Court Opinion

ID: 9956058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-31 07:16:13.792674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:06.209092
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 26, 2024.

                                     In The

                      Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-23-00219-CV

                         SHARON YASIN, Appellant

                                       V.
   METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY OF HARRIS COUNTY,
    TEXAS; ARTURO JACKSON; MICHAEL ANDRADE; JEREMY
  SCHOECH; MICHAEL HONER; AND RHONDA RUSSELL, Appellees

            On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1
                          Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 1198763

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

     Sharon Yasin filed a self-represented petition against five individuals and the
Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, Texas (METRO). Three of the
individuals—Arturo Jackson, Michael Andrade, and Jeremy Schoech—are
employees of METRO. We refer to METRO and these individuals collectively as
the METRO Defendants. The two remaining individuals—Michael Honer and
Rhonda Russell—are employees of First Transit, Inc., which staffs METRO with
bus drivers. We refer to these individuals collectively as the First Transit Defendants.

        Yasin asserted a single claim in her petition, which we recite here verbatim:
“This suit is filed against DEFENDANTS for violation of Plaintiff’s ADA
Violations and Failure to Train Employed Properly under 42 U S.C. Sec 18 1983
Act.”

        The factual allegations in support of this claim were nonspecific, but they all
focused on METROLift, which is METRO’s paratransit service for qualifying
persons with disabilities. Yasin alleged that she experienced a “pattern of
incidents/injuries” when she was a passenger on METROLift. Yasin identified the
dates of these occurrences—eighteen in total over a span of more than three years—
but she never alleged what happened on any of those occurrences. She merely
alleged that she suffered various forms of emotional distress and “loss of business,”
for which she sought $250,000 in damages.

        The METRO Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 91a of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. They advanced two main arguments. First, they
argued that Yasin’s suit was vague and threadbare, in that she did not allege any
facts that would demonstrate a viable, legally cognizable right to relief. Second, they
argued that the three individuals who were all employees of METRO should be
dismissed from the suit because METRO is a governmental unit, and by suing a
governmental unit, Yasin had made an irrevocable election to seek relief from that
governmental unit and not any of its employees. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 101.106.

        The First Transit Defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss under Rule
91a. They similarly argued that Yasin’s allegations were threadbare. They recited

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the allegations against them, which consisted of just two sentences. We recite them
here verbatim:

      16). Mike Honer ignored all incidents/injuries that kept occuring to
      Plaintiff and swept it under the rug as if it never happened and turned a
      blind eye to what was happening to Plaintiff by the contractor
      Supervisors on METRO’s Metrolift Bus.
      17). Rhonda Russell is responsible for safety and training and failed to
      properly trained it’s driver’s and did not keep me safe.

      The First Transit Defendants argued that the allegation against Honer most
nearly sounded in negligent supervision and that the allegation against Russell most
nearly sounded in negligent training. The First Transit Defendants then argued that
these theories of negligence are based on the direct negligence of an employer.
Because the First Transit Defendants were just employees, they argued that they
could not be liable, and that the proper defendant was their employer, First Transit.

      The First Transit Defendants alternatively argued that Yasin had not
demonstrated a viable claim for relief. They pointed out that, as to Honer, Yasin
never made any allegations regarding the supervision policies at First Transit, or
what supervision should have been provided. Similarly, there were no allegations
about the “incidents” that Honer allegedly “swept under the rug.” As to Russell, the
First Transit Defendants also pointed out that Yasin never made any allegations
about training policies, or what training Russell should have provided but did not.
Finally, the First Transit Defendants pointed out that Yasin had not alleged any
bodily injury, which is necessary for a claim of either negligent supervision or
negligent training.

      Yasin filed a response styled as an “Objection to Dismissal of Case,” in which
she demanded a “cease and desist” until two other motions were considered. The
first of these motions was a challenge to the constitutionality of Rule 91a. The second

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motion was styled as a “Motion Challenging Courts Jurisdiction and Challenging
Defendant’s Oath of Office.” In this latter motion, Yasin asserted that the state trial
court could take no action until the court established its “Article III jurisdiction.”
Yasin also asserted in this motion that the METRO Defendant’s counsel had not
established his credentials as an “attorney of constitutional authority.”

      The trial court conducted a hearing on the Rule 91a motions. Yasin appeared
in court early for the hearing, but she left before the hearing began. The trial court
recited on the record that Yasin “left of her own free will” and that she had been
warned that the hearing would proceed even if she were absent. The trial court
further noted that it “had gone out of its way . . . to make the courtroom available
and accessible to Ms. Yasin.” The court explained that “we have a hearing machine
that’s been provided for her as well as a big screen TV that was provided in the
courtroom for her sight issues.”

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted both motions under
Rule 91a and signed an order finally dismissing Yasin’s suit.

      Yasin then brought this appeal, where she is also self-represented. Her brief
begins with a lengthy discussion of Article III jurisdiction, which has no bearing
here, as Yasin filed this suit in state court, not federal court. She eventually presents
three issues, which we recite her verbatim:

      Q1. Do I have the right to have my case heard in a Article III court
      before a Article III Judge
      Q2. Do I have a right to have my ADA Discrimination case with Civil
      Rights Violations heard in a Proper court
      Q3. Do I have the right to have my case case transfered to its proper
      court with the jurisdiction that hear a $20,000,000.00 claim
      Yasin does not follow these issues with any arguments or authorities, even
though that was her burden. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Rogers v. City of Houston,
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627 S.W.3d 777, 786 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“Pro se
litigants and appellants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must
comply with applicable laws and procedures.”). Even if she had presented arguments
and authorities, none of these issues challenges the grounds presented in the Rule
91a motions, which was also her burden. See Estate of Savana, 529 S.W.3d 587, 592
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“If an order granting a Rule 91a
motion does not specify the grounds for dismissal, a party appealing the order must
challenge every ground upon which the trial court could have granted the motion.”).
Because Yasin did not challenge any such ground, we must presume that the
unchallenged grounds support the trial court’s adverse ruling. See Vo v. Iyer, No. 14-
18-01051-CV, 2020 WL 3698032, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 7,
2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Unrelated to her stated issues, Yasin closes her brief with the following
complaint: “I was not afforded a auxiliary aids to assist me with hearing, nor
computer-aided transcription service (CART) nor afforded requested documents be
in large printed to assist with the ability to see to read.” Yasin provides no record
citations or context for this complaint. To the extent she complains about a lack of
accommodations at the hearing on the Rule 91a motions, the record refutes her
position.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                       /s/       Tracy Christopher
                                                 Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Jewell.

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