Court Opinion

ID: 9951550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 14:08:46.736123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:30.507706
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3665-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

FRANCIS PRETO,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted January 31, 2024 – Decided March 18, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Susswein.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 11-05-0884.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief
                   Appellate Attorney, of counsel; William Kyle Meighan,
                   Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Francis Preto appeals from a April 5, 2022 Law Division order

denying his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing. In 2012, defendant was convicted at trial for conspiring

and attempting to kill his wife. He was also convicted for conspiring and

attempting to kill a fellow Ocean County Jail inmate who reported the murder

plot to authorities. In his first PCR petition, defendant claimed his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance. He now contends his first PCR counsel was also

ineffective. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the arguments of the

parties and governing legal principles, we affirm substantially for the reasons

set forth in Judge Guy Ryan's comprehensive twenty-seven-page written

opinion.

                                        I.

      We need only briefly summarize the facts adduced at trial, which are fully

recounted in our opinion affirming defendant's convictions on direct appeal.

State v. Preto, Docket No. A-4212-12T4 (July 8, 2016). While in jail, defendant

asked a fellow inmate, Timothy Milton, to arrange to kill defendant's wife

because she wanted a divorce. Defendant sought to hire Milton's "cousin"—

who did not actually exist—to commit the murder and "[m]ake it look like it's a

robbery" in exchange for $10,000. Defendant gave Milton detailed instructions,

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including when to commit the murder, how to receive the payment, and to "[j]ust

dump" his wife's body. Unbeknownst to defendant, Milton alerted the Ocean

County Prosecutor's Office about defendant's plot. Milton agreed to wear a

recording device when he interacted with defendant. The recordings were

played at trial and confirmed the plot.

      Defendant eventually learned Milton cooperated with law enforcement.

Defendant told Charles Anderson, another inmate, that Milton deserved to die.

Defendant asked Anderson to stab Milton in his neck or "take care of the

situation" to prevent him from testifying. In exchange, defendant promised to

pay Anderson's $200,000 bail. In addition, defendant told another inmate,

Maurice Peace, that Milton should be "whacked." Peace wrote a letter to the

prosecutor's office and agreed to wear a recording device when speaking to

defendant. During a recorded conversation, the two men discussed how Milton's

murder was to be accomplished.

      In August 2009, defendant was charged in a superseding indictment with

two counts of conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A.

2C:11-3(a), and two counts of attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-

3(a). The first trial ended in a hung jury. In the fall of 2012, the jury in the

second trial convicted defendant of first-degree conspiracy to murder his wife,

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first-degree attempted murder of his wife, and first-degree conspiracy to murder

Milton. Defendant was acquitted of attempting to murder Milton. In March

2013, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate sixteen-year prison term subject

to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. This sentence was

ordered to be served consecutive to an unrelated prison sentence defendant was

serving at the time of sentencing. On direct appeal, we affirmed defendant's

convictions, but remanded to correct the calculation of gap-time and jail credits.

State v. Preto, Docket No. A-4212-12T4 (July 8, 2016).

      In May 2017, defendant filed his first petition for PCR.           Defendant

claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for numerous reasons, including not

contacting a potential witness, Reilly, not presenting documentary evidence

presented in the first trial, and for failing to communicate with him t o prepare

for trial. Judge Ryan rejected defendant's arguments, finding he did not establish

a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.

      With respect to Reilly, the PCR judge confirmed that trial counsel tried to

locate him. In the trial court transcript, the trial judge stated, "I think [defense

counsel] indicated they weren't able to find [Reilly], right, we checked the jail,

I just want to make sure we check the jail and probation, unable to find him, and

there's no [other defense witnesses]?" Defense counsel responded, "[t]hat's

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correct, [Y]our Honor." Additionally, in his first PCR petition, defendant did

not submit a certification from Reilly, admitted Reilly's whereabouts were

unknown, and admitted he was "a bad heroin addict" who was frequently in jail.

Nor did defendant submit a certification by himself as to what Reilly would have

testified.

       Judge Ryan concluded:

             Defense counsel is entitled to latitude for not wildly
             pursuing Reilly's whereabouts given the limited
             credibility he would have likely had with the jury.
             Defense counsel is entitled to deference in her decision
             not to make further efforts to call Reilly given his
             criminal record and drug addiction. Any additional
             efforts by defense counsel to call Reilly as a witness
             would have been futile and meritless. Counsel has no
             duty to raise meritless claims or arguments.

             [Citations omitted.]

       On September 27, 2018, Judge Ryan entered an order denying defendant's

first PCR petition accompanied by a thirty-two-page written opinion. On June

10, 2020, we affirmed the denial of the first petition. State v. Preto, Docket No.

A-1393-18Tl (June 10, 2020). We rejected defendant's argument "his trial

counsel should have pursued Reilly's whereabouts more aggressively." We

emphasized "defendant was unable to locate Reilly while preparing his PCR and

acknowledges he does not even know if Reilly is still alive." We added:

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Even putting aside that defendant's arguments with
respect to Reilly are bald assertions, defendant's own
electronically recorded statements would have
contradicted Reilly's hypothesized testimony. In a
jailhouse conversation recorded on July 2, 2008, for
example, defendant and Milton discussed the details of
the plan to kill Ms. Preto, including Milton's payment
for killing Ms. Preto and the logistics of dumping her
body. Defendant told Milton he would pay $10,000 for
Milton to "to take her out." At no point in any of the
recorded conversations between defendant and Milton
does anyone refer to a scheme to steal personal
watercraft.

...

In this instance, in exercising her professional
judgment, defendant's trial counsel was permitted, if
not obligated to consider the credibility of Reilly's
testimony in light of the other evidence presented at
trial. Defendant explained at oral argument that in
preparing for defendant's second trial, his second trial
counsel read all the materials supplied by defendant's
first trial counsel. Counsel's decision to not make
further effort to locate and subpoena Reilly was thus
made with an understanding that Reilly would have
provided testimony contradicted by defendant's own
admissions, reducing Reilly's credibility and the value
of his testimony. In these circumstances, we agree with
the PCR court that defendant has provided no basis for
concluding that counsel's performance with respect to
this potential witness was unreasonable or otherwise
constitutionally deficient.

...

In sum, given the uncertainty concerning Reilly's
testimony, as well as Reilly's criminal record and

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             history of drug addiction, we agree with the PCR court's
             conclusion that it was reasonable that counsel did not
             further pursue Reilly's whereabouts.

       On July 7, 2020, defendant filed a second PCR petition—the matter now

before us—claiming ineffective assistance of his first PCR counsel. The central

issue is whether the first PCR counsel "failed to secure a statement or

certification from the witness which could have substantiated an ineffectiveness

claim against trial counsel for failing to call that witness to testify at trial."

       For this second petition, defendant has provided his own affidavit in which

he claims his attorney from the first trial—which ended in a hung jury and

mistrial—had "a statement by . . . Reilly, pertaining [to] conversations

[defendant] had with Timothy Milton." Defendant claims Reilly's statement

"clearly says that Reilly, Milton and I discussed plans to remove jet skis (known

as WaveRunners 1) from my former [marital] property. . . Reilly speaks about

how we had made plans to trespass onto the property, and retrieve the

Wave[R]unners, sell them and split the proceeds." Defendant also claims Reilly

stated "the conversations the three of us had pertained ONLY to obtaining and

selling the Wave[R]unners" and "there was never any discussion, or comments

whatsoever about murdering or harming my wife."

1
    "WaveRunner" is a trademarked name and type of personal watercraft.
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                                          7
      In a second affidavit submitted in support of the present PCR petition,

defendant states Reilly "is familiar with jail/prison culture, and would have

testified that in the jail/prison environment, inmates have a tendency to put on a

façade, of being a tough, no-nonsense, short tempered individual, with everyone

an[d] everything." The affidavit further asserts:

            Reilly would have testified that there were guys in the
            jail who did not respect other inmates['] age, health
            conditions, etc[.], an[d] prey upon the weaker inmates
            therefore many weaker inmates have adopted the
            thought talk ploy in an attempt to protect themselves
            through this façade. It was apparent to Reilly that
            inmate [defendant] was putting on a façade on tough
            talk.

      On April 5, 2022, Judge Ryan denied defendant's second petition. The

judge rejected defendant's central claim, finding:

            As noted in this court's first PCR opinion, no
            certification was submitted to verify the claims of . . .
            Reilly. When considering the factors set forth in [State
            v. L.A., 433 N.J. Super. 1, 16-17 (App. Div. 2013)], and
            the deference accorded to trial counsel in making
            strategic decisions, this court concludes first PCR
            counsel was not ineffective in failing to secure a
            certification from . . . Reilly. To this date, no one has
            located Reilly nor substantiated that he could have or
            would have provided testimony beneficial to the
            defendant. Further, second PCR counsel advised at oral
            argument that he came into possession of recorded
            statements of Reilly which he recently acquired from
            Glen Kassman, defendant's trial counsel in the first
            trial. As a result, the court left the record open at

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                                        8
            defendant's request to submit any favorable transcripts
            after reviewing the recorded statements. After a
            significant opportunity for review, second PCR counsel
            declined to submit any statements to support the claim,
            buttressing the conclusion that Reilly never provided
            anything helpful for defendant.

            The obligation of first PCR counsel in regard to Reilly's
            supposed testimony was to "advance all of the
            legitimate arguments requested by the defendant that
            the record will support." Rule 3:22-6(d). First PCR
            counsel raised this claim but could not support it with a
            certification by Reilly because Reilly could not be
            located then, nor has he been located since. Reilly's
            location was unknown to defendant and trial counsel at
            the time of the second trial and first PCR counsel
            indicated it was unknown whether Reilly is still alive.
            Further, no one has found any prior statements by
            Reilly, recorded, or written, which substantiates he
            should have been called as a defense witness at trial.
            Accordingly, this court finds first PCR counsel was not
            ineffective for failing to locate Reilly to secure a
            certification or affidavit.

      This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following sole contention for

our consideration:

            THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN
            EVIDENTIARY       HEARING       BECAUSE
            DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
            CASE     OF   FIRST    PCR     COUNSEL'S
            INEFFECTIVENESS FOR FAILING TO SUBMIT AN
            AFFIDAVIT OR CERTIFICATION REGARDING . . .
            REILLY,   A   POTENTIAL    EXCULPATORY
            WITNESS.

                                       II.

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      We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing

this appeal. PCR serves the same function as a federal writ of habeas corpus.

State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). When petitioning for PCR, a

defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he

is entitled to the requested relief. Ibid. To sustain this burden, the petitioner

must allege and articulate specific facts, "which, if believed, would provide the

court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell,

126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

      To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must

demonstrate: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient"; and (2) "the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the

Strickland two-pronged analysis in New Jersey). "That is, the defendant must

establish, first, that 'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness' and, second, that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.'" State v. Alvarez, 473 N.J. Super. 448, 455 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).

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       When assessing Strickland's first prong, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's

performance must be highly deferential." 466 U.S. at 669. "Merely because a

trial strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. Bey,

161 N.J. 233, 251 (1999). Thus, a trial court "must indulge a strong presumption

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance," and "the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound

trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350

U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

       Under Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show "the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. That is, "counsel's errors were

so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show the errors "had some

conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. at 693. Ultimately, "[a]n error by

counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the

judgment of a criminal proceeding if [it] had no effect on the judgment." Id. at

691.

       Further, "[a]ny factual assertion that provides the predicate for a claim of

relief must be made by an affidavit or certification pursuant to Rule 1:4-4 and

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based upon personal knowledge of the declarant before the court may grant an

evidentiary hearing." R. 3:22-10(c); see State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).

      "In addressing an ineffective assistance [of counsel] claim based on a

counsel's failure to call an absent witness, a PCR court must unavoidably

consider whether the absent witness's testimony would address a significant fact

in the case, and assess the absent witness's credibility." L.A., 433 N.J. Super. at

15. "However, the assessment of an absent witness's credibility is not an end in

itself." Ibid. Instead, "it is a factor in the court's determination whether there is

a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's failure to call the witness,

the result would have been different—that is, there would have been reasonable

doubt about the defendant's guilt." Id. at 15-16.

      When a reviewing court considers the impact an absent witness may have,

it "should consider: '(1) the credibility of all witnesses, including the likely

impeachment of the uncalled defense witnesses; (2) the interplay of the uncalled

witnesses with the actual defense witnesses called; and (3) the strength of the

evidence actually presented by the prosecution.'"           Id. at 16-17 (quoting

McCauley-Bey v. Delo, 97 F.3d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1996)). "All three factors

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derive from the court's obligation under Strickland to consider the totality of the

evidence in making its prejudice determination." Id. at 17.

      In New Jersey, the right to the effective assistance of counsel extends to

PCR counsel. See State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 18-19 (2002). PCR counsel must

"advance all of the legitimate arguments requested by the defendant that the

record will support," R. 3:22-6(d), and "make the best available arguments in

support of them," Rue, 175 N.J. at 19. Thus, "PCR counsel must communicate

with the client, investigate the claims urged by the client, and determine whether

there are additional claims that should be brought forward." State v. Webster,

187 N.J. 254, 257 (2006) (citing Rue, 175 N.J. at 18-19). However, PCR counsel

is not required to bolster claims raised by a defendant that are without

foundation. Ibid. We add the remedy for PCR counsel's failure to meet the

requirements imposed by R. 3:22-6(d) is not a new trial, but rather a new PCR

proceeding. State v. Hicks, 411 N.J. Super. 370, 376 (App. Div. 2010) (citing

Rue, 175 N.J. at 4).

      Short of obtaining immediate relief, a defendant may show that an

evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with

an ineffective assistance claim. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63. The mere raising

of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing.

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Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. Rather, "[i]f the court perceives that holding

an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant

is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State

v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citations omitted).

      The PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing only when: "(1) the

defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; (2) the court

determines that there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be resolved

by review of the existing record; and (3) the court determines that an evidentiary

hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J.

Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023) (citing State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354

(2013)).

      "Where, as here, the PCR court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing,

we review its legal and factual determinations de novo." State v. Aburoumi, 464

N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020); see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518,

540-41 (2013). However, "we review under the abuse of discretion standard the

PCR court's determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing." State v.

Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Marshall, 148 N.J.

at 157-58).

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                                        III.

      We next apply these foundational principles to the matter before us.

Defendant argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he established

a prima facie case that his first PCR counsel was ineffective "for failing to

submit an affidavit or certification regarding . . . Reilly, a potential exculpatory

witness." As in his previous PCR petition, defendant argues Reilly would have

testified that Reilly, Milton, and defendant conspired to steal WaveRunners from

defendant's wife—not to kill her. He claims Reilly also would have testified

defendant was "merely 'talking tough'" when discussing murdering his wife with

Milton.

      We agree with Judge Ryan that defendant has not established a prima facie

case for ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. First, defendant's certification

that Reilly would have testified defendant, Reilly, and Milton discussed plans to

steal WaveRunners, and not kill his wife, is belied by the electronic recording

evidence adduced at trial. So too defendant's certification "there was never any

discussion, or comments whatsoever about murdering or harming my wife" is

simply untrue.

      For example, the transcript from an electronic recording shows Milton

asked defendant, "[y]ou want her dead[?]" Defendant responded, "[y]es." When

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                                        15
Milton asked about the body, defendant replied, "[j]ust dump it. I don't give a

s**t." Defendant told Milton, "[a]lright, ten G's to take her out and that should

be enough to cover everything we need to cover."

      And on July 2, 2008, defendant said he wanted Milton's cousin to "just go

in there and mess [his wife], you know, bang her up real f**kin' good . . . beat

the s**t out of her, do you know what I'm saying." He continued, "I want, I

want him to f**k her face up real good. I want him to give her a f**king

beating." He also said, "I wanna' f**k [my wife] up. I wanna' bust her up. Give

her a beating in the house."

      Defendant's certification alleges Reilly gave a statement explaining,

"Reilly, Milton, and I discussed plans to remove jet skis (known as

'WaveRunners') from my former [marital] property." However, that assertion

does not dimmish the incriminating impact of the recorded conversations

between defendant and Milton. In other words, even assuming for the sake of

argument there was a conversation between Reilly, Milton, and defendant about

WaveRunners, that fact does not undermine the impact of defendant's recorded

conversations with Milton in which defendant expressed a clear intention to

have his wife killed.

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      In sum, defendant has not established a prima facie case for ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to call Reilly—a witness who could not be

located. Considering the likely impeachment of the uncalled defense witness

and the strength of the evidence actually presented by the prosecution, see ibid.,

defendant has failed to establish Reilly's testimony would have changed the

result of the proceeding as required under the Strickland/Fritz test.         See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish a

basis for an evidentiary hearing. See Cummings, 321 N.J. at 170.

      Affirm.

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