Court Opinion

ID: 9673940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:20:50.217229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:35.814506
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Justice
(dissenting).
I. Even the most restrictive definition of wages does not limit compensation to cash. It is one thing to say wages are usually a payment of money but quite another to say they are always a payment of money.
Our decision in this case does not depend upon whether we adopt the NLRA definition of wages as opposed to the ordinary definition of the word. This is because payment of wages may be made in kind rather than cash even under the ordinary definition. See Pacific American Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 138 F.2d 464, 465 (9 Cir. 1943) (“Generally speaking, the term wages means compensation for labor or services, which may be in the form of money paid or other value given, such as board, lodging or clothes.”); Jackson v. Clintsman, *39991 Ariz. 314, 372 P.2d 204 (1962); Schumann v. California Cotton Credit Corporation, 105 Cal.App. 136, 140, 286 P. 1068, 1070 (1930) (“Wage is compensation for services rendered, and this compensation may take the form of money paid or other value given, such as board, lodging, or clothes.”); St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Richard, 208 So.2d 35, 39 (La.App.1968); Goodman v. Moss, 43 N.Y.S.2d 381, 385 (N.Y.Sup. Ct.1943) (“ ‘Wages’ is the price paid for services, and includes not only money' but even board, lodging and clothes.”); 92 C.J.S. Wage at 1038 (“may include not only money but board, lodging or clothes”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; Black’s Law Dictionary (Rev. Fourth Ed.).
The employees in the present case wished to receive a portion of their compensation in kind rather than cash. In pursuing this objective they were seeking to negotiate wages, a mandatory subject of bargaining. I would so hold.
II. Apart from this, I believe the court’s narrow and restrictive interpretation of the terms identifying mandatory bargaining subjects in Code § 20.9 violates the requirement of § 4.1(2) that Code terms “be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language.” I agree the legislature did not adopt the broad scope of mandatory bargaining provided in the NLRA. However,-this does not automatically require that the terms in § 20.9 be given a narrow and restricted meaning. Instead I believe § 4.1(2) requires that these terms be given their ordinary meaning.
This result is also supported by the mandate of § 4.2 that the Code’s “provisions and all proceedings under it shall be liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice.” We have no basis in the Code or in the legislative history of the PER Act for believing the legislature did not intend the statute to be implemented in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms.