Court Opinion

ID: 9720828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:42:24.606443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:21.572604
License: Public Domain

*245HOPPER, J.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree that petitioner does not have a right to a sabbatical leave. He does, however, have the right to be considered after filing an application and not be arbitrarily excluded before his application is considered by an unauthorized deletion of librarians as a class from those eligible for sabbatical.
The regulations adopted by the trustees specifically include librarians as an academic employee (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 5, § 42700, subd. (1)) and thus among those who are eligible for a sabbatical (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 5, § 43000). Nowhere do I find any authority on the part of the chancellor to decide he may reduce the eligibility list by excluding an entire class of eligibles.
The chancellor has broad discretion under California Administrative Code, title 5, section 43004; but I submit that that section should be construed with the entire set of administrative regulations adopted by the trustees pertaining to sabbaticals to the end that all eligibles must be considered subsequent to their application and not be automatically eliminated from consideration in advance because they are librarians. In the absence of such an interpretation, the chancellor would have the right to decide in advance that only instructors of a particular subject matter (such as biology) would be eligible. Only the trustees, not the chancellor, have the right to decide by duly adopted regulations eligibility for sabbaticals. (Ed. Code, § 89500.)
I agree that pursuant to Education Code section 89035 the trustees may delegate to an officer a power vested in the trustees. However, there is no rule delegating a power to the chancellor whereby he may exclude librarians as a class from consideration for sabbaticals. Education Code section 89035 provides that any rule delegating a power to an officer shall prescribe the limitation of such delegation. The only rule delegating a power to the chancellor with respect to sabbaticals (the discretion to grant or deny an application) includes rather than excludes librarians within its scope.
The chancellor’s wide discretion given by section 43004 cannot under our system of government be construed to allow him to eliminate eligibles from even being considered. To hold to the contrary would be substituting the chancellor for the trustees whereas the Legislature gave the trustees the authority to adopt the regulations. While we cannot and *246should not enter into deliberations about the wisdom of those regulations because we are not trustees—neither is the chancellor. The trustees have said petitioner is eligible; the chancellor may not rule to the contrary.
While mandate does not normally lie to control an exercise of discretion, it is nevertheless appropriate to compel an officer to exercise it under a proper interpretation of the applicable law (Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107 [142 Cal.Rptr. 612]). The regulations are clear. Librarians are included within the class of those eligible for consideration for sabbatical leave. Refusal by the chancellor to consider petitioner’s application is based on an erroneous view of the regulations and of the power vested in him. (Compare Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551, 559 [147 Cal.Rptr. 165, 580 P.2d 665].)
Discussion about budgetary considerations simply clouds the issue. I grant that there is only so much money available and that money for sabbatical leave is quite limited (and is limited to appropriations available under Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 5, § 43003, subd. (b)). However, that does not authorize nonconsideration of an entire class in advance. The chancellor’s discretion does not relate to who is eligible but rather to which persons eligible will “during the leave of absence engage in study or travel of a kind and in an amount which will so improve and update his capabilities that during future employment of the applicant at the campus such experience will substantially enhance his value to the California State University and Colleges and to the students thereof.” (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 5, § 43004, subd. (c).)
Respondent points to a policy adopted in the Universities and Colleges Administrative Manual (UCAM), a portion of which was introduced into evidence.1 Reliance on that policy misses the mark. Just as is true in the case of administrative regulations and statutes, a policy that impairs the scope of administrative regulations is void and it is the obligation of the court to strike down such a policy (see Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 733, 748 [63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697], which was recently followed by the Supreme Court in J. R. Norton Co. *247v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 26 Cal.3d 1, 29 [160 Cal.Rptr. 710, 603 P.2d 1306]). Respondent’s policy impairs the scope of the trustee’s regulations which make petitioner an employee eligible for sabbatical. Furthermore, in my opinion, such policy does not reach the status of a regulation which must be filed and published under Government Code section 11343 et seq., and may become a part of the California Administrative Code.
The judgment should be reversed with directions to issue a writ requiring the chancellor to properly consider the petitioner’s application without excluding him solely because petitioner is not a teaching employee.

UCAM, section 6351..02, provides: “It is implicit in the understanding with the Department of Finance concerning funding of leaves with pay that both budgeted leaves with pay and difference in pay leaves should be limited to instructional faculty as indicated in UCAM 6352.”