Court Opinion

ID: 9727737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:49:19.147664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:42.323615
License: Public Domain

*57HANSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with the portions of the majority opinion that hold the trial court erred in granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the dismissal of the cross-appeal from the judgment entered on the verdict for the reasons stated.
I respectfully dissent only as to that portion of the majority opinion reversing the conditional order granting a new trial.
In my opinion the fact that the court below specified the same reasons for granting a new trial that it gave to support the granting of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, standing alone, does not compel reversal of the conditional order granting a new trial. Nor is the affirmance of the order granting a new trial inconsistent with the conclusion that the trial court erred in granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The applicable standards of review of the two motions are different.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, in the case of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict a determination must be made that “ ‘ “[tjhere is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.” [Citation.]’ ” (McFarland v. Voorheis-Trindle Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 698, 703 [343 P.2d 923].) On the other hand the granting of a motion for a new trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and “[o]n appeal, all presumptions are in favor of the order as against the verdict, and the reviewing court will not disturb the ruling unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion is made to appear. [Citations.]” (Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 112 [65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315].)
In Mercer the court said at pages 112-113:
“[T]wo purposes are served by the present requirement of specification of reasons, and both are related to the traditionally broad powers exercised by the trial judge in passing on a motion for new trial. . . .
“[0]ne of the functions of the requirement of specification of reasons is to promote judicial deliberation before judicial action, and thereby ‘discourage hasty or ill-considered orders for new trial.’ (Review of Selected 1965 Code Legislation (Cont.Ed.Bar), p. 81.). . .
“The second purpose of this requirement is to make the right to appeal from the order more meaningful. While the rarity of reversals is doubtless *58due to the circumstance that discretion is not often abused, it must be recognized that under the prior law an appellant challenging an order granting a new trial tended to have great difficulty in presenting his case. It often occurred, for example, that the notice of motion was predicated on all or most of the statutory grounds, and the subsequent order specified neither the ground or grounds found applicable nor the reasons therefor; in that event, the appellant was left in the dark as to which aspect of the trial to defend, and quite understandably struck out blindly in several directions at once. This process, however, was not likely to illuminate the reviewing court, which remained equally uninformed of the basis on which the trial judge acted. . . .”
In Scala v. Jerry Witt & Sons, Inc. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 359, 370 [90 Cal.Rptr. 592, 475 P.2d 864], quoted from Mercer v. Perez, supra, 68 Cal.2d 104, where that court said at page 115: “No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the content of such a specification [reasons for granting a new trial], and it will necessarily vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case.”
In my view the legislative intent of Code of Civil Procedure section 657 and the twofold purposes underlying the requirement of a specification of reasons as described in Mercer (68 Cal.2d at pp. 112-113) are satisfied.
Here, as I construe the reasons specified (as set forth in the majority opinion) the trial judge reviewed and weighed all the evidence relating to the factual issue of notice to defendant landowner Ambrose Properties and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to charge Ambrose with prior knowledge of the existence of a dangerous condition which was created by bicycles being ridden in the area where the accident happened.
I conclude the record reflects the trial judge gave mature and careful reflection in the instant case and adequately specified his reasons within the spirit of Scala and Mercer for granting a new trial on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict. I cannot say he manifestly and unmistakenly abused his discretion in granting a new trial.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 2, 1979.