Court Opinion

ID: 9750212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:35:54.200468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:04.550659
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones :
Insofar as the majority permits the appellant to withdraw his guilty plea, I must dissent. If the appellant recognized he was “guilty enough” to serve eleven and one-half to twenty-three months but not “sufficiently guilty” to serve eighteen months to fifteen years, I would modify the sentence to the agreed term rather than permit withdrawal of the plea. Indeed, this appeal, presumably, would not be before this Court had the bargain been kept. Moreover, appeals of this nature will be continually filed and guilty pleas continually invalidated unless this Court denounces, in the strongest possible terms, the unethical practice of “coaching” answers in connection with on-the-record plea entries.
For many years this Court has held that the trial judge is vested, “with discretion to allow or deny the *533withdrawal of a guilty plea, subject to review on appeal and reversal only in the case of a clear abuse of discretion: [citations of authorities omitted].” Com. v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 54, 195 A. 2d 338, 341 (1963). See, also, Com. v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21, 264 A. 2d 643 (1970) ; Com. v. Batley, 436 Pa. 377, 260 A. 2d 793 (1970); Com. v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A. 2d 540 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968) ; Com. v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A. 2d 521 (1964). See, also, Pa. R. Crim. P. §320. Although appellant petitioned the PCHA judge rather than the trial judge for a withdrawal of the guilty plea, the issue remains the same: whether a judge abuses his discretion by not allowing a withdrawal after sentence is imposed, when he discovers a plea bargain for a lesser sentence than the one imposed was not kept.
While four members of this Court in Com. v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21, 264 A. 2d 643 (1970), drew no distinction between withdrawals before or after sentence, Justice Egberts, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Pomeroy, noted that “ ‘if a plea of guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe.’ Kadwell v. United States, 315 F. 2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963).” 439 Pa. at 31, 264 A. 2d at 647. In the instant appeal, the appellant, dissatisfied with his “unexpectedly severe” punishment, now wants to take his chances with a full scale trial or another guilty plea even though he was “eleven and one-half to twenty-three months guilty.” This type of thinking goes beyond the outmoded concept sometimes termed the “sporting rules of justice” as it would remove all skill or thought and substitute a casino-like game of chance.
Appellant’s argument is not directed to the fact that he committed the acts as evidenced by his guilty *534plea but only to Ms length of sentence. Accordingly, I cannot accept the assumption implicit in the majority’s rationale that the bargained sentence so infected the guilty plea that the plea should be invalidated. With all deference to the majority of other jurisdictions and the position taken by the prestigious American Bar Association, see, Com. v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516, 519-20, 276 A. 2d 526, 528 (1971), I do not believe that withdrawal is in order when an accused’s complaint is essentially directed to the punishment and not to the charges. Moreover, we unanimously refused to permit withdrawal in Alvarado; instead we modified the sentence in accordance with the plea bargain.
In my opemng paragraph I noted the fact that tMs type of problem need not confront this Court if we can successfully stamp out an unethical, unnecessary aspect of plea bargaining: the “coached” answer. As noted by the majority, “[bjefore accepting the plea of guilty, appellant responded to an on-the-record inquiry by the assistant district attorney and stated that no one—Ms own attorney, the Commonwealth’s attorney, or the court—had promised him any specific sentence if he pleaded guilty and that he understood that if he pleaded guilty, he ‘could be sent away . . . for a long time.’ ” By a series of decisions culminating in Com. ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A. 2d 196 (1968), we have consistently stressed the importance of an on-the-record inquiry, preferably by the trial judge, on the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Moreover, the comments to Pa. It. Grim. P. §319 suggested questions including: “(6) Is the defendant aware of any plea bargain or other arrangement; (7) Is thé defendant aware that the judge is not bound by any plea bargain or other arrangement between defense counsel and the attorney for the Commonwealth?” The record discloses that these questions were asked and *535the appellant negatively responded despite the fact that an agreement had been negotiated and that all concerned, except the trial judge, were well aware of the bargain. Thus, it was the attorneys who grossly abused their discretion and not the trial judge or the PCHA judge. As demonstrated by the majority, the court should have been made aware of any bargains or promises. When a court of law is duped, those parties responsible for this travesty, either by commission or omission, should be strongly reprimanded. See, Com. v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. at 520 n.*, 276 A. 2d at 528 n.*.
We extensively analyzed plea bargaining in general in Com. ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A. 2d 699 (1966), and gave our imprimatur while realizing that, “the awesome effect of a guilty plea and the sensitive nature of the bargaining process makes certain safeguards essential.” 423 Pa. at 349, 223 A. 2d at 705. Whenever a trial judge is informed by the accused of a desire to plead guilty, any proposed bargains should be brought to light before a guilty plea is entered. At that juncture, the judge may take evidence if he believes that concessions are unwarranted. If the judge then concludes he will not follow the agreement he should then so inform the accused before receiving any guilty plea. There is nothing sinister about plea bargaining, especially when the ends of justice are best served. By keeping the bargain a secret, the accused, his counsel and the assistant district attorney have frustrated the ends of justice.