Court Opinion

ID: 9610054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:35:58.216298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:56.288749
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I would answer the certified questions “yes.” From the standpoints of both statutory construction and policy considerations, an injured party should recover only those damages attributable to the fault of the offending party. It is neither fair nor equitable that a party whose fault causes 40 percent of a loss should be required to pay 100 percent of the loss and damages. The goal of tort reform has been to create a system for compensating injured persons which is fair to both the party recovering and the party paying damages. Implicit in the system is that a party pay only for the damage caused by his fault.
*839For more years than I care to remember, contributory negligence, no matter how slight, was a complete bar to recovery in an action to recover damages caused by negligence. Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo.1963). Under this contributory negligence doctrine, a party whose fault caused 99 percent of the damage suffered paid nothing because the plaintiff was one percent at fault. The doctrine, of comparatively recent origin in the common law, is attributed to an 1809 English case. See Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 Ark.L.Rev. 1 (1946); and Annotation, Modem Development of Comparative Negligence Doctrine Having Applicability to Negligence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339, 345 § 2 (1977). It was not long before courts began developing exceptions to or abrogating the doctrine. Admiralty courts recognized a form of comparative negligence in 1854. Leflar, 1 Ark.L.Rev. at 16, n. 65. Illinois began applying comparative negligence principles in 1858. Annotation, 78 A.L.R.3d at 345. There was a move to allow recovery of personal injury and property damage under warranty which ordinarily involved actions on contract. Privity of contract was an obstacle, but it was soon held that privity of contract was not required. All of this resulted from efforts to avoid the harsh consequences of contributory negligence.
The Wyoming legislature enacted a comparative negligence statute in 1973. 1973 Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 28 § 1. See § 1-7.2 (W.S.1957, Cum.Supp.1975). Under the act, a plaintiff could recover for his injuries although the award would be reduced by the amount of fault attributed to him. Thus, the statute abolished the “harsh result” that the contributory negligence doctrine required. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1360 (Wyo.1981). In Barnette, we noted that the legislative enactment and public policy favored leaving to the “jury to balance the relative measurements of fault.” Id. at 1361.
The 1973 version of the statute read:
“(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought.
Any damages allowed shall be diminished, in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.
“(b) The court may, and when requested by any party, shall:
“(i) If a jury trial, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts;
“(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact; determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of such damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.” § 1-7.2 (W.S.1957, Cum.Supp.1975).
When renumbered in 1977, the above language contained a few grammatical changes and a subsection (b)(iii) was added. The new subsection stated:
“(iii) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of negligence.” W.S. 1-1-109(b)(iii) (December 1977 pamphlet).
The current statute as amended in 1986 reads:
“(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said person is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.
“(b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall:
“(i) If a jury trial:
“(A) Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party; and
*840“(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault.
“(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party.
“(c) The court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (b) of this section in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the person recovering and enter judgment against each defendant in the amount determined under subsection (d) of this section.
“(d) Each' defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section.” 1986 Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 24 § 1; W.S. 1-1-109 (emphasis added).
This word “fault” appears in the current version of the statute six times. The court trivializes this change contending that “fault” in the statute is synonymous with “negligence.” When the legislature adopts a statute, it is presumed to have done so with full knowledge of existing state law with reference to the subject matter. Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo.1984). It must be assumed that the legislature did not intend futile acts and that in amending the statute the legislature intended to change the law. Id. Significantly, the word “fault” receives a broad definition in the Uniform Commercial Code:
“ ‘Fault’ means wrongful act, omission or breach.” W.S. 34.1-l-201(a)(xvi).
Actions for damage caused by breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, and breach of express warranty are brought pursuant to the U.C.C. W.S. 84.1-2-313, -314, -315.
In a warranty action, recovery is for fault in the breach of a warranty and under § 402A, Restatement, Second, Torts (1965) for fault in creating a defective product and placing it in the stream of commerce. Plaintiffs fault may contribute to his injury through product misuse, voluntary exposure to a known danger and otherwise. Thus, it logically follows that appellant’s actions to recover loss or damage caused by the fault of another party should be governed by W.S. 1-1-109 as amended with fault of the parties being compared. The majority of this court disagrees. It makes no sense that plaintiff’s own fault should be chargeable on one theory of recovery but paid for by defendant on another theory. The legislature should consider correcting the anomaly that now exists among the various actions to recover damages for injuries caused by the fault of another.