Court Opinion

ID: 9531656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:13:42.871269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:33.696403
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Justice
(dissenting):
I agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the trial court erred in holding that the defendant’s discharge in bankruptcy bars his creditor (Mastercharge) from forcing payment of the obligation but that the discharge did not relieve him of his obligation to the plaintiff contained in the decree of divorce to pay the obligation and hold her harmless therefrom. It is fundamental that state courts are required to recognize and give validity to a discharge in bankruptcy ordered by a federal court. *745However, I cannot agree that the debt in this case is non-dischargeable because it is “actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support” as set forth in § 523(a)(5) of the bankruptcy code.
As a preliminary matter, I have grave doubts whether it was proper in the decree of divorce for the trial court to order the defendant to pay the debts and obligations (other than the car payment) since the parties had previously stipulated that the car payment would be the only debt which he would be required to pay. The majority opinion endeavors to justify the broad order to pay all the debts and obligations of the parties because the plaintiff had asked for that relief in her amended complaint. The majority asserts that the parties “agreed in the stipulation to have the case heard upon the amended complaint, as modified by the stipulation.” I can find no such language in the stipulation and nothing which would indicate that the terms of the complaint were meant to prevail except where they were modified by the stipulation. I read the stipulation to be a complete agreement by the parties as to the relief to be awarded the plaintiff. The only reference to the amended complaint in the stipulation was that the plaintiff could obtain a divorce upon the grounds of mental cruelty as alleged in her amended complaint, subject to introducing sufficient evidence therefor. However, it appears that the amended complaint was to serve no other purpose since the parties stipulated to complete relief in their written stipulation which supplanted the relief sought in the amended complaint. The only reference in the stipulation to the debts of the parties is paragraph 2 which provides:
2. That Plaintiff shall be awarded the Chevelle automobile, subject to the Defendant paying the balance due and owing thereon; said monthly payment to be as and for alimony and said alimony shall cease upon payment by the Defendant of all of the payments due and owing to pay off the balance due on the Chevelle automobile. [Italics added.]
No reference was made in the stipulation to the other debts and obligations of the parties, including the amount owing to Mast-ercharge. The defendant in no wise agreed to pay them. Therefore, it appears to me that the broad order contained in the decree of divorce that he “pay the debts and obligations incurred during the marriage of the parties hereto and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom” was in contravention of the stipulation of the parties. However, since no appeal was taken from that decree and no motion has ever been brought to have that part of the decree set aside because it was in excess of the stipulation, I will assume that it is binding upon us for the purposes of this appeal.
The majority opinion affirms the order of the trial court finding the defendant in contempt of court for failing to pay the Mastercharge obligation. The majority, does this upon its own finding of fact that the debt was “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.” The trial court made no such determination; and, since it is a factual matter upon which evidence would have to be taken, I think the majority is completely unwarranted in making that determination on this appeal. The trial court decided this matter of contempt solely as a question of law. He ruled that the discharge in bankruptcy barred the creditor from collection but that the discharge did not affect the decree of divorce ordering defendant to pay the obligation and to hold the plaintiff harmless. Since the majority agrees that his ruling as to the law cannot be sustained, this matter should be remanded to the trial court to take evidence and make findings of fact on whether the order to pay the Mastercharge debt was in fact an order for “alimony, maintenance, or support.” The trial court did not reach that question.
The majority opinion, without the benefit of any evidence or any findings of fact by the trial court, makes the factual determination that the order to pay the Master-charge debt was indeed in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. That determination cannot be made in that manner. The cases on the subject, Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148 (1949); *746Erickson v. Beardall, 20 Utah 2d 287, 437 P.2d 210 (1968); Nitz v. Nitz, 568 F.2d 148 (10th Cir.1977); and In re Huggins, 12 B.R. 850 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan.1981), all of which are cited and relied upon in the majority opinion, require that before a debt can be declared to be non-dischargeable, it must be found that without the debt assumption by one spouse, the other spouse would be left with inadequate means of support. These cases do not sanction the making of that important factual determination from a reading of the complaint or decree as does the majority opinion. The majority actually recognizes that when it states “we look to substance rather than form.” The determination hinges upon factual questions such as whether the non-paying spouse (usually the wife) is employed, the amount of her annual income, her expenses of support, her monthly obligations, etc. The determination will vary from case to case as is shown by a reading of the above four cases where different conclusions were derived. See footnote 15 of the majority opinion which sets out the factual test laid down in In re Huggins, supra, to be used in determining the nature of an assumed debt.
Moreover, if the question of whether the order that the defendant pay the Master-charge balance was in the nature of “alimony, maintenance, or support” is a question to be determined from the face of the complaint, stipulation and decree without the benefit of any evidence, then it is manifestly clear that the parties intended that only the monthly payments on the balance owing on the Chevelle automobile should be alimony. Paragraph 2 of the stipulation quoted above is explicit that those payments and only those payments were regarded by the parties as alimony. Even a casual reading of that paragraph discloses that it was the intent of the parties to expressly limit alimony to the automobile payments, and when the automobile was paid for, alimony would cease. The defendant claims that when he entered into the stipulation he intended to file bankruptcy, and therefore obligated himself only to pay the balance owing on the automobile. He did not agree to pay any other debts. Since filing his bankruptcy, he has paid the balance owing on the automobile. The trial court and the majority opinion require him to pay the Mastercharge debt as alimony contrary to the explicit and express words of the stipulation.
I would remand this case to the trial court for a factual determination in accordance with the views expressed herein.
STEWART, J., concurs.