Court Opinion

ID: 9629602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:46:02.87518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:21.494626
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. The circumstances of this case, in my view, present a triable issue for the factfinder. Plaintiff demanded a jury trial in his complaint. Within the context of defendant’s summary judgment motion, the parties contested whether defendant should be estopped from invoking the statute of limitations. While the parties may have agreed to the superior court holding a hearing and taking testimony on this issue, the court’s role was still limited to determining whether material facts were in dispute and whether either party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Bingham v. Tenney, 154 Vt. 96, 101, 573 A.2d 1185, 1187 (1990) (in context of summary *146judgment motion, trial court should employ oral testimony sparingly and with great care because purpose of proceeding is to determine only whether triable issue exists); Braun v. Humiston, 140 Vt. 302, 306, 437 A.2d 1388, 1389 (1981) (courts are not empowered to try issues of fact in summary judgment proceedings; they may examine affidavits or other evidence to determine whether triable issues exist, but may not resolve such issues).
Consider the following facts, keeping in mind the court’s limited role in this summary judgment proceeding. Defendant made at least one settlement offer to plaintiff, but that offer was rejected. When the parties were unable to agree upon a settlement amount, plaintiff’s Vermont attorney took over the case. At that point, nearly three quarters of the truncated one-year limitations period had already expired. In December 1996, plaintiff’s attorney sent defendant’s adjuster a letter informing him that plaintiff would be filing suit in the near future because the case had not been settled. At that point, the limitations period was set to expire in less than a month. The adjuster, who was responsible for settling ski claims in Vermont and other states and thus presumably was aware of the applicable statute of limitations, asked plaintiff’s attorney to refrain from filing suit until negotiations were complete, which could not occur until plaintiff submitted to an independent medical examination. When plaintiff’s attorney asked the adjuster if they were going to have a problem with the statute of limitations, the adjuster stated that he was not aware of any problem. Although plaintiff promptly agreed to the independent examination, the adjuster waited until after expiration of the one-year limitations period before providing plaintiff with information that would allow the examination to proceed.
Without question, reasonable minds could differ as to whether these facts estopped defendant from invoking the statute of limitations. Indeed, on strikingly similar facts in McLaughlin v. Blake, 120 Vt. 174, 180, 136 A.2d 492, 496 (1957), this Court reversed a trial court judgment on the pleadings denying the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant was estopped from raising a statute-of-limitations defense. In that case, the adjuster stated that there was no question about defendant’s liability, and then asked plaintiff to refrain from filing suit until a medical end-result was reached. Here, after already having made at least one settlement offer, the adjuster asked plaintiff to refrain from filing suit until an independent examination could confirm the claimed injuries. I find no significant distinction between the two cases.
*147The “essential” distinction noted by this Court — that the plaintiff’s attorney in McLaughlin, unlike plaintiff’s attorney here, was ignorant of the applicable limitations period — was apparently not essential to the Court in McLaughlin. Indeed, the opinion does not even indicate that the plaintiff’s attorney was unaware of the limitations period, let alone cite that fact as a basis for the decision. On the contrary, the stated basis of the decision in McLaughlin was that the plaintiff’s attorney deferred bringing suit in response to the adjuster’s request that he refrain from doing so pending a medical end-result, at which point the amount of compensation could be determined. See id. at 180, 136 A.2d at 496. This is essentially what occurred here.
Our decision in Caledonia Sand & Gravel Co. v. Campbell, 128 Vt. 182, 260 A.2d 221 (1969), also demonstrates that summary judgment was wrong in this case. In determining that the defendant was not estopped from invoking the statute of limitations, the Court in Campbell specifically noted the absence of any “evidence of a request that plaintiff not bring, or defer in bringing, suit on its claim, or of any statement made which could have induced a forbearance by plaintiff not to sue.” Id. at 186, 260 A.2d at 224; see Kunstman v. Mirizzi, 44 Cal. Rptr. 707, 709 (Ct. App. 1965) (estoppel will apply to prevent defendant from invoking limitations period if plaintiff was induced to believe that amicable adjustment to claim would be made without suit); cf. Machules v. Department of Admin., 523 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 1988) (doctrine of equitable tolling is generally applied in cases where defendant’s representations lulled plaintiff into inaction).
Here, in contrast, defendant’s agent specifically requested that plaintiff put off filing suit. Reasonable persons could conclude that the request induced plaintiff’s attorney to delay bringing suit pending the results of the independent examination. See Molinar v. City of Carlsbad, 735 P.2d 1134, 1137 (N.M. 1987) (estoppel applied where plaintiffs postponed filing suit based on defendant’s representations that settlement should be forthcoming and would be more expeditious in absence of litigation). Indeed, a jury may well have viewed the adjuster’s “gotcha” approach as an unjust way for plaintiff’s suit to end, particularly given that defendant expressly requested the delay in bringing suit and thus was not prejudiced in the least.
I would reverse and remand because, at minimum, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether, considering all the circumstances of the case, the duty of honest dealing should estop defendant from repudiating the reasonably anticipated consequences of its representa*148tions. See McLaughlin, 120 Vt. at 179, 136 A.2d at 496 (stating test for determining whether defendant should be estopped from raising statute-of-limitations defense).