Court Opinion

ID: 9742240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:09:01.364738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:30.060021
License: Public Domain

*237PAGE, Justice
(concurring).
Battered child syndrome as defined by the defense expert requires, in the first instance, a showing that the child was physically abused. As described by the state’s experts, a showing of either physical or sexual abuse of the child is required. Courts around the country that have addressed battered child syndrome as a defense also describe the syndrome as requiring physical or sexual abuse. State v. Smullen, 380 Md. 233, 844 A.2d 429, 450 (2004); State v. Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d 202, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (1998); State v. Janes, 121 Wash.2d 220, 850 P.2d 495, 501 (1993); Perryman v. State, 990 P.2d 900, 904 (Okla.Crim.App.1999); State v. Hines, 303 N.J.Super. 311, 696 A.2d 780, 785-86 (App.Div.1997); see also In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 182 Ariz. 60, 893 P.2d 60, 63 (Ct.App.1994). Absent allegations of the requisite physical or sexual abuse, there can be no prima facia showing that a child suffers from the syndrome. Here, the record does not contain the requisite allegations of either physical or sexual abuse. Therefore, there was no basis for the admission of any battered child syndrome evidence. Because there was no basis for the admission of any of the battered child syndrome evidence, I would leave for another day both the question of whether this court should formally recognize battered child syndrome as a defense and, if recognized, what method is to be employed by the trial court in analyzing the admission of expert testimony on the syndrome.