Court Opinion

ID: 9892038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 11:10:16.771434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:00.541172
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                         TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                No. 10-22-00279-CR

RAMON JOSEPH CASTRO II,
                                                          Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                          Appellee

                          From the 19th District Court
                           McLennan County, Texas
                          Trial Court No. 2021-1722-C1

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Ramon Joseph Castro II was found guilty by a jury of the offenses of aggravated

assault and felon in possession of a firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.02, 46.04.

The jury found the enhancement allegations alleged in the indictment true and assessed

his punishment at sixty years in the penitentiary for the aggravated-assault count and
twenty years in the penitentiary for the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm count. The trial

court sentenced him accordingly.

        Castro’s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief in

support of the motion asserting that he has diligently reviewed the appellate record and

that, in his opinion, the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct.

1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Castro was notified by this Court and by counsel of his right

to file a response but has not done so.

        Counsel’s brief demonstrates a professional evaluation of the record for error and

compliance with the other duties of appointed counsel and additionally identifies several

nonreversible issues related to the fees and costs assessed in the bill of costs, what we

have termed an Allison brief. See Cummins v. State, 646 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. App.—Waco

2022, pet. ref’d) (referring to Allison v. State, 609 S.W.3d 624, 628 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020,

order) (per curiam)).     When counsel files an Allison brief, we “will conduct an

independent review of the record for reversible error involving the defendant’s

conviction and sentence and then treat the briefed nonreversible error as a merits issue.”

Id. at 612. We conclude that counsel has performed the duties required of appointed

counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812–13

(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); see also Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Castro v. State                                                                         Page 2
        When counsel files an Allison brief, the State is expected to file a response

addressing the merits of the nonreversible error presented. See Cummins, 646 S.W.3d at

612. The State did file a brief in response to counsel’s motion to withdraw and supporting

Anders brief.

        In reviewing an Anders appeal, we must, “after a full examination of all the

proceedings, . . . decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87

S.Ct. at 1400; see Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 349–50, 102 L.Ed.2d 300

(1988); accord Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 509–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). An appeal

is “wholly frivolous” or “without merit” when it “lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy

v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902 n.10, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988).

After a review of the entire record in this appeal, we have determined the appeal to be

wholly frivolous. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

        While we conclude there is no error that would require reversal of Castro’s

conviction or sentence, the Allison brief, as noted, includes what we identify as Category

2 nonreversible errors that are not subject to procedural default. See Cummins, 646 S.W.3d

at 616. Claims of error related to the assessment of fees and court costs, as in this case,

may be raised for the first time on appeal. London v. State, 490 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016).

        In cases such as this, appellate courts have the authority to reform judgments and

to affirm as modified where nonreversible error is identified. Cummins, 646 S.W.3d at 610

Castro v. State                                                                          Page 3
n.2; Allison, 609 S.W.3d at 628. A court of appeals also has the authority to correct and

reform a judgment to make the record speak the truth when it has the information to do

so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b) (authorizing court of appeals to “modify a trial court’s

judgment and affirm it as modified”); see also Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993). We are also authorized to correct errors in a bill of costs independent

of finding error in the trial court’s judgment. See Cummins, 646 S.W.3d at 622 & n.12

(citing Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), and London, 490 S.W.3d

at 508 n.5); Briceno v. State, No. 10-22-00048-CR, 2023 WL 5098514, at *8 (Tex. App.—Waco

Aug. 9, 2023, no pet.).

         Court costs are not required to be orally pronounced at sentencing as they are not

punitive like fines or restitution and do “not alter the range of punishment to which the

defendant is subject, or the number of years assessed.” Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 367

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005)). The imposition of court costs is mandatory under article 42.16 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.16; Martinez v. State, 507 S.W.3d

914, 916 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, no pet.). However, the court may only impose those

costs that are statutorily authorized. See Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014). There must also be a basis in the record for the assessment of a cost. See id.

at 390; see also Wolfenbarger v. State, 581 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no

pet.).

Castro v. State                                                                       Page 4
        Castro challenges the assessment of $40 labeled “CRIMINAL FILING FEE” in the

bill of costs because he contends there is no authority for such a fee. There are multiple

bills of costs included in the clerk’s record. The only certified bill of costs is found in the

clerk’s record at page 154. Descriptions of each itemized fee are included in the bill of

costs and are easily assigned to a specific statutory provision authorizing the fee. The

amounts assessed are all authorized by section 134.101(a) of the Local Government Code.

See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 134.101(a). Section 134.101 provides for the “clerk of

the court” to be allocated $40 of the local consolidated fee. See id. § 134.101(a)(1). Here,

the clerk identifies the $40 fee as a “criminal filing fee,” and even if the label or description

is incorrect, the total local consolidated fee itemizations are authorized by section

134.101(a). See id. § 134.101(a); see also Cook v. State, No. 10-12-00204-CR, 2014 WL 1016242,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

        We overrule Castro’s issue and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

        Counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation is granted.

                                            MATT JOHNSON
                                            Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson, and
       Justice Smith
(Chief Justice Gray dissents.)
Castro v. State                                                                           Page 5
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed October 19, 2023
Do not publish
[CRPM]

Castro v. State                                Page 6