Court Opinion

ID: 9379088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 17:01:04.276351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.832836
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0129n.06

                                           No. 21-5457

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                   FILED
                                                                                  Mar 14, 2023
                                                                              DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                )
ROGER WAYNE BATTLE,
                                                )
        Petitioner-Appellant,                   )          ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                )          UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v.                                              )          COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
                                                )          DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       )
        Respondent-Appellee.                    )
                                                                                    OPINION
                                                )
                                                )

               Before: MOORE, THAPAR, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

         MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which THAPAR and NALBANDIAN,
JJ., joined. THAPAR, J. (pg. 7), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

       KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.                   Roger Battle was charged with and

convicted of numerous offenses related to his leadership of a Tennessee street gang. Two of those

convictions were for committing two murders in violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of

Racketeering (“VICAR”) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (“VICAR murders”). Battle was also

charged with and convicted of two counts of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to

a “crime of violence” and “causing the death of a person through the use of a firearm” in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j). The purported “crimes of violence” underlying his § 924(c) and (j)

convictions are the two VICAR murders. After his convictions, the Supreme Court determined

that part of the definition of “crime of violence” in § 924(c) was unconstitutionally vague. United

States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). Only the elements clause of § 924(c), which defines
No. 21-5457, Battle v. United States

a crime of violence as one that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person or property of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), remains valid.

Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336.

       Battle contends that after Davis his convictions for VICAR murder no longer constitute

“crimes of violence” and therefore his convictions under § 924(c) and (j) are invalid. Appellant

Br. at 4. This appeal presents the question of whether the VICAR murders for which Battle was

convicted constitute crimes of violence. Battle argues that under the categorical approach, the

least of the conduct criminalized by § 1959(a) is a murder by omission, which he contends does

not involve a use of “physical force” and is thus not a crime of violence. A different panel of this

court was recently presented with a similar argument pertaining to a Kentucky statute and

concluded that even murders by omission involve the use of physical force. United States v.

Harrison, 54 F.4th 884, 889 (6th Cir. 2022). Even more recently, another panel was presented

with an identical argument involving § 1959(a), § 924(c) and (j), and a Tennessee statute; it

concluded that Harrison dictates the outcome. Hall v. United States, Nos. 21-5062/5288/5472,

2023 WL 1991891, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2023). As in Hall, Harrison controls here, and therefore

we affirm the district court’s denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

       Roger Battle was the leader of a Tennessee street gang called the Vice Lords. Sentencing

Hr’g Tr. at 35 (Page ID #6082), United States v. Battle et al., No. 3:09-cr-00244-1 (M.D. Tenn.

July 12, 2012) (R. 936); Superseding Indictment at 5 (Page ID #694), United States v. Battle et al.,

No. 3:09-cr-00244-1 (R. 245). In 2010, he was indicted for a variety of offenses. He stood trial

and was convicted of fifty-seven crimes, including two murders, fourteen attempted murders, and

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a host of other offenses. Superseding Indictment Battle App’x at 2–8 (Page ID #765–71), United

States v. Battle et al., No. 3:09-cr-00244-1 (R. 245-1); Judgment at 2–3 (Page ID #5919–20),

United States v. Battle et al., No. 3:09-cr-00244-1 (R. 924). He was sentenced to three consecutive

terms of life, plus 4,020 months. Judgment at 4 (Page ID #5921), United States v. Battle et al.,

No. 3:09-cr-00244-1 (R. 924). Battle’s direct appeal was denied. United States v. Battle, No. 12-

5873 (6th Cir. Sept. 4, 2013). In 2014, Battle filed a § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, which

the district court denied. Mot. to Vacate at 1 (Page ID #1), Battle v. United States, 3:14-cv-01805

(M.D. Tenn. Apr. 26, 2021) (R. 1); Mem. Op. at 2, 34 (Page ID #789, 821), Battle, 3:14-cv-01805.

       As is relevant to this appeal, Battle was convicted of two counts of committing murder in

aid of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) for the murders of Moss Dixon

and Brandon Harris. Judgment at 2–3 (Page ID #5919-20), United States v. Battle et al., No. 3:09-

cr-00244-1 (R. 924); Superseding Indictment at 33, 58–59 (Page ID #722, 747–48), United States

v. Battle et al., No. 3:09-cr-00244-1 (R. 245). The VICAR statute provides that whoever, in aid

of racketeering, “murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon, commits assault

resulting in serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence against any

individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States, or attempts or conspires so to

do, shall be punished . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). VICAR murder is conventionally charged as an

underlying state murder committed in aid of racketeering; here, the state murder was Tennessee

first-degree premeditated murder. Superseding Indictment at 33, 58–59 (Page ID #722, 747–48),

United States v. Battle et al., No. 3:09-cr-00244-1 (R. 245). The jury also convicted Battle of two

counts of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence” and using a

firearm to cause the death of a person, in violation of § 924(c) and (j). Judgment at 2–3 (Page ID

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#5919–20), United States v. Battle et al., No. 3:09-cr-00244-1 (R. 924). The “crimes of violence”

underlying the § 924(c) and (j) convictions are the two counts of VICAR murder. Superseding

Indictment at 34, 59–60 (Page ID #723, 748–49), United States v. Battle et al., No. 3:09-cr-00244-

1 (R. 245).

       After the Supreme Court declared the residual clause of § 924(c) unconstitutional in Davis,

a panel of this court granted Battle permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion

challenging his § 924(c) and (j) convictions on the ground that his VICAR murder convictions

might no longer qualify as crimes of violence. In Re Roger Battle, No. 20-6054 (6th Cir. Nov. 25,

2020). In his § 2255 motion, Battle argued that his convictions for § 1959(a) were not crimes of

violence because it was possible to commit Tennessee first-degree premeditated murder by

omission—for example, by starving a child—and he argued that such an act does not involve the

use of physical force. Mot. to Vacate at 1, 4–5 (Page ID #960, 963–64), Battle v. United States,

No. 3:14-cv-01805 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 26, 2021) (R. 59). He argued that because his VICAR

murder conviction required a finding that he had committed Tennessee first-degree murder, it

could have been predicated on a crime of omission and therefore did not constitute a crime of

violence. Id. at 5–6 (Page ID #964–65). The district court denied Battle’s § 2255 motion, rejecting

his argument that murder by omission does not involve a use of physical force. Mem. Op. at 11–

15 (Page ID #1052–56), Battle v. United States, No. 3:14-cv-01805 (R. 64). We granted a

certificate of appealability on the question. Order Granting COA, Battle v. United States, No. 21-

5457 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 2021).

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No. 21-5457, Battle v. United States

                                         II. ANALYSIS

       Since we granted the COA, this court decided two other cases that guide the outcome here.

In Harrison, a panel of this court was presented with the question of whether it was “possible to

be found guilty of complicity to commit murder [in violation of Kentucky law] without proof of

any ‘use of physical force.’” 54 F.4th at 888–89. The Harrison court held that “murder always

requires the use of physical force,” and that this was “true even when murder is carried out by

omission rather than commission.” Id. at 889. The panel specifically discussed a situation in

which a child starves to death because a parent intentionally fails to give the child food and

concluded that such an omission would constitute murder. Id. Harrison controls our decision

here. See Wallace v. FedEx Corp., 764 F.3d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[O]ne panel of this court

cannot overrule another panel’s published decision.”).

       This court even more recently decided an identical question to the one Battle presents in

Hall, 2023 WL 1991891, at *5. Hall, like this case, involved a conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1959(a) predicated on a violation of the Tennessee first-degree premeditated murder statute, and

a related 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j) conviction. The Hall panel held that Harrison controlled,

rejecting appellants’ arguments that United States v. Bass, 315 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2002), had

conclusively decided the issue of whether causing an injury to a child due to neglect could satisfy

the elements clause. Hall, 2023 WL 1991891, at *5. We do not see a meaningful distinction

between Hall and this case, and we therefore conclude that Tennessee first-degree premeditated

murder is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of § 924(c), and that the district court properly

denied Battle relief.

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No. 21-5457, Battle v. United States

                                        III. CONCLUSION

       We are bound by Harrison, which held that murder always involves the use of physical

force, even when committed by omission, and therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of

relief in Battle’s § 2255 proceeding.

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No. 21-5457, Battle v. United States

       THAPAR, Circuit Judge, concurring. Because the categorical approach requires courts to

replace undisputedly deadly facts with imaginary ones, judges now must ask whether murder is a

crime of violence. See United States v. Harrison, 54 F.4th 884, 888–89 (6th Cir. 2022). To any

sensible person, the answer is obvious. See United States v. Scott, 990 F.3d 94, 125 (2d Cir. 2021)

(Park, J., concurring). Murder is one of the worst violent crimes. And humanity has considered it

so ever since Cain slew Abel.

       Consider this case. In murder number one, Battle directed three gang members to shoot up

a house from its driveway. The intended victim wasn’t home, but his grandparents and their two

mentally disabled sons were. The gang members shot and killed the grandfather. And in murder

number two, Battle tricked a different victim into following him down a dark street. When the

victim tried to flee, Battle and another gang member shot him in cold blood.

       These facts support the unremarkable conclusion that these murders—like all murders—

are violent. Harrison, 54 F.4th at 889. Yet under the categorical approach, if we can theorize a

way to commit murder without violence, then even Battle’s crimes wouldn’t count as “crimes of

violence.” The categorical approach has taken us far “off course” into the land of absurdity.

Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 543–44 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). It’s past time for

Congress and the Sentencing Commission to revisit the enterprise and replace it with an approach

grounded in reality. See, e.g., United States v. Burris, 912 F.3d 386, 407–10 (6th Cir. 2019) (en

banc) (Thapar, J., concurring) (proposing an approach based on the facts of the actual crimes).

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