Court Opinion

ID: 9852604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:33:34.711848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:30.605237
License: Public Domain

Koontz, C.J.,
with whom Benton, J., joins, dissenting.
To the extent that the majority concludes that Code § 19.2-294 does not apply to multiple convictions for separate offenses arising out of “the same act” where those convictions are obtained in a single trial rather than in successive or subsequent trials, I respectfully dissent.
In pertinent part, Code § 19.2-294 provides: “If the same act be a violation of two or more statutes, . . . conviction under one of such statutes . . . shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others.” (emphasis added).
The General Assembly enacted the original version of Code § 19.2- 294 to remove the apparent hardship manifest in Arrington v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 96, 12 S.E. 224 (1890), where the Court upheld multiple convictions of separate offenses arising from the same act. See Owens v. Commonwealth, 129 Va. 757, 105 S.E. 531 (1921). This statute relates to matters of a penal nature and is remedial in character; accordingly, under familiar principles, it must be construed strictly against the Commonwealth and favorably to the accused. Price v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 383, 164 S.E.2d 676 (1968). Although amended from time to time by the General Assembly, the thrust of this statute was and continues to be a prohibition against multiple convictions arising from “the same act,” even though that act may violate separate statutory offenses.
The majority concludes that “the plain language of Code § 19.2- 294 . . . bespeaks a legislative intent that it applies only to subsequent prosecutions.” It reaches this conclusion by reasoning that “in a single trial, there would be no subsequent ‘prosecution or proceeding.’ ” In addition, the majority bolsters its conclusion of the legislature’s intent by suggesting that the legislature has not clearly provided that this Code section apply to multiple convictions for the same act prosecuted in a single trial. The majority suggests that the legislature could have accomplished this by pro*904viding that “a ‘conviction’ for an offense arising out of one act shall bar another conviction for any other offense arising out of the same act.” In my view, the language of Code § 19.2-294 is clear and unambiguous. While the language used by the legislature is different from that suggested by the majority, it accomplishes the same result.
This Code section, by its express terms, does not exclude its application to multiple convictions obtained in a single trial. Because it relates to matters of a penal nature and is remedial in character, it must be construed strictly against the Commonwealth and favorably to the accused. Viewed in this context, it is true that the statute refers to a “conviction” being “a bar to a prosecution or proceeding” following a conviction.-(Emphasis added). Thus, the majority correctly concludes that in a single trial there would be no subsequent “prosecution.” This is so because the prosecution has already commenced. The majority, however, overlooks the legislature’s inclusion of the words “or proceeding” within the phrase “prosecution or proceeding.” We must assume that the legislature intended both terms to have meaning. I agree with the majority that the legislature carefully considered this statute when it chose this phrase. In doing so, I believe the legislature intended to give meaning and effect to the language “or proceeding” separate and apart from “prosecution.” Multiple criminal convictions obtained in a single trial cannot occur simultaneously. When one conviction is obtained in a single trial involving multiple offenses, necessarily there must be a further “proceeding” with respect to a second offense. Thus, in such cases, there will always be a “conviction” creating a “bar” to any further “prosecution or proceeding” for the same act. Accordingly, in my view, the language used by the legislature in Code § 19.2-294 evinces an intent that this statute apply to single trials as well as successive or subsequent trials.
Our Supreme Court, on at least four occasions, has had the opportunity to address the applicability of Code § 19.2-294 to multiple convictions obtained in a single trial but has not restricted the application of this Code section to successive or subsequent trials.Rather, the Court based its decision in each of those cases on the issue whether the “same act” was used to prove a violation of two or more statutes. Whether multiple convictions were obtained in a single trial is a matter readily determined and beyond dispute. If the statute simply is not applicable to such cases, it is difficult to *905perceive why the Court would undergo the more difficult “same act” analysis which is not readily determined and is always in dispute. Implicit in these decisions, I believe, is the conclusion that Code § 19.2-294 is applicable to multiple convictions obtained in a single trial as well as to successive or subsequent trials. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 720, 273 S.E.2d 778 (1981); Jones v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 757, 240 S.E.2d 658, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978); Estes v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 23, 181 S.E.2d 622 (1971); Hundley v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 449, 69 S.E.2d 336 (1952).
For these reasons and because Hall’s multiple convictions arose from the same act, I would reverse the decision below and remand the case with directions that the trial court impose sentence in only the appropriate convictions and dismiss the others.