Court Opinion

ID: 9734254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:29:45.823084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:47.273339
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
I respectfully dissent. I agree that the correct legal test is one of material falsity and that the court is required to conduct an independent review of the record. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that there is insufficient evidence of material falsity.
i
The disputed article in this case does contain inaccuracies. The defendant concedes that the plaintiff was not identified by his own children, but by his ex-wife’s children. In addition, the article’s assertion that the plaintiff was "arrested and charged” was inaccurate if "charged” is interpreted to mean subjected to formal charges. And, perhaps most significantly, there were never any charges "authorized by the Calhoun County Pros*280ecutor’s Office.” Under long-established principles of defamation law, however, the issue is not merely whether there are inaccuracies but whether the inaccuracies constitute material falsity.1 The test is whether the evidence supports the finding that the article was materially false in that the "sting” of the article would have a different effect upon the mind of the reader than would the literal truth.
In determining whether the concededly false aspects of the publication are significant, for defamation purposes, in relation and comparison to the concededly true portions, the inquiry necessarily goes beyond the strictly factual level and requires interpreting the likely effect of the publication on the reader’s mind, and the likely meaning conveyed. But as the Court in Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n, 438 Mich 84, 111, n 17; 476 *281NW2d 112 (1991), recognized, "in reviewing a libel verdict an appellate court does not and should not exercise review of credibility determinations, disregard previous factfindings, or create new factfindings. Rather, the court should exercise independent judgment regarding whether, as a matter of constitutional law, the evidence in the record supports the verdict.” Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has declared:
Indeed, it is not actually necessary to review the "entire” record to fulfill the function of independent appellate review .... The independent review function is not equivalent to a "de novo” review of the ultimate judgment itself, in which a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or not it believes that judgment should be entered for plaintiff. [Bose Corp v Consumers Union of United States, Inc, 466 US 485, 514, n 31; 104 S Ct 1949; 80 L Ed 2d 502 (1984).]
The task before this Court, therefore, is to undertake an independent review of the record and make a judgment regarding whether the evidence supports the finding that this article was materially false. While the standard calls for "independent appellate review,” and this Court is not constrained to agree with the jury, it is important to recognize that in this case a jury, adequately instructed with respect to the need for material falsity, has reached a conclusion regarding the likely effect of the article at issue on the mind of the average reader.2 Indeed, when the entire news*282paper article consists of only ten sentences, and those ten sentences contain six factual inaccuracies, this Court should not lightly overturn the jury’s conclusion that the overall effect was materially false.
ii
Turning now to a review of the evidence in this case, the Court of Appeals declared that the article was materially false in two respects: (1) by inaccurately stating that the plaintiff had been identified as the assailant by his own children when in fact it was his former stepchildren who had identified him, and (2) by stating several times that plaintiff was arrested and charged with sexual assault when he was in fact merely arrested. As a purely factual matter, the statement that the plaintiff’s own children had identified him as the assailant was false; the question, however, is whether it was a materially false statement; would it create a different impression in the mind of the reader than would the actual truth? I would conclude that the evidence supports such a finding. A man’s children would presumably know him very well by *283sight, and their reported identification of him would likely be treated by the reader as deserving of exceptional credibility because it "would seem to eliminate the possibility that there might have been a mistaken identification.” 184 Mich App 36. In light of the "sting” of the entire article, that there was more involved than a mere apprehension of a suspect, this statement would have had a strong effect on the mind of the reader. This Court previously declared that both the fact of the arrest and "the facts used to establish the probable cause for the arrest” are of public concern. Rouch I, 427 Mich 206. Certainly identification by one’s own children would affect probable cause for the arrest and, in determining whether the reasons for the arrest were materially false, the misidentification of the stepchildren as children is not inconsequential. Even if this question is seen as a close one, I cannot conclude that the reader would not have a different reaction than if the literal truth had been reported. Therefore, the jury’s determination should stand.
The second aspect of falsity flows from the declaration that the plaintiff was "charged” with criminal sexual conduct. As a legal matter, it was inaccurate to state that the plaintiff had been "charged.” In fact, no warrant had been issued by the prosecutor, the plaintiff had not been arraigned, and there had been no judicial determination of probable cause; the plaintiff was merely arrested and booked on suspicion of the crime.
As a preliminary matter, the dissenting judge on the Court of Appeals is correct, in maintaining that "newspapers should not be held to technical legal language. Instead, they should be held to the use of words as they are customarily and popularly used.” 184 Mich App 53 (opinion of Allen, J.). But even in light of common, colloquial usage by non-*284lawyers and the general public, when the article declared that the prosecutor had authorized the charge, the allegations became one of formal charges, not merely suspicion.3 The effect on the mind of the reader was materially different from the effect that would have resulted from the actual truth. Indeed, the last sentence of the article strongly suggests that the term "charged” was being employed in the formal sense; the article claimed that "[t]he charge against Rouch was authorized Friday by the Calhoun County Prosecutor’s Office.” Within this context the term "charge” would normally be interpreted to mean formal charges. Since no formal charges were ever pursued, this could properly have been considered by the jury to constitute a material falsity.
A final note in this area is that I believe it is inappropriate for the majority to focus merely on the definition of the single word "charge.” Ante, p 263.4 Michigan’s law of libel requires an examina*285tion of the article as a whole. See Gustin v Evening Press Co, 172 Mich 311, 314; 137 NW 674 (1912) ("To test its libelous quality, a publication must be considered as a whole . . .”); O’Connor v Sill, 60 Mich 175, 181; 27 NW 13; 28 NW 162 (1886) ("The article . . . must all be read together. Parts of it cannot be severed . . .”). Read as a whole, the article conveyed the impression that there was overwhelming evidence and that judicial proceedings had been instituted against Rouch. The effect of this on the mind of the reader is different from that of a mere "apprehension.” Rouch I, 427 Mich 172. The "sting” that results from this impression of formal charges created a substantially different effect on the mind of the reader. The evidence demonstrated, and the jury obviously found, that the article as a whole conveyed an impression quite different from that which the actual truth would have produced.
*284The plain language and clear implication of the Enquirer article are that there was more than a simple accusation against plaintiff The article says twice that plaintiff was charged with a sex crime, and the final paragraph says that the prosecutor’s office authorized the charge. The prosecutor, as is commonly known and as noted by the trial judge, does not just accuse; the prosecutor authorizes formal criminal proceedings, and that is exactly what the article says happened. There can be no doubt that both the details as reported and the gist of the article say that plaintiff was formally charged with a serious crime, not that there was merely an accusation of wrongdoing. [184 Mich App 34-35. First emphasis in original, second emphasis added.]
*285I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.
Levin, J.
(separate opinion). I have signed the Chief Justice’s opinion._
*286I
While I fully agree with the Chief Justice that "it is inappropriate for the majority to focus merely on the definition of the single word 'charge,’ ”,1 I would be inclined to conclude that it is not defamatory in itself to describe an arrest as a "charge” — to say that a person who has been arrested has been charged, rather than to say that he has been arrested.
The news article here in question, however, said more. The article said that Rouch had been "arrested and charged,” and that "[t]he charge against Rouch was authorized Friday by the Calhoun County Prosecutor’s Office.”
Arrests are often made by police officers without prior authorization from the prosecutor. The import therefore of a news article describing an arrest merely as a "charge” is significantly different than the import of an article stating that a person has been "arrested and charged” and that the "charge” "was authorized” by the prosecutor. In stating that Rouch had been arrested and charged, and that the charge was authorized by the prosecutor, the news article implied that the governmental official responsible for the administration of justice had concluded that Rouch should be arrested and charged. This suggests more than an ordinary arrest by a police officer.
The majority dwells at length on the meaning of "charge.” The sentence stating that the charge "was authorized” by the prosecutor significantly changed the import and sting of the article. As stated by the Chief Justice, the article read as a whole conveyed "the impression that there was *287overwhelming evidence and that judicial proceedings had been instituted against Rouch.”2
Rouch was arrested and detained at 5:25 a.m. by police officers without prior authorization by the prosecutor. After Rouch arrived at the station house, a police officer telephoned an assistant prosecutor who authorized the officer to further detain Rouch.3 The prosecutor had not, and did not later authorize the filing of a "charge.” That afternoon, Rouch was taken before a magistrate and released from custody.
A reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the news article, that Rouch had been "arrested and charged” with first-degree criminal sexual conduct and. that the "charge against Rouch was authorized” by the prosecutor, implied4 falsely that a prosecutor had authorized the police to arrest Rouch on charges of csc-1.
ii
The concurring opinion overlooks the distinction between stating a cause of action and providing a "statement of the facts, without repetition, on which the pleader relies in stating the cause of action.”5
A motion of the Enquirer and News of Battle Creek seeking summary disposition on the ground that Rouch had "failed to state a claim on which *288relief can be granted”6 could not properly be granted because of any failure in the complaint filed by Rouch adequately to state the facts on which he relied in seeking to state a cause of action.
A claim that a pleader has failed adequately to state facts may be raised at the trial level by a motion to correct or strike pleadings pursuant to MCR 2.115. If the motion is granted, the pleader *289may as of course file an amended pleading more fully stating the facts on which the pleader relies.7
The plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories fully supported the cause of action stated in the complaint.8
*291A claim that the facts have not been adequately stated cannot properly be raised after the trial has commenced, let alone for the first time in the Supreme Court and without even an assignment of error. Ordinarily, the allegations in the complaint are fleshed out during the discovery process, at status conferences, and in mediation statements. *292The approach of the concurring opinion, if observed generally, would elaborate on motion practice, to the dismay of bench and bar, and would needlessly increase the paper flow and the already heavy cost of litigation.
III
The Enquirer and News moved for a remittitur of the $1,000,000 verdict, which was denied. The deniál was assigned as error in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on consideration of this Court’s decision in Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp, 432 Mich 527; 443 NW2d 354 (1989), concluded that the judge did not err in denying a remittitur. The Enquirer and News did not challenge that conclusion in this Court.

 The Court of Appeals stated that this Court had rejected the approach requiring material falsity:
Our dissenting colleague . . . finds that not only must the disputed statements be proven false, they must be false in a material aspect. Under this analysis, if the gist, or sting, of the article is substantially true, the falsity test is not met. The earlier Supreme Court opinion in this case specifically rejected this approach: "[W]e decline to distinguish, as did the Court of Appeals, the essence of the article from its supporting facts or details.” 427 Mich 204. [184 Mich App 31-32.]
This Court in its earlier Rouch opinion, however, did not even address the issue of material falsity. The language quoted by the Court of Appeals is taken out of context. In the quoted passage, this Court was discussing whether the article constituted speech of public concern, not whether the falsity must be a material one. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals applied the test for material falsity and concluded that the plaintiff should prevail under either test:
[W]hether the article is read for its gist or simply for the information presented as fact, plaintiff has met his burden of proving falsity. [Id. at 32.]
Accordingly, this error by the Court of Appeals does not require reversal.

 The trial court’s instructions to the jury included:
Secondly, that statements in the article were false. In deciding whether any statements in the article were false, you must interpret the words according to their ordinary and obvious meaning. You must give the words the fair and reasonable *282interpretation that an average reader would give them. You need not look at words used in the article according to any technical or legal definition. Whether the statements in the article were false is for you to decide after considering the statements in the article, in the light of all of the evidence in the case.
Thirdly, the Plaintiff must prove that false statements in the article were materially false and tended to harm the Plaintiff’s reputation. That is, that they made the article libelous. In determining whether an article is libelous, it is necessary to read the article as a whole, and fairly and reasonably construe it in determining whether the false portions make the article libelous in character. [Emphasis added.]
Furthermore, the jury was given a special verdict form in which it was asked, in part: "Were the statements materially false, tending to harm the plaintiff’s reputation, that- is, did they make the article libelous?”

 The Court of Appeals eloquently summed up the evidence on this point:

 The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument based on the definition of the word "charge” considered in isolation:
The dissent in this case says that the common usage of the word "charge” means "accuse” and that plaintiff was accused of the assault and so the article was not false. There are *285problems with this line of reasoning. . . . [W]e do not agree that the commonly understood meaning of the word "charge” is merely to accuse. Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, Second College Edition (1984), includes "accuse” in its definition of "charge,” but it also includes the term "indictment,” a word of far more serious import and implications. Indeed, "indictment” implies a formal criminal accusation. . . .
Even if we were to accept the proposition that the common usage of the term "charge” relates only to an accusation, the article, as written, and particularly the last paragraph, certainly uses the term in a much more specific and legal sense. [Id. at 33-34.]

 Ante, p 284.

 Id., p 285.

 The police report states that the assistant prosecutor "was briefed on the complaint and the circumstances surrounding the arrest of suspect. He advised to lodge the suspect on cscist.” (Emphasis added.)

 The dispositive question in the present case then becomes whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. [Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co, 497 US 1, 21; 110 S Ct 2695; 111 L Ed 2d 1 (1990).]

 MCR 2.111(B)(1). (Emphasis added.)

 MCR 2.116(C)(8).
The actual motion for summary disposition filed by the Enquirer and News reads as follows:
Now Comes Defendant Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, Michigan, a Delaware corporation, through its attorneys, Sullivan, Hamilton, Ryan & Schulz and moves the Court that an Order be entered granting a summary judgment of no cause for action in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff in this case. This Motion is the renewal of a Motion previously filed in this action and the statements contained in the original Motion are herein incorporated by reference as though the same were set forth word for word.
That the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment originally filed was held in conjunction with a hearing on a Motion to compel Plaintiff to answer certain interrogatories dealing with Plaintiff’s assertion of malice on the part of Defendant.
That the Court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment and at the same time entered an order requiring Plaintiff to answer Defendant’s interrogatories.
That Plaintiff has filed answers to interrogatories and the same are part of the files and records of this case.
That said answers to interrogatories do not contain any factual statements or allegations which, if proved, would establish that Defendant published the article with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not and, therefore, do not raise any issues of fact on the question of malice.
That the article in question is a substantially true report of a matter of general public interest.
That the published information was obtained from police officials, upon whom Defendant had the right to rely.
That the publication is entitled to qualified privilege under the laws of this state and, therefore, in the absence of proof of malice, cannot be the basis for a judgment in an action for libel.

 MCR 2.115 and MCR 2.116(I)(5).

 The interrogatories directed to plaintiff read as follows:
Interrogatories Directed to Plaintiff
You are hereby notified that within fifteen (15) days from the time of service upon you, you shall answer separately, fully, in writing and under oath, each and every of the following interrogatories in accordance with the provisions of General Court Rule No. 309, and various subsections thereof.
These interrogatories shall be deemed continuing and supplemental answers thereto shall be required immediately upon receipt thereof, if the Plaintiff directly or indirectly obtains further or different information, from the time the answers are served to the time of trial.
1. Set forth separately each statement of fact in the article which Plaintiff alleges was false, separately quoting each alleged false statement of fact.
2. With respect to each statement of fact set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 1, describe the exact nature and extent of the alleged falsity.
3. Specify whether Plaintiff intends to rely upon a claim of common law malice, as implied by law in favor of Plaintiffs in libel actions, or upon an affirmative claim of actual malice on the part of Defendant in publication of the alleged defamatory statements.
4. If affirmative evidence of actual malice (as opposed to the common malice implied by law in favor of plaintiffs in libel actions) will be introduced at trial of this action, set forth separately and describe fully each item of evidence of fact upon which plaintiff will rely to establish actual malice on the part of Defendant Enquirer & News of Battle Creek.
5. If Plaintiff contends that the false statements of fact in the article were published with reckless disregard on the part of Defendant Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, set forth each item of evidence upon which Plaintiff will rely to establish such reckless disregard.
The answer to interrogatories reads as follows:
Answer to Interrogatories
Now comes the above-named Plaintiff who being first duly sworn deposes and says in answer to Defendant’s Interrogatories as follows:
*2901. a. Plaintiff was taken into custody with regard to an alleged offense, but was never formally charged with any offense.
b. Plaintiff was never charged with the sexual assault of a 17-year-old woman.
c. 17-year-old woman was not babysitting Plaintiff’s children.
d. Plaintiff was never formally charged with first-degree sexual conduct.
e. Plaintiff never entered the house at 4:00 a.m. Friday and attacked a young woman.
f. Plaintiff never used a knife to cut victim’s clothes off.
g. Plaintiff was not identified by any of his children as being the alleged assailant.
h. No formal charges were authorized by the Calhoun County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office.
2. All of the items set forth in Paragraph 1 are false.
3. My attorney advises me that we intend to rely on both the claim of common law malice and an affirmative claim of actual malice.
4. My attorney advises me that he has not completed discovery and, therefore is not able to answer this question at this time.
5. My attorney has not completed his investigation and, therefore, I cannot answer this question at this time.
Plaintiff’s answers to defendant’s supplemental interrogatories read as follows:
Plaintiff’s Answers to Defendant’s Supplemental Interrogatories
Now comes the above-named plaintiff, David J. Rouch, who being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1. In answering these Interrogatories, based on what I have been told by my attorney, that actual malice (knowledge of falsity of statements made or reckless disregard of their truth or falsity) and common law malice or malice in law (false and defamatory statements made without sufficient cause or excuse) are more often tha[n] not supported by the same factual basis except in unusual instances. He further advised that in ordinary cases, malice can be implied from the defamatory nature of the statements and the fact that they are false. Malice can be proved by both intrinsic evidence and extrinsic evidence. Therefore, I am unable to necessarily distinguish whether the following facts will suport [sic], as you say, "actual malice” or “common law malice,” but are those facts as I best know them at this time which I will rely on in support of my Complaint:
a. That the article was false;
b. The style and tone of the original article and the alleged retraction;
c. That normally the names of criminal defendants are not *291published by the Defendant newspaper until the criminal defendant has been formally charged or arraigned in Court;
d. That the Defendant failed to publish the fact that no formal charges had been brought against the Plaintiff and that he had been released from custody until approximately one year later when Plaintiff made a demand for retraction upon Defendant;
e. That the Defendant did not publish the fact that another individual was arrested for the same charges subsequent to Plaintiff’s release, at the time of his arrest;
f. That Plaintiff is not a public or quasi-public person;
g. That the publication in question was not a qualified or absolute privilege of the Defendant;
h. That prior to publishing the article in question, Defendant made no investigation whatsoever to determine whether or not the facts as published were true;
i. That Defendant only made a telephonic inquiry of police departments to acquire the information published;
j. That Defendant made no effort to determine the truthfulness of the charge or facts contained in the publication;
k. That Defendant made no effort to contact Plaintiff concerning the facts as published;
l. That no immediate necessity existed which would have justified the libelous publication of the article in question without making reasonable efforts to confirm the truthfulness of the facts set forth in the publication;
m. That Defendant has no standards, instructions, or guidelines to protect private citizens such as the Plaintiff from libelous publications;
n. That despite a demand from Plaintiff, Defendant failed to publish a retraction;
o. That Defendant has not at any time, by conduct or otherwise, demonstrated the slightest interest or concern of Plaintiff’s rights prior to or subsequent to the publication in question.
2. See #1 above.
3. See #1 above.
4. See #1 above.
5. See #1 above.