Court Opinion

ID: 9599604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:19:59.11737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:45.812608
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
dissenting.
Although I concur with Divisions 2 and 3 of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from Division 1 and the judgment of affirmance as follows.
Specifically, I do not believe as the majority finds, that the facts support a reasonable articulable suspicion that Lewis was engaged or about to be engaged in criminal conduct. Contrary to the majority’s characterization of the facts, the evidence merely showed that Lewis and his companion were traveling in a high crime area with an out-of-state license plate. Although the area at one time had been posted with a “no trespassing” sign, the evidence is clear and undisputed that there was no such sign on the evening in question. With regard to the majority’s statement that Lewis attempted to leave the police and acted in an erratic manner, the evidence simply showed that after he pulled his car to the curb, he attempted to back up; a maneuver commonly engaged in while parallel parking.
Finally, with regard to Wilson’s exit from Lewis’s car, the evidence shows only that this occurred simultaneously with the officers’ stop. Accordingly, it is difficult to comprehend how this could have formed a basis for the stop.
Although I agree with the legal proposition relied on by the majority, I find it misapplied under the circumstances of this case. To reiterate, an officer must possess more than a subjective, unparticularlized suspicion or hunch, but rather “ ‘a founded suspicion, some necessary basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing.’ [Cits.]” Lambright v. State, 226 Ga. App. 424, 426 (1) (487 SE2d 59) (1997); Rogers v. State, 206 Ga. App. 654, 659 (3) (426 SE2d 209) (1992). See McClain v. State, 226 Ga. App. 714 (1) (487 SE2d 471) (1997). “[Although a neighborhood’s reputation is a factor supporting articulable suspicion, the fact that [Lewis] was in a place which the officer characterized as [an area known for criminal activity] does not alone constitute an articulable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. . . . [Cit.]” Barnes v. State, 228 Ga. *564App. 44, 46 (491 SE2d 116) (1997). Without more, there is insufficient evidence to provide an articulable, reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Lewis’s vehicle. See id. The only additional factor present in this case which could have formed the basis for the officers’ stop is Lewis’s out-of-state license plate. An out-of-state license plate is not an indication of criminality. Accordingly, contrary to the majority conclusion, I do not believe the officers’ stop of the vehicle was based upon a reasonable articulable suspicion.
Decided July 16, 1998
Reconsideration denied July 27, 1998
Stephanie P. Wyatt, for appellant.
J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Gregory J. Lohmeier, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this dissent.