Court Opinion

ID: 9811402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:19:17.307514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:19.366227
License: Public Domain

JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice,
concurring.1
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write only to express my concern about the trial court’s July 18, 2008 default order that prohibits the father, J.W.L., from “any possession or access” to his daughter with no showing that he is an unfit parent.
I. Background
J.W.L. and S.W.L., natural parents of M.W.L., divorced in December 2000. The divorce decree named J.W.L. and S.W.L. joint managing conservators. S.W.L. was given the right to designate M.W.L.’s primary residence. The decree was modified in February 2004, with no changes to the conservatorship order.
On October 10, 2007, S.W.L., joined by her parents, G.W. and N.W. (“Grandparents”), filed a “Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship.” This petition noted that S.W.L. had developed terminal cancer and was not expected to survive. In language tracking section 102.003(a)(9) of the Texas Family Code, the petition alleged that Grandparents had standing to bring the petition “in that they have had actual care, control and possession of the child the subject of this suit for at least six months ending not more than [ninety] days preceding the date of the filing of this *87petition.”2 S.W.L. and Grandparents sought to have the 2000 decree and 2004 order modified to give Grandparents, upon S.W.L.’s death, the right to designate M.W.L.’s primary residence. The petition further requested that the terms and conditions for J.W.L.’s access to or possession of M.W.L. remain the same as they were in the 2000 decree.
S.W.L. died on October 16, 2007. The following day, on October 17, 2007, Grandparents, joined by S.L. (S.W.L.’s husband at the time of her death, and stepfather to M.W.L.), filed their “First Amended Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship,” again alleging standing under section 102.003(a)(9) of the family code. Grandparents and S.L. requested that they be appointed conservators with the right to designate M.W.L.’s primary residence.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the amended petition on November 7, 2007. Neither party provided this court with a record from this hearing.
On January 18, 2008, the trial court signed an “Agreed Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship” (“Agreed Order”). The Agreed Order recited that the trial court,
heard this case and made certain rulings regarding standing; a recess was taken, and the parties entered into settlement negotiations and reached a final agreement; and the agreement of the parties was read into the record and approved by the [trial court] (emphasis added).3
The Agreed Order designated J.W.L. as sole managing conservator of M.W.L. with the right to establish M.W.L.’s primary residence “without regard to geographic location,” appointed Grandparents as non-parent possessory conservators,4 and established a schedule for each party’s possession of and access to M.W.L., including provisions for long distance visitation by Grandparents should J.W.L. move more than 100 miles from Grandparents’ residence.
On June 30, 2008, J.W.L. and M.W.L. left Texas and moved to Idaho, without providing Grandparents prior notice as required by the Agreed Order. Grandparents then filed various pleadings, including a petition to modify the parent-child relationship requesting that Grandparents be appointed the persons with the right to designate M.W.L.’s primary residence and that J.W.L. be allowed only supervised access to and possession of M.W.L. J.W.L. was served with Grandparents’ pleadings in Idaho days before a scheduled July 18, 2008 hearing. J.W.L. filed a letter with the trial court indicating his inability to appear at the July 18 hearing, but the trial court proceeded with the hearing in J.W.L.’s absence.5
After the hearing, the trial court signed temporary orders naming Grandparents *88temporary sole managing conservators. Despite naming J.W.L. a temporary pos-sessory conservator, the temporary orders provided that J.W.L. “is not granted any possession or access with [M.W.L.] until further order of this court.” The temporary orders further stated that any future permission granted by the court for J.W.L. to have visitation with M.W.L. would be “supervised visitation with [M.W.L.] under the supervision of the Tarrant County Family Court Services.”
J.W.L. then filed a special appearance and a motion to vacate the trial court’s order to return M.W.L. to Grandparents. In the motion to vacate, J.W.L. argued that Grandparents never had standing to file a petition to modify the parent-child relationship and, therefore, all of the trial court’s orders following S.W.L.’s death, including the Agreed Order, were void. J.W.L. further requested that the trial court order “the immediate return of [M.W.L.] ” to his custody.
On September 22, 2008, J.W.L. submitted a letter to the trial court in which he further complained of the trial court’s “void” order depriving him of possession to M.W.L. and informed the court that “[t]his litigation has devastated me financially. I cannot afford to travel to Texas for hearings.” He again asked the court to vacate the prior orders and return his daughter “to her home here with me without delay.” He further alleged:
Time is of the essence in this matter. The Court’s Orders have unlawfully removed my child from my care; and her continued emotional and physical well-being is of paramount importance to me. [M.W.L.’s] mother died less than a year ago, and this tumultuous litigation and what amounts to no less than State-sanctioned kidnapping is quite possibly inflicting serious emotional harm on her.
On October 7, 2008, the trial court conducted a hearing on J.W.L.’s special appearance, which the trial court subsequently denied. J.W.L. then filed this original proceeding in which he has asked that we vacate the trial court’s orders as void and order that M.W.L. be returned to his custody.6
II. The Parent-Child Relationship
The right to the companionship, care, custody, and control of one’s own child is a fundamental liberty interest far more precious than any property right.7 Thus, “the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”8 In fact, it is “cardinal” that the custody, care, and nurture of a child reside in the parents.9
Both parent and child have a substantial interest in the justice of a decision affecting their ability to have a relationship with one another.10 The State also has an interest in protecting the welfare of its children; an interest that “must initially mani*89fest itself by working toward preserving the familial bond” between a parent and child unless that parent will not provide a safe, stable environment.11
While the temporary grant of custody to another or the limitation of a parent’s access to a child is not tantamount to absolute termination of parental rights, trial courts must tread very carefully when they infringe upon a parent’s ability to participate in child rearing.12 The Supreme Court of Texas has recognized that custody determinations that restrict a parent’s access to a child can risk a significant deprivation similar to termination of the relationship.13 “[A]ny significant risk of erroneous deprivation [of parental access to a child] is unacceptable.” 14
The Texas Family Code’s statutory scheme focuses on the children’s welfare and best interests.15 The legislature has instructed courts that “[t]he terms of an order that denies possession of a child to a parent or imposes restrictions or limitations on a parent’s right to possession of or access to a child may not exceed those that are required to protect the best interest of the child.”16 Consistent with this legislative mandate, Texas appellate courts have recognized that it is in the best interest of children to have maximum reasonable time living with parents.17
The legislature has further recognized parents’ abilities to act in the best interests of their children by applying a presumption that they do so.18 Consistent with this presumption, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that so long as a parent is fit, there is normally no *90reason for a court to inject itself between parent and child or to disturb that parent’s rearing of his or her children.19 In other words, trial court interference with the right of a fit parent to bring up his or her own child impacts a fundamental right and may violate the Due Process Clause.
III. Potentially Significant Deprivation of J.W.L.’s Parental Rights
In this case, the trial court’s “temporary” orders tread very closely to a significant deprivation of J.W.L.’s parental rights similar to termination of the parent-child relationship. By denying J.W.L. “any possession or access” to his child, the trial court has treated the grandparents’ statutory right to visitation as paramount to J.W.L.’s constitutional rights as a parent.20 This not only constitutes a potential violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution but also runs directly counter to stated legislative policy favoring parental involvement in children’s lives. Neither the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution nor the laws of this state permit a trial court to indefinitely deprive a presumably fit parent of his fundamental rights to care, custody, and control of his child simply because the parent infringed on a grandparent’s visitation rights.21
IV. Conclusion
I empathize with the grandparents’ plight in this case. The father’s conduct in taking M.W.L. out of state in violation of the agreed orders was wrong and potentially harmful to M.W.L. But, the trial court’s order indefinitely depriving this presumably fit father of his right to care, custody, and control of his daughter is equally troubling. The order is not only potentially harmful to M.W.L. but also raises the specter of potential due process violations that are beyond our reach in this proceeding.22 Therefore, while I concur in the majority’s decision to deny J.W.L. the relief he has requested on jurisdictional grounds, it is my hope that the trial court will reconsider its temporary orders and, based upon J.W.L.’s repeated requests for custody of his daughter throughout the course of the underlying case, enter appropriate orders granting J.W.L. possession and access to his daughter during the pen-dency of the underlying case to avoid the significant risk of erroneously depriving J.W.L. of his fundamental rights as a parent.23

. For purposes of maintaining the confidentiality of this original proceeding, I will refer to all parties by their initials or relationship to the child. See Tex.R.App. P. 9.8; see also Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.002(d) (Vernon 2008).

. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 102.003(a)(9) (Vernon 2008).

. In a later-filed trial court brief, J.W.L. notes that he objected to the trial court's jurisdiction before the November 7, 2007 hearing. The Agreed Order indicated that each party agreed to the terms of the order “to the extent permitted by law” and that the trial court "finds that it has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties.”

. The Agreed Order dismissed S.L.'s petition with prejudice.

.Subsequent temporary orders entered by the trial court stated that J.W.L. "filed an answer and although duly and properly notified, did not physically appear at the hearing and wholly made default.” Nothing in the record before this court suggests that at the time of the hearing J.W.L. had filed any "answer” to Grandparents’ pleadings other than his letter indicating his inability to appear at the hearing.

. One of the four issues J.W.L. raises — that the trial court should be compelled to hear his motion to vacate — has been rendered moot. The trial court conducted a hearing on that motion on January 29, 2009, and denied the motion by written order on February 6, 2009.

. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547-48 (Tex.2003) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)).

. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978)).

. Id. at 65-66, 120 S.Ct. at 2060 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944)).

. M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 547 (recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights).

. Id. at 548 (original emphasis removed).

. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73, 120 S.Ct. at 2063-64.

. See Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 168 n. 8 (Tex.1990) (recognizing that while proceeding is not technically termination of parental rights action, it may have such effect where mother without adequate transportation lives some distance from son and existence of visitation rights likely will be insufficient to allow her "to have a substantial role in her child’s upbringing”).

. M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 549 (emphasis added).

. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.002 (Vernon 2008) ("The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conserva-torship and possession of and access to the child.”); M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 549; Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex.2002) (reiterating legislature’s mandate that best interest of child is primary consideration).

. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.193 (Vernon 2008) ("Minimal Restriction on Parent’s Possession or Access”). Because trial courts are the factfinders that determine what is in the children’s best interest, appellate courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard of review. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.1982). The discretion courts have in determining the factual issue of children’s best interests, however, is not unfettered. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex.1976) (non-exhaustively listing factors courts consider in determining whether termination of parental rights is in children's best interests); see also In re Jane-Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex.2000) (applying non-exhaustive list of Holley factors "for determining a minor's best interests” to factual determination of best interest of minor in parental notification case).

. Wood v. Wood, 510 S.W.2d 399, 400 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ). In Wood, we lamented how divorced parents often allow their animosity towards one another to overshadow the concern that children maintain healthy relationships with the other parent, harming the children in the process. Id. This concern is especially true when, as in this case, one of the parties is a non-parent and the animosity between the parent and non-parent deprives the child of a normal relationship with the parent.

. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131(a) (Vernon 2008).

. See Traxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69, 120 S.Ct at 2061.

. The temporary orders depriving J.W.L. of any access to M.W.L. are predicated on (1) J.W.L. having moved from Texas to Idaho without providing notice even though he had the unlimited right to determine M.W.L.'s primary residence, (2) vague allegations of J.W.L. failing to take M.W.L. to a doctor when she had a fever or to a dentist to obtain orthodontic care, and (3) Grandparents’ hearsay allegations of assaultive behavior by J.W.L. against a girlfriend whom Grandparents cannot even identify by name.

. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73, 120 S.Ct. at 2063-64.

. J.W.L. limited his mandamus petition to the jurisdiction issue and did not ask this Court to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that J.W.L. shall have no access to his daughter. Thus, the parties and the trial court should not construe this court's denial of the mandamus petition as reflecting how this court would rule if presented with that issue.

. See M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 549. The majority contends that the trial court should not reconsider its July 2008 order denying J.W.L. ac*91cess to his daughter because J.W.L. has only asked that she be returned to his "custody." Among other problems with this rationale, the majority overlooks the fact that the trial court has no discretion to enter an order denying possession of a child to a parent or to restrict or limit a parent’s right to access to a child beyond what is required “to protect the best interest of the child.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.193 (Vernon 2008). J.W.L. seeks to set aside a trial court order that he contends has wrongfully deprived him of his parental rights to possession of and access to his daughter. Contrary to the majority’s contention, Texas law requires him to do nothing more to protect his statutory right under the family code to an order that does not exceed restrictions on his parental rights necessary to protect his daughter’s best interest. Whether J.W.L. will actually avail himself of the access granted under such an order given his jurisdictional objections is immaterial to the question of whether he is entitled to such access as a presumptively fit parent.