Court Opinion

ID: 9891467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 18:00:42.602634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:06.382861
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                                                                         OCT 18 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PARTAP SINGH,                                   No. 21-958
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A206-340-923
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted October 16, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Partap Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) order denying his time-barred motion

to reopen to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s denial of

a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983,

986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition.

      1. The BIA denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen because it determined that

the motion was time-barred and that no exception to the timeliness requirement

applied because Petitioner failed to produce material evidence of changed country

conditions in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). To prevail on a motion to reopen

based on changed country conditions, a movant must produce previously

unavailable, material evidence of changed conditions in the country of removal,

and must demonstrate that the new evidence, considered together with the evidence

presented at the merits hearing below, would establish prima facie eligibility for

relief. Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705, 718 (9th Cir. 2021).

      2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to

reopen without considering evidence of changed conditions in India regarding the

persecution of Sikhs. Petitioner neither stated a fear of persecution on account of

his Sikh religion in his motion, nor submitted a religion-based application for relief

along with his motion. “A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of

submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate

application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)

(emphasis added); see Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). The

                                        2                                    21-958
BIA did not err in not addressing a claim Petitioner did not properly raise.

      3. The BIA, in denying Petitioner’s time-barred motion to reopen, properly

considered whether Petitioner’s new political affiliation, a change in his personal

circumstances, established a material change in country conditions.

      4. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in characterizing Petitioner’s new

application for relief as arising from the same basis as his initial application.

Notwithstanding Petitioner’s observation that his “new claim was poorly

articulated in his motion to reopen,” the BIA’s characterization was not “arbitrary,

irrational, or contrary to law.” Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir.

2011) (quoting Ontiveros-Lopez v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000)).

      5. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s time-barred

motion to reopen without evaluating whether Petitioner established prima facie

eligibility for relief. The BIA determined that Petitioner failed to produce material

evidence of changed country conditions in India. That determination gave the BIA

grounds to deny Petitioner’s motion. See, e.g., Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 989

(9th Cir. 2009). It was unnecessary for the BIA to evaluate whether Petitioner

established prima facie eligibility for relief. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d

532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004).

      PETITION DENIED.

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