Court Opinion

ID: 9363823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 19:03:36.217528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:34.306687
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/23 P. v. Cabada CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                2d Crim. No. B315418
                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 2020032612)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Ventura County)

 v.

 JOSE MANUEL CABADA,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Jose Manuel Cabada appeals from the judgment entered
after a jury convicted him of second degree robbery, among other
offenses. (Pen. Code, § 211.)1 He contends the evidence is
insufficient to support his robbery conviction. He also contends
that he is entitled to remand for resentencing in light of recently
enacted Senate Bill No. 567. We affirm.

        All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
         1
unless otherwise indicated.
                        Procedural Background
       In May 2020, appellant engaged in a series of offenses that
involved stealing a car, robbing a convenience store, and leading
police on a high-speed chase that ended after appellant crashed
the stolen car into a median on the 101 freeway.
       The information charged appellant with three felony counts
including second degree robbery (§ 211, count 1), evading an
officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a), count 2), and unlawful
driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count
3). Count 1 alleged a five-year sentencing enhancement for a
prior serious felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).) All three
counts alleged appellant had sustained a prior strike, a serious or
violent felony conviction, and at least two prior felony
convictions, which made him presumptively ineligible for
probation and required that the imposed sentence be doubled and
served in state prison. (§§ 667, subds. (c)(1) & (e)(1), 1170, subd.
(h)(3), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1), 1203, subd. (e)(4).)
       The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of
12 years eight months in state prison. On count 1, robbery, the
trial court imposed the upper term of five years doubled as a
second strike for a total of 10 years. On count 2, evading an
officer, the trial court imposed one-third the middle term doubled
for a total of 16 months, to be served consecutive to count 1. On
count 3, unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, the trial court
imposed one-third the middle term doubled for a total of 16
months, also to be served consecutive to count 1.
                          Factual Background
       During the early morning hours of May 30, 2020, appellant
approached two men with his fists raised as they were putting
trash in the dumpster of a car dealership in Oxnard. When the

                                 2
men noticed him, they were immediately afraid and ran in
opposite directions. Appellant chased the first man, but then
turned to chase the other, using a pole saw he found in the back
of the second man’s truck. Appellant then jumped into the first
man’s car and drove away.
       Shortly thereafter, appellant went into a convenience store
in Camarillo. Video surveillance from the store shows appellant
got out of the stolen car, entering the store and selecting a gallon
of milk. At the counter, appellant requested a pack of cigarettes
and another item. He paid the clerk, but then asked for an
additional pack of cigarettes. When the clerk retrieved the
cigarettes and announced the new total, appellant became
agitated. He made a gesture as if he was going to exchange the
cigarettes, but then reached under the plexiglass barrier to grab
the money in the clerk’s hand and knocked the plexiglass barrier
to the floor. He told the clerk to give him the money and asked if
the clerk thought this was a game. Appellant demanded the
other pack of cigarettes as well.
       After the clerk complied, appellant raised the milk jug
above his head as if he was going to strike the clerk with it or
throw it at him. The clerk stepped back and put his hands in the
air. Appellant took additional items from a display rack at the
counter. As he was exiting the store, he grabbed a container of
money for a children’s charity and said, “I’m taking this too.”
       Meanwhile, the clerk activated a silent alarm to summon
police. Outside of the store, appellant approached another
customer who became startled and drove off.
       Police responded and located appellant in the stolen car.
When the officer attempted to conduct a traffic stop, appellant
fled at a high rate of speed, eventually crashing into a median on

                                 3
the freeway. Appellant suffered significant injuries from the
crash and was taken into custody.
                       Sufficiency of Evidence
       Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support
his robbery conviction because there is no evidence that the
victim’s fear was objective or reasonable. Appellant’s contention
is without merit.
       “In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331, citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443
U.S. 307, 319-320.) “We neither reweigh the evidence nor
reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] We presume
in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury
reasonably could deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Jennings
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638-639 (Jennings).)
       To establish a robbery was committed by means of fear, the
prosecution must present evidence “‘“that the victim was in fact
afraid, and that such fear allowed the crime to be
accomplished.”’” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 765,
772, quoting People v. Cuevas (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 689, 698.)
Fear may be inferred from the circumstances, including by acts of
intimidation, even without threats. (Morehead, at pp. 774-775;
People v. Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 605.)

                                 4
       Contrary to appellant’s contention, the law does not require
a victim’s fear to be objectively reasonable. Rather, “what
matters is whether the victim in this case was subjectively in
fear, not whether a hypothetical and objective ‘reasonable person’
standing in the victim’s shoes would have been afraid.” (People v.
Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 341.) We note that appellant’s
reliance on People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, is misplaced
because the Court in that case analyzed the concept of fear
within the context of the Legislature’s elimination of the active
resistance requirement in rape prosecutions.
       Nevertheless, appellant contends the evidence was
ambiguous and “reasonable minds might have interpreted” the
events in a “variety of ways.” For example, he contends there is
no evidence of force or fear because he did not “strong-arm” the
victim or demand that he empty the cash register. He did not
scream or utter words conveying a threat of unlawful harm. He
did not display a weapon. Appellant concedes that he did raise
the milk jug “for one second,” but contends this was insufficient
to cause the fear necessary to establish a robbery.
       Appellant’s contentions amount to a request for us to
reweigh the evidence and come to a different conclusion. This we
may not do. (See Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 638-639.)
The victim testified that he was “very intimidated” by appellant,
who was bigger than the victim. He stated that he complied with
appellant’s demands because he was afraid appellant would
become violent if he did not. He hit the “panic button” to
summon immediate help, which was store policy if the clerk felt
threatened or there was a robbery. Even after police arrived, the
victim was “really rattled” and his “hands were still shaking.”

                                 5
                        Senate Bill No. 567
       Appellant contends he is entitled to remand for
resentencing because the trial court erred in imposing the upper
term sentence in light of the amendments made to section 1170,
subdivision (b).
       When the trial court sentenced appellant, former section
1170, subdivision (b) provided, “When a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the choice of the appropriate term shall rest
within the sound discretion of the court.” (Former § 1170, subd.
(b).) “Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section
1170, subdivision (b), making the middle term of imprisonment
the presumptive sentence.” (People v. Flores (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 495, 500 (Flores); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, eff. Jan.
1, 2022.)
       “A trial court may impose an upper term sentence only
where there are aggravating circumstances in the crime and the
defendant has either stipulated to the facts underlying those
circumstances or they have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Flores, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 500; § 1170, subd.
(b)(1)-(2).) In making this determination, the trial court “may
consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
       The People correctly concede these amendments apply
retroactively to appellant because his conviction was not final
when the new legislation took effect. (See Flores, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 500.)

                                  6
         In imposing the upper-term sentence for appellant’s
robbery conviction, the trial court explained its reasoning as
follows:
         “As to Count 1 – first, the other thing I do want to say
before I get to sentencing is one of the things that struck me
about this case is the fact that he was looking to victimize people
that particular night. He was looking for confrontations
wherever he could find them, including with the two witnesses or
complaining witnesses on the stolen car case, and then he goes
into the store and has a confrontation with the clerk. Then, when
he’s leaving, he’s trying to have a confrontation with people out in
the parking lot. That was clear on the video. And then he goes
into an extremely dangerous pursuit. This defendant was
committed to making victims that particular night.
         “Also, I look at the defendant’s statement to probation and
there is nothing in here that indicates any sort of remorse, any
sort of acknowledgment of understanding why and what he was
doing. It is I didn’t get a fair trial. The jury got it wrong. The
witness lied. There’s just nothing in here for me to look at and
want to give him much by way of leniency.
         “As to Count 1, the Court is going to impose the upper term
. . . I chose the upper term because the defendant’s prior record is
significant. The defendant’s prior record indicates conduct of a
similar nature. His performance on probation or parole has not
been good and he’s gotten numerous prior convictions.”
         Appellant contends the trial court erred in imposing the
upper term because he did not stipulate to the facts underlying
the aggravating circumstances, nor were they found true beyond
a reasonable doubt by a jury or court trial. The People contend
remand is not required because the trial court properly relied

                                 7
upon appellant’s prior convictions to justify the upper term, and
to “require the lower court to expressly identify certified records
when the nature and number of prior convictions is undisputed is
to exalt form over substance.”
       We decline to remand this case to the trial court because no
alleged error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13.) Pursuant to Cunningham v. California
(2007) 549 U.S. 270, aggravating circumstances based on a
defendant’s criminal history that render him eligible for the
upper term include a trial court’s finding that the defendant (1)
suffered a prior conviction, (2) was on probation or parole at the
time he committed the offense, and (3) performed unsatisfactorily
while on supervision to the extent such unsatisfactory
performance is established by the defendant’s record of prior
convictions. (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 818-820;
People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 80-82 (Towne).)
       Here, the trial court relied on three aggravating
circumstances to impose the upper term: appellant’s prior
convictions were numerous (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2),
appellant was on parole when he committed the present offenses,
and his performance while on parole was unsatisfactory. (Id.,
rule 4.421(b)(4)-(5).) Nothing in the record indicates the
aggravating circumstances were inaccurate. Appellant did not
dispute the report or object to its contents at the sentencing
hearing. Moreover, the existence and number of appellant’s prior
convictions would have been readily available from official
records and were included in both the probation report and the
People’s sentencing brief, which the trial court read and
considered. (See Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 81.)

                                 8
       It is not reasonably probable that appellant would have
received a more favorable sentence if the trial court had made its
findings based on certified records. For example, the trial court
expressly stated it was not inclined to give appellant much by
way of leniency based on his lack of remorse, or any
acknowledgment or accountability for his actions. Indeed, the
trial court explained, “the sentence accurately reflects the
defendant’s behavior” and “satisfies the goals of public safety.”
To the extent the aggravating circumstances were not stipulated
to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt, any error in taking
them into consideration is harmless. (Flores, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 500; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836.)
                             Disposition
       The judgment is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                                YEGAN, J.
We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                                9
                     Ryan J. Wright, Judge
               Superior Court County of Ventura
                ______________________________

     Nancy Wechsler, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.