Court Opinion

ID: 9757990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:06:56.021689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:40.332262
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/28/23 P. v. Aguilar CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                           B316432

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. PA093196)
           v.

 ANDREW DEAN AGUILAR, JR.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hayden A. Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
      Maura F. Thorpe, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 ____________________________
       At the conclusion of a court trial, defendant Andrew
Aguilar was convicted of one count of assault with a deadly
weapon. The trial court also found true a special allegation that
Aguilar personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim.
The court sentenced Aguilar to an aggregate prison term of seven
years, which consists of the four-year upper term for the assault
conviction and a three-year enhancement for the great bodily
injury finding.
       On appeal, Aguilar argues that amendments to the
determinate sentencing law requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of aggravating factors apply retroactively to his sentence,
and that his sentence violates the revised law because the trial
court did not find beyond a reasonable doubt the facts giving rise
to two aggravating factors he asserts the trial court used to
justify imposition of the four-year upper term.
       Aguilar further maintains this error was not harmless.
Aguilar claims had he been aware of the revised law’s new
procedures, he would have developed the record to establish a
reasonable doubt as to one of the two aggravating circumstances,
that is, whether the assault was unprovoked. He further claims
we should remand for a new sentencing hearing because the
record does not clearly indicate that the trial court would have
imposed the upper term based only on the other aggravating
factor—that the victim’s injuries were substantial, permanent,
and ongoing, especially given the court’s finding that Aguilar’s
minimal prior criminal history was a mitigating factor.
       We agree with Aguilar that the new amendments to the
determinate sentencing law apply to this case. We, however,
conclude that the trial court’s noncompliance with the revised
law was harmless.

                                   2
      Reviewing the trial court’s statements at the sentencing
hearing, we conclude the court’s decision to impose the upper
term rested on only one aggravating factor—the nature and
extent of the victim’s injuries—and that the court made a remark
concerning lack of provocation merely to explain why certain
mitigating factors were inapplicable. Put differently, the record
shows that the trial court relied only on one aggravating factor,
the substantial, permanent, and ongoing injuries suffered by the
victim. We also conclude the court would have found that the
victim’s injuries were substantial, permanent, and ongoing
beyond a reasonable doubt.
       In sum, we conclude the trial court would have imposed
the upper term even had the revised statute been in effect at the
time of Aguilar’s sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm.

               PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
      On December 4, 2019, the People filed an information
charging Aguilar with one count of attempted murder, in

      1    Our description of the trial court proceedings and of the
evidence presented below is derived in part from admissions
made by the parties in their appellate briefing. (See Williams v.
Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666, 668, 674 [criminal
case in which the Court of Appeal stated: “ ‘An express
concession or assertion in a brief is frequently treated as an
admission of a legal or factual point, controlling in the disposition
of the case.’ ”]; Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275,
fn. 2 [“ ‘[B]riefs and argument . . . are reliable indications of a
party’s position on the facts as well as the law, and a reviewing
court may make use of statements therein as admissions against
the party.’ ”].) We summarize only those facts pertinent to our
disposition of this appeal.

                                     3
violation of Penal Code2 section 664 and section 187,
subdivision (a) (count 1); and one count of assault with a deadly
weapon, in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2).
The People alleged that in attempting to murder the victim,
Aguilar personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon within
the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). With regard to
both counts, the People averred Aguilar “personally inflicted
great bodily injury upon” the victim within the meaning of
section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Aguilar pleaded not guilty to
both counts and denied all allegations and enhancements.
      Aguilar waived a jury trial and was tried in October 2021.
Although the trial court acquitted Aguilar of the attempted
murder charge, it found Aguilar guilty of assault with a deadly
weapon. In connection with the assault conviction, the court also
found true the special allegation in section 12022.7,
subdivision (a) that Aguilar personally inflicted great bodily
injury on the victim.
      On November 4, 2021, the trial court sentenced Aguilar to
an aggregate prison term of seven years, comprised of the upper
term of four years for the assault conviction and a consecutive
three-year term pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (a). On
November 16, 2021, Aguilar timely appealed the judgment.

                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      Aguilar resided with his father and grandfather in a home
two houses away from J.A. and his family.
      On July 30, 2019, J.A.’s family had a barbeque and pool
party at his house. J.A.’s nephew, A.A., arrived at the party at

      2   Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

                                    4
around 5:30 or 6:00 p.m. At around 8:30 p.m., A.A. was ready to
leave the party. A.A. and J.A. walked out to A.A.’s truck, which
was parked in the driveway.
       As A.A. and J.A. were standing near the driver’s side of
A.A.’s truck, Aguilar approached and asked A.A. either:
(1) “Bitch, you called me a bitch?”; or (2) “Who’s a bitch?” Aguilar
then punched A.A. on his left cheek. The two men began to fight,
with each throwing punches at the other.
       At one point, A.A. gained an advantage by positioning
himself on top of Aguilar while holding Aguilar down with A.A.’s
left arm. A.A. asked Aguilar, “What’s your problem?” A.A. and
Aguilar yelled and cursed at each other. A.A. asked Aguilar,
“Have you had enough?” A.A., while still on top of Aguilar and
restraining him, turned to tell J.A. to call the police.
       Aguilar then slashed at A.A. with a knife. A.A. was cut in
his abdomen, on his forearm, and on his bicep. At trial, A.A.
provided testimony indicating that after Aguilar stabbed him,
A.A. saw his “[g]uts come out” and A.A. noticed that certain
arteries had been “[c]ut.” A.A. further testified that upon
receiving medical treatment, A.A. learned that Aguilar had cut
the nerves and tendons in A.A.’s right arm. A.A. testified that at
the time of trial, he continued to have difficulty moving certain
fingers and “still ha[d] a lot of nerve pain.” The parties agree
that because A.A.’s “injuries were very serious,” A.A. “requir[ed]
surgery and some long term rehabilitation.”
       A.A. testified that he was taken to the hospital in an
ambulance that evening. Aguilar was also taken to the hospital.

                          DISCUSSION
     Section 245, subdivision (a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
“Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another

                                    5
with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or
four years . . . .” (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).)
       When the trial court sentenced Aguilar on
November 4, 2021, section 1170, subdivision (b) provided in
relevant part: “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be
imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the choice
of the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of
the court. . . . The court shall select the term which, in the court’s
discretion, best serves the interests of justice. The court shall set
forth on the record the reasons for imposing the term selected
and the court may not impose an upper term by using the fact of
any enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any
provision of law.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 29, § 14; id. at § 44 [indicating
the statute took “effect immediately,” i.e., on Aug. 6, 2020].)
       Several weeks before the sentencing hearing, the
Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill No. 567), which amended section 1170 effective
January 1, 2022. (See Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3 [filed with the
Sec’y of State on Oct. 8, 2021]; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8,
subd. (c)(2) [providing that this version of § 1170 became effective
on Jan. 1, 2022].) As amended by Senate Bill No. 567,
section 1170, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part that
“[w]hen a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the
statute specifies three possible terms,” “[t]he court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a

                                     6
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (See Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3 [§ 1170, subds. (b)(1) &
(b)(2)].)
       On appeal, Aguilar argues that Senate Bill No. 567’s
amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) apply retroactively
to this case. Aguilar further contends his upper-term prison
sentence of four years for the assault conviction does not comply
with newly-amended section 1170, subdivision (b). Specifically,
he asserts the two circumstances in aggravation the trial court
relied upon in imposing the upper term “were neither found true
beyond a reasonable doubt nor admitted by [Aguilar.]” Aguilar
maintains this “sentencing error was not harmless because a
factfinder would not have found true beyond a reasonable doubt
both circumstances in aggravation and the record does not clearly
indicate that the trial court would have exceeded the
presumptive [middle] term had it known of its restricted
discretion” under Senate Bill No. 567. (Boldface & capitalization
omitted.) Aguilar asserts his “sentence must be vacated” and the
matter should be “remanded [to the trial court] for resentencing.”
       Although we agree with Aguilar that Senate Bill No. 567
applies retroactively to his sentence, we reject Aguilar’s
contention that the trial court imposed the upper term based
upon two aggravating circumstances. Rather, we conclude the
court’s decision actually rested on only one aggravating
circumstance, that is, the substantial, permanent, and ongoing
nature of A.A.’s injuries. We further conclude that had the trial
court been aware of newly-amended section 1170,
subdivision (b)’s requirements, it would have found that
aggravating factor true beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the

                                   7
trial court’s noncompliance with Senate Bill No. 567 was
harmless, we affirm.

A.    Senate Bill No. 567 Applies Retroactively to This
      Case
        Before Senate Bill No. 567 went into effect, section 1170,
subdivision (b) provided that if a “statute specifies three possible
terms” of imprisonment, “the choice of the appropriate term . . .
rest[ed] within the sound discretion of the court . . . .” (See
Stats. 2020, ch. 29, § 14.) At that time, a trial court could
“ ‘ “utilize” ’ ” a “ ‘ “circumstance” ’ ” to “ ‘ “support its sentencing
choice” ’ ” so long as the existence of that factor was
“ ‘ “established by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citations.]”
[Citation.] . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (See People v. Hicks (2017)
17 Cal.App.5th 496, 512 (Hicks).)
        As amended by Senate Bill No. 567, section 1170,
subdivision (b) permits a trial court to impose the upper term
sentence “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of
the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term . . . .” (See Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3
[§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)].) The aggravating circumstances justifying
imposition of the upper term are now subject to the heightened
“beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof rather than the
preponderance of the evidence standard. (See ibid.) This
stringent burden of proof is not applicable, however, if “the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant . . . .” (See ibid.)
        Aguilar claims Senate Bill No. 567’s new sentencing
procedures apply retroactively to his case.
        Our Supreme Court has held that “ ‘(i) in the absence of a
contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that

                                       8
ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases that are not yet
final as of the legislation’s effective date.’ [Citation.]” (See People
v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207.) The Attorney
General concedes that Senate Bill No. 567 ameliorates
punishment and that there is no indication the Legislature
intended for these amendments to operate prospectively only.
We agree with the Attorney General. (See People v. Flores (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038–1039 [agreeing with the Attorney
General that “the amended version of section 1170,
subdivision (b) that became effective on January 1, 2022, applies
retroactively . . . as an ameliorative change in the law applicable
to all nonfinal convictions on appeal”].) Because Aguilar’s
judgment is not yet final, Senate Bill No. 567’s amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b) apply here. (See People v. Lopez
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337, 341–342 [indicating that a judgment
in a criminal case is not final until the defendant has
“exhaust[ed] his appeal rights”].)

B.    Aguilar’s Claim of Error Rests on His Assertion That
      the Trial Court Imposed the Upper Term of Four
      Years for the Assault Conviction Based on Two
      Aggravating Factors
      Aguilar claims that “[a]t sentencing, the trial court stated
as the basis for imposing the upper term that the altercation was
unprovoked and that [A.A.’s] injuries were substantial,
permanent, and ongoing.” He maintains that “[b]ecause these
circumstances in aggravation were neither found true beyond a
reasonable doubt nor admitted by [Aguilar], [his] sentence does
not comply with . . . amended Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b) which constitutes error.”

                                      9
      Aguilar argues we should employ the standard announced
by the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two in People v. Lewis
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125 (Lewis),3 to determine whether this
error was harmless.
      Lewis framed the harmless error inquiry as follows:
“[T]here are two questions the reviewing court must ask to
determine whether remanding for resentencing under amended
section 1170, subdivision (b) is appropriate. First, we must ask
whether a defendant could still lawfully be sentenced to an upper
term under federal and state law. This requires us to conclude
that the [factfinder] would have found at least one aggravating
circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt.[4] [Citations.] If
the answer to that question is no, then the sentence is invalid
and must be vacated, and the matter remanded for resentencing.
[Citations.] But if the answer to that question is yes, we ask
whether the trial court would impose the same sentence in its
informed discretion under amended section 1170, subdivision (b).
To answer that question, we . . . ask whether the record clearly

      3 Our Supreme Court recently granted a petition for
review. (Lewis, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th 1125, review granted
May 17, 2023, S279147.)
      4   Although the Lewis court stated that at the first step, an
appellate court must determine whether “the jury would have
found at least one aggravating circumstance true beyond a
reasonable doubt” (see Lewis, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1137,
review granted, italics added), there is no dispute that the trial
court was the factfinder in this case. (See also Stats. 2021,
ch. 731, § 1.3 [newly amended § 1170, subd. (b)(2) provides that
the aggravating circumstances may be “found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial,” italics added].)

                                    10
indicates that the trial court would have imposed the same
sentence under the new law.” (See Lewis, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1137–1138, review granted.)
       Aguilar contends the trial court’s finding that the
altercation was unprovoked does not satisfy the first step of
Lewis’s harmless error test. He argues if he had known that
Senate Bill No. 567’s procedures applied to his case, “[d]efense
counsel would have [had] a reason to develop . . . evidence”
showing that J.A. and A.A. had taunted Aguilar at some point
prior to the altercation.5 He also argues, “It cannot be said that
on this record, [the trial court would have] found true beyond a
reasonable doubt that the altercation was unprovoked.” Aguilar
further contends that because one of the “circumstances in
aggravation could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” we
should proceed to the second step of Lewis’s harmless error test.
According to Aguilar, Lewis requires us to vacate his sentence
and remand the matter for resentencing “because the record does
not clearly indicate that the trial court would have imposed the
upper term rather than the presumptive middle term if it had
recognized its restricted discretion under the amended law . . . .”
(Boldface & capitalization omitted.)
       For the reasons set forth in Discussion, part C, post, we
reject Aguilar’s claim that the trial court’s imposition of the
upper term was based on the lack of provocation as an
aggravating factor. Rather, the sentence rested on a single

      5  By describing this contention, we take no position on
whether, if we had decided to remand the matter to the trial
court, the parties would have been allowed to proffer evidence not
admitted in the underlying trial to support their respective
resentencing positions.

                                   11
aggravating factor—the victim’s substantial, permanent, and
ongoing injuries.
       Regarding whether any noncompliance with Senate Bill
No. 567 prejudiced Aguilar, we note preliminarily that the
parties dispute which harmless error test governs this case. As
we previously noted, Aguilar asks us to employ Lewis’s two-part
test. The Attorney General argues in favor of the harmless error
standard from People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495. Flores
held that “ ‘[i]f a reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the [factfinder], applying the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true at least a
single aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the
[factfinder],’ the error [in failing to adhere to Senate Bill
No. 567’s new sentencing procedures] is harmless.” (See Flores,
at pp. 500–501.) Because the Flores approach calls for affirmance
regardless of “whether the record clearly indicates that the trial
court would have imposed the same sentence under the new law”
(see Lewis, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138, review granted;
Flores, at pp. 500–501), presumably it is less favorable to Aguilar
than Lewis’s formulation of harmless error. Other Courts of
Appeal have identified yet other tests for assessing whether a
violation of newly-amended section 1170, subdivision (b) is
harmless. (See Lewis, at pp. 1131–1136, review granted
[cataloging these differing approaches.])
       As set forth below, even under the test Aguilar prefers—
Lewis—we conclude Aguilar did not suffer prejudicial error. We
also conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the trial court
had been aware of Senate Bill No. 567’s new procedures, it
“unquestionably” would have found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one aggravating circumstance—that A.A.’s injuries

                                   12
were substantial, permanent, and ongoing. Therefore, the trial
court’s imposition of the upper term was harmless under
respondent’s preferred Flores standard as well. Because we
would affirm under either test, we need not opine on which test is
correct, an issue that is pending before our high court in Lewis.
(See fn. 3, ante.)

C.    The Record Does Not Support Aguilar’s Assertion
      that the Trial Court Relied on Lack of Provocation
      as an Aggravating Factor In Imposing the Upper
      Term
      At no point during the sentencing hearing did the trial
court state that lack of provocation for Aguilar’s assault
constituted an aggravating factor. Rather, the trial court stated:
             “In this case the court’s considered the
      California Rules of Court 4.421; circumstances and
      aggravation [sic] and circumstances in mitigation.
      Based on the evidence that the court heard I believe
      that based on the evidence that this was an
      unprovoked attack. There was no evidence to
      support any other theory that was presented. The
      victim’s injuries were substantial, and he was
      essentially gutted for lack of a better term.
             “One of the reasons the defendant was
      acquitted of attempted murder is because the court
      found based on the state of the evidence that he
      didn’t have that specific intent to kill, but it does not
      minimize the nature of the injuries suffered by the
      victim. These are permanent and ongoing injuries to
      the victim, and circumstances of mitigation are
      defendant has a minimal prior record, if any.

                                   13
             “Court will impose a sentence as follows: As to
      count 2, probation is denied. The court is going to
      select the high terms [sic] of four years as the court
      finds the circumstances in aggravation outweigh
      those in mitigation.”
      Because the trial court did not identify lack of provocation
as an aggravating factor, it appears that the court referenced lack
of provocation to explain why particular mitigating factors were
not applicable. Specifically, California Rules of Court,
rules 4.423(a)(2) and 4.423(a)(3) identify the following mitigating
factors: “The victim was an initiator of, willing participant in, or
aggressor or provoker of the incident;” and “[t]he crime was
committed because of an unusual circumstance, such as great
provocation, that is unlikely to recur.” (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.423(a)(2) & (a)(3).) Given that Aguilar’s trial counsel
asserted in his opening statement that J.A. and A.A. had called
Aguilar names prior to the attack, it is unsurprising that the trial
court deemed it necessary to explain why otherwise potentially
applicable mitigating factors identified in rules 4.423(a)(2) and
4.423(a)(3) were inapplicable in sentencing Aguilar. This
contrasts with the trial court’s finding that A.A.’s injuries were
substantial, permanent, and ongoing, which is an aggravating
factor provided in California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).6

      6 California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) identifies the
following as a circumstance in aggravation: “The crime involved
great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or
other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).) Although
Aguilar argues A.A.’s “injuries were already factored into
[Aguilar’s] punishment” vis-à-vis the three-year enhancement for
great bodily injury, he acknowledges that A.A.’s injuries may

                                   14
       California Rule of Court, rule 4.421’s list of aggravating
factors does not identify lack of provocation as one such
circumstance. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.) Indeed,
Aguilar admits this is a “factor[ ] not set out in the rules . . . .”
Aguilar’s assertion that the trial court “recite[d] the two
circumstances in aggravation” does not give full import to the
context of the court’s statements quoted above. Instead, he asks
us to interpret the court’s statements as relying on an
unenumerated aggravating factor in addition to the serious and
permanent nature of the victim’s injuries.7 As we have
explained, we disagree. The trial court merely was explaining

constitute a circumstance in aggravation to “the extent [they]
exceed” the degree of injury required for imposition of that
enhancement. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(g) [“[A]
fact charged and found as an enhancement may be used as a
reason for imposing a particular term only if the court has
discretion to strike the punishment for the enhancement and
does so.”]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment,
§ 354 [“The significant or substantial physical injury standard of
P.C. 12022.7 [(i.e., the great bodily injury enhancement statute)]
does not require that the victim suffer permanent, prolonged, or
protracted disfigurement, impairment, or loss of bodily
function.”].)
      7 We acknowledge that California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(c) permits trial courts to rely upon aggravating factors
that are not enumerated expressly in that rule. (See Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.421 & rule 4.421(c) [“Circumstances in
aggravation include factors relating to the crime and factors
relating to the defendant. [¶] . . . [¶] Any other factors
statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation or that
reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under
which the crime was committed.”].)

                                     15
why certain otherwise potentially applicable mitigating factors
expressly identified in the California Rules of Court are not
implicated by this case.
       Lastly, in respondent’s brief, the Attorney General states,
“In imposing an upper term sentence in this case, the trial court
properly relied upon the evidence establishing the aggravating
factor of unprovoked attack.” Insofar as the Attorney General
believes the trial court found lack of provocation was an
aggravating factor supporting the upper term sentence, we
disagree and are not bound by the Attorney General’s description
of the trial court’s ruling. (See People v. Kim (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 836, 847 [“We are not required to accept the
Attorney General’s concession . . . .”].)
       Accordingly, we reject Aguilar’s assertion that the trial
court found lack of provocation was an aggravating circumstance
that supported the upper term sentence for Aguilar’s assault
conviction.

D.    We Affirm Aguilar’s Sentence Because the Trial
      Court Would Have Found Beyond a Reasonable
      Doubt That A.A.’s Injuries Were Substantial,
      Permanent, and Ongoing, and There Is No Dispute
      That This Aggravating Circumstance Is a Sufficient
      Ground for Imposing the Upper-Term Sentence
       Aguilar acknowledges there “may have been sufficient proof
to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard” as to the trial
court’s finding that A.A.’s “injuries were ‘substantial’ and
‘permanent and ongoing[.]’ ” He acknowledges that “there was
evidence in the form of testimony and medical record[s]
indicating that [A.A.]’s injuries from the knife were extensive.”
Aguilar also states that A.A.’s “injuries were very serious,

                                   16
requiring surgery and some long term rehabilitation.”
Furthermore, A.A. provided testimony indicating he saw his
“[g]uts come out” after Aguilar stabbed him, Aguilar had cut
A.A.’s arteries and the nerves and tendons in A.A.’s arm, and
more than two years after the altercation, A.A. continued to have
nerve pain and difficulty moving his fingers. (See Factual
Background, ante.)
       Given Aguilar’s own acknowledgments and the trial
evidence, we conclude that if the trial court had been aware of
Senate Bill No. 567’s new restrictions on imposition of the upper
term, the court would have found this aggravating factor true
beyond a reasonable doubt. This satisfies part one of Lewis’s
harmless error test. (See Lewis, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1137, review granted [“[W]e must ask whether . . . . [the
factfinder] would have found at least one aggravating
circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt.”].)
       The next step under Lewis is determining “whether the
record clearly indicates that the trial court would have imposed
the same sentence under the new law.” (See Lewis, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1137–1138, review granted.) The answer to
that question is yes. The trial court found true (1) one
aggravating factor, that A.A.’s injuries were substantial,
permanent, and ongoing, and (2) one mitigating factor, that
Aguilar had a minimal prior record. (See Discussion, part C,
ante.) As set forth earlier in this part, Senate Bill No. 567 would
have allowed the trial court to rely upon that single aggravating
factor in imposing the upper term. Nothing in newly revised
section 1170, subdivision (b) affected the lesser burden of proof—
more likely than not—applicable to the only mitigating factor the
trial court considered, that is, Aguilar’s minimal prior criminal

                                   17
record; the parties do not contend otherwise.8 Because Senate
Bill No. 567 had no impact on the validity of the factors in
aggravation and in mitigation upon which the trial court imposed
the upper term, “the record clearly indicates” the court would
have imposed the upper term sentence under amended
section 1170, subdivision (b). (See Lewis, at p. 1138, review
granted.)
      Significantly, the parties do not dispute that under Senate
Bill No. 567, a trial court may impose the upper term based on a
single aggravating factor. In respondent’s brief, the Attorney
General argues, “The fact that [Aguilar] gutted the victim,
cutting an artery, causing his intestines to come out of his body,
standing alone, supported the upper term.” In Aguilar’s reply, he
does not challenge this proposition; Aguilar instead argues that
affirmance is inappropriate because “it cannot be said that the
[sentencing] decision was based solely” on A.A.’s injuries. We
reiterate that we disagree with that contention.

      8  On its face, newly added section 1170, subdivisions (b)(1)
and (b)(2) require a finding of beyond a reasonable doubt only for
aggravating circumstances. (See § 1170, subds. (b)(1) & (b)(2).)
Mitigating circumstances would thus remain subject to the
preponderance of evidence burden of proof. (See Hicks, supra,
17 Cal.App.5th at p. 512 [indicating that prior to Senate Bill
No. 567, “ ‘ “[t]he circumstances utilized by the trial court to
support its sentencing choice need only be established by a
preponderance of the evidence” ’ ”]; see also People v. Superior
Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1305, fn. 28 [noting
that “the preponderance standard” is synonymous with “ ‘more
likely than not’ ”].) For that reason, we also conclude that Senate
Bill No. 567 did not invalidate the trial court’s determination that
lack of provocation was not a mitigating factor in this case.

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        We further note Lewis indicates that “a defendant could
still lawfully be sentenced to an upper term under federal and
state law” if the factfinder “would have found at least one
aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt.” (See
Lewis, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1137, review granted, second
set of italics added.) Although newly-added section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2) provides that “[t]he court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term”
(see § 1170, subd. (b)(2), italics added), section 7 “provides that
when construing words and phrases throughout the Penal Code,
‘the singular number includes the plural, and the plural the
singular. . . .’ [Citation.]”9 Therefore, the text of Senate Bill
No. 567 does not necessarily require the jury or trial court to find
more than one aggravating circumstance true beyond a
reasonable doubt before the upper term may be imposed. Indeed,
our high court held that under a prior version of section 1170,
subdivision (b), “a single factor in aggravation suffice[d] to
support an upper term,” even though the statutory text required
imposition of the middle term “ ‘unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime[.]’ ” (See People v. Osband
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 729–730, quoting Stats. 1984, ch. 1432,
§ 9, p. 5028, italics added.)
        Aguilar notes in passing that in a “concurring [s]tatement”
accompanying the high court’s denial of a request for publication

      9    (See People v. Watson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 474, 485,
quoting § 7; Watson, at p. 485 [“ ‘The rule of construction
enunciated in [Penal Code] section 7 is no mere rubric—it is the
law.’ ”].)

                                    19
of a Court of Appeal decision, Justice Liu stated: “As a result of
[Senate Bill No. 567’s amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b)], it may no longer be true that ‘the existence of a
single aggravating circumstance is legally sufficient to make the
defendant eligible for the upper term.’ [Citation.]” (See People v.
Flores (June 15, 2022, S274232), conc. stmt. of Liu, J.) Aguilar
appears to cite Justice Liu’s concurring statement to support his
claim that “[n]othing in this record clearly indicates that the trial
court, recognizing its restricted discretion, would have imposed
the upper term.” Aguilar does not argue that Justice Liu was
opining that a trial court must find more than one aggravating
factor to impose an upper term sentence.10
      In sum, we conclude that the trial court’s noncompliance
with Senate Bill No. 567’s new sentencing procedures was
harmless. We thus affirm Aguilar’s sentence.

      10  Justice Liu made the statement Aguilar cites in the
course of explaining that newly-amended section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2) “appears [to provide that] a defendant is subject
to an upper term sentence only if the aggravating circumstances
are sufficient to ‘justify the imposition’ of that term under all of
the circumstances, which may include evidence both in
aggravation and in mitigation.” (See People v. Flores, supra,
S274232, conc. stmt. of Liu, J, italics added.) It thus seems
Justice Liu was merely observing that Senate Bill No. 567’s
amendments bar a trial court from imposing the upper term
sentence unless the aggravating circumstances, when balanced
against any mitigating factors, warrant the longer term.

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                          DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        BENDIX, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             CHANEY, J.

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