Court Opinion

ID: 9747036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:53:37.855253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.504663
License: Public Domain

RAKER, J., concurring and dissenting, in which BELL, C.J., and GREENE, J., join in dissent.
I.
I would reverse the sentence and the imposition of the death penalty on the grounds that the Maryland death penalty statute violates due process and is therefore unconstitutional because the statute requires that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances only by a preponderance of the evidence rather than the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 adhere to my views expressed more fully in the dissenting opinions of Evans v. State, 389 Md. 456, 886 A.2d 562 (2005), Miller v. State, 380 Md. 1, 843 A.2d 803 (2004), *374Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), and Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 786 A.2d 631 (2001).
I would sever the preponderance of the evidence standard from Md.Code (2002, 2005 Cum.Supp.), § 2-303(i) of the Criminal Law Article, vacate appellant’s death sentence, and remand the case for a new capital sentencing proceeding at which a reasonable doubt standard would apply to the weighing process under § 2-303(i). Although I find that the preponderance of the evidence standard in § 2-303(i) is invalid, that standard clearly is severable from the remainder of the Maryland death penalty statute. The Maryland death penalty statute is complete and capable of being enforced with the preponderance of the evidence standard severed from § 2-303(i). That standard would, under the requirements of due process, be replaced by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Greene have authorized me to state that they join in this dissent.
II.
I would affirm the judgments of conviction on the guilt/innocence phase.