Court Opinion

ID: 9965122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 18:00:51.057258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:43.589091
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12669    Document: 58-1    Date Filed: 05/01/2024   Page: 1 of 18

                                                            [PUBLISH]

                                  In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12669
                          ____________________

        AQUATE II LLC,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        JESSICA TEDRICK MYERS,
        KITUWAH SERVICES LLC,

                                                 Defendants-Appellees,

        KITUWAH GLOBAL GOVERNMENT GROUP LLC

                                                            Defendant.

                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12669      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 05/01/2024     Page: 2 of 18

        2                       Opinion of the Court                22-12669

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Alabama
                       D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-00360-AKK
                            ____________________

        Before GRANT, ABUDU, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        GRANT, Circuit Judge:
                This case first looks like a run-of-the-mill business dispute—
        but closer inspection reveals thorny questions of tribal sovereignty
        and contract interpretation. During the competitive bidding
        process for a government contract, one tribally owned business
        and its employee allegedly stole trade secrets from a competitor,
        another tribally owned business. The aggrieved business now
        seeks to vindicate its interests in federal court, while the alleged
        aggressor attempts to shield itself with tribal sovereign immunity.
        Meanwhile, the employee who allegedly stole the secrets says her
        employment contract mandates that the claims against her can be
        brought only in a designated tribal court. And that contention
        raises yet another area of dispute—whether the tribal court even
        exists.
                We conclude that, because it waived sovereign immunity
        for claims related to the federal contracting program, the defendant
        tribe can be sued here. As for the former employee, the district
        court failed to consider whether the clause naming the allegedly
        nonexistent tribal court as the appropriate forum was valid and
USCA11 Case: 22-12669     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 05/01/2024    Page: 3 of 18

        22-12669              Opinion of the Court                        3

        enforceable. For both reasons, we reverse the district court’s order
        dismissing the case and remand for further consideration.
                                         I.
               The Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Business
        Development Program is designed to assist certain “disadvantaged
        business concerns” compete in the American economy. 13 C.F.R.
        § 124.1; see generally 15 U.S.C. § 637(a). To that end, the federal
        government sets aside select federal contracts for businesses owned
        and controlled by individuals and groups the Small Business Act
        declares socially and economically disadvantaged. 15 U.S.C.
        § 637(a)(1), (4)–(6). Among those eligible are small businesses
        owned by certain Indian tribes. Id. § 637(a)(4)(A)(i)(II), (ii)(II).
               Both businesses here qualify. AQuate II, LLC, is organized
        under the authority of the Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town with
        its principal place of business in Huntsville, Alabama. Kituwah
        Services, LLC, is organized under the Eastern Band of Cherokee
        Indians with its principal place of business in Cherokee, North
        Carolina. Both tribal entities compete for and perform federal
        contracts under the 8(a) program.
                In 2012, AQuate won an 8(a) contract to provide armed
        security services aboard the Sea-Based X-Band Radar-1 (SBX-1), a
        semi-submersible platform vessel that operates as part of the
        ballistic missile defense program. AQuate performed those
        services for the length of the five-year contract term and won the
        contract again in 2017 for another five-year term.
USCA11 Case: 22-12669      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 05/01/2024     Page: 4 of 18

        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12669

              Jessica Myers worked for AQuate from 2013 through 2017
        during the initial SBX-1 contract and bid preparation for the
        second. As a condition of her employment, Myers signed several
        documents governing the use and disclosure of confidential
        information, as well as the standard dispute resolution policy for all
        Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town-owned businesses. That policy
        contained a clause designating a tribal court as the forum for any
        employment disputes:
              The tribal court of the Alabama-Quassarte Tribal
              Town shall be the exclusive venue for litigation
              arising out of Employee’s employment. If there is no
              tribal court in existence, then the CFR Court for the
              geographic region where Employee works shall be
              the exclusive venue for litigation arising out of
              Employee’s employment.
        Myers resigned in 2017 and took a job as the Director of
        Administration for Kituwah. According to AQuate, she also took
        copies of contracts, proposals, personnel lists, and other security
        information with her—a violation of her confidentiality
        commitments.
              AQuate intended to seek another five-year contract renewal
        for SBX-1 in 2022, but this time so did Kituwah. To help her new
        employer construct a winning bid, Myers allegedly contacted her
        former colleagues at AQuate to solicit information about the
        company’s pricing and compensation structure under the previous
        SBX-1 contracts. Kituwah and Myers allegedly intended to use the
USCA11 Case: 22-12669     Document: 58-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2024    Page: 5 of 18

        22-12669              Opinion of the Court                       5

        purported trade secret information and documents Myers took to
        compete in the SBX-1 bidding process. And beyond that, Kituwah
        and Myers (allegedly) approached AQuate employees with job
        offers—contingent, of course, on Kituwah winning the SBX-1
        contract.
              AQuate sued, alleging that Myers breached her employment
        agreements and that she and Kituwah violated both the Defend
        Trade Secrets Act of 2016 and the Alabama Trade Secrets Act. 18
        U.S.C. § 1836; Ala. Code § 8-27-1 et seq. AQuate requested a
        preliminary injunction, and Kituwah and Myers moved to dismiss.
               The district court granted the motion to dismiss. First, the
        court found that Kituwah had not waived sovereign immunity for
        the trade secrets claims because AQuate’s lawsuit did not “relate
        to” participation in the 8(a) program. Because it had granted
        immunity to Kituwah on those claims, the district court dismissed
        the same claims against Myers, finding that Kituwah was a
        necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. See Fed. R. Civ.
        P. 19. As for the remaining breach of contract claim against Myers,
        the court dismissed for forum non conveniens, concluding that the
        dispute resolution policy required the claim to be resolved in the
        Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town court. The district court decided
        that question without an evidentiary hearing, relying on the
        parties’ assertions in their motions briefing.
               AQuate moved for reconsideration. It focused mainly on
        the forum question, arguing that the district court erred by
        ignoring evidence that the Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town court
USCA11 Case: 22-12669      Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 05/01/2024    Page: 6 of 18

        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12669

        did not exist. The court denied that motion, and this appeal
        followed.
                                         II.
               This Court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of a
        motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. Motta ex rel. A.M.
        v. United States, 717 F.3d 840, 843 (11th Cir. 2013). The district
        court’s dismissal for forum non conveniens is reviewed for abuse of
        discretion and should be affirmed “unless we find that the district
        court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong
        legal standard.” GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d
        1024, 1028 (11th Cir. 2014) (GDG Acquisitions I) (quotation omitted).
        We review de novo the enforceability of a forum selection clause.
        Turner v. Costa Crociere, 9 F.4th 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021).
                                         III.
               As a separate sovereign, “an Indian tribe is subject to suit
        only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has
        waived its immunity.” Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc.,
        523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). The burden is on AQuate, as the party
        seeking federal jurisdiction, to show that Kituwah “expressly and
        unmistakably waived its right to sovereign immunity from suit.”
        Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 685 F.3d 1224, 1234
        (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).
              The 8(a) program, at least as a general matter, requires such
        a waiver from participating tribes. So, to take part, a tribally owned
        business must adopt an express sovereign immunity waiver—also
        known as a “sue and be sued” clause—designating the United
USCA11 Case: 22-12669       Document: 58-1        Date Filed: 05/01/2024      Page: 7 of 18

        22-12669                 Opinion of the Court                            7

        States federal courts as “courts of competent jurisdiction for all
        matters relating to SBA’s programs including, but not limited to,
        8(a) BD [Business Development] program participation, loans, and
        contract performance.” 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(1). Kituwah’s
        articles of organization include the required language:
               The United States Federal Courts are hereby
               designated as being among the courts of competent
               jurisdiction for all disputes or other matters relating to
               this Company’s involvement in programs of the Small
               Business Administration, including but not limited to,
               8(a) Business Development program participation,
               loans, and contract performance. Simply stated, the
               Company hereby specifically consents to “sue or be
               sued” within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court
               System of the United States.
        The question here is whether AQuate’s lawsuit against Kituwah—
        for allegedly stealing trade secrets about AQuate’s 8(a) SBX-1
        contract to improve its own bid for that same contract—is a
        “matter relating to” Kituwah’s involvement in the 8(a) program.1
        It is, so Kituwah’s sovereign immunity waiver applies.

        1 No one disputes that Kituwah is a part of the Eastern Band of Cherokee

        Indians for the purposes of sovereign immunity, or that Kituwah’s sovereign
        immunity waiver is coextensive with the 8(a) program’s waiver requirements.
USCA11 Case: 22-12669          Document: 58-1         Date Filed: 05/01/2024          Page: 8 of 18

        8                          Opinion of the Court                         22-12669

               No binding, or even persuasive, authority has established
        the scope of 8(a) sovereign immunity waivers. 2 So we will start
        from the beginning, with the plain meaning of the phrase “relating
        to.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines “relate to” as “[t]o have
        some connection with; to stand in relation to.” Relate, Oxford
        English Dictionary (online ed.) https://perma.cc/FM2V-S4ZW.
        And Black’s Law Dictionary defines “related” as “[c]onnected in
        some way; having relationship to or with something else.” Related,
        Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). It is no secret that the
        ordinary meaning of this term is “a broad one.” Morales v. Trans
        World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992). That is true across a
        range of contexts. In fact, “Congress characteristically employs the
        phrase to reach any subject that has a connection with, or reference
        to, the topics [a] statute enumerates.” Coventry Health Care of
        Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U.S. 87, 95–96 (2017) (quotation
        omitted). It is hard, candidly, to think of a more capacious term to
        use in defining the coverage of a provision.
               AQuate’s claims against Kituwah are “related to” Kituwah’s
        participation in the 8(a) program. Kituwah participated in the
        program by preparing and later submitting a bid for the SBX-1

        2 It appears that only three other courts—all out-of-circuit district courts—

        have considered this issue, and even those decisions are sparse in their
        reasoning. See Applied Scis. & Info. Sys., Inc. v. DDC Constr. Servs., LLC, No. 19-
        CV-575, 2020 WL 2738243, at *4–5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2020); Rassi v. Fed.
        Program Integrators, LLC, 69 F. Supp. 3d 288, 292–93 (D. Me. 2014); Hunter v.
        Redhawk Network Sec., LLC, No. 17-CV-0962, 2018 WL 4171612, at *6–8 (D. Or.
        April 26, 2018).
USCA11 Case: 22-12669       Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 05/01/2024      Page: 9 of 18

        22-12669                Opinion of the Court                           9

        contract, and the allegation that it stole trade secrets to boost its bid
        is certainly “connected in some way” to that participation.
               It would defy common sense to hold otherwise. Assuming
        that AQuate’s allegations are true (as we must when reviewing a
        motion to dismiss), Kituwah stole information about AQuate’s
        “compensation structure, proposals, contract terms, and bidding
        strategies” for the SBX-1 contract—an 8(a) contract. And it did so
        to gain a competitive advantage in its own bid for that same 8(a)
        contract. In other words, but for its attempt to win the bid for the
        8(a) contract, Kituwah would not have used stolen trade secrets or
        unlawfully solicited information from current AQuate employees.
        That alleged misconduct “relates to” Kituwah’s participation in the
        8(a) program.
               As a practical matter, it is not obvious what other language
        could have been employed to cover this kind of claim if “related
        to” were not enough. Indeed, Kituwah’s counsel stated during oral
        argument that if the tribe had intended to waive immunity from
        suits like AQuate’s, it would have needed to adopt a blanket
        immunity waiver for all suits. To the extent that counsel was
        trying to suggest that if “related to” is not broad enough to capture
        this lawsuit, nothing else would be either, we agree. Perhaps
        recognizing as much, Kituwah’s counsel quickly walked that
        statement back, saying instead that “the tribe could waive
        sovereign immunity as to business tort claims connected to its
        efforts to submit a bid on an SBA contract.” But we struggle to see
        how that language is anything other than a subset of the language
USCA11 Case: 22-12669     Document: 58-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2024   Page: 10 of 18

        10                    Opinion of the Court                22-12669

        in Kituwah’s immunity waiver. Is “connected with” broader than
        “related to”? We (and the Supreme Court) think not. See Morales,
        504 U.S. at 383–84.
                The district court disagreed. It concluded instead that
        “AQuate’s claims are not based on Kituwah’s participation in the
        8(a) program and do not involve allegations that Kituwah violated
        any of the 8(a) program’s requirements.” This conclusion is flawed
        for at least two reasons. First, as we have already explained,
        preparing and later submitting a bid for an exclusive 8(a) contract
        is a form of participation in the 8(a) program, so AQuate’s claim
        that Kituwah misappropriated trade secrets for that bid is
        necessarily “based on Kituwah’s participation in the 8(a) program.”
        Second, neither Kituwah’s waiver, nor the regulation it was based
        on, conditioned the waiver of sovereign immunity on Kituwah’s
        violation of any specific 8(a) program requirements. See 13 C.F.R.
        § 124.109(c)(1). Kituwah waived immunity for all matters “relating
        to” its involvement in the 8(a) program.
               AQuate’s trade secrets claims “relate to” Kituwah’s
        participation in the 8(a) program and thus fall within the scope of
        Kituwah’s immunity waiver. The district court erred in concluding
        otherwise. Because we reverse the sovereign immunity dismissal,
        we also reverse the dismissal of the trade secrets claims against
        Myers; it is no longer even arguably precluded by Rule 19, which
        governs the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. See Fed.
        R. Civ. P. 19.
USCA11 Case: 22-12669      Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 05/01/2024     Page: 11 of 18

        22-12669                Opinion of the Court                         11

                                          IV.
               Now for the district court’s dismissal of AQuate’s breach of
        contract claim against Myers. We first consider—as we must—
        whether the forum-selection clause in Myers’s employment
        contract is enforceable, and then, if so, whether dismissal for forum
        non conveniens was proper on account of that clause.
               Procedurally, “the appropriate way to enforce a forum-
        selection clause pointing to a state or foreign forum is through the
        doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S.
        Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 60 (2013). Ordinarily,
        to obtain dismissal for forum non conveniens, “the moving party
        must show that (1) an adequate alternative forum is available,
        (2) the public and private factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and
        (3) the plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the alternative forum
        without undue inconvenience or prejudice.” GDG Acquisitions LLC
        v. Gov’t of Belize, 849 F.3d 1299, 1312 (11th Cir. 2017) (GDG
        Acquisitions II) (quotation omitted).
               But when there is a valid forum-selection clause, “[t]he
        calculus changes.” Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 63. These clauses
        should be “given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional
        cases.” Id. (quotation omitted). So the usual importance attached
        to the plaintiff’s choice of forum evaporates; instead, “as the party
        defying the forum-selection clause, the plaintiff bears the burden of
        establishing that transfer to the forum for which the parties
        bargained is unwarranted.” Id. And rather than considering the
        usual panoply of forum non conveniens factors, the district court may
USCA11 Case: 22-12669         Document: 58-1          Date Filed: 05/01/2024          Page: 12 of 18

        12                          Opinion of the Court                        22-12669

        only consider arguments about the public interest, including
        considerations like “the administrative difficulties flowing from
        court congestion; the local interest in having localized
        controversies decided at home; and the interest in having the trial
        of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law.” Id. at
        62 n.6 (alteration adopted) (quotation omitted). These factors,
        though, “rarely defeat a transfer motion”—the forum-selection
        clause will almost always control. Id. at 64.
               The enforceability of forum-selection clauses is governed by
        federal law. See, e.g., P & S Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Canon USA, Inc., 331
        F.3d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2003); cf. Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat
        Realty Co., 601 U.S. 65, 71–72 (2024). The Supreme Court’s decision
        in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. is instructive. 3 407 U.S. 1
        (1972). There, the Court explained that forum-selection clauses are
        “prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is
        shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the
        circumstances.” Id. at 10; see also Krenkel v. Kerzner Int’l Hotels Ltd.,
        579 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2009). Following the Court’s
        guidance in The Bremen, we look to four factors to evaluate whether
        a forum-selection clause should be “invalidated” as unfair or

        3 Even if state law were to apply to the validity of a forum-selection clause, it

        would not change the analysis here because Alabama has adopted The Bremen’s
        test for the enforceability of forum-selection clauses. See Rucker v. Oasis Legal
        Fin., LLC, 632 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2011); Pro. Ins. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d
        347, 350 (Ala. 1997). We can thus “apply both federal and Alabama law
        harmoniously in deciding the validity of the forum selection clause in this
        case.” Rucker, 632 F.3d at 1236.
USCA11 Case: 22-12669        Document: 58-1         Date Filed: 05/01/2024        Page: 13 of 18

        22-12669                  Opinion of the Court                               13

        unreasonable: “(1) its formation was induced by fraud or
        overreaching; (2) the plaintiff would be deprived of its day in court
        because of inconvenience or unfairness; (3) the chosen law would
        deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of the clause
        would contravene public policy.” Krenkel, 579 F.3d at 1281. 4 These
        factors will rarely invalidate a forum-selection clause, which is,
        after all, a contract between two parties. See id. But if a party can
        show that “trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult
        and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived
        of his day in court,” the forum-selection clause will not be
        enforceable. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18.
               Federal courts cannot sidestep our responsibility to consider
        this question under The Bremen before applying the forum non
        conveniens inquiry as directed by Atlantic Marine. And that order of
        operations is nothing new—take Turner v. Costa Crociere. 9 F.4th
        1341. There, we considered the district court’s forum non conveniens
        dismissal of a class action against an Italian cruise operator. Id. at
        1344–45. We first explained the contours of The Bremen, and then
        considered whether the plaintiff had shown that enforcement of
        the forum-selection clause would be “fundamentally unfair” or
        “contravene public policy.” Id. at 1345–47. The answer was no, so
        we proceeded to Atlantic Marine and performed the typical forum

        4 Our cases have inconsistently used the terms “valid” and “enforceable” when

        articulating the effect of The Bremen’s test on forum-selection clauses without
        explaining whether, or how, these terms differ. Compare Krenkel, 579 F.3d at
        1281, with Turner, 9 F.4th at 1345. Whatever their differences may (or may
        not) be, it does not change the result here, so we do not delve into that issue.
USCA11 Case: 22-12669      Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 05/01/2024       Page: 14 of 18

        14                      Opinion of the Court                    22-12669

        non conveniens analysis that applies when there is an enforceable
        forum-selection clause. Id. at 1347–49. Same goes for Don’t Look
        Media LLC v. Fly Victor Ltd., 999 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2021). There,
        this Court explained that the forum-selection clause would not be
        enforced if the plaintiff could make a “strong showing that
        enforcement would be unfair or unreasonable” under The Bremen.
        Id. at 1297 (quotation omitted). In that case, too, the plaintiff failed
        to make such a showing, so we applied Atlantic Marine and
        dismissed the case for forum non conveniens. Id. at 1298–1300.
               Many other circuits have followed the same approach. As
        the Sixth Circuit explained, because “the presence of a valid and
        enforceable forum-selection clause alters the type of forum-non-
        conveniens analysis a court must apply, it follows that a court must
        first—before balancing the forum-non-conveniens factors—
        determine whether a forum-selection clause is applicable to the
        claims at issue, mandatory, valid, and enforceable.” Lakeside
        Surfaces, Inc. v. Cambria Co., 16 F.4th 209, 215 (6th Cir. 2021); see also
        Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2017); Weber v.
        PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 767, 773–776 (5th Cir. 2016);
        Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 774–76 (7th Cir. 2014);
        Gemini Techs., Inc. v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 931 F.3d 911, 914–17
        (9th Cir. 2019); Azima v. RAK Inv. Auth., 926 F.3d 870, 874–76 (D.C.
        Cir. 2019).
              The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jackson is especially useful
        because it also involved a tribal forum. 764 F.3d 765. That case
        looked at the validity of an arbitration clause (a type of forum-
USCA11 Case: 22-12669     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 05/01/2024     Page: 15 of 18

        22-12669               Opinion of the Court                        15

        selection clause) in a loan agreement. Id. at 773–76; see Mitsubishi
        Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630–31
        (1985). The clause specified the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe as the
        only arbitral forum for dispute resolution. Jackson, 764 F.3d at 769.
        The court began by considering the validity of the clause and found
        that enforcement would be unreasonable under the circumstances
        because the record had clearly established that the forum did not
        exist—the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe did not involve itself in the
        business of arbitration. Id. at 776. Because the court concluded
        that the forum was “illusory,” it had “no hesitation” in finding
        enforcement to be “unreasonable under M/S Bremen.” Id.
               In line with these cases, the district court should have
        considered the validity and enforceability of the forum-selection
        clause under The Bremen before moving on to the forum non
        conveniens analysis. Had the district court conducted that analysis,
        it very well might have concluded that enforcing the forum-
        selection clause in Myers’s employment contract would be “unfair
        or unreasonable under the circumstances.” Krenkel, 579 F.3d at
        1281.
               AQuate repeatedly argued that the Alabama-Quassarte
        Tribal Town court, though designated in the forum-selection
        clause, did not exist, and that any evidence of the purported court
        was fabricated by an ousted tribal chief in an effort to retain power.
        AQuate submitted an affidavit from Famous Marshall, the
        Chairman of Economic Development for the Tribal Town, which
USCA11 Case: 22-12669     Document: 58-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2024    Page: 16 of 18

        16                    Opinion of the Court                 22-12669

        stated that the tribe’s constitution did not provide for a court
        system and that the supposed tribal court was fictitious.
               Kituwah and Myers, meanwhile, maintained that the
        Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town court was legitimate. In support,
        they submitted two orders allegedly from that court. Suspiciously
        absent, however, was any affidavit verifying that these exhibits
        were authentic—and the faces of the orders are problematic. To
        start, despite being more than four months apart, relating to
        different issues, and seemingly binding different parties, both
        orders are marked with the same number—22-001. But one
        includes it as the “court order” number, while the other lists it as
        the case number. If correct, that is an odd coincidence. The orders
        also have remarkably different captions and formatting, which
        would be surprising to see from a legitimate court. And the
        subjects of the two orders are more curious still. The first claims
        to ban Famous Marshall and several other members (at least one
        of whom is connected to AQuate) from tribal property and offices.
        The second “enjoins” AQuate (from doing what, exactly, it does
        not say). These orders, in short, lack any indicia of authenticity.
                Given this record, we conclude that the district court erred
        when it concluded that the record did “not reveal any basis to
        suggest” that the so-called orders of the Alabama-Quassarte Tribal
        Town court were fraudulent. The record contained an affidavit
        testifying that the court was fake and unsupported by the tribe’s
USCA11 Case: 22-12669         Document: 58-1         Date Filed: 05/01/2024         Page: 17 of 18

        22-12669                   Opinion of the Court                                17

        governing charter. If that is not a “basis to suggest” that these
        orders are fraudulent, we struggle to imagine what would be. 5
                We cannot say definitively whether the forum-selection
        clause is or is not enforceable—that is for the district court to decide
        on remand with an appropriate evidentiary hearing. Of course,
        AQuate bears the burden to show enforcement is unreasonable
        under the circumstances. But we are confident that, should the
        district court determine that the Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town
        court is nonexistent, we, like the Seventh Circuit, would have “no
        hesitation concluding that an illusory forum is unreasonable under
        M/S Bremen.” Jackson, 764 F.3d at 776. 6
                                        *       *       *
                The district court erred in dismissing the claims against
        Kituwah on the basis of sovereign immunity, as well as in
        dismissing Myers from the trade secrets claims under Rule 19. The
        district court also erred in dismissing the breach of contract claim
        against Myers on the basis of forum non conveniens—it failed to
        consider the enforceability of the forum-selection clause and to

        5 The forum-selection clause in Myers’s contract also specified that, if “there is

        no tribal court in existence, then the CFR Court for the geographic region
        where Employee works shall be the exclusive venue for litigation arising out
        of Employee’s employment.” Oddly, however, neither party made arguments
        about the viability of this venue or submitted any evidence in that regard.
        Nothing herein precludes the parties from raising this issue on remand.
        6 At oral argument, counsel appeared to suggest that a tribal court may exist

        now even if it did not when the motion to dismiss was decided. We leave that
        for the district court to sort out.
USCA11 Case: 22-12669      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 05/01/2024     Page: 18 of 18

        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12669

        consider all the evidence before it. The decision of the district court
        is therefore REVERSED and REMANDED for further
        proceedings.