Court Opinion

ID: 9956287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 18:00:58.483777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:48.527925
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 1 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIO AMADOR                                    No. 22-1075
JIMENEZ; MARGARITA HERNANDEZ                    Agency Nos.
AMADOR,                                         A075-750-239
                                                A075-750-240
             Petitioners,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted March 26, 2024**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, LEE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

      Julio Amador Jimenez and Margarita Hernandez Amador, natives and

citizens of Mexico, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Appeals (BIA) denying their third motion to reopen their immigration

proceedings.1 We dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.

      Petitioners sought sua sponte reopening before the BIA, and “[w]e may only

exercise jurisdiction over BIA decisions denying sua sponte reopening for the

limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions for legal or

constitutional error.” Cui v. Garland, 13 F.4th 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

      The BIA did not legally err when it denied Petitioners’ third motion to

reopen.2 “Generally, [a noncitizen] may file one motion to reopen proceedings,

and must file it within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of

removal.” Ayanian v. Garland, 64 F.4th 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA correctly determined that Petitioners’

1
      After affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of cancellation of removal in
2005, the BIA denied motions to reopen in 2008 and 2011.
2
       Petitioners assert in a heading in their opening brief that the BIA “erred and
abused its discretion” because the government did not oppose their motion to
reopen. However, Petitioners have waived this issue because they “failed to
present any argument or pertinent authority to support this contention.” United
States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 376 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). In any event,
the government did oppose the motion to reopen.
       Petitioners have also waived any challenge to the BIA’s rejection of their
contention that they did not receive adequate notice of their hearing. See United
States v. Kirilyuk, 29 F.4th 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that “an
appellant generally waives any argument not raised in the opening brief”) (citation
omitted).

                                         2                                    22-1075
third motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred, and did not otherwise err

in holding that potential eligibility for adjustment of status was not an exceptional

circumstance warranting sua sponte reopening. See Cui, 13 F.4th at 1001

(concluding that “where the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary, . . . the BIA

may determine that the movant is not entitled to relief even though she meets the

threshold requirements for eligibility”) (citation and alteration omitted).3 As a

result, we lack jurisdiction over the petition for review because “the BIA did not

rely on an incorrect legal premise in declining to sua sponte reopen [Petitioners’]

case.” Id. at 1001 (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).

      PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

3
       Petitioners contend that the BIA erred because it did not consider Matter of
Avetisyan, 25 I & N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012) or Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I & N Dec.
326 (A.G. 2021). However, those decisions address the applicable rules for
administrative closure, not the BIA’s sua sponte authority to deny an untimely and
number-barred motion to reopen that does not establish exceptional circumstances
warranting reopening. See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I & N Dec. at 697 (“hold[ing]
that the Immigration Judges and the Board may, in the exercise of independent
judgment and discretion, administratively close proceedings under the appropriate
circumstances, even if a party opposes”); Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I & N Dec. at
329 (“restor[ing] administrative closure” procedures established in Avetisyan).

                                         3                                    22-1075