Court Opinion

ID: 9848698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:25:31.36592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:37.588154
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(dissenting). I would reverse. I do not think it can be reasonably inferred from the record before us that this defendant was aware of his right to a hearing on the charges of probation violation as an alternative to his pleading guilty.
I cannot accept what appears to be the major premise of the majority opinion, that defendant learned of this right upon receiving the petition for bench warrant listing the charges of violation. As is suggested by the language quoted by the majority which contains the phrase "violation hearing”, that language was contained in a petition for a bench warrant, directed to a judge and signed by a probation officer. While this piece of paper is normally served on a probationer, since it contains the charges of violation which the probationer is required by law to receive, one may question whether it is reasonable to assume that a probationer would always read a portion of the petition which by its terms is not directed to him.
More importantly, the language quoted by the majority would not give a probationer the advice required by People v Brown, 72 Mich App 7; 248 NW2d 695 (1976), and People v Hardin, 70 Mich App 204; 245 NW2d 566 (1976). Those cases require that a probationer be informed of his right to a hearing as an alternative to his pleading guilty. The difference is a result of the ambiguity of the term "hearing”, which is at best nebulous and can never be expected to convey information *715with the precision of a term such as "jury trial”, for example.
Despite the ambiguity of the term, we rejected the claim in Brown that the probation revocation hearing be fully described to the probationer or that any "check list” type procedure be instituted. We concluded that given the relative informality and flexibility of probation revocation procedures, information to a probationer that he had a right to a hearing as an alternative to his pleading guilty would be sufficient. In that context, a probationer at least could be expected to understand that if he declined to plead guilty, someone would have to prove the charges against him at some sort of contested evidentiary hearing. In the present case, to the contrary, the fact that defendant may have read the word "hearing” in the petition for bench warrant could not be relied upon to have conveyed much more information to him than that he would soon be before a judge.
The inference that this defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a hearing on the charges of probation violation is rendered even more unreasonable by the lack of evidence in this record that defendant ever received a copy of the petition for bench warrant. While the petition for bench warrant is dated May 1, 1975, the bench warrant itself, printed on the same paper, is unsigned. An order to show cause, directed to defendant, was issued, presumably in response to the petition for bench warrant. That order is dated May 7, 1975, and orders defendant to show cause at 9:30 a. m. on the same date. It also orders that a copy of the petition be served upon the defendant and contains blanks to be signed by defendant and/or by the person serving the papers on him, in order to prove service. The blanks are unsigned. There is no evidence on this record that either the *716order to show cause or the petition was in fact served on defendant.
The majority presumes that the defendant received the petition since defendant does not claim nonreceipt, a ground for reversal, on this appeal. Certainly I would not recommend reversing on the basis of nonreceipt where that issue is not raised. It is quite another thing, however, to presume on the basis of no evidence except defendant’s failure to allege nonreceipt on appeal that he in fact did receive the petition, that he in fact read a portion of the petition which by its terms was not directed to him, and that he would understand from the phrase "violation hearing” contained on that petition that he had a right to a hearing on the charges, which would be waived by a plea of guilty. My conclusion is that it is unreasonable to infer that this defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a hearing on the charges of probation violation. I would reverse.