Court Opinion

ID: 9791745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:16:57.853297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:37.787419
License: Public Domain

HATHAWAY, Judge
(dissenting).
The entire difficulty between the parties' seems to stem from their religious differences, as was brought out at the end of *72tfce first hearing by the following colloquy between the court and appellee:
“THE COURT: If you wife was a good Baptist or a good Methodist or a good Presbyterian, or Episcopalian, perhaps I think you are probably generally . familiar with the tenets of those religions. They may not be just like your own, but they are not too far removed. Do. you Think you would be in court here today ?
.MR. STAPLEY: No, I would not be.
■ 'THE COURT: Would you have any great objection to her going to Los Angeles to spend a week or two on the beach even if they attended a Presbyterian conference of some kind for a ■couple days?
MR. STAPLEY: No, I would not.
THE COURT: It is generally probably a truism as far as you are concerned, the root of all of this problem is the teachings of the religion and what you allege ' to be the consequences of that as it reflects on the children?
MR. STAPLEY: Directly against ’normal society, yes.”
The mother, as custodian of the children under the decree, was charged with the responsibility of making decisions concernirig the children’s care, control, education, health and religion. 24 Am.Jur.2d 903, Divorce and Separation § 796; Lerner v. Superior Court for San Mateo County, 38 Cal.2d 676, 242 P.2d 321 (1952) ; Donahue v. Donahue, 142 N.J.Eq. 701, 61 A.2d 243 (1948); Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1410, 1428 (1959). American courts are constitutionally forbidden to interfere with religious practices so long as they do not involve illegal activities. Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1410, 1412 (1959). The mother, as custodian of the children, directed them in religious activities and friction and turmoil resulted when, during visitation, the father exposed them to his religious beliefs. The evidence does not appear to implicate appellant any more than it does appellee as the source of contention. Our Supreme Court in Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190, 193, 367 P.2d 230, 233 (19.61) has held:
“A parent who teaches a child doctrines at variance with majority views does not give rise to grounds sufficient to support a change of custody.”
The trial court found the mother in contempt for refusing to comply with orders of the court allowing the father to exercise certain visitation rights; she failed to notify the father of illness; and she allowed the children to distribute religious literature to the public. The facts relating to the question of the failure of the mother to grant the father’s visitation rights are in dispute. The periods of visitation which the father contends were wrongfully precluded by appellant were: Christmas, 1968; weekend of March 21, 1969; July 3rd and 4th, 1969; July 6th and 7th, 1969 (Walter’s birthday) ; weekend of July 11, 1969. In the court’s order of September 18, 1969, the appellant was found in contempt of court as the result of her denial of visitation on the above occasions. In that order the court modified the divorce decree giving the father temporary custody for certain specified periods, but denied -the request for change of custody. In connection with the denial of visitation on the weekend of July 11th and 13th, 1969, appellee points out that appellant took the children out of Arizona, in violation of court order, to a Jehovah’s Witness rally in Los Angeles, California. But, change of custody was denied. The court should not have reconsidered matters ruled upon and remedied. In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966).
Appellee points out that he was forced to get a court order to obtain his visitation rights during Christmas of 1970 and that this was further grounds for custody change. The appellee did obtain his visitation rights albeit through the court. Such contempt is no basis for a custody change, the remedy being punishment by the court of the spouse who is in contempt. As stated in 24 Am. Jur.2d 921, Divorce and Separation § 810:
“The failure of a mother to permit visitation by the father will not in itself warrant a change in custody; nothing short of a showing of unfitness will warrant a *73change of custody, and a denial of visitation rights does not conclusively establish unfitness for custody.”
Except for Christmas, 1970, the other visitation defalcations complained of had been previously presented to the court and dealt with in the prior orders. The parties’ remarriage was also considered at the prior hearing. Appellee complains of appellant’s violation of the September 18, 1969 decree by her failure on occasion to inform him of illness or injury to the children and not allowing him to participate in selecting a physician for treatment. The medical problems were minor and appellee was advised shortly after the treatment. A breach of the September 18, 1969 order was insignificant.
Appellee’s fear that if the children should need a “whole” blood transfusion, appellant would not allow it, was dealt with in the September 18th decree giving appellee full control over such a decision, which appellant agreed to follow. This provision has not been violated and speculation that it will be does not suffice to change custody. Appellant did violate the September 18th order by allowing the children to distribute material door-to-door, but that is best handled through contempt proceedings, if such conduct is contemptuous. The welfare of children is generally promoted by stability in their custodial circumstances, and the custody should therefore not be changed except for the most cogent reasons, Galbraith v. Galbraith, 88 Ariz. 358, 362, 356 P.2d 1023, 1026 (1960); Gotthelf v. Gotthelf, 38 Ariz. 369, 300 P. 186 (1931); Davis v. Davis, 78 Ariz. 174, 277 P.2d 261 (1954); and then, only if the welfare of the children will be advanced thereby, Ward v. Ward, 88 Ariz. 130, 353 P.2d 895 (1960). Preference should be given to the mother where the custody of children of tender years, particularly requiring their mother’s care, are involved, provided all other things are equal. Johnson v. Johnson, 64 Ariz. 368, 172 P.2d 848 (1946); Patterson v. Patterson, 63 Ariz. 499, 163 P.2d 850 (1945). This policy is aptly stated in Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 6, 17 (1969):
“One facet of the relative fitness criterion which has been elevated by the courts into something approaching an independent principle is the rule, re.peated in nearly all the cases, that ordinarily the custody of an infant of tender years should be given to the mother on the ground that the mother is the natural guardian and custodian of her child and that there is no substitute for a mother’s love.”
Courts are loath to deprive a mother of custody of young children unless she has; been shown unfit to provide them a suitable home. 27B C.J.S. 457-458, Divorce §• 309(4). Custody change certainly is not. an appropriate sanction for contempt. I do not believe the record reveals cogent reasons showing the change is advantageous to the children’s welfare.