Court Opinion

ID: 9734317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:31:52.734312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:47.889477
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that the amended statute of limitations was intended by the Legislature to apply to offenses not barred when the amendment took effect.1 I also agree that the application of the amended statute of limitations does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses -of the United States and Michigan Constitutions.2
With regard to the validity of the search warrant, I agree with the majority that the proper standard of review of a magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant is set forth in Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983). See also People v Landt, 439 Mich 870 (1991). I also agree that when a warrant contains misrepresentations, the misrepresentations must *616be excluded and the warrant reviewed to determine whether there was probable cause independent of the excluded material. See Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154; 98 S Ct 2674; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978); People v Reid, 420 Mich 326; 362 NW2d 655 (1984).
I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the affidavit, comprised of information minimally almost seven years old and potentially over ten years old, was sufficient to establish probable cause to search the defendant’s home.
The affidavit provided the magistrate with the following facts:
Your affiant is a detective with the Grand Rapids Police Dep’t. assigned to the Juvenile Division of that department. On April 4, 1989, your affiant received information from Clinton County Protective Services regarding . . . possible sexual assaults] between Sam Russo as the suspect and [the complainant], age 16, said sexual assaults occurring at various locations within the City of Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan, for the past 2½ years.
On April 25, 1989, your affiant interviewed the complainant ... in her office at the Grand Rapids Police Dep’t. [The complainant] stated that she would visit the home of Sam Russo every other week-end. She stated further that during those week-end visits she would be sexually assaulted by Sam Russo, said sexual assaults involving co-mutual touching and acts of sexual penetration between herself and Sam Rússo. [She] indicated that on various times either before, during or after said sexual assaults Sam Russo would photograph her naked or in various stages of undress. On several occasions video tapes were made of the victim alone or with the suspect involved in sexual activity or naked poses.
[She] stated further that said sexual assaults began sometime in the Fall of 1978, when [she] *617was five years of age, and ended in August of 1982 when [she] was 10 years of age. [She] further indicated to your affiant that both the photographs and video tapes were displayed to her by the suspect numerous times during her week-end visits. Additionally [she] indicated that the photographs were stored in different locations, within the home and bound in piles held together by string or rubber bands. Said videos and pictures were observed by [her] at the 526 Livingston address. Suspect Sam Russo is not related by either blood or affinity to alleged victim .... [Emphasis added.]
On the basis of the allegations in the affidavit, the magistrate issued a search warrant authorizing the search of the defendant’s home for pictures and videotapes of the victim.
A careful review of the affidavit reveals that some of its allegations are inconsistent. For example, it initially alleges that the sexual assaults occurred over the last 2½ years and then specifically states that the assaults occurred when the victim was between the ages of five and ten, ending in 1982. The prosecutor admitted at oral argument before this Court that the reference in the affidavit that sexual assaults had occurred for the past 2½ years was a mistake. Thus, the misrepresented allegations must be excluded and the affidavit reevaluated to determine whether probable cause existed.
After excluding the misrepresented facts, what remains is an affidavit that states that sexual assaults occurred between the fall of 1978 and August of 1982. Further, that sometime during this period, the victim was photographed and videotaped and that sometime later the victim observed the photographs and videotapes with the defendant. Finally, that the defendant stored the *618photographs in different locations in his home, bound by string and rubber bands. I consider to be of particular importance what is not in the affidavit. Nowhere in the modified affidavit are there any allegations that the defendant’s conduct continued after August of 1982. Nowhere in the modified affidavit is there any evidence to suggest that any police officer attempted to substantiate any of the claims of the victim, not even to the minimal extent of determining whether the defendant had the opportunity to commit the alleged offenses.3 Finally, and of most significance, nowhere in the modified affidavit is there any indication that the items to be searched for would be in the defendant’s possession at the time the warrant was executed.4
Because I believe the modified affidavit did not provide probable cause to search the defendant’s home, specifically because the allegations were stale, I would quash the warrant. I recognize, however, that many lower federal courts have found probable cause despite substantial gaps between the observation of the evidence and the issuance of the warrant. See, e.g., United States v Greany, 929 F2d 523 (CA 9, 1991) (two years); United States v Rowell, 903 F2d 899, 903 (CA 2, 1990) (1½. years); United States v Freeman, 685 F2d 942 (CA 5, 1982) (seven months); United States v Minis, 666 F2d 134 (CA 5, 1981) (three months); *619United States v Johnson, 461 F2d 285 (CA 10, 1972) (three weeks); United States v LaMorte, 744 F Supp 573, 575-576 (SD NY, 1990) (3½ years). Examining these cases, I reiterate the majority’s finding that there has been no case that has upheld a probable cause determination based solely on allegations more than six years old.5
Two reasons that usually justify such a search are that the evidence sought is of an ongoing criminal business, Greany, or the evidence is of a type that is not ordinarily moved from one place to another, Freeman. Neither of these situations is present in this case. Unlike Greany which involved marijuana cultivation ("an ongoing criminal business of a necessarily long-term nature . . . rather than ... a completed act,” Greany, p 525), the victim in this case admitted that the assaults ended in 1982. The affidavit does not allege, and it cannot be assumed, that the defendant continued to engage in this type of activity with other victims.6 As expressly stated in the warrant, the search was not for evidence of an ongoing criminal activity but evidence of prior criminal acts with the victim.7
*620In addition, unlike the Freeman case that involved a search for bank records, generally kept in one locale, the objects of the search in this case were sexually explicit pictures and videos of the victim. A review of the profile offered by the majority suggests to me that this type of evidence is often moved from one place to another. Resorting to the pedophile profile, the majority emphasizes the fact that a pedophile almost never destroys the incriminating evidence.8 The question, of course, is not whether the objects of the search will be destroyed, but whether the objects of the search will be at the place to be searched at the time the search warrant is executed. According to the profile, a tendency of a pedophile with regard to child pornography is to sell, hide, move, or give the collection to another pedophile.9 Thus, because this is the type of evidence that is passed around, it is not the type of evidence that would likely remain at the same location seven years later.
For the reasons stated above, I find no basis for this Court to transmogrify evidence, which the majority itself characterizes as historical and sentimental, into a present basis for probable cause.10 Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Brickley, J., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

 MCL 767.24(2); MSA 28.964(2).

 US Const, art I, § 10, cl 1; Const 1963, art 1, § 10.

 The Court in Gates rejected the strict application of the AguilarSpinelli test, but it did state that veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge were "closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is 'probable cause’ to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.” Gates, 230. In this case the victim’s basis of knowledge is evident, but her veracity and reliability are unknown. See Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410; 89 S Ct 584; 21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969).

 See Sgro v United States, 287 US 206; 53 S Ct 138; 77 L Ed 260 (1932).

 Ante, p 613. Interestingly, the majority attempts to make the relevant appear irrelevant by stating on one hand that "[tjime [is] a factor in the determination of probable cause to search,” and, on the other hand, that "[i]n this instance, the passage of time might be inversely proportional to the likelihood that the defendant stül had the material.” Id., pp 605, 612.

 In Aguilar v Texas, n 3 supra, p 109, n 1, the Court stated: "It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought to the magistrate’s attention.” (Emphasis in original.)

 The search warrant stated:
Therefore, in the name of the people of the State of Michigan, I command that you search the following described place . . . and . . . seize, secure, tabulate and make return according to law the following property and things: Picture, Polaroid snap-shots and video tapes of [the victim], dob 6-30-73, either naked or partially clad, and/or involved in any sexual *620acts or touchings by other persons or to other persons, cameras, which may have been used to take such picture[s], and undeveloped film which may contain such pictures. [Emphasis added.]

 Ante, p 601.

 Id.

 Ante, p 613.