Court Opinion

ID: 9821883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 08:32:28.498987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:57.984443
License: Public Domain

Sweeny, J.P., and Richter, J.,
concur in a separate memorandum by Sweeny, J.P., as follows: I agree, for the reasons stated, that Village East should be granted summary judgment. I also agree that Command Security was not entitled to the same relief. I write separately to clarify that the grounds upon which this case should continue against Command Security are more narrow than those proffered by the majority.
The sole basis for the motion court’s denial of summary judgment to Command Security was that it allowed Mr. Hernandez to have access to the security booth so he could take Mr. Sanchez’s car keys. By limiting its holding to this point, the court did not find a material question of fact whether Mr. Hernandez had permission to “borrow” Mr. Sanchez’s car1 or whether he was acting within the scope of his employment in doing so. Nor could it.
Mr. Sanchez never gave permission for Mr. Hernandez to take the car out of the garage. On the day of the accident, Mr. Hernandez was off duty, in civilian clothes, and, as also found by the motion court, engaging in personal errands. Therefore, he was not in any way acting within the scope of his employ*409ment (see Hacker v City of New York, 26 AD2d 400 [1966], affd 20 NY2d 722 [1967], cert denied 390 US 1036 [1968]; Reilly v Connable, 214 NY 586, 590 [1915]). The majority’s reference to the phrase “look after” the car by Mr. Sanchez is no more than pure speculation to support the argument that Mr. Hernandez had permission to take the car for his personal use. Mr. Sanchez’s deposition testimony is clear and unequivocal that he only gave Mr. Hernandez the keys to move his car from one parking spot in the garage to another. Couple this with Mr. Hernandez’s own deposition testimony that to take the car was “wrong” and that by doing so he “made a mistake,” and it is apparent that the act of taking the car was completely unauthorized.
As Mr. Sanchez never consented to Mr. Hernandez using his car, it cannot be inferred that Mr. Hernandez’s actions were allowed by Command Security as a permitted favor for a tenant, as plaintiff alleges in an attempt to show that Mr. Hernandez acted with the permission of Command Security.2
As Command Security could not be found liable under the principle of respondeat superior, so also it could it not be found liable for negligent hiring or supervision (see Cardona v Cruz, 271 AD2d 221 [1st Dept 2000]; Seymour v Gateway Prods., 295 AD2d 278 [1st Dept 2002]).3
However, as Mr. Hernandez testified at his deposition, he removed the car keys from the unlocked and unmanned security booth. Therefore, this case should proceed to trial only on the question of Command Security’s direct negligence. That is, was it negligent in keeping Mr. Sanchez’s car keys in the security booth where anyone could have had access, and was this a substantial factor in the ensuing accident?

. In her decision, the judge said: “Someone was supposed to be in the booth at the time the keys were taken[,] ... so either the booth was unmanned or a co-worker allowed Mr. Hernandez to, basically, steal the car.” Contrary to the implication by the majority, there is no basis to conclude that Mr. Hernandez had permission to use the car.

. Regarding the so-called oil change the majority references, Mr. Hernandez did not say why he decided to get it, had no receipt for it, and admitted it was not done at the request of Mr. Sanchez.

. There being no nonhearsay support for the majority’s position, the remaining “evidence” it relied on, i.e., the hearsay statement of the Command Security account manager, cannot be considered, for the reason admitted by the majority.