Court Opinion

ID: 2965551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:41:45.94367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:23.879431
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 97-2414

                          DAVID WOOLER,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                          SCOTT HANCOCK,

                       Defendant, Appellee.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

           [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                     Torruella, Chief Judge,
                 Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                   and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                
                                

     David Wooler on brief pro se.
     Marc DeSisto, Kathleen M. Powers, and DeSisto Law Offices on
brief for appellee.
     

                   Entered: November 4, 1998
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                     Per Curiam. Plaintiff David Wooler appeals pro sefrom the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Scott
    Hancock, the former town manager for the Town of Narragansett,
    Rhode Island.  The underlying case is a diversity action in the
    District of Rhode Island for alleged tortious interference with
    a (prospective) contractual relation.  We conclude that summary
    judgment was improperly granted.  
              On or about May 2, 1994, Wooler was hired by Betty
    Cotter to work for Wilson Publishing Company as a reporter for
    the Narragansett Times (the "Times").  Wooler's job was to
    cover the Town of Narragansett.  Frederick Wilson, III, was the
    publisher of Wilson Publishing Company.  Cotter was the editor
    for the Times.  Cotter was also Wooler's direct supervisor from
    the time he was hired until sometime later that same year when
  Cotter went on maternity leave.    
       Shortly after Cotter went on leave, Hancock (and
    possibly one or two other town officials) had a meeting with
  Wilson about Wooler.    At the meeting, Hancock complained that
    Wooler's coverage of the Town was too "negative."  He also
    complained that he and Wooler had a personality conflict, and
    he suggested that Wooler be transferred to another beat. 
    Sometime within the next two months, Hancock had lunch with
    Wilson.  At this second meeting, Hancock stated that he would
    like more "positive" stories about Narragansett.  On March 3,
    1995, Wilson fired Wooler.
       Almost one year later, Wooler filed the instant
    complaint against Hancock alleging tortious interference with
  his employment "contract."    Hancock moved for summary
    judgment, and the matter was referred to a magistrate judge. 
    The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that summary
    judgment be granted in favor of Hancock on the ground that
    Wooler failed to produce any evidence demonstrating that
    Hancock played a causal role in his termination.  Wooler filed
    timely objections to the magistrate's report.  Upon review, the
    district judge adopted the magistrate's recommendation.  This
    appeal followed.
       We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. 
    Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 140 (1st Cir. 1998).  In
    doing so, we view all disputed facts and reasonable inferences
    favorable to the nonmoving party.  Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car
    Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1998).   Summary judgment is
    appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment
    as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  The moving party
    bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no
    genuine issues of material fact for trial.  Hinchey, 144 F.3d
    at 140.  After that, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
    with respect to each issue on which he bears the burden of
    proof. Id.
       Under Rhode Island law, the elements of a cause of
    action for interference with a prospective contractual relation
    are:
       (1) the existence of a business
       relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge
       by the interferor of the relationship or
       expectancy, (3) an intentional act of
       interference, (4) proof that the
       interference caused the harm sustained,
       and (5) damages to the plaintiff.
    Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661, 669 (R.I.
  1986).    Thus, Wooler bears the burden of proof on the issue of
    causation.
       The evidence proffered by Hancock to negate an
    inference of causation is strong.  This evidence includes the
    deposition testimony of Wilson.  Wilson testified that he was
    the person who made the termination decision, and that Wooler
    was terminated because of his job performance.  According to
  Wilson, Wooler was not producing enough articles.    In
    particular, Wilson testified that a reporter in Wooler's
    position is expected to produce five or six stories an issue
  and that Wooler was not meeting this requirement.    Wilson Dep.
    at 33.  Wilson further testified, unequivocally, that Hancock
    had no impact on the termination decision except, perhaps, to
  prolong Wooler's employment.  
       However, there is also evidence in the record tending
    to support Wooler's version of events.  Although, as noted
    above, the evidence is conflicting on this point, a fact-finder
    could conclude that Hancock's complaints to Wilson were made
    during the last two months of Wooler's employment.  Such a
    conclusion lends some support to an inference that Hancock's
    complaints caused Wooler's termination.  Cf. Oliver v. Digital
    Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1988) (observing that
    a showing of discharge "soon after" the employee engages in
    protected activity is indirect proof of a causal connection). 
    The possible inference is further strengthened by Cotter's
    deposition testimony that Wilson seemed upset about Hancock's
  complaints.    There is also evidence, in the form of a notice
    of decision concerning Wooler's unemployment benefits, which
    could be interpreted as demonstrating a link between Hancock's
  complaints and Wooler's termination.   
       In addition, there is evidence based on which a jury
    could question the credibility of Wilson's explanation for the
    firing.  Among other things, there is evidence from which a
    jury could conclude that Wooler was, in fact, producing the
  requisite number of articles.    Moreover, Wooler submitted
    copies of many of these articles.  More than one view of these
    articles is possible, and a fact-finder might conclude that,
    contrary to Wilson's suggestion, Wooler actually covered a
    fairly broad range of non-controversial topics.  Finally,
    Wooler proffered deposition testimony of Wilson to the effect
    that he, Wilson, had heard that Hancock threatened to "freeze"
  Wooler "out of town hall."    Although Wilson denied that the
    threat concerned him or that it posed a problem for the
    newspaper, a fact-finder might be skeptical of this denial. 
    For much the same reason, a fact-finder might be skeptical of
    Wilson's emphatic statement that his decision to terminate
    Wooler was not "in any way" affected by Scott Hancock.
       We recognize that Wooler faces a formidable obstacle
    in proving causation.  The issue turns on Wilson's state of
    mind, and the most direct evidence of Wilson's state of mind
    are his own statements.  It is not obvious what motive Wilson,
    a non-party, would have to dissemble.
       Nonetheless, the weighing of alternative factual
    scenarios should ordinarily be left to the finder of fact after
    trial.  Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 172
    (1st Cir. 1998); see also Greenburg v. Puerto Rico Maritime
    Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The
    precincts patrolled by Rule 56 admit of no room for credibility
    determinations, no room for the measured weighing of
    conflicting evidence . . . , no room for the judge to
    superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood (no
    matter how reasonable those ideas may be) upon the carapace of
    the cold record.").  Although Wooler's evidence may be thin, we
    do not think that this is a case in which the evidence is "so
    one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."  Id.(citation omitted).  Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and
  remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
       Vacated and remanded.