Court Opinion

ID: 9667515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:47:47.233125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:38.555239
License: Public Domain

MARTIN, Justice
(concurring).
This concurring opinion is written in the belief that the final disposition of this cause by the majority opinion is correct under the principles hereinafter discussed. There is a distinction between a well in which there is non-production and a dry hole. Therefore, Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 261 S.W.2d 311, is not a complete answer to the problem involved in this appeal. Ap-pellees’ problem under such decision as viewed herein, is that there is no language in the leases, other than the 30-day provision, which could extend the primary term to cover the completion of drilling of the dry hole.
This court is bound by the rulings in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Osborn, supra, in so far as such rulings are applicable here. In ruling upon the 60-day and the 30-day provision in the lease in issue in that cause, the Supreme Court stated: “The conditions contained in the two separate sentences should not be jumbled.” Since the first well drilled by appellee was a dry hole only the following language from the leases here in issue will be quoted:
*575“5. If prior to discovery of oil or gas on said land, Lessee should drill a dry hole or holes thereon * * * this lease shall not terminate if the Lessee commences additional drilling or re-working operations within sixty (60) days thereafter * *
But, appellee must of necessity rely upon the last sentence in Paragraph 5, the 30-day provision as quoted in the majority opinion, to extend the primary term of the leases to the date of the completion of the dry hole. There is no other provision, or other language in the leases, which may be relied upon to extend the primary term of the lease to cover the completion of the dry hole. Since the conditions in the 60 and the 30-day sentences cannot be interchanged or “jumbled” it follows as to the 60-day provision that although appellee was actually engaged in the drilling of the dry hole on the date of termination of the primary term of the leases, there was no applicable provision in the leases extending such primary term to the date of the completion of the dry hole. Therefore, the leases terminated under the 60-day provision on the date of the expiration of the primary term regardless of the drilling in progress which resulted in a dry hole.
The above interpretation of the 60-day provision is substantiated by the term “shall not terminate” as used in the sentence with reference to the lessee commencing drilling or re-working operations within 60 days. The leases would have had to be in effect during the drilling of the dry hole to comport with the provision “shall not terminate” —such leases could not terminate if they were not in effect. Unless the language of the 60 and the 30-day provision is used interchangeably there is no language in the leases providing for an extension of the primary term within which to complete the drilling of a dry hole under the 60-day provision. However, the words “this lease shall not terminate” clearly extends the primary term of the lease for an additional 60 days within which lessee, following drilling of a dry hole is permitted to commence additional drilling operations. But, the dry hole must be completed within the primary term.
The effect of the lease provisions, both the 60 and the 30-day stipulation, as viewed in this concurring opinion, may be summarized as follows. The language of the two provisions may not be used interchangeably or jumbled as ruled in Rogers v. Osborn, supra. The opinion of the Supreme Court, as interpreted herein, requires a ruling here that the leases in issue terminated under either the 60-day or the 30-day provision. As stated above, there is no provision in the 60-day clause in the leases which will extend the primary term thereof to the date of the completion of the dry hole — therefore, under this provision the leases terminated on completion of the primary term. Under the 30-day provision, if the same were applicable to the drilling of a dry hole, the lease remained in force only “so long as operations were prosecuted with no cessation of more than thirty (30) consecutive days.” Appellees’ drilling operations ceased from May 3, 1955, when the dry hole was completed, to June 22, 1955, when drilling operations on the second well commenced, a period of more than 30 days. Under any view of the 30-day provision, if the drilling of the dry hole to completion extended the primary term of the leases and kept them alive until the completion of such dry hole, the commencement of drilling on the second well was more than 30 days after the completion of such dry hole and thus did not comply with the 30-day provision.
Appellee’s drilling operations did not comply with either the 60-day or the 30-day provision of the leases in issue and, therefore, such leases terminated on the final date of the primary term or, in any event, not more than thirty days following; the completion of the dry hole.