Court Opinion

ID: 9674859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:36:37.560962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:29.958508
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Justice
(concurring specially in part; dissenting in part).
I agree that the judgment should be reversed and that the case should be remanded to the circuit court for new trial. Only the questions of Mrs. Higbee’s possible contributory negligence and the amount of damages, if any, that she is entitled to should be submitted to the jury, however, for I would hold that defendant was negligent as a matter of law for failing to yield the right-of-way to Mrs. Higbee. The pictures of the accident scene, taken one year to the day after the accident and under similar conditions, graphically demonstrate that defendant should have seen Mrs. Hig-bee in the intersection at a time when defendant’s vehicle would have been far enough from the intersection to permit defendant to yield the right-of-way to Mrs. Higbee.
I agree with Justice Henderson that evidence of a pedestrian's blood-alcohol content should be admissible in a case of this nature. I disagree with the majority opinion’s holding that the admission of the results of the blood-alcohol test in the instant case unfairly prejudiced plaintiff, confused the issues, and misled the jury. As I read the trial court’s instructions, I see no reference whatsoever to SDCL 32-23-1. Rather, the trial court merely instructed the jury that the fact of consumption of alcoholic beverage did not constitute negligence by itself but was merely a circumstance which might be considered in determining whether a person has exercised ordinary care. So stated, I find the instruction to be unexceptionable.
Also, I disagree with the majority opinion’s characterization of Instruction No. 27 *113as being unfairly slanted in favor of appel-lee. Granted, the instruction is longer and more detailed than most, but we are not vouchsafed even a hint regarding its deficiencies or inaccuracies. Indeed, the trial court may well be forgiven for characterizing as Delphian the direction that on retrial the instruction should be refined. Although I am in general agreement with the views set forth by the Supreme Court of California in LaManna v. Stewart, 13 Cal.3d 413, 118 Cal.Rptr. 761, 530 P.2d 1073 (1975), cited in Justice Henderson’s separate opinion, I see nothing in that case that conflicts with the principles of law set forth in Instruction No. 27. Indeed, in the Stewart case, the uneontroverted evidence showed that the pedestrian had maintained a lookout for oncoming traffic once she entered the crosswalk, while in the instant case the uncontroverted testimony is that Mrs. Hig-bee looked straight ahead once she left the curb. This evidence, coupled with the evidence of Mrs. Higbee’s blood-alcohol level and the testimony of a nearby resident that traffic on the street in question was extremely heavy immediately prior to the accident, supported the giving of the challenged instruction in the form in which it was presented to the jury.