Court Opinion

ID: 9691335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:26:05.194897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:17.081276
License: Public Domain

HAROLD L. LOWENSTEIN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand solely on the issue that the officer had reasonable cause to stop Abeln for a traffic violation.
The only evidence presented to the trial court was contained in a document executed by both sides titled “STIPULATED FACTS REGARDING VEHICLE STOP,” and was prefaced by language that the parties agreed “that Trooper Steve Wilhoit would testify as follows ...” A stipulation as to the testimony of an absent witness would give if he or she were present at trial is not an admission of the truth of the testimony. Howard v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 847 S.W.2d 187, 191 (Mo.App.1993). (The full text of the stipulation is found in *815the appendix to this dissent.) Particularly important to the decision are paragraphs four through six of the stipulation, which contain the trooper’s observations of the Abeln vehicle while he followed; e.g., the furtive motions of Abeln followed by his truck’s passenger-side tires twice going over the fog line.
The stipulation, taken by itself, presented a mixed message — the heading indicated it was a stipulation of fact, while the body of the agreement indicated it was merely to represent the Wilhoit testimony, had he been in court.
However, Abeln’s own arguments at trial and on appeal seem to indicate that he meant the stipulation to be a stipulation of the facts. In support of his motion to suppress evidence, Abeln filed a written argument, which began:
The trooper contends that he relied on three separate pieces of information to develop the reasonable suspicion necessary to make the traffic stop. The defendant contends that each piece of information separately, as well as all the pieces united, does not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.
Abeln’s motion merely argues that the facts did not add up to reasonable cause to stop the vehicle; it does not contest the truth of the facts. Indeed, by the language of the court in making the ruling,1 it was evident the judge believed the stipulation was a joint stipulation of fact. (It would therefore, have been a change of position for Abeln to have, in this court, taken the position that he did not stipulate as to the facts in the Wilhoit statement.)
Furthermore, on appeal, the State reiterated Wilhoit’s statements in the fact portion of it’s brief, and Abeln, in the facts of his brief, also recounted almost verbatim, the very same Wilhoit statements, and specifically wrote: ‘While following the truck, the trooper was able to observe the passenger side tires of the truck travel over what is commonly referred to as the fog line on 2 occasions.” Briefs filed in appellate proceedings may be acceptable sources of judicial admissions. Mitchell Eng’g Co., a Div. of CECO Corp. v. Summit Realty Co., 647 S.W.2d 130, 142 (Mo.App.1982). Any doubt as to the nature of the stipulation was dispelled by the inclusion, in the Abeln brief, of the trooper’s observations, which operate as a judicial admission of the stipulated facts. Woodard v. Dir. of Revenue, 876 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Mo.App.1994). “[W]here a statement of fact is asserted as true in both parties’ briefs, we may consider the fact as though it appears in the record.” State ex rel. Mo. Hwy. & Transp. Comm’n v. Gillespie, 86 S.W.3d 459, 462 n. 3 (Mo.App.2002); State v. Franklin, 841 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo. banc 1992). The Wilhoit testimony contained in the joint stipulation was a stipulation as to the facts, and the testimony was not examined by the trial judge for a credibility determination. Therefore, the only question in front of the court is whether the trial judge drew the proper legal conclusions from the facts as stipulated. Sheldon v. Board of Trustees, 779 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Mo. banc 1989).
An investigatory or “traffic stop” is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, State v. West, 58 S.W.3d 563, 568 (Mo.App.2001). An investigatory stop is also valid if there was probable cause to believe a traffic violation, however, minor, has been committed — even if the stop was a mere pretext for a narcotics search. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 813, 116 S.Ct. *8161769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); State v. Scott, 926 S.W.2d 864, 870-71 (Mo.App.1996) (citing State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 105-06 (Mo. banc 1992).) See also Wayne R. La-FaVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE Fourth Amendments § 1.4 (3d ed. 1997) (“The effect of Wkren, then, is that (with certain exceptions ...) the pretext doctrine has disappeared from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”). “Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible. •They are commonplace, nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘the factual and practical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).
“Reasonable suspicion” requires some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop — that is, something more than a hunch, but less than the level of suspicion necessary for probable cause. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Reasonable suspicion exists if, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657; State v. Franklin, 841 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Mo. banc 1992). The legal determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed is made de novo. State v. Goff, 129 S.W.3d 857 (Mo. banc 2004). Probable cause means a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). Neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause requires proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). And the subjective motive or intent of the officer making the stop is irrelevant in deciding whether there was probable cause or reasonable suspicion. State v. Shaw, 81 S.W.3d 75, 79 n. 3 (Mo.App.2002) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769); State v. West, 58 S.W.3d 563, 568 (Mo.App. 2001).
Missouri caselaw does not directly say whether a car’s driving on the fog line twice in a non-emergency situation justifies a traffic stop. In Riche v. Director of Revenue, supra, Riche had been stopped by a police officer after crossing the fog line twice. 987 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. banc 1999). He was arrested after the officer smelled alcohol on his breach and Riche failed field sobriety tests. Id. Riche’s license was then suspended. Id. The trial court had concluded that the officer did not have probable cause to stop Riche, but that he had probable cause to arrest Riche based on the evidence the officer gathered after the stop. Id. Riche appealed, claiming that the exclusionary rule rendered the post-stop evidence fruit of the poisonous tree, notwithstanding Section 302.505.1’s lack of a probable cause requirement for vehicular stops. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 336. The Court did not address whether the car’s crossing the fog line twice gave the officer probable cause to stop Riche, since the Director never raised the issue on áppeal. In any event, the Court held that for purposes of driver’s license revocation hearings it is untrue that the initial stop of a motorist must be supported by probable cause. Id. Thus, whether there was probable cause to stop Riche was a moot issue, at most, then even any implicit approval of the trial court’s conclusion was dicta.
In State v. Mendoza, Mendoza was pulled over, in part, because her car touched the yellow line to the left of the passing lane. 75 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Mo.App. 2002). Even if the yellow line is functionally identical to the fog line, Mendoza did *817not cross the traffic line, so the case is not on point. That Mendoza had not crossed the yellow line was one reason why the Southern District held that the stop was invalid. Id. at 846. Also notable is that Mendoza may have driven on to the yellow line “out of prudence” to avoid striking the officer’s car, which was parked on the shoulder. Id. The Southern District did not opine on whether a car’s crossing the yellow line (or the fog line) gives an officer probable cause or reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop.
On the other hand, many foreign cases have held that a vehicle’s crossing the fog line warrants a traffic stop. United States v. Pulliam, 265 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir.1999) (“[Officer] had probable cause to stop [defendant] after he saw the motor home drift onto the shoulder twice within a quarter mile under optimal road, weather and traffic conditions.”); United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir.1991); State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825-26 (Minn.2001); State v. Waters, 780 So.2d 1053, 1056 (La.2001) (per curiam); State v. Arnold, 779 So.2d 840, 844 (La.App.2000); State v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 552, 6 P.3d 408, 410-11 (App.2000); State v. Burris, 545 N.W.2d 192, 193 (N.D.1996); State v. Tijerina, 61 Wash.App. 626, 811 P.2d 241, 243 (1991). But cf. United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir.1996).
The Southern District has also noted that “[a] traffic stop may be justified by observation of conduct which may not itself even constitute a traffic violation but merely an unusual operation.” State v. Malaney, 871 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Mo.App.1994) (quoting State v. Bunts, 867 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Mo.App.1993)) (emphasis added); See also State v. Peterson, 964 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Mo.App.1998) (finding stop of vehicle valid where factors would authorize a law enforcement officer to warn a motorist). In Malaney, the defendant was stopped after the officer observed the vehicle weave toward the centerline, correct, then go back toward the white line, “virtually weaving.” 871 S.W.2d at 635. The court found that the erratic movements justified the stop. Id. at 637. “Viewed objectively, the movements ... could lead a reasonable officer to believe that the driver was drunk, asleep, or for some reason inattentive.” Id. at 638.
Here, Abeln crossed the fog line twice and made furtive movements while driving. It is not unreasonable to conclude, as did the court in Malaney, that the movements could lead an officer to believe the driver was being inattentive. While inattentiveness may not rise to the level of careless and imprudent driving outlined in the statute, it could justify a stop and a warning by a law enforcement officer.
Based on the traffic violation and the reasonable belief that Abeln was being inattentive while driving, the stop was valid. See also State v. Haldiman, 106 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Mo.App.2003) (noting of officer who had pulled over driving of car that had crossed the fog line, “[he] knew he could only ticket Mr. Haldiman for swerving onto the shoulder of the road on the two occasions that he observed him”).
Several observations of the reasoning underlying the majority opinion are presented:
1) Even though the State had the burden of proof on the defendant’s motion, there is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s judgment. There are no reasonable inferences supporting the result reached. The majority opinion is rife with comments that the trial court could not have believed that the trooper saw what his testimony *818said he saw. The trial court never stated it did not believe the trooper, or that the testimony was inherently suspect (i.e., the trooper observed everything from one mile). Abeln never disputes the officer’s stipulation; rather, it is the majority that now raises credibility as an issue.
2) In support of why the trial court could have been “skeptical about the witness’ credibility,” the majority brands the stipulation as “succinct, cursory, and without the explanation that trial testimony might provide.” The reader is again invited to read the stipulation located at the end of the dissent, and to wonder what else the trooper could or should have done to fill in any blanks as to a reason to stop the vehicle for erratic driving.
3) The majority boldly attacks the stipulation for the observation the passenger side tires were the ones that twice touched the fog line located on the right side of the Abeln vehicle. What might have appeared more unusual would have been the trooper’s observation that all the vehicle’s tires went over the line.
4) The majority opinion on page six, and not the trial court nor the defendant, doubts the trooper could have seen Abeln move toward the passenger side. The opinion then indicts the use of the word “furtive” by the officer, as not being used in general parlance, but is really a code word used only by the police. As the opinion notes, a synonym for furtive is “stealth,” a word, according to Web-steR’s was used by Shakespeare, John Milton, and Mark Twain.
Despite all the gyrations of the majority to bolster the result, the evidence here was of an admission at the trial level, and certainly at the appellate level, that Abeln did not attack the sole witness’ credibility. That Abeln used the word “contend” in his brief here does nothing to impeach that the officer saw what he said he saw. Nor can the officer’s use of the words “I saw,” or “I could see,” in the stipulation now be interpreted to “merely reflect the point of view of Trooper Wilhoit.” The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.
Appendix

STIPULATED FACTS REGARDING VEHICLE STOP

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, JONATHAN B. ABELN, by and through his Court appointed attorney, Frederick P. Tucker, AND COMES ALSO THE STATE OF MISSOURI, by and through special prosecuting attorney Timothy W. Anderson and for purposes of the Motion to Suppress Evidence filed by Defendant agrees that Trooper Steve Wilhoit would testify as follows:
1. On December 12, 2001 at approximately 10:30 a.m., I was asked to contact Troop B Headquarters. I contacted Radio Operator Simpson, who advised me Or-scheln Farm and Home had contacted Troop B in regard to a suspicious person in the store. The person had picked up a case of starter fluid, then when he noticed someone was watching him, he put the case down and purchased only one can. The Orscheln employee advised the same individual had been in the store earlier in the week buying funnels and hoses. The individual had then left in a gray over burgundy Ford pickup truck.
2. At approximately 10:42 a.m., while conducting an area canvass for the vehicle, I observed a gray over burgundy Ford pickup traveling west on US36 east of Bevier. I noticed the driver was wearing a tan colored Carhart style coat. Troop B *819radio personnel confirmed with the Or-scheln employee the individual in the store had been wearing a tan Carhart style coat.
3. At that time I drove through the median and turned around believing that was the vehicle I was supposed to be looking for and I tried to catch up with the truck as best I could. By the time the road turned from 4 lanes to 2 lanes west of Bevier, there was still a vehicle between the truck and me.
4. As I was behind the truck and the car between us I observed the driver of the truck. I could see because this truck is relatively high off the ground so you could see into the cab of the truck. The driver of the truck was making several furtive motions for the passenger side of the truck. It almost looked like he was reaching into or throwing something towards the glove compartment area of the truck.
5. While he was doing this I observed on 2 occasions while I was behind him that the passenger side tires of the truck traveled over what is commonly referred to as the fog line.
6. This was in correlation to what ever motions he was making in the truck. Whatever he was doing was causing him to lose track of what he is doing on the road and causing him to go over to the shoulder. The movements were erratic and careless enough to arouse my suspicion, and were not normal, safe driving. The actions themselves of going off the highway I did not consider particularly dangerous.
7. I passed the vehicle that separated us. After I got behind the truck I called the radio operator and ran a check of the license plate of the truck at which time it came base as registered as Jonathon Abeln of New Cambria.
8. I had recently received information that Jonathon Abeln was involved in local methamphetamine trade and also had information that he was possibly carrying a pistol on his person.
9. I believed from the information I had first of all the call for service from Orscheln, the erratic driving that I had seen, the furtive motions that the driver was making, I believed I had plenty of reason to both stop for the suspicion that had occurred at Orscheln’s and from what I had seen of his driving.
10. I activated the lights on my patrol car and made a traffic stop.

. The trial court’s ruling specifically stated: "Based exclusively upon the stipulated facts submitted, Defendants Motion to Suppress is hereby sustained.”