Court Opinion

ID: 9710936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:21:04.173435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.202363
License: Public Domain

R. B. Burns, P. J.
Defendant appeals his conviction by jury of delivery of heroin, MCLA 335.341; MSA 18.1070(41).
The circumstances surrounding defendant’s arrest involved the alleged sale by defendant and a codefendant of seven "dime packets” of heroin to a state police trooper. The defense was mainly established through the codefendant’s testimony that she was not at the residence in question, and that she did not take part in any drug sale. Defendant did not testify.
In rebuttal of this testimony, plaintiff offered into evidence a tape recording that purported to contain an on-the-scene conversation between defendant, codefendant, and the officer which tended to establish that the offense had been committed. Defense counsel timely objected on numerous grounds to the admission of this tape, and these objections are renewed on appeal.
We first note that the trial court did not err in not suppressing the tape recording for failure to obtain a warrant. People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554; 227 NW2d 511 (1975), while validating defendant’s contention, was expressly given prospective effect "and applies [only] to police conduct occurring after its release, People v Livingston, 64 Mich App 247; 236 NW2d 63 (1975)”. People v Jack Crawford, 66 Mich App 738, 740; 239 NW2d 734, 735 (1976).
We agree with defendant, however, that the admission of the tape as rebuttal testimony amounted to prejudicial error on the facts of this *300case. Michigan courts have traditionally forbidden the prosecution to manipulate its case for the greatest impact on the jury:
"[I]t is not proper to divide up the testimony on which the people propose to rest their case, and nothing which tends to prove the commission of the crime itself or its immediate surroundings can be classed as rebutting evidence under ordinary circumstances, if at all”. People v Quick, 58 Mich 321, 323; 25 NW 302 (1885).
Rebuttal evidence has been broadly defined as evidence introduced "by one party to contradict, repel, explain or disprove evidence produced by the other party and tending directly to weaken or impeach the same”. People v Utter, 217 Mich 74, 83; 185 NW 830, 834 (1921).
It is arguable that the substance of the tape constituted proper rebuttal evidence as it introduced nothing new about the circumstances surrounding the crime and was used to impeach the testimony of the codefendant through her prior inconsistent statements as contained on the tape. However, "Michigan has long held that it is necessary to lay a foundation for proof of prior inconsistent statements”. Ebel v Saginaw County Board of Road Commissioners, 386 Mich 598, 608; 194 NW2d 365, 369 (1972). The proper foundational format was approved in Scholnick v Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 187, 195; 86 NW2d 324, 328 (1957):
" 'The witness whose credibility is at stake must be asked as to whether he made a certain statement or statements, clearly indicating what they were, in connection with a designated matter, in such manner as to pin his attention to the proposed contradiction and give him a chance to admit, deny or explain it.’ ” (Citation omitted.)
*301The purpose of this rule "is to avoid surprise of the witness to be impeached”. People v Gunne (On Rehearing), 66 Mich App 318, 320; 239 NW2d 603, 604 (1976).
The transcript of trial clearly reveals that plaintiff did not follow the proper procedure, and further reveals that the introduction of the tape was a complete surprise to the defense. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction.
Another of defendant’s allegations of error requires elaboration because of the possibility that the question may arise on retrial and because of the advisability of calling an anomalous statutory provision to the attention of the bench and bar.
The trial judge instructed the jury that it could reach three possible verdicts: guilty of delivery of heroin; guilty of possession of heroin; or not guilty. Defense counsel timely excepted to the failure of the judge to instruct on certain other requested verdicts, among them "attempted delivery of heroin”.
It is necessary to observe that there can be no crime of "attempted delivery of heroin” in Michigan. The relevant section of the Controlled Substances Act, MCLA 335.304; MSA 18.1070(4), defines "delivery” as "the actual, constructive or attempted transfer from 1 person to another of a controlled substance”. (Emphasis added.) By the express and unequivocal language of this section, the Legislature has seen fit to merge attempt with the completed offense.
Additionally, the general attempt statute, MCLA 750.92; MSA 28.287, is inapplicable. The statute expressly recites that it only applies "when no express provision is made by law for the punishment of such attempt”. In MCLA 335.304; MSA 18.1070(4) such a provision has been made; thus, *302"attempted delivery” of a controlled substance is a non sequitur. See People v Richard Banks, 51 Mich App 685; 216 NW2d 461 (1974).
One further issue requires comment. Defendant now complains about the admission of polygraph evidence into the record at trial upon stipulation of the parties.
People v Frechette, 380 Mich 64, 68; 155 NW2d 830, 832 (1968), holds as follows: "There can be no doubt at present that in this jurisdiction the results of lie-detector tests are inadmissible.” Stone v Earp, 331 Mich 606, 611; 50 NW2d 172, 174 (1951), was just as unmistakable in the specific context of polygraph stipulations:
"We are not unmindful of the fact that at the direction of the trial court, the parties agreed to submit to the tests, but whether by voluntary agreement, court direction, or coercion, the results of such tests do not attain the stature of competent evidence.”
These cases are still the law in Michigan.
For the reason previously enumerated, prejudicial rebuttal testimony, defendant’s conviction is reversed.
Quinn, J., concurred.