Court Opinion

ID: 9399840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 16:11:51.899901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.135455
License: Public Domain

J-S14018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    NICOLE BECK                                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JOSEPH BECK                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1206 WDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered September 12, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Civil Division at No(s):
                                2021 GN 1776

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                            FILED: JUNE 6, 2023

        Appellant, Joseph Beck, appeals from the trial court’s September 12,

2022 order denying his petition to expunge the record of a final protection

from abuse order entered against him under the Protection from Abuse Act

(PFA), 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122. After careful review, we reverse the court’s

order and remand with instructions.

        The trial court summarized the pertinent history of this case, as follows:

        [Appellant] was a defendant in a [PFA] … action that resulted in a
        final PFA order entered against [him]. The final order was entered
        into, by agreement of the parties, on April 12, 2022[,] and expired
        on July 2, 2022. [Appellant] filed an Expungement Petition on
        August 18, 2022.       In his Petition, [Appellant] was seeking
        expungement of the record of his final PFA order. This [c]ourt
        heard [Appellant’s] argument on September 12, 2022. [O]n that
        same day, this [c]ourt issued an opinion denying [Appellant’s]
        Expungement Petition.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S14018-23

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 10/26/22, at 1.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The court did not direct him to

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal,

but it filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 26, 2022. Herein, Appellant

states two issues for our review:

       1. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s Expungement
          Petition by claiming Pennsylvania law precludes expungement
          of PFA cases that have a consent agreement approved as an
          order of court?

       2. Alternatively, did the trial court err by not allowing a Wexler[1]
          analysis to take place?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       Initially, we observe that Appellant does not present any argument on

his second issue. Instead, in the Argument section of his brief, he states his

second issue as follows: “The agreement entered by the parties was not a

‘Final Order.’” Id. at 16. Because Appellant presents no developed argument

on his “Wexler analysis” issue, it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Hardy,

918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“When briefing the various issues that

have been preserved, it is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are

____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981) (setting forth a
non-exhaustive list of factors for the court’s consideration on review of an
adult expungement petition as follows: (1) the strength of the
Commonwealth’s case against the petitioner; (2) the reasons the
Commonwealth gives for wishing to retain the records; (3) the petitioner’s
age, criminal record, and employment history; (4) the length of time that has
elapsed between the arrest and the petition to expunge; and (5) the adverse
consequences the petitioner may endure should expungement be denied).

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sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with

pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal

authorities.   … [W]hen defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct

meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find

certain issues to be waived.”).

      Moreover, Appellant did not present, in his ‘Statement of the Questions

Involved,’ his claim that the agreement entered by the parties was not a final

order. This Court has held that such a failure results in waiver of appellate

issues. See Interest of: J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding that

any issue not set forth in or suggested by an appellant’s Statement of the

Questions Involved is deemed waived).        Thus, we will not consider the

arguments set forth in support of the second issue in Appellant’s brief.

However, to the extent Appellant’s first issue involves a more cursory

argument that the PFA order was not a ‘final order’ as contemplated by the

statute, we will assess that claim.

      In reviewing Appellant’s issues, we apply the following standard:

      The decision to grant or deny a request for expungement of an
      arrest record lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge, who
      must balance the competing interests of the petitioner and the
      Commonwealth. We review the decision of the trial court for an
      abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Rodland, 871 A.2d 216, 218 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing

Commonwealth v. Lutz, 788 A.2d 993, 996 (Pa. Super. 2001)).

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     In Graham v. Flippen, 179 A.3d 85 (Pa. Super. 2018), we summarized

the law regarding expungement of PFA records, as follows:

     [I]n Carlacci [v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186 (Pa. 2002)], a
     temporary PFA order was issued against Carlacci; however, that
     order was ultimately ordered null and void, as per a stipulation
     entered by the parties. [Id.] at 187. In ruling that Carlacci was
     entitled to expungement of that record, our Supreme Court
     focused on the fact that the PFA petition was “discontinued before
     a hearing at which the plaintiff … would have had to meet the
     burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
     allegation of abuse contained in the PFA[] petition[] had
     occurred.” [Id.] at 190–91. In other words, the trial court had
     never issued a permanent order or made any findings of fact that
     the allegations of abuse had actually happened; rather, the record
     contained only “bald allegations of prior alleged acts of abuse that
     were contained in [the plaintiff’s] petition, nothing more.” Id. at
     191 (citation omitted).

     After Carlacci, this Court decided [Commonwealth v.]
     Charnik[, 921 A.2d 1214 (Pa. Super. 2007)]. There, a final PFA
     order was entered against Charnik following a hearing. However,
     the plaintiff ultimately sought, and was granted, leave to withdraw
     that final PFA order.         Thereafter, Charnik petitioned for
     expungement of the PFA record. In affirming the trial court’s
     denial of Charnik’s petition, we initially reiterated Carlacci’s
     holding that “when a PFA[] petition filed against a PFA[] defendant
     has been dismissed by court order, … or the PFA[] proceedings
     never evolve beyond the temporary order stage, … expungement
     is proper as a matter of law.” Charnik, 921 A.2d at 1219–20
     (emphasis added; relying on Carlacci, supra, and P.E.S. v. K.L.,
     720 A.2d 487 (Pa. Super. 1998)). However, we also declared that
     there exists an “expungement continuum” that “ranges from (a)
     illegal or void civil commitments, acquittals in criminal cases, and
     PFA matters that have not been proven and brought to final order
     (such as … Carlacci), where expungement is proper as a matter
     of law, to (b) non-conviction or arrest records, as in nol pros or
     ARD, where expungement is a matter of judicial decision...,
     and to (c) conviction records, where there is no right of
     expungement except by statutory authorization in limited
     circumstances.” Id. at 1220 (emphasis in original). We then held
     that Charnik’s PFA record was “closer to a conviction rather than
     a non-conviction record[,]” as “a final order was entered … only

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      after facts were brought forth proving the allegations of abuse by
      a fair preponderance of the evidence….” Id. Thus, we held that
      expungement was not warranted, presumably because there is no
      statutory authorization for the expungement of a PFA record, id.
      at 1218, and Charnik also did not meet the strict requirements for
      expungement of the records of a convicted person, id. at 1217.
      Applying Carlacci and Charnik to [Graham], [this Court
      determined] that three of [Graham’s] PFA cases [fell] under prong
      (a) on the ‘expungement continuum,’ and warrant[ed]
      expungement as a matter of law. In those three cases, only
      temporary PFA orders were entered against [Graham], and each
      of those orders were ultimately dismissed before a hearing was
      held, at which [Graham’s accuser] would have had to prove her
      allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.
      Therefore, the [three] records [at issue] contain[ed] only bald,
      unproven allegations of abuse, to which [Graham was] entitled to
      expungement as a matter of law.

Graham, 179 A.3d at 87–88.

      In the instant case, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by

interpreting our Supreme Court’s decision in Carlacci as precluding the

expungement of any PFA record where a final order was entered. Namely,

the trial court opined:

      [T]he Supreme Court in Carlacci distinguished temporary PFA
      orders from final PFA orders. The Court held that temporary PFA
      orders could be expunged. Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 191. The
      Supreme Court in Carlacci[] focused on the fact that the PFA
      order it was reviewing was discontinued before a hearing was
      held. Id. at 190. The [C]ourt there cited to Judge Emeritus
      Cercone’s dissenting memorandum that stated, “[T]he PFA[]
      proceedings never legally evolved beyond the temporary order
      stage…[. T]he Trial Court did not issue a permanent order[.]” Id.
      at 191. The [C]ourt in Carlacci then compared a temporary PFA
      order to an acquittal of a criminal offense, stating, “[I]t is equally
      improper to [assess] the strength of a PFA[] petition that has since
      been dismissed by court order before the plaintiff even attempted
      to meet its burden of proving the allegation of abuse contained in
      the PFA[] petition[.]” Id.….

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      Because the Supreme Court focused on the temporary nature of
      the PFA order, this [c]ourt interpreted the Carlacci case to mean
      that [a] temporary PFA order could be expunged, but final PFA
      orders could not be expunged. In the instant case, a final PFA
      order was entered on April 12, 2022. Because the PFA order
      entered in the instant case was a final order, this [c]ourt denied
      [Appellant’s] Expungement Petition.

TCO at 2-3.

      Appellant contends that, contrary to the trial court’s interpretation of

Carlacci, it does not stand for the conclusion that expungement is precluded

where a PFA case has gone past the point of a temporary PFA order being

entered. See Appellant’s Brief at 12. Instead, he claims that “[t]he Carlacci

case merely allowed for expungement of PFA actions where the case had not

proceeded past the entry of a Temporary PFA Order….” Id. (emphasis added).

According to Appellant, the case law discussed above regarding the

“expungement continuum” requires both the entry of a final order and the

allegations of abuse to have been proven. He insists that here, not only was

the agreement by the parties not a ‘final order’ as contemplated by the PFA

statute but, even if it was, “[t]here was no evidentiary hearing, no evidence

presented, no admissions[,] and no abuse … proven….” Id. at 15. Therefore,

he insists that “expungement is … proper as a matter of law.” Id.

      Initially, we disagree with Appellant that the PFA order was not intended

to be a final order but, instead, a consent agreement. Notably, the PFA order

is titled, “Final Order.” See Final PFA Order, 4/12/22, at 1. While the order

states that it “is entered by agreement without an admission[,]” it immediately

thereafter directs that, “[w]ithout regard as to how the order was entered,

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this is a final order of court subject to full enforcement pursuant to

the Protection from Abuse Act.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Therefore,

we agree with the trial court that the order was meant to constitute a final

PFA order.

      However,    after   careful   review,   we   agree   with   Appellant   that

expungement of his PFA record was warranted in this case, albeit for a

different reason than he provides.       Again, Appellant contends that he is

entitled to expungement as a matter of law because there was no finding of

abuse or admission of wrongdoing on his part. We need not decide whether

Appellant is correct that there must be both an explicit finding or admission

of abuse, as well as a final PFA order entered, before expungement is not

warranted as a matter of law. This is because here, the court failed to conduct

any hearing before issuing the final PFA order. “Pursuant to the PFA[ Act],

once a petition is filed[,] a hearing shall be held within 10 days.” P.E.S., 720

A.3d at 489 (emphasis added; citing Heard v. Heard, 614 A.2d 255 (Pa.

Super. 1992)). “If a hearing is not held, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to

grant relief to the filing party.” Id. (emphasis added; citing Heard, 614

A.2d at 640).

      In this case, no hearing was conducted, yet the court entered a final PFA

order stating, “Plaintiff’s request for a final protection order is granted.” Final

PFA Order at 2.      Because no hearing was held, the court did not have

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jurisdiction to enter that final PFA order granting the plaintiff relief.2 In other

words, that order was a legal nullity. Consequently, the PFA proceedings in

this case did not validly progress past the point of the temporary PFA order.

Accordingly, applying Carlacci, Charnik, and Graham, we conclude that

Appellant’s PFA case falls under prong (a) on the ‘expungement continuum,’

and warrants expungement as a matter of law.

       Thus, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s petition for

expungement, and remand this case for the trial court to enter an order

expunging the docket related to the PFA proceedings in this case.

       Order reversed.         Case remanded with instructions.       Jurisdiction

relinquished.

____________________________________________

2 We recognize that the PFA Act allows for the parties to enter a consent
agreement, which the court can then approve and continue the PFA
proceedings during the pendency of that agreement. See 23 Pa.C.S. §
6108(a) (“The court may grant any protection order or approve any consent
agreement to bring about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor
children.”) (emphasis added); see also Fischl v. Fischl, 260 A.3d 128 (Pa.
Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum) (explaining that, after Father filed
for a temporary PFA order against Son, the parties entered into a consent
agreement, which stated that a final PFA order would be entered if Son
violated any of the terms of the consent agreement, and that the PFA action
was continued for a period not to exceed three years). Thus, while we reject
Appellant’s argument that the final order issued in this case should be
construed as a consent agreement, we recognize that the parties could have
entered a consent agreement, which the court could have then approved and
continued the PFA action during the pendency thereof. See 23 Pa.C.S. §
6107(c) (“Continued hearings”).

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/6/2023

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