Court Opinion

ID: 9773694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:54:56.024242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:56.321506
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge
(dissenting).
Color me amazed once again. See Al-drighetti v. State, 507 S.W.2d 770 (dissenting opinion delivered March 27, 1974).
*398The appellant raises two and only two grounds of error. They are as follows:
“1. The Court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of an extraneous offense, a prior burglary of the Devereaux house.
“2. The Court committed reversible error in denying Mr. Taylor’s motion for an instructed verdict of acquittal on the ground that the State had failed to prove that the burglarized house was occupied and controlled by Tallie Devereaux.”
In his argument under the second ground of error appellant reviewed the evidence and then stated:
“While the foregoing evidence appears sufficient under the authorities to establish the indictment allegations that the house in question was occuped (sic) and controlled by Tallie Devereaux, the issue is raised by counsel on appeal as the only other possible point of error contained in the record.”
The record supports the conclusion that Tallie Devereaux occupied and controlled the premises in question as alleged.
Nevertheless, the majority reaches out and says:
“The first question presented is whether the evidence is sufficient to show want of consent of the alleged owner to the entry and taking of his property.”
Even though this is not a ground of error, the majority overturns well-settled law, not only in burglary cases, but in theft cases as well, all unnecessarily in my opinion.
The long-standing rule being interred today is well described in 55 Tex.Jur.2d, Theft, Sec. 185, pp. 445-447 — circumstantial evidence, as follows:
“Where positive and direct proof is available, want of consent cannot ordinarily be shown by circumstantial evidence. The best evidence of want of consent is the testimony of the owner, and circumstantial evidence is inadmissible to show want of consent unless it appears that the owner is inaccessible by the use of ordinary diligence or is beyond the reach of legal process. Thus where the owner is present and has failed to give direct and positive testimony as to his want of consent to the taking, such want of consent will not be inferred from other circumstances in the evidence. But want of consent may be proved by circumstantial evidence when the owner is dead or is incompetent to testify, or where without fault on the part of the state direct testimony cannot be produced, or where it is alleged that the owner is unknown, or where no objection is made when the evidence is offered. And where the evidence, though circumstantial, shows an absolute want of consent, a conviction will not be reversed because want of consent was not proved by the direct and positive testimony of the owner who was a witness in the case.
“Where circumstantial evidence is relied on the circumstances proved must absolutely exclude every reasonable presumption that the owner gave his consent. The rule permitting want of consent to be shown by circumstantial evidence in certain cases does not make admissible for that purpose testimony that would be inadmissible under other rules of evidence, such as that as to hearsay.”
It is clear that the rule prohibits the use of circumstantial evidence only where direct evidence of the fact is attainable, which in my opinion is a sound rule. While some of the cases refer to the attainable direct evidence as being the best evidence, there is nothing to indicate the court was relying upon the best evidence rule about writings as now assumed by the majority to reach their desired result.
I dissent.