Court Opinion

ID: 9883760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:16:51.311482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:47.201421
License: Public Domain

Inbody, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion regarding Monique’s participation in the termination proceedings. In the instant case, Monique has claimed that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not allowing her to participate in the termination hearing, either by being physically present at the hearing or, in the alternative, by participating telephonically.
It cannot be disputed that the parent-child relationship is afforded due process protection and that procedural due process is applicable to proceedings for the termination of parental rights. In re Interest of L.V., 240 Neb. 404, 482 N.W.2d 250 (1992). Procedural due process limits the ability of the govern*140ment to deprive people of interests which constitute “liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause and requires that parties deprived of such interests be provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. In re Interest of Natasha H. & Sierra H., 258 Neb. 131, 602 N.W.2d 439 (1999); Bauers v. City of Lincoln, 255 Neb. 572, 586 N.W.2d 452 (1998); Friehe v. Schaad, 249 Neb. 825, 545 N.W.2d 740 (1996). Further, “[t]he concept of due process embodies the notion of fundamental fairness and defies precise definition.” In re Interest of L.V., 240 Neb. at 413, 482 N.W.2d at 256-57. Accord In re Interest of Amanda H., 4 Neb. App. 293, 542 N.W.2d 79 (1996).
In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753-54, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” See, also, In re Interest of C.P., 235 Neb. 276, 284, 455 N.W.2d 138, 144 (1990) (“[t]he right of parents to maintain custody of their child is a natural right, subject only to the paramount interest which the public has in the protection of the rights of the child”).
Since it is undeniable that Monique was entitled to due process regarding the proceedings to terminate her parental rights, I now proceed to address whether the procedures afforded Monique comported with constitutional requirements for procedural due process.
PHYSICAL ATTENDANCE
Monique first claims that the termination hearing should have been postponed in order to allow her to physically attend the termination hearing, since she was incarcerated during the originally scheduled May 2000 date, but would be able to attend the hearing if it were postponed until late July or early August.
The issue of when procedural due process requires a parent’s physical presence at a hearing to terminate parental rights was addressed by the Nebraska Supreme Court in In re Interest of L.V., supra. The court held that “parental physical presence is *141unnecessary for a hearing to terminate parental rights, provided that the parent has been afforded procedural due process for the hearing to terminate parental rights.” Id. at 416, 482 N.W.2d at 258. If a parent has been afforded procedural due process for a termination hearing, allowing a parent who is incarcerated or otherwise confined in custody of a government to physically attend the termination hearing is within the discretion of the trial court, whose decision on appeal will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Id.
The court set forth the factors that may be considered in deciding whether to allow a parent’s attendance at a hearing to terminate parental rights, notwithstanding the parent’s incarceration or other confinement, as follows: the delay resulting from prospective parental attendance, the need for disposition of the proceeding within the immediate future, the elapsed time during which the proceeding has been pending before the juvenile court, the expense to the State if the State will be required to provide transportation for the parent, the inconvenience or detriment to parties or witnesses, the potential danger or security risk which may occur as a result of the parent’s release from custody or confinement to attend the hearing, the reasonable availability of the parent’s testimony through a means other than parental attendance at the hearing, and the best interests of the parent’s child or children in reference to the parent’s prospective physical attendance at the termination hearing. In re Interest of L.V., 240 Neb. 404, 482 N.W.2d 250 (1992).
Applying these factors to the instant case, the record reflects that Monique has been incarcerated in Wisconsin since the first part of March 2000 and that her counsel made a written request to continue her case. The request for continuance was heard by the court on April 13 and was denied. The request was renewed orally at the May 5 and 16 hearings. On May 5, Monique’s counsel advised the court that although Monique had been incarcerated, Monique would be able to be present for a hearing toward the end of July or the first part of August. Therefore, the hearing would have to be postponed for nearly 3 months in order to allow Monique to be physically present at the termination hearing. Additionally, the adjudication petition with regard to Azia had been pending since May 21,1999, although the termi*142nation petition was not filed until February 22, 2000. There is no evidence regarding the remaining factors enunciated in In re Interest of L.V., supra.
In light of the factors which we have sufficient evidence to consider concerning Monique’s physical attendance at the termination hearing, notwithstanding her incarceration, I cannot conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in disallowing Monique’s physical attendance at the termination hearing. Although the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Monique was not entitled to physically attend the termination hearing, the State was still required to afford her procedural due process. This leads me to consider Monique’s next claim, i.e., whether she should have been allowed to participate in the termination hearing telephonically.
TELEPHONIC PARTICIPATION
The second part of Monique’s due process claim is that the juvenile court should have granted her request to participate in the termination hearing via telephone. Stated another way, I believe that the crux of Monique’s claim is the issue of whether a parent who is prevented from attending a termination hearing because of incarceration or otherwise confined in government custody is entitled by due process to have the court fashion an alternative procedure to permit the parent to respond to matters presented by the State.
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972): “For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard. ...’” Accord In re Interest of L.V., supra. See, also, In re Interest of Natasha H. & Sierra H., 258 Neb. 131, 602 N.W.2d 439 (1999). “When a person has a right to be heard, procedural due process includes ... a reasonable opportunity to refute or defend against a charge or accusation; a reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and present evidence on the charge or accusation . . . .” In re Interest of L.V., 240 Neb. 404, 413-14, 482 N.W.2d 250, 257 (1992). See, Fuentes v. Shevin, supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970).
*143In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a three-part test detailing the criteria which govern the inquiry concerning whether due process has been satisfied in a particular case: the court must weigh the private interest that will be affected by the proceeding, the risk to the parent of an erroneous deprivation, and the government’s interest in making the determination. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (stating that “the nature of the process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on a balancing” of factors specified in Mathews). See, also, In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450, 598 N.W.2d 729 (1999).
The determination of whether the procedures afforded an individual comport with constitutional requirements for procedural due process presents a question of law. Billups v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs. Appeals Bd., 238 Neb. 39, 469 N.W.2d 120 (1991). When reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. Ethanair Corp. v. Thompson, 252 Neb. 245, 561 N.W.2d 225 (1997). The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded a recipient is influenced by the extent to which the recipient may be condemned to suffer grievous loss. In re Interest of Natasha H. & Sierra H., supra; In re Interest of Constance G., 254 Neb. 96, 575 N.W.2d 133 (1998).
As to the first element of Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, a parent’s interest at stake is obviously profound — the possibility that the parent will be permanently deprived of fundamental parental rights. In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., supra. See In re Interest of R.R., 239 Neb. 250, 475 N.W.2d 518 (1991). Thus, “ ‘ “W parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one.’”” In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. at 463, 598 N.W.2d at 739. Likewise, regarding the third element of the Mathews analysis — the State’s interest — I acknowledge the State’s interest in the protection of the welfare and interests of children. See Cornhusker Christian Ch. Home v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 227 Neb. 94, 416 N.W.2d 551 (1987). This leaves for consideration the second element of the Mathews analysis, which is the risk to the parent of an erroneous deprivation.
*144In CY & F Dept. v. Ruth Anne E., 126 N.M. 670, 974 P.2d 164 (N.M. App. 1999), the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered the extent to which due process requires a court to fashion procedures to permit an incarcerated parent to respond to matters presented by the State. In that case, the issues before the children’s court were whether the parent was complying with a treatment plan and using his best efforts to work toward a reunification of the family unit. The New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that the parent’s due process rights were violated by the court’s refusal to continue the hearing or adopt other procedures to permit the parent’s meaningful participation in the hearing because the parent was denied an opportunity to defend against the allegations, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence on his behalf.
Likewise, in Orville v. Division of Family Services, 759 A.2d 595 (Del. Super. 2000), the Delaware Supreme Court held that the lower court did not afford an incarcerated parent her constitutional right to due process because it failed to provide her an opportunity to participate in a meaningful manner, either by telephone during the entire termination hearing or by permitting her to review a reproduction of the case against her before presenting her own case.
In re Adoption of Edmund, 50 Mass. App. 526, 739 N.E.2d 274 (2000), involved a decree dispensing with the need to obtain a natural father’s consent to the adoption of his child. On the date of the trial, counsel for the natural father informed the trial court that his incarcerated client was ready to participate in the proceedings via telephone conferencing; however, efforts to set up the telephone conference proved unsuccessful due to improper functioning of the necessary equipment. Counsel then sought to continue the trial until such time as the father could appear or until the telephonic conferencing could be conducted. The trial court denied the motion, basing its decision largely on counsel’s failure to notify the court in advance of his election to proceed by telephone conference, which the court concluded would have afforded an opportunity to ensure that the necessary equipment was functioning properly. The hearing was conducted, and the court entered its order dispensing with the need for either parent’s consent to adoption. The father appealed the *145decision, claiming that he was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
On appeal, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals found that the natural father’s right to procedural due process was not protected “because the father had made timely and persistent requests of the courts for leave to appear which were denied, he specifically sought to participate through the court-sanctioned mechanism of telephone conferencing, and no other procedure to respond was afforded to him.” Id. at 529-30, 739 N.E.2d at 277.
It seems apparent that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of parental rights is magnified unless incarcerated parents are allowed to consult with counsel; to present evidence, including rebuttal evidence; and to confront the State’s witnesses. See In re Adoption No. 6Z980001, 131 Md. App. 187, 748 A.2d 1020 (2000). It is my opinion that to satisfy due process, an incarcerated parent must have an opportunity for meaningful participation in the termination process, including the termination hearing. Such participation can occur in various ways, other than physical attendance, such as an opportunity to “participate” meaningfully by telephone, or review transcripts of witness testimony and provide rebuttal testimony, either via deposition or telephonic connection to the courtroom. In re Baby K., 143 N.H. 201, 722 A.2d 470 (1998). See, e.g., In re Adoption No. 6Z980001, supra (parent submitted deposition testimony prior to trial, was provided with transcript from State’s case, and was given opportunity to submit affidavit in response); In Interest of Baby Doe, 130 Idaho 47, 936 P.2d 690 (Idaho App. 1997) (following evidentiary hearing, parent permitted to present testimony through telephone deposition and attorney allowed to call additional witnesses at later time if additional evidence is developed during deposition); In re Interest of L.V., 240 Neb. 404, 482 N.W.2d 250 (1992) (procedural due process satisfied where, after State’s evidence, testimony transcribed, parent testified via telephone in resumed termination hearing and parent was given opportunity to recall State’s witnesses for recross-examination, and to call additional witnesses on parent’s behalf); State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Stevens, 100 Or. App. 481, 786 P.2d 1296 (1990) (incarcerated father not deprived of due process rights where father testified by telephone and consulted with counsel by tele*146phone, counsel was able to cross-examine adverse witnesses meaningfully, and father’s testimony followed that of adverse witnesses point by point); In re Randy Scott B., 511 A.2d 450 (Me. 1986) (incarcerated father’s constitutional rights held adequately protected where his deposition was admitted in evidence and counsel declined opportunity to open record after trial); In re Juvenile Appeal, 187 Conn. 431, 446 A.2d 808 (1982) (incarcerated father’s due process rights were protected where father received transcripts of first hearing and discussed testimony with counsel and participated via telephone in second hearing held 3 months later). Compare Dependency of M.S., 98 Wash. App. 91, 988 P.2d 488 (1999) (denial of incarcerated parent’s request to testify at termination hearing by telephone was not violative of due process where request not made until day of hearing and trial counsel’s offer of proof adopted guardian ad litem’s testimony as same as parent would have given if parent had testified and court gave parent opportunity to present affidavit after hearing and termination order); In re Baby K., supra (telephonic participation did not satisfy due process where incarcerated parent could only hear counsel’s voice and could not communicate with court, possibly placing greater burdens on counsel and affecting counsel’s ability to represent client’s interests including ability to respond effectively to evidence presented and increasing risk of erroneous determination). But see, Matter of Adoption of J.W.M., 532 N.W.2d 372 (N.D. 1995) (alleged denial of due process caused by court’s denial of incarcerated parent’s request for transcript of adoption hearing for review and possible cross-examination of adverse witnesses did not result in unacceptable risk of erroneous factual decision under particular circumstances of this case).
Furthermore, juvenile courts should be given some flexibility, consistent with the individual facts present in each case, to determine the precise method of participation necessary to ensure that a parent has a meaningful opportunity to respond to the evidence presented at trial and such determination should generally be left to the discretion of the juvenile court. See In re Adoption of Edmund, 50 Mass. App. 526, 739 N.E.2d 274 (2000).
In the instant case, Monique, since her request for a continuance had been denied, specifically requested that she be allowed *147to participate in the termination hearing by telephone. Although Monique did not make her request to participate in the termination hearing by telephone until the day of the hearing, she had previously requested that the hearings be continued so that she could be physically present at the hearings. It was after her requests for leave to appear were denied that she specifically sought to participate through the court-sanctioned mechanism of telephone conferencing. This request again was denied, and Monique was not given any other procedure to personally respond to the State’s evidence against her. This is especially grievous because Monique was in the best position to refute the charges regarding substantial and continuous or repeated neglect of Azia and failure to correct conditions leading to Azia’s adjudication.
Finally, in its decision to deny Monique’s request to participate in the termination hearing via telephone, the juvenile court relied, at least in part, upon Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-278 (Reissue 1998), which the juvenile court interpreted to prohibit telephonic testimony in termination hearings. This section provides, in pertinent part: “All communications, notices, orders, authorizations, and requests authorized or required in the Nebraska Juvenile Code, with the exception of any adjudication hearing, disposition hearing, or hearing to terminate parental rights, may be made by telephone when other means of communication are impractical as determined by the court.” Although this statute prohibits adjudication, disposition, and termination hearings to be entirely conducted by telephone, in my opinion, this statute does not prohibit a parent’s telephonic participation in a termination proceeding when the parent is unable to be physically present.
I am mindful of the need for expeditious determination of cases involving the termination of parental rights, of the need for finality in termination cases, and of the importance of stability and permanence in the lives of children. At the same time, courts cannot ignore a parent’s constitutional liberty interest in the care and custody of his or her children. Thus, in my opinion, before the juvenile court can irrevocably sever the parent-child bond, it must ensure that the parent is given a full and fair opportunity to present evidence on his or her behalf and to defend his or her parental rights. It is my opinion that in the instant case, *148Monique was deprived of that opportunity. Consequently, I would reverse the juvenile court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.