Court Opinion

ID: 9665805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:57:30.256553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:19.118566
License: Public Domain

MASON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from Division II and would accordingly reverse.
There is no dispute that serious error, a violation of defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent, arose during prosecution’s direct examination of the arresting officer. While I am satisfied the prosecution did not purposely elicit the objectionable testimony, witness’ response called the jury’s attention to defendant’s refusal to answer questions upon arrest.
Comment on defendant’s silence trespasses the protective boundaries of Fifth Amendment and is, as the majority notes, clearly proscribed by Miranda v. Arizona.
Such comment has been qualitatively equated with impermissible comment on an accused’s failure to testify.
In State v. Ford, 80 N.M. 649, 651, 459 P.2d 353, 355, the court, in reversing and granting a new trial because of the prosecution’s reference in jury argument to defendant’s failure to proclaim his innocence or protest it at the time of arrest, approved this language from Gillison v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 215, 399 F.2d 586 (1968):
“ ‘In Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, the Supreme Court hel dthat the Fifth Amendment forbids prosecutor and court from commenting on an accused’s failure to testify on his own behalf. The distance between that issue and the prosecutor’s comments here about the accused’s failure to make an exculpatory statement upon arrest is infinitesimal. Indeed, in Miranda v. State of Arizona, the Supreme Court recognized the applicability of Griffin to this situation, when, at footnote 37, * * * *899[setting out the statement previously quoted from this footnote]. Even where there is no interrogation and the accused merely remains silent, no weight whatever can be given to the accused’s silence. We agree with the Second Circuit in United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173, that “it is well settled that an inference of guilt may not be drawn from a failure to speak or to explain when a person has been arrested.” ’ ”
State v. Bowman, 204 Kan. 234, 235-236, 461 P.2d 735, 736, related to admissibility of a detective’s testimony that at the custodial inquisition defendant made no comment when confronted with the incriminating statement of an alleged accomplice. On appeal defendant contended the admission of the evidence violated his constitutional rights. In reversing and remanding for a new trial the court made use of this statement from State v. Dearman, 198 Kan. 44, 46, 422 P.2d 573, 575:
“ ‘Thus, when the appellant was placed under arrest by the officers in this case and said he wanted to see a lawyer, he was exercising a federal constitutional right. At this juncture he also had the constitutional right to remain silent.
“ ‘ * * * A similar case was before the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, in Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1965). There the court said:
“ ‘ “ * * * Thus when Fagundes said when he was arrested and handcuffed that he wanted to see a lawyer he was exercising a federal constitutional right. And certainly at that juncture he had the constitutional right to keep silent. * * * His assertion of one constitutional right, his right to counsel, and his reliance upon another constitutional right, his right to remain silent when charged with crime, we think cannot be used against him substantively as an admission of guilt, for to do so would be to render the constitutional rights mere empty formalities devoid of practical substance. * * *»
“ ‘We think the foregoing decision is persuasive and hold that evidence disclosing that one charged with crime has asserted his constitutional right to counsel, and his constitutional right to remain silent, cannot be used against him substantively as an admission of guilt.’ ”
The Kansas court then made reference to the footnote in Miranda v. Arizona which is quoted in Division II by the majority.
Although we have not had the occasion to consider the announcement of the court in the footnote to Miranda v. Arizona, “Since Griffin v. State of California (1964), 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, we have held comments and instructions drawing inferences of guilt from defendant’s failure to testify violate the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and constitute reversible error. * * [citing authorities].” State v. Kimball, 176 N.W.2d 864, 868, (Iowa 1970).
Borrowing from State v. Ford, 80 N.M. at 651, 459 P.2d at 355, the distance is infinitesimal between forbidding the prosecutor or the court from commenting on an accused’s failure to testify on his own behalf and denying admissibility of the state’s evidence the accused, while under arrest and in police custody after having been warned of his constitutional rights as enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, exercises his right to remain silent. Silence of an accused may not be used directly or indirectly to aid the prosecution. State v. Osborne, 258 Iowa 390, 393, 139 N.W.2d 177, 179.
That the witness’ testimony was substantially prejudicial to defendant is axiomatic. It constitutes an obvious comment on defendant’s silence from which an inference of guilt may be drawn, and as held in State v. Kimball, supra, it constitutes reversible error. I perceive no significant difference, as concerns defendant’s constitu*900tional rights, whether the forbidden comment comes from the court, the prosecuting attorney, or prosecution’s witness. The prejudicial effect is evident in all instances.
' The majority’s denial of defendant’s contention urged in this assignment of error is based on the premise “no constitutionally inadmissible evidence was submitted for the jury’s consideration” and error, if any, was cured by the procedure followed by the trial court, referring to the court’s ruling on defendant’s counsel’s motion to strike the witness’ answer. Hence, there was no error at all.
I cannot agree. In the first place, comment on defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent is error. There was such comment here. In the second place, the error was not cured under the circumstances shown in this record. No admonition to disregard witness’ statement was given to the jury, either at the moment of objection or in jury instructions. The incriminating statement was stricken from the record, but a residue of prejudice remained. The injustice of the improper testimony was not eliminated by later testimony given when the jury was recalled after hearing defendant’s motion for mistrial.
The majority finds adequate cure provided by court’s ruling, citing State v. Carey, 165 N.W.2d 27, (Iowa 1969), where the court observed that ordinarily, withdrawal of evidence from- jury’s consideration cures any error in the admission of improper evidence. Yet we went on to state: “However, we have held in a number of cases that the mere withdrawal of evidence does not always remove its prejudicial effect. In State v, Brundidge, 118 Iowa 92, 91 N.W. 920, 921, we said, ‘It is true, also, as contended by the state, we have recognized the rule that, where incompetent evidence has been received, its subsequent withdrawal or exclusion by the trial court will ordinarily cure the error. It is, however, a rule which may easily be abused, —especially in the trial of a criminal case— * * *.’ ” See also State v. Paden, 199 Iowa 383, 202 N.W. 105 and State. v. Tharp, 258 Iowa 224, 138 N.W.2d 78.
This court has recognized that prompt withdrawal of improper testimony, even with full admonition to disregard, may in certain circumstances be insufficient to erase prejudicial effect. See State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194, (Iowa 1971); State v. Coffee, 182 N.W.2d 390, (Iowa 1970); Castner v. Wright, 256 Iowa 638, 127 N.W.2d 583.
In this instance a distinct, express withdrawal, accompanied by proper admonition to disregard, is absent. Attention is called to the fact neither the State nor the majority contended Brennan’s statement, “He wouldn’t answer me,” was mere inadvertence.
The majority cites United States v. Jiminez-Badilla, 434 F.2d 170, (Cir. 9) and United States v. Kershner, 432 F.2d 1066, 1071-1072, (Cir. 5) as support for its position. However, in Jiminez-Badilla the court admonished the jury to disregard the objectionable testimony. In Kershner the statement was regarded as a type of inadvertence. Neither impress me as being support for the position asserted by the majority.
The counsel acted with commendable promptness in protecting defendant’s constitutional rights. This is not a case where the defense attorney awaits the outcome of the trial and then complains but one in which counsel took precaution by motion in limine before trial in an effort to guard against just what happened here.
The majority further supports its position by observing no necessary connection between the question and defendant’s involvement in the crime under investigation. This reasoning misconstrues the logic un*901derlying the protection of the right to remain silent.
The right to remain silent is intended to safeguard an accused from being compelled to incriminate himself. If comment on accused’s silence were allowed, the resulting innuendo would be devastating, and the right to remain silent would be rendered nugatory. It makes no difference whether the question directed to accused patently connects him with the crime — comment on his refusal to answer must be categorically prohibited. It is the innuendo and insinuation resulting from comment on defendant’s silence, which if unchecked may force self-incrimination, that is being avoided.
“ * * * [A]ny such reference [to defendant’s silence] violates the Fifth Amendment because ‘It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.’ * * * ” State v. Johnson, 257 Iowa 1052, 135 N.W.2d 518, 521, quoting Griffin v. State of California, supra.
Even if it were to be argued the trial court has a large measure of discretion in ruling on motions to strike testimony and admonishing the jury regarding the effect of testimony and that a manifest abuse must appear before we will interfere, I would hold there was such abuse of discretion here as to require reversal.
However, since this argument was not advanced I would hold Brennan’s statement was a proscribed comment on defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent and the error arising from the comment was not cured by the court’s procedure.
RAWLINGS and BECKER, JJ., join in this dissent.