Court Opinion

ID: 9593908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:25:42.738893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:20.826276
License: Public Domain

SINGLETON, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with Chief Judge Bryner’s resolution of the issues in this case. However, I believe a few additional remarks are in order to clarify some ambiguities in the criminal rules governing criminal motion practice and in the cases interpreting the rules.
First, trial judges have discretion to dispense with the formal requirements of Civil Rule 77 (incorporated by reference into the criminal rules by Criminal Rule 50(b)). Selig v. State, 750 P.2d 834, 837 n. 4 (Alaska App.1988); Weidner v. Superior Court, 715 P.2d 264, 265-68 (Alaska App.1986).1 But see State v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1974) (Civil Rule 77 governing motion practice is made applicable to criminal actions by Criminal Rule 50(b)). Adams v. State, 704 P.2d 794, 796-97 (Alaska App.1985), applies only to situations where the trial court, in its discretion, has elected to utilize the formal procedures set out in Civil Rule 77. It does not appear to address situations where the trial court has elected to utilize the less formal procedures contemplated by Criminal Rules 16 and 42. See Weidner, 715 P.2d at 266-67. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the reasons set forth in Adams for requiring an evidentia-*47ry hearing with oral testimony and appropriate cross-examination whenever the parties’ affidavits present disputed issues of material fact apply equally to both informal and formal proceedings. See Weidner, 715 P.2d at 267 (discussing informal procedures under Criminal Rule 16). I agree with the majority that evidentiary hearings are required only where materials submitted in support of and in opposition to a motion disclose the existence of disputed issues of material fact. I also agree that the trial judge has substantial discretion in determining which issues of fact are material.
In this case, court and counsel seem to have implicitly elected to proceed informally but, nevertheless, the trial judge determined to hold an evidentiary hearing. I agree with Chief Judge Bryner that the trial judge has broad discretion to determine what issues should be addressed at such a hearing, and that the trial judge may consider evidence developed in other hearings as long as the parties had notice and an opportunity to be heard. If the record, however developed, presents disputed issues of material fact, I agree that Adams should be followed and an eviden-tiary hearing held at which the parties have the opportunity to present evidence and confront opposing evidence on the disputed issues. Afterwards, the trial court should state “essential findings on the record.” Burks v. State, 706 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Alaska App.1985).
My second area of concern involves the parties’ respective burdens of proof in criminal motion practice, particularly in resolving disputes under State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986). Distribution of the burdens of proof would appear to involve questions which are not necessarily governed by the trial court’s discretionary power to establish procedures. See generally Edward W. Cleary (ed.), McCormick on Evidence, §§ 336-341. (3rd ed.1984). In discussing burdens of proof, it is useful to distinguish between three separate burdens: (1) the burden of pleading, (2) the burden of production, and (3) the ultimate burden of persuasion. Selig, 750 P.2d at 839. At the outset, we should recognize that the majority opinion in Malkin is somewhat ambiguous in two respects: (1) in its treatment of the parties’ respective burdens of proof, and (2) in its definition of the kind of “reckless behavior” which will warrant deletion of misstatements of fact from an affidavit in support of a warrant before determining probable cause.
It seems to me that the Malkin court intended to put the burdens of pleading, production, and persuasion on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit contained misstatements of fact. In addition, the defendant has the burdens of initial pleading and production on the issues of intentional falsehood or reckless and material falsehood.2 The defendant satisfies this burden, by presenting, in affidavit form, some evidence to support a favorable finding, i.e., evidence which would support an inference of: (1) intentional3 or (2) reckless and material misstatements. It may be that, in a given case, substantial evidence of material false statements would satisfy the defendant’s burdens of pleading and produc*48tion on the issues of intent and “recklessness.” If the defendant satisfies these burdens, then the burden of production on the issues of intent, recklessness, and materiality shift to the state. The ultimate burden of persuasion would always be on the state to prove that any misstatements were not made intentionally or recklessly. If the state succeeds in disproving intentional behavior, but the trial court finds reckless behavior, then the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of the materiality of the misstatements would appear to rest on the defendant. These conclusions appear consistent with Malkin, particularly with the concerns which led the majority to depart from the procedures adopted in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676-77, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). These conclusions also meet the concerns voiced in the dissent. See Mal-kin, 722 P.2d at 948-49 (Compton, J. dissenting). More significantly, this distribution of the respective burdens of pleading, production, and persuasion, is consistent with our general treatment of the respective burdens in criminal motion practice generally, including those cases involving issues on which the state bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. See Selig, 750 P.2d at 839.
My final concern involves the meaning of “reckless” or “reckless disregard” in the context of a Malkin hearing. Alaska cases have not always agreed on the meaning of the term “reckless.” The phrase “reckless disregard” has been equated with gross or culpable negligence, not requiring “awareness of the risk.” O’Leary v. State, 604 P.2d 1099, 1104-05 (Alaska 1979), overruled on other grounds sub nom, Evans v. State, 645 P.2d 155, 160 n. 11 (Alaska 1982), accord Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 500 (1965). Alternatively, this court has held that “recklessness” under the revised criminal code does require subjective knowledge of the risk. See, e.g., St. John v. State, 715 P.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Alaska App.1986). My reading of Malkin leads me to join the majority in concluding that the trial court must find that the affi-ant was subjectively aware of a substantial risk that his statements were material and false before they should be deleted from the affidavit in determining probable cause. Of course, the defendant satisfies his burden of production on the issue of “reckless disregard” if he shows that the officer knew or should have known that statements in the affidavit were false. If a reasonable person would have known a fact or been aware of a risk, then the court may infer that the officer in question knew the fact or was aware of the risk. St. John v. State, 715 P.2d at 1209.

. In Weidner, we noted that the formal requirements in Civil Rule 77 might conflict with the informal procedures arguably encouraged by Criminal Rules 42 and 16. Weidner, 715 P.2d at 266-67. We did not mention Criminal Rule 40(d) which, by incorporating a part of Civil Rule 77, may imply an intent by the Alaska Supreme Court to dispense with the other requirements of the rule. I recognize that it would be possible to synthesize a single rule governing criminal motion practice out of Criminal Rules 12, 16, 40(d), 42, 50(b), and Civil Rule 77. However, we declined to do so in Weidner, preferring to let each trial judge determine for himself or herself which procedures to follow so long as counsel and the parties are given reasonable advance notice of the procedures to be followed. Id, at 268.

. If the misstatements were not intentional, then in order to ultimately prevail, the defendant must persuade the trial court that the misstatements of fact were material, i.e., that, if excluded, it is likely that the magistrate would not have authorized the warrant because the warrant would not be supported by probable cause. Where the trial court is satisfied that the alleged misstatements are clearly not material, the defendant has suffered no prejudice and the court need not determine whether the misstatements were reckless or negligent. In such a case, the defendant can only prevail if the mis-tatements were intended to mislead the magistrate.

. The word “intentional” in context could mean "knowing.” See, e.g., Mill v. State, 585 P.2d 546, 548-50 (Alaska 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827, 100 S.Ct. 51, 62 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979) (treating "knowledge" and "intent” as synonymous). It seems to me that Malkin requires more than a showing that the affiant may have been aware that one or more of his assertions were false. In order to quash a warrant, the trial court should find that the false statements were included with the intent to mislead the magistrate. In such a case, the court can readily infer that the affiant, at least, believed that the false statements were material. See Williams v. State, 629 P.2d 54, 64 n. 22 (Alaska 1981).