Court Opinion

ID: 9741152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:50:24.998412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.600834
License: Public Domain

Mallett, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the lead opinion’s holdings in both Parcher v Detroit Edison and Bohnert v Detroit Edison. However, I disagree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that Detroit Edison is not liable for the injuries in Groncki because it was not foreseeable that this plaintiff would come into harmful contact with the overhead power lines. I' agree with the Court of Appeals holding reversing the grant of summary *666disposition in favor of the utility, and would remand to the trial court for further fact finding with regard to the general negligence claim. A more complete record from which to assess the liability of the utility in this case needs to be provided concerning the proximity of the wires to the building and to the ground. Groncki v Detroit Edison Co, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 27, 1994 (Docket No. 153538), slip op at 1, 3. In holding that there is no duty in Groncki, the Court gives too narrow a reading to our holding in Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445; 506 NW2d 175 (1993). Such restriction is inconsistent with basic principles of negligence law that the lead opinion fails to address.
“A negligence action may only be maintained if a legal duty exists which requires the defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm.” Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992). In assessing whether to impose a duty courts must evaluate several factors, among which are the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of harm, and the nature of the risk itself. Buczkowski v McKay, 441 Mich 96, 100; 490 NW2d 330 (1992). Whether a duty will be found to exist is a question of law for the court. Trager v Thor, 445 Mich 95, 105; 516 NW2d 69 (1994). Once a legal duty is established, a breach of that duty is required for liability to attach. Whether the duty has been breached is a question of fact for the jury. Riddle, supra at 96.
In determining whether the relationship between the parties is sufficient to establish a duty, the proper *667inquiry is “ ‘whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff’ . . . Buczkowski, supra at 100, quoting Friedman v Dozorc, 412 Mich 1, 22; 312 NW2d 585 (1981). This analysis concerns whether the relationship of the parties is such that a legal obligation should be imposed on one for the benefit of another. Id., citing Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 53, p 356. “Only if the law recognizes a duty to act with due care arising from the relationship of the parties does it subject the defendant to liability for negligent conduct.” Friedman, supra at 22. In assessing the sufficiency of the relationship and whether to impose a duty, this Court has noted that “[i]t is well established that those who undertake particular activities or enter into special relationships assume a distinctive duty to procure knowledge and experience regarding that activity .. . .” Schultz, supra at 450.
This inquiry is of critical importance where a company is involved in an inherently dangerous enterprise such as the delivery of electricity. The necessary relationship arises out of the nature of the activity. The provision of electricity and electric power is one of those particular activities in which the provider assumes a distinctive duty. Accordingly, we held that it is the responsibility of the electric company, as a provider of an inherently dangerous commodity, in its superior position of knowledge and expertise, to execute its activities through the exercise of reasonable care to reduce the risk of harm as far as practicable. Id. at 451. We noted in Schultz that, “[w]here service wires erected and maintained by an electric utility company carry a powerful electric current, so that persons coming into contact with or proximity to *668them are likely to suffer serious injury or death, the company must exercise reasonable care to protect the public from danger.” Id. at 453-454.
Even though the reasonable person is charged with the knowledge of the dangerous propensities of electricity, the utility still has the duty and obligation “to reasonably inspect and repair wires and other instrumentalities in order to discover and remedy hazards and defects.” Id. at 451. Indeed, other courts have similarly held that, “ ‘where high-voltage lines were strung between closely spaced private residences, the risk to be foreseen was of the highest order; thus, the corresponding duty devolving upon the power company must be considered equally great.’ ” Id. at 455, quoting Miner v Long Island Lighting Co, 40 NY2d 372, 379; 353 NE2d 805 (1976).
In addition is the requirement of foreseeability, that is, whether the reasonable person not only could anticipate the likelihood that a particular event would occur, but that such an event would pose a risk of injury or harm to a person or property. Samson v Saginaw Professional Bldg, Inc, 393 Mich 393, 406; 224 NW2d 843 (1975). In Samson, we stated:
Foreseeability . . . depends upon whether or not a reasonable man could anticipate that a given event might occur under certain conditions. But the mere fact that an event may be foreseeable does not impose a duty upon the defendant to take some kind of action accordingly. The event which he perceives might occur must pose some sort of risk of injury to another person or his property before the actor may be required to act. . . . Negligence ... is not found to exist unless an actor, who is under a duty to act, fails to act after he has perceived or should have perceived an unreasonable risk of harm to another.
*669Consequently, as pointed out in Schultz, it is altogether possible for a reasonable person to anticipate both that an individual performing routine maintenance on his home could become electrocuted if his aluminum ladder came into contact with the overhead power line and that this could cause serious injury or death. Id. at 452. The message in Schultz is clear that “[t]hose engaged in transmitting electricity are bound to anticipate ordinary use of the area surrounding the lines and to appropriately safeguard the attendant risks.” Id. The appropriate test is not “whether the company should have anticipated the particular act from which the injury resulted, but whether it should have foreseen the probability that injury might result from any reasonable activity done on the premises for business, work, or pleasure.” Id. Accordingly, we held that Consumers Power owed “a duty to reasonably install its power lines so as to safeguard the public from foreseeable injuries.” Id. at 458. Thus, it was determined that it was foreseeable that a homeowner could become injured while performing routine maintenance on his dwelling and that the utility is duty bound to safeguard against such risks as far as practicable.
In holding that the utility has no duty in Groncki, the lead opinion interprets too narrowly our holding in Schultz. The lead opinion places far too much emphasis on the fact that, like the plaintiffs in Bohnert and Parcher, the plaintiff in Groncki was an experienced maintenance worker who knew about the dangers of power lines and had even warned *670other workers about them.1 Ante at 660-661. Accordingly, the lead opinion posits that Groncki should be governed by Koehler v Detroit Edison Co, 383 Mich 224; 174 NW2d 827 (1970), and its progeny, like Parcher and Bohnert, rather than Schultz,2 These cases really represent a continuum of liability with Koehler, finding no duty, on one end, and Schultz, imposing a duty, on the other. However, there are significant differences between Groncki, on the one hand, and Parcher, Bohnert, and Koehler, on the other, that the opinion fails to consider, which bring it closer to the holding in Schultz.
The Koehler-Bohnert-Parcher trilogy involved construction sites where new building was taking place. The work space in which the construction activities took place was ample for the activities to occur. The victims in these cases were extremely experienced at operating heavy equipment, whether a forklift, masonry delivery truck, or crane, and ignored their *671own occupational safety instructions and warnings. They knew about the danger and the need to stay away from overhead wires. Ante at 650, 652, and 654-655. Accordingly, in Koehler, we held that
[t]he mere fact that Detroit Edison knew a building was under construction near its power line and that, from time to time, mobile cranes were being brought upon the premises to be used in construction work, would not, standing alone, create a duty upon Detroit Edison to remove the charge, insulate the line, or notify the parties of a dangerous condition. We agree with the finding of the trial judge that there was no negligence on the part of Detroit Edison. [Id. at 231.]
Clearly, under these circumstances, the injuries were not foreseeable, but the result of fortuitous events not readily anticipated or caused in any way by the negligence of the utility, and thus liability could not attach.
On the other side of the spectrum is Schultz, which involved a homeowner and his friend, who was electrocuted while house painting. The lead opinion notes that we found this kind of incident to be “foreseeable, given the location and disrepair of the power line.” Ante at 656. This is only partially correct. By restricting the holding in Schultz to homeowners repairing their homes, the lead opinion misses the greater significance of Schultz. In Schultz, the critical factors to finding a duty were the placement and condition of the wires, whether it was foreseeable that reasonable maintenance would take place, and whether this maintenance could be executed with reasonable safety given the placement and condition of the *672wires.3 In Groncki, as in Schultz, even though there was no allegation that the wire was in disrepair, and in spite of his alleged experience, it is still altogether possible that the plaintiff simply could not perform routine maintenance tasks without confronting an unreasonable risk of harm because of inadequate work space. Therefore, Edison breached its duty to reasonably inspect and install its lines. This is underscored by the fact that the condominium complex grew up among the original wires and that with subsequent construction the distances between the wires and the buildings decreased to a point where repairs could not reasonably be undertaken and that injuries were therefore foreseeable.
Notwithstanding Groncki’s knowledge and experience or the fact that the power lines complied with the Public Safety Commission regulations, the Court of Appeals charged the electric company with the duty that it “must exercise reasonable care to reduce potential hazards as far as practicable.”4 Schultz at *673451. As the lead opinion notes, “electrical companies occupy a special role as providers of an essential, yet extremely dangerous commodity.” Ante at 656, citing Schultz. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the utility to “reasonably inspect and repair wires and other instrumentalities in order to discover and remedy hazards and defects.” Id. In this case, the proximity of the power lines to the condominium may have created such a hazardous condition. There simply may not have been ample space for the work to reasonably have been completed. Edison is under a duty to inspect and remedy such hazards as far as practicable where it is foreseeable that a maintenance worker or homeowner could become electrocuted while performing routine maintenance tasks.
The utility is charged with the responsibility and duty to inspect, discover, and remedy hazardous conditions to prevent foreseeable injuries. Both public policy and the protection of the public command this result. I disagree that this will have the dire economic consequences asserted of by the lead opinion. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the lead opinion’s position in Groncki v Detroit Edison, and would remand this case to the trial court for further fact *674finding to determine whether the injury was foreseeable, and whether Edison’s conduct fell below the standard of care. This evaluation should include an analysis of the type of activity performed, the distance of the power lines from the activity, and whether the activity could be performed or carried out with reasonable safety within that space.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Mallett, J.

 Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellees disputed that Mr. Groncki was truly experienced. Noting that he had only a high school education and was a laborer, albeit with some construction experience, counsel charged that he could not be
saddle[d] . . . with the knowledge, the cumulative knowledge that Detroit Edison has in dealing with power lines. ... Mr. Groncki was and is a maintenance man. Mr. Groncki never took any formal courses or had any specific training in the area of electricity, and he has no specialized knowledge or expertise as to the hazards of uninsulated electrical lines, beyond that which all persons are generally aware.

 Koehler was electrocuted while riding on a sling or wire cable attached to a crane in order to perform two tasks at a time on a construction site with too few workers. He was attaching a hook on the end of the crane to material in a truck and riding up with it to the wall or roof where the material was attached and then riding down. He repeated this several times, in spite of several warnings, and was electrocuted. Koehler, supra at 229.

 In a separate concurrence, Chief Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Levin, emphasized that, in addition to the duty to inspect and maintain, the utility must exercise reasonable care in positioning its uninsulated power lines.
[I]n resolving this case, I would focus less on the condition of the wire and more on its position. [Schulte at 460.]
Chief Justice Cavanagh noted that the house in this case was built before the wires were brought into the area and that the utility should have “anticipated that someone might attempt the not unusual task of painting that home,” with a tall ladder when installing the lines. Id. (citation omitted).

 The power lines were in place six years before the condominium on which Groncki was working was built. The lines were twenty-one feet high, and 14% feet away from the building. Ante at 651. This is closer to the building than the wire in Schultz, which was 15% feet from the house and twenty-four feet high. Id. at 448. Even though these distances com*673plied with the Michigan Public Safety Commission regulations (or the National Electric Safety Code, which the MPSC has adopted), the Court of Appeals noted that this does not preclude the plaintiffs claim. This Court has held that compliance with industry standards is not an absolute claim of defense to a claim of negligence. Id. at 456. Compliance is evidence of due care and “whether a defendant breached its duty of ordinary care, not whether a duty existed.” Id. Whether the defendant was negligent or breached its duty is a factual issue for the trier of fact to determine. See Groncki v Detroit Edison Co, unpublished opinion per curiam, slip op at 3 (citation omitted). Further, it is important to note that the safety standards represent only the minimum requirements and that circumstances might exist requiring a higher standard. Schultz at 456-457 (citations omitted).