Court Opinion

ID: 9382602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 13:10:51.052798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:40.437894
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 22

                  SUPREME COURT           OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2021AP21-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:        State of Wisconsin,
                                 Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       Robert K. Nietzold, Sr.,
                                 Defendant-Appellant.

                         REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                         Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 545, 970 N.W.2d 590
                                    (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         March 28, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         October 10, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Vernon
   JUDGE:              Darcy Jo Rood

JUSTICES:
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous
Court.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general, with whom
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an
oral argument by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general.

       For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Philip J. Brehm and Philip J. Brehm Attorney at Law, Janesville.
There was an oral argument by Philip J. Brehm.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ellen Henak, Robert R.
Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, for the Wisconsin
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

                                2
                                                                               2023 WI 22
                                                                       NOTICE
                                                        This opinion is subject to further
                                                        editing and modification.   The final
                                                        version will appear in the bound
                                                        volume of the official reports.
No.   2021AP21-CR
(L.C. No.   2018CF81)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                                  :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

            Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                                                                             FILED
      v.                                                               MAR 28, 2023

Robert K. Nietzold, Sr.,                                                  Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                       Clerk of Supreme Court

            Defendant-Appellant.

HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous
Court.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                       Reversed.

      ¶1    BRIAN   HAGEDORN,      J.        Plea   agreements         are    a    kind    of

contract.       And just like contracts, they can be breached, and

breaches sometimes cured.           The central question in this case is

whether a prosecutor cured the breach of a plea agreement when

he initially recommended a specific term of imprisonment despite

the   State's    agreement   not    to       do   so,    but    then     retracted        and

corrected the mistake upon being made aware of the error.                                  We

conclude that the breach was cured, and that defense counsel was

not   deficient     for   failing       to    object     earlier       to    the     errant
remarks.
                                                              No.      2021AP21-CR

                              I.     BACKGROUND

     ¶2     In 2019, Robert Nietzold, Sr. pleaded no contest to

one count of repeated sexual abuse of a child.                        He did so

pursuant to a plea agreement in which the prosecutor was free to

argue for prison, but agreed not to recommend a specific term of

imprisonment.

     ¶3     At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked the

circuit court1 to impose a 27-year sentence, composed of 12 years

of   initial    confinement     as     recommended    by   the      presentence

investigation     report      (PSI),       and   15   years      of     extended

supervision——five years longer than the PSI recommendation.2

     1 The Honorable Darcy J. Rood of the Vernon County Circuit
Court presided.
     2   The prosecutor argued as follows:

     So what is -- again, what's the magic number? And as
     I've said before, that's a difficult position that
     this Court is in. And a lot of times the PSI may be
     the best barometer because they do have their grids
     and their guidelines, and they understand throughout
     either this region, or at least the state, what -- I
     don't want to say typical, because there isn't a
     typical sentence, but at least -- you have to put a
     number on it eventually.    And the number that they
     came up with was 22, 12 of initial confinement and ten
     of extended supervision.

     Judge, I -- you know, again, whether that's the right
     number, not the right number, [the victim] was talking
     about the maximum term, which would be 40 years, 25 in
     and 15 out.   Again, I don't know what the number is.
     I don't know what the magic number is.     I think the
     number that the PSI put on is a reasonable number.
     I've looked at other sentences to -- again, when I say
     similar, at least the charge-wise, that that certainly
     is in the range in this area.

                                       2
                                                                      No.    2021AP21-CR

    ¶4        After   the    prosecutor       concluded,       with    the    specific

recommendation coming at the very end of his remarks, defense

counsel began by pointing out the prosecutor's breach.                         Counsel

expressed      that    the     State   had      agreed     not        to    "make   any

recommendation        with   respect   to      any    period     of    time."       The

prosecutor immediately acknowledged his mistake:

    [Prosecutor]: And, Judge, now that -- I wish [defense
    counsel] would have mentioned that.    And that's an
    accurate statement, Judge. So --

    The Court: So you'll make no recommendation separate
    from that of the PSI.

    [Prosecutor]:            Well, not even that.              Just a prison
    sentence.

    The Court:         Okay.   All right.
After   the    prosecutor      corrected      the    State's    recommendation       in

conformance with the plea agreement, defense counsel wrapped up

    Judge, the only thing I would ask the Court to
    consider would be 15 years is the maximum time of
    extended supervision.     Maybe keep Mr. Nietzold on
    extended supervision for a 15-year period rather than
    the ten that's being requested.

    So I guess that's what I would ask that the Court
    consider, is a 27-year sentence with 12 years of
    initial   confinement  and   15   years  of   extended
    supervision.    That would be a -- depending upon
    potentially early discharge from prison at some point,
    that would be about 25 years out that he would be
    under some formal either incarceration or supervision,
    which I think just makes some sense in regards to the
    heinous nature of these crimes. And so that’s what I
    would ask the Court to consider in regards to the
    sentence.

                                          3
                                                               No.    2021AP21-CR

his   argument   and   asked    for    two   to   three    years     of   initial

confinement.     Nietzold then briefly addressed the court.

      ¶5   Following a recess, the circuit court proceeded with

its sentencing decision.         Halfway through, the court mentioned

that the "state" recommended 12 years of initial confinement,

leading to an extended colloquy with the prosecutor:

      The Court:   It's always so hard to put a number on
      what the sentence should be. The state recommended 12
      years. We say 12 years in --

      [Prosecutor]:   Judge,       recall    that   I     didn't   make    a
      recommendation.

      The Court:    The state.        I meant DOC by the state, not
      you.

      [Prosecutor]:    Oh, I'm sorry.

      The Court: I'm sorry. I'm thinking of the DOC as the
      state, not [the prosecutor].

      [Prosecutor]:    Department of Corrections.

      The Court: Department of Corrections. Thank you for
      clarifying that. I would not want the record to state
      that, because I did not listen to what you were
      saying, essentially were echoing what the PSI said.

      [Defense counsel]:       Well, the record does --

      The Court:   Other than asking for a longer extended
      supervision, but you didn't ask for any more --

      [Prosecutor]:    Right, but, Judge, --

      The Court:    -- confinement --

      [Prosecutor]:    The negotiation --

      The Court:   I understand.

      [Prosecutor]:    I was not to make any recommendation.

                                       4
                                                                                 No.    2021AP21-CR

      The Court:            And you withdrew your recommendation.

      [Prosecutor]:            Yeah.

      The Court:   I get that. I'm just saying it was DOC.
      It was DOC that made this recommendation.
Thus,      the    court       clarified          that     it    was        referring         to   the

Department        of    Corrections'            recommendation            when     invoking         the

"state,"     and       that       the    court     understood         the     prosecutor            had

withdrawn        his    earlier         comments        and    was    not     arguing         for    a

specific prison term.                In the end, the circuit court crafted its

own   sentence         of    25    years       consisting      of    15     years      of    initial

confinement and ten years of extended supervision.

      ¶6     Nietzold         filed        a    motion    for       postconviction            relief

seeking resentencing based on the State's initial violation of

the plea agreement.                The circuit court denied the motion without

a hearing.        Nietzold appealed and the court of appeals reversed

and remanded for resentencing before a new judge.                                           State v.

Nietzold, No. 2021AP21-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶18 (Wis. Ct.

App. Dec. 9, 2021).                  The court of appeals reasoned that the

prosecutor materially breached the plea agreement by commenting

on the merits of the PSI's recommendation and by recommending a

specific sentence.                Id., ¶14.       It found unpersuasive the State's

arguments that the prosecutor withdrew his earlier comments and

clarified        the    State's         position.        Id.,       ¶15.      We    granted         the

State's petition for review.

                                                  5
                                                                   No.    2021AP21-CR

                                  II.    ANALYSIS

       ¶7      Nietzold makes two arguments on appeal.                    First, he

contends      the   State     materially    and   substantially     breached      the

plea agreement and that this breach was not cured.                       Second, he

asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object

earlier to the prosecutor's breach.               Neither argument prevails.

                     A.     Curing The Prosecutor's Breach

       ¶8      A plea agreement is a species of contract——albeit one

with       constitutional     boundary     markers.3    State      v.    Smith,   207

Wis. 2d 258, 271, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997); United States v. Diaz-

Jimenez, 622 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2010).               A plea agreement is

breached when a prosecutor fails to abide by the negotiated

sentencing recommendation.              Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 272.            As in

contract law, mere technical breaches are generally not enough

to afford a remedy.             Id.; State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246,

289, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).           A defendant seeking to vacate a plea

must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the breach
was material and substantial.            Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289.

       ¶9      An   initial    breach,     however,    even   if    material      and

substantial, does not end the matter.                   Some breaches may be

cured.       In Puckett v. United States, the United States Supreme

       Those accused of crimes have "a constitutional right to
       3

the enforcement of a negotiated plea agreement."       State v.
Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶37, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733.
Given the constitutional rights defendants give up when entering
a plea, "the accused's due process rights demand fulfillment of
the bargain." Id.

                                           6
                                                                        No.   2021AP21-CR

Court rejected the notion that an initial error——for example,

"requesting a higher sentence than agreed upon"——is uncurable.

556 U.S. 129, 139-40 (2009).                  While some breaches cannot be

cured,    at    least     "some   breaches      may    be    curable       upon   timely

objection——for example, where the prosecution simply forgot its

commitment and is willing to adhere to the agreement."                             Id. at

140.

       ¶10     This court has similarly said that some breaches can

be cured.       In Smith, we held that the State breached the plea

agreement when it recommended a term of imprisonment despite its

agreement to make no specific recommendation.                           207 Wis. 2d at

272-73.        After     explaining     that    this    was       a    substantial     and

material breach, we added that the breach "was not remedied,

because Smith's counsel failed to object to the breach."                               Id.

In other words, had the prosecutor been alerted to the error and

corrected it, the initial breach may have been cured.

       ¶11     General    principles      of     contract         law     confirm      the

proposition      that     some    material     and    substantial         breaches     are
curable.       In an ordinary contract, we have said that "to cure a

material     breach      means    to   engage    in    subsequent         conduct    that

substantially performs or performs without a material failure."

Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. DOT, 2010 WI 15, ¶45, 323 Wis. 2d 294,

779    N.W.2d 423      (quoting    another      source).          If    the   breach    is

cured,    it    becomes     nonmaterial.         Id.,       ¶44       (quoting    another

source).       In the context of pleas, courts have generally held

that a material breach of a plea agreement may be cured if the
prosecutor unequivocally retracts the error.                          United States v.
                                          7
                                                                                     No.    2021AP21-CR

Ligon,    937         F.3d 714,         720    (6th       Cir.       2019);       Diaz-Jimenez,      622

F.3d at 696; see, e.g., United States v. Amico, 416 F.3d 163,

165 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that government cured its plea

breach by rapidly retracting it).

       ¶12       In this case, the parties agree that only material and

substantial           plea     breaches         require          a    remedy,       and     that    some

breaches     can        be    cured.          The     parties         further       agree    that    the

prosecutor            materially         and     substantially               breached       the     plea

agreement by suggesting the PSI's recommendation was reasonable

and    recommending            a    specific         prison          term.         The     dispositive

question is whether the breach was cured.

       ¶13       The terms of a plea agreement and the facts of the

underlying conduct by the State in performance on that agreement

are questions of fact.                    State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶5, 249

Wis. 2d 492,           637     N.W.2d 733.                We     accept       a    circuit     court's

findings         of    fact     unless         they       are    clearly          erroneous.         Id.

Whether      a    plea        agreement        has        been       breached,      however,       is    a

question of law we review independently.                                 Id.        In Williams, we
held that not only is the existence of breach a question of law,

so is whether a breach is material and substantial.                                         Id.     This

is    because         an     appellate         court       must       independently          determine

whether a legal standard is met by the facts in a case.                                              Id.

The same logic applies here.                        While the facts giving rise to an

attempted cure may be found by the circuit court, whether those

facts cure the breach——meaning there is no longer a material

breach entitling an accused to a remedy——must likewise be a
question     of        law.        In    other      words,       because          materiality       is   a
                                                      8
                                                                                       No.       2021AP21-CR

question of law, so too is cure.                              See, e.g., United States v.

Purser, 747 F.3d 284, 294 (5th Cir. 2014) (reviewing cure of a

plea breach de novo).

       ¶14    On this record, we conclude the prosecutor cured the

breach.       To recap, the prosecutor materially and substantially

breached the agreement by advocating for a specific term of

imprisonment.           Moments after those offending comments, defense

counsel      informed        the    court          of    the    prosecutor's                error.        The

prosecutor immediately acknowledged the blunder and modified the

State's recommendation to an undefined prison term——exactly what

Nietzold agreed to.            But that's not all.                     The prosecutor doubled

down    when     the     circuit          court          made    comments             that       initially

suggested       it      may        have            forgotten          or        misunderstood             the

prosecutor's earlier correction.                           When the court said that the

"state"      recommended       12        years,         the    prosecutor             interjected         and

reminded      the    court     that           he    was    not    arguing             for    a    specific

sentence       length.         The        court          confirmed             it    understood,          and

explained      that     by    "state"          the       court    was          referring         to   DOC's
recommendation in the PSI.                         We accept this as a finding of the

circuit      court     that    the        prosecutor            did    withdraw          his      earlier,

erroneous      comments,           and    was        recommending               only    an       undefined

prison term.           And we conclude the prosecutor's immediate and

unequivocal         retraction           of    his        error——and            subsequent         actions

affirming       that         retraction——constitute                        a        sufficient        cure,

transforming         the      material             and     substantial               breach        into     a

nonmaterial breach.                After an initial error, Nietzold received

                                                     9
                                                                                No.    2021AP21-CR

what he bargained for:                 the State recommended a prison term but

not a specific length of time.

       ¶15    Nietzold counters that we should look to the circuit

court's comments after the prosecutor's cure as evidence that

the court remained affected by the breach.                              However, our inquiry

here focuses on the prosecutor's conduct, not the court's.                                      See

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).

       ¶16    Nietzold further argues that this kind of cure was

"too   little,    too       late"       and    cites       Williams       as   support.         249

Wis. 2d 492, ¶52.                We disagree.              The prosecutor in            Williams

"implied that had the State known more about the defendant, it

would not have entered into the plea agreement."                                       Id., ¶47.

That   left    the    impression          that       she     was       "arguing      against    the

negotiated     terms        of    the     plea    agreement."              Id.,       ¶48.      The

attempted retraction was therefore rather equivocal, coming with

a   "covert    message       to     the       circuit      court        that   a     more    severe

sentence was warranted than that which had been recommended."

Id., ¶51.      Unlike in Williams, the prosecutor in this case never
"raised doubts regarding the wisdom of the terms of the plea

agreement."          Id.,        ¶50.         Rather,        he    cured       the    breach     by

unequivocally retracting it.

       ¶17    In the end, Nietzold fails to counter the precedent

establishing         that        even     errors        in        an    initial       sentencing

recommendation can be remedied.                        See supra ¶¶8-10.                An error

here    occurred,      but        so    did     the     necessary          cure.        Nietzold

sufficiently received the benefit of his plea bargain.

                                                10
                                                                              No.   2021AP21-CR

                    B.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      ¶18    In the alternative, Nietzold argues his counsel was

ineffective        for   failing      to    contemporaneously           object       when       the

prosecutor         breached     the     agreement.              A     defendant      claiming

ineffective        assistance      of      counsel       must    show    "both       that       (1)

counsel's representation was deficient, and (2) the deficiency

was   prejudicial."             State      v.       Ruffin,     2022    WI 34,       ¶29,       401

Wis. 2d 619, 974 N.W.2d 432.                  We conclude Nietzold's counsel did

not perform deficiently.                See id. ("Both prongs of the inquiry

need not be addressed if the defendant makes an insufficient

showing on one.").

      ¶19    Proving      deficiency          requires        showing    that       "counsel's

representation           fell      below            an      objective         standard           of

reasonableness considering all the circumstances."                                  Id., ¶30.

We are "highly deferential to counsel's strategic decisions";

"counsel's performance need not be perfect, or even very good,

to be constitutionally adequate."                     Id.

      ¶20    Here, defense         counsel objected after the prosecutor
finished     his     sentencing         remarks,         which      concluded       with        the

erroneous     recommendation            for     a    specific       sentence.           Perhaps

defense counsel would have done better to object earlier when

the prosecutor first began considering an appropriate sentence

length.      But this kind of imperfection does not rise to the

level of constitutionally deficient performance in this case.

As    we    have     explained,       counsel         did     raise     the     issue      in     a

sufficiently timely way, enabling the prosecutor to cure his
mistake.      In doing so, counsel ensured Nietzold received the
                                                11
                                                                         No.    2021AP21-CR

benefit of his plea agreement.                      This comes nowhere close to a

Sixth Amendment violation.                  Because his counsel did not perform

below      a    constitutionally             acceptable        standard,       Nietzold's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

                                     III.    CONCLUSION

      ¶21      The    court     of    appeals       determined    that     Nietzold      was

entitled to a new sentencing hearing.                          We reverse.       Nietzold

asks us to hold that the prosecutor failed to cure his breach by

initially recommending a specific prison term in violation of

the   plea     agreement.            The    bell,     Nietzold    argues,       cannot   be

unrung.        "But a mistake is not a bell, and usually can be

corrected."            Diaz-Jimenez,          622     F.3d at     696.         Here,     the

prosecutor corrected his mistake by unequivocally retracting it

and abiding by the terms of the plea agreement.                                Nietzold's

alternative          argument    that       his     counsel     provided       ineffective

assistance for failing to timely object likewise fails.

      By    the      Court.—The      decision       of   the    court    of    appeals    is
reversed.

                                              12
    No.   2021AP21-CR

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