Court Opinion

ID: 9428463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:54.253091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:13.545307
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
Justice Marshall has persuaded me that this statute is unconstitutional, but I do not subscribe to all of his reasoning. He is surely correct in concluding that content-neutral restrictions on the use of private letterboxes do not automatically comply with the First Amendment simply because such boxes are a part of the Postal Service. Like libraries and schools, once these facilities have come into existence, the Government’s regulation of them must comply with the Constitution. See ante, at 151, n. 10. I cannot, however, accept the proposition that these private receptacles are the functional equivalent of public fora.
My disagreement with the Court and with Justice Marshall can best be illustrated by looking at this case from the point of view of the owner of the mailbox. The mailbox is private property; it is not a public forum to which the owner must grant access. If the owner does not want to receive any written communications other than stamped mail, he should be permitted to post the equivalent of a “no trespassing” sign on his mailbox. A statute that protects his privacy by prohibiting unsolicited and unwanted deposits on his property would surely be valid. The Court, however, upholds a statute that interferes with the owner’s receipt of information that he may want to receive. If the owner welcomes messages from his neighbors, from the local community organization, or even from the newly arrived entrepreneur passing out free coupons, it is presumptively unreasonable to interfere with his ability to receive such communications. The nationwide criminal statute at issue here deprives millions of homeowners of the legal right to make a simple decision affecting their ability to receive communications from others.
*153The Government seeks to justify the prohibition on three grounds: avoiding the loss of federal revenues, preventing theft from the mails, and maintaining the efficiency of the Postal Service.1 In my judgment the first ground is frivolous and the other two, though valid, are insufficient to overcome the presumption that this impediment to communication is invalid.
If a private party — by using volunteer workers or by operating more efficiently — can deliver written communications for less than the cost of postage, the public interest would be well served by transferring that portion of the mail delivery business out of the public domain. I see no reason to prohibit competition simply to prevent any reduction in the size of a subsidized monopoly. In my opinion, that purpose cannot justify any restriction on the interests in free communication that are protected by the First Amendment.
To the extent that the statute aids in the prevention of theft, that incidental benefit was not a factor that motivated Congress.2 The District Court noted that the testimony indicated that § 1725 “was marginally useful” in the enforcement of the statutes relating to theft of mail. 490 F. Supp. 157, 161-162 (1980). It concluded, however, that the Government had failed to introduce evidence sufficient to justify *154the interference with First Amendment interests.3 The Court does not quarrel with any of the District Court’s findings of fact, and I would not disturb the conclusion derived from those findings.
Mailboxes cluttered with large quantities of written matter would impede the efficient performance of the mail carrier’s duties. Sorting through papers for mail to be picked up or having no space in which to leave mail that should be delivered can unquestionably consume valuable time. Without the statute that has been in place for decades, what may now appear to be merely a minor or occasional problem might grow like the proverbial beanstalk. Rather than take that risk, Congress has decided that the wiser course is a total prohibition that will protect the free flow of mail.
But as Justice Marshall has noted, the problem is susceptible of a much less drastic solution. See ante, at 146, n. 3. There are probably many overstuffed mailboxes now — and if this statute were repealed there would be many more — but the record indicates that the relatively empty boxes far outnumber the crowded ones. If the statute allowed the homeowner to decide whether or not to receive unstamped communications — and to have his option plainly indicated on the exterior of the mailbox — a simple requirement that overstuffed boxes be replaced with larger ones should provide the answer to most of the Government’s concern.4
*155I am fully aware that it is one thing to sit in judicial chambers and opine that a postal regulation is not really necessary and quite another to run a mammoth and complex operation like the Postal Service. Conceivably, the invalidation of this law would unleash a flow of communication that would sink the mail service in a sea of paper. But were that to happen, it would merely demonstrate that this law is a much greater impediment to the free flow of communication than is presently assumed. To the extent that the law prevents mailbox clutter, it also impedes the delivery of written messages that would otherwise take place.
Finally, we should not ignore the fact that nobody has ever been convicted of violating this middle-aged nationwide statute. It must have been violated literally millions of times. Apparently the threat of enforcement has enabled the Government to collect some postage from time to time or to cause a few violators to discontinue their unlawful practices, but I have the impression that the general public is at best only dimly aware of the law and that numerous otherwise law-abiding citizens regularly violate it with impunity. This impression supports the conclusion that the statute is indeed much broader than is necessary to serve its limited purpose. Because, as Justice Marshall has demonstrated, it does unquestionably abridge the free exchange of written expression, I agree with his conclusion that it violates the First Amendment.
I respectfully dissent.

 Although the Government also advances the privacy interests of the mailbox owner, those interests would of course be protected by allowing the individual owner to make the choice whether he wanted to receive unstamped mail.

 The Government, see Brief for Appellant 4, n. 4, cites legislative history indicating that the “principal motivation for the statute” was the protection of postal revenues and prevention of overstuffing of mailboxes. The Government later notes that “[although Congress’ primary purpose in enacting Section 1725 was the protection of mail revenues, the statute also plays a role in the investigation of mail theft.” Id., at 7. Because this justification, unlike the other two, was formulated after the statute was enacted, it is not entitled to the same weight as the purposes that actually motivated Congress.

 The District Court held that “enforcement of § 1725 against civic associations does not appear so necessary or contributive to enforcement of the anti-theft, anti-fraud or Private Express statutes that this interest outweighs the plaintiffs' substantial interest in expedient and economical communication with their constituents.” 490 F. Supp., at 163.

 To the extent that the efficiency of the Postal Service would be impeded by the effort required for mail carriers to sort through papers for outgoing mail, the solution is again in the hands of the individual owner of the mailbox. If he wants to use this method of sending letters and wants also to receive unstamped communications, he runs the risk that his outgoing mail will not .be seen by the mail carrier.