Court Opinion

ID: 9897342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:23.793764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.164868
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Jul 17 2023, 10:18 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Victoria Bailey Casanova                                    Theodore E. Rokita
Casanova Legal Services, LLC                                Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                            George P. Sherman
                                                            Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                            General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
     COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Billy Gene Luke,                                            July 17, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            23A-CR-50
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Dearborn Circuit
                                                            Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable Frank A.
Appellee-Plaintiff                                          Negangard, Judge
                                                            The Honorable James D.
                                                            Humphrey, Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            15C01-2205-F4-10

                                   Opinion by Judge Mathias
                                 Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.

Mathias, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-50 | July 17, 2023                                Page 1 of 7
[1]   Billy Gene Luke brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order that

      prohibited Luke from proceeding pro se and appointed counsel for Luke. Luke

      raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it

      found that he had forfeited his right to self-representation. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In May 2022, the State charged Luke with Level 4 felony stalking and Level 6

      felony invasion of privacy. The trial court set Luke’s initial hearing date for

      September 6. In August, Luke filed a motion to proceed pro se. In that motion,

      Luke accused the trial judge of “uncivilized and unruly behavior” against Luke

      in a prior cause; of “total disdain” for Luke’s “right to self[-]representation”; of

      being “tyrannical” and “belligerently angry in an unhinged manner”; and of

      “personal malice against Billy Luke.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 43. Luke

      further accused the Dearborn County judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement

      officers of “operat[ing] in criminal concert with each other over the years to

      violate Billy Luke’s most basic rights.” Id.

[3]   Luke filed seven other motions in August. Luke also filed a witness list that

      identified 135 witnesses. Included on his witness list were President Biden,

      Governor Holcomb, and Chief Justice Rush. Id. at 67-68.

[4]   At his initial hearing, Luke reiterated his desire to proceed pro se. The trial

      court advised Luke accordingly. The court also informed Luke that, if he did

      proceed pro se, he would have to comply with the court’s rulings. Luke stated

      he would do so. The court then took judicial notice of the prior cause against

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-50 | July 17, 2023             Page 2 of 7
      Luke. In that prior cause, the same trial judge found that Luke had forfeited his

      right to self-representation after Luke had filed “multiple motions,” the purpose

      of which “was to harass, disrupt[,] and insult certain parties or witnesses,” and

      which had “no legitimate purpose.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 4, p. 132. After

      taking that notice, the court took Luke’s current request under advisement.

[5]   Nine days after the initial hearing, Luke filed more than 400 pages of

      “[m]iscellaneous [d]ocuments” with the court. Appellant’s App. Vol. 1, p. 3.

      The relevance and purpose of those filings to the instant charges is not clear.

      However, throughout the documents, Luke made numerous disparaging

      comments about the trial judge and others along with numerous apparent

      threats.

[6]   Following Luke’s filings, on October 4, the court, on its own motion, found

      that Luke had forfeited his right to self-representation in the instant matter and

      appointed him counsel. In its order, the court recited Luke’s criminal history

      and the prior cause’s events that had resulted in the forfeiture of Luke’s right to

      represent himself in that cause. The court then found as follows: that Luke’s

      numerous filings in the instant cause included “threatening” language; that

      Luke’s filings “made it clear that his purpose in self-representation is to attack

      the Court System and all those involved who he can bring into his proposed

      conspiracy theory”; that his filings contained numerous “attacks” on and at

      least one “threat” against state or local officials, including numerous references

      to “street justice”; and that his filings included “scandalous comments” and a

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-50 | July 17, 2023             Page 3 of 7
      threat to “physically punish [a former attorney’s] daughter.” Appellant’s App.

      Vol. 4, pp. 126-28. The court also noted Luke’s proposed witness list.

[7]   In light of those facts and circumstances, the court concluded that Luke “is

      clearly intending to turn these proceedings into a circus.” Id. at 128. The court

      added that Luke “potentially poses a significant security risk” in the courtroom

      “a few feet from the Judge.” Id. And the court further added that Luke’s

      “pattern of behavior,” as demonstrated in both the prior cause and the instant

      one, “will continue.” Id. at 129. The court then concluded that Luke had

      forfeited his right to self-representation and appointed counsel for Luke. The

      court certified its order for interlocutory review, which we accepted. This

      appeal ensued.

      Standard of Review
[8]   Luke appeals the trial court’s order in which the court found that Luke had

      forfeited his right to self-representation and appointed counsel for Luke.

      “Whether the trial court” violated a defendant’s “right to self-representation is a

      question of law that we review de novo.” Hill v. State, 773 N.E.2d 336, 342 (Ind.

      Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. As we have explained:

              A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right under
              the Sixth Amendment to proceed without the assistance of
              counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45
              L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975) (holding that “[t]he Sixth
              Amendment . . . implies a right of self-representation”). This
              right may be overridden if a defendant is not “able and willing to
              abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.” McKaskle v.
              Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173, 104 S. Ct. 944, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-50 | July 17, 2023              Page 4 of 7
        (1984). The trial court is in the best position to assess whether a
        defendant has the ability and willingness to proceed pro se. See
        Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 2009); Poynter v. State,
        749 N.E.2d 1122, 1128 (Ind. 2001).

                                              ***

        [T]he United States Supreme Court has noted that “the right of
        self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the
        courtroom.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 n.46, 95 S. Ct. 2525. The
        Indiana Supreme Court has likewise found that part and parcel of
        a defendant’s right to represent himself is “the state’s interest in
        preserving the orderly processes of criminal justice and
        courtroom decorum.” Russell v. State, 270 Ind. 55, 383 N.E.2d
        309, 312 (1978) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S. Ct.
        1057, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970); German v. State, 268 Ind. 67, 373
        N.E.2d 880 (1978)). In other words, a trial court may terminate
        self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in
        serious or obstructionist misconduct, German, 373 N.E.2d 880, or
        where the record shows that the defendant was abusing his pro se
        status as a means to engage in dilatory tactics or to distort the
        conduct of the trial. State v. Whalen, 192 Ariz. 103, 961 P.2d
        1051, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). . . .

        In denying a defendant his right to self-representation, care
        should be taken to “ensure that the record reflect respect for all of
        defendant’s rights” and, “to the extent possible, prevent the
        manipulative defendant from fashioning a record which seems to
        reflect an unconstitutional denial” of the right to counsel/self-
        representation. See Russell, 383 N.E.2d at 312. We do not find
        this to require that a trial court conduct a special inquiry, but
        nevertheless note that making a record to support the decision to
        terminate a defendant’s self-representation would be beneficial
        for appellate review. We will review and consider the entire

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-50 | July 17, 2023                 Page 5 of 7
               record to make sure the defendant’s right to self-representation
               has not been violated.

       Love v. State, 113 N.E.3d 730, 738-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

       The totality of the circumstances supports the trial court’s
       determination that Luke was abusing his pro se status.
[9]    The trial court concluded that Luke had forfeited his right to self-representation

       because, in effect, Luke was abusing his pro se status. The court’s conclusion is

       supported by the record. Luke, acting pro se, filed seven motions in August

       2022 followed by more than 400 pages of miscellaneous documents in

       September. Luke also submitted a witness list with 135 named individuals,

       including President Biden and other federal and state officials. In his filings,

       Luke repeatedly made threats, disparaged the trial judge and others, and alleged

       a federal, state, and local conspiracy against him. The relevance of the 400-plus

       pages of miscellaneous documents in particular is not clear. What is clear,

       however, is that Luke’s submissions reflect dilatory tactics and an intent to

       distort the State’s Level 4 felony stalking and Level 6 felony invasion of privacy

       charges against him. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it concluded

       that Luke had forfeited his right to self-representation and appointed counsel for

       him. See id.

[10]   Still, Luke argues that the trial court erred because none of his submissions

       were “in violation of any court order” at the time the court terminated his right

       to proceed pro se. Appellant’s Br. at 21. Luke also asserts that the trial court’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-50 | July 17, 2023              Page 6 of 7
       judgment is not based on the instant proceedings but instead “on what the trial

       court fears [Luke] might do because of his conduct in prior cases.” Id. at 22.

[11]   We cannot agree. Luke’s abuse of his pro se status, whether it was in violation

       of a standing order or not, is a sufficient basis upon which a court may

       terminate the right to self-representation. See Love, 113 N.E.3d at 738-39.

       Further, while the trial court was aware of, took notice of, and expressed

       concern about Luke’s behavior in the prior cause, nonetheless its judgment was

       grounded in and supported by the record of Luke’s behavior in the instant

       cause. We therefore reject Luke’s arguments on appeal and hold that the trial

       court did not err when it found that he had forfeited his right to self-

       representation.

[12]   The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

[13]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-50 | July 17, 2023            Page 7 of 7