Court Opinion

ID: 9836728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:14:54.507755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.676856
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(concurring in the result):
This is a case that includes three classic issues: what constitutes opening the door, what constitutes hearsay per Mil.R.Evid. 801(c),* and what is our standard of review?
The “Opening the Door” Doctrine
From voir dire to closing arguments, the defense’s theory of the case was that Mrs. Baumann was manipulating her children to lie because she wanted a divorce to marry another man. This was set forth in the defense’s cross-examination: “Mrs. Baumann, do you recall telling Shelly Whitaker that you had met someone and you were considering getting married?”
Implicit in the “opening the door” doctrine is the question of whether one party is seeking to obtain an unfair advantage. Certainly, the defense theory of the case was carefully designed — that is, the children were asked by the wife to embellish their story so that she could obtain a divorce. Thus, it was reasonable to ask whether the sole purpose for the divorce was so that she could marry another individual. However, was this the wife’s sole motivation?
Defense counsel never asserted that their theory was accidental, nor did they offer to modify the theory to make the member’s question illogical and, thus, preclude the cross-examination of Mrs. Baumann. Because there were at least two factors that motivated seeking the divorce, one cannot deny the logical relevance of Mrs. Baumann’s belief that appellant abused his younger sister as a reason for her to seek divorce. Thus, fair play and the determination of the *106truth or falsity of the charges depended on the answer to the court member’s question.
Hearsay
The statement from the mother was not hearsay per Mil.R.Evid. 801(c) because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to set forth what caused appellant’s wife to seek a divorce and to show the state of mind of appellant’s wife. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d 976, 981 (1st Cir.1992). In admitting her statement, the judge applied a Mil.R.Evid. 403 balancing test and gave an instruction properly limiting the admission of the evidence to the non-hearsay purpose.
Standard of Review
Our standard of review is abuse of discretion. Here, there was no abuse of discretion. The judge was required to make a sound, on-the-spot ruling based on the theories presented during voir dire and cross-examination. Further, there was no proffer by defense counsel that the judge had misinterpreted their theory in the case.
The majority’s ruling permits the defense to present the false impression that Mrs. Baumann had only one reason for seeking the divorce. Such a holding undermines not only fair play and the truthfinding purpose of a trial, but also public confidence in the military justice system.

This Rule is exactly the same as Fed.R.Evid. 801(c).