Court Opinion

ID: 9773054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:35:37.351269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:54.311836
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
This Court should not have, contrary to longstanding policy, granted leave to file this application for writ of habeas corpus seeking to invoke its original jurisdiction.
Of course the Court of Criminal Appeals has the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law. Article V, § 5, Texas Constitution; Article 11.05, V.A.C.C.P. The Court has general and unlimited jurisdiction to issue original writs of habeas corpus in all cases, including those of a civil nature. Ex parte Japan, 36 Tex.Cr.R. 482, 38 S.W. 43 (App.1896); Ex parte Norvell, 528 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Ex parte Powell, 558 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). “However, it is the policy of the court of criminal appeals not to entertain jurisdiction to grant original writs of habe-as corpus, except in extraordinary cases ... the court of criminal appeals will not issue original writs of habeas corpus in cases where other courts have jurisdiction to do so. For example, the court of criminal appeals will not exercise its original habeas corpus jurisdiction in attacks on the validity of a misdemeanor conviction, since the county courts and district courts and judges thereof have jurisdiction to grant *152such relief and an appeal lies from any such court’s order denying relief.” 38 Tex. Jur.3rd, Extraordinary Writs, § 62, pp. 124-126, and cases there cited.
In Ex parte Fitzpatrick, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 376, 320 S.W.2d 683 (App.1959), it was held that while the Court of Criminal Appeals has original jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus it will do so only when relator has been unsuccessful in obtaining relief from trial court having similar jurisdiction.
This Court does not take testimony. Ex parte Rodriguez, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 367, 334 S.W.2d 294 (App.1960). All we have before this Court as to what happened in County Court at Law No. 3 of Jefferson County are “statements” of applicants attached to the pleadings and affidavits from the respondent judge, bailiff, etc., filed with the response requested by this Court. Upon these conflicting versions this Court tries, though badly divided, to write on the proper law applicable.
I would deny the application for writ of habeas corpus seeking to invoke involving our original jurisdiction without prejudice to the applicants seeking habeas corpus relief from a trial court where the witnesses can be subjected to examination, direct and cross, and the facts fully developed. If the applicants do not get the relief requested an appeal lies therefrom. The applicants have other remedies without this court of last resort getting involved in every case of contempt in every court in this state.
This Court should not abandon its longstanding policy of exercising its original habeas corpus jurisdiction with care in cases where other courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction and where the facts may be properly and fully developed before a decision on the law is made. And this is particularly true if the case is one of first impression in Texas as Judge Clinton states.
Apparently neither the majority nor the dissenters agree. Since the matter is going to be decided upon “statements”1 and affidavits, then I would join the well written opinion of Judge W.C. Davis. From the meager evidence it is apparent the applicants came ready for confrontation. What occurred was contempt, direct contempt and nothing but direct contempt. In my opinion, to suggest the same was constructive contempt is absurd.
What Justice McDermott of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote in his dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Cameron, 501 Pa. 572, 462 A.2d 649, 38 A.L.R.4th 555 (1983), is here pertinent.
“The rising in unison is not a token of respect for the person of the judge. For all, including the judge, stand. The ceremony is simply an admonition to put aside all other matters and direct and center attention to the business before, the court. It separates the corridor from the courtroom, giving notice that the record is open and no distractions from the defendant’s business can be allowed. Analyzed to its clearest purpose, it is the authority of the court being exercised in the interest of the concentration and attention to which the defendant’s business is entitled. No one, including the defendant, should be allowed to alter or dilute that purpose.
“I have said that the refusal to stand when court is convened is both an abuse of process and an obstruction. It is an abuse of process because it allows a statement to be made to the court, jury, and other parties, before any statement is allowed by the rules. The statement may indeed be more forceful by action than words. It does not matter what is intended by the action. It may be threat, warning, or absurdity. Whatever is intended, it is out of order and, for whatever it is worth, it is done for an advantage that cannot be answered.
“Refusal to stand, or refusal to sit, is also an obstruction to orderly process, for it is intended, and does in fact, defeat the purpose of concentration and atten*153tion by rendering the defendant’s person the cynosure of all present, if only because he is out of order. When one is permitted to make statements by word or action, not permitted by the rules, all present lose their commitment to the need for quiet and order. Indeed, some are frightened. Not always an unintended side effect.
“The majority undertakes a careful analysis of the criminal contempt statute. They err, however, in concluding that conduct such as this does not obstruct the proceedings. It is an obstruction; of a silent, passive nature, doubtless, but a powerful, undeniable pernicious obstruction nonetheless.”
I fully agree with Justice McDermott. When this writer commenced his judicial career almost 32 years ago, there was no formal commencement of a trial court session, no traditional rising in unison of persons present in a court. All that came a few years later in Texas. There can be no doubt that rising in unison of persons present contributes to the functioning of the court. It marks the beginning and ending of each session and serves to remind all that attention must be concerned upon the business before the court. The judge’s control of the courtroom must be maintained with as little burden on him as possible. The rising requirement serves both substantive and procedural interests and constitutes an integral part of the judicial process. Persons do not rise in respect of the judge, a temporary office holder, but in respect of the governmental institution, the court.
Although I would deny the applications without prejudice as stated, I would concur in the action taken.

. The applicants’ statements as to what occurred are not sworn to by them. Each states he does not take oaths. Most conclude "I will let my Yea be Yea and my Nea be Nea as is written."