Court Opinion

ID: 9739216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:10:43.477882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.744476
License: Public Domain

Brown, J.
(dissenting). “It is long past time for prosecutors to prepare their closing arguments carefully in Order to *502avoid the possibility of reversals of convictions because of prosecutorial error.” Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 377 Mass. 772, 778 (1979). See Commonwealth v. McLeod, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 536, 541 (1991), and cases cited. There has been little improvement in the quality and propriety of closing arguments since I became a member of this court in 1976. In that very same year, Justice Braucher in Commonwealth v. Redmond, 370 Mass. 591, 597 (1976), cautioned against “sail[ing] unnecessarily close to the wind,” and since then a plethora of opinions have rained down upon both defense counsel and prosecutor, warning, threatening, and admonishing. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kelly, 417 Mass. 266, 270-272 (1994), decided only two months ago, where the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with this court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s closing remarks were proper.1 For a similar outcome in a case decided by this court very recently, see Commonwealth v. Loguidice, post 940 (1994).
Nothing seems to get through. 2 Why cannot prosecutors get it right?3 Why should appellate courts continue to reiterate that familiar refrain:
*503“We remind prosecutors again that ‘[a]dvance preparation would eliminate from our consideration most aspects of closing arguments constantly being urged as improper.’ [Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 903 (1983)], quoting Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 557 (1977).”
Commonwealth v. Phoenix, 409 Mass. 408, 428 (1991).
It is now my view that careless and flagrant disregard of the “rules of the road” and an obvious lack of preparation mandate summary reversal and a new trial. Appellate courts are being forced to this position as a last resort because this deplorable state of advocacy is today precisely as it was in 1979 when this court plaintively opined that “[t]here still appears no other way to get the point across to those prosecutors who do not prepare their closing arguments with care.” Commonwealth v. Ryan, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 941 (1979), and cases cited. It cannot be gainsaid that “[tjhoughtful and careful preparation would have saved the Commonwealth and this court much time and expense.” Commonwealth v. McLeod, 30 Mass. App. Ct. at 541. I again remind prosecutors that “[p] rejudicial excesses in argument offered on behalf of the Commonwealth constitute prosecutorial error, not judicial error” (emphasis in original). Commonwealth v. Earltop, 372 Mass. 199, 206 (1977) (Hennessey, C.J., concurring). Until the public expresses sufficient outrage at this tremendous waste of funds and judicial resources, these improper arguments will continue. As for me, I will no longer sit idly by while the government’s attorneys continue to flout the standards of our profession as well as the mandates of the Supreme Judicial Court.4 In sum, I would reverse, pure and simple, because a prosecutor again has exceeded the bounds of proper argument.
*504A final comment is necessary. I am obliged to scold the Commonwealth’s trial attorney for the unfair manner in which she attempted “to communicate [adverse] impressions by innuendo through questions which are answered in the negative.” Commonwealth v. White, 367 Mass. 280, 284 (1975). Cf. Commonwealth v. Fordham, 417 Mass. 10, 20-21 (1994). I am otherwise in substantial agreement with the majority.

 In another recent case, Commonwealth v. Wallace, 417 Mass. 126, 133 (1994), the Supreme Judicial Court did not reverse, but was obliged to say once again that “[t]he remark, although better left unsaid, does not require reversal.”

 It previously has been suggested that “in order to cure the particular type of ill found in this case a formal disciplinary procedure should be established.” Commonwealth v. McLeod, 30 Mass. at 541 & n.11.

 For a partial laundry list of the usual explanations served up by the Commonwealth over the last two decades, we offer this language from a 1977 opinion reversing a criminal conviction because of an improper closing argument:
“The Commonwealth does not deny the impropriety of these remarks. Instead, it argues that (1) the errors were not adequately preserved for appellate review; (2) the prosecution was merely attempting to ‘fight fire with fire’; (3) the prejudicial effect of these errors was diminished substantially by the judge’s curative instructions; and (4) the evidence of guilt was overwhelming; therefore, the errors were harmless.”
Commonwealth v. Burke, 373 Mass. 569, 575 (1977).

 If this carelessness or ineptitude continues, perhaps, analogous to Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450 (1993), a trial prosecutor whose misconduct is flagrant should be required personally to reimburse the Commonwealth for the costs of any resultant retrial.