Court Opinion

ID: 9602295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:52:53.143113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:02.145531
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the letter in question was not written testimony. As noted in passing in the majority opinion, the letter was introduced by the State and admitted by the court as a prior inconsistent statement. The record does reflect confusion over whether there was any inconsistency or not. Nonetheless, the letter was used by the State as an impeachment document, not as original evidence. The State argued that it should go out with the jury as an exception to the general rule. The State concedes the general rule that “[w]ritten documents . . . that substitute for testimony may not be taken into the jury room when the jury retires. [Cits.]” Johnson v. State, 244 Ga. 295, 296-97 (260 SE2d 23) (1979). This court explained the rule in the case of Thomason v. Genuine Parts Co., 156 Ga. App. 599, 601 (275 SE2d 159) (1980): “[Wjritten statements such as interrogatories, dying declarations, confessions of guilt, depositions, etc., should be allowed in evidence by reading same to the jury and presented in evidence in that form but not allowed to be in the possession of the jury during their deliberations. In other words, the jury heard the testimony from the witness stand but same should not be unduly emphasized by giving the jury an opportunity to read them one or more times after hearing them read in the courtroom, whereas oral testimony from the stand is heard only once. [Cit.] Where any such papers are delivered to the jury over timely objections, a new trial is in order.”
However, the State contends that letters do not fall within this general rule. In support of this proposition, the State refers us to Green, Ga. Law of Evid. (2nd ed.), § 87.1: “Letters, diagrams, and written inconsistent statements introduced to impeach witnesses go out with the jury when it retires for deliberation.” Green’s volume on evidence is a well-respected and often-used reference work for lawyers in this state. However, lawyers should remember to use any such reference work only as a guide; the lawyer must read the cases cited by *192the text to see if the proposition is indeed supported by case authority.
The quote above illustrates this point. The case of Stallins v. Southern R. Co., 140 Ga. 55 (2) (78 SE 421) (1913), is cited in the Green text for the proposition that written inconsistent statements go out with the jury. A reading of the case shows that the court merely held that where counsel objected to the document going out with the jury on the ground that the document had not been admitted into evidence, “but as he was in error in that position, the overruling of the objection furnished no ground for a new trial.” Id. at 59. Thus, the holding of the case is quite narrow: counsel made the wrong objection, and the statement went out with the jury. The second case cited by Green for this proposition is Johnson v. State, supra. In Johnson, appellant contended that the court erred in not allowing an impeaching written statement to go out with the jury. The court in Johnson found no error, thus holding that written inconsistent statements may not go out with the jury. Thus, Green erroneously cites this case in support of his proposition.
Green cites the case of Rudulph v. State, 16 Ga. App. 353 (8) (85 SE 365) (1915), for the proposition that letters go out with the jury. Headnote 8 reads in pertinent part: “There was no error in permitting the jury to take to their room certain letters . . . admitted in evidence without objection and read to the jury. ... As to such evidence the rule is different from that applied to depositions. 2 Thomp. Trials, § 2575; Shedden v. Stiles, 121 Ga. 637 (4), 639 (49 SE 719) [(1905)].” Shedden simply stands for the general rule that depositions and interrogatories should not go out with the jury, and if they do go out, a new trial is in order. Section 2575 of Thompson on Trials, a 1912 treatise, begins with this statement: “The modern practice is believed to be to send to the jury-room all documents and papers, other than depositions, which have been received in evidence.” The section goes on to discuss, and to criticize, the rule holding it to be error to allow documentary evidence to go out with the jury where a party has made objection to it going out with the jury. This is the rule which has always been followed in Georgia. No Georgia case, nor any case dealing with letters, is discussed or noted in the section.
It appears that reliance upon Rudulph, supra, for the proposition that letters go out with the jury regardless of any objection to their going out is misplaced. I can find no case in Georgia which has cited the Rudulph case for such a proposition. I read the holding in Rudulph to be that where no objection is made to the documents going out with the jury, the court will not reach the issue. The statements about the rule in regard to letters is but erroneous dicta.
It is not whether a document is a letter, or a statement, or a confession, which will determine whether it may go out with the jury, but *193rather whether the document substitutes for testimony. If it does, it may not go out. If it does not, as in the case of a diagram or a photograph, it may go out with the jury. In the present case the letter is a document which does substitute for testimony. The State merely used the letter as a device to impeach an alleged inconsistent statement. The contents of the letter were read to the jury. The witness testified to it. Therefore, it was error to allow it to go out with the jury. “However, the question remains whether the trial court’s error in this regard was harmful and requires a new trial. Under the standard established in Proctor v. State, 235 Ga. 720 (221 SE2d 556) (1975), and Lane v. State, 247 Ga. 19 (273 SE2d 397) (1981), it is not reversible error for a written statement to go out with the jury if that statement is consistent with the theory of the defense. If written evidence is not consistent with the theory of the defense, the trial court’s error in permitting it to go out with the jury may nonetheless be harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment. Owens v. State, 248 Ga. 629 (284 SE2d 408) (1981).” Heard v. State, 169 Ga. App. 609 (314 SE2d 451) (1984).
Decided December 5, 1985.
Hubert E. Hamilton III, for appellant.
David L. Lomenick, Jr., District Attorney, David L. Whitman, *194Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
*193The theory of appellant’s defense was that he was unaware of and took no part in the burglary which his brother admitted committing. Thus, the statements in the letter to the effect that the two must get their stories straight are not consistent with appellant’s defense. Therefore, the rule set out in Proctor and Lane would not apply. Nor can I say that it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment. The evidence against appellant was circumstantial. A police officer saw appellant crouched down next to his car in a parking lot next to the service station which was the scene of the burglary. The time was between 2:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. Appellant claimed he was relieving himself after having drunk much beer. The officer let him go. Later that morning the officer checked the service station and discovered the burglary. Appellant was arrested at the apartment of Gail Stephens where police found money taken in the burglary. Appellant’s brother Steve, who admitted the crime and testified that he committed it alone, had also been in the apartment both before and after the burglary. In these circumstances, I cannot say with certainty that there is a high probability that the presence of the letter with the jury did not contribute to the judgment. Therefore, a new trial is in order.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Benham join in this dissent.