Court Opinion

ID: 9625630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:46:12.142106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:12.197102
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority decision, in my opinion, is patently inconsistent with this court’s holding in People v. Musgrave, 187 Colo. 135, 529 P.2d 313 (1974). See also People v. Duran, 188 Colo. 420, 535 P.2d 505 (1975). See generally, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). The factual background of the instant case is all but identical to the facts in the Musgrave case. In this case, the informant arranged the drug transaction by telephone with the defendant and introduced the defendant to Agent Perez at the time of the drug transaction. Not only was the informant an eyewitness and ear-witness to the transaction, but he actively participated in the negotiations for sale. These facts track those which were the foundation for Musgrave point for point.
In Musgrave, the informant was instrumental in arranging the drug transaction and made the introductions which led to the sale of the drugs. He was present during the entire transaction and participated therein. We held in that case:
“When it was established that the purported informant was an eyewitness and earwitness to the sale and participated to the extent that he did, the court should have ordered disclosure of the informant’s identity.”

See also People v. Duran, supra.

The majority would distinguish the facts of the instant case on the basis that one James Cortez was also present in the defendant’s residence at the time of the drug transaction. In my opinion, the presence of Cortez at the residence and his subsequent availability as a witness at trial in no way dilutes the merits of the defendant’s claim that the informant should be disclosed.
In Musgrave, at least five other persons were present in the apartment where the drug transaction occurred, and several individuals actually observed the exchange. Nonetheless, we held that disclosure of the informant was required. In this case, only one other person was present, and Agent Perez was uncertain whether that person was even in the room at the time of the transaction. Perez testified that James Cortez, a minor, was sitting in a chair watching television when he and the informant first *262entered the defendant’s residence. He then stated that sometime, possibly before the actual exchange took place, Cortez left the room. Absolutely no evidence on the record suggests that James Cortez heard or observed the transaction in question. Additionally, Agent Perez was unable to recall the name of the informant. These facts demonstrate, in my view, the need' for additional information to assist in the search for truth and to guarantee the defendant a fundamentally fair trial, in accordance with the requirements of due process of law.
In Roviaro v. United States, supra, the United States Supreme Coiirt declared that the problem of the disclosure of the identity of a government informant is attended by no fixed rule, but is instead governed by a balancing test:
“The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information [to the police] against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.”
Considerations of fairness in this case outweigh, in my view, the public’s interest in masking the identity of the informant.