Court Opinion

ID: 9906458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-02 18:11:07.411043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:26.766341
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00030-CR

                              COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

                               EX PARTE RC CURTIS

                    On appeal from the 187th District Court
                          of Bexar County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

       Appellant RC Curtis was charged with capital murder, a first-degree felony. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03. By four issues, which we combine into one, appellant

argues the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion for writ of habeas corpus violates the

double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution

because the State provoked a mistrial and intentionally failed to disclose exculpatory

evidence to avoid the possibility of an acquittal. We affirm.
                                      I.      BACKGROUND1

       Appellant was indicted with capital murder that allegedly occurred on October 21,

2015. See id. § 19.03. The indictment alleged that appellant strangled Paula Boyd, the

grandmother of appellant’s wife, and struck her with a deadly weapon in the course of

committing aggravated sexual assault. A jury trial commenced on November 1, 2021.

       During the State’s case-in-chief, San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) Detective

Randal Hines revealed for the first time that SAPD performed what he identified as a

“phone dump” on Antonio Jones’s cell phone.2 Apparently, Jones had knowledge of an

alleged video of Boyd’s murder. Neither the State nor appellant were aware a phone dump

was performed on Jones’s phone. After learning of this undisclosed evidence, the trial

court instructed the State to investigate the matter “by tomorrow morning.”

       The following morning, in accordance with the trial court’s instructions, the State

notified the trial court and appellant that it turned over the phone dump records to

appellant. Appellant requested a continuance to review the contents of the phone dump.

The trial court granted the motion for continuance and directed the State to “make sure

[appellant] has everything. Period.”

       On Sunday November 7, 2021, while the trial court was in recess, the State

informed the court and appellant that it learned it was in possession of “two video

statements that had not been provided to the Defense.” The first video statement was an

       1  This case is before this Court on transfer from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio
pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 73.001.

       2 Detective Hines did not elaborate on what a “phone dump” entails.

                                                  2
interview of Jones, and the second video statement was an interview of Antonio Pena.

Apparently, Pena also had knowledge of an alleged video of Boyd’s murder. Appellant

moved for a mistrial and a dismissal with prejudice. The trial court granted the motion for

a mistrial, but it denied the dismissal with prejudice.

       On July 1, 2022, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, alleging

that a retrial was barred by Double Jeopardy. The habeas court held a hearing on

appellant’s application on September 21, 2022. On December 6, 2022, the habeas court

denied the application, entering written findings of fact and conclusions of law in support

of its decision:

       Based on the [habeas] court’s review of the entire record, after considering
       the parties’ arguments and briefing, and after analyzing the case law cited
       by the parties and discussed herein as it applies to the facts of this case,
       this court finds that the defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance
       of the evidence that the prosecution team engaged in misconduct with the
       intent to goad or provoke the defense into moving for a mistrial after
       jeopardy attached or to avoid a possible acquittal.

This interlocutory appealed followed.

                     II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

       We review a habeas court’s ruling on a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus

for an abuse of discretion, reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the habeas

court’s ruling. Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We will

uphold the habeas court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion. See id. (stressing the

importance of deferring to the trial court’s assessment of the facts, including the State’s

state of mind). “An abuse of discretion does not occur unless the [habeas] court acts

‘arbitrarily or unreasonably’ or ‘without reference to any guiding rules and principles,’”

                                              3
State v. Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Montgomery v. State,

810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)), or unless the habeas court’s decision “falls

outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “[W]e must afford great deference to the habeas court’s findings

and conclusions, especially when, as here, they involve determinations of credibility and

demeanor.” Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d 681, 695 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet.

ref’d).

          Appellant has the burden to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the

evidence. See Ex parte Coleman, 350 S.W.3d 155, 160 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011,

no pet.). Appellant “must also provide the court with a sufficient record to prove his

allegations.” Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 695. We review the habeas court’s ruling

by reviewing “the evidence adduced at the habeas hearing and the record as it existed

before the habeas court at the time of the hearing.” Id.

          The federal and Texas constitutions’ double jeopardy provisions protect a

defendant from repeated attempts at prosecution for the same criminal offense. Wheeler,

203 S.W.3d at 322; see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–55 (1957) (providing

that double jeopardy precludes the State with all its resources and power from making

repeated attempts to convict an individual “thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,

expense[,] and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and

insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found

guilty”). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted the federal standard for double

jeopardy claims when interpretating state constitutional law. See Ex parte Masonheimer,

                                             4
220 S.W.3d 494, 505–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (adopting the standard set out in Oregon

v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982)). “Thus, any analysis under the Texas Constitution

would be the same” analysis as that under the federal constitution. Ex parte Martinez,

560 S.W.3d at 702.

       A retrial is prohibited under the federal double jeopardy clause only when the

prosecutorial “conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to

provoke [or goad] the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679.

The State’s actions must amount to intentional misconduct; that is, mere negligence will

not suffice. See Ex parte Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507. Thus, when a defendant

moves for a mistrial and subsequently claims retrial is barred by double jeopardy, the

habeas court “must determine whether: (1) the prosecutor engaged in conduct to goad or

provoke the defense into requesting a mistrial; or (2) the prosecutor deliberately engaged

in the conduct at issue with the intent to avoid an acquittal.” Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d

at 698. In this case, as well as in Ex parte Martinez:

       the issue is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
       habeas court’s ruling, the habeas court abused its discretion in concluding
       [appellant] failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
       prosecutors engaged in conduct—withholding of potential . . . evidence
       under Brady or Article 39.14(h)—with the intent to goad or provoke
       [appellant] into moving for a mistrial after jeopardy attached or to avoid a
       possible acquittal.

Id. at 697.

       To assess the State’s state of mind, we review the following non-exclusive

objective factors:

                                             5
        1)       Was the misconduct a reaction to abort a trial that was “going badly
                 for the State?” In other words, at the time that the prosecutor acted,
                 did it reasonably appear that the defendant would likely obtain an
                 acquittal?

        2)       Was the misconduct repeated despite admonitions from the trial
                 court?

        3)       Did the prosecutor provide a reasonable, “good faith” explanation for
                 the conduct?

        4)       Was the conduct “clearly erroneous”?

        5)       Was there a legally or factually plausible basis for the conduct,
                 despite its ultimate impropriety?

        6)       Were the prosecutor’s actions leading up to the mistrial consistent
                 with inadvertence, lack of judgment, or negligence, or were they
                 consistent with intentional . . . misconduct?

Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d at 324.

                                            III.     DISCUSSION

        Appellant argues retrial is barred by the double jeopardy clauses of United States

and Texas constitutions because the State provoked a mistrial and the State intentionally

failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to avoid the possibility of an acquittal. See Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

A.      Pertinent Facts

        At the habeas hearing, Detective Hines testified that he turned over the

prosecution guide to the District Attorney’s (DA’s) office in March 2016.3 A few months

         3 “The prosecution guide is prepared in its entirety by law enforcement; no part of the guide is

prepared by the [DA]’s Office. The guide generally includes initial offense reports, witness statements, discs
of interviews, etc. It is used by prosecutors ‘to figure out the nuts and bolts of the case.’” Ex parte Martinez,
560 S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. ref’d).

                                                       6
later, Detective Hines interviewed Jones and Pena. According to Detective Hines, he

submitted the video statements to the DA’s office, but he could not recall the date, and

he did not get a receipt for the submission. The video statements were in the form of

DVDs inside an envelope dated August 2016. Detective Hines testified that the substance

of the video statements indicated that there may have been other witnesses to the murder,

and there may have been a recording of it. Although Detective Hines filed two

supplements to the original prosecution guide, he did not remember why he did not

include the interviews with Jones or Pena in the supplements. Irrespective of the video

statements, Detective Hines explained that he obtained an arrest warrant for appellant

based on appellant’s “DNA located on [Boyd’s] body . . . [i]n her mouth; and . . . under her

fingernails.”

       The original prosecutor testified that her involvement in the case in 2016 was very

brief, she did not read the file, and she “never physically handed off a file” to the next

prosecutor. She stated that the evidence handwritten in the logbook from 2016 reflected

that prosecution guides were dropped off by detectives, yet the video statements “were

dropped off by themselves without being paired with the prosecution guide,” and “were

not logged in, in any manner, back in August of 2016.” Thus, there was no record that the

State received the video statements in connection with this case. The original prosecutor

clarified that she did not “know where those DVDs were,” she did not “ever hide those

DVDs,” and she did not “know anything” about them.

       Next, the first-chair prosecutor testified that he acquired this case in the summer

of 2017. According to the first-chair prosecutor, during the trial court’s recess, Detective

                                             7
Hines informed him about his previous interview of Jones. After conferring with Public

Safety Headquarters, the State then became aware it was in possession of two interviews

in the form of DVDs. The first-chair prosecutor testified that throughout the State’s

preparation for trial, the State conducted numerous pretrial hearings with Detective Hines;

however, Jones’s role in the murder was never discussed, and the State did not know

that Pena existed. When the trial court asked how it was possible that the State was

unaware of the existence of the two interviews, the first-chair prosecutor answered: “It’s

a difficult question to sit here and answer, [but] I presumed that my predecessors had all

applied the system correctly.” The first-chair prosecutor explained that the State was not

“aware of either of [the two video statements] until being in Detective Hines’[s] office

November 5th of 2021.”

       The second-chair prosecutor similarly testified that he was unaware of the video

statements pertaining to Jones and Pena; otherwise, he would have uploaded them into

the digital evidence manager. The second-chair prosecutor affirmed that he did not

“conceal any videos or evidence with intent to avoid an acquittal or to provoke a mistrial.”

The second-chair prosecutor stated that he did not have a discussion with Detective

Hines about Jones or Pena.

       The habeas court found all witnesses to be truthful and credible and found that the

State’s misconduct in failing to timely disclose the evidence in question was not

committed with the specific intent to provoke a mistrial, subvert double jeopardy, or avoid

an acquittal.

                                             8
B.     Analysis

       To determine whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s

application, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the habeas court’s

denial using the Wheeler factors. Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 697. We note that

appellant does not cite to any of the Wheeler factors and does not cite to any case law

applying the Wheeler factors to the facts of this case. See Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d

at 323–24; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Nonetheless, we address each factor below.

       1.     Did it Reasonably Appear at the Time of the State’s Actions or
              Inactions Prior to the Mistrial that Appellant would likely Obtain an
              Acquittal?

       In its opening statement, the State informed the jury that appellant was married to

Boyd’s granddaughter. The State expected the evidence to show that Boyd, a seventy-

five-year-old woman, suffered from debilitating arthritis, walked with a cane, was

assaulted, suffered extreme injuries, and ultimately died. The State informed the jury that

Boyd’s daughter would testify that she shared a checking account with Boyd, and she

would check Boyd’s account daily. On the night Boyd was murdered, Boyd’s credit card

was used at an ATM, which was concerning because Boyd did not drive. The State

explained that it would provide video evidence of appellant using Boyd’s credit card at an

ATM on the night she was murdered. The State told jurors it expected a detective to testify

that Boyd’s credit cards were used several days after her murder by a group of people.

The State explained that appellant provided DNA evidence, and forensic scientists would

show that “the sum total of that evidence” and the “evidence found . . . in the autopsy from

                                             9
[] Boyd’s body cannot exclude [appellant].” Thus, the State explained that the evidence

would connect the DNA evidence found on Boyd to appellant.

       SAPD Officer Raul Tapia testified that when he arrived at Boyd’s apartment, the

door was unlocked, and there was no sign of forced entry. Boyd was found in her bedroom

floor, completely naked, and the sheets were pulled off the bed. Two walking canes were

found underneath her body. Photos of the crime scene were published to the jury.

       SAPD officer Eric Roberson testified that when he arrived at the crime scene, he

observed Boyd “on the bedroom floor with blood on her face and nose and mouth.” Officer

Roberson executed a search warrant at appellant’s apartment, and he recovered a clear

plastic walking cane from a hallway closet, a ball cap, a red muscle shirt, and a pair of

grey and red Nike tennis shoes size 11.5.

       The medical examiner testified that Boyd had extensive injuries to her face and

neck area. Particularly, there was hemorrhage to her eyeballs, eyelids, a contusion at the

hairline, a fracture and contusion to her nasal bridge, multiple lacerations and contusions

of the face, lips, and eyebrows, bruising on and around the left eye, abrasions of the skin,

lacerations of the skin, swelling of the cheeks, bruising of the ears, her tongue was

clenched between her teeth, her spine and neck were fractured, and fifteen of her ribs

were fractured. The medical examiner opined that Boyd was strangled and was

“confident” that a “blunt object struck [a] portion of her head.” Additionally, the medical

examiner collected DNA from Boyd’s vaginal, rectal, and oral cavities as well as fingernail

clippings.

                                            10
       Detective Hines testified that he received information that Boyd’s credit cards were

used several times at an ATM, McDonald’s, and different Wal-Marts after her death. The

ATM’s video surveillance was published to the jury, and it revealed a black man, about

6’4,” and over 300 pounds, wearing blue shorts, red muscle shirt, and a ball cap retrieving

cash from Boyd’s account on the same day her body was discovered. Boyd’s family

identified the man in the video as appellant.

       SAPD Detective Richard Richardson interviewed appellant. Appellant informed

Detective Richardson that he stopped at the ATM to check to see if he obtained “money

on his debit card for unemployment.” During the interview, appellant voluntarily provided

Detective Richardson with a sample of his DNA.

       Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the habeas court’s ruling, we hold

that the habeas court could have determined that it did not reasonably appear “in the time

leading up to the mistrial that [appellant] was likely to obtain an acquittal.” Ex parte

Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 699; see also Martinez v. State, No. 13-19-00312-CR, 2020 WL

5757196, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi—Edinburg Aug. 6, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (analyzing this factor and finding that “[n]othing in the

record suggests that the failure to produce the [discovery] was a reaction by the State to

abandon a trial that was going poorly”). “The evidence pertinent to the first Wheeler factor

supports the habeas court’s ruling.” Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 699.

       2.     Did the State Repeatedly Fail to Disclose the Video Interviews After
              Admonitions from the Trial Court?

                                            11
       Here, there is no evidence that before or during trial prosecutors—or any other

former prosecutor or member of the DA’s office—continued to withhold information after

being repeatedly ordered to disclose it. See Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d at 324. The

evidence provides that once the trial court ordered the State to inquire into the contents

of the alleged phone dump, the State immediately made a full disclosure to the trial court

that it had just recently become aware of the two video interviews, and that the videos

were apparently in its possession. Thus, there is no evidence demonstrating “the

wil[l]fulness of repeated misconduct by the prosecutor,” nor any evidence of “repeated

misconduct.” Id. at 328. The trial court did not order the State to disclose the information

until after the jury was sworn in and the State began presenting its case. See Ex parte

Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 701. The State immediately complied, as instructed, when it was

told to look into the contents of the phone dump. See id.

       When we view the evidence relating to the disclosure of the video interviews in the

light most favorable to the habeas court’s ruling, “we hold there is no evidence that [the

State]—or any other prosecutor or member of the [DA]’s Office—continued to withhold

information after being ordered to disclose it.” Id. at 700; see Ex parte Wheeler, 203

S.W.3d at 324. Accordingly, “this factor does not suggest an attempt to goad the defense

into a mistrial or an attempt to avoid an acquittal.” Id. at 701; see Ex parte Masonheimer,

220 S.W.3d at 507–08; see also Martinez, 2020 WL 5757196, at *4.

       3.     Did the State provide a “good faith” Explanation for its Lack of
              Disclosure?

                                            12
       The undisputed evidence provides that when the State found out about the

existence of potential discovery, it immediately obtained it, and then disclosed the same.

See Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d at 324. The State emphasized that it was uncertain

how the DVDs came to be included in appellant’s file because the State did not log them

into evidence, the DVDs were not paired with appellant’s prosecution guide, the existence

of the DVDs was not apparent from the original prosecution guide, the existence of the

DVDs was not apparent from Detective Hines’s supplemental reports, and the State did

not review the DVDs prior to trial. The State reiterated that it did not know such interviews

occurred or that such recordings existed. The habeas court was entitled to find that the

State had a good-faith desire to provide appellant with all evidence in the State’s

possession. See Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 701. We cannot say that it was an

abuse of discretion for the habeas court to find that the State provided a good-faith

explanation for its failure to disclose the discovery at an earlier point in time. See Hill, 499

S.W.3d at 865. Therefore, on the record before us, this factor does not suggest intentional

conduct aimed at provoking appellant into requesting a mistrial to avoid an acquittal. See

Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 701.

       4.     Was the State’s Failure to Disclose “Clearly Erroneous?”

       Here, the State testified that no one in the DA’s office knew the video statements

were made or otherwise existed, or that they were in possession of the State. It was only

during trial that the State learned it may have failed to provide appellant with the evidence

when Detective Hines testified that law enforcement performed a cell phone dump. Only

after the State investigated the matter of the cell phone dump did the State obtain

                                              13
additional information about law enforcement previously interviewing Jones and Pena.

Nevertheless, the State fully disclosed to appellant all information as soon as it became

aware of its existence.

       Regarding the video interview statements, Detective Hines testified that Jones

“seemed pretty high” during his interview. Nonetheless, during the interview, Jones

denied showing an alleged video of the murder to any person, and Jones voluntarily gave

Detective Hines two phones for law enforcement to perform a phone dump. Detective

Hines further elaborated that during Pena’s interview, Pena denied ever seeing an alleged

video of the murder. In the video statement, Pena admitted that he witnessed Jones’s

mom punch another individual and say, “You filmed it,” in response to hearing about the

video of the murder. Both Jones and Pena denied knowing appellant.

       Although the State concedes that the discovery should have been turned over

pursuant to Article 39.14 of the code of criminal procedure, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 39.14(i), the State claims that its conduct does not tend to negate any evidence

of appellant’s guilt for the underlying murder, and therefore, is not “clearly erroneous.”

According to the State, the trial record demonstrates that the State was “about to admit,

circumstantial evidence that [appellant] sexually assaulted the elderly victim while beating

her to death and stealing her credit card,” and the statements “from Jones and Pena do

not contradict this evidence, nor do those statements establish that [appellant] is guilty of

something other than capital murder.” See Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 811–12 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011) (holding that Brady material includes material, exculpatory evidence,

and impeachment evidence). In this regard, Detective Hines testified that he was

                                             14
compelled to seek an arrest warrant for appellant because of his DNA evidence found in

Boyd’s mouth and under her fingernails, and appellant’s ties to Boyd’s credit card use.

       The habeas court found that both video statements indicated that there may have

been additional witnesses to the murder and that someone filmed the murder, and we

agree that while the interviews with Pena and Jones may shed light on additional

suspects, those interviews do not negate appellant as the prime suspect given that

appellant’s DNA was located on Boyd’s body. See Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 702

(finding that disclosure of information “would not tend to negate Martinez’s guilt or reduce

his sentence under the facts as found by the habeas court in its discretion”). Thus,

appellant has failed to demonstrate how the State’s conduct was clearly erroneous. See

Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that an applicant

seeking habeas corpus relief must prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence);

see also Ex parte Rotter, No. 02-23-00003-CR, 2023 WL 3370725, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth May 11, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding that the

State’s conduct was not “clearly erroneous” where the record reflects that the State turned

over the body camera footage as soon as the State realized that such discovery had not

been previously disclosed); Ex parte Watson, No. 01-19-00637-CR, 2020 WL 7517453,

at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 22, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (affirming the denial of a pretrial application for writ of

habeas corpus where, after jury had been empaneled but prior to opening statements,

the State discovered that footage from an officer’ dash camera had not been turned over

to the defense, and “[a]s soon as the State learned of the video, it alerted [appellant’s]

                                            15
counsel, told him the State would burn him a copy of the footage the same day and bring

it to him, and offered to let him watch the video while it was being copied”); Ex parte

Lopez, No. 2-06-00232-CR, 2007 WL 1776061, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 21,

2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that State’s failure to

disclose two videos until after trial had started, which led to a mistrial, was a “prosecutorial

blunder that was the result of inadvertence, sloppiness, or even simple negligence, none

of which are bars to retrial”); Ex parte Duke, No. 05-15-00047-CR, 2015 WL 1636724, at

*2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(holding that “[t]he record shows no prosecutorial misconduct intended to goad appellant

into requesting a mistrial” where the record showed that game warden turned over to

prosecutor on the morning of trial an audio CD of radio traffic exchanged during chase of

appellant’s boat).

       5.     Was there a Plausible Basis—Legally or Factually—for the State’s
              failure to Disclose?

       As discussed above, the State’s reasoning for not disclosing the video statements

was because the State was not aware of its existence. Nonetheless, we concluded that

the habeas court did not err in finding that the video interviews with Jones and Pena did

not tend to negate appellant’s guilt given the evidence connecting appellant to the crime.

In the interviews, neither Jones’s nor Pena’s statements provide an opportunity for the

jury to find appellant guilty of a lesser-included offense, contradict Boyd’s age, contradict

appellant’s presence at the crime scene, contradict DNA evidence discovered at the crime

scene, or contradict appellant’s possession and use of Boyd’s credit cards. See Ex parte

                                              16
Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 703. Viewing the bases provided by the State for withholding the

information in the light most favorable to the habeas court’s denial of appellant’s

application, we cannot say the habeas court abused its discretion. See Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d

at 664. Thus, this fifth Wheeler factor does not suggest prosecutors engaged in behavior

to goad the defense into a mistrial or that it acted out of fear of an acquittal. See Ex parte

Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507–08.

       6.     Was the State’s Failure to Disclose Consistent with Intentional
              Misconduct?

       As a whole, the prosecutors involved in this case all testified that they did not

intentionally seek to provoke or goad appellant into moving for a mistrial. The evidence

supports the habeas court’s finding that there was no bad faith on behalf of the State.

       Nevertheless, appellant invites us to impute the conduct of Detective Hines to the

prosecution team. However, in Ex parte Montoya, the Fourth Court of Appeals, relying on

several unpublished cases, declined to impute a detective’s conduct to the prosecutorial

team, and we “must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor

court under principles of stare decisis if the transferee court’s decision otherwise would

have been inconsistent with our precedent.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3; Ex parte Montoya,

No. 04-22-00283-CR, 2023 WL 3856739, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 7, 2023,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Ex parte Masonheimer, 220

S.W.3d at 506 (analyzing the mens rea from the lead prosecutor from the first trial in

addition to the new lead prosecutor as the “entire prosecutorial team” to determine

whether intentional prosecutorial conduct occurred to provoke a mistrial). This Court—

                                             17
consistent with the Fourth Court of Appeals—has rejected the argument that law

enforcement conduct amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because there was no

evidence the law enforcement officer worked for the DA’s office. See Henderson v. State,

No. 13-16-00242-CR, 2019 WL 1561996, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr.

11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Therefore, like in Ex parte

Montoya and Henderson, we conclude that Detective Hines’s conduct is not imputed to

the prosecutors. See Ex parte Montoya, 2023 WL 3856739, at *3 (“Montoya’s argument

requires us to impute the conduct of the detective to the prosecutor, but there is no

evidence indicating Detective McNeely was part of the prosecutor’s team or assigned or

worked under the [DA]’s direction.”); Henderson, 2019 WL 1561996, at *4 (rejecting the

argument that law enforcement conduct amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because

there was no evidence the law enforcement officer worked for the DA’s office); State v.

Rushing, No. 09-16-00423-CR, 2017 WL 4182316, at *7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 20,

2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the conduct of

employees in the sheriff’s office could not be attributed to the State because there was

no evidence they were employed by the DA). Even if the habeas court attributed Detective

Hines’s conduct to the State, there is no evidence indicating that Detective Hines intended

to provoke appellant into requesting a mistrial. See Ex parte Montoya, 2023 WL 3856739,

at *3. Again, when viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,

we cannot conclude that any alleged oversight by Detective Hines showed intent to

subvert the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause and goad appellant to

moving for a mistrial. See id.

                                             18
       Given the evidence of the actions taken by the State in this case and the testimony

relating thereto, the trial court was within its discretion in finding the State’s actions were

inconsistent with intentional misconduct. See Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664. After analyzing

the final Wheeler factor, we hold the evidence does not suggest the actions or inactions

of the State were undertaken out of fear of an acquittal or for the purpose of goading

appellant into moving for a mistrial. See Ex parte Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507–08.

C.     Summary

       “Here, the mistrial cured the due process violation stemming from the State’s

violation of its continuing duty of disclosure under article 39.14, Code of Criminal

Procedure and Brady.” Ex parte Stewart, No. 04-17-00249-CR, 2018 WL 1610920, at *4

(Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 4, 2018, no pet.); Ex parte Coleman, 350 S.W.3d at 160

(“The impropriety of the prosecutor’s response was remedied by the mistrial.”). The

habeas court, after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, found appellant failed to

meet his burden to prove that the actions of the State were taken: (1) with the intent to

goad or force him into requesting a mistrial in order to subvert double jeopardy

protections; or (2) to avoid an acquittal. See Ex parte Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507–

08; Ex parte Coleman, 350 S.W.3d at 160. Based on an examination of the evidence

under the appropriate standard of review and considering the Wheeler factors, we hold

the habeas court acted within its discretion in concluding appellant failed to establish by

a preponderance of the evidence that the State intended to goad him into moving for a

mistrial to subvert double jeopardy protections or to avoid an acquittal. See Ex parte

Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507–08; Ex parte Coleman, 350 S.W.3d at 160. We

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therefore hold the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s petition

for writ of habeas corpus. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

                                   IV.     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                      JAIME TIJERINA
                                                                      Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
30th day of November, 2023.

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