Court Opinion

ID: 9927283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 18:01:05.784684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:12.606480
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ADRIANA SENECA HOLT,                       No. 22-55806
individually, and as guardian ad litem
for minor child L.H.; JACOB HOLT;             D.C. No.
BEATRIZ LUKENS,                            8:20-cv-01416-
                                             JVS-DFM
               Plaintiffs-Appellants,
 v.
                                             OPINION
COUNTY OF ORANGE; JUSTIN
MATHIESON; JOSE TORRES; JOSE
SALINAS; SCOTT FERRARO;
DOES, 1 through 10, Inclusive,

               Defendants-Appellees.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
          for the Central District of California
        James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

         Argued and Submitted November 7, 2023
                  Pasadena, California

                  Filed January 26, 2024

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, William A. Fletcher, and Ryan
                 D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.

              Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher
2                   HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE

                          SUMMARY *

    Statute of Limitations/Supplemental Jurisdiction
                         Statute

    Affirming the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims as barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, the panel held that the claims were not subject to
the tolling provision of the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1367.
    Adriana Holt and her children initially sued Orange
County and several deputy sheriffs in federal district court
(Holt I), alleging claims under section 1983 and California
state law based on an allegedly unlawful search and
arrest. When Holt I was filed, the statute of limitations had
not run on any of the claims. Holt and her children and
mother, Beatriz Lukens, were subsequently included as
individual plaintiffs in a separate putative class action
(Moon), which raised similar allegations. Holt and her
children then voluntarily dismissed Holt I. After the district
court dismissed the family’s claims from Moon for improper
joinder, they filed the present action (Holt II). The district
court dismissed their claims as time-barred, finding that the
limitations period was not tolled during the pendency of Holt
I and Moon.
    The panel concluded that plaintiffs’ claims were not
tolled and therefore were properly dismissed as
untimely. Section 1367 tolls the applicable statute of
limitations for a federal-law claim that is contained in the

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                  HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE                    3

same federal court complaint as a supplemental state-law
claim and that is “voluntarily dismissed at the same time as
or after the dismissal of the [supplemental] claim.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(d). But tolling is not available when the
supplemental claim is voluntarily dismissed, as happened in
Holt I. Therefore, the statute of limitations for Holt’s section
1983 claims was not tolled during the time those claims were
pending in Holt I and the claims were untimely when she
filed Holt II. Holt’s supplemental state-law claims were also
untimely.
    The panel next determined that tolling is not available
when a supplemental claim is dismissed for improper
joinder, as happened in Moon. Therefore, Lukens’ state-law
claims were not tolled during the time they were pending in
Moon.
    Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs’ state-law claims
were not tolled by a Covid-19 pandemic emergency tolling
order and rule because the limitations periods for those
claims lapsed before either the order or rule went into effect.

                         COUNSEL

Brenton W. Aitken Hands (argued) and Jerry L. Steering,
Law Offices of Jerry L. Steering, Newport Beach,
California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Aamir Raza (argued), Christina M. Sprenger, and Brenan J.
Shaw, Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi PC, Costa Mesa,
California, for Defendants-Appellees.
4                 HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE

                         OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

    Adriana Holt, her children Jacob and L.H., and her
mother Beatriz Lukens brought claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and California state law against Orange County and
several deputy sheriffs employed by the County based on an
allegedly unlawful search and arrest. The children’s claims
have been dismissed by stipulation. The question before us
is whether Holt’s and Lukens’s claims are barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations.
    Holt and her children (but not Lukens) initially sued the
County and the deputies in federal district court about a year
after the incident, in an action we will call Holt I. When Holt
I was filed, the statutes of limitations had not run on any of
their claims. After Holt, her children, and Lukens were
added to an amended complaint in a separate action, which
we will call Moon, Holt and her children voluntarily
dismissed Holt I. Holt’s, her children’s, and Lukens’s claims
were later dismissed from Moon for improper joinder. They
then filed the present action, which we will call Holt II. By
the time Holt II was filed, Holt’s and Lukens’s claims were
untimely unless the relevant statutes of limitations had been
tolled. The district court dismissed their claims as time-
barred.
    We conclude that Holt’s and Lukens’s claims were not
tolled and were properly dismissed as untimely. We
conclude that the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367, tolls the applicable statute of limitations for
a federal-law claim that is contained in the same federal
court complaint as a supplemental state-law claim and that
is “voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the
                  HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE                   5

dismissal of the [supplemental] claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
But tolling is not available when the supplemental claim is
voluntarily dismissed, as happened in Holt I. Nor is tolling
available when the supplemental claim is dismissed for
improper joinder, as happened in Moon. There is no
indication that Congress meant for § 1367 to abrogate the
longstanding principles that statutes of limitations are not
tolled during the pendency of an action that is voluntarily
dismissed or that is dismissed for improper joinder. We
therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Holt’s and
Lukens’s claims as time-barred.
                       I. Background
    We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting as true all plausible
factual allegations in the complaint. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th
964, 968 (9th Cir. 2021). “A claim may be dismissed as
untimely pursuant to a 12(b)(6) motion ‘only when the
running of the statute [of limitations] is apparent on the face
of the complaint.’” United States ex rel. Air Control Techs.,
Inc. v. Pre Con Indus., Inc., 720 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir.
2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Von Saher v. Norton
Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th
Cir. 2010)). The factual allegations relevant to our
disposition are all set forth in the second amended complaint
in Holt II.
    According to the operative complaint in Holt II, Adriana
Holt was in her car in the driveway of her house on January
2, 2018, when a group of Orange County deputy sheriffs
approached and told her to get out of the car. After
instructing Holt to remain outside her house, the deputies
entered and searched the house to investigate a series of
robberies they believed had been committed by Holt’s then-
6                 HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE

boyfriend. The deputies also searched a car belonging to
Holt’s older child.
    Holt’s children and her mother Beatriz Lukens were
detained inside the house. The deputies later brought Holt
into the house. The deputies told Holt they did not have a
search warrant. At least one of the deputies grabbed Holt
and put her arms behind her back, “resulting in bruising /
soft-tissue injury.” After searching the house, the deputies
took Holt to a sheriff’s department substation for
questioning. Holt was released several hours later.
    Holt and her children (but not Lukens) sued the County
and other defendants in federal district court on February 13,
2019. This action was Holt I. Holt and her children brought
§ 1983 claims alleging excessive force, unlawful search and
seizure, and unlawful arrest, as well as various California
state-law claims.
    On April 4, 2019, an amended complaint was filed in
Moon, a putative class action against the County. Holt, her
children, and Lukens were included in that amended
complaint as individual plaintiffs. Their allegations in Moon
were similar to those brought by Holt and her children in
Holt I. The amended complaint was stricken by the court in
Moon. It was re-filed in Moon on September 9, 2019, still
with Holt, her children, and Lukens as individual plaintiffs.
    On September 11, 2019, Holt voluntarily dismissed her
claims in Holt I without prejudice. On November 4, 2019,
the court in the Moon case dismissed the re-filed claims of
Holt, her children, and Lukens without prejudice for
improper joinder. Holt, her children, and Lukens reasserted
their claims in Moon in a second amended complaint. On
March 18, 2020, the court in Moon dismissed the claims of
Holt, her children, and Lukens, this time with prejudice, for
                  HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE                    7

improper joinder. The County has not argued to us that the
second dismissal precluded Holt, her children, and Lukens
from re-filing their claims in a different action. See Rotec
Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 348 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th
Cir. 2003) (claim preclusion is a waivable defense).
    On July 31, 2020, Holt, her children, and Lukens filed
the present action—Holt II—making the same allegations as
in Holt I, adding another § 1983 claim against the County,
and taking out a California state-law claim. The district
court in Holt II first dismissed the state-law claims as time-
barred. Holt, her children, and Lukens then amended their
complaint in Holt II so that it contained only their § 1983
claims. The district court dismissed the § 1983 claims as
time-barred, holding that the tolling provision of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(d) applied only to supplemental state-law claims
dismissed in the circumstances specified in § 1367(c).
Based on this interpretation of § 1367, the district court held
that the limitations period for Holt’s and Lukens’s § 1983
claims was not tolled during the pendency of Holt I or Moon
and that it had therefore expired before Holt II was filed. The
court also dismissed the additional claim included against
the County in Holt II for failure to state a claim, a ruling not
challenged on appeal.
    The parties stipulated to dismissal of Holt’s children’s
claims without prejudice. The district court then entered
judgment dismissing with prejudice Holt’s and Lukens’s
claims. This appeal by Holt and Lukens followed.
                        II. Discussion
             A. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
    Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 borrow the
forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury
8                  HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE

actions, as well as the state’s tolling rules, “except to the
extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law.”
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).
California’s two-year limitations period for personal injury
actions, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1, applies to Holt’s and
Lukens’s § 1983 claims.
     Absent tolling, the limitations period for Holt’s and
Lukens’s § 1983 claims expired on January 2, 2020. As
noted above, Holt II was filed more than six months later, on
July 31, 2020. Holt contends that § 1367(d) tolls the statute
of limitations for the periods during which her § 1983 claims
were pending in Holt I and Moon. Lukens contends that
§ 1367(d) tolls the statute of limitations for the period during
which her § 1983 claims were pending in Moon. If they are
entitled to tolling during the pendency of either case, their
§ 1983 claims in Holt II were timely filed.
    In 1990, Congress codified the supplemental jurisdiction
of federal courts over state-law claims that are “so related to
claims” filed in the district court’s original jurisdiction “that
they form part of the same case or controversy” as the claims
over which there is original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). The tolling provision of § 1367 reads:

        The period of limitations for any claim
        asserted under subsection (a), and for any
        other claim in the same action that is
        voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or
        after the dismissal of the claim under
        subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim
        is pending and for a period of 30 days after it
                      HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE                            9

         is dismissed unless State law provides for a
         longer tolling period.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (emphasis added).
    Because the tolling question presented by Moon is the
most straightforward, we address it first. Neither Holt’s nor
Lukens’s § 1983 claims were tolled for the time they were
pending in Moon. Their § 1983 claims in Moon were not
“voluntarily dismissed,” as § 1367(d) requires. They were
instead dismissed (twice) by the district court for improper
joinder. Lukens was not a party to Holt I. Lukens therefore
has no viable statutory argument for tolling her § 1983
claims.
     The question whether Holt’s § 1983 claims were tolled
by Holt I is more complex. Holt brought both supplemental
state-law claims and § 1983 claims in Holt I. All of her
claims in that action were voluntarily dismissed at the same
time. Holt contends that her supplemental state-law claims
in Holt I were “claim[s] asserted under subsection (a),” and
that her § 1983 claims were “other claim[s] in the same
action that [were] voluntarily dismissed at the same time
as . . . the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a).” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(d). She argues the § 1983 claims were thus
tolled during the pendency of Holt I. 1

1
  Whether § 1367(d) tolls federal-law claims when they are re-filed in
federal court, as opposed to state court, is an open question. The
Supreme Court’s leading cases interpreting § 1367(d), Raygor v. Regents
of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533 (2002), Jinks v. Richland
County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003), and Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S.
71 (2018), only addressed the availability of tolling for claims re-filed in
state court. We need not resolve that question today because we
conclude that the statute did not toll Holt’s and Lukens’s claims.
10                HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE

    We readily agree with Holt that federal-law claims like
her § 1983 claims in Holt I are “other claim[s]” within the
meaning of § 1367(d). We also readily agree that her § 1983
claims in Holt I were “voluntarily dismissed.”
    With these threshold issues resolved, we reach the key
question—whether Holt’s voluntary dismissal of her
supplemental state-law claims in Holt I was a “dismissal of
the claim[s] under subsection (a)” within the meaning of
§ 1367(d). If it was, she is entitled to tolling of her § 1983
claims. However, for the reasons that follow, we conclude
that the voluntary dismissal of supplemental state-law claims
is not a “dismissal” within the meaning of § 1367(d). That
is, voluntary dismissal of a supplemental state-law claim
does not trigger tolling under § 1367(d).
    In Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, the
Supreme Court interpreted the word “dismissal” in
§ 1367(d). 534 U.S. at 545. Raygor and a fellow employee
at the University of Minnesota had filed state-law claims
against the Regents of the University (an arm of the State) in
federal district court. Id. at 537. The court dismissed based
on the Regents’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. The
plaintiffs then re-filed in state court. Id. at 538. The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that tolling of the plaintiffs’
state-law claims under § 1367(d) was inconsistent with the
Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 539. The United States
Supreme Court agreed that the claims were not tolled, based
on a construction of § 1367(d) rather than based directly on
the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 545.
     The Court wrote in Raygor that § 1367(d) “occurs in the
context of a statute that specifically contemplates only a few
grounds for dismissal [in § 1367(a), (b), and (c)],” and that
“it is unclear if the tolling provision was meant to apply to
                  HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE                   11

dismissals for reasons unmentioned in the statute.” Id.
“[A]llowing federal law to extend the time period in which
a state sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts at least
affects the federal balance in an area that has been a historic
power of the States, whether or not it constitutes an
abrogation of state sovereign immunity.” Id. at 544.
Because reading § 1367(d) to toll the state statute of
limitations affected the “federal balance,” the Court required
a clear congressional statement of intent to apply the tolling
rules of § 1367(d) to an unconsented suit against a State. Id.
Even if § 1367(d) could be read to include Eleventh
Amendment immunity as a ground for dismissal (and
therefore tolling), there is no clear statement to that effect.
Id. at 545. Because there is no such clear statement, the
Court affirmed.
    Like the Court in Raygor, we are guided in our
interpretation of “dismissal” by background legal principles
against which Congress enacted § 1367. One such principle
is that a voluntary dismissal generally does not toll the
statute of limitations for the dismissed claims for the period
during which those claims were pending. Absent a statute to
the contrary, a voluntary dismissal “leaves the situation the
same as if the suit had never been brought in the first place.”
Humphreys v. United States, 272 F.2d 411, 412 (9th Cir.
1959). The plaintiff “cannot deduct from the period of the
statute of limitations applicable to his case” the time that the
voluntarily dismissed claims were pending. Id. at 412 n.1
(quoting 34 Am. Jur. Limitation of Actions § 281). This
principle is “well settled.” 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2367 (4th ed.
2023) (collecting cases). It is of sufficiently ancient vintage
that the Supreme Court considered it established law by the
12                 HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE

early nineteenth century. See Alexander v. Pendleton, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 462, 470 (1814).
    Adopting Holt’s reading of “dismissal” in § 1367(d) to
include voluntary dismissals would significantly pare back
the operation of the principle that the statute of limitations is
not tolled for a claim that is voluntarily dismissed. Under
Holt’s argument, tolling would be required for any action
that includes both federal and supplemental claims when the
plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action. We are unwilling
to conclude that § 1367(d) abrogated such an entrenched
legal rule absent a clear indication that Congress meant to do
so. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501
U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (“[W]here a common-law principle is
well established . . . courts may take it as given that Congress
has legislated with an expectation that the principle will
apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident.’” (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S.
779, 783 (1952))).
     There is no clear indication in § 1367 that Congress
intended to do so. Instead, each of the grounds for dismissal
listed in § 1367 requires some action by the district court.
Subsections (a) and (b) describe circumstances in which a
district court must dismiss supplemental claims—when the
claims do not “form part of the same case or controversy” as
the plaintiff’s federal claims, or when exercising jurisdiction
over the supplemental claims “would be inconsistent with
the jurisdictional requirements of” the statute codifying
federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction.           28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a), (b). Clearer still, the introductory words of
§ 1367(c) provide that “district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under
subsection (a).” Id. § 1367(c) (emphasis added). The words
“may decline” indicate that the district court must make an
                  HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE                  13

affirmative decision. The statute’s consistent requirement in
subsections (a), (b), and (c) that dismissal of supplemental
claims involve affirmative decisions by the district court
strongly suggests that “dismissal,” as used in § 1367(d), does
not encompass the voluntary dismissal of claims brought
under § 1367(a).
    Holt voluntarily dismissed her supplemental state-law
claims in Holt I. We therefore conclude that the statute of
limitations for Holt’s § 1983 claims was not tolled during the
time those claims were pending in Holt I, and that her § 1983
claims were untimely when she filed Holt II.
                    B. State-Law Claims
    Our reading of the word “dismissal” in § 1367(d) also
controls the disposition of Holt’s and Lukens’s supplemental
state-law claims. A supplemental claim is tolled by
§ 1367(d) “while the claim is pending and for a period of 30
days after it is dismissed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). Nothing in
the statute suggests that “dismissed” in the third clause of
§ 1367(d) means something different than “dismissal” in the
second clause. See Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A., 573 U.S.
302, 319–20 (2014) (unless context indicates otherwise,
“[o]ne ordinarily assumes ‘that identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning’” (quoting Env’t Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549
U.S. 561, 574 (2007))).
    The supplemental state-law claims in Holt I were
voluntarily dismissed along with the federal-law claims.
Consistent with our holding concerning the federal-law
claims, the supplemental claims in Holt I were also not tolled
during the pendency of that case. That makes Holt’s state-
law claims untimely. As the district court found, Holt had
only two days left on the statute of limitations for her state-
14                HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE

law claims when she filed Holt I. The limitations period on
those claims expired in February 2019, and the claims were
time-barred when they were re-filed in Holt II in July 2020.
    Lukens had 41 days left on the statute of limitations for
her state-law claims when she filed them in Moon. And as
discussed above, her supplemental claims were not
voluntarily dismissed from Moon; rather, they were
dismissed for improper joinder.
    But as with voluntary dismissals, it is well established
that dismissal of a party for improper joinder does not toll
the statute of limitations for the period that party’s claims
were pending before the dismissal.             See Elmore v.
Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1011–12 (7th Cir. 2000)
(collecting cases); Strandlund v. Hawley, 532 F.3d 741, 746
(8th Cir. 2008) (an action dismissed without prejudice under
Rule 21 “is treated for statute of limitations purposes as if it
had never been filed” (quoting Elmore, 227 F.3d at 1011)).
For that reason, our court and others have held that district
courts must “conduct a prejudice analysis” before dismissing
a party for misjoinder to avoid the unjust “loss of otherwise
timely claims if new suits are blocked by statutes of
limitations.” Rush v. Sport Chalet, Inc., 779 F.3d 973, 975
(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842,
846–47 (3d Cir. 2006)). To mitigate the risk that the claims
of improperly joined parties may be time-barred, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 21 states that “[m]isjoinder of
parties is not a ground for dismissing an action”; requires
district courts to dismiss parties for misjoinder only “on just
terms”; and grants district courts the power to sever
improperly joined claims instead of dismissing them. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. We conclude that § 1367(d) does not
abrogate this settled rule just as it does not abrogate the rule
that claims are not tolled by voluntary dismissals.
                  HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE                  15

    The district court did not conduct a prejudice analysis
before dismissing Lukens’s claims from Moon. But even if
it was error to dismiss without conducting such an analysis,
we agree with the Seventh Circuit that “waiving the statute
of limitations is not the proper remedy for an erroneous
dismissal. The proper remedy is appeal.” Elmore, 227 F.3d
at 1012. The deadline for Lukens to appeal her dismissal
from Moon has long passed.
    Holt and Lukens argue that their state-law claims were
nonetheless timely because they were tolled by an Orange
County Superior Court administrative order and California’s
Emergency Rule 9, which were issued in response to the
Covid-19 pandemic and tolled the statutes of limitations for
civil claims starting in March 2020. See Cal. R. Ct. app. I at
14. The administrative order and emergency rule do not help
Holt and Lukens. Because their claims were not tolled
during either Holt I or Moon, the limitations periods for their
state-law claims lapsed before either the order or rule went
into effect.
                    C. Equitable Tolling
    Finally, Holt and Lukens argue that even if § 1367(d) did
not toll their claims, the district court should have granted
equitable tolling because of Holt’s and Lukens’s good faith
efforts to assert them. The district court found that Holt and
Lukens did not pursue their claims in good faith. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in so finding. See Jones,
393 F.3d at 926.
                         Conclusion
   Section 1367(d) generally tolls the statute of limitations
for federal-law claims filed in the same action as
supplemental state-law claims and voluntarily dismissed at
16                HOLT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE

the same time as or after the district court acts affirmatively
to dismiss the supplemental claims. But the statute of
limitations is not tolled when the supplemental claims are
voluntarily dismissed, or when the supplemental claims are
dismissed for improper joinder.
     The district court’s judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.