Court Opinion

ID: 9724991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:24:12.956063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:08.711315
License: Public Domain

Dissent
Jackson, J.
I am unable to agree with the conclusions reached in the majority opinion and dissent thereto.
*478Appellants were charged by indictment with the crime of conspiring to commit second degree burglary. From a conviction on such charge appellants perfected this appeal.
The indictment, omitting caption, signatures and endorsements thereon reads as follows:
“The Grand Jurors of Lake County, in the State of Indiana, good and lawful men, duly and legally impaneled charged and sworn to inquire into felonies and certain misdemeanors in and for the body of said County of Lake, in the name and by the authority of the State of Indiana, on their oaths present that one JOSEPH GAYNOR, CARMEN APICELLA and CASS CASMIR, of said County, on the 30th day of December, A.D., 1960, at said County and State aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously unite, combine, conspire, confederate and agree to and with each other, for the object and purpose and with the unlawful and felonious intent to then and there unlawfully, feloniously and burglariously break and enter, into a certain building and structure, other than a dwelling house and place of human habitation, to-wit: a certain business building then and there housing the tavern of VASCO CATALDI and VINCENT CATALDI there situate, with intent then and there and thereby to unlawfully feloniously and burglariously steal, take and carry away the personal goods of the said VASCO CATALDI and VINCENT CATALDI, then and there being contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Indiana.”
To this indictment, appellants, with their counsel, appeared in open court and jointly and severally waived arraignment, waived trial by jury, and entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter each appellant filed his affidavit for change of venue from the Judge. Thereupon a panel was named pursuant to statute, the defendants and the State of Indiana by the Prosecuting Attorney each struck a name from such panel, leaving the name of Honorable Louis C. Holland who was appointed, qualified and assumed jurisdiction in the cause.
Thereafter this cause was submitted to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury. Witnesses for the State were sworn and the State submitted evidence and rested. *479After the State had rested, the defendants jointly and severally moved the court for a finding of not guilty. The court overruled defendants’ motions. Each appellant then rested. Thereafter, the court found each appellant guilty and sentenced each appellant to the custody and control of the Warden of the Indiana State Prison for a period of not less than two nor more than fourteen years, to which was added a fine in the sum of $25.00 and the costs of the prosecution. The prison sentence of the appellant Casmir was suspended during good behavior and he was placed on probation for a period of three years.
Thereafter the appellants separately and severally, and within time, filed a motion for a new trial. The motion for a new trial contained four (4) grounds, the first of which alleging error of law contained thirteen (13) paragraphs; the second ground was that “[t]he finding of the Court is not sustained by sufiicient evidence;” the third ground was that “[t]he finding of the Court is contrary to law;” the fourth ground alleged irregularities in the proceedings of the court and abuse of discretion by the Judge by which the defendants were prevented from having a fair trial in this, “[t]hat the Court did wrongfully abuse his discretion in interfering with the orderly processes of trial in this cause and did interrupt the interrogation of witnesses and actively participated by the asking of questions of witnesses and introducing into evidence on his own motion State’s exhibits. . . .”
The Assignment of Errors herein is the single ground that “[t]he Court erred in overruling Appellants’ Motion for New Trial.”
The evidence most favorable to the appellee may be summarized as follows:
1. Appellants were seen in the vicinity of a business establishment both on foot and in an automobile, and,
2. That certain portions of the doorway to said business establishment showed signs of having been tampered with, and,
*4803. That one of the appellants was seen leaving the auto occupied by another of the appellants. That such appellant deposited a box under a truck some distance from the business establishment referred to at one hereof, and,
4. That the box so deposited contained firearms and tools, one of which was a screwdriver alleged to have been the tool used in tampering with the doorway in the above mentioned business establishment (a tavern).
In support of the allegations of the indictment, appellee placed into evidence testimony of an FBI expert who was unable to sufficiently establish a connection between the tools examined, being those contained in the above mentioned box, and the tampered with sections of the doorway of the tavern. The witness was unable to provide any connection between fibers of insulation on the coat of one of the appellants and fibers found at the site of the alleged burglary. There was no evidence introduced that proved ownership of any of the tools mentioned at three (3) above in any of the defendants.
A review of the record reveals a total failure on the part of the appellee to even attempt to prove that the appellants combined, conspired, confederated and agreed to and with each other to break and enter into the tavern of Cataldis, etc., as charged in the indictment. The evidence adduced was an attempt to prove a burglary, not to sustain the averments of the indictment. The charge on which appellants were tried was not the commission of a burglary, but a conspiracy to burglarize. Failure to prove the conspiracy charged requires a reversal of the judgment.
As was said in Mattingly v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 326, 145 N. E. 2d 650, evidence of a mere relationship or association between the parties does not show a conspiracy. The above cited case further states at page 337,
. . Testimony from which it might reasonably be inferred that the parties charged in the affidavit had an agreement or a common plan or purpose, to break into and enter some place other than that charged in the affidavit is not, *481in itself, sufficient to sustain the conviction herein. Kelley v. State (1986), 210 Ind. 380, 385, 3 N. E. 2d 65.”
In the case at bar there is total failure to prove any agreement or common plan entered into by the appellants.
“In order to be a conspiracy there must be an intelligent and deliberate agreement to commit the offense charged. It is sufficient if the minds of the parties meet understanding^ to bring about an intelligent and deliberate agreement to do the acts and commit the offense, though the agreement is not manifest by any formal words. Concurrence of sentiment and co-operative conduct in the unlawful and criminal enterprise are the essential ingredients of criminal conspiracy. There must be an agreement and there must be evidence to prove the agreement directly, or such a state of facts that an agreement may be legally inferred. Conspiracies cannot be established by the mere suspicion. Evidence of mere relationship or association between the parties does not show a conspiracy.” Coughlin v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 393, 395, 92 N. E. 2d 718; Mattingly v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 326, 145 N. E. 2d 650; Robertson v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 368, 370, 108 N. E. 2d 711.
I am in agreement with the Robertson proposition and definition, and am of the opinion that an examination of the record in the case at bar requires us to reach the same conclusion reached by the court in Mattingly v. State, supra, at page 340 reading as follows:
“The _most that can be said of the evidence in this record is that it establishes a relationship and association between appellant and the others charged, and tends to establish a suspicion of guilt. This is not enough to sustain a conviction. Robertson v. State, supra (1952), 231 Ind. 368, 376, 108 N. E. 2d 711.”
The language in Hutcheson v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 345, 355, 192 N. E. 2d 748, is, I feel, peculiarly pertinent to the issues presented in the case at bar.
“In the case at bar the mosiacs which appellee contends weave a web of guilt around the defendant require the building of inferences upon inferences, and are therefore in our judgment insufficient. The record is simply devoid of facts and circumstances from which inferences can properly be drawn to establish that appellant entered into a conspiracy to bribe Doggett. As we have heretofore stated, *482evidence which at the most tends to establish a suspicion of guilt is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.”
I therefore conclude the judgment in this case is not sustained by sufficient evidence, the cause should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to sustain appellants’ motion for a new trial.
Note. — Reported in 217 N. E. 2d 156.