Court Opinion

ID: 9764546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:26:56.841556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:58.051464
License: Public Domain

Concurring by
Justice GRANT.
I write this separate opinion to express my judicial observations about the exclusionary rule and its applicability to this case.
On December 21, 1911, the home of Fremont Weeks was unreasonably searched by officers of the government, and all of his books, letters, money, paper, notes, evidence of indebtedness, stock certificates, insurance policies, deeds, abstracts and other muniments of title, bonds, candies, clothes, and other property in the home were illegally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
In the case of Weeks v. United States,61 the Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule, which excluded evidence obtained in violation of the United States Constitution. All the rules of evidence are designed to facilitate the search for truth in a courtroom except the exclusionary rule. It is designed to control the conduct of law enforcement officers outside of the courtroom in order to enforce the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Texas has long had this exclusion as a part of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The exclusionary rule has cost the courts much criticism as being the enforcement of a technicality, although a mandate by the Constitution of the United States or of this State is not a technicality. Lakes of printer’s ink have been used to write upon the application of this rule. But it should again be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court to determine if it is serving the purpose for which it was primarily designed.
Through the years, many exceptions have been grafted onto the construction of the Fourth Amendment, often causing the courts considerable effort to determine whether an invalid search and seizure had been made. In the present case, for example, one of the issues presented to this Court required a factual determination of a matter outside of the searching officer’s knowledge dealing with whether the defendant had standing to object to a search. Information of any prior verbal consent from the owner of the vehicle was outside the officer’s knowledge at the time of the search.
From my perception, the exclusionary rule is not working to prevent unreasonable searches of many innocent travelers on our highways, and when it is enforced on a person who is guilty of a criminal violation, then the result may be to let the criminal go free. Furthermore, the officer who conducted the unconstitutional search is not sanctioned. The rights of all citizens under the Fourth Amendment would be better protected if the application as to when to apply the Fourth Amendment were simplified. An officer cannot be expected to keep up with all the nuances and variations of its enforcement that continue to flow from the courts, and these rulings often leave ambiguities that split courts on whether there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Knowles v. Iowa,62 makes reference to a bright-line rule for field searches not incident to an arrest. Law enforcement needs bright-line rules for all areas of search and seizure, and officers who persist in violating this fundamental law should be subject to sanctions and, ultimately, to decertification if the officer persists in such conduct. *874This would result in better enforcement of the Fourth Amendment than the exclusionary rule. If this is done, I would recommend the elimination of the exclusionary rule.

. 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

. 67 U.S.L.W. 4027, — U.S.-, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998).