Court Opinion

ID: 9391152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 09:08:52.310623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.661815
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________
           No. 02-22-00189-CV
      ___________________________

        In the Interest of S.W., a Child

   On Appeal from the 360th District Court
           Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 360-677800-20

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
   Concurring Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Father1 appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary

judgment filed by Little Flower Adoptions. In one issue with two subissues, Father

argues that the trial court erred by granting the motion for summary judgment.

Because we hold that the trial court did not err by granting the motion for summary

judgment, we will affirm.

                                I. BACKGROUND

A. Prior Proceedings

      S.W. was born on October 5, 2019. S.W.’s mother (Mother) signed an affidavit

voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights to S.W and placed the child for adoption

with Little Flower. Little Flower brought suit to terminate Mother’s parental rights

and the parental rights of the unknown biological father.

      Just over a month after S.W.’s birth, on November 8, 2019, the trial court

signed an order terminating the parental rights of Mother and the child’s biological

father2 to S.W. and naming Little Flower as managing conservator of S.W.3

      1
        Father claims to be the biological father of the child S.W. We refer to him as
Father to protect the minor’s identity. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2); Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 109.002(d); In re J.P., 598 S.W.3d 789, 791 n.1 (Tex. App — Fort Worth 2020,
pets. denied).
      2
        The trial court found that Father had not registered with the paternity registry
within the time prescribed by law under Chapter 160 of the Texas Family Code.
      3
       Mother and Father filed a restricted appeal from the order terminating their
parental rights to S.W. This Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating

                                           2
Approximately one month after that—on December 16, 2019—Mother and Father

filed a suit affecting the parent—child relationship (SAPCR) asking to be named joint

managing conservators of S.W. The disposition of the SAPCR suit filed by Mother

and Father is not clear from the record before us.

      Two months later—on February 24, 2020—Mother filed a bill of review

seeking to set aside the trial court’s order of termination, and then on June 2, 2020,

Mother and Father filed a Joint Amended Petition for Bill of Review seeking the same

relief. Little Flower filed a motion for summary judgment that the trial court granted

as to both Mother and Father. Mother and Father appealed, and this Court affirmed

the summary judgment as to Mother but reversed the summary judgment as to Father.

In re S.W., No. 02-20-00160-CV, 2021 WL 4783153 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 14,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). We held that Little Flower carried its summary judgment

burden as to Mother by conclusively showing Mother’s negligence in that she failed to

exercise due diligence in pursuing all legal remedies. Id. at *4. But because Father was

never made a party to the termination suit, we held that his failure to file a motion for

new trial could not be counted against him as neglect, and we remanded to the trial

court for development of Father’s remaining arguments. Id. at *5–6.

Mother’s parental rights and dismissed Father’s appeal for want of jurisdiction. In re
S.W., 614 S.W.3d 311 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, no pet.).

                                           3
B. This Proceeding

      After this Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as to

Father, Little Flower again filed a traditional motion for summary judgment

addressing Father’s remaining claims. In its motion, Little Flower argued that Father

did not plead and prove a meritorious defense to set aside the trial court’s judgment,

addressing all four grounds that Father claimed established a meritorious defense:

(1) Father’s due process rights were violated because he was entitled to notice and

service, (2) Little Flower never searched the Texas Acknowledgement of Paternity

Registry4, (3) Little Flower purposefully left Father out of the termination

proceedings, and (4) Little Flower did not have standing.

      First, Little Flower argued that Father was not entitled to notice of the

underlying termination proceedings because he failed to register with the paternity

registry. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 160.402(b), 160.404, 161.002(b)(3). Second,

Little Flower attached as summary judgment evidence the certificate of paternity

search filed in the underlying termination proceedings to negate Father’s argument

that Little Flower did not conduct a search of the paternity registry. Third, Little

Flower argued that any alleged misconduct on its part did not relieve Father of his

obligation to register with the paternity registry. Finally, Little Flower cited Section

      The relevant statutes for the paternity registry are located in Family Code
      4

Chapter 160, Subchapter E.

                                           4
102.003(a)(7) of the Family Code to prove its standing to file suit. See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 102.003(a)(7).

      Father responded to the summary judgment motion twofold. He argued that

he had a meritorious defense but was prevented from asserting it due to fraud on the

part of Little Flower.      Father further argued that Little Flower violated his

constitutional right to assert his parental rights under both the Texas Constitution and

the United States Constitution. Father attached as summary judgment evidence his

own affidavit, the affidavit of Mother, screen shots of text messages between Mother

and Little Flower, and several court filings.

      After a hearing, the trial court granted the summary judgment motion of Little

Flower “in its entirety” and ordered that Father take nothing by his suit. This appeal

followed.

                                  II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

      When, as here, a bill of review is disposed of through summary judgment, we

review the case de novo under the summary judgment standard. Mandel v. Lewisville

Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied); see In re

Child, 492 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied). We consider

the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting

evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding

evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann

                                            5
Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We

indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.

20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). A defendant that conclusively

negates at least one essential element of a plaintiff’s cause of action is entitled to

summary judgment on that claim. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508

(Tex. 2010); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(b), (c). If the movant does not satisfy its initial

burden, the burden does not shift to the nonmovant, and the nonmovant need not

respond or present any evidence. Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437

S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014); S.W., 2021 WL 4783153 at *2.

      A bill of review is an equitable proceeding brought by a party seeking to set

aside a prior judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for a new

trial or direct appeal. Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enters., Inc., 369 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex.

2012). “Courts narrowly construe the grounds on which a plaintiff may obtain a bill

of review due to Texas’s fundamental public policy favoring the finality of

judgments.” Id. Ordinarily, a bill-of-review plaintiff must plead and prove “(1) a

meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaintiff[ ] [was]

prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party

or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on [her] own part.” Id. If

he was not served and was entitled to service, then he is relieved from showing a

meritorious defense, he is not required to show his opponent’s fraud, accident, or

wrongful act prevented him from presenting such a defense, and his own want of

                                           6
fault of negligence is established. Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998).

A summary judgment will be granted against the bill of review petitioner if the

summary judgment movant can establish the absence of any of the three elements of

the bill of review. See Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 311-312 (Tex. 1984); see

also In re Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3d 904, 909 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied).

B. Applicable Law

      The Family Code provides a statutory mechanism to protect a man’s right to

notice of certain legal proceedings involving a child that he may have fathered. Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 160.402. Specifically, Section 160.402(a) affords to a man who has

registered with the Texas Paternity Registry within 31 days of the child’s birth5 the

right to be notified of any proceeding involving the adoption of the child, or the

termination of parental rights regarding the child, that he may have fathered.6

      The alleged father may register before the birth of the child as well. Tex. Fam.
      5

Code Ann. § 160.402(a)(1).
      6
       The Family Code provides that:

      (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a man who desires to be
      notified of a proceeding for the adoption of or the termination of
      parental rights regarding a child that he may have fathered may register
      with the registry of paternity:
             (1) before the birth of the child; or
             (2) not later than the 31st day after the date of the birth of the
             child.
      Tex. Fam. Code Ann § 160.402(a).

                                           7
       On the other hand, if an alleged father has not registered with the paternity

registry in compliance with Section 160.402(a), he is not entitled to notice of adoption

or parental termination proceedings.7 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.002(b)(3), (c-1).

The Family Code imposes no obligation on the mother, an adoption agency, or

anyone else, to identify or locate an alleged father who has not registered with the

paternity registry. On its face, this statutory scheme applies to all men who “may have

fathered” a child, whether or not they are aware of the mother’s pregnancy or the

birth of the child.

C. Meritorious Defense

       In his first subissue, Father argues that he has a “meritorious defense in that

but for the intentional collusion to commit fraud between [Little Flower] and

[Mother], [Father] would have been able to register with the paternity registry and/or

intervene in the underlying termination proceedings so that he could have asserted his

parental rights in the required statutory timeframe.”

       Although there is some evidence to the contrary, Father claims that he did not

learn of S.W.’s birth until December 7, 2019, twenty-nine days after his rights had

already been terminated. And it is undisputed that at that point, Father had neither

registered with the registry of paternity, nor had he commenced a proceeding to

       The Family Code provides two exceptions. If a father-child relationship has
       7

been established by law, or if the alleged father has commenced a proceeding to
adjudicate his paternity prior to the termination of his rights, he is entitled to notice of
adoption or parental termination proceedings. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.402(b).

                                             8
adjudicate his paternity.8 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.402(a)(b). Thus, the right to

notice that would have been afforded to him under Section 160.402(a) and (b) was

never triggered.

      But Father argues he was denied the benefits of Section 160.402(a) and (b) due

to collusion between Mother and Little Flower. In support of his argument, Father

relies on the summary judgment evidence from Mother’s affidavit wherein she stated

that she provided Father’s name and address to Little Flower and that Little Flower

instructed her not to include Father’s name on the birth certificate. Father also points

to the summary judgment evidence of screen shot images of text messages between

Mother and Little Flower, one of which included a message from Little Flower to

Mother instructing her to “leave the father info blank otherwise he has to sign

paperwork and it slows things down.”

      But this evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Father’s

position, still falls short of proving that Mother and Little Flower fraudulently

prevented him from asserting his parental rights. While Mother and Little Flower

may have been aware of Father’s identity, and while they may not have notified the

court about Father or notified Father about the court proceedings, there is no

evidence in this record that they defrauded Father in any way.9

      8
       Father filed an Acknowledgement of Paternity on December 31, 2019.
      9
       To commit common-law fraud, Mother and Little Flower must have made a
material representation to Father that was either false or made recklessly, as a positive

                                           9
      Father engaged in sexual activity with Mother, the consequences of which not

only could have, but also actually did, result in pregnancy. The paternity registry exists

for just such circumstances—it allows an alleged father to register as to any child that

he may have fathered. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.402(a). If a man wants to be

provided notice of parental termination proceedings regarding a child that he may—

either potentially or actually—have fathered, the registry is available to him to ensure

that he receive such notice. As the Dallas Court of Appeals has pointed out, the

process of registering is free, the information provided in the registration process is

confidential, and there is no penalty for registering if no child is actually conceived.

Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3d at 914. Under this statutory scheme, whether to register is

within the complete control of alleged fathers. Id. And whether or not Father was

aware of the law regarding paternity registration, he was nevertheless afforded an

opportunity to assert his rights as to any child that he may have fathered with Mother,

or with any other woman, for that matter.

assertion, without knowledge of its truth. The representation must have been made
with the intent that Father act upon it, and Father must have acted on it, causing
injury. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Lufkin Indus., 573 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Tex. 2019).
There is no summary judgment evidence to support this claim.

       To commit fraud by nondisclosure, among other things, Mother and Little
Flower must have had a duty to disclose S.W.’s birth to Father. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998). Father offered no legal theory to support a
claim that Mother and Little Flower owed him any duty of disclosure.

                                            10
      Not only does the law provide fathers with this opportunity, the failure to take

advantage of this opportunity produces legal consequences. In particular, Section

161.002(b)(3) allows an unregistered father’s rights to be terminated without notice to

him. And the statute carves out no exception for situations where a mother knows

the father’s identity or location and fails to reveal that information, or when she fails

to notify the father of the pregnancy or birth. Under this statutory scheme, neither

mothers nor adoption agencies are required by law to identify, locate, or notify an

alleged father who has not registered with the paternity registry. See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 161.002(c-1).

      The bottom line is that there is no summary judgment evidence that Father was

fraudulently prevented from registering.        Father’s summary judgment proof that

Mother and Little Flower did not identify, locate or notify him does not supply that

proof. Nor is Mother’s decision to omit Father’s name on the birth certificate—even

if based on advice from Little Flower—evidence that Father was fraudulently

prevented from registering. In sum, while the summary judgment evidence may have

established that Mother and Little Flower failed to identify him even though he was

known to them, it does not prove that Mother and Little Flower fraudulently colluded

to prevent him from timely registering with the paternity registry. At all times, the

registry process remained available to Father, and even assuming that he was unaware

of the protections afforded him under this statutory scheme, the lack of evidence of

fraud remains unchanged. Under this statutory scheme, Father’s ignorance of the law

                                           11
imposes no additional duty on Mother or Little Flower to disclose S.W.’s birth to

Father or Father’s identity in a birth certificate or in parental termination proceedings.

Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3d at 915.

      We overrule subissue one.

D. Due Process

      In his second subissue, Father argues that Little Flower’s intentional fraud and

collusion with Mother to not acknowledge him as the father of the child violated his

right to due process under the United States Constitution10 and the Texas

Constitution.11 Specifically, Father argues that the application of the statutes allowing

termination of an alleged father’s parental rights without notice deprived him of his

due process rights.

      This is the same argument that the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed in Baby

Girl S. In that case, the biological father argued that the statute allowing termination

of his parental rights without notice was unconstitutional as applied to him. Id. at 911.

Like here, the mother did not name the biological father of Baby S at the time she put

the infant up for adoption. She also claimed that she did not know the father’s name.

      10
           The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. Amend XIV § 1.
      11
          Article 1 Section 19 of the Texas Constitution provides that no citizen of this
State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any
manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land. Tex. Const.
art. I § 19.

                                           12
Id. at 906. Unaware of the pregnancy or birth of Baby S, the biological father did not

register with the paternity registry, and his rights were terminated without notice to

him. Id. at 907. An adoption agency was named as the baby’s managing conservator,

and the biological father learned of the child’s birth the following month. Id.

      In Baby Girl S., our sister court, relying on the plain language of the statute,

pointed out that the paternity registry allows an alleged father to register if he desires

to be notified of a proceeding for the adoption of or the termination of parental rights

regarding a child that he may have fathered. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.402(a). But

if an alleged father fails to register, there is no requirement that he must be identified

or located; if the child is under one year of age when the petition for termination or

adoption is filed, the rights of an unregistered father may be terminated without

notice under Family Code Section 161.002(b)(3). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.002(c-

1); Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3d at 914.

      In reaching its decision that the alleged father’s constitutional rights had not

been violated, the court distinguished between a situation where a father had a

developed relationship with his child and a situation where an alleged father’s link to

his child was merely biological. The court adopted the reasoning of the Kansas

Supreme Court that the “liberty interest resulting in a right to notice” arises in the

former situation, not the latter, because it is the “developed familial relationship,” not

mere biology, that warrants protection. Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3d at 916.

                                           13
      Here, as in Baby Girl S., we are not being asked whether the statutory scheme

adequately protected the rights of an alleged father who had a developed relationship

with his child, but rather we are only asked to consider whether the safeguards

provided in the paternity registry are adequate to protect an alleged father who was

unaware of the pregnancy or birth and whose only link to his child is biological. See

id. at 914. As the court in In re Baby Girl S. explained:

      the registry provides an alleged father with the means of asserting his
      rights without depending on the mother, the courts, or anyone else to
      identify him. By registering, an alleged father ensures he will be notified
      of any proceeding to adopt the child or to terminate his rights. It also
      provides a measure of privacy for the mother who, for any number of
      reasons, may not want to divulge the biological father’s name. Finally, it
      reduces any delays in an adoption proceeding because an unknown
      father is either registered or he is not. If he is, he gets notice.

Id. at 915. The court cited the United States Supreme Court decision in Lehr v.

Robertson to point out that even if the biological father knew nothing about the

registry, that would not relieve him of the requirement to follow the law. 463 U.S.

248, 264, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2995 (1983). The Dallas court held that the statutory

scheme permits an alleged father to protect himself by invoking statutory procedures

to ensure that he received notice and that the biological father’s failure to do so does

not render the procedure unconstitutional. Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3d at 915.

      Father attempts to distinguish Baby Girl S. by pointing out that in that case the

biological mother was the only party who concealed the father’s identity, whereas and

in this case Little Flower, the movant of the termination proceedings, also knew his

                                           14
identity before termination and concealed it. We find that to be a distinction without

a difference. In both cases the biological fathers allege that their identities were

wrongfully concealed.

      We are persuaded by the reasoning of Baby Girl S. and hold that the statutory

scheme of the paternity registration is not unconstitutional as applied to Father.

Father engaged in conduct with Mother that could have resulted in the conception of

a child. The paternity registry provided Father with the means of asserting his rights

to any child that might have been conceived without depending on Mother, the

courts, or anyone else to identify him. See Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3d at 915. The fact

that he may not have registered because of “his ignorance of the law” was not

“sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself.” Id. at 914 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson,

463 U.S. at 264).

      When enacting the statutory procedures creating the paternity registry, the

Texas Legislature could have provided a defense or exception for fathers who were

unaware of the birth of their child and claim that they were prevented from learning

about the birth by the fraud or deceit of another. The Legislature chose not to do so.

      We are mindful of the delicate balance between the goal of protecting the rights

of fathers and the need to insure a stable home for the child by determining as early as

possible the rights and interests of all parties. The statutory scheme complained of

here allowed Father to protect himself by invoking statutory procedures to insure he

received notice. See Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3d at 915. Father failed to do so, and that

                                           15
failure does not now render the statutory procedure unconstitutional.                Id.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by granting Little Flower’s motion

for summary judgment. We overrule Father’s second subissue.

                                III. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled Father’s two subissues in his sole issue on appeal, we affirm

the trial court’s judgment granting Little Flower’s motion for summary judgment.

                                                      /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                      Bonnie Sudderth
                                                      Chief Justice

Delivered: April 27, 2023

                                          16