Court Opinion

ID: 9658250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:52:55.290128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:53.155658
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Among the findings entered by the trial court at the time these parties were divorced in August of 1981 was the following:
That the Plaintiff has limited earning capacity, has been removed from the job market for in excess of 20 years, has little business acumen, has limited earning capacity because of her problems with cataracts and vision and has a minimal education and lacks skills which qualify her for employment in the job market.
Appellee’s affidavit in support of his motion to reduce the alimony payments stated in part that:
Your affiant further states and shows to the Court that the Plaintiff in this matter is an able-bodied woman capable of being gainfully employed, but she seems to resist steadfastly the temptation to work and support herself.
Based solely upon that unsupported allegation, the trial court found “[t]hat the Plaintiff herein is an able-bodied woman capable of being gainfully employed but is unemployed.”
Appellee’s affidavit also stated in part “that the Plaintiff in this matter lives in an apartment house owned by her father and your affiant doubts seriously that she pays any rent.” Solely on the basis of this speculative allegation the trial court found “[t]hat the Plaintiff herein lives in an apartment owned by her father and does not pay rent.”
When faced with an affidavit such as that submitted by appellee, there is no occasion to apply the general rule that the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses is largely a matter of the trial court's discretion.
I do not believe that we should by way of redaction affirm the trial court’s order on *735the basis of the findings that are supported by competent evidence. Although redaction may be appropriate when determining whether probable cause is established by an affidavit in support of a search warrant, see, e.g., United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749 (3rd Cir.1982), and cases cited therein, I would not apply that technique to the circumstances of this case, however, for we simply cannot determine from the face of the findings those which played a pivotal role in causing the trial court to exercise its discretion as it did, in contrast to our determination of the sufficiency of an affidavit to establish probable cause.
I agree with the majority opinion’s treatment of the matter of attorney fees.