Court Opinion

ID: 7811733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:13:36.006809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:28:27.719443
License: Public Domain

Humphreys, J. Appellant was indicted, tried, and oonvieted in the Montgomery County Circuit Court for the crime of being an accessory before the fact to murder in the first degree, and punished by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for his natural life. From the judgment of conviction an appeal has been duly prosecuted to this court. Appellant contends that no crime was charged in the indictment because it does not allege that Anna McKennon was murdered in the State of Arkansas and the county of Montgomery; and because it does not negative the presence of appellant at the time and place of the killing. Omitting the signature of the prosecuting attorney, and the indorsements, the indictment is as follows: “Montgomery Circuit Court, State of Arkansas against H. M. Hughes. The grand jury of Montgomery County, in the name and by the authority of the State of Arkansas, accuse H. M. Hughes of the crime of accessory before the fact to murder in the first degree, committed as follows, to-wit: The said H. M. Hughes in the county and State aforesaid, on the............day of May, A. D. 1921, that one Raymond Cole unlawfully wilfully, feloniously, with malice aforethought, deliberation and premeditation, did kill and murder one Anna McKennon by then and there shooting her with a gun and then and there loaded with gunpowder and bullets, then and there had and held in the hands of him the said Raymond Cole; and that said H. M. Hughes on the..................day of May A. D. 1921, before the said murder was committed as aforesaid, unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously, with malice aforethought, premeditation and deliberation, did advise and encourage, aid, abet and assist the said Raymond Cole to do and commit the murder in the manner and form aforesaid, against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas.” (1) In the body of the indictment reference is made to the county and State aforesaid, meaning Montgomery County and the State of Arkansas mentioned in the caption as well as the first part of the indictment. The last part of the indictment also charges that the offense was committed against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas. Reading the whole indictment together it is perhaps sufficient, though inaptly worded, to lay the venue in Montgomery County, Arkansas. We, however, uphold the indictment on the more substantial ground that its imperfections in this respect are cured by section 3020 of 'Crawford & Moses ’ Digest, which is as follows: “If the indictment contains no statement of the place in which the offense was committed, it shall be considered as charged therein that it was commited in the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court in which the grand jury was impaneled.” (2) It is not necessary to the validity of an indictment against an accessory before the fact to a crime to negative the presence of the accused at the perpetration of the crime. This court said in the case of Larimore v. State, 84 Ark. 606: “Where the accused is indicted as accessory before the fact, it is unnecessary for the indictment to negative his presence at the perpetration of the crime. Presence at the perpetration of the crime maths the distinction, under our law, between principals and accessories before the fact, and it .is sufficient in an indictment against an accessory to allege that he advised and encouraged the perpetration of the crime,-without specifically alleging that he was not present.” Appellant next contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and judgment. The record reflects that Raymond Cole, charged as principal in the crime, was convicted of murder in the first degree. He testified that appellant induced him to kill Mrs. Anno McKennon, at a timo when he was intoxicated, by promising to pay him $850 as soon as he accomplished the act and returned to the home of Mrs. Noland, where appellant resided; that appellant furnished him a 44 Winchester, already loaded, with which to commit the deed; that he went to the home of the old lady, who resided alone, and, while she was standing in the front door, fired upon and killed her; that he took her pony which was hitched near the house and returned to the Noland home to leave the gun and get his money; that he set the gun on the back porch, but, being unable to find appellant, left for his mother’s home, and a short time thereafter left the community. This witness was an accomplice, and under the rule, in order to convict appellant, it was necessary that the testimony of the accomplice be corroborated. The record reveals a number of facts and circumstances tending to corroborate the testimony of this witness. After a very careful reading and analysis of the evidence, we think it sufficient to sustain the judgment and verdict. Appellant next contends that the court committed reversible error in admitting a statement or confession made by him while under arrest in. Garland County. After appellant’s arrest by Montgoméry County officers he made his escape and was captured by Garland County officers. While incarcerated in jail there, he was urged by the officers to make a confession, and there is some evidence tending to show that undue pressure was used in an attempt to elicit information concerning the. murder. He refused, however, to yield and make any statement at the time. Later he made a statement in the chambers of the., circuit judge, in the presence of the judge, prosecuting attorney, sheriff, and perhaps others. This statement was in conflict, in part, with appellant’s testimony on the trial. The witnesses present, except appellant, when the statement was made, testified that it was voluntarily made and that no undue influence was used to elicit it. Appellant testified that he made the statement under duress. There being a conflict in the evidence as to whether the statement was voluntarily made, the trial court admitted it, over the objection and exception of appellant, under the following injunction, which was the court’s 7th instruction: “If the defendant or any of the witnesses have at other times made statements which contradict or do not agree with the testimony given in this trial, you should, in weighing and considering the effect of such contradictory statements on the testimony in this case, carefully consider all of the circumstances under which such contradictory statements were made and whether or not such witnesses were subjected to any undue influence, coercion or intimidation, or were laboring under the influence of dread or fear, and also the physical and mental condition of the witnesses at the time such contradictory statements were made, if such statements were made.” We think, under the principle announced in the case of Henry v. State, 151 Ark. 620, it was proper to admit the statement, with the restrictions contained in the court’s 7th instruction. In the case referred to the court said: “The testimony was sufficient to justify the court in submitting it to the jury, but appellant, as before stated, had a right to have the jury consider the question whether or not it was a confession voluntarily made.’' Lastly, appellant contends that his rights were prejudiced by the following statements of the prosecuting attorney made in closing the argument, to-wit: “I know he is guilty, I am willing to meet my God in the next hour knowing that Hughes is guilty, because I am thoroughly convinced. I have examined the testimony and know so much about it, and know things that never get to anybody else.” When this statement was made, the counsel for appellant objected, and the court stated that the argument of the prosecuting attorney was improper and the jury should not consider it. The statement was an attempt on the part of the prosecuting attorney to testify. He, in effect, said that he was in possession of faets which could not be revealed to the jury, but which rive't’ed conviction upon appellant. Coming from a sworn official, the remark was calculated to make a deep impression upon the minds of the jurymen. It cannot, perhaps, be classed with remarks the effect of which cannot be removed even by a solemn admonition of the court, but it was certainly a flagrant violation of the right of appellant to a fair and impartial trial vouchsafed to him by the Constitution and laws of the State of Arkansas. Considering the highly prejudicial character of the remark, its effect could not be removed by a mild admonition of the court. We think the trial court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, should .have challenged the statement, with such comment as the exigencies of the occasion demanded. He might have said that it was the sworn duty of the prosecuting attorney to reveal all the facts within his knowledge, and his failure to do so would have been proof conclusive that he had no such information; or he could have stopped the trial and required the attorney to establish the facts in his "possession by competent testimony. Either course would have erased-the ill effects of the remark from the minds of the jury, but, in the opinion of the majority, the mild admonition of the court, as indicated by the language used, did not meet the exigencies of the particular situation. For the error indicated, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. McCulloch, C. J., dissents. Wood, Hart, and Smith, JJ., concur. Mr. Justice Wood holds that the remarks of the prosecuting attorney were so flagrant that their prejudicial effect could not be removed at all, and that the only way to cure the error was to grant a new trial.