Court Opinion

ID: 9743419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:32:47.815657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.162796
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff, the Village of Deerfield, has filed a petition for rehearing asserting that we misapprehended the Moorman doctrine (see Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 91 (1982)) in resolving this appeal. After reviewing the petition, we believe that our opinion requires clarification. It is true that a plaintiff may recover in tort for economic losses that accompany personal injury or property damage resulting from a sudden or dangerous occurrence. In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 199 (1997). Further, as we pointed out, plaintiff did allege that it, or, more specifically, its class members, suffered property damages — food spoilage, for example (In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 201 (holding that damages for loss of “perishable inventory as a result of interrupted electrical service” are recoverable in tort)). Thus, it would appear that plaintiff could recover economic damages because it has alleged property damages. One concern remains, however. Plaintiff makes allegations on behalf of a class. Only class members who suffered property damage would be eligible to recover for items such as costs of temporary housing, generators, and battery-operated sump pumps. Plaintiff’s complaint is quite general; for example, it alleges: “As a result of [ComEd’s] illegal conduct, customers (Plaintiff and Class Members) have incurred substantial damages and losses due to the unreliability of [ComEd’s] service {e.g., spoiled food, purchase of electrical generators to deal with [ComEd’s] unreliable service, property damage, temporary housing, extra municipal and policing services necessitated by [ComEd’s] power outages, etc.).” Clearly, not every individual class member has experienced each and every articulated damage. The list, being prefaced by “e.g.” and followed by “etc.” is obviously intended to exemplify damages sustained by class members. Only class members who have suffered property damage are entitled to proceed under the Moorman doctrine. As the supreme court has previously stated: “Class plaintiffs complain that the application of the economic loss rule to the present case ‘permits identically situated plaintiffs in the same case to be treated differently for recovery of their damages based solely on the fortuity that one may have suffered property damage along with economic damage.’ However, the tort recovery requirement of injury to person or property is not a ‘fortuity.’ ” In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 199. Accordingly, class members who experienced food spoilage or some other properly pleaded property damage may proceed, while those who suffered only economic losses are barred from recovery by Moorman. We do reiterate that conclusory allegations of property damage are not sufficient to avoid the Moorman doctrine. In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 202 (“The conclusory allegation of unspecified property damage is insufficient to show that their damages are recoverable in tort, and cannot withstand a motion to dismiss”). Finally, we note that in its response to plaintiffs petition, defendant asks that we reconsider our ruling and hold that all of plaintiffs damages are barred by Moorman. This we decline to do. Defendant has not filed a petition for rehearing, and, in any event, we do not find persuasive its argument that plaintiffs property damages were simply the result of a disappointed expectation in continuous electrical service. See In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 201 (“For example, in Redarowicz, the court held that plaintiffs property damage was caused by a construction defect, which was a disappointed commercial expectation. Thus, plaintiff’s damages were solely economic losses. However, the court indicated that had plaintiff suffered personal injury or other property damage, he would have been able to recover in tort”). We also note that defendant has filed a motion to file supplemental authority, namely, Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 399 Ill. App. 3d 51 (2010). We grant that motion. That case, as plaintiff points out, is not pertinent to the Moorman issue. It is, however, relevant to the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction, which was not addressed in the petition for rehearing. In any event, we have reviewed Sheffler and do not find it persuasive. More fundamentally, trial courts are courts of general jurisdiction and their jurisdiction flows from the constitution. Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335-36 (2002). We therefore question the notion that the legislature could remove from the jurisdiction of the trial court common-law tort and contract claims against ComEd. Indeed, even cast as a claim for reparations under the Public Utilities Act (see 220 ILCS 5/9 — 252 (West 2008)), recent case law suggests that jurisdiction might remain with the trial court. Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 335-36 (“The legislature may create new justiciable matters by enacting legislation that creates rights and duties that have no counterpart at common law or in equity. *** The legislature’s creation of a new justiciable matter, however, does not mean that the legislature thereby confers jurisdiction on the circuit court. *** Some case law, however, suggests that the legislature, in defining a justiciable matter, may impose ‘conditions precedent’ to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction that cannot be waived. [Citations.] We necessarily reject this view because it is contrary to article VI [of the Illinois Constitution]”). ZENOFF, PJ., and McLAREN, J., concur.