Court Opinion

ID: 9711019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:23:01.291152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.701815
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the Majority that the sentences on appellant’s aggravated assault convictions are patently illegal and cannot be allowed to stand. However, I do not agree that the trial court’s failure to comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(c); 19 P.S. Appendix, automatically entitles appellant to file post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc. Instead, I believe that we should remand the instant case (Nos. 75/79, March Term, 1976) for an evidentiary hearing on whether appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to file post-verdict motions.
Our Court has recently decided two cases which compel us to remand the instant case for an evidentiary hearing rather than the filing of post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc. See Commonwealth v. Rinier, 255 Pa.Super. 166, 386 A.2d 560 (1978); Commonwealth v. Pompey, 254 Pa.Super. 583, 386 A.2d 103 (1978). Pompey, in particular, is identical to the case at bar: both Young and our appellant failed to file any post-verdict motions. Because the lower court in Pompey failed to comply with Rule 1123(c), we remanded to allow the lower court to determine, after an evidentiary hearing, whether appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to file post-verdict motions. Rinier presented slightly different facts. In Rinier, the defendant initially filed post-verdict motions, but later withdrew them before appealing. However, Rinier did articulate a principle which, I submit, explains the result in Rinier and Pompey and governs the instant case. When the record does not rule out the possibility that trial counsel’s advice may have served as an effective substitute for the lower court’s failure to comply with Rule 1123(c), we should remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel in fact gave this advice and whether his client made a knowing and intelligent *397waiver of his post-verdict motions rights.1 Here, as in Rinier and Pompey, we cannot tell what post-verdict motion advice, if any, counsel gave appellant.2 Accordingly, we must remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to file post-verdict motions. Commonwealth v. Tate, supra; Commonwealth v. Schroth, supra; Commonwealth v. Rinier, supra; Commonwealth v. Pompey, supra.3
VAN der VOORT, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. If the record reveals that counsel could not have effectively advised his client of the panoply of post-verdict motion rights and procedures, then the appropriate remedy for a trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 1123(c) is to remand for the filing of post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc. See Commonwealth v. Rinier, supra. For example, when the trial court fails to observe Rule 1123(c) and counsel files only boilerplate post-verdict motions, we remand for the filing of post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc because it is manifest that counsel did not understand the operation of Rule 1123 and that his advice could not have served as an effective substitute for the court’s non-compliance with Rule 1123(c). See Commonwealth v. Cathey, 477 Pa. 446, 384 A.2d 589 (Filed Feb. 28, 1978); Commonwealth v. Brown, 248 Pa.Super. 289, 375 A.2d 102 (1977).

. I note that in some respects, Rinier is a stronger case for requiring an evidentiary hearing than Young. In Rinier, the defendant signed a petition for leave to withdraw his post-verdict motions; this petition stated that defendant’s counsel had fully advised his client of his rights. Thus, the record contained some affirmative indication that appellant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his post-verdict motion rights. In Pompey, by contrast, the record was silent as to whether the defendant received any advice from counsel concerning the significance and necessity of post-verdict motions. Nevertheless, following well-established Supreme Court precedent, we remanded for an evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 473 Pa. 478, 375 A.2d 341 (1977); Commonwealth v. Schroth, 458 Pa. 233, 328 A.2d 168 (1974).

. Once again, I urge the Supreme Court to undertake a full scale review of appellate case law concerning the proper remedy for a lower court’s neglect to comply with Rule 1123(c). I also reiterate my recommendation that the Supreme Court consider the appropriateness of a per se rule allowing the filing of post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc whenever a trial court violates Rule 1123(c). See Commonwealth v. Rinier, supra, 255 Pa.Super. at 177-178, 386 A.2d at 566, n. 9.