Court Opinion

ID: 9773711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:55:56.470378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:56.643299
License: Public Domain

LEE, Justice,
dissenting.
Because we are bound by the previous decisions of this court, I respectfully dissent. In Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ), a Texas resident sued an Illinois corporation in Texas for damages arising out of an accident in Louisiana. This court held that the foreign corporation that was authorized to do business in Texas and maintained a registered agent for service in Texas consented to the jurisdiction of a Texas court. Id. Noting the theory of consent was implicit in article 8.10 of the Texas Business Corporation Act, this court explicitly rejected the defendant foreign corporation’s argument that due process considerations precluded amenability to jurisdiction by consent. Id. According to the court, “the rationale behind the theory of consent is that in return for the privilege of doing business in the state and enjoying the same rights and privileges of a domestic corporation [under article 8.02 of the Business Coloration Act], the foreign corporation has consented to amenability to jurisdiction for purposes of all lawsuits within the state.” Id.
The holding in Goldman was followed in Acacia Pipeline Corp. v. Champlin Exploration, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ). There, a Texas corporation sued a Delaware corporation in Texas for breach of a gas purchase contract made in Oklahoma. 769 S.W.2d at 720. Citing Goldman and noting that “consent as a basis of jurisdiction in an in person-am suit has long been recognized,” the court held that a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Texas and maintaining an agent for service in Texas, consented to in personam jurisdiction. Id.
I am aware of the contrary holding by the Fifth Circuit in Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 181-83 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080, 113 S.Ct. 1047, 122 L.Ed.2d 356 (1993). Relying on Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining *421Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952), the court in Wenche Siemer held that a foreign corporation which properly complies with the Texas registration statute consents to jurisdiction only where such jurisdiction is “constitutionally permissible” and that the qualification to do business in Texas is of “no special weight in evaluating general personal jurisdiction.” First of all, we are not bound by the pronouncements of the Fifth Circuit.1 See Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.1993); see also Mohamed v. Exxon Corp., 796 S.W.2d 751, 753-54 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied). Second, the court’s analysis in Wenche Siemer completely ignores Goldman and Acacia. This is evident by the court’s statement that “no Texas state court decision has held that [section 8.10 of the Texas Business Coloration Act] acts as a consent to jurisdiction over a corporation in a case such as ours — that is, where plaintiffs are nonresidents and defendant is not conducting substantial activity within the state.” 966 F.2d at 183.
Third, the court’s reliance on Perkins is misplaced. In Perkins, the president of a foreign corporation that engaged in continuous and systematic activities in the forum state was served while present in the state. 342 U.S. at 438-40, 72 S.Ct. at 414-15. Because the cause of action did not arise in the forum state or relate to the corporation’s business in the state, the Supreme Court examined the nature of the coloration’s contacts in the state. Id. at 438-40, 72 S.Ct at 415. Based on those contacts, the Court held that the due process clause did not prohibit the exercise of general in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 448-50, 72 S.Ct. at 420. In reaching that conclusion, the Court explained “the corporate activities of a foreign corporation which, under state statute, made it necessary for it to secure a license and designate a statutory agent upon whom process may be served provide a helpful but not conclusive test.” Id. at 445, 72 S.Ct. at 418. The Court’s explanation of why it chose to examine the corporation’s contacts was necessary only because the foreign corporation did not consent to jurisdiction by registering to do business in the forum state and designating an agent for service process there. See id. at 440 n. 2,72 S.Ct. at 415 n. 2.
Similarly, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 411, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1870-71, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984), the court examined the foreign corporation’s contacts only because the foreign corporation was not authorized to do business and had not designated an agent for service in the forum state. Thus, I am not persuaded that Goldman is inconsistent with that precedent. As the plurality correctly observes, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that consent to jurisdiction is a viable doctrine. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2182 n. 14, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); see also Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-04, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2105, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982).
Indeed, I would agree with the Conners that the Court had the opportunity to dispense with the doctrine of consent, but chose not to in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 108 S.Ct. 2218, 100 L.Ed.2d 896 (1988). That case involved an Ohio statute that tolled limitations for any period a person or corporation was not “present” in the state. 486 U.S. at 888-89, 108 S.Ct. at 2219-20. Looking at Ohio’s broad statutory scheme, the Court observed that “to be present in Ohio, a foreign corporation must appoint an agent for service, which operates as a consent to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts.” Id. at 889,108 S.Ct. at 2220. The Court held the Ohio tolling statute placed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce because it forced the defendant, a foreign corporation, to chose between exposure to the general jurisdiction of Ohio courts (by appointing an agent for service and thus being present in the state) and forfeiture of the limitations defense (by not appointing an agent and thus remaining “absent” from the state), thereby remaining subject to suit in Ohio in perpetuity. Id. at 891,108 S.Ct. at 2221. Thus, the *422Court could not have held the statute constitutionally infirmed if it had not implicitly recognized that a foreign corporation can consent to the general jurisdiction of a forum state by registering an agent for service in that state. Therefore, while we are certainly bound by U.S. Supreme Court precedent, I disagree with the plurality’s conclusion that Goldman conflicts with binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
According to the doctrine of stare decisis, after a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court or the highest court of the State having jurisdiction of the particular case, the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties. Swilley v. McCain, 874 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex.1964) I am not persuaded that this case poses one of those “rare occasions” when stare decisis should be ignored. See Dawkins v. Meyer, 825 S.W.2d 444, 454 (Tex.1992) (J. Gonzalez dissenting) (noting that there are “rare occasions” when “[tjhere are justifiable escapes and liberations from the rigidities and inflexibilities of stare decisis ”). Rather, the facts and legal issues presented in this case are substantially the same as those resolved in Goldman. Therefore, I would hold that the doctrine of stare decisis requires us to adhere to the holding in Goldman. See Lester v. First Am. Bank, 866 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.App. — Waco 1993, writ denied) (holding that “doctrine of stare deci-sis only applies if the facts on which the prior case is founded are substantially the same as those in the subsequent suit”).2 Accordingly, I would hold that ContiCarriers, by registering to do business in Texas and maintaining an agent for service in Texas, consented to the jurisdiction of a Texas court.
I would sustain the Conners’ points of error, reverse the trial court’s order, and remand for a trial on the merits.

. Nor are we bound to follow the pronouncements of our fellow appellate court in Juarez v. United Parcel Service, 933 S.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1996, n.w.h.), which chose to rely on Wenche Siemer.

. Even if we were not bound by stare decisis, I remain unconvinced that ContiCarriers’ lacks the minimum contacts necessary to establish general in personam jurisdiction as determined by the plurality.