Court Opinion

ID: 9537638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:20:43.606259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:50.893020
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice
(dissenting):
The issue on this appeal is whether the allegations of the complaint “compel the conclusion that no claim for relief has been stated....” E.g., Motivated Management International v. Finney, Utah, 604 P.2d 467 (1979) (emphasis added). I do not think that standard has been met in this case. The majority affirms the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to allege special damages. Since the complaint does allege claims for relief that are defamatory per se, it is not necessary either to plead or to prove special damages. I respectfully dissent.
The complaint alleges, inter alia, that the defendant stated that Baum did not pay as agreed, was in poor financial condition, and had used fruit growers’ money to pay creditors. The nub of these and other allegations is that the plaintiff was dishonest and incompetent in his business. An accusation of dishonesty is defamatory per se and requires no pleading of special damages. Prince v. Peterson, Utah, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975); Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 Utah 407, 228 P.2d 272 (1951). In addition, the allegations as to Gillman’s insolvency clearly reflect directly on Baum’s ability competently to conduct a lawful business and are also defamatory per se, requiring no pleading of special damages. Allred v. Cook, Utah, 590 P.2d 318 (1979).
The law has long recognized that several classes of defamation are slanderous per se including both of those mentioned above. *44Furthermore, an allegation of dishonesty, coupled with the assertion of insolvency, clearly affects the plaintiff’s ability to engage in, or to remain in, a lawful business. Dean Prosser has stated:
“The law has always been very tender of the reputation of tradesmen, and therefore words spoken of them in the way of their trade will bear an action that will not be actionable in the case of another person.” The likelihood of “temporal” damage in such a case is sufficiently obvious; and the rule was soon extended to cover anyone engaged in a business or profession, or holding a public or even a private office. Any calling is included, “be it ever so base,” but it must be a legal one, entitled to such a sanction. Furthermore, since the object of the exception is to protect the plaintiff in his office or calling, it was decided quite early that it must appear that he held or was engaged in it, or at least about to be so engaged, when the words complained of were published.
For the same reason, the exception was limited to defamation of a kind incompatible with the proper conduct of the business, trade, profession or office itself. The statement must be made with reference to a matter of significance and importance for that purpose, rather than a more general reflection upon the plaintiffs character or qualities, where such special significance is lacking.
W. Prosser, Law of Torts, pp. 757-58 (4th ed.). See also Id. at 754-56.
Since this case was decided at the pleading stage, there is no way of knowing what factual substance there is to the allegations which have been laid. It is not, however, for this Court to make a determination of the validity of allegations charged in the complaint. If the complaint states a cause of action upon which relief may be granted, that ends our inquiry. Neither the truth of the allegations nor the applicability of any other defenses are before us. I submit that the plaintiff has a right to go to the trier of fact on at least those allegations which allege slander per se claims for relief.
For these reasons I dissent.