Court Opinion

ID: 9843766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:43:10.738903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:55.163967
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 23] Because the district court properly followed the law and because the majority wrongly seeks to substitute its *872judgment for that of the district court on findings of fact, I dissent.
[¶24] Plainly and simply stated, the district court found that this is a move-away case involving bad motives on the part of the custodial parent.
[¶ 25] The record shows that the custodial parent’s transfer to Alaska reflects his “dream sheet” filing with the Air Force, indicating Alaska as his “dream” location. He acknowledged that he did not have to make such a filing. The custodial parent’s attorney acknowledged at oral argument that there' is no evidence that absent his dream sheet, he would have been transferred to Alaska.
[¶ 26] As the district court found:
In the usual course of events, the Court would be inclined to give a person in Brandon’s position permission to move his child out of state. However,' the Court finds that this is not your “garden variety” case of a person in' the military being transferred from one duty station to another. Based upon the evidence, the Court is led to the inescapable conclusion that Brandon — at least to some degree — orchestrated his transfer from North Dakota to Alaska.
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Brandon seemed very uneasy when talking about all of this at trial; and this uneasiness, coupled with Brandon’s acknowledged request of Olga that she not attend certain of Isabelle’s recreational activities/events, causes the Court to: 1. question the integrity of Brandon’s motives for relocation; 2. seriously doubt whether, if relocation is allowed, there is a realistic opportunity for visitation which can provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering Olga’s relationship with Isabelle; and, 3. question whether Brandon would comply with a modified visitation schedule devised 'by the Court.
In the final analysis, the' Court is persuaded, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Brandon’s move to Alaska is the result, at least in part, of his desire to minimize the amount of contact he will' have with Olga in relation to visitation and other issues associated with Isabelle’s upbringing. In the Court’s view, this is an improper motive for relocation on Brandon’s part, and demonstrates to the Court that he does not have Isabelle’s best interests truly at heart when it comes to preserving and fostering the relationship between Isabelle and her mother Olga.
[¶ 27] A custodial parent seeking a court order permitting a change in a child’s residence to another state under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-07 “must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the move is in the best interests of the child.” Stout v. Stout, 1997 ND 61, ¶ 9, 560 N.W.2d 903. The district court did not believe Brandon Porter had met that burden.
[¶ 28] The majority, at ¶ 10, discusses the supposed economic benefit his family would receive from the move, and the consequences of refusing the transfer, “which would effectively end his military career.” Actually, what the majority characterizes as the “economic benefit” he will receive is, according to his own testimony, “a cost of living allowance.” The additional $500 Brandon Porter would receive was specifically labeled a cost-of-living allowance. The $600 per month housing allowance was actúally an increase of $600 per month from his existing housing allowance to assist with the higher cost of living in Alaska. By definition, these “benefits” would be allowances to help cover the higher cost of living, in this case, in Alaska. That he will receive a cost-of-living adjustment to help cover the costs of a more expensive *873place to live establishes no economic benefit at all. The evidence reflects that the wife’s “salary increase” is also related to the higher cost of living in Alaska, and that they are going to “spend more at the end of each month.”
[¶ 29] The majority quotes Dickson v. Dickson, 2001 ND 157, ¶ 19, 634 N.W.2d 76, out "of context, and wrongly seeks to shift the burden from the proponent of the move. What the Court said in Dickson is, “Nor have’we required a custodial parent to provide a trial court with a comparative cost-of-living analysis to prove the economic advantage of the proposed move. Although relevant, cost-of-living evidence is not required.” Further, in Dickson, the custodial parent was not claiming a cost-of-living adjustment as an economic advantage of the move. In this case, the custodial parent seeks to claim cost-of-living adjustments as an “economic advantage” of the move, but it in fact establishes no economic advantage.
[¶ 30] The district court specifically cites Oppegard-Gessler v. Gessler, 2004 ND 141, ¶ 12, 681 N.W.2d 762, and discusses the noneconomic considerations of the first factor, including “that the Court must ‘weigh the advantages of the move while recognizing the importance of maintaining continuity and stability in' the custodial family....’ Further, ‘Both the economic and noneconomic advantages of the move must [be] given, due weight.’ ’.’
[¶ 31] The majority ' also references that Brandon Porter may not have been allowed to reenlist if he had not accepted the transfer to Alaska. The district court found, however, that this problem was of his own making because of his improperly motived acts, resulting in his being transferred to Alaska. Two maxims , of jurisprudence are that “[a] person cannot take advantage of that person’s own wrong,” and, “[n]o one should suffer by the act of another.” N.D.C.C. § 31-11-05(8), (11); see also Kraft v. Moore, 517 N.W.2d 643, 645 (N.D.1994) (“This case calls'for application of the maxim that a person may not take advantage of her own wrong.”). Brandon Porter cannot take advantage of his own wrong.
[¶ 32] The district court properly did its job.
[¶ 33] I would affirm.
[¶ 34] Dale V. Sandstrom