Court Opinion

ID: 9714531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:39:56.343788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:26.911790
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER, dissenting: The majority opinion states that the “sole question on review is whether or not the defendant architect was a * * person having charge of the erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal, or painting of any building, * * *’ within the meaning of the Structural Work Act.” The basis of the opinion is dependent upon the contract entered into by the owner of the hospital and the contractor, and the interpretation of this contract to determine whether or not the architect (defendant) had a right to stop the work. The majority conclude that for an architect to be “in charge of” a project he must have the authority “to stop the work” whenever such stoppage may be necessary for the proper execution of the contract. In my opinion, the contract in question gave the defendant architect broad authority over the construction job and he did have authority to stop tire work. The jury in awarding damages to the plaintiff also concluded the defendant had tins broad authority. This conclusion follows from a study of the entire contract which was prepared by the defendant and in particular The General Conditions. The holding of the majority is refuted by the following language in the contract: “Paragraph 5 (Supervision): All work shall be done under the supervision of the architect, designated by the owner.” The following language appears in Paragraph 31 (Owner’s Right to Stop Work or Terminate Contract) of the General Conditions: “(a) If * * 9 (3) the contractor shall refuse or fail after notice of warning from the architect to supply enough properly skilled workmen, or proper materials, or * 9 9. (b) The Contractor shall fail or refuse to regard laws, ordinances, or the instructions of the Architect * 9 *. The owner upon the certificate of the Architect that sufficient cause exists to justify such action * 9 9 may * * * terminate the employment of the contractor.” There are also many instances in The Special Conditions which clearly indicate it was the intent of the contract that the defendant was to be classified as a “person having charge.” In Voss v. Kingdon and Naven, Inc., 9 Ill.App.3d 30, the court reversed the trial court which had directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of all the evidence. The Supreme Court in Voss v. Kingdon and Naven, Inc., 60 Ill.2d 520, affirmed the appellate court and quoted extensively from the Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. case. The term “having charge of” was defined in the Larson case and such definition clearly applies to the instant case. The following language in the Larson case is also significant: “Even at common law retention of the right to control the work is sufficient to subject one to duty and tort responsibility, [citations] and the retention of the right to control must carry with it the same duty and responsibility under the Scaffold Act. Other-wise, the absurd result would be that a statute designed to broaden the common-law duty and to give added protection, would be construed as imposing a lesser duty than the common law. Certainly it was not the legislative intent that those retaining the right to supervise or control the work could be freed from duty by doing nothing, for section 9 imposes liability for a wilful failure to comply with any of the provisions of the act, as well as wilful violation. * * *” (33 Ill.2d 316, 325.) The defendant’s position in the Voss case was practically the same as the defendant in the instant case. Both defendants prepared the contracts and in their view the contract did not give them complete control. However, the Supreme and Appellate courts in the Voss case said the question was a proper one to submit to a jury. The majority states whether or not an architect is a person in charge within the meaning of the Structural Work Act is in each situation a question of fact to be determined not only from written contracts available but also from surrounding circumstances and the role in fact assumed by the architect. In my opinion, the jury was correct in its determination that the defendant was a person in charge within the meaning of the Structural Work Act. The jury considered the written contract, all of the testimony and was properly instructed by the court. The verdict was proper in accordance with the law and the evidence and should be affirmed.