Court Opinion

ID: 9659607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:50:48.69571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:09.953313
License: Public Domain

HATCHETT, [Circuit] J[udge],
dissenting.
The majority correctly concludes that 42 U.S.C. § 1985 does not provide this court jurisdiction, but incorrectly concludes that the complaint sufficiently alleges an equal protection claim, affording this court jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). The majority also grounds this court’s jurisdiction in the Fourteenth Amendment and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993).*
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs have pled sufficient “state action” to support this court’s jurisdiction or to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2. Accordingly, in Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court recognized a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a legislatively drawn redistricting plan.
In this ease, the state of Florida bears no responsibility for the development and implementation of the 1992 redistricting plan; rather, this court developed the 1992 plan and its oddly-shaped third congressional district to replace the state’s prior unconstitutional congressional districts. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 27, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1281, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971), the Supreme Court endorsed a district court’s “frank — and sometimes drastic — gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones,” which resulted in “zones [that] are neither compact nor contiguous- As an interim corrective measure, this cannot be said to be beyond the broad remedial powers of a court.” 402 U.S. at 27, 91 S.Ct. at 1282 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts have wide latitude in fashioning remedies in response to state imposed constitutional violations. Consequently, the majority errs in concluding that this court has jurisdiction, and that the plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Moreover, the plaintiffs are collaterally es-topped from bringing this lawsuit. The presence of the following four factors invokes the preclusive effect of collateral estoppel:
(1) The issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in the prior litigation, (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior suit, (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment of that action, and (4) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding.
S.E.L. Maduro v. M/V Antonio De Gastaneta, 833 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir.1987); I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson National Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir.1986); see also In Re: St. Laurent, 991 F.2d 672, 675-76 (11th Cir.1993).
This case satisfies all four prerequisites for collateral estoppel. First, this case presents one of the same issues involved in the De-Grandy litigation: the constitutionality of Florida’s congressional districts. See DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F.Supp. 1076 (N.D.Fla.1992). Second, the constitutionality of the third congressional district was a critical and necessary part of the judgment in *1560DeGrandy. Issues regarding the shape, compactness, length, and reach of the third congressional district were fully litigated. Third, the DeGrandy action presented the plaintiffs with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues through intervention. This court, in the DeGrandy litigation, permitted several parties interested in the outcome of the litigation to intervene or otherwise participate.** The plaintiffs abstained from pursuing their claim in the DeGrandy litigation.
The parties in this case are requesting that this court reconsider its ruling regarding district 3 in DeGrandy. Even the parties in DeGrandy are now foreclosed from seeking a Shaw v. Reno ruling through a motion for new trial in DeGrandy. The parties in De-Grandy did not take an appeal; consequently, the DeGrandy’s parties’ rights are settled. Yet, according to the majority, the parties in this case, although not parties in DeGrandy, have a greater right to attack the third congressional district than the parties in De-Grandy. This lawsuit constitutes nothing more than parties who were not in the original DeGrandy case seeking a new trial in that ease. If the majority is right, anyone in the state of Florida may ask this court to reconsider any of its prior rulings in the DeGrandy case. The majority would accept such a lawsuit simply because the Supreme Court has ruled in another case subsequent to DeGrandy on a voting rights issue. Following the majority’s reasoning to its logical conclusion would ensure that no ruling would ever be final — not even rulings that the parties failed to appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. I would dismiss this case.

 It is interesting that the majority relies heavily on Shaw v. Reno, and assumes that it dictates the result in this case without citing any authority holding that the case is to be applied retroactively. Additionally, the DeGrandy case was pending before the Supreme Court at the time the Supreme Court announced its decision in Shaw v. Reno. Surely, the Supreme Court would have remanded DeGrandy to this court with directions if it had considered Shaw v. Reno relevant.

 In addition to the DeGrandy plaintiffs, the court also granted intervention and amicus curiae status to the following groups and individuals.
Those acting as amici are: Simon Ferrell, State Chairman of the Florida Democratic Party; Common Cause; Florida AFI/CIO; United States Representative Craig James; the Cuban American Bar Association; the Coalition of Hispanic Women; and State Representative Daniel Webster. Plaintiff Intervenors include: Gwen Humphrey, State Representative Darrell Reaves; United States Representative Jim Bac-cus; and United States Representative Andy Ireland. State Representative Also Reddick is a defendanl/intervenor.
DeGrandy, 794 F.Supp. at 1080.