Court Opinion

ID: 9617067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:51:43.509798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:05.233002
License: Public Domain

*418Miller, Justice,

dissenting:

I dissent as to the first syllabus, which I believe mistakenly forbids bail in an area in which the Legislature authorized the courts to exercise discretion.1
In State ex rel. Hutzler v. Dostert, _ W.Va. _, 236 S.E.2d 336, 339 (1977), I set out my views on bail at some length in a concurring, opinion. I will not repeat them here, except to state that our bail statute, W.Va. Code, 62-1C-1, et seq., represents a liberalization of our former bail acts as traced in Hutzler.
The critical point here is that W.Va. Code, 62-lC-l(b), authorizes post-conviction bail except for “an offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment.” Armed robbery is not expressly made punishable by life imprisonment by the Legislature, since it set the penalty of “not less than ten years.”
Our cases admonish that a criminal statute should be strictly construed. State v. Cole, W.Va. _, 238 S.E.2d 849 (1977); State v. Riley, _ W.Va. _, 215 S.E.2d 460 (1975); State ex rel. Carson v. Wood, 154 W. Va. 397, 175 S.E.2d 482 (1970); Dials v. Blair, 144 W. Va. 764, 111 S.E.2d 17 (1959); State v. Pyles, 86 W. Va. 636, 104 S.E. 100 (1920).
Equally elementary is the line of cases requiring that a remedial statute, such as our bail act, should be liberally construed. E.g., Reeves v. Ross, 62 W.Va. 7, 57 S.E. 284 (1907); see Raynes v. Nitro Pencil Co., 132 W.Va. 417, 52 S.E.2d 248 (1949).
It seems to me we invert these principles when we read into the armed robbery statute a legislative intent to require life imprisonment in all cases and distort the remedial aspect of the bail statute. I recognize we have held as a judicial interpretation that it is permissible for *419a trial court to impose a life sentence upon a conviction for armed robbery. State ex rel. Wright v. Boles, 150 W.Va. 381, 146 S.E.2d 524 (1966). But this is a far cry from holding that the Legislature intended to impose a life sentence standard. All the Legislature has said is that the minimum sentence shall be not less than ten years. This cannot be read to mean that armed robbery shall be punishable by life imprisonment.
In a much more difficult area involving the qualified invalidation of capital punishment, resulting from Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972), some state courts have adopted the view that bail is allowable for crimes which were formerly not bailable under statutes precluding bail for capital offenses. See, e.g., Baumgarner v. State, 253 Ark. 723, 506 S.W.2d 834 (1972); State v. Aillon, 164 Conn. 661, 295 A.2d 666 (1972); State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 294 A.2d 245 (1972); Edinger v. Metzger, 32 Ohio App. 2d 263, 61 Ohio Ops. 2d 306, 290 N.E.2d 577 (1972); Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829 (1972); Ex parte Contella, 485 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 453, 471 (1976).
The needless harshness of today’s rule means that no matter how egregious the trial error, and no matter what the actual sentence may be, and no matter how many community ties the defendant has, once the sentence is pronounced he will serve it unless, in due course, his appeal works its way through the process and his conviction is reversed. I do not find that the legislative mandate is so clear that we should force this construction on the remedial bail statute.
I am authorized to state that Justice McGraw joins with me in this dissenting opinion.

 Syllabus Point 1 reads:
“Under the provisions of W.Va. Code, 1931, 62-lC-l(b) the legislature has mandated that one convicted of an offense punishable by life imprisonment may not be released on bail pending an appeal.”