Court Opinion

ID: 9827694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:46:49.267998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:34.573387
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Appellant errs in assuming that the conveyance to it by Mills was “wholly ex-ecutory.” It was not by inadvertence that we treated it as an executed contract. It is well settled that, for the purposes of this case, the contract of conveyance is to be treated as executed. May v. Taylor, 27 Tex. 125; Brown v. Montgomery, 89 Tex. 250, 34 S. W. 443; Ogburn v. Whitlow, 80 Tex. 239, 15 S. W. 807; Carey v. Starr, 93 Tex. 508, 56 S. W. 324.
Appellant earnestly insists that the following cases are decisive in its favor in view of the undisputed evidence that the land did not contain sulphur of commercial quality in paying quantity, viz.: Edwards et al. v. T. & B. Ry. Co., 54 Tex. Civ. App. 334, 118 S. W. 572; St. L. S. W. Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 639, 125 S. W. 61; Crayton v. Hunger, 9 Tex. 285; Carson v. Taylor (Tex. Civ. App.) 238 S. W. 261.
In Crayton v. Munger the suit was upon a note given in payment for land. The defendant answered and sought to rescind on account of fraud. Exceptions to the answer were sustained. This was held to be error. Upon demurrer the truth of the allegations are taken as confessed. Carson v. Taylor was also an action to rescind and recover back money paid on accohnt of fraud. The issue of fraud was found in favor of the party asserting it. We fail to see how those two cases can be regarded as controlling in this action, where the issue of fraud has been found by the trial court against the one asserting it, and the evidence sustains the finding.
Edwards v. Ry. and Ry. v. Johnston were suits to recover damages for the breach of executory contracts. The evidence disclosed a mistake as to the subject-matter of the contracts rendering them impossible of performance, or if possible, under the circumstances it would be inequitable to enforce the same. It seems to us that the distinguishing features of these cases from the present suit are so apparent that there is no room for argument.
In the main opinion it .was said:
“The next proposition is that the undisputed evidence shows that defendant was induced to purchase the permits by the false and fraudulent representations concerning the presence of sulphur as pleaded.”
Appellant says in its motion that this is an incorrect statement of its proposition, which in fact was:
“The evidence showed conclusively that the plaintiff did falsely and fraudulently represent to the defendant,” etc.
The opinion is corrected accordingly. The opinion quotes the evidence in support of the finding that Mills did not make the representations as alleged. It speaks for itself as to its sufficiency to support the' assumed finding of the trial court.
With respect to the ruling upon the deficiency in acreage, appellant says O’Connell v. Duke, 29 Tex. 300, 94 Am. Dec. 282, which was cited in support of the ruling, does not support the same; that the ruling is contrary to the law announced in O’Oonnell v. Duke. In that case our Supreme Court gave its unqualified approval to what was said by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Harrison v. Talbot, 2 Dana, 258, and the rule then adopted has prevailed in this state ever since.
It was said:
“Sales in gross may be subdivided into various subordinate classifications: First, sales strictly and essentially -by the tract, without reference, in the negotiation or in the consideration, to any estimated or designated quantity of acres. Second, sales of the like kind, in which, though a supposed quantity by estimation is mentioned or referred to in the contract, the reference was made only for the purpose of description, and under such circumstances, or in such a manner as to show that the parties intended to risk the contingency of quantity, whatever it might be, or how much-soever it might exceed, or fall short of, that which was mentioned in the contract. * * * Contracts belonging to either of the two first-mentioned classes, whether executed or execu-tory, should not be modified by the chancellor when there has been no fraud.”
The evidence is sufficient in this case to show a sale in gross of the second classification without fraud or mistake as to the correct acreage, and in our opinion our holding is completely in accord with the rule adopted in O’Connell v. Duke.
The earnest insistence of appellant’s coun*531sel and his sincerity in the merits of his appeal merit a careful consideration of the motion for rehearing. This has been accorded, but we see no occasion to change our ruling.
The motion is overruled.