Court Opinion

ID: 9899414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 18:04:33.633439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:24.806588
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/16/23 Lee v. Ryoo CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 YEO BAI LEE,                                                        H050465
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Appellant,                                Super. Ct. No. 21CV386912)

             v.

 CHRISTY JIHEE RYOO et al.,

             Defendants and Respondents.

         Plaintiff and appellant Yeo Bai “Joe” Lee (Joe)1 appeals from an order denying his
motion to disqualify attorney Mark Adams (Adams) and Adams’s law firm Jeffer
Mangels Butler & Mitchell (JMBM) from representing defendant and respondent Christy
Jihee Ryoo (Ryoo)2 in this breach of contract, fraud, and financial elder abuse case.

         1
         For clarity, we refer to parties who share a last name by their first names as they
appear in the briefs and record. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Leonard (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 546, 550, fn. 2.)
       2
         The complaint also names defendants K & L Supply Korea Co., Ltd. (K & L
Korea), K & L Supply Co., Inc. (K & L Supply), YBL Holdings, Inc., and Skylars LLC
(together, entity defendants). The entity defendants are pleaded as nominal defendants
only and, according to Joe, are necessary parties because he seeks receiverships and a
constructive trust over them. We refer to the entity defendants and Ryoo together as
“respondents.”
       Joe maintains that Adams improperly solicited privileged and confidential
information about Joe from Jim Ryan (Ryan), Joe’s attorney of record in another matter.
Ryan’s communications with Adams culminated in Ryan’s submission of a signed
declaration. That declaration, which Adams sought to file in support of a posthearing
request to file sur-reply evidence, explained Ryan’s prior representations of Joe and his
interactions with the parties and issues in this case. Joe suggests that Ryan “switched
sides” to support Ryoo against his own client, Joe, because Ryan had begun a romantic
relationship with Ryoo that he did not disclose to Joe. Joe contends that by facilitating
Ryan’s unethical conduct and using Ryan as a witness against Joe, Adams made Ryan his
de facto cocounsel or “of counsel” to JMBM. Joe argues this relationship required the
trial court to impute Ryan’s conflict of interest to Adams and JMBM.
       The trial court denied the disqualification motion. It found there was no
substantial evidence that Adams had procured or obtained privileged or confidential
information from Ryan. It further found that Joe had not demonstrated a legal or factual
basis to disqualify either Adams or JMBM based on the alleged misconduct of Ryan.
       On appeal, Joe contends the trial court erred by failing to apply the rules of
imputed conflict of interest and vicarious disqualification. In response, Ryoo maintains
the appeal should be dismissed as moot because Joe has waived his attorney-client
privilege with Ryan. In the alternative, Ryoo asserts that Joe’s disqualification theories
are legally meritless and factually unsupported. We also consider whether the appeal is
moot because neither Adams nor JMBM currently represents respondents.
       Having considered the record before the trial court and its factual findings, we
deny respondents’ motion to dismiss the appeal, decide it is not moot, and affirm the trial
court’s order.

                                                 2
                  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
       A. The Parties and Prior Litigation
       Joe was born in North Korea and came in 1963 to the United States, where he has
built several successful companies. Joe and his then-wife Hee Ja Lee (Hee Ja), founded
K & L Supply, a motorcycle and auto parts design, manufacturing, and supply company.
During his lengthy tenure at K & L Supply, Joe was the company president and Hee Ja
was the secretary. Joe and Hee Ja have one biological daughter, Julia Lee (Julia).
       Ryoo, who is fluent in Korean and English, was born in Korea and immigrated to
the United States in 1988 when she was 17 years old. After graduating from college,
Ryoo became a licensed chiropractor and practiced full time from 2002 until
approximately 2015. Ryoo met Joe early in her practice when he was referred to her for
chiropractic care. She treated him for a short time, then again in 2012 and 2013. During
that time, Joe began confiding in Ryoo about his pending divorce with Hee Ja. Joe and
Ryoo became emotionally close.
       In 2013, Ryoo became Joe’s personal assistant and interpreter. Joe was embroiled
in multiple lawsuits, including divorce proceedings against Hee Ja, civil litigation against
Hee Ja over the ownership of K & L Supply, and a conservatorship action filed by Julia
in 2014.
       Ryan represented Joe as trial counsel in the 2014 civil case between Joe and Hee
Ja over the control of K & L Supply. Ryan also served as Joe’s counsel in the 2014
conservatorship action brought by Julia, which involved allegations that Ryoo exercised
undue influence over Joe. Ryan also was Joe’s trial counsel in what became a combined

       3
        We grant appellant’s unopposed request for judicial notice in support of his
opening brief (filed Feb. 6, 2023). The request for judicial notice comprises Joe’s
complaint in this action (filed Sept. 15, 2021), which it appears was inadvertently omitted
from the clerk’s transcript, and Joe’s petition for writ of mandate in this court (filed Oct.
7, 2022), which this court summarily denied on January 12, 2023. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d)(1), 453, 459.)
                                                 3
divorce and civil action between Joe and Hee Ja. The combined divorce and civil action
settled after mediation in June 2021 and ended in a final judgment filed in May 2022.
Ryan served as trial counsel in that action both for Joe individually and for entity
defendants K & L Supply and K & L Korea.
       In 2016, Joe made Ryoo an employee of entity defendant YBL Holdings, Inc. She
also became the chief financial officer of K & L Supply. In 2018, Joe legally adopted
Ryoo as his daughter.
       In a series of transactions over several years, Joe transferred to Ryoo complete
ownership of the entity defendants and of several real estate holdings. Ryoo also held
power of attorney for Joe from 2018 until June 2021, when Joe suffered a stroke and was
diagnosed as having impaired mental capacity.
       In September 2021, Joe executed a durable power of attorney authorizing his
longtime friend and neighbor Steve Scialabba to act as his agent/attorney-in-fact.
Scialabba retained counsel and filed this action. Joe was then 88 years old.
       In November 2021, Joe transferred the power of attorney to his daughter Julia.
       B. Current Elder Fraud Suit
       In September 2021, through counsel retained by Scialabba, Joe filed the operative
complaint. The complaint alleges that Ryoo preyed on Joe’s vulnerabilities, persuaded
him to transfer all his assets to her (which she claimed she would hold for his benefit),
and eventually removed Joe from the officer and director positions he had held, making
herself the sole shareholder, officer, and director of K & L Supply and YBL Holdings,
Inc. The complaint asserts numerous claims against Ryoo, including breach of oral
contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, elder abuse, and conversion.
It seeks the appointment of a receiver and imposition of a constructive trust against the
entity defendants.
       Shortly after the filing of the complaint, the trial court granted Joe’s request for a
temporary restraining order pending a November 3, 2021 hearing on the motion for
                                                  4
preliminary injunction to bar Ryoo from any transfer or sale of interest in the entity
defendants or real estate properties. After the November 3 hearing, respondents filed a
posthearing application to file sur-reply evidence and argument. Respondents’ briefing
filed in support of the posthearing application to file sur-reply evidence and argument
included a declaration by attorney Ryan (hereafter, Ryan declaration). This declaration
forms the basis of Joe’s motion for disqualification of Adams and JMBM.
          The Ryan declaration states that Ryan attended the November 3 hearing on the
motion for preliminary injunction and heard Joe’s counsel make “a number” of
“inaccurate” statements. The Ryan declaration details Ryan’s representation of Joe in
various matters, clarifies Ryoo’s role as a translator for Ryan in his attorney-client
communications with Joe, describes occurrences after the June 2021 mediation and
settlement when Joe suffered a stroke and hospitalization, summarizes Ryan’s
communications starting in 2016 with Joe’s friend Scialabba about Scialabba’s concern
that Ryoo was taking advantage of Joe, and expresses skepticism about Joe’s allegations
against Ryoo.
          The trial court ultimately denied respondents’ application to file sur-reply
evidence and argument (including the Ryan declaration), granted the preliminary
injunction requested by Joe, and ordered Joe to post bond as a condition of injunctive
relief.
          C. Disqualification Motion
          Counsel for Joe responded to the Ryan declaration by lodging a State Bar
complaint against Ryan and issuing deposition subpoenas for business records to both
Ryan and JMBM regarding their communications about the Ryan declaration. JMBM
objected to the deposition subpoena and submitted, in support of its objections, a
privilege log consisting of 102 entries from October 22, 2021, through January 20, 2022.
All of the entries list either e-mail or e-mail attachments “of attorney communications
regarding dispute” between Ryan and Adams.
                                                    5
       In April 2022, Joe filed a motion to disqualify JMBM from representing Ryoo and
the entity defendants (hereafter, motion).4 The disqualification motion came before a
different bench officer than the judge who had ruled on the earlier motion for preliminary
injunction.
       In support of the motion, Joe asserted that JMBM colluded with and obtained
confidential information from Ryan while Ryan was still representing Joe as his counsel
of record in the divorce action. Joe also asserted that Ryan was “romantically involved
with [Ryoo].” Joe argued that in procuring Ryan’s assistance, JMBM “aided and abetted
Ryan’s violation of his most sacrosanct fiduciary obligations to Joe—undivided loyalty
and maintaining Joe’s confidences.” Joe argued that JMBM was “irreparably tainted” in
the case and that to allow the firm to remain as counsel would violate public trust in the
scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar, a paramount
consideration in disqualification motions.
       Joe specifically asserted three grounds for disqualification of JMBM and Adams:
First, that Adams knowingly solicited confidential information from Ryan and actively
promoted Ryan’s breach of the duty of loyalty by attempting to file the Ryan declaration;
second, Ryan should be treated as de facto cocounsel to Adams and, under the imputed
knowledge rule, his knowledge must be imputed to JMBM; and third, that as
demonstrated by the assertions of privilege in the JMBM privilege log, the firm misused
confidential information in violation of its ethical obligations.
       In opposition, respondents argued “there cannot be a disqualifying conflict”
because Adams neither represented Joe nor was adverse to him at any time before Adams
began representing Ryoo and the entity defendants. Respondents asserted that Joe’s

       4
         Respondents concurrently filed their own motion to disqualify the law firm
representing Joe, on the ground that two of the firm’s attorneys have disqualifying
conflicts of interest due to their longstanding and ongoing representation of Hee Ja in the
divorce action with Joe. The trial court denied that motion, and it is not at issue in this
appeal.
                                                  6
motion lacked legal or factual support and relied entirely on speculation in its assertion
that Ryan had disclosed confidential information to Adams. They pointed out that Joe
had not challenged JMBM’s assertion of evidentiary privileges (i.e., work product
protection) over Adams’s communications with Ryan and argued that Joe’s motion
conflated Adams’s proper use of the evidentiary privilege with the adverse interest
principles that guide disqualification decisions.
       Respondents filed two declarations in support of their opposition to the motion.
The Adams declaration described Adams’s engagement in the case as counsel for Ryoo
and the entity defendants and the basis for Adams’s communications with Ryan. Adams
stated that Ryoo and the entity defendants retained him shortly after Joe filed the
complaint in this case, and prior to his retention he had no knowledge of or involvement
with any of the parties or the various lawsuits. Adams explained that he contacted Ryan,
whom he learned had “been involved as counsel in one or more of the prior proceedings,”
as part of an effort to understand the tangled family and business relations that had been
litigated over the course of the prior decade. Adams stated that he also spoke with Ryan
about issues relating to the entity defendants based on his understanding that Ryan
previously represented K & L Supply and K & L Korea, and “continues to represent
K & L Supply,” such that any communications between them relating to the K & L
entities are “independently covered by the attorney-client privilege.” Adams described
the privilege log submitted by JMBM following its objections to Joe’s subpoena for
business records. He asserted that he never asked Ryan to provide any information that
Ryan “had learned on a confidential basis” from Joe and that Ryan “has never told me
about any of the communications between him and [Joe].”
       Ryoo also submitted a declaration providing basic background facts relating to her
relationship with Joe, the retention in 2021 of Ryan to represent K & L Supply and
K & L Korea in the civil litigation brought by Hee Ja, and the conflict waivers that she

                                                    7
and Joe signed in that representation. Ryoo stated that Ryan “continues to represent
K & L Supply at the present time.”
       In reply, Joe argued that Adams’s lack of any prior adverse relationship with Joe
was a “strawman” argument because, under the circumstances, “courts impute the
knowledge of the tainted fiduciary to the law firm [and] presume that [Adams] received
confidential information from them and automatically disqualify the firm.” Joe asserted
that Adams’s declaration that he had not received any confidential information from
Ryan was entirely insufficient in light of the imputed conflict and lengthy exchange of
confidential communications and work product (based on the privilege log), while Adams
“knew Ryan was Joe’s lawyer and in an undisclosed (to Joe) personal relationship with
[Ryoo].” Although he disputed the substance of the Adams declaration, Joe did not file
any evidentiary objections to it.
       D. Trial Court Order
       The trial court denied Joe’s disqualification motion in a written order filed on
August 8, 2022 (order). Regarding Joe’s allegations against Ryan, the trial court
explained they were not “material to the disqualification issues at hand.” The court found
that Joe’s counsel provided “no evidence” that Ryan was romantically involved with
Ryoo. It determined that, regardless of the factors motivating Ryan to “ ‘switch[] sides’ ”
(as asserted by Joe), Ryan’s alleged motivation was not material to the disqualification
analysis. The court found that Joe’s other allegations against Ryan, including relating to
a 2018 State Bar suspension based on unethical conduct in a federal case in
Massachusetts and the pending California State Bar investigation (arising from the
complaint lodged by Joe), were not determinative or material, especially because the
court was “not relying on Mr. Ryan’s representations (e.g., in the Ryan Declaration) in
deciding this motion.”
       The trial court further found that Joe had not demonstrated a legal or factual basis
to disqualify JMBM or Adams. It noted that, absent the involvement of Ryan, there was
                                                 8
no basis to disqualify Adams under either a concurrent or simultaneous representation
theory. Regarding the purported disclosure of confidential information, the court found
there was no evidence either that Adams solicited confidential or attorney-client
privileged information from Ryan or that Ryan provided such information. The trial
court credited the declaration of Adams that he had not sought any confidential
information about Joe, finding it had “no reason not to trust these representations.” It
found Joe’s speculation about the communications insufficient to justify attorney
disqualification. The trial court observed that while Joe asserts the Ryan declaration did
reveal confidential information, that issue was “hotly disputed by the parties” and, in any
event, “these supposedly-problematic disclosures were not so clearly privileged so [as] to
put Mr. Adams on notice that Mr. Ryan was allegedly violating his fiduciary duty toward
Joe.”
        The trial court also rejected Joe’s argument based on submission of the JMBM
privilege log. It found the inclusion of such “prototypical attorney work product (i.e.,
attorney interviews)” in a privilege log to be unremarkable and not an indication that the
conversations “somehow involved attorney-client privileged information about Joe.” For
similar reasons, the court found Joe’s theory of disqualification based on JMBM’s
alleged misuse of confidential information to be unsupported. The court based this
determination on the standard set forth in State Compensation Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc.
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644, 656 (State Fund) for disqualification of an attorney who
receives information that “ ‘obviously appear[s]’ to be privileged or confidential” and on
the court’s acceptance of Adams’s representation that he received no such information.
        Joe timely appealed from the order denying his motion to disqualify JMBM. Joe
simultaneously filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the order denying the
disqualification motion and a stay request. This court summarily denied the writ petition
on January 12, 2023.

                                                 9
                                     II. DISCUSSION
       Joe contends the trial court erred in failing to disqualify JMBM and Adams based
on the theory that Ryan’s conflict of interest is imputed to the law firm. Joe also
contends that public policy requires disqualification of a law firm where it knowingly and
intentionally uses its client’s adversary’s lawyer as a witness against the adversary.
       In response to the filing of the appeal, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal as moot based on Joe having subsequently waived his privileged communications
with Ryan. Respondents separately contend that the circumstances of this case do not
support disqualification under any theory of concurrent or successive adverse
representation. They assert that Joe’s alternative theories based on vicarious
disqualification or public policy have no application here, where there is no evidence that
Adams received or relied upon privileged or confidential information.
       In addition to these arguments, shortly after the filing of respondents’ brief,
counsel for respondents noticed the substitution of attorney Jennifer L. Keller for Adams
as to both Ryoo and the entity defendants. Joe addresses the substitution of attorney in
his reply brief and in the accompanying request for judicial notice.5 He contends that
even though Adams has withdrawn as counsel of record, the appeal is not moot and he
may suffer continuing harm absent resolution of the disqualification question.
       A. Mootness
       We first consider mootness, raised by Joe in connection with respondents’
substitution of counsel and by respondents in their motion to dismiss. Although
respondents have not directly addressed the mootness question raised in Joe’s reply brief,

       5
          We grant in part Joe’s unopposed request for judicial notice in support of his
reply brief, which asks this court to take notice of the same substitution of attorney filed
in the trial court, dated June 6, 2023, as well as an unrelated order of the trial court dated
June 20, 2023. We grant the request as to exhibit 1, the copy of the substitution of
attorney withdrawing Adams as counsel of record for Ryoo. We deny the request as to
exhibit 2, which is not relevant to the resolution of this appeal.
                                                  10
the court may examine on its own motion whether an issue has been rendered moot.
(Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852,
865 (Better Redondo).)
       In general, “ ‘an appellate court will decide only actual controversies and [ ] a live
appeal may be rendered moot by events occurring after the notice of appeal was filed.
We will not render opinions on moot questions or abstract propositions, or declare
principles of law which cannot affect the matter at issue on appeal.’ ” (Better Redondo,
supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 866.) A case is rendered moot only “when the decision of
the reviewing court ‘can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and
will be dismissed.’ ” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214.) We will not dismiss an appeal “where, despite the happening
of the subsequent event, there remain material questions for the court’s determination.”
(Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541
(Eye Dog Foundation).) Furthermore, “[e]ven when a case is moot, courts may exercise
their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 282.)
              1. Substitution of Counsel
       Joe contends that he may suffer continuing harm absent resolution of the
disqualification question. He argues that even though neither Adams nor JMBM
currently represents Ryoo or the entity defendants, Adams and JMBM have a duty to
cooperate with the transfer of the matter to new trial counsel. Pursuant to this duty,
Adams may continue to share information obtained from Ryan with respondents’ new
counsel. Joe also points out that Adams may substitute back into the case again at any

                                                 11
point (as has occurred before).6 Furthermore, Joe asserts that because Ryan continues to
represent K & L Supply in other matters—a fact Adams used to justify his
communications with Ryan—there remains a possibility that respondents’ new trial
counsel will similarly communicate with Ryan, putting Joe’s confidences at risk. Joe
asserts that even if the appeal were moot, this court should exercise its discretion to
consider the disqualification issue because of the substantial public interest in assuring
the integrity of the bar and avoiding the potential for recurrence.
       We agree for the reasons cited by Joe that the appeal is not moot. Our review,
though limited to ascertaining whether the trial court erred in denying the disqualification
motion, has continuing relevance to the case due to the alleged dissemination of Joe’s
privileged and confidential information in this matter (which, if shown to have occurred,
could require remedial measures by the trial court). Whether the conduct of respondents’
counsel required the trial court to impute Ryan’s apparent conflict of interest to JMBM
and Adams and disqualify it from representing respondents in the case is therefore not a
moot question or abstract proposition. (Better Redondo, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at
p. 866.) This is particularly true where there have been prior substitutions of attorney,
and we have no basis to assume the same counsel involved in the challenged conduct will
not reengage with their former clients.
       We turn to respondents’ motion to dismiss on other mootness grounds.
              2. Motion to Dismiss
       In response to the filing of the appeal, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal as moot, and Joe filed a response to the motion to dismiss. Respondents then
sought leave to file a reply to the motion to dismiss, and Joe filed a conditional request

       6
         The record on appeal shows that in May 2022, counsel for Ryoo filed a
substitution of attorney, replacing Adams with attorney James R. Cummins. Counsel
filed another substitution of attorney less than two weeks later, substituting Adams back
into the case.
                                                 12
for leave to file a sur-reply. This court ordered the rulings on both the motion to dismiss
and the requests for leave to file a reply and sur-reply deferred for consideration with the
appeal.
       Respondents contend that the appeal has become moot due to waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. According to the motion to dismiss and accompanying
declaration of respondents’ counsel, after filing the appeal in this matter but before filing
his opening brief, Joe’s counsel Andrew August (August) took the deposition of Joe’s
former attorney Ryan. In that deposition, August stated on the record that Joe
“ ‘knowingly, intentionally waived the privilege between Mr. Ryan and himself as to the
matters in this case.’ ”
       Respondents argue that as a result of this express and voluntary waiver, there “no
longer is any actual controversy” with respect to the sole basis for the disqualification
motion. Respondents characterize the basis of the motion as Adams’s alleged, improper
receipt of Joe’s privileged information from Ryan and use of that privileged information
in Ryoo’s defense. Respondents assert that under the relevant mootness principles, the
appeal is moot because the waiver eliminates any claim of privilege over Joe’s
communications with his former attorney Ryan as to matters in this case and,
consequently, any claimed ethical violation related to Adams’s alleged receipt of such
information from Ryan.
       Joe counters that the motion to dismiss attempts to avoid review of the important
legal issues presented on appeal. He asserts the motion to dismiss seeks to confine the
ethical violations at issue to Ryan’s alleged disclosure of attorney-client privileged
information when, in fact, the motion raises broader issues relating to information sharing
between counsel when the attorneys are not formally affiliated and to public trust in the
integrity of the bar. Joe asserts that it would be inappropriate to dismiss the appeal when
there remain questions ripe for determination on which this court may still grant him
effectual relief. Joe also challenges the alleged effect of the waiver where its validity,
                                                 13
scope, voluntariness, and retroactive effect, if any, have yet to be litigated in the trial
court.
         We agree with Joe that the appeal should not be dismissed as moot on this ground.
The appeal challenges the trial court’s application of the doctrine of vicarious
disqualification. The basis for disqualification, as presented in the motion and on appeal,
is two-fold. Joe asserts that Adams improperly obtained and used attorney-client
privileged information gained from the adversary’s lawyer, Ryan. Joe also asserts that
Adams and JMBM enabled the breach of Ryan’s fiduciary obligations, exposing Joe’s
private confidences to his lawyer and damaging public confidence in the integrity of the
bar.
         Although the arguments on appeal are largely premised on Adams’s purported
collusion with Ryan to disclose confidential or privileged information about Joe,
resolution of the appeal does not depend solely on the specific existence or exchange of
attorney-client privileged information. Even if we were to assume the validity and effect
of August’s postappellate waiver of Joe’s attorney-client privilege with Ryan as to the
matters in this case, the presence of the waiver would not render moot all questions raised
in the appeal. On the contrary, there would “remain material questions for the court’s
determination.” (Eye Dog Foundation, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 541.)
         What is more, any determination by this court concerning mootness would
presuppose the legal validity of the waiver as well as its scope and retroactive impact.
Respondents’ motion to dismiss does not discuss these issues and has offered no legal
authority in support of the purported retroactive waiver of privilege such as would apply
to Ryan’s alleged, prior disclosure of attorney-client privileged communications. Nor
does the motion to dismiss reference August’s e-mail to Ryan’s counsel prior to the
deposition outlining in more detail the proposed scope of Joe’s intended waiver as limited
to specific issues that would be addressed in the deposition. These issues have not been
litigated in the trial court, and we decline to address their merits for the first time here.
                                                  14
       We therefore deny respondents’ motion to dismiss the appeal and the application
for leave to file a reply in support of the motion to dismiss. We likewise deny Joe’s
responsive application for leave to file a sur-reply.
       We turn to the merits of the disqualification motion.
       B. Disqualification
       Joe maintains that this case “presents a serious if not existential challenge to
existing law governing vicarious disqualification of counsel.” He asserts it affords
“unscrupulous lawyers” a loophole to the vicarious disqualification doctrine simply
because the conflicted attorney is not “formally affiliated” with the adverse client’s
counsel and the “only thing” the adverse client’s counsel must do to avoid
disqualification is “aver under oath that he or she did not actually receive confidential
information and assert the attorney-client privilege.” Joe takes issue with the trial court’s
failure to explicitly address Ryan’s conflict of interest and its willingness to credit
Adams’s declaration. Joe also challenges the court’s exercise of discretion applying the
laws and principles governing disqualification to conclude there was no legal basis on the
record before it to impute Ryan’s conflict of interest to Adams and JMBM.
              1. Standards of Review
       An order disqualifying counsel is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In
re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159 (Charlisse C.); The People ex rel. Dept. of
Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1143
(SpeeDee Oil).) Under this standard, we review a trial court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence and its conclusions of law de novo. (Charlisse C., at p. 159.) In
other words, “[i]f the trial court resolved disputed factual issues, the reviewing court
should not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s express or implied findings
supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] . . . [W]here there are no material
disputed factual issues, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination as a
question of law.” (SpeeDee Oil, at pp. 1143–1144.) The court’s ultimate decision based
                                                  15
on its application of law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.
(Charlisse C., at p. 159; see Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 712
(Haraguchi).) Even so, because a disqualification motion implicates special concerns
about the administration of justice and a party’s right to choose counsel, a careful review
of the trial court’s exercise of discretion is warranted. (SpeeDee Oil, at p. 1144.)
              2. Governing Legal Principles
       Under California law, every court has the authority “[t]o control in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(5).) The court’s power to disqualify an attorney derives from
that authority. (SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) “Ultimately, disqualification
motions involve a conflict between the clients’ right to counsel of their choice and the
need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility.” (Ibid.) The court’s
“paramount concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of
justice and the integrity of the bar.” (Ibid.) Other considerations might include “a
client’s right to chosen counsel, an attorney’s interest in representing a client, the
financial burden on a client to replace disqualified counsel, and the possibility that
tactical abuse underlies the disqualification motion.” (Ibid.)
       “Two ethical duties are entwined in any attorney-client relationship. First is the
attorney’s duty of confidentiality, which fosters full and open communication between
client and counsel, based on the client’s understanding that the attorney is statutorily
obligated [citation] to maintain the client’s confidences. [Citation.] The second is the
attorney’s duty of undivided loyalty to the client. [Citation.] These ethical duties are
mandated by the California Rules of Professional Conduct. (Rules Prof. Conduct,
[former] rule 3–310(C) & (E).)” (City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions,
Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839, 846 (Cobra).) It is the “interplay of the duties of

                                                  16
confidentiality and loyalty” that affect the conflict of interest rules governing attorneys
and guiding disqualification decisions. (Ibid.)
       The California Supreme Court has described two factual contexts (“successive
representation” and “simultaneous representation”) in which conflicts of interest
commonly arise. (See Charlisse C., supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 159–160.)
       Successive representation arises “where an attorney seeks to represent a client
with interests that are potentially adverse to a former client of the attorney.” (Charlisse
C., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 159.) In those circumstances, “the chief fiduciary value
jeopardized is that of client confidentiality.” (Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th
275, 283, italics omitted (Flatt).) “Where an attorney successively represents clients with
adverse interests, and where the subjects of the two representations are substantially
related, the need to protect the first client’s confidential information requires that the
attorney be disqualified from the second representation.” (SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20
Cal.4th at p. 1146.) “For the same reason, a presumption that an attorney has access to
privileged and confidential matters relevant to a subsequent representation extends the
attorney’s disqualification vicariously to the attorney’s entire firm.” (Ibid.)
       By contrast, in simultaneous representation cases, “an attorney seeks to represent
in a single action multiple parties with potentially adverse interests.” (Charlisse C.,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 159.) “The primary value at stake in cases of simultaneous or dual
representation is the attorney’s duty—and the client’s legitimate expectation—of loyalty,
rather than confidentiality.” (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 284, italics omitted.) “An
attorney who seeks to simultaneously represent clients with directly adverse interests in
the same litigation will be automatically disqualified.” (Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at
p. 846; see Flatt, at p. 284 [“[I]n all but a few instances, the rule of disqualification in
simultaneous representation cases is a per se or ‘automatic’ one.”].)
       The principle of vicarious disqualification, governing when an attorney’s personal
conflict will be imputed to the attorney’s law firm resulting in its vicarious
                                                  17
disqualification, was strictly “a product of decisional law” (Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at
p. 847) prior to its inclusion in the California Rules of Professional Conduct, effective
2018. Rule 1.10 on imputation of conflicts of interest generally prohibits lawyers
“associated in a firm” from “knowingly represent[ing] a client when any one of them
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so” under the rules governing conflicts
of interests involving current and former clients. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.10.) The
rationale behind vicarious disqualification, as expressed by the California Supreme Court
is that “ ‘attorneys, working together and practicing law in a professional association,
share each other’s, and their clients’, confidential information.’ ” (Cobra, at p. 848,
quoting SpeeDee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1153–1154, fn. omitted.)
       An order on a motion to disqualify counsel is directly appealable. (Jarvis v. Jarvis
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 113, 128.)
              3. Substantial Evidence of Facts Supporting Disqualification
       Beginning with the standard of review, Joe acknowledges the deferential standard
generally applicable to orders on disqualification motions but argues that the “legal
principles applicable to th[is] case limit that discretion.” Joe contends that the trial court
failed to apply the rules governing imputed conflicts of interest and vicarious
disqualification and instead relied exclusively on Adams’s declaration asserting that he
had not sought to obtain any confidential information from Ryan. Joe characterizes the
trial court’s reliance on the Adams declaration as “clear legal error.” He also describes
the facts underlying the disqualification issue as undisputed, or unable to be disputed
because of JMBM’s improper assertion of work product and attorney-client privilege.
Joe therefore contends that this court’s appellate review should be de novo.
       In deciding the disqualification motion, the trial court resolved at least some
questions of disputed material facts. Admittedly, certain facts are not disputed, such as
Ryan’s attorney-client relationship with Joe and as counsel for K & L Supply, his role as
counsel of record in Joe’s divorce action when JMBM proffered the Ryan declaration in
                                                  18
this action (though he has since withdrawn), and the numerous communications between
Ryan and Adams reflected by the JMBM privilege log. However, other factual issues,
such as whether Ryan shared Joe’s confidences with Adams, were (in the words of the
trial court) “hotly disputed.” The trial court’s decision in this matter comprised factual
findings as well as the application of law to facts. As such, our review consists of a
mixed standard of deference, in which we review factual findings for substantial
evidence, any conclusions of law de novo, and the trial court’s decision on
disqualification for abuse of discretion. (Charlisse C., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 159;
Haraguchi, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 712.)
       When we review a factual finding decided adverse to the party with the burden of
proof, to overcome the adverse determination the appellant must demonstrate no other
factual conclusion is possible, e.g., that “ ‘the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law.’ ” (Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Financial Corporation (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 129, 163 (Ajaxo).) That is, where “ ‘the trier of fact has expressly or
implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and
that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether
substantial evidence supports the judgment.’ ” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.
v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.) Instead, “ ‘where the issue on
appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.
[Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1)
“uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no
room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Id. at
p. 466.)
       The trial court’s findings include its determination that Adams had not solicited
attorney-client privileged or confidential information from Ryan and that Ryan “did not
provide such information (or at least did not do so in an obvious way).” The finding is
                                                 19
supported by Adams’s declaration describing the nature of his outreach to Ryan for
background information on the intertwined family and litigation history. Joe raised no
evidentiary objections to the Adams declaration, and the trial court was entitled to rely
upon it. The trial court similarly was entitled to consider the court’s earlier ruling
rejecting respondents’ application to file the Ryan declaration in assessing the effect of
the declaration on respondents’ choice of counsel.
       We see no basis to reject the trial court’s characterization of the JMBM privilege
log as “prototypical attorney work product.” Joe disputes this finding, arguing it ignores
that Adams worked closely with Ryan on Ryoo’s defense, “exchanging [] more than 100
attorney-client privileged communications” between them. Joe asserts that the trial court
disregarded the obvious implications of Ryan’s lengthy history representing Joe, his
declaration which publicly disclosed facts “that only he, as Joe’s lawyer, would be privy
to,” and his extensive exchange of e-mails and e-mail attachments with JMBM over a
three-month period between October 2021 and January 2022, as evidenced by JMBM’s
privilege log. While the history of exchanges between Ryan and Adams arguably
establishes Adams’s theoretical access to confidential information, the relevant
standard—as discussed in more detail post (pt. II.B.4.), is that of a reasonable probability
of disclosure. (McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
1083, 1120 (McDermott); Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1324,
1340 (Adams); Gregori v. Bank of America (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 305 (Gregori).)
       Joe asks us to draw inferences from the record that might discredit Adams’s sworn
declaration of his interactions with Ryan or suggest a breach of client confidentiality.
But our review is limited to whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law. Joe’s arguments fall short of this standard.
       Joe argues that under Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1067 (Shadow Traffic), the trial court should have discredited the Adams
declaration, which Joe characterizes as “factually meager, conclusory, and
                                                 20
uncorroborated.” Rather than assist Joe, however, Shadow Traffic merely illustrates
application of the substantial evidence standard in a case involving confidential
disclosures that precipitated a motion for attorney disqualification. The disqualification
in Shadow Traffic arose from the defense counsel’s retention of the accounting firm
Deloitte & Touche (Deloitte) as its expert witness even though Deloitte’s partners had
previously met with and discussed the case with the plaintiff’s law firm. (Id. at p. 1071.)
Several declarations offered in support of the plaintiff’s disqualification motion described
the confidential information its lawyers provided to Deloitte’s partners during their
preliminary discussions about retaining Deloitte as their expert. These disclosures
included the plaintiff’s legal theories for the case as well as trial strategies and expected
deliverables. (Id. at pp. 1073–1074.) In opposing the disqualification motion, the
defendant’s law firm initially offered a single declaration of one attorney who denied
having asked for or received any information from Deloitte about its partners’ prior
discussions with the plaintiff’s lawyers. (Id. at p. 1074.) The trial court ultimately
granted the disqualification motion, finding that confidential information imparted by the
plaintiff’s law firm to Deloitte had been conveyed to the defense attorneys. (Id. at
pp. 1075, 1078, fn. 7.) The appellate court concluded there was substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s order and affirmed. (Id. at pp. 1083, 1088–1089.)
       Joe compares Adams’s declaration averring that he never asked for and Ryan
never provided any of Joe’s confidential information to that of the defense counsel’s
declaration in Shadow Traffic denying any receipt of confidential information. (Shadow
Traffic, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1086–1087.) Joe asserts that, like in Shadow
Traffic, Adams’s “self-serving” declaration is insufficient to rebut the presumption of
disclosure that otherwise arises from the facts surrounding Ryan’s submission of a
declaration against the interest of his existing client, Joe, and his extensive
communications with Adams about this dispute.

                                                  21
       Joe’s argument overlooks a critical distinction between this case and Shadow
Traffic. In Shadow Traffic, the party seeking disqualification provided robust evidence
that the plaintiff provided confidential information to the prospective expert witness on
the plaintiff’s litigation strategy as to the specific issue (damages) about which the expert
witness then consulted with the defendant’s attorneys. (Shadow Traffic, supra, 24
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1073–1074.) To the extent that the declarations submitted in
opposition to the disqualification motion created a conflict in the evidence, the trial court
resolved the conflict in favor of the plaintiff, and the appellate court upheld that decision
as supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Id. at pp. 1083–1084.)
       By contrast, the only declaratory evidence here concerning the alleged disclosure
of confidential information is that supplied by Adams, who, according to the privilege
log, was the only JMBM attorney in communication with Ryan. Joe has not pointed us to
any evidence in the record that would compel the trial court to conclude that the
exchanges listed in the JMBM privilege log themselves disclosed Joe’s privileged or
confidential information, nor that supports an inference of reasonable probability that
Joe’s privileged or confidential information was thereby disclosed. (Ajaxo, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 163.) Insofar as the trial court found the Adams declaration trustworthy
and otherwise found no direct evidence of Ryan’s purported disclosure of Joe’s
confidential or attorney-client privileged information, this court’s review—like that of the
appellate court in Shadow Traffic—is limited to ascertaining whether substantial evidence
in the record supports the trial court’s findings, or whether evidence in the record
compels a contrary conclusion. We conclude that nothing in the record compels factual
conclusions contrary to those reached by the trial court.7

       7
         Our conclusion that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s finding that Adams did not solicit confidential information from Ryan should not
be construed as condoning the propriety of Ryan’s submission of a declaration in this
action or of JMBM’s attempt to file that declaration with the court.
                                                 22
              4. Imputing Conflict of Interest to Adams and JMBM
       We turn to Joe’s contention that, under applicable principles of imputed conflict of
interest and vicarious disqualification, Ryan’s personal conflict of interest must be
imputed to JMBM and its attorneys. This argument does not depend upon the trial
court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences. Instead, it requires us to assess, as a
question of law, “the legal significance of the undisputed facts in the record” (SpeeDee
Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1144), including Ryan’s attorney-client relationship with Joe,
his extensive correspondence with Adams as reflected in the JMBM privilege log, and his
submission of declaratory testimony in support of Ryoo’s opposition to Joe’s application
for preliminary injunction.
       The premise of Joe’s disqualification argument proceeds in two steps. First, Joe
avers that Ryan’s longstanding representation of him establishes a disqualifying personal
conflict of interest as to Ryan under both simultaneous (concurrent) and successive
representation theories of disqualification. Second, Joe contends that because Ryan is
conflicted under either analytical framework, his conflict of interest must be imputed to
JMBM and Adams under the principle of vicarious disqualification due to their joint
conduct in this litigation.
       Respondents dispute the applicability of the simultaneous/successive adverse
representation framework, as Ryan does not represent any party in this action, and neither
JMBM nor Adams was ever previously counsel to (or adverse to) Joe or to other
individuals in the action. Respondents also argue that Joe’s simultaneous and successive
representation arguments ignore Ryan’s and Adams’s respective representation of K & L
Supply, and that Ryan previously represented K & L Korea, one of Adam’s clients in this
case, providing an appropriate basis for cooperation in this case. Respondents further
argue that Joe’s effort to disqualify Adams and JMBM based on allegedly wrongful
conduct by Ryan represents a “contortion[]” of the rule of imputed conflict of interest and
vicarious disqualification, whose application is clearly delineated by case authority.
                                                 23
       We agree with respondents that Joe has not shown error in the trial court’s
decision to deny his motion for disqualification.
       As to step one (Ryan’s personal conflict of interest), it is undisputed that Ryan was
still counsel of record in the divorce action (which had settled but was pending entry of
final judgment) when JMBM filed the Ryan declaration in this action.8 Ryan also
previously counseled Joe on the subject of Ryoo’s alleged undue influence over him (the
same contention asserted by Joe in this case) while representing Joe in the
conservatorship filed by Julia in 2014. Nevertheless, Joe cannot show that Ryan’s
conduct provides a paradigmatic example of prohibited dual representation. (Cf. Flatt,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 285.) Although Ryan cooperated with opposing counsel in this case
while still representing Joe in his divorce action, there appears to be no authority for the
proposition that such cooperation, as a matter of law, equates to representation. Indeed it
is when an attorney “seeks to simultaneously represent clients with directly adverse
interests in the same litigation” (Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 846, italics added) that the
principles of automatic disqualification apply. (Ibid.; Flatt, at p. 284.)
       So, too, there is little question that Ryan’s longtime representation of Joe in prior
litigation, including the conservatorship case involving substantially similar claims,
would satisfy the “ ‘ “substantial relationship” ’ ” test used to determine presumptive
possession of confidential information relevant to the disqualification inquiry in
successive representation cases. (See Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 847; Flatt, supra, 9
Cal.4th at p. 283.) However, the “successive” element of successive representation is
lacking because Ryan does not represent the party adverse to Joe in the current litigation.
(SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1146 [requiring disqualification from a second
representation “[w]here an attorney successively represents clients with adverse interests,
and where the subjects of the two representations are substantially related”].)

       8
        On March 24, 2022, the trial court in the divorce action granted Ryan’s request
to withdraw as Joe’s counsel of record.
                                                 24
       Joe addresses these points by asserting that where there is no reasonable dispute
Ryan would be disqualified from formally representing respondents or acting as
cocounsel to Adams in this matter under both a concurrent and successive representation
analysis, the same logic must apply to Ryan’s informal association with JMBM and
Adams. He variously asserts, as to step two (imputing Ryan’s conflict of interest to
Adams and JMBM), that Ryan was “[e]ffectively JMBM’s ‘[c]o-counsel’ ” and that his
conduct was “tantamount to Ryan acting as [Ryoo]’s de facto lawyer and JMBM’s co-
counsel while still Joe’s divorce lawyer.” Joe likewise asserts that JMBM and Adams
“essentially deputized Ryan as one of their own” by enlisting him to oppose Joe’s
preliminary injunction application and by using his declaration to counter Joe’s lawyer’s
statements at the preliminary injunction hearing. He maintains that “there is no
discernable difference” between Ryan serving as a witness for respondents and him
acting as their cocounsel. In short, Joe asserts that “the tripartite relationship” between
Ryan, Adams/JMBM, and Ryoo “was the practical equivalent of Ryan and JMBM being
co-counsel.” Hence, Joe contends that under the rules extending attorney disqualification
due to an ethical conflict to the attorney’s entire firm (Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at
pp. 847–848; SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1139), Ryan’s conflict of interest must
be imputed to Adams and JMBM.
       We disagree that such a logical leap is supported in this case. In a standard
application of vicarious disqualification, courts impute an attorney’s conflict of interest to
the law firm employing that individual. (See, e.g., National Grange of Order of Patrons
of Husbandry v. California Guild (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 706, 709 [disqualification
affirmed based on law firm’s hiring of an attorney who had previously worked for a firm
representing the adverse party in the same case].) The rationale underlying the rule is
“ ‘that attorneys, working together and practicing law in a professional association, share
each other’s, and their clients’, confidential information.’ ” (Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at
pp. 847–848; SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1153–1154.) This rationale is
                                                 25
grounded in the recognition that attorneys who practice together in a firm “presumptively
share access to privileged and confidential matters.” (SpeeDee Oil, at p. 1153.) Some
courts have extended this application where an employee of the attorney against whom
disqualification is sought possessed confidential attorney-client information materially
related to the proceedings before the court. (See In re Complex Asbestos Litigation
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 579 [disqualification affirmed after lead counsel law firm in
nine asbestos-related personal injury actions employed paralegal who had previously
been employed by opposing counsel and had worked on asbestos cases].)
          Joe’s argument to extend this principle to an attorney who is not in any
employment or fiduciary relationship with JMBM rests on the assumption that Ryan’s
conduct—both in communicating with Adams over a three-month period and in
submitting the Ryan declaration for JMBM’s use in this litigation—is tantamount to
Ryan having associated as cocounsel or of counsel to JMBM in this case. Joe likewise
argues that Adams used Ryan as de facto cocounsel by enlisting his assistance in
defending against Joe’s action and enabled Ryan’s violation of one or more ethical duties
to Joe.
          Joe offers no legal authority to support the proposition that Ryan’s
communications with Adams in the context of this dispute, including his submission of a
declaration for filing with the court, qualified him as an associate of JMBM for
disqualification purposes. Even if we were to assume arguendo that Ryan’s conduct
independently violated the rules of professional conduct and breached his fiduciary duties
to Joe, Joe has not provided any persuasive basis to conclude that Ryan’s interactions
with Adams and JMBM rendered him their associate for purpose of the disqualification
analysis. Indeed, Joe concedes that “there is no reported disqualification case [] where
the tainted source of the confidential information is the moving party’s own current
lawyer who, though not formally associated with the firm whose disqualification is
sought, effectively acted as such.”
                                                   26
       In considering this proposition, we consider the concerns that animate the
imputation of conflicts of interests between affiliated lawyers. (See Rest.3d Law
Governing Lawyers, § 123. com. b [describing “three concerns” reflected in imputation
of conflicts of interest to affiliated lawyers].) These concerns include that lawyers in a
law firm or other affiliation may share financial interests, may have access to each other’s
confidential client information, and may have superior access to what was disclosed,
given the challenge faced by a client seeking to demonstrate a misuse of confidential
information by their former counsel without revealing the very information the client
seeks to protect. (Ibid.) Joe does not suggest an improper financial incentive or shared
financial interest (nor does the record reflect a basis for such concern). There is also no
evidence to suggest Adams had access to Ryan’s confidential files. Instead, Joe focuses
on the informal affiliation between Ryan and Adams as the basis for presuming
disclosure of confidential information. While there appears to be no published California
case authority addressing the type of informal cooperation that appears to have occurred
here, in evaluating whether the cooperation between Adams and Ryan supports a basis to
impute Ryan’s conflict of interest, we take guidance from the California Supreme Court’s
decision to apply the vicarious disqualification rule in the context of a more formal, of
counsel attorney relationship. (SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1153–1154.)
       In SpeeDee Oil, our high court extended imputed disqualification to an attorney
affiliated with a firm as of counsel based on the close relationship between the firm’s
members. “The close, personal, continuous, and regular relationship between a law firm
and the attorneys affiliated with it as of counsel contains many of the same elements that
justify the rule of vicarious disqualification applied to partners, associates, and members.
An of counsel attorney, particularly one frequently in the firm’s offices or in contact with
the firm’s attorneys, may be consulted on a variety of matters without being formally
identified as cocounsel. This close, fluid, and continuing relationship, with its attendant
exchanges of information, advice, and opinions, properly makes the of counsel attorney
                                                 27
subject to the conflict imputation rule, regardless of whether that attorney has any
financial stake in a particular matter.” (SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1154.)
       SpeeDee Oil reinforces our determination that Ryan’s conduct is not equivalent to
an “of counsel” affiliation. Contrary to Joe’s speculation about the nature of the
exchanges documented in the JMBM privilege log, the record reflects no such “close,
fluid, and continuing relationship” between Ryan and Adams or JMBM with respect to
the representation of Ryoo and the entity defendants in this case. (Cf. SpeeDee Oil,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1154.) To the contrary, the trial court found there was no evidence
of any exchange or receipt of confidential material such as might suggest such a “close,
fluid” relationship. For similar reasons, we reject Joe’s unsupported assertion that Ryan
“had at least a quasi-fiduciary relationship with JMBM as shown in the [p]rivilege [l]og.”
       Of course, vicarious disqualification of a law firm may be appropriate even when
the source of confidential information is not an employee or formal affiliate of the
challenged law firm. (See O’Gara Coach Co., LLC v. Ra (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1115,
1126 [“Attorney disqualification to support the fundamental principle of protecting client
confidences is not limited to situations in which an adversary’s privileged
communications have been acquired through a prior attorney-client relationship.”].) Joe
points out that disqualification can occur when the source of client confidential
information is a corporate officer of one of the litigants, or an expert witness. Joe asserts
that the touchstone for applying the rule of vicarious disqualification is the potential
access to confidential information that the law firm has by virtue of its relationship with
the conflicted lawyer (or, in some instances, non-lawyer).
       While this assertion is partially correct, the access to confidential information may
not be purely theoretical; rather, “ ‘disqualification is proper where, as a result of a prior
representation or through improper means, there is a reasonable probability counsel has
obtained information the court believes would likely be used advantageously against an
adverse party during the course of the litigation.’ ” (McDermott, supra,10 Cal.App.5th at
                                                  28
p. 1120; cf. Adams, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1340 [concluding “disqualification
should not be ordered where there is no reasonable probability the firm-switching
attorney had access to confidential information while at his or her former firm that is
related to the current representation”]; Gregori, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 305
[rejecting presumption that confidential information passed between law firm partner
who engaged in an undisclosed dating relationship with legal secretary from law firm
representing the opposing party and reasoning that “the scant evidence in the record does
not create a reasonable probability that important information regarding the lawsuit was
divulged”].)
       “Since the purpose of a disqualification order must be prophylactic, not punitive,
the significant question is whether there exists a genuine likelihood that the status or
misconduct of the attorney in question will affect the outcome of the proceedings before
the court.” (Gregori, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 308–309.) The trial court found that
there was no substantial evidence either that Adams solicited confidential information or
attorney-client communications from Ryan or that Ryan provided such information. We
agree that substantial evidence in turn supports the trial court’s conclusions, and there is
no evidence in the record to compel a contrary conclusion. On this factual record, we
decide the facts presented do not provide a sufficient factual predicate for imputing
Ryan’s knowledge of Joe’s confidential information to Adams and JMBM.
       Joe’s further reliance on the State Fund doctrine for attorney receipt of privileged
and confidential information only reinforces our conclusion. In State Fund, supra, 70
Cal.App.4th 644, the Court of Appeal articulated an attorney’s ethical obligations upon
receiving another party’s privileged information. In Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 807 (Rico), the California Supreme Court approved the State Fund
standard and extended it to the receipt of attorney work product. (Id. at pp. 817–818.)
An attorney who inadvertently receives materials “that obviously appear” (State Fund, at
p. 656) to be subject to an attorney-client privilege or otherwise privileged may not
                                                 29
examine the document more closely than is needed to ascertain that it is privileged and
must “immediately notify” the document’s sender and try to resolve the situation. (Ibid.)
(Accord, Rico, at p. 810.) Under these authorities, “ ‘ “[m]ere exposure” ’ to an
adversary’s confidences is insufficient, standing alone, to warrant an attorney’s
disqualification.” (Rico, at p. 819.) However, “ ‘disqualification might be justified’ ” if
an attorney in receipt of such materials fails to follow the standard and “ ‘assuming other
factors compel disqualification.’ ” (Ibid.) Rico illustrates such circumstances. There, the
high court affirmed the disqualification of counsel who had acquired opposing counsel’s
notes related to the case and “ ‘also acted unethically in making full use of the
confidential document.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Joe argues that the misconduct in this case is more egregious than the inadvertent
receipt of materials discussed in State Fund and Rico, since Adams and JMBM actively
solicited the information from Ryan and filed his declaration. Joe asserts that these acts
“grossly violated their ethical duty as attorneys to maintain the integrity of the judicial
process.” However, the standards discussed in Rico and State Fund do not assist Joe here
because the privileged nature of the materials obtained by counsel in those cases was
readily apparent. (State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 652; Rico, supra, 42 Cal.4th at
p. 810.) By contrast, the trial court resolved this disputed issue against Joe, and
substantial evidence in the record supports that finding.
       In sum, we conclude that Ryan’s putative conflict-of-interest does not extend to
Adams and JMBM under any theory of imputed, vicarious disqualification cited by Joe.
Furthermore, absent evidence that Adams obtained materials “that obviously appear”
privileged (State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 656) or which suggest a “reasonable
probability” that Adams and JMBM obtained confidential information they would likely
use advantageously against Joe during the litigation (McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1120), there was no clear legal basis to impute Ryan’s conflict of interest to Adams.

                                                 30
The trial court therefore did not err in declining to apply the doctrine of vicarious
disqualification to Adams and JMBM.
       Joe also asserts that the trial court erred by failing to address the relevant public
policy factors that courts must balance when weighing disqualification. Joe contends
these factors weigh heavily in favor of disqualification since both Adams and Ryan failed
to maintain their ethical standards of practice and professional conduct. Joe asserts their
conduct was antithetical to the “paramount concern” of courts “to preserve public trust in
the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.” (SpeeDee Oil,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) Because “[t]he important right to counsel of one’s choice
must yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial
process” (ibid.), Joe maintains there is no policy basis upon which to uphold the trial
court’s decision.
       We agree that these policy principles are relevant to the court’s decision whether
to disqualify a party’s chosen counsel after having determined that there is a legal and
factual basis for disqualification. However, the policy factors are less impactful when the
court finds no basis to weigh disqualification in the first instance. The evidence in the
record neither mandates disqualification of Adams or JMBM as a matter of law nor
establishes that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for
disqualification.
       Our conclusion that the trial court did not err in denying Joe’s motion should not
be read to condone Ryan’s conduct in submitting the declaration for filing or to prejudge
a renewed motion for disqualification if Adams or JMBM renew their representation of
respondents and new facts emerge.
                                    III. DISPOSITION
       The order denying Joe’s motion to disqualify Adams and JMBM is affirmed.
Respondents are entitled to their reasonable costs incurred on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
                                                 31
                           ______________________________________
                                      Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Grover, Acting P.J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H050465
Lee v. Ryoo