Court Opinion

ID: 9483995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:37:27.899041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:57.339621
License: Public Domain

MINER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I do not agree that the other act evidence presented in this case was so dissimilar to the conduct at issue that the district judge abused his discretion when he received it under the provisions of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). I also do not agree that the probative value of the other act evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect so that the evidence should have been excluded under Fed. R.Evid. 403. These disagreements compel my respectful dissent.
The other act evidence was presented through the testimony of Detective Jay Edwards of the Greensboro, North Carolina Police Department. Detective Edwards testified that he arrested Rupert Gordon in Greensboro and seized approximately four grams of crack cocaine during a search of Gordon incident to the arrest. Detective Edwards testified that he then obtained a search warrant for Gordon’s house and there discovered a triple-beam scale, “a device often used to weigh drugs for distribution,” United States v. Beaulieau, 959 F.2d 375, 377 (2d Cir.1992). Without objection, the court also received the following response to a question put to Detective Edwards relating to the basis for his suspicion that cocaine or crack cocaine might be found in defendant’s house:
Information from a confidential informant, a recent seizure of crack cocaine in the Greensboro area in which we suspected Mr. Gordon to be the supplier, information that was found in the documents showing that Rupert Gordon did live at the apartment.
Trial Tr. at 181 (emphasis added).
My colleagues conclude that this other act evidence is of little value in proving Gordon’s knowledge that Ghullkie was importing marijuana and cocaine. I think that the evidence is valuable in showing knowledge of drug dealing activity and that the showing of similarity is sufficient. There is no requirement that the prior act evidence demonstrate specific knowledge of importation. “[I]n narcotics cases there seems to [be] far less insistence on similarity.” 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 404[12], at 404-74 to 404-75 (1992). We have held that other act evidence should be admitted to show knowledge if the act is “sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue to permit the jury reasonably to draw from that act the knowledge inference advocated by the proponent of the evidence.” United States v. Peterson, 808 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir.1987). It seems to me that the evidence of drug dealing in Greensboro is sufficiently similar to the drug dealing in New York to permit the inference of knowledge.
Under Rule 404(b) “evidence of other narcotics crimes has been held admissible to show the defendant’s intent to be involved in the narcotics transaction at issue ... or to show his knowledge of the narcotics-related character of his acts.” United States v. Afjehei, 869 F.2d 670, 674 (2d Cir.1989) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Mickens, 926 F.2d 1323, 1329 (2d Cir.1991) (“Mickens’ prior involvement in narcotics activity was relevant to the prosecution’s tax evasion and money laundering theory that narcotics sales provided the cash which Mickens spent so lavishly.”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 940, 117 L.Ed.2d 111 (1992). Applying the rules enunciated in these cases, I would conclude that the narcotics-related activity engaged in by Gordon in Greensboro was relevant to the issue of knowledge and intent in this case. See United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 656 (2d Cir.1989).
*913Finally, it seems clear to me that the probative value of the prior drug dealing was not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice within the meaning of Rule 403. “A trial court’s ruling, following a ‘conscientious assessment’ of the Rule 403 factors, will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1005 (2d Cir.1985). No abuse of discretion can be found, where, as here, a showing of knowledge and intent is required in order for the prosecution to meet its burden of proof and the prior act evidence is relevant, similar and probative. Id.