Court Opinion

ID: 9947085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-02 01:00:38.836625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.764990
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10674           Document: 69-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/01/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________
                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit
                                   No. 23-10674
                                 Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                 ____________                                  March 1, 2024
                                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

Michael Roy,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:22-CR-336-2
                  ______________________________

Before Willett, Duncan, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Michael Roy pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
one count of transporting an individual in interstate commerce with the
intent that the individual engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2421, and he was sentenced within the advisory guidelines range to 97
months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. He appeals his

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
 Case: 23-10674           Document: 69-1          Page: 2       Date Filed: 03/01/2024

                                       No. 23-10674

conviction and sentencing, arguing that his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary because he did not believe that he would be required to comply
with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA), 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901-20962, and register as a sex offender if he
pleaded guilty. He also argues that the district court erred by applying, over
his objections, a two-level undue influence enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(b), and a two-level computer enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2G1.3(b)(3)(B).
        We note at the outset that Roy does not discuss whether his federal
offense under § 2421 is a qualifying “sex offense” for purposes of SORNA
or challenge the supervised release conditions requiring that he register as a
sex offender and participate in sex offender treatment and counseling.
Because we will not construe his counseled brief as raising those issues, the
issues are deemed waived. See United States v. Reagan, 596 F.3d 251, 254-55
(5th Cir. 2010); Beasley v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1986).
        Roy’s challenge to his validity of his guilty plea is not barred by the
appeal waiver in this case. We review his challenge for plain error, however,
because he did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, and his comment at
sentencing—that his plea “may not be voluntary”—was not sufficient to
preserve this issue for appellate review. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
129, 134 (2009); United States v. Brown, 328 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 2003).
        The crux of Roy’s argument is that he pleaded guilty based on his
attorney’s erroneous advice regarding SORNA’s applicability. 1 He points to
no evidence in the record—other than a unilaterally stricken SORNA notice
        _____________________
        1
           Roy’s brief fails to articulate, and thus waives, any argument that his attorney
rendered ineffective assistance, see Reagan, 596 F.3d at 254-55, and, in any event, the record
on appeal is not sufficiently developed to allow a fair evaluation of such a claim, see United
States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).

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Case: 23-10674        Document: 69-1        Page: 3    Date Filed: 03/01/2024

                                  No. 23-10674

provision in the plea agreement—to support that argument, and the record
does not indicate what advice, if any, counsel gave regarding SORNA or its
application in his case.
       Roy’s challenge to the validity of his guilty plea is unavailing. The
record shows that he understood, when he pleaded guilty, that he faced a
maximum of 10 years of imprisonment and at least five years of supervised
release. See United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 255-56 (5th Cir. 2000).
Further, the magistrate judge complied with Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11, and Roy does not argue otherwise. See Brown, 328 F.3d at 789.
Moreover, Roy does not argue that the magistrate judge erred, plainly or
otherwise, by failing to discuss SORNA or possible sex offender registration
requirements at rearraignment. See Reagan, 596 F.3d at 254-55. He therefore
has not shown a clear or obvious error regarding the validity of his guilty plea.
See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; Hernandez, 234 F.3d at 255-56.
       As for his challenges to the application of the enhancements under the
Guidelines, we conclude they are barred by the appeal waiver. Although Roy
argues that the district court granted him leave to appeal, the district court’s
statements did not negate the validity of the appeal waiver. See, e.g., United
States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992). His sentencing
challenges are within the scope of the appeal waiver based on the plain
language of the plea agreement and do not fall within any of the noted
exceptions to the waiver, see United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir.
2005), and the Government argues for the enforcement of the waiver, see
United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2006).
       AFFIRMED.

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