Court Opinion

ID: 9422509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:02:58.902014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:37.257424
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
whom
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Goldberg join, dissenting.
The governing law in this case is Title III of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,1 but that Act simply “extends to the General Services Agency the principles of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947.” 2 In Paul v. United States, ante, p. 270,1 have stated why I think those principles clearly contemplate that government procurement is to* be conducted within the framework of valid state regulatory legislation. For the reasons there stated, I also dissent from the Court’s judgment in this case.
Only one additional consideration needs mention here. The Court purports to find some additional support for the result in this case in one provision of the 1949 Act which has no counterpart in the 1947 Act. Section 201 (a) of the 1949 Act3 provides, in pertinent part,
“(a) The Administrator shall . . .
*294“(4) with respect to transportation and other public utility services for the use of executive agencies, represent such agencies in negotiations with carriers and other public utilities and in proceedings involving carriers or other public utilities before Federal and Stale regulatory bodies . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The Court seizes upon the words “in negotiations with carriers” as evidence that Congress authorized the Administrator to by-pass state rate schedules when placing contracts for intrastate transportation.
Far from supporting the Court’s position, I think § 201 (a) is simply another example of Congress’ basic assumption that state price regulation will remain applicable to federal procurement transactions. The section refers both to negotiations with individual carriers and to proceedings before regulatory agencies. It seems to me that the authorization of these alternative procedures must be read against the background of § 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 22, which provides that I. C. C. rate schedules governing interstate shipments are not to apply to transportation for the Federal Government. In light of this express statutory exemption for interstate shipments, it appears quite clear that § 201 (a) says nothing more than that the Administrator has power to deal with whoever has authority to make rate decisions — with the carrier for interstate shipments, and with state regulatory agencies for intrastate shipments when regulated by state law.4

 63 Stat. 393, as amended, 41 U. S. C. §§ 251-260.

 H. R. Rep. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6.

 63 Stat. 383, as amended, 40 U. S. C. § 481 (a).

 The same conclusion must be drawn from the several regulations cited by the Court. When read in full, both the military and civilian transportation regulations seem to anticipate that procurement officers will deal sometimes directly with individual carriers, and some*295times with a regulatory body. The Executive Director, Military Traffic Management Agency, is made responsible for:
“Negotiation with all for-hire carriers of cargo or their rate-making agencies for classifications, rates, charges, rules and regulations on military traffic . . . .” Chapter 201, Military Traffic Management Regulation, March 1958, as amended to November 5, 1959.
Similarly, regulations governing nonmilitary transportation make the Transportation and Public Utilities Service responsible for:
“the provision of advice and expert testimony on behalf of executive agencies in proceedings before Federal and State regulatory bodies involving transportation, public utilities [and] communications General Services Adm. Order, ADM 5450.3, Change 4, July 31, 1959, §1, ¶ 141 (b).