Court Opinion

ID: 9836888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:23.104068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.158835
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(concurring in the result):
There was no error in this case.
During the sentencing portion of the trial, Ms. Lorie Fortin was called by the prosecution to testify about appellant’s rehabilitative potential. The Government did not request that the court recognize her as an expert. She stated she worked at the Family Advocacy Center, had a Master’s Degree in Social Work, and was licensed in California as a clinical social worker in child sexual abuse. Her job was to “assess alleged offenders for treatment rehab potential.”
Ms. Fortin testified that appellant had been referred to her in the “December January ’97 time frame.” (Appellant was sentenced in August 1997.) She testified that she worked with a number of other professionals including Dr. Fonseca, Dr. Sussman, and Dr. Landis, as a team in treating offenders. The team members examined progress reports, update reports, and had conversations concerning treatment.
Ms. Fortin testified that the team member who conducted appellant’s psychological evaluation told her and wrote in appellant’s medical record that appellant was “predatory in nature.” A defense objection based on hearsay was overruled under either the medical records or business records exception to the hearsay rule. The following is the exchange which took place:
Q. Now, you bring up this prin—
A. Conviction.
Q. —therapy or treatment, do you know anything — has he told you or have you spoken with his other therapist about that treatment?
A. I’ve gotten some information from him and I also talked to his prior therapist and got their prior reports.
Q. Okay. And was that a positive-type treatment?
*263A. It was mixed. The person that did his psychological evaluation, which his current therapist as well, feel he’s predatory in nature, which, again—
DC: Objection, Your Honor. This is hearsay.
MJ: Why is it not hearsay, Lieutenant Knapp?
TC: Your Honor, she’s going to a medical conclusion. Not to what this person is saying so much as what his — he’s been diagnosed with. So it’s more of a condition rather than what his — what, perhaps, this person is saying just as a statement.
MJ: Yeah. Isn’t there a medical-records exception to the hearsay rule, Lieutenant Knapp?
DC: There is — one moment, Your Honor.
MJ: I think as long as a witness is only repeating what would be in a medical record, if it is hearsay, I think that would be an exception to it.
DC: There is a statement for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
MJ: Isn’t the treatment also — record of treatment also an exception to the hearsay rule there? Or if it doesn’t fall under that, would it not fall under the business-record exception? Wouldn’t these be records that are normally kept in the normal course of business?
DC: Well, I don’t believe we have a business record, sir. If she’s, again, testifying from what someone else told her about what was on that business record—
WIT: No. I have it.
DC: —then that would be hearsay.
WIT: I do have it.
MJ: Do you have that record?
WIT: I have the records that they wrote in my—
MJ: You actually read that record?
WIT: Yeah.
MJ: I’ll overrule the objection at this time since the accused [sic] has personal knowledge of the records.
Q. So you’re taking this — your information — from reading the medical records yourself?
A. From the treatment reports that were done on him previously that the doctors wrote.
Q. Thank you. Would you say from reading all of the reports that you’ve read and from your treatment and consulting with the other physicians that A01 George has a high or low risk level of repeating the same or similar behavior?
DC: Objection, Your Honor. Foundation. I’m not sure if we know that Ms. For-tin is qualified to make that sort of determination.
TC: Sir, she’s testified she’s a licensed social worker, she’s worked just with Navy for at least four years, perhaps even longer, I believe, and the fact that she’s been treating this specific person.
MJ: I’ll overrule that, Lieutenant McNair. I think she’s qualified to give that opinion. Please answer the question.
WIT: I would say he’s moderate to high risk at this time to re-offend.
R. 52-53
The court below held that “this licensed social worker was qualified to provide her observations of the nature of appellant’s problems and how well he was responding to the rehabilitative therapy____ Her observations as to his history of inappropriate behavior were directly related to understanding the appellant’s rehabilitative potential.” Un-pub. op. at 6,1998 WL 557565.
In the alternative, the court held “that there was no reasonable possibility that he would have avoided a bad-conduct discharge.” The court further reasoned that it was “confident that the military judge did not give undue weight to th[e] erroneously admitted testimony.” Id at 7.
The defense contends the judge erroneously considered hearsay from a witness testifying concerning appellant’s sentence. Final Brief at 6.
*264Both Military and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permit an individual to be qualified as an expert based on “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education____” Ms. Fortin was clearly qualified under this standard. There is no requirement* for the prosecutor to tender Ms. Fortin as an expert based on her education, training, and experience. Mil.R.Evid. 702. In the past, however, social workers have been recognized as experts. United States v. Johnson, 35 MJ 17 (1992)(social worker/ psychotherapist held qualified to give her opinion that child suffered trauma — other testimony admissible without objection); United States v. Peel, 29 MJ 235, 241 (1989)(ehief social worker with doctor of philosophy degree could testify as to significance of delayed reporting by rape victim), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1025, 110 S.Ct. 731,107 L.Ed.2d 750 (1990).
Once qualified, an expert may base her opinion on hearsay information made known to her during the course of treatment. Mil. R.Evid. 703. Specifically, we have recognized that a social worker may base her opinion not only on her observations but also upon documents and reports of others, United States v. Raya, 45 MJ 251, 253 (1996), when statements are reasonably related to the treatment appellant was receiving. United States v. Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir.1988) (admitting as part of the basis for an FBI agent’s expert opinion on the meaning of code language, the statements of an informant). Further, we have held that “an expert’s opinion may be based upon personal knowledge, assumed facts, documents supplied by other experts, or even listening to the testimony at trial.” United States v. Houser, 36 MJ 392, 399 (1993)(emphasis added). Raya and Houser support the judge’s overruling the defense objection based on hearsay.
Additionally, RCM 1001(b)(5) was greatly modified in 1994 to allow “[a]n opinion regarding the accused’s rehabilitative poten-tial____” In this instance Ms. Fortin had worked with appellant for about 8 months and certainly was qualified to render an opinion as to appellant’s rehabilitative potential based on her observations and the reports she had received. The testimony that appellant is “predatory in nature,” when considered in context, was testimony as to his future dangerousness. This type of evidence has been permitted by this Court, United States v. Williams, 41 MJ 134 (1994), and the Supreme Court, id. at 139.

 R. Carlson & E. Imwinkelried, Dynamics of Trial Practice 228 (2d ed.1995) (Most "judges follow the majority view" that after eliciting the "qualifications, you proceed immediately to the expert testimony” without tendering the witness.); Commentary, Ky. R. Evid. 702 (identical to Fed. R.Evid. 702) ("[T]he practice of tendering a witness [as an expert] should be discontinued"; this commentary notes “that the judge’s 'annoint-ing’ ” the witness should be discontinued because it could be misinterpreted as approving the witness’ testimony), cited in R. Carlson & E. Imwinkelried, supra at 229; ABA Civil Trial Practice Standards 17 at 46 (1998)(“Except in ruling on an objection, the court should not, in the presence of the jury, declare that a witness is qualified as an expert or to render an expert opinion, and counsel should not ask the court to do so.”). See also Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. Bart-ley, 855 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir.1988).