Court Opinion

ID: 9576665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:26:57.611533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:05.071927
License: Public Domain

GOULD, Circuit Judge,
with whom Chief Judge KOZINSKI and Judge TALLMAN join,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s invalidation of the permit and badge requirements, for the reasons stated by my colleague Chief Judge Kozinski in his dissent. The permit scheme is a reasonable response to the City of Seattle’s need for order to maintain the efficacy and desirability of Seattle Center for its citizenry and visitors. I write separately to explain my disagreement with the majority’s conclusions relating to the Seattle Center Rules regarding required performance locations, the allowing of only passive solicitation, and the preclusion of speech activities including performances within thirty feet of captive audiences engaging in other events at Seattle Center. These Rules are reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech because they are content-neutral restrictions that are narrowly tailored and leave open ample alternative means of communication. I conclude that separate attention to each of these restraints is warranted.
In Section I, I first comment on the substantial value of street performance, while acknowledging the City’s superordinate need to regulate it in the interest of order. In Section II, I explain why the performance location rule is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction that should be upheld and why Berger’s evidence stating otherwise is insufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of the City. In Section III, I explain why the passive solicitation rule is also a reasonable restraint on the manner of solicitation and should be upheld. In Section IV, I explain why Seattle’s rule protecting captive audiences should also be upheld in light of the special multi-purpose nature of Seattle Center.
By invalidating the City of Seattle’s reasonable time, place, and manner restraints on solicitation and performances to captive audiences, and by generating a fictitious fact issue on performance location, the majority utterly fails to give due weight to the valid interests of the City of Seattle in protecting a smoothly running Seattle Center. These include the City’s interests in “traffic control” when competing street performers want to use the same place for their expression, and the regulation of street performers who communicate at Seattle Center in circumstances that may interfere with the Center’s other activities. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 946-47 (1963) (stating that by regulating “traffic control” a government can “maintain orderly expression and thereby promote freedom of expression”). The majority’s holding impairs the value of Seattle Center to Seattle’s residents, to visitors from worldwide locations, and to the organizations that make Seattle Center their home. Its holding is not needed to protect the free and full exchange of ideas that helps to keep our society vital. Therefore, I respectfully dissent, and elaborate my views.
I
The value of the speech from street performers impacted by the City’s permit scheme is significant, but Rules F.l and F.2 are nonetheless constitutional because of the need of the City to maintain order at this gem of a civic attraction. The City’s interests are well articulated by Chief Judge Kozinski, but I will expand on the speech value of the street performances: Speech in the form of music, dra*1075ma, or performance has played a vital role in our society and deserves First Amendment protection. Some of our culture’s most valued written works originated as spoken performances. For example, what we know now as Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey likely were originally preserved through verbal performances. See Mark W. Edward, Homer and the Oral Tradition, 18/1 Oral Tradition 65 (2003) (“By now the facts about the nature of the oral features ... in Homer are well known and (on the whole) not controversial.”); see generally Bruce Louden, The Iliad: Structure, Myth and Meaning (Johns Hopkins University Press 1996). Music likewise has helped to develop our Western civilization. See, e.g., Paul Henry Lang, Music in Western Civilization XIX (W.W. Norton & Co.1997) (“Every civilization is a synthesis of man’s conquest of life. Art is the ultimate symbol of this conquest, the utmost unity man can achieve.”). Even if our society today does not always hold street performers in the highest of esteem, these performers continue the tradition of transmitting culture, as done by the traveling minstrels, talebearers, and acting troupes that have helped to develop what we consider our Western culture. It would be easy to underestimate the value provided by these performers, or the accompanying need for First Amendment protection, if we only looked at a single performer and especially if we had little affinity for that person’s performance. However, that such performances are possible in the aggregate bestows value on a society.
The City’s permit system and related regulatory restraints may require some individuals wishing to express themselves through spontaneous performance to wait until they have gained a permit and channeled their performance into a permitted location. It is true that the Supreme Court, while reviewing a restraint on private solicitation, has criticized a permit requirement in part because “a significant amount of spontaneous speech” was “effectively banned” by that requirement. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167, 122 S.Ct. 2080, 153 L.Ed.2d 205 (2002). It might also be conceded that delaying speech takes some toll on the speaker. See Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 11, 82 (1981) (“[E]ven short delays take from speakers the power to determine precisely when to disseminate their communications. When government possesses the power to delay communications that it cannot suppress, speakers cannot be said truly to control, in the sense required for autonomy, their own communicative endeavors.”). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has upheld permit requirements that seek to regulate traffic control and maintain order. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002) (upholding permit requirement for large events in public parks); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941) (upholding permit requirement for parades on public streets). Every permit requirement deters some spontaneous speech. That the Supreme Court has routinely allowed permit schemes outside of the solicitation and small-group interaction contexts shows that a harm to spontaneous speech is not enough to render a permit requirement unconstitutional. Wandering musicians, poets, actors, or other street performers who come to Seattle and wish to perform a protest song or reading or drama can be required to delay their speech until they comply with the reasonable rules that the City of Seattle has established for public performance in its important Seattle Center venue.
The value to society of informal speech presented through performance of music, poetry, and drama is great. It can keep *1076us alert and open to societal criticisms of practices that require change. At the same time, for the reasons well stated by Chief Judge Kozinski, the need for and value of a permitting system regulating such speakers is superordinate in this context because of the unique nature of Seattle Center. Indeed, the speakers themselves benefit from the maintenance of an orderly system that deters interference with their performances and disputes over desirable performing locations. It would be nice to think that all of the important interests of the City of Seattle can be accommodated by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, but it is a reckless gamble to so conclude and I cannot say that the City should not rationally be able to protect itself, and its citizens and visitors, through the permit process. Unless and until the Supreme Court stands opposed to such permitting for such a unique venue, I conclude that a permit process should be within the City’s arsenal of tools for managing order at Seattle Center.
II
I next address the performance location rule, Seattle Center Rule F.5, which I view as a reasonable time, place, and manner restraint on which the majority’s analysis goes astray. As the Supreme Court declared in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. These restrictions must be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” They must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” And they must “leave open ample alternative channels for communication.” Ward, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). For the performance location rule, the key issues arising under this formulation- of doctrine are whether the restraint permits sufficient alternate means of communication, and whether it is narrowly tailored to meet its ends without gratuitously impeding speech.
Rule F.5 is constitutional. If it were to decide otherwise, the majority would impose an improvident burden on cities seeking to regulate speech locations in the future. It would go far to read “place” out of the general accommodation for reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. What we should be asking ourselves here are fundamental questions about how Rule F.5 affects speech. It is, in my view, a paradigm restraint on location. It funnels performance speech into sixteen locations near the most popular Seattle Center attractions, where the performers will be readily visible but should not impair Seattle Center’s ability to welcome guests, both resident and tourist, who want to sample its attractions. The performance location rule does not in any way say what performers can or cannot say or do, it merely ensures they will present their speech in locations that do not unduly impede the commerce of the City. Thus alternative means of communication are ample and secured. At the same time, I conclude the restraint is sufficiently and narrowly tailored. It does not gratuitously impede any speech, it just channels it to a convenient place to accommodate both the speaker’s interest and the interests of Seattle Center patrons. What is wrong with this? Nothing, under any balanced First Amendment analysis.
The City has established that without the performance location rule there would be a likelihood of conflict and chaos that will interfere with Seattle Center’s important functions. The undisputed evidence in the record shows that before the location restrictions were imposed street performers often set up in close proximity to one another, leading to territorial disputes and altercations. Street performers also *1077set up in locations that could not accommodate the gathering audience or that blocked pedestrian access. The City received weekly complaints about pedestrian access problems. This evidence satisfies our First Amendment requirement “that municipalities provide tangible evidence that speech-restrictive regulations are necessary to advance the proffered interest in public safety.” Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir.2005) (quotation omitted). The performance location rule would help eliminate confrontations between street performers over location and would ensure that pedestrian walkways remain clear.1 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965) (stating that “[gjovernmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for movement” and that “[a] restriction in that relation, designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, and not susceptible to abuses of discriminatory application, cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which, in other circumstances, would be entitled to protection”). Accordingly, the Rule meets the Supreme Court’s narrow tailoring requirement that a “regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985)).2
Contrary to the majority’s view that there are unresolved fact issues on this matter, the City has shown that the performance location rule provides ample alternative channels for communication. All that is needed to satisfy the “ample alternatives” test is “that the government refrain from denying a reasonable opportunity for communication.” Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1141 (quotation omitted). The City has met its burden. The record includes a map of the performance locations, which shows that the locations are adjacent to major pedestrian thoroughfares and are situated near all of the most popular Seattle Center attractions, including the Space Needle, KeyArena, Pacific Science Center, and the Experience Music Project. In response, Berger makes two unsupported statements that some locations are far from walkways or are occasionally blocked by equipment. Berger does not identify the specific locations to which he objects, and he does not directly dispute the authenticity of the City’s map. “A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by *1078relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989), but that is precisely all that Berger provides. The majority nonetheless recites that Berger’s conclusory evidence is sufficient to defeat summary judgment and even creates a reasonable inference of unconstitutionality. Its conclusion is inconsistent with our summary judgment standard as it has been explained by the United States Supreme Court and elaborated in our precedent. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 880, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) (stating that although Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) allows a party to defeat summary judgment through affidavits that establish a genuine factual issue, “[t]he object of this provision is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.”).
Rule F.5 allows for ample alternative channels of communication even if we accept Berger’s factual allegations as true. I agree with the portion of Judge N.R. Smith’s analysis that explains why under our precedent and that of the Supreme Court, Berger’s conclusory allegations do not create any material fact dispute that would preclude summary judgment in favor of the City. The City presented uncontested evidence that even at peak times fewer than half of the designated performance locations are in use. Therefore, even if some of the locations are undesirable, Berger has provided no evidence that the location restrictions preclude the entire medium of street performance or deny street performers a “reasonable opportunity for communication.” Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1141 (quotation omitted); see also Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 555 (9th Cir.1998) (“The Supreme Court generally will not strike down a governmental action for failure to leave open ample alternative channels of communication unless the government enactment will foreclose an entire medium of public expression across the landscape of a particular community or setting.”). I conclude that the City is entitled to a summary judgment upholding the performance location rule. The majority’s remand for factual determination on alternative channels of communications is unnecessary and incorrect.
Ill
I next address the passive solicitation rule. Rule F.3.a provides that no street performer “shall actively solicit donations, for example by live or recorded word of mouth, gesture, mechanical devices, or second parties.” The Rule does permit passive solicitation by allowing performers to provide a receptacle for donations and display “a written sign that informs the public that such donations are sought.” By misconstruing the passive solicitation rule as being “content-based,” the majority again misapplies the general rule permitting reasonable, time, place, and manner restrictions, this time reading “manner” out of the permitted restraints.
The ban on active solicitation is neutral in content. Applying the Supreme Court’s “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality,” I conclude that the City did not adopt its passive solicitation rule “because of disagreement with the message [soliciting speech] conveys.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. The Rule does not depend on the content of the solicitation, there are no favored organizations or persons — no street performer advancing any cause can solicit funds from Seattle Center patrons in an active way, none can demand money verbally. Street performers cannot implore people to give them money, but they can post a passive sign alerting their listeners that they would appreciate a contribution, and providing a proper receptacle. In sum, there is no evidence that the City disagrees with the views of Seattle Center street performers, *1079nor is the City stifling messages of solicitation completely. If this is not a reasonable manner restriction, then probably nothing is.
The majority argues that the passive solicitation rule is based on content because it restricts a particular set of messages, namely requests for donations. But under this analysis any regulation of solicitation would be a content-based restraint because such a rule would have to differentiate words that solicit from ordinary speech. The majority’s analysis places it in tension, if not explicit conflict, with United States Supreme Court authority, which has held that solicitation restrictions may be content-neutral restraints. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (plurality opinion) (upholding ban on in-person solicitations and calling “the inherent nature of solicitation itself, a content-neutral ground”); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648-49, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) (stating that restriction on solicitation locations in public fairgrounds is content-neutral because it “applies evenhandedly to all who wish to ... solicit funds”). Under the majority’s analysis, however, the Kokinda and Heffron restrictions would be content-based restraints because they would, as the majority states, restrict individuals “from communicating a particular set of messages — requests for donations.” The majority’s analysis eliminating any possibility of a reasonable restraint on manner of solicitation is difficult to reconcile with Supreme Court precedent that has upheld such restrictions.
Our decision in ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir.1986), also supports a holding that the passive solicitation rule is content-neutral. In ACORN we said that an ordinance prohibiting solicitation of vehicle occupants is content-neutral because it “does not single out any group or the content of any speech. The ordinance applies evenhandedly to every organization or individual, regardless of viewpoint, which would desire to solicit contributions, business, or employment from the occupants of vehicles traveling on Phoenix streets.” Id. at 1267 (citing Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648-9, 101 S.Ct. 2559). The majority distinguishes ACORN because it sees no indication that the ordinance in ACORN forbade asking drivers or passengers to contribute by mail, as opposed to contributing on the spot. However, the majority cites no language in ACORN indicating that the ordinance at issue prohibited only the immediate physical exchange of money. The text of the ordinance states only that a person may not “solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business or contributions from the occupants of any vehicle.” Id. at 1262.
The majority’s reasoning for deciding that the City’s passive solicitation rule is content-specific would have required a different result in ACORN because the ordinance in that case restricts people from “communicating a particular set of messages' — requests for donations,” while allowing the same individuals to approach stopped drivers and communicate other ideas. The majority does not claim to overrule ACORN, and thus in my view ACORN compels us to hold the City’s passive solicitation rule content-neutral because it also applies evenhandedly to anyone who solicits by certain methods.
Rule F.3.a is constitutional because it is content-neutral, is narrowly tailored, and allows for ample alternative channels of communication. To hold otherwise, as does the majority, is in substance to say there cannot be a reasonable regulation of manner of solicitation, and in my view that position cannot be correct.
*1080IV
Finally, I address Rule G.4, the captive audience rule. I conclude that a close case is presented on this rule but that it should nonetheless be upheld because of the special nature of Seattle Center. The Supreme Court has stated that the government may “shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others” when a “degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). We have overturned rules restricting speech near captive audiences when we have determined that the audience in question was not captive at all. See Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 861 n. 10 (9th Cir.2004).3 But until now we have never held that a captive audience could never exist in a public park. The majority’s blanket rule will preclude courts from addressing an audience’s possible captive state on a fact-specific basis. Moreover, the majority’s approach is singularly inappropriate when we consider the unique nature of Seattle Center, containing many outstanding venues for entertainment, theater, ballet, sports, and dining.
Seattle Center is an unusual public complex that contains many captive audiences who are observing or awaiting the major events that are presented at McCaw Hall, KeyArena, or the Bagley-Wright Theater, waiting in line for rides at the Fun Forest Amusement Park, or simply attending other Center attractions, including the popular Center House restaurant venues. Seattle Center also hosts special events such as Bite of Seattle, which in theory may be impacted if the majority treatment of the Rules at issue here is sustained. The very viability of Seattle Center, the ability of Seattle residents and tourists to take advantage of the unique opportunities showcased there, in my view is placed in danger if the City is not permitted fairly and effectively to regulate the conduct of all those who may interfere with Seattle Center events. The fair regulation of street performer speech does not entirely cancel the speech out, but rather subjects it to a regime that can coexist with Seattle Center’s other activities in a way that does not unduly damage its commerce and value to the City.
The majority is correct that Seattle Center is a public forum, and this categorization affects our choice of precedents to apply. But there are important differences between Seattle Center and the typical open-air public park. Seattle Center is a unique urban center defined not solely by trees and open fields but also by museums, theaters, concert halls, amusement rides, and other special attractions for the City and its visitors. Visitors pay considerable sums to see these attractions, and they must often wait in line before attending. Unlike in a traditional public park, these patrons, should they be confronted by unwelcome or harassing performances, cannot just walk away to the next available shade tree. Rather, to avoid the nuisance these patrons must give up their place in line, potentially forfeiting their ability to enjoy the Seattle Center event they paid to attend. The City has a significant governmental interest in ensuring that these patrons have an enjoyable experience, so *1081that Seattle Center and the City as a whole may continue to be a desirable and commercially profitable destination. See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323, 122 S.Ct. 775 (“Regulations of the use of a public forum that ensure the safety and convenience of the people are not ‘inconsistent with civil liberties but ... [are] one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which [civil liberties] ultimately depend.” (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. at 574, 61 S.Ct. 762)).
The captive audience rule applies to “speech activities” rather than to only street performers. The majority imagines that the City will enforce the captive audience rule against those who make “the mildest remark.” But, as Chief Judge Kozinski aptly explains in his dissent, there is no indication that the City has or ever will enforce this Rule in such a draconian manner. See Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1190, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (“In determining whether a law is facially invalid, we must be careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.”). The majority relies on Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574-75, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987), to say that overbroad regulations are unconstitutional. But there the Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance after concluding that there was no feasible limiting eonstruction. Id. at 575-76, 107 S.Ct. 2568. However, the majority has engaged in no such analysis of the captive audience rule, and therefore its overbreadth analysis is incomplete. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (“Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged [rule].”).4
It is unrealistic and unwise to expect patrons paying to visit an attraction to give up their right to access the attraction when confronted with unwelcome behavior. Before instituting the captive audience rule, the city received weekly complaints about street performers harassing individuals in a captive audience. The captive audience rule is a reasonable method of achieving the City’s legitimate interest in the safety and convenience of Seattle Center patrons. It leaves open alternative channels of communication — in a designated location for street performers and anywhere away from a captive audience for everyone else. By contrast, the majority’s incorrect analysis echoes its earlier errors by reading “place” and “manner” out of the general rule that allows reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. I would hold that the captive audience rule is a reasonable restriction on speech.
V
Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s rejection of the permit and badge *1082requirements for the reasons aptly stated by Chief Judge Kozinski in his dissent, and also would reverse the district court’s decisions declaring unconstitutional Rule F.5, Rule F.3.a, and Rule G.4, respectively governing performance locations, passive solicitation, and captive audiences. The latter three Rules are reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions that allow for ample alternative channels of communication. They are justified by the City’s legitimate interest in protecting the safety and desirability of Seattle Center as a major tourist draw and a wholesome venue for Seattle’s citizens, and if the Rules are followed they do not pose a significant threat to the exchange of speech and ideas. Although I recognize a significant value to speech in street performance, the majority’s elimination of the City’s permit scheme and the other regulatory rules adds only a negligible marginal speech value, and this at the cost of public order. The stakes for the City of Seattle in maintaining order at Seattle Center are high, because this is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of Seattle Center by Seattle’s residents and visitors who together make up the millions of annual users of Seattle Center. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s invalidation of the permit requirement and Rules governing passive solicitation and presentation near captive audiences, and from the majority’s remand on the Rule governing location of performance.

. Thus the performance location rule serves both of the traffic control interests identified by Professor Emerson. Emerson identifies two cases in which the government has a legitimate interest in traffic control. One situation occurs "where two or more groups desire to hold a parade, demonstration or meeting in the same place,” and the other "becomes necessary in situations where a group wishes to engage in some form of communication at a place which will interfere with the normal flow of traffic or the activities of other persons engaged in other affairs.” See Emerson, 72 Yale L J. at 947.

. In its attempt to avoid summary judgment favoring the City on this Rule, the majority adopts a counterintuitive conception of what realistically is meant by the term "street performer.” As the majority sees it, this term would include Gene Kelly Singing in the Rain or any person who whistled while they worked or whistled while they walked. I agree with Chief Judge Kozinski that there is no realistic danger the City will interpret its definition so broadly and that the City’s limiting construction cures any perceived danger. The record generated in the process of adopting the Rules shows what the City was aiming at, which certainly wasn't an impromptu version of Singing in the Rain or the casual whistler. The language used by the City in Rule F.5 does not reasonably contemplate such a broad definition, and so the majority’s argument about an overbroad and thus constitutionally invalid definition of “street performer” should not be credited.

. In Kuba we did not, as the majority suggests, hold that all patrons of a place of public entertainment could not be a captive audience unless they were particularly vulnerable. Instead, we emphasized that the highly mobile individuals in Kuba were not "constricted” to a particular location while they walked towards a concert venue. Kuba, 387 F.3d at 861 n. 10. Visitors to Seattle Center must keep their place in line in order to gain entry to limited-access buildings or events.

. The majority claims that any bias in favor of commercial over noncommercial speech is by itself cause to invalidate a regulation. However, the majority’s precedential support is limited to regulations on signs or billboards. E.g., G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th Cir.2006) ("[A]n ordinance is invalid if it imposes greater restrictions on noncommercial than on commercial billboards or regulates noncommercial billboards based on their content.” (quotation omitted)). The majority’s analysis on this point proceeds from the fact that although the captive audience rule applies to "both political speech and commercial speech,” it does not apply to "licensed concessionaires,” such as food and drink vendors. Licensed concessionaires, however, are subject to a myriad of other restrictions not applicable to noncommercial speakers. Moreover, Seattle Center patrons waiting in line might welcome an opportunity to purchase food or drink.