Court Opinion

ID: 9783820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:09:03.234438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:36.395781
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, J.,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent because the majority’s opinion invalidates the contractual intent of the parties and thereby denies West the benefit of his union’s bargain with UPS.
*477West, a pilot, earned an average weekly-wage of $2,377.14 prior to sustaining his work-related back injury in 2003. Thereafter, during the existence of his injury, he received $571.42 per week in workers’ compensation — an amount equivalent to only 24% of his average wage when working. However, under his Loss of License Benefit plan, negotiated between the Independent Pilots Association (IPA) and UPS, West was entitled to an additional $1,473.35 per week once he had been off work and unable to use his FAA certificate to fly for six months.
Thus, prior to the majority’s opinion, West was able to recoup roughly 86% of his average weekly wage from May 9, 2005 through December 19, 2005 due both to his compensation and the loss of use of his FAA certificate.6 The majority’s opinion now holds that UPS is entitled to a credit against the Loss of License benefit for its workers’ compensation liability.
I simply disagree and would affirm the unanimous determination of the Court of Appeals’ panel that UPS was not entitled to a credit under our existing precedent because the Loss of License benefits were not exclusively funded by UPS — they were traded for (and thus paid for) by the union in the contract negotiations. Accordingly, in no sense of the word was it an “exclusively employer-funded plan” as required by KRS 342.730(6).
In fact, this Court effectively said so in GAF Corp. v. Barnes, 906 S.W.2d 353 (Ky.1995). In Barnes, the employee received a monthly disability retirement benefit under an employer-funded pension plan, which was encompassed by a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the employee’s union. 906 S.W.2d at 354. Although it maintained that, as a general rule, an employer-funded disability plan should be interpreted to circumvent duplicate benefits, the Court also noted that “an employee benefit which is the product of a collective bargaining process ... may properly be presumed to be a bargained-for benefit and cannot accurately or speculatively be described as the product of employer largess,” Id. at 355 (emphasis added) (citations omitted), i.e., exclusively employer-funded. Thus, because the disability retirement benefit was derived from the collective bargaining process, the Court held that the employer was not entitled to a credit or offset against the benefit. Id. at 356.7
In this instance, West, after a lapse of six months, received a bi-weekly Loss of License benefit via the plan required by the collective bargaining agreement between UPS, his employer, and the IPA, his union. In this regard, the president of IPA, Robert Miller, testified that such a bargaining process with UPS usually takes a couple of years and that both parties often had to make “trade-offs” in certain areas in order to bargain for things they found more important in other areas. With respect to the Loss of License benefit, Miller stated: ‘We negotiated, we traded off certain other areas [of value] that *478we would have obtained in exchange for that benefit.”8
Thus, under Barnes, 906 S.W.2d at 355, UPS would not be entitled to an offset because the Loss of License benefit derived from a collective bargaining agreement between the parties rather than solely employer largess. The majority, though; ignores this precedent under the guise of effectuating an assumed legislative intent behind KRS 342.730(6).
KRS 342.730(6), of course, was enacted more than a year after this Court rendered its decision in Barnes. However, and more importantly, it was enacted following the subsequent decision by the Court of Appeals in Conkwright v. Rockwell International, 920 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ky.App.1996), overruled by Williams v. Eastern Coal Corp., 952 S.W.2d 696 (Ky.1997).9
In Conkwright, the Court of Appeals allowed an employer to offset against a workers’ compensation award amounts previously paid pursuant to a company-funded disability plan even though it derived from a union contract. In so doing, the court acknowledged Barnes, id. at 92, yet, nonetheless concluded that the company was entitled to an offset, primarily because the plan fulfilled the same purpose as workers’ compensation:
Conkwright argues that since the Rockwell disability plans were negotiated through a union contract, they constitute a bargained-for benefit of his contract of employment, and as such, the employer is entitled to no credit. We point out that whether the plan was part of a union-negotiated benefits package, and hence, not a product of employer largess, is but one factor to be considered. The real issue is whether the plan fulfills the same purpose as workers’ compensation. Both the sickness and accident plan and long-term disability plan in this case provide for a decrease in benefits for those periods in which the employee is eligible for workers’ compensation by virtue of the same injury or disability. The plan considered in [Barnes] was silent as to the issue of credit.under similar circumstances, and the Court determined that the plan did not fulfill the same purpose as workers’ compensation[10]
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, I believe KRS 342.730(6)’s language was intended to encapsulate the principles discussed in Barnes rather than Conkwright. I say this because KRS 342.730(6) clearly reads:
All income benefits otherwise payable pursuant to [Chapter 342] shall be offset by payments made under an exclusively employer-funded disability or sickness and accident plan which extends income benefits for the same disability covered by this chapter, except where the employer-funded plan contains an internal offset provision for workers’ compensation benefits which is inconsistent with this provision.
*479(Emphasis added). Based upon this statutory language, a court must make several determinations before it can conclude that a Chapter 342 income benefit can be offset by payments made under an employer-funded disability or sickness and accident plan, including that the plan is exclusively employer-funded.11
Moreover, contrary to the majority’s opinion, this Court’s recitation in Barnes is quite similar to the requirements of KRS 342.730(6), to wit:
[WJhether an employer is entitled to a credit against its workers’ compensation liability for benefits paid pursuant to a disability benefit plan depends upon all relevant factors. Those factors include, blit are not limited to, unilateral funding of the plan by the employer, the duration and conditions of coverage under the plan, and whether the plan contains its own internal off-set provisions. The fundamental question is whether the plan fulfills the same purpose as workers' compensation. If so, then a credit is proper in order to avoid a duplication of benefits.[12]
906 S.W.2d at 355 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Again, both Barnes and KRS 342.730(6) enumerate exclusive/unilateral funding as a consideration with respect to whether an employer is entitled to a credit/offset against a workers’ compensation award.13 The only difference is that Barnes only deems the source of funding to be a factor, while subsection (6) renders it controlling.
Stated differently, had the subsection been enacted prior to Conkwright14 and applied to the claims discussed therein, see Williams, 952 S.W.2d at 698 n. 1 (“[KRS 342.730](6) does not] affect the outcome of claims arising before [its] effective date”), the appellate court would have erred in allowing the offset because the fact that the disability plan was negotiated through a union contract and thus a bargained-for benefit would have been dispositive.
Thus, I believe KRS 342.730(6) and Barnes should be read in congruence. *480However, one question lingers: why, given Barnes, would the General Assembly enact this subsection? 15
One important reason can be gleaned from this Court’s decision in Williams, 952 S.W.2d 696. In that case, this Court departed from Barnes and held that benefits paid pursuant to an employer-provided benefit package “cannot be applied to reduce income benefits mandated by the workers’ compensation act absent some statutory authority to do so.” 952 S.W.2d at 701 (emphasis added).16 Importantly, although Williams was decided after subsection (6) was enacted, the claims (and questions presented) arose before the effective date. Id. at 697. As such, the offset provision was inapplicable. Id. at 698 n. 1 (“[KRS 342.730](6) does not] affect the outcome of claims arising before [its] effective date.”). In short, Williams stood for the proposition that an employer is never entitled to a credit for an employer-funded benefit, regardless of whether it may be considered largess, absent statutory authorization.
Thus, by enacting KRS 342.730(6), the General Assembly set forth the statutory authorization necessary to allow an employer to claim credit against its workers’ compensation liability, as required by Williams.17 With this in mind, the provision does more than merely encapsulate the principles discussed in Barnes — it preserves and authorizes them!
In fact, a review of the legislative hearings held prior to the adoption of this law essentially confirms this. When the Commissioner of Insurance introduced KRS 342.730(6) to the House Committee on Labor and Industry, he noted the following:
What the provision does is, (1) adopt the common law as developed by the courts, but additionally it makes certain that in that situation — where there’s a sickness and accident plan paid for by the employer — and workers’ compensation benefits [inaudible], if the S & A plan doesn’t prohibit it we’re going to take credit for the workers’ comp. The theory behind that is that the employer has paid for both, and that the employer should not be required to pay for the same disability twice.
[QUESTION:] Commissioner this does ... uh, it does uh, it’s exclusively paid for by the employer ... the employer has a fund ... a union mine worker pays $4 a month out of his wages to the employer to fund that S & A benefit for himself in case he’s hurt anywhere — on the job or off the job — but it doesn’t ... but the plan doesn’t have an internal offset provision in it, then his workers’ comp would be deducted by that amount?
[ANSWER:] No. If the employee pays the first dime for the sickness and accident plan, there is no offset against workers’ comp. If there is a 10 cent payment paid by the employee, and $190 *481by the employer, it doesn’t make any difference ... there’s simply no offset.
Audio tape: Hearing on Workers’ Compensation Act in the Kentucky House of Representatives’ Committee on Labor and Industry (December 3, 1996, Tape #3, Side B) (on file with the author and available through the Legislative Research Commission) (emphasis added).
Clearly then, West’s union traded other available benefits it could have bargained for this plan to benefit its pilots. Its pilots had to pay dues to receive these benefits. Thus, one cannot say it was exclusively employer-funded — it was traded for, value-for-value!
In light of the foregoing, I cannot agree the General Assembly sought to supersede Barnes with respect to the effect of collective bargaining agreements by enacting KRS 342.730(6). And by reversing the Court of Appeals in this instance, the majority ignores the parties’ agreement, the legislative history, and our jurisprudence.18
Accordingly, I strongly dissent in the loss — even in part — of a valuable benefit bargained and traded for by IPA for its pilots.
NOBLE, J., joins.

. The majority feels it important to note that workers’ compensation benefits are not subject to income and payroll taxes. However, West's benefits never exceeded his normal wage during the time frame in which he received both workers’ compensation and negotiated benefits. More importantly, UPS did not begin paying the negotiated benefits until they were due, which was six months after he was unable to exercise his certificate to fly.

. The Court also held that no credit was authorized because "the terms of the plan ... did not provide substantial evidence that the disability retirement benefit fulfilled the same purpose as workers' compensation.” Barnes, 906 S.W.2d at 356. Compare this to the loss of a pilot’s license following a six-month waiting period for the start of benefits — an obvious benefit wholly unlike compensation.

.As the Court of Appeals aptly noted, West must pay union dues for membership in the IPA in order to be eligible for receipt of the Loss of License benefits. If West were not a member of the IPA, but instead a non-union employee of UPS, he would not be entitled to receive such benefits, which further supports the idea that benefits negotiated through a collective bargaining process are contractual benefits distinct from exclusively employer-funded benefits.

. Bames was rendered on Sept. 21, 1995; Conkwright was rendered March 29, 1996; and KRS 342.730(6) was enacted in an extraordinary session of the General Assembly, effective December 12, 1996.

. See supra note 2.

. The plan must also (1) extend income benefits for the same disability covered by workers' compensation and (2) not contain an internal offset provision for workers' compensation benefits which is inconsistent with KRS 342.730(6). The majority notes that the Loss of License benefit plan discussed herein contained no internal offset provision, but they do not consider whether the plan extended income benefits for the same disability covered by workers’ compensation, presumably because neither the Court of Appeals nor the parties addressed the issue. See also supra note 2 which addresses this point.

. In articulating the standard for determining whether an employer is entitled to a credit against a workers’ compensation award, this Court pointed to its previous decision in American Standard v. Boyd, 873 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. 1994). Barnes, 906 S.W.2d at 355. Not surprisingly, the language used in that case also parallels the passage cited from Barnes:
We agree that entitlement to a credit must depend upon proof of all relevant
factors including, but not limited to, unilateral funding by the employer, duration and conditions of plan coverage, and whether the plan contains its own internal off-set provisions. See also, Eastern Coal Corp. v. Mullins, Ky.App., 845 S.W.2d 27 (1993). The credit is permitted in order to avoid double recovery. Therefore, it is fundamental that it be shown that the plan in question actually fulfills the same purpose as workers’ compensation benefits.
American Standard, 873 S.W.2d at 823.

. Both Barnes and the statute also discuss the similarity of the plan to workers’ compensation and the presence of an internal offset provision.

. As mentioned supra at note 4, Conkwright was rendered on March 29, 1996; KRS 342.730(6) was enacted effective December 12, 1996.

. Of course, the General Assembly has enacted statutes for the purpose of codifying case law. See, e.g., KRS 505.020 (codifying the Blockburger test).

. As a result, this Court withdrew the dicta set forth in Barnes and American Standard indicating that a credit for an employer-funded disability pension benefit might sometimes be authorized, and overruled Beth-Elkhorn and Conkwright. Williams, 952 S.W.2d at 701.

.As this Court noted in Williams, “[tjhere was formerly a provision in the act which allowed a credit against the award for payments made or supplies furnished by the employer in excess of those required by the act, i.e., as a result of the employer’s largess.” 952 S.W.2d at 699 (citing KRS 342.145). However, ”[t]hat provision was repealed effective January 1, 1973.” Id. (citation omitted).

. I also note that the Court of Appeals' conclusion is supported by authority from other jurisdictions. For instance, in Essick v. City of Springfield By and Through Board of Public Utilities of City of Springfield, 680 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Mo.Ct.App.1984), the claimant had received "disability pay” pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between a public utility company, his employer, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, his union. The Missouri Court of Appeals determined that the company was not entitled to an offset or credit against a workers’ compensation award. Id. at 779. In so doing, the court noted that it had "recently held such payments made under a collective bargaining agreement are not solely on account of the injury and thus the employer is not entitled to a credit.” Id. at 778 (citing Evans v. Missouri Utils. Co., 671 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Mo.Ct.App.1984)).