Court Opinion

ID: 9792183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:24:42.515778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.999161
License: Public Domain

SHENK, J.
I dissent.
The judgment of reversal is placed on the tenuous ground that there was prejudicial error in admitting in evidence those portions of Johnson’s lengthy statement which contained declarations accusing defendant of wielding the lethal weapon because at the conclusion of Johnson’s statement Bob denied *329being the leading actor in this atrocious drama participated in by both men. The circumstances attending the felonious killing were freely related and admitted by Bob except as noted. Thus the sole ground for discovery of error is' the introduction in evidence of the denied accusations by Johnson made in the presence of Bob that the latter procured and wielded the weapon.
The two men were tried separately. On the trial of Bob his confession to the police was introduced in evidence. Johnson’s statement made in the presence of Bob was also read, together with the colloquy between the two men. No ground of objection to the admission of the statement was at first specified. Counsel merely stated, “We object to any statement madé by Johnson.” The court then asked the witness (who reported the conversations), “Well, was it in the presence of the defendant?”, and, upon receiving an affirmative reply, stated, “Very well. The objection is overruled.” (See Code Civ, Proc., § 1870, subd. 3.) After the reading of the Johnson statement was commenced defense counsel interposed an-objection upon the ground that Johnson should be brought in as a witness and that the reading of his prior and transcribed statement was not the best evidence. In overruling the objection on this ground the court said: “Any statement he [Johnson] made that was not made in the presence of this defendant would certainly not be admissible. This is a statement, a conversation, in the presence of the defendant in which the defendant took part. ...”
On oral argument in this court Bob’s counsel again contended that the Johnson statement was inadmissible on the ground that Johnson was in the county jail and could have been called as a witness.
There is no indication in the record that any declaration of Johnson was objected to on the ground that it was denied by Bob. (See People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699 [172 P.2d 18], and eases therein cited; 8 Cal.Jur. p. 102, § 196; 20 Am.Jur. p. 483, § 570.) Most of Johnson’s declarations were admissible even over any objection by reason of not having been denied. Bob’s statement disclosed participation with Johnson ' in the commission of the crime. He corroborated most of the incriminatory accusations made against him by Johnson and some of them he expressly admitted. The possibility of the '• rejection of a portion of the Johnson statement because it con-*330tamed the accusations that Bob enticed the victim and struck the fatal blow, which Bob denied, was not brought to the attention of the trial court. There was no objection on that ground, no motion to strike, and no request for an instruction that the jury disregard the accusations which Bob denied, namely, the declarations that Bob lured the victim and wielded the lethal weapon. The trial court was not required on its own motion to segregate the portions of the statement which might have been excluded by appropriate objection from the clearly admissible portions. The trial court was never given the opportunity or called upon to rule on the •question now presented for the first time on appeal.
The question whether some portion of the Johnson statement might have been excluded, had timely objection been made, is not a question for consideration on this appeal. It is the law that a reviewing court will not consider an objection the admission of evidence unless the ground of the objection has been specified in the trial court. (People v. Schafer, 161 Cal. 573, 578-9 [119 P. 920] ; People v. Farmer, 77 Cal. 1,. 7 [18 P. 800] ; People v. Duran, 57 Cal.App.2d 363, 370 [134 P.2d 305] ; People v. Wignall, 125 Cal.App. 465, 474-5 [13 P.2d 995] ; People v. Jones, 12 Cal.App. 129, 132 [106 P. 724] ; 8 Cal.Jur. p. 503, § 517.) Therefore, despite the concession of the attorney general to the contrary, there was no error in the trial court’s ruling on the admission of the statement.
By his own confession Bob was a participant in an atrocious murder committed in the course of robbery of the victim. This could only be murder of the first degree (Pen. Code, § 189). The record conclusively establishes Bob’s.guilt as to that degree of murder. His guilt is established regardless of which of the two men struck the fatal blow. (People v. Whitson, 25 Cal.2d 593 [154 P.2d 867]; People v. Gomez, 209 Cal. 296, 298-9 [286 P. 998] ; People v. Arnold, 199 Cal. 471 [250 P168] ; People v. Matthew, 194 Cal. 273, 278-9 [228 P. 424] ; People v. Bringhurst, 192 Cal. 748 [221 P. 897]; 4 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. p. 557, § 39.)
No extenuating circumstance is shown. Bob admitted that he and Johnson started out with the intention to “roll” someone, that he knew Johnson had the pipe, and that he “figured” Johnson would use it. Bach declared that no other person was • involved in the affair. Regardless of which did the actual killing, they were the only persons responsible for the *331perpetration of the crime. Assuming that Johnson completed the killing Bob took part in it and in the robbery of the fatally wounded, victim which ensued. Not only that but a short time afterward Bob returned to the scene and although the victim was still alive witnessed without remonstrance the taking of the murdered man’s shoes by Simmons.
On the evidence the jury would not have been justified in returning any verdict other than that of murder of the first degree.
The jury was properly instructed with reference to its duties and responsibilities and to its right, in its discretion, to relieve this defendant of the extreme penalty. This the jury chose not -to do. The fact that the confederate Johnson was so relieved on a separate trial and before another jury does not establish a miscarriage of justice in Bob’s case. It is impossible to say what prejudices, because of the innocent victim’s Japanese ancestry, may have crept into the jury box in Johnson’s ease to influence a verdict of imprisonment for life in that case. It is a matter of common report that at the time of the trial and because of the hostilities between our country and Japan this prejudice was so pronounced that juries in other cases rendered verdicts of not guilty for no apparent reason or excuse except that the victims were of the Japanese race. The innocent victim in this case was an ex-serviceman who had been wounded in active service in France as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States. It is obvious that no prejudice against him because of his race had any influence on the jury’s action in the present ease.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.