Court Opinion

ID: 9930715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:00:45.537778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:06.020324
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-9555    Document: 010110996279         Date Filed: 02/07/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           February 7, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
  DANIEL VALLE-SANTANA,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                           No. 23-9555
                                                           (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States
  Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Petitioner Daniel Valle-Santana petitions for review of a decision by the Board of

 Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial

 of his applications for withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (CAT)

 protection. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny his petition for

 review.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-9555    Document: 010110996279        Date Filed: 02/07/2024      Page: 2

                                            I

       1. Factual Background

       Petitioner is a native of Mexico and fears he will be harmed there on account

 of his family membership. In 2019, Petitioner’s brother fell victim to a fatal assault

 by a trio of siblings in Mexico. Subsequently, in 2021, one of these siblings

 threatened Petitioner’s sister, indicating that the group intended to inflict harm upon

 Petitioner’s family. Petitioner’s family has lived in Mexico without additional harm

 or threat since 2021, and he could internally relocate within Mexico to avoid

 potential harm.

       2. Procedural History

       Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in 2004, left the United

 States under a grant of voluntary departure in 2009, and reentered the country

 without inspection in 2009. In 2021, Petitioner pled guilty to reckless vehicular

 assault and driving under the influence in Colorado state court. In immigration

 proceedings, Petitioner applied for withholding of removal, but the IJ determined that

 the reckless vehicular assault conviction was for a particularly serious crime and that,

 as such, Petitioner was not eligible for withholding of removal. The IJ reasoned that

 “[c]rimes against persons are more likely to be categorized as serious.” ROA, Vol. 1

 at 57 (citing Matter of L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 649 (BIA 1999)). The IJ also

 determined that Petitioner had not shown he merited deferral under CAT and ordered

 Petitioner removed to Mexico. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusions, and Petitioner

 was removed from the United States.

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        Subsequent to the BIA’s decision, Petitioner filed an unopposed petition to

 withdraw his guilty plea to reckless vehicular assault. The district court for the

 County of Jefferson, Colorado, vacated Petitioner’s guilty plea to reckless vehicular

 assault because the conviction was obtained in violation of the constitutions and laws

 of the United States and Colorado. The same day, the district court entered

 Petitioner’s guilty plea to strict liability vehicular assault. Petitioner reentered the

 United States without inspection on August 30, 2023, and border patrol reinstated

 Petitioner’s prior removal order.

                                             II

        When considering a petition for review of a BIA decision, we review legal

 questions de novo. Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 974 (10th Cir. 2011). Factual

 findings are reviewed under a substantial evidence standard. Id. The “findings of

 fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

 conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Nonetheless, the

 factual findings must be “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence

 considering the record as a whole.” Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1122

 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir.

 2006)), abrogated on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411,

 424–25 (2023).

        We may not “independently search the record for alternative bases to affirm”;

 our “review is confined to the reasoning given” by the agency. Elzour v. Ashcroft,

 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004). Our review is of the BIA’s decision, with the

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 exception of “consult[ing] the IJ’s opinion to the extent that the BIA relied upon or

 incorporated it.” Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sarr

 v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783, 790 (10th Cir. 2007)).

                                           III

       The issues on appeal are (1) whether reckless vehicular assault qualifies as a

 particularly serious crime and therefore forecloses Petitioner’s application for

 withholding of removal, (2) whether the vacatur of Petitioner’s guilty plea requires us

 to remand this matter for reconsideration of Petitioner’s application for withholding

 of removal, and (3) whether Petitioner should receive CAT protection.

 1. Reckless Vehicular Assault

       Whether a conviction is for a “particularly serious crime,” 8 U.S.C.

 § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), “will depend upon the specific facts in each case and, in judging

 the seriousness of a crime, the Board of Immigration Appeals will consider such

 factors as the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the

 conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly, whether the type

 and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the

 community.” Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 244 (BIA 1982), superseded

 in part on other grounds by amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1991). Since

 Frentescu, the BIA’s approach to particularly serious crime determinations has

 evolved such that “once [a non-citizen] is found to have committed a particularly

 serious crime, [the BIA] no longer engage[s] in a separate determination to address

 whether the [non-citizen] is a danger to the community.” In Re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N.

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 Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007). The “proper focus . . . is on the nature of the crime and

 not the likelihood of future serious misconduct.” Id. “Once a finding is made that an

 alien has been finally convicted of a particularly serious crime, it necessarily follows

 that the alien is a danger to the community of the United States.” Matter of Carballe,

 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (BIA 1986).

       We cannot reweigh the evidence “to determine if the crime was indeed

 particularly serious,” but “we can determine [under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)] whether

 the BIA applied the correct legal standard in making its determination.” N-A-M- v.

 Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1055 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Brue v. Gonzales, 464

 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (“Nothing in

 subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of this chapter (other than this

 section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding

 review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review

 filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”).

       Petitioner argues that the BIA did not properly consider the factors from

 Frentescu. Petitioner was convicted of reckless vehicular assault under a Colorado

 statute that provides as follows: “If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle in a

 reckless manner, and this conduct is the proximate cause of serious bodily injury to

 another, such person commits vehicular assault.” See Colo. Rev. Stat.

 § 18-3-205(1)(a). The BIA considered the nature of the conviction, i.e., that it was

 for a crime that involves injury to others or the potential to cause serious injury to

 others. The BIA also considered the circumstances and facts underlying the

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 conviction, namely, that Petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol, that

 there was a car accident, and that the driver and a passenger of the other vehicle

 respectively suffered a broken foot and a head injury that required eleven staples.

 The BIA, therefore, applied the correct standards from Frentescu and N-A-M-. See

 Brue, 464 F.3d at 1234–35 (concluding that the BIA considered the appropriate

 factors because it recited two of the Frentescu factors and discussed that the victim

 of a sexual assault was twelve years old and that Petitioner was a danger to the

 community).

       Petitioner argues that the IJ did not discuss all reliable information in the

 record before determining Petitioner’s conviction was for a particularly serious

 crime. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the IJ did not discuss evidence that (1) the

 driver with the broken foot walked away from the scene and refused medical

 assistance, and (2) Petitioner was not able to speak in complete sentences at the scene

 because he was not fluent in English. Petitioner also submits that the IJ and the BIA

 did not discuss that Petitioner’s accident was two days after his brother’s death, and

 the IJ and the BIA should have considered this fact under Matter of B-Z-R-, a

 decision in which the Attorney General held that “immigration adjudicators may

 consider a respondent’s mental health in determining whether a respondent, ‘having

 been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a

 danger to the community of the United States.’” 28 I. & N. Dec. 563, 567 (AG 2022)

 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)).

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       As an initial matter, we remind Petitioner that our review is of the BIA’s

 opinion, not the IJ’s decision. Karki, 715 F.3d at 800 (quoting Sarr, 474 F.3d at

 790). In addition, Petitioner’s arguments cannot succeed because we “cannot

 reweigh evidence to determine if the crime was indeed particularly serious.”

 N-A-M-, 587 F.3d at 1055 n.2. Moreover, the evidence underlying Petitioner’s

 argument hardly rises to the level of compelling any reasonable adjudicator to

 conclude Petitioner was not under the influence or did not injure another person.

 Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 974.

       Petitioner also argues that a crime with the mental state of recklessness cannot

 be considered a crime against a person. Petitioner’s cited authority for this argument,

 however, Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 424 (2021), relies on the categorical

 approach of comparing the elements of federal crimes to the elements of state crimes,

 which the BIA stated has never been determined to apply to the “inherently

 discretionary determination of whether a conviction is for a particularly serious

 crime.” N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 344. The BIA has also held that an individual’s

 lack of intent to hurt anyone is insufficient to show that the individual is not subject

 to the particularly serious crime bar. Matter of D-L-S-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 568, 578

 (BIA 2022).

 2. Vacatur of Petitioner’s Plea

       Petitioner argues that the vacatur of his guilty plea to reckless vehicular assault

 means that this matter should be remanded for a determination of whether his

 substituted conviction is for a particularly serious crime and whether this bars

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 consideration for withholding of removal. Petitioner’s argument that this issue was

 properly presented to the agency is dubious. The BIA issued its decision on June 7,

 2023, and on July 10, 2023, the district court for the County of Jefferson, Colorado,

 vacated Petitioner’s guilty plea for reckless vehicular assault and entered Petitioner’s

 guilty plea to strict liability vehicular assault. In addition, Petitioner made no

 argument regarding the new conviction in his brief before the BIA, and the BIA did

 not discuss the new conviction in its decision. Petitioner simply stated in his brief

 that “he is in ongoing negotiations with the Jefferson County Conviction Integrity

 Office regarding Respondent’s Vehicular Assault conviction, as that plea was

 obtained without Respondent’s full knowledge of the consequences of his plea, and a

 joint motion for post-conviction relief is anticipated. At such time as a motion is

 filed and granted, Respondent will update the Board and submit a Motion to Remand

 on the basis of changed circumstances.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 23. There is no indication

 Petitioner filed such a motion with the BIA.

       We “shall decide the petition only on the administrative record on which the

 order of removal is based.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). As such, we are “statutorily

 precluded from consideration” of the change in Petitioner’s conviction. See N-A-M-,

 587 F.3d at 1056 n.3 (declining to consider a petitioner’s re-sentencing that was not

 in the administrative record). Even if we could consider information from outside the

 administrative record, Petitioner’s most recent reentry without inspection into the

 United States means that “the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original

 date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the [noncitizen] is not eligible

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 and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the [noncitizen] shall be

 removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.” See Tarango-Delgado

 v. Garland, 19 F.4th 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).

 3. Eligibility for CAT Protection

       Petitioner argues that the BIA’s determination that he failed to establish it was

 more likely than not he would be tortured was not supported by substantial evidence.

 Accepting Petitioner’s argument on this issue would require us to re-weigh the

 evidence, which we cannot do. See Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1122. Petitioner submits

 that the individuals who killed his brother were connected with a cartel and held

 influence over the police, that the police refused to investigate whether Petitioner’s

 brother’s death was a murder, and that the threat to Petitioner’s family continues.

 These arguments, however, are Petitioner’s own interpretation of the evidence, and

 Petitioner points to no evidence that would “compel” any reasonable adjudicator to

 find facts contrary to those found by the agency. Id. at 1122 (quoting Sarr, 474 F.3d

 at 788–89) (emphasis added). The agency’s findings of fact—that Petitioner’s family

 has lived in Mexico without harm or threat since early 2021 and that Petitioner could

 relocate within Mexico to avoid harm—are conclusive. See id.

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                                           IV

        For the foregoing reasons, we deny Petitioner’s petition for review.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Mary Beck Briscoe
                                            Circuit Judge

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