Court Opinion

ID: 9726853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:10:37.547123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:31.491075
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
DONOHUE, J.:
¶ 1 I agree with the majority’s thoughtful analysis of Pennsylvania law applicable to this case. As the majority rightly concludes, 61 P.S. § 331.27a requires that a parole agent have reasonable suspicion to search the property of a parolee. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edwards, 874 A.2d 1192 (Pa.Super.2005). In my view, the majority is also correct that even when a parolee has signed a consent to search waiver in connection with his/her release, a property search is reasonable when the totality of *555the circumstances demonstrates that (1) the parole officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee committed a parole violation, and (2) the search was reasonably related to the duty of the parole officer. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 575 Pa. 447, 836 A.2d 893 (2003) (plurality).4
¶ 2 I depart from the majority’s analysis, however, with respect to its application of these legal principles to the facts of record in this case. The record on appeal does not contain any basis on which we may properly conclude that the parole officers had any reasonable suspicion to permit them to search Hunter’s bedroom. The Commonwealth’s only witness at the suppression hearing, Officer Jones, testified that before arriving the officers had no indication that there were guns, drugs, or other contraband at the approved residence (2033 North 20th Street). N.T., 1/21/05, at 34. Officer Jones also testified that their only purpose in going to the residence was to see if Hunter was there and, if so, to arrest him. Id.
¶ 3 Upon finding that Hunter was not there, Officer Jones admitted that the only reason the officers proceeded to conduct a detailed search of Hunter’s bedroom was to find another address where they could look for him. Id. at 36. Merely having a hunch that a property search could conceivably turn up relevant evidence, however, does not constitute reasonable suspicion. Instead, at a minimum, the officers needed some basis (i.e., some reasonable suspicion) to believe that Hunter was not living at the residence or was attempting to evade capture. The record in this case does not support any such finding, since all of the information available to the officers indicated that Hunter lived at the residence in the bedroom identified by his aunt.5 His aunt directed them to “his bedroom” and upon entering they saw his clothing and mail addressed to him inside. Id. at 35-37. That the officers did not locate Hunter in his bedroom at 10:30 a.m. on a Tuesday morning, without more, provided no basis for them to conclude that he had either moved out or was attempting to evade capture. After being advised that *556the officers were searching for him, Hunter turned himself in. Id. at 28.
¶ 4 In my view, the majority here eviscerates the very constitutional and statutory protections it purports to recognize. If merely failing to locate a parolee at his/her approved address constitutes reasonable suspicion to conduct a detailed search of those premises, then parolees have no constitutional or statutory protections against unreasonable searches and seizures at an approved address. If the parolee is not at the approved address when the parole officers arrive, reasonable suspicion “automatically” exists to search the premises for another address. If, on the other hand, the parolee is at the address and is arrested, then a search may be conducted incident to the arrest. See, e.g., Commonwealth, v. Rodriquez, 532 Pa. 62, 614 A.2d 1378 (1992). Because a property search may be conducted in either case, the requirement of reasonable suspicion, as codified at 61 P.S. § 331.27a, is rendered irrelevant and superfluous.6 Because I do not believe that was the intent of the legislature, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 5 I likewise do not think that Hunter’s aunt clearly and unequivocally consented to the search of Hunter’s bedroom. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 454 Pa.Super. 207, 685 A.2d 151, 157 (1996) (the Commonwealth has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that consent was “unequivocal, specific, and voluntary”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gibson, 536 Pa. 123, 131, 638 A2d 203, 207 (Pa.1994)). When the parole officers appeared at her door with an arrest warrant for Hunter, the only reasonable inference is that the aunt allowed them entry into the residence to look for Hunter. Even considering Officer Jones’ testimony in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, it is not reasonable to infer that the aunt understood them to be asking for permission to conduct a detailed search of Hunter’s bedroom (including under the mattress on his bed), or that she ever consented to any such search.7 In fact, Officer Jones testified that the decision to conduct a detailed search was not made until after the officers determined that Hunter was not in the residence, id. at 27, and there is no testimony in the record to indicate that the aunt was asked to consent to a detailed search at that time.
¶ 6 In its footnote # 3, the majority indicates that their decision in this regard is based not upon a finding that the aunt consented to the search of Hunter’s bedroom, but rather because Hunter failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to his bedroom and his belongings and possessions contained therein. Our Supreme Court has accorded automatic standing to challenge the consti*557tutionality of a search under Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, with no preliminary showing of a proprietary or possessory interest by the defendant when possession is an essential element of the Commonwealth’s case. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 553 Pa. 76, 80, 718 A.2d 265, 267 (1998). Here Hunter was charged with and convicted of receiving stolen property, an essential element of which is proof that the defendant is in possession of the property. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a); Commonwealth v. Foreman, 797 A.2d 1005 (Pa.Super.2002).
¶ 7 Moreover, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing demonstrated that Hunter had a subjective expectation of privacy in his own bedroom that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable and legitimate. As our Supreme Court has recognized:
An individual’s effects and possessions are constitutionally protected from unreasonable search and seizure as well as his person. U.S. Const. Amend. IV, Pa. Const, art. 1, § 8. This protection does not depend on the physical presence or physical absence of the individual owner. So long as the person seeks to preserve his effects as private, even if they are accessible to ... others, they are constitutionally protected. Put another way, a person must maintain the privacy of his possessions in such a fashion that his expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.
Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 67, 470 A.2d 457, 468-69 (1983) (emphasis in original). All of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing indicated that the room searched was in fact Hunter’s private bedroom.8 Officer Jones testified that Hunter’s aunt directed them to “his bedroom,” and upon entering the officers spotted Hunter’s clothing and mail addressed to him inside. Id. at 35-37. Hunter clearly maintained the items in question (wallets, credit cards, etc.) in a manner that indicated a subjective personal privacy interest in them — he put them under the mattress in his bedroom, rather than leaving them out for others to see. In addition, in my view a subjective expectation of privacy in one’s own bedroom is one that society is prepared to recognize as both reasonable and legitimate. Cf. Commonwealth v. Roland, 535 Pa. 595, 599, 637 A.2d 269, 270 (1994) (“In a private home, ‘searches and seizures without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable’”) (quoting Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)).
¶ 8 For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s decision to deny Hunter’s motion to suppress.

. In my view, this two part test is not applicable in this case, since the parole officers did not go to the approved address to investigate possible parole violations. Instead, the record on appeal clearly demonstrates that the parole officers went to the approved address to serve an arrest warrant on Hunter based upon already established violations of his parole (i.e., his absconding from custody at a community house and his subsequent failures to report). N.T., 1/21/05, at 34, 36-37. Hunter’s absence from the approved address at the time of their arrival, without more, did not provide any reasonable suspicion to investigate new or different violations of parole from the ones used to obtain the search warrant.

. The majority’s suggestion in its footnote # 2 that the contents of the affidavit of probable cause underlying the arrest warrant constitutes evidence in support of the trial court’s decision is, in my view, not sound. The validity of the arrest warrant was not at issue here, and thus the contents of the supporting affidavit of probable cause were likewise not relevant to the Commonwealth’s case either. When counsel for Hunter introduced the affidavit at the hearing, counsel for the Commonwealth immediately objected on the grounds that it was irrelevant. N.T., 1/21/05, at 39. More importantly, Officer Jones admitted that the contents of the affidavit ("search of the room for weapons, contraband and lead[s] to where Hunter could be found”) were not based upon any reasonable suspicion, as he agreed that prior to entering the approved residence he had no knowledge that it would contain any weapon, contraband, or evidence of criminal behavior. Id. at 40-41. As the entire record on appeal demonstrates, the officers had no reasonable suspicion, either before or after arriving at the approved residence, to believe that Hunter was not living at the residence or was attempting to evade capture.

. Section 331.27a authorizes a property search by a parole agent only where he/she has a reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee's property contains either (1) contraband, or (2) other evidence of violations of the conditions of parole. 61 P.S. 331.27a(d)(2). In this case, Officer Jones admitted that the agents had no basis to think that they would find contraband at Hunter's approved address. N.T., 1/21/05, at 40-41 ("no prior knowledge" or "no specific knowledge, whatsoever, that [Hunter] had any weapons or any contraband or any evidence of criminal activity in [Hunter’s bedroom].”). Moreover, Officer Jones testified that they searched the bedroom for the purpose of finding evidence of Hunter’s whereabouts. Id. at 34, 36-37. There is no testimony in the record from anyone suggesting that the search of the bedroom related in any way to an attempt to find evidence of other parole violations.

. Officer Jones did not testify that he looked under the mattress to see if Hunter was hiding there. Instead, he testified that he looked under the mattress to try to find an address. Id. at 27 ("But during the search to try to find an address, for example, I discovered three wallets underneath the mattress.").

. I disagree with the majority’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237, 888 A.2d 680 (2005). Unlike in this case, which involves a search of a person's private bedroom, Millner involved a seizure of evidence from a vehicle after police officers heard gunshots, observed the suspect and a companion in the vehicle with a gun from a public street, found drugs on the defendant, and arrested him. Based upon these facts, our Supreme Court concluded that the suspect did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Id. at 257-58, 888 A.2d at 692.