Court Opinion

ID: 9667594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:50:19.992622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:39.237875
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I would hold that the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was correct with regard to both the malicious prosecution and libel causes of action.
Upon a motion timely made, summary judgment will be granted to the movant if there exists no genuine issue of material fact. SDCL 15-6-56(c); Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Company, 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (1968). I cannot dispute that the letter in question is libelous per se. SDCL 20-11-3. Nor do I contest the assertion that the letter constituted a privileged communication. SDCL 20-11-5(3); see also Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 4 S.Ct. 12, 28 L.Ed. 158 (1884); Danias v. Fakis, 261 A.2d 529 (Del.Super.1969); Shinglemeyer v. Wright, 124 Mich. 230, 82 N.W. 887 (1900); Zarate v. Cortinas, 553 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.Civ.App.1977); Otten v. Schutt, 15 Wis.2d 497, 113 N.W.2d 152 (1962). Since the letter was a privileged communiqué, then it was incumbent upon appellants to adequately show that there existed a genuine issue of material fact on the question of malice. Uken v. Sloat, 296 N.W.2d 540 (S.D.1980). This, I believe, appellants failed to do.
No affidavits, testimony or reports were submitted to the trial court, excepting the depositions of the parties themselves. In her deposition, Dorothy Lauck unequivocally denied writing the letter in question and maintained that she had no knowledge of the crime referred to therein. Appellants both deposed that they believed that Dorothy Lauck authored the letter. Their belief was based almost entirely on a handwriting analysis which they referred to several times during their testimony. For some reason, however, this phantom analysis was never submitted to the trial court and, accordingly, was not included in the settled record. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence in the record indicating any ill will between the parties at the time the letter was written. In fact, the record reflects that appellants themselves were aware of no difficulties between the parties prior to and at the time of Dorothy Lauck’s alleged conduct. The record is devoid of any malice, express or in fact.
The majority opinion holds that the issue of malice was adequately raised because Dorothy Lauck denied any knowledge of *611the burglary. Consequently, 'reasons the majority, “if it is later established” (emphasis mine) that Dorothy Lauck did indeed write the letter, it would be impossible for her to contend that she believed, in good faith, that appellants had committed the crime.
A trial judge cannot deny a motion for summary judgment due to evidence that is anticipated at trial. Such an expectancy of proof begs the entire process and purpose of discovery, that is, to avoid an evidentiary ambush. In this case, appellants would hope to ambush Dorothy Lauck at trial with an arrow of malice.
Summary judgment is based upon facts in the record, as distinguished from presumptions of facts not in the record. Were this Court to follow the reasoning of the special concurrence, trial judges would be relegated to the role of mystics and swamis. Trial judges cannot gaze into a crystal ball and base their decisions upon what might be proven at trial.
Marts v. Sutton, 275 N.W.2d 357 (1979), cited in the special concurrence, is inappo-site; in that case there was concrete evidence (not a presumption) that the fire emanated from the Suttons’ garbage dump. Here, there is not one scintilla of evidence establishing that Dorothy Lauck wrote the letter in question. I also fail to find anything in Stricker v. Swift Bros. Construction, 260 N.W.2d 500 (1977), excepting the dissent therein, that supports the rationale of the special concurrence.
In Kohlman v. Cahill, 301 N.W.2d 664, 666 (S.D.1981), this Court stated:
During appellate oral argument, counsel for appellants urged that had summary judgment been denied and the matter proceeded to trial, appellants probably could have produced evidence at trial of direct solicitation. Such an argument could undoubtedly be raised in most motions for summary judgment. ... We will not set aside the trial court’s [order of summary judgment] on such speculation and conjecture.
It would appear that the verbiage in Kohlman is equally applicable in this case, that is, appellants should not be permitted to get past a motion for summary judgment on the speculative and conjectural basis of proving malice at trial.
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court, as well as we at the appellate level, cannot speculate as to what might be established at trial. Rather, the record itself must be examined to determine if summary judgment is appropriate. SDCL 15-6-56(c). It is the reality of the present, not conjectures on the future, which determines the proper applicability of summary judgment.
I would affirm the trial court’s order of summary judgment on the issue of libel.