Court Opinion

ID: 9957030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 15:06:38.88976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:03.206648
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                      Docket No. 50765-2023

 STATE OF IDAHO,                                      )
                                                      )
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                            )      Boise, December 2023 Term
                                                      )
 v.                                                   )      Opinion filed: April 3, 2024
                                                      )
 KENNETH RICHARD ROSE, JR.,                           )      Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
                                                      )
      Defendant-Respondent.                           )
                                                      )

         Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
         Kootenai County. Richard S. Christensen, District Judge.

         The district court’s Order Suspending Execution of Modified Judgment and
         Sentence is vacated.

         Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Appellant. Mark Olson
         argued.

         Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Respondent.
         Kimberly Coster argued.

ZAHN, Justice.
         This appeal concerns whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider a motion for
reduction of sentence made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) following the conclusion of a
direct appeal. Kenneth Richard Rose, Jr., entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of felony
aggravated driving under the influence. The district court sentenced Rose to six years in prison,
with one year fixed. However, the district judge indicated at Rose’s sentencing hearing that it
would revisit Rose’s sentence after his direct appeal and then stayed the execution of Rose’s
sentence, citing Idaho Criminal Rule 38.
         Following the issuance of the remittitur at the conclusion of Rose’s direct appeal, the
district court held a status conference and indicated that Rose’s case needed to be set for
sentencing. The State objected, arguing that Rose had already been sentenced and the district court
did not have jurisdiction to modify his sentence. Rose then moved the district court for a reduction
of sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b). The district court concluded that, because execution of Rose’s
sentence was stayed pending appeal, Rose’s Rule 35(b) motion was timely. The district court
granted Rose’s Rule 35(b) motion and modified Rose’s sentence. The State appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. The State then filed a petition for review with this Court,
which we granted. We hold that the district court did not have jurisdiction to modify Rose’s
sentence because his Rule 35(b) motion was untimely.
                  I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In July 2016, Rose was driving on Clagstone Road in Kootenai County when he crossed
over the centerline and struck a vehicle head on. Rose and the victim suffered severe injuries. A
forensic report of Rose’s blood revealed that his blood alcohol content was .107 at the time of the
crash, and marijuana and drug paraphernalia were found on his person by hospital staff. The State
charged Rose with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs pursuant to
Idaho Code section 18-8006, and possession of a controlled substance pursuant to Idaho Code
section 37-2732(c)(3).
       In March 2017, Rose pleaded not guilty to both counts and filed a motion to suppress the
blood results and evidence of marijuana. The district court denied Rose’s motion to suppress the
blood test results but granted his motion to suppress the evidence of marijuana. Rose then entered
an Alford plea conditioned on his right to appeal the district court’s decision denying his motion
to suppress. The State dismissed the possession of controlled substance charge in exchange for
Rose’s guilty plea.
       At Rose’s sentencing in December 2017, the district court imposed a six-year unified
prison sentence with one year fixed, but stayed execution of Rose’s sentence pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 38 pending the outcome of his appeal. The district court opined that it could “take
up any change of circumstances that have advanced between now and the time that [the] appeal is
resolved.” On December 18, 2017, the district court entered a written judgment and sentence. The
judgment imposed the six-year unified sentence pronounced at the sentencing hearing and also
suspended execution of the judgment and sentence pursuant to Rule 38, pending the determination
of Rose’s appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed Rose’s conviction and the
denial of his motion to suppress. See generally State v. Rose, No. 45751, 2020 WL 4207395 (Idaho
Ct. App. Jul. 22, 2020) (unpublished). The remittitur was issued on March 3, 2021.

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        Shortly thereafter, the district court held a status conference and indicated that Rose’s case
needed to be set for sentencing. The judge assigned to the case at that time was different than the
judge who originally sentenced Rose. The State opposed scheduling the case for sentencing,
arguing that Rose had already been sentenced prior to his appeal, but the district court set a status
conference and told the parties to be prepared for sentencing. The State filed a motion to vacate
the status conference, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify Rose’s sentence.
On June 15, 2021, prior to the status conference and 104 days after the remittitur was issued in
Rose’s direct appeal, Rose moved the district court to reduce his sentence pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35(b).
        At the hearing on Rose’s Rule 35(b) motion, the district court concluded that Rose’s motion
was timely because the execution of his sentence was stayed pending appeal under Rule 38. After
listening to the audio tape from the earlier sentencing hearing, the second judge observed that the
original sentencing judge intended to revisit the sentence upon remand. The district court then
granted Rose’s Rule 35(b) motion. The district court kept the originally imposed sentence of one
year fixed plus five years indeterminate, for a unified sentence of six years, but suspended the
sentence and placed Rose on probation for four years. The district court further ordered that Rose
be under house arrest for eighteen months. The district court then entered an “Order Suspending
Execution of Modified Judgment and Sentence.” The State timely appealed the district court’s
order suspending Rose’s sentence. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. The State then filed a
petition for review with this Court, which we granted.
                                  II.   STANDARDS OF REVIEW
        “In cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of a Court of Appeals
decision, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly
reviews the decision of the lower court.” State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 97, 439 P.3d 1267, 1269
(2019) (citation omitted). “This Court thus acts as if the case were on direct appeal from the district
court.” Id. (citation omitted).
        “[T]his Court exercises free review over questions of law.” State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho
768, 770, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016) (citation omitted). “Jurisdiction is . . . a question of law and is
reviewed de novo.” Id. (citation omitted). “The interpretation of a court rule is a question of law
that this Court freely reviews.” State v. Singh, 171 Idaho 685, 688, 525 P.3d 723, 726 (2023)
(citation omitted).

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                                       III.    ANALYSIS
A. The district court lacked jurisdiction to modify Rose’s sentence.
        Resolution of this appeal turns on the proper application of Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b)
when execution of a sentence is stayed pending appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that Rule
35(b) places a limit on a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction to modify a sentence after it has
been imposed. E.g., State v. Brown, 170 Idaho 439, 444, 511 P.3d 859, 864 (2022); State v. Hall,
170 Idaho 640, 646–47, 515 P.3d 727, 733–34 (2022).
        The State argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Rose’s Rule 35(b)
motion because he filed the motion in June 2021, which was more than 120 days after the district
court entered its judgment imposing his sentence in 2017. Rose counters that the district court’s
judgment stayed the execution of his sentence, which in turn extended the district court’s
jurisdiction to consider his Rule 35(b) motion. Rose argues that his motion was timely because
Rose filed his motion within 120 days after his appeal concluded. The parties’ arguments require
us to analyze Rule 35(b) to determine when the 120-day timeframe began to run.
        This Court’s approach to interpreting court rules is similar to our approach to statutory
interpretation. Valentine v. Valentine, 169 Idaho 621, 627, 500 P.3d 514, 520 (2021). Our analysis
begins with the language of the rule, read according to its “plain, obvious and rational meaning.”
Id. (quoting Kelly v. Kelly, 165 Idaho 716, 724, 451 P.3d 429, 437 (2019)). The rule should be
considered as a whole, and we give effect to all the words and provisions so that none will be void,
superfluous, or redundant. State v. Singh, 171 Idaho 685, 688, 525 P.3d 723, 726 (2023) (quoting
Pentico v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 169 Idaho 840, 844, 504 P.3d 376, 380 (2022)).
        However, when interpreting our own rules, we are “not constrained by the constitutional
separation of powers” that require adherence to the plain language of a statute regardless of the
result. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 44, 408 P.3d 38, 42 (2017). Accordingly, we construe
a court rule in keeping with its purpose. Id. The Idaho Criminal Rules are “intended to provide for
the just determination of every criminal proceeding” and “must be construed to secure simplicity
in procedure, fairness in administration and elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” I.C.R.
2(a).
        We recently analyzed the plain language of Rule 35(b) and its effect on a district court’s
subject matter jurisdiction in Brown. 170 Idaho 439, 511 P.3d 859. There, we were called upon to
interpret Rule 35(b) to determine whether the “one motion limit” in that rule deprives a district

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court of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. We began by explaining that the “Idaho Constitution
confers general jurisdiction on Idaho district courts to hear all cases in law and equity.” Id. at 443,
511 P.3d at 863 (citations omitted). “Once a district court acquires subject matter and personal
jurisdiction over a criminal defendant, the court’s ‘jurisdiction continues until extinguished by
some event.’” Id. at 443–44, 511 P.3d at 863–64 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 6, 368
P.3d 621, 626 (2016)). One such event is when a district court issues a judgment of conviction that
imposes a sentence rather than suspending the sentence and placing the defendant on probation or
otherwise retaining jurisdiction over the defendant. See Id.
       In Brown, we recognized that “a ‘statute or rule’ may extend the district court’s subject
matter jurisdiction beyond an event that otherwise extinguishes it.” Id. at 444, 511 P.3d at 864. As
we explained in Brown, the plain language of Rule 35(b) contains three “procedural windows” that
provide the district court with limited jurisdiction to consider the motion and decide whether to
grant relief. Id. at 446, 511 P.3d at 866. The first window is “[w]ithin 120 days of the entry of the
judgment imposing sentence[.]” I.C.R. 35(b). The second is within 120 days of an “order releasing
retained jurisdiction[.]” Id. And the third is within 14 days “after the filing of [an] order revoking
probation.” Id.
       Here, Rose did not file a Rule 35(b) motion within any of the three “procedural windows”
described in Rule 35(b). At sentencing, the district court imposed a six-year prison sentence with
one year fixed and entered a written judgment of conviction on December 15, 2017. The first
procedural window in Rule 35(b) opened when the district court entered the judgment of
conviction on December 15, 2017. See id. Rose thus had 120 days from December 15, 2017, to
file a motion to reduce his sentence. Rose did not file his Rule 35 motion until June 15, 2021. The
other two “procedural windows” do not apply in Rose’s case because the district court did not
retain jurisdiction or order probation at the time the oral sentence was pronounced. Accordingly,
Rose’s motion was untimely based on the plain language of Rule 35(b).
       We are not persuaded by Rose’s argument that his motion was timely because the district
court stayed execution of the judgment and sentence pending appeal. Rose overlooks a critical
point: although the district court had authority to release Rose pending appeal, see I.C.R. 38(b)(1)
and 45(a)(2), our criminal rules do not provide that staying execution of a judgment and sentence
extends or alters the 120-day timeframe for filing a Rule 35(b) motion. Rose essentially advocates
for a fourth “procedural window” in which a defendant could file a Rule 35(b) motion when a

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judgment is stayed pending appeal. Rose’s argument fails because the plain language of Rule 35(b)
provides no such window.
       Moreover, the procedural history of the rule reveals that, while a fourth window used to
exist, it has since been removed. Rule 35(b) previously provided defendants with 120 days to file
a motion to reduce sentence “after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the
judgment or dismissal of the appeal[.]” State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho 627, 629, 550 P.2d 130, 132
(1976) (quoting I.C.R. 35 (1976)). In 1986, however, Rule 35 was amended to remove the language
allowing a motion within 120 days of a remittitur after an appeal. State v. Nickerson, 123 Idaho
971, 973, 855 P.2d 56, 58 (Ct. App. 1993). Accepting Rose’s argument would require us to read
that removed language back into Rule 35.
       Rose’s reading of Rule 35 and Rule 38 also runs afoul of Idaho Criminal Rule 45. Rule
45—titled “Computing and Extending Time”—allows courts to extend deadlines under certain
conditions. See I.C.R. 45(b). However, Rule 45(b)(2) expressly states that courts “may not extend
the time to take any action under Rules 29, 34 and 35, or for the perfecting of an appeal, except to
the extent and under the condition stated in those rules.” Rule 35(b) does not allow for extending
its deadlines. Accordingly, Rose’s argument that the district court’s order staying execution of his
judgment “effectively stayed the opening of the procedural window to file a Rule 35(b) motion” is
unavailing because it conflicts with the plain language of Rules 35(b) and 45(b).
       In sum, Rule 35(b) provided the applicable timeframe for Rose to file a motion to modify
his sentence. Rose did not file his motion within the applicable timeframe. We hold that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to modify Rose’s sentence because his Rule 35(b) motion was brought
more than three years after the sentence was originally imposed—well beyond the 120 days
permitted by the plain language of Rule 35(b).
                                    IV.    CONCLUSION
       For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the district court’s Order Suspending Execution
of Modified Judgment and Sentence and reimpose Rose’s original judgment and sentence.

       Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY and MOELLER, and Pro Tem Justice
WILLIAMSON CONCUR.

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