Court Opinion

ID: 9965696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 13:10:28.817056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:34.290758
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and         :
Edward C. Malloy,                   :
                  Appellants        :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 971 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Hon. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.       :

Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and         :
Edward C. Malloy,                   :
                  Appellants        :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 1342 C.D. 2022
                                    :
H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.            :

Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and         :
Edward C. Malloy,                   :
                  Appellants        :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 133 C.D. 2023
                                    :
H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.            : Submitted: February 6, 2024

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM                                            FILED: May 3, 2024

      In these consolidated appeals, Appellants Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and
Edward C. Malloy (collectively Appellants) challenge three orders issued by the
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County (Common Pleas). The first of these
orders, issued by Common Pleas on December 28, 2021, sustained Appellee Hon.
H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.’s (Appellee)1 preliminary objections to Appellants’
“Amended (Fifth) Complaint” (Fifth Amended Complaint) and dismissed that action
with prejudice. The second of these orders, issued by Common Pleas on June 28,
2022, denied Appellants’ Petition to Recuse Judge. The third order, issued by
Common Pleas on September 19, 2022, denied as moot Appellants’ Petition to
Transfer Case. In addition, Appellants filed a “Motion to Transfer to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania” (Motion to Transfer) with this Court on March 12, 2024,
through which they request that we transfer this matter to our Supreme Court. After
thorough review, we vacate the first order, dismiss as moot Appellants’ challenges
to the second and third orders, transfer Appellants’ action to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court on jurisdictional grounds, and dismiss as moot the Motion to
Transfer.

                                        I. Background
       On April 16, 2021, Appellants filed a mandamus action against Appellee in
Common Pleas, to which Appellee responded by filing preliminary objections.
Thereafter, the parties engaged in a repetitious dance of sorts, whereby Appellants
would file a new, slightly revised version of their complaint, thereby rendering moot
Appellee’s existing preliminary objections, only to have Appellee respond by
submitting a new round of preliminary objections. Eventually, Appellants filed their
Fifth Amended Complaint, which is the subject of these appeals, on October 4, 2021.
Therein, Appellants semi-coherently asserted that two Common Pleas judges, the

       1
          Appellee was the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts’ (AOPC) Court
Administrator at the time Appellants filed suit against him and retired from this role on September
30, 2023. See Pennsylvania Supreme Court Announces Upcoming Retirement of State Court
Administrator Geoff Moulton, THE UNIFIED JUD. SYS. OF PA. (Apr. 25, 2023),
https://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/news/news-detail/1134/pennsylvania-supreme-
court-announces-upcoming-retirement-of-state-court-administrator-geoff-moulton.

                                                2
Honorable Barry C. Dozer and the Honorable G. Michael Green, had repeatedly
violated Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 703 by failing to file reports
with Appellee that accurately listed all matters that had both been assigned to those
judges and, post-assignment, remained undecided for 90 or more days. Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 5a-14a; see Pa. R.J.A. 703. Accordingly, Appellants sought
mandamus relief, in the form of an order directing Appellee to act in accordance
with his statutory duties by reporting Judge Dozer’s and Judge Green’s alleged
violations of Rule 703 to the Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board (JCB). R.R. at
14a-15a.
      While this was taking place, Appellants also submitted two petitions that are
relevant to the appeals currently before us. Through the first, filed on July 26, 2021,
Appellants asserted that Common Pleas did not have jurisdiction over this matter
and consequently requested that their lawsuit “be transferred to the correct court.”
Id. at 83a-92a. Through the second, filed on October 21, 2021, Appellants sought to
have the Honorable Senior Judge Robert J. Shenkin, a Court of Common Pleas of
Chester County judge who had been assigned to preside over Appellants’ case,
recuse himself from handling this matter, on the basis that Judge Shenkin had shown
bias or partiality by barring Appellants from filing a sixth amended complaint. Id. at
99a-126a.
      On October 22, 2021, Appellee responded to the Fifth Amended Complaint
via preliminary objections. Specifically, Appellee argued that Appellants’ action
should be dismissed for several reasons. First, Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction
over the matter, due to the Supreme Court’s inherent supervisory authority over our
Commonwealth’s judiciary. Id. at 34a-35a. Second, Appellants had failed to
articulate a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in ensuring that Appellee

                                          3
reported Judges Dozer and Green to the JCB and, thus, had not established that they
had standing in this matter. Id. at 35a-38a. Third, Appellants had not articulated a
viable mandamus claim, because they had an alternate, entirely viable form of relief
available to them, in that they could themselves report Judge Dozer’s and Judge
Green’s alleged noncompliance with the Rules of Judicial Administration to the
JCB. Finally, Appellee asserted that he was shielded from Appellants’ action by
virtue of sovereign immunity, as he was a Commonwealth official acting within the
scope of his professional duties. Id. at 20a-43a.
      On December 28, 2021, Common Pleas sustained Appellee’s preliminary
objections, dismissed Appellants’ Fifth Amended Complaint with prejudice, and
precluded Appellants from filing a sixth amended complaint. Id. at 133a. Thereafter,
on June 28, 2022, and September 19, 2022, Common Pleas respectively denied
Appellants’ Petition to Recuse Judge and denied as moot Appellants’ Petition to
Transfer Case. Id. at 131a-32a. Appellants filed timely appeals regarding each of
these rulings, which were subsequently consolidated for purposes of disposition by
this Court.
                                   II. Discussion
      Under normal circumstances, we would now address the merits of Appellants’
substantive arguments; however, we are constrained to refrain from doing so, due to
Common Pleas’ patently erroneous exercise of jurisdiction over this matter. It is
beyond cavil that
              [j]urisdiction over the subject matter [of an action] is
              conferred solely by the Constitution and laws of the
              Commonwealth. The test for whether a court has subject
              matter jurisdiction inquires into the competency of the
              court to determine controversies of the general class to
              which the case presented for consideration belongs. Thus,
              as a pure question of law, the standard of review in

                                          4
             determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction
             is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.
Mazur v. Trinity Area Sch. Dist., 961 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 2008). Furthermore,
             any issue going to the subject matter jurisdiction of a court
             or administrative tribunal to act in a matter . . . cannot be
             waived by the parties[,] nor can the parties confer subject
             matter on a court or tribunal by agreement or stipulation.
             Since an issue of subject matter jurisdiction is not
             waivable, it may be raised at any stage of a proceeding by
             a party, or sua sponte by the court or agency.
Blackwell v. State Ethics Comm’n, 567 A.2d 630, 636 (Pa. 1989) (internal citations
omitted).
      Despite the broad language it used in its December 28, 2021 order when ruling
upon Appellee’s preliminary objections, Common Pleas subsequently made clear
that it had sustained those preliminary objections only on the basis of Appellants’
purported lack of standing and failure to state a viable mandamus claim (i.e.,
demurrer). See Common Pleas Op., 10/4/22, at 2-3. In other words, Common Pleas
did not dispose of Appellee’s assertion that the lower tribunal lacked jurisdiction to
handle Appellants’ action. This omission was legally erroneous, as the existence of
proper jurisdiction over a given matter is obviously a prerequisite for a court to issue
all other types of rulings therein. See Robinson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 582
A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. 1990) (“Jurisdiction is the predicate upon which consideration of
the merits must rest.”).
      We will therefore endeavor to remedy Common Pleas’ lapse by addressing
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction ourselves, by looking to the nature of our
Supreme Court’s administrative and supervisory powers over our Commonwealth’s
judicial apparatus. As the Supreme Court has explained:
             The [Pennsylvania] Constitution is explicit regarding the
             breadth of the [Supreme] Court’s authority over the
             Unified Judicial System. In the Supreme Court “shall be

                                           5
reposed the supreme judicial power of the
Commonwealth.” PA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). Moreover, in
addition to its judicial power, the Supreme Court has
“general supervisory and administrative authority over all
the courts and [magisterial district judges]. . . .” PA.
CONST. art. V, § 10(a). The Judicial Code helps to
implement the primacy of the Supreme Court within the
Unified Judicial System. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 501 (derived
from PA. CONST. art. V, § 2). The General Assembly has
also recognized that the Court has “[a]ll powers necessary
or appropriate in aid of its original and appellate
jurisdiction which are agreeable to the usages and
principles of law” and any powers vested in it by statute,
including the Judicial Code. 42 Pa. C.S. § 502. Section
1701 of the Judicial Code states that the Court has general
supervisory and administrative authority over the judicial
system and may exercise powers enumerated in
subsequent provisions “in aid” of that authority. 42 Pa.
C.S. § 1701 (derived from PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a)). The
enumerated powers include authority over “all courts and
magisterial district judges” and over “personnel of the
system.” 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 1723, 1724. Personnel of the
system include “judicial officers,” among them
magisterial district judges. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 102
(definitions: personnel of the system, judicial officers,
judges).
As part of its administrative responsibility, the Court
oversees the daily operations of the entire Unified Judicial
System, which provides a broad perspective on how the
various parts of the system operate together to ensure
access to justice, justice in fact, and the appearance that
justice is being administered even-handedly. See PA.
CONST. art. V, § 10 (judicial administration). One aspect
of this responsibility is management of judicial personnel.
Thus, for example: (1) the Chief Justice, acting upon
requests from the AOPC, may assign additional jurists to
temporary judicial service on any court; (2) the Court may
certify jurists for senior status, and these jurists may be
assigned by the Chief Justice as needed; and (3) the Court
approves jurists for assignment or re-assignment to
divisions of the courts of common pleas. See PA. CONST.
art. V, §§ 10(a), 16(c); Pa. R.J.A. [] 701, 702. Judicial

                             6
leave is monitored by the Supreme Court, and jurists are
required to file reports related to the status of cases
submitted to them for adjudication. Pa. R.J.A. [] 703, 704.
The AOPC records, reviews, and reports to the Supreme
Court on matters related to the operation and efficiency of
the Unified Judicial System and its component parts;
system personnel are expected to cooperate with the
AOPC in these respects and any failure to cooperate is
referred to the Supreme Court for review. See PA. CONST.
art. V, § 10(b); Pa. R.J.A. [] 505, 506, 701-704.
Another important facet of judicial administration is the
authority to devise rules of procedure governing
adjudications before inferior tribunals . . . . See PA. CONST.
art. V, § 10(c). While the [Court of Judicial Discipline
(CJD)] is permitted to devise its own rules of procedure,
the CJD is nevertheless bound in its substantive task to
take general direction from the Supreme Court, as this
Court is responsible for the substance of the codes of
conduct that govern Pennsylvania jurists, which the CJD
enforces, and our interpretation of those codes controls.
See PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c); see also Pa. Code of Jud.
Conduct Canon[s 1-3]; Pa. St. Mag. Dist. J. Rule[s 101-
1211]; [In re Carney, 9 A.3d 490 (Pa. 2013)].
Additionally, the Court regulates the conduct of jurists via
the Rules of Judicial Administration.
....
In addition to its general powers of adjudication,
supervision and administration, the Supreme Court also
has “the power generally to minister justice to all persons
and to exercise the powers of the court, as fully and amply,
to all intents and purposes, as the justices of the Court of
King’s Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, at
Westminster, or any of them, could or might do on May
22, 1722.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 502 (derived from Judiciary Act
of May 22, 1722, 1 Smith’s Law 131). The Judicial Code
recognizes that these additional powers are vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
Id. . . .
To aid in the exercise of these powers, the Court has such
jurisdiction as “shall be provided by law.” PA. CONST. art.
V, § 2(c). [For example,] Section 721 of the Judicial Code

                              7
            enumerates the types of cases over which the Court has
            original jurisdiction: habeas corpus, mandamus or
            prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction, and quo
            warranto as to any officer of statewide jurisdiction. 42 Pa.
            C.S. § 721. . . . Section 726 addresses the Court’s
            extraordinary jurisdiction to take cognizance, sua sponte
            or upon petition of a party, of any matter pending before
            an inferior tribunal “involving an issue of immediate
            public importance.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 726. In addition, the
            schedule to [a]rticle V of the Constitution continues post-
            ratification the jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court in
            1968—such as the jurisdiction of the King’s Bench. PA.
            CONST. SCHED. art. V, § 1; see, e.g., City of Philadelphia
            v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 22, . . . 999 A.2d 555
            ([Pa.] 2010) (Supreme Court exercised King’s Bench
            jurisdiction to review arbitration award upon writ of
            certiorari, where right of appeal was statutorily
            prohibited).
            ....
            [T]he [Supreme] Court’s supervisory responsibilities only
            start at relatively mundane tasks [such as those] relating to
            temporary assignments of judges to fill vacancies on the
            bench, priority of commission, or judicial assignments to
            divisions within a trial court, and related adjudicatory
            obligations. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. V, §[] 10(a), (e). . . .
            But, the duties of the [Supreme] Court atop the Unified
            Judicial System transcend these ministerial tasks. The
            Supreme Court’s principal obligations are to
            conscientiously guard the fairness and probity of the
            judicial process and the dignity, integrity, and authority of
            the judicial system, all for the protection of the citizens of
            this Commonwealth.
            ....
            [Thus, the essence of t]he Supreme Court’s supervisory
            power over the Unified Judicial System . . . implicates a
            dual authority: (1) over personnel of the system, among
            them jurists; and (2) over inferior tribunals[.]
In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 663-65, 75, 78 (Pa. 2014).

                                           8
       Here, Appellants allege that two jurists have failed to properly comply with
the reporting requirements the Supreme Court has imposed upon them through the
Rules of Judicial Administration, and consequently seek to compel Appellee, the
Chief Administrator of the AOPC (who was appointed to his role by the Supreme
Court itself),2 to report those jurists to the JCB for their alleged noncompliance. In
other words, Appellants’ mandamus claim directly implicates the Supreme Court’s
supervisory and administrative responsibilities. Therefore, their lawsuit falls
squarely within the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, rather than
that of Common Pleas.3 Accordingly, Common Pleas should have transferred this
matter to the Supreme Court, and committed legal error by both ruling upon the
merits of Appellee’s non-jurisdictional preliminary objections and issuing orders
pertaining to Appellants’ aforementioned petitions.

       2
        See 42 Pa. C.S. § 1901 (“The Supreme Court shall appoint and may remove a Court
Administrator of Pennsylvania.”).

       3
         Or, for that matter, within the original jurisdiction of this Court. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 761
(delimiting the bounds of the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdictional authority); cf. Bruno, 101 A.3d
635 (Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over interim disciplinary action against a federally
indicted traffic court judge); Begandy v. Clerk of Cts. of Allegheny Cnty. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 443
M.D. 2018, filed Mar. 29, 2019), 2019 WL 1422668 (Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over
mandamus action in which petitioner alleged that a clerk of courts and a court administrator, both
of whom worked for a court of common pleas, had not handled his record correction request in
compliance with the Unified Judicial System’s written policies); Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over action through which petitioner
sought to compel all judges from a specific court of common pleas to recuse themselves from
presiding over his case); Leiber v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 654 A.2d 11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (Supreme
Court had original jurisdiction over mandamus action against a district justice, through which an
elected constable sought payment for services rendered). Though Begandy was unreported, we
reference it as persuasive authority. See Section 414(a) of the Internal Operating Procedures of the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a) (unreported Commonwealth
Court opinions issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited for their persuasive value).

                                                 9
                                   III. Conclusion
      In light of the foregoing analysis, we vacate Common Pleas’ December 28,
2021 order and transfer Appellants’ lawsuit to our Supreme Court on jurisdictional
grounds. Stedman v. Lancaster Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 221 A.3d 747, 760-61 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2019); 42 Pa. C.S. § 5103(a); Pa. R.A.P. 751. Additionally, as this transfer
has the ancillary effect of both relieving Judge Shenkin of responsibility over the
case and affords Appellants the relief they sought via their Petition to Transfer Case,
we dismiss Appellants’ appeals regarding Common Pleas’ June 28, 2022 and
September 19, 2022 orders as moot. Finally, as our disposition of these appeals
affords Appellants the precise relief they sought through their Motion to Transfer,
we dismiss as moot that motion.

                                          10
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and          :
Edward C. Malloy,                    :
                  Appellants         :
                                     :
      v.                             : No. 971 C.D. 2022
                                     :
Hon. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.        :

Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and          :
Edward C. Malloy,                    :
                  Appellants         :
                                     :
      v.                             : No. 1342 C.D. 2022
                                     :
H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.             :

Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and          :
Edward C. Malloy,                    :
                  Appellants         :
                                     :
      v.                             : No. 133 C.D. 2023
                                     :
H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.             :

PER CURIAM
                                  ORDER

      AND NOW, this 3rd day of May, 2024, it is HEREBY ORDERED:
      1.    The Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County’s (Common Pleas)
            December 28, 2021 order is VACATED;
      2.    Appellants Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and Edward C. Malloy’s
            (Appellants) lawsuit, which they originally filed in Common Pleas, is
     TRANSFERRED to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on
     jurisdictional grounds;
3.   Appellants’ appeals regarding Common Pleas’ June 28, 2022 and
     September 19, 2022 orders are DISMISSED AS MOOT; and
4.   Appellants’ “Motion to Transfer to the Supreme Court of
     Pennsylvania” is DISMISSED AS MOOT.