Court Opinion

ID: 9465309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:42:14.568733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:06.038801
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
It is with great reluctance that I dissent from an opinion of a majority as esteemed as the one in this ease. I am compelled, however, to register my dissent because I believe there is a jury question presented whether the Forbes article is capable of a defamatory meaning. To support my position, I need not demonstrate that the article is defamatory: I need only show that the article is capable of two meanings, one defamatory and the other not defamatory.
Southard has presented this court with a plethora of theories why this article is defamatory. Most of his arguments can be dismissed out of hand and the court properly does so. He presents two, however, that are at least colorable. His first theory suggests that the article falsely accuses him of securities law violations in that Southard sold investment contracts without the proper registration. I agree with Judge Tuttle that this theory is strained and simply requires inferences that are too sophisticated for the average Forbes reader.
Southard’s second argument, however, I believe, presents a jury question. Essentially, this theory is based upon the concluding sentences in the arricie: “If he made claims like that for stocks, Southard would be in the soup. But there is no Securities & Exchange Commission for classic cars.”
The majority states that this statement is “clearly capable of defamatory meaning.” At 144. But the majority states that since the second sentence explicitly takes Southard “out of the soup” any implications that Southard was guilty of illegal conduct is negated. I disagree. The second sentence does not negate the inference that Southard is guilty of illegal conduct. It negates the inference that the SEC can do something about it. In effect, the article can be read as accusing Southard of improper business practices, albeit practices outside the jurisdiction of the SEC.
I would not be surprised to find that the public associates the work of the SEC with stock fraud.1 Given this inference, I think *147Southard should be allowed to argue to a jury that the Forbes article accuses him of fraud or improper business practice with relation to classic cars, but that the traditional guardian against fraudulent business activities is without power to do anything about it because Southard’s fraud is outside the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Because I think the article has two reasonable readings — the non-defamatory one posited by Judge Tuttle and the defamatory one suggested by myself — I think a jury question is presented and summary judgment is inappropriate.2 I reach this conclusion notwithstanding my agreement with the standard by which we consider the grant of summary judgment in libel cases as stated by Judge Tuttle.
Since I have made these comments under the protective luxury of a dissent, I need not speculate about Southard’s status as a plaintiff nor his ability to prove Forbes guilty of actual malice, if Southard is a public figure.

. In Orr v. Argus-Press, 586 F.2d 1108 (6 Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit was faced with a defamation case in which the plaintiff had been charged with various securities law violations. A newspaper article had described these charges as “fraud.” The Sixth Circuit held that the “word ‘fraud’ ... is both accurate *147and appropriate to describe a violation of Michigan’s securities laws.”

. For a similar uncomplimentary article in the financial press, see Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barrons, 442 F.Supp. 1341, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).