Court Opinion

ID: 9407614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 17:05:01.276509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.191092
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/7/23 In re Giovanni G. CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re Giovanni G. et al., Persons Coming
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                           E080858

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.Nos. J288561, J288562)

 v.                                                                      OPINION

 E.G.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G.

Pace, Judge. Affirmed.

         Tracy M. De Soto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Jessica L. Morgan, Deputy County Counsel,

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       In this dependency proceeding, E.G. (father) appeals from the termination of his

parental rights to his minor sons, Jacob G. and Giovanni G. (collectively, the children).

Father argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the beneficial parental

relationship exception under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision

(c)(1)(B)(i) (section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)) (unlabeled statutory references are to this code).

We affirm.

                                     BACKGROUND

       The family came to the attention of San Bernardino County Children and Family

Services (CFS) in March 2021, when Jacob was nine years old and Giovanni was three

years old. CFS received a referral from paternal grandmother, who was concerned about

the children’s safety because of the drug use of father and G.M. (mother) (collectively,

parents). The children and parents had lived in paternal grandmother’s home but moved

out after paternal grandmother told mother to leave because of mother’s drug use.

       While the family was living at paternal grandmother’s house in February 2021,

mother’s boyfriend had fired several gunshots at father outside of the house. Mother was

present when the shooting occurred. Mother had taken one of the children into the house

immediately before the shooting. Law enforcement arrested mother and her boyfriend.

       A social worker investigated the referral and found father and the children living

at maternal grandmother’s house. The children were wearing dirty clothing, Giovanni’s

face was dirty, and Jacob had not attended school for several weeks. Father and Jacob

could not explain why Jacob had not been to school. Jacob reported that father

                                              2
disciplined Giovanni by “smack[ing]” Giovanni in the arm or the stomach. Father denied

that mother had been arrested and denied that mother used drugs but admitted that he

used marijuana.

       CFS took both children into protective custody pursuant to a warrant. CFS filed a

petition under subdivisions (b)(1) and (g) of section 300, alleging that the children were

at substantial risk of serious physical harm because of parents’ substance abuse and

history of domestic violence and mother’s inability to support the children due to her

incarceration. Mother is not a party to this appeal.

       The juvenile court detained the children in the home of Ms. C, a nonrelative

caregiver.1 The court ordered weekly, two-hour supervised visits for father and gave

CFS discretion to liberalize the frequency and duration of the visits.

       In the jurisdiction and disposition report, CFS reported that father had not visited

the children. Ms. C was in the process of scheduling the children’s wellness exams.

       The court held the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in April 2021. The court

sustained the allegations in the petition, removed the children from parents’ custody,

declared the children dependents of the court, and ordered reunification services for

parents. The court found father to be the children’s presumed parent.

       In the six-month status review reported filed in October 2021, CFS reported that at

Giovanni’s initial medical examination in April 2021 he was underweight and diagnosed

1     In its reports, CFS occasionally mistakenly refers to the children’s caregiver as
Ms. R rather than Ms. C, but the record confirms that the children were placed in only
one home (Ms. C’s) after being removed.

                                             3
with failure to thrive. By June 2021, Giovanni had “gained an appropriate amount of

weight,” and his weight was no longer a medical concern. In addition, Giovanni had

numerous teeth extracted because he had 20 cavities along with “multiple decay and

ab[s]cesses.”

       Jacob was attending fourth grade. In April 2021, Jacob was reading at a preschool

level. In October 2021, Jacob’s reading had improved so that he was reading at almost a

first-grade level. He also had “85% accuracy in spelling tests.” Jacob’s teacher reported

that he was “putting a lot of effort into his learning” and was “a role model student,

winning an award in math and another in integrity.”

       When initially placed with Ms. C, Giovanni was angry and dependent on Jacob for

meeting his needs. Jacob acted like Giovanni’s “primary caregiver.” Giovanni was

making progress in treatment. Ms. C reported that Giovanni’s “tantrums [were] reduced

to approximately one time daily.”

       During the reporting period, Ms. C supervised father’s weekly visits with the

children. CFS had increased the visits to twice weekly, two-hour supervised visits. The

children enjoyed spending time with father, who brought supplies and activities to visits

to engage with the children. Ms. C reported that father had “no boundaries with the

children.”

       At the six-month status review hearing in October 2021, the court ordered

continued reunification services for father.

                                               4
       CFS filed the 12-month status review report in March 2022. The children

remained placed with Ms. C. CFS recommended terminating father’s reunification

services. Father had completed services but lacked insight into understanding domestic

violence and how it had traumatized the children. Father’s substance abuse issues

remained unresolved. CFS suspected that father continued to have a relationship with

mother.

       During the reporting period, father visited the children once weekly for six hours.

Ms. C supervised the visits and reported that father’s “behaviors” were improving but

that he still needed “boundaries and structure.” Giovanni hit father, and father did not

redirect Giovanni. Father struggled to follow “a structured schedule.” He did not

understand that dinnertime was “not time to play.” When Jacob needed help with

homework, father did not help and instead played with Giovanni, which caused Jacob to

be frustrated. Jacob was not allowed to play until he finished his homework.

       Ms. C reported that Giovanni had temper tantrums when visiting with father but

no longer had temper tantrums at home. At home, Giovanni used “his words to express

what he [was] feeling” when he felt frustrated.

       The social worker explained to father the concerns that Ms. C had about father’s

visits. Father denied not helping Jacob with homework and explained that Giovanni

would get upset if father did not play with Giovanni.

       In an addendum report filed in April 2022, CFS reported that father continued “to

be a ‘buddy’ to” the children during visits and “struggle[d] with the role of a parent.”

                                             5
Giovanni continued to have temper tantrums during father’s visits and ran into a parking

lot during one visit.

       The court held the contested 12-month status review hearing the following month.

CFS, the children’s counsel, and father’s counsel agreed that father should receive

continued reunification services, which the court ordered.

       In September 2022, CFS filed the 18-month status review report and an addendum

report. CFS recommended terminating father’s reunification services and setting a

selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26. CFS reported that father

continued to lack insight into why the children had been removed and how domestic

violence between him and mother had affected the children.

       During the reporting period, CFS had liberalized father’s visits so that he visited

with the children three times per week for two hours. During one visit in June 2022,

father told the children that they would be living together in a house he was going to rent.

Ms. C redirected father. After the visit, Giovanni had a “‘meltdown’” and said “he was

tired of living in [Ms. C’s] home and was going home with” father. Ms. C reported that

Jacob had also had “several ‘meltdowns’” related to father’s promises to the children that

he was getting housing for them all to live in and that he would take them to Disneyland

after they reunified.

       Ms. C initially reported to CFS that father had made “small improvements” and

appeared to be “making more of an effort to parent the children.” In July 2022, Ms. C

reported that she was frustrated with father’s visits. According to Ms. C, father continued

                                             6
to “‘mess around in the visits.’” Ms. C described father “as a child trying to be an adult”

and as being “not consistent in his parenting.” For example, at a doctor’s appointment

for Giovanni, father “showed no interest in speaking with the doctor.” Father played with

the children in the lobby while Ms. C spoke with the doctor. Father similarly played in

the lobby at Jacob’s psychiatrist appointment. Ms. C believed that father appeared to be

“trying to do the right thing, but then returns to being one of the ‘kids.’” Giovanni had

“temper tantrums” while visiting with father but otherwise had none.

       Ms. C described one visit that had occurred at a McDonald’s restaurant a couple of

weeks earlier. The children were being loud and appeared to be “annoying people,” but

father did not redirect them. Father accompanied the children to the restroom but did not

return in a timely manner, which concerned Ms. C. A male employee opened the

restroom door for Ms. C after she heard yelling and screaming. Giovanni was “on the

floor, surrounded by poop and [father] was trying to clean it up.” Giovanni had “pooped

outside the toilet and was playing in it,” and Jacob had “joined in.”

       The social worker asked father about the McDonald’s incident. Father said “that

he was working with Giovanni to wipe himself,” but Giovanni had “defecated outside the

toilet” and stepped “in the poop.” Father had to clean the toilet, the floor, Giovanni, and

Giovanni’s shoes. Father explained that “Jacob laughs when there is farting or poop

involved.”

       After speaking with father about the incident, the social worker observed a visit

between father and the children at a restaurant. Father bought pizza for the children and

                                             7
played games with them. The children were well-behaved. Father took the children to

the restroom without incident.

       At the 18-month status review hearing in September 2022, the juvenile court

terminated father’s reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing

under section 366.26.

       In preparation for the section 366.26 hearing, the social worker reported that the

children appeared “adjusted and comfortable in” Ms. C’s home, where they had lived

since March 2021. Ms. C described her relationship with the children as “‘very good’”

and loving. Ms. C shared “a strong connection” with the children, and they gave her “‘a

lot of love.’” Mr. C described his relationship with the children as “‘good’” and stable.

Mr. C said that the children “identify with him, and they share common interests.” Mr.

and Ms. C wanted to adopt the children.

       Asked how he felt about being adopted, Jacob said that he felt “‘happy’ about

being able to stay with the prospective adoptive parents.” Jacob was 11 years old. The

social worker believed that Jacob understood what it meant to be adopted in that he

understood that Mr. and Ms. C would “be his ‘forever’ home and family.” Jacob viewed

Mr. and Ms. C as family. Jacob was in sixth grade and reading at a fourth grade level.

Jacob’s goal was to read at a seventh grade level by the end of the school year.

       Giovanni was five years old and did not “understand the concept of adoption.”

Giovanni “was ‘afraid’ about being adopted because he did not want to go to a ‘new

home.’” When the social worker explained to Giovanni that he would remain with Mr.

                                             8
and Ms. C and that they would “be his forever home and family, Giovanni appeared to be

relieved.” Giovanni did not understand that he would not be able to reunify with father.

       Both Jacob and Giovanni described Mr. and Ms. C to their “peers or others” as

their “mom and dad” and described Mr. and Ms. C’s children to others as their siblings.

The children appeared “adjusted and comfortable” in Mr. and Ms. C’s home. Mr. and

Ms. C “reported improvements in the children’s initial behaviors.” Jacob no longer acted

as Giovanni’s parent.

       CFS recommended terminating father’s parental rights and freeing the children for

adoption. The social worker opined that terminating “[p]arental rights would not be

detrimental to [the] children.”

       The court held the contested section 366.26 hearing in March 2023. The court

admitted into evidence and considered CFS’s reports and a bonding study report prepared

by Dr. Robert E. Brodie II, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist. Father and Dr. Brodie testified.

The parties stipulated that Dr. Brodie was an expert, and the court accepted the

stipulation.

       Dr. Brodie testified about the bonding study that he conducted of father and the

children in February 2023. Dr. Brodie interviewed Jacob, Giovanni, Ms. C, and father

separately and observed a 45-minute visit with father and the children at a fast food

restaurant. When the children arrived at the restaurant, father and Jacob were excited to

see one another. Giovanni was sleeping in Ms. C’s arms. During the study, father

bought the children food, helped Giovanni prepare his food, and encouraged Giovanni to

                                             9
finish his meal. Father brought a card game and helped the children make a craft. Father

was patient with the children. The children smiled throughout the visit “and appeared

very comfortable with their father.” Dr. Brodie testified that father occupied a “parental

role” during the visit.

       Dr. Brodie said that Jacob understood what adoption means but that it was difficult

to assess Jacob’s wishes because Jacob appeared to answer questions “in a manner that

[Jacob] believe[d] would please the questioner.” Jacob initially told Dr. Brodie that he

wanted “‘to go back with [his] dad.’” But Jacob then amended his answer to say that “he

was not sure,” even though he loved father, because Ms. C “takes good care of him.”

Jacob could not answer whether he wanted overnight visits with father. Giovanni was

nervous when he spoke with Dr. Brodie and did not provide Dr. Brodie with any

meaningful information about Giovanni’s relationship with father.

       In the report, Dr. Brodie opined that both Jacob and Giovanni were “well

connected” and “bonded” with father and shared “a positive and secure attachment” with

him. At the visit observed by Dr. Brodie, the children were excited to see father and

comfortable with him. Giovanni viewed father “as a safety figure” and had “laid

comfortably on” father’s chest. Dr. Brodie concluded the report with his opinion “that

both children have a secure attachment to their father and it will be in the best interest of

the children to continue the reunification process.”

       In an addendum report filed the day of the hearing, CFS addressed Dr. Brodie’s

report and continued to recommend terminating father’s parental rights. CFS opined that

                                             10
Dr. Brodie’s opinion was based on one “very brief observation[] in a controlled

environment,” in which father’s ability to parent the children in a difficult situation or

otherwise to meet their needs was not challenged.

       Dr. Brodie testified that father “seemed well connected” with the children, so the

children “would benefit from continuing th[eir] relationship with” him. Dr. Brodie also

believed that it would be detrimental to the children to terminate father’s parental rights

because of the “strong connection” the children had with father. On cross-examination,

Dr. Brodie confirmed that “no part of [his] assessment was directed at weighing the

relative benefits of preserving the parent-child relationship versus the benefits that the

children may gain from adoption.”

       Father testified that he had attended all of the scheduled visits with the children.

The children were “happy and excited” to see father at the beginning of visits but “get

sad’ when visits end. Both children acted affectionately toward father. Giovanni

“constantly” asked when he would “be able to come home.” During visits, father played

card games with the children and asked them about school, homework, and whether they

were sleeping and eating. Father said that the children referred to him as “Dad” and

“Mom.”

       The juvenile court found the children likely to be adopted, and the court

terminated father’s parental rights. Applying the elements of the parental bond exception

as set forth in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), the court found that

father “clearly” satisfied the first element of regular visitation. As to the second element,

                                             11
the court found that the children had “a positive emotional attachment” to father but that

it was “questionable” whether the attachment was substantial. As to the third element,

the court found that father had not carried his burden of showing “a substantial

attachment or that termination of parental rights would be so detrimental that the Court

should implement a less permanent plan.” The court recognized that the children, and

particularly Jacob as the older child, would suffer “some detriment” from the termination

of father’s parental rights, but the court did not believe that the detriment outweighed

“the benefits and stability that the adoptive home provides.” The court indicated that the

children had been out of parents’ custody for two years and “found a home where they

can be together—permanently together in a stable placement.”

       Concerning the second and third elements, the court reasoned that Jacob’s

statements at nearly 12 years old “undermine both of those prongs in that he does

understand what adoption means and he has expressed a number of times that he does

wish to be adopted.” As to Giovanni, the court found it “telling” that Giovanni’s anxiety

decreased when he was told that adoption meant that he would stay with Ms. C.

                                      DISCUSSION

       Father argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the beneficial

parental relationship exception under section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i). We are not persuaded.

       When the juvenile court finds that a dependent child is likely to be adopted, it

must terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds

that adoption would be detrimental to the child under one of several exceptions.

                                             12
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630-631.) The “‘statutory

exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an

option other than the norm, which remains adoption.’” (Caden C., at p. 631, quoting In

re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)

       Under the beneficial parental relationship exception, the parent bears the burden of

proving three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) regular visitation and

contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that

(3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C.,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636, italics omitted; § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i).)

       We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s findings on whether the

parent has regularly visited and whether a beneficial parental relationship exists. (Caden

C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) Whether termination of parental rights would be

detrimental to the child because of the beneficial parental relationship is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) But we review any factual findings underlying that

decision for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) “A court abuses its discretion only when ‘“‘the

trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious,

or patently absurd determination.’”’” (Id. at p. 641.) We have no authority to substitute

our decision for that of the juvenile court “‘“‘[w]hen two or more inferences can

reasonably be deduced from the facts.’”’” (Ibid.)

       In determining whether the exception applies, “the court balances the strength and

quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security

                                             13
and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural

parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional

attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is

overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27

Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)

       When “assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial court must

decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs

the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11

Cal.5th at p. 632, citing Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The parent must

show that his or her relationship with the child “promotes the well-being of the child to

such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home

with new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., at p. 575.) “A showing the child derives some

benefit from the relationship is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory

preference for adoption.” (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646, disapproved

on other grounds in Caden C., at pp. 637, 638, fns. 6, 7.) The court may consider issues

ranging from “the specific features of the child’s relationship with the parent and the

harm that would come from losing those specific features to a higher-level conclusion of

how harmful in total that loss would be.” (Caden C., at p. 640.) The court must also

assess “how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those

harms,” and in that regard the court may consider “findings ranging from specific

                                             14
benefits related to the child’s specific characteristics up to a higher-level conclusion

about the benefit of adoption all told.” (Ibid.)

       The juvenile court found, it is undisputed, and we agree that father maintained

regular visitation and contact with the children. We assume for the sake of argument that

the children would benefit from a continued relationship with father. The remaining

element is whether the children shared such a “substantial, positive attachment” to father

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636) that the harm in severing the parental relationship

would “outweigh[] ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family could confer’”

(id. at p. 633).

       The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by determining that any benefits

derived from the children’s relationship with father did not outweigh the benefit of

stability through adoption. The record reflects that the children enjoyed visiting with

father and loved him. But “[a] parent must show more than frequent and loving contact

or pleasant visits.” (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555 (C.F.).) Although Dr.

Brodie opined that the children have a strong, positive connection with father, there was

no evidence that the relationship was so significant as to outweigh the security and

stability of an adoptive home. (Cf. Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634 [“When

the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of

a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child

due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent”]; id. at p. 635 [when a child has

“‘very strong ties’” with a parent and termination of parental rights “‘is likely to be

                                              15
harmful to the child, courts should retain parental ties if desired by both the parents and

the child’”].) The relationship father enjoyed with the children during their visits is not

sufficient to demonstrate that father and the children shared such a substantial, positive

emotional attachment that terminating father’s parental rights would greatly harm the

children.

       Father did not present any evidence that the security and stability of a new home

would be outweighed by the loss of the relationship with father. Dr. Brodie opined that

termination of father’s parental rights would be detrimental to the children. But Dr.

Brodie did not analyze whether the possible detriment suffered by the children in

severing their relationship with father would be so great as to outweigh the benefit of

adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)

       Moreover, father said that the children were sad when visits ended, but there was

no evidence that the children’s sadness at the end of visits otherwise had significant or

lasting effects on their behavior or general well-being. (Cf. Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th

at p. 633 [losing the parental relationship might result in “emotional instability and

preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or

depression”].) While Ms. C reported that both Jacob and Giovanni had meltdowns after

visiting with father, the meltdowns occurred only after father promised the children that

they would be living together soon and would go to Disneyland. There is no evidence

that the meltdowns were anything other than isolated incidents related to father’s

inappropriate promises during visits. The evidence demonstrates that Giovanni stopped

                                             16
having any temper tantrums while at Mr. and Ms. C’s home and only had them when

visiting with father. The evidence otherwise shows that the children were thriving in the

placement with Mr. and Ms. C, with whom they had lived for two years.

       Father does not explain how the juvenile court abused its discretion by

determining that the stability and security of adoption outweighed any detriment the

children might experience from severing the relationship with father. Instead, Father

merely points out evidence that would support a contrary conclusion, namely, Dr.

Brodie’s opinion about possible detriment. But that evidence does not show that the

juvenile court abused its discretion “‘“‘by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently

absurd determination.’”’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) When the evidence

supports two or more reasonable inferences, we do not substitute our judgment for the

judgment of the lower court. (Ibid.)

       Father also argues that this case is similar to In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th

289 (S.B.). S.B. concluded that the juvenile court erred by finding that the beneficial

parental relationship exception did not apply, because “the only reasonable inference”

from the record was that the child “would be greatly harmed by the loss of her

significant, positive relationship with” the father. (Id. at p. 301.) The expert who

conducted the bonding study opined that the child would suffer potential harm if the

parental relationship were severed, and the social worker also acknowledged that the

child would experience “some detriment” if the parental relationship were severed.

(Id. at p. 295.) The social worker nevertheless recommended terminating the father’s

                                             17
parental rights “based in part on the [caregiving grandparents’] intent to continue [the

father’s] visits with” the child. (Ibid.) The juvenile court had similarly relied in part on

the grandparents’ promise to allow future visits, which S.B. found to be an improper

consideration. (Id. at p. 300.)

       Father’s reliance on S.B. is misplaced. (See C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 558-559 [same appellate court observing that “S.B. is confined to its extraordinary

facts”]; Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2021)

§ 2.171[5][i][C], p. 2-694 [S.B. should be viewed as “the result of a very unique factual

situation”].) Unlike in S.B., the social worker here opined that the children would not

suffer any detriment upon termination of parental rights, and the juvenile court did not

rely, even in part, on any promised future visits with father that Mr. and Ms. C might

allow. Moreover, in light of the conflicting evidence concerning the extent of any

detriment that the children might suffer if father’s parental rights were terminated, the

record does not show that “the only reasonable inference” is that the children would be

“greatly harmed” by the loss of the relationship with father. (S.B., supra, 164

Cal.App.4th at p. 301.)

       Finally, Father also contends that the juvenile court applied an incorrect standard

by focusing on where the children wanted to live and not whether the parental

relationship outweighed the benefits of adoption. The argument lacks merit. The court

properly considered the children’s feelings about being adopted by Mr. and Ms. C in

                                             18
determining whether the stability of adoption would be outweighed by the detriment of

losing the parental relationship. (In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683, 692-694.)

       For all of these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its

discretion by concluding that the benefit the children would receive from adoption was

not outweighed by any detriment they might suffer from the termination of father’s

parental rights.

                                      DISPOSITION

       The March 7, 2023, orders terminating parental rights as to Jacob and Giovanni

are affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                MENETREZ
                                                                                         J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON
          Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL
                    J.

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