Court Opinion

ID: 9692253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:48:40.922922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.599107
License: Public Domain

Peterson, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. The majority has fallen into error in two respects: 1. It fails to give proper weight to the fundamental principle of eminent domain; that a condemnee is entitled to just compensation for any injury or damages suffered by him for the public good. 2. The majority places a very narrow, restricted and mistaken interpretation on the recent amendment to section 472.14, providing proper payment in condemnation cases, for losses in connection with personal property.
I. One of the fundamental principles of our Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is that no person’s private property can be taken for public use without just compensation.
In developing the judicial system in Iowa our forefathers were not satisfied to leave this theory of justice and fair dealing to the legislature alone; it was placed, with approval by the people, in the fundamental law of our state, the Constitution. Article I, section 18, as to part pertinent to this ease is as follows : “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being made * *
This is almost as axiomatic as the sacred right of contract, or the fundamental right that a man’s home is his castle, and he is entitled to hold it inviolate from disturbance, even by the law, except upon a warrant legally issued.
*56The provision in the Michigan Constitution as to Eminent Domain is in substance the same as the Iowa Constitution. After commenting on various phases of the Constitutional provision, the court properly stated in In re Bagley Avenue in City of Detroit, 248 Mich. 1, 5, 226 N.W. 688, 689; “Nothing can be fairly termed just compensation which does not put the party injured in as good condition as he would have been if the injury had not occurred.”
This principle was quoted and approved in the case of In re Gratiot Avenue in City of Detroit, 294 Mich. 569, 293 N.W. 755. The Gratiot Avenue decision was based to a large extent upon the provisions of our case of Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W. 486, 34 A. L. R. 1517. The quoted principle of law is correct and wholesome and should form the fundamental basis of the instant case.
II. With reference to Procedure under Power of Eminent Domain, section 472.14 was amended by the Fifty-eighth General Assembly, chapter 318, section 3, as follows; “In assessing the damages the owner or tenant will sustain, the commissioners shall consider and make allowance for personal property which is damaged or destroyed or reduced in value.”
Since there was no actual taking of personal property the majority holds the last clause in the above quoted amendment is not effective as to plaintiffs; that the clause is not broad enough to involve cost of moving personal property when the property where it is located was condemned by the city for public use; that if the legislature had intended to include expense of hauling it would have said so.
With this interpretation I do not agree. It does not comply with constitutional intent as to Eminent Domain. Plaintiffs were injured to the extent of $5318.84 by the condemnation proceeding as completely as if the city had damaged or destroyed that amount of personal property.
The situation involves statutory interpretation. In order to properly do so we must take into consideration not only the constitutional provision, but several rules of construction.
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 242, page 236, states: “In the interpretation of statutes, some degree of implication or in*57ference may be called in to aid tbe discovery of the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute under consideration. Indeed, a statute often speaks as plainly by inference as in any other manner * * This is supported by the following citations : McPherson v. State, 174 Ind. 60, 90 N.E. 610, 31 L. R. A., N. S., 188, and State ex rel. Otto v. Kansas City, 310 Mo. 542, 276 SW. 389.
Also see 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 273, page 261, which states: “I n construing statutes in relation to constitutional provisions, the courts take into consideration the principle that every statute is to be read in the light of the Constitution. * * * The court ought not, except for strong and powerful reasons, to give to the term a meaning different from that in which it is used in the Constitution.”
In Bookhart v. Greenlease-Lied Motor Co., 215 Iowa 8, 11, 244 N.W. 721, 82 A. L. R. 1359, this court said: “In order to arrive at the proper construction to be placed upon a statute, it is proper to look at the law as it previously stood, the matter sought to be remedied, and the nature and spirit of the statute. * * * ‘The purpose and object that the Legislature had in mind sometimes throws light upon the meaning of the language used.’ ”
Referring to the amendment adopted by the 58th G. A. the facts are that we had so many Highway Commission condemnation cases where taking etc. of personal property was involved that' the legislature wanted to correct a serious defect in our laws. There is no question about what they had in mind. They wanted to make any citizen whole who was being hurt by any condemnation proceeding. They could not go into every detail involved in correcting the wrong, so they covered it by using the statement of damaged or destroyed personal property, and, as a general statement covering many situations, personal property “reduced in value.”
It is my contention that plaintiffs’ property was clearly and definitely “reduced in value” by the condemnation proceedings of the City. There is no dispute as to the facts. The parties stipulated it would cost plaintiffs $5318.84 to move their stock of goods, fixtures etc. This situation was brought about solely by defendant’s action. We have a right to say, and under the *58constitutional provision should say, that plaintiffs’ stock of goods etc. was reduced in value as it stood there upon the condemned ground, subject to prompt removal, to the extent of the agreed cost of moving.
For example if a buyer had appeared at plaintiffs’ warehouse ready, willing and able to buy all the personal property, at the condemned location, and asked plaintiffs their price, what price would have been quoted? The market value of the goods, less cost of moving them to another reasonably close location, as plaintiffs were going to do. This is exactly in accordance with the wording of the statute; the extent of the “reduction in value.” It is impossible to find a more definite reduction in value, due directly to a condemnation proceeding. Plaintiffs had a right to receive what the personal property was worth on the premises condemned. This included the cost of hauling. Otherwise they were injured to that extent by the condemnation. We are obligated to say so, if we follow the Constitution..
III. I am not without precedent and support as to this position. The majority refers to Estelle v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1238, 119 N.W.2d 900. It correctly states there is no precedent in that case for the instant ease, pro or con. The majority also refers tó Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of Des Moines, supra, and attempts ¡ to differentiate it from the ease at bar. I admit the court in the Laundry case stated the cost of moving the machinery etc. was one of the factors to be taken into consideration in establishing the measure of damages. It is a clear precedent for the proposition that cost of moving should be considered. The fact that there were no other factors to be considered is not material or- conclusive against plaintiffs. This court approved the instruction of the trial court which said: “‘You may consider the # # * cost of removing the machinery and equipment .from said leased premises, and the fair and reasonable cost of cartage or transportation for a reasonable distance, which you may find was necessary. * * * If you find * * * the new location was a reasonable distance * * # then such cartage and transportation *'■*'* may be included in the damages which plaintiff has sustained.’ ” (Page 1085 of 197 Iowa)
*59In the instant ease plaintiffs’ situation is identical with that of the Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry ease. I contend this is a clear precedent for reversal.
Florida has held similarly, as shown in 1961 Cumulative Supplement of Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, section 255, page 132: “A construction company whose realty is taken under the power of eminent domain, the company being thereby forced to move to a new location [this is exactly plaintiffs’ situation], has been held entitled to have included in its compensation the reasonable cost of moving its equipment to the new location. Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. Du Pree Co. (Fla.) 108 So.2d 289, 69 A. L. R.2d 1445.”
I would reverse.
Larson and Thornton, JJ., join in this dissent.