Court Opinion

ID: 9709351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:45:46.095633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:47.961813
License: Public Domain

Concurring opinion by CATHELL, J. which HARRELL, J., joins.
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense in the present case. I do so, however, for entirely different reasons and expressly disavow the reasoning of the majority which holds, for the first time in this State, that action begun in an executive branch agency can toll the running of a statute of limitations applicable to judicial branch proceedings. Moreover, in my view, it is totally unnecessary in this case to go where the majority has gone.
Waiver
In my view, the respondent waived the defense of limitations by not raising it, prior to or in its answer. On May 13, 2004, the plaintiffs elected to waive arbitration and the Health Care Office ordered the case transferred to Circuit Court for Harford County. Then on May 17, 2004, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Circuit Court for Harford County.
On July 23, 2004, Upper Chesapeake Medical Center, the defendant below, having filed no other pleading or motion previously, filed its answer to the complaint. Included in that answer was the following language: “Upper Chesapeake Medical Center, Inc., reserves the right to rely on any applicable statute of limitations.” There was no replication filed to the answer. Thereafter, on December 6, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, for the first time directly asserting as a defense a particular statute of limitations, Maryland Code (1974, 2006 RephVol.), § 5-101 of the Courts *546and Judicial Proceedings Article. The plaintiff then filed a response, i.e., a “Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”
Under the Maryland Rules,5 one may not reserve the right to later raise a limitations defense. It must be pled in, or prior to, the answer; otherwise the defense of limitations is waived. Rule 2-323(g) provides that certain defenses must be raised in the answer to a complaint filed in a circuit court. A defense based on a “statute of limitations” must be raised in the answer. Rule 2-323(g)(15). In my view, even though this issue of timeliness of the raising of the limitations defense was not directly challenged below (as far as the record reflects), we, nonetheless, should reach the issue and resolve it as we did in a somewhat similar recent case involving one of the other affirmative defenses contained in the same rule. Rule 2-323(g)(13), like Rule 2-323(g)(15) at issue in the present case, provides that the affirmative defense of res judicata also must be plead no later than the filing of the answer. In Anne Arundel County Board of Education v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 104-05, 887 A.2d 1029, 1035-36 (2005), we reached a similar issue, and, in our view, we should resolve this issue.
It is clear from the record in this case that the plea of limitations was not pled at the time the defendant’s answer was filed. Instead, the defendant purportedly “reserved” the right to file such a plea at a later time, which it then did. I am unaware of any authority that permits a defendant to unilaterally and arbitrarily “reserve” the right to plead “any” affirmative defenses after the period in which the rule requires them to be plead. What the defendant sought to accomplish in this case is, in effect, to amend the Maryland Rules. To allow such an effort to pass without comment risks having subsequent litigants infer the Court’s tacit approval. In my view, it is not an issue that should be left for another day. If a party may ignore this particular rule, one may *547presume that litigants have the power to modify any rule when, in their view, a reason exists to do so.
It is clear to me that limitations must be pled no later than the filing of the answer. That is the position consistently taken by our case law. When construing the applicability of the defense of limitations under the predecessor rule relating to the time for the filing of defenses of limitations, we said in Foos v. Steinberg, 247 Md. 35, 37, 230 A.2d 79, 80 (1967) that:
“In reversing the lower court we need go no further than to hold that the appellee’s plea of limitations was not filed within the time contemplated by the Maryland Rules and thus should have been stricken____Rule 342 provides that a plea of limitations must be specially pleaded ... and further provides that the ‘plea of limitations must be filed within the time required by Rule 307 (Time for Defendant’s Initial Pleading).’ ”
See also, Dupont, Glore, Forgan, Inc. v. Barshack, 271 Md. 316, 318, 316 A.2d 527, 528 (1974), (stating the general proposition that: “Maryland Rule 342 d 2 provides that a plea of limitations ‘must be filed within the time required by Rule 307 (Time for Defendant’s Initial Pleading)’ ”). In Dupont, the defendant filed preliminary motions that, by rule, extended the time for the filing of the answer and thus, the time for raising of the plea of limitations was also extended. In the present case, when the defendant, the respondent in this appeal, filed its answer, it did not raise the plea of limitations. Instead it unilaterally and arbitrarily attempted to extend the time required for the filing of any plea relating to any statute of limitations.
Much more recently, albeit as dicta in that the Court was distinguishing between conditions precedent and statutes of limitation, this Court, relying on the Foos case, noted in Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52, 59, 626 A.2d 353, 356 (1993), that:
“In contrast [to a condition precedent], a statute of limitations affects only the remedy, not the cause of action. The *548failure of a defendant to raise the bar of limitations, timely, see Maryland Rule 2-323(g)(16),[6] results in the waiver of limitations, which permits the plaintiff to proceed with the trial of his or her case.” (Citations omitted.) (Footnote omitted.)
We also noted in Waddell that “Maryland Rule 2—323(g)[(15)] requires the statute of limitations to be specially pleaded as an affirmative defense.” Waddell, 331 Md. at 59 n. 6, 626 A.2d at 356 n. 6.
Foard v. Snider, 205 Md. 435, 451, 109 A.2d 101, 108 (1954), does note that there was language in an earlier case, Stockett v. Sasscer, 8 Md. 374, 377 (1855), that indicated that if there is a reply to the answer, i.e., a replication is filed to the answer, the waiver effect of the failure to file the defense with the answer may itself be waived. That, however, is not the situation in the case sub judice. There was no general response to the answer. Petitioner merely filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed by the respondent.
The Court of Special Appeals consistently has followed our Foos holding. Chief Judge Bell of this Court, while a judge of that court, citing Foos, wrote in Brooks v. State, 85 Md.App. 355, 363, 584 A.2d 82, 86 (1991): ‘We agree with the State that appellant’s failure to challenge his prosecution ... in the court below on the basis of the statute of limitations resulted in his waiver of that defect....” Later, he noted:
“This Rule [the comparable rule] makes clear that the plea of limitation is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded specially. It, and its predecessors, ... have been so interpreted. Failure specially to plead limitations within the time set forth in the Rule results in a waiver of the plea. Because the plea is waivable, it necessarily follows that it is not jurisdictional.
*549“Because appellant did not timely raise limitations in the court below, the defense is waived.” (Citations omitted.)
Brooks, at 364-66, 584 A.2d at 87-88.
The Court of Special Appeals in Meleski v. Pinero International Restaurant, Inc., 47 Md.App. 526, 542, 424 A.2d 784, 794 (1981), relying on Foos, stated that:
“Three of the appellants, the two Meleskis and Chas. H. Steffey, Inc., did not file timely pleas of limitations to the counterclaim filed against them.... The untimeliness of the plea as to them was raised by the appellee in its response to their pre-trial motion for summary judgment on limitations grounds. The court correctly ruled that the defense was not available to them.” (Citations omitted.)
Accordingly, I would hold that the defense of limitations was waived by it not being filed with the defendant’s answer. I would not reach the issue the majority finds determinative.
Tolling of the Statute of Limitations by Filing in the Wrong Forum
I additionally disagree with the majority opinion that the filing of the claim with the Health Care Office, an administrative entity, within three years of the alleged injury, tolled the general statute of limitations which relates, in the context of the present case, only to the filing of negligence claims with the courts. The majority first attempts to justify this drastic extension of our holding in Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 216 A.2d 723 (1966), by describing the difficulty that persons have, or may have, determining whether injuries they have received are “medical injuries” for purpose of determining whether it was necessary to file a claim with the Health Care Office prior to filing an action in a circuit court. The majority states: “While we hold that Mrs. Swam did not incur a ‘medical injury,’ our opinions have recognized that the phrase ‘medical injury’ and its statutory definition are somewhat ambiguous.” Ante at 539, 919 A.2d at 39. While I agree that the phrase “medical injuries” may give rise to some *550difficult judgment calls, I do not understand what such ambiguous language in a statute relating to the administrative processing of “medical injuries,” has to do with the clear, unambiguous, language of the general statute of limitations applicable to civil actions, i.e., § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
In discussing this issue, the majority relies on Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 905 A.2d 340 (2006), in addition to the Bertonazzi case. The majority also mentions the 1880 case of Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 708, for the proposition that the judicial authority can establish “ ‘certain and well-defined exceptions]....”’ Ante at 543, 919 A.2d at 41. I do not believe that any holding in either of the three cases justifies what the Court is now doing. All three of the cases only involved actions and proceedings in strictly judicial proceedings. Bertonazzi involved the filing of a case in the wrong county, in Baltimore County when it should have been filed in Baltimore City. Christensen concerned actions conducted exclusively within the judicial branches of government. It involved no administrative agencies. In Christensen, the Court held that, with certain limitations, the filing of a class action in court might toll the running of the statute of limitations as to the “putative members of the class.”
Weaver involved only a single court case and whether the statute of limitations applied. It, in its totality, supports the views of this concurrence—not the majority opinion. The Court held that the statute of limitations had not been tolled in that case. As specially relevant to the present case, the Court stated:
“The complainant could have safely brought his suit immediately after this sale, even if it would have been difficult for him to have asserted his rights before.
“In short, we find nothing in any, or all of these objections combined, to affect the running of limitations. Mere doubt as to the right, or difficulty in the way of its assertion, will not do. Apart from the savings and disabilities expressed in the Statute itself, there must, in order to *551defeat its operation, be some insuperable barrier, or some certain and well-defined exception clearly established by judicial authority. In Green v. Johnson, 3 G. & J. 394, the court expressed in very strong terms its disapproval of all attempts to remove the safeguards, and fritter away the provisions of this most important Statute, by judicial refinements and subtle exceptions, or to increase the number of interpolations or constructive innovations that have already been engrafted upon it.” (Emphasis added.)
Weaver, 52 Md. at 717-18. In my view, Weaver offers little, if any, support for the position the majority takes in this case.
Bertonazzi appears to be the seminal ease in this state for judicial attacks on the legislatively created statutes of limitations. Only eleven years after its filing, however, even this Court was reluctant to extend its holding. In Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 281 Md. 207, 378 A.2d 1100 (1977), a certification from the federal courts, we discussed the general rule of law and its application in Bertonazzi:
“This policy of repose has fostered a traditional rule concerning the tolling of statutes of limitation that can be fairly termed one of strict construction. Early on we adopted this rigorous stance: ‘The principle of law is indisputable, that when the Statute of Limitations once begins to run, nothing will stop or impede its operation.’ The rule has lost little of its vitality.... [S]ee McMahan v. Dorchester Fert. Co., 184 Md. 155, 160, 40 A.2d 313 (1944) (‘where the Legislature has not made an exception in express words in the Statute of Limitations, the Court cannot allow any implied and equitable exception to be engrafted upon the statute merely on the ground that such exception would be within the spirit or reason of the statute.’)
“This venerable rule, which defers to the legislative intent expressed in the statute of limitations itself, and avoids implied exceptions or strained constructions, is also applicable in cases such as the one at bar where an action filed initially within the required period fails for some technical, procedural defect falling short of a full decision on the merits. Absent a statutory provision saving the plaintiffs *552rights, the remedy is barred where limitations has run during the pendency of the defective suit.
“At first blush, Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 216 A.2d 723 (1966), would appear to stand as authority for the broad proposition that under Maryland law the running of the limitations period is tolled by a procedurally defective action which is timely filed. This is not borne out, however, by an analysis of that case. There, suit was commenced well within the three year period of limitations, but in Baltimore County instead of Baltimore City where the defendant resided....
“In Bertonazzi, the Court carved out a narrow exception to the traditional rule against engrafting implied exceptions upon the statute of limitations in certain situations where the sole reason for the dismissal of the prior action was improper venue____Just how narrow the Bertonazzi exception was intended to be was promptly demonstrated in Burket v. Aldridge, 241 Md. 423[, 216 A.2d 910 (1966) ], decided a day later. There, suit was initially filed within the required three-year period, but the sheriffs return of ‘mortuus est’ revealed to the plaintiff that the defendant had died. Service was then made upon the personal representative within the six months required by Art. 93, § 112, but not within the three-year statute of limitations. In affirming the dismissal, we held that it was necessary for the suit to be filed ‘both within three years from the date of the injuries and within six months from the qualification of the personal representative.’ Id. at 430, 216 A.2d 910. Bertonazzi stands alone, then, confined to the special circumstances which culminated in the filing of the suit in the wrong county.
“Whatever facts may have been present in Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. at 370-71, 216 A.2d 723, that moved us to relax the anti-tolling rule, they do not exist here....
“In addition, the policy considerations on which our established rule is founded weigh heavily against any departure *553in this case. If, despite the absence of a saving statute, a plaintiff were permitted to toll the statute of limitations by filing suit which was later dismissed as being procedurally defective, he could effectively postpone the running of the statute for an indefinite period of time. Even the typical saving statute imposes a time restriction, usually one year, on the suspension of limitations.
“Arguably, appellees were on notice of Walko’s claim once the motion to intervene was filed. As we have indicated, however, Walko’s approach to this case was hardly one of vigilance. The statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment of what is deemed an adequate period of time in which ‘a person of ordinary diligence’ should bring his action.” (Footnote omitted.) (Some citations omitted.) (Some emphasis added.)
Walko, 281 Md. at 210-215, 378 A.2d at 1101-04.
Although this Court has crafted other rules that have limited the applicability of statutes of limitations, i.e., the discovery rule, it has, up until now, sought, generally, to defer to the policy created by the legislative branch, and has never, as far as I have discovered, looked to actions initiated outside the judicial branch in order to toll the running of the statute of limitations.
In Gary v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 631 A.2d 429 (1993), a case in which parents were asserting that their claim for medical expenses incurred for a minor child should be joined with the child’s claim in order that the statute of limitations, as to the parents’ claim, would be tolled until the child reached majority, the Court stated:
“For reasons we now explain, in this state the parents’ claim for medical expenses is not required to be joined in the same action brought by the injured minor to recover for its own personal injuries. Consequently, the assertion that the parents’ claim for medical expenses may be tolled during the minority of the child by § 5-201 of the Courts Article is without merit.
*554“Furthermore, by not requiring the parents’ claim for medical expenses to be joined with the minor’s own claim and allowing both to be tolled by § 5-201 of the Courts Article, we remain loyal to the well established principle ‘that where the legislature has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.”
“By failing to file an action within three years of the accident, the parents’ claim for all medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident prior to emancipation of the minor is barred by limitations.”
332 Md. at 353-60, 631 A.2d at 436-40.
In Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp. 304 Md. 615, 500 A.2d 641 (1985), a case involving the attempt to apply the continuous course of treatment rule to construction defect cases,7 a property owner discovered a leak in a commercial building caused by a contractor. The contractor attempted to repair the leak, but was apparently unsuccessful. More than three years after the discovery of the leak the owner brought an action against the contractor. When the contractor raised *555the defense of limitations, the property owner argued that the period during which the contractor was attempting to repair the leak tolled the running of limitations. We said in that case:
“Under § 5-101 of the Courts Article, an action must be filed within three years of the date that it ‘accrues.’ The question of when a cause of action accrues is left to judicial determination.
“Because Huntingfield knew, or reasonably should have known of Booth’s negligence in June of 1976, its cause of action accrued at that time and suit was therefore barred by the three-year limitations period under § 5-101.
“We have long adhered to the principle that where the legislature has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.[8] Indeed the General Assembly has expressly provided exceptions to § 5-101 in those instances where it determined that a time limitation should be computed differently....
“Where repairs have been held to toll limitations, courts have done so largely on principles of equitable estoppel.... In Maryland, however, it is well settled that equitable estoppel will not toll the running of limitations absent a showing that the defendant ‘held out any inducements not to file suit or indicated that limitations would not be pleaded.’ “The record does not disclose that Booth held out any inducements to Huntingfield not to file suit, or that it indicated in any way that limitations would not be pleaded. Nor is there any showing of an unconscionable, inequitable or fraudulent act of commission or omission by Booth upon *556which Huntingfield relied in delaying the initiation of its lawsuit.” (Citations omitted.)
Booth Glass, 304 Md. at 619-24, 500 A.2d at 642-45.
There is no act by the appellee in the instant case that can be remotely construed as having misled Swam as to the applicability of the general statute of limitations. This is not a case of equitable estoppel in the first instance, but even if it were, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that the appellee in any way improperly interfered with Swam’s ability to file her action in court at any time from the moment of the needle stick.
We are reminded by our opinion in Hill, supra, that the purpose of the statutory scheme creating the medical arbitration statute (including its own statutes of limitation and repose) was “to contain the ‘long-tail’ effect of the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases by restricting, in absolute terms, the amount of time that could lapse between the allegedly negligent treatment of a patient and the filing of a malpractice claim related to that treatment.” 304 Md. at 700, 501 A.2d at 32 (emphasis added).
What the majority does in the present case is to create an extraordinary exception to the general statute of limitations by holding that the involvement of Swam with the Health Care Office under a statute designed to limit the time for the filing of certain claims, actually extends the time for the filing of a distinctly different claim in a judicial forum. For the first time, as far as I have discovered, the Court is extending a period of limitations without there being any legislatively created exception because of something that happened administratively in another branch of government. Now that the majority has crossed that line, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for this Court, in any principled fashion, to retreat back across the line when myriads of litigants who have first proceeded before any number of administrative agencies, then belatedly file claims in court, and cite to Swam as authority *557for the tolling of the running of the general statute of limitations.
Judge HARRELL joins in this concurrence.

. Hereinafter "Rule(s).”

. Since 1993, what was subsection (16) has been re-codified as subsection (15), the subsection applicable in the case at bar. The holding in Foos and Waddell has not been modified.

. The continuous course of treatment rule in medical malpractice cases apparently was abrogated in the later case of Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 700, 501 A.2d 27, 32-33 (1985), where we said; "The provisions of § 5-109, and the intent underlying the enactment of that statute, are plainly inconsistent with the survival of the continuing treatment rule. We thus conclude that the common law rule was abrogated by the legislature.... The three-and five-year periods of limitations must, therefore, be calculated in accordance with the literal language of § 5-109. Indeed, the five-year maximum period under the statute will run its full length only in those instances where the three-year discovery provision does not operate to bar an action at an earlier date. And this is so without regard to whether the injury was reasonably discoverable or not." (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, there is no dispute over when the injury was discovered. It was discovered when Swam suffered the needle stick in a non-medical treatment injury context. Thus, the statute began to run at that time.

. It can be argued that this principle has been observed by the Court more in the breach than in the observance.