Court Opinion

ID: 9795830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:39:39.986891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:38:04.934987
License: Public Domain

Judge GRAHAM
specially concurring.
I agree with the conclusion and the analysis contained in Part II of the majority's opinion. I write separately, however, to express my view that defendant's motion for postconviction relief is time barred under § 16-5-402, C.R.8.2002.
Defendant first raised his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel nearly eleven years after trial and over four years after his conviction was final. In this period, defendant pursued a direct appeal, review of that appeal, and motions to reduce his sentence and a proportionality review of his sentences. He also has been afforded further appellate review of those matters.
Section 16-5-402 limits the time in which the validity of a conviction may be collaterally attacked to three years from the date of conviction. The three-year period began running June 25, 1991, the date this court issued its mandate at the conclusion of defendant's direct appeal. Although defendant was resentenced at the conclusion of his direct appeal, this cireumstance did not toll or otherwise modify the limitations period. See People v. Metcalf, 979 P.2d 581 (Colo.App.1999). One division of this court has already expressly ruled that resentencing does not modify the three-year period. People v. Cummins, 37 P.3d 507 (Colo.App.2001).
Thus, defendant's motion was time barred, and I see no reason to reach the merits of his ineffective assistance claim.