Court Opinion

ID: 9768242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:52:05.518915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:38.544274
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
W. C. DAVIS, Judge.
On original submission of this case, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded to the trial court. Now on State’s Motion for Rehearing, the State urges that this Court erred in finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant appellant’s Motion to reopen. The State takes issue with the statement in the panel opinion that, “In the present case the witness was present before the completion of argument so that no delay would have resulted had she been allowed to testify.” The State maintains that this statement is a conclusion not supported in the record, and further maintains that a delay would have resulted, in that (1) the charge would have had to have been revised to include an instruction on “alibi,” (2) the State would have had to have located the other persons that the appellant’s witness stated were present at the time, and (3) the State would have had to have brought in witnesses to testify to the defense witness*760es’ bad reputation for truth and veracity. While we agree that there was no evidence to indicate that a delay would not have resulted if the Motion had been granted, neither was there any evidence in the record to show that the introduction of the evidence would have impeded the trial or interfered with the due and orderly administration of justice.
We find, upon reconsideration of the case, that the original opinion was correctly decided. However, we would emphasize that our determination that the trial court abused its discretion does not turn so much on the timing of the motion, i. e., whether or not the charge had been read to the jury, but on the substance of the evidence that was excluded. In Meeks v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 170, 117 S.W.2d 454 (1938), testimony was excluded which pertained to the issue of self-defense. The Court found that this evidence was not cumulative and held, in view of the fact that the issue was closely contested, that “it cannot be said that the excluded testimony would not probably have turned the scales in appellant’s favor.” Cf. Wilkinson v. State, 423 S.W.2d 311 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (held not an abuse of discretion to refuse to re-open after close of evidence to permit defense witness to impeach another witness) and Walker v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 507, 240 S.W. 538 (1922) (trial court did not err in refusing to re-open for defendant’s impeachment testimony).
As was stated in Meeks v. State, supra, quoting Stone v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 313, 239 S.W. 209 (1922):
“It is within the discretion of the trial court to refuse to hear testimony proffered after the beginning of the argument, and only when the discretion is clearly abused will the action be reviewed * * *. Concerning the testimony offered before the argument begins, the discretion of the court is not so broad In fact, under the latter circumstances if the proffered evidence is material and bears directly upon the main issues in the case, it would not be within the discretion of the court to exclude it unless it was offered under conditions which would impede the progress of the trial or in some way interfere with the due and orderly administration of justice.” (Emphasis added)
Inasmuch as there is no showing that the trial proceedings would have been interfered with in a manner which would impede the progress of the trial or interfere with the due and orderly administration of justice, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the “alibi” testimony.
The State’s Motion for Rehearing is denied.
DOUGLAS, J., dissents.