Court Opinion

ID: 9885049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:28:25.914758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:43.510613
License: Public Domain

*714NORTON, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the Commissioner’s decision. I agree with him that the Johnson case supports a conclusion that the strike ceased “active progress” when the trustee told Hormel in his letter of May 23, 1986 that respondents would no longer withhold their labor. The strike was then over, and any unemployment of respondents was no longer caused by the strike, but by the unavailability of work due to Hormel’s employment of replacement workers.
The strike in the Johnson case occurred in 1959. In recent years there have been a number of cases that recognize that once a strike ceases “active progress,” the unemployment laws should be liberally construed to deal with the severe economic problems of the employees by allowing benefits.
The case most closely on point is The Skookum Co. v. Employment Division, 24 Or.App. 271, 545 P.2d 914, aff'd 276 Or. 303, 554 P.2d 520 (1976), where striking employees returned to the job site prior to signing a final contract between their union and employer but were not put to work by the employer. There, the employer decided not to rehire the striking employees, but instead retained replacement workers. The Oregon court affirmed the decision of the Employment Appeals Board, holding that the post-strike unemployment was not due to a labor dispute, but to the unavailability of work. Skookum, 24 Or.App. at 275, 545 P.2d at 916.
The Skookum case is clearly more factually on point than is Johnson, which the majority cites for the proposition that the Hormel strike and labor dispute ended when the union voted to approve the settlement.
A number of other cases more recent than Johnson seem to be formulating a modern approach, in which in varying factual situations the termination of a labor dispute in active progress ends disqualification for unemployment benefits. See, e.g., Randall, Burkart/Randall, Division of Textron, Inc. v. Daniels, 268 Ark. 375, 597 S.W.2d 71 (1980); In re Acquisto, 25 A.D. 2d 326, 269 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1966); In re Sarvis, 296 N.C. 475, 251 S.E.2d 434 (1979); General Motors Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 210 Pa.Super. 223, 232 A.2d 35, aff'd 427 Pa. 645, 234 A.2d 859 (1967).
I believe the Commissioner correctly ruled that Johnson is authority for a determination that respondents’ disqualifications for unemployment compensation benefits ceased on the date of the trustee’s letter, May 23, 1986. An administrative agency’s construction of its own statutes, although not binding upon this court, is entitled to great weight unless it is found to be erroneous and in conflict with the expressed purpose of the act and intention of the legislature. In re Estate of Raynolds, 219 Minn. 449, 456-57, 18 N.W.2d 238, 242 (1945); Mattson v. Flynn, 216 Minn. 354, 362-63, 13 N.W.2d 11, 16 (1944). Here, the Commissioner liberally construed the term “active progress,” determining that respondents’ strike ceased active progress after the trustee’s letter of May 23. This construction comports with the purpose of the unemployment compensation statutes, which are humanitarian in nature and should be liberally construed. Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Lopez, 341 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Minn.Ct.App.1983); Minn.Stat. § 268.03 (1986).
I would further note that this strike was unnecessarily extended as the result of a dispute between the union’s International and Local P-9. Respondents suffered additional unemployment due to this dispute. This court should recognize this unusual intra-labor disagreement and reduce the severe economic effect upon the workers.