Court Opinion

ID: 9839828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 14:07:11.382914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:32.350366
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dennis Crook and Siti Crook, h/w,           :
                 Appellants                 :
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :    No. 805 C.D. 2022
East Fallowfield Township                   :    Submitted: March 31, 2023

BEFORE:       HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
              HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
              HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                          FILED: September 14, 2023

              Dennis Crook (Mr. Crook) and his wife, Siti Crook (Mrs. Crook)
(collectively, the Crooks), appeal the March 1, 2022 order of the Chester County
Court of Common Pleas (Chester County trial court) granting the preliminary
objections of East Fallowfield Township (the Township) and striking the Crooks’
complaint. Upon review, we affirm.

                                     I. Background
              On February 4, 2019, Mr. Crook allegedly sustained various injuries
when he slipped and fell on property owned by the Township which is located in
Chester County.1 Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a & 3a-10a. On January 25, 2021,

       1
        Mrs. Crook alleged that the Township’s negligence deprived her of the “society,
companionship, services and assistance” of her spouse. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 10a-11a.
roughly one week before the applicable limitations period was set to expire, the
Crooks filed a negligence claim2 with the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas
(Bucks County court).3 On or around January 27, 2021, the Crooks mistakenly sent
the complaint to the Chester County Sheriff for service, rather than first mailing it
to the Bucks County Sheriff with a request for deputized service by the Chester
County Sheriff.4 Id. at 105a & 115a; see also Trial Ct. Op., 5/20/22 at 1.5 The
Crooks allege that the Chester County Sheriff received the complaint on February 5,
2021. R.R. at 105a; see also Trial Ct. Op., 5/20/22 at 2. The Crooks further assert
that the Chester County Sheriff returned the complaint to the Crooks’ counsel on
February 17, 2021.6

       2
         The parties agreed to transfer this matter from Bucks County to Chester County for the
resolution of the Township’s preliminary objections. See R.R. at 70a-71a.
       3
        “An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual
caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another” must be
commenced within two years. Section 5524(2) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2).
       4
          Rule 400(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that with limited
exceptions not applicable here, “original process shall be served within the Commonwealth only
by the sheriff.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 400(a). Rule 400(d) provides that “[i]f service is to be made by the
sheriff in a county other than the county in which the action was commenced, the sheriff of the
county where service may be made shall be deputized for that purpose by the sheriff of the county
where the action was commenced.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 400(d).
       5
         The Crooks allege they mailed the complaint to the Chester County Sheriff on January
27, 2021. See R.R. at 105a. The record contains a letter addressed to the Chester County Sheriff
dated January 27, 2021 requesting service of the complaint on the Township, but no evidence of
actual mailing on that date. See R.R. at 115a.
       6
          The Crooks alleged in their response to the Township’s preliminary objections that the
date on which the Chester County Sheriff returned the complaint to them was “approximately”
February 12, 2021. R.R. at 105a. However, the Crooks subsequently modified this approximation
to an “estimated” date of February 17, 2021 in their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s
March 1, 2022 order. Id. at 133a; see also Crooks’ Br. at 7.
        Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 405 provides, in pertinent part:

                                                 2
               On April 29, 2021, the Crooks praeciped the Bucks County court for
reinstatement of the complaint. R.R. at 1a. The Crooks then sent the reinstated
complaint to the Bucks County Sheriff with a request to forward the complaint to
the Chester County Sheriff for deputized service. See id. at 1a & 25a. On May 3,
2021, the Bucks County Sheriff received the mailing and forwarded it to the Chester
County Sheriff sometime thereafter. Id. The Chester County Sheriff did not receive
the complaint until June 2, 2021. Id. On June 7, 2021, the Chester County Sheriff
returned the complaint to the Bucks County Sheriff, as the 30-day window for
service had already expired.7 Id. On June 8, 2021, the Bucks County Sheriff

               (a) When service of original process has been made the sheriff or
               other person making service shall make a return of service forthwith.
               If service has not been made and the writ has not been reissued or
               the complaint reinstated, a return of no service shall be made upon
               the expiration of the period allowed for service.

               ....

               (e) The return of service or of no service shall be filed with the
               prothonotary.

               ....

               (g) The sheriff upon filing a return of service or of no service shall
               notify by ordinary mail the party requesting service to be made that
               service has or has not been made upon a named party.

      Pa.R.Civ.P. 405(a), (e), (g).
      7
          Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 401 provides, in relevant part:

               (a) Original process shall be served within the Commonwealth
               within 30 days after the issuance of the writ or the filing of the
               complaint.

               (b)(1) If service within the Commonwealth is not made within the
               time prescribed by subdivision (a) of this rule or outside the
               Commonwealth within the time prescribed by Rule 404, the

                                                 3
returned the complaint to the Bucks County Prothonotary who, in turn, forwarded
the complaint to the Crooks sometime thereafter. See R.R. at 1a. On June 24, 2021,
the Crooks once again praeciped to reinstate the complaint in the Bucks County
court. R.R. at 1a & 26a-27a. The Chester County Sheriff was deputized on July 2,
2021 and effectuated service on the Township on July 16, 2021. R.R. at 1a-2a &
37a.
               The following month, the Township filed preliminary objections with
the Bucks County court. R.R. at 2a, 38a-65a. The Township asserted that the
selected venue was improper and, accordingly, requested transfer of the matter to
the Chester County trial court.8 Id. at 60a & 65a (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1)).
The Township also objected on the basis of improper service. Id. at 61a-64a (citing
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1)).9 The parties entered into a stipulation to transfer the matter

               prothonotary upon praecipe and upon presentation of the original
               process, or a copy thereof, shall continue its validity by designating
               the writ as reissued or the complaint as reinstated.

               (2) A writ may be reissued or a complaint reinstated at any time and
               any number of times. A new party defendant may be named in a
               reissued writ or a reinstated complaint only if the writ or complaint
               has not been served on any defendant.

               ....

               (4) A reissued, reinstated, or substituted writ or complaint shall be
               served within the applicable time prescribed by subdivision (a) of
               this rule or by Rule 404 after reissuance, reinstatement, or
               substitution.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 401(a), (b)(1), (2), (4).
       8
         The Township stated that it would file its remaining preliminary objections with the
Chester County trial court following a transfer. See R.R. at 64a.
       9
        The Township additionally asserted that the doctrine of governmental immunity barred
the Crooks’ claim. See R.R. at 62a-64a (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4)). We observe that the

                                                 4
to the Chester County trial court, and the Bucks County court entered an order
acknowledging the parties’ stipulation and dismissing the Township’s preliminary
objections as moot. Id. at 67a-71a. In January 2022, the Township filed preliminary
objections with the Chester County trial court. Id. at 75a-95a. The Township again
objected on the basis of improper service, contending that the court should dismiss
the complaint with prejudice as the Crooks were not diligent in their attempts to
render service. Id. at 75a-95a (citing Gussom v. Teagle, 247 A.3d 1046 (Pa. 2021);
Farinacci v. Beaver Cnty. Indus. Dev. Auth., 511 A.2d 757 (Pa. 1986)).10 The
Crooks filed a response, maintaining that their attempts at service were sufficiently
diligent. Id. at 104a-06a.
              By order dated March 1, 2022, the Chester County trial court sustained
the Township’s preliminary objections and struck the Crooks’ complaint on the basis
that the Crooks failed to offer proof that they diligently attempted to timely
effectuate service. R.R. at 123a (citing Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1048). The Crooks
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. Id. at 130a-31a & 191a-
92a. The court noted that despite alleging in their response to the Township’s
preliminary objections that the Chester County Sheriff returned the complaint to
them on February 12, 2021, the Crooks asserted in their motion for reconsideration
that this date was more likely February 17, 2021, even while conceding that this date
is “simply unknown.” Id. at 191a (quoting Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for
Recons. at 9).

Township failed to raise the affirmative defense of governmental immunity as new matter. See
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030(a) (providing that the affirmative defense of “immunity from suit . . . shall be
pleaded in a responsive pleading under the heading “New Matter”).
       10
          The Township also reasserted that it was shielded from liability pursuant to the
affirmative defense of governmental immunity. See R.R. at 79a.

                                               5
               In May 2022, the Chester County trial court issued an opinion
expounding upon its March 2022 order pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a), explaining:

               [The Crooks] attempt to provide explanations for the delay
               without providing an actual reason as to why the date of
               return [following the failed attempt at service] is unknown
               to [their] counsel. Therefore, [the Crooks] could not
               provide an excuse as to why the reinstatement was late.
               While [the Crooks] provided a timeline for the remainder
               of time it took for [the Township] to receive service, the
               [trial c]ourt denied [the Crooks’] [m]otion for
               [r]econsideration as [the Crooks] failed to provide [the
               Township] with actual notice of the [c]omplaint until
               almost six (6) months later.

Chester Cnty. Comm. Pl. Ct. Op., 5/20/22 at 2. Thus, the court concluded that absent
a request for an extension or an agreement of the parties for an extension, the Crooks’
failure to effectuate service within 30 days of filing the complaint rendered the
complaint “dead.” Id. at 2-3 (quoting Twp. of Lycoming v. Shannon, 780 A.2d 835,
839 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)). The court also concluded that the Crooks “failed to prove
they made a good-faith attempt at service after their initial attempt on January 27,
2021 before the [c]omplaint expired,” explaining that the Crooks “merely
speculate[d] as to why there was an initial delay in reinstatement and service[.]” Id.
at 3 (citing Gussom (first citing McCreesh v. City of Phila., 888 A.2d 664 (Pa.
2005)); and then citing Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1976)).11
      11
           Our Supreme Court has explained:

               In the seminal case of Lamp v. Heyman, . . . 366 A.2d 882 ([Pa.]
               1976), this Court sought to end abuses of process by plaintiffs who
               tolled the statute of limitations by filing a writ of summons, had the
               writ repeatedly reissued, and deliberately failed to notify the
               defendant of the pending litigation. This process, while technically

                                                 6
               The Crooks appealed to this Court.

                                             II. Issues
               Before this Court,12 the Crooks argue that the Chester County trial court
erred in striking their complaint, because they attempted in good faith to effectuate
service upon the Township. See Crooks’ Br. at 18. The Crooks admit that proffering
February 17, 2021 as the date on which their counsel learned of the failed attempt at
service was “no more than a blind guess, an estimate . . . for which there is no
evidence.” Id. at 7. The Crooks explain that

               [i]n [] counsel’s office, returns of service and their
               envelopes are not scanned for record keeping. They are,
               instead, sent back out immediately. There is no evidence
               to suggest this was not done in this case, other than the fact
               that [the Crooks] did not reinstate the [c]omplaint received
               by the Chester County [S]heriff [on] February 5, 2021

               compliant with the Rules of Civil Procedure, nonetheless defeated
               the purpose of the statute of limitations, which is to protect
               defendants from stale claims.

McCreesh v. City of Phila., 888 A.2d 665 (Pa. 2005). The Court explained in a separate matter
that

               Lamp requires plaintiffs to act diligently to meet their good-faith
               requirement to effectuate service of process upon defendants so as
               not to dilute the policies underlying the statute of limitations.
               [Lamp, 366 A.2d at 889] (“Our purpose is to avoid the situation in
               which a plaintiff can bring an action, but, by not making a good-
               faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for
               a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.”).

Gussom v. Teagle, 247 A.3d 1056 (Pa. 2021).
       12
          “Where a trial court dismisses a complaint based on preliminary objections, this Court’s
review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of
discretion.” Kittrell v. Watson, 88 A.3d 1091, 1095 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

                                                  7
               until April 29, 2021, 83 days later. No one knows how
               much of that 83[-]day period is attributable to [the
               Crooks’] counsel’s office, rather than a delay of the sheriff
               or a delay in the mail.[13] Nevertheless, it is the sole basis
               of the lower court striking [their] [c]omplaint.

Id. at 19. The Crooks maintain that “[t]he date the return was posted by the Sheriff’s
office is simply unknown and [the Crooks’] counsel office disposed of the envelope
when opening the mail, so it is unknown when the return was received in the office.”
Id. at 7-8. Nevertheless, the Crooks insist “that the very fact that [the length of the
delay] is no more than a guess should have militated [against] dismissal of the

       13
           The Crooks posit that mail delivery delays with the United States Postal Service would
have been likely during the time period at issue due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Crooks’ Br.
at 8. In a matter involving dismissal for insufficient service of process under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(5), although the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania

               acknowledge[d] the effects of the pandemic as they relate[d] to the
               analysis of [the plaintiff’s] good[-]faith efforts, [the plaintiff] ha[d]
               not shown how the COVID-19 pandemic actually affected [her]
               counsel’s ability to serve the writ at the proper address, obtain an
               authorized signature or file a return of service in compliance. See
               Gold Line, Inc. v. Ourbus, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-02015, 2022 WL
               16554992, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2022) (acknowledging that some
               of [the] plaintiff’s attempts at service failed due to “forces out of
               [the p]laintiff’s control, i.e., [the d]efendant’s remote workforce
               during a global pandemic,” but concluding that plaintiff did not
               establish good faith for failure to timely serve defendant because
               plaintiff “offered no rationale for its inaction for more than four
               months following its initial attempt at service.”).

Staretz v. Walmart Stores E., L.P., No., 3:22-CV-00967, 2023 WL 2351885, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
3, 2023). Likewise, here, while citing pandemic-related mail delivery delays as one of two possible
explanations for the more than two-month interval between the initial failed attempt at service and
the subsequent praecipe for reinstatement, the Crooks fail to demonstrate how the pandemic
“actually affected” their ability to effectuate service. See id.

                                                  8
[c]omplaint.” Id. at 19. Thus, the Crooks fault the Chester County trial court for
“attribut[ing] a delay—of unknown length—to [them].” Id.
             Further, the Crooks contend that the Chester County trial court erred in
striking their complaint, because their “efforts to effectuate service were reasonable
and there is zero evidence that [they were] attempting to forestall the legal machinery
of the case.” Id. at 11 (citing McCreesh). The Crooks also assert that Gussom is
distinguishable, as the roughly 135-day period deemed fatal to the plaintiff’s
complaint in that case far exceeds the estimated 76-day delay in the present matter.
Id. at 15-16. Moreover, the Crooks reason that whereas the Gussom plaintiff failed
to respond to the defendant’s preliminary objections, “thereby failing to meet her
burden[] by default,” here, they filed a response to the Township’s preliminary
objections. Id. at 4 & 18. Thus, the Crooks maintain that “the [Chester County] trial
court erred by striking [the complaint] on the basis of a short delay, of unknown
length, attributable to [the Crooks].” Id. at 13.
             The Township counters that the Crooks have failed to prove that they
attempted in good faith to timely effectuate service. Appellee’s Br. at 10 (citing
Gussom).

                                   III. Discussion
             We agree with the Chester County trial court that the Crooks failed to
prove that they diligently attempted in good faith to timely serve process on the
Township. In Gussom, the plaintiff filed her complaint approximately three months
before the expiration of the applicable limitations period. Gussom, 247 A.3d at
1049. Roughly two weeks later, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of non-service with
the Chester County trial court, alleging that she learned upon attempting service that

                                           9
the defendant had moved to a different state. Id. Around four months later, and
nearly one month after the date on which the applicable limitations period would
have expired, but for the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff filed a praecipe for
reinstatement. Id. The defendant filed preliminary objections, asserting, inter alia,
that the plaintiff had failed to properly serve the complaint. Id. The plaintiff again
praeciped to reinstate the complaint but did not respond to the preliminary
objections. Id.
             The Chester County trial court sustained the preliminary objections and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1049. The plaintiff
filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that mailing the complaint to the
defendant’s new out-of-state address constituted a good faith attempt at service, even
though it went unclaimed. Id. The Chester County trial court denied the motion.
Id. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed. Id.
             The question on appeal before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
whether dismissing the complaint in the absence of evidence that the plaintiff
intended to delay service contravened Lamp. Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1048. The Court
affirmed, holding “that a trial court has the discretion to dismiss a complaint when a
plaintiff fails to offer proof that she diligently attempted to serve process on a
defendant in a timely manner and there is no evidence to indicate that the defendant
had actual notice of the commencement of the action in the relevant time frame,
regardless of whether the plaintiff acted or failed to act intentionally.” Id. The Court
highlighted the fact that following the initial failed attempt at service, the record and
the docket reflected a nearly four-month period of inactivity before the plaintiff
sought reinstatement. Id. at 1057. Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed

                                           10
to meet her burden of proving that she diligently attempted in good faith to timely
effectuate service. See id. at 1057.
               Here, the Crooks bore the burden of proving that they diligently
attempted in good faith to serve process on the Township. See Gussom, 247 A.3d at
1057; see also Chruszczyk v. City of Phila. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 513 C.D. 2014, filed
Nov. 6, 2014), slip op. at 10 (citing Bigansky v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 658
A.2d 423 (Pa. Super. 1995)) (stating that “[a]lthough there is no mechanical
approach to determine what constitutes a good-faith effort, the plaintiff bears the
burden demonstrating his efforts were reasonable”).14 The Crooks allege that the
Chester County Sheriff received the complaint on February 5, 2021, and that the
complaint was returned to them on February 17, 2021. R.R. at 105a & 133a; Trial
Ct. Op., 5/20/22 at 2; Crooks’ Br. at 7. Assuming arguendo the accuracy of these
dates, the Crooks nevertheless fail to provide any explanation, let alone evidence,
excusing the more than two-month period preceding the April 29, 2021 praecipe for
reinstatement. In fact, the Crooks admit that the requisite evidence does not exist,
conceding that “[n]o one knows how much of that . . . period is attributable to [the
Crooks’] counsel’s office, rather than a delay of the sheriff or a delay in the mail.”
Crooks’ Br. at 19.15 The Crooks merely speculate that they may have received notice

       14
         Unreported memorandum opinions of this Court issued on or after January 15, 2008 may
be cited for their persuasive value. See Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating
Procedures 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
       15
           We observe that although the nearly month-long delay between the Bucks County
Sheriff’s receipt of the complaint and request for deputized service on May 3, 2021 and the Chester
County Sheriff’s receipt of the complaint on June 2, 2021 is not attributable to the Crooks, it
nevertheless has no bearing on the more than two-month delay preceding their April 29, 2021
praecipe for reinstatement. We further note that although it is not ascertainable from the record
precisely when in June 2021 the Bucks County Prothonotary forwarded the complaint to the
Crooks prior to their June 24, 2021 praecipe for reinstatement, this ambiguity likewise does not
bear upon the question sub judice.

                                               11
of the failed attempt at service on February 17, 2021.16 See Crooks’ Br. at 7; see
also id. at 11 (acknowledging that “[t]he period of time between the receipt of the
return of service and the [April 2021] reinstatement is unknown”). This guesswork
falls far short of the requisite level of proof. See Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1057 (stating
that whether a plaintiff fulfills his or her legal duty to make a good-faith effort to
effectuate service is a “factual question”); Farinacci, 511 A.2d at 759-60 (dismissing
personal injury action where the “plaintiffs [] failed to provide an explanation for
counsel’s inadvertence which could substantiate a finding that [the] plaintiffs made
a good-faith effort to effectuate service” after the plaintiffs’ counsel initially
misplaced a file and then after locating the papers, neglected for roughly one month
to deliver the requisite instructions and payment to the sheriff for issuance of a writ
of summons).17
               Nevertheless, as stated, the Crooks maintain that “there is zero evidence
that [they were] attempting to forestall the legal machinery of the case.” Crooks’
Br. at 11 (citing McCreesh). However, the deciding question is not whether the

       16
          The Crooks also assert that unlike the roughly 135-day period deemed fatal to the
Gussom plaintiff’s complaint, here, the estimated delay is only 76 days. See Crooks’ Br. at 15-16.
However, no bright line rule governs the permissible length of delay in serving process; rather,
whether a plaintiff has diligently attempted in good faith to timely effectuate service is a question
reserved for the sound discretion of the trial court. See Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1048.
       17
           The Crooks maintain that “the trial court erred by striking [the Complaint] on the basis
of a short delay, of unknown length, attributable to [the Crooks].” Id. at 13. However, even
accepting the more favorable estimate of February 17, 2021 (rather than February 12, 2021, see
supra note 5) as the date on which the Crooks learned of the failed attempt at service, their more
than two-month delay until April 29, 2021 in requesting reinstatement of the complaint cannot be
described as “short.” See Farinacci. The Crooks further suggest that “the very fact that [the length
of their delay] is no more than a guess should have militated dismissal of the [c]omplaint.” Crooks’
Br. at 19. Contrary to this assertion, the absence of evidence excusing untimely service of process
does not support a presumption in the Crooks’ favor, but rather points to the failure to meet their
evidentiary burden.

                                                12
Crooks intended to stall their negligence action, but whether they met their burden
of proving that they diligently attempted in good faith to timely effect service on the
Township. See Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1057; see also id. at 1048 (quoting Farinacci,
511 A.2d at 759) (holding that “[i]n each case, where noncompliance with Lamp is
alleged, the [trial] court must determine in its sound discretion whether a good-faith
effort to effectuate notice was made”); Miller v. Klink, 871 A.2d 331, 336 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2005) (concluding that “[a] plaintiff need not intentionally delay notifying
a defendant of a lawsuit in order for a court to find a lack of good faith; rather, simple
neglect or mistake can support such a finding”); Chruszczyk, slip op. at 10 (citing
Ferrara v. Hoover, 636 A.2d 1151 (Pa. Super. 1994) (specifying that “an overt
attempt at delay is not necessary to constitute bad faith”).18 Moreover, “[s]imple
neglect and mistake to fulfill the responsibility to see that requirements for service
are carried out may be sufficient to bring the rule in Lamp to bear”. Id. at 10-11
(citing Ferrara, 636 A.2d at 1152). Accordingly, we agree that the Chester County

      18
           In Gussom, our Supreme Court explained as follows:

               Although McCreesh made clear that a plaintiff could fulfill her
               good-faith service mandate without strictly complying with the
               service rules as long as her efforts resulted in actual notice of the
               lawsuit to the defendant, like Farinacci, McCreesh did nothing to
               modify a plaintiff’s duty to act diligently to serve notice of the
               commencement of an action so as not to undermine the policies that
               drive the statute of limitations. Nor, for that matter, did McCreesh
               change the rule clarified in Farinacci that the plaintiff carries an
               evidentiary burden to prove that she made a good-faith effort to
               effectuate service of process in a timely manner. To the contrary, .
               . . the McCreesh Court alluded to this evidentiary requirement. See
               [McCreesh, 888 A.2d] at 672 (“We subtly altered our holding in
               Lamp in Farinacci, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate ‘a good-faith
               effort to effectuate notice of commencement of the action.’”).

Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1056-57.

                                               13
trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Crooks’ complaint with
prejudice.19 See Gussom.

                                         IV. Conclusion
                            For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                               __________________________________
                                               CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

       19
           Although the trial court struck the Crook’s complaint, the effect of the trial court’s March
1, 2022 order was in fact a dismissal with prejudice due to the expiration of the applicable
limitations period on February 4, 2021. See Twp. of Lycoming, 780 A.2d at 839 (holding that
“[u]nless a party applies to a court for an extension of time in which to serve original process, or
unless the parties agree to waive the thirty-day time restriction, a writ or complaint will be ‘dead’
at the expiration of 30 days”); Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1047-48 (stating that “[s]o long as the plaintiff
files her writ or complaint before the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to her cause
of action, the original filing, as well as any subsequent reissuances or reinstatements, tolls the
statute of limitations”).

                                                 14
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dennis Crook and Siti Crook, h/w,      :
                 Appellants            :
                                       :
            v.                         :
                                       :   No. 805 C.D. 2022
East Fallowfield Township              :

                                    ORDER

            AND NOW, this 14th day of September, 2023, the March 1, 2022 order
of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRMED.

                                     __________________________________
                                     CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge