Court Opinion

ID: 7812919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:14:52.98231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:31.344112
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION. McCulloch, C. J. If I thought that appellee had, before and after the episode at the hotel in Little Rock, habitually associated with men and women of bad character, I would-be in favor of granting appellant a divorce on the sharply disputed question whether the appellee or Mrs. Brown was the woman found in the room with Elmer Walters. In other words, if the association of appellee was so bad that she is not entitled to a proper allowance for her support, it has such an important bearing on the question of her relations with Waiters that it is of ■controlling force in determining the issue of adultery. The evidence does not show that either Mrs. 'Brown or Walters was a person of bad. character before the incident at the hotel occurred nor since that time, except as their reputations may be affected by that occurrence. The proof shows beyond any dispute that all of appellee’s association, both with Walters and Mrs. Brown, before the incident, was with the knowledge and consent of appellant. When appellee danced with Walters, it was in the presence of her husband, and the testimony shows that he encouraged her to attend the dances. When she rode with Elmer Walters and went to the swimming pool, it was with the knowledge of her husband, and they were accompanied by another lady in Hot Springs whose reputation and character has not been brought in question. Appellee frankly admitted in her testimony that since the occurrence at the hotel and the accusation of adultery made against her by her husband, and the conduct of Mrs. Brown in openly acknowledging that she was the woman in the room with Walters, she could not find it consistent with her feeling of gratitude to Mrs. Brown to cut her acquaintance and to refuse entirely to associate with her. Appellee gives, I think, a very reasonable explanation of her conduct, and one that is consistent with the natural impulses of most any person situated as appellee was with an ugly accusation against her. She should not be blamed for indulging friendliness toward one who, as did Mrs. Brown, acknowledged herself to be the sinner. The Shirey case, cited by the majority in their opinion, has no application to the present case, for the facts are different. In that case, the wife sued the husband for divorce, but was denied a divorce on the ground that she had condoned her husband’s wrongdoing. The court allowed the wife support, but, in fixing the amount, took into consideration her own improper conduct. In the present case no such state of facts exists. Appellee has not asked for a divorce. On the contrary, she has, according to the undisputed evidence, sought in every way to regain her. husband’s affections and confidence, and, as before stated, there is nothing in the record rightly affecting her character. Her husband is shown to be a man of wealth and large income. Certainly the allowance made by the chancellor is not out of keeping with the ability of appellant to pay. I dissent therefore from that part of the judgment of this court which reduces the allowance to appellee.