Court Opinion

ID: 9390274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 15:01:10.131285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.258277
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1024   Document: 59     Page: 1   Filed: 04/27/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

 MALCOLM TOBY, SUBSTITUTED FOR ALPHONSO
                 R. TOBY,
                 Petitioner

                            v.

      DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
                   Respondent
             ______________________

                       2022-1024
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. PH-0752-15-0289-B-1.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: April 27, 2023
                 ______________________

    RALPH B. PINSKEY, Law Offices of Ralph B. Pinskey,
 Harrisburg, PA, argued for petitioner.

     ANTHONY F. SCHIAVETTI, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also repre-
 sented by REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.
                 ______________________
Case: 22-1024    Document: 59     Page: 2    Filed: 04/27/2023

 2                                               TOBY   v. DVA

  Before PROST, REYNA, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
 REYNA, Circuit Judge.
     Alphonso R. Toby petitions for review of a decision of
 the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) that re-
 versed his removal for misconduct from his position with
 the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). The VA op-
 poses the petition. Mr. Toby replies. For the reasons stated
 below, we dismiss Mr. Toby’s petition as moot.
                         BACKGROUND
    Mr. Toby’s challenge before the Board concerns his
 2013 termination from the VA, which has a lengthy history,
 and which we recite only as necessary here. 1
     Mr. Toby worked at a medical facility for the VA as a
 housekeeping aid. Appx2. He was hired for a period of one
 year and two days, and he began working in his position on
 February 26, 2012, with an end-date of February 27, 2013.
 Appx2; SAppx1–2. 2 On February 25, 2013, two days before
 the position term expired, the VA terminated Mr. Toby for
 misconduct. Appx 2, 23. Mr. Toby appealed his termina-
 tion to the Board, alleging that his termination was a vio-
 lation under the Uniformed Services Employment and
 Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C.
 § 4301–4333. Petitioner’s Op. Br. 4; Appx14–23. Correc-
 tive action was denied by the administrative judge (“AJ”).
 Appx43–46. Mr. Toby petitioned for review by the full
 Board and, on April 2, 2015, the Board affirmed the AJ’s
 denial of corrective action. Appx51. The Board’s decision
 recognized that Mr. Toby’s petition asserted two claims: a
 USERRA violation and a removal without due process

     1    Mr. Malcom Toby is now the substitute petitioner
 for his father, Mr. Alphonso Toby. Petitioner’s Reply Br. 1.
     2    “SAppx” refers to Respondent’s supplemental ap-
 pendix.
Case: 22-1024    Document: 59      Page: 3    Filed: 04/27/2023

 TOBY   v. DVA                                              3

 under 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Id. Accordingly, the Board for-
 warded the matter to the regional office (“RO”) to consider
 the latter claim involving whether Mr. Toby was an “em-
 ployee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511 with Chapter 75 rights. Id.
     On December 30, 2015, the AJ issued an initial decision
 dismissing the appeal as both untimely and filed without
 good cause, finding that only the USERRA claim was
 raised. Appx52–56. Mr. Toby again filed for review. Re-
 spondent’s Br. 4. The Board granted the petition on Sep-
 tember 23, 2016, vacated the AJ’s initial decision, and
 remanded the appeal to the AJ to address whether Mr.
 Toby was a “preference-eligible excepted service employee”
 under 5 U.S.C. § 7511. Appx57–63.
     While the matter was on remand, but before the AJ is-
 sued his decision, the VA rescinded Mr. Toby’s misconduct
 removal. SAppx5. The VA sent Mr. Toby a letter informing
 him that the removal was cancelled, and he would be com-
 pensated for the 16 hours of work he would have completed
 had the removal not occurred. Id. Additionally, because
 Mr. Toby did not receive a recommendation from his super-
 visor, which was necessary to “convert” his position to a
 “career” or “permanent” appointment, the letter explained
 that the position was effectively terminated on February
 25, 2013. SAppx 1, 4–5.
     But, four days after the VA’s decision to rescind the re-
 moval, the AJ issued his decision, finding that Mr. Toby
 had completed a full year of service and was a preference-
 eligible service employee under Chapter 75. Appx2–3.
 Thus, the Board found it had jurisdiction over Mr. Toby’s
 appeal concerning the second claim, the Chapter 75 proce-
 dural rights, and reversed his removal. Id. The VA then
 moved to dismiss Mr. Toby’s appeal as moot because of the
 VA’s recission of the removal, to which Mr. Toby argued
 that he was not restored to a permanent position and the
 appeal was not moot. SAppx7–9, 11.
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 4                                                TOBY   v. DVA

      The VA’s motion and Mr. Toby’s opposition were re-
 turned by the AJ because they were received after issuance
 of the initiation decision. SAppx 18. The Office of the Clerk
 of the Board received these submissions from the Board’s
 regional office and docketed these submissions as a petition
 and cross-petition for review, respectively. Id. The Board,
 however, lacked a quorum of judges, so the motion to dis-
 miss and Mr. Toby’s petition for review and cross-petition
 for review of the initial decision remained pending.
 SAppx20. On June 21, 2021, Mr. Toby petitioned this court
 for a writ of mandamus, seeking an order to direct the
 Board to remand the appeal to the AJ for further proceed-
 ings. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, ECF No. 2, In re:
 Toby, No. 21-157 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 22, 2021). This court is-
 sued an order stating that it would deny mandamus unless
 Mr. Toby withdrew his petition for review with the Board.
 Order at 5, ECF No. 25, In re: Toby, No. 21-157 (Fed. Cir.
 Sep. 10, 2021). Mr. Toby withdrew the petition for review,
 and, on October 7, 2021, this court construed the matter as
 a petition for review of the Board’s final decision. Id.
                         DISCUSSION
     This court’s judicial review of a Board decision is nar-
 rowly defined and limited by statute. Under 5 U.S.C.
 § 7703, we affirm a Board decision unless it is arbitrary,
 capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
 cordance with law; obtained without procedures required
 by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or unsup-
 ported by substantial evidence. See Einboden v. Dep’t of
 Navy, 802 F.3d 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The petitioner
 bears the burden of establishing reversible error in the
 Board’s decision. McCrary v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 459
 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “The party asserting ju-
 risdiction bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of
 the evidence, that the Board had jurisdiction.” Mouton-
 Miller v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 985 F.3d 864, 869 (Fed. Cir.
 2021). But, “[i]f an appealable action is cancelled or re-
 scinded by the agency, any appeal from that action becomes
Case: 22-1024     Document: 59      Page: 5    Filed: 04/27/2023

 TOBY    v. DVA                                               5

 moot,” which deprives the Board from having jurisdiction.
 Jenkins v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 911 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed.
 Cir. 2019) (quoting Cooper v. Dep’t of the Navy, 108 F.3d
 324, 326 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). For an appeal to be moot, an
 employee must have received all of the relief that he could
 have received if the matter had been adjudicated and he
 had prevailed. Id.; see also Holleman v. Merit Sys. Prot.
 Bd., 629 F. App’x 942, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Dismissal of
 an appeal as moot equates to a dismissal for lack of juris-
 diction because, in such cases, there is no final decision
 from which to appeal nor grounds for the Board to retain
 jurisdiction. See Wells v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 730 F. App’x
 909, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
      Mr. Toby argues that he is a “statutory employee” who
 is entitled to “regularization” from the agency and his peti-
 tion for relief requests backpay for a minimum of 30 days
 and “reinstatement to employment.” Petitioner’s Op. Br.
 at 1, 4; Petitioner’s Reply Br. 3. Mr. Toby seeks a remand
 to the AJ for attorneys’ fees. Petitioner’s Reply Br. 3–4. 3
 We, however, hold that Mr. Toby received all the relief that
 he was eligible for as a temporary Chapter 75 employee.
 The VA has promised to pay Mr. Toby for the sixteen hours
 of work (plus interest) that he was unable to perform due
 to his now-rescinded misconduct removal, and the VA will
 fulfill that promise if it has not yet done so. Oral Arg. at
 13:16–53. Mr. Toby has not met his burden to demonstrate

     3     As the issue of attorneys’ fees was first raised in
 Petitioner’s reply brief, it is waived. See Novosteel SA v.
 United States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Rais-
 ing the issue for the first time in a reply brief does not suf-
 fice . . . they do not provide the moving party with a new
 opportunity to present yet another issue for the court’s con-
 sideration . . . . As a matter of litigation fairness and pro-
 cedure, then, we must treat this argument as waived.”).
Case: 22-1024     Document: 59       Page: 6    Filed: 04/27/2023

 6                                                  TOBY   v. DVA

 eligibility for additional relief. This court lacks jurisdiction
 over the appeal because it is moot.
                          CONCLUSION
     For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
                         DISMISSED
                             COSTS
 No costs.