Court Opinion

ID: 9772336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:02.981742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:06.961304
License: Public Domain

Circulated q7jj j9QP_a,12•6 AM

  IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
                         CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

              V.                                  :CP -
                                                      23 -
                                                         CR-
                                                           0000410 -
                                                                   2022

DEANDRE R TAYLOR, 11

Catherine Kiefer, Esquire, for the Commonwealth
Stefanie McArdle, Esquire, for the Defendant

                                        OPINION

Brennan, J.                                                        November. 9, 2022

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

      After aBench trial on June 21, 2022, Deandre R. Taylor, II

(Defendant/Appellant) was convicted of Driving Under the Influence, General

Impairment, Incapable of Driving Safely B 1st Offense, 1and acquitted of the

summary traffic offense. On August 15, 2022, Appellant was sentenced to six [6]

months' probation, ordered to undergo adrug and alcohol evaluation, to attend a

safe driving program, to pay a $300 fine and $ 100 in costs. On September 7, 2022,

Defendant filed atimely Notice of Appeal from imposition of sentence.

       The following facts were presented at trial. Trooper Betancourt is employed

       75 P.S. ' 3802 " Al

                                             1
by the Pennsylvania State Police. At the time of this incident, he was in the patrol

unit. The entire incident was recorded on the State Police MVR device affixed to

the windshield of the marked patrol vehicle. On August 29, 2021, Trooper

Betancourt was on Exit boff-ramp of I-95 when he observed the Defendant did not

use his turn signal when changing lanes and then accelerated to 75mph in a55mph

zone. After the stop, Trooper Betancourt smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage

emanating from the vehicle. The defendant was ordered to exit the vehicle. As the

Defendant stepped away from the vehicle, Trooper Betancourt smelled the odor of

alcohol coming from his person. Trooper Betancourt could see into Defendant's

eyes and observed that they were blood-shot and glassy. Trooper Betancourt then

administered field sobriety tests. On the walk and turn test, Trooper Betancourt

observed four out of the eight validated clues. Scoring two validating clues is an

indication the person is . 08 or higher. Trooper Betancourt next administered the

one-legged stand test. On that test, Trooper Betancourt observed three of the four

validated clues. Based on the totality of his interaction with the Defendant, Trooper

Betancourt formed the opinion he was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to

adegree that rendered him incapable of safely operating amotor vehicle.

      II. DISCUSSION

                                          z
             Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of

Driving Under the Influence. The standard of review in Pennsylvania for

sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled:

             "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence

admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict

winner, to see whether there is sufficient evidence to enable [the factfinder] to find

every element of the crime beyond areasonable doubt. This standard is equally

applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as

the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond areasonable

doubt. Although aconviction must be based on "more than mere suspicion or

conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to amathematical certainty."

      Commonwealth v. Coon, 695 A.2d 794, 797 (Pa. Super. 1997) Moreover,

when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an Appellate Court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder; if the record contains support for

the convictions they may not be disturbed. Commonwealth v. Marks, 704 A.2d

1095, 1098 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 507 A.2d 1212,

1213 (Pa., 1986)). An appellate court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner and must draw all reasonable

                                            3
inferences favorable to the Commonwealth to determine if the factfinder could

reasonably have concluded that all of the elements of the crime were established

beyond areasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 839 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa.

2003). Circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to convict aperson of a

crime. Commonwealth v. Watkins, 843 A.2d 1203, 1211 (Pa. 2003). In evaluating

the sufficiency of the evidence where aconviction is based on circumstantial

evidence, the circumstantial evidence must be considered in light of all the

inferences and conclusions that reasonably and logically can be drawn therefrom.

Commonwealth v. Rivers, 644 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa. 1994). The factfinder is free to

accept all, part, or none of the witnesses' testimony. Watkins, supra. Where the

evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in

contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is

insufficient as amatter of law. Commonwealth v. Santana, 333 A.2d 876 (Pa.

1975).

         In this case, sufficient evidence existed to sustain Defendant's conviction for

DUI, general impairment. To be convicted of DUI, the Commonwealth must prove

that the Defendant was rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in

actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle. 75 Pa. C.S. Section

                                             4
3802(a)(1). Thus, the Commonwealth must prove:

      (1) that the defendant was the operator of amotor vehicle and (2) that while

operating the vehicle, the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to such a

degree as to render him or her incapable of safe driving. To establish the second

element, it must be shown that alcohol has substantially impaired the normal mental

and physical faculties required to safely operate the vehicle. Substantial impairment,

in this context, means adiminution or enfeeblement in the ability to exercise

judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently to changing circumstances and

conditions. Commonwealth v. Smith, 831 A.2d 636, 638 (Pa. Super. 2003).

      Defendant does not dispute he was driving. Rather, he alleges the evidence

was insufficient to establish that he imbibed enough alcohol to render him incapable

of safe driving. He contends he did not exhibit any evidence of alcohol impairment,

that he reacted appropriately, and was cooperative with arresting Officers.

Defendant's argument lacks merit. The focus of subsection 3802(a)(1) remains on

the inability of the individual to drive safely due to consumption of alcohol, not on

aparticular blood alcohol level. Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (Pa.

2009); see also Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 145 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citations omitted). A blood alcohol test is not necessary to prove general

                                          s
impairment under this statute. Commonwealth v. Eichler, 133 A13d 775, 790 (Pa.

Super. 2016).

      There are numerous cases substantially similar to the instant case where the

Superior Court found evidence sufficient to convict defendants of DUI General

Impairment. In Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887 (Pa: Super. 2009), the

Court found sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction for DUI where

the defendant failed four field sobriety tests, smelled of alcohol, and proceeded to

coast though astop sign despite apolice officer being in plain view. In

Commonwealth v. Rishel, 658 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa. Super. 1995) the Court upheld a

conviction of adefendant for DUI where, an hour after acar accident, officers

noticed the defendant exuded an odor of alcohol, the Defendant's speech was

slurred, she failed two field sobriety tests, and stated she had drunk two

sixteen- ounce beers in an evening. In Commonwealth v. Palmer, 751 A.2d 223 (Pa.

Super. 2000), the Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support aconviction

for driving while under the influence of alcohol to adegree that rendered defendant

incapable of safe driving. In that case, the arresting officer testified that the

defendant exuded the odor of alcohol, that the defendant had glassy, bloodshot

eyes, and that the defendant failed field sobriety tests. Id. at 228

                                            6
      Further, in Commonwealth v. Feathers, 660 A.2d 90 (Pa. ,Super. 1995),

appeal granted in par,t 543 ,Pa. 401, 672 A.2d 279, affirmed 683 A.2d 289, 546 Pa.

139, the Court found that evidence that the driver was not in control of herself, such

as failing to pass the field sobriety test, can establish that the driver was under the

influence of alcohol to adegree which rendered her incapable of safe driving. Id. In

that case, the defendant had astrong odor of alcohol on her breath and about her

person and that she had trouble in producing her license and insurance card.

Additionally, the defendant had bloodshot eyes, had difficulty standing and

producing documentation, and failed field sobriety tests. Id.

      It should be noted that in Palmer and Feathers, the arresting officers did not

observe any erratic driving on the parts of the defendants. In Commonwealth v.

Kowalek, 647 A.2d 948 (Pa. Super 1993), the Court found that acharge of driving

under the influence, alleging the driver incapable of safe driving, is not precluded

merely because at the time of arrest the driver was not observed to drive unsafely.

Erratic driving is but one factor to consider. Thus, the absence of erratic driving is

not determinative as to whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a

conviction for DUI.

       Like Mobley, the Commonwealth offered evidence and testimony that, by its
totality, establishes sufficient evidence to sustain averdict of guilty of driving under

the influence, general impairment. Trooper Betancourt smelled an odor of alcohol

coming from the vehicle. After the Defendant exited the vehicle, Trooper

Betancourt smelled an odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant. The Defendant

failed two sobriety field tests and showed signs of impairment on athird. Trooper

Betancourt observed the Defendant's eyes were watery and glassy. Finally, the

Defendant refused achemical blood test.

      To prove adefendant incapable of safe driving, the Commonwealth must

show that the defendant is "substantially impaired" by the presence of alcohol.

Substantial impairment, in this context, means a "diminution or enfeeblement in the

ability to exercise judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently to changing

circumstances and conditions." Commonwealth v. Goldsmith, 237 A.3d 462 at *2

(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Substantial impairment does not imply an

extreme lack of control, but only a " diminution or enfeeblement." Commonwealth v.

Griscavage, 517 A.2d 1256, 1258 (Pa. 1986). A finding of substantial impairment

is not based on aparticular factor, but aconfluence of circumstances that suggest a

suspect to be incapable of safe driving. "[A] police officer may utilize both his

experience and personal observations to render an opinion as to whether aperson is

                                           s
intoxicated." Commonwealth v. Kelley, 438 Pa. Super. 289, 652 A.2d 378, 382

(Pa.Super. 1994) ( citing Commonwealth v. Bowser, 425 Pa. Super. 24, 624 A.2d

125 (Pa.Super. 1993)).

      As noted above, in this case, multiple indicia of substantial impairment were

present. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was clearly

sufficient evidence given the factors outlined above to show Defendant was

substantially impaired by the presence of alcohol, and thus incapable of safe

driving. The evidence is sufficient to sustain averdict of guilty for driving under the

influence, general impairment.

      Judgment of sentence should be affirmed on appeal.

                                        BY THE COURT:

                                        MARY ALICE : RENNAN, J.

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                                           9                              -v o         O
J-S23025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                v.                             :
                                               :
  DEANDRE RAMEL TAYLOR, JR.                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2372 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 15, 2022,
              in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000410-2022.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 29, 2023

       Deandre Ramel Taylor, Jr. appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposing six months of probation after the trial court convicted him of driving

under the influence (general impairment).1 We affirm.

       In the early hours of August 29, 2021, Pennsylvania State Police stopped

Taylor’s vehicle on Interstate 95. During the stop, Trooper Seth Betancourt

smelled alcohol in the vehicle and on Taylor. Taylor’s eyes were bloodshot

and glassy. He failed two sobriety tests and refused a request to test his blood

alcohol content. The troopers arrested him for DUI.

       After a bench trial, the court convicted and sentenced Taylor as stated

above. This timely appeal followed.

       Taylor raises one appellate issue:

          Whether the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law,
          to support the conviction for [DUI] where the evidence at
____________________________________________

1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
J-S23025-23

          trial failed to establish that [Taylor] had imbibed a sufficient
          amount of alcohol such that he was rendered incapable of
          safely driving, operating, or being in actual physical control
          of the movement of the vehicle?

Taylor’s Brief at 4. He claims insufficient evidence, because “there was no

objective forensic evidence presented to support the [trooper’s] testimony

. . . that Taylor was incapable of safely operating his vehicle due to alcohol

intoxication.” Id. at 8.

      The learned Judge Mary Alice Brennan of the Court of Common Pleas of

Delaware County authored a detailed, well-reasoned, 1925(a) Opinion, which

correctly disposes of Taylor’s claim of error. We therefore adopt it as our own.

      The trial court explained that, under this Court’s precedents, forensic

evidence is not needed to convict for the DUI count that the Commonwealth

charged. Taylor’s refusal of a blood-draw test deprived the Commonwealth of

the evidence that could have supported its claim; Taylor now suggests that

this lack of evidence means his conviction should be set aside. However,

where, as here, a person refuses a blood-draw test, refusal “may be

introduced    in   evidence    along      with   other   testimony   concerning   the

circumstances of the refusal.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(e). Hence, Taylor’s refusal

of blood-draw testing, rather than exculpating him, is a fact from which the

trial court could (and did) infer his guilt. As the trial court noted, multiple

indicia of substantial impairment were noted.

      The parties shall attach the trial court’s Opinion of November 9, 2022,

to this decision in all future filings.

                                           -2-
J-S23025-23

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2023

                                 -3-