Court Opinion

ID: 9481133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:09:13.174609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:07.308203
License: Public Domain

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion has fully set forth the issue and the relevant case law, and therefore no extended discussion is necessary.
I am concerned that the majority’s approach will unnecessarily derogate from the strong policy to leave disputed issues to the arbitrator. I agree that the court must decide the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. However, the issue in this case is not whether the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration clause. The parties agree that it does. Instead, the majority elevates a time limitation provision, which is at most a defense to the claim, to the same level as a limitation imposed upon the subject matter of the agreement to arbitrate. This I believe is error.
I would agree with those courts that have held that the question whether a demand to arbitrate was time barred is within the exclusive province of the arbitrator. See, e.g., ContiCommodity Services, Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1226 (2d Cir.1980); accord County of Durham v. Richards & Associates, Inc., 742 F.2d 811, 815 (4th Cir.1984); O’Neel v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, 667 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir.1982); see also Muhlenberg Township School Dist. Auth. v. Pennsylvania Fortunato Constr. Co., 460 Pa. 260, 265, 333 A.2d 184, 187 (Pa.1975) (question whether demand for arbitration was timely is for arbitrator and is outside the bounds of the court’s review). We cannot assume that the arbitrator will not fairly decide the issue of the timeliness of the demand.
I would therefore reverse the district court’s entry of the preliminary injunction.