Court Opinion

ID: 87956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:01:28+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:39.976796
License: Public Domain

73 U.S. 561 (____)
6 Wall. 561
CANAL COMPANY
v.
GORDON.
Supreme Court of United States.

*565 Mr. Wills, for the appellant, contended &mdash.
Mr. Botts, contra.
*567 Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal in equity from the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.
*568 Gordon was the complainant, and the appellants were the defendants in that court. The record is very voluminous, but the questions presented for our determination are few in number, and their proper solution is, we think, attended with no serious difficulty.
We shall confine our opinion to the objections to the decree, taken in the argument for the appellants. According to the rule of this court, the appellee can ask nothing here but what the decree gave him. It is the appellants who complain. The questions which we are to examine are such as they present for our consideration. The position of an appellee in this court is simply defensive. It is only where both parties appeal, that a case is open here for examination as it was in the court below.
The bill was filed to enforce a particular lien given by a statute of California. The jurisdiction of the court rested upon this basis, and could extend no further.
The case was referred to a master. He reported that the defendant was indebted to the complainant in the sum of $76,589.89, with interest from the 13th of June, 1853, for work done upon the canal of the defendant, pursuant to the contract out of which this litigation has arisen: and in the further sum of $16,250.50, for what the master terms "preliminary work," without which, he states, the contract could not have been fulfilled. The latter work consisted of the building of saw-mills, railroads, other roads, an inclined plane, timber-slides, and other apparatus. The particulars are given in a schedule annexed to the report. He reported further that the defendant was entitled to credits amounting in the aggregate to $6200. According to the rules of the Circuit Court, the parties were allowed a certain time within which to file exceptions, and failing to do so, the amounts found by the master were to be taken as conclusive. No exceptions were filed by the appellants.
The court disallowed the amount found for the preliminary work, holding it not to be a lien. The amount of the credits was deducted from the amount found to be due for *569 the work done upon the canal, and a decree was rendered for the balance, with interest.
The finding of the master is as conclusive here as it was in the court below. There has been no controversy upon that subject. It is not denied that the amount is correct  if the complainant had not forfeited his right to any compensation by the violations of the contract alleged to have been committed by Gordon & Kinyon. This part of the case has been argued very fully by the counsel on both sides. We have looked carefully into the evidence. The result is, that we are entirely satisfied with the report, and in this respect with the decree. We think the fault of the rupture lies wholly with the company. Gordon & Kinyon adhered to the contract, and pursued the work longer than they were bound to do. When they retired they were fully justified, and had a clear equity to be paid a fair compensation for the work they had performed.
The release given by Kinyon to the company cannot avail them. It was a gross fraud. The evidence fixes upon it, and sets in the strongest light, this character. It would be a waste of time to discuss the subject. Our minds rest upon the conclusion we have arrived at, undisturbed by a doubt.
Yet, the release is not without effect. It severed the connection of Kinyon with the contract, and extinguished any claim which he might otherwise have had to be heard in this litigation. He can have no interest in the result, whatever it may be. Complete justice can be done between the parties before us, and the whole case disposed of without his presence in the record. He is, therefore, not an indispensable party. The company are estopped to deny this proposition. His relation to the case is not unlike that of an obligee in a title bond, to a suit upon it for specific performance by an assignee, to whom the obligee has parted with all his interest in the bond. In that class of cases it is held not to be indispensable that the assignor should be a party.
The court below held that Gordon had a lien upon the entire length of the canal or flume, extending from the *570 grand reservoir, near Placerville, to the South Fork of the American River, a distance of about twenty-five miles. When the contract with Gordon & Kinyon was entered into, the flume was completed from the reservoir to Long Cañon, a distance of eleven and two-third miles. Water flowing through it was used by means of several outlets for mining purposes. It was fed from sources other than the South Fork. The contract with Gordon & Kinyon was for the extension of the canal, by the construction of sections "from section 17 to 25 inclusive." Their work commenced where the existing canal ended, and reached to the South Fork of the American River. The object was to make use of that stream as an additional feeder, and thus to increase the supply of water in the canal.
The two parts of the work  the one extending from the reservoir to the cañon, and the other thence to the South Fork  were known respectively as the lower and the upper section. The two sections were constructed by different contractors, and, as already shown, at different times. The former was completed and in use before the latter was begun. In these respects they were distinct works. The points of identity are continuity and a common object, use, and ownership.
The lien laws of California provide that all contractors, laborers, and other persons "furnishing materials for, or employed in, the construction of any bridge, ditch, flume, or aqueduct, shall have a lien upon the structure," which they may have constructed or repaired, or for which they may have furnished materials of any description, "to the extent of the labor done, and materials furnished, or both." It is further provided that the lien shall not bind the structure for a longer period than one year after the work is done or materials furnished, unless suit be brought to enforce the lien within that time.
Several objections have been taken to the decree touching the lien.
It is not denied that it became fixed by a regular compliance with the preliminary statutory conditions. But the *571 appellants insist that it was extinguished by the release given to them by Kinyon. It would be a mockery of justice to allow an instrument so stained with turpitude to have such an effect. The subject has already been sufficiently considered.
It is said the lien was waived by the dismissal of the prior suit. The dismissal of that suit can obviously have no effect upon the rights of the parties in this litigation.
It is insisted that this suit was not brought in time to feed and preserve the lien. The evidence shows that the work was continued by the contractors down to the 13th day of June, 1854, inclusive. This bill was filed on the 12th day of June, 1854. That was within the time prescribed by the statute.
It is urged that the decree is erroneous in holding that the lien extended the entire length of the canal instead of limiting it to the upper section, where all the work was done. Is this objection well taken? Liens of this kind were unknown in the common law and equity jurisprudence both of England and of this country. They were clearly defined and regulated in the civil law.[*] Where they exist in this country they are the creatures of local legislation. They are governed in everything by the statutes under which they arise. These statutes vary widely in different States. Hence we have found no adjudication in any other State which throws any light upon the question before us, and there has been none in California. We are, therefore, compelled to meet the case as one of the first impression.
We have already shown that the upper and lower sections were distinct works in several essential particulars, to which we need not again advert. The lower one having been finished and in use before the upper one was contracted for, if those having a lien upon the former, had insisted that it became extended over the latter, as soon as the latter was completed, no legal mind, we apprehend, could have doubted that the claim could not be sustained. If it could, Gordon's *572 lien might have been rendered valueless. We think the converse of this proposition applies with equal force. If a lien upon the lower section could not have been extended over the upper one, upon what principle can it be maintained that Gordon's lien embraced the lower section? A lateral feeder constructed and intersecting the main line after it was completed, would certainly not be subject to a previous lien upon the main line, if such a lien existed. We can see no substantial difference between that case, and the one before us. The upper section was only an additional feeder. That it was an elongation of the main line, and not a lateral work, does not affect the principle involved. The controlling circumstances and the object in both cases would be the same.
We think the language of the statute rightly interpreted is decisive.
The lien is given to contractors and laborers upon the ditch or flume "which they may have constructed or repaired, ... to the extent of the labor done and materials furnished." The work of Gordon was all done upon the upper section. He had nothing to do with the lower section. So far as he was concerned, and for all the purposes of this litigation, they were distinct and independent works. A different principle would produce confusion, and lead to serious evils. We have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the decree in this particular is erroneous.
It is, therefore, REVERSED, and the cause remanded to the court below with instructions to enter a decree
IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS OPINION.
Mr. Justice FIELD, dissenting.
I dissent from so much of the opinion and decision as limits the lien of the contractor to that portion of the canal which was constructed by him. I think the lien extends to the entire canal, as much so as a lien for work upon a wing of a house extends to the entire building.
MILLER and GRIER, JJ., concurred with Field, J.
NOTES
[*]  Domat, §§ 1742, 1744.