Court Opinion

ID: 9779820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:49:26.720997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:42.034337
License: Public Domain

BRADFORD, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that Gray constructively possessed the marijuana found in plain view in her apartment. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.
*531It is well-settled that “conviction for pos-sessory offenses does not depend on the accused being ‘caught red-handed’ in the act by the police.” See Wilburn v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1098, 1101 (Ind.1982).
A defendant is in the constructive possession of drugs when the State shows that the defendant has both (i) the intent to maintain dominion and control over the drugs and (ii) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the drugs. Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind.1997), on reh’g, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind.1997). The proof of a possessory interest in the premises on which illegal drugs are found is adequate to show the capability to maintain dominion and control over the items in question. Davenport v. State, 464 N.E.2d 1302, 1307 (Ind.1984). In essence the law infers that the party in possession of the premises is capable of exercising dominion and control over all items on the premises. See id.; Martin v. State, 175 Ind.App. 503, 372 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (1978) (“[A] house or apartment used as a residence is controlled by the person who lives in it and that person may be found in control of any drugs discovered therein, whether he is the owner, tenant, or merely an invitee.”). And this is so whether possession of the premises is exclusive or not.
However, the law takes a different view when applying the intent prong of constructive possession. When a defendant’s possession of the premises on which drugs are found is not exclusive, then the inference of intent to maintain dominion and control over the drugs “must be supported by additional circumstances pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the controlled substances and their presence.” Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1275. The “additional circumstances” have been shown by various means: (1) incriminating statements made by the defendant, (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures, (3) location of substances like drugs in settings that suggest manufacturing, (4) proximity of the contraband to the defendant, (5) location of the contraband within the defendant’s plain view, and (6) the mingling of the contraband with other items owned by the defendant. Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ind.1999).
Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340-41 (Ind. 2004).
With all due respect, I believe that the majority opinion mistakenly reweighs the evidence and fails to view it in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. The majority notes that Officer Pylant testified that he did not know where Gray was before she opened the door and uses this evidence to conclude that there is nothing to suggest that she was ever near the marijuana. This conclusion fails to take into account Officer Py-lant’s and Officer Clegg’s testimony that they could see the coffee table under which the marijuana was found through the screen door as they spoke with Gray outside, as well as Officer Pylant’s testimony that the coffee table was eight to ten feet from the door. In other words, the evidence most favorable to the judgment indicates quite clearly that Gray was standing only a few feet away from the coffee table when she opened the door and would have had an unobstructed view of the table. My review of the record does not support the majority’s conclusion that there is no evidence that Gray was ever in close proximity to the marijuana.
Moreover, there is no indication that the marijuana was placed under the table while Gray was outside; indeed, the evidence most favorable to the judgment indicates exactly the opposite. Both officers *532testified that they could see the coffee table the entire time they spoke with Gray and never saw any activity near the table. This evidence, coupled with testimony that the officers noticed the marijuana in plain view immediately upon entering the apartment, leads to a reasonable inference that Gray would have been able to see it just as clearly before she opened the door. In my view, the record contains evidence that is more than sufficient, to establish Gray’s knowledge of the nature and presence of the contraband in her apartment.
The majority also seems to be treating the non-exhaustive list of “additional circumstances” from Gee as though it laid out “elements” of a test or “factors” to be weighed against one another. I believe that the list is nothing more than a compilation of examples of circumstances in which “exists the probability that the presence and character of the contraband was noticed by the defendant.” Carnes v. State, 480 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985) (case in which list of “additional circumstances” mentioned in Gee was first compiled by collecting cases). If the presence of one or more of the listed circumstances (or any other circumstance tending to show knowledge of the nature and presence of the contraband, for that matter) is sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession, it does not follow that the absence of the other listed circumstances undercuts that finding in any way. I do not consider it particularly helpful to Gray’s cause, for example, that the marijuana found in Gray’s apartment was not found in a manufacturing setting, it was not found intermingled with other personal items, and she did not attempt flight or make any furtive movements or incriminating statements. In another case, perhaps, the absence of some of these circumstances might be more relevant, but not so here. What is relevant is that the State produced evidence that Gray was in close proximity to the marijuana and that it was in plain view. In my view, this is more than enough evidence to permit a finding that Gray knew of the presence and character of the contraband.