Court Opinion

ID: 9714431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:37:17.713574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:26.029237
License: Public Domain

Mahady, J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority that a municipal law enforcement officer has no authority to effect a motor vehicle arrest outside the territorial jurisdiction of his municipality.
The legislature has specifically provided that “[w]ithin the limits of the state, police officers shall have the same powers as sheriffs in criminal matters . . . .” 24 V.S.A. § 1935. Twenty-two years ago, this Court held that a sheriff “had state wide jurisdiction to make [an] arrest.” In re Huard, 125 Vt. 189, 191, 212 A.2d 640, 643 (1965). Within the past year, this Court noted that “the existence of 24 V.S.A. § 1935, giving police officers the same pow*146ers as sheriffs in criminal matters . . . effectively settles the matter .... A sheriff, or his deputy, has state-wide jurisdiction to make arrests.” State v. Bushey, 148 Vt. 197, 200, 531 A.2d 902, 905 (1987).
In 1972, and again in 1973, the legislature amended 24 V.S.A. § 1935. It must be presumed that the legislature acts with knowledge of the relevant decisions of this Court. State v. Anair, 123 Vt. 80, 81, 181 A.2d 61, 63 (1962). Having twice made amendments to § 1935 after our holding in Huard, it is only too clear that it is the intent of the legislature to provide statewide jurisdiction for municipal police officers as well as for sheriffs. Compare State v. Hart, 149 Vt. 104, 106, 539 A.2d 551, 552 (1987) (There is “no express statutory authority in Vermont for a constable to make a warrantless arrest outside of the town in which the constable was elected, nor is there implicit statutory authority for such an expansion of a constable’s jurisdiction.”).
The language of the statute itself reinforces this conclusion. In construing a statute we must, where possible, give effect to every word, clause and sentence. State v. Tierney, 138 Vt. 163, 165, 412 A.2d 298, 299 (1980). Therefore effect must be given to the introductory clause of § 1935. That clause, “[w]ithin the limits of the state,” is clear on its face. Accordingly, its plain meaning must be given effect. See Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 93, 463 A.2d 232, 233 (1983).
The legislature has also adopted a statewide policy “to improve the quality of law enforcement and citizen protection by maintaining a uniform standard of recruit and in-service training for law-enforcement officers . . . .” 20 V.S.A. § 2351. As a matter of sound public policy this Court should encourage such statewide standardization and should encourage interagency cooperation among law enforcement agencies. In doing so, we will improve both public safety and concern for individual liberties through increased law enforcement professionalism.
When faced with situations such as that presented by Route 7, running within a short distance through Burlington, South Burlington and Shelburne, or such as that presented by Route 15, running within a short distance through Winooski, Colchester and Essex, I do not believe for a moment that the legislature intended to place the kind of needless and artificial restraints on law enforcement as the Court imposes today.
*147This Court should not presume that the legislature intends “absurd or irrational results.” State v. Rice, 145 Vt. 25, 34, 483 A.2d 248, 253 (1984). The majority would require a uniformed Colchester police officer in a marked cruiser, upon observing an obviously impaired driver weaving on the highways of Winooski, posing a serious threat to the life and limb of innocent citizens, to merely follow the vehicle and radio for the assistance of a Winooski officer. (What if the officer had happened upon an armed robbery in progress? A rape in progress? What is to be the fate of the common county-wide, interagency efforts to combat drunk driving?) The rule adopted in this case will produce such irrational consequences. That was not the intent of the legislature.
Respect for our sister branch of government, the legislature, requires this Court to give meaning and effect to its enactments. See In re A.C., 144 Vt. 37, 43, 470 A.2d 1191, 1194 (1984). Hypertechnical obfuscation of clear legislative intent denies that respect.
I would affirm. I am authorized to say that Justice Peck joins in this dissent.