Court Opinion

ID: 9541516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:26:12.403848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:05.665535
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Cercone, J.:
I find one aspect of this case to be troublesome. In the lower court’s opinion there is no explicit finding that the confession of Donald, the appellant’s brother, was not credible.1 Donald refused to change his testimony despite persistent efforts by the court to assure Donald that he would get a stiffer sentence than the appellant if he were convicted of the robbery because he had put the Commonwealth through the time and expense of two needless trials and risked the appellant’s conviction.
In rebuttal the Commonwealth did offer the testimony of a Mr. Pease, an investigator for the district attorney’s office. The gist of Mr. Pease’ testimony was that Donald totally misdescribed the inside of the bar when he first confessed to the crime at the district attorney’s office. Mr. Pease also alleged that Donald was incorrect about the number of people who were in the bar when the robbery took place. Second, Donald himself only had one shoplifting and one disorderly conduct offense on his record, while the appellant had two prior convictions for armed robbery. Donald could well have determined, therefore, that he would get a proportionately lighter sentence. Combined with his natural affection for his older brother, this would help explain *370why Donald would be willing to falsely confess. Third, Donald’s recollection of events other than the robbery and the division of its proceeds was very vague, suggesting that his memory of all the events during that period was not as vivid as they would be had he committed the robbery.
Thus, the lower court judge could well have determined that Donald’s story was not sufficiently credible, in light of the identification testimony, that it could be said that a new tiral wherein the confession was produced would likely result in the appellant’s acquittal. This determination is crucial I think regardless of whether the evidence was truly after-acquired, or whether the appellant was attempting to “run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.” If Donald’s confession was believable and its introduction at a new trial would likely compel a different result, the interests of justice would require us to grant a new trial even though the “after-acquired evidence rule” was not precisely satisfied.2 As our Supreme Court has stated: “Law must be the servant of justice, and courts of justice will not be blind to any breach of basic rights or impotent to vindicate them.”3 The fact that the appellant encouraged his brother not to confess and concealed his guilt should not operate to estop him from demonstrating his innocence, where others would be permitted to do so. It is fundamentally unfair to permit a conviction for armed robbery to stand when the criminal conduct amounted to no more than misprision of a felony, obstruction of justice or contempt of court.
There being a sufficient basis for determining that Donald’s confession was not credible and, hence, not *371likely to produce a different result after a new trial, I would affirm tke judgment of the court below.
Hoffman and Spaeth, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.

 The court apparently looked only to the evidence produced at the appellant’s second trial (the first having ended with a “hung jury”) as justification for denying the motion. The court did not indicate, however, how the confession would affect that second result.

 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bulted, 443 Pa. 422, 431 (1971) ; Hess v. Stiner, 144 Pa. Superior Ct. 249, 250 (1941). See also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 210 Pa. Superior Ct. 424 (1967) ; Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 190 Pa. Superior Ct. 444 (1959).

 Commonwealth v. Corrie, 302 Pa. 431, 437 (1931).