Court Opinion

ID: 9645682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:32:36.900691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:46.328417
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
At what point in a bench trial does jeopardy attach? This question was answered in State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Nevertheless, this Court once again shows its willingness to ignore established precedent, and finds an exception for trial judges who ignore the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, I am compelled to lodge this dissent.
I.
Marco Antonio Quintero, Francisco Garcia Cortez, Guillermo Longoria Alvarez and appellant were Mexican residents who entered this country to commit a robbery. The men located a grocery store and appellant waited in the vehicle while his co-defendants entered the store and, at gunpoint, escorted the manager to the store’s safe. However, the police arrived and shots were exchanged between Quintero and a Brownsville policeman. Both were shot. The co-defendants were arrested and gave video-taped statements and admitted participating in the robbery. Appellant fled to Mexico but was arrested two days later as he attempted to visit Quintero in the hospital. Appellant gave a video-taped statement and admitted participating in the robbery. Quintero was charged with attempted capital murder and aggravated robbery. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 19.03(a)(1) and 29.03. Appellant and the remaining co-defendants were charged with aggravated robbery.
Prior to trial, appellant and his co-defendants reached a plea bargain agreement with the State whereby appellant, Cortez and Alvarez would plead guilty and the State would reduce the offense from the first degree felony of aggravated robbery to the lesser, second degree offense, of robbery, with no agreed recommendation as to punishment. Quintero agreed to plead guilty to aggravated robbery, and the State agreed to dismiss the attempted capital murder charges. There was no agreed recommendation as to Quintero’s punishment.
The State, appellant and the co-defendants appeared before the trial judge and pled guilty pursuant to their respective agreements. See, Appendix “A,” infra.1 The trial judge admonished the defendants and accepted their pleas.2 The trial judge then ordered a pre-sentence investigation report and scheduled the cases for sentencing. Appellant and his co-defendants appeared on the scheduled day for sentencing. See, Appendix “B,” infra.3 The record establishes that during the interim: 1) the trial judge and prosecutor received a great deal of unfavorable publicity concerning the plea agreements; 2) police officers began a petition drive to influence the trial judge; 3) numerous petitions were delivered to the trial judge; and, 4) a citizen’s group contacted the trial judge to discuss these cases. See, Appendix “B,” infra. Further, many police officers and other members of the community were present at the sentencing hearing.
*113Quintero asked to withdraw his plea, contending the actions of the police officers coupled with the extensive and adverse pretrial publicity could only influence the trial judge to impose an unjust punishment. See, Appendix “B,” infra. Quintero contended he was entitled to withdraw his plea because he “wouldn’t be able to destroy the monster that [the police and media] have created.” Ibid. In essence Quintero contended that, because of the extensive publicity and pervasive community opinion surrounding this ease, the trial judge would be unable to be fair and impartial in the imposition of sentence.
The prosecutor conceded the intense publicity and community feeling surrounding this case but contended the pleas were voluntary and opposed Quintero’s request to withdraw his plea.4 Appellant and his co-defendants did not ask to withdraw their pleas. Instead, appellant announced he was ready to proceed with sentencing and the State agreed. See, Appendix “B,” infra.
The trial judge granted Quintero’s motion to withdraw his plea. Thereafter, the trial judge, sua sponte, instructed appellant and his remaining co-defendants to withdraw their pleas because the trial judge felt “that for the Court to accept the recommendations that have been made in this ease would be sending the wrong message to the community from the courts.” The trial judge ordered:
So I am hereby going to instruct the respective attorneys to withdraw the pleas of guilty in behalf of their clients and set this matter for trial. And if you don’t, I will enter it in your behalf.5
Appellant then moved to withdraw his plea and the trial judge ordered the plea withdrawn. Appellant’s motion to change venue was granted and the ease was transferred from Cameron County to Willacy County. Appellant later entered a plea of nolo conten-dere to the first degree offense of aggravated robbery, and the trial judge assessed punishment at fifty years.
On appeal appellant contended his aggravated robbery conviction was barred because jeopardy attached when the trial judge accepted appellant’s plea to robbery. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that “[w]hen presented with a plea bargain, the court has the right to accept or reject it ... Any acceptance of the plea of guilty before approval of the agreement is both premature and tentative” Ortiz v. State, 885 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994). Therefore, the Court of Appeals reasoned, since the trial judge did not accept the plea bargain, jeopardy did not attach to appellant’s case. Id., 885 S.W.2d at 274. The Court of Appeals held appellant consented to a new trial because he withdrew his plea of guilty. Ibid.
II.
In State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, we were asked to determine when jeopardy attaches in a bench trial under the Texas Constitution. The State and Torres announced ready for trial. Torres waived the formal reading of the indictment and pled not guilty. Thereafter, the State sought to amend the indictment but the trial judge refused the amendment. When the State refused to present any witnesses, the indictment against Torres was dismissed for want of prosecution. Id., 805 S.W.2d at 419. The State obtained a new indictment which the trial judge dismissed, holding the prosecution was jeopardy barred. In affirming we held: “for bench trials, jeopardy attaches when both sides have announced ready and the defendant has pled to the charging instrument.” Id., 805 S.W.2d at 421.
In Perkins v. Court of Appeals, 738 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), the defendant was charged with murder. The State and defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby the defendant pled guilty and was to receive *114not more than twenty-five years confinement. The trial judge admonished the defendant, accepted his plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation report. Id., 738 S.W.2d at 279. At the sentencing hearing the trial judge stated he would not accept the plea bargain. Id., 738 S.W.2d at 280. The defendant sought a writ of mandamus, contending he was entitled to be sentenced under the plea bargain.
We held the trial judge had “no lawful authority to sua sponte withdraw” the defendant’s guilty plea, because his actions “actually amounted to the granting on his own motion a new trial.” Id., 738 S.W.2d at 280-281. In so holding, we acknowledged the trial judge’s actions would render a second conviction void, id., 738 S.W.2d at 281, because the specific performance of the plea bargain agreement was “ministerial, mandatory and nondiscretionary.” Id., 738 S.W.2d at 285.
III.
The plurality recognizes that a plea of guilty entered pursuant to a plea bargain agreement constitutes a bench trial. Ante, 933 S.W.2d at 105. Therefore, this case should be resolved by a straightforward application of Torres and Perkins.
In the instant case, the State and appellant announced ready and, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant pled guilty to the lesser offense of robbery. The trial judge accepted this plea. See, Appendix “A,” infra. Under Torres, jeopardy attached when the trial judge accepted appellant’s plea to the offense of robbery. Torres, 805 S.W.2d at 421. And under Perkins, appellant is entitled to the specific enforcement of his plea bargain. Perkins, 738 S.W.2d at 285. But, citing no authority, the plurality chooses to ignore Torres in cases involving plea agreements. Instead the plurality holds “the attachment of jeopardy when the plea agreement is accepted best protects jeopardy concerns_” Ante, 933 S.W.2d at 105. Finding the trial judge accepted appellant’s guilty plea, but not his plea bargain, the plurality holds jeopardy did not attach. The plurality’s approach is flawed for at least two reasons.
First, the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial judge to accept a plea bargain agreement before accepting the guilty plea. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Am. art. 26.13(a)(2). Under art. 26.13(a)(2) the trial judge is required to “inquire as to the existence of any plea bargain agreements between the state and the defendant and, in the event that such agreements exist, the court shall inform the defendant whether it will follow or reject such agreements in open court and before any finding on the plea.” In this ease the trial judge did not expressly state he would follow or reject the plea bargain agreement but under art. 26.13(a)(2), the trial judge could not have accepted appellant’s plea to the lesser offense of robbery unless he had accepted the plea agreement. In short, a common sense reading of the record supports a finding that the trial judge necessarily accepted the plea bargain agreement when he accepted appellant’s plea of guilty.
Second, appellant’s plea bargain was complete at the time he entered his plea because there was no agreed recommendation as to punishment. Punishment was a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge and both parties were free to present arguments to the trial judge on that issue. Thus, the plea bargain agreement was complete at the time the trial judge accepted appellant’s plea. Thus, as in Perkins, appellant’s plea bargain agreement was complete before the proceedings were rescheduled for sentencing. Appellant relied upon the terms of this agreement until the trial judge sua sponte ordered appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.
For these reasons, I would hold jeopardy attached when the trial judge accepted appellant’s plea to the offense of robbery. Torres, supra. Because the terms of the plea bargain agreement can be enforced, I would remand this case to the trial court with orders to sentence appellant for the offense of robbery. Perkins, supra.
APPENDIX “A”
Plea of Guilty
July 28, 1989
THE COURT: Okay, Let’s get on the record on Cause No. 89-CR530-E, in the mat*115ter of State of Texas versus Francisco Garcia Cortez, Guillermo Longoria Alvarez and Osiel Valdez Ortiz.
* * * * * *
THE COURT: All three of you said that your clients understand the accusations. Now, it is my understanding from the State that we’re going on the lesser included of robbery. ... Have you all explained to your respective clients the accusation that they are going to be entering a plea to ... ?
[Each lawyer announced in the affirmative.]
******
THE COURT: And how does your client intend to plea ... ?
[Each defendant pled guilty.]
* * * * * *
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Cortez, Mr. Alvarez and Mr. Ortiz, all lawyers have indicated to the Court that you each understand the charges which you are going to be pleading to, which is the robbery and not the aggravated robbery. That you all intend to plea guilty to this. Is that true and correct ... ‘I
[Each defendant indicates it is.]
THE COURT: Okay. For all three of you, in the event that the Court were to find you guilty, you could receive by way of punishment from the Court for this accusation no less than two years, no more than 20 years in the Texas Department of Corrections. In addition, you could receive a fine not to exceed five thousand. Do you under stand that ... ‘I
[Each defendant answered in the affirmative.]
THE COURT: If your intention is to plead guilty, are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, or has somebody promised anything, threatened you or forced you to plea this way ... ?
[Each defendant pleas voluntarily.]
******
THE COURT: Is there going to be any recommendation to the Court in connection with these matters other than the reduction to the lesser included?
THE STATE: Not a this time, Your Honor, no.
THE COURT: It’s been brought to my attention, Mr. Cortez, Mr. Alvarez and Mr. Ortiz that there is going to be no recommendation to the Court by way of the sentence, which means that whatever I decide to sentence you to, you will have to accept that. And further that, you know, not only will you have to accept it, but you farther waive the right to appeal the judgment of the Court, unless you first obtain written permission to do so from this Court.
Do you understand that that is the law ... 1
[Each defendant answered in the affirmative.]
THE COURT: That being the case, the Court will accept your pleas of guilty at this time. ...
******
THE COURT: Now, certain documents are being offered for my consideration and review which appear to have your signatures which indicate to the Court that you all wish to waive your rights to a jury trial, you further wish to waive your rights to confront your accusers in open court and you stipulate that the evidence that’s been offered is true and correct.
In addition, you give up your right against self-incrimination. Are those your intentions and agreements ... ?
[Each defendant answered in the affirmative.]
THE COURT: Do all three of you further ■understand as an admonishment that if you were to be convicted for this accusation that you could be deported from this country? In addition, you could be denied entry into this country. Further, you could be denied citizenship rights in this country. Do you understand this is also a consequence of this ease ... ?
*116[Each defendant answered in the affirmative.]
* ⅜ * * * *
THE COURT: The Court is hereby going to accept it. Now, I’m not going to be making any decisions today. I’m going to be deferring findings and ordering a pre-sentence investigation report and schedule this matter for further hearing. ...
APPENDIX “B”
Sentencing Hearing
September 1, 1989
QUINTERO’S COUNSEL: If it please the Court, your Honor, and if I may address the Court, at this point we are respectfully with all due deference, requesting that the plea be withdrawn.
The reason we are asking for this, for various reasons, your Honor. Let me say at the onset that I have been before this Court many times with many defendants. And I have the utmost respect for the integrity and the dignity of this Court. And me, and as many other defense attorneys have been in this' court on several plea bargains.
But in this ease it’s very difficult, your Honor. It’s very difficult for various reasons. I know that your Honor is honest and I know that your Honor tries to do what is fair. But again, under these circumstances we are forced to bring forth this motion, motion for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty. And the reasons for this is that it is very difficult for this Court or any other court, in view of the circumstances, to not be influenced, by the misactions of a few renegade police officers who go to the society, who go out there to the community and threaten them into signing petitions or they will not protect them or they’ll not serve them.
It’s very difficult for this Court or any other Court of these few renegade police officers to run to the city commissioners and pressure them into creating a resolution, a resolution that in the end is affecting Mr. Quintero and his appearance in this court. It is very difficult for this Court or any other Court, your Honor, not to be influenced by the fact that in our country the most immature person can come and express their opinion.
In fact, there was a letter highly critical of myself, an attorney who merely is trying to do his job, who is merely trying to abide by the expectations and requirements of the law giving the best representation that I can to Mr. Quinte-ro.
It’s very difficult for this Court or any other Court not to be influenced when the newspapers, which are cheap and plenty, who care nothing about the administration of justice but only care about selling newspapers, same thing with the news media, who are only interested in competing with the sister stations in order to get bigger items. They are not interested in the administration of justice, your Honor.
It is again with reluctance that I again emphasize and plea with the Court to allow Mr. Quintero to withdraw his motion. He is to withdraw his plea of guilty, your Honor.
It is very difficult for this Court and for any other Court for that matter, to see a few police officers and a few irresponsible, insensitive and almost inhuman people feel that they are beyond and above the law, that they can go out there and create all kinds of negative publicities when in essence here we are in a court of justice, here we are in the administration of justice, where everybody, no matter what they are, the Russians or whatever, and for that matter, Mr. Quintero is a citizens of these United States and even if he wasn’t, he is supposed to be in accordance with the Constitutional guarantees that are given to any and all defendants.
He is supposed to be given those same rights, your Honor. Again, some people are out there saying he was a mojado, a wetback, a person from, not from here.
*117That shouldn’t matter. But he is a citizen of these United States.
In addition, your Honor, it is very difficult for this Court or any other Court to be inundated, with petitions who came from the pressures of those renegade officers and those irresponsible people who are asking or they are not asking for justice, they are asking for revenge. They are asking for political revenge. They are asking give [the District Attorney] a lesson.
This is not the purpose of this case, your Honor. This is not the purpose of our administration of justice.
Again, for all these reasons and others that I can’t name at this time, your Honor, and in addition, let me say, your Honor, I am probably the least person knowledgeable in the area of crime and punishment, but I have read a lot of literature in the past two or three hundred years in connection with these themes and the more I read and the more I study and the more that I doubt, my doubt grows as to the severity of punishment having anything to do with stopping of the crime.
People here—
THE COURT: Excuse me, [Quintero’s attorney]. You are making certain assertions, all right? Obviously, I have not even commented on some facts, but go ahead and proceed.
QUINTERO: That’s what I say, that I have the utmost respect for you and this court. I consider you a friend of mine, your Honor. And I consider you a fair person. And even if you weren’t a friend of mine, I know that you are an honest person. You have always given out justice the way it’s supposed to be.
And this is not the first plea that has come before this Court. In fact, I have two more pleas before this Court this morning. And it’s not the first time that the District Attorney’s office and defense attorneys like myself get together with the police officers, your Honor.
But in these circumstances, the uniqueness of these circumstances, all the negative publicity, all the pressures that have been created by virtue of all those petitions, et cetera, your Honor, it is very difficult, again, for this Court, or any other Court, your Honor, to meet out justice, to meet out justice without really having an opportunity to know who’s Mr. Quintero.
He has come here because of all the negative publicity. He won’t be able to destroy the monster that they have created.
This is not the crime of the century, Judge. This is not a capital murder ease. This is just a robbery that went sour. And some people out there are saying, your Honor, meet out the justice, the same justice that Mr. Quintero gave Mr. Castro and the same justice that Mr. Quintero gave Ponce.
This is not in accordance with our expectation of the law and the administration of justice, Judge. To do this would be to turn back the clock, to go against humanity, to go against civilization, in essence, to go back to the jungle. And this is not a jungle. This is not a Columbian-style justice. This is not Ko-mani-style justice. This is American justice, your Honor.
So for all these reasons, I again implore your Honor, I pray that you allow Mr. Quintero to withdraw his plea of guilty, your Honor. And again, I’m very sony for taking up so much time, for talking so much, Judge, but this is extremely, extremely the type of ease that merits my talking in this connection and with this frame of mind, your Honor.
And lastly, let me say that I new that when we made the agreement, Judge, that the District Attorney’s Office, through Mr. Cyganiewicz was going to be asking for the maximum. I knew that, my client knew that. But at the same time, we felt that we could come in here and present evidence with respect to Mr. Quintero that could probably equalize, because we were coming in to ask for the minimum, Judge. And *118there’s been other eases not similar to, but more probable than this that have gotten different types of justice.
Again, your Honor, we implore that you allow Mr. Quintero to withdraw his plea of guilty and allow us to go to the jury for sentencing.
THE COURT: ... I am not going to make any comment. I am simply going to allow equal time to all the respective parties. Obviously, your client Mr. Quintero is present. He has pled guilty before this Court on the matter of aggravated robbery.
Obviously, I allowed him to enter the plea of guilty. However, I did not make any findings at the time of the plea. I withheld any finding ordering a pre-sen-tence investigation report. One has been provided.
Have you been provided with all the necessary reports in connection with your client?
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅞: ⅜
As far as [appellant].
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Same things with him. I also allowed him to plead guilty and I did not make any findings, likewise ordering a pres-sentence investigation report.
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: I have had an opportunity to review the report, Judge. And my client is ready to go forward.
THE COURT: All right. I’m going to set these guidelines: I’m going to allow from the respective defense attorneys to make their presentations to the Court before I make my findings. I will allow the District Attorney’s Office an opportunity to make their presentations.
It had been brought to my attention that a group of people from the community wanted to talk to me on Thursday. I instructed my bailiff to inform the group that, the victim group, that under our rules the Court is not allowed to have ex parte hearings on any matters.
However, I did inform my bailiff to inform the group that I would allow you to speak under the Victim’s Law Act. You are allowed to your presentations to the Court. I will ask that you select one of the group as your spokesperson and I will allow that group to make a presentation in connection with this case.
So with that in mind, who wants to go first? ...
* ⅜ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅜
ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Your Hon- or, before [The District Attorney] addresses the Court, I would like to briefly make a few comments and most important in reply to [Quintero’s] concerns. I have Judge, I also have a great respect for you, consider you to be a very fair judge. I have a lot of respect for [Quintero’s attorney] and his position. And he has a right to be concerned to a certain degree, your Honor.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜: ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
... I’m just going to ask the Court, your Honor, if there were no police officers in this courtroom, if his Honor were placed with no petitions or ten thousand petitions, we would be asking for the same thing. If I were here along with [Quintero] and his Honor and no one else was here, your Honor, I would ask for [the maximum sentence],
I don’t, I am just trying to ask the Judge to try to ignore some of the petitions or I know that you can consider them, Judge. But our position is that we were going to asking for [the maximum sentence] in this matter no matter what was presented today. That was our strategy and our plan from day one.
We’d ask the Court to accept the plea. I was present for the plea. It was voluntary, as his Honor knows. And we just wanted the maximum from the start, your Honor, no matter who was here today. And that’s what we are requesting.
With regards to the other defendants who are not involved in a shooting of an officer, but who are involved in a very horrible, cruel crime, we ask for the *119maximum on those defendants also, your Honor.
THE COURT: [Appellant’s counsel], anything in behalf of your client?
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Yes, sir. After reading the PSI, it is accurate. The only thing I would like to emphasize at this point, Judge, is that this gentleman is 38 years old. The first time he’s been involved in this type of crime, any trouble whatsoever, Judge. We puts full faith in your objectivity in this situation, Judge. Nothing further.
* ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
[The trial judge then asked Quintero if he wanted to withdraw his plea on the advice of counsel and whether he was aware of the consequences of doing so.]
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ¾: ⅜
[The trial judge then allowed the District Attorney to argue for imposition of the maximum sentences for each defendant.]
THE COURT: All right. Now, do we have anybody from the victim’s group that wishes to address the Court? Do we have anybody from the victim’s group that wish to address the Court at this time? This is your chance now. Anyone? All right.
First of all, I want to tell all the respective parties involved that, obviously, this is a very serious accusation, as stated by you so eloquently [Quintero’s counsel].
And I can, how should I say, I can sympathize with you, because obviously, when you become a lawyer you take the oath to practice law. You swear to do the best of whatever you can of your abilities to represent your clients to the best of your abilities. And I can sympathize in the position that you are in the position that you find with your client at this time.
I also can sympathize with the other attorneys that are representing these. This case is obviously not an easy case for any Court to decide, based on the facts that have been presented.
In reviewing all the facts, the pre-sentence investigation reports that were given to me on each respective defendant, I quite frankly, at this time am going to announce to all of you that I cannot in good conscience accept the recommendations that have been made.
I also feel that as was stated by [the District Attorney] that for the Court to accept the recommendations that have been made in this case would be sending the wrong message to the community from the courts.
I therefore, am going to ask, I’m going to approve [Quintero’s counsel], first of all, the withdrawal of the plea of guilty.... And I’m going to set both cases for trial. Now, os to the other three, the Court cannot in good conscience enter any findings to the lesser included offense.
You know, I have five children and if all five of my children commit a wrong, I expect to sentence them all alike for the same wrong that they all committed. And I wouldn’t have been allowed to be able to do this in these eases.

So I am hereby going to instruct the respective attorneys to withdraw the pleas of guilty in behalf of their clients and set this matter for trial. And if you don’t, I will enter it in your behalf.

⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
I may also address myself to the group of people that sent all those petitions to the Court. I don’t know who you are. I recognize some signatures, but I do want for you to understand that your efforts have been courageous, well-intended. I think that all of us that are in this courtroom, along with the District Attorney’s Office, the defense attorneys, always keep in mind what is in the best interest of the community, the well-being of the community and the safety.
*120I know that our courts here have always taken in account your best interest, your family’s best interest and your children’s best interest, specifically, any and all cases involving violent behavior.
I do want to thank you for your civic duty to making your intentions to this Court as far as how you felt about it. Obviously, we always keep those in mind.
Thank you for doing a tremendous and courageous civic duty as well as your responsibility as citizens of this State.
I’m going to at this time continue with the rest of my docket. And it was nice having you here.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜

. Attached hereto as Appendix "A” are relevant excerpts from appellant's plea of guilty.

. The plurality holds the trial judge's acceptance of the guilty plea was tentative. The record does not support this holding. On two separate occasions the trial judge informed appellant and his co-defendants that he would accept their pleas of guilty. See, Appendix "A,” infra.

.Attached hereto as Appendix ''B” are relevant excerpts from the sentencing hearing.

. Even though the plurality takes issue with this statement, ante at 103, n. 1, it is supported by the record. The prosecutor stated:
... if there were no police officers in this courtroom, if his Honor were placed with no petitions or ten thousand petitions, we would be asking for &e same thing.... I don't, I am just trying to ask the Judge to try to ignore some of the petitions.
See, Appendix “B.”

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.