Court Opinion

ID: 9618461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:12:54.133577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:08.547718
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(dissenting)—I dissent. The information is
fatally defective because it does not charge Smith with having committed a crime. There is nothing illegal about being in possession of stolen property unless one knows it to have been stolen. The majority, in upholding the charge that the defendant "did possess a stolen motor vehicle," misapplies the statutory language rule and the statutory element rule. Under the former, it is sufficient to charge a crime in the language of the statute if the statute defines the crime with certainty. State v. Grant, 89 Wn.2d 678, 686, 575 P.2d 210 (1978). This rule was first set forth in Washington in State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 30 P. 729 (1892), and was summarized in State v. Randall, 107 Wash. 695, 696-97, 182 P. 575 (1919) as follows:
It is undoubtedly the rule in this jurisdiction that it is sufficient, in charging a crime, to follow the language of the statute, where such crime is there defined and the language used is sufficient to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation . . .
Under the statutory element rule, the omission of any statutory element of a crime in the charging document is a constitutional defect which requires dismissal. State v. Holt, 104 Wn.2d 315, 320-21, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985). This rule is based on amendment 10 to article 1, section 22 of the Washington Constitution: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him". The Washington provision has the same effect as the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... be informed of the nature and cause *604of the accusation". State v. Newson, 8 Wn. App. 534, 536, 507 P.2d 893 (1973).
In United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362, 24 L. Ed. 819 (1877), the Supreme Court made clear that the use of statutory language is adequate only when it states every element of the crime:
But to this general rule there is the qualification, fundamental in the law of criminal procedure, that the accused must be apprised by the indictment, with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation against him, to the end that he may prepare his defence, and plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offence. An indictment not so framed is defective, although it may follow the language of the statute.
In Washington, the Supreme Court has said:
This court has many times approved the statement ... to the effect that the information must state the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language, not the name of the offense, but the statement of the acts constituting the offense is just as important and essential as the other requirements of the information, such as the title of the action and the names of the parties.
State v. Royse, 66 Wn.2d 552, 557, 403 P.2d 838 (1965).
Elements of the crime of possession of stolen property are (1) possession of stolen property, and (2) knowledge the property is stolen. State v. Jennings, 35 Wn. App. 216, 219, 666 P.2d 381, review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1024 (1983); see also State v. Holman, 58 Wn.2d 754, 758, 364 P.2d 921 (1961); State v. Rhinehart, 21 Wn. App. 708, 712, 586 P.2d 124 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 92 Wn.2d 923, 602 P.2d 1188 (1979). Without incorporating the definition of RCW 9A.56.140(1) containing the element of knowledge into the charge, there is no crime alleged, and thus no cause of action. To be a sufficient statement of the crime, the language of RCW 9A.56.140(1) must be included in the information with that of RCW 9A.56.160.
To illustrate, conform the decision relied upon by the majority, State v. Merrill, to this case. The information would read that the defendant "did then and there advance *605the prostitution of another person," rather than, as was the case in Merrill, the defendant "did then and there being unlawfully and feloniously knowingly advance the prostitution of. . . another person".
I would reverse and dismiss.
Review denied by Supreme Court February 11,1988.