Court Opinion

ID: 9555066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 18:00:40.35735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:05.979001
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10227       Document: 00516853232           Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/10/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                                   ____________                                    FILED
                                                                             August 10, 2023
                                    No. 22-10227                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                   ____________                                    Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

   Emmanuel Alexander Teijeiro,

                                             Defendant—Appellant.
                    ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 1:19-CR-121-1
                   ______________________________

   Before Duncan and Wilson, Circuit Judges, and Mazzant, District
   Judge. *
   Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
          Emmanuel Teijeiro pled guilty of possessing child pornography, in vi-
   olation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) & (b)(2). The district court sentenced
   him to 168 months in prison and ordered him to pay his victims $46,000 in
   restitution. On appeal, Teijeiro challenges whether he was competent to

          _____________________
          *
             United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
   designation.
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                                     No. 22-10227

   enter into the plea agreement and whether the record supported the restitu-
   tion order. Because neither challenge has merit, we AFFIRM.
                                          I.
          In 2019, the Abilene Police Department followed a CyberTip
   regarding possible child pornography associated with Teijeiro’s roommate,
   Aeriel Jaggard. Officers interviewed Teijeiro, Jaggard, and a third roommate,
   all of whom admitted to watching child pornography regularly. Teijeiro in
   particular admitted to viewing child pornography habitually since 2014 and
   confessed, among other things, his attraction to children as young as
   “babies.” Oddly, though, Teijeiro claimed that he intentionally caused his
   own arrest so he could report his suspicions about predatory activity by his
   own father.
          Teijeiro agreed to a polygraph, during which he stated that he
   masturbated weekly to child pornography and described the types of videos
   he had recently viewed. He also admitted to engaging in sexual contact with
   children several times. Upon examining Teijeiro’s cell phone, authorities
   discovered over 2,000 images depicting child sexual abuse and child
   pornography, which included children as young as toddlers and babies.
          Teijeiro was arrested after a federal grand jury indicted him on one
   count of possessing material containing an image of prepubescent child
   pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) & (b)(2). Teijeiro
   pled guilty and entered into a plea agreement under which he waived his right
   to “appeal the conviction, sentence, fine and order of restitution or forfeiture
   in an amount to be determined by the district court.” As relevant here, the
   waiver contained certain exceptions, including reserving Teijeiro’s
   “right . . . to bring a direct appeal of . . . a sentence exceeding the statutory
   maximum” and his right “to challenge the voluntariness of [his] plea of guilty
   or th[e] waiver.” However, the agreement confirmed that it was “freely and

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   voluntarily made and [was] not the result of threats, or of promises apart from
   those set forth in this plea agreement.”
          At arraignment, the magistrate judge explained he was going to ask
   Teijeiro questions to “ensure that [he was] thinking clearly and fully
   underst[oo]d what [he was] doing, because pleading guilty to this charge
   [was] obviously a very serious matter.” Teijeiro confirmed that he was not
   currently receiving (nor had received for the past year) medical care for any
   reason, including mental health; that he was not on medication; and that
   nothing interfered with his ability to think clearly and understand his guilty
   plea. Counsel on each side acknowledged they had no reason to doubt
   Teijeiro’s competence, and the magistrate judge found him “competent to
   understand these proceedings and to enter a knowing and voluntary plea.”
   Additionally, the magistrate judge asked Teijeiro if he understood that being
   convicted of this charge could possibly deprive him of certain valuable civil
   rights; that he would be put on the sex-offender registry; and that the
   conviction would likely substantially restrict where he could live, work, and
   with whom he could associate. Teijeiro responded, “[y]es, understood” to
   these questions.
          Following this colloquy, the magistrate judge confirmed that Teijeiro
   still believed it was in his best interest to plead guilty and that Teijeiro had
   discussed the plea with his attorney. Accordingly, the magistrate judge found
   that Teijeiro was “fully competent and capable of entering an informed
   plea,” and that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The district court
   accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation without objection.
          When compiling the presentence report (“PSR”), a probation officer
   interviewed Teijeiro over the phone. Teijeiro admitted “he [was] guilty of
   this offense,” but also made some erratic statements. For example, he
   reiterated that he “confess[ed] to the possession of illegal research materials

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   for the purpose of reporting a sex offender to a federal judge,” in part to
   “unfreeze [his bank] account,” which allegedly held funds for writing the
   pilot of the television show “Family Guy.” Teijeiro also claimed he had
   “cured” himself in the early 2000s of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
   depression, panic attacks, and anxiety. While Teijeiro admits these
   statements were not verified by medical records or interviews, he points to
   his receipt of social security disability income due to mental illness, and a
   2007 statement his mother made to police regarding his bipolar disorder.
          The PSR also explained that both the Mandatory Victim Restitution
   Act of 1996 and the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim
   Assistance Act of 2018 applied. The court was therefore required to calculate
   the “full amount of the victim’s losses and . . . order restitution in an amount
   that reflect[ed] [Teijeiro’s] relative role in the causal process . . . but which
   [was] no less than $3,000.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2). The PSR and its
   addendum contained detailed information from professionals regarding the
   victims’ economic losses and future treatment expenses, as well as victim
   impact statements. The addendum recommended that the district court
   order restitution to the eleven victims in amounts ranging from $3,000 to
   $10,000 each, totaling $46,000.
          Teijeiro did not object to any of the PSR’s factual findings and
   acknowledged that the calculated guideline range of 135 to 168 months was
   accurate. Before sentencing, Teijeiro submitted a memorandum asking for a
   within-guidelines sentence of 135 months. The memo declared that Teijeiro
   “suffer[ed] from mental health issues, which ha[d] classified him as disabled
   by the Social Security Administration,” and which were either caused or
   exacerbated by the physical, emotional, and sexual abuse he suffered as a
   child. It also stated that “Mr. Teijeiro has taken responsibility for his
   conduct[,] . . . [and] he is remorseful and realizes the behavior was not just
   illegal but wrong ethically and morally.”

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            At the sentencing hearing, Teijeiro again stated that he felt obligated
   to view child pornography to get another offender off the streets, and so he
   “manufactured a charge” against himself. The court asked counsel for
   Teijeiro and the government whether they knew of “any reason” the court
   could not lawfully impose a sentence; both attorneys said they did not.
   Teijeiro was sentenced to 168 months in prison. Adopting the PSR’s factual
   findings and legal conclusions, the court also ordered Teijeiro to pay $46,000
   in restitution.
            Teijeiro timely appealed, but the attorney appointed to represent him
   moved to withdraw, arguing the appeal was frivolous. Teijeiro filed a pro se
   response in which he again made irrational assertions—such as that he
   manufactured the charge and that he spoke to President Obama about his
   money earned from writing the television pilot. We denied the motion to
   withdraw as inadequate, and Teijeiro’s appointed attorney filed an appellate
   brief.
                                          II.
            Teijeiro raises three arguments on appeal. First, he argues his plea was
   not knowing and voluntary because he was incompetent. Second, he argues
   the district court erred by failing to order a competency evaluation sua sponte.
   Third, he argues the restitution order was not supported by adequate
   findings. We consider each in turn.
                                          A.
            First, competency to plead guilty. The government argues we should
   review this issue for plain error because Teijeiro neither challenged the
   knowing and voluntary nature of his plea in the district court nor sought to
   withdraw his guilty plea. Teijeiro argues for review under a clearly erroneous
   standard, because competency is a mixed question of law and fact. We need

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   not decide which standard is appropriate, because Teijeiro would fail under
   either one.
          At Teijeiro’s rearraignment hearing, the district court had no reason
   to believe his plea was not knowing or voluntary. Teijeiro essentially
   concedes as much in his brief: “It was during the PSR interview[] that
   [Teijeiro] first started exhibiting potential competency issues.” Elsewhere,
   the brief admits that “the evidence of potential incompetency did not come
   to the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s attention until after the guilty plea hearing.” These
   concessions are supported by the record. For example, during rearraignment,
   Teijeiro confirmed to the magistrate judge that he understood the
   consequences of his plea, that he had reviewed the agreement with his
   counsel, and that he was pleading guilty because he was “in fact, guilty, and
   for no other reason.”
          Teijeiro now argues that, given the irrational statements in the PSR,
   one of the attorneys should have moved for a competency evaluation before
   sentencing. This argument is meritless. Teijeiro cites no authority for the
   proposition that erratic statements in a PSR can somehow retroactively
   undermine the defendant’s competency to plead guilty. To the contrary, the
   plain language of the plea agreement and Teijeiro’s testimony have a “strong
   presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); United
   States v. McDaniels, 907 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2018). Teijeiro has failed to
   overcome that presumption.
          Accordingly, the district court did not err in adopting the magistrate
   judge’s finding that Teijeiro was competent to plead guilty.
                                          B.
          Teijeiro next argues that the district court should have ordered a
   competency hearing sua sponte, given his statements to the probation officer
   during the PSR interview and during the sentencing hearing.

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          We have sometimes reviewed this kind of claimed error for abuse of
   discretion. See United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 2002);
   United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 303 (5th Cir. 1995). We have reviewed for
   plain error, however, when a defendant has failed to make a competency
   objection during the guilty plea hearing and does not seek to withdraw his
   guilty plea. See United States v. Montoya, 838 F. App’x 898, 898 (5th Cir.
   2021) (per curiam); United States v. Villarreal, 405 F. App’x 833, 833 (5th
   Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Because Teijeiro loses under either standard, “we
   decline to decide whether the stricter plain error standard of review is
   applicable.” United States v. Rey, No. 21-40836, 2022 WL 6316459, at *1 (5th
   Cir. Oct. 7, 2022).
          Convicting a legally incompetent defendant offends due process. See
   Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). “A defendant therefore has a
   procedural due process right to a competency hearing if the evidence before
   the district court ‘raises a bona fide doubt as to [the] defendant’s competence
   to stand trial.’” United States v. Barajas, No. 20-10582, 2021 WL 3437979, at
   *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2021) (quoting Pate, 383 U.S. at 385) (alteration in
   original)). “A defendant is competent to stand trial if he has the present
   ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
   understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
   proceeding[] against him.” United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir.
   2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original).
          To order a competency hearing, a district court must have
   “reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering
   from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the
   extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
   proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C.
   § 4241(a). But the existence of “mental or emotional problems or mental
   illness ‘is not dispositive as to . . . competency.’” Barajas, 2021 WL 3437979,

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   at *4 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 709 F.3d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 2013)).
   Instead, we consider three factors to detect whether a court reversibly erred
   by failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte: (1) any prior medical
   opinion on competency, (2) the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and (3) any
   history of irrational behavior. See United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 463
   (5th Cir. 2002). Here, no factor supports Teijeiro’s argument.
           The first factor weighs strongly against Teijeiro. While pointing to the
   irrational statements he made during his arrest, arraignment, and sentencing,
   he nonetheless concedes that “[t]here are no prior medical opinions about
   [his] competency in the record.” See Barajas, 2021 WL 343979, at *4.
   Moreover, receiving Social Security disability benefits is not tantamount to a
   medical declaration of incompetency. See ibid.
           The second factor, Teijeiro’s demeanor in court, also cuts against
   him. He acted cordially, took responsibility for his actions, apologized for his
   criminal behavior, and stated he understood the purpose of the hearings.
   Teijeiro counters by pointing to his off-key contention at sentencing—
   namely, that he manufactured the charge in order to draw attention to his
   father. This argument is unavailing. In Mitchell, we found no error in not sua
   sponte ordering a competency hearing because, “[d]espite [the defendant’s]
   illogical and rambling statements,” his testimony “illustrated his basic
   awareness and understanding of the proceedings.” 709 F.3d at 441. So too
   here.
           Finally, the third factor, Teijeiro’s irrational behavior, also fails to
   support him. Yes, Teijeiro made some strange statements about arranging his
   own arrest and writing a television pilot. But these assertions were not so
   irrational to show that the district court abused its discretion by not sua sponte
   addressing Teijeiro’s competency. As discussed, despite his odd assertions,

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   Teijeiro consistently admitted his guilt, affirmed he understood the
   proceedings, and asked for a “fair” punishment.
           In sum, we see no reversible error in the district court’s not holding a
   sua sponte competency hearing prior to sentencing Teijeiro.
                                              C.
           Lastly, Teijeiro contends the district court erred by ordering
   restitution without first determining his relative role in causing the victims’
   claimed losses.
           As a threshold matter, the government argues we should not reach this
   argument because Teijeiro waived his right to appeal the “order of
   restitution . . . in an amount to be determined by the district court.” 1 Teijeiro
   counters that, because the district court neglected to analyze how his offense
   proximately caused the victims’ losses under Paroline v. United States, 572
   U.S. 434, 448 (2014), his appeal falls under the waiver’s exception for a
   “sentence exceeding the statutory maximum.” We review de novo whether
   an appeal waiver bars an appeal. United States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752, 754 (5th
   Cir. 2014).
           The government asserts that Teijeiro’s argument is foreclosed by
   United States v. Meredith, 52 F.4th 984 (5th Cir. 2022). Meredith concluded
   that “the statutory-maximum carveout authorizes an appeal only when the
   district court exceeds ‘the upper limit of punishment that Congress has
   legislatively specified for violations of a statute’—not when the sentencing
           _____________________
           1
              The government also argues Teijeiro forfeited this argument by failing to
   adequately brief it. We disagree. Teijeiro’s briefing—which includes the standard of
   review, discusses applicable law, and explains how he believes the district court erred—is
   sparse but enough to preserve his argument. See SEC v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir.
   2022) (“To be adequate, a brief must ‘address the district court’s analysis and explain how
   it erred.’” (quoting Rollins v. Home Depot, 8 F.4th 393, 397 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021))).

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   judge commits any error under the sentencing statute.” Id. at 987 (quoting
   United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2005)). Meredith, however,
   addressed 18 U.S.C. § 3663, the general restitution statute authorizing
   “restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a
   plea agreement.” Id. at 987 & n.1 (citation omitted).
          Teijeiro’s restitution was ordered under a different statute, 18 U.S.C.
   § 2259. We addressed that statute in United States v. Winchel, holding that
   “if a court orders a defendant to pay restitution under § 2259 without
   determining that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the victim’s
   claimed losses, the amount of restitution necessarily exceeds the statutory
   maximum.” 896 F.3d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 2018). The government does not
   meaningfully try to distinguish Winchel.
          After briefing concluded in this case, we decided United States v.
   Alfred, 60 F.4th 979 (5th Cir. 2023). That case distinguished Winchel on the
   ground that, there, the district court performed the Paroline analysis and the
   appeal merely challenged its outcome. See Alfred, 60 F.4th at 982 (“Because
   it is clear that the district court considered the Paroline factors at sentencing
   and ordered restitution as authorized by § 2259, the statutory-maximum
   exception does not apply.”). That is not the case here: the district court did
   not address Paroline. Winchel therefore controls and we proceed to the
   merits. See United States v. Leal, 933 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding
   appeal waiver did not bar a Paroline-based appeal even without an exception
   for sentences exceeding the statutory maximum).
          On the merits, we review for plain error because Teijeiro did not
   object to the restitution order. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135
   (2009). As such, we have discretion to correct an error only if it “(1) was not
   intentionally relinquished or abandoned, (2) was plain, i.e. not subject to
   reasonable dispute, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial

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   rights.” Leal, 933 F.3d at 431. Even so, we will reverse only if “the error also
   ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings.’” Id. at 431–32 (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578
   U.S. 189, 194 (2016)).
          Section 2259 provides that “a court [can] order restitution, but only
   to the extent it is shown that the defendant in question proximately caused
   the victim’s losses.” Winchel, 896 F.3d at 389. In Paroline, the Supreme
   Court enumerated certain factors as “rough guideposts” for this inquiry:
          [1] the number of past criminal defendants found to have
          contributed to the victim’s general losses;
          [2] reasonable predictions of the number of future offenders
          likely to be caught and convicted for crimes contributing to the
          victim’s general losses;
          [3] any available and reasonably reliable estimate of the broader
          number of offenders involved (most of whom will, of course,
          never be caught or convicted);
          [4] whether the defendant reproduced or distributed images of
          the victim;
          [5] whether the defendant had any connection to the initial
          production of the images;
          [6] how many images of the victim the defendant possessed;
          [7] and other facts relevant to the defendant’s relative causal
          role.
   572 U.S. at 460 (brackets added). The factors, however, “need not be
   converted into a rigid formula,” ibid., and we have since directed district
   courts to use discretion and sound judgment in applying them. Leal, 933 F.3d
   at 432. Moreover, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the analysis may be
   “difficult” when, as is the case here, the defendant is “one of thousands who

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   have possessed and will in the future possess the victim’s images but who has
   no other connection to the victim.” Paroline, 572 U.S. at 449.
           We find helpful guidance in our recent opinion in United States v.
   Musgraves, No. 21-10947, 2022 WL 7283887 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2022), which
   addressed an analogous situation. 2 Musgraves affirmed a restitution award
   where the district court relied on detailed victim impact statements. Id. at *1.
   The district court ordered restitution in the amounts the victims requested,
   which represented only a small percentage of each of the victim’s
   demonstrated total losses. Ibid. Further, there was no indication that any of
   the victims received duplicative recovery. Ibid.
           That is exactly the case here. The district court adopted the PSR,
   which included the estimated total loss of each victim and an addendum with
   victim impact statements demonstrating how offenders like Teijeiro have
   perpetuated the victims’ abuse. The restitution amounts ordered comply
   with the victims’ requested amounts and represent only a small percentage
   of the demonstrated losses. 3 Moreover, there is no indication of duplicative
   recovery. 4

           _____________________
           2
             “An unpublished opinion issued after January 1, 1996 is not controlling
   precedent, but may be persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th
   Cir. 2006) (citing 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4).
           3
            For example, the largest individual amount, $10,000 for Sierra from the
   Jan_Sock1 Series, represents less than one percent of her estimated total losses.
           4
              Accordingly, this case is distinguishable from a case like Winchel. There, we
   vacated a restitution award where the government conceded the first three plain error
   prongs and the district court had ordered an extraordinarily large restitution amount. See
   Winchel, 896 F.3d at 389 (explaining that “[w]hen a court orders a defendant to pay nearly
   $1.5 million in restitution without determining whether that amount complies with a basic
   statutory requirement—in this case, § 2259’s proximate causation requirement—the
   fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings are seriously
   undermined”).

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          Accordingly, Teijeiro “fails to show that there is a reasonable
   probability that such error resulted in his accountability for damages he did
   not cause or that the district court would have imposed a lower restitution
   amount but for any error.” Musgraves, 2022 WL 7283887, at *1.
                                       ***
                                                                AFFIRMED.

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