Court Opinion

ID: 9882543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:25.833512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:22.059057
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]

                                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                         ATHENS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                        : CASE NO. 22CA11

        v.                                         :

IAN STEVERS,                                       : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellant.                       :

_________________________________________________________________

                                              APPEARANCES:

Kathleen Evans, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio,
for appellant1.

Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Timothy Warren, Assistant Athens County Prosecuting Attorney,
Athens, Ohio, for appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:8-22-23
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     Ian Stevers, defendant below and appellant herein,

appeals the Athens County Common Pleas Court judgment that revoked

his community control and sentenced him to serve the remainder of

his five-year prison sentence.

        {¶2}     Appellant assigns one error for review:

                 “MR. STEVERS WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND

        1
        Different counsel represented appellant during the trial
court proceedings.
                                                                       2
ATHENS,     22CA11

            EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY THE TRIAL
            COURT’S REFUSAL TO CONTINUE HIS REVOCATION
            HEARING. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.
            CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 16, OHIO
            CONSTITUTION.”

     {¶3}   On December 5, 2018, in Case Number 18CR0408, appellant

entered guilty pleas to (1) possession of heroin in violation of

R.C. 2925.11(A), (2) possession of cocaine in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A), (3) aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A), and (4) aggravated possession of drugs in violation of

R.C. 2925.11(A), all fifth-degree felonies.     The trial court placed

appellant under five years of community control.

     {¶4}   On February 1, 2021, appellant entered guilty pleas in

two additional cases.     In Case Number 20CR0013, appellant entered

guilty pleas to (1) receiving stolen property in violation of R.C.

2913.51(A), a fourth-degree felony, and (2) having weapons under

disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a third-degree

felony.     In Case Number 21CR0003, appellant entered a guilty plea

to vandalism in violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(1)(b), a fifth-degree

felony.     The trial court placed appellant under five years of

community control to be served concurrently.

     {¶5}   As part of the terms and conditions of appellant’s

community control, the trial court ordered appellant to: (1)remain

a law-abiding citizen during supervision, (2) remain in Ohio, (3)
                                                                     3
ATHENS,     22CA11

submit to a drug and alcohol assessment and follow all

recommendations, (4) abstain from using or possessing illegal drugs

or alcohol, (5) be subject to random substance abuse monitoring,

(6) successfully complete the community-based correctional program

(CBCF), (7) pay court costs, (8) report to the APA upon his

release, (9) be screened for and, if found acceptable, successfully

complete the Athens County Prosecutor’s Office Vivitrol Program and

all requirements, and (10) follow other conditions appellant’s

supervising officer deems appropriate.

     {¶6}   On June 22, 2022, appellee filed a Notice of Violation of

Community Control that alleged: (1) on May 19, 2022 appellant

failed to contact his supervising officer, (2) on June 2, 2022

appellant failed to contact his supervising officer, (3) on June

16, 2022 appellant failed to contact his supervising officer, (4)

on June 21, 2022 appellant possessed fentanyl, (5) on June 21, 2022

appellant possessed methamphetamine, and (6) on June 21, 2022

appellant possessed a firearm.

     {¶7}   At the start of the June 30, 2022 community control

violation hearing, appellant’s counsel orally requested “a brief

continuance” and stated that appellant’s son had been “in and out

of the Children’s Hospital” for weeks and appellant and his

girlfriend expected to hear about a follow-up appointment “any day
                                                                        4
ATHENS,     22CA11

now.”     When the state opposed the continuance, the court stated: “I

appreciate that he has a child in crisis.     That doesn’t obviate the

fact that he hasn’t reported for six weeks in a row.     Got caught

with Meth and fentanyl and has a firearm.”     Counsel then stated:

    Additionally your honor. I mean the Prosecutor’s office
    did provide us pretty promptly with the uh, notices of
    violations and I believe Mr. Warren said this is day eight.
    But just about a half hour ago I was given this twenty-
    five page or so report from the Sheriff’s office concerning
    then, I believe the last three violations.         This is
    something I have not had the opportunity to review or
    prepare any kind of meaningful cross examination with
    whatsoever.

    {¶8}    The trial court responded: “What kind of time frame you

looking to continue it? * * * I’m not going to continue it ad

nauseam like we have, like I got fifteen cases from you people that

are overdue that you haven’t taken care of.     So how long of a

continuance are you suggesting?”     Counsel stated that he “wouldn’t

need anything more than a week or two.”

    {¶9}    At this point appellee reasserted its opposition to the

continuance and noted that although the state is not required to

provide discovery for probation violations and defense counsel did

not request the report, the state would have provided copies if

requested.     Further, the state reiterated that to continue the case

would inconvenience the two subpoenaed witnesses who appeared for

the hearing.
                                                                          5
ATHENS,    22CA11

     {¶10} The trial court asked about the hearing date, to which

the prosecutor replied, “He was arrested on the 21st.      Violations

were filed on the 22nd and then our office coordinated this date on

the 24th.”     The trial court responded, “So we had uh, you guys

picked the date.     Well the motion will be overruled then.    We will

go forward.”

     {¶11} Athens County Sheriff’s Deputy D.J. McCollister testified

that on June 21, 2022, he and others visited appellant’s address

because he had not reported to his probation officer. Officers

detained appellant when he answered the door and retrieved

suspected fentanyl, methamphetamine, and LSD.     Officers also

retrieved several drug abuse instruments, three phones, and a

firearm.     While officers processed the scene, “several vehicles had

showed up.” Officers recognized some individuals as regular drug

users and identified some by name.

     {¶12} Before defense counsel began to cross-examine Deputy

McCollister, counsel notified the trial court that one of the

identified “regular drug users” had been a prior client.       The court

responded, “What * * * are the chances that drug offenders

mentioned by the law enforcement officer are gonna have contact

with your office.     What are the outside chances?   So what are you

saying Mr. Chaves?”     Defense counsel then stated, “I question my
                                                                            6
ATHENS,   22CA11

full ability to actually, ethically do this case considering that

an officer just listed a prior client of mine as relevant to the

violations that are listed here.”    The trial court stated, “Well I

don’t know whether it’s relevant.    He just mentioned that it’s a

person he came into contact with.    Who your office may have

previously represented.   So the Court is not fully convinced that

there is a conflict there so.    We are going to press forward.”       On

cross-examination, Deputy McCollister acknowledged that the lab had

not completed results from the seized substances.

     {¶13} Adult Parole Authority Officer Ann Richardson testified

that she supervised appellant in all three cases.     Richardson

reviewed with appellant all the probation conditions and he

initialed and signed the form.    On May 5, 2022, Richardson ordered

appellant to report bi-weekly, and he failed to report on May 19,

June 2, and June 16.   On June 16, 2022, Richardson declared

appellant “whereabouts unknown, violator at large.”

     {¶14} After Officer Richardson’s testimony, the state rested.

The trial court stated, “Mr. Chaves I’ll give you uh, I’ll give you

the opportunity, uh, happy to continue the case a week or so to

give you a chance to look at that report more fully and figure out

if you want to call witnesses or not based on that since it was

just handed to you.”   Counsel stated, “Your honor.    No.   At this
                                                                     7
ATHENS,   22CA11

point the defense will rest.”   The trial court found probable cause

for violations one, two, three, four, five, and six.

     {¶15} At the July 6, 2022 hearing, Officer Richardson testified

that appellant came onto her caseload in December 2018 and

continued violation behavior and had been “through the violation

process numerous times.”   Appellant also failed to complete the

CBCF program and had numerous opportunities to get into treatment,

but “has chosen not to take advantage of those opportunities.”

Richardson also testified that appellant had cases before her

contact with him and had served prison time.

     {¶16} On July 14, 2022, the trial court revoked appellant’s

community control and sentenced him:

     For Case 18CR0408, the Court sentences Defendant to serve
     six (6) months in the State Penal System for Count One,
     six (6) months prison for Count Two, six (6) months prison
     for Count Three, and six (6) months prison for Count Four.
     All counts of Case 18CR0408 shall run consecutive to each
     other for a total sentence of twenty-four (24) months.

     For Case 20CR0013, the Court sentences Defendant to serve
     twelve (12) months in the State Penal System for Count One
     and thirty-six (36) months prison for Count Two, to run
     concurrent to each other, for a total sentence of thirty-
     six (36) months prison for Case 20CR0013.

     For Case 21CR0003, the Court sentences Defendant to serve
     twelve (12) months in the State Penal System.

     The sentences for 21CR0003 and 20CR0013 shall run
     consecutive to each other but concurrent to prison term
     for Case 18CR0408, for a total aggregate prison term of
                                                                           8
ATHENS,     22CA11

     four (4) years.2

The trial court made consecutive sentence findings, ordered

appellant to pay court costs and restitution, serve up to two years

of optional post-release control and advised him about the

consequences of a post-release control violation.      This appeal

followed.

     {¶17} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that

the trial court’s refusal to continue his revocation hearing denied

him due process and effective assistance of counsel under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I,

Section 16, Ohio Constitution.

     {¶18} In general, “[t]he grant or denial of a continuance is a

matter which is entrusted to the broad, sound discretion of the

trial judge.     An appellate court must not reverse the denial of a

continuance unless there has been an abuse of discretion.”       State

v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981), citing

Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921

     2
       At the revocation sentencing hearing, appellee notified the court
that the July 14, 2022 sentencing entry incorrectly identified the
sentence as four years instead of five years and appellee noted that the
court should issue a nunc pro tunc entry to accurately reflect the
sentence. The trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry on August 24,
2022, but only corrected case numbers in the July 14, 2022 entry. Thus,
the August 24, 2022 entry again repeated the cumulative sentence as four
years. Consequently, the trial court may again consider this issue and
enter a nunc pro tunc entry to correctly set forth appellant’s sentence.
                                                                      9
ATHENS,   22CA11

(1964), State v. Conway, 108 St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d

996, ¶ 147, State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 342, 744 N.E.2d 1163

(2001).

     {¶19} “ ‘[A]buse of discretion’ [means] an unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or * * * a view or

action that no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.’ ”

State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d

818, ¶ 67, quoting State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-

4493, 894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23.

     {¶20} A trial court that considers a motion to continue should

“[w]eigh [] against any potential prejudice to the defendant * * *

concerns such as a court’s right to control its own docket and the

public’s interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice.”

Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d at 67, 423 N.E.2d 1078.   Therefore, when

evaluating a request for a continuance, a court should also

consider, inter alia:

     the length of the delay requested; whether other
     continuances have been requested and received; the
     inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel
     and the court; whether the requested delay is for
     legitimate reasons to whether it is dilatory, purposeful,
     or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the
     circumstance which gives rise to the request for a
     continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the
     unique facts of each case.

Id. at 67-68.
                                                                       10
ATHENS,   22CA11

     {¶21} Appellant argues that the trial court did not apply a

balancing test before it denied the request for a continuance.

While it is a “basic due process right and indeed essential to a

fair trial that a defense counsel be afforded the reasonable

opportunity to prepare his case,” State v. Sowders, 4 Ohio St.3d

143, 144, 447 N.E.2d 118 (1983), not every denial of a continuance

violates due process.    Ungar, supra, 376 U.S. at 589.   This court

has held, however, that “nothing requires trial courts to

specifically articulate an analysis of each Unger factor.”     State

v. Dickens, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 09CA3272, 2009-Ohio-4541, ¶ 13;

Fultz v. Fultz, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 13CA9, 2014-Ohio-3344, ¶ 20.

Further, absent evidence to the contrary, we “must presume that the

trial court applied the law [in this case, the Unger factors]

correctly.”   State v. Combs, 18 Ohio St.3d 123, 125, 480 N.E.2d 414

(1985); Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7, 615 N.E.2d 617 (1993).

     {¶22} Although appellant argues that the Unger factors favor

the grant of his continuance request, based on our analysis of the

Unger factors we disagree.

     {¶23} The first Unger factor is the length of the delay

requested.    Appellant’s counsel indicated that he “wouldn’t need

anything more than a week or two.”   Although a week or two does not

necessarily equate to a long delay, the state argued that appellant
                                                                    11
ATHENS,   22CA11

had been arrested on June 21, 2022, the state filed violations on

June 22, and the parties coordinated the date on June 24.     The

trial court responded, “So we had uh, you guys picked the date.

Well the motion will be overruled then.”    Although the delay

requested was reasonably short, this factor is neutral.

     {¶24} The second Unger factor is whether other continuances had

been requested and received. The state concedes that this factor

weighs in appellant’s favor because it was appellant’s first

continuance request.

     {¶25} The third Unger factor involves the inconvenience to

litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel, and the court that results

from a continuance.    The trial court noted the presence of two

subpoenaed witnesses in the courtroom, prepared to testify.

Appellant argues that any inconvenience to the witnesses would have

been “slight” because both witnesses, a deputy and a parole

officer, “were present as a requirement of their employment.”

Although the witnesses’ presence may have been a requirement of

employment, that does not diminish the inconvenience if the trial

court continued the hearing.    See State v. Colley, 4th Dist. Scioto

No. 09CA3323, 2010-Ohio-4834, ¶ 20 (continuance would have

inconvenienced court, state, and various witnesses when request
                                                                     12
ATHENS,   22CA11

made one business day before trial date); State v. Jones, 3d Dist.

Defiance No. 4-5-11, 2015-Ohio-5443, ¶ 51 (fact witnesses

“relatively local” did not diminish inherent inconvenience to the

court, state, witnesses, and jury venire).   Therefore, we conclude

that this factor weighs in favor of appellee.

     {¶26} The fourth Unger factor is whether the requested delay is

for legitimate reasons or is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived.

Appellant argues that he requested the continuance due to his

child’s health and ability to review discovery obtained just prior

to the revocation hearing.   Appellee, however, contends that

appellant did not provide any documentation to the court about his

alleged need to tend to his child, and “Ohio courts often conclude

a party’s uncorroborated allegation of medical issues, standing

alone, is not enough to render a decision denying a continuance an

abuse of discretion.”   State v. Thacker, 4th Dist. Lawrence No.

18CA21, 2020-Ohio-4620, ¶ 57, citing Jacobs v. Jones, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 10AP-930, 2011-Ohio-3319, ¶ 19.    See, e.g., Calvary

SPV I, L.L.C. v. Furtado, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-361, 2005-Ohio-6884,

¶ 8, 12 (determining the trial court did not abuse its discretion

or commit plain error in not granting continuance when defendant

left a telephone message for the court day before trial advising

she would not be able to attend as a result of health issues, but
                                                                    13
ATHENS,   22CA11

did not provide “affidavits in support” or any “medical evidence”

that “would have been helpful * * * in persuading the trial court

of the merits of defendant's contentions”); State v. Naypaver, 11th

Dist. No.2008-T-0102, 2009-Ohio-4620, ¶ 28-31 (trial court did not

abuse discretion in denying motions for continuance when the

defendants, three members of a family, moved for a continuance on

the uncorroborated statement that none of the family members could

attend hearing due to the father's medical condition); Hudson v.

Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-562, 2004-Ohio-

7203 (trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for a

continuance, based on “medical problems,” when medical records did

not support contention that she could not have sought a continuance

prior to the morning of the trial at which the defendant's

witnesses were present and ready to testify).   Thacker at ¶ 57,

citing Jacobs at ¶ 19.   Thus, we do not believe appellant

sufficiently documented his child’s medical issues.

     {¶27} In addition, appellant contends that defense counsel

needed time to review the police report given to counsel 30 minutes

before the revocation hearing.   Appellee, however, argues that

because a community control revocation proceeding is not a criminal

proceeding, Crim.R. 16 discovery procedures do not apply to the

revocation process.
[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]

        {¶28} “Although a revocation proceeding must comport with the

requirements of due process, it is not a criminal proceeding.”

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d

656 (1973).           Therefore, not all protections afforded in a criminal

trial apply to revocation proceedings.                      For example, the Ohio Rules

of Evidence do not apply, Evid.R. 101(C)(3), there is no right to a

jury trial, and the privilege against self-incrimination is not

available to a probationer.                      State v. Ferguson, 72 Ohio App.3d 714,

716-717, 595 N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist.1991), citing Minnesota v.

Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409, fn. 7

(1984).        Further, the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to

revocation proceedings.                       State v. Stafford, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas

No. 2000 AP 12 0095, 2001 WL 950692 (Aug. 16, 2001); State v.

Parsons, 2d Dist. Greene No. 96CA20, 1996 WL 665004 (Nov. 15,

1995); State v. Payne, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2001-09-081, 2002 WL

649403 (Apr. 22, 2002) * 2.

        {¶29} Instead, a trial court must comply with the following

minimum due process requirements: (1) deliver written notice of

claimed probation violations, (2) disclose the evidence against the

probationer, (3) provide probationer with the opportunity to be

heard in person and to present witnesses, as well as documentary

evidence, (4) provide probationer the right to confront and cross-
[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]

examine witnesses, (5) provide probationer with a neutral and

detached hearing body, and (6) issue a written statement as to the

evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation.

Columbus v. Bickel, 77 Ohio App.3d 26, 34, 601 N.E.2d 61 (10th

Dist.1991), citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct.

2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); State v. Ohly, 166 Ohio App.3d 808,

2006-Ohio-2353, 853 N.E.2d 675, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.);                      State v. Miller,

42 Ohio St.2d 102, 326 N.E.2d 259 (1975).

        {¶30} Appellee claims that this case is similar to State v.

Graham, 5th Dist. Licking No. 21CA0031, 2022-Ohio-1770, where the

court held that Crim.R. 16 discovery rules did not apply to a

community control revocation proceeding, but observed that

defendants in community control revocation hearings are entitled to

some minimum due process rights as stated in Gagnon, including the

disclosure           of evidence.             Appellee also claims this case is similar

to the Graham court’s conclusion that no due process violation

occurred because appellant received notice of community control

violations, had the opportunity to confront and cross-examine

witnesses and had the opportunity to present her own witnesses and

documentary evidence at the revocation hearing.                      Graham, supra, ¶

41, citing State v. Shuman, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2009CA00271, 2010-

Ohio-3957, ¶ 23.
[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]

        {¶31} In the case at bar, our review reveals that appellee

provided defense counsel a community control violation notice eight

days before the hearing, appellant had the opportunity to cross-

examine the state’s witnesses, and the trial court offered

appellant a brief continuance in order to call additional

witnesses.           See also State v. Harden, 5th Dist. Fairfield No.

02CA27, 2002-Ohio-4673 (trial court does not abuse its discretion

in refusing to continue revocation hearing, especially when

revocation is not premised upon information unknown to appellant).

See also Ohly, 166 Ohio App.3d 808, 2006-Ohio-2353, 853 N.E.2d 675,

¶23 (defendant failed to establish a violation of due process right

to have disclosure of evidence against him when state provided

probable-cause letter identifying alleged violations).           Thus, we

conclude that this factor weighs in favor of appellee.

        {¶32} The fifth Unger factor is whether the defendant

contributed to the circumstances that gave rise to the continuance

request.         The state concedes that this factor weighs in appellant’s

favor.

        {¶33} Finally, the sixth Unger factor incorporates any other

relevant factors depending upon the case’s unique facts.          Appellee

contends this factor weighs heavily in their favor.          First, the

allegations are serious because appellant did not report to his
[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]

supervising officer for six weeks, and when officers checked on

appellant, they found methamphetamine, fentanyl, LSD and a firearm.

Second, appellee argues that if appellant could not maintain

contact with his supervising officer, the court could not be

assured that he would return if it continued the hearing.                     Third,

appellee points out that at the end of the first stage of the

hearing, the trial court offered a continuance of “a week or two”

for counsel to digest the police report and to call additional

witnesses if needed before the second stage of the hearing.

However, counsel indicated he did not need additional time.

        {¶34} Appellant also contends that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel because the trial court denied a continuance

for arbitrary reasons that prevented counsel from providing

effective assistance and denied appellant his right to due process.

In particular, appellant argues that counsel could not properly

prepare for the hearing because he could not thoroughly review the

police report that related to three of the six alleged community

control violations.

        {¶35} To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must

satisfy a two-prong test.                     Initially, a defendant must show that

trial counsel acted incompetently.                     See, Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).                     In assessing
[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]

such claims, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”        Id. at 689, citing

Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83

(1955).        However, even if a defendant shows that counsel did not

provide competent representation, the defendant must then satisfy

the second prong of the Strickland test.        Under the “actual

prejudice” prong, the defendant must establish “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.”        Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694.

        {¶36} After our review of the record, we do not believe that

appellant demonstrated prejudice from the trial court’s denial of

his motion to continue, or any possibility that the outcome of the

revocation hearing would have been different.

        {¶37} Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, we conclude

that the trial court’s denial of appellant’s continuance request

did not constitute an abuse of discretion.        Consequently, we

overrule appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.
[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]

                                              JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
ATHENS,   22CA11

                                                                    20
                          JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and appellee
recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.

     If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has
been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to
allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in
that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or
the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule
II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the
date of such dismissal.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court

    BY:_____________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                         NOTICE TO COUNSEL
     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.