Court Opinion

ID: 2964559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:27:27.270807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:57.636822
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1286

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                     SANTO RUIZ,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

        No. 95-1287

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                    VIRGILIO RUIZ,

                                Defendant - Appellant.
                                     ____________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                           Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges,
                                            ______________
                         and Woodlock,* U.S. District Judge.
                                        ___________________

                                    _____________

            John  C. Doherty  , by  appointment  of  the Court,  for appellant
            ________________
        Santo Ruiz.
            Virgilio Ruiz on brief pro se.
            _____________

            Kevin J.  Cloherty, Assistant  United States  Attorney, with  whom
            __________________
        John  M. Griffin,  Assistant  United States  Attorney,  and Donald  K.
        ________________                                            __________
        Stern, United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
        _____

                                 ____________________

                                  February 12, 1997
                                 ____________________

        _____________________

        *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.  In July 1993,  a grand  jury
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            indicted defendants-appellants Santo Ruiz and  Virgilio Ruiz,

            two brothers,  for various crimes  arising out of  a December

            1990  fire that  destroyed  their variety  store in  Roxbury,

            Massachusetts.  After a  ten day trial, a jury  convicted the

            defendants of maliciously destroying  by fire a building used

            in interstate  commerce (18 U.S.C.   844(i)),  mail fraud (18

            U.S.C.   1341), conspiracy  to commit the foregoing  offenses

            (18 U.S.C.   371), and use of fire to commit a federal felony

            (18 U.S.C.   844(h)(1)).  On appeal, the defendants challenge

            the  district court's denial  of their motions  to acquit and

            for new trial.  They also appeal their sentences.   We affirm

            their convictions  but vacate their sentences  and remand for

            resentencing.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                             Sufficiency of the Evidence
                             Sufficiency of the Evidence
                             ___________________________

                      We review de novo  the defendants' challenge to the
                                __ ____

            evidentiary sufficiency of  their convictions, construing the

            evidence  in the light most favorable to the government.  See
                                                                      ___

            United States v. Olbres,  61 F.3d 967, 970 (1st  Cir.), cert.
            _____________    ______                                 _____

            denied,  116 S. Ct. 522  (1995).  Like the district court, we
            ______

            "must  resolve  all  evidentiary  conflicts  and  credibility

            questions  in the prosecution's  favor," and, among competing

            plausible inferences, we "must choose the inference that best

            fits  the prosecution's  theory of  guilt."   Id.   With this
                                                          ___

                                         -3-
                                          3

            standard  of review  in  mind, we  turn to  the facts  of the

            case.1

            A.  Facts
            _________

                      1.  Pre-Fire Events
                      ___________________

                       In February  1990, defendant  Santo Ruiz opened  a

            retail business named Brothers Fashions and Multiple Services

            ("Brothers Fashions"), in the  basement area of a three-story

            residential  duplex.    Three  of  Santo's  brothers,  Pablo,

            Frederico,   and  co-defendant   Virgilio  Ruiz,   shared  an

            apartment directly above the store.  The duplex comprised six

            residential   apartments  occupied  by  a  total  of  sixteen

            residents, including the building's owner.

                                
            ____________________

            1.  At the  end of the government's case,  Santo and Virgilio
            Ruiz  moved for  judgment of  acquittal, pursuant to  Fed. R.
            Crim. P.  29.  Because  the defendants presented  evidence in
            their defense after  the denial of  the initial motion,  they
            are deemed to have waived review of  the earlier motion.  See
                                                                      ___
            United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 986, 997-98 (1st
            _____________    __________________
            Cir. 1995); United States  v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288,  291 (1st
                        _____________     ______
            Cir. 1992).   Thus, in reviewing  the defendants' sufficiency
            of  the evidence challenge,  we consider,  in the  light most
            favorable  to  the verdict,  the  evidence  presented in  the
            defense  case.  See 2 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and
                            ___                      ____________________
            Procedure   463, at 643-45 (1982).
            _________
                      We note also that although  defendants' motions for
            acquittal and new trial were filed more than seven days after
            the  verdicts  were rendered  and  the  jury discharged,  the
            motions were  timely because,  within that  seven-day period,
            the district court extended the time allowable for making the
            motions.   See Fed. R. Evid. 29(c) & 33; see also Carlisle v.
                       ___                           ___ ____ ________
            United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460, 1463-64 (1996) (holding that,
            _____________
            absent  proper  time  extension,  a district  court  may  not
            entertain an untimely Rule 29 motion).  Thus, we consider the
            motions timely  and properly  preserved for our  full review.
            See  id. at  1471  (explaining that  a sufficiency  challenge
            ___  ___
            untimely  brought in  the trial  court  is subject  to "plain
            error" review) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

                                         -4-
                                          4

                      Santo  borrowed  $10,000   from  another   brother,

            William  Ruiz,  as  the   start-up  capital  for  the  store;

            additionally, Santo incurred  a debt of $4000  to William for

            the store's  fixtures.2  The $14,000 debt  remained unpaid in

            its entirety through the time of the fire.

                      The  store sold  sundry items,  including clothing,

            shoes,  blankets, cosmetics, household products, music albums

            and  cassettes,  beverages and  candy.    Santo obtained  the

            store's  merchandise  for  cash  from a  variety  of  sources

            located in  Massachusetts, New Hampshire,  New York, Florida,

            and California.

                      Virgilio  Ruiz spent  much  time at  the store  and

            frequently assisted  Santo, who  did not speak  English, with

            needed  language  interpretation.   Although  Santo  was  the

            putative owner of  Brothers Fashions,  the evidence  suggests

            that  Santo  and  Virgilio  represented  to  others  a  joint

            ownership  and responsibility  for the  store.   For example,

            both Santo and  Virgilio signed  the lease for  the space  as

            well  as  the business  certificate  filed with  the  City of

            Boston.

                      In  early   September  1990,  Santo   and  Virgilio

            negotiated for the installation of a store security alarm and

            jointly  signed  the  agreement  with  the  alarm  monitoring

                                
            ____________________

            2.  William had operated a convenience market in the basement
            space before the opening of Brothers Fashions. 

                                         -5-
                                          5

            service.   The alarm, which could detect heat and motion, was

            designed  primarily to  trigger  when a  burglar entered  the

            premises after hours; a sufficient  amount of smoke from fire

            could also trigger a response.  The alarm, however, would not

            operate  unless   the  subscriber  activated  the  system  by

            entering  the proper pass code.   About two  weeks before the

            fire, Santo ceased activating the alarm system.

                      In  early November 1990,  approximately nine months

            after Brothers Fashions opened and about six weeks before the

            fire,  Santo   and  Virgilio  obtained   $40,000's  worth  of

            insurance  coverage  for   the  store's  contents.     During

            discussions   with  the   insurance  agent,   the  defendants

            specifically asked  about the processing and  payment of loss

            claims.   Although such information  was not a  usual part of

            the agent's initial discussions about  insurance coverage, in

            response  to this  inquiry,  he explained  that receipts  and

            cancelled  checks   would  be  required  to   prove  a  loss.

            Virgilio, representing Brothers Fashions, signed an insurance

            finance agreement.   Coverage  began shortly thereafter  when

            the brothers  tendered a down payment  of approximately $750.

            The  payment schedule  provided that  a first  installment of

            approximately $250 would fall due on December 20, 1990.

                      Santo kept in  his possession most of  the time the

            only  set of keys to  Brothers Fashions.   Before closing the

            business each  day, Santo  would secure the  store-front with

                                         -6-
                                          6

            three heavy  metal security shutters, each  fastened with two

            padlocks.   The store's  back door, which  was rarely opened,

            measured  three-feet  wide by  four-feet  tall  and could  be

            opened only from the inside of the store.  It  was secured on

            the inside with a sliding lock and at least one wooden cross-

            bar laid across the  door.  An outer iron grate,  locked from

            the inside with a padlock, further secured the back door.

                      Less  than  two  days  before  the  fire,  Brothers

            Fashions was  fully  stocked with  merchandise  displayed  on

            clothing racks, shelves, and in display cases.

                      2.  The Fire
                      ____________

                      Around 2:00  a.m. on  Sunday, December 16,  1990, a

            fire raged through Brothers Fashions.  The close proximity of

            the  store  to a  fire  station  resulted in  near  immediate

            response.    Nonetheless, the  blaze  was  serious enough  to

            warrant   the  services  of   some  seventy  fire  department

            personnel and over one dozen fire vehicles.

                      Arriving  at  the scene,  fire-fighters encountered

            the metal security shutters  lying in the street in  front of

            the store;  the shutters  apparently had been  blown off  the

            store-front by a  powerful explosion.  A  fire-fighter in the

            first group to  reach the  back of the  building noticed  the

            store's back door standing open with flames shooting out from

            the  basement.    The  fire-fighters  extinguished  the  fire

            without forcible entry of the property.

                                         -7-
                                          7

                      Normally, when a store stocked with clothing burns,

            piles  of clothing in various  stages of ruin  remain.  After

            the  fire at  Brothers  Fashions was  suppressed, however,  a

            casual inspection  of the damaged store  revealed very little

            burned or  charred merchandise; rather, all  that was visible

            were a  few beverage bottles,  some canned goods  and minimal

            charred foodstuffs.   The  dearth of charred  merchandise and

            the complete absence of clothing remnants in the store evince

            that it was nearly empty when it burned.

                      All  of the  apartment  tenants,  except  Virgilio,

            escaped  unharmed from  the burning  building.   None  of the

            tenants, including Virgilio, required fire-fighter assistance

            to evacuate.  Virgilio suffered second and third degree burns

            on his  ankles, a severe  cut above  his left eye,  and large

            bruises  below his  left  eye  and  across  his  chest.    An

            ambulance  carried him from the  scene to the hospital, where

            he remained for eighteen days.

                      3.  Post-Fire Events
                      ____________________

                      Subsequent  investigation  revealed  that the  fire

            originated  in two  distinct locations  within the  store and

            burned in an unusual manner.   Specifically, the burn pattern

            indicated  that an  accelerant,  such as  gasoline, had  been

            poured  over  a counter  and  other  areas.   The  building's

            electrical  and natural  gas  distribution systems  showed no

            sign  of having caused or contributed to the fire.  Following

                                         -8-
                                          8

            the fire, Boston  Gas Company, the  natural gas provider  for

            the building,  conducted  a search  of  its records  for  the

            period from 1984 through the time of the fire for any reports

            of gas leak  repairs at  the building.   The search  revealed

            nothing.

                      Sometime within the first two weeks after the fire,

            John  Greenaway, who had been hired for carpentry work on the

            premises, opened up the boarded-up store so  that Santo could

            retrieve an empty clothes  rack.  In January 1991,  Santo and

            Virgilio prepared,  jointly signed  and submitted a  claim to

            their insurer --  via certified mail -- asserting  a contents

            loss  of some $48,000.   The claim detailed  various items of

            store   merchandise  and  fixtures,  including  thousands  of

            dollars'  worth  of  men's and  women's  clothing,  curtains,

            shoes, blankets, music albums and cassettes, videos, watches,

            candy, household items and toys.

                      Contrary  to the  insurance agent's  earlier advice

            and the  insurance company's request, the  defendants did not

            submit any  receipts, invoices,  or other records  to support

            their  claim of loss.   Instead, the  defendants claimed that

            the fire destroyed all such records and submitted a couple of

            photographs purporting to represent the  store merchandise at

            the  time of the fire  and a cancelled  check from Virgilio's

            bank account  for approximately $15  in cigarette tax.   When

                                         -9-
                                          9

            asked by the  insurance company, Santo  could not recall  the

            names of any of his retail merchandise suppliers.

                      At various times before trial, Virgilio related his

            version of the  fire events  to  his  attending physician,  a

            Boston  Fire  Department  investigator,   and,  in  a   sworn

            deposition,  representatives of  the insurance  company.   He

            professed  a general  inability  to recall  clearly and  gave

            somewhat  inconsistent accounts of  the fire events.   To the

            extent  Virgilio's  various  stories overlap,  they  indicate

            that: he awoke in  the first floor apartment to  the smell of

            smoke, went  to the living room  to check the gas  heater and

            saw  smoke  coming  through  the  floor;  he  then  heard  an

            explosion and ran to awaken his sleeping brothers (Pablo  and

            Frederico)  to  warn  them of  the  fire;  he  picked up  the

            telephone to call the fire department, but the line was dead;

            he proceeded to run out the  front hallway of the duplex  and

            down  the stairs toward the building's front exit; on his way

            out to the sidewalk in front of the duplex, another explosion

            occurred and his  "fuzzy" socks caught  on fire, causing  the

            injuries to  his ankles; at some point, he ran into a door --

            perhaps the front door  of the apartment unit --  causing his

            bruises and the severe cut above his eye.

                      4.  The Defendants' Case
                      ________________________

                      The defendants  presented a joint  defense, calling

            to the stand  members of the  Ruiz family: Pablo,  Frederico,

                                         -10-
                                          10

            Santo,  and  Rosa  (Santo's   wife).    Pablo  and  Frederico

            testified  that, on the night  of the fire,  Virgilio went to

            bed around midnight, and they  retired soon thereafter.  They

            stated  that Virgilio later woke them up because of the fire.

            Frederico  testified  that  he   then  dressed  quickly   and

            proceeded  out the  front door.   As  he descended  the front

            stairs,  he met Virgilio, who  was bleeding from his forehead

            and down his face.   Frederico and Virgilio ran out the front

            of  the building together.   Frederico was not  injured -- by

            flame  or otherwise  --  as he  exited.   Upon  reaching  the

            sidewalk in front of the building, he noticed fire coming out

            of the basement store.  Frederico said that he  then told the

            fire-fighters that Pablo was still inside the building.

                      Pablo testified that his only avenue of escape from

            the  burning building  was  the apartment's  back  door.   He

            stated  that when  he exited  the building,  he  observed two

            fire-fighters, who, he says, had been attempting  to pry open

            the  apartment's back door  to let him  out.  Both  Pablo and

            Frederico testified  that they  saw fire-fighters force  open

            the  store's back door, which, they claimed, had been closed.

            They  further claimed that, upon the opening of the back door

            -- which measured  four-feet by  three-feet --  fire-fighters

            emerged from  within  the store  wearing  full  fire-fighting

            regalia, including oxygen tanks and masks.

                                         -11-
                                          11

                      Santo testified in his  defense.  He explained that

            he  initially did  not insure  the  contents of  the Brothers

            Fashions  because he  wanted first  to see  how the  business

            fared.   He testified that only he  knew the alarm pass code,

            and  that he failed to  activate the alarm  for several weeks

            before the  fire because of  the recurrence of  false alarms.

            He had deduced that  rats entering the store after  hours (to

            eat candy) triggered the  alarm, and he wanted to  "kill" the

            rodents before further engaging the alarm.  He testified that

            he  complained  about  the rats  to  both  the  owner and  to

            Greenaway,  who,  in turn,  testified  that  Santo had  never

            complained to him about a rat problem.

                      Santo suggested  that a  natural gas  explosion may

            have contributed to the fire.   Specifically, he claimed that

            about one month before the fire, he called Boston Gas because

            he smelled  a  natural  gas leak;  contrary  to  other  trial

            testimony, he claimed that Boston Gas personnel then came out

            to the store  and fixed  the leak.   Santo further  testified

            that  there  may have  been paint  and  paint thinner  in the

            store, as well as household detergents, that might have acted

            as  an  accelerant for  the fire  and  would account  for the

            peculiar burn patterns.

                      Santo testified that on  December 15, 1990, the day

            before the fire, the store was fully stocked.  That night, he

            explained, he had closed the store between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00

                                         -12-
                                          12

            p.m. and secured  the front  entrance.  He  insisted that  he

            left the  back door fully secured and that he retained in his

            possession the only  set of store keys.  He  then went to his

            home in Dorchester.   The next morning, around 6:00  a.m., he

            received a call at home informing him of the fire.  He walked

            to  the store (his car was  not operational), arriving around

            8:00 a.m..

                      Santo further testified  that, upon his arrival  at

            the  fire scene, he  saw ten to fifteen  people in and around

            the  burned  store, including  people  from  Boston Gas,  and

            Greenaway's  son.   He said  the  people were  removing half-

            burned items  from the store.   He admitted at  trial that he

            had never previously mentioned his observance of the looters,

            even to the insurance company.  He also testified that he did

            not attempt to stop the looting because the merchandise taken

            was, in any event, ruined.

                      Santo admitted  that, although he did  not speak or

            understand  English   and  had   to  rely  on   Virgilio  for

            translation, he  fully understood his actions  when he signed

            the lease to  the store, the business certificate,  the alarm

            system contract, and the insurance  claim for $48,000 in lost

            inventory.    Santo  denied  removing, or  asking  anyone  to

            remove, the  merchandise  from Brothers  Fashions before  the

            fire.  He also denied  lighting the fire or asking  anyone to

            light the fire.

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      The defendants painted  a picture  of a  prosperous

            store that earned some $600 to $1000 in retail sales per day,

            suggesting  the  absence of  a  motive  to collect  insurance

            proceeds.   The  defendants also  attempted to  establish the

            bias of various trial witnesses.   For example, they produced

            (contradicted)  evidence of  the  unlawful  absence of  smoke

            detectors in the  duplex, suggesting that  the owner had  her

            own  motive to  collect insurance  proceeds.   The defendants

            also  suggested  that  the  carpenter  Greenaway  was  biased

            because  he had married the  owner's niece in  1990 and, upon

            the owner's  death, the  owner's niece stood  to inherit  the

            building.

            B.  Arson and Conspiracy Counts, Analysis
            _________________________________________

                      1.  Relevant Law
                      ________________

                      To  prove a  violation of  18 U.S.C.    844(i), the

            government   must  establish  that   the  defendants:     (1)

            maliciously damaged  or destroyed, or attempted  to damage or

            destroy,  (2)  by fire  or an  explosive,  (3) a  building or

            personal  property  used in  interstate  commerce  or in  any

            activity  affecting  interstate  commerce.    The  government

            sought  to prove that Virgilio set the fire, and Santo either

            aided  and  abetted him,  or  reasonably  could foresee  that

            Virgilio would  set the  fire in  furtherance of  an unlawful

            conspiracy.

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      To prove aiding and abetting on  the part of Santo,

            the  government  had to  prove  that  Virgilio committed  the

            arson,   and  that   Santo   associated  himself   with,  and

            participated in,  the arson "as something he  wished to bring

            about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed."  United
                                                                   ______

            States  v.  Loder,  23  F.3d  586,  590-91  (1st  Cir.  1994)
            ______      _____

            (internal quotation  marks and citations omitted);  see Nye &
                                                                ___ _____

            Nissen  v.   United  States,   336  U.S.  613,   619  (1949).
            ______       ______________

            Alternatively, to  convict  Santo of  the  substantive  arson

            offense,  the government  had  to establish  that  Virgilio's

            setting of the fire was a foreseeable act done in furtherance

            of  their  unlawful  conspiracy.   See  Pinkerton  v.  United
                                               ___  _________      ______

            States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
            ______

                      To prove  the underlying conspiracy --  a predicate

            to Santo's Pinkerton liability as well as a substantive count
                       _________

            in  the indictment -- the  government needed to establish the

            defendants'  knowledge  and  voluntary  participation  in the

            agreement, and an overt act in furtherance of it.  See United
                                                               ___ ______

            States v. Sawyer,  85 F.3d  713, 742 (1st  Cir. 1996).   "The
            ______    ______

            agreement  need  not  be  explicit; a  tacit  agreement  will

            suffice."   Id.   To  establish voluntary  participation, the
                        ___

            government must prove both the intent to agree and the intent

            to effectuate  the object of  the conspiracy.   See  id.   Of
                                                            ___  ___

            course,  direct evidence is not required  to prove either the

            agreement (which  may be inferred from  circumstances) or the

                                         -15-
                                          15

            defendants' participation in it.   See id.; United  States v.
                                               ___ ___  ______________

            Moran, 984 F.2d 1299, 1300 (1st Cir. 1993).
            _____

                      2.  Application
                      _______________

                      The  evidence more than adequately established that

            someone deliberately torched Brothers  Fashions with the  aid
            _______

            of an accelerant.  Further, there is little question that the

            store was  used in an activity  affecting interstate commerce

            both  because  it  was  a rental  property,  and  because the

            merchandise   purchased  for   resale  moved   in  interstate

            commerce.   See United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1247-
                        ___ _____________    _______

            48 (1st Cir. 1996)  (holding that "rental property is  per se
                                                                   ___ __

            sufficiently connected  to interstate commerce"  for purposes

            of    844(i)) (explaining  further  that  the  jurisdictional

            element is  met where restaurant received  food supplies that

            travelled in interstate commerce); see also Russell v. United
                                               ___ ____ _______    ______

            States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985).
            ______

                      The more  troubling question is whether  or not the

            evidence sufficiently proved that Santo and Virgilio were the

            parties criminally responsible  for the fire.   We note  that

            the case  against the  defendants is  largely circumstantial.

            Circumstantial evidence does not represent the proposition in

            question, but asserts "'something  else, from which the trier

            of  fact may  either (i)  reasonably infer  the truth  of the

            proposition,  .  . .  or (ii)  at  least reasonably  infer an

            increase  in the probability that  the proposition is in fact

                                         -16-
                                          16

            true.'"  U.S. v. Clotida, 892 F.2d 1098, 1104 (1st Cir. 1989)
                     ____    _______

            (quoting  1 D. Louisell  & C. Mueller,  Federal Evidence   94
                                                    ________________

            (1977)).    Although   circumstantial  evidence  requires  an

            inferential   step  in   its  proof,   there  is   "no  legal

            distinction"  between circumstantial  and direct  evidence in

            the context of a Rule 29 motion.  Id.; see Olbres, 61 F.3d at
                                              ___  ___ ______

            971.    We recognize  that  "the government's  proof  may lay

            entirely  in  circumstantial  evidence,"  United   States  v.
            ________                                  _______________

            Valerio,  48 F.3d 58, 63-64 (1st Cir. 1995); we are, however,
            _______

            "loath to stack inference  upon inference in order  to uphold

            the jury's verdict."  Id.
                                  ___

                      The government produced  direct evidence that Santo

            had in his possession the only keys to the store on the night

            of the fire, that  the store's back door, rarely  opened, was

            open at the time of the fire, and that Brothers  Fashions had

            been emptied of  almost all  merchandise at that  time.   The

            jury thus could rationally infer that, because only Santo had

            the means to  access the  store that evening,  he opened  the

            back  door from the inside  of the store  sometime before the

            fire.   Santo's exclusive access also  permits the conclusion

            that  he  was  involved  with  the  removal  of  the  store's

            merchandise before the fire.   The jury could infer  that his

            new   and  uncorroborated  testimony   about  looters  was  a

            fabrication  to  account  for   the  lost  merchandise  --  a

                                         -17-
                                          17

            fabrication  intended  to  cover  up  his  knowledge  of  and

            involvement in its removal.

                      The  jury could  conclude that  Santo lied  when he

            testified  that he discontinued activating the security alarm

            shortly  before the fire because of rats.  From this untruth,

            the  jury could  infer  that Santo's  unexpressed reason  for

            failing to engage  the alarm  was to nullify  its ability  to

            detect both the  removal of  merchandise and the  fire.   The

            jury could further find  that Santo lied when he  stated that

            he left  the store's back  door secured on  the night of  the

            fire and that, in fact,  he left it open for Virgilio  to set

            the fire.

                      A  jury  could   rationally  infer  that   Virgilio

            personally set fire to Brothers Fashions.  Virgilio, the only

            apartment tenant injured by the fire, had severe burns on his

            ankles, consistent  with  direct and  prolonged  exposure  to

            flame;  yet Frederico, who  exited the  building in  the same

            manner and  through the  same area  as  claimed by  Virgilio,

            testified  that he was not injured in  any manner and that he

            did not encounter any  fire until he reached the  sidewalk in

            front of  the building,  where he  viewed the  fire emanating

            from the  store.  The  jury could  also choose not  to credit

            Virgilio's unembellished and confused account of the cause of

            the injuries to his face and body and infer that, in fact, he

                                         -18-
                                          18

            suffered those  injuries escaping the store  (perhaps out the

            small back door) after lighting the fire.

                      The jury  could further  find that Santo  lied when

            testifying that: (1) he had nothing to do with the removal of

            the store's  contents, (2) he  observed looters at  the store

            the morning after the fire, and (3) Boston Gas repaired a gas

            leak at the store one month before the fire.   The jury could

            also conclude  that  Virgilio lied  about the  source of  his

            injuries.   Lies such as these legitimately support a finding

            of guilt.  See  United States v. Hadfield, 918  F.2d 987, 999
                       ___  _____________    ________

            (1st Cir. 1990)  (finding inference of guilt could  have been

            bolstered  by defendant's  "tall  tale");  United  States  v.
                                                       ______________

            Jimenez-Perez,  869 F.2d  9, 11  (1st Cir.  1989) (explaining
            _____________

            that  the  jury's  disbelief   of  defendants'  story  allows

            legitimate inference  "that the fabrication was  all the more

            proof of their guilt").

                      As  to  motive,  although  the  government  did not

            produce   evidence  that  Brothers  Fashions  was  a  failing

            business,3  the defendants  clearly  stood to  gain from  the

            insurance  proceeds.  Moreover, the jury could have given due

            weight to the fact that the defendants did not have insurance

            for the first nine months of the store's operation,  obtained

            it  only six weeks before  the fire, and  expressed  peculiar

            concern about claim payments  and proof of loss requirements.

                                
            ____________________

            3.  Santo did, however, owe $14,000 to his brother, William.

                                         -19-
                                          19

            Further, the fire occurred just four days before the due date

            of  the first installment payment, but after the down payment

            had already triggered coverage.

                      In sum, although not overwhelming, the evidence was

            sufficient to prove beyond a  reasonable doubt that (1) Santo

            and Virgilio  conspired to  set afire Brothers  Fashions, (2)

            Virgilio set the  fire, (3) Santo  assisted Virgilio in  this

            task  by  providing access  to the  store  and by  failing to

            engage the alarm, and (4) Santo reasonably could foresee that

            Virgilio would set the fire in furtherance of the conspiracy.

            Although  the evidence does not compel a finding of guilt, it
                                            ______

            need not "exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or

            be wholly  inconsistent with every conclusion  except guilt."

            United  States v. Laboy, 909  F.2d 581, 588  (1st Cir. 1990).
            ______________    _____

            The jury  was "free to choose  among reasonable constructions

            of evidence,"  id.,  and  the trial  evidence,  as  a  whole,
                           ___

            permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See
                                                                      ___

            id.  We  cannot say that the jury's verdict  on the arson and
            ___

            conspiracy counts was irrational.

            C.  Mail Fraud
            ______________

                      Little discussion  of this count is  necessary.  To

            prove  mail fraud,  the government  must establish:  "(1) the

            defendant's knowing and willing  participation in a scheme or

            artifice to defraud with the specific intent to  defraud, and

            (2) the use of the mails . . . in furtherance of the scheme."

                                         -20-
                                          20

            Sawyer,  85  F.3d  at 723.    There  was  more than  adequate
            ______

            evidence  to  prove  that  Santo  and Virgilio  intentionally

            agreed  to  collect   insurance  proceeds  fraudulently,  and

            together  submitted, by  mail,  a false  insurance claim  for

            merchandise they knew had not been lost in the fire.  We will

            not disturb the jury's verdict on this count.

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                 Motion for New Trial
                                 Motion for New Trial
                                 ____________________

                      The defendants alternatively challenge the district

            court's denial of their new trial  motions, claiming that, on

            the weight  of the evidence, their  convictions constituted a

            miscarriage  of justice.  A district court's power to order a

            new  trial is  greater than its  power to grant  a motion for

            acquittal.   See United States v. Rothrock, 806 F.2d 318, 318
                         ___ _____________    ________

            (1st  Cir. 1986).   In  considering a  new trial  motion, the

            court  may consider both the  weight of the  evidence and the

            credibility of witnesses.  See id. at 321.  Where a new trial
                                       ___ ___

            motion  is based upon the  weight of the  evidence, the court

            may not order a new trial "unless it is quite  clear that the

            jury has reached a  seriously erroneous result."  See  id. at
                                                              ___  ___

            322  (internal quotation  marks and  citations omitted).   We

            review  the district court's ruling on a new trial motion for

            abuse of discretion.  See id. 
                                  ___ ___

                      True,  the trial  evidence  was in  conflict.   The

            jury, however, was not compelled to credit Virgilio's account

                                         -21-
                                          21

            of  the  manner  in  which  he  was  injured,  or  Pablo  and

            Frederico's testimony that fire-fighters forcibly entered the

            store's  back  door.    The   jury  could  have  agreed  with

            Virgilio's   argument  that,   given  the   evident  powerful

            explosion in  the store,  his injuries  would have  been more

            severe, or worse, he would not have  survived had he been the

            arsonist.  The jury was warranted, however, in rejecting this

            theory.

                      The   strongest   competing  theory   of  innocence

            concerns Santo's involvement in  the arson.  Put  simply, the

            jury could have  reasonably found that Santo knew  nothing of

            the fire  before its  occurrence, but  acted as  an accessory

            after  the fact both to  protect Virgilio and  to profit from

            fraudulently obtained insurance proceeds.   Santo insisted in

            his  testimony, however, that he had the only means of access

            to the store on  the night of the  fire and that he left  the

            back door secured that evening.  In  contrast, the government

            produced direct, credible evidence that the back door was not
                                                                      ___

            closed at the  time of  the fire; while  the jury might  have

            found  that Virgilio opened  the door, or,  perhaps, that the

            explosion blew the  door open (although no  witness opined as

            such),  given  Santo's  staunch  refusal  to  allow  for  the

            possibility  that someone  else may  have had  access to  the

            store,  the jury  could  and did  plausibly  find that  Santo

            opened the door.   The evidence that Santo obtained insurance

                                         -22-
                                          22

            coverage  and disengaged  the alarm  shortly before  the fire

            constitutes  further proof  of  his prior  knowledge of,  and

            involvement in, the arson-for-profit scheme.  Finally,  other

            than  generally  to  deny  any involvement  with  the  arson,

            Santo's  trial testimony  did nothing  to support  the theory

            that he was an unwitting dupe in Virgilio's criminal plan.

                      The largely  circumstantial nature of the  proof in

            this case  gave rise to competing  plausible inferences, some

            pointing  to  guilt and  others to  innocence.   The  jury is

            charged with choosing between such inferences, see Olbres, 61
                                                           ___ ______

            F.3d at  972,  and, having  had  the opportunity  to  observe

            Santo's trial testimony  and demeanor, it saw  fit to convict

            him  on all counts.  While reasonable people could have found

            otherwise, "a trial judge  is not a thirteenth juror  who may

            set  aside a verdict merely  because he would  have reached a

            different  result."  Rothrock, 806  F.2d at 322.   Because we
                                 ________

            cannot say the jury reached a seriously  erroneous result, we

            find  no  abuse  of   discretion  in  the  court's  carefully

            considered refusal to grant Santo or Virgilio a new trial.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                   Jury Composition
                                   Jury Composition
                                   ________________

                      For the first time on appeal, Virgilio complains of

            the   absence  of  minority   jury  members,   suggesting  an

            unconstitutionally disproportionate  ethnic representation in

            the  jury  venire.    We consider  Virgilio's  unadorned  and

                                         -23-
                                          23

            perfunctory appellate arguments waived.  See United States v.
                                                     ___ _____________

            Zannino,  895 F.2d  1, 17  (1st  Cir. 1990)  (explaining that
            _______

            undeveloped   appellate   arguments   are   deemed   waived).

            Moreover,  not only  did he  fail timely  to raise  the issue

            below, his assertions on appeal are, in any event, inadequate

            to meet his burden on the  issue.  See United States v. Pion,
                                               ___ _____________    ____

            25  F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining elements of prima

            facie case of unconstitutional disproportionality).4  

                                         IV.
                                         IV.
                                         ___

                             Other Asserted Trial Errors
                             Other Asserted Trial Errors
                             ___________________________

                      Virgilio contends  that  the prosecutor  asked  two

            questions  of  Pablo Ruiz  that  were  calculated to  inflame

            ethnic  prejudice in  the jury.   Some  context is  in order.

            Pablo  testified that,  although  he received  many years  of

            education in  the Dominican  Republic and earned  an advanced

            degree in agriculture, he  could not find work in  the United

            States because he did not speak English.  When later asked by

            the prosecutor how  he could  remember at trial  the time  he

            went to bed on  the night of the fire  (some three-and-a-half

            years earlier) Pablo replied, "Well, if I can remember what I

            studied  during 23 years, I should be able to remember a part

            of what happened that night."

                                
            ____________________

            4.  Virgilio  also suggests  that three  of the  jury members
            were  biased  because they  had  relatives  in the  insurance
            industry.  Because Virgilio failed to raise the  issue below,
            and fails adequately to  develop it on appeal, we  decline to
            address it.

                                         -24-
                                          24

                      After  further questioning  about the  fire events,

            during which Pablo's credibility  was called into question by

            various inconsistencies, the prosecutor rekindled the subject

            of Pablo's inability to find agricultural work in the  United

            States.  The following exchange ensued:

                      [The Prosecutor]:  What about California,
                      .  . .  you ever  tried to  get a  job in
                      agriculture in California?

                      [Court   overrules   the  objection   and
                      directs the witness to answer yes or no]

                      [Pablo Ruiz]:  No.

                      [The Prosecutor]:   What about Texas, did
                      you ever --

                      [Court sustains objection].5

                      In  its post-trial  order  denying  the  defendants

            motions for acquittal and new trial, the district court found

            that "the  now disputed  cross-examination of Pablo  Ruiz was

            proper,  did not constitute a racist appeal to the jury, and,

            when viewed in context,  was not material in any event."   We

            agree.   We  have  warned  that  "courts  must  not  tolerate

            prosecutors' efforts  gratuitously to inject issues like race

            and  ethnicity  into  criminal  trials."   United  States  v.
                                                       ______________

            Saccoccia, 58  F.3d 754, 774  (1st Cir. 1995),  cert. denied,
            _________                                       _____ ______

            116 S. Ct. 1322 (1996).  To the extent the disputed questions

            here  unnecessarily  (albeit  marginally)  invited  ethnic or

            cultural prejudice, we strongly disapprove.  While,  however,

                                
            ____________________

            5.  Defense counsel did not press for any further redress.

                                         -25-
                                          25

            the  inquiries  may have  been  of  borderline relevance  and

            materiality,   it  was  Pablo   who  initially   offered  the

            explanation that his inability to speak English precluded his

            employment in  the field  for  which he  was most  qualified.

            Under  the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the

            prosecutor impermissibly  injected into  the trial  a harmful

            appeal  to any ethnic  bias in the  jury by asking  these two

            questions.  See id.6
                        ___ ___

                      Virgilio also claims that the prosecutor frequently

            "bellowed offensively at defense testimony" and "screamed  at

            the jury with totally inappropriate accompanying facial moues

            and  flailing gesticulation."    Virgilio did  not raise  any

            objection to the prosecutor's  style or manner at trial.   In

            its post-trial  order, the district court  found that, "while

            the prosecutor's closing argument was loudly and passionately

            delivered,  it  did  not  exceed the  bounds  of  propriety."

            Having failed on appeal to  develop his argument or  explain,

            with any detail, how  the prosecutor's conduct prejudiced the

            trial, Virgilio cannot prevail on this challenge.7

                                
            ____________________

            6.  We also note that the district court carefully instructed
            the jury, at some  length, that it must not draw  any adverse
            inference from  the fact  that the  defendants were  from the
            Dominican Republic and were not native English speakers.

            7.  To the  extent Virgilio suggests on appeal that his trial
            counsel rendered ineffective  representation, that  challenge
            is  not  properly  before us.    United  States v.  Martinez-
                                             ______________     _________
            Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1225 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining that
            ________
            an ineffective  assistance of counsel claim  on direct appeal
            will not  lie absent a sufficiently  developed record), cert.
                                                                    _____

                                         -26-
                                          26

                                          V.
                                          V.
                                          __

             18 U.S.C.   844(h)(1): Use of Fire to Commit Federal Felony
             18 U.S.C.   844(h)(1): Use of Fire to Commit Federal Felony
             ___________________________________________________________

                      The defendants also challenge their convictions and

            sentences under  18 U.S.C.    844(h)(1),  which provides,  in

            relevant part: "Whoever  . . . uses  fire or an  explosive to

            commit any [federal] felony  . . . shall, in addition  to the

            punishment  provided   for  such  felony,  be   sentenced  to

            imprisonment for 5 years but  not more than 15 years. .  . ."

            The indictment  charged Santo and Virgilio with using fire to

            commit  mail fraud,  a violation  of 18  U.S.C.   1341.   The

            defendants  claim,  however, that  "fire"  was  not used  "to

            commit" mail fraud, but rather, the "mailing of articles" was

            used to commit mail fraud.   They contend that fire  may have

            been used  to commit the arson,  "but it was not  the letter,
                                     _____

            envelope  or stamp,  or  handwriting/printing/typing used  to

            commit  mail fraud."  In the past, we have implicitly assumed

            the  legal conclusion  that defendants  now challenge.   See,
                                                                     ___

            e.g.,  United States v. Lombardi,  5 F.3d 568,  569 (1st Cir.
            ____   _____________    ________

            1993)  (involving   844(h)(1)  conviction for  using  fire to

                                
            ____________________

            denied,  116  S. Ct.  1343 (1996).    Further, to  the extent
            ______
            Virgilio submits new  evidence in support of  his request for
            new  trial, that evidence must be brought to the attention of
            the  district court in the first instance, either in a timely
            motion  pursuant to  Fed. R.  Crim. P.  33, or  on a  writ of
            habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.   2255.

                                         -27-
                                          27

            commit mail fraud where defendant arranged arson fraudulently

            to secure insurance proceeds).8

                      Defendants'  challenge  calls  into   question  the

            meaning of the  phrase "uses fire  . . .  to commit  [certain

            crimes]."   We have not  previously been presented  with this

            issue.   We begin our  analysis with the  statute's language.

            See  Bailey v.  United States,  116 S.  Ct. 501,  506 (1995).
            ___  ______     _____________

            Because  the  word  "use"  is  not  defined  by  statute,  we

            "construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning."

            Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993); see Bailey,
            _____    _____________                            ___ ______

            116 S. Ct. at 506.   The word is "variously defined  as '[t]o

            convert  to one's  service,' 'to  employ,' 'to  avail oneself

            of,'  and 'to  carry out a  purpose or action  by means of.'"

            Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 506  (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 228-29
            ______                              _____

            (internal  quotation  marks  omitted) (citing  Webster's  New

            International Dictionary  of  English Language  2806 (2d  ed.

            1949) and Black's Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990))).

                      We think  it plain that the  defendants "used" fire

            to commit mail fraud within the meaning of   844(h)(1).9  The

                                
            ____________________

            8.  We also note that the government has frequently charged a
              844(h)(1)   offense  in   connection   with   mail   fraud,
            specifically  where a  defendant  sought to  secure insurance
            proceeds for  property  he had  burned.   See,  e.g.,  United
                                                      ___   ____   ______
            States v. Lombardi, 5  F.3d 568, 569 (1st Cir.  1993); United
            ______    ________                                     ______
            States  v. Bennett, 984 F.2d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1993); United
            ______     _______                                     ______
            States v. Schriver, 838 F.2d 980, 981 (8th Cir. 1988).
            ______    ________

            9.  Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
            underlying  this  count.   For  the  reasons discussed  above
            concerning the  arson, conspiracy  and mail fraud  counts, we

                                         -28-
                                          28

            defendants set fire to Brothers Fashions "to carry out" their

            scheme to  deceive the insurance company  into making payment

            for claimed losses.   Specifically, the fire constituted "the

            means"  by  which  the  defendants attempted  to  create  the

            appearance  of a legitimate loss of insured items.  While the

            defendants also "used" the mails in furtherance of the scheme

            to   defraud,  that   does  not   diminish  the   fact  that,

            additionally, they "employed" or "availed themselves of" fire

            to  effect  their  scheme.    Cf.  Smith,  508  U.S.  at  230
                                          __   _____

            (explaining that including one  method of "us[ing] a firearm"

            does  not   result  in  excluding  others).     Finally,  the

            defendants make no argument that the placement and purpose of

            the  word  "use"  in  its  statutory  context  undermine  the

            applicability of   844(h)(1) here.  See Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at
                                                ___ ______

            506-07  (considering  disputed  language  in the  context  of

                                
            ____________________

            find  the evidence sufficient to  permit a jury  to find that
            Santo and Virgilio used fire to commit mail fraud.

                                         -29-
                                          29

            overall  statutory scheme).  No basis for such an argument is

            apparent.10

                      In  conclusion, we  see  no basis  to overturn  the

            defendants'  convictions and  attendant  penalties  under  18

            U.S.C.   844(h)(1).

                                         VI.
                                         VI.
                                         ___

                            Sentencing Guideline Challenge
                            Sentencing Guideline Challenge
                            ______________________________

                      Defendants  appeal the  court's application  of the

            federal arson  guideline.   See  U.S.  Sentencing  Guidelines
                                        ___

            Manual  [hereinafter "U.S.S.G."]    2K1.4(a)(1)-(4) (1994).11

            In  the sentencing context, we review factual determinations,

            which must be  supported by a preponderance  of the evidence,

            for clear error.  See United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522,
                              ___ _____________    ________

            535  (1st Cir.),  cert. denied,  117 S.  Ct. 479  (1996), and
                              _____ ______                            ___

            cert.  denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1997) (No. 96-
            _____  ______

            5017).    We  review  de  novo  sentencing  issues  involving
                                  __  ____

            questions of  law, including the applicability  of a relevant

                                
            ____________________

            10.  Moreover, the legislative history  of the Anti-Arson Act
            of   1982,  which  amends    844(h)(1)  and  other  statutory
            sections,  strongly  suggests Congress'  recognition,  in the
            context  of this statutory scheme, that one can "use fire" to
            effect a number of criminal purposes,  specifically insurance
            fraud.  See H.R. Rep. No. 678, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982
                    ___                                 _________ __
            U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631,  2632 ("Fire is used  extensively not only
            for  the  criminal  purposes   of  extortion,  terrorism  and
            revenge, but to  conceal other crimes  such as homicide,  and
            for fraud against insurance companies.").

            11.  Unless  otherwise indicated, all guideline citations are
            to the November 1994 version of the United  States Sentencing
            Commission Guidelines Manual, applied (without  objection) by
            the district court.

                                         -30-
                                          30

            guideline.   See id.   Because the sentencing  court enjoys a
                         ___ ___

            unique   vantage  point  and   has  "special  competence"  in

            assessing  the  "ordinariness"  of   a  case,  we  afford  it

            substantial deference in departure decisions, which we review

            only for abuse  of discretion.  Koon v. United States, 116 S.
                                            ____    _____________

            Ct. 2035, 2047 (1st Cir. 1996).

                      The  arson  guideline provides  for  different base

            offense levels  depending on the circumstances  of the crime.

            Subsection (a)(1) of the guideline authorizes the application

            of a base offense level of 24 if:

                      the  offense  (A)  created a  substantial
                      risk of death or serious bodily injury to
                      any  person other  than a  participant in
                      the  offense, and  that risk  was created
                                    ___________________________
                      knowingly;    or    (B)   involved    the
                      _________
                      destruction or attempted destruction of a
                      _________________________________________
                      dwelling.
                      ________

            U.S.S.G.   2K1.4(a)(1)  (emphasis added).   Subsection (a)(2)

            authorizes a lower base offense level, 20, if:

                      the  offense  (A)  created a  substantial
                      risk of death or serious bodily injury to
                      any  person other  than a  participant in
                      the offense; (B) involved the destruction
                                                    ___________
                      or attempted destruction  of a  structure
                      _________________________________________
                      other than a  dwelling; or (C) endangered
                      ______________________         __________
                      a dwelling,  or a structure other  than a
                      __________
                      dwelling.

            U.S.S.G.   2K1.4(a)(2) (emphasis added).12

                                
            ____________________

            12.  The   arson   guideline  commentary   further  provides,
            "Creating  a  substantial risk  of  death  or serious  bodily
            injury includes creating that risk to fire fighters and other
            emergency  and law  enforcement personnel  who respond  to or
            investigate an offense."  U.S.S.G.   2K1.4, comment. (n.2).

                                         -31-
                                          31

                      As  indicated  by the  underscored language  in the

            text  of the arson guideline set forth above, the higher base

            offense level (24) is warranted  under either the first prong

            of    2K1.4(a)(1) --  the knowing  creation of  a substantial

            risk of death or  serious bodily injury (  2K1.4(a)(1)(A)) --

            or  the   second  prong  --  the   destruction  or  attempted

            destruction of a dwelling  (  2K1.4(a)(1)(B)).  The selection

            between  this base offense level and the lower level (20) set

            forth in the subsequent section,   2K1.4(a)(2),  depends upon

            either  the defendant's mens rea (i.e., whether or not it was
                                    ________

            "knowing") in  creating the  requisite risk, or  the type  of
                                                         __

            structure involved,  i.e., dwelling or non-dwelling.   If the

            fire  involved a  dwelling,  the selection  between the  base

            offense levels depends on whether the defendant destroyed (or

            attempted to destroy) it, or merely endangered it.

                      The   defendants  offered  two  rationales  to  the

            district court in support of an application of a base offense

            level  of  20:  (1)  it  is  inconceivable  that  they  would

            intentionally create  a substantial risk of  death or serious

            bodily injury  to their family members  living directly above

            Brothers Fashions; and (2) they did not destroy or attempt to

            destroy  a dwelling,  but rather, a  store; and  the upstairs
                       ________

            residences, only minimally damaged, were  merely "endangered"

            incidentally to the arson offense.

                                         -32-
                                          32

                      The government countered that a  base offense level

            of 24  was  warranted  because,  under  the  first  prong  of

              2K1.4(a)(1), the  defendants had only  to "knowingly,"  not

            "intentionally,"  create  the   risk  of  death   or  injury.

            Moreover, the government argued, the defendants satisfied the

            "knowingly" requirement because they committed the arson at a

            time  when they knew residents  were in the  very building to

            which  they set fire.  The government argued further that the

            second prong  of   2K1.4(a)(1)  warranted a level  24 because

            the defendants destroyed or attempted to destroy a dwelling.

                      The district court observed that a pivotal question

            revolved  around  the  meaning   of  the  word   "knowingly."

              2K1.4(a)(1)(A).   The court  opined that the  definition of

            "knowingly" was  "a little bit  ambiguous" in the  context of

            the arson guideline.  It first observed that, "[o]bjectively,

            a  rational person  perhaps should  know that  if he  set the

            gasoline fire in the basement,  people living above would  be

            injured."   The court,  however, further  stated  that if  it

            interpreted   "knowingly"  as  "intentionally,"  it  did  not

            believe that Virgilio Ruiz  intentionally put his brothers in

            danger; instead, the court observed, "I think subjectively he

            may have had the  foolish, but sincere belief that  this fire

            could be  started, that everybody could  be quickly evacuated

                                         -33-
                                          33

            or  even  that the  dwelling where  they  lived would  not be

            destroyed, just the store would be."13 

                      The court then concluded:

                           Well, I'll tell  you what I'm  going
                      to do.  I'm  going to rate this as  a 22.
                      There is  a  preamble to  the  guidelines
                      which I cannot find right [now] that says
                      if  something  doesn't perfectly  fit one
                      category or another, it is permissible to
                      interpolate.
                           For  example, there  is  a law  that
                      says if somebody  is between a minor  and
                      minimal participant, you  can reduce  the
                      role in the offense by 3 rather than 2 or
                      4  and, in  [another  case],  I [had]  to
                      study the interpolation  language at  the
                      beginning of the guidelines.  It seems to
                      me this is a [case] which generally falls
                      between      the      two     provisions,
                      [  2K1.4](a)(1)  and (a)(2),  essentially
                      for  the reasons [stated  above].   And I
                      think  the  fairest  and  legal[ly]  most
                      appropriate   thing   to   do    in   the
                      circumstances would be to interpolate and
                      I'm going to rate this as a 22.14

                                
            ____________________

            13.  The court appeared to find inapplicable the second prong
            of   2K1.4(a)(1)  -- "destruction or attempted destruction of
            a dwelling."    2K1.4(a)(1)(B).   The court observed that the
            circumstances   of  the   arson  appeared   to  involve   the
            destruction of the  store, and the  endangering, but not  the
            destruction,  of the dwelling.  In the apparent absence of an
            intent  to destroy  the whole  building, the  court impliedly
            found   the   "attempted   destruction"    alternative   also
            inapplicable.     The   government  challenges   the  factual
            underpinnings  of this conclusion.  Finding no clear error at
            this juncture, we leave this ruling undisturbed.

            14.  The court eventually adjusted Santo's base offense level
            downward, from 22 to  20, for being a "minor  participant" in
            the offense, see  U.S.S.G.   3B1.2(b),  which, combined  with
                         ___
            his criminal history category I, yielded a guideline range of
            33 to 41 months.  The court declined the government's request
            to increase Santo's offense level by two points  for perjury.
            The  court selected  a 33-month  prison  term for  the arson,
            conspiracy,  and mail  fraud counts,  to be  followed  by the

                                         -34-
                                          34

                      On appeal, the defendants contend that the district

            court  erroneously  "interpolated"  when  applying  the arson

            guideline.  They  argue that if the  court found inapplicable

              2K1.4(a)(1), it should have  affixed the lower base offense

            level  provided for  in   2K1.4(a)(2),  rather than  apply an

            intermediate  level.   The  government  does  not appeal  the
                                                          ___

            sentences  as calculated,  but  nonetheless  argues that  the

            higher base  offense level  was clearly appropriate  and that

            the   defendants,    who   benefitted   from    the   court's

            "interpolation" exercise, have no basis for complaint.

                      The  district  court's  use  of  "interpolation" to

            affix  an intermediate  base  offense level  was an  apparent

            attempt  to   invoke  a   paragraph  (now  deleted)   in  the

            Introduction  to  the  pre-November  1989  Guidelines Manual.

            See,  e.g.,  U.S.S.G.     1A4(b)  (1987).    The   Sentencing
            ___   ____

            Commission  had  designated  "interpolation"  as  a  form  of

            departure  in  which  a  sentencing  court  could  choose  an

            intermediate   point   "between  two   adjacent,  numerically

            oriented guidelines rules."  Id.  Effective November 1, 1989,
                                         ___

            however, the Commission deleted that interpolation provision,

                                
            ____________________

            mandatory 60 month consecutive  term for his conviction under
            18  U.S.C.    844(h)(1)  (using  fire  to  commit  a  federal
            felony), for  a total of 93 months' imprisonment.  Virgilio's
            base offense  level remained  at 22,  which, combined  with a
            criminal  history   category  I   and  the  added   60  month
            consecutive term, yielded a total range of 93-111 months.  On
            the  government's recommendation,  the  court affixed  a 108-
            month prison term for Virgilio.

                                         -35-
                                          35

            concluding "that  it is  simpler to add  intermediate offense

            level  adjustments to the  guidelines where  interpolation is

            most likely to be considered."  U.S.S.G. App. C, Amendment 68

            (1989).  The Commission also stated, however: "This amendment

            is  not intended  to preclude  interpolation in  other cases;

            where appropriate, the court will be able to achieve the same

            result  by use  of the  regular departure  provisions."   Id.
                                                                      ___

            Thus, although the issue is somewhat unclear, it appears that

            interpolation between guideline rules is permissible where it

            could  be  properly  justified  under  the  normal  departure

            procedures.

                      Assuming  that  the  court essentially  effected  a

            downward departure when affixing a base offense level of  22,

            we  find  that because  the  district  court failed  to  make

            specific findings  on the defendants'  state of mind,  we are

            unable to resolve either  the defendants' contention that the

            facts warranted a level 20, or the government's argument that

            a  level 24  was appropriate.   Our  inability to  settle the

            sentencing issue  absent such findings requires  us to remand

            the case for  further findings and resentencing.   See United
                                                               ___ ______

            States  v. Valencia-Lucena,  988 F.2d  228, 234-36  (1st Cir.
            ______     _______________

            1993)  (remanding for  resentencing  where  sentencing  court

            failed  to  make  reasonably  specific   findings  concerning

            foreseeability of  drug quantity); see also  United States v.
                                               ___ ____  _____________

            Olbres, 99 F.3d  28, 30,  32 (1st Cir.  1996) (remanding  for
            ______

                                         -36-
                                          36

            clarification  of  sentencing  court's  specific  willfulness

            findings in context of downward departure).

                      In  United States  v. DiSanto,  86 F.3d  1238, 1256
                          _____________     _______

            (1st Cir. 1996), we stated: 

                      Given   the   structure   of  the   arson
                      guidelines,     we     conclude      that
                        2K1.4(a)(1)(A)   requires    that   the
                                         ______________________
                      district  court  make a  specific finding
                      _________________________________________
                      that the defendant 'knowingly'  created a
                      substantial  risk  of  death  or  serious
                      bodily  injury,  as  opposed   to  merely
                      finding  that  defendant  recklessly  (or
                      negligently)  created  such a  risk which
                      would    more    appropriately    trigger
                      application of [  2K1.4(a)(2)]  (emphasis
                      added).

            Whether  or not the defendant  acted "knowingly" calls for an

            inquiry into his subjective state of mind when he created the

            requisite risk.   See id.  at 1255 (citing  United States  v.
                              ___ ___                   _____________

            Karlic, 997 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1993)).  In this case,
            ______

            the court explored the various possibilities of a "knowledge"

            finding, opining first that a rational person would know that

            setting such  a fire would cause injury,  then observing that

            Virgilio did not "intentionally" put others in danger because

            he "may" have had the "foolish but sincere belief" in a swift

            evacuation of  the residents.  In the  end, the court did not

            make any specific findings on either of the defendants' state

            of mind but, instead, resorted to interpolation.

                      The   court's  reluctance  to  make  the  requisite

            findings may have  been the result of the  somewhat unsettled

            definition in  this circuit  of the  term "knowingly"  in the

                                         -37-
                                          37

            arson guideline.  See generally, DiSanto, 86 F.3d at 1256-58.
                              ___ _________  _______

            In  DiSanto,  we  discussed   at  some  length  the  possible
                _______

            parameters of the word "knowingly."   See id. at 1256-58.  We
                                                  ___ ___

            explained  that  "'the hypothetical  knowledge  continuum' is

            marked  by 'constructive  knowledge' at  one end  and 'actual

            knowledge' at the other."  Id. at 1257 (quoting United States
                                       ___                  _____________

            v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 236-37 (1st Cir. 1995)).  In between
               _______

            these extremes lie various "gradations," including "notice of

            likelihood"  and "practically  certain."   Id.   Although  we
                                                       ___

            expressed  our inclination  "to  conclude that  a showing  of

            knowledge anywhere along this continuum satisfies application

            of    2K1.4(a)(1)(A),"  we  declined to  determine  the exact

            level  of knowledge required for the guideline.  Id. at 1257-
                                                             ___

            58 (finding that government had established the somewhat high

            standard of defendant's awareness that the requisite risk was

            "practically certain").

                      Had the district court here actually found that the

            defendants  acted knowingly  when they created  a substantial

            risk  of death or serious bodily injury to someone other than

            themselves,  we likely would  have upheld the  finding as not

            clearly  erroneous,  even  under the  stringent  "practically

            certain" test.  The  evidence established that the defendants

            set  fire to  a  building basement  in the  early hours  of a

            winter morning, knowing that the residential units above were

            occupied.  "It is difficult to imagine a clearer illustration

                                         -38-
                                          38

            of the knowing  creation of  a substantial risk  of death  or

            serious bodily injury."   United States v. Honeycutt,  8 F.3d
                                      _____________    _________

            785,  787  (11th  Cir.  1993)  (finding  requisite  level  of

            knowledge  where defendant, having seen people inside tavern,

            threw  a  Molotov  cocktail  at the  outside  corner  of  the

            building) (using "practically certain" test).  The sentencing

            court,  however,  must make  such  a  finding  in  the  first

            instance,  and we will not engage in that initial exercise on

            appeal.

                      Because  we  remand  this  case  for  findings  and

            resentencing, we  think it  necessary to clarify  further the

            definition of "knowingly" appearing in subsection (a)(1), but

            not (a)(2), of  the arson guideline.   See U.S.S.G.    2K1.4.
                                                   ___

            The guideline's  structure "clearly suggests that  there must

            be  a  meaningful  distinction  between  the  two  sections."

            DiSanto, 86 F.3d at 1256.  As we noted in DiSanto, 86 F.3d at
            _______                                   _______

            1257, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have  adopted the Model

            Penal Code's definition of "knowingly."15  In those circuits,

            "a  defendant  can be  found  to have  'knowingly'  created a

            substantial  risk of  death  or serious  bodily injury  under

              2K1.4 only  if the defendant  was aware that  a substantial
                                                _____

            risk  of  death or  serious  bodily  injury was  'practically
                                                              ___________

                                
            ____________________

            15.  The Seventh Circuit has also approvingly cited the Model
            Penal Code's  definition of knowingly  in this context.   See
                                                                      ___
            United States v.  Altier, 91  F.3d 953, 957  (7th Cir.  1996)
            _____________     ______
            (distinguishing "knowingly" from "purposefully").

                                         -39-
                                          39

            certain'  to result from the criminal act."  Karlic, 997 F.2d
            _______                                      ______

            at 569 (emphasis added); accord Honeycutt, 8 F.3d at 787; see
                                     ______ _________                 ___

            also Model Penal Code   202(2)(b) (1985).16
            ____ ________________

                      We agree  with our  sister circuits that  the Model

            Penal Code's  definition gives due regard  to the "meaningful

            distinction"  between  the   pertinent  guideline   sections.

            Indeed,  we have  already held  that a  "practically certain"

            finding,  which is akin  to, but something  less than, actual

            knowledge,17  satisfies  the   definition  of  "knowingly."  

            DiSanto,  86 F.3d at 1257-58.  Thus, we adopt the Model Penal
            _______

            Code absent a contrary guidelines definition.  We acknowledge

            our  earlier inclination  to  include all  gradations of  the

            knowledge continuum  in this context.   Id. at 1257.   To the
                                                    ___

            extent, however, that "constructive knowledge"  requires only

                                
            ____________________

            16.  The   Model  Penal  Code's   definition  of  "knowingly"
            provides that:

                      A person acts knowingly with respect to a
                      material element of an offense when: .  .
                      .
                      (ii)  if the element involves a result of
                      his  conduct,  he  is  aware that  it  is
                      practically certain that his conduct will
                      cause such a result.

            Model Penal Code    2.02(2)(b) (1985).  The  Model Penal Code
            ________________
            further states that "[w]hen knowledge  of the existence of  a
            particular fact  is an element of an  offense, such knowledge
            is established if a  person is aware of a high probability of
            its  existence,  unless  he  actually believes  it  does  not
            exist."  Id. at   2.02(7).
                     ___

            17.  We   have  equated  "actual   knowledge"  with  "certain
            knowledge."  Spinney, 65 F.3d at 237.
                         _______

                                         -40-
                                          40

            that the defendant either have had a "notice of likelihood"18

            or  "should have  known" of  a substantial  risk, see  id. at
                                                              ___  ___

            1257-58  n.30;  Spinney, 65  F.3d  at  236-37, we  now  think
                            _______

            something  more is  needed.   For the  purposes of  the arson

            guideline,   these    particular   "constructive   knowledge"

            formulations  appear  to  establish  only  "recklessness"  or

            "negligence," both  insufficient to  trigger the  higher base

            offense level.  See DiSanto, 86 F.3d at 1256.
                            ___ _______

                      On  remand, the  district  court should  articulate

            specific findings of each defendant's state of mind regarding

            the creation  of the risk.   In order for the  higher offense

            level  to apply, the court  certainly need not  find that the

            defendants  "purposefully"  or   "intentionally"  created   a

            substantial risk of death or  serious bodily injury.  Rather,

            the court  need find only  that Virgilio  and Santo  actually

            knew that they created such risk, or were aware that the risk

            was  practically certain.  If,  on the other  hand, the court

            supportably finds  that one or both of them actually believed

            that no substantial risk was created under the circumstances,

            a  finding of knowledge would not be warranted.  See DiSanto,
                                                             ___ _______

            86   F.3d  at   1257   n.  29   (citing   Model  Penal   Code

              2.02(7)(1985),  which  provides that  a  defendant's actual

                                
            ____________________

            18.  We have  previously characterized this gradation  as "an
            enhanced  showing of  constructive  knowledge."   Spinney, 65
                                                              _______
            F.3d at 237.

                                         -41-
                                          41

            belief  in the  nonexistence  of a  fact precludes  knowledge

            finding).

                                         VII.
                                         VII.
                                         ____

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                      For   the   foregoing   reasons,   we   affirm  the
                                                              ______

            defendants'  convictions, vacate  their sentences  and remand
                                      ______                       ______

            for resentencing.

                                         -42-
                                          42