Court Opinion

ID: 9407811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 14:06:28.032511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.322595
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Roger Glahn and                     :
Donna Gorencel,                     :
                                    :
                        Petitioners :
                                    :
             v.                     : No. 1273 C.D. 2021
                                    : Submitted: July 29, 2022
Department of Environmental         :
Protection (Environmental Hearing :
Board),                             :
                                    :
                        Respondent :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                     FILED: July 10, 2023

               Roger Glahn and Donna Gorencel (collectively, Petitioners) petition for
review of a final order of the Department of Environmental Protection’s
(Department) Environmental Hearing Board (Board), which granted the
Department’s motion to dismiss upon determining that Petitioners had not appealed
any “action” of the Department. The Board noted that Petitioners filed their appeal
before the Department completed its investigation of, and rendered a final
determination on, Petitioners water supply contamination complaint under the Oil
and Gas Act.1        The Board concluded it did not have jurisdiction over the
Department’s prolonged inaction on reaching a determination on the complaint.

      1
          58 Pa. C.S. §§2301-3504.
Petitioners argue that the Board erred by dismissing their complaint on the basis that
the Department’s inactions did not constitute action subject to appeal. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the Board.2

                                        I. Background
               On May 10, 2021, Petitioners filed a notice of appeal seeking de novo
review of the Department’s actions. Certified Record (C.R.) at 4-38.3 Petitioners
alleged that, in July 2020, they filed a complaint with the Department requesting an
investigation of possible contamination of their water supply from nearby oil and
gas operations in North Branch Township, Wyoming County, operated by
Southwestern Production Company, LLC (SWN), Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC
(CHK), and Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC c/o Williams
Companies (Williams). Id. at 6-7, 9. As of May 2021, the Department had not
issued a determination regarding the investigation of their complaint within 45 days
as required by Section 3218(b) of the Oil and Gas Act, 58 Pa. C.S. §3218(b). Id. at
9. Petitioners sought review of the Department’s actions, specifically:

               (a) not advising [Petitioners] of the distance between
               nearby well bores operated by [SWN] and the absence of
               GPS coordinates in the Department’s correspondence, (b)
               not requiring that [SWN] . . . provide water to

       2
         We are also presented with the Department’s application to strike Petitioners’ reply brief
on the basis it was untimely filed. By order dated July 21, 2022, this Court directed consideration
of the Department’s application to strike and Petitioners’ answer in response with the merits.
Although we do not condone untimely filings, because the content of Petitioners’ reply brief had
no bearing on our decision, we dismiss the application to strike as moot. See Montgomery Hospital
and Medical Center v. Bureau of Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund (MCARE
Fund), 201 A.3d 909, 910 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

       3
        Because the Certified Record was filed electronically and was not paginated, the page
numbers referenced in this opinion reflect electronic pagination.
                                                2
             [Petitioners] under the Oil and Gas Act; (c) [not advising]
             [Petitioners] that [SWN] is presumptively liable under the
             Oil and Gas Act, [and] (d) not testing for chemicals used
             by oil and gas operations, including [SWN] and Williams.
Id. at 9.
             Petitioners attached four exhibits to their notice of appeal: (1)
Petitioners’ “summary and timeline”; (2) two maps showing the distances between
nearby gas wells and Petitioners’ spring house; (3) laboratory results of water
sampling; and (4) several photographs. C.R. at 12-38. According to the “summary
and timeline,” the Department visited Petitioners’ property and took water samples
in July 2020, August 2020, October 2020, December 2020, March 2021, and April
2021. Id. at 13-15. Petitioners alleged that the Department only tested for bacteria
and not chemicals used in oil and gas operations. Id. Petitioners did not attach to
their appeal any written action of, or communication from, the Department.
             On July 14, 2021, Petitioners filed a motion to amend their notice of
appeal and attached a proposed amendment. The proposed amendment included
several additional objections and exhibits, including Department correspondence
and a June 8, 2021 determination that Petitioners’ water supply was presumed to be
impacted under Section 3218 of the Oil and Gas Act by the oil and gas activities of
SWN. The proposed amendment sought to include SWN, CHK, and Williams as
additional parties.
             The Board granted in part and denied in part Petitioners’ motion to
amend. C.R. at 579. Specifically, the Board granted the motion and permitted the
amendment to allow Petitioners to add additional objections to the notice of appeal,
namely paragraphs 11 through 17. Id. However, the Board denied the motion “if
and to the extent it [was] intended to serve as an appeal from any Departmental
actions that [were] different than those identified in the original notice of appeal,”

                                          3
and to the extent Petitioners attempted to add additional parties. Id. The Board did
not allow the amended notice of appeal to include the June 8, 2021 determination or
other correspondence, which occurred after the notice of appeal was filed.
              In response to the amended notice, the Department filed a motion to
dismiss on the basis that Petitioners did not appeal an appealable action. C.R. at
580. The Department asserted that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appeal
because Petitioners did not appeal any “action” taken by the Department and instead
requested the Board to compel the Department to take action while the Department
continued to investigate Petitioners’ water supply contamination claim. Petitioners
opposed the motion, arguing that the Department has taken several actions that affect
their rights, which are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.
              On November 12, 2021, the Board issued an opinion and order granting
the Department’s motion to dismiss and dismissing Petitioners’ appeal. The Board
found that Petitioners filed their appeal before the Department completed its
investigation of, or rendered a final determination on, their water supply
contamination complaint under the Oil and Gas Act.                   Although the Board
admonished the Department’s delay, the Board concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction over the Department’s “prolonged inaction on reaching a determination
on the complaint.” Board Op., 11/12/21, at 1. Petitioners sought reconsideration,
which the Board denied. This appeal now follows.4

       4
         Our review is limited to determining whether the Board committed an error of law,
whether the Board violated constitutional rights, or whether substantial evidence supports its
findings of fact. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 89
A.3d 724, 726 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

                                              4
                                              II. Issue
                 Petitioners contend that the Board erred by dismissing their appeal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioners argue that the Board misinterpreted
the Environmental Hearing Board Act (EHB Act)5 and the Administrative Agency
Law6 and ignored its own precedent in concluding that the Department’s failures and
inactions are not appealable actions within the Board’s subject matter jurisdiction.

                                          III. Discussion
                 The Board’s jurisdiction to hear appeals extends only to matters that
fall within its statutorily-established subject matter jurisdiction. Pequea Township
v. Herr, 716 A.2d 678, 686 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998); Fiore v. Department of
Environmental Resources, 510 A.2d 880, 882 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). The Board has
the power and the duty to hold hearings and issue adjudications7 on the Department’s
orders, permits, licenses, or decisions and review any “action” taken by the
Department in accordance with the Administrative Agency Law. See Section 4(a),
(c) of the EHB Act, 35 P.S. § 7514(a), (c); HJC, LLC v. Department of

       5
           Act of July 12, 1988, P.L. 530, as amended, 35 P.S. §§7511-7516.

       6
           Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §§501-508, 701-704.

       7
           An “adjudication” is defined as:

                 Any final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by an
                 agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities,
                 duties, liabilities or obligations of any or all of the parties to the
                 proceeding in which the adjudication is made. The term does not
                 include any order based upon a proceeding before a court or which
                 involves the seizure or forfeiture of property, paroles, pardons or
                 releases from mental institutions.

2 Pa. C.S. §101.
                                                   5
Environmental Protection, 949 A.2d 350, 353 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008); Pequea
Township, 716 A.2d at 686. The Department “may take an action . . . but no action
. . . adversely affecting a person shall be final as to that person until the person has
had the opportunity to appeal the action to the [B]oard . . . .” Section 4(c) of the
EHB Act, 35 P.S. §7514(c) (emphasis added). The Board’s regulations define
“action” as “an order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by the Department
affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or
obligations of a person including, but not limited to, a permit, license, approval or
certification.” 25 Pa. Code §1021.2(a) (emphasis added).
             The Board is not statutorily authorized to exercise judicial powers in
equity.   See Pequea Township, 716 A.2d at 686; Marinari v. Department of
Environmental Resources, 566 A.2d 385, 387 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). However, when
the Board is reviewing a discretionary act of the Department, the Board may
“substitute its discretion for that of the Department and order the relief requested.”
Pequea Township, 716 A.2d at 687.
             The question here is whether the Department has taken any “action”
subject to the Board’s jurisdiction. As we have previously observed, “[t]here is ‘no
bright line rule’ for what constitutes an ‘action’ of the Department.” Chesapeake
Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 89 A.3d 724, 726
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (quoting HJC, LLC, 949 A.2d at 353). “[A]lthough it is
‘conceivable’ that a letter from the Department could constitute an “action,”
communications from the Department that “do not affect a party’s personal or
property rights, remedies, or avenues of redress are not appealable actions.”
Chesapeake Appalachia, 89 A.3d at 726 (quoting Sayreville Seaport Associates
Acquisition Co. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 60 A.3d 867, 872 (Pa.

                                           6
Cmwlth. 2012)) (internal citation omitted). However, a letter that “merely affirm[s]
the status quo” is not a decision from which an appeal may be taken. Pickford v.
Department of Environmental Protection, 967 A.2d 414, 420 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008);
see Chesapeake Appalachia, 89 A.3d at 726 (holding that a letter delineating already
existing obligations did not constitute an “action”); see also Sayreville, 60 A.3d at
872 (holding that a letter advising party as to legality of its potential future actions
was not an “action”); Alternate Energy Store, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Resources, 527 A.2d 1077, 1079 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (holding that a letter advising
permit applicant of status of application was not an “action”); Fiore, 510 A.2d at
882 (holding that an appeal from a notice of violation did not constitute an act or
adjudication within the Board’s jurisdiction).
               Here, Petitioners did not describe or attach any correspondence,
communication, or determination of the Department constituting an action to their
notice of appeal.8       In the amended notice of appeal, Petitioners consistently
challenged the Department’s inaction through its failure to advise Petitioners of the
distance between well bores, its failure to test for chemicals used in oil and gas
operations, its failure to direct SWN to provide water to Petitioners, and its failure
to advise Petitioners that SWN was presumptively liable. See Reproduced Record
at 7a. Contrary to Petitioners’ claims, such inaction or failure to act is not an “action”
subject to the Board’s jurisdiction because it is not “an order, decree, decision,
determination or ruling by the Department.” 25 Pa. Code §1021.2(a); see Marinari,

       8
          Although Petitioners attempted to amend their notice of appeal to include Department
correspondence and the June 8, 2021 determination, the Board denied the motion to amend insofar
as it intended to serve as an appeal from Departmental actions that were different than those
identified in the original notice of appeal and noted that the Department’s actions occurred after
the original notice of appeal was filed. C.R. at 579. As the Board aptly noted, the June 8, 2021
determination “cannot retroactively provide jurisdiction for the appeal filed on May 10, 2021.”
Board Op., at 12.
                                                7
566 A.2d at 388. Furthermore, Petitioners cite no statutory authority, and our review
of the Oil and Gas Act reveals no provision requiring the Department to advise the
Petitioners of the distance between well bores or test for certain chemicals. See
Section 3258(a) of the Oil and Gas Act, 58 Pa. C.S. §3258(a) (merely authorizing
that “[t]he [D]epartment may make inspections, conduct tests or sampling . . .”). As
for the Department’s failure to advise Petitioners that SWN was presumptively liable
or direct SWN to provide water to Petitioners, such duties arise only after the
Department makes a determination of pollution or diminution, which leads us to the
root of this case -- the Department’s failure to timely make such a determination.
See Section 3218 of the Oil and Gas Act, 58 Pa. C.S. §3218.
             Section 3218(b) of the Oil and Gas Act directs the Department to take
action by issuing a determination within 45 days of notification of a complaint.
58 Pa. C.S. §3218(b). Specifically, Section 3218(b) provides:

             A landowner or water purveyor suffering pollution or
             diminution of a water supply as a result of the drilling,
             alteration or operation of an oil or gas well may so notify
             the [D]epartment and request that an investigation be
             conducted. Within ten days of notification, the
             [D]epartment shall investigate the claim and make a
             determination within 45 days following notification. If
             the [D]epartment finds that the pollution or diminution
             was caused by drilling, alteration or operation activities or
             if it presumes the well operator responsible for pollution
             under subsection (c), the [D]epartment shall issue orders
             to the well operator necessary to assure compliance with
             subsection (a), including orders requiring temporary
             replacement of a water supply where it is determined that
             pollution or diminution may be of limited duration.
Id. (emphasis added). Petitioners assert that the Department’s failure to issue a
decision within this mandatory timeframe amounts to an appealable action. The

                                          8
Department counters that the statutory timeframe is merely directory and the
Department’s delay does not amount to an appealable action.
               “Whether a statute is mandatory or directory ‘must be determined by
considering legislative intent gleaned from review of the entire statute and from
considering the nature and object of the statute and the consequences of the
construction of it one way or the other.’” JPay, Inc. v. Department of Corrections,
89 A.3d 756, 763 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (quoting West Penn Power Co. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 521 A.2d 75, 78 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987)).
“Generally, a statute requiring a public official to take action within a specific
time[]frame is directory unless the statute indicates it is mandatory or time is of the
essence for the action that the statute requires.” Id. (emphasis added); see, e.g.,
Shapiro v. State Board of Accountancy, 856 A.2d 864, 872 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004);
Schulze v. Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, 794 A.2d 984, 987-89
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); Snyder v. State Ethics Commission, 686 A.2d 843, 852 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1996); Baker v. Department of Public Welfare, 588 A.2d 1337, 1340
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).
               In some statutory contexts, the failure of a governing body or agency to
render a decision within the specific timeframe allotted may result in a substantive
result, such as a deemed approval or deemed denial of an application. See, e.g.,
Section 508 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code9 (providing that the
failure of the governing body or agency to render a decision and communicate it to
the applicant within the time and in the manner specified shall be deemed an
approval of the application); Discovery Charter School v. School District of
Philadelphia, 166 A.3d 304, 321 (Pa. 2017) (holding inaction on an initial charter

      9
          Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §10508.
                                                9
application within statutory timeframe constitutes a deemed denial appealable to the
Charter School Appeal Board).
                In D’Amico v. Board of Supervisors, Township of Alsace, 526 A.2d 479,
480 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), we examined whether the failure of the governing body to
issue a decision within the seven-day statutory timeframe set forth in Section 7(b)(2)
of the Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act10 constituted a deemed action. There, the
township’s sewage enforcement officer denied an application for a residential
sewage disposal system nine days after it was filed. The applicant argued that his
application should be deemed approved. Although the statute directed that a
decision granting or denying a sewage permit was to be issued within seven days, it
contained no express language regarding deemed approval for failure to act within
that timeframe. See 35 P.S. §750.7(b)(2). We opined that, “in order for a deemed
approval to occur ‘there must be an express legislative declaration of deemed
approval in the statutory . . . provision in order to have such a substantive result
produced by procedural tardiness.’” D’Amico, 526 A.2d at 480 (quoting Beekhuis
v. Zoning Hearing Board of Middletown Township, 429 A.2d 1231, 1236
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1981)). In the absence of such statutory language, we declined to
provide “such a provision through statutory construction.”                   Id.; see Gemini
Equipment Company v. Board of Commissioners of Susquehanna Township,
604 A.2d 1233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).
                Similarly, here, the Oil and Gas Act does not include any language
triggering a substantive result on a complaint based on the failure of the Department
to issue a determination within 45 days. Whether this statutory timeframe to act is

      10
           Act of January 24, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1535, as amended, 35 P.S. §750.7(b)(2).

                                               10
directory or mandatory,11 the Department’s failure to act in the timeframe allotted
did not produce an appealable “action” as that term is defined and interpreted. 25
Pa. Code §1021.2(a); see Marinari, 566 A.2d at 388 (the Department’s inaction on

       11
          Although this Court is generally reluctant to find a statutory provision mandatory where
it requires that a Commonwealth agency issue an adjudication within a specified timeframe,
considering the legislative intent for the Oil and Gas Act and consequences of a contrary
interpretation, it would appear that the General Assembly intended Section 3218(b)’s timeframe
to be mandatory.

       The purposes of the Oil and Gas Act include protecting “the safety and property rights of
persons residing in areas where mining, exploration, development, storage or production occurs,”
and “the natural resources, environmental rights and values secured by the Constitution of
Pennsylvania.” 58 Pa. C.S. §3202. Article I, section 27 of the Declaration of Rights in the
Pennsylvania Constitution (Environmental Rights Amendment) provides:

               The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
               preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
               environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
               common property of all the people, including generations yet to
               come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
               conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.

Pa. Const. art. I, §27. The Department has duties as trustee under the Environmental Rights
Amendment to conserve and maintain our public natural resources, including groundwater. See
Gibraltar Rock, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 286 A.3d 713, 719 (Pa. 2022);
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 939 (Pa.
2017).

        By failing to issue a decision within the 45-day period, the Department failed to uphold its
statutory and constitutional duties to protect the public and public natural resources from the
potential harms from drilling activities. As illustrated in this case, the delay not only impaired
Petitioners’ right to clean water but hindered their ability to avail themselves of remedies under
the Oil and Gas Act, including the ability to receive temporary replacement of a water supply. See
58 Pa. C.S. §3218. The Department’s delay also has the potential of allowing oil and gas
operations to continue polluting underground waters unabated until a decision is issued. Although
we are sensitive to the fact that thorough investigations take time, we are equally sensitive, if not
more so, to the predicament of Petitioners and the fundamental right to clean water. We believe
the Department is certainly capable of making a preliminary determination regarding pollution
within the statutory timeframe while continuing an ongoing investigation.
                                                 11
a permit application was not a final appealable action subject to the Board’s
jurisdiction even though it immediately and directly harmed the petitioners’ ability
to develop their land). There was no “order, decree, decision, determination or
ruling” forming the basis of Petitioners’ appeal but merely a failure to act.
25 Pa. Code §1021.2(a). The Board has no jurisdiction over Department inaction.12
See 35 P.S. §7514(a); Pequea Township; HJC, LLC; Marinari.

                                        IV. Conclusion
               Although we share the Board’s disapproval of the Department’s
prolonged inaction, we nevertheless conclude that the Department’s failure to render
a determination within the timeframe allotted did not constitute an appealable
“action” within the Board’s jurisdiction.13

       12
           We note the Board’s longstanding precedent is consistent with this interpretation. See
Lower Salford Township Authority v. Department of Environmental Protection, 2011 EHB 333,
335 (2011) (holding the Department’s failure to establish Total Maximum Daily Loads did not
constitute a final Departmental action within the Board’s jurisdiction); Westvaco Corp. v.
Department of Environmental Protection, 1997 EHB 275, 277 (1997) (“While the denial or
issuance of an application for a permit revision is a final appealable action, the Department’s
inaction on an application is not.”); Royer v. Department of Environmental Resources, 1992 EHB
611 (1992) (dismissing appeal of Department’s failure to take action on appellants’ letter requests
to lift a moratorium on issuing sewage permits for a certain subdivision on the basis it did not
constitute denial or action subject to appeal); S.A. Kele Associates v. Department of Environmental
Resources, 1991 EHB 854 (1991) (holding that the Department’s failure to act upon a private
request to revise an official sewage facilities plan did not constitute deemed approval of the
request, and, consequently, the failure to act was not an action reviewable by the Board). Although
a few older Board decisions extended jurisdiction to include consideration of Departmental
inaction, the Board expressly overruled this caselaw in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Department
of Environmental Resources, 1990 EHB 515, 518 (1990), following this Court’s opinion in
Marinari.

       13
           The proper recourse to address the Department’s prolonged inaction is a mandamus
action to compel the Department to issue a determination in accordance with Section 3218(b) of
the Oil and Gas Act. See Marinari, 566 A.2d at 388; see also Smoak v. Talaber, 193 A.3d 1160,
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                               12
               Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s order.

                                               MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

1166 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (holding that the remedy for an agency’s failure to timely act is to file a
petition for mandamus in this Court’s original jurisdiction to require the agency to issue a
decision). That said, we note that on June 8, 2021, 11 months after Petitioners filed their complaint,
the Department issued a determination of pollution presumption against SWN, thereby removing
the basis for a mandamus action under Section 3218(b) of the Oil and Gas Act for failure to issue
a timely determination.
                                                 13
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Roger Glahn and                     :
Donna Gorencel,                     :
                                    :
                        Petitioners :
                                    :
             v.                     : No. 1273 C.D. 2021
                                    :
Department of Environmental         :
Protection (Environmental Hearing :
Board),                             :
                                    :
                        Respondent :

                                   ORDER

            AND NOW, this 10th day of July, 2023, the order of the Environmental
Hearing Board, dated November 12, 2021, is AFFIRMED.              Respondent’s
Application to Strike Petitioners’ Reply Brief is DENIED.

                                     __________________________________
                                     MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Roger Glahn and                        :
Donna Gorencel,                        :
                           Petitioners :
                                       :
                   v.                  : No. 1273 C.D. 2021
                                       : Submitted: July 29, 2022
Department of Environmental            :
Protection (Environmental Hearing      :
Board),                                :
                           Respondent :

BEFORE:         HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
                HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE                                               FILED: July 10, 2023

         Respectfully, I dissent in part and concur in part.
         I concur with the majority’s disposition and would also affirm the
Environmental Hearing Board’s (Board) order on the basis that “the [Department of
Environmental Protection’s (Department)] failure to render a determination within
the timeframe allotted did not constitute an appealable ‘action’ within the Board’s
jurisdiction.” Glahn v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., __ A.3d__, __ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1273
C.D. 2021, filed July 10, 2023), slip op. at 12. I dissent to note my disagreement
with the majority’s conclusion that the 45-day timeframe in Section 3218(b) of the
Oil and Gas Act (Act),1 58 Pa.C.S. § 3218(b), is mandatory. Id. at 10 n.10.

1
    58 Pa.C.S. §§ 2301-3504.
      “Whether a statute is mandatory or directory ‘must be determined by
considering legislative intent gleaned from review of the entire statute and from
considering the nature and object of the statute and the consequences of the
construction of it one way or another.’” JPay, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 89 A.3d 756,
763 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citation omitted). I agree with the majority’s explanation
that the specific nature and object of Section 3218(b), in harmony with the Act’s
declared purpose of protecting the safety of persons residing near oil and gas
production, is to protect individual property owners from pollution or diminution of
their water supply by oil and gas exploration and development. See Glahn, __ A.3d
at __, slip. op. at 11 n.10; 58 Pa.C.S. §§ 3202, 3218(b). The majority’s interpretation
of Section 3218(b)’s 45-day determination timeframe as mandatory, however,
frustrates Section 3218(b)’s purpose.
      “While both mandatory and directory provisions of the legislature are meant
to be followed, the difference between a mandatory and directory provision is the
consequence for noncompliance: a failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of a
directory statute will not nullify the validity of the action involved.” JPay, Inc., 89
A.3d at 763. As a result, when we determine a timeframe in a statute is mandatory,
the practical consequence is that an agency is divested of the authority to act beyond
the statutory timeframe. See also Shapiro v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 856 A.2d
864, 872 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (“While failure to follow a mandatory statute renders
the proceedings void, failure to follow a directory one does not.”).
      The majority’s interpretation of Section 3218(b)’s 45-day timeline as
mandatory, therefore, means that any action the Department takes after Section
3218(b)’s 45-day timeframe is null and void. In this particular case, the Department
determined an oil and gas producer was responsible for polluting Petitioners’ water

                                        SW - 2
supply well beyond the 45-day time period. The majority’s holding renders that
determination null and void. This is inapposite to the legislative intent of Section
3218(b) of the Act.
      I share the majority’s concerns with the Department’s delay. The Act,
however, “does not dictate any sanction or consequence” for the Department’s
failure to issue a determination within 45 days. See JPay, Inc., 89 A.3d at 763.
“Moreover, this Court is particularly reluctant to find a statutory provision
mandatory where it requires that a Commonwealth agency issue an adjudication
within a specified time frame.” Id. In addition, Petitioners were not without a
remedy. When an agency fails to abide by a directory timeframe, a party may file
an action in mandamus to compel the agency to take action. See Appeal of Crossley,
432 A.2d 263, 264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981); D’Amico v. Bd. of Supervisors, Twp. of
Alsace, 526 A.2d 479, 480 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987); Smoak v. Talaber, 193 A.3d 1160,
1165-66 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
       In D’Amico, 526 A.2d at 480, a local agency, which was statutorily required
to render a decision within seven days, denied a sewage permit application after nine
days. We determined the local agency’s untimely decision was valid because the
statutory timeframe was directory. Id. In reaching this conclusion, we noted “[t]his
does not mean that [the appellant] was without a remedy. Rather, a delay beyond
the seven-day time period provided by the [statute at issue] would form the basis for
a mandamus action to compel the [local agency] to perform [its] duties.” Id.
      In Appeal of Crossley, 432 A.2d at 264, a zoning hearing board, which was
statutorily required to certify its record to the Court of Common Pleas within 20 days
of the filing of an appeal, took over 300 days to certify its record. We determined
the zoning hearing board’s decision was valid despite its untimely certification of

                                       SW - 3
the record because the statutory timeframe was directory. Id. at 265. In reaching
this conclusion, we noted “[the appellant] was not without remedy. At an earlier
stage he could have filed an action in mandamus to compel the Board to certify its
record.” Id. Similarly, in Smoak, 193 A.3d at 1165-66, we determined that when
the Pennsylvania Parole Board failed to take required action in processing an appeal,
the proper remedy was “a petition for mandamus in this Court’s original jurisdiction
to require the Parole Board to issue its decision, not reversal of an otherwise correct
decision after it has been issued.”
      By concluding that Section 3218(b)’s 45-day timeframe is directory, we
would ensure that the Department can hold oil and gas producers accountable when
they cause pollution to water sources regardless of when the Department makes its
determination. This aligns with the purpose of Section 3218(b), which is to protect
property owners from pollution or diminution of their water supply by oil and gas
exploration and development. This also aligns with our reluctancy to find statutory
provisions mandatory when they require Commonwealth agencies to issue
adjudications within a specific timeframe. See JPay, Inc., 89 A.3d at 763. Lastly,
interpreting Section 3218(b)’s 45-day timeframe as directory would not negatively
impact affected property owners because they can pursue a mandamus action to
compel the Department to act anytime the Department takes longer than 45 days to
issue a determination. Accordingly, I would hold that Section 3218(b) of the Act’s
45-day timeframe is directory.

                                              ______________________________
                                              STACY WALLACE, Judge

                                       SW - 4