Court Opinion

ID: 9877486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:05:30.697644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:07.101758
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 23-1137
                               September 27, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF M.D.,
Minor Child,

J.S., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for          Pottawattamie County,

Charles D. Fagan, District Associate Judge.

      A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

      Sara E. Benson of Meldrum & Benson Law, P.C., Council Bluffs, for

appellant mother.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Norman Springer Jr. of McGinn, Springer & Noethe PLC, Council Bluffs,

attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Ahlers and Chicchelly, JJ.
                                          2

AHLERS, Judge.

       The juvenile court terminated both parents’ parental rights to their child. The

child was eight years old at the time of the termination hearing. Only the mother

appeals the termination order.        She challenges the statutory grounds for

termination, including whether the State made reasonable efforts toward

reunification, and whether termination is in the child’s best interests.1

       We conduct de novo review of orders terminating parental rights. In re

Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). Our review follows a three-step process that

involves determining if a statutory ground for termination has been established,

whether termination is in the child’s best interests, and whether any permissive

exceptions should be applied to preclude termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280,

294 (Iowa 2021). If a parent does not challenge any of the three steps, we need

not address it on appeal. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

       The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(b), (d), (e), (f), and (l). As the mother’s rights were terminated

on multiple grounds, we may affirm if any one of the grounds is supported by the

record. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012) (“When the juvenile court

terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the

juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by the record.”). We choose

to focus on paragraph (f), which permits termination upon clear and convincing

1 The mother also includes a separate argument challenging whether the State

established “that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of
the child’s mother as provided in section 232.102.” This addresses the fourth
element of one of the statutory grounds authorizing termination, see Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(f) (2023), so this issue is subsumed in our consideration of the
statutory-grounds issue.
                                         3

proof that (1) the child is four years of age or older; (2) the child has been

adjudicated a child in need of assistance; (3) the child has been removed from the

physical custody of the parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months;

and (4) the child cannot be returned to the custody of the parent.

       The mother only challenges the fourth element. She contends the child

could be safely returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. See

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4) (“There is clear and convincing evidence that at the

present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as

provided in section 232.102.”); In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014)

(holding that “at the present time” means at the time of the termination hearing).

We conclude the child could not be safely returned to the mother’s custody.

       This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services due to reports the mother was caring for the child while under the

influence of methamphetamine. During the next fourteen months leading up to the

termination hearing, the mother spent significant periods of time incarcerated on

multiple occasions. When she was released from jail the last time, she began

using methamphetamine again, admitting her last use was the night before she

entered treatment approximately one month before the termination hearing. The

mother completed the substance-abuse treatment program the morning of the

termination hearing. She planned to enter an aftercare facility that same day and

believed the child could be placed there with her. While we commend the mother

for successfully completing treatment, this is a classic example of too little done

too late. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (“A parent cannot wait

until the eve of termination, after the statutory time periods for reunification have
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expired, to begin to express an interest in parenting.”). The mother has not had

any sustained period of sobriety within the community. Given the absence of any

evidence of success following treatment, we cannot say that the mother’s

relationship with methamphetamine is at an end or that the child could be safely

returned to the mother’s custody. See In re C.H., No. 23-0123, 2023 WL 3092111,

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2023); In re S.J., No. 20-1430, 2021 WL 811162, at *1

(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2021); In re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL 1881115, at *1–3

(Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020).

       The mother contends reunification failed because the State did not make

reasonable efforts toward reunification. While not a strict substantive requirement

for termination, “[t]he State must show reasonable efforts [toward reunification] as

part of its ultimate proof that the child cannot be safely returned to the [custody] of

a parent.” In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019) (first alteration in original).

The problem with the mother’s argument—aside from the fact that the mother does

not identify what services were withheld that would have fostered reunification—is

that a parent cannot challenge reasonable efforts for the first time on appeal, or

even first raise a challenge at the termination hearing. See In re E.H., No. 21-0467,

2021 WL 2709486, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021). A parent must alert the

juvenile court of any perceived deficiency in services “at the removal, when the

case permanency plan is entered, or at later review hearings.” In re C.H., 652

N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002). When a parent fails to timely request additional or

different services, the parent waives any reasonable-efforts challenge. Id. The

mother never timely informed the juvenile court of any deficiency in services, so

her reasonable-efforts challenge is waived. Even if the mother had not waived her
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challenge, she does not identify any deficiencies in the services provided or what

services would have facilitated reunification. See id. at 147 n.4 (requiring a parent

to identify deficiencies in services or request additional services before being able

to challenge the sufficiency of the services). We ultimately conclude a statutory

ground authorizing termination is satisfied.

       Next, we turn to the mother’s contention that termination is not in the child’s

best interests.   When making a best-interest determination, we “give primary

consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-

term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional

condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2)). The child has indicated that “she is scared, nervous, and not ready

to talk to her mom.” Conversely, she is doing well with her foster family and

“appears happy, content, and safe” when around the foster family. The mother

has not demonstrated any ability to be actively involved in the child’s life or to

provide the child with any stability. These facts lead us to conclude termination is

in the child’s best interests.

       As the mother does not request application of any permissive exceptions to

termination found in section 232.116(3),2 we need not address the last step in the

three-step process. See id. (noting that if a parent does not challenge one of the

steps, we do not address it).

       AFFIRMED.

2 The mother makes a passing reference to her bond with the child.  However, she
makes no argument that that bond should preclude termination. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(3)(c) (permitting the court to forgo termination due to a strong parent-
child bond).