Court Opinion

ID: 9578687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:47:27.944829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:14.828015
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I join the Court’s opinion wherein it is held that summary judgment of dismissal in favor of the United Steelworkers should not have been granted. I am unable to agree that the State of Idaho was entitled to a dismissal at the summary judgment stage of the action against it, and briefly state the reasons which in my view require that that cause, too, should be heard and determined on the merits.
In my view the deceased miners who entered the portals of Sunshine’s mine not only had a right to rely upon the allegedly assumed duty of the union to inspect the conditions and practices prevalent in that mine, but equally had a right to rely upon the State’s statutory obligation. The obvious question here is: Who, if not the State and if not the union, had the obligation to assure the miners that they were not being subjected to dangerous working conditions and practices? An easy answer, of course, is that the miners could see for themselves the conditions and practices, and could, so to speak, stay out of the kitchen if they didn’t like the heat. However, I think that most will agree that such philosophy no longer obtains in this country. These miners, with dependents to support, were not exactly free spirits who could simply leave a job, the conditions of which may have appeared unsafe. Whether or not they were aware of any dangerous existing conditions and practices, by reason of their daily exposure thereto, it is the widows and children of those deceased miners who are the plaintiffs in these statutory wrongful death actions, and their right to rely upon the defendants’ fulfillment of their alleged obligations to look out for the safety of their fathers and husbands is no less than the right in the miners themselves.
It is claimed by the widows and children that the State of Idaho was negligent in regard to its obligation to inspect the mines and secure to the miners safe working conditions. The State of Idaho responds that the pertinent Idaho statutes and regulations imposed upon the Inspector of Mines and his deputies duties which were wholly “discretionary” in nature, and hence liability for negligence may be avoided by application of that section of the Idaho Tort Claims Act which exempts the State from its negligence with respect to a discretionary function or duty on the part of the State or its employee.
*548The briefs are replete with lengthy citation of authority intended to light the way in concluding that the State’s activity in mine safety was or was not a discretionary function, but the divergence of view is great, as might be expected. None of this case authority bears any close resemblance to the relationship we consider today — the assumed obligation of the State of Idaho for the safety of the man who works in the dark and unknown world below the surface of the earth.
The State in its brief, while decrying as mechanical an approach (by the widows and children) which would categorize and distinguish between that which is “operational” and that which is “planning level” in its turn would have us equate the mine inspector’s duties with those of a building inspector. The State relies heavily on the Minnesota case of Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 199 N.W.2d 158 (1972), urging upon us that that court held “that in order to recover plaintiffs had to show a breach of some duty owed to them in their individual capacities, and not merely a breach of some obligation owed to the general public.” State’s Brief at 52. For the same proposition the State cites and discusses Amato v. City of New York, 268 F.Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y.1967), Ivicevic v. City of Glendale, 26 Ariz.App. 460, 549 P.2d 240 (1976), Delarosa v. State, 21 Ariz.App. 263, 518 P.2d 582 (1974), Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 ArizApp. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973), Hensley v. Seminole County, 268 So.2d 452 (Fla.App.1972), Fiduccia v. Summit Hill Construction Co., 109 N.J.Super. 249, 262 A.2d 920 (1970), Evers v. Westerberg, 38 A.D.2d 751, 329 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1972), Whitney v. City of New York, 27 A.D.2d 528, 275 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1966), Stranger v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 25 A.D.2d 169, 268 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1966), Stubley v. Allison Realty Co., 124 App.Div. 162, 108 N.Y.S. 759 (1908), Reid v. City of Niagara Falls, 29 Misc.2d 855, 216 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1961), and Lockwood v. Village of Buchanan, 18 Misc.2d 862, 182 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1959). Following its discussion of these cases the State declares that:
“It is through the instrument of regulations and safety standards, inspections and compliance orders, that the State seeks to regulate safety and health conditions in mines, with the view of accommodating both the interests of the mine operators and workers. However, responsibility for the operations and control over mine facilities remains a private venture and not the direct responsibility of the State.” State’s Brief at 61.
It seems quite clear to me that the concern of the State of Idaho with regard to the mines of this State has nothing whatever to do with the general public. It is equally clear that the responsibility of the mine owners to furnish a safe place in which to work, abrogated by the Workmen’s Compensation Law insofar as civil liability is concerned, does not in any way lessen the duty of mine inspection which the State has assumed to carry out by reason of well-intended legislative enactment. A mine is not a public building. It is not a public place. There is nothing in this record which intimates that the families of these disaster victims ever had any access into that mine, or any right of access. In fact, other than that the legislature created in the mine inspector the power and authority to enter the mines of this state, it is doubted that he would have any greater access to those mines than that available to the public in general, which so far as appears is by invitation only.
It is also important to note that the provisions of I.C. § 47-104 (current version at I.C. § 44-109) are aimed, not at all at protecting the public against dangerous or insecure conditions, but “for the purpose of making said mine safe for the employees therein . . ”
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State tells us in its brief that the duty imposed on the mine inspector “existed for the benefit of the public in general” and at another place that the mine inspector’s decisions are “of public safety” and his decision “involves a balancing of competing policy considerations, accommodating both the interests of the mine operators and workers.”
*549Nothing which I read in the statutory enactments suggests in the least that the mine inspector was to make a policy judgment and perform a balancing act which would afford some measure of protection to the miners so long as it also accommodated the interests of capital. Quite the contrary, the policy determination had been made by the legislature. That determination was that miners were to be afforded the protection of government controlled examination and inspections so as to insure those miners safe working conditions and practices. That determination was that the State do this by a qualified person upon whom was conferred certain specified powers and authority — with concomitant obligations to those miners who were perceived by the legislature to be in need thereof.
The only issue before us is whether the action should have been terminated on motions for summary judgment. My vote is that it should not have been. That is not to say that each defendant might not be entitled to a judgment of involuntary dismissal when the evidence has all been presented, but until that has been done, neither this Court nor the trial court are in any position to rule as a matter of law that the widows and children of the deceased miners are without any claim for relief for the losses suffered allegedly by reason of the negligence of the defendants. Brown v. United States, 374 F.Supp. 723 (E.D.Ark.1974), State of California v. United States, 151 F.Supp. 570 (N.D.Cal.1957), Bulloch v. United States, 133 F.Supp. 885 (C.D.Utah 1955), Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman, & Scott Corp., 126 F.Supp. 406 (N.D.Cal.1954). What Justice Bakes has written in his concluding paragraph is appropriate to the motion of the State of Idaho as well as to the motion of the United Steelworkers.