Court Opinion

ID: 9556709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 07:11:07.124524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:50.183689
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                               __________________

                               NO. 09-22-00411-CV
                               __________________

                    IN THE INTEREST OF D.P. AND D.P.

__________________________________________________________________

             On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
                     Montgomery County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. 21-01-00423-CV
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant, E.L.J. (“Appellant” or “Edwin”), the maternal uncle of three-

year-old twins, D.P. and D.P. (collectively “the children”), filed a Petition to

Modify Parent-Child Relationship seeking custody of the children. 1 Edwin filed his

Petition to Modify after the trial court had already rendered its Final Order in Suit

Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship and Order for Termination that terminated

the parental rights of the children’s biological mother, who is Edwin’s sister,

terminated the rights of the children’s biological father, and appointed the

      1
        To protect the children, we use either initials or pseudonyms for “the
children” and for the relatives of the children. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b).
                                           1
Department as the permanent managing conservator of the children. See In re D.P.,

No. 09-22-00048-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5279, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

July 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). At the time Edwin filed his Petition to

Modify, the children had already been placed with a foster family that wanted to

adopt the children. After Appellant filed his petition, the children’s foster parents

intervened and filed a motion to strike Appellant’s petition, arguing that he lacked

standing. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to strike, finding Appellant

lacked standing. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred. As

explained herein, we affirm.

                                    Background

      On January 18, 2022, the trial court rendered a Final Order in Suit Affecting

the Parent-Child Relationship and Order for Termination that terminated the

parental rights of the children’s biological mother (“Mother”). Mother appealed the

Order for Termination, which this Court affirmed.2 The Order also appointed the

Department as permanent managing conservator of the children.

      2
        We upheld the order terminating the biological parents’ parental rights and
appointing the Department as the Permanent Managing Conservator of the
children. See In re D.P., No. 09-22-00048-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5279 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont July 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). This Court takes judicial
notice of the record on appeal in the prior lawsuit. See In re Z.L., No. 09-20-00194-
CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 9639, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 10, 2020, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (taking judicial notice of the records in a related appeal
involving appellant and a different child); Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) (explaining that a court may take
                                          2
       A few weeks later, Edwin filed a Petition to Modify Parent-Child

Relationship. In his Petition Edwin asserted that he has standing to bring the suit

under the Family Code Sections 102.004(a)(1), 102.006(c), and 156.002(b), and he

requested temporary orders appointing him temporary conservator of the children

with the right to designate their primary residence. In the alternative, Edwin asked

the court to render a temporary order placing the children in his home or granting

him possession of and access to the children. According to Edwin, the Department

had completed an assessment of his home, the children’s present circumstances

would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development, the

children “are in foster care with no contact with biological family[,]” and the

requested modification will be in the children’s best interest.

       Edwin’s sworn declaration was attached to his petition, and the declaration

states, in relevant part:

              I found out that my niece and nephew were in the custody of
       the Department [] in late summer/early fall in 2021. I contacted the
       caseworker [] and expressed my desire to have my niece and nephew
       placed in my home. On November 16, 2021, [the caseworker] and the
       children’s guardian ad litem visited my home and interviewed me.
       During this visit, [the caseworker] informed me that a home study
       request would be initiated. On November 23, 2021, I contacted [the
       caseworker] via text message to request an update on the home study

judicial notice of its own records, including the record in the appeal of an
appellant’s prior lawsuit); Smith v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. 09-01-348-CV, 2002
Tex. App. LEXIS 8330, at *19 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 21, 2002, pet. denied)
(“A court may take judicial notice of our judgments and records in the same or
related cases.”).
                                          3
      process. [The caseworker] informed me that the process could take six
      to eight weeks and to expect to be contacted by an assessor. Exactly
      eight weeks and one day later, on January 19, 2022, I contacted [the
      caseworker] again requesting an update. [The caseworker] requested
      more information that I provided. I was subsequently contacted by the
      assessor and the home visit was conducted on January 30, 2022.
             The children’s present circumstances would significantly
      impair their physical health or emotional development. The children
      are in foster care with no contact with biological family. Since a final
      order was entered terminating parental rights, a home evaluation has
      been conducted on my home. My wife and I are fully prepared,
      willing and able to provide my niece and nephew with a safe, loving
      environment. It is in the children’s best interest to be placed with a
      relative. Appointing me as a managing conservator and/or placing the
      children in my home is in their best interest. The modification
      requested is in the best interest of the children.

      The children’s foster parents (“the Fosters”) then filed a Petition in

Intervention. The Fosters asserted that it was in the children’s best interest for them

to remain with the Fosters while the case is pending. The Fosters also filed a

motion to strike Edwin’s Petition to Modify, arguing that he lacked standing. In

addition, the Fosters filed a Motion to Deny Relief in Suit to Modify Parent-Child

Relationship, arguing that the affidavit attached to the Petition to Modify “does not

provide the Court with facts to support an allegation that ‘the children’s present

environment may endanger the child[ren]’s physical health or significantly impair

the child[ren]’s emotional development[,]” as required by the Family Code. The

Fosters argued that based solely on the affidavit, the trial court should deny Edwin

the relief he seeks and should not schedule a hearing.

                                          4
      In their brief in support of their motion to strike, the Fosters stated that the

children were placed in their home on or about March 25, 2021, and the children

have been in their care since that time. The Fosters also alleged that Edwin had two

supervised visits with the children, on or about May 17 and June 7, 2022, and that

he has had no other contact with the children. The Fosters alleged that Edwin’s

affidavit in support of his Petition to Modify is inadequate to show that he has

standing to file suit because it makes only a conclusory assertion, which falls short

of the “satisfactory proof” that “the order requested is necessary because the

child[ren]’s present circumstances would significantly impair [their] physical

health or emotional development[]” as required by section 102.004(a)(1) of the

Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 102.004(a)(1); see also id.

§ 156.102(b). According to the Fosters, the affidavit contains only legal

conclusions and no factual allegations, rendering it insufficient to establish

standing.

      In response to the Motion to Strike, Edwin alleged that “[t]here should be no

question as to whether an order granting the Department permanent

conservatorship of 3-year[-]old children should be reassessed[,]”and “[t]he danger

of three-year-old children left stranded in the foster care system is obvious.” Edwin

also argued that his Petition to Modify alleged that the children’s present

circumstances would significantly impair their physical health or emotional

                                          5
development, as required by sections 102.004 and 156.102 of the Family Code. See

id. §§ 102.004(a)(1), 156.102(b). Edwin also alleged that “these 3-year-old

children are in foster care in the permanent custody of the State of Texas with no

contact with biological family.” The Fosters filed a First Amended Petition in

Intervention, adding an allegation that appointment of Edwin as sole managing

conservator would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional

development and that it was in the children’s best interest for them to remain in

their placement with the Fosters.

      In their reply, the Fosters agreed that Edwin is a relative within the third

degree of consanguinity as required by section 102.004(a)(1). However, the Fosters

argue that Edwin provided no factual allegation nor proof to support his argument

that the children’s present circumstances would significantly impair their physical

health or emotional development.

      The trial court heard the Fosters’ Motion to Strike on October 31, 2022. At

the hearing, the caseworker testified that she had been assigned to the case for a

little over a year. According to the caseworker, in the previous trial terminating the

biological parents’ rights, the Department’s goal was unrelated adoption with a

concurrent goal of related adoption. In the termination proceeding, and at the

hearing on the motion to strike, the Department explained that the Department’s

                                          6
goal was to have the Fosters adopt the children, and the Fosters’ attorney also told

the court that the Fosters intend, and always intended, to adopt the children.

      Edwin testified at the hearing on the motion to strike that he was the

children’s mother’s brother. He also testified that at one point, he thought the

children were going to be placed with him as a family member, and the caseworker

told him he was a possible placement option. Edwin explained that he did not want

the children to “be in the system when they have a family to return to and which is

[his] duty[.]” Edwin expressed concern that if the children stayed “in the

system[,]” they would never get to be around or know their family, and “in the

long run that’s not going to have a positive effect on them.” When asked his

concerns about the children’s care, based on pictures of the children, Edwin

replied, “hair care, skin care, [and] clothing.” According to Edwin, the children’s

hair and skin looked dry and in need of moisturizer. He also thought their clothes

looked old and worn. On cross-examination, Edwin testified that hair, skin, and

clothing are all a part of health. He also testified that the Fosters are Caucasian, and

the children are Black, and the Fosters “cannot show [the children] how to be

Black Americans. They can love them, but they can’t love them and show them

how to be Black Americans.”

      Edwin’s counsel argued that the issue was not about how the children were

being treated in the foster home but rather the dangers of three-year-old children

                                           7
remaining in the State’s care for their full childhood and the uncertainty of not

having permanency. Edwin’s counsel also admitted to the court that she did not

have any evidence to say that the children were in a dangerous home nor concerns

about how the children were being treated by the Fosters. According to Edwin, the

danger was “to make sure that the children were not stuck in foster care for the rest

of their childhood.” Edwin’s attorney also explained Edwin did not file a petition

before the prior lawsuit went to trial because “he was under the impression that the

children were going to come to him.” Finally, Edwin’s attorney agreed that, if

standing is based on facts about the children’s current placement specifically, then

there were no facts showing significant impairment.

      At the close of the hearing, the trial court stated that, based on the evidence

presented, Edwin had failed to establish standing under section 102.004(a)(1) of

the Family Code and the court was dismissing his suit. The trial court signed an

order granting the motion to strike on November 13, 2022. Edwin filed a Request

for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but none were made, and Edwin did

not file a notice of past due findings with the trial court as required by the Rules of

Civil Procedure.3 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297. Edwin timely filed a notice of appeal.

      3
        The failure to file the required “past due” notice is treated as a waiver of
the right to complain on appeal of the trial court’s failure to file findings. Sonnier v.
Sonnier, 331 S.W.3d 211, 212-13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, no pet.).
                                           8
                      Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      We review a trial court’s ruling on standing under a de novo standard of

review. See In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018); In re M.B., No. 09-19-

00247-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 8847, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 3,

2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). When evaluating standing, “we construe the

pleadings in the plaintiff’s favor, but we also consider relevant evidence offered by

the parties.” In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155. When the trial court does not issue

findings of fact, we imply all necessary findings of fact to support the trial court’s

order. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex.

2002); In re W.J.B., 294 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.).

Because standing to bring a Suit Affecting a Parent-Child Relationship (“SAPCR”)

is governed by statute, we examine the statute to determine if the petitioner seeking

to modify a SAPCR has been granted standing under the statute. In re H.S., 550

S.W.3d at 155. On appeal, Edwin relies upon section 102.004(a)(1) of the Family

Code, which provides, in relevant part,

      (a) In addition to the general standing to file suit provided by Section
      102.003, a grandparent, or another relative of the child related within
      the third degree by consanguinity, may file an original suit requesting
      managing conservatorship if there is satisfactory proof to the court
      that:
             (1) the order requested is necessary because the child’s present
             circumstances would significantly impair the child’s physical
             health or emotional development[.]

                                          9
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 102.004(a)(1). 4

      There is no factual dispute between the parties that Edwin, as the maternal

uncle of the children, is related to the children within the third degree of

consanguinity. The dispute here is whether Edwin met his burden to show

“satisfactory proof” to the trial court that “the order requested is necessary because

the child’s present circumstances would significantly impair the child’s physical

health or emotional development.” See id.; In re H.S., 550 S.W.3 at 156 n.6; Rolle

v. Hardy, 527 S.W.3d 405, 415-16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)

(discussing this statutory provision as “unusual” because in 102.004(a) the

Legislature confers standing on certain persons based on the existence of proof

rather than on the pleading of facts).

      4
          Appellant’s petition alleged that he had standing under sections
102.004(a)(1), 102.006(c), and 156.002(b) of the Texas Family Code. Section
102.004 of the Family Code provides that, under certain circumstances, a
grandparent or other relative of the child within the third degree of consanguinity
may file an original suit requesting managing conservatorship. See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 102.004(a). Section 102.006 of the Family Code provides certain
limitations on standing to file an original suit affecting the parent-child
relationship. See id. § 102.006(c) (providing that an aunt or uncle of the children
may file an original suit not later than ninety days after the date the parent-child
relationship is terminated). Because Appellant filed his Petition to Modify on
February 17, 2022, within ninety days of the trial court rendering its order
terminating the parental rights of the biological parents, we need not discuss the
applicability of section 102.006. See id. Section 156.002(b) provides that a person
who has standing to sue under Chapter 102 may file a suit for modification in the
court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. See id. § 156.002(b). Appellant’s
brief only raises an issue on appeal under section 102.004(a)(1).
                                         10
      A petitioner seeking conservatorship has the burden to prove standing. In re

Smith, 262 S.W.3d 463, 465 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, orig. proceeding). The

petitioner must show that the facts establishing standing existed at the time the

petition was filed in the trial court. See Rolle, 527 S.W.3d at 417. Challenges to

standing are determined as a matter of law and should not address the underlying

merits of a claim, and in a hearing under section 102.004(a)(1), a court does not

determine what type of access or possession should be awarded to the petitioner.

See id. at 418-19 (citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.

2000)). Whether a petitioner has presented “satisfactory proof” of standing is a

narrower inquiry than a “best interest” determination on the merits of the

underlying claims. See id. at 419. A petitioner must show “satisfactory proof,”

which in Rolle the court of appeals decided means a “preponderance of the

evidence,” that “some specific, identifiable behavior or conduct” would probably

cause significant impairment to the children’s physical health or emotional

development, and evidence that merely raises a surmise or speculation of possible

harm does not satisfy what section 102.004 requires. See id. at 420 (citing Mauldin

v. Clements, 428 S.W.3d 247, 263 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.));

see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.005 (providing that findings under Title 5 of

the Family Code “shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence[]”); Von

Behren v. Von Behren, 800 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ

                                        11
denied) (holding that proof of standing “shall be based on a preponderance of the

evidence under the rules generally applicable to civil cases[]”).

                                      Analysis

      According to Appellant, there was sufficient proof that the order he

requested was necessary because the children’s present circumstances would

significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development.

Appellant argues that his declaration which was attached to his petition, laid out

certain relevant “facts regarding the children being separated from [their]

biological family.”5 Appellant also argues that he testified that the children were

“stranded in foster care without his legal intervention.” Appellant argues that he

testified about concern for the “adequate care for [the children’s] skin and hair[]”

and adverse psychological effects of being orphans.

      Appellant argues that the trial court “misstated and misapplied the law when

it limited the children’s present circumstances to just their ‘present living

environment.’” Appellant argues that the trial court is not required to find that the

      5
        Appellant states in his declaration that he found out the children were in the
custody of the Department in the late summer or early fall of 2021, he contacted
the Department about his desire to have the children placed in his home, the
Department representative visited his home and said a home study request would
be made, he followed up with a text message and a phone call, the Department
conducted an assessment of his home, “the children’s present circumstances would
significantly impair their physical health or emotional development,” the children
are in foster care with no contact with biological family, a final order was entered
terminating parental rights, and appointing him as managing conservator and
placing the children in his home is in the best interest of the children.
                                          12
children’s current placement is abusive or dangerous, and that “[c]onsideration for

this standing provision is about conservatorship and not placement.” According to

Appellant, he need not establish that he should be appointed as sole managing

conservator of the children to have standing to seek modification of the

conservatorship order.

      Appellant relies in large part on a quote from one section of the opinion in In

re K.D.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.),

without including the remainder of that court’s analysis. Appellant fails to explain

why K.D.H. supports the Appellant’s point in this appeal. That said, we find the

facts in K.D.H. are distinguishable from the facts here.

      In K.D.H., the child’s mother tested positive for marijuana while she was

pregnant with K.D.H., and the Department “made arrangements for the Child to be

placed with the Grandmother.” Id. at 881. The child’s father was incarcerated. Id.

at 882. The record did not reflect that the Department had filed any lawsuit against

the mother or father nor that the Department was ever appointed as a conservator

of the child. Id. at 881 n.1. The grandmother cared for the child for about four

months, and then the child was returned to the mother’s care. Id. at 881. The

grandmother then filed a lawsuit seeking to be appointed the sole managing

conservator of the child, and the grandmother asserted she had standing under

section 102.004(a)(1) of the Family Code. Id. The child’s mother then filed a plea

                                         13
to the jurisdiction, asserting that the grandmother lacked standing to bring suit. Id.

at 882. In response to mother’s plea, the grandmother presented “documentary

evidence from the Department as well as certified copies of judgments reflecting

the [m]other’s various criminal convictions.” Id.

      The K.D.H. court explained that section 102.004(a) is an “unusual

provision” because the Legislature “confers standing on certain parties based on

the existence of proof rather than the existence of facts.” Id. at 885. Therefore, the

issue presented was whether “the order requested [was] necessary because the

Child’s present circumstances would significantly impair the Child’s physical

health or emotional development.” Id. The court of appeals reviewed under a de

novo standard whether the record evidence submitted regarding the issue of

standing, considered in the light most favorable to the grandmother, would enable

reasonable and fair-minded people to find that the order requested was necessary

because the child’s circumstances on the date grandmother filed her lawsuit would

significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. Id. at

888 (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 102.004; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007)).

      The facts in K.D.H. differ from our case because in K.D.H., (1) the parents’

parental rights had not been terminated, (2) the record did not reflect that the

Department had filed a suit against the parents nor was appointed conservator of

                                         14
the child, and (3) the child had been in grandmother’s care for several months. See

id. at 188-90. By contrast, in our case, the children’s parental rights had been

terminated and the Department was appointed permanent managing conservator of

the children, which this Court has upheld. See generally In re D.P., 2022 Tex. App

LEXIS 5279. The children in this case have never been placed with Edwin nor

have they ever been under his care. Rather, the children have been placed with the

Fosters for almost a year, and the Fosters consistently expressed their intent to

adopt the children. Unlike the grandmother in K.D.H., Edwin wholly failed to meet

his burden to show that the children’s present circumstances would significantly

impair the children’s physical health or emotional development.

      In this case, the trial court stated at the hearing that it did not appear there

was a disputed fact issue on standing. The court also stated,

      In this particular case, the undisputed facts are that at the time you
      filed, [the children] actually had been in the same foster home for 11
      months and continued to be in that foster home and I think the only
      potential possibility, if you were going to present a danger, is if they
      were going to be moved imminently to a place that you felt was a
      problem. But I’m not sure that’s how this is going to play out.

Here, the trial court asked whether Edwin was alleging standing “based solely on

significant impairment[,]” and Edwin’s counsel replied, “Yes.” Edwin’s attorney

also told the trial court that the issue was not how the children were being treated

in the Fosters’ home but rather the children “being in the conservatorship of the

Department and the dangers that come with that for [] 3-year-old children to
                                         15
remain in the State’s care for their full childhood.” The trial court asked whether it

was “the uncertainty of [] placement that posed the risk of harm[,]” and Edwin’s

attorney replied, that “it’s the uncertainty of not having permanency.” According to

the record, the Department’s goal was for the Fosters to adopt the children, and the

Fosters’ attorney told the court, “My clients intend to adopt these children[.] []

Their intention was always to adopt these children, Judge.” The Fosters’ attorney

also told the court that the children had been living with them for “13, 14

months[,]” and the court stated that the adoption was on hold until the appeal of the

termination proceeding was completed. The record evidence from the hearing does

not support Appellant’s argument that the court restricted its consideration to

evidence of the children’s “present living environment.” In addition, the record

does not support Appellant’s assertion that the children were “stranded in foster

care[.]”

      Edwin testified at the hearing that he was concerned about the children being

“in the system” and not with their family. He testified that he had concerns about

the children’s hair, skin, and clothes. Edwin’s attorney then explained to the court

there were no concerns about how the Fosters were treating the children and there

was no evidence the Fosters’ home was dangerous. The trial court then questioned

the attorney about Edwin’s argument:

      The Court: So essentially you don’t -- you don’t believe the children
      were in any type of -- were not at risk of harm in the place they were
                                         16
      living at the time of your filing. It’s an uncertainty argument. It’s the
      uncertainty of that placement that posed the risk of harm? I’m just
      trying to understand.

      [Edwin’s counsel]: Yeah. I guess it’s the uncertainty of not having
      permanency. Period.

The attorney representing the Fosters told the trial court that the Fosters intended to

adopt the children, and they were waiting for the outcome of the appeal of the

termination of parental rights.

      Section 102.004(a)(1) requires satisfactory proof that the requested

modification is necessary because the children’s present circumstances would

significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development. Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 102.004(a)(1). At most, Edwin presented his lay opinion that it

would be better for the children to be placed with family, and he argued that there

was a potential risk because of the uncertainty of the children being “stranded” in

the care of the Department. On this record, Edwin failed to meet his burden to

show “satisfactory proof” that “the child[ren]’s present circumstances would

significantly impair the child[ren]’s physical health or emotional development[.]”

See id.; In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 156 n.6. As previously noted, this Court upheld

the trial court’s order terminating the rights of Mother and Father and appointing

the Department as the children’s permanent managing conservator. See In re D.P.,

2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5279, at **38-39.

                                          17
      Appellant also argues that “[t]he record reflects that the children did not

have an attorney ad litem to monitor and manage the home study process after the

termination trial.” The record of the termination proceedings reflects that an

attorney ad litem was appointed for the children for the duration of the case. Edwin

admits in his declaration that the children’s guardian ad litem and the caseworker

visited his home. Following termination of the parents’ rights, the Department was

named permanent managing conservator, which this Court upheld. See id. The

record in this appeal also reflects that an attorney for the children was present at

the hearing on the Fosters’ motion to strike. Appellant did not raise this issue in the

trial court and so he did not preserve the issue for appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

In addition, Appellant’s assertion is not supported by the record. See id. 38.1(i).

Therefore, we reject this argument.

      Finding no error, we overrule Appellant’s issue, and we affirm the trial

court’s order.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                     _________________________
                                                         LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                               Justice

Submitted on July 31, 2023
Opinion Delivered August 17, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
                                          18