Court Opinion

ID: 9391551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 17:00:48.926331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:42.910753
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             MAY 2 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ATINDERPAL SINGH,                               No. 21-1104
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A206-080-228
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                     Argued and Submitted April 10, 2023
                          San Francisco, California

Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Dissent by Judge CLIFTON.

      Atinderpal Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal of an

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). The BIA further denied his application for humanitarian asylum. We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition.

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both

decisions.” De Leon v. Garland, 51 F.4th 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation

omitted); see also Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014)

(referring to the IJ and BIA “collectively as ‘the agency’”). We review the

BIA’s interpretation of legal questions de novo and the factual findings

underlying the agency’s determination for substantial evidence. De Leon, 51

F.4th at 999. The agency’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence

“unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1677 (2021) (quoting 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

      1. The agency concluded that Singh failed to demonstrate past

persecution based on his political membership in the Shiromani Akali Dal

Amritsar (“Mann”) Party. See Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1073 (9th

Cir. 2023) (stating elements of past persecution). Singh testified before the IJ

that, in 2013, he experienced two attacks by Indian Congress Party members.

During both incidents, his attackers beat him because he supported the Mann

Party, threatened him with death, and caused him to require medical treatment.

Although he requested assistance from the police after each incident, he was

denied help and accused of lying. The agency found Singh credible but denied

his asylum application because it did not find that his past harm constituted

                                        2
persecution1 or that the government was unwilling or unable to control his

attackers. Both reasons are erroneous.

      First, “when determining whether a petitioner’s past mistreatment rises to

the level of persecution, the BIA must apply cumulative-effect review.”

Salguero Sosa v. Garland, 55 F.4th 1213, 1218–20 (9th Cir. 2022) (discussing

the requirements of a “cumulative-effect review” in assessing past persecution).

Accordingly, we have held that the record compels the conclusion that a

petitioner’s treatment rises to the level of persecution when he is targeted for his

political views, threatened with death, physically assaulted, and compelled to

flee his home. See Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 657 (9th Cir. 2022)

(involving a Mann Party petitioner that was attacked twice by Congress Party

members); cf. Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2021)

(explaining physical harm may compel a finding of persecution when paired

with “something more, such as credible death threats”). Here, on two occasions,

Singh required medical attention after being targeted, beaten, and threatened

with death by Congress Party supporters based on his political membership.2

      1
         As noted in Antonio, “the standard of review for past persecution is
currently unsettled.” Id. at 1072 n.8. We need not further address the dispute
because Singh’s “harm amounts to persecution even under the more deferential
‘substantial evidence’ standard.” See id. (comparing cases).
       2
         The dissent asserts that Singh was not sufficiently clear in detailing the
severity of his injuries. This is contradicted by the record. As the BIA noted,
Singh suffered “bruises” and “body aches” from both of the attacks, “a cut on
his hand” from the second attack, and obtained medical treatment after each
attack. Indeed, where the IJ found the petitioner credible, we defer to the IJ’s

                                         3
The cases cited by the agency and dissent on this issue are distinguishable

because they do not involve “multiple instances of physical violence coupled

with a death threat,” see Singh, 57 F.4th at 655; see, e.g., Gu v. Gonzales, 454

F.3d 1014, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding no past persecution where

petitioner was involved in a singular incident without a death threat).

      Second, the record indicates that government forces—here, the police—

“[were] unable or unwilling to control” Singh’s attackers. See Bringas-

Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citation

omitted). The agency failed to evaluate “all relevant evidence in the record.”

See id. at 1069 (citation omitted). Despite finding Singh credible, the agency

wrongfully discounted his testimony that the police “did not listen” to him,

instead refusing to take a police report and calling him a liar after he reported

the two attacks and showed them his injury. Such evidence can demonstrate

that the government is unable or unwilling to control attackers. See Doe v.

Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2013) (so finding where petitioner

“presented evidence that the . . . police rejected his first complaint . . . and

subsequently dismissed his second complaint without doing anything more than

interviewing him.”). To the extent the agency and dissent found this testimony

vague, any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to disagree. The

testimony before the IJ, when put in context, indicates Singh told the police the

determination despite any minor omissions or potential speculation in the
petitioner’s testimony. See Singh, 57 F.4th at 652.

                                          4
same narrative that he told the IJ—which it found credible. Moreover, the

police attacked and arrested Singh’s father on account of his Mann Party

membership. This, combined with country conditions evidence showing that

Indian police discriminate against Mann Party members, further supports the

conclusion that the police were unwilling to control Singh’s attackers because

of his political affiliation. See Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2004) (holding that the record compelled the finding that the government

was unwilling or unable to control violence against foreigners when officials

“flatly refused” to help, police “quickly closed” an investigation, and police

expressed anti-foreigner statements).

      In sum, Singh has shown that he suffered past persecution on account of a

protected ground at the hands of those the government was unable or unwilling

to control. He is therefore presumed to have a fear of future persecution and the

government bears the burden to rebut that presumption. See Singh, 57 F.4th at

657. We remand for the BIA to determine whether the government can do so.

Id. (stating elements of future persecution). Because the BIA’s internal

relocation finding placed the burden on Singh, we remand so the BIA may

“conduct a thorough, individualized analysis of [Singh’s] ability to relocate

internally,” this time “placing the burden on the government.” See id. at 658

(citation omitted).

      2. The agency concluded that because Singh did not show he was eligible

for asylum, he was not eligible for withholding of removal. The same issues

                                        5
that require remand of the asylum claim thus require remand of the withholding

claim.

         3. The BIA denied Singh’s humanitarian asylum claim. See Singh v.

Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 661–62 (9th Cir. 2019) (stating elements of a

humanitarian asylum claim). Because Singh’s humanitarian asylum claim

requires him to show, in relevant part, past persecution or “a reasonable

possibility that [he] may suffer other serious harm upon removal” to India, id.

(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)), we remand for the BIA to reconsider

this issue on the same grounds outlined above.

         4. The agency denied Singh’s CAT claim on the ground that he failed to

show the Indian government would torture him or acquiesce in any torture

committed by third parties. See Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175,

1183–84 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating elements of a CAT claim). Because Singh’s

CAT claim relies on the same evidence as his asylum and withholding of

removal claims, we also remand for the BIA to reconsider this claim. See, e.g.,

Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1076 (remanding CAT claim after determining

petitioner suffered past persecution).

         Each party shall bear its own costs for this petition for review.

         GRANTED AND REMANDED.

                                           6
                                                                           FILED
Singh v. Garland, 21-1104                                                   MAY 2 2023
                                                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
CLIFTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:                                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

       I respectfully dissent. “To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the

evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.” Dong v. Garland, 50

F.4th 1291, 1300 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and alteration omitted). The majority

reverses the finding of the agency that Singh failed to establish that he suffered

past persecution on account of a protected ground, but the evidence does not

compel the majority’s conclusion.

       To begin, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Singh

failed to demonstrate his harm amounted to past persecution. Although the IJ

found Singh credible, the BIA noted that he “did not describe in any significant

detail the extent of his injuries” related to the two 2013 attacks. The record

supports this finding, and because Singh’s testimony was vague and speculative, I

am not compelled to find past persecution. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014,

1017–18, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying a petition for review in which the BIA

found no past persecution even though the petitioner was “detained at a police

station for three days” and beaten “approximately ten times,” but “required no

medical treatment”); cf. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2010)

(noting that the “level of detail” in a petitioner’s testimony is relevant to evaluating

credibility).

                                           1
       Even assuming Singh experienced sufficient harm, he failed to show the

harm “was committed by . . . forces that the government was unable or unwilling

to control.” See Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)).

The record does not show that Singh provided the police with “sufficiently specific

information to permit an investigation” or to arrest his attackers. See Doe v.

Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Because Singh failed to provide the

police with crucial details, including the political affiliation of his attackers and

circumstances surrounding the two attacks, the police’s failure to investigate does

not show the government was unable or unwilling to protect him. Cf. Singh v.

I.N.S., 134 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the police responded to

petitioner, but “took no further action” perhaps “due to a lack of suspects, few

leads, etc.”).

       Moreover, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Singh

failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Sharma v.

Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1065 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that a petitioner may show a

well-founded fear of future persecution even if a petitioner fails to show past

persecution). I am not compelled by the record to conclude that Singh would be

unable to relocate internally in India. See I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12,

18 (2002) (stating that an applicant’s ability to safely relocate to another part of his

                                            2
home country renders asylum unavailable). First, the record does not demonstrate

that Singh would be viewed as a traitor by the Indian government upon his return.

The agency properly relied upon country condition evidence to show the Indian

government is unlikely to misuse biometric data under the guise of national

security. Second, the record affirms the agency’s conclusion that Singh’s

relocation to a community within India and away from his attackers would be as, if

not less, burdensome as relocation to the United States. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (stating standard). Accordingly, Singh is not eligible for

asylum based on past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.

      The agency therefore properly denied Singh’s withholding of removal and

humanitarian asylum claims on similar grounds as his asylum claim—making

remand unnecessary. See Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066 (holding failure to meet the

“lesser burden” of asylum eligibility results in failure to meet the withholding

burden) (citation omitted); Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 661–62 (9th Cir. 2019)

(noting humanitarian asylum requires either “past persecution” or “a reasonable

possibility that he . . . may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country”

(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii))).

      Similarly, remand is not needed where substantial evidence supports the

agency’s denial of CAT protection. Torture is “an extreme form of cruel and

inhuman punishment” that is “more severe than persecution” and must be

                                            3
“inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public

official.” Salguero Sosa v. Garland, 55 F.4th 1213, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2022)

(internal citations omitted). Singh testified that Congress Party supporters beat and

kicked him, threatened him with death, and caused him to require medical

treatment. Such harm, if fully credited, is serious but does not rise to the level of

torture. And, because Singh did not show that Indian authorities would be unable

or unwilling to protect him, the record cannot support a clear probability of torture

with the acquiescence of the government. Thus, the evidence does not indicate “a

particularized threat of torture” to Singh. See Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822,

840 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

      For these reasons, I would deny the petition.

                                           4