Court Opinion

ID: 9764928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:44:09.025921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:02.390258
License: Public Domain

BRADY, Justice.
In 2006 the North Carolina General Assembly ratified “An Act To Protect North Carolina’s Children/Sex Offender Law Changes” direct*336ing the Department of Correction (DOC) to establish a continuous satellite-based monitoring (“SBM”) program for certain classes of sex offenders. An Act To Protect North Carolina’s Children/Sex Offender Law Changes, ch. 247, sec. 15, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1065, 1074-79 (codified as amended at N.C.G.S. §§ 14-208.40 to -208.45 (2009)). Defendants Kenney Bowditch, Kenneth Edward Plemmons, and Mark Allen Waters have each pleaded guilty to multiple counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. All of these offenses occurred before the SBM statutes took effect on 16 August 2006. Defendants dispute their eligibility for SBM, arguing that their participation would violate guarantees against ex post facto laws contained in the federal and state constitutions. We hold that the SBM program at issue was not intended to be criminal punishment and is not punitive in purpose or effect. Thus, subjecting defendants to the SBM program does not violate constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Plemmons pleaded guilty on 1 November 2006 to five counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. He stipulated to the ' aggravating factors that the victim was very young and that he abused a position of trust with the victim. Beginning in February and ending in May 2006, defendant Plemmons committed the multiple offenses when he was at least fifty years of age and his victim was a young girl of five to six years of age. Two of the offenses were consolidated for sentencing, and defendant Plemmons received an active term of imprisonment of twenty-four to twenty-nine months. The trial court suspended the remaining sentences and imposed a period of supervised probation.
Defendant Waters pleaded guilty on 12 April 2007 to five counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. At the time of his offenses, which were committed between August and December 2004, defendant Waters was approximately forty years old and his victim was a ten year old girl. The trial court suspended the sentences and imposed a period of supervised probation on defendant Waters.
Defendant Bowditch pleaded guilty on 3 December 2007 to eight counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. From June through August 2006, Bowditch, who was then sixteen years old, committed his offenses against an eight year old victim. After consolidating some of the cases and suspending sentences, the trial court imposed a period of supervised probation on defendant Bowditch.
*337Upon receiving notice of the State’s intention to seek their enrollment in the SBM program, defendants filed separate motions on constitutional grounds to dismiss the State’s petitions for satellite-based monitoring. After conducting hearings on 1 May and 28 May 2009, the trial court issued a memorandum and order on 12 June 2009 making numerous findings of fact and concluding as a matter of law that (1) determining whether an offense is aggravated for purposes of imposing lifetime satellite-based monitoring is a fact-based, rather than an element-based, inquiry;1 (2) the legislature “intended Satellite monitoring to be criminal punishment”; and (3) even if not intended to be punitive, SBM’s purpose and effect, when analyzed according to the factors enunciated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), “are so punitive that civil intent is negated.” The trial court then ruled that applying SBM to defendants “would be unconstitutional under the ex post facto provisions of both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions.” As such, the trial court allowed defendants’ motions and dismissed the State’s petitions. The State gave notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals on 23 June 2009. Defendants then filed a petition with this Court on 27 October 2009 to certify the case for discretionary review prior to determination by the Court of Appeals. This Court allowed defendants’ petition on 18 February 2010 to address the significant constitutional question at issue.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
After its enactment effective 16 August 2006, the SBM legislation was codified at Part 5 of Article 27A, Chapter 14, of the North Carolina General Statutes. Chapter 14 contains the Criminal Law portion of our statutes, and Article 27A is entitled “Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Programs.” As authorized by the legislation, DOC established and began administering the SBM program on 1 January 2007.
At the hearings conducted on 1 May and 28 May 2009, the trial court heard testimony from three individuals who were employed by DOC in the Division of Community Corrections (DCC). Todd Carter testified about his role as a probation officer assigned to assist with monitoring SBM participants on a local level; Lori Anderson testified as a manager for the Twenty-Eighth Judicial District; and Hannah *338Roland, who was based in Raleigh, testified as the special operations administrator in charge of the SBM program for sex offenders.
In relevant part, their testimony tended to reflect the following: SBM’s enrollment population consists of (1) offenders on parole or probation who are subject to State supervision, (2) unsupervised offenders who remain under SBM by court order for a designated number of months or years, and (3) unsupervised offenders subject to SBM for life, who are also known as “lifetime trackers.” Cf. N.C.G.S. §§ 14-208.40, -208.40A, -208.40B (describing when SBM is required at all, when it is mandatory “for life,” and when it should be imposed “for a period of time to be specified by the court”).
All SBM participants receive three items of equipment. First, at all times they wear a transmitter, which is a bracelet held in place by a strap worn around one ankle. Tampering with the bracelet or removing it triggers an alert. The ankle bracelet in use at the time of the hearings was approximately three inches by one and three-quarters inches by one inch. Second, participants wear a miniature tracking device (MTD) around the shoulder or at the waistline on a belt. The MTD may not be hidden under clothing. The device contains the Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and is tethered to the ankle bracelet by a radio-frequency (RF) signal. The size of the MTD in use at the time of the hearings was four and one-quarter inches by two inches by three inches. The MTD includes an electronic screen that displays text messages communicating possible violations or information to the participant. Third, a base unit is required for charging the MTD’s battery, and although it is typically kept at a participant’s residence, the base unit may be used to recharge the MTD wherever electricity is available. The MTD requires at least six hours of charging per twenty-four hour period.
Personnel from DCC perform maintenance on the equipment every ninety days and replace the transmitter once a year. This maintenance requires a visit to the location of the base. The maintenance is conducted under an agreement signed by SBM participants when monitoring begins. Criminal liability is imposed for, inter alia, refusing to allow the required maintenance, destroying the equipment, or interfering with its proper functioning. N.C.G.S. § 14-208.44(b), (c).
The monitoring aspects of SBM are conducted by DOC/DCC. Personnel in Raleigh monitor unsupervised participants and assist field staff with tracking supervised offenders. Outside of normal *339work hours for the personnel in Raleigh, local law enforcement officers are on call to receive and address alerts as necessary.
The equipment facilitates a “near real time” log of a participant’s movements. However, only periodic checks are conducted on the movements of unsupervised participants, going back a day or two at .a time. If DCC personnel observe certain patterns of movement or locations that a participant appears to frequent, they may contact local officers to identify the area and look for vulnerable sites, such as schools or day-care centers. If reviewing the tracking information reveals a participant’s presence at a location that may constitute a violation of North Carolina law, DCC contacts local law enforcement, which may investigate further. Supervised offenders may be subject to “inclusion zones,” areas in which they must remain for a period of time, or “exclusion zones,” which they must refrain from visiting. No such zones are utilized for unsupervised participants. The tracking information is stored at DOC for one year, and then the program vendor archives the information for the length of the State’s contract plus seven years.
The SBM equipment transmits various alerts regarding potential violations to DCC personnel. Alerts that are uploaded “immediately” consist for the most part of alerts indicating “bracelet gone,” violations of “inclusion” or “exclusion” zones, or “no GPS” signal. The alert for “bracelet gone” is sent when transmission is lost between the ankle bracelet and the MTD. The loss in transmission may be due to a variety of causes, such as removing the MTD and venturing too far away from it. Equipment in use at the time of the hearings allowed for a range of approximately fifty feet between the MTD and the ankle bracelet, while newer equipment allows for a range of up to thirty feet. The alerts for “inclusion” or “exclusion” zones are triggered when a supervised SBM participant violates the boundaries of an established zone. The “no GPS” alert is triggered when transmission is lost between participants and the satellite that is tracking their movements. SBM participants must acknowledge the alerts and respond to attempts to resolve them.
SBM may affect a participant’s daily activities. Entrance into some buildings disrupts the GPS signal, requiring the participant to go outside to reestablish satellite connection. Submerging the ankle bracelet in three feet or more of water generates a “bracelet gone” alert. In terms of travel, the SBM program places no restrictions on unsupervised participants who may leave the state temporarily or permanently after returning the SBM equipment to *340DOC. It is possible, though, that the GPS signal may be lost in remote areas, and commercial airplane flight is likely limited due to security regulations.
Nonetheless, testimony indicated that the equipment and DCC can make accommodations according to the needs of SBM participants. At a place of employment, the MTD can be set at a stationary location while the participant moves around, as long as the range of the equipment’s signal is not exceeded. If circumstances necessitate going in and out of range, officers know of a participant’s employment situation and can confirm via telephone that the participant is at work. Moreover, for certain medical procedures the ankle bracelet can be relocated or removed. If a physician orders a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) procedure, for example, DCC staff can remove the equipment for the MRI.
ANALYSIS
An appellate court reviews conclusions of law pertaining to a constitutional matter de novo. State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citing Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 517, 597 S.E.2d 717, 721 (2004)). The trial court’s findings of fact are binding on appeal if they are “ ‘supported by competent evidence,’ ” and they must ultimately support the trial court’s conclusions of law. Id. (quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)).
This Court has considered a number of cases involving various statutory provisions directed at convicted sex offenders. See, e.g., State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444 (2009) (clarifying the definition of “address” in the registration statutes); Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 362 N.C. 328, 661 S.E.2d 728 (2008) (upholding a city ordinance criminalizing knowing entry into public parks by registered sex offenders); State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 614 S.E.2d 479 (2005) (upholding registration statutes as constitutional when applied to a convicted sex offender who moved to North Carolina from another jurisdiction). The case before us is this Court’s first opportunity to rule on an aspect of the SBM program.2
*341The United States and North Carolina Constitutions prohibit ex post facto laws. U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, cl. 1; N.C. Const, art. I, § 16. “An ex post facto law may be defined, as relevant here, as a law that ‘allows imposition of a different or greater punishment than was permitted when the crime was committed.’ ” State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 233-34, 481 S.E.2d 44, 71 (1997) (quoting State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613, 620, 403 S.E.2d 495, 500 (1991)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876 (1998). Under this Court’s jurisprudence, “the federal and state constitutional ex post facto provisions are evaluated under the same definition.” State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 625, 565 S.E.2d 22, 45 (2002) (citing State v. Robinson, 335 N.C. 146, 147-48, 436 S.E.2d 125, 126-27 (1993)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1117 (2003).
In 1997, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed legislation enacted by Kansas that established “procedures for the civil commitment of persons who, due to a ‘mental abnormality’ or a ‘personality disorder,’ are likely to engage in ‘predatory acts of sexual violence.’ ” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02 (1994)). In 2003, the Court decided Smith v. Doe, in which it considered the registration requirements and notification system of Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act. 538 U.S. 84, 89-90 (2003). The Court held in both Smith and Hendricks that the statutory measures under review did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal constitution. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 370-71. Smith and Hendricks are significant because of their explanation of controlling ex post facto law and because of their similar subject matter to the case subjudice. As further explained below, many parallels exist between the SBM program at issue and the regulatory schemes analyzed in Smith and Hendricks. The instant case falls within the framework established by those precedents for civil, regulatory schemes that address the recidivist tendencies of convicted sex offenders.
An ex post facto analysis begins with determining whether the express or implicit “intention of the legislature was to impose pun*342ishment,” and if so, “that ends the inquiry.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361). If the intention was to enact a civil, regulatory scheme, then by referring to the factors enunciated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez for guidance, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate” the legislature’s civil intent. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Legislative Objective in Enacting SBM Was Nonpunitive
Our analysis begins with discerning through statutory construction “the legislative objective,” id. (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)), whether announced “ ‘expressly’ ” or indicated “ ‘impliedly,’ ” regarding SBM’s status as civil regulation or criminal punishment, id. at 92-93 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)). The text, structure, manner of codification, and enforcement procedures of the statutory scheme are a few of the probative indicators of legislative intent. Id. at 92-94 (citations omitted). At the outset, we note that the legislature did not expressly attach the label of civil or criminal to the SBM program. Unlike the sex offender registration programs, which are prefaced by an extensive expression of purpose in N.C.G.S. § 14-208.5, the legislature did not enact a separate purpose section specific to SBM. Nonetheless, several indicators demonstrate that the legislative objective in enacting SBM was ta establish a nonpunitive, regulatory program.
The legislature’s intent in establishing SBM may be inferred from the declaration in the authorizing legislation that it “shall be known as ‘An Act To Protect North Carolina’s Children/Sex Offender Law Changes.’ ” Ch. 247, sec. 1(a), 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1066. Desiring to protect our State’s children from the recidivist tendencies of convicted sex offenders demonstrates an intent to create a nonpunitive, regulatory scheme. Cf. Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 (noting that nonpunitive sex offender registration statutes were designed to protect the public from harm); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-63 (noting that involuntary civil commitment of dangerous sex offenders was intended to protect the public).
Furthermore, the placement of the SBM program within Article 27A of Chapter 14 of our General Statutes is significant. The SBM program follows immediately after the Article 27A sections composing the Sex Offender Registration Programs. N.C.G.S. §§ 14-208.5 to *343-208.32 (2009). Before enactment of the SBM program, the Supreme Court of the United States had determined sex offender registration statutes to be civil regulations, Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06, and North Carolina appellate courts had reached the same conclusion, see State v. Sakobie, 165 N.C. App. 447, 451-52, 598 S.E.2d 615, 617-18 (2004). Moreover, the legislature’s statement of purpose for Article 27A, found at section 14-208.5, explains that “the purpose of this Article [is] to assist law enforcement agencies’ efforts to protect communities.” Understandably, section 14-208.5 explicitly refers to registration, but the SBM program is consistent with that section’s express goals of compiling and fostering the “exchange of relevant information” concerning sex offenders. The decision to codify the SBM statutory scheme in the same Article and immediately following the registration programs implies a legislative objective to make the SBM program one part of a broader regulatory means of confronting the unique “threat to public safety posed by the recidivist tendencies of convicted sex offenders.” Abshire, 363 N.C. at 323, 677 S.E.2d at 446.
Defendants suggest that the SBM program’s location in Chapter 14, the “Criminal Law” portion of our General Statutes, is relevant. However, placement in a criminal code is not dispositive. See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 94-95 (stating that codifying a sex offender registration provision in a criminal procedure code was not dispositive of the statute’s punitive nature); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984) (holding that a forfeiture provision for firearms was a civil sanction despite codification of its authorizing statute in a criminal code). We are more persuaded to recognize the legislature’s civil intent behind SBM by noting that the program was codified into the previously recognized nonpunitive, regulatory scheme located in Article 27A of Chapter 14.
Another attribute of the SBM program that may be probative of legislative intent is that its administration is overseen by the Division of Community Corrections, which is under the Department of Correction. Even though Hannah Roland testified that in her opinion there were no other DOC programs that were not criminal punishment of some sort, any initial reaction that DOC/DCC’s involvement inherently relegates SBM to the domain of criminal punishment is premature.
Among DOC’s varied responsibilities and activities are programs “designed to give persons committed to the Department op*344portunities for physical, mental and moral improvement,” N.C.G.S. § 148-22(b) (2009), programs for “academic and vocational and technical education,” id. § 148-22.1(a) (2009), and programs providing “incarcerated offenders a work and training environment that emulates private industry,” id. § 148-129(1) (2009). Without definitively deciding the nature of these programs, we note that their existence makes the effect of DOC/DCC’s involvement in administrating the SBM program at the least, “open to debate.” Cf. Smith, 538 U.S. at 94-96 (making a similar conclusion as to the enforcement procedures established by Alaska’s sex offender registry program). DOC is responsible for the administration of criminal punishment, but not everything DOC handles is therefore punitive. DOC’s programs retain the common element of involving accused or convicted criminal offenders, but that all of DOC’s activities involve criminal punishment should not be presumed. SBM participants are offenders who, at some point in time and for some duration of time, come under DOC’s authority by virtue of their criminal convictions. As a result, utilizing DOC’s administrative and personnel resources for the SBM program appears to make sound organizational and fiscal sense. We cannot • agree, as defendants argue, that “[h]ad the General Assembly intended SBM to be civil, it would have entrusted its creation and supervision to a governmental entity other than DOC.”
In sum, the General Assembly described the SBM program as a means “To Protect North Carolina’s Children” and codified the SBM provisions in Article 27A of Chapter 14 of our General Statutes. These decisions in particular evince the nonpunitive objective of making SBM another regulatory tool in an effort to defend against an unacceptable threat to public safety.
Civil Tntent Is Not Negated by SBM’s Purpose or Effect
Although the legislature sufficiently implied its civil intent in enacting the SBM program, ex post facto jurisprudence compels an analysis of whether SBM is so punitive in purpose or effect that the legislature’s civil intent is negated. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. The “ ‘useful guideposts,’ ” id. at 97 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99), for this analysis are factors compiled in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. They are helpful but not necessarily “ ‘exhaustive’ ” or “ ‘dispositive.’ ” Id. at 97 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)). As the Court in Smith similarly recognized, two of the factors carry “little weight” in this context because SBM applies only to certain offenders based on their past conduct, not to their current *345behavior.3 See id. at 105; Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1004, 1007 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on Smith and noting that the two Mendoza-Martinez factors referenced above “were not particularly germane” when testing sex offender registration and SBM statutes for ex post facto concerns), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 287 (2008). Thus, the following five
factors most relevant to our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97; see Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). The trial court stated that it considered the Mendoza-Martinez factors and in its order listed seven points in support of its determination that the factors weigh in favor of negating the legislature’s civil intent. While it is not entirely clear which of the trial court’s observations correspond to which factors, we will assess some of the trial court’s observations and defendants’ arguments as we undertake a de novo review of the issue.
As outlined in Smith, addressing the first relevant factor entails a discussion of historical or traditional methods of punishment. The technology behind SBM is relatively new, and in that sense, it has no history or tradition of being used for punishment. As such, a meaningful discussion requires an attempt at drawing analogies. The trial court concluded that traditional criminal punishments and SBM share the aspects of “supervision by the State” and “[s]hame and humiliation by wearing a readily identifiable mechanism in public.” Defendants also argue that relevant here are the trial court’s references to SBM as being similar to electronic house arrest and to a defendant’s ability to free himself of SBM by leaving the state permanently.
An offender’s period of parole or probation, and its attendant State supervision, historically have been considered a form of crimi*346nal punishment. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). There is a level of monitoring that takes place in the SBM program; however, the difference here is that SBM’s “surveillance components are not of a type that we have traditionally considered as a punishment.” See Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1005. DCC considers some SBM participants to be supervised but that terminology is used because those offenders are concurrently serving a period of parole or probation. DCC considers other SBM participants who are no longer on parole or probation to be unsupervised. The movements of unsupervised SBM participants are only periodically checked for observable patterns or proximity to sensitive locations. Consistent with the terms of their probation, supervised offenders may be subject to “inclusion zones” or “exclusion zones,” but no such zones are utilized for unsupervised participants.
The monitoring taking place in the SBM program is far more passive and is distinguishable from the type of State supervision imposed on probationers, who must live under a regime of “ ‘conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.’ ” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (alteration in original)); see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 101 (“Probation and supervised release entail a series of mandatory conditions and allow the supervising officer to seek the revocation of probation or release . . . .” (citations omitted)). Through the SBM program the State is logging and reviewing information about offenders’ whereabouts. Hannah Roland explained DCC’s approach to the “lifetime trackers,” stating “[A]ll we’re doing is tracking them. We’re not technically supervising them. As the law stipulates, they are unsupervised.” Even the requirement that DCC personnel be allowed to enter a participant’s residence every ninety days is dissimilar from a parole or probation setting. DCC’s reason for the visit is not supervisory or investigatory; the only purpose is to perform regularly scheduled maintenance on the SBM equipment that is still property of the State.
Furthermore, likening the SBM program more to house arrest than to sex offender registration is unavailing. Defendants argue that “DOC has the power” to establish and limit an inclusion zone “to the offender’s residence, thereby turning the home into a prison cell.” However, there is no evidence that exclusion or inclusion zones have been utilized for unsupervised SBM participants. Hannah Roland was asked by defense counsel at one point about the zones: “But they could be utilized; is that correct?” and her answer was “No.” Her tes*347timony reflects that inclusion or exclusion zones are used for participants on supervised probation as an aid to compliance with their probation restrictions. For instance, an individual on probation may be ordered to attend a treatment center. Through an inclusion zone around the treatment center at the appropriate times, SBM may facilitate the probation officer’s knowledge of whether the individual attended the treatment session. Utilizing SBM as a tool in this capacity does not make it a punishment.
As additional support for the house arrest argument, defendants note that the MTD’s battery requires recharging for six hours during every twenty-four hour period. This ties the SBM participant for the charging period to the location of the base unit, which is most likely the participant’s residence. However, this feature of the SBM equipment can be distinguished from a house arrest situation because the MTD’s battery can be charged wherever electricity is available. In this day and age, finding a source of available electricity, whether at a home, hotel, place of employment, or even in a moving vehicle, should be little or no challenge.
Next, defendants argue that SBM is similar in form to historical punishments involving shaming and humiliation because the ankle bracelet and MTD must be worn in a conspicuous manner that is thus visible in public. The Court in Smith noted how historically there have been certain punishments intended to “inflict public disgrace,” such as ordering convicted offenders “ ‘to stand in public with signs cataloguing their offenses.’ ” 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1179,1226 (1982)). There is a dispositive difference between these historical types of shaming punishments and SBM. An integral dynamic of a shaming punishment is the State’s puiposeful arrangément of a “face-to-face” display of the offender in front of fellow citizens for public disgrace and ridicule. Id. at 98. With SBM the State’s objective is not to publicize crimes and bring a “resulting stigma” on the offender. See id. at 99. Any humiliation from enrollment in SBM is unintended by the State.
There is no evidence in the record that any sex offender has faced personal embarrassment or social ostracism because of wearing the SBM equipment in public, nor is there any evidence that a casual public observer has even recognized the SBM equipment and identified its wearer as a convicted sex offender. We are persuaded by the observation of the court in Doe v. Bredesen, which concluded that Tennessee’s SBM equipment was “relatively unobtrusive” and *348“[i]n its size, shape, and placement . . . appears very similar to . . . other nondescript electronic device[s].” 507 E3d at 1005. The MTD used for Tennessee’s SBM program under evaluation in Bredesen was larger than the MTD in the present case: “6 inches by 3.25 inches by 1.75 inches,” id., compared here to 4.25 inches by 2 inches by 3 inches. A casual observer could perceive the MTD to be any number of personal electronic devices, such as a cellular phone, personal digital assistant (PDA), or MP3 player. We cannot conclude that simply mandating the wearing of the SBM equipment in public amounts to a form of criminal punishment.
The final historical means of punishment that defendants attempt to analogize to SBM is that of banishment. There is no dispute that “banishment and exile have throughout history been used as punishment,” Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168 n.23. Banishment is “[e]xpulsion from” a community. Black’s Law Dictionary 655 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “exile” and showing “banishment” as a synonym thereof). Here, the argument is unconvincing because SBM expels no one from anywhere. An unsupervised offender subject to SBM is free to leave North Carolina and remove himself from any regulatory scheme imposed by our State, including SBM, if he so chooses. SBM does not banish anyone, and neither is leaving the state the only means of removal from the SBM program. See N.C.G.S. § 14-208.43 (enabling sex offender on lifetime SBM to petition for removal upon meeting certain conditions).
The second relevant Mendoza-Martinez factor is whether SBM imposes an affirmative disability or restraint on its participants and if so, to what extent. This requires a consideration of “how the effects of [SBM] are felt by those subject to it. If the disability or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 99-100.
There is no denying that being subjected to SBM has an impact on the lives of its participants. Yet, when viewed in light of other civil, regulatory schemes, we cannot conclude that the effects of SBM transform it into criminal punishment. While considering an ex post facto challenge to a sex offender registration scheme in Smith, the Court commented that registration “obligations are less harsh than the sanctions of occupational debarment, which [] have [been] held to be nonpunitive.” Id. at 100 (emphasis added) (citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 (forbidding work in the banking industry); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (forbidding work as a union official); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (revoking medical license)); *349see also Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1005 (relying on Smith to conclude that the effects of Tennessee’s SBM program were less harsh than occupational debarment). Occupational debarment is far more harsh than an SBM program that allows offenders to choose where they work and what type of occupation they pursue. Hannah Roland testified that DCC makes efforts to accommodate the employment requirements of SBM participants, when necessary. She further stated regarding employment situations that DCC attempts “to work with [offenders] and get their cooperation to make it as easy and frustrating-free as possible.” There is no indication in the record that any SBM participant has been unable to pursue a desired occupation due to SBM. Cf. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100 (noting the absence of record evidence showing any “substantial occupational or housing disadvantages” due to sex offender registration).
The effects of the present SBM program are also less harsh than the post-incarceration, involuntarily confinement of sex offenders that was found to be nonpunitive in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). In Hendricks the Court acknowledged that the civil commitment scheme involved “an affirmative restraint,” but noted that even detainment “ ‘does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.’ ” Id. at 363 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). The SBM program does not detain an offender in any significant way. Defendants point out that the SBM program requires participants to acknowledge messages sent via the MTD and cooperate with DCC in resolving alerts. Additionally, every ninety days a participant must allow DCC personnel to perform maintenance on the SBM equipment where it is located, typically in the participant’s residence. While these requirements of the SBM program, and others, constrain a participant’s experience of absolute freedom, no aspect of the SBM program remotely approaches the same level of restraint as the detainment inherent in the civil commitment scheme upheld in Hendricks. Similar to registration schemes, the requirements necessary to operate SBM “make a valid regulatory program effective and do not impose punitive restraints.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
Noting the maintenance that must be performed by DCC person- ■ nel every ninety days, typically within an offender’s residence, the dissenting opinion argues that the SBM program unnecessarily burdens the Fourth Amendment rights of those convicted felons subject to SBM. However, it is beyond dispute that convicted felons do not enjoy the same measure of constitutional protections, including the *350expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, as do citizens who have not been convicted of a felony. See, e.g., Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that collecting blood samples from felons for registration in a DNA databank does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that convicted sex offenders have no right of privacy preventing a state from requiring them to register as such and be subject to community notification of their residences), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007 (1998); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Even probationers lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to their right to privacy against searches of their homes pursuant to an established program to ensure rehabilitation and security.” (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 868)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992); Standley, 362 N.C. at 329-33, 661 S.E.2d at 730-32 (holding that a convicted sex offender’s constitutional rights were not violated by a municipal ordinance that prohibited him from access to public parks); Bryant, 359 N.C. at 557-70, 614 S.E.2d at 481-89 (holding that no due process violation occurred when a convicted sex offender who was required to register in South Carolina failed to register in North Carolina, even though he received no actual notice of registration requirement). Here felons convicted of multiple counts of indecent liberties with children are not visited by DCC personnel for random searches, but simply to ensure the SBM system is working properly.
Finally, in regards to the second factor, defendants list an array of activities that SBM may prohibit or render more difficult. Examples include bathing, swimming, scuba diving, camping in rural areas, and travel by airplane. Moreover, any activity conducted inside a building potentially could be interrupted if the building’s structure blocked the satellite signal and required a participant to exit and reestablish satellite connection. These are not trivial interferences, yet they are certainly no more onerous than the harsh effects of the regulations found to be nonpunitive in occupational debarment cases or in Hendricks.
Doe v. Bredesen is likewise persuasive on this point. The court in that case considered record testimony from an offender enrolled in Tennessee’s SBM program. He described his experiences of not being allowed to swim or bathe, of needing to go outside a building “at least once every hour so that monitoring can take place,” and of one time “standing] in the rain, for over thirty minutes, for all his neighbors to see” while a problem with the equipment was corrected. Bredesen, *351507 F.3d at 1002. Still, the court in Bredesen could not conclude that these circumstances rendered Tennessee’s SBM program punitive.
The next relevant factor is whether the SBM program promotes the traditional aims of punishment. Retribution and deterrence are “the two primary objectives of criminal punishment.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62. Defendants argue that SBM is retributive because it applies only to individuals who have been convicted of prior criminal behavior. In Hendricks the Court noted that under Kansas law, even “persons absolved of criminal responsibility may nonetheless be subject to confinement.” Id. at 362 (citation omitted). The Court commented that the “absence of the necessary criminal responsibility suggests that the State [was] not seeking retribution for a past misdeed.” Id. We do not find this language dispositive, though, in light of Smith, which did not conclude that Alaska’s sex offender registration scheme was retributive even though registration “applie[d] only to past conduct, which was, and is, a crime.” 538 U.S. at 102, 105. The SBM program is concerned with protecting the public against recidivist tendencies of convicted sex offenders. Thus, the fact that it applies only to individuals convicted of prior criminal conduct is consistent with its regulatory purpose and not indicative of a retributive nature.
Both the State and defendants acknowledge that SBM may have a deterrent purpose or effect in some measure. “But the mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal . . . .” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted). As the Court' recognized in Smith, “[a]ny number of governmental programs might deter crime without imposing punishment,” 538 U.S. at 102, and that is the case here. The SBM program’s foremost purpose is not to deter crime, and the possibility of having that secondary effect does not transform SBM into a form of punishment.
The fourth relevant factor is whether SBM has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose. The Court in Smith identified this indicator as “a ‘[m]ost significant’ factor in [its] determination.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996) (alteration in original)). Both the State and defendants recognize a rational connection between SBM and the nonpunitive purpose of protecting the public.
The fifth and final relevant Mendoza-Martinez factor is whether SBM is excessive with respect to its nonpunitive purpose of public safety. This inquiry “is not an exercise in determining whether the *352legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem” but “whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.” Id. at 105. The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders has been widely documented and is well established. See Standley, 362 N.C. at 333, 661 S.E.2d at 731 (discussing the high recidivism rates among sex offenders); see also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32-34 (2002) (plurality) (describing sex offender recidivism rates as “frightening and high”). The SBM program at issue is reasonable when compared to the unacceptable risk against which it seeks to protect.
Moreover, SBM’s reasonableness is supported by its limited application and its potentially limited duration. Only three classifications of offenders qualify for SBM according to N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40(a). The legislature viewed these categories of offenders as posing a particular risk to society. It is not excessive to legislate with respect to these types of sex offenders “as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 104. Individual determinations can be made though under N.C.G.S. § 14-208.43 if an offender on lifetime SBM petitions the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission for removal from the SBM program, subject to meeting certain conditions.4 The possibility of removal from the SBM program following a determination that the “person is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others” adds to the reasonableness of the SBM program. N.C.G.S. § 14-208.43(c).
CONCLUSION
The SBM program at issue was enacted with the intent to create a civil, regulatory scheme to protect citizens of our state from the threat posed by the recidivist tendencies of convicted sex offenders. Having examined the relevant Mendoza-Martinez factors in detail, we conclude that neither the purpose nor effect of the SBM program negates the legislature’s civil intent. Accordingly, subjecting defendants to the SBM program does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state or federal constitution. The trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
*353REVERSED AND REMANDED.

. The State assigned error to this conclusion of law, but did not address the issue in its brief. Thus, under the rules of appellate procedure applicable to this case, we consider the assignment of error to be abandoned, and we will not address it. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).

. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has already addressed the present issue, stating that the SBM program does not violate ex post facto prohibitions in at least eleven unanimous opinions. State v. Stewart, COA09-928, slip op. at 1 (N.C. App. Mar. 2, 2010) (unpublished); State v. Murdock, COA09-615, slip op. at 1 (N.C. App. Jan. 19, 2010) (unpublished); State v. Boothe, COA09-264, slip op. at 1 (N.C. App. Jan. 5, 2010) (unpublished); State v. Lederer-Hughes, COA09-280, slip op. at 1 (N.C. App. Nov. 17, 2009) (unpublished); State v. Hughes, COA09-288, slip op. at 1 (N.C. App. Nov. 3, 2009) *341(unpublished); State v. Miller, COA09-623, slip op. at 1 (N.C. App. Nov. 3, 2009) (unpublished); State v. Downey, — N.C. App. —, 683 S.E.2d 791 (2009) (unpublished); State v. Stines, — N.C. App. —, 683 S.E.2d 411 (2009); State v. Chandler, COA08-885, slip op. at 1 (N.C. App. July 21, 2009) (unpublished); State v. Anderson, — N.C. App. — 679 S.E.2d 165 (2009), and State v. Bare, — N.C. App. —, 677 S.E.2d 518 (2009). Three other panels at the Court of Appeals have concluded the same, but in divided opinions. State v. Vogt, — N.C. App. —, 685 S.E.2d 23 (2009) (Elmore, J., dissenting); State v. Morrow, — N.C. App. —, 683 S.E.2d 754 (2009) (Elmore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Wagoner, — N.C. App. —, 683 S.E.2d 391 (2009) (Elmore, J., dissenting).

. The two factors 'of only “little weight,” Smith, 538 U.S. at 105, are “whether [the scheme] comes into play only on a finding of scienter” and “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime.” Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168 (footnotes omitted). These factors are inconsequential in this setting because, similar to the sex offender registration law at issue in Smith, the SBM program applies only to individuals who have committed crimes in the past. SBM applies to individuals based on prior behavior, and its concern is with recidivist tendencies. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 105.

. Section 14-208.43(e) does not permit consideration of a request to terminate participation of an offender subjected to SBM under section 14-208.40(a)(2). This provision does not detract from our conclusion, however, because section 14-208.40(a)(2) itself requires an individualized assessment before applying SBM to an offender whose risk level “requires the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring.”