Court Opinion

ID: 9593038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:19:06.516667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:18.439283
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge.
Appellant Ernest Johnson was convicted of armed robbery. The evidence showed that Johnson used a sawed-off shotgun to force his way into a house in which several men were playing poker. At gunpoint, Johnson took money and watches from each of the men and also took the money on the poker table. Johnson backed out the door, telling the men not to stick their heads out, that he had a partner outside and if they did stick their heads out, Johnson would bust them.
1. Johnson argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a similar offense. Johnson admits he committed the previous offense and that he served ten years after his conviction. In the earlier robbery, Johnson and an accomplice (who actually wielded the gun) took money and watches and jewelry from several people working in a store. Even though the times of the robberies were different (the earlier one occurred in mid-day and the robbery in this case occurred at approximately 2:00 a.m.), and the weapon used was different (a pistol was used in the previous robbery, a shotgun in the present case), nonetheless we hold that the crimes were sufficiently similar in method to show bent of mind and scheme. In each case, Johnson preyed upon a group of people gathered in one spot and took money and jewelry from each of the victims. See Aaron v. State, 195 Ga. App. 339 (1) (393 SE2d 698) (1990). Nor is the lapse of time between the previous crime and this one dispositive. As noted by the State, Johnson was in prison for most of the time between the two crimes. *145Lapse of time is merely a factor to be considered in balancing the probative value of admitting the similar offense against its potentially prejudicial effect. Campbell v. State, 234 Ga. 130 (214 SE2d 656) (1975) (lapse of seven years held not to bar admission of similar offense); see also Rich v. State, 254 Ga. 11, 14 (1) (325 SE2d 761) (1985) (lapse of 11 years held not a bar to admission of similar offense). Admission of the similar offense was not error.
2. Although evidence of flight was slight, there was evidence to support it. The Supreme Court in Renner v. State, 260 Ga. 515 (3b) (397 SE2d 683) (1990), held that after publication of its opinion in that case in the advance sheets (January 10, 1991), trial courts could no longer charge on flight. Of course, trial in the present case long preceded the effective date of the holding in Renner.

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, J., concurs. Beasley, J., concurs specially.