Court Opinion

ID: 9581209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:12:36.728385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:46.714204
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
concurring specially.
I believe that Rubel Baking Co. v. Levitt, 118 Ga. App. 306 (163 SE2d 437) (1968), should be overruled. In my view, where a moving party satisfies the legal requirements for summary judgment, the court must grant the motion. The language of CPA § 56 (c) (Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c)) is mandatory: "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law...” (Emphasis supplied.) In view of this statutory command, I believe it would be erroneous for a trial court not to enter summary judgment to a moving party where the legal criteria for summary judgment are satisfied. The amount of an opposing party’s claim should have no bearing on the trial court’s *883determination as to whether a moving party is entitled to summary judgment.
Furthermore, I do not believe the main opinion’s reference to the "expedient of refusing to issue a final judgment until the counterclaim is concluded” is necessary. A grant of summary judgment, though appealable, is not a final judgment upon which a fi. fa. can issue where a valid counterclaim is pending against the plaintiff. Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242 (248 SE2d 641) (1978). See 33 CJS138-139, Executions, § 6. Moreover, where a valid counterclaim is pending, I do not believe the trial court would generally be authorized to enter a final judgment under CPA‘§ 54 (b) (Code Ann. § 81A-154(b)), by an express determination that "there is no just reason for delay” and an express direction for entry of judgment, unless the court also stays enforcement of the judgment under CPA § 62 (f) (Code Ann. § 81A-162(f)).1
Absent unusual circumstances which need not be considered here, there is a just reason for delay where a valid counterclaim is pending against the plaintiff. Where such a counterclaim is pending, entry of a final judgment without staying its enforcement would, in the usual case, amount to an abuse of discretion. See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 751, ¶ 54.41[3]. Upon resolution of the counterclaim, the court can offset the amount of the counterclaim against the amount of the main claim. Fagala v. Morrison, 146 Ga. App. 377, 378 (246 SE2d 408) (1978).

 The primary effect of conferring final judgment status on a summary judgment is to enable a party to enforce that judgment. The grant of summary judgment is appealable in any event under CPA § 56 (h) (Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h)). By entering a final judgment under CPA § 54 (b) and staying enforcement of that judgment under CPA § 62 (f), the court places the parties in virtually the same position as if it had merely granted summary judgment and taken no further action. In either case, (1) the grant of summary judgment is appealable and (2) the judgment is not immediately enforceable.