Court Opinion

ID: 9545666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:17:10.712986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:19.759762
License: Public Domain

*81Wedell, J.
(concurring): I concur in the decision of the majority but desire to add a word concerning my view on the subject of contributory negligence.
It is conceded plaintiff realized immediately upon entering the first room she had gotten into the wrong place. She' recognized at once she was in an office and not in a dressing room. That was the first warning she had of entering the wrong room but it was not the only warning she encountered. Realizing she was in the wrong room she proceeded to the door which opened from the office. It was a bit ajar. Of course, I do not think the mere fact she looked for another room which might be the dressing room can be said to constitute negligence as a matter of law. But the nature of her conduct cannot be ignored. The moment she opened this second door she knew it, too, was not a dressing room. Her entire testimony clearly discloses the space beyond the second door was so dim or so dark she could not discern where she was going. According to her own admissions that place was either so dark she simply could not see where she was stepping or she proceeded without looking.
The situation here was not at all similar to the facts in Buck v. Miller Amusement Co., 166 Kan. 205, 200 P. 2d 286, where a movie patron opened a door in a theater through which patrons might be expected to pass, took one step and was at once thrown off her feet by reason of having a right to believe the floor was level on the other side of the door, when, in fact, the floor immediately on that side of the door was a step lower. Nor is the situation in the slightest analogous to an open trap door in a dimly lighted passageway to a toilet in a restaurant where toilet facilities were required by statute to be maintained for the accommodation of guests. (Campbell v. Weathers, 153 Kan. 316, 111 P. 2d 72.) Neither is the situation at all similar to a case where the owner of a building expressly directed a new tenant to follow her through the darkness of a basement and in an attempt to do so the tenant tripped and fell into a shallow pit she had no reason to anticipate in view of the invitation from the owner. (Donaldson v. Kemper, 149 Kan. 330, 87 P. 2d 535.) Likewise this case is entirely dissimilar to a case where an injury was sustained by a hotel guest by reason of a defect, not noticeable in the exercise of due care, existing in a regular entrance and exit passageway used customarily by hotel guests. (Harral v. Kent Corporation, 168 Kan. 322, 212 P. 2d 356.) Other cases *82in which recovery has been allowed or denied depending on the particular facts might be reviewed but I deem that unnecessary.
Price, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.