Court Opinion

ID: 9735336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:09:38.906953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:57.376803
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
My examination of the record reflects an abundance of inappropriate and prejudicial remarks, comments and criticisms made by the trial court with respect to counsel, to jurors and to witnesses. Although perhaps no single instance would, of itself, dictate reversal, it is my belief that the cumulative effect of all the statements of the court prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial.
A representative sampling of such comments and statements should demonstrate that the court's conduct, was prejudicial, even though I have no doubt that the court did not intend such effect. To be sure, during the reading of the preliminary instructions to the jury, the court said:
"It is very important that you understand that nothing that I say or do or any gesture that I cause to happen in the confines of this courtroom, should be taken by you as any opinion or any direction from me how you should find or how you should react to any bit of evidence. I hope everyone will understand that. Whether I, levity, fall asleep, whatever it happens to be, please understand that it's a very serious matter, but it is not my decision, it is yours. And do not draw anything from anything I say or do, other than my rulings with regard to evidence, okay?" Record at 108.
In my view, such preliminary comments do not diminish the adverse impact of the recurrent statements made throughout the trial.
At one point the defense was attempting to question S.H. about her relationship with her mother's present husband when the court interjected:
"COURT: If you can show me how that's going to help prove or disprove whether or not your client compelled this young lady to lick his penis, I want you to do it! I'm going to overrule it and you go ahead with that line of questioning.
MR. SHELMON:6 You want me to tell the court that?"
Record at 368.
This statement was susceptible to an implication that defendant had some burden to "disprove" his guilt.
At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, the following occurred:
"THE COURT: The State rests?
MR. HOOVER:7 Subject to [Jury review of exhibits].
THE COURT:; Does the defense rest, as well?
*695MR. SHELMON: The defense does not rest, your Honor." Record at 428, 486.
The comment carries a possible implication that the court felt that the defendant should not or would not offer any defense.
During the defense's direct examination of the welfare caseworker there was this exchange:
"THE COURT: I thought you asked her what did she relate to.
MR. SHELMON: What Sheena related to her is, if you want me to rephrase it. What did Sheena tell her.
THE COURT: It's still hearsay.
MR. SHELMON: Is that the Court's ruling?
MR. HOOVER: No, I don't object to that.
THE COURT: Fine, pile it in." Record at 451.
Despite the fact that the deputy prosecitor had not made a hearsay objection, the court categorized the evidence as such but even more deprecatingly, implied that the defense was "piling" extraneous and inappropriate matters into the record.
The defense included testimony from Reverend Edwin Bontreger, the pastor of a church to which both the victim's mother and the defendant had belonged. Defense counsel asked a question concerning Tina Riley's assistance to another member of the congregation. Mr. Hoover objected and the following occurred:
"MR. SHELMON: We're sure going to connect it up, your Honor.
COURT: In my lifetime?
MR. SHELMON: Your Honor.
COURT: Okay." Record at 568
This deprecating question suggested that counsel was unduly prolonging the proceedings.
Very early in the proceedings, S.H. was testifying upon direct examination and the State sought to have her demonstrate, with the welfare caseworker, the manner in which the allegedly forced deviate conduct took place. The court overruled a defense objection stating:
"COURT: For that limited purpose, I'll permit it. But beyond that, I think the young lady is doing an excellent job of testifying...." Record at 269.
Quite clearly the gratuitous comment indicated a favorable view toward both the child's testimony and her credibility.
Immediately after the testimony of Reverend Bontreger and just before the defendant was called to the witness stand, the court in an apparent attempt at levity, addressed one of the jurors:
COURT: Be seated please. Next individual to testify, I believe is going to be the Defendant, which of course is, am I wrong? Don't puzzle me like that. The testimony could be somewhat lengthy. Is there anyone that has a commitment that I need to deal with tonight?
JUROR: You and I?
COURT: You and I? Our date?
MR. SHELMON: Is that on the record?
COURT: 7:00, Nu-Joy?
JUROR: 6:30.
COURT: 6:30. Anybody else have a problem? I'm not calling it a problem, Mary Lou. Yeah, I have a commitment, I know. We'll get through the Defendant, you know there's group confession you could be going to instead.
JUROR: (inaudible)" Record at 601.
The suggestion of social contact may only have been at attempt at satirical humor. However, the concluding remark about "group confession" came immediately following the minister's testimony during which the prosecution inquired concerning possible pastor-penitent privilege in that particular church. The comment, in that context, was particularly denigrating to one of the defense witnesses and constituted a possible invitation to make light of his evidence.
Finally, during cross-examination of S.H. the exchange between the court and defense counsel even prompted the deputy prosecutor to intervene in an apparent attempt to regain some semblance of propriety and civility to the trial:
"MR. SHELMON: And we're trying to find out today, and I apologize that I'm up here, the Judge told me to do this.
*696COURT: I didn't tell you to do anything. You can conduct your investigation as you see fit. I simply said you could, where there's been no showing, we have to treat anything other as a normal witness. I didn't say badger her. I didn't say how to conduct your investigation.
MR. SHELMON: Well, your Honor-
COURT: But the proper way, if you'd like to know, is to ask the question, do you recall making this question, this question being asked and do you recall this response.
MR. SHELMON: Then I have to subject her to start reading this out loud. There's a reason I didn't do it, just because of what you said, what they just gave to me yesterday morning.
COURT: You're welcome to present any inconsistency you want. Whether she's eleven or one hundred and eleven.
MR. HOOVER: Will you gentlemen come to order?" Record at 812-18.
The remarks, comments and criticisms of the court in their cumulative effect strayed far afield from the objectivity and impartiality which trial courts are obligated to display. See Ind. Judicial Conduct Canon 8. The fact that counsel did not object each time the court injected itself into the proceedings with adverse implications to the defense, should not be viewed as a waiver. As stated in Abernathy v. State (1988) Ind., 524 N.E.2d 12, 15:
"[Aln attorney may be reluctant to object to the judge's actions in the presence of the jury, fearing that an apparent conflict with the judge would cause more damage."
Perhaps for this reason also, I do not view the trial court's statement to the jury immediately following his exchange with juror Mary Lou Benner (Record at 32) and his comment about "group confession" to be curative. The court acknowledged that he intended a "bit of levity" and that when he seemed to "get short with one attorney over another, it's just an impulsive thing with me". Record at 602. He asked the jury to treat both sides fairly but in doing so once again called attention to his view that "[slometimes this things drag out...." Record at 602. This statement does little, if anything to ameliorate the negative connotations already conveyed.
In these days of increasing incivility among and between members of the bar and the bench, the cautionary admonition of our Supreme Court in Kennedy v. State (1972) 258 Ind. 211, 280 N.E.2d 611, 620-621, delivers a message, perhaps even more salient and more necessary than when uttered twenty-three years ago. The Court said:
"Care should be exercised to avoid indirect expression of opinion by the trial judge, and it is improper for the trial judge to ask questions which are reasonably calculated to impeach or discredit the witness or his testimony. Canon 8 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Ethics reads in part:
'A judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear some obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.!
A jury of laymen will often have an awesome respect for the institution of the American trial judge. This can lead them to accord great and perhaps decisive significance to the judge's every word and intimation. It is therefore essential that the judge refrain from any actions indicating any position other than strict impartiality."
In light of the Kennedy precedent, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. Mr. Shelmon was defense counsel.

. Mr. Hoover was the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney.