Court Opinion

ID: 9455319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:18:36.054396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:33.143140
License: Public Domain

ELY, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the majority opinion, and I also endorse the logical analysis expressed by my Brother Duniway. At the same time, I believe that additional factors should be recorded.
We took this case en banc for the purpose of considering and resolving the one important problem which the principal opinion attacks, and I am glad that our court has now supplied desired guidance on that issue. My examination of the record convinces me, however, that insofar as this particular appeal is concerned, we may have indulged ourselves in a great deal of unnecessary intellectual exercise. The contents of Ehlert’s Selective Service file lead me to believe that there was no alternative to the affirmance of Ehlert’s conviction even had the majority adopted the position taken by my Brother Merrill.
The sole question before the District Court was whether Ehlert’s local board erred in refusing to reopen Ehlert’s classification. Under the applicable Regulation (32 C.F.R. § 1625.2), all recognize that the board was disempowered to reopen the classification without expressly finding that there was a change in Ehlert’s status resulting from circumstances over which he had no control. In determining whether or not it could make that finding, the board could, of course, look only to that which Ehlert himself submitted in support of his belated claim for conscientious objector status.1 Even in cases not involving an *336alleged change in status after receipt of the induction notice, the registrant must “clearly establish” his right to an exemption or deferred status. Petrie v. United States, 407 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1969); Badger v. United States, 322 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1963).
Ehlert set forth his representations, after he received his notice to report for induction, in the standard Selective Service Form SSS 150. As I interpret those representations, none of them supplied the barest basis, even vestigial, upon which the local board could have supported a finding either that Ehlert claimed to be opposed conscientiously to war in any form or that his alleged beliefs crystalized after his receipt of his notice to report for induction. The board would be required to make the determination whether Ehlert’s representations would support the required finding, and we must presume the regularity of the board’s proceedings. Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 241, 89 S.Ct. 414, 21 L.Ed.2d 402 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Bishop v. United States, 412 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1969).
The threshold question of whether Ehlert claimed to be opposed conscientiously to war in any form focuses our attention on his statements that “I believe that service in the armed forces of this country at this time is work toward the end of the destruction of the human race,” and “the sole purpose of military service in this country today is preparation for a nuclear orgasm which would be totally destructive of human life and values.” (Emphasis supplied.) He also stated that he did not believe in a Supreme Being, and that he had no “religious” convictions. Furthermore, he did not claim to be driven by any moral or philosophical code that could be equated with “religion” within the meaning of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965).
In addition' to his failure to state a prima facie claim of conscientious objection, Ehlert also failed to present any facts that would have justified a finding that he had undergone a “change in status,” i.e., he did not present a claim that his beliefs had crystalized after receipt of his induction notice. In answer to the inquiry as to “when * * * you received the training and acquired the belief which is the basis of your claim * * Ehlert replied, “The time period is from September, 1960, to the present. The source and the method have been the intellectual atmosphere of the University of California and its surroundings and the natural workings of an eager-to-know and questioning mind.” In a letter to his local board Ehlert stated that he had been “unable to make a decision of such moment until faced with the absolute necessity to do so. Since the receipt of my induction notice, I have begun to be more fully aware of the implications of military service at this time.” This latter statement constitutes the only semblance of a claim that a new belief was reached after the induction notice, and it formed the basis for the argument at trial. District Judge Zirpoli expressed, as one of his then thoughts, the opinion that this language should be interpreted to mean that Ehlert had long been aware of his beliefs but had simply been unable to decide whether to claim the status to which he felt entitled. At least, the board was warranted in interpreting the letter in this fashion and there was abundant basis in fact to support that interpretation. See Blades v. United States, 407 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1969). Judge Zirpoli observed that a basis in fact for this interpretation existed by reason of the long period of the development of Ehlert’s attitude coupled with the late filing of the claim. Surely, too, the board was entitled to infer that Ehlert himself believed that he had undergone no change in status. When Ehlert presented his new claim, he wrote, “I realize that I no longer have the legal right to apply for the status of conscientious objector * *
In his footnote 1, my Brother Merrill remarks, “The points raised in Judge Ely’s concurring opinion were not *337reached by the District Court. Before the District Court the appellant asserted that the local board’s decision not to reopen was based solely on the ground that his change in status was not beyond his control. The District Court dealt with the case in a manner consistent with this position.” I cannot accept this conclusion. The judgment of conviction itself does not, of course, contain specific reasoning or include any explanation by the District Court for the ultimate determination of guilt. During the oral argument of counsel, there were numerous Socratic exchanges in which the learned trial judge clearly indicated his consideration of separate legal approaches. It is true that in the final exchange, the court made a comment which supports a portion of the minority’s footnote 1. During the argument, however, the Government’s attorney strenuously contended, and I believe correctly, that there was no factual basis upon which the board could have found a change in status. On this, in the extended colloquy, the District Judge commented, “They [the board] were not obligated to reopen.” I think it is obvious, therefore, that the District Court did in fact consider, as it was obligated to consider, the problem to which my comments are directed. It is not unusual for a court, during an analytical exchange, to express thoughts that it may not, in the end, retain; consequently, I believe that we should not cull a judge’s off-hand oral comments from the record and employ only some of them in order to conclude definitively that the trial court’s ultimate conclusion was based solely upon only a portion of his comments. * * *
The minority also, in its footnote 1, notes “From the record it would appear doubtful that they [the points I discuss] were reached even by the local board.” This conclusion flies in the face of the presumption of regularity noted earlier, since the board would be required to make these determinations before it could inform the registrant that it would not reopen or, most certainly, before it could make the required finding that there had been presented a prima facie claim of a change of status resulting from circumstances beyond the registrant’s control. Here, the only significant notation made by the board and appearing in the Selective Service file is “Reviewed and not reopened.” From this, I cannot agree that there is any doubt whatsoever that the board, performing its duty with regularity, could have blinded itself to the recorded facts which I have specified.
All the above notwithstanding, it seems clear to me that even if we construe the District Court’s statements at the conclusion of the argument as a ruling that as a matter of law there could be no change to conscientious objector status after receipt of the induction notice, still we should hold that the District Court was not in a position to reach this question since Ehlert presented no factual basis upon which his board could have justifiably based a finding that he had presented a prima facie claim for a change of status resulting from circumstances beyond his control.2
3 From Ehlert’s own revelations, the board was thoroughly justified in concluding that his representations as to his beliefs, even if true, would not legally entitle him to conscientious objector status and that such beliefs were not first reached after the notice to report for induction was sent and received. Even, therefore, if we assume, arguendo, that the opposing views3 of the dissenters are correct, I submit that we would *338nevertheless be compelled to affirm the judgment of conviction.

. This was conceded in the District Court. The trial judge recognized that there was no triable issue of fact and that his scope of review was confined to the determination of whether the contents of Ehlert’s Selective Service file disclosed the absence of any basis in fact for the board’s refusal to reopen the classification. In this connection, Judge Zirpoli commented that “the very maximum you can go by is whatever was before the Board.”

. The Gtearey court itself recognized that late filing could be a factor in determining the sincerity of the claim or the time of crystallization. United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 1966).

. The dissenters see a “hiatus” created by the fact that a literal construction of Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 could support the conclusion that the military will not consider claims arising before actual induction. X believe that the supposed “hiatus” is more fancied than real. I do not read the directive in this way, since the thrust of the directive is toward claims arising before the induction notice. Moreover, *338I am confident that military authorities would recognize a probable constitutional obligation to consider the genuineness of an inductee’s claim that conscientious objector beliefs had become fixed within the brief period between the time of the notice to report for induction and his actual induction into the armed forces.