Court Opinion

ID: 9649869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:11:54.171881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:15.496696
License: Public Domain

FICKLING, Associate Judge
(dissenting) :
The District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act (hereinafter, the Act) in its introductory portion specifies that its purpose is to ameliorate the conditions of "persons employed in some occupations in the District of Columbia,” (D.C.Code 1973, § 36-401(a); emphasis added). In the cases at bar, the employers are located in the District,* the employees report to work in the District, and the employees spend only a small portion of their working hours outside the District. It would therefore appear that these employees are in the class of persons sought to be aided by the Act.
The majority opinion, however, includes these employees within the ambit of the Act only to the extent of the hours they are physically present in the District. This construction of the Act means that an employee who spends one percent of his time outside the District of Columbia would not be entitled to the benefits of the Act for that one percent.
On the other hand, I would follow the definition of “employed in the District of Columbia” as enunciated in Williams v. W. M. A. Transit Co., 153 U.S.App.D.C. 183, 472 F.2d 1258 (1972), so that the Act would apply to such employees.
Under Williams “ ‘employed ... in the District of Columbia’ encompasses an employee who regularly spends more than 50% of his work time in the District.” 153 U.S.App.D.C. at 190, 472 F.2d at 1265. Also included is an “employee [who] does not regularly spend 50% of his work time in any particular state (or the District) . if his employment is based in the District of Columbia and he regularly spends a substantial amount of his working time in the District.” Id. This definition does not leave a gap as the majority definition admittedly does. The majority opinion says the Fair Labor Standards Act and the minimum wage acts in other jurisdictions will fill the gap although no authority is cited to support that conclusion.
Therefore, I would follow Williams and have these District employees completely protected by D.C.Code 1973, § 36-403(b)(1)(B).

 In Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 153 U.S. App.D.C. 183, 472 F.2d 1258 (1972), the court -applied the Act in a situation where the employer was not located in the District.