Court Opinion

ID: 9699177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:12:22.620741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:46.788985
License: Public Domain

Hornby, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion, in which PrBscott and Marbury, JJ., concurred.
The majority, in assuming that the assertion “we just yoked a man” was made by a person other than the defendant, treated the statement as an implied admission and held in effect that the lower court did not err when it admitted the purported admission in evidence over the objection of the defendant without cautioning the jury either at that time or in its instructions as to the peculiar nature of the testimony and the effect the jury was permitted to give to it. To me, this action on the part of the lower court constituted reversible error and should not be countenanced.
We are in substantial agreement that an implied admission is not substantive evidence of the fact asserted and that the basis for its admissibility lies in the probable truthfulness of the statement which is inferrable from the failure to speak. We further agree that the admissibility of a purported admission presents a preliminary question for the court and an ultimate question for the jury as to whether the accused heard *622the incriminating statement and understood that he was being accused of complicity in the crime, if, after the preliminary inquiry, the court determines that the statement is admissible. Barber v. State, 191 Md. 555, 62 A. 2d 616 (1948); McCormick, Evidence, § 247; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th ed.), §§ 660, 662. And, of course, should the statement and conduct of the accused be properly admitted as evidence, the jury has a right to consider the same testimony (as did the court in deciding whether it was admissible) in determining the weight to be given to it, and the inferences to be drawn from the silence or conduct of the accused. But because there is a very real danger (unless the jury is specifically cautioned and it was not in this case) that the jury might give credence to the statement itself rather than to the inference deducible from silence, it is my considered opinion that, in addition to preliminarily determining whether the incriminating statement was actually made, whether the defendant heard and understood the statement and comprehended its meaning and whether he was physically able and at liberty to speak, the lower court (if all of the aforegoing requirements are met) should then determine whether the statement was made under such circumstances as naturally called for a denial or reply before admitting the purported admission as evidence. See Note, Evidence-Admissibility of Adoptive Admissions, 29 N. Y. U. Law Rev. 1266; McCormick, op. cit., supra. And cf. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Metc.) 235 (1847), a leading case on the subject.
In the instant case, where it was not shown who made the statement, the assertion could have been made by the defendant, the codefendant or by some other person other than the defendant. But if it is assumed, as it was by the lower court and the majority of this Court, that the response “we just yoked a man” to the inquiry as to “what they were doing,” was not made by the defendant, there was some evidence tending to show (though the defendant testified that there was neither an inquiry nor a response) that the statement was actually made. It also appears that a reasonable inference could be drawn from the evidence that the defendant could have heard and understood the assertion and compre*623hended its significance. And the evidence was such as to permit a further inference that the defendant remained silent without compulsion. But it seems clear to me that the circumstances when considered as a whole did not naturally call for a reply by the defendant. For here—where the statement was made in a place (a practically deserted alley) where and at a time (in the middle of the night) when only the defendant and the codefendant and their teen-age friends and acquaintances were present—it is evident that whatever may have motivated the response to the question asked, the surrounding circumstances were not such as to require the accused to either deny or object to the incriminating statement. Instead, it appears that the assertion was more likely to have been the boast of a criminal-minded teen-ager rather than an accusation that the defendant had participated in the yoking of the victim. In determining whether a reply is required, the test generally applied is whether a reasonable person similarly situated would have thought it necessary to deny the statement. People v. Kozlowski, 13 N. E. 2d 174 (Ill. 1938); 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 570; Annotations, 80 A. L. R. 1235, 1250, and 115 A. L. R. 2d 1510, 1516. There was no compelling reason here requiring a denial of the statement by the defendant.
Inasmuch as the lower court, despite the repeated objections to the admissibility of the statement, neglected to explain to the jury the nature and effect of what the State characterized as “a most devastating admission,” it is my opinion that the judgment, instead of being affirmed, should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Judges Prescott and Marbury authorize me to say that they concur with the views herein expressed.