Court Opinion

ID: 9685210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:26:14.705139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:03.335316
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
This is an appeal by leave granted from a denial of General Motors’ motion for an order decreeing Edwin Cohen, d/b/a J & I Service Station, to be an active defendant in the retrial of a case remanded from this Court. See Kujawski v Cohen, 56 Mich App 533; 224 NW2d 908 (1974).
Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against Cohen and General Motors alleging the failure of a truck wheel bearing due to negligent installation by Cohen’s employee and negligence and breach of warranty by a General Motors *241subsidiary in manufacturing the bearing. The jury returned a verdict against General Motors of $315,000 and found no cause of action against Cohen.
General Motors alone appealed.1 On appeal, this Court held that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence relevant to the issue of whether Cohen’s employee had exercised due care and whether the truck was in safe running order. The Court held:
"Because the evidence excluded was pivotal to one of GM’s defenses and would also have been important in assessing the credibility of adverse witnesses and the validity of their claims, GM is entitled to an opportunity to introduce such evidence at a new trial.” Id. 541.
The case was "reversed and remanded for new trial”.
In the present appeal, General Motors contends that this language had the effect of reversing the no cause of action verdict for Cohen and reinstating him as an active defendant.
We believe Whinnen v 231 Corporation, 49 Mich App 371; 212 NW2d 297 (1973), controls the issue before us. Whinnen was a slip-and-fall case. Plaintiff sued the municipality, abutting property owner and lessee of contiguous property. The jury returned a verdict of $11,000 against the owner and no cause of action against the municipality and lessee. Only the owner appealed; no cross-appeal was filed. This Court, finding evidentiary errors *242which could have affected the liability of both the lessee and owner, reversed as to the owner only:
"We vacate the judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury and remand to the trial court for a new trial as to defendant-appellant 231 Corporation. Absent a cross-appeal by plaintiff as to the judgment of no cause as to the other two named defendants, or a specific appeal by this appellant of the no cause judgments as to its co-defendants in the trial court, we hold those judgments are res judicata as to the City of Hancock and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. We remand for a new trial as to appellant 231 Corporation only.” 49 Mich App at 378-379.
See, also, Vorrath v Garrelts, 49 Mich App 142; 211 NW2d 536 (1974).
General Motors relies on decisions from other jurisdictions2 holding that an appellate court may, when the interests of justice so require, order a retrial as to non-appealing defendants. We need not decide whether we will follow such rule, however, for even assuming that rule has validity in Michigan,3 we see nothing in this Court’s opinion in the prior appeal indicating that the Court intended to order retrial as to Cohen. Retrial as to a non-appealing party, under the rule advanced by General Motors, may be ordered, but it should not be presumed. As the Court did not order that Cohen be a party to the retrial, we hold that he is not.
In addition, General Motors has failed to demonstrate the injustice of a new trial without Cohen as a party. General Motors will not be precluded from raising its main defense: that the cause of the accident is attributable to another’s negli*243gence, not any breach of warranty or negligence by General Motors. See, e.g., Love v Brumley, 30 Mich App 61; 186 NW2d 19 (1971).
Affirmed. Costs to defendant-appellee.

 No claim of appeal or cross-appeal against Cohen was filed by-plaintiff. See GCR 1963, 807.1. No cross-claim was filed by General Motors against Cohen. In this situation, there was no appeal of the no-cause-of-action verdict for Cohen on plaintiff’s claim versus Cohen. General Motors could appeal only the jury verdict against it in favor of plaintiff, even though Cohen was designated "appellee” by General Motors on documents filed with this Court and served on Cohen.

 See, e.g., Isay v Cameron, 229 So 2d 916 (Ala 1969). See, generally, 166 ALR 563.

 See GCR 1963, 820.1(7).