Court Opinion

ID: 9628499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:22:20.086323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:27.328202
License: Public Domain

Herd, J., concurring:
The dissents cause me to re-examine the *173reasons for our adopting the admissibility of evidence of rape trauma syndrome in State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982). It was a responsible reaction to one of the greatest blights on our civilization. There are over 80,000 rapes reported in this country each year. The reported rapes are only the tip of the iceberg. Because of the humiliation to the victim and the stigma attached to having been raped it is estimated only one tenth of the rapes and attempted rapes are reported.
Prosecution of a rapist is a difficult task. By its nature, rape is usually committed in a secluded place witnessed by only the assailant and the victim. Thus, the trial involves the victim’s word against the accused’s with little other evidence. This presents a hard question for a jury. Psychiatry offers some assistance. Experts in the field have established through their work with rape victims that there are reactions to forcible rape common to all rape victims. They suffer a significant degree of physical and emotional trauma, unique to rape victims, which carries over for a long time. Most victims never fully recover from the emotional scars left by the experience. This is rape trauma syndrome. It is characterized by an initial acute phase during which the victim’s lifestyle is completely disrupted by feelings of fear, anger, loss of self-esteem, insomnia, humiliation, uncleanliness and anxiety.
The long-term effect, which is the second phase of the trauma, involves a complete reorganization of the victim’s lifestyle. Many are able to resume only a minimal level of functioning after the acute phase ends. The victims display uneasiness. They stay home, venturing out only in the company of a friend. Often they find it necéssary to change their residence, particularly if it was the scene of the assault. Victims usually are apprehensive about answering the telephone for fear the assailant may again make contact with them. Many victims develop phobic reactions to a wide variety of circumstances, such as fear of crowds, fear of being alone, or fear of the sights, sounds and odors associated with the rape. All victims are left with some paranoia. Most victims have a fear and dread of sexual contact after a rape. A psychiatric expert trained in the field can diagnose rape trauma syndrome from this unique combination of symptoms. Rape trauma syndrome is clearly distinguishable from guilt from an *174immoral act or fear of an unwanted pregnancy, referred to in the dissent of Chief Justice Schroeder.
The use of psychiatric testimony for the limited purpose of proving a rape occurred, where the accused contends the sex was consensual, is not a dramatic departure from the use of psychiatric testimony in other areas of criminal law. We have long admitted psychiatric evidence to show the competency and mental state of an accused. Such evidence does not invade the province of the jury as feared by the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982). It does not attempt to establish the time or place of the rape nor the identity of the rapist, which were the reasons for the Missouri court holding evidence of rape trauma syndrome inadmissible in State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984).
In People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 2d 236, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291 (1984), the California court states it disagrees with our decision in State v. Marks but a close examination of the issues in People v. Bledsoe shows it to be clearly distinguishable from Marks. In California the witness called to give testimony was merely a rape counselor, not a psychiatrist, and therefore would not qualify as an expert under Marks.
The argument that admitting evidence of rape trauma syndrome would nullify the rape shield statute in those cases is certainly a possibility which the prosecutor would need to take into consideration in planning his trial tactics in cooperation with the victim. However, it must be remembered in most cases the sexual history of the victim is unnecessary to diagnose rape trauma syndrome. The principal value of the victim’s sexual history to the psychiatrist is in treatment rather than diagnosis.
The dissent complains of the unfairness of the majority holding that “expert testimony of the absence of the rape trauma syndrome is not relevant or admissible.” I read the majority opinion to mean that in the absence of evidence offered to prove rape trauma syndrome an accused may not offer evidence to prove the absence of such trauma, but if such evidence is offered he can rebut it with his own expert.
As a final issue I must point out that the trial court improperly reversed State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, holding: “[T]he decision of our Supreme Court . . . should be reconsidered in the light of subsequent judicial decisions . . . .” The decisions cited by the trial court as authority for its reversal of this court’s *175decision are cases from Minnesota and Missouri and not Kansas precedent. The issue presented is fundamental to our system of jurisprudence:
“The decisions of the court of last resort in a state furnish imperative and binding precedents for the guidance of all the courts over which it exercises appellate jurisdiction; and the judges of all the inferior courts are bound to accept and follow such precedents implicitly, without regard to their own previous decisions or their independent views of the law.” Black’s Law of Judicial Precedents § 90 (1912).
The decisions of the highest appellate court of a state are the law of that state just as the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court are the law of the land. The rule of precedent or stare decisis is based on sound reasoning. Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis, Res Judicata and Other Selected Essays, p. 2 (1929), stated:
“[T]he rule of stare decisis is not a contrivance to hamper the judge in administering justice, but is intended to advance the general usefulness of the law and thus benefit the greatest number. It expedites the work of the courts by preventing the constant reconsideration of settled questions; it enables lawyers to advise their clients with a reasonable degree of certainty and safety; it assures individuals that, in so far as they act on authoritative rules of conduct, their contract and other rights will be protected in the courts; and, finally, it makes for equality of treatment of all men before the law and lends stability to the judicial arm of government.”
I concur in the majority opinion.