Court Opinion

ID: 9736253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:48:47.276194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:05.331968
License: Public Domain

Quirico, J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the holding of the court that St. 1979, c. 488, entitled “An Act providing for capital punishment,” and that the various amendments to *687the General Laws enacted thereby are unconstitutional under art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. Although the holding is directed to specific statutory enactments, I believe that it is fair to state (1) that the broad sweep of the language of the court leaves the Legislature without power to enact legislation authorizing the imposition of the death penalty for any crime, and (2) that this situation will prevail unless and until (a) the present decision is reversed by this court, or (b) our Constitution is amended to negative or otherwise reverse the effect of this decision by the addition of language which recognizes or declares that the Legislature has the power to enact such legislation.
Today’s decision completes a cycle which this court started by its decision in Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 369 Mass. 242 (1975), where four Justices held, although not all for the same reasons, that the Massachusetts Constitution proscribed the death penalty for the crime of rape-murder. Three of those Justices expressed the view that some cases of murder in the first degree might constitutionally be made subject to the death penalty. Id. at 263-264 n.23 (Tauro, C.J., concurring). Id. at 275 (Hennessey, J., concurring). Id. at 277-278 (Wilkins, J., concurring). I joined the dissent by Justice Reardon in the O’Neal case. Id. at 283. On the same day the rule of the O’Neal case was applied in deciding Commonwealth v. Tarver, 369 Mass. 302 (1975). I dissented in that case. Id. at 320.
The next occasion on which the Justices of this court were called to speak on the subject of the constitutionality of capital punishment under our State Constitution was in Opinions of the Justices, 372 Mass. 912 (1977). Five of the Justices joined in an opinion that a bill on the subject of capital punishment then under consideration by the House of Representatives would violate art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights. Justice Braucher and I joined in an opinion to the contrary. Id. at 922.
The grounds or bases on which the majority or plurality of the Justices based their decisions or opinions on the un*688constitutionality of the death penalty in this Commonwealth may be summarized as follows. In Commonwealth v. O’Neal, supra, in which all members of the court participated, a majority concurred in the view that because the Commonwealth had failed to establish that the death penalty for rape-murder served a compelling or substantial State interest, the punishment violated art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights.1 The Opinions of the Justices, supra, were given in response to a question whether the bill then being considered would, if enacted, violate arts. 1, 10, 12 or 26 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. Five of the Justices joined in an opinion that the bill, if enacted, would violate art. 26, and they did not answer as to arts. 1, 10, and 12.
In the present case six of the Justices subscribe to the conclusion that the death penalty violates art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights. Five of those Justices base their decision on two grounds: that the actual operation of capital punishment in Massachusetts, with its concomitant physical and mental torture, violates contemporary standards of decency; and that the discretionary powers exercised throughout the criminal process make the death penalty both arbitrary and discriminatory.2 One of those five Justices concurs in a separate opinion which places greater emphasis and reliance on the ordeal of the condemned between the imposition and the ultimate commutation of the sentence. A sixth Justice concurs in a separate opinion based on the more limited ground that the imposition of a death sentence which experience shows will rarely, if ever, *689be carried out, with the ensuing long delays before the ultimate commutation of the sentence, is per se “cruel and unusual and violates art. .26 of the Declaration of Rights.”
In this situation, having full regard for the conclusions reached by this court in Commonwealth v. O’Neal, supra, I nevertheless must note that the decision was based on a standard of review shifting the burden of proof to the State which the court has chosen not to follow in today’s decision. Similarly, and with full regard for the opinions expressed by five Justices of this court in Opinions of the Justices, supra, I note that they do not constitute a binding precedent. Therefore, I adhere to the views expressed (a) in the dissenting opinion by Justice Reardon, in which I joined in the case of Commonwealth v. O’Neal, supra at 283; (b) in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Tarver, supra at 320; and (c) in the opinions expressed by me jointly with Justice Rraucher, in Opinions of the Justices, supra at 922. On the basis of those views which I have previously expressed, or in which I have previously joined, I respectfully disagree with the decision of this court that the current death penalty statute enacted by St. 1979, c. 488, and thereby incorporated into G. L. c. 279, §§ 52-56, is unconstitutional under art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights.
While the precise question which is before us is the constitutionality of a particular statute authorizing the imposition of the death penalty for murder in the first degree in prescribed circumstances, I believe the present decision constitutionally forecloses any legislative authorization of capital punishment for any crime in this Commonwealth. I believe that the court, by its decision in this case, has completely stripped the Legislature of the constitutional power which it has heretofore possessed and exercised for two hundred years to determine, in its wisdom and discretion, when and in what circumstances the public good requires the imposition of the death penalty for murder in the first degree.
We have thus reached the precise position which was presaged by the following language in Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 369 Mass. 242 (1975): “[I]f the present will of the *690people of the Commonwealth is that capital punishment should be permitted in some or all cases of murder in the first degree, procedures for amendment of the State Constitution which are relatively speedy, but still require time for reasonable reflection, are available to accomplish that end.” Id. at 275 (Hennessey, J. [now C.J.], concurring). The same quoted language was noted in Opinions of the Justices, supra, with the following reply thereto: “With respect, we would suggest that if the present will of the people is that capital punishment should not be permitted in some or all cases of murder in the first degree, procedures for amendment of the State Constitution which are relatively speedy, but still require time for reasonable reflection, are available to accomplish that end.” Id. at 923 (joint opinion of Quirico and Braucher, JJ.). If the Legislature’s existing power to determine what should be this Commonwealth’s policy on the subject of capital punishment is to be abrogated, I believe that the latter statement suggests the correct approach to follow.
I do not, of course, question the authority or the duty of this court to pass on the constitutionality of the statute in question. Paquette v. Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 376 (1959). Nor do I question the propriety of reaching the constitutional issue as presented in this case. I do, however, have serious reservations about the standards which the court has applied and the manner and extent to which I believe the court has intruded upon the province of the Legislature in arriving at its conclusion of unconstitutionality.
We start with the proposition that the Legislature has “full power and authority ... to make, ordain, and establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, . . . either with penalties or without, so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this Commonwealth, and for the government and ordering thereof, and of the subjects of the same . . . .” Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 909 (1976), *691this court said: “We note at the outset that the Legislature has great latitude to determine what conduct should be regarded as criminal and to prescribe penalties to vindicate the legitimate interests of society. . . . ‘The function of the legislature is primary, its exercises fortified by presumptions of right and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of their wisdom or propriety.’ Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910). It is thus with restraint that we exercise our power of review to determine whether the punishment before us exceeds the constitutional limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment and by art. 26” (citations omitted).
In determining the constitutionality of a statute, this court ordinarily assumes that the Legislature has acted on the basis of facts which have a rational bearing on the subject matter of the legislation, and which support the validity of the statute. Hall-Omar Baking Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 344 Mass. 695, 700 (1962). If the Legislature could have found any conceivable facts which would form a rational basis for its legislation, the court assumes that such facts were found, and it has never required that the Legislature expressly state that it found them, or state what findings it made. As to the statute now under consideration, the Legislature voluntarily indulged in the heretofore unnecessary and somewhat unusual, but not improper, practice of making and declaring express findings which are contained in St. 1979, c. 488, § 1.
In Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 192 (1969), it was argued that a statute was unconstitutional as “‘irrational and unreasonable’ because the Legislature did not thoroughly investigate the available scientific and medical evidence concerning marihuana when enacting and revising the law.” This court rejected the argument, stating: “We know nothing that compels the Legislature to thoroughly investigate the available scientific and medical evidence when enacting a law. The test of whether an act of the Legislature is rational and reasonable is not whether the records of the Legislature contain a sufficient basis of fact to *692sustain that act. The Legislature is.presumed to have acted rationally and reasonably. See Commonwealth v. Finnigan, 326 Mass. 378, 379 [1950]; Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 348 Mass. 414, 422 [1965]. ‘Unless the act of the Legislature cannot be supported upon any rational basis of fact that reasonably can be conceived to sustain it, the court has no power to strike it down as violative of the Constitution.’ Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 418 [1940].”
In my opinion, it cannot be said that the statute under consideration “cannot be supported upon any rational basis of fact that reasonably can be conceived to sustain it.” It should therefore follow, under that rule, that “the court has no power to strike it down as violative of the Constitution.” I believe that the same result would follow if we were limited in our decision to a consideration of those facts expressly found by the Legislature.
It should surprise no one that the factual conclusions reached by the Legislature are not universally accepted. The Legislature’s powers are not limited to action in areas where there is unanimity of opinion as to the need for action and the nature of the action required. There are few subjects which have been so widely debated for so long as has been the case with capital punishment. There are perhaps few subjects on which opinions are so polarized, and the basis for which is found in personal viewpoints without satisfactory factual proof to support them. We thus have a typical case for the application of the rule that “[w]here the reasonableness of the legislative finding or the factual basis of the legislative finding is fairly debatable the legislative determination must be sustained. . . . [And the fact that] there may be an earnest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring matters of legislative judgment within the range of judicial cognizance.” Commonwealth v. Leis, supra at 201 (Kirk, J., concurring).
Rather than applying the traditional standard of review, the court today attempts to determine whether the death *693penalty is “unacceptable under contemporary moral standards.”3 However persuasive the argument might be if addressed to the Legislature, the analysis is, essentially, a moral rather than a legal one. In thus elaborating its view of contemporary morality, the court proceeds with no apparent regard for the constitutionally distinct roles of the judiciary and the Legislature.
If this court is to determine the constitutionality of the death penalty in light of contemporary moral standards, I believe it must, at a minimum, award great deference to the legislative judgment implicit in the passage of the statute that contemporary moral standards support the punishment in certain circumstances. The fact that we interpret art. 26 rather than another provision of our Constitution should not affect the functions and responsibilities of the coequal *694branches of government so as to justify an otherwise unwarranted and improper intrusion by the judiciary into the legislative domain. “ ‘Judicial inquiry does not extend to the expediency, wisdom or necessity of the legislative judgment for that is a function that rests entirely with the lawmaking department.’ Slome v. Chief of Police of Fitchburg, 304 Mass. 187, 189 [1939].” Commonwealth v. Leis, supra (Kirk, J., concurring). By substituting its view of contemporary standards for the view implicitly expressed by the Legislature, the court infringes on the Legislature’s prerogative to define crimes and establish the terms of punishment. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 909 (1976). Especially in an area of emotionally charged debate, our role should be limited to determining whether the Legislature’s action exceeds its constitutional grant of power. In contrast, today’s decision in effect limits the Constitution’s grant of power to the Legislature to judge what shall be “for the good and welfare of this Commonwealth.” I believe that we should not so alter the principles of judicial restraint and the constitutional requirement of separation of powers under art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth according to the nature of the subject matter of the legislation being construed.
This court’s obligation “to avoid judicial legislation,” Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 548 (1945), should be particularly evident here, since in St. 1979, c. 488, § 1, the Legislature has articulated its judgment as to the deterrent and retributive value of capital punishment. Cf. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 355 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (“[Legislative judgments as to the efficacy of capital punishment] are solemn judgments, reasonably based, that imposition of the death penalty will save the lives of innocent persons. This concern for life and human values and the sincere efforts of the States to pursue them are matters of the greatest moment with which the judiciary should be most reluctant to interfere”).
*695It is, of course, well established that art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights places a restraint upon the exercise of legislative power and an obligation on the court to judge the constitutionality of legislative determinations regarding punishment. It is also clear that art. 26 would bar certain punishments even if legislatively approved. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moore, 359 Mass. 509, 515 (1971). However, I am of the view that “for purposes of this analysis art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights imposes a standard no more restrictive than that expressed in the prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment in the Eighth Amendment.” Opinions of the Justices, 372 Mass. 912, 922 (1977) (Quirico, J., dissenting), quoting from Commonwealth v. O’Neal, supra at 294-295 (Reardon, J., dissenting). I do not believe that the court places any particular reliance on the slight difference between the words making reference to “cruel or unusual” punishment in art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights, and the words making reference to “cruel and unusual” punishment in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution in interpreting art. 26 as proscribing the death penalty (emphasis supplied). We are, of course, free to interpret our own Constitution differently from the manner in which the United States Supreme Court interprets basically the same language in the United States Constitution. However, the total absence of any sound reason for the difference in interpretation gives cause to question the decision in this case. There is no historical reason to suppose that these words, first adopted as a part of the Massachusetts Constitution in 1780 and then adopted as part of the First through Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in 1790, were intended to have different meanings in substantially similar societal settings, both of which clearly recognized and sanctioned capital punishment for certain crimes. There is no other apparent reason why the nearly identical State and Federal constitutional provisions should not dictate identical results. See Commonwealth v. O’Neal, supra at 284, 293-294 (Reardon, J., dissenting), and cases cited. See also Storti v. Com*696monwealth, 178 Mass. 549, 553 (1901) (Holmes, C.J.) (dicta) (“[I]t is unnecessary to go into any nice argument upon the words of the article, and to decide whether, inasmuch as those words are ‘cruel or unusual,’ not ‘cruel and unusual,’ a punishment which is unusual but is not cruel is forbidden by them. . . . [T]he word ‘unusual’ must be construed with the word ‘cruel’ and cannot be taken so broadly as to prohibit every humane improvement not previously known in Massachusetts”). Cf. Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 471, 474-475 (1957) (The rights under art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution are substantially the same as those secured under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States).
I note that in seven separate instances the majority today relies in its decision on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), to the effect that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. I believe it is appropriate to note in response that, interpreting the Eighth Amendment in light of evolving standards of decency, seven of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court have concurred in the view that the death penalty does not, of itself and in all circumstances, constitute cruel and unusual punishment: “It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed.” Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591 (1977) (plurality). See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-187, 226-227 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247, 260-261 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268, 277-279 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285, 306-324 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331, 350-356, 363 (1976).
Moreover, in following the evolving standards approach, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument that *697“the evolutionary process had come to an end, and that standards of decency required that the Eighth Amendment be construed finally as prohibiting capital punishment for any crime regardless of its depravity and impact on society.” Instead the Court concluded that “it is now evident that a large proportion of American society continues to regard [capital punishment] as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (plurality).4 See J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 65 (1980): “In their separate concurring opinions in Furman v. Georgia (1972), Justices Brennan and Marshall argued quite directly that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it was out of accord with contemporary community values. The risk in such a claim is obvious, and in this case it was tragically realized. Following Furman there was a virtual stampede of state reenactments of the death penalty, and the clarity of that community reaction surely had much to do with the Court’s turnaround on the issue” (footnotes omitted).5
Thus, in its Eighth Amendment analysis the Supreme Court recognizes that “Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.” Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality).6 Indeed, *698while recognizing that the “cruel and unusual” clause of the Eighth Amendment was intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of legislative power, the Court has noted “the limited role to be played by the courts” in addressing an Eighth Amendment claim: “[I]n assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity. We may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the people. This is true in part because the constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards.” Gregg v. Georgia, supra at 175 (plurality) (upholding the constitutionality of Georgia’s statutory scheme for imposing death penalty).
Furthermore, a review of the various decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment demonstrates clearly that a majority of the Justices emphasize the necessity for judicial restraint and deference to legislative judgments regarding capital punishment when analyzing a particular statute in light of evolving standards of decency. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra at 174-187 (plurality opinion by Stewart, J., with Powell and Stevens, JJ.); Roberts v. Louisiana, supra at 350-356 (White, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383-384 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 410-411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 428-433, 451-456 (Powell, J., dissenting). Cf. Furman v. Georgia, supra at 465-470 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated in his dissent to Furman v. Georgia, supra at 383, “in a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.”
In part two of its decision the court properly suggests that c. 488 would meet Federal constitutional requirements. *699Nevertheless, the court concludes that c. 488 — or any other statute providing for capital punishment — is unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution. Part two of the decision holds the death penalty to be unconstitutional because it is arbitrarily inflicted, and because it falls discriminatorily upon minorities. To support this holding, the court takes judicial notice of the existence of racial prejudice in some persons in this Commonwealth. Even recognizing the existence of such prejudice, however, I am not prepared to accept a statistical showing from Florida, Georgia, Texas and Ohio as evidence of the extent of such discrimination in Massachusetts. There are no comparable statistics or other evidence before the court which suggests that the death penalty has been discriminatorily imposed in this Commonwealth. In the absence of such a record, I do not concede that sentencing under c. 488 would inevitably be arbitrary and discriminatory. To the extent that the court bases its opinion in part two on statistics from four other jurisdictions and an assumption about prejudice in Massachusetts, I believe that the court ignores traditional standards of review, and particularly review under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, much as it did in part one by its purported determination of contemporary moral standards.7
I note that for the first time to my knowledge this court, or some of the Justices of this court, are holding that the death penalty is “cruel or unusual” based in whole or in part on the fact that the imposition of the penalty is almost always followed by a long period of mental suffering by the convicted felon who is under the sentence of death*, only to have the sentence commuted after many years of appellate *700procedures. I find it difficult to understand or appreciate how it is constitutionally cruel or unusual punishment to permit a person who has been sentenced to death to pursue appellate procedures almost ad infinitum when, as stated by the Justices taking that position, the procedures always end in a commutation of the death sentence. To the extent that a defendant resorts to those endless appellate procedures, he should not be heard to complain about the prolongation of his period of anxiety and agony over his possible execution. To the extent that the delays are due to the actions of in-termeddlers, the court is not without power to deal with them. As to ultimate commutations by executive officers, the courts are not responsible for such action. In any event, if this is to be a ground for the holding, I question the fairness of buttressing that holding by quotations from the unverified “brief’ submitted by Henry Arsenault. If his description of his ordeal while under sentence of death is accurate, it would be appropriate for submission to the Legislature for its consideration of the “expediency, wisdom or necessity” for capital punishment, but that is not what we are asked to decide in this case. If that description were before the Legislature, it would be open to and appropriate for the Legislature to consider also the description by this court in Commonwealth v. Devlin (and Arsenault), 335 Mass. 555, 559-563 (1957), of the deliberate planning, preparation which included the purchase of firearms, and execution by Arsenault and his codefendants of the invasion of a house while the occupants were present, the attempted commission of a robbery while armed, the resulting ter-rorization of the occupants, and the cruel and senseless murder of one of them. The place to present all of that information is before the Legislature for its consideration of the policy to be adopted on the subject of capital punishment, and not before this court. I believe that this is an appropriate occasion to recall that “legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.” Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. *701464-, 479-480 (1977), quoting from Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (Holmes, J.).
In summary, the issue before the Justices of this court, as I see it, is not whether any Justice favors or opposes capital punishment as a matter of Commonwealth policy. Nor is the issue whether any Justice would favor or oppose capital punishment if he were called to vote thereon as a member of the general public or as a member of the Legislature. Rather, the issue before us, as I see it, is whether the Legislature has the power, under the Constitution of the Commonwealth, to enact a statute mandating capital punishment for certain types of murder in the first degree, and more specifically whether it has the power to enact St. 1979, c. 488, the statute under consideration, which authorizes the imposition of the death penalty for murder in the first degree committed in particular, specified circumstances. A vote on the subject of capital punishment by a member of the general public or by a member of the Legislature requires a consideration of broad questions of public policy. A vote on the same subject as it comes before the court in this case involves consideration of the much more limited constitutional question of the power of the Legislature to determine what the public policy of the Commonwealth should be on this subject. I conclude that the Legislature has the power to make that decision under the provisions of the Constitution of this Commonwealth, and I reach that conclusion without regard to any personal views which I may have on the “expediency, wisdom or necessity” of capital punishment.

 In Commonwealth v. Tarver, 369 Mass. 302, 319 (1975), in which five members of the court participated, the statement of the court on this subject was limited to the following: “This court has decided that the death penalty for rape-murder is proscribed by our State Constitution. Commonwealth v. O’Neal [369 Mass. 242, 243 (1975)]. Accordingly the death penalty imposed herein must be vacated.”

 One of those five Justices joins in the opinion of the court, but states in a separate concurring opinion his belief that the court should have declined to pass on the constitutionality of capital punishment in the instant proceeding.

 The opinion of the court does not reach the issue whether the death penalty is a deterrent to crime. In its note 2, supra, however, citing Opinions of the Justices, 372 Mass. 912 (1977), the court implicitly accepts the standard of review set forth in that opinion, placing on the State the burden of proving that capital punishment contributes more to the achievement of a legitimate State purpose, such as deterrence, than does life imprisonment. To the extent, if any, that the court suggests that the Commonwealth bears a special burden of proving the superior deterrence of the death penalty to the court in a judicial proceeding, I respectfully disagree. That is a factual issue to be decided by the Legislature, and in my opinion it is sufficient that there is some reasonable body of fact or opinion which permits a finding of such value by the Legislature. What matters is that there be a sufficient foundation for the Legislature’s judgment, and if there is, that judgment is not reviewable by a court. It is the Legislature and not the court which must be satisfied or convinced about the merits of the remedy or penalty which the former chooses to impose for a particular offense. “Judicial inquiry does not concern itself with the accuracy of the legislative finding, but only with the question whether it so lacks any reasonable basis as to be arbitrary. Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582, 586-587 [1929].” Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 201 (1969) (Kirk, J., concurring). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), where a plurality of the United States Supreme Court noted that the results of statistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty “simply have been inconclusive.” Id. at 185. “The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures.” Id. at 186.

 The Court found that the legislative response to Furman v. Georgia, supra, was the most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the death penalty, noting that after Furman at least thirty-five Legislatures enacted new statutes that provided for the death penalty. Also, the Congress of the United States enacted a statute providing for the death penalty for aircraft piracy that results in death. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-180 (1976).

 For a persuasive analysis of the problems inherent in a constitutional jurisprudence which seeks to measure the merits of policy judgments against a perceived set of “fundamental” values, see Ely at 43-72.

 In determining the constitutionality of a particular statute, the Court stated that it should give attention to public attitudes concerning a particular sentence — history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing attitudes. Id.

 General Laws c. 278, § 33E, as amended through St. 1979, c. 346, § 2, states in relevant part: “In a capital case as hereinafter defined the entry in the supreme judicial court shall transfer to that court the whole case for its consideration of the law and the evidence. Upon such consideration the court may, if satisfied that the verdict was against the law or the weight of the evidence, or because of newly discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice may require (a) order a new trial or (b) direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt, and remand the case to the superior court for the imposition of sentence.”