Court Opinion

ID: 9514772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:36.58725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.687775
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
[¶ 28.] I concur and agree that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.
[¶ 29.] I write to reiterate that the facts of this case do not warrant creating an exception to our long-recognized collateral source rule. Nor should we rush to create an exception. That would be a dangerous precedent. By doing so we would relegate ourselves to constantly making a factual analysis in every case to determine whether the plaintiffs testimony was so egregious as to open the door to the defendant’s collateral evidence.
[¶ 30.] For many good reasons,, to date we have not recognized an exception to the collateral source rule. In Moore v. Kluthe & Lane Ins. Agency, Inc., 89 S.D. 419, 234 N.W.2d 260 (1975), we refused to create an exception where the defendant argued that plaintiffs, by testifying that they performed labor on their mobile home in order to make it habitable after flood damage, elicited sympathy from the jury and opened the door to collateral evidence. Id. at 435, 234 N.W.2d at 269.
[¶31.] Next in Degen v. Bayman, 90 S.D. 400, 241 N.W.2d 703 (1976), we applied the rule to a case where the victim received gratuitous medical services from a source wholly independent of the defendant. ' We affirmed the court’s refusal to deduct the value of the gratuitous services from the overall verdict amount awarded. Id. at 410-11, 241 N.W.2d at 708-09.
[¶ 32.] Most recently in Atkins v. Stratmeyer, 1999 SD 131, 600 N.W.2d 891, we held that the plaintiffs brief reference to his financial condition and insurance, in response to a question from his attorney, did not create prejudicial error. By allowing the plaintiff to present evidence of his financial condition, we reaffirmed our adherence to the collateral source rule. In fact, we said such information is admissible where it is “vital to establish the amount of damages.” Id., ¶ 14, 600 N.W.2d at 897. In Atkins there was no indication that the defense attempted to rebut or impeach the plaintiffs evidence.
[¶ 33.] As the dissent notes, it may be true that an exception to the collateral source rule has been recognized in some jurisdictions where a party testifies about his or her financial condition “in a false or misleading manner.” Younts v. Baldor Elec. Co. Inc., 310 Ark. 86, 832 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1992).1 However, we have not recog*444nized such an exception, and the facts of this case do not warrant it.
[¶ 34.] I must observe that even were we to adopt such an exception, there was no determination in the present case that Jurgensen’s testimony was false or misleading. The transcript here reflects that, prior to cross-examination and during a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Smith’s counsel attempted to show exactly that. Specifically, the attorney offered to rebut Jurgensen’s statement that his family was barely surviving by asserting that the family’s income for 1997 was approximately $32,000 - an amount arguably above poverty. Smith further offered to show that approximately $17,000 of this amount was received from disability payments.
[¶ 35.] Jurgensen’s counsel countered by explaining that, in addition to the disability payments, part of the 1997 income figure was attributable to a pension his client was forced to cash in, thereby proving the plaintiffs difficult financial situation. Moreover, Smith’s counsel admitted that the $32,000 income figure included both Mr. and Mrs. Jurgensen’s income, not just Mr. Jurgensen’s.
[¶ 36.] In denying Smith’s offer of proof, the court explained that, as she understood it, the collateral source rule exists to exclude evidence of collateral payments, particularly those that might require repayment in the future, from improperly influencing the damage award. The court concluded that several sources of income Jurgensen received might need to be repaid in the future; therefore such evidence was inadmissible. I agree. Because Jur-gensen’s testimony was not shown to be false or misleading, no exception to the collateral source rule was warranted or worthy of consideration.

. Unlike the present case, in Younts, when defense counsel 'alleged that the plaintiffs statement was made in a false or misleading manner, plaintiff’s counsel did nothing to dispel it. Therefore, collateral evidence of insurance proceeds was admitted.