Court Opinion

ID: 9567736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:57:16.333291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:33.933175
License: Public Domain

SCHELLHAS, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the district court. The majority concludes that the district court erred in holding that appellant’s claims are barred by res judicata. I disagree.
In this case, appellant sued her ex-husband for fraud in the underlying dissolution proceeding. Appellant prevailed after a court trial on the fraud claim, and judgment was entered. After ex-husband filed a notice of appeal, he and appellant reached a final settlement through which appellant reserved her right to pursue an action against respondents, and ex-husband dismissed his appeal. Appellant then brought this action for fraud.
After noting that “[appellant] does not dispute that her earlier claim against [ex-husband] Rucker involved the same set of factual circumstances as the present case, resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and provided [appellant] with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter,” and after a well-reasoned analysis, the district court held that
privity exists between Rucker and his attorney, Schmidt, and Schmidt’s law firm, Rider Bennett. Minnesota does not have a prevailing definition of privity which can be automatically applied. Instead, courts are instructed to carefully examine the facts of each case. Here, [appellant] brought this action based on the same set of operative facts as the fraud action against Rucker, and the alleged fraud arose out of Schmidt’s representation of Rucker in the underlying divorce proceeding. The Court is persuaded by the precedent established and widely cited in the federal and state courts of the Eighth Circuit, which consistently hold that an attorney is in privity with his client for purposes of res judicata. Although not all other jurisdictions reach the same conclusion, on balance, the weight of authority compels the conclusion that an attorney and its client are in privity for purposes of res judicata. Under the operation of res judicata, [appellant’s] claims against [respondents] are barred and summary judgment in [respondents’] favor is appropriate.
I agree with the district court.
“Privity requires a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right.” Beutz v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 431 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Minn.1988). As noted by the district court, this court has recently stated, “the circumstances of each case must be examined to determine the nature and extent of the relationship between a formal party and the person alleged to have been in privity with that party.” Crossman v. Lockwood, 713 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn.App.2006). The foreign cases cited by the district court address circumstances very similar to those present here and provide helpful precedent. Under the narrow factual circumstances presented here, where the alleged fraud by respondent attorney arose only out of the attorney’s represen*419tation of ex-husband, I agree with the district court that the attorney and his law firm were in privity with ex-husband, as a matter of law, such that appellant should be barred by res judicata from relitigating the fraud claim that was earlier fully and fairly tried.
I would affirm the district court.