Court Opinion

ID: 9463831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:17:24.68465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:17.995513
License: Public Domain

JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because I remain convinced that the charge can fairly be interpreted as placing the burden of persuasion regarding provocation upon the defendant, in violation of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), I must respectfully dissent.
The issue in Mullaney, supra, considered previously by this court in United States ex rel. Castro v. Regan,1 525 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1975), could scarcely be more important to criminal defendants, involving as it does the state’s burden of proof. Here, defendant Hallowell was apparently entitled to a charge on voluntary manslaughter: no one disputes that “the evidence fairly placed at issue the question of whether the fatal wound was inflicted in a heat of passion occasioned by provocation.” District Court opinion, 412 F.Supp. at 686. If the jury believed that the killing occurred in a heat of passion occasioned by provocation, it would ordinarily return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. If it found the killing *114malicious and without adequate provocation, it would return a verdict of second degree murder.
Mullaney requires, as the majority concedes, that the burden of proof on heat of passion cannot be placed on the defendant. Thus, as the district court noted, if the state judge’s charge to the jury could fairly have been interpreted to mean the defendant had the burden of persuasion on that critical issue, then the conviction for second degree murder cannot stand.
The challenged portion of the charge, in my view, clearly places the burden of proof on the defendant. I discern no other plausible interpretation of
“ . . . the law implies malice and renders it incumbent upon the accused to show by evidence that the killing was not done maliciously or in fact that there were circumstances of mitigation, extenuation, justification or excuse.”
(Emphasis added).
The majority claims that the emphasized language “only charged the burden of moving forward.” To me, this requires a strained and difficult to understand reading, one which we should not require of juries.2 On this, I agree fully with the district court:
“I cannot, however, accept the proposition that this is the message which this paragraph would convey to a jury with no understanding of the distinction between the burden of persuasion and the burden of going forward with evidence. In the absence of clear instructions to the contrary, I believe there would be a substantial risk of a juror taking this portion of the instruction to mean that the accused had the burden of proving heat of passion.”
412 F.Supp. at 689-90. The jury, moreover, was not instructed on the distinction between going forward with evidence and persuasion precisely because, at the time, state law apparently did place the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove heat of passion. See majority opinion, footnote 15. This trial also took place prior to the Mullaney decision.
The only remaining consideration, then, is whether the charge as a whole overcomes the constitutional infirmity of a small portion of it. The tortuous argument of the district court, adopted by the majority, runs along the following lines. During the charge, the jury is told:
1. The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime.
2. The elements of second degree murder include malice, which can be implied.
3. Malice is two things: (1) positively, it is a wicked and depraved heart; (2) negatively, it is the absence of adequate provocation.
4. Malice will be implied if a deadly weapon is used without adequate provocation.
5. Therefore, the state by implication must have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that this killing was done without adequate provocation.
I cannot agree that the jury more likely than not went through such difficult syllogistic reasoning and with enough ease then to discount the much clearer statement— that the law implies malice, and renders it incumbent upon the accused to show there was provocation.
In sum, I am gravely concerned that the state was improperly relieved of its burden of proof on a critical factor, in direct violation of Mullaney. In this criminal case, the difference in sentencing for second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter 's the difference between a life sentence and a maximum of thirty years. I would hold that there has been a violation of Mullaney, assuming arguendo that Mullaney would be applied retroactively, an issue which is not now before us, given the majority’s disposi*115tion of the case. See majority opinion, footnote 7. Because of the magnitude of possible harm flowing from the constitutionally deficient charge, I respectfully dissent.

. In finding no Mullaney violation in Castro, supra, we noted, as a “critical distinction,” that the relevant concept of malice in that case connoted an active element, such as a wicked and depraved heart — not merely a passive presumption that would stand unless disproved by a showing of, e. g., provocation.
We also found significant that in Castro the jury was completely and correctly re-charged after some four and one-half hours of deliberation; the later charge did not repeat the challenged portion. No similar “complete and unambiguous” charge appears in the case sub judice.

. Indeed, this court rejected a similar argument, by the State, in Castro, supra, calling it a “semantic distinction.” 525 F.2d at 1160.