Court Opinion

ID: 9523331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:39:25.487294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:55.926944
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
Bowen, J.
I do not agree with the conclusion reached by the majority opinion in this case. In my opinion, the sufficiency of evidence of probative value in this record to support the verdict of the jury and the judgment in the court below is clearly established by the later decisions of the Supreme Court in Davis, Exr. v. Babb (1921), 190 Ind. 173, 125 N. E. 403, and of this court in Cooper v. Cooper (1948), 114 Ind. App. 261, 51 N. E. 2d 100, and Workman v. Workman (1943), 113 Ind App. 245, 46 N. E. 2d 718. However, while there is language within the earlier decision of Wiley v. Gordon (1914), 181 Ind. 252, 104 N. E. 500, which would seem to substantiate the majority opinion, there seems to be an unanimity in all the cases to the effect that the ultimate inference of undue influence, or its absence, is one of fact to be drawn by the jury and not to be declared by the court as a matter of law. In my humble opinion the result reached by the majority in effect would tend to create a rule in which courts of appeal would be forced to undertake to determine whether or not undue influence existed from the facts and circumstances in each case, and would therefore be compelled to invade the province of the jury. This court in reviewing Davis, Exr. v. Babb, supra, in the Workman case, supra, quoted the following from such decision:
“The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict on appeal depends solely on the presence in the record of some competent evidence which tends to support that verdict. (Citing authorities.) In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, this court will con*473sider, not only the positive testimony of the witnesses, but also such inferences as flow naturally from established facts. . . . The issue of undue influence joined in this case, like other questions, must be determined from all the facts and circumstances given in the evidence. The ultimate inference of undue influence, or its absence, was one of fact to be drawn by the j ury, and not to be declared by the court as a matter of law. The exercise of undue influence may be shown by circumstantial evidence, and the provisions of the will and the circumstances attending its execution may be sufficient to warrant a finding against its validity. Friedersdorf v. Lacy (1910), 173 Ind. 429, 436, 90 N. E. 766. Such is the nature of the human mind that, when it has been habituated to the influence of another, it will yield to that influence and suffer it to have its effect, although the person in the habit of its exercise may not be present or exert it at the time an act is done. It may happen that the fruit of an evil and improper influence is born long after the influence is exerted. ... In the contest of a will on the ground of undue influence, the evidence required to establish the undue influence need not be of the direct, affirmative and positive character which is required to establish a tangible physical fact. The only positive and affirmative proof required is the facts and circumstances from which the undue influence may be reasonably inferred. Blackman v. Edsall (1902), 17 Colo. App. 429, 68 Pac. 790. In the case just cited, Blackman v. Edsall, supra, the court said: ‘The chief complaint and contention of the proponent is that the evidence presented and upon which the jury based its verdict sustaining the charge of undue influence was insufficient by reason of its lacking in that affirmative and positive character which is claimed to be necessary. It follows from the very nature of the thing that evidence to show undue influence must be largely in effect circumstantial. It is an intangible thing which only in the rarest instances is susceptible of what may be termed direct or positive proof. The difficulty is also enhanced by the fact universally recognized that he who seeks to use undue influence does so in privacy. He seldom uses *474brute force or open threats to terrorize his intended victim, and if he does he is careful that no witnesses are about to take note of and testify to the fact. He observes, too, the same precautions if he seeks by cajolery, flattery or other methods to obtain power and control over the will of another and direct it improperly to the accomplishment of the purpose which he desires.’ And again in the same case the court said: ‘Only general rules concerning the amount and character of evidence required to establish undue influence in the execution of a will can be laid down. As to what is sufficient must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” (Our emphasis).
An eminent authority, Page on Wills, Vol. 1, §184, has this to say regarding the rules governing the doctrine of undue influence:
“The theory which underlies the doctrine of undue influence is that the testator is induced by various means, to execute an instrument, which, although his, in outward form, is in reality not his will, but the will of another person which is substituted for that of the testator. Such an instrument is, in legal effect, not a will at all. Although executed by the testator, his intention to make a will is so defective that the instrument is invalid.”
The same authority in Vol. 2, §811, states:
“From the nature of undue influence, from.the fact that it is frequently employed surreptitiously, that it is shown chiefly by its results, and that in any event, the question is usually one of the effect of a long course of conduct upon the mind or the individual in question, the evidence by which undue influence is established is usually circumstantial. Undue influence is essentially a question of fact. The party who contests the will is entitled to the benefit of all inferences of fact which may be deduced, fairly and reasonably from the direct evidence. Direct evidence is necessary only to establish the fact from which undue influence may rea*475sonably be inferred. Although each fact by itself may be insufficient, the facts when taken together may justify, and even require, a finding of undue influence.”
Applying the rules from the foregoing decisions of the courts of our state and legal authorities to the evidence in the record before us, in my opinion the question of undue influence was one of fact for the jury to determine, which the jury, aided by proper instructions which were not questioned, did resolve in favor of the appellees.
Much of the evidence in the instant case is similar to the facts and circumstances in the case of Cooper v. Cooper, supra. The evidence most favorable to the appellees on the question of influence would show that the appellant through threats and pressure caused and procured the decedent to turn property over to her. There is evidence that the appellant, Anna Lindinger, was always nagging Louis Lindinger about the will; that a witness heard a violent argument between appellant and the decedent; that appellant stated in substance that now that she was married to him he should sign everything over to her. A witness testified that appellant threatened to leave decedent to go to Detroit if he did not give her her way. The evidence shows that appellant in talking to a son of the decedent said, “I screwed you, I really screwed you out of $10,000.00. I had Pa sign this house over to me.” Another witness testified that she asked the decedent if he would sign over everything to his second wife and that he answered, “No, what I have is my children’s.” As the majority opinion recites, the appellant went with the decedent to the. home of the witnesses who witnessed the will, and that the appellant remained in the house at the time the will was executed.
*476Considering all of the foregoing evidence with the fact that the evidence in the record shows a completely dominating influence continuously exercised by the appellant who prevented the decedent from entering into normal conversations, and on such occasions he would “shut up like a clam”, and that she would take him away from groups when he attempted to engage in conversation, while there may be differences of opinion in the minds of individual jurors or individual judges of courts of appeal as to the strength or weakness of the case made by the appellees, in my opinion there is ample evidence to support the verdict of the jury that the deceased was unduly influenced and dominated by the appellant to the extent that any undue influence previously exerted persisted at the time of the execution of the will, so that but for such influence the will would have been different from that actually executed, and therefore that such undue influence vitiated such will.
In my opinion the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Note. — Reported in 130 N. E. 2d 75.