Court Opinion

ID: 9394089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 14:00:37.246619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.415813
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-12946    Document: 56-1     Date Filed: 05/12/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 21-12946
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       WILBUR LEE WALLACE, JR.,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00515-SDM-JSS-1
USCA11 Case: 21-12946      Document: 56-1         Date Filed: 05/12/2023   Page: 2 of 5

       2                       Opinion of the Court                  21-12946

                            ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Appellant Wilbur Wallace, Jr., appeals the district court’s
       imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’ im-
       prisonment after Wallace pled guilty to being a felon in possession
       of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and
       the district court designated him as an armed career criminal under
       the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Wallace relies on our
       previous decision in United States v. Jackson, 36 F.4th 1294 (11th
       Cir. 2022) (“Jackson I”) vacated by United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th
       846 (11th Cir. 2002) (Jackson II), to argue that his Florida co-
       caine-related offenses do not qualify as “serious drug offenses” un-
       der the ACCA. Having read the parties’ briefs and reviewed the
       record, we affirm Wallace’s sentence.
                                             I.
              We “review de novo the legal question whether a prior state
       conviction qualifies as a ‘serious drug offense’ under ACCA.”
       United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846, 849-50 (11th Cir. 2022) (pet.
       for cert. filed, ___ U.S. ___ (Jan. 26, 2023) (No. 22-6640). Under the
       prior panel precedent rule, “we are bound to follow a prior binding
       precedent unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or
       by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d
       1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). The prior
       panel precedent rule applies even if the prior precedent is arguably
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       21-12946                Opinion of the Court                         3

       flawed. United States v. Golden, 854 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th Cir.
       2017).
                                            II.
              The ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sen-
       tence for a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.G. § 922(g) who has
       3 previous convictions for, in relevant part, “serious drug of-
       fense[s]” that were “committed on occasions different from one an-
       other.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251,
       1255 (11th Cir. 2009). The definition of “serious drug offense” in-
       cludes a crime under state law “involving manufacturing, distrib-
       uting, or possession with intent to manufacture or distribute, a con-
       trolled substance” that is punishable by a maximum term of ten or
       more years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
              In Jackson I, we held that a criminal defendant’s 1998 and
       2004 cocaine-related convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13 did not
       qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA because, at the
       times of the defendant’s convictions, § 893.13’s controlled-sub-
       stance element was broader for cocaine-related offenses than the
       ACCA’s definition of a serious drug offense. 36 F.4th at 1304, 1306.
       Because the defendant’s § 893.13 offenses did not qualify as serious
       drug offenses under the ACCA, we held that the defendant was im-
       properly sentenced as a career offender. Id. at 1306.
              However, we issued a superseding opinion in Jackson II.
       55 F.4th at 849. In Jackson II, we explained that, until 2017, § 893.13
       prohibited the sale, manufacture, delivery, or possession with
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                 21-12946

       intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver “a controlled substance,” in-
       cluding ioflupane. Id. at 851 n.3; see Fla. Stat. §§ 893.13(1),
       893.03(2)(a)(4) (1998), (2017). Similarly, in 1998, “[t]he federal ver-
       sion of Schedule II also encompassed ioflupane” until 2015. Jack-
       son, 55 F.4th at 851; see 80 Fed. Reg. at 54716 (Sept. 11, 2015);
       21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4)(ii) (2017). In Jackson II, we held that the
       “ACCA’s definition of a state ‘serious drug offense’ incorporates
       the version of the federal controlled-substances schedules in effect
       when the defendant was convicted of the prior state drug offense,”
       not the version in effect when the defendant committed the instant
       offense. Jackson, 55 F.4th at 854. Because the ACCA included io-
       flupane until 2015, § 893.13 was not categorically broader than the
       ACCA’s definition of a serious drug offense, so the defendant’s 1998
       and 2004 § 893.13(1) cocaine convictions qualified as serious drug
       offenses under § 924(e)(1). Id. at 861-62.
              Our holding in Jackson II forecloses Wallace’s argument that
       his § 893.13 offenses do not qualify as serious drug offenses under
       the ACCA. Although both federal and state law exempted io-
       flupane from the relevant prohibitions against possession of a “con-
       trolled substance” when Wallace committed the instant offense, io-
       flupane possession did qualify under both federal and state law
       when he committed his cocaine-related offenses. See Fla. Stat. §
       893.13(1) (1998); 80 Fed. Reg. at 54716; 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4)(ii)
       (2017); Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 850 n.3, 851. Because a state “serious
       drug offense” incorporates the federal controlled-substances sched-
       ules in effect when Wallace was convicted of his prior drug
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       21-12946              Opinion of the Court                       5

       offenses, and because § 893.13(1) is not categorically broader than
       the ACCA’s definition of a serious drug offense, Jackson II fore-
       closes Wallace’s argument otherwise. Accordingly, we affirm Wal-
       lace’s mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months.
             AFFIRMED.