Court Opinion

ID: 9675424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:53:10.639135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:34.431402
License: Public Domain

DALTON, J.
(dissenting).
I am unable to concur in the opinion of Lozier, C., which would reverse the judgment in this case and remand the cause for a new .trial on the theory that Instruction' 2 was prejudicially erroneous.
Instruction 2, only partially set out in the opinion, shows that it was applicable only if the jury first found from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did commit the act charged against him. As I read the opinion, it holds that this instruction, by requiring the jury to be satisfied or reasonably satisfied as to the validity of defendant’s defense of insanity before acquitting him on that ground, imposed upon the defendant a higher degree of' proof than the law requires, that is, a higher degree of proof than proof by the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. The opinion seeks to distinguish between prior decisions of this court which have approved'instructions using the words "satisfaction” and "reasonable satisfaction” and those which have approved instructions using the words "preponderance or greater weight of *788the evidence.” The opinion overrules the former group of decisions.
We think the opinion wholly overlooks the fact that the test of the correctness of an instruction lies not in the close analysis which a critical lawyer, or an appellate court, with the aid of briefs, arguments and hours of research, may give to it, but how the instruction would be understood and acted upon by the average juror who is wholly unskilled in the technicalities of the. law. While the opinion evidences hours and days of painstaking research in an effort to draw a fine line of distinction between two lines of authorities in this state, and while the opinion reaches a technically correct position as to the difference between the terms used, yet it is a difference that only a’ trained and experienced lawyer, law teacher, or experienced judge would apprehend or recognize. We are satisfied that it would be a distinction without a difference as far as any ordinary juror is concerned. In fact very few jurors would know what the words, “a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence,” meant unless the court went further and gave “a clear definition of preponderance of evidence, informing the jury that what is meant thereby is evidence which is more convincing to them as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.” Rouchene v. Gamble Construction Co., 338 Mo. 123, 89 S. W. 2d 58, 63. When such a definition has been given the jurors would understand that the term only refers to that which satisfies or reasonably satisfies the mind as to the truth of the situation. Many prior members of this court have been unable to see any material difference between the two lines of authorities mentioned in the opinion.
The defense of insanity in a criminal case is not like the defense of accident or alibi where the burden of proof remains upon the state to disprove accident or absence, and where a reasonable doubt as to intent or presence may authorize an acquittal. See State v. Markel, 336 Mo. 129, 77 S. W. 2d 112, 115(6); State v. Prunty, 276 Mo. 359, 208 S. W. 91, 95.
The law presumes that a man is sane until the contrary is shown and an instruction imposing the burden of proving insanity as a defense to a crime is upon the one who [602] asserts it. State v. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414, 417. In other words, after the jury has found from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did commit the act charged against- him, the burden of proof to establish the defense of insanity and to authorize a discharge of defendant on that ground alone rests upon the defendant. State v. Murphy, 338 Mo. 291, 90 S. W. 2d 103. The instruction imposes no greater burden. We do not think it reasonably possible that an ordinary juror could or would have been misled by Instruction 2, which concluded as follows:
*789“From all this it follows that although you may believe and find that the defendant did commit the act charged against him, yet if from the evidence you further find that at the time he did it he was in such an insane, deranged, defective or deficient condition of mind that he did not know he was doing wrong, and did not comprehend the nature and character of the act, then such act was not, in law or in fact, malicious or felonious, and you ought to acquit him on the grounds of insanity, and by your verdict so say.
“The Court instructs the jury that if you find the defendant not guilty on the sole ground that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act charged, you will so state in your verdict, and you will also state whether the defendant has entirely and permanently recovered from such insanity. ’ ’
Considered as a whole, we do not find the instruction misleading or the giving of it prejudicial error.