Court Opinion

ID: 9668869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:29:05.292939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:49.152028
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
SIMPSON, Justice.
By way of introduction in the brief for appellant on rehearing it is said:
“Upon receipt of the Court’s opinion in this case dated August 29, 1963, it was our initial thought not to make application for rehearing. As we view the decision, our client has perhaps not been materially adversely affected. Since the decision holds that the Plaintiff-Appellant has only one cause of action, and the wrongful death suit of his minor child is still pending, the liberal amendment statute would, no doubt permit an amendment in that case to include all of the injuries and damages claimed in the instant suit.”
This well-tempered and logical statement seems to be at variance with the later caustic criticism by appellant of “The rationale of the Court in arriving at its conclusion”. It is argued, first, that we should have taken into consideration “hypothetical fact situations, by which to test the validity of the legal issue, which is before the Court in the case at bar”. The second is, in effect, the same argument made on original submission, that an action under § 119, Tit. 7 of the Code, for punitive damages, may not be joined with an action for property damages as claimed in the other suit by appellant.
We do not think these propositions merit any elaboration on our part, especially in view of the statement from appellant’s brief hereinabove quoted. If the plaintiff may claim all the damages alleged to have been *14suffered by him in one action, why the insistence upon two actions which would of necessity be tried upon the same issues and state of facts ? But we have had briefs submitted to us by amici curiae in which some apprehension or misapprehension is expressed as to the effect of our holding in situations which have arisen or may arise. While we are unwilling to decide or intimate a decision upon a hypothetical case, we are aware of the instances where several people are killed or injured in a single accident. Such incidents may involve both minors and adults, as well as persons who are and are not related. These multiple death and injury accidents give rise to a variety of suits at law; in the case of death, an action by the parent for death of minor child (§ 119), or by the administrator under the Homicide Act (§ 123); in the case of personal injury, to an action by the party injured if sui juris, or, if not, by the one in his behalf. To these must be added incidental actions by a husband, a father or mother, for loss of service, etc.
There is a well-recognized common-law rule forbidding the splitting of causes of action. — 1 Am.Jur.2d, Abatement, Revival and Survival, §§ 26, 27, 30; 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 45. Our election statute, § 146, Title 7, is but a codification of the common law. But to abate a suit or require an election there must be both identity of parties and cause of action. In the present case we were at pains to point out the capacity in which the plaintiff sued and for whose benefit he sued, as well as the identity of the defendants and the wrongful act complained of and to confine our decision to such a status. We are unable to detect any confusion in our opinion which would render doubtful the course a suitor should pursue in any other case. We are clear to the conclusion that in the present case the allowance of the two suits would result in unnecessary and vexatious litigation, to avoid which is the purpose of § 146, Title 7 of the Code.
In the last paragraph of page 7 of the original opinion some words were inadvertently omitted. We have corrected that paragraph by supplying the omission.
Opinion corrected and extended, and application for rehearing overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.