Court Opinion

ID: 9907007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 18:01:03.347383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:32.213620
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 5 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RILLA HUML,                                     No.    22-55362

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                8:20-cv-00489-DOC-KES
 v.

SERVIS ONE, INC., DBA BSI Financial          MEMORANDUM*
Services, a Delaware corporation, authorized
to do business in California; WILMINGTON
TRUST FUND SOCIETY FSB, a Delaware
corporation, doing business, but not
authorize do business, as CHRISTIANA
TRUST in California) as Trustee, for
BROUGHAM FUND I TRUST, an unknown
entity; ZIEVE, BRODNAX AND STEELE,
LLP, a California Limited Liability
Partnership; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
S/B/M Wachovia Mortgage, FSB; WELLS
FARGO BANK SOUTH CENTRAL, N.A.;
DOES, 1 through 10,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted December 5, 2023**

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

      Rilla Huml appeals pro se after voluntarily dismissing without prejudice her

claims against Wilmington Trust Fund Society FSB, the sole remaining defendant

in Huml’s action alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act, and state law stemming from the servicing and transfer

of her mortgage loan. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

      Huml’s notice of appeal was timely only as to her voluntary dismissal of the

claims without prejudice. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (notice of appeal must be

filed 30 days after judgment or order appealed); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,

214 (2007) (“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a

jurisdictional requirement.”). “A voluntary dismissal without prejudice is

ordinarily not a final judgment from which the plaintiff may appeal,” unless “1)

there [is] no evidence of any attempt to manipulate appellate jurisdiction; and 2)

the plaintiff . . . sought the district court’s permission to dismiss the remaining

claims.” Galaza v. Wolf, 954 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Because Huml did not seek the “approval and

meaningful participation of the district court” in the dismissal of her claims, such

as by seeking entry of partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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54(b), we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Id. at 1272; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b);

see also WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)

(“[A] plaintiff, who has been given leave to amend, may not file a notice of appeal

simply because he does not choose to file an amended complaint. A further district

court determination must be obtained.”).

      Wells Fargo’s request for judicial notice, Dkt. Entry No. 15, is denied.

      DISMISSED.

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