Court Opinion

ID: 9850790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:03:02.384442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:43.352774
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I dissent because I believe that we need look no further than our prior order to resolve this case. On November 25, 1991, the Court issued the following:
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the judgments of the Court of Appeals and of the Recorder’s Court are reversed, and the case is remanded to the Recorder’s Court for a new triad. MCR 7.302(F)(1). The Supreme Court has concluded that the defendant-appellant was denied a fair trial by the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the victim’s state of mind._
*455While limiting instructions were given in this case, we believe that under the circumstances there was such a great likelihood of prejudice that the evidence should have been excluded because the relevance of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudice. MRE 403. [439 Mich 884, 884-885 (1991). Quotation omitted.]
Justices Boyle and Riley dissented from the order. The prosecutor moved for, and was denied, reconsideration. Justice Boyle dissented again: the "Court’s failure to differentiate between discrete classes of evidence are foreshadowed by the prosecution’s claim . . . that it does not know what 'evidence’ the Court is talking about and the defendant’s reply that since all of the evidence was 'of the same character’ it was all improperly admitted.” Id. at 886.
In light of Justice Boyle’s "vigorous” dissent, I think it clear that the Court believed that all evidence relating to the victim’s state of mind was inadmissible because the relevance of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudice. The Court obviously felt that the order was clear enough because it did not respond to the concerns raised by Justice Boyle. Accordingly, I believe that our prior ruling prohibits any evidence generated by the victim regarding the victim’s state of mind, whether offered to show its effect on the listener or for the truth of the matter asserted, because its probativeness is substantially outweighed by prejudice.1_
*456As the majority points out, the evidence in controversy can be characterized as nonhearsay because it may be offered to show its effect on the listener and not for a prohibited hearsay purpose. Nevertheless, there is a substantial danger that these out-of-court statements will in fact be used by the jury for an improper purpose: to establish the truth of the matter asserted. Our extensive citation of People v White, 401 Mich 482; 257 NW2d 912 (1977),2 demonstrates that this is the very danger that the Court sought to avoid.
When a victim’s state of mind is in issue in a homicide case it is usually because the defense asserted is either self-defense as justification for the killing, suicide or accidental death. When such claims are made by the defendant it would be highly relevant for the prosecution to show that at or near the time of the decedent’s death he said something which tends to prove circumstantially that he feared the defendant, as suggesting it was unlikely that he was an aggressor; as tending to disprove a suicidal bent; or as tending to disprove accidental death. Where such claims are made, a number of courts have allowed the admission of a victim’s statements of fear of the defendant as constituting such circumstantial proof. . . .
Here, however, there are no such claims by the defendant. The people’s theory was felony murder. The appellant’s theory was that he did not commit the crime. Self-defense, accidental death or suicide were not raised, nor were any analogous defenses. Although appellant may have in some sense raised the issue of Greene’s state of mind, by suggesting that the two were friendly, it was not claimed that anything said or done by Greene exculpated appellant or excused, justified or mitigated his alleged *457guilt. Greene’s state of mind was, therefore, only remotely and collaterally related to the real issues in the case.
On the other hand, the statement attributed to the declarant, Greene, that he had an argument with White and was frightened of him tended to . relate forcefully to the appellant’s character and the acts attributed to him, matters which were very prominently "in issue” in the case. The danger is obvious: that the jury would accept Greene’s statement "as somehow reflecting on defendant’s state of mind rather than the victim’s — i.e., as a true indication of the defendant’s intentions, actions or culpability.” United States v Brown [160 US App DC 190] 198; 490 F2d [758] 766 [(1973)].
It is against this possibility that the need for a limiting instruction is vital. Where the state of mind evidence either explicitly or implicitly includes other factual matters, a limiting instruction should be given to preserve the hearsay policy which would exclude the evidence if offered against appellant to prove the truth of those underlying facts. See United States v Brown, supra, and cases cited therein. Even where state of mind bears substantial relevance to the issues in a case, these additional factual matters may present so great a likelihood of prejudice that the evidence should be excluded. [439 Mich 884-885. Citations omitted and emphasis added.]
The rule articulated in White is clear: Evidence whose admissibility is not precluded by the hearsay rule still should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice.
Therefore, even if one concludes that the contested nonhearsay evidence3 was not covered by our prior ruling, this case is still controlled by White. As in White, neither self-defense, acciden*458tal death, suicide, nor any other defense was raised. There, as here, the defense did not claim that anything done by the deceased exculpated the defendant or excused, justified, or mitigated his guilt. Thus, the challenged evidence is not probative of,4 and only remotely related to, any material issue and should be excluded.
Even a brief review of the proposed evidence shows that it is filled with nothing but contempt and disdain of the defendant. Compounding the problem is that the victim is dead. Thus, the defendant in this case is faced with a multitude of unchallengeable denunciations by the victim. The prejudice could not be more clear.
The use of the decedent’s diary and letters is not only unfairly prejudicial but unnecessary. In fact, the prosecution actually argues that there is independent evidence to support each statement it wishes to admit. This independent evidence consists primarily of the defendant’s written statements. In effect, the prosecution concedes that there are other sources available to prove the assertions made in the victim’s journal. Why then does it so desperately desire to admit this evidence? If it is not for facts contained in the evidence, it must be for the victim’s disparaging commentary regarding the defendant.
It is apparent that not only is the evidence in question extremely prejudicial and unnecessary, it is equally cumulative. As voluminous as the victim’s diary is, there is an equally voluminous paper trail created by the defendant in his correspondence with the victim’s parents and others. There is plenty of evidence from which a juror *459could conclude that there was a significant breakdown of the marital relationship. Moreover, the evidence created by the defendant does not suffer from the defect that it is full of accusations and hence there is no chance of unfair prejudice. The jury can see what he said and draw its own conclusions, as opposed to having those conclusions •supplied by the victim.
Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the trial court insofar as it appears to admit some statements consisting of the victim’s commentary on the character and conduct of the defendant.
Brickley, C.J., and Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 The majority holds that our prior order precluded " 'hearsay evidence regarding the victim’s state of mind’ where its 'relevance . . . was substantially outweighed by the prejudice.’ ” Ante at 454. This paraphrasing is inaccurate because it suggests that only that hearsay evidence of the victim’s state of mind that is substantially more prejudicial than probative be excluded. We, however, *456excluded all hearsay evidence of the victim’s state of mind, whether excepted from the hearsay rule or not, because its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probativeness.

 A case that the majority completely fails to discuss, let alone acknowledge.

 Offered to show the effect on the listener and not for the truth of the matter asserted.

 I note that the majority seems to equate relevance with probativeness. Ante at 452. While this is certainly a unique evidentiary concept, I question the wisdom of collapsing these two completely different concepts into one.