Court Opinion

ID: 9930346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 18:01:16.461793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:13:23.605524
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 6 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK CHARLES HANSON,                            No.    21-55640

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:19-cv-08425-MAA

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of
Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                   Maria A. Audero, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted February 6, 2024**

Before:      D. NELSON, O’SCANNLAIN, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

      Mark Charles Hanson (Hanson) appeals pro se the district court’s affirmance

of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      We review de novo a district court’s order affirming a denial of Social

Security benefits. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 653–54 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015)). We may reverse a

denial of benefits only when the decision is “based on legal error or not supported

by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at 654 (quoting Benton ex rel. Benton v.

Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)).

      On appeal, Hanson claims that the administrative law judge (ALJ) failed to

properly assess the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, and improperly

credited the opinion of an examining consultative physician. “[A]n ALJ may

discredit treating physicians' opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported

by the record as a whole or by objective medical findings.” Batson v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d

1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2014). Where a treating physician’s opinion is controverted

by the opinion of another physician, an ALJ must provide “specific and legitimate

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence” to reject the opinion. Trevizo v.

Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017).

      The ALJ did not err in assigning reduced weight to the treating physician’s

opinion. To support his determination, the ALJ cited inconsistencies between the

treating physician’s opinion and the record as a whole, inconsistencies between the

opinion and Hanson’s activities of daily living, and internal inconsistencies within

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the opinion itself. These inconsistencies are specific and legitimate reasons that “a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support” the ALJ’s conclusion that

the treating physician’s opinion was not consistent with and supported by the

record. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Any error in the ALJ’s additional reason for affording

the treating physician’s opinion reduced weight was harmless because it was

“inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate nondisability determination.” Tommasetti

v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks

omitted).

      Nor did the ALJ err in assigning substantial weight to the portion of the

examining consultative physician’s opinion stating that Hanson could stand and

walk up to six hours, with normal breaks, with more standing than walking, and

could frequently climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to afford this portion of the opinion great

weight as consistent with the record as a whole and consistent with Hanson’s

activities of daily living. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196. Finally, the ALJ provided

specific and legitimate reasons for not accepting the examining consultative

physician’s opinion in its entirety and affording reduced weight to much of this

opinion because it did not adequately consider Hanson’s subjective complaints.

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041–42.

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AFFIRMED.

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