Court Opinion

ID: 9397028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 14:07:00.31626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:20.917818
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-812

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                HATIM LAALAMI.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a jury-waived trial in the District Court, the

 defendant, Hatim Laalami, was convicted of one count of assault

 and battery on a family or household member.1             On appeal, he

 argues that the judge (1) erred in denying his motion for a

 required finding of not guilty, and (2) abused her discretion in

 limiting cross-examination of the victim.2            We affirm.

       Background.     Viewing the evidence in the light most

 favorable to the Commonwealth, the judge could have found the

 following facts.      See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671,

 1 The judge found the defendant not guilty of strangulation and
 kidnapping.
 2 In his brief the defendant also argued that the judge

 considered inadmissible evidence at sentencing. At oral
 argument defense counsel advised that the defendant is not
 pursuing this issue. We accept this representation and do not
 address it further herein. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood League
 v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 712 n.10 (1990).
676-677 (1979).    On March 3, 2019, the victim and her husband

(the defendant) were at their home in Burlington when the victim

discussed a job opportunity with the defendant.    The opportunity

involved her working in Morocco as an actress and playing the

part of a married woman.   The defendant became "nervous and

aggressive" and, at some point, pushed the victim into the

bedroom closet, slapped her, pulled her hair, put his arm on her

neck, and refused to allow her to leave the closet for several

hours.

     Discussion.   The defendant contends that the judge erred in

denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty because

the victim's testimony was uncorroborated and inconsistent.      We

review the defendant's claim to determine "whether after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."    Latimore, 378 Mass. at

677, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

     In the present case, the evidence was more than sufficient

to meet the Commonwealth's burden.   The victim's testimony

provided a specific and detailed description of an assault and

battery by the defendant on a family member.3   While we agree

3 Contrary to the defendant's assertion, it is of no consequence
that the victim's testimony was not corroborated by other
physical or testimonial evidence because, as the defendant
concedes, a victim's testimony alone may be sufficient to

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that defense counsel, through skillful and thorough cross-

examination, elicited inconsistencies between the victim's

testimony and her earlier statements to law enforcement, it was

the finder of fact's obligation to resolve those

inconsistencies.   See Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779

(2005) ("If, from the evidence, conflicting inferences are

possible, it is for the [fact finder] to determine where the

truth lies, for the weight and credibility of the evidence is

wholly within their province").       See also E.B. Cypher, Criminal

Practice and Procedure § 37.10 (4th ed. 2014).      The inferences

supporting a conviction "need only be reasonable and possible

and need not be necessary or inescapable" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 800 (2021).      See

Commonwealth v. Nelson, 370 Mass. 192, 203 (1976) (evidence need

not require fact finder to draw inference; sufficient that

evidence permits inference to be drawn).

     Furthermore, the judge, as sole and exclusive fact finder

and judge of credibility, had the authority to "believe all of

what a witness said, some of what a witness said, or none of

what a witness said."4   Commonwealth v. Wood, 90 Mass. App. Ct.

support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Santos, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3 (2021).
4 As noted above, the judge found the defendant not guilty of

kidnapping and strangulation, which suggests that the judge
indeed credited some, but not all of the victim's testimony.
See note 1, supra.

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271, 286 (2016).   See Commonwealth v. Kerns, 449 Mass. 641, 650

n.13 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 431 Mass. 134, 141

(2000) (judge in jury-waived trial presumed to have "correctly

instructed [her]self" on law, absent contrary indication).

Accordingly, the judge did not err in denying the motion for a

required finding of not guilty.

     The defendant also contends that the judge abused her

discretion by limiting his cross-examination of the victim.

Specifically, defense counsel sought to inquire about the

victim's cellular telephone (cell phone) during trial, and

perhaps have the victim examine the cell phone to demonstrate

that her Google "application" or "app" could show her location

on the date of the incident.5

     A defendant is entitled to reasonable cross-examination of

witnesses against him, but the scope of cross-examination rests

in the sound discretion of the trial judge.    See Commonwealth v.

Avalos, 454 Mass. 1, 7 (2009).    "The burden of showing an abuse

of that discretion, an abuse that must be shown on the trial

5 Pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e) (3), as appearing in 481 Mass.
1611 (2019), the parties filed a stipulation, which the judge
adopted after making her own findings and revisions. The
stipulation reconstructed an inaudible sidebar in which the
judge ruled that in the absence of a pretrial motion to obtain
the victim's cell phone records, "it was inappropriate to make
the witness take out and search her phone during trial." See
Mass. G. Evid. § 1119(c) (2021) (discussing presentation and
preservation of digital evidence).

                                  4
record, rests on the party claiming it, in this case [the

defendant]" (citation omitted).       Id.

    Here, the defendant cannot show any abuse of discretion.

We begin by noting that the victim testified that, on the date

of the incident, she used the defendant's cell phone, but at the

time of trial she no longer had his cell phone in her possession

and had her own separate cell phone.        She further testified that

she did not install on her new cell phone the Google application

that could track her location on any given day.       Furthermore,

the defendant did not contend -- at trial or on appeal -- that

the victim still possessed the defendant's cell phone at the

time of trial.   Thus, the proffer at trial amounted to a

speculative suggestion that the victim had used the defendant's

cell phone on the date of the incident; that a Google

application had been installed on the defendant's cell phone;

that it was conceivable that the victim had somehow transferred

that application onto her own cell phone between the date of the

incident and the date of trial; and that through that

application the victim's new cell phone would somehow contain

data showing her location at the time of the incident.       We have

little difficulty concluding that the defendant's claim is

speculative at best and without sufficient foundation to

demonstrate that the judge abused her discretion in limiting

this proposed cross-examination.      This was a classic

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discretionary call.    In view of the speculative nature of the

proposed inquiry, we discern no abuse of discretion and no

evidentiary or constitutional violations in the judge's ruling.

See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716, 727 (1995).

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Neyman, Grant &
                                        Hershfang, JJ.6),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    May 24, 2023.

6   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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