Court Opinion

ID: 9807554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:09:03.893014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:21.116528
License: Public Domain

QlaeK, O. J.,
dissenting. It is found as a fact that Swaim went to tbe plaintiff’s bouse and asked him for money to buy stamps; tbe plaintiff agreed to this and gave a check to Eoote to buy tbe stamps in Statesville. These stamps are really and simply governmental tax receipts, and when tbe whiskey was stolen before these receipts were affixed, it was tbe same as if a bouse bad been burned after the sbexdff bad given bis receipt for taxes. Tbe plaintiff agreed to furnish money to pay these taxes, and from tbe surrounding circumstances it is tolerably plain that be was not willing to band tbe cash over to Swaim, but preferred to send him, instead, tbe stamps or tax receipts. Whether be did this through caution or at request of Swaim the fact that he was to pay the tax for Swaim is a reasonable inference that might have been drawn by the jury, and which tbe Judge, acting by consent as a jury, does draw, for be finds as a fact that tbe transaction between Swaim and Salmons, upon tbe undisputed facts, was “an agreement to make the loan which the plaintiff could recall at any time.” Tbe plaintiff has never delivered any money or money’s worth to Swaim. There is no evidence nor finding that Foote was Swaim’s agent. He was tbe plaintiff’s agent, according to tbe evidence, for tbe check drawn by the plaintiff was made payable to Foote, not to Swaim. Hence, Swaim acquired no control over tbe check. He could not have drawn the money, nor have gotten possession of it in any way, and never did receive tbe money nor have it or tbe cheek in his control. If the plaintiff had put the money in custody of a *547common carrier directed to Siwaim or the collector, he would, on learning of the destruction of the property, have had a right of stopping m transitu, hiere, the check being signed by the plaintiff and payable to Foote, under instructions from' the plaintiff, not from Swaim, to draw the money and use it for the purchase of stamps, Swaim had no control over it and could neither by telegraph nor in person have controlled Foote. The plaintiff still had the control of the matter. He could stop Foote’s drawing the money, either by message sent to him or by notifying the bank not to pay the check. He chose the former method as more courteous and proper. By telegram delivered to the defendant at 6:48 P. M. he requested a friend at Statesville, only some thirty-five miles away, to notify Foote not to buy the stamps, i. e., not to get the tax receipts. By gross negligence of the defendant the message was not delivered till 9 :50 next morning. The check was not paid till after 9 o’clock and immediately after Foote bought the stamps, i. e., paid the tax. The plaintiff has lost the sum thus paid out. This loss would not have occurred but for the gross neglect of the defendant to discharge its duty by prompt delivery of the telegram sent by the plaintiff, for which duty it has received chartered privileges and for which in this instance it accepted the plaintiff’s money. Swaim has never received any money from the plaintiff, and had no control over cashing the check. He had no power to stop it and did not attempt to do so. The defendant contracted with the plaintiff to deliver promptly a message which would have prevented the cashing the cheek (and the payment of the proceeds to the Collector), and is liable to the plaintiff for the amount he has lost by such default. The judgment below should be affirmed.
Douglas, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.