Court Opinion

ID: 9905085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 18:11:13.100316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:24.330235
License: Public Domain

494                         October 19, 2023                          No. 30

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                    STATE OF OREGON

                             Thomas HILL,
                            Plaintiff-Relator,
                                    v.
                      Ronald M. JOHNSON,
                     Defendant-Adverse Party.
                   (CC 20CV31237) (SC S069766)

   Original proceeding in mandamus.*
   Argued and submitted May 11, 2023.
   Ryan D. Harris, Vial Fotheringham LLP, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for plaintiff-relator.
Also on the briefs was Matthew A. Martin.
   Nathan G. Steele, The Steele Law Firm, P.C., Bend, argued
the cause and filed the brief for defendant-adverse party.
  Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog,
Bushong, James, and Masih, Justices.**
   GARRETT, J.
   A peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue.

______________
    * On petition for writ of mandamus from an order of Deschutes County
Circuit Court, Michelle A. McIver, Judge.
    ** Balmer, Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore, participated in oral argument,
but did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 371 Or 494 (2023)   495
496                                            Hill v. Johnson

        GARRETT, J.
         An exception to the attorney-client privilege
applies to communications that are “relevant to an issue
of breach of duty” between an attorney and client. OEC
503(4)(c). This mandamus proceeding requires us to define
one boundary of that breach-of-duty exception: whether the
exception applies only to communications between the par-
ties directly involved in the alleged breach—that is, com-
munications between the client and the allegedly breach-
ing attorney (or, alternatively, communications between the
attorney and the allegedly breaching client). Based on the
text, context, and legislative history of OEC 503(4)(c), we
conclude that the breach-of-duty exception applies only to
communications between the parties directly involved in
the alleged breach. The trial court therefore erred when
it applied the breach-of-duty exception to communications
beyond that scope.
                     I. BACKGROUND
         We take the facts from the record in the trial court
proceedings. Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 361 Or
115, 117 n 1, 390 P3d 1031 (2017). The matter underlying
this mandamus proceeding is a legal malpractice action
brought by Hill against his former attorney, Johnson, who
had represented Hill in a marriage dissolution proceeding.
Hill alleges that, at the conclusion of his dissolution proceed-
ing, Johnson signed a stipulated supplemental judgment on
his behalf without his knowledge or permission. According
to Hill, the stipulated supplemental judgment provided
Hill’s ex-wife certain proceeds out of his pension plan that
exceeded the amount to which he had previously agreed.
        Hill alleges that, months later, when he learned
that the stipulated supplemental judgment included the
disputed pension proceeds, he asked Johnson to correct
it. When that was not done to Hill’s satisfaction, he hired
new trial counsel, Fowler, to repair Johnson’s alleged error.
Fowler moved the trial court to invalidate the supplemen-
tal judgment. The trial court denied that motion. Hill then
hired appellate counsel, Daniels, to repair Johnson’s alleged
error by challenging the trial court’s order on appeal.
Cite as 371 Or 494 (2023)                                                        497

         Based on those factual allegations, Hill brought the
underlying malpractice action alleging that Johnson owed
him a duty to exercise the ordinary skill and care exhibited
by Oregon attorneys and that Johnson breached that duty
both by signing the stipulated supplemental judgment with-
out his knowledge or permission and by failing to take ade-
quate steps to remediate that error. Hill seeks damages for
the disputed pension proceeds awarded to his former spouse
in the supplemental judgment and for the fees that Hill
paid to the attorneys, Fowler and Daniels, whom he hired to
repair Johnson’s alleged error.
          In response to Hill’s complaint, Johnson issued Hill
discovery requests seeking the production of documents.
Those requests sought, among other things, the complete
files of Fowler and Daniels related to their representations
of Hill in the dissolution matter as well as documents related
to any other attorney whom Hill had contacted to represent
him in the dissolution proceeding, regardless of whether
Hill had retained the contacted attorney.
         Hill produced billing records from Fowler and
Daniels but refused to produce other documents from their
files, asserting the attorney-client privilege under OEC
503(2). Johnson disputed Hill’s reliance on the attorney-
client privilege and moved to compel the production of the
documents that Hill had withheld. Johnson argued to the
trial court that the attorney-client privilege does not apply
in legal malpractice cases. Citing OEC 503(4)(c), the breach-
of-duty exception, Johnson argued that, because Hill’s com-
plaint alleged that Johnson had breached a duty owed to
Hill, communications between Hill and Fowler and Daniels
that were relevant to the alleged breach by Johnson should
be produced.
         The trial court agreed with Johnson, ruling that the
breach-of-duty allegations precluded Hill from relying on
the attorney-client privilege to withhold documents respon-
sive to Johnson’s request for production.1 Hill petitioned this

    1
       In ordering Hill to produce documents responsive to those requests, how-
ever, the trial court expressly relied on the breach-of-duty exception with respect
to only two of the three requests at issue: the request for repair trial counsel’s file
(Request for Production (RFP) 10) and the request for repair appellate counsel’s
498                                                            Hill v. Johnson

court for a writ of mandamus. This court issued an alter-
native writ of mandamus directing the trial court to either
vacate its order or show cause why the trial court should
not do so. The trial court declined to vacate its order. As a
result, the parties proceeded to argument in this court.
                                II. ANALYSIS
         Johnson argues, as a preliminary matter, that this
case is outside our mandamus jurisdiction for two reasons.
First, Johnson notes that the trial court issued a protective
order prohibiting him from disclosing Hill’s document pro-
ductions outside the malpractice proceeding, thus limiting
any harm to Hill that might otherwise result from the pro-
duction of the documents at issue.
         Johnson’s argument misconceives the grounds for
mandamus jurisdiction when a party asserts that a trial
court’s order erroneously requires disclosure of a privileged
communication. Mandamus jurisdiction does not turn on the
extent of harm, but, rather, on whether the law otherwise
provides an adequate remedy for that harm. Mandamus
jurisdiction does not lie when a party has “a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”
ORS 34.110. A direct appeal is generally a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy. See State ex rel Automotive Emporium
v. Murchison, 289 Or 265, 269, 611 P2d 1169, reh’g den, 289
Or 673, 616 P2d 496 (1980) (“Direct appeal is an adequate
remedy unless the relator would suffer a special loss beyond
the burden of litigation by being forced to trial.” (Footnote

file (RFP 45). The trial court did not cite any authority in ordering Hill to produce
documents related to his contact with prospective repair counsel (RFP 26).
      Nevertheless, Hill had asserted the attorney-client privilege in response to
all three requests for production in dispute. And Johnson had argued that the
breach-of-duty exception applied to all documents over which Hill had asserted
privilege. The trial court did not identify other grounds for rejecting Hill’s asser-
tion of privilege with respect to RFP 26. As a result, it is unclear whether the trial
court rejected Hill’s assertion of privilege as to RFP 26 based on the breach-of-
duty exception or on some other ground.
      Our decision addresses only the scope of the breach-of-duty exception. Our
decision does not address whether Hill has established that the withheld doc-
uments are protected by the attorney-client privilege, including whether Hill
has waived that privilege. To the extent that the trial court did not rely on the
breach-of-duty exception in rejecting Hill’s assertion of privilege over documents
responsive to RFP 26, this decision does not affect those reasons.
Cite as 371 Or 494 (2023)                                 499

omitted.)). On the other hand, a direct appeal “provides an
inadequate remedy” when a discovery order erroneously
requires disclosure of privileged communications because,
“[o]nce a privileged communication has been disclosed, the
harm cannot be undone.” Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP, 355 Or 476, 485, 326 P3d 1181 (2014)
(brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted). An
appeal fails to remedy the harm that results from the dis-
closure of privileged communications regardless of whether
that harm stems from the disclosure to one person—in this
case, Johnson—or from the disclosure to many people. In
short, if the trial court’s ruling requiring disclosure was
erroneous, the fact that the court also entered a protective
order limiting the extent of that disclosure is not relevant to
the question of mandamus jurisdiction.
         Second, Johnson points out that mandamus “may
serve only to enforce a known, clear legal right,” State v.
Moore, 361 Or 205, 212, 390 P3d 1010 (2017) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted), and that, as a result, “the writ of
mandamus cannot be used as a means of controlling judi-
cial discretion,” Oregon State Hospital v. Butts, 358 Or 49,
56, 359 P3d 1187 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Johnson argues that the trial court exercised its discretion
in compelling Hill to produce the responsive documents and,
therefore, the trial court’s order is beyond our mandamus
jurisdiction.
         That argument, too, is incorrect. At issue in this
case is the trial court’s interpretation of the breach-of-duty
exception contained in OEC 503(4)(c). Hill contends that the
exception should be interpreted as applying only to com-
munications between the parties directly involved in the
alleged breach—in this case, Hill and Johnson. The trial
court interpreted the exception more broadly when it ruled
that Hill was required to produce communications between
himself and attorneys other than Johnson. In deciding how
to interpret OEC 503(4)(c), the trial court was not exercising
discretion—it was deciding a question of law. See OR-OSHA
v. CBI Services, Inc., 356 Or 577, 585, 341 P3d 701 (2014)
(“Determining the intended meaning of a statute ultimately
is a question of law.”). As a result, a peremptory writ of
500                                                 Hill v. Johnson

mandamus in this case, if issued, would be used to enforce a
legal right—Hill’s right not to produce privileged communi-
cations—rather than control judicial discretion.
          On the merits, interpreting the breach-of-duty
exception in OEC 503(4)(c) presents a question of statutory
interpretation because the rules of evidence are enacted by
the legislature and codified in statute. Crimson Trace Corp.,
355 Or at 485; ORS 40.225 (the codification of OEC 503).
We review questions of statutory interpretation for errors
of law. CBI Services, Inc., 356 Or at 585. And we apply our
usual method of statutory interpretation, seeking to give
effect to the intent of the legislature as demonstrated by the
text in context and any helpful legislative history. State v.
Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009).
        The text of both the attorney-client privilege and
the breach-of-duty exception to that privilege is found in
OEC 503. That rule provides, as relevant here:
       “A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to pre-
   vent any other person from disclosing confidential commu-
   nications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition
   of professional legal services to the client * * * [b]etween the
   client * * * and the client’s lawyer * * *.”
OEC 503(2)(a). The breach-of-duty exception relevantly
provides:
      “There is no privilege under this section:
      “* * * * *
      “As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of
   duty by the lawyer * * * to the client or by the client to the
   lawyer * * *.”
OEC 503(4)(c).
         As an initial matter, Hill does not dispute that his
allegations against Johnson allege “the breach of a duty”
that a lawyer owed to his client, for the purposes of OEC
503(4)(c). The parties, therefore, agree that the breach-of-
duty exception may apply to this case. The parties, however,
dispute the scope of the exception as it applies to this case.
Cite as 371 Or 494 (2023)                                                   501

         Hill argues that the breach-of-duty exception applies
only to communications between the parties directly involved
in the alleged breach. That is, where a client alleges that a
former attorney has breached a duty or where an attorney
alleges that a former client has breached a duty (usually fee
recovery), the exception ensures that the client cannot claim
a privilege as to communications with the attorney relevant
to the dispute. Taking a much broader view, Johnson con-
tends that the only textual limit on the scope of the excep-
tion is relevancy: any “communication” that is “relevant”
to the alleged breach between the client and attorney falls
within the breach-of-duty exception. By its terms, according
to Johnson, the exception therefore covers communications
between the client and other lawyers that are relevant to
the dispute between the client and the allegedly breaching
lawyer. Thus, although the only allegedly breached duty in
this case is one that Johnson owed to Hill, Johnson contends
that the breach-of-duty exception applies to relevant com-
munications between Hill and the attorneys that he con-
tacted or hired to vacate the supplemental judgment in his
dissolution matter.
         We pause to note the other possible implications of
Johnson’s argument. Because Johnson contends that the
only limit to the scope of the exception is relevance, he inter-
prets the scope of the exception broadly, which has the effect
of narrowing the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Under
Johnson’s interpretation, the attorney-client privilege would
cease to protect not only relevant communications between
Hill and his repair counsel, but also relevant communica-
tions that Hill and Johnson have had with the attorneys rep-
resenting them in the malpractice proceeding.2 Even more,
because Johnson himself is an attorney, the broad reading
of the exception that he advances would risk the disclosure
of communications that he had with other clients, if those
communications were relevant to Hill’s allegations.3
    2
      Johnson argues that the breach-of-duty exception should not apply to his
communications with his malpractice counsel, but he offers no reason why his
interpretation would not extend that far.
    3
      See Glade v. Superior Court, 76 Cal App 3d 738, 747, 143 Cal Rptr 119, 125
(Cal Ct App 1978) (rejecting same interpretation of California’s equivalent evi-
dence rule, noting that, if the breach-of-duty exception “were construed to extend
to this situation, a litigant who tendered an issue of breach relative to his own
502                                                       Hill v. Johnson

          Although the text of the exception is not free of ambi-
guity, it provides support for Hill’s narrower interpretation.
In particular, the breach-of-duty exception uses the definite
article “the” in referring to “a communication relevant to
an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer * * * to the client or
by the client to the lawyer * * *.” OEC 503(4)(c) (emphases
added). The definite article “the” “often signifies a narrow-
ing intent, a reference to something specific, either known
to the reader or listener or uniquely specified.” Hickey v.
Scott, 370 Or 97, 107, 515 P3d 368 (2022) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In other words, “the” often precedes a word
with an identifiable referent—here, an identifiable lawyer
and identifiable client.
         A referent may be identifiable because it was pre-
viously introduced. See Rodney Huddleston & Geoffrey K.
Pullum, The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language,
ch 5, § 6.1, 370 (2002) (providing an example of a referent
that is “identifiable by virtue of [its] prior mention”). The
subsection creating the attorney-client privilege demon-
strates that use. The provision starts by referring to “[a]
client” who holds the privilege and then later refers to “the
client” who receives professional legal services: “A client has
a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other per-
son from disclosing confidential communications made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client * * *.” OEC 503(2) (emphases added).
The client receiving professional legal services is the client
holding the privilege.
         A similar dynamic would seem to inform the mean-
ing of the breach-of-duty exception. The subsection creating
the attorney-client privilege precedes the subsection creat-
ing the breach-of-duty exception. The attorney-client privi-
lege applies to communications between, among other peo-
ple, “the client * * * and the client’s lawyer.” OEC 503(2)(a).
So, when the breach-of-duty exception says that it applies
to “a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty
by the lawyer * * * to the client or by the client to the law-
yer,” OEC 503(4)(c) (emphases added), a natural reading is

representation by an attorney would be able unilaterally to waive the attorney-
client privilege held by other clients of the same attorney”).
Cite as 371 Or 494 (2023)                                                  503

that it is referring to the lawyer and client who are parties
to the communication over which the attorney-client privi-
lege would otherwise apply. In that case, the breach-of-duty
exception would apply only when the parties to the commu-
nication at issue are also the parties directly involved in the
alleged breach.
         Our view that the text tends to favor Hill’s inter-
pretation is confirmed by the legislative history, which
demonstrates that the legislature intended the breach-of-
duty exception to apply only to communications between the
parties directly involved in the alleged breach. The breach-
of-duty exception was created as part of the 1981 Oregon
Evidence Code. Or Laws 1981, ch 892, § 32(4)(c). “The princi-
pal source of legislative history for the 1981 Oregon Evidence
Code is the 1981 Conference Committee Commentary.” State
v. Serrano, 346 Or 311, 324, 210 P3d 892 (2009).
         The commentary cites three sources for Oregon’s
exception. See Legislative Commentary to OEC 503,
reprinted in Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 503.02,
305 (5th ed 2007). Two of the sources are relevant to the
question before us, both supporting Hill’s narrower inter-
pretation.4 First, the commentary cites McCormick on
Evidence § 91 (Edward W. Cleary, ed.) (2d ed 1972). That
treatise states that the breach-of-duty exception might be
conceived as extending a separate rule: when two or more
persons jointly consult an attorney, their communications
with the attorney will be privileged in controversies with
third parties but not in controversies among themselves. Id.
§ 91, 189-90. In that situation, the parties jointly consult-
ing with an attorney “had obviously no intention of keeping
these secrets from each other, and hence as between them-
selves it was not intended to be confidential.” Id. § 91, 190.
        According to the treatise, the breach-of-duty excep-
tion might represent the same logic: “[H]ere again the notion
that as between the participants in the conference the
intention was to disclose and not to withhold the matters

     4
       The third source cited by the commentary is New Jersey Evidence Rule
26(2)(c). Although that rule offers wording for the breach-of-duty exception cod-
ified in OEC 503(4)(c), neither the parties nor this court have identified New
Jersey case law addressing the scope question presented in this case.
504                                           Hill v. Johnson

communicated offers a plausible reason.” Id. § 91, 191. In
support, the treatise cites a decision by this court apply-
ing that reasoning. See id. § 91, 191 n 95 (citing Minard v.
Stillman, 31 Or 164, 49 P 976 (1897)). Regardless of whether
that reasoning is sound, the treatise is evidence of how the
legislature likely would have viewed the scope of the breach-
of-duty exception that it adopted. And the scope suggested
in the treatise would apply the exception to communica-
tions between the client and the attorney who are directly
involved in the alleged breach—because there would be no
expectation of confidentiality as to communications relevant
to controversies between themselves—but would not extend
the exception beyond that.
         Second, the commentary cites to California
Evidence Code § 958, which is substantively the same as
OEC 503(4)(c). See Cal Evid Code § 958 (1981) (“There is no
privilege under this article as to a communication relevant
to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a
duty arising out of the lawyer-client relationship.”). When
the Oregon legislature adopts a statute modeled after the
statute of another jurisdiction, this court has frequently
consulted that jurisdiction’s case law interpreting the model
statute as informing the intent of the Oregon legislature.
State v. Guzman/Heckler, 366 Or 18, 29-30, 455 P3d 485
(2019). We assume that the Oregon legislature intended to
adopt “an interpretation of that statute by the highest court
of that jurisdiction that was rendered in a case decided
before adoption of the statute by Oregon.” Eklof v. Persson,
369 Or 531, 541, 508 P3d 468 (2022) (internal quotation
marks omitted). And, where the highest court of that juris-
diction has not addressed the interpretive question at issue,
we have, at times, viewed interpretations by lower appel-
late courts of that jurisdiction as representing the inten-
tions of the Oregon legislature, particularly where there
is a “consistent pattern” of lower court decisions applying
that interpretation. Guzman/Heckler, 366 Or at 30; see id.
(“[A]lthough we have accorded greater significance to deci-
sions of the highest court of another jurisdiction, we have
never altogether discounted decisions of lower appellate
courts of that jurisdiction, even in the absence of legislative
Cite as 371 Or 494 (2023)                                     505

history specifically indicating that our legislature was
aware of those decisions.”).
         Before Oregon adopted the breach-of-duty exception,
the California Court of Appeal had repeatedly and consis-
tently rejected Johnson’s broad interpretation of that excep-
tion in favor of Hill’s narrower interpretation, as limited to
communications between the parties directly involved in the
alleged breach. For example, in one case presenting facts
like this case, a client brought a malpractice claim against
her former attorney, who had represented her in a marriage
dissolution proceeding. Miller v. Superior Court, 111 Cal App
3d 390, 392, 168 Cal Rptr 589, 589 (Cal Ct App 1980). She
alleged that the former attorney’s negligence resulted in the
undervaluation of community property stock retained by
her former husband. Id. The trial court ordered the client to
produce communications that she had had with other attor-
neys after the alleged malpractice. Id. The California Court
of Appeal reversed, holding that the breach-of-duty excep-
tion applied only to communications between the attorney
and client who were directly involved in the alleged breach:
   “Clearly, in an attorney breach case [the breach-of-duty]
   exception applies only where the alleged breach is by the
   attorney from whom the information is sought. Where, as
   here, the client has not alleged a breach by the attorney
   involved in the communication in question, the privilege for
   that communication remains intact.”
Id. at 392-93, 168 Cal Rptr at 590; see also Schlumberger
Ltd. v. Superior Court, 115 Cal App 3d 386, 392-93, 171 Cal
Rptr 413, 417 (Cal Ct App 1981) (same, relying on Miller).
        Similarly, in another case, clients brought fraud
and malpractice claims against their former attorney
and, through discovery, sought relevant communications
between their former attorney and his other clients. Glade v.
Superior Court, 76 Cal App 3d 738, 742-43, 143 Cal Rptr 119,
122 (Cal Ct App 1978). The trial court ordered the attor-
ney to produce the responsive client communications. Id. at
743, 143 Cal Rptr at 122-23. The California Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that,
   “[i]f [the breach-of-duty exception] were construed to extend
   to this situation, a litigant who tendered an issue of breach
506                                              Hill v. Johnson

   relative to his own representation by an attorney would be
   able unilaterally to waive the attorney-client privilege held
   by other clients of the same attorney. None of the statutory
   exceptions to the attorney-client privilege are designed to
   permit such a result.”
Id. at 747, 143 Cal Rptr at 125. Those California decisions
support Hill’s narrower interpretation of the breach-of-duty
exception.
        Johnson contends that we need not consult out-of-
state case law to decide this question because, according to
Johnson, this court has authorized discovery from repair
counsel in a malpractice proceeding like this, citing Gwin
v. Lynn, 344 Or 65, 176 P3d 1249 (2008). Our decision in
Gwin, however, addressed a different question—namely, the
extent to which a party may obtain discovery from someone
who is both a fact witness and a testifying expert.
          In Gwin, a plaintiff brought a malpractice action
against her former attorney, intending to call her repair
counsel as an expert witness to testify to the efficacy of her
mitigation efforts. Expert witnesses are generally beyond
the scope of discovery available under ORCP 36 B. Id. at 72.
On that basis, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion
to depose the repair counsel in her capacity as a fact wit-
ness. Id. at 69-70. We disagreed with the trial court’s rul-
ing, holding that the repair counsel could be deposed about
her “actions as a factual participant in the effort to mitigate
damages” but was not required to answer questions “that
call[ed] for answers about her expert opinions.” Id. at 73.
         That issue is irrelevant to this case because Hill has
not opposed Johnson’s discovery efforts by arguing that his
repair counsel are beyond the reach of ORCP 36 B, as the
plaintiff in Gwin had argued. Instead, Hill has argued that
at least some of the documents responsive to Johnson’s dis-
covery requests are covered by the attorney-client privilege
in OEC 503. The court in Gwin expressly declined to address
any issues regarding the scope of the attorney-client privi-
lege. See 344 Or at 72 n 6 (explaining that the mandamus pro-
ceeding before the court “does not concern—and we express
no opinion concerning—the possibility that some of [repair
counsel]’s testimony may be shielded by other doctrines, such
Cite as 371 Or 494 (2023)                                507

as the work-product doctrine or the lawyer-client privilege”);
id. at 75 (noting that “issues respecting [the work-product
doctrine or the lawyer-client privilege] are beyond the scope
of this mandamus proceeding”). As a result, Gwin provides
no support for Johnson’s interpretation of the breach-of-duty
exception to the attorney-client privilege.
         Finally, Johnson points out that the Conference
Committee Commentary to the breach-of-duty exception
explains that the “exception is required by considerations of
fairness and policy.” Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 503.02
at 305. Johnson contends that Hill’s narrower interpretation
of the exception is unfair because it would prevent Johnson
from accessing communications that are potentially rele-
vant to Johnson’s ability to defend himself from Hill’s alle-
gation of malpractice.
         It is undeniable that interpreting OEC 503(4)(c)
to cover communications only between the parties directly
involved in the alleged breach may prevent the discovery
of relevant evidence. But that is true with all evidentiary
privileges. Evidentiary privileges “are designed to limit
the search for the truth, rather than facilitate its discov-
ery.” Serrano, 346 Or at 325 n 6. We tolerate the loss of
evidence that results from applying the evidentiary privi-
leges because the privileges “protect certain relationships
that have been deemed sufficiently important, such as the
relationship between married persons, doctor and patient,
clergy and penitent, and attorney and client.” Id. By pro-
tecting communications between people within those rela-
tionships, the privileges “encourage open communication
between the persons in the protected relationship, which
theoretically, in turn, strengthens that relationship and
encourages participation in such relationships.” Id.; see also
Frease v. Glazer, 330 Or 364, 370, 4 P3d 56 (2000) (explain-
ing that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege “is to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public inter-
ests in the observance of law and administration of justice”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
        Historically, the breach-of-duty exception has been
directed at the unfairness that results from the fact that
508                                                         Hill v. Johnson

the client holds the privilege. OEC 503(2) (client holds the
privilege). Without the breach-of-duty exception, a client in
a dispute with his or her former attorney could waive the
privilege, if doing so would help the client, or could con-
tinue to assert the privilege, if doing so would encumber the
attorney’s claims or defenses. See Cal Evid Code § 958, Law
Revision Commission Comments (1965) (“It would be unjust
to permit a client either to accuse his attorney of a breach
of duty and to invoke the privilege to prevent the attorney
from bringing forth evidence in defense of the charge or to
refuse to pay his attorney’s fee and invoke the privilege to
defeat the attorney’s claim.”). The breach-of-duty exception
corrects that unfairness by providing both the client and
the attorney in the dispute with equal access to communica-
tions between them.
         In sum, we agree with Hill that the breach-of-duty
exception, codified in OEC 503(4)(c), applies only to com-
munications between the client and the attorney who are
directly involved in the alleged breach. In this case, where
Hill has alleged that Johnson breached a duty of care owed
to him, the breach-of-duty exception applies only to commu-
nications between Hill and Johnson. As a result, the trial
court erred in applying the breach-of-duty exception to com-
munications that Hill had with counsel other than Johnson
responsive to RFP 10, RFP 26, and RFP 45.5
           A peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue.

    5
      The parties also presented briefing to this court on whether the work-
product doctrine applied to the communications responsive those requests for
production. That dispute is not part of the mandamus proceeding. That issue
was not included in Hill’s petition for writ of mandamus. And, in any event, the
issue would not be appropriate to address as part of this mandamus proceeding,
because the parties both agree that, even though the trial court’s order compel-
ling production did not address the work-product doctrine, the trial court recog-
nized that some of the documents responsive to those requests may be subject to
the work-product doctrine and has not yet ruled on any specific assertions of that
doctrine by Hill.