Court Opinion

ID: 9689885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:49:12.669757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.651272
License: Public Domain

DIXON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
We have approached a point of holding that the voir dire examination of the jurors is exclusively within the unlimited discretion of the district judge. This was not the intent of the drafters of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. (C.Cr.P. art. 786).
It is basic to the law of Louisiana that the attorneys for the State and the defense have an unqualified right to interrogate the jurors concerning their qualifications. (C. Cr.P. art. 786; State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12).
Prejudice against, opposition to, and the inability to apply rules of law disqualify jurors. Any restriction, statutory or jurisprudential, which unduly restricts the examination of jurors as to their qualifications is unwise.
Not only has the trial court unduly restricted voir dire examination in this case, but the function of the lawyer has been further debased.. Defense counsel was interrupted in his opening statement when he was apparently attempting to explain his defense.
*452The State objected for the reason that the defense was allowed only to “outline the evidence he is to present . .
If is not the defense that is restricted to outlining the evidence. The State is restricted in opening statement to explaining the nature of the charge and the nature of evidence by which the State expects to prove the charge. (C.Cr.P. art. 766).
C.Cr.P. art. 765 in providing the normal order of trial in criminal cases states that the defendant may make an opening statement. There is no statutory restriction on that right.
R.S. 15 :333, since repealed when the new Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted, provided that in a trial, “the opening statement by counsel for the defendant at his option explaining the defense and the evidence by which he expects to prove the same” could be made.
This court, in three cases, has previously considered restrictions placed on the opening statement of defense counsel. In State v. Boone, 227 La. 850, 80 So.2d 710, counsel for the defendant during his opening statement ought to read from a hospital report certain statements with reference to the mental condition of the accused. The trial judge sustained the district attorney’s objection to the reading of the report to which the defense reserved a' bill of exceptions. We held that because such evidence could not be introduced at trial because the defendant had not pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, it was proper for the trial court to sustain the objection.
In State v. Shuff, 198 La. 67, 3 So.2d 278, this court held that sustaining the State’s objection to defense counsel’s argument in the opening statement did not prejudice the defendant because, “There is nothing in the record to show that the defendant was not allowed to introduce all of the testimony available to him on the trial of this case and as referred to in his opening statement, or that he was deprived of the right to argue therefrom the deductions sought to be brought to the attention of the jury during the opening statement.” (198 La. at 73, 3 So.2d at 280).
In State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793, defense counsel during his opening statement began to argue the law of the case relative to burden of proof, reasonable doubt and failure of the defendant to take the stand. The judge informed counsel that such argument on the law was proper only at the end of the case to which counsel objected and reserved a bill of exceptions. This court held that the defense’s opening statement must be limited to the nature of the defense and the evidence relied on. We held that the prior law, R.S. 15 :333, must be incorporated into C.Cr.P. art. 765.
*454There is simply no basis in law or reason for prohibiting a defense lawyer from outlining his defense in an opening statement. If he intends to base his defense on the credibility of the State’s witnesses as was apparent when the defense lawyer was interrupted in the case before us, he is entitled to alert the jury to that fact. We ought not relegate the defense lawyer to the status of an interested witness to the proceedings.
The State has argued that economical use of courtroom time justifies restricting opening argument and voir dire examination by the defense. Statistics of the Judicial Council, 1971, Table XII, show that Rapides Parish, with three judges, held ten crminal jury trials in 1971, and thirty-seven in the last five years. Total criminal cases filed in 1971 (Table XXII) declined 18.1% from 1970. Total criminal cases terminated in 1971 declined 22.2% from 1970. Nor is this a unique situation in Rapides Parish. In every other district court in the State of Louisiana, except ten, criminal cases filed declined in number in 1971. Over the State as a whole, there was a 6.8% reduction in criminal filings in 1971.
It does not appear that there is a demonstrable need to limit the defense function in the name of efficient judicial administration.