Court Opinion

ID: 9494396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:37:10.026518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:14.080307
License: Public Domain

LAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
This is a suit brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. Ann. §§ 363.01-363.20. The suit claims the nursing facility at which the plaintiff worked as a nurse discriminated against her because of her disability. The district court instructed the jury at length and after a two-week trial, the jury reached a verdict in favor of the defendant. In denying post-trial motions, the district court affirmed the jury verdict, believing there was sufficient evidence for the jury to side with either party. The district court agreed that plaintiff “presented a significant amount of evidence in support of her claim.” Mem. Op. at 779 (Aug. 12, 1999). The district court further stated, however, that the defendant presented a substantial amount of evidence in its favor, conceding it was a close case. On that basis, the district court held that the plaintiffs post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), or in the alternative for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), should be denied.
Although the majority opinion affirms the judgment of the district court, it does so on a totally different basis. It holds that the district court should have dismissed plaintiffs case because she did not produce sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury.
I strongly disagree and for reasons to be explained, I would reverse the district court’s ruling and remand the casé for a new trial.
In light of the record, the majority’s conclusion is difficult to understand. Of course, the conclusion reached obviates the need to pass upon the erroneous jury instructions. Such a .holding avoids a remand and retrial, thereby serving judicial efficiency. However, judicial efficiency runs a distant second to judicial fairness.
The majority opinion holds that Ms. Stafne failed to produce evidence that would allow a jury to find that she was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation. The majority believes that Ms. Stafne was “in charge” of pushing wheelchair-bound residents to their proper seating locations in the dining room. The majority opinion reasons that since this was one of the essential functions of her job, she must prove, notwithstanding her disability, that she was qualified to perform this duty with or without reasonable accommodation. The majority opinion goes on to say that all of the evidence at trial tended to show that Ms. Stafne would *777not have been able to push wheelchairs even if she had been allowed to use the Amigo.
The majority rules on this issue as a matter of law, but the record is clear that pushing wheelchairs was not an essential function of her job. The majority steps into the role of the fact finder in holding, as a matter of law, that pushing residents in wheelchairs was an essential function of Ms. Stafne’s job simply because she admitted she had done it occasionally in the past.
This mischaracterization of the record overlooks the undisputed evidence that pushing wheelchairs was the essential and the primary function of another group of employees specifically hired for this purpose: Transport Aides. Tr. at 566. The district court, in discussing the evidence as a whole, did not find that pushing wheelchairs was an essential function of her job. It did not because the record is directly to the contrary. The record is undisputed that at mealtime, residents who use wheelchairs were moved by the transport aides in and out of the dining room. Trevilla’s job description for Ms. Stafne’s does not list pushing wheelchairs or transporting residents in wheelchairs.2 The majority’s holding that pushing residents in wheelchairs was an essential function of Ms. Stafne’s job because she had occasionally assisted the transport aides simply does not follow.3 See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir.1995) (“The initial inquiry in determining whether a job requisite is essential is whether an employer actually requires all employees in the particular position to perform the allegedly essential function.”). The evidence is undisputed that no one, including the employer, considered “pushing wheelchairs” an essential function of her job. The majority’s conclusion is directly contrary to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). Under this section “[t]he term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” Relevant to our discussion, the regulation continues and states “ ‘essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.” (emphasis added). For the majority to now rule, as a matter of law, that Ms. Stafne’s occasional assistance to the transport aides made that work essential to her job is a misinterpretation of the law and the facts of the case. This task was specially delegated to the transport aides and Ms. Stafne’s job description did not list it *778as one of her duties. One might argue, at the very least, this is a question of fact, but the overall record strongly suggests it was not essential she do the work a totally different group of employees was hired to do.
The majority next finds that it was Ms. Stafne’s job to assist residents in the dining room. This is true. However, Ms. Stafne introduced evidence she could perform those tasks. The majority points out that it would be impossible for Ms. Stafne to ride an Amigo and push wheelchair-bound residents in the dining room at the same time. This sounds very logical. However, Ms. Stafne never claimed that she desired to use an Amigo in the dining room to assist the residents. Notwithstanding the record, the majority concludes that “[gjiven the evidence as presented, there can be no genuine factual dispute that Ms. Stafne would have been unable to perform her duties in the dining room even if she had been allowed the use of an Amigo.” This observation completely misconstrues the record. Ms. Stafne, as well as James Cronick, a job placement counselor with the Minnesota Department of Economic Security (MDES), and Bonnie Malloy, vocational rehabilitation counselor from MDES, requested Trevilla to accommodate Ms. Stafne by allowing her to use the Amigo to travel from “point A to point B.” Once she reached her destination, Ms. Stafne could get off the Amigo, park it, and perform her duties. The majority overlooks the actual evidence as to how the use of the Amigo could otherwise make her walking assignments in the dining room such that it would lessen the stress caused by her rheumatoid arthritis. Dr. Gulli testified: “My goal with prescribing the Amigo was to reduce the amount of walking that Ms. Stafne was doing to the point below the threshold of her causing these types of injuries such as stress fractures.” Dr. Gulli further stated that once she arrived on an Amigo to where she wanted to go
that her walking requirements were relatively light and I felt that they were acceptable. And so I wanted her to use the cart to travel the longer distances so that she could save her energy and walking ability for the shorter distances that were required for her to actually do her job.
The evidence was that the hallways were wide and the Amigo could be easily parked in the hallways, the same as wheelchairs, laundry, and cleaning carts. Trevilla first told her that the fire marshal would not permit the Amigo. The evidence showed, however, that Trevilla’s people had never spoken with the fire marshal. Bonnie Malloy subsequently confirmed with the fire marshal that the electric car was permissible at Trevilla.
Trevilla urged at trial that Ms. Stafne might not be able to perform the Heimlich Maneuver on any of the residents if they required it. Once again the majority misinterprets the evidence on this issue by simply concluding that Ms. Stafne failed to make a submissible case on this issue. Yet, the record contains no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Stafne could not perform the Heimlich Maneuver. She only did this on rare occasions. The only evidence is that Ms. Stafne testified she had done this on occasion and had performed it successfully.4
*779The reason this case requires a new trial is because the jurors were given erroneous instructions concerning the burden of proof on a basic issue. There is no question that under the ADA an employer may avoid liability for discrimination if it can prove that the claimant is not qualified under one of the affirmative defenses as defined in the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b). Trevilla contended in its pleadings, as well as at trial, that Ms. Stafne was unqualified for her job because her rheumatoid arthritis made her a direct threat to nursing home residents. Under the ADA, direct threat is listed as a defense to liability.5 As such, the employer in posing an affirmative defense must carry the burden of proof that the individual poses a direct threat to the safety of those in the workplace. It is fundamental, basic procedural law under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that any affirmative defense must be pled under Rule 8(c). Tre-villa did just that; yet, the district court instructed the jury that Stafne had the burden of proof to show that she did not constitute a threat to others.
As the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) points out, this court in Belk v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 194 F.3d 946 (8th Cir.1999), in discussing another defense under the same section of the ADA, held that these were affirmative defenses and the burden of proof lies upon the employer. Id. at 951-53.6 Further, the House Judiciary Report says that an otherwise qualified applicant for a job “cannot be disqualified on the basis of a physical or mental condition unless the employer can demonstrate the applicant’s disability poses a direct threat to others in the work] lace.” H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(111), at 46 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 469 (emphasis added).
Several circuits have referred to the “defense” of direct threat. See Hamlin v. Charter Township of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir.1999) (“As a defense to [plaintiffs] claims, [defendant] argued that [plaintiff] posed a direct threat ....”); Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.1999) (“Because this is an affirmative defense, [defendant] bears the burdén of proving that [plaintiff] is a direct threat.”); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1283 (7th Cir.1995) (“The first rejected instruction involved [defendant’s] ‘direct threat’ defense.”).7
Some circuits have held, at least in a limited set of circumstances, that the plaintiff has the burden of showing that he or she is not a threat to others. These courts reason that the plaintiff cannot prove that she can perform the essential functions of her job if she is a direct threat to others. See EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir.1997) (“Where [plaintiffs] essential job functions necessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions *780in a way that does not endanger others. There may be other cases under Title I where the issue of direct threat is not tied to the issue of essential job functions but is purely a matter of defense, on which the defendant would bear the burden.”); Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir.1996) (“The employee retains at all times the burden of persuading the jury either that he was not a direct threat or that reasonable accommodations were available.”); Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284, 1295 (10th Cir.2000) (“Plaintiff was not a ‘qualified person’ to work in a position as a blaster because the defendants rightly considered that he was a direct threat to others in the work place.”).
Even if we were to accept the view of the First Circuit, the present case is not one that places the burden on Ms. Stafne to show that she was not a direct threat. The Amego court makes it clear that the only time the plaintiff has the burden of showing she is not a direct threat is when plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of her job without endangering others. See Amego, 110 F.3d at 144; Borgialli, 235 F.3d at 1292. There is simply no evidence in the record that shows that Ms. Stafne’s disability created the possibility that she would injure someone during the performance of her duties. Absent any indication that Ms. Stafne’s attempts to perform her duties might threaten the patients, indeed absent any indication that Ms. Stafne was a threat to anyone at all, the district court’s direct threat instruction prejudiced Ms. Stafne and demands a new trial.
It is difficult for me to write this dissent because of the profound respect I have for my two learned colleagues. However, unless appellate courts are willing to adhere to the actual evidence adduced at the trial, we abdicate our role as appellate judges for that of finders of fact. We are bound by the record adduced at trial. We should not attempt to obviate the actual record by our own interpretative sense of right and wrong.
It seems to me, once the plaintiff did put forth a submissible case and the defendant submitted its defense, it should be left to the jury, as the trial court reasoned, to assess the credibility of the evidence and to follow the court’s instructions by reason of the law given by the court.8
*781I believe that since there was no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Stafne’s attempts to complete her job threatened anyone, the district court erred in giving the jury a direct threat instruction. At best, defendant raised vague allegations of a threat. Even under the logic of Amego, absent any evidence that Ms. Stafne’s performance of her duties could conceivably threaten someone she worked with, the district court should have placed the burden on the defendant to show that she was a direct threat. If ever an instruction is prejudicial, it is where the trial court erroneously instructs the jury on the burden of proof.
I would grant Ms. Stafne a new trial.

.Trevilla’s job description is as follows:
Job Duties:
1. Committees
A. Aliance of Hospital and Long Term Care Providers — Quarterly meeting
1. Sub-Committee — Image
B. Circle Committee Meeting- — Unicare monthly
2. Chairman of the Marketing Committee
A. Chair Meeting
B. Compute Staff Marketing Log
C. Letters to M.D.’s every month — Appreciation
D. Annual Marketing plan for Unicare
3. Shoreview Community Center
A. B/P Monthly
B. Senior Advisory Committee Meeting— Monthly
4. Golden Pond
A. B/P Monthly
5. Dining room Supervisor
A. Breakfast and Lunch
B. Arrange seating
6. Incident Reports:
A. Nursing 24 — hour follow-up
B. Quarterly stats
7. Infection Control:
A. Checking on station — Information Control Logs
8. Chart Audits
9. Room Check Rounds
10. Other Duties as assigned.

.The majority’s reasoning is akin to saying a food server at a hospital, who occasionally washes out a dish, has washing dishes as an essential function of her job.

. I find similar problems with the majority’s discussion on the accommodation process. The majority opinion overlooks this court's discussion relating to bad faith and the interactive process as set out in Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952-54 (8th Cir.1999). However, there is nothing to be gained by going into each detail of the majority's opinion.

.42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) allows as a defense the application of "qualification standards ... that screen out ... an individual with a disability” if such a standard is "job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation .... ” A requirement that an employee "not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace” is an acceptable qualification standard. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).

. The EEOC has filed an amicus brief in this court arguing that the trial court erred in giving the burden of proof instruction.

. See also Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Centers, Inc., 213 F.3d 209, 213 (5th Cir.2000) (en banc) (deciding, under plain error standard of review, that the district court did not commit obvious error by giving the defendant the burden of proving plaintiff was a direct threat.).

. The trial court is in the best position to judge the sufficiency of the evidence. The trial judge hears the witnesses and observes their demeanor and, although the trial judge does not pass on the credibility of witnesses, when a jury is present, the judge is in a far better position to weigh the evidence in deciding whether to submit a case to a jury. All judges are mandated by the Seventh Amendment to give overall deference to a jury verdict. Our entire system of justice, as recognized in the Seventh Amendment, lies in this nation's mandate to allow issues of fact be tried by the composite diversified mix of our citizenry. Appellate courts should seldom vacate jury verdicts; this should occur
[o]nly when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court’s function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1946) (emphasis added). "We do not know what our answer would have been if we had been sitting on the jury, but that is not important. There was conflicting evidence on this issue, and it could have gone either way. Making decisions of this kind is exactly what juries are for.” Forbes v. Arkansas Educational Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 501 (8th Cir.1996). Such second guessing of the fact finder should rarely occur. It should not have occurred here. There was clearly a conflict of evidence which only a jury should have decided. If the ma*781jority had given deference to the jury verdict, then the majority would be faced with whether the trial court prejudicially instructed the jury on the law of the case.