Court Opinion

ID: 9657622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:32:07.335524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:46.875561
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
I respectfully dissent because my review of the record reveals sufficient probable cause to support bindover. The complainant testified that he had been offered up to five or six thousand dollars for the watch. He testified that he told the defendants that he did not want to sell *565the watch. He testified further that the defendants agreed to enter into a loan or pawn transaction, and that the defendants told him that they would use a buy/sell arrangement to avoid the legal requirements of pawn transactions.1 The district court found probable cause that the transaction was either a loan or a pawn, and that the transaction was usurious.
The trial judge, in denying the defendants’ motion to quash, reasoned:
This Court will follow the rules in Wilcox[2] and Boyd[3] and look beyond the form of the parties’ transaction to determine the actual nature of the agreement. Certainly the transfer of possession and Defendants bearing the risk of loss are indicative of a sale. Also, the lack of an absolute obligation on the part of [the complainant] to repay the $2,600.00 principal is indicative of a sale. However, in the context of usurious arrangements, manifestations are subject to a greater scrutiny than the average transaction. Wilcox provides a court the means to look beyond the visible indications and disclose the actual nature of the underlying agreement.
In the instant case, [the complainant] testified that he was in financial difficulty and wished to *566borrow against his Rolex watch. He stated he clearly opposed entering into a sale agreement with Defendants and on more than one occasion informed Defendants of that. He testified that he felt assured he was in fact borrowing against the watch and not selling it and that the Defendants arranged the transaction so that this could be done. If he desired to sell it, [the complainant] suggested he could have easily received more than twice the value of the watch by taking it elsewhere. Furthermore, [the complainant] understood that the personal property given up was to be security in case of a failure to repay. . . . [T]he District Court in the case at bar could properly conclude based on all the circumstances surrounding the transaction that the underlying agreement amounted not to a sale but either a loan or pawn.
Like the Court of Appeals,4 I would adopt the reasoning of the trial court and would affirm.
Boyle and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J._

 The complainant testified:
They proceeded to explain to me that because of the nature of the law they couldn’t write down that they loaned me the money. What they had to do was make a receipt saying that I sold them the watch and then put it in lay-a-way and was buying it back from them. And I said well, you know, I mean I got to trust you on this deal. And they said no, there is no problem. The fee is $650.00, you pay [for] your watch, what you borrow plus six hundred and fifty dollars and you get your watch back.

 Wilcox v Moore, 354 Mich 499; 93 NW2d 288 (1958).

 Boyd v Layher, 170 Mich App 93; 427 NW2d 593 (1988).

 Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued April 22, 1993 (Docket Nos. 149014, 149015): "[W]e affirm for the reasons stated in the trial court’s well reasoned opinion.”