Court Opinion

ID: 9470403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:05:28.355012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:53.204688
License: Public Domain

LYNNE, District Judge,
dissenting:
In my opinion the discussion and affirmance of the district court’s denial of an injunction are inappropriate. Penthouse did not contest that ruling by a cross-appeal. The superficial parallelism of the remedies of injunctive and declaratory relief would not seem to justify consideration of standards applicable to the former to illuminate the only issue before us, the grant of the latter.
I believe the court’s opinion is contrary to the precise holding of Steffel:
We therefore hold that, regardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate, federal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute, whether an attack is made on the constitutionality of the statute on its face or as applied. 415 U.S. 452, 475, 94 S.Ct. 1299, 1223-24, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1973).
*930It is conceded that Penthouse demonstrated a genuine threat of enforcement of the Georgia statute. Clearly there is a dispute as to whether this statute may be applied to “Caligula.” McAuliffe believes “Caligula” is obscene; Penthouse does not. Thus there is a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201. Septum, Inc. v. Keller, 614 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.1980).
Synthesizing the averments of the complaint, the consolidated pre-trial order, the trial transcript, and the May 15, 1981 order of the court, it is at once apparent that the gravamen of the claim asserted by Penthouse is that “Caligula” is protected by the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Con-cededly obscene material is not protected. Miller established a three-prong conterminous test to determine obscenity vel non which Georgia incorporated in its statute.
If “the average person, applying contemporary community standards would [not] find that [“Caligula”], taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,” the First Amendment insulates it from the application of the Georgia statute. Appeal to the prurient interest is a question of fact. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 1763-64, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977).
It would be anomalous to suggest that it is possible to adjudicate the question of whether material is obscene under the Georgia statute without resolving at the same time whether such material is protected by the First Amendment within the Miller definition of obscenity since out of the facts the law arises. Both the advisory jury and the court found as a fact that, applying contemporary community standards, Caligula does not appeal to the prurient interest.
A careful review of the Court’s instructions to the jury reveals that its definition of the prurient interest was in accord with the teaching of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). The Court properly charged the jury that the burden of proof with respect to obscenity was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 684, 96 S.Ct. 1189, 1197, 47 L.Ed.2d 387 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). It is reasonable to assume that the trial judge applied these standards in his own fact findings.
Finally, I cannot agree with the implication of the Court’s opinion that the district court was powerless to resolve the question of whether Caligula is obscene under the Georgia statute in order to reach the question as to whether it is protected by the First Amendment; that it is “more appropriately left to state factfinders.”
Septum, Inc. squarely holds that under the circumstances of this case abstention is inappropriate. Presumably state factfind-ers would be confined to a criminal proceeding. The fallacy of this approach is demonstrated by the reasoning of Steffel:
[W]hile a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on the part of the federal courts to intervene when no state prosecution is pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.
415 U.S. at 462, 94 S.Ct. at 1217.
I respectfully dissent.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, and RO-NEY, TJOFLAT, HILL, FAY, VANCE, KRAVITCH, JOHNSON, HENDERSON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT:
A member of this Court in active service having requested a poll on the application for rehearing en banc and a majority of the judges in active service having voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc,
IT IS ORDERED that the case shall be reheard by this Court en banc with oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a briefing schedule for the filing of en banc briefs.