Court Opinion

ID: 9414616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 08:12:25.99347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.654086
License: Public Domain

In the
                      Court of Appeals
        Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                           No. 06-22-00047-CV

BRENDA SIMMONS MCGOWEN AND EVELYN SIMMONS WOODFORK, Appellants

                                    V.

          VANDERBILT MORTGAGE & FINANCE, INC., Appellee

                 On Appeal from the 278th District Court
                        Walker County, Texas
                       Trial Court No. 2029747

              Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
              Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
                                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc., filed suit1 against Brenda Simmons McGowen,2

Evelyn Simmons Woodfork, and the unknown heirs of Georgia Lee Riles, deceased (collectively

Appellants), seeking to validate its asserted lien rights against certain real property (the Property)

owned by Woodfork. Specifically, two prior deeds in the chain of title contained a scrivener’s

error in the Property’s legal description.3                 Vanderbilt filed a second amended motion for

summary judgment, asking the trial court to grant its requested relief and to enter judgment in its

favor as a matter of law. The trial court granted Vanderbilt’s second amended motion.

            In this appeal, Appellants maintain that the trial court erred (1) when it did not rule on

Woodfork’s second amended motion to dismiss,4 (2) when it granted Appellants’ attorney’s

motion to withdraw without sua sponte granting their motion for continuance, (3) when it

granted Vanderbilt’s second amended motion for summary judgment because the summary

judgment evidence established that Vanderbilt’s request for reformation of the deed was barred

by a four-year statute of limitations, and (4) when it denied Appellants’ motion for

1
 Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We are unaware of any
conflict between precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 41.3.
2
 Vanderbilt’s amended motion for partial summary judgment stated, “Vanderbilt does not seek relief against
Defendant Brenda Simmons McGowen, but reserves its right to assert summary judgment against McGowen in the
future.” Likewise, in its second amended motion for summary judgment, Vanderbilt did not seek relief from
McGowen. Yet, the trial court’s final judgment in favor of Vanderbilt included both McGowen and Woodfork.
Consequently, we will refer to both defendants as Appellants when appropriate. We will refer to Woodfork only
when appropriate.
3
    It appears from the record that Appellants conceded that there was a scrivener’s error in the deeds.
4
    McGowen did not file a motion to dismiss and did not join in Woodfork’s motion.
                                                             2
reconsideration. We find that the trial court did not err in failing to rule on Woodfork’s second

amended motion to dismiss. Even so, because we find that the trial court erred when it granted

Appellants’ counsel’s motion to withdraw and denied Appellants’ motion for continuance, we

reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.5

I.       Background

         In 1955, Eugene Anderson (Anderson) and Leola Goffney inherited from John Anderson

approximately 60.62 acres of land. Goffney and Anderson each received title to two roughly

equal portions of those 60.62 acres. At the same time, Anderson executed a partition deed in

favor of two tracts of land to Goffney (the Anderson Deed), and Goffney executed a partition

deed to two tracts of land in favor of Anderson (the Goffney Deed). Each deed identified

respective “FIRST” and “SECOND” tracts, totaling four tracts of land conveyed on that day.

         At an unknown time, Goffney conveyed the second tract identified in the Anderson Deed

to Georgia Lee Riles. That transaction was not recorded in the real property records. In 1996,

Riles conveyed, by gift deed (the Gift Deed), 13.26 acres of the second tract identified in the

Anderson Deed to Appellants. However, the Gift Deed contained a scrivener’s error in the

property description. Instead of identifying the property to be conveyed as part of the second

tract of the Anderson Deed, it identified the property to be conveyed as the second tract of the

Goffney Deed. In 2001, McGowen deeded to Woodfork her interest in the second tract, but the

deed also identified the property to be conveyed as the second tract of the Goffney Deed. It is

5
 Because our disposition of Appellants’ second point of error is dispositive of this appeal, we find it unnecessary to
address Appellants’ third and fourth points of error.
                                                          3
undisputed that the Gift Deed contained the scrivener’s error and that it was also included in

McGowen’s warranty deed (the Warranty Deed) to Woodfork.6

        In November 2008, Woodfork borrowed $105,740.43 from Vanderbilt and executed a

deed of trust to the property at issue in favor of Vanderbilt. The deed of trust correctly described

the two-acre property as part of the second tract identified in the Anderson Deed. In other

words, it did not reflect the scrivener’s error present in the Gift Deed and the Warranty Deed.

According to Woodfork, in 2012, she defaulted on her loan, and Vanderbilt initiated foreclosure

proceedings. It was then, Vanderbilt claims, that it discovered the scrivener’s error, which

inhibited Vanderbilt’s exercise of its lien against the Property.

        In June 2020, Vanderbilt brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment for

reformation of the deeds at issue and to quiet title to the Property. The original petition was

served on Woodfork on August 6, 2020. For the majority of the case, Appellants represented

themselves pro se. However, on March 9, 2022, Appellants obtained counsel.

        Vanderbilt moved for summary judgment on March 24, 2021. Before the summary

judgment hearing was to occur, Appellants filed three motions for continuances, which were all

granted. Upon granting Appellants’ third motion for continuance, the trial court admonished

Appellants that there would be no further continuances absent an emergency. The summary

judgment hearing was ultimately set for April 25, 2022. Appellants did not file a response to

Vanderbilt’s motion for summary judgment.

6
 On June 1, 2005, McGowen executed an affidavit of heirship that did not reflect the scrivener’s error. Instead, it
correctly described McGowen’s former interest in the “SECOND TRACT” identified in the Anderson Deed and
correctly described her conveyance of interest in that tract to Woodfork.
                                                        4
           On April 22, 2022, three days before the hearing on Vanderbilt’s motion for summary

judgment, Appellants’ counsel filed a motion for continuance, stating, in part, that he intended to

withdraw from the case and asking the trial court to continue “all [p]ending [m]otions filed by

Plaintiff Vanderbilt.” On April 25, 2022, the day of the summary judgment hearing, Appellants’

counsel filed his motion to withdraw, which stated that it had “become increasingly clear that

counsel and Defendants [could not] work together.” On April 26, 2022, the trial court granted

Appellants’ counsel’s motion to withdraw, denied Woodfork’s fourth motion for continuance,

and granted summary judgment in favor of Vanderbilt. On May 11, 2022, Appellants filed a

“motion for reconsideration, to vacate, reinstate, and for new trial,” which the trial court denied.

This appeal followed.

II.        Discussion

           A.       Woodfork Waived Her Complaint Regarding the Trial Court’s Failure to
                    Rule on Her Second Amended Motion to Dismiss

           In her first point of error, Woodfork contends that the trial court erred when it did not rule

on what she refers to as her December 17, 2020, second amended motion to dismiss.7 In it,

Woodfork argued that the case against her should have been dismissed because Vanderbilt’s

deed-reformation claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

           Under Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 with certain exceptions that are

not applicable here, “a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no

basis in law or fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. “A cause of action has no basis in law if the
7
    McGowen did not file a motion to dismiss and did not join in Woodfork’s motion.
8
 From a review of Woodfork’s motion requesting dismissal of Vanderbilt’s petition, it appears, although she did not
specifically state, that she filed her motion pursuant to Rule 91a.
                                                          5
allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle

the claimant to the relief sought.” Id. A motion to dismiss based on a cause of action’s

baselessness in law is properly filed if it (1) states that it is made pursuant to Rule 91a,

(2) identifies each cause of action addressed, and (3) specifically states the merits of the motion.

Such a motion must be filed within sixty days after the movant is served with the causes of

action that the movant wishes to dismiss. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.3. “[This] deadline[] show[s] that

Rule 91a is intended to be asserted and determined soon after the filing of the case and before the

opportunity for thorough discovery.” In re Butt, 495 S.W.3d 455, 463 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2016, orig. proceeding). “We review the merits of a Rule 91a motion de novo

because the availability of a remedy under the facts alleged is a question of law and the rule’s

factual-plausibility standard is akin to a legal-sufficiency review.” Smale v. Williams, 590

S.W.3d 633, 636 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (citing City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494

S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam)).

         On August 6, 2020, Vanderbilt served Woodfork via substituted service with its original

petition, seeking a declaratory judgment in its favor on its claim for reformation of the deeds at

issue and to quiet title. Woodfork filed what we will assume to be her initial motion to dismiss

on November 13, 2020,9 around ninety-nine days after she was served with Vanderbilt’s original

petition.10 Her second amended motion was not filed until December 17, 2020, around 133 days

9
 The document was entitled “RE: REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL OF LAWSUIT(S) and ALL MOTIONS FILED
BY VANDERBILT MORTGAGE and FINANCE, INC. . . . due to the STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS
EXPIRED for the CLAIM for REFORMATION OF A DEED.”
10
  In an effort to show that she filed her motion to dismiss in a timely manner, Woodfork states in her appellate brief
that, “[o]n November 13, 2020, Appellant Woodfork filed an opposition to Appellee’s Motion for Default Judgment,
                                                          6
after she was served with the petition. Neither of Woodfork’s motions to dismiss were filed

within sixty days of service and, therefore, were untimely.

         Regardless, to preserve a complaint for our review, a party must first present to the trial

court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the desired ruling if

not apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). Furthermore, “the trial court [must

have] ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly,” or the

complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a)(2). Here, there is nothing in the record to show that Woodfork brought to the trial court’s

attention its failure to rule on any of her purported motions to dismiss. As a result, she did not

preserve this point of error for our review.

         We overrule Woodfork’s first point of error.11

reminding the trial court and Appellee that she filed an answer that included a motion to dismiss with the court on
August 24, 2020 (‘Answer and Motion to Dismiss’).” Contrary to Woodfork’s claim, the August 24 document she
refers to is entitled “Defendant’s Original Answer.” In the body of that document, Woodfork stated that she
“generally denie[d] the allegations in Plaintiff’s original petition, and put[] Plaintiff to his [sic] proof.” She then
added, “Defendant would show the Court that Plaintiff’s pleadings are vague and confusing to the extent that a cause
of action is not discernable and therefore, all such pleadings should be dismissed.”
         Even assuming that Woodfork’s August 24 original answer was, in fact, a motion to dismiss, it was
inadequate because (1) it did not state that it had been filed pursuant to Rule 91a, (2) it did not identify the cause of
action of which she was complaining, and (3) she did not adequately state the merits of the motion. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 91a.
11
  Even if Woodfork’s second amended motion to dismiss had been timely filed, it was defective in the same manner
as were her other purported motions. First, she failed to state that her second amended motion to dismiss was made
pursuant to Rule 91a. She also failed to provide an adequate basis as to why her motion should be granted.
Although Woodfork stated that she sought to dismiss Vanderbilt’s petition based on an expired statute of limitations,
she did not provide the trial court with any substantive analysis in support of her argument. See Smale, 590 S.W.3d
at 639.
                                                           7
       B.      The Trial Court Erred When it Granted Appellants’ Counsel’s Motion to
               Withdraw and Denied Appellants’ Motion for Continuance

       In their second point of error, Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion

when it (1) granted their attorney’s motion to withdraw and (2) denied their fourth motion for

continuance. We agree.

               (1)     The Trial Court Erred When it Granted Appellants’ Attorney’s
                       Motion to Withdraw

       “A trial court abuses its discretion if it grants a motion to withdraw that does not satisfy

the requirements of Rule 10” of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Jackson v. Jackson, 556

S.W.3d 461, 468 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Under Rule 10, “[a]n attorney

may withdraw from representing a party only upon written motion” showing good cause. TEX.

R. CIV. P. 10. When an attorney is not substituted, the motion must state (1) “that a copy of the

motion [w]as delivered to the [client],” (2) “that the [client was] notified in writing of [its] right

to object,” (3) whether the client has consented, (4) “the [client’s] last known address,” and

(5) “all pending settings and deadlines.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 10.

       Further, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct set forth factors that a trial

court should weigh in determining an attorney’s “good cause” to withdraw from a case:

       [A] lawyer shall not withdraw from representing a client unless:

       (1)     withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
       interests of the client;

       (2)    the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that
       the lawyer reasonably believes may be criminal or fraudulent;

       (3)     the client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;

                                                  8
         (4)    a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
         repugnant or imprudent or with which the lawyer has fundamental disagreement;

         (5)     the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding
         the lawyer’s services, including an obligation to pay the lawyer’s fee as agreed,
         and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the
         obligation is fulfilled;

         (6)    the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the
         lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or

         (7)    other good cause for withdrawal exists.

TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(b), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit.

2, subtit. G, app. A. Comment nine to Rule 1.15 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional

Conduct also states that, “[i]n every instance of withdrawal and even if the lawyer has been

unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the

consequences to the client.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(b) cmt. 9.

Furthermore, a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to “see that the attorney has complied

with the Code of Professional Responsibility.” Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex.

1986).

         When a motion to withdraw is not accompanied by a “good cause” basis to withdraw and

results in a “foreseeable adverse effect” on the client, the trial court should deny the motion.

Jackson, 556 S.W.3d at 470 (citing Villegas, 711 S.W.2d at 626). In Jackson, the Houston First

Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in granting defense counsel’s withdrawal.

Jackson, 556 S.W.3d 461. In that case, trial was set to begin on a Monday. Id. at 463. On

Sunday, the defendant and her attorney prepared for trial. Id. at 469. On the morning of trial, the

defendant’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, stating that there was good cause to grant the
                                                   9
motion because counsel “was ‘unable to effectively communicate with MONICA F. JACKSON

in a manner consistent with good attorney-client relations’ and because ‘[s]ignificant conflicts

ha[d] arisen as to how the case [was] to be presented and what issues to raise to this Judge, to the

point where the undersigned counsel [could not] proceed.’” Id. Counsel also indicated that he

could not resolve the differences. Id. at 463. The motion noted the defendant’s last known

address in addition to a recitation of pending settings and deadlines, while stating that the

defendant had been notified and could contest the withdrawal. Id. at 463–64. The motion

included no further recitation of the basis for withdrawal. Id. at 464. A hearing on the motion

was conducted the morning of the trial, during which the defendant’s attorney attempted to

explain that there was an undisclosable issue between herself and the defendant. Id.

       The trial court granted the motion to withdraw and immediately proceeded to trial. Id. at

466. The defendant ultimately lost the suit at trial. Id. The appellate court reasoned that the trial

court abused its discretion by granting counsel’s motion to withdraw because the motion did not

sufficiently state the basis for withdrawal, and the trial court made no effort to ascertain a “good

cause” basis for withdrawal. Id. at 471. The motion to withdraw was further defective, the

appellate court reasoned, because the motion did not take into account “foreseeable material

adverse effects of self-representation,” seek a continuance on the defendant’s behalf, or state

whether the defendant consented to the withdrawal. Id.

       Jackson is instructive in this case. First, Appellants’ counsel notified Appellants of his

intent to withdraw three days before the summary judgment hearing. Although counsel filed a

motion for continuance the same day, it was not properly verified. Additionally, at the time,

                                                 10
Appellants’ counsel had failed to file a response to Vanderbilt’s second amended motion for

summary judgment, despite the fact that a ruling on Vanderbilt’s summary judgment motion was

imminent. But the motion for continuance did not request additional time to file a response.

Counsel then filed his motion to withdraw on the day of the summary judgment proceeding,

noting in the motion, “Whether [Appellants] consent is unknown.”12 Based on these facts, we

find that Appellants’ counsel did not take reasonable steps to mitigate the negative consequences

to his clients due to his withdrawal.

         Second, Appellants were not given any time in which to find substitute counsel, further

increasing the adverse effect from their counsel’s withdrawal. Third, Appellants’ counsel failed

to provide any basis for withdrawal beyond a simple statement that “counsel and Defendants

[could not] work together.” Fourth, Appellants ultimately lost their case pursuant to the trial

court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Vanderbilt. Lastly, as in Jackson, the trial court

made an insufficient inquiry into whether defense counsel complied with the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Here, there is no record of the hearing on the motion to withdraw,

the motion for continuance, or the motion for summary judgment. Thus, there is no record that

the trial court made any inquiry into whether defense counsel complied with the code.

         For these reasons, we find that the trial court erred when it granted counsel’s motion to

withdraw.

12
  Counsel’s April 25, 2022, motion to withdraw stated, “A copy of this motion has been delivered to Defendants.
They have been advised of their right to object to counsel’s withdrawal. Whether they consent is unknown.
Defendants have been advised of the Court’s oral ruling at the April 25, 2022, summary judgment.” The trial court
noted at the hearing on the motion to reconsider that Appellant’s counsel withdrew “kind of at the last minute.” So,
it appears the motion to withdraw was made orally before the summary judgment hearing, and then the written
motion was filed after the fact. The written motion was filed on April 25 at 4:04 p.m., and the trial court’s order was
entered April 26, 2022.
                                                         11
        B.       The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Appellants’ Request for a
                 Continuance

        A trial court has the sound discretion to deny or grant a motion for continuance. In re

A.D.A., 287 S.W.3d 382, 387 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (citing Villegas, 711 S.W.2d

at 626). Furthermore, a trial court has the authority “to continue a case sua sponte,” and such

decision “rests within the discretion of the trial court.” Dell Dev. Corp. v. Best Indus. Unif.

Supply Co., 743 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied).

Relevant to this case, a trial court “must give [a] party time to secure new counsel and time for

the new counsel to investigate the case” if the trial court grants counsel’s voluntary withdrawal.

Villegas, 711 S.W.2d at 626.

        However, if the cumulative effect of a defendant’s actions demonstrates fault for her

attorney’s withdrawal, she is not entitled to a continuance on the basis of her attorney’s

withdrawal. Sims v. Sims, 623 S.W.3d 47, 60 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied). In Sims,

the client moved for a continuance based on his attorney’s withdrawal. The trial court denied the

request for a continuance, finding that the client had been at fault for the attorney’s withdrawal.

Id. (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 387 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.)).13 The

Sims court denied the client’s request for a continuance, finding that her behavior during the

course of the litigation was the determining factor, that is, she failed to appear for mediation and

13
  In Thompson, Thompson failed to cooperate with her attorneys, which included, among other things, her failure to
file a sworn inventory and failure to appear for mediation proceedings. Thompson, 387 S.W.3d at 772. As was the
case in Sims, Thompson had been granted multiple continuances prior to the subject motion being denied. Id.
Thompson had gone through four attorneys during the pendency of the case. Id. Based on those findings, the court
held that the cumulative effect of Thompson’s actions during the litigation showed the likelihood that her lack of
counsel was the result of some negligence or fault of her own. Id. Thompson also failed to show that her lack of
counsel was not the result of her own fault or negligence. Id.
                                                       12
other proceedings, failed to comply with discovery, was granted multiple continuances, and

“went through” four attorneys—each one citing an “inability to communicate effectively.” Id. at

59. The client did not put forth any evidence rebutting the proposition that she was at fault for

the attorney’s lack of representation. Id. The court reasoned that, taken singularly, the client’s

actions were not necessarily faulty or negligent, but “[t]he cumulative effect of [her] actions . . .

demonstrated the likelihood that her lack of counsel was the result of some fault or negligence on

[her] part.” Id.

           Here, the trial court had already granted Appellants three continuances of the summary

judgment hearing14 and had admonished them that “no further continuances [would be granted]

absent [an] emergency situation.” Woodfork also failed to appear for a deposition, and there is

no indication that she engaged in the written discovery process.15 But Appellants’ actions do not

amount to a finding that they were negligent or at fault for the difficulties in hiring and keeping

trial counsel.

           Vanderbilt filed its original petition on June 19, 2020. The record shows that initially

Appellants attempted to represent themselves by filing multiple pleadings and a variety of other

documents. The record also shows that, at the latest, Vanderbilt attempted to hire counsel in

August or September 2021. At that time, Woodfork “contacted the Earl Carl Legal Institute for

Legal and Social Policy, Inc., for assistance regarding filing of a Motion for Summary Judgment

associated with the reformation of Deeds.” In a letter dated September 1, 2021, the institute

14
  In their motions for continuance of the summary judgment hearing, Appellants asked for additional time to hire a
lawyer. However, in two of their motions for continuance, Appellants attached documentation in support of their
assertions regarding health issues.
15
     However, Appellant McGowen responded to Vanderbilt’s requests for admissions.
                                                        13
informed Woodfork that it had “reviewed the information [she] provided and . . . concluded that

[it would] be unable to assist [her] in th[e] matter because the matter occurred outside of [its]

jurisdiction.” In January 2022, Woodfork sought the assistance of counsel, only to learn that

counsel would agree to represent her for an upfront flat fee of $2,300.00 and $575.00 per hour

thereafter. Although Appellants could have been more diligent in their search for an attorney,

Woodfork did make attempts even though they resulted in either refusals or what appears to be

unmanageable hourly fee rates.

       On March 9, 2022, Rob L. Wiley entered his appearance as Appellants’ counsel. The

hearing on Vanderbilt’s second amended motion for summary judgment was set for April 25,

2022. There is nothing in the record to show that during this relatively short time period the

Appellants were negligent or at fault in causing their attorney’s withdrawal. See Villegas, 711

S.W.2d at 626.

       Still, Vanderbilt points out that Appellants’ fourth motion for continuance was

improperly filed because they did not attach a verified affidavit to their motion. For that

procedural reason, Vanderbilt maintains that the trial court did not err when it denied Appellants’

fourth motion for continuance.

       Rule 251 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states that no continuance shall be

granted “except for sufficient cause supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by

operation of law.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 251; In re J.M., 603 S.W.3d 163, 168 n.6 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2020, no pet.). It is presumed that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by

denying a motion for continuance if the motion is not supported by verified affidavit. Villegas,

                                                14
711 S.W.2d at 626. Even so, the Texas Supreme Court has held that “[i]t would be unrealistic,

however, to apply this presumption to lay movants who without fault have their attorney

withdrawn.” Id. (citing Robinson v. Risinger, 548 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. App—Tyler 1977, writ

ref’d n.r.e.)). Furthermore, a trial court has almost complete authority over its docket, including

the speed in which the docket moves. It therefore has the discretion to continue a hearing or a

case sua sponte. Dell, 743 S.W.2d at 303.

       The record in this case fails to demonstrate any fault on the Appellants’ part that caused

Appellants’ counsel to withdraw. Furthermore, as noted above, the motion to withdraw failed to

sufficiently state the basis for withdrawal, and the record fails to show that the trial court made

an effort to ascertain a “good cause” basis for withdrawal. Even if Appellants had failed to file a

fourth motion for continuance, the trial court could have, and should have, continued the hearing

on Vanderbilt’s second amended motion for summary judgment to give Appellants additional

time to find another attorney following the abrupt withdrawal of their current counsel. Failing to

do so resulted in obvious harm to Appellants.

       Accordingly, we sustain Appellants’ second point of error.

III.   Conclusion

       We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

                                             Scott E. Stevens
                                             Chief Justice

Date Submitted:        May 5, 2023
Date Decided:          July 31, 2023
                                                15