Court Opinion

ID: 9899841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 19:05:12.87585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:50.805459
License: Public Domain

SUPERIOR COURT
                                       OF THE
                                 STATE OF DELAWARE
PAUL R. WALLACE                                                        LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
     JUDGE                                                                 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400
                                                                            WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801
                                                                                   (302) 255-0660

                               Submitted: August 22, 2023
                               Decided: November 17, 2023

Timothy S. Martin, Esquire                    Thomas A. Uebler, Esquire
WHITE AND WILLIAMS LLP                        Kathleen A. Murphy, Esquire
600 N. King Street, Suite 800                 Terisa A. Shoremount, Esquire
Wilmington, Delaware 19801                    MCCOLLOM D’EMILIO SMITH UEBLER LLC
                                              2751 Centerville Road, Suite 401
Siobhan K. Cole, Esquire (argued)             Wilmington, Delaware 19808
WHITE AND WILLIAMS LLP
1650 Market Street, Suite 1800                Jeffrey D. Horst, Esquire
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103              Joyce Gist Lewis, Esquire (argued)
                                              Barclay H. Vallotton, Esquire
                                              KREVOLIN & HORST, LLC
                                              1201 West Peachtree Street NW, Suite 3250
                                              Atlanta, Georgia 30309

RE: Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
    C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
    Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Dear Counsel:
       This Letter Opinion and Order1 resolves Go Technology Management, LLC’s

pending Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. For the reasons explained below, the

motion is DENIED as to two claims and GRANTED on the rest.

1
    The Court delivers this decision mindful that the parties’ full understanding of and familiarity
with the factual background, the operative agreements mentioned, and the arguments each makes
on the instant motion obviates a need for a fuller recounting of such in this writing.
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 2 of 27

                I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

    A. THE PARTIES AND THEIR CONTRACTS

        As stated in the Complaint, “[i]n December 2021 Go Technology approached

Everphone through an information technology service provider, EBF, Inc., for the

purpose of sourcing and purchasing tablets that Go Technology would provide to

end users.”2 From there, Everphone identified a tablet manufacturer and product for

Go Technology’s use.3

        The parties subsequently entered into two agreements. The first—entered

between Everphone and EBF, for the benefit of Go Technology—was the “Rental

Agreement”4 that specified the price and quantity of the tablets Everphone was

2
    Compl. ¶ 6 (D.I. 1).
3
    Id. ¶¶ 9-11.
4
   Id. ¶ 16; Compl., Ex. A (“Rental Agreement”); Rental Agreement, Ex. A (Terms and
Conditions) § 1.1:
          Rental and Support. Pursuant to the terms of this Agreement and the Proposal,
          everphone will: (i) rent to Customer the smartphones, tablets, or other
          computing devices described more fully in one or more Proposals (each, a
          “Device”, and collectively, the “Devices”) for use by GoTechnology
          Management, LLC (“Go Technology”) and GoTechnology’s customers
          (collectively “End Users”); and (b) provide the limited repair and replacement
          services set forth in this Agreement (the “Service”) to enable Customer to
          provide support and management for the Devices to End Users. For the
          avoidance of doubt, Customer shall be solely responsible for supporting End
          Users.
    (errors in original).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 3 of 27

providing.5 The second—entered into between Everphone and Go Technology—

was the “Guaranty.”6 According to Everphone, that Guaranty was “a material

inducement” used to coax its acceptance of the Rental Agreement.7

        Under the Rental Agreement, Everphone began shipping tablets to

Go Technology.8 Approximately three months into that agreement, Go Technology

reported experiencing technical issues with the tablets.9 Everphone says it made

5
    Rental Agreement at 2.
6
    Compl. ¶¶ 24-25; Compl., Ex. B (“Guaranty”); id. § 1:
          Guarantor hereby irrevocably, absolutely and unconditionally guarantees to
          Everphone the full and prompt payment when due of the rent and any other sum
          of money due under the Rental Agreement, including but not limited to any
          indemnification obligations thereunder, together with all costs of collection and
          reasonable attorneys’ fees that may be incurred by everphone in connection
          with the enforcement of this Guaranty (collectively, the “Obligations”).
          Guarantor acknowledges and agrees that this Guaranty Agreement
          (“Guaranty”) is a guaranty of payment and not of collection and upon any
          default by EBF under the Rental Agreement, which includes, but is not limited
          to, EBF’s failure to remit monies that may have been provided by Guarantor to
          EBF pursuant to a separate agreement related to Guarantor’s use of the mobile
          devices under the Rental Agreement.
    (errors in original).
7
   Compl. ¶¶ 24-25. The Rental Agreement was “contingent on a guaranty from Go Technology
Management, LLC of EBF Inc.’s obligations pursuant to this Agreement.” Rental Agreement at
4.
8
    Compl. ¶¶ 32-45.
9
   Id. ¶ 46 (“On May 9, 2022, Go Technology emailed EBF regarding an issue that Go
Technology was experiencing with its network subscription through AT&T and its inability to
connect some of the devices Go Technology received from Everphone to AT&T’s network.”).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 4 of 27

efforts to correct those alleged issues.10 But in June 2022, Go Technology declared

the Rental Agreement “cancelled”11 and sent back some of the tablets.12 Everphone

insists those tablets were all working properly.13

        Following Go Technology’s declaration, Everphone demanded payment from

Go Technology and EBF for outstanding invoices and other fees due and owing

under the Rental Agreement and Guaranty.14 Go Technology and EBF refused to

pay.15 Accordingly, Everphone brought suit here.

     B. THIS SUIT

        Everphone’s Complaint has five claims: Breach of the Guaranty (Count I),16

10
     Id. ¶¶ 47-52.
11
   Id. ¶ 53 (“Instead, on or about June 10, 2022, Go Technology unilaterally declared, without
any right or authority to do so, that the Agreement between EBF and Everphone was cancelled.”).
12
    Id. ¶¶ 55-56 (“Go Technology’s purported return of the devices was done unilaterally and
without contractual authority pursuant to the Agreement and Guaranty, which provide only the
right to receive the replacement of any devices that fail to operate in accordance with the
manufacturer’s specifications and operating instructions.”).
13
    Id. ¶¶ 56-57 (“None of the devices Go Technology sent to Everphone on June 14, 2022, and
July 7, 2022 failed to operate in accordance with the manufacturer’s specifications and operating
instructions, nor did EBF or Go Technology ever claim such failure.”).
14
    Id. ¶ 63 (“As a result, on January 12 2023, Everphone demanded payment from EBF and Go
Technology pursuant to the terms of the Agreement and Guaranty for all amounts due and owing
under the Agreement between EBF and Everphone, and reserved all rights with respect to the total
losses Everphone incurred arising out of the Agreement.”) (errors in original).
15
    Id. ¶¶ 69-70 (“EBF and Go Technology failed and refused to respond to Everphone’s January
12, 2023, demand.”).
16
     Id. ¶¶ 71-79.
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 5 of 27

Fraud (Count II),17 Tortious Interference with the Rental Agreement (Count

III),18 Promissory Estoppel (Count IV),19 and Unjust Enrichment (Count V).20

Everphone’s allegations can be summarized as follows: (1) Go Technology

wrongfully cancelled the Rental Agreement;21 (2) Go Technology wrongfully sent

back working devices;22 and (3) Go Technology refused to pay outstanding invoices

due and other fees and costs.23

         Rather than answer the Complaint, Go Technology has moved to dismiss all

five of Everphone’s claims.

         First, Go Technology contends that the Complaint should be dismissed

because “the Guaranty contains a Georgia choice of law provision”; or, in the

alternative, that dismissal is warranted under the doctrine of forum non conveniens

in favor of Georgia.24

         Second, Go Technology says Counts II through V should be dismissed

17
     Id. ¶¶ 80-93.
18
     Id. ¶¶ 94-102.
19
     Id. ¶¶ 103-10.
20
     Id. ¶¶ 111-20.
21
     Id. ¶ 53.
22
     Id. ¶¶ 54-55.
23
     Id. ¶¶ 64, 68-70.
24
     Def.’s Open. Br. at 6-8 (D.I. 5).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 6 of 27

because the entirety of the parties’ relationship is governed by contract, so

Everphone’s separate tort claims are barred.25

        Last, Go Technology asserts that: (1) Everphone’s fraud claim (Count II) is

not pled with particularity and the presence of a merger provision bars it;26

(2) its tortious interference claim (Count III) fails “because [Everphone] does not

allege Go Technology acted with malice and intent to injure [Everphone] and

Go Technology is not a stranger to the rental agreement between EBF and

[Everphone];”27 and, (3) the unjust enrichment (Count V28) is doomed because there

is a valid contract.29

25
     Id. at 9-10 (invoking, among other things, the economic loss rule).
26
     Id. at 12-16.
27
     Id. at 16-19.
28
    Go Technology erroneously names Count IV as the unjust enrichment claim. Id. at 19. But it
is Count V that alleges unjust enrichment, while Count IV avers that relief is due by application
of promissory estoppel. Compl. ¶¶ 111-20 (identifying unjust enrichment as Everphone’s fifth
cause of action); id. at 103-10 (identifying promissory estoppel as Everphone’s fourth cause of
action). Notwithstanding this misnomination (and failure to more expressly call out the
promissory estoppel theory), it is clear from Go Technology’s papers and argument that it seeks
dismissal of both on the same bases. See, e.g., Def.’s Open. Br. at 9-11.
29
     Def.’s Open. Br. at 19.
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 7 of 27

                         II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

     A. DISMISSAL FOR IMPROPER VENUE

         This Court’s Civil Rule 12(b)(3) governs a motion to dismiss for improper

venue.30 A reviewing court “must assume as true all the facts pled in the complaint

and view those facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.”31 The Court “is not shackled to the plaintiff’s complaint

and is permitted to consider extrinsic evidence from the outset.”32 A dismissal

motion may be granted “before the commencement of discovery on the basis of

affidavits and documentary evidence if the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie

case in support of its position.”33

         When considering such a motion, the Court must “give effect to the terms of

private agreements to resolve disputes in a designated judicial forum out of respect

for the parties’ contractual designation.”34 And “[i]f a forum selection clause validly

limits a plaintiff to a single forum, that clause operates to divest a court that

30
     Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(3).
31
   Loveman v. Nusmile, Inc., 2009 WL 847655, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2009) (citation
omitted).
32
     Id. (citation omitted).
33
     Id. (citation omitted).
34
     Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 8 of 27

otherwise has jurisdiction of its status as a proper venue for the plaintiff to sue.”35

     B. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

        “Under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the legal issue to be decided is,

whether a plaintiff may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of

circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint.”36 Under that rule, the Court

will:

            (1) accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true, (2) accept
            even vague allegations as “well pleaded” if they give the
            opposing party notice of the claim, (3) draw all reasonable
            inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and (4) not dismiss
            the claims unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover
            under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.37

“If any reasonable conception can be formulated to allow Plaintiffs’ recovery, the

motion must be denied.”38 Put simply, “[d]ismissal is warranted [only] where the

plaintiff has failed to plead facts supporting an element of the claim, or that under

no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged could the complaint state a claim for

which relief might be granted.”39

35
     Simon v. Navellier Series Fund, 2000 WL 1597890, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2000).
36
   Vinton v. Grayson, 189 A.3d 695, 700 (Del. Super. Ct. 2018) (quoting Super. Ct. Civ. R.
12(b)(6)).
37
   Id. (quoting Central Mortgage Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage Cap. Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d
531, 535 (Del. 2011)).
38
     Id. (citing Central Mortgage, 27 A.3d at 535).
39
     Hedenberg v. Raber, 2004 WL 2191164, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2004).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 9 of 27

        As just mentioned, ordinarily at the motion to dismiss stage the Court must

accept as true all of a plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable

inferences in her favor.40 “But on a motion to dismiss an action for forum non

conveniens, this Court exercises its sound discretion when making findings of fact

and drawing conclusions therefrom based on that supported by the record; the Court

must, when doing so, use an orderly and logical deductive process.”41

     C. FRAUD CLAIMS

        This Court’s Civil Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to plead fraud with

particularity.42 And to state a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must allege that:

            (1) the defendant falsely represented or omitted facts that the
            defendant had a duty to disclose; (2) the defendant knew or
            believed that the representation was false or made the
            representation with a reckless indifference to the truth; (3) the
            defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from
            acting; (4) the plaintiff acted in justifiable reliance on the
            representation; and (5) the plaintiff was injured by its reliance.43

40
   GXP Capital, LLC v. Argonaut Mfg. Servs., Inc., 234 A.3d 1186, 1192-93 (Del. Super. Ct.
2020), aff’d, 253 A.3d 93 (Del. 2021) (listing cases).
41
     Id. at 1193 (citing Williams Gas Supply Co. v. Apache Corp., 594 A.2d 34, 37 (Del. 1991)).
42
    Yu v. GSM Nation, LLC, 2018 WL 2272798, at *19 (Del. Super Ct. Apr. 24, 2018) (“Although
Delaware is a notice pleading jurisdiction, Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to
plead actual fraud with particularity. ‘Rule 9(b) does not require an exhaustive cataloguing of facts
but on sufficient factual specificity to provide assurance that the plaintiff has investigated [...] the
alleged fraud and reasonably believes that a wrong has occurred.’”) (internal citations omitted).
43
     DCV Hldgs., Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 889 A.2d 954, 958 (Del. 2005).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 10 of 27

                                  III. DISCUSSION

     A. THE GUARANTY’S PERMISSIVE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE DOESN’T
        REQUIRE THAT THIS ACTION BE BROUGHT IN GEORGIA.

        Pointing to the Guaranty’s Paragraph 18, Go Technology insists that “the

Guaranty contains a Georgia forum selection clause” that prohibits suit here.44 That

paragraph, titled “Consent to Jurisdiction; Service of Process” states:

            Guarantor agrees and consents to the jurisdiction and venue of
            any state, superior or federal court sitting in or having
            jurisdiction over the Dekalb County, Georgia or Cobb County,
            Georgia with respect to any legal action, proceeding, or dispute
            between them and hereby expressly waives any and all rights
            under applicable law or in equity to object to the jurisdiction and
            venue of said courts. Guarantor further irrevocably consents to
            service of process by certified mail, return receipt requested, to
            the address of the Guarantor identified below or by any other
            means permitted by Georgia law or the Federal Rules of Civil
            Procedure. Guarantor so served shall appear or answer to any
            summons and complaint or other process and should Guarantor
            so served fail to appear or answer within the time period
            proscribed by the law of the jurisdiction where such action was
            commenced, said Guarantor shall be deemed in default and
            judgment may be entered by Everphone against the said party for
            the amount as demanded in any summons and complaint or other
            process so served.45

        Go Technology acknowledges that the provision is not mandatory but insists

44
     Def.’s Open. Br. at 6-7.
45
     Guaranty ¶ 18.
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 11 of 27

the Court should enforce it as though it were.46 As support, Go Technology turns to

In re Bay Hills Emerging Partners, I, L.P.47, saying there the Court of Chancery

“enforce[d] the permissive forum selection clause at issue by staying the Delaware

action in favor” of another forum.48 But Go Technology’s ignores the Bay Hills

court’s explicit rejection of those defendants’ attempt to “specifically enforce” what

it found to be only a permissive forum selection clause—the court instead stayed

that action in the interest of comity and judicial efficiency.49

         Unlike a mandatory forum selection clause—which deems a certain forum

exclusive—a permissive forum selection clause expands jurisdiction to a certain

forum that may or may not have had jurisdiction without the contractual provision.50

Go Technology’s attempt to use the Guaranty’s permissive forum selection clause

to bind Everphone to Georgia fails.

     B. DISMISSAL FOR FORUM NON CONVENIENS ISN’T WARRANTED.

         Even if suit in Georgia is not required, Go Technology suggests Everphone’s

complaint should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in favor

46
     Def. Repl. Br. at 3 (D.I. 14).
47
     2018 WL 3217650 (Del. Ch. July 2, 2018).
48
     Def. Repl. Br. at 3.
49
     In re Bay Hills Emerging P’rs, I, 2018 WL 3217650, at *6-7.
50
     Id. at *5.
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 12 of 27

of Georgia.51 Unsurprisingly, Everphone disagrees.52

         A motion raising forum non conveniens is a request that the Court, though

possessing both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over an action, nevertheless

decline to hear it.53 In analyzing a motion to dismiss an action for forum non

conveniens, the Court applies the well-known Cryo-Maid factors:

             (1) the relative ease of access to proof; (2) the availability of
             compulsory process for witnesses; (3) the possibility of the view
             of the premises, if appropriate; (4) all other practical problems
             that would make the trial of the case easy, expeditious and
             inexpensive; (5) whether or not the controversy is dependent
             upon the application of Delaware law which the courts of this
             State more properly should decide than those of another
             jurisdiction; and (6) the pendency or nonpendency of a similar
             action in another jurisdiction.54

Because this is the first-filed and only action, Go Technology must demonstrate

overwhelming hardship to gain dismissal here.55

         Under the first factor (the relative ease of access to proof) and second factor

(availability of compulsory process for witnesses), Go Technology says that because

51
     Def.’s Open. Br. at 7-8.
52
     Pltf.’s Ans. Br. at 11 (D.I. 12).
53
     GXP Capital, 234 A.3d at 1193.
54
   Gramercy Emerging Mkts. Fund v. Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C., 173 A.3d 1033, 1036-37 (Del.
2017) (cleaned up) (outlining the now well-accepted factors derived from General Foods Corp. v.
Cryo-Maid, Inc., 198 A.2d 681 (Del. 1964) and its progeny).
55
     Sperling & Slater v. SilkRoad, Inc., 2022 WL 16910563, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2022).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 13 of 27

its principal place of business is Georgia, “Everphone’s principal place of business

is next door to Georgia, in Florida,” and “[t]he underlying transaction had no

connection to Delaware” that the first two Cryo-Maid factors favor Georgia.56

Everphone counters that because “[d]ocuments were exchanged electronically and

by mail and the necessary proof in this case can be transmitted the same way,” the

first factor weighs equally in favor of Delaware.57 Additionally, Everphone suggests

that while some witnesses are presumably in Georgia, others are located across the

country, so the compulsory process factor does not favor dismissal here.58

         Go Technology says that nothing related to this case happened in Delaware.59

Maybe so. But that’s not the test and is hardly unusual in a commercial lawsuit

brought in a Delaware court. To gain any traction on the road toward dismissal, Go

Technology must “make a particularized showing that witnesses, documents, or

other evidence necessary to defend the allegations contained in [Everphone]’s

complaint cannot be brought to or otherwise produced in Delaware.”60                       Go

56
     Def.’s Open. Br. at 8.
57
     Pltf.’s Ans. Br. at 14.
58
    Id. (“While Go Technology’s witnesses are likely in Georgia, Everphone’s are in Florida and
elsewhere, and third-party witnesses (i.e., EBF, Hyundai, and AT&T) are in any number of other
states.”).
59
     See Def. Open. Br. at 8-9.
60
   Mar-Land Indus. Contrs., Inc. v. Caribbean Petro. Refining, L.P., 777 A.2d 774, 781 (Del.
2001)
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 14 of 27

Technology hasn’t done that.

        Relatedly, under the compulsory process factor, Go Technology must show

that “another forum would provide a substantial improvement as to the number of

witnesses who would be subject to compulsory process.”61 While many witnesses

may be located outside of Delaware, they appear equally to be located without

Georgia. Go Technology’s protestation that Georgia is closer to Everphone’s

principal place of business (Florida) is of no help; this particular factor focuses on

compulsory process (or lack thereof), not relative ease of travel.

        In sum, the Go Technology has failed to carry its burden on the first and

second factors.62

        Both parties seem to concede that the third Cryo-Maid factor (view of the

premises) plays no part here.63

        Under the fourth factor (practical problems), the Court looks at “practical

problems that would make the trial of the case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”64

61
   Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 668 A.2d 763, 769 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995) (citation
omitted).
62
    See Mar-Land Indus. Contrs., Inc., 777 A.2d at 778 (“A plaintiff seeking to litigate in Delaware
is afforded the presumption that its choice of forum is proper and a defendant who attempts to
obtain dismissal based on grounds of forum non conveniens bears a heavy burden.” (citations
omitted)).
63
     Def. Open. Br. at 9; see Pltf.’s Ans. Br. at 11-16 (omitting any reference to factor three).
64
     Gramercy, 173 A.3d at 1036-37 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 15 of 27

Neither party devotes much time to this consideration. Go Technology argues

simply that the “practical problems” factor weighs in its favor because “Georgia is

an alternative available forum.”65

        There is little to no weight to be ascribed to this factor in this instance. Like

expenses will be incurred by the parties wherever the litigation takes place—

Everphone is based in Florida; Go Technology is based in Georgia; and potential

witnesses are located across the country.

        The fifth factor centers on “whether the controversy is dependent upon the

application of Delaware law which the courts of this State more properly should

decide than those of another jurisdiction.”66 In Martinez v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours

and Co., Inc., our Supreme Court explained:

            If, as our jurisprudence holds, significant weight should be
            accorded the neutral principle that important and novel issues of
            Delaware law are best decided by Delaware courts, then it
            logically follows that our courts must acknowledge that
            important and novel issues of other sovereigns are best
            determined by their courts where practicable.67

        Go Technology says the fifth factor weighs in its favor because “Georgia law

65
     Def. Open. Br. at 9.
66
   Martinez v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., Inc., 86 A.3d 1102, 1109 (Del. 2014) (citing
Cryo-Maid, 198 A.2d at 684).
67
     Id. at 1109-10 (internal citations omitted).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 16 of 27

will be applied.”68 Everphone says the fifth factor weighs in its favor because

Delaware law applies to four of its five claims, but even if it didn’t, this Court can

easily apply Georgia law to resolve this contract fight.69

           Neither party disputes that, at the very least, the breach-of-contract claim

(Count I) must be decided under Georgia law. Even assuming Georgia law applies

to the others, there is no serious suggestion that some “important or novel” issue of

that state’s law is to be resolved here. Every day, Delaware’s business courts apply

foreign jurisdictions’ laws in commercial cases. Such a run-of-the-mill exercise

does not compel, or even favor, dismissal.70

           Under the sixth factor the Court considers whether there are pending actions

in another jurisdiction.        “The absence of another pending litigation weighs

significantly against granting a forum non conveniens motion.”71 This factor, while

not dispositive, is significant and is only overcome “in the most compelling

circumstances.”72 Without another suit pending in another jurisdiction, Everphone

68
     Mot. to Dismiss at 9.
69
     Answering Br. at 13.
70
    See Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 906 A.2d 134, 137 (Del. 2006) (finding application of
foreign law alone insufficient to dismiss an action under forum non conveniens).
71
     Id. (citing cases).
72
     Id.
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 17 of 27

would essentially be forced “to start anew” if a dismissal were granted.73

        Given the above and the overwhelming hardship standard required to gain

dismissal of a first-filed Delaware action over which this Court undoubtedly has

jurisdiction, Go Technology comes nowhere near carrying its required burden.74

The prayer to dismiss for forum non conveniens must be denied.

     C. THE COURT EVALUATES COUNTS II—V UNDER BOTH DELAWARE AND
        GEORGIA LAW.

        Go Technology posits that because the Guaranty contains a Georgia choice-

of-law clause75 that Everphone’s tort claims should be governed by Georgia law.76

Everphone says that Delaware law should apply because the tort claims concern the

Rental Agreement and that has a Delaware choice-of-law provision.77 But neither

party engaged a particularly helpful or thorough choice-of-law analysis, so the Court

73
     Parvin v. Kaufmann, 236 A.2d 425, 427 (Del. 1967).
74
   In re CVS Opioid Insurance Litigation, 2022 WL 3330427, at *7 (Del. Supr. Ct. Aug. 12, 2022)
(“The Court’s focus is, and must be, vel non the defendants have established that they will suffer
overwhelming hardship by litigating . . . in Delaware.”) (quoting In re Asbestos Litig., 929 A.2d
373, 388 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006)).
75
    Guaranty § 14 (“This Guaranty shall be deemed to be a contract entered into pursuant to the
laws of the State of Georgia and shall in all respects be governed, construed, applied and enforced
in accordance with applicable federal law and the laws of the State of Georgia, without giving
effect to any conflict of laws principles.”).
76
      Def.’s Open. Br. at 6; In its Reply Brief, Go Technology says that “[e]ven under Delaware law
. . . [Everphone]’s Counts II – V fail.” Def. Repl. Br. at 7-8.
77
  Pltf.’s Ans. Br. at 7-8; id. at 21 (“Counts II-V relate to the Agreement between Everphone and
EBF, which contains a Delaware choice of law clause.”).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 18 of 27

examines Counts II through V under both of Delaware or Georgia law because each

of those claims, as pled, may indeed be focused on a different instrument.78

     D. EVERPHONE’S FRAUD CLAIM (COUNT II) SURVIVES DISMISSAL.

        In Count II, Everphone charges that Go Technology committed fraud by

making false representations to Everphone to induce it to enter into the Rental

Agreement, including among other things, “Go Technology’s intention to guaranty

payments owed to Everphone under the [Rental] Agreement”79

        Go Technology insists the fraud claim should be dismissed because “the

parties’ relationship is governed by a contract” (i.e., the Guaranty) and so that claim

is “barred by the economic loss rule.”80 Go Technology submits also that Everphone

fails to plead its fraud claim with sufficient particularity and that the presence of a

merger provision in the Guaranty bars that claim.81 Go Technology’s focus on just

the Guaranty and Georgia law is purposeful82—but misdirected.

78
    See generally Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 2013 WL 5460164, at *3 (Del. Super.
Ct. Oct. 1, 2013) (noting that “[c]hoice-of-law determinations must be made as to each issue when
presented, not to the case as a whole.”).
79
     Compl. ¶ 86.
80
     Def.’s Open. Br. at 9-10.
81
     Id. at 12-16.
82
    Under Georgia law, one alleging fraudulent inducement can either: “(1) affirm the contract and
sue for damages from the fraud or breach; or (2) promptly rescind the contract and sue in tort for
fraud.” Ekeledo v. Amporful, 642 S.E.2d 20, 22 (Ga. 2007) (citation omitted). Where a Georgia
plaintiff omits a recessionary claim and instead “affirms a contract which contains a merger or
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 19 of 27

         To plead fraud under this Court’s Civil Rule 9(b), one must state with some

particularity83 “the time, place, and contents of the false representations; the facts

misrepresented; the identity of the person(s) making the misrepresentation; and what

that person(s) gained from making the misrepresentation.”84 And, as a general

matter, the elements of a fraud claim are:

           (1) a false representation, usually one of fact, made by the
               defendant;
           (2) the defendant’s knowledge or belief that the representation
               was false, or was made with reckless indifference to the
               truth;

disclaimer provision and retains the benefits, he is estopped from asserting that he relied upon the
other party’s misrepresentation and his action for fraud must fail.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the Guaranty has a merger clause. Guaranty ¶ 12 (“All prior agreements, understandings,
representations and communications between the parties, whether oral or written, with respect to
this Guaranty are merged into this Guaranty which alone and completely expresses the agreement
of Guarantor and Everphone.”). And Everphone has not sought rescission but sued to enforce the
Guaranty. So, if the fraud claim must indeed focus only on the existence of the Guaranty and—
more importantly—mere non-performance thereunder, Everphone’s fraud claim might be in peril
were Georgia law to be applied here.
83
    Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 9(b) (“Pleading special matters-Fraud, negligence, mistake, condition
of mind—“In all averments of fraud . . . , the circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated
with particularity.”). See Chaplake Hldgs., LTD v. Chrysler Corp., 766 A.2d 1, 5 (Del. 2001) (“As
a general rule, the law of the forum governs procedural matters.”); Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Cas.
and Sur. Co., 1994 WL 317557, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 1994) (“The only exception to this
[general rule] occurs when the procedural law of the foreign state is ‘so inseparably interwoven
with substantive rights as to render a modification of the foregoing rule necessary, lest a party be
thereby deprived of his legal rights.’”) (quoting Connell v. Delaware Aircraft Ind., 55 A.2d 637,
640 (Del. Super. Ct. 1947).
84
   Avve, Inc. v. Upstack Techs., Inc., 2019 WL 1643752, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2019)
(observing that Rule 9(b) “deviates from the [short and plain statement (‘notice pleading’)] rule
and imposes a heightened pleading standard for fraud”).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 20 of 27

             (3) an intent to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from
                 acting;
             (4) the plaintiff’s action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance
                 upon the representation; and
             (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance.85

When distinguishing fraud and breach-of-contract claims, one generally looks to the

timing of the alleged misconduct to determine whether the inducement to deal is

truly separate and distinct from mere non-performance allegations.86 Here, because

of the false representations or fraud alleged happened pre the Rental Agreement’s

signing,87 it is reasonably conceivable that Go Technology’s acts of inducement

were calculated to obtain that signing.88 And Everphone’s fraud claim is not lacking

in the needed particulars.89 Considering the fraud count as a whole, it no doubt

alleges “the circumstances of the fraud with detail sufficient to apprise [Go

Technology] of the basis for the claim.”90 Accordingly Everphone’s fraud claim—

85
      E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Fla. Evergreen Foliage, 744 A.2d 457, 461-62 (Del. 1999).
86
    See Pilot Air Freight, LLC v. Manna Freight Sys., Inc., 2020 WL 5588671, at *26 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 18, 2020) (observing that such separate fraudulent inducement claims are permissible “when
the [pled] conduct occurs prior to the execution of the contract and ‘thus with the goal of inducing
the plaintiff’s signature and willingness to close on the bargain.’” (quoting In re Bracket Holding
Corp. Litig., 2017 WL 3283169, at *18-19 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2017))).
87
      Compl. ¶¶ 81-87, 89.
88
      See Pilot Air, 2020 WL 5588671, at *26; In re Bracket Holding, 2017 WL 3283169, at *18-
19.
89
      Compl. ¶¶ 81-87, 89.
90
      ABRY P’rs V, L.P. v. F&W Acq. LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1050 (Del. Ch. 2006).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 21 of 27

i.e. that it was induced to enter the Rental Agreement not only by the Guaranty but

by other misrepresentations by Go Technology meant to convince Everphone to

sign–Count II survives this pleading-stage attack under Delaware law.

     E. EVERPHONE FAILS TO SUFFICIENTLY PLEAD TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
        WITH THE RENTAL AGREEMENT (COUNT III).

         In Count III Everphone alleges Go Technology tortiously interfered with its

Rental Agreement with EBF by “declar[ing], unilaterally and without authority, that

neither Go Technology nor EBF would perform their obligations under the

Agreement and the Guaranty.”91

         Go Technology says Count III fails “because [Everphone] does not allege Go

Technology acted with malice and intent to injure [Everphone] and Go Technology

is not a stranger to the rental agreement between EBF and [Everphone].”92

         Everphone never alleges bad faith or malice related to the alleged tortious

interference (even generally) in its Complaint. The closest Everphone comes is

labeling Go Technology’s interference as “unauthorized and unlawful.”93 But that’s

not enough. So, Everphone has failed to satisfy a pleading element required under

91
     Compl. ¶ 95.
92
     Id. at 16.
93
     Compl. ¶ 100.
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 22 of 27

both Delaware94 and Georgia95 law in its tortious interference with a contractual

relationship claim and Count III must be dismissed.

     F. EVERPHONE’S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM IS BARRED UNDER GEORGIA
        AND DELAWARE LAW (COUNT IV).

         As to Count IV (promissory estoppel), it again appears Go Technology would

suggest dismissal is warranted because “Everphone’s purported tort claims arise

from the parties’ contract and are barred by the economic loss rule.”96

         Everphone says its “promissory estoppel claim is an equitable claim based on

Go Technology’s promise to pay for all amounts owed to Everphone under the

Agreement with EBF, which include the losses Everphone suffered, and extend far

beyond the amounts invoiced for 5,465 devices under the Guaranty.”97                             In

94
    Skye Mineral Investors, LLC v. DXS Capital (U.S.) Limited explains that when “the alleged
interference comes from individuals or entities that share common ‘economic interests’ with a
party to the contract, plaintiffs must ‘demonstrate that an interference by an affiliated entity was
motivated by some malicious or other bad faith purpose.’” 2020 WL 881544, at *33 (Del. Ch. Feb.
24, 2020) (quoting AM Gen. Hldgs. LLC v. Renco Gp., Inc., 2013 WL 5863010, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 31, 2013)). From the facts alleged, Go Technology surely shares a common economic interest
with Everphone and EBF. And thus, there must be an allegation and showing of malice or bad
faith. See Bhole, Inc. v. Shore Investments, Inc., 67 A.3d 444, 453 (Del. 2013) (“Thus, to establish
a tortious interference with its Lease, [the interfered-with party] must show that [the interferer],
acted maliciously or in bad faith.”).
95
   Tidikis v. Network for Medical Commc’ns & Research, LLC, 619 S.E.2d 481, 486 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2005) (under Georgia law, malice is a required element for tortious interference with a
contract).
96
     Def.’s Open. Br. at 2.
97
     Pltf.’s Ans. Br. at 19.
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 23 of 27

Everphone’s view, its “promissory estoppel claim seeks equitable relief based on

promises Go Technology made to Everphone regarding the number of devices that

would be purchased from Everphone and that Everphone would receive full payment

for its services.”98 Accordingly, it says the “promises [made] were broader than the

promises set forth in the Guaranty as are Everphone’s damages.”99

            In Alltrista Plastics, LLC v. Rockline Industries,100 this Court cautioned that

promissory estoppel “appl[ies] only if the contract governs other aspects of the

parties’ relationship and not when the relied-upon promises were incorporated into

the contract.”101 In turn, “courts must be careful that they do not apply the doctrine

of promissory estoppel when there is an existing contract that governs the issue

before the Court.”102 This is also true under Georgia law.103

            Here, the Rental Agreement requires EBF to purchase a minimum of

98
      Id. at 21-22.
99
      Id.
100
      2013 WL 5210255 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2013).
101
      Id. at *9 (citation omitted).
102
      Id. (citations omitted).
103
   Adkins v. Cagle Foods JV, LLC, 411 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that under
Georgia law, “where a plaintiff seeks to enforce an underlying contract which is reduced to writing,
promissory estoppel is not available as a remedy” (citing Bank of Dade v. Reeves, 354 S.E.2d 131
(Ga. 1987)).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 24 of 27

60,000 devices,104 for “an initial deposit of $39.99 per Device monthly” along with

other fees and costs.105          And the Guaranty provides that: “Guarantor hereby

irrevocably, absolutely and unconditionally guarantees to Everphone the full and

prompt payment when due of the rent and any other sum of money due under the

Rental Agreement . . . .”106 So Everphone’s promissory estoppel claim is governed

by the Guaranty (and the Rental Agreement). Accordingly, Count IV fails as some

separate standalone claim.

      G. EVERPHONE’S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM IS BARRED UNDER GEORGIA
         AND DELAWARE LAW (COUNT V).

            On unjust enrichment (Count V), Go Technology repeats: it should be

dismissed because “the parties’ relationship is governed by a [valid] contract” so this

“tort claim[] . . . [is] barred by the economic loss rule.”107

            Everphone suggests the unjust enrichment claim should survive Everphone’s

dismissal motion because, in its view, the Guaranty “does not address all of the

benefits Everphone conferred upon Go Technology.”108

104
    Rental Agreement at 2 (“EBF hereby enters into a rental agreement for a minimum of
60,000 Devices”).
105
      Id.
106
      Guaranty § 1.
107
      Def.’s Open. Br. at 9-10, 19.
108
      Pltf.’s Ans. Br. at 33.
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 25 of 27

          At its most specific, Everphone says its “unjust enrichment claim is based on

Go Technology’s retention of 5,465 devices (and related services) that have not been

paid for.”109 The Guaranty provides that Go Technology “irrevocably, absolutely

and unconditionally guarantees to Everphone the full and prompt payment when due

of the rent and any other sum of money due under the Rental Agreement . . . .”110

          Here again, Alltrista Plastics is instructive; there the Court explained “[a]

claim for unjust enrichment is not available if there is a contract that governs the

relationship between parties that gives rise to the unjust enrichment claim.”111

“Thus, ‘[w]hen the complaint alleges an express, enforceable contract that controls

the parties’ relationship . . . , a claim for unjust enrichment will be dismissed.”112

The same under Georgia law.113

          To Everphone, its “unjust enrichment claim is not based on the Guaranty”

alone but rather is “based on Go Technology’s retention of benefits that have not

109
      Id. at 19.
110
      Guaranty § 1.
111
   2013 WL 5210255, at *11 (alteration in original) (quoting Kuroda v. SPJS Hldgs., L.L.C., 971
A.2d 872, 891 (Del. Ch. 2009)).
112
   Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bakerman v. Sidney Frank Importing Co., Inc., 2006 WL
3927242, at * 18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2006)).
113
    Tidikis, 619 S.E.2d at 485 (finding that, under Georgia law, when a contract governs the
dispute, and the validity of that contract is not being challenged, an unjust enrichment claim fails
as a matter of law).
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 26 of 27

been paid for, which Go Technology received from Everphone through the

overarching         business    relationship   between     EBF,      Go    Technology,       and

Everphone.”114 But Go Technology’s alleged “retention of benefits”—i.e., the

“5,465 devices (and related services) that have not been paid”—is exactly what the

Rental Agreement and Guaranty cover.

          If there is something more, its absent from the Complaint and has been no

better identified or explained during these dismissal proceedings. Accordingly,

Everphone fails to sufficiently plead its unjust enrichment claim under either

Delaware or Georgia law and Count V must be dismissed.

      H. THE WONT TO PLEAD IN THE ALTERNATIVE CANNOT SAVE EVERPHONE’S
         PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIMS.

          Everphone insisted at argument that its promissory estoppel and unjust

enrichment claims were alternatively pled and should survive dismissal on that basis

alone. But just because unjust enrichment or promissory estoppel may sometimes

be pled in the alternative to a breach-of-contract claim does not mean they will

inexorably always survive dismissal.115 The Court instead looks to whether there is

114
      Pltf.’s Ans. Br. at 34.
115
    BAE Sys. Info. & Elec. Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2009 WL 264088, at
*8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 2009) (“In some instances, both a breach-of-contract and an unjust enrichment
claim may survive a motion to dismiss when pled as alternative theories for recovery. Such
occurrences are factually distinguishable, however, and, more importantly, do not stand for the
proposition that an unjust enrichment claim must survive a motion to dismiss when pled
Everphone, Inc. v. Go Technology Management, LLC
C.A. No. N23C-03-022 PRW CCLD
November 17, 2023
Page 27 of 27

an independent basis for the alternatively pled claim.116 And mere resort to “pleading

in the alternative” will not save those cursory tag-alongs from dismissal.117

                                    IV. CONCLUSION

            Based on the forgoing, Go Technology’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to

Counts I and II, and GRANTED as to Counts III through V.

            IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                           _______________________
                                                           Paul R. Wallace, Judge
cc: All Counsel via File and Serve

alternatively with a contract claim that will move beyond the motion to dismiss stage.” (emphasis
in original) (internal citation omitted)).
116
      Id.
117
   Id. (“A right to plead alternative theories does not obviate the obligation to provide factual
support for each theory.”).