Court Opinion

ID: 9964420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 22:01:08.048233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:25.701899
License: Public Domain

CUI

              U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
             C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                          ________________________

                               No. ACM 40386
                          ________________________

                             UNITED STATES
                                 Appellee
                                      v.
                             Daniel R. CSITI
                Staff Sergeant (E-5), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                          ________________________

           Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                            Decided 29 April 2024
                          ________________________

Military Judge: Colin P. Eichenberger.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 27 July 2022 by GCM convened at Malmstrom
Air Force Base, Montana. Sentence entered by military judge on 23 August
2022: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 2 years, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and reduction to E-1.
For Appellant: Major Megan R. Crouch, USAF; Major Eshawn R. Rawlley,
USAF.
For Appellee: Colonel Zachary T. Eytalis, USAF; Colonel Steven R. Kaufman,
USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel J. Pe-
ter Ferrell, USAF; Major Olivia B. Hoff, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before JOHNSON, RICHARDSON, and WARREN, Appellate Military Judges.
Chief Judge JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior
Judge RICHARDSON and Judge WARREN joined.
                          ________________________

    This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
    precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                          ________________________
                      United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

JOHNSON, Chief Judge:
    A general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Appellant
guilty, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of sexual assault in violation
of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920.1,2
The military judge sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confine-
ment for two years, total forfeiture of pay and allowances, and reduction to the
grade of E-1. The convening authority took no action on the findings or sen-
tence.
    Appellant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether Appellant’s conviction
is legally and factually sufficient; (2) whether the military judge abused his
discretion by denying the Defense’s motion to dismiss for defective preferral of
charges and a defective preliminary hearing; and (3) whether Appellant is en-
titled to relief due to prosecutorial misconduct. We find no error materially
prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights, and we affirm the findings and
sentence.

                                 I. BACKGROUND3
    AH arrived at Malmstrom Air Force Base (AFB), Montana, in April 2017. 4
Appellant was a member of AH’s squadron and was assigned to train AH on
her duties. As time passed, Appellant and AH became close friends who spent
an increasing amount of time together off-duty, to the point that AH considered
Appellant her “best friend.” However, they did not have a sexual or romantic
relationship.
    AH was married and became pregnant while she was stationed at Malm-
strom AFB; however, the marriage did not last. According to AH’s testimony,
her ex-husband “left” during her pregnancy and at some point they were di-
vorced. During AH’s pregnancy, Appellant “ended up being a very good emo-
tional support person” for AH, and also provided financial support by “helping
[her] buy things for [her] son because [AH’s ex-husband] at the time wasn’t
helping out.” At one point in AH’s pregnancy, Appellant told AH he “had feel-
ings for” her and “wanted something more,” but she “rejected” him and told

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the UCMJ and the Rules for Courts-

Martial (R.C.M.) are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.).
2 The military judge found Appellant not guilty of two specifications of abusive sexual

contact in violation of Article 120, UCMJ.
3The following background is drawn primarily from AH’s trial testimony, supple-
mented by other evidence from the record of trial.
4 AH was an active duty Air Force member at all times relevant to this opinion.

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                    United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

him “it wasn’t going to happen.” Following this rejection, Appellant and AH
stopped talking to each other for approximately two months.
    Appellant and AH subsequently reconciled and resumed their close pla-
tonic friendship. Appellant frequently babysat AH’s child and provided other
support for AH, and he often spent the night at her house. Appellant and AH
also frequently socialized with other friends.
    AH regularly became intoxicated from drinking alcohol. On multiple occa-
sions, AH consumed alcohol such that portions of her memory were “blacked
out,” and she could not recall certain conversations and other activities she
engaged in.
    In May 2021, AH was in a relationship with Staff Sergeant (SSgt) KI. On
21 May 2021, AH made plans to go out to dinner with two other friends, AS
and SSgt NA. Appellant agreed to come to AH’s on-base house and watch her
son for the evening. Before she drove to the restaurant, AH drank some “home-
made mead,”5 but “[n]ot that much.” At the restaurant, AH began drinking
wine. She ate pizza at the restaurant, but vomited until her stomach was
empty, and then drank two or three more glasses of wine by her estimate. By
the end of the dinner AH felt “[t]oo intoxicated to drive on her own.” At trial,
SSgt NA testified he estimated AH drank three or four glasses of wine at the
restaurant and became “[t]ipsy,” “laughing and giggling” and “swaying” as she
walked, but “coherent.”
    SSgt NA drove AH home in his car. When they arrived, Appellant came out
to the car to help bring AH into the house. AH testified she did not remember
getting out of SSgt NA’s car, but she remembered being in her kitchen talking
to Appellant. She began drinking alcoholic hard seltzer, although she could not
remember how much. Appellant later told her she drank between three and
five cans of it.
    AH’s next memory was of waking up in the morning on her bed in her up-
stairs bedroom. There were no sheets on the bed, which was unusual as she
normally would make her bed after washing the sheets, and she was com-
pletely naked, which was also unusual as she normally slept with clothes on.
In addition, she felt “sore around [her] vaginal area.” After AH got dressed and
left her bedroom, she found her son was asleep in his room and Appellant was
sleeping downstairs. Appellant’s presence was not surprising because he had
spent the night at her house before. AH and Appellant spent much of that day

5 AH explained Appellant “used to make mead” and would “bring some over on occa-

sion.”

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                    United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

together. Appellant seemed “a little bit more quiet than usual,” but that did
not raise any “red flags” for AH at the time.
    A week later, AH invited Appellant to have dinner at her house. That night
Appellant told AH he performed oral sex on AH during the portion of the night
of 21–22 May 2021 that AH could not remember. AH recorded part of their
conversation on her phone. Appellant told AH they had talked for a while until
AH went upstairs to go to bed. However, AH later came back downstairs and
resumed talking with Appellant. At one point while they were talking, AH fell
over in the chair on which she was sitting, with the chair making a dent in the
wall. According to Appellant, at one point AH complained about her body, to
which Appellant responded that he thought she had a perfect body, or words
to that effect. AH then said to Appellant, “show me,” and removed her pants
and underwear. Appellant performed oral sex on AH for approximately a mi-
nute, after which AH pushed Appellant away with her leg and said she had to
urinate. Appellant helped AH put her underwear back on, after which AH said
she did not have to urinate but she was tired, and she lay down to sleep on the
sofa. Appellant then lay down on the floor nearby, but later moved to a couch
in another room to sleep.
    Appellant’s admissions “shocked” AH because she had told Appellant that
she was not attracted to him, she would not have agreed to such activity, she
trusted Appellant, and she had no suspicion during the preceding week that
any sexual activity had occurred between them. AH reported the incident to
the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) the following day. At the
OSI’s request, AH recorded another conversation with Appellant at her house
using a device the OSI provided. During this conversation, Appellant repeated
a substantially similar version of events as in the prior conversation AH had
recorded, but with additional details. Appellant stated he helped AH go up-
stairs when she initially went to her bedroom after they spoke in the kitchen.
Appellant told AH one of the things they talked about, after she came back
downstairs, was how AH’s relationship with SSgt KI was not going well at that
time. Appellant again described how AH fell over in her chair, after which he
“carried” her. Appellant said AH was drunk and agreed she was “f[**]ked up.”
Appellant said after AH removed her pants and underwear they kissed before
he performed oral sex. Appellant denied that he penetrated her with his penis
or ejaculated. On the recording, Appellant apologized to AH for what he had
done. As part of his apology, he told her, “And that’s where it was my fault for
not telling myself, ‘No,’ and to just back away from it instead.” He further told
her, “However you deemed it to be. If you were to make a phone call or some-
thing, I did what I did.”
   At trial, the Defense called Dr. EB, who the military judge recognized as
an expert in forensic psychology. Dr. EB testified about memory and the effects

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                     United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

of alcohol on the brain. She explained, inter alia, that alcohol “reduces inhibi-
tion so that we act more on our impulses,” and that regular heavy drinking
“increases a person’s tolerance so they could consume greater and greater
amounts of alcohol without showing functional impairments.” Dr. EB also ex-
plained the phenomenon of alcohol-induced blackout, which she described as
“where a person is awake, engaged, behaving, but not recording memory.” She
testified the fact that a person experiences a blackout does not directly indicate
how impaired the person is due to alcohol. Dr. EB explained blackout “is re-
lated to the speed of the rise” in one’s blood alcohol level, rather than how high
one’s blood alcohol level is, such that a blackout can occur “at different points
along th[e] progression of intoxication.” According to Dr. EB, someone in a
blackout may still be capable of complex activities and making decisions.

                                  II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency
   1. Law
    We review issues of legal sufficiency de novo. United States v. Harrington,
83 M.J. 408, 414 (C.A.A.F. 2023) (citing United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221
(C.A.A.F. 2019)). “The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Robinson, 77 M.J. 294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (cita-
tion omitted). “[T]he term ‘reasonable doubt’ does not mean that the evidence
must be free from any conflict . . . .” King, 78 M.J. at 221 (citation omitted). The
test for legal sufficiency “gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact
fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” United States v. Oli-
ver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1973)). “[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound to draw
every reasonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecu-
tion.” United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omit-
ted). Thus, “[t]he standard for legal sufficiency involves a very low threshold to
sustain a conviction.” King, 78 M.J. at 221 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). “The [G]overnment is free to meet its burden of proof with circum-
stantial evidence.” Id. (citations omitted).
    Historically, the Courts of Criminal Appeals (CCAs) have also conducted a
de novo review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v.
Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation omitted). The long-
standing test for factual sufficiency, rooted in the prior versions of Articles
66(c) and (d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 866(c), (d), required the CCAs to “take ‘a
fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’ applying ‘neither a presumption of

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                    United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

innocence nor a presumption of guilt’ to ‘make [our] own independent determi-
nation as to whether the evidence constitutes proof of each required element
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at
399), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (applying the version of Article 66(c),
UCMJ, in effect prior to 2019); see also United States v. Rodela, 82 M.J. 521,
525 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Wheeler and applying the same factual
sufficiency test in the context of Article 66(d), UCMJ, effective 1 January 2019).
  However, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
amended Article 66, UCMJ, to modify our factual sufficiency review as follows:
       (B) FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW.
           (i) In an appeal of a finding of guilty under subsection (b), the
           Court may consider whether the finding is correct in fact
           upon request of the accused if the accused makes a specific
           showing of a deficiency in proof.
           (ii) After an accused has made such a showing, the Court may
           weigh the evidence and determine controverted questions of
           fact subject to—
              (I) appropriate deference to the fact that the trial court
              saw and heard the witnesses and other evidence; and
              (II) appropriate deference to findings of fact entered into
              the record by the military judge.
           (iii) If, as a result of the review conducted under clause (ii),
           the Court is clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was
           against the weight of the evidence, the Court may dismiss,
           set aside, or modify the finding, or affirm a lesser finding.
10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B) (Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 ed.)
(2024 MCM)). The new factual sufficiency standard applies to courts-martial
in which every finding of guilty in the entry of judgment is for an offense oc-
curring on or after 1 January 2021. Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 542(e)(2), 134 Stat.
3611. This court has not yet had occasion to analyze the new statutory stand-
ard for factual sufficiency. However, two of our sister courts issued published
opinions addressing the new standard. See United States v. Scott, 83 M.J. 778,
779–80 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2023), rev’d on other grounds, ___ M.J. ___, No. 24-
0063/AR, 2024 CAAF LEXIS 68 (C.A.A.F. 1 Feb. 2024); United States v. Har-
vey, 83 M.J. 685, 690–94 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2023), rev. granted, ___ M.J. ___,
No. 23-0239/NA, 2024 CAAF LEXIS 13 (C.A.A.F. 10 Jan. 2024). Those CCAs
agreed the new statute made it more difficult than previously for an appellant
to secure relief on appeal for factual insufficiency, but Scott disagreed with

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                     United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

Harvey’s proposition that “Congress has implicitly created a rebuttable pre-
sumption that in reviewing a conviction, a [C]ourt of [C]riminal [A]ppeals pre-
sumes that an appellant is, in fact, guilty.” Harvey, 83 M.J. at 693; see Scott,
83 M.J. at 780.
    “In the absence of a statutory definition, the plain language of a statute will
control unless it is ambiguous or leads to an absurd result.” United States v.
Cabuhat, 83 M.J. 755, 765 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2023) (en banc) (citing United
States v. Lewis, 65 M.J. 85, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2007)). Inquiry into the plainness or
ambiguity of a statute’s meaning “must cease if the statutory language is un-
ambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’” Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair En-
terprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)); see also Cabuhat, 83 M.J. at 766 (quot-
ing Robinson). By contrast, when the text is ambiguous, reviewing courts may
apply the statutory canons of construction to resolve those ambiguities. See
Cabuhat, 83 M.J. at 765–66 (citing Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340). In construing
amended legislation, two canons of construction are particularly applicable.
First, we “assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legis-
lation.” United States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376, 380 (quoting Miles v. Apex
Marine Corps, 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990)). Second, “[w]hen Congress acts to amend
a statute, [courts] presume it intends its amendment to have real and substan-
tial effect.” Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 514 U.S. 386, 397
(1995) (quoted with approval in United States v. Matthews, 68 M.J. 29, 37
(C.A.A.F. 2009)).
    In order to convict Appellant of sexual assault as charged in this case, the
Government was required to prove that at or near Malmstrom AFB, on or
about 21 May 2021: (1) Appellant committed a sexual act upon AH, specifically
by causing contact between his mouth and her vulva; (2) AH was incapable of
consenting to the sexual act due to impairment by alcohol; and (3) Appellant
knew or reasonably should have known AH was so impaired. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 920(b)(3)(A); Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.), pt. IV,
¶ 60.b.(2)(f). The term “[s]exual act” includes, inter alia, “contact between the
mouth and the . . . vulva.” 10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(1)(B). “The term ‘incapable of con-
senting’ means the person is[ ] (A) incapable of appraising the nature of the
conduct at issue; or (B) physically incapable of declining participation in, or
communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act at issue.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 920(g)(8); see also United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180, 184–86 (C.A.A.F. 2016)
(explaining the definition of “incapable of consenting” under the prior version
of Article 120, UCMJ, in terms substantially similar to the current statutory
definition).

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                    United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

   2. Analysis
       a. Legal Sufficiency
     The Government introduced sufficient evidence of Appellant’s guilt to meet
the “very low threshold” for legal sufficiency. King, 78 M.J. at 221. Although
there was no physical evidence of the sexual act and AH could not remember
it, the Government introduced audio recordings of Appellant twice admitting
he performed oral sex on AH after her pants and underwear were removed. A
rational finder of fact could reasonably interpret Appellant’s statements to
mean he placed his mouth on AH’s vulva.
    Although the Government could not prove AH’s blood-alcohol level, it in-
troduced evidence AH consumed a large amount of alcohol on the night in ques-
tion. The evidence indicated AH consumed some amount of homemade mead,
approximately three or four glasses of wine, and some unknown amount of
hard seltzer that Appellant later told AH was between three and five cans.
Although AH regularly drank alcohol, the record also reflects her body size was
relatively small; a rational factfinder applying common sense and knowledge-
able of the ways of the world could conclude AH’s size rendered her more sus-
ceptible to the effects of a given quantity of alcohol than a larger person would
have been.
     Additional evidence tended to indicate AH was significantly impaired by
alcohol, and Appellant knew it or should reasonably have known it. A rational
factfinder could conclude Appellant knew AH was too drunk to drive home from
the restaurant because SSgt NA drove her home, and Appellant helped AH get
inside the house. Appellant then observed AH continue to drink alcohol. He
also stated he “helped” her go up the stairs to her bedroom before she came
back down. Appellant also told AH that at one point as they were talking, AH
fell over in her chair causing the chair to dent the wall; OSI agents found such
a dent in the wall and bits of paint on the edge of a chair when they inspected
AH’s house. Appellant told AH that after she fell over, he “carried” her, pre-
sumably to the sofa, before the sexual act occurred. Appellant agreed that AH
was drunk and “f[**]ked up” at that point.
    We recognize Appellant’s version of events, if entirely true, suggests AH
was not so impaired by alcohol that she was incapable of consenting. According
to Appellant, immediately prior to the sexual act AH was still holding a con-
versation with him; she removed her own pants and underwear; and after ap-
proximately a minute of oral sex she pushed Appellant away with her leg and
told him she needed to urinate. These actions, if true, suggest AH was able to
appreciate the nature of the sexual act and that AH was capable of declining
participation.

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                     United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

    However, the trier of fact could properly believe one part of Appellant’s
statement while disbelieving another part. Cf. United States v. Nicola, 78 M.J.
223, 227–28 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (“[T]he trier of fact may disbelieve the accused’s
testimony and then use the accused’s statements as substantive evidence of
guilt . . . .” (Citation omitted)); United States v. Bare, 63 M.J. 707, 713 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 2006) (“Court members may believe one portion of a witness’s tes-
timony but disbelieve others.” (Citation omitted)). Appellant’s version of events
failed to explain certain other evidence, including AH awakening naked on a
sheetless bed upstairs “sore around [her] vaginal area,” rather than sleeping
clothed on the downstairs sofa where Appellant purportedly left her—creating
a reasonable inference Appellant was being less than entirely candid about
what had happened.
    Moreover, the trier of fact could reasonably interpret other evidence as in-
dicating AH would not have consented or behaved in the manner Appellant
claimed. AH testified she had previously flatly rejected Appellant when he ex-
pressed a desire for a more intimate relationship. AH reacted with shock and
anger when Appellant told her he had performed oral sex on her. At trial, she
testified that she—drunk or sober—would never have allowed Appellant to
kiss her or allowed him to perform oral sex on her on 21 May 2021. A rational
factfinder could have credited AH’s testimony and found it implausible that
she removed her pants and underwear and consensually engaged in such be-
havior with Appellant—i.e., that the exculpatory aspects of Appellant’s account
were true. Such a rational factfinder could attribute Appellant’s implausible
account to consciousness of guilt, and could also consider his somewhat incrim-
inating statements to the effect that he knew he should have just “back[ed]
away,” that he “did what [he] did,” and he would understand if AH were to
“make a phone call” and report him. A rational trier of fact could find these
statements suggest that, at the time, Appellant knew what he did was wrong,
knew AH would not actually consent to sexual activity with him, and knew he
had taken advantage of her incapacitation by alcohol.
   Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Govern-
ment, a rational trier of fact could find the elements of the offense proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
       b. Factual Sufficiency
   Although the question is a close one, applying the new statutory standard,
we also find the evidence factually sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction.
           i) Specific showing of a deficiency of proof
   In contrast to earlier versions of Article 66, UCMJ, which required this
court to assess the factual sufficiency of the evidence in every case, see Wash-
ington, 57 M.J. at 399, under the current version of Article 66(d)(1)(B), UCMJ

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                    United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

(2024 MCM), the initial question is whether Appellant has requested factual
sufficiency review and has made “a specific showing of a deficiency of proof.”
We agree with our Navy-Marine Corps counterparts that this provision does
not require Appellant to demonstrate the entire absence of evidence supporting
an element of the offense, a requirement which would be redundant with legal
sufficiency review. See Harvey, 83 M.J. at 691. Rather, the statute requires
Appellant “identify a weakness in the evidence admitted at trial to support an
element (or more than one element) and explain why, on balance, the evidence
(or lack thereof) admitted at trial contradicts a guilty finding.” Id.
    Appellant has made the requisite showing of a deficiency of proof. Among
other points, Appellant contends that the version of events he related in the
two recorded conversations indicate AH was not incapable of consenting to sex-
ual activity, and even if she was incapable, the evidence does not prove Appel-
lant knew or reasonably should have known she was incapable of consenting.
If either contention were true, Appellant would not be guilty of the sexual as-
sault specification for which he was convicted.
    We note that once an appellant makes the requisite showing, the statute
provides we “may consider whether the finding is correct in fact.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 866(d)(1)(B)(i) (2024 MCM) (emphasis added). We note the permissive term
“may,” on its face, might be read to indicate that progressing further with fac-
tual sufficiency analysis is not required, but rather up to the discretion of the
CCA. The term might also be read to simply signal that once an appellant has
satisfied the initial specific showing required by 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B)(i)
(2024 MCM), the CCA is then empowered to conduct the factual sufficiency
review without implying the CCA has discretion not to do so. We leave for an-
other day the question of whether a CCA might properly decline to proceed
further with factual sufficiency analysis at this stage; in Appellant’s case, we
have proceeded with the analysis. Cf. Scott, 83 M.J. at 780 (“Once appellant
makes a specific showing of a deficiency in proof, we will conduct a de novo
review of the controverted questions of fact.”) (Emphasis added).).
           ii) Weighing the evidence and determining controverted ques-
           tions of fact
    When weighing the evidence and determining controverted questions of
fact, Article 66(d)(1)(B)(ii), UCMJ (2024 MCM), requires that we afford “appro-
priate deference to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses
and other evidence.” This is a change from the prior version of Article 66(d)(1),
UCMJ, which required CCAs to “recogniz[e] that the trial court saw and heard
the witnesses.” 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1). The current statute does not specify what
is meant by the term “appropriate deference.” Our Navy-Marine Corps coun-
terparts concluded that “appropriate deference” is a more deferential standard
than “recognizing,” but not one which deprives the CCA of the power to

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                     United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

determine the credibility of witnesses. Harvey, 83 M.J. at 692. We broadly
agree, with the additional observation that the significance of the credibility of
particular witnesses or testimony will vary depending on the circumstances of
the case.
    Accordingly, we have given appropriate deference to the fact that the mili-
tary judge saw and heard the witness testimony and other evidence. We ap-
preciate that in a case such as the instant one, where the victim cannot re-
member the charged offense, the victim’s credibility is arguably less vital than
in a case where the victim was the key witness to the offense itself or where
her testimony was in substantial conflict with other evidence. We also appre-
ciate that the critical proof of the charged sexual act in this case comes from
audio recordings that are contained in the record of trial, and therefore avail-
able to us in the same form in which they were provided to the military judge.
Nevertheless, affording appropriate deference to the military judge, in light of
the findings, we presume AH generally—to the extent not contradicted by the
record6—testified credibly with respect to the convicted sexual assault, includ-
ing her shock at what Appellant admitted doing to her and her certainty that
she would not have consensually engaged in sexual activity with Appellant.
           iii) “Clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against
           the weight of the evidence”
    Having weighed the evidence, the ultimate statutory test for factual insuf-
ficiency is whether we are “clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was
against the weight of the evidence.” 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2024 MCM).
We agree with our CCA counterparts to the extent that Congress intended this
new statutory standard to “make[ ] it more difficult for [an appellant] to prevail
on appeal.” Scott, 83 M.J. 780; see also Harvey, 83 M.J. at 693 (“[T]his [c]ourt
will weigh the evidence in a deferential manner to the result at trial.”). How-
ever, like our Army counterparts, we decline to apply Harvey’s “rebuttable pre-
sumption . . . that an appellant is, in fact, guilty.” 83 M.J. at 693; see Scott, 83
M.J. at 780 (quoting and disagreeing with Harvey).

6 For example, we recognize that after the Government rested, AH’s Special Victims’

Counsel (SVC) alerted the military judge and parties to an issue with AH’s testimony.
The Defense subsequently called AH as a witness. AH admitted that during her initial
testimony, in response to a question from the military judge, she had falsely claimed
she did not remember what happened after she awakened Appellant on the morning
of 22 May 2021. AH explained she did so because she “did not want to get in trouble”
because Appellant had driven her to the restaurant that morning to pick up her car,
and her child had been in the house alone. After her testimony, AH informed her SVC
of what she had done, leading to the disclosure and her subsequent additional testi-
mony.

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                    United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

    The statute does not further define what Congress meant by the terms
“clearly convinced” and “against the weight of the evidence” in this context. We
note Congress did not expressly refer to either the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard, nor the preponderance of the evidence standard. In general, a
finding of guilty would be against the weight of the evidence if the legal and
competent evidence admitted at trial failed to establish the accused’s guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. See 10 U.S.C. § 851(c)(1) (setting forth required court
member instructions as to the burden of proof); Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 920(e)(5) (same). This familiar standard of proof has long been applied
to questions of legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence under Article 66,
UCMJ. See United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987) (“For fac-
tual sufficiency, the test is whether, after weighing the evidence in the record
of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed the wit-
nesses, the members of the Court of Military Review are themselves convinced
of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Washington, 57
M.J. at 399 (citing Turner, 25 M.J. at 325); United States v. Sills, 56 M.J. 239,
240–41 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (declining to find references to “weight of the evidence”
in the legislative history of the UCMJ evinced congressional intent that factual
sufficiency review apply less than the “traditional criminal law standard” of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt). In the current version of Article 66, UCMJ
(2024 MCM), Congress has expressly retained CCA factual sufficiency review,
albeit in a modified form. In the absence of clearer guidance, we infer Congress
intended the beyond reasonable doubt standard to continue to apply in ques-
tions of factual sufficiency.
    However, we also recognize Congress has overlaid the requirement that the
CCA be “clearly convinced” the evidence is insufficient before granting relief.
In this context, the term “clearly convinced” is capable of an unambiguous
plain-language interpretation—independent of legal terms of art—consonant
with a coherent and consistent statutory scheme that does not lead to absurd
results. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340; Cabuhat, 83 M.J. at 766. Accordingly,
in order to set aside a finding of guilty, we must not only find the weight of the
evidence does not support the conviction; we must be clearly convinced this is
the case. Put another way, in order to set aside a finding of guilty we must be
clearly convinced that the weight of the evidence does not support the convic-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt.
   Cognizant that the Government may prove its case by circumstantial evi-
dence, and giving appropriate deference to the fact that the military judge saw
and heard the testimony and other evidence, we are not clearly convinced the
military judge’s findings of guilty were against the weight of the evidence. Ac-
cordingly, we find the findings of guilty as to the Charge and Specification fac-
tually sufficient.

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                    United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

B. Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
   1. Additional Background
    The Air Force Judge Advocate General (TJAG) designated Captain
(Capt) CP an Air Force judge advocate in September 2020. Capt CP was as-
signed to Malmstrom AFB as an assistant staff judge advocate. On 29 Novem-
ber 2021, Capt CP administered the oath to Appellant’s squadron commander,
Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) P, when Lt Col P preferred the Charge and its
three specifications against Appellant. Capt CP subsequently represented the
Government at the preliminary hearing pursuant to Article 32, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 832, held on 19 January 2022.
    In early March 2022, the Malmstrom AFB staff judge advocate became
aware that Capt CP’s license to practice law had been suspended by his state
bar on 15 March 2021. Capt CP was removed from performing legal duties, but
his designation as a judge advocate was not removed and he remained on active
duty at the time of Appellant’s trial.
    On 21 July 2022, at the outset of Appellant’s court-martial, the Defense
submitted a motion to dismiss the Charge and specifications for a defective
preferral and defective preliminary hearing. The Defense contended an attor-
ney “must be both qualified and designated” as a judge advocate in order to
perform judge advocate functions, and when Capt CP had lost his standing to
practice law in March 2021 he was no longer qualified to serve as a judge ad-
vocate. Therefore, the Defense reasoned, Capt CP was not eligible to adminis-
ter the oath to Lt Col P in November 2021, nor to represent the Government
at the preliminary hearing in January 2022, and the Charge and specifications
should be dismissed. In response, the Government contended that because
Capt CP’s designation as a judge advocate had not been withdrawn, he re-
mained eligible both to administer the oath to Lt Col P and to represent the
Government at the preliminary hearing.
   After conducting a hearing, the military judge issued a written ruling deny-
ing the Defense’s motion to dismiss. The military judge explained that alt-
hough Capt CP may “be subject to other disciplinary consequences,” the sus-
pension of his license did not “automatically strip him of his status as a ‘judge
advocate’ for purposes of the UCMJ.” Because Capt CP’s designation as a judge
advocate had not been removed, the Defense had failed to demonstrate a defect
with either the preferral or preliminary hearing.
   2. Law
    Both parties assert this court reviews a military judge’s ruling on a motion
to dismiss for an abuse of discretion, citing United States v. Douglas, No. ACM
38935, 2017 CCA LEXIS 407, at *19 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 15 Jun. 2017) (unpub.
op.) (citing United States v. Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 187 (C.A.A.F. 2004)). See also

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                     United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

United States v. Floyd, 82 M.J. 821, 828 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2022) (“We re-
view a military judge’s ruling to dismiss charges and specifications for an abuse
of discretion.” (Citing Gore, 60 M.J. at 187)). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when a military judge either erroneously applies the law or clearly errs in mak-
ing his or her findings of fact.” United States v. Smith, 83 M.J. 350, 355
(C.A.A.F. 2023) (quoting United States v. Donaldson, 58 M.J. 477, 482
(C.A.A.F. 2003)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 696 (2024).
    Charges and specifications “shall be preferred by presentment in writing,
signed under oath before a commissioned officer of the armed forces who is
authorized to administer oaths.” 10 U.S.C. § 830(a)(2); see also R.C.M. 307(b)(1)
(“The person preferring the charges and specifications must sign them under
oath before a commissioned officer of the armed forces authorized to administer
oaths.”). Officers authorized to administer oaths for military justice purposes
include, inter alia, “[a]ll judge advocates” and “[a]ll . . . assistant staff judge
advocates and legal officers.” 10 U.S.C. §§ 936(a)(1), (5).
   “A judge advocate, not the accuser, shall serve as counsel to represent the
Government” at the preliminary hearing held pursuant to Article 32, UCMJ.
R.C.M. 405(d)(2).
    “The term ‘judge advocate’ means . . . an officer of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral’s Corps of the . . . Air Force.” 10 U.S.C. § 801(13)(A). “Judge advocate func-
tions in the Air Force and the Space Force shall be performed by commissioned
officers of the Air Force who are qualified under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, and who are designated as judge advocates.” 10 U.S.C. § 9063(g).
    “Only TJAG is authorized to designate [Regular Air Force] . . . officers as
judge advocates and remove that designation.” Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-
101, The Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Corps (AFJAGC) Operations, Ac-
cessions, and Professional Development, ¶ 6.2.1 (29 Nov. 2018).
       To be designated as a judge advocate, officers must . . . [b]e a
       graduate of a law school that was accredited or provisionally ac-
       credited by the American Bar Association at the time of gradua-
       tion; and . . . [b]e in active (or equivalent) status, in good stand-
       ing, and admitted to practice before the highest court of a United
       States (US) state, commonwealth or territory, or the District of
       Columbia.
Id. at ¶¶ 6.2.2, 6.2.2.1, 6.2.2.2. “Once designated, a judge advocate must main-
tain current eligibility to actively practice law before the highest court of the
jurisdiction where they are licensed.” Id. at ¶ 6.3.1.
    A judge advocate’s designation or certification or both may be withdrawn
for good cause, including inter alia “fail[ure] to maintain professional licensing
standards.” Id. at ¶¶ 7.3, 7.3.1. A staff judge advocate or other AFJAGC

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                     United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

supervisor “submit[s] recommendations to withdraw a judge advocate’s desig-
nation, certification, or both through judge advocate supervisory channels to
[TJAG].” Id. at ¶ 7.5.
       When TJAG receives a recommendation or has sufficient basis
       to consider withdrawal, the judge advocate is notified of the pro-
       posed action and is afforded an opportunity to present infor-
       mation to show cause why the action should not be taken. The
       judge advocate will be given at least three duty days to respond.
       TJAG makes the final decision on withdrawal of designation or
       certification.
Id. “An officer whose designation has been withdrawn is not authorized to per-
form the duties of a judge advocate . . . unless authorized by TJAG.” Id. at ¶ 7.6.
   3. Analysis
    Appellant’s argument on appeal is substantially similar to the one he made
at trial. The essential facts are not in dispute. Appellant acknowledges that at
the time Capt CP administered the oath to Lt Col P and then served as the
Government representative at the preliminary hearing, TJAG had not with-
drawn Capt CP’s designation as a judge advocate. Nevertheless, Appellant as-
serts that because Capt CP failed to maintain an active license to practice law,
after 15 March 2021 he was no longer “qualified” to be a judge advocate and
could not legitimately perform judge advocate functions. Therefore, he reasons,
both the preferral of the Charge and specifications and the preliminary hearing
were defective, and this court should set aside the findings of guilty and the
sentence.
    However, we agree with the military judge’s conclusion. Although Capt CP
evidently put his status as a judge advocate at risk by failing to maintain an
active law license, the withdrawal of his designation as a judge advocate was
not an automatic consequence of the suspension. The applicable regulation pro-
vides a process whereby a judge advocate’s designation may be withdrawn for
good cause, which culminates in TJAG making the final decision on the matter.
Because TJAG had not withdrawn Capt CP’s designation, he remained a judge
advocate and therefore eligible to administer the oath at preferral and to rep-
resent the Government at the preliminary hearing.
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
   1. Additional Background
    As described in relation to the preceding issue, Capt CP was an assistant
staff judge advocate at Malmstrom AFB who represented the Government at
Appellant’s preliminary hearing in January 2022, after his state bar sus-
pended his law license in March 2021. During the hearing, Capt CP announced

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                    United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

he had “not acted in any way that might tend to disqualify [him]” from the
hearing. In March 2022, Capt CP’s staff judge advocate learned of the suspen-
sion.
   2. Law
    We review prosecutorial misconduct de novo. United States v. Voorhees, 79
M.J. 5, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (citing United States v. Andrews, 77 M.J. 393, 398
(C.A.A.F. 2018)). “Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when trial counsel ‘over-
step[s] the bounds of that propriety and fairness which should characterize the
conduct of such an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense.’” United
States v. Hornback, 73 M.J. 155, 159 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 178 (C.A.A.F. 2005)). Such con-
duct “can be generally defined as action or inaction by a prosecutor in violation
of some legal norm or standard, [for example] a constitutional provision, a stat-
ute, a Manual rule, or an applicable professional ethics canon.” Andrews, 77
M.J. at 402 (quoting United States v. Meek, 44 M.J. 1, 5 (C.A.A.F. 1996)). “[T]he
prosecutorial misconduct inquiry is an objective one, requiring no showing of
malicious intent on behalf of the prosecutor.” Hornback, 73 M.J. at 160.
    A judge advocate “shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or
law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer . . . .” AFI 51-110, Professional
Responsibility Program, Atch 2, Rules 3.3(a), 3.3(a)(1) (11 Dec. 2018). “It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Id. at Rule 8.4(c).
    “A finding or sentence of a court-martial may not be held incorrect on the
ground of an error of law unless the error materially prejudices the substantial
rights of the accused.” Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a). “In assessing
prejudice, we look at the cumulative impact of any prosecutorial misconduct
on the accused’s substantial rights and the fairness and integrity of his trial.”
Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 184 (citation omitted).
   3. Analysis
   Appellant contends Capt CP engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when he
asserted he had not acted in any way that would tend to disqualify him from
participating in the preliminary hearing, approximately ten months after
Capt CP’s law license had been suspended.
    The parties recognize this court addressed a substantially similar issue in-
volving Capt CP in United States v. Brissa, No. ACM 40206, 2023 CCA LEXIS
97, at *13–17 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 27 Feb. 2023) (unpub. op.), rev. denied, 83
M.J. 388 (C.A.A.F. 2023). Capt CP served as assistant trial counsel at Brissa’s
court-martial in July 2021, approximately four months after the suspension
took effect and eight months before his staff judge advocate learned of the

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                      United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

suspension. Id. at *2–5. Similar to the instant case, at Brissa’s court-martial
Capt CP announced he had not acted in any manner that might tend to dis-
qualify him. Id. at *13. We noted that this was “evidently not true” because by
failing to maintain his license Capt CP subjected himself to potential with-
drawal of his designation as a judge advocate. Id. We acknowledged the record
was unclear whether, at the time of the court-martial, Capt CP knew his li-
cense had been suspended, but we assumed for purposes of analysis the appel-
lant had demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at *14. However, we
found the appellant could not demonstrate prejudice because, inter alia, the
Government was also represented by a fully qualified senior trial counsel, the
appellant had pleaded guilty, and on appeal he alleged no other error at his
court-martial.
    Similar to our approach in Brissa, in the instant case we assume for pur-
poses of analysis that Appellant has demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct
on Capt CP’s part when Capt CP asserted he had not acted in any manner that
might tend to disqualify him in the preliminary hearing. However, as in Brissa,
we find Appellant has not demonstrated material prejudice to his substantial
rights. Appellant attempts to distinguish Brissa on the basis that there, the
Government was also represented by a senior trial counsel, whereas Capt CP
was the sole Government representative at Appellant’s preliminary hearing.
We are not persuaded. Appellant fails to identify any manner in which
Capt CP’s participation resulted in substantial errors at the preliminary hear-
ing, much less compromised the fairness and integrity of Appellant’s court-
martial where Capt CP did not participate at all. Accordingly, we find Appel-
lant has not demonstrated he is entitled to relief.

                                  III. CONCLUSION
    The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred.7 Arti-
cles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d).

7 We note that Preliminary Hearing Officer Exhibit 9—the sealed portion of the audio

recording of the preliminary hearing—is not attached to the preliminary hearing re-
port, which is required to be attached to the record of trial for appellate review. R.C.M.
1112(f)(1)(A). Appellant has not raised the omission as an issue nor alleged it resulted
in material prejudice to his substantial rights, and we find no such prejudice. See 10
U.S.C. § 859(a).

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              United States v. Csiti, No. ACM 40386

Accordingly, the findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

               FOR THE COURT

               CAROL K. JOYCE
               Clerk of the Court

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