Court Opinion

ID: 9786780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:02:32.554104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:48.600589
License: Public Domain

Maupin, C. J.,
with whom Agosti and Leavitt, JJ., agree,
dissenting:
In my view, the district court’s determination that Allan’s post-arrest statements to police were voluntary was supported by substantial evidence.
As noted by the majority, a confession is involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution only if the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will was overborne by police coercion.1 Under our decision in Steese v. State,2 we must analyze the voluntariness of a confession in terms of the “totality of circumstances” surrounding the interrogation. In this, we consider such factors including the youth, education and intelligence of the accused, the length of detention and the duration of questioning, and the use of physical abuse such as the deprivation of food or sleep.3 Here, there was no indication that Allan had been deprived of food or sleep during the interrogation process, and his statement does not demonstrate a marked lack of intellect or education. That he was aware of his right to counsel and gave his correct social security number also supports the district court’s ruling insofar as it might relate to Allan’s claim that his will was overborne secondary to intoxication or otherwise. Finally, the fact that Allan had gone without sleep for a considerable period of time due to his ingestion of methamphetamine is not of itself fatal to the district court’s conclusion that the statements, although taken in violation of Miranda, were voluntary.
As I see it, the district court made its voluntariness determination based upon a legitimate interpretation of the videotape, which *27depicts the interchange between Allan and Officer Canfield. I therefore conclude that the district court, in its ruling that Allan’s statement was admissible for impeachment purposes, did not improperly affect his right to testify.

 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); see also Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 214, 735 P.2d 321, 323 (1987).

 114 Nev. 479, 960 P.2d 321 (1998).

 Id. at 488, 960 P.2d at 327.