Court Opinion

ID: 9615057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:30:49.250827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:09.421344
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice.
By appellate review, we are asked whether participation by local governments in a pool fund pursuant to W.S. 1 — 39—118(c)(ii) constitutes a purchase of insurance which would waive governmental immunity under W.S. l-39-118(b) constituting a section of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, W.S. 1-39-101 through 1-39-120, enacted in 1979.1 We hold that the governmental unit pool fund creation and participation is not the purchase of liability insurance coverage and no waiver of governmental immunity under that insurance coverage exception results.
We reverse the decision of the district court that the City of Laramie’s participation in a W.S. l-39-118(c)(ii) pool fund constituted insurance purchase which extended the municipality’s tort liability to include defect in the design, construction or maintenance of the city’s streets.
BACKGROUND
W.S. 1-39-104 provides immunity to governmental entities and employees for any tort except as waived by the Act. Abelseth *269v. City of Gillette, 752 P.2d 430 (Wyo. 1988); Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130 (Wyo. 1985). W.S. 1-39-118(a)2 establishes the maximum liability for a governmental entity or employee, but under W.S. 1-39-118(b), permits the purchase of liability insurance. Pickle v. Board of County Com’rs of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262 (Wyo.1988); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County School Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo.1988). The W.S. 1-39-118(b) purchase of liability insurance extends the governmental unit’s liability to the extent covered within the liability insurance policy. Pickle, 764 P.2d 262. The Act waived immunity for negligent operation or maintenance of public facilities under W.S. 1-39-111, State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543 (Wyo.1982), until 1986 when the Wyoming legislature repealed this waiver and enacted W.S. 1-39-120, which provided:
(a) The liability imposed by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 does not include liability for damages caused by:
(i) A defect in the plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area;
(ii) The failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, *270roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area; or
(iii) The maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
See White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313 (Wyo. 1989).
In 1986, Natrona County, Laramie County and the cities of Cheyenne, Wyoming and Laramie, Wyoming formed a joint powers agreement to create the Wyoming Association of Risk Management (WARM) under the authorization of W.S. 1 — 39—118(c)(ii) and the Wyoming Joint Powers Act, W.S. 16-1-102 through 16-1-108. Three years later in 1989, Greg T. Facer filed a personal injury suit against the City of Laramie as the father and natural guardian of his minor son, Shane J. Facer. The suit sought to recover for Shane’s serious injury when his vehicle left the roadway and struck a city sign that had been placed at windshield height resulting in the sign shattering the windshield and causing his head injuries. The lawsuit was a claim of negligent design, construction, and maintenance. The City of Laramie, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), moved to dismiss for the failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court denied the motion in concluding that the City of Laramie had waived the immunity provided by W.S. 1-39-120 by purchasing insurance that provided coverage for “bodily injuries” without excluding liability for highway design. We granted a petition for a writ of certiora-ri to review this substantial issue of Wyoming municipality law.
DISCUSSION
That issue addresses whether a governmental entity by participation in the pool fund arrangement through a joint powers agreement under W.S. 1 — 39—118(c)(ii) results in the purchase of insurance waiver of immunity under W.S. 1 — 39—118(b) (insurance waiver section). If W.S. 1-39-118(c)(ii) creates insurance, the scope of resulting liability under subsection (b) will then be determined by interpreting the joint powers agreement and its operational documents.3 Conversely, if W.S. 1-39-118(e)(ii) is merely a funding mechanism to defray costs created by the exceptions to immunity under W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 or exclusion of immunity under federal law, specifically 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981, then liability of the fund is determined by statutory interpretation and not by joint power agreement documents.
Our established rules of statutory construction control the question of whether the governmental pooling provision of W.S. 1 — 39—118(c)(ii) is a statutory funding mechanism or is a purchase of insurance under W.S. l-39-118(b). To ascertain the intent of the legislature, Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, we give effect to every word, clause and sentence and construe all components of a statute in pari materia. See State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 843 (Wyo. 1991) and Britton v. Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc., 786 P.2d 855, 864 (Wyo.1990). Applying our standard rules of construction, Kelsey v. Taft, 72 Wyo. 210, 263 P.2d 135 (1953); Houghton Bros. v. Yocum, 40 Wyo. 57, 274 P. 10 (1929),4 we hold that W.S. l-39-118(c)(ii) serves the legislative purpose of providing an alterna*271tive funding mechanism for the governmental unit to defray costs created by the exceptions to immunity under W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112, but more significantly from non-immunized liabilities created by federal law. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 and other variant United States statutes which may create liabilities for local governmental entities or their employees.
Our analysis of the internal structure of W.S. 1-39-118 leads clearly to that conclusion. Subsection (a) provides a liability limitation and subsection (b) constitutes a first alternative for funding by permitting the acquisition of insurance which both covers the liability imposed and extends liability to the amount of policy limits provided by the policies which the entity has purchased to protect it citizenry. Pickle, 764 P.2d 262. Subsection (c) constitutes the second general alternative which establishes four optional categories of self-payment coverage systems leaving flexibility and choice to the entity of government:
1. (i) — put aside money as an accrual fund;
2. (ii) — join with other units of government to set aside funds as a deposit and reassessment system;
3. (iv) — with loss to utilize an installment payment arrangement; or
4. (v) — deposit of funds into a state actuarial determined account as a pool fund maintained by the state.
Not only does this internal statutory structure cause rejection of interpretively changing W.S. l-39-118(c)(ii) pooled funds into W.S. l-39-118(b) insurance, but any other conclusion would operate against the intent of the WARM participants. Those governmental entities seek to limit liability and protect against claim loss and not to extend liability exposure.5 We find an interpretation of the statutes to be self-defeating and inappropriate if the result were to require participants such as WARM to extend liability by joining together or to presume knowledgeable intent to assure unnecessary liability in addition to what is otherwise created by non-immunized activities included within W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 or provided by federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981, and other similar federally created rights of recovery where state governmental immunity is not necessarily a bar to relief. Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).
In construing the above sections of the statute some general rules of construction should be borne in mind. Statutes should, of course, be construed with a view to effecting the legislative intent, and such intent must be ascertained from the statute or statutes. However, a literal construction of the words used will not be sanctioned, when such construction would defeat the evident purpose of the Legislature. * * * And a construction producing unjust or absurd results will not be adopted, unless the terms of the statute preclude any other construction.
Houghton Bros., 274 P. at 11.
The decision of the trial court is reversed.

. For a history of the Act and detailed comments about its provisions, see State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543 (Wyo.1982) and Comment, Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity With Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis, XV Land & Water L.Rev. 619 (1980). See abo White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313 (Wyo.1989), Urbig-kit, J., dissenting.

. W.S. 1-39-118 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, in any action under this act, the liability of the governmental entity, including a public employee while acting within the scope of his duties, shall not exceed:
(i) The sum of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) to any claimant for any number of claims arising out of a single transaction or occurrence: or
(ii) The sum of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00) for all claims of all claimants arising out of a single transaction or occurrence.
(b) A governmental entity is authorized to purchase liability insurance coverage covering any acts or risks including all or any portion of the risks provided under this act. Purchase of liability insurance coverage shall extend the governmental entity’s liability as follows:
(i) If a governmental entity has insurance coverage either exceeding the limits of liability as stated in this section or covering liability which is not authorized by this act, the governmental entity’s liability is extended to the coverage;
(ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (i) of this subsection, if a governmental entity acquires coverage in an amount greater than the limits specified in this section for the purpose of protecting itself against potential losses under a federal law and if the purpose of the coverage is stated as a part of or by an amendment to the insurance policy, the increased limits shall be applicable only to claims brought under the federal law.
(c) In addition to the procurement of insurance under subsection (b) of this section a local governmental entity may:
(i) Establish a self-insurance fund against the liability of the governmental entity and its officers and employees;
(ii) Join with other governmental entities, by joint powers agreements under W.S. 16 — 1— 102 through 16-1-108, or otherwise, to pool funds and establish a self-insurance fund or jointly purchase insurance coverage. Pooled funds may be deposited with the state treasurer for disbursement as participating governmental entities direct or may be deposited as provided by the terms of the joint powers agreement;
(iii) Repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 142, § 2.
(iv) Pay the judgment or settlement, with interest thereon, in not to exceed ten (10) annual installments in cases of undue hardship and levy not to exceed one (1) mill per year on the assessed value of the governmental entity for such purpose;
(v) Enter into contracts with the purchasing and property control division of the department of administration and fiscal control for the payment of assessments by the local government in such amounts as determined by the division to be sufficient, on an actuarially sound basis, to cover:
(A) The potential liability, or any portion of potential liability, of the local government and its public employees as provided by this act;
(B) Costs of administration;
(C) Payment by the division of claims against the local government and its public employees acting within the scope of their duties which have been settled or reduced to final judgment.
(d) No judgment against a governmental entity shall include an award for exemplary or punitive damages, for interest prior to judgments or for attorney’s fees.
(e) Except as hereafter provided, no judgment authorized by this act may be enforced by execution or attachment of property of a governmental entity but shall be paid only as authorized by this section and W.S. 1-39-113. A judgment authorized by this act may be enforced by execution or attachment of the property of a governmental entity to the extent coverage of the liability has not been obtained under subsection (b) or (c) of this section or W.S. 1-39-115 unless the judgment is otherwise satisfied by the governmental entity.
(f) [Property damage provision relating to damage in amounts less than $500.00.]

. Also, if W.S. l-39-118(c)(ii) creates insurance, then it could be argued that the state is also operating an insurance fund through usage of the text of W.S. 1-39-118(c)(v) by conversion of a debt funding concept into an implied insurance arrangement provided by the state. Basic liability of both the governmental entity and the state fund would consequently be comprehensively extended.

. A concise statement of a realistic and comprehensive statutory interpretation and application standard is provided in the case of State v. Bumett, 227 Neb. 351, 417 N.W.2d 355, 357 (1988):
One of the fundamental principles of statutory construction is to attempt to ascertain the legislative intent and give its effect. * * * Also, in construing a statute, this court must look at the statutory objective to be accomplished, the problem to be remedied, or the purpose to be served, and then place on the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves the purpose of the statute, rather than a construction defeating the statutory purpose.

. We also doubt that the legislative intent included making Wyoming attorneys who prepare joint powers agreements into experts on insur-anee policy draftsmanship. See, for example, St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins., 763 P.2d 1255.