Court Opinion

ID: 9390605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 21:03:38.136336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.709871
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 210372-U

                                  Order filed April 27, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                       )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                        )      of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
                                                       )      Peoria County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                       )      Appeal No. 3-21-0372
             v.                                        )      Circuit No. 01-CF-1211
                                                       )
      JASON LAMONT JACKSON,                            )      Honorable
                                                       )      Katherine S. Gorman,
             Defendant-Appellant.                      )      Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices McDade and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court failed to comply with this court’s mandate on remand.

¶2          Defendant, Jason Lamont Jackson, appeals the dismissal of his postconviction petition,

     arguing that he made a substantial showing of actual innocence that warrants a third stage

     evidentiary hearing. We vacate and remand with directions.

¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND
¶4          Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder (720

     ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)) and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (id. § 24-

     1.1(a)). The court sentenced defendant to 38 years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder

     charge, to be served concurrently with 7 years’ imprisonment for the unlawful possession of a

     weapon by a felon charge. On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s convictions. People

     v. Jackson, 3-02-0986 (2004) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶5          On March 28, 2005, defendant, as a self-represented litigant, filed a postconviction

     petition asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. As to the actual

     innocence claim, defendant alleged that he had newly discovered evidence in the form of Karl

     Nelms. Defendant included an affidavit signed by Nelms. The circuit court summarily dismissed

     defendant’s petition.

¶6          This court reversed the summary dismissal on appeal, holding that defendant had stated

     the gist of a claim for actual innocence. People v. Jackson, 3-05-0301 (2007) (unpublished order

     under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). We remanded the matter for further postconviction

     proceedings. In our decision, we determined that an evidentiary hearing where Nelms testified

     could indeed result in a finding of actual innocence. We found that defendant’s petition, along

     with the accompanying affidavit, made a substantial showing his constitutional rights had been

     violated.

¶7          On remand, the circuit court set the matter for second stage proceedings. It also appointed

     the public defender’s office to represent defendant. On November 8, 2013, defense counsel

     appeared in court with the State and informed the court that he believed the matter should

     proceed to a stage-three evidentiary hearing. The State also believed that this court remanded the

     case for an evidentiary hearing, so there was no reason to continue with a second stage

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       proceeding. At the next court date, defendant stated that he disagreed with counsel and the State

       that the case was remanded solely to address his actual innocence claim because that would

       waive the rest of the issues in his postconviction petition. He believed that the remand permitted

       the court to address all claims in his petition. The circuit court stated that it would reread our

       order to determine what claims should proceed.

¶8            On March 20, 2015, after defense counsel had been granted several continuances to

       locate Nelms, Nelms was still unable to be found. Defendant requested to proceed without

       counsel, and the court granted his request.

¶9            On May 15, 2015, the court held a third-stage evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the

       court stated that its interpretation of this court’s order was that the matter was only remanded to

       address the actual innocence claim. On June 23, 2015, the court entered an order denying

       defendant’s postconviction petition, and defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider.

¶ 10          On February 22, 2016, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive

       postconviction petition, which the court granted. Defendant’s petition contained another actual

       innocence claim. It alleged that defendant met Davett Fisher in September 2015, and that Fisher

       told defendant he witnessed another person commit the offense that led to defendant’s

       convictions. Defendant’s petition included an affidavit signed by Fisher. The petition advanced

       to the second stage, and the State filed a motion to dismiss. On March 15, 2017, the court denied

       the petition in the same order where it denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the denial of his

       first postconviction petition.

¶ 11          Defendant appealed, and we vacated the court’s denial of defendant’s initial

       postconviction petition following the third-stage hearing. In our order, we noted that defendant

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had yet to receive the benefit of counsel who was in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). We further held that:

                       “In reaching our holding, we recognize that defendant elected to proceed

               pro se prior to the court’s ruling on his initial petition. It is clear from this record

               that defendant elected to proceed pro se largely due to his frustration over

               counsel’s erroneous belief that the only matter before the court on remand was an

               evidentiary hearing on the actual innocence claim related to Nelms’s affidavit. As

               we have discussed, counsel’s confusion was partially justified. Having clarified

               the procedural posture of this case, remand is appropriate to reset the starting

               point for the postconviction proceedings and to have defendant benefit from the

               services of counsel who is in compliance with Rule 651(c).

                       Finally, we note that the circuit court erroneously granted defendant leave

               to file a successive postconviction petition while his first petition was still

               pending. We vacate the court’s orders granting defendant leave to file a

               successive petition and denying the successive petition. Accordingly, we do not

               address defendant’s argument that the circuit court erred by not holding a third-

               stage evidentiary hearing on his successive petition. We note that defendant is not

               foreclosed from reasserting the actual innocence claim raised in his successive

               petition on remand in an amended initial postconviction petition on remand.

                                                         ***

                       For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgments of the circuit court of

               Peoria County denying the initial postconviction petition following the third-stage

               evidentiary hearing, granting leave to file a successive postconviction petition,

                                                   4
                      and denying the successive postconviction petition. We remand the matter with

                      directions that the court appoint new counsel and hold new second-stage

                      proceedings on defendant’s initial postconviction petition. Counsel is directed to

                      comply with the requirements of Rule 651(c).”

¶ 12          On remand, the circuit court appointed new counsel and set the matter for second-stage

       proceedings. The State filed a motion to dismiss both the initial and successive petitions, arguing

       that the claims involving Nelms had already received a third-stage hearing and that Fisher’s

       affidavit was cumulative and not conclusive in nature.

¶ 13          Several court dates occurred before the hearing took place. The court initially continued

       the matter, explaining that it wanted one operative pleading before it, as it did not want to review

       or keep track of several pleadings that had been filed over the last decade. It also provided its

       interpretation of our order remanding the case for hearing, stating:

                              “So in March of ’19, I re-appointed the Public Defender and asked him

                      and the State to follow and read the appellate opinion, comply with the 651

                      requirements therein, which, per that opinion could include – first of all, that

                      appeal confirmed we were proceeding on the original post-conviction petition

                      filed in March of 2005. The appellate opinion said that based on the Defense

                      attorney’s obligations he could review with defendant any other allegations and

                      make amendments if appropriate to the original post-conviction petition.

                              The Appellate Court specifically said the successive post-conviction

                      petition that the defendant filed in 2016 was not to be considered at all but could

                      be amended and added to the original post-conviction petition and that the matter

                      was amended, remanded in the Appellate Court’s words, to re-set the starting

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                      point for the post-conviction proceedings and to have the Defendant benefit from

                      the counsel, service of counsel compliant with 651.”

¶ 14          The court also explained that “the 2005 initial post-conviction petition is moving

       forward. If there were any changes to be made to that, Defense counsel is going to do that. And

       then that would be addressed at Stage Two proceedings.” Defense counsel and defendant stated

       that they were in agreement on how to proceed with the petition, and defense counsel

       acknowledged that he “should have taken the steps [the court] mentioned.” The court continued

       the matter for hearing.

¶ 15          Defense counsel did not file any pleadings or motions, but defendant filed his own

       amended petition raising several ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as well as his actual

       innocence claim based on Fisher’s affidavit. Defendant’s amended petition did not include his

       actual innocence claims as they related to Nelms and failed to include Fisher’s affidavit.

¶ 16          At the next court hearing, the State indicated that counsel had not filed an amended

       petition, but it believed that due to defense counsel filing a Rule 651(c) certificate, he was

       adopting defendant’s pleadings. On this date, counsel neither confirmed nor denied this

       assumption.

¶ 17          The court heard arguments on the State’s motion to dismiss on June 11, 2021. The State

       argued that Fisher’s affidavit was cumulative and that the claims involving Nelms amounted to

       res judicata. Defense counsel argued that Nelms’s and Fisher’s affidavits were in fact significant

       pieces of evidence that were not cumulative and required an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 18          On July 19, 2021, the court entered an order dismissing defendant’s petition. Defendant

       appeals.

¶ 19                                              II. ANALYSIS

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¶ 20          We previously remanded this matter for new second-stage proceedings on defendant’s

       initial postconviction petition. We noted that remand would be appropriate to “reset” the

       postconviction process and suggested the initial postconviction petition on remand be amended

       to include the claims in defendant’s successive petition. Further, we determined remand was

       necessary to afford defendant the benefit of services of counsel who would comply with Rule

       651(c). We gave directions that the circuit court hold new second-stage proceedings based on the

       initial postconviction petition and any amendments filed thereafter, and that counsel comply with

       the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).

¶ 21          The record reveals that, after this court’s mandate was issued, counsel did not file an

       amended postconviction petition as we suggested. The circuit court even indicated it was

       counsel’s responsibility to amend the petition if necessary but proceeded to hearing without

       receiving any amendments from counsel. Instead, defendant was forced to file his own amended

       postconviction petition which counsel argued at the hearing, even though he never clearly stated

       he adopted it and also made arguments at the hearing regarding Nelms that were not included in

       the amended petition. The Nelms claim counsel argued derived from the initial postconviction

       petition instead of the amendment. Thus, it is clear that arguments were not based on one

       operative pleading as instructed by the circuit court.

¶ 22          It is the circuit court’s responsibility to ensure that the directions in our mandate are

       followed on remand. People ex rel. Daley v. Schreier, 92 Ill. 2d 271, 276 (1982). “[A] trial court

       must obey the clear and unambiguous directions in a mandate issued by a reviewing court.” Id.;

       see also Puritan Finance Corp. v. Gumdrops, Inc., 101 Ill. App. 3d 888, 891 (1981) (“where a

       direct order with instructions has been issued by this court, a trial judge has no discretion in the

       matter and must follow the mandate”). This did not occur here. The court very clearly

                                                         7
       understood from our mandate that counsel should have amended the petition yet proceeded to

       hearing without such an amendment from counsel.

¶ 23          We therefore find that the court did not follow our mandate because it failed to ensure

       that defendant received a full and fair second-stage proceeding with the benefit of counsel. We

       have inherent authority to compel compliance with our orders, thus we must again vacate the

       court’s dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition and remand the cause to the circuit court

       for new second-stage proceedings. See People v. Stephens, 2012 IL App (1st) 110296, ¶ 123; see

       also People v. Feyrer, 269 Ill. App. 3d 734, 739 (1994) (“this court may, in the exercise of its

       responsibility to insure that a cause has a just result, ignore the doctrine of waiver and decide a

       case on grounds not properly raised or not raised at all by the parties.”). On remand, we direct

       the court to appoint new counsel and direct counsel to file one operative pleading, which should

       include all viable claims from the initial and amended petition. Moreover, defendant shall not be

       permitted to file any pro se pleadings so as to avoid confusion or a repeat situation from

       occurring. We further direct the court to consider all claims in the postconviction petition as

       amended, no matter if they have already received a hearing.

¶ 24                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25          The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is vacated and remanded with

       directions.

¶ 26          Vacated and remanded.

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