Court Opinion

ID: 9539804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:10:34.43652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:21.791598
License: Public Domain

Justice KITTREDGE:
I concur in result and the reasoning of the majority concerning Respondents’ lack of ownership of the disputed tract, *491a tract of approximately thirty acres referred to as the “laps” or the overlap area. I write separately because of the incongruity of a deed that excludes a tract of land juxtaposed to a catch-all provision.
I begin with the premise that the relevant inquiry is to ascertain the intent of the grantor, the Saluda Land and Lumber Company (Saluda). Gardner v. Mozingo, 293 S.C. 23, 25, 358 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1987) (“In construing a deed, the intention of the grantor must be ascertained and effectuated----”). In the construction of deeds, we are usually confronted with a detailed description of the property sought to be conveyed. Yet jurisprudence is fairly uniform to the effect that catch-all provisions are not defective for want of a sufficient description. The majority opinion cites to W.S.R., Annotation, Sufficiency and Construction of Description in Deed or Mortgage as “All” of Grantor’s Property, or “All” of his Property in Certain Locality, 55 A.L.R. 162, 163 (1928) (“A deed is generally held not to be ineffective because it describes the property conveyed as all the real estate belonging to the grantor.”). See also 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 49 (2002) (“A deed describing land as ‘all’ the grantor’s property or ‘all’ his property in a certain locality is not defective or void for want of a sufficient description.... ”).
Catch-all provisions may even convey all of a grantor’s property when the deed specifically describes property which does not include the property in question. Sally v. Gunter, 47 S.C.L. (13 Rich.) 72 (1860) (holding that disputed land not included in the twenty-seven tracts described in deed was conveyed under a catch-all provision); see also Hightower v. Blakely Hard Wood Lumber Co., 163 Ga. 776, 137 S.E. 22, 23 (1927) (holding that a deed containing several described tracts, followed by a conveyance of “also any and all other lots owned by me anywhere not herein enumerated,” was sufficiently definite to convey the disputed, non-described tract). The consistent theme in the cases giving efficacy to catch-all provisions is the recognition that the grantor intended to convey the disputed tract, notwithstanding the absence of a detailed description.
Appellants’ ownership claim of the disputed tract — the “laps” — turns on the construction of the deed recorded on *492April 11, 1952 (the Dargan Deed). The Dargan Deed conveyed eighty-five specifically described tracts, followed by a broad catch-all provision, including language that the property was conveyed “TOGETHER with any and all other real estate owned directly by the Grantor in Greenville and Pickens Counties ... [and it is] the intent of the Grantor by this deed to convey to the Grantee herein named, all real estate or other rights in real estate owned directly by the Grantor.” As determined in the majority opinion, Appellants may not rely on “Parcel 10” referenced in the Dargan Deed. Parcel 10 incorporates the Wiswall Plat; the Wiswall Plat shows the disputed tract, but the metes and bounds description in the plat specifically excludes the disputed tract. We are thus presented with the unusual situation of an exclusion of a tract juxtaposed to a catch-all provision. Does a catch-all provision include a tract that is identified but excluded in the deed? I answer that question with — it depends. More to the point, it depends on the intent of the grantor.
In this case, it is manifest that Saluda intended the catch-all to convey all of its interest in the property, including the disputed tract. Saluda at one time owned thousands of acres in this area. Saluda ceased its lumber business and began selling its property in Greenville and Pickens Counties years prior to the Dargan Deed.4 Saluda’s final sale was the Dargan Deed, which went to great lengths to specifically describe eighty-five separate parcels. The Dargan Deed concluded with the broad catch-all provision noted above. Given the multiple deeds out from Saluda, the intended finality of the Dargan Deed, and the arguably difficult task associated with construing the Wiswall Plat, I find the grantor Saluda intended to convey the disputed tract to Appellants’ predecessor-in-title through the catch-all provision in the Dargan Deed.
Under the circumstances presented, the unmistakable intention of Saluda was to convey whatever remaining interest in real property it had in 1952. It defies all reason to infer an *493intent on the part of Saluda to convey all of its property except this inaccessible small tract. In concurring with the result of the majority, my analysis rests on ascertaining the intent of the grantor.
TOAL, C.J., concurs.

. One example of a previous conveyance is the 1943 Hart Deed from Saluda to one of Respondents' predecessors-in-title. For the reasons discussed in the majority opinion, Respondents' claim to the ''laps” fails because of the inclusion of the Wiswall Plat in the 1943 Hart Deed and the exclusion of the "laps” by the plat's mete and bounds description.