Court Opinion

ID: 9526284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:15:05.345463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:17.746801
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I join that portion of the majority opinion affirming the defendant’s convictions. I do not agree with the majority, however, that the defendant was improperly found eligible for the death penalty, and accordingly I dissent from that portion of the court’s opinion. The majority concludes that the trial judge erred in finding the defendant eligible for the death penalty under section 9 — 1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)(3)). At the time relevant here, the “multiple murder” aggravating circumstance authorized imposition of the death penalty on a defendant convicted of multiple murders “regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate premeditated acts.” Two things are noteworthy about this language. First, the statute introduces the concept of premeditation, which is not otherwise a recognized mental state in Illinois. (People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1, 33.) Second, when applied to a person convicted of murder under an accountability theory, the statute does not require that the accomplice have either of the specified mental states. In the present case, the trial judge found the defendant guilty of the August 22, 1986, murder of Albert Oliver on the theory that the defendant knew that his acts were likely to result in death or great bodily harm. Davis had held in 1983 that a mental state of knowledge was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 9— 1(b)(3). (Davis, 95 Ill. 2d at 36.) The judge’s initial finding of guilt for the Oliver murder therefore would have been sufficient at the penalty stage to satisfy the premeditation requirement of section 9 — 1(b)(3). Because knowledge-based murders committed by a principal could render a defendant eligible under section 9 — 1(b)(3) at the time of the present offense, the defendant cannot complain that application of Davis to his case would be invalidly retroactive. The second murder on which the State relied in establishing the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty under the multiple-murder aggravating circumstance of section 9 — 1(b)(3) was that of Derrick Wilkinson. (People v. Ramey (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 498.) The defendant and another person committed the Wilkinson murder on August 1, 1986. In that prosecution, a jury was instructed on all three forms of murder and, in addition, was instructed on the principles of accountability. The jury returned a general verdict finding the defendant guilty of the offense. Because the verdict was a general one, it did not specify the theory or theories on which the jury based its determination of guilt. There are certain constitutional limits on the application of the death penalty to one who does not himself commit the acts causing the victim’s death. In Enmund v. Florida (1982), 458 U.S. 782, 797, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140, 1151, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3376, the Supreme Court determined that the death penalty could not be imposed on a person convicted as an accomplice under a felony murder theory who “does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.” Later, in Tison v. Arizona (1987), 481 U.S. 137, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127, 107 S. Ct. 1676, the Court again considered the circumstances under which an accomplice may be sentenced to death. The Tison Court concluded that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” Tison, 481 U.S. at 158, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 145, 107 S. Ct. at 1688. People v. Jimerson (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 12, construed the same version of section 9 — 1(b)(3) that is involved in the present appeal. In Jimerson, this court concluded that the provision did not prohibit imposition of the death penalty on an accomplice guilty of multiple murders who acted with the requisite Tison-type culpability. In the present case, the trial judge relied on Tison and Jimerson in finding the defendant eligible for the death penalty under section 9 — 1(b)(3). The defendant now argues that the judge could not properly use those decisions because their application to this case would be invalidly retroactive, amounting to a denial of due process. A limiting construction of statutory language may be applied retroactively to prior conduct if the litigant has been afforded fair warning. (Dombrowski v. Pfister (1965), 380 U.S. 479, 491 n.7, 14 L. Ed. 2d 22, 31 n.7, 85 S. Ct. 1116, 1123 n.7.) Contrary to the majority’s view, I would conclude that application of the Tison principles to the defendant’s participation in the Wilkinson murder was proper. As I have indicated, section 9— 1(b)(3) may be applied to either principals or accomplices. In describing the circumstances under which the provision may be used, however, the version of the statute at issue here does not require that each guilty party have acted with either intent or premeditation. Rather, the statute simply requires that the acts causing the deaths have been performed with intent or premeditation by someone, without also mandating that the accomplice have possessed any particular mental state at all. Tison, however, prohibits imposition of the death penalty on a person convicted of murder under an accountability theory unless the person acted at least with reckless indifference. Accordingly, use of the Tison principles narrows rather than expands the reach of the present statute by limiting the group of offenders to whom it would potentially apply. Thus, unlike Bouie v. Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894, 84 S. Ct. 1697, on which the majority relies, the present case does not involve an unforeseeable judicial expansion or enlargement of narrow and precise statutory language. Rather, the potential scope of section 9 — 1(b)(3) has only been limited, and the present defendant cannot complain if this new construction of the statute is applied in his case. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion finding error in the circuit court’s determination that the defendant is eligible for the death penalty.