Court Opinion

ID: 9881055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 16:06:12.069356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:01.432281
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 220328

                                                                                  SIXTH DIVISION
                                                                                 September 29, 2023
                                                No. 1-22-0328

                                              IN THE
                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                          FIRST DISTRICT

     THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                          )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
     ILLINOIS,                                           )      of Cook County.
                                                         )
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                          )
                                                         )
            v.                                           )      No. 19 CR 06650
                                                         )
     CURTIS BAKER,                                       )      The Honorable
                                                         )      Michael R. Clancy,
            Defendant-Appellant.                         )      Judge, presiding.

                      PRESIDING JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court,
     with opinion.
                      Justices C.A. Walker and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                                OPINION

¶1               Defendant Curtis Baker was convicted after a bench trial of unlawful use of a weapon

       by a felon (UUWF) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)), which was his fourth felony

       conviction to date. The trial court sentenced him to four years and six months with the Illinois

       Department of Corrections (IDOC).

¶2               On this direct appeal, defendant challenges, first, the sufficiency of the evidence against

       him. In order to be convicted of UUWF, a person must have a prior adult felony conviction.

       720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018). Defendant claims that the State failed to prove that the

       particular conviction that the State named in the indictment was an adult conviction because
     No. 1-22-0328

        defendant was only 17 years old at the time of that particular offense. Second, defendant claims

        that, as applied to him, the UUWF statute violates the second amendment under a new test,

        recently articulated by the United States Supreme Court, for laws that attempt to regulate the

        gun possession of “law-abiding citizens.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597

        U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2156 (2022) (the holding was limited to laws affecting “law-

        abiding citizens”); see also Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111 passim (the six justices in the

        majority repeated the phrase “law-abiding” 18 times in their majority and concurring

        opinions); Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by

        Roberts, C.J.) (“ ‘[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding

        prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons ***.’ ” (quoting District of Columbia v.

        Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008))). For the following reasons, we do not find these claims

        persuasive and affirm.

¶3                                          BACKGROUND

¶4             On April 20, 2019, defendant, then age 28, was arrested after officers observed him

        making what they believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction. When officers approached,

        defendant fled on foot. During the ensuing chase, officers observed defendant toss a gun, which

        they recovered shortly thereafter and which they found to be loaded.

¶5             On May 17, 2019, defendant was indicted for (1) UUWF, for possession of a gun, after

        “having been previously convicted of the felony offense of manufacturing and delivery of

        heroin, under case number 09 CR 0470201” (hereinafter, 201); (2) UUWF for possession of

        ammunition, after having been convicted of the same 201 offense; (3) aggravated unlawful use

        of a weapon (AUUW), for carrying a gun on a public street without a concealed-carry license;

        (4) AUUW, for carrying a gun on a public street without a firearm owner’s identification

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     No. 1-22-0328

        (FOID) card; (5) AUUW, for carrying an uncased and loaded gun without a concealed-carry

        license; and (6) AUUW, for carrying a gun without a FOID card. Counts III through VI stated

        that the State would seek to sentence defendant as a Class 2 offender, “in that he has been

        previously convicted of a felony, to wit” the 201 offense.

¶6             On January 12, 2022, defendant waived a jury trial, and the case proceeded to trial on

        the same day. In the defense’s opening, counsel argued that officers “may or may not” have

        observed an object being thrown, that they lost sight of this object, and that, after detaining

        defendant two blocks later, they returned and found a gun in a high-crime area. Counsel argued

        that, because of the break in both time and custody, there was nothing linking this gun to

        defendant.

¶7             Officer D’Andre Sweezer testified to observing defendant making a suspected hand-

        to-hand drug transaction and to giving chase, during which he observed defendant toss a black

        gun over a fence into a residential front yard. Officer Sweezer’s partner, Officer Zeman, 1

        subsequently detained defendant. Officer Sweezer then “held on to” defendant, while his

        partner went back to retrieve the gun. After defendant was brought to the police station and

        advised of his rights, defendant stated that somebody on the block had given him the gun.

¶8             Officer Zeman testified that, after his partner, Officer Sweezer, exited their vehicle and

        approached defendant, defendant fled on foot. During the ensuing chase, Officer Zeman

        followed along, driving their vehicle. From their vehicle, Officer Zeman observed defendant

        toss a black gun into the front yard of a residence. Shortly thereafter, Officer Zeman exited his

        vehicle and pursued defendant on foot, eventually detaining him. After defendant was placed

        into custody, Officer Zeman returned to the fenced yard where the gun was tossed. Officer

           1
            Officer Zeman’s first name is not provided in the trial transcript.
                                                         3
       No. 1-22-0328

           Zeman asked a woman at the residence to let him into the yard, and she unlocked the gate for

           him. The officer then seized the gun, which was a loaded black semi-automatic firearm.

¶9                 After the officers testified, the parties agreed to a stipulation:

                       “ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY [(ASA)]: Your Honor, we seek to introduce

                   People’s No. 2, a certified copy of disposition of case number 09 CR 0470201 from the

                   Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, indicating that defendant was previously

                   found guilty of manufacturing and delivery of heroin on March 24, 2009[,] and

                   judgment entered.[2]

                       So stipulated?

                       DEFENSE COUNSEL: We will stipulate to that, judge. We ask that you just judge

                   the facts as you have heard them.

                       THE COURT: Correct. I am not considering it for any other [purpose] than a proven

                   element of the offense.

                       DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, judge.

                       THE COURT: You’re welcome.”

¶ 10               After defense counsel thanked the court for considering the 201 conviction only as “a

           proven element of the offense,” the State rested. The trial court then denied defendant’s motion

               2
                The presentence investigation report indicates that this 201case had two disposition dates. On
       March 24, 2009, defendant was sentenced to 24 months of probation. However, on March 27, 2010, the
       probation was terminated as unsatisfactory. On that same date, March 27, 2010, the trial court sentenced
       defendant to two years with IDOC for possession of a controlled substance in case number 09-CR-
       2255801. On January 12, 2022, after the trial court found defendant guilty, defense counsel asked that
       defendant remain out on bond. When the prosecutor noted that this was defendant’s fourth conviction,
       defense counsel argued that the two 2009 prior convictions were really like one case. Counsel stated:
       “The two cases were run together. So, in our minds, it’s like one conviction.” The court asked, “run
       together, what do you mean by that.” Counsel responded: “He was convicted at the same time in 2009.
       The sentencing ran together.”
                                                           4
       No. 1-22-0328

           for a directed verdict. Defendant exercised his right not to testify, and the defense rested. After

           listening to closing arguments, the trial court stated that it found the officers “to be credible

           when they testified and [that] they corroborate each other.” The trial court then found defendant

           guilty “as charged.”

¶ 11                The presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated that defendant had two felony

           convictions in addition to the 201 offense named in the indictment. These two convictions were

           both for possession of a controlled substance: (1) case number 09-CR-2255801 had an arrest

           date of November 17, 2009, and (2) case number 11-CR-0899401 had an arrest date of May 9,

           2011. The first case had a disposition date of January 27, 2010, and defendant served two years

           with IDOC; the second case had a disposition date of November 8, 2011, and defendant served

           21 months with IDOC. 3 Defendant’s birthdate, as stated in the PSI and conceded by defendant

           on appeal, 4 establishes that defendant was 18 years old or older on the dates of these two other

           felony convictions. 5

¶ 12                On January 31, 2022, defendant filed a posttrial motion for a new trial seeking a new

           trial on the ground, among others, that “[t]he State failed to prove defendant guilty of the charge

           of UUW Felon beyond all reasonable doubt.” At the start of the sentencing hearing on March

           2, 2022, the court denied defendant’s posttrial motion,

¶ 13                At sentencing, on March 2, 2022, the trial court stated: “I found him guilty on all

           charges.” The court then observed that all the counts were Class 2 felonies, and asked the ASA

               3
                 In the PSI, the 21 months was added in pen. At sentencing, the trial court asked what the
       sentence was for that offense, and the ASA responded that it was 21 months. The trial court stated that it
       was amending the PSI to reflect that fact, and defense counsel indicated that he had no objection to that.
       Defense counsel stated that he had “nothing to add or subtract to the PSI.”
               4
                 Defendant’s brief to this court states defendant’s birthdate, and it states it as the same date stated
       in the PSI.
               5
                 The PSI also indicated two prior juvenile adjudications on drug charges.
                                                              5
       No. 1-22-0328

          what the State’s position was on merger. The ASA responded: “Our position will be that he be

          sentenced as to Count 1 and that Counts 2 through 6 would merge.” Defense counsel said that

          he agreed with that. After observing that the sentencing range for a Class 2 felony was 3 to 14

          years, the court merged counts II through VI with count I and sentenced defendant on count I

          to 4½ years with IDOC. Also, at the same hearing, defendant filed a motion to reconsider

          sentence, which the court denied. In denying the motion, the court stated: “This is an individual

          who has three prior felony convictions.” Per defense counsel’s request, the trial court

          recommended a drug rehabilitation program for defendant. On March 2, 2022, defendant filed

          a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.

¶ 14                                              ANALYSIS

¶ 15                                     I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 16              On this appeal, defendant argues, first, that the prior offense stated in the indictment

          was not a qualifying predicate for a UUWF conviction, and he asks this court to reverse his

          conviction.

¶ 17              In his brief to this court, defendant acknowledges (1) that the 201 “case was under the

          jurisdiction of the adult criminal court under the law in effect at the time” and (2) that defendant

          “was convicted of this offense as an adult on March 24, 2009.” However, defendant argues

          that the 201 case does not support a UUWF conviction because the UUWF statute requires that

          a defendant “ ‘has been convicted’ ” of an adult felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)),

          and the charge in the 201 case would not now be subject to an automatic or presumptive

          transfer to adult criminal court.

¶ 18                                          A. Standard of Review

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       No. 1-22-0328

¶ 19                 Generally, when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, the

          relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

          prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

          beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 66.

¶ 20                 However, in this appeal, defendant argues that the key facts are not in dispute and the

          only question is whether those facts satisfy the elements of the UUWF statute. Defendant is

          correct that the key fact regarding his claim is undisputed, and the State does not argue

          otherwise. It is undisputed that, when defendant committed the charged predicate offense, he

          was only 17 years old.

¶ 21                 Thus, the issue before us is one of statutory interpretation, and the interpretation of a

          statute presents a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Howard, 2016 IL App (3d)

          130959, ¶ 18 (“applying the undisputed facts to the language of the statute to determine

          whether the essential elements have been proven *** is a question of law that we review

          de novo”); People v. Chirchirillo, 393 Ill. App. 3d 916, 921 (2009) (“Because the relevant facts

          are uncontested and the issue concerns whether these uncontested facts establish the elements

          of [the offense], we review de novo defendant’s claim.”); People v. Anderson, 364 Ill. App. 3d

          528, 532 (2006) (de novo review applies “not just to the question of whether a statute was

          properly construed but also to whether the statutory elements were satisfied by the undisputed

          facts”).

¶ 22                                                B. Forfeiture

¶ 23                 The State argues that defendant forfeited his first claim for our review by failing to

          object in the court below and further waived it by stipulating to this element of the offense.

          However, forfeiture is a limit on the parties and not the reviewing court, and we may decline

                                                           7
       No. 1-22-0328

          to find forfeiture where necessary to obtain a just result and preserve the integrity of the judicial

          process. People v. Phillips, 2022 IL App (1st) 181733, ¶ 156; People v. Holmes, 2016 IL App

          (1st) 132357, ¶ 65. Finding a defendant guilty of an offense that was not an offense at the time

          that he committed it would adversely affect the integrity of the judicial process. See People v.

          Melecio, 2017 IL App (1st) 141434, ¶ 64 (forfeiture did not apply to a violation of the one-act,

          one-crime rule); see also People v. Miles, 2020 IL App (1st) 180736, ¶ 8 (The appellate court

          found that defendant could challenge Class X sentencing based on a conviction committed

          while a minor because: “A sentence that is not statutorily authorized affects a defendant’s

          substantial rights and is reviewable as second prong plain error.”).

¶ 24                                       C. Statutory Construction

¶ 25              “With statutory construction, our primary goal is to ascertain the legislat[ors’] intent,

          and the best indication of their intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the words they chose

          to use.” People v. Miles, 2017 IL App (1st) 132719, ¶ 25; State of Illinois ex rel. Pusateri v.

          Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 2014 IL 116844, ¶ 8 (citing Citizens Opposing Pollution v.

          ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 23). Where the language is plain and

          unambiguous, we apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory interpretation.

          In re Lance H., 2014 IL 114899, ¶ 11; Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 395

          (2003); Maschek v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 150520, ¶ 44 (“If the statutory language

          is clear, we must apply it, without resort to any aids of statutory construction.”).

¶ 26              In the case at bar, defendant was convicted under section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal

          Code of 2012 (Code) which provides, in relevant part:

                  “It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his land

                  or in his own abode or fixed place of business any weapon prohibited under Section

                                                         8
       No. 1-22-0328

                   24-1 of this Act or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the person has been

                   convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction. (Emphasis

                   added.) 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018). 6

           The word “convicted,” used in the above-quoted statute, requires a finding of guilt and a

           sentence imposed in an adult criminal court, and it does not include a juvenile adjudication.

           People v. Dawson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190422, ¶ 22; People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 170-71

           (2006) (a juvenile adjudication is not a prior criminal conviction for the purpose of criminal

           statutes requiring a prior conviction as an element of the offense).

¶ 27               Since the State has the burden to prove the elements of the statute beyond a reasonable

           doubt, the burden of proof is on the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

           defendant had a qualifying adult conviction. Dawson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190422, ¶¶ 27 46.

           “The burden is not on the defendant to prove that the convictions were juvenile proceedings.”

           Dawson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190422, ¶ 46.

¶ 28               It is undisputed that defendant did have a qualifying adult conviction—two of them, in

           fact. But, of the three possible choices, that probably looked pretty much the same at a surface

           glance for purposes of charging, defendant argues, in essence, that the State picked the wrong

           one—the earliest one—which led to this appeal. Defendant argues that, “[u]nder current law,

           as a 17-year-old, 7 [defendant] would have been tried and adjudicated as a juvenile” and would

           not have received an adult felony conviction for this conduct.

               6
                 Although we quote from the 2018 statute, which would have been in effect at the time of
       defendant’s 2019 offense, there has been no change in the quoted language from 2018 to the present day.
               7
                 At the time of his arrest for the 2009 case, defendant was a month and a half short of his
       eighteenth birthday.
                                                          9
       No. 1-22-0328

¶ 29               However, in making this argument, defendant asks us, first, to overlook his forfeiture

           in failing to object in the court below, his stipulation to this element of the offense and his two

           prior qualifying adult convictions. In light of his two prior qualifying adult convictions, we

           simply cannot find that the integrity of our system requires us to overlook his forfeiture and

           stipulation. 8 See Phillips, 2022 IL App (1st) 181733, ¶ 156; Holmes, 2016 IL App (1st)

           132357, ¶ 65.

¶ 30               To excuse both the forfeiture in failing to object and the waiver by stipulation,

           defendant argues that these actions prove the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. To determine

           whether a defendant was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,

           courts apply the familiar two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

           (1984). People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526 (1984) (adopting Strickland). Under

           Strickland, a defendant must show both (1) that his attorney’s actions constituted errors so

           serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that, absent these errors,

           there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been

           different. People v. Carlisle, 2015 IL App (1st) 131144, ¶ 71. To prevail on an ineffectiveness

           claim, a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test. Carlisle, 2015 IL App (1st)

           131144, ¶ 73.

¶ 31               Defendant argues that his counsel acted unreasonably by stipulating. The transcript

           indicates that counsel stipulated not only to the conviction, but also to the conviction’s

           satisfaction of the element of the offense. After stipulating to the conviction, counsel expressed

               8
                In addition, defendant asked us to review his forfeited claim under the second prong of the plain
       error doctrine which permits reversal if a clear and obvious error challenged the integrity of the judicial
       process. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). For the reasons already explained in the text,
       we do not find that the integrity of our judicial system requires reversal here.
                                                           10
       No. 1-22-0328

           a concern that the type of offense might affect the court’s fact-finding, 9 and the court assured

           him that would not happen. Defense counsel then thanked the court when the court stated that

           it would consider the conviction at issue only as “a proven element of the offense.” Further,

           the ASA’s reference to the stipulation indicates that this matter was previously discussed

           among counsel. While stipulating to the use of a nonqualifying offense as an element of the

           offense may have been serious error, we do not have to address whether any error falls below

           the objective standard of reasonableness where defendant’s claim does not satisfy the second

           prong of Strickland regarding the probability that the outcome would have been different. In

           the case at bar, the State had two other qualifying offenses to choose from: case number 09-

           CR-2255801 and case number 11-CR-0899401. Thus, even if counsel had refused prior to trial

           to stipulate to this offense, the State could have used one of the other age-valid convictions to

           satisfy the element of the offense. Thus, defendant has failed to show a reasonable probability

           that the outcome would have changed based on these facts.

¶ 32                                          II. Second Amendment

¶ 33               Second, defendant argues that this court should reverse his conviction because the

           UUWF statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. A court of review should generally refrain

           from addressing constitutional questions unless the answers are essential to the disposition of

           a case (i.e., where the case cannot be determined on other grounds). People v. White, 2011 IL

           109689, ¶ 144. In the case at bar, we have already addressed defendant’s nonconstitutional

           claim, thereby leaving his constitutional claim as the only claim left in the appeal.

               9
                The police at trial had testified to observing defendant engage in a suspected hand-to-hand drug
       conviction, and the conviction at issue was for heroin. Counsel asked the court to “just judge the facts”
       based solely on the testimony it had just “heard” at trial.
                                                          11
       No. 1-22-0328

¶ 34                While a facial challenge alleges that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts

           (i.e., the specific facts of the case are irrelevant), an as-applied challenge alleges only that the

           statute violates the constitution as applied to the particular facts and circumstances in the

           instant case. People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36.

¶ 35                Although defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal, he cites a number of

           cases for the proposition that, generally, a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute may be

           raised at any time and that this proposition applies equally to as-applied claims as to facial

           claims. E.g., People v. Cleary, 2013 IL App (3d) 110610, ¶ 35. The Illinois Supreme Court

           and the First, Second, and Third Districts of the Illinois Appellate Court have all so held.

           People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 122-23 (2006); People v. Burnett, 2015 IL App (1st)

           133610, ¶ 82; People v. Emmett, 264 Ill. App. 3d 296, 297 (1994) (First District); People v.

           Martin, 408 Ill. App. 3d 891, 895 (2011) (Second District); Cleary, 2013 IL App (3d) 110610,

           ¶ 35. 10 In response, the State notes that, in all the decisions defendant cites, the claim was then

           rejected on the merits. 11 However, this has to do with the strong presumption in favor of

           constitutionality that a statute enjoys and the high burden one faces in challenging it, as we

           discuss below.

¶ 36                A reviewing court starts with the presumption that a statute is constitutional, and the

           burden is on the party challenging it “to clearly establish any constitutional invalidity.” Allegis

           Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 334 (2006). “The burden is a formidable one, and

           this court will uphold a statute’s validity whenever it is reasonably possible to do so.” Allegis,

               10
                   Defendant also cited in support the Illinois Supreme Court case of People v. Holman, 2017 IL
       120655. However, in People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42, the supreme court stated unequivocally:
       “Holman is overruled.”
                11
                   The State also cited Thompson, but that case is completely inapposite because it concerns the
       special rules governing a section 2-1401 petition. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 31; 735 ILCS 5/2-1401
       (West 2010).
                                                           12
       No. 1-22-0328

          223 Ill. 2d at 334. Whether a statute is constitutional is an issue that we review de novo. Allegis,

          223 Ill. 2d at 334.

¶ 37              Defendant argues that his conviction is unconstitutional under the second amendment,

          pursuant to a United States Supreme Court case decided last year, namely, Bruen, 597 U.S.

          ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111. The problem with defendant’s argument is that Bruen just does not apply

          to him. The Bruen Court could not have been more clear that its newly announced test applied

          only to laws that attempted to regulate the gun possession of “law-abiding citizens,” and not

          felons like defendant. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (the holding was limited to

          laws affecting “law-abiding citizens”). Just in case a reader missed the first time that the court

          said it, the court repeated it 18 times. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111 passim (the six

          justices in the majority repeated the phrase “law-abiding” 18 times in their majority opinion

          and their concurrences). Further, Justice Kavanaugh in his concurrence quoted an earlier case

          that stated: “ ‘[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding

          prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons ***.’ ” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct.

          at 2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-

          27)). Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and they both

          joined the six-justice majority opinion. Based on the plain, clear, and repeated language of the

          justices in the majority, defendant is simply outside the box drawn by Bruen.

¶ 38              After this appeal was fully briefed, we granted defendant’s motions to cite two more

          cases as additional authority. The recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals case of Range v.

          Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023) (en banc), does not cause us to reconsider our

          decision. In Range, the Third Circuit found that the second amendment protection discussed in

          Bruen did reach those with only a misdemeanor conviction. Range, 69 F.4th at 98. First, the

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       No. 1-22-0328

          opinion is not binding upon us. Second, the three concurring judges stressed that nothing

          prevented legislatures from disarming felons, such as defendant in the case at bar. Range, 69

          F.4th at 110 (Ambro, J., concurring, joined by Greenaway Jr. and Montgomery-Reeves, JJ.)

          (“Congress may disarm felons” due to the long-standing prohibitions on the possession of

          firearms by felons). Lastly, the Range holding, which is limited to misdemeanor convictions,

          does not aid defendant, who is a four-time convicted felon.

¶ 39             We also granted defendant’s motion to cite United States v. Bullock, No. 3:18-CR-165-

          CWR-FKB, 2023 WL 4232309, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (S.D. Miss. June 28, 2023), appeal filed,

          No. 23-60408 (5th Cir. July 31, 2023). We do not find Bullock persuasive. First, it is a yet-to-

          be-published order by a federal district court where an appeal is now pending. Second, the

          order begins by criticizing the United States Supreme Court, accusing it of “cherry-picking

          briefs,” for example. Bullock, 2023 WL 4232309, *2 (the United States Supreme “Court

          continues to engage in ‘law office history’—that is, history selected to ‘fit the needs of people

          looking for ammunition in their causes’ ”). Thus, neither case cited as additional authority

          dissuades us from our finding that Bruen does not apply to or aid defendant.

¶ 40                                           CONCLUSION

¶ 41             For the foregoing reasons, we do not find defendant’s claims persuasive and affirm.

¶ 42             Affirmed.

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No. 1-22-0328

                         People v. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328

Decision Under Review:       Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 19-CR-06650;
                             the Hon. Michael R. Clancy, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                    James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Kathryn L. Oberer, of State
for                          Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                    Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique
for                          Abraham, David H. Iskowich, and Retha Stotts, Assistant State’s
Appellee:                    Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

                                            15