Court Opinion

ID: 9898169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:55.263676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:40.013602
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 MICHAEL CONKLIN,                            No. 84488-1-I

                        Appellant,           DIVISION ONE
               v.

 THE BOEING COMPANY, and                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 WASHINGTON STATE
 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR &
 INDUSTRIES,

                        Respondents.

       SMITH, C.J. — Michael Conklin filed a workers’ compensation claim with

the Department of Labor and Industries in 2011 following an onset of sudden

pain while working as a plane mechanic at Boeing. After years of contentious

litigation, the Department found that Conklin had misrepresented the severity of

his condition and ordered him to pay back the improperly obtained benefits. A

few months later, the Department directed Boeing to continue paying Conklin

time loss benefits, to accept responsibility for one of Conklin’s conditions, and to

authorize and pay for a rehabilitative surgery. Both parties appealed to the

Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. The Board affirmed the order directing

Boeing to accept responsibility for Conklin’s condition but reversed the orders

authorizing surgery and directing payment. Conklin appealed to the superior

court, which affirmed the Board’s decision and closed Conklin’s claim.
No. 84488-1-I/2

       On appeal, Conklin makes various challenges to determinations made by

the Board and superior court, arguing that the latter exceeded its scope of review

by reaching issues not properly before the Board. Because all the issues Conklin

raises were before the Board, and therefore, the superior court, we affirm.
                                      FACTS
                                2015 Proceedings

       Michael Conklin began working for Boeing as a structure mechanic in

January 2011. In April 2011, Conklin was cleaning the inside of an airplane

fuselage when he suddenly experienced an onset of full-body pain. Conklin filed

a claim with the Department of Labor and Industries (the Department) shortly

thereafter. In the meantime, Conklin continued to work light duty jobs with

Boeing. About a year after Conklin filed his claim, in May 2012, the Department

issued an order closing the claim. Conklin appealed the claim closure.

       In 2015, following a jury trial in Snohomish County Superior Court, the

court entered a judgment and order concluding that Conklin’s lumbar

spondylolisthesis, lumbar spondylolysis, and degenerative cervical spine

conditions were proximately caused or aggravated by his occupational disease.1

       1  “Occupational disease” is defined clinically and legally. A condition must
satisfy three criteria to qualify as an occupational disease: (1) a physician must
present an opinion that on a more probable than not basis, work conditions are a
cause of the disease or have aggravated a preexisting condition; (2) objective
medical findings support the diagnosis; and (3) the disease must arise “naturally
and proximately” out of employment. W ASH. DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUS.,
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIMS IN W ORKER’S COMPENSATION 2 (Feb. 2018), https://
www.lni.wa.gov/forms-publications/F252-117-000.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z58W-
GM9S]; RCW 51.08.140.

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No. 84488-1-I/3

After the judgment and order, Conklin’s claim remained open and he continued to

seek treatment and benefits for his conditions through 2017.

                                  Present Appeal

       Three Department orders form the basis of the present appeal. First, on

July 20, 2018, the Department determined that Conklin willfully misrepresented

his conditions to obtain $95,236.76 in time loss compensation, ordered Conklin to

repay that amount, assessed a 50 percent penalty for willful misrepresentation,

and reversed its prior decision to close the claim. The Department came to this

conclusion after viewing evidence collected by Boeing’s private investigators

indicating that Conklin’s conditions were not as dire as he had previously

represented. Second, on August 15, 2018, the Department ordered Boeing to

pay time loss compensation to Conklin from June 9, 2017 through August 31,

2017. The Department did not explain its reasoning for this conclusion. Third,

on August 17, 2018, the Department ordered Boeing to authorize and pay for a

C5-6 and C6-7 cervical discectomy and fusion. The Department also did not

explain why it issued this order. However, this treatment could have addressed

problems caused by Conklin’s cervical myelopathy, a condition he claimed was

related to or exacerbated by his occupational disease. Conklin appealed the July

20 order finding he willfully misrepresented his conditions. Boeing appealed all

three orders, seeking claim closure.

       The appeals were initially reviewed by an industrial appeals judge, who

concluded, in a proposed decision and order, that although Conklin

misrepresented his physical limitations, Boeing failed to establish that Conklin

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No. 84488-1-I/4

actually received the benefits alleged. The judge reversed the Department’s

finding of willful misrepresentation, but determined that Conklin was not entitled

to time loss compensation between June 1, 2015 and June 8, 2017. The judge

also denied the cervical discectomy and fusion procedures, but kept the claim

open for a lumbar injection to further treat Conklin’s lumbar spondylolisthesis and

spondylosis. Both parties petitioned the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals

(Board) for review by a three judge panel.2

       The Board held that Conklin misrepresented his physical limitations, but

that Boeing and the Department failed to prove that Conklin received $95,236.76

in time loss benefits during the period at issue. The Board reversed the

Department’s finding of willful misrepresentation and clarified that Conklin did not

owe an overpayment for June 1, 2015 through June 8, 2017. The Board also

concluded that Conklin’s preexisting cervical spine conditions and lumbar

spondylolisthesis and spondylosis were, at most, only temporarily aggravated by

the conditions of his employment. The Board concluded that those conditions

returned to pre-injury status “long before July 20, 2018.” It held that the

Department should not have authorized the C5-6 and C6-7 cervical discectomy

and fusion, that Conklin’s claim-related conditions were fixed and stable, and that

the claim must be closed.

       Conklin appealed the Board’s decision and order to Snohomish County

Superior Court. The superior court affirmed the Board’s decision and order.

Conklin appeals.

       2   The three judge panel is referred to by the parties as the “Board.”

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No. 84488-1-I/5

                                     ANALYSIS
                                  Scope of Review

       The Industrial Insurance Act (Act), chapter 51 RCW, confers a “purely

appellate function” on the Board and the superior court. Kingery v. Dep’t of Lab.

& Indus., 132 Wn.2d 162, 171, 937 P.2d 565 (1997); RCW 51.52.060; RCW

51.52.115. The Board hears appeals de novo, and its authority is “strictly limited

to reviewing the specific Department action” from which the parties appealed.

Kingery, 132 Wn.2d at 171. The Board may only consider and decide questions

included in the appealed order or raised by the notice of appeal. Cowlitz Stud

Co. v. Clevenger, 157 Wn.2d 569, 573, 141 P.3d 1 (2006); Hanquet v. Dep’t of

Lab. & Indus., 75 Wn. App. 657, 661, 879 P.2d 326 (1994).

       On appeal to the superior court, the Board’s decision and order is

presumed correct and the party challenging that decision bears the burden of

proof. Gorre v. City of Tacoma, 184 Wn.2d 30, 36, 357 P.3d 625 (2015);

RCW 51.52.115. The superior court’s review is also de novo, but it relies

exclusively on the Board’s record and can decide only matters previously

determined by the Board or the Department. RCW 51.52.115; Malang v. Dep’t of

Lab. & Indus., 139 Wn. App. 677, 683, 162 P.3d 450 (2007). The court’s review

is further confined to issues of law or fact properly included in the notice of

appeal to the Board, or in the record of proceedings before the Board. RCW

51.52.115. “Thus, a superior court’s authority to determine an issue in a workers’

compensation case ‘depends upon whether or not the Board properly addressed

that issue.’ ” Matthews v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 171 Wn. App. 477, 491, 288

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No. 84488-1-I/6

P.3d 630 (2012) (quoting Hanquet, 75 Wn. App. at 663-64). The Board’s

decision will be overturned only if the trier of fact finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that the findings and decision of the Board are incorrect. Cantu v. Dep’t

of Lab. & Indus., 168 Wn. App. 14, 20, 277 P.3d 685 (2012). Both the Board and

the superior court “have authority under the Act to reconsider decisions properly

appealed by one of the parties.” Kingery, 132 Wn.2d at 172 (emphases omitted).

                                Standard of Review

       The scope of our review is narrow. In industrial insurance appeals, we

review the trial court’s decision, not the decision of the Board, and apply ordinary

civil standards of review. RCW 51.52.140; Peterson v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 17

Wn. App. 2d 208, 217, 485 P.3d 338 (2021). We review “ ‘whether substantial

evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings and then review, de novo,

whether the trial court's conclusions of law flow from the findings.’ ” Rogers v.

Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 151 Wn. App. 174, 180, 210 P.3d 355 (2009) (quoting

Watson v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 133 Wn. App. 903, 909, 138 P.3d 177 (2006));

Ruse v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 138 Wn.2d 1, 5-6, 977 P.2d 570 (1999).

       Although the Board’s interpretation of the Industrial Insurance Act does

not bind us, “it is entitled to great deference.” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117

Wn.2d 128, 138, 814 P.2d 629 (1991). We recognize significant decisions of the

Board as persuasive authority in interpreting the Act. O’Keefe v. Dep’t of Lab. &

Indus., 126 Wn. App. 760, 766, 109 P.3d 484 (2005).

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No. 84488-1-I/7

    Temporarily Totally Disabled Worker Status and Willful Misrepresentation

       Conklin contends that after the superior court determined that Boeing

failed to prove all the elements of willful misrepresentation, it was outside the

court’s scope of review to enter findings related to willful misrepresentation. He

also argues that absent a finding of willful misrepresentation, the court could not

reach whether Conklin was a temporarily totally disabled worker entitled to time

loss compensation between June 1, 2015 and July 20, 2018. We disagree. The

Department orders appealed concerned willful misrepresentation and time loss

benefits during this time frame. To determine if Conklin willfully misrepresented

his condition or was entitled to time loss benefits, the Board and court needed to

first determine if Conklin was a temporarily totally disabled worker. Therefore,

these issues were properly before the superior court.

       The Act entitles a worker to compensation if they are injured in the course

of their employment. RCW 51.32.010. A workplace injury may result in

temporary or permanent total disability. See Hubbard v. Dep't of Lab. & Indus.,

140 Wn.2d 35, 43, 992 P.2d 1002 (2000) (defining temporary total disability);

RCW 51.08.160 (defining permanent total disability). “Temporary total disability”

is a condition that temporarily incapacitates a worker from performing any gainful

employment. Hubbard, 140 Wn.2d at 43. If a worker cannot work as a result of

their industrial injury and is totally but only temporarily disabled, they have a right

to time loss compensation “so long as the total disability continues.” RCW

51.32.090(1); Value Village v. Vasquez-Ramirez, 11 Wn. App. 2d 590, 597, 455

P.3d 216 (2019). A worker’s right to time loss compensation terminates when

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No. 84488-1-I/8

the worker recovers to a point that their “present earning power . . . is restored to

that existing at the time of the occurrence of the injury.” RCW 51.32.090(3)(a).

Thus, determining whether a worker is temporarily totally disabled is a

prerequisite to that worker receiving time loss benefits. See RCW 51.32.090.

       If a worker wrongly receives time loss benefits, RCW 51.32.240 allows the

Department or a self-insurer3 to recoup overpayments in benefits based on

several statutory grounds, including “willful misrepresentation.” To prevail on a

willful misrepresentation claim, the Department or self-insurer must prove (1) a

willful false statement, misrepresentation, omission, or concealment of any

material fact, (2) specific intent of obtaining, continuing, or increasing benefits,

and (3) receipt by the claimant of benefits as a result of their actions or

statements. RCW 51.32.240(5). Proof that a worker lied about the true extent of

their physical capabilities is not by itself sufficient to prove willful

misrepresentation. In re Hejna, No. 02-24184 (Wash. Bd. of Indus. Ins. Appeals

Aug. 28, 2006) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order), http://

biia.wa.gov/DO/0424184_ORD_20060828_DO.PDF [https://perma.cc/UF6B-

KL8G]. Instead, the Department or self-insurer must prove the worker was not

entitled to time loss benefits—in other words, that the worker was not temporarily

totally disabled. Matthews, 171 Wn. App. at 493-94 (non-entitlement to time loss

compensation was an essential element that the Department needed to prove

under RCW 51.32.240 to recoup benefits it had overpaid).

       3   Boeing is a self-insurer.

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No. 84488-1-I/9

      Here, the July 20 order, finding Conklin willfully misrepresented his

conditions, and the parties’ subsequent notices of appeal, provide the bases for

the superior court to reach whether Conklin willfully misrepresented his condition

and whether Conklin was a temporarily totally disabled worker between June 1,

2015 and July 20, 2018. The July 20 order stated:
      Time-loss compensation benefits were paid from 06/01/2015
      through 06/08/2017, inclusive, to the claimant based upon the
      representation that he was unable to work.
      An investigation reveals that during the period of 06/01/2015
      through 06/08/2017, the worker misrepresented his physical
      abilities, thereby resulting in an overpayment of benefits in the
      amount of $95,236.76 which was obtained by willful
      misrepresentation.

The July 20 order reversed a prior decision closing Conklin’s claim and instead

held his claim open so that he could continue receiving time loss benefits after

June 8, 2017 through the date of the July 20, 2018 order. Conklin appealed the

July 20 order, seeking “reversal of the determination that he engaged in willful

misrepresentation for the period from 6/1/2015 through 6/8/2017.”

      The July 20 order, finding Conklin willfully misrepresented his conditions,

and Conklin’s subsequent appeal squarely placed willful misrepresentation

before the Board. Still, Conklin takes issue with the Board and superior court

entering any findings concerning willful misrepresentation after each concluded

that Boeing did not meet its burden of proof.4 He contends that entering such

      4  Specifically, Conklin challenges the following finding: “Mr. Conklin
misrepresented his physical limitations during the period of June 1, 2015 through
June 8, 2017, but neither Boeing nor the Department presented evidence
Mr. Conklin actually received time-loss compensation benefits he was not
otherwise entitled to as a result of his willful misrepresentation in an attempt to
obtain such compensation.”

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No. 84488-1-I/10

findings “is contrary to liberal construction of the Act in favor of injured workers.”

But RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106 required the Board to make written

findings and conclusions as to each contested issue of fact and law. Because

willful misrepresentation was a disputed issue, the Board was required to enter

findings as to willful misrepresentation. As this issue was properly before the

Board, it was appropriate for the superior court to review.

       In his briefing on appeal, Conklin initially argues that after the superior

court determined Boeing did not prove all elements of willful misrepresentation, it

was precluded from determining whether he was a temporarily totally disabled

worker. He later concedes that the court could determine whether he was a

temporarily totally disabled worker between June 9, 2017 and August 31, 2017

because the Department’s August 15, 2018 order directed Boeing to pay time

loss benefits during that time period. Because the superior court needed to

determine Conklin’s status as a temporarily totally disabled worker to reach the

willful misrepresentation claim, this issue was properly before the superior court.

The crux of the matter is whether the time period alleged—June 1, 2015 to July

20, 2018—was properly before the court. We conclude that it was.

       The July 20 willful misrepresentation order addressed time loss benefits

between June 1, 2015 and June 8, 2017. But, importantly, the July 20 order

corrected an earlier order that ended time loss benefits as of May 31, 2015 and

closed the claim as of that date. The July 20 order omitted language about

ending time loss benefits, seemingly reopening the claim. Boeing appealed the

July 20 order, contesting that it erroneously omitted language ending time loss

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No. 84488-1-I/11

benefits as of May 31, 2015 and closing the claim. Because the parties disputed

whether time loss benefits were appropriate after May 31, 2015 through the July

20, 2018 order, it was appropriate for the superior court to determine if Conklin

was a temporarily totally disabled worker—and thus entitled to time loss

benefits—between those dates.

                    Cervical Myelopathy and Cervical Surgery

       Conklin asserts that the Board’s September 25, 2019 order, which made

final a determination that Boeing was responsible for his cervical degenerative

disc disease, precluded the superior court from reversing the Department’s

August 17, 2018 order directing Boeing to authorize and pay for Conklin’s

cervical surgery to address his cervical myelopathy. Conklin contends that the

court erred in reaching whether his cervical myelopathy was causally related to

his work conditions and whether cervical surgery was necessary. Because the

order addressed Conklin’s cervical degenerative disc disease, and not his

cervical myelopathy, we disagree.

       “Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue in a

subsequent proceeding involving the same parties.” Christensen v. Grant

County Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152 Wn.2d 299, 306, 96 P.3d 957 (2004). For

collateral estoppel to apply, the party seeking application of the doctrine must

establish that (1) the issue decided in the earlier proceeding is identical to the

issue presented in the later proceeding; (2) the earlier proceeding resulted in a

final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is

asserted was a party in the prior adjudication; and (4) application of the doctrine

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No. 84488-1-I/12

does not work an injustice on the party against whom it is applied. Reninger v.

Dep’t of Corrections, 134 Wn.2d 437, 449, 951 P.2d 782 (1998).

       Here, Conklin fails to meet the first collateral estoppel prong, that the issue

decided in the Board’s September 25, 2019 order is identical to the one at bar.

The underlying Department order at issue directed Boeing “to authorize and pay

for the C5-6, C6-7 cervical discectomy and fusion.” The September 25 order

adopted an earlier industrial appeals judge’s proposed decision and order, which

affirmed yet another earlier order stating: “The Self Insured Employer is

responsible for the cervical degenerative disc disease.” In the earlier proposed

decision and order, the industrial appeals judge entered a conclusion of law

stating that
       Michael Conklin’s cervical degenerative disc disease arose
       naturally and proximately out of the same distinctive conditions of
       employment that proximately caused and/or aggravated the
       condition for which this claim was allowed. The Self Insured
       Employer is responsible for Michael Conklin’s cervical degenerative
       disc disease.

Though this conclusion of law makes Conklin’s cervical degenerative disc

disease an accepted condition, it does not address what treatment is reasonable

and necessary. Therefore, it does not require Boeing to authorize any treatment

nor preclude Boeing from contesting whether a treatment is reasonable and

necessary. See RCW 51.36.010 (treatment for worker’s occupational disease

must be “proper and necessary”).

       As an alternative argument, Conklin asserts that the surgery was

appropriate treatment for his cervical myelopathy, which he claims is caused by

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No. 84488-1-I/13

degenerative changes in the spine. In determining whether a condition should be

accepted in an occupational disease claim, the issue is whether the condition

was proximately caused by the occupational disease or by the same distinctive

conditions that caused the original conditions. Street v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 189

Wn.2d 187, 194, 399 P.3d 1156 (2017).

       Here, the testimony before the Board indicates that Conklin’s cervical

myelopathy was not proximately caused by his occupational disease. Conklin’s

expert witness, Dr. Michael Wright could not offer an opinion about whether

Conklin’s cervical myelopathy was caused by either an industrial injury or

Conklin’s occupational disease. When asked if he had an explanation as to how

the cervical myelopathy developed, Dr. Wright responded: “I do not.” Dr. Wright

also opined that he didn’t know “if [Conklin]’s ever had an industrial injury to his

neck.” He stated that when he examined Conklin, Conklin had “cervical

myelopathy from cervical spinal stenosis” and that it “would be unusual for

[Conklin] to acquire that type of injury from cleaning airplanes.” Dr. Wright’s

choice of words—that myelopathy comes from spinal stenosis—implies that the

myelopathy was not caused or related to Conklin’s cervical degenerative disc

disease. None of the testimony elicited by either party addressed whether

cervical myelopathy and cervical degenerative disc disease were related

conditions. Accordingly, there is not sufficient evidence to support Conklin’s

claim that the two conditions are linked. We conclude that sufficient evidence

supported the court’s determination that the treatment was unrelated to Conklin’s

occupational disease.

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No. 84488-1-I/14

                Temporarily or Permanently Aggravated Condition

       Conklin asserts that the superior court exceeded the scope of its review by

determining his cervical and lumbar degenerative disc diseases were only

temporarily aggravated because the 2015 judgment determined causation, not

duration. Because one of the orders on appeal implicitly addressed whether

Conklin’s conditions were caused or aggravated on a temporary or permanent

basis, we disagree.

       The July 20 willful misrepresentation order omitted language from the

original February 20 order on willful misrepresentation that treatment was “no

longer necessary” and that Conklin was not entitled to permanent partial

disability. In its appeal of the July 20 order, Boeing objected to the “reversal of

claim closure without [permanent partial disability].” Thus, whether Conklin’s

conditions were permanent or temporary was before the Board and therefore,

before the superior court.

       Conklin’s claim that the superior court was precluded from reaching

whether his conditions were temporary because the 2015 judgment only

addressed causation is unavailing. The 2015 judgment did not state that it

applied to Conklin’s conditions in perpetuity. Moreover, Conklin appears to

misunderstand the superior court’s scope of review. Once raised by Boeing in its

notice of appeal (and reversed by the appealed July 20 order), this issue was

properly before the Board and superior court. We conclude that the court did not

exceed the scope of its review by determining Conklin’s conditions were only

temporarily aggravated.

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No. 84488-1-I/15

                                     Claim Closure

         Conklin maintains that there was no legal authority for the superior court to

close his claim based on the July 20 order after the Board reversed the willful

misrepresentation determination and affirmed that his cervical degenerative disc

disease was causally related to his work conditions. We are unconvinced.

         The July 20 order superseded an earlier order closing Conklin’s claim.

Boeing’s notice of appeal specifically stated that it was appealing “reversal of

claim closure.” The effect of the July 20 order and Boeing’s notice of appeal

placed the issue of claim closure squarely before the Board and the superior

court.

         It is unclear from Conklin’s briefing how reversal of the willful

misrepresentation finding and a causation determination regarding cervical

degenerative disc disease are related to claim closure. Conklin seems to argue

that Boeing’s appeal of the July 20 order cannot raise issues from the earlier

order. But this attempt to limit the superior court’s review to the substance of the

July 20 order is unavailing. The July 20 order and the earlier order are inherently

related—the former overturned the latter. If the opposite were true, Boeing would

have no recourse to protest the changes made to the earlier order. We conclude

that claim closure was properly within the superior court’s scope of review.

               Challenges to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

         Conklin assigns error to a number of findings of fact and conclusions of

law made by the superior court but does not devote any part of his briefing to

arguments explicitly addressing these findings and conclusions. “A party that

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No. 84488-1-I/16

offers no argument in its opening brief on a claimed assignment of error waives

the assignment.” Brown v. Vail, 169 Wn.2d 318, 336 n.11, 237 P.3d 263 (2010).

These assignments related to his arguments about willful misrepresentation, time

loss entitlement, causation, and claim closure, and were addressed in that

portion of his briefing and in the corresponding portion of this opinion.

       The challenged findings and conclusions roughly follow Conklin’s issue

statements and can be grouped together by subject matter. Finding 8 and

conclusion 2 concern willful misrepresentation and whether Conklin was a

temporarily totally disabled worker entitled to time loss compensation.
       [Finding] 8:   Mr. Conklin misrepresented his physical limitations
                      during the period of June 1, 2015 through June 8,
                      2017, but neither Boeing nor the Department
                      presented evidence Mr. Conklin actually received
                      time-loss compensation benefits he was not otherwise
                      entitled to as a result of his willful misrepresentation in
                      an attempt to obtain such compensation.
   [Conclusion] 2: From June 1, 2015 through July 20, 2018, Conklin
                   was not a temporarily totally disabled worker within
                   the meaning of RCW 51.32.090.

       Findings 4 and 5 and conclusions 4, 5a, and 5b concern whether Conklin’s

accepted conditions and his cervical myelopathy were proximately related to his

occupational disease and whether treatment for those conditions was necessary

and proper.
       [Finding] 4:   On April 18, 2011, Mr. Conklin’s occupational disease
                      manifested when he experienced sudden whole-body
                      pain while cleaning the inside of an airplane fuselage.
                      The following preexisting conditions were temporarily
                      aggravated by the same distinctive conditions of
                      employment in the allowed occupational disease
                      claim: lumbar spondylolisthesis, lumbar spondylolysis,
                      and degenerative cervical spine conditions.

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No. 84488-1-I/17

       [Finding] 5:   Mr. Conklin’s cervical myelopathy, and his advanced
                      degenerative changes in the L4-L5 and L5-S1 levels
                      of his lumbar spine were not caused by Mr. Conklin’s
                      occupational disease, nor did they arise naturally and
                      proximately out of the same distinctive conditions of
                      employment as Mr. Conklin’s occupational disease.
   [Conclusion] 4: Department orders dated July 20, 2018, August 15,
                   2018, and August 17, 2018 are incorrect and are
                   reversed.
   [Conclusion] 5a: To deny treatment (specifically the C5-6 and C6-7
                    cervical discectomy and fusion, and the lumbar
                    epidural steroid injection recommended by Dr.
                    Wright).
   [Conclusion] 5b: To deny responsibility under this claim for the
                    conditions known as cervical myelopathy and
                    advanced degenerative changes in the L4-5 and L5-
                    S1 levels of Conklin’s lumbar spine.

       Finding 4 and 6 and conclusions 1, 4, and 5e concern causation, medical

fixity, and claim closure.
       [Finding] 4:   On April 18, 2011, Mr. Conklin’s occupational disease
                      manifested when he experienced sudden whole-body
                      pain while cleaning the inside of an airplane fuselage.
                      The following preexisting conditions were temporarily
                      aggravated by the same distinctive conditions of
                      employment in the allowed occupational disease
                      claim: lumbar spondylolisthesis, lumbar spondylolysis,
                      and degenerative cervical spine conditions.
       [Finding] 6:   As of July 20, 2018, all claim-related conditions,
                      including but not limited to Mr. Conklin’s aggravated
                      preexisting lumbar spondylolisthesis, lumbar
                      spondylolysis, and degenerative cervical spine
                      conditions were fixed and stable and required no
                      further proper and necessary treatment.
   [Conclusion] 1: As of July 20, 2018, the claim related aggravation to
                   Conklin’s preexisting conditions were fixed and stable
                   and he was not entitled to further treatment.
   [Conclusion] 4: Department orders dated July 20, 2018, August 15,
                   2018, and August 17, 2018 are incorrect and are
                   reversed.
   [Conclusion] 5e: To close the claim effective July 20, 2018.

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No. 84488-1-I/18

       To the extent that these findings are intertwined with the above discussion

about the superior court’s scope of review, we conclude that they are supported

by substantial evidence. Those that are unaddressed, we decline to review. See

State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990) (“This court will not

consider claims insufficiently argued by the parties.”).

                                   Attorney Fees

       Conklin requests attorney fees under RCW 51.52.130, which provides a

fixed fee for workers who receive additional relief on appeal. Boeing requests

attorney fees under RAP 14.2, which allows this court to award fees and costs to

the substantially prevailing party. Because Conklin does not receive additional

relief on appeal, we do not award him fees. And because Boeing substantially

prevails on appeal, we award it fees.

       We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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