Court Opinion

ID: 9447027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:23:32.566569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:52.387618
License: Public Domain

I vote to reverse and remand for a determination as to the prisoner’s competency to stand trial. Refusing relief, the district judge concluded he possesses an “unreviewable discretion” and wrote that the whole matter had been “entrusted by the Congress to the District Court with finality.” I think he was mistaken and that his action is reviewable for abuse of discretion.1 Section 2255 expressly provides that “An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion * * * ” 2
With the case properly here, we turn to the jurisdictional statute. For years, the Judicial Conference of the United States had been seeking remedial action as to habeas corpus jurisdiction because of repetitious, vexatious and often frivolous post-conviction attacks raised by prisoners whose habeas corpus actions inundated the courts where federal detention centers were located. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Price v. Johnston, 1948, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356, Congress did not adopt merely the legislation which had been recommended by the judges. In*928stead, Congress went far beyond habeas corpus and sought to include all collateral attack situations. Accordingly, Congress wrote its own Section 2255, described in the Reviser’s Note as a “procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of error eoram nobis.” 3
For the first timé, Congress conferred special jurisdiction upon its creature courts to permit a federal prisoner under a federal court sentence to levy a post-conviction attack on that sentence in the sentencing court. He might seek relief on cmy ground which rendered his sentence subject to collateral attack as well as upon any of three grounds specifically spelled out in the first paragraph of the statute. Obviously, whether in the nature of eoram nobis or as broad as habe-as corpus or otherwise, the statute is all-inclusive as it makes available to the prisoner, on his motion, the opportunity in the sentencing court to allege and prove circumstances which deprived that court of the power to impose the challenged sentence.
If the motion and the files and the records of the case in the sentencing court conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the prisoner’s claim of a right to be released is to be denied.4 Unless it shall so appear that he is entitled to no x’elief, the sentencing court must grant a prompt hearing and otherwise comply with the directives of the statute.
After the hearing, the sentencing court may accord to the prisoner by way of relief the remedy found to be appropriate in the circumstances disclosed. Exactly what form that relief may take, the court, depending upon the facts, is empowered to order as the third paragraph of the statute specifically provides.
The statute particularizes that the prisoner may not require the sentencing court “to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief,” “relief,” i. e., appropriate in the light of the allegations, the issues determined by the judge and the remedy accordingly available. We considered the later motion problem in Turner v. United States, 1958, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 258 F.2d 165. There we held that the District Court had not abused its discretion in refusing relief on the ground that the court was confronted with a second or successive motion for “similar relief." The prisoner’s later motion had disclosed no “justifiable reason” or “unawareness,” as we explained the terms, id., 103 U.S.App.D.C. at page 315, 258 F.2d at page 167, why his first motion had failed to include allegations essential to his claim.
The petitioner here in his first motion claimed relief on the permissible ground that he had lacked the effective assistance of counsel. Had his prayer been granted, the court might have set aside the conviction and ordex'ed a new trial.
His second motion, now before us, alleges that he was incompetent to stand trial. If that allegation after hearing were found to be so, the entire trial proceeding must be deemed to have been vitiated. His conviction would have been irregular and invalid5 if he were “so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense,” 18 U.S.C. § 4244. So gravely delimiting a mental status might well make appax'ent entirely valid reasons within the meaning of Turner v. United States, supra, why he had failed to assert such allegations in his first motion. Surely if such allegations be sustained, the judg*929ment of conviction should be vacated entirely.6 It may even be developed that he should not have been prosecuted at all. I think this movant was entitled to “relief,” 7 if his allegations could be supported.
In this view, I vote to reverse and remand for a hearing on the motion.8

. What constitutes an abuse of discretion was defined in United States v. McWilliams, 1947, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 261, 163 F.2d 695, 697.

. And see United States v. Hayman, 1952, 342 U.S. 205, 209 note 4, 72 S.Ct. 263, 267, 96 L.Ed. 232. “Appeals from orders denying motions under Section 2255 are governed by the civil rules applicable to appeals from final judgments in habeas corpus actions. See Mercado v. United States, 1 Cir., 1950, 183 F.2d 486.”

. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. at page 218, 72 S.Ct. at page 272.

. Morris v. United States, 1957, 101 U.S. App.D.C. 296, 248 F.2d 618; Adams v. United States, 1955, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 222 F.2d 45, and the court should cause the record to show that such was the ground of his denial of relief.

. Such an error has been deemed to be “fundamental” in character and to be reached by a writ in the nature of eoram nobis if the movant is not currently a federal prisoner. United States v. Morgan, 1954, 346 U.S. 502, 508, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 247; cf. dissent at pages 518-519 of 346 U.S., at page 256 of 74 S.Ct. as to the “comprehensive” scheme.

. Had there been a pretrial determination of competency under 18 U.S.C. § 4244, the judge could properly have found from the files and records of the case that the prisoner was entitled to no relief. Lacking that determination of record and on the facts here, a hearing became mandatory. That is all we need decide.

. As to “the right to be released,” secured by the section, as constituting “relief,” see Heflin v. United States, 1959, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407.

. I would reach no habeas corpus question for clearly no habeas corpus application was filed here. Obviously 28 U.S.C. § 2244 applies to habeas corpus where the application is filed in the situs of detention. The last paragraph of § 2255 places a further limitation on ha-beas corpus jurisdiction. The application “shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of liis detention.” See Meyers v. Welch, 4 Cir., 1950, 179 F.2d 707, 708, written by Circuit Judge Parker. Compare Meyers v. United States, 86 U.S. App.D.C. 320, 321, 181 F.2d 802, 803, certiorari denied, 1950, 339 U.S. 983, 70 S.Ct. 1030, 94 L.Ed. 1387. Congress in its determination to alleviate the problem as presented by the Judicial Conference surely cannot be deemed to have acted as futilely as my colleagues argue.