Court Opinion

ID: 9396654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 15:01:11.476744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.694862
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 1, 2022               Decided May 23, 2023

                        No. 22-7004

                     TERRI D. WRIGHT,
                        APPELLANT

                             v.

 EUGENE & AGNES E. MEYER FOUNDATION AND NICOLA O.
                     GOREN,
                    APPELLEES

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Columbia
                    (No. 1:20-cv-02471)

    Derek S. Sells argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant.

     Alison N. Davis argued the cause for appellees. With her
on the brief was Anna M. Sheridan.

    Before: MILLETT, WILKINS and WALKER, Circuit Judges.

    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

    Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALKER.
                                2
     WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Dr. Terri Wright is the
former Vice President of Program and Community of the
Eugene and Agnes E. Meyer Foundation, a non-profit that
promotes social and racial equity in the Washington D.C. area.
In that role, Wright was responsible for the Foundation’s
community engagement efforts, grant-making, and collective
action strategy. She received largely positive feedback during
her tenure, but less than two years after she was hired, the CEO
of the Foundation, Nicola Goren, fired her for purported
interpersonal and communication-related issues. Wright, who
is African-American, believes these stated reasons were pretext
to mask discriminatory animus. Seeking to avoid litigation,
Wright and the Foundation signed a severance agreement,
under which Wright agreed to release employment-related
claims against the Foundation and its employees, and which
contained a mutual non-disparagement clause. But roughly a
month after Wright was fired, Goren told another leader in the
non-profit space that Wright was let go because she was
“toxic,” created a “negative environment,” and that two-thirds
of the Foundation staff would have quit if Wright had stayed.

     Wright sued the Foundation and Goren for breaching the
severance agreement, for doing so in a racially discriminatory
manner in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and for defaming her.
The District Court dismissed all three claims. It first found that
the non-disparagement clause obligated the Foundation only to
direct its employees not to disparage Wright, leaving the
Foundation and its officers and employees free to in fact
disparage her. Second, and as a result, the District Court found
that Wright’s § 1981 claim failed because it was based on a
breach of the severance agreement. Lastly, the District Court
found that Goren’s statements were protected by the common
interest privilege, as they were made in her capacity as the
Chair of the Board of a separate non-profit organization to the
CEO of that organization.
                                3
     We hold that the District Court erred in dismissing all three
claims. As to Wright’s breach of contract claim, the non-
disparagement clause could reasonably be interpreted to
preclude the Foundation from disparaging Wright, and
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is
therefore inappropriate. As to her § 1981 claim, we find that
she has plausibly alleged a prima facie case that the
Foundation, through Goren, breached the severance agreement
due to racial animus. And lastly, because Wright has plausibly
alleged that Goren’s statements were made with reckless
disregard for the truth and for discriminatory reasons, they are
not protected by the common interest privilege, which requires
a showing of good faith on the part of the speaker.

                                I.

     The following facts are taken from Wright’s complaint and
materials incorporated by reference. At the motion-to-dismiss
stage, we accept as true the complaint’s non-conclusory
allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

     The Eugene and Agnes E. Meyer Foundation is a grant-
making philanthropic organization that operates in the broader
Washington D.C. area. Among other causes, the Foundation
funds projects aimed at addressing issues of racial inequity. At
all relevant times during this dispute, Nicola Goren was the
President and CEO of the Foundation.

     Dr. Terri Wright has held a variety of leadership positions
in the public, private, and non-profit sectors, working on issues
of racial and social equity. In February 2018, Goren hired
Wright as the Vice President of Program and Community at the
Foundation. In that role, Wright oversaw the Foundation’s
“programs and community engagement efforts,” including its
strategy for “grant making, capacity building, collective action
and advocacy.” J.A. 81 (Compl. ¶ 17). During her first year at
                                4
the Foundation, Wright “excelled,” “spearheaded significant
initiatives,” and, at the end of 2018, “received a favorable
performance evaluation from . . . Goren,” as well as a raise.
J.A. 82–83 (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23–24).

     At the same time, Goren criticized Wright for her
“interpersonal skills and communication issues,” feedback she
had not received from anyone else at the organization. J.A. 84
(Compl. ¶ 25). Wright alleges that this criticism “was a mere
pretext to mask [Goren’s] discriminatory animus.” J.A. 84
(Compl. ¶ 26). Nevertheless, Wright worked to improve in
these areas, and during a mid-2019 check-in, Goren remarked
that “Terri has been working on her communication and
relationship with her team and . . . things feel less charged than
at the end of last year.” J.A. 84–85 (Compl. ¶ 28). During the
June 2019 Board meeting, Wright’s presentation to the Board
“received great praise.” J.A. 85 (Compl. ¶ 29).

     Beyond the particulars of her own employment, Wright’s
complaint describes a general culture of racial inequity at the
Foundation. In 2017, during a round of internal company
discussions about racial equity within the workplace, “several
employees of color shared their own concerns and experiences
regarding race issues within the . . . Foundation.” J.A. 75
(Compl. at 2). Subsequently, many employees “felt that their
concerns went disregarded,” a “sentiment . . . further reflected
in the internal surveys staff were requested to complete in
2018.” Id.

     On October 1, 2019, “[w]ithout any notice, warnings or an
opportunity to have any discussions regarding her
termination,” Goren terminated Wright. J.A. 85 (Compl. ¶ 31),
206 (Severance Agreement). Wright alleges that Goren’s
professed concerns about her interpersonal and communication
skills were “pre-textual.” Id. at 85 (Compl. ¶ 31). But “seeking
                              5
to avoid litigation over potential claims . . . regarding the
termination,” Wright and the Foundation entered into a
severance agreement (the “Severance Agreement” or
“Agreement”), which lies at the heart of the current dispute.
J.A. 86 (Compl. ¶ 33). That Agreement contained the
following clause:

       Mutual Non-Disparagement. You agree that
       you have not made, and will not make, any
       false, disparaging or derogatory statements to
       any person or entity, including any media outlet,
       industry group or financial institution,
       regarding the Foundation or any of the other
       Releasees, or about the Foundation’s business
       affairs and/or financial conditions; provided,
       however, that nothing herein prevents you from
       making       truthful     disclosures to     any
       governmental entity or in any litigation or
       arbitration. Likewise, the Foundation will direct
       those officers, directors, and employees with
       direct knowledge of this revised letter
       agreement not to make any false, disparaging or
       derogatory statements to any person or entity
       regarding you; provided, however, that nothing
       herein prevents such individuals from making
       truthful disclosures to any governmental entity
       in litigation or arbitration.

J.A. 208 (emphases in original). The Agreement was signed
by Wright and Goren and constituted “a binding agreement
with the Foundation.” J.A. 206, 28–29. The Agreement also
contained a broad “Release of Claims” clause, under which
Wright agreed to forfeit “any and all claims arising out of or
relating to [her] employment with and/or separation from the
Foundation . . . .” J.A. 26.
                                6
     In November 2019, roughly a month after Wright’s
termination, Goren was at an offsite meeting in her capacity as
the Chair of the Board of the Washington Regional Association
of Grantmakers (“WRAG”). There, she met with Dr. Madye
Henson, who was at the time President and CEO of WRAG.
During that meeting, “Goren complained that she was feeling
backlash from abruptly terminating Dr. Wright,” and in
response, “Henson shared that many leaders in the community
[were] questioning her decision and believe[d] that” the
decision was “discriminatorily motivated.” J.A. 86–87
(Compl. ¶ 36). “Goren acknowledged that she sensed this was
the perception but claimed that she had no option” because
Wright was “toxic,” fostered a “negative climate” at the
Foundation, and “had to be fired or two-thirds of the staff
would leave.” J.A. 87 (Compl. ¶ 37). Since that time, Henson
has sued WRAG, Goren, and others for racial discrimination
and retaliation.

     Based on Goren’s statements to Henson, Wright brings
three claims in this lawsuit: first, that Goren and the
Foundation discriminated against her on the basis of race in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; second, that Goren defamed her;
and third, that Goren and the Foundation breached the non-
disparagement clause of the Severance Agreement.

     The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim. Wright timely appealed the dismissal of all three
claims.

                                II.

    This Court reviews a district court’s decision granting a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. W. Org.
of Res. Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234, 1240 (D.C. Cir.
2018). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
                                7
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”’ Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). In conducting our analysis, we “must treat the
complaint’s factual allegations as true, and must grant [the]
plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged.” W. Org. of Res. Councils, 892 F.3d at 1240–
41 (quoting Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111,
1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). We also may consider “any documents
either attached to or incorporated in the complaint,” such as the
Severance Agreement here. N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977
F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

                               A.

    We begin with Wright’s breach of contract claim.

     By its terms, the Severance Agreement is governed by
D.C. law, and neither party argues otherwise. Accordingly, we
must “first . . . determine what a reasonable person in the
position of the parties would have thought the disputed
language meant.” Debnam v. Crane Co., 976 A.2d 193, 197
(D.C. 2009). In doing so, “a reasonable person is: (1) presumed
to know all the circumstances surrounding the contract’s
making; and (2) bound by usages of the terms which either
party knows or has reason to know.” Akassy v. William Penn
Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 891 A.2d 291, 299 (D.C. 2006). The
“reasonable person standard is applied both to the
circumstances surrounding the contract and the course of
conduct of the parties under the contract.” Id. And while
extrinsic evidence “may not be relied upon to show the
subjective intent of the parties absent ambiguity in the
contract’s language,” it “may be considered to determine the
circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, so that
it may be ascertained what a reasonable person in the position
of the parties would have thought the words meant.” Nest &
                                8
Totah Venture, LLC v. Deutsch, 31 A.3d 1211, 1227 (D.C.
2011).

     Where a contract is unambiguous, the court’s task is to
determine “the best objective manifestation of the parties’
intent.” Debnam, 976 A.2d at 197. But where “a contract is
reasonably or fairly susceptible to different constructions or
interpretations, . . . the provisions of the contract are
ambiguous, [and] the correct interpretation becomes a question
for a factfinder.” Id. at 197–98; see also id. at 200 (reversing
grant of summary judgment where a contract provision “could
reasonably be read as having more than one reasonable
interpretation”).

     Here, the parties dispute the meaning of the Severance
Agreement’s non-disparagement clause. The crux of Wright’s
claim is that implicit in the Foundation’s promise to “direct”
certain officers, directors, and employees to not disparage her
was a promise that the Foundation itself would also not
disparage her, at least through the statements of its CEO and
President who signed the Agreement. Thus, Wright argues, the
Foundation breached the Severance Agreement when Goren
disparaged her in her conversation with Dr. Henson. In
Defendants’ view, the Foundation’s duty began and ended with
its promise to “direct” its employees; neither the Foundation,
nor its directors or any other employee, had a corresponding or
continuing duty to not disparage Wright.

     We find that the Severance Agreement, read as a whole, is
ambiguous and reasonably capable of Wright’s interpretation.
We start with the plain language of the contract, which contains
three textual clues suggesting some symmetry between the
parties’ obligations to one another. First, the relevant clause in
the Severance Agreement is titled “Mutual Non-
Disparagement.” J.A. 208 (emphasis added). Second, the
                                9
contract language connects the parties’ duties with the term
“Likewise”: “You [(Dr. Wright)] agree that you have not made,
and will not make, any false, disparaging or derogatory
statements. . . . Likewise, the Foundation will direct . . . .” Id.
(emphasis added). Wright, for her part, is obligated under the
non-disparagement clause to not make disparaging statements
about the Foundation or certain employees. Third, the
“provided, however” clause directly contradicts the
Foundation’s assertion that its officers, directors, and
employees had no duty not to disparage Wright. That provision
grants the Foundation’s personnel the limited ability to
disparage Wright as part of litigation or arbitration
proceedings. J.A. 208 (“provided, however, that nothing
herein prevents such individuals from making truthful
disclosures to any governmental entity in litigation or
arbitration[]”). But if the contract’s sole obligation on the
Foundation and its personnel was for an anti-disparagement
directive to issue—and no one’s negative speech about Wright
was contractually curtailed—then this carve out is pointless
and serves no purpose. Courts, however, cannot read one part
of a contractual clause to render the next sentence a nullity. See
Abdelrhman v. Ackerman, 76 A.3d 883, 891 (D.C. 2013)
(“When interpreting a contract, we ‘strive to give reasonable
effect to all its parts and eschew an interpretation that would
render part of it meaningless or incompatible with the contract
as a whole.’”) (quoting District of Columbia v. Young, 39 A.3d
36, 40 (D.C. 2012)); Cap. City Mortg. Corp. v. Habana Vill.
Art & Folklore, Inc., 747 A.2d 564, 569 (D.C. 2000) (“The
court construing a contract cannot ignore a contract term; each
provision must be given meaning if at all possible.”).

    Reading the contract as a whole, a reasonable person in the
position of the parties could very well understand the terms
“Mutual” and “Likewise,” and the “provided, however” clause,
to mean that the Foundation has some corresponding duty to
                                  10
not disparage Wright, even if that duty extends only to the
actions of certain individuals who exert significant control
over, or speak on behalf of, the Foundation such as the Board
or the CEO. Cf. Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 578
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that a reasonable jury could find
employer vicariously liable for discriminatory statements made
by an employee’s supervisors). 1

     Certain allegations related to the parties’ negotiations also
suggest that this interpretation is reasonable. Because of
Goren’s previous criticism of Wright’s interpersonal skills,
which are detailed in the complaint, the non-disparagement
clause was “[c]ritically important” to Wright. J.A. 86 (Compl.
¶ 33). With that background, it would make little sense if the
mutual non-disparagement clause permitted the Foundation,
acting through the very person who signed the contract, who
fired Wright assertedly based on criticisms of her professional
skills, and who controlled the Foundation to a significant
extent, to freely disparage Wright.

     To be sure, Defendants’ and our dissenting colleague’s
more narrow interpretation of the contractual language is not
untenable. However, it focuses exclusively on the phrase “will
direct,” while omitting the words “Mutual,” “Likewise,” 2 and

1
  We are not concerned that reading the contract this way would
limitlessly “police the on-duty and off-duty speech” of the
Foundation’s employees, including “discussions at the dinner table.”
See Dissenting Op. at 3–4. The alleged conduct here lay not at the
outermost boundaries of what the Foundation plausibly promised but
was instead much closer to its core.
2
  Our dissenting colleague proffers an alternate explanation for the
presence of the terms “mutual” and “likewise” (though not the
“provided, however” clause). Dissenting Op. at 4–5. But that does
not dispute the plausibility of our plain-text reading of the contract,
read as a whole. To be clear, we maintain only that the contract is
                                 11
“provided, however,” from its analysis of the contract’s
meaning. Contracts must be “construed in harmony with the
plain and generally accepted meaning of the words used, with
reference to all of the agreement’s provisions.” 11 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 30:5 (4th ed. May 2022 update); Steele
Founds., Inc. v. Clark Constr. Grp., Inc., 937 A.2d 148, 154
(D.C. 2007) (“Contractual provisions are interpreted taking
into account the contract as a whole, so as to give effect, if
possible, to all of the provisions in the contract.”); Davis v.
Chevy Chase Fin., Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(applying the contract law “credo[]” that “every word in an
agreement should be given meaning”); Guardsmark, LLC v.
NLRB, 475 F.3d 369, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (statutory
interpretation case citing Davis for the same proposition).

     Beyond the contractual language, a simple hypothetical
further reveals why we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that
Defendants’ interpretation of the non-disparagement clause is
the only reasonable one. Imagine if, after signing the
Agreement, a director at the Foundation sent an email to all of
its employees as well as its Board directing them not to make
false, disparaging, or derogatory statements about Dr. Wright.
Then, only minutes later, the Board and the CEO go on to
release a public statement disparaging Dr. Wright. Under
Defendants’ theory, the Foundation would have upheld its end
of the bargain under the express terms of the contract (as
counsel represented at argument). Oral Arg. Tr. at 12:21–
13:18. In our view, however, a factfinder could find such a
reading unreasonable. And while counsel for Defendants did
clarify that under such circumstances, Wright may have a
separate claim under a distinct, fraud-based theory, that
concession does not persuade us that the only reasonable

reasonably capable of Wright’s interpretation at this juncture; we do
not purport to definitively resolve its meaning.
                               12
reading of the Severance Agreement places such a claim
beyond the scope of a straightforward contractual breach. Id.
at 20:18–21:8.

     As a final matter, the complaint does not specify whether
Wright seeks to pursue a breach of contract claim against the
Foundation only, or against Goren as well. To the extent she
seeks the latter, we find that Goren cannot be held personally
liable for breach of contract, because she was not a party to the
contract and therefore was not bound by it. EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002); accord 12 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 35:66 (4th ed. May 2022 update) (“[I]t is
fundamental that an officer of a corporation is not individually
bound when contracting as an agent of the corporation within
the scope of employment, at least when the corporate principal
is disclosed and when the contract does not on its face disclose
an intention by the agent to be personally bound.”).
Accordingly, the breach of contract claim survives only as to
the Foundation, and any claim against Goren is dismissed.

     Whether or not Wright will ultimately be able to prove that
her interpretation is the best reading of the contract remains to
be seen. However, we conclude that a reasonable person could
find the Severance Agreement susceptible to either of the
meanings offered by the parties, and dismissal at this early
juncture is therefore unwarranted. Wright has plausibly
alleged that the Foundation breached its duty to her when its
then-CEO and President disparaged her a month after signing
the Severance Agreement on its behalf.

                               B.

     Having found that Wright has successfully stated a claim
for breach of contract, we turn to her § 1981 claim.
                                13
     “Section 1981 protects the right ‘to make and enforce
contracts’ free from racial discrimination.” Nanko Shipping,
USA v. Alcoa, Inc., 850 F.3d 461, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). “To prevail, a plaintiff must initially
plead . . . that, but for race, [she] would not have suffered the
loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n
of African American-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019
(2020).

     “[T]he pleading standards under section 1981 track those
in the familiar McDonnell Douglas rubric for alleging a prima
facie case of purposeful employment discrimination.” Nanko
Shipping, 850 F.3d at 467. To plead a prima facie case under
that framework, “a plaintiff without direct evidence of
discrimination as it relates to contractual rights must first . . .
establish[] that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he
suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the
unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination.” Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1022 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The plaintiff’s initial burden is not onerous.” Nanko Shipping,
850 F.3d at 467 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

      Wright has alleged the “basic elements of a prima facie
case of intentional discrimination” sufficient to raise her “right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Most concretely, she
has alleged that the Foundation did not defame her predecessor,
a white man who also separated from the company, nor any
other non-African-American employee. Under this Court’s
precedent, that is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See
id. (finding it sufficient that “Nanko allege[d] that Alcoa, aware
of Diané’s race, treated the company he owns and operates less
favorably than similarly situated white-owned companies”);
Brown, 774 F.3d at 1023 (finding it sufficient for a plaintiff to
identify a “similarly-situated employee who is not in her
                                 14
protected class”). In fact, while such “[a]llegations regarding
comparators, racial comments, [or] pretext obviously
strengthen [Wright’s] discrimination complaint,” they are not
even required at the pleading stage. Nanko Shipping, 850 F.3d
at 467. 3

     Two other sets of allegations push Wright’s § 1981 claim
farther over the plausibility threshold. The first are those
related to Goren’s praise of Wright’s performance, followed by
Wright’s termination. Goren noted that Wright had a “strong
year” and “contributed to the advancement of [the
Foundation’s] mission, vision and goals.” J.A. 83 (Compl. ¶
25).     More specifically, Goren remarked that Wright
“[d]eveloped and presented a cohesive request and plan for
respectfully transitioning organizations that do not fit in the
new strategy, which resulted in the Board unanimously
approving efforts to increase the grant target over two years
and accommodate the transition.” J.A. 83–84 (Compl. ¶ 25).
And even more to the point, just a few months before the
termination, Goren commented that Wright “had been working
on her communication and relationship with her team”
successfully such that she remarked, “things feel less charged
than at the end of last year.” J.A. 84–85 (Compl. ¶ 28). In

3
  Our dissenting colleague suggests that Wright’s § 1981 claim
“need[s] [a] comparison” between herself and “an employee of a
different race” and fails solely because she did not provide one.
Dissenting Op. at 6. That is incompatible with Nanko Shipping, 850
F.3d at 467, in which we explicitly stated that a comparator is not
needed at the pleading stage. In addition, the dissent’s requirement
that Wright identify a comparator who had a non-disparagement
clause does not make sense on our facts. The complaint alleges that
the Foundation was willing to breach a contractual duty to defame
her, an African-American individual, while it did not defame her
white predecessor, even though doing so would not have breached a
contract. Those facts are more probative of discrimination, not less.
                               15
accord with this overall picture of Wright’s competence and
success in her new role at the Foundation, she also received a
salary raise during her first year. J.A. 83 (Compl. ¶ 24). At the
same time, and in contrast to this praise, which was specific
and detailed, Goren’s criticisms of Wright were vague and
subjective; when Wright asked for clarification, she was simply
told she was “too busy in the weeds.” J.A. 84 (Compl. ¶ 26).
Then, Goren fired Wright without notice or warning,
inconsistent with her performance record.

     The second set of relevant allegations are those pertaining
to the general culture of racial inequity at the Foundation
which, according to the complaint, “negatively impacted” the
working experience of employees of color. J.A. 81 (Compl. ¶
19). At one point, Wright was asked to “manage [an] African-
American Program Assistant” who did “not feel comfortable”
working at the Foundation and subsequently left, due to how
she was treated on account of her race. J.A. 82 (Compl. ¶ 20).

     Construing these facts in Wright’s favor—the combination
of specific and factually detailed praise, vague and subjective
critiques that conflicted with that praise, and an unexpected
termination, in addition to the work environment at the
Foundation—Wright has plausibly alleged that Goren was
motivated by racial animus in her description of Wright to
Henson as “toxic” and having created a “negative climate” at
work. Of course, Dr. Wright’s “burden at the summary
judgment stage and at trial [will be] different and substantially
more onerous than the pleading burden,” Nanko Shipping, 850
F.3d at 467, but we find that she has met the lower pleading
burden here, and her § 1981 claim against the Foundation
survives. And because we conclude that Wright has stated a §
1981 claim based on an alleged breach of the Severance
Agreement, we decline to address her alternative theory under
the “make benefits” clause.
                              16
     Lastly, we find that Wright cannot maintain a § 1981 claim
against Goren individually because, once again, Wright and
Goren did not have a contractual relationship. See Domino’s
Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) (“Any claim
brought under § 1981 . . . must initially identify an impaired
‘contractual relationship’ . . . under which the plaintiff has
rights.”).

                              C.

    Finally, we turn to Wright’s defamation claim, which
Wright brings against Goren only.

     Under D.C. law, a plaintiff pleading defamation must
allege: “(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory
statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant
published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3)
that the defendant’s fault in publishing the statement amounted
to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was
actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or
that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm.” Beeton
v. District of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 923 (D.C. 2001); accord
Farah v. Esquire Mag., 736 F.3d 528, 533–34 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

     In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued that the
defamation claim failed for two reasons: first, that Goren’s
statements were protected by the common interest privilege
because Goren and Henson were leaders of the same non-profit
organization at the time the statements were made, and second,
that the statements were opinions and therefore not capable of
defamatory meaning. The District Court agreed that the
common interest privilege applied and did not decide the
second issue. Once again, we reverse.
                               17
                               1.

     “The common interest privilege protects otherwise
defamatory statements made ‘(1) . . . in good faith, (2) on a
subject in which the party communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which he has, or honestly believes he has, a duty
to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, (3) to a
person who has such a corresponding interest.’” Mastro v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(quoting Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1024 (D.C. 1990)).
As a “qualified privilege,” it “exists only if the publisher
believes, with reasonable grounds, that [the] statement is true.”
Alfred A. Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Samperton & Nolan, 374
A.2d 284, 290 (D.C. 1977); see also Roland v. d’Arazien, 685
F.2d 653, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Holland, 367 A.2d 1311 (D.C. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 596 (1977) (statements made to further a common
interest are “conditionally privileged”). In other words, for the
privilege to apply, publication must not only be “reasonably
calculated to protect or further the interest,” but also it cannot
be made with “malice,” which, “within the context of the
common interest privilege, is ‘the equivalent of bad faith.’”
Mastro, 447 F.3d at 858 (quoting Moss, 580 A.2d at 1024–25).
Thus, while a defendant is “presumed” to act with “pure
motives” in making a conditionally privileged statement, a
plaintiff may “rebut this presumption” through a showing of
malice. Ford Credit Co., 367 A.2d at 190.

     Even assuming that the pleadings establish a common
interest between Goren and Henson, we find the privilege
inapplicable because the complaint plausibly establishes that
the statements were made with malice. In short, Goren did not
have “reasonable grounds” to believe her statements were true
for many of the reasons already discussed. Wright had
received a favorable performance evaluation and a raise.
                              18
Goren had also praised her for a “strong year” and even
acknowledged that she had been “working on her
communication.” Accepting these allegations as true and
drawing inferences in Wright’s favor, we cannot conclude, as
a matter of law, that Goren’s statements criticizing Wright were
made in good faith. The allegations that Goren’s statements
were motivated at least in part by racial animus weigh further
against such a finding at the 12(b)(6) stage. Cf. Mastro, 447
F.3d at 859 (a “conscious indifference or reckless disregard”
for the “rights or feelings of others” constitutes malice).

     The dissent points out that the privilege applies if “the
primary purpose” is to further the common interest. Dissenting
Op. at 9. True, and we do not suggest that a showing that Goren
bore “ill will” or “resentment” towards Wright would per se
defeat the privilege. See, e.g., Mosrie v. Trussell, 467 A.2d
475, 477 (D.C. 1983). But the fact remains that Goren must
have reasonably believed her statements to be true for the
privilege to apply. That is “ordinarily a factual issue for the
jury” which we should not prejudge. Payne v. Clark, 25 A.3d
918, 926 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d
63, 82 (D.C. 2005)).

     In any event, there are also reasons to doubt that the
purpose of the statements was to further the privilege. Had
Goren been explaining Wright’s termination to Henson in
response to a specific question, or had she offered a more
formal description of the relevant events, she might have a
stronger case. But that is not what happened here. Rather,
according to the complaint, Goren raised the issue of Wright’s
termination unprompted, first telling Henson that she was
“feeling backlash” over the firing, and then—in response to an
acknowledgement of that backlash from Henson—she made
                                19
the disparaging statements. 4 Moreover, rather than explaining
the firing in a neutral manner, Goren used language that could
fairly be characterized as ad hominem and unprofessional in
describing Wright, such as calling her “toxic” and claiming that
two-thirds of the staff would quit if Wright remained. Cf.
Mastro, 447 F.3d at 849 (privilege applied where employer
published official termination memorandum to human
resources).

                                2.

     The last remaining issue is whether Goren’s statements
were defamatory. “A statement is ‘defamatory’ if it tends to
injure the plaintiff in his trade, profession or community
standing, or lower him in the estimation of the community.”
Moss, 580 A.2d at 1023. At the same time, “a statement of
opinion is actionable only if it has an explicit or implicit factual
foundation and is therefore objectively verifiable.” Guilford
Transp. Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 589 (D.C. 2000);
accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (Oct. 2022
update) (“A defamatory communication may consist of a
statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this
nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of
undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.”).

4
  Our dissenting colleague argues that “Goren did not say anything
negative about Wright until Henson worried that Wright’s firing had
been racially motivated.” Dissenting Op. at 9. But construing the
complaint in the light most favorable to Wright, we can plausibly
infer that the “backlash” that Goren raised, unprompted, was
precisely the backlash that Goren and Henson ultimately discussed—
that the firing was purportedly discriminatorily motivated. Thus, we
cannot conclude that the “primary purpose” of the communication
was to further any common interest.
                              20
     We find that at least two of the three statements made by
Goren have an implicit factual basis and are therefore
actionable. The claim that Wright fostered a negative climate
at work could easily imply that Goren had personal knowledge
of specific actions or behaviors of Wright’s leading to that
conclusion. This could in turn be verified or shown through
indicia such as complaints, high turnover, or testimony from
colleagues. And such a statement would naturally “tend[] to
injure” Wright in her “trade, profession or community
standing,” especially given the fact that they were made to
another leader in the non-profit space. Moss, 580 A.2d at 1023.
The claim that two-thirds of the staff would leave if Wright
stayed is a straightforward assertion of fact.

     Goren does not otherwise challenge Wright’s defamation
claim. Thus, based on the lack of a qualifying privilege, and
because at least two of the alleged statements are actionable,
the defamation claim survives.

                          *   *    *

     For these reasons, Wright’s breach of contract and § 1981
claims against the Foundation are reinstated, as is her
defamation claim against Goren. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings.

                                               It is so ordered.
WALKER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

     The Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Foundation fired Terri
Wright. She alleges that the Foundation later defamed her,
breached their severance agreement, and deprived her of con-
tractual rights because she is African-American. Because those
allegations are not plausible, I would affirm the district court’s
decision to dismiss the suit.

                                I

     Four years ago, the Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Foundation
fired Terri Wright, its Vice President of Program and Commu-
nity. The parties later signed a severance agreement. It in-
cluded the following “Mutual Non-Disparagement” provision:

       You [Wright] agree that you have not made, and
       will not make, any false, disparaging or deroga-
       tory statements . . . regarding the Founda-
       tion . . . . Likewise, the Foundation will direct
       those officers, directors and employees with di-
       rect knowledge of this revised letter agreement
       not to make any false, disparaging or derogatory
       statements to any person or entity regarding
       you . . . .

JA 208.

     A month after Wright’s firing, the Foundation’s President
and CEO, Nicola Goren, met with Madye Henson in their ca-
pacities as colleagues within a different nonprofit organiza-
tion — the Washington Regional Association of Grantmakers.
Goren was the Association’s Board Chair. Henson was its
President and CEO.

    At the meeting, Goren complained that she was feeling
backlash following Wright’s termination. In response, Henson
                                2
said the nonprofit community was concerned that Wright’s fir-
ing was racially motivated. Goren disputed those claims. She
told Henson that Wright had been fired because she was
“‘toxic,’” “fostered” a “‘negative climate’” at the Foundation,
and “two-thirds of the staff would [have] le[ft]” if she had re-
mained. JA 87.

     After Wright learned of Goren’s comments, Wright sued.
First, she alleged that the Foundation and Goren breached the
mutual non-disparagement clause in the severance agreement.
Second, she claimed that the breach was racially motivated,
and thus violated the law’s guarantee that “[a]ll persons . . .
have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts.” 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a). Third, she sued Goren individually for def-
amation.

     The district court held that Wright failed to state a plausi-
ble claim to relief, and it dismissed the case. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).

    I would affirm.

                                II

     We review the district court’s decision to dismiss de novo.
Carter v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,
503 F.3d 143, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “To survive a motion to
dismiss,” Wright’s “complaint must contain” enough facts “to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). At this stage, we
take Wright’s factual allegations as true and draw reasonable
inferences in her favor. Id. at 678.

    Applying that standard, Wright fails to state a claim.
                                 3
                                 A

    Wright’s breach-of-contract claim against the Foundation
must, among other things, point to “an obligation or duty aris-
ing out of the contract” and identify “a breach of that duty.”
Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C.
2009). Here, Wright has not done that.1

      Start with the text. The Foundation promised to “direct
[its] officers, directors and employees with direct knowledge
of this . . . agreement not to make any false, disparaging or de-
rogatory statements.” JA 208 (emphasis added). That is a
promise by the Foundation to order some of its employees not
to disparage Wright. It is not a guarantee that those employees
would follow the Foundation’s order.

    Thus, to state a claim for breach, Wright must allege that
the Foundation failed to tell Goren not to make disparaging
comments. But Wright does not allege that. Instead, she
claims that the Foundation and Goren breached the agreement
when Goren made disparaging remarks.

     That turns the Foundation’s promise into something it’s
not: a guarantee that Foundation employees would not dispar-
age Wright. That guarantee would have required the Founda-
tion to police the on-duty and off-duty speech of those employ-
ees mentioned by the agreement, including their texts and

1
  I agree with the Court that Wright cannot sue Goren individually
for breach of the severance agreement. Goren “was not a party to the
contract” so “was not bound by it.” Majority Op. 12.
                               4
social-media posts, their conversations on the phone, and even
their discussions at the dinner table.

     Of course, Wright could have bargained for that type of
guarantee by including it in the contract’s terms. In fact, the
Foundation did. Wright promised that she would “not ma[ke],
any false, disparaging or derogatory statements . . . regarding
the Foundation.” JA 208.

     Because of the stark textual contrast between Wright’s
promise and the Foundation’s, we should not read both to mean
the same thing. That would ignore the difference between the
parties’ promises and thus fail to give “effective meaning to all
[the contract’s] terms.” 1010 Potomac Associates v. Grocery
Manufacturers of America, Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.
1984).

      True, the word “[l]ikewise” links the sentences containing
the parties’ promises, and the clause is titled “Mutual Non-Dis-
paragement.” JA 208 (emphasis added). But “likewise” often
does not mean “identically.” Particularly when what precedes
“likewise” differs from what follows it — as it does
here — “likewise” means “similarly” or “in addition.” See
likewise (def. 1 & 2), Merriam-Webster (2023). That is how
Wright herself uses the word in briefing to the district court.
See JA 114 (“Plaintiff alleged that her predecessor, a Caucasian
male . . . was not disparaged by Defendant Goren . . . . Plain-
tiff likewise alleged that no non-African American employee
that was given a severance agreement . . . was subsequently
disparaged.”) (emphasis added).

     As for “mutual” promises, they need not be mirror im-
ages. In contract law, they are promises that are offered in re-
turn for one another — often for different things. 3511 13th
Street Tenants’ Association v. 3511 13th Street, N.W.
                                5
Residences, LLC, 922 A.2d 439, 443 (D.C. 2007). Here, the
word “mutual” merely tells us that the parties’ non-disparage-
ment promises were in exchange for one another.

      In response, Wright says that contracts “should not be in-
terpreted to render the contract promise illusory or meaning-
less.” Retail Clerks International Association v. NLRB, 510
F.2d 802, 806 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But where, as here, the
text is clear, that rule does not come “into play.” Id. If the text
of a contract is unambiguous, “we enforce” it “according to
[its] terms.” Dyer v. Bilaal, 983 A.2d 349, 361 (D.C. 2009).

     Plus, a promise to direct a group of employees is not illu-
sory or meaningless. It requires the Foundation to act, even if
there’s still a chance the employees will defy the Foundation’s
directive. And if the Foundation does act — by directing its
employees not to disparage Wright — its action increases the
chances that the employees will refrain from disparaging
Wright. That increased likelihood is far from worthless.

                                B

     Wright also claims that the Foundation’s breach of the
non-disparagement clause was racially motivated, so it violated
her right “to make and enforce contracts” regardless of race.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). But that argument falls at the first hurdle:
The Foundation did not breach the non-disparagement clause.
So Wright did not suffer “the loss of a legally protected right.”
Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-
Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020).

     Even if Wright had plausibly pleaded breach of contract,
she would still need to allege that the breach was racially mo-
tivated. That means she must plausibly allege that the Founda-
tion was “aware” of her race and that she was treated differently
                                6
from “similarly situated” people who were not part of her racial
group. Nanko Shipping, USA v. Alcoa, Inc., 850 F.3d 461, 467
(D.C. Cir. 2017). Her complaint does not do that.

     Wright says that her predecessor, “a Caucasian male,” was
not disparaged after his employment. JA 80. But she does not
allege he had a contract that made him similarly situated to her
in a way that matters for a § 1981 claim. We do not know if he
was party to a non-disparagement clause with the Foundation.
Only if we did could we compare his treatment to hers. And
absent that, we have no way of knowing how the Foundation
would have treated a non-disparagement clause with an em-
ployee of a different race.

      We need that kind of comparison because § 1981 ad-
dresses “discrimination as it relates to contractual rights,”
Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014), a
principle confirmed by the cases that Wright and today’s Court
cite. See Appellant Br. 19, 29, 30, 31 (citing Brown, 774 F.3d
1016; Nanko Shipping, 850 F.3d 461); Majority Op. 12-15
(same). When those cases discuss the treatment of “similarly
situated” persons as evidence of contractual discrimination at
the pleading stage, they identify people who are similarly situ-
ated with regard to their contractual rights. In Brown v. Ses-
soms, for example, the plaintiff pointed to another person with
similar credentials who was offered the same kind of contract
that she sought. 774 F.3d at 1019. Similarly, in Nanko Ship-
ping v. Alcoa, the plaintiff company pointed to similar compa-
nies that were offered the same kind of contracts that the plain-
tiff sought. 850 F.3d at 467. In each case, a similarly situated
party was given a contractual right that the plaintiff was denied.
See also Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479
(2006) (“[N]othing in the text of § 1981 suggests that it was
meant to provide an omnibus remedy for all racial injustice. If
                                   7
so, it would not have been limited to situations involving con-
tracts.”).

                                   C

    Wright’s defamation claim fares no better. To succeed,
she must plead, among other things, that Goren “published [a
defamatory] statement without privilege to a third party.”
Payne v. Clark, 25 A.3d 918, 924 (D.C. 2011). But here, the
common-interest privilege protects the alleged speech.

     That privilege applies to speech “made in good faith”
about a subject of “common interest” to both the speaker and
the listener. Id. at 925 (cleaned up). The existence of a com-
mon interest depends on the “apparent[ ] ” motive of a conver-
sation instead of secret intentions. Id. (cleaned up).2 The priv-
ilege can cover private discussions about the reasons for a fir-
ing.3 For example, the D.C. Court of Appeals applied the

2
  Precedents from the D.C. Court of Appeals make clear that finding
a common interest depends on the objective manifestations of the
parties, and not their subjective intent. The applicability of the priv-
ilege depends upon “‘the primary motive by which the defendant is
apparently inspired.’” Payne, 25 A.3d at 925 (quoting Mosrie v.
Trussell, 467 A.2d 475, 477 (D.C. 1983)) (emphasis added). And
the court has clarified that the question whether a statement was
made to further the common interest (as opposed to being made in
bad faith) depends not on secret intentions, but rather “the language
of the communication and the circumstances attending its publication
by the defendant.” Mosrie, 467 A.2d at 478 (cleaned up); Heard v.
Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 886 n.6 (D.C. 2002).
3
  In fact, the privilege can cover a wide range of common interests,
even interests that are general in nature. For example, the privilege
covered a statement made by a bank security officer to a law enforce-
ment officer, presumably because both parties had a general interest
                                8
privilege to a discussion among “church members about mat-
ters of mutual concern . . . such as reasons for dismissal of the
pastor.” Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 886 n.6 (D.C. 2002).

     Here, Goren and Henson had a “common interest.” Payne,
25 A.3d at 925. They met in their capacities as a board chair
(Goren) and CEO (Henson) of the Washington Regional Asso-
ciation of Grantmakers. After Goren complained of the back-
lash she was experiencing in the wake of Wright’s termination,
the two discussed rumors that Wright’s firing was racially mo-
tivated — which, if true, would reflect poorly on the Associa-
tion because of Goren’s leadership role in the Association. Re-
sponding to those concerns, Goren assured Henson that Wright
was fired not because of her race but for being “‘toxic’” and
fostering “a ‘negative climate’” that resulted in “two-thirds of
the staff” wanting to leave. JA 87.

      To be sure, because Wright’s complaint alleges racial ani-
mus, it alleges bad faith. Payne, 25 A.3d at 925 (cleaned up)
(statements made “with such a conscious indifference” of their
“effects upon the rights or feelings of others as to constitute ill
will” are made in bad faith). But that does not defeat the priv-
ilege if “the primary purpose” of a statement was to further a
common interest. Id. at 926 (cleaned up). “[T]he fact that the
defendant feels resentment and indignation towards the plain-
tiff and enjoys defaming him will not forfeit the privilege so

in ensuring that the bank’s customers were protected by law. Colum-
bia First Bank v. Ferguson, 665 A.2d 650, 655 (D.C. 1995). Unsur-
prisingly, a common interest has been readily found when two mem-
bers of an organization discussed the conduct of a member of the
same organization. See Heard, 810 A.2d at 886 n.6 (church members
making statements to each other concerning grievances about the
church’s pastor); Mosrie, 467 A.2d at 476-78 (police officer making
statements to the chief of police concerning misconduct of an of-
ficer).
                               9
long as the primary purpose of the statement is to further the
interest which is entitled to protection.” Id. at 925-26 (cleaned
up).

     Here, the complaint confirms that a common interest in the
Association’s reputation was the primary purpose of Goren’s
remarks about Wright. Indeed, Goren did not say anything
negative about Wright until Henson worried that Wright’s fir-
ing had been racially motivated. JA 87. Commenting on
Wright’s poor performance at the Foundation reassured Hen-
son that the Association’s reputation was safe. Id.

                           *   *    *

    Because Wright fails to state a plausible claim for relief, I
respectfully dissent.