Court Opinion

ID: 9784757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:53:19.814931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:58.756633
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. The majority vacates the order of the Court of Common *992Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) and remands this case to the trial court with instructions to remand the case to the Secretary of Education (Secretary) for a formal administrative hearing on the educational merits of the proposed school district transfer, but, “[i]n the interest of judicial economy,” the majority would have the parties stipulate that the existing trial court record be “the record before the Secretary” and, only “if necessary and appropriate, augment that stipulated record.” (Majority Op. at 991.) For the following reasons, I cannot accept this disposition.
First, such a result exceeds the scope of this court’s prior remand order in In Re: Petition for Formation of Independent School District, 962 A.2d 24 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (Riegelsville I). Second, the Riegelsville Tax and Education Coalition (Coalition) did not raise the failure of the Secretary to hold a hearing as an issue in Riegelsville I or in this appeal. Third, the majority’s order does not serve the interest of judicial economy because the Secretary already has issued an adjudication based on the trial court’s record and because the parties have been given a third opportunity to present evidence in support of their positions. Fourth, the majority does not give proper deference to the Secretary’s expertise in the field of education.
To provide some background, the Coalition filed a petition for the formation of an independent school district with the trial court pursuant to section 242.1(a) of the Public School Code of 1949 (Code)1 seeking to transfer all school-related services from the Easton Area School District to the Palisades School District. The trial court referred the matter to the Secretary, who requested that the affected school districts provide information that would enable the Secretary to make an informed decision. On January 24, 2008, the Secretary determined that the proposed transfer lacked merit from an educational standpoint. As a result of the Secretary’s determination, and pursuant to section 242.1(a) of the Code, the trial court denied the petition.2
The Coalition filed a notice of appeal with this court, arguing that the trial court *993erred in denying its petition because the Secretary violated section 507 of the Administrative Agency Law (Law)3 by failing to issue an adjudication containing findings and the reasons for the adjudication. This court agreed, issuing an order that vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the trial court “in order that the trial court may secure a proper adjudication from the Secretary of Education.” Riegelsville I, 962 A.2d at 29.
I.Scope of Remand Order
On remand, the trial court held a hearing for the purpose of creating a record for submission to the Secretary. Based on that record, at least in part, the Secretary issued an adjudication concluding that the Coalition’s petition lacked merit from an educational standpoint. However, this court’s remand order did not direct the trial court to hold a hearing to create a record for the Secretary’s consideration in issuing the adjudication. This court required only that the Secretary cure the defects in its initial determination by preparing a proper adjudication under section 507 of the Law, i.e., with findings and reasons, based on the record that the Secretary originally possessed.
In my view, the trial court exceeded the scope of this court’s remand order by creating a new record for the Secretary, and the Secretary exceeded the scope of this court’s remand order by considering that record. Unlike the majority, I would vacate and remand for an adjudication by the Secretary based on the record that the Secretary originally possessed.
II.Waiver
In Riegelsville I, the Coalition did not argue that it was denied a proper hearing prior to the Secretary’s issuance of an adjudication. The Coalition argued only that the Secretary’s adjudication did not satisfy the requirements of section 507 of the Law because it lacked findings and the reasons for the adjudication. Thus, any contention here that the Secretary failed to hold a proper hearing has been waived.
Indeed, the majority sets forth the only three issues preserved for consideration by this court in this appeal: whether the Secretary used the wrong standard for evaluating the educational merits of the proposed transfer; whether the Secretary capriciously disregarded uncontradicted evidence; and whether the Secretary exceeded the scope of his statutory authority. (Majority Op. at 980-81.) No party argues that the Secretary denied it a proper hearing, and it is improper for this court to raise the issue sua sponte.
III.Judicial Economy
The Secretary already has considered the trial court’s record in making the adjudication presently before us. Nevertheless, the majority is directing that the Secretary revisit that record. It is conceivable that, on remand, the Secretary would simply accept the trial court’s record as its own and re-issue the same adjudication. This is not judicial economy.
Moreover, the parties built the initial record before the Secretary on factors that they believed were relevant to a determination of the educational merit of the proposed transfer. At the unauthorized hearing before the trial court, the parties attempted to bolster their cases with evidence on additional factors that they believed pertained to the educational merit of the proposed transfer. The majority’s position is to allow the parties a third opportunity, “if necessary and appropriate,” *994to present evidence on the relevant factors for determining educational merit. It is not clear to me why it would be “necessary” or “appropriate” for any party to present additional evidence.
IV. Deference
In In re Weaverland Independent School District, 378 Pa. 449, 455, 106 A.2d 812, 815 (1954) (emphasis added), our supreme court gave the words “from an educational standpoint” them “usual and ordinary meaning” and concluded that, in determining whether a proposed transfer has merit from an educational standpoint, the Secretary “must determine whether, on the basis of his expert knowledge in the field of education, the establishment of a proposed independent school district will advance or hinder the educational facilities in the designated area.”
When an administrative agency has made a decision pursuant to its duty under the law, this court, in reviewing the decision, must extend great deference to the administrative agency’s expertise in interpreting the legislative requirement. City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 982 A.2d 136, 138-39 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009). This court will defer to the agency’s expertise to the extent that its conclusions are reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 139. Thus, here, because of the Secretary’s expert knowledge in the field of education, we must defer to his interpretation of what constitutes educational merit, as long as the interpretation is reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious.
Instead of this court advising the Secretary regarding the factors he may or may not consider, as the majority has done,4 I would direct that, on remand, to the degree that the record originally possessed by the Secretary contains evidence regarding student diversity, student performance, geographic fit and busing matters, the Secretary shall discuss whether, based on his expert knowledge in the field of education, these ai*e appropriate considerations in determining whether the proposed independent school district will advance or hinder the educational facilities in the designated area. Should the parties bring the matter before this court again, we would then decide whether the Secretary reasonably supported his consideration of any such factors.
V. Educational Merit
Having indicated that I would permit the Secretary to determine, in the first instance, whether the proposed transfer has educational merit, I must express my disagreement with some of the majority’s conclusions regarding educational merit.5
The majority concludes that, in determining the merit of a proposed transfer “from an educational standpoint,” the Secretary is “restricted to the substantive provisions” of the Code. (Majority Op. at 991.) However, the Code does not define the words “merit ... from an educational standpoint.”
Moreover, under Weaverland, 378 Pa. at 455, 106 A.2d at 815, we must give those words their “usual and ordinary meaning.” *995Thus, as our supreme court indicated, “merit ... from an educational standpoint” means merit based on the knowledge of experts in the field of education. Id. As we have previously stated, “[w]e are not educators nor is it our place to substitute our judgment for those of learned educators who have experience and knowledge in such matters.” Reading School District v. Department of Education, 855 A.2d 166, 173 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004).
Furthermore, in restricting the Secretary’s discretion to the substantive provisions of the Code, the majority does not explain how the Secretary is to use the Code provisions as a guide. For example, the majority suggests that the Secretary has improperly considered racial diversity. However, the Code contains provisions pertaining to race, including section 1310(a) of the Code, 24 P.S. § 13-1310(a), which prohibits distinctions based on race in the assignment of pupils to schools within a district. On remand, the Secretary could reasonably interpret section 1310(a) of the Code as encouraging racial diversity in the public schools and as justifying its consideration.
In addition, section 291 of the Code, added by section 3 of the Act of August 8, 1963, P.L. 564, 24 P.S. § 2-291, requires that the State Board of Education consider the following factors, inter alia, in organizing the public schools: topography, community characteristics and transportation of pupils. Although the majority states that the petition in this case has educational merit because it would eliminate a long commute for pupils, (Majority Op. at 991), the Secretary could reasonably interpret section 291 of the Code as being inapplicable here because it provides factors for consideration by the State Board from an organizational, not an educational, standpoint.
Finally, I note that the Secretary based his determination, in part, on the Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) criteria established in the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2). The majority’s holding precludes the Secretary from considering the federal criteria on remand. However, in my view, inasmuch as the Secretary is subject to federal law as well as state law, the Secretary would not abuse his discretion by applying the AYP criteria to his determination of the educational merit of the proposed transfer.

. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, added by the Act of June 23, 1965, P.L. 139, as amended, 24 P.S. § 2-242.1(a). Section 242.1(a) of the Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A majority of the taxable inhabitants of any contiguous territory in any school district or school districts ... may present their petition to the court of common pleas ... asking that the territory be established as an independent district for the sole purpose of transfer to an adjacent school district contiguous thereto.... Such petitions shall set forth ... the reasons of the petitioners for requesting such transfer to another school district and the name of the district into which its territory is proposed to be placed.
The court shall hold hearing thereon.... In all cases where an independent district is proposed for transfer from one school district to another, the merits of the petition for its creation, from an educational standpoint, shall be passed upon by the [Secretary] and the petition shall not be granted by the court unless approved by him. The court of common pleas shall secure the reaction from the [Secretary] upon receipt of the petition properly filed.
24 P.S. § 2-242.1(a) (emphasis added).

. In In Re Establishment of Independent School District Consisting of the Borough of Wheatland, 846 A.2d 771, 773 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004), this court noted:
Under Section 242.1 of the Public School Code, the trial court has the limited role of determining whether there has been procedural compliance with the statutory provisions; it has no authority to inquire into or determine the merits of the petition requesting the transfer, and it does not inquire into the reasons assigned by the petitioners. That role is exclusively within the province of the designated educational authorities.

. 2 Pa.C.S. § 507. Section 507 of the Law states, "All adjudications of a Commonwealth agency ... shall contain findings and the reasons for the adjudication....” Id.

. In my view, the majority has substituted its own brand of educational merit for that of the Secretary.

. It is clear that, whatever “merits ... from an educational standpoint” means, the Secretary must make his determination regarding the proposed transfer based on the best interests of the children. See, generally, Walker v. School District of the City of Scranton, 338 Pa. 104, 12 A.2d 46 (1940) (stating that the fundamental public policy expressed in the Pennsylvania Constitution is to obtain a better education for the children of the Commonwealth, and, therefore, school officials must act in the best interests of the children).