Court Opinion

ID: 9751349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:21:34.500072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:43.264824
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Spaeth, J.:
I quite agree with the President Judge, that when the legislature prohibited “. . . selling, [and] trafficking in, any dangerous or narcotic drug,” presumably it meant *581to refer to two different kinds of conduct. That conclusion, however, does not solve the problem put to us by the present case; for if the legislature intended to prohibit not only “selling” but also “trafficking,” why did it not provide a penalty not only for “selling” but also for “trafficking”?
In fact, it did not, as Judge Hoffman points out. I therefore cannot join the President Judge in his conclusion that “ [i] n light of both logic and the rules of statutory construction it is therefore clear that ‘trafficking’ and ‘selling’ dangerous drugs are separate proscribed activities.” (Opinion at 575). That they are “separate activities” may be clear;1 but only one is “proscribed”; for “proscribed” cannot mean, “You must not do this act”; it must mean, “If you do this act, you will be subject to this punishment.” If the legislature omits the punishment clause, the courts cannot supply it.
Granted our obligation to make clear what is unclear, we must not pretend to powers we do not have. The statute here defies clarification. I hope the legislature will amend it.

. But see Mollendorf v. State, 67 Idaho 151, 173 P.2d 519 (1946), People v. Gwyer, 7 App. Div. 2d 711, 179 N.Y.S. 2d 987 (1st Dept. 1958), and State v. Lermeny, 213 Ore. 574, 326 P.2d 768 (1958), which treat “trafficking” as one of the definitions of “selling.”