Court Opinion

ID: 9700104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:10:57.699317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:04.408558
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
On February 22, 1978, the Commonwealth obtained and executed a warrant to search appellant’s residence. Marijuana was found and appellee was arrested and indicted. Following a suppression hearing on June 6, 1978, however, all evidence obtained as a result of the search was suppressed by the lower court on the ground that the search warrant was issued without probable cause. The Commonwealth appeals from this ruling.1
The warrant was issued upon the following affidavit of probable cause:
During the last 24 hours affiant interviewed a confidential and reliable informant. The information received from the confidential and reliable informant was that during the last 48 hours, while he (the informant) was present inside the residence located at 3918 Warfield Drive, Huntingdon Valley, he (the informant) observed a large quantity of suspected Marijuana. The Marijuana was in the possession of white male known to the informant as Carl. Carl is described by the informant being 6'2 and weighting approximately 300 pounds. Affiant checked the “Coles Directorey” and learned thru that directory that the residence at 3918 Warfield Drive, Huntingdon Valley is owned by a Carl Gelfont. Affiant also checked the Pennsylvania Bureau of Motor Vehicles and learned that a Pennsylvania Operators License is issued to a Carl Gel-font, d. o. b. 2/9/42, 3918 Warfield Drive, Huntingdon Valley. Affiant believes the informant to be reliable for the following reasons: The informant has never been *105arrested or a suspect in a crime. The informant has been gainfully employed for the majority of his adult life. The informant is also a registered voter in Montgomery County. Finally, Affiant believes the informant to be reliable due to the fact that the information given to Affiant by the informant relative to the owner of the residence located at 3918 Warfield Drive Huntingdon Valley, and a description of the residence thereof, has been substantiated by the Cole’s Directory, Pennsylvania Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Lower Moreland Township Tax Records. As a result of the above information given to Affiant by the confidential and reliable informant, Affiant believes the confidential and reliable informant to be of sound reasoning and not prone to rash judgements.
In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509,12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a search warrant based on hearsay information given by an unidentified informant. The Court held that such a warrant is lawful only when the issuing magistrate has been “informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . . . was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” Id. at 114-15, 84 S.Ct. at 1514. See also United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). We have interpreted this holding to mean that in order for such a warrant to be valid, “the issuing authority must by reference to the information in the affidavit be able to answer two questions: (1) Do I have enough information to warrant the belief that the informant could know what the officer says she told him she knew? And (2) If I do have enough such information, do I also have enough information to warrant the belief that [the informant] did know it?” Commonwealth v. Purcell, 251 Pa. Super. 545, 380 A.2d 914, 917 (1977) (plurality opinion) (original emphasis). See also Commonwealth v. Davis, 466 *106Pa. 102, 351 A.2d 642 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kline, 234 Pa.Super. 12, 335 A.2d 361 (1975); Commonwealth v. Archer, 238 Pa.Super. 103, 352 A.2d 483 (1975).
Here the issuing magistrate had sufficient information to conclude that if appellee possessed marijuana, the informant could have observed it when he was at appellee’s residence. The magistrate, however, did not have sufficient information to conclude that appellant’s assertion was reliable that the substance he saw at appellant’s residence was marijuana.
The requirement that an issuing magistrate be informed of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant for a search warrant concluded that the information he received from his informant is reliable is satisfied only if there is reason for the issuing- magistrate “to believe both that the informer is a truthful person generally and that he has based his particular conclusions in the matter at hand on reliable data . . . .” United States v. Harris, supra 403 U.S. at 588, 91 S.Ct. at 2084 (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in Commonwealth v. Slater, 242 Pa.Super. 255, 257-58, 363 A.2d 1257, 1258 (1976). See also Commonwealth v. Emerich, 225 Pa.Super. 163, 310 A.2d 390 (1973) (no probable cause despite tips from respected and generally credible members of the community because the dependability of their information was not shown). The affiant here endeavored to establish the reliability of his informant by asserting that he was a registered voter, was employed, and had no criminal record. Even if we assume that these facts are sufficient to show that the informant was generally truthful,2 they do not show that his observations provided reliable data from which he could have reasonably concluded that appellant possessed marijuana. As the lower court pointed out, the affidavit *107presented to the magistrate did not state that the informant possessed any knowledge of marijuana that would enable him to distinguish marijuana from other vegetable substances of similar appearance and characteristics. Slip opinion at 3-4. In past cases, we have upheld a warrant where the accompanying affidavit indicated that the informant was familiar with narcotics or contained other facts to show that the observed substances were probably contraband. See Commonwealth v. Cosby, 234 Pa.Super. 1, 335 A.2d 531 (1975) (probable cause present where named informant with no ulterior motive entered defendant’s apartment and saw packet with white powder, powder residue, and tube on album cover); Commonwealth v. DiSantis, 222 Pa.Super. 387, 294 A.2d 789 (1972) (probable cause present where undercover narcotics agent saw marijuana and marijuana cigarette on defendant’s premises); Commonwealth v. Somershoe, 215 Pa.Super. 246, 257 A.2d 341 (1969) (probable cause where informant with record of narcotics involvement saw marijuana in defendant’s house and defendant had been arrested a month before on another narcotics charge); see also Rutherford v. Cupp, 508 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 933, 95 S.Ct. 1663, 44 L.Ed.2d 92 (1975) (probable cause where neighbor brought sample of plant growing in defendant’s yard to police and sample proved to be marijuana). However, until today, we had yet to take judicial notice of the (unproved) fact that the use of marijuana has become so universal that it is readily recognizable by law-abiding citizens. See Commonwealth v. Purcell, supra 251 Pa.Super. at 550-552, 380 A.2d at 917 (no probable cause where facts recited in affidavit did not warrant belief that informant knew what a marijuana plant looked like). The majority takes such notice, and in doing so, I submit, it errs. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute. See Fed.R.Evid. 201(b) and Advisory Committee’s comment. It is true that the use of marijuana has risen dramatically over the past decade. See Glaser, Interlocking Dualities in Drug Use, Drug Control, and Crime, in DRUGS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS*108TEM 45 (Inciardi and Chambers ed. 1974) (42% of American students in 1970 had used marijuana and more recent surveys indicate a higher percentage of users). Still, 1971 surveys indicated that only 13% of all white collar and only 15% of all blue collar workers had some marijuana experience. Id. Given these statistics, whether the average law-abiding citizen is able to recognize marijuana is at least subject to reasonable dispute since the ability to recognize it is not innate but is attained only after training or illicit familiarity.3
I am aware that in determining the sufficiency of an affidavit of probable cause for a search warrant
only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 228, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 147 (1964); that affidavits of probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 1062, 18 L.Ed.2d 62, 70 (1967); that in judging probable cause issuing magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations or by restrictions on the use of their common sense, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 745, 13 L.Ed.2d 684, 688 (1965); and that their determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 735-736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 707, 708, 78 A.L.R.2d 233 (1960). Spinelli v. United States, supra 393 U.S. at 419, 89 S.Ct. at 590, 591.
Still, the fact remains that the affidavit here set forth no facts to establish the reasonableness of the informant’s *109suspicion that appellant possessed marijuana.4 No assertion was made that the informant had ever seen marijuana before. Nor did the magistrate know the age and background of the informant. He knew that he was not a student, for the affidavit states that he “has been gainfully employed for the majority of his adult life.” He may have been a recent graduate, but the statistical probability is that he is a member of the larger class of middle-aged and senior citizens. Nor did the affidavit assert that appellee told the informant that the substance he observed was marijuana, or that the informant saw appellee using or manufacturing the substance, or that appellee had a prior record involving narcotics violations.
In most cases, the reliability of an informant is satisfied by police reliance on information that has in the past led to arrests and convictions. Of course, there is always a first time for every informant, as the present case demonstrates. Our cases hold that the police should not discourage law-abiding citizens from coming forward with information of criminal conduct, but neither should the police be exempted from testing the reliability of the information they receive merely to accommodate their informants. Commonwealth *110v. Slater, supra 242 Pa.Super at 258, 363 A.2d at 1258. To hold otherwise, in order to validate warrants like the one involved here, would be to infringe upon the public’s legitimate expectation that a person will not be subject to search and seizure whenever another has lifted an accusatory finger, absent a preliminary testing of the rationality of the accusation.
I would affirm.

. As the majority notes, because the record shows that the suppressed evidence is critical to the prosecution of this case, the Commonwealth is entitled to bring its appeal. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304, cert. denied 375 U.S. 910, 84 S.Ct. 204, 11 L.Ed.2d 149 (1963); Commonwealth v. Reisinger, 252 Pa.Super. 1, 380 A.2d 1250 (1977).

. Whether the affidavit was sufficient to show the informant’s general truthfulness is by no means certain. See generally In re Burton, 259 Pa.Super. 20, 393 A.2d 696 (1978) (no probable cause where only reasons to believe informant were that informant had “nothing to gain by informing” and came from a family of “noted upstanding citizens of the community”); Commonwealth v. Slater, supra (no probable cause where unidentified informant swore before affiant that the information he was giving was truthful).

. One further fact may be noted. As appears in the affidavit quoted supra, the affiant also said that he believed the informant to be reliable because the informant’s assertion that appellee lived at 3918 Warfield Drive had been verified. This verification, however, could not establish the reliability of the informant’s assertion that appellant possessed marijuana at the residence. See generally Commonwealth v. Devine, 233 Pa.Super. 99, 334 A.2d 725 (1975).

. The majority’s emphasis on the particular words used in the affidavit misconstrues this opinion and, I believe, the opinion of the lower court. The search warrant lacked probable cause not because the words “suspected marijuana” were used in the affidavit, but because of the absence of any facts from which the magistrate could have concluded that the informant had a reasonable basis for claiming that the substance he saw was marijuana. Commonwealth v. Banahasky, 250 Pa.Super. 495, 378 A.2d 1257 (1977), which is cited by the majority, is not only entirely consistent with this dissent, but proves the point I make. In Banahasky, the informant was a chief of police. From this fact the magistrate who issued the search warrant could have reasonably concluded that the informant was familiar with narcotics and that his suspicion was probably accurate that the substance he found on the suspect was marijuana.
Also, I note that although both the majority and the lower court have treated the issue of the informant’s ability to recognize marijuana as involving the first prong of the test established in Aguilar v. Texas (i. e., as involving the circumstances from which the informant concluded that narcotics were where he claimed they were), I have treated the issue as involving the second prong (i. e., as involving reliability), believing that by doing so the questions presented will be focused more clearly.