Court Opinion

ID: 9918707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 16:00:27.329929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:40.502845
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MARY A. ABBOTT,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
             Appellant,                         DC-0752-12-0366-A-3

             v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: January 12, 2024
              Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Allison B. Eddy , Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.

      Jasmin A. Dabney , Landover, Maryland, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                          Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                           Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed an attorney fee petition for review of the addendum
initial decision, which awarded her attorney fees of $4,955.00 and costs of
$12.11, for a total of $4,967.11. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the
appellant’s petition for review and AFFIRM the addendum initial decision, except
as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order to award the appellant $6,825.00 in
attorney fees and $7.11 in costs, for a total award of $6,832.11.
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

                                 BACKGROUND
      In December 2016, the Board reversed the appellant’s suspension and
awarded her back pay.          Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket
No. DC-0752-12-0366-B-1, Final Order at ¶¶ 1, 22-23 (Dec. 20, 2016).             The
appellant filed a motion for attorney fees in connection with the underlying
suspension appeal, which the Board granted.         Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service,
MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-12-0366-A-1, Attorney Fee Decision (A-1 AFD)
at 1, 10 (Feb. 24, 2017).    The appellant filed a timely petition to enforce the
Board’s December 2016 order.       Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket
No. DC-0752-12-0366-C-1, Compliance File (C-1 CF), Tab 1 at 4-5.                In a
July 27, 2017 compliance initial decision, the administrative judge found the
agency in noncompliance. 2 C-1 CF, Compliance Initial Decision (C-1 CID) at 5
(June 27, 2017). On September 13, 2017, the appellant filed a second motion for
attorney fees in connection with the compliance matter and the fee petition.
Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-12-0366-A-2,
Attorney Fee File (A-2 AFF), Tab 1 at 4-11.         In February 2018, the parties
reached a settlement agreement, wherein the appellant agreed to withdraw her
second motion for attorney fees in exchange for $15,173.60 in attorney fees, and
the administrative judge dismissed the appeal as settled. A-2 AAF, Tab 11 at 4,
Attorney Fee Decision (A-2 AFD) at 1-2 (Feb. 8, 2018).                However, on
October 17, 2017, while the appellant’s second attorney fee petition was pending,
the appellant filed a second petition for enforcement, arguing that the agency
failed to comply with the Board’s July 27, 2017 order.        Abbott v. U.S. Postal
Service, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-12-0366-C-2, Compliance File (C-2 CF),
Tab 1 at 4-6; A-2 AFD at 1. In an April 27, 2018, compliance initial decision, the
administrative judge found the agency in noncompliance. C-2 CF, Compliance
Initial Decision (C-2 CID) at 7 (Apr. 27, 2018).       After the compliance initial

2
  On August 16, 2017, the administrative judge issued an erratum order clarifying her
order to the agency. A-2 AFF, Addendum Attorney Fee Decision (Aug. 16, 2017).
                                                                                 3

decision became final, the appellant filed a third motion for attorney fees on
June 19, 2018, in connection with the work performed in the second compliance
matter. Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-12-0366-A-3,
Attorney Fee File (A-3 AFF), Tab 1 at 4-11. This third fee motion is the subject
of the instant appeal.
      The appellant requested $7,200 in attorney fees and $7.11 in costs for work
performed between August 21, 2017, and July 24, 2018.            A-3 AFF, Tab 1
at 12-17, Tab 5 at 9-11. The agency disputed the appellant’s claimed fees, and
the appellant replied. A-3 AFF, Tab 4 at 5-6, Tab 5 at 4-7. After reviewing the
parties’ submissions, the administrative judge issued an addendum initial
decision, awarding the appellant attorney fees of $4,955.00 and costs of $12.11,
for a total of $4,967.11. A-3 AFF, Tab 7, Attorney Fee Decision (A-3 AFD)
at 9-10. She awarded the appellant all of the claimed costs, and found that the
rates were reasonable, but reduced the attorney fee award by $2,250 because the
hours claimed were duplicative. Id.
      The appellant has filed a petition for review, disputing the fee reduction.
Addendum Petition for Review (A-3 PFR) File, Tab 1 at 8-15. The agency has
not filed a response.

                 DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      As the administrative judge correctly explained, A-3 AFD at 5, to establish
entitlement to an award of attorney fees under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1), an appellant
must show the following elements:      (1) she was the prevailing party; (2) she
incurred attorney fees pursuant to an existing attorney-client relationship; (3) an
award of fees is warranted in the interest of justice; and (4) the amount of fees
claimed is reasonable. Driscoll v. U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 7
(2011).   The administrative judge found that the appellant met the first three
elements. A-3 AFD at 5-7. These findings are supported, well-reasoned, and
unchallenged on review. Id. Accordingly, we decline to revisit them here and
                                                                                  4

focus on the appellant’s challenges to the administrative judge’s finding
regarding the final element—the reasonableness of the fees claimed.
      In determining the reasonable fee award, the Board first calculates the
“lodestar”—the product of the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the hours
reasonably spent working on the matter. Driscoll, 116 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 10. To
establish the appropriate hourly rate, an attorney fee petition must contain a copy
of the fee agreement, if any, as well as evidence of the attorney’s customary
billing rate for similar work.        Hart v. Department of Transportation,
115 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶ 14 (2010). The party seeking an award should exclude hours
that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Driscoll, 116 M.S.P.R.
662, ¶ 11. The administrative judge need not automatically accept claimed hours,
but may disallow hours for duplication, padding, or frivolous claims and impose
fair standards of efficiency and economy of time. Id.
      Neither party challenged the administrative judge’s finding that, based
upon her review of the supporting documentation, the claimed rates for the
associate attorney and the named partner were reasonable. A-3 AFD at 8. In
calculating the lodestar, she identified a rate of $300 per hour for the associate
attorney and $400 per hour for the named partner.          Id.   We find that the
administrative judge made a typographical error regarding the named partner’s
claimed rate. Id. In his affidavit, the named partner claimed a rate of $450 per
hour. A-3 AFF, Tab 1 at 23-25. He also consistently billed $450 per hour for
work performed, as reflected in the billing statements, and provided sufficient
evidence showing that $450 per hour was a customary rate for attorneys in his
area with similar experience performing similar work. A-3 AFF, Tab 1 at 14-17,
26-33; see generally Hart, 115 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶ 14.       Finally, the administrative
judge found no basis for adjusting the claimed rates and relied on the appellant’s
fee calculations, which were based on the $450 rate. A-3 AFD at 8. Accordingly,
we modify the addendum initial decision to correct this harmless, typographical
error and find that the reasonable rate for the named partner was $450 per hour.
                                                                                      5

See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984)
(explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s
substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).
         After finding that the claimed rate was reasonable, the administrative judge
determined that the lodestar was $7,200.            A-3 AFD at 8.    She adjusted the
lodestar downward by $2,250 because she determined that, pursuant to the
February 2018 attorney fee settlement agreement, the appellant had received
attorney fees for work performed from August 21 to September 13, 2017, and
therefore     that   awarding   fees   based   on    work   performed   during    those
“overlap[ping]” dates would be duplicative. 3 A-3 AFD at 8-9. On review, the
appellant argues that the administrative judge should not have reduced her
claimed hours. A-3 PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-14. Alternatively, she argues that,
even if a reduction were appropriate, the administrative judge’s reduction of
$2,250 was excessive and unjustified. Id. at 8, 14-15. She asserts that she only
claimed $405 in fees for the disputed period.               Id.   We agree that the
administrative judge’s reduction was excessive.
         As explained above, in February 2018, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement resolving the appellant’s second fee petition. A-2 AFF, Tab 11 at 4.
A settlement agreement is a contract and is interpreted in accordance with
contract law. See Greco v. Department of the Army, 852 F.2d 558, 560 (Fed. Cir.
1988).     In construing the terms of a settlement agreement, the words of the
agreement are of paramount importance.               Flores v. U.S. Postal Service,
115 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 10 (2010) (citing Greco, 852 F.2d at 560). The Board will
consider parol evidence only if the agreement is ambiguous. Id. The terms of an
3
  Although not specified in the addendum initial decision, the administrative judge
appears to either have miscalculated the hours claimed in the period at issue or applied
a 31% reduction to the lodestar. In any event, the administrative judge must identify
the hours eliminated and give a clear explanation for their elimination. Casali v.
Department of the Treasury, 81 M.S.P.R. 347, ¶ 14 (1999). Thus, she erred in failing to
provide a detailed explanation of how she arrived at the $2,250 figure. However, in
light of our disposition here, we find it unnecessary to determine how she calculated
this amount.
                                                                                  6

agreement are ambiguous as a result of differing interpretations as to the
meanings or intent given to those terms by the parties only when the respective
interpretations are both reasonable. Id.
        Here, it is undisputed that the settlement agreement was enforceable and
the appellant withdrew her second fee petition as consideration for receiving
$15,173.60 in attorney fees. A-2 AFD at 1-2; A-2 AFF, Tab 11 at 4. Neither
party has challenged the addendum initial decision that dismissed the appellant’s
prior fee petition as settled; that decision is now final.    A-2 AFD at 12; see
generally Weldon v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 119 M.S.P.R. 478, ¶ 5
(2013) (explaining that an attack on the validity of a settlement agreement must
be made in the form of a petition for review of the initial decision dismissing the
appeal as settled); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113 (explaining that an initial decision
generally becomes the Board’s final decision 35 days after issuance, absent a
petition for review).    Instead, the appellant disagrees with the administrative
judge’s interpretation of the scope of the agreement.        A-3 PFR File, Tab 1
at 8-14.
        The administrative judge found that the entirety of the hours claimed from
August 21 and September 13, 2017, included in the instant petition were
encompassed by the parties’ 2018 settlement agreement. A-3 AFD at 9. The
appellant argues that, despite the overlap in dates, all of the fees claimed in the
instant appeal were for compliance-related work in connection with the second
petition for enforcement, which involved issues distinct from the claims involved
in the first petition for enforcement, and thus were not covered by the settlement
agreement. 4 Id. The first compliance initial decision became final on August 31,
2017.      C-1 CID at 7-8.    According to the appellant’s second petition for
enforcement, the appellant received a check for back pay from the agency on

4
   The agreement contained no requirement that the appellant waive any claim to
attorney fees related to other matters, such as separate work performed for the
appellant’s second petition for enforcement and third fee petition. A-2 AFF, Tab 11
at 4.
                                                                                        7

September 5, 2017, that was insufficient. 5 C-2 CF, Tab 1 at 5. The agency’s
purported failure to pay the appellant the appropriate back pay amount at that
time gave rise to the appellant’s second petition for enforcement. Id. Thus, the
back pay-related work performed prior thereto was reasonably related to the
matters at issue in the appellant’s second petition for attorney fees and covered by
the February 2018 attorney fee settlement agreement. 6 C-1 CID at 5; C-1 Erratum
Order at 1-2; A-2 AFF, Tab 1 at 5-6, Tab 11 at 4. Of the seven disputed entries,
all but one—the entry dated September 12, 2017—was for work performed before
the agency issued the September 5, 2017 back pay check. A -3 AFF, Tab 1 at 14;
C-2 CF, Tab 1 at 5. The appellant’s attorney described the work performed for
this period as concerning back pay.         A-3 AFF, Tab 1 at 14; C-1 CID at 1-3;
C-2 CID at 1-2. Therefore, we find that the six entries for work performed from
August 21 to September 1, 2017, were encompassed by the appellant’s settlement
agreement and her request for those fees is duplicative. 7
      As a result, we exclude the 1.1 hours of work and the 0.1 hours of work the
associate attorney and named partner billed, respectively, for August 21 through
September 1, 2017, from the lodestar calculation, reducing the associate
attorney’s number of reasonable hours from 21 to 19.9 hours and the named
partner’s reasonable hours from 2 to 1.9 hours. A-3 AFF, Tab 1 at 12-17, Tab 5
at 9-11. After multiplying the associate attorney’s 19.9 hours billed by her rate of

5
  The appellant apparently received no further notice of compliance from the agency
before she filed her second petition for enforcement on October 17, 2017. Id. at 7-11.
6
  The agency discusses the appellant’s second petition for enforcement in a filing titled
“2018 1-30 Agency Response to Enforcement Petition,” dated January 30, 2018, that the
agency submitted to the appellant’s second fee petition file; however, that filing appears
to have been intended for the C-2 compliance file. A-2 Tab 10; C -2 CF, Tab 9
(appellant’s February 6, 2018 reply to the agency’s response to the petition for
enforcement).
7
  As to the appellant’s apparent arguments that her attorneys did not double bill for
work performed outside of the disputed time frame, the administrative judge found no
such duplicate billing and did not reduce the appellant’s attorney award on that basis.
A-3 AFD at 8-14; A-3 PFR File, Tab 8-14.
                                                                                    8

$300, and the named partner’s 1.9 hours billed by his rate of $450 per hour, we
find that the lodestar calculation is $6,825.00.         The administrative judge
identified no other basis for reducing the lodestar.           See, e.g., Driscoll,
116 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶¶ 10, 16 (explaining that it may be appropriate to reduce the
lodestar to reflect a party’s failure to obtain all the relief he requested).
Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge’s inexplicable reduction of
$2,250 was in error and that the appellant is entitled to $6,825.00 in attorney fees.
      Finally, the appellant requested $7.11 in costs relating to postage paid for
filings related to the second petition for enforcement and the third petition for
attorney fees. A-3 AFF, Tab 1 at 12, 18-20, Tab 5 at 9. The administrative judge
found the appellant’s claimed costs were reasonable. A-3 AFF at 9. We agree.
See Social Security Administration v. Balaban, 33 M.S.P.R. 309, 323 (1987)
(identifying postage as a cost recoverable under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1)).
However, as the record reflects that the appellant only requested $7.11 in costs,
the administrative judge appeared to make a typographical error in awarding the
appellant $12.11 in costs. A-3 AFD at 9; A-3 AFF, Tab 1 at 12, 18-20, Tab 5
at 9. We modify the addendum initial decision in this regard. Accordingly, we
find that the appellant is entitled to $6,825.00 in attorney fees and $7.11 in costs,
for total award of $6,832.11.

                                      ORDER
      We ORDER the agency to pay the attorney of record $6,832.11 in fees and
costs. The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date
of this decision. Title 5 of the United States Code, section 1204(a)(2) (5 U.S.C.
§ 1204(a)(2)).
      We also ORDER the agency to tell the appellant and the attorney promptly
in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the
actions it has taken to carry out the Board’s Order. We ORDER the appellant and
the attorney to provide all necessary information that the agency requests to help
                                                                                      9

it carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant and the attorney, if not notified,
should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
      No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant or the attorney
that it has fully carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant or the attorney may
file a petition for enforcement with the office that issued the initial decision on
this appeal, if the appellant or the attorney believes that the agency did not fully
carry out the Board’s Order. The petition should contain specific reasons why the
appellant or the attorney believes the agency has not fully carried out the Board’s
Order, and should include the dates and results of any communications with the
agency. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       10

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                11

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     12

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant   to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439
9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              13

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Jennifer Everling
                                      Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.