Court Opinion

ID: 9726016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:27:43.053602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:22.874980
License: Public Domain

HOLMDAHL, J.—I respectfully dissent.
*117It is certainly the prerogative of this court to conclude that the Robinson Act window provision is unconstitutional. The prerogative exists, of course, whether or not the holding in Honey Springs Home Owners Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1122 [203 Cal.Rptr. 886] “regarding the constitutionality of the window provision is dicta.”
It is apparent, however, that the Honey Springs court thought it was dealing definitively with the constitutional question, as indicated by its numerous references to it1 and by the court’s detailed treatment of the issue. I think its holding is not dicta, and I think its conclusion that the statute is constitutional is correct.
Article XIII, section 8,2 does direct “the Legislature to ‘define’ open space land,” as stated by the majority of this court. However, its plain language also does far more, I believe, than “merely [allow] the Legislature to specify the ‘manner’ in which land is enforceably restricted.” Indeed, the people have mandated that if and when the Legislature does define “open space land,” such land shall be “enforceably restricted, in a manner specified by the Legislature.'’'’3 (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 8, italics added.)
I consider the disagreement of my colleagues with respondents’ argument “that the Constitution allows the Legislature to define the terms ‘enforce-ably restricted’ in any way it chooses” to be rather academic. The fact of the matter is that the Legislature has, at all points in time, enacted restrictions and that those restrictions are enforceable. One might prefer that such restrictions were more numerous or more severe or less numerous or less severe. Such determinations, however, are properly legislative, and not judicial, functions.
While my colleagues “find no indication that the constitutional provision permits the Legislature to define enforceable restrictions at all, much less to define restrictions which do not actually serve to restrict the use of the land at issue,” they do not tell us whom “the constitutional provision per*118mits ... to define enforceable restrictions.” Certainly the language of article XIII, section 8, confers such authority only upon the Legislature.
Except for conceivable “restrictions” that are clearly not restrictions and except for conceivable restrictions that are clearly not “enforceable,” are we, the judiciary, really entitled to overrule the combined actions of the legislative and executive branches of government in their determination of such restrictions? Article XIII, section 8, certainly does not confer such authority. I find no such authority elsewhere in the Constitution.
Honey Springs describes the cancellation procedures of the Williamson Act, as modified by the Robinson Act, as being “highlighted by the stringent findings required under the permanent provisions” and the window-period cancellation provisions as being “also sufficiently enforceably restrictive.” (Honey Springs Homeowners Assn. v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 1147.) I agree.
I would affirm the judgment.
The petitions of defendant and respondent and real parties in interest and respondents for review by the Supreme Court were denied May 29, 1986. Broussard, J., Reynoso, J., and Grodin, J., were of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.

 See, e.g., id., at pages 1127, 1128, 1146, and 1147.

 Article XIII, section 8, provides in relevant part: “To promote the conservation, preservation and continued existence of open space lands, the Legislature may define open space land and shall provide that when this land is enforceably restricted, in a manner specified by the Legislature, to recreation, enjoyment of scenic beauty, use or conservation of natural resources, or production of food or fiber, it shall be valued for property tax purposes only on a basis that is consistent with its restrictions and uses.”

 The “manner” of such restriction is thus left for legislative determination. I take “manner” to mean far more than my colleagues’ prescription of “the procedure by which land is restricted.” The dictionary definition provided in the majority opinion also includes “kind” and “sort”—words relating to substance, rather than to “a mode of procedure,” the alternative definition chosen by the majority.