Court Opinion

ID: 9893806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:09:20.913162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:50.877476
License: Public Domain

J-S28013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MARKCAIL WILLIAMS                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1156 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered September 6, 2022
                  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0002050-2017

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                        FILED: October 30, 2023

       Markcail Williams appeals pro se from the order entered in the Erie

County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his serial petition filed pursuant to

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546 as

untimely. After careful review, we affirm.

       In January 2018, Williams entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault

and discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure. Shortly thereafter,

Williams sent a pro se letter to the court seeking to withdraw his guilty plea,

based on his claim that plea counsel had lied to him about the plea agreement.

This correspondence was forwarded to Williams’s counsel of record. Counsel

then filed a motion to withdraw from representation. After a hearing, the trial

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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court denied both Williams’s request to withdraw his guilty plea and counsel’s

motion to withdraw.

       In April 2018, the trial court sentenced Williams to an aggregate term

of 90 to 240 months’ imprisonment. Williams did not file any post-sentence

motions or a direct appeal.

       On December 6, 2018, Williams filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, in

which he raised claims of ineffective assistance of plea counsel. PCRA counsel

was appointed but did not file an amended petition. Instead, counsel filed a

Turner/Finley no-merit letter,1 along with a petition to withdraw as counsel.

The PCRA court granted counsel leave to withdraw and issued notice of its

intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

The PCRA court subsequently dismissed the petition.2

____________________________________________

1 Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must proceed
under Commonwealth          v.   Turner,    544    A.2d     927     (Pa.  1988)
and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). Counsel
must review the record, submit a “no-merit” letter evaluating the issues the
petitioner wishes to address and explaining their lack of merit, request
permission to withdraw, and send the “no-merit” letter and petition to
withdraw to their client along with an explanation of their right to proceed pro
se.

2 The certified record contains a pro se notice of appeal filed by Williams on

May 8, 2019. However, this notice of appeal was apparently never processed
by the trial court prothonotary because Williams did not pay a filing fee or
seek to proceed in forma pauperis. See Letter, 5/10/2019.

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      On December 23, 2019, Williams filed a second pro se PCRA petition.

After issuing notice pursuant to Rule 907, the PCRA court later dismissed the

PCRA petition as untimely. See Order, 1/27/2020.

      On February 13, 2020, Williams filed a third pro se PCRA petition. Again,

after issuing notice pursuant to Rule 907, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA

petition as untimely. See Order, 3/24/2020.

      On December 8, 2020, Williams filed a pro se “Petition For Sentence

Modification and Status”. In this filing, Williams sought a modification of his

allegedly illegal sentence. See Petition, 12/8/2020, at 2. The PCRA court

properly treated this motion as a fourth PCRA petition, see Commonwealth

v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 467-68 (Pa. Super. 2013), and issued notice pursuant

to Rule 907, finding the petition untimely. Williams filed a response in which

he argued he should have been allowed to introduce evidence of ineffective

assistance of all prior counsel, and that the PCRA court should have appointed

him counsel. The court subsequently dismissed the petition. We affirmed the

dismissal on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 141 WDA 2021 (Pa.

Super. filed June 15, 2021) (unpublished memorandum). Williams filed a

petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,

followed by a “Motion to Amend New Evidence”, in which he sought to amend

his motion to include newly discovered evidence in the form of a victim

affidavit exonerating him. On December 7, 2021, our Supreme Court denied

both the petition for allowance of appeal and the motion to amend.

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      On May 13, 2022, Williams filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his

fifth. In the petition, Williams asserted an exception to the PCRA time-bar

based on the same victim affidavit he sought to present to the Supreme Court.

Williams alleged this affidavit was not made known to him until January 23,

2020. After issuing notice pursuant to Rule 907, the PCRA dismissed the

petition. On September 30, 2022, after being granted nunc pro tunc relief,

Williams filed the instant timely appeal.

      Prior to reaching the merits of Williams’s claims on appeal, we must

consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Miller,

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014).

      A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be
      filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of
      sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the
      three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A
      judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this
      Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of
      the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness
      requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not
      address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not
      timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA
      petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised
      therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden
      of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three
      exceptions.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations

and footnote omitted).

      Since Williams did not file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal, his

judgment of sentence became final on May 3, 2018, 30 days after the entry

of the judgment of sentence, when his time for seeking direct review with this

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Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (judgment of sentence becomes

final “at the conclusion of direct review … or at the expiration of time for

seeking the review”). The instant petition – filed four years later – is patently

untimely.

      As a result, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review Williams’s

petition unless he was able to successfully plead and prove one of the

statutory   exceptions   to   the   PCRA’s   time-bar.   See   42   Pa.C.S.A.   §

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

      The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar:

      (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
      interference by government officials with the presentation of the
      claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
      or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

      (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
      the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
      of due diligence; or

      (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
      by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
      of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
      has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Exceptions to the time-bar must be pled in

the petition and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). Further,

      although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed
      by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special

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      benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must
      comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania
      Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if
      an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in
      the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citations omitted).

      Even liberally construed, Williams has failed to plead and prove that any

of his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. Williams

asserts he meets the requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), i.e., the newly

discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, based on a victim affidavit

stating Williams did not shoot him.

      Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires Williams to allege and prove that there

were facts that were unknown to him and that he could not have ascertained

those facts by the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth v.

Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270-72 (Pa. 2007). “The focus of the exception is

on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing

source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d

714, 720 (Pa. 2008) (citation and brackets omitted). “Due diligence demands

that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests. A

petitioner must explain why he could not have learned of the new fact(s)

earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 35

A.3d 44, 53 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).

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      Williams filed his petition after becoming aware of the victim’s affidavit

in which the victim exonerates Williams. However, the affidavit itself is not a

new fact. See Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 745 (Pa. Super.

2020). The actual “fact” for purposes of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) is that Williams

was not the shooter. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720

(Pa. 2008) (holding that an affidavit alleging perjury does not satisfy the

requirements of the newly discovered fact exception “because the only ‘new’

aspect of the claim was that a new witness had come forward to testify

regarding the previously raised claim.” (citation omitted)).

      It is clear from a review of the record that the affidavit is merely a new

conduit for information already known by Williams. The underlying assertion

that Williams was not the shooter is not a “new fact” to Williams, as he made

the same argument in his pretrial filings prior to choosing to plead guilty.

Accordingly, Williams’s allegation of newly discovered evidence does not

qualify his petition for an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar.

      Further, Williams contends he filed his petition within one year of the

date he discovered the victim’s affidavit. However, Williams admits he became

aware of the victim’s letter in January 2020. Over a year and half then passed,

during which time Williams filed two PCRA petitions, neither of which

mentioned the affidavit. In November 2021, Williams filed a motion to amend

a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court, for the sole purpose

of attaching the victim’s affidavit as “newly discovered evidence.” Despite

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attaching the affidavit to a filing at that time, another five months then passed

from the Supreme Court’s denial of Williams’s petition for allowance of appeal

before Williams filed the instant PCRA petition, again claiming the affidavit as

“newly discovered”.

      In his petition, Williams claims the clock did not start until he received

the affidavit in January 2020, and that the clock “again halted due to

Statewide Judicial Emergency issued by PA Supreme Court in May 2020.”

PCRA Petition, 5/13/2022, at 8. However, Williams does not indicate why he

was unable to file a petition within the five months between those two dates.

Nor does he explain how he was able to file two PCRA petitions prior to the

current petition in which he failed to address the affidavit, or why another five

months passed after he raised the affidavit with our Supreme Court.

      As such, Williams has failed to show he exercised due diligence, or that

he filed his petition within one year of learning of the newly discovered fact.

As the PCRA court properly concluded Williams’s PCRA petition was untimely

and does not fall under an exception to the PCRA time bar, we affirm the PCRA

court’s order dismissing the petition.

      Order affirmed.

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10/30/202310/30/2023

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