Court Opinion

ID: 9602392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:54:07.959587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:47:25.002194
License: Public Domain

Judge PHILLIPS
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with everything said in the majority opinion except the ruling setting aside the award of punitive damages. That *66defendants’ conduct violated the state’s public policy enunciated in Chapter 75 has been established; it has also been established that the violation was committed in a manner that would warrant the award of punitive damages if the offense violated a common law rule instead of statutory policy. The Legislature clearly intended to encourage victims of unfair or deceptive practices to help enforce the statutory policy by suing violators of it; and that malicious violators of the Act be punished by the civil courts. And it also intended, it seems to me, that where trebling the damages will not promote these statutory purposes that punitive damages suitable to the wrongful and unethical character of the offense be assessed in accord with existing law. Under the aggravated circumstances of this case, which are not unique since deceitful and unfair conduct is not confined to transactions involving large sums, limiting plaintiffs’ recovery and the sanctions against defendants to $3.00 makes a mockery of our Fair Trade Practices Act, as it permits a malicious violation of statutory policy to go unpunished and denies fair compensation to victims who have aided the State in enforcing its policy. And in my opinion the law requires no such holding. The common law doctrine of punitive damages has not been repealed; it is available for use by our courts in appropriate cases; this is an appropriate case for its use; and referring the question back to the General Assembly is in effect a failure to function as the General Assembly manifestly expects us to, since their task is to set policy, not decide details which arise in the trial of cases, and ours is to enforce and implement the policy adopted. I would affirm the award of punitive damages by the trial judge. I would also hold that punitive damages may be awarded where a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 is malicious, wilful and for an improper purpose and where trebling the actual damages suffered would neither punish the wrongdoer nor encourage victims to enforce the statutory policy.