Court Opinion

ID: 9697452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:17:02.734885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.625603
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The trial court’s instructions to the jury failed to contain a definition of murder. Because of this deficiency the jury was prevented from making an intelligent decision on the charge of attempt to commit murder. Therefore, appellant should receive a new trial.
“A person commits an attempt when, with the intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901. In the instant case, the specific crime alleged to have been attempted was murder. Murder is defined *297according to the common law definition. It is the unlawful killing of another person with malice aforethought. Malice “consists of an express intent to kill or inflict serious bodily harm, or a ‘wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty’ which indicates an unjustified disregard for the likelihood of death or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 455 Pa. 508, 510, 318 A.2d 716, 717 (1974) quoting from Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 175, 242 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1968). See also: Commonwealth v. Thompson, 466 Pa. 15, 19, 351 A.2d 280, 282 (1976). An accused charged with criminal attempt to commit murder, while not entitled to a charge on the various degrees of homicide, is nonetheless entitled to an instruction as to the elements of murder. Commonwealth v. Reese, 237 Pa.Super. 326, 333, 352 A.2d 143, 147 (1975).
In the instant case, the totality of the trial court’s instruction pertaining to attempted murder was contained in the following:
The District Attorney of Montgomery County by this information charges that—and I am going to drop the name Mattheno and say Ali—Ali Ford-Bey and Eli Ford-Bey on or about April 6 of 1980, in the said county of Montgomery, did unlawfully and feloniously attempt to commit the specific crime of murder, by doing an act constituting a substantial step toward the commission of, and then and there having the intent to commit the said specific crime, all of which is against the Acts of Assembly, and the peace of dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Now, criminal attempts is defined as follows. I am not going to read the entire law on criminal attempts, because it is not all applicable, according to the evidence which has been presented here.
Criminal attempt definition: a person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he *298does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.
There is more to the act, but I am not going to go beyond that.1
“ ‘The primary duty of a trial judge in charging a jury is to clarify the issues so that the jury may understand the questions to be resolved.’ Commonwealth v. Jordan, 407 Pa. 575, 587, 181 A.2d 310, 316 (1962).” Commonwealth v. Litman, 276 Pa.Super. 114, 118, 419 A.2d 121, 123 (1980). An appellate court will uphold the trial court’s charge to the jury if it “adequately and accurately reflects the law and [is] sufficient to guide the jury properly in its deliberations.” Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 256 Pa.Super. 259, 277, 389 A.2d 1113, 1122 (1978). In my judgment, the trial court’s instructions in the case sub judice did not sufficiently define the crime of attempted murder or identify the issues to be resolved by the jury. Despite the fact that the Commonwealth was required to prove “a substantial step toward the commission of [murder],” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901, the crime of murder was never defined, and the jury was never instructed regarding the elements of that crime.
Appellant contended at trial that the act of shooting had been committed in self-defense. Moreover, the victim con-cededly had been carrying a knife. Therefore, it was essential that the attention of the jury be directed to the legal components of the offense with which appellant had been charged. Because the trial court completely failed to include in its instructions the elements of murder, the jury was required to engage in unguided speculation regarding the commission of an attempt to commit that crime.
The writer of the lead opinion holds that appellant waived this defect in the trial court’s jury instructions by not specifically objecting to the charge before the jury had retired to begin its deliberations. I am unable to agree that *299this is what occurred. When counsel for the parties were asked for additions or corrections, appellant’s counsel responded: “I have none, other than the exceptions we mentioned previously.” Immediately after the jury had left the courtroom, counsel approached the bench and said: “Your Honor, I would like to put on the record the exception that I discussed earlier with you as to the charge, in that I think the crime of murder should be included as to all its elements.” The trial judge did not in any way contradict defense counsel’s statement but responded: “The record will so reflect the objection which has been put on the record.” The deficiency in the court’s charge was also preserved specifically in post-verdict motions and was discussed and decided by the trial court in the opinion by which it denied appellant’s post-verdict motions. Under these circumstances, I would hold that the insufficiency of the trial court’s instructions has been adequately preserved for appellate review. See: Commonwealth v. Young, 474 Pa. 96, 101, 376 A.2d 990, 992 (1977); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 273 Pa.Super. 344, 348, 417 A.2d 681, 683 (1979); Commonwealth v. Wilds, 240 Pa.Super. 278, 283 n. 9, 362 A.2d 273, 276 n. 9 (1976).
Because the issues may arise upon the new trial which I deem necessary, I would note my agreement with the majority that the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 906, renders appellant’s convictions for two inchoate offenses designed to culminate in the same crime improper. See: Commonwealth v. Von Aczel, 295 Pa.Super. 242, 248, 441 A.2d 750, 756 (1981); Commonwealth v. Turner, 290 Pa.Super. 428, 434, 434 A.2d 827, 830-31 (1981); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 280 Pa.Super. 522, 523-24, 421 A.2d 845, 846 (1980); Commonwealth v. Tingle, 275 Pa.Super. 489, 499-500, 419 A.2d 6, 11-12 (1980); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 261 Pa.Super. 355, 361, 396 A.2d 436, 438-39 (1978); Commonwealth v. Crocker, 256 Pa. Super. 63, 66-68, 389 A.2d 601, 603-04 (1978). However, unlike the majority, I am of the opinion that under the circumstances of this case the crimes of recklessly endangering the victim of the shooting and at*300tempted murder of the same individual merged for sentencing purposes. See: Commonwealth v. Musselman, 483 Pa. 245, 247 n. 1, 396 A.2d 625, 625-26 n. 1 (1979). Indeed, the Commonwealth’s brief concedes such merger.2
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. The only additional reference to the crime of murder was in a defense point for charge read by the trial court as follows: “[I]n order for this crime [i.e. murder] to exist, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant acted with malice.” Malice, however, was not defined.

. The lead opinion’s conclusion that these two offenses with which appellant was charged involved different mental elements or mens rea, I believe, is incorrect. It seemingly overlooks the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(e) which allow that where a provision of the statute, such as that defining recklessly endangering another person, requires recklessness, that element may be met by conduct which is intentional and/or knowing. See also: Commonwealth v. Nay, 281 Pa.Super. 226, 234, 421 A.2d 1231, 1235 (1980).