Court Opinion

ID: 9384461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 21:02:28.209505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.685273
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/3/23 P. v. Rogers CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                B319685

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. YA023373)
         v.

JOHN SPENCER ROGERS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.
      Shannon Chase, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Daniel C. Chang and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       _________________
       In 1996 a jury convicted John Rogers of the first degree
murder of Vina Johnson, the attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murders of Ronald Gardner, Rodney Walker, and
Duane Morgan, three counts of first degree robbery, and first
degree burglary. The jury found true the special circumstance
that the murder was committed while Rogers was engaged in a
robbery. The jury also found true Rogers personally used a
firearm and a principal was armed in the commission of the
offenses. Rogers appealed, and this court affirmed. (People v.
Rogers (Sept. 2, 1997, B103451) [nonpub. opn.] (Rogers I).)
       In 2022 Rogers, representing himself, filed a petition for
resentencing seeking to vacate his murder conviction and be
resentenced pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6).1 The superior court summarily denied Rogers’s
petition without appointing counsel on the basis Rogers was
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because he was the
actual killer.
       On appeal, Rogers argues the superior court erred in failing
to appoint counsel after it found his petition was facially
sufficient and in determining Rogers was ineligible for relief as
the actual killer. The People contend that even if the court erred
in denying Rogers’s petition without appointing counsel, any
error was harmless because the record of conviction conclusively
established Rogers was the actual killer and therefore ineligible
for relief. We agree the court’s error in summarily denying
Rogers’s petition for resentencing was harmless because the
record of conviction shows he was the actual killer. We affirm.

1     Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered as section 1172.6 with no change in the text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Further statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Killing 2
       On February 26, 1995 Gardner and his cousin Walker were
in their apartment in South Los Angeles with their friend
Morgan and Johnson, a maid. At about 7:00 p.m. Rogers, who
was known to Gardner and Walker as “Baby Nut,” and another
man whom Gardner and Walker did not know, arrived at the
apartment.3
       After sitting around for a short period of time, Rogers and
the other man pulled out guns and ordered Gardner and Walker
into the kitchen, where Johnson was. Rogers ordered Gardner to
bind Walker’s ankles and wrists with duct tape, and then
Johnson to bind Gardner. Meanwhile, the other man went into
the bathroom where Morgan was showering and ordered him into
the kitchen. Morgan put on his boxer shorts, and Johnson bound
him with duct tape, as ordered. Johnson then lay down on the
kitchen floor next to Gardner, Walker, and Morgan. While one of
the men stood guard, the other went through the apartment,
taking money and jewelry. Rogers and the other man also took

2      We provide a recitation of the facts from the trial as set
forth in Rogers I, supra, B103451 only for background, as does
Rogers. Because we hold the jury instructions and verdicts
establish that Rogers was convicted as Johnson’s actual killer, we
do not reach his contention that the superior court erred in
relying on the factual recitation in Rogers I to find he was the
actual killer.
3     The amended felony complaint, filed June 6, 1995, charged
Cedric Duane Byrd as Rogers’s codefendant on all counts.

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car keys from Gardner and Walker, and the other man left the
apartment, and drove away in Gardner’s car.
      Rogers began to leave, then returned to the kitchen and
said he had to kill all of them. Rogers shot Johnson in the head.
Gardner jumped up and hopped toward the kitchen back door.
Rogers shot at him but missed. Gardner scaled a neighbor’s
fence, and the neighbor called the police. Morgan heard the two
shots and then a clicking noise that sounded like Rogers’s gun
had jammed. Morgan got up and fled the residence, then called
911. Johnson died from a gunshot wound to her head.

B.     Rogers’s Conviction and Appeal
       The jury convicted Rogers of the first degree murder of
Johnson (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true the special allegation
that the murder was committed while Rogers was engaged in a
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The jury also found true that
Rogers personally used a firearm (a handgun) (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)) and that a principal was armed with a firearm in the
commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also
found Rogers guilty of three counts of first degree robbery (of
Gardner, Walker, and Morgan) (§ 211). Further, the jury found
Rogers guilty of three counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder with respect to Gardner, Walker, and
Morgan (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664). Finally, the jury found Rogers
guilty of first degree residential burglary (§ 659). The jury found
the firearm allegations true as to the three robbery counts, three
attempted murder counts, and first degree residential burglary.
       The trial court sentenced Rogers to an aggregate state
prison term of life without the possibility of parole, plus three
consecutive life terms, plus 23 years four months.

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     Rogers appealed his conviction, and this court affirmed in
Rogers I, supra, B103451.

C.     Rogers’s Petitions for Resentencing
       On August 9, 2021 Rogers, representing himself, filed a
petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95 seeking to
vacate his murder conviction. In the petition, Rogers argued the
trial court instructed the jury “on the now impermissible felony
murder theory,” and the jury convicted him of first degree murder
on that basis. Rogers requested the court appoint an attorney to
represent him. Rogers attested in his supporting declaration that
“[t]he jury found that I used a gun . . . and the special
circumstance that the murder occurred during a robbery.”
Rogers attached excerpts of the trial transcript (including the
jury instructions and prosecutor’s closing argument) and the
printed jury instructions.
       The superior court reviewed the petition and appointed
counsel for Rogers. The People opposed the petition on the
ground Rogers was the actual killer and therefore ineligible for
resentencing. The People attached to their response this court’s
opinion in Rogers I, supra, B103451, the printed jury
instructions, and the jury verdict forms.
       On November 10, 2021 Rogers, represented by counsel,
withdrew the petition without prejudice. In an attached, signed
consent form, Rogers stated he had been advised by his attorneys
“that they do not think I am eligible for relief. . . .” On November
10 the superior court granted Rogers’s request to withdraw the
petition.
       On March 8, 2022 Rogers, representing himself, filed a
second petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95

                                 5
again seeking to vacate his murder conviction and requesting the
court appoint an attorney to represent him. Rogers’s second
petition and supporting declaration were substantially the same
as his first petition. He attached excerpts of the trial transcript,
the written jury instructions, and this court’s opinion in Rogers I,
supra, B103451.
       On March 14, 2022 the superior court summarily denied
Rogers’s second petition without appointing counsel, finding
Rogers was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because
he was the actual killer. The court found the second petition, like
the first, was facially valid. However, there was “no question
that [Rogers] is legally ineligible for relief” under former section
1170.95 because “[a] review of the court file, the Court of
Appeal[’]s decision on the case, [and] the verdict forms contained
in the court file, indicate that Rogers was the actual killer who
shot the victim to death. The jury was not instructed on the
natural or probable consequences theory of liability. The only
plausible theory of liability is that Rogers intended to kill the
victim . . . .” Moreover, the court explained, “[Rogers] alleges and
concedes, as he did in the first petition, that he was found guilty
of murder and the special circumstance allegation that the
murder occurred during a robbery. [Rogers] also concedes that
the jury found that he used a gun during the murder. The record
of conviction supports these concessions.” The court stated it was
aware of the ruling in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952
(Lewis) and the requirement to appoint counsel upon the filing of
a facially sufficient petition, but the court concluded that
appointing counsel would be a “wasteful exercise in futility.” The
court reasoned, “There must be an impossibility exception to the
apparent rule requiring the appointment of counsel in every case

                                 6
in which a petition is facially valid, especially because counsel
was appointed in the first 1170.95 filing.”
      Rogers timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

A.     Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1172.6 (Former
       Section 1170.95)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. (People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 957; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 847-
848 (Gentile).) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits
imputing malice based solely on an individual’s participation in a
crime and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of
murder except under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth
in section 189, subdivision (e). That section requires the People
to prove specific facts relating to the defendant’s individual
culpability: The defendant was the actual killer (§ 189,
subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer, the defendant, with
the intent to kill, assisted in the commission of the murder
(§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major participant in
an underlying felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and
acted with reckless indifference to human life “as described
in subdivision (d) of Penal Code Section 190.2,” the felony-murder
special-circumstance provision (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong,
at p. 708.)

                                 7
        Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure (now codified in
section 1172.6) for an individual convicted of felony murder or
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to
petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not have
been convicted of murder under Senate Bill 1437’s changes to
sections 188 and 189. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
        If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
subdivision (a), the court must appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner upon his or her request pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (b)(3). Further, upon the filing of a facially sufficient
petition, the court must direct the prosecutor to file a response to
the petition and permit the petitioner to file a reply, and the
court must determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief. (See § 1172.6,
subd. (c).) Where a petitioner makes the requisite prima facie
showing he or she falls within the provisions of section 1172.6
and is entitled to relief, the court must issue an order to show
cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to
vacate the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on
any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
        “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) Rather, at the
prima facie review stage, the court’s review is limited to “‘readily
ascertainable facts’” in the record, such as the jury instructions,

                                  8
the record of the crimes committed, and jury findings on the
enhancements. (People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798,
815; see People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 (Harden)
[considering jury instructions and verdicts to determine whether
the record of conviction conclusively established that defendant
was actual killer]; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106
[considering as part of record of conviction the jury instructions,
closing arguments, and verdicts, which did not show defendant
was ineligible for relief based on jury’s true findings on felony-
murder special-circumstance allegation].)

B.     The Superior Court’s Error in Denying Rogers’s Petition for
       Resentencing Without Appointing Counsel Was Harmless
       1.     The superior court erred in failing to appoint counsel
       Rogers contends the superior court erred in summarily
denying Rogers’s second petition for resentencing without
appointing counsel after finding Rogers filed a facially sufficient
petition. Rogers is correct. As discussed, under section 1172.6,
subdivision (b)(3), once a petitioner files a facially sufficient
petition and requests appointment of counsel, the superior court
must appoint counsel before performing a prima facie review
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). (See § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3)
[“Upon receiving a petition in which the information required by
this subdivision is set forth . . . , if the petitioner has requested
counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner.”]; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963 [petitioners “are
to receive counsel upon filing of a compliant petition”].) There is
no “impossibility exception” to the statutory requirement that
counsel be appointed, as found by the superior court, nor is it
appropriate for a court to conclude absent counsel that

                                  9
appointment of counsel would be futile. The trial court therefore
erred in denying Rogers’s petition for resentencing without first
appointing counsel.

       2.    The error in failing to appoint counsel was harmless
       Failing to appoint counsel for a petitioner at the prima facie
review stage is state law error only, reviewable for prejudice
under the harmless error standard of People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957-958, 973-974.)
As the Lewis court explained, “[A] petitioner ‘whose petition is
denied before an order to show cause issues has the burden of
showing “it is reasonably probable that if [he or she] had been
afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not have
been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.”’” (Id. at
p. 974.)
       Rogers contends that although the jury was not instructed
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, it was
instructed on felony murder, and therefore the jury could have
imputed malice based on Rogers’s intent to commit the robberies,
which would no longer support his murder conviction. The
People counter that the jury instructions and the verdicts show
Rogers was convicted as Johnson’s actual killer, and therefore the
felony murder doctrine remains a valid basis for his conviction.
(See § 189, subd. (e)(1) [“A participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of [qualifying felonies] in which a death
occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:
[¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.”]; Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 842; Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 53
[“defendants convicted of felony murder are not eligible for relief
if they were the actual killer”].) The People are correct.

                                 10
       The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.10 that “every
person who unlawfully kills a human being with malice
aforethought, or during the commission or attempted commission
of a robbery, a felony inherently dangerous to human life, is
guilty of [the] crime of murder.” No instruction was given on
aiding and abetting. For example, as the People point out, the
trial court did not instruct with CALJIC No. 3.01 on general
principles of aiding and abetting, nor did the court instruct with
former CALJIC No. 8.27 on aiding and abetting first degree
felony murder. Further, in instructing the jury on the robbery-
special-circumstance allegation using CALJIC No. 8.80.1, the
court omitted the portion of the form instruction addressing
circumstances in which a jury may return a true finding if the
defendant is not the actual killer.4 Therefore, nothing in the jury

4      The 1993 revision of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 included the
following optional language, which was not given: “If you find
that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human being, [or if
you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual
killer or [an aider and abettor] [or] [co-conspirator],] you cannot
find the special circumstance to be true [as to that defendant]
unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such
defendant with the intent to kill [aided,] [abetted,] [counseled,]
[commanded,] [induced,] [solicited,] [requested,] [or] [assisted]
any actor in the commission of the murder in the first degree] [.]
[, or with reckless indifference to human life and as a major
participant, [aided,] [abetted,] [counseled,] [commanded,]
[induced,] [solicited,] [requested,] [or] [assisted] in the
commission of the crime of [qualifying offense] which resulted in
the death of a human being, namely [qualifying offense].”
The trial court also did not instruct the jury with the following
language in CALJIC No. 8.80.1: “[I]f you are satisfied beyond a

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instructions advised the jury it could convict Rogers of murder
based on his participation in a robbery if he was not the actual
killer.
        Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45 is directly on point.
There, as here, the trial court instructed the jury on felony
murder, but not the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(Id. at p. 53.) Further, “the jury was not instructed that it could
convict Harden as an aider and abettor, accomplice, or as a major
participant in the burglary and robbery who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Ibid.) And, as here, the court
instructed the jury on murder with CALJIC No. 8.10 and a
portion of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 that excluded the optional aiding
and abetting language. (Id. at p. 54.) The court highlighted that
the language in CALJIC No. 8.10 defining when a person is
guilty of murder referred to a “‘person who unlawfully kills a
human being,’” which “‘[i]n common understanding . . . would
refer to the person who inflicted the fatal injury.’” (Id. at pp. 54-
55.) In light of these and the other instructions (and the omission
of any aiding and abetting instructions), the court concluded “no
juror could have voted to convict Harden as anything other than
being the actual killer.” (Id. at p. 54.)
        Rogers argues the jury was not instructed that it could only
convict Rogers of felony murder if he was the actual killer
because CALJIC No. 8.10 allowed the jury to convict him of
murder if the killing occurred in the commission or attempted
commission of a robbery, without a finding he was the actual
killer, acted with the intent to kill, or was a major participant

reasonable doubt that the defendant actually killed a human
being, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill in
order to find the special circumstance to be true.”

                                 12
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. But CALJIC
No. 8.10, as instructed, did not provide a path to convict Rogers
based on aiding and abetting liability. The fact the jury was not
asked to make an express finding Rogers was the actual killer
does not support an inference the jury found he was not the
actual killer where there was no other theory of conviction under
the court’s instructions.
       Because the jury necessarily found Rogers was the actual
killer when it convicted him of first degree murder, he was
convicted of murder under a still-valid theory under sections 188
and 189, as amended by Senate Bill 1437. Therefore, the
superior court’s error in failing to appoint counsel was harmless.
(See People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 864 [error in
not appointing counsel before denying facially sufficient petition
was harmless because defendant was convicted under a theory of
liability not affected by Senate Bill 1437].)5

5      In his reply brief, Rogers requests that on remand the
superior court rule on his eligibility for resentencing with respect
to his convictions for the attempted murders of Gardner, Walker,
and Morgan because Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats 2021, ch. 551, sec. 2), effective January 1, 2022, extended
sentencing relief to defendants convicted of “attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (See
§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Because Rogers did not include attempted
murder in his petition for relief, which was filed on March 8, 2022
(after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 775), the superior court
did not err in not addressing Rogers’s convictions for attempted
murder. Moreover, as discussed, the jury was not instructed on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

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                         DISPOSITION

      The order denying Rogers’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.

                                          FEUER, J.
      We concur:

            PERLUSS, P. J.

            SEGAL, J.

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