Court Opinion

ID: 9392845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 15:00:20.307213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:49.381320
License: Public Domain

22-1560-cv
   Abadi v. City of New York

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                     SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

                 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
   New York, on the 8th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

   PRESENT:
               JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
               JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
               SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
                     Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   Aaron Abadi,

                           Plaintiff-Appellant,

                      v.                                                   22-1560-cv

   City of New York,

                  Defendant-Appellee.
   _____________________________________

   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                            Aaron Abadi, pro se, New York, NY.

   FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:                             Richard Dearing, Devin Slack, Chloe K.
                                                       Moon, of Counsels, for Sylvia O. Hinds-
                                                       Radix, Corporation Counsel of the City of
                                                       New York, New York, NY.
       Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York (Engelmayer, J.).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED as moot, the judgment of the district court is

VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to enter a

judgment of dismissal without prejudice.

       Appellant Aaron Abadi, proceeding pro se, sued the City of New York (the “City”) under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that emergency orders requiring a COVID-19 vaccination to enter

various indoor establishments (the “Key to NYC program”), or to work as an employee for the

City, violated, inter alia, his rights to equal protection, bodily integrity, and freedom from false

imprisonment. After previously denying Abadi’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the

district court dismissed his amended complaint. The Key to NYC program ended on March 7,

2022, and the employee vaccination requirements for City workers ended on February 10, 2023. 1

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,

and the issues on appeal.

I.     Mootness

       Although the district court did not address mootness, we have an “independent

obligation” to consider whether an appeal is moot. United States v. Williams, 475 F.3d 468,

479 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Hassoun v. Searls, 976 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2020) (“When a case

becomes moot, the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the action.” (alteration

1
  City of New York, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccine Mandates, https://portal.311.nyc.gov/article/?
kanumber=KA-03448 (last visited May 3, 2023).
                                                  2
adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “A case is moot when the issues

presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”

Tann v. Bennett, 807 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). A case remains live, by contrast, when “a court can fashion some form of

meaningful relief to award the complaining party.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, 28 F.4th 383,

392 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The voluntary cessation of

allegedly illegal activities will usually render a case moot if the defendant can demonstrate that

(1) there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and (2) interim relief

or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.”

Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). As the Supreme Court recently explained, “even if the government

withdraws or modifies a COVID restriction in the course of litigation, that does not necessarily

moot the case” where the plaintiff “remain[s] under a constant threat that government officials

will use their power to reinstate the challenged restrictions.” Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct.

1294, 1297 (2021) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Here, both the Key to NYC program and the City’s employment vaccination requirement

have expired. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that would support the conclusion

that the City is likely to reinstitute any such COVID-19 restrictions. Cf. Fed. Defs. of N.Y., Inc.

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 954 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[P]ublic health-related

developments” as of March 20, 2020, concerning COVID-19 “suggest” that “circumstances that

disrupted attorney-client visits at the MDC . . . are all too likely to recur.”). In other words,

there is no basis to conclude that Abadi “remain[s] under a constant threat” that these restrictions

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will be reinstated, Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1297 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),

and thus the possibility of any such future action is entirely a “speculative possibility.” Lillbask

ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Conn. Citizens

Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont, 6 F.4th 439, 446 (2d Cir. 2021) (concluding that “[p]articularly in

view of the mitigation measures that have become available to combat the spread of COVID-19,

and the providential infrequency of pandemics,” the risk of a future COVID-19 restriction on

firearm retailers was “speculative”).

       Accordingly, we conclude that the City has met its burden of demonstrating that the

voluntary cessation of the COVID-19 restrictions at issue renders plaintiff’s demands for

injunctive and declaratory relief in this case moot. See Weisshaus v. Hochul, No. 21-64, 2022

WL 17256755, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 29, 2022) (summary order) (holding, inter alia, “that the

appeal [was] moot with respect to the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction” related

to the New York State Governor’s executive order mandating that certain travelers complete a

health form for COVID-19 tracing where “[t]he record [was] devoid of support for the

proposition that the Governor can reasonably be expected to reinstitute the traveler’s health

form”); Dark Storm Indus. LLC v. Hochul, No. 20-2725, 2021 WL 4538640, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct.

5, 2021) (summary order) (holding that challenges to March 2020 COVID-19 executive orders

were moot because the restrictions were lifted and New York State had demonstrated that the

possibility of recurrence was speculative).

II.    Standing

       Plaintiff’s demands for money damages are not mooted by the repeal of the policies at

issue, but we find that plaintiff lacked standing to bring these claims. The district court failed

                                                  4
to address the question of standing in its order on the motion to dismiss, but “[b]ecause the

standing issue goes to this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it can be raised sua sponte.” Cent.

States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433

F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005).

       In order to have standing, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has suffered an “injury in

fact[;]” (2) there is “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of[;]”

and (3) it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that

he or she suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized

and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330,

339 (2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Abadi lacks standing to challenge the Key to NYC policy because he has not pled an

“injury in fact” suffered as a result of the policy. The Amended Complaint merely alleges, in a

conclusory fashion, that plaintiff was “banned from . . . tens of thousands of public places

throughout the city.” There is no allegation that Abadi ever attempted to enter an establishment

and was turned away, or that he was denied any service because of the policy; his alleged injury

is entirely “conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339; see also Carlone v. Lamont,

No. 21-871, 2021 WL 5049455, at *3 (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 2021) (summary order) (Plaintiff lacked

standing to challenge a mask mandate because “the complaint does not state that [plaintiff] has

ever actually been required to wear a mask or has been subject to enforcement of the mask

mandate”).

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        Abadi also lacks standing to challenge the City’s employment vaccination requirement.

The Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiff was a City employee, or that he applied

for employment with the City, or was denied employment with the City. Abadi asserts that he

has standing simply because he was interested in applying for employment with the City but

decided against it because of the vaccination requirement. Abadi was not prevented from

applying for the job because he was unvaccinated; he simply chose not to apply. Further, had

Abadi been qualified for a position, applied for the position, been offered the position, and

accepted the position, he could have applied for an accommodation waiving the vaccination

requirement. 2 Abadi’s alleged injury is purely hypothetical and does not confer standing. See

Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339.

                                          CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS the appeal as moot, VACATE the judgment

entered by the district court, and REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to

enter a judgment of dismissal without prejudice. 3

                                                FOR THE COURT:
                                                Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

2
   See City of New York, FAQ regarding New York City Employees and the COVID-19 Vaccine,
https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dcas/downloads/pdf/guidelines/faq-vaccine-mandate.pdf at 4-5 (discussing
reasonable accommodations for City employees under vaccination policy) (last visited May 3, 2023).
3
   Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on mootness and standing grounds, the amended
complaint should be dismissed without prejudice. See Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114, 116 (2d
Cir. 2017) (“[A] complaint must be dismissed without prejudice where the dismissal is due to the court's
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”).
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