Court Opinion

ID: 9395850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 18:13:22.20626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:12.169147
License: Public Domain

2023 UT App 35

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

                      QUINTIN GRILLONE,
                         Petitioner,
                              v.
       PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COUNCIL,
                        Respondent.

                             Opinion
                        No. 20210794-CA
                       Filed April 13, 2023

                Original Proceeding in this Court

              Jeremy G. Jones and Richard R. Willie,
                    Attorneys for Petitioner
                Sean D. Reyes and Sarah Goldberg,
                    Attorneys for Respondent

    JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
     JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1     Quintin Grillone seeks judicial review of an order from the
Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (the POST Council)
suspending his peace officer certification for three years. He
argues that this agency action was barred by the four-year
catch-all statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code section
78B-2-307(3), which he asserts applied to this administrative
disciplinary proceeding by virtue of Utah Code section
53-6-211(3)(c). We disagree and decline to disturb the POST
Council’s order.
                         Grillone v. POST

                         BACKGROUND

¶2      In 2020, the Division of Peace Officer Standards and
Training (POST) 1 issued a Notice of Agency Action advising
Grillone of its intention to suspend or revoke his peace officer
certification on the ground that he “engage[d] in conduct
constituting a state or federal criminal offense” in violation of
Utah Code section 53-6-211(1)(c). 2 Specifically, in a later-amended
notice, POST alleged that six years earlier, in 2014, Grillone—then
a police officer with the Murray Police Department—gave false or
misleading information (a class B misdemeanor, see Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-504.6 (LexisNexis 2017)) and committed obstruction
of justice (a class A misdemeanor, see id. § 76-8-306(1) (Supp.
2022)) when he interfered in a judicial proceeding in an effort to
have his mother’s traffic citation dismissed. 3 Grillone’s conduct
soon resulted in an internal departmental investigation and a
misdemeanor charge of giving false or misleading information.

1. POST, operated under the auspices of the Department of Public
Safety, is “the program by which law enforcement officers in Utah
are trained and certified.” State v. Hulse, 2019 UT App 105, ¶ 11
n.4, 444 P.3d 1158, cert. denied, 456 P.3d 389 (Utah 2019). See Utah
Code Ann. § 53-6-205 (LexisNexis 2015).

2. At the time of the POST administrative disciplinary proceeding,
the relevant provision appeared in Utah Code section
53-6-211(1)(d). The provision has since, without any substantial
change, been moved to subsection (1)(c). Compare Utah Code Ann.
§ 53-6-211(1)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022), with id. § 53-6-211(1)(d)
(2015). We cite the current version of the annotated code for
convenience.

3. We do not provide a detailed recounting of Grillone’s alleged
conduct at issue in the underlying disciplinary proceeding
because it is irrelevant to the issue presented in this petition for
review.

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                         Grillone v. POST

Grillone resigned from the Murray Police Department before the
internal investigation was completed, and the misdemeanor
charge against him was eventually dismissed.

¶3      POST did not become aware of this incident until five years
later, in 2019, when Grillone applied to reactivate his peace officer
certification and disclosed the dismissed misdemeanor charge as
part of the application process. 4 Based on this disclosure, POST
initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against
Grillone.

¶4     Grillone moved to dismiss the disciplinary proceeding,
arguing that it was barred by the four-year statute of limitations
for civil actions found in Utah Code section 78B-2-307(3). He
argued that the statute of limitations applied to the proceeding
because POST disciplinary proceedings were “civil actions”
under Utah Code section 53-6-211(3)(c). An administrative law
judge (the ALJ) denied Grillone’s motion, stating that section
53-6-211(3)(c) “was written to differentiate the POST proceeding
from criminal proceedings” and that our Legislature’s “use of the
generic term ‘civil actions’” in section 53-6-211(3)(c) “is an easy

4. Our Legislature has since amended the Peace Officer Training
Certification Act to require a law enforcement agency that
becomes aware of allegations that an officer violated section
53-6-211(1) to conduct an internal investigation and to report its
findings to POST even if the officer in question resigned from the
agency before the internal investigation could be completed. See
Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022). Similarly,
our Legislature has also since amended the act to require agencies
to notify POST, within 30 days, “[i]f a peace officer’s employment
terminates during an open internal investigation regarding that
peace officer and involving an alleged violation of Subsection
53-6-211(1).” Id. § 53-6-209(3). Had these provisions been in place
in 2014, there would not have been a five-year delay in POST
becoming aware of Grillone’s conduct.

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                          Grillone v. POST

identifier to accomplish that differentiation.” Accordingly, the
ALJ reasoned that there is nothing “that would indicate that it was
the intent of the legislature to designate the POST proceeding as
anything other than an administrative adjudication process” and
held that the statute of limitations applicable to civil lawsuits
therefore did not apply to that administrative proceeding.

¶5     Following a formal hearing, the ALJ found that POST had
proven by clear and convincing evidence that Grillone committed
obstruction of justice. The POST Council—the entity responsible
for determining officer discipline—subsequently issued an order
suspending Grillone’s peace officer certification for three years.

              ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6     Grillone now seeks judicial review of the POST Council’s
order and raises a single issue for our consideration. He argues
that the ALJ erred in holding that the civil statute of limitations
does not apply to POST disciplinary proceedings. “Because this
case presents only questions of law, we review the [POST
Council’s] order for correctness.” Morgan v. Department of
Commerce, 2017 UT App 225, ¶ 4 n.2, 414 P.3d 501, cert. denied, 417
P.3d 577 (Utah 2018). See generally Kiernan Family Draper, LLC v.
Hidden Valley Health Centers, LC, 2021 UT 54, ¶ 22, 497 P.3d 330
(“The applicability of a statute of limitations is a question of law.”)
(quotation simplified); State v. Graham, 2011 UT App 332, ¶ 14, 263
P.3d 569 (“Questions of statutory interpretation are matters of
law, which we review for correctness.”).

                             ANALYSIS

¶7     In Utah, “[c]ivil actions may be commenced only within the
periods prescribed in [Title 78B, Chapter 2], after the cause of
action has accrued, except in specific cases where a different
limitation is prescribed by statute.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-102

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                           Grillone v. POST

(LexisNexis 2018). See generally In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53,
¶ 26, 144 P.3d 1129 (stating that, with the exception of suits
brought to quiet title to real property, “all actions, whether legal
or equitable, are subject to a statute of limitations in Utah”). In that
vein, Utah Code section 78B-2-307(3) provides that civil actions
“for relief not otherwise provided for by law” carry a four-year
statute of limitations. This provision has come to be known as the
“catch-all statute of limitations,” and it “applies to all causes of
action . . . in which affirmative relief is sought and another more
specific statute of limitations does not apply.” In re Hoopiiaina
Trust, 2006 UT 53, ¶ 25 (quotation simplified). Grillone contends
that the catch-all statute of limitations barred the administrative
disciplinary proceeding against him because POST initiated that
proceeding six years after the events giving rise to the disciplinary
proceeding.

¶8      But this court previously held in Rogers v. Division of Real
Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), that the catch-all statute
of limitations does not apply to administrative disciplinary
proceedings. 5 See id. at 105–06. In that case, a real estate broker
petitioned for judicial review of the Real Estate Commission’s
order revoking her real estate broker’s license, id. at 103, arguing
that the catch-all statute of limitations barred the disciplinary
proceeding, id. at 105. We disagreed. We stated that “an
administrative disciplinary hearing is not a civil proceeding”
because the former is initiated when an agency files a petition
with an administrative tribunal whereas the latter is initiated by
filing a complaint in court or by serving a summons with the filing
of the complaint to follow. See id. at 105–06. See also Phillips v.
Department of Commerce, 2017 UT App 84, ¶ 14, 397 P.3d 863.
Accordingly, we held “that in the absence of specific legislative

5. At the time, the catch-all statute of limitations was codified at
Utah Code section 78-12-25(2). See Rogers v. Division of Real Estate,
790 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

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                          Grillone v. POST

authority, civil statutes of limitations are inapplicable to
administrative disciplinary proceedings.” Rogers, 790 P.2d at 105.

¶9     Nearly two decades later, in Morgan v. Department of
Commerce, 2017 UT App 225, 414 P.3d 501, cert. denied, 417 P.3d
577 (Utah 2018), this court again held that the catch-all statute of
limitations did not bar administrative proceedings initiated
against an individual for violation of the Utah Uniform Securities
Act. See id. ¶¶ 1, 9. Citing Rogers, this court reiterated that “in the
absence of specific legislative authority, the civil statutes of
limitations in Title 78 are inapplicable to administrative
proceedings.” Id. ¶ 8.

¶10 Grillone argues that POST disciplinary proceedings are
exempted from this general rule by virtue of Utah Code section
53-6-211(3)(c), which states—with our emphasis—that “[a]ll
adjudicative proceedings under this section are civil actions,
notwithstanding whether the issue in the adjudicative proceeding
is a violation of statute that may be prosecuted criminally.”
Although the Peace Officer Standards and Training Act does not
define “civil actions,” Grillone contends that our Legislature’s use
of the term is “clear and unambiguous” and that “[t]he ALJ erred
by injecting ambiguity into [this] otherwise clear statutory
language.” Grillone further argues that the definition of “action”
that applies to the catch-all statute of limitations applies with
equal force to section 53-6-211(3)(c). Specifically, section
78B-2-101(1) defines an “action” as, in relevant part, “all other
civil actions in which affirmative relief is sought.” 6

¶11 POST counters, arguing that “the term ‘civil actions’ in
section 53-6-211(3)(c) does not have the same meaning as in

6. Grillone argues that POST disciplinary proceedings satisfy this
definition because POST sought affirmative relief from the POST
Council and because the proceedings include active, adverse
parties and “closely mirror the proceedings of a district court.”

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                           Grillone v. POST

section 78B-2-102 and, despite the label, the POST disciplinary
proceedings are the same types of proceedings that were at issue
in Rogers and Morgan.” It asserts that section 78B-2-101(1)
specifically limits its definition of “action” to Title 78B Chapter 2,
see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-101(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (“The word
‘action’ as used in this chapter includes . . . all other civil actions in
which affirmative relief is sought.”) (emphasis added), and argues
that it is improper to import the definition from one section of the
Utah Code to another section that serves a different purpose, see
Feldman v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2021 UT 4, ¶ 48, 484 P.3d 1134 (“The
legislature is undoubtedly empowered to define a statutory term
in different ways in different statutory schemes.”) (quotation
simplified). POST contends, based on the second portion of
section 53-6-211(3)(c), that the purpose of the reference to “civil
actions” in that section is “to distinguish the proceedings from
criminal actions and to clarify that POST administrative
disciplinary proceedings are civil, rather than criminal, in nature.”
See Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211(3)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022) (“All
adjudicative proceedings under this section are civil actions,
notwithstanding whether the issue in the adjudicative proceeding
is a violation of statute that may be prosecuted criminally.”).

¶12 We need not definitively resolve this debate. As Rogers
made clear, “specific legislative authority” is required for civil
statutes of limitations to apply to administrative proceedings. 790
P.2d at 105 (emphasis added). Accordingly, regardless of the
definition of “civil actions” as used in section 53-6-211(3)(c), the
threshold issue presented for review is whether section
53-6-211(3)(c) is sufficiently specific to make the four-year
catch-all statute of limitations applicable to POST disciplinary
proceedings. We hold that it is not.

¶13 “Because we will not alter the meaning of a statute by
judicial fiat, we must try to interpret it in accordance with the
legislature’s intent,” the best indication of which “is the statute’s
plain language.” Flowell Elec. Ass’n, Inc. v. Rhodes Pump, LLC, 2015

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                          Grillone v. POST

UT 87, ¶ 34, 361 P.3d 91. “When looking at the plain language, we
presume that the Legislature used each word advisedly and deem
all omissions to be purposeful.” Zilleruelo v. Commodity
Transporters, Inc., 2022 UT 1, ¶ 19, 506 P.3d 509 (quotation
simplified). See Flowell Elec., 2015 UT 87, ¶ 34. Accordingly, we are
“not to infer substantive terms into the text that are not already
there.” Zilleruelo, 2022 UT 1, ¶ 19 (quotation simplified).

¶14 Our Legislature has, in some instances, expressly
overridden the Rogers rule by providing specific legislative
authority for statutes of limitations to apply to certain
administrative proceedings. For example, the Employment
Securities Act provides that an “[a]ction required for the collection
of sums due under this chapter” by the Department of Workforce
Services “is subject to the applicable limitations of actions under
Title 78B, Chapter 2, Statutes of Limitations.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 35A-4-305(1)(g) (LexisNexis 2019). See Morgan, 2017 UT App
225, ¶ 8 & n.7; Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Board, 2002 UT App
371, ¶¶ 9, 14 n.2, 58 P.3d 873. Our Legislature has also now
specified that, while the Division of Real Estate may take other
kinds of enforcement action outside this timeframe, “it may not
issue a citation,” which carries with it a monetary sanction, “after
the expiration of one year after the day on which the violation
occurs.” Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-203(9) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022).
See id. § 61-2-203(4), (10). Additionally, the Utah Uniform
Securities Act now provides that “[a]n administrative action filed
under this chapter may be commenced within 10 years after the
violation occurs.” Id. § 61-1-21.1(2) (2018). These statutes expressly
impose a statute of limitations on administrative proceedings
either by incorporating a statute of limitations found in Title 78B
Chapter 2 or by creating an entirely new statute of limitations.

¶15 Conversely, section 53-6-211(3)(c) makes no such specific
reference to any statute of limitations. Instead, it merely provides
that “[a]ll adjudicative proceedings under this section are civil
actions,” and the purpose of this language—especially in light of

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                         Grillone v. POST

the section’s later contrast of civil actions to criminal actions—is
subject to debate. But even assuming that Grillone’s definition of
“civil actions” as used in section 53-6-211(3)(c) is correct, such a
circuitous route for imposing the catch-all statute of limitations on
POST disciplinary proceedings by virtue of section 78B-2-307(3),
without so much as a reference to that section or to statutes of
limitations more generally, cannot be said to be specific.
Accordingly, section 53-6-211(3)(c) does not satisfy the “specific
legislative authority” requirement of Rogers.

                          CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, the four-year catch-all statute of
limitations did not apply to the administrative proceeding at issue
in this petition for review. 7 We therefore decline to disturb the
POST Council’s order suspending Grillone’s peace officer
certification.

7. This does not mean, of course, that an agency has “unlimited
time” during which to initiate administrative proceedings. See
Phillips v. Department of Commerce, 2017 UT App 84, ¶ 15 n.4, 397
P.3d 863. Regardless of whether a statute of limitations applies,
“the doctrine of laches may [still] apply in equity.” Estate of Price
v. Hodkin, 2019 UT App 137, ¶ 15, 447 P.3d 1285 (quotation
simplified), cert. denied, 456 P.3d 388 (Utah 2019).

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