Court Opinion

ID: 9685512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:44:56.481489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:22.249422
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(dissenting). In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) (due process requires that contempt prosecutions be accompanied by constitutionally required jury trials), the United States Supreme Court plainly stated:
Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes: "These contempts are infractions of the law, visited with punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal, we are in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as that word has been understood in English speech." Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the legislative history of the revised contempt procedures in ch. 785, Stats., unambiguously demonstrates legislative intent to abolish distinctions between civil and criminal contempt proceedings.1 But I do not believe that sui *845generis contempt under the revised statutes prevents nonsummary, punitive contempt proceedings from producing sanctions which are properly considered a criminal penalty. Therefore, I conclude that Carpenter's conviction for contempt resulted in sanctions which meet the definition of a "crime" pursuant to sec. 939.12, Stats., and which may be enhanced under the repeater statute, sec. 939.62, Stats.
I reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, the plain and unambiguous language of the definition of "crime" under sec. 939.12, Stats., and the repeater statute, sec. 939.62, Stats., leads directly to this result. Second, nonsummary, punitive contempt proceedings are conducted pursuant to chs. 967 to 973, Stats., the criminal procedure code. It is unreasonable to conclude that the legislature intended to prevent penalty enhancement for repeated contumacious conduct, while simultaneously requiring that sanctions for such conduct be imposed pursuant to the criminal procedure code.
The legislative history of ch. 785, Stats., is helpful in determining that the legislature intended to abolish the historic, but confusing, distinction between civil and criminal contempt proceedings. Although this assistance is useful in establishing the generic nature of contempt proceedings, it is unnecessary in determining whether sec. 939.62, Stats., is applicable: the statute's plain language is sufficient. If a statute is unambiguous, it is inappropriate to resort to legislative history. State ex rel. Girouard v. Circuit Court for Jackson County, 155 Wis. 2d 148, 155, 454 N.W.2d 792, 795 *846(1990). Section 939.12, Stats., defining "crime," is unambiguous.
Section 939.62, Stats., states: "If the actor is a repeater, as that term is defined in sub. (2), and the present conviction is for any crime for which imprisonment may be imposed . . . the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be increased . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Section 939.12, Stats., states in part: "A crime is conduct which is prohibited by state law and punishable by fine or imprisonment or both." (Emphasis added.) Thus, two elements define crimes: (1) conduct prohibited by state law, (2) which is punishable by fine, or imprisonment, or some combination thereof.
Carpenter was sanctioned for contempt under sec. 785.04(2)(a), Stats., which provides: "A court, after a finding of contempt of court in a nonsummary procedure under s. 785.03(l)(b)[, Stats.], may impose for each separate contempt of court a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or both." (Emphasis added.) Both elements of the definition of a crime are satisfied: (1) Carpenter engaged in conduct prohibited by law; and (2) his contumacious conduct was subject to imprisonment, a fine, or both.2
The legislature might have chosen to define crimes by reference to the nature of the proceeding rather than the resulting punishment, but it did not. I conclude that Carpenter's sanction fits the definition of a crime and that his penalty should be subject to enhancement under sec. 939.62, Stats.
Moreover, the nature of nonsummary punitive contempt is distinctly criminal. A complaint is *847required. Section 785.03, Stats. The proceedings are conducted pursuant to Wisconsin's code of criminal procedure. Section 785.03(l)(b), Stats., provides: "The complaint shall be processed under chs. 967 to 973." Chapters 967 to 979 govern all criminal proceedings. Section 967.01, Stats. The contemnor is entitled to notice of the charges and has a right to prepare and present a defense. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). The contemnor is entitled to a hearing before an unbiased judge. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). There is a presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). If a sentence of imprisonment longer than six months is imposed, the contemnor has a right to a jury trial. Bloom, 391 U.S. 194.
It is illogical to believe that the legislature expressly provided the full panoply of rights afforded criminal defendants in sec. 785.03(l)(b), Stats., yet intended to exclude the resulting punitive sanctions from operation of the repeater statute, sec. 939.62, Stats. Indeed, Martineau states: "The Wisconsin Judicial Council, as a matter of policy, saw no reason to continue to treat persons charged with contempt differently from those charged with ordinary crimes." 50 Cincinnati L. Rev. at 697-98.3 Presumably this includes application of the repeater statute, where appropriate, to contempt convictions.
Thus, I find nothing in the legislative history of ch. 785, Stats., suggesting that the contempt statutes should not be subject to sec. 939.62, Stats. Carpenter has repeatedly and contumaciously failed to support his children, flouting the inherent power of the Clark *848County Circuit Court. His sentence, as determined by that court, is a "crime" subject to penalty enhancement. "If such acts are not criminal, we are in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as that word has been understood in English speech." Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610.

 The legislative history of the 1979 revision of the contempt statutes demonstrates that the legislature intended to clarify confusion surrounding contempt proceedings in Wisconsin by abandoning the historic distinction between civil and criminal contempt proceedings. Chapter 785 was drafted by the Wisconsin Judicial Council's Committee on Contempt expressly to *845achieve this objective. See Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 Cincinnati L. Rev. 677 (1981). See also Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. Rev. 183 (1971).

 Carpenter was sentenced to two years imprisonment.

 Professor Martineau was reporter for the Judicial Council's Committee on Contempt.