Court Opinion

ID: 9522784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:17.080957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:55.618073
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 24. dissenting. The majority has endorsed a procedure under which the Defender General determines the merits of petitioner’s case, through a secret process undisclosed to petitioner or this Court, and we rubber stamp the result to deny petitioner any counsel for his appeal and effectively dismiss the appeal. This is done, we are told, to protect petitioner from the “sandbagging” of his appeal by appellate counsel, as if this process was created to help the client. Ante, ¶ 12. In fact, the hallmark of this process is prejudice to the client, with this Court intentionally ignoring that prejudice. In my view, the process compromises our role to ensure proper treatment of litigants. Neither the Public Defender Act, nor the United States Constitution, nor this Court’s inherent power permits appointed counsel unilaterally to withdraw from representation of a needy person without an independent judicial review to ensure that the person’s interests have been adequately represented. What the majority dismisses as “second-guessing by courts,” ante, ¶ 11, constitutes, in fact, the minimal process to which every individual, regardless of wealth, is entitled. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*188¶25. The facts here are very important even though they are largely overlooked by the majority opinion.4 Petitioner handled his case in the superior court without a lawyer and applied for a lawyer on appeal. The trial court granted the motion on January 11, 2008, and issued an order stating that “an attorney is assigned to represent the applicant.” At some point shortly thereafter, conflict counsel, Allison Fulcher, was selected as the lawyer for petitioner, and she filed a docketing statement on February 4. She made no disclosure that she accepted the appointment conditional on a review process by her or the Defender General to determine the merits of petitioner’s appeal. She never stated that, in the majority’s words, “assignment would follow the Defender’s review process and a determination by counsel that the case is not frivolous.” Ante, ¶ 18.
¶26. The docket clerk determined the record was complete on April 10. On April 29, the parties filed a stipulation to extend the time for appellant’s brief to June 9, explaining that the extension was necessary “in view of the Assigned Appellate Contractor’s caseload, to permit an adequate presentation of appellant’s case.” On June 6, counsel filed a motion for another extension until August 8, saying that “the time requested is necessary as counsel is unable to complete the brief by the current deadline consistent with the appellant’s right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.”
¶ 27. On August 6, some seven months after appointment, counsel filed the motion to withdraw that led to this decision, asserting that “pursuant to Rules 3.1 and 3.3 of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct and under 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3) . . . counsel cannot continue to represent the Appellant in furtherance of this appeal.” She also asserted that she had “discussed the same with the Appellant, who by oral communication, did not oppose this motion.” There was no explanation of how the rules would be violated by counsel’s representation or why the statutory section prohibited the representation. There was no disclosure that there had been some kind of internal review process. This was actually a decision that no publicly-funded representation would be available to petitioner and not simply a statement from a lawyer that she personally could not proceed. Indeed, it is clear that whatever was the communication with petitioner, he did not *189understand the nature of the decision because he supported the withdrawal stating that “counsel has completely missed the issue at hand” and applied for replacement counsel. Later when he learned that his claim had been found without merit in some sort of review process, he claimed in a letter to the Defender General that he had been sandbagged by counsel because she had done nothing on his behalf in the course of the appeal.
¶ 28. In response to the order requiring counsel to explain the grounds for her action, counsel filed a motion for full-court review, stating for the first time that “two separate attorneys have scrutinized the case and found the claims to be without merit.” Counsel never stated that she had found the appeal to be frivolous, apparently believing that it was improper for her to state directly that she believes that petitioner’s case is frivolous or any other words to that effect. In a separate brief as amicus curiae, the Defender General has explained that three lawyers looked at the case. While none of the briefs say so explicitly, the decision here is actually a decision of the Defender General that he will not pay for representation by Attorney Fulcher or anyone else once the review process was completed. This is, then, a decision about a system and not about particular counsel.
¶ 29. I emphasize the latter point to directly dispute the majority’s characterization of the issue as much narrower — “we are not asked to decide if Attorney Fulcher waived her right to withdraw, nor are we asked to evaluate the validity of the Defender’s screening process.” Ante, ¶ 17. I disagree with both characterizations. As to the waiver point, the majority has granted Attorney Fulcher’s motion to withdraw, ante, ¶ 16 (“her motion to withdraw is granted”), and, in my judgment, her failure to raise the issue of withdrawal in a timely fashion should prevent grant of that motion. The timeliness of an attorney’s actions is always in issue. The whole point of court oversight of withdrawal is to ensure that the interests of the client are protected. Even if I agreed that she can withdraw solely by sending a letter, I would not grant the motion to withdraw in this case.
¶30. The majority offers two justifications for its nonwaiver ruling: no party raises the timeliness of the request and no demonstrable prejudice has occurred. I address below why there is demonstrable prejudice. As to the former point, the only “party” who has any interest in raising the question is the client who will be left -without a lawyer. Petitioner first agreed to *190withdrawal because counsel had done nothing for him and he wanted counsel who, in his opinion, would provide proper representation. When he learned that he was being denied all counsel, he complained that counsel had “sandbagged” his case by sitting on it. He added that “someone is dragging their feet in this matter trying to muddy it up.” Even if a pro se and semi-literate client has to specifically object to counsel’s delay for this Court to protect the interest of the client, I believe he has done so here. By granting the motion to withdraw and not even addressing the timeliness of counsel’s action, the majority is saying that appointed counsel can wait any length of time to decide to withdraw.
¶ 31. I think the second characterization simply ignores what the record shows has occurred here and is occurring in all these cases. More important, the majority relies on the Defender General’s review process in a number of places in its opinion. Since the review process is essential to the majority decision, we should look at its validity.
¶ 32. I also take as fact something my colleagues may not, but I think is critical to the issue before us. The decision on the withdrawal motion is de facto a decision on the merits of the appeal unless something with the likelihood of a lightning strike occurs. Petitioner has tried to make his argument pro se, but it is hard to comprehend from his statements. For example, in his “brief’ to this Court in seeking new counsel, he summarizes his argument why a sentence of three to eighteen years, all suspended except three to six years, is unlawful: “The unsuspended portion of a split to serve sentence becomes the minimum sentence to serve, thus there is no minimum provided for, only a six year sentence or minimum and not a 3-6 as shown.” Even in a case like this where the appellee, the State of Vermont, has not filed anything in the superior court or in this Court defending on the merits, there is no serious chance that petitioner will prevail on the merits given his inability to advocate his position. I find all the arguments from the Defender General and appellate counsel about not wanting to undercut petitioner’s appeal to be self-serving and theoretical. The fact is that the only real chance petitioner would have on appeal would occur if we reviewed the grounds for withdrawal, found them inadequate, and required briefing on issues we found not to be frivolous — exactly the review the Defender General opposes. As a recent commentator recognized in reviewing the use of Anders procedures, “[j]urisdic*191tions that have adopted the Anders procedure, as well as the opinions of practicing appellate attorneys who have submitted Anders briefs, reveal that in actual practice, the rationales and parades of horribles found in the criticisms of the Anders procedure are simply neither consistent nor true in appellate practice today.” C. Yee, Comment, The Anders Brief and the Idaho Rule: It Is Time for Idaho to Reevaluate Criminal Appeals After Rejecting the Anders Procedure, 39 Idaho L. Rev. 143, 165 (2002).
¶ 33. As near as I can determine, the substantive issue in this case is whether petitioner is entitled to appear before the parole board after the expiration of three years from his sentencing or after six years from his sentencing. He was sentenced in May 2004, and five years have already expired since sentence was imposed. If one assumed that petitioner prevailed in his PCR proceeding and was immediately released by the parole board, all of the time following the appointment of appellate counsel represents additional time that petitioner has remained in jail. Despite this potential increased incarceration time, appellate counsel never objected to her appointment, never stated that it was conditional on an independent review, never disclosed that the review was going forward and would have to be completed before she could provide any representation, and twice stated to us that any delay was caused by having too many cases to complete the brief within the time limits. The majority says that in this case there is no “demonstrable prejudice” from the delay in filing the motion to dismiss, ante, ¶ 17 n.2, despite the fact that the ultimate question on appeal is whether petitioner should now have an opportunity for release from jail. The majority can make that statement only if it assumes that the appeal is frivolous, judging the merits without presentation of briefing and argument in order to decide whether petitioner can have a lawyer to file a brief and make an argument on his behalf. On that theory, counsel can wait until the case is moot, totally eliminating petitioner’s opportunity to present a case, and the Court will find no prejudice to the client. I find it unconscionable that this Court would rubber-stamp a system that causes this kind of prejudice to a client, who would be much better off if there were no right to counsel in any circumstances and presented his case, however poorly, in time for a meaningful result.
¶ 34. The above is background, but colors my view of how we should decide the issues before us. It should come as no surprise, *192given the above discussion, that I was the single justice that issued the order requiring counsel to file an affidavit covering three items: (1) a specification of petitioner’s claims; (2) any law or argument that arguably supports such claim; and (3) a statement that counsel considers petitioner’s claims to be frivolous. Contrary to the briefing, the order did not require counsel to state why she considered the petitioner’s opinion to be frivolous. While I am prepared to defend these requirements, this dissent is not triggered by the majority’s refusal to require an Anders brief, although the majority keeps beating this drum. Instead, I am responding to the majority’s decision that there are no requirements for withdrawal beyond citing to the rules and statute, with approval of withdrawal then being automatic and nondiscretionary. This is a position even more extreme than that taken by the Defender General, and it abdicates any responsibility to protect, or even consider, the interest of the client. It is directly contrary to our withdrawal rule, and it is not supported by the statute that it supposedly implements. It is also inconsistent with the decisions in states with a comparable statute.
¶ 35. This case involves the interplay between our withdrawal rule, V.R.A.P. 45.1(f), and the statute on appointment of counsel for PCR proceedings, 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3). The withdrawal rule provides “[l]eave to withdraw after the appeal has been docketed will be granted only for good cause shown and on such terms as the Court may order.” V.R.A.P. 45.1(f). The majority states that the “attorney does not need this Court’s permission to determine whether to represent his or her client.” Ante, ¶ 20. On the contrary, any attorney who represents a client in this Court does need permission to stop representing the client. That is exactly what Rule 45.1(f) says.
¶ 36. Without saying so directly, the majority seems to argue that the withdrawal rule does not apply because no attorney was actually appointed in this case. Thus, the majority states that “such assignment would follow the Defender’s review process and a determination by counsel that the case is not frivolous.” Ante, ¶ 18. This statement is directly contrary to the superior court’s appointment order in this case. Pursuant to that order, assignment occurred on December 8, 2007, and not when the secret review process occurred, whenever that was. Indeed, under the majority’s theory, counsel never had to move to withdraw because she was never assigned to represent petitioner. The majority’s *193theory might make sense if the Defender General or Attorney Fulcher had said at the outset that they did not accept the assignment until they did an internal review, but instead they were silent.
¶ 37. The majority also holds that the withdrawal rule is inconsistent with the governing statute, that provides that a needy person has the right:
To be represented in any other postconviction proceeding which may have more than a minimal effect on the length or conditions of detention where the attorney considers the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions to be warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.
13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3), 2003, No. 157 (Adj. Sess.), § 10 (eff. June 8, 2004) (emphasis added). As the majority states, the statute was amended in 2004 in response to our decision in In re Gould, 2004 VT 46, ¶ 13, 177 Vt. 7, 852 A.2d 632. The amendment added language conditioning representation on the attorney’s determination that the case presents a meritorious issue. The purpose and effect of the amendment clearly was' to ensure that the holding of Gould no longer controls; once the court has granted a motion to withdraw based on the absence of a meritorious claim, it need not appoint new counsel based solely upon the needy person’s assessment that representation is warranted or appropriate.
¶ 38. Nothing in the amendment or its underlying history, however, reveals a legislative intent to evade the venerable — and indispensable — rule requiring judicial review and approval before counsel may withdraw his or her services in a case pending in the court. As courts have long observed, the rule is grounded in concerns for ensuring the efficient administration of justice as well as the effective representation of litigants. As explained by one court, “the inherent power of the trial court to control its calendar and conduct its business in the public interest is nowhere more apparent than when counsel — whether retained or appointed — seeks to withdraw from representation of a defendant.” State v. Batista, 492 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). “It is a cardinal rule,” the same court continued, “that once representation is undertaken, counsel cannot walk away from the defendant or from the case. If counsel wishes to be released from responsibility to *194the defendant, counsel must request the trial court to be relieved of his or her obligation to represent the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 111 (1848) (“No attorney or solicitor can withdraw his name, after he has once entered it on the record, without the leave of the court.”); Brandon v. Blech, 560 F.3d 536, 538 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that a court “may forbid withdrawal if it would work severe prejudice on the client or third parties”); Sobol v. Dist. Ct. of Arapahoe County, 619 P.2d 765, 767 (Colo. 1980) (stating that an “attorney’s withdrawal must be undertaken in a proper manner, duly protective of his client’s rights and liabilities,” and that the court’s “inherent power” to control an attorney’s appearance “derives from its responsibility to conduct its business efficiently, effectively, and fairly”); In re Rosenfeld, 157 Vt. 537, 541, 601 A.2d 972, 974 (1991) (noting the rule of professional responsibility requiring that “a withdrawing lawyer . . . take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client” (citation omitted)). As in all jurisdictions, therefore, our rules provide that counsel seeking to be relieved of his or her obligations must file a formal motion to withdraw, V.R.C.P. 79.1(f), V.R.A.P. 45.1(f), which is then committed to the sound discretion of the trial court to grant or deny based on a showing of good cause under all of the attendant circumstances. Cameron v. Burke, 153 Vt. 565, 573, 572 A.2d 1361, 1366 (1990); Chaker v. Chaker, 147 Vt. 548, 549-50, 520 A.2d 1005, 1006-07 (1986).5
¶ 39. As noted, nothing in the language or the legislative history of the amendment to § 5233 reveals an intent to overturn this well-settled process. The history of the amendment shows that it was appended to a larger bill (S.227) dealing with sex-offender registration and notification. In testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, the Defender General observed that the number of PCR filings had increased exponentially over the last ten years, and opined that truly frivolous petitions should not be allowed to divert scarce resources from meritorious cases. The Defender General explained that the Prisoner Rights Office had already instituted an internal review process for all PCR referred *195by the courts to screen out those it considered frivolous, and that the proposed amendment was essentially designed to “ratify[] the current process.” Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Hearing on S.227 Before the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 2003-2004 Bien. Sess. (Vt. April 21, 2004) (testimony of Matthew Valerio). At that time, and at all times thereafter, the “process” naturally included counsel’s obligation to seek and obtain court approval for withdrawal.
¶ 40. Thus, apart from removing an indigent’s right to demand representation regardless of the appointed attorney’s judgment that the petition is frivolous, the language and history of the amendment reveal no underlying legislative intent to alter the current system for the withdrawal of counsel. Certainly there is no evidence of an unstated intention to overturn a discretionary authority that courts have long exercised in the interest of ensuring the effective representation of litigants and the efficient administration of justice.
¶41. Although, as the majority indicates, some states have adopted statutes similar to § 5233(a)(3), I can find none that have abandoned a review process for motions to withdraw in favor of rubber-stamp approval. While some states have held that they will not impose the procedures in Anders, none have held that withdrawal is automatically allowed if the lawyer simply cites to the statute and the Rules of Professional Conduct, without even a client-specific representation that the lawyer would violate the law and the ethical rules by extending representation to the client.
¶ 42. Two precedents from courts in states with a similar statute are instructive. The first, People v. Demarest, 801 P.2d 6 (Colo. App. 1990), is from a jurisdiction cited in the majority opinion and is essentially the same as the case before us. In Demarest, a public defender moved to withdraw from an appeal of a denial of a PCR petition under a statute that conditioned the right of representation on the lawyer being “satisfied first that there is arguable merit to the proceeding.” Id. at 7. The lawyer argued that she was not “satisfied” that the case had arguable merit. The court noted it had discretion in addressing the motion and that “counsel who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates that he will prosecute it to a conclusion.” Id. The court reasoned and held:
There is no indication that counsel objected to the trial court’s order of March 16, 1989, appointing counsel on *196appeal, nor has counsel taken any action whatsoever resisting appointment until February 2, 1990. Since counsel has continued her appellate representation of defendant for some eleven months, we conclude that, under these circumstances, counsel has undertaken the appeal and cannot now be allowed to abandon representation.
Id. At a minimum, we should follow Demarest and deny counsel’s motion to withdraw for the reasons stated in that decision. By the representations in her motions to this Court and her inaction over an extended period of time, counsel has waived any right she had to abandon representation of petitioner.
¶ 43. The second case, Griffin v. State, 18 P.3d 71 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001), suggests a further answer to the real issue here — that is, the validity of a process under which lawyers, and the public defender system, withdraw based on their unreviewable evaluation of the merits of the client’s case. Alaska adopted a statute similar to that in Vermont for screening of PCR proceedings. Like the Vermont statute, the Alaska statute purports to condition representation on an unreviewable, subjective evaluation of merit by the assigned counsel. Recognizing that the judge in the PCR proceeding ultimately has to determine the merit of the petition, the court added a nonstatutory requirement that the lawyer explain why the petition lacked merit such that the lawyer could withdraw. Id. at 77. The court explained the rationale for its decision as follows:
In order for the court to perform its role under Rule 35.1(f)(2) — and thereby fulfill its duty to make sure that indigent litigants do in fact receive zealous investigation and presentation of any colorable claims for post-conviction relief — the attorney seeking to withdraw from the case must provide the court with a full explanation of all the claims the attorney has considered and why the attorney has concluded that these claims are frivolous. Only then can the court meaningfully assess and independently evaluate the attorney’s assertion that the petitioner has no arguable claim to raise.
Id. In later discussion, the court added that it acted, in part, “to avoid the constitutional problems that would arise if we interpreted [the statute] narrowly.” Id. In order to enforce Appellate *197Rule 45.1(f), I would also follow Griffin for the reasons stated above.
¶ 44. If this were a decision solely about the withdrawal of one lawyer, I would end here. But, as I state above, the argument and briefing disclose that the issue is really about whether petitioner has a publicly-funded right to counsel in this case. I repeat that this determination is made by the Defender General in a secret, unreviewable process with only the result, if it is adverse, disclosed to this Court and to the client.
¶ 45. The Defender General has given a number of justifications for responding summarily to this Court, but none for responding in this way to petitioner. In fact, the assigned lawyer and the Defender General could fully disclose their review of the merit of petitioner’s case to petitioner, without disclosing this information publicly or to this Court. This would give petitioner an opportunity to contest the decision and seek review in this Court under Rule 45.1(f), with the necessary disclosure that if petitioner desires effective review the information would be released to this Court. Under such a procedure, it would be the client, not the lawyer, who would decide what is in the best interest of the client — exactly where the responsibility should be placed.
¶ 46. I do not think that the current secret, unreviewable process is consistent with due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. As the court recognized in Griffin, the constitutional problem arises from withdrawal of an important right with no review process. In determining what process is due, we have generally followed the three-factor analysis from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), balancing the interest of the individual in the governmental benefit involved, the risk of erroneous determination under the procedures used, and the government’s interest in the process used. See LaFaso v. Patrissi, 161 Vt. 46, 51-52, 633 A.2d 695, 698-99 (1993). I will not go through the factors in detail in this dissent beyond stating that I believe that all three factors require us to impose some process on the act of withdrawal to protect the interests of the client. As I said above, petitioner’s interest is in having any possibly effective presentation of his case, the question of merit is ultimately one of professional judgment on which assessments could differ, and the cost of disclosing the reasons for withdrawal to the client, and to the court if the client desires, are low. I would welcome a full discussion of these interests in a direct challenge to the review process that led to the decision before us.
*198¶ 47. In summary, there is no justification for defaulting on our responsibility to protect a client in a case pending before us from unjustified abandonment of the lawyer’s representation. I would deny the motion to withdraw until we fulfill this responsibility.

 The majority has added some of the pertinent facts in a footnote. Ante, ¶ 2 n.l.

 Contrary to the majority’s statement that this dissent treats the case as if petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel and that it relies “almost exclusively on constitutional right-to-counsel cases,” ante, ¶ 17, our law with respect to withdrawal applies equally to cases with or without assigned counsel and irrespective of the basis for any assignment.