Court Opinion

ID: 9664775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:29:44.400681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.115996
License: Public Domain

John B. Robbins, Judge. Appellant William R. Fields and appellee Patricia Ann Fields were divorced by a decree dated July 19,1999, and entered on September 2,1999. The divorce decree ordered an equal division of the parties’ extensive assets. On November 2, 1999, Ms. Fields filed a petition for contempt and to show cause, and on August 18, 2000, a petition for contempt and modification. A hearing was held on January 29, 2001, and on March 5, 2001, the trial court entered an order continuing the case pending an audit to be conducted by a qualified auditor selected by agreement of the parties. On August 21, 2001, Ms. Fields filed another motion for contempt, to show cause, and for modification. At a hearing held on April 7, 2003, Jack Bottoms, a certified public accountant selected by the parties, gave testimony relating to his analysis of how the assets should be divided. In conducting his accounting, Mr. Bottoms reviewed a twenty-one-page proposed order that had previously been agreed on by the parties. The paragraph of the proposed order pertaining to Mr. Fields’s IRA provides: The William Fields IBA (Retirement) was valued at $2,261,984.98, as ofjuly 19,1999, and Ms. Fields is entitled to fifty percent (50%) of said sum or $1,130,992.49 plus interest at ten percent (10%) per annum from and after July 19, 1999, to the date of transfer to Ms. Fields’s account which transfer occurred on February 3,2000. Interest from and after July 19,1999, to December 30, 1999, was $50,817.04 ($309.86 per day for 164 days). The sum of $1,181,809.53 should have been transferred to Ms. Fields as of December 30, 1999. Since the transfer did not occur until February 3, 2000, an additional interest of $10,535.24 ($309.86 per day for 34 additional days to February 3, 2000) should have been transferred to Patricia Fields as of February 3, 2000, which sum will accrue interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) from and after February 4, 2000. On February 3, 2000, Mr. Fields transferred the sum of $1,275,163.10 into Ms. Fields’ IBA. for which Mr. Fields is entitled to credit. Mr. Bottoms testified that he left the February 3, 2000, IRA transfer of $1,275,163.10 totally off ofhis accounting because the assets were transferred in a like-kind exchange. He thus concluded that Mr. Fields was not entitled to any credit for the transfer. On August 12, 2003, the trial court entered the order from which Mr. Fields now appeals.1 On appeal, Mr. Fields takes issue with two of the trial court’s findings. First, he argues that the trial court erred in accepting Mr. Bottoms’s accounting to the extent that no credit was awarded for the February 3, 2000, IRA transfer. Next, Mr. Fields argues that the trial court erred in requiring him to pay the entire $11,129.30 fee charged by Mr. Bottoms, where the parties had expressly agreed to each pay half. We affirm on the first point, but we reverse the trial court’s decision to the extent that it holds Ms. Fields responsible for the entire accounting fee. Mr. Fields’s first argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce the parties agreement pertaining to division of the IBA. He argues that it is clear that the parties did not intend for the transaction to be treated as a like-kind distribution, and that the trial court was bound to accept their agreement that Ms. Fields was only entitled to interest on the sum of the IBA as ofjuly 19, 1999, through the February 3, 2000, date of distribution. Mr. Fields notes that the parties specifically agreed in writing that he would be given credit for the overpayment when he transferred $1,275,163.10 into Ms. Fields’s IRA account.  We do not agree that the trial court committed reversible error when it deviated from the parties’ agreement on the distribution of Mr. Fields’s retirement account. The trial court is not bound by a stipulation entered into by the parties, and it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to approve, disapprove, or modify an agreement. Rutherford v. Rutherford, 81 Ark. App. 122, 98 S.W.3d 842 (2003). The parties came to disagree on some of the terms of the twenty-one-page proposed order, and the order was never signed or entered by the trial court. The divorce decree provided, “Any stock held in the [IRA] shall be divided by reference to date of purchase and costs. The division will be an In kind division of stocks and cash.” Mr. Fields failed to distribute one-half of the IRA account, as directed by the divorce decree, until more than six months after the decree was entered. Under the trial court’s interpretation of its decree, Ms. Fields was entitled to one-half of the value of the IRA at the time of distribution. We think the trial court’s interpretation was reasonable, and under the facts of this case we hold that it did not abuse its discretion in failing to give Mr. Fields credit for any overpayment. Mr. Fields’s second argument is that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay the entire accounting fee charged by Mr. Bottoms. We agree. At the January 29, 2001, hearing, appellee’s attorney stated to the court, “We are going to agree to employ a certified public accountant” who “will be paid by the parties.” On July 23, 2001, appellee’s attorney sent a letter to appellant’s attorney requesting that appellant pay half of the existing fees. At the April 7, 2003, hearing, appellee’s attorney asked the trial court to address the accounting fees, appellant’s attorney responded, “There’s no question we’re obligated to pay half of those,” and appellee’s counsel answered, “That’s fine.” Even after the trial court issued a letter opinion requiring Mr. Fields to pay the entire fee, Ms. Fields responded to Mr. Fields’s motion for reconsideration and asserted: Mr. Bottoms clearly understood he was not working one side of the case. The settlement agreement, which previously [appellant’s counsel] argued did not exist, now he wants to argue does exist. The agreement, if accepted, provided among other things for an equal division on the accountant fees. One of the Exhibits introduced as evidence is a Transcript in which [appellant’s counsel] agreed Mr. Fields would pay one-half of the accountant’s fees while the work was in progress; however, Mr. Fields never paid and only pays when forced to pay. Ms. Fields consistently agreed to pay half of the fees, and never asked the trial court to rule otherwise.  While a trial court may refuse to enforce a parties’ agreement, a trial court’s decision cannot be arbitrary or groundless. See Skokos v. Skokos, 344 Ark. 420, 40 S.W.3d 768 (2001). In this case the parties repeatedly agreed to each pay half of the fees because Mr. Bottoms was hired by the parties and was working for both sides. The trial court gave no explanation for deviating from the agreement, and we see no rational basis for its action in this regard. We hold that the trial court’s decision requiring Mr. Fields to pay the entire accounting fee was arbitrary and groundless, and amounted to an abuse of discretion.2 Therefore, we remand to the trial court with instructions to enter an order requiring each party to pay half of the accounting fees. Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. Stroud, C.J., Griffen, and Vaught, JJ., agree. Hart and Baker, JJ., concur in part; dissent in part.   The appellee argues that the order being appealed from was not a final, appealable order, and thus that this appeal should be dismissed. She asserts that there are unresolved issues, which include final division of certain stocks and allocation of the marital debt. However, we disagree because the order resolves these issues. For an order to be final, it must not only decide the rights of the parties, but also put the court’s directive into execution, ending the litigation or a separable part of it. Capitol Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Phelps, 72 Ark. App. 464, 37 S.W.3d 692 (2001). When an order appealed from reflects that further proceedings are pending that do not involve merely collateral matters, the order is not final. Id. Applying these standards, we have concluded that any potential further proceedings are collateral in nature and that the August 12,2003, order is final for purposes of appeal.    The dissenting opinion suggests that we err in reversing a finding of contempt by the trial court. Although Ms. Fields sought a finding of contempt in this matter, the trial court did not address the issue of contempt. Consequently, neither do we.