Court Opinion

ID: 9775585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:04:16.057429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:29.129378
License: Public Domain

KITE, Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom HILL, Justice, joins.
[¶22] I disagree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the word "legally" as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-801(a) (Lex-isNexis 2011) encompasses only violations of Title 12 and does not extend to violations of municipal ordinances. I also disagree that the legislature has preempted the field so as to preclude cities and towns from enacting ordinances intended to reduce damages caused by excessive consumption of alcohol in their communities. Were I writing the majority opinion, I would hold that § 12-8-801(a) means what it says-no person who legally provides alcohol to another person is liable for damages caused by that person's intoxication. I would further hold, however, that under § 12-8-801(a) a person who provides alcohol to another person in violation of the law, including a municipal ordinance, may be liable for such damages.
[¶23] Our standards for interpreting statutory provisions are well established:
The paramount consideration is to determine the legislature's intent, which must be ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute. We look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous. A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute.
Dorr v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 2010 WY 120, ¶ 11, 238 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo.2010).
[¶24] Section 12-8-301(a) unambiguously states that a person who legally provides aleohol to another is not liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the person. The word "legal" means "conforming to or permitted by law or established rules." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1290 (2002). Giving the word "legally" its plain and ordinary meaning as used in § 12-8-301(a), a person who provides aleohol to another in conformance with or as permitted by law or established rules is not liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the other person.
[¶25] An ordinance is a law adopted by a governmental authority, specifically, a municipality. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1588 (2002). Thus, a person who provides aleohol to another in conformance with or as permitted by ordinance is not liable under § 12-8-801(a). The immunity afforded by § 12-8-801(a), however, does not apply when a person provides aleohol in violation of the law. -If the liquor vendors who provided aleohol to Mr. LaBrie did so in violation of the town ordinances, they can be liable for damages caused by his intoxication.
[¶26] In holding otherwise, the majority in essence construes § 12-8-801(a) to mean that a person who provides aleohol to another "in compliance with Title 12" is not liable for damages resulting from the other person's intoxication. This construction reads words into the statute that the legislature omitted, contrary to our standards for interpreting statutes. Kennedy Oil v. Dep't of Revenue, 2008 WY 154, ¶ 14, 205 P.3d 999, 1004 (Wyo.2008). The plain and ordinary meaning of "legally" is not "in compliance with Title 12." Absent language expressly limiting the word legally to mean "in compliance with Title 12," I would give the word its plain meaning-"conforming to or permitted by law or established rules," which includes municipal ordinances.
[¶27] Also contrary to our standards of statutory interpretation, the majority's reading of § 12-8-801(a) makes superfluous subsection (c), which states: "This section does not affect the liability of the licensee or person if the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage *729was sold or provided in violation of title 12 of the Wyoming statutes." If the legislature intended the word "legally" as used in subsection (a) to mean "in compliance with Title 12," subsection (c) is unnecessary. It is well established that we do not interpret a statute in a way that renders any portion meaningless. Stutzman v. Office of the Wyoming State Engineer, 2006 WY 30, ¶ 16, 130 P.3d 470, 475 (Wyo.2006). Additionally, when the legislature specifically uses a word in one place, we will not interpret that word into other places where it was not used. Qwest Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 2007 WY 97, ¶ 25, 161 P.3d 495, 501 (Wyo.2007).
[¶28] The majority also concludes "the legislature has, in effect, preempted the field as to [this] statewide social issue [and] it is not the province of municipalities to enact contrary laws." I disagree with this conclusion, first, because it ignores Art. 13 § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution and, second, because I see nothing in the ordinances at issue in this case that is contrary to the plain language of § 12-8-301(a).
[¶29] In 1972, Art. 18, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution was amended to provide in pertinent part:
(b) All cities and towns are hereby empowered to determine their local affairs and government as established by ordinance passed by the governing body, subject to referendum when prescribed by the legislature, and further subject only to statutes uniformly applicable to all cities and towns....
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(d) The powers and authority granted to cities and towns, pursuant to this section, shall be liberally construed for the purpose of giving the largest measure of self-government to cities and towns.
[¶30] Prior to this amendment, municipalities in Wyoming operated under Dillon's Rule, meaning they were considered a creature of the state with no inherent right of self government. Thomas S. Smith, No Home on the Range for Home Rule, 31 Land & Water L.Rev. 791, 798 (1996). The amendment was approved in 1972 by an overwhelming majority of Wyoming voters. Id. at 791 n. 2. With the amendment, Wyoming became one of forty-eight states with some type of home rule. Id. at 794. "Home rule ... is based on the premise that municipalities should be free to regulate their own municipal affairs without interference from the state." Id. at 798. As reflected in Art. 13, § 1(b), a municipality's constitutional right to determine its local affairs "is subject [in relevant part] only to statutes uniformly applicable to all cities and towns."
[¶31] There is no language in Title 12 making § 12-8-801(a) applicable only to those who violate that title and I see nothing in the statutes suggesting it was meant to preclude cities and towns from exercising home rule with respect to alcohol. Moreover, the legislature has expressly authorized cities and towns to regulate aleohol and conduct resulting from excessive alcohol consumption.
[¶82] Wyo. Stat. Ann. (LexisNexis 2011) provides: § 12-4-101(a)
Incorporated cities, towns and counties within Wyoming shall license and regulate or prohibit the retail sale of aleoholic and malt beverages under this title.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103(a) (LexisNexis 2011) further provides:
(a) The governing bodies of all cities and towns may:
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(xili) ... regulate any business whatsoever conducted ... within the limits of the city or town for the purpose of raising revenue ...;
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(xy) Regulate ... saloons ...;
(xvili) Regulate any conduct which disturbs or jeopardizes the public health, safety, peace ... in any public or private place;
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(xli) Adopt ordinances, resolutions and regulations, including regulations not in conflict with this act and necessary for the health, safety and welfare of the city or town ...; '
[¶33] With these provisions, the legislature has clearly and unambiguously authorized cities and towns to enact ordinances regulat*730ing the sale and consumption of alcohol in their communities. Pursuant to Art. 18, § 1(d) the powers and authority granted to cities and towns "shall be liberally construed for the purpose of giving the largest measure of self-government to cities and towns." The majority opinion is directly contrary to this constitutional directive.
[¶34] As authorized by Art. 18, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution and §§ 12-4-101(a) and 15-1-103(a) of the Wyoming Statutes, the town of Basin adopted Ordinance 2-2-5-1(E) which prohibits "[elxcessive drinking of aleoholie and malt beverages ...." and the town of Greybull adopted Ordinance 9.40.020 which makes it unlawful for a saloon-keeper to "suffer any drunkenness ... in his or her or their premises." To the extent that the liquor vendors who provided alcohol to Mr. LaBrie did so in violation of these ordinances, I would hold that the immunity provided under $ 12-8-8301(a) does not apply and they may be liable to the extent they failed to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 412 (Wyo.1983).