Court Opinion

ID: 9898653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 21:05:18.390913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:38.148735
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/14/23 In re N.W. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

In re N.W., a Person Coming                                     B327954
Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
                                                                18LJJP00781A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

E.W.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Stephanie Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
     Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                      _________________________

       E.W. (mother) appeals the denial of her second petition
filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 and the
termination of parental rights over her daughter, N.W. (minor)
(born July 2017). Mother contends that the juvenile court abused
its discretion by denying her petition without an evidentiary
hearing. Because mother did not meet her burden of showing
changed circumstances or that minor’s best interests would be
served by granting the petition, we affirm.2

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2     Apart from the fact that the termination of parental rights
at the section 366.26 hearing followed the allegedly erroneous
denial of mother’s section 388 petition, mother raises no
arguments on appeal as to the order terminating her parental
rights. Mother has therefore forfeited any independent challenge
to that order. (See Antounian v. Louis Vuitton Malletier (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 438, 455 [“[A]n argument not raised in the
opening brief is forfeited on appeal”].)

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       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Referral and Investigation
      In November 2018, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
that a maternal aunt had recently entered mother and minor’s
apartment and witnessed mother’s boyfriend sexually abusing
minor, who was then 16 months old.3
      Minor was taken to the hospital for a forensic examination.
While there, the social worker noticed that minor had dirty feet,
as well as red marks and blisters under her diaper. Minor
smelled as though she had not been bathed recently.
      On November 16, 2018, minor was removed from mother’s
custody and placed with an extended family member. The
juvenile court ordered monitored visitation for mother.
II.   Jurisdiction Petition and Adjudication
      Four days later, DCFS filed a dependency petition under
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (d) (sexual
abuse). Counts b-1 and d-1 alleged that minor was “sexually
abused by . . . mother’s [boyfriend] . . . who was a member of the
household,” and that mother “knew or reasonably should have
known” about the abuse but “failed to protect” minor, including
by “allow[ing] [her boyfriend] unlimited access to [minor].”
      In March 2019, the juvenile court held an adjudication
hearing. Mother pled no contest to an amended petition, and the
juvenile court sustained the allegations in count b-1.4 The

3     Mother’s boyfriend was not minor’s father. The
whereabouts of minor’s alleged father is unknown, and he is not
part of this appeal.

4     The original petition listed identical allegations under both
count b-1, about mother’s failure to protect, and count d-1, about
the boyfriend’s sexual abuse. The amended petition removed any

                                  3
juvenile court ordered reunification services for mother to include
parenting classes and individual counseling focused on protective
parenting and sexual abuse awareness.
III. Initial Reunification Efforts
      Over the next six months, mother frequently visited minor
and diligently participated in services. By September 2019 she
had progressed to unmonitored overnight visits. On October 9,
2019, the juvenile court returned minor to mother’s custody with
family maintenance services, on the condition that mother
cooperate with unannounced home visits from social workers.
      On December 13, 2019, social workers made an
unannounced visit to mother and minor’s apartment. Minor’s
diaper was sodden and sagging to her knees.
      On January 17, 2020, another unannounced visit took
place. The visiting social worker found mother and minor in the
apartment, along with five women and three men. The home
stank of marijuana and cigarette smoke. When the social worker
stepped out to call her supervisor, mother shut the blinds, locked
the door, and turned up the volume on television. The social
worker knocked on the door, but mother refused to let her back
into the home. When the social worker returned later that same
day, she could strongly smell marijuana from outside the
apartment; the television was still blaring, but no one answered
the door.
      Four days later, the social worker interviewed two of
mother’s neighbors, who reported that they heard minor crying
throughout the day and all night almost every night. One
neighbor expressed concern about any children in the home
because of the strong smell of marijuana emanating from the

reference to mother from count d-1; the text of count b-1 was
unchanged.

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apartment door and the crowds of people coming and going at all
hours.
       The social worker returned to the apartment on
January 27, 2020. As she approached, she could hear mother
yelling over the television. When the social worker knocked and
identified herself, she heard people moving around and telling
each other to “hurry up.” Through the window, the social worker
saw four people shoving things into a backpack; mother took the
screen off the bathroom window, another woman threw the
stuffed backpack outside, and mother’s guests went into an
interior room. Only then did mother allow the social worker into
the apartment.
       Walking into the apartment, the social worker saw mother
and minor—again wearing a soggy, sagging diaper—with another
woman and toddler, as well as a man that mother introduced as
her father. Mother denied that anyone else was in the home.
The apartment still reeked of marijuana and cigarette smoke,
and the social worker noted that the bathrooms were filthy; one
was filled with used toilet paper, men and women’s underwear,
and other clutter. The bedroom floor was littered with used foil
ash trays.
       Throughout this period, mother had missed several on-
demand drug tests. She had also stopped attending counseling.
       Concerned with deteriorating conditions in the home,
DCFS obtained another removal warrant. When they picked
minor up from the apartment, her diaper was soaked through
with urine.
IV. Supplemental Jurisdiction Petition and
       Adjudication
       In February 2020, DCFS filed a supplemental jurisdiction
petition under section 342, alleging that mother created an
unsafe home environment for minor by exposing her to marijuana

                               5
use and unsanitary living conditions.5 At the detention hearing,
the trial court ordered minor detained from mother with
monitored visitation.
       In June 2020, the juvenile court held an adjudication
hearing on the section 342 petition. Again, mother pled no
contest to an amended version of the petition, which the trial
court sustained.6 The trial court ordered further reunification
services for mother, including a return to individual counseling to
address protective parenting issues. It also ordered mother to
participate in random drug tests; if mother produced eight drug
tests showing low or decreasing marijuana use, the trial court
would allow unmonitored visitation.

5      Count b-1 of the supplemental petition alleged that mother
“established an endangering and detrimental home environment”
by “expos[ing] [minor] to marijuana use while the child was
present in the child’s home.” Count b-2 alleged that the family
home “was found to be in an unsanitary condition with safety
hazards,” including “cigarette butts on the living room floor[,]” as
well as a “master bathroom [that] was . . . unorganized and
unsanitary[,]” with “an overfilled bag . . . found with used toilet
paper[,]” a “toilet [with] urine and feces inside[,]” “clothes piled
behind the door[,]” and “used toilet paper and cigarette butts on
the floor.” Additionally, “[o]n two separate occasions . . . the child
was found to be wearing a urine soaked diaper.”

6     The amended petition struck count b-1. Count b-2 was
amended to include a reference that minor was “exposed to
marijuana,” and to remove many extraneous details about the
unsanitary conditions of the home. References to cigarette butts
on the floor, piles of used toilet paper, and minor’s “urine soaked
diaper” were retained.

                                  6
V.     Continued Reunification Efforts
       From minor’s removal in February 2020 until the June
adjudication hearing, mother’s visits were sporadic. When the
coronavirus pandemic briefly curtailed in-person visits, mother
did call minor, but the calls were infrequent and terse. Mother
often changed her phone number without telling minor’s
caregiver.
       In July 2020, mother resumed individual counseling
services and began visiting minor more frequently. But mother
missed many drug tests. In January 2021, mother briefly
enrolled in a drug program, but the program terminated her
services after two months due to nonattendance. In May 2021,
she again enrolled in the program and was again discharged after
two months of infrequent attendance.
       In July 2021, social workers visited mother’s apartment
and found it just as unhygienic as it had been 18 months earlier.
Mother did not cooperate with attempts to schedule additional
home visits and became combative with social workers and
minor’s caregiver.
       In November 2021, mother again stopped attending
individual counseling. In December 2021, mother did not visit
minor at all; her phone calls were short and infrequent.
       In January 2022, the juvenile court terminated
reunification services. The tentative permanency plan was to
place minor with her maternal grandmother, who had a close
bond with minor and had expressed interest in adopting her.
VI. Postreunification Efforts
       Mother started regularly visiting minor in June 2022 at a
local park, and the visits went well. But problems resurfaced in
September 2022, when DCFS became aware of video footage of
mother in a physical altercation. When asked about this
incident, minor’s caregiver reported that mother and her friend

                               7
had a history of picking fights with people; on one occasion,
mother asked the caregiver to pick minor up early from a visit so
that mother could fight another woman at the park.
       By late September 2022, mother started visiting less
frequently. Mother reported that she was unemployed and
looking for a new apartment. Mother’s current apartment
manager confirmed that mother continued to have serious
problems maintaining a clean home. He reported that, in
September 2022, he had received complaints from neighbors
about a rotting smell emanating from mother’s apartment; upon
investigation, he found out that mother’s dog had died in the
apartment after being left alone for a week, and mother refused
to dispose of it properly.
       In October 2022, minor was placed in maternal
grandmother’s home, where she appeared to thrive. Mother
continued to miss visits. At those visits she did attend, mother
often video-called a friend and failed to fully engage with minor.
VII. Section 388 Petitions and Termination of Parental
       Rights
       On January 11, 2023, mother filed a section 388 petition, in
propria persona, asking the juvenile court to place minor with her
or to reinstate reunification services. Mother attested that she
had visited minor each week in November and December 2022,
and that she had completed a drug program in September 2022.
The juvenile court summarily denied the petition.
       Two weeks later, mother filed a second section 388 petition,
this time through appointed counsel, reiterating her requests for
placement of the child or, in the alternative, for reinstated
reunification services. Mother repeated that she had completed a
six-month drug program, but added that she was now
participating in individual counseling. She argued that
reunification would be in minor’s best interest because of their

                                8
“established bond and relationship” and because “mother
. . . loves her daughter very much and wants to continue to
provide her with . . . the familial support that every child
deserves.” Mother added that she “had been continuously
working on her compliance with Court orders[.]”
         The juvenile court again summarily denied mother’s
petition. The court stated that “mother has demonstrated
perhaps changing circumstances, but not changed
circumstances,” and that mother had not demonstrated that the
proposed change in placement order and reunification services
would be in minor’s best interest, particularly given mother’s
history of inconsistent, poor-quality visitation.
         The juvenile court then terminated mother’s parental
rights over minor.
VIII. Appeal
         Mother timely appealed.
                             DISCUSSION
I.       Applicable Law and Standard of Review
         Under section 388, subdivision (a)(1), a parent or other
interested party may petition the juvenile court to change,
modify, or set aside a previous order in dependency proceedings.
To be entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the petition, the
parent must make a prima facie showing of (1) a change in
circumstances or new evidence and (2) that the child’s best
interests will be promoted by granting the petition. (In re
Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478.) “The petition must be
liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency.” (In re Jasmon O.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415 (Jasmon O.).)
         The summary denial of a section 388 petition without a
hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Angel B. (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 454, 460 (Angel B.); see also In re Jamika W.
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1451.) Thus, we must affirm “unless

                                 9
the [juvenile] court exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
determination.” (In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358
(A.S.).)
II.    Mother Did Not Make a Prima Facie Showing of
       Changed Circumstances
       Mother argues that because she had completed a six-month
drug treatment program and embarked on another round of
individual counseling, she was entitled to a hearing on her
section 388 petition. We conclude that the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion by finding that mother’s petition stated no
new evidence or change of circumstances, and by denying the
petition without a hearing.
       “To support a section 388 petition, the change in
circumstances must be substantial.” (In re Ernesto R. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 (Ernesto R.).) A mere showing of
changing circumstances is insufficient. (A.S., supra,
180 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) Thus, a parent’s relatively recent
efforts to achieve or maintain sobriety, following a long history of
failed attempts, is generally not sufficient to establish changed
circumstances. (See In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635,
642 [father’s efforts including completing a substance abuse
program and attending parenting classes “were not prima facie
evidence of a change in circumstances” in light of his previous
extensive treatment and history of relapses].)
       Mother’s petition did not make the necessary prima facie
showing of changed circumstances to trigger a full evidentiary
hearing. That mother had, after three years of unsuccessful
attempts, finally completed a six-month drug treatment program,
and had gone back into individual counseling after years of
inconsistent or nonattendance, were evidence of changing—as
opposed to changed—circumstances in mother’s life. Given

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mother’s extensive history of positive or missed drug tests and
her inconsistent contact with minor for over a year (including
during the entirety of the family reunification period), her
petition only demonstrated that mother was making progress
that may have eventually led to changed circumstances. But
“[c]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.”
(In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 (Marilyn H.).)
       Additionally, mother’s petition did not address the
circumstances at the heart of the most recent petition leading to
minor’s removal and dependency—namely, mother’s apparent
inability to maintain a safe and hygienic home environment for
minor. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531 [“It is
only common sense that in considering whether a juvenile court
abuses its discretion in denying a section 388 motion, the gravity
of the problem leading to the dependency, and the reason that
problem was not overcome by the final review, must be taken into
account”].)
       Mother’s renewed participation in drug services and
individual counseling is certainly laudable, if untimely, but it
does not shed any light on whether she had changed her attitudes
and behaviors regarding cleanliness and hygiene. And the record
indicates that, as recently as four months before the petition was
filed, mother’s home had further deteriorated due to her
unwillingness or inability to properly dispose of the body of a dog
that died alone in the home, apparently due to mother’s neglect.
This further supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother had
not made enough progress on the issues causing minor’s
dependency to warrant a finding of changed circumstances.
       Finally, the recency of mother’s efforts distinguishes the
facts alleged in the petition from those in cases where a parent’s
period of sobriety and completion of classes were held sufficient
to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances.

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        For example, in In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424
(Aljamie D.), the mother “had completed numerous educational
programs and parenting classes, . . . had tested clean in weekly
random drug tests for over two years . . . [and] had visited
consistently with the children and continued to have a strongly
bonded relationship with them.” (Id. at p. 432.) And in In re
Hashem H. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1791 (Hashem H.), the
mother’s section 388 petition alleged that “her continuous
participation in individual therapy for more than 18 months
which was so successful that her therapist recommended [her
son] be returned to her custody,” her “regular and consistent
visitation with her son for more than a year, her participation in
conjoint counseling with him, her stable employment and
religious affiliation, and her current ability to provide a home for
[her son] on a full-time basis.” (Hashem H., supra, at p. 1799.)
The allegations in each of these cases—sustained for significantly
longer periods than that alleged here by mother—constituted
prima facie showings of changed circumstances. (Aljamie D.,
supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 432; Hashem H., at p. 1799.)
        Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that
the juvenile court’s conclusion that mother’s petition failed to
state new evidence or a change of circumstances was “an
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination.” (A.S.,
supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) Accordingly, the court did not
abuse its discretion.
III. Mother Did Not Make a Prima Facie Showing That
        Granting the Petition Was in the Child’s Best
        Interests
        Additionally, a successful section 388 petition “must
. . . describe specifically how the petition will advance the child’s
best interests.” (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157.)
“[A] primary consideration in determining the child’s best

                                 12
interest is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.”
(Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) And once family
reunification services are terminated, the child’s need for
permanency and stability take precedence over the parent’s
interest in reunification. (See Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at
pp. 309–310.)
        Here, mother’s petition was filed one year after the
termination of family reunification services. The petition did not
describe how the various relief sought by mother—including
returning minor to mother’s custody or reinstating reunification
services—would benefit minor and outweigh her “constitutional
and statutory interest in stability” (Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th
at p. 421) and permanency. In light of mother’s history of
inconsistent visitation, and her failure to fully engage with minor
at those visits she did attend, the juvenile court was entirely
justified in finding that she had failed to show that the
modification proposed in the section 388 petition was in minor’s
best interest. And mother’s stated desire to “provide [minor] with
. . . the familial support that every child deserves” was
insufficient to make a prima facie showing.
        Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile
court’s summary denial of mother’s petition.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The order denying mother’s section 388 petition is affirmed.
As mother has provided no independent basis to reverse the order
terminating parental rights, that order is also affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                               _____________________, Acting P. J.
                               ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

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