Court Opinion

ID: 9806398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 19:01:25.333892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:04:58.666424
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 49. concurring and dissenting. I concur on the issues of the separation period and hearsay testimony, but I *597dissent on the double jeopardy issue. The majority’s reasoning on this issue appears on the surface to be a clear and logical application of existing double-jeopardy precedent and analysis. This is one of those cases, however, where the use of our historic reasoning and analysis produces a result that is otherwise indefensible. The result of the majority’s decision is the judicial repeal of a crime. As the State emphasized in this case, no prosecutor will ever again charge a defendant with the crime of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult even if a defendant admits to having perpetrated exactly that crime. If we were required to reach that result as a matter of federal constitutional law for which we are not the final arbiter, I would have to go along despite my misgivings. Instead, the majority has reached that result based on a conclusion that it implements the intent of the Legislature, a conclusion that is clearly wrong. No legislature would create an important crime on the basis that it will never be charged by a prosecutor. The majority’s result cannot be consistent with legislative intent. I would affirm the trial court decision.
¶ 50. I recognize that the Legislature can fix the result in a number of ways, and the decision may have the salutary effect of a closer examination in the future of crimes that are defined similarly with overlapping elements. I do not believe, however, that the opportunity to repair the damage and use it as a lesson for future drafting justifies this result. We are left with a distorted view of legislative intent and how to discern it in future cases. For this reason, I dissent.
¶ 51. I begin with my points of agreement with the majority. As the majority observes, whether overlapping crimes allow for multiple convictions and sentences turns on legislative intent. State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 12, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597. The Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V, prohibits courts from imposing multiple sentences for the same offense but does not preclude the Legislature from defining separate but overlapping crimes and authorizing cumulative punishments. Id. ¶ 11. The intent of the Legislature to do so, however, must be clear. Id. ¶ 12. The longstanding test for determining legislative intent was enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), and has been adopted by this Court. State v. Ritter, 167 Vt. 632, 632, 714 A.2d 624, 625 (1998) (mem.). The central inquiry under this test is whether the two offenses involved are “the same” for the purposes of double *598jeopardy. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Two offenses are the same unless each offense contains an element of proof that the other does not. Id. If this initial “elements test” is not satisfied, the two offenses are the same and the Legislature is presumed to have prohibited cumulative punishments for those offenses. State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 384-85, 721 A.2d 445, 460 (1998). The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a “ ‘clear indication of contrary legislative intent,’ ” id. at 385, 721 A.2d at 460 (quoting Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981)), through the “language, structure, or legislative history of the statutes.” Id. In my opinion, the majority did not adequately consider the language, structure, and legislative history of the enactments in reaching its conclusion.
¶ 52. The majority begins its examination of the two offenses of sexual assault, 13 V.S.A. § 3252, and sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult, 13 V.S.A. § 1379, by applying the Blockburger test, and it properly concludes that § 1379 requires proof of an element that § 3252 does not — that the victim is a vulnerable adult — while § 3252 requires no such independent element of proof. Essentially, proving all the elements of § 1379 necessarily involves proving all the elements of § 3252. The majority thus concludes that the presumption under Blockburger is that the Legislature did not intend to impose cumulative punishments for these two offenses. I agree with this analysis.
¶ 53. From there, the majority explores the legislative history in search of clear indication of the Legislature’s intent. Finding no express statement in the legislative history, the majority concludes that the Blockburger presumption is not overcome and that therefore the cumulative sentences cannot stand. The majority then briefly considers related statutory provisions under the vulnerable-adult act and the penalties they impose, as compared to their more general counterparts. The majority merely observes that the penalties are “inconsistent” and that no conclusion can be drawn that rebuts the presumption. Ante, ¶ 29. This is where I disagree.
¶ 54. I take issue with the majority’s “mechanical” application of the Blockburger test, State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶21, 279 P.3d 747, and its inadequate examination of the legislative history it has presented. Finding no express statement, the majority resorts to the rule of lenity without considering other applicable principles of statutory construction, Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 342 *599(stating that rule of lenity “comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what [the Legislature] has expressed, not at the beginning” (quotation omitted)), which place this matter beyond a mere “guess.” See Grega, 168 Vt. at 388, 721 A.2d at 462 (observing that “lenity means that the Court will not interpret. . . a criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the Legislature] intended” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)). Essentially, the majority reads the Legislature’s silence as ambiguity that can and should be resolved in defendant’s favor. I cannot end the inquiry there. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340-42 (holding that legislative silence does not imply ambiguity requiring application of rule of lenity).
¶ 55. In this state, where committee records are limited and no record of floor debate exists, determining legislative intent often can be difficult. Legislative intent need not be illuminated merely by an express statement but may also be discovered by other means, including statutory interpretation. See State v. Handy, 2012 VT 21, ¶ 29, 191 Vt. 311, 44 A.3d 776 (“Our rules of statutory construction are aimed at discerning legislative intent.”); see also In re Carroll, 2007 VT 19, ¶ 9, 181 Vt. 383, 925 A.2d 990 (stating that where “doubt exists” about legislative intent, “[t]he intent should be gathered from a consideration of the whole statute, the subject matter, its effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law” (quotation omitted)). Indeed, Grega instructs us to look at the language and structure of the relevant statutes. 168 Vt. at 386-88, 721 A.2d at 460-62. Aside from noting the inconsistencies in penalties imposed under the related statutory provisions, the majority makes no attempt to determine legislative intent from other available sources.
¶ 56. One method of discerning legislative intent in a double-jeopardy analysis is to look at the nature of the social norms sought to be protected. The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized this method of analysis in Albernaz, where it considered the “separate evils” presented by the crimes of importation and distribution of marijuana and concluded that because Congress sought to regulate two “diverse societal harms” that it intended the resulting sentence to be cumulative when violated in a single *600offense.1 450 U.S. at 343. The Supreme Court reiterated this test in United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985), where it examined two statutes, one dealing with false statements to a federal agency and another addressing failure to report transportation of currency in excess of $5000 into the United States, and concluded that “Congress’ intent to allow punishment under both [statutes] is shown by the fact that the statutes ‘are directed at separate evils.’ ” Id. at 109 (quoting Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343).
¶ 57. A number of state courts have followed this rationale and used the social-norms test to either reinforce or rebut the Blockburger presumption. If the social norms are separate and distinct, the offenses are not the same and the legislative intent is to permit cumulative punishments. See, e.g., People v. Robideau, 355 N.W.2d 592, 604 (Mich. 1984) (stating that “[statutes prohibiting conduct that is violative of distinct social norms can generally be viewed as separate and amenable to permitting multiple punishments”), overruled by People v. Smith, 733 N.W.2d 351 (Mich. 2007)2; State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶32, 306 P.3d 426 (using “language, history, and subject of the statutes” to “identify the particular evil sought to be addressed by each offense” in effort to rebut Blockburger presumption (quotation omitted)); State v. Gardner, 340 S.E.2d 701, 713 (N.C. 1986) (considering distinct social norms protected by prohibition on breaking and entering and felony larceny predicated on breaking and entering as indicative of legislature’s intent to impose cumulative sentences, thus overcoming Blockburger presumption); State v. Garza, 2014 SD 67, ¶ 19, 854 N.W.2d 833 (reinforcing conclusion that arson and felony murder allow cumulative punishments because they are “directed toward protecting different social norms and achieving different policies” (quotation omitted)); State *601v. Hughes, 212 P.3d 558, 562-63 (Wash. 2009) (considering purposes of statutes in determining whether single act of intercourse could be punished cumulatively under both rape and child rape statutes); Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 567 (Wyo. 1989) (discerning legislative intent by looking at purpose of statutes and noting that “[w]here independent but overlapping statutes are directed at separate evils, cumulative punishments are intended.”) (quotation omitted).
¶ 58. In considering whether two statutes seek to protect different social norms, the definition of the norm should be construed narrowly. Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 32 n.7, 810 P.2d 1223 (“Both rape and incest broadly can be understood as protecting society against a single evil — aberrant sexual behavior. That construction would raise a strong presumption that the legislature intended but one conviction and sentence for a single episode implicating both offenses. . . . [S]uch broad interpretation eviscerates the legislature’s intent to proscribe the narrower, distinct evils ... by way of different statutory schemes.”); State v. Hargrove, 1989-NMSC-012, ¶ 20, 771 P.2d 166 (concluding that incest and criminal sexual penetration of children, although both involving sexual misconduct, are not same because incest statute prohibits intercourse within the prohibited degree of consanguinity and criminal sexual penetration of children prohibits intercourse with individuals who by their age are unable to consent).
¶ 59. The location of the statutes in the larger statutory scheme may also provide some guidance in drawing this line. Statutes located in the same code section likely were intended to protect the same social norms, while statutes located in distinct code sections, while otherwise possessing overlapping elements, likely were intended to protect different social norms and permit cumulative punishment. See Hughes, 212 P.3d at 562 (concluding that rape of child and rape of vulnerable adult are same offenses in part because both offenses are found in same code section entitled “Sex Offenses”).
¶ 60. The majority distinguishes these cases on their facts and consequently reasons that they do not support the point that this “social norms” test may be applicable here. Ante, ¶¶ 35-42. But the facts of the individual cases and the attendant conclusions on whether cumulative punishments were appropriate in those cases are not relevant here. Certainly the legislative enactments in the *602individual states are likely to vary, making an application of this test highly fact-specific. What is applicable in the context of this case is that we have a method for discerning legislative intent, which has been adopted in several state and federal courts, that is useful when confronted with two statutory provisions that are difficult to reconcile. Moreover, what these cases tell us is that we cannot stop short of looking at the purpose behind the statutory provisions and what the Legislature was seeking to protect.
¶ 61. Here, the legislative history makes clear that 13 VS.A. § 1379 was adopted not to prevent sexual assault generally but to protect vulnerable adults from abuse and exploitation. Section 1379 is found in Title 13, chapter 28, “Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation of Vulnerable Adults,” which contains statutory provisions prohibiting against vulnerable adults abuse, abuse by unlawful restraint and unlawful confinement, neglect, sexual abuse, financial exploitation, and exploitation of services. 13 V.S.A. §§ 1376-1381. Legislative findings supporting the passage of the 2005 Act indicate that “[vjulnerable adults are one of the most abused segments of our population” and that reports of abuse have been on the rise. 2005, No. 79, § 1. Additionally, “statistics show that more than 90 percent of people with developmental disabilities will experience sexual abuse at some point in their lives,” and individuals with severe mental illness are victims of violent crimes at “more than 11 times the rate for the general population.” Id. Abuse against nursing home residents is an “increasing concern,” as these residents “are abused by the very people who are supposed to care for them[,] . . . [rjeports of sexual and physical abuse often are not made promptly, and existing state and federal safeguards do not adequately protect residents from potentially abusive nursing home employees.” Id. In passing the Act, the Legislature sought to “enhance[ ] the ability to prosecute persons under criminal law who abuse vulnerable adults.” Id. (emphasis added).
¶ 62. While § 1379 is located in a chapter of the code that protects the elderly and vulnerable adults, § 3252 is located in chapter 72, which broadly covers sexual assault. This, along with the legislative findings and stated purposes of the vulnerable-adult act, demonstrates that the overriding goals of the Legislature were to curtail the widespread abuse — sexual or otherwise — of vulnerable adults, increase the rate of reporting such incidents, and protect vulnerable adults from abuse and exploitation by *603those charged with their care. Furthermore, the Legislature’s goal was to enhance prosecution of offense's against vulnerable adults, not to enhance prosecution of sexual abuse specifically. If anything is discernible from this history it is that the Legislature found the protection of vulnerable adults of particular concern. The purpose of the vulnerable-adult act would be poorly served if the Legislature did not intend cumulative punishments under § 1379 and § 3252.
¶ 63. Another piece of this analysis is a look at the penalties imposed for the two offenses. For example, if a base penalty is imposed for one crime and the penalty is then increased for aggravating circumstances, the likely intent is that these crimes are the same and cannot be imposed cumulatively. See People v. Kulpinski, 620 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (observing that where statute does not involve hierarchy of offenses with penalties increasing as offenses increase in severity, legislature intended cumulative punishment); Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 33 (stating that “[t]he quantum of punishment also is probative of legislative intent to punish” and that “[i]f the punishment attached to an offense is enhanced to allow for kindred crimes, these related offenses may be presumed as a single offense”). As the Michigan Supreme Court observed, the clear intent is that the “Legislature has taken conduct from the base statute, decided that aggravating conduct deserves additional punishment, and imposed it accordingly, instead of imposing dual convictions.” Robideau, 355 N.W.2d at 604.
¶ 64. Here, sexual assault under § 3252 is the base statute,- and sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult under § 1379 involves an aggravating circumstance — the victim being a vulnerable adult. Yet § 1379 imposes a lesser penalty than § 3252. In a reverse scenario, where the aggravating conduct receives a greater penalty, such an alignment is evidence that the Legislature intended to prohibit cumulative punishment. By the same reasoning, where the aggravating conduct receives a lesser penalty, as is the situation here, such an alignment is evidence that the charges are separate and the punishment is cumulative. Cf. Gardner, 340 S.E.2d at 713 (concluding that legislature could not have intended “absurd result” of offense with higher penalty to be lesser-included offense subsumed by offense with lower penalty).
¶ 65. The corollary to statutes protecting separate and distinct social norms being seen as different offenses is that statutes *604protecting the same social norms, being the same crime for the purposes of double jeopardy, often are considered lesser-included offenses. Indeed, the Blockburger analysis serves to identify such lesser-included offenses and protect defendants from cumulative sentencing under these schemes. See, e.g., Grega, 168 Vt. at 384-85, 721 A.2d at 459-60 (concluding that because aggravated sexual assault is lesser-included offense to aggravated murder that offenses are same under Blockburger test). As the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted in Gardner, however, one offense may appear to be a lesser-included offense of the other, based on the penalties imposed and the elements of proof, but that if the offenses serve different purposes, they may, in reality, be separate offenses for the purposes of imposing cumulative sentences. 340 S.E.2d at 713-14. The majority’s reading effectively establishes § 3252 as a lesser-included offense to § 1379 since all the elements of the general sexual assault statute are subsumed within the vulnerable-adult statute. Again, this defies logic, particularly given that § 1379 has a lower penalty.
¶ 66. The majority rejects the State’s claim that reading § 1379 and § 3252 as the same offense creates the illogical result of rendering the vulnerable-adult statute superfluous because the majority finds no clear statement in the legislative history. Ante, ¶¶ 31-32. Yet, one way to determine legislative intent is by considering whether a statutory interpretation renders a portion of the statute mere surplusage, In re Lunde, 166 Vt. 167, 171, 688 A.2d 1312, 1315 (1997), as well as if the interpretation produces absurd or irrational results. State v. Brunner, 2014 VT 62, ¶ 11, 196 Vt. 571, 99 A.3d 1019.
¶ 67. A good example of this analysis is found in State v. Ritter, a double-jeopardy case in which the defendant was charged with two separate counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault arising out of the same incident. The governing statute, 13 V.S.A. § 1044, lists several aggravating factors that elevate the crime of domestic assault to second-degree aggravated domestic assault. Although based on only one incident, the information charged separate crimes for each of the two aggravating factors. Because the factors were separate elements, they satisfied the Blockburger test and triggered the presumption that the Legislature intended cumulative punishments. We concluded that, despite the Blockburger presumption, a determination that the Legislature allowed the imposition of two sentences would produce the absurd *605result of punishing the defendant for each aggravating factor under the statute. Ritter, 167 Vt. at 633, 714 A.2d at 625-26. Thus, we found the necessary intent to rebut the Blockburger presumption based on the “absurd results” produced under the elements test. If the presumption in Ritter was overcome on the basis that the result was absurd, it should be overcome in this case. The majority here fails to address the State’s argument.
¶ 68. The majority undermines its own argument in examining the statutory provisions established by the vulnerable-adult act and how the penalties imposed therein relate to the penalties imposed in the general provisions of the same crimes. For example, assault of a vulnerable adult under 13 V.S.A. § 137603) is punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment, a maximum fine of $2000, or both; simple assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1023(b) is punishable by a maximum of one year imprisonment, a maximum fine of $1000, or both. Similarly, aggravated assault against a vulnerable adult under 13 V.S.A. § 1376(c) imposes maximum sentences of twenty years imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both, while aggravated assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1024(b) imposes maximum sentences of only fifteen years imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both. Finally, the penalty schemes for lewd and lascivious conduct under 13 V.S.A. § 2601 (general), 13 V.S.A. § 1379(c)(1) (vulnerable adult), and 13 V.S.A. § 2602(b) (child) increase as the severity of the crime increases from an offense against the general population, up to a vulnerable adult, and then a child. While the majority’s conclusion is that the statutory provisions are “inconsistent” with respect to the nature of the penalties, ante, ¶ 29, I read these provisions as a clear statement that the Legislature finds offenses against vulnerable adults to be more severe than their general counterparts. A conclusion that sexual abuse against a vulnerable adult is an exception, being a less-severe crime than its general counterpart, is untenable.
¶ 69. Finally, the majority points out that, prior to 2006, sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult under § 1379 was subject to a more severe penalty than general sexual assault under § 3252, but that in 2006 the Legislature enhanced the sentence under § 3252, creating the penalty scheme we have now, with sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult a crime having a less severe punishment. Ante, ¶ 28. Rather than recognizing the result that the 2006 penalty enhancement produced — a result that is illogical if we do not accept the punishments as cumulative — the majority rationalizes *606that the Legislature’s failure in increasing the penalty for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult was a simple “oversight.” Ante, ¶ 33. Unlike the majority, I cannot accept that the Legislature’s inaction with respect to § 1379 was a mistake. As we frequently have stated, we presume that the Legislature passes and amends laws “in light of relevant judicial precedents and with knowledge of prior legislation on the same subject.” State v. Read, 165 Vt. 141, 147, 680 A.2d 944, 948 (1996). We must presume that the Legislature was aware of the penalties under other sexual-assault crimes when it enhanced the penalty for § 3252. Cf. In re Town of Killington, 2003 VT 87A, ¶13, 176 Vt. 60, 838 A.2d 98. In a conflict of competing presumptions, I choose the presumption that creates a rational result.
¶ 70. In closing, I emphasize that my analysis is not at all inconsistent with our prior decisions applying the Blockburger presumption. In fact, our discussion in Ritter indicates the need for a more in-depth examination of the legislative intent than the majority supplies here. As noted above, supra, ¶ 66, the Blockburger presumption in Ritter was rebutted not by any statement found within the legislative history but by a showing that the outcome under Blockburger produced an illogical result. 167 Vt. at 633, 714 A.2d at 625-26. The majority here nonetheless rejects the State’s argument to that effect and stops short of conducting a full assessment of the legislative intent. Consequently, we are left with a statutory scheme that defies logic and contravenes the Legislature’s intent to impose cumulative sentences. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 I acknowledge that Albernaz is a case in which the elements of the statutes met the Blockburger test because each had an element not in the other. Albernaz, 460 U.S. at 339. The Supreme Court noted that the different elements triggered a presumption that the crimes were not the same, but that the presumption could be overcome by clear evidence of contrary legislative intent. Id. at 340. The analysis discussed in the text applies whether or not the Blockburger test is met, but of course where it is met defendant has a much larger burden in order to prevail.

 Robideau was overruled by Smith for its abandonment of the Blockburger “same elements” test, Smith, 733 N.W.2d at 363, but the court in Smith never explicitly abandoned the use of “social norms” or other means of discerning legislative intent to rebut the Blockburger presumption. In any event, I find the analysis of Robideau applicable.