Court Opinion

ID: 9830501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:15:15.971933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:28.553491
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
It has been held that upon the death of a guardian the relation of the ward to the estate of his former guardian is that of debtor and creditor, and that upon the appointment of another guardian by the probate court it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the matters between the ward and the estate of the former guardian. American Bonding Co. v. Logan, 132 S. W. 894.
[4, 5] If a second guardian is appointed, that guardianship ceases when the ward becomes of age, and such ward could then sue upon the bond of the first guardian for waste committed by the first guardian. Hix v. Duncan, 99 S. W. 422. Suits of that character were sustained in the two cases hereinbefore cited, thus demonstrating that our statutes do not have the effect of releasing the estate and sureties of a deceased guardian from liability to the heirs upon the appointment of another guardian. Upon the appointment of the successor, our statute (article 4204, Rev. St. .1911) charges him with responsibility for the .entire estate which came into- the hands of his predecessor, and the only way in which he can escape liability is to show that he has been unable to collect the same or part thereof from persons liable to the estate of the minors and from the *271estate of the first guardian and his bondsmen, although he exercised due diligence. In this case the petition alleges, in substance,that A. Malik made the loans to Toman without authority from the court, and had never reported same to the court, and had made such loans without taking security in the manner prescribed by law. The guardian is liable for money thus loaned if it is lost.^ Roberson v. Tonn, 76 Tex. 535, 13 S. W. 385; Freedman v. Vallie, 75 S. W. 322.
[6] It is further alleged that A. Malik made certain deposits of funds with Tomanwithout any authority from the county court, and that he made the same negligently, and continued the same negligently wñen he knew, or could have known by the use of due diligence, that the same were liable to be lost to the minors. As against a general demurrer, at least, such averments were sufficient to charge liability, it being alleged that the funds were never recovered from Toman. Murph v. McCullough, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 90 S. W. 69; American Surety Co. v. Hardwick, 186 S. W. 805. The petition showed that Mary Malik had never recovered the money from Toman, and had renewed loans to him to the extent of $735, from which allegations, and the general allegation with regard to loss of funds, the intendment can reasonable be indulged that the money due by Toman was not paid to Mary Malik by the estate of A. Malik or the sureties on his bond. It is not alleged that any accounting took place between Mary Malik apd the estate of her husband and his sureties; and, as she is interested in the community estate held by her deceased husband, it would seem that any accounting other than the actual procurement of the funds might be contested by her surety, and by the wards.
[7] It is alleged that she undertook to deal with Toman as to part of the indebtedness, but this would not release her husband’s estate or his sureties. It is also alleged that she dealt negligently in regard to the matter. We are not prepared to say that such negligence under the facts of this case, or under any facts, would release the sureties of her husband from liability to the wards, but suppose that it would do so, provided the negligence resulted in the loss of the loans and deposits, which might be the case if Toman was solvent and the money could have been collected after she became guardian. In this case it 'is alleged that plaintiffs are unable to say when Toman became insolvent; that is, even under the .theory that the sureties might become released by her negligence, the facts pleaded merely show that plaintiffs do not know whether .or, not the sureties of A. Malik have a defense to the suit.
As the statute makes Mary Malik liable for the same debt alleged to be due" by'the sureties of A. Malik, it appears that the petition makes out a prima facie case against all the defendants for the same debt. Plaintiffs can only collect their debt once, so it if eminently proper that they join in one suit all who are asserted to be liable for suc!> debt. The fact that under our statutes ant' under the averments of the petition there are matters to be adjusted between the sureties of A. Malik and Mary Malik adds weight to the conviction that there is no misjoinder, for if the allegations be true, in all probability, had plaintiffs sued only Mary Malik and her surety, they would have impleaded the sureties of A. Malik. We believe the following language of Judge Stayton, in Love v. Keowne, 58 Tex. 201, is peculiarly applicable to this case:
“The breach of each of the bonds doubtless constitutes a cause of action against the makers of the several bonds, ordinarily separate and distinct; but the relation of two sets of sureties may be such to the subject-matter of litigation, which in this case is the estate, that came into the hands of the administrators, that they may be joined in one action, and in which it may become eminently proper that all the sureties should be joined, not only -for the protection of those interested in the estate, but also for the purpose of adjusting the equities existing among the sureties themselves. In a court of equity this is always desirable, in order to do complete justice between all parties without a multiplicity of suits.”
It is true in that case the two sets of sureties had the same principal, but in view of the manner in which our statutes connect up the two guardianships and of the construction placed on our statutes by our decisions, it was just as proper to join the sureties of Malik with Mrs. Malik and her surety as it was to join both sets of sureties in the case quoted from.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.