Court Opinion

ID: 9745354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:51:01.81587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:22.681010
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: I cannot agree with the majority that, since no objection was raised to Dorothy Downing being accepted as a member of the jury, or any allegation of prejudice asserted in the defendants’ motions for a new trial, the issue is therefore waived. Our Rule 615(a) embodies the exception to the waiver rule. It provides, in part: “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” 87 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). In this capital case the wife of a judge who had previously sentenced defendant Bracey in an unrelated case was permitted to sit on the jury. I believe her presence on this jury constituted plain error. “The doctrine of plain error may be invoked in criminal cases *** where the error was of such magnitude that the accused was denied a fair trial. People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 350; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564; People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280.” People v. Lucas (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 245, 251. Certainly a defendant who is being tried in a capital case, his very life hanging in the balance of the decision of the jury, has a right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. In People v. Cole (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 401, 411, this court stated: “The right to a trial by an impartial tribunal is so basic that a violation of the right requires a reversal. (Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 71 L. Ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437.) The right to a jury trial guarantees to one accused of a crime a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-472, 13 L. Ed. 2d 424, 428, 85 S. Ct. 546.” When one of the jurors is the wife of a judge who has found one of the defendants guilty in a previous unrelated case and sentenced him to 12 to 36 years in the penitentiary for armed robbery, it would seem that a substantial question has been raised as to the appearance of possible partiality on the part of that juror. The degree of possible prejudice imparted to the other jurors from this knowledge alone can never be evaluated. Although I do not doubt Mrs. Downing’s assertion which she made during voir dire, that even though her husband was a judge she could be impartial, I do believe that other jurors may have viewed her opinion in this case as being of special value because her husband was the judge who had previously sentenced defendant Bracey or they may have believed that by voicing an opinion different from hers they might be offending her. At the very least there was the appearance of impropriety. In People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225, this court stated: “One purpose of the plain error rule is to afford certain protections to the accused. *** The other purpose of the plain error rule is to protect and preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process.” 88 Ill. 2d 225, 230-31. The erroneous presence of Mrs. Downing on this jury should be corrected in order to afford both of the defendants their right to an impartial jury and a fair trial and also to protect and preserve the integrity and reputation of our judicial process. Even though defendant Collins was never sentenced by Judge Downing, I believe that defendant Collins could have been perceived by the jury as being so closely associated with defendant Bracey that any prejudice resulting from Mrs. Downing’s presence on the jury could also have affected him. In this case, defense counsel knew during voir dire selection of the jury that defendant Bracey had been previously convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a term in the penitentiary by Mrs. Downing’s husband, Judge Robert Downing. Bracey’s defense counsel, for whatever reason, revealed to the jury for the first time that Judge Downing had previously sentenced Bracey to a 12- to 36-year term in the penitentiary for armed robbery. Therefore, I believe that defense counsel’s decision not to object to her becoming a member of the jury and Bracey’s attorney’s subsequent decision to make known to the jury during defendant Bracey’s direct examination that Judge Downing was the judge who had previously sentenced defendant Bracey to the penitentiary in 1970 are two errors made by counsel which are serious enough to fulfill the two-part Strickland standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel’s errors, in my opinion, were so serious that they were “not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and counsel’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064. In summary, I believe Mrs. Downing’s presence on this jury constituted plain error which cannot be waived. I also believe that these defendants were denied their right to a fair and impartial jury and effective assistance of counsel. I would reverse the defendants’ convictions and sentences and remand this cause for a new trial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. JUSTICE SIMON joins in this dissent.