Court Opinion

ID: 9533265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:29:59.048571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:59.191188
License: Public Domain

BAILEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While I agree that the doctrine of amelioration is inapplicable here, because the punishment for a violation of Indiana Code section 9-80-10-16 was not changed,7 I disagree that De-santis could be convicted pursuant to the foregoing statute absent proof that his driver's license suspension was valid.
The habitual traffic violation suspension notice issued to Desantis was invalid because it failed to include the judicial review provision mandated by Indiana Code 9-30-10, which governs repeat violations of traffic laws. This cireumstance rendered the State unable to meet its burden of proving that Desantis had violated the provisions of Indiana Code section 9-80-10-16, which requires a valid suspension to support conviction.
*647At the time of Desantis's arrest on November 19, 1999, Indiana Code section 9-30-10-16 provided in pertinent part:
(a) A person who operates a motor vehicle:
(1) While the person's driving privileges are suspended under this chapter or IC 9-122 (repealed July 1, 1991); ... commits a Class D felony.
In Fields v. State, 679 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ind.1997), Brown v. State, 677 N.E.2d 517, 519 (Ind.1997), and Loe v. State, 654 N.E.2d 1157, 1158 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), the Indiana Supreme Court and this Court uniformly held that, absent proof of a valid suspension, a defendant could not be convicted of the offense of driving while suspended as an habitual traffic offender.
Subsequently, in Stewart v. State, 721 N,.E.2d 876 (Ind.1999), our Supreme Court sought to harmonize previous habitual traffic offender decisions. The Court examined Pebley v. State, 686 N.E.2d 168 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), and specifically disapproved that decision, as well as Griffin v. State, 654 N.E.2d 911 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (each of which reversed an habitual traffic offender conviction because the notice had rot contained procedures for seeking judicial review). Without explicitly overruling Loe and Fields, the Court held that a conviction of driving after having been adjudged an habitual traffic offender requires that the State prove: (1) the act of driving, (2) after a license suspension or an habitual traffic violation adjudication, and (8) that the defendant knew or reasonably could have known that his driving privileges had been suspended as a result of having been determined to be an habitual traffic offender. Stewart, 721 N.E.2d at 879. Although the Court observed that a failure in the Bureau of Motor Vehicles notification process might afford a driver remedies in the administrative process, the Court nevertheless concluded that a driver who knows of his suspension and still drives commits a criminal offense pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-30-10-16. Id.
In apparent response to Stewart, the Indiana Legislature amended Indiana Code section 9-80-10-16 and explicitly inserted the word "validly" before the word "suspended." The timing of this modification is significant. Determining legislative intent is foremost in construing any statute, and where possible, this Court will give deference to that intent. Alvers v. State, 489 N.E.2d 83, 88 (Ind.Ct.App.1986). When the legislature amends a statute, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law unless it clearly appears that the amendment was made only to express the original intention of the legislature more clearly. Id. The legislature's amendment of a statute is indicative of the legislature's intent at the initial enactment of the statute. Tedlock v. State, 656 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). Here, the addition of the single word "validly" to modify "suspended" represents a clarification of the legislature's original intent rather than a change to the requisite elements for conviction. As such, it effects a reaffirmation of the prior case law that required a valid suspension of driving privileges. The clear intent of the Legislature has consistently been to require that the State prove the existence of a valid license suspension.
Second, Stewart was not the relevant case law at the time of Desantis's act. Stewart was handed down on December 30, 1999, one month after Desantis performed the act of driving that led to his conviction. Accordingly, both the applicable statute and prevailing case law required the State to establish that Desantis's driver's license was validly *648suspended. The State failed to do so. I would reverse the conviction.

. Generally, the statute to be applied when arriving at the proper criminal penalty should be the one in effect at the time the crime was committed. Bell v. State, 654 N.E.2d 856, 858 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). The doctrine of amelioration constitutes an exception to the general rule, and provides that "a defendant who is sentenced after the effective date of a statute providing for more lenient sentencing is entitled to be sentenced pursuant to that statute rather than the sentencing statute in effect at the time of the commission or conviction of the crime." Id. (quoting Lunsford v. State, 640 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ind.Ct.App.1994)). Indiana Code section 9-30-10-16, as amended, prescribes a more difficult burden of proof for the State than that contemplated in Stewart, but does not prescribe a lesser punishment upon conviction.
Although I concurred in State v. Hammond, 737 N.E.2d 425 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. granted, an opinion which discusses generally the doctrine of amelioration and the applicability of the doctrine in light of the statutory amendment to Indiana Code section 9-30-10-16, upon reflection I have concluded that the amelioration discussion was misplaced. The analysis should have been limited to statutory construction and legislative intent, which is what the decision ultimately turned on. It was this rationale that garnered my concurrence and it is this rationale that is the basis of my dissent today.