Court Opinion

ID: 9556199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 16:06:03.690495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:40.663924
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed August 16, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D23-1123
                       Lower Tribunal No. 15-29351
                          ________________

            Warren Gammill & Associates, P.L., et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

                          Stefanny Sommers,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Beatrice Butchko, Judge.

      Warren Gammill & Associates, P.L., and Warren P. Gammill, for
appellants.

      Coffey Burlington, P.L., and Jeffrey B. Crockett and Jared Whaley, for
appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ.

     LOGUE, C.J.

     Warren Gammill & Associates, P.L. and Warren Gammill, Esquire,

seek review of the trial court’s decision disqualifying Mr. Gammill from
representing the firm. This case presents the issue of whether, under the

advocate-witness rule, a trial judge may disqualify an attorney from

representing his law firm in its libel trial against its client, set to be tried before

a jury. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.7(a).

      Rule 4-3.7 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar is intended to

prevent the prejudice and confusion that may result when one person

combines the role of witness, who is limited to testifying truthfully to matters

in his or her personal knowledge, with advocate, who is free to comment on

and explain the evidence. Comment, R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.7.

Disqualification in these circumstances turns on the trial judge weighing the

nature of the lawyer’s testimony with the potential for confusion and prejudice

in the circumstances of the case. Id. (“Whether the tribunal is likely to be

misled or the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the

nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's

testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that

of other witnesses.”). Accordingly, we review the trial court’s decision under

an abuse of discretion standard.

      Given the centrality and controverted nature of Mr. Gamill’s testimony

regarding the firm’s claim of libel, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion. In so ruling, we distinguish Philip M. Warren, P.A. v.

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Arcara, 566 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), where the court allowed a

lawyer to act as an attorney and witness in a case where his professional

association sued a client for unpaid attorney’s fees. As the rule itself

recognizes, disputes before judges over the amount of attorney’s fees

present less potential for confusion and prejudice than other cases.

Comment, R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.7 (“Subdivisions (a)(2) and (3)

recognize that, where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal

services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting

the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to

resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has first-hand

knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the

adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony.”).

      Affirmed.

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