Court Opinion

ID: 9699758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:50:25.38223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:56.769348
License: Public Domain

FORD ELLIOTT, Judge,
concurring:
I write separately to note that I agree only in part with the rationale of the majority, and thus, will concur in part and join in part.
*46My specific disagreement is with the majority’s interpretation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1574. The majority has chosen to insert a “know” or “reason to know” culpability requirement into the statute. While similar predecessor statutes have been interpreted by other courts of this Commonwealth to include such a “know” or “reason to know” culpability requirement, I am particularly, troubled by the majority’s decision to do so instantly. As noted by the parties, a review of the legislative history of § 1574 reveals that, as originally introduced, the legislature did, indeed, include this culpability requirement. However, and for whatever reason, the legislature chose to strike the word “knowingly” from the statute when the bill was reported from committee February 11, 1976. This is a clear indication to me that a “know” or “reason to know” culpability standard was considered and rejected.
I would additionally note, as a matter of policy, that to only attach liability to an owner or possessor of a vehicle who knowingly gives permission to an unlicensed driver is to relieve the responsible party under the statute of any obligation to make inquiry in the first instance. Clearly, the purpose of the statute was to protect the citizens of this Commonwealth from injuries caused by unlicensed drivers, and the obligation of determining the status of a driver must fall on the owner or possessor of the vehicle prior to authorization.
Still, I am nevertheless able to concur in the result and to join in the alternate holding of the majority. I agree with the interpretation that once the lessor has lawfully passed control of the vehicle to the lessee, the lessor is relieved of liability under the statute. Section 1574 was only intended to place liability upon one in control of the vehicle. Once the original owner-lessor has lawfully transferred possession, the owner-lessor can no longer be held hable for the action of those persons which the lessee improperly authorizes to operate the vehicle.
Instantly, the lessee is the corporate entity, Harvco, Inc., and it is Harvco which authorized Scanlon to operate the vehicle without a valid driver’s license. Pollow did not autho*47rize Scanlon to operate the vehicle, and therefore no liability can be imposed upon Pollow under § 1574.