Court Opinion

ID: 9396811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:08:23.197136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.975442
License: Public Domain

J-S10027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    STEVEN MILLER                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1316 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 10, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-CR-0011715-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                 FILED MAY 23, 2023

       Steven Miller appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we

affirm.

       This Court previously set forth the following factual and procedural

history of this case as follows:

          On October 6, 2013, [Miller], an inmate at Curran-Fromhold
          Correctional Facility in Philadelphia, was using a phone in
          the prison’s telephone bank.[1] Khayree Murray, a fellow
          inmate, approached [Miller] and asked to use one of the
          phones. Correctional Officers Denise Irving and Eddie Rosa
          and Correctional Sergeant Joyce Cooper observed [Miller]
____________________________________________

1 Miller was in prison on pre-trial incarceration due to an unrelated case in
which Miller was charged with third-degree murder. See Commonwealth v.
Miller, 131 A.3d 83 (Pa. Super. 2015) (Table). Relevantly, in that case, Miller
was later convicted of third-degree murder, prior to sentencing in the instant
case. Id.
J-S10027-23

       attack Murray. [Miller] stabbed Murray several times with
       “a sharp long screw rigged with sharp ridges and a rubber
       band wrapped in a ripped T-shirt” in the head, back, and
       ear. Officer Rosa immediately intervened, separated the
       two men with the help of Officer Irving, and used pepper
       spray to subdue [Miller]. Officers recovered the makeshift
       weapon from the ground after [Miller] dropped it. Officer
       Rosa testified that Murray was in shock and that he did not
       observe Murray strike [Miller prior to Miller attacking
       Murray].

       Murray attempted to downplay his injuries, and told officers
       that he fell down some stairs. Murray sustained life-
       threatening injuries, which included three stab wounds to
       the back, two puncture wounds to the base of the neck,
       wounds to his back, back of the head, and left hand, and
       lacerations to this ear and cheek. Murray’s injuries required
       eight sutures. Sergeant Cooper decided to transport Murray
       to the hospital for treatment. [Miller] had no injuries, but
       he was treated for pepper spray in his eyes and placed in
       solitary confinement.

       While walking with Officer Rosa through the prison shortly
       after the stabbing, [Miller] stated, “If you didn’t pepper
       spray, you would have been the next victim.” In recorded
       prison phone calls, [Miller] subsequently made several
       inculpatory statements boast[ing] of his violent reputation
       in the prison as a result of the attack, and repeated a rumor
       that there was a bounty on Murray’s head because he was
       such a snitch.

       [Miller] proceeded to a jury trial. Murray refused to testify
       at trial and the trial court held him in contempt. [Miller]
       testified and claimed that he acted in self-defense. Although
       [Miller] claimed that Murray attacked him first with the
       weapon, [Miller] admitted that he never feared that Murray
       would kill him.

                                   -2-
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           On June 25, 2015, the jury convicted [Miller] of
           [a]ggravated [a]ssault,[2] [s]imple [a]ssault,[3] and
           possessing an instrument of crime.[4] On that same day,
           the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 8 to 20 years’
           incarceration. [Miller] filed a [p]ost-[s]entence [m]otion,
           which the trial court denied on October 2, 2015.

        Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 638 (Pa. Super. 2017).

        [Miller filed a timely direct appeal to this Court, raising eight
        claims.] We deemed the first seven issues meritless and affirmed
        [the] judgment of sentence on that basis, but we determined
        [that] remand was necessary to allow the trial court to consider
        the final issue, in which [Miller] raised an after-discovered
        evidence claim. Id. at 650-51.

                                       *       *   *

        On May 23, 2018, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
        pursuant to [our remand]. By its [o]rder of May 30, 2018, the
        [trial] court denied [Miller’s after-discovered evidence claim] due
        to lack of merit.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 224 A.3d 787 (Pa. Super. 2019) (Table) (some

citations and quotations omitted).

        Miller filed a timely notice of appeal, and this Court affirmed the trial

court’s May 30, 2018 order. See id. Miller filed a timely petition for allowance

of appeal to our Supreme Court, which was denied on May 27, 2020. See id.,

234 A.3d 407 (Pa. 2020) (Table). Miller did not seek review in the United

States Supreme Court.

____________________________________________

2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.

3   Id. at § 2701.

4   Id. at § 907.

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      On May 18, 2021, Miller, pro se, filed the instant PCRA petition, his first.

The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on

December 15, 2021. On March 3, 2022, the PCRA court filed notice of its

intent to dismiss Miller’s PCRA pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Miller did not

file a response, and on May 10, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Miller’s

petition.

      Miller filed a timely notice of appeal. The PCRA court did not order a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and

Miller did not file such a statement.

      Miller now raises the following claims for our review:

      (1) [Direct appeal] counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
      issue of recorded prison phone [calls] being admitted.

      (2) Trial counsel was ineffective by failing to file a [m]otion to
      [r]econsider [s]entence.

      (3) The PCRA court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary
      hearing.

Brief for Appellant, at 7 (reordered).

      When reviewing the [dismissal] of a PCRA petition, our scope of
      review is limited by the parameters of the [PCRA]. Our standard
      of review permits us to consider only whether the PCRA court’s
      determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether
      it is free from legal error. Moreover, in general we may affirm the
      decision of the [PCRA] court if there is any basis on the record to
      support the trial court’s action; this is so even if we rely on a
      different basis in our decision to affirm.

Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 544 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(quotations and citations omitted).

                                        -4-
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      For ease of disposition, we address Miller’s claims of ineffectiveness first.

Generally, counsel is presumed to be effective, and “the burden of

demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Commonwealth v.

Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      To satisfy this burden, an appellant must plead and prove by a
      preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his underlying claim is
      of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by
      counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate
      his [client’s] interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness[,]
      there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
      challenged proceeding would have been different. Failure to
      satisfy any prong of the test will result in rejection of the
      appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Commonwealth v. Holt, 175 A.3d 1014, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal

citations omitted).

      In his first claim, Miller contends that his direct appeal counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the trial court’s admission of the

prison phone calls. See Brief for Appellant, at 16-17. Miller asserts that the

prison phone calls were not relevant to the Commonwealth’s asserted basis of

establishing motive. Id. at 17. Instead, Miller argues that the phone calls

establish that Miller was attempting to find out who attacked him. Id. Miller

further argues that, therefore, the probative value of the phone calls was

outweighed by their prejudicial impact. Id. Miller is entitled to no relief.

      When we review a trial court’s ruling on admission of evidence,
      we must acknowledge that decisions on admissibility are within
      the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned
      absent an abuse of discretion or misapplication of law. In addition,
      for a ruling on evidence to constitute reversible error, it must have
      been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party. An abuse of

                                       -5-
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      discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a
      conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment
      exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
      prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the
      record, discretion is abused.

Commonwealth v. Talley, 236 A.3d 42, 55 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations

omitted).   “The threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether

evidence is relevant.” Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 577 (Pa.

Super. 2005). Evidence is relevant if “it has the tendency to make a fact more

or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of

consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b). “Evidence is

relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to

make a fact at issue more or less probable[,] or supports a reasonable

inference or presumption regarding a material fact.”       Commonwealth v.

Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa. Super. 2002). “All relevant evidence is

admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant

is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if

its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one of more of the following:

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,

wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.

      Instantly, at trial, trial counsel objected to the admission of the phone

call recordings, which the trial court overruled. See N.T. Jury Trial, 6/24/15,

at 89-91 (trial court noting several objections to phone calls and transcripts);

id. at 104 (trial counsel reiterating prior objections to phone calls and

                                      -6-
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transcripts). On appeal, rather than challenging the relevance of the phone

calls, direct appeal counsel challenged the trial court’s decision to permit the

jury to take a transcript of the phone call recordings to the jury room for

deliberations. See Miller, 172 A.3d at 648. This Court concluded that, if

Miller had intended to challenge the relevance of the phone calls on appeal,

Miller had waived the claim by failing to cite to relevant authority. Id. at n.7

(noting Miller’s claim “suggests that the trial court erred in admitting this

evidence at all,” but Miller failed to cite authorities).

      However, the trial court, in its original Rule 1925(a) opinion, addressed

the relevancy of these phone calls as follows:

      [Miller] called the same persons that he had been on the telephone
      with at the time he attacked [Murray].          [Miller]’s counsel
      objected[,] claiming that the taped conversations were irrelevant
      and unduly prejudicial because [Miller] peppered his speech with
      offensive words.

      The trial court listened to the prospective recorded testimony and
      determined that the conversations were contextually relevant
      because [they] specifically provided [Miller’s] motivation for the
      attack upon [Murray], whom [Miller] specifically named in the
      telephone call to the same person(s) he had been on the
      telephone [with] at the time of the attack. [Miller] revealed that
      he had not known [Murray] before the assault[,] but he had
      been aware that there had been a price on the head of
      “K[ha]yree Murray” for snitching on someone else in the
      prison. [Miller] also bragged that he was considered to be a
      [“]top dog[”] imbued with certain respect within his prison pod by
      the other inmates because of the assault.             [Miller] never
      claimed he was acting in self-defense when freely
      conversing [with] his friends. . . . [Miller] . . . was keenly
      aware that the telephone conversations were recorded. The fact
      that [Miller] utilized colorfully offensive words at times concretely
      illuminated his perspective. As such, [Miller]’s language was not

                                       -7-
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      so unusually prejudicial as to outweigh the significant probative
      value of this evidence. The evidence was properly admitted.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/7/22, at 8-9, quoting Trial Court Opinion, 6/10/16, at

14-15 (emphasis added).

      After reviewing the record, we agree with the PCRA court that these

phone calls were relevant and properly admitted.          See Talley, supra.

Moreover, with respect to any prejudice as a result of the language Miller used

in the phone calls, his trial counsel sought a cautionary instruction “about the

language,” and the trial court issued the requested cautionary instruction.

See N.T. Jury Trial, 6/24/15, at 95-96 (trial counsel stating requesting

cautionary   instruction, and trial court issuing requested instruction).

Therefore, Miller cannot and has not established that his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim has arguable merit, and he is afforded no relief on this claim.

See Rivera, supra; Holt, supra.

      In his second claim, Miller argues that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Brief for Appellant, at 18-19.

      Preliminarily, we observe that “[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects

of sentencing are not cognizable under the PCRA.”         Commonwealth v.

Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 593 (Pa. Super. 2007). However, when a petitioner

advances such a claim under the purview of ineffective assistance of counsel,

it does fall under the PCRA’s jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Watson,

835 A.2d 786, 801 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[A] claim regarding the discretionary

aspects of [the defendant’s] sentence, raised in the context of an

                                     -8-
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ineffectiveness claim, would be cognizable under the PCRA.”). Accordingly,

Miller’s challenge is cognizable under the PCRA.

      Nevertheless,     Miller’s   brief    contains   only   bald   assertions   of

ineffectiveness for failing to raise this claim. His entire argument is less than

one-and-a-half pages and contains no citations to the record, and only

boilerplate citations to authority. See Brief for Appellant, at 18-19; see also

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring “discussion and citation of authorities as are

deemed pertinent”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa.

2009) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim

with citation to relevant authority[,] or fails to develop the issue in any other

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”); id. at 925 (“It

is not the role of this Court to formulate [an a]ppellant’s arguments for him.”).

Accordingly, this claim is waived.

      For the above reasons, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Miller’s

PCRA petition, and, thus, we affirm the court’s order. See Commonwealth

v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011) (PCRA court may dismiss petition

without hearing when satisfied “that there are no genuine issues concerning

any material fact, the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral

relief, and no legitimate purpose would be served by any further proceedings”)

(citation omitted).

      Order affirmed.

                                           -9-
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023

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