Court Opinion

ID: 9612300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:06:51.066353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:56.344132
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, J.,
Dissenting.
I disagree with several conclusions reached by the majority here, and therefore I must respectfully dissent.
*70Factual sufficiency of zero damage findings
First, in detailing the evidence on Alberto Perez Sr.’s mental- anguish and loss of companionship and society of his son, the majority recites no evidence supporting the jury’s finding of zero damages. Instead, all evidence listed (and all that solicited at trial) supports a finding that Mr. Perez suffered terribly following his son’s suicide, as almost any parent would. The majority opinion simply recites the deferential standard we apply in determining factual sufficiency of the evidence, then fails to engage in any analysis of what evidence supports the jury’s damage findings and prevents them from being manifestly unjust. I can find none. Indeed, defendants in their response brief cite only two pieces of evidence that might support the jury’s failure to award damages: that plaintiff suffered depression and sought treatment prior to his son’s suicide, and that after his parents’ divorce, Albert Jr. lived with his mother during the week, seeing his father mainly on weekends. In this case, the second fact I find irrelevant to the issue of mental anguish and loss of companionship. There is no evidence that plaintiff was anything but a loving, involved father, and that he and the deceased’s mother were divorced does not diminish that. The first fact cited, while perhaps relevant, is answered by the testimony of Dr. Aboud that Perez’s depression was qualitatively different, and much more severe, than any problems he had exhibited prior to the suicide.
In analyzing the evidence, I do not use the discredited “zero damages” rule. Nevertheless, I am mindful that courts of appeals possess equal power to review the sufficiency of evidence to support both a jury’s affirmative and negative answers, including the jury’s failure to award damages. Pilkington v. Kornell, 822 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991). We are not entitled to reverse merely because we conclude more evidence supports an affirmative finding. Id. at 226. Rather, only where the great weight of the evidence, preponderates against the jury’s verdict, may we reverse and remand for new trial. Id. This standard is variously formulated as where the verdict shocks the conscience, is clearly unjust, or clearly indicates bias. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). I conclude that the evidence here meets the Pool standard, and indeed I discern no evidence supporting the jury’s decision to award no damages on the elements of mental anguish and loss of companionship in this case. Using the appropriate standard for analyzing the issue, I would sustain Perez’s Issues No. One and Two.
Negligence per se
Similarly, in its discussion of Issue No. Four, the majority not only fails to analyze the particular facts of this case, but does not even fully recite the law. Although I agree that, under the deferential standard of review we must apply, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the negligence per se instruction requested here, this set of facts is one of first impression and I believe deserves a more thorough analysis. My short attempt at one follows.
If the law on negligence per se were as the majority states, then no judge would ever abuse his or her discretion in failing to so charge the jury, simply because in a civil case “a court is not required to adopt the ■ penal statute’s standard.” Although true, this statement is incomplete and misleading. In a case ignored by the majority, the Texas Supreme Court has set out a detailed set of criteria for determining when a penal statute should set the standard for tort liability. Perry v. S.N., 973 *71S.W.2d 301, 304-07 (Tex.1998). Perry begins with the familiar threshold inquiries. Does the plaintiff (or here, the plaintiffs decedent) belong to the class that the statute was intended to protect? Is the plaintiffs injury of a type that the statute was designed to prevent? Id. at 305. Without doubt, Albert Perez, Jr., a minor, was within the class of persons intended to be protected by Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 46.06 (Vernon 1994). Suicide, along with accidents, irresponsible gunplay, and unsupervised access to firearms all of which can and do lead to terrible tragedy, are the type of injuries this penal provision are designed to prevent. I would hold that both prongs of the threshold inquiry are met here. The Supreme Court instructs us, however, that this does not end, our review only begins here. Id.
When determining whether it is appropriate to impose tort liability for violations of a penal statute, the Court has pointed to a number of non-exclusive factors which should guide the court in determining the question. Id. These factors include the following.
First, whether absent a change in the common law, the negligence per se action would derive its duty element solely from the criminal statute. Id. at 306. That is not the situation here, as discussed below in the section on foreseeability. I believe this prong of the test favors civil liability for violating this public safety statute.
Second, whether the statute clearly defines the prohibited or required conduct. Id. at 307. The statute at issue here does not clearly prohibit the Lopez’s conduct, although certainly the spirit of the statute is to prevent minors from unsupervised access to operable firearms, which is exactly what their conduct permitted, with tragic results. Nevertheless, I cannot say that the language of Tex. Pen.Code § 46.01 (Vernon 1994) clearly prohibits removing a trigger lock from a firearm already in the apparently lawful possession of a minor.1 This prong of the test favors the trial court’s refusal to charge on negligence per se.
Third, whether applying negligence per se would create liability without fault. Id. at 308. Here, strict liability would not result, because the statute only criminalizes intentionally or knowingly supplying a firearm to a minor. This characteristic of the statute weighs in favor of civil liability.
Fourth, whether imposing negligence per se would impose ruinous liability disproportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. Id. This author believes the irresponsible conduct of defendants is serious in the extreme, but considering the age of Albert Jr. and his apparently legal possession of the gun, I believe there is room here for reasonable minds to disagree. In such a circumstance, we defer to the trial court’s discretion.
Fifth, whether the injury resulted directly or indirectly from the violation of the statute. Id. The Perry court cautions that lack of direct causation is not in itself dispositive, as civil liability has been imposed in situations where statutory violations caused an injury by merely facilitation the tort of a third person. Id. at 309, (citing El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 312-13 (Tex.1987); Nixon v. *72Mr. Property Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985)). Here, the consequences were indirect and again, I would defer to the discretion of the trial court.
For these reasons, and not for those set out by the trial court, I would overrule Perez’s issue four.
Forseeability
Finally, in the majority’s discussion on duty, I take issue with the characterization of the law on foreseeability. The majority’s analysis rests on whether the Lopezes should have foreseen Albert Jr.’s suicide. I do not think this is the law. Rather, the particular injury need not have been foreseeable if the injury was of such a general character as might reasonably have been anticipated, and the injured party was so situated in relation to the wrongful act that the injury might reasonably have been foreseen. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management, 690 S.W.2d at 551. Thus, the relevant inquiry is not foreseeability of the suicide,2 but whether it was foreseeable that an unsupervised minor would misuse a firearm after requesting that its existing trigger lock, to which the minor had no key, be removed. This is a far different question, and does not require proof that the minor exhibited signs of depression, aggression, or lack of judgment.3 Gun shop owners are not psychologists, but they do have societal responsibilities inherent in the dangerous merchandise in which they traffic. See 18 U.S.C. 922(b)(1) (Licensed firearm dealers may not sell or deliver handguns to persons under age 21); Wal-Mart Stores v. Tamez, 960 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.1997) (violation of federal law to sell any ammunition to child under 18).
Moreover, I would point to the actions of the Lopezes themselves as evidence that they, at least, found it foreseeable that Albert Jr. would misuse the firearm in some way. Knowing that he was not eighteen, they tried to call his home before removing the trigger lock, and “joking around,” asked him what he intended to do with the gun, whether he would use to it “go out and rob anybody.” To me this indicates their' knowledge, on some level, that something was amiss.
*73In determining the legal issue of duty, we must remember that duty is the function of several interrelated factions, two of which are foreseeability and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the defendant’s conduct. Greater Houston Trans. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 528, 525 (Tex.1990); Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921, 927 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, no writ). Here, I would find it patently foreseeable that, given the opportunity, a minor would misuse a firearm which was protected by a trigger lock to which the minor had no key. In balance, I would find the social utility of the Lopezes conduct to be nil; they certainly violated the spirit of laws designed to prevent minors from gaining access to guns. Under these facts, I conclude the trial court properly submitted this case to the jury. I would overrule Appellees cross-point.
Conclusion
Because I conclude that the jury’s failure to find damages for mental anguish and loss of companionship are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, and because I would overrule Appellees’ cross-point, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.

. Had Albert, Jr. been under seventeen, a stronger case for negligence per se could be made for a violation of Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 46.13 (Vernon 1994), which provides that “a person commits an offense if a child [under age 17] gains access to a readily dis-chargeable firearm and the person with criminal negligence: (1) failed to secure the firearm; or (2) left the firearm in a place to which the person knew or should have known the child would gain access.”

. Although sadly, it seems that adolescent suicide by firearm is all too foreseeable, in the practical sense if not the legal one. In a recent law review article, one commentator observed:
Suicide is the second leading cause of death among youths between the ages of fifteen and nineteen, and the third leading cause of death for youths aged fifteen to twenty-four. ... While the overall suicide rate in the United States has remained relatively stable since 1950, the rate of suicide for adolescents has more than tripled. Firearms account for 60 percent of all suicides in this country, including youth suicides.
A large and growing body of public health evidence confirms that easy access to firearms significantly increases the risk of suicide. These studies come in three forms pertinent to this Article: (1) studies showing that higher gun ownership rates correlate with higher suicide rates; (2) studies showing that guns kept in the home greatly enhance the risk of suicide; and (3) most pertinent, studies showing that guns kept in the home greatly enhance the risk of suicide for adolescents. Andrew J. McClürg, The Public Health Case for the Safe Storage of Firearms: Adolescent Suicides Add One More “Smoking Gun,” 51 Hastings L.J. 953, 956-57, 965-66 (2000).

. The Center for Disease Control reports that in 1999, there were a total of 3,385 firearms deaths involving children 19 and under. In that year, 2,896 children between 15 and 19 were killed in firearm related incidents. There were 1,078 total underage suicides, and there were 975 gun-related suicides of children between 15 and 19. Office of Statistics and Programming, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, CDC Center for Disease Control.