Court Opinion

ID: 9553832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:35:46.292956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:20.595111
License: Public Domain

CONNOR, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would sustain the order of the superior court on the basis of the precedent established in Wellmix, Inc. v. City of Anchorage, 471 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1970), which is discussed in the majority opinion.
Here, as in Wellmix, appellee’s motion for sanctions for appellant’s obstruction of
discovery was not opposed until after the motion had been granted and the order of dismissal had been entered. Appellant’s August 10, 1972, motion to vacate and reconsider was merely a belated attempt to present to the trial court what should have been presented earlier, i. e., his reason for opposing appellee’s March 3, 1972, motion to dismiss.
In view of the marked similarity between the instant case and Wellmix, I would hold that Schandelmeier’s appeal, insofar as it raises the merits of the dismissal, is untimely and should be dismissed.
Turning to the correctness of the decision denying appellant’s August 10, 1972, motion to vacate and reconsider, which we should review under Wellmix, I find no showing of the kind of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or other reason justifying relief — the tests of Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) — which required the court to set aside the order of dismissal in order to correct an injustice.
The main thrust of the motion to vacate challenged the court’s conclusion that timely opposition to Winchester’s motion to dismiss would have to be filed no later than March 16, 1972. Appellant read Alaska Civil Rule 77 (e) (2) as giving him until March 20, 1972, the date scheduled for hearing on the motion, to file opposition. The superior court’s computation of time for filing opposition was correct. There is no need to belabor appellant’s computation here. Suffice it to say that it is wrong. Inasmuch as appellant offered no explanation for his failure to file timely opposition, the court was not required to consider his other arguments going to the merits of the dismissal.
*76The dismissal of an action with prejudice is a harsh sanction and should be imposed only in extreme circumstances. Mely v. Morris, 409 P.2d 979, 982 (Alaska 1966). But, judicious imposition of a harsh sanction does not mean non-imposition. Finding no error in the court’s disposition of the August 10 motion, I would affirm the order denying the motion to vacate.