Court Opinion

ID: 9403223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 18:09:07.435833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:05.519538
License: Public Domain

J-A10021-23

                                   2023 PA Super 111

    LICELY JUAREZ VELASQUEZ                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    LIZARDO MARROQUIN MIRANDA                  :
                                               :
                       Appellee                :       No. 2688 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered September 20, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
                     Civil Division at No(s): CV-2021-002235

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY KING, J.:                                      FILED JUNE 20, 2023

        Appellant, Licely Juarez Velasquez (“Mother”), appeals from the order

entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which declined to

find her minor children, S.M.J. (born in 2007) and E.M.J. (born in 2010)

(“Children”) eligible for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”).1     We

affirm.

        The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Mother and Appellee, Lizardo Marroquin Miranda (“Father”), are the biological

parents of Children.      On March 5, 2021, Mother filed a custody complaint

seeking sole legal and physical custody of Children. Mother also attached to

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 “The SIJ[S] statute, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(2)(J), provides that a juvenile who
qualifies [for SIJS] may apply for lawful permanent residency and thus relief
from deportation.” Orozco v. Tecu, 284 A.3d 474, 476 (Pa.Super. 2022).
J-A10021-23

her custody complaint a proposed order asking the court to award Children

SIJS. The court scheduled a hearing for June 22, 2022. At the June 22, 2022

hearing, the court raised questions concerning its jurisdiction because neither

of the parties are citizens of the United States nor are Children citizens of the

United States.2      Mother subsequently briefed the jurisdictional issue and

argued that under Section 5402 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act, the court had exclusive jurisdiction over the custody matter

because Pennsylvania is the home state of Children.3 On July 7, 2022, the

court entered an order asserting that it lacked jurisdiction over the custody

matter.    The next day, Mother filed a petition for reconsideration and an

evidentiary hearing. The court granted relief and scheduled a custody trial for

August 15, 2022.

       The court held a custody trial on August 15, 2022, at which Mother

____________________________________________

2 The parties and Children are citizens of Guatemala. Mother moved to
Pennsylvania with Children in December 2018.      Father still resides in
Guatemala.

3 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5421(a) (explaining that court of this Commonwealth
has jurisdiction to make initial custody determination only if Commonwealth
is home state of child on date of commencement of proceeding); 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5402 (defining “home state” as state in which child lived with parent for at
least six consecutive months immediately before commencement of child
custody proceeding). Mother further asserted that she and Children were not
unlawfully present in the United States because they have pending asylum
claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(II) (stating no period of time in
which alien has bona fide application for asylum pending shall be taken into
account in determining period of unlawful presence in United States).

                                           -2-
J-A10021-23

testified.4 On September 20, 2022, the court granted Mother sole legal and

physical custody of Children, but the court declined to find Children eligible for

SIJS. On October 11, 2022, Mother filed a petition for reconsideration. While

the petition remained pending, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on

October 19, 2022. On October 27, 2022, the court denied the petition for

reconsideration. On November 14, 2022, this Court directed Mother to file a

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal no later than November

28, 2022. Mother filed her statement on November 21, 2022.

       Mother raises three issues on appeal:

          Whether…Mother properly preserved the issues raised in her
          Rule 1925(b) Statement?

          Whether the trial court erred in denying [M]other’s request
          to find that reunification of the minor children with their
          father is not viable due to abandonment, abuse or neglect,
          or a similar basis under state law because the trial court
          construed both federal and state remedial statutes narrowly
          and ignored or misapplied state definitions of abandonment,
          abuse and neglect to reach its conclusions?

          Whether the trial court’s refusal to conclude that it is not in
          the best interest of the minor children to return to
          Guatemala is unreasonable, and therefore an abuse of
          discretion, given [M]other’s credible testimony and the trial
          court’s findings of fact in support of its custody
          determination?

(Mother’s Brief at 6).

____________________________________________

4 Although Father accepted service of the custody complaint and received
notice of the hearing, he declined to participate in the hearing or in any
proceedings involving this matter. Father also has declined to file an
appellee’s brief on appeal.

                                           -3-
J-A10021-23

      In her first issue, Mother acknowledges that she failed to file her concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal contemporaneously with her

notice of appeal. Mother argues, however, that once this Court directed her

to file a concise statement, she complied with the timeframe set by this Court’s

order. Thus, Mother asserts that she cured any defect concerning her failure

to file the statement.

      Additionally, Mother asserts that her concise statement clearly and

concisely identified the issues she sought to raise on appeal. Mother contends

that her concise statement discussed the trial court’s narrow construction of

relevant federal and state statutes, and the court’s misapplication of, or failure

to consider, the definitions of “abandonment,” “abuse,” and “neglect,”

relevant to a determination of SIJS. Mother claims these were the precise

challenges she planned to assert on appeal. Mother maintains her concise

statement further addressed the court’s failure to conclude that reunification

of Children with Father and a return to Guatemala would be against Children’s

best interests. Mother avers that she also raised in her statement that the

court’s failure to find Children eligible for SIJS contradicts its custody award

in favor of Mother. Mother insists this was another issue she intended to, and

does, raise on appeal.     Mother concludes that she submitted her concise

statement in a timely fashion after receipt of this Court’s directive, and

properly preserved her issues such that we may review her issues on appeal.

We agree.

                                      -4-
J-A10021-23

      Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i) provides that in

a children’s fast track appeal, “[t]he concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal shall be filed and served with the notice of appeal.” Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i). Nevertheless, this Court has held that “in all children’s fast

track cases, the failure to file a concise statement of errors complained on

appeal with the notice of appeal will result in a defective notice of appeal, to

be disposed of on a case by case basis.” In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747

(Pa.Super. 2009).    In deciding whether to quash or dismiss an appeal for

noncompliance with Rule 1925(a)(2)(i), the K.T.E.L. Court directed us to the

guidelines set forth in Stout v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 491 Pa.

601, 421 A.2d 1047 (1980). See id. In Stout, our Supreme Court stated:

         The extreme action of dismissal should be imposed by an
         appellate court sparingly, and clearly would be inappropriate
         when there has been substantial compliance with the rules
         and when the moving party has suffered no prejudice.

                                   *    *    *

         The Rules of Appellate Procedure were adopted to insure the
         orderly and efficient administration of justice at the
         appellate level. They were not intended, however, to be so
         rigidly applied as to result in manifest injustice, particularly
         when there has been substantial compliance and no
         prejudice.

Stout, supra at 604-05, 421 A.2d at 1049.

      Additionally, we observe that:

         A concise statement of errors complained of on appeal must
         be specific enough for the trial court to identify and address
         the issues the appellant wishes to raise on appeal.
         Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 provides

                                       -5-
J-A10021-23

         that a Rule 1925(b) statement shall concisely identify each
         ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with
         sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.
         Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in
         accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are
         waived.

         This Court has considered the question of what constitutes
         a sufficient Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on numerous
         occasions and has established that an appellant’s concise
         statement must properly specify the error to be addressed
         on appeal.

S.S. V. T.J., 212 A.3d 1026, 1030-31 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal citations,

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

      “In essence, the purpose of requiring a concise statement of [errors]

complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) is to allow the trial court to

easily discern the issues an appellant intends to pursue on appeal and to allow

the court to file an intelligent response to those issues in an opinion pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).” Id. at 1032. See also Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d

394, 401 (Pa.Super. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092, 126 S.Ct. 1048, 163

L.Ed.2d 858 (2006) (stating: “By raising an outrageous number of issues, the

Defendants have deliberately circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule

1925(b) and have thereby effectively precluded appellate review of the issues

they now seek to raise”). “[A] [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to

allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional

equivalent to no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.” Id. at 400.

      Instantly, Mother did not file a concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal contemporaneously with her notice of appeal, even though this

                                       -6-
J-A10021-23

case is designated as a children’s fast track case. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

Consequently, this Court entered an order on November 14, 2022, directing

Mother to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal no later

than November 28, 2022. Mother filed her statement on November 21, 2022.

Under these circumstances, we see no reason to dismiss Mother’s appeal for

her technical noncompliance with Rule 1925(a)(2)(i).             Mother ultimately

complied with this Court’s directive, and her belated filing did not prejudice

Father (who has had no involvement in this case) or impede the trial court’s

ability to draft an opinion. See K.T.E.L., supra. See also Stout, supra.

       Turning to whether Mother’s Rule 1925 statement properly preserved

her appellate issues, the trial court described Mother’s statement as “overly

verbose, generalized, and vague necessitating the court to guess and search

for the issues being raised and attempt to guess at [Mother’s] intended issues

to be framed for appeal.” (Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/29/22, at 13). The

trial court deemed all of Mother’s issues waived on appeal on this basis, relying

on S.K. v. C.K., No. 1311 EDA 2022 (Pa.Super. filed Nov. 22, 2022)

(unpublished      memorandum)5          (holding   father’s   eight-page   “concise”

statement raising 41 issues failed to comply with requirements of Rule

1925(b)(4), constituting waiver of issues on appeal).

       While we acknowledge that Mother’s Rule 1925 filing is anything but

____________________________________________

5See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this
Court filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive authority).

                                           -7-
J-A10021-23

concise and does not appear in the typical formatting of a concise statement

of errors, we cannot agree with the trial court that Mother failed to preserve

her claims for appeal. Specifically, upon our review of Mother’s Rule 1925

statement, we cannot say that the statement is vague or that it was

insufficient to permit the trial court to identify the issues Mother sought to

raise on appeal.    See Kanter, supra.        If anything, Mother’s statement is

overly specific and more detailed than necessary to preserve her claims.

Mother not only specified the issues she sought to raise on appeal, but she

cited the record and legal authority to support her claims. We further note

that Mother did not purport to raise an “outrageous” number of issues on

appeal. Compare id.; S.K., supra. Rather, Mother essentially raised one

issue: whether the trial court’s decision regarding Children’s eligibility for SIJS

was erroneous as against the facts of record, applicable law, and at odds with

the court’s custody decision in favor of Mother. Consequently, we decline to

deem Mother’s appellate issues waived and will proceed to a merits review of

her claims.

      In her second and third issues combined, Mother argues that the court’s

denial of SIJS eligibility for Children is diametrically opposed to the trial court’s

custody decision in Mother’s favor.      Specifically, Mother contends that the

court needed to decide whether reunification with Father was viable due to

Father’s abandonment, abuse, or neglect. If the court found that reunification

was not viable, Mother maintains the court was required to find Children

                                        -8-
J-A10021-23

eligible for SIJS. Mother complains that the court readily found evidence of

Father’s abandonment, abuse and/or neglect such that the court awarded

Mother sole physical and legal custody of Children.        Nevertheless, Mother

emphasizes that the court failed to make the same findings relevant to SIJS

eligibility for Children. Mother insists that SIJS eligibility does not require the

initiation of formal proceedings against Father to support a finding of

abandonment, abuse, or neglect.

      Further, Mother argues it is in Children’s best interests not to return to

Guatemala. Mother stresses that there are less educational opportunities for

Children in Guatemala. Mother asserts that neither Father nor Children’s step-

siblings would have any relationship with Children if Children were forced to

return to Guatemala.     Mother contends that Children previously witnessed

Father’s physical abuse against Mother. Mother concludes that the trial court

abused its discretion concerning its findings regarding Children’s best

interests, and this Court must grant Mother relief.      We disagree, albeit on

different grounds than the trial court.

      When interpreting a federal statute, we apply the following principles:

         The construction of a federal statute is a matter of federal
         law.    Under federal rules of statutory construction, in
         determining the meaning of a federal statute, the courts
         look not only to particular statutory language, but also to
         the design of the statute as a whole and to its purposes.
         Furthermore, when the courts confront circumstances not
         plainly covered by the terms of a statute, suggesting that
         Congress did not contemplate the issue, they endeavor to
         give statutory language the meaning that advances the
         policies underlying the legislation.

                                       -9-
J-A10021-23

Zaleppa v. Seiwell, 9 A.3d 632, 636 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting Council 13,

American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO

ex-rel. Fillman v. Rendell, 604 Pa. 352, 379-80, 986 A.2d 63, 80 (2009))

(internal citations omitted).

      SIJS is an immigration status that may be awarded to:

         (J) an immigrant who is present in the United States—

            (i)  who has been declared dependent on a
         juvenile court located in the United States or whom
         such a court has legally committed to, or placed under
         the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or
         an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile
         court located in the United States, and whose
         reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s
         parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,
         abandonment, or a similar basis found under State
         law;

             (ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative
         or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best
         interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous
         country of nationality or country of last habitual residence;
         and

            (iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security
         consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status,
         except that—

                   (I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to
         determine the custody status or placement of an alien in the
         custody of the Secretary of Health and Human Services
         unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services
         specifically consents to such jurisdiction; and

                 (II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of
         any alien provided special immigrant status under this
         subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue to such parentage,
         be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this

                                     - 10 -
J-A10021-23

        chapter[.]

8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (emphasis added).

     Additionally, the Code of Federal Regulations provides:

        § 204.11 Special immigrant juvenile classification.

                                  *     *      *

        (b) Eligibility. A petitioner is eligible for classification as a
        special immigrant juvenile under section 203(b)(4) of the
        Act as described at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act, if they
        meet all of the following requirements:

           (1) Is under 21 years of age at the time of filing the
        petition;

           (2) Is unmarried at the time of filing and adjudication;

           (3) Is physically present in the United States;

          (4) Is the subject of a juvenile court order(s) that
        meets the requirements under paragraph (c) of this
        section; and

           (5) Obtains consent from the Secretary of Homeland
        Security to classification as a special immigrant juvenile.
        For [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
        (“USCIS”)] to consent, the request for SIJ classification
        must be bona fide, which requires the petitioner to establish
        that a primary reason the required juvenile court
        determinations were sought was to obtain relief from
        parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis
        under State law. USCIS may withhold consent if evidence
        materially conflicts with the eligibility requirements in
        paragraph (b) of this section such that the record reflects
        that the request for SIJ classification was not bona fide.
        USCIS approval of the petition constitutes the granting of
        consent.

        (c) Juvenile court order(s).

           (1) Court-ordered dependency or custody and

                                      - 11 -
J-A10021-23

       parental reunification determination. The juvenile
       court must have made certain judicial determinations
       related to the petitioner’s custody or dependency and
       determined that the petitioner cannot reunify with
       their parent(s) due to abuse, neglect, abandonment,
       or a similar basis under State law.

          (i) The juvenile court must have made at least one
          of the following judicial determinations related to
          the petitioner’s custodial placement or dependency
          in accordance with State law governing such
          determinations:

          (A) Declared the petitioner dependent upon the
          juvenile court; or

          (B) Legally committed to or placed the petitioner
          under the custody of an agency or department of a
          State, or an individual or entity appointed by a
          State or juvenile court.

          (ii) The juvenile court must have made a judicial
          determination that parental reunification with one or
          both parents is not viable due to abuse, abandonment,
          neglect, or a similar basis under State law. The court is
          not required to terminate parental rights to determine
          that parental reunification is not viable.

          (2) Best interest determination.

          (i) A determination must be made in judicial or
          administrative proceedings by a court or agency
          recognized by the juvenile court and authorized by law
          to make such decisions that it would not be in the
          petitioner’s best interest to be returned to the petitioner’s
          or their parent’s country of nationality or last habitual
          residence.

          (ii) Nothing in this part should be construed as altering
          the standards for best interest determinations that
          juvenile court judges routinely apply under relevant
          State law.

          (3) Qualifying juvenile court order(s).

                                   - 12 -
J-A10021-23

            (i) The juvenile court must have exercised its authority
            over the petitioner as a juvenile and made the requisite
            judicial determinations in this paragraph under applicable
            State law to establish eligibility.

            (ii) The juvenile court order(s) must be in effect on the
            date the petitioner files the petition and continue through
            the time of adjudication of the petition, except when the
            juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the petitioner
            terminated solely because:

            (A) The petitioner was adopted, placed in a permanent
            guardianship, or another child welfare permanency goal
            was reached, other than reunification with a parent or
            parents with whom the court previously found that
            reunification was not viable; or

            (B) The petitioner was the subject of a qualifying juvenile
            court order that was terminated based on age, provided
            the petitioner was under 21 years of age at the time of
            filing the petition.

8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b), (c) (emphasis added).

      To summarize, SIJS is a federal immigration status available to foreign

children in the United States who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected.

See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J). To obtain SIJS, a child must first apply to

a state court for an order finding that he or she meets the statutory and

regulatory requirements. See id. (SIJS statutory requirements). See also 8

C.F.R. § 204.11 (SIJS regulatory requirements). See also Osorio-Martinez

v. Attorney General United States of America, 893 F.3d 153, 163 (3d.

Cir. 2018) (stating: “Alien children may receive SIJ[S] only after satisfying a

set of rigorous, congressionally defined eligibility criteria, including that a

juvenile court find it would not be in the child’s best interest to return to her

                                     - 13 -
J-A10021-23

country of last habitual residence and that the child is dependent on the court

or placed in the custody of the state or someone appointed by the state”).

      The Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the eligibility criteria for SIJS

in Osorio-Martinez as follows:

         We begin with the requirements for SIJ[S] that show a
         congressional intent to assist a limited group of abused
         children to remain safely in the country with a means to
         apply for [legal permanent resident] status, and that, in
         effect, establish a successful applicant as a ward of the
         United States with the approval of both state and federal
         authorities[.]

         This understanding of SIJ[S] is reflected in the very
         definition of a Special Immigrant Juvenile, i.e., a child “who
         has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in
         the United States or whom such a court has legally
         committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or
         department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed
         by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and
         whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s
         parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment,
         or a similar basis found under State law.” 8 U.S.C. §
         1101(a)(27)(J)(i). It is also compelled not only by the
         statute’s purpose and history, … but also by [the
         Department of Homeland Security’s] own characterization
         of SIJ[S] as a classification to provide humanitarian
         protection for abused, neglected, or abandoned child
         immigrants eligible for long-term foster care[.] And the
         SIJ[S] statute’s implementing regulations indicate that, to
         remain eligible for adjustment of status pending visa
         availability, SIJ[S] designees must remain in the custody of
         the state court or state agency to which they have been
         committed. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5) (noting that to be
         eligible for SIJ[S], an alien must “continue to be dependent
         upon the juvenile court and eligible for long-term foster
         care” (emphasis added)); see also Special Immigrant
         Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54978-01, 54980 (proposed
         Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R pts. 204-05, 245)
         (noting that “dependency,” for purposes of SIJ status,
         “encompasses dependency, commitment, or custody”).

                                      - 14 -
J-A10021-23

       Importantly, that close, dependency relationship with the
       United States is also borne out by the statutory criteria for
       SIJ[S] eligibility. To qualify for SIJ[S], applicants not only
       must be physically present in the United States, unmarried,
       and under the age of twenty-one, but also, … they must
       obtain an order of dependency from a state juvenile court.
       8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c). That
       order requires the state court to find: (1) that the applicant
       is “dependent on a juvenile court ... or placed under the
       custody” of a state agency or someone appointed by the
       state; (2) that “it would not be in the alien’s best interest to
       be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of
       nationality or ... habitual residence,”; and (3) that
       “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is
       not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar
       basis found under State law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i),
       (ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a), (c). Moreover, these
       determinations must be “in accordance with state law
       governing such declarations of dependency,” 8 C.F.R. §
       204.11(c)(3), which, depending on the state, may also
       entail specific residency requirements, e.g., [Pa.R.C.P.]
       1915.2(a)(ii) (providing that the dependency action must be
       brought in the child’s home county or a county “which had
       been the child’s home county within six months before
       commencement of the proceeding”). …

       With that order in hand, applicants must then file an
       application with USCIS, along with “sufficient evidence to
       establish ... eligibility” and the associated filing fee. The
       Secretary of Homeland Security must also consent to the
       grant of SIJ[S], which functions as an acknowledgement
       that the request for SIJ classification is bona fide—that is,
       that the benefit is sought primarily ... for the purpose of
       obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.

       All of these requirements attest to SIJ[S] designees’
       dependency and close ties with state and federal authorities,
       the risk to their well-being in being removed to their
       countries of origin, and a relationship to the United States
       that far exceeds that of aliens on the threshold of initial
       entry or apprehended within hours of surreptitiously
       entering the United States.

                                   - 15 -
J-A10021-23

Id. at 168-70 (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      In Orozco, supra, on which Mother relies, this Court considered an

interlocutory appeal from a collateral order denying the mother’s petition

seeking the issuance of an order containing specific factual findings regarding

her minor child necessary to obtain SIJS. In that case, the mother had filed

a petition for sole custody along with a petition seeking specific findings

regarding SIJS for the child. The trial court stated that it intended to consider

only the mother’s custody issue raised in her complaint, but not the issue of

SIJS. On appeal, this Court held:

         We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
         Mother specifically requested SIJ[S] findings both orally
         during the March 2019 hearing and in her October 2019
         petition. The federal statutory scheme puts the factual
         determinations necessary for SIJ[S] solely within the
         purview of state courts. Yet the court flatly refused to issue
         the SIJ[S] order. In this posture, the refusal was an abuse
         of discretion. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order
         and remand for the trial court to enter a new order that shall
         include factual findings with respect to [the child]…

Orozco, supra at 479.

      Instantly, we initially note that Mother’s reliance on Orozco does not

afford her any relief. While the trial court in that case refused to make any

factual findings concerning eligibility for SIJS despite the mother’s requests to

do so, here, the trial court made factual findings concerning whether Children

were eligible for SIJS and simply did not find facts necessary to demonstrate

that Children were eligible for SIJS. Specifically, the trial court found: (1) the

record does not demonstrate that Father abused Children; (2) based on the

                                     - 16 -
J-A10021-23

evidence presented, the court was without sufficient information to decide

whether Mother informed Father of her intent to relocate with Children to the

United States or whether Father consented to relocation, such that the court

was unable to determine that Father abandoned Children; and (3) the record

did not definitively support a conclusion that it would be in Children’s best

interests to remain in the United States.    (See Trial Court Opinion, filed

12/1/22, at unnumbered pp. 10-12).      On appeal, Mother challenges these

findings as against the facts of record, applicable law, and inconsistent with

the court’s decision to award Mother sole legal and physical custody of

Children.

      Nevertheless, we need not decide whether the trial court’s factual

findings set forth above were erroneous, because Children are not eligible for

SIJS on other grounds. The relevant federal law contemplates an award of

SIJS only where the child or children have been adjudicated dependent or the

child or children have been legally committed to the custody of a state agency

or an individual or entity appointed by the state or juvenile court.   See 8

U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(4), (c)(1)(i)(A-B). See

also Osorio-Martinez, supra.

      Significantly, Children have not been adjudicated dependent or placed

in the legal custody of a state agency or an individual or entity appointed by

a state or juvenile court. Rather, the record makes clear that Children reside

with Mother and Mother’s two sisters, and the two children of one of Mother’s

                                    - 17 -
J-A10021-23

sisters.   (See N.T. Trial, 8/15/22, at 7-8; R.R. at 116-17).      Thus, Mother

focuses on only part of the relevant statutory and regulatory federal language

at issue (concerning whether reunification with one or both parents is viable

and whether it would be in the children’s best interest to remain in the United

States), but she ignores the eligibility requirement that Children must be

adjudicated dependent or under the custody of a state agency or individual or

entity appointed by the state or juvenile court.6 On this record, Children are

simply ineligible at this juncture for SIJS. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i);

8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(4), (c)(1)(i)(A-B); Osorio-Martinez, supra. See also

Zaleppa, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the order declining to find Children

eligible for SIJS, albeit on other grounds.        See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Domtar Paper Co., 77 A.3d 1282 (Pa.Super. 2013), aff’d, 631 Pa. 463, 113

A.3d 1230 (2015) (explaining that this Court may affirm trial court’s decision

on any grounds supported by record on appeal).

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

6 In response to a question concerning this point raised at oral argument,
Mother responded that she satisfied the relevant statutory language because
the court awarded her sole custody of Children. Nevertheless, the express
statutory language and the purpose of the statute do not support Mother’s
claims. See Zaleppa, supra. Notably, the statute contemplates a scenario
where the court appoints an individual or entity to have custody over the
child at issue. This scenario is consistent with the purpose behind the statute
to assist a limited group of abused children who are essentially “ward[s] of
the United States.” See Osorio-Martinez, supra. Here, the court did not
appoint Mother to have custody. Rather, Mother is the biological parent of
Children and she sought to exercise sole custody of Children over the rights
of Father. Mother’s interpretation of the statutory language is unavailing.

                                          - 18 -
J-A10021-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/20/2023

                          - 19 -