Court Opinion

ID: 9662965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:24:13.538909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:44.250640
License: Public Domain

HECHT, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the Court’s judgment and in much of its opinion. I am not, however, quite as convinced as the Court appears to be that the result in this case is obvious from a simple reading of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. I do not find a provision in the rules which expressly addresses the issue we face today and dictates the result in this case; rather, I read the pertinent rules to be somewhat conflicting and to suggest competing policy considerations, considerations which are not unique to Texas courts but are at play in the rules of other courts as well. I conclude that our decision today comports with these policies, but I add a few words to explain how and why.
Under Rule 47,1 a pleading for unliqui-dated damages may allege only “that the damages sought exceed the minimum jurisdictional limits of the court” unless specially excepted to, in which event “the court shall require the pleader to amend so as to specify the maximum amount claimed.” This mandate upon the court to require a claimant to plead a specific maximum amount of unliquidated damages sought can be read, as Service Lloyds contends, to suggest that the claimant is to be held to the amount pleaded and cannot recover more, even if the evidence and findings would support a greater award. Rule 63, however, allows amendments to pleadings “at such time as not to operate as a surprise to the opposite party”. And Rule 66 requires a court to allow amendments to pleadings during trial “freely when ... the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the allowance of such amendment would prejudice him in maintaining his ac*942tion or defense upon the merits.” These provisions give a broad right to amend pleadings, even during trial, provided that an opposing party is not surprised or prejudiced. The rules do not terminate this right at the close of the evidence or the return of the verdict. To complicate matters further, Rule 301 states:
The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, the nature of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and shall be so framed as to give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled in law or equity.
The rules are silent as to what judgment should be rendered when, as here, the verdict exceeds the prayer for relief in the pleadings.
If the purpose of Rule 47 were to bind the pleader to a maximum claim for unliq-uidated damages, it would be a significant exception to Rules 63 and 66, which allow amendments more freely. If, however, Rule 47 is intended not so much to commit the pleader to a maximum number as to provide information to his opponent to facilitate a full and fair presentation of the merits of the dispute without surprise or prejudice, the conflict between that rule on the one hand, and Rules 63 and 66 on the other, is reduced, if not eliminated, in the situation presented in this case. This latter reading of Rule 47, which reduces the conflict between these rules, is therefore to be preferred. Moreover, it seems to me a sounder policy — and one we, as promulgators of the rules, are obliged to consider — to apply Rule 47 not strictly but with some latitude. A verdict which exceeded a prayer for relief by a few dollars would offend a strict application of Rule 47 as much as one which exceeded the other a thousandfold. The opposing party is more likely to be surprised and prejudiced, however, if an amendment of pleadings were permitted in the latter circumstances.
Surprise and prejudice would preclude a post-verdict amendment of a prayer for relief when the opposing party has taken a posture in the case premised on the damage claim as a maximum amount which could be recovered, and altering that premise would significantly undermine the party’s position. For example, the amount claimed in a case involving insurance might influence decisions as to coverage, settlement, and parties to be joined. What may constitute legitimate surprise and prejudice in the abstract does not admit of easy definition. In the present case, I agree with the Court that Service Lloyds has not shown any reason why the trial court exceeded its discretion in allowing Green-halgh to amend his claim for $100,000 exemplary damages to equal the $128,000 found by the jury.
The result in this case would be required expressly under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2664 (1983); Annot., Scope of Relief Which May Be Granted, Under Rule 54(c) ..., 16 A.L.R.Fed. 748 (1973). There is some indication that it would be the same under the law of many, if not most, states. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages §§ 854-857 (1988); 61A Am. Jur.2d Pleadings §§ 120-124 (1981). Our rules need not always conform to those of other jurisdictions, but consistency in practice is often a virtue, and I believe it is in this case.
PHILLIPS, C.J., and COOK, J., join in this concurring opinion.

. All references to rules are to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted.