Court Opinion

ID: 88398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:01:38+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:59.086307
License: Public Domain

79 U.S. 349 (____)
12 Wall. 349
THOMAS
v.
CITY OF RICHMOND.
Supreme Court of United States.

*351 Mr. Conway Robinson, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. John A. Meredith, contra, for the city.
*352 *353 Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
First. The court finds as a fact that the notes upon which the present action is brought were issued to circulate as currency; and, as matter of law, that this was in violation of the law and policy of Virginia, and that, therefore, the notes were void.
The first question is, whether the issue of notes as currency by the Common Council of the city of Richmond, in April, 1861, was against the law and policy of Virginia. The issue of notes as a common currency, or circulating medium, is guarded with much jealousy by all governments as touching one of its most valuable prerogatives, and as deeply affecting the common good of the people. Almost every State has stringent laws on the subject, and it may be said to be against the public policy of the country to allow individuals or corporations to exercise this prerogative without express legislative sanction. The State of Virginia, like all the other States, had a law of this kind in operation at the time the notes in question were issued. The issue of the notes in question was clearly in violation of this law; and it will be perceived that the 17th section makes the receipt of such notes in payment, as well as the issue and passing of them, a penal offence.
But the charter of the city of Richmond has been referred to for the purpose of showing that the Common Council had power to issue such notes. One of the grants of power relied on is, that the city is made a corporation with power to contract and be contracted with, and generally with "all the rights, franchises, capacities, and powers appertaining to municipal corporations." In a community in which it is against public policy, as well as express law, for any person or body corporate to issue small bills to circulate as currency, it is certainly not one of the implied powers of a municipal corporation to issue such bills. Such a corporation "can exercise no power which is not, in express terms, or by fair implication, conferred upon it."[*] Another clause *354 of the charter to which reference has been made authorizes the council to borrow money and to issue the bonds or certificates of the city therefor. But this cannot be seriously urged as conferring the right to issue such bills as those now in suit. Such city securities as those authorized by the charter are totally different from bills issued and used as a currency or circulating medium. The distinction is well understood and recognized by the whole community. A power to execute and issue the one class cannot, without doing violence to language, be deemed to include power to issue the other. We do not hesitate to say, therefore, that the Common Council of Richmond had no power or authority to issue such paper, and that they could not bind the city thereby.
It is contended, however, that although the notes themselves should be deemed void, yet the city received the money therefor, and ought not, in conscience, to retain it; and, therefore, that the action can be maintained on the count for money had and received.
If the defendant were a banking or other private corporation, and had issued notes contrary to law, and had incurred penalties therefor, no penalty being imposed upon the receiver or holder of the notes, this argument might be sound. In the case of The Oneida Bank v. The Ontario Bank,[*] in which the defendant had issued post notes contrary to a statute of New York, it was held that the holder could recover the money advanced therefor. "The argument for the defendant against this position," says Chief Justice Comstock, "rests wholly on the idea that Perry, in receiving the post-dated drafts, was as much a public offender as the bank or its officers issuing them... . But such were not the relations of the parties... . Whatever there was of guilt, in the issuing of the drafts, it was the creature of the statute... . By that authority, and that alone, the bank is prohibited from issuing, but not the dealer from receiving; and the punishment is denounced only against the individual banker, *355 or the officers, agents, and members of the association... . If the issuing of the drafts was prohibited, and if they were also void, Perry, nevertheless, had a right to demand and recover the sums of money which he actually loaned to the defendant." This is in accordance with the general principles of law on this subject. Lord Mansfield, in Smith v. Bromley, as long ago as 1760, laid down the doctrine, which has ever since been followed, in these words: "If the act be in itself immoral, or a violation of the general laws of public policy, both parties are in pari delicto, but where the law violated is calculated for the protection of the subject against oppression, extortion, and deceit, and the defendant takes advantage of the plaintiff's condition or situation, then the plaintiff shall recover."[*] In that case the plaintiff had given the defendant money to sign her brother's bankrupt certificate, and she was allowed to recover it back, the law prohibiting any creditor from receiving money for such a purpose. Whilst the general principle has been frequently recognized, the application of it to particular cases has been somewhat diverse. Mr. Frere, in his note to Smith v. Bromley,[] thus sums up the result of the cases: A recovery can be had, as for money had and received (1st) where the illegality consists in the contract itself, and that contract is not executed  in such case there is a locus pnitenti, the delictum is incomplete, and the contract may be rescinded by either party; (2d) where the law that creates the illegality in the transaction was designed for the coercion of one party and the protection of the other, or where the one party is the principal offender and the other only criminal from a constrained acquiescence in such illegal conduct  in such cases there is no parity of delictum at all between the parties, and the party so protected by the law, or so acting under compulsion, may, at any time, resort to the law for his remedy, though the illegal transaction be completed.[]
*356 Now, in cases of bills, or other obligations, illegally issued by a banking or other private corporation, which has received the consideration therefor, it would enable them to commit a double wrong to hold that they might repudiate the illegal obligations, and also retain the proceeds. Hence, where the parties are not in pari delicto, actions are sustained to recover back the money or other consideration received for such obligations, though the obligations themselves, being against law, cannot be sued on. The corporation issuing the bills contrary to law, and against penal sanctions, is deemed more guilty than the members of the community who receive them whenever the receiving of them is not expressly prohibited. The latter are regarded as the persons intended to be protected by the law; and, if they have not themselves violated an express law in receiving the bills, the principles of justice require that they should be able to recover the money received by the bank for them. But if the parties are in pari delicto, as, if the consideration as well as the bills or other obligation is tainted with illegality or immorality, as it would be if loaned or advanced for the purpose of aiding in any illegal or immoral transaction, or if the receiving as well as passing or issuing the bills is forbidden by law, then the holder is without legal remedy, and the parties are left to themselves.
But, in the case of municipal and other public corporations, another consideration intervenes. They represent the public, and are themselves to be protected against the unauthorized acts of their officers and agents, when it can be done without injury to third parties. This is necessary in order to guard against fraud and peculation. Persons dealing with such officers and agents are chargeable with notice of the powers which the corporation possesses, and are to be held responsible accordingly. The issuing of bills as a currency by such a corporation without authority is not only contrary to positive law, but, being ultra vires, is an abuse of the public franchises which have been conferred upon it; and the receiver of the bills, being chargeable with notice of the wrong, is in pari delicto with the officers, and should *357 have no remedy, even for money had and received, against the corporation upon which he has aided in inflicting the wrong. The protection of public corporations from such unauthorized acts of their officers and agents is a matter of public policy in which the whole community is concerned. And those who aid in such transactions must do so at their peril.
According to these principles no recovery could have been had against the city, either on the bills themselves or on a claim for money had and received. It was against the law of the State to issue them. It was a penal offence in both the person who paid and the person who received them, and they were issued by a municipal corporation which had no power, and which was known to have no power to issue them.
It was insisted further, however, that the legislature, in March, 1862, passed laws which authorized, and even required, the city to redeem these bills. But,
Secondly. The court found that these laws were passed by a legislature not recognized by the United States and in aid of the rebellion, and, therefore, that these notes were not made valid thereby.
The fact thus found, that the laws referred to were passed in aid of the rebellion, is conclusive on the subject. We have already decided, in Texas v. White,[*] and just now in the case of Hanauer v. Doane,[] that a contract made in aid of the rebellion is void, and cannot be enforced in the courts of this country. The same rule would apply, with equal force, to a law passed in aid of the rebellion. Laws made for the preservation of public order, and for the regulation of business transactions between man and man, and not to aid or promote the rebellion, though made by a mere de facto government not recognized by the United States, would be so far recognized as to sustain the transactions which have taken place under them. But laws made to promote and aid the rebellion can never be recognized by, or receive the sanction *358 of, the courts of the United States as valid and binding laws. To recognize them as such would be derogatory to the dignity and authority of the government of the United States, and would be setting too light an estimate upon so great an offence.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*]  Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wallace, 330.
[*]  21 New York, 496.
[*]  2 Douglas, 696, n.
[]  Ib. 697, a.
[]  See the cases collected in 2 Comyn on Contracts, 108-131; 1 Selwyn's Nisi Prius, 87-100; 3 Phillips on Evidence, 119; 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 121, p. 120; Chitty on Contracts, 550, 552, 553, and notes.
[*]  7 Wallace, 700.
[]  The preceding case; supra, 342.