Court Opinion

ID: 9408768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 16:09:09.866216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:46.451177
License: Public Domain

J-S09008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 SHELLY R. HANNER                          :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 880 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 5, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-25-CR-0002734-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                   FILED: July 13, 2023

      Appellant, Shelly R. Hanner, appeals from the judgment of sentence of

a one-year period of probation and fifty hours of community service entered

following her conviction by a jury for one count of harassment, predicated on

her calling a ten-year-old boy a “fucking little snitch.” Appellant contends that

we should construe the statutory phrase “obscene language” to carry the same

meaning that we require for disorderly conduct, which holds that language is

obscene only if it is meets the test set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.

15 (1973), which, generally speaking, requires a sexual connotation.         We

apply this standard as the Commonwealth pursued a theory equating “obscene

language” with the Miller standard, and the jury was instructed accordingly.

We further conclude that Appellant’s remarks were not “threatening” under

the circumstances. We therefore reverse Appellant’s judgment of sentence

and order Appellant discharged, as Appellant’s language was not obscene in
J-S09008-23

that sense, nor threatening, and the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden

to establish the elements of the crime that it charged and pursued.

     The facts, as taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as

the verdict winner, are straightforward. Sometime during 2021, Appellant’s

two children were in the foster care system while Appellant was dealing with

an incident of domestic abuse in which she was the victim. Her two children

stayed with N.M., who is the mother of the victim in this case, S.M.       On

September 11, 2021, N.M. permitted S.M., who was then ten years old, to

ride his bike home from his grandmother’s home. Shortly thereafter, S.M.

returned to the house, crying and scared.

     S.M. testified that he encountered Appellant while bicycling home. He

saw a vehicle stopped in the road near a gas station. The driver asked S.M.

“do you remember me? I’m [her children’s] mom.” N.T., 4/18/21, at 32.

S.M. recognized the driver as Appellant.     Appellant then pulled into the

station’s parking lot and loudly and aggressively berated S.M., twice calling

S.M. a “fucking little snitch.” Id. S.M. was scared, started crying, and biked

back to his grandmother’s home.

     Appellant was charged with one count of harassment pursuant to 18

Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4), which states that a person commits harassment “when,

with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person … communicates to

or about such other person any lewd, lascivious, threatening or obscene

words, language, drawings or caricatures[.]” Because the Commonwealth’s

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theory of the case is relevant to our disposition, we quote the parties’

discussion of the jury instructions:
      THE COURT: So we’re on the record right now. I’m speaking to
      both counsel about the standard jury instruction for harassment,
      and, again, the [c]ourt’s original intention would be to simplify it
      and read the first element that has to be proven is that the
      defendant communicated to [S.M.] any threatening or obscene
      words or language, and then [the] second element, proven that
      the defendant did so with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm,
      and then give the definition of intentionally. In the conversation
      just leading up to going on the record, [Appellant] believes that
      the definition of what obscene is, which was taken from the
      standard jury instruction, should be given.

                                       ***

      THE COURT: So you would be asking for the part of the instruction
      that begins with words or language are obscene if, and then it
      gives the three different definitions?

      [Appellant]: Yes.

      THE COURT: And then also gives the – defines contemporary
      community standards and the term sexual conduct.

      [Appellant]: Yes.

      THE COURT: [Commonwealth], your thoughts? I mean, this is a
      standard instruction. I haven’t heard from the Commonwealth
      yet, which is on me, but there’s a lot of superfluous language in
      here. [Commonwealth], your thoughts?

      [Commonwealth]: Judge, I will defer to you.

Id. at 52-53.

      Consistent with this discussion, the trial judge instructed the jurors as

follows:
      THE COURT: To find the defendant guilty of this offense, you must
      find that each of the following elements have been proven beyond
      a reasonable doubt.

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      First, that the defendant communicated to [S.M.] any threatening
      or obscene words or language. Now, threatening words are self-
      explanatory. Obscene words or language has a specific definition.
      Words or language are obscene if the average person
      applying contemporary community standards would find
      that the subject matter taken as a whole appeals to the
      prurient interest.

      In defining the term obscene[,] I have used a term that itself must
      be defined: Contemporary community standards. Contemporary
      community standards refers to the standards of the people of the
      whole Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at the time of the alleged
      offense.

Id. at 84-85 (emphasis added).

      Following her conviction at the jury trial and her subsequent sentencing,

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court’s

order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on

appeal, asserting that her conviction was “based on the use of the phrase ‘f-

ing snitch’ to the victim.     Pursuant to well-settled case law, [Appellant]

respectfully submits the facts … were insufficient to sustain a conviction for

Harassment.” Concise Statement, 9/6/22, at unnumbered 1. The trial court

issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion, concluding that the evidence was sufficient:
      In this case, the evidence established that [Appellant] yelled in a
      loud and aggressive voice at a 10-year old, and told him twice
      that he is an [sic] “f-ing little snitch” (while using the full profane
      word). Therefore, the jury was well within its discretion as the
      finders of fact when it obviously determined that an adult who
      aggressively yelled profanities at a 10-year-old child was guilty of
      Harassment. The language used was both threatening and
      obscene and was done with the intent to harass.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/22, at 3.

      Appellant raises one issue for our review:

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      1. Did the Commonwealth present insufficient evidence to sustain
      Appellant’s conviction for harassment, 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 2709(a)(4),
      where Appellant did not communicate any threatening or obscene
      words or language?

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

      We apply the following principles when determining whether the

Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to convict:
      A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law
      requiring a plenary scope of review. The appropriate standard of
      review regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the
      evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn
      therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to support all
      the elements of the offenses. As a reviewing court, we may not
      weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
      fact-finder. Furthermore, a fact-finder is free to believe all, part
      or none of the evidence presented.

Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 860 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict turns on what the

General Assembly intended by the terms “obscene” and/or “threatening.” See

Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 302–03 (Pa. 2022). This presents

a pure question of law involving statutory interpretation, and our scope of

review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth v.

Foster, 214 A.3d 1240, 1247 (Pa. 2019).

      The General Assembly has not defined “obscene” or “threatening[,]” and

Appellant submits that this is an issue of first impression. She does not offer

a traditional, statutory analysis of the terms. Instead, with respect to the

definition of “obscene,” Appellant directs our attention to caselaw interpreting

a subsection of the disorderly conduct statute, which criminalizes the

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following: “A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause

public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk

thereof, he … uses obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture[.]” 18

Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(3).    In Commonwealth v. Bryner, 652 A.2d 909 (Pa.

Super. 1995), we discharged a conviction under that subsection because the

language did not rise to the level of “obscenity” as defined by Miller, which

holds that material is “obscene” only if it, inter alia, “appeals to the prurient

interest[.]” Id. at 912 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24). A “prurient interest”

has “a tendency to excite lustful thoughts,” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.

476, 487 (1957), which roughly encompasses “a shameful or morbid interest

in nudity, sex, or excretion….” Id. at 487 n.20. In Bryner, it was clear “that

the epithet hurled at Mrs. Long[ — “Go to hell, Betsy” —] ... did not, in any

way, appeal to anyone’s prurient interests.” Id. Appellant asks us to adopt

these same principles with respect to the harassment statute and conclude

that her language, while coarse and crude, did not appeal to the prurient

interest and, thus, cannot meet the Miller standard.       As to “threatening,”

Appellant points out that the criminal information did not reference the

“threatening language” component of the statute. In any event, Appellant

submits that her language was not threatening in any way.

      The Commonwealth does not address Appellant’s arguments. Instead,

in a cursory two-and-one-half page brief, the Commonwealth recites the

standard of review and agrees with the trial court’s analysis. Commonwealth’s

Brief at 2.

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    Appellant’s fundamental claim is that her conviction rests upon her saying

“fucking”; i.e., if she had merely called S.M. “a little snitch” there would be no

basis to convict. “The First Amendment generally prevents government from

proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the

ideas expressed.”    R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).

“From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free but civilized

societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few

limited areas….” Id. at 382-83. See also Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 248

(2017) (“Those few categories of speech that the government can regulate or

punish—for instance, fraud, defamation, or incitement—are well established

within our constitutional tradition.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In this case,

the jury instructions touched on three of these: obscenity, “fighting words,”

or “true threats.”

    A citizen cannot be punished due to the mere use of a word, no matter

how offensive.    In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), Cohen was

convicted of “maliciously and willfully disturb(ing) the peace or quiet of any

neighborhood or person … by … offensive conduct.” Id. at 16 (quoting statute;

all alterations in original). His charge was based solely on wearing a jacket in

a courthouse corridor with the phrase “Fuck the Draft” plainly visible to the

public, which he wore to protest the Vietnam War. The United States Supreme

Court held that the conviction violated the First Amendment.

      The Cohen Court began by explaining that the conviction rested “upon

the asserted offensiveness of the words Cohen used to convey his message to

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the public.” Id. at 18. Thus, the case involved “a conviction resting solely

upon ‘speech’ … not upon any separately identifiable conduct….” Id. The case

did not involve “those relatively few categories of instances where prior

decisions have established the power of government to deal more

comprehensively with certain forms of individual expression simply upon a

showing that such a form was employed.” Id. at 19-20. The Cohen Court

stated, “This is not, for example, an obscenity case. Whatever else may be

necessary to give rise to the States’ broader power to prohibit obscene

expression, such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic.” Id. at

20 (citing Roth, supra).

      Because the case did not involve any recognized exception to

criminalizing speech, the case reduced to whether the use of the word “fuck”

“is inherently likely to cause violent reaction or upon a more general assertion

that the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may properly remove

this offensive word from the public vocabulary.” Id. at 22-23. In the Court’s

judgment, “most situations where the State has a justifiable interest in

regulating speech will fall within one or more of the various established

exceptions, discussed above but not applicable here, to the usual rule that

governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content of individual

expression.”   Id. at 24.   Cohen therefore forbids attempts to “make the

simple public display” of an expletive a criminal offense. Id.

      We recognize that a harassment conviction is arguably not predicated

on the speech itself but rather the conduct accompanying the speech. For

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instance, in Commonwealth v. Hendrickson, 724 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1999), our

Supreme Court rejected an overbreadth challenge to former 18 Pa.C.S. §

5504, which criminalized harassment via telephone. The Court stated, “The

statute is not directed at the content of speech and is unrelated to the

suppression of free expression. Rather, the statute focuses on the manner

and means of communication and proscribes communications made with an

intent to harass.” Id. at 318. However, while we agree with Appellant that

there is no decision from our appellate courts squarely addressing whether

the harassment statute incorporates the Miller test with respect to “obscene

language,” reported decisions have accepted that a harassment conviction is

valid only if the speech falls within a First Amendment exception. Recently,

in Commonwealth v. Collins, 286 A.3d 767, 771 (Pa. Super. 2022),

reargument denied (Jan. 19, 2023), we affirmed a harassment conviction

under subsection (a)(3), which applies where the actor, with the requisite

intent to “harass, annoy or alarm another ... engages in a course of conduct

or repeatedly commits acts which serve no legitimate purpose.” 18 Pa.C.S. §

2709(a)(3).   Collins had produced “wanted posters” and letters depicting

Hoffman’s face, which “were clearly intended to be insulting, attacking

Hoffman’s appearance (‘it’s got a goat face and smells like a pig’), parentage

(stating that Hoffman was ‘a Billy goat [crossed] with a pig’), and character

(stating that Hoffman was ‘yellow,’ i.e., cowardly).” Id. at 776-77 (quoting

trial court opinion). Collins argued, inter alia, that his speech was protected

by the First Amendment on an as-applied basis. We disagreed.

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     Collins is correct that his speech does not fall within the identified
     exceptions to the First Amendment set forth in Chaplinsky [v.
     New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)]: his posters and letters
     did not contain obscenities; no proof was offered that Collins’
     description of Hoffman was untrue, and in any event, Section
     2709(a)(3) does not target defamation; and his speech did not
     technically constitute “fighting words” as Hoffman was not present
     when Collins distributed the posters or letters were distributed and
     therefore it was unlikely that they would have led to “an
     immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572….
     However, the Chaplinsky exceptions do not purport to be an
     exhaustive list of the categories of speech that may be prosecuted
     under the First Amendment. Indeed, additional categories of
     offenses that criminalize speech—including solicitation, extortion,
     and other speech “integral to criminal conduct”—have been
     deemed to pass constitutional muster.

                                     ....

     Although Collins testified that he was publicizing Hoffman’s
     criminal record in order to advise the public that Hoffman was
     driving with a suspended license, his purpose was not evident on
     the face of the poster or letter and Collins admitted that his real
     motivation was to “get back at [Hoffman] for spreading lies about
     [him] and flaunting [sic] the law.” N.T., 9/9/21, at 13, 16-19, 22.
     There is no question that Collins’ publication of Hoffman’s criminal
     record and the insults directed towards him were part and parcel
     of the two men’s long-running feud.

     Also crucial in our determination that Collins was engaged in
     unprotected speech is the fact that he identified Hoffman’s home
     address and the make, year, color, and license plate number of
     Hoffman’s vehicle. The inclusion of this information in the posters
     and letters served no other apparent purpose than as an invitation
     for the public to confront Hoffman at his residence or during his
     travels in the community. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
     486 … (1988) (upholding ban on residential picketing where
     picketing did not “seek to disseminate a message to the general
     public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in
     an especially offensive way”). The belligerent nature of the
     communication was only accentuated by the juxtaposition of
     Hoffman’s mug shot photograph with Old West-style “wanted
     poster” language, with an offer of a “$500.00 reward to capture”

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      Hoffman and “put [him] in a cage.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/22,
      at 2. Moreover, Collins did not simply resort to announcing his
      criticisms of Hoffman to passersby in a public forum, but he also
      directed his injurious message to various unwilling and
      unsuspecting recipients through the United States Postal Service,
      at least one of whom submitted a complaint to law enforcement.
      In sum, we conclude that Collins’ actions here fall outside the
      ambit of the protection of the First Amendment.

Id. at 776–77

      As Judge Kunselman argued in dissent, the Collins Majority appeared

to create a new First Amendment exception:

      My learned colleagues in the Majority do not identify any
      recognized exception to the First Amendment that would apply to
      Mr. Collins’ speech. This deficiency should end our analysis, and
      Mr. Collins’ conviction should be overturned. Nevertheless, the
      Majority denies his speech constitutional protection by crafting a
      new exception to the First Amendment, the ‘shame and provoke’
      exception.

Id. at 780-81 (Kunselman, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).

      In this case, the Commonwealth deferred to the trial court’s decision to

instruct the jury that any conviction must satisfy the Miller standard, i.e., a

recognized    exception   to   the   First   Amendment’s    prohibition   against

criminalizing speech. The Commonwealth did not, and does not now, suggest

that Appellant’s speech satisfied any other recognized speech exception.

Thus, while Collins is not directly on point, in that it did not explicitly decide

what the General Assembly intended by using the phrase “obscene language,”

the decision suggests that some type of exception must apply. And, here, the

Commonwealth lodged no objection, and in fact deferred to the trial court’s

instruction that Appellant’s language must “appeal[] to the prurient interest.”

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N.T., 4/18/21, at 84. Therefore, given the Commonwealth’s acquiescence on

this point, we will assume for the limited purposes of this appeal that “obscene

language” must appeal to the prurient interest in accordance with Miller.

    There is no doubt that uttering the phrase “fucking little snitch” does not

appeal to a prurient interest in sex as the comment has nothing to do with

sex. This is obvious on its face, and readily demonstrated by the disorderly

conduct precedents discharging “obscene language” convictions for failing to

meet the Miller standard. See Commonwealth v. Pennix, 176 A.3d 340

(Pa. Super. 2017) (discharging conviction where the appellant, while detained

at courthouse metal detector, shouted “Fuck you police” and similar variants);

Commonwealth v. McCoy, 69 A.3d 658 (Pa. Super. 2013) (discharging

conviction where McCoy repeatedly shouted, “Fuck the police,” while

observing a funeral procession honoring an officer killed in the line of duty);

Commonwealth v. Kelly, 758 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 2000) (discharging

conviction where appellant said, “Fuck you, asshole,” and displayed middle

finger to borough employee). See also Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d

943 (Pa. 1999) (holding that police officer did not have probable cause to

arrest for disorderly conduct under separate subsection concerning “fighting

or threatening … behavior” where Hock, during encounter with police, stated,

“Fuck you, asshole,” to officer). The Commonwealth therefore failed to satisfy

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one of the elements of harassment as it understood the elements of the

crime.1

     Next, we acknowledge that the jury was instructed that Appellant was

guilty if her words were “threatening,” which is likewise criminalized by

subsection (a)(4) of the harassment statute. The trial judge informed the jury

that the definition of “threatening” was self-evident. We respectfully disagree

with the trial court’s characterization. Again, accepting for purposes of our

disposition that, as in Collins, an exception to the First Amendment must

apply, the only plausible bases are “fighting words” or “true threats.”

     Concerning the former, the Commonwealth failed to establish sufficient

evidence that Appellant used “fighting words.” The basic formulation of that

doctrine was stated in Cohen. “[T]he States are free to ban the simple use,

without a demonstration of additional justifying circumstances, of so-called

‘fighting words,’ those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to

the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely

to provoke violent reaction.” Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.

     Whether language qualifies as “fighting words” requires consideration of

the facts. In Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1980), our
____________________________________________

1 While Appellant does not discuss due process issues, it would be unusual to
determine whether the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to meet
a “lesser” form of “obscene language” when the Commonwealth failed to ask
for an instruction that deviated from the Miller test. The Commonwealth
proceeded as if Appellant’s language met the Miller obscenity standard, and
nothing prevented the Commonwealth from submitting an alternative
instruction.

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Supreme Court upheld a conviction for disorderly conduct based on this

exception where the appellant, who saw a borough employee issue a parking

ticket for his car, repeatedly called her a “fucking pig.” Id. at 55. The next

day, the appellant saw the employee on patrol and followed her, “shouting at

her and calling her, among other things, a ‘n***** lover’ and a ‘cocksucker.’”

Id. at 56 (expurgation added). The Court rejected the appellant’s as-applied

challenge, concluding that his speech qualified as “fighting words.” “It is clear

in the instant case that [the] appellant was not exercising any constitutionally

protected right; rather, in a loud, boisterous and disorderly fashion, he hurled

epithets at the meter maid which we believe fit the Chaplinsky definition of

fighting words.” Id. at 58. In Hock, supra, where the appellant shouted,

“Fuck you, asshole,” to a police officer, the Court distinguished Mastrangelo,

stating that “in determining whether words constitute fighting words, the

circumstances surrounding the words can be crucial, for only against the

background of surrounding events can a judgment be made whether the

words had a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by others.” Hock, 728

A.2d at 946 (cleaned up). Appellant’s insults do not remotely compare to the

racial epithet in Mastrangelo, and under the factual circumstances, a rational

fact-finder could not conclude that Appellant intended to goad S.M. into a

violent encounter.2 Appellant’s language was abusive and uncouth, especially

____________________________________________

2 Mastrangelo, decided over forty years ago, is arguably inconsistent with
later United States Supreme Court caselaw. The case quoted a lengthy
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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when directed at a ten-year-old child, but her words were not likely to provoke

a violent reaction.

     We now address whether the speech qualified as a “true threat.” “Speech

which communicates a serious expression of intent to commit an act of

unlawful violence against a particular individual or group of individuals — more

commonly referred to as a ‘true threat’ — is another certain class of speech

that … is beyond the protective ambit of the First Amendment.” Interest of

J.J.M., 265 A.3d 246, 254 (Pa. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).    The hallmark of a “true threat” is that it “threatens unlawful

violence.” See Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1155 (Pa. 2018).

Appellant’s statements were insulting but nothing in her diatribe, either as an

individual statement or in the aggregate, threatened harm to S.M.3           We
____________________________________________

passage from Chaplinsky stating, inter alia, that words qualify as “fighting
words” if “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.” Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d at 58 (quoting Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 572). However, it is not clear on what specific basis the
Mastrangelo Court determined that the speech qualified as “fighting words.”
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently remarked,
“in the decades since Chaplinsky, the Court has imposed a number of
limitations on the ‘fighting words’ exception to First Amendment protection.”
United States v. Bartow, 997 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 2021). See id. at
207-10 (summarizing development of United States Supreme Court caselaw
and concluding that calling an African-American man the n-word did not
qualify as “fighting words” under the circumstances).

3 We also note that the “true threat” doctrine poses difficult questions with
respect to intent. See generally Knox, supra; see also Counterman v.
Colorado, 143 S.Ct. 644 (2023) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to
decide whether the speaker must subjectively know or intend the threatening
nature of a statement, or whether it is sufficient to establish that an objective
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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therefore conclude that a rational fact-finder could not conclude, even when

granting all reasonable inferences to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner,

that Appellant issued a “true threat.”             We therefore reverse Appellant’s

judgment of sentence and order her discharged.

     Judgment of sentence reversed. Appellant discharged.

     Judge Bowes and Judge Sullivan both concur in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/13/2023

____________________________________________

reasonable person would regard the statement as a threat). In this regard,
we note that the trial court mistakenly failed to instruct the jury that
Appellant’s comments had to be made with the requisite “intent to harass,
annoy or alarm another.” 18 Pa.C.S § 2709(a). While Appellant did not object
to that omission, the fact that the jury was permitted to return a verdict based
solely on the words that Appellant used poses serious difficulties in our ability
to affirm the conviction on an alternative basis.

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