Court Opinion

ID: 9961409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 17:02:19.28822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:44.673655
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

       IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 23-0157
                                FILED 4-18-2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                              No. JS520346
            The Honorable Keelan S. Bodow, Judge Pro Tempore

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Czop Law Firm, PLLC, Higley
By Steven Czop
Counsel for Appellant David F.

Guymon Law Offices, Chandler
By Ian D. Haney, Amber L. Guymon
Counsel for Appellee Ashley R.

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:
             IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F.
                        Decision of the Court

¶1            This is an appeal of a private severance action. David F.
(“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child (“S.F.”).
For the following reasons, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             Father and Ashley R. (“Mother”) are the biological parents of
S.F., born in August 2016. In April 2022, Mother petitioned to terminate the
parent-child relationship between Father and S.F. Mother alleged Father
had abandoned S.F., see Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 8-531(1), -533(B)(1),
and that termination was in S.F.’s best interests because it would provide
S.F. with stability and permanency.

¶3            The next month, Father moved in propria persona to dismiss
Mother’s petition. He did not appear at the initial severance hearing in July
2022. The superior court appointed Father counsel and stated that he “is
free to hire an attorney of his own if he is able to afford one.”1 The court
then continued the initial severance hearing to August 2022.

¶4             After the court appointed counsel, Father filed in propria
persona a notice of conditional acceptance of legal counsel. Father’s notice
demanded, inter alia, that his court-appointed counsel and S.F.’s court-
appointed counsel “follow [his] lead on all matters”; “pledge [their] alliance
and loyalty to [him], not to the B.A.R. or the Court”; and “prove that
[Father] is a 13th and 14th amendment corporate citizen, and not a natural
born of the Republic.”

¶5           Father did not appear at the continued severance hearings in
August or September 2022. In late August, Father filed in propria persona a
writ of quo warranto by affidavit, demanding that all case-related judicial
officers and legal counsel present to him their professional credentials
within 72 hours.

1 The court’s Notice of Appointment warned Father:

       Failure to contact your attorney within thirty days of the date
       of this Notice may result in the Court discharging the attorney
       and may cause no attorney to be appointed in the future. In
       addition, failure to stay in contact with your attorney may be
       considered a lack of interest by you and may cause your
       attorney to be discharged by the Court.

                                       2
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F.
                       Decision of the Court

¶6           Father appeared for the first time at the continued severance
hearing in November 2022. The court read to Father Form IV (Notice to
Parent in Termination Action), advising him in part:

       You are required to appear for every hearing the court sets,
       including a pre-trial conference, a settlement conference, and
       the adjudication hearing. If you don’t show up for a court
       date and you don’t have a good reason for not showing up,
       the court may find you have waived your rights in this case
       and you have admitted the allegations in the motion or
       petition. The court may then consider evidence in your
       absence, terminate your parental rights, and place the child
       for adoption.

¶7           The court found Father indigent, reaffirmed the appointment
of counsel to represent him, and appointed him a guardian ad litem
(“GAL”).

¶8           At the December continued severance hearing, the court
denied Father’s counsel’s oral motion to withdraw. Father then orally
requested new counsel, and the court directed him to file a written request.
Father did not file a new counsel request; instead, he filed in propria persona
another request to dismiss Mother’s petition, asserting that Mother and the
court had failed to address his pending requests, including his
“[e]xpedited” motion to dismiss, notice of conditions, and writ of quo
warranto.

¶9             The court denied Father’s motions at the January 2023 pre-
trial conference and noted that his notice of conditional acceptance and writ
of quo warranto “were not motions permitted by rule or statute for
termination of parental rights matters, were not filed in accordance with the
juvenile rules, and did not refer to any relevant statutes or rules as applied
to this matter.” At that time, Father’s appointed counsel advised the court
that she could not accept Father’s conditions. The next day, Father filed an
“amended” notice of conditional acceptance, again asserting, inter alia, that
all case-related counsel must follow his lead on all matters, pledge to him
their alliance and loyalty, and prove that he is a 13th and 14th Amendment
corporate citizen.

¶10            Father’s appointed counsel then filed a written motion to
withdraw, stating, “Irreconcilable conflicts have arisen which preclude
further effective representation and impair undersigned counsel’s ability to
effectively represent the Father.”

                                      3
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F.
                       Decision of the Court

¶11            The court found Father’s conditions for representation “have
no valid legal basis and are improper” and that “[t]here is no attorney who
can legally submit to Father’s conditions as written.” The court stated that
Father could hire his own attorney, or he “can choose to proceed with a
court-appointed lawyer who follows the law and not Father’s conditions as
written.” The court also stated that Father could alternatively proceed
without an attorney and represent himself, and that if he “continues to
insist that Counsel follow his conditions as written, Father will effectively
be choosing to represent himself.” The court then ordered Father to
indicate if he would proceed with represented counsel or be representing
himself on or before the February 2023 in-person hearing.

¶12           Father responded in propria persona, stating that he “continues
to stand by [his] previously stated and unchanged position” regarding his
conditions. He argued he had “been awaiting the appointment of new
counsel(s) who must meet [his] current/upcoming Revised Notice of
Conditional Acceptance” and that he could neither represent himself nor
afford an attorney. He asserted the court and all counsel must accept his
conditions “point by point.”

¶13           Father appeared telephonically at the February 2023 hearing,
despite the court’s order for in-person attendance. The court granted
appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw and appointed advisory counsel
for Father. The court ordered Father “shall advise advisory counsel if he
chooses his advisory counsel to be re-appointed his attorney no later than
[April 1].” The court also stated:

       Father states he would like an attorney, but states he will only
       work with the attorney if they follow his conditions in his
       previously filed pleading. The Court explains again that his
       requirements are not consistent with the law, and that by
       requiring his “conditions” and refusing to work with an
       attorney unless the “conditions” are met, he is effectively
       choosing to work without a court appointed attorney.

¶14           The court advised Father, “[I]f you don’t appear in the future,
again as we described in the Form IV that was read to you at the beginning
of the case, we could proceed in your absence.”

¶15          Father did not file any notice regarding court-appointed
counsel before April 1. But in early May, he filed, in propria persona, a
“revised” conditions request.

                                      4
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F.
                       Decision of the Court

¶16           The court reset the final severance hearing for early May 2023,
ordering that the “hearing shall be conducted in-person.” Because advisory
counsel had a conflict, the court issued a minute entry rescheduling the
hearing for a later date in May.

¶17           Father appeared telephonically at the rescheduled
termination adjudication hearing. He claimed he could not appear in
person because he had no notice of the rescheduled date. His advisory
counsel confirmed she had forwarded the continuance minute entry to the
email address Father had been using to communicate with her. When
Father argued that email was insufficient service, the court stated that a
scheduling minute entry was “not service of process” but an “order of the
[c]ourt” and found advisory counsel’s email to Father was an appropriate
method to communicate the new date. In response, Father asserted, “She’s
not my attorney,” noting that he had not “accepted her.”

¶18            The court proceeded with the hearing despite Father’s
telephonic appearance. The court found that Father is “effectively
responsible for representing [him]self” with advisory counsel available.
The court also stated Father’s “failure to appear in person is something that
the Court can consider in ultimately making a ruling in this case.” Soon
after, Father “hung up or was disconnected” from the hearing and did not
attempt to call back.

¶19           Father’s advisory counsel and his GAL moved to withdraw,
stating Father would not accept their counsel or services. The court denied
both requests, finding Father “has significant difficulty understanding and
communicating,” and because of those traits, it was important he be
represented.

¶20          After hearing Mother’s evidence and testimony, the court
found Mother proved by clear and convincing evidence that Father had
abandoned S.F. and proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination was in S.F.’s best interests. Father timely appealed, arguing
lack of proper legal representation, violation of due process, denial of his
conditional acceptance requests, and failure to include him in the
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-
2101(A)(1).

                              DISCUSSION

¶21           Father does not challenge the superior court’s underlying
factual findings or legal conclusions in its order terminating Father’s
parental rights. He only argues that the superior court deprived him of a

                                     5
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F.
                       Decision of the Court

right to representation and to be noticed for the rescheduled hearing, and
thus violated his due process rights. “Whether due process has been
satisfied is a question of law that we decide de novo.” State ex rel. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec. v. Torres, 245 Ariz. 554, 560, ¶ 23 (App. 2018) (citation omitted).

I.     Appointment of Counsel

¶22           An indigent parent has a right to court-appointed counsel in
a parental termination proceeding under statute, A.R.S. § 8-221(A)-(B), and
as a matter of due process, Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz.
299, 307, ¶ 28 (App. 2007). See also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 303(b).

¶23            Relying on Daniel Y. v. Arizona Department of Economic
Security, 206 Ariz. 257 (App. 2003), Father argues the court’s finding that he
waived his right to counsel was error because he was not advised of the
consequences of representing himself. In Daniel Y., this court held that a
waiver of counsel cannot be “easily presumed” and that before finding an
indigent parent has waived his right to counsel, “Arizona law requires that
he be advised of ‘the dangers of self-representation, and the difficulties
involved in defending oneself without formal legal training.’” Id. at 260-61,
¶ 15 (citations omitted).

¶24            In Daniel Y., the superior court terminated the father’s
parental rights without providing appointed counsel when the father
“made no unequivocal request to represent himself and did not knowingly
or voluntarily waive, or otherwise forfeit, his right to counsel.” Id. at 263,
¶ 26. The superior court allowed three attorneys—two court-appointed—
to withdraw based on “strategic” and “irreconcilable” differences. Id. at
258–59, ¶¶ 5–6. Two weeks before the termination adjudication hearing,
the court granted the most recently appointed counsel’s withdrawal request
after an ex parte, in camera hearing. Id. at 259, ¶ 6. The court declined to
appoint substitute counsel for the father, referencing an earlier minute
entry that warned the father that it “would find it very difficult to grant any
other motion to withdraw filed by an attorney or request for a new attorney
filed by [the father].” Id. At the termination adjudication hearing, the court
asked whether the father was ready to proceed, and he stated that he did
not know how to respond without counsel. Id. at ¶ 7. The court
nevertheless proceeded with the hearing and terminated the father’s
parental rights. Id. at 259–60, ¶¶ 7, 10.

¶25           This case is distinguishable from Daniel Y.—Father had access
to representation throughout the proceedings. Rather than inform the court
whether he wanted to proceed with his appointed counsel, Father

                                      6
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F.
                       Decision of the Court

continuously filed conditional notices pro per. And when offered the
opportunity for new counsel, Father ignored the court’s acceptance
deadline and reasserted his conditions, which the court rightfully found
improper and contrary to law. Even after Father disengaged from the
termination adjudication hearing, the court denied the requests of advisory
counsel and the GAL to be relieved.

¶26           The court repeatedly warned Father that his conditions for
representation were contrary to law and that it could not require an
appointed counsel to meet Father’s “improper” conditions. And, unlike
Daniel Y., the court cautioned Father that if he “continues to insist that
Counsel follow his conditions as written, Father will effectively be choosing
to represent himself,” and gave him at least two opportunities to indicate
whether he would accept the court’s offered counsel.

¶27            The court also warned Father that, based on his conduct, the
court could find that he was representing himself. “[P]ersistent disruptive
or dilatory conduct by a [party] will support a determination that the
[party] ‘waived’ his right to counsel. Such a waiver by conduct can occur
only after a court both warns the [party] that further disruptive conduct
may result in the loss of the right to counsel and explains the implications
of such a waiver.” State v. Hampton, 208 Ariz. 241, 244, ¶ 7 (2004) (citations
omitted); accord Tammy M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 242 Ariz. 457, 461, ¶ 17
(App. 2017) (citing Hampton). On this record, the court did not deprive
Father of his right to representation.

II.    Hearing Notice

¶28          Father also argues that the court erred in allowing Mother to
proceed on her termination petition in Father’s absence, asserting the court
failed to provide him with notice of the rescheduled termination
adjudication hearing. But Father was present telephonically at the
beginning of the hearing, and he otherwise offers no facts challenging
advisory counsel’s avowal that she sent notice of the changed date to the
email address Father used to communicate with her.

¶29          If a parent fails to appear without good cause, the court may
proceed with the termination hearing, but only if it finds that the parent:

       (A) had notice of the termination adjudication hearing; (B)
       was properly served pursuant to Rule 351; and (C) had been
       admonished regarding the consequences of failing to appear
       at the termination adjudication hearing, including a warning
       that the hearing could go forward in the parent’s absence and

                                      7
             IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.F.
                        Decision of the Court

       that failing to appear may constitute a waiver of rights and an
       admission to the allegations contained in the termination
       petition or motion.

Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(f)(1).

¶30            The court repeatedly notified Father that the hearing could
proceed in his absence if he did not appear. Father fails to explain his failure
to attend the hearing in person or to rejoin the termination adjudication
hearing telephonically. “The [superior] court has discretion to control the
courtroom and trial proceedings.” Christy A., 217 Ariz. at 308, ¶ 31 (citation
omitted). “We will not interfere in matters within the [superior] court’s
discretion unless we are persuaded that the exercise of such discretion
resulted in a miscarriage of justice or deprived one of the litigants of a fair
trial.” Id. (quoting O’Rielly Motor Co. v. Rich, 3 Ariz. App. 21, 27 (1966)).

¶31           Father received proper hearing notice, and the court did not
err when it held the termination adjudication hearing in his absence.

                                 CONCLUSION

¶32            We affirm.

                            AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                            FILED: AA

                                           8