Court Opinion

ID: 9949435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 17:09:43.027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:24.885240
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Spangler, 2024-Ohio-883.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                LOGAN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 8-23-02
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

ROGER D. SPANGLER,                                        OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                  Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
                           Trial Court No. CR 21 09 0261

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                             Date of Decision: March 11, 2024

APPEARANCES:

        Christopher Bazeley for Appellant

        Eric C. Stewart for Appellee
Case No. 8-23-02

MILLER, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Roger Spangler (“Spangler”), appeals the January

24, 2023 judgment of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

       {¶2} On September 14, 2021, Spangler was indicted by the Logan County

Grand Jury on four counts: Count One of operating a vehicle under the influence of

alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them (“OVI”) in violation of R.C.

4511.19(A)(1)(a), a fourth-degree felony; Count Two of domestic violence in

violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a first-degree misdemeanor; Count Three of

attempted felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.11(A)(2), a third-

degree felony; and Count Four of driving under OVI suspension in violation of R.C.

4510.14(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. Spangler initially entered not guilty pleas.

       {¶3} Spangler appeared for a change-of-plea hearing on December 20, 2022.

Pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, Spangler withdrew his not guilty plea with

respect to Count One and entered a plea of guilty.          In exchange, the State

recommended dismissal of the remaining counts.           The trial court accepted

Spangler’s guilty plea, found him guilty of Count One, and ordered a presentence

investigation (“PSI”). Further, the trial court dismissed the remaining counts of the

indictment.

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Case No. 8-23-02

       {¶4} On January 24, 2023, Spangler was sentenced to five years of

community control which included sixty days of local incarceration. Relevant to

this appeal, Spangler was also ordered to pay a fine of $5,000.00. That same day,

the trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence.

       {¶5} Spangler filed his notice of appeal on February 6, 2023. He raises two

assignments of error.      For ease of discussion, we will address Spangler’s

assignments of error in reverse order.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       Spangler’s plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily
       given.

       {¶6} In his second assignment of error, Spangler argues that the trial court

failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) before it accepted his guilty plea to OVI.

Specifically, Spangler contends the trial court erred by failing to correctly inform

him of the maximum fine associated with the offense.

                           Felony Pleas & Crim.R. 11(C)

       {¶7} “Because a no-contest or guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional

rights, a defendant’s decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary.” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 10. “If the plea

was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is

unconstitutional.” Id.

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Case No. 8-23-02

       {¶8} Crim.R. 11, which outlines the procedures that trial courts must follow

when accepting pleas, “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial

court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his

plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” Id. at ¶

11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975). Crim.R. 11(C), which

applies specifically to a trial court’s acceptance of pleas in felony cases, provides in

relevant part as follows:

       (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a
       plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest
       without first addressing the defendant personally * * * and doing all
       of the following:

       (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
       understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
       penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible
       for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at
       the sentencing hearing.

       (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
       understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the
       court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
       sentence.

       (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
       understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury
       trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory
       process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to
       require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
       doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify
       against himself or herself.

Crim.R.11(C)(2)(a)-(c).

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Case No. 8-23-02

       {¶9} “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on

appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trial-

court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13.

However, in the criminal-plea context, the Supreme Court of Ohio has carved out

two limited exceptions to the prejudice component of the traditional rule. Id. at ¶

14-15. First, when a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights listed in

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) that the defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, it is

presumed that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing

of prejudice is required. Id. at ¶ 14. Second, “a trial court’s complete failure to

comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show

prejudice.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 15. “Aside from these two exceptions, the

traditional rule continues to apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea

vacated unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to

comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16.

                                        Analysis

       {¶10} In determining whether to vacate a defendant’s plea due to a trial

court’s alleged noncompliance with Crim.R. 11(C), we engage in a three-step

inquiry. First, we ask whether the trial court has complied with the relevant portion

of Crim.R. 11(C). Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 17. If we

determine that the trial court has not complied fully with the relevant portion of

Crim.R. 11(C), we then query whether the failure is “of a type that excuses a

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Case No. 8-23-02

defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice.” Id. Finally, if we find that

the failure is not one of the two types that relieves the defendant of his burden to

demonstrate prejudice, we ask whether the defendant has shown that he was

prejudiced by the trial court’s noncompliance with Crim.R. 11(C). Id. Applying

this analysis to the facts of this case, we conclude that Spangler is not entitled to a

vacation of his guilty plea.

       {¶11} Spangler argues his conviction should be reversed because the trial

court failed to correctly inform him of the maximum fine. Accordingly, Spangler

contends the trial court did not inform him of the maximum penalty pursuant to

Crim.R.11 (C)(2)(a).

       {¶12} At the change-of-plea hearing, after informing Spangler of the

maximum term of incarceration for fourth-degree felony OVI, the trial court

engaged in the following dialogue with Spangler:

       [Trial Court]: There are fines involved. There is a minimum fine of
                     $1,350. The Court’s required to fine you that amount.
                     I can fine you up to $2,500. Do you understand that?

       [Spangler]:   Yes, sir.

(Dec. 20, 2022 Tr. at 11). However, R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d)(iii) provides that the

trial court must impose a mandatory fine between $1,350 and $10,500. Thus, the

trial court misspoke when it stated the maximum fine was $2,500. At the sentencing

hearing, the trial court ordered Spangler to pay a $5,000 fine, which was within the

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Case No. 8-23-02

permissible statutory range, albeit in excess of the $2,500 figure referenced by the

trial court.

        {¶13} “A criminal sentence consists of several distinct components,

including a prison sentence, a fine, postrelease control, and where applicable, certain

criminal statutory registration and notification requirements.” State v. Fabian, 12th

Dist. Warren No. CA2019-10-119, 2020-Ohio-3926, ¶ 20. “[A] trial court’s total

failure to inform a defendant of a distinct component of the maximum penalty

during a plea colloquy constitutes a complete failure to comply with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(a), thereby requiring the vacation of the defendant’s guilty or no contest

plea.” Id. “By contrast, a trial court’s mention of a component of the maximum

penalty during a plea colloquy, albeit incomplete or perhaps inaccurate, does not

constitute a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).” Id. Thus, the

trial court’s misstatement of the maximum fine does not constitute a complete

failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). See State v. Rogers, 12th Dist. Butler

No. CA2019-11-194, 2020-Ohio-4102, ¶ 23 (vacating the defendant-appellant’s

plea for making no mention of the fine and noting that “[t]he trial court did not

simply misinform Rogers about the fine, such as the amount or whether it was

mandatory or discretionary”).

        {¶14} Furthermore, although Spangler baldly asserts he would not have

entered a guilty plea if he was accurately informed of the maximum fine, he has

failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the trial court’s misstatement. In

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Case No. 8-23-02

fact, the record indicates that Spangler had actual knowledge of the maximum fine

at the time he entered his guilty plea. (Doc. No. 36). Specifically, the change-of-

plea petition initially indicated that the maximum fine for the offense was $5,000.

(Id.).   However, the $5,000 figure is crossed out by hand and $10,500 was

handwritten below it. (Id.). The initials of Spangler and his trial counsel appear

next to the correction. (Id.). Thus, the record indicates that Spangler was actually

aware of the maximum fine associated with fourth-degree felony OVI.

         {¶15} Accordingly, we decline to adopt Spangler’s argument and find that

his guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

         {¶16} Spangler’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                             First Assignment of Error

         The trial court erred when it imposed a fine above the statutory
         minimum without making a finding that Spangler had the ability
         to pay.

         {¶17} In his first assignment of error, Spangler argues that the trial court

erred by imposing a fine above the statutory minimum without specifically making

a finding that he had the ability to pay. We disagree.

                                        Relevant Law

         {¶18} R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) requires a trial court to “consider the offender’s

present and future ability to pay” before imposing a financial sanction or fine under

R.C. 2929.18 or 2929.32, respectively. “‘The trial court is not required to hold a

hearing on ability to pay, nor are there any specific factors to consider or findings

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Case No. 8-23-02

to make.’” State v. Wilkins, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-13-13, 2014-Ohio-983, ¶ 17,

quoting State v. Parker, 183 Ohio App.3d 431, 2009-Ohio-3667, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.).

“‘Furthermore, “a trial court need not explicitly state in its judgment entry that it

considered a defendant’s ability to pay a financial sanction. Rather, [appellate]

courts look to the totality of the record to see if the requirement has been satisfied.”’”

Id., quoting State v. Crish, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-08-13, 2008-Ohio-5196, ¶ 50,

quoting State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Ross No. 06CA2893, 2007-Ohio-1884, ¶ 42.

       {¶19} “‘“[W]hen a trial court has imposed a financial sanction without even

a cursory inquiry into the offender’s present and future means to pay the amount

imposed, the failure to make the requisite inquiry is an abuse of discretion.”’”

Parker at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Haney, 180 Ohio App.3d 554, 2009-Ohio-149, ¶ 22

(4th Dist.), quoting State v. Henderson, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 07CA659, 2008-Ohio-

2063, ¶ 5.

                                        Analysis

       {¶20} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court considered

Spangler’s financial situation, specifically his present and future ability to pay

before imposing the $5,000 fine.

       {¶21} At the sentencing hearing, Spangler’s trial counsel requested the trial

court grant Spangler work release, and in so doing, provided the trial court with

specific information regarding Spangler’s financial situation. (Jan. 23, 2023 Tr. at

5). Spangler’s counsel stated that Spangler was a self-employed contractor that

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Case No. 8-23-02

desires to continue running his business while serving his term of local

incarceration. (Id.). In fact, Spangler’s counsel offered to permit the trial court to

inspect several pending contracts, including contracts for $55,600 and $3,500. (Id.).

The trial court also addressed Spangler’s ability to work and present and future

ability to pay and acknowledged that Spangler had been “going to work” and

“paying [his] bills,” and functioning as a member of society in spite of his apparent

struggles with alcohol. (Id. at 8-9). Although the trial court did not grant Spangler’s

oral request for work release at the sentencing hearing, it indicated that it would

grant a properly-filed motion for work release provided that it was “reasonable” and

identified with specificity Spangler’s location and anticipated activities and

whereabouts. (Id. at 12).

       {¶22} Furthermore, the trial court stated that it had “thoroughly read and

reviewed” the PSI prepared in this case. (Id. at 10). The PSI included information

relating to Spangler’s educational background, health, work history, and financial

situation. (See PSI). Specifically, the PSI indicated that Spangler graduated from

college with an associate’s degree in business and continued his education for

several quarters at a four-year university. (PSI). Additionally, the PSI indicated

that Spangler is 58 years old, in good physical and mental health, and is not under a

physician’s care or prescribed any medications. (PSI). The PSI stated that Spangler

has operated a construction company since 2005 and Spangler estimated his income

at $3,200 per month, with some fluctuations due to the economy, COVID-19 health

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Case No. 8-23-02

crisis, and the seasonal nature of the business. (PSI). Moreover, Spangler’s

estimated income exceeded his itemized monthly expenses. (PSI). See State v.

West, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-22-07, 2022-Ohio-4069 ¶ 27-29; Parker, 2009-Ohio-

3667, at ¶ 14-16; State v. Clifford, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-04-06, 2005-Ohio-958,

¶ 14, reversed on other grounds, In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases,

109 Ohio St.3d 313, 2006-Ohio-2109; Crish, 2008-Ohio-5196, at ¶ 50 (“When the

trial court considers information in the [PSI] relating to the defendant’s age, health,

education, and employment history, that is sufficient to comply with R.C.

2929.19(B)[5].”). Accordingly, the record indicates that the trial court considered

Spangler’s present and future ability to pay and we reject his argument to the

contrary.

       {¶23} Spangler’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                     Conclusion

       {¶24} For the foregoing reasons, Spangler’s assignments of error are

overruled.   Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Logan County Court

of Common Pleas.

                                                                  Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls

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