Court Opinion

ID: 9554626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 16:10:56.047389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:59.922672
License: Public Domain

J-A13008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  PETRA DINENNA N/K/A PETRA                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  THOMAS                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID DINENNA, SR.                           :
                                               :   No. 312 MDA 2022
                       Appellant               :

             Appeal from the Order Entered January 14, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s):
                              2002-6087C

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                               FILED: AUGUST 9, 2023

       David DiNenna, Sr. (“Husband”) appeals from the order denying (1) his

petition for special relief requesting that the trial court determine the amount

of his military pension to be distributed to Petra DiNenna n/k/a Petra Thomas

(“Wife”), and (2) his exceptions filed in response to a master’s report

concerning the same issue. We affirm.

       We glean the following facts from the certified record. Husband began

serving in the military in 1987. He and Wife married in 1992 and separated

in 2002, and thereafter initiated divorce proceedings. In 2005, the trial court

appointed a master to address, inter alia, equitable distribution of marital

property and alimony. The master held a hearing wherein the sole issue to

be addressed was equitable distribution of Husband’s military pension.
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A13008-23

Husband and Wife reached an agreement at the hearing, and thus no

testimony was taken. The terms of the agreement were put on the record

and the transcript was attached as “Exhibit A” to a report prepared by the

master.

       As articulated by Wife’s counsel on the record, the agreement

concerning the military pension, in its entirety, stated “Wife to receive [forty-

five] percent of [H]usband’s military pension, as of his retirement date. If a

quatro[1] is necessary, it is to be prepared by pension analysis with the parties

sharing the costs of preparation.”             N.T. Master’s Hearing, 11/16/06, at 8.

Counsel for both Husband and Wife expressed their consent to this language

on the record. See id. The master then memorialized the agreement within

his report as follows:

       vi. The Plaintiff, Petra DiNenna, the former spouse is awarded
       [forty-five percent] of the service member’s disposable retirement
       pay as of his retirement date. If a [QDRO] were necessary, it was
       to be prepared by pension analysis with the parties sharing the
       cost of preparation. The master researched the issue of the
       necessity of a QDRO and recommends that the Uniform Services
       Former Spouses’ Protection Act does not require a QDRO. Since
       military retirement pay is a federal entitlement and not a qualified
       pension plan, there is no such requirement that a QDRO be used.
       As long as the award is set forth in the divorce decree or other
       court order in an acceptable manner, that is sufficient. The Master
       recommends that the expense of a QDRO not be incurred.
       Attached to this master’s report is a copy of the Uniform Services
       Former Spouses’ Protection Act and a treatise titled Dividing
____________________________________________

1  The word “quatro” appears to be an erroneous transcription of the
abbreviation “QDRO,” short for Qualified Domestic Relations Order. As we will
discuss in the body of this memorandum, Husband points to this error as
evidence of an ambiguity in the contract.

                                           -2-
J-A13008-23

      Military Retired Pay Under the Uniformed Services Former
      Spouse’s Protection Act and they are marked are Exhibits “B” and
      “C” respectively.

      vii.   The language to be used in this Divorce Decree is
      recommended as follows: “The former spouse (Plaintiff, Petra
      DiNenna) is awarded [forty-five percent] of the member’s
      (Defendant, David DiNenna’s) disposable retirement pay as of his
      retirement date[.]”

Master’s Report, 4/23/07, at ¶ 8(B) (cleaned up). Subsequently, a divorce

decree was entered in 2007 which stated “[i]t is further ordered, adjudged,

and decreed that pursuant to the settlement terms as described in the

Master’s Report, [Wife] is awarded [forty-five percent] of [Husband]’s

disposable retirement pay as of his retirement date.” Divorce Decree, 7/5/07

(cleaned up).

      Husband continued serving in the military until he retired in 2017. There

was no further activity in the divorce portion of this action until 2020, when

Husband filed a petition to determine the appropriate division of his pension,

arguing that Wife was only entitled to forty-five percent of the marital portion

of the pension, not of the entire pension. The trial court appointed another

master, Susan A. Maza, Esquire, to address the issues raised in the petition

for special relief.   Both Husband and Wife participated in an evidentiary

hearing before Master Maza and filed memoranda prior to and after the

hearing.

      Master Maza then filed a report on July 6, 2021, recommending that the

agreement was clear and unambiguous, and that Wife was entitled to forty-

                                     -3-
J-A13008-23

five percent of the entire military pension based on the agreement of the

parties.   Husband filed exceptions to the report.   The trial court held oral

argument on the exceptions but did not take any additional testimony. On

January 14, 2022, the court entered an order that (1) denied Husband’s

exceptions; (2) found that the parties, in the presence of their attorneys,

agreed and consented that Wife is to receive forty-five percent of Husband’s

military pension, as of his retirement; (3) the agreement was the result of a

contractual agreement between the parties, not a court order; and (4) the

phrase “Petra Di[N]enna n/k/a Petra Thomas is to receive 45 percent of David

Di[N]enna’s military pension, as of his retirement date” is clear and

unambiguous. See Order, 1/14/2022.

      This timely appeal followed. Husband and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Husband raises the following issue on appeal:

      Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or an abuse
      of discretion in finding the contractual terms of the parties[’]
      November 16, 2006 agreement stating [Wife] to receive [forty-
      five] percent of [Husband]’s total military pension, as of his
      retirement was clear and unambiguous when there were both
      patent and latent ambiguities in the agreement?

Husband’s brief at 2.

      Our review is governed by the following principles:

      A marital support agreement incorporated but not merged into the
      divorce decree survives the decree and is enforceable at law or
      equity. A settlement agreement between spouses is governed by
      the law of contracts unless the agreement provides otherwise.
      The terms of a marital settlement agreement cannot be modified
      by a court in the absence of a specific provision in the agreement
      providing for judicial modification.

                                    -4-
J-A13008-23

      When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, the trial court
      is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of discretion,
      we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding function. On appeal
      from an order interpreting a marital settlement agreement, we
      must decide whether the trial court committed an error of law or
      abused its discretion.

      Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court is
      not bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of
      review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent
      necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as the appellate
      court may review the entire record in making its decision.
      However, we are bound by the trial court’s credibility
      determinations.

Rosiecki v. Rosiecki, 231 A.3d 928, 932-33 (Pa.Super 2020) (cleaned up).

“An abuse of discretion is not lightly found, as it requires clear and convincing

evidence that the trial court misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal

procedures.”   Paroly v. Paroly, 876 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa.Super 2005)

(citation omitted).   “Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses

should be bound by the terms of their agreements.” See id. at 1065 (citation

omitted).

      Husband’s    assertion   that   the   marital   settlement   agreement   is

ambiguous necessarily requires us to interpret a contract. The “paramount

goal of contractual interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent

of the parties. In determining the intent of the parties to a written agreement,

the court looks to what they have clearly expressed, for the law does not

assume that the language was chosen carelessly.” Wiley v. Brooks, 263

A.3d 671, 676 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted).            While “construing

agreements involving clear and unambiguous terms, this Court need only

                                      -5-
J-A13008-23

examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties’ understanding.”

Rosiecki, supra at 933 (cleaned up).       “In other words, the intent of the

parties is generally the writing itself.” Id. (citation omitted). “The language

of a contract is unambiguous if we can determine its meaning without any

guide other than a knowledge of the simple facts on which, from the nature

of the language in general, its meaning depends.”       Riverview Carpet &

Flooring, Inc. v. Presbyterian SeniorCare, ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL

4412195 at *32 (Pa.Super. 2023).

      A contract “is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different

constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense.”

Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (Pa. 2004) (citation omitted).          “A

contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties do not agree on its

construction.” Pass v. Palmiero Automotive of Butler, Inc., 229 A.3d 1,

5 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted).     “Nor does an ambiguity exist if it

appears that only a lawyer’s ingenuity had made the language uncertain.” Id.

(cleaned up).

      When an ambiguity exists, “the court considers the parties’ outward and

objective manifestations of assent, as opposed to their undisclosed and

subjective intentions.” Rosiecki, supra at 933 (citation omitted). The court

may take into consideration the “surrounding circumstances, the situation of

the parties, the objects they apparently have in view, and the nature of the

subject-matter of the agreement.” Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251,

1258 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted).         “The court will adopt an

                                     -6-
J-A13008-23

interpretation that is most reasonable and probable bearing in mind the

objects which the parties intended to accomplish through the agreement.” Id.

(citation omitted).

      The contested provision before us, as transcribed at the hearing in front

of the master on November 16, 2006, is as follows: “Wife to receive [forty-

five] percent of [H]usband’s military pension, as of his retirement date. If a

quatro is necessary, it is to be prepared by pension analysis with the parties

sharing the costs of preparation.” N.T. Master’s Hearing, 11/16/06, at 8. The

agreement was then ultimately memorialized in the divorce decree, which

stated: “It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that pursuant to the

settlement terms as described in the Master’s Report, [Wife] is awarded [forty-

five percent] of [Husband]’s disposable retirement pay as of his retirement

date.” Divorce Decree, 7/5/07. We note that the oral agreement utilized the

term “military pension,” whereas the decree used “disposable retirement pay.”

Additionally, the decree did not contain a reference to either a “quatro” or a

QDRO because, prior to entry of the decree, the master determined that a

QDRO is not required for distribution of federal entitlements like the military

pension in question. See Master’s Report, 4/23/07, at ¶ 8(B)(vi).

      With this background in mind, we turn to the positions of the parties.

Husband first argues that the agreement concerning his military pension is

patently ambiguous, and that the intent of the parties was for Wife to receive

forty-five percent of the marital portion of the military pension, not forty-

five percent of the entire pension. See Husband’s brief at 14-17. Specifically,

                                     -7-
J-A13008-23

he contends that the language “[forty-five] percent of husband’s military

pension” is not clear since it “does not indicate [the] value of the pension

which [Wife] is to receive [forty-five] percent of.” Id. at 16. He highlights

that the total value of the pension was different when the agreement was

made in 2006 than when he retired in 2017, and similarly, the value of the

marital portion in 2006 was different than the total value at the same time.

See id. at 16-17. He believes that other provisions in the agreement, such

as a cash distribution to Wife, specified both a known value and timing of

payment, unlike the pension provision, supporting the notion that it is

ambiguous. See id. at 16. He also accuses the court of failing to review the

whole agreement, and instead focusing on a single term. See id. at 22, 27.

He argues that had the court considered the additional language from the

verbal agreement referencing “pension analysis” preparing a “quatro,” it

would be compelled to find an ambiguity because it is unclear (1) that “quatro”

actually meant “QDRO,” (2) under what circumstances preparation of a QDRO

would be necessary, or (3) how a QDRO might impact Husband’s pension.

See id. at 24-26.

      Relatedly, Husband maintains that even if the agreement concerning his

military pension is seemingly clear on its face, there is nonetheless a latent

ambiguity based on the collateral circumstances surrounding the agreement.

See id. at 18. He states that the purpose of the hearing before the master

was to dispose of marital assets, which would include only the part of his

pension earned during the marriage.      See id. at 18.    He believes that a

                                     -8-
J-A13008-23

pension valuation report prepared at the time of the agreement, as well as

the fact that the parties understood Husband would continue serving in the

military after the divorce, support the intention that Wife receive only forty-

five percent of the marital portion of the pension. See id at 16, 18. Since

there is an ambiguity, he avers that the trial court committed an error of law

or abused its discretion by failing to conduct its own hearing concerning these

issues, rather than relying on a report from the hearing officer without the

benefit of the record developed therewith. See id. at 20-21. He notes that

although    the   court had access             to   Master   Maza’s   2021   report and

recommendation, it did not review the transcript or exhibits, as they were not

filed by the master.2       Id.    As such, Husband asks this Court to find an

ambiguity as a matter of law and independently review the record to

determine that the intent of the parties was for Wife to receive only forty-five

percent of the marital portion of his pension. See id. at 27-28.

       In considering this issue, the trial court found that the provision

regarding Husband’s military pension was clear and unambiguous on its face.

See Trial Court Opinion, 6/13/22, at 13. It held that the provision “awards

[Wife] forty-five percent (45%) of [Husband]’s disposable retirement pay” and

that the phrase “as of his retirement date” is the point at which Wife would be
____________________________________________

2 Our review of the record supports Husband’s assertion that Master Maza did

not file the record developed before her. The certified record on appeal does
not include a transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on April 14, 2021, nor
does it contain any exhibits introduced at that hearing. However, given our
disposition that the contract in question is clear and unambiguous, infra, this
omission from the certified record does not hinder our review.

                                           -9-
J-A13008-23

entitled to begin receiving the distribution. Id. at 14. It noted that nowhere

in the record is the word “marital” used, nor does the agreement utilize any

formula to determine Wife’s award. See id. The court further stated that just

because Husband has a different interpretation of the agreement, that does

not constitute an ambiguity. See id. at 14-16. Finally, the court reviewed

Exhibit “B” to the master’s report filed in 2007, which contained a handout

from the United States Department of Defense website addressing division of

military retired pay pursuant to the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’

Protection Act.   It found that this article provided Husband and Wife with

examples of both acceptable and unacceptable language for military pensions

under the act.    See id. at 16-17.    The court highlighted that none of the

parties objected to the language of the verbal agreement after it was

incorporated into the divorce decree, and therefore it is presumed that their

intentions were clearly expressed as set forth. See id.

      Wife agrees with the trial court that the contested agreement regarding

Husband’s military pension is “clear and unambiguous.” Wife’s brief at 9. She

also challenges the assertion that there is a latent ambiguity, arguing that no

consideration should be given to the pension analysis discussed by Husband

because it was not incorporated into the agreement or the master’s report.

See id. at 10. She further states that the intent of the parties was for her to

receive forty-five percent of Husband’s whole military pension, as the military

pay was only one asset amongst others considered in the negotiations

involving the marital estate. See id. at 11. She indicates that the parties

                                      - 10 -
J-A13008-23

were aware that Husband intended to continue serving in the military, which

would impact the pension, and the parties negotiated with that in mind and

with the benefit of independent counsel. See id. at 10-11. She claims that,

at the time of and in consideration of the agreement, she entered into the

agreement bearing the risk of receiving nothing in the event Husband died

before payout. See id. at 6.

      After careful review of the certified record, the arguments of the parties,

and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not commit an

error of law in finding the agreement between Husband and Wife

unambiguous. First, we reject Husband’s arguments that there was a patent

ambiguity on the face of the contract. Like the lower court, we can determine

the agreement’s meaning “without any guide other than a knowledge of the

simple facts on which, from the nature of the language in general, its meaning

depends.” See Riverview Carpet, supra at *32. Whether reviewing the

agreement as memorialized in the transcript from the master’s hearing or the

decree itself, the phrase “Wife to receive [forty-five] percent of [H]usband’s

military pension” or “[Wife] is awarded [forty-five percent] of [Husband’s]

disposable military pay,” means the same thing. The value of the award is

forty-five percent of the entire pension. As the trial court correctly identified,

there was no use of the word “marital” or phrase “marital portion” in the

agreement concerning the pension. Nothing in the language used indicates

any intent to limit the obligation to only the marital portion. Without use of

such a qualifier, the phrase “[forty-five] percent of [H]usband’s miliary

                                     - 11 -
J-A13008-23

pension” is clearly understood to mean forty-five percent of the whole pension.

We further agree with both the trial court and Husband that the phrase “as of

his retirement date” refers to when payments to Wife were to begin, and also

indicates the triggering event for determination of the amount of payment.

      Additionally, review of other portions of the contract do not create an

ambiguity concerning the military pension distribution.      Use of the word

“quatro” in the sentence immediately following that provision does not create

an ambiguity as to the value of the pension or its timing of payment. We note

that neither this term nor the word “QDRO” were contained within the decree,

as the master determined that a QDRO is not applicable to military pensions.

Thus, this ancillary provision has no bearing on the distribution or valuation

of the military pension whatsoever. Husband does not argue that a QDRO is

in fact required to be prepared for distribution of the pension, and he did not

challenge the special master’s recommendation in 2007 that one was not

needed. In the same vein, we are not persuaded by Husband’s assertion that

the specific cash payment to Wife identified in the agreement somehow casts

doubt on the meaning of the provision concerning the military pension. The

fact that the language concerning the cash distribution contained both a

certain sum and schedule of payments does not               prevent us from

understanding the agreement as it pertains to the military pension.

      In short, there is nothing contained within the language of the

agreement itself supporting Husband’s argument that the parties intended to

limit Wife’s entitlement to the marital share of the pension. The contract’s

                                    - 12 -
J-A13008-23

meaning can be ascertained by its plain language. The fact that Husband does

not agree with the court’s interpretation does not create an ambiguity. See

Pass, supra at 5.

       Next, we address and reject Husband’s arguments that there is a latent

ambiguity in the agreement concerning his military pension. The crux of this

contention is that, since it is beyond cavil that only the marital portion of the

pension was subject to equitable distribution, Husband’s apparent agreement

to give Wife a larger portion of his pension is illogical absent some extrinsic

explanation. Although the concept of a latent ambiguity has been discussed

by this Court in matters involving interpretation of contracts in family law

cases,3 the doctrine has largely been considered and developed in cases

involving challenges to wills and insurance contracts.          Nonetheless, the

principles articulated in those matters guide us in determining whether there

is a latent ambiguity in situations involving marital settlement agreements.

       “Generally speaking, an ambiguity in a will must be found without

reliance on extrinsic evidence; extrinsic evidence is admissible only to

resolve, not create, an ambiguity.”            In re Estate of Cassidy, ___ A.3d

___, 2023 WL 3910447 at *4 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citation omitted) (emphasis

added).    “A latent ambiguity arises from collateral facts which make the

meaning of a written document uncertain, although the language appears

clear on the face of the document.” Id.
____________________________________________

3 See, e.g., Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638 (Pa.Super. 1993);

Kohn v. Kohn, 364 A.2d 350 (Pa.Super. 1976).

                                          - 13 -
J-A13008-23

      The most ordinary instance of a latent ambiguity is where an
      instrument of writing contains a reference to a particular person
      or thing and is thus apparently clear on its face, but it is shown by
      extrinsic evidence that there are two or more persons or things to
      whom or to which the description in the instrument might properly
      apply.

Koplin v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 44 A.2d 877, 879

(Pa.Super. 1945) (cleaned up). For example, this Court has stated:

      A latent ambiguity in an insurance contract may be one in which
      the description of insured property is clear on face of instrument,
      but there is more than one estate to which the description applies,
      or it may be one where property is imperfectly or in some respects
      erroneously described, so that description does not refer with
      precision to any particular object, and if such an ambiguity
      develops, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show intent of
      parties.

Id. (cleaned up). In the context of challenges to wills, we have stated that

“[w]here a latent ambiguity exists, the court may resort to parol evidence

(such as testimony of the scrivener) to determine the decedent’s true intent.”

Estate of Cassidy, supra at *4.

      We find that by his arguments, Husband attempts to use extrinsic

circumstances to create, rather than resolve, any latent ambiguity. See id.

The clear and unambiguous language of the agreement references with

precision the entirety of Husband’s pension in describing the property subject

to Wife’s forty-five-percent share. Nonetheless, Husband devotes a significant

portion of his brief to identifying collateral matters to explain why he would

not have agreed to give Wife forty-five percent of his entire pension.        Put

another way, he tries to convince us of the parties’ subjective intent, and why

it is contrary to the express language used in the contract. However, it is not

                                     - 14 -
J-A13008-23

the role of the courts to focus on subjective intent in interpreting clear

agreements. See Wert v. Manorcare of Carlisle, PA, LLC, 124 A.3d 1248,

1260 (Pa. 2015) (“[W]here language is clear and unambiguous, the focus of

the interpretation is upon the terms of the agreement as manifestly

expressed rather than as, perhaps, silently intended[.]” (emphasis in

original)).

      The case sub judice is distinguishable from other matters where we have

found a latent ambiguity. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schultheis, 747 A.2d

918 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding that the phrase “I give my shares of stock . . .

as follows” in a will was latently ambiguous when the will specifically

bequeathed 2,045 shares to named beneficiaries, yet it was determined that

the decedent in fact owned 3,288 shares); Kohn, supra (ruling that the term

“alimony” was latently ambiguous in a marital settlement agreement when (1)

numerous express provisions in the agreement implied that “alimony” meant

child support payments, (2) the definition of “alimony” typically did not

concern payments for purposes of child support, and (3) there existed a

supplemental agreement between the parties expressly reducing “alimony”

payments if federal regulations permitting a tax deduction for such payments

were changed); Koplin, supra (holding there was a latent ambiguity in a

contract disparately insuring two chicken houses on a property, where the

agreement only labelled them as Chicken House No. 1 and Chicken House No.

2 and where the parties disputed which provision applied to the single chicken

house that burned down).

                                    - 15 -
J-A13008-23

      The common thread in these cases is that some external fact is required

to clarify a provision because a description was inadequate, or a term was

used in contravention to its ordinary meaning or definition. However, that is

not what Husband advocates for in the instant matter. This is not an instance

where the marital settlement agreement inadequately described the military

pension so that there was confusion as to what was being addressed.

Similarly, the parties here did not use some distinct term in contravention to

its customary meaning, triggering a need for information to be found outside

the four corners of the contract.   Husband’s position really amounts to an

attempt to re-write the agreement, one we find clear and unambiguous, to

include new terms that were never identified therein. That we cannot do. See

Vaccarello v. Vaccarello, 757 A.2d 909, 914 (Pa. 2000) (“When the terms

of a written contract are clear, this Court will not re-write it to give it a

construction in conflict with the accepted and plain meaning of the language

used.”).

      Since the trial court correctly determined that the marital settlement

agreement is clear and unambiguous, it did not err in denying Husband’s

petition for special relief or his exceptions to the master’s report and

recommendation.

                                    - 16 -
J-A13008-23

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/2023

                          - 17 -