Court Opinion

ID: 9604341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:20:00.540338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:21.224426
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for the plaintiff in their motion for rehearing insist that this court has overlooked the fact that the plaintiff testified that she had the deeds recorded, paid the recording fee, picked up the deeds from the clerk, and that she had been in possession of the deeds continuously since they were recorded.
The fact that the plaintiff’s testimony (which covers 38 pages of the record) is not set out in full in the opinion will not sustain a conclusion that her testimony in its entirety was not carefully considered. The testimony of the plaintiff on both direct and cross-examination appears in part in the opinion. The plaintiff testified on cross-examination that she was not present at the execution of either deed, that her husband gave the deeds to her and “told me to put it on record,” and that her husband told her the deeds had not been delivered.
It appears without dispute from the testimony of the plaintiff that all transactions on her part pertaining to the deeds grew out of conversations she had with her deceased husband. The plaintiff filed her petition to cancel the deeds. She is, therefore, the opposite party to the grantee named in the deeds.
“In an action to cancel a deed and recover land, the opposite party to the grantee of the deed from a deceased person, is not competent to testify in his own behalf to transactions and communications with such deceased person, affecting adversely the title conveyed by the deed; and this is true whether such transactions and communications were had by such deceased person with the party testifying, or with any other person.” Culberson v. Everett, 152 Ga. 497 (110 S. E. 275).
All transactions of the plaintiff pertaining to the deeds in question being based upon, and growing out of, conversations with *107her deceased husband, her testimony in relation thereto was incompetent. If the rule were otherwise, and her testimony that she had the deeds recorded on the instructions of her husband had been admissible, there would still be no competent evidence to offset the presumption of the delivery of the deeds.
In Patterson v. Patterson, 210 Ga. 359, 360 (4) (80 S. E. 2d 310), it was held: “ ‘The fact that the grantor had this deed recorded created a presumption that it was delivered, and that presumption was not overcome by any evidence submitted.’ Henderson v. Kemp, 155 Ga. 489 (2) (117 S. E. 244).” See also Wellborn v. Weaver, 17 Ga. 267, 275 (63 Am. D. 235); Harvill v. Lowe, 47 Ga. 214, 217; Bourquin v. Bourquin, 110 Ga. 440, 446 (35 S. E. 710); Stinson v. Daniel, 193 Ga. 844, 849 (20 S. E. 2d 257).
There is no fact or circumstance appearing from the plaintiff’s testimony to refute delivery at the time of execution, except the testimony of the wife as to alleged statements by the deceased husband to the contrary, which testimony, being mere hearsay, was inadmissible for any purpose.
On the first appearance of this case, the contentions of the plaintiff were stated, but the opinion of this court limited the plaintiff’s right to attack the deeds to the allegation that there had been no delivery. Fuller v. Fuller, 211 Ga. 201, 203, supra. The plaintiff in her petition (paragraph 16) alleged that the deeds were executed for the sole purpose of avoiding levy and sale by creditors, and she so testified. Where a deed is made to defraud creditors, it is good as between the parties thereto and those in privity with them, though void as to creditors. Bush v. Rogan, 65 Ga. 320 (38 Am. R. 785); McDowell v. McMurria, 107 Ga. 812 (33 S. E. 709, 73 Am. St. R. 155); Boswell v. Boswell, 147 Ga. 734 (95 S. E. 247); McCranie v. Cobb, 174 Ga. 370, 379 (162 S. E. 692); Waters v. Waters, 195 Ga. 281, 284 (24 S. E. 2d 20).
The plaintiff having failed to overcome by any competent evidence, the presumption of delivery, she can not obtain relief in a court of equity, even should there be competent testimony that the deeds were, in fact, made to defraud creditors.

Motion for rehearing denied.

All the Justices concur.