Court Opinion

ID: 9531194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:08:31.053172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:21.921428
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McGLOON, specially concurring: I concur with the result reached by my colleagues, but believe that defendant’s argument based on section 104 — 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 should be addressed because of the uncertainty expressed by the trial court regarding the application of this and related statutes involving unfit defendants. Defendant has argued that her right to a speedy trial was violated where the trial court failed to conduct a discharge hearing within 120 days of her arrest. She further maintained that a discharge hearing was required by section 104 — 23(a). (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1979 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 — 23(a).) The trial court ruled that defendant was not entitled to a discharge hearing as there was a substantial probability that she would attain fitness within one year. The court based its ruling on its belief that section 104 — 16(d) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1979 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 — 16(d)) allowed discharge hearings only for those not likely to become fit within one year after a finding of unfitness. Section 104 — 23 provides in part: “Cases involving an unfit defendant who demands a discharge hearing or a defendant who cannot become fit to stand trial and for whom no special provisions or assistance can compensate for his disability and render him fit shall proceed in the following manner: (a) At any time after a finding of unfitness to enter a plea or to stand trial, a defendant or the attorney for the defendant may move for a discharge hearing pursuant to the provisions of Section 104 — 25. The speedy trial provisions of Section 103 — 5 shall commence with the filing of a motion for a discharge hearing. (b) If at any time the court determines that there is not a substantial probability that the defendant will become fit to stand trial or to plead within one year from the date of the original finding of unfitness, or if at the end of one year from that date the court finds the defendant still unfit and for whom no special provisions or assistance can compensate for his disabilities and render him fit, the speedy trial provisions of Section 103 — 5 shall commence to run 9 9 9 Section 103 — 5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 — 5) provides for a 120-day period for those not released on bond or recognizance. The pertinent part of section 104 — 25, referred to in 104 — 23(a), states: “(a) As provided for in paragraph (a) of Section 104 — 23 and sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph (b) of Section 104 — 23 a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the evidence shall be held. Such hearing shall be conducted by the court without a jury. The State and the defendant may introduce evidence relevant to the question of defendant’s guilt of the crime charged. The court may admit hearsay or affidavit evidence on secondary matters such as testimony to establish the chain of possession of physical evidence, laboratory reports, authentication of transcripts taken by official reporters, court and business records, and public documents.” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1979 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 — 25(a). The purpose of the discharge hearing provided in section 104 — 25 is to alleviate any unfairness in holding criminal charges against an unfit defendant without giving him the opportunity to prove his innocence. (See People v. Lang (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 311, 329-30, 391 N.E.2d 350, 357-58.) Keeping this purpose in mind and construing these sections as a whole, I would find that in the absence of any delays attributable to defendant, an unfit defendant is entitled to a discharge hearing within 120 days after a motion for said hearing is made. If sections 104 — 23 and 104-25 were construed in any other manner, their obvious intent and purpose would not be effectuated. I would further find that section 104 — 16(d) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1979 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 — 16(d)) does not conflict with the above interpretation or warrant a contrary conclusion. The pertinent sentence of 104 — 16(d) provides that if there is not a substantial probability that defendant will attain fitness within one year, the court should proceed as provided in section 104 — 23. Section 104 — 23(b) provides a separate procedure to be followed in such cases. However, section 104 — 23(a) is not restricted to cases where defendant will not attain fitness within one year. The introductory language to section 104 — 23 states that any unfit defendant may request a discharge hearing. As a point of clarification, I would add that I agree with my colleagues’ general assertion that delay caused by an adjudication of incompetency tolls the speedy trial statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 — 5). However, as noted above, a discharge hearing must be timely held if a motion for the hearing is made after the adjudication of incompetency. In the case at bar, defendant’s attorney motioned for a discharge hearing on March 21, 1980, after defendant was found unfit. Thus, the time period imposed by section 104 — 23(a) began to run. But defendant was found fit atid tried 105 days after the motion for discharge hearing was made. Thus, the rights afforded defendant under sections 104 — 23 and 104 — 25 were not substantially impaired, and the purpose of these statutes was met in substance. For this reason, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.