Court Opinion

ID: 9953063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 15:02:38.135475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:37.601216
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 23-1399
                        ___________________________

         A.J.T., a minor child, by and through her parents, A.T. and G.T.

                                      Plaintiff - Appellant

                                         v.

 Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279; Osseo School Board

                                    Defendants - Appellees

                            ------------------------------

                Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc.

                              Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)

Minnesota Administrators for Special Education; Minnesota Association of School
            Administrators; Minnesota School Boards Association

                                Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s)
                                 ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                         for the District of Minnesota
                                ____________

                          Submitted: October 18, 2023
                             Filed: March 21, 2024
                                 ____________

Before GRUENDER, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________
KOBES, Circuit Judge.

      This case involves the same circumstances as those described in Osseo Area
Schools, Independent School District No. 279 v. A.J.T. ex rel. A.T., ___ F.4th ___
(8th Cir. 2024). But here, A.J.T. sued Osseo Area Schools (the District) for disability
discrimination. The district court 1 granted the District’s motion for summary
judgment, and we affirm.

       A.J.T. has epilepsy, and her seizures are so severe in the morning that she
can’t go to school until noon. Her parents asked for evening instruction to give her
a school day closer in length to that of her peers, but District officials denied their
repeated requests. So A.J.T. sued through her parents, alleging violations of Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The
district court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that
the District could not be held liable because it did not act with bad faith or gross
misjudgment.

       We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming
only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” B.M. ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R–II Sch. Dist.,
732 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We view all facts
in favor of A.J.T. and give her “the benefit of all reasonable inferences in the record.”
Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2013).

       Claims under Section 504 and the ADA live and die together, as “the
enforcement, remedies, and rights are the same under both.” B.M., 732 F.3d at 887
(citation omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Section 504 requires federal grantees to give
“otherwise qualified” people with disabilities “meaningful access” to their benefits.
See Argenyi, 703 F.3d at 448 (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301
(1985)); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). And Title II of the ADA requires public entities to
provide meaningful access to their services, programs, or activities. Segal v. Metro.

      1
      The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.
Council, 29 F.4th 399, 404 (8th Cir. 2022); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “Meaningful access”
often requires “reasonable accommodations.” Choate, 469 U.S. at 301.

        That said, when the alleged ADA and Section 504 violations are “based on
educational services for disabled children,” a school district’s simple failure to
provide a reasonable accommodation is not enough to trigger liability. B.M., 732
F.3d at 887 (citation omitted). Rather, a plaintiff must prove that school officials
acted with “either bad faith or gross misjudgment,” Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d
1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982), which requires “‘something more’ than mere non-
compliance with the applicable federal statutes,” B.M., 732 F.3d at 887 (citation
omitted). The district’s “statutory non-compliance must deviate so substantially
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that
[it] acted with wrongful intent.” Id.

       A.J.T. may have established a genuine dispute about whether the district was
negligent or even deliberately indifferent, but under Monahan, that’s just not
enough. She points out that her parents repeatedly notified the District that its refusal
to provide evening instruction violated Section 504 and the ADA. And she says that
the District violated accepted professional standards by failing to follow its own
policies and procedures requiring its staff to report, investigate, and respond to
complaints of discrimination. As evidence, she notes that the District’s Director of
Student Services, who oversees Section 504 compliance, testified that she was
unaware of the parents’ complaints and did not know that the District’s policies
permit at-home schooling as an accommodation. But the Director’s non-compliance
does not amount to a deviation “so substantial[]” that it demonstrates “wrongful
intent.” Id.

      True, “notice of a student’s disability coupled with delay in implementing
accommodations can show bad faith or gross misjudgment” under some
circumstances. Id. at 888; see also M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 326
F.3d 975, 982 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding genuine dispute as to bad faith or gross
misjudgment where school district knew about disability-based harassment of a
student, ignored the mother’s repeated calls, offered patently unworkable solutions,
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and reneged on its offer to cover transportation costs to a new school after the student
transferred). But here, the District did not ignore A.J.T.’s needs or delay its efforts
to address them, even if the efforts were inadequate. District officials met with
A.J.T.’s parents and updated her individualized education program (IEP) each year.
Her IEP included a variety of services, like intensive one-on-one instruction and a
15-minute extension of her school day so that she could safely leave after the halls
cleared. And the District even offered 16 three-hour sessions at home each summer.
Regardless of whether these actions were enough to provide meaningful access, they
do not show wrongful intent.

      A.J.T. has failed to identify conduct clearing Monahan’s bar, so we are
constrained to hold that summary judgment was proper. 2 We affirm the district
court’s judgment.
                          ______________________________

      2
        Why do we have such a high bar for claims based on educational services
when we require much less in other disability-discrimination contexts? See, e.g.,
Withers v. Johnson, 763 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2014) (no intent required for
failure-to-accommodate claim); Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 388–
89 (8th Cir. 2011) (deliberate indifference required for damages); accord S.H. ex rel.
Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 260–65 (3d Cir. 2013) (collecting
cases). The answer is a lesson in why “[w]e do not . . . add provisions to . . . federal
statute[s].” Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 352 (2010).
       In Monahan, we speculated that Congress intended the IDEA’s predecessor
to limit Section 504’s protections, and without any anchor in statutory text, we added
a judicial gloss on Section 504 to achieve that end. 687 F.2d at 1170–71. Congress
rejected Monahan’s premise just a few years later. See Handicapped Children’s
Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). But
nonetheless, its bad faith or gross misjudgment rule spread like wildfire. See I.Z.M.
v. Rosemount–Apple Valley–Eagan Pub. Schs., 863 F.3d 966, 973 n.6 (8th Cir. 2017)
(collecting cases).
       Monahan has been questioned. See, e.g., Knox Cnty. v. M.Q., 62 F.4th 978,
1002 (6th Cir. 2023); Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability
Discrimination Law, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 1417, 1455–64 (2015); AP ex rel. Peterson v.
Anoka–Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1145–46 (D. Minn.
2008); Howell ex rel. Howell v. Waterford Pub. Schs., 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1318–19
(E.D. Mich. 1990). But for the time being, it remains the law of our circuit.
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