Court Opinion

ID: 9759334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:13:12.398548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:15:35.002138
License: Public Domain

CUMMINGS, Justice,
dissenting.
The issue before us is whether the special election of May 5, 1990, creating a Hamilton County Hospital District (HCHD) was conducted in accordance with the law concerning special elections.
As outlined in the majority opinion, enabling legislation was passed in 1987 setting forth the procedure to establish the HCHD. Following that procedure, the County Judge appointed five temporary directors who called for an election on the issue. The voters rejected the formation of a hospital district at that election.
The next important event was that the ten-member board of directors of the charitable hospital corporation obtained an amendment to the enabling act, effective June 14, 1989, which changed or amended the original 1987 enabling act in two ways:
1. Changed the boundaries of the HCHD by eliminating County Commissioner Precinct No. 3.
2. Changed the maximum tax rate from 75$ to 25$.
All of the changes in the enabling act were made without giving any notice to the County Judge or Commissioners’ Court of Hamilton County, the temporary directors of the hospital district or to the general public. No newspaper or media coverage was ever provided to the voters of Hamilton County concerning these changes when the legislation was passed in May 1989 or when the legislation became effective on June 14, 1989. The opponents of the hospital district were not made legally aware of these changes until the notice of election was published in the Hamilton Herald News on April 5, 1990, only 30 days prior to the election in question.
The notice provision of the enabling act provided:
SECTION 3.04. NOTICE. The temporary directors shall give notice of the election by publishing a substantial copy of the election order in a newspaper with general circulation in the proposed district once a week for two consecutive weeks. The first publication must appear at least 35 days before the date set for the election. Act of August 3, 1987, 70th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 42, 1987 Tex.Gen. Laws 130.
(Emphasis added).
It was stipulated by the parties that only 30 days notice was given instead of the 35 days required by the act. So, only 30 days prior to the election on May 5, 1990, the opponents of the proposition first learned that Commissioners’ Precinct 3 had been eliminated from the proposed hospital district. Precinct 3, according to the evidence, was an area where major opposition to the hospital district had been in the first election because the Hico hospital already served that area. It is apparent the opponents of the hospital district found out only 30 days prior to the election that they could not count on the voters in Precinct 3 who had previously voted against the creation of the hospital district.
The question before us is to determine whether the 30 days notice given was substantial compliance with the notice requirement of at least 35 days.
The majority follows Appellees’ contention that the matter of publishing notices is only directory and not mandatory, thus allowing the treatment of irregularities as *872informalities which do not vitiate the election. Appellees cite several cases in support of the contention that the matter of legal notice in this case is only directory, but all of said cases are distinguishable because they involved general law elections.
In Turner v. Lewie, the court noted the distinction between general law elections and special law elections, where it stated:
Laws requiring notice of general elections, held on days fixed by law, are usually held to be directory only, because it is presumed that time and place of the election is known to all without special notice. But the rule is different as to special elections. It is usually held that the required notice of a special election constitutes a condition upon which authority is granted to hold the election, and that there must be substantial compliance with the law. It has often been held that failure to give the required notice invalidates the special election.
Turner v. Lewie, 201 S.W.2d 86, 88-89 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1947, writ dism’d).
The Appellees and the majority opinion seem to follow the rule that irregularities in an election will not invalidate the election if voters had notice of the election through other means than legal notice, such as newspaper articles, and that to invalidate such an election it must be shown that the result of the election would have been different but for the irregularities complained of. In Turner the court refused to follow that rule and stated what I believe to be the proper rule, as follows:
The proceedings of the election, and those leading up to it, must themselves give sufficient notice regarding the election and its purposes. It is not enough that some or even all of the voters learned of the election through reading news items, or by conversations with other citizens, or by hearing of it through any means other than the notices required to be given by the statutes regulating the election. If there is not a substantial compliance with the law in the proceedings leading up to the election, there is no valid election. The will of the majority of the voters might be expressed in any number of ways, as in a mass meeting, or by petition, and yet not amount to an election. Our system of government depends for its existence on orderly elections, held strictly in accordance with the law, and surrounded by all of the safeguards which the lawmakers have seen fit to impose. It is important that the voters receive legal notice of the election and the purposes for which it is to be held.
Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
Further, in Coffee v. Lieb the court stated:
‘Where, as is usually the case in special elections, the time and place for holding the same are not fixed by law but are to be fixed by some authority named in the statute after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutes as to giving notice thereof are considered mandatory, and a failure to give notice or issue proclamation of such an election will render it a nullity.’
Coffee v. Lieb, 107 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Tex. Civ.App.—Eastland 1937, no writ) (emphasis added).
Appellees rely on Pollard v. Snodgrass, 203 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1947, writ dism’d), which was a special local-option election wherein the notice of election was required to be posted six days prior to the election. Appellees herein stated that only five days’ notice was given and the court held that to be substantial compliance. Appellees contend that Pollard holds that variances greater than 15% constitute substantial compliance. I find the court’s reasoning to be more narrow than Appellees contend. The court found that “the time of actual posting and that provided by the statute could not have been more than a few hours,” and the court held that was substantial compliance. Id. at 644.
In Coffee, six days’ notice was required by statute for a special election involving local option and the clerk only posted notice three days prior to the election. The court found that not to be substantial compliance and held the election to be void.
*873In Pickard, the Kentucky court followed that same law as the Texas rule for special elections and the opinion states: “Where a special election is required by statute to be advertised a given time before the day of election, such advertisement is ‘mandatory’ and election is void unless there is a substantial compliance with the statute.” Pickard v. Cross, 292 Ky. 70, 165 S.W.2d 986 (1942). The Kentucky court, in holding the election void for failing to substantially comply with the notice requirement, cited Pendley v. Butler County, 229 Ky. 45, 16 S.W.2d 500 (Ky.Ct.App.1929), a case where there was a thirty-day notice requirement for a special election and only twenty-seven days was given. That Kentucky court found there was not substantial compliance with the notice requirement and voided the election.
Texas courts have consistently held in special elections that legal notice provisions are mandatory and require substantial compliance with the law. Branaum v. Patrick, 643 S.W.2d 745, 749-50 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1982, no writ); Christy v. Williams, 292 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex.Civ. App.—Galveston 1956), writ dism’d w.o.j., 156 Tex. 555, 298 S.W.2d 565 (1957); Turner v. Lewie, 201 S.W.2d 86, 88-89 (Tex.Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1947, writ dism’d); Coffee v. Lieb, 107 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1937, no writ); Op.Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JM-747 (1987); 31 Tex.Jr.3d Elections § 107 (1984). Turner held that our system of government depends for its existence on orderly elections, held strictly in accordance with the law. Turner, 201 S.W.2d at 89. Turner also rules out consideration of other means of disseminating notice of an election to the voters than that prescribed by statute. Id. Accordingly, all the other publicity concerning the election should not be considered by the court in determining whether there was substantial compliance. The Pendley case is closest to the facts of this case, where the court found that twenty-seven days’ notice did not substantially comply with the thirty-day notice requirement. Following Pend-ley, I find that the thirty-day notice given in this case did not substantially comply with the mandatory notice of at least 35 days. To rule otherwise renders the statutory requirement of at least 35 days meaningless.
In this case there were 919 votes cast for the creation of the hospital district and 880 against, which is a difference of 39 votes out of 1,789 total votes. The opponents to the proposition, Appellant herein, were not legally aware that Precinct 3 had been eliminated from the proposed district until the April 5, 1990, edition of the Hamilton Herald News, just 30 days prior to the election. The proponents of the district, Appellees herein, had known of the boundary change since May 1989. By limiting the Appellant to only 30 days’ notice of a major change in the size of the proposed district which eliminated Appellant’s strongest precinct, it is my opinion that the Appellant was placed at a significant disadvantage which materially interfered with the election. It is obvious that the Appellant was entitled to at least 35 days notice of this change. Under these circumstances and following the rationale in Pendley, it is my opinion that the 30 days’ notice given was not substantial compliance with the notice provision and that the failure to give 35 days’ notice materially interfered with the election and the right of electors to freely participate therein. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse the judgment of the trial court.