Court Opinion

ID: 9738181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:44:12.106417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:04.212067
License: Public Domain

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
{dissenting). The rationale of the court’s opinion rests upon a misunderstanding of the exception to the hearsay rule that is permitted by sec. 908.03(4), Stats. That exception pertains to:
"STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”
The exception is founded upon the perception that a person who is being attended by a physician will accurately and truthfully state a condition or recount a symptom, because only by so doing can the condition be properly treated and the malady alleviated. As McCormick Evidence (hornbook series 1954), sec. 266, p. 563 (the authority relied upon by our Code of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R1 (1973)), states, such statements are reliable because "the patient knows that *448the kind of treatment he receives, and its value and helpfulness, may largely depend on the accuracy of the information which he gives to the doctor.” See also, McCormick, Evidence, sec. 292, p. 839 (1984). That element of reliability, despite the unsupported assertions of the majority, are absent here. The patient was three years old, there was no evidence that the child had any idea that the numerous sessions with the psychologist were for the purpose of treatment. Indeed, the record shows that the technique of eliciting information from the child was to simulate play. Thus, while there was no circumstance that would tend to cause a person, even in a post litem motem situation, to not tell the truth, the affirmative evidence of reliability that would be induced by a consciousness of the fact of treatment was entirely absent. The assertion that the interrogator was an authority figure is irrelevant to the rationale of the exception. There is no hearsay exception for statements made to authority figures. Unfortunately, it is the court here which gives recognition to the psychologist as an authority figure. Under this evidentiary scheme, the credence is being given not to the child, whose reliability is not enhanced by the circumstances, but to the hearsay testimony of the reporting psychologist.
This opinion warps the rules of evidence to allow the admission of evidencé that is not reliable enough to qualify as an exception to the rule against hearsay. The admission of the evidence was erroneous and was prejudicial. I would reverse the conviction and order a new trial.
In addition, it appears that, from the outset of this case, the state has taken the position that T.N. must either testify as a conventional courtroom witness or *449not testify at all. Such a position is both contrary to this court’s decision in State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982),1 and unwarranted in light of the amount of attention that has recently been devoted to alternative means of testimony for child-witnesses. The various alternative methods whereby a child can avoid the trauma of testifying in court as a conventional witness, and yet have his or her testimony heard b the trier of fact, have been exhaustively researched and discussed in the past decade. See for example, Eatman & Bulkley, Protecting Child Victim/Witnesses, 17-36 (1986); ABA, Papers From a National Policy Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse Cases (1985), see also, State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 514, 518, notes 18 and 24.
Both the Judicial Council and the legislature of this state have demonstrated an awareness of the potential problems of requiring child witnesses to testify in a conventional manner. The Judicial Council studied the matter for approximately one year and ultimately made recommendations regarding the use of videotaped depositions for child witnesses. Minutes of the Judicial Council 5/18/84-4/30/85. These recommendations led to the adoption by the legislature of sec. 967.04(7)-(10), Stats. This statute sets out particular circumstances under which a court may order a videotaped deposition of a child witness in lieu of live *450courtroom testimony. There is no suggestion that a child may be excused altogether from testifying.2
It is obviously of great importance that the testimony of the child be available if reliability can be reasonably assured. That is the goal this court should strive for. It can, I believe, be reached by utilizing the techniques explored by recent research. It cannot be reached by the shortcut method approved herein by the majority.
The state’s failure to explore or seriously consider alternatives to conventional courtroom testimony in the present case is disturbing. The majority’s acceptance of the state’s failure, in view of our own past precedents, is inexplicable.
I dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICES ABRA-HAMSON and BABLITCH join in this dissent.

 In Gilbert, this court observed, "While we have found much public, legislative, and judicial concern for the needs and well-being of the child-victim-witnesses, we have not found any suggestion in the legal literature that the child be excused completely from giving testimony and that the child’s testimony not be available in the criminal proceeding.” 109 Wis. 2d at 515-16.

 Nor do the ABA Guidelines for the Fair Treatment of Child Witnesses in Cases Where Child Abuse is Alleged (approved July 10,1985) go so far as to suggest that a child victim/witness should be completely excused from testifying at trial. These guidelines do not even approve of the use of videotaped depositions in criminal proceedings.