Court Opinion

ID: 9844461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:03:14.365597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:35.620844
License: Public Domain

WOO'D, J.,
Dissenting.—I dissent. Provision is expressly made in the Vehicle Code that the vendor of an automobile under a contract of conditional sale is not liable for the negligence of the vendee “until the vendor or his assignee retake possession of such motor vehicle”. (Sec. 402f.) In section 177 (b) of the Vehicle Code it is provided: “Every dealer upon transferring by sale, lease or otherwise any vehicle, whether new or used, of a type subject to registration hereunder, shall immediately give written notice of such transfer to the department upon the appropriate form provided by it ... ” In Bunch v. Kin, referred to in the majority opinion, it is said that this provision was made for the protection of the vendor. In that case the vehicle had been sold and delivered six months prior to the accident and no notice had ever been given to the department of motor vehicles and it was properly held that the vendor was not relieved from liability. Any language used in the opinion which might be construed as holding that in all circumstances the vendor is liable until the notice be actually given was not necessary to the determination of the issues then before the court. It will be noted that in the present case the sale and delivery was made on Saturday at 12 o’clock noon and the accident occurred on Sunday, the following day. It is provided in section 10 of the Political Code: “Every Satur*589day from twelve o ’clock noon until twelve o ’clock midnight is a holiday as regards the transaction of business in the public offices of this state ...” It is apparent that it was practically impossible for the vendor to notify the department of motor vehicles “upon the appropriate form” before the accident occurred. In construing a statutory provision the “interpretation must be reasonable”. (Sec. 3542, Civ. Code.) In Lewis v. Curry, 156 Cal. 93, 101 [103 Pac. 493], it was held that, “There is no precise definition, so far as time is concerned, of the words ‘forthwith’ and ‘immediately’. In every case the meaning depends upon the circumstances of the ease and the act to be performed.” The rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties must be determined as of the time of the accident, on Sunday, September 26th. In my opinion a reasonable interpretation of the statute in question forces the conclusion that the ICelley Kar Company was not then liable. The fact that notice was- given to the department several days later cannot create a liability where none had theretofore existed.
The rights and obligations of the parties were not changed by the making of a second conditional sale contract four days after the accident. Both contracts covered the same car, the only substantial difference being in respect to the provision for the payment of the balance of the purchase price. Both contracts provided for the down payment of $300, the first contract providing for the payment of the balance in a lump sum and the second providing for monthly payments. The vehicle was sold and delivered under the first contract.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on February 23, 1939, and an application bjr appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on March 27, 1939.