Court Opinion

ID: 9656085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:34:43.578705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:28.050952
License: Public Domain

LANSING, Judge
(concurring).
The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes three statutory reasons for termination: (1) failure to comply with the duties and responsibilities of the parent-child relationship, (2) failure to correct conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement, and (3) neglect and continued placement in foster care. To prove that termination was in the child’s best interests, the state presented testimony from a child-protection social worker and the guardian ad litem.
In the course of the social worker’s testimony the state introduced nine exhibits, two of which were letters from the child’s therapist. According to the trial transcript, the purpose of those letters was to show that the therapist was recommending continued therapy for the child. Appellant objected on hearsay grounds, and the county contended that the letters were admissible under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule. The court permitted the county to establish foundation through the social worker’s testimony that it was a business record of the county. No one suggested that the preparation of the letters was untrustworthy. In fact, the appellant has not challenged the foundation.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the letters were not prejudicial to the court’s decision to terminate parental rights. The letters were not referred to in closing argument except in a general reference to the nine exhibits, and the letters did not form a basis for any of the court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. But I do not agree that the letters are inadmis*165sible because they lack proper foundation, were prepared in anticipation of litigation, or address the ultimate issue. For the limited purpose for which the letters were admitted their admission was not an abuse of discretion.
I concur in the majority’s determination that the record establishes clear and convincing evidence for termination of parental rights on three separate statutory grounds.