Court Opinion

ID: 9644174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:49:24.793658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:09.345612
License: Public Domain

Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent to the majority’s holding that the trial court’s ruling to suppress seized evidence was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. In granting the motion to suppress, the trial court describes the affidavit for a search warrant as “boilerplate,” and “over-broad,” which it is, and noted in particular “that there are basically just two conclusory statements about the reliability of the C.I.” and that “the Court really feels that more can be done on that.” It is obvious that the court’s remarks were directed toward the fact that the affiant did not set forth any particular facts as to the informant’s reliability. Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.1(b) provides in pertinent part: “If an affidavit or testimony is based in whole or part on hearsay, the affiant or witness shall set forth particular facts on . . .” (Emphasis added.) The record is devoid of any statement or proof in this regard. To overcome this requirement, the majority relies on the additional language contained in Rule 13.1(b) which states: Failure of the affidavit or testimony to establish the veracity and bases of knowledge of persons providing information to affiant shall not require that the application be denied, if the affidavit or testimony viewed as a whole, provides a substantial basis for a finding of reasonable cause to believe that things subject to seizure will be found in a particular place. Based on my examination of both the “boilerplate” and written portion of the affidavit for a search warrant, I cannot accept the fact that this document provides a substantial basis for. the finding of reasonable cause to issue the warrant in question. Even though we make an independent determination of the correctness of the trial court’s ruling based on the totality of the circumstances, we can only reverse the trial court if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee, State v. Villines, 304 Ark. 128, 801 S.W.2d 29 (1990), we determine the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). I not only join the trial court’s concern over the use of a boilerplate form of affidavit with nothing more than conclusory statements about the reliability of the confidential informant -1 am especially troubled in my examination of the record as I find that all of the written insertions on both the affidavit for a search warrant and the warrant itself seem to have been written by the same person. This strongly suggests that the search warrant was based not upon the judicial officer’s findings as required by Rule 13.1, but rather upon the findings of the party seeking the warrant. As mentioned in the majority opinion, no record was made of any information which may have been presented to the issuing magistrate. At most, we have for our consideration an affidavit for a search warrant and the warrant itself which is attached to this opinion. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, as we must do, I can only reiterate that I do not think the ruling of the trial court was clearly against a preponderance of the evidence before him. I would affirm.