Court Opinion

ID: 9667367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:43:55.189265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:37.372698
License: Public Domain

D. F. Walsh, J.
(dissenting). I must dissent. It concerns me greatly that we should find it necessary to reverse this conviction for probation violation which was based upon an obviously completely voluntary plea of guilty.
The defendant originally appeared before the court with a court appointed attorney and pled guilty to a charge of larceny in a building. Rather than incarcerate the defendant, the court placed him on probation for a period of two years. The defendant then failed to comply with the terms of his probation and was again brought before the court on a petition for revocation of his probationary status. The court advised the defendant that he had a right to be represented by an attorney at the hearing on probation revocation. The record indicates that the court gave the defendant the following advice:
"Before we proceed, Mr. Moore, there are some rights you have that I want to advise you of.
"You have a right to be represented by an attorney, at this hearing, an attorney of your own choice, if you can afford one, or an attorney appointed by the court, to represent you, at public expense.” (Emphasis added.)
The defendant indicated that he wanted to have *462an attorney appointed. The court then appointed an attorney and adjourned the hearing giving the defendant time to consult with counsel and giving counsel time to prepare for the hearing. On the rescheduled date the defendant appeared with his court appointed counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of violation of the terms of his probation. Before accepting the plea the court carefully inquired of the defendant about the charged violations and the defendant freely admitted them.
The defendant does not claim on appeal that his plea was involuntary and I find nothing in the record which would even slightly suggest that it was. It was made after defendant had ample opportunity to consult with counsel and while he was represented by counsel. Moreover, defendant does not claim on appeal that he is not guilty of probation violation nor does he assert that he did not fully understand that he had a right to a contested hearing on the petition for revocation or that he was in fact deprived of due process or any constitutional right through the procedure by which his probationary status was revoked.
The defendant contends, however, that his probation violation conviction should be reversed because the court failed to advise him a second time when he appeared with his court appointed counsel on the rescheduled hearing date that he had a right to a contested hearing. The majority agrees with the defendant; I cannot.
There is no question that a defendant charged with probation violation has a right to a written copy of the charges and to a contested hearing. MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134. It is certainly appropriate, therefore, that the court be required to advise a probationer of those rights when a charge of *463probation violation is made. But to require automatic reversal of an order terminating probation because this advice was imprecisely given, even in a case in which the defendant’s awareness of his right to a hearing is obvious and undenied, is in my judgment unwarranted.
The Legislature has provided that no judgment in a criminal case should be set aside or reversed for any error unless "after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice”. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096. In construing this legislatively enacted test for determining reversible error, the Supreme Court observed in People v Bigge, 288 Mich 417, 421; 285 NW 5 (1939):
"That statutory provision is not a cure-all for it must serve within constitutional limitations or else be declared void. Minor errors which clearly can be held not to have affected the result may be mollified by this statutory provision, but errors which deprive an accused of the right of due process of law cannot be composed thereby to the detriment of an accused. The responsibility of maintaining the right of fair trial and due process of law is placed with the judicial branch and cannot be otherwise by legislative permission.”
In People v Nichols, 341 Mich 311, 332; 67 NW2d 230 (1954), the Court stated that "the rule always in effect in Michigan, both before and after the enactment of the mentioned statutes [i.e., MCL 769.26] and unaffected thereby, has been and is that the question of reversal is controlled by determination of whether the error was prejudicial”. In People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 562-563; 194 NW2d 709 (1972), the Court pointed out that the appropriate considerations for determining whether an error was prejudicial are those de*464scribed in People v Wichman, 15 Mich App 110, 116; 166 NW2d 298 (1968):
" 'Where it is claimed that error is harmless, two inquiries are pertinent. First, is the error so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that it never can be regarded as harmless? See People v Bigge, 288 Mich 417, 421; 285 NW 5 (1939); People v Berry, 10 Mich App 469, 474; 157 NW2d 310 (1968); People v Mosley, 338 Mich 559, 566; 61 NW2d 785 (1953). See, also, Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 23-24; 87 S Ct 824; 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967), reh den 386 US 987; 87 S Ct 1283; 18 L Ed 2d 241 (1967). Second, if not so basic, can we declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? See People v Liggett, 378 Mich 706, 716-717; 148 NW2d 784 (1967); Chapman v California, supra. ’ ”
In this case it is beyond question that there was no miscarriage of justice. Nor does the defendant even allege that he was in any way prejudiced by the claimed omission. Certainly there was no deliberate conduct on the part of the trial court tending to deprive the defendant of fair treatment or any constitutional right. On the contrary, the record discloses diligent effort by the trial court to insure that the defendant was accorded every right to which he was entitled. Even if there were some error, therefore, and I am firmly persuaded that there was not, it could not be considered to be "offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process” and was clearly "harmless beyond a reaonable doubt”.
What reasoning then compels us to reverse this judgment of probation revocation? By what authority are we empowered to do it? I know of none. The judiciary is constitutionally empowered to override a legislative enactment relating to the reversal of a judgment in a criminal case only *465when its "responsibility of maintaining the right of fair trial [or] due process of law”, People v Bigge, supra, p 421, or some other constitutional right requires that it do so. The judiciary, it seems to me, is not empowered to promulgate prophylactic rules enforced by the sanction of automatic reversal for failure to follow them precisely, even without a showing of any prejudice in a specific case, unless long experience with a continuously recurring deprivation of a particular constitutional right in the trial courts makes it virtually certain that that constitutional right cannot be protected effectively in any other way.
In my judgment, ensuring the voluntariness of pleas of guilty to probation violations does not require such drastic and inflexible action. The voluntariness of such pleas can be ensured adequately by appellate consideration of each case on its own merits with reversal required only for prejudicial error. As the Supreme Court stated in People v Robinson, supra, p 562, "[A]ppellate courts should not reverse a conviction unless the error was prejudicial”. I find no prejudicial error in this case. I would affirm.