Court Opinion

ID: 9737216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:19:12.584841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:57.277873
License: Public Domain

Justice CASTILLE,
dissenting.
The majority opinion correctly outlines the analysis a court must generally perform under the Parental Kidnapping Protection Act (PKPA) and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in determining jurisdiction in a multijurisdiction child custody dispute. However, I disagree with the majority’s finding that the undisputed facts of this case dictate a conclusion that jurisdiction here rests in North Carolina. In my view, Pennsylvania has continuing jurisdiction; accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority aptly notes, jurisdiction in this case hinges on which state has jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA. The UCCJA would confer jurisdiction where, inter alia, Pennsylvania is the home state of the child at the time of the commencement of the proceeding. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5344(a)(1)®. However, the UCCJA is silent as to what constitutes “commencement” of a custody action. I am aware that the Superi- or Court has held that, for purposes of determining jurisdiction under the UCCJA, the commencement date is the date of the proceeding then before the court, and not the initiation date of any previous action between the parties. See Favacchia v. Favacchia, 769 A.2d 531 (Pa.Super.2001); Simpkins v. Disney, 416 Pa.Super. 243, 610 A.2d 1062 (1992); Black v. Black, 441 Pa.Super. 358, 657 A.2d 964 (Pa.Super.), appeal denied, 542 Pa. 655, 668 A.2d 1119 (1995). This conclusion, however, is not drawn from the plain language of the statute itself, and, since this Court has yet to address the issue, it is not binding upon us.
*368In my view, Mother commenced the relevant custody action in this case as part of her initial divorce complaint filed in Pennsylvania in 1994. The immediate result of that action was a custody order entered by a Pennsylvania judge that same year. That order derived from a stipulation in which Father agreed to Mother’s moving to North Carolina with the children and also agreed to pay $6,000 per month in child support. During the period between 1994 and 1997, custody of the parties’ children was governed by the 1994 Pennsylvania custody order. In 1997, when the 1994 order was still in force, Father filed a motion for a conciliation conference, clearly seeking conciliation concerning the 1994 Pennsylvania order entered on the custody count in Mother’s divorce complaint.
I do not view Father’s 1997 motion as commencing some new custody action, but rather as being exactly what it purported to be: an attempt at conciliation given complications arising from the 1994 order then in force. It was Mother who instituted a new custody action, in a new jurisdiction, notwithstanding the existence and pendency of her original Pennsylvania action. There is no dispute that the children, like Mother and Father, resided in Pennsylvania at the time Mother commenced the original custody action in 1994. A fair reading of the UCCJA thus vests jurisdiction in Pennsylvania in this case because the children resided in Pennsylvania at the time of the commencement of the relevant proceeding.
I am troubled' by the chaos that may result from the majority opinion permitting a parent to uproot children and then, six months later, haul the other parent into a court in a distant jurisdiction which is now the children’s “home state,” perhaps even multiple times and in multiple jurisdictions during a child’s minority. Here, in response to Mother’s 1994 Pennsylvania complaint, Father agreed to Mother’s relocation to North Carolina with the children. Under the majority’s holding, Father, who has continuously resided in Pennsylvania — a jurisdiction in which, the record shows, the children have maintained significant contacts — is now rewarded for his *369accommodation by being forced to litigate succeeding issues arising out of a Pennsylvania custody order secured by Mother in a state hundreds of miles away. One result of the majority’s decision will be to encourage those in Father’s position not to be so accommodating in the future, but instead to vigorously oppose any relocation of the children to another jurisdiction — a result that may not be in the best interests of the children.
I believe that the language of the UCCJA is flexible enough to encompass a wide range of factual scenarios that arise in the context of child custody. I would hold that where, as here, the custody action was originally commenced in Pennsylvania and a custody order was properly entered, and the later filing merely sought court assistance with enforcing that order, the plain language of the UCCJA permits a Pennsylvania court to continue to exercise jurisdiction over custody disputes. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the Superior Court.
Justice SAYLOR joins this dissenting opinion.