Court Opinion

ID: 9914019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 14:08:51.967894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:52.883177
License: Public Domain

J-A24023-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                    :
                v.                                  :
                                                    :
                                                    :
    DANIEL J. SALINAS                               :
                                                    :
                       Appellant                    :   No. 1032 EDA 2023

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-52-SA-0000046-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                 FILED DECEMBER 28, 2023

       Appellant, Daniel Salinas, appeals from the March 8, 2023, judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County following his

conviction for Harassment.1 Appellant challenges the sufficiency and weight

of the evidence underlying his conviction.2 After careful review, we vacate

Appellant’s Harassment conviction.

                                               A.

       We glean the following facts and procedural history from the certified

record. Appellant, Appellant’s father Ramon, and victim Joseph DiPietro live

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(3).

2 We note that Appellant’s father Ramon Salinas has also appealed his
Harassment conviction arising from the same incident. His case is before this
Court at Docket Number 866 EDA 2023.
J-A24023-23

in the same gated community. Appellant lives next door to Mr. DiPietro, while

his father lives a half-mile away.

      On the morning of May 9, 2022, Mr. DiPietro was jogging around the

lake in the community, while Appellant’s father was driving with Appellant in

the car.   At approximately 11:47 AM, Appellant and his father passed Mr.

DiPietro. After passing him, Appellant’s father turned around and drove past

him again a minute and a half later. When they passed Mr. DiPietro the second

time, Appellant’s father yelled, “you should sell your F’ing house and move,

this is only going to get worse for you and your family.” Appellant then yelled,

“you better move or I will F your daughter in the A.” N.T. Trial, 3/8/23, at 6.

      Mr. DiPietro called the police, and Pennsylvania State Trooper Bradley

Emerick responded. After speaking with Mr. DiPietro, Trooper Emerick issued

citations for Harassment to both Appellant and his father.

      After a proceeding on August 18, 2022, a magistrate judge convicted

both Appellant and his father of Harassment, a summary offense.            Both

appealed, which entitled them to a trial de novo in the Court of Common Pleas.

They proceeded to a consolidated bench trial on March 8, 2023.

      At trial, Mr. DiPietro and Trooper Emmerick testified in accordance with

the above facts. Appellant and his father also testified. During his testimony,

Appellant’s father stated that he was driving Appellant to work in Appellant’s

SUV. He testified that they saw Mr. DiPietro jogging, but that they did not

speak to him. Appellant’s testimony confirmed his father’s account.

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        The Court of Common Pleas convicted both Appellant and his father of

Harassment. The same day, the court sentenced Appellant to pay a fine of

$300.

                                        B.

        Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. Both he and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

        Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

        I. Did the Commonwealth fail to produce sufficient evidence to
        support the Harassment conviction where it failed to establish that
        [Appellant] committed a series of acts to support the “course of
        conduct” element of the Harassment charge?

        II. Was the conviction against the weight of the evidence where
        evidence was produced that [Appellant] was not near Joseph
        DiPietro at the time the alleged harassment occurred?

Appellant’s Br. at 4.

                                        C.

        Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

Harassment conviction.        In addressing this challenge, our well-settled

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is limited to the

evidence admitted at trial viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner.        Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d

416, 420-21 (Pa. 2014). We determine “whether the evidence at trial, and all

reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish

all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v.

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May, 887 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 2005). The Commonwealth “can meet its burden

by wholly circumstantial evidence[.]” Commonwealth v. Benito, 133 A.3d

333, 335 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

       The factfinder, “while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight of the evidence[,] is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017).                 “In

conducting this review, the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and

substitute its judgment for the fact[]finder.” Id.

       Instantly, to sustain a conviction for Harassment, the Commonwealth

must prove that the defendant, “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another,

the person: engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which

serve no legitimate purpose.”3 18 Pa.C.S. 2709(a)(3).

       A course of conduct is a “pattern of actions composed of more than one

act over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of conduct.

The term includes . . . threatening or obscene words . . . or actions[.]” 18

Pa.C.S. 2709(f).      A course of conduct “is more than an isolated verbal or

physical act.    It is a pattern of conduct composed of same or similar acts

repeated over a period of time, however short, which establishes a continuity

of purpose in the mind of the actor.” Commonwealth v. Tedesco, 550 A.2d

796, 799–800 (Pa. Super. 1988) (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S.§2709(a)(3), the subsection of Harassment charged in this case,

is the only subsection of the Harassment offense that requires proof of a
course of conduct.

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                                       *

      Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to

establish a course of conduct.     Appellant’s Br. at 12-17.    In support, he

maintains that he only took a single action, making one statement to Mr.

DiPietro, which does not constitute a course of conduct. Id. at 14. Finally,

he maintains that the “mere act of being a passenger in a vehicle driving past

Joseph DiPietro was a separate innocuous act” that did not establish a course

of conduct. Id. at 14. We agree.

      Our review of the record indicates that the Commonwealth’s evidence,

believed by the trial court, establishes that the only action Appellant took was

shouting one reprehensible threat at Mr. DiPietro. N.T. Trial at 6. Appellant,

as the passenger, was not the one who turned the car around to pass Mr.

DiPietro a second time. Pursuant to the legal authority cited above, one action

does not equate to a “course of conduct” so as to sustain a Harassment

conviction.

      The Commonwealth has, thus, failed to prove an element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt and the evidence was insufficient as a matter of

                                     -5-
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law to sustain Appellant's conviction.              Accordingly, we vacate Appellant's

Harassment conviction.4, 5

                                               D.

       In sum, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain

Appellant’s conviction for Harassment.              Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s

conviction and the judgment of sentence.

       Conviction vacated. Judgment of Sentence vacated.                   Jurisdiction

relinquished.

____________________________________________

4  The Commonwealth argues that this Court should affirm Appellant’s
conviction based on a theory of accomplice liability. Specifically, it maintains
that we should impute liability for his father’s actions—turning the car around
to pass Mr. DiPietro a second time and shouting his own threat—to Appellant.
Commonwealth’s Br. at 9. However, the Commonwealth raised this theory for
the first time on appeal and failed to present any evidence supporting it at
trial. Specifically, the Commonwealth presented no evidence that Appellant
solicited or aided his father’s conduct of driving past Mr. DiPietro a second
time or shouting a threat and no evidence that either Appellant or his father
“intended to aid or promote the underlying offense of [H]arassment of the
other.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c); Commonwealth v.
Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 415 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted) (explaining that
a person is an accomplice, and “equally criminally liable for the acts of
another[,] if he acts with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission
of an offense and agrees, aids, or attempts to aid such other person in either
planning or committing that offense.”); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844
A.2d 1228, 1234 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted) (explaining that to establish
accomplice liability, there must be evidence that the defendant was not merely
present, but rather (1) “intended to aid or promote the underlying offense”
and (2) “actively participated in the crime by soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to
aid the principal.”).

5 In light of our disposition, we decline to address Appellant’s second issue
raising a challenge to the weight of the evidence.

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Date: 12/28/2023

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