Court Opinion

ID: 9679797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:07:42.304388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:20.745652
License: Public Domain

ELLISON, J.
(dissenting).- — I respectfully dissent from the holding in the principal opinion that the specific negligence causing the plaintiff-appellant’s fall and injury remains in doubt and is not clearly shown by her testimony — in consequence of which the ease was properly submitted under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The opinion says the plaintiff-appellant testified to conclusions and results, and not to specific facts.
The ruling is based on Belding v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 358 Mo. 491, 497, 215 S.W. (2d) 506, 510 (6, 7), which says “• • * when the plaintiff, having pleaded a case of res ipsa loquitur, goes so far in his own evidence as to point out, and reveal his knowledge of, the specific act of negligence which was responsible for his injury, there is neither room nor necessity for the application of the doctrine. But on the other hand, even though the plaintiff’s evidence may tend to show the specific cause of the accident, he will nevertheless not lose the benefit of the doctrine, nor be deprived of the right to rely upon it in the submission of his case, if, after his evidence is in, ‘the true cause is still left in doubt or is not clearly shown. ’ ”
The plaintiff-appellant and her physician were the only witnesses in her behalf. She testified she went to a designated street ihtérsection to board the bus. She stepped up on the sidewalk, but the bus didn’t come that far like it was supposed to do. It stopped out in the middle of the street. When he [the bus driver] stopped there he opened the door and said “Come on, come on,” that he was “turning in.’’ She was ready to put her feet on and that is when'he “snatched *120me down.” Later she explained that when she said he “snatched up” the bus she meant he jerked it up, pulled it up.
Continuing, she said she was carrying a bundle of clothes in her left arm. She had “just put this one foot up and started with the other one and that is when he snatched again. ’ ’ She had put her right foot on and started to put her left foot on and ' ‘ That is when he pulled the bus up. He had never just plumb stopped. ’ ’ He was going very slow, and when she got up to put the other foot on ‘ ‘ that is when he snatched, snatched me down where he was. ’ On cross-examination she conceded the bus never did “plumb stop” and that she got on it while it was still moving. Her explanation of that was that the bus driver told her to come on, that he was turning in.
The only thing about her testimony that was vague was her usé of the expression that the bus driver “snatched up” or “pulled up” the bus. But even as to that she explained that when she said he snatched it'up she meant he jerked it up or pulled it up. This, it seems to me, is a specific and definite charge of specific negligence committed by the respondent Public Service Company’s bus operator which was the cause- of her injury. There are many decisions holding that when the specific negligence of the defendant’s agent or servant is known to and proven by the plaintiff, or his witnesses, there is no room for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
In Conduitt v. Trenton Gas & Elec. Co., 326 Mo. 133, 142-3 (3, 4), 31 SW. (2d) 21, 25 (4, 5), the plaintiff turned off an electric light in her home and received a shock. At the trial she proved the specific cause' of her injury, the breaking of the limb of a tree which fell across an electric wire causing a short circuit in the wire to the light. It was ruled she was bound by this specific proof notwithstanding she sued under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
In Stolovey v. Fleming, 328 Mo. 623, 624-5, 8 SW. (2d) 832, the plaintiff’s petition alleged she “was thrown and. injured by the carelessness and negligence of defendants’ operators in,charge of said (s.treet) car in starting the car while the plaintiff had one foot upon thi'e step and was trying to get thereon as a passenger” — practically the identical charge made by appellant’s testimony here. The plaintiff-appellant there contended the charge was one of general negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This court held it was specific and not general, and that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine did not apply to the case. . <
In Powell v. St. J. Ry. L.H. & P. Co., 336 Mo. 1016, 1021(4), 81 SW, (2d) 957, 960(6) this court said: “The res ipsa loquitur rule aids the injured party who does not know and therefore cannot plead or adduce proof showing the specific cause of or how the event which resulted in his injury occurred, but if he knows how it came to happen, and just what caused it, and either specifically pleads or proves the *121cause, there is neither room nor necessity for the presumption or inference which the rule affords. ’ ’
The principal opinion cites and quotes the following from Belding v. St.L. Pub.Serv.Co., 358 Mo. 491, 497, 215 SW, (2d) 506, 510: “ * * * ^611 £he plaintiff, having pleaded a ease of res ipsa loquitur,goes so far in his own evidence as to point out, and reveal his knowledge of, the specific act of negligence which was responsible for his injury, there is neither room, nor necessity for the application of the doctrine. But on the other hand, even though the plaintiff’s evidence may tend to, show the specific cause of the accident, he will nevertheless not lose the benefit of the doctrine, nor be deprived of the right to rely upon it in the submission of his case, if, after his evidence is in, ‘the true cause is still left in doubt or is not clearly shown.’ ” [Emphasis ours].
But in this ease the true cause of the casualty was shown by the plaintiff-appellant herself. She said the bus driver told her to get on the bus while it was still moving, and then accelerated its speed. We, do not say that failed to make a case for the jury in her behalf, but it was a specific negligence case and not a res ipsa loquitur case, on which theory her suit was brought. And as held in the Conduitt, Stolovey and Powell cases cited above she cannot recover on the latter' theory when her suit was brought on the former. See also: Palmer v. Brooks, 350 Mo. 1055, 1061(1), 169 SW. (2d) 906, 909(4, 5); Charlton v. Lovelace, 351 Mo. 364, 369-372, 173 SW.(2d) 13, 16-18; Hoeller v, St.L. Pub. Serv. Co. (Mo.App.) 199 SW. (2d) 7, 11-12(11); Fuller v. St.L. Pub. Serv. Co. (Mo.App.) 245 SW.(2d) 675, 677 (1, 2); Lukitsch v. St. L. Pub. Serv. Co., 362 Mo.1071, 1078 (1), 246 SW. (2d) 749, 752 (3, 4).
In my opinion the order of the trial court sustaining the defendant-respondent’s motion for new trial should be affirmed.