Court Opinion

ID: 9694500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:44:22.472382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:02.531031
License: Public Domain

Oliphant, J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion states that the statutory requirement of notice of injury is satisfied when “his supervisory employees have been duly made aware of circumstances which, in common parlance, would indicate knowledge of the occurrence of the injury.” I agree that this is a correct exposition of the rule but the record here is clear that the employer through the petitioner’s supervisory employees had no awareness of circumstances which would indicate the occurrence of an injury or of an incident which might produce an injury until over seven months after its alleged occurrence.
Petitioner says that on March 19, 1951, while performing his usual work, he felt a “sharp jab in my back” which he described as a “pin prick” which did not last even a second and he paid no further attention to it. Later on that day he became dizzy and faint and said to .the foreman: “There is something wrong with me; * * * I don’t feel well.” The foreman testified that he said he had some sort of a pain and made sort of a motion toward his back. He was instructed to report to the first aid station where he told the nurse “Something is wrong with me. I don’t feel well. I want to go home.” To the nurse he made no mention of any back pain and concedes that no one but himself had any knowledge that anything had happened to him. He returned to work the following day and continued his work without interruption and without complaint until October, 1951, when he sought medical treatment. It was not until November 1, 1951, seven months after the alleged injury, that anyone at his place of employment was advised of any back condition.
Because an employee leaves his work on account of illness does not impart to the employer knowledge of injury or of itself create circumstances which, in common parlance, would indicate knowledge of the occurrence of an injury. No case in this state so holds. It was impossible from the facts *27exhibited here to spell out a sufferance of a back injury by this petitioner.
The provision for notice or knowledge of injury is an integral part of the statute. The provision is mandatory and reads: “Unless knowledge be obtained, or notice given, within ninety days after the occurrence of the injury, no compensation shall be allowed.” The case of Kerman v. Hygrade Food Products Corp., 130 N. J. L. 468 (Sup. Ct. 1943), affirmed 131 N. J. L. 188 (E. & A. 1944), is directly in point here; see also Moe v. Holbrook Hat Co., 4 N. J. Super 196 (App. Div. 1949).
The requirement of notice is not merely directory but is a condition precedent to the enforcement of any claim. Hercules Powder Co. v. Nieratko, 114 N. J. L. 254 (E. & A. 1935).
The purpose of the notice is to give the employer opportunity to make a timely investigation of the circumstances attendant upon the alleged accident. In most instances an investigation initiated weeks or months after an alleged accident would be fruitless. A further purpose of the provision is to prevent the filing of fictitious claims when lapse of time makes proof of genuineness difficult.
The majority attempts to read into the statute what is not there when it holds that notice is timely when given within 90 days of the time the employee first becomes aware of the effects of an injury. The statute uses the words “after the occurrence of injury.” This term is synonymous with the occurrence of the incident which produced the injury. The statute does not speak of notice of the effects of the injury and its clear meaning requires notice within ninety days of the event or incident which produced the injury. Cf. Hercules Powder Co. v. Nieratko, supra; Kerman v. Hygrade Food Products Corp., supra; General Cable Corp. v. Levins, 122 N. J. L. 383 (Sup. Ct. 1939), affirmed 124 N. J. L. 223 (F. A. 1940). If the Legislature had meant otherwise, it would have said so in unmistakable terms. Persuasive evidence of this is in the fact that in the enactment providing for notice in occupational disease cases, R. S. 34:15-33 *28(as amended L. 1948, c. 468, p. 1914, par. 1), wherein the Legislature provided for a five-month notice after the date when the employee was last subject to exposure, it inserted the provision “* * * or within ninety days after the employee knew or ought to have known the nature of his disability and its relation to his employment * *
I would affirm the judgment entered below.
For reversal — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Wacheneeld, Burling, Jacobs and Brennan — 6.
For affirmance — Justice Oliphant — 1.