Court Opinion

ID: 9833520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:47:14.345266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:03.856334
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The attorneys for appellant present a very forceful motion for a rehearing. We have concluded to write more fully on the questions presented than we did in the original opinion.
The speed limit on commercial vehicles, such as the one involved here, by the last amendment (Acts 1931, c. 282, § 9, Vernon’s Ann.P.C. art. 827a § 8), is fixed at 25 miles per hour, and not at 18 miles, as stated in the opinion.
Appellant assigned1 error to the entry of judgment against it in the sum of $1,500 as the contribution found appellees probably would have received from their deceased son after reaching his majority, for the reason that there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding. Appellant insists that the evidence must show some pecuniary loss as distinguished from sentimental loss.
As we construe the court’s charge, only a pecuniary loss was submitted. As supporting its contention we are referred to Francis v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 113 Tex. 202, 253 S.W. 819, 30 A.L.R. 114, and Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Leifeste (Tex.Com.App.) 22 S.W.(2d) 1061. In the first cited case, Francis, at the time of his death, was 29 years of age, unmarried, and gave to his parents some $2.10 or more per day.' It was alleged' by the parent, suing as administrator, that he and his wife were about 55 years of age and stated their life expectancy for which they sued. In their motion for a new trial it was alleged that after the death of the son, Porter Francis, involved in the suit, another son had died carrying a large amount of life insurance in favor of plaintiffs, and that by reason of that fact the judgment of $12,000 was excessive. In that case Judge Pierson for the Supreme Court held that the income from the insurance was admissible to be shown in evidence, and otherwise discussed the facts that could be shown by both parties under the facts of that case. The court quoted from other cases where the deceased son was far passed the age of 21 years, and where the evidence showed the amount of money actually contributed to the support of the parents, and held as in other cases from which quotations are made, that the compensation should be equivalent to the pecuniary benefits which the parents might have reasonably expected from the continuance of the life of the deceased son.
 In Texas Jurisprudence, vol. 33, p. 258, it is said that it is ordinarily impossible, particularly with respect to a child of tender years, to produce exact proof of the loss sustained by reason of his death. The law does not fix the amount and witnesses cannot be called to estimate it. The measure of damages in such cases is the present value of the pecuniary benefits which the parents had a reasonable expectation of receiving from him after he reached his majority, had he lived.
It is true there is a paucity in pleading as to the facts, and in the proof offered on the facts pleaded. Appellant states for the first time in its motion that the record is bare of proof as to the age, health, and life expectancy of the parents. Appellant made no point in its pleading, nor in its motion for a rehearing, nor in its brief as to the want of such proof.
The court’s attention was not called to the absence of such facts in the proof, and *499appellant does not in its motion suggest reversible error based on the absence from the record of such facts. We feel disposed to hold that reversible error is not shown.
 The court did not submit any issue of unavoidable accident, though requested to do so, and appellant complains of such failure. We still have the same view on that issue we expressed in the opinion. It seems to us that the driver of appellant’s truck owed the duty to check up the speed1 of his truck to a much less rate than he said he was going before and at the time of the accident. He then saw ánd had passed the school zone notice, saw children on the school grounds, and the uncontroverted evidence of other witnesses shows that other children were on the highway going toward the school grounds at the time of the accident. Conceding that the d'river of appellant’s truck did all that he could do to avoid striking the boy after he saw him go upon the highway in front of his truck, yet, by his failure to use that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would ordinarily use under the same circumstances, it seems to us he created the danger of injuring some child he now says was unavoidable. While the driver of the truck had the right, under ordinary circumstances, to drive on the highway at the rate of 25 miles per hour, we think, under the undisputed circumstances, there could be no question but that he should have checked up his speed to a much less speed than he said he was going at the time of the accident. We think the accident should not be classed as unavoidable.
The motion is overruled!.