Court Opinion

ID: 9863029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:50:53.266559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:06.346143
License: Public Domain

CLEMENS, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent and would affirm the trial court’s denial of interpleader. That remedy should not be granted merely because the insurer asks for it. The purpose of life insurance is to provide the beneficiary with money at the time of insured’s death. In-terpleader defeats that purpose. It penalizes the beneficiary — not only by delaying payment but also by depleting the fund in allowing court costs and attorney fees. The majority opinion would do just that.
Interpleader is justified only when the stakeholder has a goodfaith doubt about which claimant it should pay, and by paying either the stakeholder would be exposed to the risk of double liability. As we held in State ex rel. Creswell v. Scott, 491 S.W.2d 343 (Mo.App.1973), whether interpleader should be granted depends on existence of: “A dispute of fact upon which the right to interplea turns is real and substantial or only feigned and colorable” and should be granted only when “persons have claims against plaintiffs, and that those claims are of such nature that plaintiffs may be exposed to ‘double liability.’ Obviously, ‘double liability’ means ‘exposed to double recovery for a single liability.’ ” The stakeholder’s grounds for interpleader must appear from the facts alleged in its petition. Baden Bank of St. Louis v. Trapp, 180 S.W.2d 755 [4](Mo.App.1944).
The petition here pleads in essence: Jacob Benedict, deceased-insured in plaintiff’s policy, had designated his wife, Sharon Benedict, as beneficiary; on March 26, 1976 plaintiff-insurer received a change of beneficiary form, signed not by the insured as called for the plaintiff’s printed form, but by his ex-wife Carolyn, naming herself as beneficiary; two days later Jacob Benedict died; both Sharon and Carolyn claimed the policy proceeds; and plaintiff “is unable to *347determine which claimant is entitled to the proceeds of the policy.”
In my view the petition failed to plead facts showing plaintiff was entitled to in-terpleader. This, because the petition showed neither a real and substantial dispute as to whom the proceeds were payable, nor that plaintiff would be exposed to double liability by paying the named beneficiary, the insured’s widow.
In Lafayette-Southside Bank & Trust Co. v. Siefert, 223 Mo.App. 431, 18 S.W.2d 572 (1929), a judgment granting interpleader to the bank was reversed. The bank had issued certificates of deposit to Katherina Rose and Emma Dipple, payable to either or the survivor. Katherina Rose died; both Emma Dipple and Katherina’s executor claimed the proceeds. The trial court granted the interpleader and Emma Dipple appealed. In holding the petition did not warrant interpleader, and reversing, the court held “ ‘a mere assertion of claim by another, without alleging anything whatever on which to base it, is not enough to sustain an interpleader. There must be reasonable ground of uncertainty as to which claimant is entitled to the fund, and a bona fide controversy between rival claimants. Where the petitioner may be discharged from all liability by paying the money to one of the claimants, an inter-pleader will not be sustained.’ ” So it is here.
The other case is Meredith v. Meredith, 235 Mo.App. 1010, 148 S.W.2d 611 (1941). There, plaintiff-wife pleaded defendant-husband had breached a post-nuptial contract, that her husband had agreed to surrender certain personal property to her, among which were securities defendant owned but were being held by him in his safety deposit box at the Mercantile Bank. The wife alleged an equitable lien on the securities and sought to compel the bank to surrender them into a trust fund to await adjudication of her claims. The bank responded with a bill of interpleader seeking to be “relieved from the danger of being held liable ... to different parties.” The trial court granted interpleader but we reversed. In holding this was not a proper case for interpleader we held: “We do not believe that any one could entertain any reasonable doubt as to the rights of the parties to the securities in question. There is nothing in the amended petition or in the cross-bill to throw a shadow of a doubt upon defendant Charles A. Meredith’s right of ownership and right to possession of these securities as against any claim of plaintiff as disclosed by her petition.” The court reasoned: “The rule is well settled that an action of interpleader can only be sustained where it appears that a reasonable doubt exists as to which of the claimants to the fund is in the right. It is not sufficient to show that rival claims are made. It must also appear that the elements of a bona fide controversy exist between the rival claimants over the right to the fund or property in question; nor is it sufficient that the stakeholder merely establish that suits have been brought against him, or that suits have been threatened by different claimants to a fund or property held by him in order to entitle him to the protection of a court of equity, but he must set forth facts disclosing the existence of a reasonable doubt as to whom he can safely deliver the fund or property in dispute, and, of course, where there are two claimants, and it clearly appears from the allegations of the bill that the claim of one of them is without merit, the bill does not state a cause of action.”
I would apply the reasoning of these cases to the one before us. By its petition the plaintiff acknowledged a clear unchanged obligation to pay the policy proceeds to the insured’s widow, Sharon, his named beneficiary. Her claim was based on a clear, express contractual right. The insurer sought to avoid its obligation by asserting that insured’s former wife, a stranger to the contract, had claimed the proceeds by virtue of having herself signed a change of beneficiary form. The trial court held in effect that this ineffective document did not create a real and substantial doubt as to whom plaintiff should pay, nor in paying the named beneficiary would plaintiff-insurer be exposed to double liabil*348ity. The effect of granting interpleader would have been to deprive the widow of her just funds until the coils of the law unwound, and would have further penalized her for the insurers’ attorney fees and court costs. The petition for interpleader did not state facts which entitled the plaintiff to interpleader.
I would affirm and hold the trial court did not erroneously apply the law in denying interpleader.