Court Opinion

ID: 9962301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 15:00:55.935012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:19.505536
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 20-6057   Document: 010111036569    Date Filed: 04/23/2024   Page: 1
                                                                            FILED
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                    PUBLISH                             Tenth Circuit

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      April 23, 2024

                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                         FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                     _________________________________

  HETRONIC INTERNATIONAL,
  INC.,

         Plaintiff – Appellee,

  v.                                               Nos. 20-6057 & 20-6100

  HETRONIC GERMANY GMBH;
  HYDRONIC-STEUERSYSTEME
  GMBH; ABI HOLDING GMBH;
  ABITRON GERMANY GMBH;
  ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH;
  ALBERT FUCHS,

         Defendants – Appellants.

                      ________________________________

                      On Remand from the Supreme Court
                              of the United States
                               (S.C. No. 21-1043)
                          (D.C. No. 5:14-CV-00650-F)
                      ___________________________________

 Lucas M. Walker (Anton J. Rupert and Geren T. Steiner, Rupert & Steiner
 PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the supplemental briefs), of MoloLamken
 LLP, Washington, D.C., for Defendants - Appellants.

 Debbie L. Berman (Wade A. Thomson, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, Illinois,
 Gianni P. Servodidio, Rémi J.D. Jaffré, Jenner & Block LLP, New York, New
 York, Matthew S. Hellman, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C., Samuel R.
 Fulkerson, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart P.C., Oklahoma City,
 Oklahoma, with her on the supplemental brief), of Jenner & Block LLP,
 Chicago, Illinois, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
                        _________________________________
Appellate Case: 20-6057   Document: 010111036569     Date Filed: 04/23/2024   Page: 2

 Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
                    _________________________________

       This case returns to us on remand from the Supreme Court for further

 proceedings in accordance with Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic

 International, Inc., 600 U.S. 412 (2023). The underlying dispute involves the

 alleged infringement by Abitron, a foreign company, of U.S.-registered

 trademarks owned by Hetronic, an American company. Abitron sold Hetronic-

 branded products without permission to customers around the world, including

 in the United States; Hetronic alleged that these sales violated its trademark-

 ownership rights under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1).

       Deciding this appeal in 2021, we held that Lanham Act penalties

 extended to Abitron’s foreign sales to foreign customers because the foreign

 sales substantially affected U.S. commerce. Hetronic Int’l, Inc. v. Hetronic

 Ger. GmbH, 10 F.4th 1016, 1046 (10th Cir. 2021), vacated, 600 U.S. 412

 (2023). Abitron petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, asking the Court to

 decide whether the Lanham Act may indeed apply to “purely foreign sales that

 never reached the United States or confused U.S. customers.” Petition for Writ

 of Certiorari, Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc., 600 U.S. 412 (No.

 21-1043). The Supreme Court granted Abitron’s petition. Abitron Austria

 GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc., 143 S. Ct. 398 (2022) (mem.). Considering the

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 extraterritoriality of the Lanham Act for the first time since the 1950s, 1 the

 Court assessed whether the Lanham Act’s trademark-infringement provisions

 apply to Abitron’s foreign infringing conduct. Abitron, 600 U.S. at 415. The

 Court held that the provisions are not extraterritorial, but that they remain in

 force when a foreign entity uses an infringing mark in domestic commerce. Id.

 at 423, 428. The Court then vacated our decision and remanded the case. Id. at

 428.

        We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties on the

 impact of this decision and reheard the case for oral argument. Having revisited

 the Lanham Act issue in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion and having

 considered the parties’ supplemental arguments, we issue this revised opinion

 and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings as prescribed

 below.

                                  BACKGROUND

        We have previously spelled out the facts and procedural history, see

 Hetronic, 10 F.4th at 1023–27, so we discuss the background briefly, focusing

 on the facts most relevant to the Lanham Act claims.

        Hetronic International, Inc. (Hetronic) manufactures radio remote

 controls used to operate large industrial equipment. The remotes are

        1
        See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281, 285 (1952)
 (determining the Lanham Act’s governance over infringing conduct committed
 by an American citizen operating a counterfeit wristwatch business in Mexico).
                                          3
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 identifiable by the “HETRONIC®” mark, Appellants’ App. vol. 3 at 679,

 product marks specific to Hetronic’s remote models, like “NOVA” and

 “ERGO,” id., and by the remotes’ trade dress—a “distinctive black-and-yellow

 color scheme,” Hetronic, 10 F.4th at 1024. 2 Hetronic executed licensing and

 distribution agreements for the remotes with two European companies,

 collectively Abitron. 3

       Sometime during Hetronic’s dealings with Abitron, Abitron employees

 surmised that Abitron owned some of Hetronic’s intellectual property (IP)

 under a years-old research-and-development agreement. Asserting that this IP

 ownership empowered Abitron to manufacture its own version of Hetronic’s

 products, Abitron began assembling remotes that mimicked Hetronic models.

 Abitron built these Hetronic-branded remotes with parts that it sourced from

 unauthorized suppliers, in violation of its agreements with Hetronic. Abitron

 sold these copycat remotes to foreign and American customers. Hetronic

 terminated its licensing and distribution agreements with Abitron, but Abitron

 continued to sell Hetronic-branded remotes without Hetronic’s authorization.

       2
        Collectively, we refer to these marks and trade dress as the “Hetronic
 trademarks.”
       3
        Albert Fuchs owned Hydronic Steuersysteme GmbH (an Austrian
 company) and Hetronic Germany GmbH (a German company), which were later
 bought by Abitron Germany GmbH and Abitron Austria GmbH through Fuchs’s
 holding company, ABI Holding GmbH. Fuchs and the corporate entities
 associated with him are the named defendant-appellants in this litigation, to
 whom we refer collectively as “Abitron.”
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       Radio-remote-control sales is a worldwide business; a product

 manufactured in Germany is often destined for another country, like the United

 States. Given the global nature of this business, Abitron typically sold its

 remotes through middlemen—original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)—

 rather than directly to end-users. It worked like this: Abitron would sell the

 remotes to an OEM; the OEM would install the remotes into its own machinery

 (like cranes); and then the OEM would sell that machinery to end-users (like

 construction companies) in other countries, including the United States.

 Knowing that many of its remotes would eventually be exported into the United

 States through the OEMs, Abitron secured the required Federal

 Communications Commission (FCC) certifications and hired a U.S.-based

 distributor to service Abitron’s U.S. products and to market them at U.S.

 tradeshows.

       Based on this conduct, Hetronic sued Abitron in Oklahoma federal

 district court for breach of contract, later adding claims for federal trademark

 infringement under the Lanham Act, along with several other state-law tort

 claims. 4 The district court held an eleven-day jury trial, after which the jury

       4
         Hetronic’s second amended complaint alleged breach of contract,
 federal trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
 §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A), federal unfair competition under
 § 1125(a)(1)(A), “reverse palming off” under § 1125(a)(1)(A), federal
 trademark counterfeiting and infringement under § 1114, federal contributory
 trademark infringement (against Fuchs, only), as well as unfair competition,
                                                              (footnote continued)
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 found for Hetronic on all its claims. The jury found that Abitron had willfully

 infringed the Hetronic trademarks under the Lanham Act and awarded Hetronic

 about $96 million in damages related to those violations, along with

 compensatory and punitive damages for the state-law claims. The district court

 then ordered a permanent injunction against Abitron, enjoining it from any

 further infringing uses of Hetronic trademarks “within and outside of the

 United States.” Appellants’ App. vol. 10 at 2521.

       Abitron appealed the judgment. On appeal, Abitron challenged the

 worldwide Lanham Act injunction, the disgorgement based on Abitron’s

 foreign sales, some of the district court’s evidentiary rulings at trial, the district

 court’s rejection of Abitron’s IP-ownership defense at summary judgment, and

 the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants. We

 affirmed and reversed in part. 5

       Relevant here, we applied Supreme Court and circuit precedent in

 deciding whether the Lanham Act’s trademark-infringement provisions reached

 Abitron’s foreign sales to foreign customers. See Hetronic, 10 F.4th at

 tortious interference with contract, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty,
 civil conspiracy, and conversion under Oklahoma state law.
       5
          We affirmed the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction over all foreign
 defendants, the Lanham Act’s application to Abitron’s foreign sales, the district
 court’s summary-judgment ruling denying defendants’ IP-ownership defense,
 and the district court’s evidentiary rulings; but we narrowed the scope of the
 worldwide injunction to “the countries in which Hetronic currently markets or
 sells its products.” Hetronic, 10 F.4th at 1047. We reversed and remanded on
 that basis.
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 1033–38, 1045 (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 338

 (2016) (applying the Court’s extraterritoriality framework to the Racketeer

 Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) Act); Morrison v. Nat’l

 Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255–65 (2010) (assessing the extraterritorial

 reach of the Securities Exchange Act); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S.

 280, 281–87 (1952) (deciding whether the Lanham Act covered trademark

 infringement committed primarily in Mexico, though some facilitating steps

 were taken in the United States); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234

 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (creating a tripartite test to determine the

 extraterritoriality of the Lanham Act); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am.

 Nat’l Tr. & Savs. Ass’n, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (adopting its own

 extraterritoriality test); McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 111, 118–21 (1st

 Cir. 2005) (same)). So as a matter of first impression for this court, we

 fashioned a test to determine the Lanham Act’s extraterritoriality. Id. at

 1037–38. Our test amalgamated the factors that we found most persuasive

 among those espoused by our fellow circuit courts, which led us to adopt three

 factors: (1) whether the defendant is an American citizen, (2) whether the

 defendant’s conduct has substantially affected U.S. commerce, and (3) whether

 the Act’s extraterritorial application would conflict with the defendant’s

 established trademark rights in another country. Id. at 1036–38. Because none

 of the defendant-appellants are American citizens and none argued that any

 other foreign-trademark rights would conflict with the Lanham Act’s

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 application here, the substantial-effect prong remained as the singular

 touchstone for our analysis.

       We evaluated the substantial effect of Abitron’s sales on U.S. commerce,

 as divided into three groups: direct sales to U.S. customers, foreign sales of

 products that “ended up” in the United States, and foreign sales that diverted

 customers away from Hetronic. Id. at 1042–43. For the first group (direct U.S.

 sales), we easily concluded that the Lanham Act governed because these sales

 invoked a purely domestic application of the Act. Id. at 1043 (“[T]he Lanham

 Act would encompass [Abitron’s] direct sales into the United States even if we

 concluded that the Act didn’t apply extraterritorially . . . .”). For the second

 group (products sold abroad that ended up in the United States), we determined

 that “the effects of [Abitron’s] foreign conduct [were] sufficiently substantial,”

 id. at 1044, to raise an actionable Lanham Act claim because Hetronic had

 submitted evidence at trial “that U.S. consumers were confused about

 Hetronic’s product’s relationship to the Abitron companies,” id. at 1043, due to

 its foreign sales. And for the third group (diverted foreign sales), we observed

 that “[w]hen diverted sales that would have otherwise flowed to a U.S.

 company instead inure to a foreign defendant, the loss to U.S. commerce is

 clear,” id. at 1045, and we agreed that ample evidence buoyed Hetronic’s claim

 that Abitron’s “foreign infringing conduct had a substantial effect on U.S.

 commerce,” id. at 1046. See id. (upholding the diversion-of-sales theory based

 on “the millions of euros worth of infringing products that made their way into

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 the United States,” the “diverted tens of millions of dollars of foreign sales,”

 and the “numerous incidents of confusion among U.S. consumers”). Altogether,

 we concluded that evidence “of a sufficient character and magnitude” supported

 extending Lanham Act protections to Hetronic for Abitron’s foreign infringing

 conduct. Id.

       But our decision added yet another Lanham Act extraterritoriality

 framework into the mix, further entrenching the extant circuit split. Soon after,

 the Supreme Court granted Abitron’s petition for certiorari to settle when and

 how far the Lanham Act extends to protect U.S.-trademark owners from foreign

 infringement. Abitron, 600 U.S. at 417. In doing so, the Court crafted a new

 framework to determine the extraterritorial application of the relevant Lanham

 Act provisions. That framework lays the foundation for our discussion.

                                   DISCUSSION

       Our principal task on remand is to reevaluate which of Abitron’s

 allegedly infringing activities count as “uses in commerce” under the Supreme

 Court’s new extraterritoriality framework for the Lanham Act’s trademark-

 infringement provisions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1). After

 engaging with this framework and drawing our conclusions, we then discuss

 how our revised view of the Lanham Act’s application to Abitron’s conduct

 impacts the remedies awarded in the district court.

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  I.    Abitron’s Extraterritoriality Framework

        The Lanham Act regulates and protects the use of federally registered

  trademarks in U.S. commerce. The statute ordinarily governs domestic

  trademark disputes, but this case posed a different scenario: What happens

  when a foreign entity infringes on an American-registered trademark outside

  the United States? The Supreme Court has contemplated similar extraterritorial

  applications of U.S. statutes in recent years. See, e.g., Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe,

  593 U.S. 628 (2021) (Alien Tort Statute); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579

  U.S. 325 (2016) (RICO Act); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247

  (2010) (Security Exchange Act). But until Abitron, the Court had yet to decide

  when the Lanham Act’s trademark-infringement provisions might, if ever, reach

  an infringer’s foreign conduct.

        In Abitron, the Supreme Court began with a “longstanding principle of

  American law” called the “presumption against extraterritoriality.” 600 U.S. at

  417 (cleaned up). Under that presumption, “exclusively ‘foreign conduct is

  generally the domain of foreign law.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting

  Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007)). But when Congress

  expresses “a contrary intent,” the presumption may be rebutted. Id. To decide

  whether an act of Congress rebuts the presumption, courts apply a “two-step

  framework.” Id. (quoting RJR, 579 U.S. at 337).

        “At step one, we determine whether a provision is extraterritorial,”

  meaning that “Congress has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that the

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  provision at issue should apply to foreign conduct.” Id. at 417–18 (quotation

  marks omitted) (quoting RJR, 579 U.S. at 335). If the statute contains such an

  instruction, then “claims alleging exclusively foreign conduct may proceed,

  subject to ‘the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute’s foreign

  application.’” Id. at 418 (quoting RJR, 579 U.S. at 337–38). But if the

  provision lacks any express intent for the law to apply outside the United

  States, then we proceed to step two. Id.

        At step two, we gauge whether the claim alleges “a (permissible)

  domestic or (impermissible) foreign application” of the provision. Id.

  Embedded in that question lies another two-part inquiry: first, to “identify the

  statute’s focus,” and second, to “ask whether the conduct relevant to that focus

  occurred in United States territory.” Id. (cleaned up). This two-pronged inquiry

  at step two “separate[s] the [domestic] activity that matters from the [foreign]

  activity that does not.” Id. at 419. And even among the domestic activity, only

  “the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus” implicates the Lanham Act. Id.

  (citation omitted) (“[T]he presumption would be meaningless if any domestic

  conduct could defeat it.”); see also WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical

  Corp., 585 U.S. 407, 414 (2018) (“If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus

  occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic

  application of the statute . . . . But if the relevant conduct occurred in another

  country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application

  regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.” (cleaned up)).

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        Applying “this well-established framework,” the Supreme Court

  concluded that the Lanham Act provisions at issue, § 1114(1)(a) and

  § 1125(a)(1), are not extraterritorial. 6 Abitron, 600 U.S. at 419. So the Court

  proceeded to step two to determine the statute’s focus and the conduct relevant

  to that focus. See id. at 421. At this step in the analysis, the Court accused the

  parties of “miss[ing] th[e] critical point” by disputing the Lanham Act’s focus

  “without regard” to the relevant conduct. Id. The Court reasoned that under

  “any potential focus of § 1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1),” the relevant conduct is

  the infringing, domestic “use in commerce” of a trademark. 7 Id. at 423

  (emphasis added). “[I]f all the conduct regarding the violations took place

  outside the United States,” the Court noted, then “the focus test has no filtering

  role to play.” Id. at 419 (cleaned up). From that perspective, the Court viewed

        6
          The Court rejected Hetronic’s arguments that the Lanham Act’s
  definition of “commerce” constitutes an unmistakable provision that rebuts the
  presumption against extraterritoriality. Abitron, 600 U.S. at 421 (recalling its
  similar rebuke to statutory provisions that “reference” foreign commerce as
  being sufficient to rebut the presumption). The Lanham Act defines
  “commerce” as “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”
  15 U.S.C. § 1127. Hetronic argued that this definition encompasses foreign
  conduct because Congress lawfully regulates foreign trade under the Foreign
  Commerce Clause. Abitron, 600 U.S. at 420. And Hetronic advanced that the
  Lanham Act definition differs from “boilerplate” definitions of commerce
  found in other statutes. Id. Together, Hetronic alleged, these features defeated
  the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id.
        7
          Abitron argued that the focus is “the ‘use’ of the mark ‘in commerce’”;
  Hetronic argued that the focus is both to “protect[] mark owners from
  reputational harm and [to] protect[] consumers from confusion”; and the
  government argued that the focus is “consumer confusion.” Abitron, 600 U.S. at
  436–37 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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  “the parties’ particular debate over the ‘focus’ of § 1114(1)(a) and

  § 1125(a)(1)” as inapposite to “the relevant inquiry” about Abitron’s conduct—

  where Abitron had used Hetronic trademarks: the United States or overseas. Id.

  at 422; see id. (“The ultimate question regarding permissible domestic

  application turns on the location of the conduct relevant to the focus.”).

        Drilling down on the meaning of “use in commerce,” the Court observed

  that, under the Lanham Act, Congress forbade the unauthorized use of

  trademarks in commerce under “certain conditions,” id. at 423, one being that

  the use “is likely to cause confusion,” id. (quoting §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)).

  The Court explained that consumer confusion is a “necessary characteristic of

  an offending use,” but “not a separate requirement.” Id. So though a likelihood

  of consumer confusion is part and parcel of any infringing “use in commerce,”

  the keystone for liability is the “specific action” that the alleged infringer took

  in the United States, and whether that action contravened the Act’s focus. 8 Id.

        8
          Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence supported Lanham Act penalties
  extending to “activities carried out abroad” that cause “a likelihood of
  consumer confusion in the United States.” Abitron, 600 U.S. at 433
  (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). According to her concurrence—
  joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kagan, and Justice Barrett—the
  statutory focus of § 1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1)(A) is “protecting consumers
  from confusion.” Id. at 437. In short, the four concurring justices regarded
  domestic confusion as the sine qua non of the Lanham Act, not domestic
  conduct. See id. at 440–41 (criticizing the majority’s citation to Supreme Court
  cases in which “the focus of the provision at issue was conduct” and
  maintaining that “none of the cases upon which the majority relies establish
  categorically that there must be domestic conduct in order for there to be a
  domestic application of [the Act]”).
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  That “particular sort of use” which offends the Lanham Act’s focus must be the

  “premise[] [for] liability.” Id.

        Summing up, the Supreme Court held that a domestic, infringing “‘use in

  commerce’ of a trademark” draws “the dividing line between foreign and

  domestic applications” of the Lanham Act. Id. at 428. So with that

  understanding of the Act’s extraterritoriality, we proceed to determine on

  which side of the dividing line Abitron’s conduct falls.

  II.   “Use in Commerce”

        For Abitron’s foreign conduct to be actionable under the Lanham Act,

  § 1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1) must apply extraterritorially. 9 The Supreme

        9
          Sections 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1) technically create two separate
  claims for relief under the Lanham Act, though we typically group them
  together when both are raised as part of a Lanham Act trademark-infringement
  claim because both provisions contain “virtually identical elements.” Utah
  Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Rsch., 527 F.3d 1045,
  1050 (10th Cir. 2008); see Elevate Fed. Credit Union v. Elevations Credit
  Union, 67 F.4th 1058, 1070 (10th Cir. 2023) (noting that both § 1114(1) and
  § 1125(a)(1) impose liability when “the junior user’s mark is likely to cause
  confusion with the senior user’s mark” (quoting Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Sys.
  Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013))). Our fellow circuits do the same.
  See, e.g., Rex Real Est. I, L.P. v. Rex Real Est. Exch., Inc., 80 F.4th 607, 616
  (5th Cir. 2023) (clarifying that “[t]he same two elements apply to both causes
  of action,” referring to “trademark infringement [allegations] in violation of
  Sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which are codified at 15 U.S.C.
  § 1114(1) and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), respectively”); Radiance Found., Inc. v.
  N.A.A.C.P., 786 F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 2015) (referring to § 1114(1) and
  § 1125(a) collectively as “[t]he Lanham Act’s provisions prohibiting trademark
  infringement”). The notable difference between the two provisions is that
  § 1125(a)(1) affords broader protections than § 1114(1)(a), which protects only
  registered trademarks. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 154 (2d
  Cir. 2007); see also Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174
                                                                   (footnote continued)
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  Court resolved that these provisions are not extraterritorial at step one of the

  framework, so we can immediately proceed to step two. At step two, we first

  decide the focus of the provisions at issue, § 1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1). “The

  focus of a statute is ‘the object of its solicitude,’ which can include the conduct

  it ‘seeks to regulate,’ as well as the parties and interests it ‘seeks to protect’ or

  vindicate.” WesternGeco, 585 U.S. at 413–14 (cleaned up) (quoting Morrison,

  561 U.S. at 267). To assess the object of the Lanham Act’s solicitude, we

  examine the provisions’ statutory language.

        Broadly speaking, the Lanham Act protects trademark owners by making

  the infringement or unauthorized use of a registered mark in commerce civilly

  actionable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The Act generally defines “use in commerce”

  as “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade,” id., but the

  provisions specific to trademark infringement, see §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1),

  narrow that definition further. Section 1114(1)(a) creates civil liability for any

  “use in commerce,” meaning any use “in connection with the sale, offering for

  sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods” that is “likely to cause

  confusion.” And § 1125(a)(1) imposes civil liability for “uses in commerce” of

  any “name [or] symbol” “in connection with any goods or services” that are

  “likely to cause confusion.” From this language, we deduce that the plain focus

  F.3d 1036, 1046 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (illustrating that “the same standard is
  embodied” in both § 1114(1) and § 1125(a), their application depends only on
  whether the mark is registered or unregistered).
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  of § 1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1) is to punish unauthorized commercial uses of

  U.S.-registered trademarks that harm American businesses and consumers by

  causing confusion (or a likelihood of confusion) about the true origin of a

  product. Cf. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, 599 U.S. 140, 146

  (2023) (explaining that “trademarks benefit consumers and producers alike”

  because “[a] source-identifying mark enables customers to select ‘the goods

  and services that they wish to purchase, as well as those they want to avoid’”

  (quoting Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 224 (2017))).

        Having determined the statutory focus, we turn to the relevant conduct

  implicated under that focus and where that conduct occurred. The relevant

  conduct under § 1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1) is the use of a trademark “in

  commerce” “in connection with any goods or services,” specifically “the sale,

  offering for sale, distribution, or advertising,” in a manner “likely to cause

  confusion.” Using this yardstick, we assess which of Abitron’s allegedly

  infringing activities amounted to an infringing use of Hetronic trademarks.

  Once we determine that Abitron has committed an infringing use, we then

  consider where that use occurred—domestically or overseas—before Lanham

  Act penalties attach. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (governing Lanham Act damages);

  see also 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir.

  2005) (describing the “use” determination as “a threshold matter” because “no

  such activity is actionable under the Lanham Act absent the ‘use’ of a

  trademark”).

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          A.    Domestic Sales

          Last time, we established that the Lanham Act covers Abitron’s direct

  sales to U.S. customers. Hetronic, 10 F.4th at 1042–43. These sales blatantly

  used Hetronic trademarks in domestic commerce, thus no “extraterritorial

  application of the Act” was required. Id. at 1043. On rehearing, Abitron accepts

  that its “sales to U.S. customers may be subject to the Lanham Act as a

  domestic application of the law.” Suppl. Op. Br. at 7. Abitron instead contests

  the amount of U.S. sales that triggers Lanham Act liability, asserting that “only

  a fraction” of them violated the Act because most of its domestic sales posed no

  likelihood of confusion to U.S. consumers—“a necessary characteristic of an

  offending use.” Id. at 7–8 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Abitron, 600 U.S. at

  423).

          From its total direct U.S. sales (€202,134.12), Abitron excises the portion

  that went to Hetronic’s U.S.-based affiliates (€185,463.52), reasoning that

  those sales “presented no cognizable likelihood of confusion.” Id. at 9; see

  Suppl. Reply Br. at 4 (“Hetronic knew the goods came from [Abitron], because

  [Hetronic] bought them from [Abitron].”). At most, Abitron presses, Hetronic’s

  evidence of the confusion stemming from these sales reveals confusion about

  “whether [the goods] were constructed with the parts Hetronic requested,”

  which goes to the “contractual obligations” between Abitron and Hetronic, not

  to “the goods’ source.” Suppl. Reply Br. at 4. And to create liability under the

  Act, Abitron continues, the U.S. sales must have caused a likelihood of

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  confusion “about [the] source” of the goods. Suppl. Op. Br. at 9 (quoting

  Abitron, 600 U.S. at 430 (Jackson, J., concurring)). Based on that, Abitron

  insists that only €16,670.60 of its U.S. sales to “non-Hetronic U.S. buyers”

  were “likely to cause confusion,” and so only those sales “can support Lanham

  Act liability.” Id. at 8–9.

        “In this circuit, likelihood of confusion,” as an element of Lanham Act

  trademark infringement, “is a question of fact.” Affliction Holdings, LLC v.

  Utah Vap or Smoke, LLC, 935 F.3d 1112, 1114 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sally

  Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002)). To decide

  whether “a likelihood of confusion exists,” we have identified six

  nonexhaustive factors: (1) “the degree of similarity between the marks”;

  (2) “the intent of the alleged infringer in adopting its mark”; (3) “evidence of

  actual confusion”; (4) “the relation in use and manner of marketing between the

  goods or services marketed by the competing parties”; (5) “the degree of care

  likely to be exercised by purchasers”; and (6) “the strength or weakness of the

  marks.” 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1239 (10th Cir.

  2013); see also King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d

  1084, 1090 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[a]ll of the factors are

  interrelated” and that “no one factor is dispositive” because “the weight

  afforded to some of the factors differs when applied in . . . separate contexts”

  (citation omitted)).

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        At trial, the jury received instructions on the multi-pronged likelihood-

  of-confusion test to determine whether Hetronic had proved that essential

  element of its trademark-infringement claims against Abitron. Following those

  instructions, which Abitron never challenged, the jury found “by the greater

  weight of the evidence [that] each essential element of [the] trademark

  infringement claim[s]” had been proved. 10 Appellants’ App. vol. 10 at 2490–92.

        For starters, “[w]e do not and cannot retry factual determinations made

  by a jury.” Bennett v. Longacre, 774 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1985). On top

  of that, we review de novo likelihood-of-confusion determinations on

  summary-judgment appeals, which this is not. See Hornady Mfg. Co. v.

  Doubletap, Inc., 746 F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that though

  “[l]ikelihood of confusion is a question of fact,” it is “amenable to summary

  judgment in appropriate circumstances”). And even if it were, we would reject

  Abitron’s argument on procedural and substantive grounds.

        10
            The jury issued a general verdict on the likelihood-of-confusion
  element through its findings that Hetronic had proved “each essential element
  of its trademark infringement claim[s]” for the Hetronic mark, product marks,
  and trade dress. Appellants’ App. vol. 10 at 2490–92. The verdict forms did not
  parse out the disparate levels of confusion Abitron may have caused among
  Hetronic’s U.S. affiliates versus non-Hetronic-affiliated U.S. customers. That
  lack of granularity in the verdict is hardly surprising because Abitron didn’t
  raise the point at trial. Because Abitron didn’t present its case to the jury that
  way, we decline to rehash the evidence to discern which portions of the trial
  record do (or don’t) support a likelihood-of-confusion finding specific to
  Hetronic’s U.S. affiliates.
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        Procedurally, this argument is waived. See Hansen v. PT Bank Negara

  Indon. (Persero), 706 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Plaintiffs never raised

  this argument before the district court, and it is therefore waived.”). Abitron

  should have disputed before the district court and in its previous appeal that

  €185,463.52 of its sales lacked the necessary likelihood of confusion. 11 Despite

  agreeing to the amount of Abitron’s direct U.S. sales as a factual matter,

  Abitron alleges that, legally, Hetronic Germany’s sales to Hetronic’s U.S.

  affiliates “presented no cognizable likelihood of confusion” under § 1114(1)(a)

  or § 1125(a)(1)(A). Suppl. Op. Br. at 9. We decline to let Abitron relitigate the

  amount of its actionable direct U.S. sales, even as a matter of law, because

  nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion abrogated or altered the law on the

  likelihood-of-confusion element for Lanham Act trademark-infringement

  claims. The Court discussed the likelihood-of-confusion element briefly, 12

        11
            Indeed, on appeal last time, Abitron challenged the U.S.-sales figures
  as a factual matter, alleging that its sales to U.S. customers were de minimis,
  totaling €16,670.60. We rejected that assertion because Abitron had conceded
  that its direct U.S. sales totaled €202,134.12 (€16,670.60 from Abitron
  Germany and €185,463.52 from Hetronic Germany) in its statement of
  undisputed facts submitted with its motion for summary judgment and in an
  offer of proof at trial. Hetronic, 10 F.4th at 1042 n.8.
        12
           The majority confirmed that infringing uses in commerce “must create
  a sufficient risk of confusion,” but it focused the extraterritoriality analysis “on
  the location of the conduct relevant to the [Act’s] focus.” Abitron, 600 U.S. at
  422–23. In fact, the majority criticized Justice Sotomayor’s concurring view
  that a domestic application of the Act accrues whenever the use of a mark
  abroad might incite a likelihood of confusion in the United States, because, the
                                                                   (footnote continued)
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  mainly to confirm that likelihood of confusion is a “necessary characteristic” of

  an infringing use. Abitron, 600 U.S. at 423. This comment merely clarifies that,

  though an infringer’s domestic conduct dominates the extraterritoriality

  analysis, a likelihood of consumer confusion remains instrumental for Lanham

  Act liability in general. See id. Because likelihood of confusion was already an

  essential element for any actionable Lanham Act trademark-infringement claim,

  and the multi-factor test for likelihood of confusion remains unchanged,

  Abitron could have argued at trial that €185,463.52 of its direct U.S. sales

  “create[d] no actionable likelihood of confusion.” Suppl. Op. Br. at 8; see

  § 1114(1)(a) (requiring that any liable infringing use be “likely to cause

  confusion”); § 1125(a)(1)(A) (same). By failing to do so, Abitron has waived

  that argument on appeal.

        Substantively, Abitron contends that the sales to Hetronic’s U.S.

  affiliates “could create no actionable likelihood of confusion” because

  “Hetronic knew exactly where the goods came from.” Suppl. Op. Br. at 8. In

  Abitron’s view, the Lanham Act requires a likelihood of confusion about the

  majority warned, that approach “threatens to negate the presumption against
  extraterritoriality.” Id. at 425.
         From this discussion, we glean that likelihood of confusion remains
  intact as an element of Lanham Act trademark infringement, albeit recognizing
  that domestic confusion takes a backseat to domestic conduct when considering
  the Act’s extraterritoriality. See id. at 422–23. But nothing in the Court’s
  opinion suggests to us that this circuit’s well-established likelihood-of-
  confusion test is inadequate or abrogated. See id. at 423.
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  source of the infringing goods that could not have existed here because

  “Hetronic knew the goods came from [Abitron].” Suppl. Reply Br. at 4.

        Contrary to Abitron’s position, “the relevant confusion under trademark

  law is not limited to confusion of consumers as to the source of the goods.”

  Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 835 (10th Cir. 2005).

  The confusion may also be “as to sponsorship or affiliation” of the goods. 13 Id.;

  accord Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC,

  823 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he [Lanham] Act’s protection against

  infringement is not limited to any particular type of consumer confusion, much

  less exclusively to confusion as to source. Rather, [the Act] protects against

  numerous types of confusion, including confusion regarding affiliation or

  sponsorship.”); Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 748 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir.

  1984) (stating that the likelihood-of-confusion determination should account

  “not only” for “confusion of source, but also . . . confusion that results from a

  mistaken belief in common sponsorship or affiliation”).

        13
           Other circuits agree that if consumers are likely to misunderstand the
  infringer’s product as having been approved or sponsored by the trademark
  owner, then Lanham Act liability and penalties ensue. See, e.g.,
  Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007)
  (affirming the district court’s finding of confusion based on evidence that
  “consumer[s] might assume that Perfumebay is part of eBay’s web site or one
  of eBay’s internet stores” based on “search results for ‘perfume’ and ‘eBay’
  that provided links to Perfumebay”); Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Luigino’s,
  Inc., 423 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining that Luigino’s “use of the
  term ‘Points’ on the front” of its packaging “was likely to confuse consumers
  into believing that Weight Watchers had determined the point values or
  otherwise endorsed the Luigino’s products”).
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        Hetronic presented evidence at trial showing that U.S. customers were

  confused about the association between Abitron’s and Hetronic’s products.

  Hetronic showed that U.S. consumers, and even Abitron’s U.S. distributor,

  thought that Abitron had replaced Hetronic. Hetronic submitted evidence that

  Abitron sold products with the same shape, appearance, and product name as

  Hetronic’s to assure consumers that they were buying the same products they

  had bought before. Hetronic produced evidence that Abitron installed

  counterfeit parts into Hetronic-branded systems without Hetronic’s approval or

  the customers’ knowledge, and that those parts sometimes malfunctioned. And

  Hetronic’s evidence revealed that Abitron’s online advertising intentionally

  directed U.S. customers to Abitron for repair services and replacement parts.

  From this, the jury found that Abitron’s activities were likely to have confused

  Hetronic’s U.S. customers about the affiliation between the two companies.

        This sort of confusion (or likelihood thereof) suffices to sustain a

  Lanham Act trademark-infringement claim for all of Abitron’s direct U.S.

  sales. See Team Tires Plus, 394 F.3d at 835; see, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns,

  Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding

  that confusion existed where the similar branding between two internet

  databases risked leading consumers to “wrongly assume that the [original] . . .

  [wa]s no longer offered” and had “been replaced” by the infringer’s service).

  Because even if Hetronic’s affiliates knew that Abitron sourced the remotes,

  part of a mark’s core function is to help consumers “quickly and easily”

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  identify that “this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same

  producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in

  the past.” Jack Daniel’s, 599 U.S. at 146 (citation omitted). That assurance—

  that the product will possess the same qualities and features that the consumer

  previously found appealing—vanishes if Abitron sold products masquerading

  under Hetronic trademarks that varied substantively from those affiliated with

  the Hetronic brand. Such tactics are a far cry from a consumer purchasing a

  “disappointing product,” as Abitron alleges, Suppl. Op. Br. at 9 (citation

  omitted), or even from a legitimate attempt to compete by mimicking

  “successful features” of a product, Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Sys., Inc., 726 F.3d

  1136, 1158 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc.,

  159 F.3d 739, 741–42, 745 (2d Cir. 1998)).

        We decline to decide at this late stage that €185,463.52 of Abitron’s

  direct U.S. sales posed no likelihood of confusion. This argument is waived and

  untenable when considered with the jury’s findings. We therefore conclude that

  all of Abitron’s direct U.S. sales are actionable under the Lanham Act because

  these sales used Hetronic trademarks in domestic commerce in a way that

  threatened confusion among U.S. consumers.

        B.    Foreign Sales

        Shifting next to Abitron’s foreign sales to foreign customers, Abitron

  maintains that “[t]hose sales indisputably did not involve a ‘domestic’ ‘use in

  commerce.’” Suppl. Op. Br. at 10 (quoting Abitron, 600 U.S. at 415). In the

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  initial appeal, this panel held that some of Abitron’s foreign sales triggered a

  domestic application of the Lanham Act either because the goods wound up in

  the United States or the foreign sales diverted customers from Hetronic, costing

  Hetronic tens of millions of dollars in sales that “would have flowed into the

  U.S. economy but for [Abitron’s] conduct infringing a U.S. trademark.”

  Hetronic, 10 F.4th at 1045; see id. at 1043–46 (discussing both theories). But

  neither theory works under the Supreme Court’s new framework.

        For the €1.7 million of Abitron’s foreign sales that “ended up,” id. at

  1043, in the United States, Abitron counsels against our assigning significance

  to the ultimate destination of the infringing goods, see Abitron, 600 U.S. at

  422. What matters is “the location of the conduct relevant to the focus” of the

  Act. Abitron, 600 U.S. at 422. Above, we identified that focus as the

  punishment of illegal trademark uses in U.S. commerce detrimental to U.S.

  businesses and consumers. Considering the location of Abitron’s deleterious

  conduct, we conclude that its foreign sales cannot “premise[] liability” under

  the Act. Id. at 423. That conduct occurred abroad, and so in basing its Lanham

  Act claims on Abitron’s foreign sales, Hetronic seeks an “(impermissible)

  foreign application of the provision[s].” Id. at 418; see id. at 419 (“[I]f all the

  conduct regarding the violations took place outside the United States,” then

  “there would be no domestic conduct that could be relevant to any focus.”

  (cleaned up)). The same goes for the foreign sales that we found actionable

  under the diversion-of-sales theory. Hetronic, 10 F.4th at 1045–46. This

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  conduct falls beyond the Lanham Act’s purview even if those sales caused

  economic losses in the United States.

        Because the Court now requires infringing conduct in domestic

  commerce to anchor any Lanham Act claim, none of Abitron’s purely foreign

  conduct—that is, foreign sales to foreign customers—can premise liability for

  Hetronic’s Lanham Act claims.

        C.     Other Domestic Conduct

        Abitron’s direct U.S. sales are only one slice of the domestic-conduct

  pie; below, we dig into the rest.

               1.     Advertising, Marketing, Distribution

        The Supreme Court instructs us that “the conduct relevant to any

  potential focus of § 1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1)” is the alleged infringer’s

  domestic “use in commerce” of a registered trademark. Abitron, 600 U.S. at

  423. And § 1114(1)(a) defines “use in commerce” as “the sale, offering for

  sale, distributing, or advertising of any goods or services . . . which . . . is

  likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” From this, we

  understand Abitron’s “use[s] in commerce” as going beyond its domestic sales

  to include any marketing, advertising, and distributing activities that Abitron

  undertook in the United States. A plain reading of § 1114(1)(a) and

  § 1125(a)(1) clearly envelops all these actions as “uses in commerce.”

        Besides, Abitron “does not dispute that [the] ‘use’ of a mark is broader

  than sales.” Suppl. Reply Br. at 2. So without going further, we hold that

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  Abitron’s domestic advertising, marketing, and distributing—activities that

  used Hetronic trademarks without authorization and caused a likelihood of

  confusion among U.S. consumers—all count as infringing “uses in commerce”

  under the Lanham Act. See Abitron, 600 U.S. at 423.

              2.     Downstream Sales

        Beyond Abitron’s domestic advertising, marketing, and distributing

  activities that fall squarely within the text of the Lanham Act, see § 1114(1)(a),

  Hetronic argues that Abitron’s infringing products “routinely . . . sold

  downstream into the United States,” Suppl. Resp. Br. at 7, also count as

  domestic uses in commerce. By “downstream sales,” Hetronic refers to the

  sales from OEMs to end-users in the United States. Hetronic reasons that these

  “goods [were] intended to be sold downstream” and that Abitron “took . . .

  steps to facilitate downstream sales in the United States,” making those sales

  “sufficiently domestic” for Lanham Act purposes. 14 Suppl. Resp. Br. at 8, 9, 11.

        14
           Accounting for these “downstream sales,” Hetronic contends that the
  €1.7 million in sales that “ended up” here are “just the tip of the iceberg.”
  Suppl. Resp. Br. at 9. Hetronic alleges that the €1.7-million figure is
  underinclusive not overinclusive of Abitron’s downstream sales because many
  more remotes were sold by OEMs to U.S. end-users that were not “indicate[d]”
  as bound for the United States. Id. at 9–10. For example, Hetronic references
  some of Abitron’s foreign sales to Teupen (a Germany-based OEM) that were
  apparently not marked as “designated for the United States,” even though
  Teupen “sold between 150 and 200 machines in the U.S. market.” Id. at 10
  (cleaned up). From this, Hetronic calculates that as much as €650,000 in
  Teupen sales are unaccounted for in the €1.7-million figure. Id. Abitron
  contests Hetronic’s characterization of the Teupen evidence, countering that
  these sales were made in the early 2000s “long before any alleged
                                                                  (footnote continued)
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  Hetronic rests this argument largely on Justice Jackson’s concurrence in

  Abitron. In her concurrence, Justice Jackson posited that the Lanham Act may

  protect against the foreign sale of goods bearing an infringing trademark if the

  goods are resold in the United States. See Abitron, 600 U.S. at 430–32

  (Jackson, J., concurring). 15

        Abitron challenges both the claim that downstream sales constitute a

  domestic use in commerce and the persuasive value of Justice Jackson’s

  concurrence. First, “even assuming Hetronic could identify U.S. resales of

  goods that [Abitron] sold abroad,” Abitron argues, “those U.S. resales would

  . . . be [a] domestic use of the marks in commerce” “by the reseller” not “by

  defendants.” Suppl. Reply Br. at 8. Second, Abitron insists that because Justice

  Jackson “joined the Court’s opinion in full, without qualification,” this panel is

  not bound by her view of domestic resales as potentially actionable uses in

  commerce. Id.

  infringement.” Suppl. Reply Br. at 7. To the extent that this evidence can be
  found in the existing record, we defer to the district court to assess its
  relevance on remand.
        15
           Justice Jackson devised a hypothetical about German-made handbags
  marked “Coache”—replicating the mark of the American-handbag company,
  “Coach”—resold in the United States by Americans who had bought the bags in
  Europe. See Abitron, 600 U.S. at 431 (Jackson, J., concurring). Under those
  facts, Justice Jackson concluded that “once the marks on [the German] bags are
  serving their core source-identifying function in commerce in the United States,
  this German company is doing—domestically—exactly what Congress sought
  to proscribe.” See id.
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        At the outset, we agree that Justice Jackson’s concurrence need not alter

  our approach to the substantive Lanham Act issue partly because, as Abitron

  says, Justice Jackson joined her majority colleagues “in full,” and also because

  her concurrence advances a different point than the one Hetronic makes. 16

        16
           Hetronic urges that Abitron “cannot so easily brush off the views
  expressed by Justice Jackson,” and we agree. Suppl. Resp. Br. at 2. The trouble
  is that Hetronic misapprehends Justice Jackson’s point. Justice Jackson wrote
  separately from the majority to clarify her view on two things: (1) “what it
  means to ‘use a trademark in commerce’”; and (2) “how that meaning guides
  the permissible-domestic-application question in a particular case.” Abitron,
  600 U.S. at 429 (Jackson, J., concurring) (brackets omitted). In doing so, she
  stressed that a “‘use in commerce’ does not cease at the place . . . where the
  item to which [the mark] is affixed is first sold” because a use in commerce
  occurs “wherever the mark serves its source-identifying function.” Id. at 430.
  Rooted in that understanding of what is meant by the “use” of a trademark,
  Justice Jackson employed her German-handbag hypothetical, supra note 15, to
  illustrate that infringing goods do not offend the Lanham Act merely by their
  presence in the United States. See id. at 431. Rather, she explained, goods
  originally sold abroad become domestically infringing once they are resold
  inside the United States. See id. Upon being resold, the goods enter the flow of
  domestic commerce and so they start doing domestically “what Congress
  sought to proscribe.” Id. at 431–32.
         Hetronic warps this commentary to assert that Abitron’s selling remotes
  to OEMs abroad “knowing and intending that U.S. customers would later buy
  their products” justifies recovery for those foreign sales. Suppl. Resp. Br. at 11.
  But, according to Justice Jackson, that’s not enough. See Abitron, 600 U.S. at
  431 (Jackson, J., concurring). Hetronic needed to show that the remotes
  originally sold abroad were then resold inside the United States by U.S. end-
  users because only then would the goods have begun “serving a source-
  identifying function in the way Congress described.” Id. at 430 (emphasis
  added). But Hetronic doesn’t make this argument, nor does it introduce any
  evidence that U.S. end-users ever resold Abitron products in U.S. commerce.
  Thus, we fail to see how Justice Jackson’s concurrence bears on Hetronic’s
  theory of recoverable “downstream sales.” This argument is waived for
  inadequate support and explanation. See Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v.
  A & B Builders, Ltd., 989 F.3d 747, 769 (10th Cir. 2021) (determining that
                                                                 (footnote continued)
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  Abitron, 600 U.S. at 432 (Jackson, J., concurring). As to Hetronic’s other

  points about Abitron’s downstream sales, none are convincing.

        According to Hetronic, “where a foreign entity sells to a foreigner with

  the expectation that the goods will be sold downstream in the United States,

  that sale is sufficiently domestic” under the Lanham Act. Suppl. Resp. Br. at

  11. We disagree. Products bound for the United States but sold abroad cannot

  premise a Lanham Act claim without some domestic conduct tying the sales to

  an infringing use of the mark in U.S. commerce. See Abitron, 600 U.S. at

  422–23. The Abitron majority made clear “that the infringing ‘use in

  commerce’ of a trademark creates the dividing line between foreign and

  domestic applications” of the Lanham Act. Id. at 428. Hetronic asks us to

  stretch that line to include allegedly infringing uses in the United States by

  other entities, mainly the OEMs’ sales to U.S. end-users. 17 Abitron doesn’t

  unexplained and unsupported arguments were waived for “inadequate
  briefing”).
        17
           For this argument, Hetronic’s supplemental brief relies almost
  exclusively on Justice Jackson’s concurrence, which we have established does
  not bind our analysis. The only other case Hetronic points us to is Yegiazaryan
  v. Smagin, 599 U.S. 533, 545 (2023), specifically for the Supreme Court’s
  observation that “courts should engage in a case-specific analysis that looks to
  the circumstances surrounding the injury.” Suppl. Resp. Br. at 11. But
  Yegiazaryan discussed the domestic-injury requirement for Lanham Act
  trademark infringement, not whether infringing acts by one foreign entity may
  impute liability onto another based on knowledge and intent; so Yegiazaryan is
  off-base. See 599 U.S. at 544. With that, we make no further comment on
  Hetronic’s claim that because Abitron “sold their knockoff goods knowing and
  intending that U.S. customers would later buy their products,” those sales
  become “domestic.” Suppl. Resp. Br. at 11.
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  support such an elastic interpretation of domestic infringing uses. The Abitron

  majority purposely confined the “ultimate question regarding permissible

  domestic application[s]” of the Lanham Act to “the location of the conduct

  relevant to the focus,” 600 U.S. at 422, because it worried that broadening the

  focus inquiry—as Justice Sotomayor envisioned—could allow “almost any

  claim involving exclusively foreign conduct [to] be repackaged as a ‘domestic

  application,’” id. at 425. Hetronic’s downstream-sales theory strikes us as the

  sort of “repackag[ing]” the majority sought to prevent. Id. Hetronic needs to

  keep its eye on the prize: Abitron’s infringement of Hetronic trademarks in

  U.S. commerce.

        Hetronic next asserts that the downstream sales create Lanham Act

  liability because Abitron “took steps to facilitate [the] sales” in the United

  States—namely, by obtaining FCC licenses and hiring a U.S.-based distributor.

  Suppl. Resp. Br. at 8. Had Abitron not taken these steps domestically, Hetronic

  argues, the OEMs would never have bought Abitron’s replicas because the

  spurious remotes could not have been resold in the United States.

        This argument resembles the Court’s “essential steps” reasoning from

  Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., where the Court determined that the “[defendant’s]

  activities, when viewed as a whole, f[ell] within the jurisdictional scope of the

  Lanham Act,” 344 U.S. at 285, because the defendant had taken “essential

  steps” in the United States “in the course of business consummated abroad” that

  infringed an American company’s trademarks, id. at 287. There, the defendant

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  bought component parts in the United States for the counterfeit watches that he

  produced and sold in Mexico. Id. at 286. Before Abitron, Steele was the go-to

  Supreme Court authority for Lanham Act extraterritoriality. But for a few

  reasons, the Abitron majority jettisoned Steele from the analysis. See Abitron,

  600 U.S. at 421–22.

        To start, the majority couched Steele as outdated because the Steele Court

  “understandably did not follow the two-step framework [for extraterritoriality]

  that [the Court] would develop decades later.” Id. at 422. Next, the Court cast

  Steele as “narrow and factbound” because there, the Court explained, “the

  defendant committed ‘essential steps’ in the course of his infringing conduct in

  the United States” and “his conduct was likely to and did cause consumer

  confusion in the United States.” Id. Steele’s “implicat[ing] both domestic

  conduct and a likelihood of domestic confusion” thwarted the Abitron Court’s

  ability to discern “which one determines the domestic applications of

  § 1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1).” Id. Because Steele couldn’t answer that

  essential question—whether Lanham Act extraterritoriality “turns on” domestic

  conduct or a likelihood of domestic confusion—the Court “put aside” Steele

  and approached the analysis anew under modern Supreme Court

  extraterritoriality precedents. Id. at 422; see id. at 422–23 (pulling from RJR

  and WesternGeco). Applying those authorities, the majority concluded that

  domestic conduct (not confusion) is the hallmark of Lanham Act

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  extraterritoriality. See id. at 423. Thus, the Supreme Court’s new conduct-

  focused framework exists completely separate from Steele.

        Hetronic’s contention that Abitron violated the Lanham Act by “t[aking]

  steps” in the United States “to facilitate” trademark infringement evokes

  Steele’s reasoning. 18 Suppl. Resp. Br. at 8. But post-Abitron, Steele no longer

  carries weight in the extraterritoriality analysis. By affirmatively “put[ting]

  aside” Steele, the majority eschewed everything Steele stood for: that any

  “essential steps” taken domestically to facilitate trademark infringement abroad

  subject infringers to Lanham Act liability. See Abitron, 600 U.S. at 422. Under

  Abitron, the Court now requires the defendant to have engaged in “specific

  action[s]” in U.S. commerce that violate the Act’s focus to trigger a domestic

  application of the Lanham Act. Id. at 423. That standard for domestic

  infringing conduct narrows what the Court set out in Steele.

        Under the Supreme Court’s new framework, we struggle to ascertain how

  Abitron’s acquiring FCC licenses, hiring a U.S. distributor, or repairing a

  broken part should count as infringing domestic conduct when none of those

  actions require using Hetronic trademarks in commerce. Cf. U.S. Surgical Corp.

  v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1208–09 (D. Kan. 1998) (rejecting the

        18
           Hetronic directly invokes Steele later in its brief to argue that Abitron
  “undertook the essential steps of their scheme in the United States,” which
  violated the Lanham Act. Suppl. Resp. Br. at 13. For example, Hetronic points
  out that Abitron entered into the distribution agreement with Hetronic in the
  United States. For the reasons explained in this section, we reject any of
  Hetronic’s arguments dependent on Steele and its “essential steps” reasoning.
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  plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s “conduct in receiving, reprocessing, and

  returning the instruments” constituted uses in commerce under the Lanham

  Act); Soc. Techs. LLC v. Apple Inc., 4 F.4th 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[U]se in

  commerce within the meaning of the Lanham Act requires use of a genuine

  character,” meaning a use “sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the

  marked goods in an appropriate segment of the public mind.” (citation

  omitted)). Like the “essential steps” in Steele, these behaviors strike us as

  merely intermediary or incidental to Abitron’s foreign infringement because

  none involve affixing Hetronic’s trademark to goods and introducing those

  goods into U.S. commerce by selling, advertising, marketing, or distributing

  them to American consumers. See §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1).

        Yet the U.S. distributor’s advertising at U.S. tradeshows or marketing

  Abitron’s infringing products online to U.S. customers would qualify as

  domestic infringing uses in commerce under Abitron. These activities fall into

  the same buckets of infringing conduct contemplated by the statute (selling,

  marketing, advertising, and distributing), and so these uses fit within the

  domestic reach of the Lanham Act.

        We conclude that Abitron’s downstream sales do not constitute infringing

  domestic conduct under the Lanham Act and neither do the steps that Abitron

  undertook in the United States merely to facilitate foreign infringement. But as

  established in Section II.A., supra, any activities that Abitron engaged in

  through its U.S. distributor to sell, market, advertise, or distribute infringing

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  goods to U.S. consumers do violate the Lanham Act. Having identified

  Abitron’s infringing conduct under the Supreme Court’s framework, we turn to

  the disgorgement calculation.

  III.   Disgorgement

         In the district court, the jury awarded Hetronic nearly $96 million in

  damages for the profits attributable to Abitron’s infringing domestic and

  foreign sales which, on appeal, we agreed were actionable under the Lanham

  Act. See Hetronic, 10 F.4th at 1027, 1043–46. But after Abitron, any portion of

  that disgorgement award based on Abitron’s foreign sales is improper,

  assuming those sales were unconnected to any infringing use of Hetronic

  trademarks in domestic commerce. See 600 U.S. at 423, 428.

         On that ground, Abitron argues that the Abitron ruling gouges “99%” of

  Hetronic’s disgorgement award because most of the award was granted under

  an impermissible extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act based on

  Abitron’s foreign sales. Suppl. Op. Br. at 1, 10. Hetronic disagrees and

  maintains that, even under the new decision, it can still properly disgorge a

  significant portion of Abitron’s foreign sales. In Hetronic’s view, Abitron

  misunderstands the disgorgement remedy by contending that “a sale to a

  foreign buyer could never justify disgorgement.” Suppl. Resp. Br. at 17. To the

  contrary, Hetronic asserts, the disgorgement award should account for

  Abitron’s foreign sales that flowed from its domestic infringing conduct, like

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  advertising. 19 Abitron doesn’t dispute this in theory, but it maintains that there

  is insufficient evidence in the record to tether its foreign sales to its infringing

  domestic conduct.

        We have established that Abitron’s infringing “uses in commerce”

  include its direct U.S. sales, marketing, advertising, and distributing that

  caused a likelihood of confusion among U.S. consumers. And we have rejected

  that Abitron’s selling to OEMs abroad can premise Lanham Act liability under

        19
           For support, Hetronic looks to the Supreme Court’s statement in
  WesternGeco that a “legal injury” differs from “the damages arising from that
  injury.” Suppl. Resp. Br. at 17 (quoting 585 U.S. at 417). From that
  observation, Hetronic suggests that so long as it can prove a domestic injury,
  then the foreign-sales profits arising from that injury would still be
  recoverable. But Hetronic walks a tightrope in applying WesternGeco to its
  own facts.
         In WesternGeco, the Court ruled that the petitioner’s recovering lost-
  profits damages from foreign sales was appropriate and not an extraterritorial
  application of the Patent Act because “it was [the defendant’s] domestic act of
  supplying the components that infringed [the plaintiff’s] patents,” thus the
  award for lost foreign sales was nevertheless based on a domestic injury. 585
  U.S. at 415–16. In so deciding, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that
  the Patent Act’s application became “extraterritorial” due to “overseas events”
  and “foreign conduct subsequent to [the] infringement.” Id. at 416. The Court
  found that the foreign conduct the defendant identified was “merely incidental
  to the infringement,” and so it lacked the “primacy” required “for purposes of
  the extraterritoriality analysis.” Id. (citation omitted).
         Hetronic poses virtually the same argument here but in the reverse.
  Rather than asserting that a domestic application of the Act is truly foreign,
  Hetronic insists that Abitron’s foreign sales transfigure into a domestic injury
  because of actions taken in the United States that culminated in foreign sales.
  Heeding the Court’s reasoning in WesternGeco, we caution that Hetronic
  cannot use “merely incidental” domestic conduct as a foothold for its Lanham
  Act claims. See id. Only Abitron’s foreign-sales profits that flowed directly
  from Hetronic’s domestic injuries, as prescribed under § 1114(1)(a) and
  § 1125(a)(1), may be recovered.
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  § 1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1), even if the OEMs later sold the infringing goods

  to U.S. end-users. Yet we conclude that, if Abitron’s foreign sales arose from

  domestic infringing conduct, then those profits represent the fruits of a

  domestic injury for which Hetronic may seek disgorgement. That said, to

  disgorge foreign-sales profits, Hetronic bears the burden of proving the

  connection between Abitron’s domestic infringing conduct and its foreign sales.

  So before remanding this matter to the district court, we address the parties’

  relative burdens of proof under the Lanham Act’s disgorgement remedy.

        A trademark owner who proves infringement under the Lanham Act is

  entitled to recover damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Under § 1117(a), “the

  registrant of a mark” “shall be entitled . . . to recover,” upon “a violation of any

  right” under the Act, “(1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the

  plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action,” “subject to the principles of equity.”

  As a “prerequisite to recover disgorgement of profits,” the plaintiff “must show

  either actual damages or willful action on the part of the defendant.” Klein-

  Becker USA, LLC v. Englert, 711 F.3d 1153, 1161 (10th Cir. 2013). Because

  the jury found that Abitron had willfully infringed Hetronic trademarks,

  Hetronic’s right to recover Abitron’s ill-gotten profits is not in question. What

  remains to be determined is the amount of profits Hetronic may disgorge.

        To account for the profits subject to disgorgement, § 1117(a) institutes a

  burden-shifting scheme under which the plaintiff bears the initial burden to

  “prove the defendant’s sales only,” before “the burden shifts to the defendant,”

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  who must then “prove which portion of the sales are not attributable to the

  [infringing goods].” Vitamins Online, Inc. v. Heartwise, Inc., 71 F.4th 1222,

  1244 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted); accord Dewberry Eng’rs Inc. v.

  Dewberry Grp., Inc., 77 F.4th 265, 292 (4th Cir. 2023) (“A ‘plaintiff . . . is not

  entitled to profits demonstrably not attributable to the unlawful use of his

  mark.” (quoting Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316

  U.S. 203, 206 (1942))).

        To satisfy its burden, the plaintiff must identify the “total sales” that

  resulted “from the [defendant’s] infringing activity with reasonable certainty.”

  Klein-Becker, 711 F.3d at 1163 (citation omitted). To pass “reasonable

  certainty,” the plaintiff must show more than the defendant’s gross revenues,

  though an estimation of infringed profits based on gross revenues is sufficient.

  See Max Rack, Inc. v. Core Health & Fitness, LLC, 40 F.4th 454, 472 (6th Cir.

  2022) (recalling Judge Posner’s observation that a plaintiff must do more than

  adduce an infringer’s “corporate income tax return in the record and rest [its]

  case for an award of infringer’s profits” (quoting Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d

  1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983))); see also Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1120, 1122

  (discussing the analogous calculation for profits recoverable to victims of

  copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)); see also,

  e.g., Est. of Bishop v. Equinox Int’l Corp., 256 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1057 (10th

  Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s disgorgement award based on the

  defendant’s total gross profits during the infringement period, along with an

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  estimation of “the net profit attributable to its [infringing] products for the

  relevant time period”); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Odetallah, No. 21-00322, 2022 WL

  17475784, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 6, 2022) (concluding that the plaintiff

  “carried its burden in calculating the proper award of profits” by using the

  defendant’s spreadsheet “containing sales projections and profit forecasting” to

  estimate the profits attributable to the infringement), appeal dismissed for lack

  of jurisdiction, No. 22-6167, 2022 WL 19404932 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2022).

  Above all, the plaintiff needs to “show some connection between the identified

  ‘sales’ and the alleged infringement.” Vitamins Online, 71 F.4th at 1244

  (emphasis added) (quoting Max Rack, 40 F.4th at 472). Said differently, the

  plaintiff must show that the defendant’s sales were “proximately caused” by the

  infringement. 20 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S.

  118, 132 (2014); see id. at 140 (holding that the respondent could not “obtain

  relief” under § 1125(a) “without evidence of injury proximately caused by [the

  petitioner’s] alleged misrepresentations”); see also Atlas Biologicals, Inc. v.

  Kutrubes, No. 19-1404, 2022 WL 2840484, at *4 (10th Cir. 2022)

  (unpublished) (“As the Supreme Court has explained, Lanham Act liability

        20
           At oral argument, Hetronic agreed that it bears the burden to prove a
  “plausible connection” between Abitron’s domestic infringing conduct and the
  foreign sales, which we assume refers to the same proximate-cause requirement
  discussed in Lanham Act caselaw. Hetronic bears the burden to show proximate
  causation by a preponderance of the evidence. See World Wide Ass’n of
  Specialty Programs v. Pure, Inc., 450 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting
  that every element of a Lanham Act claim must be proved by a preponderance
  of the evidence).
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  requires a showing of proximate cause.”). So any monetary relief that Hetronic

  receives must share a causal nexus with Abitron’s domestic conduct that used

  Hetronic trademarks in commerce. See Vitamins Online, 71 F.4th at 1242

  (affirming the plaintiff’s disgorgement award based on a demonstrated “nexus

  between the false advertising and the lost sales”). Hetronic insists that it can

  meet its burden on the existing record. As neither side has requested a new trial

  on the Lanham Act claims, the parties are limited to the existing factual record

  on remand. Yet the parties may put on limited opinion evidence as necessary

  for the district court to interpret which of Abitron’s domestic activities meet

  the infringing “uses in commerce” threshold, in light of Abitron and this

  revised opinion.

        Lastly, Hetronic requests that “in fashioning relief,” the district court

  should “take into account various other forms of compensation” that Hetronic

  “declined to pursue,” including “attorney’s fees and treble damages.” Suppl.

  Resp. Br. at 17–18. We take no stance on this issue. As Hetronic says, it

  “declined to pursue” these remedies in the district court. Id. See generally

  Proposed Final Judgment, Hetronic Int’l, Inc. v. Hetronic Ger. GmbH, No. 14-

  CV-00650 (W.D. Okla. May 18, 2020), ECF No. 454, Ex. 1. But even if it had,

  § 1117(a) “gives [the] district court discretion to award treble damages,”

  United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1236 (10th

  Cir. 2000) (discussing § 1117(a)), and to award reasonable attorneys’ fees “in

  exceptional cases,” Xlear, Inc. v. Focus Nutrition, LLC, 893 F.3d 1227, 1236

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  (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting § 1117(a)). We don’t need to bestow on the district

  court discretionary authority it already possesses by statute.

  IV.   Scope of Injunctive Relief

        On our first go-round in this case, we narrowed the district court’s

  worldwide injunction to “the countries in which Hetronic currently markets or

  sells its products.” Hetronic, 10 F.4th at 1047. On remand, Abitron insists that

  we must further narrow the injunction to Abitron’s activities exclusively within

  U.S. borders. Abitron asserts that “[b]ecause only a mark’s use in commerce in

  the United States could constitute a ‘violation’ of the Act,” we must limit

  Hetronic’s injunctive relief to uses of the mark “in this country.” Suppl. Op.

  Br. at 15–16. By the same token, Abitron asks that we order the district court to

  vacate the sanctions imposed for its “putative violations” of the injunction. Id.

  at 16. Hetronic requests that any injunction issued by this court or the district

  court “be framed sufficiently broadly” to capture “any [of Abitron’s] infringing

  domestic conduct.” Suppl. Resp. Br. at 18.

        The Lanham Act empowers the district court to grant injunctive relief “to

  prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark.” 15 U.S.C.

  § 1116(a). As we’ve established above, Hetronic’s rights were violated when

  Abitron used Hetronic trademarks in U.S. commerce through its domestic sales,

  marketing, advertising, and distribution. This list of Abitron’s injurious

  conduct sketches the outer limit for the injunctive relief permitted by

  § 1116(a). In terms of the injunction’s geographical scope, we agree with

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  Abitron that any permanent injunction issued against it cannot extend beyond

  Abitron’s qualifying domestic conduct. We remand to the district court to

  modify the permanent injunction in accordance with that view.

  V.    State-Law Claims

        The jury found for Hetronic on several state-law claims. Abitron never

  appealed this portion of the verdict. Yet, on rehearing, Abitron asserts what we

  construe as akin to an objection under Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 403: the

  jury heard “reams of irrelevant evidence about [Abitron’s] foreign conduct” for

  the Lanham Act claims that tainted its ability to adjudicate the state-law claims.

  Suppl. Op. Br. at 16, 17. Given the “spillover prejudice” from this allegedly

  irrelevant evidence, Abitron insists that a new trial is warranted on these

  claims. Id. at 18.

        Abitron concedes that it failed to bring this evidentiary issue to our

  attention last time, despite every opportunity to do so. 21 See First W. Cap.

  Mgmt. Co. v. Malamed, 874 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen a party

  presents a new argument on appeal and fails to request plain error review, we

  do not address it.”). Likewise, it declined to challenge in the Supreme Court the

        21
            In its opening brief filed during the original appeal, Abitron requested
  relief in the form of “a reversal and remand for retrial of the breach of contract
  judgments and the 5 tort claims,” based on the district court’s alleged error in
  “excluding [Abitron’s] evidence of ‘belief of ownership’” of Hetronic’s IP. Op.
  Br. at 54 ¶ 3. That basis for a retrial differs from the one that Abitron raises
  now, so its current argument is not preserved.
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  relief granted under the state-law claims. Abitron, 600 U.S. at 446 n.9. This

  argument is waived.

                                  CONCLUSION

        Beyond the Lanham Act ruling, we see no conflict between our prior

  opinion in this case and the Supreme Court’s decision in Abitron. Accordingly,

  all other aspects of our prior opinion apart from its Lanham Act discussion are

  reinstated. We also affirm the district court’s final judgment on the state-law

  breach-of-contract and tort claims. As for Hetronic’s federal claims under the

  Lanham Act and the associated remedies, we remand the case to the district

  court for further proceedings consistent with this revised opinion.

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