Court Opinion

ID: 9366024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 18:01:00.653441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:48.939247
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-6045     Document: 010110803226      Date Filed: 01/25/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       January 25, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  MARK A. PENDERGRAFT,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                        No. 22-6045
                                                     (D.C. No. 5:18-CV-00793-D)
  BOARD OF REGENTS OF OKLAHOMA                              (W.D. Okla.)
  COLLEGES; DAVID MISAK, in his
  individual and official capacities; TODD
  THURMAN, in his individual and official
  capacities,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Mark Pendergraft filed a pro se lawsuit against the Board of Regents of

 Oklahoma Colleges (BROC), David Misak, and Todd Thurman. The suit arose out of

 an employment dispute involving a graduate assistant position with the softball

 program at Southwestern Oklahoma State University (SWOSU). He brought federal

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-6045    Document: 010110803226        Date Filed: 01/25/2023     Page: 2

 claims under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as

 state claims for tortious interference with business relations, breach of contract, and

 tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court granted

 defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the Title VII and § 1983

 claims for failure to state a claim for relief. Defendants then moved for summary

 judgment on the remaining claims. The district court granted summary judgment in

 favor of BROC (the only applicable defendant) on the EPA claim. It then declined to

 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims and dismissed those claims

 without prejudice. Mr. Pendergraft now appeals.1 Exercising jurisdiction under

 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       I. Background

       A. Factual Background

       SWOSU is a public university that is governed by the BROC. In June 2016,

 SWOSU hired Kim Maher as its new head softball coach. SWOSU then posted two

 openings for graduate assistant positions with the softball program. Each position

 had the same salary, and each position also offered a tuition waiver.

       1
          On appeal, Mr. Pendergraft does not challenge the district court’s dismissal
 of his Title VII and § 1983 claims, nor does he challenge the district court’s dismissal
 of the EPA claim against the individual defendants or the dismissal of the state
 claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities. Accordingly, he
 has waived any challenge to the dismissal of those claims. See Doebele v.
 Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1140 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that issues
 not raised on appeal are deemed waived).

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       Marsha Cusack, a high school softball coach, applied for one of the positions.

 Coach Maher wanted SWOSU to hire Ms. Cusack because Coach Maher had known

 Ms. Cusack for years and thought Ms. Cusack could bring experience and knowledge

 to SWOSU’s softball program.

       Coach Maher testified in her deposition that to get a more qualified coach, she

 needed to increase the pay. So she asked Defendant Todd Thurman, SWOSU

 Athletic Director, if the salaries allotted to the two graduate assistant positions could

 be combined for Ms. Cusack, leaving only a tuition waiver for the other graduate

 assistant position. Mr. Thurman submitted the proposal to the appropriate

 administrators, including Defendant David Misak, SWOSU Human Resources (HR)

 Director. SWOSU later hired Ms. Cusack at a salary equal to the combined amount

 of the salaries of the two previously posted graduate assistant positions.

       Mr. Pendergraft also applied for the graduate assistant position. He had never

 coached softball at the college or high school level, but he had helped coach his

 daughter’s youth travel softball team. Coach Maher recommended he be hired for the

 second position, but the parties dispute what happened next. In particular, the parties

 dispute whether Mr. Pendergraft was aware that the second position was an unpaid

 position, and they also dispute whether SWOSU ever officially hired

 Mr. Pendergraft.

       Mr. Pendergraft asserts he was hired for a paid position, and he signed a pay

 action form on August 17, 2016, which is a document SWOSU uses to formalize

 employment agreements. After signing the pay action form, he contends that he

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 assisted Coach Maher that same day with unofficial visits for two high school

 softball recruits. But the next day when he was in the HR office, Mr. Pendergraft

 testified he was told by an HR employee that Mr. Thurman wanted to turn his paid

 position into a volunteer position. Mr. Pendergraft did not agree to that change, and

 he alleges Mr. Thurman fired him on August 19, 2016.

       In contrast, defendants contend that Mr. Pendergraft knew the position was a

 volunteer position and that he had agreed to be a volunteer because he wanted to get

 some collegiate coaching experience. They also assert he was never a SWOSU

 employee because his conduct in the application process caused them to reconsider

 hiring him, he never signed a pay action form, and they withdrew the job posting for

 the second graduate assistant position. Regardless of whether Mr. Pendergraft was

 an employee or merely a candidate for an open position, the parties agree that his

 relationship with SWOSU ended on August 19, 2016.

       B. Procedural Background

       After defendants moved to dismiss his initial complaint, Mr. Pendergraft filed

 an amended complaint alleging that defendants: violated the EPA by employing a

 female coach and paying her twice what they agreed to pay him (Count I); unlawfully

 discriminated against him based on sex in violation of Title VII by terminating him

 because he is not a woman (Count II); tortiously interfered with his business right by

 terminating his employment agreement in bad faith (Count III); breached his contract

 with SWOSU by terminating his employment without just cause (Count IV);

 tortiously interfered with his prospective economic advantage by terminating his

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 employment agreement in bad faith (Count V); and conspiring against him to

 wrongfully terminate his employment agreement (Count VI).

        Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss, seeking dismissal of Count I

 against the individual defendants, and dismissal of Counts II, III, V, and VI against

 all defendants. The district court granted the motion to dismiss in part. It dismissed

 Count I against the individual defendants, Count II against all defendants, and

 Counts III, V, and VI against the individual defendants in their official capacities.

 The court dismissed Count VI without prejudice and gave Mr. Pendergraft the

 opportunity to amend his complaint to address the pleading deficiencies the court

 identified.

        Mr. Pendergraft then filed what he called his Fourth Amended Complaint

 (although the district court noted it was only his third amended complaint). In it, he

 presented a revised Count VI, in which he alleged defendants violated § 1983 by

 acting under color of state law and conspiring to violate his constitutional rights.

 Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss Count VI, which the district court

 granted.

        Defendants next moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims: the

 EPA claim (Count I) against BROC, and the state claims (Counts III, IV, and V)

 against the individual defendants. The district court granted summary judgment in

 favor of BROC on Count I, and then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

 over the remaining state claims against the individual defendants. The court

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 dismissed those claims without prejudice to Mr. Pendergraft refiling them in state

 court.

          Mr. Pendergraft now appeals from the district court’s summary-judgment

 decision.

          II. Discussion

          A. EPA claim

          We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

 defendants. Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2015). Summary

 judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

 Civ. P. 56(a). “[W]e view all evidence and any reasonable inferences that might be

 drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Riser,

 776 F.3d at 1195 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

          “The EPA prohibits wage discrimination ‘between employees on the basis of

 sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,

 and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’” Id.

 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). The court’s consideration of an EPA claim

 proceeds in two steps. See Mickelson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1304, 1311

 (10th Cir. 2006). “First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of

 discrimination by demonstrating that employees of the opposite sex were paid

 differently for performing substantially equal work.” Id. If the plaintiff does so, “the

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 burden of persuasion then shifts to the defendant to prove that the wage disparity was

 justified by one of four permissible reasons.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

       For Mr. Pendergraft to establish a prima facie case of pay discrimination under

 the EPA, he must demonstrate that: “(1) []he was performing work which was

 substantially equal to that of the [fe]male employee[] considering the skills, duties,

 supervision, effort and responsibilities of the jobs; (2) the conditions where the work

 was performed were basically the same; [and] (3) the [fe]male employee[] w[as] paid

 more under such circumstances.” Riser, 776 F3d at 1196 (internal quotation marks

 omitted). The district court assumed Mr. Pendergraft was an employee of SWOSU

 for purposes of summary judgment, after determining there were material facts in

 dispute on that issue. The court concluded, however, that Mr. Pendergraft failed to

 establish a prima facie case of pay discrimination under the EPA because he could

 not show he performed substantially equal work to that of Ms. Cusack.

       The court noted Mr. Pendergraft’s argument in response to summary judgment

 that he performed substantially equal work to Ms. Cusack because he participated in

 unofficial visit tours for two softball recruits and SWOSU used his name and likeness

 in the visit itineraries. The court then recited the record description of Ms. Cusack’s

 work, which included “complet[ing] several tasks related to recruiting (identifying

 and monitoring potential recruits), practice (planning and coordinating training

 sessions), team travel (organizing lodging, transportation, and meals for the team),

 gameday preparation (scouting opposing teams), and field maintenance (chalking and

 dragging dirt).” R., vol. 3 at 270. The court found that “Ms. Cusack performed a

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 variety of functions for the softball program; Plaintiff participated in two recruitment

 tours.” Id. It therefore concluded “[t]heir work was not substantially equal,” id.,

 and, as a result, Mr. Pendergraft could not establish a prima facie case of pay

 discrimination under the EPA.

          On appeal, Mr. Pendergraft’s primary argument is that “the reason the

 workload was not substantially equal is because [he] was wrongfully terminated after

 (3) three days [of] employment without cause.” Aplt. Opening Br. 13. He explains

 that “Coach Cusack was hired after [him] and was employed for a full year,” so “[i]t

 would be impossible to compare” the work of the two jobs. Id. Mr. Pendergraft’s

 claims alleging wrongful termination, however, have been dismissed. And as noted

 above, he does not challenge the dismissal of his Title VII claim on appeal, which

 alleged he was unlawfully terminated based on his sex. Further, for the reasons

 discussed below, we uphold the district court’s decision to dismiss his state claims,

 which also alleged wrongful termination. We therefore agree that Mr. Pendergraft

 has not established a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the EPA, and we

 affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of BROC on that

 claim.

          B. State claims

          Mr. Pendergraft next contends “the District Court erred by refusing to exercise

 jurisdiction over [his] remaining State claims.” Id. at 14. We review for abuse of

 discretion the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

 the state claims. Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1172 (10th Cir.

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 2009). A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when it “has

 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

       Here, the district court had dismissed all the federal claims and only state

 claims remained. In deciding not to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims, it first

 noted our guidance on the issue in Crane v. Utah Department of Corrections,

 15 F.4th 1296 (10th Cir. 2021). In that case, we explained “[w]hen all federal claims

 have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise

 jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.” Id. at 1314 (internal quotation marks

 omitted). The district court also noted that “‘[t]he Supreme Court has encouraged the

 practice of dismissing state claims or remanding them to state court when the federal

 claims to which they are supplemental have dropped out before trial.’” R., vol. 3 at

 271 (quoting Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C.,

 956 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2020)). And the district court considered our

 decision in Thatcher Enterprises v. Cache County Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1478

 (10th Cir. 1990), in which we explained that “[n]otions of comity and federalism

 demand that a state court try its own lawsuits, absent compelling reasons to the

 contrary.” Id. But we also recognized in Thatcher that a district court has discretion

 to exercise jurisdiction over state claims even in the absence of any triable federal

 claims, if given the nature and extent of pretrial proceedings, “judicial economy,

 convenience, and fairness would be served by retaining jurisdiction.” Id.

       In considering whether to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims after the

 dismissal of the federal claims, the district court recognized the parties had engaged

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  in discovery and dispositive motions, but it noted no trial submissions had been

  made, no substantial trial preparations had happened, and the case was not currently

  set on any trial docket. Given these circumstances, the court found the state claims

  should be dismissed without prejudice.

         Mr. Pendergraft does not directly challenge the district court’s reasoning or

  dispute the fact that no substantial trial preparations had happened. Instead, he

  argues that the district court’s decision will delay the resolution of his state claims,

  which will prejudice him. But the district court properly considered precedential

  cases on the issue of supplemental jurisdiction, as well as the nature and extent of the

  pre-trial proceedings in this case, and we see no abuse of discretion in its decision to

  decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Pendergraft’s state claims after

  all federal claims were resolved.

         III. Conclusion

         We affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                               Circuit Judge

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