Court Opinion

ID: 9495920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:13:20.874667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:16.033811
License: Public Domain

POGUE, Judge,
dissenting:
The crucial question in this case is whether Franklin’s flight was provoked by the police themselves. As this Court stated in Gordon, “the [Supreme] Court made clear that the key question in this context *1304is whether the flight is unprovoked.” 231 F.3d at 757. As the facts here, even viewed in the light most favorable to the government, do not support such a conclusion, I respectfully dissent.
The majority assumes, and I agree, that absent Franklin’s flight, there were insufficient particularized indications of wrongdoing to justify reasonable suspicion. Franklin was standing on the street, perhaps with other people, in front of an open restaurant at which he may have ordered food, and across the street from an open bar. A government witness testified that Franklin was standing in a “problem” area, but mere presence in a high-crime area, “standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; see also Gordon, 231 F.3d at 756 (“Gordon and his co-Defendants were sighted standing, at night, within ten feet of a parked car, surrounded by largely abandoned buildings, in an area notorious for violent crime and drug trafficking. Standing alone, these facts would not have justified this stop.”).
While Franklin was standing underneath a no-loitering sign, Florida’s anti-loitering statute requires that (1) an individual must be loitering or prowling at a place or time, or in a manner that is unusual for law-abiding citizens, and (2) the loitering or prowling must be under circumstances that warrant a reasonable fear for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. Fla. Stat. § 856.021(1).1 Franklin’s behavior at the time of the incident did not meet these requirements. Police did not know of Franklin’s outstanding arrests and were not searching for him; moreover, they did not observe him engage in any suspicious behavior.
It is undisputed that the police arrived in full SRT gear, including military fatigues, body armor, boots and sidearms. Although the police vehicle was clearly identified with the words “Rivera Beach Police” painted on its side, it was 10:15 p.m. and the area was lit only by street lights and the light from the restaurant. Additionally, two witnesses testified that the vehicle pulled up rapidly and that the doors were already opening and officers were exiting the vehicle while it was still moving. I do not believe that the circumstances here- — a restaurant located in a high-crime area, the sight of a car pulling up and armed men in military-type gear— *1305provide a basis for the conclusion that Franklin’s flight was unprovoked.
Under Illinois v. Wardlow, “unprovoked flight” may form the basis for reasonable suspicion and therefore for an investigative stop. 528 U.S. at 124-25. Where an individual’s flight is provoked, however, it cannot support reasonable suspicion. The police may not frighten an individual into fleeing, and then assert his flight as a justification for pursuing and stopping him.
The Seventh Circuit has already come to this conclusion in Marshall v. Teske, 284 F.3d 765, 770-71 (7th Cir.2002), holding that where an individual’s flight was provoked by the police, the flight could not support reasonable suspicion. In Marshall, a teenage boy who was on the street in an area known for drug activity fled upon seeing three masked men with guns coming towards him. The three men were actually police officers executing a search warrant, but testimony indicated that their identifying police insignia were not visible. After Marshall fled, the officers arrested him. There was no evidence either prior to or after Marshall’s flight that he was involved in any wrongdoing. The court stated, “it’s doubtful that the officers had even reasonable suspicion to stop Marshall, given that his flight was not ‘unprovoked.’ Marshall did what any sane person would do if he saw masked men with guns running toward him: he ran....” Marshall v. Teske, 284 F.3d at 771.
The fact that Franklin’s flight was “fast and far” does not distinguish this case from Marshall. On the contrary, the speed and distance of Franklin’s flight support a determination that he, like Marshall simply ran away from an intimidating situation.
As Justice Stevens observed in Ward-low,
a reasonable person may conclude that an officer’s sudden appearance indicates nearby criminal activity. And where there is criminal activity there is also a substantial element of danger — either from the criminal or from a confrontation between the criminal and the police. These considerations can lead to an innocent and understandable desire to quit the vicinity with all speed. Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 131-32 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, & Souter, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Certainly Justice Steven’s caveat must be all the more relevant when the police act in military gear.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the district court’s decision to deny Franklin’s motion to suppress the evidence against him.

. Florida's loitering statute, Fla. Stat. § 856.021, provides as follows:
Loitering or prowling; penalty.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.
(2) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself or herself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or herself or any object.- Unless flight by the person or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a law enforcement officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section, afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting the person to identify himself or herself and explain his or her presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this section if the law enforcement officer did not comply with this procedure or if it appears at trial that the explanation given by the person is true and, if believed by the officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern.
(3)Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemean- or of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.