Court Opinion

ID: 9480343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:45:08.794543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:37.408972
License: Public Domain

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge,
with whom SCHROEDER and FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:
Palmer v. United States, 652 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.1981), dealt with a litigant who didn’t complain when the district court mistakenly ignored his timely jury demand; instead, the litigant participated in the bench trial and complained only when judgment was entered against him. We granted the litigant’s request for a new trial, holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set out the ways one can withdraw a jury demand, and that failing to complain about the court’s mistake is not one of them. The majority today overrules Palmer ’s interpretation of the Federal Rules as “rigid” and “formalistic,” as if to suggest that there is some other, more palatable, way to read the Rules. But there is not; the language of the Rules is susceptible to only one reading. Consequently, to reach the result it deems desirable, the majority follows the lead of our sister circuits by engrafting a judicially-created exception onto the statutory language. Because I would reaffirm Palmer as the straightforward application of a clear rule, I dissent.
DISCUSSION
As the Supreme Court has often noted, the process of statutory interpretation starts with the language of the statute. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, — U.S. *706-, 110 S.Ct. 304, 308, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989). See also Betkesda Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1255, 1258, 99 L.Ed.2d 460 (1988). Here, the relevant statutory provisions are Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38(d) and 39(a).1 The language of these rules is clear and unambiguous. Rule 38(d) provides that a timely jury demand “may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.” Rule 39(a) specifies how this consent may be expressed, providing just two methods: (1) “by written stipulation,” and (2) “by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record.” Here, there was neither a written nor an oral stipulation consenting to a bench trial, much less one entered in the record. Accordingly, under a straightforward application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, White’s request for a jury was never withdrawn and the district court’s failure to set the case for jury trial was error. This is precisely the rationale we adopted the last time we addressed this question in Palmer. See 652 F.2d at 896.
I am not unmindful that the result we reached in Palmer appears to be a triumph of form over substance: the parties and the judicial system have suffered the burden and expense of a trial, witnesses have been inconvenienced, a judgment has been rendered. To reverse that judgment against a plaintiff who sat mute during the proceedings and raised his objection only after the outcome proved unsatisfactory to him, seems to offend basic notions of efficiency and fair play. But we may not focus our sights so narrowly. As the Supreme Court reiterated only this Term, “ ‘[i]n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.’ ” Hallstrom, 110 S.Ct. at 311 (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2497, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980)). See also Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 680, 687, 107 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990) (“[Cjourts should be loath to announce equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that are unqualified by the statutory text.”).
In Hallstrom, the Supreme Court rejected arguments, like those adopted by the majority in this case, that an unambiguous rule “should be given a flexible or pragmatic construction,” 110 S.Ct. at 309, and that a literal application of the rule would “unnecessarily waste judicial resources” by rendering meaningless years of litigation. Id. at 312. As the Supreme Court recognized in Hallstrom, greater unfairness may be visited upon a far larger number of litigants when rules of procedure are given a creative interpretation in response to the apparent exigencies of a particular case.
This danger is particularly acute where, as here, the rule in question is designed to safeguard the right to trial by jury, one of the few constitutional rights pertaining to the conduct of civil trials. Rule 38(a) expressly declares that “the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution ... shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.” The formalities embodied in Rules 38(d) and 39(a) were no doubt designed to preclude the inadvertent forfeiture of that right. By weakening the protections built into those rules, the court weakens the constitutional right itself.
At the heart of the court’s analysis is the notion that to allow White to relitigate his case before a jury would work an injustice. I am not convinced; as I see it, the injustice lies in the court's decision today, a decision that denies plaintiff the benefit of a precedent he was entitled to rely on. Palmer, decided nine years ago, established the law of the circuit long before this case was filed. White, acting pro se, discharged ful*707ly his responsibility under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the law of this circuit in securing his right to a jury. Defendant, at all times represented by counsel, was on notice of plaintiff’s request for a jury trial; elementary research would have disclosed that White’s seventh amendment right was not waivable by acquiescence or mute assent. Defendant, no less than plaintiff, could have brought this to the attention of the district court and objected to the conduct of a bench trial. He did not. While I assume this was the result of inadvertence rather than calculation, it is nonetheless hard to conclude — as the majority and concurrence do — that the fault was entirely plaintiff’s and that he should therefore pay for the district court’s error by forfeiting his constitutional right to trial by jury.2
I acknowledge that by reaffirming Palmer, we would remain alone among the federal circuits in adhering to the literal language of Rules 38(d) and 39(a).3 While we should not lightly part company with our sister circuits, we would have good reason for doing so in this case. In the first place, we would be right. Palmer is not only consistent with pronouncements of the Supreme Court, such as Hallstrom and Gui-dry, but with our own tradition of strict and literal compliance with rules and statutes. See, e.g., Purba v. INS, 884 F.2d 516, 517-18 (9th Cir.1989) (under plain meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), requirement that deportation hearings be “before” an immigration judge is not satisfied by telephonic hearings “[ujntil Congress chooses to change the wording of the statute”); United States v. Buzard, 884 F.2d 475, 475-76 (9th Cir.1989) (courts lack authority to extend time for filing notice of appeal under Fed.R.App.P. 4(b) despite excusable neglect because Fed.R.Crim.P. 49(c) expressly states that clerk’s failure to notify party of entry of judgment is not an excuse); United States v. Eccles, 850 F.2d 1357, 1359-60, 1362 (9th Cir.1988) (government will not be permitted to pursue interlocutory appeal of suppression ruling unless certificate required by 18 U.S.C. § 3731 is filed on time; even where government is permitted to pursue interlocutory appeal, bright-line rule prohibits defendant’s interlocutory cross-appeal, despite concerns of judicial efficiency); United States v. Avendano-Camacho, 786 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir.1986) (Fed.R.App.P. 4(b)’s deadlines for filing notice of appeal are mandatory and court will not create exception for cases of attorney neglect); International Ass’n of Ironworkers ’ Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus., 733 F.2d 656, 658-59 (9th Cir.1984) (adopting bright-line rule that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 requires notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of judgment on merits even though attorneys’ fees issues remain unresolved); United States v. Armored Transport, Inc., 629 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S.Ct. 1481, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981) (construing Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(g) as bright-line rule that grand jury’s term begins on impanelment date, regardless of first day of service).
Particularly telling is our most recent en banc decision, United States v. Fernandez-Angulo, 897 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir.1990) *708(en banc). We held in Fernandez-Angulo that, under the plain language of the Rule, a remand for resentencing is required where a district court fails to make the required Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) findings. In so doing, we rejected a proposed “practical interpretation” that would have glossed over the clear mandate of the Rule to avoid resentencing. See id. at 1518 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Our reasoning was simple and straightforward: “Strict compliance with the Rule is required.” Id. at 1516. While noting that other circuits had split on the question, we concluded that “the bright-line rule we adopt imposes no onerous burden on the district courts and is most faithful to the language of the Rule.” Id.
The majority here takes an approach inconsistent with Fernandez-Angulo, raising serious doubts as to the proper method of interpreting and applying federal rules of procedure in this circuit. In Fernandez-Angulo, an eleven judge panel held that Rule 32’s plain language is binding. Here, a different combination of eleven judges treats the plain language of Rules 38 and 39 as little more than obstacles to be overcome in depriving a section 1983 plaintiff of his constitutional right to a jury trial. While the two cases deal with different rules and different areas of the law, they undeniably give inconsistent signals as to how procedural rules are applied in this circuit.4 That the signals come from separate en banc panels is especially regrettable, as the en banc process is meant not merely to decide specific cases but also to offer more general guidance concerning the judicial philosophy that should prevail among the federal courts in this large circuit.
To my mind, it is more important that we act consistent with our own guiding principles than with decisions from our sister circuits. This is particularly true as to procedural rules, where uniformity among the circuits is not essential. Rules pertaining to the conduct of trial can differ somewhat among circuits, even among districts, without visiting unfairness on litigants in either jurisdiction. Indeed, unfairness is more likely to result from the change of settled rules within a jurisdiction. In this regard, I note that this appears to be the first appellate case in our circuit since Palmer to have dealt with this precise issue. Given the thousands of cases litigated here every year, the error rate under the current rule seems to be de minimis. Indeed, the problem nationwide seems to be very small, with only 14 appellate decisions having raised this issue in the last 41 years.5
Finally, we should take comfort in the fact that, to the extent a nationwide rule is desirable, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are continually under review by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the *709Supreme Court. If a literal interpretation of the Rules is perceived as unwise, or if the Advisory Committee believes that it is important to have national uniformity, it can correct the situation by amending the language of the applicable rules. Palmer, however, has been the law of this circuit for nine years, and there has been a circuit conflict for that entire time,6 yet the Committee has not seen fit to act.
CONCLUSION
My colleagues today exercise the power of an en banc court to take away a section 1983 plaintiffs constitutional right to a jury trial. I find little in the record of this case, or the operation of the existing rule, that justifies this extraordinary display of judicial power. Sometimes the wisest course is to leave well enough alone. Because that is what I would do today by reaffirming Palmer, I dissent.

. The Federal Rules are promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. Accordingly, we are obliged to treat them as we would statutes, and lack the power to modify them by judicial interpretation. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1090, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969).

. Although plaintiff, defendant and the district judge are each charged with knowledge of the Federal Rules, the majority and concurrence place the blame for what transpired entirely on White. See Maj. at 700, 703-04; Concur, at 704. The concurrence goes further, referring to "appellant's ambush” and accusing plaintiff of “sandbagging.” Concur, at 704, 705. With all respect to my concurring colleague, I suggest that plaintiff is not deserving of such harsh treatment. There has never been a finding that White deliberately forwent an objection in order to ambush the district judge. Most likely, what we have here is an oversight by all concerned. The question is, who should pay for this mutual mistake? I have much difficulty concluding it should be the party who did exactly what the law required of him.

. See Royal Amer. Mgrs., Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1018-19 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air, 777 F.2d 947, 950-51 (4th Cir.1985); Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639, 643-44 (5th Cir.1976); Sewell v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d 461, 464-66 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 75, 107 L.Ed.2d 42 (1989); Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 227-29 (7th Cir.1987); Allen v. Barnes Hosp., 721 F.2d 643, 644 (8th Cir.1983); Wool v. Real Estate Exchange, 179 F.2d 62, 63 (D.C.Cir.1949).

. The similarities between these two cases are more than superficial. In Fernandez-Angulo, as here, we considered whether violation of a procedural rule requires redoing the procedure the rule seeks to protect, or whether it suffices to adopt a shortcut that conserves judicial resources. The Fernandez-Angulo court ordered a complete resentencing even though there was no indication that the district court’s failure to comply with the procedural rule in question was anything more than an oversight, one that the defendant had apparently failed to call to the district court’s attention. As best I can tell, the only relevant distinction between these two cases cuts in White’s favor: Fernandez-Angulo involved a right created entirely by the rules of procedure; at stake here is a right guaranteed by the Constitution.

. See DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421, 424 & n. 1 (2d Cir.1962); Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82, 88-90 (2d Cir.1981); Royal Amer. Mgrs., Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1018-19 (2d Cir.1989); Millner v. Norfold & Western Railway Co., 643 F.2d 1005, 1011 & n. 1 (4th Cir.1981); United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air, 777 F.2d 947, 950-51 (4th Cir.1985); Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639, 643-44 (5th Cir.1976); Sewell v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d 461, 464-66 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied,-U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 75, 107 L.Ed.2d 42 (1989); National Family Ins. Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 474 F.2d 237, 241 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825, 94 S.Ct. 129, 38 L.Ed.2d 59 (1973); Chapman v. Kleindienst, 507 F.2d 1246, 1253 (7th Cir.1974); Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 227-29 (7th Cir.1987); Allen v. Barnes Hosp., 721 F.2d 643, 644 (8th Cir.1983); Smith v. Cushman Motor Works, Inc., 178 F.2d 953, 954 (8th Cir.1950); Palmer v. United States, 652 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir.1981); Wool v. Real Estate Exchange, 179 F.2d 62, 63 (D.C.Cir.1949).

. In 1983, on virtually identical facts, the Eighth circuit held that the jury right was waived. See Allen, 721 F.2d at 644. However, even before Palmer was decided in 1981, there were decisions stating that mere acquiescence sufficed to waive a jury demand. See, e.g., Chapman, 507 F.2d at 1253 (creating pro se exception to general rule); National Family Ins. Co., 474 F.2d at 241.