Court Opinion

ID: 9424237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:10:53.47832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:49.027567
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
Appellees, recipients of benefits under the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, brought this suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 to have declared invalid and permanently enjoined the enforcement of the Maryland maximum grant regulation, which places a ceiling on the amount of benefits payable to a family under AFDC. They alleged that the regulation was inconsistent with the Social Security Act and that it denied equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. I do not find it necessary to reach the constitutional argument in this case, for in my view the Maryland regulation is inconsistent with the terms and purposes of the Social Security Act.
The Maryland regulation under attack, Rule 200, § X, B, of the Maryland Department of Social Services, places an absolute limit of $250 per month on the amount of a grant under AFDC, regardless of the size of the family and its actual need.1 The effect of this regulation is to deny benefits to additional children born into a family of six, thus making it impossible for families of seven persons or more to receive an amount commensurate with their actual need in accordance with standards formulated by the Maryland Department of Social Services, whereas families of six or less can receive the full amount of their need as so determined. Appellee Williams, according to the computed need for herself and her eight *491children, should receive $296.15 per month. Appellees Gary should receive $331.50 for themselves and their eight children. Instead, these appellees received the $250 maximum grant.
In King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 318-319, this Court stated: “There is no question that States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.” That dictum, made in the context of a case that dealt with Alabama's “substitute father” regulation, does little to clarify the limits of state authority. The holding in King was that the Alabama regulation, which denied AFDC benefits to the children of a mother who “cohabited” in or outside her home with an able-bodied man, was invalid because it defined “parent” in a manner inconsistent with § 406 (a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). The Court rejected the State's contention that its regulation was “a legitimate way of allocating its limited resources available for AFDC assistance.” 392 U. S., at 318. Thus, whatever else may be said of the “latitude” extended to States in determining the benefits payable under AFDC, the holding in King makes clear that it does not include restrictions on the payment of benefits that are incompatible with the Social Security Act.
The methods by which a State can limit AFDC payments below the level of need are numerous. The method used in King was to deny totally benefits to a specifically defined class of otherwise eligible recipients. Another method, which was disapproved by Congress in §402 (a) (10) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (10) (1964 ed., Supp. IY), was to refuse to take additional applications pending a decrease in the number of recipients on the assistance rolls or an increase in available funds. The two methods most commonly em*492ployed by the States at present, however, are percentage reductions and grant máximums. See Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), State Máx-imums and Other Methods of Limiting Money Payments to Recipients of the Special Types of Public Assistance, Oct. 1968, Tables 2, 3 (NCSS Report D-3). Grant máx-imums, in which payments are made according to need but subject to a stated dollar maximum, are of two types: individual máximums and family máximums. Only the latter type is at issue in the present case. Percentage reductions involve payments of a fixed percentage of actual need as determined by the State’s need standard.
The authority given the States to set the level of benefits payable under their AFDC plans stems from § 401 of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 601 (1964 ed., Supp. TV), which states the purpose of the federal AFDC appropriations as “enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State (Emphasis added.) It is significant in this respect that the Court in King referred only to a State’s determination of the level of benefits “by the amount of funds it devotes to the [AFDC] program,.” 392 U. S., at 318-3.19 (emphasis added). The language of §401 and the language of the Court in King both reflect a concern that the Federal Government not require a state legislature to appropriate more money for welfare purposes than it is willing and able to appropriate. The use of the matching formula in § 403 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 603 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), supports this deference to the fiscal decisions of state legislatures. The question of a State’s authority to pay less than its standard of need, however, has never been expressly decided.
Assuming, arguendo, that a State need not appropriate sufficient funds to pay all eligible AFDC recipients the *493full amount of their need, it does not follow that it can distribute such funds as it deems appropriate in a manner inconsistent with the Social Security Act. The question involved here is not one of ends; it is one of means. Thus the United States Government, in its Memorandum as Amicus Curiae in Rosado v. Wyman, decided this day, ante, p. 397, stated, at 6-7:
“Máximums, whether so many dollars per individual or a total number of dollars per family, have an arbitrary aspect lacking from ratable reductions, since their application means that one family or individual will receive a smaller proportion of the amounts he is determined to need under the state’s test than another family or individual. Where percentage reductions are used, the payment of every family is reduced proportionately .... [T]his aspect explains why Congress might wish to distinguish between máximums and ratable reductions as a means of reducing a state’s financial obligation and, at least inferentially, to disfavor the former.”
The District Court, in its initial ruling that the Maryland regulation was inconsistent with the Social Security Act, relied primarily on §402 (a) (10) of the Act, which provides that “all individuals wishing to make application for aid to families with dependent children shall have opportunity to do so, and that aid to [families with] dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (10) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). (Emphasis added.) This provision was added by the Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, 64 Stat. 549. The House Committee on Ways and Means, where the provision originated, explained its purpose as follows:
“Shortage of funds in aid to dependent children has sometimes, as in old-age assistance, resulted in *494a decision not to take more applications or to keep eligible families on waiting lists until enough recipients could be removed from the assistance rolls to make a place for them. . . . [T]his difference in treatment accorded to eligible people results in undue hardship on needy persons and is inappropriate in a program financed from Federal funds.” H. R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 48 (1949).
In the court below, the appellants relied upon this legislative history to argue that the “eligible individuals” to whom aid must be furnished are the applicants for aid referred to in the beginning of the provision, and not the individual members of a family unit. I find nothing in the Act or in the legislative history of § 402 (a) (10) which supports that argument.
The purpose of the AFDC program, as stated in the Act, is to encourage “the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life . . . .” Social Security Act §401, 42 U. S. C. §601 (1964 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). The terms “dependent child” and “relative with whom any dependent child is living” are defined in § 406 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
The aid provided through the AFDC program has always been intended for the individual dependent children, not for those who apply for the aid on their behalf. The Senate Committee on Finance, in its report on the Social Security Bill of 1935, stated this purpose in the following terms:
“The heart of any program for social security must be the child. All parts of the Social Security *495Act are in a very real sense measures for the security of children. . . .
“In addition, however, there is great need for special safeguards for many underprivileged children. Children are in many respects the worst victims of the depression. . . .
“Many of the children included in relief families present no other problem than that of providing work for the breadwinner of the family. These children will be benefited through the work relief program and still more through the revival of private industry. But there are large numbers of children in relief families which will not be benefited through work programs or the revival of industry.
“These are the children in families which have been deprived of a father’s support and in which there is no other adult than one who is needed for the care of the children. . . .
“With no income coming in, and with young children for whom provision must be made for a number of years, families without a father’s support require public assistance, unless they have been left with adequate means or are aided by friends and relatives. . . . Through cash grants adjusted to the needs of the family it is possible to keep the young children with their mother in their own home, thus preventing the necessity of placing the children in institutions. This is recognized by everyone to be the least expensive and altogether the most desirable method for meeting the needs of these families that has yet been devised.” S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 16-17 (1935) (emphasis added).
Prior to 1950, no specific provision was made for the need of the parent or other relative with whom the dependent child was living. Although this underscores *496the fact that the payments were intended to benefit the children and not the applicants who received those payments, the exclusion from the federal scheme of provision' for the need of the caring relative operated effectively to dilute the ability of the AFDC payments to meet the need of the child. To correct this latter deficiency, the 1950 Amendments allowed provision for the needs of this caring relative. The Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means stated:
“Particularly in families with small children, it is necessary for the mother or another adult to be in the home full time to provide proper care and supervision. Since the person caring for the child must have food, clothing, arid other essentials, amounts allotted to the children must be used in part for this purpose if no other provision is made to meet her needs. . . .
“To correct the present anomalous situation wherein no provision is made for the adult relative and to enable States to make payments that are more nearly adequate, the bill would include the relative with whom the dependent child is living as a recipient for Federal matching purposes. . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1949).
This amendment emphasizes the congressional concern with fully meeting the needs of the dependent children in a given family; and it would seem to negative the necessity of those children sharing their individual allocations with other essential members of the family unit.
There is other evidence that Congress intended each eligible recipient to receive his fair share of benefits under the AFDC program. The Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 provided that a state AFDC plan must “provide for the development and application of a pro*497gram for [services to maintain and strengthen family-life] jor each child who receives aid to families with dependent children . . . 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (13). The Social Security Amendments of 1967, which extended this program of “family services” to relatives receiving AFDC payments and “essential persons” living in the same home as the child and relative, retained the emphasis on providing these services to “each appropriate individual.” Social Security Act, §§ 402 (a) (14), (15), 42 U. S. C. §§602 (a)(14), (15) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). The Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1967 Amendments stated:
“Under the Social Security Act Amendments of 1962, an amendment was added to title IV requiring the State welfare agency to make a program for each child, identifying the services needed, and then to provide the necessary services. This has proven a useful amendment, for it has required the States to give attention to the children and to provide services necessary to carry out the plans for the individual child. . . . [T]he committee believes that it is essential to broaden the requirement for the program of services for each child to include the entire family. The committee bill would require, therefore, that the States establish a social services program for each AFDC family. Thus there will be a broadened emphasis to include a recognition of the needs of all members of the family, including 'essential persons.’ ” S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 155 (1967).
These “family services” provisions are helpful in interpreting the words “all eligible individuals” in § 402 (a) (10) of the Act for they reveal Congress’ overriding concern with meeting the needs of each eligible recipient of aid under the AFDC program. The resources com*498manded to meet those needs, as well as the definition of those individuals eligible to receive this aid, have expanded over the years. At first, only financial assistance was available. Now “family services” programs have been added.2 In each case, however, the concern has been with meeting the needs of each eligible recipient.
*499A further indication that the phrase “all eligible individuals” as used in §402 (a) (10) refers to the individual beneficiaries of aid, and not those who apply for and receive the payments, lies in the provisions of the Act that concern the computation of federal payments to the States. Social Security Act § 403. These payments are presently computed in relation to the State’s contribution to individual recipients, with federal payment of five-sixths of the first $18 a month per recipient of state expenditure, and further payment up to a maximum of $32 a month per recipient. There is no limitation on federal payments based on family size in the present provisions, nor has there ever been such a limitation in previous versions of the Act.
Section 403 (d)(1) of the Act imposes a limitation on federal payments to States as respects children whose eligibility is based upon the absence from the home of a parent. Under this section, the number of AFDC children under the age of 18 for whom federal sharing is available cannot exceed the ratio of AFDC children eligible because of an “absent parent” to the total child *500population of a State as of January 1, 1968. Appellants have argued that this limitation somehow indicates congressional approval of the maximum grant concept. The District Court below properly rejected that contention. The Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means indicates that the purpose of the limitation is to keep federal financial participation “within reasonable bounds” and to “give the States an incentive to make effective use of the constructive programs which the bill would establish.” H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 110. Keeping federal participation “within reasonable bounds” was tied to the fact that the “absent parent” category of AFDC recipients was the one that was growing most rapidly. Ibid. This provision, however, relates only to federal contributions to a State’s AFDC program, and does not authorize the State’s termination of aid to any of the children who would otherwise be eligible for aid because of an absent parent. Representative Mills explained the purpose of this limitation to the House in the following terms:
“Finally, Mr. Chairman, the bill would add a provision to present law which would limit Federal financing for the largest AFDC category — where the parent is absent from the home — to the proportion of each State’s total child population that is now receiving AFDC in this category. This provision, we believe, would give the States an additional incentive to make effective use of the constructive programs which the bill would establish. Moreover, this limitation on Federal matching will not prevent any deserving family from receiving aid payments. The States would not be free to keep any family off the rolls to keep within this limitation because there is a requirement in the law that requires equal *501treatment of recipients and uniform administration of a program within a State. . . 113 Cong. Rec. 23055.
In sum, the provisions of the Act that compute the amount of federal contribution to state AFDC programs are related to state payments to individual recipients and have consistently excluded any limitation based upon family size. The limitation contained in §403 (d)(1) of the Act affects only the amount of federal matching funds in one category of aid, and in no way indicates congressional approval of maximum grants.
The purpose of the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act is not only to provide for the needs of dependent children but also “to keep the young children with their mother in their own home, thus preventing the necessity of placing the children in institutions.” S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1935). Also see Social Security Act § 401. As the District Court noted, however, “the maximum grant regulation provides a powerful economic incentive to break up large families by placing ‘dependent children’ in excess of those whose subsistence needs, when added to the subsistence needs of other members of the family, exceed the maximum grant, in the homes of persons included in the class of eligible relatives.” 297 F. Supp., at 456. By this device, payments for the “excess” children can be obtained.
“If Mrs. Williams were to place two of her children of twelve years or over with relatives, each child so placed would be eligible for assistance in the amount of $79.00 per month, and she and her six remaining children would still be eligible to receive the maximum grant of $250.00. If Mr. and *502Mrs. Gary were to place two of their children between the ages of six and twelve with relatives, each child so placed would be eligible for assistance in the amount of $65.00 per month, and they and their six remaining children would still be eligible to receive the maximum grant of $250.00." Id., at 453-454.
The District Court correctly states that this incentive to break up family units created by the maximum grant regulation is in conflict with a fundamental purpose of the Act.
The history of the Social Security Act thus indicates that Congress intended the financial benefits, as well as the other benefits, of the AFDC program to reach each individual recipient eligible under the federal criteria. It was to this purpose that Congress had reference when it commanded in §402 (a) (10) of the Act that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished to “all eligible individuals."
The Court attempts to avoid the effect of this command by stating that “it is the family grant that is affected.” Ante, at 477-478. The implication is that, regardless of how the AFDC payments are computed or to whom they apply, the payments will be used by the parents for the benefit of all the members of the family unit. This is no doubt true. But the fact that parents may take portions of the payments intended for certain children to give to other children who are not given payments under the State’s AFDC plan, does not alter the fact that aid is not being given by the State to the latter children. And it is payments by the State, not by the parents, to which the command of § 402 (a) (10) is directed. The Court’s argument would equate family *503grant máximums with percentage reductions, but the two are, in fact, quite distinct devices for limiting welfare payments. If Congress wished to design a scheme under which each family received equal payments, irrespective of the size of the family, I see nothing that would prevent it from doing so. But that is not the scheme of Congress under the present Act.
Against the legislative history and the command of § 402 (a) (10), the appellants cite three provisions of the Social Security Act as recognizing the validity of state maximum grant regulations.
The first of these provisions is § 402 (a) (23) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (23) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), which provides:
“[A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must] provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established, and any máximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted.”
This section had its genesis in an Administration proposal to require States to pay fully the amounts required by their standard of need, and also to make cost-of-living adjustments to that standard of need by July 1, 1968, and annually thereafter. Hearings on H. R. 5710 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 59 (1967); House Committee on Ways and Means, Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Provisions of H. R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (Comm. Print) (1967). The bill that emerged from the House as H. R. 12080, however, did not include any provision relating to an increase in benefit levels or *504adjustments to standards of need. See Hearings on H. R, 12080 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 109-144 (1967). A provision requiring a cost-of-living adjustment in the standard of need by July 1, 1969, and annually thereafter was added to the House bill by the Senate Finance Committee, and this provision also required that “any máxi-mums ... on the amount of aid” be proportionately adjusted. S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 293 (1967). An amendment of the bill was proposed in the Senate that would have required a positive increase in AFDC payments, but that amendment was rejected. 113 Cong. Rec. 33560. The Senate-House Conference Committee adopted the Senate AFDC cost-of-living provision, omitting only the requirement for annual updating of need standards after July 1, 1969. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 63 (1967).
Nowhere in any of the hearings, committee reports, or floor debates, is there shown a congressional intent to validate state maximum grant regulations by the provisions of §402 (a) (23). Rather, the legislative history shows that Congress was exclusively concerned with increasing the income of AFDC recipients. If Congress had not required cost-of-living adjustments in state-imposed grant máximums, the States could easily nullify the effect of the cost-of-living adjustments for many AFDC families by retaining the grant ceilings in force before the adjustment was made. Congress was, to be sure, acknowledging the existence of maximum grant regulations. But every congressional reference to an existing practice does not automatically imply approval of that practice. The task of statutory construction requires more. It requires courts to look to the context of that reference, and to the history of relevant legislation. In the present context, the reference to maximum *505grants was necessary to preserve the integrity of the cost-of-living adjustment required by the bill. No further significance can legitimately be read into that reference.
Appellants also rely on § 108 (a) of Pub. L. 87-543, 76 Stat. 189, a provision of the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 that amended § 406 of the Act. This amendment, which has since been superseded, authorized “protective payments” to an individual other than the relative with whom the dependent child is living. The problem which this amendment was designed -to cure was that some payees were unable to manage their funds so that the' dependent children received the full benefit of the AFDC payments. Hearings on H. R. 10606 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 137 (1962). The House bill required “a meeting of all need as determined by the State” as a condition to including “protective payments” within the definition of “aid to families with dependent children.” The Senate Finance Committee changed that requirement, however, by an amendment which authorized federal funding of “protective payments” if the state-determined need of individuals with respect to whom such payments were made was fully met by their assistance payment and other income or resources. The Senate Committee explained this provision as follows:
“The effect of this provision is to make it possible for protective payments to be made in behalf of certain ADC recipients in States in which there is a maximum limiting the amount of assistance an individual may receive. These are the cases in which the statutory maximum does not prevent need from being met in full according to the State's standards.” S. Rep. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1962).
*506This reference to a state-imposed maximum can hardly be interpreted as a congressional approval of a family maximum grant. If anything, it implicitly disapproves the concept by withholding federal payments with respect to individuals receiving “protective payments” when a maximum grant operates to prevent these individuals from receiving the full amount of their state-determined need.
The final statutory provision relied upon by appellants is § 220 (a) of Pub. L. 90-248, 81 Stat. 898, which added to the Medical Assistance Title of the Act a new § 1903 (f), 42 TJ. S. C. § 1396b (f) (1964 ed.,'Supp. IV). This section limits federal financial participation in medical assistance benefits to those whose incomes do not exceed 13314% of the highest amount of AFDC assistance paid to a family of the same size without any income or resources. This section, however, also provides: “If the Secretary [of HEW] finds that the operation of a uniform maximum limits payments to families of more than one size, he may adjust the amount otherwise determined ... to take account of families of different sizes.” The purpose of this provision was to allow qualification as medically indigent of those individuals who would have qualified but for the operation of an AFDC grant maximum, and thus prevent the extension of the operation of grant máximums into the Medical Assistance Title. Congressional rejection of grant máximums in the Medical Assistance Title does not infer their approval in the context of the AFDC provisions. Quite the contrary would seem to be the case.
In all of the legislative provisions relied upon by the appellants, the congressional reference to maximum grants has been made in the context of attempting to alleviate the harsh results of their application, not in a context of approving and supporting their operation. The three statutory references cited by appellants and *507discussed above are clearly inadequate to overcome the long history of concern manifested in the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act for meeting the needs of each eligible recipient, and the command of § 402 (a) (10) of the Act to that effect.
Appellants tender one further argument as to the compliance of the Maryland maximum grant regulation with the Social Security Act. That argument is that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has not disapproved of any of the Maryland plans that have included maximum grant provisions, and that this lack of disapproval by HEW is a binding administrative determination as to the conformity of the regulation with the Social Security Act. That argument was thoroughly explored by the District Court below in its supplemental opinion. The District Court accepted the claim that HEW considers the Maryland maximum grant regulation not to be violative of the Act, but held:
“In view of the fact, however, that there is no indication from administrative decision, promulgated ' regulation, or departmental statement that the question of the conformity of maximum grants to the Act has been given considered treatment, we believe that the various actions and inactions on the part of HEW are not entitled to substantial, much less to decisive, weight in our consideration of the instant case.” 297 F. Supp., at 460.
HEW seldom has formally challenged the compliance of a state welfare plan with the terms of the Social Security Act. See Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 Col. L. Rev. 84, 91 (1967). The mere absence of such a formal challenge, whatever may be said for its constituting an affirmative determination of the compliance of a state plan with the Social Security Act, is not such a determination as is entitled to *508decisive weight in the judicial determination of this question.
On the basis of the inconsistency of the Maryland maximum grant regulation with the Social Security Act, I would affirm the judgment below.

 In certain counties the applicable maximum grant is $240 per month. All of the appellees in this case are residents of Baltimore City, where the $250-per-month maximum grant applies.

 The benefits distributed under the AFDC program include “financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services.” Social Security Act § 401. The term “aid to families with dependent children” is itself defined in § 406 (b) of the Act, as “money payments with respect to, or . . . medical care in behalf of or any type of remedial care recognized under State law” in behalf of dependent children, the relatives with whom they live, and other “essential persons” residing with the relative and child.
The services provided by the Act for AFDC recipients include “family services” and “child-welfare services.” “Family services” are defined by § 406 (d) of the Act, as “services to a family or anj-member thereof for the purpose of preserving, rehabilitating, reuniting, or strengthening the family, and such other services as will assist members of a family to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence.” “Child-welfare programs” are defined by § 425 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §625 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), as “public social services which supplement, or substitute for, parental care and supervision for the purpose of (1) preventing or remedying, or assisting in the solution of problems which may result in, the neglect, abuse, exploitation, or delinquency of children, (2) protecting and caring for homeless, dependent, or neglected children, (3) protecting and promoting the welfare of children of working mothers, and (4) otherwise protecting and promoting the welfare of children, including the strengthening of their own homes where possible or, where needed, the provision of adequate care of children away from their homes in foster family homes or day-care or other child-care facilities.” In addition, § 402 (a) (15) of the Act requires the State AFDC plan to provide for the development of a program for each appropriate relative and dependent child receiving aid under the plan, and other “essential persons” living with a relative and child receiving such aid, “with the objective of — (i) assuring, to the maximum extent possible, that such relative, child, and individual will enter the labor force and accept employment so that they will become self-sufficient, and (ii) preventing or reducing the *499incidence of births out of wedlock and otherwise strengthening family life . . .
Section 432 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §632 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), provides for the establishment of work-incentive programs for AFDC recipients which include the placement of recipients over the age of 16 in employment, “institutional and work experience training for those individuals for whom such training is likely to lead to regular employment,” and “special work projects for individuals for whom a job in the regular economy cannot be found.” See also Social Security Act § 402 (a) (19).
The State must also provide foster care in accordance with § 408 of the Act. See Social Security Act §402 (a) (20). And whenever the State feels that AFDC payments may not be used in the best interests of the child, it may provide for counseling or guidance with respect to the use of such payments and the management of other funds. Social Security Act § 405, 42 U. S. C. § 605.