Court Opinion

ID: 9675677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:01:52.891901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:37.059776
License: Public Domain

*660DWYER, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot subscribe to the reasoning of the majority in reversing the conviction of Howard.
The majority stresses Howard’s confinement in a small room for 16 hours while scantily clad lying on the floor in order to keep warm. What is left unsaid is that appellant’s testimony at the suppression hearing concerning the conditions of his confinement formed no basis for his attack on the competency of his confession.
The majority further stresses the incompetency of the confession in that the sheriff misled appellant as to the evidence against him and this somehow induced his relinquishment of right to counsel. In responding to appellant’s request to see him, the sheriff informed the appellant of the evidence that had been gathered in the investigation of the rape and kidnapping. There was no deception, as I view the evidence, when the sheriff informed appellant that the truck was going to be analyzed “piece by piece” for fingerprints and anything detrimental to this case. The sheriff’s statement related to matters that were relevant to his investigation and in keeping with his duties as a peace officer. Contrary to the majority’s reasoning that the only “hard evidence” the sheriff had against Howard was that he had been with McBee on the evening of the crime, were the facts that the victim had related that two men in a pickup truck had abducted and raped her, that McBee and Howard were arrested together in McBee’s residence and a pickup truck was in the driveway. Likewise, there is no authority whatsoever to sustain the reasoning that during the investigation the sheriff should perform a judicial task and inform Howard of what evidence would be relevant to him and not to McBee.
While acknowledging that the court must presume that a defendant does not waive his constitutional rights, a waiver may be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated. The question of waiver must be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1768, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).
In considering the totality of the circumstances here, legitimate inquiries can be made concerning: (1) the youth of the accused: Appellant Howard was 26 years of age at the time of the crime; (2) his educational background and intelligence rating: There was no showing that Howard was mentally deficient; (3) whether the accused was advised concerning his constitutional rights: The record reflects appellant had been advised as per Miranda prior to the interview and that he understood those rights. Furthermore, when appellant sent for the sheriff he was once again advised; (4) the length of detention: Appellant was incarcerated approximately 16 hours prior to the questioning; (5) was the questioning repeated and prolonged? The appellant was not questioned during the incarceration until he requested to see the sheriff; and (6) was physical punishment involved, such as the deprivation of food or sleep? The record indicates the appellant was fed and left alone. As indicated earlier he was scantily clad and the room was cool but he never complained of this condition. No single factor is determinative, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); however, based on the surrounding circumstances I am of the opinion that the appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and the statement was properly admitted.
If law is founded on reason then reason must dictate that when the appellant sent word that he wished to see the sheriff, in responding, the sheriff should not have merely shrugged his shoulders and walked away when appellant mentioned he was scared and “wanted to talk to an attorney but ...” The dots indicate a pause as explained by the sheriff at trial and not a conclusive statement that he was exerting his Miranda rights. To hold as the majority that the interrogation should have ceased conflicts with the general proposition that “... the right to talk or remain silent is the defendant’s, and no mechanical application *661of Miranda should prevent the informed, voluntary and free exercise of that right.” [Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975)]. United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 1975). The record reflects appellant had been advised of his Miranda rights prior to the interview and when appellant sent for the sheriff, he was once again advised,* with the appellant indicating that he understood his rights, which readily distinguishes this record from Lee v. State, 560 S.W.2d 82, 83 (Tenn.Cr.App.1977), relied upon by the majority. In short, appellant’s remark was not an affirmative request for an attorney but merely a preface to his thinking that he wanted to talk to the sheriff.
If I could agree with the majority that the appellant properly invoked his right to an attorney, his subsequent willingness to give a statement after being informed as to the charges and certain evidence in this ease indicated a voluntary waiver of this right. In United States v. Hodge, 487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973), the appellant after being arrested and given adequate warnings requested an attorney. The investigating officer terminated the interview but proceeded to explain the charges and evidence. Hodge then changed his mind and confessed. In affirming the conviction, the court rejected his literal interpretation of Miranda, holding instead that an arrestee can change his mind after requesting an attorney so long as the change of mind is voluntary and freely made. Hodge, p. 947. Also see, United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976). Based on this reasoning Howard relinquished his right to counsel when confronted with the evidence and his subsequent statement was admissible.
With the evidence showing Howard and McBee together before the crime and after the crime, with Howard in McBee’s residence and the pickup truck in the driveway, coupled with the little victim testifying that two men raped her and neither appellant testifying or offering evidence, the error if any was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(b). The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Howard guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, T.R.A.P. 13(e), as conceded by the majority in remanding the record for a new trial.
I concur completely with the majority’s affirmation of the judgment against McBee. I would also affirm the judgment against Howard.

 At the suppression hearing it was agreed that the transaction would reflect the sheriff having given the Miranda warnings to appellant.