Court Opinion

ID: 9945092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 01:00:36.567943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:21.805440
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50108           Document: 70-1         Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/26/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                    Fifth Circuit

                                                                                  FILED
                                   No. 23-50108                            February 26, 2024
                                  ____________
                                                                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                  Clerk
Stanley Mason,

                                                                 PlaintiffAppellant,

                                         versus

City of Waco; Ryan Holt, Former Acting Chief and Former Chief of
The City of Waco Police,

                                           DefendantsAppellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 6:20-CV-844
                  ______________________________

Before Wiener, Haynes, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
       Plaintiff-Appellant Stanley Mason appeals the district courts grant
of the defendants motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth
below, we AFFIRM.

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-50108          Document: 70-1        Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/26/2024

                                    No. 23-50108

                 I.    Factual and Procedural Background
      Mason served as a police officer in the Waco Police Department
(Department) for approximately 25 years, until he resigned in 2019. In
2016, Mason began posting a Facebook Live broadcast, which eventually
evolved into a radio blog called Behind the Blue Curtain. His broadcasts
covered a range of topics including issues related to policing.
      In July 2016, another officer employed by the Department complained
that Mason had posted a video online in which Mason called police officers
executioners while wearing his uniform. Then-Assistant Police Chief
Ryan Holt1 called for an investigation. The investigation determined that the
complaints were unfounded and that Mason had not committed any
wrongdoing. Mason was not sanctioned or disciplined as a result. In total,
Mason complains of three inquiries conducted by the Department into his
conduct, but there is no evidence that any of them led to any findings of
wrongdoing or sanctions against Mason.
       Mason also stated in a sworn affidavit that he experienced slow back
up responses from the time [he] began [his] broadcasts. He points to one
specific incident in October 2018, when he responded to a domestic violence
call and had to wait down the street from the reported location of the offense
for more than 30 minutes before his backup arrived.
        Lastly, Mason complains that an officer with the Department failed to
timely report that an arrestee had threatened Masons life. Holt learned
about this incident during a February 2019 phone call with Mason. Holt
testified that he immediately began an investigation, which resulted in the

       _____________________
       1
         Holt served as Assistant Police Chief of the Department from 2008 until he was
promoted to Chief of Police in January 2017. He served as Chief of Police from January
2017 until February 2020.

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                                 No. 23-50108

officer apologizing for forgetting to report the threat. The Department took
corrective action against that officer.
       More than a year after resigning from the Department, Mason filed
suit against the City of Waco and Holt. Mason asserted claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Both parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate
judge. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
magistrate judge granted in full.
               II.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
       The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. With both parties consent, the district court referred this case to a
magistrate judge to conduct the proceedings and enter final judgment, in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
73. We have appellate jurisdiction over the magistrate judges grant of
summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 73(c) (In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), an appeal from a
judgment entered at a magistrate judges direction may be taken to the court
of appeals as would any other appeal from a district-court judgment.); see
also Trufant v. Autocon, Inc., 729 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1984).
       We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
reasonable inferences in that partys favor. Pierce v. Dept of the U.S. Air
Force, 512 F.3d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2007) (italics adjusted). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact
exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

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                                   No. 23-50108

for the non-moving party. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328
(5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).
                            III.    Discussion
       On appeal, Mason raises two issues: (1) [w]hether the Magistrate
erred in granting summary judgment on an admittedly poorly pleaded case
when the court had other options, and (2) [w]hether properly citing the
lengthy record would have revealed genuine issues of material fact.
       As a preliminary matter, we note that the party opposing summary
judgmenthere, Masonhas the burden to identify specific evidence in
the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence
supports his . . . claim. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458
(5th Cir. 1998). But Mason concedes in his briefing before us that his
response to the defendants summary judgment motion failed to make
adequate references to a lengthy appendix. He also admits that his
shortcoming and frailty here is . . . a failure to adequately identify
[evidence]. It was not the magistrate judges duty to sift through the
record in search of evidence to support [Masons] opposition to summary
judgment. See id. (quotation omitted). We therefore cannot agree with
Masons argument that the magistrate judges alleged failure to do so
constitutes error. Nor will we permit Mason to use his briefs in this forum
as a substitute memorandum in opposition to the defendants motion for
summary judgment below. See Lewis v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., No. 22-
10758, 2023 WL 2810881, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2023) (per curiam).
       Masons briefing before us does not discuss the alleged Fourth or
Fourteenth Amendment violations, so he has waived those claims. See
United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(It has long been the rule in this circuit that any issues not briefed on appeal
are waived.). We therefore focus this analysis exclusively on Masons First

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Amendment retaliation claim. We conclude that no reasonable jury could
have found that Masons First Amendment rights were violated, based on
the facts as referenced by both parties in their summary judgment briefing
before the magistrate judge. As such, his claims against both defendants fail.
   A. First Amendment
       To succeed in a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, a
public employee must show: (1) he suffered an adverse employment action;
(2) he spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern; (3) his interest in the
speech outweighs the governments interest in the efficient provision of
public services; and (4) the speech precipitated the adverse employment
action. Wilson v. Tregre, 787 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Masons claim fails at the first
element.
       Mason does not allege that he was fired, demoted, reprimanded, or
sanctioned in any way. Rather, Mason argues that his voluntary resignation
from the Department qualifies as constructive discharge.
      We have previously recognized that constructive discharge may be
an appropriate basis for a [§] 1983 action. Kline v. N. Tex. State Univ., 782
F.2d 1229, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986). To establish constructive discharge, a
plaintiff must offer evidence that the employer made the employees
working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel
compelled to resign. Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch. Dist., 549 F.3d 985, 991
(5th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
       Mason argues that the three inquiries into his conduct, one belatedly
reported death threat, and one instance of delayed backup combined to create
an environment so intolerable that any reasonable officer would have
resigned. We disagree. Mason cites no cases that show Holts July 2016
investigation into Masons videoin which Mason wore his police uniform

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                                      No. 23-50108

while commenting on matters related to the Departmentwould be
improper. More importantly, none of the inquiries that Mason complains of
resulted in any sanctions or negative action taken against him, and
investigations alone are not adverse employment actions. See Benningfield v.
City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376 (5th Cir. 1998). Mason also failed to
provide evidence of any time in which slow back up responses put him at risk.
Regarding the October 2018 incident, the evidence shows that Mason waited
down the street for backup to arrive, did not respond to the call alone, and
was never in any danger. The evidence presented also shows that one officer
was dispatched to back up Mason, but then proceeded to another call
involving his direct supervisor. So, a third officer then filled in to back up
Mason. The notion that the everyday difficulties in being a police officer,
standing alone, constitute a constructive discharge is without support.
       Lastly, Holt immediately initiated an investigation upon learning
about the untimely death threat, which resulted in the Department taking
corrective action against the offending officer. A mistake made by a colleague
in the police station who is then sanctioned is not reasonably viewed as a
constructive discharge.
        A reasonable jury could not conclude that these events collectively
created an environment so intolerable that a reasonable police officer in
Masons position would have felt compelled to resign.2 See Stover, 549 F.3d
at 991. As such, no genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether
Mason suffered an adverse employment action, so Masons First
Amendment claim fails.

        _____________________
        2
          Because we reach this conclusion, we need not assess whether any individual acts
are time barred.

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                                 No. 23-50108

   B. Defendant Holt
        Holt asserted a defense of qualified immunity, so the burden shifted
to Mason to raise a genuine and material dispute as to whether [Holt] is
entitled to qualified immunity. See Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376 (5th
Cir. 2015). Holt is entitled to qualified immunity unless Mason can raise a
fact issue showing (1) Holt violated constitutional law, and (2) the right at
issue was clearly established at the time of Holts alleged misconduct. See
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
       As detailed in the previous section, Mason has failed to raise any fact
issues that support a First Amendment constitutional violation. We thus
need not reach the clearly established prong. See id. at 236. Holt is
entitled to qualified immunity, and summary judgment on Masons claims
against him was proper.
   C. Defendant City of Waco
        To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a party must show that
(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was
the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right. Peterson v.
City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009). We have stated time
and again that without an underlying constitutional violation, an essential
element of municipal liability is missing. Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty.
Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 86667 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Because Mason has failed to raise a fact issue supporting a First Amendment
violation, he has failed to establish municipal liability, so summary judgment
on Masons claims against the City of Waco was proper.

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                        IV.    Conclusion
       For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on all of Masons claims. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM.

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