Court Opinion

ID: 9880596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 20:01:13.920194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:56:18.065443
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11530    Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 09/27/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11530
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        ROBERT JAMES BROWN,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-10012-KMM-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11530

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges
        PER CURIAM:
               Robert James Brown appeals his sentence of 180 months’ im-
        prisonment for failing to register as a sex offender and receiving
        child pornography. Brown argues that the district court erred in
        imposing a statutory minimum sentence of 180 months because it
        erroneously concluded that his 2018 Colorado conviction for un-
        lawful sexual contact “relat[ed] to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual
        abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward”
        within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). After careful review,
        we affirm Brown’s sentence.
                                       I.
                A grand jury returned a ﬁve-count indictment charging
        Brown with (1) failing to register as a sex oﬀender, in violation of
        18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (Count 1); (2) possessing child pornography, in
        violation 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2) (Count 2); and (3) re-
        ceiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and
        (b)(1) (Counts 3, 4, and 5). Brown pled guilty to Counts 1 and 3.
               Brown agreed that the government would have been able to
        prove the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. On
        August 11, 2020, law enforcement oﬃcers executed a search war-
        rant on Brown’s boat in Key West, Florida. Forensic analysis of his
        cell phone revealed that Brown had approximately 20,000 images
        of child pornography and had downloaded at least 100 videos of
        child pornography on his cell phone. Brown agreed that he knew
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        22-11530              Opinion of the Court                        3

        at least one person in each image or video was a minor. Brown
        also agreed that he was convicted in Colorado of “Unlawful Sexual
        Contact, without consent,” in violation of Colorado Revised Stat-
        ute § 18-3-404(4). Finally, Brown agreed that, in 2019, he completed
        a sexual oﬀender registration form, acknowledging his duty to reg-
        ister as a sex oﬀender, but failed to register as a sex oﬀender. An
        arrest warrant was issued for Brown in Colorado, but he moved to
        Florida and again failed to register as a sex oﬀender there.
                Pursuant to the plea agreement, Brown acknowledged that
        the district court may impose a statutory maximum term of im-
        prisonment of up to ten years as to Count 1 and that the district
        court must impose a minimum term of imprisonment of ﬁve years
        and may impose a maximum term of imprisonment of up to
        twenty years as to Count 3. Brown also acknowledged that, if the
        district court found that Brown had a prior conviction “relating to
        aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct
        involving a minor or ward . . . , then the Court must impose a min-
        imum term of imprisonment of ﬁfteen (15) years and may impose
        a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of up to forty (40)
        years, followed by a term of supervised release of up to 5 years.”
              Before sentencing, a probation oﬃcer prepared a presen-
        tence investigation report (“PSI”).        Pursuant to U.S.S.G.
        § 2G2.2(a)(2), the PSI assigned Brown a base oﬀense level of 22.
        Because Brown did not intend to traﬃc in or distribute child por-
        nography, the oﬀense level was decreased by two. The age of the
        minors depicted, the fact that the material portrayed the abuse of
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-11530

        an infant or toddler, the use of a computer, and the fact that the
        oﬀense involved 600 or more images all increased the base oﬀense
        level, in total, by thirteen. The oﬀense level was decreased by three
        because of Brown’s acceptance of responsibility and his assistance
        of authorities in his own investigation. The total oﬀense level was
        30. Because of Brown’s prior conviction in Colorado for unlawful
        sexual conduct, the PSI also concluded that the mandatory mini-
        mum sentence for Count 3 was 15 years’ imprisonment pursuant
        to 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1).
               Brown objected to the PSI’s calculation of the mandatory
        minimum 15-year sentence. Brown argued that because the least
        culpable conduct criminalized by Colorado Revised Statute § 18-3-
        404 does not qualify as a predicate oﬀense under 18 U.S.C.
        § 2252(b)(1), the mandatory minimum 15-year sentence does not
        apply. Brown contended that the categorical approach, pursuant to
        which courts look only at the elements of the statute under which
        the defendant was convicted and not at the facts underlying the
        prior conviction, was appropriate. Brown, however, acknowledged
        that this Court had held that when generic oﬀenses are “non-tradi-
        tional,” they are deﬁned based on their “ordinary, contemporary,
        and common meaning.” The government responded that the con-
        duct prohibited by the Colorado statute falls well within the mean-
        ing of “sexual abuse” under § 2252(b)(1).
              At sentencing, Brown repeated his objections to the en-
        hancement and argued that “the least conduct which violates the
        Colorado statute is not conduct which is proscribed by the federal
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        22-11530              Opinion of the Court                       5

        statutes.” The district court determined that, “even under the cat-
        egorical approach,” the prior conviction qualiﬁed for the enhance-
        ment. The district court also stated that it would take the convic-
        tion into account “regardless of the guideline calculation, and
        [would] consider it in imposing what the [c]ourt would consider a
        reasonable sentence under the circumstances and would impose
        the same sentence regardless.” The government sought an upward
        variance, asking for a 25-year sentence because of the number of
        images on Brown’s cell phone and the fact that he ignored his obli-
        gation to register as a sex oﬀender. The district court denied that
        request, noting that the 15-year enhancement takes into considera-
        tion all the sentencing factors “and then some.”
               The district court then imposed a term of 180-months’ im-
        prisonment, and Brown again objected to the applicability of the
        enhanced mandatory minimum. In response, the district court
        noted that “the [c]ourt sentence imposed today is both pursuant to
        the guideline calculation, as well as a reasonable sentence post-
        Booker; that the [c]ourt would have had to impose the same sen-
        tence, in any event.”
              Brown timely appealed his sentence.
                                      II.
               We review de novo whether a prior conviction triggers a
        statutory sentencing enhancement. United States v. Miller, 819 F.3d
        1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 2016).
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11530

                                       III.
               On appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred in im-
        posing a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18
        U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). Brown contends that the Colorado statute pro-
        hibiting unlawful sexual contact without consent does not qualify
        as a predicate for the enhancement. Brown argues that the Colo-
        rado statute is not a predicate oﬀense because it neither requires
        that the victim be a minor or a ward nor “relat[es] to” aggravated
        sexual abuse or sexual abuse.” Because the federal crimes of “ag-
        gravated sexual abuse” and “sexual abuse” require force, a threat,
        or an incapacitated victim, and Brown’s Colorado conviction does
        not, Brown argues that his conviction does not qualify as “sexual
        abuse.”
                Any person who knowingly receives or distributes child por-
        nography is ordinarily subject to at least ﬁve years’ imprisonment
        and a maximum possible sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. 18
        U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1). But the mandatory minimum increases
        to ﬁfteen years’ imprisonment and the maximum increases to 40
        years’ imprisonment if the defendant “has a prior conviction. . . un-
        der the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual
        abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” 18
        U.S.C. § 2252 (b)(1).
               To determine whether a state conviction qualiﬁes as a pred-
        icate oﬀense for a sentencing enhancement, federal courts use the
        “categorical approach.” United States v. Kushmaul, 984 F.3d 1359,
        1364 (11th Cir. 2021). Under this approach, a court compares the
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        22-11530               Opinion of the Court                         7

        elements of the state conviction with the generic oﬀenses men-
        tioned in the sentence enhancing statute. Id. If the “least culpable
        conduct” that could result in a conviction under the state law meets
        the enhancement requirements, then the enhanced sentence is im-
        posed. Id. “If the generic oﬀenses are non-traditional—that is,
        crimes not developed in the common law—they are deﬁned based
        on their ‘ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning.’” Id.
        (quoting United States v. Ramirez-Garcia, 646 F.3d 778, 783 (11th Cir.
        2011)). We have interpreted “aggravated sexual abuse,” “sexual
        abuse,” and “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” as
        non-traditional generic oﬀenses and used their common meaning.
        Id. at 1365. We have held that the common meanings need not be
        identical to federal crimes. Miller, 819 F.3d at 1317 (reasoning that
        the functionally identical language of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) requires
        only that the state oﬀenses “relat[e] to” sexual abuse).
               As to the phrase “involving a minor or ward,” in Lockhart v.
        United States, 577 U.S. 347 (2016), the Supreme Court decided
        whether the modiﬁer “involving a minor or ward” attached to each
        term or only “abusive sexual conduct.” Id. at 350–51. The Court
        held that the modiﬁer attached only to “abusive sexual conduct”
        because of the last antecedent canon. Id. at 351–52. This, the
        Court reasoned, was “conﬁrmed by the structure and internal
        logic” of the statute because “aggravated sexual abuse,” “sexual
        abuse,” and “abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward”
        mirror the titles of separate federal crimes, suggesting that Con-
        gress intended each term to be a separate unit. Id. at 351–54. The
        Court, however, “[took] no position . . . on the meaning of the
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11530

        terms ‘aggravated sexual abuse,’ ‘sexual abuse,’ and ‘abusive sexual
        conduct’” within the statute. Id. at 356.
               In United States v. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d 1158 (11th Cir. 2001),
        we held that the common meaning of “sexual abuse” is “a perpe-
        trator’s physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment . . . for a
        purpose associated with sexual gratiﬁcation.” Id. at 1163. We have
        also applied the same “plain meaning” of “sexual abuse” to 18
        U.S.C. § 2251(e), which has a functionally identical sentencing en-
        hancement as § 2252(b)(1). United States v. Mathis, 767 F.3d 1264,
        1285 (11th Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Lockhart, 577 U.S.
        347.
              At the time of Brown’s conviction, in Colorado, “[a]ny actor
        who knowingly subjects a victim to any sexual contact commits
        unlawful sexual contact if: [t]he actor knows that the victim does
        not consent.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-404(4)(a) (2013). In turn, “sex-
        ual contact” was deﬁned, in relevant part, as:
               the knowing touching of a victim’s intimate parts by
               the actor, or of the actor’s intimate parts by the vic-
               tim, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering
               the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate
               parts if that sexual contact is for the purposes of sex-
               ual arousal, gratiﬁcation, or abuse.
        Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-401(4)(a) (2013). The statute that Brown vi-
        olated thus prohibits physical conduct done for sexual gratiﬁcation
        and without consent. See id. §§ 18-3-404(4); 18-3-401(4)(a). And in
        Miller, we interpreted the phrase “relating to” “broadly in the con-
        text of child exploitation oﬀenses.” 819 F.3d at 1317. We thus
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        22-11530               Opinion of the Court                          9

        conclude that Brown’s Colorado conviction for unlawful sexual
        contact does “relat[e] to . . . sexual abuse” based on the “ordinary,
        contemporary, and common meaning” of the statutory words. See
        Kushmaul, 984 F.3d at 1364.
                As to Brown’s argument that such a conclusion is foreclosed
        by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lockhart, he is mistaken. The
        Court in that case expressly took no position on the meaning of
        “sexual abuse.” Lockhart, 577 U.S. at 356. And as to Brown’s argu-
        ment that his conviction does not qualify as a predicate because the
        Colorado statute does not require the victim to be a “minor or
        ward,” the Lockhart decision forecloses that argument. Id. at 351–
        52 (holding that the phrase “minor or ward” only attached to “abu-
        sive sexual conduct,” and not to “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sex-
        ual abuse”). Knowingly making sexual contact with a nonconsent-
        ing victim is related to “sexual abuse,” and holding otherwise
        would contort the language of both the Colorado statute and
        § 2252. Thus, we conclude that Brown’s Colorado conviction qual-
        iﬁed for the enhanced 15-year minimum sentence and that the dis-
        trict court did not err.
               But even if the district court did err in applying the statutory
        enhancement, we conclude that such error would be harmless be-
        cause the district court stated that it would ﬁnd the same 180-
        month sentence reasonable even without the enhancement and
        would have “impose[d] the same sentence regardless.” Indeed, the
        error complained of did not impact Brown’s sentence, as the en-
        hancement did not aﬀect Brown’s “substantial rights.” See United
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        10                    Opinion of the Court               22-11530

        States v. Hernandez, 160 F.3d 661, 670 (11th Cir. 1998) (“To ﬁnd
        harmless error, we must determine that the error did not aﬀect the
        substantial rights of the parties.” (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52)).
        Therefore, because the sentence was reasonable in either event, we
        would still aﬃrm.
                                     IV.
              For these reasons, we aﬃrm the district court’s sentence.
              AFFIRMED.