Court Opinion

ID: 9900353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:29.661087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.701321
License: Public Domain

No. 490            September 20, 2023                 203

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
              RAYMOND BLAINE STONE,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
               Lane County Circuit Court
                 20CR64831; A177223

  Bradley A. Cascagnette, Judge.
  Submitted August 7, 2023.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Stephanie J. Hortsch, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, for petition.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney
General, for response.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  AOYAGI, P. J.
  Reconsideration allowed; former opinion modified and
adhered to as modified.
204   State v. Stone
Cite as 328 Or App 203 (2023)                            205

        AOYAGI, J.
         Defendant requests that we reconsider our decision
in State v. Stone, 326 Or App 200, 532 P3d 90 (2023), specif-
ically the remedy portion. In Stone, we reversed defendant’s
conviction for second-degree assault, ORS 163.175(1)(a),
based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence to prove that
crime, and we remanded “for further proceedings, which
may include a new trial on other lesser included offenses.”
Stone, 326 Or App at 201. As described below, we grant
reconsideration, clarify one aspect of our former opinion,
and otherwise adhere to our former opinion.
         Defendant was charged with first-degree assault,
ORS 163.185, for intentionally causing serious physical injury
to G with a dangerous weapon. At trial, the jury was asked
to decide whether defendant committed the charged offense
or any of four unpleaded lesser included offenses: a non-
weapons theory of second-degree assault, ORS 163.175(1)(a)
(“[i]ntentionally or knowingly causes serious physical injury
to another”); a weapons theory of second-degree assault, ORS
163.175(1)(b) (“[i]ntentionally or knowingly causes physical
injury to another by means of a * * * dangerous weapon”);
third-degree assault, ORS 163.165(1)(a) (“[r]ecklessly causes
serious physical injury to another by means of a * * * danger-
ous weapon”); or fourth-degree assault, ORS 163.160(1)(a)
(“[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes physical
injury to another”).
         The jury found defendant not guilty of first-degree
assault, but guilty of the nonweapons theory of second-
degree assault. That combination of verdicts means that the
jury necessarily found that defendant caused serious phys-
ical injury to G but either did not act intentionally or did
not use a dangerous weapon. Stone, 326 Or App at 213 n 7
(discussing same). The jury did not render verdicts on the
other three lesser included offenses.
         On appeal, we held that the evidence was legally
insufficient to prove “serious physical injury,” a required
element of the nonweapons theory of second-degree assault.
Id. at 212. Given the circumstances, we concluded that the
appropriate remedy was to “reverse defendant’s conviction
206                                                             State v. Stone

for second-degree assault under ORS 163.175(1)(a) and
remand for further proceedings, which may include a new
trial on lesser included offenses that do not require ‘serious
physical injury.’ ” Id. at 212-13. Defendant takes issue with
that remedy, making two arguments.1
         First, defendant contends that we erred in holding
that he may be retried on the weapons theory of second-
degree assault, ORS 163.175(1)(b). He argues that the
weapons theory of second-degree assault requires that he
intentionally caused physical injury to G with a dangerous
weapon and that such theory is now foreclosed by the jury’s
verdict on first-degree assault.2 We reject that argument.
The minimum required culpable mental state for second-
degree assault under ORS 163.175(1)(b) is “knowingly,” the
state requested a “knowing” instruction on that offense, and
the trial court instructed the jury that what the state was
required to prove was that defendant “knowingly caused
physical injury to [G] by means of a dangerous weapon.” It is
true that the instruction as a whole was inartfully drafted,
creating a potential ambiguity (that no one seems to have
noticed at the time) as to whether the required mental
state was intentional or knowing.3 Had the jury rendered

     1
       In their original appellate briefing, neither party addressed the appropri-
ate remedy in the event of reversal. On reconsideration, defendant asks that we
remand for entry of a conviction for fourth-degree assault, while the state main-
tains that the remedy provided in our former opinion is correct.
     2
       The first jury necessarily found that defendant either did not act intention-
ally or did not use a dangerous weapon, so double jeopardy precludes retrial of a
lesser included offense that would require both those findings. However, it does
not preclude retrial of a lesser included offense that would require only one of
those findings, because, as defendant acknowledges, double jeopardy precludes
relitigating only those issues that were necessarily decided in a prior trial. See
State v. Mozorosky, 277 Or 493, 499, 561 P2d 588 (1977) (“The crux of the test is
whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than
that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)).
     3
       As to the elements of the crime of second-degree assault on a weapons the-
ory, the full instruction given to the jury was as follows:
         “Oregon law provides that a person commits the crime of assault in the
     second degree if the person intentionally causes physical injury to another by
     use of a dangerous weapon.
         “In this case, to establish assault in the second degree, the state must
     prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements:
         “(1) The act occurred on or about November 24, 2020; and
Cite as 328 Or App 203 (2023)                                        207

a verdict on the weapons theory of second-degree assault,
that might raise an interesting question as to how the ver-
dict should be understood for double-jeopardy purposes. The
jury did not render a verdict, however, so we do not see how
the instructional ambiguity precludes a retrial on second-
degree assault, ORS 163.175(1)(b), for knowingly caus-
ing physical injury to G by means of a dangerous weapon.
Defendant cites no persuasive authority. We therefore reject
defendant’s first argument.
         Second, defendant contends that he cannot be
retried for third-degree assault, ORS 163.165(1)(a), and
that our decision “includes contradictory language” on that
point. The state concedes, and we agree, that defendant can-
not be retried for third-degree assault. For clarity, we revise
our former opinion to address that issue. First, on the top
of page 213, we replace the existing sentence to which foot-
note 7 is attached with this sentence: “It did not address
the other lesser-included offenses, nor do its findings fore-
close those other theories, except for third-degree assault,
which cannot be retried because third-degree assault under
ORS 163.165(1)(a) requires proof of ‘serious physical injury.’ ”
Footnote 7 remains attached. Second, in the sentence that
begins on the last line of page 213 and continues onto page
214, we delete the words “at a minimum” so that the conclud-
ing clause reads, “including the weapons theory of second-
degree assault.”
       Reconsideration allowed; former opinion modified
and adhered to as modified.

      “(2) Raymond Blaine Stone knowingly caused physical injury to [G] by
   means of a dangerous weapon.”