Court Opinion

ID: 9899673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 15:13:05.912899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.043269
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              November 17, 2023
                                                                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                             SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                  OF WEST VIRGINIA

Lloyd M. Dillon,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 22-583 (Nicholas County 20-C-34)

Robert Starcher,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent

                                 MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Lloyd M. Dillon appeals the June 13, 2022, final order of the Circuit Court of
Nicholas County following a bench trial. 1 Upon our review, we determine that the circuit court
abused its discretion by conducting a bench trial without ensuring that petitioner had been provided
with notice of the trial, and, thus, the final order must be vacated. Because this case presents no
substantial question of law, we find that it satisfies the “limited circumstances” of Rule 21(d) of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure and is appropriate for disposition by a memorandum decision
rather than an opinion.

        This action stems from a boundary line dispute between the parties. The parties were
previously involved with litigation concerning petitioner’s use of an easement on respondent’s
property. Per the mediation agreement that resolved the earlier litigation, petitioner could use the
easement and the parties agreed to respect the boundary line of their adjoining individual tracts. In
this civil action, respondent filed a complaint in circuit court alleging trespass and ejectment for
petitioner’s farm equipment and miscellaneous personal property which respondent claimed was
improperly on his property. Petitioner was self-represented when he answered the complaint and
later retained counsel. Petitioner, through counsel, participated in discovery, filed a response to
respondent’s motion for summary judgment, and submitted a pretrial memorandum.

       Approximately one month prior to trial, petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel pursuant to Rule 4.03 of the West Virginia Trial Court Rules. Although the motion to
withdraw noted the June 9, 2022, bench trial, 2 the attorney notification certificate required under

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Daniel K. Armstrong. Respondent appears by counsel Leah
R. Chappell.
       2
          Notably, the pretrial submissions in the appendix record submitted to this Court provide
that the jury trial was scheduled for March 1, 2022. Although additional pretrial submissions may
have been provided showing a later scheduled trial date, they were not included in the appendix.

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Rule 4.03 was silent as to the trial date. Moreover, it does not appear from the United States Postal
Service tracking documentation in the record that petitioner received the motion to withdraw.
Three days after the motion to withdraw was filed, and without holding a hearing, the circuit court
granted the motion. The order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw did not include the trial date
and there is no notice of hearing or other notification of the scheduled trial date reflected on the
docket sheet after the entry of this order.

        After petitioner’s counsel withdrew, the court conducted a bench trial. Petitioner did not
appear for the bench trial and was not represented by counsel. Although the bailiff called for
petitioner outside of the courtroom, there is nothing on the record to suggest that there were any
further inquiries by the court about petitioner’s absence from the proceeding. Following the
presentation of respondent’s evidence, the court accepted the survey notes and plat from
respondent’s expert as an accurate depiction of the boundary lines between the parties. The court
ultimately awarded respondent an injunction against petitioner along with an award of $19,335.35,
which was comprised of $3,819 for the survey; $15,516.36 in attorney’s fees; and $225 for filing
fees/costs. 3 Petitioner appeals from the judgment order.

                “In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court
        made after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferential standard of review is applied.
        The final order and the ultimate disposition are reviewed under an abuse of
        discretion standard, and the circuit court’s underlying factual findings are reviewed
        under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo
        review.”

Syl. Pt. 1, Pub. Citizen Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538
(1996).

          Petitioner argues that the court erred in proceeding with the bench trial without confirming
that he was provided notice of it. We agree. Rule 1 of West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the
framework for civil procedure, provides that the rules “shall be construed and administered to
secure the just . . . determination of every action.” Moreover, Rule 5 provides that orders,
discovery, written motion, and similar papers “shall be served upon each of the parties.” This
notice and an opportunity to be heard is to ensure a fundamental constitutional tenant that “[n]o
person shall be deprived of life liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” W. Va. Const.
art. III, § 10, in part. 4 Here, petitioner did not receive notice of the bench trial. In fact, the docket

        3
          Although respondent sought to recover storage/rental costs, annoyance and
inconvenience damages, and punitive damages, the court declined to award these damages to
respondent.
        4
          As we stated in Litten v. Peer, 156 W. Va. 791, 797, 197 S.E.2d 322, 328
        (1973), “[i]t has always been the policy of this Court to protect each litigant’s day
        in court.” It is equally true, of course, that “the fundamental requirement of due
        process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are
        adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is
                                                    2
sheet reveals no notice of hearing setting the bench trial for June 9, 2022. Accordingly, it was an
abuse of discretion for the court to fail to ensure that petitioner received notice prior to proceeding
with a bench trial. Thus, we vacate the circuit court’s judgment order and remand to the circuit
court for a new trial.

        For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the circuit court’s order and remand this case for
further proceedings.

                                                             Vacated and remanded with directions.

ISSUED: November 17, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

       invoked.” Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246, 64 S.Ct. 599, 88 L.Ed.
       692 (1944).

In re Charleston Gazette FOIA Request, 222 W. Va. 771, 777, 671 S.E.2d 776, 782 (2008).

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