Court Opinion

ID: 9821881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 08:32:26.759202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:57.970804
License: Public Domain

Tom, J.P.,
dissents in a memorandum as follows: The record contradicts the majority’s conclusion that defendant was not properly apprised of the implications of waiving his right to appeal. Thus, defendant’s valid waiver of the right to appeal forecloses appellate review of his excessive sentence claim (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256-257 [2006]).
The record discloses that upon accepting defendant’s guilty plea, the court, in a lengthy plea allocution, engaged in the following colloquy:
“THE COURT: All right. Sir, you understand that also as a part of this you are waiving your right to appeal. You understand that this conviction, or these convictions will be final, that a court will not review what we have done here, other than some residual rights that remain?
“Do you understand that?
*403“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Have you gone over that with your attorney?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: There is a document entitled waiver of appeal. I see that you executed that document. Do you have any questions about it?
“THE DEFENDANT: No.”
This language tracks the same colloquy that provided for a valid waiver in People v Nicholson, one of the cases consolidated under People v Lopez (6 NY3d 248, 254-255 [2006]), and, with the written waiver in this case, even exceeds Nicholson. In the written waiver, signed both by defendant and his attorney, defendant expressly acknowledges as follows: “I understand that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from other rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty.” Further, “I also understand that by waiving my right to appeal, I am giving up the right to raise on appeal a number of claims that I could otherwise raise even after a guilty plea. In particular, I understand that I am waiving my right to ask the Appellate Division to review the terms of the plea and reduce my sentence, and my right to appeal the denial of any suppression motion I made.” Finally, “I execute and sign this waiver knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily” and “have had a full opportunity to discuss these matters with my attorney and any questions I may have had have been answered to my satisfaction.” After defendant acknowledged that he had gone over the terms of the document with his attorney, the court asked if he had any questions regarding the waiver, to which defendant responded, “No.” I conclude that this colloquy is clearly adequate under Nicholson for the enforcement of the waiver of appeal by defendant.
A defendant who has validly waived his right of appeal may not invoke this Court’s interest-of-justice jurisdiction to reduce a bargained-for sentence (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 255-256 [2006]), particularly where the waiver is documented by a writing. “By pleading guilty and waiving the right to appeal, a defendant has forgone review of the terms of the plea, including harshness or excessiveness of the sentence” (id. at 256). Waiver will be enforced “so long as the record demonstrates that it was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily” (id., citing People v Calvi, 89 NY2d 868, 871 [1996]). It is essential that a defendant understand that the right to appeal is distinct from “the panoply of trial rights automatically forfeited upon pleading guilty” (6 NY3d at 257). While this explanation may be given verbally by the court, it is “even better to secure a written waiver including such explanation (as in Lopez)” (id.).
*404Here, defendant acknowledged before the Court that he fully understood the terms of the written waiver after consulting with his attorney. Contrary to the majority’s position, even if there is some ambiguity in the court’s colloquy, the waiver is still valid if defendant also executed a detailed written waiver (People v Ramos, 7 NY3d 737 [2006]), since “the written waiver ensured defendant understood that in addition to the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, he was separately giving up his right to appeal as a bargained-for condition of the plea” (People v Carvajal, 68 AD3d 443, 443 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 799 [2010]).
It is clear from the Court of Appeals’ decision in Lopez that a written waiver incorporating the explanation that the right to appeal is a distinct right fulfills the requirement to demonstrate that waiver of such right was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Thus, the defendant cannot “invoke the court’s review power” to disturb the terms of the negotiated plea agreement (Lopez, 6 NY3d at 262, 256 [fairness and finality are promoted only if parties to a plea agreement are confident that “an agreed-upon sentence will not be disturbed as a discretionary matter”], citing People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 10 [1989] [“the public interest concerns underlying plea bargains generally are served by enforcing waivers of the right to appeal”]; People v Jenkins, 138 AD3d 102 [1st Dept 2016]). Nor can we “sua sponte” reduce the sentence (People v Jenkins; see also People v Romano, 45 AD3d 910, 913-914 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 770 [2008]).
In short, “ [h] aving received the benefit of his bargain, defendant should be bound by its terms” (People v Lopez, 190 AD2d 545, 545 [1st Dept 1993]). This record provides no compelling evidence of special circumstances to the contrary.
Accordingly, the judgment should be affirmed in all respects.