Court Opinion

ID: 9704796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:46:59.71388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:05.590543
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The probability of the guilt of a defendant does not provide license to trample upon that person’s constitutional rights. Here there was a flagrant violation of appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The police went to the home of appellant’s sister, 2838 N. Watson Street, armed with an *87arrest warrant specifying “Levi Smith, 2955 N. 12th Street.” The warrant, as written, authorized entry into appellant’s North 12th Street residence. In order for entry into the sister’s home to have been appropriate under these facts, there must have been reason to believe appellant was inside the sister’s home. The majority appropriately cites to Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981); and Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 446 A.2d 583 (1982), for the above standard for an arrest at a different location from that shown on the arrest warrant and concedes no evidence was offered by the Commonwealth to justify a belief by the police that defendant could be found in his sister’s home.1 Entry into the sister’s home to arrest the defendant, implicitly acknowledged by the majority to be unauthorized even if deemed waived, may not be used to justify a warrantless search of clothing in the sister’s house. The fact is that the police officers were illegally on the premises when one of them “accidentally” knocked down several coats as they descended the cellar steps while looking for the appellant. After determining that appellant was not on the premises, one of the officers attempted to repair the damage resulting from his intrusion into the lady’s home by graciously replacing the garments on the hook from which they had been dislodged.
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the warrant which was used to secure entrance into the home was a warrant of arrest of a specific person who, at that point the police knew, was not on the premises.2 The testimony the Commonwealth asserts to justify the search is that the officer noticed one of the jackets (which belonged to appellant) was of unusual weight, and by feeling the pocket determined that a gun was probably contained therein. The *88majority characterizes this search as an “inadvertent” finding3 and seeks to justify the warrantless search of the lady’s home by resort to the “stop and frisk” search doctrine.
The majority’s application of the “stop and frisk” doctrine in this case is erroneous. Under that doctrine, first enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), an officer, prior to making any search of an individual’s person, must have observed such an unusual and suspicious conduct on the part of the person who is stopped that he may reasonably conclude criminal activity is afoot and the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and dangerous. In both Commonwealth v. Fassett, 496 Pa. 529, 437 A.2d 1166 (1981), and Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53, 331 A.2d 414 (1975), on which the majority relies, automobiles were involved. In both Fassett and Murray police officers caused the driver of an automobile to stop. As I stated in Murray:
The United States Supreme Court in Terry, supra and in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct.1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), has suggested that even in the absence of probable cause there may be, under certain circumstances, justification for a limited intrusion upon the privacy of an individual. Under these decisions the Court has suggested that a brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining additional information may in fact be reasonable although the officer at that time did not possess probable cause that would justify an arrest. In the Terry, supra and Adams, supra decisions, the Court was required to struggle with the balancing of the right of society and the right of an individual in street encounters. Because a motorist’s extreme mobility may otherwise al*89low him to avoid police confrontation, the State has an equally strong interest in these cases in stopping a moving vehicle to freeze momentarily a situation of suspected criminality. However, these decisions have made it clear that to justify the intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warranted the intrusion---- (Citations omitted.)
Thus, it is also clear that an investigative stop of a moving vehicle to be valid must be based upon objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the detained motorist is presently involved in criminal activity. (Emphasis added.)
460 Pa. at 61, 331 A.2d at 418.
The “specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably” warranting intrusion, referred to in Terry and rearticulated by me in Murray, are not the type of facts present in this case. There is no issue of a motorist’s extreme mobility nor a case of freezing momentarily a situation of suspected criminality. The urgency extant in “stop and frisk” cases was not present here. This is clearly a case of an illegal entry into someone’s home, followed by an illegal search of appellant’s clothing found in that home which produced poisoned fruit.
Finally, when holding that the doctrine of the “stop and frisk” cases warrants the admissibility of the evidence produced by the unlawful entry, search and seizure occurring here, the majority does violence to a fundamental aspect of stare decisis —the facts must be substantially the same when applying a principle of law previously enunciated.
I am compelled to dissent.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The majority's statement "the appellant resided in his sister’s home”, p. 341, is contradicted by the concession there was no evidence to justify a belief the defendant could be found in his sister’s home.

. At the point when the officers knew the defendant was no longer on the premises, there was no longer a reason for them to remain in the house.

. The facts as related by the officer who found the gun are remarkably similar to the facts of a "pat down” search except for the crucial point that here the garment searched was not being worn when "patted” or felt.