Court Opinion

ID: 9633279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:41:32.477825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:32.630196
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion in part II of its opinion that the general statutory provisions in the Criminal Code dealing with burglary are necessarily supplanted by the specific provisions of the Limited Gaming Act of 1991 (Gaming Act). In People v. Bagby, 734 P.2d 1059 (Colo.1987), the case upon which the majority relies, we held that prosecution under a more general statute may be barred if “a legislative intent is shown to limit prosecution to [a] special statute.” Id. at 1061. In my view, *572such an intent was neither expressed nor implied by the Gaming Act.
In Bagby, the defendant falsified a liquor license application. Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1060. The defendant was charged with the felony offense of offering a false instrument for recording.1 Id. The same conduct, however, also was proscribed by more specific sections and implementing regulations of the Colorado Liquor Code. § 12-47-129(4)(a), 5 C.R.S. (1985); Revenue Regulation 47-107.1, 1 C.C.R. 203-2. Under the Liquor Code, falsifying a liquor license application is punishable as a misdemeanor. § 12-47-130, 5 C.R.S. (1985). The defendant in Bagby argued that the more specific provisions of the Liquor Code precluded the District Attorney from charging him with the felony offense of offering a false instrument for recording. Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1060-61.
We agreed with the defendant and stated in Bagby that “enactment by the General Assembly of a specific criminal statute does not preclude prosecution under a general criminal statute unless a legislative intent is shown to limit prosecution to the special statute.” Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1061. In that case, three characteristics of the Liquor Code convinced us that the General Assembly intended to supplant general criminal law. First, the Liquor Code invoked the full extent of the state’s police power. Id. at 1062. Second, the Liquor Code created a comprehensive regulatory program with detailed descriptions of the licensing process. Id. Third, the Liquor Code carefully defined different types of offenses in detail, often with particularized references to specific provisions of the Criminal Code. Id. The majority now finds that these same characteristics are evident in the Gaming Act and that, under Bagby, no burglary charges could be brought against the defendant now before us. See maj. op. at 568.1 disagree.
The key to the Bagby decision was the General Assembly’s express declaration that the Liquor Code was adopted as an expression of the full police power of the state. Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1062. When we decided Bagby, section 12-47-102(1) specifically stated:
The general assembly hereby declares that this article shall be deemed an exercise of the police powers of the state for the protection of the economic and social welfare and the health, peace, and morals of the people of this state....
§ 12-47-102(1), 5B C.R.S. (1985)(emphasis added). We concluded in Bagby that the explicit language of this legislative declaration showed that the General Assembly “exercised the full police power of the state and considered the full range of possible sanctions in selecting those most appropriate for violations of the liquor code.” Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1062.
In contrast to the Liquor Code, the Gaming Act contains no express invocation of the state’s police power. The majority, however, cites two statutory provisions as being equivalent to the Liquor Code provision on police power.2 See Maj. op. at 568. Section 12-47.1-102(e) of the Gaming Act states:
All establishments where limited gaming is conducted and where gambling devices are operated and all manufacturers, sellers, and distributors of certain gambling devices and equipment must therefore be licensed, controlled, and assisted to protect the public health, safety, good order, and the general welfare of the inhabitants of the state to foster the stability and success of limited gaming and to preserve the economy and policies of free competition of the state of Colorado.
§ 12-47.1-102(c), 5B C.R.S. (1991). .The other provision cited by the majority, section 18-20-101 of the Criminal Code, provides: *573§ 18-20-101, 8B C.R.S. (1996 Supp.). Neither provision refers to the state’s police power or contains any other language indicating any legislative intent to preempt the application of the Criminal Code.
*572The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that the strict control of limited gaming in this state is necessary for the immediate and future preservation of the public peace, health, and safety.
*573Given the lack of express language addressing this issue, the next question is whether an intent to preempt can be reasonably inferred from the Gaming Act. To resolve this question, I have turned to the legislative history. There I found no stated intent to preempt the Criminal Code but rather an intent to supplement the Criminal Code with the addition of newly defined crimes. For example, one of the Gaming Act’s sponsors, Senator Hopper, in presenting the bill3 to the Senate Business Affairs and Labor Committee, described the enforcement provisions as
a mishmash ... [of] several unlawful acts that were just conforming legislation to other parts of the law.... We also have under Article [20]-some new offenses related to limited gaming that we hadn’t had use for before and hopefully will not have use for in the future, but just in case we do, they are all there.
Hearing on S.B. 91-149 Before the Senate Business Affairs and Labor Committee, 58th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (hearing tape 91-8, Feb. 7,1991, at 2:27 p.m.). This statement by the bill’s sponsor supports my conclusion that the new criminal provisions related to gambling were additive only and were not intended as a comprehensive replacement for the existing crimes defined in the Criminal Code.
However, the majority contends that, similar to the Liquor Code, the Gaming Act “creates a comprehensive and thorough regulatory scheme to control all aspects of limited stakes gambling in Colorado.” Maj. op. at 568. In Bagby, we concluded that the Liquor Code’s “detailed descriptions of the licensing process and specific directions to licensing authorities concerning the exercise of regulatory power ... indieate[d] a thorough legislative consideration of all aspects of the licensing process, including the fashioning of appropriate sanctions.” Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1062. Since the conduct of that defendant directly involved a fraudulent attempt to circumvent the licensing process, we held that it was appropriate for the sanctions of the Liquor Code to supplant the more géneral provisions of the Criminal Code. Id.
The legislative history of the Gaming Act does not support the majority’s analysis. In addition to Senator Hopper’s statement, the Senate Business Affairs and Labor Committee heard testimony from Donald Mielke, District Attorney for the First Judicial District, who helped develop and draft the Gaming Act’s criminal provisions. He emphasized that the bill drafters were concerned with the need for new enforcement provisions to prevent abuse by licensed operators. Mielke testified,
if it is the operator or if it is the distributor that is running the slot machine, and they tamper [with] that slot machine to the detriment of the public and steal ten thousand dollars from one machine, or whatever dollar [amount] it might be ... we could not go under the theft statute and file a felony theft, because it’s over three hundred dollars, because we would not have a victim that we could identify. I mean everybody comes in, puts in their dollar, does whatever, and goes on to the next machine. Because Colorado law specifically says, for theft, you cannot [file charges] unless you specify the victim of the theft and the amount of the theft, that even though that machine stole ten thousand dollars we could not file against the owner or the operator who tampered [with] that machine ... because the theft statutes require the naming of the victim and the naming of the amount. So we need the felony for that offense for the licensed person.
Hearing on S.B. 91-149 Before the Senate Business Affairs and Labor Committee, 58th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (hearing tape 91-8, Feb. 7, 1991, at 2:37 p.m.). The testimony of District Attorney Mielke shows that the Gaming Act’s criminal provisions were intended to cover specific gaps which prosecutors had identified in the existing crimes defined in the Criminal Code.
*574The majority’s final rationale for finding preemption is based upon its finding of a parallel between the Gaming Act and the Liquor Code -with respect to each Act’s reference to the Criminal Code. Maj. op. at 568. In my view, the two statutes are not comparable. When Bagby was decided, section 12-47-130, 5B C.R.S. (1985) of the Liquor Code defined a limited number of offenses with particularized references to specific provisions of the Criminal Code. Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1062. We concluded that this selective incorporation of portions of the Criminal Code into the Liquor Code indicated a legislative determination that all other violations of the Liquor Code should be prosecuted only under the Liquor Code’s penal provisions. Id. By contrast, all of the Gaming Act’s penal provisions are reproduced verbatim in the Criminal Code. See §§ 18-20-101 to -115, 8B C.R.S. (1996 Supp.). Citing the Bagby rationale, the majority asserts that by reproducing the Gaming Act’s penal provisions in the Criminal Code verbatim, the General Assembly has demonstrated an intent to limit the punishment of illegal conduct related to limited gaming to the specific provisions of the Gaming Act. I disagree.
There is a distinct difference between an organic act (ie., the Liquor Code) which makes particular references to the Criminal Code in order to delineate which act controls certain types of offenses, and an organic act (ie., the Gaming Act) whose criminal provisions are reproduced verbatim in the Criminal Code. Unlike the Liquor Code, the Gaming Act is not a self-contained body of law with specific limited references to the Criminal Code. Incorporation of the Gaming Act violations into the Criminal Code indicates to me that the two statutes are of equal stature and are intended to complement each other. My reading is supported by Senator Hopper who testified to the Conference Committee that the criminal provisions were reproduced in both Title 12 and Title 18 as a result of a “compromise” between the Department of Revenue and the law enforcement community. Hearing on S.B. 91-U9 Before the House and Senate Conference Committee, 58th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (hearing tape 91-34, March 7, 1991, at 8:30 a.m.). “Compromise” does not indicate an intent to have one set of laws prevail over the other. Thus, I see no basis for the majority’s conclusion that the General Assembly intended to restrict prosecutorial discretion in these types of cases.
Finally, I point out that the majority’s conclusion is contrary to New Jersey case law, and New Jersey is one of the states from which the language of the Gaming Act criminal provisions was taken. Both Senator Hopper and District Attorney Mielke testified to the Senate Business Affairs and Labor Committee that they considered New Jersey law in developing the criminal provisions of the Gaming Act. Hearing on S.B. 91-119 Before the Senate Business Affairs and Labor Committee, 58th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (hearing tape 91-8, Feb. 7, 1991, at 2:25 p.m. & 2:34 p.m.). Similar to Colorado’s Gaming Act, New Jersey’s Casino Control Act defines specific crimes related to gambling. N.J.Rev.Stat. § 5:12-1 to -203 (1996). In State v. Stelzner, 257 N.J.Super. 219, 608 A.2d 386 (App.Div.1992), the appellate division of the New Jersey superior court, confronted with the same issue now before us, upheld the convictions of defendants involved in a scheme to defraud a casino by cheating at cards. Id. 608 A.2d at 389.
In Stelzner, the defendants illegally won over $150,000 and were convicted under the Casino Control Act for swindling and under the general criminal code for theft by deception. Id. at 387. The theft by deception statute allowed for felony convictions in the second and third degree, while the Casino Control Act only provided for a felony conviction in the fourth degree. Like this case, the defendants argued that the more specific provisions of the Casino Control Act indicated a legislative intent to limit prosecutions of gambling offenses to that Act. In New Jersey, as in Colorado, the “question of whether a specific act containing a criminal offense bars prosecution under a more generally applicable criminal statute is a matter of legislative intent.” Id. at 396. The Stelzner court held, however, that despite the fact that the casino industry in New Jersey was heavily regulated, there was no evidence that the legislature intended to limit casino theft *575prosecutions to the provisions of the Casino Control Act. Id. at 396-97.
Although certainly not binding, the Stel-zner court’s rationale is persuasive here. Neither the plain language of the Gaming Act nor its legislative history supports the majority’s conclusion that the General Assembly intended to prevent prosecutors from filing general criminal charges in cases like the one before us. To the contrary, the inclusion of these new criminal provisions was a result of law enforcement concerns that the existing statutes would not address certain criminal conduct as applied to owners and operators. Further, it stands to reason that these suggestions were made by the law enforcement community to supplement the Criminal Code and not to limit the discretion of prosecutors.
We have explained that “[t]he Colorado Constitution establishes the office of the district attorney and vests in the office ... the discretion to determine the charges that will be filed.” Gansz v. People, 888 P.2d 256, 257-58 (Colo.1995). We also have held that “[w]here a single transaction may violate two criminal statutes, it is well settled that no constitutional proscription exists which prohibits a district attorney from exercising his prosecutorial discretion in determining under which statute to prosecute.” People v. Wellington, 633 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Colo.1981). While Bagby indicates that the discretion of a prosecutor can be restricted by the legislature, the Bagby rationale is only applicable to legislative acts that clearly show an intent by the General Assembly to preclude prosecution under the general criminal statute. That is not the case here.
Accordingly, I would reverse and direct the trial court to reinstate the felony charges. In my opinion, the General Assembly did not intend to limit prosecutorial discretion for violations of the Gaming Act. I agree, however, with the majority opinion that the speedy trial provision of section 18-1-405(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986), is tolled pending our resolution of the People’s appeal. Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice VOLLACK and Justice SCOTT join in this dissent.

. § 18-5-114, 8B C.R.S. (1986).

. The legislation at issue established unlawful acts related to limited gaming which are codified in the Gaming Act at §§ 12 — 47.1-801 to -839, 5B C.R.S. (1991 & 1996 Supp.). Some of these unlawful acts are also reproduced in the Criminal Code at §§ 18-20-101 to — 115, 8B C.R.S. (1996 Supp.). See Act approved June 4, 1991, ch. 263, sec. 1 & 11, 1991 Colo. Sess. laws 1521.

. The Limited Gaining Act of 1991 was introduced as Senate Bill 91-149.