Court Opinion

ID: 9535463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:49:51.103333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:15.735129
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I join the result and reasoning of the other portions of the lead opinion, though I must write separately to express my dissent from the lead opinion’s analysis of the "similar acts” issue in part iii(b).
I cannot join the reasoning of part iii(b) since I would hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have admitted the testimony of *98the similar acts witnesses at defendant’s trial. The similar acts testimony simply does not support the inference that the defendant was about to entice the two young girls into his car, or that he was about to engage them in some other improper or criminal conduct. While this inference is necessary to support the admission of the evidence under MRE 404(b), it would be an abuse of discretion to infer that fact from this record.
If I accepted the lead opinion’s reading of the record, however, I might find that the similar acts evidence is admissible under MRE 404(b). See People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 309-312; 319 NW2d 518 (1982). For example, if the testimony did show that the actor had stalked his victims, or sought to attract the two little girls into his car by physically reaching out to them or verbally urging them into his car for no apparent proper purpose, then I might deem such acts to satisfy the requirements of MRE 404(b). On this record, however, the similar acts simply are not so unusual and distinctive as to serve the purposes for which such evidence may be considered by the jury.1
i
1 accept the summary of the testimony of the similar acts witnesses contained in the lead opinion. (Ante, pp 90-91.) The lead opinion summarizes the testimony of Amy Combs and Judy Sanchez accurately.2_
*99The lead opinion characterizes the similar acts testimony in a manner that the record does not support by describing the two witnesses’ version of events according to what may have occurred when the black man stopped the two young girls, rather than what actually happened to them. The acts of the man who stopped Amy Combs and Judy Sanchez may have been a prelude to a child abduction, as the lead opinion suggests (ante, p 95), but the girls did not testify to that.
Indeed, I am persuaded the record fails to support the lead opinion’s interpretation of the testimony of the similar acts witnesses.3 While the lead opinion states that the girls only testified that the defendant was coaxing them to come closer to the car,4 it then draws unsupported conclusions from this testimony that the man who committed the "similar act” was "stalking” the two young girls.5
The similar acts evidence shows only that a man *100stopped the two young girls on February 6, 1979, to urge them to come closer to his car (i.e., as close as six feet), at which time he asked them the time of day and for directions. Any speculation by this Court about whether this man intended to carry out some improper (or criminal) intent is only speculation and has no record support. The circumstances of this incident do not indicate that the man intended to abduct the two young girls, though he may have secretly harbored such an unlawful intent. Moreover, the man’s behavior can as well be explained as motivated by a totally innocuous purpose.
Perhaps, this Court could assume facts not in evidence because the "similar acts” incident bears such a close resemblance to the fears of all parents who have worried that their children will talk to a stranger while walking alone to school. I would reject that approach, however, for obvious reasons. This Court cannot simply take judicial notice of the fact that a black man who stops young white girls to ask them the time of day and for directions is engaged in acts that are a prelude to a child abduction. Since the lead opinion makes unsupportable assumptions about the quality of the similar act that are necessary to the finding that the similar act was so unique and distinctive when compared to the charged offense as to constitute a "signature,” Golochowicz, supra at 310-311, I must dissent.
ii
The reasoning of the lead opinion does not ad*101dress the question whether the similar acts evidence will be admissible on retrial. Rather, the lead opinion holds only that "[w]hile the prosecutor’s use of the evidence was inappropriate in this trial, on this record, the evidence was admissible.”6 Nevertheless, there remains the important issue whether the analysis of the lead opinion can be applied if the prosecutor seeks to introduce the same evidence on retrial. The similar acts evidence may well be inadmissible, under the reasoning of the lead opinion, if the prosecutor on retrial cannot prove with substantial evidence that a black man driving a black car committed the charged offense.7
We simply do not know whether there will be any additional evidence to supplement this record in proving that the charged offense was committed by a black man driving a black car. The evidence in this record contains proof of that fact only if the hypnotized witnesses’ testimony is admissible. Yet, the evidence is necessary to show the uniqueness and distinctiveness of the "similar act” because it links the similar act to the charged offense in the manner required by MRE 404(b).
Under the first prong of the Golochowicz four-part evidentiary safeguards, there must be "substantial evidence that the defendant actually perpetrated the bad act sought to be introduced,” id. at 309. In analyzing this prong of the test, the lead opinion finds that there was substantial evidence to show that the defendant was the perpetrator of the similar act. The lead opinion reaches this conclusion, despite the tentativeness of the witnesses’ eyewitness identification of him, because of two additional, and crucial, facts:
*102[1] the man had a black car and that defendant drives a black car, [and]
[2] that defendant did not go to work on February 6 . . . .[8]
The fact that the defendant did not go to work proves very little, since it is the prosecutor’s burden of production and persuasion to prove by substantial evidence that the defendant committed the similar act.9
The fact that the perpetrator of the charged offense was a black man and drove a black car plays an important role in the lead opinion’s finding that this "similar acts” evidence was properly admitted for an additional reason. Under the second prong of the Golochowicz standard, when (as here) "the only conceivable justification for admission of such similar-acts evidence is to prove the identity of the perpetrator, . . . '[t]he [commonality of circumstances] [between the act and the charged offense] must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature,’ ” id. at 310-311 (citation omitted);10 see ante, pp 93-94; see also People v Hall, 433 Mich 573, 586; 447 NW2d 580 (1989).11 Indeed, if there is no substantial evidence *103linking the similar act to the charged offense, then there is no basis for the admission of the similar acts evidence to prove identity under MRE 404(b).
In analyzing the second prong of the Goloehowicz standard, the lead opinion relies, in large part, on the fact that a black man driving a black car was seen both during the commission of the charged offense and during the similar act; indeed, this fact serves as the key factor which proves the similarity between the charged offense and the similar act that MRE 404(b) requires.12
Given today’s holding that the testimony of the hypnotized witnesses who saw a black man in a black car at the scene of the charged offense "is inadmissible absent proof by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony being offered [to show that it] was based on facts recalled and related prior to hypnosis,” (ante, p 86), the testimony of these witnesses may be inadmissible upon retrial.13
*104Archer, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

I need not address whether or not there was substantial evidence to show that the defendant was the man who committed the similar acts (on February 6, 1979), Golochowicz, supra at 309, given that the testimony of the similar acts witnesses cannot suffice to meet the requirements of the second prong of the Golochowicz test, id. at 309, 310-312.

 The testimony of the two girls varies somewhat, although they generally testified that the man stopped his car and put *99one foot outside the door. He asked them for the time and the location of Hall Street. The girls responded to the questions, and after doing so the man motioned to the girls to come closer to the car. Both girls testified that they were scared and that the man recognized their fear. Judy had apparently run from the car, but Amy had stayed longer. As Judy gradually came back, the girls testified that the man got into the car and left. [Ante, p 90.]

 The lead opinion interprets the similar acts testimony as follows:
[T]he manner and circumstances of stalking and attracting victims can be and is, in this case, sufficiently distinctive and unique that it can pass the Golochowicz "signature” requirement. Child abduction cases, in the overall scheme of criminal activity, are rather rare and unique .... The coaxing of these two girls to the actor’s car is in and of itself somewhat distinctive and, when coupled with the similarities in place and time, lend to the entire act a uniqueness and distinctiveness. [Ante, pp 94-95.]

 Ante, p 95.

 The lead opinion suggests that the actions of the man who stopped these two young girls is analogous to "child abduction.” {Ante, p 95.) Yet, on this record, with only the testimony of the two girls to *100describe what happened on February 6,1979, the trial court could not have legitimately drawn the inference that the similar acts testimony was evidence of an attempted abduction. On appeal, the prosecutor conceded that the man’s behavior does not even amount to an inchoate crime of any sort.

 Ante, p 97.

 See discussion below.

 Ante, p 93.

 The defendant is not required to give proof of an alibi in his own defense in order to justify the exclusion of evidence of extrinsic acts if the prosecutor cannot prove with substantial evidence that, given the qualities of the charged offense and the similar act, he was the perpetrator of both acts.

 The finding of similarity between the similar act and the charged offense cannot be dispensed with since it, "assures thereby that evidence of the separate offense is probative of some fact other than the defendant’s bad character . . . [namely, that] the circumstances and manner in which the two [acts] were committed are '[s]o nearly identical in method as to earmark [the charged offense] as the handiwork of the accused ....’” Id. at 310, citing McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 449.

 In Hall, the plurality stated that "[t]o be sure, where the prosecution uses similar acts to prove the identity of a perpetrator, the commonality of circumstances must be unique and distinctive.” While *103this language is dicta from a plurality opinion by Justice Boyle (joined only by Justice Griffin and Chief Justice Riley), that sentence is nevertheless an accurate statement of the law.

 The lead opinion reasoned that the similar act is sufficiently unusual and distinctive when compared to the charged offense because both acts share four factors in common:
The similarity between the two incidents upon which the prosecutor bases its admission are that (1) both incidents involved a black man driving a black car, (2) each occurred in the early morning hours when children would be walking to school, (3) both incidents involved young girls, and (4) both occurred in the same general area. [Ante, p 94.]

 The fact that the charged offense was committed by a black man in a black car was established at the first trial by the testimony of the hypnotized witnesses. In fact, these witnesses were the only ones who identified the racial background of the perpetrator of the charged offense and the color of the car he drove at the scene of the abduction on February 12,1979. i
The trial court considered the testimony of the hypnotized witnesses in making a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of the "similar acts” evidence under MRE 404(b).
The lead opinion states:
*104[The testimony of the two girls] alone probably does not constitute substantial evidence to show that it was defendant who committed the bad act. [Ante, p 92.]