Court Opinion

ID: 9429734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:27:45.67303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:21.120797
License: Public Domain

Justice White,
with whom Justice Powell and Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
Section 93(b) of the New Jersey Casino Control Act restricts the activities of unions representing workers employed in the casino industry. In particular, it provides that a union may not collect dues from casino workers or administer pension or welfare funds if any of its officials is disqualified under the criteria set forth in § 86. The Court purports to save some portion of this statute1 by holding that a state law restricting the class of individuals who can serve as officers in a union is not pre-empted by federal labor law. If § 93(b) did no more than that, I would agree with the Court’s *514resolution of these cases because, as the Court amply demonstrates, Congress’ actions in enacting the LMRDA indicate that federal labor law does not pre-empt state laws which prevent certain types of individuals from serving as union officials.2 However, § 93(b) is not directed at the individuals who are disqualified under §86. It imposes sanctions on the union itself and, in so doing, infringes on the employees’ federally protected rights.
Section 7 of the NLRA grants covered employees the right “to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” 29 U. S. C. § 157.3 A bargaining representative achieves this status by being “designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the em*515ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes.” 29 U. S. C. § 159(a). The employees’ right to exercise this right is protected from employer, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1), labor organization, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(1), and state, Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U. S. 538 (1945), interference. The employees whose rights are involved in these cases have exercised this right by selecting Local 54 as their bargaining representative.4 The State, acting pursuant to § 93(b), has sought to prohibit Local 54 from collecting dues from these employees, thereby effectively preventing the union from carrying out the collective-bargaining function and nullifying the employees’ exercise of their § 7 right.
In Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, the Court held that federal labor policy prohibits a State from enforcing permissible regulations by the use of sanctions that prevent the union “from functioning as a labor union.” Id., at 543. Allowing the State to so restrict the union’s conduct infringes on the employees’ right to bargain collectively through the representative of their own choosing because it .prevents that representative from functioning as a collective-bargaining agent. The same effect would occur if New Jersey were to enjoin Local 54 from collecting dues from employees in the casino industry. A union which cannot sustain itself financially obviously cannot effectively engage in collective-bargaining activities on behalf of its members. Unlike the Court, I see no need to remand these cases in order to determine whether, as a factual matter, Local 54 is so dependent on dues that it will be prevented from effectively functioning as a bargaining representative if that source of revenue is cut off. I am willing to hold that, as a matter of law, a statute *516like § 93(b), which prohibits a union from collecting dues from its members, impairs the union’s ability to represent those members to such an extent that it infringes on their § 7 right to bargain through the representative of their choice. Since the Court refuses to strike down the statute on this ground, I respectfully dissent.

 It is not clear what portion of the statute the Court upholds since it expressly refuses to decide whether the dues prohibition and fund administration provisions are valid. Section 93(b) does nothing more than impose those two restrictions on unions whose officials are disqualified under the criteria set forth in § 86. It does not, by its terms, provide a mechanism for disqualifying any union officer. Therefore, while it appears that the Court holds that a State is free to disqualify certain individuals from acting as union officials as long as it does not impose sanctions on the union itself, it is not clear that anything in § 93(b) enables the State to do that.

 If these cases required us to determine whether New Jersey could enforce the limits in § 86 by imposing sanctions directly against the disqualified individual, for example by imposing fines or criminal penalties on those who hold union office after being disqualified, I would hold that it could. Section 93(b) does not purport to do that, however, and it is that statute which we are asked to review.

 The Court correctly recognizes that there is a fundamental difference between the employees’ absolute § 7 right to choose which labor organization will act as their bargainingrepresentative and their less absolute right to determine who will serve as officers in that organization. One need only examine the actual workings of most unions in order to realize that the two rights are not coextensive. For example, while a nonunion employee in an agency shop retains his § 7 right to participate in the selection of the bargaining representative, he often has no say in who will serve as officers of the union that represents him in the bargaining process since such decisions are generally made by union members only. Similarly, while only the members of a particular collective-bargaining unit are empowered to decide which union will act as their bargaining representative, all members of the union, even those not in the particular bargaining unit, are generally free to participate in the process of electing union officials. Thus, in a large union, it is possible that a substantial majority of the members of a particular bargaining unit may vote against the union official who is eventually elected. Even though the members of the bargaining unit are unable to select the union official of their choice in such situations, there would be no legitimate claim that this somehow interfered with their § 7 right to bargain through the representative of their choice.

 Under the NLRA, an individual, as well as a labor organization, can serve as the exclusive bargaining representative. 29 U. S. C. § 152(4). See Louisville Sanitary Wiper Co., 65 N. L. R. B. 88 (1945); Robinson-Ransbottom Pottery Co., 27 N. L. R. B. 1093 (1940). The employees whose interests are at stake in these cases have chosen a union (Local 54), rather than an individual, as their bargaining representative.