Court Opinion

ID: 9774827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:34:57.764449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:16.614210
License: Public Domain

SHANNON, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the reversal of the judgment.
This is an appeal from the entry of a summary judgment by the district court of Bastrop County.
*152Appellees, Cleve W. Jacobs, Jr., and wife, Hope E. Jacobs, filed a motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment suit which they had filed. The object of the declaratory judgment suit was to obtain the construction by the district court of a mineral reservation in warranty deed signed by Genevieve Rix Fitzwilliam. As stated in the majority opinion, appellant, H. E. Du-Bois, individually and as independent executor of the estate of Genevieve Rix Fitzwil-liam, deceased, contended that the deceased had reserved a one-half royalty interest in perpetuity. Appellees, to the contrary, claimed that the deceased had reserved a one-half royalty interest for the period of her life.
Contrary to Tex.R.Civ.P. 166-A(c) the motion for summary judgment did not “ . . . state the specific grounds therefor.” However, it is observed that in paragraph II of the motion, appellees state that they and the deceased entered into a contract to convey certain real estate and that the contract to convey was attached to the motion for summary judgment. Paragraph II of the motion reads also, “That as an intricate part of such contract, a deed of conveyance was executed thereunder . wherein the said Genevieve Rix Fitzwilliam did convey the real estate to the Plaintiffs [appellees].” An examination of the motion for summary judgment shows that appel-lees attached the contract to convey to the motion and made it a part of the summary judgment proof.
Although inappropriate in a summary judgment proceeding, the district court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. State v. Easley, 404 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.1966), Gallop v. Seagoville Investments, Inc., 417 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Civ.App.1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.), Kovac v. Hicks, 416 S.W.2d 496 (Tex.Civ.App.1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.), Reynolds v. Park, 521 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, writ ref’d n. r. e.), Fulton v. Duhaime, 525 S.W.2d 62 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, writ ref’d n. r. e.). The court concluded inter alia that the terms of the deed were “ . . .in such conflict as to render said deed so ambiguous that the nature of the interest reserved to the Grantor cannot be determined until such conflict has been resolved.” The court concluded further that “ . . . as a matter of law that this case should be controlled by the rule announced in certain Texas cases which permit the court to refer to the contract for the conveyance in order to resolve and clear up an ambiguity in the language of the deed.” The court concluded finally that it had examined the contract to convey and based upon that examination “ . . . I find that the deed should be construed as having reserved to the Grantor, during her lifetime an estate consisting of the mineral interest described, and that upon the death of such Grantor said estate was ended.”
Where there is a question as to the meaning of an ambiguous instrument, summary judgment is improper. Thompson v. Hambrick, 508 S.W.2d 949 (Tex.Civ.App.1974, writ ref’d n. r. e.), Robert v. E. C. Milstead Ranching, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.Civ.App.1971, writ ref’d n. r. e.), Chapa v. Benavides Mill & Gin Company, 420 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.Civ.App.1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.), Tinnin v. Crook, 333 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Civ.App. 1960, writ ref’d n. r. e.).