Court Opinion

ID: 9498776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:27:48.43774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:03.758840
License: Public Domain

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, with whom TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, joins,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority notes the standard for relief set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but then substitutes its factual findings for those of the state court. Although the majority professes to grant relief under § 2254(d)(1), holding that the state court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, my reading of its opinion is that it actually, and incorrectly, concludes that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
The majority’s perspective rests on two premises. First, it asserts that it was established federal law in 1999, that the construction and interpretation of plea agreements were matters of state law and that in California a plea agreement was interpreted according to the same rules as other contracts. Second, the majority concludes that under California law, the uncertainty in the plea agreement requires that the agreement be construed against the state.
I agree with the majority that the construction and interpretation of plea agreements are matters of state law, that in California plea agreements are interpreted similarly to other contracts, and that here the plea agreement is ambiguous. I also agree that the ambiguity in the plea agreement requires that we look to the expectations of the promisee in the context of the contract as a whole and the relevant surrounding circumstances. I part company with the majority on the conclusions we reach from examining the surrounding circumstances. The majority finds that the surrounding circumstances do not resolve the ambiguity. AEDPA, however, requires that we defer to the state court’s factual determination that Buckley “well knew” that he had bargained for a sentence of 15 years to life unless that finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2004). Because I cannot say “that an appellate panel, applying the normal standard of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record,” see id. at 1000, I would deny Buckley’s petition for a writ of habe-as corpus.
In its most recent opinion concerning the interpretation of plea agreements, the California Supreme Court, after reiterating that a plea agreement is interpreted according to general contract principles, wrote:
“The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. (Civ.Code, § 1636.) If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. (Civ.Code, § 1638.) On the other hand, ‘[i]f the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee understood it.’ (Id., § 1649; see AIU [Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807,] 822[274 Cal.Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253].)” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264-1265, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d *701538, 833 P.2d 545.) “The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties’ intent, including the ivords used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties. (Civ.Code, §§ 1635-1656; Code Civ. Proc., 1859-1861, 1864; [citations].)” (Morey v. Vannucci (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 912, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 573; see also People v. Toscano, supra, at p. 345, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 923.)
People v. Shelton, 37 Cal.4th 759, 767, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 354, 358, 125 P.3d 290, 294 (2006) (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
The California Supreme Court proceeded to explain that in resolving the ambiguous plea agreement before it, it would:
consider the circumstances under which this term of the plea agreement was made, and the matter to which it relates (Civ.Code, § 1647) to determine the sense in which the prosecutor and the trial court (the promisors) believed, at the time of making it, that defendant (the promisee) understood it (id., § 1649).
Id. The court further noted that one interpretation of the agreement was “reinforced by the prosecutor’s remarks at the sentencing hearing....” Id. at 768, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d at 359, 125 P.3d at 295. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that it considered “the totality of the circumstances presented here.” Id.
Thus, under California law, a judicial determination of the parties’ expectations in a plea agreement is not confined to reviewing the four corners of the plea agreement. A plea agreement is not like a contract between two private parties. Rather, in a plea agreement, the prosecutor and the defendant agree to make certain representations to the trial judge who retains the authority to accept or reject those representations. See Frankel v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 46 Cal.App.4th 534, 551, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 128 (Cal.Ct.App.1996). Furthermore, a plea agreement is often, as ■in this case, before the trial court on at least two occasions at which various factors that have an influence on the agreement and the parties’ expectations may- be considered. Here, the trial court first considered the plea agreement at the change-of-plea hearing, and subsequently the trial court considered the provisions of the plea agreement when it sentenced Buckley.
A review of the record in this case shows that the state court reasonably determined that Buckley’s expectation was that he would receive a 15-years-to-life sentence.1 As noted in the majority opinion, there is some question as to what language was in the plea agreement when Buckley signed it. The record, however, shows that when Buckley testified in Fau-ber’s trial in January 1988, he stated that he had pled guilty to second-degree murder, with a penalty of 15 years to life, in return for the District Attorney not prosecuting him with murder in the first degree, which carried a penalty of 25 years to life, and dropping the robbery and burglary *702charges. Moreover, at his subsequent sentencing hearing in March 1988, the trial court sentenced Buckley to a prison term of 15 years to life and a parole term of life. Buckley was represented by counsel at the sentencing hearing and did not object to the imposed sentence. Furthermore, the attorney who represented Buckley in 1988 subsequently testified that he had no recollection of negotiating a determinant sentence of 15 years with the District Attorney or discussing such a sentence with Buckley. It was not until 1996 that Buckley advanced the contention that his plea agreement was for 15 years. Perhaps reasonable minds may differ on whether Buckley in 1988 knew that his plea agreement was for 15 years to life, but the state court’s determination that he did is not “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2): see also Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000 (stating that “it is not enough that we would reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court decision;” instead, we must be convinced that the state court “could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.”).
Finally, I note that this factual determination is further bolstered by the State’s representation — not rebutted by the majority or by Buckley — that the allegedly bargained-for sentence of 15 years was illegal under California law.2 This too, is part of the relevant surrounding circumstances that a court may consider in determining the parties’ intent in entering into a plea agreement. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the prosecutor intended or had any motive to agree to such an illegal sentence. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial judge was not aware of the statutory sentence for second degree murder or that he intended to approve an illegal sentence.
In this case, the state court — on the basis of the same evidence as Buckley presented in his federal habeas petition— determined that Buckley “well knew that the term of imprisonment for which he was to be committed to prison for the crime of second degree murder was 15 years to life.” Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), this factual determination precludes federal habeas relief unless it is “unreasonable.” The fact that the state court did not refer to contract law when determining Buckley’s understanding of the plea agreement does not make the state court’s factual determination unreasonable. Accordingly, I would vacate the district court’s grant of Buckley’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and deny the petition.

. It is trae that the California Superior Court did not specify that the plea agreement should be interpreted pursuant to general contract terms. Nonetheless, the application of those terms would not have changed that court's factual determination. Moreover, the state court’s factual finding that Buckley well knew that his bargained-for sentence was 15 years to life resolved the ambiguity in the agreement.

. For this reason, I also disagree with the majority's holding that Buckley is entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement, as it interprets the agreement. Were I to otherwise agree with the majority, I would vacate the sentence and give Buckley an opportunity to withdraw his plea; thus placing both sides back in the positions they were in prior to their entry into the plea bargain. This is not to suggest that what has transpired since 1988 would not have a substantial impact on the parties’ subsequent actions. Rather, my concern is that a federal court should not order the specific, performance of a plea agreement in a state court that is illegal under state law.