Court Opinion

ID: 9806483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 19:07:37.677234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:06:03.666401
License: Public Domain

DeGrasse, J.,
dissents in a memorandum as follows: Plaintiff, a demolition worker, was injured when his hand came into contact with an angle grinder that he was using to cut through cement. Plaintiff invokes Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.5 (c) (3) as the predicate for his cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6), the only claim before us. Where relied upon by plaintiff, section 23-1.5 (c) (3) provides that “[a]ll safety devices, safeguards and equipment shall be kept sound and operable, and shall be immediately repaired or restored or immediately removed from the job site if damaged.” Plaintiffs only theory of liability, which the majority implicitly adopts, is that “[t]he section was violated as the angle grinder was not provided with the proper guarding as required in § 23-1.5.”
As a matter of statutory and regulatory construction, I disagree with the result reached by the majority. It is settled that in order to establish liability under Labor Law § 241 (6), a plaintiff is required to establish a breach of a provision of the Industrial Code which gives a specific, positive command (see Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 349 [1998]). Regulatory enactments, such as the Industrial Code, are *560subject to the same canons of construction as statutes (see Matter of ATM One v Landaverde, 2 NY3d 472, 477 [2004]). Under one such canon of construction, “where . . . the statute describes the particular situations in which it is to apply, ‘an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded’ ” (Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205, 208-209 [1976], quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 240; see also Eaton v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 56 NY2d 340, 345 [1982]).
Section 23-1.12 (c) (1) is the only Industrial Code provision that addresses the guarding of portable, hand-operated power-driven tools and it applies to only saws. That section provides that “[e]very portable, power-driven, hand-operated saw which is not provided with a saw table, except chain saws and circular brush saws, shall be equipped with a fixed guard above the base plate which will completely protect the operator from contact with the saw blade when the saw is operating and with a movable self-adjusting guard below the base plate which will completely cover the saw blade to the depth of the teeth when such saw blade is removed from the cut.” By contrast, the Industrial Code sets forth no requirement regarding the guarding of grinders. Moreover, section 23-1.5 (c) (3), upon which plaintiff bases his claim, is completely silent with respect to guarding. Had the Industrial Code contemplated a requirement that grinders be guarded there would be a specific provision to that effect. That is precisely what the Code does under section 23-1.12 (c) (1) with respect to portable, power-driven, hand-operated saws. Under the foregoing canon of statutory construction, which the majority disregards, the Industrial Code clearly does not require that grinders be guarded. Again, “what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded” (Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn., 41 NY2d at 208-209 [internal quotation marks omitted]). This conclusion is inescapable because the canon applies regardless of whether section 23-1.5 (c) (3) is treated as a general or specific provision. Therefore, Misicki v Caradonna (12 NY3d 511 [2009]), which the majority cites, is not dispositive. In any event, the clear specificity of section 23-1.12 (c) (1) belies plaintiffs argument that “there is simply no way for the Commissioner to have drafted 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (c) (3) in a manner more specific than it already is” with respect to the purported requirement that grinders be guarded. Also, although not part of the rule itself, its preamble makes it clear that section 23-1.5, including subdivision (c) (3), was promulgated as a general safety standard rather than a specific standard of conduct: “These general *561provisions shall not be construed or applied in contravention of any specific provisions of this Part (rule)” (12 NYCRR 23-1.5 [emphasis added]). I would affirm.