Court Opinion

ID: 9899653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 15:04:43.902957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:45.257498
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DIVISION
                               MCFADDEN, P. J.,
                            BROWN and MARKLE, JJ.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                  November 17, 2023

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1626. ATHENS HEART CENTER, P.C. et al. v. MOLINA et
     al.

      BROWN, Judge.

      A jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee-plaintiff, Miguel Angel Molina,

III, as executor of the estates of Miguel Angel Molina, Jr. and Juan Carlos Molina,

against appellants-defendants, Athens Heart Center, P.C. and Subodh Agrawal

(collectively “Athens Heart”), in the amount of $4,363,000, and judgment was

entered accordingly. After Athens Heart filed a motion for new trial, Molina filed a

motion for supersedeas bond pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-62 (b), requesting a bond in

the amount of the judgment plus interest. The trial court granted Molina’s motion

after a hearing. Athens Heart has filed a direct appeal of the trial court’s bond order,

contending that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a $4,687,000 bond
despite their affidavit of indigency and inability to pay. For the reasons explained

below, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.

      The record shows that following the jury trial, the trial court entered judgment

on February 9, 2023, against Athens Heart in the amount of $4,363,000 plus court

costs and post-judgment interest. Ten days later, Athens Heart filed a motion for new

trial, and Molina filed an “Emergency Motion for Supersedeas Bond” under OCGA

§ 9-11-62 (b).1 Athens Heart filed a response to Molina’s motion along with

Agrawal’s affidavit of indigence pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-47 (a), stating that neither

he nor Athens Heart Center could obtain a bond in the amount requested by Molina.

After a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting Molina’s motion and finding

that good cause existed to require Athens Heart to post bond in the amount of

judgment plus ten months of interest while pending the motion for new trial.2 While

the trial court noted it “may not be required to consider indigence, . . . the best

      1
         “The filing of a motion for a new trial or motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict shall act as supersedeas unless otherwise ordered by the
court; but the court may condition supersedeas upon the giving of bond with good
security in such amounts as the court may order.” OCGA § 9-11-62 (b).
      2
         According to the trial court’s order, on the day before trial, Agrawal’s
attorney sent an e-mail to Molina’s attorney communicating Agrawal’s intent to make
it “‘extremely difficult, if not impossible, to recover more than $1 million,’” and on
the day of the verdict, Agrawal transferred real property out of his name.

                                          2
practice is to consider the filing as made.” The court then concluded that under both

OCGA §§ 5-6-47 (a) and 9-15-2 (a) (1), a party must be unable to pay or post bond

due to his level of poverty or financial hardship, and Athens Heart had not established

that they could not pay the bond amount due to indigence, poverty, or financial

hardship. Alternatively, the court found that even if “indigence” simply should be

interpreted to mean “unable to fund a bond if ordered,” as asserted by Athens Heart,

Athens Heart failed to establish it was unable to fund the bond. Athens Heart filed a

direct appeal in this Court, contending that the trial court (1) erred in construing

“indigence,” as used in OCGA § 5-6-47, to mean “a level of poverty or financial

hardship” rather than a party’s inability to post the required bond; (2) erred in failing

to determine whether they actually had the ability post the bond; and (3) abused its

discretion in fixing the bond amount at $4,687,000.

      Molina has filed a motion to dismiss Athens Heart’s appeal, contending that

we lack jurisdiction because the bond order is not a directly appealable final order.

Conversely, Athens Heart asserts that the bond order qualifies as a final order under

OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), because it “fully resolves the issue of a supersedeas bond.”

We agree with Molina.

                                           3
      “OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) authorizes direct appeals only from final judgments

of the trial court, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court

below.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga.

770, 773 (784 SE2d 775) (2016). Thus, the pertinent inquiry is whether “the case is

no longer pending in the court below.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).

And, as Athens Heart admits, its motion for new trial remains pending in the trial

court. Cf. Auld v. Weaver, 196 Ga. App. 782, 782-783 (397 SE2d 51) (1990) (“A

notice of appeal from the judgment, filed while a motion for new trial is pending, and

unaccompanied by a proper certificate for immediate review, confers no jurisdiction

in the appellate court and results in a dismissal of the appeal.”) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

      Athens Heart cites Winchell v. Winchell, 352 Ga. App. 306, 313 (3), n.10 (835

SE2d 6) (2019), for the proposition that this Court has considered an appeal from a

supersedeas bond to be a final order. However, Winchell dealt with an appeal bond

set pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-46, not a bond pending a motion for new trial.3 Id. at

      3
         There is a distinction between a supersedeas bond pending a motion for new
trial and one pending an appeal. As this Court has explained,
       if a party desires to attack the judgment in the trial court, by a motion for
      a new trial or a similar post-trial motion, he can make his motion and the

                                          4
308. Moreover, in Winchell, the matter still pending below was a motion for

reconsideration rather than a motion for new trial, and we recognized that “[w]hile

it is true that a notice of appeal filed during the pendency of a motion for new trial

      issue of supersedeas is resolved as provided in OCGA § 9-11-62 (b). If
      he prefers to appeal, he can file a notice of appeal (in which case the
      issue of supersedeas is resolved as provided in OCGA § 5-6-46).

(Punctuation omitted.) Bank S., N.A. v. Roswell Jeep Eagle, 200 Ga. App. 489, 490
(3) (408 SE2d 503) (1991). See Blackmore v. Blackmore, 311 Ga. App. 885, 888 (1)
(717 SE2d 504) (2011) (noting that OCGA § 9-11-62 (b) “governs the stay of
proceedings upon the filing of a motion for new trial”). In general, if a party has a
pending and proper direct appeal of a trial court order or final judgment, and the trial
court requires the party to post a supersedeas bond pending the appeal, then the party
has a right to directly appeal the supersedeas bond order, and the two appeals are
consolidated. See Jackson v. Sanders, 333 Ga. App. 544, 546-547 (1) (773 SE2d 835)
(2015); Owens v. Green Tree Servicing, 300 Ga. App. 22, 24-25 (2) (684 SE2d 99)
(2009).
       We further note that in Byelick v. Michel Herbelin U.S.A., 260 Ga. App. 111,
114-115 (2) (578 SE2d 907) (2003), this Court explained that
       [w]hile OCGA § 5-6-47 (a) provides that a notice of appeal and affidavit
      of indigence may act as supersedeas, and OCGA § 5-6-47 (b) allows any
      party at interest to contest the truth of the indigence affidavit, the trial
      court ordered this bond pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-62. . . . OCGA § 9-
      11-62 contains no provision for avoiding bond by filing an indigence
      affidavit[.]

                                           5
confers no jurisdiction on this Court, the same rule does not apply to motions for

reconsideration.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 313 (3), n.10.4

      We conclude that the trial court’s order setting a supersedeas bond pending

Athens Heart’s motion for new trial is not a final order subject to direct appeal under

OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).5 Rather, a party who is ordered to pay a supersedeas bond

pending a motion for new trial can seek to immediately appeal that order through the

      4
         In reaching its conclusion, this Court distinguished Pruett v. Commercial
Bank of Ga., 211 Ga. App. 692 (440 SE2d 85) (1994), in which the appellants filed
direct appeals from the trial court’s two orders requiring them to post appeal bonds
pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-46. Winchell, 352 Ga. App. at 313 (3), n.10. “Without
addressing the broad question of the general appealability of an order granting a
supersedeas bond,” this Court held in Pruett that the orders were not final, appealable
orders. 211 Ga. App. at 694. Although the trial court certified the orders as final
pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-54 (b), governing interlocutory appeals, “no such finality
was indicated on the orders regarding the bonds” and there were still matters pending
in the cases. Id.
      5
        Our holding is consistent with how this Court handled the only other appeal
from an order setting a supersedeas bond pending a motion for new trial, Leventhal
v. Seiter, 208 Ga. App. 158, 165 (9) (430 SE2d 378) (1993). In that case, the
defendant appealed the final judgment against him after the trial court denied his
motion for new trial and to set aside the judgment. One of the defendant’s
enumerations was that “the trial court erred in requiring a supersedeas bond pending
the motion for new trial, because the evidence produced did not show that good cause
existed as required under OCGA § 9-11-62 (b).” Id. We concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in requiring the defendant to post a supersedeas bond
pending resolution of his post-judgment motions. Thus, we addressed the issue of the
bond after the trial court had ruled on the motion for new trial, and only in
conjunction with a direct appeal from the final judgment.

                                          6
interlocutory appeal procedures established in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).6 See

Buckner-Webb v. State, 314 Ga. 823, 827 (2) (a) (878 SE2d 481) (2022) (“as a

general rule, when a party seeks to appeal a non-final order issued by a trial court

before the case is fully adjudicated below, Georgia courts require adherence to the

interlocutory procedures of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) for appellate review”). Cf. Byelick

v. Michel Herbelin U.S.A., 260 Ga. App. 111, 112 (578 SE2d 907) (2003) (noting that

the appellant’s direct appeal from a supersedeas bond order set pursuant to OCGA §

      6
        OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) provides in part:
      Where the trial judge in rendering an order, decision, or judgment, not
      otherwise subject to direct appeal, including but not limited to the denial
      of a defendant’s motion to recuse in a criminal case, certifies within ten
      days of entry thereof that the order, decision, or judgment is of such
      importance to the case that immediate review should be had, the
      Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals may thereupon, in their
      respective discretions, permit an appeal to be taken from the order,
      decision, or judgment if application is made thereto within ten days after
      such certificate is granted. The application shall be in the nature of a
      petition and shall set forth the need for such an appeal and the issue or
      issues involved therein. . . . The Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
      shall issue an order granting or denying such an appeal within 45 days
      of the date on which the application was filed. Within ten days after an
      order is issued granting the appeal, the applicant, to secure a review of
      the issues, may file a notice of appeal as provided in Code Section
      5-6-37. The notice of appeal shall act as a supersedeas as provided in
      Code Section 5-6-46 and the procedure thereafter shall be the same as
      in an appeal from a final judgment.

                                          7
9-11-62 (c) had been dismissed by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the

appellant failed to secure a timely certificate of immediate review).

      Athens Heart alternatively argues that it has a right to directly appeal the bond

order under the collateral order doctrine. We disagree.

      To qualify for immediate appeal under [the] collateral order doctrine, an
      interlocutory order must be effectively final— a status we assess by
      examining whether the order resolves an issue that is substantially
      separate from the basic issues to be decided at trial; would result in the
      loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment; and
      completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal such that
      nothing in the underlying action can affect it.

(Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Buckner-Webb, 314 Ga. at 828 (2) (a).

In Buckner-Webb, our Supreme Court held that “orders denying a counsel’s motion

to withdraw based on an alleged conflict of interest are not ‘effectively final,’ even

as to counsel’s interest, in the sense needed to justify application of the collateral

order doctrine [because] counsel will still have ways to obtain review of the interest

at issue in such orders[.]” Id. at 830 (2) (b). The Court went on to explain that “an

attorney who is denied permission to withdraw as counsel based upon an alleged

conflict of interest can seek to immediately appeal that order through the interlocutory

appeal procedures established by OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).” Id. Similarly, and as stated

                                           8
above, a party ordered to post a supersedeas bond pending a motion for new trial can

seek to appeal the order through an interlocutory appeal. As such, we conclude that

such orders do not fall within the “very small class” of trial court orders that are

appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 172 (1)

(829 SE2d 348) (2019).

      Because Athens Heart failed to follow the interlocutory appeal process, we lack

jurisdiction over the appeal. Eidson v. Croutch, 337 Ga. App. 542, 543 (788 SE2d

129) (2016) (“when the order appealed from is an interlocutory order, the appellate

court does not acquire jurisdiction unless the procedure of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) for

interlocutory appeal is followed”) (citation and punctuation omitted).7

      Appeal dismissed. McFadden, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.

      7
      Given our ruling, Molina’s motion to dismiss this appeal is moot. We hereby
deny Molina’s motion for sanctions for frivolous appeal.

                                         9