Court Opinion

ID: 9390709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 14:05:03.330159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.092626
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0812-MR

GRAVITY DIAGNOSTICS, LLC                                              APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 19-CI-01631

KEVIN BERLING                                                           APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND JONES, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, Gravity Diagnostics, LLC (Gravity), appeals from a

judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Appellee, Kevin Berling (Berling), whose

employment was terminated after he suffered panic attacks at work. Gravity

argues that Berling does not meet the statutory definition of “disability” under the

Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)

344.040(1). Gravity also argues that the trial court should have conducted a
hearing to investigate alleged post-verdict juror misconduct. Gravity requests that

we reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter judgment

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) in its favor; alternatively, it asks that we

reverse the judgment and remand for the trial court to hold a hearing to determine

whether juror misconduct occurred. After our review, we affirm.

             In 2009, Berling was diagnosed with a generalized anxiety disorder

and panic attacks. For approximately six years, he has treated weekly with his

current therapist, Sarah Garvin, who testified at the trial. Berling described a panic

attack as feeling as if the world is closing in on him, being terrified, and wanting to

run away and hide.

             In October 2018, Berling was hired by Gravity, a laboratory testing

company, as an accessioner, a position which involves organizing test samples and

entering data. Before Gravity became aware of Berling’s mental health issues in

August 2019, he received positive performance reviews and a raise, and he was

being cross-trained to work in the lab processing samples in addition to his work as

an accessioner.

             Gravity customarily celebrated its employees’ birthdays by

purchasing a cake and a card for everyone to sign and hanging a banner in the

breakroom. Berling’s birthday -- which falls on August 7 -- was a trigger for his

panic attacks. In anticipation of that event, Berling and his therapist decided that

                                          -2-
Berling should discuss the matter with Allison Wimmers, Gravity’s Chief of Staff.

Prior to that point, Berling had not told anyone at Gravity that he had a panic

disorder or any kind of mental disorder.

             Berling spoke with Allison Wimmers the week before his birthday.

Berling testified at trial that he told Wimmers that his birthday can cause a lot of

stress and anxiety, that it could lead to a panic attack, and that he would prefer that

nothing happen on his birthday. Wimmers agreed to honor Berling’s request.

Unfortunately, she forgot about it and was out of town on business the following

week. Consequently, the staff prepared the usual birthday celebration for Berling

on August 7, 2019, which he discovered upon entering the breakroom at lunchtime.

Berling grabbed his lunch and went out to his car where he suffered a panic attack.

After his lunch break, Berling went back into work and kept to himself.

             The next morning, Thursday, August 8, 2019, Berling was called into

a meeting with Amy Blackburn, lead accessioner and his immediate supervisor,

and Ted Knauf, another Gravity employee, regarding what had occurred the day

before. According to Berling’s testimony at trial, Blackburn started yelling at him,

telling him that he was “stealing people’s joy” and “that he needed to suck it up

and get over it.” That verbal diatribe triggered another panic attack, which he

described as crying, hyperventilating, and saying “please stop, panic attack, not

now” -- a technique he has been taught to use to communicate what is happening.

                                           -3-
Blackburn and Knauf left the room. After a couple of minutes, Berling was able to

walk out of the conference room. Blackburn and Knauf were waiting for him; they

told him to go home and to come back on Monday. They asked for his key fob.

             As Gravity notes in its Brief, the testimony of Blackburn and Knauf

provided a different account of that meeting. According to Blackburn, they were

trying to see what was going on. Berling related that he had had a panic attack the

previous day because of the birthday celebration and that he “felt like he was being

suffocated.” Blackburn denied telling Berling that he was stealing other people’s

joy; he also denied making other antagonistic remarks as Berling had testified.

According to Blackburn, Berling’s behavior in the meeting was “concerning”; i.e.,

he got red, started clenching his fists, and closed his eyes. Blackburn asked if he

was okay. Berling just kept saying, “silence, please do not talk.” According to

Blackburn, Berling opened his eyes at one point and looked at her with a cold stare

that scared her. Blackburn and Knauf walked past Berling and stepped out of the

conference room. After Berling came out, they escorted him from the building

without incident.

             Knauf testified that Blackburn handled the situation professionally.

Berling had a visceral reaction displaying clenched fists (inward), rocking, heavy

breathing, and redness in the face. Knauf thought that something crazy was going

                                         -4-
to happen. Berling said “silence, silence,” on multiple occasions. Knauf was in

fear and thought that they needed to get Berling out of the building.

             At 12:02 p.m. that afternoon, Berling sent Blackburn a text message

stating that he was sorry he “had a panic attack at work yesterday and today.”

Blackburn testified that she provided a copy of Berling’s message to Julie Brazil,

Gravity’s Chief Operating Officer.

             Later in the afternoon of August 8, 2019, Brazil, Blackburn, Knauf,

and Wimmers had a telephone conference. Brazil testified that it was her decision

to terminate Berling. She terminated him for his actions on August 8 that had

made Blackburn and Knauf feel physically unsafe in the workplace. Gravity’s

employee handbook has a zero-tolerance policy for employees who engage in

violent or threatening behavior.

             On Sunday, August 11, 2019, Brazil sent Berling a letter by email

notifying him that his employment was being terminated because his behavior had

caused some of his coworkers to “feel threatened and unsafe.”

             On September 10, 2019, Berling filed a complaint against Gravity in

Kenton Circuit Court asserting various claims in violation of the Kentucky Civil

Rights Act, KRS Chapter 344. Gravity subsequently filed a motion for summary

judgment, which the trial court denied by order entered on October 21, 2021. The

case proceeded to trial before a jury on March 30-31, 2022. At trial, Berling

                                         -5-
voluntarily dismissed his claims for failure to accommodate and retaliation,

pursuing only the claim for disability discrimination, which was presented to the

jury after the trial court denied Gravity’s motions for directed verdict. The jury

returned a unanimous verdict for Berling awarding $150,000.00 in lost wages and

$300,000.00 in damages for emotional distress.

             Gravity filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

(JNOV). Gravity also filed a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered

evidence, contending that after the trial ended, it discovered that a juror had viewed

Brazil’s LinkedIn page. The trial court denied both motions by orders entered on

June 17, 2022, which we address more fully in our analysis below.

             Gravity has appealed. As this Court explained in Insight Kentucky

Partners II, L.P. v. Preferred Automotive Services, Inc., 514 S.W.3d 537, 545–46

(Ky. App. 2016):

                    The standard of review regarding a motion for a
             directed verdict or JNOV has been described as a
             difficult one for an appellant to meet. Peters v. Wooten,
             297 S.W.3d 55, 65 (Ky. App. 2009). . . .

             ....

                    In reviewing evidence supporting a judgment
             entered upon a jury verdict, the role of an appellate court
             is limited to determining whether the trial court erred in
             failing to grant the motion for a directed verdict or
             JNOV. See Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16 (Ky.
             1998); NCAA v. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1988).
             All evidence which favors the prevailing party must be

                                         -6-
             taken as true and the reviewing court is not at liberty to
             determine credibility or the weight which should be
             given to the evidence, these being functions reserved to
             the trier of fact. We may not disturb the trial court’s
             ruling unless the decision is clearly erroneous. Peters v.
             Wooten, 297 S.W.3d 55, 65 (Ky. App. 2009) (citing
             Bierman, 967 S.W.2d at 18). As such, a denial of a
             directed verdict or JNOV “should only be reversed on
             appeal when it is shown that the verdict was palpably or
             flagrantly against the evidence such that it indicates the
             jury reached the verdict as a result of passion or
             prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted).

             It is axiomatic that a trial court has the superior advantage in

assessing the evidence for admissibility, thus resulting in our necessary deference

to its evidentiary rulings. “A reviewing court is rarely in as good a position as the

trial judge who presided over the initial trial to decide whether a jury can properly

consider the evidence presented.” Bierman, 967 S.W.2d at 18.

             Gravity first argues that the trial court committed legal error in

concluding that Berling had a “disability” under the KCRA, KRS Chapter 344.

                    Under KRS 344.040(1), it is unlawful for an
             employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against
             an individual with respect to compensation, terms,
             conditions or privileges of employment because the
             person is a “qualified individual with a disability.” The
             plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima
             facie case of disability discrimination against the
             defendant. In order to establish a prima facie case of
             discrimination based on a disability, the plaintiff must
             show: (1) that he had a disability as that term is used
             under the statute (i.e., the Kentucky Civil Rights Act in
             this case); (2) that he was “otherwise qualified” to
             perform the requirements of the job, with or without

                                         -7-
             reasonable accommodation; and (3) that he suffered an
             adverse employment decision because of the disability.

                   Under KRS 344.010(4), a “disability” is defined
             as:
                   (a) A physical or mental impairment that
                       substantially limits one (1) or more of the
                       major life activities of the individual;

                   (b) A record of such an impairment; or

                   (c) Being regarded as having such an
                       impairment.

Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 706-07 (Ky. App. 2004)

(citations and footnotes omitted).

             The KCRA is interpreted consistently with the ADA
             [Americans with Disabilities Act]. But . . . the KCRA
             follows the pre-2008 ADA standards.

             ...

                    The pre-2008 ADA did not define “major life
             activities.” . . . In interpreting the KCRA’s §
             344.010(4)(a) definition of a person with a disability
             using the pre-2008 ADA standards, the Supreme Court of
             Kentucky identified major life activities as including
             “walking, seeing, hearing, performing manual tasks,
             caring for oneself, speaking, breathing, learning, and
             working.”

Baum v. Metro Restoration Services, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 684, 693-95 (W.D. Ky.

2017) (quoting Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Ky. 2003)).

             Specifically, Gravity argues that Berling’s anxiety disorder failed to

substantially limit a major life activity because it did not prevent him from

                                         -8-
working, going about his day-to-day activities, or performing a wide range of other

jobs. Thus, it contends that his claim is “easily dismissed.” Hallahan, 138

S.W.3d at 709 (“A plaintiff must also show that his impairment significantly

restricts his ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs, and

not just his current or a single job.”). Gravity acknowledges that the trial court’s

order denying its motion for JNOV “did not invoke this theory[.]”

             Gravity submits that Berling’s “claim is foreclosed unless he carried

his burden to show that he was ‘regarded as’ having an impairment that

substantially limited his ability to work.” Further, that in order for him to succeed

on such a theory, Gravity claims that Berling must show that an employer thought

he was disabled and that his disability would prevent him from performing a broad

class of jobs. Gravity argues that Berling failed to meet that burden because there

was no evidence from which a jury could make such inferences undermining

Brazil’s beliefs.

            The trial court ably addressed this issue in meticulous detail in its July

17, 2022, order denying Gravity’s motion for JNOV:

                    It is necessary only that plaintiff was “regarded as
             having such impairment.” KRS 344.010(4)(c). “The
             purpose of protecting those who are regarded as disabled
             from discrimination is to prohibit employers from relying
             on ‘stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of
             individual ability.’” Quiles-Quiels v. Henderson, 439
             F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006). To establish that one is
             “regarded as” disabled, the plaintiff is required to

                                          -9-
demonstrate: (a) the employer mistakenly believed
plaintiff had an impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activity; or (b) the employer
mistakenly believed that an actual, non-limiting
impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activity. Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 539,
594 (Ky. 2003). In “regarded as” cases, what an
employer “regards” as disabled goes to the defendant’s
state of mind and is thus more appropriately a question of
fact. Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 706 (6th
Cir. 2001).

       Plaintiff worked for the defendant for several
months before his mental health issues came to their
attention. In that time he consistently received positive
performance evaluations, he received a raise, and he was
being trained to perform additional work in another
department to which he desired to be transferred. During
those initial ten months of employment, it is likely that
defendant did not regard plaintiff as disabled. It is not
necessary that an employer have advance notice of a
disability, only that they regard him as having a disability
at the time of the adverse action. After plaintiff suffered
his second panic attack in as many days, he was clearly
regarded by the company as disabled. After his panic
attack on August 8, 2019, he was immediately escorted
out of the building and his access to the building was cut
off. Three days later he was informed that he was
terminated. While defendant argues that their actions
showed only that he was not qualified to work at his
current position, their action in escorting him from the
building and terminating him, rather than offering him
another position, clearly shows to the contrary.
Management’s response to plaintiff’s disability-related
conduct revealed that they no longer believed that he
could safely perform any class of work and was thus
substantially limited in the major life activity of working.

     Employers may legitimately fire employees for
misconduct, even conduct that occurs as a result of a

                           -10-
disability, if that conduct disqualifies the employee from
his or her job. Yarberry v. Gregg Appliances, Inc., 625
F. App’x 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2015). Employers, however,
are expected to “tolerate eccentric or unusual behavior
caused by an employee’s mental disability, so long as the
employee can perform the essential functions of the job.”
Id. at 740. When considering whether an employee’s
conduct disqualifies him or her from her job, the [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission] 2008 Guidance
and the Sixth Circuit suggests that certain factors should
be considered, including: the manifestation or symptom
of a disability affecting an employee’s conduct, the
frequency of occurrences, the nature of the job, the
specific conduct at issue, and the working environment.
Id. at 740.

       The evidence at trial showed that the plaintiff
excelled at his job for a period of ten months without
incident and that he was well-liked by his co-workers.
He suffered two panic attacks at work on successive days
due to unusual situations which fell outside the scope of
his day-to-day job responsibilities, and which were
preventable by defendant had they only acceded to his
reasonable request not to have a celebration of his
birthday. Under these circumstances, plaintiff’s
disability-related conduct did not render him disabled to
perform the essential functions of his job.

       Defendant asserts that plaintiff was terminated due
to safety concerns, arguing their employees have the right
to feel safe at work. Employers are not required to
tolerate disability-related conduct that is violent or
threatening. Yarberry at 740, citing Den Hartog v.
Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 1997). As
plaintiff’s counsel pointed out in closing arguments,
plaintiff too had the right to feel safe at work and that
right was denied to him by the company ignoring his
simple request. The evidence does not support a finding
that any actions of plaintiff could have led to a
reasonable apprehension for the safety of any employees.

                           -11-
             Plaintiff’s appearance at the time of his second attack
             may have been concerning, but there was sufficient
             evidence to support the finding by the jury that it was not
             objectively violent or threatening. “[P]roof that the
             employer’s proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even
             obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that
             the plaintiff’s proffered reason is correct. In other words,
             it is not enough to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder
             must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional
             discrimination.” Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 184
             S.W.3d 492, 498-99 (Ky. 2005); see also Bishop v.
             Manpower, Inc., 211 S.W.3d 71, 75-77 (Ky. App. 2006).
             Here the evidence supported plaintiff’s explanation of
             intentional discrimination as the termination was the
             immediate result of their discovery of his disability and
             the jury clearly found that explanation persuasive.

                     Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
             to plaintiff and giving him the advantage of every fair
             and reasonable inference which can be drawn from the
             evidence; and not finding a complete absence of proof on
             a material issue upon which reasonable men could differ,
             the court concludes that the standard for granting a
             judgment notwithstanding the verdict has not been met.

             We cannot improve upon the thorough analysis and sound reasoning

of the trial court. After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we are not

persuaded that the jury verdict was palpably or flagrantly against the evidence so

as to indicate that the jury reached the verdict as a result of passion or prejudice.

Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Gravity’s motion for

JNOV.

             Next, Gravity argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion

for a new trial without conducting an evidentiary hearing to investigate the

                                          -12-
consequences of alleged juror misconduct; i.e., that after the conclusion of the

trial, it discovered that a juror had violated the trial court’s instructions not to

conduct any independent research or access media relating to the parties or facts

of the case. Specifically, Gravity charged that after the trial concluded, Brazil

discovered that a juror had viewed her LinkedIn page mid-way through trial.

             By order entered on June 17, 2022, the trial court denied Gravity’s

motion for a new trial. It acknowledged that there was evidence that one juror had

reviewed a professional profile page of defendant’s Chief Operating Officer, who

was a witness at trial. Gravity argued that this conduct gave the juror information

regarding the parties’ relative wealth. The trial court noted that testimony had

been presented at trial regarding Gravity’s recent success in operating COVID-19

testing sites and the resulting increase in profits and salaries. The court did not

find that any information on the website would have had influence on the juror so

as to warrant a mistrial or a new trial.

             Additionally, there was no evidence that the juror had shared

whatever he may have viewed with other jurors. The court emphasized that the

jury verdicts were unanimous both in the finding of fault and in damages, reciting

that “so even were the court to find that one juror was tainted, the verdicts were

rendered by three more jurors than necessary and therefore the court concludes

there was no prejudice to defendants caused by the action of the juror.”

                                           -13-
                CR1 59.01 provides that: “A new trial may be granted to all or any

of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes: . . .

(b) Misconduct of the jury. . . .” (Emphasis added.) This Court’s “only function

in reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial is to decide whether the trial

judge abused his discretion.” McVey v. Berman, 836 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Ky. App.

1992). We conclude it did not.

                Nor do we agree with Gravity that it was an abuse of discretion not to

conduct a post-trial hearing. As Berling notes, the cases upon which Gravity

relies to support this argument are distinguishable on their facts. As another panel

of this Court explained in Lay v. Adley, No. 2003-CA-001685-MR, 2004 WL

2201192, at *4 (Ky. App. Oct. 1, 2004),2 “[t]he mere fact that post-verdict

allegations of juror misconduct are raised does not automatically create a right to a

hearing. We are of the opinion that the decision to conduct a hearing with respect

to allegations of juror misconduct lies within the sound discretion of the trial

court.”

                We affirm the sound analysis and judgment of the Kenton Circuit

Court.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

2
 An unpublished opinion may be considered as permitted by Kentucky Rules of Appellate
Procedure (RAP) 41.

                                           -14-
           ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Katherine L. Kennedy       Anthony J. Bucher
Bradley S. Fyffe           Covington, Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky

John R. Maley
Kian J. Hudson
Indianapolis, IN

                         -15-