Court Opinion

ID: 9523602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:44:37.414509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:43.658336
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur in large part with the majority’s opinion, except in two respects. Specifically, I write to express my disagreement with the majority’s conclusions regarding whether the duration of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court is overbroad and whether the $2000 injunction bond is unreasonably low.
First, I dispute the majority’s conclusion that the preliminary injunction’s two-year duration is improper. The majority first concludes that the two-year time period for the injunction is reasonable, but then states that “it is an inherent characteristic of a preliminary injunction order that it should not include a specific timeframe of its effectiveness. Rather, a preliminary injunction is effective until there is a final adjudication on the merits.” The majority then reasons that because the case may linger for more than two years, the two-year limitation on the injunction was improper. I disagree.
To be sure, a preliminary injunction must end by the time the case is resolved on its merits, but it may appropriately end beforehand. The scope of an injunction cannot be broader than is “reasonably necessary to protect the interests of [an] aggrieved part[y].” Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 600 (Ind.2001). *319Reasonableness in a particular situation may very well dictate that a preliminary injunction should end before a dispute is resolved on its merits. For example, in a case involving the enforcement of a non-compete agreement, the agreement might limit activity by the defendant for a period of one year. In such a case, the trial court would be perfectly justified in issuing a preliminary injunction for one year even though the case may pend for longer. Likewise, other circumstances may exist that make it reasonable for the court to limit the duration of the order. To force the trial court to issue a preliminary injunction until such time as the dispute is resolved might be unreasonable in light of the circumstances of a particular case.
Here, the appellants’ sole objection to the length of the order is that the two-year order is too. long. The appellee does not argue that the two-year order is unreasonably short. What the majority does is to take the appellants’ argument that the order should be made shorter and, based on that argument, lengthen the order. I say that the order is lengthened because by the time this appeal is done and the case is set for trial on the merits at the trial court level, more than two years will have elapsed before there is a final disposition on the merits. Because no one argues that the injunction should be made longer and because nothing in the record convinces me of such, I cannot find that the length of the trial court’s order is unreasonable.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the $2000 injunction bond is not unreasonably low. As the majority notes, the purpose of a bond ordered upon the issuance of a preliminary injunction is “for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Ind. Trial Rule 65(C). Further, “[t]he size of the bond should approximate the damage the enjoined party will suffer if it is found that the injunction was wrongfully entered.” Slip op. at 87 (citing Titus v. Rheitone, Inc., 758 N.E.2d 85, 95 (Ind.Ct. App.2001), trans. denied). The majority recognizes the appellants’ claim that they would be unable to meet financial obligations if required to cease operations for even a week. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that this is irrelevant because it is not what was ordered by the preliminary injunction. However, as the majority recognizes earlier in its opinion, this is the effect of the preliminary injunction. Further, in light of the appellants’ presentation of evidence that the preliminary injunction would “result in immediate harm to Fast Tek in the nature of lost revenues estimated at a minimum of $980,000.00,” Appellants’ App. p. 132, I believe that ordering this nominal $2000 bond was an abuse of discretion.
Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I would affirm in part and remand for a new determination of an appropriate preliminary injunction bond.