Court Opinion

ID: 9539447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:04:26.263673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:49.653496
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
As noted by the majority, whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment is usually a question of fact. In some cases, however, the issue presents a mixed question of fact and law. Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888, 889 (288 SE2d 601) (1982). I consider this case to be within the latter category.
“Under liberal construction the statute [presently OCGA § 34-9-1] includes injury received in doing an act which the injured employee was employed directly to perform or an act incidental thereto, reasonably necessary in performance of the act he was employed to perform. If in performance of an act which he was directly employed to do, or an act reasonably necessary to be done in order to perform the act he was employed to do, the employee receives accidental injury, such injury is compensable. If the act does not come within either of these classifications, the injury is not compensable . . . [W]hether an act comes within either classification is a question which involves the terms of the particular contract of employment.” U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Skinner, 188 Ga. 823, 829 (5 SE2d 9) (1939) (emphasis supplied); see also American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Lemming, 187 Ga. 378 (200 SE 141) (1938).
In Lemming, where an employee of a corporation was injured (on a lot adjacent to the place of business) while on company time building a turkey pen for the corporation’s president at the latter’s instruc*90tions, and the corporation’s business was unrelated to raising turkeys, the Supreme Court held that under those circumstances, it could not be said “that the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employer’s business, notwithstanding the testimony of the president of the company that the directors knew that he was raising turkeys and using mill labor in connection therewith; that the employee was to do anything he instructed him to do; that he had the authority to direct the employee to do anything he saw fit; that the officers and directors called on Lemming to do ‘all their jobs,’ and that the odd jobs were not separated from his regular job of keeping the mill and houses in repair.” Id. at 380. While the majority rule in other jurisdictions appears to allow compensation in cases of this nature, where the employee’s act conferred some benefit upon the employer, our Supreme Court has not yet adopted such a liberal view. The Supreme Court cases of Skinner and Lemming remain valid, binding, and dispositive precedents applicable to this case.
The appellant in this case was directly employed as a secretary, and her specified job duties certainly did not include fetching fast food on “company” time for the office manager’s lunch. The only possible justification for finding such a delivery service to be a de facto job duty of the appellant as a secretary was the catch-all, i.e., “other duties as assigned,” contained in her job description. As the superior court properly concluded, however, that language must be construed as contemplating activities concerning the running of an employment security office and not those of a fast-food delivery service. Under Skinner and Lemming, it cannot seriously be contended that providing such a food service is reasonably necessary to be done in order to perform those specified secretarial duties for which the appellant was hired.
The majority evidently finds that Lemming is distinguishable in that building turkey pens did not benefit the corporation, whereas in the instant case, fetching the office manager’s lunch benefited the employer by allowing the manager to continue working at his desk. However, this arguable benefit to the Department of Labor still did not render that task reasonably necessary and incidental to the appellant’s regular work. Cf. Hall v. West Point Pepperell, 133 Ga. App. 24 (209 SE2d 659) (1974); Pike v. Maryland Cas. Co., 107 Ga. App. 49 (129 SE2d 78) (1962). Moreover, if the Department of Labor’s benefit in this case was the office manger’s opportunity to remain at his desk and work, surely the corporation in Lemming enjoyed a similar benefit in that the corporate president was able to remain at work while a less valuable employee took care of the president’s personal business. In this regard, Lemming is virtually indistinguishable from the instant case.
Over seventeen years ago, this writer noted that the rule in Lem*91ming “is itself contrary to the trend in many jurisdictions,” Westbrook v. Hartford Accident &c. Co., 116 Ga. App. 37 (156 SE2d 654) (1967), but this court nevertheless followed Lemming at that time. Perhaps it should be re-emphasized that the minority (and unpopular) view is not necessarily the incorrect view. Extending the rationale of the majority opinion to its logical conclusion, if a state employee suffered an injury on state time while putting up political campaign posters for his department head, arguably the injury would be compensable because the employer enjoyed a benefit from the employee’s political activity. Similarly, should a state employee be injured while working on a department head’s boat, or in procuring fishing or hunting equipment for his boss, during regular working hours, under the majority opinion the employee arguably would be entitled to workers’ compensation. This unsavory outcome is promoted by the majority opinion, in ignorance of Lemming.
In summary, the law in Georgia does not allow workers’ compensation in a case of this nature. In Skinner and Lemming, our Supreme Court adopted what is now the minority rule in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, that rule remains valid and binding, arid the superior court below was correct in its application of that rule. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.