Court Opinion

ID: 9647671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:44:46.38873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:51.677196
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
ONION, Judge.
I agree that the appellant prior to his confession, was given the warnings required by Article 15.17 and 38.22, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., in effect at the time of his statement as well as the warnings required by Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, and that thereafter he intelligently, voluntarily and knowingly “waived” his rights. In view of the length of his incarceration (8 p. m. *660on January 19, 1967, to the time of the confession on January 24, 1967) and the failure to call his court appointed attorney, I feel I must express my own reasons for agreeing that there was a “waiver” as contemplated by Miranda.
In Miranda the United States Supreme Court said:
“Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so.” 384 U.S. at p. 476, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 724.
The record before us shows that the appellant was a 21-year-old high school graduate, who was a member of the United States Air Force with 4 years of service.
Testifying in his own behalf at the separate hearing on the voluntariness of the confession, the appellant stated that he had not been mistreated in jail and that the jailer had made him and all the jail inmates aware that they could call their attorneys any time they got “ready.” There was no evidence that he was held incommunicado.
While there appears to be some conflict in the testimony as to whether appellant sent for Deputy Sheriff Jackson, the evidence supports the judge’s finding that he did.
It appears that prior to the confession the appellant, while he was drinking coffee with the deputy, was warned by such deputy among other things that he did not have to make any statement, that any statement he made would be used against him, and that he could call his court appointed counsel. He was further told that his lawyer would advise him against making any statement. Appellant then stated he was willing to make a statement and did not want his lawyer.1 Thereafter, without lengthy interrogation, the written confession was taken, read and signed by appellant in the District Attorney’s office under the circumstances described in the majority opinion.
I cannot conclude that the record would support a finding that this appellant was threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver. It appears that all the necessary warnings were given at the time of the interrogation and the appellant was aware that he was free to exercise his rights and privilege against self-incrimination at that point in time.
Caution, however, is urged in the use of this opinion as authority for the proposition that the counsel for the accused, either retained or appointed, need not be called prior to interrogation. Here the evidence demonstrated a clear cut affirmative waiver of the right to counsel prior to interrogation, which will not always be present in every case.
For the reasons stated, I concur.
MORRISON, J., joins me in this concurrence.

. In Miranda, the Court said: “[a]n express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. * * *»