Court Opinion

ID: 9688987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:15:40.727505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:26.783202
License: Public Domain

Beasley, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
Plaintiff, Kathy Aneta Moon, filed this action under the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq.; MSA 25.491 et seq., alleging that defendant, Jerry Ballinger, was the father of her child. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion to compel defendant to submit to a blood test. Pursuant to MCL *680722.716; MSA 25.496,1 the trial judge granted plaintiffs motion and ordered defendant to submit to a blood test. Upon defendant’s refusal to submit to the ordered blood test, plaintiff filed a motion to have a default judgment entered against defendant. Pursuant to MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c), formerly OCR 1963, 313.2(2)(c), the trial judge granted plaintiff’s motion and held that a default judgment would be entered against defendant if he did not submit to a blood test within sixty days or pursue an appeal of the trial judge’s decision in this matter. Defendant appeals the trial judge’s decision by leave granted.
On appeal, defendant argues that a default judgment is not a permissible sanction against a defendant who refuses to submit to a blood test ordered by a trial court under MCL 722.716; MSA 25.496. Defendant bases his argument on the relationship between the provisions of the Paternity Act and the Michigan Court Rules and the language of the statute.
MCR 3.212(A), formerly GCR 1963, 730.1, provides:
Procedure in actions under the Paternity Act (MCL 722.711 et seq.; MSA 25.491 et seq.) is governed by. the rules applicable to other civil actions except as modified by this rule and the Paternity Act.
*681In interpreting this court rule, this Court has found that the general court rules applicable in civil actions which are not in conflict with the provisions of the Paternity Act are applicable in paternity actions. However, where there is a conflict between the court rules and the Paternity Act, the Paternity Act provisions prevail.2
It is clear that MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c) provides the trial judge with the authority to impose, among various other sanctions, a default judgment upon a party who refuses to submit to a blood test ordered by the court pursuant to MCR 2.311, formerly GCR 1963, 311. However, MCL 722.716; MSA 25.496 appears to modify the court rule in the paternity action situation. The statute provides in pertinent part:
If the court orders any blood or tissue typing test to be taken and any party refuses to submit to the test, in addition to any other remedies available, the fact of the refusal shall be disclosed at the trial unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.
This language appears to reveal the Legislature’s intent that a defendant’s refusal to submit to a court-ordered blood test will not preclude a trial on the issue of paternity. The only express remedy provided in such a situation is that the defendant’s refusal to submit to the blood test shall be revealed at the trial. The statutory language, when taken alone, clearly indicates that a trial will take place despite a defendant’s refusal and, thus, appears to preclude a default judgment in this type of paternity action situation.
Plaintiff, on appeal, and the trial judge, in grant*682ing a default judgment, point to the language in the statute allowing, in addition to the sanction of revealing defendant’s refusal at trial, "any other remedies available” to the court. However, I do not believe the Legislature intended to authorize a trial judge to render the only express remedy provided by the statute meaningless by allowing the entry of a default judgment. I believe the statute modifies the court rules in paternity actions to the extent that the court rules would allow the entry of a default judgment when a defendant refuses to submit to a court-ordered blood test. Thus, I conclude that the "other remedies available” in such a situation do not include the default judgment sanction.
Plaintiffs reliance on this Court’s decision in Butler v Cann3 is misplaced. The Butler Court only addressed the issue presented when two provisions of the Paternity Act itself are allegedly inconsistent. The Butler Court did not address the issue presented when a provision of the Paternity Act allegedly modifies a court rule. Therefore, I conclude that the decision in Butler, concerning the propriety of default judgments in paternity actions when the defendant fails to appear at trial, does not provide any guidance for our decision in this matter.
As previously indicated, MCL 722.716; MSA 25.496 was recently amended by the Legislature in 1982 in order to allow the trial court to order a defendant in a paternity action to submit to a blood test. Prior to this amendment, only the plaintiff and the child could be ordered to submit to a blood test. I am convinced that the Legislature, in making this substantial amendment to prior procedures concerning court-ordered blood *683tests, did not intend to go so far as to allow a trial judge to impose the severe sanction of a default judgment on a defendant in a paternity action when he refuses to submit to a court-ordered blood test.
Therefore, I would conclude that the trial judge erred in entering a default judgment against defendant for his refusal to submit to a blood test in this paternity action and would reverse and remand.

 This statute was amended by 1982 PA 129, § 1, effective April 20, which expressly recognized the human leukocyte antigen (hla) tissue tests, providing in part:
(4) The result of a blood or tissue typing test, and if a determination of exclusion of paternity cannot be made, a calculation of the probability of paternity made by a person the court determines is qualified as an examiner of blood or tissue types based on the result of a blood or tissue typing test shall be admissible in evidence in the trial of the case. [MCL 722. 716(4); MSA 25.496(4).]

 Pridemore v Williams, 90 Mich App 483, 487; 282 NW2d 363 (1979).

 62 Mich App 663; 233 NW2d 827 (1975).