Court Opinion

ID: 9399076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 20:04:20.685072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:38.693412
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/1/23 P. v. Turner CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
             Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A164858
 v.
 CURTIS MARQUIS TURNER,                                                 (Contra Costa County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 2-334434-8)
             Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Curtis Turner appeals from an order finding him not
competent to stand trial and committing him to the Department of State
Hospitals (DSH) pursuant to Penal Code section 1367 et seq.1 His appointed
counsel has filed a brief raising no issues, asking us to consider his appeal as
prescribed in Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529 (Ben C.). Our
review of the record leads us to conclude that the appeal is moot, and we
therefore dismiss it.
                                                  BACKGROUND
         On May 4, 2021, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a
felony complaint charging Turner with indecent exposure – unlawful entry
(§ 314, subd. (1)) (count 1); carrying a dirk or dagger (§ 21310) (count 2); and
simple battery (§§ 242/243, subd. (a)) (count 3). The complaint also alleged

         1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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that Turner committed the charged offenses in violation of a grant of
probation and a grant of mandatory supervision (§ 1203.3).
      On May 14, defense counsel declared a doubt about Turner’s
competency. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings and, on May 19,
appointed two psychologists pursuant to section 1368 to evaluate Turner’s
competence —Dr. Marlin Griffith and Dr. Alexis Smith—with written reports
due July 1. Dr. Griffith opined that Turner was a “mentally competent
individual,” and Dr. Smith found that Turner was “likely competent to stand
trial.” The record does not reflect that the trial court made any findings
based on these reports, and at a December 1 hearing, the trial court noted
that the issue of Turner’s competency was “still unresolved.”
      On January 6, 2022, pursuant to the parties’ request, the court
reappointed Dr. Smith to again evaluate Turner’s competence. On February
14, Dr. Smith submitted a written report noting that in her June 2021
evaluation of Turner, she had been “equivocal about his competency to stand
trial,” observing that “[h]is mental state appears to have deteriorated
significantly since he was seen several months ago,” and concluding that
Turner “should be adjudicated incompetent to stand trial.”
      On February 16, after the parties submitted on the psychologists’
reports, the trial court found Turner incompetent and referred the matter to
the Contra Costa Conditional Release Program (CONREP) for a placement
evaluation.
      On March 2, the trial court indicated that it had received CONREP’s
recommendation that Turner be referred to DSH for competency training.
The parties submitted on the recommendation, and the trial court ordered
Turner committed to DSH for two years for competency training and
treatment.

                                       2
      On March 3, Turner filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s
finding of incompetence and commitment to DSH.
      On November 1, while this appeal was pending, the trial court found
Turner competent to stand trial and reinstated criminal proceedings.2
      On November 15, pursuant to a plea agreement, Turner pled no contest
to carrying a dirk or dagger, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The
trial court sentenced Turner to the midterm of two years, and awarded him
602 days of actual credit and 602 days of conduct credit, meaning that the
two-year sentence was deemed served and Turner was ordered released.
      Turner’s appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues and asks
us to consider his appeal pursuant to Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th 529. Turner
was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief but has not done so.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Turner’s counsel acknowledges our Supreme Court’s decision in Ben C.,
which held that review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende)
is inapplicable to appeals of Lanterman-Petris-Short Act conservatorship
proceedings (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). (Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at
pp. 538–543.) Counsel also points us to People v. Blanchard (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 1020 (Blanchard), in which Division Three of this court, relying
on Ben C. and other relevant cases, concluded that due process does not
require independent review in incompetency commitment proceedings such
as these. (Blanchard, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1024–1025.) The
Blanchard court explained that in appeals in such proceedings, appointed
counsel should follow the process identified in Ben C. by filing a brief setting

      2On April 3, 2023, the record on appeal was augmented with the
transcripts of the November 1 and November 15 hearings. (See California
Rules of Court, rule 8.340.)

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forth the relevant facts and law and informing the court that he or she has
found no arguable issue to be pursued on appeal. Such a brief, the court
stated, provides an adequate basis for dismissal. (Blanchard, at pp. 1025–
1026.) Counsel asks that we “at the very least, conduct the level of review
prescribed . . . in Ben C.”
      In any event, we need not resolve whether independent review of the
record under Wende and Ben C. is appropriate because we conclude that this
appeal is moot.
      “ ‘ “[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy
cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by
subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without
practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.” ’ ” (People v.
Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486 (Delong).) In the criminal context,
review is permitted where the defendant who has completed his or her
sentence has an interest in clearing his or her name or where, as a result of
the sentence, the law imposes “disadvantageous collateral consequences” on
the defendant. (People v. Lindsey (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 742, 744 (Lindsey);
16 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2022) Criminal Appeal,
§ 187.)
      In Lindsey, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d 742, the defendant had been found
insane within the meaning of section 1367 et seq. The court suspended
criminal proceedings and committed the defendant to a state hospital for care
and treatment. (Lindsey, at p. 743.) The defendant appealed the finding of
insanity, but, during the pendency of the appeal, he was certified to have
become sane and was returned to the court, where the criminal charges were
set for trial. (Ibid.) The appellate court, holding that the appeal was moot,
observed: “The certificate of [sanity] . . . attests that defendant is no longer

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under . . . a [mental] disability. The law imposes no disadvantageous
collateral consequences upon one whose trial has had to be postponed by
reason of such a temporary disability . . . . If defendant’s mental state is
considered in future proceedings, the issue will turn upon what that state is
found to be as of the relevant time, and not the fact that an order was
[previously] made under . . . section 1370. If any social opprobrium is
thought to attach by reason of the commitment, that is nothing which is
likely to be relieved by an appellate decision. The temporary commitment is
nothing from which defendant needs to ‘clear his name.’ ” (Lindsey, supra,
20 Cal.App.3d at pp. 744–745; see Delong, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 489.)
      Here, the February 16, 2022 incompetence finding and subsequent
commitment impose no disadvantageous collateral consequences on Turner;
they caused a temporary delay in the disposition of his criminal case while
his competency was being restored. The criminal case has since been
resolved and Turner has been released. No meaningful relief can be
effectuated through a review of the incompetency finding and commitment
and so this appeal is moot. (Lindsey, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at pp. 744–745.)
                                 DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.

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                                           _________________________
                                           Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Markman, J. *

People v. Turner (A164858)

      *Superior Court of Alameda County, Judge Michael Markman, sitting as
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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