Court Opinion

ID: 9825974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:07:22.988159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:43.172577
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. ChiEE Justice Blease.
The plaintiff brought this action, one for damages in the sum of $2,950, against the defendant, a public service corporation, engaged in furnishing electric current; because of the removal from plaintiff’s place of a meter and cutting out the electric current service. The cause of action, according to the allegations of the complaint, was based on the theory that there was a bona fide dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the amount due by the former to the latter on the account, and that the acts of the defendant in discontinuing the service, in such circumstances, were wrongful and unlawful.
The defendant denied generally the allegations of the complaint. In addition, it alleged that the monthly bill for *165the service previously furnished to the plaintiff, to be paid not later than August 7, 1931, amounting to $8.90, was proper and correct, and, although so admitted to be by the plaintiff, he had not made, or tendered, payment therefor within the agreed time. The defendant admitted that the succeeding monthly bill, in the sum of $9V74, was erroneous, due to a mistake in the reading of the meter, which bill it corrected, and offered to correct, as soon as the matter was properly called to its attention. The defendant further said that the service had been discontinued because of plaintiff’s failure and refusal to pay the admitted correct bill of $8.90, and not because of failure to pay the later bill for $9.74.
The trial, in the Court of Common Pleas for Sumter County, before his Honor, Circuit Judge Townsend, resulted in the granting of the defendant’s motion for a non-suit, and from the order thereon, the plaintiff has appealed.
The legal principles mainly applicable to the case here are found in the following decisions of this Court: Poole v. Paris Mountain Water Co., 81 S. C., 438, 62 S. E., 874; 128 Am. St. Rep., 923. Johnson v. Carolina Gas & Electric Co., 106 S. C., 447, 91 S. E., 734. Benson v. Paris Mountain Water Co., 88 S. C., 351, 70 S. E., 897, and Barret v. Broad River Power Company, 146 S. C., 85, 143 S. E., 650.
It has been held in all of those decisions that a consumer of water or electricity, furnished by a public service company, has the right to the continuance of the service, pending the adjustment of a bona fide dispute as to the amount due on his bill for service. On the other hand, those cases hold that the public service company has the right to discontinue its service to the customer upon the nonpayment by the customer of recent and just bills for the service furnished him, and has, also, the right to.refuse a further supply of electricity or water until those bills are paid. Barrett v. Broad River Power Co., supra.
Applying the declared principles to the present case, the correctness of the order of nonsuit depends upon the evi*166dence adduced at the trial favorable to the plaintiff’s contention that the service was wrongfully discontinued at a time when there was a bona fide dispute of the bill claimed to be due by him to the defendant. A fair statement of the evidence, we think, is as follows:
The plaintiff had electric current furnished to the house in which he lived. He opened a shop for the repair of automobiles near his house about March 16,' 1930. The electric current to the shop came through the same meter used for the house. His bill for electric service usually amounted from $1.60 to $1.80 per month. After operating the shop awhile, he put in a battery charger, not for the purpose of fully charging batteries, but to aid him somewhat in his work on automobiles. The electric current bill for the month ending July 25th, due under the contract to be paid not later than August 7th, amounted to $8.90. On complaint that the bill was excessive, a representative of the defendant company made an examination, and advised the plaintiff that the “charging outfit” had caused the great increase. The plaintiff seemed to be satisfied at the explanation. Asked, “Did you pay the bill then?” he replied that he did not, and “the reason I didn’t pay it was that I just waited to see what the next bill was going to be, purposely.” On August 7th, defendant notified plaintiff that, unless the July account of $8.90 was paid or arranged by August 12th “service will be discontinued without further notice.” Pursuant to that notice the service was discontinued on August 27, 1931, payment not having been made.
The bill for the month ending August 25, 1931, amounting to $9.74, which defendant admitted to be a little excessive, was not past due on August 27th, when the service was discontinued, since the plaintiff had until September 5th to make payment. It is clear, therefore, that the notice that the service would be discontinued, given on August 7th, related to the bill for the month ending July 25th, and could have had no reference to the amount which would be due on August 25th.
*167If, therefore, the bill for the month ending July 25th, amounting to $8.90, was correct, due, and unpaid, and there was no bona fide dispute thereabout, under the cited decir sions, the defendant company had the right to discontinue the service.
In addition to plaintiff’s statement that he “purposely” waited beyond the time for payment, ten days after the due date of the bill, July 25, 1931, to make payment thereof, we find the following in his testimony:
“Q. That was the one you sent up about and he came to see about? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And it was just shortly after that they came? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You knew that bill was more than ten days due, and should have been paid, didn’t you? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. But you had not paid it? A. No, sir.
“Q. And you didn’t pay it? A. No, sir.”
In reply to this question by the presiding Judge, “Have you ever paid the amount you say you are due them,” the plaintiff replied, “No, sir.”
Much has been said in the argument of appellant’s counsel on the question of tender. It is maintained that there was a tender of the proper amount due by the plaintiff to the defendant, and, if there was no such proper tender, that tender was unnecessary, since it was clearly shown that the defendant would not have accepted the tender of the sum only claimed to be due by the plaintiff. A close examination of the evidence, favorable to the plaintiff, does not disclose that he ever tendered the amount of the July bill, or that the defendant indicated at any time that it would not accept such payment. The only evidence relating to tender in any way whatever, had reference to the August bill.
Under the cited decisions, the order of nonsuit was proper, and the granting thereof is affirmed.
Messrs. Justices Stabler, Carter, and Bonham concur.