Court Opinion

ID: 9963139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 17:01:46.75727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.370485
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       APR 24 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DEBORAH STAMPFLI,                               No.    23-15346

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC
 v.

STEVE J. STUMP,                                 MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant,

and

SUSANVILLE SANITARY DISTRICT; et
al.,

                Defendants.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of California
                   William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 25, 2024**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      Steve Stump appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and granting Deborah

Stampfli’s motion for partial summary judgment on the basis that she was not an

at-will employee at the time of her termination. We have jurisdiction to review the

denial of qualified immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we have pendent

jurisdiction to review the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment as the

corresponding issue is “inextricably intertwined” with “other issues properly

before the court.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir. 2000). We

affirm.

      1. When assessing whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, we

engage in a two-prong inquiry. “First, we must determine whether the official

violated a constitutional right.” Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 907 (9th

Cir. 2008) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). “Second, we must

determine whether the right was clearly established such that a reasonable official

would [have] known that he was engaging in unlawful conduct.” Id. (citing

Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007)). “If an official reasonably

believed that his conduct was lawful, qualified immunity applies.” Id. (citing

Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001)).

      2. First, the district court did not err in concluding that Stump violated

Stampfli’s procedural due process rights.

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      As an initial matter, Stampfli properly established that she had a protected

property interest in her continued employment because she was not an at-will

employee at the time of her termination. Indeed, the Susanville Sanitary District’s

policies provide that an individual is entitled to for-cause protection from

termination (in addition to other procedural safeguards), provided they are a

permanent employee. And this court’s precedent establishes that those associated

protections do not terminate without proper notice. See McGraw v. City of

Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384, 388 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, the record

demonstrates that Stampfli was a permanent employee. Even viewing all evidence

in the light most favorable to him, Stump fails to raise a genuine dispute of

material fact concerning whether Stampfli was given proper notice that she would

be surrendering her pre-existing employment protections simply by accepting her

promotion to Assistant General Manager/Office Administrator. Thus, Stampfli was

entitled to procedural safeguards prior to her termination.

      Because it is undisputed that Stampfli was not afforded any procedural

safeguards prior to her termination, the district court did not err in concluding that

Stump violated Stampfli’s procedural due process rights. The district court also

properly granted Stampfli’s motion for partial summary judgment.

      3. Second, the district court did not err in determining that Stampfli’s rights

were clearly established at the time of her termination. Our precedents have long

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established that a “‘permanent employee,’ dismissible only for cause, has ‘a

property interest in [her] continued employment which is protected by due

process.’” Dorr v. Butte Cnty., 795 F.2d 875, 876 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Skelly v.

State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 207–08 (1975)); see also Beckwith v. Clark

Cnty., 827 F.2d 595, 597 (9th Cir. 1987); McGraw, 882 F.2d at 389. Our

precedents also establish that procedural protections for permanent employees may

not be removed without proper notice to the employee. See McGraw, 882 F.2d at

388 (“[I]t is very difficult to accept an argument that the City Council intended

‘permanent employee’ status, once earned, to terminate sub silentio upon

promotion, once again subjecting the promoted employee to the risks of what is

essentially the ‘at-will’ employment status.”). And one can violate clearly

established law “even in novel factual circumstances.” Bonivert v. City of

Clarkston, 883 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, at the time of Stampfli’s

termination, it was clearly established that terminating a public employee who was

afforded for-cause protections by district policy on the basis that she lost her for-

cause protections solely due to offhand, mistaken remarks made at a board meeting

would violate that employee’s due process rights.

      4. Finally, Stump has failed to demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to Stampfli, “a reasonable official in [Stump’s] position could

have believed that his conduct was lawful.” Levine, 525 F.3d at 907. Indeed,

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“[w]hen the law is clearly established, as here, the qualified immunity defense fails

‘since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his

conduct.’” Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982)). Thus, summary judgment on

the basis of qualified immunity was appropriately denied by the district court.

      AFFIRMED.

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