Court Opinion

ID: 9625831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:52:17.915536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:15.757345
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. A new trial should be granted because the trial was conducted by a disqualified jury, in that one of the jurors swore falsely on voir dire, prior to his selection as a juror, and thus induced defendant to accept him as a juror to serve in this case.
The trial was begun in April, 1971. The juror testified on voir dire examination prior to his selection, that he had never served on any criminal jury. On cross examination defendant’s counsel *504specifically inquired as to whether he had served on a particular criminal jury in 1969 in Fulton Superior Court, in which a human being was convicted and sentenced to die in the electric chair. Much detail surrounding the case was called to the prospective juror’s attention, and a very thorough and exhaustive cross examination was conducted on this point, but the juror steadfastly maintained that he had not served on the jury, and had not participated in the conviction of a defendant whereby he was sentenced to die in the electric chair.
After conviction of the defendant in the case sub judice, Judge Williams conducted a special hearing on September 20, 1972, but the juror still maintained that he had not served on the jury that convicted the defendant who was thereby sentenced to death. He swore that if he did serve, he had no recollection of it. But it was proven that a certain person, residing at a certain address, and of a certain occupation, did serve as a juror on the aforementioned criminal case, and the juror admitted that this was his name, his occupation, and his address; and did not contend that any person with the same name and same occupation resided at said address. In fact he was the only person with that name in the Atlanta telephone directory. Thus, it was conclusively shown that the juror had sworn falsely on the voir dire examination in the instant case.
Further, the conclusion is inescapable that the juror deliberately and intentionally swore falsely, or that he was so afflicted in memory that he could not remember such an important occurrence in his life which happened just two years before when he answered on voir dire in April, 1972, and just three years before when the special hearing was conducted by Judge Williams in September, 1972.
In 1951 a new statute (Ga. L. 1951, pp. 214, 215; Code Ann. § 59-705) was enacted which greatly extended and expanded the right of litigants to conduct an exhaustive voir dire examination of prospective jurors. The new law did not limit the examination to questions which might per se disqualify the prospective juror from serving, but was all-inclusive so as to allow questions which might illustrate the bent of mind, leaning, or preferences of the juror, including "any interest of the juror in the cause, including any opinion as to which party ought to prevail, the relationship or acquaintance of the juror with the parties or counsel therefor, any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning or bias which the juror might have . . . and religious, social and fraternal connections of the juror.”
*505A false answer by a juror to any of the questions on voir dire, whereby a party was induced to accept him as a juror in the particular case, was held ground for a new trial. In Glover v. Maddox, 100 Ga. App. 262 (5) (111 SE2d 164), it was specifically held that the false answer need not relate to a disqualification of the juror, in order to constitute error; and that a false answer as to whether he had ever been represented by opposing counsel, as a result of which he was accepted as a juror in that case, authorized the grant of a new trial.
Of course, it is still the rule — as it has always been — that where a party or his counsel has notice of some fact which might suggest not accepting the juror, and instead of exercising diligence to discover the truth, remains silent and inactive, this constitutes a waiver of the right to complain. See Norman v. Norman, 103 Ga. App. 626 (2) (120 SE2d 42).
The majority, in a rather extended discussion of this enumeration, seeks to gloss over this glaring error, and they labor tortiously to show that this event, of such devasta ting consequences to defendant, was really not an error of which complaint may be made. In support of their contention that no reversible error is shown, they argue as follows:
1. At page 493 they cite seven cases to show that a waiver occurs where the defendant by proper diligence could have ascertained the fact of disqualification and did not use diligence and did not object. We readily agree with this principle. But not a one of these cases relates to questions propounded on the voir dire! Since the new voir dire law was enacted in 1951, the place to exercise diligence is at the time the juror stands up and is subjected to interrogation under the voir dire principle. No lawyer could have been more diligent in trying to get the juror to admit his prior criminal service in a case where the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death than did counsel in the case sub judice. But no matter how hard they tried, no matter how greatly they went into detail, the juror professed that, "I am not the man,” and that he had not served on that jury. This is the only diligence that was required and there was an over-abundance shown. They were entitled to rely on his answer as being truthful, and to thereby accept him as a juror, which they did.
2. The majority argues that, "in the instant case the juror was not per se disqualified.” How can they make this positive assertion? If he testified truthfully, he was almost without any memory — he could not remember just two years before sitting on a jury in *506Fulton County and convicting a defendant in a criminal case, and then hearing this fellow human being sentenced to die in the electric chair! Nor could he even remember ever serving in any criminal case. If he was truthful, he was without memory. Code § 59-804 (3) provides that idiots, lunatics and intoxicated persons are disqualified to serve as jurors.
3. The majority originally argued that amnesia might have caused this juror not to remember having served on the previous criminal jury that caused a man to be sentenced to death, under a human tendency to forget distasteful occurrences. With this admission by the majority, how can they contend that a person so afflicted with amnesia is a qualified juror?
4. The majority argues that the post-trial investigation did not reveal that the juror had acted other than impartially. What kind of investigation can be made into the mind of a juror who cannot remember two years back, as to a once-in-a-lifetime occurrence, or who deliberately and intentionally has sworn falsely in order to get on the jury. Could we accept his sworn statement: "I was impartial.” Would that mean anything at all? Can the other eleven jurors render any aid whatever as to whether the mind of this juror was partial or impartial? Only the juror himself knew whether he acted partially or impartially, and his previous conduct precluded the resting of any judgment based on his testimony.
But the statement by the majority that the post-trial investigation did not reveál that the juror had "acted other than impartially” is hardly a fair statement, because that investigation did not reveal anything as to partiality or impartiality. He was not asked any question, nor was any other person asked any question, as to whether the juror acted partially or impartially. It would have been ridiculous to ask the juror — what answer would be expected? Furthermore, Judge Williams made no judgment or decision as to whether this juror acted partially or impartially.
5. The majority opinion states: "Therefore, we place our reliance on such authorities as Kennedy v. State, 191 Ga. 22 (11 SE2d 179) and Jennings v. Autry, 94 Ga. App. 344 (94 SE2d 629).” In this they go far afield! In the Kennedy case the juror stated that he was probably disqualified and defendant’s counsel made no further investigation. How different from the case sub judice, where the juror in effect testified that he was not disqualified, and defendant’s counsel sought with all diligence at their command to show he had served on a certain jury, which he steadfastly, though falsely, denied. In the Jennings case, it was shown that defendant’s *507counsel had some notice of relationship of the juror to a party, and did not thereafter exercise ordinary diligence to ascertain the truth, but remained silent, and allowed the juror to serve. But in the case sub judice, counsel did not remain silent, and did exercise more than ordinary diligence to discover the truth from the juror on an extensive and searching cross examination but was prevented by the juror’s false answers to counsel’s questions.
6. The majority opinion states: "If this juror had possessed a legal disqualification then a false answer which would have led to the exclusion of such juror would require a new trial. Glover v. Maddox, 100 Ga. App. 262 (5) (111 SE2d 164).” The majority opinion has completely failed to interpret and construe the Glover case, cited above, correctly. It was not a legal disqualification which the juror professed; he simply answered falsely as to whether he had ever been represented by opposing counsel. This, of course, was not a legal disqualification, but it was illustrative of his leaning or feeling, and counsel was entitled to have a truthful answer so he might strike the juror if he wished to do so. We repeat, the majority thinks the Glover case held that an untruthful answer as to a legal disqualification must be shown before a new trial would be granted. The contrary is true; any untruthful answer which illustrates the leaning, bias, etc. of the juror, whether it amounts to a legal disqualification or not, will authorize the grant of a new trial.
It is hard to conceive that the majority of this court is unwilling to grant to this defendant a new trial. His rights, in my opinion, are being flagrantly trampled and abused. The lower court is by the majority opinion affirmed, but consider the absolutely absurd and ridiculous reasons advanced for the affirmance, to wit:
a. The juror was not disqualified per se, because he falsely swore on voir dire in this case that he had not served as a juror in the earlier Cummings case. (No one has ever contended that he was disqualified per se. )
b. Amnesia may have caused the juror not to remember when he answered falsely on voir dire examination. (Why try to prop up the juror; he is not on trial yet?)
c. The post-trial investigations did not reveal the juror "acted other than impartially.” (There was no post-trial investigation, absolutely none, as to the partiality or impartiality of the juror. How could his impartiality have been investigated? A juror is not allowed to impeach his own verdict. See Code § 110-109. But is there any person so naive as to believe the juror even, if the law *508allowed him to impeach his own verdict — would come forward after verdict and swear, "I was partial and biased in favor of the State — I did not act impartially”?)
d. The majority cites seven cases on which they rely on the question of "failure to exercise diligence.” Not a one of these cases deals with situations where questions were falsely answered on the voir dire examination. Further, the defendant was extremely diligent, calling the juror’s attention to the Cummings case and trying to get him to remember it and when the juror answered he had not served on that case, the defendant had an absolute right to believe his answer and to accept the juror. (No right is afforded a party to bring in contradictory evidence to disprove the juror’s sworn answer at this stage of the trial, under Code Ann. § 59-705.)
e. The majority says the defendant did not exhaust all of his strikes and cites cases in support thereof. (But not one of them deals with false answers to questions on voir dire examination. If the defendant had been allowed 50 additional strikes in this case, he would not have used a one of them on juror Noyes. He was satisfied with the juror and accepted him as a juror on the panel of 12 after the juror had testified under oath that he had not served on the Cummings case.)
f. The majority says that if the juror possessed a "legal disqualification” a false answer would have required a new trial. (They cite no case and cannot cite one that holds a false answer to voir dire examination under Code Ann. § 59-705 affords no right to a new trial unless the juror possessed a "legal disqualification.”)
g. The majority places "our reliance” on such authorities as Kennedy v. State, 191 Ga. 22 (11 SE2d 179) and Jennings v. Autry, 94 Ga. App. 344 (94 SE2d 629). (There is no parity whatever; the Kennedy case is one where the juror said he was probably disqualified and defendant’s counsel made no further investigation; in the Jennings case no question was asked the juror on voir dire examination, but defendant waited until after trial to investigate relationship.)
These, then, are the flimsy, erroneous, and utterly ludicruous reasons assigned by the majority opinion for their failure to grant a new trial to the defendant in this case.
I am indeed grateful for the privilege of dissenting.
7. In enumeration number 15 defendant complains of the court’s admitting certain documents in evidence for the purpose of comparison of handwriting of the accused. He contends that Code § 38-709 was not complied with. The state contends that it *509served photo-static copies of the documents upon defendant’s counsel; and told him the state intended to use as evidence certain known handwriting of the defendant. Defendant’s counsel (Tr. 1371) in reference to copies stated, "I can state in my place I was supplied with these documents.” We repeat, this testimony was with reference to copies, and not to the original documents. State’s counsel also stated, "When I furnished these copies to defense counsel, I received no further request . . .”
Service of photo-static copies of writings which are to be used as evidence for comparison purposes does not meet the requirements of Code § 38-709. The originals must be submitted. This was plainly held in Mitchell v. State, 89 Ga. App. 80, 87 (78 SE2d 563).
The majority cites and relies on Padula v. State, 119 Ga. App. 562 (167 SE2d 696), but the facts in that case are in no wise similar to the facts in the case at bar. In Padula, it was held that no reversible error was shown where the original documents were admitted in evidence, and where state’s counsel, before the case began, exhibited the original documents to defendant’s counsel, and several weeks before the trial told defendant’s counsel the state had the documents and intended to use them and further told counsel that the documents "were available. ” But in the case sub judice state’s counsel never at any time told defendant’s counsel that the documents were available; nor was there any indication made to suggest to defendant’s counsel that he could see the original documents. To the contrary, state’s counsel, as his sole excuse, said that, "I received no further request.”
The law imposes no duty or burden upon defendant’s counsel as to inspection of original documents in cases where they are to be introduced for comparison of handwriting. The duty is on the party who intends to introduce the documents. The language of the statute is as follows: Code § 38-709. "Other writings, proved or acknowledged to be genuine, may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of comparison by the jury. Such other new papers, when intended to be introduced, shall be submitted to the opposite party before he announces himself ready for trial. ” (Emphasis supplied.) This language is cogent, clear and unmistakable in intent. The originals must be submitted, not copies. The opposite party has no duty of going to state’s counsel and requesting permission to be allowed to look at the documents; state’s counsel has the duty of submitting them to him in advance of trial.
State’s counsel here was under a misconception of his duties in this matter. He felt he could serve copies and thereafter it was *510incumbent upon defendant’s counsel to make a request that he be allowed to inspect the original documents. The law is exactly the reverse of the foregoing.
The error here complained of requires the grant of a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Judge Deen concurs with this dissent.