Court Opinion

ID: 9386582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 21:00:47.012063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.459909
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10447    Document: 22-1     Date Filed: 04/12/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10447
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       ALFRED WISHER,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cr-00201-RSB-CLR-1
                           ____________________
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       2                           Opinion of the Court                        22-10447

       Before NEWSOM, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Alfred Wisher appeals his convictions and his 640-month to-
       tal sentence. * Wisher contends that the district court erred by ad-
       mitting into evidence Wisher’s prior armed-robbery convictions,
       by refusing to issue a justification-defense jury instruction, and by
       denying Wisher’s motion for a new trial. In its response brief, the
       government acknowledges -- based on the Supreme Court’s recent
       decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022) -- that
       Wisher’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), for using, carrying,
       and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to attempted
       Hobbs Act robbery (“Count 7”) is unlawful. Reversible error has
       been shown; we vacate Wisher’s conviction and sentence on

       * Wisher was convicted of these offenses: (1) three counts of possession of a
       firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Counts 1, 8,
       11); (2) possession of a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2) (Count
       2); (3) theft of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 924(l) (Count 3); (4) carjacking, 18 U.S.C.
       § 2119(1) (Count 4); (5) two counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a fire-
       arm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)
       (Counts 5, 7); (6) attempted Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Count 6);
       (7) conspiracy to use and to carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime
       of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count 9); and (8) conspiracy to commit Hobbs
       Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Count 10). The district court imposed an
       above-guidelines sentence of 640 months’ imprisonment: a sentence that in-
       cluded an 84-month consecutive sentence for the section 924(c) offense
       charged in Count 7.
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       22-10447                Opinion of the Court                         3

       Count 7 and remand for resentencing on the remaining counts of
       conviction.
                                             I.
              We first address Wisher’s argument that the district court
       erred in admitting -- in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) -- his prior
       New York convictions for armed robbery. We review for abuse of
       discretion the district court’s admission of evidence under Rule
       404(b). See United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir.
       2008).
               Under Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes is inadmissible
       to show proof of bad character. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But
       such evidence may be admissible to prove “motive, opportunity,
       intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake,
       or lack of accident.” See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). For other-crimes
       evidence to be admissible under Rule 404(b), “(1) the evidence
       must be relevant to an issue other than defendant’s character; (2)
       the probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its un-
       due prejudice; [and] (3) the government must offer sufficient proof
       so that the jury could find that defendant committed the act.” See
       United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005). We
       have described Rule 404(b) as a rule “of inclusion which allows ex-
       trinsic evidence unless it tends to prove only criminal propensity.”
       See Ellisor, 522 F.3d at 1267 (quotations and brackets omitted).
             The district court abused no discretion by admitting into ev-
       idence Wisher’s prior New York armed-robbery convictions. The
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10447

       prior robbery convictions were properly relevant to establishing
       Wisher’s intent to commit the charged Hobbs-Act-robbery and car-
       jacking offenses: not to show Wisher’s bad character. We reject
       Wisher’s assertion that his intent was not at issue at trial. A defend-
       ant -- like Wisher -- “who enters a not guilty plea makes intent a
       material issue . . ..” See United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324,
       1345 (11th Cir. 2007).
               Given the similarity between the charged offenses and
       Wisher’s prior armed-robbery convictions -- each of which in-
       volved the intent to knowingly take someone else’s property by
       means of actual or threatened force or violence -- evidence of
       Wisher’s prior convictions was probative to showing that Wisher
       had the requisite intent to commit the Hobbs-Act-robbery and car-
       jacking offenses charged in this case. See United States v. Dicker-
       son, 248 F.3d 1036, 1047 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that prior crim-
       inal convictions are relevant to show a defendant’s intent when
       “the extrinsic offense requires the same intent as the charged of-
       fense”); N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15(3) (McKinney 2022) (providing
       that a person is guilty of first-degree robbery when he forcibly
       steals property and “[u]ses or threatens the immediate use of a dan-
       gerous instrument”); 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (defining “robbery” under
       the Hobbs Act as “the unlawful taking . . . of personal property . . .
       by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of in-
       jury, immediate or future. . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) (providing that
       a person is guilty of carjacking when he -- “with the intent to cause
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       22-10447                Opinion of the Court                          5

       death or serious bodily harm” -- takes a motor vehicle “by force and
       violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so”).
               We cannot conclude that the evidence’s probative value was
       outweighed substantially by the risk of undue prejudice. The dis-
       trict court twice issued a limiting instruction to the jury: instruc-
       tions that minimized the risk of unfair prejudice caused by admit-
       ting the challenged evidence. See United States v. Brown, 665 F.3d
       1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A limiting instruction can diminish
       any unfair prejudice caused by the evidence’s admission.”). We
       presume that jurors follow the court’s instructions. See United
       States v. Brown, 983 F.2d 201, 202 (11th Cir. 1993).
                                             II.
              Wisher next challenges the district court’s refusal to instruct
       the jury on a justification defense. “We review a district court’s
       refusal to give a requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion.”
       United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2006).
       We review de novo the district court’s determination that a defend-
       ant has failed to set forth a sufficient proffer to warrant a justifica-
       tion defense. See United States v. Dicks, 338 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th
       Cir. 2003). The defendant bears the burden of proving by a pre-
       ponderance of the evidence the elements of a justification affirma-
       tive defense. Id.
              To establish a justification defense, a defendant must show
       these elements: (1) that he faced an “unlawful and present, immi-
       nent, and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury;” (2)
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10447

       that he “did not negligently or recklessly place himself in a situation
       where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct;” (3) that
       he “had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law;” and
       (4) “a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the
       avoidance of the threatened harm.” United States v. Deleveaux,
       205 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) (in the context of 18 U.S.C. §
       922(g)); see Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006).
              The district court abused no discretion in declining to in-
       struct the jury on the justification defense. Wisher presented no
       evidence that shows -- by a preponderance of the evidence -- that
       he satisfied the requisite elements of the affirmative defense. Of
       import, nothing evidences that Wisher faced a “present, imminent,
       and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury.”
              On appeal, Wisher argues that a justification-defense in-
       struction was warranted based on evidence that -- while Wisher
       and his co-conspirator (Chisholm) discussed committing a robbery
       -- Chisholm pulled out a gun and placed it in his (Chisholm’s) lap.
       Wisher says that Chisholm’s conduct could be perceived as threat-
       ening. But Wisher testified expressly that he was not afraid of
       Chisholm, that he did not know what Chisholm meant by placing
       the gun in his lap, and that he was unsure what would have hap-
       pened if Wisher did not go through with the robbery.
             In any event -- even if Wisher might have been afraid of
       Chisholm at the time of the robbery -- Wisher’s testimony comes
       nowhere close to demonstrating the kind of “immediate emer-
       gency” that might warrant a justification-defense instruction. See
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       22-10447                Opinion of the Court                         7

       United States v. Bell, 214 F.3d 1299, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000). Wisher
       has produced no evidence tending to show that he faced an immi-
       nent threat of serious harm.
               Wisher has also failed to present evidence sufficient to estab-
       lish the remaining three elements. Because Wisher armed
       Chisholm with the gun and drove himself and Chisholm to the
       store in search of a robbery victim, Wisher cannot show that he did
       not act negligently or recklessly to put himself in the position
       where he was supposedly forced to commit a robbery. Nor does
       the evidence support a finding that Wisher lacked a reasonable, le-
       gal alternative other than to rob a victim at gunpoint. Wisher has
       also shown no direct causal relationship between Wisher’s criminal
       conduct and his supposed fear of Chisholm.
                                            III.
              Wisher next challenges the district court’s denial of his mo-
       tion for a new trial. In arguing that he was entitled to a new trial,
       Wisher repeats his assertions that the district court erred in admit-
       ting Wisher’s prior armed-robbery convictions and in denying
       Wisher’s request for a justification-defense jury instruction.
              We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for a new
       trial under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See United States v.
       Green, 981 F.3d 945, 960 (11th Cir. 2020). A new trial may be war-
       ranted only when the evidence “preponderate[s] heavily against
       the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the
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       8                     Opinion of the Court                22-10447

       verdict stand.” See United States v. Gallardo, 977 F.3d 1126, 1139-
       40 (11th Cir. 2020).
              The district court acted within its discretion by denying
       Wisher’s motion for a new trial. For the reasons already discussed,
       Wisher’s prior-conviction and justification-defense arguments are
       without merit and offered no basis for the granting of a new trial.
       Moreover, the government presented overwhelming evidence of
       Wisher’s guilt: no miscarriage of justice would result from letting
       the verdict stand.
                                           IV.
             We next address Wisher’s section 924(c) conviction under
       Count 7. Count 7 charged Wisher with using a firearm in connec-
       tion with a “crime of violence,” which was identified as Wisher’s
       attempted Hobbs Act robbery.
              While Wisher’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
       concluded that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a
       predicate “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §
       924(c)(3)(A). See United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2002-21
       (2022).
              In the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor, we
       vacate Wisher’s conviction and 84-month sentence on Count 7.
       We remand to the district court for resentencing on the remaining
       counts of conviction. See United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010,
       1017 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that, when a conviction is set
       aside, we presume that “sentences on each count of a multi-count
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       22-10447                Opinion of the Court                         9

       indictment are part of a package that may . . . be revisited to ensure
       that the overall sentence on the surviving counts is constituent
       with the district court’s intentions, the guidelines, and the § 3553(a)
       factors”).
              VACATED AND REMANDED.