Court Opinion

ID: 9540257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:14:06.420673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:47.519565
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE ALLOY, dissenting: I cannot agree with my colleagues that the trial court abused its discretion in not adhering rigidly to the provision of the original decree which measured increased support money solely by increase in the defendant’s gross income and not in any manner by the increase in plaintiff’s gross income. On January 9, 1974, a decree of divorce as between the parties to this cause was entered by the Circuit Court of Knox County. That decree provided, in part: “The father (defendant) shall pay to the mother (plaintiff), for child support, the sum of *150.00 on alternate Thursdays. * * * If the father’s (defendant’s) gross income increases, support shall increase proportionally.” On February 28, 1975, the circuit court ordered, on stipulation of the parties, that due to an increase in defendant’s gross salary the child support be increased to *163 (to be paid on alternate Thursdays). It appears, also, that in early 1976, defendant began to pay *175 biweekly as child support. On May 5,1976, plaintiff filed a petition to fix the amount of child support for 1976, and alleged in the petition that due to increases in defendant’s salary, child support should increase to *180.46, payable on alternate Thursdays. Defendant filed, on May 17, 1976, a petition to modify the decree of divorce, alleging that since the entry of the decree plaintiff’s income had increased substantially. On June 30, 1976, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiff’s and defendant’s petitions. The evidence established that while defendant’s income was increased, plaintiff’s income was also increased from 1973 in the sum of *5,323.46 to *9,420 per year, as of June 30, 1976. By order entered December 15, 1976, the trial court granted defendant’s petition for modification of the decree of divorce so that increases in payments would not be measured solely by increases in defendant’s income. The court directed defendant to pay to plaintiff, as child support, the sum requested by plaintiff of *180 on alternate Thursdays, beginning on December 9, 1976, and also provided that all provisions (other than the proportionate increase provision) of the original decree remain in full force and effect. Plaintiff first argues that a provision in the divorce decree for automatic increases in child support should be rigidly enforced, and that the trial court erred in failing to adhere to that provision in the original decree of divorce which provided for increases in child support measured only by increases in defendant’s salary. Plaintiff, however, did not cite any precedent in Illinois supporting her contention. Plaintiff’s petition to fix child support was heard in the trial court concurrently with defendant’s petition for a modification of the divorce decree. As I note later in the course of this dissent, no support is shown for plaintiff’s contention that the court had no power to modify the proportionate increase provision. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s petition to modify the divorce decree. As the court stated in Bokhoven v. Bokhoven (2d Dist. 1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 720, 722, 342 N.E.2d 399: ” the modification of provisions for the payment of child support rests in the sound discretion of the court and a reviewing court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion in the absence of its abuse (Scalfaro v. Scalfaro (1970), 123 Ill. App. 2d 23, 259 N.E.2d 644), or unless manifest injustice has been done (Miezio v. Miezio (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 469, 129 N.E.2d 20).” At the hearing in the instant case, the evidence established that the incomes of both plaintiff and defendant had increased substantially since the entry of the decree of divorce. The court properly considered the increased income of both the father and the mother. As was stated in Matthews v. Matthews (1st Dist. 1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1053, 356 N.E.2d 1083: “The financial responsibility for the support of children of divorced parents is the joint and several obligation of each parent. The amount of child support to be assessed against each parent is to be determined by the facts and circumstances in each case and the failure to properly consider such circumstances of either divorced parent in determining the amount of child support is considered to be an abuse of discretion, and such child support order if not sustained by the record will be set aside. Hursh v. Hursh (1st Dist. 1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 947.” Thus, it is clear that the trial court, in ruling on the petition filed in this cause, was required to consider the financial circumstances of both plaintiff and defendant. The trial court apparently concluded that, due to the material change of circumstances of the parties because of increasing incomes, the rigid provision as to child support in the original decree was no longer appropriate and should be replaced at this time by support payments giving consideration to incomes of both parents. The decree actually granted plaintiff the amount she requested in the sum of *180 biweekly. I believe that the trial court acted properly within its discretion in granting the modification of the child support provision, and that no manifest injustice has been done by the trial court’s order which abandoned the provision measuring increases only by defendant’s increase of income and giving no consideration to plaintiff’s increased income. I believe, therefore, that the increase in defendant’s income, as well as the increase in the plaintiff’s income, should both be considered in determining the amount of support payments to be paid by defendant. The discretion and authority of the court should not be limited by the provisions of the decree which sought to measure increased payments solely by defendant’s increase in income. I note, however, that plaintiff, in the petition for increased payments of support money, had requested the payment of *180 biweekly commencing as of January 1, 1976. There is nothing in the record which indicates that the request, in view of the ultimate determination of the court, should not have been made effective as of January 1, 1976, rather than on December 9, 1976, as provided in the order of the court. The petition was filed in this cause in May 1976, and the ultimate order was not entered until December 15, 1976. The record also shows that defendant had begun payments of *175 biweekly in the early part of 1976. On the basis of the record, therefore, I believe that the order of the court specifying the *180 payments every two weeks should be modified to provide that such payments should become effective as of January 1, 1976, and to continue thereafter until further order of the court. I believe that with the exception of the modification to make *180 biweekly payments effective as of January 1, 1976, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Knox County should be affirmed.