Court Opinion

ID: 9596054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:45:49.174311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:53.074429
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that Hodges’ statement of eight years earlier regarding how he would kill someone if he were a hit man is relevant; nor can I agree that excluding relevant evidence that supports Hodges’ sole defense is harmless error. Therefore, I dissent.
1. The majority concludes that Hodges’ statement regarding how he would kill someone if he were a hit man is relevant to “Hodges’ course of conduct, plan, scheme or bent of mind.”2 This talismanic litany does nothing to illuminate the logical connection between the statement and any material issue in the trial. The statement sheds no light on any course of conduct, because there was no evidence that Hodges had ever killed in this manner. Nor is the statement relevant to a scheme or plan in the absence of evidence that Hodges was planning to kill the victim or anyone else when he made the statement eight years ago. Finally, because “a person’s bent of mind is dangerously close to being his character”3 the statement should have been excluded under OCGA § 24-2-2.4
Finally, the majority’s reliance upon Barnes v. State5 is misplaced. In Barnes the statement that the defendant had killed once and did not mind killing again was made six weeks before the murder and, in context with other statements, was actually a threat against a member of the victim’s family. A casual comment by Hodges eight years ago while he was a correctional officer about how he would carry out a contract killing if he were a hit man is not logically connected to this murder.
2. I agree with the majority that it was error to exclude the testimony of Amber Britain that she saw Hopkins, the “rough lady biker,” get mad and threaten to kill the victim. Hodges’ sole defense was that someone else, possibly Hopkins, killed the victim. Britain’s testimony described the volatile nature of Hopkins’ relationship with the victim and Hopkins’ explosive temper. Britain’s testimony was not offered to *876prove that Hopkins made a specific threat against the victim’s life. Rather, her testimony was offered to show a volatile and contentious relationship, and an explosive temper, and thus a motive for the killing.6
Decided October 30, 1995
Reconsideration denied November 20, 1995.
Smith & Hodges, Thomas L. Hodges III, Hudson & Montgomery, James E. Hudson, for appellant.
Lindsay A. Tise, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael D. Groves, Peggy R. Katz, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
The majority’s reliance on harmless error, however, is baffling. Hodges had one defense and this testimony supported that defense. The state’s theory of how Hodges committed the murder was barely plausible and the evidence of Hodges’ guilt was far from overwhelming. For example, the tire and boot prints found at the scene had no uniquely identifying features and could have been made by numerous other tires or boots. Additionally, far from “concluding” that Hodges was the anonymous caller who discovered the body, the dispatcher testified that “I’m not saying that was [Hodges],” but only that the voice was “familiar.” Finally, the majority’s view of the record is belied by the fact that a previous jury failed to agree on a verdict and a mistrial was declared.
I would reverse based on these two prejudicial errors. I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this dissent.

 Majority op. at 873.

 Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 630 (458 SE2d 643) (1995) (Sears, J., concurring specially).

 The state argues by rote that this evidence was also relevant to motive and intent. The statement, however, cannot be connected to motive because the state admitted that it did not attempt to prove motive. Nor does the statement tend to illuminate Hodges’ intent to kill where Hodges has not raised a defense of accident or justification.

 245 Ga. 609, 610 (266 SE2d 212) (1980).

 Perry v. State, 255 Ga. 490, 493 (339 SE2d 922) (1986).