Court Opinion

ID: 9889811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 17:07:36.893673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:00.003024
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 22-1360
                              Filed October 11, 2023

NED WILLIAM REYNOLDS JR.,
     Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal    from    the    Iowa     District   Court   for   Monona   County,

Steven J. Andreasen, Judge.

      Ned Reynolds Jr. appeals the denial of his application for postconviction

relief. AFFIRMED.

      Jack Bjornstad of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

       In 2009, Ned Reynolds Jr. was convicted of sexually abusing a ten-year-old

girl. Our court affirmed his conviction on appeal. State v. Reynolds, No. 09-1208,

2010 WL 1875740 (Iowa Ct. App. May 12, 2010). In 2012, Reynolds initiated this

postconviction-relief (PCR) action. His PCR application alleged his trial counsel

was ineffective in four ways. In 2018, without objection from the State, Reynolds

successfully moved to amend his application to add another claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. The added claim contended the prosecutor made two

improper statements during opening statement or closing argument1 that

amounted to prosecutorial misconduct to which his trial counsel failed to object.

       After a trial, the district court denied all of Reynolds’s PCR claims. Reynolds

appeals. The only issue he raises on appeal relates to his amended claim that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to comments Reynolds contends the

prosecutor made during opening statement or closing argument. The district court

rejected this claim both because it was barred by the statute of limitations and on

the merits. Seeing a clear path to resolution on the merits, we bypass the statute-

of-limitations issue.

       A PCR claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raises a constitutional

issue, so our review is de novo. Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa

2021). With de novo review, we give weight to the district court’s fact findings,

1 The uncertainty over whether the alleged statements were made in opening

statement or closing argument and what was said stems from the fact that neither
the opening nor closing were reported. Although openings and closings are now
required to be reported, see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(3) (2023), they were not so
required when Reynolds was tried in 2009. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(4) (2009).
                                          3

especially relating to witness credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id.

       To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Reynolds must show by a

preponderance of the evidence both that his counsel failed to perform an essential

duty and that such failure prejudiced him. State v. Boothby, 951 N.W.2d 859, 863

(Iowa 2020). Reynolds’s claim is based entirely on his contention that his counsel

was ineffective for failing to object to two comments he claims were made by the

prosecutor during opening statement and/or closing argument. One comment was

along the lines that Reynolds didn’t testify because he would have lied to hide the

truth. The second comment was along the lines that Reynolds revictimized the

ten-year-old girl by going to trial and making her testify.

       No one disputes that, if made, such comments would be improper and that

Reynolds’s counsel would have been obligated to object to them. The difficulty for

Reynolds lies in the fact that he has the burden of proving that such comments

were made, and meeting that burden is challenging given that the opening

statement and closing argument were not reported. Reynolds tried to meet that

burden through his testimony, his mother’s testimony, and an affidavit from his

deceased father. The State countered by calling the prosecutor, who testified that

he knew such statements would be improper and he did not make them. Both

parties called Reynolds’s trial counsel, who testified that he did not recall the

prosecutor making any such statements, but if the prosecutor had, he knew well

enough to object, move for a mistrial, and raise the issue in a motion for new trial.

He inferred from the absence of such actions that the prosecutor did not make the

alleged statements.
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       The district court found the prosecutor and Reynolds’s trial counsel more

credible than Reynolds, Reynolds’s mother, and Reynolds’s father and determined

the challenged statements were not made. We give deference to such credibility

findings, see Sothman, 967 N.W.2d at 522, and following our de novo review, we

agree with the district court’s findings.

       The prosecutor testified he had a strong memory of the trial because it was

an important case in his career, and he soundly denied having made those

statements. Reynolds’s defense counsel, who had both prosecution and defense

experience in his long career, testified he made a practice of objecting and making

a record when something objectionable occurred.           His notes from closing

arguments do not mention improper statements by the prosecution, and no

objection, motion for a mistrial, or claim of prosecutorial misconduct in post-trial

motions was made. This testimony supports the conclusion that the challenged

statements were not made, especially in light of the district court’s credibility

findings about the testimony.

       Besides the details lending support to the credibility of the witnesses who

said no such comments were made, there are also details that detract from the

credibility of Reynolds, his mother, and his father. First, none of Reynolds’s

witnesses are disinterested or neutral. His evidence consisted of his self-serving

testimony and that of family members with an incentive to say what was needed

to help Reynolds. Second, the length of time between when the statements were

allegedly made and the time Reynolds raised an issue about them is suspect,

especially considering Reynolds made several complaints about his trial counsel’s

performance as early as sentencing. Third, the clarity with which Reynolds’s
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mother’s claims to remember the prosecutor making the challenged statements is

suspect given her lack of recollection of anything else said during opening or

closing or almost any other detail about the trial. Finally, looming over Reynolds’s

claim is the specter of a botched attempt to garner an additional witness supporting

his claim.     The State presented the testimony of a witness who has known

Reynolds most of their lives. Reynolds contacted her from prison and asked her

to provide an affidavit about the prosecutor’s statements during opening or closing.

Even though the witness told Reynolds she did not attend the trial, Reynolds asked

her to prepare an affidavit anyway. He then told her “what had happened” during

the trial. Even though she did not attend trial, she prepared an affidavit reporting

alleged statements by the prosecutor that are hauntingly similar to those claimed

by Reynolds, his mother, and his father. This apparent effort to manufacture

evidence in his favor casts doubt on the veracity of the evidence he was able to

muster.

       We agree with the district court that Reynolds failed to prove that the

challenged statements were made. Reynolds’s counsel had no obligation to object

to statements that were not made, so Reynolds’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claims fail.

       AFFIRMED.