Court Opinion

ID: 9959773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:10:27.693184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:53.372476
License: Public Domain

J-A26003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN RE: ESTATE OF RONALD                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 HUTCHINSON, DECEASED                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: NATALIE TANNASSO              :
 AND FRANCIS J. PETERS                    :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 577 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered January 17, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Orphans' Court at
                         No(s): 1151 DE 2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                               FILED APRIL 12, 2024

      Appellants Natalie Tannasso and Francis J. Peters appeal from the

January 17, 2023 decree entered by the Philadelphia County Orphans’ Court.

The orphans’ court overruled Appellants’ objections to the proposed

distribution of their father’s residuary estate. After careful review, we affirm

the orphans’ court’s decree.

      The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows.        Ronald

Hutchinson (“Decedent”) had three children: Appellants and Ted Peters. On

September 9, 2020, Decedent executed his Last Will and Testament (“Will”),

utilizing a four-page, pre-printed form, which included spaces for the testator

to personalize the document and indicate his intent.

      On the first page, Decedent handwrote his name and address in the

relevant fields.   He next initialed the provision indicating that he was “not

married at the time of making this Will.” Will, 9/9/20, at 1.
J-A26003-23

      Central to the issues before this Court, Decedent completed Section 3,

addressing his residuary estate, as follows:

Id. It is undisputed that “teddy Ray” is a reference to Decedent’s son, Ted

Peters.

      On the second page of the document, Decedent named “Teddy Peters”

as executor. Id. at 2. He did not make any changes to the form language on

the third page.   On the fourth and final page, he initialed the provision

directing that his “remains be cremated and his ashes disposed of according

to the wishes of my Executor.” Id. at 4. Finally, he completed the signature

line to indicate the date and place of signature and signed the Will.      He

additionally initialed each page in the space provided. Decedent did not place

any other markings on the document.

      Decedent died on September 25, 2020.        On August 17, 2021, the

Register of Wills granted Ted Peters letters testamentary.     On October 3,

2022, Ted Peters, as Executor, filed a First and Final Account and a Petition

for Adjudication/Statement of Proposed Distribution. The Account indicated

that over $450,000 of non-probate assets had been distributed to named

                                     -2-
J-A26003-23

beneficiaries, including Decedent’s children and grandchildren and that the

residuary estate totaled approximately $311,000.          The Account proposed

distribution of the entire residuary estate, after payment of liabilities, to Ted

Peters.

      On November 7, 2022, Appellants objected to the proposed distribution.

They argued that the residuary estate should be divided in equal shares

between Decedent’s children based upon Section 3(B) of the Will.

      After hearing argument on January 4, 2023, the orphans’ court

concluded on January 17, 2023, that Decedent’s handwriting in Section 3

clearly expressed his intent to give his entire residuary estate to his son and

Executor, Teddy Ray. Accordingly, the court entered a decree overruling the

objections and ordering the distribution of the Estate as set forth in the Petition

for Adjudication/Statement of Proposed Distribution.

      On February 3, 2023, Appellants filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

Appellants and the orphans’ court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Before this Court, Appellants raise the following issues:

      A. Whether the court below abused its discretion in the factual
      finding of the testator’s intent in preparing and executing the will.
      Murphy v.[] Karnek, 160 A.3d 850, 861 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      B. Whether the court below erred as a matter of law and/or abused
      its discretion when it failed to read all the clauses within the Last
      Will and Testament of Ronald E. Hutchinson as a whole, Flatley
      by Flatley v. Penman, [632 A.2d 1342 (Pa. Super. 1993)], and
      ignored a clear preceding condition precedent clause while
      simultaneously accepting a condition precedent clause in the Will
      provision it accepted as the testator’s intent?

                                       -3-
J-A26003-23

      C. Whether the court below erred as a matter of law and/or abused
      its discretion when it concluded that [§ 3(C)] only has legal
      meaning if no children were alive to take under [§ 3(B)] and
      “viewed in a vacuum” the handwritten words. Murphy v. []
      Karnek, 160 A.3d 850, 861 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      D. Whether the court below erred as a matter of law and/or
      abused its discretion when it failed to consider the technical rules
      of construction when the Honorable Court determined that the
      Last Will and Testament contained conflicting terms. [In re
      Estate of Houston], 201 A.2d [592, 595 (Pa. 1964)].

      E. Whether the court below erred as a matter of law and/or abused
      its discretion when it concluded that merely writing in the space
      provided in [§ 3(C)] of the Last Will and Testament negatives not
      only the typed portions of the will elsewhere that but also the
      typed words contained within [§ 3(C)] itself of the Last Will and
      Testament.

Appellants’ Br. at 2-4 (suggested answers omitted).

                                       A.

      Appellate review of an orphans’ court decision in a will contest is “limited

to determining whether the [orphans’] court’s findings of fact were based upon

legally competent and sufficient evidence and whether there is an error of law

or abuse of discretion.” In re Estate of Schumacher, 133 A.3d 45, 49-50

(Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). “Only where it appears from a review of

the record that there is no evidence to support the court’s findings or that

there is a capricious disbelief of evidence may the court’s findings be set

aside.” Id. (citation omitted)

      It is well-established that “[t]he testator’s intent is the polestar in the

construction of every will and that intent, if it is not unlawful, must prevail.”

In re Estate of Cassidy, 296 A.3d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted). In interpreting a will, courts should “focus on the precise wording

                                      -4-
J-A26003-23

of the will and view the words of the will in the context of the overall

testamentary plan.” Id. (citation omitted)

       Courts will only resort to the “technical rules or canons of construction”

when “the language of the will is ambiguous or conflicting or the testator’s

intent is for any reason uncertain[.]” In re Houston’s Estate, 201 A.2d at

595. One such rule provides that “[w]here written and printed clauses of an

instrument are repugnant to each other the printed form must yield to the

written clauses, as the latter are presumed to be the deliberate expression of

the real intent of the parties[.]” Onofrey v. Wolliver, 40 A.2d 35, 38 (Pa.

1944); see also Flatley, 632 A.2d at 1345.

                                               B.

       While Appellants raise five questions, we find their issues revolve around

the central argument that the residuary estate should be divided in equal

shares between the three children pursuant to Section 3(B) of the Will.

Appellants’ Br. at 6-36.         They contend that the handwritten provision,

designating the residuary to Teddy Ray, applies only if Section 3(C) is

triggered.    As Section 3(C) applies when there are no beneficiaries under

Section 3(A) or (B), Appellants assert that Section 3(C) does not apply to the

instant case because Decedent had children for purposes of Section 3(B).1 Id.

at 14-16, 34-35.

____________________________________________

1Appellants maintain that the handwritten language would have applied if
Appellants, but not Teddy Ray, had predeceased Decedent. Appellants’ Br. at
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -5-
J-A26003-23

       As did the trial court, we reject Appellants’ analysis because it fails to

abide by Decedent’s unambiguous expression of his intent to distribute his

residuary estate to “[his] son teddy Ray only No one else.” Will at 1. Based

upon the unambiguous handwritten language in Section 3 of Decedent’s Will,

we affirm the orphans’ court’s well-reasoned conclusion that “Decedent plainly

stated his intent” to leave his residuary estate to Teddy Ray. Trial Ct. Op. at

8.

       Decree affirmed.

Date: 4/12/2024

____________________________________________

23-24, 27-30. They posit that the language was Decedent’s attempt to avoid
distribution of the residuary to his grandchildren. Id. Like the orphan’s court,
we find this theory “untenable,” because Section 3(C) applies where there are
no beneficiaries under Section 3(A) or 3(B), which would include Teddy Ray.
Trial Ct. Op. at 9. Thus, the distribution to “Teddy Ray only” could not occur
if Teddy Ray predeceased Decedent.

                                           -6-