Court Opinion

ID: 9728628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:12:49.334757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:50.447270
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
Although I agree with the result reached by the Majority in reversing the decision of the Superior Court, I strongly disagree with the rationale relied upon by the Majority in reaching that conclusion. Because I am strongly opposed to providing an absolute right of appeal from an order disposing of a motion in limine on the bare allegation of the District Attorney that the prosecution is substantially handicapped, I must write separately.
The majority concludes that orders excluding significant Commonwealth evidence on motions in limine are final in the same manner as are suppression orders and, therefore, such orders are appealable, as are suppression orders, upon certification by the Commonwealth that the exclusion of that evidence substantially handicaps the prosecution. See, Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985). Contrary to position of the majority, I find that a suppression order differs significantly, both in design and purpose, from a motion in limine.
A motion in limine is a pre-trial motion requesting the court to prohibit opposing counsel from referring to or offering into evidence matters so highly prejudicial to the moving party that curative instructions cannot alleviate an adverse effect on the jury. (Black’s Law Dictionary Fifth Ed.). Thus, a motion in limine deals with the relevancy, probativeness and prejudice of a piece of evidence.
A suppression motion, on the other hand, does not look at the relevancy of the evidence sought to be excluded. Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985), the case upon which the majority relies for support, this Court stated as follows:
*567To require that a suppression record be cluttered with questions of ultimate relevance is senseless. A suppression record ought not, and properly handled does not, disclose the ultimate relevance of a piece of evidence or why a prosecution could not go forth if that evidence is suppressed.
The relevancy of a piece of evidence can rarely be seen outside the context of the case, even then, not always clearly. Most often considerable thought and argument must be supplied before a piece of evidence is clearly discerned as relevant. All relevant evidence may not be necessary to a prosecution, but one piece of suppressed evidence may make all other evidence irrelevant. It is an argument all its own and certainly must be an argument dehors the record of a suppression court.
Id., 506 Pa. at 546, 486 A.2d at 386.
The issue to be determined in a suppression motion is whether such evidence was improperly obtained and, therefore, inadmissible. Clearly, an erroneous suppression order may deprive the Commonwealth of a conviction it would otherwise have obtained had the suppressed evidence been admitted. The evidence suppressed has already, in effect, been determined to be relevant. Thus, if the Commonwealth were not permitted to appeal such orders, it may well suffer the consequences of an acquittal because suppressed evidence was not admissible. The Commonwealth would then be deprived of any meaningful opportunity to secure an appellate court determination of the validity of the order of suppression. Indeed, this Court has deemed such orders “final” for purposes of appeal because of the practical effects that an order suppressing relevant evidence has on the prosecution. See, Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963).
While I would concede that some motions in limine involve purely legal questions, many such motions call for evidentiary rulings based upon the trial court’s inherent authority to control the admission of evidence at trial. The latter requires the trial court to balance the prejudice which may result to the defendant should the evidence be admit*568ted against the probative value of that evidence, a function solely within the province of the trial court. A motion in limine requires a preliminary ruling which is subject to change during the course of trial should the balance tip in favor of admission. See, 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 458. Thus, all orders disposing of a motion in limine are not necessarily “final,” as the majority so concludes.
Not all evidence excluded by an order granting a motion in limine necessarily precludes the Commonwealth from presenting evidence essential to its prosecution. As noted above, some evidence is simply irrelevant. And, while some evidence which is the subject of a motion in limine may, indeed, substantially handicap the prosecution, the rules permit an appeal upon certification of the trial court. See, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b); Pa.R.App.P. 312, 1311-1312. To permit the Commonwealth the right to appeal all orders granting a motion in limine will inundate the appellate courts with evidentiary rulings, the subject of which should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Moreover, contrary to the holding of the majority, I strongly believe that trial strategy in criminal cases will be guided in an undesirable direction should the Commonwealth be permitted to appeal all orders granting a motion in limine with unfettered discretion. Based upon the majority opinion, no sane defense counsel would file a motion in limine because if successful, the Commonwealth will be able to directly appeal that judicial determination claiming that the prosecution was substantially harmed, thereby self-authenticating that harm without risk of future penalty.1 The Commonwealth, then, will be the only party filing motions in limine. If the Commonwealth is unsuccessful in asserting its position and the court denies the motion, the majority opinion now provides the prosecution an absolute *569right of automatic appeal from that determination. Thus, the majority opinion creates a situation where, through no fault of the defense, a defendant may be required either to remain in jail or at bail, effectively waiving his speedy trial rights. This is unacceptable.
The majority opinion fails to take into account the right of a defendant to a speedy trial, instead focusing only on the right of the prosecution to present all its evidence. Rather than look only to the fact that the Commonwealth may be precluded from presenting all its available evidence, we should employ a balancing test in which a court, as opposed to the prosecution making an unilateral decision, will weigh the severity of the harm to the prosecution against the right of the defendant to have a speedy trial. The procedure currently in effect whereby the trial court may certify for appeal an order involving a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion where an immediate appeal of that order may materially advance the ultimate determination of the matter, addresses both concerns. 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b). To allow the Commonwealth the absolute right to appeal an order granting or denying a motion in limine will provide the prosecution a license to delay the case to the prejudice of the defendant even where the evidence excluded may not be relevant to the prosecution. This balancing test is simply not necessary when dealing with a motion to suppress because only the defense will file such motions, whereas both the Commonwealth and the defense file motions in limine.
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons I believe the direct appeal by the Commonwealth in this case should have been quashed.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

. Under the majority opinion, the question arises as to whether defense counsel could now be deemed ineffective for filing a motion in limine, traditionally filed as a courtesy to the court on which counsel obtains a favorable ruling which is then certified and appealed by the Commonwealth and subsequently reversed, rather than objecting to that evidence during trial and obtaining a ruling thereon which is not immediately appealable.