Court Opinion

ID: 9845951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:31:45.81001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:29.800326
License: Public Domain

Nichols, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot subscribe to the majority’s holdings that "the Court of Appeals improperly acted as a fact finder, substituting its judgment for that of the special master and the trial judge,” and that "On appeal, the judgment must be affirmed unless shown to be clearly erroneous,” and, finally, that in regard to the actions of the special master and the trial court, "These findings should not be disturbed on appeal if there is any evidence to support them.”
*623No citation of authority is offered by the majority in support of the first two principles because, I submit, no authority exists for such holdings. The citation offered in support of the third precept upon which the majority’s decision turns dealt not with constitutional challenges to the exercise of the power of eminent domain; but rather, with judicial review of the denial of a temporary injunction. Barrett v. State Hwy. Dept., 211 Ga. 876 (89 SE2d 652) (1955). Not only is the articulated basis for the majority’s decision unsupported by authority, but it is contrary to prior holdings indicating, quite positively, that the question of what constitutes a "public use,” authorizing exercise of the power of eminent domain, is a question of law for the courts — not a question of fact for the finder of the facts. Piedmont Cotton Mills v. Ga. R. &c. Co., 131 Ga. 129, 136 (62 SE 52) (1908); Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 563 (74 SE2d 891) (1953); City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 144 Ga. App. 157 (240 SE2d 730) (1977).
It is apparent from the record that MARTA is seeking in this case to condemn private air rights unneeded in any respect in connection with its public purposes, and that MARTA intends to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of these excess air rights to unspecified private persons for their use in the development of structures that are being planned for construction within the air spaces over MARTA’s facilities. The record reveals that MARTA’s engineers already have provided within the confines of MARTA’s planned facilities spaces for footings upon which these contemplated overhead structures can be supported. I cannot ignore these facts. Neither can I hold that the taking of the excess air rights was constitutional. Hence, I must dissent.