Court Opinion

ID: 9953758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 20:02:53.435889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:48.441552
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 P. v. Diaz CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                       SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                             B323131

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                      Los Angeles County
                                                         Super. Ct. No. BA225116
          v.

 JUAN ANTONIO DIAZ,

          Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Terry A. Bork, Judge. Affirmed.

      Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      _________________________
      Defendant and appellant Juan Antonio Diaz appeals
from the superior court’s order denying his petition to vacate
his murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 We
conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s findings, after
an evidentiary hearing and beyond a reasonable doubt, that Diaz
was a major participant in an attempted robbery and he acted
with reckless indifference to human life. Therefore, we affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.    The Trial
      a.    The crimes2
      The People charged Diaz with the murder of Hector
Quevado (§ 187, subd. (a)) and the attempted second degree
robbery of a different victim (§§ 211, 664). The People also
alleged gang and firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1),
12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)).
      At trial, the People presented evidence that Diaz, Abel
Lopez, and Modesto Torres were members or associates of the
“Crazies” gang, with the monikers “Lonely,” “Snoopy,” and
“Chato,” respectively.
      On October 30, 2001, Torres was walking home when he
saw Diaz and Lopez in a stolen white Toyota Camry. Both Diaz
and Lopez were 19 years old at the time. Lopez was driving

1    References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered to section
1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2     We take our statement of facts from the testimony at
Diaz’s trial. We previously granted the Attorney General’s
Request for Judicial Notice of the reporters’ and clerk’s
transcripts from the trial.

                                2
and Diaz was in the front passenger’s seat. Diaz and Lopez
invited Torres to drive around with them, and he agreed.
       After visiting a restaurant, the group saw a teenage boy
riding a bicycle. Lopez made a sharp right turn and stopped
the car, nearly hitting the bicyclist. Lopez yelled at Diaz to “jack”
the bicyclist, i.e. to rob him. Diaz got out of the car, ran after
the bicyclist, and threatened to beat the teenager unless he
handed over the bicycle. The teenager refused and rode away.
Diaz very briefly chased after him before getting back in the car.
       After the attempted robbery, Torres asked Lopez to take
him home because he did not “want to get involved in all that
thing.” Diaz and Lopez told Torres to “shut up,” and said,
“Don’t be a [wimp].”
       The group stopped at a gas station to fill up the car around
9:30 p.m. Lopez started talking to a woman standing nearby,
who appeared to be working as a prostitute. The woman made
a motion toward Quevado, who was standing across the street.
Lopez became angry when he saw Quevado.
       Lopez drove Diaz and Torres across the street, and he
stopped the car near Quevado. Diaz got out of the Camry. Lopez
opened the driver’s side door and put his left leg on the ground,
while keeping his right leg inside the car.
       Diaz and Lopez repeatedly asked Quevado, in an angry
tone, why he was “pimping” in their “hood.” Diaz approached
Quevado and threatened to beat him up unless he turned over
his “ ‘money, wallet, everything you have.’ ” Quevado said he
“didn’t have nothing,” and Diaz swung his fist at Quevado.
       Diaz told Lopez to “ ‘[h]it him up.’ ” Diaz and Lopez then
asked Quevado, “ ‘Where you from?’ ” Quevado responded that
he is from Temple, which is a rival gang to the Crazies.

                                  3
       After Quevado identified his gang, Lopez pulled out a gun
and fired four to five shots at him. Quevado fell to the ground.
According to Torres, Diaz told Lopez to stop shooting, and the
two got back in the car.3 Lopez fired two or three more shots
at Quevado from inside the car and then drove away. Diaz
did not try to stop Lopez from shooting the gun. Three bullets
ultimately hit Quevado, two of which were fatal.
       As they drove away, Lopez told Torres not to “ ‘snitch’ ”
or mention the shooting. Torres again asked Lopez to take him
home. Lopez replied, “ ‘I’m going to take you home, you little
[wimp], because you whine too much.’ ” Diaz was silent.
       The next evening, October 31, 2001, Diaz attended a large
party at which Lopez, Torres, and other Crazies gang members
were present. The party was only a few blocks from the scene
of the shooting. Around 3:30 a.m., officers spotted the stolen
Camry parked near the party. Torres was sitting in the driver’s
seat and Diaz was in the front passenger’s seat.
       When the officers passed the Camry, Diaz, Torres, and
another person ran from the car. Officers eventually found Diaz
lying face down on the ground in a dark area. About two feet
away from Diaz, officers found a handgun the same caliber
as that used in the shooting. Officers searched Diaz and found
a “shaved key,” which is essentially a “skeleton key” that could
be used to start a variety of Toyotas.
       b.    Witness intimidation
       Torres was the prosecution’s main witness at trial, and
he testified to most of the facts summarized above. Torres had
previously testified against Diaz at the preliminary hearing.

3    Torres revealed this fact for the first time at trial.

                                 4
According to Torres, after the preliminary hearing, Diaz’s
brother, Hugo, showed up at his house dressed in a delivery-
person uniform. At the time, Torres did not know Hugo, nor
did he know Hugo was Diaz’s brother. Hugo told Torres someone
had sent him a computer, and he convinced Torres to drive
with him to a warehouse to get it. Hugo instead drove Torres
for 45 minutes to the Angeles Crest Forest. Hugo stopped the
truck, put on gloves and a sweater, and asked Torres, “ ‘Why you
snitching, fool?’ ” Hugo tried to force Torres to walk with him
into the forest, but Torres escaped and ran to safety.
       c.    Gang testimony
       The prosecution’s gang expert testified the Crazies is a
gang whose members claim as their territory the locations of
the attempted robberies and shooting. According to the expert,
gangs use their territory to commit crimes. Some of the Crazies’
primary criminal activities included homicides, assaults with
firearms, and prostitution.
       The expert explained it is the “ultimate sign [of] disrespect”
to make money in a gang’s territory if you are not a member of
that gang. It is significantly worse if the person making money is
a member of a rival gang. If a gang member is caught in a rival
gang’s territory, it is “very likely” he will be killed. Asking a
gang member “ ‘where you from’ ” is a challenge likely to provoke
a violent response, and it is a common prelude to a shooting.
       The expert testified that “Temple Street” and Crazies are
rival gangs. Around the time of the shooting, the police had
noticed graffiti with the names of both gangs crossed out next
to the number 187. The graffiti signified the gang members from
both sides were looking to kill members of the other gang. The

                                  5
expert explained the graffiti was akin to a declaration of war
against the rival.
       d.    Diaz’s accounts of the incidents
       Police officers interviewed Diaz about the shooting. Diaz
told them he and Lopez were friends and had known each other
for five years. Diaz said he is “from” Crazies, but he had not been
“jumped in.” Torres and Lopez were also from Crazies.
       Diaz initially suggested he and Lopez met the day of the
shooting because Diaz had the stolen Camry, and Lopez wanted
to get it from him. Later, Diaz said Lopez picked him up in
the Camry around two or three in the afternoon.
       Diaz admitted being present for the Quevado shooting.
Diaz told police he said “ ‘[h]it him up’ ” and then asked Quevado
“ ‘[w]here you from?’ ” Quevado responded, “Temple Street,”
and Lopez started shooting him. Diaz claimed he did not know
Lopez had a gun.
       Diaz testified in his own defense at trial. He admitted
intending to commit the robberies, but he insisted he was acting
according to Lopez’s instructions. According to Diaz, Lopez
told him to “hit [Quevado] up.” Diaz then challenged Quevado
by asking him “ ‘[w]here are you from?’ ” Diaz claimed he did
not know Lopez had a gun and was shocked when he started
shooting. After Diaz got back in the car, he asked Lopez why
he did that, but Lopez did not respond. Lopez drove for a block
and dropped off Diaz and Torres.
       e.    The verdict and sentencing
       The jury convicted Diaz of first degree murder and
attempted second degree robbery. (People v. Diaz (Aug. 30, 2004,
B169353) [nonpub. opn.].) The jury found true allegations that
Diaz committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street

                                 6
gang and that a principal personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm causing Quevado’s death. The trial court—the
Honorable Marsha N. Revel—sentenced Diaz to a term of
50 years to life in prison. On August 30, 2004, this division
affirmed Diaz’s conviction. (Ibid.)
2.     Diaz’s petition for resentencing
       After Senate Bill No. 1437 took effect, Diaz filed, on
April 22, 2019, a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95.
At a hearing on the petition, the superior court concluded, “the
evidence at trial, as described in the court of appeal’s opinion,
show[s] that the defendant was a major participant in the crime
and acted with reckless indifference” to human life within the
meaning of sections 189, subdivision (e)(3) and 190.2, subdivision
(d). The court stated Diaz therefore was “not eligible for relief”
and denied his petition.
       Diaz appealed, arguing the superior court erred by denying
his petition based on the Court of Appeal’s opinion without
permitting him to present new evidence as well as argument
on accomplice liability. We agreed and reversed the order.
(See People v. Diaz (Dec. 23, 2020, B301598) [nonpub. opn.].)
We remanded the case for the superior court to issue an order
to show cause and to proceed to an evidentiary hearing at which
the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that Diaz is ineligible for resentencing and both parties
could offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens. (Ibid.)
       The superior court complied with our directions and held
an evidentiary hearing to reconsider Diaz’s petition. Neither
side presented new evidence at the hearing. After listening
to argument, the court discussed each factor identified by the

                                7
California Supreme Court as relevant to determining whether
a defendant was a major participant in a felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. We discuss the court’s
findings in more detail below. The court concluded, beyond a
reasonable doubt, Diaz was guilty of felony murder as a major
participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference
to human life. Accordingly, the court denied Diaz’s resentencing
petition.
       Diaz timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
1.     Section 1172.6
       “In Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) . . . , the
Legislature significantly narrowed the scope of the felony-murder
rule. It also created a path to relief for defendants who had
previously been convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory
but who could not have been convicted under the new law.
Resentencing is available under the new law if the defendant
neither killed nor intended to kill and was not ‘a major
participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
[Penal Code] section 190.2’ (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e); see id.,
§ 1172.6; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 3–4; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).”
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 703 (Strong).)
       Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism by which a person
convicted of murder under the former law may be resentenced if
he could no longer be convicted of murder because of the changes
to section 188. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; see generally
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843; People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959–960.) Once a petitioner establishes
a prima facie case for relief and the superior court issues an order

                                 8
to show cause, the matter proceeds to an evidentiary hearing
at which it is the prosecution’s burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.
(Strong, at pp. 708–709; People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
943, 951 (Vargas).) If the superior court finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder
notwithstanding the amendments to sections 188 and 189,
the petitioner is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
(Strong, at pp. 708–709; Vargas, at p. 951.)
2.     Our standard of review
       While the superior court acts as an independent factfinder
in determining whether the People have met their burden,
on appeal the reviewing court applies the substantial evidence
standard. (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951; People
v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745, 747.) Under this
familiar standard, we review the entire record in the light
most favorable to the order to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Vargas, at p. 951; People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276,
298.) “We determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658,
715.) In so doing, a reviewing court presumes in support of the
order the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce
from the evidence. (People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458,
476 (Nieber); People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022
(Owens).) Substantial evidence also includes circumstantial

                                 9
evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57; Nieber,
at p. 476.)
       We resolve all evidentiary conflicts and questions of
credibility in favor of the order. (People v. Brady (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014, quoting People v. Cardenas (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 220, 226–227.) We cannot reweigh the evidence or
reassess witness credibility on our own. (People v. Young (2005)
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies
in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact].)
3.     Substantial evidence supports the superior court’s
       finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Diaz
       is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6
       In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks),
and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), and again
in In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 (Scoggins), our Supreme
Court identified the overlapping factors for assessing whether
the defendant was a major participant in an underlying serious
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life for
purposes of section 190.2, subdivision (d), and thus for section
189, subdivision (e)(3). These three cases charted a “spectrum
of culpability” set forth in two opinions from the United States
Supreme Court: Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 and
Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison).
       “[I]t is important to consider where the defendant’s conduct
falls on the ‘spectrum of culpability’ that Enmund and Tison
established. . . . On one end of the spectrum is Enmund, ‘the
minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither
intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental
state.’ ” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 675.) At the other end

                                10
of the spectrum are the 19- and 20-year-old defendants in the
Tison case, who were major participants who acted with reckless
indifference to human life, even though neither of them shot
any murder victim. (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 139–142, 158.)
The California Supreme Court has embraced these federal
decisions as “instructive.” (Scoggins, at p. 675.)
       In Banks the Supreme Court listed the following factors
to consider in determining whether the defendant was a major
participant in one of the specified felonies: “What role did the
defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led
to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in
supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the
defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of
the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the
other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene
of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual
murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after
lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
       Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. As to the subjective element, the defendant
must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner
in which the particular offense is committed, and he must
consciously disregard the significant risk of death his actions
create. As to the objective element, the risk of death must be
of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to
him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)

                               11
       In Scoggins the Supreme Court listed the following factors
to consider in determining whether the defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life: “Did the defendant use or
know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many
weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically
present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to
restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration
of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and
the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or
her confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using
lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize
the risks of violence during the felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 677; see Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–622.)
       The requirements for finding major participation and
reckless indifference to human life significantly overlap, for
the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder,
the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615; see Owens,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1023.) No one of these considerations
is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.
(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; see Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803.) “We analyze the totality of circumstances”
(Scoggins, at p. 677; see People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
575, 592) to determine whether Diaz acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
       We apply the Banks/Clark/Scoggins factors to the
evidence here:
       a.    Major participant
       Role in planning. The superior court observed “[t]here’s
no evidence of planning, per se, on the part of either of the two

                                12
participants” with respect to the robbery of Quevado specifically.
Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence Diaz and Lopez made
a general plan to commit robberies that day.
       At trial, the parties stipulated Lopez and Diaz were driving
around in a stolen Camry the day of the shooting. Although Diaz
testified that Lopez picked him up in the car, Diaz had previously
suggested to the police he brought the car to Lopez. That
conclusion is supported by the fact that the police searched Diaz
and found he was carrying a “shaved key” capable of starting
Toyotas. Moreover, about a day after the shooting, the police
observed Diaz, but not Lopez, in the stolen car, which suggests
Diaz was its primary caretaker.
       The evidence also shows Diaz and Lopez were driving
around for hours with no apparent destination in mind,
suggesting they had intended to use the stolen car to commit
crimes. When they eventually came across a teenager on a bike,
Lopez drove the car very close to the teenager and told Diaz
to “jack” him. Diaz got out of the car without hesitation and
demanded the teenager’s bike, suggesting he had anticipated
committing a robbery. After the teenager escaped, Diaz willingly
got back in the car, which indicates he had been a willing
participant in the attempted robbery.
       The record shows Diaz and Lopez continued to drive
around aimlessly until they came across Quevado. As with
the prior attempted robbery, Lopez drove up to the victim.
Without hesitation or any prompting from Lopez, Diaz got out
of the car and demanded Quevado’s property.
       Considered together, this is strong circumstantial evidence
the attempt to rob Quevado—although not specifically planned—
was part of a more general plan by Diaz and Lopez to commit

                                13
robberies that day. It is also strong circumstantial evidence Diaz
played a prominent role in forming that plan.
       Supplying weapons. The superior court found, and the
parties agree, there’s no evidence Diaz gave Lopez the gun he
used to shoot Quevado.
       Awareness of danger posed by nature of the crime,
weapons used, or past experience or conduct of other participants.
Mere hours before attempting to rob Quevado, Diaz and Lopez
attempted to rob a different victim using a remarkably similar
modus operandi. Like the attempt to rob Quevado, Lopez drove
a stolen car close to the victim. Diaz got out of the car, demanded
the victim’s property under threat of physical harm, and then
returned to the car to flee with Lopez.
       It also is reasonable to infer Diaz was aware any attempt
to rob Quevado would be more dangerous than a typical robbery.
According to Torres, the confrontation began with Diaz and
Lopez repeatedly asking Quevado, in an angry tone, why he
was “pimping” in their “hood.” Those comments indicate Diaz
believed Quevado had been procuring a prostitute in his gang’s
territory. Diaz also directed a gang challenge at Quevado—
“where you from”—which indicates he suspected Quevado was
a gang member. Given Diaz’s history of associating with the
Crazies gang, it is reasonable to infer he was aware there was
a significant risk the encounter would turn violent, depending
on how Quevado responded to the gang challenge.
       Defendant’s presence at scene of killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder; role of defendant’s own
actions or inaction in the death. The record shows Diaz was
present at the scene and played a significant role in escalating
the incident from an attempted robbery to a gang killing.

                                14
According to Torres, Diaz approached Quevado and demanded
he turn over his property. Lopez did not direct or instruct Diaz;
Diaz got out of the car and attempted to rob Quevado entirely on
his own. When Quevado claimed not to have anything valuable,
Diaz swung his fist at Quevado, told Lopez to “ ‘[h]it [Quevado]
up,’ ” and directed a gang challenge at Quevado by asking
him “ ‘[w]here you from?’ ” As the superior court observed,
Diaz’s actions steered the confrontation towards violence and
“elevated this tragic situation from a mere strong arm robbery
to something more dangerous.”
       We acknowledge there is some evidence Diaz tried
to restrain Lopez. Torres testified that Diaz told Lopez to
“stop shooting” during the first flurry of bullets. However, the
superior court reasonably could have disregarded this testimony
as not credible. Torres revealed this information for the first
time at trial. Torres also testified that Diaz’s brother had
threatened him after he testified against Diaz at the preliminary
hearing. This threat provided a significant incentive for Torres
to fabricate evidence favorable to Diaz.
       Even if Diaz had initially directed Lopez to stop shooting,
the record shows he made no similar attempt to stop Lopez from
opening fire on Quevado a second time. According to Torres,
Diaz and Lopez got back into the car after Lopez fired the initial
shots. Lopez was in the driver’s seat, and Diaz was in the front
passenger’s seat. Lopez then fired two or three more shots at
Quevado, who was lying on the ground. It is possible those were
the shots that ultimately killed Quevado. Diaz certainly knew
by that point Lopez had a gun he was willing to use, and Diaz
was close enough to Lopez to intervene physically. According to
Torres, Diaz instead sat silently as Lopez repeatedly fired at a

                                15
defenseless victim. (In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999,
1013–1015 [defendant “was present when the violence ensued
but took no steps to prevent it”; even accepting defendant’s “self-
serving statements after the crime that he did not know [shooter]
had a gun,” he “knew, by no later than the warning shot, that
[shooter] was both carrying and willing to fire a gun”].)
        Actions after the use of lethal force. Diaz fled with Lopez
immediately after the shooting. There’s no indication Diaz tried
to call for help for Quevado or report Quevado’s injuries to anyone
who could provide aid. The next day, Diaz attended the same
party as Lopez, which was held at a house only a few blocks
from the scene of the murder.
        b.    Reckless indifference to human life
        Use of gun or knowledge a gun would be used. The
superior court found Diaz was not armed with, and did not use,
a gun. Nor is there direct evidence Diaz knew Lopez had a gun
before Lopez fired the first shots.
        Nevertheless, the superior court noted there is some
circumstantial evidence suggesting Diaz was aware Lopez was
armed before he attempted to rob Quevado. As we discussed
above, Diaz’s comments during the attempted robbery indicate
he suspected Quevado was a member of another gang and
engaged in criminal activity inside the Crazies’ territory.
Given Diaz’s history of associating with the Crazies gang,
it is reasonable to infer he was aware there was a significant
risk of violence if he attempted to rob Quevado under those
circumstances. For the same reasons, it also is reasonable
to infer Diaz believed Quevado might be carrying a weapon.
Diaz nevertheless singlehandedly approached and attempted
to rob Quevado, swung his fist at Quevado, and directed a gang

                                16
challenge at Quevado. It is reasonable to infer Diaz would not
have acted so cavalierly unless he knew Lopez or Torres had
access to some sort of weapon. Moreover, the fact that Lopez
and Torres remained at a distance during the encounter suggests
Diaz knew the weapon was a gun.
       Number of weapons ultimately used. There was evidence
only of one gun.
       Physical presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain
the crime. As we discussed, Diaz was present during the
shooting, but it is not clear whether he was close enough to Lopez
to stop him from firing the initial shots at Quevado. However,
Diaz certainly was close enough to Lopez to attempt to prevent
him from firing the second series of shots. Rather than doing so,
the record shows Diaz sat silently in the passenger’s seat as
Lopez fired at a defenseless, prone victim. (See In re McDowell,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1013–1015; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 619 [“ ‘the defendant’s presence allows him to observe
his cohorts so that it is fair to conclude that he shared in their
actions and mental state’ ”]; Nieber, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 478–479 [defendant present at robbery; didn’t intervene
to prevent murder]; cf. Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 678
[defendant, who remained at nearby gas station during
the course of the crime, “was not in a position to restrain”
the shooter]; Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 807 [defendant
“did not see the shooting happen, did not have reason to know
it was going to happen, and could not do anything to stop it”];
In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1025–1026 [defendant
was “across the street” and “did not see or know if anyone was
shot or hurt”].)

                               17
       Duration of interaction between perpetrators and victims.
The time from Diaz’s initial confrontation until the shooting
seems to have been relatively brief. Nevertheless, Diaz had
many opportunities to try to deescalate the confrontation
during that time. (See In re McDowell, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1005, 1012, 1014 [defendant was major participant who
acted with reckless indifference even though “events unfolded
quickly” after defendant and shooter entered victim’s home,
and whole incident took maybe a minute].)
       Defendant’s knowledge of confederate’s propensity for
violence or likelihood of using lethal force. The day of the
shooting, Lopez nearly struck a teenager with his car while
attempting to rob him of a bicycle. Diaz was in the car at the
time, so he certainly was aware of Lopez’s dangerous maneuver.
Lopez’s propensity for violence and willingness to use lethal force
also would have been obvious to Diaz after Lopez fired the first
series of shots at Quevado, but before he fired the second series.
       Efforts, if any, to minimize risks of violence during the
felony. Instead of working to alleviate the rising tensions and
risk of violence, Diaz repeatedly exacerbated them. First, he
turned a verbal confrontation into a physical one by swinging
his fist at Quevado. Diaz then escalated the risk of violence
further by instructing Lopez—a fellow gang associate—to “ ‘[h]it
[Quevado] up.’ ” Diaz escalated the risk of violence yet again
when he directed a gang challenge at Quevado, “ ‘[w]here you
from.’ ” Once that risk materialized in the form of Lopez firing
a series of shots at Quevado, Diaz did nothing to minimize the
risk of further violence. Instead, he sat silently next to Lopez
as he fired what may well have been the fatal shots.

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       c.    Totality of the circumstances
       The record shows Diaz played a central role in forming
and executing a plan to commit robberies, repeatedly escalated
the risk of violence during the encounter with Quevado, and took
no meaningful steps to protect or aid Quevado once that risk
materialized. Considering the totality of the circumstances in
the light most favorable to the superior court’s ruling—including
Diaz’s youth at the time of the incident—we conclude substantial
evidence supports the superior court’s finding that Diaz could
be convicted of murder under the new felony-murder standard
because he was a major participant in the underlying felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
       We are not persuaded by Diaz’s arguments to the contrary.
According to Diaz, the record shows he intended only to commit
an unarmed robbery at Lopez’s direction, he had no reason
to suspect Lopez was armed or would shoot the victim, and the
murder was solely the result of Lopez’s impulsivity and anger.
Diaz arrives at these conclusions by viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to him, while overlooking or minimizing
the evidence pointing to his guilt. On appeal, we view the
evidence in the opposite light, drawing all reasonable inferences
in favor of the court’s decision. (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th
at p. 951.) Where, as here, “ ‘the circumstances reasonably
justify the trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion
the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with
a contrary finding does not warrant the [order]’s reversal.’ ”
(People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
       Diaz’s reliance on In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384
(Ramirez) is misplaced. In that case, the 19-year-old defendant
found two guns in an abandoned house. He and three juveniles

                                 19
decided they “ ‘ “wanted to jack somebody.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 389–
391.) Later, Ramirez’s 16-year-old friend Josh along with
another juvenile jogged toward a truck in a parking lot across
the street from a bar. Josh had one of the guns. Ramirez
heard shots. He gave Josh a ride away from the scene on the
handlebars of his bike. Ramirez told police he hadn’t seen
anything. (Ibid.)
       In vacating the jury’s special circumstance finding,
the appellate court noted that, although Ramirez “was in close
proximity to the shooting,” he was not “close enough to exercise
a restraining effect on the crime or his colleagues.” (Ramirez,
supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 388, 391, 405.) The court also
stressed the lack of evidence showing Ramirez elevated the
risk to human life beyond that inherent in any armed robbery.
(Id. at pp. 405–406.)
       Neither can be said for Diaz. Unlike the defendant in
Ramirez, Diaz was an active participant in the attempted robbery
and within feet of the shooter when he fired the shots. Even if
Diaz had been too far away to stop the initial round of shots,
he was seated directly next to Lopez in a small sedan when Lopez
fired the second series of shots. There also is ample evidence
that Diaz’s conduct significantly increased the risk the attempted
robbery would turn violent. Under these circumstances, it is
reasonable to conclude Diaz is more culpable than the defendant
in Ramirez.
       Diaz next contends the superior court erred by failing
to consider his relative youth—19 years old—at the time of
the crime. Although the court did not mention Diaz’s age while
reciting its factual findings, it is apparent the court considered it
before reaching its final decision. At the resentencing hearing,

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Diaz’s counsel argued his age was a relevant factor and “bears
some serious analysis.” After counsel finished her argument,
the court invited the People to discuss “the issue of Mr. Diaz
being apparently 19 years old at the time of this. [The District
Attorney’s office] has taken the position that the brain of a
19-year-old doesn’t fully mature until age 25, even though they’re
adults. As a matter of law, your office takes the position that
that brain isn’t fully mature.” From these remarks, it is apparent
the court was aware of, and gave consideration to, Diaz’s youth.
We decline to second guess the court’s implicit finding that
Diaz’s age did not warrant a decision in his favor.
      Nor is remand required under People v. Jones (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1076. In Jones, the petitioner appealed after the
superior court denied his resentencing petition at a March 2021
hearing. The Court of Appeal remanded the case on the basis
that the superior court failed to discuss explicitly the petitioner’s
youth when he committed the crime. (Id. at pp. 1079, 1082.)
The court explained in “the usual case, the fact that a court
did not specifically mention certain evidence does not mean that
the court ‘ignored’ that evidence. As [the petitioner] points out,
however, it is unlikely in this particular instance that the trial
court could have known to consider [the petitioner’s] age and
maturity level, particularly to the extent now required by cases
issued after [the petitioner’s] hearing.” (Id. at p. 1092.) The
cases to which the Jones court was referring were issued in
February 2021, August 2021, November 2021, and March 2022.
(See People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939; In re Moore
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970; In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450.)
Here, Diaz’s resentencing hearing took place in July 2022,

                                 21
well after all of those cases had been issued. Given this timeline,
the superior court should have known Diaz’s age was relevant
to the issues before it, and we may “presume the [superior] court
followed the law in exercising its duties and duly considered
the evidence presented to it.” (Jones, at p. 1092.)
       We also reject Diaz’s suggestion that he could not have
acted with reckless indifference to human life because he was
only 19 years old at the time of the crime. “[T]he case law
discussing the differences in brain development among youthful
offenders (in contrast to their adult counterparts) stress[es]
two areas of divergence: (1) their relative impulsivity; and
(2) their vulnerability to peer pressure. (See, e.g., Miller [v.
Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460,] 461.)” (People v. Oliver (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489.) The record does not indicate Diaz’s
criminal behavior was substantially motivated by either factor.
This is not a case where “a youthful offender was swept up in
circumstances beyond his or her control that led to an unintended
death.” (Ibid.) Instead, Diaz and Lopez were similarly-aged
peers who jointly formed a plan to commit a series of crimes
to benefit their gang. (Cf. People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
546, 562 [15-year-old defendant who was given gang moniker at
age six “would have felt pressure” to “go along with the robbery”
instigated by older gang member].) Diaz’s “actions during this
crime did not show ‘a transient rashness’ or ‘inability to assess
consequences.’ (Miller [v. Alabama], supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 471–
472.) Nor do we perceive any ‘ “impetuosity” ’ or ‘ “failure to
appreciate risks and consequences.” ’ ” (Oliver, at p. 490;
cf. People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975, 991
[15-year-old defendant “ ‘influenced by peer pressure’ ” and
“afraid” of consequences if he didn’t aid shooter].)

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                       DISPOSITION
     We affirm the order.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                 EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

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