Court Opinion

ID: 9759227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:09:33.248023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:00.359093
License: Public Domain

*359Arthur H. Healey, J.
(dissenting). I do not agree with that portion of the majority opinion which concludes that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the defendant’s sexual misconduct with the second girl (the sixteen year old girl). I feel that this evidence was admissible to show a “system of criminal activity” or modus operandi by the defendant. See State v. Hauck, 172 Conn. 140, 374 A.2d 150 (1976). Pointing out that the principal issue at trial was the identity of the victim’s assailant, the majority finds error in the trial court’s conclusion that any prejudicial effect was outweighed by its probative value on the issue of identification. It sets out that the state claimed such evidence was admissible “because it indicated that the defendant used a particular modus operandi in his attempt to have sexual relations with the sixteen year old girl which was also used in committing the offenses against this fourteen year old victim.” The majority then states that “the defendant objected that the similarities between the two incidents were insufficient to make this evidence of any significant probative value on the identity issue . . .
I have no quarrel with the majority’s general statement that “[t]he significance of the second incident in establishing the identity of the man who attacked the victim of the crimes charged two months earlier depends upon the extent of the similarity between the two occurrences.” After noting certain comparisons showing similarity between the two occurrences,1 the majority then states *360“ [b] eyond these comparisons the resemblances cease” and it proceeds to set out a few dissimilarities. Immediately thereafter, however, the majority, while saying that each girl “described” the car in which she was driven as a large grey two-door automobile with a maroon interior, that each girl “testified” that the driver spoke with a foreign accent, and that each girl “described him similarly,” then goes on to say that “the admissibility of such evidence as relevant to identity would not justify the admission of testimony concerning the attempted sexual misconduct with the second girl.” The majority opines that “[t]his innocuous evidence of the defendant’s characteristics and his vehicle at the time of the occurrence was not so intertwined with the evidence of his misconduct that no separation was possible . . . .” I believe, however, that these last three patent similarities certainly render the proffered evidence relevant to the issue framed by the parties.
The general principle applicable here is that evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a material fact. State v. Mastropetre, 175 Conn. 512, 517, 400 A.2d 276 (1978) ; State v. Villafane, 171 Conn. 644, 675, 372 A.2d 82 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1106, 97 S. Ct. 1137, 51 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1977). “ ‘One fact is relevant to another fact whenever, according to the common course of events, the existence of the one, taken alone or in connection with other facts, renders the existence of the other either certain or more probable.’ ” State v. Lombardo, 163 Conn. 241, 243, 304 A.2d 36 (1972). I cannot, therefore, accept the “so intertwined” theorem of the majority in this eon-*361text; certainly the trial court could consider these last three admitted similarities of this evidence in the light of the claims before it.
In my view the majority fails to apply properly the test which we are required to apply to the contested ruling that requires reversal “only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done.” State v. Barlow, 177 Conn. 391, 394, 418 A.2d 46 (1979) ; State v. Hauck, supra, 144; State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 702, 364 A.2d 186 (1975). It matters not that we might have decided the question differently. In deciding whether there has been such an abuse or injustice in the trial court’s resolution of this balancing test between the probative value and the prejudicial tendency of this evidence, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling. State v. Barlow, supra ; State v. Hauck, supra; State v. Brown, supra. I submit that we have clearly indicated that we must affirm such a ruling unless we can say it was erroneous as a matter of law. State v. Hauck, supra, 144 ; State v. Brown, supra, 700-702.
Significantly, concerning the admission of evidence such as we have here this court has recently said: “An examination of recent decisions in other jurisdictions indicates a greater liberality in admitting evidence of other criminal acts to show a common scheme, pattern or design in sex related crimes.” State v. Hauck, supra, 145. “ ‘Such evidence is admissible for a variety of other purposes, however, such as “when it is particularly probative in showing such things as intent, an element in the crime, identity, malice, motive, a system of criminal activity. . . .” [Citations omitted.] “That *362evidence tends to prove the commission of other crimes "by the accused does not render it inadmissible if it is otherwise relevant and material; State v. Marshall, 166 Conn. 593, 600, 353 A.2d 756 [1974] ; State v. Holliday, 159 Conn. 169, 172, 268 A.2d 368 [1970] ; see State v. Jenkins, 158 Conn. 149, 152-53, 157, 256 A.2d 223 [1969]; and if the trial judge determines in the exercise of judicial discretion that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial tendency. State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597, 325 A.2d 199 [cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 291, 38 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1973)]; State v. Holliday, supra, 173.” State v. Ralls, 167 Conn. 408, 417, 356 A.2d 147 [1974] .... ‘Evidence of another sex offense is admissible to show a common scheme or plan if the offense is proximate in time, similar to the offense charged, and committed with persons similar to the prosecuting witness. . . . Admissibility lies within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and we see no abuse of discretion here.’ ” (Emphasis added.) State v. Hauck, supra, 144-45.
I believe that the proffered evidence of the subsequent sexual assault by the defendant clearly demonstrated “a system of criminal activity.” The similarities between the two assaults outlined above and in the footnote far outweigh any dissimilarities. The issue, in my opinion, is actually one of prejudice versus probative value and on this point I see no reason to disagree with the trial court’s conclusion. In fact, if the proffered evidence in this ease were not admissible under this theory, it would be difficult to imagine exactly how similar an incident would have to be in order to be allowed into evidence.
Therefore, I dissent.

 These similarities include proximity in time of the two assaults, young age of the victims, location of the victim’s initial encounter with the defendant, the defendant’s offer of money and alcohol or drugs to the victims and the defendant’s ultimate physical aggression while the victims were in a remote area.