Court Opinion

ID: 9752870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:40:55.334584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:47:20.783847
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I am in complete accord with the views expressed in this matter by Mr. Justice Flaherty writing in dissent and join that opinion. Although not expressly stated, the federal constitutional provision clearly guarantees a face-to-face confrontation; notwithstanding, it does not graphically express that protection by the use of the phrase, “face-to-face,” as does the Pennsylvania Constitution. Moreover, the attempt by the majority to latch upon this stylistic difference in the two provisions as a basis to support the *482contention that our state constitutional provision provides an absolute right of confrontation is not only superficial but is indeed demonstrably incorrect.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution specifically mandates that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him____” U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. VI. The United States Supreme Court has noted that both a literal interpretation of this language and reference to its historical origins yield the conclusion that the Confrontation Clause requires face-to-face confrontation. Maryland v. Craig, — U.S.-,-, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3165, 111 L.Ed.2d 666, 677 (1990). There has never been any doubt that the right guaranteed is that which enables a criminal defendant to directly face his accusers in front of a fact-finding body. See id. See also Idaho v. Wright, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). The absence of the specific words, “face-to-face,” has not been a significant obstacle to this interpretation. The Supreme Court has stated that the clause envisions
a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face-to-face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Mattox v. United States, supra, at 242-243, 15 S.Ct. at 339-340. Thus even in absence of the explicit language the right to face-to-face confrontation has been vigorously defended. Nevertheless, instances have been recognized where competing interests, “if closely examined,” have war*483ranted dispensing with confrontation at trial. Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 64, 100 S.Ct. at 2538. As the Court noted in Mattox, supra, “general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243, 15 S.Ct. at 340. This approach led the Court to uphold as constitutional a Maryland statute which establishes a closed-circuit procedure identical to that used in the instant matter. See Maryland v. Craig, supra. Thus the issue herein presented would not be cognizable under the federal constitution.
Clearly, the federal constitution reflects no less strong a preference for face-to-face confrontation than does our state constitution. The presence of the words “face-to-face” in our state’s confrontation clause is merely a stylistic difference; the substantive right protected is identical to that found in the Sixth Amendment.1 Indeed, our analysis of the state’s confrontation clause has mirrored that employed in interpreting the federal constitution. While recognizing the accused’s right to confrontation under that provision, we nevertheless have carved out exceptions in certain circumstances, recognizing that the right is not *484absolute. See Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 322 A.2d 653 (1974). The majority’s assertion that face-to-face confrontation is mandatory in all circumstances, rather than just preferential, see op. at 478-479, is undercut by its recognition of those exceptions previously adopted. If the concern for face-to-face confrontation were as “emphatic” and unyielding as the majority seems to suggest, any hearsay exception would run afoul of the state constitution. See Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 63, 100 S.Ct. at 2537. Even the majority concedes that this result is not intended. Op. at 479.
The majority’s insistence that the policies underlying the adoption of hearsay exceptions are not present in the instant case is plainly ludicrous. The policy furthered by the various hearsay exceptions is that of saving the prosecution’s case when a live witness is, for whatever reason, unavailable to testify. See generally McCormick on Evidence, §§ 246, 253 (3d. Ed.) This policy certainly cannot be accorded greater importance than that of protecting the psychological well-being of a minor of tender years who claims to have been abused. Clearly the Commonwealth has an interest in the healthy development of its children, an interest that provides ample justification for the relatively minor curtailment of defendant’s right to confrontation. Moreover, any implicit suggestion by the majority that the testimony in this case did not carry the “indicia of reliability,” see Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 2538-39, to justify an exception to the confrontation requirement must be rejected in light of the fact that the testimony, with the sole exception of the use of the closed-circuit equipment, was given in exactly the same manner as if the witness had been in the courtroom. The defendant was able to fully cross-examine the witness; it therefore can be argued that the testimony of the child bore even greater “guarantees of trustworthiness,” see id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539, than would the statement of, for example, a co-conspirator or a decedent whose statement has not been tested through the adversarial process.
*485In view of our traditionally flexible approach to confrontation clause problems, I would embrace the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig, supra, as being consistent with our prior interpretation of the right to confrontation under both the federal and state constitutions. The procedure sanctioned in Craig permits the closed-circuit testimony of a child witness upon a finding by the judge that live testimony by the child will result in “the child suffering severe emotional distress, such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.” Craig, Id. — U.S. at -, n. 1, 110 S.Ct. at 3161, n. 1, 111 L.Ed.2d at 675 n. 1. Under the Maryland statute, the child’s testimony is given in front of the attorneys for both sides and any person who contributes to the well-being of the child, with the testimony transmitted via closed-circuit television into the courtroom, where the defendant and the judge are to be present. Id. All other elements of the confrontation right are preserved. Id. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 3166-67, 111 L.Ed.2d at 682. This procedure is identical to that employed in the instant case; indeed, the same procedure has been codified by our state legislature. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985(a).2
The Supreme Court found that the use of the one-way closed-circuit procedure, where necessary to further an im*486portant state interest, did not impinge upon the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Maryland v. Craig, supra, at -, 110 S.Ct. at 3166-67, 111 L.Ed.2d at 682. In ascertaining whether an important state interest was furthered, the Court noted that the state’s compelling interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficient to outweigh, in some cases, a defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation. Id.3 Accordingly, the Court stated the following:
[W]e hold that, if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.
The requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one: the trial court must hear evidence and determine whether use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify. See Globe Newspaper Co. [v. Superior Court], 457 U.S. [596], at 608-609 [102 S.Ct. 2613, at 2620-2622, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982)] (compelling interest in protecting child victims does not justify a mandatory trial closure rule); Coy, 487 U.S., at 1021 [108 S.Ct. at 2803]; id., at 1025 [108 S.Ct. at 2805] (concurring opinion); see also Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.App.3d 777, 793, 208 Cal.Rptr. 273, 283 (1984). The trial court must also find that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Wilhite, 160 Ariz. 228, 772 P.2d 582 (1989); State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 554 A.2d 277 (1989); State v. Davidson, 764 S.W.2d 731 (Mo.App.1989); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa.Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987). *487Denial of face-to-face confrontation is not needed to further the state interest in protecting the child witness from trauma unless it is the presence of the defendant that causes the trauma. In other words, if the state interest were merely the interest in protecting child witnesses from courtroom trauma generally, denial of face-to-face confrontation would be unnecessary because the child could be permitted to testify in less intimidating surroundings, albeit with the defendant present. Finally, the trial court must find that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more than “mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify,” Wildermuth [v. State], 310 Md. [496], at 524, 530 A.2d [275], at 289 (1987)]; see also State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 511-512, 57 P. 542, 543-544 (1899).
Id. — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 3169, 111 L.Ed.2d at 685.
In the instant case the evidence is more than sufficient to justify the finding of necessity. When interviewed an hour before the preliminary hearing the five-year old victim was able to describe in detail the sexual acts which had been committed upon her by her father, yet at the preliminary hearing she was unable to remember or respond to any questions relating to the incident. The victim was subsequently examined by Dr. Chupella, who testified that she had suffered “emotional freezing” in the presence of her father, and that she might be permanently traumatized if she were required again to testify in the physical presence of her father. Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa.Super. 361, 371, 531, A.2d 459, 464 (1987). This evidence meets the standards set forth in Craig, such that a finding of necessity could be made which would justify use of the closed-circuit procedure.
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Superior Court.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Of interest is the discussion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, whose state constitution also guarantees the defendant the right to meet the witnesses “face-to-face.” In Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky.1986), the Court said:
There is no constitutional right to eyeball to eyeball confrontation. The choice of the words “face to face” may have resulted from an inability to foresee technological developments permitting cross-examination and confrontation without physical presence.
In the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, live testimony was the only way that a jury could observe the demeanor of a witness. The use of video tapes does not represent a significant departure from that tradition because the goal of providing a view of the witness’s demeanor to the jury is still achieved.
The intervention of a video screen or a one-way mirror does not infringe upon the defendant’s right to confrontation. There is a difference between confrontation and intimidation. It would be unconstitutional for the government to take evidence in secret and outside of the presence of the defendant, but there is no right to eyeball to eyeball presence.
Id. at 230-231. (Emphasis added.)

. § 5985. Testimony by closed-circuit television
(a) Closed-circuit television. — The child victim or material witness, through his parent or guardian, or, where applicable, the child’s advocate or the attorney for the Commonwealth may move, for good cause shown, that the testimony of a child be taken in a room other than the courtroom and televised by closed-circuit equipment to be viewed; by the court and the finder of fact in the proceeding. Only the attorneys for the defendant and for the Commonwealth, the court reporter, the judge, persons necessary to operate the equipment and any person whose presence would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child, including persons designated under section 5983 (relating to rights and services), may be present in the room with the child during his testimony. The court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the child in person but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant. The court shall make certain that the defendant and defense counsel have adequate opportunity to communicate for the purposes of providing an effective defense. Examination and cross-examination of the child shall proceed in the same manner as permitted at trial.

. Significantly, Pennsylvania was among those states whose statutes were cited as evidence of the widespread belief in the importance of protecting child abuse victims. See Maryland v. Craig, — U.S.-, -, n. 2, 110 S.Ct. 31572167-68 n. 2, 111 L.Ed.2d 666, 683 n. 2 (1990).