Court Opinion

ID: 6582161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 19:39:09.896584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:56:57.610824
License: Public Domain

Pardee, J.
The defendants with sundry other persons associated themselves under the name of the Bridgeport Cooperative Association, an unincorporated trading association. They established a meat market. Their purpose was to buy at wholesale, and to retail to any person who would buy, regardless of membership, and to the members at such a price as would relieve them from paying at least one middleman’s profit. Each member contributed something to the starting fund, the amount determined by himself. No profits were anticipated beyond payment of the expenses of management. The members held meetings and elected officers; these employed managers to conduct the business; these last bought and sold, paying the receipts to the treasurer. *112One of the defendants was president, the other treasurer. Upon request of the managers the plaintiffs sold merchandise to the association; this suit is for the price thereof.
It did not otherwise appear than Rom the above facts that any of the members of the association ever held themselves out as partners, or as being liable as individuals, for the obligations of the association; or that the plaintiffs or any other persons ever gave credit to them, either as individuals or as partners; or that the members entered into any agreement of co-partnership among themselves; or into any agreement or understanding by which they or any of them should become personally liable for the debts of the association. The defendants claimed that they were not liable either as individuals or as co-partners.
The determination of the controversy as to the liabilty of the defendants depends not at all upon the question whether they and the other associated individuals were partners as between themselves; nor upon the question whether as between all of the associates and strangers they were such; but upon the law of agency. If the defendants clothed an agent with unrestricted authority to buy, they must pay, regardless of the other questions.
Upon the record the defendants, with others undisclosed, associated themselves for commercial purposes, for their pecuniary advantage. For convenience they transacted business under an assumed associate name ; sent their managers and agents into the market with unrestricted authority to buy goods and pledge their credit under that name; to buy for the benefit of all jointly and of each individually. In the due execution of the authority conferred upon them they contracted the debt in suit and pledged the joint and several credit of the associates. As a matter of law the plaintiffs, in giving credit to the associate name, gave credit to the individuals whom upon inquiry should be found to stand behind it.
It is of no legal significance that the defendants did not intend to be individually responsible, or that they did not know or believe that as a matter of law they would be, or *113that they intended that jhe_gopds^hen_bpnght should become the property of the association. Having given to the agent unrestricted authority to buy, their secret intent as to the ultimate destination of the merchandise is of no avail. The rule that he who instructs his agent to buy can be made to pay, stands quite independent of intent or knowledge; he who buys by an agent buys by himself, and the law imputes to him knowledge that he must pay, and the corresponding intent to pay, for what he buys.
The statute permits individuals to unite under a distinguishing associate name for trading purposes; but they do not thereby acquire either corporate powers or immunity from individual liability. If they choose so to do they can institute a suit for the common benefit in the assumed name; also they may be made defendants under the same name. If the latter, execution will go against common property of the association as such and not against individual property. If, disregarding the fact and form of association, the suit is against all of the individuals, execution will go against the individual property of any. A suit may be instituted against them as individuals, as at common law, if the plaintiff will take the risk of naming all and of naming them correctly. If he names only a part of those who should be named, a plea in abatement may be interposed specifying omitted names; if no such plea is interposed those who are named are properly sued and must submit to judgment. If the associated persons send an agent into the market with unlimited authority to make purchases and contract debts in the name and for the benefit of the association, and the agent discloses the name of the association and not the names of the individuals composing it, the creditor may, if he is content to look only to the property of the association as such for his security, institute his action against the association by its distinguishing name. If he desires to reach the individual property of members he must institute his suit against such and so many of them as he can name, as individuals; he may do this even if the sale was made and the credit given in form to the association and the name of *114no individual member was then known to him. He may do this for the reason that he gave credit upon the request of a known agent for an unknown principal. By operation of law the credit was to the principal from the beginning, to be enforced ivhenever he can be discovered.
There is error in the judgment complained of.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.