Court Opinion

ID: 9541630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:27:15.922583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:14.071247
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J., Dissenting.—
The wanton pursuit of power is not a new problem. In his farewell address, George Washington warned “[t]he spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of the love of power and proneness to abuse it which predominates in the human heart is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position.” (Speeches of the American Presidents (Podell & Anzovin edits. 1988) p. 17.)
California government has never been immune to the spirit of encroachment. Writing in 1859, a decade after this court’s founding, Justice Stephen J. Field responded to legislation requiring us to issue written opinions in all cases: “It is but one of many provisions embodied in different statutes by which control over the Judiciary department of the government has been *75attempted by legislation. To accede to it any obligatory force, would be to sanction a most palpable encroachment upon the independence of this department. If the power of the Legislature to prescribe the mode and manner in which the Judiciary shall discharge their official duties be once recognized, there will be no limit to the dependence of the latter. ... [IQ The truth is, no such power can exist in the Legislative Department or be sanctioned by any Court which has the least respect for its own dignity and independence. In its own sphere of duties, this Court cannot be trammeled by any legislative restrictions.” (Houston v. Williams (1859) 13 Cal. 24, 25, italics added.)
One hundred and forty years, seven generations, have come and gone, during which time this court has successfully labored to maintain the judiciary’s self-respect. Yet, today’s ruling marks the third time in as many months a majority has willingly ceded constitutional ground. (See In re Rose (2000) 22 Cal.4th 430 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 298, 993 P.2d 956] [neither legislation establishing State Bar Court nor summary denial of judicial review in professional discipline case is unconstitutional]; Leone v. Medical Board (2000) 22 Cal.4th 660 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 61, 995 P.2d 191] [Legislature can constitutionally limit appellate review of professional discipline by writ of mandate rather than direct appeal].)
The legislation examined here shows disrespect for this court as a coordinate branch of government. The majority’s abject acceptance of such legislative impudence goes far beyond comity and cooperation. This is abdication.
I
The doctrine of the separation of governmental powers, a principle embodied in the Constitutions of the United States and of most of the states, including California, is a structural means of thwarting tyranny by dividing political power, the better to resist its consolidation and abuse. Nevertheless, like that of many American high courts, our separation of powers jurisprudence has tempered formal doctrine with insights drawn from the pragmatic necessities of effective government. “While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." (Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer (1952) 343 U.S. 579, 635 [72 S.Ct. 863, 870, 96 L.Ed. 1153] (cone. opn. of Jackson, J.).) We have, in short, practiced a sensible doctrine of shared powers, rather than strictly separated powers.
In an area of regulation where the practical reality of the activities of the regulated class implicates legitimate interests of more than one department *76of government, recognizing the utility of a shared jurisdiction makes eminently good sense. But shared jurisdiction should be distinguished from officious intermeddling. In the interest of ensuring workable government and avoiding interbranch conflicts, each branch needs to exercise self-discipline, showing institutional restraint and a respect for constitutional limits. As then Professor Felix Frankfurter explained: “The dominant note” in separation of powers jurisprudence “is respect for the action of that branch of the government upon which is cast the primafy responsibility for adjusting public affairs. The accommodations among the three branches of the government are not automatic. They are undefined, and in the very nature of things could not have been defined, by the Constitution. To speak of lines of demarcation is to use an inapt figure. There are vast stretches of ambiguous territory.” (Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers (1924) 37 Harv. L.Rev. 1010, 1016, italics in original; see also Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision (1958) 107 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1; Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law—A Proposed Delineation (1976) 60 Minn. L.Rev. 783.) Once this obvious point is acknowledged—that the activities of government are such that at times departmental functions blur—the mature solution to the threat of interbranch conflicts is a pragmatic, respectful give-and-take, adjusting the powers of a department relative to another so that functions deemed basic to one are not trenched upon by another.
Our own cases exhibit just such an effort to accommodate legitimate legislative interests in the judicial sphere. We have upheld, for example, legislation fixing the compensation paid court employees (Millholen v. Riley (1930) 211 Cal. 29 [293 P. 69]), prescribing the conditions under which judges may be disqualified (Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal.2d 693 [329 P.2d 5]), and fixing the punishment for contempt of court (In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8 [73 Cal.Rptr. 580, 447 P.2d 972]). Given that much of what attorneys do in contemporary California society is of legitimate interest to the Legislature under its broad police powers, we have also approved legislation prescribing criteria for admission to the bar (Brydonjack v. State Bar (1929) 208 Cal. 439 [281 P. 1018, 66 A.L.R. 1507]), and regulating attorney fees (Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 920 [211 Cal.Rptr. 77, 695 P.2d 164]). (See also In re Attorney Discipline System (1998) 19 Cal.4th 582 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 967 P.2d 49].)
Yet equally, and even emphatically, when legislation trammeled on core judicial functions, we did not hesitate to strike it down on separation of powers grounds. Indeed, we aggressively defended the perimeter of our *77constitutionally conferred territory, on occasion going so far as to invalidate legislation with little impact on the operations of the courts.1 (See, e.g., Hustedt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 329 [178 Cal.Rptr. 801, 636 P.2d 1139] [statute authorizing administrative agency to discipline attorneys appearing before it void as violating separation of powers]; Katz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 353 [178 Cal.Rptr. 815, 636 P.2d 1153] [same]; cf. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics (1986) § 2.2.3, pp. 27-28 & fn. 53.)
Regrettably, the legislation before us lacks any sense of constitutional restraint. Here, we deal not with such matters as regulation of attorney fee arrangements or administrative operation of the courts. (Cf. Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53-58 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 837, 913 P.2d 1046] [legislative declaration of unpaid furlough days on which trial courts are not in session does not facially violate separation of powers].) Instead, the subject—the naming and vetting of judicial officers—lies close to the heart of the courts’ function and implicates the “longstanding Anglo-American tradition of an independent Judiciary” (United States v. Will (1980) 449 U.S. 200, 217 [101 S.Ct. 471, 482, 66 L.Ed.2d 392]; see also Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 50, 58 [102 S.Ct. 2858, 2864-2865, 73 L.Ed.2d 598]). Why? Because “[a] Judiciary free from control by the Executive and the Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.” (United States v. Will, supra, 449 U.S. at pp. 217-218 [101 S.Ct. at p. 482].)
The vice of this statute is not so much that it raises palpable concerns that biased or even corrupt judges will be appointed by the legislative or executive departments—that is at least a possibility under any appointment process, including the one by which article VI judges are chosen. But, by arrogating to themselves the staffing of a disciplinary tribunal we have repeatedly referred to as our “administrative assistant[s]” (see, e.g., In re Attorney Discipline System, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 600; Lebbos v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 37, 47-48 [278 Cal.Rptr. 845, 806 P.2d 317]; Emslie v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 210, 224 [113 Cal.Rptr. 175, 520 P.2d 991]; *78Saleeby v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 547, 557 [216 Cal.Rptr. 367, 702 P.2d 525]; Jacobs v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 191, 196 [141 Cal.Rptr. 812, 570 P.2d 1230]; Brotsky v. State Bar (1962) 57 Cal.2d 287, 301 [19 Cal.Rptr. 153, 368 P.2d 697, 94 A.L.R.2d 1310]), the Legislature and the executive infringe this court’s most basic prerogative. What does it say about the constitutional independence of the judiciary if the Legislature can deprive us of the power to choose our own subordinates?
The majority suggest this legislation may nevertheless be upheld because review of State Bar Court Hearing Department (Hearing Department) rulings will remain the task of the State Bar’s Review Department (Review Department), whose judges remain our appointees (for now, at least) and, ultimately, by this court. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 54-56.) But judicial control cannot practically be divorced from the power to find facts. Alone, the power to resolve ultimate issues of law is insufficient to ensure a thoroughgoing judicial independence because the essence of the decisionmaking process includes factual determinations: “And of course making impartial decisions in individual cases requires control over fact-finding as well as law-declaring. In the run of the mill case, the facts are everything.” (Strauss, Article III Courts and the Constitutional Structure (1990) 65 Ind. L.J. 307, 309.) Because these two components of the judicial function are inextricably intertwined, the Legislature cannot devolve one to itself without violating the separation of powers doctrine.
Our own State Bar precedents reflect this same reality. Although the recommendations of the Hearing Department judges do not bind us, we give them “‘great weight.’” (In re Menna (1995) 11 Cal.4th 975, 984 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 905 P.2d 944].) Because we do not conduct hearings, “[t]he findings of the hearing panel have long been accorded significant weight, inasmuch as the hearing judge is in the best position to weigh intangibles such as credibility and demeanor.” (Id. at p. 985.) Given that practical necessity, it is by no means clear that a tribunal consisting of administrative judges with political ties to the other two departments of government can be squared with the notion of judicial independence. It ought to go without saying that, “[b]y freeing . . . judges from continuing review by appointing authorities, conflicts of interest are minimized. An independent judiciary is the hallmark of the constitutional state.” (Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence (1989) 30 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 301, 308.)2
*79II
There is a second reason why the legislation petitioners attack here fails to pass muster, one not derived from abstract theory but tied instead to pertinent precedents of this court. In In re Lavine (1935) 2 Cal.2d 324 [41 P.2d 161, 42 P.2d 311], an attorney was disbarred after being convicted of attempted extortion. Later, he applied to be reinstated, invoking a pardon conferred by the Governor and the “pardon statute” purporting to restore all rights to those so pardoned. (Id. at p. 326; see Stats. 1933, ch. 945, § 1, p. 2476.) We denied his application, holding the statute “unconstitutional and void as a legislative encroachment upon the inherent power of this court to admit attorneys to the practice of the law and . . . tantamount to the vacating of a judicial order by legislative mandate.” (Lavine, at p. 329.) In Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724 [147 Cal.Rptr. 631, 581 P.2d 636], the petitioner engineering firm sought mandate permitting it to appear in a municipal court civil action through a corporate officer who was not an attorney, relying on a statute authorizing such appearances. We denied relief, saying it was “established without serious challenge that legislative enactments relating to admission to practice law are valid only to the extent they do not conflict with rules for admission adopted or approved by the judiciary” (id., at pp. 728-729), and again invalidated the law as “ ‘the vacating of a judicial order by .legislative mandate.’ ” (Id. at p. 728, quoting In re Lavine, supra, 2 Cal.2d at p. 329.) And in Hustedt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 30 Cal.3d 329, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board began contempt proceedings against the petitioner-attorney arising out of an administrative hearing, relying on a provision of the Labor Code. We granted the attorney’s petition for mandate restraining the board’s action, concluding the statute did not displace our exclusive jurisdiction to suspend or remove attorneys. (Id. at p. 344.)
This case, too, falls within the rule we announced in Lavine and have since applied to invalidate legislation vacating our orders. The 1988 legislation establishing the State Bar Court provided that statutory procedures for the appointment of judges of the State Bar Court are to be followed “unless otherwise directed by the Supreme Court.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6079.1, subd. (c).) In 1991, this court adopted rule 961 as a Rule of Court (hereafter all undesignated rules references are to the California Rules of Court). The rule prescribes in detail procedures for the evaluation and nomination of *80judges to the State Bar Court. In 1995, in response to concerns that the appointment of State Bar judges by the bar’s board of governors raised substantial conflict of interest problems, we amended rule 961 to establish an Applicant Evaluation and Nomination Committee, empowering it to solicit and evaluate applications for appointments and reappointments as State Bar Court judges. The rule specifies the composition of the committee, provides that it serves at the court’s pleasure, and directs it to adopt, with our approval, procedures for the selection process. (Rule 961(a).) Through the rule, we have reserved the right to extend the terms of incumbent judges and provide for staggered terms (rule 961(c)), and, over the course of the last few years, have done so several times.
The legislation challenged by petitioners in this proceeding failed to carry forward the specific legislative recognition of our inherent power to direct a different appointment process. Instead, the new legislation vests without qualification the appointive power over three of the five Hearing Department judges in the Speaker of the Assembly, the Senate Rules Committee, and the Governor. The measure, in other words, purports to delete this court’s authority to adopt its own procedures for the selection and retention of State Bar Court judges despite our express ruling that the “reserved judicial power over admission and discipline” was “critical to the constitutionality of the State Bar Act.” (In re Attorney Discipline System, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 600.) The challenged legislation not only invades a subject which, in both substance and history, has belonged wholly to the judiciary, it sweeps aside—“vacates”—the rule we have adopted for conducting our own business. It is equivalent to this court’s appointing the membership of legislative committees. Because the legislation substantially compromises our inherent power to adopt an appointment procedure of our own devising and changes the rules under which our own house is governed, it violates the separation of powers doctrine. (Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. (1991) 501 U.S. 32, 43 [111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132, 115 L.Ed.2d 27], quoting United States v. Hudson (1812) 11 U.S. (7 Crunch) 32, 34 [3 L.Ed. 259, 260] [“ ‘[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others’ ”].)
Conclusion
Dissenting in Baker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 186, 267 [82 S.Ct. 691, 737-738, 7 L.Ed.2d 663], Justice Frankfurter noted a court’s authority “ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction” and that confidence is nourished by the judiciary’s “complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements . . . .” Who can doubt that, *81by upholding the law at issue here, the majority blithely welcomes into the judiciary’s own household the specter of “political entanglement” in one of its core functions—the appointment and reappointment of judicial officers, of, in a word, . . . judges.
James Madison said of the separation of powers that it was a “political maxim.” (Madison, The Federalist No. 47 (Kramnick edit. 1987) p. 302.) He meant, I think, that while the phrase itself is a formula, or an aspiration, its success as an operative principle depends upon the skill with which the political game is played out among the departments of government. The preservation of a viable constitutional government is not a task for wimps. We cannot, as the majority seem to suppose, simply defer to the violation of the Constitution. The struggle for judicial supremacy—not primacy, but supremacy—within the courts’ constitutional domain is unending. Unending because, as Washington understood, it derives from the human heart. With the decisions of this term, the ceaseless struggle to preserve the independence of the judiciary—a struggle that is a constitutional obligation of this court—has been placed at risk. With “earnest heart and troubled mind[,] hav[ing] sought gropingly but honestly for what was best for [our] day,” I dissent. (Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (1941) p. xvi.)

Robert C. Fellmeth, formerly the Legislature’s special State Bar discipline monitor, has characterized legislative and executive branch involvement in the bar disciplinary function in California as “perhaps . . . unprecedented . . . .” (Third Progress Report of the State Bar Discipline Monitor (1988) p. 99.) Yet in his 1988 progress report, Mr. Fellmeth rejected the notion of executive or legislative appointments to the State Bar Court: “[I]n 33 states,” he wrote, “the state supreme court appoints not only the adjudicators, but also the commission overseeing the entire disciplinary system operation, including investigations and trial counsel. . . . [fl] Perhaps, more importantly, this is .a judicial position and one unique to the very special jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.” (Id. at pp. 99-100.)

A famous incident in federal constitutional history—the “court-packing” plan of the mid-1930’s that so riled the nation—may make the point more sharply than any legal analysis. Although not exact, the parallel to this case is not inapt. What was feared was the *79perceived attempt by one department of the federal government—the executive—to undercut the constitutional independence of another department—the judiciary—by expanding the size of the United States Supreme Court. The widespread anxiety over the plan was not provoked by the idea of presidential appointment, but by the public’s felt sense that the administration, unhappy with the high court’s jurisprudence in matters social and economic, was in effect attempting to overthrow the court as a coordinate department of government, swamping its membership with new appointees handpicked by the administration.