Court Opinion

ID: 9570177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:20:47.083849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:05.484290
License: Public Domain

Given, President,
dissenting:
The problem in this case was to determine whether the deed from S. B. Wellman to James I. Tomblin, dated February 25, 1946, conveyed the whole of the surface of three tracts of land, or whether it conveyed some lesser interest in the surface. The pertinent language contained in the deed is “does hereby grant * * * all those certain Tracts, Pieces or parcels of surface land, situate on Peter Cave and Bartram Fork Creek of Little Lynn Creek, in Stonewall District, Wayne County, West Virginia, and being the same land conveyed by Sarah B. Wellman and B. F. Wellman, her husband, to S. B. Wellman, by deed dated the 19th day of December, 1921 * * *”. Then follows, by metes and bounds, a particular description of each of the three tracts. After the particular descriptions, follows this paragraph: “Containing in the aggregate 56 53/100 acres, more or less, being surface land only.” Notice the clear, exact language of the granting clause, “grant * * * all those certain tracts * * * of surface land”. Notice particularly the use of the word “all”. The deed contained no other provision relating to the quantum of interest. The position of the grantee is, assuming that the *351grantor did not have complete title to the three tracts of land at the time of the execution of the deed, and that the interest in the three tracts of land outstanding at the time was subsequently acquired by the grantor, that such acquisition inured to the benefit of the grantee by virtue of the general warranty contained in the deed.
The granting clause in the deed referred to, in so far as material, is: “* * * confirm and convey * * * B. F. Well-mans undivided interest in Three separate tracts * * *”. Notice that the quantum of the interest conveyed is not fixed or even indicated in the deed referred to. No other provision in the deed attempts to do so. No reference to any other deed or instrument is contained therein.
The Court holds that the quantum of the interest conveyed by the deed to Tomblin is cut down from “all” to an undivided one half as to tracts one and two, and to nothing as to tract three, by virtue of the language of the deed referred to, notwithstanding the interest attempted to be com eyed by that deed is not even indicated therein, and notwithstanding the language used applies alike to each of the three tracts. It is my view that the reference to the prior deed in the chain of title was for the purpose of description only, and did not have the effect of cutting down the quantum of land granted from “all * * * surface land” to an undivided one half interest in two tracts and to nothing in the third tract. So viewed, no repugnancy exists and every word contained in the deed would be given its usual and natural meaning. The Court, in its opinion, concludes that “There is no indication by reference or otherwise that the plaintiff possessed any other interest in these tracts.” But the true situation is, I believe, that there is no showing what “undivided” interest the grantor did own. No deed exhibited with the bill so shows. Most certainly, the only instrument referred to did not do so. Even had it so shown, this Court would have no right to assume that the grantor had not acquired the entire interest which he purported to convey from some other source. In considering the questions involved, *352we must keep in mind that no extrinsic evidence was offered, the cause having been disposed of on bill, answer and general replication. The answer denied pertinent allegations of the bill. The deeds mentioned are exhibited with the bill.
It is not questioned, of course, that the quantum of an interest or estate in land included in a granting clause in a deed may be cut down or limited by clear language used in some other part of the deed. That may be done even by reference to some other instrument. To accomplish that purpose, however, the language must clearly disclose an intent to do so. Such intent must clearly appear from the language used in the deed. See Code, 36-3-4. Language used in a deed referred to will not cut down the interest or estate clearly included within a conveyance unless it clearly appears that the reference was made for that purpose, and that the language in the instrument referred to clearly does so.
In Collins v. Stalnaker, 131 W. Va. 543, 48 S. E. 2d 430, this Court stated: “The grant in the instant deed of the fee to Clara Stalnaker is clear, direct and in conventional form. It therefore cannot be cut down unless the express language of the instrument evidences the grantor’s intention to do so. To effect such result, the language relied upon to create an exception and reservation, must be as certain and definite as the granting clause. Miller v. Nixon, supra; 16 Am. Jur., Deeds, Sections 307 and 309 * * In Lott v. Braham, 92 W. Va. 317, 116 S. E. 513, this Court held: “1. If, by the granting clause of a deed, land be conveyed to a named person, without mention of the estate intended to be vested in him, the habendum clause therein, if any, will define the estate granted. 2. If there be no habendum in such a deed, the law determines the estate it passes, and, under sec. 8, ch. 71 of the Code, the grantee takes an estate in fee simple absolute, by legal implication.” In Browning v. Bluegrass Hardware Co., 153 Va. 20, 149 S. E. 497, the Court quoted with approval a statement found in Wornom v. Hampton Normal & Agri*353cultural Institute, 144 Va. 533, 132 S. E. 344, which was there quoted with approval from Thornhill v. Hall, 8 Bligh’s Rep. (N.S.) 107, and which reads: “It is a settled rule in the construction of instruments that, if an estate is conveyed, an interest given, a benefit bestowed, in one part, by clear, unambiguous, explicit words, upon which no doubt could be raised, to destroy or annul that estate, interest, or benefit, it is not sufficient to raise a mist and create a doubt, from other terms in another part of the instrument. Possibilities and even probabilities will not avail. The terms to rescind or cut down the estate or interest before given must be as clear and decisive as the terms by which it was created. If the benefit is to be taken away, it must be by express words or by necessary implication.” See Miller v. Nixon, 90 W. Va. 115, 110 S. E. 541; Morgan v. Morgan, 60 W. Va. 327, 55 S. E. 389. In 5 M. J., Deeds, Section 68, the rule is stated in this language: “It is a settled rule of construction, both in deeds and wills, that if an estate is conveyed, interest given, or a benefit bestowed, in one part of the instrument, by clear, unambiguous and explicit words, such estate, interest, or benefit is not diminished nor destroyed by words in another part of the instrument, unless the terms which diminish or destroy the estate given are as clear and decisive as the terms by which it was given.”
Assuming that the reference to the former deed was for the purpose of fixing the quantum of the interest conveyed, which it was not, and assuming that the language contained in the deed referred to is repugnant to the language used in the granting clause of the deed to Tomblin, which it is not, still the authorities apparently all agree that language so indefinite as that contained in the deed referred to, quoted above, can not cut down or override the effect of such clear language as “all * * * surface land” contained in the deed being considered.
As above noticed, the language contained in the deed to Tomblin does not purport to refer to the former deed for the specific purpose of fixing the quantum of the interest conveyed. The holding of the Court that it does so of *354necessity rests upon mere implication to that effect. Even repugnancy by implication is not necessary. The reference could as well have been made for the purpose of furnishing a description of the several tracts of land, or to identify the source of title of the property conveyed, as for the purpose of defining what interest was intended to be conveyed. “Inferences and implications arising from the words of a contract yield to express provisions manifesting intention to the contrary thereof.” Berry v. Humphreys, 76 W. Va. 668, 86 S. E. 568. See White Flame Coal Co. v. Burgess, 86 W. Va. 16, 102 S. E. 690. The position of the words of reference in the deed, in the same sentence with and immediately following the general description, and immediately before the description by metes and bounds, strongly indicates to me that the reference was intended merely as a part of the description of the three tracts of land, not a defining of the quantum of the interest conveyed. Assuming, however, that there is some basis for holding that the reference creates a repugnancy, the deed should be construed most strongly against the grantor. In Deer Creek Lumber Co. v. Sheets, 75 W. Va. 21, 83 S. E. 81, this Court held: “2. Generally, where the language of a deed is susceptible of two interpretations, and the uncertainty is not cleared by evidence properly admissible, that interpretation is to prevail which is most favorable to the grantee.” See Bennett v. Smith, 136 W. Va. 903, 69 S. E. 2d 42; Swope v. Pageton Pocahontas Coal Co., 129 W. Va. 813, 41 S. E. 2d 691; Weekley v. Weekley, 126 W. Va. 90, 27 S. E. 2d 591, 150 A. L. R. 689; Realty Securities & Discount Co. v. National Rubber & Leather Co., 122 W. Va. 21, 7 S. E. 2d 49; Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 80 W. Va. 187, 94 S. E. 472; Berry v. Humphreys, 76 W. Va. 668, 86 S. E. 568.
The Court relies heavily upon a part of the holding made in Point 2 of the Syllabus in the case of Kent’s Representative v. Watson’s Heirs, 22 W. Va. 561. The whole point reads: “Where a party sells and conveys, without warranty, a particular claim or title to land, he is not thereby estopped from purchasing a superior adverse or *355outstanding title and holding the land under such superior title against the grantee of such particular claim or title where there was no fraud or concealment in the sale of said particular claim. An estoppel is never extended beyond what is called for by the plain import of the terms employed by the grantor in the conveyance.” Notice particularly that the holding applies specifically to conveyances “without warranty”. After an examination of the entire holding, keeping in mind that the deed in the instant case contained covenants of general warranty, while the deed considered in the cited case did not, does it not become clear that the holding in the cited case amounts to just the opposite of the holding in the instant case, by implication at least?
Another applicable rule of construction which would lead to a result different from that reached by the Court is stated by Judge Fox, in the opinion of the Court in Stephenson v. Kuntz, 131 W. Va. 599, 49 S. E. 2d 235, in this language: “Another rule, equally fundamental, is that an effort should be made to give effect to every part of an instrument, and, where possible, to every word thereof, to the end that the same shall be interpreted as a whole, and not merely by a consideration of disjointed or disconnected parts thereof. This rule is supported by 3 Va. and W. Va. Digest, 553, and cases cited therein. 26 C. J. S. Deeds, Section 84; 17 Id. Contracts, Page 707, Sec. 297; 16 Am. Jur. 534; Uhl v. Ohio River Railroad Company, 51 W. Va. 106, 41 S. E. 340; Realty Securities and Discount Co. v. National Rubber and Leather Co., 122 W. Va. 21, 7 S. E. 2d. 49; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Moles, 122 W. Va. 577, 11 S. E. 2d. 369; Wheeling Dollar Savings and Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703-9, 37 S. E. 2d. 563; Hinton v. Milburn, 23 W. Va. 166; Kello v. Kello’s Executors (Va.), 103 S. E. 633; Graham v. Graham, 23 W. Va. 36; Bently v. Ash, 59 W. Va. 641, 53 S. E. 636.” In the instant case the Court simply forgets the words “all * * * surface land”, and construes the words “undivided interest”, indefinite as *356they are as to quantum, to mean an undivided one half interest in two tracts and nothing in a third tract.
Yet another applicable rule of construction was not followed by the Court. In Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 80 W. Va. 187, 94 S. E. 472, this Court held: “7. If, in a deed, there be two clauses so totally repugnant to each other, that they cannot stand together, effect will be given to the first, and the latter rejected.” See Realty Securities & Discount Co. v. National Rubber & Leather Co., 122 W. Va. 21, 27, 7 S. E. 2d 49.
The correct conclusion of the controlling question in this case does not depend upon what interest the grantor in the deed to Tomblin actually owned. We are here permitted to consider only what the language of the deed says was conveyed. “* * * in the absence of explaining testimony or circumstances, the deed itself and the language employed must be alone resorted to * * *”. Realty Securities & Discount Co. v. National Rubber & Leather Co., supra. The language used in the deed clearly shows that the grantor actually conveyed “all * * * surface land” of the three tracts and warranted the same generally, and since he later acquired the outstanding interest, that acquisition inured to the benefit of his grantee. “If one conveys land with general warranty, his title to which is defective, and he afterwards acquires good title to the same, such acquisition inures to the benefit of his grantee.” Point 1, Syllabus, Yock v. Mann, 57 W. Va. 187, 49 S. E. 1019. See Johnston v. Terry, 128 W. Va. 94, 36 S. E. 2d 489; Blake v. O’Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61 S. E. 410.
Being of the view that the language of the deed to Tomblin clearly granted complete title to the surface of the three tracts of land involved, and that the subsequent acquisition of the outstanding title by the grantor inured to the benefit of the grantee in that deed, by virtue of the covenant of general warranty contained therein, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to say that Judge Lovins concurs in this dissent. We would reverse the decree complained of.