Court Opinion

ID: 9738887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:04:55.447601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.973774
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring). I agree with the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals and parts i, ii and m of Justice Riley’s opinion.1 Plaintiff’s proofs are insufficient to support the inference of a promise of termination only for just cause.
i
I read part i of the opinion to stand for the *663proposition that plaintiff’s proofs are insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that the employer made a commitment that a reasonable promisee would believe amounted to a promise of termination only for just cause.2
The employment-at-will rule reflected a policy judgment that informal promises of informal employment security should not be taken seriously by the law, unless the employee offers an indication that both parties meant for their deal to be enforced. [Perritt, Employee Dismissal Law & Practice (2d ed), § 4.2, p 176.]
Professor Epstein explains that rules of construction are adopted to reflect "the dominant practice in a given class of cases and because that practice is itself regarded as making good sense for the standard transactions it governs.” Epstein, In defense of the contract at will, 51 U Chi L R 947, 951 (1984). It has not been demonstrated that the dominant practice of employment-at-will arrangements in the oral promise employment context has shifted sufficiently to warrant determination that the practice no longer makes sense and to reject the rule of construction that presumes employment at will.
Drawing on the facts of Toussaint and Ebling,3 the lead opinion sets forth a list4 of some of the *664circumstances that are of assistance in determining the threshold issue of intent. Even where there is proof that an employer made an express statement of job security, for "as long as I sold,” or "forever/’ it does not follow that a promise to continue employment until cause existed for termination must be inferred. Lynas v Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich 684, 687; 273 NW 315 (1937) ("permanent position or one for life so long as his services were satisfactory to defendant”); Sullivan v Detroit, Y & AA R, 135 Mich 661, 676; 98 NW 756 (1904) (circumstances insufficient to support a contract contemplating that the plaintiff would be employed "as long as he was able to do the legal work of the defendant”). Stated otherwise, where the parties have not supplied a durational term, employment at will is the inferred term that the court supplies by construction. It will be overcome by circumstances establishing that the nonexistence of the presumption is more likely than not.5
The court’s description of the method of analysis in Darlington v General Electric, 350 Pa Super *665183, 200; 504 A2d 306 (1986), an employment case, is instructive:
When "sufficient additional consideration” is present, courts infer that the parties intended that the contract will not be terminable at-will. This inference may be nothing more than a legal fiction because it is possible that in a given case, the parties never truly contemplated how long the employment would last even though additional consideration is present. Even so, the at-will presumption would be overcome. On the other hand, if the parties specifically agreed that the employment would be at-will, even though additional consideration were present, we would expect a court to construe the contract according to the parties’ stated intention and hold it to be at-will. Thus, we start with the usual at-will presumption which, let us say, has not been overcome by evidence of a contract for a term or for a reasonable length of time. Then, if sufficient additional consideration is present, the law presumes this to be sufficient to rebut the at-will presumption. . . . However, the presumption created by the additional consideration rule could itself be rebutted by evidence that the parties specifically contracted for employment at-will. [Emphasis in the original.]
As Toussaint and Ebling illustrate, reliance or special consideration as a result of bargaining is an objective indication that the existence of job security is more probable than not. Otherwise stated, it is circumstantial evidence that the omitted durational term that the court would otherwise infer (employment at will) does not reflect the parties’ intent. Thus, while the oral contract prong of Toussaint and Ebling recognizes that validation devices6 provide circumstantial evidence rebutting *666the presumption of employment at will, neither case is to be construed as creating a rule of substantive law that words of commitment must be interpreted as words of promise which must be submitted to the factfinder.
As Professor Perritt states,
Part of the idea of offer and acceptance or meeting of the minds in contract theory is to require that a promise be supported by some sort of validation device before the law enforces it. A competing approach to promise enforcement has received little support in the cases: essentially to forget about validation devices and enforce employer promises of employment security merely upon proof the employer made them. [Perritt, supra, § 4.12, pp 197-198. Emphasis omitted.]
This is not to say that consideration in addition to rendering services is essential to enforceability in employment cases; it is to say that the more ambiguous the circumstances, the more appropriate it is to look for objective indications of assent.
Professor Farnsworth likewise observes, when determining whether circumstances constitute an offer,
[t]he fact that a proposal is very detailed suggests that it is an offer, while omission of many terms suggests that it is not. "The more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement.” [Farnsworth, Contracts, § 3.10, p 127, quoting the comment to UCC 2-204.]
*667Courts will infer a reasonable price or other term to avoid a problem with indefiniteness. However, when "the indefiniteness goes to the central question of the quantity of work to be done,[7] and there is no satisfactory external standard of reasonableness to answer it,” courts are much more reluctant to infer a durational term. Farnsworth, supra, § 3.28, p 197. Thus, when considering whether a statement constitutes an ofier, in the context of commercial contracts, courts construe a statement as nonpromissory if it would expose the maker to the risk of being bound to perform beyond his means to perform.
Even under the liberalized requirement of definiteness under the Uniform Commercial Code
which permits a contract to be found with many open terms emphasizes two fundamental requirements: (1) a manifest intention to make a contract, and (2) a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy. ... If an employee has begun to perform with the acquiescence of the employer, there can be no question that the parties intended to make a contract. However, absent other manifestations of intention, how shall a court read a definite term into such a contract to provide an appropriate remedy . . . ? [I]t is not possible to decide upon a suitable term of employment where there is no objective manifestation of the parties’ intention to guide the court. [Darlington v General Electric, supra, p 197.]
In most employment arrangements, the durational term is central to the agreement because it is inseparable from the threshold question whether a commitment could reasonably be understood to be a promise.
I agree with Justice Riley’s conclusion that *668there is an insufficient basis to overcome the presumption and supply an omitted durational term. In this context, the standard of performance is not sufficient to guide the Court on the central question of the parties’ intent regarding the duration of the employment relationship.
ii
It is black letter law that enforceable obligations may arise from "explicit” promises, Perritt, supra, § 4.1, p 173, from promises implied in fact, or obligations implied in law (such as the policy or legitimate-expectations prong of Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield). An enforceable obligation under the contract prong of Toussaint can arise from an explicit promise or can be inferred from words or other conduct.8 "Sometimes a contract that results from words is described as 'express,’ while one that results from conduct is described as 'implied in fact,’ but the distinction as such has no legal consequences.” Farnsworth, supra, § 3.10, p 124.
When the communication between parties has more than one possible meaning and that formula*669tion is submitted to a court, the court employs its own criteria for interpretation. Likewise, when a contract is incomplete because it fails to provide for a contingency, courts both at common law and under the Restatement may supply constructive conditions or "gap fillers” to avoid failure for indefiniteness. See, generally, Goetz & Scott, The limits of expanded choice: An analysis of the interaction between express and implied contract terms, 73 Cal L R 261 (1985).
Thus, even in employment contracts where courts have been much more reluctant to cure indefiniteness in duration, if the amount of work to be done is definite, a term that it must be done within a reasonable time will be supplied and enforced, Browne & Co v Sharkey Co, 58 Or 480; 115 P 156 (1911), as would a reference to a measurable time period such as, " 'as long as’ John Engler is Governor, or Michael F. Cavanagh is Chief Justice,” Levin, J., post, p 700, which clearly refers to an external standard of durational measure.
Farnsworth describes the process by which a court analyzes a dispute over an omitted term by observing that in order to determine what the parties have not said, it is first necessary to determine what they have said. Farnsworth, Disputes over omission in contracts, 68 Colum L R 860, 874 (1968).
The first step in deciding whether the requirement of definiteness has been met is to interpret the language of the agreement. [Farnsworth, Contracts, § 3.28, p 195.]
Thus, the process of supplying omitted terms begins with an incipient dispute over expression, for finding an omitted term "is itself an exercise in *670interpretation of the contract to decide whether or not the parties have provided for the case.” Farnsworth, 68 Colum L R 873-874.
In this case, to determine what the parties have not said, we examine the language "as long as she sold,” which the dissent finds is a "definite term of employment.” (Post, p 688. Emphasis added.) The dissent eschews interpretation of the language in question, and characterizes the language as an absolute promise that would terminate only on the happening of a condition or event, i.e., failure to sell the quota.9
It is apparent, however, that the "as long as” language can be interpreted two ways: either in a temporal sense or in a qualitative sense,10 that is, that your employment will last "as long as” you sell or your employment will last "as long as” your sales are satisfactory. The term is less definite than "lifetime” or "permanent employment,” which has a temporal reference only, but in referring to a sales draw, it may be understood to mean as long as the employee is able to do the work properly and the employer continues in the business. Stated otherwise, the words "as long as,” like "permanent” and "lifetime,” may be taken either literally as an obligation in perpetuity or seen as an offer of steady employment.
Since, in this case, there is more than one *671possible meaning of the language "as long as” she sold, a meaning that signals a temporal limit and another that provides in generalized terms for the performance expectation of the employer, I cannot agree that the "plain meaning” of the language employed addresses when or how termination will occur, or binds the employer for any particular length of time.
Terms such as "permanent employment” have no immutable meaning. When used in different concrete situations by different individuals different meanings may fairly be attached to the term. If the employee has paid in money or in some other way for the promise of "permanent employment,” it is likely that both parties understood that employment was to endure as long as the employee is able to perform the work for which he is hired or at least until retirement age. The payment of a consideration is an evidentiary factor bearing on the proper interpretation of the parties’ intention. It follows that other evidentiary factors can perform the same function. In each case all of the circumstances are to be considered. It may be shown that the parties meant or did not mean something definite. [Calamari & Perillo, Contracts (3d ed), § 2-9, pp 60-61.]
If this problem is analyzed as a dispute over interpretation, i.e., the meaning of "as long as,” I read Justice Riley’s opinion as fully consistent with the rule of construction, acknowledged in Toussaint, that the Court’s task is "to construe 'permanent’ consistent with the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract . . . .” Id., p 609.
If analyzed as a case of an omitted term, Farnsworth, supra, § 7.17, pp 531-532, the result is also fully consistent with courts that have regularly found that an agreement that is silent with re*672spect to termination is an omitted case, despite absolute promises on both sides. Then, by implication, they have almost invariably supplied a term allowing either party to terminate at will.11
When one party seeks to terminate an agreement that is silent with respect to termination, the other party may claim that silence is not omission and that, since the promises of the parties are absolute, the agreement admits of no termination. Despite the superficial appeal of this argument, courts have had little difficulty in resolving the threshold problem of interpretation so as to find an omitted case. Farnsworth, supra, § 7.17, pp 531-532. Farnsworth emphasizes that although this dispute arises frequently in the employment context, "[c]onscious of the traditionally intimate nature of the relationship between employer and employee, courts have regularly found that termination is an omitted case, despite absolute promises on both sides. Then by implication they have almost invariably supplied a term allowing either party to terminate at will.” Id., p 532.
Farnsworth explains that, just as modern courts conclude that promises in a bilateral contract are not absolute, but include constructive conditions of exchange, they conclude that the promise relied on here cannot be read to supply a durational term. In the seventeenth century, early common-law courts held that bilateral promises were absolute unless one of the parties explicitly qualified the promise. Thus, if one party failed to perform, the other party "could not escape liability merely because the other party had not performed what he had promised in return.” Farnsworth, 68 Colum LR 863. Later common-law courts concluded that *673despite an absolute promise, the performance of each parties’ promise "is made a condition of the duty to perform the other . . . Farnsworth, supra, § 8.9, p 579.
According to Farnsworth, modern courts do not follow a literal approach to contract construction but "take greater liberties in defining its [the contract’s] scope.” Farnsworth, 68 Colum LR 863. Rather than interpreting the promises as absolute, modern courts conclude that each promise defines the party’s performance, but does not necessarily address the conditions of performance. Thus, the courts conclude that they are dealing with an omitted term, the conditions of performance. The same reasoning applies when courts consider language such as the "as long as she sold” statement upon which the plaintiff predicates her claim.
Despite the fact that modern courts reject this literal approach and conclude that neither party intended the language to cover the duration or scope of the obligation, Farnsworth, supra, § 7.17, pp 531-532, the dissent would read the words as absolute, resulting in an obligation conceivably extending for the plaintiff’s life. The approach confirms the accuracy of the observation that the dissent "clearly evidences an insistence that this Court broaden the reach of . . . Toussaint,” Riley, J., ante, p 651, an observation that is further supported by comparing the analysis here with that of the Toussaint majority.
In Toussaint, the majority assumed the validity of precedent that a contract for "permanent” employment was for an indefinite term, Lynas v Maxwell Farms, supra, and found that an employee hired for an indefinite term may nonetheless have an enforceable obligation of "for cause” discharge. In this case, despite the recognition in Toussaint of the fact that our precedents require *674construing " 'permanent’ consistent with the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract,” id., p 609, the dissent relies on the plain meaning of "as long as” to supply a durational term.12
Finally, I read Justice Riley’s opinion as consistent with the modern view of 1 Restatement Contracts, 2d, § 33 and the UCC 2-204(3), that indefiniteness regarding material terms does not prevent a contract from existing,13 and that context is referenced to determine the meaning of the agreement. 1 Restatement Contracts, 2d, § 33 appears in the chapter of the work which deals with offers. It expresses the view that a court should not find that there is no contract simply because "one or more of the terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain,” § 33(3). That the illustration relied on by Justice Levin addresses the enforceability of the promise, not its duration, is supported both by comment (d) that "[w]hen the contract *675calls for successive performances but is indefinite in duration, it is commonly terminable by either party, with or without a requirement of reasonable notice,” and by the Reporter’s note to comment (d), citing Tanenbaum Textile Co, Inc v Sidran, 423 SW2d 635, 637 (Tex Civ App, 1968). In Tanenbaum, a manufacturer was obligated to pay a one percent commission on sales produced by the plaintiff, against the defendant’s claim that "the agreement ... is too indefinite to be enforceable in that: (1) its duration is not specified . . . .”
While holding that the law would imply that a reasonable time was the durational term intended by the parties and that the contract was not too indefinite to be enforced, the court specifically stated:
Where a contract is silent as to the time it is to run, or provides that it is to run for an indefinite term, it is not invalid for that reason but may be terminated by either party at any time. [Id., p 637. Emphasis added.]
In sum, I read part i of the opinion to be fully consistent with the black letter rule that where the parties have failed to set forth a material term, the court must interpret the language and conduct to determine the parties’ intent.
hi
The plaintiff relied on a promissory theory of liability and the implied-in-law policy prong of Toussaint. In the context of employment arrangements, a promissory theory of liability is analyzed in light of the presumption of employment at will, a procedural device that, like other presumptions, is simply a legal recognition of the normal expec*676tations of parties in most employment situations.14 Where it is asserted that the proofs are insufficient to create an issue of fact, the promissory implied-in-fact claim requires the court to focus on the words or actions of the defendant to determine whether there is sufficient evidence manifesting an intention to make a commitment of job security. Where the defendant’s commitment-making actions predominate, that is, where it is more likely than not that a reasonable promisee would believe that the employer was making a commitment that amounted to a promise, the presumption is overcome. Where the defendant’s commitment-making actions do not predominate and there exists no other basis to supply a term regarding the scope or duration of the obligation, the promissory theory is an inappropriate rationalization for an enforceable obligation. Pettit, Modern unilateral contracts, 63 Boston ULR 551 (1983).
Because I agree that on this record the "defendant’s commitment-making actions do not predominate,” id., p 577, I agree that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

 This opinion responds to the latest draft of a proposed dissent circulated by Justice Levin.

 I do not read Justice Riley’s opinion as rejecting the claim that if the parties’ intention appears, it is that intention that should be enforced. 2 Restatement Contracts, 2d, § 201, pp 83-86; Farnsworth, Contracts, §§ 7.15-7.16, pp 517-526; Darlington v General Electric, 350 Pa Super 183; 504 A2d 306 (1986).

 Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980).

 Among the circumstances identified as objective indications of intent are the clarity, specificity, and lack of ambiguity of oral statements; whether there were specific negotiations for job security; the nature of the position; and whether, if policy statements are relied on, they support or undercut a reasonable belief that a promise of job security was being extended.

 Where the parties’ intention is not apparent and the facts and circumstances advanced by the plaintiff are sufficient to show it is more likely than not that a reasonable promisee would believe that the employer was making a commitment that amounted to a promise of job security, the court will conclude, as a threshold matter, that the presumption has been overcome. Where facts and circumstances are contradicted and reasonable minds can differ, the jury will determine the facts and circumstances that actually obtained, whether there was a commitment amounting to a promise, and whether the promise was breached. Where the facts and circumstances produced would not warrant a reasonable juror in finding a promise of job security, the question cannot be put to the jury, Leslie v Mendelson, 302 Mich 95, 104; 4 NW2d 481 (1942). To experienced practitioners of employment law, this formulation may appear at best, unnecessary — at worst, simplistic. It is here to balance the perhaps unduly cryptic language in Bullock v Automobile Club of Michigan, 432 Mich 472, 483; 444 NW2d 114 (1989), that the determination (of the effect of these manuals) "must await further discovery and perhaps trial.” (Emphasis added.)

 Chief Justice Cavanagh incorrectly observes that the oral contract claim in Toussaint did not "rely on the policy manual,” post, p 721. "Toussaint’s case is, if anything, stronger because he was handed *666a manual of Blue Cross personnel policies which reinforced the oral assurance of job security,” Toussaint, p 597. "Toussaint’s testimony was sufficient to create a question of fact for the jury whether there was a mutual understanding that it was company policy not to discharge an employee 'as long as [he] did [his] job,’ and that this policy, expressed in documents (which said 'for just cause only’), assertedly handed to Toussaint when he was hired, would apply to him as to other Blue Cross employees.” Id., p 613.

 In the area of sales of goods, for example, courts will infer almost every kind of term except the quantity term.

 Contrary to Justice Levin’s assertion, the Rules of Personal Conduct (or other policy statements) may be relevant to an inquiry into Rowe’s claims under the contract prong of Toussaint The facts of Toussaint are illustrative. Toussaint inquired regarding job security, and a manual was handed to him in response. Id., pp 598, 617. The manual, which Toussaint asserted became part of his contract, included ah explicit provision limiting dismissal to just cause. Id., p 597, n 5. In contrast, Rowe received a copy of the Rules of Personal Conduct which enumerated grounds for immediate dismissal, but failed to limit discharge to those grounds and omitted any discussion regarding just cause. Unlike the manual relied on in Toussaint, the Rules of Personal Conduct fail to support Rowe’s contention that her agreement with her employer was anything other than the at-will term inferred where a durational term is omitted or ambiguous.
Like the manual in Toussaint, the Rules of Personal Conduct also may be analyzed under the policy prong of Toussaint to determine whether it gives rise to legitimate expectations, an obligation implied in law. See Riley, J., part n, ante, pp 646-651.

 While Justice Levin characterizes the durational term of the offer as " 'as long as [she was] able to do the work,’ ” citing the Restatement, post, p 691, the proofs rest on the words, "as long as she sold.”

 "As long as” does not establish the scope or duration of the agreement. See, e.g., Tanner Co v Sparta-Tomah Broadcasting Co, 716 F2d 1155, 1158-1159 (CA 7, 1983) (applying Wisconsin law); Starling v Valmac Industries, Inc, 589 F2d 382, 387 (CA 8, 1979); Fleming v Mack Trucks, Inc, 308 F Supp 917, 920 (ED Pa, 1981); cf. Davie v Lumberman’s Mining Co, 93 Mich 491, 492; 53 NW 625 (1892) ("as long as” they could make it pay, too uncertain to enforce an executory contract) with Caplis v Monroe, 228 Mich 586, 588; 200 NW 123 (1924) (" 'as long as I paid the rent that I could stay there until she sold the property”). (Emphasis added.)

 This is not to say that relief may not be awarded under an indefinite agreement on the basis of the terms of the agreement, restitution, or reliance. Farnsworth, supra, § 3.30, pp 208-210.

 Justice Levin implicitly acknowledges the lack of an explicit durational term when he discusses the parties’ contentions regarding the existence or nonexistence of a just-cause term. Post, p 681, n 8. According to the dissent, the statement upon which Rowe predicates her claim defines the "work to be done, the compensation to be paid, and a durational term of the contract, so that the trier of fact may find, upon acceptance of the offer, an express contract of employment was formed for as long as the employee is able to do the work.” Post, pp 687-688. Nowhere in this statement is there any reference to a just-cause dismissal term. Furthermore, if the logic of the dissent is adopted, this "not unusual promise of employment for as long as the employee is able to do the work,” post, p 686, would preclude an employer from terminating for any reason except a failure to meet the standard of performance. Even if Justice Levin limited the "as long as she sold” statement with the Rules of Personal Conduct, the employer would be entitled to terminate only for failure to sell or for one of the enumerated grounds for immediate dismissal. A termination on the basis of any other ground, including an economic downturn requiring layoffs, a business reorganization, excessive absenteeism, or chronic tardiness, would presumably be a breach of contract.

 As observed in concurrence in Dumas v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 437 Mich 521; 473 NW2d 652 (1991), the Court would not be precluded from resorting to "gap fillers” analogous to those contemplated under the ucc to supply an omitted term or to resolve an ambiguity.

 The presumption does not prevent proof of actual intent and should not be employed to permit unjustified evasions of promissory liability.