Court Opinion

ID: 9829444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:18:33.174376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:01.182962
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We adhere to the conclusions reached upon original hearing that the testimony of O. J. Barnard was too indefinite to show that plantiffs were the sole owners of the claim asserted against the defendant and upon which a recovery was awarded. The proof on that issue was peculiarly within the knowledge of the plaintiffs, and, if they are the sole owners, they should prove that fact by evidence reasonably definite, which they failed to do. They sued in their own right, claiming ownership in them; hence authorities cited by the appellees, to the effect that it is incumbent upon the defendant by special plea to challenge the right of the plaintiffs to sue in the capacity of the representatives of the other parties in interest, whom they claimed to represent, have no application.
•[3] But appellees insist that under the evidence and findings of the jury it was not necessary to a recovery by them that they establish the-affirmative of the issue of mutual mistake, alleged in the second count of their petition. In other words, it is contended that under that evidence and the finding of the jury a judgment shoulcj have been rendered in their favor*, without any finding by the court or jury on the issue of mutual mistake, if it can be said that the evidence was sufficient to show that plaintiffs were the sole owners of the claim sued on. An<J appellees insist that the correctnesk of this contention should be determined for the guidance of the trial court, if the cause is to be reversed and remanded.
After careful consideration, we have reached the conclusion that that contention should be sustained. According to Hammond’s own testimony, the broker, John W. Owens, represented him in the negotiations leading up to the sale of the property to the P. B. M. Company, and also in the consummation of the trade, and Hammond’s testimony, to the effect that he told Owens that he was unwilling to sell the property unless he realized the net sum of $37,500, after paying commission to Owens, was never brought to the notice of his vendee. Furthermore, he admits that he signed the contract to sell the property for the aggregate sum of $38,500,. and, aside from the stipulations in the deed, no testimony was introduced from any source to show that, prior to or at the time of the delivery of the deed, the grantee agreed to pay more than that sum for the property. The proof showed without controversy that the deed was executed, delivered, and accepted in order to carry out the written contract of purchase and sale theretofore executed by the parties, and that notice of the secret intention of Hammond to add $936 to the consideration for which he had theretofore agreed to convey the property was not brought home to the grantee before the deed was accepted. The proof was also uncon-troverted that Barnard accepted the deed when it was delivered to him by Owens, who was Hammond’s agent, 'without reading it. But Hammond seeks to hold the grantee to the payment of-the additional consideration of $936 solely by reason of his contention that by the terms of the deed the grantee assumed the payment of all past-accrued interest on the Kell notes, as well as interest there*920after to accrue, although, not specifically so expressed, and by the acceptance of the deed containing that covenant.
It will be observed that in the deed of conveyance the consideration is expressed as “the sum of ($38,500) thirty-eight thousand five hundred dollars, to us paid and secured to be paid by P. B. M. Company, a corporation, as follows.” Eollowing that statement are the items constituting the consideration which aggregate $38,500, exclusive of the past-accrued interest on the Kell notes, aiid there is no language used expressly requiring the vendee to pay that interest as well as interest thereafter to accrue on the Kell notes. But if the contract of the vendee to assume those notes be construed as an assumption of such past accrued interest, then there is an ambiguity between that stipulation and the consideration of $38,500 theretofore expressed as the full consideration for the conveyance which the jury found was the total consideration agreed on between the •parties. As noted in our opinion on original hearing, the deed was not prepared by the vendee, but by some one representing Hammond, and was accepted by Barnard for the vendee under the belief and upon the assurance of Owens, Hammond’s agent, that it was in compliance with the terms of the prior written contract of Hammond to sell the property.
The following are excerpts from Page on the Law of Contracts, vol. 4, § 2053:
“As between two constructions, each probable, one of which makes the contract fair and reasonable and the other of which makes it unfair and unreasonable, the former should always be preferred.”
And in section 2054 the author says:
“If terms of a contract appear on their face to be inserted for the benefit of one of the parties, he will be considered as having inserted such terms and as having chosen the language thereof. Any ambiguity in such language is therefore to be construed more strongly against the party making use of such language. If one party draws the contract and the adversary party has no choice in the selection of the words used or in the arrangements of the sentences or in the punctuation, any ambiguity is to be resalved in favor of the party who did not prepare the contract. * * * Thus a contract of sale has been construed more strictly against the vendor.”
Section 2062 reads:
“If the contract is ambiguous so that explanatory evidence is admissible, and such evidence establishes certain facts without dispute, so that only one inference can be drawn therefrom, the construction of such contract is for the court in spite of such ambiguity.”
In Amory Manufacturing Co. v. G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 89 Tex. 419, 37 S. W. 856, 59 Am. St. Rep. 65, Chief Justice Gaines, for the Supreme Court, said:
“The rule is elementary that, if a written contract when viewed as a whole and in the light of the attendant circumstances reasonably admits of two constructions, that one is to be adopted which is least favorable to the party whose language it is.”
And in that case, and by applying that rule-of construction, the railway company was held liable for damages to cotton destroyed by fire, which it had accepted for shipment under a bill of lading issued by it, the terms of which were subject to two constructions, one favorable to the railway company, and the other favorable to the shipper. We believe those authorities fully support the conclusion we have reached and which is expressed above.
The appellant did not plead mutual mistake in the drafting of the deed, but relied upon its terms as absolutely binding the purchaser to pay the past-accrued interest on the Kell notes, although he requested the submission of the issue of the mutual mistake to the jury in order to have that issue determined by the jury in the event the court should be of the opinion that it was necessary for plaintiffs to rely for a recovery upon the issue of mutual mistake as pleaded in the second count of their petition. We adhere to our former conclusions upon the submission of mutual mistake, if upon another trial it becomes necessary for any reason for plaintiffs to recover upon that theory; but whether that necessity will arise upon another trial will depend upon the facts developed by the evidence.
.The motion for rehearing is overruled.