Court Opinion

ID: 9742222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:08:39.322796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:29.687930
License: Public Domain

*744ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result but write separately to express my view of the underlying principles that support the conclusion that CIVJIG 91.40 not only improperly permits application of collective liability principles in single plaintiff/single tortfea-sor cases but also allocates to the jury the determination of divisibility of harms, a judicial function.
In Minnesota the defendant is liable only for the extent to which his conduct has aggravated the preexisting condition. Watson v. Rheinderknecht, 82 Minn. 235, 238, 84 N.W. 798, 799 (1901); Schore v. Mueller, 290 Minn. 186, 189, 186 N.W.2d 699, 701 (1971) (plaintiff with a preexisting condition is entitled to recover damages for an aggravation of that condition, “recovery being limited, however, to the additional injury over and above the consequences which normally would have followed from the preexisting condition absent defendant’s negligence”). The burden has long been upon the plaintiff to distinguish harm caused by the defendant “over and above” the original condition. Watson, 82 Minn, at 238, 84 N.W. at 799 (burden was upon the plaintiff “to show in what respect, and to what extent, his present condition could be attributed to the assault and battery, and what could be more properly established as the result of his army experience.”).
For over 30 years our pattern jury instruction summarized the law related to the measure of damages for an aggravation of a preexisting condition as limited to the additional injury caused by the defendant’s conduct. 4 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice — Jury Instruction Guides, Civil, CIVJIG 163 (3d ed.1986).1 But the current pattern jury instruction, CIVJIG 91.40,2 permits allocation of liability to the defendant for harm for which the defendant was in no way responsible. The original commentary to CIVJIG 91.40 suggested that the instruction was derived from Canada by handy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496 (Minn.1997). I read Canada, however, as involving a unique application of collective liability principles in which joint and several liability was imposed upon multiple tortfeasors. Canada, 567 N.W.2d at 507-08.3
*745The rule of joint and several liability “results in the imposition of liability on multiple defendants whose fault combined to cause a single, indivisible injury or damage to the plaintiff.” Michael K Steenson, Joint and Several Liability Minnesota Style, 15 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 969 (1989). The justification for joint and several liability “rested on two factual premises: (1) that each defendant had caused the loss; and (2) the absence of any basis for dividing the harm among the defendants.” Gerald W. Boston, Apportionment of Harm in Tort Law: A Proposed Restatement, 21 U. Dayton L.Rev. 267, 273 (1996). Professor Wigmore believed such wrongdoers should not “go scot free” and proposed the following rule:
Whenever two or more persons by culpable acts, whether concerted or not, cause a single general harm, not obviously assignable in parts to the respective wrongdoers, the injured party may recover from each for the whole. In short, wherever there is any doubt at all as to how much each caused, take the burden of proof off the innocent sufferer; make any one of them pay him for the whole, and then let them do their own figuring among themselves as to what is the share of blame for each.
John H. Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages: Making the Innocent Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 Ill. L.Rev. 458, 459 (1923) (emphasis omitted).4 Minnesota adopted joint-and-several liability principles in Flaherty v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 39 Minn. 328, 329, 40 N.W. 160, 160-61 (1888). This common-law rule has been incorporated into our comparative negligence statute in modified form. Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1 (2004).5
A “necessary corollary” to the rule of holding each defendant liable for the entire harm was “that when the harm can be apportioned on some rational basis, then liability should be proportionate only.” Boston, supra, at 284. Apportionment principles were incorporated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 433A, 433B (1965). These apportionment principles apply to all contributing causes of a single harm and divisible harms. Id. § 433A.6 Preexisting conditions are divisi*746ble harms. Id. § 433A cmt. e. “[P]re-existing conditions can be apportioned from the incremental harm attributable to the defendant’s tortious conduct. * * * [T]he touchstone of apportionment is reliance on the contribution that causes the ultimate harm and not to some actual division of the harm itself.” Boston, supra, at 301. Joint and several liability applies to situations involving one “innocent” cause and two or more culpable causes, where either culpable cause would have been sufficient to cause the harm or where both are essential to the harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. i.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(1) states that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant’s tor-tious conduct caused the harm. Sections 433B(2) and (3), exceptions to the rule stated in subsection (1), provide for burden-shifting in two situations: when the tortious conduct of two or more defendants has combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, the defendant seeking to limit liability has the burden as to apportionment; and when the plaintiff sues two or more tortfeasors and proves that at least one of them has caused harm to the plaintiff but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is on the defendant to prove that he had not caused the harm.7 Comment “c,” in reiterating that subsection (2) is an exception to the general rule on burden of proof “where the tortious conduct of two or more actors combines to bring about the harm,” indicates that burden-shifting only applies in multiple tortfeasor situations. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. c.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434 spells out the functions of the court and jury. The court determines whether the evidence meets the causation threshold and whether the harm is divisible. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434(l)(a), (b). If the harm is divisible, the jury determines the apportionment. Id. § 434(2)(b).8
*747We adopted the rationale of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(2) in Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 178 N.W.2d 841 (1970):
[W]e feel that the rule adopted in Restatement [Second of Torts] § 433B(2), is the one by which we should be governed. This section provides:
“Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has been combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.”
Thus, in a multiple-impact situation, the burden of proving that the harm can be separated falls on those defendants who contend that it can be apportioned.
Id. at 22,178 N.W.2d at 845.
We also embraced the rationale of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434(b)(1):
Having decided that the burden of establishing that the injuries in a multiple-accident situation are capable of apportionment rests upon the defendants so claiming, we further hold that it is the function of the trial court to determine whether such burden has been met. Whether or not the harm to the plaintiff is capable of apportionment among two or more causes is a question of law. Once the trial court determines that the harm is capable of apportionment, the question of actual apportionment of damages among several causes becomes one of fact to be determined by the jury.
Mathews, 288 Minn, at 23, 178 N.W.2d at 845 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434 cmt. d).9 In that the question of whether the harm is capable of apportionment is a legal one, CIVJIG 91.40’s instruction (advising the jury that if it cannot separate the damages then the defendant is liable for all of the damages) improperly assigns the legal question to the jury.
In taking the position that collective liability principles extend to aggravations of preexisting conditions, the dissent relies on Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 174, at 425 (2000) (citing the Newbury line of cases).10 There is, however, well-regarded authority to the contrary. 1 J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, Modem Tort Law: Liability & Litigation § 6:6 (2d.ed.2002) (‘Where the aggravation of a preexisting injury is involved, generally the plaintiff has the burden of proof on apportioning the injuries which are a result of the preexisting condition and those which are a result of the aggravation of the condition.”); 11 Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 52 at *748351 (W. Page Keeton, et al. eds., 5th ed.1984) (citing the Newbury line of cases as well as other cases rejecting the idea of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant).12 I believe that CIVJIG 91.40 holds a defendant responsible for a portion of damages suffered by the plaintiff which were due to an innocent cause, a proposition which is contrary to the philosophy of our Watson /Schore line of cases.13

. From 1963 through 1999, CIVJIG 163 covered damages in cases of preexisting conditions:
A person who has a defect or disability at the time of an accident is nevertheless entitled to damages for any aggravation of such pre-existing condition, even though the particular results would not have followed if the injured person had not been subject to such pre-existing condition. Damages are limited, however, to those results which are over and above those which normally followed from the pre-existing condition, had there been no accident.
4 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice — Jury Instmction Guides, Civil, CIVJIG 163 (3d ed.1986).

. The current pattern jury instruction, CIVJIG 91.40, provides:
There is evidence that (plaintiff) had a preexisting disability or medical condition at the time of the accident.
(Defendant) is liable only for any damages that you find to be directly caused by the accident.
[If you cannot separate damages caused by the pre-existing disability or medical condition from those caused by the accident, then (defendant) is liable for all of the damages.]
4A Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice, Jury Instruction Guides — Civil, JIG 91.40 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp.2004).

: Canada involved successive lead-paint poisonings suffered by the minor plaintiff at separate rental properties. The trial court determined that plaintiff's injuries were divisible, a ruling not challenged on appeal, and went on to instruct the jury to apportion among multiple tortfeasors damages between pre-July *7451992 lead poisoning and damages occurring after that time. Canada, 567 N.W.2d at 508 n. 7 (Minn. 1997).

. Professor Prosser believed that the difficulties of proof:
may have been overstated. The courts quite reasonably have been very liberal in permitting the jury to award damages where the uncertainty as to their extent arises from the nature of the wrong itself, for which the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is responsible.
William L. Prosser & W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 52, at 350 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.1984).

. Minnesota Statutes § 604.02, subdivision 1 provides:
When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, except that the following persons are jointly and severally liable for the whole award:
(1)a person whose fault is greater than 50 percent;
(2)two or more persons who act in a common scheme or plan that results in injury;
(3) a person who commits an intentional tort; or
(4) a person whose liability arises under chapters 18B — pesticide control, 115 — water pollution control, 115A — waste management, 115B — environmental response and liability, 115C — leaking underground storage tanks, and 299J — pipeline safety, public nuisance law for damage to the environment or the public health, any other environmental or public health law, or any environmental or public health ordinance or program of a municipality as defined in section 466.01.

.Restatement (Second) of Torts § 43 3A provides for the apportionment of harm to causes:
*746(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.

. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2) and (3), the burden of proof that the tortious conduct of the defendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff.
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.
(3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.

. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434 provides:
(1) It is the function of the court to determine
(a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which the jury may reasonably differ as to whether the conduct of the defendant has been a substantial factor in causing the harm to the plaintiff;
(b) whether the harm to the plaintiff is capable of apportionment among two or more causes; and
(c) the questions of causation and apportionment, in any case in which the jury may not reasonably differ.
(2) It is the function of the jury to determine, in any case in which it may reasonably differ on the issue,
(a) whether the defendant's conduct has been a substantial factor in causing the harm to the plaintiff, and
(b) the apportionment of the harm to two or more causes.

. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434 cmt. d reads as follows:
The question whether the harm to the plaintiff is capable of apportionment among two or more causes is a question of law, and is for the decision of the court in all cases. Once it is determined that the harm is capable of being apportioned, the actual apportionment of the damages among the various causes is a question of fact, which is to be determined by the jury, unless the evidence is such that reasonable men could come to only one conclusion.

. See, e.g., Newbury v. Vogel, 151 Colo. 520, 379 P.2d 811, 813 (1963) (stating that "plaintiff was entitled to an instruction advising the jury that if they could not apportion the disability between the pre-existing arthritis and the trauma then the defendant was liable for the entire damage resulting from the disability.”); Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1091, 1092 (Me.1995) (applying Newbury single injury rule); Tingey v. Christensen, 987 P.2d 588, 591-92 (Utah 1999) (recognizing Newbury rule).

.Lee & Lindahl note the rule may be different in medical malpractice cases, citing Fosgate v. Corona, 66 N.J. 268, 330 A.2d 355, 359 (1974). Lee & Lindahl, supra, § 6:6 n. 7.

. Of interest is the experience of the Hawaii Supreme Court which adopted the Newbury rule, only to repudiate the rule 23 years later. Montalvo v. Lapez, 77 Hawai’i 282, 884 P.2d 345, 357-58, 362 (1994). Montalvo involved a plaintiff with a preexisting back condition who was also injured in unrelated accidents prior to the one for which he brought suit and alleged post-accident aggravations of the same injuries. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that if, on remand, the jury found that the preexisting condition was not fully resolved or not dormant or latent at the time of the sued-upon accident, apportionment was required, if "even roughly”; but if that failed, then in equal shares among the various causes. I'd. at 363. Professor Boston believes that "Montalvo represents modern authority that is driven by a sense of fairness to all the parties and a preference for a single proceeding in which all responsible parties are joined.” Boston, supra, at 341.

. I do not believe that the rule taking the plaintiff's preexisting condition into account in assessing damages is inconsistent with the "thin skull” rule that holds the defendant liable for the unforeseeable aggravation of a preexisting condition. The rule that the "defendant takes his victim as he finds him * * * simply means that the extent of the victim's actual injury from the accident need not have been reasonably foreseeable.” Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 Yale L.J. 1353, 1361 (1981).