Court Opinion

ID: 9623671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:39:37.177996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:33.382721
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J.
I respectfully dissent. The majority correctly explains that, on the facts of this case, “the only issue is whether defendant was prejudiced by the delay in bringing him to trial” because the memories of the prosecution witnesses have faded. (Ante, p. 496.) The parties have located no California cases and our research discloses no cases in any jurisdiction where the fading memories of prosecution witnesses have been held to cause actual prejudice to a defendant. If defendant in fact was prejudiced, he would have a speedy trial claim. I dissent, however, because the overwhelming evidence indicates that defendant was not prejudiced, but was benefitted by the delay.
Marjorie L. was raped, robbed and burglarized on June 4, 1981, and Anne B. was robbed and burglarized on August 11, 1981. In September 1981, Marjorie identified defendant from a lineup, and Anne selected defendant’s picture from a group of six photographs. By September 1982, however, neither woman was sure of her identification. The only logical conclusion to draw is that had the trial been held earlier, the victims would have been more certain defendant was the man who attacked them.
How was defendant prejudiced by this delay? The majority explains that defendant was deprived of the opportunity to elicit potentially exonerating *500testimony. (Ante, p. 497.) Fortunately for defendant, however, he probably no longer has any need to elicit exonerating testimony: evidently the victims now admit they are no longer certain defendant is the man who attacked them. Furthermore, even assuming defendant’s scope of impeachment of the victims is diminished by the delay, such minor limitation is far outweighed by the huge advantage defendant had gained. He would have faced a trial in which the victims positively identified him; now he faces a trial in which the victims are unsure.
Yet the majority turns its collective back on the facts and purports to rely on the presumption of innocence, stating: “[T]o contend that a faded memory aids the defendant is to assume defendant’s guilt; if he is innocent, obviously he would prefer witnesses who can forthrightly so testify.” (Ante, p. 498.) The argument does not withstand analysis. Certainly we must presume defendant’s innocence. But we cannot presume, in the face of strong evidence to the contrary, that the victims’ eyewitness testimony would have been exculpatory, regardless of defendant’s preference for such testimony.
The victims’ positive identification of defendant in September 1981 strongly suggests the victims’ testimony close to that date would have inculpated defendant. Because their memories have faded, we cannot, of course, be absolutely certain. Because we lack absolute certainty, the majority invokes the presumption of innocence to presume conclusively, despite all indications to the contrary, that the victims’ testimony would have been exculpatory.
When the facts strongly indicate what the lost evidence would have been, the presumption of innocence should not be used to absolve the court from judging whether the loss of evidence prejudiced the defendant.
Of course any defendant is innocent until proven guilty. But the majority not only assumes defendant’s innocence, it assumes defendant already had been proven innocent. At this stage of the case, defendant has not been proven innocent or guilty. The People should have the opportunity to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt despite the weaker case they now possess.
The majority correctly states that prejudice is a factual question to be determined by the trial court. Unlike the majority, however, I find no substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding of prejudice. On the *501contrary, it is the People who have been prejudiced by the delay and the defendant who has gained at their expense.
I would reverse the order of dismissal.
On January 24, 1985, the opinions were modified to read as printed above.