Court Opinion

ID: 9866385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 11:41:03.769664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:24.356811
License: Public Domain

Eberly, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the judgment of reversal in this case. The sole reason for this court’s action is fairly disclosed by the following extract from the majority opin*586ion: “We agree with plaintiff’s counsel that evidence that defendant carried liability insurance is admissible to prove the relation of master and servant, or any other relation upon which liability can be predicated, where, as in the case at bar, it is an issue under the pleadings. * * * But, in the case at bar, the form in which the question was asked precludes this argument because it shows on its face that it did not tend to1 prove any such issue. The question asked made no reference to the cab in which plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident and was clearly offered for the purpose of informing the jury that an insurance company, and not the defendants, would pay any judgment they might render.”
This also appears as the sole reason for reversal, as stated in the first paragraph of the syllabus.
It may be said in passing that the motion of appellants for a new trial, filed in the trial court, contains as an assignment of error no charge of misconduct of plaintiff’s attorney during the trial. But, without reference to questions, upon which the case is by the majority opinion made to turn, having been properly raised in the trial court, we are impressed by the view that the opinion proceeds on an assumption of facts which the record does not support; that it ignores the scope and effect of the real issue presented by the record; and expresses a conclusion which, in view of the actual issue to which it is by the majority opinion applied, is wholly without support of the opinions which are relied upon to sustain it.
The transaction in suit is one which the police power of this state has expressly regulated, and the incidents which compose it must be viewed in the light of the duties ouy statutes enjoin. These are expressed in chapter 147, Laws 1929. They were enacted by the legislature of that year, approved April 6, 1929, and in force and effect on September 1, 1933, the date of the accident which forms the subject of the present action.
The act is entitled: “An act relating to taxicabs and public cars and providing for the filing of insurance policies, *587surety braids or securities with the state railway commission for the protection of the public; and to provide penalties for the violation thereof.”
This act contains four sections.
Section 1 defines the terms “taxicab” and “public car.”
Section 2 provides: “No person, firm, association or corporation shall operate or use any taxicab in any manner as above defined in the state of Nebraska until there has been filed or deposited with the Nebraska state railway commission either a liability insurance policy or a surety bond with an approved surety company as surety or negotiable and salable securities at the option of such person, firm, association, or corporation but which shall be approved by the commission, in such sum' and with such other terms and provisions and on such conditions as the commission may deem necessary adequately to protect the interest of the public having due regard for the number of persons and amount of property affected.”
Section 3 relates to the application of the terms of the act to public cars, and section 4 constitutes the provisions for penalties for a violation thereof.
It will be noted that by the terms of this act certain regulatory powers are expressly vested in the Nebraska state railway commission.' This is an agency of the state, constitutionally created, and endowed with certain powers in their nature both executive and legislative. It is therefore within the reason of the rule which declares that the public official acts and proceedings of the legislative and executive departments of the state and national governments may be noticed judicially. 7 Ency. of Evidence, 983.
So, also, “Where a statute authorizes executive officers to make general rules for the conduct of public business, and such rules are duly made and published, the courts will take judicial notice of them.”: 7 Ency. of Evidence, 990.
In Larson v. First Nat. Bank of Pender, 66 Neb. 595, 72 N. W. 729, this court was committed to the view: “Where a statute authorizes executive officers to make general rules for the conduct of public business, and such rules are duly *588made and published, the courts will take judicial notice of them.”
It, therefore, follows that, in a proper case, it is the duty of this court to judicially notice that prior to the 1st day of September, 1933, after due notice to all persons interested, an open public hearing by the Nebraska state railway commission was had and held, and regulations, provisions, and conditions contemplated by section 2, ch. 147, Laws 1929, were by it then duly made, adopted, prescribed, approved, and published as necessary to adequately protect the interest of the public, having due regard for the number o£ persons and amount of. property affected, and have ever since such adoption remained and continued in force and effect. That, by the directions and requirements of the state railway commission, the following, so adopted and approved, constitute a part of all liability insurance policies filed under the provisions of said act:
“1. In consideration of the premium stated in the policy and determined in accordance with the provisions of the policy and/or indorsements attached thereto, the company hereby waives a description of the automobiles to- be.insured thereunder, and agrees to pay, subject to the limits of liability set forth in the policy, any final judgment for personal injury, including death resulting therefrom, sustained by any person other than an employee of the assured (while engaged in the maintenance or operation of the assured’s automobile) caused by any and all passenger carrying automobiles operated by the assured. The named assured states by acceptance of this indorsement that the list of passenger, carrying vehicles contained in said policy is a complete list of all passenger carrying vehicles owned by him at the inception of said policy, and the assured agrees to immediately notify the company and the Nebraska state railway commission of any additional passenger carrying vehicles placed in service.”
Further, “9. It is understood and agreed that this policy is accepted and approved by the Nebraska state railway commission under the express promise and condition on the *589part of the company, that nothing in the policy to which this indorsement is attached or in any indorsement already attached or which may hereafter be attached, which is inconsistent with the terms of this indorsement, shall in any manner affect the validity of this indorsement.”
These provisions, if valid, have the full force and effect of law, and, in view of their contractual nature, could hardly be questioned in this proceeding.
Issues in legal controversies are made up of two essential elements, viz., the facts, and the law applicable to the same.
In the first paragraph of plaintiff’s petition, in addition to formal matters, it is alleged: “The defendant, Publix Cars, Inc., is a corporation organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the state of Nebraska for the purpose of conducting, operating and maintaining taxicabs for hire as common carriers in the aforesaid city of Omaha, Douglas county, Nebraska; that defendants, Elmer Denson and B. J. Reynolds, are citizens of the state of Nebraska, residing in the said city of Omaha, county and state aforesaid.”
The second paragraph of plaintiff’s petition contains the following: “That on or about the first day of September, 1933, at about the hour of 9:15 o’clock p. m., plaintiff approached a taxicab stand operated by the defendant, Publix Cars, Inc., at Twenty-fourth and Cuming streets in said city of Omaha, intending to become a passenger for hire of said defendant, and requested that he be taken to his home at 1002 No. Forty-ninth street in said city of Omaha; that he was told to enter a cab operated by and bearing the name of the defendant, Publix Cars, Inc.; that the defendant, Elmer Denson, was the driver of said cab, and at said time the said defendant, B. J. Reynolds, was the owner of said cab, and that the same was being used and operated by the defendant, Elmer Denson, in the taxicab business of the defendants, Publix Cars, Inc., and B. J. Reynolds, and that the said Elmer Denson was legally using and operating the same under their direction and with their permission.”
Plaintiff’s petition then sets out the details as to the happening of the accident, the specific acts of negligence on *590part of defendants, the injuries sustained by plaintiff, and closes with a prayer for the amount of damages alleged to have been suffered.
The answer of defendants admits the allegations of paragraph 1 of plaintiff’s petition. In paragraph 2 of the answer, defendants admit that “on or about the date mentioned in plaintiff’s petition, while riding in a taxicab, plaintiff sustained some slight injuries, the exact nature of which is not known to defendants, but which defendants allege are not of the character nor as serious as set forth in plaintiff’s petition.” Paragraph 3 of the answer reads as follows: “Further answering defendants deny all and singular the allegations of plaintiff’s petition not herein admitted.” Paragraph 4 of the answer sets out the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff and prays that plaintiff’s petition be dismissed at plaintiff’s costs.
It is manifest that the relationship of the Publix Cars, Inc., and its legal responsibility for the cab driver operating the cab at the time of the accident in which plaintiff was injured is squarely put in issue by these pleadings. The case was tried on the theory that new matter alleged in the answer was denied.
At the close of the trial, the motion of counsel for the Publix Cars, Inc., for a directed verdict was as follows: “Now, at the close of all of the evidence, the defendant, the Publix Cars, Inc., moves the court to direct the jury to return á verdict in favor of the said defendant, or to dismiss the jury and enter judgment in favor of the defendant, for the following reasons, and each of them, to wit: 1. That the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor and against the defendant. 2. The evidence wholly fails to establish a relationship of master and servant between the said defendant and the defendant, Denson, the driver of the cab. 3. The evidence wholly fails to show that the defendant had any control or direction over the movements and operation of the taxicab involved in this accident.”
At the same time, in open court, the Commercial Stand*591ard Insurance Company, without objection on part of defendants, and by and through defendants’ attorney, intervened and presented the following motion: “Now, at the close of all of the evidence, the defendant, Commercial Standard Insurance Company, moves the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in favor of the said defendant, or to dismiss the jury and enter judgment in favor of the defendant, Commercial Standard Insurance Company, for the following reason, to. wit: 1. That the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor and against the defendant, Commercial Standard Insurance Company.”
Both of these motions were overruled. The insurance company filed no motion for a new trial. But that it became in fact a party to the proceeding is recognized by the trial court in the bill of exceptions settled.
In view of the admissions of the answer, it is plain that we have in this case a transaction squarely within the provisions of chapter 147, Laws 1929, and the terms employed in the pleadings are presumptively used in the sense defined by that act.
Under the issues made by the pleadings, it is plain that the actual relation of the Publix Cars, Inc., to the offending vehicle is vital. The real question presented is: Was the taxicab in which the plaintiff received his injuries then employed in the business for which the Publix Cars, Inc., was admittedly organized to transact, and which it was alleged that corporation was then carrying on in conjunction with other defendants? While the rights alleged to have been possessed by the Publix Cars, Inc., are, in places in the record, referred to as “ownership,” ownership is recognized by the authorities as an elastic term. Thus, it is said: “The word ‘owner,’ when used in connection with personal property, does not mean necessarily the absolute legal owner only, but it may also apply to any person having-the possession and control of the property. It may include one having the general property, or a special property, or even one in possession by virtue of a lien.” 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) 237. So, also, it includes one who *592has power of disposition, care, control and management of .a chattel; also, any one who has an interest under a special title. 50 C. J. 776.
In view of the policy of the controlling statute, in the instant case it would include any one who, by virtue of contract or agreement, possessed rights in and to the taxicab in its employment in the business of the Publix Cars, Inc. The relation of the offending taxicab to the defendant corporation was challenged and expressly made an issue. The source of proof was confined to the defendants; Under these circumstances plaintiff was relegated to circumstantial evidence. The unquestioned rule on the subject is: “Circumstances that are the ordinary indicia of ownership, or that tend to indicate ownership, are admissible as evidence thereof.” 9 Ency. of Evidence, 263. In support of this text, the following are among the cases cited: “The payment of taxes, procuring a policy of insurance, describing the premises and naming the person to be insured, the act of giving a promissory note to secure against losses, and the payment of assessments to meet losses, are all proper tests of ownership, not conclusive, but competent to be submitted and weighed by the jury.” Hodgdon v. Shannon, 44 N. H. 572. “Insuring of property in one’s name is admissible in evidence to show that the insured managed and controlled it as her own.” Bettes v. Magoon, 85 Mo. 580. “The fact that a man applied for a license to keep a dog is competent evidence that he was the owner or keeper of the dog.” Commonwealth v. Gorman, 16 Gray (Mass.) 601. The principles upon which these decisions are based have been expressly approved in this jurisdiction. Fruide v. State, 66 Neb. 244, 92 N. W. 320; Schiele v. Sanders, 53 Neb. 664, 74 N. W. 39.
It is also undoubtedly true that, even in the jurisdictions which -are cited in the majority opinion, with exceedingly few exceptions, the rule is generally applied that, though evidence may tend to establish that the defendant carried liability insurance, it will not be rendered incompetent or inadmissible on tha.t account where it tends to establish the *593necessary facts that the defendant is the owner or controller of the instrumentality involved; for instance, a truck; or participated in the business in which the offending instrumentality was engaged when the litigable injuries were inflicted. See, Gayheart v. Smith, 240 Ky. 596, 42 S. W. (2d) 877; Hoover v. Turner, 42 Ohio. App. 528, 182 N. E. 598; O'Connor v. Sioux Falls Motor Co., 57 S. Dak. 397, 232 N. W. 904; Biggins v. Wagner, 60 S. Dak. 581, 245 N. W. 385; Perkins v. Rice, 187 Mass. 28, 72 N. E. 323.
In summarizing the evidence, it will be remembered that the allegations contained in the first paragraph of plaintiff’s petition, as hereinbefore quoted, were expressly admitted. The facts alleged in the second paragraph of plaintiff’s petition, though formally denied by pleading, were fully established by plaintiff’s proof; and their existence is not even seriously challenged by defendants’ evidence. The proof also establishes that the defendant Publix Cars, Inc., is engaged in the taxicab business; that there is a fleet of cars on the streets of Omaha, each of which is owned by an individual other than the Publix Cars, Inc.; that each of these cars bears the name of the Publix Cars, and is operated as a Publix Car taxicab by the owner thereof, and such owner pays the Publix Cars, Inc., a certain amount for the right to operate such car as a Publix Car, and without payment of this “stated” fee no car could be operated by its owner as a Publix Car taxicab. It also appears that the Publix Cars, Inc., carried advertising for the Publix Cars, which was of course for the equal benefit of all cars in service. Further, telephone service for all cars of the fleet is also furnished by the Publix Cars, Inc., and the testimony is explicit that each individual cab owner of the fleet pays his contribution for the service the company renders him each day in the way of taxicab passengers or the business he may get. It also appears that the taxicab responsible for the accident in suit was, at that time, owned by Reynolds, but was a member of the Publix Cars, Inc., taxicab fleet in Omaha, and was being operated as a part thereof, making the same contributions and receiving the same *594benefits as were received by the owners of other cars in the . fleet. There is no evidence that the Publix Cars, Inc., was the absolute owner of any car bearing its name or which was under its direction and control. Under these facts, in view of the issues presented for determination, practically all authorities agree that evidence that the defendant carried insurance, liability or other kind, on the instrumentality involved, is properly receivable to establish, in connection with other facts established by proof, that such defendant is the owner or responsible controller of the property so insured.
The question addressed to the president of the Publix Cars, Inc., which the majority opinion quotes and condemns, is certainly one which seeks to develop from an unwilling witness the existence, at the time of the infliction of the injuries in suit, of an automobile insurance policy covering results of accidents “to persons driving and riding in your cabs for fare.” Obviously, it must be admitted that by “your cabs” all cabs in the fleet then operated by the company of this "witness were included. The affirmative an- . swer, which necessarily affirmed the fact that this company maintained insurance on the entire fleet, was, in view of other proof in the record, incontrovertible evidence which disclosed that the company carried insurance on defendant’s cab in suit. The form of the policy referred to is not suggested in the majority opinion, nor, in fact, is it disclosed by the evidence. If we suppose it to be a “blanket” policy covering all cars of the fleet, and that the car in suit was only insured as a member of this fleet, what possible valid reason supports the rule announced in this opinion? If such there be, we respectfully suggest the great importance of advising the profession how the important fact of insurance on a single car may be properly elicited under such conditions, without committing the unforgivable error of disclosing that other cars of the defendant, in no wise connected with the accident or with the lawsuit arising therefrom, were also insured. Is a “blanket” insurance policy an unsurmountable legal barrier to ascertaining, in a proper *595case, that a single car embraced therein is thereby insured?
But we gather from the majority opinion (including the authorities cited in support thereof) that it is wholly premised on the assumption that they are dealing with liability insurance, in the form repeatedly before this court, wherein the private owner of an automobile is indemnified and protected by private contract against the result of his own wrongs. That is not our present case. Here, we are dealing with a public agency in its exercise and discharge: of public duties, as to which the public policy of the state exacts prescribed compliance. This includes the nature and forms of insurance it is required to have and maintain. The ordinary presumption, in the absence of clear and direct evidence to the contrary, supports the conclusion that the insurance which the Publix Cars, Inc., had and possessed at the time of the accident was such as is required by chapter 147, Laws 1929, and regulations pursuant thereto, as a condition precedent to the commencement of the business it was organized to carry on and to its continuance therein.
On this basis, in the instant case we are not concerned with questions arising out of a private contract for indemnity protecting a tort-feasor from the results of a private' wrong by him inflicted. Here, we have for consideration, in effect, a police regulation established primarily for the protection of the public. In legal effect, it provides protection to the public (and those who compose it) for injuries suffered by imposing a positive duty on one engaged in carrying and transporting passengers in taxicabs for hire to comply with the terms of the controlling statute and regulations pursuant thereto by providing and maintaining in force contracts of insurance wherein the positive obligation is imposed on and accepted by the insurer (as to such injuries within the limits of his liability set forth in such policy or contract), to promptly pay and discharge “any final judgment for personal. injury, including death resulting therefrom, sustained by any person * * * caused by any and all passenger carrying automobiles operated by the assured.”
*596As to the identity of the offending car, these rules and conditions thus prescribed by the commission, in effect, provide that the insurer shall waive a description of the automobiles to be insured by his contract, and, in addition thereto, shall agree to pay any final judgment for all deaths and personal injuries caused by any and all passenger carrying automobiles operated by the assured.
It will be noted that under the above provisions recovery for damages suffered is in no manner predicated on the identity of the offending car, but is established by proof of' the existence of public insurance protecting the carrier and proof of damages inflicted by any or all of the passenger-carrying automobiles operated by the assured. In connection with other facts in the record the inference is unavoidable that Publix Cars, Inc., in its taxicab business, at the: time of the accident in suit, carried insurance on all of its taxicabs, which constituted its fleet, and of which the offending taxicab was a member, and that the plaintiff was injured by a taxicab operated by said Publix Cars, Inc.
I submit that, by these facts, the existence of insurance secured and maintained by this taxicab company was properly established, and its relation to the instrumentalities, covered by this insurance properly shown.
It follows that the rule of exclusion of evidence announced in the majority opinion, as applied to the actual facts in the present case, is wholly unjustified, and is not sustained by logic, reason, nor any of the authorities cited in the opinion.
I am not in accord with the action of this court in revoking the rule as to cross-examination promulgated in Jessup v. Davis, 115 Neb. 1, 211 N. W. 190. The reasons which were thought controlling at the time of its adoption appear in that opinion.
It will be noted in passing that cases approved and cited in the majority opinion, in support thereof, are not wholly in harmony with each other. Indeed, for example, Gerry v. Neugebauer, 83 N. H. 23, 136 Atl. 751, is as repugnant to the doctrine announced by the writer of the majority opinion in the instant case as it is to the rule revoked.
*597During the past year within this nation, as the result of accidents from various causes, there have occurred 99,000 fatalities, 365,000 cases of permanent disability, and 9,-100,000 cases of temporary disability. Of these, Nebraska has had her due proportionate share. It is commonly admitted that in many instances actions for legal redress by these unfortunates have furnished the occasion for manifest abuse of legal process and improper practice of law in connection therewith.
The evidence adduced at an investigation ordered by the appellate division of the supreme court of New York on February 7, 1928, certainly sustains the conclusion stated, and an article appearing in the bound volume of the American Law Review for 1927, at page 77, entitled, “Why Do Courts Coddle Automobile Indemnity Companies,” suggests the necessity of the rule as heretofore announced by this court, to prevent evils which the action now taken by the majority opinion will necessarily conceal. This action creates a regrettable uncertainty in this class of actions in this state in procedure. The rule is revoked, and nothing replaces it. Where are trial courts to find authoritative directions for procedure?
The facts in the instant case in no manner involved the application of the rule of cross-examination. The language of the opinion on this subject was selected with the express intention of announcing no rule of court on the subject. Improper cross-examination not being in any manner involved in the record here before us, the language of the opinion relating thereto may not be considered as other than obiter dicta, and without binding force and, effect. It is obvious that the situation created by the action of this court will continue as an appeal to court or legislature for relief from uncertainty in procedure, to the end that the rights of unfortunate victims of accidents in this state may be properly safeguarded and not imperiled by dangers wholly unconnected with the merits of their claims.