Court Opinion

ID: 9449229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 07:10:04.274516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:47.504712
License: Public Domain

In The

                           Court of Appeals

                Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                          __________________

                         NO. 09-23-00068-CV
                          __________________

      IN THE INTEREST OF A.F., D.F., D.F., A.O., AND D.O.

__________________________________________________________________

            On Appeal from the 279th District Court
                    Jefferson County, Texas
                    Trial Cause No. C-240,719
__________________________________________________________________

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

     Mother, N.F., appeals from an order terminating her parental

rights to her five children, Amy (11 years old at removal), Dennis (seven

years old at removal), Damien (six years old at removal), Anna (two years

old at removal), and Drew (one year old at removal). 1 On appeal, Mother

argues that the Department of Family and Protective Services (“the

     1 We use pseudonyms for the names of the minors and those of their

family to protect the minors’ identities. Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2)
(Protection of Minor’s Identity in Parental-Rights Termination Cases).
The Father, D.O., whose rights were also terminated, did not appeal and
will only be discussed as necessary.
                                     1
Department”) failed to introduce legally and factually sufficient evidence

to prove her rights to Amy, Dennis, Damien, Anna, and Drew should be

terminated or to prove that terminating them is in the children’s best

interest. 2 Because Mother’s issues lack merit, we affirm.

                                Background

     In January 2022, the Department filed a Petition to terminate

Mother’s rights on seven grounds, including (D) and (E) allegations that

Mother had endangered her children. 3 The Department’s petition was

supported by an affidavit signed by an investigator for the Department.

The supporting affidavit, which was admitted into evidence at trial,

contained information about Mother’s history with the Department.

Supporting Affidavit:

     According to the affidavit, in June 2009, Mother was investigated

after testing positive for PCP and benzodiazepine after the birth of her

oldest daughter, Callie. 4 The Department concluded there was

supporting evidence and the allegations were ruled “Reason to Believe.”

     2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2).
     3 See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (K), (N), (O), (P), (R).
     4 Callie is not one of the children in this suit. The record is unclear

as to whether Father is the biological father of Callie.
                                    2
     The Department investigated its second case against Mother from

August 2009 to February 2011. At that time, Mother was incarcerated

for criminal charges involving drugs and her oldest child was in the care

of the child’s maternal grandmother.

     In April 2015, the Department investigated Mother for her ability

to adequately supervise, protect, and care for her children after Mother

admitted she was taking Xanax while caring for her children when

Mother did not have a prescription for the medication, but she stated she

believed there was nothing wrong with taking medications not prescribed

to her. The Department concluded there was supporting evidence and the

allegations were ruled “Reason to Believe.”

     In December 2021, an intake was received alleging sexual abuse of

Callie by Father. Callie made consistent outcries of sexual abuse and

neglect by Father. At the time, law enforcement was actively pursuing

charges against Father. The allegations of the sexual abuse of Callie by

Father were ruled “Reason to Believe” by the Department.

     On January 13, 2022, the Department received a report of concerns

of sexual abuse of Amy by Father. The report alleged concerns that

Mother had refused medical treatment for Amy, even though the forensic

                                   3
exam reported an extensive sexual abuse history which included genital

and anal penetration of Amy by Father. Amy stated that the abuse had

been occurring since August 2021 and in a forensic interview at the Garth

House, Amy made an outcry of sexual abuse against Father and provided

details of the abuse. Amy also described incidents where Father made

sexual advances towards her siblings. Amy stated she was told by Mother

to lie about what Father had done. Because of the sexual abuse of Amy

by Father, the Department removed all the children.

Witnesses and Evidence Presented at Trial:

     In February 2023, the Department’s suit against Mother and

Father was called to trial. Mother appeared and testified in the trial. The

trial court heard from three other witnesses: (1) S. Living, the

conservatorship caseworker, (2) the Court Appointed Special Advocate

(CASA) Volunteer Coordinator, and (3) the CASA assigned to the case.

     Living testified that Mother was allegedly present in the next

bedroom when the sexual abuse took place. Living said that Mother knew

what was going on, Mother did not believe her children, and told her

children to lie so Father could stay in the home. Living testified that once

Callie made an outcry of sexual abuse, Mother should have been

                                     4
protective of the children. Living stated that it appeared to her that

Mother chose Father over the children. According to Living, Mother

never admitted to any wrongdoing, and she did not protect her children.

Living testified that Mother took no steps to remove Father from the

home.

     Mother testified at trial that she did not tell Amy to lie about what

Father had done, but Mother conceded that she told Amy not to tell the

truth about the abuse because she did not want her children “to be taken

again.” Mother agreed she was not protective of her children when she

did not believe Callie when Callie told Mother in September 2021 that

Father touched her. Mother stated: “I did not believe her because I did

not see anything with my eyes. I did not – I did not witness anything. So,

no, I did not believe my daughter.” Mother also stated “my first daughter

lies so much I didn’t believe her.”

     At trial, Mother claimed that she now believes her daughters and

that she has taken action to remove Father from the home, and she stated

she has called the police on him at least half a dozen times after she

learned of the allegations.

                                      5
     The CASA Volunteer Coordinator testified that she received a

phone call from Mother on February 13, 2023, just days before trial,

where Mother stated she did not believe Callie’s or Amy’s allegations

against Father, and that Mother told her she “didn’t see any reason” to

kick Father out of the home following Callie’s outcry.

     A family plan of service was created for Mother and made an order

of the court. Although it took Mother five months to begin services, she

did ultimately complete services. Part of the services included

counselling and the notes from Mother’s sessions were admitted as an

exhibit during trial. The counselling notes contain statements that

Mother’s progress “is minimal at best” and that Mother “has a mind-set

of ‘fabricated information’ related to her life and family.”

     Mother completed a psychological evaluation with Dr. Amin, whose

report was admitted as an exhibit during trial. Dr. Amin diagnosed

Mother with bipolar I disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, mild

intellectual disability, severe unknown substance abuse disorder in

remission, and other specified personality disorders (narcissistic,

histrionic, and dependent personality features). Dr. Amin’s report noted

that Mother

                                     6
     has not adequately met the medical, emotional, or welfare
     needs of her children, primarily due to her drug use, lack of
     support and general knowledge regarding child development
     and childrearing practices. Many responsibilities that are
     necessary to maintain a self-sufficient, “routine”, adult
     lifestyle…have not been met effectively by the mother. Her
     own sense of affection and bonding with her children has been
     impacted by her psychiatric problems, lack of insight, drug
     history, lack of parenting skills, lack of involvement, and lack
     of support.

     Dr. Amin’s report also expressed concerns about reunification. The

report concluded that Mother “has been unable to show that she is a

psychologically   capable,    socially     competent,   sober,   financially

independent, mature adult who is able to prioritize the welfare and safety

of her children in all areas long-term.”

     Mother admitted at trial that she has a lengthy history of drug use.

Mother’s Spindletop Center records which were admitted into evidence

at trial reflect that she has a history of using marijuana, cocaine, meth,

and ecstasy, and Mother reported she stopped using cocaine, meth, and

ecstasy after her children were born. That said, Mother admitted in her

testimony at trial that she “probably” used meth during the pendency of

this case. Department records reflect that while the case was being

investigated and when caseworkers visited Mother’s home, it smelled of

marijuana. The trial court also heard testimony that Mother smelled of

                                     7
marijuana when she came to the Department’s office. Mother also

reported she had been taking Xanax pills even though she didn’t have a

prescription for the pills.

      The trial court also heard Mother admit she tested positive for

drugs on a July 2022 hair follicle test. At the time of the positive drug

test, Mother was also pregnant with another child, Pat, who is not one of

the children named in this termination. Mother agreed that Blake is the

father of Pat, and that Blake has a lengthy criminal history, including

charges for harassment of a public servant in a correction or detention

facility and felony possession of a controlled substance, namely PCP.

      The Father of the children who are subjects of this suit also had

gone to prison for selling drugs; and Mother and Father used to smoke

PCP together. Father currently has charges pending for the sexual

assault of his children.

      Mother confessed to having an extensive criminal history, but she

stated her last criminal charge was almost thirteen years ago. Mother

admitted her criminal history included three charges for prostitution, at

least three charges for trespassing, possession of a controlled substance,

theft, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, terroristic threats, two

                                    8
charges for failure to ID, assault, and for the manufacture or delivery of

a controlled substance. She served two years in jail for drug charges.

Mother testified she has been rehabilitated and denied that her criminal

history shows she makes bad decisions.

     The evidence before the trial court also included testimony about

the children’s current placements. Living testified that the children were

safe in their current placements, their needs were being met, and their

placements were able to be protective. Living testified that, although not

a long-term option, the foster home where Amy is placed is able to meet

her mental health needs. The three boys are placed with their maternal

grandmother, who is willing to be a forever home for them. Anna is placed

with a caregiver that is dealing with health issues, so Anna will be

returning to foster care. The children who were old enough to speak each

stated they did not wish to return to their Mother. Amy stated during the

Garth House interview that she did not want to live with Mother and

Father.

     Living, the CASA, and the CASA Volunteer Coordinator each

recommended that the trial court terminate Mother’s parental rights to

the children. Living cited Mother’s inability to protect the children and

                                    9
that the children’s safety remained a concern. The CASA Volunteer

Coordinator stated that Mother was not protective of the children, and

the CASA Volunteer Coordinator did not believe Mother would be able to

implement the things she’s learned to parent the children. The CASA

opined that termination was in the children’s best interest, as it was clear

to her that the “children are not in – as a priority in [Mother’s] life. It

seems like she still has doubt about believing her children and their

outcries, and that is a very big concern.”

     At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court signed an order

terminating the parent-child relationship as to Mother and Father with

Amy, Dennis, Damien, Anna, and Drew. The trial court found by clear

and convincing evidence that the predicate statutory grounds in

subsections D and E of the Family Code were met,5 and also found by

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children’s best

interest. The trial court also found that terminating Mother’s and

Father’s rights to Amy, Dennis, Damien, Anna, and Drew is in their best

interest. Mother appealed from the trial court’s order.

     5 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

                                    10
                            Standard of Review

     At trial, the Department had the burden to prove the allegations in

its petition by clear and convincing evidence. 6 As defined by the Family

Code, clear and convincing evidence “means the measure or degree of

proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”7 In

a case tried to the bench, the trial court acts as the factfinder, determines

what witnesses are credible, decides what weight to give the testimony,

and is free to resolve the inconsistencies that may exist in the testimony. 8

     Under a legal-sufficiency review, we determine whether “a

reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that

its finding was true.” 9 In reviewing the evidence, we “look at all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the finding[,]” “assume that the

factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable

factfinder could do so[,]” and “disregard all evidence that a reasonable

     6   See id. § 161.001(b); In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 740-41 (Tex.
2022).
     7 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007.
     8 See Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. 2011); McGalliard v.
Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); see also City of Keller v.
Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005).
     9 In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002).

                                    11
factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.”10

Still, in our review we will not disregard “undisputed facts that do not

support the finding” that a party is challenging in an appeal.11 When

deciding whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief

or conviction that the evidence supports a finding challenged in an

appeal, we defer to the factfinder’s role as the “‘sole arbiter of the

witnesses’ credibility and demeanor[]’” when the inferences the factfinder

drew from the evidence before the factfinder were reasonable. 12

     When conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we “give due

deference” to the findings that are based on the direct and circumstantial

evidence admitted by the trial court in the trial. 13 In a factual sufficiency

review, the question we must decide is not what we would have found

from the evidence had we been seated as the factfinder.14 Rather the

question is whether from the evidence as a whole the factfinder could

     10 Id.
     11 Id.
     12 In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2012) (quoting In re
J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009)); see In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at
741.
     13 In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (cleaned up).
     14 Id.

                                  12
“reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the

[Department’s] allegations.” 15

      On appeal, to support an argument that the evidence is factually

insufficient to support a finding, the parent challenging the finding

should explain why the factfinder could not have credited the evidence

the parent challenges in favor of the finding the parent disputes.16 A

reviewing court will not find the evidence factually insufficient unless “in

light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant

that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or

conviction[]” in favor of its finding. 17

          Sufficiency of the Evidence—Endangerment Findings

      In issues one and two, Mother argues the evidence is legally and

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings of condition

endangerment and conduct endangerment outlined in subsections

161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). 18 While similar, subsections D and E are not

      15 In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002).
      16 See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
      17 Id. at 267.
      18 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

                                       13
identical. Under subsection D, the Department had to prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, that Mother knowingly placed the children or

allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that

endangered their physical or emotional well-being. 19 Under subsection E,

the Department needed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that

Mother knowingly placed the children with a person or allowed them to

remain in a condition with a person who engaged in conduct that

endangered their well-being.20 Under either subsection D or E, the term

endanger means “‘expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.’”21 Generally, a

parent’s conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and

instability endangers a child’s physical and emotional well-being;22

however, “it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or

that the child actually suffers injury.” 23

      19 See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D).
      20 See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
      21 In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 313 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human

Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987) (citing Endanger,
Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language
599 (1976))).
      22 See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 n.4 (citing In re R.W., 129

S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).
      23 Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533.

                                   14
     Often, evidence used to establish violations of subsections D and E

overlaps. Subsection D does not require evidence that a parent engaged

in conduct multiple times, and evidence that a parent engaged in either

acts or omissions that endangered a child, even a single act or omission,

may suffice. 24 Allegations involving subsection D violations require that

courts examine the period before the Department removed the child from

the home to evaluate the parent that placed or allowed the child to

remain in a condition that endangered the child’s physical or emotional

well-being.25 In contrast, allegations involving subsection E violations,

may be “based on conduct both before and after removal.” 26

     “Without question, sexual abuse is conduct that endangers a child’s

physical or emotional well-being.”27 Sexual abuse of one child in the home

endangers the physical and emotional well-being of the abused child as

well as other children in the same home who may discover the abuse or

     24 In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015,

no pet.) (citing In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2003, pet. denied)).
     25 Id. (citing In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d 790, 795 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2004, no pet.)).
     26 In re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d 60, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2017, pet. denied) (citing In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)).
     27 In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d at 796.

                                      15
may be abused themselves. 28 “Parental knowledge that an actual offense

has occurred is not necessary; it is sufficient that the parent was aware

of the potential for danger and disregarded that risk.” 29

     The record reveals ample evidence that Mother, at a minimum,

knew of the potential danger of sexual abuse of her children by Father

and failed to adequately protect the children from that risk. Mother

admitted that Callie told her in September 2021 that Father sexually

abused her. Despite Callie’s outcries, Mother refused to believe Callie

because she did not see the sexual abuse with her own eyes. Mother

admitted she failed to remove Father from the home but blamed this

action on the Department because she said they did not tell her he could

not be in the home.

     After Mother failed to remove Father from the home, Amy made an

outcry of sexual abuse against Father in January 2022. Testimony at

trial showed that Mother was present in the next bedroom when the

sexual abuse of Amy took place. Amy stated that Mother told her to lie

about the sexual abuse and Mother admitted she told her “not to tell the

     28 Id.
     29 Id.

                                    16
truth” because Mother did not want her children to be removed. Though

Mother said at trial that she now believes Callie and Amy, a telephone

call Mother had just before trial indicated Mother still doubted Callie’s

and Amy’s outcries. Mother also admitted at trial that she failed to

protect the children.

     The record also reveals endangering conditions other than those

relating to sexual abuse. The evidence at trial showed that Mother had a

long drug history with use of marijuana, cocaine, ecstasy, PCP, and meth.

Although Mother claimed to have stopped using drugs, she admitted that

she likely used meth during the pendency of this case and the record

shows she tested positive for drugs during this case and while she was

pregnant with another child. The evidence of Mother’s drug use and

continued drug use during the pendency of the case permitted the trial

court to conclude that she engaged in conduct that subjected her children

“to a life of uncertainty and instability, thereby endangering their

physical and emotional well-being.” 30

     We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that the Department established by clear

     30 See In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d at 777.

                                   17
and convincing evidence that Mother committed the predicate acts

enumerated in subsections D and E. We overrule Mother’s first and

second issues.

          Sufficiency of the Evidence–the Best-Interest Finding

     In her third issue, Mother contends the evidence is legally and

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination

of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. When

deciding whether terminating a parent’s rights is in a child’s best

interest, the inquiry is necessarily “child-centered and focuses on the

child’s well-being,   safety,   and development.” 31     Generally,   when

examining the evidence supporting a best-interest finding, we compare

the evidence admitted in a trial against the nonexclusive factors the

Texas Supreme Court identified in Holley v. Adams.32 The evidence that

     31 In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).
     32  See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). In
Holley, the Texas Supreme Court used these factors when reviewing the
best-interest finding:
      • The child’s desires;
     • The child’s emotional and physical needs, now and in the
       future;
     • The emotional and physical danger to the child, now and in the
       future;
                                    18
relates to a factfinder’s normal decision-making process in finding what

is in a specific child’s best interest need not include evidence addressing

all nine Holley factors.33

     Under the Family Code, there is a strong presumption that keeping

a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest.34 Even so, it is also

presumed “the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe

environment is…in the child’s best interest.” 35

     • The parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody;
     • The programs available to assist the party seeking custody;
     • The plans for the child by the parties seeking custody;
     • The stability of the home or the proposed placement;
     • The parent’s acts or omissions that reveal the existing parent-
       child relationship is improper; and
     • Any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.
     33 In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 (noting the lack of evidence on some

Holley factors “would not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming
a strong belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best
interest[]”).
      34 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(b); see also In R.R., 209 S.W.3d

112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (noting that a “strong presumption” exists favoring
keeping a child with the child’s parent).
      35 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a).

                                    19
      In a best-interest analysis, the focus is on the best interest of the

child, not the best interest of the parent. 36 Often, the evidence that

supports the predicate findings on the D and E grounds may also support

the trial court’s best-interest finding.37 And the Department need not

present evidence to support each of the Holley factors, as the lack of

evidence on some factors will not preclude the factfinder from forming a

strong conviction that terminating the parent-child relationship is in a

child’s best interest, particularly when the evidence is undisputed that

the parent endangered the child.38 As the reviewing court, the question

we must decide is whether the record, when considered as a whole,

supports the trial court’s best-interest finding. 39

      As already mentioned, the trial court found that Mother

endangered her children based on the evidence presented at trial. The

trial court could have reasonably concluded that—terminating Mother’s

      36 Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d

81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ).
      37 In re T.R.S., No. 09-18-00482-CV, 2019 WL 2455273, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont June 13, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The same evidence
that supports a trial court’s findings under subsections D, E, . . . may also
be relevant to the trial court’s best-interest finding.”).
      38 In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.
      39 Id. at 28.

                                      20
parental rights was required to prevent Mother from endangering her

children again, Mother failed to protect her children from sexual abuse

by Father, Mother told Amy to lie about the abuse to keep Father in the

house, and Mother admitted just before trial that she still did not believe

the outcries from her daughters.

     The trial court heard testimony the children were safe in their

current placements, their needs were being met, and their placements

were able to be protective. Although not a long-term option, Amy is

currently placed in a foster home that is able to meet her mental health

needs. The three boys are placed with their maternal grandmother, who

is willing to be a forever home for them. Anna is currently placed with a

caregiver that is dealing with health issues and will be returning to foster

care. The children who were old enough to verbalize their desires each

stated they did not wish to return to their Mother. Amy stated during the

Garth House interview that she did not want to live with Mother and

Father.

     During the case, Mother was not allowed visitation with her

children because of the sexual abuse allegations and her inability to be

protective. While in Mother’s care, Mother reported that Dennis had to

                                    21
repeat kindergarten and defecated on himself and was still in a diaper at

seven years old, but she did not take him to a doctor for those problems.

The service plan also reflected concerns that Amy was in a caregiver role.

Mother testified that she did not know that Amy was suffering from

nightmares and anger issues about the sexual abuse.

        A parent’s past conduct is relevant to a trial court’s decision about

what is in a child’s best interest.40 As already discussed, the trial court

heard evidence that Mother had drug use issues that continued during

the pendency of this case. Mother continued to associate with men who

have criminal charges and who used drugs. In fact, Mother admitted she

used drugs during her pregnancy with Pat, who as we previously

mentioned is not one of the children the Department named in this suit.41

Likewise, Dr. Amin’s report indicates that Mother has untreated mental

health issues that Mother is unlikely to address, and Mother has

substance abuse issues for which Mother is not likely to seek long-term

care.

        40 Id. at 27-28.
        41 Pat was born after the Department received a report in January

2022 alleging that Father was abusing Amy and after the Department
opened the investigation that resulted in the judgment at issue in this
appeal.
                                  22
     Deferring to the trial court’s role as the sole arbiter of the facts, we

conclude the record contains legally and factually sufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s best-interest finding.42 We overrule Mother’s

third issue.

                                Conclusion

     Because Mother’s issues lack merit, the trial court’s judgment is

     AFFIRMED.

                                              _________________________
                                                 LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                       Justice

Submitted on June 20, 2023
Opinion Delivered August 3, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

     42 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(2), 263.307(a); see also In

re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.
                                    23