Court Opinion

ID: 9761045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:30:03.557427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:19.837992
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
It may very well be that the ultimate disposition in this case properly is disbarment, as the majority holds. Because, however, in the hearing below, the respondent raised the issue of the causal relationship between his acts of misconduct and his alcohol addiction, but the trial court did not resolve it, that holding is now premature. In my view, it is inappropriate to decide the issue of causal relationship as a matter of law on this record. Therefore, I would *422remand so that the hearing court can make that determination.
Heretofore, when, having been found to have engaged in misconduct warranting disbarment, an attorney alleged that his or her addiction caused the acts giving rise to the charges brought against him or her, and offered proof of that allegation, the burden being on the attorney, see Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Winters, 309 Md. 658, 663 n. 2, 526 A.2d 55, 57 n. 2 (1987); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Clinton, 308 Md. 701, 706, 521 A.2d 1202, 1204 (1987); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Deutsch, 294 Md. 353, 366, 450 A.2d 1265, 1271 (1982), we have required the hearing court to resolve the matter. In other words, we have looked to that court’s findings to determine whether the attorney has met his or her burden to establish mitigating or extenuating circumstances sufficient to justify a lesser sanction. See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 404, 593 A.2d 1087, 1092 (1991); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 608-609, 541 A.2d 966, 969 (1988); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Winters, 309 Md. 658, 663, 526 A.2d 55, 57 (1987); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Haupt, 306 Md. 612, 614-16, 510 A.2d 590, 591-92 (1986); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Willemain, 305 Md. 665, 679-80, 506 A.2d 245, 252-53 (1986); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Newman, 304 Md. 370, 377, 499 A.2d 479, 483 (1985); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Truette, 299 Md. 435, 446, 474 A.2d 211, 217 (1984); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Dunphy, 297 Md. 377, 382-85, 467 A.2d 177, 179-81 (1983); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Finlayson, 293 Md. 156, 158-60, 442 A.2d 565, 567 (1982). Unless the attorney proved that such circumstances existed, disbarment was mandated. Proof that an attorney is addicted to alcohol and, further, that his/her addiction “was to a substantial extent responsible for the conduct of the attorney”, Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Miller, 301 Md. 592, 608, 483 A.2d 1281, 1290 (1984), sufficed. When evidence tending to prove the causal relationship of the attorney’s addiction to the misconduct had been produced, but the court did not make a finding on the issue, one way or the other, we have not hesitated to remand the *423case with directions to the trial court to make such a finding. See e.g. Bakas, 323 Md. at 405, 593 A.2d at 1092; Truette, 299 Md. at 443, 474 A.2d at 215.
The majority acknowledges that the respondent adduced testimony concerning his alcoholism, its duration and extent. The respondent testified about his historical involvement with alcohol and as to his perception of its effect on the charged misconduct, opining, — the hearing court and the majority characterize his opinion as “rationalization”— that his acts of misconduct were caused by the alcoholism. In addition, Richard Vincent, the Director of the Maryland State Bar Association’s Lawyer Counseling Committee, to whom the hearing court referred as an expert, testified to a “connection” between the respondent’s thinking processes when misappropriating client funds and his alcoholism. He also testified that his drinking, i.e., his alcoholism, “allowed [the respondent] to do it.” The respondent did not produce any other expert testimony; he did not call any medical experts, such as psychiatrists or psychologists.
The majority “finds” the “[e]vidence that White’s misconduct was, to a substantial extent, precipitated by his alcoholism ... woefully absent in this case.” [Op. at 421]. It characterizes the evidence produced by the respondent as “little more than a recitation of White’s lengthy history of alcoholism and a generalized claim that the theft was caused by his alcoholism.” [Op. at 420]. Therefore, it excuses the hearing court from having to make a factual finding concerning the existence, or not, of a causal relationship, explaining:
Simply to show that the attorney was in the throes of alcoholism at the time he misappropriated client funds; that his thinking was “alcoholically impaired” to the point where he rationalized his behavior as “acceptable,” even though he knew it was not, is insufficient mitigation of itself to justify a sanction less than disbarment.
[Op. at 421].
I believe that the evidence produced by the respondent generated the issue of whether the respondent’s misconduct *424was causally related to his alcoholism. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the hearing court to resolve that issue, one way or the other. Had it made the “findings” that the majority does, I would unhesitatingly join in the disbarment disposition. That court would have had the benefit of the warm record; it would have seen the witnesses and would have been able to assess their credibility. This Court does not have that vantage point. Therefore, it is inappropriate for it to have done so.
Unlike the attorneys in the majority of cases in which alcoholism has been found to be causally related to ethical violations, e.g. Truette, 299 Md. at 443, 474 A.2d at 215; Winters, 309 Md. at 664, 526 A.2d at 57; Miller, 301 Md. at 609, 483 A.2d at 1290; Nothstein, 300 Md. at 670-74, 480 A.2d at 809-12, the respondent did not offer any expert medical evidence, offering only his own testimony and the expert testimony of Mr. Vincent. The majority does not expressly require the offer of expert medical evidence as a predicate to the court’s consideration of whether, or finding that, the causation issue has been generated and proven. And it does not even purport to do so. But that may be the practical effect of this holding. The evidence in this case absent expert medical evidence, compares favorably with that in cases in which a causal relationship has been found; by characterizing it as insufficient as a matter of law, the majority sends a strong hint that more expert testimony is required, that an expert other than Mr. Vincent must be presented. To the extent that that is what is intended or will be the interpretation, I can see no reason to prefer the opinion of one expert over that of another, except insofar as the trier of fact chooses to accept one over the other.
In the cases on which the majority relies for the proposition that the evidence in this case is insufficient to show causation as a matter of law, it was the hearing court that addressed the causation issue; in some, it found causation, see Truette, 299 Md. at 443, 474 A.2d at 215; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Willemain, 297 Md. 386, 394, 466 A.2d 1271, 1274 (1983); while in others it did not. Bakas, 323 *425Md. at 401, 593 A.2d at 1090; Winters, 309 Md. at 664-65, 526 A.2d at 58; Nothstein, 300 Md. at 684-85, 480 A.2d at 816. In each of the cases where the hearing court found no causal relationship, we held that finding not clearly erroneous; we did not hold that it was correct as a matter of law. Thus, it was in upholding the hearing court’s findings that we commented in Bakas that “[t]he court] indicated, we think correctly, that the report contained little detail or substance to support her opinion.” Bakas, 323 Md. at 403, 593 A.2d at 1091. It was in the same context that we mentioned in Nothstein that “[d]uring the period of Nothstein’s misconduct he not only carried on a practice without any problems insofar as the record shows, but at the same time wrote a treatise on an aspect of labor law for a national publisher.” Nothstein, 300 Md. at 686, 480 A.2d at 817. Just as significant is our statement of conclusion: “We cannot say that the trial judge was clearly in error when she concluded that ‘[t]he proof offered by the Respondent was not clear and convincing that he was so mentally ill that he could not control his conduct.’ ” Id. (emphasis added).
It may be that the distinction the majority seeks to draw is between cases in which there is evidence that the attorney has acted calculatingly and those where the evidence to that effect is less clear. The majority emphasizes counsel’s proffer which indicates that the respondent knew the money he misappropriated was not his, but nevertheless set out on a deliberate course to use it, rationalizing that he would not be caught. The majority then tells us that causation was not shown in this case because no strong substantive evidence was presented. It does not tell us, unfortunately, what would have sufficed as such evidence. The “guidance” it gives is not at all helpful in determining when a hearing court must make findings and when it may not. Certainly, whatever the context of the misappropriation, what the majority has said here will have equal applicability-
*426The lengthy history of the respondent’s alcoholism was presented to establish the probability that his addiction was substantially the cause of the misappropriation. What the majority calls a generalized claim that the theft was caused by alcoholism was Vincent's attempt to draw the “connection,” or the causal relationship, if you will. A rational trier of fact, the hearing court, could have found from that evidence that, more than being in the throes of alcoholism at the time he misappropriated client funds, the “root cause” of the respondent’s misconduct was his alcoholism. Of course, it also could have found, as the majority has done, that it was insufficient. But it is the trial court, not this court, that should have initially made that call. Only in the most obvious circumstance should we preclude or discourage it from doing so. This is not such an obvious circumstance.
I do not disagree with the majority, I repeat, that more than an historical recitation is required. I am satisfied, as is it, that the alcoholism must be the root cause of the misconduct or have triggered it. I do not agree that the evidence in this case is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that connection. A remand is necessary in order that the hearing court may decide if the evidence offered convinces it that there is the requisite causal relationship.