Court Opinion

ID: 9947777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 17:13:42.657447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:33.090903
License: Public Domain

J-A08015-24

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S.A., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: S.H.B., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2957 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered November 20, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-AP-0000345-2023

  IN THE INTEREST OF: S.N.A., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: S.H.B., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2958 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered November 20, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-AP-0000346-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                 FILED MARCH 5, 2024

       S.H.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees terminating her parental

rights as to her two daughters, K.S.A., born in February 2017, and S.N.A.,

born in April 2019.1 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 Separately, on the same date, the trial court terminated the parental rights

of the children’s biological father, S.A. (“Father”). Father has not appealed
that decision.
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      We glean the following background from the certified record. On May

13, 2021, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) received a

report from child protective services that, earlier that day, Mother had a

mental health crisis and attacked both K.S.A. and S.N.A. More particularly,

police responded to the residence for a disturbance and, upon arrival,

observed Mother jumping from a third-story window and attempting to run

into traffic. Inside the home, law enforcement located K.S.A., who was four

years old at the time and suffering from cancer, with a bloody face and nose.

S.N.A., then two years old, was found bleeding and unconscious, wedged

between a bed and window. Both children were taken to Children’s Hospital

of Philadelphia. The treating doctors determined that S.N.A. had a right orbital

bone fracture and tested positive for benzodiazepines. She was subsequently

admitted to the intensive care unit.

      Representatives from DHS spoke with the children and Father at the

hospital. K.S.A. indicated that Mother was responsible for both child’s injuries.

Father stated that he had recently ceased his relationship with Mother and

that, despite still living in the home, he was not present at the time of the

attack. Father also informed that he was aware that Mother had mental health

issues but believed they were under control.

      After determining that returning K.S.A. and S.N.A. to Father’s custody

would be inappropriate, DHS obtained orders of protective custody as to both

children. Upon each child’s discharge from the hospital, DHS placed them into

different foster homes pursuant to the recommendation of each child’s

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therapist.2    In June 2021, the trial court adjudicated K.S.A. and S.N.A.

dependent and committed them to the care of DHS.

       Mother was arrested two days after the incident and charged with

various crimes, including aggravated assault. During the pendency of these

termination matters, she pled guilty to one count each of aggravated assault

and endangering the welfare of children. The trial court in the criminal case

sentenced her to an aggregate term of three to six years in prison, and further

entered a no-contact order as between Mother and the children. Mother has

remained incarcerated since the time of her arrest in May 2021. The earliest

she would be eligible for parole is in May 2024, whereas her sentence

maximum date is in May 2027.

       Shortly after Mother’s arrest, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)

created an initial single case plan (“SCP”) for Mother, requiring her to complete

a dual diagnosis evaluation. In May 2022, based on Mother’s conduct, the

trial court entered an order finding aggravated circumstances, which relieved

DHS from its obligation to utilize reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with the

children or otherwise preserve the familial relationship as between them.

Nonetheless, Mother’s SCP was later revised in April 2023, ultimately calling

for her to attend a dual diagnosis evaluation, maintain contact with CUA, and

complete parenting courses.
____________________________________________

2 The children have remained in the same respective pre-adoptive foster
homes since initial placement, shortly after the assault. Despite being placed
separately, K.S.A. and S.N.A. have had the opportunity to see each other
every weekend and have become familiar with each other’s foster families.

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       In August 2023, DHS filed a petition seeking to change the children’s

permanency goals from reunification to adoption by the respective resource

parents, as well as termination of the parental rights of both Mother and

Father. The court held a hearing on November 20, 2023, where it heard from

CUA case manager Alexis Church, social worker Roya Paller, and Mother.3

       Ms. Church testified that she was assigned this case in October 2021

and has managed it since that time.              She contacted Mother in prison on

approximately three occasions in late October and early November of 2021.

Since then, Mother has made no outreach to CUA as to her reunification plan

or goals. Ms. Church further said that Mother has had no contact with either

child since her arrest and that the children have no relationship with Mother.

She did not believe reunification was appropriate, explaining as follows:

       [Mother] has not provided anything for the children, whether it’s
       their needs, their medical needs, educational needs, support
       system. She also hasn’t maintained contact with CUA to ensure
       that, whether there was a protection order or not, that she’s well
       aware of what’s going on when it comes to their medical, when it
       comes to [K.S.A.]’s cancer, and things like that. She doesn’t
       really – well she doesn’t participate in [her SCP]. We have
       meetings for the girls. They have [individualized education
       program] meetings. [Mother] doesn’t reach out. She hasn’t
       signed consents or releases for the children. She doesn’t have
       housing. We are unaware of her mental state at this point, if she
       is receiving treatment. If so, what kind of treatment. So[,] there
       [ are] a lot of safety concerns when it comes to [Mother].

N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/20/23, at 17.

____________________________________________

3 At the termination hearings, the children were represented collectively by

Edward Louden, Esquire, as legal counsel, and Gary Server, Esquire, as
guardian ad litem (“GAL”).

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      Ms. Paller attested that she is a social worker who examined and spoke

with both K.S.A. and S.N.A. on several occasions.           When asked about

adoption, six-year-old K.S.A. expressed a desire to continue living with her

foster mother, whom she identified as “mom.”         This foster mother helped

K.S.A. through her chemotherapy treatment for cancer. As to S.N.A., who

was just shy of four years old at the time of the interviews, all indications were

that she desired to stay in the same home as her foster parents. She had

lived with them since her initial placement at age two, and accordingly these

parents were the only ones she knew. Ms. Paller ultimately opined that there

would be irreparable harm to both children if they were removed from the

respective foster families.

      Mother, for her part, testified that she wanted to be a part of her

children’s lives and needed more time to place herself into a position to be a

parent. She indicated that CUA had not contacted her after the first few initial

calls in November 2021, and otherwise did little to make her aware of her

reunification goals.   Mother also outlined her progress in prison, which

included completing a drug and alcohol treatment program, working in the

prison kitchen for a period, beginning the process of obtaining her GED, and

starting enrollment in parenting courses and another drug treatment program.

However, she did not introduce any documentation verifying her participation

in these programs.

      After testimony was taken, both the GAL and counsel for the children

informed the trial court that they believed the best interests of both children

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would be served by termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered separate decrees

terminating the parental rights of both parents as to K.S.A. and S.N.A.

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as § 2511(b).

     These timely appeals followed.      The court ordered Mother to file a

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),

and Mother complied. The trial court entered a notice of compliance with Rule

1925(a), referring us to relevant portions of the transcript from the

termination hearing, wherein it recited its findings.     We consolidated the

appeals sua sponte.

     Mother presents five issues for our consideration:

     I.     Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
            terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to
            23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(1) where Mother presented evidence
            that she tried to perform her parental duties.

     II.    Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
            terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to
            23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(2) where Mother presented evidence
            that she is trying to remedy her situation while incarcerated,
            by receiving drug treatment and mental health treatment,
            starting parenting classes and working in the kitchen and
            will have the present capacity to care for her child.

     III.   Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
            terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to
            23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(5) where evidence was provided to
            establish that the children w[ere] removed from the care of
            . . . Mother and Mother is now working on her goal and will
            have the ability to care for her children once she is released
            from prison.

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      IV.   Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
            terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to
            23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(8) where evidence was presented to
            show that Mother would be capable of caring for her children
            after she completes parenting classes, and has already
            received mental health treatment, drug treatment[,] and is
            employed.

      V.    Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
            terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to
            23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(b) where evidence was presented that
            Mother was denied visitation and the chance to bond with
            her children.

Mother’s brief at 7 (cleaned up).

      We begin with our well-settled standard of review.

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard
      employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to
      accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
      trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not
      require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences
      or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported,
      we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result
      merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
      different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only
      upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
      prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an
      error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
      decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized
      our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However,
      we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in
      order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported
      by competent evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented

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and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings,

we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In

re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation

omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption

Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed

by the needs and welfare of the child, which we have described as follows:

      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
      for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
      and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
      child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 705 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citations

omitted). The bases for termination must be proven by clear and convincing

evidence, or evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to

enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the

truth of the precise facts in issue.” Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 831 (Pa.Super.

2022) (citation omitted).

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      Termination is proper when the moving party proves grounds for

termination under any subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). See In

re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa.Super. 2011) (stating that “[w]e must agree

with the trial court’s decision as to only one subsection of . . . § 2511(a) in

order to affirm the termination of parental rights).       Here, we consider

§ 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

         ....

            (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
            or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
            essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
            his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
            causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
            will not be remedied by the parent.

            ....

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

      The grounds for termination of parental rights under § 2511(a)(2) due

to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but may also

include acts of refusal and inability to perform parental duties. See In re

S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa.Super. 2021). We have long recognized that

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a parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt

assumption of full parental responsibilities. See, e.g., In re Adoption of

M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.Super. 2017). Our Supreme Court has also

indicated that,

      incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor,
      in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist under
      § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a
      parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without
      essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes
      of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012). The Court further

stated that “the length of the remaining confinement can be considered as

highly relevant to whether the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent, sufficient to

provide grounds for termination pursuant to . . . § 2511(a)(2).” Id. at 830

(cleaned up).

      On appeal, Mother contends that her parental rights were terminated

solely based on her past incapacity, without consideration of her soon-to-be

present ability to parent, in contravention to our case law. See Mother’s brief

at 16.   She asserts that she has “substantially completed her SCP goals,”

including “parenting classes, employment, [and] mental health and drug

treatment while incarcerated.” Id. Mother maintains that she will be released

from prison “in the near future” and can then “provide a safe home for herself

and the children.” Id. In short, she believes that DHS did not adequately

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meet its burden pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) since, upon her release, she will

have gained the capacity to care for K.S.A. and S.N.A. Id.

      In concluding that DHS carried its evidentiary burden as to this

subsection, the trial court noted the following on the record at the termination

hearing:

      [M]other is incarcerated and has some limitations obviously on
      her ability to engage in her case plan objectives, [yet M]other has
      not produced any documentation through her attorney to show
      that she’s actively been engaged in any type of mental health
      treatment. We don’t have any documentation of the parenting
      [courses]. We don’t have anything to show that [Mother has]
      done anything to remedy the situation while she’s been
      incarcerated or that any additional time would correct the
      situation, if more time were given. While [M]other may be eligible
      for [parole in six months], she may also be in jail for several more
      years based on the current sentence she has.

N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/20/23, at 64. As such, the court found that DHS

proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother has not “demonstrated

an ability to remedy this situation.” Id. at 63.

      Upon review, we find that the certified record supports the trial court’s

conclusions. The testimony from the termination hearing bore out that, after

CUA initially reached out to Mother and provided her with her SCP objectives,

Mother took no steps to follow up with CUA on those goals. She likewise did

not contact CUA to check in on her children or to assist even minimally

concerning the medical care and special needs of her children, such as by

executing medical consents or releases. Aside from her self-serving testimony

as to programs she purportedly undertook in prison, she did not introduce any

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evidence supporting her assertions, as the trial court correctly noted. Further,

assuming arguendo that Mother did enroll in parenting classes, by her own

attestation she did not do so until after being in prison for two years and had

not completed them as of the time of the hearing.

      Moreover, to the extent Mother faults CUA for not providing reunification

services, we note that the agency was relieved of that obligation pursuant to

the trial court’s finding of aggravated circumstances in May 2022. Had that

order not been entered, Mother nonetheless would not be entitled to relief on

that basis. See In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 896 (Pa.Super. 2014) (finding that

an agency’s failure to provide reunification services alone “is not a basis to

disturb the trial court’s order terminating . . . parental rights”).

      Finally, although Mother claims to have a present ability to parent the

children, she would not be in a position to do so until her release from prison

in May 2024 at the soonest, and possibly as late as May 2027. The record

simply belies her claim that she has the ability to remedy her incapacity and

become a parent to either K.S.A. or S.N.A.

      Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying upon

§ 2511(a)(2) as a basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights.

      Turning to § 2511(b), we “consider the matter from the child’s

perspective, placing [the child’s] developmental, physical, and emotional

needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T.,

296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). This analysis “should not be

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applied mechanically,” but “must be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein

“the court must determine each child’s specific needs.”         Id. at 1105-06

(cleaned up).   Thus, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors that must be

considered. Id. at 1113 n.28. While the particular circumstances of each

case dictate the factors to be considered, our precedent indicates that relevant

points of inquiry include “intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and

stability.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has mandated, however, that an

evaluation pursuant to § 2511(b) should also consider the child’s bond with

his or her parent. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). Specifically,

the court must render “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and

beneficial to the child[.]” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. This

involves consideration of the effect of severing the child’s bond with the

parent. Id. at 1109. In termination matters, “severance of a necessary and

beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that would predictably cause ‘extreme

emotional consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.”      Id. at 1109-10

(quoting In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 484). The High Court has distinguished,

however, “extreme emotional consequences” from a mere “adverse or

detrimental impact” in the termination context. Id. at 1111. Specifically, it

has cautioned that Pennsylvania courts “must not truncate [their] analysis and

preclude severance based solely on evidence of an adverse or detrimental

impact to the child.” Id. at 1114 (cleaned up).

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      Furthermore, “courts must not only consider the child’s bond with the

biological parent, but also examine” the child’s bond “with the foster parent.”

Id. at 1111 (emphasis in original, cleaned up). Thus, we consider factors that

arise from the circumstances of each case, such as the child’s need for

permanency and length of time in foster care, whether the child is bonded

with the foster parents, and whether the foster home meets the child’s needs.

Id. at 1113.    Overall, “bond, plus permanency, stability and all intangible

factors may contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of

primary importance in the [§] 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109 (cleaned up).

      In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts

must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d

at 269. “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.              When courts

fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

Given these crucial concerns, a court cannot “toll the well-being and

permanency” of a child indefinitely in the hope that a parent “will summon the

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d

999, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted).

      As to this issue, Mother summarily argues, in relevant part, that “[t]he

children were never permitted to visit with [her].         If [she] was provided

visitation with her children[,] she could have maintained a bond with her

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children.” Mother’s brief at 18. Notably, Mother does not discuss any aspect

of the relationship between each child and their respective foster parents.

      At the termination hearing, the trial court found as follows:

      With regard to [§] 2511(b), I do not find that there is a parent
      child relationship between . . . [M]other . . . and these two
      children. While the children may know who their parents are, they
      certainly don’t look to them to meet any of their parental needs
      or any of their daily needs. By contrast, they look to the resource
      parents to do so. And I find that the children would not suffer any
      irreparable harm if parental rights were terminated in this case.

N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/20/23, at 66.

      Again, we determine that the trial court’s conclusions are fully supported

by the evidence of record. Mother plainly does not share a parental bond with

either K.S.A or S.N.A.    Instead, both children are attached to their foster

families, with whom they have resided for more than two and one-half years.

While K.S.A. remembers who Mother is, she has not relied on her for any

aspect of her care in that time. As to S.N.A., she has not seen Mother since

she was attacked at two years old and has now spent more than half of her

life with her foster parents. Ms. Paller testified that the children are thriving

with their respective resource families and that to remove them from those

environments would be substantially detrimental to the children.            While

Mother believes that in due time, she may eventually be in a position to

successfully parent the children, we cannot “toll the well-being and

permanency” of these children in the hope that one day transpires. In re

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007.

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     In sum, the court did not err in finding that termination of Mother’s

parental rights would not “cause extreme emotional consequences or

significant, irreparable harm.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-10

(cleaned up).

     Having determined that the orphans’ court properly found statutory

grounds for termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) and (b), we affirm the

decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights as to K.S.A. and S.N.A.

     Decrees affirmed.

Date: 3/5/2024

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