Court Opinion

ID: 9353088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 21:02:25.366204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:30.686405
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/10/23 P. v. Lytle CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A165859
 v.
 CORAL ANNETTE LYTLE,                                                   (Tulare County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. VCF358009)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Coral Annette Lytle pled guilty to numerous sex offenses
against two teenage victims. On appeal, Lytle challenges an order that she
pay $100,000 in noneconomic restitution to each victim. We reject Lytle’s
contentions that the noneconomic restitution order violated her Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial and that the statute authorizing such
restitution violates the federal and state equal protection clauses. But we
find merit in her contention that the court abused its discretion by not
stating the method or factual basis it used to calculate the restitution
amount. Accordingly, we will reverse the order for noneconomic restitution
and remand for further restitution proceedings.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         Lytle was 40 years old at the time of the offenses involving M.W. and
E.G. According to the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, 14-
year-old M.W. briefly dated Lytle’s teenage daughter. On several occasions,
Lytle bought cigars and alcohol for M.W. and sent him nude photographs.
Often, and even after M.W. and Lytle’s daughter stopped dating, Lytle would
pick up M.W. from his home while his parents were sleeping and then return
him home at 5:00 a.m. Lytle once went to M.W.’s home while his parents
were away and performed oral sex on him. On another occasion, they
performed oral sex on each other and had vaginal sex in the back of Lytle’s
car.
       Lytle also engaged in sexual relations with 15-year-old E.G., who dated
her other daughter. During the first of three incidents, the two engaged in
oral sex and unprotected sexual intercourse while in Lytle’s car at a park.
During the second incident, the two had sexual intercourse in Lytle’s parked
car on the street. In the third incident, E.G. said he was not interested and
had a test the next day, but Lytle urged him on and the two had sexual
intercourse in a Walmart parking lot. E.G. stopped these sexual relations
because he was friends with Lytle’s daughters and had to interact with
Lytle’s husband, and E.G. felt badly that Lytle was cheating on her family
with him. After E.G. broke it off, Lytle sent him nude messages saying he
would miss her.
       Lytle was charged by information with 21 felony counts, as follows:
unlawful sexual intercourse by a person over the age of 21 with a person
under the age of 16 (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (d), counts 1 through 41);
meeting with a minor for lewd purposes (§ 288.4, subd. (b), counts 5 through
8); contact with a minor for a sexual offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a), counts 9
through 12); and lewd acts on a 15-year-old (§ 288, subd. (c)(1), counts 13
through 21). She pled guilty to all counts.

1     All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
                                        2
      A sentencing hearing was held in November 2019. As relevant here,
M.W.’s father appeared and stated M.W. was “physically, emotionally, and
intellectually victimized by [Lytle]” and the “trauma experienced by him
terrifies him to have to relive this episode and come in here and speak.” He
described M.W. as an “an athlete, a good student, and very outgoing” who
“became sullen, lost interest in activities, and wanted to be alone.” Moreover,
M.W. was in therapy and had conversations with his brother that caused his
brother concern.
      With regard to E.G., victim impact statements were offered by his
father and grandfather, and a victim advocate read a statement by E.G.’s
mother into the record. E.G.’s father stated that E.G. was bullied by his
peers and that he lost friends and withdrew from social life at school. E.G.’s
father and mother indicated that E.G. blamed himself for the pain caused to
Lytle’s children, and E.G.’s mother indicated generally that E.G. saw
counselors numerous times and was in ongoing therapy. According to E.G.’s
father, E.G. had suicidal thoughts at one point but was doing “all right” now
and had verbally committed to a college to play a particular sport. E.G.’s
grandfather indicated he believed E.G. would need continued counseling but
focused his remarks on how Lytle’s action had a negative impact on the entire
family.
      Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Lytle to an indicated sentence of
four years and ordered that she register as a sex offender. The court imposed
various fines and fees but kept the matter of victim restitution open and set a
date for a restitution hearing.
      The prosecution filed motions seeking $250,000 in noneconomic
restitution for each victim pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F)
(section 1202.4(f)(3)(F)), for the victims’ past and future psychological harm.

                                        3
In its initial motion filed in late March 2019, the prosecution referenced
materially identical written versions of the victim impact statements from
the victims’ family members which had been placed in the record after Lytle
entered her initial plea earlier that month.2 Though its motion did not
identify the point in time when E.G. and M.W. spoke of their psychological
harm,3 the prosecution argued that the extent of such harm warranted the
$250,000 award and that, pursuant to People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
415 (Smith), $250,000 for each victim would be appropriate as an amount
that did not shock the conscience or suggest prejudice or corruption.
      Prior to sentencing, the probation department had filed a sentencing
report that said nothing about any mental health issues suffered by victim
M.W. as a result of Lytle’s crimes, evidently because the department was
unable to reach M.W.’s father. The report, however, contained a short
paragraph echoing the victim impact statements of E.G.’s family members
about the impact of the crimes on him.4 After indicating that the prosecution
had provided a copy of its motion for restitution, the probation report

2     These particular impact statements are separate and apart from the
victim impact statements that family members offered at the sentencing
hearing in November 2019.
3      In its motion, the prosecution asserted its understanding that “bullying
has affected E.G. so greatly that his family was forced to move homes .” But
this statement is unsupported by the victim impact statements. Neither
E.G.’s parents, nor his grandparents nor pastor, indicated the family had
moved. E.G.’s pastor—who testified in June 2020 and had spoken to E.G. five
to six weeks previously—asserted that E.G. “wished his family would move.”
(Italics added.)
4     Like the prosecution’s motion for restitution (see fn. 3, ante), the
probation report represented that E.G.’s family had moved. But again, such
representation was at odds with the statement of E.G.’s pastor and not
otherwise borne out by the victim impact statements at sentencing.
                                       4
summarily concluded: “Therefore, as victims M.W. and E.G. have claimed
$250,000 each, in noneconomic losses via psychological harm, provided in the
[prosecution’s] Motion, Probation recommends restitution in the amount of
$250,000 be paid each victim, M.W. and E.G.”
      Then, on January 16, 2020, the prosecution filed a supplemental
motion for restitution. Citing the probation report and the victim impact
statements from the victims’ parents, the prosecution asked the court to
make a prima facie ruling regarding restitution as stated in the probation
report and the burden should now be on the defendant to refute the
amounts.”
      Lytle opposed the motion for victim restitution, arguing the prosecution
presented no evidence to support the claimed losses.
      At a restitution hearing on January 30, 2020, the court indicated it
needed more information and wanted to hear from a mental health
professional. In the court’s words, “it’s very hard for me to come up with a
monetary amount when I don’t know the extent of what’s going on other than
representation from family members” and “I need something a little bit more
along the line of professional levels” in order to quantify the appropriate
amount of restitution. Specifically, the court said it wanted to hear “a
counselor’s assessment of progress and prognosis” and “what affect the
counselor has observed.” The court scheduled a future contested restitution
hearing.
      At the hearing in June 2020, the prosecution indicated it would come
back at a later date after gathering the additional materials the court had
requested, but in the meantime E.G.’s pastor was present to testify. E.G.’s
pastor, who had spoken with and counseled E.G. about seven times after the
crimes were reported, gave the following testimony. E.G. was easy-going

                                        5
before the crimes but in “emotional shock” after the abuse and full of sadness
and guilt because of what would happen to Lytle’s children. E.G., at least
initially, had no concept about how this would impact his future. E.G. told
the pastor he was being taunted and threatened at school, and E.G. wanted
to quit sports or change schools, or wished his family could move. Although
E.G. presented as suicidal at the midpoint of his meetings with the pastor, he
moved on from that and instead started using alcohol and marijuana more
regularly. E.G.’s pastor indicated that E.G. had “gotten through the trauma”
and “feels better” but has a long road ahead. The prosecution presented no
evidence concerning M.W. at this hearing.
      At the last restitution hearing in February 2021, the prosecution
indicated that it had obtained an expert pursuant to the court’s earlier
request for additional information, but that due to Covid and numerous
continuations, it no longer had the expert. Nevertheless, the prosecution
contended there was ample information to make a finding for noneconomic
restitution based on the victim impact statements at the sentencing hearing.
The prosecution again asked for $250,000 in restitution for each victim to
compensate for the pain the victims suffered and will continue to suffer.
Lytle objected, arguing that the prosecution’s numbers were “tethered to
nothing” and also that the bullying that the victims endured could not be
ascribed to her. Ultimately, the court made its ruling, stating: “I have spent
nine years as the presiding judge of juvenile court and I’m very well aware of
the far reaching consequences of child trauma and how it effects [sic] the
futures from trafficking cases and things like that. [¶] Based on that, I am

                                       6
awarding $100,000 to each of the victims in restitution.” This appeal
followed.5
                                  DISCUSSION
      Lytle makes three main contentions concerning the trial court’s
restitution order: (1) the order violated her Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial; (2) section 1202.4(f)(3)(F)—which provides for restitution for
noneconomic losses when defendants are convicted of certain sex offenses—
violates the federal and state equal protection clauses; and (3) the court
abused its discretion by not stating the method it used to calculate the
restitution amount or the factual basis for the amount. We will address these
contentions in turn, but first briefly set out some general principles
concerning restitution.
      Article I, section 28, subdivision (b)(13), of the California Constitution
establishes that victims have a right “to seek and secure restitution from the
persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer” and that
restitution shall be ordered from every convicted wrongdoer when a victim
suffers a loss. Section 1202.4 implements this constitutional provision.
(Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 431.) Subdivision (a)(1) of
section 1202.4 declares: “It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of
crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime
shall receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of that crime.”
Section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(3), provides that courts must order victim
restitution “in accordance with subdivision (f).”

5     The California Supreme Court transferred this matter from the Court
of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District to the First Appellate District on
August 9, 2022.
                                        7
      In turn, subdivision (f) of section 1202.4 states: “[I]n every case in
which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s
conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the
victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the
amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the
court.” Subdivision (f)(3) of section 1202.4 requires, to the extent possible,
that the restitution order constitute “a dollar amount that is sufficient to
fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss
incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” The statute then
goes on to provide a nonexhaustive list of the types of losses to be included in
that amount. “With one exception, restitution orders are limited to the
victim’s economic damages.” (Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 431.) That
exception, which is relevant here, is in section 1202.4(f)(3)(F), which allows
restitution for “[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not limited to,
psychological harm, for felony violations of Section 288, 288.5, or 288.7.”
      A. Jury Trial Right
      Lytle first contends the trial court’s order for noneconomic restitution
violates the Sixth Amendment. Citing Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530
U.S. 466 (Apprendi) and its progeny—principally Blakely v. Washington
(2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely) and Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012)
567 U.S. 343 (Southern Union)—Lytle contends that a section 1202.4(f)(3)(F)
order for noneconomic restitution is punishment beyond the statutory
maximum for the alleged offenses that must be submitted to a jury and
determined beyond a reasonable doubt.
      Initially, the People contend that Lytle forfeited the claim as she never
raised it below. Lytle does not counter this. Indeed, the record reflects that
Lytle pled guilty to all of the charges in this case after defense counsel

                                        8
discussed with her all of her rights and “all the ramifications” of the case.
Though the court held several hearings to consider the issue of noneconomic
losses, Lytle never raised this claim regarding jury trial rights. In any event,
even if we addressed the merits, we would reject it.
      This issue presents a question of law that we review de novo. (People v.
Saint-Amans (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084.)
      In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that, apart from
the fact of a prior conviction, “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) In
Blakely, the court clarified that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (Blakely,
supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303, italics omitted.) And in Southern Union, the high
court held the Sixth Amendment right to a jury applies to “sentences of
criminal fines.” (Southern Union, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 346.)
      Lytle acknowledges the numerous cases holding that “neither Apprendi
nor Southern Union applies to direct victim restitution because direct victim
restitution is not a criminal penalty.” (E.g., People v. Foalima (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 1376, 1398; People v. Wasbotten (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 306, 309;
People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1183–1184.) But Lytle
argues these cases are distinguishable because they concerned economic
losses, not noneconomic losses. We are not convinced.
      In Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 415, the appellate court concluded
that a restitution order for noneconomic damages is a sentencing order that
“does not give rise to a jury trial right.” (Smith, at p. 433.) In so concluding,
the Smith court rejected the defendant’s contentions that (1) unlike economic

                                        9
damages, noneconomic damages are determined pursuant to a subjective
standard and that such determinations must be made by a jury; and
(2) because noneconomic restitution is indistinguishable from noneconomic
damages in the civil trial context, “ ‘there is no rational reason why they
should not be subject to the right to a jury trial.’ ” (Ibid.) As to the first
contention, the Smith court observed “there is no basis for distinguishing jury
trial rights, or lack thereof, for restitution orders for economic damages and
restitution orders for noneconomic damages. In both cases, the trial court is
performing a task that, in a civil case, a jury would perform.” (Ibid.) As for
the second contention, the Smith court relied on precedent holding that a
restitution hearing need not “ ‘approximate the formality of a civil trial’ ” and
that “ ‘the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies due process.’ ”
(Ibid.) We see no reason to reject Smith’s reasoning.
      Lytle further suggests that restitution for noneconomic losses warrants
a jury trial because it applies only to defendants convicted of certain sex
crimes (i.e., §§ 288, 288.5, and 288.7) and is therefore punitive on its face.
Citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144 (Kennedy), she
asserts there is no reason other than punishment for subjecting this
particular group of defendants to noneconomic restitution in their criminal
proceedings, where they are afforded fewer constitutional protections. This
contention misses the mark.
      The United States Supreme Court has identified the following factors
as useful guideposts for determining whether a particular statutory scheme
is so punitive either in purpose or in effect so as to transform what was
intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty: “(1) ‘whether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint’; (2) ‘whether it has historically
been regarded as a punishment’; (3) ‘whether it comes into play only on a

                                         10
finding of scienter’; (4) ‘whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence’; (5) ‘whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime’; (6) ‘whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it’; and (7) ‘whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.’ ” (Hudson
v. United States (1997) 522 U.S. 93, 99–100, citing Kennedy, supra, 372 U.S.
169.)
        Though Lytle conclusorily asserts there is no reason other than
punishment for subjecting defendants convicted of violating sections 288,
288.5 or 288.7 to noneconomic restitution, there is an obvious and perfectly
rational alternative purpose for such restitution, namely, to provide
compensation to child victims who have endured sexual abuse, which
generally has serious and long-term psychological effects. (See, e.g., Sen.
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 756 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
Feb. 17, 2017, p. 2 .) Further, Lytle does not address the other Kennedy
factors weighing strongly in favor of a conclusion that noneconomic
restitution is compensatory rather than punitive. For example,
section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) does not require scienter, and historically restitution
orders have not been regarded as punishment. (People v. Harvest (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 641, 650.) And contrary to Lytle’s suggestion, an order for
noneconomic restitution does not involve the imposition of an “affirmative
disability or restraint” and “certainly nothing approaching the ‘infamous
punishment’ of imprisonment.” (Flemming v. Nestor (1960) 363 U.S. 603,
617; Harvest, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 650 [victim restitution “does not
involve an affirmative disability or restraint”].)
        Next, Lytle contends noneconomic restitution is punitive in effect
because “it is not limited to compensation for a specific sum, the victim’s

                                        11
demonstrated and actual losses,” but instead is subjective, unlimited, and can
“involve ‘substantial’ sums.” Lytle asserts that “[s]ubjective decisions
regarding intangible damages under the common law, and until the
enactment of section 1204.2, subdivision (f)(3)(F), were allocated to the jury
because the jury has been deemed to be in the position to make those
decisions.” This contention is lacking in merit.
      As Lytle acknowledges, economic restitution, like noneconomic
restitution, “can involve substantial sums as well.” (People v. Giordano
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 661 [several enumerated categories of loss may “result
in large restitution awards”].) But in cases involving either type of
restitution, the trial court’s broad discretion in making an order is not
unlimited. While an order need not be restricted to the exact amount of loss,
the court “must use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make
the victim whole, and may not make an order which is arbitrary or
capricious.” (People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988, 992.)
      In sum, we reject Lytle’s Sixth Amendment contention that
noneconomic restitution is punishment that necessitates a jury trial.
      B. Equal Protection
      Lytle next contends that section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) violates the federal and
state equal protection clauses by singling out defendants convicted of certain
sex offenses against children—violations of section 288, 288.5, or 288.7 6—but
not those convicted of other crimes or other sex crimes against children. In

6      Section 288 criminalizes lewd conduct with a child under the age of 14
years old, and in some cases with victims who are 14 or 15 years old. (§ 288,
subds. (a), (c)(1).) Section 288.5 criminalizes continuous sexual abuse of a
child under the age of 14 years, and section 288.7 criminalizes various sexual
acts (intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, and sexual penetration) with a
child under 10 years of age.
                                       12
her view, the statute “irrationally discriminates solely on the basis of the
sexual act, or even more irrationally, on the basis of the statute under which
the sexual act is punished.”
      The People first argue that appellant has forfeited this claim by failing
to object below, and Lytle does not counter the point. Nevertheless, even if
we considered the merits, we would reject the claim.
      In Smith, the defendant similarly contended that his state and federal
equal protection rights were violated by an order for noneconomic restitution
under former section 1202.4(f)(3)(F), which was then applicable only to
“ ‘[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, for
felony violations of Section 288’ ” (without enumerating sections 288.5 and
288.7). (Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 431.) In rejecting this claim, the
Smith court first concluded that “child molesters are not similarly situated to
other criminals.” (Ibid.) Then applying the rational basis test, the court
determined that the differential treatment is rationally related to a
legitimate public purpose, i.e., to protect child sexual abuse victims. (Id. at
p. 435.) Though the defendant had suggested strict scrutiny should apply
because the statute impacted his constitutional right to a jury trial, the court
observed: “Violators of section 288 have the same civil jury trial rights as
anyone else. But this is not a civil jury trial; it is a criminal sentencing.
Therefore, strict scrutiny is inapplicable.” (Ibid.)
      Lytle fails to set forth any argument supporting a departure from
Smith’s application of the rational basis test as the appropriate equal
protection standard. Nor does she offer any legal or logical basis for
distinguishing Smith or reaching a different conclusion here.
      The rational basis test applies when the challenged statutory disparity
implicates no suspect class nor infringes on a fundamental right. (Johnson v.

                                        13
Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 (Johnson).) Under the
rational basis test, the statutory disparity will withstand an equal protection
challenge as long as the disparate treatment is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose. (Ibid.) “To mount a successful rational
basis challenge, a party must ‘ “negative every conceivable basis” ’ that might
support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Ibid.)
      In her briefing, Lytle makes generalized arguments that treating
offenders convicted of violating section 288, 288.5, and 288.7 differently than
other offenders—i.e., by allowing an award of noneconomic losses without the
rigorous scrutiny and consensus of a jury—has no rational basis. While it is
true that section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) limits its application to certain child sex
offenders, this does not mean the disparate treatment is not rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose—here, that these child sexual
abuse victims are deserving of restitution to compensate for their
noneconomic losses, including harm to their psyche.
      Indeed, section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) was specifically intended to “help
address the mental health needs of children who are victims of serious sex
crimes,” in light of legislative recognition that “[t]he trauma that young
children experience from egregious sex crimes takes an enormous
psychological toll, leaving them anxious, depressed, withdrawn and even
suicidal. To cope, many need the help of a mental health counselor to help
understand that they can recover from the abuse, trust adults and lead a
normal life.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 756
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 17, 2017, p. 2; see Assem. Com. on
Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 756 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) p. 1
[“ ‘SB 756 will help address the mental health needs of children who are
victims of serious sex crimes’ ”].) In this regard, the statute need not apply to

                                        14
all sex crimes against children in order to comply with equal protection
principles. That is because rational basis review requires that we “ ‘accept
any gross generalizations and rough accommodations that the Legislature
seems to have made.’ [Citation.] ‘A classification is not arbitrary or
irrational simply because there is an “imperfect fit between means and
ends” ’ [citations], or ‘because it may be “to some extent both underinclusive
and overinclusive.” ’ ” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 887.)
      In sum, we reject Lytle’s equal protection challenge to
section 1202.4(f)(3)(F).
      C. Abuse of Discretion
      Relying on People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1179–1180
(Valenti), Lytle contends the court abused its discretion in ordering $200,000
in noneconomic restitution for the victims ($100,000 each) because the court
did not state its method of calculation or the factual basis for its order. She
raises a valid point.
      In Valenti, the trial court awarded noneconomic restitution in the
amount of $50,000 per year—for a total of $450,000—to each of eight victims
of the defendant’s sexual abuse. (See Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1180–1181.) In concluding the record offered no rational basis for the
trial court’s calculation of noneconomic loss at $50,000 for three of the
victims, the Valenti court explained: “The trial court has broad discretion to
choose a method for calculating the amount of restitution, but it must employ
a procedure that is rationally designed to determine the victim’s losses.
[Citation.] The court ‘must demonstrate a rational basis for its award, and
ensure that the record is sufficient to permit meaningful review. The burden
is on the party seeking restitution to provide an adequate factual basis for
the claim.’ ” (Id. at p. 1182, italics added.)

                                         15
      We concur in this portion of Valenti’s analysis. When a court does not
indicate the basis for the restitution order, it is difficult to see how such an
order could be meaningfully reviewed for passion, prejudice, corruption, or
some other abuse of discretion (aside perhaps from an amount that is
patently excessive). As explained in other contexts, “a requirement of
articulated reasons to support a given decision serves a number of interests.
In the first place, . . . the statement of such reasons will frequently be
essential to any meaningful review of the decision. Secondly, a requirement
of articulated reasons acts as an inherent guard against the careless decision,
insuring that the [court itself] analyzes the problem and recognizes the
grounds for [its] decision. Finally, articulated reasons aid in preserving
public confidence in the decision-making process ‘by helping to persuade the
parties [and the public] that . . . decision-making is careful, reasoned and
equitable.’ ” (In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 937 [prospectively requiring
courts to provide a statement of reasons for denying a defendant’s motion for
bail on appeal].)
      In adopting the foregoing standard in Valenti, we acknowledge that the
explanation for a calculation of noneconomic restitution need not, or perhaps
cannot, be as detailed as when calculating economic losses, and that
subjectivity will play a role. But providing a sufficiently adequate
explanation is not only possible but will serve the public interests in
promoting public confidence and guarding against careless decision-making.
For example, in People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 795 (Lehman), the
appellate court rejected the defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s
noneconomic restitution awards because the court specifically identified the
bases for its awards to the two victims, Jane Does 1 and 2, who were the
defendant’s granddaughters. (Id. at pp. 802–803.) In particular, the trial

                                        16
court cited Jane Doe 1’s testimony at trial and her statements at
sentencing—in which she described the emotional pain she suffered from the
long-term and extensive abuse by her grandfather—to support its conclusion
that the defendant’s molestation of Jane Doe 1 caused her “immeasurable
psychological harm.” (Ibid.) Similarly, the trial court pointed to Jane Doe 2’s
visibly distraught testimony and her “emotional breakdown” on the stand as
“ ‘manifestations of the psychological harm the [d]efendant caused Jane Doe
[2] to suffer because of his conduct against her, his conduct against her sister,
and the resulting devastation to the family.’ ” (Id. at pp. 803, 805.) Based on
the evidence and its observations of the victims, the Lehman court found that
the noneconomic restitution awards were amply supported and that the
amounts did not shock the conscience. (Id. at pp. 803–805.)
      Unlike in Lehman, the trial court here did not identify any specific
evidentiary basis for its awards or otherwise explain how it arrived at the
$100,000 figure for each victim. Rather, after hearing from the victims’
family members, the court indicated, at least initially, that it needed
information from mental health professionals to calculate the appropriate
amount of restitution. Then, upon learning at the February 2021 restitution
hearing that the prosecution’s mental health expert would not be available,
the court issued its order of $100,000 to each victim. But in contrast to what
happened in Lehman, where the trial court actually made findings based on
the evidence, the trial court here merely stated its award was based on its
own juvenile court experience and its awareness—apparently from
“trafficking cases”—of the consequences of child trauma and its future effect.
But this was not a trafficking case, and the record here does not supply an

                                       17
obvious basis for the magnitude of restitution ordered for each victim.7 Thus,
we cannot simply excuse the trial court’s failure to mention any facts, cite
any reliable evidence, or otherwise explain how it calculated the respective
amounts of restitution.
      On this latter point, we note the prosecution’s motion for noneconomic
restitution did not explain with any specificity how it arrived at the
requested amount of $250,000 per victim, but instead argued the victims had
suffered psychological harm and asserted the requested amount did not shock
the conscience. On appeal, the People rely on Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th
415, for the proposition that a restitution order for noneconomic losses must
be affirmed if the order “ ‘does not, at first blush, shock the conscience, or
suggest passion, prejudice, or corruption.’ ” To the extent the People suggest
this standard applies to the exclusion of the standard in Valenti, we disagree.
      In Smith, a jury had convicted the defendant of molesting the victim
from the time she was eight years old until she turned 15. (Smith, supra, 198
Cal.App.4th at p. 419.) Moreover, the opinion recited that the evidence at the
restitution hearing established that the victim “was still having nightmares
and flashbacks concerning the abuse”; that “she had been in therapy to deal
with the problems caused by the abuse”; and that she “was having difficulty
keeping jobs, and, at age 30 at the time of the hearing, had not finished her

7      Because the case was settled by plea, the trial court never heard from
the victims directly and had no opportunity to observe their demeanor. (Cf.
Lehman, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 803–804.) And with regard to M.W.
in particular, who received the same $100,000 award as E.G., the only
evidence presented about the harm he suffered consisted of his father’s
statement at sentencing in 2019. While that statement indicated that M.W.
was experiencing some psychological harm in 2019, there was no evidence
regarding M.W.’s psychological state at the time of, or leading up to, the
restitution hearing in February 2021.
                                        18
[college] education”; and that she “twice attempted suicide by overdosing on
ibuprofen.” (Id. at p. 432.) Though the source of all that evidence is unclear
from the opinion, it is apparent that the Smith court was not purporting to
address the procedural type of challenge made here. Contrary to the People’s
assumption, it is premature at this point to focus on whether or not the
restitution amount is excessive. Rather, we must contend with the trial
court’s failure to indicate what methodology or facts were used to calculate
the noneconomic restitution amounts at issue.
      In this case, we cannot perform meaningful judicial review of this
restitution order as we are left to speculate why the court determined that a
$100,000 amount was appropriate for each victim. (Cf. In re Pipinos (1982)
33 Cal.3d 189, 202.) Thus, we will reverse the noneconomic restitution order
and remand for further restitution proceedings. (Valenti, supra, 243
Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.) We express no opinion as to the proper amount of
noneconomic restitution to be imposed in this case.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The order for noneconomic restitution (§ 1202.4(f)(3)(F)) is reversed,
and the matter is remanded for further restitution proceedings. The trial
court may, if it deems it appropriate, receive additional evidence and
reconsider the noneconomic restitution amount. When issuing a future order
concerning noneconomic restitution, the court must ensure that the record is
sufficient to permit meaningful review. (Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1182.) In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                      19
                            FUJISAKI, J.
WE CONCUR:

TUCHER, P.J.

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. Lytle (A165859)

                             20