Court Opinion

ID: 9900322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:10:59.767967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.132080
License: Public Domain

No. 569             November 1, 2023                   817

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                    Jane KRISTOF,
                      individually,
                  and Nicholas Kristof
                  and Sheryl Wudunn,
                   husband and wife,
                  Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                             v.
                 Matthew A. MEALEY
              and Rebecca Bowman-Mealey,
                   husband and wife,
                Defendants-Respondents.
              Yamhill County Circuit Court
                  21CV12195; A178517

  Jennifer K. Chapman, Judge.
  Argued and submitted on September 29, 2023.
   Elena M. Farley argued the cause for appellants. Also on
the briefs were Martinis & Farley.
   Thomas A. Larkin argued the cause for respondents. Also
on the brief were Tyler J. Storti and Sokol, Larkin, Wagner
& Storti LLC.
   Before Egan, Presiding Judge, and Kamins, Judge, and
Kistler, Senior Judge.
  KISTLER, S. J.
  Reversed and remanded.
818   Kristof v. Mealey
Cite as 328 Or App 817 (2023)                                                 819

           KISTLER, S. J.
         The trial court ruled on summary judgment that a
1959 deed did not grant plaintiffs an easement over defen-
dants’ property and entered a judgment to that effect. On
appeal, we conclude that the deed, read as a whole, unam-
biguously grants plaintiffs an easement but does not spec-
ify precisely where over defendants’ property the easement
runs. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this
case for further proceedings.
         Defendants’ property lies immediately to the south
of plaintiffs’ property. In 1959, the Delletiglies owned
the property that defendants now own.1 In that year, the
Delletiglies used a preprinted form for a warranty deed to
grant the following interest to plaintiffs’ predecessors in
interest:
    “A sixteen foot Right of Way running from the Northeast
    Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township
    2 South, Range 4 West in a Southeasterly direction to a
    point on the Northerly line of the Tualatin Valley State
    Highway over and across the following described property:
    [a metes and bounds description that, as we discuss below,
    describes the Delletiglies’ property in 1959].”
         After a dispute arose between the parties about
the “sixteen foot Right of Way” that the 1959 deed granted,
plaintiffs brought this action to establish the existence and
location of what they contend is a 16-foot easement across
defendants’ property.
          Defendants counterclaimed and moved for sum-
mary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims and their counter-
claims. Defendants argued, in support of their summary
judgment motion, that the 1959 deed gave plaintiffs fee sim-
ple title to a 16-foot strip of land. In defendants’ view, the
metes and bounds description set out in the deed identifies

     1
       In 1959, the Delletiglies owned more property than defendants now own.
In this opinion, we use the phrase “the Delletiglies’ property” to refer to the par-
cel of property that the Delletiglies owned in 1959 that is largely the same as
defendants’ current property. The primary difference between the Delletiglies’
property in 1959 and the property that defendants now own is that two small
lots were carved out of the Delletiglies’ property before defendants purchased it.
Those two small lots are not material to the issues this case presents.
820                                          Kristof v. Mealey

the boundaries of that 16-foot strip, which they contend runs
along the western edge of their property.
        Plaintiffs responded by filing a cross-motion for par-
tial summary judgment. They argued that the 1959 deed
granted their predecessors in interest a 16-foot easement
over and across defendants’ property but that the deed does
not specify where over defendants’ property the easement
runs. Plaintiffs reasoned that, in that respect, the deed is
typical of many conveyances that grant an easement but
leave the easement’s exact location to be determined under
the “practical location” doctrine.
          At first blush, one might wonder why defendants
are arguing that the 1959 deed gave plaintiffs fee simple
title to a 16-foot strip of land rather than a 16-foot easement.
After all, an easement is a lesser property interest than fee
simple title. As we understand the parties’ positions, how-
ever, they differ primarily over the location of the 16-foot
right-of-way. Defendants argue that the location of the
right-of-way is fixed by the metes and bounds description
in the deed, which places the 16-foot strip of land immedi-
ately to the west of their property and contiguous with their
western boundary. Plaintiffs, for their part, read the metes
and bounds description differently. They reason that the
metes and bounds description defines the property that the
Delletiglies owned in 1959 and over and across which plain-
tiffs’ 16-foot easement runs. They necessarily disagree with
defendants that the metes and bounds description identifies
a 16-foot strip of land that runs along the western border of
defendants’ property.
        The trial court essentially adopted defendants’
arguments. It granted defendants’ summary judgment
motion, denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary
judgment, and entered judgment accordingly. On appeal,
both parties agree that the interpretation of the 1959 deed
presents a question of law. They disagree, however, what
the deed means. Their disagreement turns initially on the
terms used in the deed. Defendants note that the preprinted
form that the 1959 deed used is captioned “Warranty Deed”
and that the preprinted part of that deed uses terms that
ordinarily are associated with conveying fee simple title to
Cite as 328 Or App 817 (2023)                                               821

property. Plaintiffs respond that the Delletiglies described
the property interest that they conveyed to plaintiffs’ prede-
cessors in interest as a “Right of Way,” a phrase that typi-
cally identifies an easement.
         The Oregon Supreme Court considered a virtually
identical issue in Cappelli v. Justice, 262 Or 120, 496 P2d
209 (1972), and it dismissed out of hand essentially the same
argument that defendants initially make here. The court
explained:
    “We do not regard [the use of a warranty deed to convey a
    right of way] as having any significance. We are sure that
    many deeds denominated ‘Warranty Deed’ contain grants
    of easements described as rights of way.”

Id. at 126. Although similar to this case, Cappelli differs
in one critical respect. In Cappelli, the court was reviewing
the trial court’s decree de novo. See Tipperman v. Tsiatsos,
327 Or 539, 964 P2d 1015 (1998) (identifying that stan-
dard of review, which Tipperman and earlier cases applied).
Employing that standard of review, the Supreme Court in
Cappelli was free to resolve competing factual inferences
and to do so differently from the trial court. This case, by
contrast, arises on summary judgment. In that procedural
posture, neither we nor the trial court can resolve the 1959
deed’s jumbled use of terms associated with conveying fee
simple title, on the one hand, and easements, on the other, to
determine the nature of the interest that the deed conveyed.
The conflicting inferences arising from the use of those com-
peting terms do not point in only one direction.2

     2
       Defendants argue that that this case differs from Cappelli in one other
respect. They contend that, unlike the deed at issue in Cappelli, the 1959 deed
granting the right-of-way in this case did not expressly reserve the Delletiglies’
right to use the underlying land. It follows, they argue, that the right-of-way
granted by the 1959 deed should not be viewed as an easement. Defendants
misperceive what Cappelli said. The passage from Cappelli on which defendants
rely was discussing an earlier deed in which the grantor transferred fee simple
title to property but reserved an easement for the grantor’s use. See 262 Or at
127. Cappelli did not say that a deed granting a right-of-way (as opposed to a
deed reserving a right-of-way) must also reserve the grantor’s right to use the
underlying land before the right-of-way may be considered an easement. Such a
statement would have been contrary to longstanding law. See Miller v. Vaughn, 8
Or 333, 336 (1880) (rejecting the criterion that defendants erroneously argue that
Cappelli established).
822                                                       Kristof v. Mealey

         If those competing terms were all that the 1959
deed contained, we would reverse the judgment and remand
this case for trial so that the trial court could find what the
Delletiglies had intended. Three other aspects of the deed,
however, fix the Delletiglies’ intent and lead us to conclude,
as a matter of law, that plaintiffs’ interpretation of the deed
is correct. We identify those three aspects and then discuss
them briefly. First, the 1959 deed describes where the 16-foot
right-of-way runs. According to the deed, the right-of-way
runs from an undefined point in a quarter-quarter section of
plaintiffs’ property to an undefined point on a highway on the
southeasterly border of defendant’s land. The deed does not say
that the right-of-way runs along a specific location, and it cer-
tainly does not say that the right of way runs along the west-
ern border of defendants’ land, as defendants argue. Second,
the deed states that the right-of-way runs “over and across”
a parcel of land described by its metes and bounds—a prepo-
sitional phrase that almost invariably is used to describe the
grant of an easement, not the grant of fee simple title. Third,
the parcel of land that the deed describes by its metes and
bounds—namely, the parcel that the deed says the right-of-
way runs “over and across”—is the property the Delletiglies
owned in 1959. Contrary to defendants’ argument, the metes
and bounds description set out in the 1959 deed does not
define the boundaries of the 16-foot right-of-way.
          We discuss each of those points briefly. First,
according to the 1959 deed, the right-of-way “run[s] from the
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23
* * * in a Southeasterly direction to a point on the Northerly
line of the Tualatin Valley State Highway.”3 Put differ-
ently, the right-of-way runs from an unspecified point in
an area owned by plaintiffs (the Northeast Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 23) to an unspecified point on
the Tualatin Valley State Highway, which forms the south-
eastern border of defendants’ property.

    3
      For surveying purposes, land is divided into 640-acre sections. Each sec-
tion is divided into four quarters: northwest, northeast, southwest, and south-
east. Each quarter section is divided further into four quarters—for example,
the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23. The section or
quarter section in which land is located can provide a reliable starting point for
a metes and bounds description.
Cite as 328 Or App 817 (2023)                             823

          Some deeds granting an easement will specify the
easement’s exact location; for example, they will describe
the easement’s centerline. See Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 140
Or App 282, 286, 915 P2d 446 (1996) (illustrating that prop-
osition), modified in part on other grounds, Tipperman, 327
Or at 549-50. Other deeds, however, will identify a parcel
of land over and across which the easement runs but will
not specify more particularly where the easement lies. Id. In
those situations, courts have looked for clues to the grant-
or’s and grantee’s intent to determine the easement’s exact
location. Id. (discussing the practical location doctrine); see
Powers v. Coos Bay Lumber Co., 200 Or 329, 391, 263 P2d
913 (1953) (same). The absence of a specific location for the
right-of-way cuts in favor of plaintiffs’ argument that the
Delletiglies intended to grant an easement, not fee simple
title.
         The second point is related to the first. The 1959
deed does provide one clue as to where the right-of-way
runs. It says that the 16-foot right-of-way “run[s] * * * over
and across the following described property,” and, as we
explain below, the metes and bounds description that follows
describes the property that the Delletiglies owned in 1959.
The prepositional phrase “over and across the grantors’
property” is almost invariably used to describe the grant of
an easement. See Cappelli, 252 Or at 126 (so recognizing but
noting that the absence of that phrase does not necessar-
ily mean that the grantor did not intend to convey an ease-
ment). Given the deed’s use of the phrase “over and across
the following described property,” we are hard pressed to
conclude that the Delletiglies granted anything other than
an easement.
         The third point removes any doubt about the
Delletiglies’ intent. The metes and bounds description con-
tained in the deed describes the property that the Delletiglies
owned in 1959; that is, it makes clear that the right-of-way
runs over and across the property that the Delletiglies
owned in 1959 and that defendants now own. The metes
and bounds description does not describe the boundaries of
the 16-foot right of way, nor does it locate the 16-foot right
824                                                       Kristof v. Mealey

of way along the western border of defendants’ property, as
defendants argue.
        The deed sets out the following metes and bounds
description of a parcel of real property:
    “Beginning at a point on the North line of Lot 2 of Section
    23, Township 2 South, Range 4 West of the Willamette
    Meridian, 800 feet East of the Northwest corner of said
    lot; thence South 400 feet thence 46° 14’ East to a point on
    the Northerly line of the Tualatin Valley State Highway;
    thence following the Northerly line of said Highway in a
    Northeasterly direction to a point on the North line of the
    Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 23,
    Township 2 South, Range 4 West; thence West following
    the legal subdivision line to the point of beginning.”
        The parties agree, and so do we, that the first part
of the metes and bounds description—the part that starts
“Beginning at a point on the North line of Lot 2” and that
continues “to a point on the Northerly line of the Tualatin
Valley State Highway”—identifies the western boundary of
the Delletiglies’ property in 1959. They also agree that the
Tualatin Valley State Highway formed the southeastern
border of the Delletiglies’ property in 1959.
          From that point (the point on the northerly line of
the Tualatin Valley State Highway), the metes and bounds
description “follow[s] the Northerly line of said Highway in
a Northeasterly direction to a point on the North line of the
Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 23.”
The map of the property, on which both sides rely, shows
that the Tualatin Valley State Highway curves in a large
northeasterly arc until it reaches the northern border of
the Delletiglies’ property in 1959 (the “North line of the
Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 23”).
The Tualatin Valley State Highway does not reach “a point
on the North line of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast
Quarter of Section 23” until it has traversed the majority of,
if not all, the property that defendants now own.4
    4
      The metes and bounds description follows the Tualatin Valley State
Highway for the length of defendants’ property—from the Northwest Quarter of
Section 23 to the Northeast Quarter of Section 23. It does not follow the Tualatin
Valley State Highway for a mere 16 feet and then turn north, as defendants’ argu-
ment assumes.
Cite as 328 Or App 817 (2023)                                                825

         From that point, the metes and bounds description
traces the northern boundary of defendants’ property, which
it says runs “West following the legal subdivision line to the
point of beginning.”
         The metes and bounds description is telling. It
describes the metes and bounds of a three-sided piece of
land, shaped like a fat slice of pie. It does not describe, as
defendants argue, the boundaries of a skinny, four-sided
right-of-way that runs along the western edge of their prop-
erty. Instead, the metes and bounds description defines the
Delletiglies’ property in 1959, which defendants now largely
own. Not only is defendants’ interpretation of the metes
and bounds mistaken, but their interpretation of the metes
and bounds description is at odds with what the deed says.
The deed says that the 16-foot right-of-way “run[s] * * * over
and across the following described property.” It does not say
that the “following described property” defines the bound-
aries of the 16-foot right-of-way. Defendants err in arguing
otherwise.
         Defendants advance two other arguments that
warrant brief mention. As defendants note, the county tax
assessor created tax lot 1600, which is identified on the
assessor’s map as a narrow strip of land that runs along the
western border of defendants’ property. Much of defendants’
argument rests on the assumption that tax lot 1600, as
depicted on the assessor’s map, represents the 16-foot right-
of-way that the 1959 deed granted. The basis for defendants’
assumption is not apparent, however. The record does not
reveal when the county assessor created tax lot 1600, nor
does it reveal whether the county assessor created that tax
lot based on the 1959 deed, another deed, or some other
source. And, as our preceding discussion makes clear, the
easement appurtenant granted by the 1959 deed provides
no basis for creating a tax lot, much less one that runs along
the western border of defendants’ property.5 Put differently,
    5
      Ordinarily, easements appurtenant, as opposed to easements in gross,
are not “specifically and separately assessed”; rather, the value of appurtenant
easements is included in the assessment of the dominant estate. Rockwood
Development Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 10 OTR 95, 98 (1985); cf. Clackamas Cty
Assessor v. Village at Main St. Phase II, 349 Or 330, 245 P3d 81 (2010) (explaining
that site developments, such as roads, sidewalks, and water lines, were an inte-
gral part of the land underlying an apartment complex development and should
826                                                        Kristof v. Mealey

whatever tax lot 1600 reflects, the unambiguous terms of
the Delletiglies’ 1959 deed establish that it does not reflect
the 16-foot easement that that deed granted.
         Defendants also rely on later events, such as what
plaintiffs’ real estate agent told them when they were buy-
ing their property and the initial positions that plaintiffs
allegedly took, perhaps based on that advice, in their discus-
sions with defendants. Defendants never explain, however,
how a lay person’s understanding of the property interests at
stake, made almost 60 years after the Delletiglies granted
the easement, can trump what the terms of the 1959 deed
unambiguously say.
         Considering all the terms in the 1959 deed, we con-
clude that only one interpretation is reasonably permissible:
As plaintiffs argue, the 1959 deed conveyed a 16-foot ease-
ment to plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest over and across
the property that the Delletiglies owned in 1959. The deed,
however, does not specify where over that property the ease-
ment runs, and plaintiffs properly did not move for sum-
mary judgment on that issue. This case must go back to the
trial court so that it can decide that issue.
         In considering that issue, the controlling question
is what the Delletiglies and plaintiffs’ predecessors in inter-
est intended when the Delletiglies granted the easement in
1959. In similar situations, the courts have determined the
grantor’s and grantee’s intent by looking to the grantee’s
use of a road either at the time the easement was granted
or shortly afterwards; that is, they have inferred an implied
agreement to fix the location of the easement “arising out
of the use of a particular way by the grantee and acquies-
cence on the part of the grantor.” Cullison v. Hotel Seaside,
Inc., 126 Or 18, 22-23, 268 P 758 (1923); cf. Tipperman, 327
Or at 541-42, 549-50 (declining to consider consistent usage
that occurred 20 years after an easement was reserved
to determine the grantors’ intent). They also have consid-
ered the reason for granting the easement in the first place

have been included in assessing the value of the land). It follows that the appurte-
nant easement that the 1959 deed conveyed to plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest
ordinarily would not (or should not) have resulted in the creation of a separate
tax lot.
Cite as 328 Or App 817 (2023)                           827

in determining what the grantor and grantee intended.
Cullison, 126 Or at 22-23; cf. United States v. Oregon Elec.
Ry. Co., 195 F Supp 182, 186-87 (D Or 1961) (looking to the
negotiations between the parties to determine their intent).
Finally, while the grantor and grantee may expressly agree
on the location of an easement, neither party has offered
any evidence to show that the Delletiglies and plaintiffs’
predecessors in interest entered into an express agreement
regarding the location of the 16-foot easement. For the rea-
sons explained above, we reverse the trial court’s judgment
and remand this case for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.
        Reversed and remanded.