Court Opinion

ID: 9373694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:46.415859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.586171
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     LEWIS A. HICKS,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  AT-0752-13-7338-X-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: May 17, 2022
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
           Lewis A. Hicks, Americus, Georgia, pro se.

           Denise Gillis, Quantico, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         On May 8, 2015, the administrative judge issued a compliance initial
     decision finding the agency in noncompliance with the Board’s January 2, 2015
     nonprecedential final order. For the reasons discussed below, we DISMISS the
     petition for enforcement as moot. This is the final decision of the Merit Systems

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

     Protection Board in this compliance proceeding. Title 5 of the Code of Federal
     Regulations, section 1201.183(c)(1) (5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c)(1)).

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         Effective July 31, 2013, the agency removed the appellant from his
     Engineer Technician position at the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany,
     Georgia, based on the appellant’s guilty plea to a criminal charge.      Hicks v.
     Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-13-7338-I-1, Initial Appeal
     File (IAF), Tab 4 at 19, 27-28; Hicks v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket
     No. AT-0752-13-7338-I-1, Final Order at 2 (Jan. 2, 2015) (7338-I-1 Final Order);
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 10.      The appellant filed a Board appeal
     challenging his removal, and on December 17, 2013, an administrative judge
     issued an initial decision reversing the appellant’s removal, finding that the
     agency failed to prove a nexus between the appellant’s misconduct , which
     occurred when he was off duty, and the efficiency of the service. IAF, Tab 13,
     Initial Decision at 3-11.   The agency filed a petition for review of the initial
     decision, and on January 2, 2015, the Board issued a nonprecedential final order
     affirming the initial decision.   7338-I-1 Final Order.   The Board ordered the
     agency to reinstate the appellant, effective July 31, 2013, and to pay him the
     correct amount of back pay, including all interest and other benefits to which he
     was entitled. Id. at 7-8.
¶3         On February 17, 2015, the appellant filed a petition for enforcement, in
     which he contended that the agency had failed to reinstate him to the Engineer
     Technician position or a comparable position. Hicks v. Department of the Navy,
     MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-13-7338-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab 1 at 3. In
     response, the agency asserted that it had provided the appellant with the back pay
     and benefits to which he was entitled but admitted that it had placed him on
     administrative leave instead of returning him to duty, because the Commander of
     the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, had barred the appellant’s
                                                                                       3

     access to that installation based on the same conduct that the agency had relied on
     in the removal action. CF, Tab 3 at 4-6.
¶4        On May 8, 2015, the administrative judge issued a compliance initial
     decision finding the agency in noncompliance with the Board’s final order
     because the agency had placed the appellant on administrative leave instead of
     restoring him to duty. CF, Tab 5, Compliance Initial Decision (CID) at 2 -3. The
     administrative judge found that the Commander of the Marine Corps Logistics
     Base, a commanding officer of the agency, could not refuse to comply with the
     Board’s final order requiring the agency to reinstate the appellant. CID at 2-3.
     The administrative judge ordered the agency to restore the appellant to the
     Engineer Technician position that he held prior to his removal, in a duty status,
     or, if the agency had compelling reasons to do so, to reassign him to another
     position with duties and responsibilities substantially equivalent in scope and
     status to those of his former Engineer Technician position. CID at 3; CF, Tab 7,
     Erratum Order.
¶5        Neither party filed a petition for review of the compliance initial decision ,
     and on June 17, 2015, the Clerk of the Board ordered the agency to submit
     evidence that it had taken the actions required by the compliance initial decision.
     Hicks v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-13-7338-X-1,
     Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tab 1 at 3.
¶6        In a July 2, 2015 response to the Clerk’s order, the agency stated that it had
     maintained the appellant in a paid administrative leave status instead of returning
     him to duty, but argued that it had good cause for doing so. CRF, Tab 2 at 4-5.
     The agency submitted evidence that on June 17, 2015, more than a month after
     the compliance initial decision was issued, the Department of Defense
     Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DODCAF) notified the Security Director of
     the Marine Corps System Command that the DODCAF had decided to revoke or
     deny the appellant’s eligibility for access to classified information and/or
     assignment to duties that have been designated national security sensitive.     Id.
                                                                                        4

     at 8, 10-16. The agency also submitted an affidavit from the Security Director of
     the Marine Corps System Command, in which he asserted that all Department of
     Defense employees must have a Common Access Card (CAC) to access agency
     computer systems and that, because the DODCAF had denied or revoked the
     appellant’s eligibility for access to classified information, the agency could not
     issue him a CAC. Id. at 8. The agency submitted evidence that the appellant’s
     former Engineer Technician position was designated as a noncritical sensitive
     position and that the position required him to be able to obtain and maintain a
     secret security clearance. Id. at 21, 23. The agency contended that it did not
     have a policy requiring it to detail or reassign the appellant to nonsensitive duties
     following the loss of a security clearance but that it would continue to maintain
     the appellant in a paid administrative leave status while he appealed the
     DODCAF’s denial or revocation of his eligibility for access to classified
     information and/or assignment to duties that have been designated national
     security sensitive to a Personnel Security Appeals Board (PSAB). Id. at 6-7.
¶7         In a July 19, 2017 reply to the agency’s response, the appellant asserted that
     the agency had filled the Engineer Technician position that he held prior to his
     removal with another employee. CRF, Tab 3 at 4-5. He argued that it therefore
     was unclear which position the agency should restore him to and whether that
     position would require him to be able to maintain or obtain a secret security
     clearance. Id. at 5.
¶8         On March 14, 2016, the agency submitted evidence that on March 10, 2016,
     a PSAB upheld the DODCAF’s revocation or denial of the appellant’s eligibility
     for access to classified information and/or assignment to duties that have been
     designated national security sensitive (i.e., his former position).     CRF, Tab 4
     at 6-7. The agency stated that it continued to maintain the appellant in a paid
     administrative leave status but that it was in the process of proposing his removal
     on the ground that he could no longer maintain the required security clearance.
     Id. at 4-5.
                                                                                         5

¶9          Effective June 11, 2016, more than a year after the administrative judge
      issued the compliance initial decision, the agency removed the appellant a second
      time based on the loss of his security clearance and his ineligibility to occupy a
      noncritical sensitive position. Hicks v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket
      No. AT-0752-16-0745-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0745-I-1 IAF), Tab 1 at 10-11.
      The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging his second removal on due process
      grounds.   Id. at 5.    An administrative judge dismissed that appeal without
      prejudice pending the resolution of the instant compliance matter. 0745 -I-1 IAF,
      Tab 9, Initial Decision; Hicks v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket
      No. AT-0752-16-0745-I-2, Appeal File, Tab 4, Initial Decision.
¶10         On September 21, 2016, the Clerk of the Board issued an order in the
      instant compliance matter, which directed the appellant to submit evidence and
      argument as to why the compliance matter should not be dismissed as moot in
      light of the loss of his security clearance and his resulting ineligibility to occupy
      the Engineer Technician position. CRF, Tab 6 at 2. In response, the appellant
      reiterated his prior arguments that the Engineer Technician position had been
      filled with another employee, and that the agency should have reassigned him to a
      different position. CRF, Tab 8 at 3. The agency did not submit a reply to the
      appellant’s response, although the Clerk’s order afforded the ag ency an
      opportunity to do so. CRF, Tab 6 at 2.

                                          ANALYSIS
      The agency had a compelling reason not to reinstate the appellant to the Engineer
      Technician position, and he is ineligible for reinstatement to that position.
¶11         When the Board orders an agency action canceled, the aim is to place the
      appellant, as nearly as possible, in the situation he would have been in had the
      wrongful personnel action not occurred.      Kerr v. National Endowment for the
      Arts, 726 F.2d 730, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Tubesing v. Department of Health &
      Human Services, 112 M.S.P.R. 393, ¶ 5 (2009). This is known as status quo ante
      relief. Tubesing, 112 M.S.P.R. 393, ¶ 5. Generally, to be in compliance with a
                                                                                      6

      Board order to reinstate an employee, an agency must return an employee to his
      former position. Id., ¶ 6. When an agency has not reinstated the appellant to his
      former position and duties, the agency must have a strong overriding interest or
      compelling reasons for not doing so. Id.
¶12        Here, the DODCAF’s revocation of the appellant’s eligibility for access to
      classified information and/or assignment to duties that have been designated
      national security sensitive, which occurred more than a month after the
      compliance initial decision was issued, was a compelling reason for the agency
      not to reinstate the appellant to his Engineer Technician position. CRF, Tab 2
      at 10-16; see LaBatte v. Department of the Air Force, 58 M.S.P.R. 586, 594
      (1993) (finding that the lack of a security clearance constituted a compelling
      reason not to return an appellant to his former position, which required him to
      have a security clearance); Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 49 M.S.P.R. 271,
      275 (1991) (finding that the suspension of an appellant’s access to classified
      information constituted a compelling reason not to return her to her former
      position, which required her to handle classified materials); Gray v. Department
      of the Navy, 29 M.S.P.R. 281, 283-84 (1985) (finding that the lack of a security
      clearance constituted a compelling reason not to return an appellant to his former
      position, which required him to have a security clearance).
¶13        On March 10, 2016, more than 10 months after the compliance initial
      decision was issued, a PSAB affirmed the DODCAF’s revocation or denial of the
      appellant’s eligibility for access to classified information and/or assignment to
      duties that have been designated national security sensitive. CRF, Tab 4 at 6 -7.
      It is well settled that the Board lacks authority to review the substance of an
      agency’s determination that an employee is ineligible for a secret security
      clearance or to occupy a noncritical sensitive position. Department of the Navy v.
      Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1988); Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1158-60
      (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also King v. Department of the Navy, 98 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 20
      (2005) (finding that, in the context of a compliance proceeding, the Board cannot
                                                                                         7

      examine the substance of an agency’s decision not to grant a security clearance to
      an appellant), aff’d, 167 F. App’x. 191 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Board also lacks
      authority to order the agency to place the appellant into a position that requires
      him to possess a security clearance or to be eligible for access to classified
      information or assignment to sensitive duties, when he does not hold such a
      clearance or possess such eligibility.    See LaBatte, 58 M.S.P.R. at 594; Hill,
      49 M.S.P.R. at 275; Gray, 29 M.S.P.R. at 283-84.         Accordingly, the evidence
      reflects that the appellant is ineligible to occupy his former Engineer Technician
      position, and the Board cannot order the agency to restore him to that position.

      The agency is not required to reassign the appellant to a different position that
      does not require a security clearance or eligibility for access to classified
      information and/or assignment to duties that have been designated national
      security sensitive.
¶14         Moreover, under the circumstances at issue, we find that the agency is not
      required to reassign the appellant to a different position that did not require him
      to maintain or obtain a security clearance or to be eligible for access to classified
      information and/or assignment to duties that have been designated national
      security sensitive.   Although the compliance initial decision stated that if the
      agency had compelling reasons to do so, it could restore the appellant to “another
      position which has duties and responsibilities that are substantially equivalent in
      scope and status to those of the position the appellant previously held,” the
      compliance initial decision was issued prior to both the DODCAF’s revocation or
      denial of the appellant’s eligibility for access to classified information and/or
      assignment to duties that have been designated national security sensitive, and the
      PSAB’s affirmance of the DODCAF’s revocation or denial. CID; CF, Tab 7 at 1.
¶15         The agency has asserted, and the appellant does not dispute, that the agency
      does not have a policy requiring it to reassign him to nonsensitive duties
      following the loss of a security clearance. CRF, Tab 2 at 7. Whe n a security
      clearance is a requirement of an appellant’s position, and an appellant has lost
      eligibility for such a clearance and there is no agency regulation or policy
                                                                                         8

      requiring an agency to reassign employees who lose their security clearances to
      nonsensitive positions, the Board lacks authority to inquire into the feasib ility of
      an appellant’s transfer to an alternative position.    Griffin v. Defense Mapping
      Agency, 864 F.2d 1579, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Putnam v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶ 13 (2014).          Thus, if the agency had
      never removed the appellant from his Engineer Technician based on his guilty
      plea in the first instance, the Board would lack authority to order the agency to
      reassign him to a different position after his eligibility for access to classified
      information and/or assignment to duties that have been designated national
      security sensitive was revoked.
¶16         Status quo ante relief does not entitle the appellant to be placed in a better
      position than he would have enjoyed if he had not been removed. See Sink v.
      Department of Energy, 110 M.S.P.R. 153, ¶¶ 19, 22 (2008); King, 98 M.S.P.R.
      547, ¶ 19. Thus, to be in compliance with the Board’s final order, the agency was
      not required to reassign the appellant to an alternative position following the
      revocation of his eligibility for access to classified information and/or assignment
      to duties that have been designated national security sensitive. See, e.g., King,
      98 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 23 (finding that an agency was not required to search for a
      position that did not require a security clearance to be in compliance with a Board
      order requiring that the agency afford the appellant priority consideration for a
      position).
¶17         We find the circumstances at issue here to be distinguishable from Board
      decisions finding that agencies properly complied with orders to reinstate
      appellants by detailing them to alternative positions while their security
      clearances were in the process of being reinstated or were temporarily suspended.
      See LaBatte, 58 M.S.P.R. at 594-95 (finding an agency in compliance with an
      order to reinstate an appellant when it detailed him to a different position that did
      not require a security clearance while the reinstatement of his security clearance
      was pending); Hill, 49 M.S.P.R. at 274-75 (finding an agency in compliance with
                                                                                        9

      an order to reinstate an appellant when the agency detailed her to a different
      nonsensitive position while her security clearance was temporarily suspended).
      Here, the DODCAF’s revocation or denial of the appellant’s eligibility for access
      to classified information and/or assignment to duties that have been designated
      national security sensitive was not temporary, and was affirmed by a PSAB on
      appeal. CRF, Tab 4 at 6-7. Neither the Board’s nonprecedential final order nor
      the compliance initial decision immunizes the appellant from a second removal
      based on his subsequent failure to meet the requirements of the Engineer
      Technician position.     See Sink, 110 M.S.P.R. 153, ¶¶ 19-23 (finding that a
      Board’s decision that an appellant’s retirement was involuntary did not prevent
      the agency from acting on a separate pending proposal to remove him for refusal
      to accept a directed reassignment).
¶18         We also have considered the appellant’s argument that, if the agency had
      timely complied with the Board’s final order, it might have restored him to a
      different position that would not have required him to be able to maintain or
      obtain a secret security clearance, because the agency had filled the Engineer
      Technician position with another individual. CRF, Tab 3 at 5, Tab 8 at 3. We
      find this argument unpersuasive. The fact that the agency filled the appellant’s
      Engineer Technician position with another individual would not have established
      a compelling reason for the agency to reinstate the appellant to some different
      position that might not have required a security clearance, rather than his former
      position. See Taylor v. Department of the Treasury, 43 M.S.P.R. 221, 227 (1990)
      (finding that an agency’s assertions that an appellant’s former position had been
      filled by another individual did not establish a compelling reaso n not to reinstate
      an appellant to that position); Williams v. Department of Health & Human
      Services, 32 M.S.P.R. 259, 262 (1987) (same). Nor does it require the agency to
      place the appellant in a different position at this juncture.
                                                                                           10

      The appellant’s petition for enforcement must be dismissed as moot.
¶19         Events subsequent to the compliance initial decision have rendered the
      appellant ineligible to occupy his Engineer Technician position, and the agency
      was entitled to effectuate a second removal action based on the appellant’s
      inability to meet the requirements of that position. The appellant does not dispute
      that the agency has provided him with the back pay and benefits to which he was
      entitled pursuant to the Board’s final order, and that the agency placed him on
      paid administrative leave through the effective date of his seco nd removal action.
      Accordingly, there is no further relief that the Board can provide in the context of
      his claims in these compliance proceedings, and we must dismiss the appellant’s
      petition for enforcement as moot. See Allen v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      110 M.S.P.R. 111, ¶ 3 (2008) (recognizing that a petition for enforcement is moot
      when there is no effective remedy that the Board can provide); Adair v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 69 M.S.P.R. 431, 435 (1996) (concluding that a matter is moot
      when the Board can grant no meaningful or effective relief). Any relief that the
      appellant may be entitled to following the effective date of his second removal
      will be resolved in his separate Board appeal challenging that removal, once that
      appeal has been refiled. See Strope v. U.S. Postal Service, 76 M.S.P.R. 539, 542
      n.1 (1997) (finding that an appellant’s right to relief following a second removal
      action would be resolved in a separate Board appeal challenging that second
      removal, rather than in a compliance matter regarding an order reversing the
      appellant’s first removal).

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

      2
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      11

review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow a ll
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
                                                                                    12

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit , you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor war rants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to t he Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. distri ct court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
                                                                                13

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2 302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 3   The court of appeals must receive your petition for

3
  The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
                                                                                     14

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       15

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.