Court Opinion

ID: 9828565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:30:00.051576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:50.472315
License: Public Domain

*315On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants have filed a vigorous and lengthy motion for a rehearing and we have carefúlly considered same, hut feel that it is necessary only to discuss the matter of our disposition of 'the issues touching contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Smith.
It is noticeable that appellants only allege that Mr. Smith and Mrs. Smith were guilty of negligence in not keeping a proper lookout for the motor vehicle being driven by Roy Wheat on the same highway and behind the plaintiffs.
There is no pleading averring that Mrs. Smith discovered the car driven by Wheat and was guilty of negligence in not giving Wheat a proper signal - or warning, or in not operating their vehicle carefully after discovering Wheat’s car approaching.
We have said, in our opinion, that we know no rule of law that would require either Mr. Smith or Mrs. Smith to keep a proper lookout for vehicles approaching from the rear. Our idea of a proper lookout incumbent upon' the operators of motor vehicles upon . highways, is one that' concerns vehicles in front of the party to be held to such rule, and not those approaching from behind, unless there appears some particular fact that calls the attention of the. driver of the front car .to the car that follows, which would impose some duty upon the driver of the front car to maintain such a lookout, or unless the driver of such car either slows down his vehicle or intends to stop the same, under which circumstances, or either of them, it would be the driver’s duty to keep a proper lookout for vehicles following such car and to then give a proper signal to apprise the driver of the car in the rear of such intention.
But even so, in the instant suit, where it appears that Mr. Smith was not “looking back” and it appears that Mrs. Smith, when she looked back at the oil well near the highway, saw Wheat’s car approaching from the rear,' she had every reason to believe that Wheat was obeying “the law of the road”: that he was keeping a proper lookout for the Smith car and would not negligently run into it. At least she had a right to so believe and depend upon Wheat’s obeying such law until she saw that he was not going to do so. And when this'fact was made known to her, •under the undisputed testimony, it was too late for her to do more than she did do, namely, scream to her husband. This act upon her part did not prevent the collision, and there is no issue requesting' a finding that Mr. Smith was negligent in not heeding her warning. In fact, there is no pleading justifying the submission of any such issue.
Appellant cannot rely upon the provisions of subdivision (A) of Article 801, Penal Code of Texas, as he contends, for the reason that no issue was submitted or'requested, and there is no 'finding that Roy Wheat gave any audible signal of his intention to overtake and pass the Smith car; and there is no evidence to support any such finding, had it been made. Furthermore, there is no pleading raising such issue of contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Smith.
The motion is overruled.