Court Opinion

ID: 9720472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:31:31.382071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:18.729392
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring in result.
In 1976, Justice Paul Sand, writing for the Court in Bjerke v. D.T., 248 N.W.2d 808, 814 (N.D.1976), observed that we are “sensitive to the argument that it is dangerous to allow the judgment of social workers to determine how a family is run ... this is especially true in situations where emotional or psychological harm is alleged, because of our relatively limited knowledge of child development and the nature and causes of psychological harm.” Similar comments have appeared in subsequent cases, see, e.g., McBeth v. J.J.H., 343 N.W.2d 355 (N.D.1984); In Interest of J.K.S., 274 N.W.2d 244 (N.D.1979). This is 1992 and this case involves an issue between parents of custody of children and the opinion of a clinical psychologist rather than a social worker. Nevertheless, I believe the same rationale applies: that judges cannot surrender to professional psychologists the judges’ responsibility to decide the issue of the best interests of the children.
Richard argues that the trial judge ignored Richard’s expert witness, also a clinical psychologist, and relied solely on the independent expert witness. Richard further argues that the independent expert was overly impressed with Rhonda’s educational background. Indeed, the trial judge in his decision quoted with approval excerpts from that expert’s testimony to the effect that while Richard “might do a better job inculcating some abstract moral code, I don’t think he would do as good a job in preparing his children for a confusing and rapidly changing world....” That statement involves a “judgment” that moral codes are “abstract” and that prepara*493tion for a “confusing and rapidly changing world” is more significant than a moral code, even an abstract one. There are those who would disagree and others who would suggest the two are not and should not be mutually exclusive. Such a conclusion, if it is to be used as the basis for awarding custody, is more properly the domain of the trial judge, considering all factors, than one for the expert clinical psychologist.
Fortunately for Rhonda, that statement does not appear to be the sole or even primary basis for the expert’s recommendation or the trial court decision. The majority opinion outlines the other matters considered by the trial court. The trial judge was obviously impressed by the thoroughness of the independent expert witness and influenced by his recommendation, but I do not believe the trial judge surrendered the decision-making process to the expert. If I did so believe I would vote to reverse. Rather, I believe the trial judge, although admittedly influenced by the recommendation of the independent witness, exercised a neutral judicial discretion to reach the decision in this case. That decision is not clearly erroneous under our interpretation of Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, and I therefore concur in the result.