Court Opinion

ID: 9372945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:43.337158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:47.458348
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     TIMOTHY M. JOEL,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        SF-0752-16-0058-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                          DATE: February 1, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Richard W. Stevens, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Chief Employment Law, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been id entified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner ’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.       Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to apply under Charges 2 and 4 the correct legal standard for a
     lack of candor charge, and to supplement the administrative judge ’s analysis of
     the appellant’s retaliation and race discrimination claims, we AFFIRM the initial
     decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant, a preference-eligible veteran, was employed as a GS-13
     Special Agent with the agency’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2. On June 18, 2015, the Unit Chief of Adjudication
     Unit I of the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) proposed the
     appellant’s removal following an agency Office of Inspector General (OIG)
     administrative inquiry into the appellant’s alleged conduct towards Y.K., a
     Korean national the appellant had met through his work on alien smuggling
     matters with the FBI and whom he aided in obtaining parole to remain in the
     United States. IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4e. The proposed removal was based on the
     following four charges: (1) failure to report—administrative; (2) lack of candor
     not under oath; (3) unprofessional conduct—off duty; and (4) lack of candor—
     under oath.   Id. at 3-5.   On September 24, 2015, the OPR Assistant Director
     issued a decision sustaining the proposed action and immediately removing the
     appellant from Federal service. Id., Subtab 4a.
¶3         The appellant timely filed a Board appeal challenging the agency’s removal
     action. IAF, Tab 1. In addition, he raised the following affirmative defenses:
     discrimination based on race, national origin, ethnicity, sex, and marital status;
     retaliation for prior protected equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity; due
     process violation; and harmful procedural error. IAF, Tabs 1, 85. Following a
     hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the agency’s
     action. IAF, Tab 90, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge found that,
     because the appellant is a preference-eligible veteran, the Board has jurisdiction
     over the appeal. ID at 1. The administrative judge found that the agency proved
     its four charges by a preponderance of the evidence and therefore he sustained the
     agency’s charges.    ID at 3-34.    Upon considering the appellant’s affirmative
     defenses, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that the
     agency violated his constitutional due process rights or committed harmful
     procedural error. ID at 34-39. In addition, the administrative judge determined
     that the appellant failed to establish his race, national origin, ethnicity, sex, EEO
     retaliation, and marital status discrimination claims. ID at 39-46. Finally, the
     administrative judge found that the agency established the nexus requirement and
     that the penalty of removal was reasonable under the circumstances. ID at 47-50.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 3. He raises the following arguments on review: (1) the administrative
     judge erred in sustaining the agency’s charges; (2) the administrative judge
     improperly denied his race discrimination and retaliation affirmative defenses; 2
     (3) the penalty of removal is excessive; and (4) the administrative judge abused
     his discretion in denying his motion for a subpoena. Id. The agency has filed a
     response to the appellant’s petition, and the appellant has filed a reply to the
     agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 7-8.

     2
      Because the appellant does not contest his remaining affirmative defenses, we do not
     consider them.
                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

     The administrative judge correctly sustained the agency’s charges.
           Charge 1: Failure to report—administrative
¶5         In support of this charge, the agency alleged that all FBI employees are
     required to submit a Roommate Form when they live with a roommate. IAF, Tab
     14, Subtab 4e at 4. The agency stated that, despite having lived with Y.K. for
     several months at a time on various occasions, the appellant had failed to file the
     required form. Id. The notice of proposed removal stated that the appellant’s
     actions violated FBI Offense Code 5.7, which prohibits employees from failing to
     inform appropriate FBI officials “about an administrative matter which the
     employee knew, or should have known, was required by FBI or [Department of
     Justice] regulation or policy to be reported.” Id. at 3-4.
¶6         Citing to Colston v. Department of the Army, 10 M.S.P.R. 158, 160 (1982),
     the appellant contends that the charge should not be sustained because the agency
     did not submit the text of the policy requiring the reporting of roommates into the
     record below. PFR File, Tab 3 at 13. Furthermore, he asserts that the way the
     regulation was paraphrased by the agency in the decision letter is unintelligible
     and ambiguous.     Id. at 13-14.   He also contends that his delay in filing the
     roommate form was due to his misunderstanding of the policy.         Id. at 14. In
     particular, he asserts that he waited to file the form after he had “been staying
     some nights with Y.K.” because he understood a roommate situati on to be
     long-term. Id. at 14-15. He further argues that the agency improperly charged
     him with never filing a roommate form, and that the agency’s charge should fail
     because the agency did not provide evidence of 30 days of consecutive
     cohabitation. Id. at 14-15.
¶7         The appellant’s arguments do not provide a basis for disturbing the
     administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved its charge.        Unlike in
     Colston, where the agency did not submit evidence of the specific procedures that
     the appellant in that case was charged with violating, the agency in this case
     presented sufficient evidence of its reporting policy to meet its burden of proving
     the charge. 3 Specifically, in the decision letter, the OPR Assistant Director noted
     that the “Cohabitant-Roommate Policy” requires that “anyone who has a
     roommate or cohabitant that the employee is sharing living quarters with for
     30 consecutive days or more must report at least 60 days in advance .”             IAF,
     Tab 14, Subtab 4a at 5.
¶8         Moreover, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the
     appellant failed to abide by the agency’s roommate reporting policy and that
     accordingly, he violated FBI Offense Code 5.7. Following a careful review of the
     testimonial and documentary evidence, the administrative judge found that the
     agency established by preponderant evidence that the appellant cohabitated or
     lived with Y.K. for the periods between July 2012 and October 2012, and
     February 2013 and March 2013. ID at 6-8. The administrative judge found that
     the appellant did not file a “roommate report” with the agency until
     October 2012, several months after first moving in with Y.K. in July 2 012. ID
     at 7-9. The administrative judge considered the appellant ’s argument that he did
     not live with Y.K. consecutively during this period and found that, while the

     3
       As previously noted, the appellant asserts that the way the regulation was paraphrased
     by the agency in the decision letter is unintelligible and ambiguous . PFR File, Tab 3
     at 13-14. To the extent the appellant is alleging that the agency violated his
     constitutional due process rights by not providing him with a copy of the agency ’s
     reporting policy on roommates with the notice of proposed removal, any such argument
     lacks merit. Fundamental due process requires that notice of char ges against an
     employee be sufficiently detailed to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
     Mason v. Department of the Navy, 70 M.S.P.R. 584, 586 (1996). As set forth above, the
     notice of proposed removal clearly notified the appellant that the agency was charging
     him with violating its roommate reporting policy. In addition, the appellant provided a
     written response in which he defended himself against the charge and alleged that he
     had, in fact, filed a roommate report. IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4d at 2 ; see Yinat v.
     Department of the Army, 101 M.S.P.R. 328, 333 (2005) (determining that, when an
     appellant comes forward and refutes a charge made against him, the Board cannot find
     that he was not given notice of the charge). Thus, the appellant has not shown that the
     agency violated his constitutional due process rights by failing to provide hi m with a
     copy of its roommate reporting policy.
      appellant may have left Y.K.’s apartment at least one night per week, his
      testimony established that he lived in Y.K.’s apartment throughout these periods
      while paying her rent. ID at 9.
¶9         The appellant’s alleged misunderstanding of the meaning of “roommate”
      does not provide grounds for disturbing the administrative judge ’s decision to
      sustain the charge. The appellant does not allege that he was not aware of the
      agency’s roommate reporting policy and we agree with the administrative judge’s
      well-reasoned finding that, as a Special Agent with the FBI, the appellant knew or
      should have known that he was required to report that he was living with Y.K. ID
      at 10; see Micali v. Department of the Treasury, 56 M.S.P.R. 127, 131 (1992)
      (sustaining the appellant’s removal based on a charge of failure to report his
      spouse’s income on his Federal tax returns when the appellant had knowledge of
      the relevant reporting requirement), aff’d, 11 F.3d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Table).
¶10        The appellant is correct that the agency stated in the notice of proposed
      removal that he did not file a Roommate Form. IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4e at 4. As
      previously noted, the administrative judge found that the appellant did file such a
      form in October 2012. ID at 8. However, an agency need only prove the essence
      of its charge and need not prove every factual specification. Hicks v. Department
      of the Treasury, 62 M.S.P.R. 71, 74 (1994), aff’d, 48 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
      (Table). We find that the agency has established the essence of its charge here.
      Based on the foregoing, we find that the administrative judge correctly sustained
      Charge 1.

            Charge 2: Lack of candor not under oath
¶11        In support of charge 2, the agency provided the following narrative:
            [y]ou knowingly provided false information when you told a
            [Department of Homeland Security (DHS)] agent that you did not
            know where Y.K. was or where she was living. You knew where she
            lived, and in fact, she had spent the night at your apartment when
            you received the call. You also failed to be fully forthright when
            you purposely provided an old phone number for Y.K., and
            concealed the material information that you knew her new number.
      IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4e at 4.      The agency stated that the appellant ’s actions
      violated FBI Offense Code 2.5, which prohibits an employee from “[k]nowingly
      providing false information when making a verbal or written statement, not under
      oath . . . when the employee is questioned about his conduct or the conduct of
      another person.” Id.
¶12        In Fargnoli v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 330 (2016), the
      Board clarified the correct legal standard for a lack of candor charge. Relying on
      Federal Circuit and Board precedent, the Board held that lack of candor requires
      proof of the following elements:       (1) that the employee gave incorrect or
      incomplete information; and (2) that he did so knowingly.          Id., ¶ 17.   The
      administrative judge did not apply Fargnoli in assessing this charge, and he stated
      that the allegation in the specification that the appellant knowingly provided false
      information appears to reflect the elements of a charge other than a lack of c andor
      charge. ID at 11. We therefore modify the initial decision to reflect the proper
      legal standard under Fargnoli for analyzing a lack of candor charge. However,
      the administrative judge nonetheless made findings regarding the requisite
      elements of proof. He found that the language of FBI Offense Code 2.5, which
      was cited within the charge, prohibited employees from knowingly providing
      false information.   Id. He then went on to make comprehensive findings and
      credibility determinations regarding the issue of whether the appellant knowingly
      provided incomplete information. ID at 13-20. Thus, because the administrative
      judge made comprehensive credibility determinations and findings regarding this
      issue, his failure to rely on Fargnoli when assessing the agency’s charge does not
      provide a basis for remanding the initial decision. Cf. Fargnoli, 123 M.S.P.R.
      330, ¶ 18 (remanding for further analysis on the lack of candor charge when the
      administrative judge made no findings as to whether the appellant knowingly
      gave incorrect or incomplete information).
¶13        The appellant contends on review that the agency’s charge should not be
      sustained because the DHS agent questioned him about what he knew, whereas
      the agency charged him under FBI Offense Code 2.5 with providing incorrect
      information regarding his and Y.K.’s conduct. PFR File, Tab 3 at 16-25. The
      appellant further asserts that FBI Offense Code 2.5 requires that he know that the
      individual asking him questions is a DHS agent, but that he did not. Id. at 25-26.
¶14         The administrative judge considered these arguments below, and found
      them to be unavailing. He noted that the DHS agent was attempting to serve a
      subpoena on Y.K., and that she called the appellant to seek information about the
      whereabouts of Y.K. from the appellant because he had aided in her obtaining
      parole.   ID at 12-13.     Because the DHS caller sought information about the
      movement of Y.K. from the appellant, the DHS agent’s questions necessarily
      sought information about the conduct of both Y.K. and the appellant. Id. We
      agree with this finding.      While the DHS agent may have sought information
      regarding what the appellant knew about Y.K.’s conduct, her questions related to
      the conduct of Y.K. and the appellant all the same; the appellant ’s attempts to
      distinguish knowledge from conduct in an effort to render FBI Offense Code 2.5
      inapplicable to the charge are frivolous.
¶15         Furthermore, by applying the factors set forth in Hillen v. Department of the
      Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), 4 the administrative judge found the
      appellant’s assertion that he did not know that he was being questioned by a DHS
      agent to lack credibility. ID at 15. In particular, the administrative judge found
      the appellant’s version of events to be inconsistent with his own testimony and

      4
        In Hillen, the Board articulated factors to consider in resolving credibility issues. The
      Board held that, to resolve credibility issues, an administrative judge must identify the
      factual questions in dispute, summarize the evidence on each disputed question, state
      which version he believes, and explain in detail why he found the chosen version more
      credible, considering such factors as: (1) the witness’s opportunity and capacity to
      observe the event or act in question; (2) the witness’s character; (3) any prior
      inconsistent statement by the witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or lack of bias; (5) the
      contradiction of the witness’s version of events by other evidence or its consistency
      with other evidence; (6) the inherent improbability of the witness’s version of events;
      and (7) the witness’s demeanor. Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453,
      458 (1987).
      with the record evidence, and to be inherently improbable.         ID at 14-15.    For
      example, the administrative judge cited to the transcript of the telephone call
      between the appellant and the DHS agent, during which the DHS agent stated she
      was investigating a DHS matter multiple times and during which the appellant
      discussed at length his actions to obtain parole for Y.K. and his living
      arrangement with her. ID at 13-14; IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4m. The administrative
      judge noted that the appellant’s decision to discuss these matters indicated that he
      was aware that he was communicating with another Government agent about Y.K.
      ID at 14.     The Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations when, as here, they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on
      observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing, and may overturn
      such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.
      Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We find
      that the appellant has not proffered sufficiently sound reasons to set aside the
      administrative judge’s credibility finding regarding this issue.
¶16         Moreover, the administrative judge found, and the record reflects, that the
      appellant did not provide the DHS agent with Y.K. ’s current phone number when
      asked. ID at 15; IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4m. Instead, he stated that he only had an
      old phone number for her and that he did not know if it still worked.             IAF,
      Tab 14, Subtab 4m at 10. The appellant also denied knowing where Y.K. lived.
      Id. at 6. The administrative judge found that the appellant knowingly conc ealed
      or omitted material information when he told the DHS agent that he did not have
      Y.K.’s current phone number because he testified that he had Y.K. ’s new phone
      number on his phone. ID at 16-17; Hearing Transcript (HT) at 441 (testimony of
      the appellant). Further, citing to the appellant’s testimony that Y.K. had stayed
      with him the night before, the administrative judge found that the agency proved
      the factual portion of the specification stating that the appellant knew where Y.K.
      was living and that Y.K. had spent the night with him. ID at 18; HT at 409
      (testimony of the appellant). The administrative judge noted that the appellant
      testified that Y.K. was living in a particular apartment complex when not living
      with the appellant.       ID at 18-19; HT at 409 (testimony of the appellant).
      Accordingly, the administrative judge found that the appellant knowingly
      concealed false information from the DHS agent regarding where Y.K. lived. ID
      at 19.
¶17            We discern no basis for disturbing the administrative judg e’s well-reasoned
      and supported findings that the appellant knowingly provided false information to
      the DHS agent, thereby violating FBI Offense Code 2.5. The agency, therefore,
      established the requisite elements of proof for its lack of candor charge.       See
      Fargnoli, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 17.        Based on the foregoing, we find that the
      administrative judge properly sustained Charge 2.

               Charge 3: Unprofessional conduct—off duty
¶18            The agency provided the following narrative in support of charge 3 :
               You were admonished several times by the DHS agent not to
               mention the telephone call or the subpoena to Y.K. However, you
               immediately returned to your apartment and informed Y.K. of the
               call. You then advised her to depart the United States. You
               intentionally attempted to interfere with official government action,
               both when you told Y.K. about the call and when you told her to
               return to her home country. As an FBI agent, your conduct
               discredits the FBI and seriously calls into question your judgement
               and character.
      IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4e at 4.        The agency stated that the appellant ’s actions
      violated FBI Offense Code 5.21, which prohibits employees from engaging in
      off-duty conduct that dishonors the FBI or calls into question the character of the
      employee. Id.
¶19            A charge of unprofessional conduct has no specific elements of proof; it is
      established by providing that the employee committed the acts alleged in support
      of the broad label.         See Canada v. Department of Homeland Security,
      113 M.S.P.R. 509, ¶ 9 (2010) (noting that a charge of improper conduct has no
      specific elements of proof). We agree with the administrative judge’s finding that
      the appellant engaged in the charged misconduct. As noted by the administrative
      judge, the record reflects that the DHS agent instructed the appellant to not
      mention the telephone call or subpoena to Y.K. ID at 21 ; IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4m
      at 21. The appellant testified that, following the call with the DHS agent, he met
      with Y.K. to explain to her what a subpoena was. HT at 422 (testimony of the
      appellant). Citing to Hillen, the administrative judge found that, to the extent the
      appellant was alleging that he did not discuss the subpoena matter with Y.K. as
      alleged, but rather, sought to educate her in general about subpoenas, any such
      explanation lacked credibility. ID at 23. We discern no basis for disturbing this
      credibility determination on review.       See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service,
      74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (stating that the Board will defer to the credibility
      findings of the administrative judge and will not grant a petition for review based
      on a party’s mere disagreement with those findings).
¶20          The appellant contends on review that the charge cannot be sustained
      because it requires proof that he disobeyed a direct order—that of the DHS
      agent—and that he did not have a duty to obey directives by non-FBI personnel.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 27-29.       The appellant argues that the charge cannot be
      sustained unless his conduct was wrongful in some way, which it was not because
      he had no duty to follow the DHS agent’s instructions. Id. at 29.
¶21          The appellant’s argument does not provide a basis for disturbing the initial
      decision. Nothing in law or regulation requires an agency to affix a label to a
      charge of misconduct, and an agency may simply describe actions that constitute
      misbehavior in narrative form and have its discipline sustained if the efficiency of
      the service suffers because of the misconduct. See Canada, 113 M.S.P.R. 509,
      ¶ 9.   Here, the agency charged the appellant not with violating an order or
      instruction, but rather with unprofessional conduct.      As set forth above, the
      agency proved that the appellant engaged in the charged misconduct. Moreover,
      by citing to FBI Offense Code 5.21, the agency alleged that the charged
      misconduct constituted misbehavior because it dishonored the FBI and called into
      question the appellant’s judgment and character.          We agree with the
      administrative judge’s finding that the agency showed by preponderant evidence
      that the sustained portions of the specification violated FBI Offense Code 5.21.
      ID at 25. Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge correctly sustained
      Charge 3.

            Charge 4: Lack of candor—under oath
¶22         The agency provided the following narrative in support of this fourth
      charge:
            During an interview under oath, you told the OIG you had occasional
            contact with Y.K. from 2009 to 2011, but you concealed the full
            extent of your contacts with her. Phone and text message records
            indicated that from 2009 to 2011, you were in frequent contact with
            Y.K., calling her multiple times per week and exchanging numerous
            text messages.
            You also failed to be fully forthright when you were questioned
            about how Y.K. paid her rent and expenses. You ass erted her
            parents sent her money, and you also believed she had a boyfriend
            who assisted with the expenses. You also stated your only monetary
            contribution was half the monthly rent for the apartment you shared.
            However, between 2009 and 2013, you provided Y.K. with regular
            cash payments from your personal bank account totaling nearly
            $20,000.      Further, Y.K. told OIG investigators that in
            September 2011, she was unable to work because she was sick, so
            you had given her some money.
            You knowingly provided false information when you told OIG
            investigators that you and Y.K. had rented separate apartments after
            March 2013. However, the two of you continued to live together for
            three to four months.
      IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4e at 5. The agency stated that the app ellant’s misconduct
      violated FBI Offense Code 2.6, which prohibits an employee from “[k]nowingly
      providing false information in a verbal or written statement made under oath.”
      Id.
¶23         The deciding official, however, did not sustain all of the charged
      misconduct underlying Charge 4 in the proposal notice. IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4a
      at 8 n.5. Rather, she only sustained the second paragraph of the charge stating
      that the appellant failed to be fully forthright when questioned about how Y.K.
      paid her rent and expenses. Id. at 7-8.
¶24        As set forth above, a lack of candor charge requires proof of the following
      elements: (1) that the employee gave incorrect or incomplete information; an d
      (2) that he did so knowingly.      Fargnoli, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 17.       As with
      Charge 2, the administrative judge did not apply Fargnoli when assessing
      whether the agency met its burden of proof under the charge.         Therefore, we
      modify the initial decision to reflect the correct legal standard under Fargnoli as
      to Charge 4. However, as he did for Charge 2, the administrative judge made
      comprehensive findings and credibility determinations regarding the elements of
      proof that comprise a lack of candor charge in sustaining the charge.
¶25        In particular, following a careful review of the documentary and testimonial
      evidence, the administrative judge found that the appellant concealed or omitted
      financial information when questioned under oath by the OIG about how Y.K.
      paid her rent and expenses. ID at 32. The administrative judge found that, while
      the agency failed to adequately explain its calculations regarding its $20,000
      total, the appellant already had transferred $29,451 to Y.K. when he was
      questioned by the OIG on February 28, 2013.         ID at 33 -34.    Moreover, the
      administrative judge found that the appellant failed to be fully forthright by not
      disclosing these monetary amounts to the OIG.        ID at 34.      In addition, the
      administrative judge found that the appellant knowingly concealed financial
      information, and that accordingly, the agency established that he violated FBI
      Offense Code 2.6. Id.
¶26        On review, the appellant appears to argue that the administrative judge
      improperly found that he knowingly failed to be forthright.      PFR File, Tab 3
      at 32-33.   He argues that his answers were correct within the context of the
      interview, and that he did not understand that the OIG was seeking information on
      all the funds he had provided Y.K. Id. at 33.
¶27         In finding that the appellant knowingly failed to be forthright in his answers
      to the OIG, the administrative judge considered the appellant ’s assertion that his
      answers to the OIG were based on a misunderstanding. ID at 32 -33. Relying on
      the factors set forth in Hillen, including demeanor-based evidence, the
      administrative judge found the appellant’s version of events to be lacking in
      credibility.   ID at 33.   The appellant has not provided a sound reason for
      disturbing these demeanor-based credibility findings on review.         See Haebe,
      288 F.3d at 1301.    Thus, we agree with the administrative judge’s decision to
      sustain Charge 4.

      The administrative judge properly denied the appellant ’s race discrimination and
      retaliation affirmative defenses.
¶28         In analyzing the appellant’s race discrimination and retaliation claims, the
      administrative judge identified the legal standards set forth in Savage v.
      Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612 (2015), overruled in part by Pridgen
      v. Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25.              ID at 39-41.
      When the administrative judge issued the initial decision, he did not have the
      benefit of the Board’s decision in Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      123 M.S.P.R. 647 (2016), clarified by Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-24.           In
      Gardner, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 30, the Board clarified that Savage does not require
      administrative judges to separate “direct” from “indirect” evidence.
¶29         Here, as in Gardner, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 31, the administrative judge
      discussed the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, but there is
      no allegation that he disregarded any evidence because it was not direct or
      circumstantial.     Moreover, we find that the administrative judge properly
      considered the documentary and testimonial evidence as a whole in determining
      that the appellant failed to establish he was discriminated against because of his
      Korean heritage or retaliated against for prior protected activity (filing a
      complaint with the Ombudsman). Specifically, the administrative judge carefully
      considered whether there was relevant comparator evidence and found that the
      appellant presented no evidence that individuals outside of his race and/or
      individuals who have not contacted the Ombudsman were treated more favorably
      by the FBI. ID at 42. In addition, he found that there was nothing to suggest the
      existence of suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, behavior
      toward or comments directed at other employees in the protected group, and other
      bits and pieces of evidence from which an inference of discriminatory intent
      might be drawn, even when considered with the appellant’s unsupported
      allegations. ID at 45. Moreover, the administrative judge found there was no
      reason to believe the agency’s stated reason for the removal action was pretextual
      given, inter alia, that all of the agency’s charges were sustained. ID at 46. The
      administrative judge concluded that the appellant failed to establish these
      affirmative defenses. Id.
¶30         The appellant challenges these findings on review, alleging that the
      administrative judge disregarded evidence of temporal proximity.             PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 37-39. We find the appellant’s argument constitutes mere disagreement
      with the administrative judge’s well-supported findings regarding the appellant’s
      race discrimination and retaliation claims, and that his allegation does not provide
      a basis for disturbing these findings.      We therefore affirm the administrative
      judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to prove these affirmative defenses. 5

      The appellant failed to show that the administrative judge abused his discretion
      by denying the appellant’s motion for a subpoena.
¶31         Administrative judges have broad discretion in regulating discovery, and,
      absent a showing that the administrative judge abused his discretion, the Board
      will not find reversible error. Vores v. Department of the Army, 109 M.S.P.R.
      191, ¶ 14 (2008), aff’d, 324 F. App’x 883 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A party may request a

      5
        Because we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to meet
      his initial burden to prove that race or retaliation for EEO activity were motivating
      factors in the agency’s actions, we need not resolve the issue of whether the appel lant
      proved that discrimination or retaliation was a “but-for” cause of the agency’s
      decisions. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33.
      subpoena to obtain the testimony of a witness and the Board has the authority to
      issue a subpoena requiring the witness’s attendance. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.81(a). A
      subpoena request must “be supported by a showing that the evidence sought is
      directly material to the issues involved in the appeal.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.81(c).
¶32        The appellant contends on review that the administrative judge abused his
      discretion by denying his motion to subpoena R.R. for a deposition. PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 35-37. He argues that R.R. was involved in the underlying investigation
      and in his removal because R.R. sent an email regarding the appellant to the
      Human Resources Department (HRD), instead of the Security Division. Id. at 36.
      He further contends that R.R.’s testimony was relevant to his race discrimination
      claim because he attacked the appellant’s Korean culture. Id. at 35.
¶33        Following a careful review of the evidence, the administrative judge found
      that the appellant failed to meet his burden under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.81(c). IAF,
      Tab 39 at 3-4. The administrative judge considered the appellant’s argument that
      R.R. may have initiated the underlying investigation because he told the appellant
      that this case was being referred to HRD instead of to the Security Division. Id.
      at 3. The administrative judge further considered R.R.’s proffered testimony as it
      referred to the appellant’s affirmative defenses, and found it to not be directly
      material.   Id.   We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the
      appellant failed to meet the standard under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.81(c); thus, we find
      that the appellant has failed to show that the administrative judge abused his
      discretion in denying the motion to subpoena R.R.

      The administrative judge correctly found that the agency established the nexus
      requirement and that the penalty of removal was reasonable under the
      circumstances.
¶34        The nexus requirement, for purposes of determining whether an agency has
      shown that its action promotes the efficiency of the service, means there must be
      a clear and direct relationship between the articulated grounds for an adverse
      action and either the employee’s ability to accomplish his duties satisfactorily or
      some other legitimate Government interest. Scheffler v. Department of the Army,
      117 M.S.P.R. 499, ¶ 9 (2012), aff’d, 522 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The
      Board has found that there is a sufficient nexus between an employee ’s
      misconduct and the efficiency of the service when the sustained misconduct
      concerned an employee’s lack of candor during an administrative inquiry.
      Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 56, ¶ 28 (2000), aff’d, 278 F.3d
      1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Likewise, our reviewing court and the Board have found
      that a sufficient nexus exists when certain types of unprofessional off-duty
      conduct undermine the necessary trust and confidence in the agency’s missi on.
      Brown v. Department of the Navy, 229 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming the
      Board’s determination that the agency established a nexus be tween the appellant’s
      misconduct of having an adulterous affair with the wife of a Marine while he was
      deployed overseas, given the appellant’s managerial position in an office
      responsible for providing support to Marine families, including families of
      Marines deployed overseas; the appellant’s misconduct undermined the necessary
      trust and confidence of the agency’s mission, especially given that the wife of a
      deployed Marine was a member of a unit that the appellant was directly
      responsible for supporting; the court further agreed that removal was warranted
      under the circumstances). We therefore find that the agency has met the nexus
      requirement here.
¶35        When, as here, the agency’s charges have been sustained, the Board will
      review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all
      of the relevant Douglas factors and exercised management discretion within
      tolerable limits of reasonableness. 6       Portner v. Department of Justice,
      119 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Singh v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 17. In determining whether the selected penalty

      6
        In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board
      articulated a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to the penalty determination in
      adverse actions.
      is reasonable, the Board gives due deference to the agency’s discretion in
      exercising its managerial function of maintaining employee discipline and
      efficiency. Portner, 119 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10. The Board will modify a penalty
      only when it finds that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or that the
      penalty the agency imposed clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. Id.
      However, if the deciding official failed to appropriately consider the relevant
      factors, the Board need not defer to the agency’s penalty determination. Id.
¶36          The appellant contends on review that the penalty of removal is excessive.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 34. He alleges that, contrary to the administrative judge’s
      finding, he disclosed that he was sharing a space with Y.K. Id. He also asserts
      that the penalty is inconsistent with the agency’s table of penalties. Id.
¶37          The appellant’s arguments do not provide a basis for disturbing the
      administrative judge’s finding that the deciding official considered all of the
      relevant Douglas factors and exercised management discretion within tolerable
      limits of reasonableness. In upholding the proposed penalty, the deciding official
      considered the nature and seriousness of the misconduct and its relationship to the
      appellant’s position as an FBI agent.     IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4a; see Gaines v.
      Department of the Air Force, 94 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶ 9 (2003) (holding that in
      evaluating a penalty, the Board will consider, first and foremost, the nature and
      seriousness of the misconduct and its relationship to the employee ’s duties,
      position, and responsibilities). Law enforcement officers, like the appellant, are
      held to a higher standard of honesty and integrity.      Prather v. Department of
      Justice, 117 M.S.P.R. 137, ¶ 36 (2011). The deciding official recognized that the
      appellant acknowledged during his oral response that he was at fault for not filing
      a roommate report in a timely manner, but determined that, despite the appellant’s
      acceptance of responsibility, the fact remains that he continued to act in an
      obstructive manner during the OIG investigation. IAF, Tab 14, Subtab 4a at 9
      n.6.   She further determined that the penalty imposed was consistent with
      corresponding agency offense codes. Id. at 8. She also considered mitigating
factors, such as the appellant’s successful ratings, service with the FBI, and the
stress he was under due to separation from family, but found these factors to be
outweighed by the seriousness of the sustained misconduct. HT at 227-29, 234
(testimony of the deciding official).      In light of the above, we find that the
penalty of removal is reasonable under the circumstances of this case.              See
Kamahele v. Department of Homeland Security, 108 M.S.P.R. 666, ¶¶ 2, 15
(2008) (finding that the removal penalty was reasonable when the appellant
demonstrated lack of candor and inappropriate conduct); Dunn v. Department of
the Air Force, 96 M.S.P.R. 166, ¶¶ 2, 12-18 (2004) (determining that removal was
reasonable when the employee engaged in conduct unbecoming and exhibited a
lack of candor), aff’d, 139 F. App’x 280 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appro priate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.

7
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this d ecision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 8   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.