Court Opinion

ID: 9793959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:55:49.299298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:08:55.721964
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
dissenting.
I believe that granting defendant a new trial on the facts presented here is unjustified, and constitutes an unwarranted extension of Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 83 S Ct 1194, 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), and Hanson v. Cupp, 5 Or App 312, 484 P2d 847 (1971). I therefore respectfully dissent.
Turning first to the decided cases on this question, our attention has hot been called to, nor have I been able to find, any reported case (except In re Ferguson, 5 Cal 3d 525, 535, 96 Cal Rptr 594, 487 P2d 1234, 1241 (1971), relied upon in the majority opinion), that has gone so far as to hold that failure to show defendant a “rap sheet” constituted withholding of essential information. See the exhaustive annotation in 34 ALR3d 16-167 (1970). In re Ferguson, supra, is clearly distinguishable on the facts because there the information withheld was crucial to the defense and cast grave doubt on the credibility of one of the state’s chief witnesses.
Levin v. Clark, 408 F2d 1209 (DC Cir 1967), United States v. Keogh, 391 F2d 138 (2d Cir 1968), and Ashley v. State of Texas, 319 F2d 80 (5th Cir 1963), also cited in the majority opinion, all involved nondisclosures of much more serious import.
In Levin, a grand larceny case, the prosecution failed to reveal to the defense a bank officer’s statement which might have enabled defense to procure *262statements from bank personnel which would have materially aided the defense.
In Keogh, the prosecution failed to turn over to the defense an unrequested FBI report on financial records of a prosecution witness.
In Ashley, the prosecution failed to disclose to defendants’ counsel the fact known to the district attorney of the existence of professional opinions of a psychiatrist and a psychologist engaged by the state that defendants were legally incompetent.
Here, the “rap sheet” information reflected only that the victim had, on many occasions in the past 10 years, been arrested in Nevada and California for public drunkenness, driving while intoxicated and once for destruction of private property. In most instances he was convicted.
At the trial in the case at bar the evidence was that both defendant and the victim had been drinking prior to the fatal shooting. The victim’s drinking habits were known to the defense and were inquired into by defendant on cross-examination of numerous witnesses.
Defendant’s counsel contends that had he known of these matters he would have been able to investigate deceased’s reputation in each of the communities in which the victim had previously lived, and that such investigation might have uncovered evidence that the deceased had a reputation for violence. I am unable to see how this expression of a mere possibility constitutes a showing that defendant was prejudiced in mailing his defense by not having seen the “rap sheet” in question.
It is elementary that a defendant charged with homicide who relies on self-defense normally endeavors *263to establish (a) that the victim was the aggressor and (b) that he had a reputation for physical violence.
According to the record defendant’s counsel had the services of an investigator at his disposal in preparing for trial. There is nothing in the record to indicate that either defendant, his counsel or their investigator asked about an FBI “rap sheet” until after trial and conviction. There is no contention that the nondisclosure by the district attorney’s office was willful and deliberate.
Defendant argues that the reason he did not investigate his victim’s character and reputation was because the district attorney’s file showed that the deceased had no local or Oregon criminal record, and that the district attorney failed to call their attention to the FBI “rap sheet” which arrived some days later.
I find it impossible to accept defendant’s argument and overturn the conviction on this account.
In addition, none of the offenses shown on the sheet indicated that defendant had committed acts of physical violence against the person of another. Further, none of the convictions shown would have been admissible in this case.①
An examination of the record satisfies me that defendant had full opportunity to present his defense of self-defense, that he had a fair trial and that he was convicted upon substantial evidence of guilt.
An appellate court reviewing a conviction is not governed by mere technicalities based on imaginary possibilities. State v. Hibberd, 123 Or 490, 262 P 950 (1928).

 See cases collected in Annotation, 121 ALR 380, 386 (1939).