Court Opinion

ID: 9766695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:56:46.467167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:36.935117
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the manner in which the majority opinion addresses the issues concerning the state’s opening statement and the warrantless search of appellant’s residence. The first part of this dissent is based upon the law and the facts as set out in the majority opinion. Based on my understanding of the law and precedent, I am compelled to reach a different conclusion. During the opening statement the prosecutor made the following remarks: The defendant is arrested and he is read his Miranda rights, and during the course of those rights as they are read to him, he states, I want a lawyer. So Officer Howard of the Arkansas State Police folds his papers up, and he says all right, there will be no more questions. Officer Howard stopped asking questions. The court denied the appellant’s motion for a mistrial but offered to give a limiting instruction. Defense counsel rejected this offer. In my opinion the instruction would have simply called to the jury’s attention a second time the appellant’s invocation of this constitutional right. The jury could just about as easily have forgotten this statement as it could have forgotten having heard a shotgun fired during the opening statement. The majority attempts to distinguish Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), with the statement that “[t]he situation here is not exactly the same as in Doyle." The distinction is nothing but an effort to evade the clear holding in Doyle. No price should be required of any person for invoking a constitutional right. The practical effect of these remarks in the opening statement was to shift the burden to the appellant to explain why he had invoked his constitutional right to an attorney. I will assume that the state’s opening statement accurately described the incident for the purposes of this opinion. We have spoken on the issue of the defendant’s right to remain silent many times and up until now we have held that the right to remain silent can not be used against an accused. In Clark v. State, 256 Ark. 658, 509 S.W.2d 812 (1974) we stated: We are, of course, controlled by the federal requirements of the Fifth Amendment as well as our own similar constitutional and statutory provisions. Part of the requirements of the federal amendments demand that the prosecution not comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. The Clark case was before us because the prosecuting attorney, in his opening statement, called the jury’s attention to the situation that the victim of the homicide (husband of the accused) could not be there to tell his story. The prosecutor then said to the jury, “The story then that you will have about what happened out there will come from her.” The trial court denied a motion for a mistrial. On appeal we reversed because the prosecutor’s opening statement was improper. The exact same series of events as were before us in Clark are before us in the present case. In Clark at 661, we stated: “We have held that it is error, over defendant’s objection, to give an instruction that defendant’s failure to testify is not to be considered by the jury. [Citations omitted.] Even such a neutral comment on defendant’s silence should not be given over his objection.” The comment by the prosecutor in this case was improper and such comments should not have been permitted. After the appellant had invoked his constitutional right to an attorney, the efforts of the police to interrogate him continued. In fact a written statement was thereafter obtained from the appellant, which statement was excluded by the trial court in the presence of the jury. No reference to a signed statement should have been made in the presence of the jury. The reference likely left the jury with the impression that it was a confession. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the United States Supreme Court discussed psychological ploys calculated to initiate “voluntary” statements. The Court held that a person who has invoked his right to counsel could not be subjected to express questioning or its “functional equivalent.” The Innis opinion stated that the term “interrogation” under Miranda applies to words or actions on the part of the police that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Supra at 299. To compound the error, in the opening statement the prosecutor recited Holden’s remark, “What’s her name?” Officer Howard later testified that he deliberately used the word “person” rather than the victim’s name when he said, “a person was shot out at Joy.” I am in total disagreement with the statement in the majority opinion, “The officer’s motive in framing his statement is irrelevant.” I disagree. Motive in this case is very important. This statement by Officer Howard is clearly the “functional equivalent” of continuing interrogation. I agree with the majority opinion that the fundamental rule of law enunciated in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) is that once a defendant indicates he wants a lawyer, the interrogation must cease. I also agree with the majority opinion that in the past we have followed the rule without exception. One of these opinions is Futch v. State, 288 Ark. 323, 705 S.W.2d 11 (1986). In the present opinion the majority has departed from the Edwards rule. Next, I want to discuss the matter of the warrantless search. It is very important that we know the location and the circumstances of the appellant at the time of his arrest if this search and seizure is to be justified as a search incident to an arrest. Below is some of the testimony of the officers which is included in the majority opinion. From the testimony of Officer Mitchell: “I proceeded into the Holden residence armed with my service revolver and my 12 gauge shotgun . . . Sgt. Howard, myself and Officer Denney entered. . . Then, as we were moving down the hall, through the kitchen, a voice came from this side room, ‘What’s going on out there?’ ” ... He was probably standing three feet to the rear of the facing of the door when he reached over and flipped the lights on . . . . At no time prior to the arrest did I go into the bedroom .... I put him up against the wall in the hall. There were 2 or 3 other officers in the hall. He was handcuffed and taken into the kitchen which was probably 3 or 4 feet. . .. At this point we had not discovered any evidence or any of the items. He was arrested and put into handcuffs and removed to the kitchen. I did not see a search warrant. The rifle came out of the bedroom that he was arrested in. It was under the bed up against the wall. Part of the evidence was visible, I believe the shells were visible From the testimony of Officer Howard: “The defendant had come out of the bedroom and there was, I guess you call it a short hallway and he was in that hallway. I guess you could say Mitchell was at the kitchen end of the hallway, as opposed to the bedroom. Mitchell did not get to the bedroom end until after the suspect was in custody. Mitchell was standing up, leaning, and looking down the hall and I was crouched down beside the bar in the kitchen, looking around. Mitchell, he actually placed him under arrest. . . . [A]nd after the suspect was in custody, I then went in the bedroom and there was a hunting knife lying . . . and a closer inspection showed there was a rifle under the bed. ... I shined a light under the bed and saw it. . . the bolt on the rifle was open. . ..” Although not recited in the majority opinion, Officer Mitchell also testified: [T]hen as we were moving down the hall through the kitchen,... I repeated myself, telling him, Eric, to come out, calling him by first name, come out so I can see you. He asked if he could turn on the light, I told him to turn the light on. He reached across to turn the light on. I could see half of his body, and he flipped the light on, and I told him to stay right there, don’t go back in. . . . “He had come out of his bedroom and there was, I guess you call it a short hallway and he was in that hallway. I guess you could say the kitchen end of the hallway as opposed to the bedroom.” The overall testimony of the officers and the diagram in the record which was prepared by them, clearly show that the appellant was in the hallway at the time he was arrested. Officer Howard, who was following Officer Mitchell down the hallway, stated that the actual arrest took place 6 to 8 feet outside the bedroom door. In any event there is no evidence that the appellant was within the “lunge area” of the seized evidence. At the time of the search the appellant was under arrest, handcuffed, under guard by several heavily armed officers, and probably even out of the residence. A few questions and answers bearing heavily upon this decision are set out as follows: Q: So from the time that he was arrested until the time that you walked the 6 or 8 feet to the door, there was a possibility that there might be somebody else there? A: Yes, sir. Q: And then when you made the determination there was not anybody else there, those exigent circumstances were gone, is that correct? A: Yes. Q: You weren’t afraid somebody would jump out and shoot you? A: That is correct. Q: [ W] as there any reason why you could not have gotten a search warrant to search that bedroom, later in time? A: Probably not . . . Q: So you weren’t afraid somebody was going to remove the evidence? A: No. Q: You were not afraid the evidence was likely to be removed or destroyed before you could get a search warrant? A: We could have posted someone there to secure the scene. Q: I believe the rifle was not in plain sight? A: That is correct. Q: It was under the bed? A: Yes. Q: And you had to get a light down and search and you retrieved it, is that correct? A: That is correct. The above is but a sample of the circumstances at the time of the search. There was clearly no danger of harm to the officers or of destruction of evidence at the time of the search and no exigent circumstances existed. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), it is stated: [I]t is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seekto use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. . . . And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area 'within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. [Emphasis added.] Supra at 763. Chimel goes on to hold that there is no justification for “routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs” or for searching desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in the same room. In Moore v. State, 261 Ark. 274, 551 S.W.2d 185 (1977), we considered a similar factual situation where the appellant was arrested in one room and the arresting officers proceeded to search in other areas of the house after the appellant was removed. There the officers found a gun and other items. In reversing and remanding on rehearing we cited Chimel v. California, supra and stated: The officers did not have a search warrant or legal consent to search the premises. The law permits a search of the area within the immediate control of the person arrested. . . . However, a search of the rest of the house turned up a .32 pistol. We hold that only those items in Moore’s bedroom were lawfully seized and all other evidence was improperly seized. It is clear from the facts in the present appeal that there was no evidence of weapons on the person of the appellant. There were no exigent circumstances. Therefore, the seizure of the rifle and other items were not necessary for the protection of the officers or the prevention of the destruction of evidence. I would hold that the items seized in the bedroom without a search warrant, after the suspect was in custody, were unlawfully seized and therefore inadmissible.