Court Opinion

ID: 9369846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 19:02:11.847125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:17.361345
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/23 P. v. Toschi CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C095977

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                         (Super. Ct. Nos.
                                                                                   19CF03379, 21CF04876)
           v.

 MICHAEL KEFFE SHELLEY TOSCHI,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Michael Keffe Shelley Toschi pleaded no contest to bringing
contraband into a jail, and the trial court placed him on probation. Defendant
subsequently pleaded no contest in two separate cases. The trial court terminated
defendant’s probation and sentenced him according to the stipulated sentence to which
the parties had agreed, including an upper term in the first case.
         On appeal, defendant argues he is entitled to remand for the retroactive application
of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3) (Senate Bill

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567),1 which amended Penal Code section 11702 to limit the trial court’s discretion to
impose the upper term (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1), (2)) and mandated imposition of the lower
term in certain circumstances, including where the offender is under 26 years old at the
time of the offense or has experienced physical, psychological, or childhood trauma
contributing to the commission of the offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) The People
concede the issue. Because defendant stipulated to the upper term as part of a plea deal,
we reject the People’s concession. We will order the trial court to correct a clerical error
in the abstract of judgment and affirm.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A.     Case No. 19CF03379 (case No. 3379)
       In May 2019, defendant drank alcohol, smoked marijuana, and fell asleep in his
car for two hours. As he was driving home, he hit two parked cars. Scared, he fled the
scene. Defendant told a responding police officer that his name was “Eric Smith” and
produced a driver’s license with the same name. After defendant was arrested and placed
in a holding area at the local police department, he dropped some benzodiazepine pills on
the floor and crushed them with his feet. Defendant was 24 years old at the time.
       In July 2019, defendant was charged with bringing contraband into a jail (§ 4573,
subd. (a)—count 1); felony attempted false personation (§§ 664, subd. (a), 529, subd.
(a)(3)—count 2); and misdemeanor hit-and-run driving resulting in property damage.
(Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)—count 3.) As to count 1, it further was alleged defendant
suffered a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12) and had served a prior prison term.
(§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

1    Senate Bill 567 was enacted after Assembly Bill No. 124 and incorporated
Assembly Bill No. 124’s amendments to section 1170. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 3(c).)
2      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              2
       In July 2020, defendant pleaded no contest to counts 1 and 3. The remaining
allegations were dismissed with a Harvey3 waiver. During the October 2020 sentencing
hearing, the prosecutor argued the upper term was appropriate because defendant was on
parole at the time of the offenses, had previously committed four prior felonies and five
prior misdemeanors, and had never successfully completed a grant of probation. In
addition, with respect to the current charges, defendant committed multiple hit-and-run
offenses, lied to the police officer, and tried to destroy drugs while he was in custody.
Defense counsel responded that defendant suffered from substance abuse and had been
trying to destroy the drugs rather than smuggle them into the jail. In addition, defendant
had completed outpatient drug treatment and had been sober for nearly one year, and he
now had steady employment. The court ordered three years of probation and imposed
various fines and fees.
       B.     Case No. 21CF04876 (case No. 4876)
       In September 2021, defendant was charged with forgery of a prescription (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 4324, subd. (a)—count 1); possession of a false prescription blank (id. at
§ 4325, subd. (a)—count 2); and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b)(2)—count 3.) With respect to count 1, it further
was alleged that defendant suffered a prior strike. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12.)
       In December 2021, defendant pleaded no contest to count 1. The remaining
allegations were dismissed with a Harvey waiver.
       C.     Case No. 21CF05778 (case No. 5778)
       In November 2021, defendant was charged with child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)—
count 1); felony falsifying a registration card, license, license plate, permit, or evidence
of vehicle ownership (Veh. Code, § 4463, subd. (a)(1)—count 2); and misdemeanor

3      People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

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driving under the influence. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f)—count 3.) As to counts 1
and 2, it further was alleged defendant suffered a prior strike. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j),
1170.12.)
       In December 2021, defendant pleaded no contest to count 3. The remaining
allegations were dismissed with a Harvey waiver.
       D.     Sentencing on all three cases
       In March 2022, the court found defendant had violated probation in case No. 3379.
During the sentencing hearing, the court noted that as part of defendant’s plea deal, the
parties had stipulated to an aggregate state prison term for all three cases of four years
eight months, which included an upper term in case No. 3379. The trial court sentenced
defendant as follows: (1) in case No. 3379, the upper term of four years for count 1
(§ 4573, subd. (a)), plus six months concurrent for count 3 (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd.
(a)); and (2) in case No. 4876, eight months (or one-third the midterm) consecutive for
count 1. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4324, subd. (a).) The court also imposed various fines
and fees.
       Defendant filed timely appeals from case Nos. 4876 and 3379. He did not request
a certificate of probable cause in either appeal.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
       At the time of defendant’s sentencing in 2022, Senate Bill 567 had come into
effect and section 1170, subdivision (b) required trial courts to impose no more than the
middle term unless there are aggravating circumstances that have been (1) stipulated to
by the defendant; or (2) found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or judge.
(§ 1170, subds. (b)(1), (2).) The court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions
during sentencing based on a certified record of conviction. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) In
addition, section 1170 now makes the low term of imprisonment the preferred sentence
when the person was a youth (i.e., younger than 26 years old) at the time the offense was

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committed. (§§ 1170, subds. (b)(6), (b)(6)(B), 1016.7, subd. (b).) Under such
circumstances, a trial court “shall order imposition of the lower term” when the person’s
youth was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense, “unless the court finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition
of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
Section 1170 also requires a court to state on the record the reasons for its sentencing
choice at the time of sentencing. (§ 1170, subd. (c).)
         Defendant argues remand for resentencing is required because the trial court
imposed the upper term as part of his four-year eight-month sentence even though there
was no fact in aggravation that was stipulated to by defendant or found true beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury or the judge. Defendant further argues the upper term was
improper because he was a youth at the time of the offense in case No. 3379. Defendant
acknowledges that he stipulated to the upper term as part of his negotiated plea
agreement, but argues his plea agreement cannot avoid the requirements of the amended
section 1170, subdivision (b). We disagree.
         The plain language of the amendatory language in section 1170 relates to the
discretion involved when the court fashions and imposes a sentence, and not the parties’
ability to negotiate a stipulated term. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6) [stating the court shall
impose the lower term unless the court finds the interests of justice demand otherwise];
see also § 1170, subd. (b)(2) [discussing the court’s ability to exercise its discretion to
exceed the middle term in imposing a sentence].) Here, because the plea agreement
included a stipulated sentence that included an agreed-upon upper term, the trial court
was never called upon to exercise any discretion in fashioning a sentence. Nor could it
do so.
         A negotiated plea is a contract. (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.)
“ ‘ “When a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits
such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties,

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including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 930-931.) The trial court may decide not to approve the
terms of a plea agreement negotiated by the parties if it does not believe the agreed-upon
disposition is fair, but it cannot change that bargain or agreement without the consent of
both parties. (Id. at p. 931.) If the court accepts the plea, “the court may not proceed as
to the plea other than as specified in the plea.” (§ 1192.5, subd. (b).)
       Here, the trial court followed the rules applicable to negotiated pleas and
conducted no analysis of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court proceeded
to sentence defendant consistent with the agreed-upon terms of the sentence. Under these
circumstances, the trial court could not both accept the plea agreement and make a
discretionary sentencing choice under section 1170, subdivision (b), making Senate Bill
567’s amendment of section 1170 inapplicable to this case.
       We find the logic of People v. Brooks (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1099, which
involved a similar situation, persuasive. There, the defendant agreed to a stipulated
sentence in a plea agreement. (Brooks, supra, at p. 1102.) After he was sentenced, the
Legislature enacted section 1170.91, which required the trial court to consider
retroactively trauma the defendant suffered as a result of military service as a factor in
mitigation when imposing a sentence under section 1170. (Brooks, at pp. 1102-1103.)
The trial court denied the defendant’s petition to recall his sentence pursuant to this new
law, finding it had no power to resentence defendant because he had agreed to a
stipulated term in his plea agreement. (Ibid.) The appellate court affirmed, reasoning
that because the defendant stipulated to the term of his sentence in his plea agreement, the
trial court did not apply any judicial discretion at the time it sentenced him. (Id. at pp.
1102, 1106-1107.) In addition, it had no discretion on resentencing, because to do so
would unlawfully modify the terms of his plea agreement. (Ibid.) Once the trial court
accepted the plea agreement, it was required to impose a sentence within the limits of that
plea bargain. (Id. at p. 1106.) As a result, when the court sentences the defendant to that

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stipulated term, it is not exercising its triad sentencing discretion. (Id. at p. 1107.) Put
another way, “ ‘when a trial court sentences a defendant who has agreed to a stipulated
sentence for a term of years, the trial court exercises no discretion to decide between an
upper, middle and lower term and may not consider factors in mitigation and aggravation.
Therefore, the trial court is not “imposing a term under subdivision (b) of Section 1170.”
(§ 1170.91, subd. (a).)’ ” (Brooks, at p. 1109.)
       Here, the record reflects that the parties agreed to a stipulated sentence of four
years eight months, which included the upper term of four years on count 1 in case No.
3379. The trial court accepted that plea agreement and did not exercise its discretion to
impose the lower, middle or upper term sentence under section 1170, subdivision (b).
Instead, the trial court lacked discretion to sentence defendant to anything but the agreed-
upon term. As such, the retroactive changes brought about by the enactment of Senate
Bill 567 do not affect his sentence, and remand for resentencing is not required.
                                              II
       The parties note that the abstract of judgment incorrectly records defendant’s
conviction in case No. 4876 for forgery of a prescription as a violation of Penal Code
section 4324, subdivision (a). We will order the trial court to correct the abstract of
judgment to reflect the correct code, namely, Business and Professions Code section
4324, subdivision (a). (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [reviewing court
may order a trial court to correct an abstract of judgment to reflect the oral
pronouncement of judgment].)
                                       DISPOSITION
       The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment identifying
the conviction in case No. 4876 as pursuant to Business and Professions Code section

                                               7
4324, subdivision (a) and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. The judgment is affirmed.

                                                      KRAUSE               , J.

I concur:

      EARL                 , J.

                                            8
DUARTE, J., dissenting.
        The majority rejects the Attorney General’s concession that remand for
resentencing is required, relying on authority that simply does not apply to the statutory
subdivision at issue here, amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).1 I agree
with the parties’ shared conclusion that remand is required; accordingly, I dissent.
        As the majority correctly notes, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 731, § 1.3) amended section 1170 to limit the trial court’s discretion to impose
the upper term (§ 1170, subds. (b)(1), (2)) and mandated imposition of the lower term in
certain circumstances, including where, as here, where the offender is under 26 years old
at the time of the offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); maj. opn., ante, p. 2.) Defendant was 24
years old at the time of his crimes; thus, there is no dispute that but for his pre-
amendment stipulation to the upper term, a lower term sentence would be mandated
absent the findings required by the statute, i.e., that imposition of the lower term would
be contrary to the interests of justice.
        Although the majority applies People v. Brooks (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1099 to the
situation here (maj. opn., ante, pp. 6-7), I do not. I do not disagree with the Brooks
court’s conclusion, but I disagree with the majority here that the specific statutory
subdivision at issue in this case is analogous to the statute discussed in Brooks.
        As the majority points out, section 1170.91 merely requires the trial court to
“consider the circumstance [of military service] as a factor in mitigation when imposing a
term under subdivision (b) of Section 1170.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 6.) I do not disagree
that this requirement of discretionary consideration is arguably analogous to section
1170, subdivision (b)(1), which provides that “the court shall, in its sound discretion,

1   Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term,” absent certain
requirements of proof to which the parties are expressly permitted to stipulate.
       But section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) is different, and expressly excludes the
discretionary language of subdivision (b)(1), providing that “notwithstanding paragraph
(1), and unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term.” And, unlike 1170.91--the
statute at issue in Brooks--subdivision (b)(6) of section 1170 does not require mere
consideration of a factor in mitigation, it requires imposition of a low-term sentence
absent a specific interests of justice finding that was neither made nor stipulated to here.
       For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s refusal to accept the
Attorney General’s concession that remand for resentencing is required in this case.

                                                         DUARTE                , Acting P. J.

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