Court Opinion

ID: 9555219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 06:00:21.382812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:45.920836
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                            MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ERIN E. STERN,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                             Appellant,               NY-1221-21-0160-W-1

                     v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                           DATE: August 10, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                     THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Erin E. Stern, Baker, Florida, pro se.

           Justina L. Lillis, Esquire, Buffalo, New York, for the agency.

           Shelly S. Glenn, Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                  Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                          REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed the appellant’s Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction.        For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and admi nistrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the
     New York Field Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand
     Order.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        The appellant is a Military Services Coordinator (MSC) employed by the
     agency’s Buffalo Regional Office in Buffalo, New York, who previously
     performed duties at Fort Drum, New York, a U.S. Army (Army) installation.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 12 at 4-5. The appellant’s duties are to work with
     Army personnel to timely develop Integrated Disability Evaluation System
     compensation claims for service members transitioning to civilian life. Id. at 10.
¶3        In a prior IRA appeal, the appellant alleged that the agency took certain
     personnel actions—including ordering her to work from home, denying her tools
     and permissions necessary to perform her MSC duties, requiring her to perform
     duties of another position, and proposing her removal—because of her protected
     disclosures and activity. Stern v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket
     No. NY-1221-19-0193-W-1, Initial Appeal File (0193 IAF), Tab 103, Initial
     Decision (0193 ID) at 8-10.        In an April 14, 2020 initial decision, the
     administrative judge found that the appellant made a prima facie case of
     whistleblower reprisal and that, with the exception of the proposed removal, the
     agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the
     same actions absent the appellant’s protected disclosures or activity. Id. at 11-22.
     The administrative judge found that the agency failed to meet its burden of proof
     with respect to the notice of proposed removal, and she ordered corrective action
     as to that personnel action. Id. at 23-32. The initial decision became the final
     decision of the Board when neither party petitioned the Board for review.
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.
¶4        On December 8, 2020, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of
     Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that, in retaliation for various protected
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     disclosures and activity, the agency denied her MSC duties beginning when she
     was nominally reinstated to her MSC position on February 4, 2020. IAF, Tab 11
     at 100-03. The appellant also alleged that, in retaliation for protected disclosures
     to the Board and to Congress and in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 731, the agency
     failed to discipline the supervisors who were found to have committed a
     prohibited personnel practice in her prior IRA appe al. 2 Id. at 103-05. After OSC
     issued its close-out letter, IAF, Tab 12 at 8-9, 20-24, the appellant filed a timely
     appeal with the Board, IAF, Tab 1. The appellant stated in her appeal that she did
     not want a hearing. Id. at 2.
¶5         In a show cause order, the administrative judge notified the appellant of her
     burden to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over her appeal, described the
     applicable legal standards, and ordered the appellant to file a statement to
     facilitate a determination of whether jurisdiction existed.          IAF, Tab 4.     The
     appellant filed evidence and argument in support of jurisdiction in response. IAF,
     Tabs 11-16. In an initial decision, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal
     for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the three protected disclosures which
     the appellant identified in her response to the show cause order—the appellant’s
     December 8, 2020 OSC complaint; July 2, 2020 emails the appellant sent to
     Congress and various agency personnel, including an official at the agency’s
     Office of Inspector General (OIG); and a November 12, 2020 email to
     Congress—were made after February 2020, and therefore could not have possibly

     2
       The appellant also asserted claims in the section in the OSC complaint form for
     “improper personnel actions” resulting in the violation of a law, rule, or regulation that
     implements, or directly concerns, a merit system principle. IAF, Tab 11 at 108 -10.
     However, the appellant did not identify a merit systems principle, nor any law, rule, or
     regulation implementing a merit systems principle, that the agency allegedly violated,
     and appears to have used this section to merely rehash her prior IRA appeal and
     arguments she made in other sections. Id. The appellant also repeated the remedies she
     sought in the section in the OSC complaint form for “other activities prohibited by
     statute,” without asserting any new basis for relief. Id. at 110. Accordingly, we find it
     unnecessary to address her claims in these sections any further.
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     motivated the agency’s failure to reinstate her MSC duties in February 2020.
     IAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID) at 5-6. 3
¶6         The appellant filed a petition for review in which, among other things, she
     requests a hearing, argues that the administrative judge “did not give [her] a
     chance to present the evidence . . . that formed the basis for [her] protected
     disclosures,” Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4, and claims that the
     administrative judge erred because the agency’s failure to reinstate her MSC
     duties occurred not just in February 2020 but over a “fluid date,” id. at 5. She
     also submits new evidence of allegedly protected disclosures or activity which
     she claims she was not aware of despite her due diligence when the record closed.
     Id. at 6-65. The agency filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

     The appellant established jurisdiction over her claim that the agency failed to
     reinstate her MSC duties because of her protected disclosures or activity.
¶7         If an appellant has exhausted her administrative remedies before OSC, she
     can establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal by nonfr ivolously alleging
     that: (1) she made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)
     or engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
     (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor
     in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a p ersonnel action as defined by
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).        Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security,
     2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 14.           To satisfy the contributing factor criterion at the
     jurisdictional stage, an appellant need only raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the

     3
       The administrative judge characterized the appellant’s allegation as stating that, in
     retaliation for her protected disclosures, she “has not been allowed to perform the duties
     of her bid position and has not been reassigned, which contributed to a 3 of 5 rating on
     her 2021 performance appraisal.” ID at 4. We do not read the appellant’s statements in
     her OSC complaint regarding the agency’s reassignment attempts and her performan ce
     rating as alleging separate retaliatory personnel actions or failures to take personnel
     actions but rather as details regarding the retaliatory personnel action she did
     allege—the agency’s failure to assign her MSC duties. IAF, Tab 11 at 100 -02.
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      fact of, or content of, the protected disclosure or activity was one factor that
      tended to affect the personnel action in any way. Id.
¶8         One way to establish this criterion is the knowledge/timing test, under
      which an employee may nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure or activity was a
      contributing factor in a personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as
      evidence that the official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure or
      activity, and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a
      reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure or activity was a
      contributing factor in the personnel action. Id., ¶ 15; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).
      If an appellant fails to satisfy the knowledge/timing test, the Board must consider
      other evidence, such as that pertaining to the strength or we akness of the agency’s
      reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was
      personally directed at the proposing or deciding official, and whether those
      individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant. Chambers,
      2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 15.
¶9         We find that the administrative judge erred in determining that the Board
      lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal. We agree with the appellant’s
      assertion on review that she alleged a continuing violation by the agency in its
      failure to reinstate her MSC duties over a “fluid date,” which her OSC complaint
      and correspondence with OSC alleged occurred from February 4, 2020, through
      June 16, 2021. IAF, Tab 11 at 102, Tab 12 at 16. In other words, the appellant
      alleged a continuing failure to take a personnel action, namely a significant
      change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii), that could theoretically have occurred because of protected
      disclosures or activity the appellant made or engaged in either before or after
      February 4, 2020.
¶10        We further find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of Board
      jurisdiction. In her OSC complaint, the appellant claimed both retaliation for
      whistleblowing and retaliation for protected activity, IAF, Tab 11 at 95, and
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      claimed that the “alleged retaliation,” i.e., the agency’s failure to reinstate her
      MSC duties, occurred because of, among other things, the fact of her prior IRA
      appeal, id. at 101. The appellant’s prior IRA appeal is activity protected under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), Luecht v. Department of the Navy, 87 M.S.P.R. 297,
      ¶ 9 (2000), and its subject matter comports with the appellant’s description of her
      protected activity in her OSC complaint, IAF, Tab 11 at 100-01; 0193 ID at 10.
      Further, two of the appellant’s supervisors whom she alleges were responsible for
      the failure to restore her MSC duties testified at the hearing in her prior IRA
      appeal on February 10 and 12, 2020, 0193 IAF, Hearing Transcript, and were thus
      undeniably made aware of the fact of, if not the content of, the appellant’s
      protected activity at a time close to when the appellant alleges the agency’s
      retaliation began.    The Board has held that a personnel action taken within
      approximately 1 to 2 years of an appellant’s disclosures or activity satisfies the
      knowledge/timing test.     Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110,
      ¶ 21 (2015). Accordingly, the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she engaged
      in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) and that the
      protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to fail to take
      a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). 4
¶11         The appellant also established jurisdiction over her claim that the agency
      also failed to reinstate her MSC duties because of her July 2, 2020 email to
      an agency OIG official.         IAF, Tab 11 at 8-9, 101.              Under 5 U.S.C.

      4
        Contrary to the administrative judge’s statement that the appellant requested a hearing
      on appeal, ID at 1, the appellant requests a hearing for the first time in her January 13,
      2022 petition for review, PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. She did not a request a hearing in her
      appeal form, IAF, Tab 1 at 2, and a September 28, 2021 acknowledgment order
      informed her that she had 10 days from the date of that order to request a hearing or she
      would otherwise waive her right to a hearing, IAF, Tab 2 at 1-2. Because the appellant
      has not shown good cause for her delay in requesting a hearing, she waived her right to
      one. Nugent v. U.S. Postal Service, 59 M.S.P.R. 444, 446-47 (1993) (finding that the
      appellant waived his right to a hearing when he failed to request one either on his
      appeal form or within the timeframe established by the administrative judge’s order);
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.24(e).
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      § 2302(b)(9)(C), “cooperating with or disclosing information to the Inspector
      General . . . of an agency” is protected activity, irrespecti ve of whether
      an individual had a reasonable belief that she was disclosing wrongdoing or the
      content of the information.     Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 62. The appellant’s July 2, 2020 email disclosed information to
      the agency’s OIG, including that she had previously “won” her prior IRA appeal
      and could not return to her MSC duties despite having been no minally reinstated
      to her position. IAF, Tab 11 at 8-9. Because the email was sent during the period
      in which the retaliation allegedly continuously occurred—February 4, 2020,
      through June 16, 2021—and the email was also addressed to one of the officials
      whom the appellant claims was responsible for the failure to restore her to her
      MSC duties, id. at 8, 103, the appellant satisfied the knowledge/timing test, and
      she therefore made a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency’s failure to restore
      her to her MSC duties was also because of her July 2, 2020 email to OIG .
¶12        We find that Board jurisdiction does not extend to any of the appellant’s
      additional claims of whistleblower reprisal. The only other purportedly protected
      disclosures or activities the appellant clearly identified in her OSC complaint and
      pleadings were her December 8, 2020 OSC complaint and July 2 and
      November 12, 2020 emails to Congress. Id. at 8, 10, 100-01; IAF, Tab 16 at 4.
      However, even if any of these communications constituted protect ed disclosures
      or activity, the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that any of the officials
      with authority to reinstate her MSC duties was aware of them—a requirement for
      satisfaction of the knowledge/timing test—and we discern nothing in the record
      that would establish a nonfrivolous allegation of the contributing factor
      requirement on other grounds.
¶13        We also considered the appellant’s argument on review                that the
      administrative judge failed to afford her the opportunity to present evidence
      regarding her protected disclosures, PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, and the exhibits she
      submits on review which she claims she was not aware of despite her due
                                                                                        8

      diligence when the record closed because they were mixed with other emails in
      her possession and “were not label[ed] with the rest of [her] Congressional email
      traffic,” id. at 6.   The administrative judge provided the appellant a detailed
      notice regarding the requirements to establish Board jurisdiction over her IRA
      appeal and ordered her to file a statement, “accompanied by evidence,” of facts
      that would establish jurisdiction, including a list of her protected disclosures or
      activities. IAF, Tab 4. Because the appellant failed to comply with this order,
      the administrative judge issued her a second order to file evidence and argument
      in support of Board jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 6. The appellant’s argument that she
      lacked the opportunity to establish jurisdiction is therefore without merit.
      Finally, because the appellant’s argument seeking to justify the untimely filing of
      the exhibits she submits on review, all of which significantly predate the filing of
      her appeal and have been in her possession and control, evidences her failure of
      due diligence, we decline to consider those exhibits.     Avansino v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980); see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d).

      The appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over her claim that the agency failed
      to initiate discipline against her supervisors because of her protected disclosures
      or activity.
¶14         We find that the appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over her separate
      claim—which the initial decision did not address—that the agency failed to
      initiate disciplinary procedures under 38 U.S.C. § 731 against her supervisors
      responsible for the rescinded notice proposing her removal because of her
      protected disclosures or activity. The Board lacks jurisdiction over this claim
      because the statute authorizing IRA appeals for whistleblower repr isal claims
      only allows an employee to seek corrective action from the Board in an IRA
      appeal “with respect to any personnel action taken, or proposed to be taken,
      against such employee.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a). The agency’s failure to discipline
      other employees is not on its face a personnel action taken, or proposed to be
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      taken, against the appellant.     Accordingly, the appellant failed to make a
      nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction over thi s claim.

                                            ORDER
¶15         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the New York Field
      Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.