Court Opinion

ID: 9498802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:28:11.094449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:03.965144
License: Public Domain

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, and because I am unpersuaded that N’Diom’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim entitles him to a remand, I respectfully dissent.
I. ADVERSE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATION
The majority contends that a remand is necessary because the BIA failed to credit N’Diom’s testimony or his explanations for the various inconsistencies. Its opinion, however, neither articulates nor follows the proper standard for reviewing an adverse credibility determination. Adverse credibility determinations are findings of fact that must be reviewed under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard. Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 703 & n. 2 (6th. Cir.2004). Under this standard, we are not to reverse an IJ’s factual determination as affirmed by the BIA unless we find “that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 986 (6th Cir.2004) (emphasis in original). The majority has apparently departed from this standard, remanding instead because the BIA “might ... adjudicate[ ] N’Diom’s case differently” if it emphasizes various factors that the majority considers relevant.
I also find unpersuasive the assertion of my colleagues that the “Board [did] not sufficiently articulate its reasoning nor evaluate the applicant’s claim on the record considered as a whole.” Maj. Op. at 499 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The record reflects that the opposite is true. In fact, the majority opinion itself cites instances in the record where the IJ referred to various discrepancies as forming the basis for his decision. The IJ’s decision was based not only on the incompleteness of the asylum application, as the majority opinion contends, but also on the fact that N’Diom’s testimony was inconsistent with his personal statement attached to the application. These inconsistencies convinced the IJ that N’Diom had embellished his story, and ultimately led to the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.
The majority opinion further criticizes the IJ for relying on omissions as opposed to direct contradictions. Maj. Op. at 495 - *503497 (“All of the so-called ‘discrepancies’ are simply omissions to state a particular detail. None are lies in the sense of a statement opposite to or inconsistent with a prior statement.”). My colleagues overlook, however, a major discrepancy concerning N’Diom’s allegations of torture in Libya. N’Diom, after claiming in his personal statement that he was physically and psychologically tortured in Libya, testified before the IJ that he was subjected to psychological torture only. Such a discrepancy certainly goes to the heart of N’Diom’s claim, see Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir.2004), considering that N’Diom was relying on this evidence of torture to demonstrate his past persecution — a necessary prerequisite to obtaining asylum.
Moreover, this purported distinction between direct contradictions on the one hand and omissions on the other is not supported by our caselaw. See Shkabari v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 324, 329 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that “omissions may form the basis of an adverse credibility determination, provided that they are substantially related to the asylum claim”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In Shkabari, the Albanian petitioner applied for asylum on the basis that his leadership in the Democratic Party of Albania allegedly led to persecution in his native country. The Shkabari court affirmed an adverse credibility determination on the basis of two omissions: (1) Shkabari testified at his hearing before the IJ that he was the chairman of the Albanian Democratic Party, yet his asylum application failed to mention a leadership role, and (2) Shkabari claimed at the hearing that he was afraid to go to the hospital because the rival political party controlled it, yet he stated in his asylum application that he was treated at a local hospital after the police burned him with scalding water. Id. at 329-30. These omissions were considered “major inconsistencies]” by the Shkabari court because Shkabari’s status as a leader of the Democratic Party, as well as his fear of the local hospital, “greatly enhanced his claim of persecution.” Id. at 329.
Here, as in Shkabari, the alleged testimonial facts that were omitted in N’Diom’s asylum application, if believed, would amplify his persecution claim. The last example of persecution reported in N’Diom’s asylum application or in the notes of the Asylum Officer occurred in 1993. N’Diom testified before the IJ, however, that he had been under house arrest from 1993 to 1997, that he endured a subsequent arrest in 1998, and that his wife had died as a result of shock from his 1998 arrest. Prior to N’Diom’s testimony, as the IJ noted, his application and other materials portrayed him as “a person who had existed in a perfectly normal manner in his country for the last ten years.”
These additional claims made during N’Diom’s testimony led the IJ to conclude that N’Diom had “embellished his testimony” and “effectively created a new story” for the hearing. The IJ’s concern that N’Diom’s “tale [of persecution] grew in the telling” heeds the warning in Shkabari that such exaggerations are often the result of a desire to enhance an immigrant’s claim. See Shkabari, 427 F.3d at 329. I believe that the IJ was justified in determining that N’Diom’s slew of new allegations at the hearing, none of which were supported by prior evidence in the record, indicated his lack of credibility.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the IJ and the BIA failed to consider N’Diom’s explanations for these inconsistencies, a review of the record indicates otherwise. In fact, the decision of the IJ acknowledges N’Diom’s claim that he was told by the Asylum Officer to “keep it short,” and the decision goes on to explain *504why N’Diom was still held responsible for the inconsistencies. The IJ pinpointed the fact that the Asylum Officer specifically asked N’Diom whether anything had happened to him after his release from jail in 1993, and that N’Diom had disregarded this opportunity for elaboration by answering in the negative — even though he later testified that his wife’s death, as well as his contemporaneous arrest, occurred in 1998. Cf. Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir.2004) (“An adverse credibility finding is not based on substantial evidence where [t]he BIA [or the IJ] did not comment on [an applicant’s] explanation nor suggest any reason that it found his explanation not credible.”) (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The majority opinion also places great emphasis on the fact that “[t]here is no indication in the record before us that the Immigration Judge or the Board took cognizance of the dire human rights situation in Mauritania or the mistreatment of the black African Fulani by the government.” Maj. Op. at 498. Its decision to remand is partly based on this purported oversight by the IJ and the BIA. In the BIA’s order, however, it explicitly considered the relevant country report and concluded:
Because the respondent’s testimony as to his political associations cannot be accepted as true and because the country conditions evidence of record shows that the Mauritanian government no longer expels or harms black Fulanis in a way that rises to the level of torture, the respondent is ineligible [for relief].
The assertion by the majority that the BIA’s rejection of N’Diom’s testimony was “questionable” because his testimony was “plausible and consistent with known facts about conditions in Mauritania” is therefore incorrect on two counts. First, the BIA actually considered N’Diom’s allegations in light of current conditions in Mauritania and determined that black Fulanis were no longer being persecuted to the extent claimed by N’Diom. Second, and more importantly, the deferential substantial-evidence standard requires more than mere plausibility to disturb an adverse credibility determination. Because the record before us does not “compel” a contrary result, see Marku, 380 F.3d at 986, I would therefore affirm the adverse credibility determination.
II. N’DIOM’S INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL CLAIM
The majority opinion blames N’Diom’s numerous discrepancies on his counsel, whom the majority characterizes as “clearly lacking in competence and diligence.” Maj. Op. at 499. If counsel had properly presented certain evidence, the majority reasons, the BIA “might have adjudicated N’Diom’s claim differently.” Maj. Op. at 499. (Emphasis added.) The majority opinion, however, fails to acknowledge that not only did the BIA consider and reject N’Diom’s complaints about his counsel, but also that N’Diom’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not properly before us.
Because a deportation proceeding is civil rather than criminal, N’Diom’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is reviewed pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 723 (6th Cir.2003). Ineffective assistance of counsel in this context will constitute a due-process violation “only if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, consideration of N’Diom’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim by this court is appropriate only if N’Diom properly pre*505sented the merits of his claim to the BIA. See Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir.2004).
An alien seeking to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings is required to (1) set forth the relevant facts in an affidavit, (2) inform counsel of the allegations and provide counsel with an opportunity to respond, and (3) file a formal disciplinary complaint or explain why one has not been filed. Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988); see also Hamid v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir.2003) (refusing to consider such a claim where the Lozada requirements were not satisfied). The order of the BIA makes clear that N’Diom failed to properly raise his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because he did not satisfy the conditions in Lozada, the failure of which prohibits us from considering his claim. See Ramani, 378 F.3d at 560. Moreover, even if N’Diom had properly raised the claim, the BIA opined that it would have considered his argument meritless because he was unable to show prejudice from his counsel’s oversight. BIA Op. at 2 (“We further note that the respondent has demonstrated neither the content of the testimonial and documentary evidence he sought to have admitted, nor how that evidence would have changed the outcome of this case.”).
The majority opinion does not discuss the procedural requirements of Lozada, improperly considers N’Diom’s complaints against his counsel in adjudicating this case, and assumes that the mistakes made by counsel were fatal to N’Diom’s petition. Maj. Op. at 498 (“The reason that N’Diom was unable to introduce any witness or documentary evidence corroborating his testimony was that his immigration lawyer at the trial did not understand or comply with the local [rules]”). As the BIA noted, however, N’Diom was unable to show that the introduction of this evidence would have altered the outcome of the case. See Sako v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 857, 864 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that the alien “must establish that, but for the ineffective assistance of counsel, he would have been entitled to continue residing in the United States”); see also Huicochea-Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the alien “carries the burden of establishing that ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced him”). This court has also emphasized that “[s]ound policy reasons support compliance with the Loza-da requirements,” one of which is to “discourage] baseless allegations.” Hamid, 336 F.3d at 469.
The majority opinion, by making no mention of Lozada and accepting at face value N’Diom’s assertion that the excluded evidence would have proven the merits of his case, arguably requires a remand in every case in which an immigrant claims that his attorney was ineffective. Such a position is not only contrary to the law of this court, see Hamid, 336 F.3d at 469, but would also swamp the already overburdened BIA with needless remands.
III. CONCLUSION
Because I am unpersuaded that the record compels a contrary conclusion as to the adverse credibility determination, and because I believe that the majority opinion improperly considers N’Diom’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, I respectfully dissent.