Court Opinion

ID: 9927600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 16:02:44.412472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:58.115846
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 23-1651
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                                   Lamel Yancey

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
                                  ____________

                          Submitted: November 17, 2023
                             Filed: January 29, 2024
                                 [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before COLLOTON, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Lamel Yancey pled guilty to receipt of a firearm while under felony
indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), after the district court 1 denied his
motion to dismiss the indictment. He was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment

      1
       The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.
and 3 years of supervised release and now appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                           I.

        Detectives were surveilling Yancey and his brother, both of whom were
suspected in a recent shooting, at an apartment complex in Little Rock, Arkansas.
The men left an apartment and entered the back seat of a car, driven by a woman
later identified as their mother. Officers followed the car and initiated a traffic stop
after observing the driver improperly change lanes on the interstate. The officers
found two firearms on the rear floorboard, one at Yancey’s feet and the other at his
brother’s feet. During a subsequent interview with a detective, Yancey admitted that
he was out on bond and knew that he was not supposed to have a gun; at the time,
he was under felony information in Arkansas for several offenses. Yancey was then
indicted for receipt of a firearm while under felony indictment, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(n). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing, as relevant here, that
§ 922(n) was unconstitutionally vague. At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the
district court denied the motion, and Yancey subsequently pled guilty. On appeal,
he renews his vagueness argument and also raises for the first time that § 922(n)
violates the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.
Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

                                          II.

       Determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague involves a two-part
analysis: first, “the statute must define the offense with sufficient definiteness to
provide fair warning or adequate notice as to what conduct is prohibited,” and
second, “it must also define the offense in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Ghane, 673 F.3d 771, 777 (8th
Cir. 2012). “When reviewing for vagueness, we first determine if a statute is vague
as applied to the defendant’s conduct, and only if it is will we consider whether a
statute is facially unconstitutional.” United States v. Burgee, 988 F.3d 1054, 1060
                                          -2-
(8th Cir. 2021). While we review vagueness claims de novo, Ghane, 673 F.3d at
777, “[w]e do not consider claims that a party fails ‘meaningfully [to] develop or
argue’ on appeal,” United States v. Ruzicka, 988 F.3d 997, 1006 (8th Cir. 2021)
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted).

       To determine whether § 922(n) is vague as applied to Yancey, “we look to
whether [§ 922(n)] gave adequate warning, under a specific set of facts, that
[Yancey’s] behavior was a criminal offense.” United States v. Palmer, 917 F.3d
1035, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Section 922(n) prohibits “any
person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm
or ammunition or receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Yancey fails to articulate how §
922(n) is vague as applied to him. Rather, he suggests that because there are
thousands of Arkansans facing criminal charges, the federal government could
arbitrarily choose to charge any of those individuals under § 922(n) if they simply
pick up a bullet. This is not an argument that the statute is vague as applied to him. 2
Because he fails to meaningfully develop his claim, we will not consider its merits.

                                          III.

       Yancey also argues that § 922(n) violates his Second Amendment rights in
light of Bruen. He forfeited this challenge by failing to raise it before the district
court; we therefore review for plain error. United States v. Lehman, 8 F.4th 754,
757 (8th Cir. 2021) (“To obtain relief on a forfeited claim, . . . [a defendant] must
show that the district court made an obvious error that affected substantial rights and
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the judicial proceedings.”

      2
       To the extent Yancey argues that § 922(n) is overbroad rather than vague, we
have previously explained that “[t]he overbreadth doctrine, under which a challenger
may rely on the rights of others in situations not before the court, applies only in the
limited context of the First Amendment.” United States v. Adams, 914 F.3d 602,
607 (8th Cir. 2019).
                                           -3-
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)). “It is far from plain or obvious that the
Second Amendment protects [Yancey’s] conduct.” Id. Importantly, “[a]n asserted
legal error does not meet this standard if the proposition is ‘subject to reasonable
dispute.’” Adams, 914 F.3d at 606 (citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129,
135 (2009)). Yancey points to no controlling authority holding that § 922(n) violates
the Second Amendment, and there is reasonable dispute in other courts concerning
whether the Second Amendment protects the right for someone under felony
indictment to carry a weapon. Compare, e.g., United States v. Kays, 624 F. Supp.
3d 1262, 1268 (W.D. Okla. 2022) (rejecting Second Amendment facial challenge to
§ 922(n)); and United States v. Bartucci, 658 F. Supp. 3d 794, 808 (E.D. Cal. 2023)
(same); and United States v. Jackson, 661 F. Supp. 3d 392, 414-15 (D. Md. 2023)
(rejecting facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(n)); with,
e.g., United States v. Quiroz, 629 F. Supp. 3d 511, 527 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (finding §
922(n) violates Second Amendment as applied to defendant); and United States v.
Stambaugh, 641 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1193 (W.D. Okla. 2022) (same). Accordingly,
we find no plain error on the part of the district court. See Ruzicka, 988 F.3d at 1009
(explaining that non-binding authority is insufficient to show a proposition is clear
or obvious).

                                          IV.

      For these reasons, we affirm.
                      ______________________________

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