Court Opinion

ID: 9564994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:12:53.295854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:18.441929
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
specially concurring:
I specially concur in the judgment reversing the district court and remanding the case for further proceedings. I write separately because, as I view the record, it is only necessary for the district court on remand to determine the availability of other zoning districts where the appellants could cohabit as an unmarried couple in a single-unit dwelling. It is unnecessary for the trial court to make further findings concerning the nature and extent of the rights asserted by appellants and the purpose of the zoning ordinances.
I agree with the majority that our holding in Rademan v. City & County of Denver, 186 Colo. 250, 526 P.2d 1325 (1974), does not control this case. At the time Rademan was decided, we only had Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974), to guide us. Since Rademan, the United States Supreme Court has considered constitutional challenges to zoning ordinances in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 *675U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion), and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). In light of these cases, the determination whether minimal or strict scrutiny applies in a particular case is fact specific and depends solely on the nature of the right infringed by the zoning ordinance, see City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (rational basis scrutiny applied to ordinance disparately impacting mentally retarded persons); Moore, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (strict scrutiny applied to zoning ordinance restricting freedom of blood relatives to associate), and the degree to which the statutory scheme places disproportionate burdens on a suspect class, see Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 6, 94 S.Ct. at 1539 (“If the ordinance segregated one area only for one race, it would immediately be suspect....”); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149 (1917) (invalidating city ordinance barring a black from acquiring real property in a white residential area). According to the majority, “[findings concerning the purposes served by the ordinances are ... instructive in determining to what extent the ordinances abridge the appellants’ constitutional rights.” Majority opinion at 673. As I read this language and Village of Belle Terre and its progeny, the purpose of the zoning ordinance is only considered after a court ascertains the appropriate standard to review the constitutionality of the legislation. See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 596 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing application of strict scrutiny standard to review constitutionality of statutes).
I also agree with the majority that we cannot determine which standard of scrutiny applies since the magnitude of the ordinance’s impact on the alleged rights of the appellants, Norma L. Dotson and Ysidro M. Zavala, is unclear. The parties do not agree, and based upon the record we cannot determine, whether the single-unit dwelling restriction, see Denver, Colo. Rev. Mun.Code § 59-2(131) (1982), prevents appellants from residing as an unmarried couple in a single-unit dwelling not only in an RS-4 district but anywhere else m Denver. It is unclear whether section 59-2(121), which authorizes the granting of permits allowing unrelated parties to reside in the same single-unit dwelling, applies to appellants’ living arrangement. In addition, the joint stipulation entered into by the parties does not locate and delineate those areas zoned to enable appellants to acquire a permit under section 59-2(121). Accordingly, I agree that the case must be remanded for additional factual findings under C.R.C. P. 57 to identify and locate the different zoning districts in Denver and to determine for each zoning district the extent to which the zoning ordinances would permit appellants to cohabit as an unmarried couple in a single-unit dwelling.
In my view, this court may resolve the remaining issues without a remand to the trial court. The majority remands for a determination of both the nature and extent of the rights asserted by appellants and the purpose of the ordinances. As I read the record and the briefs, it is unnecessary to remand the case for a clarification of the nature and extent of the rights asserted by appellants. In their complaint, appellants attacked section 59-2(131) for the following reasons:
a. The ordinances deprive the plaintiffs of their rights of freedom of association and privacy by creating an unconstitutional, irrebuttable presumption that the plaintiffs’ sharing of this house is immoral or somehow unsafe for the people of the State of Colorado, without showing a compelling state interest.
b. The ordinances deprive the plaintiffs of the use and enjoyment of their property without due process of law because the ordinance is both over- and under-inclusive. It therefore is not reasonably related to the achievement of a rational state goal.
c. The ordinance deprives the plaintiffs of their right to equal protection of the laws of the State of Colorado to protect their property because it singled them out for enforcement.
In their opening brief, appellants clarify their position by arguing that their rights *676of association and privacy were violated because the zoning ordinance infringed upon their right to choose not to be married. They contend that an inherent element of a fundamental right to marry, see Beeson v. Kiowa County School Dist. RE-1, 39 Colo.App. 174, 567 P.2d 801 (1977) (decision to create marriage relationship is a fundamental right grounded in the public policy of Colorado), is the freedom to choose whether to exercise the right. According to appellants, by prohibiting cohabitation of unmarried couples, the zoning ordinance impinges upon that fundamental right. If the decision not to marry is not a fundamental right, they assert that an ordinance prohibiting unmarried couples from cohabiting in a single-unit dwelling is unconstitutional under a minimal standard of scrutiny. See Israel v. Allen, 195 Colo. 263, 577 P.2d 762 (1978) (statute prohibiting marriage between adopted brothers and sisters unconstitutional under minimal standard of scrutiny). In my view, the bases of appellants’ constitutional attacks on the zoning ordinance are clear and do not require further factual clarification on remand.
Based on the record, it is also unnecessary to remand the case to determine the purpose behind the zoning ordinance. It is axiomatic that issues of statutory interpretation and the concomitant determination of a statute’s purpose are questions of law which may be resolved by appellate courts. In this case, the plain language of the zoning ordinance and the purpose of the ordinance stated in Denver, Colo.Rev.Mun. Code § 59-1 unambiguously establish that the zoning ordinance is intended to promote and preserve traditional family values by encouraging families to live in certain zoning districts throughout the city of Denver. The zoning districts delineated for families prohibit commercial uses of property, thereby creating areas free from crowds, parking problems, and traffic congestion. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 500, 97 S.Ct. at 1936 (use of zoning ordinance to reduce overcrowding, traffic congestion, and parking problems is valid legislative purpose); Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9, 94 S.Ct. at 1541 (recognizing “family values” as valid purpose of zoning ordinance).
In my view, remanding the case to the district court for a determination of the nature and extent of rights asserted by appellants and the purpose behind the zoning ordinance is unnecessary and creates needless confusion for the parties and the trial court. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for the sole purpose of determining the availability of other zoning districts where the appellants could cohabit as an unmarried couple in a single-unit dwelling.
I am authorized to say that Justice LOHR and Justice VOLLACK join in this special concurrence.