Court Opinion

ID: 9963573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 19:25:12.46947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:53.593437
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm., 2024-Ohio-1598.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Pin Cha Byk,                             :

                 Relator,                              :           No. 17AP-511

v.                                                     :       (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al.,                  :

                 Respondents.                          :

                                              DECISION

                                      Rendered on April 25, 2024

                 On brief: Dean R. Wagner and Vincent J. DeLorenzo, for
                 relator.

                 On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and John R. Smart,
                 for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

                 On brief: Morrow & Meyer, LLC, and Tod T. Morrow, for
                 respondent Republic Steel.

                                  IN MANDAMUS
                 ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

EDELSTEIN, J.

        {¶ 1} Relator, Pin Cha Byk, the surviving spouse of Bohdanus Byk, has filed an
original action seeking a writ of mandamus from this court ordering respondent, the
Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission”), to vacate its order denying her request for
scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.60 and 4123.57(B) for her late husband’s
loss of use of his extremities due to an industrial accident. At issue is whether the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex rel. Smith v. Indus. Comm., 138 Ohio St.3d 312, 2014-
Ohio-513—a case involving a claim for compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) for loss of sight
No. 17AP-511                                                                                                2

and hearing—categorically precludes an award for loss of use of the limbs when medical
evidence shows that loss is the result of brain injury, not direct trauma to the extremities.
Because we ultimately conclude it does not, we must also determine whether the
commission’s erroneous application of Smith as the sole basis for denying Mr. Byk’s 2014
loss-of-use claim while he was alive has any collateral estoppel consequences on Ms. Byk’s
2016 request for scheduled-loss compensation that had accrued and would have been due
to Mr. Byk at the time of his 2015 death. Notably, we did not previously consider the
propriety of the commission’s reading of Smith because Mr. Byk died while his mandamus
action contesting the commission’s 2014 denial of his loss-of-use claim was pending before
this court. In any event, we conclude Ms. Byk’s claim for accrued benefits is not precluded
by the commission’s 2014 denial of Mr. Byk’s request for scheduled-loss compensation.
        {¶ 2} For the following reasons, we grant a limited writ of mandamus directing the
commission to vacate its November 3, 2016 order and to issue a new order adjudicating the
merits of Ms. Byk’s application consistent with law and this decision.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        {¶ 3} On August 20, 2012, Mr. Byk was employed as a laborer by respondent
Republic Steel and working on a platform when he slipped, fell backwards off the platform
from a height of approximately 6 to 8 feet, and landed on cement, sustaining blunt trauma
to his head and ribs. (See Stip. Evid.1 at 73.) Mr. Byk sustained multiple fractured ribs and
severe head injuries which, in turn, resulted in significant bleeding and swelling in his
brain. (Stip. Evid. at 73-78.) To remove multiple blood clots and ease significant pressure
on his brain, Mr. Byk underwent a right frontal decompressive craniectomy (removal of a
section of the skull) with drainage. (Stip. Evid. at 76-78.) The attending neurosurgeon was
unable to close the opening in the skull because of the significant intracranial pressure
buildup. (Stip. Evid. at 77-78.)
        {¶ 4} Following surgery, Mr. Byk remained in a persistent vegetative state for
almost three years, until his death on May 3, 2015. (See, e.g., Stip. Evid. at 5-6.) Before his
death, the commission recognized Mr. Byk’s workers’ compensation claim for the following

1 The parties filed stipulated evidence on July 15, 2022 and supplemented the stipulated record by additional

filings on July 15, 2022 and September 7, 2022. Because the record is consecutively paginated across the three
filings, “Stip. Evid.” refers to the entire stipulated record.
No. 17AP-511                                                                                 3

conditions: subarachnoid hemorrhage; subdural hemorrhage; intracerebral hemorrhage;
fractured left ribs 3-6; subdural hematoma; intraparenchymal hematoma; subarachnoid
hemorrhage with significant traumatic brain injury status post-decompressive craniotomy
with resultant persistent vegetative state; neuralgic bowel; bladder dysfunction; and
chronic respiratory failure. (See Stip. Evid. at 18, 38.)

       A. The 2013 and 2014 Applications for Scheduled-Loss Compensation
       {¶ 5} Before his death, in 2014, Mr. Byk applied for scheduled-loss compensation
under R.C. 4123.57(B) for his loss of use of his bilateral arms, hands, legs, and feet. (See
Stip. Evid. at 1-9.) Evidence presented at the February 18, 2014 hearing before a district
hearing officer (“DHO”) on this claim established that Mr. Byk’s lack of purposeful
movement and inability to use any of his extremities was due to his brain injury and the
subsequent neurological sequelae from that injury. (Stip. Evid. at 3-9, 15, 23-33. See also
Stip. Evid. at 36.) Although evidence suggested Mr. Byk attempted some purposeful
movements in the summer of 2013, by the time of the February 2014 hearing, Mr. Byk’s
condition had deteriorated to the point where he was nonresponsive. (Stip. Evid. at 24,
181-97.)
       {¶ 6} At the hearing, the parties generally agreed that Mr. Byk’s loss of function of
the extremities was permanent. (See Stip. Evid. at 6-9, 15, 24-27.) The parties also agreed
that Mr. Byk’s loss of function was due to brain injury, and not the result of direct trauma
to the extremities or a spinal cord injury. (See Stip. Evid. at 3-9, 15, 27-29, 31-32. See also
Stip. Evid. at 36.)
       {¶ 7} By order of the DHO, the commission awarded Mr. Byk compensation for the
scheduled loss of his bilateral upper and lower extremities—arms, hands, legs, and feet—
pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) on February 18, 2014. (Stip. Evid. at 18-19.)
       {¶ 8} That same day, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in Smith, 2014-
Ohio-513, holding that “in the absence of injury to the eyes and ears, evidence of a brain
injury that precludes definitive visual and auditory testing is insufficient to support a
finding that the eyes and ears no longer function and, therefore, will not support an award
for loss of sight and hearing under R.C. 4123.57(B).” State ex rel. Walters v. Indus. Comm.,
__ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-Ohio-552, ¶ 27 (“Walters II”), citing Smith at ¶ 2. However, as
explained more below, “the standard for proving the requisite degree of loss of a body part
No. 17AP-511                                                                                 4

differs from the specific statutory standards applicable to loss of sight and loss of hearing.”
(Emphasis sic and added.) Walters II at ¶ 31. See R.C. 4123.57(B).
       {¶ 9} Republic Steel appealed from the DHO’s order awarding scheduled-loss
compensation, arguing the holding in Smith should be extended to claims involving the loss
of use of extremities when medical evidence shows that loss is because of brain damage,
not direct injury to the affected body part. (See Stip. Evid. at 44-48.)
       {¶ 10} That appeal was heard by a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) on April 3, 2014.
(See Stip. Evid. at 41-61.) Following that hearing, the SHO vacated the DHO’s February
2014 order and denied Mr. Byk’s request for scheduled-loss compensation based solely on
her extension of the holding in Smith. (Stip. Evid. at 38-40.) The SHO broadly construed
Smith as holding that R.C. 4123.57(B) “does not authorize compensation for the loss of
brain stem functioning.” (Stip. Evid. at 39.) Finding the medical evidence showed that Mr.
Byk suffered from the loss of brain stem function and that his extremities had no purposeful
movement due to the lack of higher cortical functioning, the SHO concluded that, on the
authority of Smith, Mr. Byk was not entitled to receive scheduled-loss compensation under
R.C. 4123.57(B) for the loss of use of his extremities. (Stip. Evid. at 39.) Compare Walters
II at ¶ 19 (acknowledging the requests for scheduled-loss compensation in Smith were
based on the contention that the injured worker suffered from a lack of cerebral-cortical
functioning, not a loss of brain stem functioning).
       {¶ 11} Notably, in this case, the SHO did not find the medical evidence presented
failed to show Mr. Byk’s bilateral upper and lower extremities were no longer functional.
(See Stip. Evid. at 38-40.) Thus, the SHO’s basis for vacating the DHO’s order and denying
Mr. Byk’s scheduled-loss claim in 2014 was exclusively grounded in law—to wit, the
application of Smith to Mr. Byk’s claim for loss of use of his arms, legs, hands, and feet
under R.C. 4123.57(B).

       B. The 2015 Mandamus Actions
       {¶ 12} After the commission refused further administrative review of the SHO’s
April 2014 denial of his claim (Stip. Evid. at 62-63), Mr. Byk filed a mandamus action in
this court under case No. 15AP-157. However, while that case was pending, Mr. Byk
succumbed to his August 2012 industrial injuries on May 3, 2015. (Stip. Evid. at 64.)
No. 17AP-511                                                                                5

Accordingly, we dismissed that case without prejudice on May 13, 2015 pursuant to Civ.R.
41(A).
         {¶ 13} After Mr. Byk’s death, the previously dismissed mandamus complaint filed in
case No. 15AP-157 was refiled under case No. 15AP-992 in October 2015, with Mr. Byk still
named as relator in that action. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Byk, in her capacity as the Executrix
of the Estate of Bohdanus Byk, was substituted as the relator. We stayed proceedings in
case No. 15AP-992 pending the outcome of the commission’s administrative review process
on Ms. Byk’s claim for accrued but unpaid scheduled-loss compensation under R.C.
4123.60 and 4123.57(B) for Mr. Byk’s loss of use of his extremities.
         {¶ 14} On April 20, 2016, Ms. Byk filed a C-86 motion for a scheduled loss-of-use
award. (Stip. Evid. at 253-54.) The DHO denied that motion on June 27, 2016. (Stip. Evid.
at 258-59.) On review, we note the DHO’s reason for denying Ms. Byk’s motion is not stated
in the order. (See Stip. Evid. at 258-59.) In any event, the SHO affirmed the DHO’s denial
on August 10, 2016 “[b]ased on the 04/03/2014 [SHO] decision.” (Stip. Evid. at 263.) Thus,
the SHO’s 2016 denial of Ms. Byk’s claims was solely based on the continued application
of Smith as barring Mr. Byk’s entitlement to scheduled-loss benefits under R.C. 4123.57(B)
because his loss of use was the result of brain injury and not direct trauma to the
extremities. (See Stip. Evid. at 263-64, referencing Stip. Evid. at 38-40.)
         {¶ 15} The commission accepted further administrative review of Ms. Byk’s claim,
but ultimately denied Ms. Byk’s request for scheduled-loss compensation without a hearing
on November 3, 2016. (Stip. Evid. at 272-91, 295, 317-19.) Noting that Mr. Byk’s initial
request for a scheduled-loss award was “adjudicated and denied by the Staff Hearing
Officer order, issued 04/0[3]/2014,” the commission found as follows:

               Because the [initial] request was denied by a final decision at
               the administrative level, [Mr. Byk’s] entitlement to the loss-of-
               use award has already been determined and denied, and based
               on this action, there is no award for the loss of use of the
               extremities he would be entitled to and no accrued
               compensation for a loss of use of the extremities. Therefore,
               there is no entitlement award or accrued compensation payable
               pursuant to R.C. 4123.6[0] to Surviving Spouse. The Surviving
               Spouse is collaterally estopped from receiving an award for
               [Mr. Byk’s] loss of use of the extremities under R.C. 4123.57
               based on the denial of [Mr. Byk’s] request for this award by the
               Staff Hearing Officer order, issued 04/0[3]/2014.
No. 17AP-511                                                                               6

(Stip. Evid. at 317-18.)

       {¶ 16} We were notified about the conclusion of the commission’s administrative
hearing process in February 2017. Following partial briefing and delays, the previously
stayed mandamus action brought under case No. 15AP-992 and litigated by Ms. Byk in her
capacity as the executrix of Mr. Byk’s estate returned to our active docket in 2021 and was
heard by a magistrate of this court on June 25, 2021.
       {¶ 17} Notably, Ms. Byk, in her capacity as the surviving spouse of Mr. Byk,
contemporaneously pursued a separate mandamus action under case No. 17AP-511, which
is the matter presently before us. Her 2017 mandamus complaint challenges the propriety
of the commission’s 2016 proceedings and determinations of her claim, as a surviving
spouse, for accrued but unpaid scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.60 and
4123.57(B) for Mr. Byk’s loss of use of his extremities.
       {¶ 18} At issue in case No. 15AP-992, however, was whether Mr. Byk’s estate
(through Ms. Byk as executrix) could pursue, in place of Mr. Byk postmortem, a mandamus
action challenging the commission’s 2014 denial of Mr. Byk’s claim for scheduled loss-of-
use benefits. Again, Mr. Byk died before we had the occasion to consider in case No. 15AP-
157 the propriety of the SHO’s April 3, 2014 finding that Smith precludes a loss-of-use
award for extremities under R.C. 4123.57(B) when an injured worker’s loss of function is
the result of a brain injury.
       {¶ 19} Ultimately, we determined that the action itself was procedurally improper.
See State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-992, 2022-Ohio-136 (“Byk I”).
More precisely, we found that because the mandamus action brought under case No. 15AP-
992 was commenced after Mr. Byk’s death, his estate lacked standing to pursue the
mandamus action on his behalf. This is because Mr. Byk’s 2014 claim for scheduled loss-
of-use benefits abated upon his death. See Byk I at ¶ 6-10.
       {¶ 20} Significantly, in Byk II, we declined to address the merits of the commission’s
legal reasoning for denying Mr. Byk’s loss-of-use claim. Rather, we found Ms. Byk would
be able to obtain judicial review of a final order of the commission in her ongoing R.C.
4123.60 proceedings, which are the subject of this case. See Byk I at ¶ 11-13. Accordingly,
we dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus in case No. 15AP-992 pursuant to Civ.R.
12(B)(1).
No. 17AP-511                                                                              7

       C. The 2017 Mandamus Action
       {¶ 21} Ms. Byk commenced this mandamus action on July 18, 2017 under case No.
17AP-511, seeking a writ directing the commission to vacate its November 3, 2o16 order and
issue a new order granting her request for scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.60
and 4123.57(B). Specifically, Ms. Byk challenges the commission’s 2016 denial of her claim
for accrued but unpaid scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.60 and 4123.57(B)
for Mr. Byk’s loss of use of his extremities.      In denying Ms. Byk’s 2016 claim, the
commission did not conduct any evidentiary hearings or make any evidentiary findings.
Instead, the November 3, 2016 order relied exclusively on the SHO’s application of Smith
in the April 3, 2014 order denying Mr. Byk’s 2014 scheduled-loss claim to find that Ms. Byk
“is collaterally estopped from receiving an award for [Mr. Byk’s] loss of use of the
extremities.” (Stip. Evid. at 317-18.)
       {¶ 22} Ultimately, then, Ms. Byk seeks in this mandamus action judicial review of
the commission’s application of Smith as a legal basis for denying compensation under R.C.
4123.57(B) for any loss other than loss of sight or hearing.
       {¶ 23} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals, we referred this matter to a magistrate who issued the appended decision,
including findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that we deny Ms. Byk’s
petition for a writ of mandamus. (Nov. 28, 2023 Mag.’s Decision at 16.)
       {¶ 24} The commission, Ms. Byk, and Republic Steel each object to some of the
magistrate’s conclusions of law, as discussed in our analysis below. All objections were
timely filed under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). We are therefore required to independently review
the objected to matters and evaluate whether “the magistrate has properly determined the
factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). The parties do not
object to the magistrate’s findings of fact. Having reviewed the record and the magistrate’s
factual findings—and in the absence of any objection thereto—we find no error in the
magistrate’s determinations of the facts, except as otherwise specified below.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
       A. Mandamus Standard and Standard of Review
       {¶ 25} An order of the commission that grants or denies scheduled-loss
compensation sought under R.C. 4123.57(B) concerns the extent of a claimant’s disability
No. 17AP-511                                                                                8

and, as such, is not subject to appeal. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Stover, 31 Ohio
St.3d 229 (1987), paragraph one of the syllabus; R.C. 4123.512(A). Thus, such order must
be challenged in a mandamus action. See id.
       {¶ 26} Ms. Byk is entitled to a writ of mandamus if she shows by clear and
convincing evidence that she has a clear legal right to the requested relief, that the
commission has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and that she has no adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Zarbana Indus. v. Indus. Comm.,
166 Ohio St.3d 216, 2021-Ohio-3669, ¶ 10. “When an order [of the commission] is
adequately explained and based on some evidence, there is no abuse of discretion and a
reviewing court must not disturb the order.” State ex rel. Aaron’s, Inc. v. Ohio Bur. of
Workers’ Comp., 148 Ohio St.3d 34, 2016-Ohio-5011, ¶ 18.
       {¶ 27} We are not, however, required to defer to an administrative agency’s
interpretation of a statute enacted by the General Assembly or application of case law issued
by Ohio courts. See TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional
Engineers & Surveyors, 172 Ohio St.3d 225, 2022-Ohio-4677, ¶ 3. And, the Supreme Court
has broadly opined that, “[i]n the interpretation of Ohio's Workmen’s Compensation
statutes, R. C. 4123.95 dictates a liberal construction in favor of employees.” State ex rel.
Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64, 67 (1975).

       B. Scheduled Loss-of-Use Compensation
       {¶ 28} R.C. 4123.57 governs partial disability compensation. R.C. 4123.57(B) sets
forth a schedule for the payment of compensation at the statewide average weekly wage for
the loss of enumerated body parts. A claimant would receive the following compensation
for loss of use of the following body parts: 175 weeks for a hand, 225 weeks for an arm, 150
weeks for a foot, and 200 weeks for a leg. See R.C. 4123.57(B).
       {¶ 29} The General Assembly included two provisions in R.C. 4123.57(B) protecting
the rights of an injured worker’s dependents to receive scheduled-loss benefits in the event
of the injured worker’s death. State ex rel. Waste Mgt. of Ohio v. Indus. Comm., 171 Ohio
St.3d 68, 2022-Ohio-4581, ¶ 45-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Both provisions generally
limit the right of an injured worker’s dependent to receive scheduled-loss benefits to those
cases in which an award was made “prior to the death” of the injured worker. See id. at ¶
47, discussing R.C. 4123.57(B) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
No. 17AP-511                                                                             9

       {¶ 30} Because nothing in R.C. 4123.57(B) provides for payment of scheduled-loss
benefits to Ms. Byk—as Mr. Byk did not receive scheduled-loss benefits before his death—
R.C. 4123.60, instead, governs Ms. Byk’s claim as a surviving spouse for a scheduled-loss
award under R.C. 4123.57(B) after Mr. Byk’s death.
       {¶ 31} Under R.C. 4123.60, a surviving spouse may apply for an award of
compensation for which the decedent would have been lawfully entitled to apply at the time
of death. See, e.g., State ex rel. Masterson v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-83, 2019-
Ohio-5217, ¶ 6, citing State ex rel. Nyitray v. Indus. Comm., 2 Ohio St.3d 173, 174 (1983).
Regarding a surviving spouse’s entitlement to benefits, R.C. 4123.60 provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
               In all cases where an award had been made on account of
               temporary, or permanent partial, or total disability, in which
               there remains an unpaid balance, representing payments
               accrued and due to the decedent at the time of his death, the
               administrator may, after satisfactory proof has been made
               warranting such action, award or pay any unpaid balance of
               such award to such of the dependents of the decedent, or for
               services rendered on account of the last illness or death of such
               decedent, as the administrator determines in accordance with
               the circumstances in each such case. If the decedent would
               have been lawfully entitled to have applied for an award at
               the time of his death the administrator may, after satisfactory
               proof to warrant an award and payment, award and pay an
               amount, not exceeding the compensation which the decedent
               might have received, but for his death, for the period prior to
               the date of his death, to such of the dependents of the decedent,
               or for services rendered on account of the last illness or death
               of such decedent, as the administrator determines in
               accordance with the circumstances in each such case, but such
               payments may be made only in cases in which application for
               compensation was made in the manner required by this
               chapter, during the lifetime of such injured or disabled person,
               or within one year after the death of such injured or disabled
               person.

(Emphasis added.)

III. ANALYSIS
       {¶ 32} In objecting to the magistrate’s November 28, 2023 decision, the commission
and Republic Steel both contest Ms. Byk’s ability as a surviving spouse to seek an award
No. 17AP-511                                                                                  10

under R.C. 4123.57(B) for a loss of use not caused by injury to an extremity. Specifically,
respondents contend the magistrate erred in finding the commission’s 2014 denial of Mr.
Byk’s claim for loss of use did not have collateral estoppel consequences for Ms. Byk’s 2016
claim brought pursuant to R.C. 4123.60. (Jan. 18, 2024 Commission’s Objs. at 2-15; Jan.
19, 2024 Republic Steel’s Objs. at 13-19.) Republic Steel also more broadly relies on the
commission’s April 3, 2014 denial of Mr. Byk’s loss-of-use claim while he was alive to argue
that, contrary to the magistrate’s finding, Ms. Byk failed to satisfy the prerequisites of R.C.
4123.60. (Republic Steel’s Objs. at 9-13.)
       {¶ 33} Ms. Byk objects to the magistrate’s determination that, pursuant to Smith,
2014-Ohio-513, and our holding in State ex rel. Walters v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No.
20AP-560, 2022-Ohio-4587 (“Walters I”), scheduled-loss compensation cannot be
awarded under R.C. 4123.57(B) for loss of use of extremities when the claimant’s loss of
that function is due to brain injury and not direct trauma to the affected body parts.
(Dec. 12, 2023 Relator’s Objs. at 5-10.) Additionally, the commission and Ms. Byk both
object to the magistrate’s adjudication of the substantive merits of Ms. Byk’s claim, as the
commission did not address the merits in the first instance. (Relator’s Objs. at 1-4;
Commission’s Objs. at 15-18.)

       A. Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply to Ms. Byk’s Claim.
       {¶ 34} The magistrate determined the commission’s April 3, 2014 denial of Mr.
Byk’s claim for loss of use under R.C. 4123.57(B) does not have collateral estoppel
consequences for Ms. Byk’s 2016 claim for accrued compensation under R.C. 4123.60 as
his surviving spouse. Respondents object to that determination.
       {¶ 35} Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) prevents parties or their privities from
relitigating a point of law or fact in a subsequent suit that was actually and directly litigated
in a prior action between the same parties and was passed upon by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Office of Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 16 Ohio St.3d 9, 10 (1985);
Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183 (1994). It requires “an identity of parties and
issues in the proceedings” and applies equally to administrative hearings. Beatrice Foods
Co., Inc. v. Lindley, 70 Ohio St.2d 29, 35 (1982). See also Set Prods., Inc. v. Bainbridge
Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 31 Ohio St.3d 260, 264 (1987).
No. 17AP-511                                                                               11

       {¶ 36} Respondents assert the commission’s April 2014 order denying Mr. Byk’s
2014 claim for loss of use under R.C. 4123.57(B) collaterally estops Ms. Byk from making a
claim for accrued compensation under R.C. 4123.60 after her husband’s death. Without
addressing the elements of collateral estoppel, respondents merely assert that because
commission proceedings concerning Mr. Byk’s claim had come to a close, the SHO’s April
2014 order finding Mr. Byk was not entitled to scheduled-loss benefits under R.C.
4123.57(B) became final and now has preclusive effect on Ms. Byk’s 2016 claim for accrued
benefits as his surviving spouse. In furtherance of that argument, respondents take great
pains to distinguish a mandamus action from a direct appeal of a commission’s order under
R.C. 4123.512. (See Commission’s Objs. at 5-15; Republic Steel’s Objs. at 15-19.) But,
ultimately, these efforts are of little consequence.
       {¶ 37} Generally, litigants may seek judicial review of commission rulings in one of
the following three ways: by direct appeal to the court of common pleas under R.C. 4123.512
in limited circumstances, by seeking a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, or by seeking a declaratory judgment under R.C. Chapter
2721. Clendenin v. Girl Scouts of W. Ohio, 150 Ohio St.3d 300, 2017-Ohio-2830, ¶ 9, citing
Felty v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 65 Ohio St.3d 234, 237 (1992).
       {¶ 38} The commission’s April 3, 2014 order denying Mr. Byk’s loss-of-use claim is
not subject to direct appeal under R.C. 4123.512. See Stover, 31 Ohio St.3d at paragraph
one of the syllabus; Clendenin at ¶ 12. As such, the writ of mandamus Mr. Byk sought in
case No. 15AP-157 was the only viable remedy he could use to obtain meaningful judicial
review of the commission’s legal conclusion resulting in the denial of his loss-of-use claim.
       {¶ 39} Although Mr. Byk timely initiated a mandamus action challenging the
propriety of the commission’s 2014 denial, he died before we conducted any judicial review
of the commission’s application of law in that order. This fact is significant because the
commission relied on the reasoning in the April 2014 order to find, in 2016, that Ms. Byk
was not entitled to an award for Mr. Byk’s loss of use of his extremities under R.C.
4123.57(B). (See Stip. Evid. at 317-19.)
       {¶ 40} Respondents’ contention that an unresolved direct appeal permitted by R.C.
4123.512 should have different collateral estoppel consequences than an unresolved
mandamus action concerning a commission’s order would box this court into the position
No. 17AP-511                                                                                 12

of being unable to correct unreasonable or legally unsound commission decisions like the
one in this case. And we note respondents do not support their collateral estoppel
arguments with legal authority—binding or persuasive—suggesting any distinction on this
issue between the two.
       {¶ 41} To the contrary, it is precisely the absence of any adequate legal remedy
(direct appeal or otherwise) that allows for a writ of mandamus to issue. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Kerns v. Simmers, 153 Ohio St.3d 103, 2018-Ohio-256, ¶ 5. “ ‘[T]he writ of mandamus,
at common law, was a prerogative writ, introduced to prevent discord from a failure of
justice, and to be used on occasions where the law had established no specific remedy.’ ”
Id. at ¶ 5, quoting Shelby v. Hoffman, 7 Ohio St. 450, 455 (1857).
       {¶ 42} Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[a]ll courts shall
be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial
or delay.” Mr. Byk died before his mandamus action challenging the commission’s 2014
denial of his request for scheduled-loss compensation was resolved by this court. Since the
commission’s interpretation and application of law was never subjected to meaningful
judicial review by this court, Ms. Byk could not reasonably expect to be bound by any legal
determination rendered by the commission in connection with her husband’s claim. For
these reasons, we find collateral estoppel does not preclude our judicial review of whether
Smith impinges on Mr. Byk’s entitlement to scheduled-loss compensation under R.C.
4123.57(B) for the loss of use of his extremities due to brain injury preceding his death.
       {¶ 43} Even assuming the issue was fully litigated in Mr. Byk’s 2015 mandamus
action, respondents fail to account for another essential component of collateral estoppel:
the parity of parties in the prior and subsequent actions. While collateral estoppel can apply
to administrative proceedings under the appropriate factual circumstances, it is not
applicable where the party upon whom collateral estoppel is asserted in a subsequent action
lacks privity with the party in the first action.
       {¶ 44} As the surviving spouse, Ms. Byk has exercised a separate right of action
under R.C. 4123.60. Although Ms. Byk was the wife of Mr. Byk, she did not appear as a
party in his 2014 claim for workers’ compensation. Nor can it be said that she was closely
aligned in interest to him. Even if she supports her 2016 claim with the same evidence Mr.
No. 17AP-511                                                                                                13

Byk originally submitted in support of his claim for scheduled-loss compensation, her claim
is based on her own interests in Mr. Byk’s workers’ compensation benefits. See, e.g., State
ex rel. Sanders v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-496, 2016-Ohio-7704, ¶ 9-11
(Brunner, J., concurring in judgment only). Of course, a compensable injury is necessary
for surviving dependents to receive benefits under R.C. 4123.60 for accrued compensation.
But the two sets of entitlements—one being the injured worker’s claim during life and the
other being the dependents’ claim after the worker’s death—are nonetheless separate and
distinct. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 9 (Brunner, J., concurring in judgment only); Indus. Comm. v.
Davis, 126 Ohio St. 593, 595-97 (1933). Indeed, Ms. Byk’s claim under R.C. 4123.60 did
not accrue until Mr. Byk’s death.2
        {¶ 45} Based upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable case law, it
cannot be said that Ms. Byk was in privity with Mr. Byk. Accordingly, respondents’
objections to the magistrate’s determination that collateral estoppel has no application to
Ms. Byk’s claim are overruled.
        {¶ 46} Ultimately, we agree with Republic Steel’s contention that the real issue is not
one of collateral estoppel but rather, whether Mr. Byk “would have been lawfully entitled to
have applied for an award at the time of his death.” (Emphasis omitted.) (See Republic
Steel’s Objs. at 10, quoting R.C. 4123.60.) Indeed, R.C. 4123.60 “ ‘permits the deceased
claimant’s dependents to receive awards made on account of “temporary, or permanent
partial, or total disability,” when there remains an unpaid balance of accrued payments due
to the claimant at the time of the claimant's death,’ ” and also authorizes an award to the
deceased claimant’s dependents “ ‘up to the amount the decedent would have received if he
had made application for an award of benefits to which he was lawfully entitled during his
lifetime.’ ” Masterson, 2019-Ohio-5217 at ¶ 7, quoting Fulton, Ohio Workers’
Compensation Law, Section 11.2, 618-19 (5th Ed.2018).3

2 An example is instructive to this point. Under respondents’ proposed application of collateral estoppel, the

commission could summarily deny a surviving spouse’s claim under R.C. 4123.60 for scheduled-loss
compensation even when evidence not previously considered substantiated a loss-of-use award. For instance,
an injured worker’s condition could deteriorate over time such that medical evidence available after the
commission denied a claim for scheduled-loss benefits brought during while the worker was alive would
support an award even if sought by the surviving spouse after the injured worker’s death.

3 Under R.C. 4123.60, a surviving spouse may apply for an award of compensation for which the decedent

would have been lawfully entitled to apply or was accrued but unpaid “ ‘only if an application was filed during
No. 17AP-511                                                                                               14

        {¶ 47} The DHO initially found on February 18, 2014 that an award of compensation
for Mr. Byk’s loss of use of his bilateral arms, hands, legs, and feet—despite resulting from
brain injury and not direct trauma to the affected body parts—was substantiated by the
medical evidence presented while Mr. Byk was still alive. (See Stip. Evid. at 18-19.) The
SHO vacated that award solely on the authority of Smith, 2014-Ohio-513. (Stip. Evid. at
38-40.) The commission relied on the same legal grounds to deny Ms. Byk’s claim in 2016.
(See Stip. Evid. at 317-19.)
        {¶ 48} In interpreting R.C. 4123.60, both the commission and Republic Steel focus
on the “lawfully entitled” phrase to argue that its April 3, 2014 denial of Mr. Byk’s claim
ipso facto means Ms. Byk cannot meet a threshold requirement of the statute: Mr. Byk’s
premortem entitlement to scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B). In doing
so, respondents lose sight of the sole basis for the commission’s 2014 denial of Mr. Byk’s
scheduled-loss claim: its application of Smith, a case involving loss of sight and hearing, to
Mr. Byk’s claim for scheduled-loss compensation for the loss of use of extremities due to
brain injury.
        {¶ 49} Thus, whether Mr. Byk would have been lawfully entitled to scheduled-loss
compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) prior to his death hinges on our resolution of the
ultimate issue presented in this case: whether the commission’s application of Smith to a
request for compensation for the loss of use of extremities was proper under the facts and
circumstances of this case. As explained below, we conclude it was not.

        B. The Commission Erred in Applying Smith as Barring Mr. Byk’s Claim
        for Loss of Use of his Extremities Due to Brain Injury.
        {¶ 50} This case centers entirely on our resolution of a purely legal question:
whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith can be applied as a legal basis for denying
compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) for the loss of use of limbs when that permanent loss
of function is caused by brain injury and not direct trauma to the affected extremities. We
are not compelled to adopt the commission’s reading or application of the law—unless, of

the deceased claimant’s lifetime or within one year after his death.’ ” Masterson at ¶ 7, quoting Fulton, Ohio
Workers’ Compensation Law, Section 11.2, 619 (5th Ed.2018), and citing State ex rel. Scott v. Ohio Bur. of
Workers’ Comp., 73 Ohio St.3d 202, 204 (1995) (applying one-year statute of limitations under R.C. 4123.60
to claim for scheduled-loss award under R.C. 4123.57). Respondents do not contest that Ms. Byk’s application
satisfied this requirement.
No. 17AP-511                                                                              15

course, we find that its reading and application of the law were correct. See TWISM Ents.,
L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-4677 at ¶ 63. For the reasons that follow, we conclude they were not.
       {¶ 51} In Smith, the injured worker suffered anoxic brain damage as a result of
surgical complications following a work-related injury, leaving him in a persistent
vegetative state after the workplace accident. 2014-Ohio-513 at ¶ 2. In addition to seeking
compensation on the allowed condition of anoxic brain injury (which was awarded), Smith
also sought scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) for loss of sight and
hearing caused by the loss of brain function. Id. at ¶ 5-6. The commission denied his
request for scheduled-loss compensation because the medical evidence did not show any
direct injury to Smith’s eyes or ears, and Smith’s inability to respond to visual stimuli or
auditory communications due to his vegetative state precluded definitive testing of his
vision and hearing. See id. at ¶ 7-9.
       {¶ 52} On review, the Supreme Court held that “R.C. 4123.57(B) does not * * *
provide for compensation for a loss of brain-stem functioning that precludes the claimant
from processing and understanding the visual and auditory stimuli that are received by
functioning eyes and ears.” Id. at ¶ 13. The court therefore upheld the commission’s
decision denying the additional requests for compensation because the evidence showed
that Smith had suffered a loss of brain-stem functioning; it did not support a finding that
Smith’s eyes and ears no longer functioned. Id. at ¶ 18-19.
       {¶ 53} The Supreme Court recently acknowledged in Walters II, however, that “the
requests for additional compensation in [Smith] were based on the contention that Smith
suffered from a lack of cerebral-cortical functioning, not a loss of brain-stem
functioning.” (Emphasis added.) 2024-Ohio-552 at ¶ 19, citing Smith at ¶ 2, 11-16, 19.
Nonetheless, the Walters II court explained that “[r]egardless of whether Smith suffered a
loss of brain-stem function or cerebral-cortex function, our conclusion that the medical
evidence did not support a finding that Smith’s eyes and ears no longer functioned
remains unchanged.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
       {¶ 54} Notably, the magistrate’s decision in this case relies heavily on our decision
in Walters I, 2022-Ohio-4587, since reviewed by the Supreme Court in Walters II. In
Walters II, the court clarified the appropriate application of Smith, noting that “the key
question in Smith was whether the medical evidence demonstrated that Smith’s eyes and
No. 17AP-511                                                                                  16

ears no longer functioned.” Walters II at ¶ 26, citing Smith at ¶ 16. The Walters II court
further explained:

                 In Smith, the medical evidence included a physician’s opinion
                 that Smith could not process visual stimuli because “ ‘no
                 significant relay of the impulses past the brain stem to the
                 visual cortex on either side exist[ed],’ ” (emphasis deleted) id.,
                 and the physician “ ‘[did] not believe’ ” Smith could hear
                 “ ‘because of loss of efferent pathways from the mid brain and
                 auditory nerve to the auditory cortex bilaterally in the posterior
                 superior temporal lobes,’ ” (brackets sic and emphasis deleted)
                 id. at ¶ 17. The fact that there was no evidence of an eye
                 or ear injury was significant because Smith’s brain
                 injury precluded definitive visual and auditory
                 testing. See id. at ¶ 18. We denied the writ in that case because
                 there was no evidence to support a finding that Smith’s eyes
                 and ears no longer functioned; the only loss established by the
                 medical evidence was a loss of brain function. Id. at ¶ 18-19. In
                 other words, the medical evidence demonstrated Smith’s lack
                 of ability to respond to visual stimuli or auditory
                 communications but not a lack of sight or hearing.

(Emphasis sic and added.) Id. at ¶ 26.
          {¶ 55} Critically, the Walters II court explained that “[t]he crux of our holding in
Smith is that in the absence of injury to the eyes and ears, evidence of a brain injury that
precludes definitive visual and auditory testing is insufficient to support a finding that the
eyes and ears no longer function and, therefore, will not support an award for loss of sight
and hearing under R.C. 4123.57(B).” Id. at ¶ 27, citing Smith at ¶ 2. See also State ex rel.
Harris v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-60, 2022-Ohio-3149, ¶ 2; State ex rel.
PolyOne Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-313, 2014-Ohio-1376, ¶ 6, fn. 1
(limiting Smith’s application to cases involving scheduled-loss benefits for loss of sight and
hearing, and noting the Smith court did not discuss (or overrule) its decision in State ex rel.
Moorehead v. Indus. Comm., 112 Ohio St.3d 27, 2006-Ohio-6364 holding R.C. 4123.57(B)
does not require an injured worker to be cognizant of his loss of use).
          {¶ 56} This case does not involve a claim for loss of hearing or loss of sight. Rather,
it involves a loss-of-use claim for Mr. Byk’s bilateral arms, hands, legs, and feet due to brain
injury.
No. 17AP-511                                                                                   17

       {¶ 57} In this context, the Walters II court observed that “Smith’s basic premise
seemingly applies to any alleged loss under R.C. 4123.57(B)—namely, in the absence of an
injury to the affected body part, evidence of a brain injury that precludes definitive testing
of the alleged loss is insufficient to support a finding that the affected body part no longer
functions.” 2024-Ohio-552 at ¶ 31. However—and most significantly—“the standard for
proving the requisite degree of loss of a body part differs from the specific statutory
standards applicable to loss of sight and loss of hearing.” (Emphasis sic and added.) Id.
       {¶ 58} For loss of sight, “in no case shall an award of compensation be made for less
than twenty-five per cent loss of uncorrected vision.” R.C. 4123.57(B). And, for loss of
hearing, the statute precludes compensation “for less than permanent and total loss of
hearing.” Id. See also Walters II at ¶ 32, citing State ex rel. Hammond v. Indus. Comm.,
64 Ohio St.2d 237, 241 (1980) (“Regarding an injury related to hearing, as with sight, the
General Assembly has specified in [R.C. 4123.57(B)] a threshold injury level, below which
no compensation will be allowed” [footnote omitted]); State ex rel. Dingess v. Indus.
Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 31, 34 (1998) (“R.C. 4123.57(B) expressly limits compensation to
those suffering a permanent and total hearing loss”).
       {¶ 59} But, for loss of a limb under R.C. 4123.57(B), the Supreme Court has held that
the “loss” of a body part includes amputation, severance, and “loss of use” that is both
permanent and total, to the same effect and extent as if the limb had been physically
removed. Walters II at ¶ 33, citing State ex rel. Walker v. Indus. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d
402 (1979). Thus, to obtain scheduled-loss compensation for loss of use of an extremity,
“[a] claimant must demonstrate with medical evidence a total loss of use of the body part
at issue ‘for all practical intents and purposes.’ ” Id., quoting State ex rel. Alcoa Bldg. Prods.
v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 341, 2004-Ohio-3166, ¶ 12. See also Moorehead, 2006-
Ohio-6364 at ¶ 20-22; Gassmann, 41 Ohio St.2d at 67.
       {¶ 60} In Alcoa Bldg. Prods., compensation was awarded under R.C. 4123.57(B) for
the claimant’s loss of the left arm based on evidence that the claimant was unable to use
that arm with a prosthesis where claimant suffered an industrial injury to his left hand and
arm that resulted in amputation of his left arm just above the elbow. 2004-Ohio-3166 at ¶
1-4, 16-17. In Moorehead, scheduled-loss benefits were found to be payable under R.C.
4123.57(B) where the medical evidence established that before the claimant died from his
No. 17AP-511                                                                                   18

industrial injury, he suffered “the physical loss of use of his limbs” due to quadriplegia
resulting from a spinal injury caused by his workplace fall. 2006-Ohio-6364 at ¶ 20-22.
         {¶ 61} In reviewing our holding in Walters I, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]his
case appears to be the first instance in which the Tenth District has denied compensation
under R.C. 4123.57(B) for any loss other than loss of sight or hearing by applying our
holding in Smith.” Walters II at ¶ 34. The Walters II court also noted that “in at least one
instance the commission has expressly declined to apply Smith to a request for
compensation for the loss of use of arms and legs.” Id., citing State ex rel. Heilman v. Indus.
Comm., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-353, 2023-Ohio-3073, ¶ 52.
         {¶ 62} But, ultimately, the Walters II court declined to resolve the extent to which
Smith applies to a claim for compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) for loss of use of the limbs.
Id. Apart from the holding of Smith, the Walters II court found there was “some evidence
in this case to support the SHO’s finding that an award for compensation for decedent’s
loss of use of his arms and legs was not substantiated, and the cases on which Walters relies
to support her loss-of-limbs claim are distinguishable from this case.” See Walters II at ¶
34-35.
         {¶ 63} We note that, in Walters I and II, the injured worker sustained blunt trauma
to his chest, which caused traumatic asphyxiation, which, in turn, caused traumatic cardiac
arrest, ultimately resulting in a severe anoxic brain injury. Walters II at ¶ 2. Walters never
regained consciousness and died the day after the industrial injury. Id. A key issue in that
case, then, was whether Walters died prior to the loss of use of his upper and lower
extremities. See id. at ¶ 8. And, critically, medical evidence did not indicate whether
Walters’s loss of function would have been permanent if he would have recovered from his
anoxic brain injury. See id. at ¶ 38. See, e.g., State ex rel. Koepf v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist.
No. 18AP-753, 2019-Ohio-3789, ¶ 11 (we have “repeatedly looked to whether the evidence
supports that, but for the decedent’s death, there was a loss of use that would have been
permanent”), citing State ex rel. Sagraves v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1030,
2012-Ohio-1010, ¶ 9, and State ex rel. Carter v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-30,
2009-Ohio-5547, ¶ 5.
         {¶ 64} In stark contrast, here, Mr. Byk lived for nearly three years after his industrial
injury. Dr. Erickson (Mr. Byk’s independent medical expert) opined that Mr. Byk had
No. 17AP-511                                                                                 19

permanent loss of use of both upper and lower extremities, and Dr. Reichert (Republic
Steel’s independent medical expert) agreed, except as to the right upper extremity. (Stip.
Evid. at 15, 35-36.) Based on the medical evidence presented at the 2014 hearing (see,
e.g., Stip. Evid. at 145-78, 181-252), the DHO found that Mr. Byk had “permanently lost the
usage of the bilateral upper and lower extremities due to a persistent vegetative state, which
itself is due to the allowed conditions in this claim,” and thus granted Mr. Byk’s scheduled-
loss claim in February 2014. (Stip. Evid. at 19.)
       {¶ 65} Critically, we note the Smith decision turned not on the mechanism of the
loss of use (brain injury versus direct trauma) but, rather, the absence of any medical
evidence to prove the claimant’s entitlement to scheduled-loss benefits under R.C.
4123.57(B). For loss of sight and hearing claims, as alleged in Smith, R.C. 4123.57(B)
precludes an award of compensation “for less than twenty-five per cent loss of uncorrected
vision” and “for less than permanent and total loss of hearing.” In contrast, the statute—as
interpreted by the Supreme Court—authorizes compensation for the permanent loss of use
of a hand, arm, leg, and foot without qualification. See R.C. 4123.57(B); Moorehead, 2006-
Ohio-6364 at ¶ 13 (summarizing precedent holding that “ ‘loss’ as used in R.C. 4123.57(B)
is equivalent to ‘loss of use’ ” because loss of function of an extremity has, for all practical
purposes, the same effect as the actual physical removal of a limb)..
       {¶ 66} This point is salient when comparing the medical evidence necessary to prove
the scheduled-loss claim in Smith with Mr. Byk’s claim in this case. In Smith, the
commission denied Smith’s request for additional compensation “based on the lack of any
objective testing showing vision or hearing loss.” 2014-Ohio-513 at ¶ 8. Indeed, because of
Smith’s persistent vegetative state, the court observed that “no test [could] be performed to
determine whether he has suffered an actual loss of sight in one or both eyes or an actual
loss of hearing in one of both ears.” Id. at ¶ 2, 18. However, contrary to the position of
respondents, the Smith court did not categorically hold that scheduled-loss compensation
under R.C. 4123.57(B) is prohibited for the loss of use of a body part if that loss of function
is due to brain injury and not direct trauma thereto.
       {¶ 67} Indeed, unlike for loss of sight and loss of hearing, medical evidence can
prove permanent loss of use of arms, hands, legs, and feet even when that loss of function
is caused by brain damage from an industrial injury. This is because these types of losses
No. 17AP-511                                                                               20

can be evaluated and proven through objective and reliable physical testing, physical
examination, and observation even when the injured worker is unable to process sights and
sounds because of brain damage. Compare Smith at ¶ 6.
       {¶ 68} To be sure, the DHO found as much when he initially determined that Mr.
Byk was entitled to scheduled-loss compensation in February 2014 for his permanent loss
of use of his bilateral upper and lower extremities “due to a persistent vegetative state.”
(See Stip. Evid. At 18-19.) The DHO’s 2014 finding was based on medical evidence
describing observations of Mr. Byk’s non-purposeful movements (using right hand to
scratch or touch face, hold a stuffed animal, and pull on support tubing), purposeful
movements (attempting a “thumbs up” in right hand), responses to painful stimuli
(withdrawing in right upper and left lower extremities; equivocal withdrawal in left upper
extremity; no withdrawal in right lower extremity), and musculature atrophy (noted past
the knees in both lower extremities). (See Stip. Evid. at 3-9, 11-16, 18-37, 82-136, 138-40,
181-252.) And because Mr. Byk remained in inpatient medical care for the remainder of
his life, his progressive loss of function over time was extensively documented in the
medical records from the date of the industrial injury (August 20, 2012) up until around
the time of his death (May 3, 2015).
       {¶ 69} Based on the foregoing, we hold that the commission erred in applying the
holding of Smith as a bright-line legal bar that entirely foreclosed Mr. Byk’s entitlement to
scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) for loss of use of “an arm,” “a hand,”
“a foot,” or “a leg.” On review, we find that—contrary to the commission’s determination—
nothing in R.C. 4123.57(B) requires proof of “direct trauma” to an injured worker’s
extremity in order to substantiate a claim for the loss of use of an extremity. And we decline
to extend the holding of Smith to exclude compensation for any permanent loss of use
caused by brain injury from an industrial accident, irrespective of whether reliable and
objective physical testing or examination can show the existence of a loss contemplated by
R.C. 4123.57(B). See generally Heilman, 2023-Ohio-3073; Walker, 58 Ohio St.2d 402.
       {¶ 70} For these reasons, we find the commission’s reliance on the flawed legal
reasoning underlying the SHO’s 2014 order as the sole basis for denying Ms. Byk’s 2016
application was contrary to law. Finding the commission thus abused its discretion in
issuing the 2016 order denying Ms. Byk’s claim, we sustain Ms. Byk’s second objection to
No. 17AP-511                                                                                 21

the magistrate’s decision, overrule the commission’s first objection, and overrule both of
Republic Steel’s objections.

       C. The Magistrate Erred in Evaluating Ms. Byk’s Entitlement to
       Scheduled-Loss Benefits in the First Instance.
       {¶ 71} We agree, however, that after finding Ms. Byk was entitled to apply for
scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.60 and 4123.57(B), the magistrate erred by
proceeding to the merits of Ms. Byk’s application. The commission never adjudicated the
merits of her application. Instead, as described above, it relied on its 2014 application of
Smith when it denied Mr. Byk’s loss-of-use claim as the sole basis for denying Ms. Byk’s
claim in 2016. Yet, the magistrate considered the evidence in the stipulated record and
rendered his own decision on whether Ms. Byk should receive the award.
       {¶ 72} It was error for the magistrate to evaluate the weight and credibility of the
evidence for the first time, and not to instead return the matter to the commission for the
initial adjudication of the substantive merits of Ms. Byk’s claim. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pass
v. C.S.T., 74 Ohio St.3d 373 (1996); State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm., 88 Ohio
St.3d 284, 287 (2000); State ex rel. Williams v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 98AP-573,
1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1149 (Mar. 25, 1999).
       {¶ 73} Accordingly, we sustain Ms. Byk’s first objection and the commission’s
second objection to the magistrate’s decision, and return the matter to the commission for
its review of the evidence and determination of whether Ms. Byk, as Mr. Byk’s surviving
spouse, is entitled to an award of accrued compensation for Mr. Byk’s loss of use of his
bilateral arms, hands, legs, and feet due to a brain injury sustained in an industrial accident
prior to his death under R.C. 4123.57(B) and 4123.60.

IV. DISPOSITION
       {¶ 74} After an examination of the magistrate’s decision, an independent review of
the record pursuant to Civ.R. 53, and due consideration of the parties’ objections and
arguments, we sustain Ms. Byk’s two objections, overrule Republic Steel’s two objections,
overrule the commission’s first objection, and sustain the commission’s second objection.
       {¶ 75} Accordingly, we modify the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law for the reasons discussed above. We grant a limited writ of mandamus directing the
No. 17AP-511                                                                          22

commission to vacate its November 3, 2016 order and issue a new order adjudicating Ms.
Byk’s application consistent with law and this decision.

                                     Objections sustained in part, and overruled in part;
                                                     limited writ of mandamus granted.

                     MENTEL P.J. and BEATTY BLUNT, J., concur.
No. 17AP-511                                                                           23

                                        APPENDIX

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Pin Cha Byk,                   :

               Relator,                      :

v.                                           :                   No. 17AP-511

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al.,        :              (REGULAR CALENDAR)

               Respondents.                  :

                          MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

                              Rendered on November 28, 2023

               Dean R. Wagner and Vincent J. DeLorenzo, for relator.

               Dave Yost, Attorney General, and John R. Smart, for
               respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

               Morrow & Meyer, LLC, and Tod T. Morrow, for respondent
               Republic Steel.

                                     IN MANDAMUS

       {¶ 76} Relator Pin Cha Byk seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent
Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission”) to vacate its order denying loss of use
compensation to Pin Cha Byk, as the surviving spouse of Bohdanus Byk.
       {¶ 77} By way of background, Bohdanus Byk sought and was denied loss of use
compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B). A mandamus action in Bohdanus Byk’s name
seeking review of the commission’s denial was dismissed by this court following his death.
While Bohdanus Byk’s mandamus action was still pending, Pin Cha Byk filed with the
commission an application for compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.60 asserting
entitlement to a loss of use award under R.C. 4123.57(B) based on Bohdanus Byk’s injuries.
No. 17AP-511                                                                                               24

Following the commission’s denial of that application, Pin Cha Byk filed the instant
mandamus action. As this matter involves interrelated and often chronologically
overlapping proceedings before the commission and this court, the following findings of
fact are grouped chronologically by action rather than strictly chronologically.

I. Findings of Fact
        {¶ 78} 1. Bohdanus Byk suffered severe injuries on August 20, 2012 in the course
and arising out of his employment with respondent Republic Steel. While cleaning a ladle
car, Bohdanus Byk slipped, fell on the cement, and hit his head. After being transported to
hospital, he underwent a right frontal decompressive craniotomy with drainage and
evacuation of the right temporal acute subdural hematoma as well as superior frontal
intraparenchymal hematomas. Following surgery, Bohdanus Byk remained in a persistent
vegetative state until his death on May 3, 2015.
        {¶ 79} 2. Bohdanus Byk’s workers’ compensation claim was recognized for the
following conditions: subarachnoid hemorrhage; subdural hemorrhage; intracerebral
hemorrhage; fracture left ribs 3-6; subdural hematoma; intraparenchymal hematoma;
subarachnoid hemorrhage with significant traumatic brain injury status post-
decompressive craniotomy with resultant persistent vegetative state; neuralgic bowel;
bladder dysfunction; chronic respiratory failure.

A. Bohdanus Byk’s Loss of Use Claim Pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B)
        {¶ 80} 3. In October 2013 and January 2014, Bohdanus Byk filed C-86 motions
seeking compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) for loss of use of his right and left upper
extremities and right and left lower extremities. Byk’s January 2014 motion was supported
in part by the reports of Dean W. Erickson, M.D., which were completed following an
examination of Bohdanus Byk on December 19, 2013.4

4 In the first report, Dr. Erickson addressed whether Bohdanus Byk’s workers’ compensation claim should be

amended to include additional allowed conditions. (Stip. at 3-9.) In the second report, Dr. Erickson addressed
whether Bohdanus Byk had for all practical intent and purposes permanently lost the use of his bilateral upper
extremities, including both arms and hands, and his bilateral lower extremities, including both legs and feet.
(Stip. at 320-26.) Aside from the opinions in the conclusion, the body of Dr. Erickson’s reports appear largely
identical. Having reviewed both reports and considering that the additional allowances discussed in the first
report are not at issue in this matter, references in this decision to Dr. Erickson’s report following his
December 19, 2013 examination of Bohdanus Byk are to the second identified report that addressed loss of
use.
No. 17AP-511                                                                                             25

        {¶ 81} 4. Dr. Erickson initially noted that Bohdanus Byk was in a persistent
vegetative state and was unresponsive, so Dr. Erickson obtained the history of the matter
from medical records and conversations with Pin Cha Byk and Tim Thurman, one of
Bohdanus Byk’s coworkers at Republic Steel. Prior to his work-related injury, Bohdanus
Byk was reportedly in good health without prior neurological injuries or conditions. After
his injury and hospitalization, Bohdanus Byk’s prognosis was “extremely poor and it was
concluded that he would never recover neurologically.” (Stip. at 322.) At the time of Dr.
Erickson’s examination, Bohdanus Byk was under the following protocols for his care:
“PICC line for IV, PEG feeding tube, Constant demand ventilator with oxygen for
respiratory failure, Indwelling urinary catheter, Utilization of diapers for loss of bowel
function, Specialized mattress and extremity padding to prevent ulcers.” (Stip. at 322.)5
Regarding his condition at the time of examination, Dr. Erickson stated:
                Currently, Mr. Byk is in a persistent vegetative state. There is
                no meaningful response or spontaneous attempts at
                communication. Mr. Byk essentially lies quietly, with only
                occasional, non-purposeful motion of right upper extremity
                such as reaching up to pick at his face or eyebrow. He
                reportedly has very minimal non-purposeful movements of
                both feet and has had no movement of his left upper
                extremity. The only response reported in the record, or by
                Mrs. Byk or Mr. Thurman, is that Mrs. Byk is at times able to
                get Mr. Byk to open up his eyes with her voice commands.
                Occasionally, this will also happen if his hand is held. They
                state that he does not respond to voice commands of others.
                Finally, it is noted that Mr. Byk does have a bit of facial
                sensation if there is a light touch to the open craniotomy area
                of his skull.
                ***
                In terms of function, Mr. Byk has none. Apparently, there
                were several times when the family and staff have gotten him
                into a sitting position in a chair; however, he has not been able
                to do that for months.
(Stip. at 323.) “[B]ased on the severe neurologic sequelae of [Bohdanus Byk’s] traumatic
brain injury with resultant loss of purposeful motions with joint contractures,” Dr. Erickson

5 Multiple supplemental stipulations to the evidence were filed following the original stipulation. As these

supplemental stipulations were numbered consecutively to the original stipulation, documents in all
stipulations are referred to by page number only without further differentiation.
No. 17AP-511                                                                              26

concluded that Bohdanus Byk “for all practical intent and purposes has permanently lost
the use” of his right and left upper extremities, including his arms and hands, and right and
left lower extremities, including his feet and legs. (Stip. at 326.)
       {¶ 82} 5. Bohdanus Byk was next examined by Richard J. Reichert, M.D., on
February 6, 2014. In a February 10, 2014 report, Dr. Reichert stated that “[i]nterview with
the caregiver * * * and Ms. Byk identified that the individual will routinely hold a stuffed
animal in his right hand and will use the right hand to scratch or touch his face area” and
that “[p]roviding him a stuffed animal to grasp reportedly keeps him from pulling on his
various support tubing.” (Stip. at 12.) Dr. Reichert stated the following with regard to his
examination of Bohdanus Byk:
                 My examination of Mr. Byk revealed a gentleman who was
                 bedridden. He had heel pads/cushions to avoid development
                 of pressure sores. * * * He did withdraw from painful stimuli
                 in the right upper extremity and left lower extremity. He had
                 an equivocal withdrawal in the left upper extremity and no
                 evidence of withdrawal in the right lower extremity. There was
                 atrophy noted in the musculature past the knees in both lower
                 extremities.
                 ***
                 With the right hand, he grabbed and held onto a stuffed
                 animal. He also gave what appeared to be a response to a
                 verbal request to squeeze my fingers.
(Stip. at 12.)
       {¶ 83} At the conclusion of his report, Dr. Reichert provided opinions in response to
a series of questions. Asked whether there is any injury or damage to Bohdanus Byk’s spinal
cord which rendered him a quadriplegic or paraplegic, Dr. Reichert responded, “I found no
medical evidence to substantiate a diagnosis of spinal cord injury in Mr. Byk and, as such,
there is no evidence of quadriplegia or paraplegia.” (Stip. at 15.) Asked whether Bohdanus
Byk had purposeful movement of his extremities, Dr. Reichert stated:
                 Mr. Byk had purposeful movement of the right upper
                 extremity on the date of my examination. There is notation
                 made as recently as 09/03/2013 that the individual has
                 bilateral lower extremity purposeful movements. It is noted
                 shortly after this that the individual was admitted for sepsis
                 and found to have an increase in encephalopathy and CT
                 evidence of new left hemisphere cerebral bleed in the left basal
                 ganglia and in the left subinsular cortex. It is noted that his
No. 17AP-511                                                                                27

               medical records identify evidence of the individual pulling out
               his catheter in April of 2013. Lower extremity spontaneous
               movements were noted on 01/03/2013 as well. A nursing note
               of 04/29/2013 identified purposeful movement of the left arm
               and response to squeezing request with the right hand on that
               same date.
(Stip. at 15.) In response to being asked whether Bohdanus Byk would have function of
his extremities if not for the brain injury, Dr. Reichert stated: “In my review of the medical
records, I did not find any evidence that this individual had extremity trauma. There is no
evidence of extremity trauma to my examination as well. * * * If not for the brain injury,
Mr. Byk would be expected to have function of his extremities.” (Stip. at 15.) Finally, asked
whether it was accurate that Bohdanus Byk had function of his extremities but does not
engage that function due to his brain injury and persistent vegetative state, Dr. Reichert
responded: “Yes. Mr. Byk’s brain injury and subsequent neurological sequelae from that
injury are responsible for the persistent vegetative state and specifically the function of his
extremities, both upper and lower. His neurologic/brain injury prevents Mr. Byk from
engaging his extremities to attain normal function.” (Stip. at 15.)
       {¶ 84} 6. In an order dated February 20, 2014, a commission district hearing
officer (“DHO”) awarded compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) for Bohdanus Byk’s
loss of use of his right and left upper extremities, including arms and hands, and loss of use
of his right and left lower extremities, including legs and feet. Republic Steel appealed the
DHO’s order.
       {¶ 85} 7. In an addendum dated March 12, 2014, Dr. Erickson addressed
Dr. Reichert’s report. With regard to Dr. Reichert’s opinion that there was no evidence of
injury or damage to Bohdanus Byk’s spinal cord that would render him quadriplegic or
paraplegic, Dr. Erickson “agree[d] with Dr. Reichert’s assessment in that I also found no
evidence of a spinal cord injury.” (Stip. at 36.) Dr. Erickson further stated:
               Dr. Reichert did conclude based on his evaluation and his
               review of the medical record that Mr. Byk did have purposeful
               movements of at least of [sic] his right upper extremity on the
               date of his examination and reference to bilateral lower
               extremity purposeful movements in September 2013. I would
               respectfully disagree with Dr. Reichert’s assessment of what
               constitutes purposeful movement. Purposeful movement by
               definition requires higher cortical function which
               unfortunately Mr. Byk does not possess. In the absence of
No. 17AP-511                                                                                 28

                 higher cortical function there cannot be a purposeful
                 movement. There is no evidence that Mr. Byk’s occasional
                 movement of his right upper extremity to touch his face is in
                 anyway [sic] considered purposeful.
                 Dr. Reichert then concludes that if not for the brain injury,
                 Mr. Byk would be expected to have function of his extremities
                 and that Mr. Byk’s neurologic/brain injury prevented Mr. Byk
                 from engaging his extremities to attain normal function. I
                 would agree with Dr. Reichert’s assessment that indeed Mr.
                 Byk’s lack of purposeful movement or for that matter any use
                 of his extremities is due to the brain injury.
(Stip. at 36.)
       {¶ 86} 8. On April 8, 2014, a commission staff hearing officer (“SHO”) vacated the
DHO’s order and denied Bohdanus Byk’s loss of use claim. The SHO found that Bohdanus
Byk “failed to establish he is entitled to the payment for the scheduled loss of use of all four
extremities,” and stated that the “order is based on [R.C.] 4123.57(B) and the decision set
forth in Smith v. Industrial Commission of Ohio.” (Stip. at 39.) Applying State ex rel. Smith
v. Indus. Comm., 138 Ohio St.3d 312, 2014-Ohio-513, the SHO made the following findings:
                 [T]he Injured Worker also suffers from the loss of brain-stem
                 functioning. The claim is also recognized for persistent
                 vegetative state. Because of the lack of higher cortical
                 functioning, the Injured Worker’s extremities have no
                 purposeful movement. Counsel for the Injured Worker
                 contends the Injured Worker is entitled to the scheduled loss
                 of use of the four extremities as a consequence of the loss of
                 brain-stem functioning. Based on the reasoning set forth in
                 the Smith case, the Staff Hearing Officer finds that
                 [R.C.] 4123.57(B) does not authorize compensation for the
                 loss of brain stem functioning.
(Stip. at 39.) Thus, the SHO denied Bohdanus Byk’s request for compensation.
       {¶ 87} 9. Bohdanus Byk’s appeal from the SHO’s order was refused by the
commission on April 29, 2014.
       {¶ 88} 10. Bohdanus Byk filed a mandamus action in this court on March 6, 2015
seeking review of the SHO order. Bohdanus Byk voluntarily dismissed the action on May 8,
2015. State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-157 (May 13, 2015) (Journal
Entry of Dismissal).
       {¶ 89} 11. Following Bohdanus Byk’s death on May 3, 2015, a mandamus action in
the name of Bohdanus Byk was filed in this court on October 29, 2015 in case No. 15AP-
No. 17AP-511                                                                            29

992. Upon motion, Pin Cha Byk, in her capacity as executrix of the estate of Bohdanus Byk,
was substituted as the relator in the action by entry on November 13, 2015.
       {¶ 90} 12. On January 20, 2022, this court dismissed the mandamus action
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1). State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-992,
2022-Ohio-136, ¶ 13 (“Byk I”).

B. Pin Cha Byk’s Claim for Benefits Pursuant to R.C. 4123.60 & R.C. 4123.57(B)
       {¶ 91} 13. On April 21, 2016, Pin Cha Byk filed with the commission a C-86 motion
for benefits pursuant to R.C. 4123.60 as the surviving spouse and dependent of Bohdanus
Byk. Pin Cha Byk sought an award of compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) for
Bohdanus Byk’s loss of use of his right and left upper extremities, including arms and
hands, and loss of use of his right and left lower extremities, including legs and feet. In
support of her motion, Pin Cha Byk relied on the two reports of Dr. Erickson following his
December 19, 2013 exam of Bohdanus Byk in addition to the medical evidence in the file.
       {¶ 92} 14. A commission DHO denied Pin Cha Byk’s April 21, 2016 motion by order
mailed July 6, 2016. Pin Cha Byk appealed the denial.
       {¶ 93} 15. On August 16, 2016, a commission SHO affirmed the DHO’s July 6, 2016
order. Noting that Bohdanus Byk’s motion for loss of use of bilateral upper and lower
extremities pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) was denied by order on April 8, 2014, the SHO
stated that “[t]herefore, the request by the Widow-Claimant for accrued compensation for
scheduled loss of the right and left upper and right and left lower extremities is denied.”
(Stip. at 263.) Pin Cha Byk then appealed the SHO’s order.
       {¶ 94} 16. On December 10, 2016, the commission issued an order affirming the
SHO’s August 16, 2016 order. The commission made the following findings:
               The Surviving Spouse’s request is based on the prior request
               by the Decedent Injured Worker for an award under R.C.
               4123.57 for the loss of use of all the extremities, filed
               01/21/2014.
               The initial request for an award based on the loss of use of the
               extremities was filed by the Decedent Injured Worker on
               01/21/2014, and adjudicated and denied by the Staff Hearing
               Officer order, issued 04/08/2014. Because the request was
               denied by a final decision at the administrative level, the
               Decedent Injured Worker’s entitlement to the loss-of-use
               award has already been determined and denied, and based on
No. 17AP-511                                                                             30

               this action, there is no award for the loss of use of the
               extremities he would be entitled to and no accrued
               compensation for a loss of use of the extremities. Therefore,
               there is no entitlement award or accrued compensation
               payable pursuant to R.C. 4123.61 to the Surviving Spouse. The
               Surviving Spouse is collaterally estopped from receiving an
               award for the Decedent’s loss of use of the extremities under
               R.C. 4123.57 based on the denial of the Decedent’s request for
               this award by the Staff Hearing Officer order, issued
               04/08/2014.
(Stip. at 317-18.)
       {¶ 95} 17. Pin Cha Byk filed with this court her complaint that is the subject of the
present mandamus action on July 18, 2017.
       {¶ 96} 18. Republic Steel filed a motion to dismiss on August 1, 2017. The
commission filed a motion to dismiss on August 23, 2017. On May 13, 2022, the magistrate
previously assigned to this matter denied the motions to dismiss. The magistrate concluded
that Pin Cha Byk “may adjudicate in this action the question of whether she is entitled to a
writ of mandamus because the commission had a clear legal duty to award R.C. 4123.57(B)
benefits based on the nature of [Bohdanus Byk’s] injury.” (May 13, 2022 Mag.’s Order at 3.)
       {¶ 97} 19. With answers having been filed, the matter proceeded to briefing and
argument.

II. Discussion and Conclusions of Law
       {¶ 98} Pin Cha Byk seeks review of the commission’s order denying her application
as a dependent under R.C. 4123.60 for loss of use compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B)
based on Bohdanus Byk’s injuries.

A. Compensation for Dependents Following the Death of an Injured Worker
       {¶ 99} An injured worker’s cause of action under the Workers’ Compensation Act
accrues at the time the worker is injured in the course of employment, whereas the cause
of action of a worker’s dependent accrues at the time of the worker’s death. Indus. Comm.
v. Kamrath, 118 Ohio St. 1 (1928), paragraphs three and four of the syllabus. “Such causes
of action are separate and independent, neither being dependent upon nor affected by the
determination of the other.” Indus. Comm. v. Davis, 126 Ohio St. 593 (1933), paragraph
two of the syllabus.
No. 17AP-511                                                                          31

       {¶ 100} “When a claimant dies, an action pending at the time of death is abated by
the claimant’s death.” State ex rel. Coleman v. Indus. Comm., 136 Ohio St.3d 77, 2013-
Ohio-2406, ¶ 13, fn. 2. Abatement of workers’ compensation actions is addressed by Ohio
Adm.Code 4123-5-21, which provides:
               (A) When a claimant dies, action on any application filed by
               the claimant, and pending before the bureau of workers’
               compensation or the industrial commission at the time of his
               death, is abated by claimant’s death.
               (B) Abatement of action, as described in paragraph (A) of this
               rule, does not apply to payment for medical and hospital
               treatment, for medicine, nursing, and other health care
               services rendered as a result of the injury or occupational
               disease for which the claim was allowed during the deceased
               claimant’s lifetime, provided that the respective bills were
               filed within the time as required by law and by the rules of the
               industrial commission and the bureau.
See also Ohio Adm.Code 4123-3-10(A)(6)(b) (“When a claimant dies prior to endorsing a
compensation check or accessing an electronic benefit payment, no one has the right to
endorse and cash such check or access the electronic benefit funds. * * * Upon receipt of
information of claimant’s death, payment of compensation shall be terminated and
proper entry made in the records of the bureau.”).
       {¶ 101} “R.C. 4123.60 addresses eligibility of dependents to receive compensation
for which a deceased worker was entitled to but did not receive prior to death.” State ex
rel. Masterson v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-83, 2019-Ohio-5217, ¶ 6. In
pertinent part, the statute provides:
               If the decedent would have been lawfully entitled to have
               applied for an award at the time of his death the administrator
               may, after satisfactory proof to warrant an award and
               payment, award and pay an amount, not exceeding the
               compensation which the decedent might have received, but
               for his death, for the period prior to the date of his death, to
               such of the dependents of the decedent, or for services
               rendered on account of the last illness or death of such
               decedent, as the administrator determines in accordance with
               the circumstances in each such case, but such payments may
               be made only in cases in which application for compensation
               was made in the manner required by this chapter, during the
               lifetime of such injured or disabled person, or within one year
               after the death of such injured or disabled person.
No. 17AP-511                                                                                        32

R.C. 4123.60. Thus, R.C. 4123.60 allows a deceased claimant’s dependents to receive an
award up to the amount the claimant would have received if the claimant would have
lawfully been entitled to apply for such award while alive. R.C. 4123.60 permits
dependents to receive such an award only where the application was filed either during
the deceased claimant’s lifetime or within one year after the deceased claimant’s death.
See State ex rel. Scott v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 73 Ohio St.3d 202, 204 (1995) (finding
that surviving spouse’s application for scheduled loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57
was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in R.C. 4123.60).

B. Loss of Use Claims Under R.C. 4123.57(B)
       {¶ 102} “R.C. 4123.57(B) provides for scheduled-loss compensation that is paid to
an injured worker for the loss of a body part as listed in the schedule.” Coleman, 2013-
Ohio-2406, at ¶ 16. In pertinent part, the schedule in R.C. 4123.57(B) provides:
               For the loss of a hand, one hundred seventy-five weeks.
               For the loss of an arm, two hundred twenty-five weeks.
               ***
               For the loss of a foot, one hundred fifty weeks.
               For the loss of a leg, two hundred weeks.
R.C. 4123.57(B).6 Thus, the statute “specifies, to some degree, how loss is measured, based
on the anatomy of the affected member.” State ex rel. Riter v. Indus. Comm., 91 Ohio
St.3d 89, 90 (2001). “The claimant bears the burden of proving entitlement to
compensation.” State ex rel. Koepf v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-753, 2019-Ohio-
3789, ¶ 6, citing State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 81 Ohio St.3d 56,
57 (1998).
       {¶ 103} Generally, and as relevant to hands, arms, feet, and legs, R.C. 4123.57(B)
does not define loss. When the loss of use statute was originally construed, amputation
was considered the only compensable loss. See State ex rel. Bohan v. Indus. Comm., 146
Ohio St. 618 (1946), paragraph two of the syllabus (holding that the “word ‘loss’ as used
in [the scheduled loss statute] and therein applied to certain members of the human body

6 R.C. 4123.57 has been amended multiple times since Pin Cha Byk filed her motion for benefits with the

commission on April 21, 2016. However, the changes wrought by those amendments are not at issue in this
matter.
No. 17AP-511                                                                                33

means loss by severance and not the loss of use of such members”). This interpretation
was overruled when the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “loss” as used in R.C. 4123.57
“includes ‘loss of use’ and not merely ‘loss by severance’ ” so as “to alleviate the ‘obviously
unjust result, whereby a claimant’s award is measured by the fortuity of the events
contributing to his disability.’ ” State ex rel. Walker v. Indus. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d 402,
404 (1979), quoting State ex rel. Benton v. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 14 Ohio St.2d
130, 133 (1968) (stating further that “permanent impairment of a member without
severance generally entitles the injured employee to an award and is regarded as being
the same as loss by severance”).
       {¶ 104} In more recent years, the court recognized that a claimant may receive total
loss of use compensation where the medical evidence establishes a “permanent loss of use
of the injured bodily member for all practical intents and purposes.” State ex rel. Alcoa
Bldg. Prods. v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 341, 2004-Ohio-3166, ¶ 12. See State ex rel.
Varney v. Indus. Comm., 143 Ohio St.3d 181, 2014-Ohio-5510, ¶ 16 (stating that a
claimant “may qualify for a total loss of use even when the body part retains some residual
function”); Koepf at ¶ 7 (stating that a claimant must demonstrate the loss of use is
permanent and that a causal relationship exists between the allowed occupational injury
and the alleged loss of use); State ex rel. Waste Mgt. of Ohio v. Indus. Comm., 171 Ohio
St.3d 68, 2022-Ohio-4581, ¶ 19, quoting State ex rel. Moorehead v. Indus. Comm., 112
Ohio St.3d 27, 2006-Ohio-6364, ¶ 14, 16 (stating that “ ‘R.C. 4123.57(B) does not specify
a required length of time of survival after a loss-of-use injury before benefits pursuant to
R.C. 4123.57(B) are payable” and noting that “ ‘there is no language in R.C. 4123.57(B)
requiring that an injured worker be consciously aware of his paralysis in order to qualify
for scheduled loss benefits’ ”). See also State ex rel. Meissner v. Indus. Comm., 94 Ohio
St.3d 203, 205 (2002) (stating that “when dealing with amputation, R.C. 4123.57(B) is far
less opaque,” but “[l]oss of use without amputation * * * can be more complicated”).
       {¶ 105} Since Walker and Alcoa, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the issue
of “whether R.C. 4123.57(B) permits an award of compensation for the scheduled loss of
vision or hearing when the inability to comprehend sights or sounds results from a lack
of brain-stem function.” State ex rel. Smith v. Indus. Comm., 138 Ohio St.3d 312, 2014-
Ohio-513, ¶ 12. In Smith, the court found in a four-to-three decision that the claimant’s
No. 17AP-511                                                                              34

loss of brain stem functioning, which resulted in an inability to comprehend sights or
sounds, was “a loss that the General Assembly has not included in the schedule for
compensation set forth in R.C. 4123.57.” Id. at ¶ 19. As a result, the court found the
commission “properly denied his claim seeking additional compensation for loss of vision
and hearing” even though the medical evidence established the claimant “lack[ed] the
ability to process visual and auditory stimuli” as a result of the industrial injury. Id. at
¶ 18.
        {¶ 106} Following Smith, this court held that “where there is only a loss of brain
function * * * and no injury to a body part listed in R.C. 4123.57(B), and no other injury
to the body, the commission does not abuse its discretion in failing to award loss of use
compensation under R.C. 4123.57.” State ex rel. Walters v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No.
20AP-560, 2022-Ohio-4587, ¶ 22 (finding that the commission did not abuse its
discretion in denying loss of use compensation to surviving spouse where the decedent
injured worker suffered a traumatic cardiac arrest as a result of traumatic asphyxiation,
sustaining a severe anoxic brain injury).

C. Application
        {¶ 107} Pin Cha Byk asserts the commission erred in denying her application for
compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.60 on the basis of collateral estoppel. The commission
responds that this matter “has nothing to do with collateral estoppel” and does not attempt
to defend its order denying Pin Cha Byk’s application for compensation on this basis.
(Comm. Brief at 12.) The commission’s response is not borne out by the plain text of the
commission’s order denying Pin Cha Byk’s appeal from the SHO’s order. In that order, the
commission states that “[t]he Surviving Spouse is collaterally estopped from receiving an
award for the Decedent’s loss of use of the extremities under R.C. 4123.57 based on the
denial of the Decedent’s request for this award by the Staff Hearing Officer order, issued
[April 8, 2014].” (Stip. at 318.) Thus, a stated basis for the commission’s denial of Pin Cha
Byk’s request for compensation was collateral estoppel. Nevertheless, unlike the
commission, Republic Steel argues that the commission correctly denied Pin Cha Byk’s
application under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
        {¶ 108} Beyond collateral estoppel, both the commission and Republic Steel argue
that the commission did not err in denying Pin Cha Byk’s application for compensation
No. 17AP-511                                                                               35

pursuant to R.C. 4123.60 because they argue that Bohdanus Byk would not have been
lawfully entitled to have applied for an award at the time of his death. This court, in its
decision in Byk I, has already provided an answer as to whether collateral estoppel bars Pin
Cha Byk’s application and whether R.C. 4123.60 permitted Pin Cha Byk to claim that
Bohdanus Byk was lawfully entitled to the scheduled loss-of-use benefits.
       {¶ 109} In Byk I, this court first considered whether Bohdanus Byk’s application for
scheduled loss benefits pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) had abated on Bohdanus Byk’s death.
Based on the language of R.C. 4123.60, Pin Cha Byk argued an application for benefits only
abates if the application was pending before the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation or the
commission at the time of the applicant’s death. Because the commission had already
denied Bohdanus Byk’s application for scheduled loss benefits before his death, Pin Cha
Byk argued that the application had not abated. This court rejected those arguments, noting
that there exist “two circumstances under which a deceased worker’s claim does not abate
upon the worker’s death: (1) where the commission has allowed the claim, and (2) where
the claimant has successfully prevailed in court on a challenge to the commission’s denial
of the claim before the claimant dies.” (Emphasis sic.) Byk I at ¶ 8. The court further noted
caselaw holding that “when an injured worker’s claim abates upon his death, a deceased
spouse cannot ‘pursue’ an injured worker’s claim on his behalf.” Id. at ¶ 9, citing State ex
rel. Nicholson v. Copperweld Steel Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 193, 196 (1996). Therefore, the court
held that “because Bohdanus Byk died after the commission denied his claim for scheduled
loss-of-use payments but before Bohdanus Byk successfully challenged the commission’s
denial, his claim for scheduled loss-of-use benefits abated at the time of his death.” Id. at
¶ 10. The court further held that “because Bohdanus Byk’s claim for scheduled loss-of-use
payments abated upon his death, his estate could not pursue the claim on his behalf,” and
concluded that dismissal was warranted. Id.
       {¶ 110} Next, addressing Pin Cha Byk’s argument that if the court “conclude[d] that
Bohdanus Byk lacked standing to initiate this mandamus action after his death, then she,
as representative of Bohdanus Byk’s estate is being denied judicial review of a final order of
the commission,” this court stated, “We do not agree.” Byk I at ¶ 11. The court expressly
found that “R.C. 4123.60 specifically provides an opportunity for Pin Cha Byk to make a
claim to the commission that Bohdanus Byk was lawfully entitled to the scheduled loss-of-
No. 17AP-511                                                                               36

use benefits.” Id. Emphasizing this point, the court stated that “Pin Cha Byk’s remedy * * *
is in her R.C. 4123.60 action.” Id. In support of its finding, the court cited to Vincent v.
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 7th Dist. No. 99-JE-7, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3662
(July 27, 1999), explaining that under this case “[a]n abated workers’ compensation claim
will not have collateral estoppel implications in the surviving spouse’s R.C. 4123.60 action.”
Id. Furthermore, the court found that it was not necessary to “address whether the
commission abused its discretion in denying the claim for scheduled loss-of-use benefits as
the claim had abated and any review of the commission’s denial of benefits would have
resulted in an advisory opinion.” Id. The court concluded that “Bohdanus Byk lacked
standing to initiate the mandamus action, that Pin Cha Byk cannot pursue the mandamus
action on his behalf but has a remedy in her ongoing R.C. 4123.60 proceedings, and that
the instant mandamus action must be dismissed.” (Emphasis added.) Byk I at ¶ 13.
       {¶ 111} Thus, this court found Pin Cha Byk was able pursuant to R.C. 4123.60 to
claim that Bohdanus Byk was lawfully entitled to the scheduled loss of use benefits. The
court also explained that a decedent’s abated workers’ compensation claim does not have
collateral estoppel consequences for the surviving spouse’s claim brought pursuant to
R.C. 4123.60. Neither Republic Steel nor the commission sought review of this decision
before the Supreme Court of Ohio. See State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm., 166 Ohio St.3d
1451, 2022-Ohio-1002 (dismissing appeal filed by Pin Cha Byk). Therefore, consistent
with this court’s decision in Byk I, the arguments of the commission and Republic Steel
are not well taken.
       {¶ 112} The remaining question in this action as articulated by the magistrate
previously assigned to this matter is whether Pin Cha Byk is entitled to a writ of
mandamus because the commission had a clear legal duty to award scheduled loss of use
benefits under R.C. 4123.57(B) based on the nature of Bohdanus Byk’s injury. Under this
court’s precedent, such question must be answered in the negative.
       {¶ 113} As noted by the commission, Pin Cha Byk’s application as a dependent
under R.C. 4123.60 was based on Bohdanus Byk’s loss of use of his upper and lower
bilateral extremities, the same alleged loss of use previously sought by Bohdanus Byk. Thus,
the commission based its order denying Pin Cha Byk’s application on the April 8, 2014 SHO
order denying Bohdanus Byk’s loss of use claim. In the April 8, 2014 order, the SHO denied
No. 17AP-511                                                                               37

Bohdanus Byk’s loss of use claim because of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Smith,
finding R.C. 4123.57(B) did not authorize loss of use compensation based on lack of brain
stem functioning.
       {¶ 114} Republic Steel asserts the commission correctly found that Bohdanus Byk’s
injury did not support an award for loss of use of his bilateral upper and lower extremities
under R.C. 4123.57(B). Republic Steel argues the holding in Smith applies because the
alleged loss of use in this case, as in Smith, is based entirely on the lack of brain stem
functioning. Pin Cha Byk responds that Smith should not be extended to a claim for loss of
use of limbs. She argues that the reasoning of Smith was limited to claims for loss of vision
and hearing because, in Smith, “there was no way to quantify the amount of loss of vision
and hearing of the injured worker while being in a persistent vegetative state, absent some
damage to the structures of the eyes or ears that would allow a physician to determine
objectively [the injured worker] could not see or hear.” (Pin Cha Byk’s Reply Brief at 15.)
However, this court in Walters held otherwise.
       {¶ 115} In that case, the injured worker had no bodily fractures, organ injuries, or
injuries to his arms or legs. Rather, a traumatic cardiac arrest as a result of traumatic
asphyxiation left the injured worker with a severe anoxic brain injury following his
resuscitation. As a result of the anoxic brain injury, the injured worker was left without
the function of his arms and legs until his death. Noting the holding of Smith, i.e., that
loss of brain stem functioning does not exist in the schedule of compensation under
R.C. 4123.57(B), the court found that “R.C. 4123.57(B) does not authorize loss of use
compensation when a loss of brain function is the only cause of the loss of use of an arm
or arms and/or a leg or legs rather than damage to the structure of one or both arms
and/or one or both legs.” Walters, 2022-Ohio-4587, at ¶ 19. The court distinguished prior
cases where loss of use compensation was awarded for loss of use of extremities because
those cases involved spinal or neck injuries in addition to brain injury. Thus, this court
held that “where there is only a loss of brain function (i.e., as in the instant case in which
decedent suffered a traumatic cardiac arrest as a result of traumatic asphyxiation,
sustaining a severe anoxic brain injury), and no injury to a body part listed in
R.C. 4123.57(B), and no other injury to the body, the commission does not abuse its
discretion in failing to award loss of use compensation under R.C. 4123.57.” Id. at ¶ 22.
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       {¶ 116} Here, neither Dr. Reichert’s report nor the reports of Dr. Erickson reflect
any injury to Bohdanus Byk’s arms or legs. There is no record of a spinal cord injury. Rather,
Dr. Reichert concluded that “Mr. Byk’s brain injury and subsequent neurological sequelae
from that injury are responsible for the persistent vegetative state and specifically the
function of his extremities, both upper and lower.” (Stip. at 15.) Dr. Erickson found that
Bohdanus Byk “for all practical intent and purposes has permanently lost the use” of his
right and left upper extremities, including his arms and hands, and right and left lower
extremities, including his feet and legs on the basis of “the severe neurologic sequelae of
[Bohdanus Byk’s] traumatic brain injury with resultant loss of purposeful motions with
joint contractures.” (Stip. at 326.) Thus, the record reflects, and Pin Cha Byk does not
otherwise contend, that any loss of use of Bohdanus Byk’s bilateral upper and lower
extremities was solely the result of his severe, traumatic brain injury. In accordance with
Walters, Pin Cha Byk has not demonstrated a clear legal right to an award of scheduled
loss of use compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) based on Bohdanus Byk’s injuries or that
the commission was under a clear legal duty to grant loss of use compensation.

D. Conclusion
       {¶ 117} Therefore, Pin Cha Byk has not demonstrated a clear legal right to the
requested relief or that the commission is under a clear legal duty to provide such relief.
Accordingly, it is the decision and recommendation of the magistrate that Pin Cha Byk’s
request for a writ of mandamus should be denied.

                                               /S/ MAGISTRATE
                                               JOSEPH E. WENGER IV

                               NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

               Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
               error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or
               legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
               finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R.
               53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects
               to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R.
               53(D)(3)(b). A party may file written objections to the
               magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the
               decision.