Court Opinion

ID: 9759582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:20:27.320435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.964954
License: Public Domain

*888REYNOLDS, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when appellant’s motion of recusation was denied. KRS 26A.015(2)(a), (e) and SCR 4.300, Canon 3 C(l) provide that a judge should disqualify himself in any proceeding where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party and that a judge should disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
The trial judge’s comments, which were the basis of the recusal motion, were not reasonably questioned by appellant. The recusal motion was only made some three weeks before commencement of trial; only made nine months after the comments by the trial judge; and only made after the trial judge had ruled on 19 different defense counsel motions. The recusal motion, as the Commonwealth remarked, should not be used as a last resort when the outcome on motions and hearings do not meet with counsel’s desires.
The majority concedes appellant’s recusal motion was not timely filed. It speculates, however, that the ruling, which was in close proximity to the forthcoming election, was a factor in the trial judge’s decision. Why should this Court .speculate that a judge’s decisions are political in the absence of direct evidence? Should we increase our scrutiny and speculation so as to invalidate judicial decisions in high profile cases during an election year? This Court is not to be cast in the role of second guessing trial court decisions in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defense counsel’s motion for funding of a pathologist and an arson investigator. It is axiomatic that indigent defendants are entitled to reasonably necessary expert assistance. Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 585 S.W.2d 378 (1979). Implicit in this standard is that some discretion rests with the trial court. Hicks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 670 S.W.2d 837 (1984). The trial court discretionally declined to expend public funds for defense experts. The court on two different occasions heard evidence about defense experts. The trial judge offered suggestions regarding persons the defendant could consult, but few were actually utilized.
Contrary to the majority opinion, the appellant could have had the assistance of state experts, but indicated that he did not want the use of state experts or facilities. Sommers maintains that refusal was based on the fact that the state experts were not “defense loyal” or “defense oriented.” In essence, the experts had conducted “directive research,” that is, research to support a certain conclusion. The appellant, however, never challenged the experts at either hearing. The court is not in the ready position to determine, nor should it be, whether a particular expert is prosecu-torial or defense oriented.
Additionally, appellant never made a clear showing as to what his experts would show or in what manner his experts would assist him. Appellant mentioned other potential expert witnesses, but failed to mention the name of some of them and estimates of cost. Clearly the trial courts are not required to provide funds for defense counsel’s fishing expeditions. Hicks; Simmons v. Commonwealth, Ky., 746 S.W.2d 393 (1988). There is no violation of due process in the refusal to provide for expert witnesses where the defense offers little more than an undeveloped assertion that the requested assistance would be helpful. Hicks, supra. Appellant’s assertion was simply a fishing expedition to find a defense oriented expert that would testify favorably. This type of activity should not be condoned.
The remaining issues, except for the introduction of the prior felony conviction, were either, as the majority concedes, not preserved or harmless. The question of appellant’s prior felony was properly presented by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Richardson, Ky., 674 S.W.2d 515 (1984). Prior to permitting the question the trial court should have determined the prejudicial effect, however, the trial court held a bench conference as to the prejudicial effect after the defense objection and before appellant’s answer. This was harm*889less in this instance, since the prior conviction about which the appellant subsequently testified was 17 or 18 years old. See Richardson, supra.
I would affirm the conviction.
SPAIN and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissent.