Court Opinion

ID: 9886472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 16:10:56.628512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:49.390617
License: Public Domain

J-A15025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ANTHONY FENTON                               :   No. 1388 WDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered November 1, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-42-CR-0000299-2021

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                      FILED: October 6, 2023

       The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s pretrial order granting

Anthony Fenton’s motion for the return of property seeking the return of a

cellphone. The Commonwealth asserts that the trial court erred in granting

the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. We find merit in the

Commonwealth’s argument. We therefore vacate and remand for an

evidentiary hearing.

       Fenton is charged with homicide and other crimes related to the alleged

assault and death of his girlfriend. During its investigation, the Commonwealth

obtained a search warrant for Fenton’s cellphone, which was on his person on

the day of the incident and used to call 911.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A15025-23

       Fenton filed two motions to compel discovery of the contents of his

phone. On September 21, 2021, the trial court issued an order directing the

Commonwealth to provide Fenton with a copy of any records obtained from

the search of the phone. Order, 9/21/21. Fenton filed a second motion to

compel discovery on April 19, 2022. At a May 13, 2022 hearing on the second

motion, Fenton contended there was exculpatory evidence on the phone and

he was willing to assist with the search of the phone. The Commonwealth

asserted it did not have the passcode to unlock the phone. Fenton contended

he would provide potential passcodes to unlock the phone and if those

passcodes did not work, the parties agreed to use of the “chip-off method” to

obtain data from the phone. The “chip-off method” is an advanced data

extraction technique that involves physically removing flash memory chips

from a mobile device and then acquiring the data using specialized

equipment.1

       The court ordered the following, which was based upon a stipulation of

the parties: 1) Fenton was to immediately provide possible passcodes to

unlock the phone to the Commonwealth; 2) if the passcodes did not unlock

the phone, after 30 days, the Commonwealth could utilize the “chip-off

method” to search the phone; and 3) copies of any data recovered from the

Commonwealth’s search was to be provided to Fenton. Order, 5/13/22.

____________________________________________

1 See https://www.fletc.gov/jtag-chipoff-smartphones-training-program.

                                           -2-
J-A15025-23

      Having not received any copies of any cellphone data from the

Commonwealth or a confirmation that a search of the phone was done, Fenton

filed a motion for the return of property on July 20, 2022, which is the subject

of this appeal. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the

motion. The court ordered the Commonwealth to complete the search of

Fenton’s phone and return it to him no later than December 19, 2022. Order,

11/1/22.

      The Commonwealth filed the instant appeal from the court’s order

granting Fenton’s motion. In its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth indicated

that the order was appealable as a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313.

This Court directed the Commonwealth to show cause as to why the appeal

should not be quashed as an unappealable, interlocutory order. In response

to the rule to show cause, the Commonwealth filed a letter in this Court stating

that the police seized Fenton’s phone after obtaining a search warrant, but it

has been unable to access the contents of the phone. The Commonwealth

argued that returning the phone to Fenton before it could access the phone’s

contents would have the practical effect of excluding any evidence that might

be on the phone from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth alternatively

argued in its response to the rule to show cause that the order would

substantially handicap the prosecution and therefore the order should be

considered appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). On January 25, 2023,

the rule to show cause order was discharged, and the issue was referred to

this panel.

                                     -3-
J-A15025-23

      The Commonwealth raises the following issues on appeal:

      1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or committed an abuse of
         discretion in ordering the Commonwealth to return the phone
         to [Fenton?]

      2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or committed an abuse of
         discretion in not holding a hearing on the motion before
         granting [Fenton’] motion for return of property[?]

      3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or committed an abuse of
         discretion in assuming the Commonwealth was unable to
         establish a nexus between the phone and the criminal
         activity[?]

      4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or committed an abuse of
         discretion in finding that [Fenton] is entitled to the return of
         the phone[?]

      5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or committed an abuse of
         discretion in finding that the Commonwealth “either can’t or
         won’t search the cellphone[?]”

      6. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or committed an abuse of
         discretion in failing to require [Fenton] to establish ownership
         and lawful possession in support of his Motion for Return of
         Property filed pursuant to Rule 588[?]

      7. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or committed an abuse of
         discretion in failing to allow the Commonwealth the opportunity
         to show why the cell phone should not be returned[?]

Commonwealth’s Br. at 7-8.

      We initially consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. “The

appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked

to review the order.” Bailey v. RAS Auto Body, Inc., 85 A.3d 1064, 1067

(Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). This Court may “inquire at any time, sua

sponte, whether an order is appealable.” Id. at 1068 (citation omitted).

                                      -4-
J-A15025-23

“As a general rule, only final orders are appealable, and final orders are

defined as orders disposing of all claims and all parties.” In re Bridgeport

Fire Litigation, 51 A.3d 224, 229 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted); see

also Pa.R.A.P. 341.

      Here, the Commonwealth acknowledges that the trial court’s order is

not a final order. However, it argues that the order is an interlocutory order

from which an appeal arises as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) or a

collateral order under Pa.R.A.P. 313.

      Rule 311(d) provides, in relevant part:

      Commonwealth Appeals in Criminal Cases. In a criminal case,
      under the circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth
      may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end
      the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of
      appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the
      prosecution.

Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). Rule 311(d) directs the Commonwealth to perfect its right

to appeal by including the Rule 311(d) certification in its notice of appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Chism, 216 A.3d 1133, 1136 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 904(e) (“When the Commonwealth takes an appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), the notice of appeal shall include a certification by counsel

that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution”)

(emphasis added). A subsequent inclusion of the certification in the

Commonwealth’s appellate brief or in an amended notice of appeal does not

cure the defect of a lack of certification in the original notice of appeal. See

                                      -5-
J-A15025-23

Chism, 216 A.3d at 1137; see also Commonwealth v. Knoeppel, 788 A.2d

404, 407 (Pa.Super. 2001).

      Instantly, the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal did not contain a

statement certifying that the order would terminate or subsequently handicap

the prosecution. Instead, the Commonwealth suggested that we exercise

jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) for the first time in its response to this

Court’s rule to show cause order. The Commonwealth’s attempt to cure the

defect in the filing of its notice of appeal is insufficient for this Court to exercise

our jurisdiction. Thus, we find no basis in Rule 311(d) to exercise jurisdiction

over the Commonwealth’s appeal.

      We next consider whether jurisdiction is proper under the collateral

order doctrine. Rule 313 defines a collateral order as “an order separable from

and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too

important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if

review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be

irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). “[A]n order is separable from the main

cause of action if it is entirely distinct from the underlying issue in the case

and if it can be resolved without an analysis of the merits of the underlying

dispute.” Keesee v. Dougherty, 230 A.3d 1128, 1132 (Pa.Super. 2020)

(citation omitted). “[A] right is important if the interests that would go

unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to the efficiency

interests served by the final order rule.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] right

sought to be asserted on appeal will be ‘irreparably lost’ if, as a practical

                                         -6-
J-A15025-23

matter, forcing the putative appellant to wait until final judgment before

obtaining appellate review will deprive the appellant of a meaningful remedy.”

Id. (citation omitted).

      Here, the present order granting Felton’s motion for the return of

property is “separable” from the main cause of action, to wit, Fenton’s guilt or

innocence of the crimes with which he is charged. Second, the order involves

a right that is too important to be denied review, namely the Commonwealth’s

right to be heard on the issue. Lastly, a claim that the trial court erred in

granting the return of the phone to Fenton would be irreparably lost if the

matter proceeded to trial. The order directing the Commonwealth to return

the phone effectively results in the loss or exclusion of potential evidence

contained in the phone that was obtained through a lawful search warrant.

Having found that the Commonwealth satisfied all three prongs of the

collateral order doctrine, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, and we

now address the merits of the Commonwealth’s claim.

      “The standard of review applied in cases involving motions for the return

of property is an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Durham, 9 A.3d

641, 645 (Pa.Super. 2010). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 588

addresses motions for the return of property and provides:

      (A) A person aggrieved by a search and seizure, whether or not
      executed pursuant to a warrant, may move for the return of the
      property on the ground that he or she is entitled to lawful
      possession thereof. Such motion shall be filed in the court of
      common pleas for the judicial district in which the property was
      seized.

                                     -7-
J-A15025-23

       (B) The judge hearing such motion shall receive evidence on
       any issue of fact necessary to the decision thereon. If the
       motion is granted, the property shall be restored unless the court
       determines that such property is contraband, in which case the
       court may order the property to be forfeited.

       (C) A motion to suppress evidence under Rule 581 may be joined
       with a motion under this rule.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 588 (emphasis added).

       Under Rule 588, “[t]he movant bears the initial burden of coming forth

with evidence of lawful entitlement to possession of the property.”

Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 166 (Pa.Super. 2011). If the movant

meets this initial burden, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that the items in question are contraband per

se or derivative contraband, and therefore should not be returned to the

moving party. See id. at 166-67; Commonwealth v. Crespo, 884 A.2d 960,

961 n.4 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2005).2 “To meet its burden to prove that an item is

derivative contraband, the Commonwealth must establish a specific nexus

between the property and criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Trainer, 287

A.3d 960, 964 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2022).

       Importantly, Rule 588 requires the trial court to conduct a hearing on a

motion for the return of property so that the court can receive evidence and

resolve disputed facts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 172 A.3d

1162, 1166 (Pa.Super. 2017) (emphasizing that “appellate courts have
____________________________________________

2 “Although the decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this

Court, we may look to them for their persuasive value.” Commonwealth v.
Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 395 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2014).

                                           -8-
J-A15025-23

recognized the importance of an evidentiary hearing when considering a

petition for the return of property” and remanding for evidentiary hearing on

motion for return of property); Trainer, 287 A.3d at 964 (finding trial court

erred by not holding evidentiary hearing on motion for the return of property

because a hearing is a mandatory requirement under the plain language of

Rule 588(B) and “case law requires the determination by a preponderance

of evidence of a nexus between criminal activity and the property”)

(emphasis in original); Commonwealth v. Howard, 931 A.2d 129, 132

(Pa.Cmwlth. 2007) (holding “both the language of Rule 588 and the caselaw

interpreting it mandate that resolution of disputed facts await presentation of

evidence at a hearing”).

       Here, the court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing on Fenton’s

motion for the return of property. While the court was permitted to incorporate

the record from previous hearings in the case, see Janda, 14 A.3d at 167

n.12,3 it nonetheless was required to conduct a separate hearing on Fenton’s

motion for the return of property so that both parties could present evidence.

As the Commonwealth explains, the hearing on the prior motion to compel

discovery did not suffice for the subject motion to return property. Holding a

hearing will not be a meaningless gesture because the Commonwealth has

proffered evidence linking the phone to criminal activity. Because the trial

court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and properly fulfill its fact-finding
____________________________________________

3 See also Commonwealth v. Tokarcik, No. 993 WDA 2020, 2021 WL

4740951, unpublished memorandum at *6 (Pa.Super. filed Oct. 12, 2021).

                                           -9-
J-A15025-23

duties, we vacate the court’s November 1, 2022 order and remand the matter

to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

      Order     vacated.   Case   remanded   with   instructions.     Jurisdiction

relinquished.

  DATE: 10/6/2023

                                    - 10 -