Court Opinion

ID: 9587110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:18:03.157702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:02.011803
License: Public Domain

GOOLSBY, J.
(concurring):
I concur fully in Judge Stilwell’s opinion.
What Judge Howard’s opinion would have us do is weigh the evidence, and this the court of appeals cannot do in a criminal case any more than it can make a “crab walk *288straight” or “smooth the rough spikes of the hedgehog.” Aristophanes, Peace (Anomtrans.) (420 B.C.), at http://www.vt.edu/vt98/academics/books/aristophanes/peace; see State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 535 S.E.2d 126 (2000) (stating the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence and not its weight even when the prosecution relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 46, 515 S.E.2d 525, 531 (1999) (“On a motion for a directed verdict in a criminal case, the trial court is concerned with the existence or non-existence of evidence, not its weight.”). The question of whether the crack cocaine found on Cherry’s person was for his own personal use or for distribution to others was singularly for the jury.
Although the amount of crack cocaine in this case was not sufficient to apply the statutory inference of intent to distribute, there is no question that the State presented direct evidence of possession. Furthermore, in discrediting the evidence of Cherry’s intent as circumstantial rather than direct, Judge Howard’s opinion fails to recognize that “[ijntent is seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence and must ordinarily be proven by circumstantial evidence, that is, by facts and circumstances from which intent may be inferred.” State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971); see also 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1469 at 849-50 (1994) (“Circumstantial evidence alone is often sufficient to show criminal intent because the element of intent, being a state of mind or mental purpose, is usually incapable of direct proof.”).
What gives me additional concern is the reason Judge Howard characterizes the evidence of Cherry’s intent as “not substantial.” In dismissing this evidence because it could have supported the inference that Cherry intended to use rather than distribute the crack cocaine in his possession, he appears to follow the directive in State v. Manis, 214 S.C. 99, 51 S.E.2d 370 (1949), that when the prosecution attempts to prove guilt by circumstantial evidence, an acquittal is warranted unless the circumstances “point conclusively — that is, to a moral certainty — to the guilt of the accused; ... and they must further be absolutely inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis than the guilt of the accused.” Id. at 101, 51 S.E.2d at 371 (citations omitted). The supreme court, howev*289er, has since overruled Manís and its progeny on this very issue. State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 879 S.E.2d 888, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895, 110 S.Ct. 246, 107 L.Ed.2d 196 (1989).