Court Opinion

ID: 9775970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:14:28.594641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:32.341085
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ROBERTS, Judge.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of welfare fraud in violation of Article 695c, Section 34, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. The court assessed punishment at six months in jail and a fine of twenty-five dollars, and probated the sentence.
Article 695c, Section 34 provides:
“Fraudulent assistance; penalty
“Sec. 34. Whoever obtains, or attempts to obtain, or aids or abets any person to obtain, by means of a wilfully false statement or representation or by impersonation, or by other fraudulent means:
“(1) Assistance, services, or treatment to which he is not entitled;
“(2) Assistance, services, or treatment greater than that to which he is justly entitled;
“(3) Or, with intent to defraud, aids or abets in buying, or in any way disposing of the property of a recipient of assistance without the consent of the State Department, or whoever violates Section 32 or Section 33 of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined any sum not more than One Hundred Dollars ($100) or be imprisoned for not less than six (6) months, nor more than two (2) years, or be both so fined and imprisoned.”
Omitting the formal parts, the information alleges that:
“on or about the 30th day of April, A.D. 1974, ANDRES BOCANEGRA did then and there unlawfully obtain assistance and services in an amount greater than to which he was justly entitled, fraudulently, to wit, an over-issuance of bonus coupons in the amount of $708.00 from the Texas Department of Public Welfare by failing to declare earned income of $2,832.56 from his employment at War-shaw Printing Co. in McAllen, to Raymond D. Flores, a representative of the Texas Department of Public Welfare, that because of his misrepresentation of being unemployed he was able to purchase Food Stamps at a lower purchase price than he was entitled such being $2,464.00 of Food Stamps for $729.00 giving him $1,735 worth of bonus coupons, when in fact, had he reported his earned income, he would have been allowed to purchase the same amount of Food Stamps but at a higher price being $1,437.00 which would have resulted in his having received $1,027.00 in bonus coupons instead during the period of August 1, 1973 through April 30, 1974.”
We hold that the information is fundamentally defective for failing to allege a culpable mental state. Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed and the prosecution under this information ordered dismissed.
Sections 6.02 and 6.03 of the new Penal Code establish the requirements and definitions of culpability for the Code, and Section 1.03(b) makes it clear that these provisions, as well as the other provisions of Titles 1, 2, and 3 of the Code, apply to *132offenses defined by the civil statutes “unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise.” Since nothing in Article 695c, Section 34 “provides otherwise,” it is clear that Sections 6.02 and 6.03 apply to this statute.
Section 6.02 of the Penal Code provides in part:
“Sec. 6.02. Requirement of Culpability
“(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b) of this section, a person does not commit an offense unless he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the definition of the offense requires.
“(b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.
“(c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b) of this section, intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.”
Section 34 of Article 695c does not clearly dispense with a mental element since willful conduct and fraudulent conduct are part of the offense, and, under subsection (3), an intent to defraud is also a part of the offense.1 It follows that an intent to defraud is a necessary prescribed culpable mental state when welfare fraud is alleged pursuant to subsection (3). However, it also seems clear that subsections (1) and (2) of Section 34 do not prescribe culpable mental states; therefore, either intent, knowledge, or recklessness is necessary to establish criminal responsibility.
In reaching this latter conclusion, we find that the words “wilfully” and “fraudulent” in Section 34 do enable us to determine that the statute does not “plainly
dispenses with any mental element.” V.T. C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 6.02(b). However, because it is impossible to determine which of the four culpable mental states is embraced by the terms “wilfully” and “fraudulent,” we hold that these words are not sufficient to prescribe any specific culpable mental state. See the Practice Commentary to V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 6.03, and authorities there cited. Therefore, we conclude that either intent, knowledge, or recklessness is a necessary part of the offense of welfare fraud under subsections (1) and (2). See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Secs. 6.02(a) and 6.02(b); Davila v. State, 547 S.W.2d 606, 608, n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), and authorities there cited.
To hold othérwise would be to lose much of the beneficial effect of creating four “carefully defined” culpable mental states. See the Practice Commentary to Section 6.03, supra. Moreover, such a holding would be in direct conflict with the explicit language of Section 1.03(b), supra, which extends the provisions of Sections 6.02 and 6.03 to offenses outside the Penal Code.
Turning to the case before us, it is clear that this prosecution was under subsection (2) of Section 34; thus, the State was required to prove that the appellant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly: This is an element of the offense. Ex Parte Winton, 549 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Cr.App., No. 54,508, delivered April 27, 1977); Ailey v. State, 547 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), and authorities there cited. Thus, as we held in Ex Parte Winton, supra, at 752:
“Where a culpable mental state is an element of the offense, failure to allege this element renders the indictment fundamentally defective.”
We hold that the State was required to allege intent, knowledge, or recklessness in the information and the failure to do so was fundamental error,2 since “Everything *133should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.”3 Art. 21.03, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.; Ex Parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing); Ex Parte Winton, supra; Alley v. State, supra; Davila v. State, supra.
The judgment is reversed and the prosecution under this information ordered dismissed.

. Clearly, under this Court’s holding in Teniente v. State, 533 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), such an intent alleges a culpable mental state under Section 6.03(a).

. We are aware of the rule that ordinarily a charging instrument is sufficient if it alleges the offense in the language of the statute. Baldwin v. State, 538 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). However, this is an instance where legislative intent, as expressed in Sections *1331.03(b) and 6.02 of the Penal Code, requires greater particularity. See Johnson v. State, 547 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), and authorities there cited.

. This rule applies with equal force to informa-tions. Art. 21.23, V.A.C.C.P., provides: “The rules with respect to allegations in an indictment and the certainty required apply also to an information.”