Court Opinion

ID: 9702273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:04:32.037086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:36.069901
License: Public Domain

GLASSMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
In light of the strict standard of proof required to terminate parental rights and the inconclusive evidence presented in this case, I must respectfully dissent. It is well established that a mother’s right to the care and custody of her children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution and article I, section 6-A of our state constitution. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Danforth v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, *335800 (Me.1973).1 The commanding nature of the parental interest and the permanent consequences of the termination of parental rights led the United States Supreme Court to conclude that proof in these proceedings must at a minimum be by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 758-770, 102 S.Ct. at 1397-1404.
In this case the District Court, by its order dated December 11, 1986, found that Lori was unwilling or unable to protect her children from jeopardy and these circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the needs of the children. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(b)(i) (Supp.1986). “Jeopardy” as defined in 22 M.R.S.A. § 4002(6) (Supp.1986) means:
[S]erious abuse or neglect, as evidenced by:
A. Serious harm or threat of serious harm;
B. Deprivation of adequate food, clothing, shelter, supervision or care, including health care when that deprivation causes a threat of serious harm; or
C. Abandonment of the child or absence of any person responsible for the child, which creates a threat of serious harm; or
D. The end of voluntary placement, when the imminent return of the child to his custodian causes a threat of serious harm.
The jeopardy finding was primarily based on a violent outburst in April 1985 directed at Lori’s boyfriend, television set and automobile. Lori’s anger was not directed at her children, nor were they endangered. Based on this evidence I do not believe that the District Court reasonably could have been persuaded that it was proved to be “highly probable” Lori’s children were subject to “serious harm or threat of serious harm” from future outbursts within the meaning of 22 M.R.S.A. § 4002(6)(A). See In re John Joseph V., 500 A.2d 628, 629 (Me.1985). Far from being highly probable, any future threat to the children posed by Lori’s temper is highly speculative.2
The finding of jeopardy might also have been based on neglect. The only evidence in this regard was that Misty had poor teeth and “looked neglected” according to the foster mother, whose background and standards for comparison are unknown. There was no evidence that Jessica was neglected, except that her hair was “drab.” The evidence did not constitute clear and convincing proof that either girl had been abandoned or deprived of “food, clothing, shelter, supervision or care.” 22 M.R.S.A. § 4002(6)(B) and (C).
The District court also found as an alternative ground for termination that Lori failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(b)(iv). This finding appears to be based on Lori’s resistance to addressing “her childhood issues” and to engaging in “meaningful psychotherapy.” 3 The record shows that Lori *336made significant progress since the first DHS intervention in May 1981, when she was only sixteen years of age. Lori attended counseling sessions and was genuinely interested in making a secure home for her children. The State offered no proof that exploring Lori’s childhood was directly related to the State’s interest in ensuring Lori’s fitness as a parent. The record as a whole does not show clearly or convincingly that Lori failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with her children. Moreover, conditioning Lori’s fundamental right as a mother on “meaningful psychotherapy” required the District Court to abdicate its role adjudicating constitutional rights to experts who practice that uncertain art. This reliance on experts at almost every stage of termination proceedings increases the ever present risk that such proceedings are vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 763, 102 S.Ct. at 1400.
Although the children’s interest alone does not justify termination, I also address the District Court’s finding that termination of Lori’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(a). The District Court and now this court find support for this conclusion in the evidence of “violence” and “physical neglect.” Those powerful words provide more heat than light. The court is simply again relying on the single violent outburst in April 1985, which was not directed at the children, and the evidence concerning Misty’s teeth. There was no evidence that Jessica had been neglected. The court also relies on the opinion of an expert, who had never observed Lori and the children together, that the children’s interests would be best served by permanent placement as soon as possible. The decision to terminate Lori’s parental rights did little to advance this interest. The court recited in its order that termination of Lori’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children because of “their strong attachment to their foster family instead of their mother” and “the need for a safe, loving, nurturing and stable home environment.” The foster parents, however, testified they were not willing to adopt the children, and a DHS caseworker testified that it might take one or two years before such adoption could be completed. Accordingly, the children faced continued uncertainty while adoptive parents were found and thoroughly investigated. See 19 M.R.S.A. § 533 (Supp.1986). The absence of a permanent plan for the children’s care points up the State’s lack of a compelling interest in protecting the two girls from further reunification efforts with their mother. The State should be required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the consequences in harm to the children of allowing the parent-child relationship to continue are more severe than the consequences of termination of that relationship. See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F.Supp. 10, 23-24 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976). Here, the State not only failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the children would be harmed by a continuing relationship with their mother, it failed to demonstrate that the consequences of continuation of the parent-child relationship would be more harmful to the children than its termination.
I would vacate the judgment of the District Court.

. The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the ninth amendment, and the right to privacy. See cases collected in Danforth v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d at 796-97; Roe v. Conn, 417 F.Supp. 769, 777 (M.D.Ala.1976).

. In adopting the elevated standard of proof in a parental rights termination proceeding, the Supreme Court stated this "would alleviate ‘the possible risk that a factfinder might decide to [deprive] an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] ... idiosyncratic behavior. Increasing the burden of proof is one way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that inappropriate’ terminations will be ordered." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 764-65, 102 S.Ct. at 1400-01 (citation omitted) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1810, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)).

.Lori was a foster child from the age of 22 months.
On December 30, 1985, Lori and the Department signed a Service Agreement providing, inter alia, the following recommendations in regard to individual counseling of Lori:
1. Recognizing your ambivalence and dependency needs
2. Trusting your therapist
3. Reviewing your life
4. Resolving your sadness and anger
5. Learn how to express your anger appropriately