Court Opinion

ID: 9755995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:01:57.82485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:13.821283
License: Public Domain

KING, Associate Judge,
with whom Associate Judges TERRY and STEADMAN join,
dissenting:
In this appeal of an order of detention pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-1322(b) (1997 Supp.), the en bane court has decided to reverse a decision of a motions panel that became moot three days after that decision was issued when the defendant entered a guilty plea and was thereafter detained pursuant to a different statutory provision. The en banc court has chosen this course even though the decision it reverses was an unpublished judgment with no precedential value beyond this case.1 Moreover, because the judgment was decided on cross-motions for summary affirmance/reversal, the language contained in the judgment is so cryptic and uninformative that one is hard pressed to discern exactly what rule of law, if any, was laid down.2
Finally, as I have said, the defendant entered a plea of guilty three days after the judgment was entered by the division. Once the defendant pled guilty he was detained pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-1325(b) (1996 Repl.). Therefore the order of detention pursuant to § 23-1322(b), which was the order affirmed by the motions division, was no longer in effect.
It is essentially undisputed that this matter would be moot in the federal courts because there is no reasonable expectation that this defendant will be subjected to the same action again. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. *281478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1188-84, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982). Although we are not bound by federal mootness precedent, we do not generally stray from the course set out by those authorities unless there is a compelling reason to do so. For example, although we have previously addressed the question of mootness in a number of appeals of pretrial detention orders where the defendant had either pleaded guilty or been found guilty during the pendency of the appeal, we have exercised our discretion “to reach the merits of a seemingly moot controversy”, McClain v. United States, 601 A.2d 80, 82 (D.C.1992) (citation omitted), on only two occasions.
In both “seemingly moot” cases where we reached the merits we decided an important issue that affected every future pretrial detention case under the applicable statute. For example, in United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C.1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1721, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982), we decided the constitutionality of pretrial detention pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-1322(a)(l) (1973), the predecessor provision of the one under which appellant here was originally detained. And in Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580 (D.C.1989) (en banc), we were called upon to decide what burden of proof applied to the dangerousness determination for pretrial detention pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-1325(a) (1988 Supp.), for persons charged with first degree murder. In short, we exercised our discretion and reached the merits in those cases because our decision affected every pretrial detention case that would arise in the future under the respective detention provisions. As we said in McClain, supra, where we declined to decide the underlying issue under circumstances affecting only a small number of cases, we reached the merits in Edwards and Lynch because both cases “involved overarching issues important to the resolution of an entire class of future detentions. The same cannot be said in this case. Id. at 82. It also cannot be said in the case before the court here.
With respect, the chance of recurrence of the events presented here is slim. First, these circumstances arise only where detention is sought pursuant to § 23-1322(b).3 Second, the identical events would recur only in those infrequent cases where an indictment is issued before the detention hearing. Moreover, the circumstances would repeat only in those even rarer instances where a defendant’s criminal record is so extensive that the trial court will be able to determine dangerousness without any consideration of the facts of the pending charges. In its brief before the en banc court, the government informs that it was aware of only two other such instances and in neither case did the defendant seek to present additional evidence.4 Further, so far as can be determined, the precise circumstances of this case have never been before either this court or the trial court, and appellant does not claim otherwise.. In sum, this case has become moot by virtue of appellant’s plea of guilty and there is little likelihood that the same circumstances will recur. Therefore we should exercise our discretion by declining to decide the merits of a dispute which presents a very close and difficult question which need not, for the reasons stated, be decided either en banc or by any division of the court.

. See Rule IX D District of Columbia Court of Appeals Internal Operating Procedures; D.C. Ct. App R. 28(h); In re Pearson, 628 A.2d 94, 98 n. 8 (D.C.1993) ("unpublished decision ... cannot be invoked as precedent”); Scott v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 319, 322 n. 5 (D.C.1985) ("unpublished decisions may not be cited to the [trial] court by counsel"); see also Angarano v. United States, 329 A.2d 453, 456 (D.C.1974) (en banc) ("perfunctory ruling on the motion ... could not and did not bind future divisions which might be asked to decide similar motions.”)

. The division's order on this point stated;
This matter came before the court for oral argument on appellant’s motion for summary reversal and appellee's motion for summary affirmance. The court concludes that the court sufficiently considered "the weight of the evidence against the [defendant],” D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(2) (1994 Supp.), when it took into account the existence of the indictment, which conclusively established probable cause. The court further concludes that in seeking to contest the strength of the government’s case, appellant is attempting to do indirectly what he is barred from doing directly, namely, to challenge the evidence supporting the indictment. Scott v. United States, 633 A.2d 72, 73 (D.C.1993); see Lawn v. United States 355 U.S. 339, 349 [78 S.Ct 311, 317-18, 2 L.Ed.2d 321] (1958); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 [76 S.Ct. 406, 408-09, 100 L.Ed. 397] (1956); Coppedge v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 82-83, 311 F.2d 128, 131-132 (1962); United States v. Williams, 798 F.Supp. 34 (D.D.C.1992). It is therefore
ORDERED that appellant’s motion for summary reversal is denied. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that appellee's motion for summary affirmance is granted because the order of the trial court is "supported by the proceedings below.” D.C.Code § 23-1324(b) (1989); see Ireland v. United States, 406 A.2d 1259, 1260 (D.C.1979). It is
FURTHER ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the order on appeal be, and it hereby is, AFFIRMED. * * *
Tyler v. United States, No. 95-CO-183 (D.C. filed May 5, 1995).

. For detention pursuant to § 23-1325(a), the court must find there is a substantial probability the defendant committed the charged offense. Therefore, the circumstances present in this case could not arise for determination pursuant to that section.

. Statistical data provided by the Pretrial Services Agency shows that detention pursuant to § 23-1322(b) was ordered in 1,410 cases in calendar year 1996. If the government is correct in its estimate of only two other cases where the circumstances here were nearly duplicated, the number of such instances would occur in less than 0.2% of the cases where pretrial detention pursuant to § 23-1322(b) is sought.