Court Opinion

ID: 9538594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:38:02.752855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:59.599105
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Vice Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The court holds that the mother of the two children is a “victim” entitled to invoke the protection of the victims’ bill of rights and thus refuse pretrial interview or deposition. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1. I dissent from this conclusion because the record shows what the majority neglects to mention: the state has alleged that this mother is an unindicted co-conspirator and *240principal in the murder of her own children.3
Of course, the constitutional amendment was never intended to give the rights of a victim to a person whom the state alleges to be a murderer. Although this court usually considers the obvious intent behind the words of the constitution, in this case it chooses to look no further than what it describes as “plain language.” Even the plain language, however, does not support such a reversal of the basic purpose of the victims’ bill of rights.
The constitutional amendment excludes “the accused” from the definition of “victim.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(C); at 239, 823 P.2d at 687. Citing no authority, the majority concludes that one whom the state alleges to be a principal in the murder is not an “accused” in the “ordinary meaning” of the word. At 239, 823 P.2d at 687. According to the dictionary, however, an accused is “one charged with an offense; esp: the defendant in a criminal case.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 14 (1976).4 Thus, the dictionary definition of “accused” includes, but is not limited to, the defendant in a criminal case. The drafters of the constitutional provision did not use the word “defendant” but, instead, chose the broader term — “accused.” As in this case, one may be “accused” and never arrested or prosecuted as a defendant.
The majority attempts to shore up its otherwise unsupported definition of “accused” by reference to the Victims’ Rights Implementation Act, A.R.S. § 13-4401(1). At 239, 823 P.2d at 687. The act is effective, however, only from December 31, 1991, and is thus entirely irrelevant to our decision today. More important, the majority offers neither explanation nor support for its implicit assumption that the scope of a constitutional guarantee can be amended by legislation.5 A.R.S. § 13-4401(1) defines “accused” in terms equivalent to the definition of “defendant,” while the constitution uses the broader term “accused.” In addition, if we are to look to the legislature for guidance in interpreting a constitutional provision, we ought not ignore the fact that, in a provision already in effect, the legislature expressed its intent that the act protect “innocent persons.” Laws 1991, Ch. 229, § 2 (captioned “Legislative intent”) (effective January 1, 1992) (emphasis added). As the state’s treatment of Mrs. Knapp illustrates, the fact she has not been indicted is hardly probative of her innocence.
The majority argues that we should not permit “trial courts ... to make ad hoc exceptions” or “encourage defendants or others to assert that the person designated as the victim should, instead, be considered to be a suspect.” At 239, 823 P.2d at 687. I agree, but this exceptional case presents neither danger. Mrs. Knapp has not been accused by any ad hoc suggestion of the defendant. She is an “accused” because the state’s pleadings accuse her of being a principal in the murder.6
*241The majority points out that although I would affirm the trial court’s order on the theory that Mrs. Knapp is an accused, “the trial court did not consider her to be an ‘accused,’ ” but instead “held that [she] was not a ‘victim,’ ” and that “the drafters ... did not intend to include” suspects as “victims.” At 239, 823 P.2d at 687. I respond with two points. First, what difference does it make if the trial court reached the right result for the wrong reason? The thrust of trial judge’s order is that Mrs. Knapp is not a “victim” as that word is used in the amendment. That conclusion is correct because if Mrs. Knapp is an “accused” she is not a victim. Second, the trial court is also correct on the question of intent. Constitutional provisions should not be interpreted to reach absurd results. Ward v. Stevens, 86 Ariz. 222, 228-29, 344 P.2d 491, 497-98 (1959); Bus-sanich v. Douglas, 152 Ariz. 447, 450, 733 P.2d 644, 647 (Ct.App.1986). It is absurd to believe that the protections of the victims’ bill of rights were intended to apply to one whom the state has named as a principal in the murder. The trial court was thus correct in both result and reasoning.
The victims’ bill of rights was adopted to address the hardships suffered by victims, not to help alleged criminals whenever the strategic ends of the prosecutor are served. Today’s decision does just that. Mr. Knapp is now the defendant and Mrs. Knapp has been given immunity in return for her testimony. The majority holds, therefore, that Mrs. Knapp enjoys all the rights of a “victim.” If, however, the state had chosen a different strategy, making Mrs. Knapp the defendant and naming Mr. Knapp as the unindicted co-conspirator and principal, it could have used his testimony to try to convict Mrs. Knapp. In the majority’s view, Mrs. Knapp would then be the “accused” and Mr. Knapp a “victim” entitled as surviving father to all the benefits of the victims’ bill of rights.
Surely those who worked for the victims’ bill of rights had something better in mind than making a victim’s status wholly contingent on the prosecutor’s strategy. The constitutional amendment was never intended to serve or protect those accused by the state of being principals in the crime. The words of the provision do not force us to defy common sense, and we should not. I therefore dissent.

. Mr. Knapp was charged both with first degree murder and as an accessory to murder. The state has "acknowledged that the co-conspirator would be the defendant’s ex-wife, [Mrs.] Knapp.” Minute Entry of Judge Martone, August 22, 1991.

. The first definition of the verb “accuse” is "to charge unequivocally with a specified or implied wrong or fault often in a condemnatory or indignant manner <the courtiers accused their queen > <the planes were accused of spreading cholera, typhus, and bubonic plague ...>." WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 14 (1976). This indeed is the “ordinary meaning” of the word. It is only the second meaning listed — "to charge with an offense judicially or by a public process” — that pertains to the judicial process, and even that definition is met in this case.

. The victims’ bill of rights grants the legislature the power to “define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims.” Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 2.1(D). That provision does not, however, confer upon the legislature or any other body the authority to redefine the scope of those rights.

. The majority asserts that the state’s charge implicating Mrs. Knapp was only an “alternate allegation.” At 238, 823 P.2d at 686. What makes that allegation “alternate" instead of primary is not disclosed by the record or mentioned by the majority, nor does the majority explain what difference it would make. Whether alternate or primary, the allegation is formally made in the charging papers, and the bottom line is the same: the state formally implicates Mrs. Knapp as a principal in the murder.