Court Opinion

ID: 9646027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 07:00:26.453294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:26.585299
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARCUS COLICELLI,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-4324-19-0769-M-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: August 22, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Brian J. Lawler, Esquire, San Diego, California, for the appellant.

           Michael Potter, Esquire, Providence, Rhode Island, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
     which granted the appellant’s request for corrective action in his Uniformed
     Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) appeal. For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the agency’s petition for review, REVERSE

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     the administrative judge’s grant of corrective action in the form of 66 workdays
     of additional military leave, and DENY the appellant corrective action in that
     regard.   We AFFIRM the remand initial decision regarding the administrative
     judge’s denial of the agency’s challenge to the separate grant of corrective action
     in Colicelli v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DC-4324-19-
     0769-I-1, concerning the appellant’s entitlement to differential pay.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        At all relevant times, the appellant was an agency attorney who also served
     as a Judge Advocate in the U.S. Army Reserves.           Colicelli v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DC-4324-19-0769-I-1, Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 14 at 7, 20-21. From October 2016 to February 2017, he was ordered
     to active duty to attend military training for newly appointed Judge Advocates at
     Fort Benning, Georgia, and Charlottesville, Virginia. Id. at 5, 7, 20. From March
     to September 2018, he again was ordered to active duty, this time to serve as a
     Trial Defense Counsel at Fort Meade, Maryland. IAF, Tab 14 at 11, 20. The
     appellant served both periods under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d), which provides for
     voluntary active duty of reservists.    Id. at 5, 11; see Kluge v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 60 F.4th 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
¶3        Based on his active duty service, the appellant requested the agency provide
     him differential pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a) 2 and 22 days of additional paid
     military leave under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(b) for each of calendar years 2016, 2017,

     2
       Under 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a), Federal employees who are absent from civilian positions
     due to certain military responsibilities may qualify to receive the difference between
     their military pay and what they would have been paid in their civilian employment
     during the time of their absence. This entitlement is referred to as differential pay.
     Adams v. Department of Homeland Security, 3 F.4th 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2021), cert.
     denied, 142 S. Ct. 2835 (2022).
                                                                                           3

     and 2018. 3 Colicelli v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DC-
     4324-19-0769-M-1, Appeal File (M-1 AF), Tab 6 at 152, Tab 11.                After the
     agency denied these requests, the appellant filed a Board appeal alleging that the
     denials violated USERRA, specifically 38 U.S.C. § 4311. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 14
     at 17-18.
¶4         Following    the   appellant’s   withdrawal    of   his   hearing   request,   the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision granting in part and denying in part
     the appellant’s request for corrective action. IAF, Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID).
     Based on his interpretation of the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
     Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) in O’Farrell v. Department of Defense, 882 F.3d
     1080 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the administrative judge granted the appellant’s request for
     differential pay, finding that he qualified for such pay because he was ordered to
     active duty to serve in a “contingency operation” as defined in 10 U.S.C.
     § 101(a)(13). ID at 7-12. The administrative judge then denied the appellant his
     request for additional military leave, finding that, although O’Farrell also
     supported that request, the appellant did not timely request such leave from the
     agency. ID at 4, 12-14. Neither party petitioned the Board for review of the
     initial decision, which thus became the Board’s final decision.                5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.113.
¶5         The appellant appealed the initial decision to the Federal Circ uit, to which
     he asserted that the agency failed to produce in its response to his appeal emails
     indicating that he timely requested additional military leave.             Colicelli v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 2020-2048, 2021 WL 6112979 at *1-2 (Fed.
     Cir. Dec. 27, 2021) (per curiam). Based on this undisputed assertion, the Federal
     Circuit vacated the portion of the initial decision denying corrective action and
     remanded the case for the administrative judge to order the production of the

     3
      This was in addition to the 15 days of military leave for each of fiscal years 2017 and
     2018 the appellant had been awarded under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a). IAF, Tab 14 at 20-21.
                                                                                         4

     appellant’s requests for additional military leave and re-determine whether the
     appellant was entitled to relief. Id. at *2-3.
¶6         On remand, the parties stipulated that the appellant timely requested
     22 days of additional paid military leave during each of calendar years 2016,
     2017, and 2018. M-1 AF, Tab 11, Tab 12 at 7. After the appellant waived his
     right to a hearing on remand, M-1 AF, Tab 10 at 1, the administrative judge
     granted the appellant’s request for 66 total workdays of additional military leave.
     M-1 AF, Tab 15, Remand Initial Decision (RID) at 4-5. This was in addition to
     the grant of differential pay in the previous initial decision, which the
     administrative judge observed was final and that the agency had paid the
     differential pay. RID at 5-6.
¶7         The agency filed a petition for review in which it argues, among other
     things, that the administrative judge misapplied O’Farrell and that the appellant
     was not ordered to serve “in support of a contingency operation” as required for
     additional military leave. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5, 8-18. The
     appellant filed a response, to which the agency replied. PFR File, Tabs 5 -6.

                                          ANALYSIS
     The appellant was not entitled to additional military leave under 5 U.S.C.
     § 6323(b).
¶8         In relevant part, 38 U.S.C. § 4311 provides that a person who performs or
     has performed military service shall not be denied any benefit of employment on
     the basis of that service.      When the benefit in question is only available to
     members of the military, an employee making a claim under 38 U.S.C. § 4311 is
     only required to show that he was denied that benefit. Adams v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 3 F.4th 1375, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2021), cert. denied,
     142 S. Ct. 2835 (2022).
¶9         Under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a), Federal employees who perform certain types of
     reserve military duty are entitled to 15 days of paid military leave per fiscal year.
     In addition to these 15 days, 5 U.S.C. § 6323(b) provides in relevant part that an
                                                                                         5

      employee who, as a reservist in the armed forces, performs military service as a
      result of an order to active duty “in support of a contingency operation” as
      defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13), is entitled, during and because of such service,
      to an additional 22 workdays of paid military leave per calendar year. In turn,
      10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) defines “contingency operation,” as relevant to this case,
      as a “military operation” that results in the order to active duty of members of the
      uniformed services under any law during a national emergen cy declared by the
      President. 4
¶10         The record establishes that, for both periods of active duty for which he
      claimed additional military leave, the appellant was a U.S. Army reservist ordered
      to active duty under a provision of law, 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d), during a national
      emergency declared by the President.       83 Fed. Reg. 46067 (Sept. 10, 2018);
      82 Fed. Reg. 43153 (Sept. 11, 2017); 81 Fed. Reg. 60579 (Aug. 30, 2016); IAF,
      Tab 14 at 5, 11. At issue in this case is thus whether the appellant served on
      active duty “in support of” a “military operation” which resulted in his orders.
      We find that he did not.
¶11         In O’Farrell, 882 F.3d at 1082-83, 1087, the Federal Circuit held that a
      U.S. Army reservist ordered to active duty under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) to replace
      a civilian who had, in his own capacity as a U.S. Arm y reservist, deployed to
      Afghanistan, was entitled to additional military leave.        The Federal Circuit
      explained that the phrase “in support of” a contin gency operation in 5 U.S.C.
      § 6323(b) included indirect support, and that by replacing an employee who
      directly   supported   a   contingency   operation   through   his   deployment    to
      Afghanistan, the petitioner was called to active duty “in support of” a
      contingency operation. Id. at 1086-87.

      4
       The appellant did not claim, nor does he appear, to be entitled to corrective action
      under any other portion of 5 U.S.C. § 6323(b) or 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13).
                                                                                           6

¶12         The Federal Circuit made two additional points in O’Farrell important to
      this case: (1) that the phrase “military operation,” as part of the definition of
      “contingency operation” in 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13), “[a]t the very least . . .
      includes engagement in open hostilities against the nation’s enemies”; and
      (2) that its holding “[did] not mean that all reservists called to active duty during
      a national emergency will be entitled to additional leave.        Instead, they m ust
      demonstrate that their call to active duty was ‘in support of a contingency
      operation,’ as properly construed.”      Id. at 1084 n.4, 1086 n.5.      In the latter
      statement, it is clear that the Federal Circuit recognized a demarcation past which
      an asserted connection between an individual’s order to active duty and a
      contingency operation is too tenuous to satisfy 5 U.S.C. § 6323(b).
¶13         Here, there is no indication in the record that either of the appell ant’s orders
      to active duty service was in direct support—or even in indirect support of the
      kind accepted in O’Farrell—of a military operation. In 2018, the appellant was
      ordered to active duty as a Trial Defense Counsel in the continental United States.
      IAF, Tab 14 at 11. In that capacity, there is no indication that he performed
      duties, which, save perhaps through some unspecific organizational connection
      recognized as insufficient in O’Farrell, supported “engagement in open hostilities
      against the nation’s enemies.” Further, unlike in O’Farrell, there is no indication
      that the appellant was ordered to active duty as a Trial Defense Counsel to
      replace an individual directly supporting a contingency operation.          Likewise,
      there is no indication that the appellant’s order to active duty to attend training
      for new Judge Advocates was itself “in support of a contingency operation.”
      Even if it could be claimed that the training was provided to prepare the appellant
      for future service in support of a military operation, or that there was some other
      connection between the training and a military operation, nothing in the record
      demonstrates that the appellant’s order to attend the training supported a
      contingency operation to the degree accepted in O’Farrell for entitlement to
      additional military leave. Thus, finding that the appellant’s orders to active duty
                                                                                            7

      were not “in support of a contingency operation” to qualify him for additional
      military leave, we reverse the administrative judge’s grant of corrective action.

      The agency’s challenge to the administrative judge’s grant of differential pay
      exceeds the scope of the remand.
¶14         Finally, on review, as it did on appeal, the agency challenges the
      administrative judge’s prior initial decision granting the appellant corrective
      action concerning differential pay. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 8 -13, 15-18; M-1 AF,
      Tab 12 at 8-12, 14-16. The administrative judge denied the challenge, finding the
      grant to be final.       RID at 3, 5-6.     The administrative judge’s denial was
      appropriate because the challenge exceeded the scope of the Federal Circuit’s
      remand, which was limited to the issue of additional military leave.          Colicelli,
      No. 2020-2048, 2021 WL 6112979 at 2-3 & n.**; see, e.g., Zelenka v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 110 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 15 n.3 (2008) (refusing to address
      an appellant’s argument that exceeded the scope of the issues to be address ed on
      remand), rev’d on other grounds, 361 F. App’x 138 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Umshler v.
      Department of the Interior, 55 M.S.P.R. 593, 597 (1992) (finding that an
      administrative judge properly limited the scope of remand proceedings consistent
      with the Federal Circuit’s remand order), aff’d, 6 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
      (Table); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. The agency’s arguments afford no basis to disturb
      this denial on review.

                                NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.            5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

      5
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        8

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable t ime
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U .S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
                                                                                   9

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. I f so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.           See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
                                                                                  10

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for

6
  The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
                                                                                     11

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our we bsite at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       12

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.