Court Opinion

ID: 9387796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 00:00:25.302319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:15.542525
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60341         Document: 00516716643             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/18/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                              FILED
                                                                            April 18, 2023
                                       No. 22-60341                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                     Summary Calendar                            Clerk
                                     ____________

   Wilson Filander Paz Palma,

                                                                                   Petitioner,

                                             versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                                Respondent.
                      ______________________________

                         Petition for Review of an Order of the
                             Board of Immigration Appeals
                               Agency No. A206 157 682
                      ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Wilson Filander Paz Palma, a native and citizen of Honduras,
   petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissing
   his appeal from an order of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying his application
   for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
   Against Torture (CAT). He contends: the BIA incorrectly concluded he

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60341      Document: 00516716643          Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/18/2023

                                    No. 22-60341

   waived any challenge to the IJ’s denying asylum based on the firm
   resettlement rule; he established his eligibility for relief for asylum and
   withholding of removal; and his request for a continuance during proceedings
   before the IJ should have been granted. (He has abandoned any claims
   regarding CAT protection by failing to brief them. E.g., Soadjede v. Ashcroft,
   324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating issues not briefed are abandoned).)
          We review the BIA’s decision and consider the IJ’s decision only to
   the extent it influenced that of the BIA. E.g., Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861,
   863 (5th Cir. 2009). Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; factual findings,
   for substantial evidence. Id. The substantial-evidence standard applies to
   factual determinations that an alien is ineligible for asylum, withholding of
   removal, and CAT protection. E.g., Zhang v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 344 (5th
   Cir. 2005).
          Regarding asylum, the BIA ruled: Palma failed to meaningfully
   contest the IJ’s determination he was ineligible for asylum based on the firm
   resettlement rule, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (alien ineligible for asylum
   if “firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United
   States”); and, therefore, he waived the issue. It alternatively denied asylum
   on the merits. We note our circuit’s precedent regarding the exhaustion
   requirement in immigration proceedings may be affected by the Supreme
   Court’s forthcoming decision in Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 22 F.4th 570 (5th
   Cir.), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 82 (2022). Because, as discussed infra, Palma’s
   asylum claim fails on the merits, we assume, without deciding, he exhausted
   this issue.
          In alternatively denying asylum, and denying withholding of removal,
   the BIA determined Palma failed to demonstrate the requisite nexus between
   his alleged harm and the two protected grounds he claimed: his religion and
   membership in a particular social group consisting of “small businessmen in

                                              2
Case: 22-60341      Document: 00516716643          Page: 3   Date Filed: 04/18/2023

                                    No. 22-60341

   Honduras victimized by gang violence and extortion”. He had the burden of
   showing he suffered past-persecution or had “a well-founded fear of
   persecution on account of” a protected ground. Milat v. Holder, 755 F.3d
   354, 360 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In this context, “on account of”
   means the protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason” for
   the persecution. Id. (citation omitted).
          His testimony indicated that the MS-13 gang did not threaten or beat
   him during the nearly two-year period while he paid the monthly fee they
   demanded. The gang took those actions only after he stopped paying the fee
   following an increase and refused their alternative demand to disassemble
   stolen cars for them. He also testified that the gang extorted money from
   almost everyone, not just businessmen and churches.
          Based on that testimony, substantial evidence supports a finding that
   the gang was primarily motivated by monetary extortion or assistance with
   their criminal activity, and that Palma’s religion and status as a small
   businessman at most were incidental or secondary reasons for the harm he
   experienced. While he contends he refused to disassemble the stolen cars
   because of his religious concerns, it is the motivation of the “persecutor, not
   the persecuted” that is the proper focus of this analysis. Vazquez-Guerra v.
   Garland, 7 F.4th 265, 269 (5th Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original).
          Palma also did not demonstrate the requisite nexus as to a different
   incident he experienced involving the police, as he testified that the police
   were motivated by money and not his religion or the fact he owned a small
   business. Further, his reliance on expert reports about gang conduct in
   Honduras does not compel the determination that a protected ground was a
   central reason for the harm he experienced or might face in Honduras in the
   future. See Shaikh, 588 F.3d at 864 (nexus requirement fails where protected
   ground is “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another

                                              3
Case: 22-60341      Document: 00516716643           Page: 4    Date Filed: 04/18/2023

                                     No. 22-60341

   reason for harm” (citation omitted)); Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 536–37
   (5th Cir. 2009) (reversing under substantial-evidence standard requires
   evidence “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against
   it”).
           The denial of his motion for a continuance is reviewed for abuse of
   discretion. E.g., Masih v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2008). The
   BIA’s decision is not an abuse of discretion “so long as it is not capricious,
   racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so
   aberrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible
   rational approach”. Galvez-Vergara v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 798, 801 (5th Cir.
   2007) (citation omitted).
           In upholding the IJ’s finding of lack of good cause, the BIA noted
   counsel’s involvement and familiarity with the case prior to his entry of
   appearance. Palma fails to show an abuse of discretion in reaching that
   determination. See Pan v. Garland, No. 19-60606, 2022 WL 4007282, at *5
   (5th Cir. 2 Sept. 2022) (unpublished) (holding no abuse of discretion where
   “a perceptible rational approach” supported denial of continuance (citation
   omitted)). Moreover, he has not shown that the BIA erred in alternatively
   concluding he failed to demonstrate prejudice from the denial of the
   continuance, as he does not identify any specific evidence he could have
   obtained if his case had been continued. See Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec.
   354, 356–57 (BIA 1983) (petitioner must show actual prejudice from denial of
   continuance).
           Finally, to the extent he claims the denial of a continuance violated his
   right to due process, that contention is unavailing. See Santos-Alvarado v.
   Barr, 967 F.3d 428, 439 (5th Cir. 2020) (initial showing of substantial
   prejudice required to prevail on due-process claim); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d

                                              4
Case: 22-60341     Document: 00516716643          Page: 5   Date Filed: 04/18/2023

                                   No. 22-60341

   678, 681 (5th Cir. 2006) (denial of continuance does not violate due process
   where good cause not shown).
         DENIED.

                                            5