Court Opinion

ID: 9726715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:05:09.642228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:29.971087
License: Public Domain

*1314BAKER, Judge,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
Although I concur with the majority's disposition for Issue I, I cannot concur with the affirmance of the illegal sentence disposed of in Issue II. Their decision deprives Sutton of 704 days of time he has already spent in jail pending the disposition of this charge.
I acknowledge the trial court may suspend a sentence, place the defendant on probation, and order the defendant to serve a period of imprisonment as a condition of probation. McVey v. State (1982), Ind. App., 438 N.E.2d 770. The trial court cannot, however, suspend a sentence that has already been executed. Sutton received an eight-year sentence, the maximum sentence allowed for battery, a Class C felony. See IND.CODE 85-50-2-6. The trial court then purported to give Sutton credit for the 352 days he spent in jail pending the disposition of this case. Sutton received Class I credit for the 852 days of incarceration, for a total of 704 days eredit. See IND.CODE 35-50-6-8(a); IND.CODE 85-50-6-4(a). Sutton was thus left with six years and twenty-six days on his maximum eight-year sentence. The court suspended the prison portion of the sentence, the remaining six years and twenty-six days. The court could not suspend more than this because, by definition, a portion of a sentence that has already been executed cannot be suspended.
After suspending the prison portion of the sentence, the court gave Sutton eight years of probation. This eight-year probation term combined with the "credited" 704 days gives Sutton a sentence which is almost two years in excess of the statutory maximum sentence. The majority states the trial court "suspended the sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for eight years (as permitted by I.C. 85-50-2-2)" Maj. Op. at 1818. IND.CODE 35-50-2-2, however, states: "Whenever the court suspends a sentence for a felony, it shall place the person on probation under IC 35-38-22 for a fixed period to end not later than the date the suspended sentence expires." ITND.CODE 835-50-2-2(c), emphasis added. Sutton's suspended sentence could only have been six years and twenty-six days, since the remainder of this maximum sentence had already been executed. Sut ton could then be placed on probation for a fixed period to end not later than the date the six year and twenty-six day suspended sentence expired. Yet the trial court placed Sutton on probation for eight years, which is a period ending later than the date the suspended sentence expired. Sutton did not receive credit for the time he had already spent in jail, and in fact received a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum sentence.
The majority states: "Even if we include the 352 days he spent in jail before trial, the total imprisonment involved is still less than four and one-half years."" Maj. Op. at 1313. Assuming Sutton remains in Class I1, with good-time eredit Sutton will have in essence served a sentence of almost nine years, which is in excess of the statutory maximum sentence. A sentence in excess of the penalty mandated by our General Assembly through its applicable statute is an illegal sentence. Golden v. State (1990), Ind.App., 553 N.E.2d 1219, 1222. "The broad discretion afforded trial courts in sentencing does not extend beyond statutorily prescribed limits." Id. at 1222.
The effect of the majority's decision is to allow Sutton to bear a punishment of almost ten years, when the statutory maximum sentence for this offense is eight years. Appellate courts are to bring an illegal sentence into compliance. Golden, supra. I would affirm the conviction, but remand for resentencing to properly credit Sutton for the time he spent incarcerated pending the disposition of the charge. Sut ton should be placed on probation for no longer than six years and twenty-six days.

. A person imprisoned for a crime is initially assigned to Class I time and is only reassigned to Class II or Class III if he violates a rule of the department of correction or the penal facility in which he is imprisoned. See IND.CODE 35-50-6-4.