Court Opinion

ID: 9947346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 17:04:28.845963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:21.939647
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                       Barry F. Logan, Jr.,                   FILED
                                         Appellant-Plaintiff,            Mar 04 2024, 8:39 am

                                                                              CLERK
                                                                          Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                             Court of Appeals
                                                    v.                         and Tax Court

                                           Curtis Evans,
                                         Appellee-Defendant.

                                            March 4, 2024

                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                          23A-SC-1324

                                       Appeal from the
                               Marion County Small Claims Court

                                           The Honorable
                                       Steven G. Poore, Judge

                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                       49K07-2112-SC-3629

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024   Page 1 of 23
                                     Opinion by Senior Judge Najam
                                    Judges Mathias and Foley concur.

      Najam, Senior Judge.

      Statement of the Case
[1]   Barry F. Logan, Jr. (Logan) appeals from the trial court’s judgment for Curtis

      Evans (Evans) on Logan’s small claim for breach of contract. Logan sued

      Evans for breach of a service and repair warranty on the heating and air

      conditioning (HVAC) equipment Evans had installed in Logan’s residence.

      Evans counterclaimed. During a bench trial, Evans moved under Trial Rule

      41(B) for an involuntary dismissal of Logan’s claim based upon the statute of

      frauds. The trial court granted Evans’ motion to dismiss and denied Evans’

      counterclaim. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Logan contracted with Evans to install heating and air conditioning equipment

      in Logan’s home. Evans installed that equipment between December 29, 2015,

      and March 31, 2016. The invoice embodied the complete agreement between

      the parties and included an invoice price of $22,875, which Logan paid in two

      installments. The invoice, dated December 29, 2015, described the HVAC

      equipment to be installed but made no reference to a warranty for service or

      repair. See Exhibits Vol. 3, p. 37 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 24).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024      Page 2 of 23
[3]   Logan contends the first installment payment of $14,000 he made on the

      invoice included $10,000 for a warranty; however, there is no documentation to

      support that contention except Logan’s own assertions in his affidavit. See id.,

      p. 4 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1, Affidavit of Barry F. Logan, Jr. 9-30-2022).

[4]   In September and October 2021, Logan requested that Evans perform

      “warranty repair” on the first-floor furnace. Appellant’s Br. p. 6. In December

      2021, after Evans did not respond, Logan filed a small claim against Evans

      alleging that he had “paid Evans $22,875 to perform and warrant HVAC work”

      on his property and had “not been able to receive agreed upon

      products/services.” Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 17 (small claims complaint).

      Logan requested $10,000 in damages from Evans, the amount he attributed to

      purchase of the warranty. Id. Logan’s claim was, in effect, a complaint for

      rescission of the alleged service and repair warranty.

[5]   Evans filed a motion to dismiss which alleged that Logan was attempting to

      “repackage” claims that had been previously litigated as a fraud claim. Id. at

      22. After a hearing, on June 6, 2022, the trial court granted Evans’ motion to

      dismiss all claims “originating from fraud, breach of contract, and home

      improvement” and denied the motion to dismiss “for breach of [a] service and

      repair warranty.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 2.

[6]   In November 2022, the trial court conducted a bench trial on the remaining

      claim. After Logan had completed the presentation of his evidence, Evans

      moved for an involuntary dismissal under Trial Rule 41(B) based upon the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024       Page 3 of 23
      statute of frauds, specifically, Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1(b)(5) (2002). Tr.

      Vol. 2, p. 73. The trial court took the motion under advisement and recessed

      the trial. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 3.

[7]   On November 28, 2022, the trial court entered its Order, which included

      written findings and conclusions. The court found that Logan’s claim that

      Evans had “personally agreed to perform warranty service after one year had

      passed from the date of [HVAC] installation under an agreement not reduced to

      writing” would “if true” be barred under Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1(b)(5)

      because the alleged agreement “was not reduced to writing.” Id. at 5. Thus, the

      court held that “upon the weight of the evidence and the law” Logan had failed

      to show that he was entitled to relief on his claim that Evans had breached an

      agreement to personally provide warranty and repair service to Logan for the

      HVAC systems Evans installed in Logan’s residence. Id.

[8]   The court granted Evans’ motion for involuntary dismissal and dismissed
                          1
      Logan’s claim. Logan then filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court

      denied. Logan now appeals.

      1
       The trial court entered judgment for Logan and against Evans on Evans’ counterclaim for attorney’s fees
      and costs, stating
            24. The court having observed the manner and demeanor of [Logan] during his testimony and
            considered this against the facts presented finds that [Logan’s] testimony about his intent at the
            time he filed the notice of claim for the above entitled cause was credible and more likely than
            not true.
            25. The court finds that it was [Logan’s] intent that the notice of claim assert a claim based
            upon breach of [a] service and repair warranty.
            26. Although the court found that [Logan’s] claim was barred by the statute of [frauds], the
            court finds that [Logan] made a good faith and rational argument on the merits of the action.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024                                  Page 4 of 23
       Issue
[9]    The question presented is whether Logan’s warranty claim is an action

       involving a contract that is not to be performed within one (1) year and, as

       such, is barred by the statute of frauds, Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1(b)(5).

       Discussion and Decision
       Standard of Review
[10]   Logan appeals from a negative judgment. “‘A judgment entered against the

       party bearing the burden of proof is a negative judgment.’” Ayers v. Stowers, 200

       N.E.3d 480, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting RCM Phoenix Partners, LLC v.

       2007 E. Meadows, LLP, 118 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)). “‘On appeal

       from a negative judgment, this Court will reverse the trial court only if the

       judgment is contrary to law.’” Id. “‘A judgment is contrary to law if the

       evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial court reached an opposite

       conclusion.’” Id. “‘In determining whether the trial court’s judgment is

       contrary to law, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
                                                                                                         2
       prevailing party, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom.’” Id. We

       will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 12. This judgment was not appealed.

       2
         Logan asserts that “Evans’ Brief has not demonstrated how the Small Claims Court correctly held that
       Logan’s complaint was barred by the Statute of Frauds.” Reply Br. p. 8. However, the burden on appeal
       begins and remains with Logan to demonstrate that the trial court erred. It is not Evans’ burden to show that
       the trial court was correct.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024                                Page 5 of 23
[11]   Here, the trial court entered written findings and conclusions. “In an appeal

       from a small claims judgment, a trial court’s special findings aid our review by

       providing us with a statement of the trial court’s reasoning, but they do not alter

       the nature of our review.” Id. at 484. “Special findings and the two-tiered

       standard of review under Trial Rule 52(A) do not apply in small claims

       proceedings.” Id. (citing Bowman v. Kitchel, 644 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ind. 1995)).

       Small claims trials are informal, “with the sole objective of dispensing speedy

       justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law. . . .” Ind.

       Small Claims Rule 8(A). However, a litigant who appeals an adverse judgment

       on the merits has taken himself out of the informal context of a small claims

       court and is subject to the same standards on appeal as any other appellant.

       Potts v. Castillo, 460 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). And while Logan

       proceeds pro se in this appeal, “‘[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants are held to

       the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.’” Spainhower v. Smart & Kessler,

       LLC, 176 N.E.3d 258, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58

       N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)), trans. denied.

[12]   Logan also appeals from the denial of a motion to correct error. “We review

       the denial of a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion.” Ayers, 200

       N.E.3d at 483-84. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the judgment is clearly

       against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or is

       contrary to law.” Id. at 484. “Thus, in this appeal both from a negative

       judgment and a motion to correct error, the only question presented is whether

       the trial court misinterpreted or misapplied the law to the facts.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024              Page 6 of 23
       Analysis
[13]   Logan makes four arguments in support of his contention that the trial court

       erred. First, he contends categorically that the statute of frauds does not apply

       to the alleged transaction. Second, he contends that the statute of frauds does

       not apply to home improvement contracts. Third, he contends that the statute

       of frauds does not apply because the agreement is governed by Article 2 of the

       Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). And fourth, he contends that, in any

       event, there is sufficient evidence of an oral warranty agreement between the

       parties.

       Waiver

[14]   Evans counters that Logan has waived these arguments either because they

       were not presented to the trial court at all or were raised for the first time in

       Logan’s motion to correct error. Whether or not Logan has waived one or

       more of these arguments, given that this appeal has been fully briefed, we elect
                                                                                                   3
       to address each claim on its merits and shall consider each in turn. See Omni

       3
         Evans also contends that the Motions Panel of our Court erred when it granted Logan’s motion to file a
       belated brief and appendix. Appellee’s Br. p. 8. Evans filed a motion to dismiss in which he alleged that
       Logan was not entitled to an extension of time under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which the motions
       panel denied. He correctly states that the writing panel may reconsider a decision of the motions panel while
       an appeal remains in fieri, citing Miller v. Hague Ins. Agency, Inc., 871 N.E.2d 406, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
       However, we are reluctant to overrule the motions panel without a compelling reason as, for example, where
       we conclude, after due deliberation, that the motions panel has misapplied a rule of substantive law. Here,
       however, the motions panel merely exercised its discretion when it granted a non-dispositive motion to allow
       this appeal to proceed, and we decline to disturb that decision.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024                                  Page 7 of 23
       Ins. Group v. Poage, 966 N.E.2d 750, 753 (Ind Ct. App. 2012) (“We prefer to

       decide a case on the merits whenever possible.”), trans. denied.

       The Statute of Frauds

[15]   Logan first contends categorically that the trial court erred when it applied the

       statute of frauds to his claim. The trial court held that Logan’s claim for relief is

       barred by the statute of frauds under Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1(b)(5),

       which provides that:

               * * * * *

               (b) A person may not bring any of the following actions unless
               the promise, contract, or agreement on which the action is based,
               or a memorandum or note describing the promise, contract, or
               agreement on which the action is based, is in writing and signed
               by the party against whom the action is brought or by the party’s
               authorized agent:

               * * * * *

               (5) An action involving any agreement that is not to be
               performed within one (1) year from the making of the agreement.

[16]   Logan asserts, however, that Indiana Code Title 32, Article 21, only concerns

       real property, that this case presents “no material issue related to conveyance

       procedures or to real property,” and, therefore, that section 32-21-1-1(b)(5)

       “simply does not apply to Logan’s claim.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14. Evans

       counters that Logan has waived this argument because at trial Logan stated

       only that, “I do not believe that that [statute] applies here,” and did not explain

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024          Page 8 of 23
       or develop his argument further. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 75; Appellee’s Br. p. 9. We

       cannot agree. Logan’s statement was sufficient to inform the trial court that he

       contested application of the statute of frauds to his claim and to preserve that

       argument on appeal.

[17]   We note that the captions associated with Title 32 (“Conveyance Limitations of

       Real Property”), and Section 21 (“Conveyance Procedures for Real Property”)

       suggest that these statutory provisions apply only to real estate. However, as

       Evans notes, the headings that appear throughout the Indiana Code are merely

       descriptive, not substantive. Appellee’s Br. p. 10. Indiana Code section 1-1-1-

       5(f) (1991) clearly provides, in pertinent part, that:

               The headings of titles, articles, and chapters as they appear in the
               Indiana Code, as originally enacted or added by amendment, are
               not part of the law . . . . These descriptive headings are
               intended for organizational purposes only and are not intended
               to affect the meaning, application or construction of the statute
               they precede.

[18]   In addition, the descriptive term “statute of frauds” can be misleading in that

       neither an allegation of fraud nor evidence of fraud is required for the statute to

       apply. Instead, in pertinent part here, the showing required is merely that the

       activity that is the subject of the agreement is not to be performed within one

       year from the making of the agreement. Thus, the term “statute of frauds”

       describes what it seeks to prevent, not what is required to be alleged or proved.

       This is so because “[t]he purpose of a statute of frauds is ‘to preclude fraudulent

       claims which would probably arise when one person’s word is pitted against

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024          Page 9 of 23
       another’s so as to open wide those ubiquitous flood-gates of litigation.’” Akin v.

       Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Summerlot v.

       Summerlot, 408 N.E.2d 820, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)) (internal quotations

       omitted). “The closer a statute of frauds is adhered to with controlling judicial

       authority, the better.” Id. “Otherwise, the protections afforded by a statute of

       frauds will be diminished such that the statute is rendered a dead letter.” Id.

[19]   Logan’s argument that Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1(b)(5) “simply does not

       apply” because this dispute does not concern real property is not well-taken.

       See Appellant’s Br. p. 14. The statute of frauds is often associated with real

       estate transactions, see I.C. § 32-21-1-1(b)(4), but it also applies to other

       transactions unrelated to real estate. See I.C. § 32-21-1-1(b)(1) (actions against

       executor or administrator for damages); (b)(2) (action against any person upon

       any promise to answer for debt, default or miscarriage of another); (b)(3) (action

       charging person upon any agreement or promise made in consideration of

       marriage); (b)(5) (action involving agreement not to be performed within one

       year from making of the agreement); and (b)(6) (action involving agreement,

       promise, contract, or warranty of cure concerning medical care or treatment not

       affecting right to sue for malpractice or negligence).

[20]   It is well settled and, indeed, beyond dispute that the statute of frauds can apply

       to transactions that have no connection with real estate. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co.

       v. Babyback’s Intern., Inc., 841 N.E.2d 557 (Ind. 2006) (statute of frauds applied

       to alleged multi-year national co-marketing agreement), disapproved of on

       other grounds by Pennington v. Mem’l Hosp. of South Bend, 223 N.E.3d 1086 (Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024           Page 10 of 23
       2024); Rodts v. Hearty City Auto., Inc., 933 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)

       (statute of frauds applied to alleged five-year employment contract).

[21]   In Rodts, we explained that Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1(b) requires contracts

       that are “not to be performed within one (1) year” from the making of the

       agreement to be in writing. 933 N.E.2d at 553. And “‘[p]erformance’ under a

       contract is ‘[t]he successful completion of a contractual duty.’” Id. (quoting

       Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (7th ed. 1999). In Rodts the employment

       agreement at issue was for a five-year term, and we concluded that, “Because

       the term of Rodts’ employment was not to be performed in one year but,

       instead five years,” the statute of frauds applied to Rodts’ breach of contract

       action. Id. Here, likewise, Evans’ performance and contractual duty under the

       alleged warranty could not have been performed within one year but, instead, at

       the expiration of ten years.

[22]   Finally, the statute of frauds requires a written agreement signed by the person

       against whom the other party seeks to enforce the purported agreement. I.C. §

       32-21-1-1(b). Here, there is no writing signed by Evans. We do not hesitate to

       conclude that the statute of frauds applies in this case.

       Home Improvement Contracts

[23]   Logan contends that Evans documented the purchase in an invoice that

       constituted a home improvement contract. Appellant’s Br. p. 14. He attempts

       to avoid the statute of frauds by citing two statutes, one concerning real

       property improvement contracts, and the other concerning construction

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024        Page 11 of 23
       warranties on real property. See id. (citing Ind. Code § 24-5-11-1 (2017), et. seq.,

       and Ind. Code § 32-27-1-12 (2002)). He does not distinguish between these two

       statutes, and his argument is not well-developed. Indeed, other than a brief

       mention of the statutes, he does not present cogent reasoning or support his

       argument by citations to relevant authorities as required by Appellate Rule

       46(A)(8)(a). As a rule, we will not “address arguments that are . . too poorly

       developed or expressed to be understood.” Spainhower, 176 N.E.3d at 263

       (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind Ct. App. 2016)).

[24]   Nevertheless, the thrust of Logan’s argument appears to be that these real

       property improvement and construction warranties statutes avoid or supersede

       the statute of frauds. In other words, Logan appears to suggest that these

       statutes either satisfy or preclude application of the statute of frauds to his

       warranty claim.

[25]   Logan contends that the purchase and installation of the HVAC equipment

       “constituted a home improvement contract” under Indiana Code section 24-5-

       11-10 (2017) which, he suggests, is not subject to the statute of frauds.

       Appellant’s Br. p. 14. And further, as we have noted, he asserts that even if the

       statute of frauds were to apply to his claim, “Evans documented the purchase

       [of HVAC equipment] in an invoice that constituted a home improvement

       contract.” Id. Thus, he reasons that “the code reference [to the statute of

       frauds] in the involuntary dismissal does not apply to his claim.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024           Page 12 of 23
[26]   Logan’s agreement with Evans does not satisfy the statutory requirements for a

       real property improvement contract, as clearly set out in Indiana Code section

       24-5-11-10 (Contract requirements). This statute provides that, “A real property

       improvement supplier shall provide a completed real property improvement

       contract to the consumer” containing “A reasonably detailed description of the

       proposed real property improvements,” including complete specifications of the

       work to be performed and other specified information, and signature lines for

       both the supplier and the consumer. Id. But, here, Logan has stated that the

       complete agreement between Logan and Evans is embodied in a single invoice.

       Appellant’s Br. p. 5. Logan’s affidavit states that, “Evans never provided any

       written warranty terms,” Exhibits Vol. 3, p. 4 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1 (Logan’s

       Affidavit)), and Logan also testified that, “I don’t have any documentation” of

       the warranty agreement. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 62. A single invoice, even where, as

       here, proof of payment is shown by a cashier’s check, does not constitute a real

       property improvement contract under Indiana Code section 24-5-11-10.

[27]   Logan also relies on the statutory citation for Construction Warranties on Real

       Property [Ind. Code § 32-27-1-1, et seq.], concerning statutory home

       improvement warranties. This statute defines a home improvement contract as

       “a written agreement between the remodeler and an owner to make a home

       improvement.” Ind. Code §32-27-1-5 (2002). The statute also provides for

       optional statutory home improvement warranties which may cover “new

       heating, cooling, and ventilating systems.” Ind. Code § 32-27-1-12 (2002). But,

       as Logan concedes, the warranty described under the statute “does not cover

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024       Page 13 of 23
       appliances, fixtures, or items of equipment that are installed under the home

       improvement contract.” Id.

[28]   In addition, the statute provides that during the two (2) year period beginning

       on the warranty date, “a remodeler may warrant to the owner” that the home

       improvement is “free from defects in workmanship or materials” and “from

       defects caused by faulty installation[.]” Id. (emphasis added). Such written

       warranties would comply with the statute of frauds for two years. But even if

       Evans had given statutory home improvement warranties for an HVAC

       installation completed in 2015, they would have expired well before Logan filed

       suit in 2021. And, at all times the statute of frauds would remain in effect, both

       during the optional two-year warranty period and after the warranties had

       expired.

[29]   The two home improvement statutes cited by Logan do not correlate with the

       facts in this case and, thus, we conclude they are inapposite. We fail to see the

       relevance of either of the home improvement statutes cited by Logan in that
                                                                                                        4
       even if these statutes applied, they contemplate a written agreement.

       4
         We note an internal discrepancy between two provisions of the Real Property Improvement statute. Under
       Indiana Code section 24-5-11-4, the definition of a “real property improvement contract” means an
       agreement, oral or written, between a real property improvement supplier and a consumer . . . .” (emphasis
       added). Yet in Indiana Code section 24-5-11-10 (a)(10), the requirements of the written contract, which is to
       be provided to the consumer by the real property improvement supplier, are listed in unmistakable specificity
       to include, among other details, “(10) Signature lines for the real property improvement supplier or the
       supplier’s agent and for each consumer who is to be a party to the real property improvement contract with a
       legible printed or a typed version of that person’s name placed directly after or below the signature.” When
       interpreting statutes a specific provision controls or takes priority over a general provision. ESPN, Inc v. Univ.
       of Notre Dame Police Dept., 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1199 (Ind. 2016). Here, the statute specifically and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024                                    Page 14 of 23
       Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code

[30]   Logan next contends that his agreement with Evans constituted a contract for

       the sale of goods governed by Article 2 of the Indiana Uniform Commercial

       Code. Logan summarizes the evidence he contends supports the elements of

       his U.C.C. warranty claim, as follows:

               (1) Evans was a merchant of HVAC equipment, (2) Logan made
               the warranty a condition of the purchase, (3) Evans provided an
               express warranty on the equipment to be installed, (4) Logan
               purchased and paid for the equipment, (5) the equipment
               malfunctioned; (6) Logan notified Evans of the malfunction, (7)
               Evans failed to perform the warranty service, and (8) Logan
               suffered damages equal to or greater than the amount sought in
               his claim.

       Appellant’s Br. p. 13. (emphasis added.)

[31]   Logan contends that Evans is a “Merchant,” as defined in Indiana Code section

       26-1-2-104 (2007), and that “the sale and associated warranty related to the

       HVAC equipment would be governed by Indiana’s Uniform Commercial Code

       (UCC).” Appellant’s Br. p. 15. He asserts that the HVAC furnace and air

       conditioning equipment systems Evans sold him fit the U.C.C.’s definition of

       “goods” and that his “warranty claim must be based upon Evans’ sale of the

       HVAC equipment.” Reply Br. p. 7.

       unambiguously requires that a real property improvement contract be in writing and signed by both the
       supplier and the customer. I.C. § 24-5-11-10(a)(10).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024                             Page 15 of 23
[32]   At trial, Logan testified that his claim is based on a warranty for installation of

       the equipment, “For the equipment itself.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 4. And, again, on

       appeal he contends that, “Evans provided an express warranty on the equipment

       to be installed.” Appellant Br. p. 13 (emphasis added). But Logan confuses

       and conflates a warranty on the equipment, which on a given set of facts might

       be covered by the U.C.C., and a warranty for service and repair of the

       equipment. These are not one and the same.

[33]   Logan’s claim is for breach of a service and repair warranty. Logan does not

       invoke the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular

       purpose, which are implied in the contract of sale. See Ind. Code § 26-1-2-314

       (1986) and Ind. Code § 26-1-2-315 (1986). And he does not seek to recover

       damages for non-conforming goods. See Ind. Code § 26-1-2-714 (1986)

       (damages for breach in regard to accepted goods). Instead, Logan asserts an

       express warranty claim, and among other statutes, he cites Indiana Code

       section 26-1-2-313, which provides for express warranties. Appellant’s Br. p.

       15. And he contends that his “presentation of the invoice and payment for the

       HVAC equipment was sufficient to evidence the promise, the contract, or

       agreement on which the warranty was based.” Id. at 16.

[34]   While this statute contemplates both written and oral express warranties by the

       seller, the statute does not apply to Logan’s claim. Under Indiana Code section

       26-1-2-313, an express warranty is created from the seller’s affirmation of a fact

       or promise made to the buyer “which relates to the goods” and which represents

       “that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.” In other words,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024         Page 16 of 23
       an express warranty under this statute arises from a “self-imposed undertaking”

       by the seller that the goods shall conform to an affirmation or promise upon

       which the buyer is entitled to rely. See Bayer Corp. v. Leach, 153 N.E.3d 1168,

       1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“an express warranty is a promise that goods will

       conform to a particular description or affirmation”). The express warranty

       provisions of Indiana Code section 26-1-2-313 do not apply to a service and

       repair warranty which, while related to the sale of goods, is not a warranty that,

       when delivered, the goods will conform to a particular affirmation or promise.

[35]   Thus, Logan asserts neither a statutory implied warranty nor a statutory express

       warranty upon a sale-of-goods claim under the U.C.C. He claims a breach of

       warranty to service and repair the HVAC equipment. His claim is not a U.C.C.

       warranty claim but a common law action for what he calls a “refund.” Tr. Vol.

       2, p. 59. In other words, while Logan seeks “damages,” he actually seeks a

       rescission, namely, to sever the warranty claims from the sale-of-goods

       transaction and to recover $10,000 of the total contract price, the amount which

       he attributes to purchase of the warranty.

[36]   Thus, we conclude that Logan’s warranty claim is not covered by the U.C.C.

       because a service and repair warranty is not a warranty that the goods conform

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024       Page 17 of 23
       to an affirmation or promise, i.e., not a warranty of the value or fitness of the
                                                                             5
       goods, but a warranty ancillary to the sale of goods.

[37]   Logan notes that, “Evans claims the warranties expired four years after

       delivery” and asserts that, “this is simply untrue.” Reply Br. p. 7. Instead,

       Logan contends that, “In this case, performance of the warranty service was

       only required when/if the equipment malfunctions.” Id. Logan

       misunderstands the U.C.C. limitations of actions provisions. Under the

       U.C.C., the warranty would run from the date of installation, not from the date

       when service or repair was required. See Ind. Code § 26-1-2-725 (“breach of

       warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made . . . .”).

[38]   Even if Logan’s alleged warranty were governed by the U.C.C., Indiana Code

       section 26-1-2-725 contains a four-year statute of repose for breach of warranty

       actions. Ludwig v. Ford Motor Co., 510 N.E.2d 691, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).

       Under the U.C.C., an action for breach of warranty must be commenced within

       four years after tender of delivery. Ferdinand Furniture Co., Inc. v. R.M. Anderson,

       399 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Indiana Code section 26-1-2-725 is

       5
         Evans asserts that the U.C.C. Article 2 provisions governing the sale of goods do not apply because the
       “primary thrust” of the alleged agreement was a services contract. Appellee’s Br. pp. 7, 11. We cannot
       agree. The primary thrust of the agreement was the installation of HVAC equipment. The alleged service
       and repair warranty was secondary and ancillary to the equipment. But, here, on these facts, whether the
       equipment provisions or the alleged service and repair provisions of a hybrid or “mixed transaction”
       predominate is not dispositive.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024                              Page 18 of 23
       not an occurrence-based statute of limitations but a four-year statute of repose
                                                                                            6
       which, on these facts, would preclude Logan’s warranty claim.

[39]   Thus, under Indiana Code 26-1-2-725(2), the statute begins to run when tender

       of delivery is made, and an action for breach of implied warranty must be

       commenced within four years after tender of delivery. Ferdinand Furniture Co.,

       399 N.E.2d at 802. Logan’s warranty claim is not covered by the U.C.C. Even

       if it were covered it would be barred by the four-year statute of repose which ran

       from the date of installation—March of 2016.

       Sufficient Evidence to Prove the Warranty Claim

[40]   Finally, again, Logan asserts that his “presentation of the invoice and payment

       for the HVAC equipment was sufficient evidence [of] the promise, contract, or

       agreement on which the warranty was based.” Appellant’s Br. p. 16. He

       contends that when all the evidence is considered, there is sufficient evidence of

       an oral warranty and that, “Evans breached an agreement to personally provide

       warranty service to Logan for the HVAC systems installed into Logan’s

       residence.” Id. at 17. The record shows Evans conceded there was a warranty.

       Thus, Logan contends “there has been no dispute that Evans provided Logan

       an express[] warranty for a period of 10 years on the HVAC equipment.” Id.

       6
        Logan appears to suggest that the exception which can extend the statute of limitations to the “time of
       performance” applies. See Reply Br. p. 7. But Logan’s reliance on that exception is misplaced because the
       exception applies only “where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance.” See Ind. Code § 26-1-2-
       725(2) (emphasis added). Here, there was no warranty expressly extending the time of performance.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024                              Page 19 of 23
       Logan contends that this evidence is sufficient to support an enforceable claim.

       Id.

[41]   At trial Logan introduced an audio recording of his conversation with Evans on

       December 30, 2015. In that recording, Evans conceded that there was a 10-year

       manufacturer’s warranty, but he did not concede, as Logan alleges, that

       $10,000 of the contract price was to purchase a service and repair warranty.

       There is no evidence other than the bare assertion in Logan’s affidavit and his

       trial testimony that $10,000 of the first payment was attributable to a 10-year

       warranty, and no evidence of the other terms and conditions of the alleged

       warranty. Logan concedes that Evans “never provided any written warranty

       terms,” Exhibit Vol. 3, p. 4 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1; Logan’s affidavit), and that, “I

       don’t have any documentation.” Tr. p. 62. It is well settled that our courts can

       only enforce the terms of a contract agreed upon and cannot supply missing,

       essential terms. Johnson v. Sprague, 614 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

       And where, as here, an agreement is required to be in writing, the agreement

       must completely contain the essential terms without resort to parol evidence in

       order to be enforceable. Coca-Cola Co., 841 N.E.2d at 565.

[42]   Further, the burden of proof with respect to damages is with the plaintiff. LTL

       Truck Service, LLC v. Safeguard, Inc., 817 N.E.2d 664, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

       A fact finder may not award damages on the mere basis of conjecture or

       speculation. Id. Again, even if in theory an oral contract were enforceable

       here, essential terms would be missing.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024          Page 20 of 23
[43]   In the audio recording, Evans stated, “It’s got a 10-year warranty. It’s a Bryant

       furnace” and that, “You’ve got a 10-year warranty and it’s a Bryant Carrier.”

       Tr. Vol. 2, p. 21, 23. Evans concedes he told Logan there was a manufacturer’s

       10-year warranty, id. at 12, which is what the audio recording indicates.

       However, Logan testified that, “My agreement was only with [Evans]. I paid

       him.” Id. at 56. Logan asserts that it was his understanding “Mr. Evans was

       going to take care of everything.” Id. at 12. Thus, Logan’s claim is a personal

       claim against Evans, not against a manufacturer, that he paid Evans for a

       warranty and that Evans was obligated either to register the manufacturer’s

       warranty or to perform the warranty service himself. Reply Br. p. 8. If

       anything, the recording confirms that there was no meeting of the minds, and a

       meeting of the minds between the contracting parties is essential to the

       formation of a contract. Lash v. Kreigh, 202 N.E.3d 1098, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2023).

[44]   Logan further contends that Evans “appear[s] to have delegated his duties

       under the warranty to the manufacturer,” Appellant’s Br. p. 17, and notes that

       under the Uniform Commercial Code, “No delegation of performance relieves

       the party delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for breach.” Id. at 16

       (quoting Indiana Code § 26-1-2-210). In other words, Logan contends that

       Evans cannot shift his liability for performance of the warranty to the

       manufacturer. Logan’s argument might well prevail if there were written

       documentation of a warranty between Logan and Evans. But, as the trial court

       found, Logan has not provided an agreement reduced to writing that Evans

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024         Page 21 of 23
       agreed to personally provide warranty and repair maintenance on the HVAC

       system beyond one (1) year from the making of the agreement, which was

       December 29, 2015, the date of the invoice, at the earliest, or March 31, 2016,

       when installation of the HVAC system had been completed, at the latest.

[45]   Evans contends and the audio recording confirms that he agreed to provide a

       manufacturer’s warranty. And Logan argues that Evans was required either to

       register the manufacturer’s warranty or perform the warranty service himself

       but that he did neither. While Logan has established that he purchased a

       warranty of some kind, he has not documented the terms and conditions of the

       alleged warranty. This case illustrates the perils of oral contracts not to be

       performed within one (1) year from the making of the agreement, precisely the
                                                                                                  7
       kind of disputed agreements the statute of frauds seeks to prevent. To survive

       the statute of frauds, not only must there be a writing but the writing must be

       signed by the party against whom the contract is to be enforced, and, here,

       Evans’ signature is nowhere to be found.

       Conclusion
[46]   We conclude that the statute of frauds applies and precludes Logan’s warranty

       claim in that the alleged ten-year agreement is not to be performed within one

       (1) year from the making of the agreement. We also conclude that neither the

       7
         Like the trial court, we do not question that Logan holds a bona fide belief that he paid Evans $10,000 for a
       service and repair warranty. However, because any such alleged agreement was not documented in writing,
       as a matter of law he has shown no right to relief. See Ind. Trial Rule 41(B).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024                                 Page 22 of 23
       home improvement statutes cited by Logan nor Article 2 of the Uniform

       Commercial Code avoid or nullify the operation and effect of the statute of

       frauds. And we conclude that the alleged oral agreement is barred by the

       statute of frauds. Even if the agreement were unambiguous and otherwise valid

       in all other respects, it would be unenforceable because it was not documented

       in writing as required by law.

[47]   Affirmed.

       Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       APPELLANT PRO SE
       Barry F. Logan, Jr.
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
       Tasha R. Roberts
       Roberts Litigation Group
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-SC-1324 | March 4, 2024     Page 23 of 23