Court Opinion

ID: 9689559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:40:18.81351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:50.342640
License: Public Domain

Kavanagh, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). I concur in the holding that the prosecutor violated DR 7-104(A)(l) when he took part in the questioning of Ernest Green without first notifying defense counsel. I do not agree that the defendant’s statements should be admissible.
The opinion for affirmance sets forth the conventional view that disciplinary action under the established grievance procedure is an adequate method of dealing with violations of disciplinary rules. Violation of such rules, it is asserted, does not affect the admissibility of evidence.
The opinion also rejects the defendant’s argument that without suppression of his statements he will have no redress for the wrong done to him.
I am convinced both the opinion and the defendant’s argument misperceive the error and ignore this Court’s duty to supervise the procedure of trial as well as the practice of law.
Here the evidence sought to be introduced was obtained in violation of one of this Court’s established rules of practice.
This action by the prosecutor is an affront to the whole profession for it diminishes the effectiveness *298of the attorney-client relationship, and enfeebles defendant’s Fifth- and Sixth-Amendment rights.
But we should not here be diverted by consideration of any violation of defendant’s rights. We should treat the affront to this Court and the procedure it has established. I would apply the exclusionary rule for the purpose of deterring unacceptable practice of the type involved in this case. Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 217; 80 S Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960).
The evidence should be suppressed to give unmistakable notice that, in addition to exposure to disciplinary action, disregard of our rules will in no way assist an attorney in the performance of professional duty.
Levin, J., concurred with Kavanagh, J.