Court Opinion

ID: 9491107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:03:45.403384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:30.509342
License: Public Domain

LAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As the experienced district judge points out, there should be little question the defenses urged by the petitioner Michael Hood and his co-defendant were mutually antagonistic. Each accused the other of pulling the trigger of the gun that killed Sherryl Snodgrass’ husband. To urge that such defenses were not irreconcilable defies common acceptance of that term.
Irreconcilability requires severance when “ ‘there is a danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.’ ” United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304, 1310 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1143 (8th Cir.1996)), cert. denied, ■—■ U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 189, 139 L.Ed.2d 128 (1997). Given the conflicting testimony of these two co-defendants, the irreconcilability of their defenses could not be more clear. As Justice Harris’ strong dissent in the Iowa Supreme Court opinion notes:
The rationale for the antagonistic defenses rule rests on two bases. First, it is inherently prejudicial for a defendant to face multiple prosecutors, or for the State to orchestrate a pit fight in which each defendant’s attorney attempts to destroy the other’s client. Secondly, a defendant should not face the risk that a jury may become so disgruntled or perplexed by the eodefendants’ inconsistencies that they will unjustifiably disbelieve both and find both guilty.
Snodgrass, 346 N.W.2d at 480 (Harris, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
The majority argues that the jury could have accepted Ms. Snodgrass’ story that she did not fire the fatal shot and still have believed Hood was not guilty of murder, because Ms. Snodgrass testified that Hood acted in self-defense in shooting Gregory Snodgrass. This misses the point. As Justice Harris pointed out, the core of the defenses presented by Hood and Ms. Snodgrass were much broader than justification. Specifically, they each presented irreconcilable and mutually exclusive defenses to the specific intent element of both first-degree murder and aiding and abetting first-degree murder. As Justice Harris observed, the joint trial “was indeed a battle in which the *899eo-defendants’ attorneys attempted to destroy each other’s client.” Snodgrass, 346 N.W.2d at 481. Each defendant claimed the other defendant was lying. How much more evidence of irreconcilability is needed?
Each defendant denied an intent to kill, and each denied knowledge of the other’s intent to Mil. Significantly, they disagreed on whether each knew the intent of the person who pulled the trigger. These are not just simple inconsistencies in testimony; they are clearly irreconcilable versions of events. Justice Harris points out that even the prosecutor at trial argued that the two defendants could not both be telling the truth. Snodgrass, 346 N.W.2d at 480. Jurors could not believe the “core” of Hood’s defense—that he did not pull the trigger— without disbelieving Ms. Snodgrass’ “core” defense that he did. See Gutberlet, 939 F.2d at 645-46.
However, conflicting defenses alone are not enough to mandate severance. In Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. at 938, the Supreme Court ruled that “[mjutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se.” Instead, the Court stated that severance is warranted “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. at 938. The Court stated: “Such a risk might occur when evidence that the jury should not consider against a defendant and that would not be admissible if a defendant were tried alone is admitted____” Id. This scenario which the Supreme Court identified as highly prejudicial is exactly what took place at Hood’s trial.
Ms. Snodgrass’ first witness was Dr. Allen Silberman, who testified that he had diagnosed Sherryl as a “passive dependent personality” with low self-esteem, who “would tend to subordinate her own needs for other people upon whom she is dependent.” Dr. Silberman also stated that Ms. Snodgrass “would go along with many things without questioning,” and as a rule, people with this disorder do not become violent. During closing arguments, Ms. Snodgrass’ attorney emphasized Dr. Silberman’s assessment of Ms. Snodgrass’ passive-dependent personality and portrayed Hood as the aggressor in the relationship.
Two years after Hood’s criminal appeal was completed, the State of Iowa revoked Silberman’s license to practice psychology when it was learned that Silberman had a sexual relationship with Ms. Snodgrass while he was treating and evaluating her in preparation for his trial testimony. The majority declines to take judicial notice of the details of the license revocation or the sexual relationship, stating the additional evidence would not entitle Hood to habeas relief. See supra note 2.
This testimony would not have been admitted into evidence if Hood had been tried alone. The State in fact objected to the calling of Silberman at trial, arguing he was improperly giving an opinion on Ms. Snodgrass’ likelihood to commit a crime. The result of Silberman’s testimony was to shift the blame of the crime away from Ms. Snodgrass (as the “passive-dependent”) and on to Hood (as the aggressor.) The prejudice to Hood is compounded by the fact that, in light of Silberman’s sexual relationship with Ms. Snodgrass, his testimony now must be viewed as shockingly biased and unreliable. It is difficult for me to assess this prejudice as anything but constitutional error.
The majority further argues that the admission of some of the evidence presented by Ms. Snodgrass did not render Hood’s trial fundamentally unfair, because much of this evidence would have been admissible against Hood if he was tried alone. Assuming this is true, the dynamics of the joint trial still amounted to a tag-team prosecution against Hood and Ms. Snodgrass, as each side desperately tried to pin the blame on one another. In Zafiro, Justice Stevens recognized that joinder may be highly prejudicial “in cases ... in which mutually exclusive defenses transform a trial into ‘more of a contest between the defendants than between the people and the defendants.’” 506 U.S. at 543,113 S.Ct. at 940 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Braune, 363 111. 551, 2 N.E.2d 839, 842 (1936)). This is exactly what happened here, as Hood was forced to fend off attacks from both the prosecutor and his *900co-defendant. As Justice Hams poignantly-put it:
The tensions [between Hood and Ms. Snodgrass] were greatly exacerbated by the fact that a circle was drawn around both defendants in the same trial. The circle was then tightened, not only by the prosecution but also by the attempts of each defendant to escape by becoming a star witness against the other.
Snodgrass, 346 N.W.2d at 481.
For these reasons, I believe it clear that the mutually antagonistic defenses prevented the jury from making a rehable judgment about Hood’s guilt or innocence on the first-degree murder charge. This extreme prejudice rendered Hood’s trial fundamentally unfair, and in turn constituted a violation of the defendant’s right to due process. His conviction should be reversed, and a separate trial should be granted.