Court Opinion

ID: 9374916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 17:02:38.619052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.130611
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KELLY ROOT and THOMAS JOYCE, )
                             )
    Plaintiffs,              )
                             )
           v.                )
                             )                C.A. No. N20C-05-156 CLS
MAIDPRO WILMINGTON,          )
THRESHOLD BRANDS LLC,        )
MAIDPRO FRANCHISE, LLC,      )
DAISY PEREZ, CASH IN JEWELRY )
AND PAWN INC., and JUAN      )
CARIDE a/ka JUAN CARIDE-     )
HERNANDEZ,                   )
                             )
    Defendants.              )

                      Date Submitted: December 6, 2022
                       Date Decided: February 23, 2023

              Upon Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reargument. DENIED.

                                   ORDER

Josiah R. Wolcott, Esquire, Connolly Gallagher LLP, Newark, Delaware, 19711,
Attorney for Plaintiffs, Kelly Root and Thomas Joyce.

John G. Harris, Esquire, and Peter C. McGivney, Esquire, Berger Harris LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware, 19801, Attorneys for Defendants Threshold Brands, LLC
and MaidPro Franchise, LLC.

Shae Chasanov, Esquire, Tybout, Redfearn & Pell, Wilmington, Delaware, 19899,
Attorney for Defendant MaidPro Wilmington.

Periann Doko, Esquire, Kent McBride, Wilmington, Delaware, 19809, Attorney
for Defendants Cash In Jewelry and Pawn, Inc. and Juan Caride.

SCOTT, J.

                                      1
                                INTRODUCTION
      Before the Court is Kelly Root and Thomas Joyce’s (“Plaintiffs”) Motion for

Reargument (“Motion”) on this Court’s Order of Dismissal of their responeat

superior claim against Defendant MaidPro Franchise, LLC (“MaidPro”). Upon

reviewing Plaintiffs Motion and MaidPro’s opposition, the Motion is DENIED for

the following reasons.

                      BACKGROUND/ALLEGED FACTS
      MaidPro Franchise, LLC is the franchisor of the MaidPro brand. Plaintiffs’

Second Amended Complaint alleged Respondeat superior/vicarious liability,

negligent hiring, civil conspiracy, and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional

distress stemming from MaidPro Wilmington’s former employee, Daisy Perez (“Ms.

Perez”), entered their home through an unlocked door and stealing valuables.

Plaintiffs allege MaidPro can be held liable as franchisors because MaidPro controls

the daily operations of MaidPro Wilmington, the specific franchisee who hired Ms.

Perez, because the franchisors require franchisees to use the set models and systems

established.

      On or about June 13, 2018, MaidPro Wilmington hired Ms. Perez. On June

22, 2018, due to the findings of her background report, MaidPro Wilmington

terminated Ms. Perez, ending their employer/employee relationship.

                                         2
      In October of 2018, Plaintiffs, while they were on vacation, claim Ms. Perez

unlawfully entered their home and stole personal property. Ms. Perez has been held

criminally liable for the crimes committed against Plaintiffs.

      On July 28, 2022, MaidPro filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended

Complaint. On November 17, 2022, upon review of the Motion to Dismiss and

Plaintiffs’ Response, this Court granted the Motion to Dismiss. For the respondeat

superior claim, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss because: (1) Plaintiffs state

that Ms. Perez was not an employee of MaidPro Wilmington at the time of the

burglary as they contend on June 22, 2018, Ms. Perez was terminated. The burglary

did not occur until October of 2018, therefore Ms. Perez was no longer an employee

at the time of the act. As a matter of law, Ms. Perez was not acting in the scope of

her employment with MaidPro, (2) the Court looked to the factors outlined in the

Restatement 2nd and made a finding that the unauthorized conduct is not within the

scope of employment, and (3) the Court found Plaintiffs respondeat superior claim

failed because they are attempting to hold MaidPro, a parent company, liable for the

acts of their subsidiary, MaidPro Wilmington and failed to allege that the MaidPro’s

control over MaidPro Wilmington was actual, participatory, and total.

      On November 28, 2022, Plaintiffs filed this instant Motion. They argue this

Court did not analyze Plaintiffs’ agency claims or discuss the franchisor-franchisee

                                          3
relationship relying on Patel v. Sunvest Realty Corp.1 as “controlling”. They also

argue this Court’s Order is inconsistent with the Court’s prior “decision” from

February 2022 denying MaidPro Wilmington’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’

Amended Complaint.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW
      On a Motion for Reargument under Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e), the Court will determine from the motion and answer whether reargument will

be granted and the only issue is whether the Court overlooked something that would

have changed the outcome of the underlying decision.2 Thus, the motion will be

granted only if “the Court has overlooked a controlling precedent or legal principles,

or the Court has misapprehended the law or facts such as would have changed the

outcome of the underlying decision.”3 A Motion for Reargument is not an

opportunity for a party to rehash the arguments already decided by the Court or to

present new arguments not previously raised.4 A party seeking to have the Court

reconsider the earlier ruling must, “demonstrate newly discovered evidence, a

1
  2018 WL 4961392 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2018)
2
  Brenner v. Vill. Green, Inc., 2000 WL 972649, at *1 (Del. Super. May 23, 2000)
aff'd, 763 A.2d 90 (Del. 2000).
3
  BRP Hold Ox, LLC v. Chilian, 2018 WL 6432978, at *1 (Del. Super. Dec. 6,
2018) (quoting Kennedy v. Invacare, Inc., 2006 WL 488590, at *1 (Del. Super.
Jan. 31, 2006)).
4
  Kennedy, 2006 WL 488590, at * 1.
                                          4
change in the law, or manifest injustice.”5 “Delaware law places a heavy burden on

a [party] seeking relief pursuant to Rule 59.”6

                                   DISCUSSION
Although the Court miscategorized the relationship between MaidPro and
MaidPro Wilmington as parent/subsidiary, the Motion is DENIED because such
error does not change the outcome of the underlying opinion.
      Plaintiffs ask the Court to look at Patel, which this Court clarifies is

persuasive, not controlling. In the Patel case, a real estate broker worked for a

franchisee of RE/MAX, LLC (“franchisor”) from 1986-2017.7 During his time of

employment with the franchisee, the broker convinced several friends and

acquaintances to invest in real property in return for monthly interest payments.8

After he failed to make monthly interest payments as promised, one of the

noteholders found out he was no longer employed by the franchisee.9 The broker

subsequently filed for bankruptcy and the noteholders learned most of their funds

were never invested in real property.10 The noteholders brought an action against the

franchisor for respondeat superior liability for the acts of the franchisee’s broker.11

5
  Brenner, 2000 WL 972649, at *1.
6
  Newborn v. Christiana Psychiatric Serv., P.A., 2017 WL 394096, at *2 (Del.
Super. Jan. 25, 2017)
7
  Patel, 2018 WL 4961392, at *1.
8
  Id.
9
  Id.
10
   Id.
11
   Id.
                                          5
According to Patel, a plaintiff may hold a franchisor vicariously liable by

establishing the franchisor had actual or apparent agency relationship with its

franchisee.12 Patel found the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the franchisor had

apparent authority over the franchisee because it alleged the franchisee’s signs, email

signature, and documents all bore franchisees name and trademark, and plaintiffs

relied on franchisors name and brand quality.13 Patel, as well as other cases similar

citing to in the opinion are distinguishable from the facts in this case because unlike

Patel, Ms. Perez was not an employee at the time the incident occurred. This Court

could not find any caselaw relating to franchisee liability for a criminal act of a

former employee of a franchisor. As such, this case must be distinguished from other

franchisee liability cases.

      Actual Authority

      Under Delaware law, a “franchisor may be held to have an actual agency

relationship with its franchisee when the former controls or has the right to control

the latter's business.”14 Where a franchise agreement exists and it goes “beyond the

12
   Patel, 2018 WL 4961392, at *5.
13
   Id.
14
   Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 197 (Del.1978).
                                          6
stage of setting standards, and allocates to the franchisor the right to exercise control

over the daily operations of the franchise, an agency relationship exists.”15

      In Cumpston v. McShane,16 the Court analyzed actual agency in a motion for

summary judgment motion. The motion for summary judgment motion was denied

on the issue of actual authority because the Court found there was a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the employee who caused injury to third persons was a

servant/employee or an independent contract at the time of the accident.17 The Court

finds the italicized language to be critical in the analysis of actual agency under these

facts. Plaintiffs have made it clear that Ms. Perez was not an employee or

independent contract at the time of the burglary. Therefore, having alleged this fact,

they admit there was no actual authority at the time of the incident.

      Apparent authority

      The concept of apparent authority focuses not upon the actual relationship of

a principal to the agent, but the reasonable perception of the relationship by a third

party.18 Where a principal represents through apparent authority that “another is his

servant and causes a third person to justifiably and reasonably rely upon the care and

15
   Id.
16
   2009 WL 1566484 (Del. Super. Ct. June 4, 2009).
17
   Id at *3.
18
   Billops, 391 A.2d at 198.
                                           7
skill of such apparent agent[,]” the principal will bear the same liability as if the

agent had actual authority.19 Liability may ensue from a principal's representation of

apparent authority to a specific individual or the general public.20 The concept of

apparent authority does not apply here because Ms. Perez no longer maintained any

employment relationship with MaidPro Wilmington, as alleged by Plaintiffs.

Therefore, Plaintiffs could not justifiably and reasonably rely upon the care and skill

of Ms. Perez, who had not been employed with MaidPro for four months at the time

of the incident.

      Because Plaintiffs admit Ms. Perez was not an employee at the time of the

circumstances under no set of facts would the Court find they properly allege actual

or apparent authority. As such the denial of the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint would not change.

      The Court’s prior “decision” from February 2022 denying MaidPro
Wilmington’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is not inconsistent
with the Court’s granting of the MaidPro’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint on November 17, 2022.
      Plaintiffs insist, again, this decision is inconsistent with the Court’s February

2022 denial of MaidPro Wilmington’s Motion to Dismiss. This exact argument was

made previously and was addressed by the Court, so it is not properly raised now as

19
   Singleton v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 333 A.2d 160, 163 (Del.Super.1975) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267); Billops, 391 A.2d at 198.
20
   Billops, 391 A.2d at 198.
                                          8
no new information is being offered. However, the Court will readdress the issue for

Plaintiffs’ understanding. On April 14, 2021, MaidPro Wilmington filed a Motion

to Dismiss relying on facts outside of the pleadings, Ms. Perez’s deposition

testimony, affidavit from President of MaidPro Wilmington, and employment

document regarding an employee’s introductory period, consideration of these

exhibits/testimony goes beyond the scope of the pleadings. The Court denied

MaidPro Wilmington’s Motion to Dismiss only because the Motion would be more

appropriately filed as a Motion for Summary Judgment. It did not make any

determinations as the substance of the arguments presented in the previous Motion

to Dismiss. The amended complaint was subsequently amended, Second Amended

Complaint, again on June 1, 2022. On July 28, 2022, the Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint was filed by MaidPro, separate and apart

from MaidPro Wilmington. Because MaidPro’s Motion did not rely on facts outside

of the pleadings, like MaidPro Wilmington’s Motion to Dismiss did, the Motion was

appropriately filed as a Motion to Dismiss, and the Court then addressed the Motion

based on the allegations contained within the Second Amended Complaint as

Delaware Rules required under a 12(b) Motion. There is no inconsistency present.

                                         9
                         CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reargument is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                          /s/ Calvin L. Scott
                                          Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.

                                10