Court Opinion

ID: 9426379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:17:43.240378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:00.590912
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
concurring.
Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141 (1889), recognized that the exemption of national banking asso*462ciations from suit in counties or cities other than those in which they were located was a personal privilege of the associations which could be waived by them. Id., at 145. This exception to the otherwise mandatory nature of this, venue limitation has been carried forward in the current recodification of the federally created privilege. Michigan Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 372 U. S. 591, 594 (1963). In Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165 (1939), the Court held that by designating an agent for service of process within a State, a corporation gave its consent to be sued in federal court within that State notwithstanding the provisions of the predecessor to 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c), which accorded defendants in federal courts a privilege regarding venue essentially equivalent to that found in 12 U. S. C. § 94. I see no reason for concluding that the venue privilege extended by § 94 is of a different nature from that contained in § 1391, or that it may not be similarly waived by the conduct of a national banking association. Thus, I believe Neirbo establishes that petitioner National Bank could be deemed to have consented to being sued in Utah by providing an agent for service of process in that State or otherwise qualifying to do business therein according to Utah law. The record before us does not reveal whether such facts may exist in this case, however, and the Utah courts apparently engaged in no inquiry along these lines. I therefore agree with the Court’s decision to remand this case to the Utah court in order that it can examine whether petitioner may have waived the privilege afforded it by § 94.