Court Opinion

ID: 9445925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:41:14.760076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:27.225195
License: Public Domain

■ Wilbur K. Miller, Circuit Judge, with whom Danaher and Bastían, Circuit Judges,
concur, dissenting: In considering this case, we should not lose sight of what happened on the morning of June 20, 1951. About 7:00 a. m. Clarence L. Wright met his estranged wife on a street corner near Georgetown University in the District of Columbia and, in the presence of eyewitnesses, calmly and deliberately shot her several times, inflicting wounds from which she died a few days later. Apprehended almost immediately, he at once admitted his guilt to the arresting officer, and later in the morning signed a written confession. Before noon he was presented to a committing magistrate.
Wright has been twice tried for this murder and twice convicted. At both trials the only defense was that he was insane when he killed his wife. Both juries rejected this defense and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence before them that he was sane at the time of the murder. The first verdict was set aside by the trial judge, not because of any infirmity in the evidence from which the jurors were convinced Wright was sane when the crime was committed, but because examinations made shortly subsequent to the first trial —and two years after the killing — indicated he was mentally incompetent when the first trial occurred in February, 1953.
The Superintendent of St. Elizabeths notified the Director of the Bureau of Prisons September 21, 1955, that Wright was at that time mentally competent to-stand trial and able to consult with counsel and properly assist in his own defense. November 15, 1955, Chief Judge Laws of the District Court entered an order which, after reciting St. Elizabeths’ certification of sanity and Wright’s statement in open court that he did not object to the Hospital report, “found that the defendant had been restored to mental competency and is presently able to understand the proceedings against him and to properly assist in his own defense,” and ordered that he stand trial.
Pursuant to this order, a second trial began December 14, 1955, before Judge McLaughlin and a jury. At its inception, appellant’s counsel said to the presiding judge, “It will be our defense, Your Honor, that the man was of unsound mind at the time the offense was committed but is of sound mind as of now.’” As a consequence of this defense tactic,, most of the evidence at the trial dealt with the question whether Wright was; insane when he killed his wife; for the fact that he had killed her was quickly proved without contradiction. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the second degree, thus finding he was sane when he committed the crime.
A majority of the court reverse the conviction and remand the case to the District Court with instructions “to enter a judgment of [not guilty] by reason of insanity notwithstanding the verdict,” unless the Government should request a new trial. This is a drastic exercise of appellate authority. The majority attempt to justify it by saying in their opinion, “Reasonable jurymen could not, conclude beyond a reasonable doubt’” from the evidence introduced “that Wright was sane at the time of the shooting.”
Yet the testimony of the only witnesses, who had observed Wright on the day of *15the murder was that he was then of sound mind. These witnesses were laymen, to be sure, but their testimony was indisputably admissible; and the verdict shows it was convincing as well. Apparently the majority view is that the testimony of five psychiatrists who thought Wright was insane when he killed his wife so overwhelmed the contrary testimony of the lay witnesses that the jurors were unreasonable in not accepting their opinion. The majority say there was no conflict in the medical testimony; even if that were correct, its clash with the lay testimony would nevertheless form an issue of fact for the jury.
In fact, however, there were sharp conflicts in the medical testimony, which impaired its probative value. Eleven psychiatrists, who had examined Wright at various times from about three months to as long as four and one-half years after the crime, testified before the jury. Only five of them thought he was insane when he killed his wife, and only one of the five thought the criminal act was the “product” of the postulated insanity. The other six psychiatrists, who had had equal opportunity for observation, said they could not diagnose Wright’s mental condition as of the morning of the murder.
The majority say their inability to do so “does not detract from the testimony of the doctors who were able to state an opinion that he was ill” at the time of the killing. I cannot follow this reasoning. To my mind, the fact that six of the eleven psychiatrists could not diagnose Wright’s mentality as of June 20, 1951, on the basis of examinations made long thereafter, while from similar data the other five professed to be able to do so, demonstrates a serious conflict in the medical testimony. It doubtless caused the jury to wonder how, and to question whether, the five could actually do what the other six equally qualified experts said they could not do.
There were more conflicts in the med-dical testimony. Drs. Perretti and Gilbert, who made their examinations about the same time — some three months after the crime, — did not agree. Both thought him then insane; but Perretti could say he thought Wright was mentally diseased on the murder date and Gilbert could not make that statement. Drs. Cavanaugh and Todd, who examined in 1953, and Drs. Cushard, Epstein and Tartaglino, who examined in 1954, found Wright mentally deficient when examined, but could not say the condition had existed on the morning of the murder. Despite these opinions which seem to comport with reason, Drs. Miller and Odenwald, who examined Wright for the first time in December, 1955, and found him then sane, were willing to say they thought he was insane in June, 1951.1
It seems to me that, instead of being without conflict, the medical testimony in its totality was confused and contradictory, calculated to cause the jury to give little credence to the testimony of the five doctors who claimed rather remarkable power of “antegnosis”- — if I may coin a word to describe their action in forming an opinion as to a condition in the past. About all the medical testimony in its entirety proved to a certainty is that psychiatry is not an exact science.
Added to the weakness of the testimony tending to show mental illness on the day of the murder is the striking fact that of the five “antegnosticians” only one ventured to say the murder was the “product” of the supposed insanity- — an element without which the testimony of mental infirmity had little relevance.
There is still another consideration which looms large here. In resolving the issue of fact submitted to them, the jurors had the right and the duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses, both lay and medical, and to reject testimony which they considered unworthy of *16belief. They observed the demeanor and conduct of the five “antegnosticians” on the witness stand and were in a much better position than this court is to decide whether their statements should be accepted at face value. The verdict shows their decision. They did not choose to believe the doubtful and discredited testimony of Drs. Miller and Odenwald and the other three who shared with them the opinion that the appellant was mentally diseased on the day of the murder. It should also be noted that the unanimous expert opinion that Wright was of sound mind in December, 1955, indicates that the disturbed mentality some discerned in 1953 and 1954 was not a permanent condition.
As weak as the evidence of insanity was, there was unquestionably a conflict of testimony on the single crucial question whether Wright was mentally responsible on the morning of the crime. The evidence therefore presented a typical jury question which conceivably could have been decided either way. The decision was for the jury, however, and not for us;2 we have no right whatever to substitute our judgment for that of the jury when there is evidence to support its verdict, no matter what evidence there may have been to the contrary and no matter how much we may wish to decide the question the other way. Cf. Bradley v. United States, 1957, 101 U.S.App.D.C. -, 249 F.2d 922. The reversal of Wright’s conviction is, I think, arbitrary and unjustifiable.
For the reasons stated I cannot concur in the majority’s disposition of the case, which seems to me to be a usurpation of the jury’s function, and another example of what I regard as an alarming judicial tendency to magnify the rights of criminals at the expense of the public interest in the strict enforcement of the criminal laws, particularly in cases where the defense of insanity is interposed. This reversal allows a murderer to go unpunished and, in all probability, will result in his almost immediate release from any custodial restraint.
Having reversed solely on the ground that reasonable jurors could not have believed from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright was sane when he committed the crime, the majority proceed to express in four numbered passages their views on other matters, from all of which I dissent.
I draw attention first to passage No. 1 therein, which has to do with the judge’s charge to the jury, which was in exact accord with the Durham ease. Nevertheless the majority make the following comment concerning it, which I quote from their opinion:
“ * * * There is danger that the jury might infer from the contrasting treatment of the two possible verdicts that, in order to acquit by reason of insanity, it would be necessary for them to reach the affirmative conclusions that Wright was insane at the time of the crime and that the act was the product of the illness.”
*17This means that the majority think there is danger that the jury might infer from the charge that Wright had the burden of proving he was insane at the time of the crime when in fact the Government had the burden of proving sanity after some evidence of insanity had been brought forward. The danger is fanciful; the majority’s apprehension probably springs from their failure carefully to examine the complete charge. Judge McLaughlin made it quite clear that in the circumstances the burden was on the Government to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, he said to the jury:
“You are instructed that if you, the jury, believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Clarence L. Wright committed the criminal act with which he is charged, and was not suffering from a mental disease or from a mental defect at the time he committed the said criminal act, you may find him guilty.”
and again he said, using almost verbatim the language of the Durham case:
“You are further instructed that unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt either that the defendant was not suffering from a disease or mental condition, or that the act was not the product of any mental disease or mental defect, you must find the accused not guilty because of insanity.”
to which he later added this:
“Now, to summarize: If you find that the Government has established beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the crime as I have delineated them to you, and if you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or a defective mental condition at the time the criminal act was committed, then you may find the defendant guilty.”
Finally Judge McLaughlin said this to the jury:
“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, every person is presumed to be sane until the contrary appears. This presumption is founded on human experience. This presumption does not mean, however, that the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove insanity. If the defendant offers any evidence that the defendant was legally insane at the time of the deed, the presumption of sanity vanishes from the case. The burden is then on the prosecution, the Government, to establish the sanity of the defendant.
“In other words, on the issue of insanity, or of mental incapacity, as it is otherwise called, just as on every other issue in the case, the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and that burden must be sustained beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In view of the carefully worded and repeated admonitions to the jury, it seems to me there is no basis whatever for the majority’s apprehension that the jury might infer from the instructions that the burden of proof was on the defendant.
It should be pointed out in this connection that an unsupported defense of insanity does not cast upon the Government the burden of showing sanity. Insanity is never presumed and may not be assumed by the jury without proof when it is merely suggested. There is, however, a legal presumption of sanity which obviates the necessity of proving it, unless and until the defendant produces proof tending affirmatively to show insanity. When that is done, the presumption of sanity is rebutted and dispelled and the Government must then, in order to convict, bring convincing countervailing proof. Thus there can be no issue for the jury concerning insanity unless there is some testimony showing its existence. It follows that a verdict of acquittal for insanity cannot be returned in the absence of evidence tending to prove insanity. Such a verdict cannot result from simple default — from the Government’s failure to prove sanity to the jury’s satisfaction — -because the issue is *18never submitted in the absence of evidence tending to show insanity.
On the basis of the foregoing, which I think must be conceded, I suggest that the jury should not be told it may acquit if it negatively concludes — without evidence — that the defendant was insane simply because it thinks sanity was not sufficiently shown.
The Durham rule, whatever its imperfections,3 at least requires the jury to find the existence of a mental malady which caused the crime before acquitting for insanity.4 It is much to be preferred to a looser rule.
The action of the court in this case disturbs me for another reason to which I have already made reference: it is an exercise of appellate review of a jury’s factual finding reached on conflicting evidence but supported by substantial proof. Traditionally such a finding cannot be disturbed on appeal. I suggest that stable rules of law and consistent application of them are essential for the guidance of bench and bar in trial practice and procedure. Instability and inconsistency result when an appellate court retries each case on a new and different standard and substitutes its own determination for that of the jury concerning a defendant’s mental status and its causative effect.
I turn next to passage No. 2 in the majority opinion, from which I quote the following:
“ * * * After several hours of deliberation one juror asked for further instruction as to whether ‘in determining sanity * * * any other consideration * * * might be included * * * than dementia or schizophrenia.’ The judge replied:
“ ‘The Court has read the instructions to you. The Court is not going to amplify the instructions. They are lengthy. They are inclusive. The Court feels they are adequate to enable you to return a verdict in this case. So that the answer to the question that you have asked is answered in the way the Court has just answered it.
“ ‘It will be necessary for the jury to reach its determination on the evidence and on the instructions which the Court has given you.’
“A defense request embodying the juror’s request for explanation was also denied.
“The refusal to answer the juror’s question and the denial of the requested instruction constitute reversible error. * * * ”
I disagree. I think Judge McLaughlin followed the correct course in refusing to answer the question and in denying *19the requested instruction. He had adequately covered the matter in his charge, in the course of which he referred several times to “a mental disease or mental defect” and again to “any mental disease or mental defect.”
Thus it clearly appears that the learned trial judge had not limited the jury to dementia or schizophrenia in determining insanity. The inquiring juror could have found in the applicable portion of the charge the answer to his own question: the all-embracive terms “any mental disease or mental defect” are not confined to dementia or schizophrenia. Moreover, further discussion of the subject by the presiding judge might have confused the other jurors who apparently understood the simple language used, and might somehow have run afoul of the Durham rule. It seems to me that the refusal to answer what in reality was a silly question cannot logically be called reversible error.
The majority further say the trial judge erred in refusing a defense request to explain “causal connection” as used in the charge. In view of the ample and instructive charge he had already given, I think Judge McLaughlin was wise in declining to define those two simple English words which are self-explanatory and easily understood without elaboration. An attempt to explain them in the manner indicated by the majority — which I am confident average jurors would find puzzling indeed — would have served only to confuse the jury.
For these reasons I think the majority opinion further complicates a complex and difficult problem, and particularly that the sections numbered 3 and 4 will add to the confusion already engendered by the Durham rule, as given ad hoc interpretations in subsequent opinions of this court. It is made more vague by what the majority say here. I am sure the District Court judges, who have heretofore found it difficult to understand and apply the rule, will now find it even more difficult.
I would affirm.

. Although Dr. Odenwald thought Wright was schizophrenic in June, 1951, he said there was not necessarily a causal con-neetion between the condition and the crime,

. The Durham opinion recognizes this. It suggests the jury be told, “These questions must be determined by you from the facts which you find to be fairly deducible from the testimony and the evidence in this case.” 94 U.S.App.D.C. at page 241, 214 F.2d at page 875. The opinion continues thus: “The questions of fact under the test we now lay down are as capable of determination by the jury as, for example, the questions juries must determine upon a claim of total disability under a policy of insurance where the state of medical knowledge concerning the disease involved, and its effects, is obscure or in conflict,” and later adds, “Finally, in leaving the determination of the ultimate question of fact to the jury, we permit it to perform its traditional function which, as we said in Holloway, is to apply ‘our inherited ideas of moral responsibility to individuals prosecuted for crime * * *.’ [Holloway v. U. S., 80 U.S.App.D.C. at page 5, 148 F.2d at page 667], Juries will continue to make moral judgments, still operating under the fundamental precept that ‘Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame.’ [80 U.S.App.D.C. at pages 4-5, 148 F.2d at pages 600-067.]”

. The Durham ease has been pressed upon and rejected by the United States Oourt of Military Appeals, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and the highest courts of Maryland, Montana, California, Indiana, Vermont and Washington. United States v. Kunak, 5 USCMA 346 (1954); Howard v. United States, 5 Cir., 1956, 232 F.2d 274; Andersen v. United States, 9 Cir., 1956, 237 F.2d 118; Thomas v. State, 1955, 206 Md. 575, 112 A.2d 913; State v. Kitchens, 1955, 129 Mont. 331, 286 P.2d 1079; People v. Ryan, 1956, 140 Cal.App.2d 412, 295 P.2d 496; Flowers v. State, Ind.1956, 139 N.E.2d 185; State v. Goyet, Vt.1957, 132 A.2d 623; State v. Collins, Wash.1957, 314 P.2d 660. Cf. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727, decided by the Supreme Court of New Mexico May 12, 1954, a few weeks before the Durham decision. As far as I know the Durham rule prevails nowhere else except in New Hampshire, its birthplace.

. I quote the following from the Durham opinion, 94 U.S.App.D.C. at page 241, 214 F.2d at page 875:
“ * * * But under the rule now announced, any instruction should in some way convey to the jury the sense and substance of the following: If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition at the time he committed the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe he was suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition when he committed the act, but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not the product of such mental abnormality, you may find him guilty. * * * ”