Court Opinion

ID: 9636276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:22:31.575756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:43.780423
License: Public Domain

MAJORITY OPINION
FOWLER, Justice.
Appellant, Jerry Frank Birdwell, appeals from his conviction of the offense of theft upon his plea of guilty. Finding the enhancement paragraphs to be true, the trial court assessed his punishment at six years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, in accordance with a plea bargain agreement between appellant and the State. Appellant presents two points of error in which he asserts that (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case when he was convicted; and (2) the appeal must be abated and the cause remanded for a hearing on his motion for new trial, because the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on that motion.
In his first point of error, appellant contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his plea because he entered his plea before the information was filed. A court obtains its jurisdiction from the presentment of an indictment or information. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 12. An information is considered presented when it has been filed by the proper officer in the proper court. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.07 (Vernon 1977). In civil and criminal cases, an instrument is deemed filed when it is left with the clerk, regardless of whether a file-mark is placed on the instrument. See Williams v. State, 767 S.W.2d 868, 871-872 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd) (citing Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. LaCoke, 585 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex.1979)); Queen v. State, 701 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.App.—Austin 1985, pet. ref'd); Phariss v. State, 144 Tex.Crim. 234, 161 S.W.2d 1066 (1942).
Appellant claims the record in this case affirmatively shows that the information was filed after the plea admonishments and the stipulation and confession. As we explain below, we disagree.
We have no reporter’s record, so we are limited in our inquiry to the documents filed in the case. Several different documents pertain to the issue appellant raises. The written plea admonishments were file-*383stamped by a deputy District Clerk at “12:10 p.m.”; and a “Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement To Stipulate, and Judicial Confession” signed by appellant was file-stamped by the same clerk who file-stamped the admonishments at “12:15 p.m.” The information, to which appellant pled, and the waiver of indictment appellant executed, were file-stamped by a different deputy District Clerk at what appears to be “12:1812.” Nothing in the record shows whether these documents were given individually to these clerks; for example, at the times written on them, or if they were all handed to one clerk at the same time and file-stamped later by the two clerks.
However, the court’s docket sheet does shed some light on the issue. It shows, unequivocally, that the documents were executed and presented in the correct order. The first item on the docket sheet for June 21, 1996, states that appellant appeared in person with counsel and waived a court reporter. This notation is partly stamped and partly handwritten. Next, is the stamped phrase, “FELONY INFORMATION,” and, stamped partly on top of that phrase are the words, “DEFENDANT WAIVED INDICTMENT.” Below these stamps appear the stamped statement that Defendant waived arraignment and formal reading of the indictment, and that he pleaded guilty in open court. This was followed by a printed paragraph, stamped on the page, reflecting that appellant waived a jury, was admonished by the court, refused to change his plea, and was found guilty.
Appellant could have had a court reporter record the hearing before the judge. Such a record would have established whether the information was filed prior to the entry of the plea. As it is, however, we have three documents file-stamped by two different clerks, who may or may not have had synchronized watches, and, another document, the most important document, the information and waiver of indictment, which has an unusual notation for the time: “12:1812.” On the other hand, we have a docket sheet clearly showing that the information was filed with the court prior to appellant’s plea.
To sustain appellant’s point of error, we would have to ignore the docket sheet and otherwise speculate about the order the documents were filed with the clerk. We are unwilling to speculate on the basis of what we consider to be inconclusive evidence. Without a reporter’s record or other evidence to conclusively establish that the court lacked jurisdiction, appellant has failed to carry his burden of establishing error. See Montalvo v. State, 846 S.W.2d 133, 136-37 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, no pet.); Anderson v. State, 720 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no pet.).1 See also Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(c)(3, 4). In sum, we overrule appellant’s claim that his conviction is void, and we overrule Appellant’s first point of error.
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his motion for new trial. As we explain below, the problem with appellant’s claim is that a defendant must present a timely motion to the trial court. Appellant did not do so.
To be timely, a motion for new trial must be (1) filed within 30 days of the date sentence was imposed or suspended in open court; and (2) presented to the trial court within 10 days of filing or within 75 days if the trial court grants permission. See Tex.R.App. P. 21.4(a) and 21.6(a); see also Enard v. State, 764 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (holding a defendant has the duty to file and present a motion for new trial in order to have it considered by the trial *384court). Appellant, therefore, had to timely present his motion for new trial before the trial court could rule on the motion. See Price v. State, 840 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christ 1992, pet. ref'd). Merely filing a motion for new trial does not constitute evidence of its presentment to the court. See Owens v. State, 832 S.W.2d 109, 111-12 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no pet.), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).
Here, appellant filed a motion for new trial on July 22, 1996. On that day he also submitted an “ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.” However, that document reflects that the motion for new trial was not presented to and signed by the trial court until September 3, 1996. The court neither granted nor denied the motion. Clearly, September 3 is more than 10 days after July 22, but the record does not reflect that appellant received permission to have his motion for new trial presented and heard more than 10 days after the date his sentence was imposed. Without such a request, appellant needed to present the motion within ten days of July 22, 1996. The record contains no requests for a hearing on the motion for new trial, nor does it indicate the court was ever put on notice that appellant desired such a hearing. See Carranza v. State, 960 S.W.2d 76, 79-80 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). The only evidence in the record concerning presentment is appellant’s order reflecting that it was presented on September 3, 1996, well after the expiration of the required ten-day period.
The trial court’s decision to deny a motion for new trial cannot be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion even if the trial court denies the motion without a hearing. See McIntire v. State, 698 S.W.2d 652, 660 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Kiser v. State, 788 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref'd). A trial court cannot abuse its discretion by denying a motion for new trial that was not timely presented. See id. at 915.
We find the record does not demonstrate that appellant presented his motion to the court within ten days as required by Rule 21.6, and accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Tex.R.App. P. 21.6. We overrule appellant’s second point of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. Both Montalvo and Anderson are based, at least in part, on former Tex.R.App. P.50(d). While we recognize that Rule 50(d) was omitted when the Rules of Appellate Procedure were revised, we nevertheless reiterate that it is an appellant’s burden to secure a record an appeal that demonstrates error. Here, appellant failed to do this.