Court Opinion

ID: 9401465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 14:07:35.916893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:52.924108
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-13351

              COMMONWEALTH   vs.   OSCAR DELOSSANTOS.1

            Essex.     March 8, 2023. – June 13, 2023.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Firearms. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions,
     Waiver of constitutional rights, Voluntariness of
     statement, Search and seizure. Waiver. Evidence,
     Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement.
     Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Admissions and
     confessions, Waiver, Voluntariness of statement, Affidavit.
     Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle.

     Complaints received and sworn to in the Newburyport
Division of the District Court Department on January 20, 2017,
and June 13, 2017.

     A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Peter
F. Doyle, J.; the cases were tried before Allen G. Swan, J.; and
a motion for a new trial was heard by Doyle, J.

     After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

     Matthew Spurlock, Committee for Public Counsel Services,
for the defendant.

     1 As is our practice, we use the defendant's name as it
appears on the complaint.
                                                                   2

     Kathryn L. Janssen, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

     CYPHER, J.    The defendant, Oscar Delossantos, was charged

with one count of carrying a firearm without a license pursuant

to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), one count of carrying a loaded

firearm without a license pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n),

and one count of disorderly conduct pursuant to G. L. c. 272,

§ 53.    In a pretrial motion, the defendant sought to suppress

"all evidence and statements seized" by police as a result of

"the unlawful search and seizure[]" of the defendant.     Following

an evidentiary hearing, the defendant's motion to suppress was

denied, as the judge found that the defendant knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights after,

as the judge further found, the defendant was given "the full

compl[e]ment of Miranda warnings (in English and in Spanish)."

     At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of carrying a

firearm without a license, and he was sentenced to eighteen

months in a house of correction.2   The defendant filed a motion

to file a late notice of appeal, which was allowed by a single

justice of the Appeals Court.   A stay of the appellate

proceedings was subsequently entered as the defendant filed a

     2 The judge granted the defendant's motion for a required
finding of not guilty as to the disorderly conduct charge, and
the jury found the defendant not guilty of carrying a loaded
firearm without a license.
                                                                   3

postconviction motion for a new trial.     The motion was denied

following a nonevidentiary hearing, and the defendant filed a

timely appeal.   In a consolidated appeal, a panel of the Appeals

Court affirmed the defendant's conviction and the denial of his

motion for a new trial in an unpublished memorandum and order

pursuant to its rule 23.0.3   Commonwealth v. Delossantos, 101

Mass. App. Ct. 1115 (2022).     We granted the defendant's petition

for further appellate review.

     This case presents the question whether the defendant

waived a claim regarding the adequacy of the Miranda warnings

provided to him in Spanish, where the Commonwealth argues that

the defendant failed to set forth with particularity the grounds

on which he sought to suppress his postarrest statements to

police.   Where we conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to

demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in fact

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda

rights, and that the defendant did not waive the issue, the

defendant's conviction must be vacated.4

     3 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the decision
pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 27, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1656
(2019), which the panel denied.

     4 Because we conclude that the defendant did not waive the
Miranda warning issue and that the judge erred in denying the
defendant's motion to suppress his postarrest statements, we
need not reach the arguments raised in the motion for a new
trial, i.e., whether trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly
"failing to hold the Commonwealth to its burden to establish"
                                                                    4

     Background.   We summarize the facts as found by the motion

judge, following an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's

motion to suppress, supplemented by undisputed facts from the

hearing.   See Commonwealth v. Pinto, 476 Mass. 361, 362 (2017).

     Shortly after 10 P.M. on January 19, 2017, Officer David

Noyes of the Amesbury police department was on routine patrol in

Amesbury when he observed a gray Honda motor vehicle "roll

through" a stop sign and take a quick right turn without using a

directional signal.   Noyes observed that the license plate on

the vehicle was secured with only one screw, prompting him to

turn around and follow the vehicle in his police cruiser.5   Noyes

called dispatch with the license plate number for a registry

query.   At that time, however, Noyes did not activate the lights

of his cruiser.

     Another officer of the Amesbury police department, Officer

Neil Moody, was parked at a local business when the gray Honda

passed him.   Moody, having heard Noyes's request for a registry

query on the gray Honda, used the computer in his cruiser to

conduct a registration query of the vehicle, which revealed that

it was registered to a male owner whose license had expired and

that the defendant received accurate and complete Miranda
warnings in Spanish.

     5 Noyes was in a "ghost cruiser," i.e., a police cruiser
that did not appear to be marked fully until headlights "hit
it."
                                                                    5

was nonrenewable.    Moody saw that the driver of the vehicle was

a male, prompting him to pursue the vehicle and activate the

blue lights of his cruiser.

     As Moody was in pursuit, Noyes followed behind.6   The

vehicle continued about one-tenth of a mile, passing numerous

open parking spots without stopping.   The vehicle entered a

parking area of a nearby convenience store and parked in two

spaces, one of which was a handicap space.   Both front doors of

the vehicle opened quickly.    The driver and the defendant, who

was seated in the front passenger's seat, got out of the vehicle

and continuously looked at the pursuing officers as they quickly

walked in opposite directions away from the vehicle and the

convenience store.    Moody then parked behind the vehicle, and

Noyes soon thereafter pulled up next to him.7   Seeing both men

quickly get out of the vehicle, the officers believed they were

on the verge of fleeing the scene.

     6 Noyes still had not activated the lights of his cruiser.
He testified on cross-examination that he was not in pursuit of
the vehicle, but merely was trying to follow it, as he had been
given a description by dispatch about the vehicle and was trying
to confirm that information. Noyes estimated that when he
turned around to follow the vehicle, he was 900 feet behind
Moody.

     7 Moody and Noyes were not in communication during the
pursuit of the vehicle. Moody did not know Noyes was following
behind him. Once Noyes pulled up next to Moody, who had already
stopped the vehicle, Noyes saw that the vehicle matched the
description provided by dispatch.
                                                                       6

     As a result, both officers got out of their vehicles; Moody

"painted" the defendant with a Taser gun, and Noyes told the

driver to stop.8    Noyes told the driver and the defendant

multiple times to return to the vehicle, which they did after a

lot of "back and forth."     On returning to the vehicle, both the

driver and the defendant were ordered to put their hands on the

dashboard.     Each, however, took his hands off the dashboard

multiple times.    The defendant placed his hands near his waist,

while the driver continued to reach with his right hand towards

the center console and the floor area.     Fearing for their

safety, the officers removed the two men from the vehicle.       The

defendant was moved to the front of the vehicle and was pat

frisked, but no weapons were found.     Officer Scott Peters of the

Amesbury police department arrived on the scene and was told to

check the area of the vehicle that the driver had "lung[ed]

for."    Peters then found a loaded handgun within a bag that was

located on the floor of the front passenger's area.

     Neither the defendant nor the driver had a license to carry

the firearm.    Both men were arrested and were advised of the

Miranda rights in English.     Once arrested, the defendant claimed

that he could not speak English.     Because none of the officers

     8 The term "painted" was described as the officer drawing
the Taser gun, pointing it at the defendant, and activating the
Taser gun's red laser light.
                                                                      7

at the scene spoke Spanish, an officer who was fluent in

Spanish, Officer Guillermo of the Salisbury police department,

was called to the scene and readvised the defendant of his

Miranda rights in Spanish.     The defendant then was questioned by

police about the firearm.    While the driver admitted that the

firearm belonged to him, the defendant admitted to trying to

conceal the firearm.

    Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress

"all evidence and statements seized" by police, including any

postarrest statements made by the defendant during the motor

vehicle stop.    During the evidentiary hearing on the motion, the

Commonwealth presented testimony from Noyes, Moody, and Peters.

Noyes testified that Guillermo advised the defendant of his

rights in Spanish, and that the defendant appeared to understand

those rights once given in Spanish.     Moody testified that he

knew Miranda warnings were read to the defendant at the scene of

his arrest.     Peters testified that he provided Miranda warnings

to the defendant, but not in Spanish because he did not speak

Spanish.   The Commonwealth did not call as a witness Guillermo,

the officer who, according to the testimony, had given the

defendant Miranda warnings in Spanish.    Nonetheless, the motion

judge found that the defendant was given "the full compl[e]ment

of Miranda warnings (in English and in Spanish)" and had
                                                                      8

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights.

The defendant's motion then was denied.

    Discussion.     1.   Waiver of issue.   The Commonwealth argues

that although the defendant "conceivably raised" the issue

whether Miranda warnings were given at all, the issues whether

Miranda warnings were required to be given in Spanish and

whether they in fact were given in Spanish were not raised

properly in the defendant's motion to suppress.      "Pursuant to

Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516

(2004) [(rule 13 [a] [2])], a motion to suppress 'shall state

the grounds on which it is based and shall include in separately

numbered paragraphs all reasons, defenses, or objections then

available, which shall be set forth with particularity'"

(emphasis added).   Commonwealth v. Dew, 478 Mass. 304, 309

(2017).   The Commonwealth argues that where the defendant has

failed to do so, the issues whether Miranda warnings were

required to be given in Spanish, and whether they in fact were

given in Spanish, are waived.    We disagree.

    The defendant's motion to suppress, albeit in somewhat

brief fashion, sought to suppress "any statements" made to

police because the defendant "did not waive voluntarily any of

[his] rights under the [United States] Constitution or the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."       In his affidavit, the

defendant more specifically stated that he "did not knowingly
                                                                     9

and voluntarily waive any of [his] constitutional rights"

following his arrest, and that "[a]ny statements attributed to

[him] in the police report were not accurate and not truly

voluntary" (emphases added).    In the memorandum of law filed in

support of his motion, the defendant further argued that he did

not receive Miranda warnings, as "[n]otably absent from the

[a]rrest [r]eport [was] whether any 'Miranda' warnings were

administered in Spanish to the [defendant] before questioning

ensued."

    According to the findings of the motion judge, the

defendant spoke English up until his arrest.     The motion judge

found that once arrested, the defendant "claimed" that he could

not speak English.     The Commonwealth was aware that the

defendant had challenges with speaking English, as the

prosecutor had elicited testimony from one of the officers,

Noyes, on direct examination that Guillermo specifically was

called to the scene to provide the defendant with Miranda

warnings in Spanish.    In fact, on direct examination, the

prosecutor specifically asked Noyes if the defendant appeared to

understand the Miranda warnings once they were given to him in

Spanish by Guillermo, to which Noyes responded, "Yes."

    A defendant's waiver of his or her Miranda rights must be

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.     Commonwealth v.

Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 153 (2011).    The Commonwealth is aware that
                                                                  10

it bears "the 'particularly heavy burden' of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant's Miranda waiver was [in

fact] valid."   Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 655

(2018), quoting Hoyt, supra at 152.    In doing so, the

Commonwealth always must demonstrate not only what warnings were

provided to the defendant, but also that the defendant

understood such warnings.    See Commonwealth v. The Ngoc Tran,

471 Mass. 179, 186 n.6 (2015).    See also Commonwealth v. Garcia,

379 Mass. 422, 429 (1980) ("A confession can be voluntary in the

legal sense only if the suspect actually understands the import

of each Miranda warning").   Where the Commonwealth bears a

particularly heavy burden in demonstrating a valid waiver of

Miranda protections, and where the Commonwealth was aware of the

defendant's challenges with the English language, the

Commonwealth was on full notice that the defendant's challenge

to the over-all sufficiency of his Miranda warnings necessarily

would include a challenge to the Commonwealth's proof that

adequate Miranda warnings actually were provided in Spanish.

See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 864 (2019), quoting

Commonwealth v. Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. 537, 544, cert. denied,

537 U.S. 942 (2002) (Miranda warnings must be provided in

"language which [a defendant] can comprehend and on which [a

defendant] can knowingly act").
                                                                   11

    The Commonwealth knew that the defendant's ability to speak

English was an issue, as evidenced by its direct examination of

Noyes, and thus it had a full opportunity to present whatever

facts it deemed relevant at the motion to suppress hearing.     See

Commonwealth v. Santosuosso, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 310, 314 (1986).

We conclude that the defendant placed the Commonwealth on

sufficient notice of the issue whether proper Miranda warnings

were provided in Spanish following the defendant's arrest.

    Despite our holding that the defendant satisfied the

particularity requirement of rule 13 (a) (2), we take this

opportunity to review this court's previous holding in

Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 389-391 (2010).     In Mubdi,

we held that if the Commonwealth seeks to challenge the

particularity of a defendant's motion to suppress and fails to

file either a motion for a more particularized affidavit or,

alternatively, a motion to deny, without a hearing, the

defendant's motion to suppress for failure to provide fair

notice under rule 13 (a) (2), then the Commonwealth waives any

objection to the particularity requirement of rule 13 (a) (2).

Id. at 390-391.

    Rule 13 (a) (2) serves two practical purposes.      Mubdi, 456

Mass. at 389-390.   It "alerts the judge and the Commonwealth to

the suppression theories at issue, and allows the Commonwealth

to limit its evidence to these theories."   Dew, 478 Mass. at
                                                                  12

309, quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, 440 Mass. 772, 781 (2004).

Sufficient detail in the defendant's motion to suppress and

accompanying affidavit allows the prosecution to receive fair

notice "of the particular search or seizure that the defendant

is challenging, so that the prosecution may determine which

witnesses it should call and what evidence it should offer to

meet its burden of proving" the constitutionality of the

relevant search or seizure.   Mubdi, supra at 389.   The degree of

detail that ultimately is required by rule 13 (a) (2), however,

is evaluated with the rule's two practical purposes in mind.

Id. at 390.

    The practice of placing the burden on the Commonwealth to

challenge the defendant's failure to satisfy the particularity

requirement of rule 13 (a) (2), in order to avoid waiver of the

issue, aligns with neither the rule's two practical purposes,

nor the rule's explicit language, which unambiguously places the

burden for particularity in a motion to suppress on a defendant.

See Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2) ("A pretrial motion shall state

the grounds on which it is based . . . with particularity. . . .

Grounds not stated which reasonably could have been known at the

time a motion is filed shall be deemed to have been waived").

    The purpose of the rule is to provide notice to the judge

and the Commonwealth of what is at issue in the defendant's

motion to suppress, so that the Commonwealth is not forced to
                                                                  13

intuit and predict the multitude of challenges that a defendant

could make to a search or seizure.   See Commonwealth v. Rogers,

444 Mass. 234, 250 n.3 (2005) (Greaney, J., dissenting)

(defendant must state grounds for suppression with particularity

so Commonwealth need not unnecessarily extend length of

suppression hearing by presenting evidence on issues not raised

by defendant).   Therefore, we overturn our previous decision in

Mubdi, and no longer require that the Commonwealth file either a

motion for a more particularized motion to suppress or

affidavit, or alternatively a motion to deny the defendant's

motion to suppress without a hearing, in order to preserve a

challenge to the particularity of a defendant's motion to

suppress.   We caution defense counsel across the Commonwealth

that the burden of compliance with the particularity requirement

of rule 13 (a) (2) falls on the defendant alone, as it had been

prior to this court's decision in Mubdi.   Compare Commonwealth

v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 473-474 & n.12 (2000) (where defendant

did not raise in motion to suppress, or accompanying affidavit,

issue whether search for weapon was outside curtilage of

apartment, such issue was waived), with Commonwealth v. Douglas,

472 Mass. 439, 444 n.5 (2015) (Commonwealth's contention that

motions to suppress should have been dismissed for failure to

comply with particularity requirement of rule 13 [a] [2] was

waived because of Commonwealth's failure to file motion before
                                                                   14

suppression hearing for denial of suppression motions or for

more particularized motions from defendant).   Overbroad and bare

assertions in a motion to suppress will not satisfy the

particularity requirement of rule 13 (a) (2), and absent a

showing of cause, grounds that reasonably could have been known

at the time the motion to suppress was filed and are not stated

with particularity by the defendant will be waived irrespective

of the Commonwealth's failure to file a motion for a more

particularized motion or affidavit.   See Mass. R. Crim. P.

13 (a) (2).

    2.   Defendant's waiver of Miranda warnings.   Where the

defendant did not waive the issue whether Miranda warnings were

properly given in Spanish, we next assess whether the

Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

waived his Miranda rights knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily.   "In reviewing a judge's determination regarding a

valid waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness, we 'accept[]

the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error,

give[] substantial deference to the judge's ultimate findings

and conclusions of law, but independently review[] the

correctness of the judge's application of constitutional

principles to the facts found.'"   Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 435

Mass. 743, 751 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass.

375, 381 n.8 (1995).
                                                                     15

    "In Miranda[ v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)], the United

States Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not use

statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from

custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates

the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the

privilege against self-incrimination" (quotation and citation

omitted).   Vasquez, 482 Mass. at 861-862.   "These procedural

safeguards mandate that an accused must be warned that he or she

'has a right to remain silent, that any statement he [or she]

does make may be used as evidence against him [or her], and that

he [or she] has a right to the presence of an attorney, either

retained or appointed.'"   Id. at 862, quoting Vuthy Seng, 436

Mass. at 543.

    As discussed supra, the Commonwealth bears the particularly

heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his

Miranda rights.   See Tremblay, 480 Mass. at 655.   "In deciding

whether a defendant's waiver of the rights described in the

Miranda warning is valid, 'a court must examine the totality of

the circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused

and the details of the interrogation.'"   Hoyt, 461 Mass. at 153,

quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, 388 Mass. 495, 501 (1983).     "The

question [of waiver] is not one of form, but rather whether the

defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights
                                                                   16

delineated in the Miranda case."   Hoyt, supra, quoting North

Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).

    Here, the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant's waiver of his Miranda

rights was valid because it failed to call Guillermo, the

officer who actually provided Miranda warnings in Spanish to the

defendant.   Unless Miranda warnings are provided in a language

that the defendant actually can comprehend, the defendant cannot

make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda

rights.   See Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. at 544.   Because none of the

officers initially present at the scene of the defendant's

arrest could speak Spanish, the officers were forced to call

Guillermo to the scene.   While the non-Spanish-speaking officers

testified that they heard Guillermo provide the defendant with

Miranda warnings in what appeared to be Spanish, and that the

defendant appeared to understand Guillermo's warnings, none of

this testimony resolved the question; because of their inability

to speak Spanish, none of these witnesses properly could testify

to the content of the Miranda warnings given.   Cf. Commonwealth

v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 256 (1991) (where officer who did not

understand Spanish testified that Spanish-speaking officer had

properly administered to defendant Miranda rights in Spanish,

any argument against such practice was of "no consequence" where
                                                                 17

ample additional evidence independently corroborated defendant's

receipt and understanding of Miranda rights in Spanish).

     A translation of Miranda warnings need not be "word for

word," Vasquez, 482 Mass. at 864, and a defendant has an

opportunity to discredit the translation of Miranda warnings, or

alternatively to discredit the interpreter who provided such

warnings, in order to demonstrate the lack of a knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her Miranda rights.

See Commonwealth v. Ardon, 428 Mass. 496, 500 (1998).    The

Commonwealth's shortcomings in deciding not to call Guillermo,

and instead choosing to rely only on the testimony of other

officers with no ability to speak Spanish, render the evidence

insufficient for us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

complete and accurate Miranda warnings were provided to the

defendant in Spanish, and that the defendant knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights.9    Cf. Perez,

411 Mass. at 255-256 (Commonwealth demonstrated valid Miranda

waiver beyond reasonable doubt where judge could verify complete

and accurate Miranda warnings were provided in Spanish because

     9 Guillermo testified at trial that he had been speaking
Spanish for thirty-five years and did not struggle with
translating the Miranda warnings to Spanish. This does not
alter our conclusion, however, because when reviewing the denial
of the defendant's motion to suppress, we review only the
evidence presented to the motion judge, not evidence adduced at
trial. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 441 Mass. 358, 367 (2004).
                                                                  18

defendant was given cards on which such warnings were printed,

defendant indicated understanding of what he read on cards, and

judge independently could verify that warnings on cards were

complete and accurate Miranda warnings in Spanish).   Therefore,

the admission of the defendant's incriminating postarrest

statements was erroneous.

    Where the Commonwealth introduced the defendant's

statements at trial, in violation of his constitutional rights,

we must examine whether the erroneous admission was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.   See Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447

Mass. 546, 552 (2006).   Such review "requires us to consider,

among other factors:

    '[1] the importance of the evidence in the prosecution's
    case; [2] the relationship between the evidence and the
    premise of the defense; [3] who introduced the issue at
    trial; [4] the frequency of the reference; [5] whether the
    erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of
    properly admitted evidence; [6] the availability or effect
    of curative instructions; and [7] the weight or quantum of
    evidence of guilt.'"

Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 467-468 (2018), quoting

Dagraca, supra at 553.

    "In short, we analyze the case to see whether the error

might have had an effect on the jury or contributed to the

verdicts, and whether the Commonwealth's evidence was '"merely

cumulative" of evidence properly before the jury,' Commonwealth

v. Sinnott, [399 Mass. 863, 872 n.8 (1987),] or was overwhelming
                                                                     19

without the erroneously admitted evidence."     Dagraca, 447 Mass.

at 553, citing Perez, 411 Mass. at 260.

    Among the elements required to sustain a conviction under

G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), the Commonwealth was required to prove

that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.     See

Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 489 Mass. 292, 298 (2022).     See also

Commonwealth v. White, 452 Mass. 133, 136 (2008).     According to

the trial testimony, the defendant, following his arrest at the

scene, admitted to officers that he did not possess a license to

carry the firearm and, more importantly, that he was trying to

hide the firearm.     In its closing, the Commonwealth emphasized

the importance of the defendant's incriminating statements

because of the defendant's "interesting turn of phrase," i.e.,

that he was trying to "hide" the firearm.     The Commonwealth

argued in closing that the defendant's intent to hide the

firearm was important evidence of his knowledge and possession

of the firearm.     Where the defendant's statements were not

cumulative of other evidence presented, and the evidence of the

defendant's knowing possession of the firearm was not

overwhelming without the admission of the defendant's

incriminating statements, the erroneous admission of the

defendant's statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.   See Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 473-474

(2015) (admission of defendant's involuntary statements not
                                                                  20

harmless beyond reasonable doubt where defendant's admission to

possessing knife limited defense counsel's strategy, boosted

victims' credibility, and served as prominent part of

Commonwealth's case that defendant assaulted three teenage

victims at knifepoint).

    Conclusion.   Accordingly, because the admission of the

defendant's postarrest statements was error, the judgment is

vacated and the verdict is set aside.

                                   So ordered.