Court Opinion

ID: 9897990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:37.758668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:05.333591
License: Public Domain

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                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

          STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                          No. 83797-4-I
                               Appellant,
                                                          DIVISION ONE
                        v.
                                                          PUBLISHED OPINION
          ALEJANDRO SAMUEL MEZA,

                               Respondent.

                 HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — The State of Washington appeals from an order

          granting a new trial based on the cumulative prejudice that resulted from

          pervasive prosecutorial misconduct. Because the trial court did not abuse its

          discretion, we affirm.

                                               FACTS

                 On March 7, 2021, Alejandro Meza and Gene Peterson were involved in a

          verbal, and then physical, altercation on a bus in Everett.       Meza accused

          Peterson of smoking drugs on the bus and told him to stop. The men, along with

          Peterson’s associate, Howard Forbes, argued briefly and then Peterson struck

          Meza in the face. Meza began bleeding from the blow and became concerned

          about having a seizure based on his medical history.       As they continued to

          scuffle, Peterson pulled Meza’s hood over his head, obscuring his vision.
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          No. 83797-4-I/2

                Meza testified that the fight escalated further when he saw and felt a hand

          reaching for his waist, where he was carrying a firearm and knives. Meza drew

          his firearm and fired two shots, one second apart, killing Peterson. The entire

          encounter was captured on video by a security camera on the bus. Meza made

          no pre-arrest statements to officers, but did make several statements after he

          was given Miranda1 warnings, both on the scene and later at the police station

          pursuant to a recorded interview. He terminated the recorded interview after

          invoking his right to remain silent and to counsel at which point the officers

          ceased questioning.

                The State initially charged Meza with murder in the second degree. The

          information was later amended to add an allegation that the intentional murder

          was committed with a deadly weapon, a separate firearm enhancement, and one

          misdemeanor count of carrying a concealed weapon without a license. The case

          proceeded to trial and Meza testified. In his cross-examination of Meza, the

          prosecutor stated, “I want to talk about some of the new information that

          previously hasn’t been disclosed until Friday,” a reference to the day during trial

          when Meza began to testify. Meza objected and argued this was a comment on

          his exercise of the right to remain silent and to counsel. The court sustained the

          objection and explained its reasoning, but denied Meza’s subsequent request for

          a mistrial. In sustaining the defense objection, the following exchange between

          the court and the deputy prosecutor occurred:

                [THE COURT:] Well, you can point out the differences. That — I
                have no — I don’t think that’s objectionable. It’s the form of what

                1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 694 (1966).

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          No. 83797-4-I/3

                    you asked. New information is highly prejudicial. And that’s the
                    problem.
                           It’s not that you can’t compare the statements he made on
                    the stand or the statements he made to the officers. It’s the way
                    you’re phrasing it that makes it prejudicial and makes it look like
                    suddenly he’s holding back. When he has the right to answer the
                    questions when he’s in front of the officers any way he wants to,
                    and he can remain silent.
                    You know this.

                    [DEPUTY PROSECUTOR]: I do.

                    THE COURT: So that’s the problem.

          (Emphasis added.) Despite this instruction from the court, the prosecutor made

          several similar statements during his closing argument about Meza’s failure to

          incorporate the details provided in his trial testimony into his earlier statements to

          police.      The prosecutor additionally misstated the burden of proof and

          characterized the shooting as an execution.

                    The jury found Meza not guilty of murder in the second degree, but

          convicted him of the lesser included offense, which had been provided to the jury

          over his objection, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm enhancement.

          Meza moved for a new trial under CrR 7.5.          He argued that the cumulative

          prejudice of the prosecutor’s comment in cross-examination, in addition to the

          statements made during closing argument, necessitated a new trial. The court

          granted the motion, issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law along with its

          ruling.

                    The State timely appealed.

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                                             ANALYSIS

                Under CrR 7.5(a)(2), if “it affirmatively appears that a substantial right of

          the defendant was materially affected” by “[m]isconduct of the prosecution or

          jury,” the court “may grant a new trial.” We review a decision on a motion for a

          new trial for abuse of discretion. State v. Burke, 163 Wn.2d 204, 210, 181 P.3d 1

          (2008). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is based on “untenable

          grounds or for untenable reasons, such as a misunderstanding of the underlying

          law.” Id. We review the trial court’s “‘rulings as to the law’” de novo. State v.

          Lupastean, 200 Wn.2d 26, 37, 513 P.3d 781 (2022) (internal quotation marks

          omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 113 Wn.2d 154, 158, 776

          P.2d 676 (1989)).    The court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial

          evidence. State v. Wood, 19 Wn. App. 2d 743, 775, 498 P.3d 968 (2021).

                Where a motion for a new trial is based on prosecutorial misconduct, “the

          trial court applies the same standard as an appellate court reviewing such

          claims.” State v. McKenzie, 157 Wn.2d 44, 52, 134 P.3d 221 (2006). The court

          views the State’s allegedly improper remarks “‘in the context of the total

          argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and

          the instructions given to the jury’” to determine if the prosecutor’s comments were

          improper and prejudiced the accused. Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d

          529, 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)).

                A trial judge has “‘broad discretion in granting motions for new trial.’”

          State v. Mohamed, 186 Wn.2d 235, 240-41, 375 P.3d 1068 (2016) (quoting State

          v. Williams, 96 Wn.2d 215, 221, 634 P.2d 868 (1981)). We afford even greater

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          No. 83797-4-I/5

          deference to a court’s decision to grant a new trial than a ruling to deny. State v.

          Lopez, 190 Wn.2d 104, 117, 410 P.3d 1117 (2018). This deferential standard is

          “based on ‘the oft repeated observation that the trial judge, having seen and

          heard the proceedings, is in a better position to evaluate and adjudge than we

          can from a cold, printed record.’” State v. Perez-Valdez, 172 Wn.2d 808, 819,

          265 P.3d 853 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McKenzie, 157

          Wn.2d at 52). Likewise, because it has the benefit of witnessing the proceedings

          live, “the trial court is in the best position to discern prejudice.” State v. Garcia,

          177 Wn. App. 769, 777, 313 P.3d 422 (2013). With these principles in mind, we

          turn to the merits of the State’s appeal.

          I.     Improper Comment on Exercise of Constitutional Right

                 A.     General Principles

                 An individual’s exercise of their right to remain silent after receiving

          Miranda warnings may not “be used to impeach an explanation subsequently

          offered at trial.” Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d

          91 (1976). This is by virtue of the fact that “every post-arrest silence is insolubly

          ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested.”

          Id. at 617. However, the rule “does not apply to cross-examination that merely

          inquires into prior inconsistent statements” as “[s]uch questioning makes no

          unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving

          Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent.” Anderson v. Charles,

          447 U.S. 404, 408, 100 S. Ct. 2180, 65 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1980).              Under this

          Supreme Court precedent, “the State may question a defendant’s failure to

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          No. 83797-4-I/6

          incorporate the events related at trial into the statement given [to] police or it may

          challenge inconsistent assertions” if “a defendant waives the right to remain silent

          and makes a statement to police.” State v. Belgarde, 110 Wn.2d 504, 511, 755

          P.2d 174 (1988). Where a defendant makes a statement to police and then

          asserts something different at trial, the “‘partial silence’ . . . is not insolubly

          ambiguous, but ‘strongly suggests a fabricated defense and the silence properly

          impeaches the later defense.’” Id. at 511-12 (quoting State v. Cosden, 18 Wn.

          App. 213, 221, 568 P.2d 802 (1977)).

                 In State v. Romero, Division Three of this court articulated a two-step

          analytical framework “for dealing with the problem of direct and indirect

          comments from State agents about a defendant’s constitutional right of silence.”

          113 Wn. App. 779, 790, 54 P.3d 1255 (2002). Under Romero, a direct comment

          is a constitutional error. Id. In contrast, if a comment is indirect, “three questions

          should be considered before deciding whether the comment rises to

          constitutional proportions.” Id.

                 First, could the comment reasonably be considered purposeful,
                 meaning responsive to the State’s questioning, with even slight
                 inferable prejudice to the defendant’s claim of silence? Second,
                 could the comment reasonably be considered unresponsive to a
                 question posed by either examiner, but in the context of the
                 defense, the volunteered comment can reasonably be considered
                 as either (a) given for the purpose of attempting to prejudice the
                 defense, or (b) resulting in the unintended effect of likely prejudice
                 to the defense? Third, was the indirect comment exploited by the
                 State during the course of the trial, including argument, in an
                 apparent attempt to prejudice the defense offered by the
                 defendant?

          Id. at 790-91 (citations omitted). “Answering ‘yes’ to any of these three questions

          means the indirect comment is an error of constitutional proportions.” Id. at 791.

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                 B.      Parties’ Dispute as to Applicable Case Law

                 The State first argues that the prosecutor’s statements are distinguishable

          from cases where courts have held the State improperly commented on the

          accused’s exercise of their right to silence.             It contends that several facts

          distinguish this case from previous ones: (1) Meza provided more than “limited

          statements” to police before invoking his right to remain silent and to counsel, (2)

          the prosecutor never directly stated that Meza ended his interview or refused to

          answer questions, and (3) the prosecutor did not imply that Meza’s silence was

          evidence of guilt, but rather used the omissions to attack Meza’s credibility.

          Because of this, the State alleges, the prosecutor’s comments are more akin to

          Anderson,2 Hatley,3 Cosden,4 and Young.5

                 In Anderson, the Court held that the State did not improperly comment on

          post-arrest silence because “[t]he quoted colloquy, taken as a whole, does ‘not

          refe[r] to the [respondent’s] exercise of his right to remain silent; rather [it asks]

          the [respondent] why, if [his trial testimony] were true, he didn’t tell the officer that

          he stole the decedent’s car from the tire store parking lot instead of telling him

          that he took it from the street.’” 447 U.S. at 408-09 (most alterations in original)

          (quoting People v. Charles, 58 Mich. App. 371, 381, 227 N.W.2d 348 (1975)).

          However, nothing in Anderson indicates the defendant ever invoked his right to

          silence or to counsel, and the colloquy focused on the factual differences

          between two contradictory statements, rather than omissions. Id.

                 2 447 U.S. 404, 408, 100 S. Ct. 2180, 65 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1980).
                 3 State v. Hatley, 41 Wn. App. 789, 706 P.2d 1083 (1985).
                 4 State v. Cosden, 18 Wn. App. 213, 568 P.2d 802 (1977).
                 5 State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 574 P.2d 1171 (1978).

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          No. 83797-4-I/8

                 In State v. Hatley, this court held that where a defendant “makes one or

          more statements involving the facts of the case, then he or she has not exercised

          the right to remain silent and is subject to the rules normally governing cross

          examination.” 41 Wn. App. 789, 801, 706 P.2d 1083 (1985). However, Hatley is

          factually distinguishable because there is no indication that the defendant there

          elected to remain silent. Id. at 800. The court stated it was “noteworthy that

          Hatley gave no indication to [the detective] that he desired to exercise his right to

          remain silent, nor did he make any such claim at trial.” Id. at 801.

                 In State v. Cosden, Division Two of this court held that the State properly

          impeached a defendant based on the “wholly inconsistent” statements he made

          to police and at trial. 18 Wn. App. at 220-21. Cosden is factually similar to the

          case before us in that the defendant made a statement to the police after he was

          provided Miranda warnings, but later invoked his right to remain silent. Id. at

          220.    Because Cosden made a statement to police, “there was not an

          unequivocal post-arrest assertion of the right to remain silent,” and, rather, “his

          partial silence strongly suggests a fabricated defense and the silence properly

          impeaches the later defense.” Id. at 220-21.

                 Finally, in State v. Young, our Supreme Court held a prosecutor properly

          argued “the failure of the defendant to disclaim responsibility” because he had

          “voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.” 89 Wn.2d 613, 621, 574 P.2d 1171

          (1978). The court quoted from an Ohio Supreme Court case, which stated in

          part, “‘If a defendant voluntarily offers information to police, his toying with the

          authorities by allegedly telling only part of his story is certainly not protected by

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          Miranda or Doyle.’” Id. at 621 (quoting State v. Osborne, 50 Ohio St. 2d 211,

          220, 364 N.E.2d 216 (1977)).

                 The cases the State relies on generally stand for the proposition that a

          defendant who makes any post-arrest statement to police has waived their right

          to remain silent and thus may be cross-examined on omissions later identified in

          the statement made to police. However, several cases contradict that broad

          premise.

                 Meza urges us to follow State v. Heller. 58 Wn. App. 414, 793 P.2d 461

          (1990). In Heller, we held that “the State was entitled to cross-examine Heller

          regarding her inconsistent prior statements and ‘raise unfavorable inferences

          from the defendant’s failure to tell police at the time of her arrest crucial

          exculpatory information she later relates at trial.’” Id. at 418 (quoting State v.

          Gutierrez, 50 Wn. App. 583, 589, 749 P.2d 213 (1988)). However, the court also

          held that the prosecutor acted improperly when they asked Heller “whether she

          or her attorney ever went to the police or prosecutor after the original

          interrogations to tell them her story,” as it “wrongly suggested to the jury that she

          or her attorney had an affirmative obligation to come forward with an

          explanation.” Id. at 418-19.

                 State v. Silva also contradicts the authority offered by the State. See 119

          Wn. App. 422, 430, 81 P.3d 889 (2003). There, the court held that there was not

          “an incomplete self-serving statement followed by inconsistent trial testimony,”

          which distinguished Silva’s case from other precedent.          Id.   Rather, “Silva

          answered innocuous identifications, then declined to incriminate himself.”        Id.

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          Similarly, in State v. Fuller, Division Two of this court analyzed a prosecutor’s

          statements about a defendant’s silence where the defendant “invoked his right to

          partial silence in not responding to some of [the officer’s] questions or statements

          during the custodial interrogation. Thus, the State could not elicit testimony or

          comment on Fuller’s partial silence to infer his guilt.” 169 Wn. App. 797, 816,

          282 P.3d 126 (2012).

                 C.     Prosecutor’s Statements During Cross-Examination

                 During his cross-examination of Meza, the prosecutor stated, “I want to

          talk about some of the new information that previously hasn’t been disclosed until

          Friday,” referencing the first day Meza testified. In granting the defense objection

          to the State’s comment, the judge explained to the prosecutor, “It’s the way

          you’re phrasing it that makes it prejudicial.”

                 In briefing, the State focuses on its authority to impeach a defendant on

          inconsistent statements rather than the heart of the court’s ruling: the phrasing of

          the prosecutor’s question as an improper comment on Meza’s exercise of his

          right to remain silent. Contrary to the State’s contention, the prosecutor did not

          merely “compare[] the defendant’s statements to police to his trial testimony;” he

          asserted, through the phrasing of his question, that Meza was disclosing “new

          information” at the time of trial.      The court specifically explained that the

          prosecutor “use[d] that type of language to imply that he somehow is holding

          back when he has the right to hold back.”

                 Here, the State could question Meza on the inconsistencies between his

          testimony and the statement he gave to police. However, the language chosen

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          No. 83797-4-I/11

          by the prosecutor in doing so wrongly implied that Meza had an obligation “to

          come forward with an explanation” but, instead, was only providing this “new

          information” at trial.   See Heller, 58 Wn. App. at 419.        The court carefully

          described the reasons why this comment was improper and what the prosecutor

          needed to do to avoid violating the law.          Again, the prosecutor stated his

          agreement to the court’s framing of the issue:

                 [THE COURT:] It’s not that you can’t compare the statements he
                 made on the stand or the statements he made to the officers. It’s
                 the way you’re phrasing it that makes it prejudicial and makes it look
                 like suddenly he’s holding back. When he has the right to answer
                 the questions when he’s in front of the officers any way he wants to,
                 and he can remain silent.
                 You know this.

                 [DEPUTY PROSECUTOR]: I do.

                 THE COURT: So that’s the problem.

          (Emphasis added.)         The   statement       during cross-examination    was an

          impermissible comment on Meza’s invocation of his rights; the prosecutor was

          warned by the court and acknowledged that he understood.

                 D.     Prosecutor’s Statements During Closing Argument

                 Despite the focused discussion with the court, the prosecutor repeated

          this improper argument in closing several times:

                 1. What did Mr. Meza leave out that came out on Friday and
                    yesterday? Mr. Meza left out that he felt someone was reaching
                    for his gun . . . And we don’t hear that until six months later.

                 2. Isn’t it of significant importance to tell the officers that you have
                    had a focal seizure on scene in the back of a cop car, maybe we
                    should hold off on this interview. Nope. We’ll just do it on the day
                    of testimony.

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                3. Isn’t it strange that he didn’t tell those things immediately to
                   officers?

                4. You heard from Mr. Meza that someone was reaching for his gun
                   on his hip — no pockets, no jackets. His gun on his hip for the
                   first time.

                5. [Meza] enjoys no presumption whatsoever as to his credibility.
                   You decide that. That’s your charge. That’s your duty. It’s your
                   charge to decide whether it’s too convenient to remember on the
                   Friday of a jury trial that someone touched your hip. You decide
                   whether it’s credible to neglect to mention to officers that you’ve
                   had a seizure in the back of a cop car. You decide whether it’s
                   reasonable to leave out exactly where the victim was reaching at
                   any one time. And you will be able to listen to the interview to
                   your heart’s content. Tell me where he says exactly where he
                   was reaching, and tell me where he mentions that it was actually
                   on his person and not Mr. Peterson’s. I would submit to you that
                   the difference is glaring. How do you forget to mention that
                   someone is reaching for your gun. And the answer is just that
                   simple because it didn’t happen.

                6. Ladies and gentlemen, I’ll say it again this man may be
                   presumed innocent. He is not presumed credible. And I would
                   submit to you, you’ll have no reason to think he is. You have no
                   reason to think Mr. Meza was credible. Mr. Meza didn’t even tell
                   — remember, he’s sitting in this chair, he gets punched in the
                   face. He feels a metallic taste in his mouth. He thinks he’s about
                   to have a stroke — right? — or a seizure. That’s why he thinks
                   he’s in fear of his life. Never mentioned to the officers. Ever.
                   Never mentioned to the officers no mention to anybody until
                   Friday.

          Although the court had admonished the prosecutor and explained the specific

          basis for his ruling, and counsel for the State affirmatively stated that he

          understood the prejudicial impact of his phrasing, the prosecutor continued

          making improper arguments in the same vein as the statement that drew the

          objection. These statements implied, again and again throughout the State’s

          closing, that Meza had a duty to supplement or correct his earlier statement to

          officers. The trial judge did not err in his conclusion that this constitutes an

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          improper comment on Meza’s exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent

          and to counsel.

                 Critically, Meza’s case is distinct from those now cited by the State

          because the supplemental details he provided at trial are not inconsistent with his

          statement given to police and are borne out by the security footage from the bus

          that the State introduced. For example, Meza testified at trial that he felt a hand

          reaching near his waist that he believed was Peterson’s. The video footage of

          the interaction appeared to show that approximately five seconds before Meza

          fired the first shot, Forbes, who was travelling with Peterson, reached his hand in

          between Peterson and Meza “up and around the chest side.” Feeling a hand

          near his weapon was a key piece of Meza’s theory of self-defense and the video

          evidence substantiated that aspect of his testimony. Meza also testified that he

          was afraid he was about to have a seizure after Peterson hit him and that he

          believed he had experienced a focal seizure6 in the back of the police car.

          Contrary to the State’s implication that this was new information, Meza did

          explain to officers on the scene that he suffers from seizures, including focal

          seizures. This was not a different narrative, as in Anderson or even Young, but

          simply additional details consistent with the information provided to law

          enforcement close in time to the incident.

                 The State argued before this court that a prosecutor only makes an

          improper comment where the State specifically informs the jury that the accused

                 6 Meza testified that, based on his history with seizures and understanding of different

          types and symptoms, one would not lose consciousness during a focal seizure.

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          has exercised their right to silence.7 This assertion is not supported by the law.

          No magic words are required to determine that the State has improperly

          commented on the accused’s exercise of their right to silence. Romero is clear

          that an indirect comment can rise to the level of constitutional error. See 113

          Wn. App. at 790. Here, all three questions in Romero are answered “yes.”8 See

          Id. at 790-91. First, the comment during cross-examination could “reasonably

          [be] considered purposeful,” as the prosecutor knew Meza had terminated the

          recorded interview when he invoked his right to silence. This knowledge can be

          attributed to the prosecutor because, for example, Meza’s recorded interview

          with police was played for the jury, but was expressly redacted so that it ended

          before his invocation of rights. The prosecutor asserted to the court that the

          redactions were consistent with the court’s rulings on motions in limine. This

          knowledge was clearly present when the prosecutor began a question by stating,

          “I want to talk about some of the new information that previously hasn’t been

          disclosed until Friday.”        Second, as the trial court carefully explained to the

          prosecutor, this comment was likely to impair the defense because “the way

          you’re phrasing it . . . makes it prejudicial and makes it look like suddenly he’s

          holding back.” Third, under Romero, “the indirect comment [was] exploited by

          the State during the course of trial, including argument, in an apparent attempt to

                  7 Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, State v. Meza, No. 83797-4-I (Apr. 12, 2023) at

          7 min., 26 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network,
          https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2023041157/?eventID=2023041157.
                    8 The three questions are: (1) Could the comment reasonably have been considered

          purposeful? (2) Could the comment be considered given for the purpose of prejudicing the
          defendant or unintentionally result in prejudice to the defendant? (3) Was the comment “exploited
          by the State during the course of trial, including argument, in an apparent attempt to prejudice the
          defense offered by the defendant?” Romero, 113 Wn. App. at 790-91.

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          No. 83797-4-I/15

          prejudice the defense offered by the defendant” as reflected in the prosecutor’s

          repeated references in his closing argument to “new information,” urging the jury

          to disbelieve Meza’s self-defense claim. Id. at 791. Further, the State knew

          Meza had invoked his right to remain silent, and the only way to rebut the

          prosecutor’s improper inference regarding that invocation would have been for

          Meza to disclose that he had in fact exercised his right to silence and to an

          attorney. See State v. Curtis, 110 Wn. App. 6, 14, 37 P.3d 1274 (2002). Under

          the Romero test, the prosecutor’s comments here, though indirect, amount to

          constitutional error.

                 The trial court correctly interpreted and applied the law and therefore did

          not abuse its discretion.

          II.    Misstatement of the Burden of Proof

                 The court’s decision to grant a new trial also considered the prosecutor’s

          misstatement of the law as to the burden of proof. The prosecutor asserted,

          “There is no benefit of the doubt, ladies and gentlemen, when it comes to the

          amount of force that you apply, right?” On appeal, the State properly concedes

          this argument was error.    Throughout a criminal proceeding, the accused “is

          entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt” and it is improper for the State to

          argue otherwise. State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 26-27, 195 P.3d 940 (2008).

          Where the accused raises a self-defense claim, “the prosecution bears the

          burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense.”

          State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 493, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983). Under the law of

          self-defense in the State of Washington, Meza is explicitly entitled to the benefit

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          No. 83797-4-I/16

          of the doubt and the prosecutor’s statement to the contrary was error. We accept

          the State’s concession and agree that the trial court did not misapply the law in

          concluding that this inaccurate assertion was misconduct.

          III.   Characterization of Shooting as “Execution”

                 The State next avers the trial court erred in finding the characterization of

          the shooting as an “execution” was improper.              In closing argument, the

          prosecutor “has wide latitude to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence,”

          but “must seek convictions based on only probative evidence and sound reason.”

          State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438, 448, 258 P.3d 43 (2011); State v. Lucas-

          Vicente, 22 Wn. App. 2d 212, 224, 510 P.3d 1006 (2022).              It is error for a

          prosecutor to “‘mislead the jury by misstating the evidence.’” State v. Markovich,

          19 Wn. App. 2d 157, 170, 492 P.3d 206 (2021) (quoting State v. Guizzotti, 60

          Wn. App. 289, 296, 803 P.2d 808 (1991)). “Thus, a prosecutor must function

          within boundaries while zealously seeking justice” as they owe “a duty to

          defendants to see that their rights to a constitutionally fair trial are not violated.”

          State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667, 676, 257 P.3d 551 (2011).

                 Here, the State argues that the characterization of the shooting as an

          “execution” was a reasonable inference based on the evidence adduced at trial

          because Meza shot Peterson, Peterson fell to his knees while turning his back

          toward Meza, and Meza then fired a second shot. The prosecutor stated:

                 Ladies and gentlemen, this man has been hit. He is turned away.
                 He is on his way down to the ground. He has less than an hour to
                 live. Mr. Meza executed him. Mr. Meza shot him in the back.
                        Mr. Meza shot him right on top of the shoulder through his
                 lungs and through his liver. At that moment, there was no imminent

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          No. 83797-4-I/17

                 threat. At that moment, there was no risk of severe pain, suffering,
                 or death. Nothing was going to be happening to Mr. Meza at this
                 point.
                        That’s where it’s murder. That’s why it counts.

          (Emphasis added.)

                 The State relies on two cases where courts have held a prosecutor’s

          characterization of a death as an “execution” was not misconduct. First, in State

          v. Davis, our Supreme Court held a prosecutor’s comment that the defendant

          “acted as the ‘judge, jury and executioner of the victim’” was not misconduct

          because “[t]here is nothing in the argument to indicate the comment was

          intended to inflame the jury.” 141 Wn.2d 798, 873, 10 P.3d 977 (2000). Next, in

          State v. Berkley, an unpublished opinion,9 this court held a prosecutor’s

          characterization of a shooting as an execution was not improper because it was

          based on a reasonable inference from the evidence presented.10 The victim in

          Berkley was shot in the face while seated and buckled in his car; Berkley then

          waited several seconds before firing again, striking the victim in the head.11

          These facts “support[ed] a reasonable inference that if the first shot was intended

          to incapacitate [the victim], the only conceivable purpose for the second shot was

          to end [the victim’s] life,” and thus the characterization of the shooting as an

          execution was a permissible inference.12

                 9 Under GR 14.1(a), “[u]npublished opinions of the Court of Appeals have no precedential

          value and are not binding on any court,” though they “may be accorded such persuasive value as
          the court deems appropriate.”
                   We discuss Berkley as one of the cases offered by the State in support of its argument
          and because it analyzes a similar allegation of an improper statement.
                   10 No. 82588-7-I, slip op. at 16 (Wash. Ct. App. Sep. 6, 2022) (unpublished),

          https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/825887.pdf.
                   11 Id.
                   12 Id.

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          No. 83797-4-I/18

                 Again, courts review allegedly improper statements in the context of the

          entire trial. In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704, 286 P.3d

          673 (2012). Important context to the prosecutor’s comment here is the State’s

          consistent use during trial of an altered version of the video exhibit that showed

          the shooting.    While the prosecution repeatedly played an artificially slowed

          version of the footage, and questioned Meza about his thoughts during the

          protracted time between the shots, the unaltered footage reflects that only one

          second elapsed between the first and second shot. This emphasis of a distorted

          version of the evidence used during cross-examination was used to suggest to

          the jury that Meza had sufficient time to realize that any threat he originally

          perceived had dissipated and that the second shot was unnecessary to protect

          himself, therefore, it could only have been intended to kill Peterson.

                 Another fact critical to the overall analysis of this issue is that this shooting

          took place in the context of a physical altercation initiated by Peterson where

          both men were active participants; this is vastly distinct from Davis and Berkley

          where the victims were in a passive position compared to the accused. See

          Davis, 141 Wn.2d at 814-15, Berkley, slip op. at 16. In fact, the evidence here

          establishes that Meza believed Peterson was smoking drugs on the public bus

          and verbally confronted him about that conduct. Toxicology evidence introduced

          at trial supports Meza’s belief in this regard as the medical examiner, Robert

          Johnston, testified that, at the time of his death, Peterson had alcohol,

          methamphetamine, heroin, marijuana, and fentanyl in his system.               Johnston

          testified that the levels of methamphetamine and fentanyl were high, in fact, he

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          No. 83797-4-I/19

          noted that the level of methamphetamine alone may have been “fatal in some

          people.” Johnston concluded that at the time of the fight, Peterson “wouldn’t be

          in a sober state of mind.” Through that lens of substance use and upset by

          Meza’s callout, Peterson continued the verbal dispute with him, and Forbes

          joined in, making threats referencing Peterson’s dangerousness. Peterson not

          only initiated the physical fight with Meza, bloodying Meza’s face and causing

          him concern over a seizure being triggered, he pulled the hood of Meza’s jacket

          over his head, obscuring his vision, and likely increased the fear of harm Meza

          experienced. All of this turmoil preceded the point in the incident when Meza felt

          a hand near his weapons, a firearm and knives.          The unaltered evidence

          presented at trial does not support a reasonable inference that Meza “executed”

          Peterson. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the comment

          was improper and prejudicial.

          IV.   Cumulative Error

                The court ultimately concluded that the cumulative impact of the

          prosecutor’s misconduct throughout the proceedings was sufficiently prejudicial

          that no remedy short of a new trial could provide appropriate relief. In briefing,

          the State argued the court abused its discretion in applying the cumulative error

          doctrine because the evidence against Meza was overwhelming. However, at

          oral argument, the State conceded that if this court agreed the prosecutor

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          No. 83797-4-I/20

          improperly commented on Meza’s exercise of his right to silence, there is no

          abuse of discretion as to application of the cumulative error doctrine.13

                 “The cumulative error doctrine applies where a combination of trial errors

          denies the accused a fair trial even where any one of the errors, taken

          individually, may not justify reversal.” In re Det. of Coe, 175 Wn.2d 482, 515, 286

          P.3d 29 (2012). The test “is whether the totality of circumstances substantially

          prejudiced the defendant and denied him a fair trial.” In re Pers. Restraint of

          Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664, 690, 327 P.3d 660 (2014), abrogated on other grounds

          by State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018). Where “the evidence is

          overwhelming against a defendant,” cumulative error will not require reversal. Id.

          at 691.

                 Here, the trial court determined that “[t]he prosecutor repeatedly sought to

          tarnish the defendant’s exercise of his constitutional rights,” and that there was

          “no credible argument” that the statements did not “have an improper effect in

          swaying the jury.” The prosecutor further made two additional, independently

          improper, assertions in closing.           While a curative instruction might have

          neutralized each instance of misconduct in isolation, the trial court did not err in

          concluding that the cumulative effect of these arguments warranted a new trial.

          This is particularly true because the improper arguments focused on the

          defendant’s credibility as to his self-defense claim, which was the heart of his

          theory of the case.       The purpose of the prosecutor’s comment on Meza’s

          exercise of his right to silence was to undercut his credibility; the statement that

                 13 Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, supra, at 20 min., 58 sec.

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          No. 83797-4-I/21

          Meza was not entitled to “the benefit of the doubt” was likewise used to impugn

          Meza’s credibility as to his fear and use of force with regard to self-defense.

          Finally, the characterization of the shooting as an “execution” was also offered as

          a means to argue that the jury should not believe Meza’s testimony that he acted

          in self-defense. The court was in the best position to observe the tenor and tone

          of these statements as they were made and, more critically, to discern the impact

          that the prosecutor’s improper arguments had on the jury. Case law is clear that

          it is precisely for these reasons that the trial court is afforded a high degree of

          deference when it grants a motion for a new trial; it did not abuse its discretion in

          concluding that the proper remedy here was a new trial.

                   The evidence against Meza was not so overwhelming that it negated the

          cumulative error of the prosecutorial misconduct. The jury unanimously found

          Meza not guilty of murder in the second degree, as charged by the State, even

          when presented with video evidence of the shooting. Instead, the jury found him

          guilty of manslaughter in the first degree; meaning, based on the jury instructions

          as to the original charge and the lesser included offense, it found that Meza

          acted with recklessness rather than intent to cause death.          Turning to the

          evidence presented at trial, medical examiner Johnston testified that the level of

          methamphetamine in Peterson’s body at the time of his death was “definitely

          high.”    Johnston explained that, “Methamphetamine is associated with, yeah,

          violent and irrational behavior, and it’s within the level there they’ve reported.”

          Forbes, Peterson’s associate who was present on the bus, testified that Peterson

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          No. 83797-4-I/22

          had a knife in the backpack in his possession at the time of the altercation.14

          Forbes provided the only other eyewitness testimony of the altercation and

          shooting; he largely could not remember or had not seen the events leading up to

          the shooting. Meza also testified at trial. He stated that Peterson “threatened to

          beat me and put me to sleep,” and that Forbes told him that Peterson was “not

          someone I want to mess with.” Meza further testified that Peterson struck him in

          the head “hard enough to make me bleed and for my head to go back.” He

          described feeling “[n]ot safe” because he “couldn’t really see anything” after

          Peterson pulled Meza’s hood up over his head. Meza stated he thought he saw

          and felt someone reaching across his waist, toward where he carried his

          weapons, and presumed it to be Peterson. The footage of the incident appears

          to show that approximately five seconds before Meza fired the first shot, it was

          actually Forbes who reached between the men, “up and around the chest side” of

          Meza. Meza testified he “was scared for [his] life,” drew his weapon and fired

          two shots, one second apart.

                  Based on the evidence presented at trial, there was not “overwhelming

          evidence” that Meza committed manslaughter in the first degree and, as such,

          the trial judge correctly applied the cumulative error doctrine. A jury could have

          found, based on the jury instruction for self-defense, that Meza reasonably

          believed Peterson intended to “inflict death or great personal bodily injury” based

          on the perceived drug use on the public bus (later confirmed by toxicology

          results), verbal threats, physical altercation, obscuring of Meza’s vision, and

                  14 Forbes testified that the backpack and knife belonged to him but admitted that at the

          time of the altercation, they were in Peterson’s possession.

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          apparent reach across Meza’s body toward the area that he was carrying

          weapons.    It could have also found, pursuant to the jury instruction on self-

          defense, that Meza reasonably believed Peterson would cause such harm, and

          that Meza employed the same force “as a reasonably prudent person would use

          under the same or similar conditions,” particularly given the speed at which the

          altercation took place. The evidence presented does not preclude application of

          the cumulative error doctrine.

                Again, “the trial court is in the best position to discern prejudice.” Garcia,

          177 Wn. App. at 777. The trial judge observed the proceedings as a whole, as it

          played out in real time; he had the benefit of observing the argument of the

          parties, the evidence presented, and the impact of the prosecutor’s misconduct

          on the jury. It was the trial judge who sat in the best position to determine the

          impact of the misconduct and to select the appropriate remedy; for these reasons

          this decision is appropriately shown great deference. The court did not abuse its

          broad discretion and, accordingly, we affirm.

          WE CONCUR:

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