Court Opinion

ID: 9706000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:29:30.084886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:38.116845
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, President Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I join in part II of the majority’s opinion. However, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s decision to vacate the *450judgment of sentence and remand for a Batson hearing. Appellant Weaver has failed to establish the necessary inference of discrimination, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and thus has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.) 343-44 see also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 Pa.Super. 29, 562 A.2d 338, 343-44 (1989); Commonwealth v. Long, 367 Pa.Super. 190, 532 A.2d 853 (1987). The burden shifts to the prosecutor to come forward with a neutral explanation for striking certain venirepersons from the jury only after a prima facie case of discrimination has been established. Based upon a review of the voir dire proceedings and the argument on post-trial motions in this case, Weaver has failed to establish a prima facie case. Therefore, the majority’s decision to remand for a Batson hearing is inappropriate in this case.
A peremptory challenge is defined as the “right to challenge a juror without assigning a reason for the challenge.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1023 (5th ed. 1979). Its significance in our jury system has been well documented. The peremptory challenge has been described as a “necessary part of a trial by jury,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 91, 106 S.Ct. at 1720, “one of the most important of the rights” in our criminal justice system, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), and “essential to the fairness of trial by jury,” Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376, 13 S.Ct. 136, 138, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892). Unlike a challenge for cause, for which an attorney is required to specify reasons why a prospective juror should not be allowed to be a member of the jury, a party may utilize a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror “on his own dislike, without showing of any cause.” H. Joy, On Peremptory Challenge of Jurors 1 (1844). As Chief Justice Burger aptly noted in his dissenting opinion in Batson, “[ajnalytically, there is no middle ground: A challenge either has to be explained or it does not.” 476 U.S. at 127, 106 S.Ct. at 1739.
*451In Batson, however, a majority of the Supreme Court determined that a state’s privilege to strike individual jurors must bend to the constitutional principle of equal protection. Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. Thus, a prosecutor is forbidden from challenging a potential juror solely on account of his or her race “on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the [s]tate’s case against a black defendant.” Id. Since Batson, the peremptory challenge, when used in the case of a black defendant to strike one or more black venirepersons under circumstances suggesting racial animus, is no longer a peremptory challenge in its purest form; as a result of the Batson decision, it has become, in effect, a challenge for cause for which the prosecutor must give a race-neutral explanation. A prosecutor must provide the court with a race-neutral explanation, however, only if the trial court determines that based on the totality of the circumstances an inference of discrimination arises. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24; Jackson, supra, 386 Pa.Super. at 41-43, 562 A.2d at 343-44. The evidentiary test is as follows:
a defendant can establish a prima facie case [of racial discrimination] by showing that he is a “member of a cognizable racial group,” that the prosecutor exercised “peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race,” and that those “facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. ” [Batson,] 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723]. Once the defendant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecutor “to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.” Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
Jackson, supra (Concurring Opinion by Cirillo, P.J.) 386 Pa.Super. at 40-42, 562 A.2d at 342-43, quoting Teague v. Lane, — U.S. —, —, —---—, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1066, 1065-67, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (emphasis added).
*452Here, Weaver presented the trial court with no facts concerning his jury selection which would support a finding of a prima facie case of discrimination. Weaver’s argument on post-trial motions with respect to this issue is as follows:
You cannot tell me that that jury selection was not an exact intention to put an all white jury in those seats and preclude any blacks from being on that jury. Every black that came forward, Mr. Sax struck, Your Honor. It was intentional, it was noted, we had a side bar on it and what did Mr. Sax do? He came back, struck another and another black juror in the face of what Your Honor had noted to us____ [T]he prosecution cannot strike jurors on the basis of race strictly. And I believe and I aver that that, in fact, was done, Your Honor.
Weaver’s argument established only that he is a member of the black race and that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike black members of the venire; Weaver failed to cite any facts or circumstances which would support an inference that the prosecutor’s strikes were racially motivated. Neither the fact that Weaver is a member of the black race nor the mere fact that strikes were disproportionately exercised against minority venirepersons establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. The mere cry of “discrimination,” even on an issue as sensitive as race, has never been enough to establish a prima facie case. Jackson, supra (Concurring Opinion by Cirillo, P.J.), 386 Pa.Super. at 40, 562 A.2d at 343, citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2046-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976).
Based upon my review of the record, I find no facts or circumstances upon which the trial court could have based a finding of a prima facie case of discrimination. It is only in his appellate brief that Weaver for the first time points to the specific similarities in characteristics between black and white venirepersons. Under these circumstances, I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that no inference of racial bias on the part of *453the prosecutor has been shown, and that no prima facie case of discrimination was established.
Additionally, I point out that the fact that the composition of the jury in this case was all white does not necessarily mandate an inference of racial discrimination. See Commonwealth v. McKendrick, 356 Pa.Super. 64, 514 A.2d 144 (1986), allocatur denied, 514 Pa. 629, 522 A.2d 558 (1987) (where defendant and his victim were both members of the black race, witnesses for both sides were black, and no racial issues were present in the case, appellant had not established a prima facie case under Batson despite the fact that appellant was tried by an all-white jury). The holding in McKendrick is not intended to imply, however, that where both the defendant and the complainant are black, a finding of a prima facie case is always precluded. The law in this area does not call for a mechanical response by a trial court simply because there are certain objective, observable facts before it, i.e., the number of blacks on the jury, the number of black venirepersons excluded, and the race of the victim.1 In the instant case, this was all that was before the trial court. Without more, we cannot say that the trial court erred in determining that the defendant had failed to establish a racial motivation for the prosecutor’s action.
Because I believe that the trial court was not presented with evidence establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, I find that the majority’s decision today has incorrectly determined that the trial court abused its discretion. Therefore, I must register my dissent to part I of the majority opinion. I would affirm the judgment of sentence.

. Although a finding of a prima facie case based only on these observable factors may appear to be a safe way for a trial judge to handle this issue, the fact remains that subtleties and subjective perceptions are the source and rationale of all peremptory challenges. Knowing full well that even the trial judge is not privy to all exchanges, or lack of exchanges, between an advocate and a venireperson, we have no choice but to rely upon the trial court to evaluate the atmosphere of the voir dire. This court is certainly not privy to averted eyes and sidelong glances.