Court Opinion

ID: 9957460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 16:02:36.638047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:20.826318
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                Before
                   HOLIFIELD, GROSS, and BLOSSER
                       Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                     v.

                  Christopher F. PATTERSON
              First Lieutenant (O-2), U.S. Marine Corps
                             Appellant

                             No. 202200262

                        _________________________

                           Decided: 4 April 2024

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                            Military Judges:
                        Derek A. Poteet (motions)
                   Andrea C. Goode (arraignment, trial)

 Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: confinement for thirty-six months
 and a dismissal.

                             For Appellant:
                Captain Arthur L. Gaston III, JAGC, USN

                           For Appellee:
     Lieutenant Commander Paul L. LaPlante, JAGC, USN (argued)
              Major Mary Claire Finnen, USMC (on brief)

 Judge BLOSSER delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
 Judge HOLIFIELD and Judge GROSS joined.
              United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                             Opinion of the Court

                          _________________________

         This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
              may be cited as persuasive authority under
               NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                          _________________________

BLOSSER, Judge:
    A general court-martial composed of a military judge sitting alone con-
victed Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of 17 specifications of indecent record-
ing, in violation of Article 120c, Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]. 1
    Appellant asserts five assignments of error [AOEs], which we rephrase and
renumber as follows: (1) whether the military judge erroneously denied Appel-
lant’s motion to suppress his statements to agents of the Naval Criminal In-
vestigative Service [NCIS]; (2) whether the military judge plainly erred by
granting the Government’s motion to admit evidence under Military Rule of
Evidence [Mil. R. Evid.] 404(b); (3) whether trial defense counsel were ineffec-
tive for not moving to suppress evidence derived from a warrantless search of
a Secure Digital [SD] memory card found inside a recording device placed sur-
reptitiously in the men’s locker room; (4) whether trial defense counsel were
ineffective for not moving to suppress evidence derived from searches of Appel-
lant’s mobile phone and laptop; and (5) whether trial defense counsel were in-
effective for not opposing the Government’s use of evidence under Mil. R. Evid.
404(b). We find merit in Appellant’s first AOE. Given the relief provided in our
decretal paragraph, we need not address the remaining AOEs.

                               I. BACKGROUND

    On the morning of 17 December 2022, a Marine noticed a pen on the floor
under a radiator in the male locker room of the Expeditionary Operations
Training Group [EOTG] building aboard Marine Corps Base, Camp Pend-
leton. 2 Upon initial inspection, the Marine realized the item was not an ordi-
nary pen because it had lights on it, what appeared to be a microphone, and an

   1 10 U.S.C. § 920c.

   2 R. at 460–61.

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                 United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                                Opinion of the Court

SD card inside. 3 The Marine took the suspected recording device from the
locker room and gave it to his superior officer. 4
    An agent from NCIS took possession of the device later that day. 5 At the
time, there was a national security and counterintelligence concern with the
device because intelligence personnel and other Marines with access to classi-
fied information frequented the locker room where it was found. 6 The agent,
with the assistance of an NCIS Digital Forensic Examiner, conducted a review
of the SD card’s contents. The review revealed a video of Appellant manipulat-
ing the device, looking directly at the camera, and placing it under the radiator
where it was found. 7
    The content review also revealed numerous videos of what appeared to be
Appellant engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with unknown men. 8
There were deleted folders with names such as “Marine1,” “Big Asia,” “Big
Asian Dude,” and “Mexican Dude.” 9 Within the deleted folders, there were two
videos of a male later identified as Captain Jones 10 and one video of a male
later identified as Captain Clark completely naked in their respective bed-
rooms. 11
    Appellant’s Regimental Executive Officer [XO]—Lieutenant Colonel
[LtCol] Hill—received a call from NCIS requesting assistance in arranging an
interview with Appellant regarding “something that happened over at [I Ma-
rine Expeditionary Force].” 12 LtCol Hill called Appellant and left a voicemail

   3 R. at 461, 467–68.

   4 R. at 470.

   5 R. at 92-93.

   6 R. at 93.

   7 R. at 239–40.

   8 App. Ex. XXXVI at 20.

   9 Pros. Ex. 50 at 1–2.

   10 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and counsel,

are pseudonyms.
   11 Pros. Ex. 50 at 2.

   12 R. at 130; R. at 122–24.

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                  United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                                 Opinion of the Court

at 1837 13 on Saturday, 17 December 2022. Appellant returned the call imme-
diately and LtCol Hill directed him to report to the XO’s office. 14 Appellant put
his uniform on and traveled to the regimental headquarters, arriving around
1900. 15 LtCol Hill took Appellant into his office and closed the door. Both Ma-
rines sat down once in the office. 16 LtCol Hill told Appellant that NCIS wanted
to talk to him and that another officer assigned to the unit, Captain Thomas,
would escort him to the NCIS office. 17 LtCol Hill told Appellant, “[D]on’t squir-
rel around, just answer their questions.” 18 LtCol Hill spoke in a conversational
tone 19 and the meeting lasted five to six minutes. 20
    Immediately following his meeting with LtCol Hill, Appellant, escorted by
Captain Thomas, traveled from the regimental headquarters to the NCIS field
office in a Government vehicle. 21 Two NCIS agents took Appellant to an inter-
view room at 1925 where they engaged in “small talk” with him and asked him
for biographical information during the first 13 minutes. 22 At 1938, the lead
agent began advising Appellant of his rights under Article 31(b), UCMJ, 23 and
United States v. Tempia. 24

   13 The times indicated by Appellant during a motion to suppress his statements to

NCIS were based off his phone record. R. at 30; App. Ex. XXIII at 1. However, we note
Appellant signed his rights advisement form at 1942, which conflicts with his declara-
tion and testimony that LtCol Hill left a voicemail at 2037. Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI
at 14; App. Ex. XXV at 28. Appellant’s phone record indicates his mobile number has
a 318 area code. App. Ex. XXIII at 1. We take judicial notice that the 318 area code is
in Louisiana, and that the Central Time Zone is two hours behind the Pacific Time
Zone where Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton is located.
   14 App. Ex. XXII at 1; R. at 125.

   15 R. at 30–31.

   16 R. at 129.

   17 R. at 31.

   18 Compare R. at 136, 142, and App. Ex. XXII at 2, with R. at 138 (LtCol Hill re-

sponding in the negative to trial counsel’s question whether, at any time, he told Ap-
pellant to answer NCIS’ questions).
   19 R. at 137.

   20 App. Ex. XXII at 2.

   21 Id.

   22 Pros. Ex. 4.

   23 10 U.S.C. § 831(b).

   24 United States v. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249 (C.M.A. 1967).

                                           4
             United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                            Opinion of the Court

    The lead agent began the rights advisement by saying, “Before we can talk
to you, we just have to go over this form with you, okay?” 25 He described it as
“[n]ot a scary form” and “just a piece of paper.” 26
    After informing Appellant that he was suspected of indecent viewing, vis-
ual recording, and broadcasting, the lead agent asked him if he knew “the dif-
ference between being suspected of doing something and being accused of
something.” 27 Appellant responded with “if you’re suspected then you’re sus-
pected.” 28 The lead agent then explained,
       [S]uspected of something means like “hey we need to talk to this
       person because they might have some kind of knowledge about
       it.” Being in the military, if I think you have anything to do with
       this, I have to advise you of your rights. Okay. That’s why I’m
       advising you of your rights. Uh. Because I want to know some-
       thing you may have knowledge of.
       ...
       Accused of something is when you’re actually sitting in front of
       the judge and the judge is saying that you did this okay. So, if
       me and you are at the bar, you know, having some drinks and
       [John] falls down and starts bleeding and he points in our gen-
       eral direction and he says, “That guy stabbed me.” Right? The
       police are going to want to talk to us because we might know
       something about [John] being stabbed without saying that we
       stabbed him. It’s saying that we might have some kind of
       knowledge of what happened.
       ...
       I don’t want you to think that we are accusing you of anything.
       We’re just here to find out some information. 29
   Appellant ultimately signed the rights advisement, initialing each para-
graph, and reading the last paragraph aloud:

   25 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 11.

   26 Id.

   27 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 12.

   28 Id.

   29 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 12–13.

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               United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                              Opinion of the Court

        I understand my rights as related to me and said rights as set
        forth with the understanding that I do not desire to remain si-
        lent, consult with or retain or appoint a lawyer, or have a lawyer
        present at this time. I make this decision freely and voluntarily.
        No threats or promises have been made to me. 30
    Initially, Appellant provided a false story, denying ownership of the hidden
recording device and any related criminal conduct. He explained that he found
the device in the locker room and initially thought it was a pen, but realized it
was some sort of recording device after he picked it up and looked at it. 31 Ap-
pellant drew a diagram of the locker room and where he found the recording
device, and explained how he thought about turning it in to appropriate au-
thorities but ultimately decided not to. The agents allowed Appellant to spin
this yarn for around nine minutes before confronting him with their knowledge
of the multiple recordings of him on the SD card.
   While initially confronting Appellant with evidence of his criminality, the
lead agent stated, “I don’t want you to walk out of here and me have to you
know tell your boss that um you know [Appellant] lied to us today.” 32 When
Appellant asked the agent if he should get a lawyer, the agent responded
        I can’t make that decision for you, um but at this point if you ask
        for a lawyer, I couldn’t talk to you anymore. Um. And you made
        a statement, right, and that’s what I’ll have to report, um, but I
        can’t make that decision for you . . . I would love to hear your
        story, I would love that, but I can’t decide if you if you (sic) want
        a lawyer. That that’s (sic) up to you. Like I said, I would like to
        hear your story, but I can’t make that decision for you. 33
    Hearing this, Appellant agreed to keep talking.
    Throughout the interview, the NCIS agents referred to their need to report
to Appellant’s command on no less than 11 occasions. 34 At one point, the lead
agent held a blank piece of paper and said,

    30 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 13; App. Ex. XXV at 28.

    31 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 14–15.

    32 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 20.

    33 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 20–21.

    34 Pros. Ex. 4.; App. Ex. XXXVI at 20, 22 (“We find out what happened, and we

report that to your command.”), 23 (“[W]e receive any kind of incident such as this, we
find out all the facts behind it, we report it to your commanding officer . . . They make

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               United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                              Opinion of the Court

        So, imagine that this piece of paper had, you know, was full of
        writing, had a story, right, and that story would be your story
        and you give that story directly to Colonel [Brooks—the Regi-
        mental Commanding Officer—]and you say this is what hap-
        pened. This is everything that happened, right. Would that be
        easy to read?
        ...
        And it would be easy for him to understand and make an in-
        formed decision. 35
    The agent began crumpling and tearing the paper while saying,
        Well every piece that we’re missing is just crumpled the paper,
        tears in the paper, and you know, like rip it to pieces and then I
        have to take it to Colonel [Brooks] and say, “here’s what hap-
        pened.” Right. Is that easy to read? 36
    The agent pushed the paper toward Appellant and said,
        So, what if you could iron that out for me right now? I got all the
        pieces back and I could just tape it up.
        ...
         And I took it to Colonel [Brooks] and Colonel [Reed] and I could
        say, “Here’s the story. It might be a little crinkled, but, you

kinda the decision on where this goes, right, right based on the facts that we can find,
right.”), 34 (“We’re just the fact finders . . . [What happens next] is gonna be up to your
command.”), 35 (“[This investigation] is strictly between you, me and [John], our bosses
obviously, and we communicate directly with O-6 level command.”), 42 (“[If there’s
nothing on your computer,] then we give it right back and set Colonel [Brooks] and
Colonel [Reed] . . . mind at ease.”), 46 (“These are all things Colonel [Reed] and Colonel
[Brooks] are gonna want answered and they look to us, me and [John] to answer these
questions.”), 47 (“[W]hat you can control is what you do right now. The things you say
in here. Because what you say in here is gonna go from here to the ears of the people
that matter.”), 62 (“[T]his is between you, [John], and I and, you know, your senior
command, senior level command.”), 63 (“Um and remember man, just, like the state-
ment to Colonel [Brooks], the best way we can give it to him, we will. Um, but we can’t
do that without your help.”), 67 (“Colonel [Brooks] is gonna know about this or Colonel
[Reed] and I’m not sure which way it’s gonna go, but they’re um gonna find out about
this like as soon as I’m done talking to, I’m calling them to tell them whatever your
future is going to be.”).
    35 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 49.

    36 Id.

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              United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                             Opinion of the Court

        know, me, Chris, and [John], we sat down and we ironed every-
        thing out. This is what happened.” 37
     At 2316, Appellant requested to look at the rights advisement form again.
After re-reading the form, he invoked his right to consult an attorney prior to
additional questioning and the NCIS agents honored that invocation. 38 How-
ever, by that point in the interrogation, Appellant had already characterized
himself as a “hit-it-and-quit-it kind of person,” 39 admitted to placing the re-
cording device in the EOTG male locker room for his sexual gratification, and
admitted to recording his sexual encounters with men he met on Grindr 40 on
at least 10 to 12 occasions without their knowledge or consent. 41 He also iden-
tified Captains Jones and Clark by name and admitted to recording each of
them naked in their bedrooms without their knowledge or consent. Although
all of these recordings were captured on the SD card in NCIS’s possession, Ap-
pellant admitted to previously inserting the SD card into his laptop computer
for viewing. 42 He also informed the NCIS agents that his mobile phone was
located in his truck in his regiment’s parking lot, and that his laptop was lo-
cated in his off-base residence.
    The next day (18 December 2022), upon the lead NCIS agent’s request,
Colonel Brooks authorized a search of Appellant’s truck to seize his mobile
phone. 43 The agent used many of Appellant’s admissions during his interroga-
tion in the supporting affidavit. 44 Similarly, a Federal Magistrate Judge signed
a warrant authorizing a search of Appellant’s off-base residence to seize any
audio/video recording devices, media storage devices, Appellant’s laptop, and
paraphernalia associated with video voyeurism. 45 The agent included many of
Appellant’s admissions during his interrogation in the supporting affidavit. 46

   37 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 49–50.

   38 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 94-95.

   39 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 37, 55, 65.

   40  Grindr is a “social networking app for gay, bi, trans, and queer people.”
https://www.grindr.com/about, last visited 18 March 2024.
   41 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 27.

   42 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 30.

   43 App. Ex. L.

   44 App. Ex. L at 4–5.

   45 Govt. Mot. to Attach, Appendix A.

   46 Govt. Mot. to Attach, Appendix A at 3–5.

                                           8
              United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                             Opinion of the Court

   NCIS agents searched Appellant’s truck and residence on 18 December
2022, seizing his mobile phone and laptop, among other items. The agents ul-
timately searched the data on Appellant’s mobile phone and laptop, and found
additional incriminating evidence.
    Appellant moved to suppress his statements to the NCIS agents and all
evidence derived therefrom as violative of the Fifth Amendment, Article 31,
UCMJ, and Mil. R. Evid. 305. 47 The Government opposed the suppression mo-
tion, but conceded Appellant’s interrogation was custodial. 48 The military
judge denied the motion orally on the record with no follow-on written supple-
ment. 49
    In his ruling, the military judge found that: (1) Appellant is a very intelli-
gent man who performed well on standardized tests, holds a degree in micro-
biology, and completed the requirements to become a communications officer
in the Marine Corps; (2) Appellant was 30 years old during his NCIS interro-
gation; (3) Appellant served in a variety of billets carrying responsibility; (4)
Appellant demonstrated he understood his rights while reading the rights ad-
visement form; (5) LtCol Hill appeared credible, truthful, and forthright; (6)
Appellant was less credible when he testified he did not think lying to NCIS
was “squirrely”; (7) LtCol Hill likely gave Appellant some sort of admonish-
ment to answer questions; (8) LtCol Hill did not intend to prevent Appellant
from invoking his rights; (9) LtCol Hill’s admonishment was “benign” in terms
of his intentions; (10) LtCol Hill’s conversation with Appellant was “signifi-
cantly attenuated” from the beginning of Appellant’s NCIS interrogation; (11)
the NCIS agents did nothing improper with respect to the conduct of the inter-
view; and (12) the interrogation occurred late at night and lasted four hours. 50
The military judge assessed these facts, considered the totality of the circum-
stances, and concluded Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his
rights. The military judge did not address whether Appellant’s rights advise-
ment complied with the requirements of Article 31(b) or Tempia. 51
    Additional facts necessary to resolve Appellant’s first AOE are discussed
below.

   47 App. Ex. XXI; R. at 23–77, 120–58.

   48 App. Ex. XXIV at 8.

   49 R. at 158–62.

   50 Id.

   51 Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249.

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              United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                             Opinion of the Court

                                 II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review
    We “review a military judge’s denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion.” 52 This is a strict standard, “calling for more than a mere difference
of opinion.” 53 A military judge abuses his discretion when he: (1) “predicates a
ruling on findings of fact that are not supported by the evidence of record,” (2)
“uses incorrect legal principles,” (3) “applies correct legal principles to the facts
in a way that is clearly unreasonable,” or (4) “fails to consider important
facts.” 54 We review conclusions of law de novo. 55

B. Ineffective Rights Advisement

   1. Law
    “No person subject to [the UCMJ] may interrogate, or request any state-
ment from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first inform-
ing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have
to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or sus-
pected . . . .” 56 “Congress enacted Article 31(d), UCMJ, as a strict enforcement
mechanism to implement the rights’ warning requirements of Article 31(b),
UCMJ.” 57 Article 31(d) provides that “[n]o statement obtained from any person
in violation of [Article 31] . . . may be received in evidence against him in a
trial by court-martial.” 58 Military Rule of Evidence 305(c)(1) similarly provides
that “[a] statement obtained from the accused in violation of the accused’s
rights under Article 31 is involuntary and therefore inadmissible against the
accused.” 59

   52 United States v. Nieto, 76 M.J. 101, 105 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (citation omitted).

   53 United States v. Jones, 73 M.J. 357, 360 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (citation omitted).

   54 United States v. Rudometkin, 82 M.J. 396, 401 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

   55 United States v. Swift, 53 M.J. 439, 446 (C.A.A.F. 2000).

   56 Article 31(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b).

   57 United States v. Gardinier, 65 M.J. 60, 63 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (internal quotations

and citation omitted).
   58 Article 31(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831(d).

   59 Mil. R. Evid. 305(c)(1).

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               United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                              Opinion of the Court

    Article 31(b)’s requirement to inform a suspect of the nature of the accusa-
tion has been the subject of many appellate cases. 60 While an investigator need
not use the “precision and expertise of an attorney in informing an accused of
the nature of the accusation,” 61 he may not mislead the person by informing
him he is not accused of criminal conduct when the opposite is true. 62

    2. Discussion
    We find the military judge abused his discretion by failing to consider im-
portant facts. In its response to Appellant’s motion, the Government provided
the military judge a copy of Appellant’s NCIS interrogation video. 63 On that
video, at the beginning of Appellant’s rights advisement, the lead NCIS agent
makes a distinction between suspicion and accusation that is unsupported by
the law. 64 The agent then drew upon this distinction to say, “I don’t want you
to think that we are accusing you of anything.” 65 The military judge failed to
consider these important facts in his ruling.
   A proper rights advisement under Article 31(b) and Tempia is more than a
formality—it is not “just a piece of paper” or a mere “form” as the lead agent

    60 See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 54 M.J. 281, 284 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (“[T]he ac-

cused or suspect must be informed of the general nature of the allegation, to include
the area of suspicion that focuses the person toward the circumstances surrounding
the event.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Ruiz, 54 M.J. 138, 139 (C.A.A.F. 2000)
(“A person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice may not ‘interrogate’ a sus-
pect without first informing the suspect of the nature of the accusation, the right to
remain silent, and that any statement made may later be used as evidence in a court-
martial.”) (citing Art. 31(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b)); United States v. Rogers, 47
M.J. 135, 137 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (“The purpose of informing a suspect or accused of the
nature of the accusation is to orient him to the transaction or incident in which he is
allegedly involved.”).
    61 Simpson, 54 M.J. at   284 (citation omitted).
    62 See United States v. Erie, 29 M.J. 1008, 1012 (A.C.M.R. 1990) (“use of [trickery,

artifice, and subterfuge] in obtaining a waiver of rights or in dissuading invocation of
rights is not permissible”) (citations omitted).
    63 App. Ex. XXIV at 14; App Ex. IX at 29.

    64 In its answer and during oral argument, the Government attempted—without

citation to authority—to defend the agent’s distinction between “accused” and “sus-
pected.” Govt. Ans. at 30. We are unconvinced.
    65 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 12–13.

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               United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                              Opinion of the Court

described it. 66 And, more importantly, the plain language of Article 31(b) re-
quires informing an accused or suspect of the “accusation” irrespective of
whether “he is accused or suspected.” 67 The agent’s departure from the stat-
ute’s mandates—especially his explicit statement that he was not accusing Ap-
pellant of anything—rendered the rights advisement inadequate and Appel-
lant’s subsequent statements inadmissible in accordance with Article 31(d). 68

    3. Prejudice
    If a statutory violation of Appellant’s Article 31(b) rights does not also in-
clude a constitutional violation, 69 then the test for prejudice spelled out in
United States v. Kerr 70 applies. 71 This requires weighing “(1) the strength of
the Government's case, (2) the strength of the defense case, (3) the materiality
of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in question.” 72
    Here, the Appellant’s confession was quite probative and perhaps the most
damaging evidence admitted against him. 73 Without the improperly admitted
evidence, the Government’s case would have been considerably weakened. In
the video of Appellant’s NCIS interrogation, he admitted to at least two of the
three elements of an Article 120c, UCMJ, violation. He unequivocally admitted
to knowingly making the recordings and, in most cases, doing so without the
other person’s consent—a fact apparently not discernable from the recordings
alone. In its opening statement, the Government relied on this video as one of

    66 Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249; United States v. Campbell, 76 M.J. 644, 654 (A.F. Ct.

Crim. App. 2017); Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 11.
    67 Article 31(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b).

    68 Id.

    69 We address the constitutional violation separately infra.

    70 United States v. Kerr, 51 M.J. 401, 405 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

    71 United States v. Evans, 75 M.J. 302, 303 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

    72 Kerr, 51 M.J. at 405 (citations omitted).

    73 See United States v. Ellis, 57 M.J. 375, 381 (C.A.A.F. 2002); Arizona v. Ful-

minante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (“A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the
defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that
can be admitted against him. . . . The admissions of a defendant come from the actor
himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his
past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the [factfinder]. . .”) (in-
ternal quotation and citations omitted).

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               United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                              Opinion of the Court

“three main categories of evidence” it would rely on to prove its case. 74 Appel-
lant’s statements took on a prominent role in the lead agent’s testimony. Then,
after admitting the video of Appellant’s interrogation, the Government argued
it showed Appellant’s motive and intent. 75
   Accordingly, we find that admission of Appellant’s interrogation was not
harmless and that it materially prejudiced his substantial rights.

C. Voluntariness of Appellant’s Statements

   1. Law
    In addition to Article 31’s statutory safeguards, “the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect an accused generally against
the admission of any involuntary statements.” 76 When analyzing the voluntar-
iness of an appellant’s statements to law enforcement, we review the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether the person’s “will was overborne
and his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired.” 77 Courts look
to the characteristics of the accused, including his health, age, education, ex-
perience, and intelligence; the character of the detention, including the condi-
tions of the questioning and rights warning; and the manner of the interroga-
tion, including the length of the interrogation and the use of force, threats,
promises, or deceptions. 78 Courts also consider whether the statement was
made due to “deliberately coercive or improper tactics.” 79

   2. Discussion
   Even if we assume the rights advisement did not violate Article 31, we
would still find, under the totality of the circumstances, that Appellant’s due
process rights were violated and that his statements to NCIS were not volun-
tary.

   74 R. at 181-183.

   75 R. at 783.

   76 United States v. Chatfield, 67 M.J. 432, 439 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (citing Dickerson v.

United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000).
   77 Chatfield, 67 M.J. at 439 (quoting United States v. Bubonics, 45 M.J. 93, 95

(C.A.A.F. 1996)).
   78 Ellis, 57 M.J. at 379; Chatfield, 67 M.J. at 439; see also Bubonics, 45 M.J. at 95;

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
   79 United States v. Young, 49 M.J. 265, 267 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (quoting Oregon v. El-

stad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985)).

                                          13
                  United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                                 Opinion of the Court

   We find the military judge, in ruling otherwise, abused his discretion in
three ways.
    First, the military judge abused his discretion by failing to consider im-
portant facts. Specifically, while the military judge found it was “likely that
there was some sort of admonishment by [LtCol Hill] to answer questions,” 80
he failed to consider the compound effect of that directive in relation to the
agents’ repeated reference to their need to report to Appellant’s command. Sim-
ilarly, as discussed supra, the military judge failed to consider the improper
character of Appellant’s rights warning.
    Second, by focusing on LtCol Hill’s intent rather than Appellant’s percep-
tion, the military judge abused his discretion by using incorrect legal princi-
ples. The correct legal lens is from the perspective of the person making the
statement. 81
    Third, by finding LtCol Hill’s conversation with Appellant “significantly at-
tenuated” and doing so without discussion of what legal principle led to that
conclusion, the military judge abused his discretion either by applying an in-
correct legal principle or by applying the correct legal principle in a clearly
unreasonable way. Appellant entered LtCol Hill’s office as ordered around
1900. 82 This meeting lasted five to six minutes, after which, a superior officer,
Captain Thomas, escorted Appellant to NCIS. 83 The lead NCIS agent began
discussing Appellant’s rights at 1938, after 13 minutes of “small talk.” 84 The
Government conceded this was a custodial interrogation. We are aware of no
case that supports a finding that significant attenuation occurs from a mere 33
minute delay while continuously under Government escort.
    In conducting our de novo review of the voluntariness of Appellant’s state-
ments, we are convinced that three separate, but related, factors worked to-
gether to overcome Appellant’s will notwithstanding his age, education, expe-
rience, and intelligence. First, as Appellant’s Regimental XO, LtCol Hill, held
great authority—by rank and billet—over Appellant, which gave significant

   80 R. at 159.

   81   See, e.g., Bubonics, 45.M.J. at 95 (“The necessary [voluntariness] inquiry is
whether the confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice
by its maker. If, instead, the maker’s will was overborne and his capacity for self-de-
termination was critically impaired, use of his confession would offend due process.”)
(citation omitted).
   82 R. at 31.

   83 App. Ex. XXII at 2.

   84 Pros. Ex. 4.

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               United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                              Opinion of the Court

force to his directive to “[not] squirrel around, just answer their questions.” 85
Second, prior to the custodial interrogation, the lead agent undermined the
rights advisement—portraying it as a mere formality, “just a piece of paper”—
and misled Appellant by saying he was not accused of any crime and was only
being interviewed to obtain information. 86 Third, by referring, no less than 11
times, to their need to report to Appellant’s command, the agents underscored
and amplified the coercive effect of LtCol Hill’s directive to answer their ques-
tions. 87
   Appellant’s age, difficult undergraduate studies, standardized test scores,
and experience as a Marine Corps officer—while certainly part of voluntari-
ness analysis—are insufficient to convince us his statements were voluntary.
Likewise, within the context of the facts here, reading and initialing a rights
advisement document portrayed as a “just a piece of paper” does not render
what would be an otherwise involuntary confession voluntary. 88
   Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant’s capacity for self-
determination was critically impaired and his will was overborne. His state-
ments to NCIS were involuntary and inadmissible.

    3. Prejudice
    “Constitutional errors are reviewed for harmlessness beyond a reasonable
doubt.” 89 The erroneous admission of evidence is not harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt if “there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained
of might have contributed to the conviction.” 90 “This determination is made on
the basis of the entire record, and its resolution will vary depending on the

    85 R. at 136.

    86 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 11.

    87 We do not hold that it is per se improper for law enforcement agents to refer to

their need to report to an accused’s command, or that doing so—without more—would
have been sufficient to convince us that Appellant’s will was overborne. Our conclusion
here is limited to the unique facts of this case and the compounding effect of the factors
bearing on Appellant’s will.
    88 Pros. Ex. 4; App. Ex. XXXVI at 11.

    89 United States v. Mott, 72 M.J. 319, 332 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (citation omitted).

    90 United States v. Moran, 65 M.J. 178, 187 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (quoting Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

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             United States v. Patterson, NMCCA No. 202200262
                            Opinion of the Court

facts and particulars of the individual case.” 91 Erroneous admission of a con-
fession “requires a reviewing court to exercise extreme caution before deter-
mining that the admission of the confession at trial was harmless.” 92
   Having previously found that Appellant suffered prejudice under the lesser
nonconstitutional harmlessness test, we now find, on the basis of the entire
record, that the improper admission of Appellant’s statements to NCIS was
prejudicial under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test.

                               III. CONCLUSION

    After careful consideration of the record, briefs of appellate counsel, and
informative oral argument, the findings and sentence are SET ASIDE. A re-
hearing is AUTHORIZED.

                                     FOR THE COURT:

                                     MARK K. JAMISON
                                     Clerk of Court

   91  United States v. Sweeney, 70 M.J. 296, 306 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Blazier, 69 M.J. 218, 226–27 (C.A.A.F. 2010)).
   92 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296.

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