Court Opinion

ID: 9811523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:23:27.614057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:51.245544
License: Public Domain

Walker, J.,
dissenting: This action was brought under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, and is, therefore, to be decided under the *643Federal law. Meadows v. Tel. Co., 173 N. C., 240, citing Fleming v. R. R., 160 N. C., 196; Lloyd v. R. R., 166 N. C., 24; Tilghman v. R. R., 167 N. C., 163 (same case on writ of error); S. A. L. Railway Co. v. Tilghman, 237 U. S., 499; Railway Co. v. Renn, 241 Y. S., 290. Tbis being so, the decision of the case is governed by Aerkfetz v. Humphries, 145 U. S., 418, as the facts of the two cases are not materially different bnt substantially the same. If there is any essential difference, it is in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff’s intestate was employed by the defendant as a switchman, and was an expert in his business. He was ordered to handle the very ears by which he was killed, and was standing in, or close to the track upon which the cars were moving. It was broad daylight, and the moving cars were plainly visible to him, there being nothing to obstruct his view of them, and right here occurred the negligence, all his own, which caused him to lose his life. He was standing on or near the track, not engaged in the actual performance of his work, but looking at the conductor removing a child from the main line about forty yards east of the place where he was killed. If he had been attending to his duties and looking in the right direction, this case would not be here.
The Federal Supreme Court, and this Court as well, has held repeatedly that a railroad track is itself a place of danger, and a sufficient warning to any one on it that prudence requires of him to take care of himself by using proper precaution for his own safety, as by looking and listening for approaching trains. The exact language was: “The track, as it seems necessary to iterate and reiterate, is itself a warning. It is a place of danger. It can never be assumed that cars are not approaching on a track, and that there can be no danger from them.” The decisions in other States are clearly against the principle that circumstances like those we have here take the case out of the general rule, and it is held that no custom of the railroad company to run its trains according to a certain schedule, or to use one track and not another, or to run its trains at certain times in one direction (east), and at other times in another (west), will excuse one using its tracks from looking and listening, or requires the engineer to presume that he has not done so, but, on the contrary, it is held that he is within the zone of danger, however and wherever the track is located. R. R. v. Hart, 87 Ill., 529; Morgan v. R. R., 116 C. C. A. (196 Fed., 449); Kinnare v. R. R., 57 Ill., 153; White v. R. R., 73 N. Y. Suppl., 827; Smith v. R. R., 141 Ind., 92; Boyd v. R. R., 50 Wash., 619. Many other cases might be •cited, some of them being in defendant’s brief.
The Court said, in Morgan v. R. R., supra: “It is altogether probable that he acted on the daughter’s statement that the train did not come down that track; but he had no right to do so. Which of the *644tracks would or should be used for its various trains was, of course, a matter for the exclusive determination of the railroad company.” It was held in Rich v. R. R., 31 Ind. App., 10, that a traveler using a railroad track has no right to confine his precautions to his knowledge of the schedules and customs of the company, but must take due care against the approach of “extra-trains,” and even “wild trains,” those which are expected as well as those not expected to use the track on which he is walking. And in White v. R. R., supra, the Court stated that the accident was due entirely to the plaintiff’s want of proper care for his own safety in relying upon his expectation, which was according to the railroad company’s usage, “that the train by which he was struck would not come upon the track. He must look out for all trains, and any other rule, it was said, would measure his conduct by the altogether too liberal rule of chances and risks, and would impose upon the railroad company too rigorous and burdensome responsibilities,” regardless of the inconvenience to the public arising from operating its trains under any such handicap. See, also, High v. R. R., 112 N. C., 385; Ward v. R. R., 167 N. C., 148, especially at p. 151 and at p. 152.
The same high Court, to which we have referred above, has said in somewhat different language from that quoted above: “The track itself, as it seems necessary to repeat with emphasis, is itself a warning. It is a place of danger, and a signal to all on it to look out for trains. It can never be assumed that trains are not coming on a track, and that there can be no risk to persons on the track from them.” See 164 N. C., at margin p. 95, where the same principle is approved, and the eases decided in this Court to the same effect are collected. Turning again to Aerkfetz v. Humphries, supra, the Court said in that ease, the facts of .which are practically identical with those now before us: “There could have been no thought or expectation on the part of the engineer, or of any other employee, that he (the employee), thus at work in a place of danger, would pay no attention to his own safety. Under such circumstances, what negligence can be attributed to the parties in control of the train or the management of the yard? They could not have moved the cars at any slower rate of speed. They were not bound to assume that any employee, familiar with the manner of doing business,, would be wholly indifferent to the going and coming of the cars. There were no strangers whose presence was to be guarded against. The ringing of the hell and the sounding of whistles on trains going and coming,, and switch engines moving forwards and backwards, would have simply tended to confusion. The person in direct charge had a right to act on the belief that the various employees in the yard, familiar with the continuously recurring movement of the cars, would take reasonable precaution against their approach.” And again: “Any ordinary at*645tention on tbe part of tbe plaintiff to tbat wbicb be knew was a part of tbe constant business of tbe yard would have made bim aware of tbe approach of tbe cars, and enabled bim to step one side as tbey moved along tbe track. It cannot be tbat under these circumstances tbe defendants were compelled to send some man in front of tbe cars for tbe mere sake of giving notice to employees, who bad all tbe time knowledge of what was to be expected. We see in tbe facts as disclosed no negligence on tbe part of tbe defendants, and if by any means negligence could be imputed, surely tbe plaintiff, by bis negligent inattention, contributed directly to tbe injury. Tbe judgment was right, and is affirmed.” It must not be overlooked, or disregarded if seen, tbat in tbe Aerlcfetz case, tbe Court held tbat the company was not guilty of any negligence, and tbat tbe death was caused solely by tbe plaintiff’s own negligence, though it added, tbat if this were not true, tbe plaintiff was guilty of such contributory negligence as would bar bis recover (and under present law affect only tbe measure of damages). If a person will not look when be can easily see'tbat cars are coming wbicb will injure him if be does not avoid them by stepping out of tbe way, but blindly and recklessly continues in a place of danger, be has no one but himself to blame for tbe resulting injury. Tbe risk of such conduct is as plainly assumed as any risk could be. Tbe intestate at tbe time of tbe accident was in full possession of bis faculties, and could, with one motion, bave placed himself beyond any possible danger. Having failed in bis duty to himself, be will not be beard to charge defendant with consequences following solely from bis own wrong.
Tbe case of Hinson v. R. R., 172 N. C., 646-648, would seem to be decisive of this one. It cites and quotes from Aerkfetz v. Humphries, supra, and adopts what is said therein, and then bolds tbat, as tbe case should be considered, and decided, under the Federal law, tbe injury was caused by tbe plaintiff’s own fault, and it alone, and tbat be was not entitled to recover. See, also, Smith v. R. R., 130 N. C., 344.
It may clarify the inatter if we quote from the testimony, wbicb shows tbat the deceased was alone to blame, of plaintiff’s witnesses, except where otherwise indicated: “I did not see the railroad man do anything only be motioned for bim to come back and be started the engine; the man I saw motion was right down below me about 15 or 20 feet; be motioned to the engineer; I do not know who the man was who did the motioning; when be saw the motion the engineer started the train backwards down the track, and be got to going pretty fast and cut three coal cars loose, and they went on down there and knocked bim (Mr. Moore) down. . . . Mr. Moore was facing towards bis bouse when the cars were cut loose; be was standing sidewise; I did not see any other man around there just before the cars struck bim. ... I do *646not know bow long be continued to stand two feet from the track; the engine moved these cars back down tbis main lead; as they moved them back be was standing on the track as they came back; be was on the track; was over from the rail; on the inside of the rail before the cars bit bim; be never moved out of the way at all wben the cars were coming down, not until after the cars bit bim and the cars pushed bim down. . . . I saw the man giving the engineer the signal to come back; wben be gave the signal he came back with bis train; the engineer was on the rigbt-band side; that was the side Mr. Moore got run over on; I do not know where the man was standing that gave the signal for bim (the engineer) to come back; be was above me a good piece. He was 150 feet, I guess, from where Mr. Moore was; Mr. Moore could have seen bim give the signal. ... At the time they lifted bim up Mr. Harrison asked bim bow be came to get under there, and be said be was watching bim get that little negro boy off the track, and that be did not know that the cars were coming in on the track or either they come in on the wrong track.” Tbe yardmaster, defendant’s witness, testified: “I think they got that wrong about my having a conversation in the presence of Mr. Down with Mr. Moore in reference to bow be got killed. H. B. Harrison is my brother. Tbe only thing Moore said to me (be called me Harry), be says, ‘Harry, tbis is awful.’ I left bim at once to go to the first-aid room of the Champion Fibre Company to get a stretcher, and I left bim with H. B. Harrison.” H. B. Harrison, defendant’s witness, testified: “I asked bim bow it happened, and be said be was watching Harry — that is the yardmaster — and a little negro, and was not paying any attention to what be was doing, and the cars bit bim. That is all I believe be said to me at that time.”
It appears from tbis recital that tbe deceased was not looking out for moving engines or cars, but in quite another direction, and tbis was tbe efficient and proximate cause of tbe catastrophe. If tbey were making a flying switch it does not aid tbe plaintiff’s case, because tbe intestate was himself “an experienced railroad man and switchman.” It was a part of bis duty to help in making such switches.
What tbe yardmaster may have said is immaterial. It is not substantive evidence, but, at most, contradictory. Tbe facts are all before us, so that tbe Court can itself determine, as matter of law, who caused tbe death of Moore, without regard to any opinion on that subject from a mere witness. There was no culpable negligence of tbe defendant railroad company, as it was engaged in its ordinary daily work of shifting cars, and in tbe usual way. It was not bound to look out for its switchmen, employed in tbe same work, and who were expected to use care and protect themselves, something tbey could easily do, if attentive to their work. Tbe case falls directly within tbe principle of Aerkfetz v. Humphries, supra.
*647As to the damages: Tbe plaintiff cites Gulf, etc., Railroad Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S., at p. 176, to support a distributive, or apportioned, verdict, but it does not do so, and if it did, the latter case of Central Vt. R. R. Co. v. White, 238 U. S., 507, disapproves sucb a verdict, deciding tbat the distribution, or apportionment, of the fund to be recovered in solido is for the probate courts of the particular jurisdiction, and not for the jury to make. Tbe Court says: “Tbe Employers’ Liability Act is substantially like Lord Campbell’s Act, except tbat it omits the requirement tbat the jury should apportion the damages. Tbat omission clearly indicates an intention on the part of Congress to change what was the English practice so as to make the Federal statute conform to what was the rule in most of the States in which it was to operate. Those statutes, when silent on the subject, have generally been construed not to require juries to make an apportionment. Indeed, to make them do so would, in many cases, double the issues; for, in connection with the determination of negligence - and damages, it would be necessary also to enter upon an investigation of the domestic affairs of the deceased — a matter for probate courts and not for jurors.” Tbat case was cited in Horton v. R. R., 175 N. C., at p. 488.
For the foregoing reasons, we dissent from tbe conclusion of the Court in this case.
Brown, J., concurring in dissent.