Court Opinion

ID: 9473174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:21:45.264831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:22.076721
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result:
Since Judge Posner’s opinion pursues an analysis which seems to contradict the purposes of the Black Lung Benefits Act, I must respectfully propose a counter-analysis. Putting to one side for the moment my reservations about the standard of review which Judge Posner has applied, even on that standard I would reject the AU’s conclusion that no disability resulted from Prewitt’s respiratory condition. The medical reports, it is agreed, simply contain no mention of the degree to which Prewitt was impaired by this condition. To my mind, there is a good reason for this omission: Prewitt was totally disabled by a heart condition, and there was no reason for the doctors treating him to speculate on how disabling his lung problem would have been if his heart were sound. Because these doctors did not speculate in that fashion, the AU and Judge Posner conclude that the statutory presumption of disability was rebutted. I cannot agree; treating this gap in the evidence as a decisive element in the case against Mary Prewitt runs seriously contrary to the remedial purposes of the Black Lung Benefits Act.
Eligible survivors of miners, who were employed for 25 or more years in coal mines before June 30, 1978 and who died on or before March 1, 1978, are entitled to benefits unless “it is established that at the time of his or her death such miner was not partially or totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.” 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(5) (made applicable to this case by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a)). If there were no evidence at all relating to disability, benefits presumably would have to be awarded. Simply because the evidence in this case discusses in detail Prewitt’s more imminently threatening heart disorder, it does not follow that the lung impairment would not have been disabling to some degree. There is nothing in the record to establish affirmatively that Prewitt was not disabled by the secondary disease,1 and I think the statute directs a grant of benefits in such a case.
*593I believe that my position finds support in the purposes of the Black Lung Benefits Act as established by its legislative history. The 1969 Black Lung Benefits Act contained provisions for the payment of sums to disabled miners or their widows as a type of emergency assistance in an effort to “control the steady toll of life, limb, and lung, which terrorizes so many unfortunate families.” H.R.Rep. No. 91-563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 2503 & 2515. The 1972 amendments to that Act were intended to be remedial and to assure that cases that should be compensated would be compensated. “In the absence of definitive medical conclusions there is a clear need to resolve doubts in favor of the disabled miner or his survivors.” S.Rep. No. 92-743, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2305, 2315. I do not understand the use of the word “disabled” in this passage to limit its application to demonstrably — as opposed to putatively — disabled miners, as Judge Posner apparently argues. In any event, in the case before us there are no definitive medical conclusions about the degree of Prew-itt’s disability, and I believe that the doubt resulting from that deficiency should be resolved in his favor and benefits should be awarded.
I would also note my concern about the appropriateness of the standard of review applied by the majority of the panel. While I recognize that this standard is currently employed by most, if not all, of the courts of appeal, I am unable to reconcile it either with logic or with the statutory language. While the standard, as announced, requires the reviewing court to look at the decision of the AU and to see if that decision is supported by substantial evidence, the statute does not so direct.
Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States court of appeals____ [T]he court shall have ... the power to give a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, the order of the Board____
33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (emphasis supplied).
In this case, the Board issued a full written opinion, as it is authorized to do when summary disposition is not appropriate, 20 C.F.R. § 802.404(c). That four-page order sets forth the Board’s review of the evidence and its reasons for concluding that the AU’s determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. As noted, the outcome in this case should be determined by a statutory presumption of disability unless there are adequately supported findings of nondisability; the Board could follow this approach and did not thereby “engage in a de novo proceeding or unrestricted review of the case.” 20 C.F.R. § 802.301. There is no statutory authority for our ignoring the Board’s order or regarding it only as an example to be considered in conducting our own.review of the AU’s decision.
As noted in Judge Posner’s opinion, the statute and its legislative history are not particularly helpful in determining the appropriate standard of, or scope for, review. A standard is established for the Board’s review of the AU’s decision-substantial ev*594idence. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3). But the language relating to judicial review, quoted above (33 U.S.C. § 921(c)), contains no such direction. Discussion of the issue in Congress was terse at best. “H.R. 12006 [the House bill on which this part of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act was based] authorizes judicial review of board decisions in the courts of appeals under the same ‘substantial evidence’ test.” H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 4698, 4709. This could be read to mean the same test as under prior law. Prior law authorized review of decisions of deputy commissioners through injunction proceedings in the district courts. Id. at 4709. The deputy commissioners’ decisions were to be accepted unless they were unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508, 71 S.Ct. 470, 472, 95 L.Ed. 483 (1951), citing Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88, 71 S.Ct. 456, 463-65, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). If Congress retained the “same” test for judicial review of decisions but contemplated a different source of decisions and this new source had different powers than the old, the Congressional meaning is necessarily unclear. Alternatively, Congress may have meant the “same” test as that used by the Board in its review of ALJ decisions. If this is the proper interpretation, we are still directed to apply the substantial evidence test to the Board decision, not the ALJ’s decision. This alternative reading of the legislative history, although by no means conclusive, seems to support the position I favor.
Whatever may be the uncertainty about congressional intent, I continue to believe that, at least in cases where the Benefits Review Board has issued a new, full opinion which is prepared in accordance with the law, this court should determine whether that opinion, and not the AU’s, is supported by substantial evidence. This view is based on the language of the statute, which refers only to our review of the Board’s order, and on the dubiousness of the powers and status of the Board if the majority's alternative standard is correct. Under that standard, the review function of the Board is reduced to making a final ruling on cases, unless those cases are appealed to the federal courts.2 If such an appeal is taken, the role of the Board is, at best, advisory; its determination of the case has no more weight than, for example, a brief submitted by one of the parties. Perhaps this is its intended function; a number of courts have held that it is. See, e.g., Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 382-83 (D.C.Cir.1983); Walker v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 645 F.2d 170, 172-73 (3rd Cir.1981); Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range R. Co. v. Dept. of Labor, 553 F.2d 1144, 1147 (8th Cir.1977). Despite these interpretations and that of the majority on this issue, I continue to be troubled by the plain language of the statute; the regulation directing the Board to prepare a full, written opinion; the fact that members of the Benefits Review Board (here two AUs and one Administrative Appeals Judge) are trained and experienced in cases of this nature; and the fact that the Board exists within the Department of Labor and its opinion may reflect in part the policy concerns of the Secretary.
I concur in the affirmance of the Board’s order.

. The evidence noted by the AU does not provide a basis for knowing the degree to which Prewiy was disabled by black lung disease. . Neither the blood gas test nor a negative x-ray is *593enough to disprove the existence of black lung disease and therefore could not rule out at least partial disability from the disease. I have noted the doctors’ understandable failure to address the effects of the respiratory ailment. In addition to the testimony quoted in Judge Posner’s opinion, Mrs. Prewitt also testified as follows:
Q: Do you recall when Mr. Prewitt first made his application for Black Lung benefits, back in January of 1976?
A: Yes.
Q: At that time he was complaining of shortness of breath. How long had he been complaining of that problem, do you know?
A: I would say probably since his heart attack, and in all truthfulness, probably several months before.
This portion was not acknowledged by the AU and undermines his assertion that Mrs. Prewitt said her husband’s only health problem was his heart condition. I agree with the statement in the Board decision that "there is no substantial evidence supportive of a finding that the miner was not totally disabled or partially disabled by pneumoconiosis.”

. The Board also has administrative duties. See Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 383 (D.C.Cir. 1983).