr. Rosenquist replied that they were not. Counsel for appellee, Miller, then attempted to clarify Mr. Rosenquist’s testimony and the following exchange took place:
Q: Mr. Rosenquist, isn’t it true that after this fall of July 19, 1984, that a carpet was placed, rug was placed in front of the ice machine?
A: Yes, that’s true. The ice machine now he asked me. It’s not where it’s been, it’s been in three places since then.
Q: And you moved it since then?
A: Yes.
Q: There was a change in the procedure followed by Mr. Edinger?
*526A: Wasn’t Mr. Edinger’s procedure. The only reason the rug was put there, it looked like there might have been a potential problem.
Such questioning by counsel for Miller was not improper in light of the prior testimony elicited by counsel for Loblaws and Edinger. Further, to preclude counsel for Miller from pursuing this line of questioning would have precluded counsel’s ability to impeach the prior incorrect testimony. See Leghart v. Montour Railroad Co., 395 Pa. 469, 150 A.2d 836 (1959).
Even if I were to find that such testimony was prejudicial to Loblaws, I am inclined to find any objection on appeal waived. While, as noted in the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, evidence of subsequent precautions ordinarily is inadmissible, an exception exists where the evidence is competent for some purpose other than to prove antecedent negligence See Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971) (evidence of subsequent precautions is admissible to show a caution which was not costly or burdensome to defendant in relation to risk of danger involved and jury was instructed that evidence was admitted for such limited purpose). In accord is Hyndman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 396 Pa. 190, 152 A.2d 251 (1959), in which evidence that subsequent to an accident involving a child’s contact with a transformer tower, the defendant attached signs to the tower reading “Danger, Live Wire, Keep Off” was admitted for the special purpose of demonstrating to the jury one of the precautionary steps which could have been taken by the defendant without hindering its operation. In Hyndman, it was held that no prejudice could be said to stem from the admission of this evidence as the jury was instructed adequately that the testimony had no bearing on antecedent negligence, but was only introduced to show a caution which was not costly or burdensome to the defendant in relation to the risk or danger involved. See also, Leghart v. Montour Railroad Co., supra (while evidence of subsequent precautions ordinarily is inadmissible, an exception exists where the purpose *527of the evidence is to show control or to impeach relevant testimony.)
Based on the foregoing, I cannot find as a matter of law that the trial court erred in denying Loblaws’ motion in limine and I agree with the majority that the challenging of the evidence by way of a motion in limine spared Loblaws the necessity of specifically objecting when testimony was elicited at trial. However, I cannot agree that the motion in limine relieved Loblaws from requesting limiting instructions as this court previously has found waiver for a defendant’s failure to so request such instructions. See O’Malley v. Peerless Petroleum, Inc., 283 Pa.Super. 272, 288-290, 423 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1980).
In its reply brief at page 7, Loblaws contends that it did submit such a point; however, a review of the Points for Charge contained in the record on appeal does not bear out this allegation.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment below.