Court Opinion

ID: 9779835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:50:41.812634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:42.174224
License: Public Domain

Pigott, J. (concurring).
Although I concur in the results in People v Ortega and People v Benston because I think any error that occurred in those cases was harmless, I write separately to underscore two significant points. First, it must be noted that the content of a medical record proffered under CPLR 4518 is, *623upon a proper objection, always subject to redaction of information that is irrelevant or not germane to the patient’s medical diagnosis or treatment (see People v Johnson, 70 AD3d 1188, 1191 [3d Dept 2010]; see also Montes v New York City Tr. Auth., 46 AD3d 121, 124-125 [1st Dept 2007] [trial judge has an obligation to redact from reports any parts thereof that, standing alone, would not be admissible, since the fact that certain conclusions are irrelevant is not changed merely because they are set forth in a business record]). To that extent, I agree with Judge Smith that “the business records exception makes the records themselves, but not hearsay contained within the records, admissible” (Smith, J., concurring op at 620).
Second, in my view, the majority in Benston interprets the business records exception too broadly by concluding that the “diagnosis” of domestic violence and references to a “safety plan” were properly admitted as part of the victim’s diagnosis and treatment. While I recognize that domestic violence differs materially as an offense from other types of assault, the admission of this evidence can be error. A blanket rule allowing statements made by the complainant at the time of admission to the hospital can be just as harmful to a complainant’s interests in some cases as its application here was to the defendant.
It is common knowledge that many domestic violence victims may mislead medical providers to protect their abusers, and are known for crafting cover stories to hide their victimization. This is also true in cases involving child abuse. Assuming a victim or a parent relays a cover story to medical personnel, would that record automatically be allowed in as proof for the defense, or should the trial judge be afforded the latitude to exercise discretion in redacting that portion of the record even though it is considered part of the diagnosis, care and treatment of the patient?
The mechanism of injury is almost always important, but hearsay statements that may identify (or misidentify) the alleged perpetrator or purport to explain the circumstances of an injury may, in certain circumstances, violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Thus, conclusory statements such as “domestic violence” while part of the medical record, in my view, should have been redacted because whether complainant was strangled by a former intimate partner or by a stranger was irrelevant to the type of treatment she received for her physical injuries. In a similar vein, formulation of a “safety plan” for use after the complainant left the hospital was not *624pertinent to the diagnosis and treatment of her immediate injuries and is therefore not part of the record that is contemplated by the exception.
As to People v Ortega, the idea that the complainant was forced at gunpoint to ingest crack cocaine so that the defendant could convince him to turn over his ATM card seems to me unworthy of belief, and therefore, in my view, probably inured to the benefit of the defendant. However, absent medical testimony that the complainant being “forced” to ingest cocaine was relevant to diagnosis and treatment, it should have been excluded, not only because complainant’s statement “extend[ed] . . . beyond the basic disclosure [ ] necessary or germane to diagnosis and treatment,” but also because it bolstered complainant’s testimony (People v Benedetto, 294 AD2d 958, 958-959 [4th Dept 2002] [even if counselor’s notes had been certified, and a proper foundation had been laid for their admission as business records, they nonetheless contained hearsay declarations that bolstered complainant’s testimony and therefore should not have been admitted]).
Judges Cipabick, Graffeo, Read and Jones concur with Chief Judge Lippman; Judge Smith concurs in result in a separate opinion; Judge Pigott concurs in result in another opinion.
In each case: Order affirmed.