Court Opinion

ID: 9396172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 18:04:29.618306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:14.452803
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/19/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION EIGHT

  ARNETTE TRAVIS et al.,             B298104

      Plaintiffs and Appellants,

          v.                         Los Angeles County
                                     Super. Ct. No. BC665330
  BILL BRAND et al.,

      Defendants and Respondents;

  REDONDO BEACH
  WATERFRONT, LLC, et al.,

      Appellants.

  ARNETTE TRAVIS et al.,            B301479

      Plaintiffs and Appellants,     Los Angeles County
                                     Super. Ct. No. BC665330
          v.

  BILL BRAND et al.,

      Defendants and Respondents.
       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Malcolm H. Mackey, Judge. Reversed.
       Shumener, Odson & Oh, Betty M. Shumener, John D.
Spurling, and Daniel E. French for Plaintiffs and Appellants
Arnette Travis and Chris Voisey.
       Stevan Colin for Defendants and Respondents Bill Brand,
Brand for Mayor 2017, and Linda Moffat.
       Jeanne L. Zimmer for Defendant and Respondent Nils
Nehrenheim.
       Law Office of Bobak Nayebdadash and Bobak Nayebdadash
for Defendants and Respondents Wayne Craig and Rescue Our
Waterfront P.A.C.
                         ____________________
       In a case on remand from our Supreme Court, we hold the
defendants and respondents are not entitled to an award of
attorney fees. We apply two statutory attorney fee provisions:
the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Gov. Code, § 81000 et seq. (the
Act); § 91003, subd. (a)), as well as Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5.
       This matter is, one hopes, the final stage of a lawsuit about
an electoral campaign in 2016 and 2017. Supporters of a local
measure succeeded at the ballot box, but thereafter opponents of
the measure sued them for campaign disclosure violations. In an
earlier decision, we held the prevailing defendants were entitled
to attorney fees under the Act, whether or not the plaintiffs had a
foundation for bringing the case. (Travis v. Brand (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 240, 263–264 (Travis I).)
       The Supreme Court granted review and reversed: a
prevailing defendant may recover attorney fees under the Act
only if the plaintiff brought or maintained the suit without

                                 2
foundation. (Travis v. Brand (2023) 14 Cal.5th 411, 427–428
(Travis II).)
       We now revisit the attorney fee issue and reverse the trial
court’s fee award and our previous result. Although the plaintiffs
lost at trial, they marshaled a foundation for their suit and,
according to the Act, thus now avoid the bill for the other side’s
lawyers. A second basis for a fee award—Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5—is inapplicable because this suit neither enforced
an important right affecting the public interest nor conferred a
significant benefit on the general public.
       Unless otherwise noted, citations are to the Government
Code.
                                   I
       Our statement of facts is long and detailed by necessity.
Our first job is to determine whether this lawsuit had a
foundation in the facts. The facts involve a considerable cast.
                                  A
       We introduce the actors according to their attitudes about a
proposed redevelopment of the Redondo Beach waterfront. (See
Redondo Beach Waterfront, LLC v. City of Redondo Beach (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 982, 986–990.) Forces opposing the
redevelopment backed a Measure C. Those favoring
redevelopment opposed Measure C. Voters passed Measure C in
2017. (Id. at p. 990.)
       We generally call those favoring Measure C the Supporters
and those against it the Opponents. In a nutshell, after the
election, the Opponents sued the Supporters but lost at trial.
       Now we populate these two sides—Opponents and
Supporters—with individuals.

                                 3
      The Opponents, Arnette Travis and Chris Voisey, were
against Measure C because they favored the redevelopment
project. They were the plaintiffs and appellants in this action.
They sued the Supporters of Measure C, which curtailed the
redevelopment.
      The Supporters included a political action committee and
two municipal officials. The political action committee was
Rescue Our Waterfront P.A.C. (Rescue). The officials were
Redondo Beach Mayor Bill Brand and Redondo Beach City
Councilmember Nils Nehrenheim.
      The Opponents also sued Wayne Craig, the principal officer
of Rescue; Brand’s mayoral campaign committee; and the
committee’s treasurer, Linda Moffat.
      All these defendants—Rescue, Brand, Nehrenheim, Craig,
the campaign committee, and Moffat—are now respondents in
this appeal. We generally refer to all of them as the Supporters.
      When the Opponents lost at trial, the court entered
judgment and awarded attorney fees against them. They
appealed the judgment and the fees.
      Redondo Beach Waterfront, LLC (Waterfront), Fred
Bruning, and Jean Paul Wardy also appealed the judgment.
Bruning and Wardy were the principals for Waterfront and for
CenterCal Properties, LLC (CenterCal). CenterCal is a developer
the City of Redondo Beach selected in 2012 for proposed
redevelopment of the city’s waterfront. We call Waterfront,
Bruning, and Wardy collectively the Nonparties.

                                4
                                   B
       We summarize aspects of Redondo Beach’s March 7, 2017
election, which resulted in electoral victories for Measure C,
Brand, and Nehrenheim.
       On June 28, 2016, Craig, Nehrenheim, and one Martin
Holmes submitted a “Notice of Intent to Circulate Petition” to the
city of Redondo Beach seeking to place a local initiative—later
designated Measure C—on the ballot for the next election. They
succeeded: Measure C indeed was on that ballot. Measure C
aimed to limit waterfront development.
       On July 1, 2016, Craig and Holmes signed a “Statement of
Organization” form designating Rescue as a primarily formed
committee and listing the measure Rescue was primarily formed
to support. Craig and Holmes also designated Rescue as a
general purpose committee on the form and left the controlled
committee section blank, indicating Rescue was not candidate
controlled. The Secretary of State rejected the form because
Rescue could be primarily formed, or general purpose, but not
both.
       These classifications—“primarily formed,” “general
purpose,” and “controlled”—are statutory terms of art unfamiliar
to a general audience, but they are fundamental to the merits of
this case.
       Later we define these classifications more comprehensively,
but for now we note that primarily formed committees support or
oppose a single candidate, single measure, multiple candidates in
a single election, or multiple measures in a single election.
(§ 82047.5.) General purpose committees support or oppose more
than one candidate or ballot measure. (§ 82027.5.) There is some
overlap in the definitions, but if a committee meets the primarily

                                5
formed criteria, it is not general purpose. (See id.) Either type of
committee may also be candidate-controlled, which means a
candidate has significant influence over the committee.
(§ 82016.)
       The main disclosure in this case was in the committee
name. Committees primarily formed to support or oppose a
measure must say so in their name, for example “No on Measure
A,” or, of more relevance, “Yes on Measure C.” (See § 84107; Cal.
Fair Pol. Practices Com., Committee Naming Requirements, at
 [as of March 17, 2021], archived at
.) Similarly, a controlling
candidate’s name is part of the committee’s name. (Cal. Code
Reg., tit. 2, § 18521.5.)
       We return to Rescue. Craig and Holmes corrected and
resubmitted Rescue’s Statement of Organization form in August
2016. They designated it a general purpose committee. They
described their plan for Rescue’s activities on the form: “Support
candidates & ballot measures to preserve the Redondo Beach
Coastal zone and related activities.” Craig and Holmes again left
the controlled committee section blank, indicating Rescue was not
candidate controlled.
       Voters favored Measure C in the March 7, 2017 election.
Brand won his bid for mayor. Nehrenheim qualified for a run-off
election and later won a seat on the city council.

                                 6
                                 C
      After the election, on June 15, 2017, the Opponents filed a
complaint alleging the Supporters violated the Act and related
regulations.
      The complaint included two main issues, both related to the
March 7, 2017 election and Measure C.
      The first issue was about Rescue’s purpose. The Opponents
alleged Rescue was not a general purpose committee but rather a
primarily formed committee that its founders created to support
Measure C. The Opponents contended the law thus required
Rescue, as a primarily formed committee, to include words like
“Yes on Measure C” in its name. Additionally, Rescue could not
have categorized expenditures to support Measure C as
independent expenditures.
      The second issue was about whether Brand and
Nehrenheim controlled Rescue. The Opponents alleged Brand
and Nehrenheim “exerted significant influence and control over”
Rescue and were “controlling candidates.” According to the
Opponents, the candidates improperly “failed to disclose [their]
controlling candidate status on their campaign reports.”
      The Opponents sought injunctive relief compelling the
Supporters to comply with the Act.
      The Supporters moved for summary judgment. The court
found there were triable issues of material fact and denied
summary judgment.
      A five-day bench trial began November 14, 2018. We
summarize this 11-witness trial.
      Travis and Voisey testified they were residents of Redondo
Beach and followed local politics.

                               7
       Craig, principal officer and treasurer of Rescue, formed
Rescue with Holmes. He testified they intended Rescue to
support multiple activities, candidates, and ballot measures
related to the Redondo harbor area. Selecting both “primarily
formed” and “general purpose” on Rescue’s initial Statement of
Organization form was simply an error.
       Craig said Rescue did a “huge number of things” to support
Measure C. It paid to publish its title, summary, and notice in a
local newspaper; it printed petitions; and it paid for signature
gatherers to circulate the petitions. It also paid for yard signs,
door hangers, and mailers in favor of Measure C. Rescue and its
volunteers knocked on doors and made phone calls in favor of
Measure C.
       Craig said no candidate ever directed or controlled Rescue.
Rescue distributed a mailer that supported Measure C and four
candidates, including Brand and Nehrenheim. Rescue had a
fundraiser with Brand and Nehrenheim in November 2016, but
Craig “didn’t have any conversations” with Brand and
Nehrenheim leading up to the event.
       Nehrenheim and Brand testified. They denied having
control or significant influence over Rescue, but they admitted
involvement with and support for Measure C.
       According to his resume, Nehrenheim was a “Co-writer” of
the initiative that became Measure C. He testified he had a role
in writing the measure by gathering information from the
community. Both candidates helped collect signatures in support
of placing the measure on the ballot. Nehrenheim’s campaign
literature promoted Measure C. Brand placed newspaper
advertisements in support of Measure C.

                                8
       Brand shared with Rescue his subscription to an online
program that provides information about voters. That program
charged Brand if a user selected a voter population. Brand gave
Rescue access, but “didn’t talk to them about it.” Brand did not
require Rescue to reimburse the charges it accrued. Brand
disclosed these charges as non-monetary contributions to Rescue.
       Ann Ravel testified as an expert for the Opponents. She
chaired the California Fair Political Practices Commission (the
Commission) between 2011 and 2013. She concluded Rescue was
primarily formed. This was based on Rescue’s activities in
support of Measure C as well as the proportion of Rescue’s
spending that was for the measure. Ravel also concluded Brand
and Nehrenheim were controlling candidates of Rescue.
       After the Opponents rested, the Supporters moved for
nonsuit. The court denied this mid-stream effort to end the trial:
“This is not the type of case. I need further evidence.”
       The Supporters called Travis and Voisey a second time and
asked about the lawsuit’s funding. As of trial, Travis had not
paid anything to prosecute the case and said she did not know
the payment arrangement she had with her lawyers. Like
Travis, Voisey said he had not paid any court-related costs. He
said he was not aware of arrangements in which anyone
promised to pay to prosecute the case.
       An expert testified for the Supporters. She disagreed with
Ravel. She believed Rescue was a general purpose committee
and neither Brand nor Nehrenheim controlled it. She conceded
that at the end of 2016, Rescue had reason to know almost all of
its political expenditures were in support of Measure C. She said
Rescue originated as a general purpose committee and did not
need to change its status to primarily formed, though, because it

                                9
did not meet a total spending threshold and because the election
was over.
       The Supporters called the Opponents’ attorney, Bradley
Hertz, to testify. Over the Opponents’ objection, the court
allowed the Supporters to ask him about the lawsuit’s funding.
Hertz said his clients were Travis and Voisey, but Waterfront, a
company whose principals were involved in the proposed
waterfront redevelopment, was paying for the lawsuit.
       After Hertz testified, Brand’s attorney moved to dismiss the
lawsuit. Counsel argued Waterfront was the real party in
interest and it lacked standing. The court denied the motion and
said, “[w]e’ll face the real issues on the case.”
       At the end of the trial, the court made oral findings in favor
of the Supporters.
       The Opponents declared they could not afford legal fees and
costs and had given informed written consent for Waterfront to
fund the litigation on their behalf before they filed the case.
       The court entered judgment in favor of the Supporters. The
judgment included several findings. Rescue was formed as a
general purpose committee, never became a primarily formed
committee, and was not a controlled committee. The court ruled
none of the Supporters needed to amend their campaign
statements or forms.
       The court made additional findings about the Opponents.
They were “ ‘shills’ for [the Nonparties] . . . who initiated the
instant lawsuit against the [Supporters] and directed and
financed the prosecution of this case against each of the
[Supporters].” The court entered the judgment not only against
the Opponents but also against the Nonparties.

                                 10
       The court signed a statement of decision reflecting these
findings. The court found the Supporters and their expert
witness to be credible.
       The court awarded the Supporters $862,736.60 in attorney
fees against the Opponents. This award was pursuant to the Act
and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. This is the ruling at
issue today.
       The Opponents and the Nonparties appealed the judgment.
The Opponents also appealed the attorney fees. We consolidated
the appeals.
       In our earlier opinion, we held the Nonparties had standing
to appeal the judgment, the court erred by entering judgment
against them, and substantial evidence supported the court’s
findings that Rescue was a general purpose committee and was
not a controlled committee. (Travis I, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 255–263.) The Supreme Court’s review was not about those
holdings.
       The trial court granted attorney fees to the victorious
defendants: the Supporters. Our first opinion held the Act gave
the trial court authority to award attorney fees to these
defendants irrespective of whether the plaintiffs had a foundation
for bringing the case. (Travis I, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp.
263–264.)
       The Supreme Court reversed on that issue: a prevailing
defendant may recover attorney fees under the Act only if the
plaintiff brought or maintained the suit without foundation.
(Travis II, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 427–428.) The high court
remanded for us to determine whether the Supporters
demonstrated the lawsuit was objectively groundless or,

                               11
alternatively, whether Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5
supported the award. (Id. at p. 428.)
                                   II
       We reverse the trial court’s award of attorney fees because
it violates both the Act and Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5. The standard of review for fee awards is abuse of
discretion. (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th
1169, 1175.) Our review is independent when we construe
statutory requirements for a fee award. (Ibid.) The Opponents
must show error. (See Laffitte v. Robert Half International Inc.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488.)
                                    A
       The award was not proper under the Act. Under Travis II,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pages 427–428, a prevailing defendant is
entitled to fees only if the court finds the action was objectively
without foundation when the plaintiffs brought it, or the plaintiff
continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The trial court
found the lawsuit was frivolous and groundless. This finding
lacks support. The court abused its discretion by awarding fees
under the Act.
       The trial court explained its finding as follows: “As I
already decreed, the [Opponents] were shills for [] Waterfront;
that the [Supporters] acted in good faith; that Rescue [] was
always a general purpose committee; and that Brand and
Nehrenheim do not control or significantly influence the actions
of [Rescue]. . . . [The Opponents] attempted to punish [the
Supporters] because of their free-speech rights exercised in
publicly supporting Measure C on the city’s ballot, and [the
Supporters’] support for Measure C was to guard against a
525,000-square-feet encroachment on the city’s waterfront in

                                12
Santa Monica Bay; and the people voted, along with the
[Supporters], to reject this project. So the Court finds that the
suit was frivolous, and that’s my ruling.”
       The trial court’s statement concentrates on motive, not
foundation. Motive and foundation are quite different. You can
have a vile motive for bringing a valid suit: you might
subjectively loathe and envy the defendant, but your suit can be
legally correct and fully supported by the evidence. Conversely,
you can have lofty motives for baseless litigation: you can be
pure of heart but legally inept. So a particular motive does not
negate foundation. Neither does outside funding. Under the
Travis II standard, the trial court’s rationale for its ruling was
incorrect.
       That does not settle the matter by any means, for we
review results and not reasoning. In other words, we do not
reverse a correct result because a court gave an incorrect reason
for it. We must go further to determine what the right legal
result is on these facts.
       The right result under Travis II is that the Opponents owe
no fees because they had ample support for the lawsuit they filed.
These plaintiffs had a foundation for their case at the outset and
throughout the proceedings.
       To size up the foundation for a case, we scrutinize the law,
and then the facts that this law makes material. We start with
the law.
       Section 82047.5 provided that Rescue would be a primarily
formed committee if it were formed, or it existed, primarily to
support or oppose a single measure, such as Measure C. In
contrast, it would be a general purpose committee if it were

                                13
formed or existed primarily to support or oppose more than one
candidate or ballot measure. (§ 82027.5.)
        Regulations specify three ways a committee can be formed
or exist primarily to support or oppose a measure. These are: (1)
the committee was created for or is involved in the primary
campaign for a measure; (2) the committee’s primary purpose and
activities are for the measure; or (3) over 70 percent of the
committee’s contributions and expenditures go to the measure.
(Cal. Code Reg., tit. 2, § 18247.5, subd. (c).) A general purpose
committee must change its status to primarily formed if it meets
one of the three requirements and it makes at least $10,000 in
contributions or expenditures for a local measure. (Id., subd.
(f)(2).)
        A committee can be candidate-controlled under either of
two analyses: (1) the candidate directly or indirectly controls the
committee or (2) the candidate acts jointly with the committee in
making expenditures. (§ 82016.) Candidates control a committee
if they have “a significant influence on the actions or decisions of
the committee.” (Ibid.)
        The lawsuit had foundation. This conclusion follows from
three sources: actions and testimony of the Supporters,
testimony of the Opponents’ expert, and the court’s rulings
throughout the case.
        The Supporters’ actions and testimony created a factual
foundation. Craig originally submitted a Statement of
Organization form designating Rescue as both “Primarily
Formed” and “General Purpose.” Craig said this initial selection
was merely an error and the trial court found him credible. The
Opponents certainly were entitled, however, to believe and to
argue the reasonable inference that Craig originally selected

                                14
“Primarily Formed” because Rescue was primarily formed to
campaign for Measure C.
       Other facts supported the notion that Rescue was created
for, or involved in, the primary campaign for a measure, or that
its primary purpose and activities were for Measure C. Craig
testified about the “huge number of things” Rescue did to support
Measure C. Publishing a measure’s title, summary, and notice,
printing petitions, paying for signature gatherers, paying for yard
signs, door hangers, and mailers, and knocking on doors and
making phone calls in support of a measure are all things one
would expect a primarily formed committee to do. And the
Supporters’ expert said Rescue had reason to know, at the end of
2016, almost all of its political expenditures were in support of
Measure C.
       Some of the Supporters’ testimony likewise contributed to
the suit’s foundation by suggesting Brand and Nehrenheim made
joint expenditures with Rescue or controlled Rescue. The
candidates had a fundraiser with Rescue. Brand gave Rescue
free access to his subscription to an online program that provides
information about voters. Like Rescue, the candidates heavily
promoted Measure C. Nehrenheim helped co-write it. Rescue
and both candidates gathered signatures to place the measure on
the ballot. Nehrenheim’s campaign literature and Brand’s
newspaper advertisements supported Measure C. One
reasonable inference is the candidates and Rescue merely shared
a goal. Another is that this coordination amounted to candidate
control of Rescue.
       The Opponents did not win the trial, but they had a factual
foundation for their claims.

                                15
      The Opponents’ expert’s opinion also poured a foundation of
law for their case. This expert, a former chair of the Commission,
opined Rescue was a primarily formed committee and Brand and
Nehrenheim were controlling candidates. The trial court did not
oust this expert under Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of
Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 772. Some “expert”
opinions are clearly invalid and unreliable. (Ibid.) This expert
opinion had more going for it than that. It provided a foundation.
      Court rulings also reveal the strength of this foundation.
The trial court denied the Supporters’ request for summary
judgment, denied nonsuit after the Opponents rested at trial, and
denied dismissal after Hertz testified about the funding. These
rulings signal the case had some factual and legal support.
      The Supporters’ counterarguments are incorrect.
      Some of the Supporters’ arrows fly far wide of the target.
They argue the Opponents were “motivated” by “hatred of [the
Supporters] and their political views and their continued
verbalization of those views” and substantial evidence supported
the judgment. Motive and outcome do not prove lack of
foundation.
      The Supporters say the Opponents knew Rescue was a
general purpose committee because Rescue corrected its
Statement of Organization form to say so. But the Opponents
thought the correction was erroneous and they sued to prove it.
Their suit had a foundation.
      Finally, the Supporters incorrectly argue a 2010
Commission letter shows the Opponents’ suit lacked foundation.
      We describe this letter, which offered “informal assistance.”
The Commission advised that, if a general purpose committee
reaches spending thresholds only after an election ends, the

                                16
committee need not change its status to primarily formed even if
it otherwise meets the requirements for changing its status. The
letter also explained Commission staff would examine whether to
make the regulation “more prospective” so committees in that
situation would have to change to primarily formed before the
election.
       The 2010 informal assistance letter did not affect the case’s
foundation. The letter, from seven years before the Opponents
filed suit, predicted a potential change in rules. The letter is not
law. Nor would it have been decisive had it been law. The
Opponents argued in part that Rescue was primarily formed from
the start. The issue of changing from general purpose to
primarily formed committee was irrelevant to that argument.
Furthermore, this letter did not address the candidate-controlled
issue. Arguments from this letter do not win the day.
       In sum, the court abused its discretion by awarding fees
under the Act.
                                   B
       We turn to the second basis for the fee award.
       The court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5—the so-called
“private attorney general fees.” The court ordered these fees on
the basis of a faulty free speech argument. On appeal, the
Supporters reiterate this flawed argument. They also raise new
arguments, but these too are erroneous.
       A party must satisfy four elements to earn private attorney
general fees. In shorthand, the elements are: (1) the party
enforces an important right affecting the public interest; (2) the
party confers a significant benefit to the general public or a large
class of people; (3) an award is appropriate because private

                                17
enforcement was necessary and financially burdensome; and (4)
fees must not be paid out of a recovery. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1021.5; Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 934–935 (Woodland).)
       The first two elements are missing from this case, so we do
not address the third. There was no monetary recovery, so the
fourth element does not apply.
       The first two elements require a practical analysis. For
element one, trial courts must “realistically” assess the litigation
and determine, from a “practical perspective,” whether the action
vindicated an important right. (Woodland, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p.
938.) For element two, trial courts must make a “realistic
assessment” of the significance of the benefit and the size of the
class receiving the benefit. (Id. at pp. 939–940.)
       We begin with the court’s rationale for its fee award. With
our emphases, the court’s order asserted the successful defense
“resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the
public interest which has been conferred on the general public by
the [Supporters].” The order’s reasoning, which seems to apply
both to the Act basis and the private attorney general fees basis,
stated the Opponents were “shills” who brought the lawsuit to
“punish” the Supporters for exercising their free speech rights to
support Measure C. The court also said the Supporters were
“guard[ing]” against a “525,000-square-feet encroachment on the
city’s waterfront.” The court likewise noted voters favored
Measure C.
       On appeal, the Supporters rephrase these free speech
points in arresting prose: the Opponents “trampled on the
Constitutional rights of an untold number of people in the state”
by trying to “silence” and “punish” the Supporters for exercising

                                 18
their speech rights of “transparently advocating” their support for
less development and slower growth.
       Actually, this case was not about free speech. Everyone in
the campaign said whatever they pleased. It was a lively
fountain of free speech. The lawsuit had nothing to do with
speaking freely: it neither constricted nor enlarged the fountain’s
flow. Rather, the Supporters avoided changing the committee
name to “Yes on Measure C” or something similar and avoided
disclosing that Brand and Nehrenheim were backing the
committee.
       The Opponents’ suit aimed, not to suppress speech, but to
promote what they believed were proper campaign disclosures.
They lost, as the trial court ruled and as we affirmed. (See
Travis I, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 257–262.)
       But their lawsuit’s legal issues were narrow: what was a
political committee’s purpose, and did Brand and Nehrenheim
control the committee? These questions did not put freedom of
speech on trial.
       The public at large did not know and did not care about the
issues the court adjudicated. Nothing in the record demonstrates
even minimal public interest in these obscurities. Practically and
realistically, important rights affecting the public interest were
nowhere to be seen. (See Woodland, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 938.)
The claim for fees fails element one of the test.
       The Supporters seek, unsuccessfully, to inflate the
significance of this litigation by suggesting the redevelopment
proposal was large and many people voted for Measure C. The
lawsuit, however, did not tackle the merits of redevelopment.
Nor did it challenge the election’s validity. These pitches are
balls, not strikes.

                                19
       There has been no showing that anyone besides the parties
does care, or should care, about this case. The claim for fees
flunks element two of the test. (Woodland, supra, 23 Cal.3d at
pp. 939–940.)
       This case is similar to Willard v. Kelley (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 1049 at pages 1057–1058 (Willard), in which the
Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of public attorney general
fees. Willard filed a petition asserting his political opponent,
Woolery, tried to list an incorrect occupation on the ballot. (Id. at
p. 1051.) Woolery successfully defended the case and sought
attorney fees. His defense did not shed light on his views as a
candidate and it meant merely that he could continue to
designate his preferred occupation on the ballot. (Id. at p. 1057.)
This resembled “ ‘mundane squabbles,’ ” the court ruled. (Ibid.,
quoting Hammond v. Agran (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 115, 135
(Hammond).) The case neither enforced an important public
right nor conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a
large class of people. (Willard, at pp. 1057–1058.)
       The Supporters’ defense was like Willard. It concerned the
technical accuracy of Rescue’s committee name and campaign
forms. The Supporters vindicated their forms as filed. Nothing
else happened. This win did not increase the sum of information
to the electorate. It shed no light on anyone’s views. As in
Willard, there was no important right and no significant benefit.
       The Supporters claim Waterfront’s funding meant the
lawsuit involved an important right: “Candidates seeking
elective office, citizens seeking to limit overdevelopment in their
communities and other citizens who oppose or support
transparent candidates must be allowed to freely speak publicly
about their concerns, without fear of reprisal by those with

                                 20
opposing views and/or a large wallet.” And the case conferred a
significant public benefit, they argue, because “[c]andidates and
citizens must be afforded the opportunity to speak freely about
matters which affect their communities, their state, and their
country, without fear of reprisal and intimidation by well-
financed opponents.”
       The Supporters’ suggestion is that, absent a fee award
here, contestants in future elections will mute or censor
themselves for fear of monied opponents who, from behind the
scenes, will fund retaliatory lawsuits. This factual assertion
lacks record support. The claim that a fee award in this case
would broadly affect electoral vigor is farfetched. (See also
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d
1118, 1136 [California has no public policy against outside
funding of litigation].)
       The Supporters say election law litigation inherently
implicates public rights, but this claim runs counter to Travis II,
which held prevailing defendants in election law cases cannot be
inherently entitled to fees. (Travis II, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 422–428.)
Caselaw, moreover, shows private attorney general fees are not
appropriate in every election law case. The holding in Willard,
supra, 238 Cal.App.4th 1049, proves this point. (See also Bradley
v. Perrodin (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1165 [denying request
for private attorney general fees in election contest case]; Early v.
Becerra (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 726, 738 (Early) [“not every
election contest confers ‘a significant benefit to the electorate.’ ”].)
       The Supporters cite three inapposite cases.
       Sandlin v. McLaughlin (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 805
(Sandlin) does not help the Supporters. Sandlin challenged
statements three candidates submitted for the voter pamphlet in

                                  21
a City of Irvine election. (Id. at pp. 815–817.) Sandlin wanted to
cut parts of the statements, including the candidates’ promises
that they, if elected, immediately would begin building a
veterans’ cemetery in a certain location. (Id. at p. 816–817 & fn.
3.)
       The candidates successfully defended the challenge, but the
trial court denied private attorney general fees, finding no
important right and no significant benefit. (Sandlin, supra, 50
Cal.App.5th 805 at pp. 829–830.) The Court of Appeal reversed.
Had Sandlin’s petition succeeded, “it would have deprived local
voters of critical information about each candidate’s views.” (Id.
at p. 830.) The candidates enforced their right to communicate
about their views to voters and enforced voters’ rights to receive
this information. (Id. at pp. 830–831.) This conferred a
significant benefit on Irvine voters, who were a large class. (Id.
at p. 831; and see id. at p. 830, applying Hammond, supra, 99
Cal.App.4th at p. 121 & fn. 2 [candidate’s right to express views
in voter pamphlet affects public interest by providing voters with
information, and this benefits general voting public].)
       Unlike Sandlin, this case was not about statements in
voter pamphlets. Neither was it about some other significant
communication with the electorate. Had the Opponents won,
their victory would not have prevented the Supporters from
sharing their preservationist views. Voters would have lost no
critical information.
       Early, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th also does not help the
Supporters. Early was about whether candidate Xavier Becerra
earned private attorney general fees for defending his eligibility
to run for Attorney General. Eric Early alleged Becerra did not
meet statutory eligibility requirements to be a candidate. (Id. at

                               22
p. 731.) The trial court found for Becerra and awarded him
private attorney general fees. (Id. at pp. 731–732.)
       The Court of Appeal interpreted the eligibility statute to
allow candidates with inactive State Bar licenses and who were
not engaged in legal practice to run for Attorney General. Thus,
candidates like Becerra, who voluntarily took inactive status
while serving in public office, were eligible. (Early, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at pp. 731–732 & 739.) This was the first published
appellate opinion to interpret this statutory provision. (Id. at p.
739.)
       In a separate opinion—the opinion the Supporters cite—
the appellate court affirmed the private attorney general fees.
(Early, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 732.) As proof Becerra
vindicated an important right and conferred a significant public
benefit, the court relied in part on its earlier appellate decision.
(Id. at p. 739.) The court reasoned that its decision to publish
and to announce a rule for the first time showed the significance
of the underlying action. (Ibid.) The court explained its inclusive
interpretation of eligibility in the earlier decision had a public
benefit for all candidates for Attorney General and for California
voters. (Id. at p. 740.)
       The Supporters urge us to apply Early here to find an
important right and public benefit based on the Travis I and
Travis II opinions, but the Supporters ultimately have lost on the
pertinent issues in those opinions. The part of Travis I on which
they prevailed was the substantial evidence analysis, which was
an individualized analysis of the facts of their case. This victory
did not confer a broad public benefit. As for Travis II, it was the
Opponents, not the Supporters, who petitioned for review and

                                23
who obtained a favorable Supreme Court opinion. This case is
unlike Early.
       Neither is this case like Press v. Lucky Stores (1983) 34
Cal.3d 311. In that case, store officials prohibited plaintiffs from
circulating petitions for a ballot initiative outside a supermarket.
A court granted injunctive relief restraining the store from
denying the plaintiffs access to the premises. (Id. at p. 316.) This
litigation enforced important rights of free expression and
petition. While speech and petition rights “are by nature
individual rights,” enforcing these rights helps secure society’s
general interests. (Id. at p. 319.) Lucky exemplifies a case
protecting free speech. This case does not.
       In sum, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
                                   C
       The Opponents request judicial notice of the transcript
from the Supreme Court’s oral argument in Travis II. We grant
this request for judicial notice of a record of a California court.
(See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d); 459, subd. (a).)
       The Supporters request judicial notice of another
Commission letter. We deny the request because the Supporters’
motion does not state why the letter is relevant to this appeal.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252.)
                           DISPOSITION
       We reverse the award of attorney fees.
       As to the earlier proceedings in the Court of Appeal, we
repeat our order that Redondo Beach Waterfront, LLC, Bruning,
and Wardy shall recover their costs on appeal against Rescue Our
Waterfront P.A.C., Brand, Brand for Mayor 2017, Moffat, Craig,
and Nehrenheim.

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       In the earlier proceedings in the Court of Appeal, we also
ordered that Rescue Our Waterfront P.A.C., Brand, Brand for
Mayor 2017, Moffat, Craig, and Nehrenheim shall recover their
costs on appeal against Travis and Voisey. We reverse that part
of the order. Except as to the appellate costs we describe in the
paragraph above in favor of Redondo Beach Waterfront, LLC,
Bruning, and Wardy in the earlier appellate proceedings, Rescue
Our Waterfront P.A.C., Brand, Brand for Mayor 2017, Moffat,
Craig, Nehrenheim, Travis, and Voisey shall bear their own costs
on appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)

                                         WILEY, J.
We concur:

             GRIMES, Acting P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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