Court Opinion

ID: 9715281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:59:22.230331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:33.195714
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the majority opinion as to Part II insofar as it absolves Sherman from negligence liability. The design of the bar did not create a condition of imminent danger. As to JD & M, however, the majority implies that the product itself was not defective. I do agree that the contractor’s work was not defective. I do not agree, however, that the plans and therefore the product itself were free from defect. In any event, I agree that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment for both defendants as to the negligence claim.
I have more basic disagreement with Part I. In my view, the product was in a “defective condition” when it left the designer’s drawing board. By that very design, the unknown but anticipated user could not gain access to his or her work station without assuming the unnatural stooping posture and virtually crawling or duck-walking through the tunnel-like configuration. Until actually seeing and using the product, the unknown prospective user could not be anticipated to have a contemplation that such contortions would be necessary for the performance of the employment duties.
However, the second prong of the liability test, i.e., the “unreasonably dangerous” element saves the designer in this case. Admittedly, our case may not be decided upon application of the “open and obvious danger” rule. That rule was abrogated in Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co. (1990) Ind., 551 N.E.2d 437. Nevertheless, consideration of Hamilton’s conduct in the light of the circumstances remains relevant to resolution of the issues before us.
One day after the Koske decision, our Supreme Court in FMC Corporation v. Brown (1990) Ind., 551 N.E.2d 444 observed that the open and obvious rule “bears a close relationship” to the affirmative defense of incurred risk. 551 N.E.2d at 449. That observation carries with it the implication that although the concepts are related, they are not one and the same. Accordingly, it is not necessarily inappropriate to say that while the open and obvious doctrine is not applicable in a strict liability suit, the doctrine of incurred risk may, under some circumstances, be applied.
Also subsequent to Koske, but only three weeks later, in Miller v. Todd (1990) Ind., 551 N.E.2d 1139, the court held that “the relative obviousness of a defect is certainly pertinent to determining whether a product is ... unreasonably dangerous” 551 N.E.2d at 1143.
In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Gregg (1990) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 554 N.E.2d 1145, trans. pending, obviousness was also found to be “an appropriate consideration ... in evaluating the actual state of mind of the product user when the affirmative defense of incurred risk is raised.” 554 N.E.2d at 1151. Assuming that injuries have been caused by a product, the defense of incurred risk requires the defendant to prove two things: (1) plaintiff’s knowledge of the defect, and (2) plaintiff’s unreasonable use of the product despite that knowledge. Moore v. Sitzmark Corp. (1990) 1st Dist., Ind.App., 555 N.E.2d 1305. The statute itself, I.C. 33-1-1.5-4(b)(1) provides:
“It is a defense that the user or consumer bringing the action knew of the defect and was aware of the danger and nevertheless proceeded unreasonably to make use of the product and was injured by it.”
The first element is clearly present in this case. The second element is absent, however. To be sure, Hamilton was unmistakably aware of the defect and of the danger. She had entered and exited the bar on numerous occasions and had bumped her head on several such occasions. She had cautioned other employees about the danger. Hamilton, however did not proceed to unreasonably use the bar. The manner of her use was not unreasonable because if the product were to be used at all, it had to be used in the precise manner in which it was used at the time of *1141her injury. It was a matter of use or do not use. The choices do not equate with “unreasonable use”.
On the other hand, if we were to discount the “reasonableness” of Hamilton’s use and focus merely upon the voluntariness of the use, a different result might obtain. Restatement of Torts, 2d § 496 E, Comment b, observes that acceptance of a risk is voluntary even though plaintiff is acting under the compulsion of circumstances not of the defendant’s making. Under such analysis, a plaintiff driven by his own economic necessities is nevertheless bound to the conscious and voluntary undertaking of the risk.
In this regard, the choices available to Hamilton differ from those available to the assistant fire chief plaintiff in City of Alexandria v. Allen (1990) 2nd Dist., Ind.App., 552 N.E.2d 488. There, albeit in a negligence setting, we affirmed a jury verdict for plaintiff holding that the choice of a fireman to answer an emergency fire run using equipment known by him to be defective is not truly voluntary. We there relied upon a quote from an earlier Supreme Court case, Ridgeway v. Yenny (1944) 223 Ind. 16, 22, 57 N.E.2d 581, 583:
“... if continuance of exposure to the danger is the result of influence, circumstances, or surroundings, which are a real inducement to continue, the doctrine [of incurred risk] does not apply, since the exposure is not in a true sense voluntary.”
Whether or not the considerations deemed important in City of Alexandria undercut the above-stated rationale of the Restatement, the choices available to Hamilton do not bring into play the saving “tough choice” public policy underpinning of City of Alexandria.1 In any event, my concurrence does not depend upon whether or not Hamilton incurred the risk.
As earlier discussed, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Gregg, supra, held that obviousness of a defect was germane to the defense of incurred risk. The case also held, as did Miller v. Todd, supra, that obviousness could be considered as it relates to whether the product is “unreasonably dangerous”. 554 N.E.2d at 1164.
In Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1990) 2nd Dist., Ind.App., 557 N.E.2d 1045, trans. pending, we held: “... a product is not unreasonably dangerous if it injures in a way which, by objective measure, is known to the community of persons [using] the product.” 557 N.E.2d at 1053. In the case before us, by objective measure, the community of persons using the bar, and more particularly Hamilton, knew that it would likely injure in the precise way the injury here was sustained, i.e., in raising up, she struck her back and was caused to fall. The obviousness of the danger therefore triggers the necessity to view Hamilton’s conduct and use of the product in the light of her knowledge.
We observed in Jarrell v. Monsanto Co. (1988) 2nd Dist.Ind.App., 528 N.E.2d 1158, trans. denied, that whether or not the product contains a defect focuses upon the product itself at the time it leaves the hands of the defendant. 528 N.E.2d at 1167. Whether the product is unreasonably dangerous, however, focuses upon the reasonableness of the consumer’s conduct in his use of the product, and in light of his awareness of a defect and danger. 528 N.E.2d at 1168. Although the product may be considered somewhat dangerous in view of a particular defect, that defect may not be unreasonably dangerous if the user has full awareness of the defect and the likelihood of injury.
In the vast majority of cases, whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is a question of fact inappropriate for summary judgment. Where, as here, however, no reasonable trier of fact could differ as to the determination, it may be held as a matter of law that the product was not unreasonably dangerous. I would so hold in this instance and for that reason concur *1142in the affirmance of the summary judgments for both defendants.

. Where, as here, the risk of injury is minimal and the utility of continuing use of the product is relatively great, it may be said that the plain-565 N.E.2d — 26 tiff voluntarily accepts a known reasonable risk. Kroger Co. v. Haun (1978) 2nd Dist., Ind.App., 379 N.E.2d 1004 at 1012.