Court Opinion

ID: 9752105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:36:34.785113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:07.554698
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting.
For the second time this court is reversing a sentence imposed by the trial court in this case, and in my view is taking such action for the second time, unjustifiably.
Prefacing the Majority’s ultimate ruling is its initial conclusion that it is appropriate to review the Commonwealth’s claims regarding the defendant’s sentence because “the Commonwealth has raised a substantial question that the sentence imposed is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Majority Opinion at 537. I believe this conclusion is erroneous with regard to the discretionary sentencing issues raised by the Commonwealth and unnecessary with regard to the Commonwealth’s claims concerning the questions of merger and the application of the deadly weapons enhancement.
The Commonwealth's claims which address the leniency of the sentence imposed do not constitute what has been found to be a “substantial question” deserving of appellate review. “In effect, appellant asks this Court to substitute its judgment regarding an appropriate sentence for that of *546[the sentencing judge]. Such a statement does not raise a substantial question that the sentence imposed was in fact inappropriate.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 386 Pa.Super. 322, 562 A.2d 1385 (1989). The Majority’s failure to adhere to this court’s previous unwillingness to review sentences which are called into question because of their severity, leniency or the court’s failure to mention on the record certain considerations, does nothing but further confuse those seeking an interpretation of the law in this area.
The Commonwealth’s remaining claims do not involve discretionary sentencing questions. The application of a deadly weapons enhancement and the issue of merger are not matters within the discretion of a sentencing court; rather, they implicate the legality of a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 351 Pa.Super. 56, 505 A.2d 262 (1986). As such, they may be appealed by a party as of right. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(a).
Although this court must review these matters, in this case I believe the Majority errs in concluding that the sentencing court wrongly ruled that a separate sentence on the conviction for possession of an instrument of crime was precluded because deadly weapon enhancement was added to the aggravated assault conviction.
I believe that the Majority would not dispute that it was well within the sentencing court’s discretion to impose no further sentence on the defendant for his conviction of possessing an instrument of crime. The court imposed a sentence on the aggravated assault conviction recognizing the role the deadly weapon enhancement provision played in structuring the sentencing guidelines for this crime. The fact that the sentencing court failed to impose a further penalty on the possessing an instrument of crime charge, can not, in my view, be deemed an abuse of discretion.
My belief that the sentencing court was well within its discretion, in refusing to impose a sentence on the possessing an instrument of crime charge is supported by the fact that a conviction on such a charge in this case was inappropriate. A dry wall saw is not an “instrument of crime.” *547Appellant pled guilty to a violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907 which defines an “instrument of crime” as:
(1) Anything specially made or specially adapted for criminal use; or
(2) Anything commonly used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have.
In interpreting this statute this court has held that a screwdriver, used to stab and slash at a victim was not an instrument of crime. Commonwealth v. Eddowes, 397 Pa.Super. 551, 580 A.2d 769 (1990). We have also held that a pair of scissors, an icepick, and an ordinary razor blade, which were not objects regularly used by criminals and which were not physically altered in such a fashion as to demonstrate criminal objective, were not “instruments of crime.” See, Commonwealth v. Myers, 376 Pa.Super. 41, 545 A.2d 309 (1988), Commonwealth v. Taylor, 362 Pa.Super. 408, 524 A.2d 942 (1987) and Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 316 Pa.Super. 203, 462 A.2d 1310 (1983). A dry wall saw, as was used in this case, is not an object commonly used for criminal purposes and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the saw at issue in this case was in any manner altered to aid in the commission of the aggravated assault.
The sentencing court recognized the inherent problem that the facts of this case bring when attempting to formulate a sentence, particularly for the possessing an instrument of crime charge to which Appellant plead guilty. The sentencing court in this case did not engage in a merger analysis, as does the Majority, but rather found that it would be inappropriate to sentence this defendant on the possession conviction. In my view based upon the facts as presented and relevant case law, this action was entirely appropriate.
At sentencing, the court recognized that the aggravated assault conviction was to receive an enhanced recommended range under the Sentencing Guidelines because a deadly weapon was used during the perpetration of the crime. *548While the dry wall saw constitutes a “deadly weapon” for purposes of the enhancement provisions (see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301), the court was of the opinion that a separate sentence should not be imposed for a conviction of possessing an instrument of crime. The court stated:
The application of the deadly weapons enhancement makes inappropriate a sentence on the PIC charge. Because once you add the deadly weapons enhancement, you cannot sentence then on the instrument of crime charge because that is the very basis for adding the enhancement.
Also it is interesting to note, under Commonwealth v. Morgan, [265 Pa.Super. 225, 401 A.2d 1182 (1979) ], a dry wall saw is probably not an instrument of a crime.
I accepted the plea because I believed that the prosecutor at the time had discussed that with defense counsel. And, that there had been some discussion about this was the plea that was to be presented. In retrospect, I wish I had insisted that it is not an instrument of crime. It might be a deadly weapon. But it is certainly not especially adapted for use in criminal activities.
So under 907 of 18 Purdon’s a dry wall saw would not be a PIC, if I consider that, and don’t apply a sentence on the PIC charge.
In any event, because it is covered by the deadly weapons enhancement, what I have before me now, as far as I am concerned, is a sentence on an aggravated assault with a deadly weapons enhancement, and the guideline range of 9 and a zero.
I find the trial court was well within it’s discretion in refusing to apply a sentence to the possessing an instrument of crime charge. I further note that upon remand it will be free, once again, to formulate this same sentence. The Majority’s actions, in my view are needless and unresponsive to the sentencing court’s recognition that a sentence on the possessing an instrument of crime charge was inappropriate in this case.