Court Opinion

ID: 9396125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 16:07:48.759549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:14.184262
License: Public Domain

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
                            No. 23-28C
                       (Filed: May 17, 2023)
                     (Re-filed: May 19, 2023) 1
**************************
PERCIPIENT.AI, INC.,

                            Plaintiff,
                                                       Bid protest; post-award bid
v.                                                     protest; motions to dismiss
                                                       for lack of subject matter
THE UNITED STATES,                                     jurisdiction; Tucker Act;
                                                       Federal Acquisition
                            Defendant,                 Streamlining Act; task
                                                       order bar.
and

CACI, INC. – FEDERAL,

                            Intervenor.
**************************

      Samuel C. Kaplan, Washington, DC, for plaintiff, Percipient.ai, with
whom were Hamish P.M. Hume, Eric J. Maurer, and Gina A. Rossman, of
counsel.

       Reta E. Bezak, Senior Trial Counsel, United States Department of
Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, with whom were Brian M. Boynton,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy,
Director, and Corinne A. Niosi, Assistant Director, for defendant. Graham
Day, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, of counsel.

      Anne B. Perry, Washington, DC, for intervenor, CACI, Inc. – Federal,
with whom was Jonathan S. Aronie and Ariel E. Debin, of counsel.

1
 This opinion was originally issued under seal, and the parties were given an
opportunity to propose redactions of any protected material. The parties
agreed that none were necessary, so it appears in full.
                                  OPINION
        This is a post-award bid protest of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency’s alleged violation of 10 U.S.C. § 3453, a statute that
requires agencies to procure commercial or non-developmental products “to
the maximum extent practicable.” Both the United States and the intervenor,
CACI, Inc. – Federal, move to dismiss the protest for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. For the reasons below, we grant the motions to dismiss.

                             BACKGROUND 2

        The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) obtains and
analyzes images and other geospatial information to provide the federal
government with intelligence data. Supplying this kind of intelligence on a
global scale is a burdensome analytical task and cannot be done effectively
without the help of advanced computer technology. One of those advanced
technologies is computer vision, a form of artificial intelligence that “trains
and uses computers to interpret the visual world.” Compl. ¶ 55. With
computer vision, users can more efficiently compile and analyze geospatial
intelligence.

       Hoping to benefit from this technology, NGA, more than three years
ago, issued the SAFFIRE solicitation—which was for an indefinite delivery,
indefinite quantity contract containing two parts. The first was a data
repository, which would store and disseminate geospatial intelligence
“across various large organizations.” Compl. ¶ 60. The second, which is at
the heart of this dispute, would integrate a computer vision system to enhance
the agency’s ability to produce, review, and classify intelligence from
“millions” of images. Compl. ¶ 58.

      The plaintiff, Percipient, is a technology company that developed a
computer vision software called “Mirage.” Mirage is an open architecture
software that works alongside other computer systems and can detect
2
  When a party moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
court assumes that the undisputed facts in the complaint are true and draws
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Acevedo v. United States, 824
F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2016). These undisputed facts are drawn from the
complaint, the attached materials, and the administrative record.
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equipment, vehicles, and faces—each of which is a critical aspect of
geospatial intelligence. More than that, though, Mirage’s tools also allow
users to narrow the computer’s focus to specific objects, patterns, or
geographical areas, and it can even learn to anticipate its users’ needs over
time. Despite these features and capabilities, Percipient did not bid on the
SAFFIRE contract because its software could only fulfill SAFFIRE’s
computer vision requirements. For that reason, Percipient relied on what it
viewed as the agency’s statutory obligation to consider incorporating
commercial products and hoped to be part of NGA’s SAFFIRE efforts.

       In January 2021, NGA simultaneously awarded the SAFFIRE
contract to CACI and issued Task Order 1, which directed CACI, among
other things, to “develop and deliver the Computer Vision (CV) suite of
systems.” AR 3030. The agency then informed Percipient that, if it wanted
to participate in SAFFIRE, it needed to speak with CACI. This eventually
led to a meeting between Percipient and CACI in March 2021. At this
meeting, CACI expressed significant interest in partnering with Percipient
on future projects, but explained that, as for working together on SAFFIRE,
“that ship” had already “sailed.” Compl. ¶ 93.

       Alarmed by this revelation, Percipient asked NGA if it would
independently evaluate Mirage as a possible commercial solution for
SAFFIRE’s computer vision system. NGA responded several weeks later
and reassured Percipient of its commitment to using commercial products.
NGA further explained that CACI’s “ship has sailed” statement was an
“unfortunate miscommunication,” which did not reflect the agency’s
position. Compl. ¶ 100. Instead, the agency had not yet decided whether it
needed to incorporate a commercial product because CACI was still
reviewing NGA’s legacy systems. NGA confirmed that commercial products
would be evaluated once CACI finished.

        Another two months went by before Percipient finally secured a
meeting with CACI to demonstrate Mirage, although CACI’s Program
Manager—the individual largely responsible for deciding whether to
incorporate a commercial product—left the meeting after only 20 minutes.
Still, Mirage received positive feedback, and CACI promised to evaluate
Mirage more fully. This “deep dive” into Mirage never happened, however.
Compl. ¶ 108.

                                     3
        Several months later, Percipient learned at the 2021 GEOINT
Symposium that CACI would be developing a computer vision system for
SAFFIRE when CACI employees visited Percipient’s symposium booth.
Surprised by the news, and no longer believing that CACI could fairly
evaluate Mirage, Percipient met with NGA and asked to set up a
demonstration. NGA agreed but requested that Percipient “ease up on the
legal pressure.” Compl. ¶ 118. Percipient then demonstrated Mirage’s
abilities to several NGA representatives in December 2021, at the end of
which NGA concluded that Percipient’s software met “all of NGA’s
analytical transformation requirements.” Compl. ¶ 120.

       Over the next several months, the parties worked to reach an
agreement that would allow NGA to test Mirage with live data, something
that Percipient agreed to do at no cost. Just before signing an agreement to
that effect, however, NGA changed its tune. Citing legal and security
complexities, NGA would no longer use live data and would instead use
previously released and publicly available images. Percipient pushed back,
claiming that these images would not allow NGA to test Mirage’s geospatial
module or some of its unique features, such as its ability to alert changes over
time. After significant delay, NGA relented and allowed the use of live data.

        NGA completed its testing of Mirage in October 2022. Based on the
results, Percipient suspected that NGA was not assessing Mirage as a
possible commercial solution for SAFFIRE’s computer vision requirements
because, among other reasons, Percipient could only identify four NGA
searches over the 12-week testing period. Thus, Percipient offered to extend
the testing period, again at no cost, so NGA could more fully evaluate Mirage
as a computer vision system. Percipient’s suspicions appeared to be
confirmed, though, when NGA explained one month later that it had
evaluated Mirage as “an enterprise Machine Learning Platform,” and not “as
an Analytical tool.” Compl. ¶ 137.

       After Percipient’s efforts to be incorporated into SAFFIRE proved
unfruitful, it filed this protest. In its complaint, Percipient alleges that the
agency violated its statutory and regulatory obligations by wastefully
pursuing a development solution when a possible commercial solution
existed. It also alleges that the agency unlawfully delegated inherent
government authority when it allowed its contractor, CACI, to determine
agency policy on commercial technology. Finally, Percipient believes that
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the agency arbitrarily handled the SAFFIRE project. In response, the
government and CACI have moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that Percipient’s protest is barred by the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act’s (FASA) task order bar.

                                DISCUSSION

        Like all federal courts, we possess limited jurisdiction, with ours
being defined mainly by the Tucker Act. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d
1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under the Tucker Act, we have
jurisdiction over bid protests that allege a “violation of statute or regulation
in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.”
28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1).

        Even if a protest falls within the Tucker Act’s jurisdictional grant, it
may still be barred by FASA. Through FASA, Congress effectively
eliminate[d] all judicial review for protests made in connection with a
procurement designated as a task order.” 22nd Cent. Techs., Inc. v. United
States, 57 F.4th 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2023). In particular, FASA excludes from
our jurisdiction any protest “in connection with the issuance or proposed
issuance of a task or delivery order.” 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f)(1). An agency’s
challenged action is “in connection with the issuance” of a task order if there
is a direct and causal relationship between the two. SRA Int’l v. United States,
766 F.3d 1409, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

        Here, Percipient’s protest is directly and causally related to the
agency’s issuance of Task Order 1. Specifically, Percipient alleges that—
after the agency issued Task Order 1, which directed CACI to develop and
deliver a computer vision system—the agency violated §3453 because it
failed to consider whether Percipient’s product could meet those same
requirements. That challenge is barred by FASA.

       First, it is unclear whether §3453 requires an agency to consider
commercial products after it issues a task order—an issue we need not
decide. But even if it does, that task order would be the “direct and immediate
cause” of the agency’s statutory obligation to consider those commercial
products. See Mission Essential Pers. v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 170, 178
(2012) (holding that FASA barred a protest because an agency’s challenged
action was the “direct and immediate cause” of the issued task order). In other

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words, without the task order, the work that Percipient is challenging would
not be taking place and Percipient could not allege this §3453 violation.
Second, the agency’s alleged procurement decision not to consider
commercial products is not “logically distinct” from its decision to procure
that same computer system through a task order. See 22nd Cent. Techs., Inc.
v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 152, 157 (2021) (holding that FASA applies
unless a procurement decision is “logically distinct” from the issuance of a
task order). Instead, that decision would be in direct response to the task order
that the agency had already issued.

       In short, the protest cannot be abstracted away from CACI’s
performance under a task order. And certainly, if Percipient prevailed on the
merits, any meaningful relief would require this court to partially suspend or
discontinue performance under that task order, which further evidences the
connection between the challenge and the task order. See SRA, 766 F.3d at
1414 (explaining that a protestor’s requested relief can support the
application of FASA’s task order bar). We hold that Percipient’s protest is
“in connection with the issuance” of a task order and is therefore barred by
FASA from being brought in this court.

                               CONCLUSION

       In sum, we lack subject matter jurisdiction over Percipient’s protest.
Its challenge to the agency’s actions under §3453 is “in connection with the
issuance of a task order” and is barred by FASA. Thus, the motions to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are granted. The Clerk of Court is
directed to enter judgment accordingly. No costs.

                                            s/Eric G. Bruggink
                                            ERIC G. BRUGGINK
                                            Senior Judge

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