Court Opinion

ID: 9853861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:23.897636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:11.973617
License: Public Domain

HUFF, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and would affirm appellant’s conviction. While I concur in part with the majority’s opinion, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion on the admission of evidence regarding details of witness Ruger’s conviction for giving false information to the police. I further disagree with the majority’s analysis of the chain of custody issue.
LAW/ANALYSIS
A. EXPLANATION OF IMPEACHING EVIDENCE
The majority concludes the trial judge erred in allowing Officer Ruger to explain his conviction for providing false information to the police. I disagree. The record shows, on cross examination, counsel for appellant was allowed to impeach Ruger with a 1992 conviction for giving false information to a police officer. The State asked Ruger on redirect to “expand upon the false information to police conviction.” Over the objection of defense counsel, Ruger stated:
I was fooling around one night and give a female my jeep. She didn’t come back on time. So, I reported it stolen. Okay. At that particular time, I didn’t want my wife to find out, right. So, I told the policeman that it was stolen and then later I had to come back and tell him that it wasn’t stolen. So, that’s basically the bottom line of it.
The majority cites State v. Gregg, 230 S.C. 222, 95 S.E.2d 255 (1956) and State v. Corn, 215 S.C. 166, 54 S.E.2d 559 (1949) for the proposition that any details of a crime of which a *367witness has been convicted are not admissible, whether the details be mitigating or aggravating. I disagree.
In State v. Gregg, our Supreme Court found that the defendant, after being impeached by a prior conviction, was not entitled to testify to mitigating details of the crime. I disagree with the majority’s assertion that this testimony diminished the severity of Ruger’s crime. The clear implication from the testimony that he did not want his wife to find out another female had his car was that he was carrying on an illicit relationship with the female. Further, even if this testimony does not amount to an admission of adultery, it clearly affects the credibility of the witness, showing he was deceitful with his own wife. At any rate, Ruger’s “explanation” of the details as to his crime in no way mitigated the seriousness of his conduct. If anything, the testimony reinforced that Ruger’s credibility was questionable. Therefore, State v. Gregg is not controlling.
In State v. Com, the Supreme Court found it was improper for the State to pursue further evidence relating to the defendant’s prior convictions by eliciting evidence on the sentences imposed, revocation of parole, and a dishonorable discharge from the Army. The court stated, “It was permissible for the prosecution to show that the appellant had been convicted of crimes which would affect his credibility as a witness, but not his reputation for violence or other crimes not affecting his credibility. The length of the sentences imposed could not be said to affect his credibility.” State v. Com thus prohibits the introduction of evidence of prior bad acts or convictions which do not affect the witness’ credibility. Here, the State did not elicit further evidence of a crime which was prejudicial to the appellant. While the evidence elicited by the State may have been categorized as “aggravating,” such evidence only prejudiced the State’s own witness.
The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from Gregg and Com. This is not a situation, as in Gregg, where the defendant is offering evidence to mitigate the seriousness of his conduct, thereby rehabilitating his credibility. Neither is this a situation, as in Com, where the State is attempting to elicit testimony of aggravating circumstances to prejudice the defendant’s credibility. Here, the testimony offered by the *368State is, at the most, harmless to the defendant, and at the very least, farther impeaches the State’s witness. Therefore, its admission would not be prejudicial to the appellant.
A trial judge has considerable latitude in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and his rulings will not be disturbed absent a showing of probable prejudice. State v. Sims, 304 S.C. 409, 405 S.E.2d 377 (1991). The burden is upon the appellant to satisfy this court that there was prejudicial error in the admission of the testimony. State v. McElveen, 280 S.C. 325, 313 S.E.2d 298 (1984). In order to constitute reversible error, the reviewing court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for supposing that the jury might have been misled to the prejudice of the appellant. State v. Smith, 230 S.C. 164, 94 S.E.2d 886 (1956). I conclude there was no prejudice to the appellant by the admission of this evidence.
B. CHAIN OF CUSTODY
The majority also finds error in the admission of the marijuana and crack cocaine into evidence based on defects in the chain of custody. The majority finds chemist Kilmer’s absence to be fatal to the State’s showing of proper chain of custody. I disagree.
Rule 6, SCRCrimP provides in pertinent part:
(a) Report of Chemical Analysis. For the purpose of establishing the physical evidence of a controlled substance ... a report signed by the chemist or analyst who performed the test or tests required concerning its nature shall be evidence that the material delivered to him or her was properly tested under procedures approved by the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED), that those procedures are legally reliable and that the material is or contains the substance or substances stated. The report shall be admitted without the necessity of the chemist or analyst personally being present or appearing in court provided:
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(2) the report is accompanied by an affidavit of the chemist or analyst who performed the test.... *369The defendant or opposing party may object to the introduction of a chemist’s or analyst’s report.... If such objection is properly made, the trial judge shall require the chemist or analyst to be present at trial for the purpose of personally testifying.
(b) Certified or Sworn Statement. For the purpose of establishing a chain of physical custody or control of evidence entered under Part A of this Rule, a certified or sworn statement signed by each successive person having custody of the evidence that he or she delivered it to the person stated is evidence that the person had custody and made delivery as stated without the necessity of the person who signed the statement being present in court provided: (1) the statement contains a sufficient description of the substance or its container to distinguish it; and (2) the statement says the substance was delivered in substantially the same condition as when received.
The defendant or his attorney may demand appearance in court of the persons within the chain of custody in the same manner as provided in Section (a).
The majority notes a violation of Rule 6 does not necessarily require the exclusion of drug evidence. However, the majority concludes Kilmer was a critical link in the chain because it was Kilmer who retrieved the evidence from the drop box and first analyzed it, and Kilmer who retained possession for a period of six months. I disagree.
The admission of evidence is in the sound discretion of the trial judge whose decision will not be overturned absent an error of law resulting in undue prejudice. State v. Johnson, 818 S.C. 194, 456 S.E.2d 442 (Ct.App.1995), cert. denied (December 8,1995). Because evidence involving drugs may easily be tampered with, the party offering the drugs into evidence must establish a chain of custody as far as practicable; however, the proof of the chain of custody need not negate all possibility of tampering. Id. Instead, where the substance analyzed has passed through several hands, the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it between the taking and analysis. Id. The party offering evidence must trace possession of the substance and what was done with it from the time it was taken until final *370analysis. State v. Singleton, 319 S.C. 312, 460 S.E.2d 573 (1995).
In the case at hand, the State did not have to rely on the analysis of Kilmer to establish the drug properties of the substances found on appellant. While the State did have the substances reanalyzed by another SLED chemist after Kilmer’s departure, the record shows the substances had already field tested positive for marijuana and crack cocaine prior to the drugs coming into the possession of Kilmer or anyone else at SLED.1 Because appellant was charged with possession of contraband, the weights of the drugs were immaterial. The evidence of record does not leave to conjecture as to who had the substances and what was done with them between taking the drugs from appellant and the analysis by Davis. Accordingly, I would find Kilmer’s presence was not necessary to establish the chain of custody. Further, any discrepancy in testimony concerning the weight of the drugs reflected upon the credibility of the evidence and not its admissibility.
C. DENIAL OF IMPEACHING EVIDENCE
I would further note that I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the issue of impeachment of Ruger with the crack cocaine evidence. However, I would affirm this issue on the ground that any error in the exclusion of such evidence was harmless.
The question of admission or exclusion of evidence is largely within the discretion of the trial judge and his exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse thereof amounting to an error of law. State v. Smicklevich, 268 S.C. 411, 234 S.E.2d 230 (1977). The factors to be considered in determining whether exclusion of evidence of a witness’s credibility constitutes harmless error include: (1) the importance of the witness’s testimony to the prosecution’s case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3) whether *371other evidence corroborates or contradicts the witness’s testimony; (4) the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the State’s case. State v. Holmes, 320 S.C. 259, 464 S.E.2d 334 (1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2507, 135 L.Ed.2d 197 (1996). Generally, where evidence is merely cumulative to other evidence admitted at trial, the exclusion of such evidence is not an abuse of discretion. See State v. Jones, 298 S.C. 118, 378 S.E.2d 594 (1989) (no abuse of discretion in denial of admission of photograph where photo was cumulative to other photographs admitted into evidence). The record before us clearly reflects the testimony given by Ruger was cumulative to and corroborative of testimony elicited from three other officers involved in the incident. Further, Ruger was effectively impeached by evidence of his conviction of giving false information to police. Finally, the overall strength of the State’s case against appellant was very strong. Any possible error in the exclusion of the PTI evidence was therefore harmless.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm appellant’s conviction.

. I disagree with the majority’s assertion that Officer Davis's field testing of the substances was insufficient to establish the content of the evidence. The fact that it was field tested goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. I further discern no significance in the fact that the judge submitted charges of possession of marijuana and possession of crack cocaine as lesser included offenses.