Court Opinion

ID: 9459015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:07:58.567649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:58.905478
License: Public Domain

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent.
To me the Utah statutes make clear that the local school district and board are not agencies of the state for our purposes. This being so, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply and the state may not deny jurisdiction to a federal court of this suit to which it has consented in the state court.
The majority opinion accepts the principles of Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir.). Under these principles it is clear that where a general right is conferred, it can be enforced in any federal court in a state having jurisdiction of the parties, and the right “cannot.-be withdrawn from the cognizance of such Federal court by any provision of State legislation that it shall only be enforced in a State court.” Railway Co. v. Whitton’s Administrator, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 286, 20 L.Ed. 571; Markham v. City of Newport News, supra, 292 F.2d at 714; Grady County, Ga. v. Dickerson, 257 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 909, 79 S.Ct. 237, 3 L.Ed.2d 230.
Nevertheless, where a suit is in actuality one against a state, the state may waive immunity from suit in state courts only, and retain its immunity from suit in the federal courts provided by the Eleventh Amendment. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t. of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 465, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389. I agree with the majority opinion that the Utah statutes do intend to limit the waiver to suit in the state courts. However for the state to be able to consent to suit in its courts while validly retaining its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the federal courts, the suit must in fact be one against the state. I feel that the Utah statutes clearly make the school district and board political subdivisions in substance and not the alter-ego of the state. Utah Governmental Immunity Act of 1965, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. (1968 Supp.). To such subdivisions the Eleventh Amendment does not apply. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 10 S.Ct. 363, 33 L.Ed. 766; Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington RR. Co., 255 U.S. 56, 41 S.Ct. 237, 65 L.Ed. 500. Therefore the Utah attempt to bar federal court jurisdiction is invalid.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act of 1965, supra, defines the state as including any officer, department, agency *222and the like, but states that a political subdivision includes any county, city, town, school district, etc. § 63 — 30—2(1) and (2). The Act makes a sharp distinction between payment of judgments against the state and the payment of judgments against political subdivisions, with separate procedures prescribed. §§ 63-30-12, 13, 23, and 24. And the board of education of the county school district is empowered to sue and be sued and to take, hold, lease, sell and convey real and personal property. Utah Code Ann., § 53-4-8 (1953).
We should also consider whether the action is in essence one for recovery of money from the state, in which case it may claim its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t. of Treasury of Indiana, supra, 323 U.S. at 464, 65 S.Ct. 347; Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges, 356 F.2d 599, 601 (10th Cir.). In this connection all political subdivisions are authorized to levy an annual property tax to pay claims or judgments and other liabilities by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-27 (1968 Supp.). See also Utah Code Ann. § 53-7-13 (1953).1 Moreover, the subdivision may purchase liability insurance covering all risks created by the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-26 (1968 Supp.) As the majority opinion points out, the district’s funds derive both from the state and from local sources. Since the judgment need not be expended on funds of the state, but on funds held by the board or raised by it locally to satisfy the judgment, I feel that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply. See State Highway Commission of Wyoming v. Utah Construction Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199, 49 S.Ct. 104, 73 L.Ed. 262; Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington RR. Co., supra, 255 U.S. at 71, 41 S.Ct. 237.

. ‘'[Significant, here also is whether the agency has the funds or the power to satisfy the judgment.” Krisel v. Duran, 258 F.Supp. 845, 849 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d. per curiam, 386 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1042, 88 S.Ct. 1635, 20 L.Ed.2d 303. See also Urbano v. Board of Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 415 F.2d 247, 251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948, 90 S.Ct. 967, 25 L.Ed.2d 128.