Court Opinion

ID: 9834113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:18:22.270033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.751639
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The argument of the Attorney General on motion for a rehearing indicates some misunderstanding on his part as to the grounds of our decision herein, and for fear that we have not made our position quite plain, we will here attempt to do so.
[9] 1. We do not hold that the judgment of the district court of Hartley county, under which the road was sold, authorized the purchasers to dismantle the road. The right, exists independent of that judgment.
[10] 2. We recognize the fact that, -though the purchasers have not organized a corporation to take over the sold-out road, for-*503which reason the provisions of article 6625, B. S., do not apply to them, nevertheless, the sale of the road did not work a forfeiture of its charter, but the purchasers became, in effect, its stockholders, and were bound by all of the provisions of the statute and of the common law applicable to the sold-out company. Railway Co. v. Morris, 67 Tex. 700, 4 S. W. 156; Railway Co. v. Newell, 73 Tex. 338, 11 S. W. 342, 15 Am. St. Rep. 788; Railway Co. v. Harle, 101 Tex. 181, 105 S. W. 1107; Bailway Co. v. Anderson County, 150 S. W. 250; Id., 156 S. W. 503; Thayer v. Wathen, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 392, 44 S. W. 906; Williams v. Railway Co., 22 Tex. Civ. App. 281, 55 S. W. 130. Therefore, the question is: Could the railway company, under the facts of this case, be enjoined from removing the ties and rails, if it was threatening to do so, as are the individual defendants herein? It is a general rule of the common law that when a railroad has been constructed and operated, its location shall not be changed without legislative consent, and such is the general policy of this state as indicated by our statutes. Articles 6550, 6625, B. S. This rule is founded on reason and justice. The reason of the rule is that a railway is a public highway, and property is acquired with reference to its location, and with the view of its permanent operation. To allow railway companies to remove their tracks would generally destroy the rights of the public, acquired with reference to such public highway. If railway companies could change their location or discontinue operations at their will, a threat to do so would be a potent means of levying blackmail on that portion of the public whose interest would be affected by such removal or abandonment. The' consideration which a railway company receives for the enforcement of such rule is its charter granted by the state, and the privileges conferred thereby. A railway company, while a going concern, may be enjoined from violating its implied contract not to move its track. Por failure to operate its road, its charter may be forfeited. But, as we have stated in our previous opinion herein, the state has no power to compel any one to operate a railroad, and when the owners have permanently ceased to do so, and thereby abandoned all of the privileges granted them by the charter, it has ceased to be a railroad in any proper sense.
There is another well-established rule of the common law, and that is, the owner of property may use it as he pleases, so long as he does not infringe upon the rights of others. This rule is not violated by forbidding a railway company that is a going concern to move its track, for in so doing it violates the property rights of that portion of the public contiguous thereto. When the reason of a rule ceases, the rule itself ceases. There can be no violation of public rights ■where the public has no rights. The public can have no beneficial interest in maintaining the ties and rails on a roadbed, if no trains are ever to be operated thereon, and can suffer no wrong by their removal. It cannot be anticipated that trains will ever be operated on a road which will never pay expenses. The state, by its Attorney General, has signed an agreed statement of facts wherein it is stated that the road here under consideration can never be made to pay operating expenses. It is suggested that it might do so if extended, as called for in its charter. But the railway company has forever forfeited its right to continue the construction of the road, and there is no way of compelling the individual owners, or any one else, to do so. We are not called upon to deal with the rohd as it may be extended in the future, but as it now exists, this being the road that it is proposed to dismantle. Consideration as to this road’s ever being able to pay operating expenses is precluded by the agreement of the parties hereto that it can .never be made to do so, which agreement will be taken as a fact by this court.
It is suggested that this case is differentiated from Jack v. Williams (C. C.) 113 Fed. 823, in that, in that case no part of the expense of constructing the road had been paid for by subscriptions of private parties, whereas, in the instant case the road was built principally, if not entirely, by such subscription. The Subscribers to that fund are not complaining — they are not parties to this suit. The only party plaintiff in this suit is the state, in behalf of the public, represented herein by the Attorney General.
The Attorney General denies the applicability of Trust Co. v. Bailway Co. (C. C.) 192 Fed. 728, to this case, inasmuch as the decree in that case was in the alternative. The fundamental proposition there decided was that, under proper circumstances, the court may order the sale of the constructive material as junk, in which case, of course, the purchasers would have the right to remove the same. If a court in a given case could rightfully make such order, it would be because the public had no interest in having such material remain in place. If such be the fact, the right of removal would not be created by the judgment of the court permitting the same, but such judgment would be entered because such right already existed, just as the judgment of a court quieting title or to recover a debt does not create such title or debt, but only evidences its previous existence.
The facts being that the Enid, Ochiltree & Western Bailway Company has no rolling stock and is not able to purchase any; that it has ceased operations for several years, and can never resume such operations, except at a loss, as is admitted by the Attorney General, having thus in fact been permanently abandoned — said railway company would have the right to remove the rails and ties; and, as the purchasers have succeeded *504to all of the rights of the company, they likewise have such right of removal.
Such being our views of the law, we overrule appellee’s motion for a rehearing. Overruled.