Court Opinion

ID: 9881091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:09:39.706992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:02.970170
License: Public Domain

J-S28031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: C.E., A MINOR :         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :              PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
    APPEAL OF: A.R., MOTHER           :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :         No. 307 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered February 13, 2023
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court
                  Division at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000117-2022

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                  FILED: September 29, 2023

       A.R. (“Mother”), appeals from the February 13, 2023 order granting the

petition filed by the Allegheny Office of Children, Youth and Families (“OCYF”)

for the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her daughter, C.E.

(“Child”), born in April of 2021.1 We affirm.

       The certified record supports the following factual and procedural history

set forth by the orphans’ court.

       In June of 2021, Child was taken to Children’s Hospital of
       Pittsburgh for concerns for possible failure to thrive and
       insufficient weight gain.   Mother was counseled about the
       concerns and a plan was implemented which included changing
       Child’s formula. (OCYF Exhibit 2 – CAC Consult). OCYF did not
       become involved with the family at that time. Approximately one
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The same order involuntarily terminated the parental rights of C.L.E.
(“Father”), and he did not appeal.
J-S28031-23

       month later, Mother brought Child back to Children’s Hospital,
       reporting that she was vomiting frequently and was unusually
       fussy. (Id). Based upon Child’s physical condition, a number of
       routine medical tests were administered. This testing revealed
       that Child had two healing rib fractures. Medical staff opined that
       the injuries were diagnostic physical child abuse, and Child was
       admitted to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit. Mother was unable
       to give a plausible explanation for how the injuries occurred. As
       a result, a ChildLine report was made to the City of Pittsburgh
       Police and OCYF. (OCYF Exhibit 2-CAC Report). At the time of
       Child’s admission to Children’s Hospital, Mother presented with a
       black eye. When questioned about the injury, Mother reported
       that a former paramour had caused the injury. (Id). Mother later
       admitted that Father had caused the injury. (Tr. at 56-57).2 OCYF
       became active with the family to address child abuse as well as
       for concerns for domestic violence. (Tr. at 40).

       Child remained in the hospital for several days. In anticipation of
       her release, OCYF sought an emergency custody order on July 14,
       2021. (Joint Stipulation B – Mother). Child was discharged from
       Children’s Hospital on July 17, 2021 and placed in respite care.
       (Id). On July 19, 2021, Child was placed in the foster home of
       [K.M.]. Both Mother and biological Father were charged criminally
       for Child’s injuries.

       An adjudicatory hearing was held on September 21, 2021 and
       Child was found to be dependent. The court ordered Child to
       remain in her foster care placement. Mother was court ordered to
       participate in intimate partner violence (hereinafter “IPV”)
       counseling, to address her criminal matters,[3] attend visitation,
       complete a forensic evaluation and follow all recommendations, to
       work with in-home services and to work with Achieva[, a parenting
       program,] when the service was available. (Joint Stipulation B –
       Mother) (OCYF Exhibit 7 – September 21, 2021 order).

       In November and December of 2021, the court-appointed
       psychologist assigned to the family, Dr. Eric Bernstein, conducted
____________________________________________

2 The orphans’ court cited to the notes of testimony    from the February 10,
2023 termination hearing as “Tr.”
3 According to the OCYF caseworker, Mother was charged with endangering

the welfare of the child, but “it actually pled down to . . . [s]ummary
harassment and moved to non-traffic court.” N.T., 2/10/23, at 51-52.

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     several evaluations.       Mother underwent an individual
     psychological evaluation during this time and made several
     disclosures about IPV between herself and Father. She reported
     to Dr. Bernstein that Father had punched her with a closed fist,
     “choked her” a few times, struck her with some type of cord and
     prevented her from calling police during episodes of violence.
     (OCYF Exhibit 9 – 2021 Bernstein Report). Dr. Bernstein also
     conducted an interactional evaluation between Mother and Child.
     He reported that Mother did well with Child and provided her
     proper affection and attention. (Id). During this course of
     evaluations, Dr. Bernstein expressed concern for Child’s physical
     safety given the domestic violence concerns between the parents
     and Father’s poor parenting skills. (OCYF Exhibit 9 – 2021
     Bernstein Report). He did report that he had no significant
     concerns about Mother’s ability to parent and was hopeful that her
     continued participation in parenting classes would increase her
     knowledge as to Child’s needs. (Id). Dr. Bernstein was in
     agreement with continued supervised visitation for Mother so long
     as she was compliant with OCYF. (Id).

     The parties appeared for a permanency review hearing on April
     14, 2022 and the court ordered Child to remain in her foster care
     placement. Mother was found to be in moderate compliance with
     the permanency plan and to have made moderate progress
     toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the
     original placement. During this time, Mother was attending
     coached parenting, had completed IPV treatment and was working
     with in-home services. The court continued to have concerns for
     IPV between the parents as Father had been charged criminally
     for assaulting Mother. The court ordered Mother to continue to
     work with in-home services and continue her mental health
     treatment. (OCYF Exhibit 7 – April 14, 2022 order).

     The parties appeared on July 7, 2022 and the court ordered Child
     to remain in her foster care placement. Mother was found to be
     in a moderate compliance and to have made moderate
     progress.[FN1] (OCYF Exhibit 7 – July 7, 2022 order). The court
     ordered visitation to continue to be supervised. During this
     reporting period, the parents reported to their OCYF caseworker,
     Aryana Williams-Swanson, that they were no longer willing to
     work with services and ceased all contact with service providers.
     (Tr. at 49).

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          [FN1] The compliance and progress noted in the court order

          are not consistent with the court’s findings in the rest of the
          court order or the testimony of the OCYF caseworker,
          Aryana Williams-Swanson. To the contrary, Mother refused
          to work with any services during this time. (Tr. at 49). The
          court believes that this may have been a scrivener’s error.
          However, the order was not appealed.

       OCYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental
       rights on September 9, 2022.         The parties appeared for a
       permanency review hearing on September 27, 2022. The court
       ordered Child to remain in foster care placement. Mother was
       found to be in minimal compliance and to have made minimal
       progress. The court ordered Mother to participate in a parenting
       program. (OCYF Exhibit 7 – September 27 2022 order). After the
       termination petition was filed, Mother reached out to the OCYF
       caseworker and expressed a willingness to engage with services
       again. (Tr. at 50).

       Dr. Bernstein conducted several evaluations with the parents,
       Child and foster mother on December 20, 2022.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, (“O.C.O.”), 4/12/23, at 2-5 (cleaned up).

       The subject proceeding occurred on February 10, 2023, at which time

Child was twenty-two months old.4              OCYF presented the testimony of Lisa

Pfaff, the family’s case manager for in-home services until September of 2022;

Terraina Alexander, via video, Child’s foster care coordinator at Wesley Family

____________________________________________

4 Child was represented during the involuntary termination hearing by a
guardian ad litem (“GAL”) - counsel. Insomuch as Child’s legal interests were
incapable of ascertainment due to her young age, the court did not appoint
separate legal counsel for Child. See In re T.S., 648 Pa. 236, 257, 192 A.3d
1080, 1092-1093 (Pa. 2018) (holding, “if the preferred outcome of a child is
incapable of ascertainment because the child is very young and pre-verbal,
there can be no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or her best
interests; as such, the mandate of Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act” is
satisfied). On appeal, the GAL filed a brief advocating in favor of the order
involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights.

                                           -4-
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Services; Aryana Williams-Swanson, OCYF caseworker; Tanya Marshall, the

caseworker employed at Arsenal Family and Children Center who provided

coached visitation for Mother; and Dr. Bernstein, the court-appointed licensed

psychologist. Mother and Father testified on their own behalf.

      By order dated February 10, 2023, and docketed on February 13, 2023,

the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother timely appealed on

March 13, 2023, and she filed concurrently her concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1295(a)(2)(i) and (b). The

orphans’ court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on April 12, 2023.

      On appeal, Mother presents the following two issues for review:

      1. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
         matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate
         Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §
         2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)?

      2. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
         matter of law in concluding that [O]CYF met its burden of
         proving by clear and convincing evidence that the termination
         of Mother’s parental rights would best to serve the needs and
         welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 6.

      We consider Mother’s issues in the context of determining whether the

involuntary termination order is supported by competent evidence.            In re

Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021).            When applying this

standard, appellate courts must accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact

and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Interest

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of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual

findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb

the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of

discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).

      Our Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n abuse of discretion does not

result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different

conclusion,” or “the facts could support an opposite result.” In re Adoption

of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012). Instead, an appellate court may

reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. at 826.   This

standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often

observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings. Interest of S.K.L.R.,

256 A.3d at 1123–24.

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section

2511 of the Adoption Act (“Act”), which requires a bifurcated analysis.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.   The trial court must initially determine whether the

conduct of the parent warrants termination under Section 2511(a). Only if

the court determines that the petitioner established grounds for termination

under Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under

Section 2511(b), which involves a child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M.,

71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

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       To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove

grounds under both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing evidence,

which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable

a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted).

       In this case, the relevant provisions of the Act are Section 2511(a)(2)

and (b),5 which provide as follows.

       (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
       may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
       grounds:

                                           ...

           (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
           or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
           essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
           for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
           causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
           or will not be remedied by the parent.

                                           ...

       (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
       of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
       physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
       of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
       environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
       income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
       control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
       to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
____________________________________________

5 This Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in

addition to Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental
rights. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(en banc) (citation omitted). Based on this disposition, we need not consider
Mother’s arguments with respect to Section 2511(a)(5) and (8).

                                           -7-
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      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2)

due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct. We have

explained, “[a] parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just

as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.”        Matter of

Adoption of C.A.W., 683 A.2d 911, 914–15 (Pa.Super. 1996) (citation

omitted).   Further, we have recognized that, under Section 2511(a)(2), a

parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt

assumption of full parental responsibilities. See In re Adoption of M.A.B.,

166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

      With respect to Section 2511(b), the court is required to “give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Regarding the “emotional needs and

welfare” of the child, our precedent has interpreted it to include “intangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

      Our Supreme Court in In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993), first

recognized that the “emotional needs and welfare” analysis under Section

2511(b) should include, in part, the child’s bond with his or her parent. In

doing so, trial courts must examine the effect on the child of severing such a

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bond, and this includes “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and

beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” In the Interest

of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (Pa. 2023). The High Court recently explained:

      Severance of a “necessary and beneficial” bond would predictably
      cause more than the “adverse” impact that, unfortunately, may
      occur whenever a bond is present. By contrast, severance of
      a necessary and beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that
      would predictably cause “extreme emotional consequences” or
      significant, irreparable harm. See E.M., 620 A.2d at 484 (“a
      beneficial bonding could exist between a parent and child, such
      that, if the bond were broken, the child could suffer extreme
      emotional consequences”).

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-1110 (some citations omitted).

      As   such,   the   K.T.   Court   distinguished   “extreme    emotional

consequences” from an “adverse impact” to the child when parental rights are

terminated. Id. at 1111. Specifically, the Court cautioned that a trial court

“must not truncate its analysis and preclude severance based solely on

evidence of an ‘adverse’ or ‘detrimental’ impact to the child.”   Id. at 1114.

The Court concluded, “to grant termination when a parental bond exists, there

must be clear and convincing evidence that the bond is not necessary and

beneficial.” Id.

      Moreover, in reiterating that the parental bond is only one part of the

analysis, the K.T. Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must also

include consideration . . . [of] certain evidence if it is present in the

record.” Id. at 1113, n.28 (emphasis in original). The specific evidence at

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issue in K.T. related to the child’s need for permanency and the length of time

she had spent in foster care; the pre-adoptive nature of her foster home and

the child’s bond with foster parents; and whether the foster home met the

child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs. Id. at 1112. The Court

emphasized, however, that these foregoing factors were not an exhaustive list

for consideration under all Section 2511(b) analyses.      Id. at 1113, n.28.

Rather, the K.T. Court found, as noted above, that the particular facts of each

case determine the factors to be considered.

      The Court recognized that “case law indicates that bond, plus

permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors may contribute equally to the

determination of a child’s specific developmental, physical, and emotional

needs and welfare, and thus are all of ‘primary’ importance in the Section

2511(b) analysis.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109. For instance, if relevant in a case,

a trial court “can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child” in its

analysis under Section 2511(b).      See In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118

(Pa.Super. 2014).

      On appeal, Mother argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove

that her conduct warranted termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother’s

Brief at 24. Specifically, Mother asserts that the court abused its discretion

by finding that she did not complete her goals with respect to in-home

services, IPV, parenting, and mental health or that she would not be able to

complete them within a reasonable period of time. Id. at 25. We disagree.

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      The testimony of the OCYF caseworker, Ms. Williams-Swanson, reveals

that Mother suffers from intellectual deficits, the extent of which is not

specified in the record. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 2/10/23, at 62. As a

result, the caseworker believed that Mother did not comprehend what was

required of her under the permanency plan. Id. at 45. Further, Ms. Williams-

Swanson testified that Mother “would seem receptive to the information”

regarding the required services, “but she would end up not following through.”

Id. As such, the record reveals that Mother was inconsistent in complying

with the services needed to reunify with Child. Id. at 90.

      It is well-settled that Section 2511(a)(2) provides the statutory basis

for “terminating involuntarily the rights of a parent with a physical or mental

impairment.” In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 893 (Pa. 1986). Our

Supreme Court has emphasized, “the focus in such cases is the effect which

an impairment has on the person’s ability to provide parental care, not the

mere fact of impairment. . . .” Id.        In this case, ample evidence exists to

support the termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2).

      For instance, because of her intellectual deficit, Mother was referred to

the Office of Intellectual Disabilities.   N.T. at 45.   This service would have

provided Mother with a service coordinator to assist her on a permanent basis,

which was important because the in-home service she was involved with was

offered temporarily.   Id. at 12.    However, Mother was inconsistent in her

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engagement with the Office of Intellectual Disabilities. Id. at 10, 12. The

court aptly explained:

      [Mother] suffers from intellectual deficits, and it was vitally
      important for her to be connected to services to address and
      overcome the challenges that accompany such deficits. Much of
      the concern for Mother related to her ability to understand the
      importance of complying with court-ordered goals. In-home
      services were implemented as a way to provide her with additional
      assistance for resources and service providers. The family was
      referred to work with these services in August of 2021. [Tr. at 6].
      Lisa Pfaff was assigned to work with the family and assisted with
      several referrals to help the parents. She attempted to connect
      Mother with the Office of Intellectual Disabilities. (Tr. at 45). This
      office could have assigned [M]other a case manager or a service
      coordinator to assist with securing affordable housing, Social
      Security benefits and other valuable community resources. (Tr.
      at 46). Mother did not follow through with the referral for the
      Office of Intellectual Disabilities. (Tr. at 8). During her tenure
      with the family, Ms. Pfaff attempted to connect the parents with
      referrals for [IPV] counseling and mental health services. (Tr. at
      7). Mother did not make herself available to meet with Ms. Pfaff
      on a regular basis and did not follow through with most of her
      referrals. (Tr. at 7, 8, and 11). Ultimately, in-home services
      closed out in July of 2022 for noncompliance. (Tr. at 13).

O.C.O. at 8-9. The testimony of Ms. Pfaff supports the court’s findings. It is

important to note that Mother and Father told both Ms. Pfaff and Ms. Williams-

Swanson in approximately July of 2022, that they did not want to be involved

with in-home services anymore. N.T. at 12-13, 72. The parents stated that

they “wanted to get [Child] back on their own.” Id. at 72. Ms. Williams-

Swanson testified she explained to Mother and Father that their participation

with in-home services was necessary to demonstrate they were capable of

meeting Child’s needs; however, they did not understand. Id.

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      The record also reveals that, despite Father’s history of physically

abusing Mother and her failure to provide a plausible explanation for Child’s

broken ribs that occurred at the outset of the dependency matter, she

remained in a relationship with Father at the time of the hearing. Indeed,

Mother testified that she intended to obtain housing with Father and raise

Child with him. N.T. at 115.

      The record supports the court’s finding that, “despite Mother’s

successful completion of IPV classes, she hasn’t made any meaningful

progress in understanding the dynamic of the relationship with Father and the

safety concerns that he poses.” O.C.O. at 10 (citing N.T. at 57). Furthermore,

the court found, “There has been little change in the nature of the relationship

and there continues to be IPV incidents between the parents.” Id. at 11 (citing

N.T. at 58, 123). The court’s finding is supported, in part, by Ms. Williams-

Swanson’s testimony that Father has acknowledged his own need for anger

management. She testified that Father “often reports to me that he needs to

get his anger under control.” N.T. at 59-60. However, Father revealed in his

testimony that he was not in mental health or anger management treatment.

Id. at 128.   As such, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in

concluding that Mother failed to satisfy her IPV goal.

      With respect to Mother’s parenting goal, the orphans’ court found as

follows.

      Mother did participate in two parenting programs. Initially,
      Mother was referred to a parenting program through the Achieva

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      program. She was unable to engage in that program due to a
      long wait list. Mother participated in a coached parenting program
      through Justice Works. (Tr. at 46-47). It was also court-ordered
      the Mother engage in a parenting program through the Arsenal
      program. Mother was initially resistant to this program but did
      begin in the fall of 2022. (Tr. at 47-48). At the time of the
      termination proceedings, Mother was on the verge of being
      discharged from Arsenal for inconsistent attendance. (Tr. at 100).
      The service providers reported that Mother had made progress in
      these programs and accepted redirection and suggestions. (Tr. at
      96). Despite her participation in these programs, the court has
      concerns about Mother’s parenting abilities. Mother has the
      capability to parent short-term and in a controlled environment
      but there is little evidence that she could independently care for
      her child. For these reasons, the court to did not find that Mother
      successfully completed this goal.

O.C.O. at 10. The court’s conclusions are based on the following relevant

findings:

      Mother lacks a basic understanding of Child’s feeding needs.
      [Child] has dietary restrictions due to food allergies and also needs
      extra support to ensure that she is consuming enough food during
      meals. Mother has had to be reminded and redirected often to
      ensure that her child is eating enough to sustain her until her next
      meal. The visit supervisor, Terraina Alexander, reported concerns
      about Mother’s lack of understanding about Child’s food allergies,
      as Mother would often bring dairy products despite Child’s
      intolerance to those items. (Tr. at 21).

      Child also suffers from developmental and physical delays and was
      recommended to participate in [physical and occupational]
      therapeutic services to address these issues. (Tr. at 74). Mother
      struggled to understand the need for these services. (Tr. at 23,
      102). As reunification was the goal during the pendency of the
      case, Mother was given the opportunity to implement these
      services and engage in them.         The services were initially
      scheduled to occur during Mother’s visits, and she was expected
      to schedule and coordinate with these service providers.
      Unfortunately, Mother was inconsistent with scheduling despite
      being reminded to do so from various providers. (Tr. at 23).
      Ultimately, these services had to be moved into Child’s daycare
      because Mother kept canceling appointments. (Tr. at 75). Aside

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      from Child’s special needs, Mother was expected to attend Child’s
      medical appointments so that she could meet her routine medical
      needs. (Tr. at 43). Mother did not consistently schedule, nor did
      she attend, Child’s [routine] medical appointments. (Tr. at 35).

Id. at 9-10 (cleaned up). The foregoing findings are based on the testimony

provided by Ms. Alexander, Ms. Williams-Swanson, and Ms. Marshall.

Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in determining

Mother did not meet her parenting goal.

      Regarding her mental health goal, the court found that Mother “was

ordered to engage in mental health treatment at nearly every court hearing.

However, she has never consistently done so and only attends medication

management.” O.C.O. at 9. Ms. William-Swanson’s testimony supports these

findings. Specifically, she testified that Mother’s mental health goal required

her to attend therapy which is different than medication management. N.T.

at 44. Further, Ms. Pfaff testified that Mother never reengaged with mental

health services. Id. at 9. The record amply supports the court’s findings that

Mother did not comply with this goal.

      Based on the sustainable factual findings, we discern no abuse of

discretion by the court in concluding that “Mother has failed to make progress

in most all of her court-ordered goals either due to an incapacity to parent or

her refusal to engage with services. The conditions and causes of the

incapacity and refusal cannot or will not to be remedied by Mother.” O.C.O.

at 11 (cleaned up). Mother’s first claim fails.

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         With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother argues that the evidence was

insufficient to terminate her parental rights based on the testimony of Dr.

Bernstein. Mother alleges that Dr. Bernstein observed her meeting Child’s

physical needs by changing her diaper, feeding her, and burping her. Mother’s

Brief at 29. In addition, Mother asserts that Dr. Bernstein testified that she

was able to meet Child’s emotional needs. Id. at 30. We discern no abuse of

discretion.

         Mother is correct that Dr. Bernstein observed her during the

interactional evaluations as offering “her daughter attention and support and

close supervision. I considered [Mother] to be responsible in supporting or

attending to [C]hild’s needs and [C]hild [was] responsive to the interaction as

well.”     N.T. at 135-136.     Nevertheless, Dr. Bernstein testified on cross-

examination by Mother’s counsel:

         Q. And both times [of your evaluations] did you observe a bond
         between [Child] and her mother?

         A. [T]he bond itself is not so much observed as it is understood
         as a culmination of not only the parent’s level of investment but
         consistent participation in the child’s life and familiarity with the
         child’s needs and, of course, how they also interact.

         So I would alternatively suggest that there was a positive
         interaction between Child and Mother, but the bond itself
         is measured by more than just the interactions alone.

Id. at 149 (emphasis added).          Indeed, the orphans’ court measured the

following considerations in concluding that Child’s developmental, physical,

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and emotional needs and welfare are served by the termination of Mother’s

parental rights under Section 2511(b).

     The court would have serious concerns for the safety of Child if
     she were returned to Mother’s care. The most glaring concern is
     that Mother has never been able to explain the cause of the
     injuries that Child presented with at Children’s Hospital in July of
     2021. (Tr. at 53). Of equal concern is that Mother seemingly has
     no safety concerns as it relates to Father and does not believe he
     poses a safety risk to Child. Father presented as easily frustrated
     and unable to complete basic parenting tasks such as diapering or
     changing Child’s clothes. Mother has long reported that Father
     does fine with Child and believed he could care for her
     independently. Dr. Bernstein testified to this concern, noting that
     it was puzzling that Mother could not identify any areas in which
     Father needed improvement. (Tr. at 140). He went on to further
     opine that “either she’s not critically assessing him, or she is
     protecting him in some way or another, but clearly there were
     some deficiencies and that she is not willing to acknowledge those
     raises concerns, especially placing him in the position to care for
     Child for any sustained period.” (Tr. at 140). Based upon the
     prior incident of child abuse and Mother’s lack of protective
     capacity, the court finds that Child would be at increased risk of
     child abuse if returned to Mother’s care.

     Cases involving domestic violence always raise safety concerns for
     the children involved. In addition to the physical safety of a child,
     domestic violence can have long-term ramifications on a child’s
     functioning and development.         Dr. Bernstein reported that
     exposing a child to domestic violence could have a myriad of
     effects including psychological distress, anxiety, and could affect
     the child’s mood, behavior, or aggressiveness. (Tr. at 142).
     Mother has continued to engage in a relationship with Father and
     has downplayed incidents of physical violence. She has reported
     to being victimized by Father several times and as recently as July
     of 2022.     There has been no change in the status of the
     relationship between the parents and they remain an intact
     couple. If Child were returned to Mother’s care, she would be at
     increased risk for exposure to domestic violence.

     With respect to the bond/attachment analysis, the court does not
     find that Child has a necessary or secure attachment to Mother.
     Child recognizes Mother and does have a relationship with her but

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      does not view her as her psychological parent. (OCYF 8 – 2022
      Bernstein Report). Child shares a loving bond with her foster
      mother and all of her needs are being met in the foster home. The
      foster care coordinator, Terraina Alexander, has reported that
      Child shares a bond with her foster mother.           (Tr. at 27).
      Additionally, the OCYF caseworker testified that Child is doing
      “amazing” in the foster home. (Tr. at 74). Dr. Bernstein reported
      that the foster mother presented as “a stable, healthy, invested
      caretaker” and has provided Child with necessary love and care.
      (OCYF 8 – 2022 Bernstein Report).

      He further opined that Child has relied on [her foster mother] as
      a “stable, consistent and loving support” and that Child’s
      attachment to her foster mother is a secure one. (OCYF 8 – 2022
      Bernstein Report); (Tr. at 153).     The court acknowledges that
      Child may suffer some emotional discomfort or uncertainty if her
      relationship with Mother were to cease. However, Dr. Bernstein
      did not believe that it would “deleteriously affect” Child. (Id.)

O.C.O. at 12-13 (cleaned up).

      The testimony of Ms. Williams-Swanson, Dr. Bernstein, and Ms.

Alexander supports the court’s findings. Specifically, with respect to Father’s

parenting deficiencies, Dr. Bernstein testified that, in the interactional

evaluations he performed in November 2021, and again in December of 2022,

he observed Father struggle “to engage, support, communicate with and

attend to” Child. N.T. at 136. Further, he testified that “Father did not show

a substantial or significant advancement in his anticipation of and response to

his daughter’s needs. [Child] [wa]s upset and in distress in both instances,

and [Father] did not effectively calm her.” Id. Dr. Bernstein testified that,

“as long as [Mother and Father] are a couple and [Mother] relies on [Father]

to coparent and raise the child, that too is of issue especially given [Father]’s

notable struggles in both of the interviews and discussion [that took place

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during his evaluations] as well as about his understanding of the child’s needs

and to the extent that he can meet those needs.” Id. at 140.

      Finally, concerning whether Child has a necessary and beneficial

relationship with Mother, Dr. Bernstein testified that Mother has “a positive

relationship with [C]hild but not to the level such that [C]hild depends upon

[Mother] for her everyday needs.”       Id. at 144.     As such, he opined that

severing the relationship between Child and Mother would not rise “to the level

of detrimental.” Id. at 145. In contrast, Dr. Bernstein testified that Child

relies upon her foster mother “for sustenance and her day-to-day needs.” Id.

at 145. He opined as follows regarding severance of the bond between Child

and her foster mother.

      [Child] is approaching almost two years of age, which is a central
      part of development when separation anxiety is issue. That is,
      that the bond that has been established, and if a child . . . is apart
      for long from the caregiver to whom [he or she has] the
      attachment, it can lead to perhaps much more challenges or
      maladjustment than at any other age.

      It is a very sensitive period of [the child] life. So the point is that
      if separated from [her] foster mother, it could have substantial
      impact upon [Child] today.

Id. at 145-146.

      Based on the foregoing sustainable findings of fact, we discern no abuse

of discretion by the court in concluding that terminating Mother’s parental

rights serves the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

of Child. Thus, we affirm the order pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/2023

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