Court Opinion

ID: 9786585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:58:44.62035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:44.733593
License: Public Domain

MAES, Justice (dissenting). {47} The issue in this case is whether NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15.1 (1993), presents a statutory range within which a judge may exercise discretion, as we held in State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, 138 N.M. 521, 123 P.3d 754, or whether a different interpretation under Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007), requires that we render this section unconstitutional. The majority chooses to read elements into this statute to make it unconstitutional. I believe that Cunningham does not change our holding in Lopez and Section 31-18-15.1 is valid in both form and function. {48} In matters of statutory interpretation, where varying interpretations are presented, typically the Court will seek out the constitutionally permissible interpretation of a statute. See State v. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, ¶ 16, 135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264. In Flores, this Court reversed a district court order that found the statutory process for determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded, as a mitigating factor in capital murder eases, unconstitutional. Id. ¶ 1. Similar to the present case, the defendant ip Flores challenged the statute based on his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See Id. ¶ 2; NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991). In its analysis, the Court found that for the statute to be constitutional, “the sentencing jury in a capital trial must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant’s background and character or the circumstances of the crime.” Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, ¶ 14, 135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court stated that “to the extent Section 31-20A-2.1(C) may be construed to restrict the jury’s opportunity to consider and give mitigating effect to other evidence probative of mental retardation, such restriction would fail to comply with the rule of Lockett, Eddings, and Penry.” Id. ¶ 16; see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (“[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (“Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.”) (emphasis omitted). Recognizing two possible interpretations of the statute, the Court chose the interpretation that rendered the statute constitutional: “Because construing Section 31-20A-2.1(C) as restricting the defendant’s right to present other evidence of mental retardation would render that restriction unconstitutional, we instead construe Section 31-20A-2.1(C) so as to permit the defendant to introduce any admissible evidence of mental retardation.” Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, ¶ 16,135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264. “[I]f a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one supporting it and the other rendering it void, a court should adopt the construction which will uphold its constitutionality.” Huey v. Lente, 85 N.M. 597, 598, 514 P.2d 1093, 1094 (1973). In the present case, I believe we should adhere to the statutory construction of Section 31-18-15.1 provided by Lopez, as it is the constitutional interpretation of the statute. {49} Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and Cunningham are the corpus of constitutional jurisprudence regarding sentencing schemes and a defendant’s right to a jury trial. Apprendi and its progeny do not completely bar judges from making factual findings to enhance a sentence. In Apprendi, the Court stated that when sentencing offenders, it is permissible “for judges to exercise discretion-taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute.” Apprendi 530 U.S. at 481, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Similarly, Blakely explicitly stated, “Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing discretion.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 309, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Cunningham confirmed these holdings. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 871 (noting that several States have modified their systems in the wake of Apprendi and Blakely to retain determinate sentencing by calling upon the jury to find any fact necessary to the imposition of an elevated sentence, or by permitting judges “ ‘to exercise broad discretion ... within a statutory range’ ” (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 233, 125 S.Ct. 738)). In my opinion, Cunningham cannot properly be deemed to prohibit all judicial fact-finding for sentencing enhancements. {50} Therefore, judges are permitted to exercise broad discretion within a statutory range of sentences authorized by the jury’s verdict. For example, in Booker the Court held, “[W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 233, 125 S.Ct. 738. Under Booker, a sentencing judge is free to impose an enhanced sentence within a statutory range based on any aggravating circumstances, even if those circumstances were not found by the jury. {51} If the sentencing judge is authorized to enhance the sentence without finding additional facts, then judicial fact-finding is permissible. Decided after Cunningham, Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007), is the next case in the line of United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment. In Rita, the United States Supreme Court discussed its Sixth Amendment holdings and stated, “This Court’s Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence.” Id. at 2465-66. To that end, the Court held, “The Sixth Amendment question ... is whether the law forbids a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence unless the judge finds facts that the jury did not find (and the offender did not concede).” Id. at 2466. Accordingly, if the judge’s authority to enhance the sentence comes from facts found by the jury, then a judge is permitted to find facts to determine whether to actually enhance the defendant’s sentence and to what degree. {52} The majority correctly finds that a statute violates the Sixth Amendment when a judge has “no discretion to select a sentence within a range” and where a judge must find a basic or medium sentence “unless he found facts allowing the imposition of a [greater] sentence.” Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 870. But, to reach the conclusion that Section 31-18-15.1 is “facially unconstitutional,” the majority interprets Cunningham broadly to hold that “any sentence above the basic sentence contained in our sentencing statutes as written violates the Sixth Amendment because, based solely on the jury verdict (or plea agreement admitting only to the elements of the crime), a judge may not alter the basic sentence upwards without affirmatively establishing facts.” Therefore, the majority holds that it is “undeniable” that Section 31-18-15.1 “forbids a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence unless the judge finds facts that the jury did not find (and the offender did not concede)” (quoting Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2466). {53} In light of Apprendi and its progeny, a plain reading of Section 31-18-15.1 presents some ambiguity: The court shall hold a sentencing hearing to determine if mitigating or aggravating circumstances exist and take whatever evidence or statements it deems will aid it in reaching a decision. The court may alter the basic sentence as prescribed in Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978 upon a finding by the judge of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances surrounding the offense or concerning the offender. If the court determines to alter the basic sentence, it shall issue a brief statement of reasons for the alteration and incorporate that statement in the record of the case. ■ Section 31-18-15.1(A). Section 31-18-15.1’s plain language does not invoke the Supreme Court’s bar of judicial fact-finding because there is no language explicitly showing that judicial fact-finding is the sole basis for the sentence enhancement. {54} In Lopez we recognized ambiguity in the statute given the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment rulings: Section 31-18-15.1 refers to “circumstances” rather than “facts,” and imposes very few restrictions on what circumstances may be considered. The statute requires a writing stating “reasons” rather than findings of fact. The purpose of the writing requirement is to ensure that the trial court did not consider impermissible circumstances, such as a defendant’s exercise of the right to silence. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, ¶ 40, 138 N.M. 521, 123 P.3d 754 (citation omitted). The plain language of Section 31-18-15.1 leaves open an interpretation of Section 31-18-15.1 as a range of permissible sentences, which would pass constitutional muster. {55} Lopez resolved the ambiguity in Section 31-18-15.1 and interpreted the statute as a range of permissible sentences, within which the sentencing judge has broad discretion. The defendant in Lopez argued that the trial court exceeded its authority in aggravating the defendant’s sentence for conspiracy to commit murder by one-third. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, ¶2, 138 N.M. 521, 123 P.3d 754. The defendant argued that under the Sixth Amendment “the maximum sentence a judge may impose is the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant argued that “the ‘aggravating circumstances surrounding the offense or concerning the offender’ to which Section 31-18-15.1 refers are ‘additional findings’ under Blakely and that a jury rather than a judge must determine whether the State has proved the necessary facts to support these findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In Lopez, we faced the same issue that we now face in Frawley: whether Section 31-18-15.1 violated defendant’s right to trial by jury when the judge aggravated the defendant’s sentence by one-third. {56} This issue has been resolved. In Lopez, this Court recognized that “in every criminal ease, without exception, the sentencing judge must hold a hearing to determine whether to decrease the defendant’s sentence below the midpoint, or increase it above it, showing there was no right to the basic sentence.” Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, ¶ 35, 138 N.M. 521, 123 P.3d 754. Moreover, we found that the legislative history of NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15 (1999) and Section 31-18-15.1 “ ‘strongly evinces a legislative intent that the two provisions be read together to prescribe a range of permissible sentences.’ ” Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, ¶ 41, 138 N.M. 521, 123 P.3d 754 (affirming the statutory analysis in Wilson, 2001-NMCA-032, ¶ 17, 130 N.M. 319, 24 P.3d 351). As a result, this Court held, “The outer limits of sentencing, without additional specific fact-finding, is the basic sentence plus a one-third increase under Section 31-18-15.1.” Id. ¶ 35 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). {57} This construction does not violate Defendant’s right to jury trial. Defendant was convicted of two felonies, each carrying a basic sentence of three years’ imprisonment. State v. Frawley, 2005-NMCA-017, ¶ 2, 137 N.M. 18, 106 P.3d 580. The trial judge increased the sentence for each felony by one year for aggravating circumstances, pursuant to Section 31-18-15.1(A). Those aggravating circumstances were Defendant’s lack of remorse, the short interval between these felonies and a prior similar offense, the pain and fear endured by the victims and their families, and Defendant’s flight to avoid prosecution. Id. As in Lopez, Defendant is arguing that by increasing the sentence based on these aggravating circumstances, the judge violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Because we held in Lopez that the Legislature created ranges of permissible sentences, of which the basic sentence is the midpoint, and that a convicted criminal has no right to a sentence at the midpoint, it follows that a judicial finding under Section 31-18-15.1 does not increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, ¶45, 138 N.M. 521, 123 P.3d 754. {58} I disagree with the majority that Section 31-18-15.1 is unconstitutional in all circumstances. When the jury finds at least one fact permitting the judge to impose the upper term of the basic sentence plus one-third, Section 31-18-15.1 becomes a range in which the relevant statutory maximum for Sixth Amendment purposes is that upper term (basic sentence plus one-third). On remand from the United States Supreme Court after Cunningham, the California Supreme Court held, People v. Black (Black II), 41 Cal.4th 799, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 161 P.3d 1130, 1138 (2007). The court in Black II recognized that the Sixth Amendment decisions beginning with Apprendi and leading to Cunningham require juries to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, only those facts that expose a defendant to a greater potential sentence. Id. Therefore, when the upper term is available by virtue of the jury’s findings, the United States Constitution permits the sentencing judge to rely on any aggravating circumstances to select the appropriate term within the range, from the basic sentence to the basic sentence plus one-third. In this situation, aggravating circumstances may be judicially found and may come from any source. See id. Under our sentencing statutes, a jury’s verdict authorizes punishment within the range prescribed by Section 31-18-15.1, in which a judge may determine the appropriate sentence. [A]s long as a single aggravating circumstance that renders a defendant eligible for the upper term sentence has been established in accordance with the requirements of Apprendi and its progeny, any additional fact finding engaged in by the trial court in selecting the appropriate sentence among the three available options does not violate the defendant’s right to jury trial. {59} Judicial fact-finding within the authorized range does not implicate the Sixth Amendment. Applied in this manner, Section 31-18-15.1 is consistent with a plain reading of the statute in conjunction with Section 31-18-15. Furthermore, under Cunningham and its predecessors, this is a permissible application of our sentencing scheme. In my opinion, this reading of Section 31-18-15.1 is consistent with Lopez, and it satisfies the presumption of constitutionality without committing “judicial surgery,” with which the majority is concerned. {60} Even if Section 31-18-15.1 is construed as constitutional, the majority is concerned that it will still be unconstitutional in effect. Apprendi stated, “[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect[.]” 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The majority reasons that Section 31-18-15.1 cannot be interpreted constitutionally because “when determining if aggravating circumstances exist, a judge would still be finding facts.” However, as discussed above, judicial fact-finding is permitted in the appropriate circumstances. {61} I disagree with the majority that this statute is fundamentally unconstitutional in either form or effect. For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent. As a matter of application, however, I agree with the majority that its ruling should apply prospectively, not retroactively.