Court Opinion

ID: 9927864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 15:07:27.912999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:27:52.119721
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3294-21

FRANK ANGRISANI,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE LAW OFFICE OF LEO B.
DUBLER, III, LLC, LEO B.
DUBLER III, individually, LOCKS
LAW FIRM, LLC, MICHAEL A.
GALPERN, ESQ., FISCHER, PORTER
& THOMAS, P.C., ARTHUR L.
"SCOTT" PORTER, ESQ., TALBOT
B. KRAMER, JR., ESQ., DONNA
L. FREIDEL, ESQ., and FREIDEL
& KRAMER, P.C.,

     Defendants-Respondents.
_______________________________

                   Argued January 23, 2024 – Decided January 30, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-1041-17.
            Frank Angrisani, appellant, argued the cause pro se
            (Offit Kurman, PA, attorneys; Branka Banic, on the
            briefs).

            Jay H. Greenblatt argued the cause for respondents The
            Law Office of Leo B. Dubler, III, LLC and Leo B.
            Dubler, III (Greenblatt & Laube, PC, attorneys; Jay H.
            Greenblatt, on the brief).

            Thomas N. Gamarello argued the cause for respondents
            Fischer, Porter & Thomas, PC, and Arthur Scott Porter,
            Esq. (Schenck, Price, Smith & King, LLP, attorneys;
            Eric Andrew Inglis, of counsel and on the brief).

            John L. Slimm argued the cause for respondents Freidel
            & Kramer, PC, Donna L. Freidel, Esq., and Talbot B.
            Kramer, Jr., Esq. (Marshall Dennehey, attorneys; John
            L. Slimm and Arthur F. Wheeler, on the brief).

            Michael P. Chipko argued the cause for respondents
            Locks Law Firm and Michael Galpern, Esq., (Wilson,
            Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, attorneys,
            join in the brief of respondents The Law Office of Leo
            B. Dubler, III, LLC, and Leo B. Dubler, III, and the
            brief of respondents Fisher, Porter & Thomas, PC, and
            Arthur Scott Porter, Esq.).

PER CURIAM

      In this legal malpractice case, plaintiff Frank Angrisani appeals from the

Law Division's order granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing

plaintiff's complaint against his former attorneys. We affirm.

                                       I.

                                                                          A-3294-21
                                       2
      The parties are fully familiar with the underlying procedural history and

facts of this matter. We summarized the most salient points of this early history

in our decision in the companion appeal, Angrisani v. Costello & Mains, LLC,

Docket No. A-2718-20 (App. Div. Dec. 6, 2023).               We incorporate that

discussion here by reference.

      After plaintiff settled his legal action in the litigation involving Financial

Technology Ventures, L.P. (FTV) and Nexxar Group, Inc. (Nexxar), he retained

the Costello firm to institute a legal malpractice action against his attorneys in

that matter, Larry Orloff, Esq. and his firm Orloff, Lowenbach, Stifelman &

Siegel, PA. (OLSS). Eventually, plaintiff hired defendants Leo B. Dubler, III,

Esq., and the Law Office of Leo B. Dubler, III (individually or collectively,

Dubler) as Costello's co-counsel in that case. Costello was later relieved as

plaintiff's counsel and Dubler remained as sole counsel in the Orloff litigation.

      Plaintiff then retained defendants Michael A. Galpern, Esq. and Locks

Law Firm, LLC (individually or collectively, Galpern) and Arthur "Scott" L.

Porter, Esq. and Fischer, Porter & Thomas, PC (individually or collectively,

Porter), as legal experts in the Orloff litigation.     Galpern and Porter each

rendered expert opinions in March 2013 and again in May 2013. These reports

                                                                              A-3294-21
                                         3
identified deviations from the standard of care that Orloff allegedly committed

when he was handling plaintiff's claims in the FTV litigation.

      To support his claim for damages against Orloff and OLSS, plaintiff

submitted a report authored by the Tinari Economics Group (Tinari), entitled

"An Appraisal of Economic Loss to Frank Angrisani," dated May 7, 2013. The

Tinari expert report analyzed plaintiff's estimated damages by considering three

components: "contract earnings," "loss of investment," and "increased litigation

fees." The Tinari expert report set forth the estimated total present value of the

economic loss sustained by plaintiff as $11,583,180. The report did not provide

an analysis or estimate of the damages attributable to Orloff's alleged

negligence, either directly or by estimating the settlement value of plaintiff's

claims in the FTV litigation in the absence of negligence.

      On November 26, 2013, the trial court dismissed all of plaintiff's legal

malpractice claims on summary judgment because it found that plaintiff's expert

reports did not adequately calculate plaintiff's claim for damages. In its fifty-

two-page written opinion, the trial court stated:

            This [c]ourt's finding in granting [OLSS]'s motion is
            based on that no expert has calculated the damages
            allegedly suffered by [plaintiff] as a result of Orloff's
            alleged negligence. Having no reports of damages
            based on admissible evidence, any damages would be
            based on speculation or conjecture because there is not

                                                                            A-3294-21
                                        4
            expert testimony on the subject of damages that is
            admissible.

            There is no dispute that the "fair settlement value," can
            only be established through expert testimony same as
            with "ultimate conclusion." Having reviewed the
            expert reports submitted by [plaintiff], the [c]ourt has
            difficulty making conclusions or findings as to what the
            jury could use to evaluate whether [plaintiff] settled for
            fair value, and if not, what the fair value should have
            been or what he would have recovered at trial. The
            [c]ourt queries what are the ascertainable damages
            suffered by [plaintiff].

      Plaintiff then retained defendants Talbot B. Kramer, Jr., Esq., Donna L.

Freidel, Esq., and Freidel & Kramer, PC (individually or collectively, Kramer)

to move for reconsideration of that dismissal. When reconsideration was denied,

Kramer handled the appeal in Orloff of the dismissal of plaintiff's legal

malpractice claims against OLSS and Orloff.

      On February 12, 2016, we affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's

legal malpractice claims against Orloff and OLSS, as well as the denial of

reconsideration. Orloff, Lowenbach, Stifelman & Siegel, PA v. Angrisani, No.

A-3724-13 (App. Div. Feb. 12, 2016), certif. denied, 226 N.J. 211 (2016).

      The Dubler firm then brought suit against plaintiff for unpaid legal fees .

Plaintiff responded by filing an amended answer that included a counterclaim

alleging legal malpractice against the Dubler firm, and a third-party complaint

                                                                            A-3294-21
                                        5
for legal malpractice against Dubler individually. Dubler filed an answer to

plaintiff's malpractice claims, and asserted a fourth-party complaint against

Kramer for indemnification and contribution.

      The trial court thereafter severed Dubler's claim for counsel fees and

issued an order that opened plaintiff's malpractice claims in a new action.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, joining Galpern and Porter as additional

defendants.

      During discovery, plaintiff provided defendant with the August 1, 2020

liability expert report of Scott B. Piekarsky, Esq., as well as his supplemental

report dated November 15, 2020.       To support his calculation of damages,

plaintiff relied on the supplemental economic reports issued by the renamed

Sobel Tinari Economics Group, authored by Kristin Kucsma, M.A., a principal

of that group, dated June 10 and August 1, 2020.

      In October 2020, all defendants moved for summary judgment.

Defendants noted that in support of his malpractice claims, plaintiff had

essentially repackaged the Tinari report that the trial court, and this court, in

Orloff had already ruled was insufficient to establish plaintiff's claim for

damages.

                                                                           A-3294-21
                                       6
      The trial court agreed with defendants' assessment of plaintiff's expert

reports, granted summary judgment to defendants, and dismissed plaintiff's

complaint. The court stated it was compelled to dismiss plaintiff's complaint

"because of the fact that all this information was before [the trial court in Orloff]

and the Appellate Division," and "[t]here's nothing new that's been presented"

in the present litigation.

                                         II.

      On appeal, plaintiff argues in Point I of his brief that the trial court

erroneously applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar his expert reports

because the sufficiency of the proffered expert economic loss testimony and

legal malpractice proofs against defendants was not adjudicated fully and fairly

in the Orloff litigation.    In Point II, plaintiff asserts that the trial court's

application of collateral estoppel mistakenly disregarded the claims of

defendants' negligence in precipitating the adverse results in the Orloff

litigation. We disagree with both contentions.

      Our review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo,

applying the same legal standard as the trial court. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut.

Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (citing Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22,

38 (2014)). Under that standard, summary judgment will be granted when "the

                                                                              A-3294-21
                                         7
competent evidential materials submitted by the parties," viewed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, show that there are no "genuine issues

of material fact" and that "the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as

a matter of law." Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017)

(quoting Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38); see also R. 4:46-2(c).

      To present a prima facie legal malpractice claim, a claimant must establish

"1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care upon

the attorney; 2) that the attorney breached the duty owed; 3) that the breach was

the proximate cause of any damages sustained; and 4) that actual damages were

incurred." Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 598 (App. Div. 2014)

(quoting Sommers v. McKinney, 287 N.J. Super. 1, 9-10 (App. Div. 1996)).

Actual damages are damages that are "real and substantial as opposed to

speculative." Greenwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 495 (1995). Damages must

be supported by more than "conjecture, surmise or suspicion." 2175 Lemoine

Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc., 272 N.J. Super. 478, 488 (App. Div. 1994).

      As noted above, the trial court found that plaintiff could not establish

actual damages in this case because the expert reports he submitted had already

been found wanting by the trial court and this court in the Orloff litigation. On

appeal, plaintiff contends that neither the trial court nor this court in the Orloff

                                                                              A-3294-21
                                         8
case ruled that the 2013 Tinari report was inadmissible. Plaintiff argues that the

trial court "erroneously construed the ruling in the Orloff litigation as

establishing that the Tinari analysis was a net opinion." He also argues that the

Appellate Division "simply did not hold that the original Tinari report was a net

opinion, and it was not on that basis that summary judgment was affirmed in the

Orloff litigation."

      According to plaintiff, "[t]he deficiency in the Orloff matter was the

failure of the plaintiff's attorneys and their legal, not the economic expert, to

establish proximate cause between the alleged negligence of Orloff and the

damages that were quantified by the Tinari Group." Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he

dereliction of [his] counsel resulted in insufficient evidence of the likelihood of

success at trial," and therefore, he was "deprived of the opportunity of proving

harm by way of either a suit within a suit to simulate the result that would have

occurred, or through expert testimony on the anticipated trial outcome as a

matter of reasonable probability."

      Plaintiff's argument is not persuasive because he misstates the trial court's

and this court's decisions in the Orloff litigation. In fact, both the trial court and

this court clearly determined that the Tinari report was inadmissible to support

plaintiff's claim for damages.

                                                                               A-3294-21
                                          9
      In the Orloff litigation, Orloff moved to dismiss plaintiff's legal

malpractice claims based on plaintiff's inability to "quantify damages," as well

as his failure to support his claims of liability. Orloff argued that plaintiff failed

to provide expert testimony as to actual damages, and the trial court held that

"[b]ecause [plaintiff] cannot prove the damages element of his legal malpractice

claim, it must be dismissed as a matter of law."

      On the issue of damages, the trial court explained:

             This [c]ourt's findings in granting plaintiff's motion
             [are] based on that no expert has calculated the damages
             allegedly suffered by [plaintiff] as a result of Orloff's
             alleged negligence. Having no reports of damages
             based on admissible evidence, any damages would be
             based on speculation or conjecture because there is not
             expert testimony on the subject of damages that is
             admissible.

             There is no dispute that the "fair settlement value," can
             only be estimated through expert testimony same as
             with "ultimate conclusion." Having reviewed the
             expert reports submitted by [plaintiff], the [c]ourt has
             difficulty making conclusions or findings as to what the
             jury could use to evaluate whether [plaintiff] settled for
             fair value, and if not, what the fair value should have
             been or what he would have recovered at trial. The
             [c]ourt queries what are the ascertainable damages
             suffered by [plaintiff].

      As to the deficiencies in plaintiff's damages evidence as set forth in the

Tinari report, the trial court further explained:

                                                                               A-3294-21
                                         10
            In reviewing the Tinari report, the movant [Orloff]
            contends that Tinari primarily performed a "liquidation
            analysis" of [plaintiff's] share as of December 31, 2005
            and that his analysis does not support [plaintiff's]
            diminished settlement value theory, or his newly
            concocted ultimate success on the merits theory and is
            not relevant to this motion, therefore it cannot be
            utilized as a substitute for the expert testimony on the
            issue of damages necessary to defeat this motion. This
            [c]ourt is well aware of this expert's qualifications and
            the movant has argued that the analysis is flawed being
            based essentially on the illegal operation of UNO in
            Brazil but does not address the fair settlement value as
            argued by the defendant in his pleadings.

            ....

            . . . After reviewing the Tinari report, this [c]ourt does
            not find that he analyzes [plaintiff's] underlying claims,
            but does an evaluation of the business which foundation
            is built on an illegal operation therefore how could this
            report be admissible where the foundation upon which
            it is built is full of holes as one cannot profit from
            illegal operation . . . .

      Additionally, the trial court found that the Tinari report did not support

plaintiff's claim for damages, and stated:

            Tinari does not value the underlying claims and does
            not value the claims that were not asserted. Instead,
            Tinari sets forth a hypothetical liquidation value of
            [plaintiff's] shares in Nexxar as of December 31, 2005.
            The [c]ourt concurs with the movant that they cannot
            find the relevancy of that analysis nor contemplate how
            this analysis had anything to do with what [plaintiff]
            would have received had he been successful at trial.
            [Plaintiff] never sought the liquidation of Nexxar, nor

                                                                          A-3294-21
                                       11
            was it part of the underlying case, wherein UNO failed
            because of its illegal operation in Brazil where Nexxar
            accordingly failed as well. How does this analysis of a
            failing business assist the jury in finding damages
            proximately caused by Orloff in representing him in his
            litigation with Nexxar/FTV?

            The [c]ourt did find an interesting comment of the
            movant that Tinari's liquidation value ignores reality.
            Tinari's analysis is based on projections of what the
            company would have earned from an illegal venture. It
            is well settled that courts should not become involved
            in an attempt by a party to profit off an illegal venture
            therefore isn't . . . plaintiff seeking values of shares in
            Nexxar that are not recoverable as a matter of law?
            Furthermore, Tinari's liquidation analysis did not
            consider that after UNO was shut down Nexxar went
            out of business shortly thereafter and this evaluation by
            Tinari ignores that the company is not operating
            furthermore the profits were derived solely from an
            illegal venture is worthless and this [c]ourt so finds.
            This Tinari report does not support what the fair
            settlement value of the third party plaintiff claims nor
            what he could have received if he was successful in
            litigating the underlying matter to a conclusion which
            the third party saw fit not to do by settling the matter
            with subsequent counsel.

      Thus, in granting summary judgment to Orloff dismissing plaintiff's legal

malpractice claims, the trial court specifically found that the Tinari report was

legally inadequate, explaining:

            It is well settled that where, as here, the allegation is
            that the attorney's negligence resulted in an insufficient
            settlement amount or hindered the ultimate success of
            settlement negotiations, expert testimony is required to

                                                                           A-3294-21
                                       12
establish what would constitute a fair settlement value
for the claims or what should have been the ultimate
outcome of the underlying case, absent the alleged
malpractice. When no such testimony is offered a legal
malpractice claim must be dismissed. To support his
claims, [plaintiff] submitted reports from several
experts–Tinari, Porter, and Galpern. The [c]ourt finds
that none of these experts performed the requisite
analysis [of] what constitutes the fair settlement value
of [plaintiff's] claims or what would have been the
successful outcome of the underlying case, absent the
alleged malpractice. While Tinari's report finds the net
value of the claims that were lost to be $11,583,180, the
[c]ourt finds Tinari's report primarily performed a
liquidation analysis of [plaintiff's] shares as of
December 31, 2005 and that his analysis does not
support [plaintiff's] diminished settlement value theory
or in the alternative his ultimate success on the merits
theory. As such, Tinari's report cannot be utilized as a
substitute for expert testimony on the issue of damages,
which is necessary to defeat this motion. Furthermore,
Tinari's analysis is based on projections of what the
company would have earned from an illegal venture,
i.e., UNO's northbound Brazil operations. UNO's
business accounted for essentially all of Nexxar's
profits. Nexxar lost the bulk of its revenues, and it went
out of business not too long after UNO was shut down
in May 2005. Tinari's report ignores the fact that any
profits derived from such an illegal venture are
worthless. Thus, his report does not provide an
accurate fair settlement value of . . . plaintiff's claims.
The [c]ourt finds that the necessary expert testimony
o[n] damages has not been provided to warrant this
matter going forward to trial on the issue of profession
negligence by OLSS or Orloff.

                                                              A-3294-21
                           13
      Therefore, contrary to plaintiff's contention on appeal, the trial court

granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's legal malpractice claims

precisely because it found that the Tinari report could not support plaintiff's

claim for actual damages.

      In affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in our decision

in Orloff, we explained

            the trial judge found that none of the expert reports
            "performed the requisite analysis [of] what constitutes
            the fair settlement value of [plaintiff's] claims or what
            would have been the successful outcome of the
            underlying case, absent the alleged malpractice." He
            further found that Tinari's report, by performing
            liquidation analysis of [plaintiff's] share as of a relevant
            date, neither supported the diminished settlement value
            theory which formed the first grounds for recovery, nor
            the ultimate success on the merits theory. Because he
            found none of the reports demonstrated either the fair
            settlement value of the claims, or the likely outcome
            absent the alleged malpractice, the judge reasoned the
            motion for summary judgment had to be granted
            because "[w]hen no such testimony is offered, a legal
            malpractice claim must be dismissed."

            [Orloff, slip op. at 4-5.]

      As a result, we "concur[red] with the motion judge's view concerning the

lack of evidence of proximate cause and actual damages," Id. at 9. This court

found that plaintiff failed to establish either proximate cause or damages under

either a diminished settlement theory or trial within a trial theory. We stated

                                                                           A-3294-21
                                         14
that "[u]nder either legal malpractice theory[,] [plaintiff] is required to present

proof as a 'matter of reasonable probability' of the outcome at trial if the alleged

malpractice had not occurred," but that "[s]uch proofs are absent in the expert

reports." Id. at 10-11.

      Thus, contrary to plaintiff's contention, both the trial court and this court

found the Tinari report to be insufficient and therefore inadmissible to prove his

actual damages under either a diminished settlement theory or trial within a trial

theory. Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim was dismissed because he failed to

prove actual damages. The trial court found that the Tinari report did not

calculate the actual damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff and, therefore, the

report was inadmissible to support claim for damages. Without expert testimony

to support his claim for damages, the trial court properly found that plaintiff's

legal malpractice claim failed as a matter of law.

      Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by relying upon the Orloff

decisions to collaterally estop him from relying upon a repackaged Tinari report

to attempt to prove actual damages. He argues that collateral estoppel cannot

apply in the present case because the "Orloff litigation addressed Orloff's

representation of [plaintiff] in the FTV/Nexxar litigation, and whether his

professional negligence led to a diminished settlement of that action," but did

                                                                              A-3294-21
                                        15
not "consider the subsequent negligence of the defendants herein [Dubler,

Kramer, Galpern, and Porter] and whether such negligence may be linked to the

damages suffered by" plaintiff.

      Plaintiff's argument is not persuasive because it is based on his contention

that "the [Orloff] courts did not reject the Tinari economic analysis itself."

However, as explained above, both the trial court and this court in the Orloff

litigation determined that the Tinari report was inadmissible to prove plaintiff's

damages. Because plaintiff's claims for damages in the present case were also

based on the Tinari report, collateral estoppel was applicable and appropriate

because all five collateral estoppel requirements were met.

      "As a general principle, '[c]ollateral estoppel is that branch of . . . res

judicata which bars relitigation of any issue which was actually determined in a

prior action, generally between the same parties, involving a different claim or

cause of action.'" In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 214 N.J. 51, 66 (2013)

(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.D., 207 N.J. 88, 114 (2011)).

The application of collateral estoppel is a question of law, Selective Ins. Co. v.

McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 173 (App. Div. 2000), and questions of law are

reviewed de novo. Kean Fed'n of Tchrs. v. Morell, 233 N.J. 566, 583 (2018).

                                                                            A-3294-21
                                       16
      It is well settled that, for collateral estoppel to foreclose the re-litigation

of an issue,

               the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue
               to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the
               prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in
               the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior
               proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4)
               the determination of the issue was essential to the prior
               judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine
               is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to
               the earlier proceeding.

               [Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521
               (2006) (quoting In re Est. of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20-21
               (1994)).]

      All of these requirements were met in this case.           First, the issue of

damages in both the Orloff litigation and the present action were identical. The

issue was whether plaintiff could prove he suffered actual damages as a result

of legal malpractice. However, in both cases plaintiff failed to establish the fair

settlement value of his claims and failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate the

actual damages he suffered, as a result of his attorney's alleged malpractice, be

it by Orloff in the Orloff litigation or by Dubler, Kramer, Galpern, and Porter in

this action. As a result, he could not demonstrate in that action or this one that

there was a likelihood of success in trying the FTV litigation to judgment.

                                                                              A-3294-21
                                         17
      Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish his legal malpractice claims against

Orloff in the Orloff litigation from his legal malpractice claims against

defendants in the present matter is unavailing. In both matters, the issues of

causation and damages were identical. While plaintiff focuses on causation,

arguing that the proofs on proximate cause were different in the two matters, he

cannot avoid the fact that the issues of damages in both cases were identical.

Thus, regardless of how plaintiff attempts to rephrase the issues, the damages

issues were the same and, therefore, the first factor for collateral estoppel was

satisfied.

      Second, the admissibility of the Tinari report was actually litigated in the

Orloff litigation. As set forth above, the parties argued the issue extensively

when Orloff moved for summary judgment and again before this court on appeal.

Indeed, we specifically determined that plaintiff failed to "establish either

proximate cause or damages." Orloff, slip op. at 13.

      Plaintiff attempts to dispute this factor by arguing that the proximate cause

in this action, the negligence of defendants at trial here, was separate and distinct

from the proximate cause in the Orloff litigation, namely, Orloff's negligence.

While that may be correct, the issue of proximate cause is itself separate and

distinct from the issue of damages. Both issues of proximate cause and damages

                                                                               A-3294-21
                                        18
were thoroughly argued before, and considered by, the trial court and this court.

Thus, the issue of damages and the admissibility of the Tinari report was actually

litigated in the Orloff litigation, and therefore, the second factor for collateral

estoppel was satisfied.

      Third, a final judgment on the merits was issued in the Orloff litigation.

There, the trial court issued an order dismissing plaintiff's legal malpractice

claims against Orloff and OLSS with prejudice, and that order was affirmed on

appeal. Orloff, slip op. at 14. Fourth, the court's determination that plaintiff

could not prove damages was critical to the decision to dismiss his legal

malpractice claims against Orloff and was similarly the basis for the affirmance

of that dismissal on appeal. Ibid. Thus, the determination of the issue was

essential to the judgment in the Orloff litigation.

      Finally, plaintiff was a party in the Orloff litigation and is the plaintiff in

the present litigation. Thus, the party against whom the doctrine was asserted

was a party to the earlier proceeding, and therefore, the fifth factor for collateral

estoppel was satisfied. Olivieri, 186 N.J. at 521; Est. of Dawson, 136 N.J. at

20-21.

      Accordingly, because all of the necessary factors were satisfied, the trial

court correctly determined that plaintiff's claim for damages was barred . He

                                                                               A-3294-21
                                        19
relied upon the same expert report in both cases and, once that report was found

wanting in the Orloff litigation, the trial court in this matter properly found that

plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relying on that report to attempt to prove

actual damages in this case.

      In an attempt to avoid this result, plaintiff next contends that the reports

he submitted in support of his legal malpractice claim in this case were

substantially different than the Tinari report he relied upon in the Orloff

litigation. Plaintiff asserts that the trial court "ignored that [he] may have and

did have the expert proof, lacking in the Orloff litigation, to support the claim

for insufficient settlement as well as proximate cause." He argues that

            Scott Piekarsky's 2020 reports addressed the measures
            plaintiff's prior attorneys and experts took to prove
            proximate cause, and concluded that the defendants
            were negligent in failing to identify and articulate the
            connection between the specific categories of damages
            and the negligent acts and omissions by Orloff and thus
            failed to establish the case within the case in the Orloff
            litigation.

      Plaintiff's argument lacks merit. He does not address the fact that the

reports he submitted in this case, like the original Tinari report, do not set forth

the fair settlement value of his claims. In fact, none of plaintiff's experts set

forth the fair settlement value of the claims. Indeed, in her August 1, 2020

supplemental report, Kucsma states: "As economists, it is not our responsibility

                                                                              A-3294-21
                                        20
to determine a 'fair settlement amount' or the outcome of a completed litigation

but rather it is to render an independent appraisal of economic damages." Thus,

plaintiff lacked evidence to prove at trial that the $800,000 settlement was

insufficient because it was for less than the fair settlement value of his claims.

Moreover, there was no evidence that FTV and Nexxar would have paid a larger

settlement amount.

      Plaintiff argues that his "economic damages experts have re-examined and

tied together the various elements of damages, and plaintiff's liability expert,

Piekarsky, has incorporated these findings in his expert and rebuttal reports,

including benchmarks for the damages [plaintiff] incurred, which were found

lacking in the Orloff litigation." He also argues that the trial court and the

Appellate Division in the Orloff litigation did not reject the findings in the 2013

Tinari report, "as if to suggest that the data developed in that earlier report were

somehow inaccurate. Rather, this [c]ourt found that there was a failure to

establish either proximate cause or damages under either a diminished

settlement theory or a trial within a trial theory." According to plaintiff, "[t]hese

are now issues of legal malpractice, not inaccurate data or faulty valuations, and

lie at the feet of plaintiffs' attorneys and legal malpractice experts, not the Tinari

economic damages report."

                                                                                A-3294-21
                                         21
      Plaintiff's argument is not persuasive. First, Piekarsky is not an economist

and relied entirely on the opinions expressed in the Tinari report. He opined

that "[t]he Tinari Economics Group report's valuations and damages were based

upon well established and existing tax laws, accounting and valuation principles,

techniques, methodologies, and case law dispelling any question of

speculation." When he considered "the fourth requirement for proving legal

malpractice which is that there were actual damages," he reviewed and relied on

the Tinari report, and "[a]fter reviewing Dr. Tinari's Economic Report, [he]

concur[ed] with the methodologies and sources used to construct the value of

Nexxar and Mr. Angrisani's share of the value which was lost[.]"

      According to Piekarsky,

            The Tinari report was more than just a well[-]
            documented set of damages, it established the actual
            damages based upon the principles and authorities used
            in the valuation of companies and the long standing
            acceptable practices, acceptable methodologies used,
            and the credible case law to support the calculated
            losses and the fair settlement value for each identified
            damage.

      Ultimately, Piekarsky concluded that plaintiff's total quantifiable losses

were $11,583,180, the exact amount set forth in the Tinari report. In fact, he

relied upon the Tinari report exclusively to support his contention that plaintiff

suffered actual damages.

                                                                            A-3294-21
                                       22
      Second, as set forth above, both the trial court and this court in the Orloff

litigation determined that the Tinari report was inadmissible to support

plaintiff's claims for actual damages. Piekarsky's unsupported contention that

the Tinari report was reliable and that the methodologies used were valid does

not make them so.

      Third, the sufficiency and reliability of the Tinari report was argued

extensively before the trial court and this court in that action. Indeed, prior to

his appeal in the Orloff litigation, plaintiff sought additional commentary from

the Tinari Group regarding its economic analysis, and it provided supplemental

reports dated February 7 and April 7, 2014. Plaintiff's appellate brief and reply

brief in the Orloff litigation, which sought reversal of the trial court's holding

that the Tinari report was inadmissible to support his claim of damages,

incorporated the opinions expressed in those supplemental reports. We rejected

plaintiff's argument and affirmed the holding that the Tinari report was

inadmissible to prove plaintiff's actual damages. Orloff, slip op. at 8-13.

      Fourth, Piekarsky's opinion that the Orloff trial court and this court simply

misunderstood the Tinari analysis, were confused, or were misled by Orloff's

counsel, lacks merit. In the present appeal, plaintiff argues that both the trial

court and this court were mistaken, likely because they were confused by the

                                                                              A-3294-21
                                       23
use of the word "liquidated" in the Tinari report. To support his position,

plaintiff produced two additional supplemental reports of Kucsma, who was a

co-author of the original 2013 Tinari report. Plaintiff contends that Kucsma

"rebutted any kind of presumption that plaintiff was relying on a li quidation

analysis." In the appendix of both of her supplemental reports, dated June 10,

2020, and August 1, 2020, Kucsma explained that the appendix showed

            the manner in which [plaintiff] would have been
            compensated, if the value of the Company [Nexxar]
            were $341,287,521, and if the Company were
            liquidated in December 2005. [SOURCE: Tinari
            Economics Group, An Appraisal of Economic Loss to
            Frank Angrisani, May 7, 2013.]

            It seems as though there may be some confusion, as to
            the use of the word "liquidated" in the aforementioned
            statement. In no way is the context to assume a
            bankruptcy, dissolution or winding up of the Company,
            where the Company would have been sold for less than
            the fair market value. We use the word "liquidate" to
            mean the apportioning of assets and the calculation of
            liabilities, a necessary procedure to be performed in any
            financing, merger or acquisition transaction.

            The investment community has defined and readily
            uses the word "liquidation preference" within its
            shareholder agreements. The liquidation preference is
            a mechanism that legally establishes how much an
            investor would receive upon a sale, dissolution or
            winding up of a company. It also establishes the
            hierarchy of which investors are to be paid. The rights
            provided to each shareholder are found in the stock
            purchase agreements.

                                                                        A-3294-21
                                      24
      The foregoing passage was taken verbatim from the February 7, 2014

supplemental report, and also reproduced verbatim in Piekarsky's August 1,

2020 expert report. As set forth above, the arguments in the February 7, 2014

supplemental report were incorporated in plaintiff's appellate briefs in the Orloff

litigation, and therefore, are not new and were previously considered and

rejected by this court.

      Finally, Kucsma's supplemental reports provide no support to plaintiff's

argument because they are fundamentally identical to the 2013 Tinari report and

the February 7, 2014 and April 7, 2014 supplemental reports. In her June 10,

2020 supplemental report, Kucsma merely criticizes the trial court's opinion in

the Orloff litigation. The seven-page appendix attached to the supplemental

report is, with the exception of the last three paragraphs, a verbatim reproduction

of the February 7, 2014 supplement report. The last three paragraphs of the

appendix are a verbatim reproduction from the April 7, 2014 supplemental

report.

      Furthermore, Kucsma's August 1, 2020 supplemental report is essentially

a verbatim reproduction of the 2013 Tinari Group report. Indeed, just as the

2013 report did, Kucsma concluded that plaintiff sustained damages totaling

$11,583,180. This report also contains a seven-page appendix, which mirrors

                                                                             A-3294-21
                                       25
the appendix attached to the June 10, 2020 supplemental report (which was

essentially a verbatim reproduction of the February 7, 2014 and April 7, 2014

supplemental reports).

      Kucsma's August 1, 2020 supplemental report does contain references to

Piekarsky's report and comments consistent with Piekarsky's contention that the

Orloff trial and appellate courts reached the wrong conclusion. It also contains

an ostensibly new argument that was not in the original 2013 Tinari report.

However, this new argument merely consists of Kucsma's review of litigation

"verdicts and settlements for cases with claims similar to those asserted by

[plaintiff], in the State of New Jersey, [that] ranged between $2,476,248 and

$33,487,500." Kucsma named numerous cases and said that the average of the

verdicts and settlements was $12,509,009. Apparently, Kucsma's review of the

verdicts and settlements was included in the report to support her contention that

the estimate of the total loss calculated by the Tinari group was reasonable, as

it is consistent with average of those verdicts and settlements. Nevertheless,

those verdicts and settlements would not be germane to plaintiff's claim for

damages.

      In sum, Kucsma's 2020 supplemental reports were identical in substance

to the Tinari reports that were rejected in the Orloff litigation. That includes the

                                                                              A-3294-21
                                        26
original 2013 Tinari report that was presented to and rejected by the trial court

and the Appellate Division, and the February 7 and April 7, 2014 reports first

presented in the appeal, which this court rejected when we affirmed the trial

court's conclusion that the original Tinari report was inadmissible to sup port

plaintiff's claim for damages.

      Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly found that

Kucsma's 2020 reports were essentially identical to the Tinari reports, and

therefore, they were properly found to be inadmissible under the collateral

estoppel doctrine.

      Finally, plaintiff contends that the Orloff court erred in concluding that

UNO's operation was illegal. He argues that "[t]he court below assumed UNO

was illegal, as the trial court in Orloff offhandedly so concluded[.]" According

to plaintiff, "the defendants failed to disabuse [the trial court in the Orloff

litigation] of the notion that UNO was 'illegal,' and to advance the conclusions

to the contrary of international compliance experts, Graves, Erb and McDonald."

We disagree.

      First, the facts of this case fall squarely within the invited-error doctrine.

"The doctrine of invited error operates to bar a disappointed litigant from

arguing on appeal that an adverse decision below was the product of error, when

                                                                              A-3294-21
                                       27
that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error."

Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, 144 N.J. 479, 503 (1996). The doctrine "is

intended to 'prevent [a party] from manipulating the system' and will apply

'when a [party] in some way has led the court into error' while pursuing a tactical

advantage that does not work as planned." State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 100

(2014) (quoting State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561-62 (2013)). A party "cannot

beseech and request the trial court to take a certain course of action, . . . then

condemn the very procedure he sought and urged, claiming it to be error and

prejudicial." State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 471 (1955).

      From the time plaintiff hired Orloff to represent him in 2006, and pursue

his claims against FTV and Nexxar, plaintiff has consistently claimed that

UNO's business operations were illegal. Plaintiff's fraud claims were based on

the illegality of UNO's business operations. Indeed, at his deposition in the

Orloff litigation, plaintiff testified that UNO's business operations were illegal.

Therefore, plaintiff is precluded under the doctrine of invited error from arguing

that the Orloff court erred by accepting his argument and the evidence he

presented of UNO's illegality.

      In sum, the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff could not

demonstrate actual damages in this case because, as in the Orloff litigation, his

                                                                             A-3294-21
                                       28
expert reports were inadmissible.    Therefore, the court properly granted

summary judgment to defendants and dismissed plaintiff's complaint.

     Affirmed.

                                                                      A-3294-21
                                    29