Court Opinion

ID: 9849720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:45:01.759344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:25.371139
License: Public Domain

WOLLHEIM, J.,
dissenting.
The majority’s holding, in essence, requires trial counsel to do the job of an appellate court. This is the danger of applying “pure hindsight,” Turner v. Maass, 103 Or App 109, 110 n 3, 795 P2d 617, rev den 310 Or 547 (1990), to measure the effectiveness of counsel at trial, and for that reason I respectfully dissent.
Trial counsel is required to “do those things reasonably necessary to diligently and conscientiously advance the defense.” Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 874, 627 P2d 458 (1981). However, the majority dismisses the fact that the meaning of the Dangerous Offender Act (the Act), ORS 161.725, “was not clearly settled.” Wells v. Peterson, 315 Or 233, 236, 844 P2d 192 (1992). Instead, the majority, with the benefit of studied and deliberate hindsight, explains that the established “simple” legal principle announced in State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 405, 623 P2d 630 (1981), and State v. Wedge, 293 Or 598, 607, 652 P2d 773 (1982), was clear enough at the time of petitioner’s trial to require his trial counsel to have applied that principle to the Act even though no appellate court had yet applied the principle to the Act.
I take exception to the majority’s approach for three reasons. First, it effectively ignores the caveat that “application of this simple principle is not always so simple.” 293 Or at 607.1 start from the general premise that courts are obligated to interpret statutes as constitutional, “if that can be done.” State v. Charlesworth / Parks, 151 Or App 100, 107, 951 P2d 153 (1997), rev den 327 Or 82 (1998). Additionally, in general, “there is no right to a jury for sentencing” under the Oregon or United States Constitutions. Wedge, 293 Or at 605. The Act sets out the “[standards of sentencing of dangerous offenders.” ORS 161.725 (emphasis added). Indeed, it is an enhanced penalty statute, and Oregon has “upheld other enhanced penalty statutes even though they required additional post-trial findings by the court as a basis for a greater sentence.” Quinn, 290 Or at 405.
*165In Quinn and Wedge, the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the respective statutes insofar as they permitted or required the court to make a finding of predicate fact as to an element of the crime. But both statutes in question explicitly added elements to the crime and squarely placed the finding of those elements on the court. See Wedge, 293 Or at 600 n 1 (where ORS 161.610(4) stated “if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used or threatened to use a firearm during the commission of the crime, it shall impose at least the minimum term of imprisonment”); Quinn, 290 Or at 406 (the addition of the mental state, deliberation, “in the act of homicide is part of an act declared by the legislature to be criminal” and thus must be determined by a jury). The Act provides that when a court finds, in part, that “[t]he defendant is being sentenced for a felony that seriously endangered the life or safety of another,” the court may sentence the defendant as a dangerous offender. ORS 161.725(1)(b). The Act does not as clearly require the court to “find beyond a reasonable doubt” a fact traditionally or expressly predicate to the crime. Wedge, 293 Or at 600 n 1. Therefore, I find the application of the “simple” principle to the Act not as “simple” as the majority suggests. I would not require trial counsel to predict that an appellate court would read the Act, which appeared facially consistent with the general procedures for sentencing, as unconstitutional — a reading we would normally take pains to avoid.
My second exception is that, notwithstanding the clarity of the application of the principle to the Act, I simply do not believe that trial counsel is required to anticipate what the law would be if an appellate court had addressed it. While such anticipation would be good lawyering, it is not a measure of the constitutional adequacy of counsel. Certainly, I agree that counsel is required to be prepared on the law to enable informed representation of a defendant. Krummacher, 290 Or at 875. But that relates only to counsel being informed on what the law is, or perhaps to be aware if there is an active debate in the court or at bar about its meaning. I do not believe that counsel must be able to predict that a principle of law announced in similar but different contexts, will be applied to overturn an unassailed portion of a statute. *166I believe that especially in a case, as here, concerning the litigation of multiple and complex issues, the majority’s requirement places too heavy a burden on counsel.
My third reason concerns the majority’s discounting the state’s reliance on Wells. The majority holds that Wells does not apply because the law in Wells was unsettled and the law here was “well settled.” 159 Or App at 162.1 do not agree. Until this court decided State v. Mitchell, 84 Or App 452, 734 P2d 379, rev den 303 Or 590 (1987), no appellate court considered whether the current Dangerous Offender Act required a jury to decide whether a defendant was a dangerous offender. However, the same issue was considered under the predecessor statute, the Habitual Criminal Act, ORS 168.085 (1963). In State v. Hoffman, 236 Or 98, 104, 385 P2d 741 (1963), the defendant argued that Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, required a jury trial to determine whether he had been convicted of prior crimes. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument:
“The duty of determining the extent of the penalty to be imposed in a criminal case * * * is by law imposed upon the trial judge. The extent of that punishment is legislative, limited only by the constitutional prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment.” Id. at 107.
Based on Hoffman, reasonable trial counsel could have disagreed about whether to make an argument that ORS 161.725 required a jury determination because at that time the meaning of the statute was not clearly settled.
With respect, I fear the ramifications of the majority’s requirement could open a pandora’s box of hindsight being right-sight.
I respectfully dissent.