Court Opinion

ID: 9928360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:01:24.000146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:00.527572
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13173    Document: 86-1     Date Filed: 01/31/2024   Page: 1 of 12

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13173
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        TAMIKO N. PEELE,
        And Tamiko N. Peele,
        Individually On Behalf Of Themselves,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
        THROUGH ITS UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM,
        REGION 21 AND IT'S OFFICIALS THE CHAPTER 13
        TRUSTEE,
        ERIK P. KIMBALL,
        ROBIN R. WEINER, P.A.,
        NANCY J ARGULA, et al.,
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        2                   Opinion of the Court                22-13173

                                                 Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-14305-AMC
                          ____________________

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14096
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        TAMIKO N. PEELE,
        And Tamiko N. Peele,
        Individually On Behalf Of Themselves,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
        THROUGH ITS UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM,
        REGION 21 AND IT'S OFFICIALS THE CHAPTER 13
        TRUSTEE,
        ERIK P. KIMBALL,
        ROBIN R. WEINER, P.A.,
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        22-13173                Opinion of the Court                          3

        NANCY J ARGULA, et al.,

                                                       Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-14305-AMC
                            ____________________

        Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                In these consolidated appeals, Tamiko Peele appeals, among
        other things, the district court’s dismissal of her complaint. Rather
        than filing a response, several appellees have moved for summary
        affirmance, arguing Peele has abandoned any challenge to the dis-
        trict court’s relevant orders, the appeal is frivolous, and the district
        court did not err in any respect. We address the parties’ conten-
        tions in turn.
                                           I.
               Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
        the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is-
        sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”
        or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat-
        ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13173

        outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the
        appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,
        1161-62 (5th Cir. 1969). An appeal is frivolous when the party is
        not entitled to relief because there is no basis in fact or law to sup-
        port their position. See Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.
        2001).
                Section 1442(a)(1) permits the “United States or any agency
        thereof” to remove a civil action against it that is commenced in
        state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). After a case is removed, a mo-
        tion to remand the case on the basis of any defect, other than lack
        of subject matter jurisdiction, must be made within 30 days after
        the filing of the notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “If at any
        time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
        subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Id. “[I]n
        any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdic-
        tion, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
        other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
        original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or contro-
        versy. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
               Generally, arguments not raised in the district court cannot
        be raised on appeal. Club Madonna Inc. v. City of Miami Beach,
        42 F.4th 1231, 1247 n.4 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Access Now, Inc. v.
        Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004)). We have
        explicitly cautioned litigants that we “cannot allow [p]laintiff[s] to
        argue a different case [on appeal] from the case [they] presented to
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        22-13173                 Opinion of the Court                            5

        the district court.” Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 769
        (11th Cir. 1998).
                In addition, an appellant can abandon an issue by failing to
        challenge it on appeal. See Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1 (11th
        Cir. 1994) (applying this rule to a pro se litigant). An appellant can
        also abandon a claim where he presents it only in “passing refer-
        ences” or “in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments
        and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., Co., 739 F.3d 678,
        681 (11th Cir. 2014). “[S]imply stating that an issue exists,” without
        providing reasoning and citation to authority that the appellant re-
        lies on, “constitutes abandonment of that issue.” Id. (quoting Singh
        v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009)).
                In applying the preceding principles, we hold pro se pleadings
        to a less stringent standard and will liberally construe them. Camp-
        bell v. Air Jam., Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). But we
        will not “serve as de facto counsel for a party [or] rewrite an other-
        wise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Id. at 1168-69.
        In addition, all litigants in federal court—pro se or counseled—are
        required to comply with the applicable procedural rules. See Albra
        v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
                We review the district court’s dismissal of a complaint on
        shotgun pleading grounds for abuse of discretion. Weiland v. Palm
        Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). A com-
        plaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim show-
        ing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Fur-
        ther, claims should be stated in numbered paragraphs, each limited
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13173

        as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P.
        10(b). Rule 10(b) also mandates that each claim founded on a sep-
        arate transaction or occurrence be stated in a separate count if do-
        ing so would promote clarity. Id.
               Shotgun pleadings waste scarce judicial resources, inexora-
        bly broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court
        dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the courts. Vibe
        Micro Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2008). The
        typical shotgun complaint contains several counts, each one incor-
        porating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to
        a situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain
        irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions. Strategic Income
        Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th
        Cir. 2002); Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1279
        (11th Cir. 2006). We have repeatedly condemned the use of shot-
        gun pleadings because those types of complaints do not provide a
        short and plain statement of the claim as is required under Rule 8.
        Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
               Shotgun pleadings include complaints that: (1) contain mul-
        tiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preced-
        ing counts; (2) are replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial
        facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action;
        (3) do not separate each cause of action or claim for relief into sep-
        arate counts; or (4) assert multiple claims against multiple defend-
        ants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for
        which acts or omissions. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23. All these
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        22-13173               Opinion of the Court                         7

        types of shotgun pleadings are characterized by their failure “to
        give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and
        the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. A district
        court can dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds under
        its “inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt
        resolution of lawsuits.” Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295.
                Typically, we review for abuse of discretion a district court
        judge’s decision not to recuse himself. United States v. Berger, 375
        F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). Recusal is governed by two fed-
        eral statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Id. Under the former, a
        judge must recuse himself when a party to a district court proceed-
        ing files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom
        the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against
        him or in favor of any adverse party. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
               Section 455 designates two primary reasons that a judge
        must recuse himself. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th
        Cir. 2003). Under § 455(a), a judge should recuse himself “when
        there is an appearance of impropriety.” Id. The standard of review
        for whether a judge should have recused himself under § 455(a) “is
        whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of
        the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
        would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”
        Id. (quotation marks omitted).           Recusal decisions under
        “§ 455(a) are extremely fact driven and must be judged on their
        unique facts and circumstances more than by comparison to situa-
        tions considered in prior jurisprudence.” In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891,
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13173

        895 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme
        Court has stated that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute
        a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States,
        510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Indeed, bias “must stem from extrajudicial
        sources, unless the judge’s acts demonstrate such pervasive bias
        and prejudice that it unfairly prejudices one of the parties.” Berger,
        375 F.3d at 1227 (quotation marks omitted). “Any doubts must be
        resolved in favor of recusal.” In re Moody, 755 F.3d at 895 (quotation
        marks omitted and alteration adopted). Nonetheless, “a judge,
        having been assigned to a case, should not recuse himself on un-
        supported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.” Id. (quota-
        tion marks omitted).
               Distinctively, § 455(b) lists the several circumstances for
        when a judge should recuse himself, including, in relevant part,
        “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
        personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
        proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b). Under § 455(b), “a judge should
        recuse himself under § 455(b) when any of the specific circum-
        stances set forth in that subsection exist, which show the fact of
        partiality,” and finding that one of the circumstances exists requires
        recusal. Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321-22.
               Finally, we review the denial of a motion for reconsideration
        for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347,
        1356 (11th Cir. 2004). We have affirmed the denial of a motion for
        reconsideration when the defendant did not present newly discov-
        ered evidence. See Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343–44 (11th Cir.
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        22-13173               Opinion of the Court                         9

        2007). We have also affirmed the denial of a motion for reconsid-
        eration where the defendant “did nothing but ask the district court
        to reexamine an unfavorable ruling.” Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l,
        Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010).
               As a threshold matter, notwithstanding Peele’s arguments
        to the contrary, the suit was properly removed to federal court and
        the district court did not err in implicitly denying Peele’s motions
        to remand. The Federal Defendants (the Department of Justice
        (“DOJ”), the United States Department of Education (“DOE”), the
        United States Social Security Administration (“SSA”), the United
        States Postal Service (“USPS”), and United States Bankruptcy
        Court Judge Erik P. Kimball) properly removed the case to federal
        court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) and (3), because the DOJ,
        DOE, SSA, and USPS, federal agencies, were named as defendants.
        28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Peele has not identified any defect in the
        removal, as contemplated by § 1447(c). 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Fur-
        ther, Peele has not raised any coherent argument on appeal that
        might warrant remand. Id. Finally, the district court properly and
        permissibly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over any claims in
        the suit which were not the basis of the federal removal. 28 U.S.C.
        § 1367. Therefore, to the extent that Peele’s briefs challenge the
        removal of the case to federal court, her argument is meritless.
              Here, for both procedural and substantive reasons, sum-
        mary affirmance is warranted.
               Procedurally, Peele has abandoned her challenges to all of
        the district court’s orders by failing to adequately raise them in her
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13173

        initial brief. Peele does not argue that her complaint was not a
        shotgun-pleading and has made only passing references to the dis-
        trict court’s order denying recusal and denying her motion to reo-
        pen the case. Irwin, 40 F.3d at 347 n.1; Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681;
        Singh, 561 F.3d at 1278. While we liberally construe pro se plead-
        ings, we do not “serve as de facto counsel for a party [or] rewrite an
        otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Camp-
        bell, 760 F.3d at 1168-69. And while Peele correctly asserts that she
        has proceeded pro se throughout this litigation, we have repeatedly
        found that pro se litigants must comply with applicable procedural
        rules. Albra, 490 F.3d at 829. For this reason alone, there is “no
        substantial question as to the outcome of the case,” so we could
        grant the motions for summary affirmance and affirm. Groendyke
        Transp., 406 F.2d at 1161-62.
               But even assuming Peele’s lengthy filings have preserved a
        challenge to the district court’s orders, the district court did not err.
               First, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismiss-
        ing Peele’s complaint as a shotgun pleading. See Weiland, 792 F.3d
        at 1321-23. Peele’s complaint is a quintessential shotgun pleading
        because it contains several counts, each one incorporating by ref-
        erence the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a situation
        where most of the counts contained irrelevant factual allegations
        and legal conclusions. Strategic Income Fund, 305 F.3d at 1295;
        Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23. Further, the count headings and al-
        legations make it difficult to ascertain which defendant is responsi-
        ble for which act or omission, since Peele frequently asserted
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        22-13173                Opinion of the Court                         11

        multiple claims against multiple defendants (or all defendants)
        without specifying which defendants were responsible for which
        acts or omissions, creating uncertainty regarding to whom each al-
        legation referred. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23. Because the
        complaint was a shotgun pleading, the district court properly dis-
        missed it without prejudice and granted Peele leave to replead her
        complaint. Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295.
                Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
        ing the motion to recuse. Berger, 375 F.3d at 1227. First, it was
        unclear on what grounds Peele requested recusal, and there is
        nothing, in the record or on appeal, that might show “an appear-
        ance of impropriety” such that recusal would have been proper.
        Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321; 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Instead, it appears that
        Peele was simply seeking recusal based on the district court’s prior
        judicial rulings, which are “almost never” a valid basis for recusal,
        Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Further, recusal was not proper under
        § 445(b) or § 144 either, because there is nothing in the record that
        might suggest that the district court judge had personal bias or prej-
        udice concerning a party or knowledge of evidentiary facts.
        28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(b); Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321-22. For these rea-
        sons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
        motion to recuse.
               Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
        ing the motion to reopen the case, because the motion was frivo-
        lous and failed to provide any basis upon which the district court
        could give relief. Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349. Much of the relief she
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13173

        requested in that motion, moreover, appears to have been for
        things that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant her in any
        event, because Peele had already appealed. See United States v.
        Diveroli, 729 F.3d 1339, 1341-44 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the
        filing of a notice of appeal normally divests the district court of au-
        thority to proceed further with respect to any matters involved in
        the appeal, except in aid of the appeal). Denial of this motion, as
        well, was not an abuse of discretion.
              For these reasons, the appellees’ position is “clearly right as
        a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to
        the outcome of the case,” so we GRANT the motions for summary
        affirmance. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1161-62.
               AFFIRMED.