Court Opinion

ID: 9790484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:53:38.848488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.846097
License: Public Domain

*1026BRYNER, Justice,
dissenting.
I find myself unable to agree with this court’s reversal of the superior court’s order dismissing Metcalfs appeal.
Metcalf received an adverse ruling from the Workers’ Compensation Board and filed an appeal in the superior court. After being notified of the due date for his opening brief, he moved for a six-month extension. The extension would have changed the due date from February 1,1996, to July 31. To justify this extraordinary delay, Metcalf advanced a conclusory assertion that a 1982 head injury required him to sleep eighteen hours a day and made it impossible for him to file the brief within the normal time frame. Metcalf did not substantiate his claims of mental incapacity and physical impairment, and he made no effort to explain why an extension of less than six months would not have sufficed. Despite these shortcomings — and over Fe-lec’s opposition — the superior court granted Metcalf a ninety-day extension to May 31. The court expressly warned Metcalf, however, that “no further extensions will be granted.”
Metcalf almost immediately began trying to circumvent the court’s “no further extensions” order. Twelve days after the court granted Metcalf the ninety-day extension, he filed a “Motion for an Amendment to ... [the] Order Granting a 90 Day Extension.” In this motion, Metcalf sought to “amend” the ninety-day extension order by extending it to cover the full period of delay originally requested. To support the motion, Metcalf repeated the same conclusory claims that he had advanced in his motion for á six-month extension; he offered no further insight into why the just-granted ninety-day extension was insufficient.
The superior court understandably rejected Metcalfs attempt at an “amendment.” Undeterred, Metcalf, on April 8,1996, filed a “Motion to Accept a Late File on July 31, 1996[.]” The “late file” date Metcalf requests ed was, again, the date on which his brief would have been due had his originally requested six-month extension been allowed. And again, Metcalf made no attempt to substantiate the need for a six-month extension; he simply asserted that he had already shown that the extension was necessary.
The superior court denied Metcalfs “late file” motion. The briefing deadline passed with no brief being filed. On May 29, Felec moved to dismiss the appeal. Within several days, Metcalf filed an opposition to the motion. The superior court took no immediate action. On July 31, the date designated in his original extension motion, Metcalf filed his brief, offering no further justification or explanation.
Felec moved to strike the brief as ninety days overdue. Metcalf promptly opposed the motion, but once again offered nothing new. On August 15,1996, the superior court granted Felec’s motion to dismiss the appeal, finding it “well taken.” Metcalf thereafter appealed to this court, seeking to litigate the merits of the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision. This court allowed the appeal to proceed, but ordered it limited to the issue of whether the superior court erred in dismissing the case; we directed that this issue be considered on an expedited basis and without briefing. This court now concludes that the superior court erred in ordering dismissal. I disagree.
Admittedly, an untimely brief should rarely provide occasion for dismissal. As the court aptly observes, the dismissal for untimeliness in this case seems particularly harsh because it was ordered after the untimely brief had already been filed.1 However, Metcalfs case presents exceptional circumstances.
Metcalf has been litigating this ease for seventeen years and has pressed his claims through seven decisions by the Workers’ Compensation Board and two prior decisions *1027by this court. In the past, the Board has found Metcalf responsible for delaying the litigation — a finding expressly affirmed by this court in Metcalf v. Felec Servs., Mem. Op. & J. No. 662 (Alaska, April 21, 1993). The Board has also found Metcalf responsible for unreasonably refusing to undertake appropriate medical treatment — a finding likewise affirmed by this court. See Metcalf v. Felec Servs., 784 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Alaska 1990). Most recently, the Board has found Metcalfs claims of impairment to be incredible — a finding Metcalf has not appealed.
Metcalfs history of litigiousness and procrastination, his apparent lack of credibility before the Board, his failure to submit any meaningful substantiation of his claim of impairment, his failure to offer even a semblance of an explanation for his purported inability to file a brief within the ninety-day extension actually allowed, his promptness in responding to adverse orders and motions, and his resourceful but transparent attempts to end-run the superior court’s order barring any further extensions all belie Metcalfs claims of mental incompetency and physical impairment; these same considerations bespeak Metcalfs wilfulness in disregarding the superior court’s scheduling orders, and his obstinate insistence on having his own way.
The order dismissing Metcalfs ease should be overturned only if the superior court abused its discretion. See Geczy v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources, 924 P.2d 103, 104 (Alaska 1996). Given the exceptional nature of this case, I am unable to find an abuse of discretion. Unlike the court, I do not view the dismissal order as a purely punitive measure.2 The superior court is a high-volume forum in which efficient case management and integrity of scheduling orders are matters of keen interest and paramount importance. Under the unique circumstances presented here, acceptance by the superior court of Metcalfs late-filed brief would have been tantamount to an abdication of that court’s authority to manage its own caseload. This court’s decision does little but send litigants like Metcalf an unmistakable signal to litigate at their own pleasure.
Accordingly, I dissent.

. This harshness may be more seeming than real. By waiting to dismiss the case until after the originally-requested six-month deadline had passed and Metcalf had filed his brief, the superi- or court in effect allowed Metcalf one last opportunity to substantiate his claim of impairment It and explain his need for a full six months. When Metcalf failed to offer any additional justification for his dilatory filing, the court dismissed the case. To fault the court for waiting under these circumstances will only encourage judges to act precipitously in dismissing administrative appeals involving tardy briefing.

. For this reason, I do not believe that an exploration of lesser sanctions was required, as the court suggests. In any event, the lack of any exploration of lesser sanctions seems inconsequential, in context. Metcalf has no significant financial resources and would thus be impervious to any form of monetary sanction. And given that this was an administrative appeal, it did not lend itself to any of the lesser procedural and evidentiary sanctions that are normally available in civil cases that are awaiting trial or being tried. The court suggests no lesser sanctions that could realistically have been considered or applied in this case.