Court Opinion

ID: 9896367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-10 01:00:39.246189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:46.696563
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30038         Document: 00516962959             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/09/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                      November 9, 2023
                                       No. 23-30038
                                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Alexander D. Pennington,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 5:21-CR-130-2
                      ______________________________

   Before Jones, Barksdale, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Alexander D. Pennington entered a conditional-guilty plea to
   conspiring to advertise the distribution of child pornography, in violation of
   18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1), (e), reserving his right to contest the denial of his
   motion to suppress evidence.               He contends his statements to law
   enforcement should have been suppressed because he: was in custody; did

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30038     Document: 00516962959           Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/09/2023

                                    No. 23-30038

   not waive his Miranda rights; and made a limited but unambiguous request
   for counsel. Pennington was not in the requisite custody. AFFIRMED.
                                         I.
          On the morning of 7 July 2021, law enforcement executed a search
   warrant based on an investigation into a private chat room dedicated to the
   advertisement and distribution of child pornography. The investigation led
   law enforcement to Pennington’s residence in Las Vegas, Nevada. (He had
   recently been granted parole after serving ten years for sexually assaulting a
   child under 14 years old.)
          Around 15 law-enforcement agents, some dressed in tactical gear and
   carrying AR-15-style rifles, surrounded the residence and, using a
   loudspeaker, ordered the occupants out. After no response, the agents
   forcefully opened the door with a ram and continued to order the occupants
   to exit.   The three occupants were placed in handcuffs while agents
   conducted a five-minute protective sweep of the residence. The occupants
   were then released from their handcuffs, and Pennington’s mother and
   uncle, but not Pennington, were allowed to re-enter the residence.
          Agent Walch, not in uniform or displaying police insignia or visible
   firearm, approached Pennington and informed him: he was not under arrest
   (there was no arrest warrant for him); but wanted to speak with him about
   why a search warrant was being executed at his residence. After the Agent
   explained who he was, he and Pennington walked to the Agent’s vehicle: an
   unmarked SUV without a “cage”, parked about 15 to 20 yards away. The
   Agent sat in the driver’s seat, Pennington in the front passenger’s seat, and
   a detective with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department behind
   Pennington.
          Agent Walch told Pennington: he was not under arrest; the vehicle
   doors were unlocked; and he was free to leave at any time. The Agent

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   removed a digital recorder from his pocket; but Pennington objected to its
   use and told the Agent that, if the interview was going to be recorded, he
   would want an attorney. After the Agent responded that the purpose of the
   recorder was so “neither party can claim the other one made any statements
   that aren’t true”, Pennington “agreed to allow [the Agent] to turn the
   recorder on”.
         Pennington contests these facts, asserting he: was not released from
   handcuffs; requested an attorney before the Agent produced the recorder;
   was threatened with arrest if he did not speak; and was restricted from
   helping his panicking mother.
         The recording captures a 30-minute interview. Pennington was
   advised of—and, when asked, stated he understood—his Miranda rights.
   The Agent then asked Pennington if he was willing to talk, and Pennington
   “paused for a moment”. The Agent continued: “with the understanding
   that if you change your mind later you can stop this conversation at any
   time”. The Agent testified Pennington nodded his head in affirmance.
         A    magistrate   judge’s     report   and    recommendation    (R&R)
   recommended, and the district court concurred, that Pennington was willing
   to talk. Pennington asserts on appeal he was not and did not nod his head in
   affirmance.
         Pennington then said: “now that we are on the record, if you can go
   ahead and explain to me what it is”. During the 30-minute interview,
   Pennington made several incriminating statements about his activities in the
   online chat room.
         Following the interview, the Agent re-entered the residence to assist
   other agents and returned to his vehicle to conduct a separate, recorded
   three-minute interview with Pennington that is not the subject of the motion
   to suppress. Pennington and the Detective remained in the vehicle during

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   the Agent’s 25-minute absence. Pennington was not arrested at the
   conclusion of the search.
          Approximately four months later, Pennington was indicted on nine
   counts: one for conspiracy to advertise the distribution of child pornography;
   one for conspiracy to distribute child pornography; and seven for distribution
   of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(d)(1), (e),
   2252A(a)(2), (a)(2)(A), (b)(1). Pennington moved to suppress the
   statements he made during the 30-minute interview, maintaining: law
   enforcement did not honor his request for a lawyer; and he did not knowingly
   and intentionally waive his Miranda rights. The Government responded
   that, inter alia, he was not in custody.
          Following an evidentiary hearing before the magistrate judge, at which
   Agent Walch and Pennington testified, and at which the Government
   introduced into evidence the audio recordings of the 30- and three-minute
   interviews, the resulting R&R found the Agent’s testimony was credible;
   Pennington’s, not credible. The R&R stated the Agent’s testimony was
   “consistent    with what      the recordings      actually reveal[ed]”,   and
   recommended: the suppression motion be denied because Pennington was
   not in custody and therefore did not have the right to an attorney; he did not
   make an unequivocal and unambiguous request for an attorney and withdrew
   his objection after the Agent’s explanation; and he “made a knowing and
   voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights and agreed to the recorded interview
   without counsel”.
          Pennington objected to the R&R. The district court, after
   “thoroughly review[ing] the record, including the written objections filed”
   against the R&R, “concurr[ed] with the findings of the Magistrate Judge
   under the applicable law” and denied the motion.

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                                         II.
          Pennington contests the denial of his motion to suppress his
   incriminating statements because he:            was in custody, warranting
   constitutional protections; made a limited but unambiguous request for
   counsel; and did not waive his Miranda rights.
          For the contested denial of a suppression motion, findings of fact are
   reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions, de novo. E.g., United States v.
   Nelson, 990 F.3d 947, 952 (5th Cir. 2021). “A factual finding is not clearly
   erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United
   States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 769, 773 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “Where
   there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice
   between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. Harris, 740
   F.3d 956, 967 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “The question of whether
   Miranda’s guarantees have been impermissibly denied to a criminal
   defendant, assuming the facts as established by the trial court are not clearly
   erroneous, is a matter of constitutional law, meriting de novo review.” United
   States v. Harrell, 894 F.2d 120, 122–23 (5th Cir. 1990). The evidence is
   viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in district court—
   here, the Government. E.g., Wright, 777 F.3d at 773, 777.
          First at issue is whether Pennington was in custody. If so, we reach
   whether his request for counsel was sufficient and honored by Agent Walch.
   But, if not in custody, we need not reach the two other presented issues
   because “the Miranda-Edwards guarantee . . . relates only to custodial
   interrogation”. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991).
          Merely advising a suspect of his Miranda rights, as in this instance,
   does not convert the encounter into a custodial interrogation. E.g., United
   States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[A] custodial situation
   cannot be created by the mere giving of modified Miranda warnings”.). And,

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   “[w]hether a suspect is in custody is an objective inquiry that depends on the
   totality of circumstances”. Wright, 777 F.3d at 774 (citations omitted).
          “A suspect is . . . in custody for Miranda purposes when placed under
   formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would
   have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of
   movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.” Id.
   (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “Two discrete inquir[i]es are
   essential to the determination:        first, what were the circumstances
   surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would
   a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the
   interrogation and leave.” United States v. Cavazos, 668 F.3d 190, 193 (5th
   Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
          “The requisite restraint on freedom is greater than that required in
   the Fourth Amendment seizure context.” Wright, 777 F.3d at 774. “The
   critical difference between the two concepts . . . is that custody arises only if
   the restraint on freedom is a certain degree—the degree associated with
   formal arrest.” United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1988).
   Therefore, our court considers several factors—for which “no one fact is
   determinative”—in deciding custody vel non in the Miranda context: “the
   length of the questioning”; “the location of the questioning”; “the
   accusatory, or non-accusatory, nature of the questioning”; “the amount of
   restraint on the individual’s physical movement”; and “statements made by
   officers regarding the individual’s freedom to move or leave”. Wright, 777
   F.3d at 775.
          Along that line, the parties contest whether the factual circumstances
   at hand are more like those in Cavazos or Wright. Cavazos, 668 F.3d at 195
   (affirming grant of suppression motion); Wright, 777 F.3d at 777, 784
   (affirming denial of suppression motion). Pennington concedes in his reply

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   brief that the line between the two cases is a “fine one”. His comparison to
   Cavazos is unavailing; the facts at hand are almost indistinct from those in
   Wright, where our court weighed the above-described factors and held
   Wright was not in custody. Wright, 777 F.3d at 775–77. In addition, as noted
   in Wright, because Cavazos prevailed in district court, the evidence was
   viewed on appeal by the Government in the light most favorable to Cavazos;
   the opposite was applicable in Wright. Id. at 776.
          In Wright, as here, defendants were removed from their home in the
   early morning by more than 12 officers. Id. at 777. In Wright and here,
   defendants were not forced to enter an officer’s unmarked vehicle located
   near the residence and were told several times they were not under arrest and
   free to leave. Id. at 771–77; see also United States v. Michalik, 5 F.4th 583, 589
   (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 910 (2022) (affirming district court’s
   finding defendant was informed he could leave; and, therefore, was not in
   custody); United States v. Gonzalez, 814 F. App’x 838, 845 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (defendant “not in Miranda custody when he made his unwarned
   statements”).
          Additionally, and as discussed, Pennington was interviewed for only
   30 minutes in the challenged interview. See United States v. Coulter, 41 F.4th
   451, 459 (5th Cir. 2022) (noting 30-minute interview suggests defendant not
   in custody); and United States v. Ortiz, 781 F.3d 221, 233 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (noting 20-to-30 minute encounter “suggests [defendant] was not in
   custody”).
          Pennington attempts to distinguish his case from Wright by noting
   Wright was never handcuffed and testified the officers told him he was free
   to leave and was not under arrest. In his reply brief, however, Pennington
   concedes that, viewing the evidence in the requisite light most favorable to
   the Government, his handcuffs were removed. In Ortiz, our court discussed

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   the effect of handcuffing, stating: “[T]he fact that the agents eventually
   handcuffed him would suggest to a reasonable person that he was not free to
   leave”. 781 F.3d at 231. Although Pennington was temporarily handcuffed,
   he was not alone: he and the other two occupants were handcuffed at the
   same time, but only during the five-minute protective sweep of the residence.
   Additionally, he was not singled out, as in Cavazos or Ortiz.
          Pennington also fails to show the requisite clear error in the district
   court’s concurring in the R&R’s findings that Pennington was told he was
   not under arrest and the doors to the vehicle were unlocked. See Coulter, 41
   F.4th at 461 (“Informing a suspect he is not under arrest, [even without]
   explicitly tell[ing] him he [is] free to leave[,] . . . . would [also] suggest to a
   reasonable person that he [is] free to leave[.]” (alterations in original)
   (citation omitted)).
          Viewing the totality of the circumstances in the requisite light most
   favorable to the Government, Pennington was not in custody. Accordingly,
   his motion to suppress was properly denied.
                                          III.
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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