Court Opinion

ID: 9418908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:42:57.551321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:12.900782
License: Public Domain

Mr.-Justice Roberts,
dissenting:
I regret that I am unable to concur in the opinion of the court. I think that the judgment should be affirmed.
There is no occasion now to discuss the dual character of our form of government, and the consequent dual allegiance of a citizen of a state to his state and to the United States, to elaborate the thesis that the integrity of each government is to be maintained against invasions by the other, or to reiterate that the implied immunity of the one from taxation by the other springs from the necessity that neither shall, by the exercise of the power to tax, burden, hinder or destroy the operation or existence of the other. There is universal recognition of the truth of these tenets, and of their fundamental relation to the preservation of the constitutional framework of the nation. Our difficulties arise,'not in their statement as guiding principles, but, as in this instance, in their application to specific cases.
*375The frank admissions of counsel at the bar concerning the confusion and apparent inconsistency in administrative rulings as to the taxability of compensation of municipal employees seems to call for an equally candid statement that our decisions in the same field have not furnished the executive a consistent rule of action. The need of equitable and uniform administration of tax laws, national and state, and the just demand of the citizen that the rules governing the enforcement of those laws shall be ascertainable require an attempt at rationalization and restatement.
It seems to me that the reciprocal rights and immunities of the national and a state government may be safeguarded by the observance of two limitations upon their respective powers of taxation. These are that the exactions of the one must not discriminate against the means and instrumentalities of the other and must not directly burden the operations of that other. To state these canons otherwise: an exaction by either government which hits the means or instrumentalities of the other infringes the principle of' immunity if it discriminates against them and in favor of private citizens or if the burden of the tax be palpable and direct rather than hypothetic and remote. Tested by these criteria the imposition of the challenged tax in the instant case was lawful.
The petitioner is a citizen of New York. By virtue-of that status he is also a citizen of the United States. He owes allegiance to each government. He derives income from the exercise of his profession. His obligation as a citizen is to contribute to the support of the governments under whose joint protection he lives and pursues his calling. His liability to fulfill that obligation to the national government by payment of income tax upon his salary would be unquestioned were it not for the character of his employer. If the water works of New York *376City were operated by a private corporation under a public franchise and if the petitioner held a like position with the corporation, there could be no question that the imposition of a federal income tax, measured by his compensation, would be justified. If petitioner, instead of holding a so-called official position under the municipal government of New York City, were consulted from time to time with respect to its water problems his compensation would be subject to income tax. (Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514.) He is put into an untaxable class upon the theory that as an official of the municipality, which in turn is an arm of the state, he is an “instrumentality” of the state, and to tax him upon his salary is to lay a burden upon the state government which, however trifling, is forbidden by the implied immunity of the state from burdens imposed by the United States. The petitioner seeks to show the reality of the supposed burden by the suggestion that if his salary and the compensation of others employed by the city is subject to federal income tax, the municipality will be compelled to pay higher salaries in order to obtain the services of such persons and the consequent aggregate increase in outlay will entail a heavy financial load. We know, however, that professional services are offered in the industrial and business field; and that while there is no hard and fast standard of compensation, and men bargain for their rewards, salaries do bear some relation to experience and ability. There is a market in which a professional man offers his services and municipalities are bidders in that market. We know further that those in private employment holding positions comparable to that of the petitioner pay a tax equal to that levied upon him. It is clear that any consideration of the petitioner’s immunity from federal income tax would be altogether remote, impalpable and unascertainable in influencing *377him to accept a position under the municipality rather than under a private employer.
In reason and logic it is difficult to differentiate the present case from that of a private citizen who furnishes goods, performs work or renders service to a state or a municipality under a contract or an officer or employe of a corporation which does the same. Income tax on the compensation paid or the profit realized is a necessary cost incident to the performance of the contract and as such must be taken into account in fixing the consideration demanded of the city government. In quite as real a sense, as in this case, the taxation of income of such persons and, as well, the taxation of the corporation itself, lays a burden upon the funds of the state or its agency. Nevertheless, the courts have repeatedly declared that the doctrine of immunity will not serve to exempt such persons or corporations from the exaction.
The importance of the case arises out of the fact that the claimed exemption may well extend to millions of persons (whose work nowise differs from that of their fellows in private enterprise) who are employed by municipal subdivisions and districts throughout the nation and that, on the other hand, the powers of the states to tax may be inhibited in the case of hundreds of thousands of similar employes of federal agencies of one sort or another. Such exemptions from taxation ought to be strictly limited. They are essentially unfair. They are unsound because federal or state business ought to bear its proportionate share of taxation in order that comparison may be made between the. cost of conducting public and private business.
We are here concerned only with the question of the taxation of salaries or compensation received by those rendering to a municipality services of the same kind as are rendered to private employers and need not go be*378yond the precise issue here presented. We have no concern with the exaction of a sales tax by the federal government on sales to a state government or one of its subdivisions, or the reverse; we are not called upon to define the power to levy taxes upon real property owned by a state or by the national government. We have no occasion to discuss the power of either government to impose excise taxes upon transactions of the other or upon the evidence of such transactions. Nor are we called upon here to determine the validity of a nondiscriminatory tax upon the salary of a governmental officer whose duties and functions have no analogue in the conduct of a business or the pursuit of a profession, but are both peculiar to and essential to the operation of government. The sole question here is whether one performing work or rendering service of a type commonly done or rendered in ordinary commercial life for gain is exempt from the normal burden of a tax on that gain for the support of the national government because his compensation is paid by a state agency instead of a private employer. I think the imposition of a tax upon such gain where, as here, the tax falls equally upon all employed in like occupation, and where the supposed burden of the tax upon state government is indirect, remote, and imponderable, is not inconsistent with the principle of immunity inherent in the constitutional relation of state and nation.
Me. Justice Beandeis joins in this opinion.