Court Opinion

ID: 9383091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 16:00:52.462218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.545639
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
                                          )
DENIERIKA F. GREEN,                       )
                                          )
      Plaintiff,                          )
                                          )
             v.                           )
                                          ) Case No. 21-cv-02061 (APM)
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION,             )
                                          )
      Defendant.                          )
_________________________________________ )

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Plaintiff Denierika F. Green was waiting in the checkout line at a Costco in Washington,

D.C., when a store employee carrying a case of bottled water on his shoulder made contact with

her head. Plaintiff claims that this contact resulted in a concussion and various long-term medical

issues, which kept her out of work and eventually forced her to retire. The court has construed

Plaintiff’s pro se complaint and legal brief to assert three theories of negligence: (1) ordinary

negligence, (2) negligence per se, and (3) res ipsa loquitur. Plaintiff seeks $350,000 in damages

to recover lost income and medical expenses.

       Before the court is Defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation’s motion for summary

judgment. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 20 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.]. For the reasons stated

below, the motion is granted.

                                                I.

                                                A.

       On January 8, 2019, Plaintiff was waiting in the checkout line at the Costco store located

at 2441 Market Street, N.E. in Washington, D.C. Def.’s Mot., Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot., ECF

No. 20-1 [hereinafter Def.’s Mem.], at 1. A Costco employee walked by carrying a case of bottled
water on his shoulder, instead of on a cart. Id. Plaintiff felt something strike the back of her head.

She initially believed she was hit by a bird. Pl.’s Dep. Tr., ECF No. 27 [hereinafter Pl.’s Dep.].

        Plaintiff claims that she suffered a concussion from the strike. She “was precluded from

work several times; at the initial incident January 8th 2019, January 23rd 2019 for 4 weeks and

ultimately for the remainder of the year May 13th 2019.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 23

[hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.], Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Opp’n, ECF No. 23-13 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n],

at 9 1; see Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 11, ECF No. 23-11 [hereinafter Pl.’s Ex. 11] (primary care provider’s

notes excusing Plaintiff from work).             She also claims to have developed long-term health

conditions that forced her to retire from work, including post-concussion syndrome, whiplash,

hearing loss with tinnitus, vision impairment, post-traumatic stress disorder, adjustment disorder, 2

vertigo, and dizziness. Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. In November 2020, a clinical neuropsychologist

conducted an evaluation and found Plaintiff had a “mildly abnormal exam with psychomotor

slowing, attentional difficulties, and inefficient learning for words,” but stated that the issues were

likely due to a multitude of causes, such as “pre-existing factors, normal intra-individual

variability, sleep fragmentation, and psychiatric distress,” and that it was “unlikely that these

difficulties [were] the direct result of her concussion.” Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 9, ECF No. 23-9 [hereinafter

Pl.’s Ex. 9].

1
  ECF pagination is used for Plaintiff’s opposition brief.
2
  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines adjustment disorders as “[t]he presence of
emotional or behavioral symptoms in response to an identifiable stressor(s) occurring within 3 months of the onset of
the stressor(s).” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2022).

                                                         2
                                                 B.

       Plaintiff filed suit on July 7, 2021, in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia,

demanding $350,000 in “money damages,” including $35,727 for medical expenses. Notice of

Removal, ECF No. 1, Ex. A, ECF No. 1-2 at 10–11. On July 29, 2021, Defendant filed a Notice

of Removal to this court and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Notice of Removal,

Civil Cover Sheet, ECF No. 1-1 at 2; Costco Wholesale Corp.’s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl.,

ECF No. 2. The court denied Costco’s motion to dismiss. Minute Order, Aug. 9, 2021. Construing

her pro se complaint liberally, the court found that Plaintiff had pleaded a plausible claim of

negligence. Id.; see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[A] pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.”) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Costco subsequently filed a

motion for summary judgment. See Def.’s Mot.

                                                 II.

       Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); accord Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

A genuine issue of material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The movant must demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. When determining whether a genuine

issue of material fact exists, the trier of fact must view all facts, and reasonable inferences drawn

from those facts, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986).

                                                 3
                                                III.

                                                 A.

       Defendant’s argument for summary judgment largely rests on Plaintiff’s failure to support

her negligence claim with expert testimony. Def.’s Mem. at 7–11. Plaintiff designated neither a

standard-of-care expert nor a medical expert to establish causation. Plaintiff responds that no

expert testimony is required to support her negligence claim. Pl.’s Opp’n at 9. She does not

require a standard-of-care expert because she advances theories of negligence per se and res ipsa

loquitor. See id. (“Why must an expert testify to an obvious preventable safety hazard?”). And a

causation expert is not needed because she has submitted medical records as evidence of her

injuries. Id. (“As all my submitted medical records state, I have Cognitive and Memory Recall

issues.”). The court concludes that Plaintiff cannot proceed without a medical expert.

       “There is no inflexible requirement in a personal injury case that the plaintiff produce

expert medical testimony on causation.” Williams v. Patterson, 681 A.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. 1996).

“In the absence of ‘complicated medical questions,’ the plaintiff’s own testimony, without need

for supporting expert medical testimony, will suffice to prove causation of injury.” Int’l Sec. Corp.

of Va. v. McQueen, 497 A.2d 1076, 1080 (D.C. 1985) (quoting Jones v. Miller, 290 A.2d 587, 590

(D.C. 1972)). On the other hand, “in cases presenting medically complicated questions due to

multiple and/or preexisting causes, or questions as to the permanence of the injury, . . . expert

testimony is required on the issue of causation.” Baltimore v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 545 A.2d 1228,

1231 (D.C. 1988) (internal citations omitted). This case falls into the latter category.

       As noted, Plaintiff asserts that as a result of being hit in the head with a case of bottled

water she has suffered multiple long-term ailments. According to her opposition, Plaintiff seeks

to recover damages for the following:

                                                 4
               Damages—I was diagnosed with a Concussion. As a result I now
               suffer from Post-Concussion Syndrome, Whiplash (which
               exacerbated pre-existing Cervical Radiculopathy such that, I need
               more intensive treatments and possibly surgery) Hearing Loss with
               Tinnitus, (I now wear a Hearing Device) Vision Impairment with
               Bifocals (I did not wear glasses before) PTSD, Adjustment
               Disorder, Vertigo and Dizziness (I walk with a cane) I also use a
               shower and toilet chair assistance. I also have a disability parking
               placard and will soon have provisions placed upon my license.

Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. In addition, she also demands compensation for lost wages: “I have claimed

‘Loss of Capacity to Earn’” and “I have been unable to work since the incident.” Id. at 20.

For these types of claimed injuries and losses, Plaintiff was required to come forward with expert

testimony to establish causation. See, e.g., Williams v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat. Training Sch. for

Deaconesses & Missionaries, 924 A.2d 1000, 1003 (D.C. 2007).

       The limited medical records that Plaintiff attaches to her opposition make the point. One

from November 25, 2020, states:

               Ms. Green produced a mildly abnormal exam with psychomotor
               slowing, attentional difficulties, and inefficient learning for words.
               These difficulties likely have a multifactorial etiology, including
               pre-existing factors, normal intra-individual variability, sleep
               fragmentation, and psychiatric distress. It is unlikely that these
               difficulties are the direct result of her concussion.

Pl.’s Ex. 9. Another record from July 2020 describes Plaintiff has having “[c]hronic pain,”

“anxiety disorder,” and a “probable concussion,” and notes that “some issues [were] likely due to

mood and sleep issues” and were potentially “multi etiologic.” Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 10, ECF No. 23-10

[hereinafter Pl.’s Ex. 10], at 1–3. As these records make clear, Plaintiff does not present with the

type of uncomplicated medical questions that could proceed to trial without an expert.

       Still, Plaintiff theoretically could seek damages for the injuries she immediately suffered

based solely on her own testimony. See, e.g., Lucy Webb, 924 A.2d at 1003 (holding that the

testimony of a plaintiff who had not designated an expert could support damages for “pain and

                                                 5
suffering that she experienced over a period of hours, not longer”). But nowhere does she submit

admissible proof to support such damages. The court advised Plaintiff how she must respond to a

motion for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 56. See Order, ECF No. 21, at 2 (quoting

in full FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). However, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to support any

actual injury. She has not offered contemporaneous medical records from a treating physician. 3

Nor has she submitted her own declaration or affidavit to support any pain and suffering soon after

being struck.      Even Plaintiff’s opposition brief is silent about any pain and suffering she

immediately experienced.

         The only record evidence presented of Plaintiff’s condition following the strike comes from

her deposition testimony, which Defendant submitted. Plaintiff testified that, “I was putting the

groceries on the conveyor belt and I felt something strike the back of my head. And originally I

thought it was a bird, I looked over and I said, honey, was that a bird, something hit me in the

head.” Pl.’s Dep.; see Def.’s Mem. at 3 n.1. Thus, the only record evidence suggests that Plaintiff

was not forcibly struck in the head. Based on the record presented, the court cannot find that there

is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Plaintiff suffered any compensable injuries.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 (1979) (“If actual damage is necessary to the cause

of action, as in negligence, nominal damages are not awarded.”); 22 AM. JR. 2D Damages § 18

(“Nominal damages are not recoverable in actions to recover damages for ordinary negligence, in

which damages are an element of the cause of action itself, and the plaintiff has failed to prove

those damages.”).

3
 Plaintiff has offered two letters, one dated January 23, 2019, and another dated May 13, 2019, from her treating
physician indicating that she could not work due to a concussion. Pl.’s Ex. 11. Those letters, however, reflect expert
opinion that Plaintiff did not support with the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(2)(C).

                                                          6
                                                    B.

        Nor can the court excuse Plaintiff for failing to make expert disclosures. See McNeil v.

United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in

ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed

without counsel.”). Rule 37 provides that “[i]f a party fails to . . . identify a witness as required by

Rule 26(a) . . . the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a

motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). District courts have broad discretion to determine whether nondisclosure

is substantially justified or harmless. Grant v. Ent. Cruises & Spirit Cruises, LLC, 767 F. App’x

15, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The court’s analysis of the effects of nondisclosure is influenced by the

Fourth Circuit’s five factor test, which considers:

                (1) the surprise to the party against whom the evidence would be
                offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the surprise; (3) the extent
                to which allowing the evidence would disrupt the trial; (4) the
                importance of the evidence; and (5) the nondisclosing party’s
                explanation for its failure to disclose the evidence.

S. States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 318 F.3d 592, 597 (4th Cir. 2007);

see also DAG Enters. v. Exxonmobil Corp., No. 00-cv-0182 (RBW), 2007 WL 4294317, at *1

(D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2007) (considering the Fourth Circuit’s five-factor test when determining

whether to exclude evidence under Rule 37(c)(1)); Burns v. Levy, No. 13-cv-898 (CKK), 2019 WL

6465142, at *24 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2019) (applying the Fourth Circuit test while acknowledging that

it “is not binding on this Court”). These factors do not support a finding of harmlessness.

        First, Defendant has not received, as required, the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians

or had the opportunity to cross examine them. Plaintiff has produced some medical records, but

the records are an inadequate substitute for proper expert disclosures and examination during

                                                    7
discovery. The limited records disclosed also appear to be incomplete. And, at least one of the

records conveys a different version of the alleged injury than the one Plaintiff advances here.

Pl.’s Ex. 10 at 3 (notation that Plaintiff “asked that I update her chart to reflect that she was hit

with an elbow”) (emphasis added).

       Second, Plaintiff has not said that her treating physicians will make themselves available

for depositions to cure the nondisclosure.

       Third, although no trial is set in this matter, reopening discovery at this juncture is

unwarranted given that the court explained to Plaintiff how to respond to a motion for summary

judgment, but she did not comply.

       Fourth, the expert testimony is evidently important. Plaintiff is seeking hundreds of

thousands of dollars in damages for long-term physical injuries and lost wages but has not offered

any evidence to support a causal connection between the alleged strike to her head and her claimed

injuries. If anything, the limited medical records in the record do not help her. Pl.’s Ex. 9 (stating,

as of November 25, 2020, that (i) Plaintiff’s psychomotor issues likely were due to multiple

factors, (ii) it was “unlikely” that her long-term ailments were “the direct result of her concussion,”

and (iii) “her most impairing distress appears to stem from her many non-specific physical

complaints and focus on them”); Pl.’s Ex. 10 at 1 (stating, more than a year after the incident, that

Plaintiff’s brain MRI was normal and her neck pain was present before her injury).

       Finally, Plaintiff’s explanation for non-disclosure of experts is wanting. She says that she

“took the advice of [her] neurologist who has retired from expert testimonies and that her reports

should be substantial enough, to provide clear documentation of [her] injury and diagnosis.”

Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. Plaintiff should not have relied on her neurologist’s assessment of legal

requirements.

                                                  8