Court Opinion

ID: 9489993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:29:46.898336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:50.199902
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE, District Judge,
dissenting:
An at-will employee has very few protections against being discharged from employment, whether working in the private or public sector. One crucial difference between a private and public employee, however, lies in the fact that the United States Constitution prohibits the government from discharging a public employee for exercising his First Amendment right to freedom of expression. Specifically, public employees have the right to speak out on matters of public concern and cannot be retaliated against for such speech, if the employee’s interest in commenting on matters of public concern outweighs the public employer’s interest in promoting efficiency. See Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 950 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 2275, 119 L.Ed.2d 201 (1992). Upon becoming a public employee, an individual such as Philip Cabrol is thus not forced to sacrifice one of the greatest rights our,Constitution affords the people of this nation— the right to participate freely in debates on public issues.
The majority concedes the First Amendment right of public employees such as Ca-brol to speak out on issues of public concern, in this instance, “fighting chickens.” But, *111the majority finds that Cabrol failed to make a sufficient showing that his comments on this public issue were, in any manner, made known to the mayor, who discharged Cabrol from his employment by the Town. This failure, the majority holds, obviates a finding that Cabrol’s speech was a motivating or substantial factor in the mayor’s decision to dismiss Cabrol. Hence, the majority has affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment against Cabrol on this issue. I believe, however, that the evidence in the record shows otherwise, and for this reason, I dissent from the majority’s resolution of Cabrol’s First Amendment claims. I concur in the remainder of the majority’s opinion.
The Town of Youngsville is a small community in Louisiana with well under 2,000 residents. As discussed in the majority’s opinion, in the fall of 1994, the mayor sponsored a proposed amendment to Youngs-ville’s nuisance ordinance which targeted Ca-brol’s and other citizens’ fighting chickens by outlawing “disagreeable or obnoxious odors and stenches” in addition to “unnecessary or unauthorized noises ... including animal noises.” Cabrol, apparently an avid chicken fighter, believed that the proposed ordinance constituted foul play, and, rather than brooding over the proposal, vocalized his opposition to the amendment in the community. He spoke to several council members, others raising fighting chickens in the community, and various Youngsville residents about his opposition to the amendment. Several members of the town council rallied behind Ca-brol, and told him that he should be able to keep his chickens. Indeed, at the meeting of the Town Council that considered the matter, opposition to the proposed ordinance amendment was so strong that it was tabled and never brought up for a vote.
Subsequently, on November 16, 1994, the mayor wrote Cabrol a letter in which the mayor made clear his high displeasure with the continued presence of Cabrol’s chickens. The following appears in the letter:
This may be the perfect time for you to move on to another occupation if you do not agree with my philosophy. November 30, 1994, I feel will give you ample time to get rid of your chickens. I am confident that you will do what will best serve you and the town. No matter what you do I will harbor no ill feelings and I hope that you don’t, either.
(emphasis in the original). Cabrol, however, was defiant, and refused to get rid of his chickens. On November 29, 1994, the mayor notified Cabrol that he was being fired, effective the next day.
As previously stated, the majority found that the absence of proof of notice by Cabrol to the mayor of his opposition to the mayor’s proposed amendment to the nuisance ordinance was fatal to Cabrol’s First Amendment claim. There is, however, direct evidence in this case that the mayor knew that Cabrol had spoken out against the amendment. A letter that Cabrol’s attorney sent to the may- or on November 18, 1994, twelve days before Cabrol was fired, reads as follows:
If someone under your employment is not doing a good job and/or is not representing the town in a manner which the town fathers disagree with, then certainly disciplinary action can be instituted, including termination; however, you cannot stick a gun to somebody’s mouth and try to force them to do something that the laws of your town do not prohibit merely for political reasons. Several of the councilmen in your town voted against animal control laws within your town’s limits, and certainly Mr. Cabrol and his wife expressed their disagreement with those laws, as well.
(emphasis added).
This letter supports, the finding that the mayor was aware of Cabrol’s expressions of opposition to the animal control amendment. Not until after this letter was sent to Cabrol did the mayor actually terminate Cabrol’s employment. A reasonable jury could thus find that the mayor was aware of Cabrol’s speech at the time he made his decision to fire Cabrol. Furthermore, this record evidence supports a finding that the mayor was not only aware of Cabrol’s speech, but also fired Cabrol in retaliation for speaking against the amendment. Direct evidence of illegitimate intent is not required. Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 608-09 (5th *112Cir.1994). In this case, the improper motive of the mayor in firing Cabrol can be inferred from the record, including evidence of the mayor’s attempt to pass an ordinance to outlaw Cabrol’s chickens and Cabrol’s role—i.e., speaking against the proposed ordinance with fellow citizens—in defeating the mayor’s proposal.
Cabrol has also met his summary judgment burden of establishing the other elements of his First Amendment claim. First, examining the content, form, and context of his complaints, Cabrol’s speech was clearly a matter of public concern. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 606-07 (5th Cir.1994). The fact that Cabrol spoke out against the proposed amendment as a participant in a widespread debate taking place throughout the Town of Yourigsville supports this finding. Id. at 607. Cabrol’s personal interest in the amendment does not dictate a contrary finding: an employee can have a mixed motive without defeating his First Amendment claim. Thompson v. City of Starkville, Miss., 901 F.2d 456, 463 (5th Cir.1990). Moreover, Cabrol’s speech constituted a public concern even though he may have expressed his opposition to the amendment only in private conversations with fellow citizens of the town. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413, 99 S.Ct. 693, 695, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979).
Second, Cabrol’s interest, as a citizen, in commenting on the amendment outweighs the interest of the mayor, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of his governmental office. Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 992; Davis v. Ector County, Tex., 40 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir.1994). The balancing test acts as a sliding scale, under which a stronger showing of disruption is necessary when the employee’s speech, as here, involves a highly significant matter of public concern in the community where Cabrol resided. Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 761 (5th Cir.1988). The mayor has the burden of producing evidence of disruption. Moore v. City of Kilgore, Tex., 877 F.2d 364, 372 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 562, 107 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989). As the mayor’s assistant, Cabrol’s duties were to read meters, maintain city utilities and streets, and handle citizen complaints related to utilities. The mayor has presented no evidence, and the record does not otherwise support a finding, that Cabrol’s opposition to the proposed amendment hindered the ability of the mayor, Cabrol, or other Town of Youngsville employees to perform their duties. The mayor’s mere dissatisfaction with Cabrol’s opposition to the amendment does not outweigh Cabrol’s interest in participating in a public debate on an issue of great importance to the community.
For the foregoing reason, I respectfully dissent.