Court Opinion

ID: 9954668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 18:03:16.173762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:09.233487
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 P. v. Dowell-Rollins CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098295

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. Nos. 22CF05768,
                                                                                         23CF00736)
           v.

 PATRICK LEE DOWELL-ROLLINS,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Patrick Lee Dowell-Rollins pled no contest to one count of assault with
a semiautomatic firearm, one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, and one count
of attempting to dissuade a witness. Defendant was sentenced, in relevant part, to the
upper term of nine years for assault with a semiautomatic rifle.

                                                             1
       Defendant raises two arguments on appeal: (1) Penal Code1 section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) prohibits the imposition of the upper term even when the lower term
presumption is defeated; and (2) even if imposition of the upper term is allowed, the trial
court abused its discretion here by relying on the same aggravating circumstances to
defeat the lower term presumption and justify imposition of the upper term, i.e., the trial
court engaged in an improper dual use of facts. The People argue defendant forfeited
both arguments. In the alternative, the People contend both arguments are without merit.
We agree with the People on the merits and affirm.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       To resolve two cases, defendant pled no contest to one count of assault with a
semiautomatic rifle, one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, and one count of
dissuading a witness. In exchange for the no contest plea, the prosecution dismissed one
count of possession of a firearm by a felon and two allegations attached to the assault—
that defendant inflicted great bodily injury and personally used a firearm during the
commission of the offense. Defendant further entered a Harvey2 waiver.
       On defendant’s plea form, he waived his statutory right to a jury trial or court trial
on the aggravating circumstances and stipulated the sentencing judge could find
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as they appeared in defendant’s police and
probation reports.
       During sentencing, the trial court recognized defendant “experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including but not limited to abuse, neglect,
exploitation, or sexual violence.” The trial court also took “into account . . . defendant
may have had a mental health diagnosis.” The trial court then recognized the

1      Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2      People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

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presumption of the lower term pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) but found “an
imposition of the lower term would not be in the interests of justice because the
aggravating [circumstances] outweigh the mitigating [circumstances] in terms of their
significance.”
       The trial court recognized as a mitigating circumstance that defendant “may have
been suffering from a mental or physical condition that may have reduced culpability
toward his crime.” The court then sentenced defendant to the upper term for the assault
based on six aggravating circumstances: (1) “[D]efendant’s prior convictions as an adult
are numerous or of increasing seriousness and nature;” (2) “defendant has served prior
prison terms;” (3) “defendant was on [postrelease community supervision];” (4) “this
crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other
acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness;” (5) “the manner in
which this crime was committed indicat[ed] planning, sophistication, or
professionalism;” and “lastly, . . . [(6)] defendant engaged in conduct that indicates a
serious danger to society.”
       Defendant appeals.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                        Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(6) Does Not
                   Prohibit The Imposition Of An Upper-term Sentence
       Defendant argues the imposition of an upper-term sentence when the lower term
presumption applies runs afoul of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), even if the
presumption is defeated and the requirements in subdivision (b)(2) are met. The People
contend defendant forfeited his statutory argument by failing to raise it at the sentencing
hearing, and, in the alternative, the argument lacks merit.
       We disagree with the People that defendant forfeited his statutory argument.
Issues of statutory interpretation, given they are pure legal questions, compose a narrow

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category of nonforfeitable error. (See People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037,
1043.) “ ‘The appellate court may intervene in the first instance because these errors
“present[] ‘pure questions of law’ [citation], and [are] ‘ “clear and correctable”
independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing’ ” and without
“remanding for further findings.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       As to the merits, we disagree with defendant. “To resolve whether defendant’s
interpretation of the . . . statute[] is correct, we are guided by familiar canons of statutory
construction. ‘[I]n construing a statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of the
Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In determining that
intent, we first examine the words of the respective statutes: ‘If there is no ambiguity in
the language of the statute, “then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said,
and the plain meaning of the language governs.” [Citation.] “Where the statute is clear,
courts will not ‘interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not
exist.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] If, however, the terms of a statute provide no definitive
answer, then courts may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be
achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] ‘We must select the construction that
comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to
promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an
interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.’ ” (People v. Coronado (1995)
12 Cal.4th 145, 151.)
       Section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) provides that when a statute contains three
possible terms, the middle term is the maximum unless the requirements in subdivision
(b)(2) are met. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) provides an exception to the middle term
maximum when there are aggravating circumstances the defendant has stipulated to or
that “have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge
in a court trial.”

                                                4
       Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) provides an alternative presumptive maximum to
subdivision (b)(1) if certain conditions are met, although the trial court can overcome the
presumption. Under subdivision (b)(6), the lower term is the maximum
“[n]otwithstanding [subdivision (b)](1)” if the trial court finds that “psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma,” “youth,” or “intimate partner violence or human
trafficking” were “contributing factor[s] in the commission of the offense.” To overcome
the lower term presumption, a court need find only “that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
       Notably, the only positive command in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) is to
impose the lower term unless the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.
Nowhere does subdivision (b)(6) reference the middle term as the maximum sentence
when the presumption is defeated and the requirements in subdivision (b)(2) have been
met.
       Defendant makes only one argument connected to the text of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). Specifically, he reads the statute to imply the middle term as the
maximum sentence because the initial phrase of subdivision (b)(6) indicates it is
operative “[n]otwithstanding [subdivision (b)](1)” and subdivision (b)(1)’s presumption
that a defendant’s sentence not exceed the middle term. To defendant, this means when a
court finds a lower-term sentence is contrary to the interest of justice, the court must look
to subdivision (b)(1), which requires imposition of the middle term sentence. Defendant
argues if the Legislature sought to apply subdivision (b)(2)’s exception to the maximum
middle term when a defendant falls under subdivision (b)(6), it would have stated that
subdivision (b)(6) is operative “ ‘[n]otwithstanding [subdivisions] (b)(1)’ and (b)(2).”
(Italics omitted.)
       Defendant’s argument is without merit because section 1170, subdivision (b)(1)
incorporates subdivision (b)(2) by reference. As subdivision (b)(1) states, “When a

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judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms,
the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in [subdivision (b)](2).” (Italics added.)
Consequently, any reference to subdivision (b)(1) is also a reference to subdivision
(b)(2).
          Defendant next argues, “Sidestepping the middle term and instead imposing an
upper term sentence upon defendants who qualify for the lower term presumption runs
contrary to the spirit of rehabilitation and trauma-informed sentencing. [¶] . . . By
imposing the upper term, the trial court placed [defendant] in the position of a defendant
who never presumptively qualified for the lower term . . . , in effect treating his trauma
and the letter and spirit of section 1170, subdivision (b), as no longer impactful to its
sentencing issue.”
          To the contrary, there are two steps involved when going from the presumptive
lower term in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) to an upper-term sentence. One of the two
steps is applicable only to defendants who qualify for the lower term under subdivision
(b)(6), thus providing those defendants with an impactful added layer of protection when
compared to other defendants sentenced under 1170, subdivision (b). Indeed, to get from
the presumptive lower term—a presumption bestowed only upon subdivision (b)(6)
qualifiers—to the middle term, a trial court must find that the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice based on a balancing of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) To then get from the middle term to the upper
term, a defendant must stipulate to aggravating circumstances or a fact finder (either a
jury or court in a court trial) must find true the aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) In this way, the Legislature provided a means
to recognize the trauma that qualified defendants experienced and bestow upon them a
presumption unavailable to other defendants.

                                              6
       We acknowledge the Legislature embodied, as defendant put it, “the spirit of
rehabilitation and trauma-informed sentencing,” but it did so in a manner that offers less
protection than other areas of section 1170, subdivision (b). Subdivision (b)(2), for
example, allows for the imposition of the upper term only if aggravating circumstances
have been found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or bench trial, or if the defendant
stipulated to aggravating circumstances. That same protection does not exist in
subdivision (b)(6) to defeat the lower term presumption. Nor do defendants need to
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that they are entitled to the presumptive lower
term. In the end, the Legislature struck a balance and sought fit to enact trauma-informed
sentencing with the sentencing judge’s determination of whether “the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower
term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); see also
People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 204 [holding the trial right and beyond a
reasonable doubt standard in § 1170, subd. (b)(2) does not apply to subd. (b)(6)], review
denied Sept. 20, 2023, S281378; People v. Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
922, 929 [same].) To the extent the legislative policy conflicts with the text of the
statute, that is a matter for the Legislature. (See People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
237, 243, fn. 3.)
       Our position finds support in Bautista-Castanon, wherein the First District Court
of Appeal implicitly recognized the availability of the upper term when the lower term
presumption is defeated. (People v. Bautista-Castanon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 928
[“If this ‘interest of justice’ exception to the lower term applies (and if the prerequisites
for imposing an upper term set forth in [§ 1170,] subd. (b)(1)-(3) have not been met),
then the court may impose the middle term”].) Defendant urges us to reject Bautista-
Castanon’s implicit recognition as dicta, noting the issue in Bautista-Castanon was
whether the “true beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in section 1170, subdivision
(b)(2) applies to subdivision (b)(6). (Bautista-Castanon, at p. 929.) Nonetheless, we

                                               7
agree with the First District’s implicit resolution of the present issue for the reasons laid
out above.
       Defendant lastly relies on Hilburn, contending the court implicitly recognized the
middle term as the maximum sentence once the lower term presumption applies.
(People v. Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 202-205.) Defendant quotes the
following passage for support: “To summarize, under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
the [trial] court is tasked with assessing mitigating and aggravating [circumstances] to
impose the middle term only if it first determines that the defendant qualifies for
treatment under the provision.” (Id. at p. 205.)
       The quoted passage, however, does not imply the middle term is the maximum
term when the lower term presumption applies. Instead, the Hilburn court described that
a trial court considers aggravating circumstances only after it finds that the lower
presumption applies; there is no mention of what the maximum sentence is after the trial
court defeats the lower term presumption and further satisfies the requirements of section
1170, subdivision (b)(2). (People v. Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 205.) Indeed,
the facts in Hilburn did not implicate the possibility of an upper-term sentence because
the dispute centered entirely on whether the trial court properly imposed the middle term
without a fact finder finding true aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt
and without a stipulation. (Id. at p. 202.) The Hilburn court did not address, even
implicitly, the issue in the present case. (See ibid.) We therefore disagree that Hilburn
provides support for defendant’s position.
       In sum, we hold a trial court may impose the upper term when the lower term
presumption in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) applies but is then defeated and the
subdivision (b)(2) requirements are met. There is nothing in section 1170 or in case law
to require the opposite.

                                              8
                                                 II
            A Trial Court May Rely On The Same Aggravating Circumstances To
         Defeat The Lower Term Presumption And Impose An Upper-term Sentence
        Alternatively, defendant argues it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
rely on the same aggravating circumstances to defeat the lower term presumption and
impose the upper term. The People again argue defendant forfeited this argument by
failing to raise it at the sentencing hearing.
        We decline to decide whether defendant forfeited this claim and instead exercise
our discretion to adjudicate its merits in light of defendant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. (See People v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 150 [even where an issue
has been forfeited, if defendant “asserts his counsel thereby rendered ineffective
assistance . . . we turn to the merits of the claim”].) As to the merits, we disagree with
defendant.
        Our Supreme Court has observed three situations in which the dual use of facts is
prohibited. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331.) “The first circumstance in which dual
use is proscribed is set out in section 1170, subdivision (b)[(5)]: ‘[T]he court may not
impose an upper term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which sentence is
imposed . . . .’ California Rules of Court, rule 4.420(c) states the principal rule as
follows: ‘To comply with section 1170[, subdivision ](b), a fact charged and found as an
enhancement may be used as a reason for imposing the upper term only if the court has
discretion to strike the punishment for the enhancement and does so.’ (See Scott, . . . at
p. 350.) . . .
        “A second circumstance in which dual use is prohibited also is addressed in
California Rules of Court, rule 4.420(d): ‘A fact that is an element of the crime upon
which punishment is being imposed may not be used to impose a greater term.’ Scott
states the rule as follows: A [trial] court may not ‘use a fact constituting an element of

                                                 9
the offense either to aggravate or to enhance a sentence.’ ([People v. ]Scott, supra,
9 Cal.4th at p. 350.) . . .
       “Scott states a third circumstance in which dual use is proscribed and also notes
the limited reach of the proscription: ‘[T]he court cannot rely on the same fact to impose
both the upper term and a consecutive sentence. [Citations.] However, one relevant and
sustainable fact may explain a series of consecutive sentences. [Citations.]’ ([People
v. ]Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 350, fn. 12.)” (People v. Moberly (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
1191, 1197-1198.)
       Defendant does not argue any of the prohibitions in Scott apply to the present case;
instead, he argues we should expand the already existing prohibitions such that the same
reasons cannot defeat the lower term presumption and also justify an upper-term
sentence. The text of section 1170, subdivision (b), as well as its legislative history, give
us reasons not to.
       We begin with the text. When the Legislature “ ‘includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same [a]ct, it is generally
presumed that [the Legislature] acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.’ ” (Russello v. United States (1983) 464 U.S. 16, 23; see also
Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1142, 1148
[exclusion of a recovery of expert fees from the statute was notable where numerous
statutes expressly included such fees].)
       Here, the Legislature included a narrow prohibition against the dual use of facts in
section 1170, subdivision (b)(5): “The court may not impose an upper term by using the
fact of any enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any provision of law.”
The absence of a similar prohibition against the dual use of facts akin to what defendant
advances demonstrates the Legislature did not intend for such a prohibition. The
Legislature knew how to prohibit the dual use of facts in particular contexts when it

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meant to. (See Russello v. United States, supra, 464 U.S. at p. 23; Olson v. Automobile
Club of Southern California, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1148.)
       We next address the legislative history. When section 1170, subdivision (b) was
initially added to the Penal Code in 1976, it had the following proviso: “In no case shall
the court impose an upper term upon a finding of any fact used to enhance the sentence
under [various sections]. In no event shall any fact be used twice to determine,
aggravate, or enhance a sentence.” (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 273, p. 5140-5141, italics
added.) The following year, the Legislature removed the latter half of that proviso, to
read: “The court may not impose an upper term by using the same fact used to enhance
the sentence under [various sections].” (§ 1170, former subd. (b); Stats. 1977, ch. 165,
§ 15, p. 648.)
       Evidently, the Legislature knew how to broadly prohibit the dual use of facts and,
in fact, initially did so. The Legislature’s decision to remove the broad prohibition
indicates the Legislature intended to allow for the double use of facts to aggravate a
sentence subject to the narrow prohibition remaining in the statute. (See People v.
Moberly, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1198 [trial courts may, for instance, use the same
aggravating fact to impose upper-term sentences on multiple counts or “on a single
offense and on its accompanying, consecutive enhancement”].)
       Accordingly, we conclude a trial court can use the same aggravating
circumstances to defeat the lower term presumption and to impose an upper term, subject
to satisfying the requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).

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                                    DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                               /s/
                                               ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
DUARTE, J.

/s/
ASHWORTH, J.*

*     Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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