Court Opinion

ID: 9949340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 14:11:29.770261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:41.600800
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued March 7, 2024

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00495-CR
                           ———————————
                DWAYNE JAMELL BRADSHAW, Appellant
                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 434th District Court
                          Fort Bend County, Texas
                    Trial Court Case No. 20-DCR-091365

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Dwayne Jamell Bradshaw appeals his conviction for burglary of a

habitation. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.02(a)(3). After a jury trial, he pleaded true

to an enhancement, and the trial court sentenced him to 16 years’ imprisonment.

On appeal, he argues (1) that certain testimony violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause and (2) that the jury’s verdict was not unanimous, causing

him egregious harm. We affirm.

                                   Background

      Bradshaw and the complainant had an infant child. The complainant and the

infant lived with the complainant’s mother in Fort Bend County. At trial, the jury

heard from a Fort Bend County Sheriff’s deputy that he responded to the

complainant mother’s address after a man called 911. He met the 911 caller outside

the residence. From outside, the deputy could see Bradshaw in an upstairs window,

and it looked like he was damaging the house. As he went inside the house, the

deputy saw damage to the front door frame, as if the front door had been kicked in.

      When he went inside, the deputy encountered the complainant and her

mother. One of them yelled to him, telling him that Bradshaw was inside. The

deputy stated that both the complainant and her mother seemed afraid, and they

yelled, “That’s him!” The deputy observed that the upstairs bedroom had been

ransacked, with damage to many items inside it and the wall. He arrested

Bradshaw and booked him into the county jail. Once he had detained Bradshaw,

the deputy interviewed both women. The deputy testified that he had responded to

the same address before for family violence.

      A second sheriff’s deputy testified to similar details about arriving at the

house, finding the door kicked in, and observing the upstairs bedroom ransacked.

                                         2
He spoke with the complainant and observed fresh scratches around her neck and

ear. She seemed fearful and was reluctant to speak with him.

      The complainant’s mother testified at trial. She stated that she did not want

to testify but appeared because she was subpoenaed. She said that she leased the

residence and on the day of the incident, Bradshaw did not have permission to be

in her home. He had been fighting with her daughter. She testified that Bradshaw

kicked the door in. When she asked Bradshaw to leave, he ran upstairs and started

“tearing stuff up.”

      An investigator testified that the complainant did not show up for a meeting

with him on the day before trial. He called her and the complainant said that she

was afraid of retaliation and did not want to testify.

      The jury found Bradshaw guilty of burglary of a habitation. He pleaded true

to an enhancement. The trial court made an affirmative finding that the offense

involved family violence and sentenced Bradshaw to 16 years’ imprisonment.

                               Confrontation Clause

      In his first issue, Bradshaw argues that the trial court committed

constitutional error when it admitted the complainant’s statements to a sheriff’s

deputy and an investigator in violation of Bradshaw’s rights of confrontation.

Specifically, Bradshaw contends that he was never given the opportunity to cross-

                                           3
examine the complainant, who did not testify. The State responds that Bradshaw

did not preserve this error.

      The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution states “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The

Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial statements of a witness

who does not appear at trial unless the witness is unavailable, and the defendant

had a prior opportunity to cross examine him. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

36, 59 (2004). Error based on violations of the Confrontation Clause must be

preserved. See Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)

(holding defendant failed to preserve error on Confrontation Clause ground

because, although he objected at pretrial hearing to admission of statement on

Confrontation Clause ground, he did not assert that objection at trial).

      The complaining witness did not testify at trial. Defense counsel objected on

hearsay grounds several times during the responding officer’s testimony. The

sheriff’s deputy testified that he responded to the complainant’s address and went

upstairs where he encountered the complainant and her mother. He testified that

the complainant’s mother yelled, “That’s him. He’s over there.” Bradshaw

objected on hearsay grounds, and the objection was overruled. The officer testified

that he then approached Bradshaw, told Bradshaw to come to him, grabbed him,

                                          4
and detained him. The officer later testified that he spoke with both the

complainant and her mother and that their stories were consistent with each other.

Bradshaw’s counsel objected on hearsay grounds, and the objection was overruled.

      Defense counsel also lodged a hearsay objection during an investigator’s

testimony. The State asked the investigator if the complainant expressed feelings

about coming to testify. Over defense counsel’s hearsay objection, the investigator

responded that the complainant said that she feared retaliation.

      Defense counsel never mentioned the Confrontation Clause during trial.

Confrontation   and    hearsay   are distinct    objections;   confrontation   raises

constitutional issue, while hearsay invokes an evidentiary rule. Paredes, 129

S.W.3d at 535; Ford v. State, 179 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). Bradshaw’s appellate brief does not identify any particular

part of the record or offer any legal argument to support the assertion that a

Confrontation Clause objection was apparent from the context. Because Bradshaw

does not direct us to any place in the record in which he objected to the admission

of the officer’s testimony or the investigator’s testimony on Confrontation Clause

grounds, we hold that Bradshaw has waived his complaint. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1;

see Paredes, 129 S.W.3d at 535 (holding defendant who complained on hearsay

ground did not preserve Confrontation Clause issue).

                                          5
                                   Jury Unanimity

      In his second issue, Bradshaw argues that the jury charge did not require a

unanimous verdict causing him egregious harm. Specifically, Bradshaw argues that

the jury verdict was not unanimous because the charge listed two property owners

in the alternative. We disagree because the charge still required the jury to agree on

one discrete criminal incident.

                                  Standard of Review

      We review alleged jury charge error in two steps: first, we determine

whether error exists; if so, we then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from

the error to require reversal. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App.

2015); Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The degree

of harm required for reversal depends on whether the jury charge error was

preserved in the trial court. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1985) (op. on reh’g) (setting forth analysis for determining whether jury

charge error requires reversal). If the jury charge error has not been properly

preserved by an objection or request for instruction, reversal is required only if the

appellant suffered “egregious harm” from the error. Id.

      “Under the Texas Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure, a Texas

jury must reach a unanimous verdict.” O’Brien v. State, 544 S.W.3d 376, 382 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018). “[T]he jury must be unanimous in finding every constituent

                                          6
element of the charged offense in all criminal cases.” Jourdan v. State, 428 S.W.3d

86, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 714 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007)). The jury must agree that the defendant committed one specific

crime, but “this does not mean that the jury must unanimously find that the

defendant committed that crime in one specific way or even with one specific act.”

O’Brien, 544 S.W.3d at 382; Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011) (unanimous verdict “means that the jury must agree upon a single and

discrete incident that would constitute the commission of the offense alleged”)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he jury must be instructed that it must

unanimously agree on one incident of criminal conduct (or unit of prosecution),

based on the evidence, that meets all of the essential elements of the single charged

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Saenz v. State, 451 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014) (quoting Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 776).

      “[T]he requirement of jury unanimity is not violated by a jury charge that

presents the jury with the option of choosing among various alternative manner

and means of committing the same statutorily defined offense.” O’Brien, 544

S.W.3d at 382; Jourdan, 428 S.W.3d at 94; Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 715. “[A] jury

must unanimously agree about the occurrence of a single criminal offense, but they

need not be unanimous about the specific manner and means of how that offense

was committed.” Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

                                          7
      “‘[M]anner or means’ describes how the defendant committed the specific

statutory criminal act.” Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 745. The State is permitted to plead

alternate manner and means of committing the same offense. Landrian v. State,

268 S.W.3d 532, 535–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “Therefore, different modes of

commission may be presented in a jury instruction in the disjunctive when the

charging instrument, in a single count, alleged the different means in the

conjunctive.” Jourdan, 428 S.W.3d at 94 (internal quotation and citation removed).

Jury unanimity requires evaluating whether the statute defining the offense created

multiple, separate offenses, or only created a single offense with different methods

or means of commission. Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 715.

      To convict Bradshaw of burglary of a habitation, the State was required to

prove that he entered the habitation without the consent of the owner. TEX. PENAL

CODE § 30.02(a)(3). The gravamen of the offense of burglary is the entry, and the

existence of multiple victims “does not convert a single unlawful entry into

multiple burglaries.” Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);

see Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (determining

allowable unit of prosecution in double jeopardy context for burglary to be

unlawful entry with requisite mental state or further requisite act). The offense is

complete once unlawful entry is made. Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d at 337 (unlawful

                                         8
entry is gravamen of burglary because offense is complete once unlawful entry is

made).

         The Penal Code defines “owner” to include a person who has “a greater right

to possession of the property than the actor.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(35).

“Ownership of the burglarized premises may be proven in one of three ways:

(1) title, (2) possession[,] or (3) a greater right to possession than the defendant.”

Morrow v. State, 486 S.W.3d 139, 164 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref’d)

(quoting Alexander v. State, 753 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). The

Penal Code’s definition of owner is “expansive” and “give[s] ownership status to

anyone with a rational connection to the property.” Garza v. State, 344 S.W.3d

409, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Where there is more than one owner of

property, the State is required to allege and prove ownership in only one of them.

Pickens v. State, 768 S.W.2d 496, 496 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no

pet.).

                                       Analysis

         The indictment stated, “Dwayne Jamell Bradshaw heretofore on or about

April 27, 2020, did then and there intentionally and knowingly enter a habitation,

without the effective consent of [complainant’s mother] or [complainant], the

owner thereof . . . .” The jury charge stated:

                     If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about
               April 27, 2020, in Fort Bend County, Texas, the defendant

                                           9
            DWAYNE JAMELL BRADSHAW did then and there
            intentionally or knowingly enter a habitation, without the
            effective consent of [complainant’s mother] or [complainant],
            the owner thereof, and attempted to commit or committed an
            assault against [complainant], then you will find the defendant
            “Guilty” of the offense of Burglary of Habitation.

                  If you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable
            doubt thereof, you will find the defendant “Not guilty” of
            Burglary of Habitation as alleged in the indictment.

      The jury charge set forth the single, specific statutory offense of burglary of

a habitation, with alternative theories of committing the offense. See Martinez v.

State, 129 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“The unanimity requirement

is not violated by instructing the jury on alternate theories of committing the same

offense . . . .”). The charge required the jury to decide whether a single unlawful

entry occurred and alleged two different owners, either of whom had a greater right

to possession than Bradshaw. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(35). (defining

owner).

      Because unlawful entry is the gravamen of the offense of burglary,

presenting alternate property owners, either of whom had a greater right to

possession of the house than Bradshaw, did not violate the jury-unanimity

requirement. We overrule Bradshaw’s second issue.

                                         10
                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                Peter Kelly
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Guerra.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           11