Court Opinion

ID: 9749289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:32:16.788627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:46.051504
License: Public Domain

O’Connell, J.,
dissenting. I am unable to agree with the majority opinion for the reasons hereinafter stated.
*492It is to be noted that the pertinent Connecticut statute applicable here contains the proviso that “no action shall be brought under this section but within one year from the neglect complained of or from the commission of such wilful, malicious or felonious act.” (italics mine) 2 General Statutes of Connecticut (Rev. 1930), chapter 319, sec. 5987. It further provides that such action may be brought by the executor or administrator of the deceased. No one else is authorized to institute suit thereunder. In Connor v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R., 28 R. I. 560, this court held that where the statute of another state gives a right of action to the personal representatives of a deceased it means the executor or administrator appointed and acting under the authority of such foreign state. See also Hartford & New Haven R. R. v. Andrews, 36 Conn. 213. In the instant case no administrator was appointed in Connecticut.
It is well settled in this state that the right of action’ arising out of a tort is governed by the law of the place where the tort occurred. O’Reilly v. New York & New England R. R., 16 R. I. 388; Pendar v. H. & B. American Machine Co., 35 R. I. 321; Kwasniewski v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R., 53 R. I. 144. See also 15 C.J.S., Conflict of Laws, §12, p. 897. The right claimed by the plaintiffs is one created by the law of Connecticut which limits the remedy to one year. Such right therefore is nowhere enforceable after that limitation of time has expired. Gratton v. Harwood, 53 R. I. 94; Wingert v. Carpenter, 101 Mich. 395. See also 25 C.J.S., Death, §77, p. 1200.
The statute of limitations cannot be evaded under the guise of an amendment. In Wingert v. Carpenter, supra, plaintiff sued to recover damages for the death of his decedent, caused, as alleged, by the negligence of the defendant, a Michigan corporation engaged in running a line of steamers in both Michigan and Canadian waters, in the latter of which the decedent was drowned. A verdict was directed for the defendant on the ground that the cause *493of action arose wholly without the jurisdiction of the state. The plaintiff applied for leave to amend the declaration, similar to plaintiffs’ action in the instant case, by setting forth the statute of another jurisdiction on the subject, namely, the Canadian statute. That statute limited the' time for bringing suit to twelve months, which had expired, as here, when the motion to amend was made. The court held that the right of action, having been barred in Canada, was likewise barred in Michigan and that the motion to amend was properly denied.
The court stated at page 397: “The cause of action arose in Canada, and under Canadian laws. If the plaintiff has any right of action, it is by virtue of those laws. The question must therefore be determined by the same rule that would hold were this the commencement of a suit. The statute of limitations cannot be evaded under the guise of an amendment. Gorman v. Circuit Judge, 27 Mich. 138. The Canadian statute establishes the liability and provides the remedy. It must control. The right of action, having become barred in Canada, is barred here. The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 214.” (italics mine)
It would appear therefore that when the first motion to amend the declaration was made, nearly two years and five months after the death of plaintiffs’ intestate, there was no valid action pending based on the provisions of the Connecticut statute. The second motion to amend was made more than two years after a similar motion had been denied by another justice of the superior court and almost six years and five months after the death of plaintiffs’ intestate. These motions to amend sought to change the parties and to change the law on which the action was based, all after the statute of limitations of both the forum and locus delicti had expired.
The pending suit was not filed by a Connecticut executor or administrator as required by the applicable Connecticut law. The proposed amendment would substitute an entirely different legal basis for determining the rights of the parties *494as of the date of the accident, and would clearly have substituted one cause of action for another. Neither the pending action nor the new action contemplated by the proposed amendment could have been maintained in Connecticut because they did not come within the terms of the applicable Connecticut statute. Consequently neither action was maintainable in this state. See Kwasniewski v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R., supra. In my judgment the proceeding which was brought by the beneficiaries had no legal standing whatever under the Connecticut statute and was void ab initio.
Cappuccio & Cappuccio, Frank S. Cappuccio, for plaintiffs.
William A. Gunning, William H. Leslie, Jr., for defendant.
In my opinion all of the plaintiffs’ exceptions should be overruled, and the case remitted to the superior court for entry of judgment on the verdict as directed.