Court Opinion

ID: 9890506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 14:06:23.477671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:20.441183
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 21–1594

           Submitted September 13, 2023—Filed October 13, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellee,

vs.

DAGGER LE ERDMAN,

      Appellant.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Myron L.

Gookin, Judge, and Daniel P. Kitchen, District Associate Judge.

      The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision affirming

the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction and his conviction for second-degree

sexual abuse. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUVENILE COURT AND

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED.
      Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.

      Denise M. Gonyea (argued) of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester (argued),

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
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CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice.
      The defendant committed second-degree sexual abuse, a class “B” felony,

around one month after his seventeenth birthday. The State filed a delinquency

petition in juvenile court against the defendant and a motion to waive jurisdic-

tion to allow for the defendant’s prosecution as an adult. Based mainly on his

status as a first-time offender with no criminal history, the defendant advocated

for the juvenile court to maintain its jurisdiction. His attempt was unsuccessful,

and he was prosecuted and convicted of second-degree sexual abuse as an adult

in district court.

      We transferred the defendant’s appeal to the court of appeals, which af-

firmed the waiver decision and the defendant’s conviction. On further review, we

also affirm the juvenile court’s waiver order because we have no reason to believe

it abused its discretion based on the arguments presented on appeal. Likewise,

we reject the defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to support

his conviction.

      I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      On May 31, 2019, seventeen-year-old Dagger Erdman put his hand down

nine-year-old Z.E.’s shorts and touched her vagina while they were watching

television. Z.E. testified Erdman “was, like, patting, and then he was, like touch-
ing around” her vagina and then put his hand down the front of his pants. Z.E.

was afraid and made up an excuse to leave. Erdman asked her if she was going

to tell anyone. Although she said she would not, Z.E. reported it to her mother

that night, which led to a police investigation.

      During the investigation, Investigator Chad Ellis conducted two recorded

interviews with Erdman. In the first interview, Erdman initially denied touching

Z.E., even by accident. But then Investigator Ellis explained the concept of touch

DNA to Erdman and asked, “So, why would there be, if we were to test [Z.E.’s]
                                        3

clothes, would your touch DNA be on there?” Erdman stated, “There could be a

chance by accident, but not in[side] the shorts,” like when he was trying to tag

her stomach and hit the wrong part of her body. During his second interview,

Erdman confessed that he put his hand inside Z.E.’s shorts and made contact

with her skin under the shorts. He drew a picture to show how far his hand went

down Z.E.’s shorts and summarized that he started touching Z.E. outside her

shorts before placing his hand inside her waistband.

        On September 13, the State filed a delinquency petition charging Erdman

with one count of second-degree sexual abuse—a class “B” felony—in violation

of Iowa Code sections 709.1(3), 709.3(1)(b), 709.3(2), and 903B.1 (2019), along

with a motion to waive jurisdiction and prosecute Erdman as an adult. This was

approximately seven months before Erdman’s eighteenth birthday. A juvenile

court officer (JCO) filed a waiver investigation report, recommending waiver to

prosecute Erdman as an adult. The JCO reasoned the sex offender treatment

Erdman needed “is intense with often at least weekly meetings and generally is

6 months minimum in duration. This Officer does not see sufficient time to re-

habilitate if Mr. Erdman was admitting to the [o]ffense, which as of July, he was

not.”

        On October 22, the JCO reiterated this during her testimony at the waiver
hearing. She also opined that Erdman did not meet the placement criteria for

the state training school under Iowa Code section 232.52(2)(e), which she

testified was the only available facility that could keep Erdman after he turned

eighteen. Similarly, counsel for Erdman “believe[d]” Erdman would not qualify

for the state training school “under those circumstances,” but he “maintain[ed]

that there are . . . programs available involving intense treatment for adults in

the JCO’s office that [Erdman] could take advantage of once he is on probation.”
                                               4

At no time did the State or Erdman challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdiction or

authority.

       The juvenile court issued an order waiving jurisdiction the same day. It

noted it had considered the factors for waiver under the Iowa Code1 and

concluded there were not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating Erdman if the

juvenile court retained jurisdiction. It also found that waiver “would be in the

best interests of the child and the community.” The ruling primarily focused on

the opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation, or lack thereof, in juvenile

court. The juvenile court wrote,

       The evidence reflects, however that should the child be adjudicated
       and disposition was entered, the State Training School is not an op-
       tion. Further, there is insufficient time to have reasonable prospects
       of rehabilitating the child between this date and April, 2020. Even if
       the child should be adjudicated to have committed Sex Abuse 2nd
       degree, evaluated for programming, and eventually admitted into a
       program, there is no reasonable prospect of rehabilitation prior to
       the court losing jurisdiction and the ability to enforce treatment.

       The case proceeded to a jury trial in the district court in July 2021, which

resulted in a guilty verdict. The district court sentenced Erdman to a term of

incarceration not to exceed twenty-five years with no parole eligibility until he

had served 77% of his sentence; the sentence was suspended and Erdman was

placed on probation for five years. Erdman filed a timely notice of appeal, and

we transferred the case to the court of appeals. A split court of appeals affirmed

his conviction, with one dissenting judge who would have reversed the juvenile

court’s waiver order. We granted Erdman’s application for further review.

       1The juvenile court’s order stated it had considered the factors under Iowa Code section

232.45(7), which would not apply to this case based on Erdman’s age, but it correctly listed the
applicable factors under Iowa Code section 232.45(8) in its reasoning. We assume its reference
to section 232.45(7) was a typo given the juvenile court’s reliance on section 232.45(8) in its
analysis.
                                        5

      II. Standard of Review.

      Because Erdman’s challenge to the juvenile court’s waiver decision in-

volves the juvenile court’s statutory discretion under Iowa Code section 232.45,

we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. In re A.J.M., 847 N.W.2d 601,

604 (Iowa 2014). We review Erdman’s sufficiency-of-evidence claim for the cor-

rection of errors at law and are bound by the jury’s verdict if the evidence is

“sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” State v. Mong, 988 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2023) (quoting

State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021)).

      III. Analysis.

      Erdman challenges the juvenile court’s waiver decision that led to his pros-

ecution as an adult and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

We will discuss the juvenile court’s waiver decision in-depth below, but Erdman’s

claim of insufficient evidence warrants little analysis because he is simply argu-

ing that “the only evidence against [him] was the testimony of the complaining

witness.” Claiming the victim’s testimony alone “is not credible enough to con-

vince a rational fact finder of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is unavailing

for sufficiency of the evidence purposes.” State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 11

(Iowa 2021). Nevertheless, the jury heard Erdman’s recorded confession to In-
vestigator Ellis that he had put his hand down Z.E.’s shorts, in addition to Z.E.’s

testimony, so a rational fact finder could determine beyond a reasonable doubt

that Erdman committed second-degree sexual abuse based on the evidence pre-

sented. See Mong, 988 N.W.2d at 312.

      Erdman’s waiver claim is not as simple. Erdman was charged with sexual

abuse in the second degree, which is a forcible felony. Iowa Code § 702.11(1) (“A

‘forcible felony’ is any felonious child endangerment, assault, murder, sexual
                                           6

abuse, kidnapping, robbery, human trafficking, arson in the first degree, or bur-

glary in the first degree.”); see also id. § 709.3(1)(b), (2). Iowa Code section

232.8(1)(c) provides, “[V]iolations which constitute a forcible felony are excluded

from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and shall be prosecuted as otherwise

provided by law unless the district court transfers jurisdiction of the child to the

juvenile court upon motion and for good cause pursuant to section 803.6.” Thus,

Erdman’s case should have commenced in district court instead of juvenile

court.

         The district court would then have had the option to “direct a juvenile court

officer to provide a report regarding whether the child should be transferred to

juvenile court for adjudication and disposition as a juvenile” and “hold a hearing

on whether the child should be transferred [to juvenile court].” Id. § 803.6(1)–(2).

In the district court, Erdman would have had the burden to show good cause for

a reverse waiver to juvenile court. State v. Terry, 569 N.W.2d 364, 367 (Iowa

1997). Consequently, Erdman actually benefited from the procedural mishap be-

cause the waiver hearing in juvenile court placed the burden on the State to

establish the elements necessary to support waiver. Iowa Code § 232.45(6)(c).

         Further, although Erdman’s case should have commenced in district

court, the juvenile court was not without subject matter jurisdiction over
Erdman’s criminal proceedings because the juvenile court and the district court

are separate dockets within the same court of original jurisdiction in our unified

court system. State v. Emery, 636 N.W.2d 116, 121–22 (Iowa 2001); see also

Woodbury Cnty. Att’y v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 448 N.W.2d 20, 21 (Iowa 1989).

“Jurisdiction,” as it is referenced in Iowa Code sections 232.8 and 232.45, refers

to the court’s authority to adjudicate the charges, not its subject matter

jurisdiction over such cases. Emery, 636 N.W.2d at 123. Accordingly, “the lack

of a proper transfer from [the] juvenile court is simply a defect in the district
                                          7

court’s authority that can be waived.” Id. Neither party challenged the juvenile

court’s authority, so they waived that defect here. Therefore, we examine

Erdman’s challenge to the juvenile court’s waiver decision as if it was filed in the

proper docket.

      The juvenile court may waive jurisdiction over a child to allow for the

child’s prosecution as an adult if three elements apply. See Iowa Code

§ 232.45(6). Erdman does not challenge the juvenile court’s determination that

he met the first two factors—namely, that he is fourteen years of age or older and

that probable cause existed to believe he committed a public offense. Id.

§ 232.45(6)(a)–(b). The dispute lies in whether the juvenile court properly evalu-

ated all factors in considering the third element, which requires the juvenile

court to determine

          that the state has established that there are not reasonable pro-
          spects for rehabilitating the child if the juvenile court retains ju-
          risdiction over the child and the child is adjudicated to have com-
          mitted the delinquent act, and that waiver of the court’s jurisdic-
          tion over the child for the alleged commission of the public of-
          fense would be in the best interests of the child and the commu-
          nity.

Id. § 232.45(6)(c).

      Iowa Code section 232.45(8) contains a nonexhaustive list of factors that
the juvenile court must consider in deciding that element, including:

            a. The nature of the alleged delinquent act and the circum-
      stances under which it was committed.

             b. The nature and extent of the child’s prior contacts with ju-
      venile authorities, including past efforts of such authorities to treat
      and rehabilitate the child and the response to such efforts.

             c. The programs, facilities and personnel available to the juve-
      nile court for rehabilitation and treatment of the child, and the pro-
      grams, facilities and personnel which would be available to the court
      that would have jurisdiction in the event the juvenile court waives
      its jurisdiction so that the child can be prosecuted as an adult.
                                         8

      Erdman contends the juvenile court focused “exclusively on the factor that

there was insufficient time for Erdman to attend the State Training School if he

were to be adjudicated” without considering the enumerated factors in Iowa Code

section 232.45(8)(a)–(c). That is simply not the case. The parties presented

evidence addressing the necessary factors at the waiver hearing, and the juvenile

court’s written order listed those factors essentially verbatim as its reasons for

waiver before elaborating on the available rehabilitation and treatment options

if Erdman were prosecuted as a juvenile or an adult.

      The best practice would be for the juvenile court to articulate its analysis

of those factors more thoroughly than it did, but Iowa Code section 232.45(10)

does not mandate any degree of specificity in requiring the juvenile court to

“make and file written findings as to its reasons for waiving its jurisdiction.” Cf.

State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 67 (Iowa 2022) (noting sentencing courts must

state their reasons for selecting a particular sentence on the record, but it is not

obligated to explain why it rejected particular sentencing options). Ultimately, we

take the juvenile court’s statement that it considered all of the necessary factors

“at face value.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 107 (Iowa 2020) (quoting State

v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 763 (Iowa 1998)). This is especially so given the “very

broad discretion” vested in the juvenile court to consider the factors as it deems
relevant. In re J.J.A., 580 N.W.2d 731, 741 (Iowa 1998) (quoting In re T.D., 335

N.W.2d 638, 639 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983)). A juvenile court’s use of this discretion

to weigh the factors differently than Erdman would have does not amount to an

abuse of discretion. See State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Iowa 2005) (“It is

the essence of the court’s duty to evaluate conflicting evidence in making the

judgment whether the juvenile will be better off in adult court.”).

      Moreover, the juvenile court’s analysis in the waiver order focused on the

parties’ primary dispute at the hearing: whether there were reasonable prospects
                                          9

for rehabilitating Erdman if the juvenile court kept jurisdiction based on “[t]he

programs, facilities and personnel available” to it. Iowa Code § 232.45(8)(c). At

the time of the hearing, Erdman was six months shy of his eighteenth birthday.

This posed problems for the juvenile court, as the JCO testified that she based

her waiver recommendation in part on the fact that there would not be juvenile

placement opportunities available to Erdman once he turned eighteen. She ex-

plained,

      In a sex abuse case, normally a child is evaluated and then recom-
      mended for treatment. The treatment is an intense treatment that
      lasts at least six months; and at this point without an adjudication
      or a conviction, we don’t have six months in order to provide that
      treatment if the evaluation was even done.

      In response, Erdman advocated for placement at the state training school,

observing that Iowa Code section 232.53(2) provides for the automatic termina-

tion of dispositional orders one year and six months after the disposition date if

they are entered “subsequent to the child attaining the age of seventeen years

and prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday.” The parties’ discussion with the

juvenile court proceeded to focus on whether Erdman met the conditions re-

quired under Iowa Code section 232.52(2)(e)(1)–(4) to qualify for placement at the

state training school. That section authorizes the juvenile court to enter

      [a]n order transferring the . . . child, subject to the continuing juris-
      diction and custody of the court for the purposes of section 232.54,
      to the director for purposes of placement in the state training school
      or other facility, provided . . . the court finds any three of the follow-
      ing conditions exist:

            (1) The child is at least fifteen years of age and the court finds
      the placement to be in the best interests of the child or necessary to
      the protection of the public.

             (2) The child has committed an act which is a crime against a
      person and which would be an aggravated misdemeanor or a felony
      if the act were committed by an adult.
                                               10

             (3) The child has previously been found to have committed a
       delinquent act.

             (4) The child has previously been placed in a treatment facility
       outside the child’s home or in a supervised community treatment
       program established pursuant to section 232.191, subsection 4, as
       a result of a prior delinquency adjudication.

Id.

       But when pressed further on Erdman’s eligibility under those conditions,

counsel for Erdman conceded,

       I don’t believe he would qualify under those circumstances, no, but
       I do still maintain that there are -- and I would -- I’ve not had a
       chance to thoroughly look into it -- that there are programs available
       involving intense treatment for adults in the JCO’s office that he
       could take advantage of once he is on probation.2

       Erdman’s belief about the existence of other programs aside, the JCO tes-

tified that the state training school was the only placement facility available to

       2Although Erdman did not meet at least three of the four conditions for placement under

Iowa Code section 232.52(2)(e)(1)–(4), he was eligible for placement at the state training school.
The statute allows the juvenile court to enter

       [a]n order transferring the custody of the child, subject to the continuing jurisdic-
       tion and custody of the court for the purposes of section 232.54, to the director
       for purposes of placement in the state training school or other facility, provided
       that the child is at least twelve years of age and the court finds the placement to
       be in the best interests of the child or necessary for the protection of the public,
       and that the child has been found to have committed an act which is a forcible
       felony, as defined in section 702.11.
Id. § 232.52(2)(e). Erdman qualified because he was over twelve years of age and committed a
forcible felony.
         As the appellant, Erdman “must file a brief and is limited to the issues raised in that
brief.” King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Iowa 2012). The issues Erdman raises in his brief do not
include a claim that the juvenile court wrongly determined he was ineligible for the state training
school. Instead, he merely argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by “focus[ing] exclu-
sively on the factor that there was insufficient time for Erdman to attend the State Training
School if he were to be adjudicated . . . without considering all the mandatory factors set out in
§ 232.45(8)[(a)–(c)].” In fact, nobody challenged the juvenile court’s ruling regarding Erdman’s
state training school eligibility until we questioned the attorneys on it during oral argument. By
that point, it was too late to challenge it. See, e.g., State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848, 860 (Iowa
2021) (“[W]e do not decide or consider arguments raised for the first time during oral argument.”).
It is not our role to raise and decide new issues on appeal.
                                       11

juvenile court services that could keep Erdman past his eighteenth birthday.

Nevertheless, she explained that “it’s not usually recommended as the first place-

ment for anyone.” A JCO’s opinion is “entitled to considerable weight” at waiver

hearings, and the juvenile court was entitled to take the JCO at her word—espe-

cially in the absence of any evidence to the contrary about the availability of

other placements for Erdman. State v. Greiman, 344 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Iowa

1984) (“Here, there were only twenty months in which any rehabilitation would

have to be accomplished. The juvenile probation officer, whose opinion should

be entitled to considerable weight, noted that fact in recommending waiver of

jurisdiction.”); see also In re R.J., No. 15–1475, 2016 WL 1133889, at *2 (Iowa

Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2016) (“Considerable weight attaches to a juvenile court of-

ficer’s opinion.”). We affirm the juvenile court’s waiver decision because it was

supported by the evidence and reasonable based on the information before it.

      IV. Conclusion.

      For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s waiver order and

Erdman’s subsequent conviction in the district court for second-degree sexual

abuse as an adult.

      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUVENILE COURT AND DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED.