Court Opinion

ID: 9763692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:52:28.191851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:48.357300
License: Public Domain

KAUFFMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
The sole issue presented here is whether a general pay-tax clause, which would have relieved a testator’s divorced spouse of all tax liability on the share of his estate to which she would have been entitled if all bequests to her had not become ineffective by operation of law, has been revoked in toto by reason of the divorce. The court en banc answered in the negative. I agree and would affirm.
Though paying lipservice to section 2507(2) of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, Act of June 30, 1972, P.L. 508, No. 164, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2507(2), the majority, by focusing solely on the testator’s presumed intent at the time he executed his will, effectively ignores the statute and the General Assembly’s intent in enacting it. Section 2507(2) provides for modification of a will by operation of law upon divorce of a testator:
*275(2) Divorce — If the testator is divorced from the bonds of matrimony after making a will, all provisions in the will in favor of or relating to his spouse so divorced shall thereby become ineffective for all purposes.
There is no dispute that the personal effects and marital deduction bequests to testator’s first wife thus have become ineffective for all purposes and that she takes nothing under his will. Appellant argues, however, that because the general pay-tax clause would have conferred an economic benefit upon the divorced spouse if her bequests had not been nullified by operation of law, it favors her and, therefore, it too has become ineffective for all purposes. I disagree.
Section 2507(2) is a verbatim re-enactment of Section 7(2) of the Wills Act of 1947,1 in which the General Assembly, to promote justice, provided for modification of a will by operation of law upon a testator’s divorce. Cf. McGuigen Estate, 388 Pa. 475, 131 A.2d 124 (1957). Under the prior law of this Commonwealth, a testator’s subsequent divorce did not operate by law to revoke a testamentary gift to the divorced spouse. Re Jones’ Estate, 211 Pa. 364, 60 A. 915 (1905). The Report of the Joint State Government Commission on Decedent’s Estates, which Commission was responsible for drafting what eventually became Section 7(2) of the Wills Act of 1947, reflects the desire of the General Assembly to provide by law a testamentary scheme akin to that which it presumed a divorced testator would have intended in light of his dramatically changed circumstances:
This [section] is taken from section 53 of the Model Probate Code. There is no similar provision in the 1917 act. A will in favor of a named spouse remained good in Pennsylvania without regard to a subsequent divorce: Jones’s Est., 211 Pa. 364. It is not a complete answer to say that the will can be changed or revoked. The testator may delay the change too long or may forget to make it or may be incompetent to make it. The real question is whether most persons so circumstanced (as in the case of *276later marriage or birth) would wish their wills changed or would wish them to remain the same, and there is no doubt that most would wish them changed.
Report of the Joint State Government Commission of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania Relating to the Wills Act of 1947, p. 42, (1947). Assuming that a testator ordinarily would not wish to confer a testamentary benefit upon one no longer his spouse, the General Assembly concluded that continuation of will provisions favoring the former spouse was simply a matter of inadvertence and provided for revocation thereof by operation of law. Thus, the purpose of the statute clearly is to prevent the former spouse, and only the former spouse, from receiving any type of benefit under the will.2
A general pay-tax clause obviously applies only to those who receive part of a testator’s gross estate for tax purposes. Since all bequests to the divorced spouse clearly were rendered ineffective by operation of law at the time of the divorce, the pay-tax provision here neither favors nor relates to her. It does mandate, however, that all death taxes otherwise chargeable to testator’s wife at the time of his death be paid out of the residuary estate, even though she takes by operation of law.3
*277It is ironic and unjust for the majority to interpret a statute designed to effectuate a decedent’s presumed intent to nullify will provisions favoring his divorced spouse in a manner which results instead in detriment to his wife at the time of his death. The objective of the legislation was to bar only the divorced spouse from benefits under the will. I conclude, therefore, that the pay-tax clause has not been rendered ineffective and that testator’s wife at the time of his death is entitled to take her share free of all taxes.

. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 89, No. 38, as amended, Act of February 17, 1956, P.L. 1070, No. 346.

. “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly....” Statutory Construction Act of 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a).
“ ‘[I]n ascertaining the legislative meaning ... the report of a legislative commission or a Senate or House committee may, if obscurity or ambiguity exists, be considered.’ ” McGuigen Estate, 388 Pa. 475, 482, 131 A.2d 124, 128 (1957) (citations omitted). Further, in construing an ambiguous statute, we must consider the object of the legislation, “and the former law, including statutes, upon the same or similar subjects.” Casey v. Pennsylvania State University, 463 Pa. 606, 615, 345 A.2d 695, 700 (1975).

. I note that Paragraph Ninth of testator’s will expressly applies to “any property not forming a part of [testator’s] testamentary estate but included in [testator’s] gross estate for tax purposes.” Thus, by unambiguous language testator provided that the pay-tax provision would apply to state inheritance taxes imposed upon all property whether part of his testamentary estate or otherwise. Although the *277second wife’s share of testator’s estate passed to her by operation of law, it was “included in [his] gross estate for tax purposes.”