Court Opinion

ID: 9382347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 08:09:10.447273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:38.852603
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________

           No. 02-21-00195-CR
      ___________________________

  CHRISTOPHER GADSDEN, Appellant

                       V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 5
           Tarrant County, Texas
         Trial Court No. 1644138

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Bassel, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found Appellant Christopher Gadsden guilty of assault causing bodily

injury. Following the jury’s verdict, the trial court made a finding of family violence

and sentenced Gadsden to 250 days in jail and a $500 fine. The trial court suspended

imposition of imprisonment and placed Gadsden on probation for twenty months.

Gadsden now appeals his conviction.

      In two points of error, Gadsden contends the trial court abused its discretion

by (1) admitting extraneous-offense evidence as relationship evidence under Article

38.371, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371, because the evidence did not

comply with Rules 404(b) and 403, see Tex. R. Evid. 403, 404(b), and (2) admitting

expert testimony and exhibits related to the dynamics of domestic violence because

the evidence was not sufficiently tied to the facts of the case to be relevant to aid in

the jury’s decision, see Tex. R. Evid. 702. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by admitting the challenged evidence or by allowing the expert testimony

and exhibits; we therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                    I. Background1

      On November 5, 2019, Gadsden’s wife, Heidi, 2 drove Gadsden to the Dallas–

Fort Worth airport for his flight to Mexico. Gadsden and Heidi’s adopted daughter,

      1
       Because Gadsden does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction, we omit a more detailed factual background and will set forth
additional facts as necessary in our discussion.
      2
       Aliases have been used for Gadsden’s wife and their minor child. See Tex. R.
                                            2
Gia, was also in the vehicle. That morning, Gadsden, Heidi, and Gia left their house

before sunrise; it was dark and had been raining. As they entered the airport premises,

there was a physical altercation in the vehicle between Heidi and Gadsden. Heidi later

filed a police report alleging that Gadsden had assaulted her. When he returned from

his trip to Mexico, Gadsden was arrested at the airport and charged with family-

violence assault. At Gadsden’s trial, Heidi’s and Gadsden’s testimonies regarding the

assault contradicted each other.

      Heidi testified that on the morning she drove Gadsden to the airport, it had

been dark and raining, and she had to drive through busy traffic and road

construction. Because of the dangerous driving conditions, Heidi drove cautiously. As

they entered the airport’s toll road, Heidi pulled up to a toll booth to retrieve a ticket,

and in doing so, she “slightly scratched” the driver’s side mirror of the vehicle.

Gadsden then began punching Heidi in her right arm, cursing at her, and calling her

stupid. Heidi testified that Gadsden hit her several times. Heidi then dropped

Gadsden off at the terminal, and as he left the vehicle, he told Heidi that he never

wanted to see her again and that Gia could “go to hell.”

      Gadsden, on the other hand, testified that Heidi had been upset with him that

morning because she did not want him to go back to Mexico. Gadsden described

Heidi’s demeanor as “very angry.” On the way to the airport, Heidi began speeding,

weaving in and out of traffic, accelerating suddenly, and slamming on the brakes to

App. P. 9.10(a)(3); McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1982).
                                            3
“spite” him. Gadsden told Heidi to slow down several times. As they approached the

airport toll booth, Heidi slammed on the brakes, and in the process, the driver’s side

mirror hit the concrete post. When Heidi struck the toll booth, Gadsden reached over

and “grabbed” her arm and told her to slow down because she was “going to kill

[them].” Gadsden testified that he never hit or punched Heidi but that it was “quite

possible” he could have bruised her arm when he reached over to grab her because

she “has always bruised very easily.” 3 He also testified that Heidi had hit him as he got

out of the car at the terminal. Heidi “snickered” at Gadsden and told him that he was

going to go to jail and that she would get custody of Gia.

      The State gave notice that it intended to introduce evidence at trial to show the

relationship between Heidi and Gadsden, including Heidi’s testimony that Gadsden

(1) had been controlling Heidi throughout the relationship; (2) had isolated her from

her friends and family; (3) had physically abused her several times throughout the

relationship; (4) had choked her; (5) had punched her; (6) had pushed her down the

stairs; (7) had forced her to perform sexual acts; (8) had threatened her with

immigration consequences involving their daughter, who they were adopting from

Mexico; (9) had sent harassing messages to Heidi; and (10) had threatened to kill

Heidi. The State also sought to introduce evidence that the physical violence had

increased in severity or frequency in the year before the November 5, 2019 assault and
      3
       During Heidi’s testimony, the State entered photos of Heidi’s bruises into
evidence. Heidi testified that during the week following the assault, she had taken
those photos of her arm—where Gadsden had punched her—that show the
progression of her bruising.
                                            4
that Gadsden had physically assaulted Gia on at least one occasion when he slapped

her in the face.

       At trial, Gadsden objected to the admission of the evidence under Rules 403

and 404(b). The trial court determined that under Article 38.371(b), evidence of the

nature of the relationship between Gadsden and Heidi was admissible and overruled

Gadsden’s objection. However, the trial court clarified that Heidi could testify only

about her relationship with Gadsden and not about his relationship with their

daughter; any testimony related to the allegation that Gadsden had slapped Gia across

the face was inadmissible. The trial court then issued a limiting instruction in the

written jury charge:

       You are further charged that if there is any evidence before you in this
       case tending to show that [Gadsden] committed a crime, wrong, or act
       other than the offense alleged in the information, you cannot consider
       said evidence for any purpose unless you first find and believe beyond a
       reasonable doubt that [Gadsden] committed said crime, wrong[,] or act.
       If you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that [Gadsden]
       committed the crime, wrong[,] or act, you may then consider the same in
       determining the purpose for which it was introduced, namely, the nature
       of the relationship of the parties, and for no other purpose.

       In addition to the extraneous-offense evidence, the State sought to introduce

the expert testimony of Lacy Hensley regarding the dynamics of domestic violence.

When the State tendered Hensley as an expert at trial, Gadsden objected under Rule

702 and argued that “the dynamics of domestic violence” was not a subject matter

requiring scientific or technical knowledge for which a jury would need the assistance

of an expert. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony.

                                          5
Hensley testified generally about domestic violence and more specifically about the

cycle of violence, which describes the three cyclic phases of an abusive relationship,

and power and control, which explains the different ways in which an abuser may

maintain power and control over their victim. To aid in Hensley’s testimony, the State

offered the power-and-control wheel and the cycle of violence as demonstrative

exhibits, and Gadsden objected to relevance and hearsay. The trial court overruled the

objections and admitted both exhibits for demonstrative purposes.

                                    II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

      We review the trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion,

and we will uphold the trial court’s decision so long as it falls within the “zone of

reasonable disagreement” and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the

case. Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Henley v. State, 493

S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Merrick v. State, 567 S.W.3d 359, 375 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d); Pettigrew v. State, No. 02-14-00494-CR, 2016 WL

7405792, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 22, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). We also review a trial court’s ruling on an expert’s

qualifications for an abuse of discretion. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2019); Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 527–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

We will uphold the trial court’s correct decision under any applicable legal theory even

if the trial court gave a wrong or incomplete reason for its ruling. De La Paz v. State,

                                           6
279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Qualls v. State, 547 S.W.3d 663, 675 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d).

B. Admissibility of Evidence of Extraneous Offenses

      In his first point of error, Gadsden complains about the trial court’s admission

of the State’s evidence proffered under Article 38.371 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. He argues that the extraneous-offense evidence was offered to show

Gadsden’s character conformity in violation of Rule 404(b) and that the probative

value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by a risk of undue prejudice,

confusing the issues, and misleading the jury, in violation of Rule 403. See Tex. R.

Evid. 403, 404(b).

      1. The Extraneous-Offense Evidence

      At trial, the jury heard extraneous-offense evidence through Heidi’s testimony,

who testified about her relationship with Gadsden and his history of abuse. Heidi

testified that she and Gadsden got married in 2007 and that Gadsden became verbally

abusive shortly thereafter. Specifically, Gadsden began yelling and cursing at Heidi in

2007, and he would “twist things around” on her. Heidi and Gadsden eventually

decided to adopt a baby from Mexico, and when Gia was born, Heidi began traveling

back and forth to Mexico to be with Gia. While Heidi was in Mexico with Gia,

Gadsden would call Heidi to curse at her and tell her to come home to do his laundry.

On one occasion when Heidi was home, Gadsden cursed at her and pushed her down

the stairs while she was carrying a hamper of dirty laundry. On another occasion when

                                          7
Heidi came home to surprise Gadsden, he became angry and slapped her across her

cheek.

         Gadsden and Heidi eventually moved to Mexico together to be with Gia, and

the abuse worsened. Gadsden began drinking, and he would push, shove, and slap

Heidi. Heidi ultimately became Gadsden’s “servant,” and Gadsden would force her to

perform sexual acts she did not want to do and “wear things” she did not want to

wear. Heidi testified that, although she had considered leaving Gadsden while they

lived in Mexico, she stayed with him because (1) he had threatened to report her to

immigration services and said he would accuse her of kidnapping Gia and (2) she had

been alone and felt she did not have any support.

         In July 2019, Gadsden, Heidi, and Gia moved to Texas from Mexico, and

Gadsden continued to travel back and forth between Texas and Mexico for his

business. Heidi testified that the abuse occurred even when Gadsden was in Mexico.

She described Gadsden as controlling; he controlled her access to finances, and she

always had to ask him for permission to use money. While he was gone, he controlled

her life through abusive messages and abusive phone calls. When he would return

from Mexico, he would check the mileage on the vehicle he allowed her to drive to

see how far she had driven while he was gone.

         During Heidi’s testimony, the State entered evidence of “screen shots” of

messages that Gadsden had sent to Heidi via the texting application, WhatsApp. On

November 17, 2019—after the alleged assault—Gadsden wrote

                                          8
       Heidi answer the phone . . . . If you want [Gia] to get her paper answer
       or I swear to [expletive] God I will call the attorney tomorrow and tell
       them I don’t want to continue with [Gia’s] case and she will be deported
       . . . . [E]ither you answer the phone[,] or it will be a very bad day for you
       tomorrow[.]

After Heidi received several missed phone calls from Gadsden, Gadsden threatened

Heidi again: “There are going to be complicated and serious issues when I stop [Gia’s]

case[. S]he will be deported . . . . [I]s that what you want?” The next day, Gadsden

apologized to Heidi: “Look I’m really sorry and was way out of line, and can never be

undone, and I will pay for it for the rest of my life[.]” A few days later, after more

missed phone calls, Gadsden told Heidi that they were both abusers:

       Wow really so you’re throwing it all away? Oh and when you say “abuse”
       please check the Texas def[i]nition[.] I’ll email it to you but it includes
       “willful destruction of property” ie [sic] the car mirror[,] so I have a
       counter so we both are abusers[.] [W]hat do you think is going to happen
       to [Gia]?

Heidi testified that she was not an abuser. She stated that to Gadsden, the most

important thing in his life was his vehicle.

       Heidi testified that before the November 5, 2019 assault, she had not reported

any of Gadsden’s abuse to the police because he would threaten her and tell her that

he would not complete Gia’s adoption process, which would prevent Gia from

entering the United States. She decided to report the November 5, 2019 assault

because it was the first time Gadsden had hit her in front of Gia, and she did not want

Gia to grow up thinking that kind of behavior was acceptable. But Heidi did not

immediately call the police after the assault. She testified that at first, she did not want

                                               9
to report it because she was “very scared.” Heidi did not report the assault until that

night.4

          2. Admissibility under Rule 404(b) and Article 38.371

          Rule 404(b) precludes the admission of evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act

solely to prove a person’s character to show that he acted in conformity with that

character on a particular occasion. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). However, the evidence may

be admitted for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id.

“Those listed purposes ‘are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive.’”

James v. State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 545 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) (quoting

De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343); see also Garcia v. State, 201 S.W.3d 695, 703 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006) (“Based on the clear language of the Rule, this list is not exhaustive.”).

Indeed, Rule 404(b) limits character evidence but is nevertheless a rule of inclusion.

Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343; James, 623 S.W.3d at 545.

          Article 38.371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides another non-

character-conformity purpose for admitting extraneous-offense evidence, which is

evidence of “all relevant facts and circumstances” that may assist a trier of fact in a

family-violence prosecution. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371. It expressly

allows extraneous-offense evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between

        At trial, Heidi’s sister testified that she had seen the bruises on Heidi’s arm
          4

when Heidi picked Gia up from her house that evening. She then told Heidi that “it
was time. It was already so many years going through that stuff.” Heidi reported the
assault that night.
                                            10
an accused and a complainant. See id. (allowing evidence to help determine “whether

the actor committed the offense . . . , including testimony or evidence regarding the

nature of the relationship”); James, 623 S.W.3d at 545–46 (similar); Franco v. State, No.

08-18-00040-CR, 2020 WL 3168560, at *8 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 15, 2020, no

pet.) (not designated for publication) (“[T]he Legislature has determined under

[A]rticle 38.371 that the nature of the relationship itself is a permissible, non-

character-conformity purpose for which evidence is admissible.” (citing Fernandez v.

State, 597 S.W.3d 546, 564–66 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, pet. ref’d))); Mourning v.

State, No. 02-19-00168-CR, 2020 WL 6165309, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct.

22, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

      Examples of admissible, extraneous-offense evidence that complies with

Article 38.371 include evidence to rebut a defensive theory, to explain why a victim of

domestic violence is reluctant to testify, to provide context for an otherwise isolated

incident or outburst of violence, to describe the circumstances surrounding the

relationship between the victim and the assailant at the time of the charged offense, or

to simply contextualize the nature of the relationship between the victim and the

assailant. See Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Garcia v.

State, 201 S.W.3d at 704; Williams v. State, No. 02-18-00382-CR, 2019 WL 2223214, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Gonzalez v. State, 541 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2017, no pet.). Notably, “[w]hether extraneous[-]offense evidence has relevance apart

                                           11
from character conformity . . . is a question for the trial court.” Moses v. State, 105

S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

      Here, the trial court determined that the extraneous-offense evidence Gadsden

complains of showed the nature of his relationship with Heidi pursuant to Article

38.371(b). We conclude it was well within the zone of reasonable disagreement for the

trial court to have found in this case that the complained-of evidence was admissible

for a non-character-conformity purpose. Indeed, the extraneous-offense evidence

provided an explanation for Heidi’s failure to immediately report the November 5,

2019 assault, so the trial court could have reasonably concluded that evidence of

Gadsden’s past assaultive behavior was necessary for the jury to understand why

Heidi was “very afraid” to report the assault. See Williams, 2019 WL 2223214, at *3

(holding no abuse of discretion when trial court allowed extraneous-offense evidence

of defendant’s assault of the victim that had occurred more than ten years earlier,

given victim’s reluctance to testify against him). The trial court could have also

concluded that the extraneous-offense evidence was necessary for the jury to

understand the relationship between Gadsden and Heidi, the circumstances

surrounding their relationship at the time of the assault, his motive for assaulting her

on November 5, 2019, and his intent to commit the charged offense. See id. The

evidence likewise could have been necessary to help the jury understand this

otherwise isolated incident or outburst of violence. See id.

                                            12
       Further, during voir dire, defense counsel talked about the credibility of

witnesses and discussed when and to what extent a juror must believe a witness’s

testimony. Gadsden then asserted—in his opening statement, his case in chief, and his

closing argument—that he did not assault Heidi, as she had testified, but that he only

grabbed her to stop her reckless and dangerous driving. Gadsden also cross-examined

Heidi on her alleged speeding and reckless driving, and he obtained a jury charge on

the law of necessity. Thus, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that

Heidi’s testimony of Gadsden’s past assaultive conduct and the exhibits showing the

text messages Gadsden had sent to Heidi after the assault—in which he threatened to

have their daughter deported, apologized to Heidi, and conceded that he was an

abuser—were admissible to rebut Gadsden’s theory of necessity.

       In addition, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding the

extraneous-offense evidence. “Without evidence to the contrary, we must presume

that the jury followed the trial court’s instruction.” Id. (citing Walker v. State, 300

S.W.3d 836, 850 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d)).

       We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

the extraneous-offense evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371(b); Tex.

R. Evid. 404(b); James, 623 S.W.3d at 546 (holding evidence concerning relationship

between accused and complainant was admissible); Mourning, 2020 WL 6165309, at

*4–5 (“The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by allowing the evidence

. . . as it was relevant to explaining the nature of the[] relationship.”); Tran v. State, No.

                                             13
03-17-00155-CR, 2018 WL 3118464, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin June 26, 2018, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“We conclude that the trial court

would not have abused its discretion by admitting testimony about the 1994 arrest

under Rule 404(b) because the testimony was relevant to the relationship between

[defendant] and his wife.”).

      3. Admissibility under Rule 403

      Within his first point of error, Gadsden also argues that even if the extraneous-

offense evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), Rule 403 precludes its admission.

Evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) may nevertheless be excluded under Rule 403

“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403.

      Rule 403 generally favors the admission of relevant evidence, and there exists a

presumption that relevant evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Jones v. State,

944 S.W.2d 642, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g). To overcome this presumption, the party

opposing admission of the evidence must show that the probative value of the

evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or by the other

dangers listed in Rule 403. James, 623 S.W.3d at 547; Wells v. State, 558 S.W.3d 661, 669

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d). Trial courts must conduct a balancing test

when considering the admissibility of the evidence under Rule 403. Gigliobianco v. State,

                                           14
210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389. This

test requires the trial court to consider (1) the inherent probative force of the

proffered evidence along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence, and balance

those factors against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest a decision on an

improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from

the main issues, (5) any tendency that a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate

the probative force of the evidence would give it undue weight, and (6) the likelihood

that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or

merely repeat evidence already admitted. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42; James, 623

S.W.3d at 547.

             a. Probative Value and the State’s Need for the Evidence

       Probative value compares “the inherent probative force of an item of

evidence—that is, how strongly it serves to make more or less probable the existence

of a fact of consequence to the litigation . . . with the proponent’s need for that item

of evidence.” Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. If the State has “other compelling or

undisputed evidence to establish” what the extraneous-offense evidence “goes to

prove,” the value of the evidence is much less. Id. (relying on Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d

at 390).

       Gadsden contends the probative value of the extraneous-offense evidence was

limited. Relying on James, he argues that the complained-of evidence does not have

the same “closeness in time” or similarities to the charged offense as that in James, 623

                                           15
S.W.3d at 547. In James, we held that “the timing of the offenses [was] key” because

the complained-of evidence “concern[ed] acts that occurred during a period of less

than four months” before James’s arrest and “therefore had probative value as to his

intent to commit the charged offenses.” Id. We also held that the evidence was

probative of the nature of James’s abusive relationship with his victim, showing the

patterns of abuse and the power and control that he had over her. Id. at 548. And it

was probative to rebut the defensive theory of fabrication. Id.

      Here, the extraneous-offense evidence was probative of the nature of

Gadsden’s abusive relationship with Heidi, showing the patterns of abuse and the

power and control that he had over her. See id. While some of the prior assaults and

abuse certainly did not occur “during a period of less than four months” before

Gadsden’s arrest, Heidi’s testimony indicated that the abuse worsened over the years,

which continued when they moved back to Texas in 2019—just months before this

assault. And the exhibits showing the messages Gadsden sent to Heidi after the

November 5, 2019 assault indicated that the abuse was ongoing. The complained-of

evidence helped the jury understand why Heidi did not immediately report the

November 5, 2019 assault, why she had not reported any of Gadsden’s past abusive

conduct, and why she had stayed with Gadsden. See id. It also helped the jury

understand Gadsden’s motive and his intent to commit the assault in this case, and it

explained an otherwise isolated incident or outburst of violence.

                                           16
       Additionally, the extraneous-offense evidence was probative to rebut

Gadsden’s defensive theory that Gadsden did not punch Heidi, as Heidi testified, but

that he grabbed her out of necessity. During voir dire, defense counsel talked about

judging witness credibility and whether jurors must “believe everything that [a

witness] says on the witness stand.” In the defense’s opening statement, defense

counsel indicated that the case came down to the credibility of witnesses. He told the

jury that they would hear “the rest of the story” from Gadsden, which would

ultimately show that Heidi had lied about the assault and about her own behavior that

morning. He conceded that “there was physical contact [and] pain” but contended

that “there was a reason.” He also told the jury that there was a reason Gadsden had

not been able to “give his side of the story” until trial. And Gadsden obtained a jury

charge on the law of necessity. Evidence of Gadsden’s prior assaults and abuse makes

it less likely that Gadsden merely “grabbed” Heidi out of necessity, i.e., to stop her

alleged reckless and dangerous driving. See id.; Foster v. State, No. 01-17-00537-CR,

2018 WL 1914871, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 24, 2018, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication); Martin v. State, Nos. 02-07-309-CR–02-07-

316-CR, 2008 WL 4831345, at *12–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 6, 2008, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Therefore, the extraneous-offense

evidence showed the jury that it was less likely that Gadsden left bruises on Heidi out

of necessity.

                                          17
      For all these reasons, we hold that the probative value of the extraneous-

offense evidence was strong. See Upchurch v. State, 656 S.W.3d 170, 179 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2022, no pet.); James, 623 S.W.3d at 548; Foster, 2018 WL 1914871, at *5;

Martin, 2008 WL 4831345, at *12–13.

      In evaluating the State’s need for the evidence, “we consider (1) whether the

proponent has other available evidence to establish the fact of consequence that the

evidence is relevant to show, (2) the strength of the other evidence, and (3) whether

the fact of consequence is related to an issue that is in dispute.” Upchurch, 656 S.W.3d

at 179 (citing Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 495–96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). Here,

the State had a strong need for the extraneous-offense evidence because Heidi and

Gia were the only witnesses to the charged offense, and Heidi’s credibility was

implicitly at issue. See James, 623 S.W.3d at 548; Emich v. State, No. 02-18-00059-CR,

2019 WL 311153, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 24, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication). Gadsden avers that the State should have called

Gia—his own daughter—to testify as a witness. However, Gadsden argued to the jury

that Gia was a missing witness and that the State’s failure to call her to testify created

a presumption that, even if she had testified, her testimony would not have helped the

State’s case. This argument implicitly supported the State’s need for the extraneous-

offense evidence. And as the State points out, Gia is the daughter shared by both

Gadsden and Heidi.

                                           18
       Gadsden also asserts that the State did not have a great need for the

extraneous-offense evidence because there was physical evidence of Heidi’s injuries.

While it is true that the State presented photographs of Heidi’s bruises and that

Heidi’s sister testified to seeing the bruises firsthand, Gadsden told the jury that the

bruises were caused by his grabbing her out of necessity. With the cause of Heidi’s

“evident injuries” in dispute, the State had a strong need for the extraneous-offense

evidence, especially because Heidi’s credibility was at issue. See James, 623 S.W.3d at

548. Indeed, the State did not actually have “other compelling or undisputed evidence

to establish” what the extraneous-offense evidence was offered to prove—that is, the

nature of Gadsden and Heidi’s relationship. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641

(emphasis added); cf. Upchurch, 656 S.W.3d at 179–80 (distinguishing James, 523 S.W.3d

at 548).

       These two factors weigh in favor of admission.

             b. Tendency of the Evidence to Suggest a Decision on an
             Improper Basis

       Unfair prejudice “refers to a tendency to suggest [a] decision on an improper

basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d

at 641. However, evidence is not excludable under Rule 403 if it is merely prejudicial,

as “all evidence against a defendant is . . . designed to be prejudicial.” Pawlak v. State,

420 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Tex. R. Evid. 403. Rule 403 is thus

concerned with evidence that is unfairly prejudicial. Pawlak, 420 S.W.3d at 811.

                                            19
      Gadsden argues that the evidence was highly prejudicial. Specifically, he

contends the evidence that he threatened to end adoption proceedings or to have Gia

deported portrayed him as “cruel and cold-hearted,” as well as the evidence of his

controlling behavior and prior physical abuse, which would likely prevent the jury

from evaluating the evidence “dispassionately.” “When the extraneous offense is no

more heinous than the charged offense, evidence concerning the extraneous offense is

unlikely to cause unfair prejudice.” Norwood v. State, No. 03-13-00230-CR, 2014 WL

4058820, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 15, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). The complained-of evidence showed the nature of the

relationship between Gadsden and Heidi, including the tactics he used to exert power

and control over her. That evidence, while prejudicial, was not unfairly so. See James,

623 S.W.3d at 549; Norwood, 2014 WL 4058820, at *5; cf. Upchurch, 656 S.W.3d at 180

(holding factor weighed in favor of defendant when complained-of evidence involved

“horrific” and “inflammatory” facts related to aggravated assault by fire).

      Gadsden acknowledges that extraneous-offense evidence inherently carries the

risk that a jury will convict on an improper basis of character conformity. When the

evidence does tend to suggest a decision on an improper basis, a limiting instruction

can minimize the risk of the jury improperly relying on it in reaching its verdict. James,

623 S.W.3d at 549; Flores v. State, No. 03-19-00489-CR, 2020 WL 3887976, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Austin July 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Gadsden argues, however, that because the trial court did not give a limiting

                                           20
instruction when the evidence came in, there was an enhanced risk that the jury would

consider the evidence as character-conformity evidence and give it undue weight.

However, Gadsden cites no authority requiring the trial court to give the limiting

instruction multiple times. The trial court included a written limiting instruction in its

jury charge. We presume that the jury followed the trial court’s limiting instruction. See

Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); James, 623 S.W.3d at 549.

Gadsden does not attempt to rebut this presumption. See Thrift, 176 S.W.3d at 224.

       Accordingly, we hold that this third factor weighs in favor of admission.

              c. Tendency of the Evidence to Confuse or Mislead the Jury

       Confusion of the issues alludes to the likelihood that the evidence would

confuse the jury or distract it from the case’s central issues. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at

641. “Evidence that consumes an inordinate amount of time to present . . . might tend

to confuse or distract the jury . . . .” Id. Misleading the jury refers to a tendency of an

item of evidence to be given undue weight by the jury. Id.

      Gadsden argues that the complained-of evidence distracted the jury from the

main issue. According to Gadsden, this was “a simple he-said, she-said case,” and the

jury could have determined “whether to believe [Heidi’s] story that [Gadsden]

punched her or Gadsden’s story that he grabbed her” without the complained-of

evidence. The State contends the evidence did not confuse or distract the jury but

rather provided a better picture of the cycle of violence between Gadsden and Heidi,

which helped to explain Heidi’s actions on the day of the assault. Further, the

                                            21
evidence consumed a large portion of Heidi’s testimony only because it was

intertwined with the history of Gadsden and Heidi’s marriage and Gia’s adoption.

And the State argues that the evidence was not scientific or complex but instead came

in the form of Heidi’s testimony as a lay witness. We agree with the State. See Upchurch,

656 S.W.3d at 181; James, 623 S.W.3d at 550; Emich, 2019 WL 311153, at *7.

      Gadsden was arraigned on the charges in the jury’s presence. The trial court

issued a written limiting instruction prescribing how the jury should use the

extraneous-offense evidence, if at all. Moreover, the jury charge and verdict forms

made clear that the jury’s job was to determine whether Gadsden was guilty or not

guilty of the charged offense. We hold that these factors weigh in favor of admission.

             d. Likelihood of Undue Delay and Needless Repetition

      This factor focuses on how efficient the trial is and not on the risk of an

erroneous verdict. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. Heidi was the only witness to testify

to the extraneous-offense evidence, and the length of the testimony was related to the

history of Gadsden and Heidi’s marriage and Gia’s adoption. Moreover, Gadsden

concedes that this factor does not weigh against admissibility of the evidence or that it

does so only slightly. We agree.

             e. Resolution

      Balancing all six factors, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by determining that the probative value of the extraneous-offense evidence was not

substantially outweighed by the risk of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,

                                           22
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex. R.

Evid. 403; see James, 623 S.W.3d at 551; Flores, 2020 WL 3887976, at *5. All the

Gigliobianco factors favor admission of the extraneous-offense evidence. See 210 S.W.3d

at 641–42. The probative value of the evidence was high because it rebutted Gadsden’s

theory of necessity and showed the nature of Gadsden’s abusive relationship with

Heidi. It helped the jury understand why Heidi did not immediately report the

November 5, 2019 assault, why she had not reported any of Gadsden’s past abusive

conduct, and why she had stayed with Gadsden. See id. It also helped the jury

understand Gadsden’s motive for the assault and his abusive behavior and explained an

otherwise isolated incident or outburst of violence. For the same reasons, and because

Heidi’s credibility was implicitly at issue, the State’s need for the evidence was high.

       Gadsden failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that the evidence

confused or misled the jury. The extraneous-offense evidence was not unduly

prejudicial, and the trial court’s limiting instruction sufficiently diminished the risk

that the evidence had the potential to sway the jury to improperly convict Gadsden

based on character conformity. We overrule Gadsden’s first point of error.

C. Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Exhibits

       In his second point of error, Gadsden contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by allowing the State to present Hensley’s expert testimony and exhibits

related to the dynamics of domestic violence because the evidence was not sufficiently

tied to the facts of the case to be relevant to aid in the jury’s decision. The State

                                             23
argues that, because Gadsden did not raise this specific objection in the trial court, the

point of error is unpreserved for our appellate review. Assuming, without deciding,

that Gadsden’s second point of error is preserved for appellate review, we hold that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Hensley’s expert testimony and

the accompanying exhibits.

      1. Applicable Law

      Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Tex. R. Evid. 702.

Under Rule 702, a witness who is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education” may “testify in the form of an opinion or

otherwise if [her] scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. Thus,

expert testimony may be admitted only if (1) the witness qualifies as an expert by

reason of her knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the testimony’s

subject matter is appropriate for expert testimony; and (3) admitting the expert

testimony will aid the factfinder in deciding the case. Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 669.

These conditions are known as (1) qualification, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance. Id.

On appeal, Gadsden challenges only relevance.

      2. Relevance of the Expert Testimony

      Gadsden argues that Hensley’s testimony about the dynamics of domestic

violence was not relevant because this case was straightforward and because the

                                           24
testimony covered dynamics of abuse not tied to the facts of this case or applicable to

Gadsden and Heidi’s relationship.

      At Gadsden’s trial, Hensley testified as follows about domestic violence, the

cycle of violence, and the power-and-control wheel:

          • Domestic violence involves power and control.

          • Abuse is rooted in power and control.

          • Abusers use physical and sexual abuse, emotional abuse, intimidation,
            coercion, threats, isolation, male privilege, minimizing, denial, blame, and
            even their children to maintain power and control.

          • The power-and-control wheel is a tool used to demonstrate domestic
            violence.

          • The center of the wheel is power and control, and each spoke of the
            wheel represents the different tactics used by abusers to exert power and
            control over their partner in the relationship.

          • The abuser in an abusive relationship may threaten to take children away
            from the victim or use immigration issues to exert power and control.

          • Emotional abuse includes name-calling, making the victim feel
            worthless, and making the victim feel like the abuse is their fault.

          • Coercion involves getting the victim to do something she may not want
            to do by using threats, including, for example, threatening the victim that
            she would be charged with kidnapping if she left with a child.

          • Isolation limits a victim’s ability to leave the relationship.

          • Abusers may require the victim to seek permission to use money, which
            is a common tactic used to exert power and control.

          • Many victims describe their abuser as having strict, rigid beliefs about
            gender roles in their relationship in which the abuser is the master of the

                                            25
             castle and the victim’s role is to be submissive and to care for the
             children in the home.

          • The cycle of violence consists of a circular pattern of three phases:
            tension building, explosion or violence, and honeymoon.

          • The cycle repeats over time and can look different throughout the same
            relationship over time.

          • A complete cycle can occur in a day or may take years to complete.

          • During the honeymoon phase, the abuser may apologize and promise to
            change, which gives the victim a sense of false hope.

          • The victim of domestic violence is often fearful and typically does
            whatever she can to just maintain peace in their relationship.

          • It is common for victims of domestic violence to choose to not report
            abuse to the police out of fear of retaliation by the abuser.

          • There are common traits that occur in most domestic-violence
            relationships.

      The testimony was relevant. “The average juror will not typically be familiar

with the effect of domestic violence on victims and the dynamics of the relationship

between an abuser and victim.” James, 623 S.W.3d at 554 (citing Fernandez v. State, No.

02-18-00483-CR, 2020 WL 1057323, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2020, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). And Gadsden concedes that the

cycle of violence and the power-and-control wheel are generally accepted terms and

tools used by experts to explain the domestic-violence relationship.

      While the expert “must make an effort to tie pertinent facts of the case to the

scientific principles [that] are the subject of [her] testimony,” hypothetical facts that

                                           26
“mirror” or “parallel” the facts of the case are sufficient. Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d

425, 438–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Here, several hypotheticals to which Hensley

applied her theories and opinions mirrored the facts of this case. For example, one

hypothetical in which Hensley explained that an abuser may threaten to take a child

away or use immigration issues to exert power and control over the victim mirrored

Heidi’s experiences with Gadsden’s threats that he would stop Gia’s adoption, which

would interfere with Gia’s immigration, and that Gia would be deported. Similarly,

Hensley’s testimony that an abuser may threaten to report the victim for kidnapping

as a coercion tactic parallels Gadsden’s threats to accuse Heidi of kidnapping Gia.

Several other hypotheticals paralleled the emotional abuse that Heidi described, such

as Gadsden’s name-calling, cursing at her, twisting things around, and making her feel

like the abuse was her fault because, for example, she had scratched his car mirror or

had ignored his phone calls.

      Further, Hensley’s testimony describing an abuser’s strict, rigid ideas that there

are gender roles in the relationship and that the victim’s role is to be submissive is

identical to Heidi’s role in her relationship with Gadsden, including his getting angry

with her for not doing his laundry, his forcing her to perform sexual acts and “wear

things,” and her ultimately becoming his “servant.” Other examples where Hensley’s

testimony describing the common traits of a domestic-violence relationship mirrors

the facts of this case include Gadsden’s control over Heidi’s access to money, Heidi’s

isolation while she lived in Mexico with Gadsden and Gia, Gadsden’s abusive phone

                                           27
calls and text messages, Heidi’s fear, and Gadsden’s apology and promise to “pay for

it for the rest of [his] life.” Thus, Hensley’s testimony was sufficiently tied to the facts

of this case. See id.

       While we agree with Gadsden to the extent that Heidi’s testimony did not

identify every aspect of power and control or describe in great detail each phase of the

cycle of violence, we do not agree that such testimony was required for Hensley’s

expert testimony to be relevant. Rule 702 requires that an expert’s testimony “take

into account enough of the pertinent facts to be of assistance to the trier of fact.” Jordan

v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (emphasis added). Hensley’s

testimony was sufficiently tied to the facts of the case to meet the simple requirement

that it be “helpful” to the jury. See id. Indeed, “[t]hat some facts were not taken into

account by the expert is a matter of weight and credibility, not admissibility.” Id.

Similarly, that Heidi’s testimony about her relationship with Gadsden did not

incorporate every “topic” of Hensley’s testimony on the dynamics of domestic

violence is a matter of weight and credibility, not admissibility. See id.

       Hensley’s testimony was relevant to help the average juror understand the

dynamics of the relationship between Gadsden and Heidi, why Heidi would stay in an

abusive relationship for so many years, why she had not reported any of his past

abusive conduct, and why she did not immediately report the November 5, 2019

assault. For all these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing

                                             28
Hensley’s expert testimony. See James, 623 S.W.3d at 555. We overrule Gadsden’s

second point of error.

                                III. Conclusion

      Having overruled Gadsden’s two points of error, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                                  /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                  Wade Birdwell
                                                  Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 23, 2023

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