Court Opinion

ID: 9778587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:13:11.339739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:11.888481
License: Public Domain

FABE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the court's opinion in all respects but one: I do not see a need to remand this case to the superior court for additional findings to clarify the basis or extent of its unequal distribution of the marital estate. I would affirm both the trial court's decision to award the greater share of the marital assets to Bonnie and its decision to enhance attorney's fees based on Allen's vexatious behavior during litigation.
The court correctly concludes that the trial court "did not abuse its discretion by awarding Bonnie a larger share of the marital estate." 1 This conclusion is well supported by the trial court's careful consideration of such relevant factors as the parties' relative ages; Bonnie's serious long-term health issues, which limit her ability to increase her income; Allen's significantly greater earning capacity; Bonnie's conduct in paying most, if not all, of the marital debts; and Bonnie's payments of the mortgage and all repairs for the marital home after separation. Indeed, the trial court made thoughtful and detailed factual findings that amply support its decision to divide the marital estate in an unequal manner:
17. In order to determine how best to allocate the economic effects of divorce between the parties the court has considered the factors specified in AS 25,24.160(a)(4) in the division of marital property.
(a) During the six years of marriage (and two additional years of co-habitation) the parties acquired personal property, debts and land in Palmer.
(b) Ms. Kelley-Heustess is five years older than the defendant and has serious long-term health issues that limit her ability to make a living.
(c) Defendant's earning capacity is much greater than that of Ms. Kelley-Heustess. He has consistently earned two or three times as much and the earnings discerepan-cy in the future will probably be greater.
(d) All of the defendant's debts were paid when Ms. Kelley-Heustess refinanced her home. As a result, she has been paying most, if not all, of the marital debts while retaining the residence.
(e) Neither party has unreasonably depleted marital assets. Defendant's conduct during litigation has been vexatious. Defendant has engaged in a number of litigation strategies that have unnecessarily increased attorney's fees, such as his refusal to return the truck that belonged to Matt and his refusal to provide basic pretrial discovery. o
(£) The family home was awarded to Ms. Kelley-Heustess and should be awarded to her because she has sole custody of the parties' minor child ...-and defendant has not paid child support for most of the child's life.
(g) Ms. Kelley-Heustess' income is constrained by her injuries. She now works for TSA. There is not much prospect for her to increase her income.
(h) Ms. Kelley-Heustess' home in Chug-iak was acquired by her prior to the marriage. She has made all payments and repairs since divorce in 2005.
(i) From time to time Ms. Kelley-Heus-tess has received rental income. The black-mold problem in the rental has or will cost as much or more to remediate than she has received in rents over the past two or three years.
18. Taking these factors into consideration, it is the Court's intention to deviate from equal distribution of the marital estate and award a greater share to Ms. Kelley-Heustess.
Yet, after concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning an unequal distribution of marital property, the court remands the property division, requiring additional findings because it "cannot determine whether [the trial court] double-*482counted Allen's vexatious litigation con-duet." 2
The court focuses on a single observation by the trial court-in the same subparagraph as its explicit finding that "[nleither party has unreasonably depleted marital assets"noting that Allen's vexatious "litigation strategies ... have unnecessarily increased at-tormey's fees. ..." (Emphasis added.) But nothing in the trial court's analysis indicates that this finding played any role in the trial court's division of property: The trial court expressly indicated that this finding related to an increase in attorney's fees. I interpret the placement of this finding within the sub-paragraph determining that neither party had unreasonably depleted marital assets as designed to signal that the positive finding of no dissipation should not be taken as overlooking Allen's problematic behavior in a different context. After this preview, the trial court then proceeded, quite properly, to take Allen's litigation conduct into consideration in its award of attorney's fees.
In sum, I see no evidence of the "double-Allen's vexatious litigation conduct" that troubles the court. The trial court's findings are thorough and clear. The trial court correctly recognized that Allen's vexatious litigation strategies "ha[ld] unnecessarily increased attorney's fees," but there is no indication that the trial court took this fact into account in dividing the marital estate. I would affirm the trial court's property division and enhanced attorney's ' fee award, and I therefore respectfully dissent from this aspect of the court's opinion.

. Op. at 473.

. Id.