Court Opinion

ID: 9943673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-24 01:09:36.680064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:43.706664
License: Public Domain

02/23/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                          Assigned on Briefs October 3, 2023

  STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROBERT BEVIS, JR. A/K/A BUTCH BEVIS

                    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dyer County
                      No. 19-CR-233      Mark L. Hayes, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                           No. W2022-01740-CCA-R3-CD
                       ___________________________________

A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Bevis, Jr., of two counts
of attempted first degree premeditated murder and one count of employing a firearm during
the commission of a dangerous felony, and the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of
thirty-five years at eighty-five percent for the attempted murder convictions and a
consecutive ten-year sentence at one hundred percent for the firearm conviction. On
appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court failed to declare a mistrial in response to
numerous outbursts by the victims’ families; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
convictions; (3) the trial court erred in overruling the defense’s objection when the
prosecutor misrepresented evidence during closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred
in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and attempted first degree murder
without serious bodily injury. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but
remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 4 to reflect the accurate
conviction offense of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed
                                  and Remanded

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY, JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Brett B. Stein (on appeal), Memphis, Tennessee and Hal Dorsey (at trial), Trenton,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert Bevis, Jr.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; and Danny Goodman, Jr., District Attorney General, for the appellee,
State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION
        In 2019, a Dyer County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant on three counts of
attempted first degree premeditated murder and one count of employing a firearm during
the commission of a dangerous felony. Thereafter, the State entered a nolle prosequi on
the attempted murder charge involving victim Haleaka Childress.

        At the Defendant’s trial, Lynn Waller, a deputy with the Dyer County Sheriff’s
Office, testified that on February 7, 2019, he was dispatched to Earl Carter Road following
a shooting. When Deputy Waller first arrived on the scene a little before 5:00 p.m., he
noted that an SUV was off the road in a ditch and that a white truck had collided with the
front porch of a nearby house. He observed an older lady at the house tending to a woman,
later identified as Haleaka Childress, who appeared to have been shot and seemed to be in
pain. He also saw a man, later identified as Jesse Palmer,1 the driver of the truck, who had
been shot in the face and was panicking. Deputy Waller said Palmer told him that the SUV
belonged to the Defendant, who had shot him. When Deputy Waller asked why the
Defendant shot him, Palmer stated he did not know, and when he asked if it was over drugs,
Palmer said, “No, I swear, I don’t know.” Deputy Waller said he tried to calm down Palmer
because Palmer believed he was going to die from the gunshot wound to his face.

       Deputy Waller said that he never saw the Defendant on the scene, just the
Defendant’s SUV. After securing the scene, he drove in the direction of the Defendant’s
home, and another man flagged him down, telling him he had just seen the Defendant
jumping over a fence and running across a field with his crossbow in hand. Deputy Waller
then saw the Defendant and a woman in the field and ordered them to stop. When Deputy
Waller took the Defendant into custody, the Defendant said, “They tried to shoot me.”
When Deputy Waller asked him what he was talking about, the Defendant said, “Well,
something went on.” Deputy Waller noted that the Defendant never provided further
explanation as to what happened. A short time later, Deputy Waller had his trained canine
track the path that the Defendant followed, which led to the discovery of the Defendant’s
crossbow in the woods.

       On cross-examination, Deputy Waller denied that the Defendant ever told him that
Palmer had pulled a gun on him or that he took the gun from Palmer before he fired into
Palmer’s truck. Deputy Waller acknowledged that the Defendant’s SUV was almost
completely off the right-hand side of the road, with only the back corner of the vehicle still
on the road.

      On redirect examination, Deputy Waller noted that when he first approached the
Defendant, the Defendant did not have any injuries and was “grinning real big” and acting

        1
          We have spelled the witness’s first name as “Jesse,” in accordance with how this witness’s name
is spelled in both the indictment and his victim impact statement.
                                                  -2-
“[l]ike he was evil.” Deputy Waller stated that the Defendant did not give him a gun. He
said the Defendant never claimed that he took the gun away from Palmer or Clark and
never offered to give him the gun because he was just defending himself.

       On recross examination, Deputy Waller asserted that the Defendant appeared to be
under the influence of methamphetamine at the time he took him into custody.

       Rick Gregory, an investigator with the Dyer County Sheriff’s Department, testified
that on February 7, 2019, he was dispatched to the scene because there was an active
shooter on the scene. Investigator Gregory took numerous photographs of the scene and
observed that the victims’ truck, which had been driven by Palmer, was “covered with
blood.” He identified several photographs of the truck that had crashed into the front porch
and several photographs of the second house where another victim Bradley Clark had gone
after being shot. Investigator Gregory said that Palmer’s truck had two bullet holes—one
below the gas fill area and one behind the left rear tire. He also identified photographs he
took of the Defendant’s SUV, where a nine-millimeter casing was found on the truck’s
floormat.

        Jessica Byrd, a deputy for the Dyer County Sheriff’s Office, testified that she was
instructed to go past the location where Palmer and Childress were to another address on
Earl Carter Road where victim Bradley Clark was located. Upon arriving there, she saw
Clark, who had sustained an injury to his face and claimed he had been shot. At the time,
she tried to get Clark to sit down because she was afraid he was going to pass out from his
injury.

       On cross-examination, Deputy Byrd acknowledged that Clark’s mother attempted
to grab him by the arm to pull him out of the ambulance so she could transport him to the
hospital herself. She said Clark and his mother got into his mother’s vehicle; however,
when Deputy Byrd blocked Clark’s mother’s car from leaving as Deputy Byrd was
awaiting instructions from her sergeant, Clark exited his mother’s car and approached
Deputy Byrd aggressively, indicating that he would hurt her if she did not allow them to
pass. Deputy Byrd acknowledged that emotions were running high at that time and that
she did not feel threatened by Clark’s behavior.

       Jesse Palmer, one of the victims in this case, testified that he was currently
incarcerated at the Dyer County Jail while he was awaiting trial in an unrelated case.
Palmer said that on February 7, 2019, he was with Bradley Clark and Haleaka Childress,
and they were headed back to Clark’s home after visiting friends. Palmer admitted that he
had been drinking Crown Royal and using methamphetamine earlier that day, although he
did not feel that he was under the influence of these substances when the shooting incident
occurred. At the time, Palmer was driving Clark’s truck, and he had turned onto Earl Carter
                                           -3-
Road when he saw the Defendant driving toward them. Palmer said that he and the
Defendant had been friends since they were young and that he had no issues with the
Defendant before seeing him that day. However, Palmer acknowledged hearing about an
incident, wherein the Defendant beat up Clark at Clark’s home two weeks earlier. Palmer
said that a few days after Clark’s beating, he and Clark encountered the Defendant, who
apologized to Clark for beating him up, and Palmer believed the issues between the
Defendant and Clark had been resolved.

        Palmer said that when he first saw the Defendant on February 7, 2019, the
Defendant’s SUV was “swerving back and forth,” and he understood this to mean that the
Defendant wanted to talk to them. Palmer said he stopped and rolled down his window,
and the Defendant stopped his SUV right beside him and rolled down his window. At the
time, the Defendant was drinking beer or alcohol from a bottle, and Palmer offered him
some of his Crown Royal. The Defendant took a drink from the Crown Royal bottle and
then the Defendant pulled out his gun, setting it on the windowsill of his SUV. Palmer
asked the Defendant why he had pulled out his gun, and the Defendant provided a rambling
reply. Palmer stated that the Defendant was routinely hyperactive and that he was generally
concerned when in the presence of the Defendant, but he was particularly concerned that
day because the Defendant had pulled out his gun. When Palmer continued to ask the
Defendant why he had his gun out, the Defendant ignored his questions and asked Palmer
if he wanted to buy some drugs. Palmer said he turned around and began talking to
Childress and Clark, and the Defendant leaned over and pointed his gun at the back of
Palmer’s head. When Palmer turned back around to face him, the Defendant shot Palmer
in the face from a distance of a few inches away. When asked to describe what it felt like
to be shot, Palmer said, “I remember a loud noise . . . some burning, I remember my head
going back real hard, I remember it going black for a moment, then white; and then I slowly
started . . . actually see[ing] what was going on around me.” Palmer stated that he heard
two gunshots, with the first shot hitting him in the face and the second shot bringing him
back to consciousness.

        Palmer explained that the bullet that hit him entered his face and came out his neck,
which “shattered [his] lower jaw” as well as “the top and the bottom of [his] mouth.” He
said this bullet also “cut the nerve that controls [his] facial movements on the left side of
[his] face[,]” which caused him to have “facial palsy[,]” a sort of partial paralysis of his
face. Palmer stated that once the Defendant fired the shots, Palmer’s foot came off the
brake, and his truck began to roll. He noted that the Defendant’s SUV also rolled forward,
and the Defendant was initially unable to get out of his SUV because the vehicles were so
close together. When the Defendant finally exited his SUV, he held up his gun and fired
toward the truck Palmer was driving. Palmer said he was able to drive off, and he turned
into the first driveway he came to and rolled into the front porch of the house there. Palmer
then jumped out, banged on the window, and yelled that they had been shot and needed
                                            -4-
help, and the woman inside the house called 9-1-1. At the time, Palmer was bleeding from
the front of his face, his mouth, and the back of his neck, and he was “freaking out because
[he] thought [he] was going to die” Palmer was taken to the Dyersburg Hospital, which
then transported him to The Med in Memphis for surgery. During this period of time, he
was experiencing pain worse than any he had in his life. He said he continued to feel this
pain until the hospital put him to sleep.

      Palmer claimed that at the time the Defendant shot him, neither he, nor Childress,
nor Clark possessed a gun. Palmer said that he never made any threats to the Defendant
and never pulled out any weapons of any kind before the Defendant shot him. When asked
why the Defendant shot him, Palmer said he “didn’t see a reason for him to do it at all”
because he believed he and the Defendant were “friends.” He said he still did not know
why the Defendant shot him.

       On cross-examination, Palmer admitted that on March 30, 2010, he was convicted
of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine and received a four-year sentence. He
also admitted that in July 2020, he was convicted of reckless endangerment with a deadly
weapon. In addition, he acknowledged being charged with a third offense, for which he
was currently incarcerated. Palmer admitted that the day of the shooting, he had smoked
methamphetamine, and he asserted that the Defendant was normally on drugs. He also
said that in the months prior to this incident, he and Clark were addicted to
methamphetamine, and that he, Clark, and the Defendant were engaged in the drug trade.
Palmer also admitted that he had drunk a quarter to a half of a pint of Crown Royal shortly
before he encountered the Defendant on February 7, 2019.

       Palmer said he first learned that Clark and the Defendant had gotten into a fight
when he and Clark went to “Smitty’s” house a few days before the shooting, and Clark said
he was scared to go in because the Defendant was present. Palmer denied that Clark said
he was going to get revenge on the Defendant. Instead, Palmer asserted that Clark was
scared of the Defendant because the Defendant and some of the Defendant’s friends had
come to Clark’s home and had beaten him up. Palmer said he was not aware of any
Facebook posts where Clark had threatened to kill the Defendant.

       Bradley Clark testified that he was currently serving a sentence for possession with
the intent to sell methamphetamine. He admitted that he was addicted to marijuana and
methamphetamine. Clark said that although he was currently incarcerated, he was headed
to an in-patient drug rehabilitation program for six months. He acknowledged that his
criminal history included other convictions, including a domestic violence conviction.
Clark said that he and the Defendant became friends in 2018, and they often used
methamphetamine.

                                           -5-
        Clark stated that approximately fifteen days prior to February 7, 2019, the
Defendant informed him that Clark was going to have to choose whether to hang out with
Palmer or the Defendant because Palmer had gotten the Defendant in trouble. Clark replied
that he did not want to be told with whom he could hang around, and when Palmer suddenly
appeared at his house, Clark encouraged the Defendant and Palmer to work out their
differences. Clark said his conversation with the Defendant never became heated.

       Clark asserted that two or three days after having this conversation with the
Defendant, the Defendant appeared at his home with four of the Defendant’s friends. Clark
said he immediately felt “tension in the air[,]” and then the Defendant “sucker punched
[him above his right ear] out of nowhere.” Clark said this hit knocked him off balance and
then the Defendant hit him another four or five times. Although the Defendant “beat [him]
up pretty bad,” Clark said he did not really fight back because he was trying to defend
himself. At the time, Clark did not possess any weapons. After the fight, the Defendant
and his friends walked out of Clark’s home and left. After this beating, Clark said he felt
“mad, angry, and betrayed, in a rage.” He said he had no idea why the Defendant beat him
up, and he claimed he was afraid the Defendant would hurt him again because the
Defendant was “a big man.” Clark said the Defendant kept telling him not to hang out with
Palmer because Palmer would eventually get him in trouble over drugs.

        Clark stated that after the Defendant beat him up, he sent the Defendant a Facebook
message stating that he had recorded everything the Defendant told him over the phone,
that he was watching him, that he could not run and hide, and that he would have the last
laugh when the Defendant was stuck in jail. Clark also sent a message telling the Defendant
that he had a crossbow for the purpose of “scar[ing] him away,” even though Clark did not
own a crossbow. Clark said he sent the Defendant these messages because he was “mad”
after the Defendant “beat [him] up.” Clark claimed he was fearful that the Defendant would
come back and hurt him worse or hurt the eleven-year-old child living with him. Clark
asserted that his intent to sending the Facebook messages to the Defendant was to keep him
away from him.

       Clark recalled that on February 7, 2019, he was with Jesse Palmer and Haleaka
Childress, and they were coming back from Dyersburg. When they turned onto Earl Carter
Road, they saw the Defendant driving directly toward them, which caused Palmer to pull
over on the shoulder of the road. Clark said the Defendant “swerved” to miss hitting them,
“slammed on [his] brakes[,]” and then backed up so they were lined up “driver window to
driver window.” Clark said Palmer asked the Defendant why he was swerving near them
because Childress was eight months pregnant, and the Defendant started laughing. The
Defendant suddenly quit laughing, and during this tense moment, Palmer noticed that the
Defendant was drinking, so he handed the Defendant a bottle of liquor, and the Defendant
took a drink. Clark stated that when the Defendant handed the liquor bottle back to Palmer,
                                           -6-
the Defendant pulled out a gun and held it in Palmer’s face. Palmer looked over at Clark,
and when Palmer looked back at the Defendant and told him to put the gun up a couple of
times, the Defendant shot him in the face.

       Clark said that at the time, no one in Palmer’s truck had a gun. Clark believed that
the Defendant had fatally shot Palmer, who had fallen motionless against the steering
wheel. The Defendant fired another shot, which hit Childress, jerking her head violently.
The Defendant then fired a third shot, which hit Clark right above his lip, and Clark thought
he was going to die. Clark denied being able to get out of Palmer’s truck by the time the
Defendant shot him. Once Clark was shot, he reached for the door handle and fell out of
the truck.

        Clark said that being shot felt like “the hardest hit” he had “ever taken” and “felt
like a burning sensation, almost like somebody hit [him] with hot lava.” After Clark fell
out of the truck and was lying on the ground, he saw the Defendant get out of his SUV and
begin walking toward the back of Palmer’s truck. Clark believed the Defendant was
coming to shoot him again to make sure he was dead. As the Defendant got to the back of
Palmer’s truck, Palmer’s tires started squealing like he was trying to drive off. Clark said
he knew he needed to get up right then or he was going to die. Clark saw the Defendant
pointing his gun at the back of the truck towards Palmer and Childress, and when Clark
stood up, the Defendant spotted him and pointed his gun at Clark, and Clark ran through
the field toward a ditch.

       As Clark was running, he heard several more shots and felt a few bullets fly by him.
When Clark got to the ditch, he tried to jump over it, but he fell into the middle and climbed
up the other side. He looked back at the Defendant, who was pacing back and forth near
the vehicles, and Clark dialed 9-1-1 as he walking down a trail. At the time, Clark knew
most of his teeth on the left side of his face were missing because he had spit them out.
Clark was eventually taken to the hospital, where he was put in a medically-induced coma.
He said his doctors woke him once to re-inflate his lung and then put him back into a coma.
Clark’s gunshot injury to the face forced him to have multiple surgeries, including five
reconstructive surgeries at Vanderbilt, where doctors removed bone fragments and tooth
fragments from his tongue and the roof of his mouth. Clark said to this day he continued
to have bone and tooth fragments coming to the surface and continued to have pain in his
jaw and difficulty eating. He said the Vanderbilt physicians also had to remove half of his
tongue on the left side and had to remove bullet fragments from his face. He noted that his
doctors actually left a bullet fragment in his throat because it would have caused more
damage to remove it. Clark said he still did not know why the Defendant shot him.

       On cross-examination, defense counsel challenged Clark’s testimony about sending
the Facebook messages because he was afraid of the Defendant, and Clark asserted that the
                                            -7-
Defendant had “intimidated [him], so [he] felt the best thing to do was intimidate him
back.” Clark acknowledged that he sent these Facebook messages to the Defendant
approximately two weeks prior to the shootings but denied that he threatened the Defendant
in these messages. Clark admitted that on February 7, 2019, at 4:32 a.m., the same day as
the shootings, he shared a post on his Facebook page, which originally had been posted by
another individual, which stated: “Mfs think cause you avoid the drama you not with the
shits. Bitch I’ll kill you.” Clark replied to this post by stating, “I understand this
completely and whole heartedly [sic].” Although Clark acknowledged sharing and
responding to the aforementioned post, he denied that he was trying to threaten Defendant
with it.

       Clark admitted that he had been convicted of aggravated assault on September 12,
2012, and received a three-year sentence for this conviction. In addition, he admitted that
he had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver on August
17, 2012, for which he was currently incarcerated. He said on the same date, he was also
convicted of aggravated burglary.

       Clark denied using methamphetamine or marijuana on February 7, 2019, but
admitted he had used methamphetamine in the weeks leading up to that day. Clark
admitted telling an officer during his interview on February 21, 2019, that he smoked some
marijuana the day of the shooting. Clark said he informed Palmer that the Defendant had
beaten him up at his home a few days before the shootings. Palmer saw the marks from
the beating on Clark’s arm, and he asked him about it. However, Clark claimed that he
never told Palmer all of the details about the beating.

       Clark denied having a gun on February 7, 2019, and claimed that he did not own a
gun at that time. He said that he saw the Defendant pull a gun on Palmer and then saw the
Defendant pull the trigger. However, he admitted telling the officer during his interview
on February 21, 2019, that he never saw a gun the day he got shot.

      The Defendant, Robert Bevis, Jr., did not testify at trial.

        Jack Flora, a corporal with the Dyer County Sheriff’s Department, testified that on
February 7, 2019, he went to a home on Earl Carter Road and made contact with Bradley
Clark. At the time, Clark appeared to be in shock and was standing in front of the home.
Corporal Flora said that after Clark was taken to the hospital, he found a glass pipe,
commonly used to ingest drugs, and a cell phone in the flower bed in front of the home,
just a few feet from where Clark had been standing. He said the owner of the home denied
that the pipe or cell phone belonged to him. On cross-examination, Corporal Flora
acknowledged that he did not know to whom the cell phone or the glass pipe belonged.

                                            -8-
       Wesley Brasfield testified that he knew Bradley Clark and the Defendant and that
he was present at Clark’s house in January 2019 when the Defendant and Clark fought.
Brasfield said that the Defendant and Clark began arguing, and then Clark shoved the
Defendant, and they got into a fight. Brasfield said that he broke up the fight, and as they
were leaving, Clark pulled out an assault rifle. He said Clark never actually fired the rifle
at them because when he went to load it, the clip fell out of it. Brasfield claimed he was
scared when Clark pulled out the rifle because he believed that he and the men with him
were about to be shot.

        On cross-examination, Brasfield admitted that he was the Defendant’s cousin. He
also admitted that he had smoked marijuana, used methamphetamine, and had been
drinking alcohol the day of the fight between the Defendant and Clark. However, he
asserted that he did not observe the Defendant using drugs or drinking alcohol that day.
He said he rode with the Defendant and two other men to Clark’s home the night of the
fight. Brasfield said he and the Defendant went into Clark’s home, although the other two
men with them may have come inside as well. When they entered the home, Clark was
sitting on his bed, and the Defendant and Clark began arguing about a phone. He said that
Clark initially shoved the Defendant, and the Defendant beat Clark up, hitting him more
than two or three times. Brasfield said that although Clark was trying to fight back, he
ended up getting beaten up by the Defendant. Brasfield ultimately broke up the fight, and
he and the Defendant and the men with them left because they believed the police were
coming. As they were trying to leave in their vehicle, they saw another car on Clark’s
property. Braswell said that Clark then exited his home, and when Clark cocked his rifle,
“the clip fell out.”

       The State called Mildred Cook as a rebuttal witness. Cook said that she was Bradley
Clark’s grandmother and that she lived across the street from Clark. She said the night of
the January 2019 fight, she went to Clark’s home so they could go to the store for plumbing
supplies, and she parked behind a truck and then honked her horn for Clark. As she did so,
“some boys ran out of the house and jumped in the truck” and began backing up. She said
they did not give her a chance to get out of the way, so she put her vehicle in reverse so
they could get by her to leave. She said the truck with the men immediately left, and she
never saw Clark come outside while the truck was on his property. After the truck left,
Clark came out of his home holding his arm and told her he had gotten into a fight with the
men who had just left. Cook said she never saw Clark with a gun that night and that Clark
did not have a gun at that time. She also said that she had never known Clark to have an
assault rifle. Cook denied that Clark had pointed a gun at the men in the truck before they
left.

      At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of the two counts of
attempted first degree premeditated murder and the one count of employing a firearm
                                            -9-
during the commission of a dangerous felony. During a bifurcated hearing, the jury heard
proof that the Defendant had two prior convictions for sale of over .5 ounce of marijuana,
which were Class E felonies, and a prior conviction for the sale of methamphetamine under
.5 gram, which was a Class C felony, at the time the Defendant committed the firearm
offense. Ultimately, the jury determined that the Defendant had a prior felony conviction
at the time he committed the firearm offense. The trial court then sentenced the Defendant
to concurrent sentences of thirty-five years at eighty-five percent for the attempted murder
convictions and a consecutive sentence of ten years at one hundred percent for the firearm
conviction.

       Thereafter, the Defendant timely filed a motion for new trial and then filed an
amended motion, alleging in pertinent part that the trial court should have granted a mistrial
because of the disruptive conduct by witnesses and family members in the gallery; that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; that the trial court failed to provide a
curative instruction when the State unfairly stated during closing argument that the
Defendant admitted to possessing a firearm; and that the trial court erred by failing to
provide an instruction regarding the voluntary intoxication of the Defendant and by failing
to provide an instruction on attempted first degree murder without serious bodily injury.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, and the Defendant
timely filed a notice of appeal.

                                         ANALYSIS

        I. Mistrial. The Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial
in response to numerous outbursts by the victims’ families. He claims that these outbursts
required several jury-out hearings, which resulted in the trial court providing harsh
warnings to the disruptive parties. While the Defendant acknowledges that the trial court
warned the disruptive parties, he claims that such warnings were “insufficient to un[-]ring
the bell of prejudice” and ultimately tainted the jury’s verdict. In response, the State asserts
that the Defendant waived this issue by failing to request a mistrial until his motion for new
trial and that the Defendant, who failed to request plain error review, has failed to show
that this amounted to plain error. We agree with the State.

       At a bench conference, outside the hearing of the jury, that immediately followed
defense counsel’s opening statement, the trial court advised the State that it would make
the victims’ families leave the courtroom if they were unable to be still, remain quiet, and
stop showing their dissatisfaction with defense counsel. The State assured the court that it
would pass this message on to the victims’ families.

      After the conclusion of Deputy Waller’s testimony and following the jury’s
dismissal for lunch, the trial court announced to the individuals in the gallery that it was
                                             - 10 -
“concerned about the participation of those who are here to observe the trial.” The trial
court then said, “I don’t want to see another expression. I don’t want to hear another peep
out of anybody who’s here. If you’re unhappy with what lawyers are saying, or what the
witness is saying, I’m sorry. That’s part of the trial.” The court then added, “So we’re
going to all be quiet and respectful, or we’re going to have this trial without anybody sitting
in the gallery. Those are the only two choices I’ve got, and don’t make me make that
choice, because I will without hesitation.” The trial court then directly addressed the
Defendant, stating, “Mr. Bevis, I know from time to time, things are gonna [sic] be said
that you absolutely disagree with. I understand that, but remember, to voice or to have a
problem, it doesn’t help your cause. Okay?” The Defendant replied that he understood.

       In his amended motion for new trial, the Defendant asserted that “[t]he trial court
should have granted a mistrial due to disruptive conduct by witnesses and family members
in the gallery.” The trial court, in its order denying the motion for new trial, made the
following findings and conclusions with regard to this issue:

       During the trial, the [c]ourt observed both the Defendant and two or three
       persons in the gallery of the courtroom acting in an animated manner in
       response to testimony or questions posed by the attorneys. The [c]ourt
       directed the State to let the spectators know that . . . they would be excluded
       if their conduct continued. At one point, the [c]ourt admonished both the
       Defendant and the spectators outside the presence of the jury that a condition
       of remaining in the courtroom was that their behavior not disrupt the
       proceedings. The [c]ourt did not observe the jurors notic[ing] any of this
       behavior. There were no further problems with either the Defendant nor
       spectator conduct during the trial. The conduct did not affect the proceedings
       but attracted my attention. This ground is overruled.

       Initially, we note that the Defendant waived this issue by failing to cite to the
pertinent portions of the record when raising this issue in his brief. See Tenn. Ct. Crim.
App. R. 10(b) (“Issues which are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or
appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in this court.”); Tenn. R. App.
P. 27(a)(7) (A brief shall contain “[a]n argument . . . setting forth the contentions of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, including the
reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and
appropriate references to the record . . . relied on.”).

       In addition, we agree with the State that the Defendant waived this issue by failing
to request a mistrial in response to the disruptions. Here, the trial court initially advised
the State, outside the hearing of the jury, that it would require the victims’ families to leave
the courtroom if they were unable to remain quiet. The trial court later instructed the
                                             - 11 -
disruptive parties, after the jury was dismissed, that they had to be quiet and respectful
during the trial or they would be required to leave the courtroom. We note that when these
disruptions occurred during trial, the Defendant never contemporaneously objected or
requested a mistrial, and he raised this issue for the first time in his motion for new trial.
See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be
granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was
reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); State v.
Robinson, 971 S.W.2d 30, 42-43 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (“[F]ailure to make a
contemporaneous objection or motion for mistrial constitutes a waiver of the issue absent
the existence of plain error.”). Accordingly, we agree with the State and conclude that the
Defendant waived plenary review of this issue by failing to take whatever action was
available “to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” Because the Defendant has
waived this claim, we may only review this issue for plain error. See Tenn. R. App. P.
36(b). However, the Defendant has neither request plain error relief nor has provided any
analysis of the five factors required for plain error review.

       In order for this court to find plain error,

       “(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a
       clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a substantial
       right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the accused did
       not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error is
       ‘necessary to do substantial justice.’”

State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d
626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). “[P]lain error must be of such a great magnitude
that it probably changed the outcome of the trial.” Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 642 (citations
and internal quotations marks omitted). It is the defendant’s burden to persuade an
appellate court that the trial court committed plain error. State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788,
808 (Tenn. 2010). “[T]he presence of all five factors must be established by the record
before this Court will recognize the existence of plain error, and complete consideration of
all the factors is not necessary when it is clear from the record that at least one of the factors
cannot be established.” Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 283. A recognition of plain error “should be
limited to errors that had an unfair prejudicial impact which undermined the fundamental
fairness of the trial.” Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 642.

       First, the record does not clearly establish what occurred in the trial court. Although
the Defendant claims that the victims’ families caused numerous disruptions at trial and
although the trial transcript makes general references to these disruptions, the transcript
does not specifically detail the substance of these outbursts. While the record does contain
the motion for new trial and the order denying the motion on this issue, the Defendant did
                                              - 12 -
not include the transcript for the motion for new trial in the appellate record. However, the
portions of the record that were included and are relevant to this issue do not clearly
establish what occurred in the trial court regarding these disruptions.

       In addition, the Defendant has failed to show that a clear and unequivocal rule of
law has been breached or that a substantial right of the accused was adversely affected.
The Defendant claims that the disruptive conduct from the victims’ families affected his
right to an impartial jury and that the trial court’s admonishment to these individuals,
outside the hearing or presence of the jury, was insufficient to remove the prejudice from
these disruptions. However, the Defendant, as noted above, has failed to provide enough
information regarding these disruptions to show that they impacted the jury in any way.
Accordingly, the Defendant has failed to show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was
breached or that a substantial right belonging to him was adversely affected.

       Lastly, the Defendant has failed to establish that consideration of the error is
necessary to do substantial justice. “‘The purpose for declaring a mistrial is to correct
damage done to the judicial process when some event has occurred which precludes an
impartial verdict.’” State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 341-42 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting State v.
Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)). A trial court should declare a
mistrial “only upon a showing of manifest necessity.” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469,
494 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Saylor, 117 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tenn. 2003)). In this case,
the Defendant has not established that the disruptive behavior of the victims’ families
precluded an impartial verdict. In its order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court
found no suggestion that the jury ever noticed the disruptive behavior. In addition, the trial
court found that the disruptive behavior stopped after the court issued its warning to the
relevant individuals outside the presence of the jury. Because the Defendant has failed to
establish the requirements for plain error, he is not entitled to relief on this issue.

        II. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The Defendant also argues that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder with
serious bodily injury and for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous
felony. Specifically, he claims that the proof at trial established that he had reason to fear
the victims, which supported his claim of self-defense, and that the victims were not
credible. Consequently, the Defendant asserts the trial court should have set aside the
jury’s verdicts on the grounds that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. In response, the State contends that the Defendant is not entitled to
relief because the jury resolved any questions concerning the victims’ credibility with its
verdict and because a rational jury could have found from the evidence presented that the
Defendant did not act in self-defense and was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
conviction offenses. We agree with the State.

                                            - 13 -
       “Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and raises a
presumption of guilt, the criminal defendant bears the burden on appeal of showing that
the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.” State v. Hanson, 279
S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)).
“Appellate courts evaluating the sufficiency of the convicting evidence must determine
‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). When this court
evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence. State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Majors, 318
S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010)).

       Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence,
circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686,
691 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998). The standard of review
for sufficiency of the evidence “‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct
or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011)
(quoting Hanson, 279 S.W.3d at 275). The jury as the trier of fact must evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses’ testimony, and
reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn.
2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)). Moreover,
the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and the inferences
to be drawn from this evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury. Dorantes,
331 S.W.3d at 379. When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this court “neither
re-weighs the evidence nor substitutes its inferences for those drawn by the jury.” Wagner,
382 S.W.3d at 297 (citing State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)).

        As relevant in this case, a person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the
kind of culpability otherwise required for the offense, “[i]ntentionally engages in action or
causes a result that would constitute an offense, if the circumstances surrounding the
conduct were as the person believes them to be[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101(a)(1).
First degree murder is the premeditated and intentional killing of another person. Id. § 39-
13-202(a)(1) (Supp. 2019). Premeditation is defined as “an act done after the exercise of
reflection and judgment.” Id. § 39-13-202(d) (Supp. 2019). This section further defines
premeditation:

       “Premeditation” means that the intent to kill must have been formed prior to
       the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind
                                             - 14 -
       of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental state of the accused
       at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered
       in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free from
       excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.

Id. The existence of premeditation is a question of fact for the jury to determine and may
be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense. State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d
85, 108 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660); State v. Suttles, 30 S.W.3d 252,
261 (Tenn. 2000). Factors that may support the existence of premeditation include, but are
not limited to, the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim, the particular cruelty
of the killing, the infliction of multiple wounds, declarations by the defendant of an intent
to kill, lack of provocation by the victim, failure to aid or assist the victim, evidence of
procurement of a weapon, preparations before the killing for concealment of the crime,
calmness immediately after the killing, and destruction and secretion of evidence of the
killing. State v. Kiser, 284 S.W.3d 227, 268 (Tenn. 2009); State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d 42,
53-54 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 615 (Tenn. 2003); Bland, 958
S.W.2d at 660. In addition, a jury may infer premeditation from any planning activity by
the defendant before the killing, from evidence concerning the defendant’s motive, and
from proof regarding the nature of the killing. State v. Bordis, 905 S.W.2d 214, 222 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995).

       While serious bodily injury is not an element of attempted first degree murder, a
defendant found guilty of attempted first degree murder “where the victim suffers serious
bodily injury as defined in § 39-11-106,” is not eligible for release until he serves eighty-
five percent of his sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(k)(5) (Supp. 2018). Serious
bodily injury is defined as bodily injury that involves (A) a substantial risk of death; (B)
protracted unconsciousness; (C) extreme physical pain; (D) protracted or obvious
disfigurement; (E) protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily
member, organ or mental faculty; or (F) a broken bone of a child who is twelve years of
age or less. Id. §§ 39-11-106(a)(34)(A)-(F) (Supp. 2018). This Court has held that the
subjective nature of pain is a fact to be determined by the trier of fact. State v. Dedmon,
No. M2005-00762-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 448653, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23,
2006).

       The Defendant was also charged with employing a firearm during the commission
of a dangerous felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2018). Attempt to
commit first degree murder is statutorily defined as a “dangerous felony.” Id. § 39-17-
1324(i)(1)(A).

        In his motion for new trial, the Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain his convictions. In his amended motion for new trial, the Defendant claimed that
                                           - 15 -
“[t]he trial court erred by failing to set aside his conviction[s] in its role as ‘13th Juror’ when
the jury’s verdict was not substantiated by the weight of the evidence” and where the “the
jury’s verdict found serious bodily injury without any evidence of medical records.” In the
order denying these motions, the trial court held that it had “considered its role as thirteenth
juror and finds that there is ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict.”

       First, the Defendant argues that the proof established he had reason to fear both
victims, which supported his claim that he shot both victims in self-defense. He claims
that both victims admitted to prior altercations with him that would have given them an
incentive to harm him and would have caused the Defendant to have a reasonable fear of
the victims. In particular, the Defendant asserts that the same day of the shootings victim
Bradley Clark wrote threatening comments in private messages to him and then publicly
commented about his intent to get revenge on him.

      Self-defense is a complete defense to an offense. Id. § 39-11-601; State v. Ivy, 868
S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). At the time of the offenses in this case,
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611(b)(1)-(2) provided:

       (1) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful
       activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to
       retreat before threatening or using force against another person when and to
       the degree the person reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary
       to protect against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.

       (2) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful
       activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to
       retreat before threatening or using force intended or likely to cause death or
       serious bodily injury, if:

       (A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of
       death or serious bodily injury;

       (B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury
       is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time; and

       (C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.

Id. § 39-11-611(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2019). When a defendant relies upon the theory of self-
defense, it is the State’s burden to show that the defendant did not act in self-defense. State
v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 2001). Whether the defendant acted in self-defense is a
question of fact for the jury. State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 283 (Tenn. 2012); State v.
                                              - 16 -
Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Ivy, 868 S.W.2d at 727.
Consequently, the jury is free to reject a defendant’s claim of self-defense. State v. Goode,
956 S.W.2d 521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

        In State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 401 (Tenn. 2017), the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that “the phrase ‘not engaged in unlawful activity’ is a condition on a person’s
statutory privilege not to retreat[,]” rather than a total bar to self-defense. “[A] duty to
retreat does not mean that a person cannot defend herself or himself.” Id. at 404. However,
a defendant engaged in unlawful activity “must have employed all means in his power,
consistent with his own safety, to avoid danger and avert the necessity of” using force. Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court explained that “the trial court
makes the threshold determination whether to charge the jury with self-defense, and . . . as
part of that threshold determination, should decide whether to charge the jury that a
defendant did not have a duty to retreat.” Id. at 403. The court added, “As part of that
decision, the trial court should consider whether the State has produced clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity such that the ‘no
duty to retreat’ instruction would not apply.” Id.

        In the instant case, the jury was instructed that the Defendant had a duty to retreat
before using force because the Defendant was engaged in unlawful activity at the time he
shot the victims, namely he possessed a firearm as a convicted felon. Based on the evidence
presented at trial, a rational jury could have rejected the Defendant’s claim that he acted in
self-defense. The jury heard the Defendant’s statement to Deputy Waller that the victims
tried to shoot him at the scene; the jury also heard that the Defendant blamed Palmer for
getting him in trouble over drugs, that the Defendant had gotten into an earlier fight with
Bradley Clark, and that Clark had sent the Defendant several Facebook messages, which
the Defendant could have been interpreted as threats. On the other hand, the jury heard
Deputy Waller testify that the Defendant was “grinning . . . like he was evil” when he
claimed that the victims tried to shoot him.” The jury also heard Clark claim that he sent
the Facebook messages to protect himself rather than to threaten the Defendant and heard
Mildred Cook and Clark testify about how the Defendant had beaten up Clark in January
2019. Moreover, as we will explain in more detail below, the jury heard proof that the
Defendant initiated contact with the victims just before the shooting, that the Defendant
pulled a gun on the victims without any provocation, that the Defendant shot both victims
in the face even though they were unarmed, that the Defendant never sought aid for the
victims after shooting them, that the Defendant was uninjured following the shootings, that
the victims’ truck contained two bullet holes, and that a nine-millimeter casing was found
on the floormat of the Defendant’s SUV. Although there was some proof that the
Defendant had reason to fear both victims, the jury, by its verdict, clearly accredited the
State’s proof concerning the incident and rejected the Defendant’s claim of self-defense.

                                            - 17 -
        Second, the Defendant contends that the victims were not credible. He claims,
without citation to the record, that both victims admitted to providing untruthful statements,
not only to the police after the incident but also in their testimony at the preliminary hearing
and at trial. The Defendant also asserts that both victims admitted they were under the
influence of methamphetamine or alcohol at the time of the incident. Finally, the
Defendant asserts that both victims testified against him at trial while they were
incarcerated for possessing and manufacturing methamphetamine. He suggests that the
victims had “sufficient personal incentive to lie” during their testimony because at the time
of his trial, Jesse Palmer had a pending criminal charge and Bradley Clark was supposed
to receive drug treatment in lieu of a felony prison sentence.

        Victims Palmer and Clark both testified that the Defendant initiated contact with
them by stopping his SUV and then reversing until the driver’s side windows of both
vehicles were only a short distance apart. The victims, who testified that they were
unarmed, stated that Palmer offered the Defendant a drink, which the Defendant accepted.
When Palmer turned away to talk to Clark, the Defendant pulled out his gun and pointed it
at the back of Palmer’s head. When Palmer turned back around to face him, the Defendant,
without provocation, shot Palmer in the face from a few inches away. The Defendant then
fired two more shots, including one that hit Clark in the face. Thereafter, the two vehicles
rolled apart, and then the Defendant exited his SUV, walked toward the back of the victims’
truck, and fired shots at the truck. When the Defendant saw Clark lying on the ground,
Clark jumped up and ran through a nearby field as the Defendant fired several shots at him.
Law enforcement later found two bullet holes in the victims’ truck and recovered a nine-
millimeter casing on the floor of the Defendant’s SUV. Both Palmer and Clark testified
regarding extensive, horrific injuries to their face, head, and neck that doubtlessly
constituted serious bodily injury. By its verdict, the jury resolved any issues regarding
credibility or conflicting evidence in favor of the State’s witnesses. Accordingly, we
conclude that the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, is more than
sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions for two counts of attempted first degree
premeditated murder with serious bodily injury and one count of employing a firearm
during a dangerous felony.

        We also detect an error in the Defendant’s judgment form in Count 4. Although the
Defendant was charged with and convicted of employing a firearm during the commission
of a dangerous felony, which is a Class C felony, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-1324(b),
(e)(1), (h)(2), the judgment form in Count 4 erroneously shows that the Defendant was
convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony,
incorrectly lists this offense as a Class C felony, and then accurately reflects a ten-year
sentence at one hundred percent served consecutively to his other sentences. Because the
record clearly shows that the Defendant in Count 4 was indicted for and convicted of the
offense of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C
                                             - 18 -
felony, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form
reflecting this conviction offense, class, and ten-year sentence served consecutively to his
sentences in Counts 2 and 3.

         III. Allegations of Prosecutorial Misconduct. The Defendant also argues the trial
court erred in overruling his objection when the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence by
stating that the Defendant had admitted to using a gun during the incident, which he claims
also constituted an improper comment on his invocation of the right against self-
incrimination. He claims that the State’s argument during closing, that the Defendant never
denied possessing or firing a gun, relies on the assumption that the Defendant would have
explicitly denied it by testifying at trial if he had not possessed or fired the gun. In response,
the State asserts that the Defendant waived this prosecutorial misconduct claim by raising
it for the first time on appeal and that the Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief. We
conclude that the Defendant has waived this issue for the reasons that follow and that the
Defendant is not entitled to plain error review.

         The Defendant, while acknowledging that he pursued a theory of self-defense at
trial, also claims that he pleaded not guilty throughout the proceedings, did not provide a
written statement to police admitting that he shot the victims, and invoked his right against
self-incrimination at trial. He contends that the State “knowingly, intentionally, and falsely
represented that [he] made admissions of guilt that are nowhere in the record of evidence.”
The Defendant also asserts that the trial court never provided a curative instruction or other
remedy in response to the State’s argument during closing and then the court “excoriated”
the Defendant for “standing silent” and “failing to deny that he possessed or used a gun.”
Moreover, the Defendant argues that the State’s comments during closing were “calculated
to inflame the passions of the jury” and that regardless of whether they stemmed from a
misrepresentation of the evidence or an improper comment on his invocation of his right
to silence, they were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

       In this case, the State made the following assertion during its final closing argument:

       And then, the defendant’s primary defense is gonna [sic] be all these
       inconsistencies. Well, let’s talk about things that we know. Let’s talk about
       things that are not inconsistent, things that are not rebutted, things that [the
       Defendant] has not denied. First one, [the Defendant] had a gun. He doesn’t
       deny that. He admits, yep, I had a gun. Second thing, he fired that gun. He
       doesn’t deny that.

Upon hearing this, the defense immediately requested a bench conference, wherein defense
counsel claimed that the State was “arguing facts not in the evidence” because the
Defendant had never made a statement that he fired the gun at the victims. The State
                                              - 19 -
countered that the Defendant “admitted he shot them.” When the trial court asked if the
Defendant’s admission came in as evidence, the State replied that the Defendant was
“claiming self-defense” and that “he shot [the victims] because he was in fear of them[,]”
which constituted the Defendant’s “whole defense.” The trial court interjected, “I think
it’s a fair argument because your defense is self-defense.” Defense counsel responded that
the Defendant had never made a statement that he shot the victims. The State clarified, “I
didn’t say he said it. [The Defendant] admitted that he fired the gun when it was in self-
defense.” The trial court agreed this was “true,” and defense counsel replied, “Okay. All
right.” The defense never requested a curative instruction or any other remedy during this
bench conference.

       The Defendant, in his amended motion for new trial, specifically reserved only the
issue that “[t]he trial court failed to provide a curative instruction when the prosecution
unfairly characterized the defendant as having admitted to possession of a firearm.” In the
order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court made the following findings and
conclusions:

       The Defendant did not make a formal admission of possessing a weapon to
       law enforcement other than his interaction with Deputy Waller. The State’s
       argument was based upon that encounter. The jury was free to accept or
       reject that argument and any implication arising from the Defendant’s
       statement to Deputy Waller. Defendant’s counsel did not request that the
       Court instruct the jury to disregard the State’s argument. The Defendant’s
       opening statement asserted that the Defendant had acted in self-defense. This
       ground is overruled.

While the defense objected to the State’s closing argument, defense counsel never asked
the trial court to provide a curative instruction or other remedy in response to the State’s
argument. A trial court should provide a curative instruction once an objection to improper
argument is made. State v. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d 577, 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
However, if the trial court fails to give a curative instruction sua sponte, then counsel for
the party has the obligation to request the trial court to provide a curative instruction. Id.
If the party fails to request a curative instruction, or is dissatisfied with the instruction and
fails to request a more complete instruction, then the party waives this issue for appellate
purposes. Id. Because the Defendant never asked the trial court for a curative instruction
or other remedy in response to the State’s argument, he has waived this issue. See Tenn.
R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to
a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably
available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); State v. Bell, No. M2019-
01810-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 794771, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2021) (reiterating
that when a defendant fails to ask for a curative instruction, he waives the issue on appeal).
                                             - 20 -
        In addition, the Defendant never raised the self-incrimination claim during the
bench conference at trial and never included this particular claim in either his original
motion or amended motion for new trial. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) (“[I]n all cases tried
by a jury, no issue presented for review shall be predicated upon . . . the misconduct of . .
. parties or counsel . . . or other ground upon which a new trial is sought, unless the same
was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise such issues will be treated as
waived.”). In addition, the Defendant never raised a stand-alone prosecutorial misconduct
claim in any of his motions for new trial. Accordingly, the Defendant has waived these
issues.

        While this court may consider an otherwise waived issue for plain error, the
Defendant has not asked for plain error review, much less shown that he is entitled to plain
error review. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282. At trial, Deputy Waller
testified that when he took the Defendant into custody, the Defendant said, “They tried to
shoot me.” When Deputy Waller asked him what he was talking about, the Defendant said,
“Well, something went on,” but never provided further explanation regarding what
happened. Deputy Waller also stated that at the time he took the Defendant into custody,
the Defendant did not have any injuries and was “grinning real big” and acting “[l]ike he
was evil.” The Defendant’s entire defense at trial consisted of a theory of self-defense.
During opening statement, defense counsel argued that by the end of trial the jury would
be “convinced . . . that [the Defendant] was acting in self-defense” and that the State had
failed to prove that the Defendant “was not acting in self-defense,” which is what the State
is required to do. Defense counsel also repeatedly argued during his closing that the State
had failed to prove “that [the Defendant] did not act in self-defense.” Given the proof
offered and the Defendant’s consistent pursuit of a self-defense theory at trial, we conclude
the Defendant has failed to establish that the prosecution’s remark during closing breached
a clear and unequivocal rule of law, adversely affected a substantial right belonging to him,
or necessarily must be considered in order to do substantial justice. Therefore, the
Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief with regard to this issue.

        IV. Jury Instructions. Lastly, the Defendant contends that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in failing to provide a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication
and on attempted first degree murder without serious bodily injury, which he claims is a
lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury. The
State counters that the Defendant has waived this issue by failing to request these
instructions in writing and that the Defendant has neither requested nor established that he
is entitled to plain error review. We agree with the State.

       “[A] defendant has a constitutional right to a complete and correct charge of the law,
so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper
                                            - 21 -
instructions.” Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 390. Because challenges to jury instructions
present mixed questions of law and fact, this court reviews challenged instructions de novo
without a presumption of correctness. State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 245 (Tenn. 2016).
When a party wants the trial court to provide a particular jury instruction, that party must
first provide the court with a written request for the instruction and provide counsel with a
copy of the same. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30(a); see State v. Mackey, 638 S.W.2d 830, 836
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (reiterating that because “the request was not made in writing,
the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on intoxication”). A failure to
request an instruction in writing will result in a waiver of this issue on appeal. See State v.
Leath, 461 S.W.3d 73, 106-07 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013); State v. Winton, No. M2018-
01447-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 1950777, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2020).

        First, the Defendant argues that the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding
his intoxication during the incident. He claims that because intoxication operates to negate
mens rea rather than as an affirmative defense, it is immaterial that his intoxication was
most likely voluntary. He also asserts that because attempted first degree murder requires
the mens rea of “malice,” the trial court’s failure to instruct on the relationship between
intoxication and mens rea undermines the reliability of the jury’s verdict in this case.

        We agree with the State that the Defendant has waived plenary review of this issue
because the record does not contain a written request for a jury instruction on voluntary
intoxication. Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to relief regarding the trial court’s
failure to give the voluntary intoxication instruction to the jury unless he establishes plain
error. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). However, the Defendant neither requested plain error
review nor established that the court’s failure to charge voluntary intoxication amounted
to plain error. Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282.

        Voluntary intoxication “is admissible in evidence, if it is relevant to negate a
culpable mental state.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39-11-503(a); see 7 Tenn. Prac. Pattern. Jury
Instr. T.P.I.—Crim 40.02. “Proof of voluntary intoxication is therefore akin to proof of a
mental disease or defect that prevents a defendant from forming the culpable mental state
required for the offense under consideration.” Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d at 814. “However,
‘[p]roof of intoxication alone is not a defense to a charge of committing a specific intent
crime nor does it entitle an accused to jury instructions . . . ; there must be evidence that
the intoxication deprived the accused of the mental capacity to form specific intent.’” Id.
(footnote omitted) (quoting Harrell v. State, 593 S.W.2d 664, 672 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979);
see Mills v. State, No. W2005-00480-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 44381, at *8 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Jan. 5, 2006) (“[W]hile intoxication is not in itself a defense to prosecution, a
defendant’s intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, is admissible in evidence if it
is relevant to negate a culpable mental state.”). This court has emphasized that “[t]he

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determinative question is not whether the accused was intoxicated, but what was his mental
capacity.” Harrell, 593 S.W.2d at 672.

       In his amended motion for new trial, the Defendant argued that the trial court had
“failed to instruct the jury regarding voluntary intoxication of the [D]efendant.” In its order
denying this motion, the trial court held:

       The [c]ourt did not instruct on the issue of voluntary intoxication. There was
       testimony from Officer Waller that he believed the Defendant to be under the
       influence of methamphetamine when he encountered him after the incident.
       The Defendant had been driving an automobile just prior to the encounter
       and engaged in conversation with the officer. The Defendant did not present
       any proof of the Defendant’s intoxication. Proof of voluntary intoxication
       sufficient to make an issue of the Defendant’s ability to form the necessary
       mental state was not fairly raised in the proof and would have required the
       jury to speculate in the absence of proof. This ground is overruled.

       Here, the Defendant failed to present any proof that intoxication from alcohol or
drugs deprived him of the mental capacity to form culpable mental state required for the
charged offenses. See Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d at 814. Instead, the Defendant consistently
argued at trial that the victims’ testimony was not credible and that the Defendant acted in
self-defense. Because the Defendant has not shown that a clear and unequivocal rule of
law was breached; that a substantial right belonging to him was adversely affected; or that
consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial justice, the Defendant is not entitled
to plain error relief on this issue.

       Second, the Defendant contends that the trial court failed to charge attempted first
degree murder without serious bodily injury as a lesser included offense of attempted first
degree murder with serious bodily injury. He argues that attempted first degree murder
without serious bodily injury is a lesser included offense under part (b) of the test in State
v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 466-67 (Tenn. 1999), because it consists of conduct constituting
a lesser degree of harm.

        Initially, we note that the record does not contain a written request for a jury
instruction on attempted first degree murder without serious bodily injury. See Tenn. R.
Crim. P. 30(a). Moreover, all requests for lesser included offenses must be made in writing.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110(b). If a defendant fails to make a written request for an
instruction of a lesser included offense, the instruction is waived, and the failure of a trial
judge to instruct the jury on any lesser included offense may not be presented as a ground
for relief either in a motion for a new trial or on appeal. See id. § 40-18-110(c); State v.
Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tenn. 2006).
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       Because the record does not contain a written request for an instruction for first
degree murder without serious bodily injury, we agree with the State that the Defendant
has waived plenary review and is not entitled to relief unless he establishes plain error. See
Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282. Nevertheless, the Defendant has once
again failed to request or show that he is entitled to plain error relief on this issue.

        In his amended motion for new trial, the Defendant argued that the trial court had
“failed to provide an instruction on attempted first degree murder without serious bodily
injury,” which he claimed was “a lesser included offense” under the Burns test.” The trial
court, in its order denying the motion for new trial, held:

              In the [c]ourt’s view, an instruction on attempted first degree murder
       which does not include the requirement that the victim suffer serious bodily
       injury would have made conviction more likely by removing a necessary
       element of the offense as contained in [T.P.I.]—Crim. 4.01(a). Moreover,
       the charge suggested by the Defendant, which was not requested at trial,
       represents the same level of offense rather than a lesser[]included offense,
       except for the calculation of the Defendant’s sentence release eligibility.
       This ground is overruled.

        We reiterate that while serious bodily injury is not an element of attempted first
degree murder, a defendant found guilty of attempted first degree murder “where the victim
suffers serious bodily injury as defined in § 39-11-106,” is not eligible for release until he
serves eighty-five percent of his sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(k)(5).
Accordingly, the phrase “with serious bodily injury” is properly categorized as a sentencing
enhancement, rather than an additional element of the attempted first degree murder
offense. See Thomas v. State, No. E2022-00160-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL 2062518, at *1
(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2023) (stating that “[t]he Petitioner’s indictment did not include
the ‘serious bodily injury’ sentencing enhancement, but the Petitioner’s pleading guilty to
the enhancement was a condition of his plea agreement”); Rogers v. State, No. W2022-
00019-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 6957427, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2022)
(reiterating the holding in Vaughn that serious bodily injury is not an element of attempted
first degree murder); State v. Vaughn, No. W2016-00131-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL
7102748, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016) (stating that “serious bodily injury is not
an element of attempted first degree murder” and that a defendant found guilty of attempted
first degree murder, where the victim suffers serious bodily injury as defined Code section
39-11-106, is not eligible for release until after service of eight-five percent of the
sentence). Because “serious bodily injury” is not an element of the charged offense of
attempted first degree murder, the offense of attempted first degree murder without serious
bodily injury is not a lesser included offense. The Defendant has not shown that the trial
                                            - 24 -
court’s failure to charge attempted first degree murder without bodily injury breached a
clear and unequivocal rule of law, adversely affected a substantial right belonging to him,
or must necessarily be considered in order to do substantial justice. Accordingly, the
Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief on this issue.

                                    CONCLUSION

        Based on the aforementioned authorities and reasoning, the trial court’s judgments
are affirmed but the case is remanded for entry of a corrected judgment form in Count 4 to
reflect the accurate conviction offense of employing a firearm during the commission of a
dangerous felony.

                                      _________________________________________
                                      CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE

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