Court Opinion

ID: 9399348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 17:09:40.493541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:09.640834
License: Public Domain

J-S13022-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CURTIS RODNEY JONES                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1647 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 2, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
                  Criminal Division at CP-23-CR-0001758-2002

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                 FILED JUNE 2, 2023

        Curtis Rodney Jones (Appellant) appeals pro se from the dismissal of

the third petition he filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

        The PCRA court summarized the case history as follows:

               [O]n April 15, 2002, Appellant was arrested and charged
        with murder in the first degree for killing his roommate, Abdul
        Sesay, on Widener University’s campus in Chester, PA. Following
        the reports of multiple gunshots, police located the victim’s body
        lying in a pool of blood, punctured with five gunshot wounds and
        police identified the victim. Appellant confessed to drinking
        alcohol and smoking marijuana prior to the incident. Police
        obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s dorm room and found
        the victim’s cell phone, which had blood matching the victim.
        After receiving an anonymous tip, police recovered the murder
        weapon from a lake located behind Appellant’s mother’s house in
        New Jersey.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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             On July 27, 2005, following a jury trial, Appellant was found
      guilty of the crimes [of] murder in the first degree and robbery.

            On September 7, 2005, the court imposed judgment of
      sentence upon Appellant for the murder of the first-degree
      conviction to confinement in a State Correctional Facility for a
      term of life without parole, and for the robbery conviction to
      confinement in a State Correctional Facility for a minimum term
      of 66 months to a maximum term of 132 months consecutive to
      the judgment of sentence for the murder conviction.

             Since the date judgment of sentence was imposed,
      Appellant has engaged in continuous litigation resulting in a
      voluminous, nearly unmanageable record. On January 17, 2019,
      this court filed an opinion explaining the dismissal of Appellant’s
      second untimely PCRA petition. On July 8, 2019[, the] Superior
      Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. On August 6, 2019, Appellant
      filed a petition for Allowance of Appeal. On February 19, 2020[,
      the] Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied the petition.

             On November 30, 2020, Appellant filed a third pro se
      Petition for Post Conviction Collateral Relief. On March 9, 2022,
      PCRA counsel filed a no merit letter and motion for leave to
      withdraw appearance; on March 29, 2022, Appellant’s “March 18,
      2022 letter to Judge Cappelli” concerning the no merit letter was
      filed.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/16/22, at 1-3 (footnote omitted).

      As noted, Appellant previously filed two unsuccessful PCRA petitions.

On April 13, 2022, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s

current petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.      The PCRA court dismissed

Appellant’s petition on June 2, 2022. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of

appeal on June 21, 2022. Although the PCRA court did not order Appellant to

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, the PCRA court filed an opinion on August

16, 2022.

      Appellant presents two related issues:

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      I.    Whether the PCRA Court erred when it opined that trial
            counsel was not ineffective for raising a voluntary
            intoxication defense or requesting the instruction in
            violation of Appellant’s rights pursuant to the Pennsylvania’s
            [sic] and the United States Constitution.

      II.   Whether the PCRA Court erred when it opined that the trial
            court did not err when it gave the aforementioned voluntary
            intoxication instruction in violation of Appellant’s rights
            pursuant to the Pennsylvania’s [sic] and the United States
            Constitution.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      Appellant discusses his two issues together. See id. at 9-13. Appellant

asserts his trial counsel “introduced an incompatible defense, voluntary

intoxication, at the closing of his argument … after arguing an innocence

defense the entire trial.” Id. at 8. Appellant claims trial counsel’s actions “left

the jury considering Appellant’s guilt since his attorney conceded criminal

liability and the trial court’s instructions supported that conclusion.”       Id.

Appellant contends he was “prejudiced by trial counsel’s actions due to its

confusing presentation.” Id. at 11.

      The Commonwealth counters:

      [Appellant’s] third PCRA petition was properly dismissed as
      untimely because he filed it ten years after his judgment of
      sentence became final and did not prove any statutory exception
      to the time bar. Although he claims that he did not receive a copy
      of the jury instructions transcript until 2020, he repeatedly cited
      to it in a pro se filing in 2011. The “missing” volume was also
      cited repeatedly by the Commonwealth and this Court in prior
      proceedings. Regardless, [Appellant] was present during his own
      trial, so he should have been aware since the time of trial of what
      jury instructions were given.

Commonwealth Brief at 10.

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      We review “the PCRA court’s findings of fact to determine whether they

are supported by the record, and ... its conclusions of law to determine

whether they are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d

294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). Pertinently, “Pennsylvania law makes

clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.”

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003)).

      “A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). A petitioner must file a PCRA petition

within one year of the judgment becoming final unless a statutory exception

applies.     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).       The three exceptions are: “(1)

interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly

discovered    facts;   and   (3)   an   after-recognized   constitutional   right.”

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012); see

also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). A petitioner invoking an exception must

do so within a year of the date the claim could have been presented.            42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). If a petitioner fails to invoke a valid exception, the

court lacks jurisdiction to review the petition or provide relief. Spotz, 171

A.3d at 676. If a petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction

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over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority    to   address    the    substantive   claims.”      Commonwealth       v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

       Appellant concedes his PCRA petition is untimely. He states he “is aware

that in order for it to succeed, it has to meet certain requirements set by 42

Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).”       Appellant’s Brief at 12.     Appellant claims he

meets the newly discovered facts exception set forth in subsection

9545(b)(1)(ii). Id. Appellant asserts he was unaware of his claims related to

voluntary intoxication and “was first made aware of the jury instruction in

question” when he obtained his trial transcript.             Id. at 9.   According to

Appellant, he requested the trial transcript on November 29, 2018, but did not

receive it until sometime “between January 2020 and September 2020.” Id.

Appellant states that “it wasn’t until after I received my 7/27/2005 trial

transcript that I became aware of this erroneous jury instruction.” Id. at 12.

We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument.1

       The PCRA court specified that Appellant’s judgment of sentence became

final on October 4, 2010, and the “time to file a timely PCRA petition expired

October 4, 2011.”           PCRA Court Opinion, 8/16/22, at 5.             See also

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s pro se status “does not entitle him to any advantage.” See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citations omitted).

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Commonwealth Brief at 8 (stating Appellant’s judgment of sentence “became

final on October 4, 2010, when the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari.”). Contrary to his claim, Appellant has failed to plead and prove a

newly discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Critically, Appellant

does not explain why he did not seek to review the trial transcript until 2018,

after his direct appeal and first two PCRA petitions had been decided.2 In

addition, we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant would have been

aware of any issue concerning jury instructions, as Appellant was present

during his trial.3

       This Court and the PCRA court lack jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s

untimely third PCRA petition. Derrickson, supra. Therefore, no relief is due.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

2As the Commonwealth observes, Appellant cited the transcript in a 2011 pro
se filing, the Commonwealth cited the transcript “during the initial PCRA
proceedings” in 2012, and this Court cited the transcript in affirming the denial
of PCRA relief the following year. See Commonwealth Brief at 9-10 (citing
Commonwealth v. Jones, 82 A.3d 1080 (Pa. Super. July 29, 2013)
(unpublished memorandum)).

3 Further, “in an abundance of caution,” the PCRA court explained it had
reviewed the record and “concluded Appellant did not prove … trial counsel
was ineffective for raising a voluntary intoxication defense or for requesting
the instruction: the instruction was not given to the jury in error and it was
not confusing.” PCRA Court Opinion, 8/16/22, at 5-6 (citing Commonwealth
v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987)).

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/2/2023

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