Court Opinion

ID: 9584988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:54:50.150373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:48.738333
License: Public Domain

BETTY B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the denial of Donchev’s claim of asylum. His credible testimony and corroborating evidence compel a finding of past persecution in Bulgaria. This shifts the burden to the government to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution by a preponderance of the evidence. I would therefore remand this case to the agency for an individualized analysis of how current country conditions affect the reasonableness of Donchev’s fear of persecution if he is returned to Bulgaria.
I. Past Persecution
The Immigration Judge found that Don-chev credibly testified that he experienced severe mistreatment in Bulgaria. The IJ also repeatedly credited Donchev’s testimony that he was targeted because of his association with the Roma, stating, for example, “It was obvious that there was no reason for [the police] to fine [Donchev and his Roma friends] or detain them, but *1221the police kept searching for reasons.” It can therefore not be said that substantial evidence in the record supports the IJ’s conclusion that Donchev was not persecuted “on account of’ his support for the Roma. See Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 727 (9th Cir.2004).
A. Persecution
The abuse that Donchev suffered over the course of a decade clearly rose to the level of persecution. See Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir.2004) (“[T]he severity of harm is compounded when incidents of persecution have occurred on more than one occasion, particularly where an applicant is victimized at different times over a period of years.”). We have “consistently found persecution where ... the petitioner was physically harmed because of’ a protected ground. Mihalev, 388 F.3d at 729 (quoting Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.1999)). Although a “single four-to-six-hour detention, in which Petitioner was hit on his stomach and kicked from behind,” may be insufficient to compel a finding of past persecution, see Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir.1995), such a finding is compelled in this case because of the repeated and severe nature of the abuse, see Mihalev, 388 F.3d at 729 (“The operative question is whether, looking at the cumulative effect of all the incidents that a Petitioner has suffered, the treatment he received rises to the level of persecution.”) (quoting Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.2004)).
During his time in the military, Donchev was beaten almost every day, sometimes twice a day, because he refused to mistreat Roma soldiers. Such physical abuse cannot be considered legitimate punishment for failing to follow orders, particularly where, as here, those orders were given in order to effectuate the officers’ discrimination against an ethnic minority. Cf. Taga-ga v. INS, 228 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding past persecution when asylum seeker had been court martialed for refusing to follow orders to arrest and detain Indo-Fijians); Barraza Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1451 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that punishment for “refusing to comply with orders ... because they violate standards of human decency” can itself amount to persecution).
Donchev also testified to four run-ins with the police after he left the military. In all of these cases, Donchev was detained; in most, he was beaten. He was never, however, charged with any crime. We have repeatedly held that detention and mistreatment partially motivated by a protected ground and not accompanied by formal prosecution is persecution that provides a proper basis for asylum even if there also is a legitimate reason for the detention. See, e.g., Mihalev, 388 F.3d at 727; Ndom v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 743, 755 (9th Cir.2004), superseded by statute as stated in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir.2008); Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir.1998); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir.1995), superseded by statute as stated in Parussimova, 533 F.3d at 1133; Ramirez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 867-68 (9th Cir.1990); Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.1988), superseded by statute as stated in Parussimova, 533 F.3d at 1133.1
*1222In addition to this conduct by the Bulgarian police and military, Donchev also testified that he was persecuted by skinheads. The skinheads threatened him at work and he often had to clean swastikas off the wall. They would also come after unsuccessful attempts by the police to stop a pro-Roma demonstration and beat up the participants. In the most serious incident, shortly before he left Bulgaria, Donchev was beaten up and strangled by people dressed like skinheads when he was leaving the annual meeting of the Future for the Roma organization. Although Donchev did not testify that they said anything about him being a Roma or Roma supporter during that attack, the timing and location of the action is strong circumstantial evidence that they targeted him because of his membership in the organization. According to Donchev’s credible testimony, the police were not contacted after this attack because everybody knew that the police and the skinheads frequently worked together. In the face of this type of governmental acquiescence, harassment and violence by private actors constitutes persecution, even if the victim does not report it to the police. Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that victim of private persecution need not report that persecution to the authorities if doing so would be futile, as when the authorities themselves are responsible for similar persecution).
Particularly relevant in evaluating Don-chev’s claim is Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722. Although the majority is correct that the petitioner in Mihalev was of Roma ethnicity and Donchev is not, the petitioners’ ethnicity is a distinction without a difference because Mihalev informs our analysis of whether Donchev was persecuted, not the reason for that persecution. Ethnicity aside, the facts of these two cases are strikingly similar. In both cases, the police broke up an exclusively-or primarily-Roma party, allegedly in response to a noise complaint, and proceeded to make offensive comments about Roma and beat the attendees, and detained the petitioners without charge. Significantly, this Court remanded Mihalev’s case based on that single arrest, whereas Donchev was persecuted on multiple occasions. In that sense, Donchev’s case is actually stronger than that of Mihalev, despite the fact that Donchev is not a Roma.
B. “On Account of’
An asylum applicant must demonstrate that the persecution he suffered is “on account of’ a protected ground: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(I). The record compels the conclusion that Donchev was persecuted on account of his membership in a particular social group.
1. Particular Social Group
On his asylum application, Donchev indicated that he was persecuted on account of his membership in a particular social group — supporters of the Roma. We have defined “particular social group” to mean a group “united by 1) a voluntary association which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to the members’ identities, or 2) an innate characteristic which is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that they either cannot or should not be required to change it.” Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007)). See also In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73 (BIA 2007) (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA 1985)). Here, Donchev’s “characteristic” is his friendships with, support, and defense of the Roma. This characteristic is fundamental to his individual identity *1223and conscience and he should not be required to change it.
While in the military, Donchev was beaten because he refused to carry out discriminating orders. As a civilian, he was repeatedly detained and beaten by the police but never prosecuted. These detentions were at least partially motivated by Donchev’s affiliation with the Roma, and were therefore on account of his support for the Roma. See, e.g., Mihalev, 388 F.3d at 727. With respect to one incident, the IJ concluded that there was no legitimate reason for the detention; in another case, the police explicitly suggested that Don-chev was responsible for a theft because “he has friends who are gypsies”; in a third case, the police specifically said “what are the gypsies doing in a church,” before they began to beat Donchev and his friend, using not only their hands and feet, but also batons. Cf. Kebede v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that statements by attackers compelled a finding that the nexus requirement was met); Maini v. INS, 212 F.3d 1167, 1175-76 (9th Cir.2000) (same). Finally, he formally associated himself with a pro-Roma organization, participated in their demonstrations and meetings, and as a result, suffered a brutal attack by skinheads. This evidence compels a conclusion that Donchev’s persecution was on account of his membership in the particular social group of supporters of the Roma people.
2. Relevance of Embassy Telegram
As thoroughly demonstrated above, the record is replete with evidence that Don-chev, himself, was persecuted on account of his membership in the particular social group of Roma supporters. He was targeted because of his association with, and support for, the Roma, an ethnic minority. This was a voluntary association characterized by his membership in the pro-Roma organization, Future for Roma, and his refusal to mistreat Roma when ordered to do so by his superiors in the military. This individualized evidence is not discredited by a telegram from the U.S. Embassy stating that although the human rights situation has improved, “individual instances of anti-Roma discrimination which still occur should not be equated with wholesale systematic persecution.” See Cheb-choub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that the BIA could rely on a country report to refute the applicant’s generalized statements about country conditions, but “not to discredit specific testimony regarding his individual experience”); Duarte de Guinac, 179 F.3d at 1162 (stating that the purpose of country condition evidence is to enable the factfin-der to “intelligently evaluate the petitioner’s credibility”). This telegram was not sent in response to Donchev’s petition. It is dated December 30, 2000, almost three years before he applied for asylum, and contains only general statements about the Roma in Bulgaria. Importantly, Don-chev’s testimony is not inconsistent with the telegram, which simply states that some Bulgarian asylum seekers were awarded asylum based on the general perception that Roma are persecuted despite the fact that those applicants failed to present any evidence that they themselves had been persecuted. In contrast, Don-chev’s credible testimony establishes that he suffered persecution because of his association with the Roma. See Duarte de Guinac, 179 F.3d at 1162-63 (reversing BIA conclusion that State Department reports regarding discrimination against indigenous people in Guatemala failed to provide adequate support for Duarte de Guinac’s persecution claim because the report did not contradict his testimony regarding what happened to him). Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority that this single document establishes that Don-chev was not persecuted because of his association with the Roma in light of the *1224compelling direct evidence that he was targeted because of that association.
II. Fear of Future Persecution
The Immigration Judge denied Donchev’s asylum claim because he failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. However, because the record compels the conclusion that Donchev suffered persecution in the past, the burden was on the government to rebut the presumption of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). In order to do this, the government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a fundamental change in circumstances in the country of origin such that the asylum seeker no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i). The government’s evidence must allow the BIA to make “an individualized analysis of how changed conditions will affect [Donchev’s] situation.” Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 805 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Generalized country information from the State Department is not by itself sufficient to rebut the presumption. Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir.2002). Because the Immigration Judge failed to properly shift the burden to the government and failed to consider the issue of changed country conditions, I would remand. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that Courts of Appeals cannot decide the issue of changed country conditions in the first instance). I note that no Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Bulgaria is contained in the Administrative Record.
III. Withholding of Removal
Once a petitioner establishes past persecution, he is entitled to a presumption of withholding of removal. Mihalev, 388 F.3d at 731. Because I believe that the record compels the conclusion that Don-chev was persecuted in the past,2 I would remand the case so that the BIA consider his withholding of removal claim or, if appropriate, remand to the IJ to do so.

. Because Donchev filed his application for asylum in 2003, the provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005 do not apply to his case. Therefore, Donchev is not required to prove that the protected ground was “one central reason” for his persecution. Cf. Parussimova, 533 F.3d at 1135-36 (holding that although the petitioner’s assailants made ethnic slurs when they attacked her, the evidence did not compel a conclusion that her ethnicity was a "central motivating reason” for the attack).

. My dissent, contrary to Judge Kleinfeld's unfair assertion, does not independently weigh the evidence. Rather, it rigorously applies the substantial evidence standard and concludes that the record compels reversal and remand. See Dissent at 1223 (last line), Dissent at 1221 (last line of Part I.B.l).