Court Opinion

ID: 9874385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 22:06:53.141315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:48.235232
License: Public Domain

Hall, J.R,
dissents, and votes to reverse the judgment, on the law, and order a new trial, with the following memorandum: Pursuant to the Rules of the City of New York and an Operations Order implemented by the New York City Department of Correction (hereinafter the DOC), the respective New York City District Attorneys’ Offices have essentially unfettered access to the recordings of nonpriviledged telephone calls made by pretrial detainees at pretrial detention facilities, such as Rikers Island Correctional Facility (hereinafter Rikers) (see People v Johnson, 27 NY3d 199, 203-204 [2016]). This arrangement between the DOC and the District Attorneys’ Offices presents a fundamentally unfair situation to pretrial detainees. In short, while pretrial detainees are notified that telephone calls made from institutional telephone lines may be recorded and monitored, they are not informed that the recordings of such calls may be distributed to the prosecutors handling their cases, and that information in the calls can be used against them at their criminal trials. I share Judge Pigott’s concern, expressed in his concurrence in Johnson, that this arrangement “creates a serious potential for abuse and may undermine the constitutional rights of defendants who are financially unable to make bail. Something needs to change” (id. at 208 [Pigott, J., concurring]).
The current arrangement between the DOC and the District Attorneys’ Offices simply adds to the well-documented disparities between defendants who can afford to make bail and are at liberty while awaiting trial, and those who cannot afford to make bail and are in pretrial detention facilities. “A defendant free on bail or on his [or her] own recognizance can . . . make good use of that liberty by consulting and participating fully with counsel in time-consuming preparations for trial, including tracking down witnesses and evidentiary leads” (id. at 210). *978The detained suspect, however, cannot engage in such pretrial preparations. “Moreover, any telephone conversations with family members or potential witnesses are now turned over to the prosecution for it to review. Not only do prosecutors obtain critical information about key defense witnesses and possible defenses well before those materials would have been disclosed, but they can also use innocuous details to their advantage in negotiating plea deals, for example, by combing through a detainee’s recorded conversations for information about his [or her] financial limitations or family obligations” (id.).
I am seriously troubled by the fact that pretrial detainees cannot speak to family members without members of the District Attorneys’ Offices listening in. This is especially egregious where pretrial detainees are never informed that the recordings of such telephone calls may be turned over to the prosecution.
Assistant District Attorneys regularly seek to introduce at trial recordings of telephone calls made by pretrial detainees as affirmative evidence of their guilt, principally on the basis of consent. According to the Assistant District Attorneys, since the pretrial detainees consented to the monitoring and recording of such telephone calls, the recordings of the calls may properly be admitted into evidence. However, consent to the monitoring and recording of a telephone call does not equate to an implied consent to have the recording of the call handed over to the prosecution.
In this case, I agree with the majority that the defendant impliedly consented to the monitoring and recording of his telephone conversations by using the telephones at Rikers. As the majority notes, the defendant was informed that his telephone calls from institutional telephones at Rikers would be recorded and monitored, and that his use of those telephones constituted consent to such recording and monitoring. However, the defendant was never informed that the recordings of his telephone calls would be provided to the prosecutor handling his case. Consequently, the defendant never expressly or impliedly consented to the recordings of those calls being disseminated to the prosecutor for potential use at his criminal trial on this matter.
While the defendant admittedly “had no reason to expect privacy in his calls, that does not equate to any consent that the agents and prosecutors working on this case would gain access” to the calls (United States v Mitan, 2009 WL 3081727, *4, 2009 US Dist LEXIS 88886, *11 [ED Pa, Sept. 25, 2009, Nos. 08-760-1, 08-760-2], 499 Fed Appx 187 [3d Cir 2012]). Indeed, *979there is “a major distinction between prison authorities having access to prisoners’ phone calls for purposes of prison security and discipline, and the prosecutors of that pretrial prisoner having the same access for purposes of gaining advance knowledge of the pretrial prisoner’s trial strategy and potential witnesses” (2009 WL 3081727, *4, 2009 US Dist LEXIS 88886, *11; see People v Johnson, 27 NY3d at 209 [Pigott, J., concurring]).
In my view, the defendant’s consent was limited to the monitoring and recording of his telephone calls. This limited consent did not extend to the dissemination of the recordings of those calls to the prosecutor handling his case. In this context, the defendant’s consent can be no broader than the notice provided to him (cf. Watkins v L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F2d 577, 581 [11th Cir 1983]).
Since the defendant did not impliedly consent to the dissemination of the recordings of his telephone calls to the prosecution, the recordings of the calls were improperly admitted into evidence. This error was not harmless, as there is a significant probability that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s convictions (see People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969, 970 [1982]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]).
Pretrial detainees are presumed innocent, as they have not yet been convicted of any crime. Moreover, while the DOC has a legitimate interest in maintaining the safety and security of its detention facilities, it has no legitimate interest in harvesting evidence for the prosecution (see People v Johnson, 27 NY3d at 208-209). Under these circumstances, it is not simply a better practice for the DOC to provide express notification to pretrial detainees that recorded telephone calls may be turned over to the prosecution; such notice is required for the proper admission of these recordings into evidence at a criminal trial.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent, and vote to reverse the judgment and order a new trial.