Court Opinion

ID: 9954585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 17:01:29.688285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:06.129003
License: Public Domain

DLD-074                                           NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                       No. 23-3105
                                       ___________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                                      JAMES COLE,
                                                       Appellant

                        __________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                        (D.C. Criminal No. 2-91-cr-00570-002)
                       District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond
                      ____________________________________

                  Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action
                   Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
                                   February 22, 2024

                Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion filed: March 26, 2024)
                                       _________

                                        OPINION *
                                        _________

PER CURIAM

       James Cole, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
orders denying his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)

and his motion to reconsider that ruling. The Government moves for summary

affirmance. We grant the Government’s motion and will summarily affirm.

       In 1993, Cole was convicted of conspiring to distribute, and to possess with the

intent to distribute, heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; engaging in a

continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848; and possessing

cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The convictions

arose from Cole’s leadership role in a largescale, violent drug trafficking operation in the

Philadelphia area. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. Cole was

unsuccessful on direct appeal and in various post-judgment proceedings.

       At issue here is Cole’s most recent motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 1 In the motion, he sought early release from his life sentence on the

ground that he now meets the age and sentence requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii)

because he is seventy years old and has served thirty years in custody. Cole alternatively

sought early release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because, he argued, his age, medical

1
  This was Cole’s third motion for “compassionate release” in recent years. In September
2020, he sought compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) on the grounds that his
age and medical conditions placed him at heightened risk of serious illness if he were to
contract COVID-19. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that even if these
factors constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the
sentencing concerns set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) counseled against release. In
December 2022, Cole filed another motion for compassionate release based on his
medical conditions. The District Court again denied relief, explaining that nothing
material had changed since his last motion, and that the § 3553(a) factors still outweighed
the risks posed by his medical conditions.

                                             2
conditions (arthritis and diabetes), rehabilitative efforts, and time already spent in custody

constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting release. The District Court

denied the motion, explaining that (1) § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) does not apply to him; and (2)

even if his age, medical conditions, and rehabilitative efforts constituted “extraordinary

and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the sentencing concerns set forth in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) counseled against release. Cole moved for reconsideration, but the

District Court denied relief. He appealed. 2

       The “compassionate release” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3582 allows a district court

to reduce a prisoner’s sentence if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a

reduction,” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), or, alternatively, the prisoner meets the age and sentence

demands of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). Before granting compassionate release, a district court

must consider “the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are

applicable.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include “the nature and circumstances of

the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(1), as well

as the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect

for the law, . . . to provide just punishment for the offense,” “to afford adequate

2
  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review both the District Court’s order
denying Cole’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion and its order denying reconsideration thereof.
Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly authorize the filing of
a motion for reconsideration in a criminal matter, the Supreme Court has held that the
timely filing of such a motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. See United
States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8–9 (1976); United States v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412, 1413–
14 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). We review both orders for an abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Dupree,
617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010).
                                               3
deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C).

       The District Court acted well within its discretion in denying Cole’s

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion. First, the District Court correctly concluded that Cole was not

eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) because that provision applies only to

prisoners who had been sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), the “three strikes”

provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) (stating that the district court may modify a

prison term if, among other things, the defendant has served at least 30 years of a

sentence imposed under section 3559(c)). Second, the District Court reasonably

concluded that release was not warranted under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in light of the §

3553(a) factors. As the District Court explained, given Cole’s leadership role in a

notoriously violent criminal enterprise, early release from his life sentence would not

protect the safety of the community, see § 3553(a)(2)(C), or reflect the seriousness of the

underlying crimes, see § 3553(a)(2)(A).

       The District Court also acted within its discretion in denying Cole’s motions for

reconsideration. Although Cole argued that the District Court had not sufficiently

addressed each of his arguments, the record reflects that it had. See Dist. Ct. Order 2,

ECF No. 747. Moreover, Cole did not provide any legal or factual support for his

contention that the District Judge who adjudicated his compassionate-release motion

improperly reassigned the case to a different district judge; rather, the docket report

indicates that the Chief Judge reassigned the case at random pursuant to the court’s

standard practice upon a judge’s retirement. Order, ECF No. 759; see also E.D. Pa. Rule

                                              4
50.1(d). Lastly, to the extent that Cole challenged the District Court’s finding that his

medical conditions were “stable and well-managed in the prison environment,” Order 3,

ECF No. 747, the District Court reasonably determined that even if they were not, the

sentencing factors counseled against releasing Cole.

       We have considered Cole’s arguments on appeal and conclude that they are

meritless. Accordingly, because this appeal does not present a substantial question, see

Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), we grant the

Government’s motion and summarily affirm. 3

3
  The Government’s requests for leave to file its motion for summary affirmance out of
time and to be excused from filing a brief are granted.
                                             5