Court Opinion

ID: 9839715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 20:04:12.128373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:26.406828
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/13/23 P. v. Yi CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B319845

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                  KA081781)

JAE HEE YI,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Bruce F. Marrs, Judge. Affirmed.
      John Lanahan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie A.
Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     I.    INTRODUCTION

      Defendant and appellant Jae Hee Yi filed a petition for
resentencing of his first degree murder conviction pursuant to
former Penal Code section 1170.95.1 The trial court denied the
petition, ruling that defendant was ineligible for resentencing
because he was a major participant in the underlying robbery,
burglary, and carjacking felonies and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Defendant appeals, challenging only
the court’s reckless indifference finding.2 We affirm.

               II.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

      We recite evidence relevant to the issues on appeal from
the prior opinion in this case (People v. Yi (B251560,
Oct. 24, 2014) [nonpub. opn.])3:

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature
renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 with no change in
text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Further references will be to the
statute’s current section number only.

2     Although defendant also argues in his opening brief that
the court erred in finding he was a major participant, he
conceded at oral argument that there was sufficient evidence to
show that he was a major participant.

3     Neither party contends that the facts as recited in the prior
appellate opinion do not accurately reflect the facts in the trial
record in this matter and neither party adduced additional
evidence at defendant’s section 1172.6 hearing. (See section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).) Accordingly, we set forth relevant

                                   2
                  “A.    The Prosecution’s Case
                          1.     Overview
      “Summarized in a light most favorable to the judgment, the
evidence was as follows. Defendant was a member of a burglary
conspiracy which targeted Indian families. The perpetrators
routinely stole cash, jewelry, electronics and vehicles. During the
present burglary, Panalal Shah was murdered. Mr. Shah
suffered blunt force trauma causing multiple bruises and
abrasions, fractured ribs and vertebrae, and a fractured spine.
He was found with his hands and feet bound lying face down on
his bedroom floor. Defendant made admissions to his girlfriend,
Jennifer Pasasouk, and an acquaintance, Josephine Chai.
Defendant admitted assaulting a man. Defendant thought the
man had died.

                        “2.    The evidence
      “a. December 4, 2007 burglary, murder, and carjacking
       “On December 4, 2007, defendant and several accomplices
burglarized a Diamond Bar home. They entered the home after
prying off a window screen at the back of the house. They
attempted unsuccessfully to access a safe inside an armoire.
Several tools, including a screwdriver, were left on the floor near
the armoire. Latex gloves were also left on the floor. They were
visible in the crime scene photographs. And the victims’
Mercedes was stolen. There was evidence that subsequent to the
burglary defendant had the key to the Mercedes in his possession
and knew where it had been parked. The Mercedes was later

facts from the prior opinion, which we have independently
confirmed from our own review of the record, as context for
defendant’s claims.

                                 3
found in West Covina. Boxes of latex gloves had been left in the
vehicle.
       “During the burglary, Mr. Shah was murdered. The time of
death was estimated at between 1 and 4 a.m. Mr. Shah was
found lying face down on his bedroom floor. His hands and feet
were bound with Christmas tree lights. He had suffered multiple
blunt force injuries. He had multiple bruises and abrasions,
fractured ribs and vertebrae and a thoracic spine fracture. Two
preexisting conditions may have contributed to Mr. Shah’s
death—osteoporosis, causing his bones to be weak and break
easily, and coronary artery disease. Dr. Juan Carrillo, a deputy
medical examiner, testified at trial that Mr. Shah had a 50
percent narrowing of a major coronary artery. A 50 percent
narrowing of a major coronary artery decreases the blood flow to
the heart. Dr. Carrillo explained, ‘In any situation of stress, the
heart requires more oxygen, and this can deprive the heart of the
oxygen it needs.’ Dr. Carrillo further explained that if an
individual in Mr. Shah’s condition were tied up, facedown, with
no ability to move, death could ensue: ‘The person’s entire weight
is on his chest and he will have difficulty breathing. If he is
unable to turn his body, even though his face may be uncovered,
eventually he will tire out and will be unable to breathe, and die.’
Given that Mr. Shah’s ribs had been fractured and vertebrae
bruised and crushed, Dr. Carrillo concluded: ‘With the injury to
the spine, it would prevent his lower extremities from moving.
So any ability for him to try to turn and remove himself from this
situation is gone; and, therefore, he’d remain on his chest. [¶]
Injuries to the ribs now compromise his ability to breathe. He
can’t expand his chest very well with the fractured ribs. On top
of that, now he’s facedown with his entire weight, so that further

                                 4
decreases his ability to breathe.’ If he remained in that position
unattended for a period of time, he would die. Dr. Carrillo was
unable to say whether a younger, healthier man with these
injuries would have survived.
      “Details of the crime were not made public. The location
and the murder victim’s name were disclosed. Information about
the Mercedes was given only to law enforcement agencies.

      “b.    Ms. Chai’s January 9, 2008 arrest and interview
      “On January 9, 2008, Ms. Chai was arrested on drug
charges. Sergeant Randy Seymour interviewed Ms. Chai in
custody the following day, January 10. Sergeant Seymour offered
to ‘walk’ the charges against Ms. Chai if she told him who
perpetrated the Shah burglary and murder. Ms. Chai said three
people were involved. Defendant was one of them. Ms. Chai had
seen defendant with two pieces of jewelry, presumably from the
burglary. Ms. Chai thought the jewelry had since been sold. Ms.
Chai told Sergeant Seymour she overhead defendant talking to
her boyfriend. Ms. Chai refused to name her boyfriend. Her
boyfriend was later identified as Steven Phong (Steven). The
conversation occurred at around 4 a.m. the day of the murder:
‘[Defendant] was saying . . . that he wanted to get in the safe but
he couldn’t get in. He’s saying that the [Mercedes is] somewhere.’
With respect to the murder, Ms. Chai told Sergeant Seymour,
‘[A]nd I guess the old man came downstairs, into . . . the room,
and [defendant] didn’t get really into detail about [it] and I got
the gist that something bad happened.’ Ms. Chai said, ‘[They
hurt the old guy because] [h]e was making noises.’ Sergeant
Seymour ended the interview after Ms. Chai continually refused
to identify the perpetrators other than defendant.

                                5
       “Ms. Chai later testified before a grand jury. She described
defendant as a potentially violent person, ‘I’ve seen [him] get
angry with people that he thought were snitching on him.’ She
also testified, ‘I have never seen him actually beat anybody up,
but I have seen him hold a gun to somebody.’ Ms. Chai also told
the grand jury that on the morning following the Shah burglary,
defendant had said to her, ‘I think I killed somebody.’ Defendant
told Ms. Chai ‘they’ went to the Shah home because there was a
safe, but they were unable to get into it. Defendant told Ms. Chai
a man showed up downstairs. Defendant restrained the man
who resisted. Ms. Chai testified to the grand jury: ‘[Defendant]
said he went in the house and . . . I don’t think that he knew that
anybody would be home. But he went in the house, and the old
man obviously showed up downstairs. And . . . he did say that he
—he sub—I can’t think of the word now, sub, where you just hold
somebody down like—so that [they] can’t move, like restraining
him . . . and then the man resisted . . . and that’s it. I don’t think
he knew that the man died.’ Ms. Chai said ‘they’ took the man’s
black Mercedes and parked it somewhere. Defendant had the
keys to the Mercedes.
       “At trial, Ms. Chai testified her statements to Sergeant
Seymour and her grand jury testimony were untruthful. Ms.
Chai said she did not hear any information about the burglary
from defendant. She had heard about the Shah burglary on the
news and had read about it on the Internet. She had not spoken
to defendant about the burglary at all. Ms. Chai said she had
implicated defendant because she hated him. Ms. Chai testified,
‘A lot of my testimony [before the grand jury] was because I had
felt that [defendant] had robbed me when I was . . . dealing dope
when I was on the streets.’ Ms. Chai also testified she made the

                                  6
untruthful statements because she wanted to get out of custody
and she had been promised leniency. Ms. Chai told the grand
jury what she thought the detectives wanted her to say.

    “c.    The January 11, 2008 search pursuant to a warrant
      “On January 11, 2008, sheriff’s investigators conducted a
search of a home in Rowland Heights pursuant to a search
warrant. Defendant lived in the home with Ms. Chai, Ms. Chai’s
boyfriend, Steven and her boyfriend’s brother, Nelson ‘Nate’
Phong (Mr. Phong). Sergeant Seymour saw a Lexus automobile
at the location. Also on January 11, 2008, detectives searched a
Rancho Cucamonga residence pursuant to a search warrant.
Defendant and his girlfriend, Ms. Pasasouk, had been staying in
the home. Officers found what appeared to be stolen electronics
and currency, including Indian currency.

         “d.   Ms. Pasasouk’s January 11, 2008 interview
      “Defendant’s girlfriend, Ms. Pasasouk, was present during
the Rancho Cucamonga search. Sergeant Seymour interviewed
Ms. Pasasouk. The interview was recorded, but the recording
was lost prior to trial. Ms. Pasasouk told Sergeant Seymour the
following. Defendant made a living committing ‘licks’—in other
words, burglaries, robberies, thefts and drug dealing. Sergeant
Seymour testified Ms. Pasasouk related the following, ‘She said
that [defendant] had come home one morning rather upset, and
he told her that he thought he had just killed somebody.’
Defendant said it happened during a burglary. The victim had
been tied up and kicked. After that morning, defendant began
committing burglaries about once a week. Defendant told Ms.
Pasasouk he lost a cellular telephone during one of those

                               7
subsequent burglaries. He left it in a car that was abandoned at
the burglarized home.

 “e.    Defendant’s and Ms. Pasasouk’s January 14, 2008 arrests
                    and subsequent interviews
       “Defendant and Ms. Pasasouk were both arrested at a
Fullerton hotel on January 14, 2008. This was a few days after
Ms. Pasasouk spoke with Sergeant Seymour. Ms. Pasasouk was
charged as an accessory to murder. Male and female clothing
and toiletries were in the hotel room together with a laptop
computer, a small amount of methamphetamine, and more than
$10,000 in cash. The laptop appeared to be relatively new. It
contained pictures of an Indian family. It also contained a folder
labeled ‘Pasadena.’ The folder held the names, addresses and
telephone numbers of four Indian families in Pasadena. During
booking, defendant said he was known by a moniker.
       “Sergeant Seymour interviewed Ms. Pasasouk in custody
the day following her arrest. The jury heard a recording of that
interview. Ms. Pasasouk repeated that defendant thought he had
killed someone. She said defendant felt bad about it. Defendant
knew he was wanted for murder. Ms. Pasasouk told Sergeant
Seymour: ‘[Defendant] just told me that he tied up the person, he
held down the person: he tied the person; he kicked them, it was
a couple of times. But then . . . after that, you know, he didn’t
know if the man had a heart attack or not. But he was saying
that he probably had a heart attack ‘cause he stopped moving.’
According to Ms. Pasasouk, defendant’s accomplices were Mr.
Phong and John Smiles. Ms. Pasasouk overheard Mr. Phong and
defendant talking. They had not known Mr. Shah would be
home. They knew Mr. Shah had died, but they did not know

                                8
whether he had suffered a heart attack. They also said that Mr.
Smiles had ‘fucked up.’
      “Ms. Pasasouk testified at trial under a conditional grant of
immunity. Ms. Pasasouk admitted she told Sergeant Seymour
the foregoing. She denied, however, that it was true. Ms.
Pasasouk testified Sergeant Seymour gave her information about
the burglary and told her to repeat it. Sergeant Seymour said if
she implicated defendant, her children—who had been detained
by the Department of Children and Family Services—would be
returned to her. Ms. Pasasouk testified she only told Sergeant
Seymour what he wanted to hear so that she could reclaim
custody of her children.
      “Sergeant Seymour also interviewed defendant. The
interview occurred on the day following defendant’s arrest. The
recorded interview was presented to the jury. Defendant
admitted he was known by a particular moniker. At first
defendant claimed he only held property stolen by others.
Eventually, defendant admitted that he burglarized houses. He
denied he had ever killed anyone. Defendant asserted he was
only the driver and lookout; he was not the one who set up the
burglaries. Defendant admitted driving to seven or eight
burglaries including in Corona, Anaheim Hills, Hidden Hills,
Hacienda Heights or La Puente, Boyle Heights and Rowland
Heights. Defendant specifically acknowledged his participation
in [another burglary,] the Corona burglary: ‘[Defendant]: Well,
Corona’s just—which one’s Corona? [¶] [Sergeant Seymour]:
Corona’s the one where you almost got caught. [¶] [Defendant]:
Oh, okay.’ Defendant admitted a cellular telephone found at the
Corona location was his: ‘[Defendant]: And the phones.
Honestly, only one of them was mine.’ Defendant and his co-

                                 9
perpetrators repeatedly stole cash, electronics, jewelry and cars,
including a Lexus, a Maxima and a Honda Accord. Defendant
named Steven, John Smalls, ‘Keith,’ and ‘[a] guy named Bethos’
as among the perpetrators of the multiple burglaries. Mr. Smalls
handled the jewelry and sold it in Orange County. Defendant
said Steven got caught with the Lexus. Defendant remembered
Steven and ‘Joseph’ driving the Lexus. Defendant also told
Sergeant Seymour he had left the Corona residence just before
the detectives arrived. As a result, defendant’s accomplices
thought he had ‘snitched.’ Just after midnight, a text was sent to
the cellular telephone defendant had left behind. The text said:
‘Where in the hell r u at? dont even tell me that u knocked out
wherever the fuck u at n dont expect me not to trip if u did, so
call me from ur other phone[.]’
        “Sergeant Seymour told defendant Ms. Pasasouk had been
arrested. Only then did defendant admit his participation in the
Diamond Bar burglary. Defendant said there were four
perpetrators—defendant, Mr. Smalls, ‘Bethos,’ and an otherwise
unidentified Asian man. They gained entry at the rear of the
residence. The burglars had been told there was $60,000 cash in
the house. Defendant said the burglars knew Mr. Shah would be
present: ‘It was done, it was done out of—it was—they knew that
person was in the house. Know what I mean?’ Defendant said he
had been waiting outside in his truck but was summoned inside
the Shahs’ house. The other burglars wanted defendant to tie up
Mr. Shah. The burglars inside the residence wanted Mr. Shah
placed in defendant’s truck: ‘And they call . . . they wanted me at
first, they wanted me to get the body and load it up. I’m like,
fuck, no, man. I ain’t touching that body, man. You know, like—

                                10
you call me in the house to load it up? No, man. Know what I
mean?’
       “At one point, defendant seemed unsure whether Mr.
Shah’s abduction or murder was an objective of the burglary:
‘They wanted me to tie and take him to the car. . . . I don’t know
if this was the job . . . if this is the reason why we came to the
house for.’ Defendant said: ‘[L]ike they’re like trying, trying to
hold somebody down, whatever. But like, it looked like—the guy
wasn’t even—they [wanted to] put him in the truck.’ Upon
entering the residence, defendant saw the armoire on the
bedroom floor and Mr. Shah was ‘mostly on the floor.’ Someone
was holding Mr. Shah down. Mr. Shah was alive and moving.
He was not tied up. Mr. Shah was on his knees by the bed with
his torso laid out across the bed. It looked like there was a sheet
over him. (As Sergeant Seymour later testified, Mr. Shah was
wearing a ‘lungee’—a linen wrap worn by Indian men. That
information had never been disclosed to the public.) Defendant
did not know who subsequently tied Mr. Shah’s feet and hands:
‘But like—the last time I know—like I know somebody—I don’t
know who tied him up. I really don’t know that part, sir. Tied up
or not. But I heard—I know that he was trying to resist or
something, and somebody just—you know what I mean—
whacked him. But he didn’t like, uh, I guess whacked to the head
or anything. It was just, be quiet. You know what I mean? Type
of thing.’ Defendant left the house and returned to his truck
where he waited. Defendant saw someone drive the Shahs’
Mercedes out of their garage.
       “Sergeant Seymour testified it was defendant who first
mentioned the Mercedes. Defendant also told Sergeant Seymour,
‘[T]he [Shahs’] son or somebody either owned or worked at a hotel

                                11
or motel.’ In fact, the Shahs did own a hotel in Colorado and
their son did work there. Further, defendant’s description of
Mr. Shah’s fatal beating was consistent with Mr. Shah’s injuries.
During the interview, defendant, who was nervous, expressed
fears for his safety and that of his family and Ms. Pasasouk.
Sergeant Seymour testified, ‘He was fearful that if he gave names
of certain individuals, especially one name in question, that that
could have repercussions on his safety.’ During the conversation,
defendant asked if efforts could be taken to protect Ms. Pasasouk.
Sergeant Seymour testified defendant expressed concern about
protecting Ms. Pasasouk from a specific Latino gang. Sergeant
Seymour was asked to describe the structure of the gangs in this
state. After referring to the gang mentioned by defendant,
Sergeant Seymour testified: ‘You have Southern California
Hispanic gangs. Depending on who you are talking to and the
context you are talking to, Hispanic gangs can go into a larger or
more organized group, leading up to, and who I believe he was
eventually talking about was the Mexican Mafia.’” (People v. Yi,
supra, B251560.)
       The prosecution also presented DNA forensic and
uncharged burglaries evidence that does not bear on the issue in
this appeal, that is, whether defendant’s actions in connection
with the Diamond Bar robbery, burglary, and carjacking showed
a reckless indifference to human life.

                     “B. The Defense Case”
       Defendant presented cellular forensic, DNA forensic, and
false confession evidence that does not bear on the issue in this
appeal: i.e., whether defendant’s actions in connection with the
Diamond Bar robbery, burglary, and carjacking showed a

                                12
reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Yi, supra,
B251560.)

            III.   PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    Defendant’s Conviction

      The trial court instructed the jury on principals (CALJIC
No. 3.00), direct aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01), natural
and probable consequences (CALJIC No. 3.02), murder (CALJIC
No. 8.10), malice aforethought (CALJIC No. 8.11), first degree
felony murder (CALJIC No. 8.21), first degree felony murder—
aider and abettor (CALJIC No. 8.27), and special circumstances—
murder in commission of a robbery or burglary (CALJIC No.
8.81.17).
      The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder.
(§ 187, subd. (a).) It found he committed the murder while
engaged in the commission of a robbery, burglary, or carjacking.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The jury also convicted defendant of first
degree in concert robbery (§§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)); first
degree residential robbery (§ 211); carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a));
and first degree burglary with another person present. (§§ 459,
667.5, subd. (c)(21).) The trial court found defendant had a prior
serious felony conviction within the meaning of sections 667,
subdivisions (a)(1) and (b) through (i), and 1170.12. It further
found defendant had served two prior prison terms within the
meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced
defendant to life without the possibility of parole plus five years.
The court stayed imposition of the section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements. (People v. Yi, supra, B251560.)

                                13
B.    The Prior Appellate Decision

       Defendant appealed from his convictions. A prior panel of
this division upheld defendant’s convictions, but reversed the
trial court’s order staying the section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements and remanded for the court to exercise its
discretion whether to impose or strike those enhancements.
(People v. Yi, supra, B251560.)
       In connection with defendant’s claim that the trial court
erred in denying his request that it instruct the jury on major
participant and reckless indifference concepts regarding the
special circumstance allegation, the prior panel concluded the
court erred, but that the error was harmless because there was
“overwhelming evidence” that defendant was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.4 (People v. Yi,
supra, B251560.)

C.    Defendant’s Section 1172.6 Petitions

       On July 6, 2021, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition
for resentencing. The matter was assigned to the Honorable
Bruce F. Marrs, who presided over defendant’s trial. On
December 21, 2021, the trial court (Judge Marrs) found that
defendant made a prima facie case and issued an order to show
cause. On December 27, 2021, defendant filed a second section
1172.6 petition for resentencing, adding, among other allegations,

4     The court rendered its opinion prior to the California
Supreme Court’s major participant and reckless indifference
analyses in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).

                                14
the allegation that he “was not a major participant in the felony
or [he] did not act with reckless indifference to human life during
the course of the crime or felony.” Without objection from the
parties, the court consolidated the two petitions.
       At the March 29, 2022, hearing on defendant’s section
1172.6 petition, the trial court stated it had reviewed the abstract
of judgment, charging documents, preliminary hearing
transcript, trial transcript, jury instructions, and the prior
opinion, all of which it admitted into evidence. As noted above,
neither party presented new or additional evidence.
       At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied
defendant’s petition for resentencing. It found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that defendant was a major participant in the
underlying felonies and had acted with reckless indifference to
human life.
       The trial court explained the evidence showed defendant
“help[ed] to hold the victim down, assisting and facilitating, tying
up the victim. . . . He clearly participated in beating the victim.”
As a result of the beating, Mr. Shah suffered “fractured vertebra,
ribs, [and] spine.” Defendant noted that after the beating,
Mr. Shah stopped moving and defendant left the scene having
made “absolutely no attempts to help [Mr. Shah] at all. No
attempts to stop anybody else. No attempt to summon . . . help.
He admitted that he had seen the situation, understood what was
going on, understood [Mr. Shah’s] condition, and with the co-
defendants, participated in the assault, both in intent and in
action.”
       The trial court further explained that defendant was “not a
mere bystander when it came to the deadly force used during the
robbery. He was clearly aware of the risk of death or great bodily

                                15
injury once the robbery was underway. There is strong evidence
that he knew or should have known from the start that the way
the co-defendants were treating [Mr. Shah] that he was likely to
be killed during the robbery, and his actions played a role in that
murder. [¶] Therefore, substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that . . . [defendant] acted with reckless indifference to
human life, and he expressed total indifference by behaviors
whether his cohorts used deadly violence. As I said, he did
nothing to aid [Mr. Shah] and did nothing to minimize the risk of
violence when it became clear that things were not as planned in
the original proceedings.”

                       IV.   DISCUSSION

       Defendant contends that insufficient evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that the prosecution proved beyond a doubt
that he acted with reckless disregard for human life in the
robbery, burglary, and carjacking. We disagree.

A.    Standard of Review

      “We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence. [Citations.] ‘[W]e review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the [trier of fact] could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘“We
resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts . . . .”
[Citation.].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1015, 1022.)

                                 16
B.    Senate Bill 1437

       “Senate Bill 1437 was enacted to ‘amend the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Substantively, Senate Bill 1437
accomplishes this by amending section 188, which defines malice,
and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder, and as now
amended, addresses felony murder liability. Senate Bill 1437
also adds . . . section [1172.6], which allows those ‘convicted of
felony murder or murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory . . . [to] file a petition with the court that
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts . . . .’ (§ [1172.6], subd. (a).)
       “An offender may file a petition under section [1172.6]
where all three of the following conditions are met: ‘(1) A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine[;] [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted
a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be
convicted for first degree or second degree murder[;] [¶] [and]
(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree
murder because of changes to [s]ection[s] 188 or 189 made

                                17
effective January 1, 2019.’ (§ [1172.6], subd. (a)(1)–(3).)” (People
v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.)

C.    Reckless Indifference to Human Life

        “‘[T]he culpable mental state of “reckless indifference to
life” is one in which the defendant “knowingly engag[es] in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death”
[citation]. . . .’ (People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 577.)
‘The defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,
demonstrating reckless indifference to the significant risk of
death his or her actions create.’ (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 801.) ‘[I]t encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist
another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant
does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his
actions.’ (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.)” (In re Loza (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 38, 51–52.)
        Among the relevant factors to consider in determining
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life are: (1) knowledge of weapons, and use and number of
weapons; (2) physical presence at the crime and opportunities to
restrain the crime and/or aid the victim; (3) duration of the
felony; (4) the defendant’s knowledge of a cohort’s likelihood of
killing; and (5) the defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of the
violence during the felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–
623.) No one of the factors for determining reckless indifference
“‘is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 618.)

                                 18
      1.    Knowledge of weapons, and use and number of
            weapons

      The prosecution did not present evidence that any of the
perpetrators was armed. Accordingly, this factor does not
support the trial court’s finding of reckless indifference to human
life.

      2.    Physical presence at the crime and opportunities to
            restrain the crime and/or aid the victim

       Presence is important to culpability because it allows a
defendant to observe his cohorts’ actions and demeanor and
determine whether their behavior tends to suggest a willingness
to use lethal force. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) Presence
also provides a defendant opportunities to act as a restraining
influence on his cohorts and to render aid to a wounded victim.
(Ibid.)
       Defendant admittedly was present for Mr. Shah’s beating
and so was in a position to stop the beating or assist Mr. Shah.
There is no evidence that defendant attempted to intervene or
render aid to Mr. Shah. Instead, the evidence shows that the
burglars knew Mr. Shah would be present, and when he “showed
up downstairs,” defendant restrained him, tied him up, and
kicked him. Mr. Shah “resisted” and “was making noises” so the
perpetrators “hurt the old guy.” Mr. Shah was found lying face
down. His hands and feet were bound and he had multiple blunt
force injuries—multiple bruises and abrasions, fractured ribs and
vertebrae, and a thoracic spine fracture. Defendant’s
participation in Mr. Shah’s beating was such that he confessed to

                                19
Chai and Pasasouk that he thought he had killed Mr. Shah.
Defendant told Pasasouk that he believed Mr. Shah might have
suffered a heart attack—i.e., he believed Mr. Shah was in
immediate medical peril—but he did not render assistance or call
for aid.
       The evidence concerning defendant’s physical presence and
actions at the scene strongly weighs in favor of the trial court’s
finding of reckless indifference to human life.

      3.    Duration of the felony

       “Where a victim is . . . restrained in the presence of
perpetrators for prolonged periods, ‘there is a greater window of
opportunity for violence’ [citation], possibly culminating in
murder.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620.) No direct evidence
was adduced concerning the amount of time the perpetrators
were in the Shah home. Circumstantial evidence, however,
suggests the robbery, burglary, and carjacking took place over an
extended period of time. According to defendant, while his
cohorts entered the Shah home looking for a safe that contained
$60,000, he waited outside in his truck. Having found the safe,
defendant’s cohorts unsuccessfully attempted to open it. At some
point, defendant’s cohorts summoned defendant inside the Shah
home and requested that he tie up Mr. Shah and place Mr. Shah
in defendant’s truck. Defendant refused. Thereafter, defendant’s
cohorts tied up Mr. Shah, Mr. Shah resisted, and “somebody”
beat Mr. Shah. Later still, “someone” drove away in Mr. Shah’s
Mercedes. Crime scene photographs support the conclusion that
the offenses committed in the Shah home occurred over an
extended period of time as various areas, including the bedroom

                                20
in which Shah was killed, a closet, and the family room, had been
ransacked. The evidence of duration supports the trial court’s
conclusion that defendant exhibited reckless indifference to
human life.

      4.    Defendant’s knowledge of cohorts’ likelihood of killing

      The prosecution did not present evidence that defendant’s
cohorts had a propensity for violence or that defendant was
aware of such a propensity. The prosecution did, however,
present evidence that defendant was fearful of identifying his
cohorts to Sergeant Seymour because he believed at least one of
his cohorts was a member of a Hispanic gang that had ties to the
Mexican Mafia. The record is unclear whether defendant learned
of that cohort’s gang membership before or after the crimes at the
Shah home.
      The evidence concerning this factor neither increases nor
decreases defendant’s culpability.

      5.    Defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of the
            violence during the felony

      From the evidence presented at trial, there is no evidence
that defendant took steps to minimize the risks of violence during
the robbery, burglary, and carjacking. Rather, defendant actively
participated in a home invasion robbery, burglary, and carjacking
knowing that someone was home and actively participated in the
violence against Mr. Shah. Accordingly, this factor increases
defendant’s culpability.

                                21
       Considering the totality of the circumstances from the
evidence presented at defendant’s trial (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at pp. 801–802) and the factors identified in Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pages 618 through 623, we conclude there was
sufficient evidence that defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life.

                     V.    DISPOSITION

      The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing is affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         KIM, J.

I concur:

            MOOR, J.

                               22
The People v. Jae Hee Yi
B319845

BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting

       The opinion for the court holds a finding of reckless
indifference to human life can rest solely on two facts: presence at
the crime scene and the failure to render aid to a victim who is
killed by others.1 We know this because the majority concedes (1)
none of the perpetrators of the crime were armed with any
weapons, (2) there was no direct evidence concerning the amount
of time the perpetrators were in the victim’s home, and (3) the
prosecution presented no evidence about defendant’s knowledge
of the other perpetrators’ propensity for violence.
       The majority’s holding is mistaken for two reasons. First,
the majority’s opinion does not engage with the actual record of
defendant’s trial, instead block quoting for pages this court’s
prior opinion on direct appeal—which issued before our Supreme
Court identified the pertinent factors to consider in People v.
Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th
522, and In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667. Proceeding in this
fashion, the majority avoids the need to acknowledge ambiguities
and deficits in the record, particularly with respect to what
defendant himself knew and did while the crime was actually
1
       No matter what the majority’s opinion might suggest, there
is no evidence that permits concluding defendant and appellant
Jae Yi (defendant) was victim Panalal Shah’s actual killer—that
is why a reckless indifference analysis is necessary.
underway (as opposed to what others claimed defendant said
after the fact). (Compare Scoggins, supra, at 683 [“Determining a
defendant’s culpability under the special circumstances statute
requires a fact-intensive, individualized inquiry”].) Second, the
majority does not heed our Supreme Court’s admonition that we
must consider “the totality of the circumstances” (Scoggins,
supra, at 677) to determine whether defendant was aware of and
willingly involved in the violent manner in which the offense was
committed while consciously disregarding “the significant risk of
death his . . . actions create[d]” (Banks, supra, at 801).
Defendant’s physical presence at the crime scene in this case (he
told investigators he was called in to the victim’s home by the
other perpetrators after initially remaining outside) does not
provide strong evidence of a recklessly indifferent mental state,
and a failure to render aid to the victim is a fact that will be
present in all but the most exceptional crimes.
       Our Supreme Court has already said much about the
evidence that is relevant to a reckless indifference to human life
inquiry. But at some point, more may need to be said about how
courts should make analytical use of the factor that requires
consideration of whether a defendant had the opportunity to
restrain the crime or aid the victim. Otherwise, we will get more
opinions like today’s that use the nearly omnipresent failure to
render aid as a basis to deny Penal Code section 1172.6 relief so
long as there is some other consideration that might be said to
weakly support a reckless indifference finding.

                      BAKER, Acting P. J.

                                2