Court Opinion

ID: 9532129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:18:25.612236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:40.834758
License: Public Domain

VOGEL, Judge
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result. I believe that the lower court made a mistake in transferring the custody of the children from one party to the other, but I am not sufficiently positive of the correctness of my belief to say that the decision is clearly erroneous.
The remarks which follow are intended as provisional hypotheses, tentative approaches toward a philosophy of custody in difficult cases. They are not intended to be critical of the trial court and the majority opinion, which apply the usual standards in such cases.
We should not be so much interested in the fitness of the parents as such, but . . who is the child used to, fond of, connected with by daily experiences, related to through memories, learning from through identification? Whom is he used to coming to with his questions, finding at home when he gets there, being tucked in by at night and trying to act like ? Who *524gives him his bottle, eventually teaches him how to make a sandwich or throw a ball, who reads to him, whom does he wind up wanting to ‘be good’ for so they’ll go on loving him?” [Quoted from a review of Freud, Goldstein, and Solnit, “Beyond the Best Interests of the Child” (The Free Press, 1973), in the New York Times Magazine, October 7, 1973.]
In this case, that person very likely was the mother.
The book just quoted makes the further point that any change of custody is an uprooting, which can be expected to be damaging, and which therefore should be avoided except in extreme cases. Here, a visit which was to be temporary was prolonged by the unilateral decision of the father, a disruptive tactic. The action of the mother in retaking possession of the children, although justified by existing court custody orders, was likewise unsettling, and the ultimate decision of the trial court caused another uprooting. The effect could hardly be other than traumatic. Both parents have contributed to the trauma, and so has the court. For a full discussion of the concept of “separation trauma” see In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis.2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973).
As the Supreme Court of Iowa wisely says:
“ . . . the status of children should be quickly fixed and, thereafter, little disturbed.” Jacobs v. Jacobs, Iowa, 216 N.W.2d 312 (1974).
This is a case where the children would have benefited from having their own lawyer. They may be victimized by the animosities of their parents. Parents who love their children, but actively dislike each other, cannot be expected to be dispassionate about the children’s welfare in the midst of confrontations with each other.
I do not believe it is beneficial for courts to ask children what their preferences are as to custody. Of course, courts cannot prevent (except by persuasion) the parties from calling the children as witnesses. If the parties insist, I agree that it is better for the court to make inquiries in chambers, preferably in the presence of counsel. I take it that the commendation of the trial court in the majority opinion refers to this procedure, and not to the practice of asking the children for their preferences. It would be better, I believe, to leave the children out of the matter entirely. In the first place, it must create a feeling of guilt in any child to have to disappoint one of two parents he loves by expressing a preference for the other. Psychological problems can be expected whether the child makes the choice or refuses to do so. In the second place, if the child knows (and he usually does) that placements are not final and that he may be asked in the future to express a preference, he may consciously or unconsciously use that knowledge to extort favors from one or both parents — not a cheerful harbinger of a normal relationship with either parent.
I regret the continued vitality of the idea that children of tender years belong with the mother and older children with the father. This is a relic of the days when child labor was an economic asset and children learned their trades from cottage labor. Those days are gone. The concept, as expressed in our statute, Section 30-10-06, subdivision 2, N.D.C.C., may even be unconstitutional, as held in State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, Family Court, City of New York, 77 Misc.2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973), under the suspect criterion of discrimination by reason of sex. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). Seemingly contra, Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 517 P.2d 1019 (1974).
I also express a doubt as to whether there was an adequate showing of a change in circumstances sufficient to justify a change of custody in this case.
*525In summary, this is a case where there is no right answer, only a plethora of wrong ones. I have the feeling, hut not the conviction, that the trial court would have done better to leave the children with the mother, rather than uproot them again and turn them over to the father. But I cannot say the decision was clearly erroneous. I hope it is not erroneous at all, but I fear it may be.