Court Opinion

ID: 9901736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 15:06:26.163513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:38.332778
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3345-21

SIRA TRAORE and ALASSANE
DIANE, her husband,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

FAIRVIEW HOMES
PRESERVATION, L.P.,
RELATED MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, L.P., and
RICARDO MENDOZA,

          Defendants-Respondents,

and

BERNARD FREUND,

     Defendant.
______________________________

                   Argued May 24, 2023 – Decided November 22, 2023

                   Before Judges Accurso, Vernoia, and Firko.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7364-20.
            Philip B. Vinick argued the cause for appellants.

            Robert H. Bernstein argued the cause for respondents
            Fairview Homes Preservation, L.P., and Related
            Management Company, L.P. (Greenberg Traurig, LLP,
            attorneys; Robert H. Bernstein, on the brief).

      The opinion of the court was delivered by

FIRKO, J.A.D.

      Plaintiffs Sira Traore and her husband Alassane Diane appeal from an

order dismissing their second amended complaint with prejudice against

defendants Fairview Homes Preservation, L.P. (Fairview), Bernard Freund,1

Related Management Company, L.P. (Related), and Related's former employee,

Ricardo Mendoza, for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

                                       I.

      Because this appeal comes to us on a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss, we

accept the facts alleged in the second amended complaint as true, granting

plaintiffs "every reasonable inference of fact." Green v. Morgan Props., 215

N.J. 431, 452 (2013) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,

1
  Freund is the alleged "owner, alter ego and other self of Fairview." He was
never served with a summons and complaint and did not participate in the
matter.
                                                                          A-3345-21
                                       2
116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, we begin

with a summary of the facts pled by plaintiffs in their second amended

complaint.

      Traore went to Fairview's leasing office in Newark seeking to lease a

residential apartment and obtain financial assistance for herself and her family.

Traore contends she met with Mendoza, Related's former traveling community

manager, who was responsible for the management and procurement of leases

for Fairview's residential properties in New Jersey.

      Related is located in New York City and is in the business of managing

and offering prospective tenants residential properties to lease, including

properties owned by Fairview and Freund. Prior to hiring Mendoza, plaintiffs

allege Related and Sterling Talent Solutions (Sterling) conducted a background

check on Mendoza, which was "limited in nature," geographically confined to

Florida and Maryland, was to serve as an "investigative tool only," and was not

to be "used as the basis of any employment decision." Plaintiffs also allege

neither Related nor Sterling contacted any of Mendoza's previous employers

before hiring him to ascertain if he had any performance or disciplinary issues

or complaints made against him.

                                                                           A-3345-21
                                       3
      In June 2019, Related hired Mendoza. In September 2019, he took two

online training courses on preventing workplace harassment for employees. The

courses did not address sexual harassment or discrimination of non-employees,

such as residents, tenants, or prospective tenants.

      On November 7, 2019, Traore alleges she went to Fairview's leasing office

in Newark seeking an application for an apartment lease and financial assistance

for herself, her husband, and three children. Traore met with Mendoza who

"touched and tried to touch" her and pressured her to meet him at his hotel to

have sex with him in exchange for an apartment lease and housing assistance for

her and her family. Mendoza gave Traore a handwritten note with the address

of his hotel and his cellular phone number. Traore claims that because she did

not accede to Mendoza's sexual demand, she did not receive an apartment lease

or housing assistance. She recorded the incident on her cellular phone. Three

months later, Related terminated Mendoza's employment.

      Plaintiffs filed their second amended Law Division complaint, the

operative pleading here, asserting five causes of action against Fairview and

Related: (1) sexual harassment and discrimination in violation of the New

Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, and Lehmann

v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993) (count one); (2) aiding and abetting

                                                                          A-3345-21
                                        4
(count two); (3) tortious conduct (count three); (4) negligence (count four); and

(5) a per quod claim on behalf of Diane (count five).          Plaintiffs sought

compensatory and punitive damages, along with attorney's fees and an award of

costs.

         Fairview and Related filed a motion to dismiss the second amended

complaint, which the motion court granted with prejudice. 2 In a written opinion,

the court analyzed each count of the second amended complaint. As to the

sexual harassment and discrimination claim alleged in count one as to Fairview,

the court found Mendoza was not its employee, and Fairview could not be

vicariously liable for his alleged conduct.

         The court highlighted that count one alleges only that Traore met with

Mendoza at a leasing office owned by Fairview and that Fairview allowed

Related and Mendoza to use the leasing office. The court rejected plaintiffs'

argument that absent a certification from a Fairview representative indicating

there was no relationship between Fairview and Mendoza, dismissal as to

Fairview was unwarranted.

2
  The record shows that default was entered against Mendoza before the court
rendered its decision on the motion to dismiss.
                                                                           A-3345-21
                                        5
        In addressing the sexual harassment and discrimination claim alleged in

count one against Related, the court determined it would not impute vicarious

liability to Related because it did not stand to benefit from the harassment

perpetrated by Mendoza. The court cited the agency principles set forth in

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (Am. L. Inst. 1958) and Lehmann to

evaluate Traore's LAD claim. The court considered whether the claim that

Mendoza acted within the scope of his employment, and whether his claimed

quid pro quo offer of favorable action in exchange for sexual favors, sexual

harassment, discrimination, and other conduct rendered Fairview and Related

directly and/or vicariously liable for Traore's damages under the doctrine of

respondent superior, agency, and the LAD. The court relied on an unpublished

Third Circuit decision,3 predicting the New Jersey Supreme Court would apply

the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 and Lehmann to find harassment

3
    Rule 1:36-3 provides in pertinent part:

              No unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be
              binding upon any court. Except for appellate opinions
              not approved for publication that have been reported in
              an authorized administrative law reporter, and except to
              the extent required by res judicata, collateral estoppel,
              the single controversy doctrine or any other similar
              principle of law, no unpublished opinion shall be cited
              by any court.

                                                                          A-3345-21
                                         6
cases arising in a non-workplace setting actionable under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f).

Godfrey v. Princeton Theological Seminary, 196 N.J. 178, 195-96 (2008)

(summarizing N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f) as making unlawful the denial, refusal, or

withholding of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of

public accommodations or to discriminate against any person in the furnishing

thereof on the basis of gender).

      The court then summarized the five-part test in the Restatement (Second)

of Agency § 219 where the master is liable for the torts of his or her servants to

address whether plaintiffs pled sufficient allegations supporting their vicarious

liability claim:

             (1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his
             [or her] servants committed while acting in the scope of
             their employment.

             (2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of
             his [or her] servants acting outside the scope of their
             employment, unless:

             (a) the master        intended   the   conduct   or   the
             consequences; or

             (b) the master was negligent or reckless; or

             (c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the
             master; or

             (d) the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of
             the principal and there was reliance upon apparent

                                                                            A-3345-21
                                         7
            authority, or he [or she] was aided in accomplishing the
            tort by the existence of the agency relation.

      However, the court did not analyze these five factors in dismissing count

one. Instead, the court merely concluded the first count did not allege sufficient

facts to hold Related vicariously liable for Mendoza's conduct.        The court

determined count one "does not demonstrate how Mendoza demanding sexual

favors in exchange for . . . housing assistance and a lease helped Related's . . .

business as opposed to hurt Related's . . . business," and that the "requirement"

for Traore to have sex with Mendoza "put another hurdle" in her way to obtain

housing. The court found count one does not explain how Traore's rejection of

Mendoza's sexual advances and Mendoza "failing to give [her] rental housing

advanced Related['s] . . . goal of renting homes to prospective applicants. It

does the opposite."

      The court dismissed count one as to Related with prejudice based on its

determination that Mendoza's conduct and the alleged discrimination fell outside

the scope of his employment. The court added plaintiffs had no further facts to

plead and instead filed the second amended complaint hoping to obtain

discovery "to uncover evidence of wrongdoing."

      Regarding the aiding and abetting claim asserted in count two, the court

concluded plaintiffs failed to allege Related "encouraged any of the wrongful

                                                                            A-3345-21
                                        8
conduct against [Traore], that it assisted the wrongdoers," or "was present when

the wrongful conduct occurred," citing Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 84 (2004).

Because plaintiffs did not allege facts establishing how Related's business would

benefit from, or be improved by, Mendoza's quid pro quo offer, the motion court

found plaintiffs failed to assert a cognizable aiding and abetting claim against

Related and dismissed the second count.

      The court construed count three, which was simply pled as tortious

conduct, as a claim for the intentional tort of sexual harassment against Related.

In addressing count three, the motion court set forth the elements required to

establish vicarious liability for tortious conduct: "(1) that a master-servant

relationship existed [control]; and (2) that the tortious act of the servant occurred

within the scope of employment," citing Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 409

(2003).

      The court then listed the four requirements that must be met to prove that

the tortious conduct occurred within the scope of an actor's employment:

             (a) it is of the kind the employee is employed to
             perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the
             authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at
             least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and (d)
             if force is intentionally used by the servant against
             another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the
             master," citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §
             228(1).

                                                                               A-3345-21
                                         9
        The court dismissed count three because plaintiffs simply alleged Related

failed to call Mendoza's former employers as part of its background check.

Accordingly, the court determined plaintiffs' tortious conduct allegation does

not establish vicarious liability against Related for Mendoza's conduct in making

a quid pro quo offer to Traore.

        Turning to count four, the court observed plaintiffs failed to allege how

an inadequate background check may have impacted Related's hiring of

Mendoza, or explain how Mendoza's quid pro quo benefitted Related. The

motion court noted a cause of action for negligent hiring requires plaintiffs to

show:

              (1) that the employer knew or had reason to know of
              the particular unfitness, incompetence, or dangerous
              attributes of the employee and could reasonably have
              foreseen that such qualities created a risk of harm to
              other persons; and (2) that, through the negligence of
              the employer in hiring the employee, the latter's
              incompetence, unfitness, or dangerous characteristics
              proximately caused the injury.

              [G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 416 (2019) (quoting
              Di Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 173 (1982)) (internal
              quotation marks omitted).]

        In dismissing count four, the court found Mendoza was not acting within

the scope of his employment with Related when he sought "sexual favors" from

                                                                           A-3345-21
                                       10
Traore to secure housing.       The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that

"defendants knew or should have known about the prevalence of foreseeability

of sexual harassment" and "had a duty to prevent sexual harassment and

discrimination from occurring," as conclusory statements unsupported by any

facts alleged in count four.

      The court also concluded that plaintiffs' allegation that Related revised its

employee handbook several months after the incident in question to include a

prohibition against the harassment of non-employees, such as residents, is not

evidential because it was a subsequent remedial measure. The court dismissed

count four against Fairview because insufficient facts were alleged to show

Fairview had control over Mendoza.

      The court reasoned it had to dismiss Diane's per quod claim pled in count

five because counts one through four were dismissed as to Fairview and Related

and no derivative cause of action could be sustained. A memorializing order

was entered. This appeal followed.

      Before us, plaintiffs argue the motion court abused its discretion in

dismissing the second amended complaint as to Related and Fairview with

prejudice. Having considered plaintiffs' allegations in the light most favorable

to them, and having analyzed the relevant law, we: (1) hold Traore—but not

                                                                             A-3345-21
                                       11
Diane—has stated a viable cause of action in count one of the second amended

complaint under the LAD against Related but not Fairview; (2) affirm the

dismissal of count two against Fairview and Related with prejudice; (3) reverse

dismissal of count three as to Related from with prejudice to without prejudice

to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to file a motion for leave to file and serve a

third amended complaint specifically detailing what tortious conduct allegedly

occurred; (4) reverse dismissal of count four and reinstate the negligent hiring

and supervision/training claim against Related; and (5) affirm dismissal of

Diane's per quod claim under the LAD in count one and reinstate his per quod

claim as to Related in count four.

                                       II.

      We review motions to dismiss de novo, applying the same standard as the

trial court. Wreden v. Twp. of Lafayette, 436 N.J. Super. 117, 124 (App. Div.

2014) (citation omitted). The court must determine if "a cause of action is

'suggested' by the facts." Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting Velantzas v.

Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). When doing so, the court

must search "the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the

fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement

of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary." Ibid. (quoting Di

                                                                            A-3345-21
                                       12
Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div.

1957)).

       "[T]he facts as pleaded must be taken to be true for the purposes of the

motion, and the court's 'inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of

the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.'" Darakjian v. Hanna, 366 N.J.

Super. 238, 248 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746). In

ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), "the [c]ourt is not

concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the

complaint[,]" and "plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact."

Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746 (citations omitted).

       Dismissal for failure to state a claim "should be granted in only the rarest

of instances." Id. at 772. "The examination of a complaint's allegations of fact

required by the [previously stated] principles should be one that is at once

painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach." Id. at

746.

                                        III.

                                        A.

                                    Count One

                                       LAD

                                                                             A-3345-21
                                       13
      In count one of their second amended complaint, plaintiffs assert LAD

claims against Fairview and Related for the sexual harassment perpetrated by

Mendoza. Plaintiffs contend count one alleged sufficient facts to show that

sexual harassment occurred: (1) within the scope of Mendoza's employment,

justifying the imposition of vicarious liability against both Fairview and

Related; and (2) as a consequence of Fairview and Related's deficient hiring,

management and/or supervision of Mendoza, Fairview and Related are directly

liable. Regarding count one, plaintiffs also argue the court failed to evaluate

their LAD claim pursuant to the direct liability framework set forth in

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 and Lehmann. The court and both

parties agree that Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 should be applied to

analyze Traore's LAD sexual harassment claim.

      The LAD prohibits sexual discrimination in housing and real property

transactions, by making it unlawful:

            For any person, including but not limited to, any owner,
            lessee, sublessee, assignee or managing agent of, or
            other person having the right of ownership or
            possession of or the right to sell, rent, lease, assign, or
            sublease any real property or part or portion thereof, or
            any agent or employee of any of these:
            (1) To refuse to sell, rent, lease, assign, or sublease or
            otherwise to deny to or withhold from any person or
            group of persons any real property or part of portion
            thereof because of . . . sex . . . .

                                                                          A-3345-21
                                       14
            [N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g).]

Our courts have not yet considered the issue of employer liability in the

context of an employee's sexual harassment of a third party in a housing or real

property transaction under subsection (g).

      "Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that violates both Title

VII and the LAD." Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 601. Our Supreme Court established

a four-part test for an employee "[t]o state a claim for hostile work environment

sexual harassment."    Id. at 603-04. The first Lehmann prong requires the

plaintiff to allege the harassment "occurred because of their sex," or "would not

have occurred but for" their sex. C.V. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 255 N.J.

289, 296 (2023); see also Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 603. The Lehmann Court held

that the "first prong will automatically be satisfied when the plaintiff alleges

sexual touching, which by nature occurs because of a person's sex." C.V. at 3.

"When the harassing conduct is sexual or sexist in nature, the but-for element

will automatically be satisfied." Id.

      Here, the court correctly dismissed count one against Fairview. It never

employed Mendoza, who is an employee of the independent contractor Related,

and LAD liability cannot be imposed on an entity for the discriminatory conduct

of the employee of an independent contractor. See Majestic Realty Assocs. v.

                                                                            A-3345-21
                                        15
Toti Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425, 430-31 (1959).            In Majestic Realty

Associates, our Court noted it has long been the rule in New Jersey that one who

hires an independent contractor is not responsible for the latter's negligent acts.

Id. at 430-31. The Court held there are three exceptions that apply:

            (1) where one retains control over the manner and
            means by which the work is to be performed;

            (2) where the work constitutes a nuisance per se; or

            (3) where on knowingly engaged an incompetent
            contractor.

None of these exceptions apply to Fairview based upon the factual record.

Because Fairview and Mendoza are not in a master-servant relationship by virtue

of Related's independent contractor status, Restatement (Second) of Agency §

219 does not apply and therefore it would be inappropriate to hold Fairview

liable for Mendoza's discriminatory conduct. See E.S. for G.S. v. Brunswick

Inv. Ltd. P'ship, 469 N.J. Super. 279, 290 n. 5 (App. Div. 2021).

      However, the court erred in dismissing count one against Related because

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 does apply to a master-servant

relationship, such as the employment relationship between Related and

Mendoza. Traore has sufficiently pled an LAD claim against Related because

Mendoza's touching of Traore and quid pro quo offer of an apartment and

                                                                             A-3345-21
                                       16
financial assistance in exchange for sex was intended to benefit Related by

leasing a Fairview apartment if she acceded to his demands. We also conclude

Traore sufficiently pled a vicarious liability claim against Related under the

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(d)(2). When a vicarious liability claim

is asserted, the factfinder is required to engage in a "detailed fact -specific

analysis," and answer each of the following four questions:

            (1) Did the employer delegate the authority to the
            supervisor to control the situation of which the plaintiff
            complains . . .?

            (2) Did the supervisor exercise that authority?

            (3) Did the exercise of authority result in a violation of
            [the LAD]?

            (4) Did the authority delegated by the employer to the
            supervisor aid the supervisor in injuring the plaintiff?

            If each of these questions are answered in the
            affirmative, then the employer is vicariously liable for
            the supervisor's harassment under [Restatement] §
            219(2)(d).

            [Aguas v. State, 220 N.J. 494, 514 (2015) (quoting
            Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 620).]

      Here, we find Traore sufficiently pled that Mendoza was aided by

agency—according to Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(d)(2)—because,

in his position as Related's manager, he undertook the discriminatory conduct in

                                                                          A-3345-21
                                       17
the form of sexual harassment as part of an effort to obtain tenants for Rela ted's

benefit. Thus, count one is reinstated, as to Related, so that the factfinder can

consider the above-mentioned four-part test to determine whether Related is

vicariously liable for Mendoza's conduct. Regardless of the factfinder's ultimate

conclusion, these allegations, as they currently stand, support a cause of action

against Related for vicarious liability under Lehmann and Restatement (Second)

of Agency § 219(d)(2).

      We further conclude Traore sufficiently pled a direct negligence claim

against Related under the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(b). When

a direct negligence claim is asserted, the factfinder must consider five factors:

            (1) formal policies prohibiting harassment in the
            workplace;

            (2) complaint structures for employees' use, both
            formal and informal in nature;

            (3) anti-harassment training, which must be available to
            all employees of the organization;

            (4) the existence of effective sensing or monitoring
            mechanisms to check the trustworthiness of the policies
            and complaint structures; and

            (5) an unequivocal commitment from the highest levels
            of the employer that harassment would not be tolerated,
            and demonstration of that policy commitment by
            consistent practice.

                                                                             A-3345-21
                                       18
            [Aguas, 220 N.J. at 513.]

      Here, Related asserts that it should be insulated from liability because it

had anti-harassment training and policies in place for its employees.         We

disagree. Although an employer's anti-harassment policy "is a critical factor in

determining negligence and recklessness claims under Restatement §

219(2)(6)," it is an affirmative defense to liability and thus is irrelevant to

determining whether plaintiff has stated a claim under the LAD. See Aguas v.

State, 220 N.J. at 499-500. Thus, based upon our de novo review, we conclude

the court erred when it dismissed count one as to Related.

                                        B.

                                   Count Two

                     Aiding and Abetting Under the LAD

      A plaintiff proves aiding and abetting against an employer under the LAD

by showing that:

            (1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a
            wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant
            must be generally aware of his [or her] role as part of
            an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he
            [or she] provides the assistance; [and] (3) the defendant
            must knowingly and substantially assist the principal
            violation.

            [Tarr, 181 N.J. at 84 (quoting Hurley v. Atl. City Police
            Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 127 (3d Cir. 1999)).]

                                                                           A-3345-21
                                        19
      A claim for aiding and abetting "require[es] active and purposeful

conduct." Cicchetti v. Morris Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 194 N.J. 563, 594 (2008)

(citation omitted). Aiding and abetting liability focuses on "whether a defendant

knowingly gave substantial assistance to someone engaged in wrongful conduct,

not on whether the defendant agreed to join the wrongful conduct." Podias v.

Mairs, 394 N.J. Super. 338, 353 (App. Div. 2007) (citation, internal quotations

and emphasis omitted). To prove an aiding and abetting claim under the LAD,

"a plaintiff must show that '(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform

a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware

of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time he provides

the assistance; [and] (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist

the principal violation.'" Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. at 84 (alteration in original)

(quoting Hurler v. Atl. City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 127 (3d Cir. 1999)).

      In our view, plaintiffs' second amended complaint does not allege any

facts supporting a claim for aiding and abetting against Fairview or Related.

Because plaintiffs have not alleged that Fairview and Related were aware of

Mendoza's role in bargaining for sex or placed him in a position of authority for

the purpose of furthering this violation, these facts fail to support an aiding and

abetting claim. See Tarr, 181 N.J. at 84.

                                                                                A-3345-21
                                         20
      Specifically, although the second amended complaint alleged Fairview

owned the property that Related was charged with leasing and the leasing office

in which Mendoza worked, which displayed Fairview's signage, these

allegations do not support Fairview "knowingly and substantially assisted"

Mendoza in sexually harassing Traore.        Simply stated, they do not allege

Fairview encouraged or assisted, let along knew about Mendoza's wrongful

conduct. See Tarr, 181 N.J. at 85 (finding owner of automobile franchise was

not individually liable to employee under LAD as an aider and abettor of sexual

harassment of employee; there was no evidence that owner encouraged any of

the wrongful conduct against the employee, that he assisted the wrongdoers, or

that he was even present when the wrongful conduct occurred; and at best, the

owner negligently supervised his employees).         Thus, the court correctly

dismissed count two as to Fairview.

      We likewise find count two does not state a viable aiding and abetting

claim against Related.      Plaintiffs alleged Related hired Mendoza for a

managerial position without conducting proper background checks or

implementing effective anti-harassment policies and training after he was hired

and prior to the incident in question. These allegations fall short of the active,

knowing, and purposeful conduct required to establish liability for aiding and

                                                                            A-3345-21
                                       21
abetting. See Tarr, 181 N.J. at 85. Thus, the court properly dismissed plaintiffs'

aiding and abetting claim against Fairview and Related with prejudice.

                                       C.

                                  Count Three

                                Tortious Conduct

      Count three of the second amended complaint merely avers that

defendants' conduct "was tortious in nature," without setting forth any facts

establishing the elements of a cause of action that resulted in damages to

plaintiffs. The failure to satisfy the fundamental requirement that a complaint

"state the essential elements of a cause of action," Zoneraich v. Overlook

Hospital, 212 N.J. Super. 83, 101 (App. Div. 1986), serves as a basis to dismiss

the third count with prejudice because the claim is vague and conclusory.

      We note that the court construed count three as a claim for "the intentional

tort of sexual harassment" based on the alleged violations of the LAD pled in

count one. Regardless, dismissal of count three with prejudice as to Related is

unwarranted and premature at this juncture because the pleading standard might

be met upon amending the second complaint. When determining the adequacy

of a pleading, we must search the complaint thoroughly "and with liberality to

ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from

                                                                            A-3345-21
                                       22
an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary."

Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171.

      It is the existence of the fundament of a cause of action that is pivotal.

Teamsters Local 97 v. State, 434 N.J. Super. 393, 412 (App. Div. 2014). We

therefore reverse the dismissal with prejudice as to count three so that plaintiffs

may be given the opportunity to amend and sufficiently establish a fundament

of a cause of action against Related based on Mendoza's alleged tortious

conduct.

                                        D.

                                   Count Four

                   Negligent Hiring and Supervision/Training

      "An employer whose employees are brought into contact with members

of the public in the course of their employment is responsible for exercising a

duty of reasonable care in the selection or retention of its employees." Di

Cosala, 91 N.J. at 170-71.      "Unlike respondent superior, negligent hiring,

supervision, and training are not forms of vicarious liability and are based on

the direct fault of an employer. G.A.-H., 238 N.J. at 415. The tort of negligent

hiring has two fundamental requirements. Ibid.

                                                                             A-3345-21
                                       23
      The plaintiff first must show that irrespective of whether the employee

was acting within the scope of his or her employment:

            (1) that the employer "knew or had reason to know of
            the particular unfitness, incompetence or dangerous
            attributes of the employee and could reasonably have
            foreseen that such qualities created a risk of harm to
            other persons" and (2) "that, through the negligence of
            the employer in hiring the employee, the latter's
            incompetence, unfitness or dangerous characteristics
            proximately caused the injury."

            [Ibid. (quoting Di Cosala, 91 N.J. at 173).]

The tort of negligent supervision or training similarly requires that the employer

"knew or had reason to know that the failure to supervise or train an employee

in a certain way would create a risk of harm" and the "risk of harm materializes

and causes the plaintiff's damages." Ibid.

      Here, we conclude the second amended complaint adequately sets forth a

cause of action against Related for the torts of negligent hiring and negligent

supervision or training. It is well established that if a fundament of a cause of

action can be gleaned from even an obscure statement then the complaint should

survive the preliminary stage.     Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746.      Although

plaintiffs' second amended complaint was bare bones in nature, we are satisfied

from the particular claims asserted—such as the incomplete background check

and ineffective anti-harassment policies and trainings—that the second amended

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complaint was legally sufficient to withstand a dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e).

Therefore, count four was improperly dismissed and is reinstated as to Related

only.

                                       E.

                                  Count Five

                                Per Quod Claim

        Diane's per quod claim for loss of consortium and reimbursement for

payment of his wife Traore's medical expenses pled in count five is reinstated

as to count four only. It is well settled that a per quod claim is a derivative

claim, not a separate cause of action. Weir v. Mkt. Transition Facility, 318 N.J.

Super. 436, 444 (App. Div. 1999). Such claims must be joined with the primary

claim in a single action, and the derivative claim can rise no higher than the

claim of the other spouse. Ibid. (quoting Tichenor v. Santillo, 218 N.J. Super.

165, 173 (App. Div. 1987)).

        Here, even though we have reinstated Traore's cause of action for

violations of the LAD against Related in count one, Diane's per quod claim as

to that count is not viable because per quod damages are not recoverable under

the LAD. Catalane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 271 N.J. Super. 476, 500 (App.

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Div. 1994). Our reversal of Traore's negligence cause of action in count four,

however, operates to reinstate Diane's per quod claim on that count.

      To the extent that we have not specifically addressed plaintiffs' remaining

arguments, we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings

consistent with our opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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