Court Opinion

ID: 9678896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:35:35.692611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:08.835846
License: Public Domain

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge, dissenting. I believe there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict; therefore, I respectfully dissent. Appellee began living on the land in question in the 1980s. In addition to the facts set out in the majority opinion, appellee testified that he owned the property since 1985 because appellant had given it to him. Other witnesses testified that appellant said in front of them or to them that she had given appellee the property and he could do with it what he wanted. In determining whether a directed verdict should be granted, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is sought and give it its highest probative value, taking into account all reasonable inferences deducible from it. Woodall v. Chuck Dory Auto Sales, Inc., 347 Ark. 260, 61 S.W.3d 835 (2001). A motion for a directed verdict should be granted only if there is no substantial evidence to support a jury | ¿verdict. Id. Where the evidence is such that fair-minded persons might reach different conclusions, then a jury question is presented and a directed verdict should be reversed. Id. It is not our place to try issues of fact; rather we simply review the record for substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Crawford County v. Jones, 365 Ark. 585, 232 S.W.3d 433 (2006). In order to prove ownership of land by adverse possession, the party claiming possession must show continuous possession of the property for seven years. Robertson v. Lees, 87 Ark.App. 172, 183, 189 S.W.3d 463, 471 (2004). In addition, that possession must be actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile, exclusive and accompanied by an intent to hold against the true owner. Id. Also, because use of land by family members is presumed to be permissive, stronger evidence of adverse possession is required in cases involving family. Id. at 184, 189 S.W.3d at 471. If the original use and possession of the land is permissive, it cannot become adverse until notice of the hostility of the possessor’s holding has been brought home to the owner by actual notice or by a holding so open and notorious as to raise a presumption of notice equivalent to actual notice; the evidence of an adverse holding when the original entry is by permission must be very clear. Rickett v. O’Dell, 86 Ark.App. 86, 91, 160 S.W.3d 717, 720 (2004). There have been very few adverse-possession cases tried to jurors. In Lowe v. Cox, 210 Ark. 169, 194 S.W.2d 892 (1946), an example of an adverse-possession issue tried to |na jury, our supreme court discussed the trial court’s failure to grant a directed verdict when there was testimony that the possessor’s possession was permissive and not adverse. It stated: In discussing the recognition of title in another by an offer of purchase made after the running of the statute, this court in Shirey v. Whitlow, [80 Ark. 444, 97 S.W. 444 (1906) ], said: ‘Such recognition might be evidence tending to show that the possession of the claimant was not adverse, and that no title had in fact vested. But the weight to be given to such recognition would be a question for the jury, and the court could not declare as a matter of law that the mere fact that defendant had recognized the title of the defendant entitled plaintiff to a judgment for possession.’ Id. at 177, 194 S.W.2d at 896. In the present case the parties did not abstract the jury instructions, so we should assume that the jury was properly instructed. If so, then whether appellee’s actions were so open and notorious as to raise a presumption of notice is a jury question. The jury believed appellee’s actions were adequate to give notice of his intent as they found in his favor on a general verdict. Acts such as changing the zoning, collecting and keeping rents, making improvements on the property, paying taxes, insurance, and utilities, allowing people to stay on the property, and running a business on the property are substantial evidence showing an open and notorious holding against the appellant. Further, there was evidence before the jury that appellant acknowledged by her statement to others that the property belonged to appellee. This could easily have been construed by the jury as actual notice of appellee’s intent. As it is not our place to try issues of fact, but only to review the record for substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. I would affirm.