Court Opinion

ID: 9943132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:12:48.78821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:10.524702
License: Public Domain

J-S42027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRANDON KEY                                :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 842 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 17, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
               Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-1101741-1996

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2024

         Appellant, Brandon Key, appeals pro se from the February 17, 2023

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which denied his

second1 petition for collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.

         The factual and procedural background of the instant appeal are not at

issue.    Briefly, a jury found Appellant guilty of one count each of second-

degree murder, robbery and possessing an instrument of crime. On July 21,

1998, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the second-degree

murder conviction, and an aggregate concurrent sentence of ten to twenty

years on the remaining charges. Appellant’s counsel failed to file a timely

____________________________________________

1 The pleading is docketed as a “subsequent” PCRA.           Upon review of the
record, it appears to be a second PCRA petition.
J-S42027-23

direct appeal, but the trial court subsequently reinstated Appellant’s direct

appeal rights, nunc pro tunc.

       On direct appeal, we vacated the sentence on the robbery conviction

and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on all but

one of the nine ineffectiveness claims.2 See Commonwealth v. Key, No.

1341 EDA 1999 (Pa. Super. filed July 12, 2000). Following a hearing, the trial

court denied the remaining ineffectiveness claims. Appellant appealed, and

we subsequently affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth

v. Key, No. 740 EDA 2001 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 21, 2002).          Appellant’s

petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court was denied on October

29, 2002. See Commonwealth v. Key, No. 140 EAL 2002.

       On October 30, 2003, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. After

appointing counsel, the PCRA court denied relief on October 10, 2006. On

appeal, Appellant raised several issues of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel.    See Commonwealth v. Key, No. 3315 EDA 2006, unpublished

memorandum (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 31, 2008). We affirmed, concluding all

of Appellant’s issues were either waived or devoid of merit. Id. Appellant’s

petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court was denied on

November 24, 2008. See Commonwealth v. Key, No. 368 EAL 2008.

____________________________________________

2 Prior to our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 813
A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002), claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were
reviewable on direct appeal.

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        On July 31, 2019, Appellant filed the underlying pro se PCRA petition,

arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately review

discovery, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise that

claim. Additionally, Appellant reiterated claims of ineffective assistance of trial

and appellate counsel that were previously raised. On December 30, 2022,

the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition

as untimely pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The PCRA court formally dismissed

Appellant’s petition on February 17, 2023. This appeal followed.

        On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue:

        Does The PCRA Court’s Ruling Lack Support In The Record Where
        The Court Failed To Perceive That I Put Forth An As-Applied
        Constitutional Challenge To Imposition of The PCRA’s Time-Bar To
        My Particular Circumstances, Which Is A Viable Form of Timeliness
        Argument?

See Appellant’s Brief at 3. Simply stated, Appellant argues that the PCRA

time-bar should not apply to his circumstances. He argues that his first PCRA

was erroneously dismissed as “previously litigated”. See Appellant’s brief at

9-15.

        We review an order denying a petition for collateral relief to determine

whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the evidence of record and

free of legal error. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091

(Pa. 2010). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is

no support for the findings in the certified record.”       Commonwealth v.

Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).

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       Here, the PCRA court found that the petition is untimely because

Appellant failed to plead and prove an exception to the timeliness

requirement.       It did not address Appellant’s as-applied constitutional

challenge. All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall

be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final,” unless an

exception applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).3 A judgment becomes final at

the end of direct review or the expiration of time seeking direct review. 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

       “The PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, [i]f a

PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction

over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority to address the substantive claim.” Commonwealth v. Chester,

895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

(overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267

(Pa. 2020)).      Timeliness is separate and distinct from the merits of the

underlying claim; therefore, we must determine whether Appellant’s petition

was timely before we are permitted to address the substantive claims.

Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008).

____________________________________________

3 For an exception to apply, a petitioner must (1) plead and prove one of the

exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii); and (2) file a petition raising
the exception within one year from when the claim could have been presented.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

                                           -4-
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      It is undisputed that the instant petition is facially untimely.     We

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on March 21, 2002. Our Supreme

Court denied review on October 29, 2002.       Appellant did not seek further

review. As a result, the judgment of sentence became final on January 27,

2003, at the expiration of the 90-day period to file review with the Supreme

Court of the United States. Therefore, Appellant had one year – until January

27, 2004 – to file a timely PCRA petition. The instant petition was filed on

July 31, 2019, more than fifteen years after the judgment became final.

      Appellant admittedly does not plead an exception to the timeliness

requirement. Rather, he argues that the timeliness requirement should not

apply to his case. His argument is two-fold: (1) his first PCRA was erroneously

dismissed as “previously litigated” because the court failed to follow

precedent; and (2) due to the “error”, Appellant was “forced” to file a second

PCRA petition and it would be unconstitutional to apply the timeliness

requirement. See Appellant’s brief at 9-15.

      Appellant primarily relies on a footnote in a concurring opinion of

Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646 (Pa. 2007) to support his

argument. The footnote states: “[A] majority of the Court reaffirmed that the

timing provisions of the PCRA are subject to as-applied constitutional

challenges based on claims of unreasonable application.” Copenhefer, 941

A.2d at 650 n. 1. It cites Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa.

2007), which held that the timeliness requirement should not apply where a

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direct appeal is not filed due to abandonment of counsel. Bennett, 930 A.2d

at 1273. The Court explained:

      [A]llowing such claims to go forward would not eviscerate the time
      requirements crafted by the Legislature. Rather, subsection
      b(1)(ii) is a limited extension of the one-year time requirement
      under circumstance when a petitioner has not had the review to
      which he was entitled due to a circumstance that was beyond his
      control.

      Furthermore, we believe that the Statutory Construction Act
      requires such a result. In addition to requiring us to interpret the
      language plainly, the Act requires that we employ the presumption
      that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the United
      States or Pennsylvania Constitutions, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922. While
      we have declared the PCRA to be constitutional generally, see
      Peterkin, this does not mean that it is constitutional as
      applied to all petitioners.

Id. (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Bennett Court held that an allegation

of abandonment of counsel is sufficient to invoke the newly discovered fact

exception to the timeliness requirement. Id. at 1276.

      Post-conviction collateral relief is a guarantee of the Pennsylvania

constitution, and not the federal constitution.       Id. at 1273.     As such,

procedural due process requirements are less stringent than a criminal trial or

direct appeal. Id. Due process requires that the post-conviction collateral

relief process be fundamentally fair. Id. “Thus, petitioners must be given the

opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner.” Id.

      Appellant   argues   that   the    PCRA   timeliness   requirements    are

unconstitutional as applied to him because “[t]he Courts’ [sic] failure to follow

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precedent during proceedings for my 1st PCRA petition deprived me [due

process and equal protection of the law].” See Appellant’s Brief at 11. The

precedents he believes were not followed are: Commonwealth v. McGill,

832 A.2d 1014 (Pa. 2003) (discussion on how to properly raise a layered claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Moore, 860 A.2d 88

Pa. 2004) (distinction between “traditional” and “non-traditional” layered

claims of ineffectiveness); and Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564 (Pa.

2005) (holding that claims of ineffectiveness are distinct issues and should be

reviewed under the three-prong standard articulated in Commonwealth v.

Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987)). He argues that applying the timeliness

requirement to his second PCRA petition would not serve a legitimate purpose

“because the state acts without legitimacy when it refused to correct its own

errors that have cost a citizen constitutional rights.” Id.

      Appellant attempts to circumvent the PCRA’s timeliness requirement by

arguing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because the

courts failed to “follow precedent.” We disagree. We know of no authority

that permits a PCRA petitioner to evade the timeliness requirements of the

PCRA by asserting a court’s failure to “follow precedent.” Even if there was,

nothing in the record suggests any failure to “follow precedent” or any other

irregularity.

      A jury convicted Appellant of second-degree murder and related

offenses. On direct appeal, we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing

                                      -7-
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on Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court

reviewed these claims under the proper standard (Pierce) and denied relief.

Subsequently this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence by holding

that the trial court properly determined that trial counsel was not ineffective.

      Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition arguing that appellate counsel on

direct appeal was ineffective.   The PCRA court denied relief due to lack of

arguable merit, and we affirmed. Contrary to Appellant’s claim in the present

appeal, we did not affirm on the ground that the claims of ineffective

assistance counsel were “previously litigated.”    Simply stated, our decision

was: (1) Appellant raised a layered claim of ineffectiveness, which required

Appellant to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective, and appellate

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness; and

(2) since trial counsel was previously determined to be effective, appellate

counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge trial counsel’s performance.

Nothing in these proceedings suggests any failure by the courts to “follow

precedent” or any error that entitles Appellant to circumvent the timeliness

requirement.

      In sum, Appellant’s PCRA petition is facially untimely, and he fails to

plead or prove any exception to the timeliness requirement. Nor does his

claim of constitutional error have any substance. As a result, we conclude

that Appellant’s underlying petition is untimely, and we have no jurisdiction to

entertain the merits.

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     Order affirmed.

Date: 2/22/2024

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