Court Opinion

ID: 9711753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:38:24.737809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.267914
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN dissenting: The Administrative Review Act was adopted in 1945. From that date until the date of this opinion I find no case where one state agency purports to assert authority to obtain administrative review of a decision of another co-equal state agency. No such case has been cited, nor has my research found any. The Administrative Review Act does not expressly confer the authority for such review upon a state agency. The majority in finding that the Departmen of Registration and Education is entitled to review a decision of the Civil Service Commission does so by construing the language relating to the reviewability of “all final administrative decisions”. This finding of authority to review by reason of statutory construction and by implication seems to me to ignore other statutory language found in the personnel code that suggests there is no authority for the state agency to seek review of a Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the entire statutory scheme suggests an absence of authority of a state agency to appeal an order of the Commission. The state agency initiates charges which are filed with the Civil Sendee Commission, and upon the filing by an employee of a request with the Commission, the Commission is required to grant a hearing within 30 days. Under sec. 11 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 127, p. 63b-111), the finding and decision of the Commission is certified by the director and he is ordered by statute to “forthwith” enforce that decision. If the Commission certifies a decision that an employee is to be retained in a position and orders no suspension for disciplinary purposes, the statute requires that he receive compensation for any period during which he was suspended pending the investigation of the charges. It may be desirable that a state agency have authority to appeal a decision of a sister agency adverse to its contentions. If such is to be, it is for legislative not judicial action. The argument as to desirability should be made in a legislative forum and should not be sought by way of judicial construction. It seems clear that in the administration of state government, one state agency is often affected by proceedings within the scope of the authority of another state agency. For instance, the Department of Agriculture would be concerned with and affected by proceedings of the Environmental Protection Agency or Pollution Control Board as to the use of insecticides or chemical fertilizers. It would appear that under the majority opinion the Department of Agriculture would be entitled to have administrative review of otherwise reviewable orders promulgated from other agencies of state government if it has participated in an administrative hearing. If this should be so, which side of the controversy would the attorney general represent since he is, both by constitution and statute, the attorney for both? This type of illustration can be multiplied many fold. On the question of the standing of one agency to have administrative review of the acts and doings of another, a comprehensive article, 16 Ad.L.Review, p. 163, et seq., suggests that an administrative department or officer has no standing to challenge a decision of a superior or coordinate board or tribunal absent a particular statutory mandate granting such authority. The cases discussed in this article are persuasive here. The majority opinion relies on the Samter case as authority to sustain its position. In that case, the employee appealed the Civil Service Commission order to the circuit court and was successful. The department thereafter appealed to the appellate court. That appeal was to review the action of the circuit court; thus, it is an appeal from a judicial decision and is not persuasive as to the existence of authority to initiate administrative review. The majority opinion in holding for the first time in the 27-year history of the Administrative Review Act that one state agency has standing to initiate administrative review of the decision of another is an invitation to and authorization for interdepartmental litigation; which I believe to be neither justified nor desirable. Accordingly, I dissent.