Court Opinion

ID: 9598180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:06:21.037281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:41.136670
License: Public Domain

DEITS, C. J.,
dissenting.
As the majority acknowledges, this case presents a close question of law. In my view, however, after considering the text and context of the pertinent statute, the Board’s dissenting opinion has the better argument.
The question here is whether the compensability of claimant’s condition should be assessed as an injury, under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), or as an occupational disease under ORS 656.802(2)(b). As the majority points out, that makes a significant difference here because, if the compensability of the claim is assessed as an injury, claimant must prove that his work activity was a material contributing cause of his disability or need for treatment of the combined condition. On the other hand, if the claim is assessed as an occupational disease, claimant faces the more difficult burden of proving that his work activity was the major contributing cause of the *84combined condition and the pathological worsening of the disease.
The statutory language that we must interpret, ORS 656.802(1), provides:
“(l)(a) As used in this chapter, ‘occupational disease’ means any disease or infection arising out of and in the course of employment caused by substances or activities to which an employee is not ordinarily subjected or exposed other than during a period of regular actual employment therein, and which requires medical services or results in disability or death, including:
“(A) Any disease or infection caused by ingestion of, absorption of, inhalation of or contact with dust, fumes, vapors, gases, radiation or other substances.
“(B) Any mental disorder, whether sudden or gradual in onset, which requires medical services or results in physical or mental disability or death.
“(C) Any series of traumatic events or occurrences which requires medical services or results in physical disability or death.
“(b) As used in this chapter, ‘mental disorder’ includes any physical disorder caused or worsened by mental stress.”
The majority concludes that, although the term “disease” is not defined in ORS chapter 656, well accepted definitions of the terms “occupational injury” and “occupational disease” have developed in our case law. Under those definitions, the decision whether a condition is a disease or an injury depends on whether the symptoms of the condition are gradual or sudden in onset. The majority holds that, in order to come within the terms of ORS 656.802(l)(a)(A), a condition must satisfy the definition of occupational disease found in the case law. In other words, in order to be considered an occupational disease under ORS 656.802(l)(a)(A), the symptoms of the condition must have been gradual in onset. Here, of course, the symptoms were sudden in onset and, consequently, under the majority’s view, the claim must be assessed as an occupational injury under ORS 656.005-(7)(a)(B).
*85The majority’s holding is a plausible reading of the statutory language. However, in my opinion, the text and context of the statute support a different understanding of what is included as an occupational disease under this subsection of the statute. First, looking at the text of the statute, an occupational disease is defined by the entire subsection. That includes both the general definition set out in subsection (l)(a) as well as the three specific categories included in subsections (A) through (C) of subsection (l)(a). One of those categories is, of course, the one at issue here, which specifically includes as an occupational disease:
“(A) Any disease or infection caused by ingestion of, absorption of, inhalation of or contact with dust, fumes, vapors, gases, radiation or other substances.”
ORS 656.802(l)(a)(A) (emphasis added).
The majority’s interpretation of the term “disease,” as used in subsection (l)(a)(A), gives it the same meaning as the term “occupational disease” as generally used in our case law. The majority is essentially defining the term “occupational disease,” as used in subsection (l)(a), by using the term “occupational disease.” It seems unlikely that that is what the legislature intended. Further, under the majority’s interpretation of “disease,” as used in ORS 656.802(l)(a)(A), the remaining language of the subsection becomes completely unnecessary because a condition that is gradual in onset and caused by dust, fumes, vapors, gases, radiation, or other substances, is already covered by the general definition of an occupational disease. Presumably, by adding the language listing specific categories of conditions to be included in the general definition of occupational diseases, the legislature meant to add conditions that may not otherwise come within the general definition of “occupational disease” as found in ORS 656.802(l)(a).
The majority appears to believe that it has no other choice but to use the definition of occupational disease found in our case law. However, in addition to the fact that, as discussed above, the legislature included language adding specific categories to the definition, the majority’s definition of “disease” is not the only definition of “disease” available. As the dissenting opinion of the Board points out, in the *86Supreme Court’s decision in Mathel v. Josephine County, 319 Or 235, 875 P2d 455 (1994), in discussing whether the condition there was a “disease” or an “injury,” the court used the definition of disease found in Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (unabridged ed 1993), which defines a disease as:
“any impairment of the normal state of the living animal or plant body or any of its components that interrupts or modifies the performance of the vital functions, being a response to environmental factors (as malnutrition, industrial hazards, or climate) * *
Id. at 648.
As the Supreme Court did in Mathel, it is reasonable here to interpret the term disease as used in ORS 656.802(l)(a)(A) in this general sense. That understanding of the term is completely consistent with the text and context of the statute. In adding subsections (A) to (C) to ORS 656.802(l)(a), it is apparent that the legislature intended to require that the categorization of certain types of conditions as occupational diseases or occupational injuries be determined differently from the traditional analysis, which focuses on whether the onset of the injury is gradual or sudden. The language of subsection (A) clearly indicates that, with respect to conditions caused by the ingestion, absorption, contact with or inhalation of specified substances, the legislature intended the focus to be on the cause of the condition.
In Mathel, the Supreme Court recognized exactly that. It stated that there are some conditions for which the categorization of the condition as a disease or an injury does depend on the cause of the condition, citing ORS 656.802(l)(a)(A). The court stated:
“Under the Workers’ Compensation Law as a whole — that is, with respect to both ‘injury’ claims and ‘occupational disease’ claims — workers make claims for accidental injuries or occupational diseases, not for the causes of those accidental injuries or occupational diseases. See ORS 656.005(7)(a) (providing in part that a ‘compensable injury’ is an accidental injury meeting certain criteria); ORS 656.802 (providing *87in part that an ‘occupational disease’ is a disease or infection meeting certain criteria). Some provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law expressly describe certain causes, which are differentiated from the concepts of ‘compensable injury’ and ‘occupational disease.’ See ORS 656.005(7)(b) (‘compensable injury’ does not include injuries caused by various activities such as consumption of alcoholic beverages); ORS 656.802(l)(a) (‘occupational disease’ includes diseases or infections caused by ingestion, absorption or inhalation of, or contact with, various substances).”
Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
My interpretation of ORS 656.802(1)(a)(A) is also supported by the fact that the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to subsection (B) of ORS 656.802(l)(a). In Fuls v. SAIF, 321 Or 151, 894 P2d 1163 (1995), the claimant was seeking compensation for a mental disorder that he alleged was caused by a distinct work incident. The claimant attempted to rely on the general case law distinction between occupational injuries and diseases in arguing that his condition should be analyzed as an injury. The court rejected that argument, concluding that the definition of an occupational disease in ORS 656.802(1)(a)(B) included any mental disorder without regard to the suddenness of the condition’s onset:
“Claimant argues that, despite the language of ORS 656.802, a ‘sudden onset injury in the form of a mental disorder’ should not be analyzed under ORS 656.802 but, rather, should be treated as an ‘injury,’ as defined in ORS 656.005(7). It is true that this court’s cases have drawn a distinction between occupational diseases and occupational injuries along the lines that occupational diseases are gradual rather than sudden in onset. See, e.g., James v. SAIF, 290 Or 343, 624 P2d 565 (1981) (so indicating); see also Mathel, 319 Or at 240-42, (citing James, noting that heart attack was sudden onset condition, and rejecting argument that it was an occupational disease). However, ORS 656.802(l)(b) specifically includes ‘[a]ny mental disorder’ within the definition of ‘occupational disease,’ without regard to the suddenness of its onset.”
Fuls, 321 Or at 158.
*88The majority acknowledges the holding in Fuls, but concludes that subsection (A) is different from subsection (B), because subsection (A) refers to “any disease” while subsection (B) does not. As discussed above, the majority reasons that, by using the term disease in subsection (A), the legislature intended that we must use the accepted case law definition of disease. However, for the reasons discussed above, we are not compelled to use that definition in interpreting subsection (B). The court’s reasoning in Fuls, that the specific categories of conditions included in subsections (A) through (C) of ORS 656.802(l)(a) are part o/the definition of an occupational disease under that statute, is directly applicable here. Under ORS 656.802(l)(a)(A), conditions caused by the ingestion, inhalation, absorption or contact with certain substances are occupational diseases regardless of the suddenness of the onset of the condition.
The final point that the majority relies on to support its conclusion is the fact that, in 1995, the legislature added the language “whether sudden or gradual in onset” to subsection (B). The majority reasons that, because similar language was not added to subsection (A), that subsection may not be read to include conditions with symptoms that are sudden in onset. However, as the Board’s dissenting opinion notes, the addition of this language was essentially meaningless because the court, in Fuls, had already concluded before the language was added that the subsection included conditions where the onset was sudden.
I would hold that ORS 656.802(l)(a)(A) applies to any claim for a condition caused by the ingestion, absorption, inhalation or contact with dust, fumes, vapors, gases, radiation or other substances, regardless of the onset of the condition. Consequently, in my view, the claim here must be analyzed as an occupational disease. Because claimant here did not establish a compensable occupational disease, I would reverse the Board and uphold the employer’s denial. For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.