Court Opinion

ID: 9783037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:37:28.631559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:19.163091
License: Public Domain

Justice BENDER
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
Louis Madden’s right to a fair trial was violated when he was charged with doing one criminal act but convicted of another. The prosecution charged Madden with attempted exposure of a child’s intimate parts but the jury convicted him of an entirely different criminal act with different elements — that he attempted to subject a person to sexual contact. The majority finds no error despite this difference and concludes that Madden had adequate notice of the charges against him. In so doing, the majority fails to analyze the disparity between the crime charged and the crime for which he was convicted. Because I believe that the United States and Colorado Constitutions require the prosecution to prove the crime charged, and not some other crime proven at trial, I respectfully dissent to Part 111(A) of the opinion and would reverse Madden’s conviction for attempted third degree sexual assault.
Discussion
The prosecution charged Louis Madden with attempted third degree sexual assault by exposing the intimate parts of another. The jury, however, was instructed that a person commits attempted third degree sexual assault if he “knowingly subjected a person to any sexual contact” by the use of force or violence.
The United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee a defendant-the fundamental right to be notified of the charges made against him. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Colo. Const Art. II, See. 16; People v. Cooke, 186 Colo. 44, 46, 525 P.2d 426, 428 (1974). This right is so fundamental that the defendant may not be convicted of an offense that was not alleged in the charging document. Russell v. U.S., 369 U.S. 749, 770-71, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1050-51, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 257 (Colo.1996) (citing United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 915 (10th Cir.1992)); 4 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 19.6(b), at 809 (2nd ed.1999).
To provide adequate notice, an information must apprise the defendant of the charge he faces by setting forth the essential elements of the crime. Howe v. People, 178 Colo. 248, 253-55, 496 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (1972). In general, the essential elements of a crime are “the elements of mental state, criminal conduct, and resulting harm” that the prosecution intends to prove at trial. 4 LaFave, *461Criminal Procedure, § 19.3(a), at 762 (2nd ed.1999).
The constitutional rights of a defendant are impacted when an essential element of the charging document is altered after trial has begun. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 257. Thus, if a defendant’s conviction is based on an entirely different act than what is present in the charging document — that is, the original charge is broadened — the indictment has been constructively amended. U.S. v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 139, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 1816, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985).
“To prevail on a constructive amendment claim, a defendant must demonstrate that either the proof at trial or the trial court’s jury instructions so.altered an essential element of the charge that, upon review, it is uncertain whether the defendant was convicted of conduct that was the subject of the grand jury’s indictment.” U.S. v. Milstein, 401 F.3d 53, 65 (2nd Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 620 (2nd Cir.2003)). When a reviewing court determines that the charging document has been constructively amended, a defendant’s conviction must be reversed. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); Milstein, 401 F.3d at 65; Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir.1990); Casadas v. People, 134 Colo. 244, 304 P.2d 626 (1956).
Turning to this case, I conclude that the jury convicted Madden of an entirely different method of committing attempted third degree sexual assault than was identified in the charging document — contact or touching compared to exposure. While the generic crime charged remained the same, attempted third degree sexual assault1, the method of committing the crime was inherently different. One requires removal of the victim’s clothing so that the defendant may see or be exposed to the victim’s intimate parts. This may be accomplished without touching the victim’s intimate parts or for that matter, without touching the victim. The other method, however, applies whether or not the victim’s clothing is removed and requires a touching or contact between the defendant and the victim’s intimate parts, or as relevant to the facts presented at Madden’s trial, requires contact between the defendant’s intimate parts and the victim.2
This difference between how the prosecution claims the offense was committed goes directly to the criminal conduct at issue, an essential element of the crime. Thus, by changing an essential element of the crime charged after Madden became powerless to rebut it, Madden was denied his constitutional right to know the charges against him and defend against those charges.
The majority relies upon the fact that the information included the phrase “with or without sexual contact” to conclude that Madden was on notice that evidence could be presented indicating that some form of sexual contact occurred. Maj. op. at 456-57. While this recitation of what is contained within the information is .true, this fact alone does not change that Madden was charged with exposing S.J.’s intimate parts. Had he disproved this element of the crime, that he did not expose her intimate parts irrespective of whether there was sexual contact, then Madden would have been acquitted of third degree sexual assault as charged in the information. The prosecution has the constitutional responsibility to provide the defendant with notice of the criminal act charged and then prove that charge, and not some other criminal act. Basic constitutional criminal jurisprudence does not permit the prosecution to mold the crime to fit the evidence presented at trial.
I also take issue with the majority’s position that reference to the statutory subsec*462tion in the information is sufficient to cure the problem created by the variance between the information and the jury instruction. This is not a case where the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the information in setting forth the crime charged. See People v. Williams, 984 P.2d 56 (Colo.1999); Cervantes v. People, 715 P.2d 783 (Colo.1986). Nor is this a situation where the prosecution charged a defendant with alternative methods of committing a crime, Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 258, or where the defendant is convicted of a lesser included offense of the charge alleged in the information, People v. Cooke, 186 Colo. 44, 47, 525 P.2d 426, 428 (1974). Rather, in this case the essential elements of the crime charged are inherently different from the crime instructed. Whether a defendant is charged with attempt does not change the constitutional requirement that an accused be convicted of the criminal act charged and not some other act. Here, Madden was charged with one crime, the attempted exposure of a child’s intimate parts, but convicted of another, attempted sexual contact.
The method or manner of committing the crime charged — the criminal conduct — is an “essential element” that must be disclosed to the defendant prior to trial. Where the essential elements of committing the offense as alleged in the charging document are different from those elements that are set forth in the jury instructions, the defendant’s right to a fair and adequate opportunity to prepare his defense is violated.
Therefore, I would hold that this substantial change to the crime charged embodied in the jury instruction constituted a constructive amendment when the jury convicted Madden of a criminal act for which he was not charged. This constructive amendment should be fatal to Madden’s conviction. Hence, I respectfully dissent to part 111(A) of the majority’s opinion.
I am authorized to state that Justice MARTINEZ joins in this dissent.

. Third degree sexual assault is defined as inducing someone "to expose intimate parts or to engage in any sexual contact, intrusion or penetration" for the defendant's sexual gratification. § 18-3-404(1.5), C.R.S. (1999) (emphasis added).

. Section 18-3-401(4), C.R.S. (1999), defines "sexual contact" as:
[T]he knowing touching of the victim’s intimate parts by the actor, or of the actor’s intimate parts by the victim, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor's intimate parts if that sexual contact is for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.