Court Opinion

ID: 9838486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 16:04:55.138109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:32.099380
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

 ERIC TEEL,                               §
                                          §
       Defendant Below,                   § No. 363, 2022
       Appellant,                         §
                                          § Court Below—Superior Court
       v.                                 § of the State of Delaware
                                          §
 STATE OF DELAWARE,                       § Cr. ID No. 2004004125 (N)
                                          §
       Appellee.                          §

                          Submitted: July 21, 2023
                          Decided:   September 5, 2023

Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

                                  ORDER

      Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears

to the Court that:

      (1)    The appellant, Eric Teel, filed this appeal from a Superior Court order

denying his motion for correction of an illegal sentence under Superior Court

Criminal Rule 35 and his motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court

Criminal Rule 61. After consideration of the parties’ arguments, we affirm the

Superior Court’s denial of the motions.

      (2)    In August 2021, a grand jury indicted Teel for possession of a firearm

by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”) and two counts of terroristic threatening. The

charges arose from Teel threatening his ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend by sending
her a photograph of himself with a gun. On December 6, 2021, Teel pleaded guilty

to one count of PFBPP and one count of terroristic threatening in exchange for the

State (i) entering a nolle prosequi on the other terroristic threatening charge, and (ii)

agreeing not to pursue other acts of intimidation occurring before December 6, 2021.

The parties also stipulated that Teel had two previous violent felony convictions and

jointly agreed to recommend the following sentence: (i) for PFBPP, fifteen years of

Level V incarceration suspended after the ten-year minimum mandatory for

decreasing levels of supervision; and (ii) for terroristic threatening, one year of Level

V incarceration suspended for one year of Level III probation. That same day, the

Superior Court accepted Teel’s guilty plea and imposed the recommended sentence.

      (3)    On May 2, 2022, Teel filed a pro se motion for correction of illegal

sentence, and on May 12, 2022, he filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.

In both motions, Teel argued that his PFBPP sentence was illegal because one of the

two felony convictions identified in the Immediate Sentencing Form—a 2008

conviction for possession of a controlled substance within 300 feet of a school

zone—was not a violent felony under Section 4201(c) and he therefore did not

qualify for a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(2).

He also contended that his 2008 conviction for possession with intent to deliver

marijuana (“PWITD”), which was not listed on the Immediate Sentencing Form,

should not qualify as a violent felony under Section 4201(c).

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         (4)    The Superior Court asked the State and Teel’s trial counsel to address

whether Teel qualified for a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence under Section

1448. In response, Teel’s counsel advised the court that he had contacted the State

a few days after sentencing to request resentencing because the school zone

possession conviction was not a violent felony under Section 4201(c). If Teel only

had one prior violent felony conviction, he faced a five-year minimum mandatory

sentence under Section 1448(e)(1)(b) rather than a ten-year minimum mandatory

sentence under Section 1448(e)(2)(b). Teel’s counsel also told Teel that if the State

relied upon the school zone possession conviction, he would seek resentencing to

reduce the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence to a five year minimum

mandatory sentence.

         (5)    Teel’s counsel further advised the court that he and the State had

discovered the Immediate Sentencing Form contained a scrivener’s error and should

have listed Teel’s 2008 PWITD conviction as the second violent felony conviction,

rather than the school zone possession conviction. Teel’s counsel also discussed this

with Teel, who reminded counsel that he had filed a motion regarding his belief that

the PWITD conviction should not qualify as a violent felony. Teel’s counsel then

reminded Teel that the Superior Court had denied that motion before accepting his

plea.1      The State agreed with Teel’s counsel’s summary of the parties’

1
    See App. to Answering Br. at B35.

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communications, took responsibility for the scrivener’s error in the Immediate

Sentencing Form, and noted that the plea form correctly listed the minimum

mandatory sentence for PFBPP as ten years.

       (6)    The Superior Court held an office conference with counsel on August

3, 2022. After the parties reviewed what had occurred since sentencing, the Superior

Court judge stated that he believed the error in the Immediate Sentencing Form was

minor and he would resolve the error in his order deciding the motion for correction

of illegal sentence. On September 1, 2022, the Superior Court issued an order

denying the motions for correction of illegal sentence and postconviction relief. This

appeal followed.

       (7)    This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a Rule 35 motion for

correction of illegal sentence and a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief for

abuse of discretion.2 We review questions of law de novo.3 A sentence is illegal if

it exceeds statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to

the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a

term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a

sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.4 To prevail on an

2
  Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014); Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811,
810 (Del. 2013).
3
  Fountain, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1; Ploof, 75 A.3d at 820.
4
  Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).

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ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under Rule 61 after entering into a plea

agreement, the defendant must demonstrate that: (i) trial counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) counsel’s actions were

so prejudicial “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the

defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”5

         (8)     On appeal, Teel argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his

motions because his PWITD conviction is not a violent felony under Section 4201(c)

and therefore he only qualified for a five-year minimum mandatory sentence for

PFBPP under Section 1448(e)(1). At the time of the crimes Teel committed in 2020,

Section 1448(e)(1)(c) provided that a prohibited person who knowingly possessed a

firearm “shall receive a minimum sentence of . . . ten years at Level V, if the person

has been convicted on 2 or more separate occasions of any violent felony.” Teel

does not dispute that he was convicted of stalking, a violent felony under Section

4201(c), in 2014. He also admits that he has a 2008 conviction for PWITD but

contends that PWITD is no longer a violent felony under the Ned Carpenter Act, 78

Del. Laws. Ch. 13 (2011). Teel is mistaken.

         (9)     The Ned Carpenter Act eliminated or reclassified certain drug offenses,

but the act did not apply retroactively to any violation that occurred before

5
    Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988).

                                                    5
September 1, 2011.6 At the time Teel committed the crime of PFBPP in 2020,

Section        4201(c)        designated         (and       still      designates)         Former

Manufacture/Delivery/Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled or Counterfeit

Controlled Substance under 16 Del. C. § 4752, the crime Teel was convicted of in

2008, a violent felony.7 Because Teel had two convictions designated violent

felonies under Section 4201(c) at the time he committed PFBPP in 2020,8 he was

subject to a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP.9 The Superior Court

therefore did not err in denying Teel’s motion for correction of illegal sentence.

       (10) As to the Rule 61 motion, the record does not support Teel’s claim that

he pleaded guilty because he believed he would not have to serve a ten-year

minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP. Although the Immediate Sentencing

Form incorrectly listed possession of a controlled substance within 300 feet of a

school zone, instead of PWITD, as one of Teel’s prior violent felony convictions,

the plea colloquy reflects that Teel was aware he had a previous conviction for

PWITD. The signed plea agreement correctly disclosed that Teel faced a ten-to-

fifteen year Level V sentence for PFBPP. The parties agreed in the plea agreement

6
  Ayala v. State, 204 A.3d 829, 838-39 (Del. 2019).
7
  Section 4201(c) also designates the current version of 16 Del. C. § 4752, drug dealing, a violent
felony.
8
  Butcher v. State, 171 A.3d 537, 543 (Del. 2017) (holding “that the definition of ‘violent felony’
as the term is used in Section 1448(e) is controlled by the version of Section 4201(c) in effect” at
the time the defendant committed the Section 1448 offense).
9
  11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1).

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to recommend a PFBPP sentence of fifteen years of Level V incarceration suspended

after the ten-year minimum mandatory. During the plea colloquy, Teel expressed

his understanding that he faced a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP.

The Superior Court imposed the sentence recommended by the parties.

      (11) If Teel had not pleaded guilty and had insisted on going to trial, he

would have faced the same minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP— ten years of

Level V incarceration—plus the possibility of an additional five years of

unsuspended Level V time for PFBPP and two years of unsuspended Level V time

for the terroristic threatening charges, along with additional Level V time for the act

of intimidation charges that the State agreed not to pursue in exchange for Teel’s

plea. Teel has not shown that there is a reasonable probability he would have

rejected the plea offer and insisted on proceeding to trial had he known he would

have to serve the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP. Accordingly,

the Superior Court did not err in denying Teel’s motion for postconviction relief

under Rule 61.

      NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

                                        BY THE COURT:

                                        /s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
                                        Justice

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