Court Opinion

ID: 9400750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 09:11:16.850285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.605521
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                          TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 10-22-00373-CR

ARTURO LOPEZ,
                                                            Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                            Appellee

                          From the County Court at Law
                               Ellis County, Texas
                             Trial Court No. 2210619

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In two issues, appellant, Arturo Lopez, challenges his conviction for criminal

trespass, a Class B misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05. Specifically,

appellant contends that there was a variance between the indictment and proof at trial

and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
                                       Background

        In March 2021, Azucena Lopez bought a 16.77-acre property in Palmer, Texas,

from her mother. The property is divided into two sections: a residential section that is

about one acre and contains a home and a section that is zoned as farmland. The

residential section is listed as 2616 Wilson Road and is where Azucena lives with her wife,

Vanessa Pillow, and Pillow’s two children. Azucena’s brother, appellant, lived in a

mobile home and later a shack on the section of the property that is zoned as farmland.

The farmland section of the property is listed as 2588 Wilson Road.

        On July 29, 2021, appellant was given a criminal trespass warning for jumping the

fence and running an electrical cord from Azucena’s home at 2616 Wilson Road.

Thereafter, Azucena filed an eviction petition against appellant for the property at 2588

Wilson Road. She ultimately received a writ of possession, but physical eviction was

never completed because of a paperwork error, and because appellant moved to Mexico.

        On June 19, 2022, Pillow observed appellant filling a large jug from the “water

hydrant” on the property located at 2616 Wilson Road.           Appellant did not have

permission to be on the 2616 Wilson Road property. The entire property at 2616 Wilson

Road is fenced in and has a no trespassing sign posted on the gate. The gate has a chain

and a lock, and appellant does not have a key to the gate. After seeing appellant trespass

onto the 2616 Wilson Road property, Pillow called Azucena and then the police.

Lopez v. State                                                                       Page 2
Appellant quickly left the property by jumping over the fence. Pillow took pictures of

appellant jumping over the fence back to the property at 2588 Wilson Road.

        Appellant was charged by information with misdemeanor criminal trespass. At

the conclusion of trial, the jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense and assessed

punishment at 180 days in jail with a $1,000 fine. The trial court certified appellant’s right

of appeal, and this appeal followed.

            Alleged Variance Between the Information and the Proof at Trial

        In his first issue, appellant contends that a material variance exists between the

information and the proof at trial. Appellant argues the State failed to prove that

appellant committed the offense of criminal trespass because the information alleged that

Pillow is the owner of the property at 2616 Wilson Road even though the evidence

presented at trial established that Azucena is the owner.

STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

        The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of sufficiency

issues as follows:

        When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider
        whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
        the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319,
        99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.
        Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer “to
        the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
        testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
        basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh
        the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams
Lopez v. State                                                                             Page 3
        v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting
        a sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy
        but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d
        at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or
        evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the
        facts so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at
        trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson,
        443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App.
        2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
        from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution.
        Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because
        the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the
        witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323
        S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial
        evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be
        sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the
        incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey
        v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at
        13.

               We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
        to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as
        defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v.
        State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically
        correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
        the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof
        or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately
        describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see
        also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law
        as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the
        offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387
        S.W.3d at 665.

Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

        A variance occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in the

charging instrument and the evidence presented at trial. Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292,

294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “In a variance situation, the State has proven the defendant
Lopez v. State                                                                              Page 4
guilty of a crime but has proven its commission in a manner that varies from the

allegations in the charging instrument.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2001).

        In an evidentiary-sufficiency analysis, there are two types of variances: material

and immaterial variances. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A

variance is material if it: (1) fails to adequately inform the defendant of the charge against

him; or (2) subjects the defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime.

Ramjattansingh v. State, 548 S.W.3d 540, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at

258. A sufficiency review does not rest on how the jury was instructed, but we review

whether the evidence supports the elements of the charged crime. Walker v. State, 594

S.W.3d 330, 335-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The elements of the charged crime are defined

by the hypothetically correct jury charge that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by

the charging instrument, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden or proof or

unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. at 336. “As authorized by the

indictment” means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging

instrument. Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). “Only

material variances will affect the hypothetically correct jury charge” and render the

evidence legally insufficient. Hernandez v. State, 556 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. Crim. App.

Lopez v. State                                                                          Page 5
2017). On the other hand, “[a]llegations giving rise to immaterial variances may be

disregarded in the hypothetically correct [jury] charge.” Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 257.

        In addition to the foregoing, variances can occur in two different ways. Hernandez,

556 S.W.3d at 313. The first way—called a statutory variance—involves the statutory

language that defines the offense and occurs when the State’s proof at trial deviates from

the statutory theory of the offense as alleged in the charging instrument. Id. This type of

variance is always material and renders the evidence legally insufficient to support the

conviction. Id. The second way—called a non-statutory variance—occurs when the

State’s proof deviates from a “‘non-statutory allegation that is descriptive of the offense

in some way.’” Id. at 313-14 (quoting Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 294). A non-statutory

variance can be either material or immaterial, depending on whether it would result in a

different offense than what the State alleged in the indictment. Id. at 314.

        A person commits the offense of criminal trespass if the person enters or remains

on property of another, without effective consent, and the person had notice that the entry

was forbidden or received notice to depart but failed to do so. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §

30.05(a)(1)-(2). Ownership is not an element of criminal trespass. Langston v. State, 855

S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

        In arguing that a variance existed in this case, appellant asserts that although

ownership is not a necessary allegation to prove the offense of criminal trespass, when

the State alleges an owner of the property, it is required to prove that ownership

Lopez v. State                                                                          Page 6
allegation.      See id. at 721 (“Because the State elected to prosecute appellant on an

‘unnecessary specific allegation,’ the issue of ownership is germane to the instant case.”).

However, since Langston was decided, the Court of Criminal Appeals has required

sufficiency of the evidence to be analyzed under the hypothetically correct jury charge.

See Gharbi v. State, 131 S.W.3d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Adames v. State, 353

S.W.3d 854, 861-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (explaining that an appellate court applies the

Jackson v. Virginia standard of review to the hypothetically correct jury charge). In Gharbi,

the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the issue of whether the evidence is sufficient

to support a conviction for an offense when the charging instrument contains an

unnecessary allegation. See 131 S.W.3d at 481. The Gharbi Court held that an allegation

in a charging instrument that is “not a statutory element or an ‘integral part of an essential

element of the offense’” may be disregarded. Id. at 483 (quoting Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at

253-55). Thus, in this case, because ownership is not an element of the offense of criminal

trespass, the State was not required to prove ownership. See Langston, 855 S.W.3d at 721.

        In any event, appellant emphasizes that because the charging instrument did not

allege the “property of another,” but rather the property of Pillow, the State failed to meet

its burden of proof. We disagree.

        The information alleged that appellant “intentionally and knowingly enter[ed] the

property of another, namely Vanessa Pillow,” in Ellis County, Texas. This is a sufficient

allegation in a criminal trespass case. See Franks v. State, 688 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. Crim.

Lopez v. State                                                                          Page 7
App. 1985); Chunn v. State, 821 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet.

ref’d) (“Trespass is an offense against the owner’s possession and control of property, not

an offense against the property itself. Alleging that the offense occurred on March 24,

1990, in Harris County, Texas, on Leslie Moore’s property is sufficient” (internal citation

omitted)); Reed v. State, 762 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, pet. ref’d)

(“Trespass is an offense against the owner’s possession and control of property, rather

than an offense against the property itself . . . . The location of the property is not an

element of the offense. Thus, the allegation that the crime occurred in Galveston County

is sufficient to meet the notice requirements.” (internal emphasis and citations omitted)).

        Furthermore, to the extent that appellant complains that the information wrongly

identified Pillow as the owner of the property located at 2616 Wilson Road, we note that

when two people are joint possessors of property, even if only one is the legal owner,

either may be alleged for the purpose of prosecuting criminal trespass. See Weathered v.

State, 119 Tex. Crim. 90, 46 S.W.2d 701, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1932); Duncan v. State, 49

Tex. Crim. 150, 91 S.W. 572, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905); see also Vanderburg v. State, 874

S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that the State may establish ownership

in a trespass case by proving the complainant had a greater right to possession of the

property than the defendant); In re J.V., No. 04-12-00707-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5941,

at **7-8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 15, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (same). Here, the information alleged that appellant entered on the property

Lopez v. State                                                                       Page 8
of another, namely Pillow’s, without consent and that appellant had notice that entry was

forbidden. Further, the evidence presented at trial established that Pillow lives at the

property at 2616 Wilson Road with her two children and her spouse, Azucena, and that

Pillow manages the property when Azucena is away on National Guard duties, as she

was on the date of this offense. Therefore, based on the foregoing, we cannot say there

was a variance between the pleading and the proof in this case. As such, we overrule

appellant’s first issue.

                               Sufficiency of the Evidence

        In his second issue, appellant complains that the evidence is insufficient because

the State did not negate his claim that he lived on the property. In support of his

argument, appellant emphasizes that he lived on the property through the date Azucena

purchased the property from her mother and that Azucena never completed the eviction

process.

        A review of the record shows that appellant did not live at the property at 2616

Wilson Road after Azucena purchased both it and the property at 2588 Wilson Road from

her mother. Rather, appellant resided next door in a mobile home and later a shack on

the 2588 Wilson Road property. The record also reflects that the property located at 2616

Wilson Road was fenced in with a chain and lock and had a no trespassing sign. Both

Azucena and Pillow testified that appellant did not have permission to be on the property

at 2616 Wilson Road.

Lopez v. State                                                                      Page 9
        In his testimony, appellant disclaimed any ownership interest in 2616 Wilson Road

by stating, “I don’t want anything to do with that property.” Moreover, appellant’s

reliance on Azucena’s failure to complete the eviction proceedings is unpersuasive

because the eviction proceedings pertained to the property at 2588 Wilson Road, not 2616

Wilson Road—the property appellant trespassed upon.

        And as mentioned earlier, Pillow observed appellant filling a large jug from the

“water hydrant” by the house located at 2616 Wilson Road despite not having permission

to be on the property. Pillow took pictures of appellant jumping over the fence back to

the property at 2588 Wilson Road. These pictures were admitted into evidence.

        Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude

that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant

trespassed on the property of another and that the property was not appellant’s. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05; see also Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732-33. And to the extent that

the evidence conflicts, we note that jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the

credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. See Montgomery

v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also Green v. State, 607 S.W.3d 147,

152 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). The jury may choose to believe or

disbelieve all or part of a witness’s testimony, and to the extent conflicts in the evidence

exist, we presume the jury resolved any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing

party. See Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“We defer to the

Lopez v. State                                                                         Page 10
jury’s finding when the record provides a conflict in the evidence.”); see also Green, 607

S.W.3d at 152. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s

conviction for criminal trespass. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05; see also Zuniga, 551

S.W.3d at 732-33. We overrule appellant’s second issue.

                                       Conclusion

         Having overruled both of appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

                                                 STEVE SMITH
                                                 Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson,
       and Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed June 7, 2023
Do not publish
[CR25]

Lopez v. State                                                                     Page 11