Court Opinion

ID: 9479227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:11:58.096635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:53.781932
License: Public Domain

WILL, Senior District Judge,
concurring.
The court’s opinion is predicated on the basis that this circuit follows the “objective” test in determining whether or not a search incident to an arrest is legal. That test, as the opinion defines it, makes the search legal “as long as the arresting officer possesses sufficient information to give him probable cause to arrest.” His motive and ultimate objectives are relevant, if at all, only if he did not have probable cause to arrest.
In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 424, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932), the Supreme Court held that an “arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.” In Lefkowitz, lawful arrests at the defendants’ residence pursuant to valid arrest warrants were followed by a general search of the residence during which inculpatory evidence was found. Even though the arrests were clearly valid, they were held to be a pretext and not to warrant the general search of the premises.
Following Lefkowitz, a number of Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that searches pursuant to “pretextual” arrests are invalid. The test to be used in determining whether a stop was pretextual is whether a reasonable officer would have made the arrest and search “in the absence of illegitimate motivation.” United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir.1986). The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, citing Lef-kowitz and other cases, have held that if the motivation or primary purpose of the police is to search for evidence of a crime unrelated to the one for which the ostensible arrest is made the arrest is pretextual and the search illegal. In Warren v. City of Lincoln, Neb., 816 F.2d 1254, 1257-58 (8th Cir.1987), the court said that “[a]n arrest ostensibly for one purpose but in reality for the primary purpose of furthering an ulterior goal is unreasonable under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.” And the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.1986), held that “[c]ourts have found improper *994motivation where the defendant is arrested for a minor offense so as to allow police to search for evidence of some other unrelated offense for which police lack probable cause to arrest or search.” The District of Columbia Circuit in McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C.Cir.1950), citing Lefkowitz, held that when “ ‘the search and not the arrest’ ” was the real motive, “the search is not reasonable within the meaning of the Constitution.” Id. at 978 (quoting Henderson v. United States, 12 F.2d 528, 531 (4th Cir.1926)).
On the other hand, as the opinion here points out, a number of circuits have adopted what has come to be known as the “objective” as distinguished from the “subjective” test in determining the validity of a search incident to an arrest. See United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 69 (1987); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 357, 98 L.Ed.2d 382 (1987); and United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc). Until Causey, the Fifth Circuit applied a “reasonable officer” test, i.e., whether a reasonable officer would have made the arrest without the motive to search for evidence of another crime.
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. D’Antoni, 856 F.2d 975 (7th Cir.1988), a case not referred to in the opinion here, found the arrest there not to be pretextual but said:
As the government concedes, it is well established that an arrest may not be used as a mere pretext to avoid the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 424, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932). This rule generally has been confined to certain narrow circumstances. For example, when law enforcement officials follow a suspect, waiting for him to commit some minor offense, then arrest him and use the arrest to collect statements or evidence of another crime, courts may require suppression of the evidence gained in this way. See, e.g., United States v. Keller, 499 F.Supp. 415, 418 (N.D.Ill.1980).
Id. at 979.
Subsequently, the question arose in United States v. McCarty, 862 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.1988). The court there expressly adopted the objective test and held that the arresting officers’ subjective reasons for stopping a defendant are irrelevant so long as the facts they know give them probable cause to do so.
There is no question here that the motive for arresting the defendant on May 10, 1988 was to search her and her car for narcotics. Detective Richard Pharo of Madison, Wisconsin’s Intra County Narcotics and Vice Bureau had been investigating her for some time. On March 4, 1988, he obtained a search warrant for her house and two automobiles registered in her name. Acting on the search warrant, he found Vi pound of cocaine, approximately $9,000 in cash, a semi-automatic pistol and drug paraphernalia. Kordosky was arrested but, for reasons which are not clear, was released the next day and never charged.
Pharo continued his investigation of her and, in mid-April, learned that her driver’s license had been suspended for two months from March 10th through May 10th. At 5:30 p.m. on May 10th, Pharo received word from an informant that Kordosky intended to leave Madison. He quickly arranged a stake-out of her residence to see if she would drive her car on the last day of the suspension. She did and the arrest and search described in the court’s opinion followed at 7:30 p.m.
It is difficult to conceive of a more pre-textual arrest. In fact, both Magistrate Groh and Judge Crabb found or assumed that the arrest was pretextual. Pharo’s unit had no responsibility for enforcement of traffic laws. Under Wisconsin law, the first offense of operating a motor vehicle after suspension is a civil offense punishable only by fine and further driving restrictions, a minor offense.
While the opinion does not expressly so state, it is clear to me that the objective test necessarily makes motive irrelevant. *995Even this court’s statement in D’Antoni “that an arrest may not be used as a mere pretext to avoid the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment,” 856 F.2d at 979, is inconsistent with the statement in the opinion here that a search incident to an arrest is legal so long as the arresting officer had sufficient information to give him probable cause to arrest even though his motive may have been to search for evidence of a crime unrelated to the arrest.
The result of the “objective” test is clearly inconsistent with the abjuration in Lefkowitz that an arrest may not be used as a “pretext to search for evidence.” It seems to me that, given the diametrically opposed interpretations of the fourth amendment reflected in the decisions of the various circuits and the frequency with which the issue arises, clarification is badly needed.
I concur here because this circuit, rightly or wrongly, has determined that any basis for a valid arrest justifies a search regardless of the motive or intent of the arresting officer or how pretextual the arrest is. If this were a matter of first impression, I would adhere to Lefkowitz and the cases which hold that a pretextual arrest is not a valid basis under the fourth amendment for a general search for evidence and that, accordingly, the search here was invalid.
As to the inventory search, I find it reasonable to conclude that the procedure used by Detective Rickey was established by the police department and not created by him alone. Given that this circuit follows the “objective test” to determine whether or not a search incident to an arrest is legal, the subsequent inventory search was proper. However, if the arrest itself was pretextual and unlawful, following Lefkowitz, the evidence seized during the inventory search would also have to be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.