Court Opinion

ID: 9853751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:53:29.488949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:03.906507
License: Public Domain

DONALDSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from that part of the majority opinion ' which allows jurisdiction to be waived for the defendant Wolf. The majority states that there are two inconsistent *484statutes governing the age at which jurisdiction can be waived, and then holds that I.C. § 18-216, which allows jurisdiction to be waived for Wolf, must control in this conflict.
Wolf was fifteen at the time the crime was committed. Idaho Code § 18-216, in the Criminal Code, bars the criminal trial of juveniles. This section was passed in 1972 and bars outright the criminal trial of persons under fourteen. It also bars the trial of persons age fourteen through seventeen unless the court has waived jurisdiction pursuant to Ch. 18, Title 16 of the Idaho Code.
The Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA), I.C. § 16-1801 et seq., specifically addresses that issue. The YRA contains the waiver provision in I.C. § 16-1806. Previous to 1976, I.C. § 16-1806 allowed jurisdiction to be waived for persons between sixteen and eighteen years of age for the trial of felonies. In 1976 the statute was amended by deleting the eighteen year limit and also by deleting the felony requirement. 1976 Idaho Sess.Laws 821.
Jurisdiction cannot be waived in the Wolf case for several reasons. Specific statutes must govern over more general statutes. Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942). The YRA is the more specific statute dealing with juvenile jurisdiction. Idaho Code § 18-216 requires waiver to be ordered pursuant to the requirements of I.C. § 16-1806, in which case waiver cannot be ordered for someone under sixteen.
Statutory construction rules give effect at the latest enactment of the legislature. Jordan v. Pearce, 91 Idaho 687, 429 P.2d 419 (1967); State v. Davidson, 78 Idaho 553, 309 P.2d 211 (1957); see generally IA C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.09 (4th ed. 1972). In this case the legislature last addressed the age issue in the previously mentioned 1976 amendment which deleted the eighteen-year-old limit. That amendment was to I.C. § 16-1806 and was effective March 30, 1976. Both before and after the amendment, Wolf could not be tried as an adult.
As much as legislative history can come from later enactments, Immaculate Heart of Mary High School, Inc. v. Anderson, 96 Idaho 226, 526 P.2d 831 (1974), the legislature considered I.C. § 16-1806 the controlling statute for the age limit for waiver. In 1977 I.C. § 16-1806 was amended to lower the minimum for waiver from sixteen to fifteen. 1977 Idaho Sess.Laws 427.
If the legislative history is at all clear, the conflict must be resolved to say that waiver was not permitted for those under sixteen.
“When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted.” [citations omitted]. The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.
People v. Smith, 44 Cal.2d 77, 79, 279 P.2d 33, 34 (1955).
Because I feel the statutes should be read to bar the waiver of jurisdiction over Wolf, I do not address any of the other issues1 which the majority opinion raises.

. There are also serious equal protection, due process, and ex post facto problems with allowing the statute to be construed to the detriment of the defendant Wolf.