Court Opinion

ID: 9908263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:04:56.925941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:04.416562
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                   No. 21–1133

           Submitted September 19, 2023—Filed December 8, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellee,

vs.

STEPHEN ANDREW ARRIETA,

      Appellant.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Worth County, Colleen D. Weiland,

Judge.

      The defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence

obtained after a drug dog alerted to the smell of drugs during a commercial

vehicle inspection. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
      Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
      Colin Murphy (argued) of Gourley Rehkemper Lindholm, P.L.C., West Des

Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden (argued) and

Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
                                           2

OXLEY, Justice.
         Officers are allowed to use a drug dog to conduct a “free air sniff” around

the outside of a vehicle during a valid traffic stop without any suspicion that the

vehicle contains drugs under the premise that the driver has no expectation of

privacy in the air outside the vehicle. Even so, that doctrine is a narrow one.

Stopping a vehicle for a traffic violation is itself a seizure, and any conduct that

goes beyond investigating the “mission” of the traffic violation is closely scruti-

nized.

         In this case, Stephen Arrieta, a truck driver from Texas, failed a “PrePass”

check as he approached a weigh station on Interstate 35 outside Northwood. He

pulled into the weigh station, and an Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT)

officer undertook a “Level 3” commercial vehicle inspection of the driver’s docu-

mentation. Well into his inspection, the DOT officer called for a K-9 unit to con-

duct a free air sniff of the truck and trailer. The drug dog ultimately alerted to

the area around the sleeper compartment of the cab, and Arrieta admitted he

had a bowl of marijuana inside. Arrieta challenges the district court’s denial of

his motion to suppress the marijuana on three grounds. First, he argues that

the DOT officer engaged in an unlawful seizure when he extended his Level 3
document-only investigation to give the K-9 handler time to get to the weigh sta-

tion and search his truck, relying on Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348

(2015). Second, he argues that the K-9 handler engaged in an additional unlaw-

ful search when the dog jumped up on the fuel tank of the cab to enable it to

smell the area around the sleeper compartment where the marijuana was lo-

cated, relying on the property-based-search framework delineated in United

States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), and Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).

Third, he challenges the reliability of Titan, the drug dog, relying on Florida v.
Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013).
                                          3

      As explained below, we conclude that Arrieta was detained beyond the time

needed to complete the Level 3 inspection in violation of the Fourth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. That violation requires suppression of the sub-

sequently discovered drugs, so we need not address Arrieta’s other arguments.

The district court’s judgment is reversed and remanded.

      I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      On August 5, 2020, Stephen Arrieta was traveling through Iowa as he

hauled a load of insulation from Minnesota to Texas. His semitruck “failed” the

PrePass check just north of the Northwood DOT weigh station on I-35, so Arrieta

pulled into the weigh station. DOT Officer Taran Waalkens initiated a Level 3

commercial motor vehicle inspection, which involves a document review of the

logbook, truck and trailer registrations, fuel tax receipts, and bills of lading. Dur-

ing the ensuing inspection, Waalkens requested assistance from the Worth

County K-9 handler to conduct a free air drug dog sniff around the perimeter of

the semi as the inspection was being conducted. It was during this sniff that K-

9 Titan alerted to the smell of narcotics coming from inside the cab of Arrieta’s

truck. Arrieta admitted to the officers that he had a small amount of marijuana

in the sleeper compartment. A subsequent search of the cab revealed the mari-
juana, and Arrieta was charged with possession of a controlled substance in

violation of Iowa Code § 124.401(5) (2020).

      Before trial, Arrieta moved to suppress the evidence seized by the officers,

alleging the search violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amend-

ment and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. He advanced four argu-

ments in support of the motion to suppress, three of which he urges on appeal:

(1) officers lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to de-

tain him while waiting for a K-9 to arrive; (2) an impermissible search occurred
when the K-9 made deliberate, physical contact with the vehicle by putting its
                                         4

paws up on the fuel tank to reach the area near the sleeper compartment during

the free air sniff; and (3) K-9 Titan was not sufficiently trained and reliable to

provide probable cause to support the search of his truck. After a hearing, the

district court denied the suppression motion. Arrieta proceeded to a trial on the

minutes. He was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and was

sentenced to a fine of $250 and two days in jail, both of which were suspended.

      Arrieta appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, and we transferred

the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s

ruling, concluding that the initial report of a stolen vehicle and the other dis-

crepancies found in Arrieta’s logbook justified the length of the stop, which was

still ongoing when Deputy Luther arrived with Titan. It concluded that Titan’s

training and experience satisfied the requirements that a drug dog be sufficiently

reliable to support Luther’s belief that a search would reveal drugs. Finally, it

concluded that the dog jumping up on the side of the truck was not an uncon-

stitutional search, relying on United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 511

(8th Cir. 2007).

      We granted Arrieta’s application for further review to address whether Ar-

rieta’s constitutional rights were violated.
      II. Standard of Review.

      We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based on dep-

rivation of a constitutional right de novo. State v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284, 286

(Iowa 2017). “This review requires ‘an independent evaluation of the totality of

the circumstances as shown by the entire record.’ ” State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d

767, 771 (Iowa 2011) (quoting State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001)).

“Each case must be evaluated in light of its unique circumstances.” State v. Fogg,

936 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Coffman, 914 N.W.2d 240,
                                         5

244 (Iowa 2018)). We give deference to the district court’s findings of fact, but we

are not bound by them. State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2017).

      III. Was the Traffic Stop Unconstitutionally Extended?

      Law enforcement officers often use drug dogs to locate illegal narcotics

during traffic stops. As a general matter, unless an officer has reasonable suspi-

cion that a vehicle contains drugs, an officer who otherwise lawfully stops a ve-

hicle cannot detain the vehicle beyond the purpose for the stop to conduct a drug

dog sniff. But they can conduct a free air drug dog sniff around the exterior of

the vehicle under Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).

      Arrieta raises several challenges to the district court’s denial of his motion

to suppress, including his claim that the duration of the stop was impermissibly

extended without the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The de-

tention of an individual during a traffic stop, even if brief and for a limited pur-

pose, is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Kreps,

650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). Arrieta does not contest the validity of the

initial stop or the Level 3 inspection. Rather, he argues the seizure violated his

constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 when

he was detained longer than what was reasonably necessary to complete the
Level 3 inspection. He further argues the State failed to proffer a sufficient ex-

planation for the delay, demonstrating the officer’s improper intent to unduly

prolong the inspection to allow time for a K-9 unit to arrive on the scene. We

conclude the stop was impermissibly extended beyond a reasonable duration,

which renders it an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. With

that violation, we need not, and do not, address whether the stop was also im-

permissibly extended under the Iowa Constitution. See In re Prop. Seized from

Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 391 n.6 (Iowa 2015).
                                         6

      The controlling precedent for Arrieta’s challenge is Rodriguez, 575 U.S.

348. That case also involved a free air sniff by a drug dog during a routine traffic

stop that revealed the presence of narcotics inside the vehicle. Id. at 352. Alt-

hough the initial stop was valid, the United States Supreme Court held that law

enforcement unconstitutionally prolonged the stop beyond what was necessary

to effectuate the legitimate purpose for the stop. Id. at 354–55. Support for the

holding came from underlying facts showing that the officer detained Rodriguez

for “seven to eight minutes” beyond the time reasonably needed to “complete

th[e] mission” of issuing a warning ticket while he waited for a K-9 unit to arrive.

Id. at 350–51, 353 (alteration in original) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407).

Absent individualized suspicion, law enforcement may not prolong a traffic stop

to conduct unrelated investigations—such as drug dog sniffs—that do not serve

the stop’s lawful objectives. Id. at 354–55.

      Federal caselaw makes clear that even de minimis extensions of traffic

stops are unacceptable under the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Florida v. Royer, 460

U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (holding that an investigative detention must be temporary

and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop); United

States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 867–68 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that several
minutes of additional questioning to ascertain defendant’s identity was imper-

missible in the absence of independent reasonable suspicion); United States v.

Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding evidence unlawfully obtained

during a five-to-six-minute traffic stop because the officer impermissibly ex-

tended the seizure to ask unrelated questions); United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d

651, 662–63 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that six minutes of questioning measurably

prolonged the traffic stop beyond its original purposes because the topics covered

more than just context-framing questions and the extraneous questions lasted
a “not insubstantial” amount of time); United States v. Milton, 621 F. Supp. 3d
                                         7

421, 430–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (finding that a delay of “two minutes or so” caused

by “investigative inquiries unrelated to motor vehicle violations” unconstitution-

ally prolonged the traffic stop); United States v. Cornejo, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1137,

1152 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (finding eight minutes was an unreasonably long duration

“to complete the simple, one-page, written warning citation”); United States v.

Dolson, 673 F. Supp. 2d 842, 867 (D. Minn. 2009) (finding delay of one minute

and twenty-four seconds to call drug task force to be an unlawful extension).

      The critical question for courts applying Rodriguez is not whether the un-

related investigation occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether

conducting the unrelated investigation adds time to the stop. Rodriguez, 575

U.S. at 357. “Just as an officer may not earn ‘bonus time’ to conduct inquiries

for an unrelated criminal investigation by efficiently processing the matters re-

lated to the traffic stop, an officer may not consume much of the time justified

by the stop with inquiries about offenses unrelated to the reasons for the stop.”

Gomez, 877 F.3d at 91–92 (citation omitted).

      We have likewise applied Rodriguez’s holding in a variety of factual con-

texts. In In re Property Seized from Pardee, we concluded that a twenty-five-mi-

nute traffic stop was unconstitutionally prolonged beyond what was necessary
to address the traffic infraction. 872 N.W.2d at 396–97. We rejected the state’s

reliance on individualized suspicion of additional criminal activity because the

officers “developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity—if at all—only

by prolonging the initial stop beyond the time reasonably necessary to execute

the traffic violation warnings.” Id. at 391. Pardee reiterated the rule delineated

by Rodriguez: “Authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic

infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. at 392 (omis-

sion in original) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354). Rodriguez made clear that
the Fourth Amendment will permit certain extraneous investigations that do not
                                          8

perpetuate the roadside stop, but the stop is lawful only “so long as [unrelated]

inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Rodriguez, 575

U.S. at 355 (alteration in original) (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323,

333 (2009)).

      We applied Rodriguez’s rule again in State v. Salcedo to hold that an officer

cannot utilize delay tactics to prolong a lawful traffic stop until a drug dog arrives

on the scene. 935 N.W.2d 572, 579 (Iowa 2019). In that case, the defendant

consented to a vehicle search within fourteen minutes of being pulled over, which

ultimately revealed marijuana in the trunk before the dog ever arrived. Id. at

574–75. Although the stop was objectively short in light of the officer’s

suppression hearing testimony that it would take anywhere from ten to twenty-

five minutes to complete an average traffic stop, we found this stop violated the

Fourth Amendment because it was delayed by the officer’s actions unrelated to

investigating or processing the traffic violation. Id. at 576, 580–81. In reaching

the decision, we noted that the officer’s “complete lack of effort to address

Salcedo’s specific traffic infraction” was obvious from the evidence, such as body

camera footage that showed the officer repeatedly flipping through the pages of

a car rental agreement and his admitted failure to ask any questions related to
the traffic infraction during the stop. Id. at 580. Additionally, we found that the

officer was “no closer to completing the mission of the traffic stop than he was

prior to inviting Salcedo into his patrol car” to ask him a few questions. Id. at

580–81. We agreed with Salcedo’s argument that the officer was merely

“stringing along the stop until a drug dog arrived” and the delay was

“measurable, unreasonable, and in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.”

Id.

      To be clear, there is no time limit on traffic stops. “Whether a particular
detention is reasonable in length is a fact-intensive question, and there is no per
                                          9

se time limit on all traffic stops.” Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d at 510. For instance,

when complications arise while carrying out the original purposes of the stop,

law enforcement may reasonably detain a driver for a longer duration than when

a stop is strictly routine. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685–

87 (1985). The specific circumstances of the stop determine the outcome of each

case, so courts should conduct a thorough factual inquiry into the record. There-

fore, the timeline of relevant facts is particularly pertinent to our decision in this

case, and we discuss them in some detail.

      At approximately 12:35 p.m., Arrieta’s truck “failed” the PrePass, so he

pulled into the DOT weigh station. Waalkens met Areitta at his truck at approx-

imately 12:39 p.m. to begin the Level 3 inspection. Due to COVID-19 protocols

in place at the time, Waalkens put his email into the “Keep Trucking” app Arrieta

used for his logbook so Waalkens could access and review the log without being

in close contact. Waalkens then reviewed Arrieta’s information from his com-

puter inside the weigh station facility while Arrieta waited in his truck.

      Waalkens first scanned the bar codes on Arrieta’s driver’s license and the

registration form for the semi-tractor. The electronic system, which automati-

cally runs a warrant check and checks for current registration, reported that the
semi-tractor was stolen. Waalkens followed up with “Cedar Falls state radio” to

check the license plate and vehicle identification number (VIN). Although the

license plate number was not reported stolen, the VIN again registered as stolen.

Waalkens then asked state radio to check with the originating agency to see if

the stolen report was still valid while he continued his inspection. Waalkens

learned about this issue “right away,” which he estimated to be within the first

ten minutes. He continued his inspection while he waited for information about

whether the stolen report was valid.
                                              10

         As the inspection continued, Waalkens noticed discrepancies in Arrieta’s

paperwork that he found to be suspicious. The bill of lading showed that Arrieta

“was only hauling insulation from Minneapolis all the way back down to Texas,”

which Waalkens believed was not “fairly common” because “from [his] work ex-

perience” only hauling insulation on “that far of a trip . . . wouldn’t be a produc-

tive trip for the company at that point.” Waalkens also identified what he de-

scribed as inconsistencies from his review of Arrieta’s logbook. Arrieta was pri-

marily a local hauler in Texas, and he was not required to maintain a licensed

electronic logbook. The Keep Trucking app Arrieta used on his cell phone allowed

him to retroactively edit the location, miles, and times. Waalkens noted a few

instances in the log where Arrieta had changed duty status locations in Texas

with no recorded driving time. The logbook also showed that Arrieta drove the

770 miles “from Edmond, OK to Minneapolis, MN . . . in exactly 11 hours of

driving time” the prior day. Waalkens calculated (wrongly)1 that Arrieta “would

have averaged 77 mph during th[e] entire trip.” Finally, Waalkens found it sus-

picious that the logbook “did not specify what [Arrieta] brought up to Minneap-

olis, but he just had a trip to go all the way up to Minneapolis and then straight

back down to Texas.” These factors, combined with Waalkens’s “know[ledge] that
I-35 is a very popular corridor for drug trafficking,” led him to request a K-9 unit

to further inspect Arrieta’s truck.

         Waalkens testified he learned about the VIN discrepancy within the first

ten minutes of his investigation—after returning to the building and scanning

the bar code on the registration. After asking state radio to follow up on the

stolen report with the initiating authorities in Arlington, Texas, Waalkens turned

to the logbook. He testified he identified discrepancies in the logbook “within 20

         1Driving 770 miles over 11 hours would be an average of 70 mph, not 77 mph (770 ÷ 11

= 70).
                                         11

minutes of starting the inspection.” He estimated it took another “few minutes”

each to review the fuel tax receipts, bills of lading, and trailer registration.

      Waalkens called state radio to request a K-9 unit shortly before 1:34

p.m.—an hour after he began his inspection but before he received confirmation

about whether the stolen truck report was valid. Waalkens testified he “needed

to further investigate the log[]book and talk with Mr. Arrieta” when he called for

the K-9 unit. When asked to clarify whether, “in addition to discussing with [Ar-

rieta] log[]book issues,” there was “any other thing that was not yet completed

by the time you contacted state radio for a K-9,” Waalkens responded, “Just

reviewing the information with the driver.”

      At 1:34 p.m., while the K-9 unit was en route, state radio told Waalkens

not to hold Arrieta based on the stolen VIN report; the Arlington police depart-

ment had been contacted and reasoned that because the truck’s current regis-

tration was valid, the report was likely outdated. Waalkens testified that he nev-

ertheless continued holding Arrieta “because he was traveling from Texas to Min-

nesota[,] . . . the discrepancies in [his] log[]book changes in southern Texas, [and]

incorrect mileage on his log[]book.” Critically, based on our de novo review of the

record, by about 1:34 p.m. Waalkens was done with all of his tasks except going
over the inspection with the driver.

      Just before 2:00 p.m., the K-9 unit—Worth County Sheriff’s Office Chief

Deputy Jesse Luther and his dog Titan—arrived at the weigh station. Luther had

been in a meeting at the sheriff’s office in Northwood, the county seat, about ten

miles from the weigh station. When Waalkens’s request for a K-9 unit came in,

Luther asked his boss for permission to leave for the weigh station. He was

granted permission and “left the meeting within minutes.”

      When Luther arrived with Titan, Arrieta was still in his truck. Luther spoke
briefly with Waalkens and Arrieta, and then he and Titan began a free air sniff
                                        12

of the truck at 2:00 p.m. while Waalkens took Arrieta inside the weigh station to

review the paperwork. Luther and Titan first made a clockwise pass around the

truck, beginning from the front passenger side of the vehicle. During this first

pass, Luther allowed Titan to lead rather than directing him where to sniff. Lu-

ther noticed Titan “immediately showed signs of a breathing change” and was

“in odor” during the first trip around the truck and trailer. Titan did not ever

“alert” during this pass, though.

      The team then turned around for a counterclockwise pass. During this

pass, Luther cued Titan to sniff particular areas of the truck he wanted Titan to

focus on—a process he called “detailing.” As they came around the front driver’s

side corner of the truck, Titan jumped up and placed his paws on the truck twice

to reach the areas Luther directed him to sniff. First, Titan placed his front paws

on the truck’s tire to smell near the engine compartment, and then he placed

them on the fuel tank to smell near a seam in the truck’s body behind the driver’s

side door near the sleeper compartment. After smelling the seam, Titan gave an

alert that he had found the source of the odor of narcotics by sitting down.

      Luther informed Waalkens about the alert, and they questioned Arrieta,

who admitted having a “bowl” of marijuana in the sleeper compartment of his
truck, which he had smoked the night before to help him fall asleep. Arrieta

agreed that Waalkens could retrieve the marijuana, and Waalkens pulled his

cruiser behind the truck, advising dispatch that he would be searching the ve-

hicle based on Titan’s alert. This was at 2:06 p.m.—an hour and a half after

Arrieta first pulled into the weigh station. Waalkens found 0.29 grams of mari-

juana in Arrieta’s sleeper compartment; a search of the rest of the truck and

trailer revealed no additional marijuana or other narcotics. Arrieta was arrested

and charged with possession of marijuana.
                                         13

      In assessing whether Waalkens unduly prolonged the duration of the stop,

we acknowledge that this stop was not “normal” based on the report that Ar-

rieta’s truck might be stolen. Under our totality approach, we give proper weight

to the additional time required to complete this particular inspection given the

officer’s collateral investigation to determine if the truck was stolen. Even so, a

close review of the record reveals that the inspection should have reasonably

been completed before the K-9 unit arrived, and Waalkens no longer had author-

ity to detain Arrieta to conduct the free air sniff.

      The district court gave undue weight to Waalkens’s asserted need to in-

vestigate whether the truck was stolen to excuse the delay. Waalkens learned of

the report at the outset, called dispatch, and asked them to follow up. Mean-

while, he continued his investigation, discovering some discrepancies in Arietta’s

logbook within twenty minutes of starting the inspection. This would have been

around 1:00 p.m. He continued reviewing the logbook and other paperwork over

the next half hour and—other than talking to Arrieta—was finished with his re-

view when he received word that the stolen report was cleared up at 1:34 p.m.

This was approximately twenty-five minutes before Luther and Titan arrived.

Thus, even if we assume the officer’s calls with state radio added some measur-
able amount of time, the inspection should have wrapped up shortly after state

radio responded.

      The evidence in the record reveals that Waalkens was simply waiting inside

the weigh station between the time he talked to state radio at 1:34 p.m. and

Luther’s arrival just before 2:00 p.m. Waalkens testified he was done inspecting

the paperwork other than going over it with Arrieta when he called for the K-9

unit, which was before he talked to state radio. So, when he received confirma-

tion that the truck was not stolen at 1:34 p.m., there was no basis for Waalkens
to continue holding Arrieta except to go over the paperwork and discuss any
                                        14

logbook issues with him. Once he received the green light to not hold Arrieta

related to the stolen VIN report at 1:34 p.m., Waalkens should have been pre-

pared to talk to Arrieta then. Instead, he waited twenty-five minutes for Luther

to arrive before going to get Arrieta from his truck. Although we do not have a

bodycam video to reveal what Waalkens was doing in the meantime as we did in

Salcedo, 935 N.W.2d at 576, Waalkens admitted he only needed to review the

paperwork with Arrieta and offered no explanation for not doing that after talking

to state radio at 1:34 p.m. He certainly was not acting diligently to complete the

purpose of the traffic stop. Waalkens’s estimation of the time it took him to review

Arrieta’s documents and his admission that he only needed to review the paper-

work with Arrieta when he called for the K-9 unit reveal that he was “stringing

along the stop until a drug dog arrived.” Id. at 580; see also State v. Flanagan,

No. 20–0652, 2021 WL 4593222, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021) (holding an

unconstitutional delay occurred because the officer was less than expeditious in

completing his traffic-related mission by asking off-topic questions); State v.

Lopez-Cardenas, No. 15–2040, 2017 WL 3283279, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 2,

2017) (identifying officer’s “striking shift to slow motion” immediately upon dis-

covering the drug dog would be delayed as compelling evidence to support the
conclusion that unrelated checks unduly prolonged the traffic stop). Even cred-

iting the unusual circumstances present in this case, we conclude that here, as

in Salcedo, the delay was “measurable, unreasonable, and in violation of his

Fourth Amendment rights.” 935 N.W.2d at 581.

      On a motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search, “[t]he

defendant has the burden of proof as to whether a seizure occurred,” Fogg, 936

N.W.2d at 668, whereupon the burden shifts to the state to prove that its war-

rantless actions were justified, State v. Torres, 989 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Iowa 2023)
(“In seeking to sustain an exception to the warrant requirement, the state bears
                                       15

the burden of proof.” (quoting State v. Wilson, 968 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Iowa 2022))).

In this case, the State did not meet its burden because it failed to explain the

twenty-five-minute delay between the time Waalkens heard back from state radio

and the arrival of the drug dog, during which Waalkens should have been going

over the paperwork discrepancies with Arrieta. It is not enough to prove that the

inspection was still ongoing when the dog conducted the free air sniff. Rather,

the State’s burden of proving the stop was not extended beyond its lawful pur-

pose required evidence showing that Waalkens could not reasonably have com-

pleted the inspection before Luther arrived. Thus, the State failed to justify the

considerable delay to await the arrival of a drug dog, and, in the absence of rea-

sonable suspicion, violated Arrieta’s Fourth Amendment rights.

      The State makes a passing argument that Waalkens’s suspicions from Ar-

rieta’s logbook, the stolen vehicle report, and his travel along I-35 as a known

drug route provided reasonable suspicion to support delaying Arrieta beyond the

purpose for the initial stop. “When a person challenges a stop on the basis that

reasonable suspicion did not exist, the State must show by a preponderance of

the evidence that the stopping officer had specific and articulable facts, which

taken together with rational inferences from those facts, to reasonably believe
criminal activity may have occurred.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa

2004). We determine the existence of reasonable suspicion by considering the

totality of the circumstances facing the officer. State v. McIver, 858 N.W.2d 699,

702 (Iowa 2015). But an officer’s “[m]ere suspicion, curiosity, or hunch of crimi-

nal activity is not enough.” Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204.

      In considering the circumstances of the stop, the factors identified by the

State do not rise to the level needed to create reasonable suspicion that Arrieta

was engaged in criminal activity. We considered whether reasonable suspicion
justified prolonging a traffic stop to conduct a free air sniff in Pardee and came
                                         16

to a similar conclusion on more facts. In Pardee, the officer identified several

factors supporting reasonable suspicion, including “California plates, the

slowing down to sixty-five miles per hour, the failure to make eye contact with

the trooper, the oversight of leaving the right signal light on after pulling over,

the initial nervousness [of the vehicle occupants], the lived-in look of the vehicle,

[and] the air freshener [in the vehicle].” 872 N.W.2d at 394. We concluded that

the trooper “developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity—if at all—

only by prolonging the initial stop beyond the time reasonably necessary to

execute the traffic violation warnings.” Id. at 391.

      Moreover, the stolen vehicle report cannot be considered among the

circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to continue holding Arrieta

because Waalkens learned the truck was not stolen twenty-five minutes before

Titan began his sniff around the truck. Once the issue had been resolved by the

call from state radio, it could no longer be used to extend the stop. By Waalkens’s

own admission, the only task left before completing the inspection was reviewing

the paperwork with Arrieta. There is no justification for why Waalkens delayed

talking to Arrieta during the twenty-five minutes between resolving the

discrepancy in the stolen vehicle report and Titan conducting the free air sniff.
Therefore, Arrieta was improperly detained in violation of his Fourth Amendment

rights when the free air sniff occurred, and any evidence obtained as a result of

the search should have been suppressed.

      IV. Conclusion.

      The district court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED AND REMANDED.