Court Opinion

ID: 9465961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:01:25.134945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:28.245736
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Although we do not find persuasive the arguments defendant makes in urging us to rehear this appeal, we believe another development should be addressed in denying the request for rehearing.
Subsequent to the filing of our opinion in the instant case, the Supreme Court summarily vacated the judgment in People v. Robbins, No. 1/Crim 14387 (Cal.Ct.App. May 9, 1978) and remanded “for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235.” Robbins v. California, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 3093, 61 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). This action gives us pause because the lower court opinion in Robbins states that the vehicle search in question revealed “two securely wrapped bricks of marijuana and a tote bag containing another 2.2 pounds of marijuana.” 1 People v. Robbins, slip op. at 3.
Although we considered the search of defendant’s briefcase in the instant case to be governed by United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) and Arkansas v. Sanders, -U.S.-, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), we judged the warrantless search of the large plastic sacks containing marijuana to be beyond the scope of those cases. We believe that distinction was appropriate under Chadwick and Sanders. We decline to read into the summary Supreme Court action in Robbins the implicit adoption of a per se rule that would hold a warrant required before any form of container or package found in a vehicle could be searched.2
In Sanders, the Court focused on the fact that what had been searched without a warrant was “luggage” and emphasized the fact that “luggage is a common repository for one’s personal effects, and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy.” -U.S. at-, 99 S.Ct. at 2592. We believe Sanders justifies our distinction between the briefcase and the mere cargo involved in this case. We reaffirm our decision that the reduced expectation of privacy in that cargo justified its warrant-less search.
We should not be understood as using the term “mere cargo” in some talismanic sense or as a substitute for reasoned analysis. For example, if the marijuana in the case before us had been contained in double-locked footlockers upon which had been stenciled in two-inch red letters “Contents Private — Keep Out,” it would have been accurate in one sense to refer to the lockers collectively as “cargo.” It is not likely, however, that we would have found a warrantless search of the lockers constitutional. The reason is that affirmative steps to insure privacy would have been taken; it would have been inaccurate to characterize the footlockers as mere cargo, even though the number of footlockers might have indicated the likelihood that what was involved was some mass shipment.
The focus in all such cases is on the party’s reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular item,3 a concept which has been *127elaborated on in the case law. See, e. g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In view of the number and nature of the sacks involved in the case before us and their ready visibility through the open door of defendant’s airplane, we have simply concluded that defendant had in them no privacy interest that mandated procurement of a search warrant under the facts of this case.
The petition for rehearing is denied.

. At another point in the opinion the court refers to the search as extending to “the contents of various packages and suitcases found in the interior and luggage compartment of the vehicle.” People v. Robbins, slip op. at 5.

. Writing in dissent in Sanders, Justice Black-mun indicated that the decision had announced no such per se rule: “Still hanging in limbo, and probably soon to be litigated are the briefcase, the wallet, the package, the paper bag, and every other kind of container.” Arkansas v. Sanders, -U.S. at-, 99 S.Ct. at 2595.

. We agree with Justice Blackmun’s dissenting observation in Sanders that it will not always be a simple matter for law enforcement officials to determine which containers or other items found in a vehicle “may be searched immediately, and which are so ‘personal’ that they must be impounded for future search only pursuant to a warrant.” -U.S. at-, 99 S.Ct. at 2597. However, making such determinations is not a function that officers need undertake. The simple solution for the officer is this: When in doubt, get a warrant.