Court Opinion

ID: 9719057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:41:41.44516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.368227
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE MILLS, concurring in part and dissenting in part: This case should not be disposed of on the basis of procedure or pleadings. We should meet the issue headon. I concur in the result of affirmance, but for a different reason. The dissent is correct in my judgment about the pleadings. They were somewhat scanty, to be sure, but in this enlightened age of liberal pleading construction and a commendable tendency to permit sufficient amendment to either be more specific or otherwise comply with objections, the allegations here look to me adequate to at least stay in the ballpark. To this extent I agree with the dissent — the adequacy of the amended complaint does not bother me. But the question of punitive and compensatory damages in tort for a wilful refusal to pay under a contract does give me concern. I have weighed and compared Ledingham and Debolt, by the pound and by the paragraph, and finally conclude that the opinion in Debolt is more sound and more persuasive. It strikes me that statutory causes of action, being creatures of the legislative branch, should be viewed with judicial restraint. The Debolt rationale of legislative preemption in this area — by recovery of reasonable and limited attorney’s fees — is cogent and convincing. Adequate remedy? Perhaps not. But as was said by the Debolt court, “It may well be that the statutory remedy should provide greater relief but we hold that to be a matter for legislative determination.” 56 Ill. App. 3d 111, 117, 371 N.E.2d 373, 378. Any further words would be overkill. It will suffice to conclude that I agree to affirm because there can be no tortuous recovery on a contract beyond the statutory prescriptions, the legislature having preempted the field. I concur in the result.