Court Opinion

ID: 4579208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2020-10-21 19:08:33.841595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:46:55.252947
License: Public Domain

Reyes v Kashem (2020 NY Slip Op 05960)

Reyes v Kashem

2020 NY Slip Op 05960

Decided on October 21, 2020

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on October 21, 2020
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

MARK C. DILLON, J.P.
JEFFREY A. COHEN
ROBERT J. MILLER
BETSY BARROS, JJ.

2019-07509
 (Index No. 515099/15)

[*1]Sashia Reyes, etc., appellant, 
vAbul Kashem, respondent.

Sobo & Sobo, LLP, Middletown, NY (Stephen J. Cole-Hatchard of counsel), for appellant.
Noll Law Firm, P.C., Syosset, NY (Richard E. Noll of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Karen B. Rothenberg, J.), dated May 16, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on February 2, 2013. The defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. In an order dated May 16, 2019, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the defendant's cross motion. The plaintiff appeals.
The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614).
In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219). As the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, a lack of causation (see Straussberg v Marghub, 108 AD3d 694, 695; Kearney v Garrett, 92 AD3d 725, 726), [*2]the burden did not shift to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact regarding causation or to explain any gap in treatment (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 572; Torres v Rettaliata, 171 AD3d 829, 830).
Accordingly, we disagree with the Supreme Court's determination granting the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
DILLON, J.P., COHEN, MILLER and BARROS, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court