Court Opinion

ID: 9925379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 16:06:56.57381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:06.117145
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

21-P-1113                                            Appeals Court

             COMMONWEALTH    vs.   STEVE S., a juvenile.

                            No. 21-P-1113.

        Essex.         October 5, 2023. – January 19, 2024.

            Present:   Wolohojian, Desmond, & Sacks, JJ.

Delinquent Child. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Practice,
     Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Sentence,
     Retroactivity of judicial holding, Presumptions and burden
     of proof. Retroactivity of Judicial Holding.

     Complaint received and sworn to in the Essex County
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on February 4, 2021.

     The case was heard by Kerry A. Ahern, J., and a motion to
continue sentencing was heard by her.

     Caroline I. Alpert for the juvenile.
     Emily R. Mello, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

    WOLOHOJIAN, J.     Approximately one month before his

eighteenth birthday, the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for

having committed assault and battery on a family or household

member in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a).     At the end of

the trial, the Commonwealth moved to continue sentencing until
                                                                      2

after the juvenile turned eighteen.   The Juvenile Court judge

allowed the motion after an evidentiary hearing.    She did so on

the ground that the juvenile's desperate need of aid,

encouragement, and guidance could not be satisfied in the

limited time before he turned eighteen, and that it was in the

juvenile's best interest to postpone sentencing so that he could

obtain services necessary for his rehabilitation.      The juvenile

has appealed.

    While the appeal has been pending, the Supreme Judicial

Court decided Noah N. v. Commonwealth, 489 Mass. 498 (2022)

(Noah N.), in which it held that a judge is permitted to allow a

continuance beyond a juvenile's eighteenth birthday for the sole

purpose of extending the time of commitment, but only after the

judge conducts an evidentiary hearing and makes express findings

to the effect that the continuance is necessary to ensure the

rehabilitation of the juvenile.   Id. at 502-503.   The court

placed the burden on the Commonwealth to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that continued commitment is necessary to

ensure the juvenile's rehabilitation.    Id. at 503.

    The juvenile argues that Noah N. announced a new rule that

should not apply retroactively to him.   In the alternative, the

juvenile argues that the requirements of Noah N. were not

satisfied in this case.   Further, relying on Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Apprendi), the juvenile argues that
                                                                     3

the framework established in Noah N. violates his rights under

the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution

because it permits a judge to extend a sentence merely upon a

showing by clear and convincing evidence, instead of reserving

that determination to a jury upon proof beyond a reasonable

doubt.   Finally, the juvenile argues that his due process rights

were violated because the delay in sentencing gave the

Commonwealth a "tactical advantage."    We affirm the adjudication

of delinquency and the order allowing the motion to continue.1

     Background.   On February 4, 2021, approximately four months

before the juvenile was to turn eighteen, he was charged with

assault and battery on a family or household member, in

violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a).   The juvenile and his

counsel pursued a strategy to have the charge tried before he

turned eighteen to attempt to prevent the judge from sentencing

him beyond that age.   See G. L. c. 119, § 58.   To that end,

believing that a bench trial was likely to be scheduled sooner

than a jury trial, the juvenile waived his right to a jury

trial.

     1 The Commonwealth agrees that this appeal is not moot, even
though the juvenile's commitment to the custody of the
Department of Youth Services (DYS) has ended, and he is now over
twenty years old. We are of the same view and conclude, for the
reasons explained in Matter of a Minor, 484 Mass. 295, 299-300
(2020), that the juvenile has a surviving interest in
establishing that the commitment order was not lawfully issued.
                                                                     4

     As the juvenile and his counsel hoped, the case was tried

over two days approximately one month before the juvenile's

eighteenth birthday.   At the conclusion of the trial, the judge

adjudged the juvenile delinquent.    The juvenile does not

challenge the adjudication of delinquency on appeal on

evidentiary grounds, and we now recite the facts underlying the

adjudication as the judge found them.2

     In 2018, the juvenile -- six feet, two inches tall and

weighing 210 pounds -- and the victim -- four feet, eleven

inches tall and weighing 118 pounds -- began an intimate

relationship.   The victim ended the relationship around January

2021, after she discovered that the juvenile had been cheating.

The following month, on February 3, 2021, the victim went to the

juvenile's home to talk.   After a conversation lasting around

fifteen to twenty minutes, the victim said she wanted to go

home.    The juvenile grabbed her arm to prevent her from leaving

and threw her onto his bed.    When the victim again attempted to

leave and repeated that she wished to go home, the juvenile

struck her, causing her to fall back onto the bed.    The juvenile

then repeatedly punched, slapped, and spit at the victim, who

went into a fetal position, covering her face with her arms.

     2 The judge made detailed and comprehensive written findings
of fact in her decision on the motion to continue sentencing,
and we draw our recitation of the facts from those findings.
                                                                     5

Despite the victim's request that he stop, the juvenile

continued to beat her while atop her and said, "[S]hut the fuck

up bitch."   Eventually, the juvenile stood up and told the

victim, "I fucking love you, don't you fucking get it."     When

the victim then attempted to leave, the juvenile again called

her a "bitch," punched her in the back of the head, and caused

her to fall to her knees.    He then grabbed the victim by the

hair and dragged her through the bedroom.    Eventually, the

victim was able to leave the juvenile's room and called 911.3

Officers responded quickly and found the victim crying, with

visible scratches on her hand and both sides of her neck.      The

victim was taken to a hospital where she was treated for

approximately three hours.   At the time of the trial, she

continued to suffer long-term injuries from the assault and was

attending ongoing physical therapy twice a week for injury to

her spine and for pain while sitting or walking.

     The juvenile moved for immediate sentencing as soon as the

judge adjudged the juvenile delinquent at the conclusion of the

trial.   The Commonwealth moved to stay sentencing until after

the juvenile's eighteenth birthday, a request the juvenile

opposed.   At the beginning of the ensuing evidentiary hearing,

before she allowed extensive argument from counsel, the judge

     3 Members of the juvenile's family attempted to interfere
with the victim's 911 call.
                                                                   6

stated that she was inclined to allow the motion and explained

her reasoning as follows:

     "So when I think about what transpired here -- this was a
     horrific beating that transpired involving an intimate
     partner of his -- the goals of the juvenile court are to
     make sure that [the juvenile] receives the treatment
     necessary in order to make sure that he has the services in
     place, that he gains insight as to what transpired here, to
     make sure that he goes on into adulthood he has the
     capacity, understanding, and ability to control himself and
     to engage in a safe and appropriate relationship with
     individuals of the opposite sex.

     "So I can't imagine that in three weeks, which I think is
     his -- his birthday is mid-June -- that that's going to be
     accomplished by sentencing him for a three-week sentence."

The judge also expressly stated that she was "not looking at

punishment, . . . [but] at engagement in services to make sure

that [the juvenile] engage[s] in intimate partner abuse

prevention, to make sure he receives the counseling necessary in

order to be able to prevent that type of thing."   The judge

repeated during the course of argument that "given the time

periods and the particulars of this case, I don't see that it

is[] reasonable in any way, shape, or form to commit him to

[the] D[epartment of] Y[outh] S[ervices] [DYS] for three weeks.

It wouldn't even entail the start of services in that time

period."4

     4 The judge also gave weight to the juvenile's delinquency
record as well as to the fact that the juvenile had violated
probation in the past and was therefore not a good candidate for
probation. The judge also considered that, even if probation
                                                                     7

    Counsel for the juvenile then asked to call a witness from

DYS and to present additional evidence.   The judge allowed both

requests.   Prior to the introduction of this evidence, the judge

permitted the victim to make a victim impact statement.    The

victim laid out the details of the assault and its continuing

psychological and physical effects.   The judge then repeated the

basis for her ruling to continue sentencing:

    "So again, as I stated, taking into consideration the
    nature and circumstances of this offense, the victim impact
    statement, the juvenile's delinquency record which, as I
    indicated, includes a continuation without a finding and a
    commitment to DYS for similar offenses, assault and battery
    type violent offenses, the lack of success that he has had
    on probation, and the concerns the [c]ourt has in not
    addressing the violence that has been on display here for
    the past two days,[5] I didn't think it serves his interests
    or meets the needs and interest of the [J]uvenile [C]ourt
    in committing him for three weeks."

The juvenile then presented additional evidence, including the

testimony of the juvenile's DYS caseworker.    The caseworker, who

had worked with the juvenile for three years, testified that the

juvenile would benefit from additional DYS services, including

individual therapy, prosocial activities in the community, and

family work.   He also testified that, should the juvenile be

were available, a one-month probation would not allow sufficient
services to rehabilitate the juvenile.

    5  The judge was apparently referring to the testimonial
evidence of violence during the assault on the victim. The
record does not suggest that there was violence on display in
the courthouse during the trial.
                                                                      8

committed to DYS custody after he turned eighteen, he would be

released to the community with services after three to five

months.6

     After further discussion of issues that are not implicated

in this appeal, the judge then allowed the Commonwealth's motion

and continued sentencing to the day after the juvenile was to

turn eighteen.     The judge subsequently issued a detailed written

memorandum of decision containing a nuanced analysis of the

issue and explained, among other things, that her

     "paramount concern [wa]s that the [j]uvenile in this matter
     is in desperate need of aid, encouragement, and guidance.
     The purpose of committing a [j]uvenile after a finding of
     delinquency is not only correction, but the redemption to
     society of the offending child. These goals cannot be
     satisfied within the narrow window of time between when the
     juvenile was adjudicated delinquent and when he turns
     eighteen. Therefore, it would not be in the 'best
     interest' of the [j]uvenile here to move forward with
     sentencing that would fail to adequately 'encourag[e] and
     help[ ] [him] to become [a] law-abiding and productive
     member[ ] of society.'" (Quotation and citations omitted.)

See Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 461, 466 (2012).

     Sentencing occurred on June 24, 2021, the day after the

juvenile's eighteenth birthday, and the juvenile was committed

to DYS custody until he turned nineteen.     This appeal followed.

     Discussion.    The juvenile's overarching argument is that

the judge abused her discretion or committed other error of law

     6 The juvenile argues, based on the caseworker's testimony,
that should the judge continue sentencing, the juvenile would
not receive services until the continued date.
                                                                    9

by allowing the motion to continue sentencing until after the

juvenile turned eighteen.    Within that overarching argument, the

juvenile makes a number of subsidiary arguments that are in some

form or fashion driven by the Supreme Judicial Court's decision

in Noah N., which was decided after the judge allowed the motion

to continue and while this appeal has been pending.     We

accordingly begin our analysis with Noah N.

      When the juvenile in Noah N. was seventeen years old, he

was charged in a delinquency complaint with assault and battery

on a family or household member.   See Noah N., 489 Mass. at 499.

Approximately one month before he was to turn eighteen, he filed

a tender of plea or admission to the charge.    Id.   The

Commonwealth then requested a continuance of the change of plea

hearing "for the express purpose of delaying the case's

disposition until after the juvenile's eighteenth birthday."

Id.   The Juvenile Court judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion,

and accordingly, Noah's eighteenth birthday passed without his

plea being tendered.   Id.   On appeal to the Supreme Judicial

Court, Noah argued that because he had sought to tender a plea

when he was seventeen, he should have benefited from the

provisions of G. L. c. 119, § 58, second par., which required

that any commitment to DYS custody end when he turned eighteen.7

      7General Laws c. 119, § 58, second par., provides in
relevant part:
                                                                     10

Noah N., supra at 501.     Noah argued that allowing a continuance

for the sole purpose of committing him until age nineteen was

contrary to the statute.     Id.

    The Supreme Judicial Court noted that § 58 does not

expressly address continuances, stating,

    "This is understandable, as continuances are an ordinary
    aspect of an orderly judicial process. If a case is
    continued for reasons related to the judicial process and
    unrelated to extending the time of commitment, then the
    statutory requirements for extending such time of
    commitment are clearly met. Allowing continuances for the
    sole purpose of extending the commitment period are,
    however, different. Such continuances, if they do not
    otherwise serve the purposes of the judicial process,
    intrude on the Legislature's authority to set limits on the
    time of commitment. Allowing continuances for this reason
    alone raises the question whether the statutory language
    regarding disposal of cases is being manipulated to extend
    the time of commitment beyond what the Legislature
    intended."

Noah N., 489 Mass. at 501.     Accordingly, the court held that

    "[w]here a request for a continuance has nothing to do with
    the orderly disposition of the case, but rather is directed
    at the timing of the juvenile's impending eighteenth
    birthday, and at extending the time of commitment beyond
    that ordinarily authorized by statute, the ample discretion
    allowed Juvenile Court judges is tightly constrained. A
    continuance may only be allowed in such circumstances if it

    "If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child on a
    complaint, the court . . . may commit him [or her] to the
    custody of [DYS], but the . . . commitment period shall not
    be for a period longer than until such child attains the
    age of eighteen, or nineteen in the case of a child whose
    case is disposed of after he [or she] has attained his [or
    her] eighteenth birthday or age [twenty] in the case of a
    child whose case is disposed of after he [or she] has
    attained his [or her] nineteenth birthday."
                                                                  11

     is necessary to ensure the rehabilitation of the juvenile
     and express findings are made to that effect."

Id. at 502.    The court required that the judge hold an

evidentiary hearing, and that the "Commonwealth bears the burden

of proving by clear and convincing evidence the necessity of

continued commitment to ensure the rehabilitation of the

juvenile."    Id. at 503.

     Noah N., as we have already noted, was decided after the

judge in this case allowed the continuance on appeal here.

There is no doubt that Noah N. announced new rules with respect

to the legal standard for allowing a motion to continue for the

sole purpose of extending the time for which a juvenile may be

committed, to the need for an evidentiary hearing before

allowing such a motion, and to the Commonwealth's burden of

proof.8   See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 428 (2013),

S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

     8 Prior to Noah N., continuances in delinquency proceedings
needed only to be assessed against the requirements of the rules
of criminal procedure, which permit continuances "only when
based upon cause and only when necessary to insure that the
interests of justice are served." Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (1),
378 Mass. 861 (1979). "In most cases, 'cause' refers to reasons
related to the orderly processing of cases." Noah N., 489 Mass.
at 502. Rehabilitation, which is the central purpose of
juvenile justice, could and can satisfy rule 10 (a) (1)'s
requirement that an extension be in "the interests of justice."
Id. However, prior to Noah N., there was no requirement that
the Commonwealth prove the need for rehabilitation by clear and
convincing evidence, or that the judge conduct an evidentiary
hearing and make express findings regarding the need for
rehabilitation.
                                                                  12

288, 301 (1989) ("a case announces a new rule when it breaks new

ground or imposes a new obligation . . . [or] if the result was

not dictated by precedent existing at the time the [adjudication

of delinquency] became final" [emphasis in original]).   Although

a new rule does not generally have retroactive application, it

will apply retroactively to cases -- such as this one -- that

are pending on direct appeal when the new rule is announced.

See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466

Mass. 655, 664 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015).   We

accordingly disagree with the juvenile's argument that Noah N.

does not apply retroactively to him.

    Alternatively, the juvenile argues that the requirements of

Noah N. were not satisfied.   We begin by noting that the judge,

with remarkable prescience, foresaw Noah N.'s core requirement

that the continuance be necessary for the juvenile's

rehabilitation.   Moreover, the judge anticipated and satisfied

Noah N.'s requirements that she conduct an evidentiary hearing

and make detailed findings.   In other words, the central

purpose, thrust, and procedural safeguards of Noah N. were

clearly satisfied.   But the juvenile contends that what happened

here nonetheless fell short of what was required.   Specifically,

the juvenile points to the fact that the Commonwealth presented

no evidence during the evidentiary portion of the hearing on the

motion to continue, and that the judge did not state the
                                                                   13

evidentiary standard by which she assessed the juvenile's need

for rehabilitation.   The juvenile argues that both shortcomings

are fatal.

    As to the first, although Noah N. clearly places the burden

on the Commonwealth to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that the continuance is necessary for the juvenile's

rehabilitation, the opinion does not suggest that trial evidence

cannot be used to meet the Commonwealth's burden.     Nor does Noah

N. stand for the proposition that the Commonwealth must

introduce evidence of the juvenile's need for rehabilitation

twice:   once at trial, and again at the time of the evidentiary

hearing on the motion to continue.   The circumstances in Noah N.

were materially different than those presented here.    In Noah

N., the motion to continue was filed pretrial, no evidentiary

proceeding bearing on the juvenile's need for rehabilitation had

yet occurred during the case and, as a result, there was no

evidence upon which the judge could have made the required

findings regarding the need for rehabilitation.   Here, by

contrast, the motion to continue came directly on the heels of a

bench trial during which ample evidence had been introduced to

support the required findings regarding the juvenile's need for

rehabilitation.   And, in addition, the judge was the trier of

fact for both the trial and the motion to continue.
                                                                  14

     As to the second, it is true that the judge did not state

that she was applying a clear and convincing standard in

assessing the juvenile's need for rehabilitation.9   We have

accordingly considered whether the matter should be remanded,

because it is ordinarily for the trial court judge to make such

a determination in the first instance -- not us.10   Cf. Adoption

of Eden, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 296 (2015) ("it is for the trial

judge, not us, to determine in the first instance whether

unfitness has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and

whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests

of the children").   Importantly, the juvenile does not contend

that any of the judge's extensive and detailed subsidiary

findings made in connection with the motion to continue is

clearly erroneous.   Nor does the juvenile challenge the

subsidiary findings underlying the adjudication of delinquency

that, as a matter of law, were required to be made upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt.   G. L. c. 119, § 58, first par.;

Magnus M., 461 Mass. at 462-463.   In these circumstances, we are

in sufficient position to review whether clear and convincing

evidence supported the judge's ultimate determination that the

     9 This is no fault of the judge who, after all, did not have
the benefit of Noah N. when acting on the motion to continue.
See Noah N., 489 Mass. at 503 n.5.

     10The juvenile does not seek a remand, which he views as an
empty exercise since he has already turned twenty.
                                                                  15

juvenile was in need of rehabilitation.   Cf. Doe, Sex Offender

Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass.

643, 657 & n.4 (2019) (where requirement of explicit finding on

clear and convincing evidence not created until after

administrative decision, court retains discretion to determine

whether factual record is sufficiently clear that remand to

apply heightened burden of proof is unnecessary).

    "Proof by clear and convincing evidence is 'not without

teeth[,]' . . . [and] [t]he evidence must be sufficient to

convey a 'high degree of probability' that the contested

proposition is true."   Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316

v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 309 (2015), quoting

Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 372 Mass. 582, 588

n.3 (1977).   This "means that '[t]he requisite proof must be

strong and positive; it must be "full, clear and decisive."'"

Adoption of Chad, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 828, 838 (2019), quoting

Adoption of Iris, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 105 (1997).     Without

repeating the judge's findings, which we have already set out,

the standard was easily met here.

    The juvenile next argues that the Noah N. framework

conflicts with the requirements of Apprendi, and violates his

rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because it permits a

judge to extend a sentence merely upon a showing by clear and

convincing evidence, instead of reserving that determination to
                                                                  16

a jury upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.     Apprendi holds

that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond

a reasonable doubt."    Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.   See

Commonwealth v. Denehy, 466 Mass. 723, 736 (2014), quoting

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 112, 114-115 (2013)

(Apprendi applies to "any fact that aggravates the punishment,

either by raising the floor or the ceiling, such that 'the fact

. . . alters the prescribed range of sentences to which a

criminal defendant is exposed'").    Cf. Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth,

482 Mass. 325, 330 (2019) ("a deprivation of liberty imposed by

the State as a direct consequence of being found delinquent for

having committed an offense necessarily includes an element of

punishment"); Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 859, 864-865

(2001) (acknowledging that, under Apprendi, any fact necessary

to increase delinquent juvenile's penalty beyond statutory

maximum commitment to DYS must be proved to jury beyond

reasonable doubt).     "The 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi

purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on

the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted

by the defendant."     Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567

U.S. 343, 348 (2012), quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296, 303 (2004).
                                                                   17

     Here, G. L. c. 119, § 58, limited the seventeen year old

juvenile's potential sentence to a maximum commitment to DYS

custody to age eighteen.   Noah N., however, permits a judge to

allow a continuance for the sole purpose of committing a

juvenile beyond the statutory maximum if the judge finds, upon

clear and convincing proof, that a longer period of commitment

is necessary for the juvenile's rehabilitation.   The juvenile's

need for rehabilitation is not a fact reflected in the

adjudication of delinquency for assault and battery on a

household or family member.   It follows, the juvenile argues,

that the framework established in Noah N. is in conflict with

Apprendi because the juvenile's need for rehabilitation should

have been determined by a jury upon proof beyond a reasonable

doubt.11

     Whatever merit this interesting argument may have, it is

not for us to decide it.   "[W]e have no power to alter, overrule

or decline to follow the holding of cases the Supreme Judicial

Court has decided."   Commonwealth v. Dube, 59 Mass. App. Ct.

476, 485 (2003).   It is for the Supreme Judicial Court to

     11The juvenile does not attempt to explain what
significance, if any, his waiver of trial by jury has on this
argument. Nor does it appear he has considered whether
requiring a jury trial on the question of rehabilitation could
result in delay beyond the juvenile's eighteenth birthday itself
affecting the juvenile's potential sentence.
                                                                   18

determine whether Noah N. is in irreconcilable tension with

Apprendi, not us.12

     Finally, the juvenile argues that the continuance gave the

Commonwealth a tactical advantage in violation of his due

process rights.   The main weakness in this argument is that the

juvenile fails to articulate what tactical advantage the

Commonwealth obtained from the continuance.   Cf. Commonwealth v.

Imbruglia, 377 Mass. 682, 691 (1979) (pretrial delay

intentionally undertaken to gain tactical advantage is

impermissible).   The case had already been tried, and the judge

had already adjudged the juvenile delinquent before the

Commonwealth moved for a continuance.   Furthermore, the juvenile

misapprehends the purpose of the continuance, which was not to

advantage the Commonwealth but to help ensure the juvenile's

rehabilitation.

     There was no error in the order allowing the motion for a

continuance.

                                    Judgment affirmed.

                                    Order allowing motion to
                                      continue sentencing
                                      affirmed.

     12We requested and received the briefs filed in Noah N.,
and we note that the Supreme Judicial Court does not appear to
have been alerted to the potential interplay between Apprendi
and the standard for allowing a continuance for the sole purpose
of extending sentence in a delinquency proceeding.