Court Opinion

ID: 9634944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:29:49.454824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:14.020205
License: Public Domain

Speziale, J.
(dissenting). The plaintiff has argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously applied a lower standard of proof, that of a fair preponderance of the evidence, rather than the required standard of clear and satisfactory proof. The trial court’s conclusions in its finding are silent not only as to the burden of proof, but also as to the standard of proof; however, as contended by the plaintiff, the court in its memorandum of decision stated that the defendants satisfied their burden of proof by a “fair preponderance of the evidence.” This was clearly error on the part of the trial court. *175The majority excuses this misapplication of the law on the ground that the claim of error was not raised at the appropriate time.
It is true that this court will not generally consider claimed errors unless there has been compliance with § 652 of the Practice Book.1 In rare cases, however, we have considered a question not so raised, “not by reason of the appellant’s right to have it determined but because, in our opinion, in the interest of the public welfare or of justice between the parties it ought to be done.” Kavanewsky v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 401, 279 A.2d 567 (1971); Leary v. Citizens & Manufacturers National Bank, 128 Conn. 475, 479, 23 A.2d 863 (1942); Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 655, 197 A. 761 (1938). In a case such as the one before us, where the error is clear and is one which may well have been determinative, it should be considered in the interest of “justice between the parties.”
The only issue in the case was whether the money in question was a gift or a loan. The only evidence presented was the conflicting testimony of the parties and their witnesses. As the majority notes, “[t]he decision in this case depended in large measure upon the credibility which the court placed on the testimony of the witnesses.” The defendants had the burden of proving that a valid gift was made. Kukanskis v. Jasut, 169 Conn. 29, 35, 362 A.2d 898 (1975); Flynn v. Hinsley, 142 Conn. 257, 262, 113 A.2d 351 (1955); Kriedel v. Krampitz, 137 Conn. 532, 534, 79 A.2d 181 (1951). Thus, had the *176higher — and proper — standard of proof been applied, the plaintiffs might very well have prevailed.
The application of the wrong standard of proof, in the particular circumstances of this case, is grounds for a new trial, or at the very least, because the case was tried to the court, it should be remanded to the trial judge for a further determination of whether, upon the application of the proper standard of proof, the conclusion can stand.
In this case, the majority holding, sustaining the erroneous judgment of the trial court because of a failure to comply with Practice Book § 652, results in a substantial injustice.
In this opinion Bogdanski, J., concurred.

 See footnote 1 of the majority opinion.