Court Opinion

ID: 9785783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:20:26.81779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:33.017683
License: Public Domain

Justice KIDWELL,
dissenting as to part III.
I respectfully dissent as to part III of the Majority’s opinion because I do not find that the jury instructions misstated the law or were apt to confuse or mislead the jury.
Young was charged with felony injury to a child under I.C. § 18-1501(1):
Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year, or in the state prison for not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years.
I.C. § 18-1501(1).
The district court gave the following elemental jury instruction:
[Y]ou may find the Defendant guilty of Injury to Children Under Circumstances Likely To Produce Great Bodily Harm if each of the following are proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That on or about July 2,1998,
2. in the County of Canyon,
3. in the State of Idaho,
4. the Defendant Steven Paul Young,
5. under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,
*3766. unlawfully and willfully caused or permitted, Michael Steven Young, to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering by failing to provide Michael Steven Young with reasonably necessary medical treatment after the child was burned, and
7. Michael Steven Young was under eighteen (18) years of age.
(Emphasis added). The district court also defined “unlawfully” in the jury instructions:
The word “unlawfully,” as used in these instructions, means wrongfully or contrary to law or the intentional doing of something which the law forbids or makes a crime.
The pattern Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions provide, in relevant part, that to be convicted of “Injury To a Child,” the state must prove that the defendant:
[willfully caused or permitted [name of child] to suffer,] [or] [willfully inflicted on [name of child] unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,]____
IC JI 1243 Injury To A Child.
Young argues that the district court’s jury instructions misstated the law and were apt to confuse and mislead the jury in two ways. First, he argues, the instructions misstated the law regarding a parent’s legal duty to secure medical treatment for his or her children. Second, he argues, the instructions misstated the mental state the prosecution was required to show in order to secure a conviction.
A. A Parent’s Legal Duty To Obtain Medical Treatment For His Or Her Children
Young argues that because Instructions 10 and 13 included the phrases “unlawfully” and “by failing to provide Michael Steven Young with reasonably necessary medical treatment after the child was burned” — phrases that do not appear in either I.C. § 18-1501(1) or ICJI 1243 — they misstated Idaho law and were apt to confuse and mislead the jury. Young argues that Idaho law does not impose a duty upon parents to seek medical treatment for their children and does not allow a jury to determine what medical care a parent should “reasonably” seek for their children.
The addition of the term “unlawfully,” alone, although technically incorrect, did not prejudice Young. From the standpoint of an accused, it was, at worst, redundant in the context of the provisions of I.C. § 18-1501(1), which makes it unlawful to allow a child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering and, at best, it placed a burden on the State to prove an additional element.
Similarly, the inclusion of the language “reasonably necessary,” alone or in concert with “unlawfully,” did not serve to give the jury authority to decide the proper course of medical treatment for Michael in a way contrary to Idaho law. The question before the jury did not hinge on whether some collateral source of Idaho law imposes a duty upon parents to secure professional medical treatment for injuries to their children; rather, the instructions informed the jury that it must decide whether Young’s failure to seek out professional medical treatment in this situation amounted to an omission sufficient to violate the prohibition against permitting a child to suffer contained in I.C. § 18-1501(1) itself. The prohibition in I.C. § 18-1501(1) plainly and logically encompasses the situation in which a parent willfully fails to seek out professional medical treatment, if the State can convince a jury that the failure was “unjustified,” “willful,” and “under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death.”
The language was not apt to confuse or mislead the jury. Idaho Code section 18-1501(1) charges the jury with the task of determining whether an act of permitting a child to suffer was “unjustifiable.” Obviously, the statute contemplates the situation in which a parent may justifiably permit a child to suffer to some extent without incurring criminal liability for doing so. The phrase “reasonably necessary,” contained in Instruction 10, embodies a conceptual tool likely to *377be utilized by jurors in determining whether a parent was justified in permitting the suffering. The inclusion of this language did not alter the jury’s task in a way that was prejudicial to Young.
Consequently, although Instruction 10 did not strictly comply with the language of I.C. § 18-1501(1) or ICJI 1243, Young cannot show prejudice resulting from that instruction.
B. The Mental State Necessary For A Conviction Under I.C. § 18-1501(1)
The jury instructions defined “willfully” as follows:
The word “willfully,” when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.
Young argues that he was prejudiced by the fact that the instructions indicated that the jury only needed to find that Young willfully failed to obtain professional medical treatment. Young argues that in the context of I.C. § 18-1501(1), the term “willfully” requires a finding that the defendant committed the act or omission with knowledge of the consequences of his or her actions — ie., the defendant was aware, or should have reasonably foreseen, that the conduct would bring about injury or suffering to the child.
Young’s argument implicitly refers to the difference between general and specific criminal intent. “A general criminal intent requirement is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts, but a specific intent requirement refers to that state of mind which in part defines the crime and is an element thereof.” State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405, 406, 788 P.2d 220, 221 (1990) (citations omitted). “Specific intent is a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the completed crime.” State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 401-02, 3 P.3d 67, 79-80 (Ct.App.2000). In Stiffler, this Court held that “statutory rape,” under I.C. § 18-6101(1), does not require specific intent and that ignorance of the age of the victim is therefore not a defense. 117 Idaho at 407-OS, 788 P.2d at 222-23. This Court focused on the fact that the legislature evidenced knowledge of the difference between general and specific intent by including specific intent requirements in two of the six subsections of I.C. § 18-6101 but not in the other four. Id. The Court held that, because the legislature chose not to include specific intent language in subsection one, regarding “statutory rape,” the offense required only general intent, or a showing that the defendant intended to commit the actus reus. Id.
Idaho Code section 18-101(1) provides the general definition of “willfully” applicable to Title 18 of the Idaho Code, saying:
The following words have in this code the signification attached to them in this section, unless otherwise apparent from the context:
1. The word “wil[l]fully,” when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.
I.C. § 18-101 (emphasis added). This section limits its own applicability by the lead-in phrase “unless otherwise apparent from the context.”
Idaho Code section 18-1501(1) does not include language that, “otherwise apparent from the context,” requires a showing of intent related to something other than the actus reus. The legislature could have chosen to include specific intent language in I.C. § 18-1501(1), as it did in the theft statute, which provides that “[a] person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.” I.C. § 18-*3782403 (emphasis added). In enacting I.C. § 18-1501, the legislature did not choose to include any such language clearly requiring specific intent. Instead, the legislature chose to generally reference the term “willfully,” which is defined in terms of general intent in I.C. § 18-101. Therefore, because no different meaning is clearly indicated in the context of I.C. § 18-1501(1), the correct course is to revert to the general definition in I.C. § 18-101, which merely requires the state to show that the act or omission itself was “willfully” brought about. Additionally, within the ambit of the definition of “willfully” contained in I.C. § 18-101, lies the concept that, if a person has a purpose or willingness to commit an act or make an omission, that person must logically and necessarily intend any injury or suffering that is a reasonably foreseeable result of that act or omission. It is reasonable for a finder of fact to make such an inference based upon a showing that the defendant “willfully” acted or failed to act.
Consequently, I would hold that the State was not required to show that Young intended or had knowledge that his omission would lead to further injury or suffering by Michael in order to show a violation of I.C. § 18-1501(1) and affirm Young’s conviction. Notably, this would not turn felony injury to a child into a strict liability offense that would penalize “innocent mistakes in judgment;” rather, the question of the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions would be bounded by the requirement that the acts be “unjustifiable,” as required by the plain language of the statute.