Court Opinion

ID: 9809196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:03:35.368272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:26.587556
License: Public Domain

BeowN, J.,
dissenting: I am of opinion that the motion to nonsuit should have been allowed. The evidence, taken in its most favorable view for plaintiff, tends to prove these facts:
The intestate was killed on 7 April, 1915. At the time he was on top of a running freight train of the railway company, walking towards the caboose, lie was caught by two wires belonging to the traction company, stretched across the railway right of way by its consent and fastened to juniper poles 143 feet apart, one on the east and one on the west side of the -right of way about 2 miles from Durham. The intestate was thrown to the ground between the cars and killed. The intestate was not an employee of the railway company, but was riding on top of the rapidly running freight train without tbe knowledge or consent of the conductor or of any proper authority of said company.
It is in evidence that one Howard Holeman, a brakeman, invited the intestate, to ride on the train. No one else knew of it. There had been an extraordinary snowstorm and wind, 2 and 3 April, 1915, that had caused the wires-to sag so low that they caught the intestate about the shoulder and threw him under the wheels. The wires were in proper position on 2 April, and defendant traction company had no notice that they were sagging as result of the storm.
That the intestate was a trespasser as to the railway company, and violating the statute, Revisal, 3748, making it a misdemeanor to ride on top of the freight train under such circumstances, cannot successfully be questioned. Vassor v. R. R., 142 N. C., 68: Bailey v. R. R., 149 N. C., 169.
The statute is explicit, and forbids any person other than a railway employee in the discharge of his duty from riding or attempting to ride on top of any car, coach, engine, or tender on any railroad without authority from the conductor of the train or the engineer, and *689makes it a misdemeanor to do so. If the intestate was a trespasser, tbe railway company, the owner of the premises, owed him no duty except to refrain from inflicting willful or wanton injury; and the defendant, the traction company, owed him no greater duty than did its lessor, the railroad company. The poles of the traction company were put on the land of the railroad company and its wires crossed its tracks by its consent. It was not required to foresee that the plaintiff would -violate the statutes of the State and put himself in. a position of danger where he would possibly come in contact with its wires. Willis v. R. R., 122 N. C., 909; Vassor v. R. R., supra; Peterson v. R. R., 143 N. C., 260; Quantz v. R. R., 137 N. C., 136.
If the plaintiff had been an employee of the railroad company, or rightfully on top of the ear, it would be different. If the railway company, the owner of the right of way, over which the wires of the defendant were stretched, owed the plaintiff’s intestate no duty except to refrain from inflicting willful or wanton injury, then the defendant could not be held to a higher degree of care than the owner of the premises, upon which rested the primary duty of keeping its premises and right of way reasonably safe.
The railway company owned the right of way and had the right to stretch its telegraph and telephone wires along and across, its right of way with its wires. If mischief happened to a trespasser by reason of the wires being stretched across the right of way, it is -his fault. He is held to assume the risk. The implied duty to prevent harm from unsafe premises does not exist in favor of a trespasser. McGhee v. R. R., 147 N. C., 147.
The Benton case, 165 N. C., 354, does not controvert this well settled proposition. Benton was not a trespasser upon the service company’s property, but had climbed a tree and come in contact with a sparking wire with defective insulation. The . question presented by this appeal is well settled and fully discussed in many cases, and we need not dwell on it further. Briscoe v. Lighting Co., 148 N. C., 396; Telephone Co. v. Odom,, 70 S. E. Rep., 1116; Telegraph Co. v. Martin, 116 Ky., 554; McCaughna v. Electric Co., 129 Mich., 407.
Mr. Justice Walker concurs in this opinion.