Court Opinion

ID: 9568429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:03:37.700615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:23.695531
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(dissenting). We granted leave to consider whether the order entered by the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board was a final “judgment” and therefore an exception to Romein v General Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515; 462 NW2d 555 (1990), aff’d 503 US 181; 112 S Ct 1105; 117 L Ed 2d 328 (1992), in which this Court upheld 1987 PA 28 prohibiting coordination of *103benefits for injuries arising before March 31, 1982. Instead, the lead opinion evades the fundamental issue in this case in order to revisit the due process and separation of powers issues already decided by this Court in Romein. The lead opinion declares that the minimal constitutional protection afforded by the final judgment exception established by the Court in Romein is dicta. The lead opinion then engages in a separation of powers discussion and ultimately concludes that the doctrine is not violated because 1987 PA 28 did not, consistent with Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211; 115 S Ct 1447; 131 L Ed 2d 328 (1995), “reopen” or “set aside” a judgment entered by a court. Because I believe the lead opinion has misstated the issue and reached an erroneous conclusion, I dissent and would affirm the decision of the WCAB.
I
In Chambers v General Motors Corp, decided with Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636; 375 NW2d 715 (1985), this Court decided whether 1981 PA 203, providing for coordination of benefits under MCL 418.354; MSA 17.237(354), applied to persons injured before the March 31, 1982, effective date.1 The Court held that the unambiguous language of § 354 required coordination of worker’s compensation and other *104specified benefits for all compensable periods, after the effective date of the statute, regardless of the date of the worker’s injury. The Court reasoned:
The statute does not limit its application to cases where workers’ compensation payments are made to an employee for injuries incurred after its effective date, [i.e.,] for injuries incurred after March 31, 1982. Nor does it contain any language indicating that it should not be applied when payments are being made for injuries that occurred prior to March 31, 1982. The Legislature’s failure to do so leaves the section generally applicable to payments made after its effective date. [Id. at 651 (emphasis in original).]
In response to Franks, the Legislature enacted 1987 PA 28, §§ (17) through (20), overruling this Court’s interpretation of § 354.2 The new legislation prohibited coordination of benefits of any person injured before March 31, 1982, the effective date of the coordination provision.
Subsequently, in Romein, this Court decided the constitutionality of 1987 PA 28. Defendant General Motors contended that it relied on the § 354 coordination provision between March 31, 1982, and May 14, 1987, the date the Legislature amended § 354. General Motors claimed a vested right to have its liability for those periods determined by the law then in effect.
*105The Court concluded that the separation of powers3 and one court of justice4 provisions were not violated under the Michigan Constitution.5 The Romein Court, however, conditioned the constitutionality of 1987 PA 28 as follows: “Such retroactive amendments based on prior judicial decisions are constitutional if the statute comports with the requirements of the Contract and Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions, and so long as the retroactive provisions of the statute do not impair final judgments.”6 Id. at 537 (emphasis added). The lead opinion improperly dismisses this controlling language as dicta.
*106Although Romein clearly held that workers have no vested rights in the finality of coordinated benefits paid, implicit in the Court’s holding is that rights do vest for purposes of due process when judgments are entered by the wcab at the direction of an appellate court pursuant to former law. Otherwise, Romein would be internally inconsistent because nothing would constitute a final judgment, regardless of the extent to which the parties have litigated the controlling law.
Consequently, there must be a distinction for purposes of finality between the situation in which the WCAB enters its own decision and the situation in the present case in which this Court, relying on its then-recent pronouncement of the law in Franks, remanded to the wcab for entry of judgment. In order to read Romein and Pike v City of Wyoming, 431 Mich 589; 433 NW2d 768 (1988), consistently, I would distinguish Pike. In Pike, the lead opinion held that “[b]ecause the amount of an employee’s award is never final, res judicata principles do not apply to a change in the amount of benefits the claimant receives.” Id. at 602. However, the rule announced in that decision, striking the gender-based conclusive presumption of a wife’s dependency, was applied without upsetting a previous judgment entered by the wcab at the direction of this Court. This Court had not previously upheld the conclusive dependency provision with respect to the worker in Pike. That worker merely had a decision by a hearing referee because “there [had been] no appeal,” id. at 592, when this Court later changed the amount of his benefits to reflect the change in the law announced with that very decision. The lead opinion relies on this dis*107tinction to conclude that the Romein exception is merely dicta. I disagree. The lead opinion later more explicitly and honestly states the effect of its decision today, i.e., to overrule rather than disregard the minimal protection the judgment exception established. See ante, part vi(a) at 90-92.7
As the Court stated in Romein, such a judgment exception “protects the vested rights that form in reliance on an award at the moment it is reduced to a final judgment.” Id. at 533. The employer has a greater expectation of finality after litigation and decision by the appellate courts of this jurisdiction. A decision of the wcab is less immune to a change in the law than the appellate courts of this state. Accordingly, this language is not dicta, but forms the very basis on which the constitutionality of 1987 PA 28 was conditioned.8 The lead opinion essentially concedes this point:
*108This Court declared this exception for final judgments because, at the time, we were concerned that a broader order permitting all qualifying claimants to recover improperly coordinated benefits, regardless of the extent to which they had litigated their claims, might run afoul of either the Michigan or federal constitution. [Ante at 74 (emphasis added).]
Therefore, when this Court previously remanded Quinton “for entry of a judgment consistent with Franks,”9 General Motors obtained a final judgment within the purview of Romein and the award was then “immune from [subsequent] legislative modification.” Romein, supra at 533.10 Properly analyzed pursuant to this Court’s decision in Romein, the decision of the wcab allowing coordination of Quinton’s benefits through the effective date of 1987 PA 28 should be upheld.
H
Although Romein is dispositive, the lead opinion engages in an irrelevant discussion of separation of powers. Asserting that it is not controlling, the lead opinion relies on Plaut, supra. Ante at 77-78. The lead opinion maintains that consistent with Plaut, the legislation now at issue did not “reopen” or “set aside” the 1986 wcab orders. The lead opinion’s characterization is a result-oriented application of those terms from Plaut. Once this Court accepts the premise that *109an order or judgment entered by the WCAB pursuant to a remand order by this Court is an order implicating the doctrine of separation of powers, as the lead opinion properly does, it is immediately apparent that the 1987 legislation is an intrusion on the judiciary. The threat to the independence of the judiciary is increased with the lead opinion’s holding today.11 Not only has the Court violated the fundamental principle that “the proper construction of a statute is a judicial function,”12 but it now continues the assault by allowing a judgment entered by the WCAB at the direction of this Court to be set aside. In total disregard for even the minimal protection established by Romein, the lead opinion characterizes the legislation as “modifying the operative effect of a prior judgment or order” that evidently “can be accomplished without reopening or setting aside a judgment entered by a court.” Ante at 84. I disagree.
To say that the 1987 legislation “simply requires payment to all in Quinton’s class an uncoordinated benefit from and after March 31, 1982,” id. at 85, is the unquestionable equivalent of setting aside a previous determination by this Court. This Court allowed coordination of benefits for all injuries occurring before March 31, 1982, and the Legislature explicitly *110set aside that holding and ruled that there could be no coordination for persons injured before that date: “The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636 (1985) is declared to have been erroneously rendered insofar as it interprets this section . . . MCL 418.354(17); MSA 17.237(354)(17) (emphasis added). No clearer example of setting aside a judgment or order of a court is imaginable.
HI
The parties disagree whether the wcab has the authority to enter a “judgment” and, if so, whether a judgment was entered. In doing so, the parties elevate form over substance. Irrespective of the language the Court used to establish the Romein exception and the language previously used in its remand order in the present case, it is clear that both refer to the same action of the wcab (entering an order at the direction of an appellate court) that finally determined the rights of the parties with respect to coordinating benefits upon entry of a final judgment.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ argument that “judgment” in the context of Romein means judicial enforcement by a circuit court pursuant to MCL 418.863; MSA 17.237(863) rather than entry of an order at the direction of an appellate court is absurd.13 The purpose of *111§ 863 is to protect the interests of persons awarded worker’s compensation by providing them with prompt enforcement by a circuit court in situations in which the employer fails to pay an award. See Wyrybkowski v Cobra Pre-Hung Doors, Inc, 66 Mich App 555; 239 NW2d 660 (1976). A circuit court judgment is merely entered “ ‘in accordance’ with the award, which means that it should recite and follow the award, which furnishes the data for further action of the court.” Brown v George A Fuller Co, 193 Mich 214, 219; 159 NW 376 (1916) (emphasis added). Therefore, the primary purpose of entering a judgment in circuit court is to ensure satisfaction of the worker’s compensation award. It cannot fairly be said that a judgment by a circuit court produces a more final decision for purposes of res judicata after judgment is entered by the WCAB at the direction of an appellate court.
IV
This Court remanded Quinton’s earlier petition for entry of a “judgment” consistent with Franks. The wcab responded by entering a judgment that is properly understood as fulfilling the Supreme Court’s remand order and falls squarely within the judgment exception established by Romein. Therefore, the decision of the wcab should be affirmed.
Brickley, C.J., concurred with Riley, J.
Weaver, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Chambers described the application of § 354 as follows:
This section provides that an employer may coordinate employee benefits, by applying against its workers’ compensation obligations payable for compensable periods after its effective date, that portion of certain other benefits, such as pensions and social security payments, also received by the employee and financed by the employer. [Id. at 647.]

 The relevant portion of the amendment states:
The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636 (1985), is declared to have been erroneously rendered insofar as it interprets this section, it having been and being the legislative intention not to coordinate payments under this section resulting from liability pursuant to section 351, 361, or 835 for personal injuries occurring before March 31, 1982. It is the purpose of this amendatory act to so affirm. This remedial and curative amendment shall be liberally construed to effectuate this purpose.

 Const 1963, art 3, § 2 states:
The powers of government are divided into three branches; legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.

 Const 1963, art 6, § 1 states:
The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house.

 I disagree with this conclusion, as I previously stated in dissent in Romein-.
I would hold that the 1987 Legislature ran afoul of the separation of powers and the one court of justice articles of the Michigan Constitution when it gave retroactive effect to 1987 PA 28. [Id. at 564]
I concede, however, that the Court is bound by that decision, particularly the minimal protection carved out by the judgment exception.

 The Court made clear no fewer than four times that the due process rights of employers would not be violated only in situations where it would not affect a final judgment. See id. at 521, 533, 537, and 540.

 In other words, I would make the distinction between Pike and the present case in which this Court had already ruled on the provision (Franks) and ordered the WCAB to enter a judgment consistent with that decision. Such a circumstance should be accorded a greater degree of finality because the litigant, Quinton, relied on the decision of the highest court of the state in contrast to the situation in Pike or Riley v Northland Geriatric Center (After Remand), 431 Mich 632; 433 NW2d 787 (1988). This distinction also serves to prevent further erosion of the separation of powers doctrine. See Romein, supra (Riley, J., dissenting).

 Moreover, as this Court has previously noted:
“When a court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses and decides a question germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision.” [Detroit v Public Utilities Comm, 288 Mich 267, 299-300; 286 NW 368 (1939), citing Chase v American Cartage Co, Inc, 176 Wis 235, 238; 186 NW 598 (1922) (emphasis in original).]

 424 Mich 884 (1986) (emphasis added).

 The WCAB entered an order stating in relevant part:
This cause having come before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court . . . for entry of a judgment consistent with Chambers [supra] .... [Emphasis added.]

 As I previously stated in Romein, supra at 563:
It is necessary to have an equally powerful judicial branch of government in order to ensure that the balance of power is not weighted in favor of the Legislature, and to ensure that individual rights are not circumvented by the will of the majority. Therefore, in order for this Court to maintain its equal position with our tripartite system of government, we must secure our constitutionally granted authority.

 Webster v Rotary Electric Steel Co, 321 Mich 526, 531; 33 NW2d 69 (1948).

 It should be noted that this Court routinely refers to decisions of the WCAB as judgments. See Clayton v Vickers, Inc, 447 Mich 851 (1994), in which the Court “[i]n lieu of granting leave to appeal, [vacated] the judgment of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission”; Poling v Merillat Industries, 446 Mich 852 (1994), in which the Court stated “[i]n lieu of granting leave to appeal, the judgment of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission is vacated, and the case is remanded to the WCAC for reconsideration”; Luke v Michigan, 446 Mich 851 (1994), in which the Court again vacated “the judgment of the Worker’s Compensa*111tion Appellate Commission”; Scott v VandeBunte Egg Co, 433 Mich 870 (1989), in which the Court reinstated “the judgment of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board . . . .”