Court Opinion

ID: 9853925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:57:35.167151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:15.939077
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because the uncontradicted evidence shows that Gourley had knowledge equal to that of Food Concepts of any defect, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
Evidence was presented that Gourley knew the floor surrounding the food bar was slippery. According to Hendrickson, while he visited the food bar and walked completely around it as he served his food, he noticed the floor “was very slippery.” It looked shiny and wet, like the floor in the entranceway. Hendrickson stated he had to hold onto the food bar because the floor was so slippery. After Hendrickson returned to his table, he told Gourley he had almost slipped at the food bar. He testified that Gourley then went to the food bar and fell. Gourley did not controvert this testimony that Hendrickson explicitly mentioned the condition of the floor near the food bar.
To recover in a premises liability case such as this, it is incum*184bent on a plaintiff to show the existence of two elements: (1) fault by the proprietor; and (2) the invitee’s ignorance of the danger. Shansab v. Homart Dev. Co., 205 Ga. App. 448, 450 (3) (422 SE2d 305) (1992). As to the second element, if the invitee has knowledge equal to that of the proprietor, the invitee is charged with exercising ordinary care for his or her own safety and using all his or her senses to avoid harm. Steele v. Chappell, 222 Ga. App. 451, 452 (474 SE2d 309) (1996). See also Eid v. Great A & P Tea Co., 222 Ga. App. 714, 715 (476 SE2d 25) (1996). Where the invitee “knows of the condition or hazard there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn [her] and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee . . . has as much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting, in view of [her] knowledge, assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) O’Steen v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 194 Ga. App. 240, 241 (1) (390 SE2d 248) (1990). This “superior/equal knowledge” rule “presumes the plaintiff, knowing of the danger, could have avoided the consequences of defendant’s negligence with the exercise of ordinary care.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 242.
Decided November 5, 1997.
Rubin & Hoyt, Robert P. Hoyt, for appellant.
Food Concepts submitted evidence on motion for summary judgment that Gourley was told by her son of the condition of the floor near the food bar before she fell. As respondent on motion for summary judgment, it was Gourley’s burden to come forward with evidence contradicting this fact. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991). This she failed to do. The evidence therefore shows that Gourley had equal knowledge of the alleged hazard and nonetheless chose to enter that area and to walk away from the food bar without looking down at the floor. Even assuming that the restaurant had knowledge of some substance on the floor, Gourley elected to traverse the area without looking at the floor despite being warned of its condition and her consequent knowledge of its condition. She failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety and therefore should not recover. See Steele, O’Steen, Shansab, supra. Although issues of negligence ordinarily require jury resolution, where the facts are plain, as here, summary judgment is proper. Warnke v. Pace Membership Warehouse, 215 Ga. App. 33, 34 (449 SE2d 629) (1994).
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.
*185Baker & Shivers, Thurbert E. Baker, Charles E. Johnson III, for appellee.