Court Opinion

ID: 9963964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 16:06:03.98607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:06.734997
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                        Roman Lee Jones,                     FILED
                                           Appellant-Plaintiff           Apr 26 2024, 8:42 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                     v.                     Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

                                       Sharon Hawk, et al.,
                                          Appellee-Defendants

                                             April 26, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                            23A-CT-201
                              Appeal from the Miami Circuit Court
                            The Honorable Timothy P. Spahr, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                         52C01-2012-CT-969

                                      Opinion by Judge Pyle

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024   Page 1 of 16
                                     Judges Tavitas and Foley concur.

      Pyle, Judge.

      Statement of the Case
[1]   Roman Lee Jones (“Jones”) appeals, pro se, the trial court’s order granting

      summary judgment to prison employees, Sharon Hawk (“Hawk”), Brian Hollis

      (“Hollis”), and Renee Gall (“Gall”) (collectively, “the prison employees”) on

      Jones’ prisoner complaint against the prison employees. In Jones’ complaint,

      he alleged that the prison employees had retaliated against him after he had

      exercised his First Amendment speech rights. Jones argues that the trial court

      erred by granting summary judgment to the prison employees. Concluding that

      the trial court did not err, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[2]   We affirm.

      Issue
              Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to
              the prison employees.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024       Page 2 of 16
      Facts1
[3]   At all relevant times, Jones was an inmate in the Indiana Department of

      Correction (“DOC”) at the Miami Correctional Facility (“the prison”) and was

      serving a sentence for murder and attempted murder. Jones had a prison job in

      the prison law library. Hawk was the prison’s deputy warden, Hollis was a law

      library supervisor, and Gall was a correctional officer at the prison. 2

[4]   During the morning of December 19, 2019, Jones was working in the law

      library. The law library and some of the prison classrooms are located on the

      second floor of the prison’s offender services building (“the OSB”). That day,

      Gall was the correctional officer over that education floor. Jones was in the

      hallway with at least seven other inmates, and they were waiting to use the

      restroom. Jones had a conversation with another inmate about a prison

      restroom policy, which was apparently posted on the wall in the hallway. Jones

      was “explaining” the policy and rules to the other inmate, and he did so while

      in the presence of Gall and the other inmates. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 38).

      Gall overheard what Jones was saying and, at some point, she “intervened” in

      the conversation to inform Jones that his interpretation was not accurate.

      (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 39). Jones told Gall that he was correct, that he was

      1
        When Jones filed his Appellant Appendix, he did not include all the summary judgment pleadings and
      associated designated evidence. Therefore, the prison employees also filed an Appellees’ Appendix to
      include the relevant pleadings and documents.
      2
          Hawk retired from her position at the prison in November 2020.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024                           Page 3 of 16
      not speaking to her, and that what she had said was wrong and was not the

      policy. Jones then returned to his job at the law library.

[5]   Around this time, Hawk, who was making rounds in the OSB, walked to the

      second floor and saw that Gall was “visibly upset.” (App. Vol. 2 at 20;

      Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Gall informed Hawk that Jones had been “loud

      and disrespectful[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Gall

      also informed Hawk that Jones had been “disruptive in the hallway” and had

      “attempt[ed] to get other offenders upset and to join in[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 20;

      Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Additionally, several classroom instructors also

      complained to Hawk about “the loud commotion and disruption to their

      respective classes.” (App. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). At some

      point that day, Hollis and Hawk spoke with Jones about the incident. Jones

      told them that he had been speaking to another person and that Gall should not

      have “interjected herself” into his conversation. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 42).

[6]   Based on Jones’s behavior, Hawk instructed Gall to fill out an Offender

      Evaluation Performance Report (“offender evaluation form”). Gall partially

      completed the offender evaluation form by filling out the comments section of

      the form as follows:

              . . . I opened the restroom in Education for the classes to use. I
              enforced the rule per [Deputy Warden] Hawk, one at a time in
              [the] restroom. I had approximately 10 offenders in the hall at
              this time. Offender Jones . . . became upset with staff and stated
              there was nothing in [the] policy to say one at time in [the]
              restroom. I informed him it was put in place by [Deputy
              Warden] Hawk due to a fight in [the] restroom and was a safety
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024         Page 4 of 16
              and security issue. [Jones] stated [that] [Deputy Warden] Hawk
              didn’t know policy and can’t make up things and [that] he knows
              policy. At this time[,] other offenders joined in w[ith] his
              negative comments regarding [Deputy Warden] Hawk [and]
              myself. This incident caused an issue w[ith] multiple offenders.
              [Jones’] attitude was bad[,] and he was disrespectful with staff.

      (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 59).

[7]   Hollis, who was Jones’ supervisor in the law library, received the partially

      completed offender evaluation form and then met with Gall to obtain her

      observations of the incident. Hollis then completed the recommendation

      section of the offender evaluation form and recommended that Jones be

      removed from his library job. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 59). Thereafter, the

      prison reclassified Jones to “INP, which is idle no pay for 90 days[.]” (App.

      Vol. 2 at 55; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 17). Jones subsequently filed a prison

      classification appeal, which the prison denied. Jones later returned to his prison

      job in the law library.

[8]   On December 2, 2020, Jones filed a pro se prisoner complaint against the prison

      employees in their official and individual capacities. In Jones’ complaint, he

      alleged that the prison employees had retaliated against him after he had

      exercised his protected First Amendment rights. Specifically, Jones alleged that

      the prison employees had temporarily removed him from his prison job in the

      law library for exercising First Amendment speech by commenting on a prison

      restroom policy. According to Jones, the policy at issue related to a

      requirement that males needed to wait two hours to use the restroom. Jones

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024        Page 5 of 16
       alleged that his conversation about a restroom policy was “protected under the

       First Amendment” and that “due to his conversation[,] he [had] suffered by

       being fired from his job and forced to remain idle for ninety (90) days.”

       (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 6).3 Additionally, Jones alleged that the prison

       employees had falsified information on a state document. Jones also alleged

       that the prison employees had engaged in a “civil conspiracy” and had engaged

       in “defamation of character[.]” (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 3-4, 8). As his relief,

       Jones sought $10,000 from Hawk, $5,000 from Hollis, and $5,000 from Gall.

[9]    In February 2022, the prison employees filed a motion to dismiss Jones’

       complaint pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). The trial court granted the

       motion in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the trial court granted the

       prison employees’ motion to dismiss the defamation claims and the claims

       raised against the prison employees in their official capacities. The trial court

       denied the prison employees’ motion to dismiss the First Amendment

       retaliation claim against the employees in their individual capacities, which

       made that claim the only remaining claim.

[10]   Thereafter, in October 2022, Jones filed a motion for default judgment and

       attached exhibits. Also in October 2022, the prison employees filed a motion

       3
         Jones’ complaint also references his conversation with Hawk and Hollis as being an exercise of his First
       Amendment rights. However, Jones specifically “alleges that his conversation about policy to another
       prisoner” in the hallway and in the presence of Gall was the “protected” First Amendment speech that “was
       the motivating factor for the retaliation action” by the prison employees. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 6).
       Accordingly, we will address only that specific First Amendment retaliation allegation in this appeal. Even if
       we were to include his other allegation, it would not change the result of this appeal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024                                Page 6 of 16
for summary judgment. The prison employees made various arguments in

support of their motion. The argument upon which the trial court relied to

grant their motion was the prison employees’ argument that Jones had not

engaged in activity that was protected under the First Amendment.4 In support

of their argument, the prison employees cited to Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791

(7th Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, in which the Seventh Circuit discussed the elements

that a prisoner must prove when raising a First Amendment retaliation claim,

including the element that the prisoner engaged in an activity protected by the

First Amendment. Watkins, 599 F.3d at 794. The Watkins Court explained that

this “threshold” element requires analyzing whether a prisoner “engaged in

speech in a manner consistent with legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 795,

797. The Court further explained that a prisoner’s acts of speech that are

inconsistent with legitimate penological interests are “unprotected” under the

First Amendment “as a matter of law.” Id. at 799. The Watkins Court

discussed some relevant factors in a “legitimate penological interests test” 5 and

concluded that the prisoner’s acts of speech, during which he “public[ly]

challenge[d]” the law librarian’s directives in the presence of other inmates and

did so in a “confrontational” manner, were inconsistent with the legitimate

penological interests of discipline and order and were, therefore, unprotected

4
 The prison employees also argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because: (1) Hawk and
Hollis were not personally involved in any alleged retaliation; (2) Hawk and Hollis were entitled to qualified
immunity.
5
  The relevant factors included the impact that accommodating the speech would have on prison officials and
inmates and the availability of alternative means for the prisoner to express his complaints.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024                                 Page 7 of 16
       activities under the First Amendment as a matter of law. Id. at 797, 798.

       Additionally, the Watkins Court explained that the prisoner generally had a

       First Amendment right to criticize prison policies but that he was required to do

       so “in a manner consistent with his status as a prisoner[,]” including the use of

       a “less disruptive approach of filing a written complaint.” Id. at 797 (internal

       quotation marks and citations omitted).

[11]   In their designated evidence, the prison employees included Jones’ deposition

       from February 2022; State forms that included the offender evaluation form, a

       classification hearing report form, and an offender grievance form; Gall’s

       interrogatory responses; and affidavits from Hawk, Hollis, and other prison

       employees. In Jones’ deposition, he acknowledged that, while in the prison

       OSB hallway in the presence of Gall and about seven inmates, he had spoken to

       another inmate about a restroom policy and had then told Gall that he was not

       speaking to her and that she was wrong about the policy. In Gall’s

       interrogatory response, she stated that Jones’ “actions [in the prison hallway on

       December 19, 2019] were belligerent, disrespectful, and impacted facility

       security by causing other inmates to become upset and angry.” (Appellees’

       App. Vol. 2 at 74). In Hawk’s affidavit, she averred that she had instructed Gall

       to fill out an offender evaluation form due to Jones exhibiting “disruptive and

       disrespectful behavior” and because “his behavior that morning reflected on his

       work assignment as a law library clerk.” (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Hawk

       also averred that “[s]everal [classroom] instructors [had] c[o]me out of their

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024        Page 8 of 16
       classrooms to complain because of the loud commotion and disruption to their

       respective classes.” (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25).

[12]   In Jones’ summary judgment response, he argued, in relevant part, that his act

       of discussing a prison policy with another inmate in the hallway was a

       protected activity under the First Amendment. He did not dispute that his

       speech to Gall challenging her interpretation of the restroom policy was done in

       the presence of other inmates. Nor did Jones dispute the manner in which he

       spoke to Gall. Jones asserted that he “corrected Ms. Gall and explained to her

       that she was incorrect and [that] the disputed rule that was posted on the wall

       was not policy.” (App. Vol. 2 at 80).

[13]   The trial court held a hearing on the parties’ motions in December 2022.

       Thereafter, the trial court denied Jones’ default judgment motion. The trial

       court also granted the prison employees’ summary judgment motion,

       concluding that there was “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that

       the prison employees were “entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]” (App.

       Vol. 2 at 18). In relevant part, the trial court explained that it had “[a]ppl[ied]

       the legitimate penological interests test discussed in Watkins” and concluded

       that Jones had “not engage[d] in activity protected by the First Amendment.”

       (App. Vol. 2 at 17).

[14]   Jones now appeals.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024          Page 9 of 16
       Decision
[15]   At the outset, we note that Jones has chosen to proceed pro se. It is well settled

       that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.

       Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied. Thus, pro

       se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be

       prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Id. We will not

       become a party’s advocate, nor will we address arguments that are

       inappropriate, improperly expressed, or too poorly developed to be understood.

       Id. at 984.

[16]   Jones argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the

       prison employees. We disagree.

[17]   Our standard of review for summary judgment cases is well-settled. When we

       review a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment, our standard of

       review is the same as it is for the trial court. Knighten v. E. Chi. Hous. Auth., 45

       N.E.3d 788, 791 (Ind. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the

       moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

       it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000,

       1003 (Ind. 2014). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome

       of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the

       parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts

       support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Id. (cleaned up). “Summary

       judgment is appropriate when the undisputed material evidence negates one

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024            Page 10 of 16
       element of a claim.” Schmidt v. Indiana Ins. Co., 45 N.E.3d 781, 785 (Ind. 2015)

       (cleaned up). A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is “clothed with a

       presumption of validity,” and an appellant has the burden of demonstrating that

       the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d

       756, 762 (Ind. 2009) (cleaned up).

[18]   “[C]ourts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison

       inmates.’” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 547 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Turner v.

       Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)). “Prison walls do not form a barrier separating

       prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.” Turner, 482 U.S. at

       84. “However, [l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or

       limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the

       considerations underlying our penal system.” Bridges, 557 F.3d at 548 (cleaned

       up).

[19]   At issue in this summary judgment proceeding, is Jones’ prisoner claim that the

       prison employees had retaliated against him after he had exercised his First

       Amendment speech rights. To prevail at trial on a First Amendment retaliation

       claim, a plaintiff must show at trial that: “(1) he engaged in activity protected

       by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter

       First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity

       was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to take the

       retaliatory action.” Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 707-08 (7th Cir. 2023)

       (cleaned up). See also Watkins, 599 F.3d at 794. Thus, in this summary

       judgment context, in order to get summary judgment granted in their favor, the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024         Page 11 of 16
       prison employees were required to negate one of these elements of Jones’ First

       Amendment retaliation claim. See Schmidt, 45 N.E.3d at 785 (“Summary

       judgment is appropriate when the undisputed material evidence negates one

       element of a claim.”).

[20]   Here, the trial court granted summary judgment after finding that the prison

       employees had negated the first element of Jones’ First Amendment retaliation

       claim. Specifically, the trial court “[a]ppl[ied] the legitimate penological

       interests test discussed in Watkins” and concluded that Jones had “not

       engage[d] in activity protected by the First Amendment.” (App. Vol. 2 at 17).

       We, therefore, review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on that

       first element of whether Jones engaged in activity protected by the First

       Amendment.

[21]   To determine whether Jones’ activity while in the prison hallway was protected,

       we must ask “whether ‘he engaged in this speech in a manner consistent with

       legitimate penological interests.’” Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708 (quoting Watkins,

       599 F.3d at 796). “The prison setting is distinctive, and it affects many

       constitutional rights.” Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708. An inmate’s speech is not

       protected where it is “disruptive” or “confrontational.” Whitfield, 76 F.4th at

       708 Id. (citing Watkins, 599 F.3d at 798, 799 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Moreover, an inmate’s “backtalk,” which “violates prison [disciplinary

       policies],” is also unprotected. Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708 (citing Kervin v. Barnes,

       787 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024         Page 12 of 16
[22]   In Watkins, the Seventh Circuit explained that a prisoner generally has a First

       Amendment right to criticize prison policies but that he is required to do so “in

       a manner consistent with his status as a prisoner[,]” including the use of a “less

       disruptive approach of filing a written complaint.” Watkins, 599 F.3d at 797

       (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Watkins Court concluded

       that a prisoner, who worked as a prison law clerk and who had openly

       challenged the law librarian in the presence of other inmates, had a “negative

       impact on [the librarian’s] legitimate interests in discipline” and had “impeded

       her authority” in the library. Id. at 797. The Watkins Court further concluded

       that the prisoner’s acts of speech, which were “confrontational” manner, were

       inconsistent with the legitimate penological interests of discipline and order and

       were, therefore, unprotected activities under the First Amendment as a matter

       of law. Id. at 797, 798.

[23]   Here, the undisputed facts reveal that when Jones and at least seven other

       inmates were in the prison OSB hallway and waiting to use the restroom, Jones

       had a conversation with another inmate about a prison restroom policy, which

       was apparently posted on the wall in the hallway. Jones was “explaining” the

       policy and rules to the other inmate, and he did so while in the presence of Gall

       and the other inmates. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 38). Gall overheard what

       Jones was saying and, at some point, she “intervened” in the conversation to

       inform Jones that his interpretation was not accurate. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2

       at 39). Jones told Gall that he was correct, that he was not speaking to her, and

       that what she had said was wrong and was not the policy. Jones then returned

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024        Page 13 of 16
       to his job at the law library. Around this time, Hawk walked in the hallway

       and saw that Gall was “visibly upset.” (App. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol.

       2 at 25). Gall informed Hawk that Jones had been “loud and disrespectful[.]”

       (App. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Gall also informed Hawk that

       Jones had been “disruptive in the hallway” and had “attempt[ed] to get other

       offenders upset and to join in[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at

       25). Additionally, several classroom instructors also complained to Hawk

       about “the loud commotion and disruption to their respective classes.” (App.

       Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Based on Jones’ “disruptive and

       disrespectful” behavior, Hawk instructed Gall to fill out an offender evaluation

       form. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25).

[24]   Here, similar to the prisoner in Watkins, Jones openly challenged Gall in the

       presence of other inmates and did so in a manner that was loud, disruptive, and

       disrespectful. Jones asserts his actions were protected by the First Amendment

       because he was talking to another inmate before Gall spoke to him.6 Jones,

       however, fails to recognize that the actions taken by the prison employees to fill

       out the offender evaluation form that led to his temporary removal from his

       prison law library job were not done because of the specific words that he spoke

       6
         Jones also makes various derogatory allegations against the prison employees, including accusations that
       they committed perjury, gave a false declaration, engaged in a practice of doing “nefarious things.” (Jones’s
       Br. 12). Additionally, Jones asserts that Indiana Attorney General’s Office engaged in “attempting a cover-
       up” for the prison employees. (Jones’ Br. 13). We note that “we do not look favorably upon disparaging and
       disrespectful language in briefs[.]” In re Garrard, 985 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied,
       trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024                              Page 14 of 16
       to the other inmate. Instead, the action taken by the prison employees were

       based on Jones’ “disruptive and disrespectful” behavior of challenging Gall in

       the presence of other inmates and interrupting several classrooms. (Appellees’

       App. Vol. 2 at 25).

[25]   Jones’ behavior was inconsistent with the legitimate penological interests of

       discipline and order and was, therefore, an unprotected activity under the First

       Amendment as a matter of law. See Watkins, 599 F.3d at 798-99 (holding that

       the “confrontational” manner in which the prisoner complained and challenged

       the prison employee removed his grievances from First Amendment

       protection). See also Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708 (explaining that an inmate’s

       activity is not protected by the First Amendment when that activity is

       “disruptive[,]” “confrontational” or “backtalk”). Because the prison employees

       negated the first element of Jones’ First Amendment retaliation claim, the trial

       court did not err by granting summary judgment to the prison employees. See

       Schmidt, 45 N.E.3d at 785 (“Summary judgment is appropriate when the

       undisputed material evidence negates one element of a claim.”). Accordingly,

       we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[26]   Affirmed.

       Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024        Page 15 of 16
APPELLANT, PRO SE
Roman Lee Jones
Miami Correctional Facility
Bunker Hill, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Frances H. Barrow
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024   Page 16 of 16