Court Opinion

ID: 9667474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:46:49.487141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:38.296309
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I take the opportunity to file a dissent in this case for the limited reason that I was not a member of the court when we decided the case of State v. Wahrman, 199 Neb. 337, 258 N.W.2d 818 (1977). Had I been a member of the court at that time, I would have joined in the dissent of Judges White and Mc-Cown. I specifically write now to express my view that I disagree with the rule of law first declared by us in Zadina v. Weedlun, 187 Neb. 361, 190 N.W.2d 857 (1971), and repeated again in State v. Wahrman, supra, to the effect that when an officer requests an individual to give either a blood or urine sample, pursuant to the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.09 (Reissue 1978), the individual need not be advised that the statute entitles the individual to have a physician of his choice present to evaluate his condition and perform or have performed whatever further laboratory tests he deems appropriate in addition to that requested by the officer. It is no longer generally acceptable in American jurisprudence to merely suggest that all persons are presumed to know the law and, therefore, nothing more is ever required. The underlying philosophy which motivated the U.S. Supreme Court to establish the Miranda warnings makes that clear. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). It does not appear to me to impose an unreasonable burden upon a police officer, who must in the first instance request the test, to further advise an individual that he has a right to select a physician of his choice to perform whatever laboratory tests the physician deems appropriate, particularly in view of the fact that, absent the accused’s physician, the tests are conducted completely out of the view of the accused and the results establish the violation, with nothing more. Unless *283the individual has been advised of his rights, I have difficulty in seeing how he can knowingly waive them. We have, in a host of cases, now made it clear that before an individual may waive a constitutional right, he must understand that he had that right in the first place and that he knowingly waived the right. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). I would opt for a rule which requires the officer to advise the individual of his rights under the provisions of § 39-669.09.
White, J., joins in this dissent.