Court Opinion

ID: 9519922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:27:37.704214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:21.065046
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Prentice, J.
I dissent and would grant transfer but would reverse-the trial court, as did the Court of Appeals, and direct that the guilty plea and conviction be vacated.
The record in this case merely discloses only that at some time prior to arraignment Emert’s counsel had read a written form to him which contained an explanation of the constitutional rights which would be waived upon the plea of guilty, that Emert had signed such form and that, at arraignment, the trial judge asked him only if he understood the same, and he answered that he did. The most this record can indicate is that Emert thought that he understood his rights, and there is nothing from which the trial judge could have independently assessed Emert’s knowledge. Boykin v. Alabama, (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, requires that the record demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver by the accused.
*343Nothing is more clearly demonstrated by the parade of cases that pass before us than that most criminally accused are woefully ignorant, not only of their intricate constitutional rights but also of court procedures and even of the English language. Such circumstances mandate that the trial court make such inquiry, in each case, as will enable him to assess intelligently the accused’s true understanding of his perilous position. What is demonstrated by the record is important only to the extent that it assures that the rights of the accused are not violated. We should not permit our concern for the record to obliterate our concern for the accused; and we should not, therefore, accept a record unless it discloses, beyond reasonable question, that the trial judge concerned himself with the comprehension of the accused and not merely with the appearance of the record. This is not done by the presence of signed waivers or the reliance upon statements of counsel or even upon the statement of the accused that they understand — all of which may be given in the best of faith but, nevertheless, in error.
I do not agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals from Kite v. State, (1974) Ind. App., 318 N.E.2d 390, that the court’s duty to advise is non-delegable, although it most certainly is to be preferred that it not be delegated. I concurred in the result in Williams v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 165, 325 N.E.2d 827, because the record there reflected that although the colloquy was between the accused and his counsel rather than between the accused and the judge, it, nevertheless, took place in the presence of the judge and under circumstances that enabled the judge to assess independently the accused’s comprehension.
I would remand the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate the guilty plea and the judgment.
DeBruler, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 330 N.E.2d 750.