Court Opinion

ID: 9738322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:49:48.299608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.377985
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
Bose v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 209, 181 N. W. 2d 839, is controlling here unless it can be distinguished. The majority opinion distinguishes this case from Bose on one ground only. In this case there was only one insurance policy covering two vehicles while in Bose there were two policies covering two vehicles. In making that distinction the majority opinion also adopts a strict and literal interpretation of section 60-509.01, R. R. S. 1943, which is in conflict with the liberal construction mandated by Bose and other cases.
In Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 181 N. W. 2d 835, this court said: “Our uninsured motorist law was enacted for the benefit of the innocent victim of the financially irresponsible motorist, and is to be liberally construed to fully accomplish that purpose.” We also said: “It is obvious to us that it is undesirable to permit an insurance carrier to satisfy a statutory requirement by a policy provision that reduces or eliminates liability in those instances where its insured is not fully indemnified. We have no quarrel with provisions to prevent overcompensation, but where, as here, defendants’ damages exceed the possible liability, to allow the insurer to escape or limit liability is to pervert the intent of the statute.”
In Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156 N. W. 2d 133, we said: “The general rule is that an insurer may not limit its liability under uninsured motorist coverage by set offs or limitations through ‘other insurance,’ excess insurance, or medical payment reduction clauses, and this is true even when the setoff for the reduction is claimed with respect to a separate, independent policy of insurance (workmen’s compensation) or other insured motorist coverage.”
In Bose, we said: “The letter of the statute prohibits issuance of a. policy without uninsured motorist cover*721age subject to exceptions of no consequence here. Although a literal interpretation does not support defendant’s position, we consider the spirit of the statute * *
Section 60-509.01, R. R. S. 1943, provides in part: “No policy insuring against loss * * * arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered * * * with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein * * * in limits * * * set forth in section 60-509” for protection against uninsured motorists. (Emphasis ours.)
The interpretation adopted by the majority opinion makes the amount of statutorily required uninsured motorist coverage dependent upon the number of liability policies issued to the insured instead of on the number of vehicles insured or the number of premiums paid. In this connection it should be noted that the premium for uninsured motorist coverage on each of the two vehicles listed in the policy here was identical and that each premium was the same as it would have been had there been separate policies issued on each of the vehicles. It should be noted also that the insured was a pedestrian when struck by the uninsured motorist and neither of the vehicles actually insured here was involved.
The majority holding here limits the required uninsured motorist coverage to $10,000 whenever a single policy insures more than one vehicle. Aside from semantics and the technical niceties of policy provisions, in this case that holding of necessity determines either that each of the vehicles had only $5,000 of uninsured motorist coverage or that one vehicle had $10,000 of uninsured motorist coverage while the other had none. In either case, the minimum uninsured motorist coverage required by statute “with respect to any vehicle” did not apply to one or both of the vehicles here.
The holding of the majority opinion reads section 60-509.01, R. R. S. 1943, as requiring uninsured motorist *722coverage in the statutory minimum amount of $10,000 and requires that amount of coverage to be allocated or divided between the number of vehicles insured under the same policy. That interpretation ignores the fact that the statute refers to “a motor vehicle” and “any motor vehicle,” and that the term is only singular and not plural.
The majority holding also disregards the fact that separate premiums were paid and charged for the uninsured motorist coverage on each vehicle and Bose specifically held that under such circumstances the reasonable expectations of the insured would be defeated if policy limits were decreased or prorated. Where the insured pays the premium for uninsured motorist coverage in the minimum amount on each of two vehicles but receives only one policy from the insurance company covering both vehicles, that fact ought not to reduce the coverage which he would have had had the insurance company issued separate policies. Such a result is neither just nor reasonable and, in my opinion, is in direct conflict with our prior decisions.
White, C. J., and Clinton, J., join in this dissent.