Court Opinion

ID: 9392585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 16:08:29.347988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:46.813161
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Somerset Area School District,             :
                 Petitioner                :
                                           :
            v.                             :
                                           :
Rockwood Area School District,             :
Joseph E. Archer, Nancy J. Bonati,         :
Christopher C. Bosworth, Deborah A.        :
Bosworth, Belita J. Brown, Stephen C.      :
Brown, Deborah A. Cunningham, Paul         :
V. Cunningham, Candace DiMarco,            :
Ross F. DiMarco Jr., Janeen Dupre,         :
Karen A. Farmerie, Wilson J.               :
Farmerie, David A. Fetchko, Mary           :
Ellen Fetchko, Clifford J. Forrest,        :
Tracy L. Forrest, Gary D. Gadley,          :
Annette D. Ganassi, Hemlock Property       :
LLC, Georgia C. Hernandez, Robert          :
M. Hernandez, Martha E. Hildebrandt,       :
Mark J. Hileman, Rebecca L. Hileman,       :
James A. Nassif, Qualified Personal        :
Residence Trust, Susan A. Jurik, Kurt J.   :
Lesker III, William J. Lloyd, David P.     :
Mendis, Lisa B. Mendis, Joseph C.          :
Metzgar, Lynette E. Metzgar, Erin          :
Morris, Michael A. Morris, Netco Inc.,     :
Mary Jo Ochson, John C. Prentice,          :
Douglas Keith Rosetti, Ronald T.           :
Rosetti, Seven Springs Farm, Inc.,         :
Matthew Tarosky, Three Rivers              :
Enterprises Inc., David A. Tonnies,        :
Cynthia G. Urgo, Donald J. Urgo,           :
Virginia’s Pheasant Run Limited            :
Partnership, David A. Webber, Lorie A.     :
Webber, Harold Wiegel, Steven H.           :
Wiegel, James P. Wilhelm, Paige M.         :
Wilhelm, Jackie Wolfe, Jacquelyn K.        :
Wolfe, Tim Wolfe, and Timothy W.           :
Wolfe (Pennsylvania Department of          :
Education),                                :   No. 175 C.D. 2022
                   Respondents             :   Argued: April 3, 2023
BEFORE:       HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
              HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
              HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                                 FILED: May 5, 2023

              Somerset Area School District (Somerset) petitions this Court for
review of the Secretary of Education’s (Secretary) February 4, 2022 order (Order)
approving Respondents’1 Petition to Establish an Independent School District for
Property Situated in Jefferson Township, Somerset County for Purposes of Transfer
from Somerset to Rockwood Area School District (Rockwood) (Petition). Somerset
presents six issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether this Court should revisit
Archer v. Rockwood Area School District, 249 A.3d 617 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021),
wherein this Court concluded that Respondents’ desire to lower their tax millage is
relevant to educational merit since there are presently no students in the proposed
independent school district; (2) whether the Secretary, on remand, erred by merely
reciting rather than analyzing the evidence this Court considered potentially
relevant; (3) whether the Secretary erred by considering Somerset’s and Rockwood’s

       1
          Respondents, various property owners, among others, include: Rockwood Area School
District, Joseph E. Archer, Nancy J. Bonati, Christopher C. Bosworth, Deborah A. Bosworth,
Belita J. Brown, Stephen C. Brown, Deborah A. Cunningham, Paul V. Cunningham, Candace
DiMarco, Ross F. DiMarco Jr., Janeen Dupre, Karen A. Farmerie, Wilson J. Farmerie, David A.
Fetchko, Mary Ellen Fetchko, Clifford J. Forrest, Tracy L. Forrest, Gary D. Gadley, Annette D.
Ganassi, Hemlock Property LLC, Georgia C. Hernandez, Robert M. Hernandez, Martha E.
Hildebrandt, Mark J. Hileman, Rebecca L. Hileman, James A. Nassif, Qualified Personal
Residence Trust, Susan A. Jurik, Kurt J. Lesker III, William J. Lloyd, David P. Mendis, Lisa B.
Mendis, Joseph C. Metzgar, Lynette E. Metzgar, Erin Morris, Michael A. Morris, Netco Inc., Mary
Jo Ochson, John C. Prentice, Douglas Keith Rosetti, Ronald T. Rosetti, Seven Springs Farm, Inc.,
Matthew Tarosky, Three Rivers Enterprises Inc., David A. Tonnies, Cynthia G. Urgo, Donald J.
Urgo, Virginia’s Pheasant Run Limited Partnership, David A. Webber, Lorie A. Webber, Harold
Wiegel, Steven H. Wiegel, James P. Wilhelm, Paige M. Wilhelm, Jackie Wolfe, Jacquelyn K.
Wolfe, Tim Wolfe, and Timothy W. Wolfe.
                                               2
(collectively, the Districts) tax millage differences when there was no evidence of
the effect on the Districts; (4) whether the Secretary erred by finding a difference in
management quality without considering all relevant factors; (5) whether substantial
evidence supports the Secretary’s finding of educational merit in the proposed
transfer; and (6) whether the Secretary’s finding of educational merit was against the
weight of the evidence.2 After review, this Court vacates and remands.

                                       I. Background
              On June l, 2012, Respondents filed the Petition in the trial court
pursuant to Section 242.1 the Public School Code of 1949 (School Code),3 24 P.S.
§ 2-242.1, therein seeking to transfer territory consisting of a portion of property
located within Jefferson Township (Territory) out of the Districts for educational
and real estate tax improvement purposes. See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 400a.
              Section 242.1(a) of the School Code provides, in relevant part:

              A majority of the taxable inhabitants of any contiguous
              territory in any school district or school districts, as herein
              established, may present their petition to the court of
              common pleas of the county in which each contiguous
              territory, or a greater part thereof, is situated, asking that
              the territory be established as an independent district for
              the sole purpose of transfer to an adjacent school district
              contiguous thereto. Where the territory described in any
              such petition is to be taken from two or more school
              districts, such petition shall be signed by a majority of all
              the taxable inhabitants of the part of each school district
              which is to be included in such independent district for
              transfer. Such petitions shall set forth a proper description
              of the boundaries of the territory to be included in such
              proposed independent district, and the reasons of the

       2
        This Court has reordered and summarized Somerset’s issues for ease of discussion herein.
       3
        Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 1-101 - 27-2702. Section 242.1
was added by Section 1 of the Act of June 23,1965, P.L. 139.

                                               3
             petitioners for requesting such transfer to another school
             district and the name of the district into which its territory
             is proposed to be placed.
24 P.S. § 2-242.1(a).
             Somerset is located in Somerset County, which is comprised of four
municipalities: Lincoln Township, Jefferson Township, Somerset Township, and
Somerset Borough. See R.R. at 9a. None of Somerset’s school buildings are located
in Jefferson Township. See id. Somerset had a total of 2,263 students enrolled for
the 2014-2015 school year. See id. The Territory is located south of Forbes State
Forest within Jefferson Township in the southwestern part of Somerset County and
is the part of Somerset that is contiguous to Rockwood. See id. The Territory
consists of 39 parcels of real property situated in Jefferson Township, all of which
pay real estate taxes to Somerset. See id. Of the 39 parcels, 25 property owners
joined the Petition (Joinders). See id. Many properties within the Territory are on
dead-end roads that originate in Middlecreek Township, which is assigned to
Rockwood, but end in Jefferson Township. See id. Nine of the 39 properties are
owned by entities rather than individuals. See R.R. at 10a. Only 2 property owners
among the 25 Joinders have established permanent residency, are voters registered
at those addresses, and pay earned income tax and per capita tax or adult residence
tax to Somerset. See id. Approximately half of the 39 parcels are not improved by
a home or residential building structure and, of those that are (aside from possibly 8
full-time residents associated with an unknown quantity of parcels as asserted by
Respondents), the residences are not primary residences. See id.
             Rockwood is located in Somerset County, and is comprised of eight
municipalities: Black Township, Casselman Borough, Middlecreek Township,
Milford Township, New Centerville Borough, Rockwood Borough, Seven Springs
Borough, and Upper Turkeyfoot Township. See R.R. at 11a. During the 2013-2014

                                           4
school year, 729 students were enrolled in Rockwood and 23 students were enrolled
in non-public schools. See id.
             Respondents alleged in the Petition that there is a greater distance
between the Territory and Somerset’s schools than between the Territory and
Rockwood’s schools. See R.R. at 399a. Respondents further asserted that the
property owned by Seven Springs Farm, Inc., (Seven Springs Farm) located within
the Territory, is the only portion of Seven Springs Farm’s property that is not located
within Rockwood. See id. In addition, the plan of lots known as Pheasant Run is
located partly in Somerset and partly in Rockwood. See id. Respondents also
averred that the 13:1 teacher-to-student ratio in Rockwood is better than the 14:1
ratio in Somerset, and that Rockwood offers a superior educational opportunity. See
R.R. at 400a. Additionally, Respondents alleged that the 2010 tax millages for
Rockwood and Somerset were 21.89 and 37.96 respectively. See id. Their 2011 tax
millages were 21.89 and 39.50 respectively. See id.
             On August 22, 2012, the Somerset County Common Pleas Court (trial
court) held a hearing to consider whether the Petition complied with the preliminary
requirement of Section 242.1(a) of the School Code that Respondents qualify as “[a]
majority of taxable inhabitants of a[] contiguous territory[.]” 24 P.S. § 2-242.1(a).
On November 16, 2012, the trial court concluded that Respondents failed to meet
the statute’s preliminary procedural requirements because only two of the Petition
signers qualified as taxable inhabitants and, even if the trial court included four
properties that are contiguous to the parcels owned by those taxable inhabitants, that
area was not adjacent to Rockwood into which it was proposed to be transferred.
Thus, the trial court dismissed the Petition.
             Respondents appealed to this Court. On August 9, 2013, this Court held
“that the trial court erred in concluding that a ‘taxable inhabitant,’ as used in the
[School Code], must be a human being who permanently resides in the proposed
                                           5
independent school district to participate in a transfer proceeding[.]” In re Indep.
Sch. Dist. for Prop. Situate in Jefferson Twp., 74 A.3d 389, 390 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)
(footnote omitted). Accordingly, this Court reversed the trial court’s order and
remanded for further proceedings.
             On April 22, 2014, the trial court forwarded the Petition to the Secretary
to evaluate the Petition’s educational merits in accordance with Section 242.1 of the
School Code. The Department of Education (Department) forwarded Educational
Impact Projection Questionnaires to the Districts. The Districts responded to the
questionnaires and the matter was assigned to the Deputy Secretary for
consideration. The Deputy Secretary concluded that it was impossible to evaluate
the proposed transfer’s educational merit because no students lived in the proposed
independent school district. Absent students living in the proposed school district,
the Deputy Secretary determined that the Petition lacked educational merit.
             Respondents sought a formal administrative hearing to challenge the
Deputy Secretary’s decision. On August 1, 2019, a hearing examiner conducted a
hearing at which the parties presented a joint stipulation and witness testimony.
Following the hearing, the Secretary issued a decision adopting the Deputy
Secretary’s determination as his adjudication.
             Respondents again appealed to this Court, see Archer, arguing that the
Secretary erred by concluding that the absence of any students residing in the
proposed school district was fatal to the Petition. In Archer, this Court reversed the
Secretary’s order, explaining:

             Section 242.1(a) [of the School Code] contains a detailed
             list of what must be contained in a petition to establish an
             independent school district. The petition must contain: (1)
             the boundaries of the proposed independent school
             district; (2) a verification that a majority of “taxable
             inhabitants” in the “contiguous territory” agree to the
             transfer; (3) the reasons for the transfer; and (4) an

                                          6
            identification of the school district to be joined. 24 P.S. §
            2-242.1(a). This list does not include a statement that
            students currently reside in the independent school district.
            Likewise, it does not require any information about the
            number of students that may be affected or how a transfer
            would benefit them.
            Section 242.1(a) [of the School Code] requires the
            Secretary to consider the “merits of the petition” from an
            “educational standpoint.” 24 P.S. § 2-242.1(a) (emphasis
            added). In In re Weaverland Independent School District,
            . . . 106 A.2d 812, 813-14 ([Pa.] 1954), the phrase “merits
            . . . from an educational standpoint” was challenged as
            vague and an impermissible delegation of legislative
            power. Acknowledging that a statute must prescribe “with
            reasonable clarity the limits of power delegated,” the
            [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court held that “educational
            merit” met that clarity standard. Id. at 814 (quotation
            omitted). It held that “educational merit” referred to
            “school considerations,” giving the phrase “educational
            merit” its “ordinary meaning.” Id. at 814-15. Specifically,
            the review requires the Secretary to determine whether
            “the establishment of a proposed independent school
            district will advance or hinder the educational facilities in
            the designated area.” Id. at 815.
            This Court has explained that the term “educational”
            means “of, relating to, or concerned with education or the
            field of education” and “[s]erving to further education.”
            [In re Petition for Formation of Indep. Sch. Dist.
            Consisting of the Borough of Highspire], 228 A.3d [584,]
            593 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2020), rev’d, 260 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2021)
            (Highspire II)] (citing Webster’s Third New International
            Dictionary 723 (2002)). The term “education” refers to a
            course of study, learning, instruction, and training. Id.
            These are abstract precepts.
Archer, 249 A.3d at 624-25 (footnote and citation omitted).
            The Archer Court expounded:
            The Secretary’s analysis of educational merit must be
            done without regard to a discrete student population.
            Indeed, any student population changes over the
            course of years, as students move in or out of the
            district or graduate. It is noteworthy that it took the
                                         7
                Secretary five years to make a determination on the
                educational merit of the proposed independent school
                district.
                The Secretary’s conclusion is also inconsistent with this
                Court’s holding that standing to file a transfer petition is
                based upon liability for real estate taxes, not upon
                parenthood or residency. [See] Jefferson Twp. . . . A
                petition for an independent school district transfers
                territory from one school district to another, [In re:
                Petition for Formation of Indep. Sch. Dist. (]Riegelsville
                II[),] 17 A.3d [977,] 988 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)]; it does not
                transfer people.

Archer, 249 A.3d at 625 (bold emphasis added). Thus, this Court held that the
Secretary erred by dismissing the Petition based on the lack of students residing in
the proposed independent school district.4
                The Archer Court further emphasized:

                Merit from an educational standpoint begins with “school
                considerations.” [] Weaverland, 106 A.2d at 814. We
                have held that “school considerations” include[] the
                proximity of schools to the proposed independent school
                district. Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 990-91. It also includes
                consideration of the educational outcomes of each district.
                There is no requirement that a petition involve an exit from

       4
           Senior Judge Leadbetter dissented, explaining:
                I fully agree with the majority that the absence of school-aged
                students in an area for which a district transfer is proposed does not,
                in and of itself, bar the transfer or automatically mean that there can
                be no educational merit to the transfer. However, I disagree that the
                Secretary . . . based his decision on any such conclusion. In
                discussing his agreement with the recommendation of the hearing
                examiner, he stated[:] “I do not believe the Deputy Secretary
                imposed a specific requirement that there be school[-]age[d]
                students to approve the Petition.” (Sec’y’s Op. at p.4.) Rather, he
                found that under the highly unusual circumstances here, evidence
                regarding the traditional factors would be too speculative to form
                the basis of a conclusion regarding educational merit.
Archer, 249 A.3d at 627 (Leadbetter, S.J., dissenting).
                                                  8
            a severely deficient school district in order to show
            educational merit.

Archer, 249 A.3d at 625 (citation omitted). In addition, the Archer Court considered
the parties’ stipulation which, inter alia, reflected that Rockwood’s schools are
closer to the proposed independent school district than Somerset’s schools. With
respect thereto, the Archer Court noted that “[a] reduction in students’ travel time
has been held to demonstrate educational merit.” Id. The Archer Court also
referenced Rockwood’s better student/teacher ratio, lower tax millage rates and
fewer administrators, stating that “[b]etter management has been held to demonstrate
educational merit.” Id. at 626. The Archer Court further observed that Rockwood
students scored better than Somerset students on various proficiency tests over a
seven-year period, and that the School Code “makes district performance a factor in
the evaluation of educational merit.” Id.
            Concluding that the Secretary had refused to evaluate the stipulated
facts and hearing testimony because of the absence of any students in the proposed
territory, this Court reversed the Secretary’s order and remanded the matter to the
Secretary to “evaluate all of the evidence against the factors that, according to
precedent, have been held to demonstrate merit from an educational standpoint.” Id.
at 627.
            On October 7, 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its
decision in Highspire II, wherein the Supreme Court explained:

            Transfer petitions under Section []242.1 [of the School
            Code] are factually unique and depend upon the
            circumstances raised in a particular case. In those
            petitions where financial conditions may play a role in
            the Secretary’s assessment of educational merit, there
            should be no constraints on his or her ability to take
            them into consideration.       Moreover, it must be
            acknowledged that in reviewing a petition for
            educational merit, the Secretary must take a holistic
            approach, looking not just at the students who would
                                            9
            be transferred, but at the students in each of the
            affected school districts. See, e.g., Wash[.] Twp. [Indep.
            Sch. Dist. v. Pa. State Bd. of Educ., 153 A.3d 1177,] 1181
            [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)]. No language in Section 242.1 [of
            the School Code] requires the Secretary to limit his or her
            review only to the newly proposed school district, and
            neither the Secretary nor the Commonwealth Court have
            ever limited an educational merits analysis in this way.

Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 941 (italic, bold and underline emphasis added; footnote
omitted).
            On February 4, 2022, the Secretary issued his opinion on remand
(Opinion) and the Order. See R.R. at 8a-33a. In his Opinion, the Secretary
referenced Archer, stating:

            [L]ooking at many of the traditional factors of
            “educational merit” present in its previous cases, the
            [Archer] Court has found that the record in this matter
            contains evidence of educational merit. Notably in
            Archer[,] the Commonwealth Court did not accept former
            Secretary Rivera’s conclusion that the weight of the
            academic merits presented by this transfer could not be
            determined due to a lack of students or prospective
            students in the territory. The Court has also implicitly
            rejected former Secretary Rivera’s conclusion that
            because there was no evidence that travel times of any
            potential students would be reduced by the transfer (as
            opposed to simply travel distance) that was not a measure
            of educational merit.        Further in Archer, [the]
            Commonwealth Court rejected former Secretary Rivera’s
            conclusion that the School Code states an educational
            preference for keeping a township (in this case, Jefferson
            Township) as part of one school district. Instead, the
            [Archer] Court stated that the Secretary must focus on
            the need to keep a “community of interest” together
            which it found would be the case in this matter by
            bringing the real estate development of Seven Springs
            Farm []. together in one school district.

R.R. at 23a-24a (bold emphasis added).

                                         10
               Acknowledging that he was constrained by Archer, the Secretary then
concluded that reduced travel distance, better academic results, better school district
management, and more favorable taxes demonstrate educational merit favoring the
transfer. Somerset appealed to this Court.5

                                         II. Discussion
               Initially, the Highspire II Court explained:

               Section []242.1 of the [] School Code ([]Section 242.1[])
               provides a means for a majority of the taxable inhabitants
               within a geographical territory to file a petition to create
               an independent school district for the purpose of
               transferring that territory to another school district that is
               territorially contiguous with that of the petitioning district.
               24 P.S. § 2-242.1. The petition must initially be filed with
               the court of common pleas, which determines if the
               petition meets certain basic procedural requirements, e.g.,
               that a majority of the taxable inhabitants of the would-be
               independent district have signed the petition and that the
               proposed receiving district is contiguous to that territory.
               See In re Establishment of Indep. [Sch.] Dist. of
               Wheatland, 846 A.2d 771 (Pa. [Cmwlth.] 2004). The
               court of common pleas then sends the petition to the
               Secretary, who then must pass on “the merits of the
               petition for its creation, from an educational standpoint.”
               24 P.S. § 2-242.1.
               If the Secretary approves the petition, it is returned to the
               trial court to sign a decree establishing the independent
               school district, along with a statement of the obligations of
               the school district from which the independent school
               district is being severed and a statement prorating the state
               subsidies payable between or among the former school
               district and the new school district. Wheatland, 846 A.2d
               at 773. The matter is then transferred to the State Board

       5
         “This Court’s review determines whether constitutional rights have been violated,
whether the adjudication is in accordance with the law, whether the proceedings relating to practice
and procedure before an agency were violated, and whether necessary findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence.” Archer, 249 A.3d at 622 n.5.
                                                11
             [of Education] under Section 292.1 of the School Code,[6]
             Wash[.] T[wp.], 153 A.3d at 1187, to determine whether
             the transfer would “violate the adopted [State] Board [of
             Education] standards or express statutory standards that
             govern the organization of school districts.” Riegelsville
             II, 17 A.3d at 981-82. If the State Board [of Education]
             approves, then the independent district is merged into the
             new and reconstituted school district. Id.

Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 936.

             Even though the School Code neither defines the phrase
             “merits from an educational standpoint” nor any of the
             component words therein, the phrase is not vague, is not a
             technical term, and must be given its ordinary meaning.
             Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 985 n.10. Specifically[,]
             regarding the scope and meaning of the Secretary’s
             statutory authority to “pass” on the merits, we have held
             that his or her authority is not open-ended but instead
             restricted to the substantive provisions of the School Code.
             Id. at 991. Further, analogizing the Secretary’s role to a
             veto power, id. at 982, we have held: “[W]hen the
             Secretary exercises his [or her] discretion to determine
             whether a proposed transfer has ‘merit from an
             educational standpoint,’ he [or she] must be guided by the
             policy choices made by the legislature in the [School
             Code] and not by his [or her] own personal sense of what
             constitutes good education policy.” Id. at 991. This
             “manifest restriction” on the Secretary’s power is
             “necessary lest the statute violate the proscription against
             delegating legislative power to an administrative agency.”
             Id. at 988-89.

Wash. Twp., 153 A.3d at 1184.

             The [] School Code . . . creates comprehensive
             accountability mechanisms.         It includes provisions
             requiring school districts to submit yearly financial reports
             with budget statements, [See Sections 218,[7] 687, 2133[8]
             of the School Code, 24 P.S.] §§ 2-218, 6-687, 21-2133,
             and establishes auditing and reporting requirements. [See

      6
        Added by the Act of June 23, 1965, P.L. 139, as amended, 24 P.S. § 2-292.1.
      7
        Added by the Act of May 10, 2000, P.L. 44, No. 16, § 1.1.
      8
        Added by the Act of February 4, 1982, P.L. 1, § 5.
                                            12
              Sections 2401-2462, 24 P.S.] §§ 24-[2]401 - 24-2462.
              Records of these reports are required to be retained by the
              district for at least six years. [See Section 518 of the
              School Code, 24 P.S.] § 5-518. The General Assembly
              has created a framework for identifying and monitoring
              school districts in financial distress and to assist them in
              financial recovery through the development and
              implementation of recovery plans. [See Sections 601-A-
              695-A of the School Code, 24 P.S.] §§ 6-601-A - 6-695-
              A.[9] The General Assembly developed a special system
              to assess school districts’ financial practices and establish
              public financial accountability. [See Sections 2501-2511
              of the School Code, 24 P.S.] §§ 25-2501 - 25-2511 . . . .
              Districts that use “best practices” because of demonstrated
              financial management “instill public confidence,” while
              those who do not exhibit best practices are required to
              provide an action plan to remedy issues identified by the
              assessment. See [Sections 2507-A - 2508-A of the School
              Code, 24 P.S.] §§ 25-2507-A - 25-2508-A.[10] These
              provisions are supplemented by regulations in [Chapter 18
              of the State Board of Education’s Regulations,] 22 Pa.
              Code [§§ 18.1-18.8], and together they aim to identify
              school districts with negative financial conditions that
              might impact their ability to provide and maintain
              educational programs for students and methods to rectify
              those conditions.
              These provisions of the [] School Code reflect our General
              Assembly’s unmistakable recognition that a school
              district’s financial health is an essential factor in its ability
              to provide a suitable education to its students. To require
              the Secretary to attempt to fulfill his [or her] duty to
              ascertain the educational merits of a school district transfer
              under Section 242.1 [of the School Code] without
              considering the issues of financial viability undermines his
              or her ability to make a meaningful determination. The []
              School Code demonstrates the legislature’s obvious
              recognition that a school district cannot educate students
              without adequate resources. Educational resources are not
              free - teachers, buildings, school supplies, computers, etc.

       9
         Sections 601-A - 695-A of the School Code were added by Section 10 of the Act of July
12, 2012, P.L. 1142.
       10
          Sections 2507-A and 2508-A of the School Code were added by Section 36 of the Act
of December 23, 2003, P.L. 304.
                                             13
                all need to be financed. To the extent that a proposed
                independent school district results in undermining the
                ability of the remaining school district to finance the
                educational needs of its students, that detriment is a
                legitimate consideration in the Secretary’s analysis. For
                these reasons, in conducting a review of the educational
                merits of a proposed school district transfer petition, the
                Secretary may undoubtedly consider financial conditions
                that would result from the transfer.

Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 940.
                Moreover,

                [t]he leading case on the construction of th[e] words[,
                “merits from an educational standpoint,”] is . . .
                Weaverland . . . . It addressed the meaning of “merits from
                an educational standpoint” and the extent of the
                Secretary’s power to determine those merits.

Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 986.
                [The Weaverland Court] explained:

                        The statute directs the [s]uperintendent to
                        pass upon the merits of the petition “from an
                        educational standpoint.” Giving those words
                        their usual and ordinary meaning, [see]
                        Statutory Construction Act of 1937, P.L.
                        1019, Sec[tion] 33, [formerly] 46 P.S. § 533,
                        [repealed by the act of December 6, 1972,
                        P.L. 1339,] they can have no other intended
                        import than that the Superintendent must
                        determine whether, on the basis of his expert
                        knowledge in the field of education, the
                        establishment of a proposed independent
                        school district will advance or hinder the
                        educational facilities in the designated area.
                        It is difficult to imagine how the legislature
                        could have more explicitly expressed its
                        intention in the premises.
                [Weaverland], 106 A.2d at 815 (emphasis added).[11]

      11
           The Riegelsville II Court further stated:
                                                  14
Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 988.

               Weaverland interpreted “merits from an educational
               standpoint” at a time when approval of an independent
               school district effected a new district, not a transfer, and
               the reason for a proposed new district was limited to
               “better facilities.” Nevertheless, Weaverland continues
               to control the construction of “merits from an
               educational standpoint” in two important respects.
               First, the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court held that the
               Secretary’s power under Section 242 [of the School Code]

               In 1954, when Weaverland was decided, the [School Code]
               contained a provision at Section 241 [of the School Code] that
               explains the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court’s above-quoted
               analysis. Section 241 [of the School Code] stated, in relevant part,
               as follows:
                       Such petition shall set forth a proper description of
                       the boundaries of the territory to be included in such
                       proposed independent school district, and the desire
                       of the petitioners for better school facilities than are
                       or would be provided and maintained by the district
                       or districts of which such independent school district
                       is a part.
               24 P.S. § 2-241 (emphasis added). Section 241 [of the School Code]
               has been replaced with the following provision:
                       Such petition[s] shall set forth a proper description of
                       the boundaries of the territory to be included in such
                       proposed independent district, and the reasons of the
                       petitioners for requesting such transfer to another
                       school district and the name of the district into which
                       its territory is proposed to be placed.
               Section 242.1(a) of the [School Code], 24 P.S. § 2-242.1(a)
               [(emphasis added)]. The current law, i.e., Section 242.1(a) [of the
               School Code], does not mention school facilities. Petitioners are
               now free to cite reasons other than “better school facilities” for their
               proposed transfer.
Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 988.

                                                 15
            is “manifestly restricted,” which is necessary lest the
            statute violate the proscription against delegating
            legislative power to an administrative agency. Second, in
            ruling that “merits from an educational standpoint” was
            not vague, the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court turned to
            other, relevant provisions in the [School Code] to give the
            standard substance. That continues to be the appropriate
            approach to discerning the meaning and application of the
            statutory standard.

Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 988-89 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

                                 A. Law of the Case
            Somerset first argues that given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
holding in Highspire II, this Court should revisit its Archer decision. Despite
approving the Petition, the Secretary expressed his unease in finding educational
merit in the transfer where there are no students in the Territory. He questioned
Archer’s continued applicability in light of our Supreme Court’s Highspire II
decision. The Secretary observed:

            [W]hile I am required to follow the ruling of [the]
            Commonwealth Court in Archer remanding this matter, I
            believe the [Commonwealth] Court’s opinion to be in
            tension with the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court’s
            subsequent ruling in [Highspire II]. While Somerset did
            not appeal Archer and the cases involve different issues,
            the fact that Archer prevents me from considering that
            there are no students here, or in my view[,] no
            reasonable prospect of students, is difficult to reconcile
            with [Highspire II]. Indeed, the Archer [C]ourt’s
            statements that the definition of educational merit
            involves “abstract precepts” and that “[t]he Secretary’s
            analysis of educational merit must be done without regard
            to a discrete student population” is [sic] difficult to
            square with [our] Supreme Court’s statement in
            [Highspire II] that in reviewing such petitions “the
            Secretary must take a holistic approach, looking not
            just at the students who would be transferred, but at the
            students in each of the affected school districts.”

                                        16
             [Highspire II], [260 A.3d] at 941[] ([italic] emphasis
             added). Compare also with Archer, 249 A.3d at 627
             ([s]tating that “[a] petition for an independent school
             district transfers territory from one school district to
             another . . . does not transfer people”[]). Indeed, it is
             arguable that the Supreme Court’s approach to viewing
             these cases, following the values set forth in the School
             Code, is a student-based approach and the approach
             embodied in the Archer opinion is not. It is also clear in
             [Highspire II] that the Secretary’s role in determining
             educational merits is to weigh educational values when
             they may be competing. Accordingly, it is problematic to
             require the Secretary to ignore discrete student populations
             impacted, or in this case that no actual students will be
             benefited by improved transportation times or
             improvements in test scores or school district
             management. Without actual students, it appears the
             only educational benefit here is reduced taxes for
             certain taxpayers, which the Commonwealth Court
             itself has held is not sufficient in its own to constitute
             educational merit. Archer, 249 A.3d at 627. If I were to
             be permitted to consider the lack of students involved
             in this transfer, I would weigh the educational benefits
             to this transfer to the hypothetical students in this
             territory to be negligible.

R.R. at 30a-31a (bold emphasis added).
             Respondents counter that, notwithstanding the Secretary’s misgivings,
the “law of the case” doctrine prevents this Court from revisiting its earlier holding
in Archer. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has described:

             Th[e law of the case] doctrine refers to a family of rules
             which embody the concept that a court involved in the
             later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen
             questions decided by another judge of that same court or
             by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter.
             Among the related but distinct rules which make up the
             law of the case doctrine are that[] (1) upon remand for
             further proceedings, a trial court may not alter the
             resolution of a legal question previously decided by the
             appellate court in the matter; (2) upon a second appeal,
             an appellate court may not alter the resolution of a
             legal question previously decided by the same appellate
                                         17
             court; and (3) upon transfer of a matter between trial
             judges of coordinate jurisdiction, the transferee trial court
             may not alter the resolution of a legal question previously
             decided by the transferor trial court.

Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995) (emphasis added; citations
omitted). “Departure from . . . these principles is allowed only in exceptional
circumstances such as where there has been an intervening change in the
controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the
dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would
create a manifest injustice if followed.” Id. at 1332 (emphasis added). Further, “[i]t
is well[ ]settled that changes in decisional law which occur during litigation will be
applied to cases pending on appeal.” Pa. State Police v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Bushta), 149 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), aff’d, 184 A.3d 958 (Pa. 2018)
(quoting Cipic v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Consolidation Coal Co.), 693 A.2d
1009, 1011 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (emphasis omitted)).
             The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Highspire II decision effected a
change in the controlling law from the Archer Court’s reasoning. Unlike Archer,
which prohibits the Secretary’s educational merit analysis from considering a
discrete student population, Highspire II requires the Secretary to “take a holistic
approach, looking not just at the students who would be transferred, but at the
students in each of the affected school districts.” Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 941
(emphasis added). Further, Highspire II holds that “[i]n those petitions where
financial conditions may play a role in the Secretary’s assessment of educational
merit, there should be no constraints on his or her ability to take them into
consideration.” Id. This Court’s directive in Archer is irreconcilable with our
Supreme Court’s mandate in Highspire II. Accordingly, this Court concludes that
the Secretary should have rendered his Opinion in accordance with the law as
described in Highspire II.

                                          18
                       B. Secretary’s Analysis of the Evidence
             Somerset next contends that the Secretary, on remand from this Court’s
Order, erred by merely reciting (without analyzing) the evidence that the Archer
Court considered possibly relevant, and improperly deferred to the Archer Court’s
findings. Specifically, Somerset argues:

             The Secretary’s report . . . conflates [the] Commonwealth
             Court’s identification and discussion of evidence of
             educational merits in the record to findings of fact, when
             the statute clearly requires the Secretary’s independent
             educational merit determination. There is no basis for the
             Secretary to assert that his authority and responsibility to
             act under the terms of applicable Pennsylvania [l]aw can
             be abrogated by the Commonwealth Court.                 The
             Secretary’s refusal to conduct the inquiry and
             determination imposed upon the Department . . . is entirely
             unjustified. Due process and common sense require the
             Secretary’s full and adequate review and action.

Somerset Br. at 20.
             The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared in Highspire II:

             [W]eighing of interests are not in the purview of the
             Commonwealth Court. . . . [I]t is for the Secretary to
             weigh [] factor[s] in determining the educational merits
             of the petition. In doing so, students in all of the affected
             school districts over time are part of the analysis. . . . It is
             the Secretary, applying his “expert knowledge in the
             field of education” through the lens of the [] School
             Code, who makes the determination of educational
             merits in light of the factors.

Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 940-41 (bold and underline emphasis added).
             By complying with this Court’s directives in Archer, the Secretary
applied a more constrained approach to weighing educational merits of the
Territory’s proposed transfer than was his role as later prescribed in Highspire II -

                                           19
               where financial conditions may play a role in the
               Secretary’s assessment of educational merit, there should
               be no constraints on his or her ability to take them into
               consideration. . . . [I]n reviewing a petition for educational
               merit, the Secretary must take a holistic approach,
               looking not just at the students who would be transferred,
               but at the students in each of the affected school districts.

Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 941 (bold and italic emphasis added; citation and footnote
omitted). Consistent therewith, the Secretary should have considered the entirety of
the impact on all of the affected school districts and weighed that impact on
Somerset’s students and on Rockwood’s students and those students in the
proposed independent district (including consideration of the current absence of any
such students and the lack of any record evidence that the student population will
likely increase in the near future, or record evidence of how the change will impact
Rockwood’s students’ education). Accordingly, as stated above, because Highspire
II was decided after Archer and was decided by our Supreme Court, the Secretary
should have applied the law as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared in
Highspire II.12
               For all of the above reasons, the Secretary’s Order is vacated, and the
matter is remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.13

                                             _________________________________
                                             ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

       12
           This Court notes that the Secretary’s decision reflects that the Secretary did more than
merely recite the evidence that the Archer Court considered relevant and analyzed the evidence.
Nonetheless, in weighing the evidence, it is clear that the Secretary relied, in large part, on the
Archer Court’s review, and the Archer Court’s constraints on such review. Given the Highspire
II decision, the Secretary must conduct his own independent review as informed by Highspire II.
        13
           Given this Court’s disposition of the first two issues, it does not reach Somerset’s
remaining issues on appeal.
                                                20
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Somerset Area School District,             :
                 Petitioner                :
                                           :
            v.                             :
                                           :
Rockwood Area School District,             :
Joseph E. Archer, Nancy J. Bonati,         :
Christopher C. Bosworth, Deborah A.        :
Bosworth, Belita J. Brown, Stephen C.      :
Brown, Deborah A. Cunningham, Paul         :
V. Cunningham, Candace DiMarco,            :
Ross F. DiMarco Jr., Janeen Dupre,         :
Karen A. Farmerie, Wilson J.               :
Farmerie, David A. Fetchko, Mary           :
Ellen Fetchko, Clifford J. Forrest,        :
Tracy L. Forrest, Gary D. Gadley,          :
Annette D. Ganassi, Hemlock Property       :
LLC, Georgia C. Hernandez, Robert          :
M. Hernandez, Martha E. Hildebrandt,       :
Mark J. Hileman, Rebecca L. Hileman,       :
James A. Nassif, Qualified Personal        :
Residence Trust, Susan A. Jurik, Kurt J.   :
Lesker III, William J. Lloyd, David P.     :
Mendis, Lisa B. Mendis, Joseph C.          :
Metzgar, Lynette E. Metzgar, Erin          :
Morris, Michael A. Morris, Netco Inc.,     :
Mary Jo Ochson, John C. Prentice,          :
Douglas Keith Rosetti, Ronald T.           :
Rosetti, Seven Springs Farm, Inc.,         :
Matthew Tarosky, Three Rivers              :
Enterprises Inc., David A. Tonnies,        :
Cynthia G. Urgo, Donald J. Urgo,           :
Virginia’s Pheasant Run Limited             :
Partnership, David A. Webber, Lorie A.      :
Webber, Harold Wiegel, Steven H.            :
Wiegel, James P. Wilhelm, Paige M.          :
Wilhelm, Jackie Wolfe, Jacquelyn K.         :
Wolfe, Tim Wolfe, and Timothy W.            :
Wolfe (Pennsylvania Department of           :
Education),                                 :   No. 175 C.D. 2022
                   Respondents              :

                                    ORDER

            AND NOW, this 5th day of May, 2023, the Secretary of Education’s
(Secretary) February 4, 2022 order is vacated. This matter is REMANDED to the
Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
            Jurisdiction is relinquished.

                                       _________________________________
                                       ANNE E. COVEY, Judge