Court Opinion

ID: 9737046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:13:52.795897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.131768
License: Public Domain

ALBIN, J.,
dissenting.
The right to trial by jury is an ancient and revered right, a right embodied in our State Constitution before there was a Federal Constitution, a right as old as the Magna Carta.3 That right -has been devised to us through the ages and finds its home in our *111current New Jersey Constitution, which guarantees that the “right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” N.J. Const, art. I, ¶ 9. The majority opinion strikes a blow to that right by diminishing the role and importance of the jury in our system of criminal justice and by ceding from the jury to the judge the relevant fact-finding power that determines the real-time length of a defendant’s sentence. By radically altering the balance between the function of the jury and the judge, the majority opinion departs from this Court’s previously held belief that “[t]he responsibility of the jury in the domain of factual findings” is “preeminent,” and that in determining guilt or innocence, the jury “serves as the conscience of the community and the embodiment of the common sense and feelings reflective of society as a whole.” State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 211-12, 432 A.2d 912 (1981) (citations omitted). I, therefore, join with the thoughtful dissents of. Justices Long and Zazzali and add these words to signal my concern about the path on which the Court now embarks.
One evening, Traci Stanton lost control of the Porsche she was driving, striking a tree off the side of the road and killing her sister-in-law, Nancy Smith, who was in the front passenger seat. The State claimed that Stanton recklessly operated the vehicle, causing Smith’s death. Stanton was charged with vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A 2C:ll-5, a second-degree crime, and several motor vehicle offenses, including reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, and driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. The vehicular homicide charge was tried to a jury and the motor vehicle charges to a Superior Court judge in one proceeding pursuant to Rule 3:15-3.
The State presented the same evidence to the jury with respect to the indictable and motor vehicle charges, including evidence that Stanton was intoxicated at the time of the accident. After the jury rendered a verdict of guilty on the vehicular homicide charge, the Superior Court judge sat in judgment on the motor vehicle charges and, without taking any additional evidence or testimony, found Stanton guilty of reckless driving and DWI. The judge’s *112finding of guilt on the DWI charge had grave implications beyond the penalty range for that motor vehicle offense. The judge sentenced Stanton to a three-year state prison term based on the jury’s finding of vehicular homicide. The judge’s verdict on the DWI charge, however, required the imposition of a mandatory minimum three-year state prison term on the vehicular homicide charge pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-5b(l). But for the DWI finding, Stanton would have been eligible for parole in nine months. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51g. The judge’s factual finding exposed Stanton to a real-time sentence four times greater than the exposure resulting from the jury’s factual finding.
I.
The New Jersey Constitution empowers this Court to promulgate rules governing the “practice and procedure” in the Superior Court. N.J. Const, art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3; Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 255, 74 A.2d 406 (establishing that Court’s rule-making power, in matters of practice and procedure, is not subject to overriding legislation), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877, 71 S.Ct. 123, 95 L.Ed. 638 (1950). In accordance with this authority, the Court enacted Rule 3:15-3, which provides that disorderly persons, petty disorderly, and motor vehicle complaints must be joined for trial with a criminal offense “based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode.” R. 3:15-3(a)(l). Unlike disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses, which are submitted to the jury if they are lesser-included offenses, Rule 3:15-3(a)(2) requires lesser-included motor vehicle offenses of a criminal complaint to be decided by the Superior Court judge “on the proofs adduced in the course of trial.” Rule 3:15-3 is the codification of several decisions of this Court that I believe have mistakenly taken from the jury its rightful authority to decide lesser-included motor vehicle offenses arising from the same conduct of a criminal offense. See State v. Muniz, 118 N.J. 319, 571 A.2d 948 (1990); State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, 527 A.2d 1355, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944, 108 S.Ct. 331, 98 L.Ed.2d 358 (1987). This rule is directly *113implicated in this case because it was the judge’s and not the jury’s verdict on the DWI complaint that mandated a three-year period of parole ineligibility. This Court has the constitutional power, and responsibility, to make its procedural rules logical and consistent, and this ease provides the opportunity to do so with respect to Rule 3:15-3. State v. Clark, 162 N.J. 201, 205-07, 744 A.2d 109 (2000) (stating that “the Court’s authority to engage in rule making includes the exclusive power to establish or modify Court Rules through judicial decisions”); George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 381-83, 86 A.2d 8 (1952) (holding statute addressing procedural aspects of contributory negligence operated within field of Court’s exclusive rule-making power and was superseded by Court’s rules and, therefore, no longer effective).
There is no sound reason why a jury in a vehicular homicide case should not decide the lesser-included offenses of DWI and reckless driving. A jury is no less capable of rendering a decision on reckless driving and DWI charges than on criminal charges. Our constitutional jurisprudence recognizes both DWI and reckless driving as lesser-included offenses of vehicular homicide. A finding of guilt of DWI will bar a subsequent prosecution of vehicular homicide on double jeopardy grounds if the sole evidence supporting the element of recklessness is intoxication related to the DWI charge. DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 109, 527 A.2d 1355. Likewise, a municipal court conviction of reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, will bar a later criminal trial for recklessly causing death arising from the same evidence. State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573, 583, 458 A.2d 502 (1983).
Our law requires that lesser-included offenses be charged to a jury if a rational basis in the evidence supports the lesser charges. State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 299, 486 A.2d 833 (1985). The principle of charging a jury with lesser-included offenses serves two important purposes. It protects the prosecution against an outright acquittal when an element of the greater charge is not proven, and it protects a defendant from conviction of the more serious charge when the jury is given an all-or-nothing choice. *114State v. Neal, 229 N.J.Super. 28, 33, 550 A.2d 998 (App.Div.1988). Under this doctrine, no defendant should be acquitted or convicted of a particular crime merely because the jury was precluded from considering another charge that is rationally based on the record. No person should be found guilty of a more serious offense merely because a jury was denied the opportunity of finding guilt of a lesser offense. In short, a jury should be free to consider all lesser-included offenses that are reasonably related to the evidence and the crime charged. N.J.S.A. ■ 2C:l-8(d), (e). In this case the motor vehicle DWI and reckless driving charges and the vehicular homicide charges arose from the same evidence. Yet, the current state of our law precludes the lesser-included offenses of DWI and reckless driving from being submitted to the jury. Muniz, supra, 118 N.J. at 332, 571 A.2d 948.
Disorderly persons, petty disorderly persons, and serious motor vehicle offenses are quasi-criminal offenses. A person charged with a quasi-criminal offense is entitled to fundamental due process protections, including the presumption of innocence, which requires the State to bear the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Garthe, 145 N.J. 1, 8, 678 A.2d 153 (1996); Dively, supra, 92 N.J. at 585, 458 A.2d 502; State v. Finamore, 338 N.J.Super. 130, 138-39, 768 A.2d 248 (App.Div. 2001); State v. Young, 242 N.J.Super. 467, 473, 577 A.2d 520 (App.Div.1990).
Disorderly persons, petty disorderly persons, and motor vehicle offenses are all subject to the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Disorderly persons and petty disorderly persons offenses, however, may be submitted to the jury in criminal trials as lesser-included offenses, despite the general jurisdiction of the municipal court in such matters. See N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(e); R. 3:15-3. See also, e.g., DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 111, 527 A.2d 1355 (stating that “Superior Court may assert jurisdiction over non-indietable offenses when they are lesser included offenses of the indictables” for purpose of submitting disorderly persons charges to jury); State v. Braxton, 330 N.J.Super. 561, 563, 568, 750 A.2d 185 *115(App.Div.2000) (affirming conviction where defendant was acquitted of charged aggravated assault and convicted of lesser-included offense of disorderly persons simple assault); State v. Green, 318 N.J.Super. 361, 375, 724 A.2d 254 (App.Div.1999) (holding that failure to give lesser-included charge of simple assault as lesser-included offense of aggravated assault on police officer was reversible error), aff'd, 163 N.J. 140, 747 A.2d 1234 (2000); State v. Lopez, 160 N.J.Super. 30, 36, 388 A.2d 1273 (App.Div.1978) (finding that disorderly persons theft offense should have been given to jury as lesser-included offense of criminal charges).
The same principles that support submitting disorderly persons offenses to the jury as lesser-included offenses apply as well to serious motor vehicle charges, such as DWI and reckless driving. The penalties for a conviction of DWI, even for a first-time offender, are more severe than for a petty disorderly persons offense. Compare N.J.S.A 39:4-50(a)(l) (providing that person who operates motor vehicle while intoxicated shall be subject to fines, suspension of license for not less than six months nor more than one year, “a period of detainment ... as prescribed by the program requirements of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers ... and, in the discretion of the court, a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 days”), with N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8 (stating that “person who has been convicted of a ... petty disorderly persons offense may be sentenced to imprisonment for a definite term which ... shall not exceed ... 30 days”). Penalties for a third DWI offense are even more severe, and include a minimum 180-day term of imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3). In its previous incarnations over the last century, DWI has been classified as a disorderly persons offense and a misdemeanor. State v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109, 119, 577 A.2d 1259 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 1413, 113 L.Ed.2d 466 (1991). The nature of the offense and its relationship to the greater offense, not a classification by label, should govern whether the jury decides the issue. Notions of fairness, consistency in the fact-finding process, and respect for the jury as a truth-seeking body favor submitting DWI and *116reckless driving charges to the jury along with the vehicular homicide charge.
The majority takes the position that where the State presents evidence to support different theories of recklessness in a vehicular homicide case, ie., intoxication and speeding, unanimity on any one theory is not necessary, so long as all twelve jurors agree that the defendant was reckless. Ante at 86, 820 A.2d at 644. Because the jury renders a general verdict, the theory upon which the verdict is based is not known. Therefore, it is conceivable that in a vehicular homicide case in which various theories are presented to prove recklessness, all twelve jurors may reject intoxication as the basis for finding recklessness while the judge will be allowed to make a finding of intoxication to "render a DWI verdict. It is the potential for this kind of inconsistent result that undermines the integrity of dual fact-findings.
This Court’s precedents have compelled bifurcated fact-findings between the judge and the jury in vehicular homicide cases. Muniz, supra, 118 N.J. at 331-32, 571 A.2d 948; DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 111, 527 A.2d 1355. In Dively, supra, we recognized that a reckless driving or DWI charge prosecuted in municipal court could bar the later prosecution of a vehicular homicide charge on double jeopardy grounds. To avoid this unjust result, the Court issued a directive to the municipal courts to withhold action on motor vehicle charges related to a vehicular homicide until authorized by the county prosecutor. 92 N.J. at 586, 589-90, 458 A.2d 502. In DeLuca, supra, we concluded that if evidence of recklessness in a vehicular homicide prosecution were based solely on intoxication, double jeopardy would bar a subsequent DWI prosecution on the same evidence. 108 N.J. at 100, 527 A.2d 1355. To resolve double jeopardy concerns in the future, the DeLuca Court directed the Superior Court, pursuant to its constitutional powers, to assume jurisdiction of the related municipal court matters in vehicular homicide cases. In such cases the Superior Court judge presiding over-the jury trial of the vehicular homicide case would sit as the trier of fact on the related motor vehicle *117violation, such as DWI. 108 N.J. at 111, 527 A.2d 1355. See also R. 3:15-3.
In Muniz, supra, this Court reversed the Appellate Division, which had concluded that, under the common law, lesser-included motor vehicle charges must be submitted to the jury in a vehicular homicide case. The Court determined that although lesser-included motor vehicle offenses should be joined in the prosecution of death-by-auto cases, they should be decided by the judge, not the jury. 118 N.J. at 331-32, 335, 571 A.2d 948. The Court reasoned that the policies behind the Code of Criminal Justice and Title 39, which governs motor vehicle violations, did not require the submission of those lesser-included offenses to the jury. Id. at 331, 571 A.2d 948. To mitigate the all-or-nothing effect this might have on a jury deciding a vehicular homicide case, the Court instructed the trial courts to make the jury aware that the Superior Court would render a decision on the related motor vehicle charges. Id. at 332, 571 A.2d 948.
This Court, in Muniz, provided no satisfactory rationale to justify denying jury consideration of a DWI charge in a vehicular homicide case where intoxication is part of the State’s proof of recklessness. There is no salutary purpose in the continued practice of two fact-findings, one by a jury and the other by a judge, in which both view the same evidence at the same trial. Had all the charges been submitted to the jury in this case, the constitutional issue, which now divides the Court, probably would have been avoided.
I do not suggest here that a DWI complaint that stands alone, one that is not joined with a criminal offense, should be tried to a jury. This matter, however, presents a different case. One of the State’s theories in this vehicular homicide ease was based on intoxication. The Superior Court judge charged the jury that it had to decide whether defendant “violated” the law “that a person may not operate a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor,” as well as other motor vehicle laws, in “deciding whether or not she drove recklessly.” In essence, the jury was *118told to decide the DWI matter, but not to give voice to its judgment on the DWI complaint, which was left to the court’s determination. This, to me, is a process devoid of any sense.
Ultimately, any ruling of this Court must withstand the test of reason and experience. Adherence to a practice that does not advance any legitimate objective should be discarded in favor of one that does. Relevant motor vehicle charges that are lesser-included offenses of a vehicular homicide charge should be submitted to a jury.
n.
I fully concur with the well-reasoned opinions of Justices Long and Zazzali. However, the importance of the right to trial by jury compels me to add these thoughts. In interpreting our State Constitution, particularly the “right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate” provision, which is textually different from its federal counterpart, a decision of the United States Supreme Court is persuasive authority only if it can persuade by force of reason, logic, and historical interpretation. If federal precedent is an aid in interpreting a state constitutional right, infusing the right with purpose and meaning in light of our traditions and values, then we should make use of it. Alternatively, we are not bound to take bad advice, and when our state’s interests are not advanced by federal precedent, we must go our own way. Our state constitutional provisions need not be homogenized to fit within the interpretation of counterpart provisions of the Federal Constitution, particularly in this area where the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of its “trial by jury” provision has been muddled and inconsistent, and has barely obtained the support of a majority of that Court. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 356, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (Pashman, J., concurring) (questioning presumption that uniformity in constitutional analysis is unqualified advantage).
Our Court should not “adopt federal constitutional interpretations for the New Jersey Constitution merely for the sake of consistency.” Id. at 355, 450 A.2d 952 (Pashman, J., concurring). *119The textual language of the federal and state jury trial provisions are different; the history and application of those clauses to our federal and state laws have been different;4 the structure of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the roles that juries play in these distinct legislative schemes, are vastly different. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines leave many factual determinations to a judge that would be wholly unacceptable in our state system.5
The majority’s decision, which gives judges free rein to make factual determinations within the statutory maximum, theoretically permits the complete restructuring of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, transferring powers traditionally reposed in juries to judges. One example will make the point. Currently, a jury determines whether a theft is greater than $200, $7500, or $75,000 for the purpose of grading the offense and determining the range of sentence. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(4). The logic of the Court’s decision would allow the enactment of a statute limiting a jury to rendering a general verdict of theft with a maximum sentence of, say, twenty years. Under this construct, a judge would then make the factual determination as to the amount of the theft for the purpose of imposing a specific sentence within that range. This would be entirely contrary to our current law, and yet this potential scenario follows from the Court’s decision.
*120Our state is a separate and independent laboratory, a political experiment, in a larger federal system of states with varied customs, cultures, and values. See Hunt, supra, 91 N.J. at 356-57, 450 A.2d 952 (Pashman, J., concurring). Through the New Jersey Constitution, this Court is permitted to reject a federal “one-size-fits-all” approach to the interpretation of state constitutional rights. Our federal constitutional rights are a floor, a lowest common denominator, intended to apply to a diverse people spread over a geographical domain of fifty states. We can and should interpret our rights more expansively when it is in keeping with our special state interests.
We have no greater state interest than sustaining the right to trial by jury, ensuring the heritage that places great trust in the common wisdom of everyday men and women to make judgments on the most vital issues concerning their fellow citizens. Traci Stanton was entitled to have a jury decide the factual issue that now requires her to serve a three-year mandatory minimum jail term. By allowing a judge to make that critical finding of fact in this case, the Court has diminished one of our most important rights.
Justices LONG and ZAZZALI join in this opinion.
For reversal and reinstatement — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices COLEMAN, VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA — 4.
Dissenting — Justices LONG, ZAZZALI and ALBIN — 3.

 See N.J. Const, of 1176 art. XXII (stating “that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever”) (reproduced at http:llwww.nj.gov/njfactsl njdoclOa.htm); J. Kendall Few, 1 In Defense of Trial by Jury 10 (1993).

 See State v. Anderson, 127 N.J. 191, 194, 603 A.2d 928 (1992) (declining to follow federal law and, relying on State Constitution, declaring unconstitutional statutory provision making materiality element of perjury question of law and holding that, as element of crime, materiality must be determined beyond reasonable doubt by jury).

Compare Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 513-14, 118 S.Ct. 1475, 1477, 140 L.Ed.2d 703, 708 (1998) (stating that Federal "Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge ... to determine both the amount and the kind of 'controlled substances' for which a defendant should be held accountable — and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind"), with NJ.S.A. 2C:35-5c (stating that where degree of offense for manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture or distribute controlled dangerous substance depends on quantity of substance, quantity shall be determined by trier of fact).