Court Opinion

ID: 9573411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:54:41.186057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:54.018640
License: Public Domain

Hines, Justice,
dissenting.
Today the majority of this Court drastically changes the law.
[B]ecause the majority opinion unwarrantedly abandons established precedent, ignores legislative prerogatives, provides no guidance, fails to consider the ramifications of its holding, and destroys predictability, certainty, and stability in the law, I must respectfully dissent to the judgment of the majority in this case.
AT&T Corp. v. Sígala, 274 Ga. 137, 145 (549 SE2d 373) (2001) (Ben-ham, J., dissenting). The majority has violently shaken the salutary doctrine of stare decisis.
Stability and certainty in law are desirable; stare decisis is a valid and compelling basis of argument. [Cits.] . . . [But] “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis seems to be less viable year by year.” [Cit.] The haste [to abandon precedent] damages the reliability and credibility of this court’s decisions and adds to instability and uncertainty in the law. . . . Perhaps the doctrine of stare decisis is no longer in vogue, but is it not unsettling to the practicing bar to recognize the willingness of this court to alter its interpretation of [statutes] as subsequent cases arise?
Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374, 378 (418 SE2d 27) (1992) (Benham, J., concurring specially). In abandoning the doctrine of stare decisis, the majority simply has put itself in the place of the legislature.
As the majority seems to accept, a mistrial does not constitute a “trial” so as to satisfy a statutory speedy trial demand; the defendant who has experienced a mistrial still has not received the speedy trial guaranteed him under the statute. Geiger v. State, 25 Ga. 667 (1858); Adams v. State, 129 Ga. App. 839, 840-841 (201 SE2d 649) (1973); *437Rider v. State, 103 Ga. App. 184 (118 SE2d 749) (1961); Nix v. State, 5 Ga. App. 835, 836-837 (63 SE 926) (1909). Thus, Varner did not receive the speedy trial which he demanded under the statute. It has long been held that such a failure requires that Varner be discharged. See Hunley v. State, 105 Ga. 636, 638 (31 SE 543) (1898). But the majority holds that the statute will be read differently if a mistrial occurs at a certain point in the term. That has never been the law of this State, nor is it proper to so declare today.5
Criminal statutes are construed strictly against the State, including those that pertain to procedure and confer a benefit upon a defendant. See State v. English, 276 Ga. 343, 349 (3) (578 SE2d 413) (2003); Hughes v. State, 269 Ga. 819, 821 (2) (504 SE2d 696) (1998); Bankston v. State, 258 Ga. 188, 190 (367 SE2d 36) (1988). See also Pryor Organization v. Stewart, 274 Ga. 487, 488 (1) (554 SE2d 132) (2001).6 But the majority does not strictly view this statute. Rather, relying on dicta from Brown v. State, 85 Ga. 713 (11 SE 831) (1890), the majority re-writes the statute. That is the prerogative of the General Assembly. But that body has not enacted any statutory provision to address a speedy trial demand and a late-term mistrial; it is the majority opinion in this case that has engrafted such a provision onto the statute.
The statute is clear. Assuming that the demand has been properly made and the terms at issue meet the statute’s requirements, there are but two outcomes: trial, or discharge and acquittal. OCGA § 17-7-171. This Court has recognized, both before and after Brown, that under the speedy trial demand statutes, “[t]he court must try, or the prisoner must be discharged.” (Emphasis in original.) Hunley, supra at 638. See also Durham v. State, 9 Ga. 306, 310 (1851) (“The Act makes no exceptions - none are admissible by the Courts.”). As this Court stated over a century-and-a-half ago,
We can add no qualifications or limitations to this Act - we can create no exceptions, and can make no additions. It is said that in this case, the Court had not time to try the prisoner. That may be. The Legislature makes no remission of the operation of this Act for that cause. We are to presume that they looked to all the circumstances of the case, and
*438Decided November 26, 2003 —
Reconsideration denied December 11, 2003.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Elizabeth A. Baker, Brett E. Pinion, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
D. Todd Wooten, for appellee.
with an eye open upon them all, passed the law as we find it. It is said that this ruling will turn out one-half the criminals before the Courts, without a trial. We do not believe this; but if it be true, what better answer to such a suggestion, than that the Legislature have so ordered it?
Kerese v. State, 10 Ga. 95, 97 (1851).
The dicta of Brown, upon which the majority relies, has not existed in a vacuum since 1890. Rather, it has long been recognized to be dicta, and unpersuasive dicta. Nix v. State, supra at 836-837. It is clear that the General Assembly has had notice of the problem presented here prior to this day. In cases such as Kerese and Nix, supra, it was contended that the mistrial occurred when it was not possible to retry the defendant in the last term under the demand. No action was taken by the General Assembly to change the statute. This situation was thoroughly discussed in Nix, supra at 836-837, wherein it was clearly noted that the statute provides for either trial or discharge, and that the dicta of Brown suggesting otherwise has not been acted upon. That dicta has still not been acted upon, at least not by the General Assembly, the body properly designated in our Constitution as holding legislative power. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. Ill, Sec. I, Par. I. A majority of this Court has now determined that it knows better than the General Assembly how the statute should read.
The majority opinion sub silentio overrules precedent from this Court dating to its earliest days, and usurps the role of the legislature in doing so. I cannot join it.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Fletcher joins in this dissent.

 I must also note that the majority opinion does not provide guidance to the bar as to when the departure from the statute is warranted: only when mistrial occurs on the last day of the term; when it occurs in the last week of the term and all prospective jurors have been excused; or when weeks remain in the term but jury trials are not scheduled?

 In fact, in discussing the predecessor of our current OCGA § 17-7-170, this Court stated “Criminal statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the accused.” Denny v. State, 6 Ga. 491, 493 (1849). But see Price v. State, 25 Ga. 133, 135 (1858), overruling Denny and strictly following the language of the statute.