Court Opinion

ID: 9753131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:59:37.767067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:30.676397
License: Public Domain

Wachenfeld, J.
(dissenting). I am in accord with the majority’s holding in so far as it indicates an action for malicious prosecution will lie for the institution, maliciously and without probable cause, of disciplinary proceedings against an attorney. There is much authority to support this conclusion. Originally, actions for malicious prosecution could be based only upon the wrongful institution of a criminal action, but as early as 1816 the former Supreme Court extended the rule, holding that such an action was maintainable if based upon the wrongful prosecution of a civil suit if the defendant in that suit was “arrested without cause and deprived of his liberty, or made to suffer other special grievance different from, and superadded to the ordinary expense of a defense.” Potts v. Imlay, 4 N. J. L. 377, *292382, 386 (Sup. Ct. 1816); Bitz v. Meyer, 40 N. J. L. 252, 254 (Sup. Ct. 1878); Schneider v. Mueller, 132 N. J. L. 163, 166 (E. & A. 1944); Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., 15 N. J. Super. 139, 151 (Ch. Div. 1951), affirmed 9 N. J. 60S (1952). See the authorities cited in Justice Jacobs’ concurring opinion.
An attorney, perhaps more than any one else, may suffer serious injury when false and malicious accusations of unprofessional conduct are lodged against him in the form of a complaint before a grievance committee.
However, I cannot join the majority when it concludes that the public interest underlying the duty and functions of this court in disciplinary matters involving members of the legal profession makes it necessary to deny relief to an attorney for the wrong which he has suffered — relief which would ordinarily be available to any other member of the community in like circumstances.
In support of this conclusion, the majority holds that to sustain the instant complaint would deter citizens from bringing charges of unprofessional conduct against attorneys, and in the interest of maintaining high standards and qualifications for membership in the bar, we must permit unfettered resort to grievance committees even by those who willfully, maliciously and falsely make a complaint.
But we are concerned in the instant case with a complaint which alleges the defendant filed a false charge against the plaintiff, without reasonable or probable cause, and that she did so “maliciously and with a design of forcing plaintiff to accede to the unconscionable demands of the defendant.” At this stage of the proceedings, we are, of course, obliged to accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and the fact that the grievance committee, before whom the charges were made, subsequently filed a presentment against plaintiff with this court should not automatically deprive him of his day in court on his complaint.
I cannot understand how the filing of a knowingly false and malicious charge against an attorney before a grievance committee to advance private interests can be said to aid *293us in fulfilling our constitutional duty to maintain the high standards of the bar or to advance the public interest. To confer blanket immunity in such a situation will, in my opinion, have precisely the opposite effect. Those who have legitimate grievances against attorneys need no cloak of immunity as an inducement to file complaints with grievance committees. Granting immunity will only serve to encourage the use of disciplinary proceedings as privileged sanctuaries to carry on personal vendettas and excursions of ill will disassociated from the true facts in a cause. It will weaken, rather than strengthen, the disciplinary process and will make a mockery of equity and justice.
I would reverse the judgment entered below and remand the cause for trial on the issues alleged in the complaint.