Court Opinion

ID: 9657949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:41:54.837307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:49.735416
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, P. J.
(dissenting). In this action for a declaratory judgment, the trial court concluded:
“It is the finding of the court that on the basis of the record in this case the tractor in question was attached to a trailer used to carry property in a business at the time the accident occurred; that the tractor in question was excluded from coverage under policy no. 54-87-120; and that because there is no coverage under the policy there is no obligation on plaintiff to defend defendant Rombough in any claim for damages in docket no. 335.”
I would affirm.
The.defense provision of the insurance contract is clear and unambiguous. It provides:
“With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy * * * the company shall: (a) Defend any suit against the insured * * * even if such suit is groundless.” (Emphasis supplied.)
By its express terms, the policy clearly limits the insurer’s obligation to defend. The insurer can only *613be required to defend those suits in which the com-' plaints allege facts which, if proved, establish liability upon the insured, and with respect to such liability the policy provides coverage. See American Fidelity Co. v. Deerfield Valley Grain Co. (D Vt, 1942), 43 F Supp 841, quoted with approval in Duval v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1943), 304 Mich 397, 401.
The majority conclude that Latz’s complaint “sets forth allegations which, if true, would subject Rom-bough to liability covered by the policy.” I disagree. On its face, the - complaint is ambiguous. Latz alleged only that Rombough was owner of a tractor-trailer unit negligently driven with his knowledge and consent. Accepting these allegations as true, we cannot conclude that the liability imposed would be covered by the policy.1 It must first be determined whether at the time of the accident “the automobile or any trailer attached thereto [was being] used to carry property in any business.” In such a situation, resort to the allegations of the injured party’s pleading2 cannot provide an appropriate measure of the insurer’s duty to defend. We must' of necessity turn to extrinsic evidence; and, as in this case, an action for declaratory judgment ‘ by either the insurer3 or the insured4 provides an ideal *614forum in which to determine the scope of an insurer’s obligation to defend.5
6
Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s finding that the specific vehicle involved was excluded from coverage under the policy. Notwithstanding this finding, defendant asserts that plaintiff is obliged to provide the defense in the Latz suit. This result, it is argued, is required since plaintiff has contracted to defend any suit, including groundless actions. In effect, we are urged to hold the policy’s obligation to defend absolute. This we cannot do.
“The insurer is not required to defend the insured against claims expressly excluded from coverage in the policy. This exception in the policy is a part of the contract between the parties. The duty of the insurance company to defend was not independent of the duty to pay damages, if any. The two provisions are not separable.” Duval v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 401, 402.
Accord, Burton v. Travelers Insurance Company (1954), 341 Mich 30; Central Wholesale Company v. Wolverine Insurance Company (1966), 4 Mich App 688. The provision requiring plaintiff to defend “even if such suit is groundless” cannot be construed as imposing upon the insurer the duty to defend *615claims outside the coverage of the insurance contract. See Annotation, “Allegations in Third Person’s Action against Insured as Determining Liability Insurer’s Duty to Defend.” 50 ALR2d 458, 474.
In the present case, defendant did not pay for, or secure, insurance protection against the claim asserted by Latz. The trial court noted that under defendant insured’s policy “the coverage was bobtail coverage only.” Such insurance is sold at a low premium because of the limited coverage provided.6 The majority, in effect, impose upon the insurance company an obligation for -which the company has received no consideration. The result emasculates the policy’s express limitation upon the insurer’s obligation to defend. The provision requiring plaintiff to defend only those suits “with respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy” is rendered meaningless. This we have no right to do.
“This Court recognizes the cardinal principle of construction that a contract is to he construed as a whole and that all of its parts are to he harmonized so far as reasonably possible; that no part is to be taken as eliminated or stricken by some other part unless such a result is fairly inescapable.” Burton v. Travelers Insurance Co., supra, p 32.
In Kramarczyk v. Jontz (1937), 282 Mich 208, 211, the Court considered the very question now before us.
“If there was no coverage in this instance, may the insurer be held to the obligation of defending the actions brought against the insured and, therefore, liable for the expense of the defense and the costs taxed in such suits?”
In my view, the Court’s response controls this case.
*616“We need but say that, if the insurance did not cover the car, there was no obligation to take care of the defense.” Kramarczyk v. Jontz, supra, p 212.
Tbe judgment should be affirmed.

 Nor is it unusual that the allegations of Latz’s complaint, even if accepted as true, fail to resolve the issue of coverage. The difficulty is that “[t]he draftsman of a complaint against the insured is not interested in the question of coverage which later arises between insurer and insured.” Ritchie v. Anchor Casualty Company (1955), 135 Cal App 2d 245 (286 P2d 1000, 1003).

 “It is settled that the insurer’s duty to defend the insured is measured by the allegation in plaintiff’s pleading.” Guerdon Industries, Inc., v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York (1963), 371 Mich 12, 18.

 See Guerdon Industries v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, supra fn. 2; American Fidelity Co. v. Deerfield Valley Grain Co. (D Vt, 1942), 43 F Supp 841.

 See Guerdon Industries v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, supra fn. 2; Economy Mills of Elwell, Inc. v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Company (1967), 8 Mich App 451.

 See 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 687. In faet, an action for declaratory judgment may provide the only solution to the dilemma confronting the insurer. “The decision whether or not to defend the injured person’s suit is frequently difficult for the insurer. This is particulary so where the insurer desires to show that the injured party’s allegations refer to facts excluded from the policy coverage. If under such circumstances the insurer refuses to defend and decides to await the determination of its obligation in a subsequent proceeding against it, it must do so at its peril, and if it guessed wrong it must bear the consequences, legal or otherwise, of its breach of contract. * * * However, the insurer may have [a] solution available in its dilemma. It may seek to secure an adjudication of nonliability by way of a declaratory judgment. Sueh a judgment, if available, settles definitely the question of its duty to defend.” Annotation, “Allegations in Third Person’s Action against Insured as Determining Liability Insurer’s Duty to Defend,” 50 ALR2d 458, 462, 463.

 For a discussion of the nature and scope of “bobtail” coverage, see Ayers v. Kidney (CA 6, 1964), 333 F2d 812, 813.