Court Opinion

ID: 9498677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:24:55.365856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:00.195647
License: Public Domain

SYKES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Judge Kennelly did not impermissibly participate in plea negotiations in violation of Rule 11(c)(1). Rather, he explained his reasons for rejecting the parties’ initial plea agreement, as Kraus explicitly requires. United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir.1998).
A defendant “has no absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted by the court.” Id. (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)). Rule 11(c)(1) prohibits judicial participation in plea negotiations, but when a plea agreement is presented to the court for approval, “it is not only permitted but expected that the court will take an active role in evaluating the agreement.” Id. at 452. Prosecuting criminal offenders is an executive function but sentencing is a shared power. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989); United States v. Spillman, 924 F.2d 721, 724 (7th Cir.1991). The court may reject a plea agreement because it calls for a sentence that is too lenient or too harsh or because it unduly limits the court’s sentencing discretion. Kraus, 137 F.3d at 453; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A).
The court’s duty of independent evaluation extends with special force to “lock in” plea agreements under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). “[Wjhere the parties have agreed to a particular sentence pursuant to [Rule 11(c)(1)(C),] ... the court has the power— *664and under the Sentencing Guidelines, the explicit obligation — to consider whether that sentence is adequate and to reject the plea agreement if the court finds it not to be.” Kraus, 137 F.3d at 453 (citing U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(e); United States v. Crowell, 60 F.3d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1995); United States v. Skidmore, 998 F.2d 372, 376 (6th Cir.1993)).
When a district court rejects a plea agreement, “it must be able to articulate a sound reason for doing so.” Id. (quotation omitted). This is to prevent arbitrariness, discipline the exercise of discretion, and facilitate review. Id. This court held in Kraus that when a district court rejects a plea agreement, “the court may and, under our precedent, must explain why it finds the agreement objectionable.” Id. (emphasis added). Although the court’s explanation “no doubt will have an effect on any future negotiations,” it will not be construed as impermissible participation in plea negotiations in violation of Rule 11(c)(1) “[s]o long as the court speaks in the context of ‘actively evaluating a plea agreement’ ... and its remarks are confined to the agreement before it.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, Judge Kennelly was presented with a plea agreement that he found unacceptable. He announced two reasons for rejecting it: 1) although he had no objection in principle to a § 5K1.1 departure for O’Neill’s substantial cooperation, the proposed “lock-in” fixing the sentence at 124 months would unacceptably cabin his discretion; and 2) the fixed sentence of 124 months might be too lenient. In my view, this explanation did not make the judge a participant in plea negotiations in violation of Rule 11(c)(1). Judge Kennelly was required under Kraus to explain why he was rejecting the agreement, and he did so. He confined himself to the terms of the agreement before him and spoke in the context of evaluating that agreement. O’Neill’s guilty plea was not tainted by impermissible judicial participation in plea negotiations.
What O’Neill is really complaining about is not the integrity of his plea but the length of his sentence. The plea agreement was renegotiated, the new agreement was accepted by the court, and O’Neill’s sentence of 224 months is within the sentence range called for by that agreement, although at the very top of the stipulated range. O’Neill now argues that because his 224-month sentence was at the bottom of the otherwise applicable guidelines range, he did not get a § 5K1.1 departure after all. That the sentence did not actually “depart” from the otherwise applicable range makes no difference here because O’Neill agreed to it, albeit as an outer limit to the judge’s discretion.
As Judge Posner notes, the usual remedy for impermissible judicial participation in plea negotiations is to set aside the plea, on the theory that judicial participation categorically undermines the plea’s volun-tariness. See Kraus, 137 F.3d at 458. O’Neill did not seek to withdraw his plea or otherwise object to Judge Kennelly’s comments in the district court, so he is here on plain error review. Although he is claiming a Rule 11(c)(1) violation, he has not asked us to vacate his plea and conviction. He just wants to be resentenced. But there must be an error for us to grant relief, and there is no sentencing error here apart from the mandatory application of the sentencing guidelines contrary to the remedial opinion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The Booker error calls for a limited remand under United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir.2005). However, because O’Neill’s sentence is within the range stipulated by the plea agreement and the district court did not *665impermissibly participate in plea negotiations, neither resentencing nor plea withdrawal is warranted. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.