Court Opinion

ID: 9558950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:19:24.565963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:40.669643
License: Public Domain

Dolliver J.
(dissenting) — Do the courts of the State of Washington have jurisdiction over the business activities of a member of an Indian tribe when such activities are conducted on trust lands and are within the boundary of an Indian reservation? Contrary to the views expressed by the majority, I do not believe such jurisdiction exists, and, therefore, dissent.
Subject matter jurisdiction is "the authority of the court to hear and determine the class of actions to which the case belongs. ... A court lacking such jurisdiction may do nothing other than enter an order of dismissal." (Citations omitted.) In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wn.2d 649, 655, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976). In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129, 93 S. Ct. 1257 (1973), the Supreme Court, quoting from the United States Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 (1958), said '"State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply." It is conceded that defendant is a tribal Indian on an Indian *789reservation and that even though Public Law 280 authorized Washington to assume jurisdiction over certain matters, the state has never implemented the federal act, visa-vis the Puyallup Tribe.
In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251, 79 S. Ct. 269 (1959), the Supreme Court laid down the rationale for the rule on state jurisdiction: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Williams, at 220.
Given the clear language of McClanahan, the circumstances of this case and the fact that the actions brought by plaintiff, if allowed, would obviously infringe on the right of the Puyallup Tribe to make its own laws and be ruled by them, I would think the matter to be ended and the dismissal of the trial court upheld.
The majority, believing otherwise, begins its analysis by pointing to what it calls a " refine [ment]" of the Williams test which it claims is found in McClanahan and in Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 65 L. Ed. 2d 10, 100 S. Ct. 2069 (1980). McClanahan involved the imposition of state taxes upon a member of an Indian tribe living on a reservation. No consent was given by the tribal member. The court did not rely upon Williams, stating that it applied principally to situations involving non-Indians (the exact case here). Confederated Tribes said the application of the state cigarette tax to non-Indian purchases of cigarettes on an Indian reservation did not infringe on the right of the reservation Indians to "make their own laws and be ruled by them." The real nexus of Confederated, of course, was not non-Indian against Indian but rather the application of the tax laws of the State of Washington to an activity on an Indian reservation. I see nothing in either McClanahan or Confederated which in any way either weakens or refines Williams as it applies to this case.
Next the majority finds comfort in that the contract was executed off the reservation. I fail to see the relevance of *790this fact. The majority says at page 787 "it is not asserted that a tribe has an interest in regulating a contract made off the reservation." But, surely, that is not what this case is about. It is about a non-Indian asserting state jurisdiction over a member of an Indian tribe on a matter the subject of which is on an Indian reservation. That the contract was made off the reservation is immaterial to the Williams test. The action in this case, just as in Williams, arises because of the activities of a retail operation on the Indian reservation.
The majority says the exercise of state jurisdiction here would not infringe on the sovereignty of the tribe or lessen the tribe's ability to tax and otherwise regulate the smoke-shop. Again, this is irrelevant to the issue. Williams v. Lee, supra, was an action to collect for goods on credit sold by Lee, a non-Indian, who operated a general store on the Navajo Indian Reservation, to Williams, a Navajo Indian. As in this case, the exercise of state jurisdiction would not have prevented the Navajo Indian Tribe from "tax[ing] and otherwise regulating]" the general store. The majority asserts this bringing of the action for partnership dissolution and accounting to be talismanic on the question of jurisdiction. I fail to see, however, where this type of action provides subject matter jurisdiction any more than an action to collect for goods sold on credit did in Williams v. Lee, supra.
I can understand the interest of the plaintiff in attempting to bring this suit in state courts. However, he made the agreement with a Puyallup Indian to take part in the operation of the business on the Puyallup reservation. The situation in which the plaintiff now finds himself may be one for which he is entitled to redress, but it cannot be through the courts of this state. If this seems harsh, the remedy is with the Congress which alone can grant jurisdiction by the state over Indians on Indian reservations. Williams v. Lee, supra.
I dissent.