Court Opinion

ID: 9898335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:01.897991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:18.707385
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       AUGUST 3, 2023
                                                                In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                               WA State Court of Appeals Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )
                                              )         No. 38899-9-III
                     Respondent,              )
                                              )
       v.                                     )
                                              )
K.D.A.-H.,†                                   )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                              )
                     Appellant.               )

       SIDDOWAY, J.P.T.1 — K.D.A.-H. appeals an order of adjudication and disposition

finding him guilty of a fourth degree assault of his sister. He contends the evidence is

insufficient to support the finding of guilt, and makes associated assignments of error to

three of the court’s conclusions of law. He also contends that remand is required for the

court to make findings on whether K.D.A.-H.’s conduct was intentional and offensive.

       We reject the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence but agree that additional

findings are required. We remand for that purpose.

       †
          Consistent with RAP 3.4 and General Order of Division III, In Re the Use of
Initials or Pseudonyms for Child Victims or Child Witnesses (Wash. Ct. App. June 18,
2012), we refer to the appellant and his sister by their initials. Our general order is
available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/?fa=atc.genorders
_orddisp&ordnumber=2012_001&div=III.
       1
        Judge Laurel H. Siddoway was a member of the Court of Appeals at the time
argument was held on this matter. She is now serving as a judge pro tempore of the court
pursuant to RCW 2.06.150.
No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       We rely for the factual background primarily on the juvenile court’s findings,

which are unchallenged and are therefore verities on appeal. State v. B.J.S., 140 Wn.

App. 91, 97, 169 P.3d 34 (2007).

       On October 6, 2021, K.D.A.-H. had recently been released from the hospital after

surgery. He had lost weight and was weak. He was resting in a bedroom of his mother’s

home when his sister, K.M.R. came upstairs to the room, looking for the two family dogs.

One of K.M.R.’s chores was to let the dogs outside in the morning, before school.

K.D.A.-H. was sitting on the edge of the bed with his feet hanging over the edge.

       As K.M.R. attempted to retrieve Bosley, K.D.A.-H.’s dog, it nipped at her and she

responded by hitting it on the nose. K.D.A.-H. told her not to hit the dog and K.M.R.—

who described herself as in a bad mood that morning—responded, “No one is talking to

you.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 16. It made K.D.A.-H. angry, but K.M.R. did not care.

       As K.M.R. was retrieving the second dog, which was under the bed on which

K.D.A.-H. was sitting, she called K.D.A.-H. a “little bitch,” and he responded by giving

her what she would later characterize as a “quick tap in the face with his foot.” Rep. of

Proc. (RP) at 26. She threw a lotion bottle and a vitamin bottle at him, striking him with

one of the bottles, and then went downstairs to speak to her father, who was visiting the

home at the time.

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No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

       K.D.A.-H. followed her downstairs and, on catching up with her, hit her on the left

side of her head with an open hand. K.M.R. described it as a “hard high five.” RP at 30.

The blow led to a mutual fight, during which she suffered a bloody nose. Although

K.D.A.-H. was 16 at the time and K.M.R. was 11, she weighed more than he did, given

his then-recent weight loss.

       K.M.R.’s father (he is not K.D.A.-H.’s father) told K.M.R. to report her brother’s

actions to a school counselor and she did, as soon as she arrived at school. Evidence of

her bloody nose was still visible. The counselor asked her about it and summoned the

school resource officer. Photographs were taken and K.M.R. made a statement that she

signed under penalty of perjury.

       The State charged K.D.A.-H. with one count of assault in the fourth degree, based

on the kick or tap in the face that occurred upstairs. The case proceeded to an

adjudicatory hearing. At the hearing, K.M.R. acknowledged that in her statement given

at school she had referred to K.D.A.-H.’s foot tap to her face as a kick. She testified that

it was not like kicking a soccer ball, though, and that K.D.A.-H. was too weak at the time

to kick hard.

       K.D.A.-H. defended against the charge with argument that what happened with

K.M.R. was a “typical and common and de minimis interaction between siblings” that

was “de minimis mutual combat” rather than a fourth degree assault. RP at 133.

                                             3
No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

       At the conclusion of the evidence and argument, the court announced its decision,

finding K.D.A.-H. guilty of the assault charge. It observed that K.M.R. had been a

credible witness who tried to testify “to the very best of her ability” even though it was

apparent that “[s]he did not necessarily want to be here today; that she wanted this to

be—my words—water under the bridge.” RP at 141. Addressing the defense argument

that K.D.A.-H.’s actions did not amount to a fourth degree assault, the court observed:

       I don’t have to get further than the tap to the head under the bed, quite
       frankly, to find a 4th Degree Assault as an unwanted touching. She further
       on redirect said to [the prosecutor] when he specifically asked her whether
       it was a kick or a tap to the head, she identified that as upsetting her, which
       I think completes the definition of a 4th Degree Assault, which is an assault
       which is unwanted touching.
              So, you know, potentially you’ve got two separate⎯this could have
       been a two Count, I guess, Information by the State had they chosen to
       identify both. I’m focusing only on the tap/kick to the head. I don’t think I
       need to go any further; I don’t even think I need to get downstairs in the
       testimony to find that this was an unwanted touching or she wouldn’t have
       been upset by it, as she testified.

RP at 143-44. The court added,

       Everybody has transitioned well beyond this and I get that, but the reality
       is, is the police were called, reports were taken, it was the State’s
       prerogative to pursue this today and⎯and I am satisfied that this has been
       proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

RP at 144.

                                              4
No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

       At the disposition hearing, the court sentenced K.D.A.-H. to local sanctions of no

confinement and 12 months’ community supervision. The court thereafter entered

written findings of fact and conclusions of law. K.D.A.-H. appeals.

                                         ANALYSIS

       A person is guilty of fourth degree assault “if, under circumstances not amounting

to assault in the first, second, or third degree, or custodial assault, he or she assaults

another.” RCW 9A.36.041(1). “Assault is an intentional touching or striking of another

person that is harmful or offensive, regardless of whether it results in physical injury.”

State v. Tyler, 138 Wn. App. 120, 130, 155 P.3d 1002 (2007).

       K.D.A.-H. argues that given the elements of fourth degree assault and the juvenile

court’s findings and conclusions, there was insufficient evidence of the essential element

of a touching that was harmful or offensive. He emphasizes that the court found an

“unwanted” touch rather than an “offensive” one, pointing to the court’s finding that

K.M.R. “identified the kick, or the tap . . . as an unwanted touching,” Br. of Appellant at

10, and the following conclusions of law:

       1.     A fourth-degree assault is an unwanted touching.
       ....
       3.     [K.M.R.] identified the touch as unwanted.
       4.     [K.D.A.-H.] is guilty of fourth-degree assault for the unwanted
       touching of [K.M.R.] on October 6, 2021, within the State of Washington.

CP at 17.

                                               5
No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

       If we disagree, he argues that at a minimum, the case must be remanded for

additional findings. We address these challenges in turn.

I.     THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT

       The court’s finding that K.D.A.-H’s touching was “unwanted” is not a basis for

concluding that the court may have found it harmful, but it is a basis for concluding that

the court may have found it to be offensive. At issue, then, is the sufficiency of the

evidence to establish an offensive touching.

       Had this been a jury trial, and had it been deemed necessary to define “offensive”

for the jury, the note on use for pattern criminal instruction 35.50 provides the following

definition: “A touching or striking is offensive if the touching or striking would offend an

ordinary person who is not unduly sensitive.” 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON

PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 35.50, at 619 (5th ed. 2021) (adapting the

definition from section 19 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).

As commonly used, “offensive” means “causing displeasure or resentment : giving

offense : INSULTING, AFFRONTING.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED,

https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/offensive.

       Due process requires the State to prove every element of the crime charged

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. C.B., 195 Wn. App. 528, 537-38, 380 P.3d 626

(2016) (citing State v. Baeza, 100 Wn.2d 487, 488, 670 P.2d 646 (1983)). “‘The test for

                                               6
No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 538 (quoting State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d

1068 (1992)). Where trial was to the bench, this is ordinarily done by determining

whether substantial evidence supports the findings of fact, and if so, whether the findings

support the conclusions of law. Id. Where, as here, the trial court omits a finding on an

essential element (thereby requiring remand), the State may still have met its burden of

proof. State v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 19, 904 P.2d 754 (1995). In such a case, we

review whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the necessary

elements. Id.

       During K.M.R.’s direct examination, she testified:

             Q     Was there any more physical contact in the bedroom between
       you and [K.D.A.-H.]?
                A    Yes, there was.
                Q    And what happened in the bedroom?
                A    I threw a lotion bottle at him and a vitamin bottle.
                Q    Okay. And why did you do that?
                A    Because I was mad. I acted out of anger.
             Q     Well, that’s understandable. Why did you throw them? What
       were you angry about?
                A    Him kicking me in the face.

RP at 28. Her reaction to the tap or kick was revisited in cross-examination:

                                             7
No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

           Q      Okay. Here as you remember right now though, you
      remember that he tapped you in the face with his foot.
               A      How I remember it now?
               Q      Yes.
               A      Yes.
               Q      Okay. And you don’t remember crying after he did that?
             A      I can’t remember. I don’t know if I was crying, but I was
      very upset. I know that.
               Q      You remember it making you very mad?
               A      Yes, I remember it making me very upset.
               ....
             Q      And when you got up off the floor, you threw a vitamin bottle
      and a lotion bottle at [K.D.A.-H.]?
               A      Yeah.
               Q      And you missed him with the vitamin bottle.
               A      No. I think I missed—
               Q      You hit him with—
               A      I think I missed him with the vitamin bottle maybe.
               Q      Okay. You hit him with one of the bottles.
               A      Yes.

RP at 47-48.

      On redirect examination, K.M.R. testified:

             Q        You said you were upset when [defense counsel] asked you if
      you⎯if [K.D.A.-H.]’s foot touched your head. Do you remember you
      called it a tap and then a kick? You talked about that.
               A      Yeah.
               Q      And you told [her] you were upset. Why were you upset?
               A      When?

                                              8
No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

              Q      When his foot touched your head.
              A      Wouldn’t you be upset if a foot touched your head?
            Q       So you were upset that he kicked you, tapped you, whatever
       we want to call it?
              A      Yeah.
             Q       And when he gave you the hard high five, were you also
       offended?
              A      Yes.

RP at 83. A last question was posed by the court:

              Q      You seem to distinguish between being upset and being mad.
       You kind of went back and forth, so do you have a different definition on
       what it means to be upset as opposed to being mad? Are they the same
       thing to you or different?
               THE WITNESS: Mad is different than upset because mad is like
       really, really mad, like⎯that didn’t really explain it. (Laughs)
              Mad is like when you’re really angry and you just can’t control
       yourself. And upset is when you can control yourself, but you don’t really
       care because you’re upset.

RP at 84.

       When one of the essential elements of a crime is whether the person affected by

the defendant’s act would reasonably react in a particular way, the actual reaction of the

person actually affected is key evidence. In State v. Kohonen, 192 Wn. App. 567, 580,

370 P.3d 16 (2016), for example, where the defendant was charged with making a true

threat, testimony regarding the actual reactions of three members of the intended

audience “provide a guide for what constituted a reasonable reaction under the

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No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

circumstances.” Similarly, in State v. Kilburn, our Supreme Court observed that “in the

vast majority of cases . . . a reasonably foreseeable response from the listener and an

actual reasonable response should be the same.” 151 Wn.2d 36, 45 n.3, 84 P.3d 1215

(2004) (citing Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 623 (8th Cir.

2002)). The only case where there might be a different outcome “is where the recipient

suffers from some unique sensitivity unknown to the speaker.” Id.

       K.D.A.-H. has never contended that K.M.R. suffers from some undue or unique

sensitivity. Her testimony about her and her brother’s actions appeared to be fair and

balanced. The juvenile court found her “incredibly credible” and, as noted earlier, shared

its observation that K.M.R. tried to provide her sworn testimony “to the very best of her

ability.” RP at 143, 141. K.M.R.’s immediate response to the touching (throwing bottles

at K.D.A.-H.), her reporting the event to her school counselor that day, and her testimony

at the adjudication hearing that the foot tap to her face made her mad and very upset are

all evidence that the touching was offensive—a reaction on her part that we find

reasonable and, by extension, that we find objectively reasonable. More so than any

other part of the body, uninvited contact to a person’s face is likely to be offensive. We

find apt K.M.R.’s response, when asked why the tap with the foot upset her, “Wouldn’t

you be upset if a foot touched your head?” RP at 83. The evidence was sufficient.

                                             10
No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

II.    WE WILL REMAND FOR FINDINGS ON THE ISSUES OF INTENTION AND
       OFFENSIVENESS

       In a case that is appealed, JuCR 7.11(d) requires the court to enter written findings

and conclusions, with findings that “state the ultimate facts as to each element of the

crime and the evidence upon which the court relied in reaching its decision.” K.D.A.-H.

points out that the juvenile court “failed to enter any finding or conclusion that the quick

tap of the foot was intentional or that it was offensive.” Br. of Appellant at 17. He asks

us to remand so that, if supported by the evidence, the court can enter the missing

findings and conclusions.

       The State agrees that remand is appropriate for entry of a finding that the assault

was intentional. It disagrees that remand for entry of a finding of offensiveness is

appropriate, however, arguing that “the uncontroverted evidence about the aftermath of

the assault reveals that K.M.R. was offended and harmed by K.D.A.-H.’s assault.” Br. of

Resp’t at 12. It cites State v. Banks, 149 Wn.2d 38, 46, 65 P.3d 1198 (2003), in which

the Supreme Court held that where a court’s unchallenged written findings necessitated

an inference of the essential element of knowledge, the court’s failure to explicitly

address knowledge in its findings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

       We do not agree that the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions that the

touching was unwanted necessitate an inference that it was offensive. On remand, the

court should address the need for findings on intention and offensiveness.

                                             11
No. 38899-9-III
State v. K.D.A.-H.

       Consistent with the remand order in Alvarez, we affirm the finding of guilty and

remand. See 128 Wn.2d at 22. We allow the juvenile court 60 days from entry of the

mandate to accomplish entry of appropriate findings and conclusions, failing which the

fourth degree assault charge must be dismissed. See id.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                                 Siddoway, J.P.T.

WE CONCUR:

Fearing, C.J.

Staab, J.

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