Court Opinion

ID: 9756458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:29:40.361897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:23.001154
License: Public Domain

WATT, J.,
dissenting:
11 The Court's order refuses to assume original jurisdiction at this time and directs the parties to again seek relief in the Court of Criminal Appeals (Criminal Appeals Court) by way of a joint application presumably to "correct" that court's statement providing that "[the Speech and Debate Clause in the Oklahoma Constitution includes an express exception for felonies.1 I dissent. Simply because parties may agree upon a question of law, such an agreement does not bind a tribunal. Rather than declining to invoke our constitutional, general superin tending control over all inferior courts,2 I would: 1) recognize that the parties' agreement that the Criminal Appeals Court erred in its statement associated with the Speech and Debate Clause binds neither this Court nor that tribunal; 2) address the applicability of 26 0.8.2001 § 16-1083 to the defendant/petitioner, Deborah Ann Leftwich (Left, wich/Legislator); 83) refuse to issue an advisory opinion4 regarding the breadth of the speech and debate clause; and 4) assume original jurisdiction and prohibit the District Attorney of Oklahoma County from proceeding in the criminal matter as currently charged while affording the opportunity for filing criminal charges under any other existing appropriate statutory provision.
RELEVANT FACTS
T2 On June 9, 2011, the Criminal Appeals Court denied the Legislator's petition for writ of prohibition and alternative request for a writ of mandamus. The Legislator sought to prohibit the District Court from proceeding in a matter charging her with the offense of soliciting and/or accepting a bribe from another for withdrawal of candidacy pursuant to 26 0.8.2001 § 16-108. The Criminal Appeals Court determined that: there was an express exception for felonies to the Speech and Debate Clause found in Okla. *752Const., art. 5, § 22; and inadequate facts were presented to determine whether candidacy had been established under the statutory provision. The Legislator filed an application with this Court to assume original jurisdiction and petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus, or in the alternative, declaratory relief on June 22, 2011. Left-wich asks this Court to determine the breadth of protection offered by the Speech and Debate Clause, ie its applicability to criminal cases.
T3 a) The parties' agreement that erroneous statements were made by the Criminal Appeals Court in its order denying the petition for writ of prohibition and in the alternative petition for writ of mandamus does not bind that Court nor does it confer jurisdiction for the petition for rehearing to be filed out of time.
4 4 The majority invites the parties back to the Criminal Appeals Court to afford that tribunal the opportunity to revisit its order denying the petition for writ of prohibition and, in the alternative, petition for writ of mandamus. The relief we grant, while stating we are not assuming original jurisdiction, is not available under the rules of the Criminal Appeals Court.
5 The Criminal Appeals Court does allow rehearing in an original action where relief has been afforded or denied. Nevertheless, its rules provide that a timely petition "shall be made by the attorney of record, and filed with the Clerk within twenty (20) days from the date on which the opinion in the cause was filed."5 The Criminal Appeals Court's order issued June 9, 2011. We should not now, in mid-September and well out of time, require the Criminal Appeals Court to review an order which it would not have addressed under its procedural rules.
6 The majority sends the matter back to from whence it came because "[alll counsel agreed that a portion of the order issued by the Court of Criminal Appeals should not be enforced in the underlying criminal proceeding." The parties may, not by agreement or otherwise, confer jurisdiction on the Criminal Court of Appeals.6 Furthermore, a parties agreement on an issue will not bind a tribunal.7
T7 b) As a matter of law, charges leveled under 26 0.8.2001 $ 16-108 may not stand. There is no evidence that the Legislator "withdrew" from a political contest within the meaning of the statutory provision.
T8 Generally this Court follows the construction given to criminal statutes by the Criminal Appéals Court. Nevertheless, we note that the Criminal Court has not, in this case8 chosen to construe the statutory provision at issue or to determine its applicability to this cause.: Additionally, the statutory provision has not been addressed in any other opinion of this Court or of the Criminal Court of Appeals. While we recognize that there is ample precedent that prohibits this Court from construing a criminal statute previously construed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, it is equally clear that upon their failure to do so that we may proceed by virtue of our co-extensive appellate jurisdiction.9
T9 Title 26 0.8.2001 $ 16-108 provides that "[alny person who shall solicit or accept from another anything of value for withdrawing from any political contest as a candidate or nominee for any office at any election shall be deemed guilty of a felony." The District Attorney seeks to apply 21 0.8.2001 § 18710 *753and Ethics Commission Rule 257: 1-1-2, 74 0.8. Supp.2007, Ch. 62, App.11 to define the term, candidacy. The attempt is inapposite.
{10 There is no need for statutory interpretation. If the language is plain and clearly expresses the legislative will, further inquiry is unnecessary.12 The Legislature has clearly and unequivocally expressed its intent that § 187 apply only to related sections found in title 21 stating that the definitions "[as] used in Sections 1 through 3 of this act [this act relating to title 21 0.8. §§ 187 through 187.2 concerning Campaign Contributions]. [Emphasis supplied.] Likewise, Ethics Commission Rule 257: 1-1-2, 74 0.8. Supp.2007, Ch. 62, App. echos the same legislative intent providing in pertinent part:
"Masculine words, whenever used in this title, shall include the feminine and neuter, and the singular includes the plural, unless otherwise specified. In addition, the following words or terms, when used in this title, shall have the following meaning ..." [Emphasis supplied.]
Therefore, as a matter of law, charges leveled under 26 0.S8.2001 § 16-108 may not stand as there is no evidence that the Legislator "withdrew" from a political contest within the meaning of the statutory provision.
{11 c) Because the charges levied, as a matter of law, may not stand, no need exists to answer the broader constitutional question involving the speech and debate clause. To do so results in issuance of a purely advisory opinion.
1 12 Resolution of the instant cause is affordable on - non-constitutional grounds. Most assuredly, the charges levied, as a matter of law, may not stand. Therefore, we need not address the broader question of whether the Legislator's actions would have been protected under the Oklahoma Constitution's speech and debate clause.13 Furthermore, we take the opportunity to issue what would, under the facts we have before us, be an advisory opinion.14 Finally, this Court should not leave resolution of the same to our counterpart in the criminal arena.
CONCLUSION
{13 I would assume original jurisdiction and prohibit the district court from proceeding further in the criminal matter as currently charged. I would urge that nothing in this writing should be interpreted to prohibit the District Attorney of Oklahoma County from proceeding against the Legislator under any *754other existing appropriate statutory provision.

. - Order Denying Petition for Writ of Prohibition and in the Alternative Petition for Writ of Mandamus, No PR-2011-319 filed on June 9, 2011, p. 3. The Okla. Const. art. 5, § 22 providing:
"Senators and Representatives shall, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same, and, for any speech or debate in either House, shall not be questioned in any other place."

. The Okla. Const. art. 7, § 4 providing in pertinent part
. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and Boards created by law. ...'
Jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals is not a legislative matter, but a constitutional issue to be determined by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the jurisdictional limits of the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals are set and defined by the this Court, not the Court of Criminal Appeals. In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, 145 P.3d 1040.

. Title 26 0.$.2001 § 16-108 providing:
"Any person who shall solicit or accept from another anything of value for withdrawing from any political contest as a candidate or nominee for any office at any election shall be deemed guilty of a felony."

. Application of Fun Country Development Auth., 1977 OK 138, 566 P.2d 1167; City of Shawnee v. Taylor, 1943 OK 11, 132 P.2d 950.

. Rule 3.14, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 22 0.S. Supp.2003, Ch. 18, App.

. - Matter of Application of C.A.D., 1992 OK 89, fn. 36, 839 P.2d 165; Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co., 1989 OK 140, 786 P.2d 1230.

. See, State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. T.D.G., 1993 OK 126, 861 P.2d 990; Bynum v. Bynum, 1938 OK 520, 84 P.2d 424.

. See, State ex rel. Ikard v. Russell, 1912 OK 425, 124 P. 1092.

. The Okla. Const. art. 7, § 4, see note 2, supra.

. Title 21 0.$.2001 § 187 providing in pertinent part:
"As used in Sections 1 through 3 of this act [this act relating to Title 21 O.S. §§ 187 through 187.2 relating to Campaign Contributions]:
*753... 4. 'Candidate' means a person who seeks nomination or election to state or local office. An individual is a candidate when the individual:
a. has filed a declaration of candidacy for any state office with the Secretary of the State Election Board ... or ...
e. solicits or accepts contributions, makes expenditures or gives consent to an individual, organization, party committee, or other committee to solicit or accept contributions or make expenditures to secure election to any state or local office at any time, whether or not the office for which the individual will seek nomination or election is known when the:
(1) solicitation is made,
(2) contribution is accepted, or
(3) expenditure is made...." [Emphasis provided.]

. Ethics Commission Rule 257: 1-1-2, 74 O.S. Supp.2007, Ch. 62, App. providing in pertinent part:
ax . 'Candidate' means a person who seeks nomination or election to state office. An individual is a candidate when the individual:
(1) has filed a declaration of candidacy for any state office with the Secretary of the State Election Board;
(2) has filed a declaration of candidacy with the Secretary of State and has drawn active opposition;
... (4) solicits or accepts contributions, makes expenditures or gives consent to an individual, organization, party committee, or other committee to solicit or accept contributions or make expenditures to secure election to any state office at any time, whether or not the office for which the individual will seek nomination or election is known when the:
(A) solicitation is made;
(B) contribution is accepted; or
(C) expenditure is made...."

. Whitev. Lim, 2009 OK 79, 1 12, 224 P.3d 679; Rout v. Crescent Public Works Auth., 1994 OK 85, T 10, 878 P.2d 1045.

. State ex rel. Fent v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 2003 OK 29, 66 P.3d 432.

. Application of Fun Country Development Auth., see note 4, supra; City of Shawnee v. Taylor, see note 4, supra.