Court Opinion

ID: 9848596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:23:08.862137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:28.796658
License: Public Domain

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Given the standard of review on appeal and Grocery’s concession as to the standard of proof for abandonment, I concur in the court’s per curiam opinion. I write separately to express my view on a question unanswered in our circuit. Although we have previously held that “[ajbandonment of a trademark, being in the nature of forfeiture, must be strictly proved,” Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Gibraltar Financial Corporation of California, 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir.1982), and that “[bjecause a finding of insufficient control [of a tradename] essentially works a forfeiture, a person who asserts insufficient control must meet a high burden of proof,” Edwin K. Williams & Co., Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir.1976), we have not elaborated on the meaning of “strict proof’ or “high burden.” See Electro Source, LLC v. Brandess-Kalt-Aetna Group, Inc., 458 F.3d 931, 935 n. 2 (9th Cir.2006) (reserving the issue of the standard of proof to show trademark abandonment).1
In my view, the language of 15 U.S.C. § 11272 does not support an elevated standard of “clear and convincing.” The statute does not impose a burden beyond the *954traditional preponderance of the evidence standard applicable in civil matters. Nor is there any evidence that Congress intended to raise the bar to clear and convincing evidence,3 as argued by Albert-son’s. The federal courts of appeals that have considered the issue are in accord and have consistently applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in the trademark abandonment context. See Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. FireEagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531, 536 (4th Cir.2000) (applying preponderance of the evidence standard); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 938 (7th Cir.1989) (same); Cerveceria Centroamericana, S.A. v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 892 F.2d 1021, 1023-24 (Fed.Cir.1989) (same, in appeal from trademark cancellation proceeding before Trademark Trial and Appeal Board). These cases are predicated on the statutory language of the Lanham Act, not on the common law or some judicially-created hybrid standard.
In addressing the Lanham Act’s changes from the common law with respect to the law of abandonment, the Federal Circuit noted that
[a]t common law there was no similar presumption of abandonment of a mark simply from proof of nonuse. A challenger had to prove not only nonuse of the mark but also that the former user intended to abandon the mark. However, with respect to rights under the Lanham Act, proof of abandonment was facilitated by the creation of the ... statutory presumption.
Imperial Tobacco, Ltd., Assignee of Imperial Group PLC v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1990) (appeal from trademark cancellation proceeding before TTAB) (citations omitted). Thus, the Federal Circuit cautioned that “statements from opinions under the common law of abandonment concerning the nature of the element of intent and who had the burden of proof cannot be applied indiscriminately to an abandonment case under the Lanham Act.” Id. Although the vacuum in our circuit with respect to a square holding on the burden of proof in abandonment cases may cause some litigants and judges to fall back on pre-Lanham Act cases, we are bound by the statute, not the common law.4

. The brief analysis in Edwin K. Williams & Co. does not address what a "high" burden requires and the case relied on refers only to the "strict” burden of proof of abandonment otherwise undefined in our circuit. See 542 F.2d at 1054 (citing Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624-25 (5th Cir.1963)).

. A mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned” if either of the following occurs:
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent *954not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment. "Use” of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark. Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining abandonment under this paragraph.
15 U.S.C. § 1127.

. Rather, the statute recognizes that proving the subjective intent of a trademark holder may be burdensome for a defendant and provides two aids for demonstrating intent not to resume use: (1) intent may be inferred from the circumstances, and (2) a rebuttable presumption of abandonment arises after three consecutive years of nonuse. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167, 1174 (11th Cir.2002). With that acknowledgment expressed in the statute, I do not presume that Congress intended to raise the burden of proof without specifying its intention to do so.

. In his separate concurrence, Judge Wallace argues that the applicable burden is clear and convincing evidence, relying on a case decided more than 30 years before the Lanham Act. See Mathy v. Republic Metalware Co., No. 623, 35 App.D.C. 151, 1910 WL 20792, at *3 *955(D.C.Cir.1910). That case is inapposite, however, as it was decided under the common law regime requiring proof of “intent to abandon,” see id., rather than the Lanham Act, which requires proof of "intent not to resume use” and permits a presumption of abandonment after three consecutive years of nonuse. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 96, 102-03 (5th Cir.1983) (“There is a difference between intent not to abandon or relinquish and intent to resume use in that an owner may not wish to abandon its mark but may have no intent to resume its use.... An 'intent to resume' requires the trademark owner to have plans to resume commercial use of the mark. Stopping at an 'intent not to abandon' tolerates an owner's protecting a mark with neither commercial use nor plans to resume commercial use. Such a license is not permitted by the Lanham Act.”) (emphasis added). Nor do the other non-trademark cases, also decided before adoption of the Lanham Act, shed light on the applicable burden of proof under the statute.