Court Opinion

ID: 9688785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:05:17.726009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:41.494899
License: Public Domain

NEUMAN, Justice.
This appeal concerns a refusal by the Iowa Department of Human Services to correct or expunge an entry in the state child abuse registry. On judicial review of agency action the district court found the governing statute, Iowa Code § 235A.19(2)(a) (1989), unconstitutional. The State has now appealed and we reverse.
In January 1989 the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) named Mark Reynolds as a perpetrator of child abuse and filed its findings with the Iowa Child Abuse Information Registry. See generally Iowa Code § 235A.12. Reynolds was promptly notified pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.71(7). Child in need of assistance (CINA) proceedings were then begun in juvenile court. Nine months later, the juvenile court ruled that although the proof conclusively established that Reynolds’ daughter had been sexually assaulted, the court could not find by clear and convincing evidence that Reynolds was the assailant. The court nevertheless restricted Reynolds’ future visitation with his daughter.
Based on the court’s findings, Reynolds sought to have his name expunged from the registry. Iowa Code section 235A.19(2)(a) governs such requests. It provides:
A person may file with the department within six months of the date of the notice of the results of an investigation required by section 232.71, subsection seven, a written statement to the effect that child abuse information referring to the person is in whole or in part erroneous, and may request a correction of that information or of the findings of the investigation report. The department shall provide the person with an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to chapter 17A to correct the information or the findings, unless the department corrects the information or findings as requested. The department shall delay the expungement of information which is not determined to be founded until the conclusion of a proceeding to correct the information or findings. The department may defer the hearing until the conclusion of a pending juvenile or district court case relating to the information or findings.
Iowa Code § 235A.19(2)(a) (emphasis added).
DHS refused to amend the registry, asserting (1) Reynolds’ request was untimely, and (2) its findings — based on a preponderance of the evidence — were not in conflict with the juvenile court’s acquittal of Reynolds under the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.
Reynolds sought judicial review of the agency’s decision. The district court reversed. It concluded that section 235A.19(2)(a), on its face, denied Reynolds equal protection and due process. This appeal by the State followed.
I. It is axiomatic that the equal protection clauses of our state and federal Constitutions prohibit state action which discriminates among persons along irrationally drawn class lines. Redmond v. Carter, 247 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Iowa 1976). Here Reynolds alleged — and persuaded the trial court — that section 235A.19(2) imper-missibly denied him a right available to DHS, that is, the opportunity to defer hearing on a requested correction until the conclusion of pending juvenile proceedings. By casting his complaint as a denial of equal protection, however, Reynolds has confused privilege with process.
Under the statutory scheme of chapter 235A, DHS is charged with responsibility to organize and staff a registry for the collection, maintenance and dissemination of child abuse information. Iowa Code § 235A.14(1), (2). The purpose of the registry is to aid the research and identification of victims or potential victims of child abuse through one statewide source of data. Iowa Code § 235A.12. The statute is also designed to provide safeguards *815against the unwarranted invasion of privacy which such registry might otherwise entail. Id. Once a report of abuse is made and forwarded to the registry, see Iowa Code § 232.70(4)(b) and (c), DHS is obliged to notify the subject of the report and advise that person of the right to ask for a correction of the information in accordance with Iowa Code section 235A.19. Iowa Code § 232.71(7).
Just as the responsibility to investigate and compile child abuse data rests with DHS, the privilege to challenge the accuracy of the registry rests with the accused. This in turn triggers an obligation by DHS to grant an evidentiary hearing unless the department willingly corrects its information or findings. Iowa Code § 235A.19(2)(a). In the meantime, DHS is authorized to delay expungement pending outcome of the hearing, or defer the hearing until conclusion of a pending court case relating to the same information. Id.
Throughout this process the rights and obligations of the parties are not the same; they are responsive to the other’s action. This is natural given the parties’ markedly different roles as investigator and investigates. No one disputes the reasonableness of these classifications. Moreover, Reynolds concedes that he has been treated the same as all other alleged abusers. So long as members of the same class are treated equally, and the classification itself is reasonable, the Constitution’s equal protection standard is not violated. Hack v. Auger, 228 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Iowa 1975).
II. The real question is whether the process outlined in section 235A.19(2)(a) meets constitutional muster. Duly enacted statutes are, of course, cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality. Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Iowa 1986). When faced with a claim that a statutory procedure fails to comport with due process, we are obliged to identify and weigh the following factors: (1) the private interest affected by the State action; (2) the risk that an erroneous deprivation of that interest will result from the procedure dictated; (3) the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (4) the fiscal and administrative burden to the government were additional or substitute procedures compelled. In re K.L.C., 372 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1985) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976)). No particular process is guaranteed; beyond the basic element of notice and opportunity for hearing, the concept of due process is merely meant to protect substantial rights. Id.
Here the district court faulted section 235A.19(2)(a) because it grants the agency — but not the accused — the authority to defer hearing on the accused’s request to correct the registry pending completion of judicial proceedings. Relying on this alleged procedural infirmity, the court held that it was unfair — and hence “unconstitutional and contrary to law” — for DHS to deny Reynolds’ request for expungement once the six-month deadline of section 235A.19(2)(a) had passed. On appeal the State asserts that the statute affords Reynolds ample procedural protection; he simply neglected to take advantage of it. It also asserts that a delayed hearing would not have resulted in Reynolds’ removal from the registry. We agree on both counts.
To begin, the record does not support Reynolds’ claim that if he had made a timely request for expungement, and then asked that his hearing on the request be deferred until conclusion of the juvenile proceedings, his petition would have been denied. The statute does not, on its face, prevent an accused from making such a request. Nor does it appear that the accused would be prevented from appealing the denial of such a request, if one were made. The fact is that Reynolds made no attempt to engage this process. Thus he is in a poor position to complain about its inadequacy.
Turning to the factors identified in Mathews, Reynolds has demonstrated little risk that inability to defer the hearing on his own would result in an erroneous listing in the registry. Implicit in the court’s ruling is the notion that if Reynolds had been permitted to delay the expungement hear*816ing, the outcome would have been different; that DHS would have removed his name from the registry based on the juvenile court’s decision. Yet we note that DHS is authorized to list in the registry those persons found, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be suspected of child abuse. See Iowa Code § 235A.18(2) (referring to expungement of information which could not be determined by a preponderance of the evidence to be founded or unfounded within one year). Nowhere in the statute is DHS required to remove founded reports which are later determined not to meet the higher judicial standards of clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We interpret this scheme as a deliberate attempt by the legislature to create a safety net for abused children in an arena in which extraordinary proof is often difficult, if not impossible, to secure.
Further, we question the value of granting Reynolds the additional process ordered by the court. On this appeal he defends his failure to timely comply with section 235A.19 by asserting that six months is inadequate for a meaningful hearing and adjudication of the expungement request, particularly when one is burdened by the pursuit of simultaneous proceedings in juvenile court and under the registry. But the record reveals that medical evidence used to cast doubt on the State’s proof in the CINA proceeding was available to him (and, in fact, tendered to the court) within the six-month deadline of section 235A.19. More importantly, we believe that the time limit in section 235A.19 is rationally related to the legislation’s intended purpose: to facilitate the identification of child abuse victims while safeguarding the confidentiality of the registry. See Iowa Code § 235A.12. Given the prompt notice to alleged perpetrators, and the urgent need to protect potential victims, we do not believe a six-month period in which to seek correction or expungement is unreasonable.
In summary, we are convinced that the statutory scheme of section 235A.19(2)(a) satisfies' due process. The district court’s contrary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for an order affirming the decision of the agency.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All Justices concur except SNELL, J., and McGIVERIN, C.J., who dissent.