Court Opinion

ID: 9536602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:03:16.812839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:50.664449
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE LEE
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part I of the majority opinion but respectfully dissent to Part II.
The evidence presented by the People, together with the reasonable inferences therefrom, concerning the manner in which the defendant drove his vehicle during the “cops and robbers” *332chase, in my view, was sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon.
Viewing the chase in the context of the events of the evening, as described in the majority opinion, it becomes clear that the swerving of defendant’s vehicle was not the innocent act of one who was lawfully operating his vehicle on the streets of Boulder and who unfortunately became the victim of a mechanical brake or steering malfunction, as the defendant suggested in his testimony. The swerving was not an isolated occurrence but happened, according to the police officers, three times during the high-speed chase which lasted for a period of approximately twenty minutes.
The jury could reasonably conclude under all the circumstances that the defendant three times deliberately swerved his car toward the surveillance car during the chase, thus forcing the surveillance car to take evasive action to avoid a collision and potentially grievous personal injuries; that the defendant’s conduct in driving his car toward the police car was motivated by an abandoned and malignant heart, as evidenced by the unrestrained manner in which the car was being driven at that time; and that defendant’s intention was to cause bodily injury upon the officers in the other car.
That the defendant’s car did not cross the lane dividing the two driving lanes or make actual contact with the police car would not, in my view, lessen the criminal culpability demonstrated by the defendant in the operation of his car under the circumstances then existing.
I would affirm the judgment of conviction of assault with a deadly weapon.
I am authorized to say that MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PRINGLE and MR. JUSTICE KELLEY join in this dissent.