Court Opinion

ID: 9493734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:17:17.04469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:00.048325
License: Public Domain

LAY, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The issue before us is one interpreting the Oregon disability statute. The Oregon law is to “be construed to the extent possible in a manner *1095that is consistent with any similar provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act.”1 Or.Rev.Stat. § 659.449. However, the Oregon appellate courts specifically reject the federal burden-shifting scheme applied by the majority in this ease.2 See Henderson v. Jantzen, Inc., 79 Or.App. 654, 719 P.2d 1322, 1323-24 (1986). (“A plaintiffs prima facie case [for employment discrimination] does not disappear merely because a defendant asserts a nondiscriminatory reason which may or may not persuade the trier of fact.”). Because the two statutes are different, this case does not present an issue of whether the state or federal burden of proof should be applied. It seems axiomatic that in applying the Oregon statute we need to apply Oregon law which interprets that statute. In other words, it is incongruous for a federal court to dismiss a prima facie case made under the Oregon disability statute based on a burden of proof paradigm designed for disparate treatment cases brought under a totally different statutory scheme. See Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 100 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (7th Cir.1996). Erie and Byrd both teach us that we simply exchange courtrooms, not law, in deciding diversity cases. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 78 S.Ct. 893, 2 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958). In this case, I am not aware of any federal policy such as those discussed in the majority opinion which should override application of the Oregon law in a diversity case.
Furthermore, applying McDonnell Douglas principles to the facts of this case seems to be a complete non sequitur. This is not a disparate treatment case of the sort which the McDonnell Douglas burden of proof is designed to govern. Snead does not contend that other employees who were similarly situated were treated more favorably than her. Snead simply claims that she has a disability but is still qualified to work with or without accommodation.
Thus, even if the Oregon law parallels the ADA, the facts of this case do not fit within the McDonnell Douglas framework. Rather, the language of the ADA sets the threshold Snead must meet in order to defeat summary judgment. Snead must establish that (1) she is disabled; (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions *1096of the job, either with or without accommodation; and (3) she was terminated by-reason of her disability. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). If the employee cannot show a genuine issue of material fact on any of the three prongs, summary judgment is appropriate.
As for the first prong, I agree with that part of the majority’s opinion that finds there is a genuine issue of disputed fact as to whether Snead is disabled.
The second prong of Snead’s prima facie case requires a two-part showing. First, Snead must demonstrate that she meets the necessary prerequisites for the job. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); cf. Or.Rev.Stat. § 659.436(2)(e). Met concedes that Snead is qualified to perform the essential functions of the MDM position that she held prior to her leave of absence. Next, Snead must show that she can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); cf. Or.Rev.Stat. § 659.436(2)(e). Unlike many ADA claimants, Snead did not ask Met to alter her job in a way that would accommodate her disability. Snead was prepared to return to her MDM position without any modifications to the job as it was before she went on leave. In other words, she simply asked Met for her old job back. At this point she has shown that she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the MDM position with or without accommodation.
However, by the time Snead was prepared to return to work, Met had for business reasons eliminated her former MDM position and thus, could not restore her to that job. The court will not interfere with Met’s business judgment to institute a reduction-in-force unless that action runs afoul of the law. See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Harrah’s Club, 337 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir.1964). Yet this fact in itself is not fatal to Snead's ability to establish a causal link between her disability and Met’s actions. Snead does not claim a right to the particular MDM position she formerly held, nor could she under either federal or Oregon law. See Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 540 (9th Cir.1997); Winnett v. City of Portland, 118 Or.App. 437, 847 P.2d 902, 907 (1993). But assuming Snead can prove that she was disabled, before Met can terminate her it must try to provide other reasonable accommodation or employment opportunities. Met did just that by presenting Snead with three options. First, it offered her continued employment out of the Seattle office, albeit at a lesser position than the one she previously held. Second, Met offered a similar MDM position at a different geographic location. Finally, because her former position had been eliminated from the company, Met offered Snead a severance package. In the end, Met terminated Snead when her request for further information about these alternatives arrived too late. That excuse belies Met’s sincerity in offering Snead continued employment with the company.3
Assuming that the Oregon disability statute, like the ADA, recognizes the need for parties to engage in a good-faith interactive process to arrive at a reasonable accommodation, then it seems to me there is a gap in the majority’s analysis that still leaves this matter unresolved.4 As this *1097court has held, “[t]he interactive process is triggered either by a request for accommodation by a disabled employee or by the employer’s recognition of the need for such an accommodation.” Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1112. The interactive process is mandatory at this point and requires “good-faith exploration of possible accommodations between employers and individual employees.” See id. at 1114. It is then the employer’s burden to show that a proposed accommodation will cause undue hardship. See id. at 1113. Thus, in light of Snead’s proof and Met’s offer of accommodation, there is still missing a good-faith interactive process which should be available to both parties to attempt to resolve any differences. Under the foregoing analysis, the issue of pretext, which is addressed by the McDonnell Douglas framework, is subsumed by the issue of reasonable accommodation. Once a party shows she suffers from a disability but is qualified to carry on work with or without accommodation, the issue becomes whether the employer has entered into a good-faith interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation. The question is whether the accommodation is reasonable and will not cause the employer undue hardship. Pretext should never be an issue in an ADA analysis. Pretext relates to an employer’s subjective motivation. Reasonable accommodation relates to an objective analysis of whether other jobs are available which the employee is qualified to do.
Nevertheless, the elimination of Snead’s job, for whatever reason, does not preclude further inquiry under the ADA. To survive summary judgment Snead must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties engaged in a good-faith interactive process aimed at reasonable accommodation. If no other jobs exist, then the inquiry ends because it is impossible under the circumstances for an employer to accommodate the employee. An employer is not required to undertake undue hardship in accommodating a disabled employee. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10); cf. Kellogg v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 233 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that under the ADA “an employer is not required to make accommodations that would subvert other, more qualified applicants for the job.”); Or.Rev. Stat. § 659.436(2)(e). But that is not the situation here. Met has sought to reasonably accommodate Snead by offering her various alternatives. By its own actions Met has shown that these offers for accommodations do not pose an undue hardship on its business.
Accordingly, I fail to see how the McDonnell Douglas framework for disparate treatment cases relates in any way to the facts of the present case. Here, notwithstanding the elimination of Snead’s previous position, Met, at least initially, made an effort to accommodate her. There is no issue of pretext lurking in that. The sole issue that remains is whether Met and Snead have engaged in a good-faith interactive process to determine whether reasonable accommodation is feasible. Without the clarification requested by the plaintiff, it seems to me that there exists an evidentiary gap that needs to be filled before this case can be decided.
I would therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

. Notably, the statutory language of the Oregon law is phrased much differently than that of the ADA. The Oregon law states that "[i]t is an unlawful employment practice for any employer to ... discharge from employment ... an otherwise qualified person [because such person] is a disabled person.” Or.Rev.Stat. § 659.436(1) (1999). The ADA states that an employer “shall [not] discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... discharge of employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applied by the majority was fashioned by the Supreme Court to analyze claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-06, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The Court has explained that "[t]he McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court ... to [the] ultimate question [of whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff]” in violation of Title VII. Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Accordingly, once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its allegedly discriminatory actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the employer does so, the prima facie case disappears and the employee must then show that the employer's proffered reasons were pretext for discrimination. See id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817.
In contrast, the ADA was designed "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards” to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2). As such, unless disparate treatment with others similarly situated is alleged, there is no statutory avenue under the ADA for an employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions or for an employee to show that the employer’s reason was pretextual.

. "A few hours’ tardiness should not be the reason for cutting off the interactive process and cutting off a person's rights under the ADA.” Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1286.

. An employer commits unlawful discrimination under the ADA if the employer does "not mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the employer].” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); cf. Or.Rev.Stat. § 659.436(2)(e). The ADA’s regulations state that: "To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the [employee] with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the *1097precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). See also Taylor v. Phoenuville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 156-165 (3d Cir. 1999).