Court Opinion

ID: 9609820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:31:53.691929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:45.713306
License: Public Domain

OP ALA, Justice,
with whom WILSON, Justice, joins for Parts 1,2,3 and 4, concurring in judgment.
Although I concur in today’s judgment, I write separately to explain the critical steps that guide my analysis of this case.
(1) Judicial scrutiny of the Transaction at hand is confined by law to a search for infirmities recognized in the legal system. The range of policy choices and of considerations that would accommodate, or even command, managerial or economic preferences (éither of short- or of long-term character) may not enter into the court’s decisional *322process. These concerns lie exclusively within the domain of executive or legislative action.1
(2) The activities that by the terms of this Transaction are to be transferred to the contracting private entrepreneur do not appear to fall into that inner core of strictly public functions the State is constitutionally powerless to delegate to nonpublic entities.2
(3) There is no probative basis for a legally supportable finding that this Transaction, alleged to be an agreement supported by no more than de minimis3 consideration, may be condemned for being an illusory contract that should be invalidated as a disguised gift in violation of Art. 10, Sec. 15, Okl. Const.4 The legal conclusion pressed on the court to declare this Transaction an impermissible donation is amply refuted by the record viewed as an entirety.
(4) “A gift may be defined as a voluntary transfer of his property by one to another without any consideration or compensation therefor ” [Emphasis supplied].5 The donor must intend gratuitously to pass the title to the donee.6 On this record, a finding of donative intent on the part of the State would be utterly unsupportable. Consideration takes away from the Transaction its donative character.
(5) Neither facially nor by proof dehors the four corners of the document is the Transaction in contest condemnable as in discord with the applicable law.
(6) The judgment roll for this cause will not allow the court to grant injunctive relief that is contemplated by the Act. Today’s declaration that the Transaction is not in discord with the applicable law provides a complete judicial response to the issues actually tendered, inquired into, and decided under the Act, which confers on the Supreme Court mandatory original jurisdiction of this cause.7
(7) Insofar as today’s declaration may spawn other issues or rights not now before the court, there can be no legal impediment to future litigation over their judicial settlement.8
(8) Although the terms of the Act severely restrict the time frame for adduction of evidence, protestants were afforded ample opportunity fully and fairly to present proof of the Transaction’s extrinsic flaws. The hearing afforded them by the court before the assigned referee meets constitutional muster when measured by the minimum standards of Due Process.9
(9) The referee correctly allocated to the protestant the burden of production and persuasion on protestant’s allegation that the Transaction should be condemned as a disguised gift. Courts cannot assume a violation of fundamental law. Those who chal*323lenge the constitutional validity of government action bear the burden of proving that it should be condemned.10
(10) Neither the Act nor the Transaction can be declared to be fraught with any infirmity ascribed to it by the protestants’ tendered proof and by their legal argument.
¶ 1 KAUGER, Chief Justice, concurring in the denial of rehearing:
¶2 Because the protestants did not initially raise the balanced budget amendments, art. 10, §§ 23, 24 and 25,1 they were not addressed by the Court in its opinion. -We probably should have done so, especially because of the fifty-year indigent care provision.2 Under this provision, it is anticipated that the Legislature will make annual appropriations to the University Hospitals Authority (Authority). Pursuant to the leasing agreement with HCA Health Services of Oklahoma (HCA), HCA has agreed to provide indigent care to Oklahoma- citizens in return for the Authority’s promise to pay HCA the amounts appropriated for this service by the Legislature. Addressing art. 10, §§ 23 24 and 25 would not alter the outcome of the cause — the agreement does not violate these constitutional provisions — and it would provide certainty for fináncing mechanisms which are common in the increasingly complex financial arena.3
¶ 3 In matters publici juris, it is the Court’s duty to take judicial notice of applica*324ble constitutional provisions.4 The statutory command5 of 12 O.S.1991 § 22016 obligates this Court to take judicial notice of the common law, constitutions and public statutes. This is not merely a rule of practice which may be relaxed when the public interest demands.7 The mandatory8 duty to take judicial notice of public statutes may extend to any stage of a proceeding.9 Pursuant to 12 O.S.1991 § 2203,10 the command to take judicial notice extends to the appellate process. Matters of health care are of special public importance and subject to this Court’s review as matters of publici juris.11 Because my constitutionally and statutorily imposed duties require me to address art. 10, §§ 23, 24 and 25, I write separately in support of the majority opinion.
¶ 4 The OMa. Const, art. 10, §§ 23, 24 and 2512 prohibit pledging the full faith and credit of the state of Oklahoma without a vote of the people. The proposal to fund the indigent care agreement through anticipated legislative appropriations does not entail a pledge of the full faith and credit. The agreement entails only a pledge of partial faith and partial credit — on an annual basis— of legislatively appropriated funds.
¶5 Unless prohibited by the Constitution, the Legislature has the right and the responsibility to declare the fiscal policy of Oklahoma. Even if this Court believes that a revenue crisis might result, we have no authority to consider the desirability, wisdom or practicability of fiscal legislation.13 It is not this Court’s prerogative to question the wisdom of the expressed policy. Whether an act is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory or whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result are matters for legislative determination. Members of this Court, may not, based on a perception of how the State should conduct its business dealings, direct legislative decision making.14 In construing constitutional debt-limitation provisions, it is the judiciary’s duty to guard against indebtedness, not creative financing.15 It is not illegal to accomplish a desired result, lawful in itself, by innovative, legal measures.16
*325¶ 6 Twenty years ago, in Halstead v. McHendry, 1977 OK 131, 566 P.2d 134, 138, this Court analyzed a leasing agreement and bond issue in which retirement of the revenue raising bonds depended on the continuance of a leasing relationship over a fifteen-year period. In so doing, we looked at the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 10, § 26.17 [Art. 10, § 26 applies to political subdivisions and is the counterpart of art. 10, § 25, requiring that before the state may enter into certain “debts”, a vote of the public is required.]
¶ 7 In Halstead, the Court found no legal impediment to the validity of the multi-year lease agreement. It reached that result by acknowledging that constitutional debt-limitation provisions similar to the Okla. Const, art. 10, §§ 23, 24 and 25 did not obligate future County Commissioners to agree to the leasing agreement — just as the agreement here does not bind future legislatures to make anticipated appropriations. Promises or an expressed Legislative “intent” to continue the funding of a revenue raising project is not a “debt” within the meaning of constitutional debt-limitation provisions.
118 Although the voters in Halstead approved a resolution providing for the levy of a tax to assist in the maintenance of a health department, no election was held under the provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution art. 10, § 26 before the leasing agreement and bond issue were completed. ■ Retirement of the revenue raising bonds depended on the continuance of the leasing relationship over a period of fifteen years. In upholding the financing scheme, the Court discounted arguments that actions of the present County Commissioners in executing the lease would “morally” obligate succeeding County Commissioners to continue the arrangement in future years. Rather, the Halstead Court found that the continuance of the leasing arrangement depended entirely upon the actions of the County Commissioners who would consider its renewal.
'¶ 9 The renewal of the lease in Halstead was governed by the County Commissioners in office at the time the lease was presented. The lease was renéwed on a year-by-year basis. Here, the agreement for indigent care is also subject to an annual review by current members of. the legislative body. The Legislature will determine on a year-by-year basis in the appropriation process whether indigent care should be funded through the agreement with HCA. This Court recognized in Halstead that although the County Commissioners might feel a moral obligation to continue the lease, there was no legal impediment to approval of the leasing agreement — ■ the agreement was constitutional. The fact that the Legislature might, under the agreement with HCA, feel some moral obligation to continue the agreement or to ensure .that indigent care is provided to the needy of this state does not render the agreement void— the indigent care agreement, like the leasing agreement in Halstead, is constitutional.
¶ 10 Likewise, in U.C. Leasing, Inc. v. State ex rel. State Bd. of Public Affairs, 1987 OK 43, 737 P.2d 1191, 1195, we upheld a leasing arrangement spanning a period of sixty consecutive months. The lease agreement in U.C. explicitly provided that if the Legislature failed to allocate funds for payment, the obligation would cease at the end of the term for which there were allocated funds. The Court recognized that there was no binding promise to continue the lease. Instead, its terms were contingent upon the Legislature’s providing funding on an annual basis.
¶ 11 In U.C. and here, a limited liability debt has been created. This Court stated that:
“Where a person or entity enters into a valid contract with the proper State offi-*326eials’ and a valid appropriation has been made therefore, the State has consented to be sued and has waived its governmental immunity to the extent of its contractual obligations and such contractual obligation may be enforced against the State in an ordinary action at law.” [Emphasis supplied.]
This Court clearly limited the extent of the obligation to pay in U.C. to the extent that a “valid appropriation” had been made — precisely the situation outlined by the indigent care agreement here.
¶ 12 In Indiana Nat’l Bank v. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services, 1993 OK 101, 857 P.2d 53, 57, the Court “cleared up” the misconception that, in a lease for the acquisition of computer equipment — a non-revenue producing item, a State agency could not enter into a lease/purehase agreement which would bind the State for a future fiscal year if it were conditioned solely on continued fiscal year appropriations by the Legislature. DHS believed that this was unconstitutional, and that the agreement had to contain a clause allowing termination at the end of each fiscal year. In explaining the fallacy of this belief, the Court reiterated the position it took in U.C., stating:
“After the matters pertinent to this case transpired we decided U.C. Leasing, Inc. v. State Board of Public Affairs, 737 P.2d 1191 (Okla.1987), an opinion which cleared up the area of the law involving acquisitions of such equipment by State entities. In U.C. Leasing we held that State constitutional and statutory fiscal year limitation clauses were not violated where a 60 month lease (a State agency as lessee) explicitly provides that if the Legislature fails to allocate or appropriate funds for payment, lessee is not obligated to pay beyond the period for which funds have been allocated. Id. at 1195. The converse of this would, of course, be true, i.e. the agency would be bound if adequate appropriations were made by the Legislature. This is so because the obligation is not absolute and in all events binding on the State, but is contingent upon continued funding on a fiscal year basis by the Legislature continuing to appropriate funds to satisfy the obligation. Id. Thus, it turns out DHS, as all now appear to concede, was wrong in its view on what could be agreed to in regard to the lease/purchase agreement.”
There is no difference between leasing equipment requiring legislative appropriations spanning more than one legislative session and providing indigent care through an agreement which is based on anticipated future legislative appropriations. Long-term commitments, multi-year leases and contracts, have been upheld. Despite DHS’s confusion in Indiana Nat’l Bank, this Court said the matter had been settled — multi-year commitments based on the possibility of future legislative appropriations did not violate constitutional debt limitation provisions.
¶ 13 The analysis for balanced budget and debt-limitation purposes does not change simply because an obligation is created by bonds, by leases or by multi-year agreements. The analysis turns not on the type of instrument but, rather, on whether an enforceable obligation is created beyond the fiscal year. This principle is buttressed by 62 O.S.1991 § 582(8) which provides a functional definition of obligations which does not distinguish between layers of transactions. The statute does not support a false distinction which would separate bond transactions, leases or other multi-year agreements. This section states:
“‘Obligation’ means an agreement of a public entity to pay principal and any interest thereon, whether in the form of a contract to repay borrowed money, a lease, an installment purchase contract, or otherwise, and includes a share, participation or other interest in any agreement.”
¶ 14 This analysis is further strengthened by 12A O.S.1991 § 3-103(9), a codification of basic contract law, in which a promise is defined:
“ ‘Promise’ means a written undertaking to pay money signed by the person undertaking to pay. An acknowledgment of an obligation by an obligor is not a promise unless the obligor also undertakes to pay the obligation.”
¶ 15 This analysis is further supported by a statute which has been the law in this *327jurisdiction since 189018 — when Oklahoma was Indian Territory — and which was incorporated into statutory law at statehood. The idea that a moral obligation to continue an agreement over a period of time may serve as consideration for a contractual obligation is nothing new. It has been with us always. Title 12 O.S.1991 § 107 provides:
“An existing legal obligation resting upon the promisor, as a moral obligation originating in some benefit conferred upon the promisor, or prejudice suffered by the promisee, is also good consideration for a promise, to an extent corresponding with the extent of the obligation, but no further or otherwise.”
The fact that future legislatures might feel “morally obligated” to continue to fund the indigent care agreement does not alter the fact that the promise is sufficient consideration to support the contract. This concept did not pose a problem to framers of the Constitution who were elected to Oklahoma’s first Legislature.
¶ 16 In the leasing cases, this Court recognized that vendors were willing to enter multi-year transactions with the state notwithstanding the lack of an enforceable promise to pay beyond the current fiscal year. These financing schemes are simply facts of economic reality recognized by prom-isors and promisees, lessors and lessees, and by the sellers and purchasers of bonds. The legal principles are the same regardless of the monetary amount of the undertaking. There is neither a principled nor a legal basis for distinguishing between multi-year “moral obligation” leases, multi-year “moral obligation” contracts, and multi-year “moral obligation” bonds. Such an inconsistent analysis simply would not fly. Prohibiting one would necessarily jeopardize the other. The full scope of the problems created by such an approach would be difficult to describe fully because its operative principles apply to seemingly unrelated contexts. Just one example is the recent enactment of 70 O.S. Supp.1997 § 5-10619 which allows school boards to contract with school superintendents for three year contracts.
¶ 17 For this Court to brush aside decades of ease law dealing with methods of public finance would be cavalier at best. At this stage of our fiscal history, the abrupt change in the status of multi-year leasing agreements20 from constitutional to unconstitutional would ring the death knell for economic development and replace it with economic chaos in which state government financing would come to a standstill while the political branches painfully tried to sort out the consequences.
¶ 18 The indigent care agreement is not subject to attack on the basis that it is not self-liquidating and will produce no revenue. The facts here are simply indistinguishable from other causes in which this Court has upheld similar arrangements. In U.C. the lease at issue covered communications switching equipment. In Indiana Bank, the lease was for computer equipment. No one contended in U.C. or in Indiana Bank that any revenue would arise even tangentially from the installation of the equipment.
¶ 19 Here, the indigent care agreement is financed from legislatively appropriated funds paid from the University Hospitals Authority (Authority) to HCA Health Services of Oldahoma (HCA) under the leasing agreement which spans fifty years. HCA has agreed to provide indigent care in return for the Authority’s promise to pay to HCA the appropriations made by the Legislature. When the origination of the actual payments are traced, this transaction does not differ *328from arrangements where state buildings are rented by state agencies. The money for both transactions comes from the same coffer — state monies. There’s just one pot of money. The building is constructed from state funds and the rent is paid from annual appropriations from the Legislature. Here, indigent care will be provided and paid for by state appropriations. There simply is no difference.
¶ 20 The Authority is an instrumentality of the state and subject to suit under some circumstances. However, the Authority’s status does not convert the multi-year indigent care agreement to a constitutionally prohibited debt of the state. Even if HCA should sue the Authority under the agreement. HCA could only sue the Authority for the money appropriated by the Legislature to University Hospitals Authority intended for indigent care. If the Authority doesn’t have monies to support the agreement, because legislative appropriations are not made, there is nothing for HCA to recover. There is no legally enforceable contract between this State’s Legislature and either the Authority or HCA to make the anticipated appropriations necessary to satisfy the debt created by the agreement. At most, a “moral obligation” arises to continue funding.
¶21 Under Halstead v. McHendry, supra, U.C. Leasing, v. State ex rel. State Bd. of Public Affairs, supra; and Boswell v. State, infra; Indiana Natl Bank v. State ex rel. Dept. Human Services, infra; and the majority of jurisdictions21 considering the effect of financing mechanisms comparable to the one mandated by the agreement here, the obligations created are not “debts” within the meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions similar to the Oklahoma Constitution art. 10, §§ 23, 24 and 25. Under these cases, the financing procedures are not “debts” either because the enacting body is not bound legally to make future appropriations or because it is clear that the legislators did not intend them to be obligations of the states or their subdivisions.
¶22 This Court’s decision in Boswell v. State, 1937 OK -, 181 Okla. 435, 74 P.2d 940, supports the proposition that the agreement is constitutional. In Boswell, we acknowledged that a simple declaration by the Legislature that the bonds were not to be considered a debt of the State or of its political subdivision was not dispositive of the cause and we held that the bonds created unauthorized “debts” within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution art. 10, §§ 23, 24 and 25. However, the facts here are distinguishable from those in Boswell in two critical respects. In Boswell, there was: 1) an unequivocal pledge of taxes to the retirement of the bonds; and 2) the promise bound subsequent legislative officers to continue appropriations. Neither situation exists in this cause. There simply is no legally enforceable promise to appropriate funds or any responsibility imposed on future legislatures to do so. In fact, Boswell requires the opposite result. This Court defined the Legislature’s role in fiscal matters and its limitations in Boswell:
“As we conceive it, the constitutional provisions dealing with the ‘debt limit’ of the state were adopted for the purpose of fixing the power and responsibility of legislation relating to the fiscal affairs of the state upon the existing legislative assembly, and to prevent one legislative assembly from laying its mandate upon a future one. The effect of these provisions is that one legislative assembly cannot guarantee the span of life of its legislation relating to the fiscal affairs of the state beyond the *329period of its biennium. These provisions of the Constitution guarantee that the power of a subsequent legislative body either to acquiesce or repeal shall always be existent.”
One Legislature cannot bind another. That is precisely why the full faith and credit of the state of Oklahoma is not pledged here— and why this agreement is not unconstitutional.
¶23 It has been shown that art. 10, § 2322 is inapplicable because no debt or obligation is created. The authority of the Legislature indubitably extends to all rightful subjects of legislation pursuant to the Okla. Const, art. 5, § 36.23 The Okla. Const, art. 21, § l24 authorizes the Legislature to establish and to provide support by the State for such other institutions as the public good may require as may be "prescribed by law.” The term “prescribed by law” denotes legislative enactments-statutes promulgated by the governing legislative body.25 Just as the Legislature prescribed review of the trust agreement by this Court:26 the Legislature, by law has established the University Hospitals Trust.27 It has given the Trust the power to enter into agreements with any entity for operation of facilities leased by the University Hospitals Authority.28 The agreement approved by the Trust and entered into between the Authority and HCA provides that indigent care services shall be paid for through annual legislative appropriations.
¶ 24 The agreement does not compel future legislatures to appropriate money for indigent care. Art. 10, § 2329 of the Oklahoma Constitution prohibits one legislative body from binding a successive legislative entity. It does not create a debt against the state if the money is not appropriated. A creditor cannot compel the Legislature to make the anticipated appropriations. There is no debt in the constitutional sense. The Court cannot make business decisions for HCA. It has chosen, through the anticipation that it will continue to receive legislative appropriations, to provide indigent care to the citizens of Oklahoma. There is no guarantee of appropriations, the agreement is not backed by the full faith and credit of the state.

. See Application of Goodwin, Okl., 1979 OK 106, 597 P.2d 762 (1979), where it is stated:
“Courts do not concern themselves with the merits, wisdom or advisability of legislative enactments but only with their meaning and validity.”

. Sovereign power of the State is not delegable to private entities or institutions. State ex rel. Schones v. Town of Canute, 1993 OK 90, 858 P.2d 436, 446 n. 40 (Opala, J., dissenting), citing People v. Chicago, 413 Ill. 315, 109 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1952); Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Childers, 197 Okl. 331, 171 P.2d 618, 619 (syllabus 2 by the court) (1946).

. De minimis is a contraction of the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex — the law takes no notice of trifling matters. Black's Law Dictionary (4th Ed.1951).

. The pertinent terms of Art. 10, Sec. 15, Okl. Const., are:
"A. Except as provided by this section, the credit of the State shall not be given, pledged, or loaned to any individual, company, corporation, or association, municipality, or political subdivision of the State, nor shall the State become an owner or stockholder in, nor make donation by gift, subscription to stock, by tax, or otherwise, to any company, association, or corporation. * * * ”

. Childrens Home and Welfare Ass’n v. Childers, 197 Okl. 243, 171 P.2d 613, 614 (1946); Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68, 14 Am.Rep. 181 (1873).

. 2 Schouler, Personal Properly (3rd Ed.) 61 (1896); Brown, The Law of Personal Properly (3rd Ed.) 114-115 (1975).

. State v. Moore, 167 Okl. 28, 27 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1933).

. Greco v. Foster, Okl., 268 P.2d 215, 220 (1954).

. Underside v. Lathrop, 1982 OK 57, 645 P.2d 514, 516 n. 6.

. TXO v. Oklahoma Corp. Com'n., 1992 OK 39, 829 P.2d 964, 968 n. 18.

. The Okla. Const, art. 10, § 23 provides in pertinent part:
"The state shall never create or authorize the creation of any debt or obligation, or fund or pay any deficit, against the state, or any department, institution or agency thereof, regardless of its form or the source of money from which it is to be paid, except as may be provided in this section and in Sections 24 and 25 of Article X of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma ...”
The Okla. Const, art. 10, § 24 provides in pertinent part:
"In addition to the above limited power to contract debts, the State may contract debtys to repel invasion, suppress insurrection or to defend the State in war ...”
The Okla. Const, art 10, § 25 provides in pertinent part:
“Except the debts specified in sections twenty-three and twenty-four of this article, no debts shall be hereafter contracted by or on behalf of this State, unless such debt shall be authorized by law for some work or object, to be distinctly specified therein; and such law shall impose and provide for the collection of a direct, annual tax to pay, the interest on such.debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal of such debt within twenty-five years from the time of contracting thereof No such law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have bee submitted to the people and have received a majority of all votes cast for and against it at such election...."

. The indigent care provisions states:
"HCA agrees to provide care at costs defined in the Agreement in return for the Authority’s promise to pay to HCA the amounts appropriated for indigent care by the Legislature.”

. See, In re Anzai, 85 Hawai'i 1, 936 P.2d 637, 642 (1997); Wilson v. Kentucky Trans. Cabinet, 884 S.W.2d 641, 644-45 (Ky.1994); Schulz v. State, 84 N.Y.2d 231, 616 N.Y.S.2d 343, 639 N.E.2d 1140, 1148 (1994); Dieck v. Unified School Dist. of Antigo, 165 Wis.2d 458, 477 N.W.2d 613, 618 (1991); Dykes v. Northern Virginia Transportation Dist. Comm'n, 242 Va. 357, 411 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 941, 942, 112 S.Ct. 2275, 2277, 119 L.Ed.2d 201, 203; Department of Ecology v. State Finance Committee, 116 Wash.2d 246, -804 P.2d 1241, 1246 (1991); State v. School Bd. of Sarasota County, 561 So.2d 549, 552 (Fla. 1990); State v. Goldschmidt, 308 Or. 573, 783 P.2d 988, 995 (1989); Caddell v. Lexington County School Dist. No. 1, 296 S.C. 397, 373 S.E.2d 598 (1988); Municipal Bldg. Auth. of Iron County v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah 1985); Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872, 877-78 (Colo. 1983); Baliles v. Mazur, 224 Va. 462, 297 S.E.2d 695, 697-98 (1982); Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 90 N.J. 396, 448 A.2d 449, 455 (1982); Ruge v. State, 201 Neb. 391, 267 N.W.2d 748, 750-51 (1978); Edgerly v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 377 A.2d 104, 108 (Me.1977); McFarland v. Barron, 83 S.D. 639, 164 N.W.2d 607, 609-10 (1969); Berger v. Hewlett, 25 Ill.2d 128, 182 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1962); Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273, 287 (1958); Duff v. Jordan, 82 Ariz. 228, 311 P.2d 829, 831 (1957); State v. Armory Bd., 174 Kan. 369, 256 P.2d 143, 150 (1953). See also, Texas Pub. Bldg. Auth. v. Mattox, 686 S.W.2d 924, 928 (Tex.1985); St. Charles City-County Library v. St. Charles Library Bldg. Corp., 627 S.W.2d 64, 67 (1981) [Multi-year lease terminable at will of municipality did not create a debt within meaning of constitutional provisions.]; Opinion of the Justices, 335 So.2d 376, 379 (1976) [Contract spanning from one to twenty years is not a "debt” as defined by constitutional provision if annual amount payable is to be derived from current revenues received.]; State v. Giessel, 271 Wis. 15, 72 N.W.2d 577, 583 *324(1955) [Obligation to pay periodic rentals contingent upon enjoyment of property is not a debt or the loaning of the credit of the state.]; State v. Donahey, 93 Ohio St. 414, 113 N.E. 263 (1916) [Upholding lease subject to appropriations of the Legislature.]

. Matter of McNeely, 1987 OK 19, 734 P.2d 1294, 1296; 1-2 O.S.1991 § 2201(A) provides in pertinent part:
"A. Judicial notice shall be taken by the court of the common law, constitutions and public statutes in force in every state, territory and jurisdiction and the United States.”

. Use of "shall,” by the Legislature is normally considered as a legislative mandate equivalent to the term “must,” requiring interpretation as a command. Fuller v. Odom, 1987 OK 64, 741 P.2d 449, 453.

. Title 12 O.S.1991 § 2201 provides in pertinent part:
"A Judicial notice shall be taken by the court of the common law, constitutions and public statutes in force in every state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States...."

. John Deere Plow Co. v. Owens, 1943 OK -, 194 Okla. 96, 147 P.2d 149, 153.

. The use of "shall” by the Legislature is normally considered as a legislative mandate equivalent to the term "must,” requiring interpretation as a command. State ex rel. Macy v. Freeman, 1991 OK 59, 814 P.2d 147, 153; Forest Oil Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 1990 OK 58, 807 P.2d 774, 787; Schaeffer v. Shaeffer, 1987 OK 30, 743 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Okla. 1987.)

. Tide 12 O.S.1991 § 2203 provides in pertinent part:
"... C. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.”

. Title 12 O.S.1991 § 2203, see note 9, supra.

. Halstead v. McHendry, 1977 OK 131, 566 P.2d 134, 136.

. The Okla. Const, art. 10, §§ 23, 24 and 25, see note 1, supra.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 347, 1991 OK 55, 813 P.2d 1019, 1031; State ex rel. York v. Turpen, 1984 OK 26, 681 P.2d 763.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 347, see note 5, supra; Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1950 OK -, 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997, appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 390, 72 S.Ct. 842, 96 L.Ed. 1022.

. Dieck v. Unified School Dist. of Antigo, see note 3, 477 N.W.2d at 618, supra.

. State v. Giessel, see note 3, 72 N.W.2d at 590, supra; Tranter v. Allegheny County Auth., 316 Pa. 65, 173 A. 289, 297 (1934).

. The Okla. Const, art. 10, § 26 provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Except as herein otherwise provided, no county, city, town, township, school district, or other political corporation, or subdivision of the state, shall be allowed to become indebted, in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue provided for such year without the assent of three-fifths of the voters thereof, voting at an election, to be held for that purpose
The current version of the Constitution is cited. Although the provision has been amended since this Court promulgated Halstead v. McHendry, 1977 OK 13Í, 566 P.2d 134, the quoted language remains unchanged from the version in effect when the decision was rendered.

. Okla. Stat. Ch. 17, § 38 (Ind.Terr.1890).

. Title 70 O.S. Supp.1997 § 5-106 provides:
"The governing board of each school district in Oklahoma is hereby designated and shall hereafter be known as the board of education of such district. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the superintendent of schools appointed and employed by the board shall be the executive officer of said board and shall perform duties as said hoard directs. The board may contract with a superintendent for a term as mutually agreed upon but not to exceed three (3) years beyond the fiscal year in which the contract is approved by the board and accepted by the superintendent...."

.The Legislature has specifically prescribed that school districts may enter into contracts with a superintendent spanning a three-year period. Title 70 O.S. Supp.1997 § 5-106, see note 19, supra.

. In re Anzai, see note 3 supra; Wilson v. Kentucky Trans. Cabinet, see note 3, supra; Schulz v. State, see note 3, supra; Dieck v. Unified School Dist. of Antigo, see note 3, supra; Dykes v. Northern Virginia Transportation Dist. Comm’n, see note 3, supra; Department of Ecology v. State Finance Committee, see note 3, supra; State v. School Bd. of Sarasota County, see note 3, supra; Caddell v. Lexington County School Dist. No. 1, see note 3, supra; Municipal Bldg. Auth. of Iron County v. Lowder, see note 3, supra; Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, see note 3, supra; Baliles v. Mazur, see note 3, supra; En-ourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., see note 3, supra; McFarland v. Barron, see note 3, supra; Berger v. Howlett, see note 3, supra; Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, see note 3, supra; Duff v. Jordan, see note 3, supra; State v. Armory Bd., see note 3, supra. See also, Texas Pub. Bldg. Auth. v. Mattox, note 3, supra; St. Charles City-County Library v. St. Charles Library Bldg. Corp., note 3, supra; Opinion of the Justices, note 3, supra; State v. Giessel, note 3, supra; State v. Donahey, note 3, supra.

. The Okla. Const, art. 10, § 23, see note 1, supra.

. The Okla. Const, art. 5, § 36 provides:
"The authority of the Legislature shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, and any specific grant of authority in this Constitution, upon any subject whatsoever, shall not work a restriction, limitation, or exclusion of such authority upon the same or any other subject or subjects whatsoever."

. The Okla. Const, art. 21, § 1 provides:
"Educational, reformatory, and penal institutions and those for the benefit of the insane, blind, deaf, and mute, and such other institutions as the public good may require, shall be established and supported by the State in such manner as may be prescribed by law.”'

. State ex rel. Strandberg v. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 131 Mont. 65, 307 P.2d 234, 236 (1957); Howard v. Cook, 59 Idaho 391, 83 P.2d 208, 210 (1938); Winters v. Hughes, 3 Utah 443, 24 P. 759, 761 (1861).

. Title 63 O.S. Supp.1997 § 3225.

. Title 63 O.S. Supp.1997 § 3224.

. Title 63 O.S. Supp.1997 § 3224.

. The Okla. Const. art. 10, §23, see note 1, supra. Boswell v. State, 1937 OK -, 181 Okla. 435, 74 P.2d 940. See also, Halstead v. McHendry, note 17 at 138, supra.