Court Opinion

ID: 9705420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:05:19.301014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:10.916405
License: Public Domain

PELLEGRINI, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s reversal of the license suspension, but disagree with its reasoning that this is an appeal from the illegal imposition of a penalty in a criminal case properly appealable to the Superior Court. Because this is a statutory appeal of an administrative action of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation’s (PennDot) suspension of a driver’s license, this appeal is properly before this court.
The facts that underlie this appeal are as follows: Ian M. Duffey (Duffey), then age 20, was charged by the Commonwealth under Section 6308(a) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6308(a), with underage drinking. When charged, he received a non-traffic citation which, in accordance with the instructions contained on the reverse side, allowed him to plead guilty by mailing in the fine and costs specified to the magistrate. Pursuant to those instructions, Duffey pled guilty by signing in the space provided on the citation, and, together with a check for the fine and costs, mailed it back *294to the district justice.1 The district justice accepted the plea and the matter, as far as the criminal prosecution involved, was over.
Unbeknownst to Duffey, the district justice then completed PennDot Form DL-21C (5-88) titled “Report of Court Ordering the Suspension of Operating Privileges As a Result of a Violation of Chapter 63 of Title 18” .2 As part of that report, there is a pre-printed block containing a proposed order of court stating that the operating privileges of licensee be suspended in accordance with the provisions of Section 6310.4 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6310.4, that is to be signed as part of completing the report. Duffey, prior to pleading guilty or at any relevant time, never received notice that he was subject to such a penalty or that such an order was going to be or had been entered.
*296Duffey contends that since he pled guilty to pay only the fine and costs, the acceptance of his plea by the Commonwealth precludes imposition of any additional penalty, and, therefore, PennDot has no justification to suspend his license. PennDot contends that what Duffey is attempting to do is collaterally attack the criminal conviction which must be raised in a motion to set aside a guilty plea and may not be raised in the license suspension appeal.
While PennDot argues that the impropriety of the additional penalty must be raised in the criminal conviction which has nothing to do with the license suspension proceeding, the mandatory order upon which it relies is contained on a PennDot Form Report which PennDot provides to district justices, and which, for all intents and purposes, initiates the license suspension proceeding. PennDot, a stranger to the criminal action, initiated, caused and is responsible for the issuance of the order, thereby depriving Duffey the “bargain” the Commonwealth offered through the guilty plea procedure as authorized by Pa.R.Crim.Pro. 59. For all practical purposes, the order in question was not part of the criminal proceeding between Duffey and the Commonwealth, but part of PennDot’s license suspension proceeding.
Separate and apart from the violation of Duffey’s due process rights by modifying the penalty without notifying him that such a penalty could be imposed and not notifying him at any relevant time that such an order was issued, the district justice had no jurisdiction to increase the penalty once the guilty plea was accepted, imposing only a fine and costs. When a district justice accepts a guilty plea and sentence is imposed as prescribed in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, he or she is also divested of any authority to impose any additional penalty and any such imposition is a nullity. Because it is a nullity, then no valid order exists imposing a penalty suspending Duffey’s license, and because such a requirement is necessary to meet the statutory mandates contained in Section 6308 of the Crimes Code, Duffey’s appeal must be sustained.

. The procedure to plead guilty in summary cases is set forth in Rule 59 of the Pa.R.Crim.Pro.

. Footnote 2 appears on page 295.
*2952. The following is a copy of PennDot Form DL-21C (5-88) filed by the district justice in this case:
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