Court Opinion

ID: 9961523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 05:07:29.782522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:52.710854
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

CHRISTOPHER LEE WILLIAMSON,                                            UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       April 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                      No. 366453
                                                                       Montcalm Circuit Court
ANDREW DEAN ADAMS,                                                     LC No. 2022-029106-NI

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and FEENEY and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the injuries plaintiff
suffered in an automobile accident between these two drivers do not rise to the no-fault threshold
of a serious impairment of body function. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in granting summary disposition and we affirm.

       Although plaintiff spends a fair amount of time arguing that the June 21, 2019, accident
was defendant’s fault, that is not an issue presented here. In his brief, plaintiff describes the
accident as happening when defendant, after stopping at a stop sign, pulled out in front of plaintiff
and plaintiff was unable to stop in time to avoid colliding with defendant.

        At the time of his January 4, 2023, deposition, plaintiff testified that he was working at a
restaurant in Dorr. He further testified that, in terms of injuries, his biggest complaints are anxiety
and his knees, which limit him from doing landscaping work, plowing, and irrigation.
Additionally, he has anxiety while driving. He stated that he sought medical care for his anxiety,
but they wanted to put him on medication which he declined because he feared relapse due to his
drug addiction. He does not attend counseling for the anxiety.

       At his deposition, plaintiff was unsure about which leg was injured in the accident:

       Q      All right. The next claimed damage: Subpart b in paragraph 10 of your
       complaint it says, “A sprain, contusion and/or injury to his left knee.” Okay? So
       how did your left knee get injured in the accident?

                                                 -1-
         A       Smashed up against—I’m assuming, I didn’t see it. I don’t have cameras in
         my car, but my leg, the whole thing was liked swelled and couldn’t move. It was
         like really, really, really fat. I think—

         Q       Your left leg?

         A     Yes, my—I think it was my left leg. I don’t want to say for sure but it was
         one—I can’t remember the exact leg. I think it was the left, though.

Plaintiff then went on to describe that his left knee hit the dash. He reported that nothing was
broken, just sprained. Plaintiff stated that he was able to get out of his vehicle at the scene on his
own. He was treated and released at the hospital after the accident, being driven there by a Good
Samaritan at the scene. He was given a knee brace for the injury. Plaintiff reports that his knee
pain has gotten worse since the accident.

         Plaintiff also testified that he has some pain in his right knee, although not as much as in
his left knee. But he denied having any bruising, contusions, or sprain of the right knee as a result
of the accident. He also reports an injury to his left chest wall that makes it harder to run and play
golf. He sought care for the chest injury at White Pine Family Medicine in Cedar Springs. They
referred him to physical therapy, which he says refused to accept him because he “couldn’t lift—
couldn’t push with [his] left arm at all.”

        When asked about his claim of a sprain to his left wrist and a contusion to his left hand, he
stated that he could not remember if he had sustained those injuries. He did state that a finger and
the thumb on his left hand “locks up every so often.” He was offered a cortisone shot for the hand,
but declined because he did not want to take anything with needles. When asked about his claim
of the accident aggravating a pre-existing injury, he denied having any medical problems before
the accident.

        As for medical restrictions, plaintiff states that he had “light limitations” until fully healed.
On cross-examination by his counsel, plaintiff testified that his knee locks up and he ascribed to
an exacerbation of his Osgood Schlatter’s syndrome. Defense counsel on redirect inquired about
the Osgood Schlatter’s disease, and plaintiff said he had been treated for the disease. He stated
that he had surgery for it about 10 years before the accident, but the surgery only made it worse.

         To establish that he meets the no-fault threshold for a serious impairment of body function,
plaintiff presented in his trial court reply brief the original medical report from the emergency
department visit after the accident and a subsequent Independent Medication Examination (IME)
report.1

        Plaintiff was seen in the emergency department of Spectrum Health Kelsey Hospital in
Lakeview by Dr. Justin R. Dueweke. Dr. Dueweke’s report reflected sprains of the left knee and
left wrist, and contusions of the left knee, left hand, and left chest wall. Plaintiff was treated at
this hospital without admission and discharged to home care. Plaintiff was administered two

1
    The IME is dated March 9, 2023, almost four years after the accident occurred.

                                                  -2-
tablets of 5-325 mg Norco. The Review of Systems was negative for everything except headache
and joint and muscle pain. It also reflects a past medical history of anxiety, bipolar 1 disorder,
chronic pain of left knee, depression, emphysema, heart palpitations, opioid use disorder (severe,
dependence), post-traumatic stress disorder, and tobacco abuse. It also reflected plaintiff’s past
surgery on his left knee for Osgood-Schlatter’s syndrome. The report reflects full strength in all
extremities but notes some spot tenderness and plaintiff appearing anxious. Imaging was ordered,
but results were pending. The addendum report on the imaging reflected with respect to the left
knee that there was “[n]o acute fracture or malalignment. There is fragmentation of the tibial
tuberosity with overlying soft tissue swelling, which can be seen with Osgood-Schlatter disease.”
As for the left tibia and fibula, it reports that “[t]here is no bone or joint abnormality.” A left knee
brace was applied, plaintiff was given crutch training, and his left wrist was splinted. It appears
that plaintiff spent approximately two and one-half hours in the emergency department
immediately after the accident.

       Turning to the IME, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Yousif Hamati on March 9, 2023. Dr. Hamati
provided a two-page report dated March 13, 2023. The report largely recounts what plaintiff told
Dr. Hamati as well as Dr. Hamati’s review of the accident report itself, and the emergency
department report. On page 2 of the report, Dr. Hamati summarized his examination as follows:

                 On examination, this is a very pleasant 40-ycar-old male, very cooperative.
       He has answered all questions without any limitation. He is thought to be really
       honest about his disposition and his life. He weight is around 190 pounds, 5-foot
       8-lnches. He walks with a normal gait. He can walk on his toes and heels without
       any major problem. Neurological examination of both upper and lower extremities,
       including motor, power, sensation and reflexes were within normal limits. He is a
       little bit anxious, although again for the history of this patient, he came across very
       nice and very polite and kind of frustrated with life and frustrated with the anxiety
       that he has developed since the car accident. Local examination of both legs
       showed a small old scar for what seems to be removal of a bony protuberance, due
       to Osgood-Schlatter's disease. This happened before the accident. Since the
       accident, he has been very tender there with pain shooting down the leg almost to
       the ankle. He has slight weakness of his quadriceps mechanism due to the injury
       of his left knee. The right knee seems to have full range of motion and good
       strength without any complicating factor. He seems to be very sensitive to touching
       his leg. There is no major Instability in the left knee or the right knee including
       varus or valgus stress, anterior drawer test, Lachman test, pivot shift test.

               Currently, he does not take any pain medication other than the Suboxone
       for his history of drug abuse.

               X-rays of the left knee report was reviewed. There was no fracture or
       malalignment. He had fragmentation of the tibial tuberosity with overlying soft
       tissue swelling which is usually seen by Osgood-Schlatter disease. The tibia and
       fibular x-rays were within normal limits. The impression was no acute osseous
       abnormality of the left knee or the left tibia and fibula.

Dr. Hamati then concluded as follows:

                                                  -3-
              Due to the motor vehicle collision injury, this patient has sustained left knee
      injury with aggravation of an old Osgood-Schlatter disease, which he has already
      had one surgery for. He had a wrist sprain, chest contusion as well as increased
      anxiety and fear of driving. Since his injury, he has been to the emergency room
      on November 3, 2019 for [a] branch which hit his face. He was also seen on August
      16, 2020 for abdominal pain and September 2, 2020 for a bee sting. His last most
      recent visit to the emergency room was due to Fentanyl abuse because he was going
      to commit suicide because of his anxiety and his inability [sic] to function due to
      stresses he has encountered.

              The accident has had major affect on this patient, affecting both knees, left
      much worse than the right. It has aggravated his sensitivity to pain. At this state,
      no further surgical treatment is needed. Restrictions are a sit/stand option with any
      kind of work he does. The only thing I worry about in the long run, is continuation
      of pain across his leg and his admitted post-traumatic stress syndrome as well as
      anxiety and his fear of driving and being in an accident.

     Following briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for
summary disposition at a May 9, 2023, hearing. The trial court opined as follows:

              All right. So I appreciate the briefings and the argument. I read this with
      some interest because many of the questions I've asked Mr. Bosch [plaintiff’s
      counsel] are things that kind of bounce around, and in my mind, as I look at a
      motion of this nature and then a case with these sort of facts, as much as I would
      like to be able to see it as the Plaintiff does, I just can't. I'm going to grant the
      motion for summary disposition. Now, while I do that, I think it's important the
      Court place on the record; it's a motion brought under (C)(10), and the Court has to
      view this in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In this case, that would
      be the Plaintiff.

              But I keep coming back to this idea of what I read about in the transcript
      here, whether that is as defined as a threshold to injury as serious impairment of
      body function. And I go back and I look at the statute, and it defines under
      Subsection (b), serious impairment of a body function is an impairment of an
      important body function which is a body function of great values, significance, or
      consequence to the injured person, and (c) goes on to tell us that it affects the injured
      person's general ability to lead his or her normal life, meaning it hasn't—it has had
      an influence on some of the person's capacity to live in his or her normal manner
      of living.

               Now, as I mentioned, I did look at the Farm Bureau case because I was
      trying to match up—and every case is fact-specific, but some of those facts—
      because if I could summarize the deposition as a whole, and we've referenced
      several times, the bulk of that deposition dealt with what I would characterize as
      pre-accident issues, talking about the issues that the Plaintiff was dealing with prior
      to this accident, and there was really not a whole lot about post-accident issues, and
      chief in that was this idea that he had this PTSD, anxiety issue. I couldn't ferret out

                                                -4-
from that at all—in fact, maybe to the contrary—how the accident would be
responsible at all for the—the PTSD, the anxiety issues.

        I’m also just not comfortable with the idea that that, by itself, can sustain a
threshold injury, if you wi1l, a serious impairment of a body function. I would also
characterize that, as a summary of that deposition testimony, that he prefers not to
drive. He prefers not to do certain things, not that he cannot do them, in other
words, not that it truly has effected [sic—affected?] his general ability to lead his
or her normal life. He's just making these decisions not to do so.

        I'm also—I didn't think of it at the time, but I think Defense Counsel has a
good point; when we're talking about the doctor involved with this, I do, then,
wonder—and I don't think it's clear—that he does have the ability to diagnose sort
of this mental health anxiety issue as opposed to, for instance, any issue.

       Going to the other ailments that were part of the complaint, chiefly this leg
injury, a contusion of the chest, there was very little information—not
information—discussion about that today or briefing here.

         Again, I'm uncomfortable with the idea that this record would support any
sort of conclusion that these issues are the result of the traffic accident. Certainly—
now Mr. Bosch, I say this all the time, and I think a lot of times you've heard me
say it when you're on the other side. You're welcome to appeal me at any time. It's
not going to hurt my feelings at all. The Court of Appeals has said I'm an idiot
before. They'll probably say that again in the future, but I'm not comfortable with
the idea that what I've seen here today would suggest that these injuries can be
attributed to that accident. I recognize if they are exasperating [sic—aggravating?]
a pre-existing condition, that might be able to get you there, and that certainly can
meet that threshold injury requirement, the general ability to lead his or her life in
a normal manner, but the rest of the record doesn't reflect that. It sounds like—not
sounds like. I read from the transcript that he just chose not to go to work. He
didn't have anything other than—and I'll go back and characterize it—light
limitation. But he chose not to go back to work, and I don't know what all the
reasons that go into that, but there was nothing that would suggest, then, if I go back
to the statute, that it's affecting his general ability to lead his or her normal life.

        And then as Defendant has pointed out, sometime in 2020—now nobody
put the dates on here, but the accident's [sic] June 21 of 2019, and then in August
of 2020, he visits the emergency room department where he has this pelvis pain,
ends up with a hernia because of strenuous work. That, by definition, would
suggest that he is leading his general, normal 1ife, a laborer doing landscaping and
has, in fact, incurred a new and different unconnected injury to the accident in
question here, the June 2, 2019, incident. That is completely, as I mentioned,
severed from the—the original incident. That fact that he was able to work in a
manner to suffer a hernia, back to strenuous work, again, I think looking at this in
the light more favorable to the nonmoving party, would suggest that it doesn't meet
the serious impairment of a body function.

                                         -5-
              For all those reasons that I’ve stated on the record, I'd also adopt by
       reference, then, the briefings and the arguments of Defense Counsel here, I’m
       granting that motion for summary disposition. [Hearing Tr, pp 17-21.]

      Plaintiff now appeals and for the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s grant
of summary disposition.

        We review the trial court’s decision on summary disposition de novo. Patrick v Turkelson,
322 Mich App 595, 605; 913 NW2d 369 (2018). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Id. It is reviewed considering
the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence, which is viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Id.

        In resolving this case, we find the greatest guidance in two cases cited by the parties: the
Supreme Court’s decision in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180; 795 NW2d 517 (2020), and
Patrick, supra. Turning first to McCormick, it lays out a roadmap to determining if summary
disposition on a claim of a serious impairment of body function is appropriate.

        First, it must be determined whether there is factual dispute regarding the nature and extent
of the plaintiff’s injuries that is relevant to determining if the threshold is met. McCormick, 487
Mich at 194. In this case, there appears to be no dispute over the extent of plaintiff’s injuries
sustained in the accident. These are detailed in the report of the emergency department physician,
Dr. Dueweke, and the parties do not contest these findings. Accordingly, under McCormick, it is
appropriate to determine whether those injuries reach the threshold for a serious impairment of
body function.

       As McCormick, 487 Mich at 194-195, explains, the no-fault statute establishes a three-
prong test for determining a serious impairment:

              In those cases where the court may decide whether the serious impairment
       threshold is met as a matter of law, the next issue is the proper interpretation of
       MCL 500.3135(7). It provides that, for purposes of the section, a “serious
       impairment of body function” is “an objectively manifested impairment of an
       important body function that affects the person's general ability to lead his or her
       normal life.” On its face, the statutory language provides three prongs that are
       necessary to establish a “serious impairment of body function”: (1) an objectively
       manifested impairment (2) of an important body function that (3) affects the
       person's general ability to lead his or her normal life. [Footnote omitted.]

        In looking to the first prong, McCormick referred favorably to the Court’s earlier decisions
in Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), and DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich
32; 398 NW2d 896 (1986), while rejecting its more recent decision in Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich
109; 683 NW2d 611 (2004), to the extent that Kreiner differed from Cassidy and DiFranco.
McCormick, 487 Mich at 196. In particular, the McCormick Court stated that in considering
“impairment,” “the focus ‘is not on the injuries themselves, but how the injuries affected a
particular body function.’ ” Id. at 197, quoting DiFranco, 427 Mich at 67.

                                                -6-
         Plaintiff points to Dr. Hamati’s IME as evidence of an objectively manifested impairment.
But the report provides little support for plaintiff’s position. First, plaintiff points to a statement
in the report that plaintiff’s legs are tender to the touch. But the report does not reflect that this
was an observation by Dr. Hamati rather than plaintiff’s complaint to Dr. Hamati. And, for that
matter, the report states that plaintiff is able to ambulate and walks with a normal gait. The report
goes on to observe that plaintiff is able to walk on heels and toes “without any major problem.”
Dr. Hamati further notes that the neurological exam of plaintiff’s extremities “were within normal
limits.” The report describes a bony protuberance, but ascribes it to the pre-existing Osgood-
Schlatter’s disease. And “no major instability” in plaintiff’s knees is noted. Dr. Hamati also
reviewed x-rays that did not reflect any physical problems. The closest the report comes to noting
a physical impairment is a “slight weakness of his quadriceps mechanism due to the injury of his
left knee.” Dr. Hamati concluded that there was no need for surgical treatment and the only
restriction on plaintiff was a “sit/stand option with any kind of work he does.”

        Plaintiff also points to portions of Dr. Hamati’s report that discussed the accident’s effect
on plaintiff’s mental health. There are two reasons why this reliance is misplaced. First, these are
not the doctor’s observations but are instead plaintiff’s reports. Indeed, at one point in the report it
refers to plaintiffs “admitted post-traumatic stress syndrome as well as anxiety and his fear of
driving and being in an accident.” That is to say, the report relays plaintiff’s claims, not objective
observations.2 Second, Dr. Hamati is an orthopedic surgeon, not a psychiatrist. Any discussion
of plaintiff’s mental health condition is simply outside the doctor’s scope of practice. While any
events that Dr. Hamati may have observed during the examination might be relevant, he is unable
to render an expert opinion on the topic.

        Guidance can also be found in the discussion in Patrick regarding the plaintiff’s claim of
hearing loss. In that case, the facts presented both subjective complaints by the plaintiff, Lindsey
Patrick, as well as objective observations:

               Review of the record evidence submitted in this matter reveals that Lindsey
       complained of problems related to hearing loss and ringing in her ears immediately
       following the car accident and that Dr. Heidenreich determined that Lindsey had
       mild high frequency sensorineural hearing loss in both ears and an acoustic reflex
       abnormality. Lindsey's hearing loss was documented in the results of audiological
       evaluations by Keenan and Dr. Heidenreich. Defendants argue, and the trial court
       seemingly agreed, that because there exists a subjective component to the hearing
       tests, namely that Lindsey had to indicate when she heard a particular sound, Dr.
       Heidenreich's conclusions were not evidence of an objectively manifested

2
   As defendant states in his brief, a subjective claim does not become an objective observation
merely because the physician repeats it in his report. Plaintiff does argue in his brief that
“[t]hrough Plaintiff’s subjective reports, Dr. Hamati’s Independent Medical Evaluation confirms
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints through objective observation . . . .” [Emphasis in original.] But
it is unclear what “objective observation” plaintiff is referring to. Plaintiff tries to draw an analogy
to this Court’s decision in Patrick. But while Patrick did include the plaintiff’s subjective reports,
it also included observations by third parties, including medical witnesses.

                                                  -7-
       impairment. Rather, defendants contend, the testing that revealed hearing loss was
       dependent on the subjective verifications of Lindsey and for that reason, her hearing
       loss does not constitute an objectively manifested impairment. However, the fact
       that there was a subjective component to the hearing tests does not negate a finding
       that Lindsey's hearing loss is an objectively manifested impairment. Furthermore,
       the record also reveals that in addition to Keenan's and Dr. Heidenreich's findings,
       Lindsey's husband, Christian, testified that Lindsey had difficulties after the
       accident with speaking too softly or too loudly, which made it hard for him to
       understand her. Christian observed Lindsey experiencing frustration over her own
       lack of awareness about the volume of her voice. Christian also testified that
       Lindsey sometimes did not hear questions that were asked of her and that Lindsey
       sometimes responded to questions in a way that showed that she did not accurately
       hear the question. On the basis of his observations of his wife's actions, Christian
       testified that Lindsey had difficulty hearing adequately in everyday situations. The
       evidence of Lindsey's medical evaluations and Christian's testimony supports
       finding that a question of fact exists as to whether Lindsey's hearing was impaired.
       This impairment to her hearing was observable by others, which would satisfy the
       standard for showing an “objectively manifested impairment.” McCormick, 487
       Mich at 196-198. “In other words, an ‘objectively manifested’ impairment is
       commonly understood as one observable or perceivable from actual symptoms or
       conditions.” Id. at 196.

                Keenan, Dr. Heidenreich, and Christian testified as to their observations.
       All three testified that Lindsey suffered a hearing loss. Additionally, Lindsey
       testified that her hearing was muffled after the accident and that she suffered from
       tinnitus. Dr. Heidenreich testified that while it is not possible to test for tinnitus,
       both symptoms Lindsey complained of are consistent with air-bag explosions.
       Hence, examination of the entirety of the record in the light most favorable to
       plaintiff plainly reveals that Lindsey's complained of symptoms and conditions
       were observed and perceived by Keenan and Dr. Heidenreich's testing and that
       Christian also observed and perceived Lindsey's hearing loss in everyday situations.
       Consequently, plaintiff has demonstrated, in accordance with McCormick, that
       there is a physical basis for her complaints. See, id. at 198. [322 Mich App at 608-
       610.]

What is missing in the current case are the objective observations that buttress plaintiff’s subjective
complaints. At best, the objective evidence plaintiff submitted supports some tenderness
remaining in his legs. But the objective evidence of impairment is lacking; even Dr. Hamati stated
that plaintiff walks with a normal gait and his report lacks any significant observation of an
impairment.

         Turning to the second factor, it requires that any impairment be of an important body
function. Plaintiff states in his brief, without substantiation, that he has serious limitations on his
ability to ambulate. His brief even acknowledges that he “has had numerous subjective complaints
that his ability to walk and move have been significantly impaired. Plaintiff has also stated he is
at risk of falling, due to his legs giving out.” Plaintiff claims to be at risk of falling, but does not
cite any instances in which he had actually fallen due to his legs giving out. Moreover, this claim

                                                  -8-
is directly contradicted by Dr. Hamati’s report (which, again, is submitted by plaintiff, not
defendant). As previously noted, Dr. Hamati states that plaintiff has a normal gait, that he can
walk without major problems, that the neurological exam on his extremities is within normal range,
that there is no major instability in his knees, although there is a slight weakness in his quadriceps.

        Plaintiff also points to his claims of impairment to his mental health, leading to anxiety,
depression, and paranoia. This might arguably present a claim of an impairment of an important
body function, but even if it does the objective evidence of it is completely lacking. Although
plaintiff claims to be debilitated by the anxiety and fear of being involved in another accident, he
presents no evidence from a mental health professional to corroborate this. In fact, it appears that
plaintiff has declined to seek therapy to treat this condition.

       In short, plaintiff points to no evidence of an actual impairment to an important body
function.

        The third prong requires the showing that the impairment affects the general ability to lead
a normal life. In his brief, plaintiff cites a few areas where his life has been affected. First, that
he was given a knee brace for his injured leg and knee immediately after the accident. While the
dispensing of a knee brace is substantiated by the emergency room report, and plaintiff testified to
it in his deposition, plaintiff does not indicate how long (if at all) he wore the brace or how
significantly it affected his ability to walk or to engage in activities. Plaintiff also refers to a
diminished ability to engage in landscaping, plowing, and irrigation due to the knee injuries. He
did testify in his deposition that he was limited in these activities. This seems to be contradictory
to the fact that one of his post-accident jobs was landscaping in which he stated that he engaged in
“heavy lifting.”3 Finally, plaintiff refers to his struggles with driving due to the paranoia of being
involved in another accident. Plaintiff did acknowledge in his deposition that he does own a motor
vehicle and has a valid driver’s license. And, in any event, as Dr. Hamati’s report reflects, there
are no physician-imposed restrictions on plaintiff’s activities, other than perhaps the need to
occasionally sit instead of standing.

       Once again, the available evidence simply does not support plaintiff’s claim.

        For the above reasons, we conclude that plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the no-fault serious impairment threshold and that the trial court did not err
in granting summary disposition.

       Affirmed. Defendant may tax costs.

                                                               /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                               /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                               /s/ Adrienne N. Young

3
 Plaintiff developed an umbilical hernia and sought treatment for it in August 2020 when he
worked doing landscaping.

                                                 -9-