Court Opinion

ID: 9718095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:16:53.218086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:55.120857
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE EGAN, specially concurring: I concur in the judgment remanding this case for a new trial on the ground that the judge participated in an ex parte communication with the jury; and I agree that no violation of the defendant’s due process rights occurred by the destruction of evidence. But I disagree with a number of things that are said in the majority opinion. People v. Ward is not the last word by the supreme court on the effect of the loss or destruction of evidence on a defendant’s right to due process. In a later case, People v. Hobley (1994), 159 Ill. 2d 272, 637 N.E.2d 992, the defendant alleged that he had not been given the results of tests on fingerprints taken from a gasoline can. Rather than consider the claim as a Brady violation, the supreme court analyzed the case as one "where evidence has been lost or destroyed and its contents are unknown.” (159 Ill. 2d at 307.) The court said that the case was analogous to Youngblood and concluded as follows: "In order to promote the preservation of exculpatory evidence, there must be the possibility of a sanction where evidence is lost or destroyed. On the other hand, a defendant should not be rewarded for the inadvertent loss of a piece of evidence where other evidence sufficient to support his conviction remains. The proper balance between these competing interests can be accomplished through careful consideration of (1) the degree of negligence or bad faith by the State in losing the evidence, and (2) the importance of the lost evidence relative to the evidence presented against the defendant at trial.” (Emphasis added.) 159 Ill. 2d at 307. The court concluded that no due process violation had occurred because of the absence of proof of bad faith and "[m]ore importantly, there was independent evidence tying defendant to the gasoline can.” (159 Ill. 2d at 308.) The court also relied on the fact that there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt separate from the gasoline can. In the very recent case of People v. Newberry (1995), 166 Ill. 2d 310, the supreme court upheld dismissal of an indictment for destruction of evidence even in the absence of bad faith on the part of the custodial police. It seems clear to me, therefore, that, under Illinois Supreme Court precedent, the inquiry into whether a due process violation has occurred does not end with the determination of whether the evidence was lost or destroyed through bad faith. The language of the supreme court in Hobley is consistent with the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the majority which have refused to follow Youngblood but have held that the negligence or bad faith of the police is one factor which may be considered. For example, in Commonwealth v. Henderson, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that whether an "ndictment should be dismissed for police failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence was within the trial judge’s discretion. In the exercise of that discretion the "judge must consider and balance the degree of culpability of the government, the materiality of the evidence, and the potential prejudice to the defendant.” (Henderson, 411 Mass, at 310, 582 N.E.2d at 496.) In State v. DeLisle, the Supreme Court of Vermont said that the court should consider the degree of negligence or bad faith on the part of the prosecution; the importance of the evidence lost; and the other evidence of guilt at trial. The other cases mentioned by the majority are in the same vein. The posture of this case is unlike any of the cases cited from other jurisdictions, or Ward, Hobley or Newberry, in that the question was never raised in the trial court. The defendant knew eight months before trial that the evidence was no longer available. He made no motion to dismiss, which is the only relief sought by the defendant in this court; and he never moved to strike the testimony of the complainant. Neither Derrick Webster, the man who recovered the complainant’s clothes from a trash can, nor Officer Bradshaw, who received the clothes and inventoried them, was ever asked any questions about the condition of the clothes. Consequently, the State was never given an opportunity to present any evidence to explain any mitigating circumstances for the release of the clothes or any possible evidence corroborating the complainant’s testimony that the clothes were torn. Most important, the trial judge was never given an opportunity to exercise his discretion. The defendant did not even raise the question in the post-trial motion. Under the circumstances, it would be manifestly unfair to hold that the trial judge had permitted a violation of the defendant’s due process rights. I conclude that, if the judge had been called to exercise his discretion and if he had concluded that the indictment should not be dismissed, which is what the defendant urges now, I would hold under the totality of the evidence that the judge had not abused his discretion. I do not agree with the majority that the affidavits of the jurors showing that the jurors were deadlocked eight for conviction and four for acquittal are not properly before us. The affidavits of the jurors are file-stamped February 11, 1992, the same day that the defendant filed his motion for a new trial. His motion for a new trial specifically states that "[i]t is unequivocally clear that members of the jury in this cause were aware that both the numerical division of the jury, as well as how they stood on the issue of guilt, was conveyed to the Trial Judge.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, I note that the defendant’s brief and reply brief both refer to the affidavits and that the State does not take issue with the defendant’s referring to them. The fact that a two-to-one majority for conviction existed is probative when considering the effect of the judge’s subsequent communication to the jury. See People v. Santiago (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 787, 439 N.E.2d 984. I agree that some instruction on missing evidence may be justified when evidence is lost and destroyed; but I am not prepared to say that the specific instruction mentioned by the majority is necessarily the one that should be given or that a similar instruction must always be given. There may be instances where the evidence is lost or destroyed after the passage of time during which the evidence was available for examination, but the defendant did not examine it, or there may be instances where the evidence was examined by the defendant. In such cases, I question whether an instruction is proper. But if an instruction is given in those cases, the instruction should point out that the evidence was available for examination by the defendant or that the defendant did examine the evidence. I note parenthetically that the defendant’s attorney argued very effectively to the jury about the missing undergarments. I would also address the defendant’s claim that the judge erred in not giving sua sponte two non-IPI instructions, one on intent and one on the lesser included offense of aggravated battery. In my judgment, the judge did not err by not submitting these instructions sua sponte.