Court Opinion

ID: 9666103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:05:01.086703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:14.889418
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OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
May 29, 1991
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appeal was taken from a conviction for capital murder. TEX.PENAL CODE § 19.-03(a)(2). After finding appellant guilty, the jury returned affirmative findings to the special issues under TEX.CRIM.PROC. CODE art. 37.071. Punishment was assessed at death.1
On direct appeal, in his fourth and fifth points of error, appellant argued that the trial court erred when it refused to give the jury his requested charge on mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of his trial, and that article 37.071 prohibits individualized consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
On original submission, we rejected appellant’s arguments and affirmed his conviction. In regard to his fourth point of error, we found that the trial court’s instruction provided sufficient guidance to the jury to “conscientiously consider” the mitigating evidence “in the context of the special issues.” See page 120. We further noted that article 37.071 is not unconstitutional even though it does not provide an instruction on consideration of mitigating evidence beyond the scope of the special issues.2 In regard to appellant’s fifth point *129of error, we found that article 37.071 did not prohibit or prevent the jury from considering appellant’s mitigating evidence.
In his motion for rehearing, appellant argues that the mitigating evidence admitted during the punishment phase of his trial is similar to the evidence presented in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989).3 Appellant argues that in the absence of a charge that instructs the jury to apply the mitigating evidence in answering the special issues of article 37.071, or another special issue dealing specifically with mitigating evidence, the jury is left without a vehicle, required by Penry, for expressing a “reasoned moral response” in regard to their decision on punishment. Appellant submits that the jury could not act on the mitigating evidence before them in answering the special issues — thus ensuring a sentence of death.
We granted appellant’s motion for rehearing in order to determine whether, in light of the mitigating evidence offered at trial, the trial court erred in rejecting appellant’s proffered special instruction at the punishment phase of his trial. We now hold that the mitigating evidence of character and background offered at trial was relevant to special issue two of article 37.-071, that the mitigating evidence was not relevant to appellant’s “moral culpability” beyond the scope of the special issues of article 37.071, that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit appellant’s requested instruction on such evidence to the jury, and that the denial of appellant’s requested instruction did not prevent the jury from making an individualized assessment of appellant and a “reasoned moral response” about the appropriateness of the death penalty in the instant case.
I. MITIGATING EVIDENCE
At trial, the appellant offered evidence of a “disadvantaged background and emotional or mental problems" which he now claims shows “that he might be less culpable than [other] defendants who had no similar excuse.” Appellant’s Brief on Rehearing, at 5. Furthermore, he claims that the jury could not give effect to such evidence in answering the special issues under the death sentencing procedure of article 37.071.
The record reveals potentially relevant mitigating evidence including: 1) a low level of intelligence, shown by extremely substandard IQ test scores and a very poor school record; 2) a turbulent childhood and troubled relationship with his father; 3) youthful age (23) at the time of the offense; 4) voluntary intoxication and “alcoholic black-out” at the time of the offense; and 5) a pattern of “periodic drinking,” with the inability to control his drinking once initiated. Although appellant avers that Penry is limited to the facts of that case, he contends that the evidence offered at his trial regarding childhood abuse and school problems is similar to the evidence in Penry.
Annabelle Lackey, appellant’s mother, testified that appellant was moved around to several cities as a child, that appellant did poorly in school, that appellant’s father drank a lot, that his father and he “fussed a lot,” and that his father “hit him some.” She also testified that appellant did not drink around her, and she did not think that appellant had a drinking problem.
Betty Edge testified that she was with appellant for several hours prior to the murder of Kumpf. Edge testified that at the time of the murder, she had known appellant for almost six months. On the night of July 30, 1977, Edge and friends were at a small club in Lubbock. Appellant arrived around midnight, at which time Edge considered him to be intoxicated. Appellant drank beer at another table until the bar closed at 2 a.m. At that time Edge, appellant, and four other persons continued on to an after hours club, where appellant *130drank at most one more beer. The group stayed there less than an hour. Edge and appellant were invited to the mobile home of their friends. They were at the mobile home for almost an hour, when Edge left to take one of the group home, and appellant left to check on a friend. They ran into each other again outside the after hours club, and returned to the mobile home. Sometime later, appellant removed all of his clothing, and Edge removed most of hers. Edge refused to engage in sex, and appellant told her she was “a lady”, and “to go home, and not be going to bars anymore.” Appellant did not appear angry and left shortly after 5 a.m.
Edge testified that appellant was still intoxicated around 4 a.m., but appeared to be “sobering up” even though he continued to drink from midnight till after 4 a.m. She testified that she could not tell how many drinks appellant had consumed between midnight and 2 a.m., but that appellant might have had one beer at the after hours bar, and possibly two or three beers after that. Appellant was intoxicated, but at all times coherent and conversational.
Dr. Herbert Modlin, a general psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and board certified neurologist, testified that he had examined appellant for two hours and had read appellant’s past medical psychiatric and psychological reports, and educational records. Modlin testified that appellant had been psychologically tested as an adult, and at ages 7, 11, and 14; that appellant’s school record in academics was extremely poor, but that he had good marks for citizenship and art; that appellant’s IQ was 75 at age 7, 80 at age 11, 67 at age 14, which was mental retardation, and as an adult was probably in the 70-80 range; and that appellant was “over controlled” and “somewhat inh[i]bited emotionally.” In Modlin’s opinion, appellant did not fit any particular category such as psychotic, impulsive paranoid, or anti-social personality.
Modlin, however, classified appellant as a “periodic drinker.” Although appellant did not have a daily need for alcohol, “[t]he problem [was] that he often drank too much and it got out of hand, and he would have alcoholic blackouts.”4 Modlin testified that appellant’s version of the events on the morning of Kumpf s murder was consistent with an alcoholic blackout at the time of the murder. Modlin testified that appellant recognized his alcohol problems, and that appellant would probably not constitute a continuing threat to society.
The State presented evidence to refute appellant’s mitigating evidence and his claim of alcoholic blackout. Carroll Johnson Holmes, appellant’s girlfriend and roommate at the time of the murder, testified that when appellant saw the news coverage of Kumpf’s murder, he turned to her and said, “Baby, I’ve got to tell you something. I’m the one they’re looking for.” The State also introduced appellant’s prior conviction for burglary, his revocation of probation for that offense, and his conviction for burglary committed with the intent to commit rape.
II. PENRY EVIDENCE?
We must determine whether appellant presented evidence sufficient to raise a claim under Penry v. Lynaugh, supra.5 Penry presented evidence of brain damage that occurred either at birth or as a result of beatings and multiple injuries to the brain at an early age, resulting in an “organic brain disorder at the time of the offense which made it impossible for him to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law.” Penry, 109 S.Ct. at 2941. The State’s psychiatric experts acknowledged that Penry had “extremely limited mental ability, and *131that he seemed unable to learn from his mistakes.” Id. at 2942.
In Penry, the Supreme Court concluded that, in the absence of instructions informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to Penry’s mitigating background evidence, “the jury was not provided with a vehicle for expressing its ‘reasoned moral response’ to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision.” Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2952. The evidence of Penry’s mental problems and organic brain disorder, while relevant to special issues one and two of article 37.071, was also relevant to Penry’s “moral culpability beyond the scope of the special [issues].”6 See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2333, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (O’Connor, J. concurring). Thus, even if the jury found that Penry’s mitigating background evidence somehow reduced his “personal culpability” for the crime, the special issues of article 37.071 did not provide the jury with a vehicle for expressing a “reasoned moral response” that would allow a sentence less than death.
If the sentencer is to make an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty, “evidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 [107 S.Ct. 837, 841, 93 L.Ed.2d 934] (1987) (concurring opinion). Moreover, Eddings [v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982),] makes clear that it is not enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer. The sentencer must also be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 [107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347] (1987). Only then can we be sure that the sentencer has treated the defendant as a “uniquely individual human bein[g]” and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence. Woodson [v. North Carolina], 428 U.S. [280] at 304, 305 [96 S.Ct. 2978 at 2991, 2992, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) ]. “Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime.” California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at 545 [107 S.Ct. at 841] (concurring opinion) (emphasis in original).
Penry, 109 S.Ct. at 2947. Thus, under Penry, the jury must be allowed not only to consider relevant mitigating evidence of the defendant’s background, character and circumstances of the offense, it must also be able to make a reasoned moral response to that evidence in arriving at an individualized assessment of the appropriate punishment.

A. Mitigation and “Relevance”

Although the Supreme Court has made it clear that relevant mitigating evidence may not be excluded in the capital sentencing process, the parameters of exactly which evidence is both mitigating and “relevant” are less clear. For example, the plurality opinion in Franklin concludes that State legislatures may enact some “framework” for the use of relevant mitigating evidence *132in the capital sentencing procedure, but does not answer the most important question posed: What mitigating evidence is relevant to that procedure?
[T]he sentencing jury may not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence. This statement leaves unanswered the question: relevant to what? While Lockett [v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1977)] answers this question at least in part — making it clear that a State cannot take out of the realm of relevant sentencing considerations the questions of the defendant's “character,” “record,” or the “circumstances of the offense” — Lockett does not hold that the State has no role in structuring or giving shape to the jury’s consideration of these mitigating factors. See Booth v. Maryland, [482 U.S. 496], 107 S.Ct. 2529 [96 L.Ed.2d 440] (1987). Given the awesome power that a sentencing jury must exercise in a capital case, it may be advisable for a State to provide the jury with some framework for discharging these responsibilities.
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2330, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
Although the Supreme Court believes that the special issues of article 37.071 are relevant to “personal” or “moral” culpability, the Court in Penny makes it clear that not all possible aspects of “culpability” for a particular crime can be addressed by these two or three questions. Whether specific relevance, as defined in Rule 401, TEX.R.CRIM.EVID., to “personal” or “moral” culpability is required is even less clear.
In her concurring opinion in Franklin, Justice O’Connor, the author of Penny, provides a somewhat cryptic answer to the lingering question in the Franklin plurality opinion concerning relevance of mitigating evidence.
In my view, the principle underlying Lockett, Eddings, and Hitchcock is that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.

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If ... petitioner had introduced mitigating evidence about his background or character or the circumstances of the crime that was not relevant to the special verdict question, or that had relevance to the defendant’s moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questions, the jury instructions would have provided the jury with no vehicle for expressing its “reasoned moral response” to that evidence. (emphasis added)
Franklin, 108 S.Ct. at 2333. Thus, in Justice O’Connor’s view, a separate instruction on mitigation is required when the mitigating evidence presented is of relevance to “moral culpability,” and that evidence cannot be given mitigating effect within the scope of the special issues.
B. Moral Culpability — or an Individualized Assessment?
We first note that the Supreme Court has not defined “personal” or “moral culpability.” We believe that the terms “personal” and “moral culpability,” used by the Court in Penny, might lead to the conclusion that a capital defendant’s guilt is somehow diminished by the introduction of certain forms of mitigating evidence.7
We think a more appropriate analysis would be to focus the punishment phase of the trial on an individualized assessment of the capital defendant for “deathworthiness.” Above all, the capital defendant must be afforded a “particularized consideration of relevant aspects of [his] character and record ... before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976).
*133A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or.the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.
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This Court has previously recognized that “[f]or the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.” Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 [58 S.Ct. 59, 61, 82 L.Ed. 43] (1937).
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[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, see Troy v. Dulles, 356 U.S. [86], at 100 [78 S.Ct. 590, 597, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1957)] (plurality opinion), requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.
This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long_ Because of that qualitative difference there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Id. at 304-305, 96 S.Ct. at 2991-2992.
In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), decided the same day as Woodson, the Supreme Court upheld the Texas capital murder system. The constitutionality of the Texas procedure turned on whether the special issues allowed “consideration of particularized mitigating factors.” Id. at 272, 96 S.Ct. at 2956.
By authorizing the defense to bring before the jury at the separate sentencing hearing whatever mitigating circumstances relating to the individual defendant can be adduced, Texas has ensured that the sentencing jury will have adequate guidance to enable it to perform its sentencing function.
Id. at 276, 96 S.Ct. at 2958.
The Supreme Court in Jurek required a broad reading of article 37.071 to allow any mitigating circumstances relevant to the individual capital offender. The Court, in fact, enumerated several mitigating factors potentially relevant under a broad conception of article 37.071. Id. at 272-73, 96 S.Ct. at 2956-57. Penry, however, destroyed the illusion that the special issues mandated by article 37.071 can handle all capital offenders and offenses. While the Court in Penry focused on the “moral culpability” of a brain damaged, sociopathic, and mentally retarded offender, the true problem, as we read Penry, with the Texas system as applied in that case, was the inability of the procedure to allow an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty, given the offense and the offender.
We believe that the concept of “moral culpability” (or in our view deathworthiness), as used by the Supreme Court in Penry and other Eighth Amendment cases is relevant to the sentencing process as it provides additional insight into an overall assessment of the offender. For example, the insight obtained from evidence of certain positive character traits merits consideration for reasons unrelated to the concerns of the special issues.8 Positive character traits, such as artistic talent or service to others, while arguably relevant to special issue two, would more likely serve as a basis for a sentence less than death for reasons beyond the scope of the special issues. Positive character traits are, how*134ever, clearly relevant to our conception of an individualized assessment of deathwor-thiness. Thus, deathworthiness, as raised by relevant mitigating evidence, is an appropriate, but not exclusive factor, to be used in evaluating the punishment alternatives for the individual capital offender.

C. An Individualized Assessment Under Special Issue Two

Appellant offered evidence of his background and character to support his theory that he was not a continuing threat to society, and therefore direct the jury towards a negative finding to the second special issue. At trial, appellant called Dr. Modlin, who testified that his examination of appellant’s psychiatric history led to his opinion that appellant’s brutal murder of Kumpf was incompatible with his life history. Modlin further testified that at the time of the offense appellant’s overall situation was about the best it had ever been. Appellant had been steadily employed, had a good social and sexual relationship with his girlfriend, had a good relationship with his mother, and had other social contacts. His violence in murdering Kumpf was largely inexplicable. In summation, appellant used Modlin’s testimony, plus his psychiatric, educational, and overall life history, to argue against an affirmative finding that he would pose a continuing threat to society under special issue two. As presented and argued at trial, appellant’s evidence was not comparable to the “two edged sword” evidence of organic brain damage and mental retardation found in Penry. See note 6.
The Eighth Amendment requires a broad reading of special issue two of article 37.071, to include any “mitigating circumstances relating to the individual defendant.” Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276, 96 S.Ct. at 2958. We find that evidence of appellant’s limited intellectual and mental capability, his problematic relationship with his father, physical abuse by his father, and his age at the time of the offense is relevant to a proper resolution of the concerns of special issue two.
Appellant offered and argued his mitigating evidence to show that he would not be a continuing threat to society. Thus, such evidence could have been used by the jury to answer special issue two negatively, even absent the Jurek requirement of broad admissibility.
We agree that appellant was entitled to a vehicle for consideration and ef-fectuation of his mitigating evidence. In the instant case, however, we find that special issue two provided the jury with an appropriate vehicle for evaluating and acting upon appellant’s mitigating evidence.

D. Mitigation Beyond the Scope of Article 37.071 and an Individualized Assessment

Although appellant’s background and character evidence is relevant to the concerns of special issue two, we conclude that the mitigating evidence in the instant case is otherwise irrelevant to an individualized assessment of the deathworthiness of appellant. Appellant’s background evidence does not tend to excuse or explain his criminal act, as did the evidence presented by Penry. Appellant did not present any evidence of mitigating positive character traits. Furthermore, there is little or no connection between his background and character evidence and the facts and circumstances of his criminal acts in the instant case. Appellant’s expert, Dr. Modlin, testified that appellant’s record could not explain the brutal crime appellant committed.9 Appellant made no showing *135that the mitigating evidence of his character, background and mental status somehow specifically reduced his blameworthiness for the murder of Kumpf in a way that could not be adequately addressed through the special issues.
If the mitigating evidence of appellant’s background, character, or circumstances of the offense can be given effect under article 37.071, then the defendant is not entitled to an additional special instruction on that mitigating evidence. A jury instruction on mitigating evidence about background, character or circumstances of the offense may not be required unless the mitigating evidence is “not relevant to the special verdict questions, or ... [has] relevance to the defendant’s [“Jmoral culpa-bilityff] beyond the scope of the special verdict questions.” Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2333, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (O'Connor concurring) (emphasis added).10
III. CONCLUSION
We find that article 37.071 did not violate appellant’s Eighth Amendment right to an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty. The jury could consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence on background and character within the scope of the special issues.11 The jury, having returned “Yes” answers to the special issues, was not then entitled “to cast an ‘independent’ vote against the death penalty.” Franklin, 108 S.Ct. at 2330. Jurek affirmed the constitutionality of the Texas special issue practice, and Penry did not overrule that holding. Thus, we are duly constrained to consider challenges to article 37.071 in light of these decisions. If we were to require a special issue on mitigation on the facts of the instant case, we do not believe that the special issues of article 37.071 would, in the future, continue to serve any useful pur*136pose in arriving at an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty.
The only evidence proffered by appellant that could arguably be relevant to his “moral culpability” for the murder of Kumpf was the evidence of voluntary intoxication and the possibility of alcoholic blackout at the time of the offense. On rehearing, however, appellant does not argue that the evidence presented regarding his voluntary intoxication at the time of the offense and his claim of alcoholic blackout is relevant to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the special issues. Thus, we will not address whether such evidence presented a need for appellant’s special requested instruction.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

. The murder in the instant cause occurred in Lubbock County. Venue was changed to Tom Green County. Appellant was convicted, but his conviction was reversed on appeal. Lackey v. State, 638 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). On remand, the instant cause was tried on a change of venue in Midland County.

. In support we cited Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2332, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988):
Simply put, we have previously recognized that the Texas Special Issues adequately "allow the jury to consider the mitigating aspects of the crime and the unique characteristics of the perpetrator, and therefore sufficiently provide for jury discretion.” See Lowenfield v. *129Phelps, 484 U.S. [231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568] (1988). We adhere to this prior conclusion.
Lackey, at 120.

. The original opinion in the instant cause was handed down on June 14, 1989. Penry v. Lynaugh was decided on June 26. We granted appellant’s motion for rehearing on September 13, 1989.

. Dr. Modlin testified that a person must have a blood alcohol level of .20% or above to enter a state of alcoholic blackout.

. At the punishment phase of his trial, appellant requested a special instruction on mitigating evidence, including a third special issue, ostensibly designed to allow the jury to vote against the death penalty based on mitigating circumstances. For text of the requested instruction, see op. at 118. Although we express no opinion on the merits of appellant’s requested instruction, we do find that it was adequate to "call the trial court’s attention to error in the charge." TEX.CRIM.PROC.CODE art. 36.15.

. The Supreme Court found that Penry’s limited mental capacity and his inability to learn from his mistakes apparently did not preclude an ability to act “deliberately as that term is commonly understood," under special issue one. Penry’s background evidence was relevant beyond the scope of issue one, since the jury could "conclude that Penry was less morally ‘culpable than defendants who have no such excuse[.]”’ Penry, 109 S.Ct. at 2949.
With respect to his being a continuing threat to society under special issue two, such evidence pointed not only toward a finding of future dangerousness, but also to reduced culpability for the crime. The Court concluded that such “two edged sword” evidence directed the jury to make an affirmative finding of a continuing threat to society, usually resulting in a death sentence, based on evidence that tended to absolve the defendant of personal or moral culpability for his crime. In Penry’s case his mental problems made it extremely likely that he would continue to be a danger. The Court found that Penry’s “culpability” for his acts, however, could somehow be reduced by the origin of his mental problems. Id.

. Under a bifurcated system, culpability for the crime is an issue that should normally be resolved at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. One might surmise in a hypothetical case, that a defendant who was the product of a broken home, parental abuse, and an unhappy marriage, was only 70 percent "morally culpable” for the crime he committed — the other 30 percent being attributable to his unfortunate background.

. "Evidence of voluntary service, kindness to others, or of religious devotion might demonstrate positive character traits that might mitigate against the death penalty." Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S.Ct. at 2333.

. The dissent focuses on the fact that appellant’s "only remaining viable argument was to persuade the jury to consider and give effect to the evidence through the second special issue,” [implying that since appellant's requested instruction was refused, appellant’s only avenue was to "funnel” his mitigating evidence through special issue #2]. Op. at 141, Baird, J., dissenting.
Conceding this point for the sake of argument, does this mean that if appellant’s special instruction had been given, Dr. Modlin would have testified that, on further reflection, appellant really was a future danger to society, that the crime really was entirely predictable, given appellant’s background and mental history, but that he should be extended mercy because of these misfortunes.
*135If we accept Dr; Modlin’s testimony at face value, even conceding the strategy limitation placed on appellant, he opined, in effect, that appellant’s commission of the crime was not "attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems," Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 319, 109 S.Ct. at 2947, but was, by all accounts, aberrational. Therefore, the jury in this case was able to "make an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty” pursuant to special issue #2. Id.

. Justice O’Connor seems to further require some nexus between the mitigating evidence and culpability for the crime. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 841, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (concurring opinion). If moral or personal culpability is reduced only when the criminal act (murder) is "attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems,” then mitigating evidence relevant to the defendant's character, background, mental condition, or circumstances of the offense must also be connected with or somehow help to explain or excuse the commission of the offense by this defendant. See e.g., Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (Evidence of either actual or imagined sexual abuse of appellant at an early age by his mother tended to ameliorate fault for appellant’s intermittent acts of violence against women. Appellant was thought of as stable, hard working and polite, but his sexual fantasies combined with drugs or alcohol developed into true psychosis resulting in violent behavior.)
We recognize, however, that a nexus requirement would seem to be in conflict with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982).
[The] Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
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[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605, 98 S.Ct. at 2965; see Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987).
In Eddings, supra, the Court found that the sentencer may not be precluded, as a matter of law, from considering relevant mitigating evidence.

. The Supreme Court has found that the Texas special issue practice under article 37.071 is still viable, and the second special issue can still be used by the jury for consideration of mitigating evidence. "In resolving the second Texas Special Issue the jury [is] surely free to weigh and evaluate [evidence of character] as measured by his likely future behavior.” Franklin, 108 S.Ct. at 2329.