Court Opinion

ID: 9925956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 16:02:21.992434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:57.641694
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3072     Document: 010110988437         Date Filed: 01/23/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            January 23, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  PIDY T. TIGER,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 23-3072
                                                      (D.C. No. 5:19-CV-03088-JWL)
  SAM CLINE,                                                     (D. Kan.)

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

        Pidy T. Tiger is a pro se Kansas inmate who seeks a certificate of appealability

 (COA) to challenge the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C.

 § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA to appeal the denial of a § 2254 petition). We deny a

 COA and dismiss this matter.

                                              I

        A Kansas jury convicted Mr. Tiger of rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a

 child. His convictions were upheld on direct appeal, and his state post-conviction

 proceedings were unsuccessful. He then sought federal habeas relief on five claims, four

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-3072      Document: 010110988437          Date Filed: 01/23/2024       Page: 2

 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and one based on McGirt v. Oklahoma,

 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). The district court denied the first claim on procedural grounds

 and the rest on the merits. The district court also denied a COA and two post-judgment

 motions for reconsideration. Mr. Tiger now seeks a COA from this court.

                                               II

        To obtain a COA, Mr. Tiger “must make a substantial showing of the denial of a

 constitutional right.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For those claims the

 district court denied on the merits, he must show “that reasonable jurists would find the

 district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. But for

 the claim the district court denied on procedural grounds, he must go further and show

 both “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid

 claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it

 debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. (emphasis

 added). “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to

 invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the

 district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petition should be allowed to

 proceed further.” Id. If there is a procedural bar, the court should usually deny a COA

 on that basis, without reaching the constitutional issue. Id.

        A. Claim One: Procedural Default

        We begin by considering whether reasonable jurists could debate that Mr. Tiger’s

 first claim was procedurally defaulted. Procedural default is a “corollary to the

 exhaustion requirement,” which mandates that “a state prisoner . . . exhaust available

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 state remedies before presenting his claim to a federal habeas court.” Davila v. Davis,

 582 U.S. 521, 527 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C.

 § 2254(b)(1)(A)). If a state prisoner failed to exhaust his state remedies and would now

 be barred by state law from doing so, “there is a procedural default for purposes of

 federal habeas regardless of the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner

 actually presented his claims.” Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212, 1231 (10th Cir. 2014)

 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We have referred to this as an anticipatory

 procedural bar.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To overcome an anticipatory

 procedural bar, a prisoner must show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of

 justice, which requires a credible showing of actual innocence. Id.

        Mr. Tiger claims his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by pursuing

 an issue on direct appeal that could not have resulted in relief—viz., he faults his

 appellate attorney for arguing that his trial attorney violated his speedy-trial rights by

 taking continuances outside his presence when state law would not have attributed such

 delays to the prosecution. But he did not raise this claim in the state courts. Rather, he

 pursued a distinct claim on direct appeal against his trial counsel, arguing she rendered

 ineffective assistance and “denied him a speedy trial by taking numerous continuances

 without his permission.” State v. Tiger, 2015 WL 1513955, at *9 (Kan. Ct. App.

 Mar. 27, 2015) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The latter claim did not

 exhaust the former because state claims of ineffective assistance “based . . . on different

 reasons than those expressed in [the federal] habeas petition” do not satisfy the

 exhaustion requirement. Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999).

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 Further, Mr. Tiger now faces an anticipatory procedural bar because his federal claim

 would be rejected in state court as successive and untimely. See Kan. Stat. Ann.

 § 60-1507(c) (prohibiting successive postconviction motions); id. § 60-1507(f) (requiring

 that postconviction motions be filed within one year of termination of appellate

 jurisdiction on direct appeal, denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, or denial of

 postconviction relief and any appeal). Mr. Tiger makes no attempt to show cause and

 prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, and thus no reasonable jurist could

 debate the propriety of the district court’s decision.

        B. Resolution of Remaining Claims on the Merits

        Turning to Mr. Tiger’s remaining claims, all of which the district court denied on

 the merits, our assessment of whether a COA is warranted “requires an overview of the

 claims . . . and a general assessment of their merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

 336 (2003). We also account for the deferential treatment afforded state court decisions

 by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Dockins v. Hines,

 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, federal habeas relief is prohibited on

 claims adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s decision “was

 contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

 as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an

 unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

 court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “We look to the District Court’s application of

 AEDPA to petitioner’s constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was

 debatable amongst jurists of reason.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336.

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        1. Claim Two: Ineffective Assistance of Direct Appeal Counsel for Failing to
           Challenge a Voluntary Intoxication Instruction

        Mr. Tiger contends his direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

 Under Strickland v. Washington, he must show his counsel’s performance was both

 deficient and prejudicial. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984). Although our review of

 counsel’s performance is always “highly deferential,” “[t]he challenge is even greater for

 a petitioner under § 2254, as our review in such circumstances is doubly deferential.”

 Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks

 omitted). “[W]e defer to the state court’s determination that counsel’s performance was

 not deficient and, further, defer to the attorney’s decision in how to best represent a

 client.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, a petitioner challenges

 appellate counsel’s failure to raise an issue, the “petitioner must show both that

 (1) appellate counsel performed deficiently in failing to raise the particular issue on

 appeal and (2) but for appellate counsel’s deficient performance, there exists a reasonable

 probability the petitioner would have prevailed on appeal.” Davis v. Sharp, 943 F.3d

 1290, 1299 (10th Cir. 2019). We examine the merits of the omitted issue, and, if

 “meritless, its omission will not constitute deficient performance.” Id. (internal quotation

 marks omitted).

        Mr. Tiger’s ineffective-assistance claim turns on a factual issue. “[W]e presume

 that the factual findings of the state court are correct unless the petitioner presents clear

 and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Frederick v. Quick, 79 F.4th 1090, 1099

 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The presumption of correctness

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 also applies to factual findings made by a state court of review based on the trial record.”

 Id. at 1104 (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Mr. Tiger contends his direct appeal counsel should have challenged a voluntary

 intoxication instruction that he says interfered with his Sixth Amendment right to present

 his own defense. He requested the instruction but asked the trial court to delete the first

 sentence, which stated, “Pidy Tiger raises voluntary intoxication as a defense.” Tiger,

 2015 WL 1513955, at *14 (internal quotation marks omitted).1 He explained to the trial

 court that although he wanted the instruction, “he oppose[d] . . . telling the jury that he’s

 raising voluntary intoxication . . . as a defense because he is not saying he did the actual

 crime.” R., vol. II at 1157. He emphasized to the trial court that he did not “want the

 jury to have . . . any impression that he’s agreeing that he committed the crime[s].” Id.

 The trial court refused to delete the first sentence of the instruction and asked Mr. Tiger,

 “with that position now from the Court, . . . does the defense still want to raise voluntary

 intoxication and instruct as such?” Id. at 1159. Mr. Tiger’s trial attorney replied,

 “Preserving our objection to how [the instruction] is worded, yes, we still want to be able

 to discuss the effects of alcohol and specific intent.” Id. His trial attorney later argued to

 the jury:

        What role does alcohol have to play in this. I want to talk about that for a
        minute. In no way is Mr. Tiger saying that he did these matters but he gets
        an out because he was drunk. But what the law tells you is that there is
        alcohol, you have the evidence of alcohol, consumption to excess. It’s

        1
          The Kansas Court of Appeals determined that Mr. Tiger abandoned this issue by
 failing to brief it on appeal, though the court considered and rejected it in any event. See
 id. at *14-15.
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        there. So you as a juror get to decide how do we put this into this intent
        that he had to have to commit these crimes.

 Id. at 1201.

        Based on these proceedings, Mr. Tiger’s direct appeal counsel argued that “[w]hen

 the [trial] court gave the instruction without the requested modification against

 Mr. Tiger’s wishes, the [trial court] presented a guilt based defense on Mr. Tiger’s behalf.

 This was error.” R., vol. III at 61-62. The Kansas Court of Appeals (KCA) rejected that

 argument and concluded that Mr. “Tiger was raising the [voluntary-intoxication]

 defense,” and that “he requested the trial court to provide the instruction.” Tiger,

 2015 WL 1513955, at *14, 15.

        During state postconviction proceedings, Mr. Tiger raised his present claim,

 arguing appellate counsel should have contended the trial court sua sponte instructed the

 jury on voluntary intoxication, which violated his constitutional right to present his own

 defense because he did not concede that he committed the alleged acts. The state

 postconviction court rejected this claim, explaining:

        [Mr. Tiger] requested the voluntary intoxication instruction to undermine
        specific intent, but wanted to alter the [instruction’s] language. Instead of
        altering the [instruction’s] language, this court instructed the jury pursuant
        to [the instruction] and allowed Trial Counsel . . . to argue the matter to the
        jury. This court did not issue a sua sponte instruction on voluntary
        intoxication and did not interfere with [Mr. Tiger’s] right to make his
        defense.

        In the direct appeal, the [KCA] made an extensive ruling regarding this
        court’s decision to give the voluntary intoxication defense. The [KCA]
        ruled [that Mr. Tiger] requested the instruction and had the opportunity to
        explain and argue the impact of the instruction as it pertained to a voluntary
        intoxication defense.

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        [Mr. Tiger] fails to sufficiently prove that either prong of the test for
        ineffective assistance of counsel has been met. Appellate Counsel . . . was
        not unreasonable for failing to raise the issue and there has been no
        showing of prejudice.

 R., vol. IV at 112-13 (citation omitted).

        The KCA summarily affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, and on federal

 habeas review, the district court denied the claim, ruling that the KCA reasonably

 determined that Mr. Tiger requested the voluntary intoxication instruction. The KCA’s

 finding is presumptively correct, and Mr. Tiger offers nothing to suggest otherwise. It

 follows, then, that appellate counsel was not deficient in failing to raise an argument that

 had no factual basis—viz., that the trial court sua sponte instructed the jury on voluntary

 intoxication. The district court’s decision is not reasonably debatable.

        2. Claim Three: Ineffective Assistance of Substitute Counsel for Failing to Call
           Child Witnesses

        Mr. Tiger next claims substitute counsel, who represented him on a motion

 for a new trial, was ineffective in failing to call two witnesses at an evidentiary

 hearing to establish trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in failing to call the

 witnesses. The witnesses were two children, HJ and NJ, who were in the bedroom

 when the crimes were committed. Mr. Tiger asserted the children would have

 testified that they did not see or hear anything inappropriate. The state

 postconviction court rejected this claim, ruling the children’s proffered testimony

 did not outweigh the trial evidence, so Mr. Tiger failed to establish either deficient

 performance or prejudice. The KCA affirmed, and the federal district court

 determined the KCA’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.

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        Reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s decision. As the

 state postconviction court recognized, even accepting the children’s proffered

 testimony, it would have been outweighed by the trial evidence, including: (1) the

 victim’s conflicting testimony; (2) testimony from Crystal Johnson, who

 discovered Mr. Tiger in the room with the victim while the children were asleep;

 (3) physical evidence of the victim’s injury; and (4) DNA evidence. The state

 postconviction court also recognized the proffered testimony would have been

 inconsistent with Mr. Tiger’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing that both

 children awoke when Crystal entered the room, after the assault would have

 occurred. Mr. Tiger asserts the children’s testimony would have created

 reasonable doubt of his guilt, but with nothing to substantiate his assertion, he

 cannot establish either deficient performance or prejudice.

        3. Claim Four: Ineffective Assistance of Substitute Counsel for Failing to Argue
           Trial Counsel’s Ineffectiveness

        Mr. Tiger also contends substitute counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial

 counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to call an expert on proper interviewing techniques for

 child witnesses. The state postconviction court concluded that Mr. Tiger did not establish

 either deficient performance or prejudice because trial counsel was not per se ineffective

 in failing to call an expert, and Mr. Tiger was not convicted based primarily on the

 victim’s testimony, but also based on physical evidence, DNA evidence, and statements

 from Crystal Johnson. The state postconviction court observed that the victim’s

 description of the assault evolved during her trial testimony, but the court pointed out that

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  trial counsel highlighted the victim’s evolving testimony and argued at summation that it

  could have been caused by improper interviewing techniques. The KCA affirmed, and

  the federal district court concluded the KCA’s decision was not an unreasonable

  application of Strickland.

         Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s conclusion. Although

  Mr. Tiger contends an expert might have explained how improper interviewing

  techniques could solicit inculpatory statements from a child witness, he wholly ignores

  the other evidence underlying his convictions, including physical and DNA evidence and

  statements from Crystal Johnson. Given this evidence, Mr. Tiger cannot show deficient

  performance or prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to call an expert on child

  interviewing techniques. It follows then that he also cannot show substitute counsel was

  ineffective in failing to raise trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.

         4. Claim Five: McGirt

         Last, Mr. Tiger claims that under McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), the

  trial court lacked jurisdiction because he is an Indian and his crimes were committed in

  Indian country. In McGirt, the Supreme Court held that tribal lands in Oklahoma

  comprising “the Creek Reservation had never been disestablished [by Congress] and that

  the land it encompassed remained Indian country for purposes of the Major Crimes Act.”

  Pacheco v. Habti, 62 F.4th 1233, 1239 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2672 (2023).

  Consequently, absent congressional passage of a law conferring jurisdiction on

  Oklahoma, McGirt held that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Indians for major

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  crimes committed in Indian country. 140 S. Ct. at 2478. Relying on McGirt, Mr. Tiger

  claims Kansas courts similarly lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him.

         The KCA rejected this claim, ruling that Congress expressly conferred criminal

  jurisdiction on Kansas. State v. Tiger, 2022 WL 4115573, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 9,

  2022) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3243). The KCA also observed there was no indication the

  crimes here were committed in Indian country. See id. The federal district court denied

  relief because Mr. Tiger failed to identify any clearly established federal law extending

  McGirt to Kansas. See Andrew v. White, 62 F.4th 1299, 1310-11 (10th Cir. 2023) (“If—

  and only if—the principle of federal law was clearly established, do we then . . . consider

  whether the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that

  clearly established federal law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Tiger still fails

  to cite any clearly established Federal law extending McGirt to Kansas, and as a result,

  reasonable jurists could not debate the propriety of the district court’s decision.

                                               III

         Accordingly, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter.

                                                 Entered for the Court

                                                 Jerome A. Holmes
                                                 Chief Judge

                                               11