Court Opinion

ID: 9492695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:47:42.102708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:26.375449
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Were I not constrained by precedent in this circuit, I would reach a contrary decision on the issue of guilt with respect to the charge of filing false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. As set out in Judge Moore’s opinion, the statute covers wilful falsification, concealment or cover-up, or fraudulent statements or representations on a written form “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.” (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court cases relied upon in United States v. Gibson, 881 F.2d 318 (6th Cir.1989), and United States v. Lewis, 587 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.1978), all involve misrepresentations made to federal agencies and bodies. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 90 S.Ct. 355, 24 L.Ed.2d 264 (1969), involved a false affidavit furnished to the National Labor Relations Board. United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 104 S.Ct. 1942, 80 L.Ed.2d 492 (1984), involved written false material furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.1 No Supreme Court case noted involves a written statement to a state or non-federal government department or agency.
The statute itself is plain and unambiguous; it refers to federal agencies of the United States, not to those of state or private departments, agencies, or instru-mentalities. One charged with an offense under the statute would not expect to be confronted with a charge connected with some statement or submission to a department or agency that is not a United States instrumentality.
It is true, however, that despite the statutory language and the lack of Supreme Court precedent supporting that position, the Sixth Circuit has construed the statute to include “matters not completely controlled by these departments or agencies,” or statements not “made directly to, or received by, the federal department or agency.” Gibson, 881 F.2d at 322 (citing Lewis, supra, and cases from other circuits). Gibson, however, involved the investigation of fraud in a TVA contract, with a warning in the document requiring conformity to “federal requirements” and filing reports to the “TVA Contracting Officers.” Id. The dissenting opinion in Gibson found it important to determine whether the defendant had knowledge of the federal government involvement.
While I doubt the correctness of the Sixth Circuit precedent noted above, we are bound to follow that precedent. I therefore concur in the result reached as to part II.A. of the panel opinion.
I also concur in the result reached in part II.B. of the opinion dealing with relevant conduct in the sentencing of Shafer. I am in basic agreement with the distinction drawn between taking into account relevant conduct of a direct criminal nature in sentencing and counting as rele*833vant conduct that which “could never lead to a criminal conviction.” I would add in this context, however, that a sentencing court should be able to consider as relevant conduct that is proximately related to or inextricably tied to criminal conduct of the defendant or an accomplice or associate, although not strictly “criminal” in its consequence. Such conduct might include grossly indecent or immoral conduct affecting another’s criminal act, or persuading and cajoling another to commit a criminal offense if deemed “relevant” and material by the sentencing judge.2
In any event, despite my added reservations, I would concur that “the district court erred when it included the FLSA violations in its sentencing calculations in this case.”

. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 61 S.Ct. 518, 85 L.Ed. 598 (1941), cited in Rodgers, involved a written false material submitted to the Secretary of the United States Department of Interior. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 75 S.Ct. 504, 99 L.Ed. 594 (1955), also cited in Rodgers, involved the United States House of Representatives.

. I would not preclude the sentencing judge from taking such conduct into account to counterbalance a claimed basis for a downward departure.