Court Opinion

ID: 9627724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:52:41.330615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:39:15.368602
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J., Dissenting.
The issue in this case is whether Civil Code section 3333.41 precludes the wrongful death plaintiffs from recovering nonpecuniary damages when the decedent was an uninsured motorist at the time of the accident. Under section 3333.4, subdivision (a)(2) and (3), a “person” cannot recover nonpecuniary damages if the “injured person” was either an uninsured owner or uninsured operator of the vehicle involved in the accident.
While the majority correctly notes that the “controlling language for our purposes is the reference to the ‘injured person’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 277), I am not convinced by its analysis that the “injured person” is by definition any plaintiff seeking recovery. Rather, I am persuaded by the rules of statutory construction that “injured person” means what it says—the person injured in the underlying accident. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I would hold instead that section 3333.4’s limitations apply to the heirs of an uninsured motorist killed in an accident.
The majority finds the wrongful death plaintiffs here are not barred from recovery under the section because they, as “injured persons,” were neither uninsured owners nor uninsured operators. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 277.) In so finding, the majority assumes what it should be critically asking—what does “injured person” mean under section 3333.4? I cannot accept the majority’s *289unsupported conclusion that “under the law the terms [‘injured person’ and ‘plaintiff’] are equivalent, or at least without legal distinction in these circumstances.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 279.) This tautological argument should not replace reasoned analysis, especially given the significance of the term “injured person” in this context.
Indeed, the majority’s interpretation of “injured person” runs counter to general rules of statutory construction. An interpretation that renders any term surplusage should be avoided. (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224].) Under section 3333.4, subdivision (a), the term “person,” which controls paragraphs (1) through (3), clearly refers to a plaintiff seeking recovery. No other conclusion is possible. Those paragraphs, however, contain the appar- • ently narrower term, “injured person.” By defining “injured person” also to mean the plaintiff, the majority’s interpretation effectively renders the term “injured” preceding “person” surplusage.
Instead, “[i]f reasonably possible, the phrase must be given a meaning that will make of it something more than only an unnecessary and tautological addition to the act.” (Golden Gate Scenic Steamship Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 373, 377 [19 Cal.Rptr. 657, 369 P.2d 257].) Here, not only is it reasonably possible that “injured person” means the person directly injured in the underlying accident, but the statute also supports this interpretation. Subdivision (c) of section 3333.4 describes the “injured person” as a person “injured by a motorist who at the time of the accident was operating his or her vehicle . . . .” This language makes clear that the “injured person” is someone directly injured in the accident, not merely anyone who is a plaintiff in an action relating to an accident.
I do not suggest that plaintiffs have not been “injured” by their daughter’s death. (See Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, 68 [137 Cal.Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022].) However, the majority has not presented any compelling argument that the term “injured person” under the section should be defined generally as any plaintiff seeking recovery (which definition would render the term “injured” surplusage), when the statutory language itself supports a narrower definition.
Section 3333.3, which also was enacted as part of Proposition 213, also supports my interpretation. The majority asserts that section 3333.3’s language is “[p]arallel” to that of section 3333.4. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 278.) The language is hardly parallel; rather, it is quite different. Section 3333.4 precludes nonpecuniary damages when the “injured person” is an uninsured motorist. By contrast, section 3333.3 prohibits any damages in a negligence *290action if the “plaintiff’s injuries” were caused by the “plaintiff’s” commission of a felony. We may reasonably conclude that if the electorate intended “injured person” to mean “plaintiff’ in section 3333.4, it would have stated so specifically, as it did in section 3333.3. “[Wjhen the drafters of a statute have employed a term in one place and omitted it in another, it should not be inferred where it has been excluded.” (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1010 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154].) The electorate’s use of the term “injured person” in section 3333.4 rather than section 3333.3’s broader reference to “plaintiff’ shows clearly that the electorate intended a different meaning.
The majority’s concern that this interpretation would preclude anyone, including a passenger, from recovering nonpecuniary damages when a vehicle’s owner or operator is uninsured is unfounded. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 280-281.) A passenger who is injured in the accident is an “injured person” who, as neither the uninsured owner nor uninsured operator of the vehicle, can recover nonpecuniary damages.
Unlike the majority, I do not readily dismiss the argument that a wrongful death plaintiff generally “stands in the shoes” of the decedent and is subject to any defenses that the defendant could have asserted against the decedent. (Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 758, 763-764 [276 Cal.Rptr. 672]; Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 320, 324 [210 Cal.Rptr. 417].) Under this general rule, “If one injured by a tortious act may not himself recover from the tortfeasor, ‘then it follows that under established law governing wrongful death actions, his survivors may not recover in . . . such an action.’ ” (Salin v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 185, 192 [185 Cal.Rptr. 899], quoting Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345, 351 [289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137], overruled on other grounds in Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 167 [95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151].)
Although this rule concededly is not absolute, nothing in section 3333.4’s language suggests the intent to carve out an exception under the circumstances of this case. Section 3333.4 seeks to deter persons from disobeying the financial responsibility laws. In this regard, the section is closely analogous to the defense of comparative negligence, which can be asserted against the decedent’s heirs. (See Buckley v. Chadwick (1955) 45 Cal.2d 183, 200-201 [265 P.2d 884]; Atkins v. Strayhorn (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1380, 1395 [273 Cal.Rptr. 231].) If a wrongful death plaintiff’s recovery can be reduced by the decedent’s comparative negligence, we may reasonably conclude the electorate intended a wrongful death plaintiff’s recovery similarly to be reduced by the decedent’s failure to obtain legally required insurance.
*291Moreover, the secondary materials which the majority cites are not dis-positive. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 277-279.) While Proposition 213’s uncodified “Findings and Declaration of Purpose” refer to targeting “[ujninsured motorists, drunk drivers, and criminal felons,” without specific mention of wrongful death plaintiffs (Ballot Pamp., text of Prop. 213 as presented to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) § 2, at p. 102), the same findings also do not specifically create any exception to the general rule that a wrongful death plaintiff “stands in the shoes” of the decedent.
My interpretation furthers the intent and purpose of Proposition 213. “. . . Proposition 213 was designed primarily for the benefit of ‘law-abiding citizens’—i.e., drivers who obey the financial responsibility laws . . . .” (Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109, 116 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 884, 980 P.2d 433]), and was also intended “to reduce skyrocketing insurance premiums by encouraging motorists to buy liability insurance.” (Yoshioka v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 972, 983 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].) Barring the heirs of uninsured motorists from recovering nonpecuniary damages provides an additional incentive for those motorists to purchase insurance, to the benefit of all law-abiding citizens. The majority summarily attempts to discount the effectiveness of this incentive without providing any substantive basis for doing so. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 282-283.) I remain unpersuaded. If denying nonpecuniary damages to uninsured motorists “encourag[es] motorists to buy liability insurance” (Yoshioka v. Superior Court, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 983), the incentive is certainly increased when the uninsured motorist’s heirs are also denied such damages. I believe the electorate sought this incentive when it prohibited nonpecuniary damages whenever the “injured person” was an uninsured motorist.
Accordingly, I dissent.

All further statutory references are to the Civil Code.