Court Opinion

ID: 9679440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:53:05.508882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:13.607217
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring.
Given the facts of this cause, and the express and clear wording of Article 14.04, V.A.C.C.P., which provides, “Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a felony [offense] has been committed, and that the offender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace officer may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused,” (my emphasis), the majority opinion by Judge Miller correctly holds that the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Sklar v. State, 700 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.App.-13th 1985), used the wrong standard in deciding this cause, namely, “the possibility of escape” rather than the statutory standard of “about to escape”. When a person is “about to escape” he is on the verge of escaping, he has nearly escaped, or he has almost escaped, see The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1973 edition). In the context of the facts of this case, in order to come within the statute, the State was required to establish that “The appellant's escape was imminent.” In this instance, as easily seen by the facts of this case, the State simply failed to establish that appellant’s escape was imminent. Thus, the State cannot use the above statute to sustain the warrant-less arrest that occurred in this cause, and, as that is the only basis on which the arrest can be sustained, the majority opinion correctly holds that the fruits of the unlawful arrest should have been suppressed in the trial court.
The only problem that I have with the majority opinion, and I assume that if I have a problem that prosecutors and law enforcement officials of this State will have the same problem, is that I cannot square up what this Court states and holds in this cause with what it stated and erroneously held in DeJarnette v. State, 732 S.W.2d 346 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), which was also written by Judge Miller. I will, however, not elongate this opinion by setting out herein what this Court’s majority stated and held in DeJarnette, supra, but will simply refer the reader to that opinion, let him make a comparison of this opinion with that opinion, and then let him see if he reaches the *782same conclusion that I do — that was the week for the prosecution; this week, however, is for the defendant.