Court Opinion

ID: 9831722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:19:07.018302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.355609
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Upon original hearing we overlooked a memorandum of authorities cited by appellants as a supplement to their briefs theretofore filed, and such of those authorities as are especially relied on we will now discuss.
In Cigler v. Keinath, 265 Ill. 144, 106 N. E. 629, a judgment was sought against a surety on an appeal bond filed by the defendants in a suit against whom a judgment had been rendered for the possession of certain real property. The bond was conditioned that the appellants should prosecute their appeal with effect “and pay the costs and damages rendered, or to be hereafter'rendered against them, in case said order shall be affirmed, in said appellate court.” After the judgment was affirmed the plaintiffs in that suit instituted suit against a surety on the appeal bond to recover the court costs adjudged against the principals on the bond in the appellate court and also the sum of $534, the rental value of the property held by the defendants pending the appeal. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that, while the surety was liable for the court costs mentioned, he was not liable for the rents sued for, because, as concluded by the court, those rents were not covered by the terms of the bond. However, in the opinion in that case another decision by the same court in Shreffler v. Nadelhoffer, 133 Ill. 536, 25 N. E. 630, 23 Am. St. Rep. 626, was referred to and discussed with the conclusion that it was distinguishable from the ease then being determined. In the former case it was held that the surety was liable on'an appeal bond given to suspend the operation of a writ of injunction for damages sustained by the appellee pending the appeal from the decree granting the writ. The condition of that appeal bond was that the appellant “shall duly prosecute said appeal, and shall moreover pay all damages, and damages growing out of the continuance of the injunction herein, costs of suit rendered” and to be rendered against them, in case the decree should be affirmed by the appellate court.
German National Bank of Beatrice v. Beatrice Rapid Transit & Power Company was decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska and the opinion appears in 69 Neb. 115, 95 N. W. 49, 5 Ann. Cas. 88. The following syllabus reflects the holding of the court in that case:
“In an action on a bond executed after judgment, and pending the transfer of the cause to this court by proceedings in error, conditioned that the obligors ‘shall, pay whatever judgment may be rendered by the court upon dismissal or trial of said appeal,’ a petition which merely alleges that the original judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and is unpaid fails to state a breach of the bond.”
We quote also the syllabus in Cole v. Edwards, by the Supreme Court of Iowa, reported in 104 Iowa, 373, 73 N. W. 863:
“Damages for defendant’s continuing to practice his profession pending his appeal from a decree enjoining Ms further practice are not covered by the supersedeas bond, conditioned for payment of ‘all costs and damages that shall be adjudged against said appellant in this appeal.’ ”
Those authorities all contain statements of the well-recognized rule that the liability of a surety on an appeal bond is to be determined by the strict letter of the bond. We believe that those authorities are clearly distinguishable from the present suit by reason of the fact that the conditions of the -bonds there involved were, in our opinion, materially different from the bond in controversy in this suit. We believe that the appeal bond in the present suit is more nearly similar to the one involved in Welch v. Welch, 106 Ky. 406, 50 S. W. 687, in which the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held a surety on an appeal bond was liable for damages sustained by the appellee pending the, appeal of the ease. The condition of the bond in that case was:
*419“That the appellant will pay to the appellees all costs and damages that shall be adjudged' against the appellant on the appeal and also that they will satisfy and perform the said judgment in case it shall be affirmed, * * * and also pay all damage which, during the pend-ency of the appeal, may accrue by reason of the appeal.”
Of course, in that bond there was a specific separation of the damages that might be adjudged against the appellant upon appeal and the damages which the appellee might sustain during the pendency of an appeal, and we believe that the appeal bond in controversy in this suit is substantially to the same effect, since, following the express provision that appellants should “prosecute their appeal with effect and in case the judgment of the Supreme Court or the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals shall be against them, they shall perform its judgment, sentence, or decree and pay all sums of money and costs which may be adjudged against them,” there was a further stipulation that the obligors would also pay “qll such damages which said John Richardson, plaintiff, may suffer.” The judgment which was sustained was one granting an injunction restraining the operation’ of the Palace Theater in competition with another theater operated by the plaintiff. There was no basis for any judgment By the appellate court for damages or sums of money other than court costs, and the stipulation contained in the last clause of the bond binding appellants to also pay “such damages which said John Richardson may suffer” manifestly meant damages other than those which.the appellate court could assess.
We believe further that on the question involved the bond in this suit is substantially to the same effect .as that in Shreffler v. Nadelhoffer, 133 Ill. 536, 25 N. E. 630, 23 Am. St. Rep. 626, referred to above.
If the statutes had given appellants in the former suit the right tó suspend the operation of the injunction by giving a supersedeas bond, and had prescribed the conditions of such a bond, and if, by the terms of those conditions the sureties were not bound for the damages here sought, then they would not be liable therefor, notwithstanding the stipulation in the bond filed, purporting to bind them for such damages. In that event it could be said that there being no .consideration for such obligation, it would be construed as surplusage and unenforceable, under the doctrine announced in such authorities cited by appellants, as Ireland v. Taylor, 68 Tex. 159, 4 S. W. 65. However, no such ease is presented here, since, as pointed out on original hearing, the right to suspend the appeal in the former suit was not given by statute, but solely by order of the trial court granting the injunction made upon request of appellants in that suit, who voluntarily prepared, executed, and filed the appeal bond with all its conditions, and, by reason thereof, reaped the full benefits of the suspension of the writ of injunction pending the appeal.
It is true, of course, that the sureties on the bond in question could not in any event be held liable for more than the penal sum fixed by the bond, to wit, $2,000, and, if liable at all, they are entitled, of course, to a credit thereon for the $120 paid by them as costs of appeal of the former suit. We did not intend to hold otherwise. The statement in the concluding portion of our opinion on original hearing, which appellants have construed as a conclusion, that, if the principals on the bond in question are liable to plaintiff for the profits claimed, the sureties would also be liable for the same amount, was not intended to have the meaning, and it is therefore modified in such manner as to accord with the conclusion stated above.
With this modification of our original opinion, the motions of appellants and appellees for a rehearing are both overruled.