Court Opinion

ID: 9786725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:01:38.034018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:47.908857
License: Public Domain

BURKE, Justice,
specially concurring, with whom VOIGT, Chief Justice, joins.
[115] I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately because I do not agree with the path taken by the majority to reach its decision to affirm.
[116] The pivotal issue in this appeal, as identified by both parties, is whether the State breached the plea agreement. The majority opinion does not directly resolve this issue. Instead, it holds that the sentence should be affirmed solely because of "the district court's compliance with the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2)." This holding implies that the State is free to breach a plea agreement so long as a defendant has been advised that the court is not bound by the agreement and the defendant has also been advised that he cannot withdraw his guilty plea if the court does not impose the recommended sentence. However, such an advisement is required in every plea agreement made pursuant to W.R.Cz.P. ll1{(e)(1)(B). If this advisement relieved the State of its obligation to comply with the plea agreement, it would render the State's promise to make a sentencing recommendation illusory.
[117] The court's discretion to accept or reject a sentence recommended pursuant to a plea agreement does not relieve the State from complying with that agreement. When a defendant enters a guilty plea in exchange for a promise from the State to recommend a specific sentence, the State is obligated to make the agreed-upon sentencing recommendation. The court has discretion to accept or reject the recommendation, but the defendant is entitled to have the court consider the State's recommendation when determining the appropriate sentence. This approach is consistent with our established precedent. "When a plea of guilty rests to any significant degree on a promise or agreement by the State, that promise must be fulfilled." Herrera v. State, 2008 WY 25, ¶ 8, 64 P.3d 724, 727 (Wyo.2008); Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 42, 100 P.3d 394, 410 (Wyo.2004). "[A] prosecutor must explicitly stand by those terms agreed upon and may not play 'fast and loose' with the established terms reached between the parties in a plea agreement." Herrera, 118, 64 P.3d at 729. "[A] party should not be released from its obligations under a plea agreement absent another party's material or substantial breach of that agreement." Browning v. State, 2001 WY 98, 132, 32 P.3d 1061, 1071 (Wyo.2001); Schade v. State, 2002 WY 133, 15, 58 P.3d 551, 554 (Wyo.2002); Herrera, ¶ 12, 64 P.3d at 727.
[118] Nevertheless, I would affirm the district court's decision because the record establishes that Mr. Gibbs materially breached the plea agreement prior to the time when the State was obligated to perform. "It is axiomatic that, if a defendant fails to comply with a plea agreement, the is not bound by that agreement." Schade, 18, 53 P.3d at 555. I believe it is equally axiomatic, however, that when a defendant complies with a plea agreement, the State must also fulfill its part of the bargain. That obligation *868is not negated just because the court has discretion to accept or reject the sentencing recommendation.