Court Opinion

ID: 9654868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:53:26.77729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:14.271453
License: Public Domain

FARRIS, Justice,
dissenting.
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining Adkins’ motion to suppress. The majority holds the trial court abused its discretion because Sergeant Boyd was justified in stopping Adkins’ ear based upon the anonymous informant’s tip and Boyd’s observation that Adkins was driving on a flat tire. I dissent because the majority opinion denies the trial court any discretion in the matter.
The majority cites a number of cases which involve a police officer’s right to rely upon information from an unknown informant as probable cause to detain a suspect. None of those authorities goes as far as the majority opinion in holding that such information, standing alone, can be sufficient probable cause to stop a suspect. And none of those authorities compels a trial judge to put aside any reservations about the credibility of the State’s case because of proof the police relied upon such information.
In this case the informant told Boyd he had been following a drunk driver and pointed to Adkins’ car. The informant reported his assessment of what he had observed rather than his relaying to Boyd all that was necessary to constitute criminal activity. Compare Williams v. State, 629 S.W.2d 146, 147 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, no pet.) (in an unlawful possession of a firearm case, an unidentified witness told police that suspect had a gun). The majority sees the fact that Adkins was driving on a flat tire as corroboration of the anonymous tip. However, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court may have found driving on a flat tire at 3:00 in the morning was not a circumstance which would support a reasonable suspicion the driver was intoxicated. Perhaps the trial court found that, in all probability, driving on a flat at that hour could reflect the driver’s fear of the risk involved in stopping to change the tire as well as the possibility of his wrongdoing. Further, the trial court heard Boyd’s testimony that: he did not observe Adkins commit any traffic violations; he would have stopped Adkins even if there was not a flat tire; and there was another officer in a car ahead of Adkins who was in position to observe and, if necessary, pursue Adkins.
In addition, the majority ignores Boyd’s testimony that he did not see Adkins commit a traffic violation and insists Boyd had probable cause to stop Adkins because he was driving on his wheel rim.
In announcing he was sustaining the motion to suppress, the trial judge held the tip from an unnamed informant alone was not enough to justify detention referring to a case which had been cited by the State. See Pringle v. State, 732 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, pet. ref’d).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion and we should affirm its exercise of that discretion. See State v. Stevenson, 784 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth *9031990, no pet.); State v. Carr, 774 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tex.App.—Austin 1989, no pet.).