Court Opinion

ID: 9714731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:44:31.129104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:28.264233
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE LEWIS, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The trial court was correct in dismissing count I, which dealt with the Mobile Home Landlord and Tenant Rights Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 80, par. 201 et seq.). Under the title of the Act it is stated: “An act concerning Mobile Home Parks and the rights of Mobile Home owners and Mobile Home Residents.” The Act is replete with the rights and obligations of both the tenant and owner and, in fact, the last paragraph of section 21 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 80, par. 221), entitled “Remedies, tenants,” says: “The tenant may sue to enforce all Sections of this Act and the court may award damages or grant any injunctive or other relief.” In the next paragraph, section 22 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 80, par. 222) of the Act, the remedies of the park owner are defined. The majority states that the Act prohibits defendant from obstructing the freedom of Johnson (tenant) from selling his mobile home. In this it is absolutely correct. However, the majority goes on to say that because of the economic difficulties that people who live in mobile homes have, someone else has standing to bring the law suit. I cannot accept this line of reasoning. The legislature by enacting this Act set forth the rights and responsibilities of the park owner and the tenant or resident. Section 24 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 80, par. 224) provides: “Sale of Mobile Home. The park owner shall be enjoined and restrained from prohibiting, limiting, restricting, obstructing or in any manner interfering with the freedom of any mobile home owner to: (a) Sell his mobile home to a purchaser of his choice, provided that the park owner shall be allowed to promulgate any general qualifications or lawful restrictions on park residents which limit or define the admission of entrants to the park. The purchaser, prior to closing, must obtain a written and signed lease.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 80, par. 224(a).) This section specifically grants any mobile home owner the freedom to sell to the purchaser of his choice. However, this section also requires that a purchaser must obtain a lease prior to closing, from the park owner. Here, Johnson was not prohibited from selling his mobile home to the plaintiff, but, according to the plaintiff’s affidavit, the plaintiff had bought Johnson’s mobile home without obtaining a lease before closing. The reason for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain a lease prior to closing is irrelevant, and the important fact to this case is that the plaintiff did not comply with the statute in obtaining a lease, and without a lease, he was not a tenant under the Act. Therefore, since the plaintiff was not a tenant, either present or future, the plaintiff had no standing to sue. If the plaintiff had requested a lease as stated in the plaintiff’s affidavit, and had been refused a lease by the defendant before closing, then Johnson should have challenged the refusal at that time as prohibiting Johnson’s right to sell to a purchaser of his choice. This Johnson did not do. Section 6, upon which the majority relies, discusses the obligation of a park owner to offer a written lease and it states in part: “Obligation of Park Owner to Offer Written Lease. No person shall offer a mobile home or lot for rent or sale in a mobile home park without having first exhibited to the prospective tenant or purchaser a copy of the lease applicable to the respective mobile home park. (a) The park owner shall be required to offer to each present and future tenant a written lease for a term of not less than 12 months, unless the parties agree to a different term subject to existing leases which shall be continued pursuant to their terms.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 80, par. 206(a).) This provision is meant to protect the parties so they know the exact terms of the lease. Even if we assume that no lease was offered it makes no difference in this case. It is Johnson, the tenant, who needs and gets protection under the Act. Section 6 protects persons wanting to rent or buy by allowing them to know the exact terms of the written lease. In discussing the constitutionality of the Act in question, the court in People ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 83, 95, 438 N.E.2d 924, 932, stated: “A reading of the Mobile Home Landlord and Tenant Act indicates that the purpose of sections 6 and 9 of the Act is to protect tenants from landlords who would take unfair advantage of a tenant by raising rental fees and adding charges after the tenant has expended funds by affixing a dwelling onto the rented premises.” It is the tenant who is given protection and can sue to have those rights protected. The plaintiff in this case was not a present or future tenant, and thus, he was not entitled to the rights afforded under the Act. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court as to count I.