Court Opinion

ID: 9900408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:29.451169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.118408
License: Public Domain

82                         July 12, 2023          No. 364

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                      Jennifer J. CALEF,
                          Petitioner,
                               v.
                 EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT,
                         Respondent.
                   Employment Appeals Board
                    2021EAB0229; A176016

     Submitted March 3, 2023.
     Jennifer J. Calef filed the briefs pro se.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
     HELLMAN, J.
     Affirmed.
Cite as 327 Or App 82 (2023)                                   83

         HELLMAN, J.
          Petitioner seeks judicial review of the denial of her
application for pandemic unemployment assistance under
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act
(CARES Act) Pub L 116-136, 134 Stat 281 (2020). In her
first assignment of error, she asserts that the Employment
Appeals Board (EAB) impermissibly applied eligibil-
ity requirements from 20 CFR section 625.4 to pandemic
unemployment assistance eligibility determinations. In her
second, third, and fourth assignments of error, petitioner
argues that EAB made findings that were not supported by
the record and failed to consider evidence she had submitted
into the record. In her fifth assignment of error, petitioner
asserts that EAB erred by failing to provide legal citations
in its findings of fact. For the reasons explained below, we
affirm.
        We set out the legal framework at the start to pro-
vide context for the specific issues presented in this case.
The CARES Act was enacted in March 2020, in response
to the COVID-19 public health emergency. Among other
things, the CARES Act provided the opportunity for “cov-
ered individuals” to receive pandemic unemployment assis-
tance by directing the Secretary of Labor to provide “to any
covered individual unemployment benefit assistance while
such individual is unemployed, partially unemployed, or
unable to work for the weeks of such unemployment with
respect to which the individual is not entitled to any other
unemployment compensation * * *.” Id. § 2102(b). A person is
considered a “covered individual” if they are
   “not eligible for regular compensation or extended ben-
   efits under State or Federal law or pandemic emergency
   unemployment compensation under section 2107, includ-
   ing an individual who has exhausted all rights to regular
   unemployment or extended benefits under State or Federal
   law or pandemic emergency unemployment compensation
   under section 2107[.]”
Id. § 2102(a)(3)(A)(i).
        The pandemic unemployment assistance program
dovetailed with 20 CFR section 625, a preexisting disaster
84                                      Calef v. Employment Dept.

unemployment assistance program. As such, section 2102(h)
of the CARES Act stipulates that:
        “Except as otherwise provided in this section or to the
     extent there is a conflict between this section and section
     625 of title 20, Code of Federal Regulations, such section
     625 shall apply to this section as if—
        “(1) the term ‘COVID-19 public health emergency’
     were substituted for the term ‘major disaster’ each place it
     appears in such section 625; and
         “(2) the term ‘pandemic’ were substituted for the term
     ‘disaster’ each place it appears in such section 625.”
The question of eligibility for disaster unemployment assis-
tance is addressed in 20 CFR section 625.4(i) which reads:
         “An individual shall be eligible to receive a payment of
     [disaster unemployment assistance] with respect to a week
     of unemployment * * * if:
        “(i) The individual is not eligible for compensation (as
     defined in § 625.2(d)) * * * for such week under any other
     Federal or State law, except that an individual determined
     ineligible because of the receipt of disqualifying income
     shall be considered eligible for such compensation * * *. * * *”
Section 625.2(d) defines unemployment compensation, in
relevant part, as “any assistance or allowance payable to an
individual with respect to such individual’s unemployment
under any State law or Federal unemployment compensa-
tion law * * *.”
         With that legal framework in place, we turn to the
specifics of petitioner’s case. Prior to the pandemic about
half of petitioner’s income came from her small business that
made and sold dyed clothing at markets and fairs. The other
half came from her work as a cashier for Bi-Mart. After the
Governor’s stay-at-home order was issued in March 2020,
petitioner’s clothing business shut down. However, she con-
tinued to cashier at Bi-Mart.
       On March 29, petitioner filed a claim for regu-
lar unemployment benefits with the Oregon Employment
Department (OED). On May 7, OED issued a Wage and
Cite as 327 Or App 82 (2023)                                85

Potential Benefit Report to petitioner which stated that peti-
tioner qualified for regular unemployment benefits with a
weekly benefit amount of $172, a maximum benefit of $4,472,
and a benefit expiration date of April 3, 2021. Petitioner
first applied for regular unemployment benefits; those were
denied because her earnings from Bi-Mart exceeded her
weekly benefit amount. See ORS 657.100(1) (An individual is
considered unemployed for the purposes of receiving regular
unemployment benefits if “in any week of less than full-time
work [the] remuneration paid * * * for services performed
during the week is less than the individual’s weekly bene-
fit amount.”); ORS 657.155(1)(e) (“An unemployed individual
shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week
only if * * * [t]he individual is not disqualified from bene-
fits or ineligible for benefits under any other section of this
chapter.”).
         Petitioner then applied for pandemic unemployment
assistance and claimed benefits for the weeks of March 29,
2020 to March 6, 2021. On October 16, 2020, OED notified
petitioner that she was not eligible for pandemic unemploy-
ment assistance because she was eligible for regular unem-
ployment assistance. Petitioner appealed that decision, but
the ALJ upheld it. Petitioner then appealed to EAB, which
also upheld OED’s decision. This timely appeal followed
         In her first assignment of error, Petitioner chal-
lenges EAB’s finding that she was not a “covered individ-
ual” for purposes of the CARES Act. She argues that in
reaching that conclusion, EAB unlawfully added an eligi-
bility requirement to the CARES Act when it interpreted
section 2102(h) of the Act to require application of 20 CFR
section 625.4 to pandemic unemployment assistance eligi-
bility determinations. Alternatively, petitioner argues that
even if EAB was correct in applying 20 CFR section 625,
there was conflict between the applicable CFR provisions
and the CARES Act, such that the CARES Act controlled.
OED argues that EAB did not err because 20 CFR section
625 applies to the CARES Act vis-à-vis section 2102(h) of
the Act and that EAB correctly concluded that there was no
conflict between the applicable parts of 20 CFR section 625
and the CARES Act.
86                                          Calef v. Employment Dept.

         We review an agency’s legal conclusions for errors of
law. ORS 183.482(8)(a); National Maintenance Contractors v.
Employment Dept., 288 Or App 347, 348, 406 P3d 133 (2017),
rev den, 362 Or 508 (2018). Because petitioner’s argument
concerns a question of statutory interpretation, we follow
the principles espoused in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and
State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-73, 206 P3d 1042 (2009)
(In interpreting a statute we first examine its text and con-
text, then if necessary, its legislative history and then, if
the meaning is still unclear, we turn to other canons of con-
struction.). We follow a similar process in interpreting fed-
eral statutes. Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Columbia River,
346 Or 366, 377-78, 213 P3d 1164 (2009).

         As an initial matter, we disagree with EAB and OED
that the starting point for a determination as to whether an
applicant is a “covered individual” is the question whether
the claimant has exhausted all Oregon unemployment ben-
efits. By its terms, the statute creates a subcategory of cov-
ered individuals for those who have exhausted all benefits,
but it is not required that a claimant have exhausted all
unemployment benefits to be a “covered individual.” Instead,
the starting point for a determination of when an applicant
is a “covered individual” is an examination of petitioner’s
employment status under state employment law. See Pub L
116-136, § 2102(a)(3)(A)(i), 134 Stat 281 (2020) (stating that
a “covered individual” is one who is “not eligible for [other]
compensation * * * under State or Federal law”).

         In Oregon, a claimant must be “unemployed” to be
eligible for unemployment benefits. Teledyne Wah Chang
Albany v. Employment Div., 302 Or 186, 189, 728 P2d 26
(1986) (en banc); Cook v. Employment Div., 47 Or App 437,
442 n 4, 614 P2d 1193 (1980).1 As applicable in this case,
ORS 657.100 establishes that an individual is “unemployed”

     1
       Oregon also has a “qualification” requirement, which requires the individ-
ual to have worked a certain number of hours and have earned a certain amount
before OED can set the individual’s weekly benefit, maximum benefit, and ben-
efit expiration date. ORS 657.150. There is no dispute in this case over whether
petitioner “qualified” for unemployment benefits; the dispute is whether she was
“eligible” for those benefits to be paid to her.
Cite as 327 Or App 82 (2023)                                       87

   “in any week of less than full-time work if the remunera-
   tion paid or payable to the individual for services performed
   during the week is less than the individual’s weekly benefit
   amount.”

         In plain terms, to be considered “unemployed” a
person must make less during a week from any employment
than they would receive in unemployment benefits. Here,
petitioner made between $275 and $300 a week from her
employment at Bi-Mart. However, her weekly benefit amount
was $172. Therefore, petitioner was not “unemployed” under
Oregon law, and was not eligible for Oregon state unemploy-
ment benefits.
          Reading section 2102(a)(3)(A) of the CARES act
alone, it would appear that petitioner, someone who was “not
eligible” for state unemployment benefits, was thus a “cov-
ered individual” for purposes of pandemic unemployment
assistance. However, section 2102(a)(3)(A) cannot be read
in isolation. Importantly, and dispositively for petitioner’s
claim, there is an exception for claimants, like petitioner,
who are not eligible for unemployment benefits because
their weekly compensation exceeds any benefit amount. See
20 CFR § 625.4(i). Under section 625.4(i) when a claimant is
“not eligible” for state unemployment benefits because their
weekly compensation exceeds their benefit amount, the law
treats that claimant as though they were “eligible” for state
unemployment benefits. See id. (“except that an individual
determined ineligible because of the receipt of disqualifying
income shall be considered eligible for such compensation”).
A claimant in that position is thus not a “covered individual”
under the CARES Act. Because that is petitioner’s situation,
she was not a “covered individual” under the CARES Act,
and EAB did not err in denying her application for pandemic
unemployment assistance.
         We disagree with petitioner’s argument that EAB
erred in applying 20 CFR section 625.4(i). EAB applied
that regulation because the CARES Act required it. Section
2102(h) of the CARES Act expressly states that “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this section or to the extent there is
a conflict between this section and [20 CFR section 625],
such section 625 shall apply * * *.” The phrase “shall apply”
88                                Calef v. Employment Dept.

indicates that application of 20 CFR section 625 is manda-
tory. That construction is supported by the sentences imme-
diately thereafter, which require substituting the term
“COVID-19 public health emergency” for the term “major
disaster” and the term “pandemic” for the term “disaster” in
each place that those terms appear within 20 CFR section
625. Because the law required incorporation of 20 CFR sec-
tion 625, EAB did not err.
          We also disagree with petitioner’s argument that
EAB erred in concluding that no conflict exists between the
eligibility requirements of the CARES Act and the eligibil-
ity requirements of the CFR. To support her argument that
there is a conflict between the CARES Act and the CFR,
petitioner relies on a Department of Labor Manual (the
manual) developed to provide guidance on how to adminis-
ter the CARES Act. While it is true that the manual points
to a possible conflict between 20 CFR 625 and the CARES
Act, it does not demonstrate a conflict in a way that assists
petitioner. In the portions cited to us, the manual refers
to 20 CFR 625.6(e)(3) as a provision that conflicts with the
CARES Act. That subsection of 625 specifically addresses
requirements to document employment, self-employment, or
the start of either. As the manual recognized, those specific
requirements to provide documentation would conflict with
the CARES Act, which allowed self-certification.
        EAB did not rely on section 625.6(e)(3). Instead,
EAB applied section 625.4(i), which addresses eligibility.
There is no conflict between section 625.4(i) and the CARES
Act; indeed, section 625.4(i) is readily incorporated into the
CARES Act as further defining what makes a claimant a
“covered individual.” EAB was thus correct to determine that
there was no conflict that prevented applying section 625.4(i).
          We turn to two final points. Although we disagree
with EAB and OED that the starting point in the analysis
is the question of whether petitioner had “exhausted all
rights to regular unemployment,” we agree that as a matter
of fact, she had not. As EAB explained, because petitioner’s
income for the weeks at issue was greater than her regular
unemployment benefit of $172, petitioner had not been paid
any unemployment benefits. As a result, petitioner had not
Cite as 327 Or App 82 (2023)                                89

reached her maximum benefit of $4,472. Because petitioner
retained the right to those benefits and could use them if
and when she became “eligible” for them under state law,
petitioner had not “exhausted all rights to regular unem-
ployment” under the CARES Act.
         Finally, petitioner argues that, even if she was not
a covered individual under section 2102(a)(3)(A)(i) of the Act,
she was eligible under section 2102(a)(3)(A)(ii)(II) because
she is someone who “otherwise would not qualify for regular
unemployment.” Pub L 116-136, § 2102(a)(3)(A)(ii)(II), 134
Stat 281 (2020). But, as explained above, petitioner is both
qualified and eligible for regular unemployment. Section
2102(a)(3)(A)(ii)(II) thus provides no basis for an award of
pandemic unemployment assistance to petitioner.
        In sum, given the intersection of the CARES Act
and 20 CFR 625, petitioner was not a “covered individual”
under the CARES Act because her weekly income from
Bi-Mart exceeded her weekly unemployment benefit amount.
Therefore, EAB did not commit legal error when it denied
her application for pandemic unemployment assistance.
         In petitioner’s second, third, and fourth assign-
ments of error petitioner argues EAB made findings not
supported by the record and failed to consider certain evi-
dence. We review EAB’s order for substantial evidence and
substantial reason. ORS 183.482(8)(c). “Substantial evi-
dence to support a finding of fact is evidence that, viewing
the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to
make that finding.” Portland Assn. Teachers v. Mult. Sch.
Dist. 1, 171 Or App 616, 627, 16 P3d 1189 (2020). In con-
ducting that review, our role “is not to substitute [our own]
findings of fact for an ALJ’s findings of fact, when there is
substantial evidence in the record for the ALJ’s finding.”
Gaylord v. DMV, 283 Or App 811, 822, 391 P3d 900 (2017).
“This is true even when there is also substantial evidence to
the contrary.” Id. (citing Wood v. MVD., 93 Or App 575, 577,
763 P2d 190 (1988)). “We review to determine whether a rea-
sonable person could have made the findings supporting the
decision, not whether a reasonable person could have made
different findings.” Shakerin v. MVD., 101 Or App 357, 360,
790 P2d 1180 (1990).
90                                 Calef v. Employment Dept.

         Petitioner takes issue with two of the ALJ’s findings—
that petitioner filed a claim for regular unemployment ben-
efits on March 29, 2020, and that petitioner claimed regu-
lar unemployment benefits for the week of March 29, 2020,
and the weeks of April 12, 2020 through May 9, 2020. But
those findings are supported by the record. The record con-
tains OED’s “Wage and Potential Benefit Report” which was
issued to petitioner and identifies the date of her claim as
March 29, 2020. And the claims report in the record indi-
cates that petitioner claimed benefits for the five weeks in
question. That is sufficient to meet EAB’s substantial evi-
dence burden.
         Petitioner also argues that EAB failed to consider
evidence about her business, as well as evidence and testi-
mony she submitted regarding OED’s classification of her
claim as regular unemployment benefits rather than pan-
demic unemployment assistance. Our role on review is not
to second guess the ALJ’s findings when, as here, there is
substantial evidence in the record to support those findings,
even if other evidence in the record could lead a reasonable
person to come to a different conclusion. EAB’s findings
were supported by substantial evidence in the record and
EAB adequately explained why, for the purposes of deter-
mining pandemic unemployment eligibility, petitioner was
considered eligible for regular unemployment benefits.
          In petitioner’s fifth assignment of error, she argues
that EAB erred by failing to provide legal citation to sup-
port some of its findings. We review an agency’s legal conclu-
sions for errors of law. ORS 183.482(8)(a). We agree with the
state that EAB was not required to provide legal citation to
support each of its findings. An agency order must include
findings of fact and conclusions of law. ORS 183.470(2) (“The
findings shall consist of a concise statement of the underlying
facts supporting the findings as to each contested issue of fact
and as to each ultimate fact required to support the agency’s
order.”). Nothing in the rule requires EAB to support every
finding of fact with a cited authority so long as EAB’s find-
ings are supported in the record, and it explains how those
findings inform its legal conclusions. EAB did so here.
        Affirmed.