Court Opinion

ID: 9401145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-10 21:00:40.808937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.482752
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-1749      Doc: 21         Filed: 06/09/2023    Pg: 1 of 4

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-1749

        EDWARD LAWTON SPIVEY,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        MOHAWK ESV, INC.,

                            Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Roanoke. Elizabeth Kay Dillon, District Judge. (7:19-cv-00670-EKD-RSB)

        Submitted: March 31, 2023                                            Decided: June 9, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and AGEE and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Thomas E. Strelka, L. Leigh R. Strelka, N. Winston West, IV, Brittany M.
        Haddox, Monica L. Mroz, STRELKA EMPLOYMENT LAW, Roanoke, Virginia, for
        Appellant. Crystal L. Tyler, JACKSON LEWIS, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1749      Doc: 21          Filed: 06/09/2023     Pg: 2 of 4

        PER CURIAM:

               Edward Lawton Spivey appeals from the district court’s order granting summary

        judgment to his former employer, Mohawk ESV, Inc. (“Mohawk”), on Spivey’s claim of

        age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.

        §§ 621 to 634. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

               “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Battle v.

        Ledford, 912 F.3d 708, 712 (4th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there

        is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

        of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is ‘genuine’ for these purposes so long as a

        reasonable jury could resolve it in [the nonmovant’s] favor.” Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295,

        302 (4th Cir. 2021). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we

        “view[] the facts and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

        nonmovant.” Salley v. Myers, 971 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2020), abrogated on other

        grounds by Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022). However, “the nonmoving party

        must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one

        inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Humphreys &

        Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015)

        (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “The ADEA prohibits employers from refusing to hire, discharging, or otherwise

        discriminating against any person who is at least 40 years of age ‘because of’ the person’s

        age.” EEOC v. Baltimore Cnty., 747 F.3d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C.

        §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a)). To demonstrate a claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must either

                                                      2
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1749      Doc: 21         Filed: 06/09/2023     Pg: 3 of 4

        provide direct evidence of discrimination or demonstrate a prima facie case of

        discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see

        also Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying McDonnell Douglas

        framework to ADEA claims), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin.

        Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 177-80 (2009). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination

        under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:

               (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse
               employment action (such as discharge), (3) he was performing his job duties
               at a level that met the employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the
               adverse employment action, and (4) his position remained open or was filled
               by a similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class.

        Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 742 (4th Cir. 2006).

               If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, then the burden shifts to the employer

        to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.

        Dugan v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d 716, 721 (4th Cir. 2002). If the employer

        comes forward with such a reason, “the burden reverts to the plaintiff to establish that the

        employer’s non-discriminatory rationale is a pretext for intentional discrimination.”

        Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank, 434 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2006). To do so, the plaintiff

        must “show that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence, thus

        supporting an inference of discrimination, or offer other forms of circumstantial evidence

        sufficiently probative of intentional discrimination.” Dugan, 293 F.3d at 721.

               We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Spivey failed to

        establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. The evidence

        showed that Spivey was not meeting Mohawk’s expectation that he maintain a safe

                                                     3
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1749      Doc: 21         Filed: 06/09/2023     Pg: 4 of 4

        working environment at the company’s Hillsville, Virginia, manufacturing plant.

        Maintaining a safe workplace was one of Spivey’s job duties, as evidenced by his job

        description, the fact that the plant’s safety record was included in his annual performance

        reviews, and his own admissions. Furthermore, although Spivey’s supervisors counseled

        Spivey about his duty to ensure safety in his performance reviews, the number of safety

        incidents at the Hillsville plant increased dramatically under Spivey’s tenure. In the face

        of this evidence, Spivey failed to establish that he was meeting Mohawk’s legitimate

        expectations.

               The district court also properly held that, in any event, Spivey failed to rebut the

        legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons Mohawk offered in support of its decision to

        terminate his employment.       Specifically, Spivey quibbles with minor, immaterial

        inconsistencies among Mohawk representatives’ accounts of the termination and

        complains that the reasons for the termination of his employment were unsupported by

        documentation, but he offers nothing other than speculation to suggest that Mohawk’s

        expectations regarding safety were a pretext for discrimination.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

                                                    4