Court Opinion

ID: 9728975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:21:01.158678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:53.752953
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
While agreeing with the result reached by the majority, I do so under a somewhat different view of Boyhin v. Alabama. I see the issue before us as one of substantive effect, not retroactive application. In my view, under our procedure, we need never overturn a guilty plea simply because there was no on-the-record inquiry at the time the plea was entered, provided that a subsequent record establishes that the plea is otherwise valid. I do not believe that Boyhin in any way compels a contrary result.
Boyhin, as I read it, deals with the following situation: at the. outset, the trial judge accepted a guilty plea with absolutely no on-the-record inquiry of the defendant as to whether the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, with no further record before it, in effect approving this procedure, at least as a matter of state law. The case then moved on to the Supreme Court of the United States, where that Court was faced with a guilty plea, apparently held valid under state law, that had no supporting record as to voluntariness. Under these facts, the Supreme Court of the United States had no choice but to reverse and invalidate the guilty plea.
Contrasted with this is the record which the Supreme Court would receive were they to hear the case now before us. Although there was no on-the-record inquiry of appellant at the time his plea was entered, *539we now have a complete record as to voluntariness which was formed in a PCHA proceeding. Thus after the ease left our state system, the Supreme Court of the United States would have before it — as we do now— a full record establishing the validity of the plea. In Boykin, the Supreme Court stated that “We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights [those waived by a guilty plea] from a silent record.” 37 U.S.L. Week at 4476. Here, however, there is no silent record, and thus no need to presume a waiver. Instead there is a PCHA record, and an explicit finding made after a hearing that the plea when entered was knowingly and voluntarily made.
Likewise, even were we to hear this case on direct appeal, either in a case where the plea was entered before Boykin, because a prisoner had been adjudged entitled to a direct appeal under Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963), or even in a case where the plea was entered after Boyldn, we would remand for an evidentiary hearing and a determination of whether the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Thus under Pennsylvania procedure, the Supreme Court of the United States would never receive a case in the posture of Boykin where there was an affirmance of a sentence after guilty plea although the plea was supported by absolutely no record.
I hardly mean to imply that the judge accepting the plea should not make an on-the-record inquiry. This Court has made it clear in the past that that is recommended, and now a necessary procedure. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cushnie, 433 Pa. 131, 249 A. 2d 290 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A. 2d 196 (1968). Now, under our rule in Cushnie, if a hearing as to the validity of the plea is necessary, and there is no on-the-record inquiry by counsel for prosecution or defense, or by the judge who *540accepted the plea, the burden of proof is on the Commonwealth to establish that the plea is valid.
The fact that we require an on-the-record inquiry when a guilty plea is accepted does not, in my view, also require us to automatically wipe out the plea if no such inquiry is made. Boykin clearly says that we may not, without more, allow the plea to stand. That is what the Alabama Supreme Court did, and it was that action that the Supreme Court of the United States overturned. But where the state system provides a mechanism for fairly establishing a record and determining the validity of the guilty plea, I do not believe that the Supreme Court of the United States meant to — or properly could — mandate a prophylactic rule that the states would be required to follow, to overturn pleas proven valid on a full record. Clearly the Supreme Court thinks that is the best technique for insuring on-the-record inquiries, see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969). But while F. R. Crim. P. 11, as interpreted by McCarthy may be a desirable method of achieving a procedural compliance with the constitutional requirements of a guilty plea, I do not see how the exact form of relief can be constitutionally imposed on the states. As long as Pennsylvania guarantees and provides a full and fair procedure for determining the validity of guilty pleas, in my view the Supreme Court of the United States cannot properly and does not in Boykin require us to follow a rule that it would opt for as a matter of policy or preferred procedure.
I agree with the statement in Boykin that an on-the-record inquiry by the judge accepting the plea “forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.” 37 U.S.L. Week at 4476. In support of this proposition, the Court even quoted a Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth ex rel. West v. *541Rundle, supra. Yet although. I obviously agree with this statement, I do not take it to mean that state hearing procedures for determining the validity of guilty pleas are inherently unreliable. I would find this position to be wholly untenable and unsupported in fact or law and I cannot accept it as constitutionally requiring the automatic overturn of guilty pleas where an on-the-record inquiry by counsel or the judge accepting the plea is absent. This would call into question the basic reliability of the entire state constitutional fact finding process, a position inconsistent with our general theory of criminal review in the federal system. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S. Ct. 822 (1963). Yet without a judgment that the state hearing procedures for determining the validity of guilty pleas in these cases are inherently unreliable, it is clear to me that the Supreme Court cannot mandate that the prophylactic rule of Boykin bind the states.
In summary, I would hold that as long as Pennsylvania procedure provides a mechanism for the full and fair determination of the validity of a guilty plea, based on a record — developed at the time of the plea or thereafter — sufficient for adequate state and federal review, we are not compelled to automatically overturn guilty pleas under Boykin v. Alabama, merely because the judge accepting the plea failed then to make the requisite on-the-record inquiry.
Mr. Chief Justice Bell and Mr. Justice Pomekoy join in this opinion.