Court Opinion

ID: 9903740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:01:58.025611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:28.196040
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13284    Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 11/27/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13284
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       ALFREDO BOTTON RUIZ,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20036-JEM-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13284

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Alfredo Ruiz, proceeding with counsel, appeals his convic-
       tions and total sentence of 200 months’ imprisonment for two
       counts of attempted sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of
       18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), and two counts of attempted enticement of
       a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity, in violation of 18
       U.S.C. § 2422(b). On appeal, he argues that that the district court
       erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because
       there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could have rea-
       sonably concluded that he knowingly attempted to entice a minor
       to engage in unlawful, commercial sex acts. He also argues that
       the district court abused its discretion by imposing a total sentence
       of 200 months’ imprisonment because his total sentence is substan-
       tively unreasonable.
                                             I.
              We review whether sufficient evidence supported a jury’s
       guilty verdict de novo, resolving all reasonable inferences in favor of
       the verdict. United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 912 (11th Cir. 2010).
       We will not disturb the verdict unless no trier of fact could have
       found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
              Under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), it is unlawful to recruit, entice,
       harbor, transport, provide, obtain, or maintain a minor, knowing
       or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of
       force, fraud, coercion, or any combination of such means will be
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       22-13284               Opinion of the Court                        3

       used to cause the minor to engage in a commercial sex act. 18
       U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). Under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), it is unlawful to
       knowingly attempt to entice a minor to engage in unlawful sexual
       activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). To sustain a conviction for the crime
       of attempt, the government most show: (1) that the defendant had
       the specific intent to engage in the criminal conduct for which he
       was charged and (2) that he took a substantial step toward commis-
       sion of the offense. United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286
       (11th Cir. 2004). The government must prove that the defendant
       intended to cause assent on the part of the minor, not that he acted
       with specific intent to engage in the sexual activity, and that he
       took a substantial step toward causing assent, not toward causing
       actual sexual contact. Lee, 603 F.3d at 914.
               To determine whether a defendant took a substantial step
       under § 2422(b), we consider the totality of the defendant’s actions.
       Id. at 914, 916. We have held that a defendant’s sexually solicitous
       communication can constitute a substantial step under § 2422(b)
       because the principal, if not exclusive, means of committing the of-
       fense requires oral or written communications. United States v.
       Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 626-27 (11th Cir. 2010). The defendant
       takes a substantial step when his communication crosses the line
       from sexual banter to criminal enticement. Id. at 627. Additionally,
       in Murrell, we determined that the defendant took a substantial step
       where the defendant did the following: sent text messages to an
       undercover officer posing as the minor’s parent, in which he ex-
       pressed his desire to have sex with the minor in exchange for
       money; arranged a meeting for the purpose of having sex with the
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13284

       minor; arrived at the designated time and place; and brought with
       him a teddy bear, $300 in cash, and a box of condoms. Murrell, 368
       F.3d at 1284-85, 1287-88. However, evidence that the defendant
       traveled to meet the minor is not necessary to sustain an attempt
       conviction under § 2422(b). United States v. Yost, 479 F.3d 815,
       819-20 (11th Cir. 2007).
              When a defendant takes the stand and testifies in his own
       defense, the jury may disbelieve his testimony, and the defendant’s
       own statements may be considered as substantive evidence of his
       guilt. United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995).
              Here, the district court did not err by denying Ruiz’s motion
       for a judgment of acquittal because there was sufficient evidence
       from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that he
       knowingly attempted to entice a minor to engage in unlawful,
       commercial sex acts. See §§ 1591(a)(1), 2422(b); Murrell, 368 F.3d at
       1286; Lee, 603 F.3d at 912, 914. Ruiz’s argument is that he thought
       the girls were adults, notwithstanding that the undercover agent
       posing as the mother repeatedly told him they were 12 and 14 years
       old. He argues that advertisements for sex routinely lie about age
       in order to seem younger. Although he testified that he had no
       intentions of engaging in sexual activity with minor girls, the jury
       was free to believe the opposite and to use his testimony as sub-
       stantive evidence of his guilt. See Brown, 53 F.3d at 314. After learn-
       ing that the girls he would pay to have sex with were minors, he
       continued talking to the undercover agent who was acting as the
       mother of the girls, he asked for more information about the sexual
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       22-13284                Opinion of the Court                          5

       services and pricing, he made plans to meet with the mother and
       the girls, and he arrived at the meeting location with his payment.
       See Rothenberg, 610 F.3d at 626-27; Murrell, 368 F.3d at 1284-85,
       1287-88; Yost, 479 F.3d at 819-20. Thus, there was sufficient evi-
       dence to uphold his convictions.
                                             II.
               We consider the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
       under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v.
       Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 2022). In reviewing the rea-
       sonableness of a sentence, we will not substitute our own judg-
       ment for that of the district court and will affirm a sentence so long
       as the court’s decision was in the ballpark of permissible outcomes.
       Id. at 1355. The defendant bears the burden of showing that the
       sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the
       18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319,
       1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
               Under § 3553(a), the district court must impose a sentence
       that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to reflect the seri-
       ousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide
       just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence, and
       to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 18
       U.S.C. § 3553(a). In addition, the court must consider, among
       other factors, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the his-
       tory and characteristics of the defendant, and the need to avoid un-
       warranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defend-
       ants. Id. The court imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-13284

       when it fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were
       due significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or
       irrelevant factor, or commits a clear error of judgment in consider-
       ing the proper factors. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. The court commits
       a clear error of judgment when it weighs the § 3553(a) factors un-
       reasonably. Id. However, the weight given to each factor is com-
       mitted to the sound discretion of the court, and the court may at-
       tach great weight to one factor over the others. Id.
               Additionally, the court’s failure to discuss mitigating evi-
       dence does not indicate that the court erroneously ignored or failed
       to consider the evidence. Id. at 1356. The court’s acknowledgment
       that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ argu-
       ments is sufficient. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1356. Furthermore, a sen-
       tence imposed well below the statutory maximum may indicate
       reasonableness. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324.
               Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion because
       it imposed a substantively reasonable total sentence. The court
       properly considered and weighed the § 3553(a) factors. See
       § 3553(a); Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355-56. Additionally, his total sen-
       tence of 200 months’ imprisonment was well below the statutory
       maximum of life imprisonment and below the guideline imprison-
       ment range of 235 months to 293 months, and thus, his total sen-
       tence was within the ballpark of permissible outcomes. See Gonza-
       lez, 550 F.3d at 1324; Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355.
             AFFIRMED.