Court Opinion

ID: 9948265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 18:12:51.62122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:23.534409
License: Public Domain

03/06/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                          Assigned on Briefs October 10, 2023

          STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTHONY DUANE GRAY, JR.

               Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
              Nos. CC-18-CR-1359       William R. Goodman, III, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                            No. M2022-01233-CCA-R3-CD
                        ___________________________________

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony Duane Gray, Jr., of assault,
kidnapping, possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin, four counts of possession with
the intent to sell or deliver four different scheduled drugs, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced him as a Multiple Offender to an effective
sentence of fourteen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1)
the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever his offenses; (2) the trial court erred
when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of a motel room;
(3) the trial court erred with it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the
search of two cell phones; (4) the State violated his right to due process by intentionally
allowing false testimony; (5) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment
of acquittal to the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping; (6) the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction for kidnapping; and (7) the trial court erred when it
denied his motion for new trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN W.
CAMPBELL, SR., and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Terria D. Blunt, Kenneth W. Merriweather, and Travis N. Meeks, Clarksville, Tennessee,
for the appellant, Anthony Duane Gray, Jr.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy E. Wilber, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Robert J. Nash, District Attorney General; and C. Daniel Brollier, Jr.,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                          OPINION
                                           I. Facts
       This case arises from police officers responding to a motel room on June 25, 2018,
about a possible domestic assault. Present in the motel room were the Defendant and
another man, Chris Ingraham. The Defendant attempted to leave, but was detained, and
Mr. Ingraham allowed the officers into the room, where they found large quantities of
heroin, smaller quantities of other scheduled drugs, and items that appeared to be associated
with reselling the drugs. As a result, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted the
Defendant on several counts. Some of those charges were dismissed by the State, others
were bifurcated for trial1, and the charges as relevant to this appeal were as follows: Count
1, aggravated assault by use or display of a weapon; Count 2, especially aggravated
kidnapping; Count 3, resisting arrest; Count 4, possession with intent to manufacture, sell
or deliver heroin; Count 5, possession with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver marijuana;
Count 6, possession with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver Schedule IV Diazepam
(Valium); Count 7, possession with intent to sell or deliver Clonazepam; Count 8,
possession with intent to sell or deliver Schedule IV drug Alprazolam (Xanax); Count 9,
possession of drug paraphernalia; Count 10, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed
during a dangerous felony; and Count 11, possession with intent to sell or deliver a
Schedule IV controlled substance, Cathine.

                                            A. Pretrial Motions

       The Defendant filed a motion to sever the offenses, a motion to suppress evidence
found on two cell phones, and a motion to suppress evidence found in the motel room. In
his motion to suppress the evidence from the cell phones, the Defendant stated that the
officer who filed the application for the search warrant, Deputy Emmanuel Graham, made
“willful reckless misrepresentations” in the application.

                                      1. November 5, 2019 Hearing

        On November 5, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the Defendant’s motions.2
The State informed the trial court that it had not responded to the Defendant’s motion to
suppress because it conceded that Deputy Graham made an incorrect statement of fact
when he applied for the cell phone search. The Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) stated
that, upon learning of the misstatements, he contacted law enforcement officers to obtain a
new search warrant with the correct facts in the affidavit. That search warrant had been
executed on the cell phones, a second search conducted, and the ADA said he would get
the findings to the Defendant’s attorney as soon as they were available.

      The Defendant proceeded on his other motions, including his motion to suppress
evidence law enforcement officers found in the motel room. He posited that the officers

          1
              Ultimately, the State dismissed the charge that was bifurcated, and it is not relevant to this
appeal.
          2
              The transcript of this hearing is included in the record as an exhibit, Exhibit #7.
                                                       2
did not have consent to search the motel room.         The State then offered the motel
registration, and the hearing proceeded.

       Multiple officers testified about their response to this domestic disturbance call.
Joshua Clegg, with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department, responded first to the
call in this case and parked to the side of the motel. He activated his audio recording
equipment and walked towards the motel room. He stood outside and listened before
contacting anyone. Upon hearing nothing, Officer Clegg knocked on the door, and Mr.
Ingraham answered the door. Officer Clegg informed him that he was there responding to
a 911 call about a domestic altercation. Mr. Ingraham stepped outside of the room, leaving
the door open, and said that everything was fine and had calmed down, explaining that the
argument was between the Defendant and the Defendant’s girlfriend, who had since left
the premises.

        While Officer Clegg was speaking to Mr. Ingraham, the Defendant exited the motel
room and got into a vehicle parked in front of the room. Officer Clegg saw that the vehicle
started, so he asked the other officers who were responding to the scene, Officer Alexander
Koziol and Officer David Mann, to detain the Defendant. Officer Koziol noticed the
reverse lights come on as he approached the vehicle parked in front of the motel room, and
based on information Officer Clegg relayed, he asked the Defendant, who was in the
driver’s seat, to turn off the engine and provide some identification. The Defendant
identified himself as “Jordan” and said that he did not have any identification. Officer
Mann assisted Officer Koziol and then, based on information from Mr. Ingraham, went to
look for the victim at a nearby motel.

        While Officer Mann was departing, Officer Koziol asked the Defendant to exit the
vehicle, and, when the Defendant complied, his driver’s license that listed his name as
Anthony Gray, fell to the ground. Officer Koziol noticed something in the Defendant’s
pocket, and the Defendant told him that it was a “blunt,” which the officer understood to
mean a marijuana cigar. The officer searched him, found a pill bottle in his pocket that
contained the marijuana cigar, and detained him for criminal impersonation and simple
possession and because he had outstanding warrants. Officer Knoblock arrived at the scene
as the other officers were asking the Defendant to exit his vehicle. He saw a small struggle
between Officer Koziol and the Defendant, so he went toward Officer Koziol and assisted
him. Officer Knoblock said that he collected a key card to the motel room from the
Defendant, so he believed that the Defendant had been in the motel room. The Defendant,
however, at some point, said to the officers that he was just at the motel room “visiting a
friend.”

       Officer Knoblock smelled an odor of marijuana coming from the motel room, and
he said Mr. Ingraham was being detained because of that fact. Officer Knoblock also
acknowledged that he is heard on the recording from police equipment saying he could not
smell marijuana but smelled cigarettes. Later, Officer Mann returned and took Mr.

                                             3
Ingraham, who possessed a weapon, into custody. Officer Koziol assisted and took the
gun out of Mr. Ingraham’s waistline of his pants and placed it on the hood of the vehicle.
Officer Knoblock heard Mr. Ingraham say that he took the gun out of the motel room so
that the Defendant would not get into more trouble. The officers were discussing among
themselves whether to enter the room, and Mr. Ingraham said, “Well, I left the door open
for you all.” At that point, Officer Koziol and Officer Knoblock entered the room to clear
it for officer safety and to ensure there was no one else armed and present in the room. The
bathroom of the motel room was locked, so the officers knocked, announced, and then
kicked the door open. The found no one present in the bathroom or the motel room.

       Officer Koziol saw in plain view an open drawer containing blue and yellow pills.
Officer Koziol said that, while he requested the dash camera footage from the incident, he
was unable to obtain it. Officer Knoblock also went into the room and saw signs of possible
narcotics use and also possible narcotics, including empty capsule pills.

      The State entered a DVD of a recording from one of the officer’s recording
equipment. On it, Mr. Ingraham is heard making a statement about how he left the door
open for the officers.

       After leaving the motel and before returning and arresting Mr. Ingraham, Officer
Mann located the Defendant’s girlfriend, Shelby Hale. Ms. Hale had bruising around her
neck and what appeared to be bite marks on her thighs, all of which she showed to the
officer. Officer Mann believed that Ms. Hale was under the influence when she was
speaking to him. He said that she never mentioned a gun being involved in the incident
but, once the gun was located, did state that the gun belonged to the Defendant. Officer
Mann brought Ms. Hale back to the Super 8 Motel to speak with Officer Knoblock, who
was the primary officer investigating.

       Officer Mann said that it was after he brought Ms. Hale to the Super 8 Motel that
Mr. Ingraham made the statement about going back into the motel room to retrieve the gun
so the Defendant would not get into more trouble. Officer Mann confirmed that Mr.
Ingraham said that he left the room open for the officers, “wide open for [them], if you all
need it.” Officer Mann identified his recording of the interaction with Mr. Ingraham during
which Mr. Ingraham made these statements.

       The Defendant offered the testimony of Mr. Roy Henries, who described the
Defendant as “[a] good friend.” Mr. Henries said that the Defendant called him the day of
these events and asked him to purchase a motel room at the Super 8 Motel for the
Defendant. Mr. Henries went to the motel, purchased the room which was under his name,
and the Defendant reimbursed him for the expense. Mr. Henries said he gave the Defendant
the key cards for the room.

                                             4
        During cross-examination, Mr. Henries said that he rented the room on June 23, for
three or four days. He said that he informed the motel clerk that his “Niece Kelsey3” was
in the room. Mr. Henries said that, while a long time had passed, he still believed that his
niece was present. Mr. Henries agreed that he told police that he rented the room for a man
named Chris (presumably Chris Ingraham).

       Christopher Ingraham testified and said that he met the Defendant through a mutual
friend. He went to the Super 8 Motel on the day of the Defendant’s arrest and knocked on
the door of the Defendant’s room. The Defendant answered and, shortly thereafter, Ms.
Hale exited the motel room. After about five minutes, law enforcement officers knocked
on the door, and Mr. Ingraham answered the door at the Defendant’s direction. He said
that he returned to the room during the investigation, but never with a key card because he
did not have one. He said that officers asked him if he was staying in the room, and he told
them “no” and said that he did not have a key to the room. Mr. Ingraham said he never
gave officers consent to search the motel room, and he further posited that he did not have
the authority to grant a search request.

       During cross-examination, Mr. Ingraham agreed that he did not tell officers in his
written or recorded statement that it was not his motel room. He maintained, however, that
he told Officer Clegg when he first arrived that the motel room did not belong to him. He
agreed that he went back into the motel room three or four times after first encountering
law enforcement, and said that he picked up a key card the second time he returned to the
room. Mr. Ingraham agreed that he said to law enforcement officers at the scene that he
had left the door wide open for them.

        Emmanuel Graham with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department testified
that he worked for the Clarksville Police Department (“CPD”) at the time of this incident.
He interviewed Mr. Ingraham as part of this investigation, and the defense offered a
recording of that interview to refresh the officers recollection. Officers at the scene
informed Deputy Graham that Mr. Ingraham had a key card to the motel room, so during
the interview, Deputy Graham asked Mr. Ingraham if he had a key to the motel room. Mr.
Ingraham informed the officer that the door to the motel room was already opened. Deputy
clarified that he did not recall anyone saying that they observed Mr. Ingraham use the key
card to enter the motel room.

       Mr. Ingraham also informed Deputy Graham that Ms. Hale and the Defendant were
staying in the motel room but that someone else rented the room. Mr. Ingraham also said
that the Defendant fell asleep in the room and that there were other people staying there.
He did not offer the name of the individual who rented the room.

       3
        In later testimony we learn that a woman by the name “Kelsey Vance” spent at least one
night, maybe two, in the motel room with the Defendant and Mr. Ingraham.
                                              5
       Deputy Graham also interviewed Ms. Hale who told him that the Defendant picked
her up and brought her to the Super 8 Motel room.

      The Defendant then stipulated that he and Ms. Hale went to the room and had sex.
They were in the room together from 2:30 p.m. until approximately 6:00 p.m.

       Based upon the motions, the evidence, and the arguments of counsel, the trial court
denied the Defendant’s the motion to suppress the evidence found after a search of the
motel room. It noted that the room had been rented by Mr. Henries, who informed the
motel staff that his niece Kelsey would be staying in the room. The parties presented no
evidence about Kelsey or whether she was present in the room. The trial court found that
the motel room was “a stopping off point for a lot of people,” which was significant to
determining who had “standing to give consent and who honestly has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”

       The trial court noted that the Super 8 Motel receipts indicated that the motel room
in question was paid for in cash on June 23 for one night, then in cash again for the night
of June 24, and then with cash again for the night of June 25, the day this incident occurred.
He noted that there were multiple people “in and out” of this room. Ms. Hale testified at
the preliminary hearing that she and the Defendant were in the room on June 25 and that
they fought the whole time. The Defendant said that they had sexual intercourse.

        As to the search by police that the State indicated was based upon Mr. Ingraham’s
consent, the trial court found that officers responded to a domestic dispute call, and
knocked on the motel room door. Mr. Ingraham answered the door and told the officers
that the Defendant, who was present in the room, had been fighting with the Defendant’s
girlfriend but that the fight had ended. The Defendant exited the motel room and went to
a vehicle parked nearby. Law enforcement officers stopped and spoke with the Defendant
and then detained him based upon their finding of a pill bottle on his person.

        The court noted that Mr. Ingraham made multiple trips into and out of the motel
room. After one of these trips, law enforcement officers stopped him and found a gun in
his waistband. He told them that he got the gun from the motel room to keep the Defendant
from getting into trouble. He also had a key card to the room in his possession. The trial
court found that the key card gave Mr. Ingraham authority over the room. Mr. Ingraham
at this point informed law enforcement officers that he left the room open for them.

       The trial court found:

       that [Mr. Ingraham’s] statement, “I left it open for you all,” is indicative that
       he believed that he did have authority over the room and that he had the
       authority to grant consent, in that, “I leave it open for you all.”

                                              6
              On that basis, the Court finds that there was consent given. That the
       individual giving the consent had a room key, that in this instance, gives him
       the apparent authority, and that he believed he did have the authority.

The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the motel
room as a result of this search.

       The parties then argued whether, based on the facts, it was mandatory to join the
domestic assault offenses with the drug offenses that all stemmed from this same incident.
The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to sever, finding:

       In this case . . . it starts out basically as a response by law-enforcement to a
       complaint of a domestic assault. Ms. Ha[le] it appears would be one that
       connects the handgun to the Defendant. She was present in the motel room.

              It is in that room that drugs were located, as well as the drug
       paraphernalia, and it also connects that handgun as to Count Thirteen, that is,
       the possession of a firearm with the intent to commit the dangerous felony,
       the possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver. I’m
       going to deny the motion to sever.

                                 3. July 29, 2020 Hearing

        On July 23, 2020, the State filed a motion to consolidate offenses from cases CC-
2018-CR-1359 and CC-2020-CR-691. Case CC-2020-CR-691 was a second set of
indictments stemming from the June 25 arrest and search, that included two charges, one
count for manufacturing, selling, or delivering a Schedule IV narcotic and one count for
being a felon in possession of a handgun. The State stated in the motion that joinder was
mandatory as both indictments arose out of the same criminal episode. It explained that
the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) had not originally tested all of the pills and
that, after so doing, the State sought additional charges based on those findings and also on
the Defendant’s status as a convicted felon.

        The trial court held a hearing on the motion on July 29, 2020. The State reminded
the trial court that, in the first search warrant, Deputy Graham incorrectly said in his search
warrant application that the phones were found “on the Defendant” when they were found
in the hotel room. The State asserted that it then sought a second search warrant that
corrected that fact, and the trial court granted that second search warrant. The evidence
found on the phones was therefore admissible pursuant to the second search warrant. The
Defendant argued that the second search warrant contained misstatements of facts, in part
because it said that Officer Knoblock smelled marijuana, a fact that the officer denied at
the previous hearing.

                                              7
       The State called Officer Christopher Nolder, also with the CPD, who testified that
a representative from the District Attorney’s office notified him that there were
misstatements in the first search warrant for the cell phones. He prepared a second search
warrant in which he corrected the misstatements. The trial court granted the second search
warrant on October 10, 2019, and Officer Nolder testified that the information in the second
search warrant was all accurate. On October 15, 2019, after receiving the approval of the
second search warrant, Officer Nolder, assisted by Detective Kolosky, searched the cell
phones found in the motel room.

       During cross-examination, Officer Nolder said he created the second search warrant
based on the first, with the exception of the misstatement. He included in the search
warrant that Officer Knoblock smelled the odor of marijuana coming from the room, and
he was unaware that Officer Knoblock may have said something contrary to this at the
November 5, 2019 hearing. He said he did not tell the judge that he was filing the second
search warrant because of the misstatements in the first, and the judge may have found that
relevant in making his decision.

        Officer Knoblock testified that he had been accused of false testimony about
whether he smelled marijuana coming from the hotel room because he can be heard on one
of the officer’s in-car recordings saying that he did not smell marijuana. He explained that,
when he was speaking in the recording to his supervisor, he was recounting the story. He
initially thought that the odor of cigarettes was coming from the room because the door
was not yet opened. After being next to the door, and before entering the room, he smelled
marijuana. He stated that his statements were not inconsistent.

       Deputy Graham also testified again and said that he did not respond to the scene,
but he interviewed the Defendant and Ms. Hale. The two were located in separate, but
adjacent, rooms. The two attempted to speak to each other through the walls, so he had to
separate them.

      Deputy Graham said that he filed the first affidavit for a search warrant. In it, he
made the statement that the cell phones were found on the Defendant’s person, which was
inaccurate. He explained that he assumed that the phones belonged to the Defendant
because, during his interview, the Defendant asked for his phone to call the person to whom
the money found belonged. Based on this assumption, Deputy Graham wrote down the
wrong information in his notes that he subsequently used to create the affidavit.

        Deputy Graham said that, later, the ADA informed him of the error, the State
conceded the motion to suppress, and the State sought a second search warrant for the
phones based upon accurate information. He recalled that there were illegal drugs found
in the hotel room, along with the phones. He stated that he at no point intended to deceive
the court.

                                             8
        During cross-examination, Deputy Graham said he had photographed six phones at
the scene. He said that he assumed that the Defendant’s was the “little phone” because that
was how the Defendant described it in the interview when he asked to use it and contact
the money owner. Deputy Graham said that he only searched two of the six phones because
all the information indicated that the Defendant was the owner of the drugs and that he was
also the owner of the two phones. The deputy therefore did not seek a warrant for the other
phones.

      Deputy Graham agreed that he misspoke when he said in the warrant that the
Defendant had pills on him, when in fact the Defendant had a pill bottle on him. The pills
were found inside the hotel room. He similarly stated that the Defendant was found in
possession of $771, when that money was actually found in the hotel room.

      During redirect examination, Deputy Graham testified that he believed all of the
statements in the affidavit when he swore to them. He said that he based his belief on
statements of other officers who had responded to the scene and statements by the
Defendant during their interview.

        The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. It agreed with the State
that joinder of the cases for trial was required.

                                          B. Trial

        On November 16, 2020, the parties convened for trial. The State informed the trial
court that it was not proceeding with prosecuting one of the aggravated assault charges, the
count based on strangulation, because of the evidence as it existed. The trial court
dismissed this count. The Defendant moved to bifurcate two of the counts because the
charges were based on the Defendant’s prior criminal history. The trial court then noted
that the two charges in case number CC-2020-CR-691 became counts fourteen and fifteen.
It then noted that all the counts had to be renumbered.

        According to the renumbering, the following charges were presented to the jury in
the first part of the bifurcated trial: Count 1 aggravated assault by use or display of a
weapon, Count 2 especially aggravated kidnapping, Count 3 resisting arrest, Count 4
possession with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver heroin, Count 5 possession with intent
to manufacture, sell or deliver marijuana, Count 6 possession with intent to manufacture,
sell or deliver Schedule IV Diazepam (Valium), Count 7 possession with intent to sell or
deliver Clonazepam, Count 8 possession with intent to sell or deliver Schedule IV drug
Alprazolam (Xanax), Count 9 possession of drug paraphernalia, Count 10 possession of a
firearm with intent to go armed during a dangerous felony; and Count 11 possession with
intent to sell or deliver a Schedule IV controlled substance, Cathine.

                                             9
        The parties then presented the following evidence: On June 25, 2018, the manager
at the Super 8 Motel where these events occurred heard a “lot of racket” that sounded like
someone fighting emanating from room 148, the room in which the Defendant was located.
She called 911 after determining that the situation was greater than she could handle alone.
She was not present outside the room when law enforcement arrived.

       Law enforcement officers asked the manager for the registration of the room. The
room was registered to “Roy Henries,” and he rented the room from June 23 until June 26.
Notations on the registration included that the room was going to be used by his niece,
“Kelsey”. During cross-examination, the manager testified that the Super 8 Motel was
located near the CPD station and also near several other motels.

       Mr. Roy Henries confirmed that he rented the motel room for the Defendant in June
2018 because the Defendant did not have any identification at that time. He said that he
had known the Defendant, who referred to him as “Uncle Roy,” for a “long time” through
family friends. The Defendant reimbursed Mr. Henries for the room expense. Mr. Henries
admitted that he told the rental agent that he was renting the room for a young lady who
was with him, and he did not remember her name, but he was actually renting it for the
Defendant.

       During cross-examination, Mr. Henries said he gave the young lady both keys to the
room and never gave them to the Defendant. Mr. Henries said that he also knew Ms. Hale
and Mr. Ingraham, and he had seen Mr. Ingraham at the motel room and was under the
impression that Mr. Ingraham was also staying in the motel room. Mr. Henries said that
he was under the influence of opiates at the time he spoke with police in this case, but he
also admitted that he told them he had rented the room for “Chris.”

       During redirect examination, Mr. Henries agreed that he rented the room for the
Defendant and said he previously testified that he gave the keys for the room to the
Defendant. He also said that he and Mr. Ingraham returned to the motel after the
Defendant’s arrest to retrieve Mr. Ingraham’s personal belongings that were still in the
motel room.

        Multiple CPD officers responding to Ms. Moyer’s 911 call testified and they
testified in conformity with their testimony at the suppression hearing. Officer Clegg
testified that he responded to a 911 call at the Super 8 Motel about a possible domestic
assault situation on June 25, 2018. He was the first officer to respond at around 5:30 p.m.
which was close to shift change, and, due to the nature of the call, he parked some distance
from the room and listened from outside the room for some period of time. Upon hearing
nothing, he knocked on the door of the room. Mr. Ingraham answered the door, leaving
the door open, and the officer asked him about the sounds of argument from within. Mr.
Ingraham said that his “boy and his girlfriend” were arguing but that the “girl” was heading
toward another hotel somewhere. Officer Clegg said that he and Mr. Ingraham spoke for

                                            10
between five and ten minutes. As the two were speaking, the Defendant exited the room
and headed toward a car that was parked directly in front of the room. The Defendant
opened the car door, did something in the car, and then returned and reentered the motel
room. The Defendant exited the motel room again and started his vehicle. As Officer
Clegg believed him to be involved in the altercation, he radioed other officers to ensure
that the Defendant did not leave the premises.

      While the Defendant was in a patrol car, Officer Clegg asked Mr. Ingraham for
consent to search his person. Mr. Ingraham agreed, and the officer found nothing illegal
on Mr. Ingraham during this initial search.

        Officer Kozial and Officer Mann also responded to the Super 8 Motel in response
to the 911 call. When they arrived, Officer Clegg was already there speaking with Mr.
Ingraham at the door of the motel room. Both officers heard Officer Clegg’s call for
someone to stop the Defendant in his vehicle. Officer Mann approached the driver’s side
of the Defendant’s vehicle first while Officer Kozial gave the license plate number of the
vehicle the Defendant was in to dispatch. Officer Kozial then joined Officer Mann, and he
asked the Defendant to place the car in park and turn off the ignition. Officer Kozial stayed
with the Defendant, and Officer Mann went across the street to contact the Defendant’s
girlfriend, where Mr. Ingraham indicated that she would be located.

        Officer Mann found Ms. Hale in front of the Americas Best Value Inn holding a bag
and standing with her mother. She seemed “frantic,” and the officer noted bruising around
her neck, so Officer Mann asked her if she had been involved in the incident across the
street. Ms. Hale told Officer Mann that the Defendant had picked her up, and she thought
he was taking her to the W.I.C. office. She told him that she thought there was going to be
“a domestic today,” which he understood to mean that she anticipated the altercation with
the Defendant. She indicated to the officer that she did not call the police and did not want
to file a police report. Ms. Hale did, however, provide him some details of what had
happened during the altercation, including that she was at the Super 8 Motel for
approximately four hours, and the officer asked her to come back across the street with
him. Officer Mann went back to the crime scene and left Ms. Hale in his vehicle while he
continued assisting with the investigation.

        While Officer Mann was speaking with Ms. Hale, Officer Kozial was speaking with
the Defendant. When asked, the Defendant told Officer Kozial that his name was “Jordan”
and said that he did not have any identification with him. The officers asked the Defendant
to exit the vehicle, and, when he did, his identification fell on the ground, and the Defendant
quickly retrieved it and placed it in his pocket. As the Defendant bent over, Officer Kozial
noticed a prescription pill bottle in his pocket, and asked the Defendant about it. The
Defendant told him that it was a “blunt,” meaning a marijuana cigarette. The Defendant
handed Officer Kozial the bottle, and the officer noted that the bottle did in fact appear to

                                              11
contain a marijuana cigarette. Officer Knoblock said that officers also found “a wad of
cash” and a room key on the Defendant’s person.

       Officer Kozial patted down the Defendant at that point, and found the Defendant’s
Tennessee identification, which listed his name as “Anthony Gray.” At that point, Officer
Kozial detained the Defendant for criminal impersonation for giving a false name and
simple possession of marijuana. As Officer Kozial began walking the Defendant toward
the back of the patrol car to put him into custody, the Defendant began resisting. Officer
Knoblock arrived at that time and assisted Officer Kozial in placing the Defendant into
handcuffs. The officers placed the Defendant into Officer Knoblock’s patrol vehicle.
Because of the shift change, and Officer Kozial’s departure from duty at 6:00 p.m., Officer
Knoblock took over.

      Officer Knoblock recalled Mr. Ingraham asking for the keys to Defendant’s vehicle,
which was a rental car. One of the officers verified the paperwork showing that Mr.
Ingraham had rented the vehicle, and the officers returned the keys to Mr. Ingraham.

       Officer Mann saw Mr. Ingraham return to the motel room. He stopped him and
confronted him, asking if he had taken anything illegal or otherwise out of the room. Mr.
Ingraham admitted to Officer Mann that he had taken a revolver from the room, which was
now located in his waistband. Officer Kozial, who was still at the scene, removed the
revolver and placed it on the hood of the nearby vehicle. He noted that the revolver was
loaded, so he unloaded the weapon. Officer Kozial said that he had not seen Mr. Ingraham
go back into the motel room, but he assisted Officer Mann after the discovery of the
weapon. Officer Mann placed Mr. Ingraham in the back of a police vehicle parked adjacent
to his, so he could watch both Mr. Ingraham and Ms. Hale simultaneously. Officer
Knoblock noticed bruising and possible bite marks on Ms. Hale.

       After discovering the weapon, Officer Kozial and Officer Knoblock entered the
motel room to do a “protective sweep” and ensure that there was no one else in the room.
As Officer Kozial was leaving the room, he saw blue and yellow pills on the dresser and
in an open drawer. Officer Knoblock also saw in plain view a bag that he suspected
contained marijuana. He also saw a plastic grocery store bag in which appeared to contain
marijuana cigarettes. Additionally, officers saw multiple pills, some of which appeared to
be individually packaged.

       After doing a more thorough search of the motel room, officers found two touch
screen smartphones and additional pills that appeared to match the ones they had previously
seen scattered about the room. Officers found an unopened bag of syringes, a small pink
bag that contained more pills, and a box of sandwich baggies in the room.

       Officer Knoblock also found a flip-phone in the rental car. Officers found a fourth
cell phone, but none was sure whether the fourth phone was found in the rental car or the

                                            12
motel room. Officer Knoblock collected everything he believed had evidentiary value and
transferred it to Agent Graham, including the suspected drugs, the gun, bullets, phones,
and cash. Officer Knoblock identified the evidence collected, and the trial court admitted
it into evidence, and the jury viewed it.

        During cross-examination, Officer Kozial testified that he later learned that Mr.
Ingraham had removed evidence from the motel room, but he personally never saw Mr.
Ingraham enter or exit the motel room. Officer Kozial agreed that Mr. Ingraham should
not have been allowed to enter and exit the motel room. During the cross-examination of
Officer Clegg, he agreed that Mr. Ingraham could have brought drugs into the motel room
while the officer was watching the Defendant. Officer Mann said during cross-examination
that he was not present when the Defendant was taken into custody because he was across
the street speaking to Ms. Hale. He agreed Ms. Hale did not mention a handgun when she
recounted the events. She also refused to give a written statement. Officer Knoblock was
unsure whether a phone was found on the Defendant’s person when he was searched.
Officer Knoblock agreed that Ms. Hale did not tell him about the gun until after officers
discovered it. She then identified it as belonging to the Defendant. He agreed that a
majority of the narcotics found were found in a blue and white backpack, which was located
by the door of the motel room. Officer Knoblock also agreed that Mr. Ingraham had a
keycard to the room, was going in and out of the room, and could have put drugs in the
motel room.

       Chris Ingraham testified and recalled the events surrounding the Defendant’s arrest.
He said that, at the time, he had known the Defendant for over two years through the
Defendant’s uncle, A.J. He met Ms. Hale through the Defendant. Mr. Ingraham
acknowledged that he was currently incarcerated on charges that he tampered with the
evidence in this case because he retrieved a gun from the motel room and left with the
weapon. Mr. Ingraham said that the State agreed to drop the charge against him in
exchange for his truthful testimony at the Defendant’s trial. Mr. Ingraham also
acknowledged that he had two previous theft convictions and one pending charge against
him in Mississippi.

        Mr. Ingraham said that on June 25, 2018, he went to the Super 8 Motel room to see
the Defendant. He explained that he had allowed the Defendant to use a rental car rented
in Mr. Ingraham’s name, and the rental had to be returned that day by the close of business,
which was about 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. The Defendant had had the car for about three days.
When he arrived at the hotel room, the Defendant and Ms. Hale exited the room arguing.
She left headed in the direction of two other hotels. Mr. Ingraham said he went to his
vehicle and retrieved a chessboard and put it in the motel room. He noted that the
Defendant was still “mad,” and Mr. Ingraham saw that he still had multiple items in the
rental car. The Defendant began removing items from the car and putting them inside the
hotel room. Mr. Ingraham followed the Defendant into the motel room with his
chessboard. He put down his cigarettes and lighter, and he noticed that the room contained

                                            13
a lot of clothing and purses. The police knocked on the door. He said he was only at the
room for ten to fifteen minutes before the police arrived.

       Mr. Ingraham said that the Defendant had just received a phone call and was
walking toward the back of the motel room, so he answered the door. Mr. Ingraham said
that the officer said that he was there in response to a domestic disturbance, and Mr.
Ingraham attempted to help the officer by showing him a picture of Ms. Hale and pointing
out the direction in which she had left. The Defendant got into the rental vehicle and
attempted to leave until other officers stopped him.

        Mr. Ingraham said he never stayed in the motel room, and he did not have a key
card to the room. He said that he returned to the room after the Defendant was in custody.
The first time, he attempted to find a phone charger. The officer then told him that he could
go home, but, after realizing that he left his cigarettes and lighter in the motel room, he
returned to the motel room. He found his cigarettes but could not find his lighter. He left
the room, and then returned to the motel room a third time to find his lighter. When he
looked in the nightstand he saw a silver revolver with a black handle on the bed. He
grabbed the weapon and holstered it in the front of his pants. He then left the motel room
again. An officer stopped him, asked him if he had taken anything from the room, and,
after initially saying he had not, Mr. Ingraham told him that he had taken the weapon.

        Mr. Ingraham said that he picked up the weapon in hopes that the Defendant would
not be charged with having the weapon. Mr. Ingraham said that, at the time, he was under
the influence of heroin and marijuana. He purchased some of the drugs he consumed from
the Defendant. He assumed that drug sales were the Defendant’s only source of income.

       During cross-examination, Mr. Ingraham testified that officers did not search him
until he came out of the room on the fourth occasion.

       Ms. Hale testified that, before this incident, she had known the Defendant for
approximately seven months. She called him “T.J.” and she knew he had another
nickname, “Dolo.” They were friends for a short period of time and then began dating but
had broken up before the incident but maintained an intermittent relationship. She
described their relationship after breaking up as “strictly sexual.”

        Ms. Hale said the Defendant did not have a job but received money from the sales
of drugs. She was unsure about what drugs, if any, he sold other than marijuana, but she
explained that she met him when she purchased marijuana from him. Around the time of
this incident, Ms. Hale used Xanax, smoked marijuana, and drank alcohol.

       Ms. Hale described the day leading to her being in the motel with the Defendant.
She said that the two spoke electronically, she was not sure whether by phone or Facebook
messenger, and she asked the Defendant to take her to a doctor’s appointment. The

                                             14
Defendant picked her up in a rental car between noon and 2:00 p.m. The Defendant said
that he needed to go to his motel room, and she assumed that they would go there and have
sexual intercourse and then he would take her to her appointment.

       Ms. Hale recalled that from the moment she got into the vehicle, the Defendant was
angry. He thought that she had been cheating on him, so the two got into an argument with
him yelling at her. She attempted to exit the vehicle, and the Defendant grabbed her by the
hair, pulled her back into the vehicle, and said, “It’s a good day to catch a domestic.” She
understood this to mean that he was going to “put his hands on” her and that he was angry
enough to go to jail over it.

        Once at the motel, Ms. Hale went into the room voluntarily, still thinking that the
two were going to engage in sexual intercourse. Ms. Hale acknowledged that she went
with the Defendant willingly even after he had violently pulled her hair. She said that she
was in love with the Defendant at the time, she was young and impressionable, and her
mother had always been with violent men, so Ms. Hale felt the Defendant’s behavior was
normal. After entering the room, the Defendant immediately began “interrogat[ing]” her
about who she was seeing, sending electronic messages, and her whereabouts. Ms. Hale
explained that the Defendant had linked her and his Google accounts, so he could pull up
her information on his phone, and he questioned her about it. She said that, if she did not
provide the “right answers,” he became more violent and physical. Ms. Hale said, at that
point, she attempted to leave the room.

        The Defendant prevented Ms. Hale’s attempt to leave on multiple occasions by
dragging her by her arms or her legs back to the bed. She tried to call her mom and 911,
but he “snatched” the phone cord out of the jack. The Defendant did not allow her to make
a phone call. The Defendant held Ms. Hale on the bed by sitting on top of her, legs on
either side of her, and squeezing the tops of her arms tightly. She said she also had marks
on her neck, but she did not explain what caused them, becoming more vague during
questioning. Ms. Hale said she screamed loudly during this incident in hopes that someone
would hear her and send help. This went on for two or three hours, and she even resorted
to hitting the Defendant’s “bad leg” in hopes that she would be able to leave.

       At one point, the Defendant brandished a gun from his bag and started waving it
around and threatening her. She identified a photograph of the weapon. While waving the
gun, the Defendant told her, “This isn’t a game to me.” He also uttered “a lot of crazy
ramblings.” Ms. Hale said she was crying, and the Defendant said he wanted to play
Russian roulette with her. Ms. Hale said that she reacted quickly and started screaming at
him. She took the gun away from him and threw it under the sink. She said the Defendant
was not holding her down at this point, but she stayed because he was waving the gun
around. She said she was terrified.

                                            15
        Ms. Hale acknowledged that, during this time period, she had sex with the
Defendant willingly. She said that she thought that, if they had sex, the incident would be
over. She also said she never successfully left the room after multiple attempts. When Mr.
Ingraham arrived the Defendant opened the door. The Defendant released Ms. Hale, and
she was able to leave the motel room. She said she ran under the Defendant’s arm as it
was propping the door open. Mr. Ingraham asked her if she was okay and if she needed a
ride, and she told him she did not need anything. She just wanted to go call her mom. Ms.
Hale went across the street to another motel and called her mother, who came to get her.

       Ms. Hale agreed that there was a police station across the street from the Super 8
Motel, but she said that she chose not to go there and went to another motel instead. She
said that, in her youth, she equated love with loyalty. It had been ingrained in her that you
did not call the police on your significant other, ever, no matter the circumstances.

       Ms. Hale said that, because she did not call the police, she was surprised when
Officer Mann arrived at the motel where she called her mother. He told her that he was
there about a domestic disturbance and, from the bruising on her body, he assumed she was
the other person involved in the altercation. Ms. Hale said she agreed to talk to him and
allowed him to take pictures of her injuries.

        Ms. Hale described her injuries, saying that she had bruises all over her body.
Specifically, she had bruising and bite marks on her inner thighs, one of which left a scar.
She also had bruises and bite marks on her neck. At the end of her testimony, Ms. Hale
identified Snapchat videos from the Defendant’s phone that showed the inside of the Super
8 Motel room. She can be heard crying on the videos.

        Ms. Hale said she had contacted the Defendant since this incident. She said that she
entered a drug rehabilitation program and, as part of her treatment, she wrote him a lengthy
letter in which she apologized for her wrongdoing and indicated that she forgave him for
this incident. The Defendant contacted her, and the two spoke. The Defendant would talk
to her about the case, but she emphasized that her desire was to tell the truth in court.

       Ms. Hale discussed her previous criminal history which included some drug charges
that she received around the time of this incident. She was serving a probationary sentence
and would get judicial diversion if she successfully completed diversion. She had also
been charged with the domestic assault of her mother.

       During cross-examination, she expounded that her conviction was for the felony
resale of Xanax. She also had a pending charge in Texas for the resale of pills from the
same time period. Ms. Hale agreed that, during this incident, she fought back with the
Defendant. She said that she had a newborn child at the time, and the child was living with
her grandmother. Ms. Hale was under investigation by the Department of Children’s
Services because there were drugs found in the child’s system around the time of his birth.

                                             16
        Ms. Hale agreed that she had previously testified that she and the Defendant did not
have sex that day. She also previously testified that she did not see him point the gun at
her, although she said he had a gun in his hand while they were arguing. She explained
any discrepancies in her testimony by saying that she was still loyal to the Defendant during
her previous testimony and now she just wanted to be truthful.

       Crystal Myers, a public defender, testified that she represented Ms. Hale for a
probation violation. She saw her June 28, 2017, three days after this incident, when Ms.
Hale came for an appointment. Ms. Myers recalled that Ms. Hale, who she estimated
weighed ninety pounds, was wearing a tank top and long shorts. Her arms were “absolutely
covered” in black and purple bruises. There were both cluster and circle bruises on her
arms.

        During cross-examination, Ms. Myers testified that Ms. Hale had been convicted of
reselling Xanax. Ms. Myers also said that her office had previously represented the
Defendant. When she learned this, she withdrew from representing Ms. Hale.

       Officer Graham testified about the physical evidence in this case, which he received
from Officer Knoblock. He took the evidence, photographed it, and the trial court admitted
those photographs into evidence. Officers submitted a total of six cell phones in this case.
One of the phones belonged to Ms. Hale, and he returned it to her. Another belonged to
Mr. Ingraham, who was taken into custody.

       Officer Graham interviewed the Defendant, Mr. Ingraham, and Ms. Hale while they
were at the police station. He noticed that Ms. Hale had bruises over her arms and legs and
also around her neck. The officer photographed her injuries, and noted that Ms. Hale
seemed “very upset” about the whole situation. Officer Graham recalled that Ms. Hale and
the Defendant, who were in separate rooms, communicated through their interview rooms.
They were shouting at each other and appeared to be trying to have a conversation about
the incident. The officers separated the two into rooms from which they could not
communicate through the walls.

       Officer Graham said that, when he interviewed the Defendant, the Defendant did
not offer any place of employment. The Defendant admitted that he had been at the Super
8 Motel with “his girl” and “some other people” but would not provide any names. The
Defendant was unresponsive when Officer Graham asked him if Mr. Ingraham was also
staying in the motel room.

       Officer Graham sealed the physical evidence and sent it to the TBI to be tested.
Special Agent Jennifer Sullivan with the TBI tested the evidence in this case. Her testing
revealed that the evidence submitted included: 12.22 grams of heroin and fentanyl, 96.71
grams of marijuana, 60 Diazepam tablets, 15 Klonopin tablets, four Xanax tablets, 13

                                             17
Clonazepam tablets, and 297 Cathine tablets. Special Agent Sullivan said that there was
additional material submitted that she believed to be marijuana, but she did not test it as
the first bag submitted exceeded the first threshold. It was apparent to her that there was
not enough marijuana to meet the next threshold, which was ten pounds.

       During cross-examination, Special Agent Sullivan said that of each of the pills
marked the same, she tested one to determine what substance that pill contained. She did
not test every single pill.

        CPD Detective Debra Kolofsky, an expert mobile phone forensic examiner,
identified a flip-phone submitted as evidence in this case. She described the flip-phone as
“low tech” and inexpensive. In text messages on the phone, it appeared the user was
named, “Dolo,” and the phone was last was used on June 25, 2018. Detective Kolofsky
also conducted a forensic examination of one of the smartphones. After looking at the
accounts associated with the phone, she determined that the Defendant was its primary
user. The phone memory also contained a picture of the Defendant that he appeared to
take of himself on June 25, 2018 and some Snapchat videos. Around the date of this
incident, there were also text messages that appeared to indicate drug activity. Agent
Graham identified two search warrants in this case for the cell phones, one dated August
8, 2018, and the other dated October 10, 2019.

       Will Meeks, the senior drug agent with the CPD, testified that he looked at multiple
circumstances to indicate whether someone was involved in the sale of drugs. Some of
those factors included: how they were working in our community; whether they possessed
used and unused baggies; the types of baggies and packaging they possessed; and whether
the person had digital scales, smoking apparatuses and or syringes. He also said that it was
significant that the Defendant in this case was in a hotel room rented in someone else’s
name, which drug dealers sometimes did as an attempt to conceal themselves. Drug dealers
would also sometimes drive rented vehicles to conceal their identity. Agent Meeks also
indicated that those engaging in drug dealing also carried cash currency, as narcotics selling
was a cash-based business.

       Agent Meeks found indications of drug sales in the photographs of the motel room.
He noted the sandwich baggies, the cigarette wrapping paper, and the marijuana packaging,
which appeared to be for resale. The agent estimated the value of the drugs found. He said
that the 12.2 grams of heroin had a street value of $2400 and that the 192 grams of
marijuana had a value of between $1500 and $2000. He estimated that many of the pills
would have a value of $7.00 per pill and the quantities of the pills indicated that they were
for resale. Agent Meeks indicated that all of the factors indicate that the items in the motel
room were associated with drug dealing, except for the burnt portions of the marijuana
cigarettes, which were for personal use.

                                             18
       During cross-examination the agent agreed that no digital scales were found in the
motel room.

       Kelsey Vance testified on behalf of the Defendant and said that she and the
Defendant were “hanging out” in June 2018. On June 24, 2018, she was at the Super 8
Motel with the Defendant along with Mr. Ingraham. She spent the night at the motel with
the Defendant and Mr. Ingraham, and during that time, she never saw drugs being sold
from the motel room and she also never saw a weapon. Ms. Vance identified a photograph
of her and the Defendant from that day, and she said Mr. Ingraham took the photograph.
She said Mr. Ingraham had a keycard for the room, and he came and went as he pleased.

       During cross-examination, Ms. Vance agreed that she had spoken with the
Defendant while he was incarcerated, and the two talked by phone twice the weekend
before the trial. The two discussed whether she would testify. After listening to a recording
from the jail telephone, she agreed that she asked the Defendant, “I’m supposed to know
what Chris looks like, right?” She also said, “Chris is in jail, so I know Chris.” The State’s
attorney then asked her to describe Chris, and she said he was light-skinned with light eyes.
She denied that she only knew what he looked like from his booking photograph.

       After listening to another recording, Ms. Vance agreed she called the Defendant
“Dolo.” She also listened to a recording of her speaking with a woman named “Brook”
from the jail. “Brook” told Ms. Vance to testify that, “It was the plug4 that was taking the
pictures.”

        Ms. Vance agreed that she stayed in the room on June 23, which was her birthday,
and also on June 24. She did not see a gun or drugs, and the room was not in disarray. She
left around 8:00 a.m. on June 25. The photographs on the phone depicting her and the
Defendant were from her birthday weekend.

       During redirect examination, Ms. Vance agreed that she had previously spoken with
the Defendant’s investigator, before these jail house calls, and her statements were
consistent with her testimony. She disagreed that the Defendant tried to get her to testify
that Mr. Ingraham was “the plug.”

      The investigator in the Defendant’s case, James North, testified that Ms. Vance’s
statements to him from months before the trial were consistent with her trial testimony.

      The Defendant testified that he was twenty-eight years old at the time of trial and
had previously been convicted of multiple felonies, including facilitation of robbery,
aggravated robbery, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.

       4
         Earlier in her testimony, Ms. Vance explained that a “plug” in street terms is one who does
illegal activity.
                                                19
      The Defendant explained this incident by saying that he picked up Ms. Hale because
he wanted to have sex with her. He brought her to the motel room, had sexual intercourse
with her, and he fell asleep. He awoke to her going through his phone, seeing pictures of
him with another female the day before, and asking who he was with and why it was not
Ms. Hale. The Defendant agreed that the photographs on his phone were provocative,
which made Ms. Hale angry. He said Ms. Hale also saw videos on his phone that showed
the Defendant and Mr. Ingraham having sex with Ms. Vance. There were multiple other
photographs of women on his phone that Ms. Hale also saw.

       The Defendant denied every assaulting Ms. Hale while he drove her to the motel
room. He also denied taking the route that she said that they took, explaining that he only
took back roads because he did not have a valid driver’s license.

        He described the incident saying that, after seeing the photos on his phone, Ms. Hale
started looking into dressers and slinging things around. He said she was “cussing” at him.
The Defendant argued that Ms. Hale could not be upset with him because she was doing
inappropriate things to obtain drugs. The Defendant said that the most serious part of the
argument occurred approximately thirty minutes before Mr. Ingraham arrived at the motel
room. He had locked Ms. Vance’s possessions in the bathroom, and Ms. Hale was beating
down the door attempting to get into the bathroom.

       The Defendant said that Ms. Hale hit him first and that he never hit her. He said he
did grab her when she was trying to break down the bathroom door, and he put her on the
bed. He said that he also bit her, but did so in response to Ms. Hale hitting his face and
choking him.

       The Defendant said that there was no gun in the motel room, and he never pulled a
gun out on Ms. Hale. He identified the weapon in this case and said that it belonged to Mr.
Ingraham. The Defendant said he asked the State to test the gun for fingerprints, but it
refused.

       The Defendant said that he told Ms. Hale that it was time to leave when Mr.
Ingraham arrived. He did not want to leave her in the motel room because he believed she
would try to beat down the bathroom door because she believed there was someone hiding
inside the bathroom. She was upset about leaving because she had nowhere else to stay.

       The Defendant recalled that Ms. Hale had smoked “fake” marijuana and consumed
some Xanax the day of the incident. He said that she had attacked him before but he never
called the police. The Defendant admitted that he was a “drug dealer” at the time of this
incident and that he had marijuana, Xanax, and pain pills in the motel room. The Defendant
said that he purchased drugs from Mr. Ingraham, who was a “bigger” drug dealer than he
was. Ms. Hale also sold drugs for the Defendant.

                                             20
       The Defendant said that he, Roy Henries, and Ms. Vance all had keycards to the
motel room. When Mr. Ingraham came to town, he also got a keycard to the room. The
Defendant said that the book bag that the State introduced into evidence belonged to Mr.
Ingraham. The Defendant said that he was purchasing drugs from Mr. Ingraham when
police arrived.

       The Defendant agreed he gave police a fake name and that he had a pill bottle with
a marijuana cigarette and some Xanax on his person when police stopped him. He ingested
the Xanax while in the police car, so he was not sober during the interview. The Defendant
said that he only owned one of the cell phones that police confiscated. The Defendant said
Ms. Hale had “fabricated” the testimony that she took a gun from him.

        During cross-examination, the Defendant agreed that his testimony about the
incident was contrary to the majority of the other witnesses, but he maintained that they
were all lying. The Defendant agreed that, in the motel room, he possessed the three bags
of marijuana found by law enforcement in the room. He also had Xanax pills, which he
consumed before they were discovered by law enforcement. He said that he also had
Viagra pills in the room, but he denied ownership of any of the other pills found in the
room. He said that the large quantity of blue pills found in the white bag did not belong to
him. The Defendant did not recall a phone conversation with Ms. Hale after his arrest
during which he told her that he was lucky that law enforcement officers did not test those
pills because it would be “a lot worse.”

        The Defendant agreed that he sold drugs as his only source of income and described
his role as a “middle man,” selling Lortab, Xanax, “Roxys,” and anything that he could.
The day of this incident, he had purchased some heroin from Mr. Ingraham to resell, but
Mr. Ingraham had not given him the right quantity. Mr. Ingraham came to the motel room
to give him the rest of the heroin that the Defendant had purchased for resale. The
Defendant said that the $700 found with him was his, but he agreed that he repeatedly told
police that it belonged to his uncle. The Defendant said that he was “shocked” when he
first heard about the quantity of pills and heroin that he was being charged with because he
did not have those in the room. The drugs found in the backpack belonged to Mr. Ingraham,
as did the backpack itself.

       He also agreed that he had a physical altercation with Ms. Hale. He said that he
held her only hard enough to get her to stop kicking the bathroom door. He explained that
he only bit her because she knew that his leg was injured but stayed on top of him and
biting her was his only recourse.

       The Defendant said that Officer Clegg lied when he first arrived at the room and
said he was investigating a domestic disturbance. The Defendant opined that Ms. Hale had

                                            21
called the police to report drug activity in the Defendant’s motel room and that the officer
was there to investigate that.

        The jury convicted the Defendant of assault, kidnapping, possession with intent to
sell or deliver heroin, four counts of possession with the intent to sell or deliver four
different scheduled drugs, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced
him as a Multiple Offender to an effective sentence of fourteen years of incarceration. It
is from these judgments that the Defendant now appeals

                                         II. Analysis

       On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to sever his offenses; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
evidence found during the search of a hotel room; (3) the trial court erred with it denied his
motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of two cell phones; (4) the State
violated his right to due process by intentionally allowing false testimony; (5) the trial court
erred when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal; (6) the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (7) the trial court erred when it denied his motion
for new trial.

       We first note that the State contends that the Defendant waived each one of his
issues by failing to cite to the appellate record. The State correctly notes that Rule
27(a)(7)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a brief “shall”
contain” an argument with “citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the
record.” Further, the rules of this court provide that issues not supported by references to
the record will be treated as waived. See Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App. 10(b).

       After reviewing the Defendant’s brief, we find that he did make some citations to
the record. While we encourage parties to be more precise in their citations, we conclude
that we can aptly review his issues on their merits based upon the Defendant’s brief.

                                 A. Severance of Offenses

       The Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it did not sever his drug-
related charges from the kidnapping and assault charges. The State counters that the
offenses were properly joined by the trial court.

       On October 19, 2019, the Defendant filed a motion to sever the sets of offenses
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1). He contended that, if
“permissive joinder” applied in this case, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 8(b), then joinder of the offenses was improper because, pursuant to Rule
14(b)(1), the crimes were not part of the same criminal episode and proof of one count was
not admissible in a trial of the other counts. The State contended that the mandatory joinder

                                              22
rule of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) applied, and the Defendant countered
that the trial court should then sever the offenses pursuant to Rule 14(b)(2). After a hearing,
the trial court found that the offenses arose out the same criminal episode, starting with a
complaint regarding the domestic disturbance. The court stated that Ms. Hale, the other
party involved in the disturbance, connected the Defendant to the handgun in the room, as
well as the drugs in the room. Because of the connection of the offenses, the trial court
denied the Defendant’s motion to sever.

       The State asserts that the Defendant waived this issue by failing to raise it in his
motion for a new trial. The Defendant concedes as much, but asks us to review this issue
for plain error. We agree that full appellate review of this issue is waived because the
Defendant failed to raise the issue in his motion for new trial. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e).
Therefore, we review this issue solely to determine if plain error review is warranted.

       The doctrine of plain error applies when all five of the following factors have been
established:

       (a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court;
       (b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached;
       (c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected;
       (d) the accused must not have waived the issue for tactical reasons; and
       (e) consideration of the error must be “necessary to do substantial justice.”

State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting State v. Terry, 118 S.W.3d
355, 360 (Tenn. 2003)) (internal brackets omitted). “An error would have to [be] especially
egregious in nature, striking at the very heart of the fairness of the judicial proceeding, to
rise to the level of plain error.” Id. at 231. When it is clear from the record that at least
one of the factors cannot be established, this court need not consider the remaining factors.
State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 283 (Tenn. 2000). The defendant bears the burden of
persuasion to show that he is entitled to plain error relief. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d
349, 355 (Tenn. 2007).

        The record clearly establishes what occurred in the trial court in this case. The
arguments of the parties rely upon what occurred during the trial, which was adequately
transcribed and preserved for our review. The first element of plain error review is
satisfied. See Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282.

       Next, we determine whether a clear and unequivocal rule of law has been broken.
Id. Decisions to consolidate or sever offenses pursuant to Rules 8(b) and 14(b)(1) are to
be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999).
“[A] trial court’s refusal to sever offenses will be reversed only when the ‘court applied an
incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or reasoning that
caused an injustice to the party complaining.’” Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 442-43

                                              23
(Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997)); see also Shirley,
6 S.W.3d at 247. Discretion is also abused when the trial court “failed to consider the
relevant factors provided by higher courts as guidance for determining an issue.” State v.
Garrett, 331 S.W.3d 392, 401 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141
(Tenn. 2007)).

       The consolidation of multiple offenses against a single defendant in a single trial is
governed by the interplay of Rules 8, 13, and 14 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Rule 8 identifies the circumstances for mandatory joinder and permissive
joinder. Under the rule for mandatory joinder:

       (a)(1) Two or more offenses shall be joined in the same indictment,
       presentment, or information, with each offense stated in a separate count, or
       the offenses consolidated pursuant to Rule 13, if the offenses are:
       (A) based on the same conduct or arise from the same criminal episode;
       (B) within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
       (C) known to the appropriate prosecuting official at the time of the return of
       the indictment(s), presentment(s), or information(s).

Multiple offenses arise from the same criminal episode only when “proof of one offense
necessarily involves proof of the others.” State v. Johnson, 342 S.W.3d 468, 475 (Tenn.
2011) (citing 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 13-1.3 cmt., at 13.10). Stated
differently, “the proof of one offense must be ‘inextricably connected’ with the proof of
the other or . . . the proof of one offense [must] form[ ] a ‘substantial portion of the proof’
of the other offense.” Id. (citations omitted). Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a).

       Pursuant to 14(b)(2), if two or more offenses are joined or consolidated for trial
pursuant to Rule 8(a), (mandatory joinder), the court shall grant a severance of offenses in
any of the following situations:

       (A) Before Trial. Before trial on motion of the state or the defendant when
       the court finds a severance appropriate to promote a fair determination of the
       defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense.

       (B) During Trial. During trial, with consent of the defendant, when the court
       finds a severance is necessary to achieve a fair determination of the
       defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense. The court shall consider
       whether--in light of the number of offenses charged and the complexity of
       the evidence--the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and
       apply the law intelligently as to each offense.

      In this case we conclude that the trial court did not abuse it’s discretion when it
determined that these offenses were subject to mandatory joinder pursuant to Rule 8. These

                                              24
offenses all stemmed from an incident that occurred on a single date, after the police were
called for a domestic disturbance. As part of their investigation into the disturbance,
officers found drugs in the motel room where the disturbance occurred. The victim, Ms.
Hale, was held against her will by the Defendant, who possessed a gun, in the room in
which the drugs were found and from which the gun was taken by Mr. Ingraham. Ms. Hale
was located and brought by officers immediately to the scene where the Defendant was
still located while officers found the drugs and weapon. This all occurred during a three to
five-hour timeframe. Ms. Hale gave a statement to police that included allegations that the
Defendant was in the motel room with the weapon and the drugs at the time of the
domestic-related offenses, and that the weapon was used during the domestic-related
offenses. As such, the trial court did not err when it determined that all of the alleged
offenses occurred from the same criminal episode. We further conclude that it did not err
when it determined that severance was not necessary to achieve a fair determination of the
Defendant’s guilt or innocence.

       Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief because he has not
proven that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b)
(“A final judgment from which relief is available and otherwise appropriate shall not be
set aside unless, considering the whole record, error involving a substantial right more
probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial
process.”); State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59, 70 (Tenn. 2018); State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d
626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). He is not entitled to relief on this issue.

                                  B. Motion to Suppress

       The Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress evidence found during the search of the motel room. He assets that Mr. Ingraham
was at the motel room only to get his rental car but had no authority to consent to law
enforcement searching the motel room. The State counters that Mr. Ingraham had the
apparent authority to consent to the search of the motel room, so the trial court property
denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress.

       On review, an appellate court may consider the evidence adduced at the suppression
hearing as well as at trial in determining whether the trial court properly denied a pretrial
motion to suppress. State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 297-99 (Tenn. 1998). A trial
court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal unless the
evidence preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996);
State v. Jones, 802 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Questions about the
“credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of
conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Odom,
928 S.W.2d at 23. The application of the law to the facts as determined by the trial court
is a question of law which we review de novo on appeal. State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d
626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

                                              25
       The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

       The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
       effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
       no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
       affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
       persons or things to be seized.

A similar guarantee is provided in Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution:

       That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
       possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general
       warrants, whereby an officer may be commanded to search suspected places,
       without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not
       named, whose [offenses] are not particularly described and supported by
       evidence, are dangerous to liberty.

       The essence of these constitutional protections is “to ‘safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions of government officials.’” State v.
Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn.1997) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 528 (1967)). Under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, evidence that is obtained
through exploitation of an unlawful search or seizure must be suppressed. See Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).

        The prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures is subject only to a few
specifically established and well-defined exceptions. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967); State v. Tyler, 598 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). One
exception to the general warrant requirement is consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1996); State v.
Jackson, 889 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). “The sufficiency of consent
depends largely upon the facts and circumstances in a particular case.” Id. In most
circumstances valid consent exists when given “either by the individual whose property is
searched or by a third party who possesses common authority over the premises.” State v.
Ellis, 89 S.W.3d 584, 592 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court
has defined common authority as the

       mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control
       for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-
       inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the
       others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the
       common area to be searched.

                                             26
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974); see Bartram, 925 S.W.2d at 231.
This court has previously concluded that valid consent exists if (1) the third party in fact
had common authority or (2) a reasonable person, given the facts and circumstances
available to the police, would have concluded “that the consenting party had authority over
the premises.” Ellis, 89 S.W.3d at 593 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89
(1990)). Courts consider the reasonableness of an officer’s belief under the totality of the
circumstances, and no single fact is determinative. United States v. Rogers, 861 F. App’x
8, 20 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Ford v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1422 (2022);
United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 442-43 (6th Cir. 2005).

        The consent doctrine applies to hotel rooms as well as other types of property.
United States v. Saine, 2022 WL 17000877 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 27, 2022). “Under the Fourth
Amendment, an occupant of a hotel room has a reasonable expectation of privacy there,
even though he is just a guest, not an owner, of the room.” United States v. Caldwell, 518
F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, a warrantless search of a hotel room is unreasonable
unless an exception applies. Id. The fact that a person is an overnight guest in a residence
or an apartment, standing alone, is sufficient to clothe the guest with a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises sufficient to challenge the search and any resulting
seizure. State v. Madewell, No. M2018-00183-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 6566632, at *5
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2018) (citing State v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1996) (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990)), no perm. app.
filed. The same principles apply to hotel rooms, see Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
490 (1964), and “an occupant of a hotel [r]oom has a reasonable expectation of privacy
there, even though he [or she] is just a guest, not an owner, of the [r]oom,” Caldwell, 518
F.3d at 429. This was holding has been affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court. State
v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 840 (Tenn. 2001). Indeed, courts have recognized the authority
of third-parties sharing hotel rooms to consent to a search of the room even if the room is
not registered in their name. See United States v. Kimoana, 338 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir.
2004) (“Although [d]efendant was not the registered guest who had paid for the room, he
had stayed there overnight, left his possessions there, and carried a key to the room. This
supports a finding that [d]efendant had joint access or control over the room, and thus had
actual authority to consent.”); United States v. Clark, 234 F. Supp. 2d 471, 476-77 (D.N.J.
2002) (third-party had actual authority to consent to search of hotel room where he stayed
overnight despite not being a registered guest).

       When one occupant of a hotel room consents to a search and another does not, the
question is whether the consenting occupant had actual or apparent authority. Caldwell,
518 F.3d at 429. The Sixth Circuit has found actual authority to exist when an occupant
was a registered guest, placed his or her belongings in the room, spent time in the room,
and intended to stay there overnight. Id.; see also United States v. Eastman, 645 F. App’x
476, 480 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that “Kellogg had, at a minimum, mutual use of the hotel
room sufficient to consent to its search. She paid for the room with her debit card, spent
time there earlier in the day, and planned to return in the evening, perhaps to spend the

                                            27
night”); United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 965 (6th Cir. 2008) (Sutton, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (observing that “Crist, to start, had unquestioned authority
over the hotel room: She rented the room in her name; she opened the door to the officers;
and her personal effects were in the room.”); see also Saine, 2022 WL 17000877, at *4
(finding that one party had actual and apparent authority to consent to a search of a hotel
room when, although not registered in her name, she had been staying in the room, had
possession in the room, and had a key and joint access to the room).

        In this case, reviewing the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and the
trial, we conclude that Mr. Ingraham had actual authority to grant consent to search the
room. Law enforcement officers arrived in response to a domestic dispute. Mr. Ingraham
answered the door and spoke with law enforcement officers. Mr. Ingraham knew what had
happened, and informed the officers that it was a simple dispute between the Defendant
and his girlfriend. The Defendant left the room without speaking to officers and was
intercepted by law enforcement officers trying to leave the premises. Mr. Ingraham used
a key card to go into and out of the room several times during the officers’ investigation,
and the officers found him in possession of a key card. Mr. Henries, whose name the motel
room was registered, told police that he rented the room for “Chris,” presumably referring
to Chris Ingraham.

        During the trial, Mr. Henries, who rented the room, said he saw Mr. Ingraham at the
motel and was under the impression that Mr. Ingraham was staying at the motel with the
Defendant. Both Ms. Vance and the Defendant testified that Mr. Ingraham had a keycard
to the motel room. Ms. Vance said that Mr. Ingraham came and went from the room as he
pleased with the keycard, and the Defendant said that, when Mr. Ingraham got into town,
the Defendant gave him a keycard to the room. Ms. Vance said that she spent the night of
June 24, 2018 in the motel room with “them” referring to Mr. Ingraham and the Defendant.
According to the Defendant, at some point during the time she was there, the Defendant,
Mr. Ingraham, and Ms. Vance engaged in sexual relations with each other, which the
Defendant videotaped. Mr. Ingraham took pictures of the Defendant and Ms. Vance during
that time period. Ms. Hale saw videos of these events, which caused the argument leading
to the domestic dispute. The Defendant testified that the book bag containing many of the
drugs found in the motel room belonged to Mr. Ingraham, along with the gun that officers
found in the room. Mr. Henries testified that, after the Defendant’s arrest, Mr. Ingraham
returned to the motel room to retrieve Mr. Ingraham’s personal belongings.

       Viewing the evidence adduced during the motion to suppress hearing and the trial,
we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s motion to
suppress. The evidence shows that Mr. Ingraham had the actual authority to grant law
enforcement officers consent to search the room. There is some evidence that Mr. Henries
thought he was renting the room for “Chris,” and he thought Mr. Ingraham was staying in
the motel room with the Defendant. Mr. Ingraham had a key card to the motel room, came
and went has he pleased, possessed items in the room, and spent the night there. He

                                            28
conducted drug related activities from the room during the time that he was there. The
evidence indicates that Mr. Ingraham was also staying at the motel room and spent at least
one night there with the Defendant and Ms. Vance. As such, he had actual authority to
consent to the search of the motel room.

        Further, even if Mr. Ingraham did not have actual authority to consent to a search,
it was reasonable for police to believe he had such authority under the circumstances,
meaning he had the apparent authority to consent to the search. Mr. Ingraham answered
the motel room door when officers arrived, and he spoke with them and knew where Ms.
Hale had gone. The Defendant told officers that he was at the motel room “visiting a
friend,” so they did not have knowledge that he had an expectation of privacy to the room.
Officers observed Mr. Ingraham going into and out of the room, and after searching him,
they found a weapon on his person that he said he removed from the room. It was
reasonable for officers to conclude that Mr. Ingraham had authority to consent to the search
when he told him that he had left the door open for them. As such, the search of the motel
room did not violate the Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, and he is not entitled to
relief on this issue.

                                 C. Search of Cellphones

        The Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress the search of two cellphones. He first summarizes the procedural history of this
issue and the arguments he presented before the trial court. In conclusion, he says that the
trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence found on the two phones
because “the warrants were obtained in violation of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(3) and T.C.A.
ss 40-6-107.”

        Under Tennessee’s Rules of Criminal Procedure, a “warrant must be executed
within five days after its date.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(3). “[T]here is a rebuttable
presumption [in Tennessee] that a warrant served within the statutory five (5) day period
retains the probable cause validity attributed to it by the issuing magistrate, subject to a
proper evidentiary showing to the contrary.” Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-107
states: “(a) A search warrant shall be executed and returned to the magistrate by whom it
was issued within five (5) days after its date, after which time, unless executed, it is void.”

       The record is clear that the State executed the search warrant within the applicable
five day time frame. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue in that regard. In
the Defendant’s reply brief he indicates, without further argument, that he reiterates his
argument as stated in his brief. While unclear, he appears to be contending, as he did
below, that the issuance of the second search warrant was in error because the first warrant
contained false information in that it stated the cell phones were found on the Defendant’s
person when they were found in the motel room, and there was an insufficient nexus
between the Defendant and the cellphones. Before the trial court he also argued that the

                                              29
second search warrant contained misstatements of facts, in part because it said that Officer
Knoblock smelled marijuana, a fact that the officer denied at the previous hearing.

       “A search warrant can only be issued on probable cause, supported by affidavit,
naming or describing the person, and particularly describing the property, and the place to
be searched.” T.C.A. § 40-6-103; see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 41(c). Thus, “[a] sworn and
written affidavit containing allegations from which a magistrate may determine whether
probable cause exists is an ‘indispensable prerequisite’ to the issuance of a search warrant.”
State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 205 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 294).
“Probable cause has been defined as a reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by
circumstances indicative of an illegal act.” Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 294 (citation omitted).
To establish probable cause, the affidavit must show a nexus among the criminal activity,
the place to be searched, and the items to be seized. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 273
(Tenn. 2002); State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993). A defendant seeking to
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant bears the burden of establishing
by a preponderance of the evidence “the existence of a constitutional or statutory defect in
the search warrant or the search conducted pursuant to the warrant.” Henning, 975 S.W.2d
at 298. Determining the existence of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact
that we review de novo. State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283, 298 (Tenn. 2016).

       We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
the evidence found on the cellphones need not be suppressed. The phones were confiscated
from a motel room where the Defendant was located when law enforcement officers
arrived. Also in the motel room were large quantities of drugs. Phones, a communicative
device, are often used in an illegal drug sale operation. The affidavit in the first search
warrant incorrectly listed the location where the phones were found, and the ADA had an
officer correct the affidavit and resubmit that affidavit. As to the Defendant’s argument
about whether officers smelled marijuana, the officer explained that when the motel door
was closed he did not smell marijuana but that when it was opened he did. He said that his
testimony and his statements heard on the dash recording were not inconsistent. The
Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

                              D. Allegedly False Testimony

        The Defendant next contends that the State violated his due process rights by
intentionally allowing false testimony. He argues that, at trial, Ms. Hale made several false
statements during her testimony. He notes that she testified that the terms and conditions
of her sentence did not include that the State would dismiss the charge against her if she
testified against the Defendant. The Defendant asserts that her guilty plea agreement
includes that she “testify, continue cooperation with the District Attorney in Anthony
Gray.” He further asserts that her agreement includes that she testify truthfully and that
her case will be retired. The Defendant similarly contends that Ms. Myers, who represented

                                             30
Ms. Hale, also lied when she said that Ms. Hale did not receive preferential treatment in
exchange for her testimony.

       The State contends that this issue is waived because the Defendant failed to raise it
in his motion for new trial. In his reply brief, the Defendant concedes as much but asks us
to review this issue as it is necessary to do substantial justice because this evidence is
material to his case.

       As the State correctly notes, the Defendant did not raise this issue in the motion for
a new trial. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e). As explained above, plenary review is therefore
waived, and our consideration is limited to one for plain error. Id.; Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d
at 641-42.

       At trial, Ms. Hale said that her terms and conditions did not include that the State
would dismiss the charges against her if she testified. The Defendant cross-examined her
attorney, Ms. Myers, who also testified, and introduced the judgment form that showed
that a condition of Ms. Hale’s diversion agreement was that she testify and continue to
cooperate with the ADA in the Anthony Gray case. We find that Ms. Hale’s statement is
not wholly inaccurate. While her juridical diversion requires her to testify truthfully, there
is no proof that she was given judicial diversion solely based on her testifying. Further,
the Defendant cross-examined both witnesses, noted their biases, and submitted to the jury
Ms. Hale’s judicial diversion agreement. The jury therefore had the information from
which it could decide the credibility of the witnesses.

      We conclude that justice does not require us to review this issue, as it is not
necessary to do substantial justice. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

          E. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Sufficiency of Evidence

       The Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for
judgment of acquittal because the State failed to establish the elements of especially
aggravated kidnapping, in part because of the “inconsistent and false statements
presented.” He further contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction
for kidnapping. We will combine these issues, as our standard of review for each is the
same.

       Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 provides, in pertinent part:

       On defendant’s motion or its own initiative, the court shall order the entry of
       judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment,
       presentment, or information after the evidence on either side is closed if the
       evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.

                                             31
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 29(b). When considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, whether at
the close of the State’s proof or after the conclusion of all proof at trial, the trial court is
only concerned with the legal sufficiency of the evidence and not with the weight of the
evidence. State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 892 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Blanton, 926
S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995); State v. Hall, 656 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)). “This rule
empowers the trial judge to direct a judgment of acquittal when the evidence is insufficient
to warrant a conviction either at the time the state rests or at the conclusion of all the
evidence.” State v. James, 315 S.W.3d 440, 455 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Overturf v. State,
571 S.W.2d 837, 839 & n.2 (Tenn. 1978)). “The standard by which the trial court
determines a motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of all the proof is, in essence, the
same standard which applies on appeal in determining the sufficiency of the evidence after
a conviction.” State v. Thompson, 88 S.W.3d 611, 614-15 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

       Accordingly, we consider whether, after considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)
(emphasis in original); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775
(Tenn. 2004) (citing Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 276). This rule applies to findings of guilt based
upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and
circumstantial evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1999) (citing State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). In the
absence of direct evidence, a criminal offense may be established exclusively by
circumstantial evidence. Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn. 1973). “The jury
decides the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and ‘[t]he inferences to be drawn
from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury.’” State v. Rice, 184
S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tenn.
1958)). “The standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence] ‘is the same whether the
conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331
S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn.
2009)).

       In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this court should not re-weigh or
reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
Nor may this court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the
evidence. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Liakas v. State, 286
S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956)). “Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the
weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the
evidence are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn.
1997). “‘A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony
of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.’”

                                              32
State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978) (quoting State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d
474, 476 (Tenn. 1973)). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated the rationale for this rule:

       This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the
       jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their
       demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary
       instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given
       to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human
       atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a
       written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523,
527 (Tenn. 1963)). This court must afford the State the “‘strongest legitimate view of the
evidence’” contained in the record, as well as “‘all reasonable and legitimate inferences’”
that may be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d at 775 (quoting Smith, 24
S.W.3d at 279). Because a verdict of guilt against a defendant removes the presumption
of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal defendant bears the
burden of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.
State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000).

        In the case under submission, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when
it did not grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of especially aggravated
kidnapping. Especially aggravated kidnapping is false imprisonment, as defined in section
39-13-302, “[a]ccomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used or
fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon . . . .” T.C.A.
§ 39-13-305(a)(1) (2018). Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-302 defines false
imprisonment as occurring when, “A person . . . knowingly removes or confines another
unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with the other’s liberty.”

       The evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, proves
that Ms. Hale went to the motel room with the Defendant. While there, the two got into an
argument, and the Defendant produced a gun. By all accounts, Ms. Hale was crying during
this incident, a video of which was entered into evidence. The Defendant mentioned
playing Russian roulette, a game during which one can be shot and killed. The victim
grabbed the gun and threw it under a sink. She felt unable to leave until Mr. Ingraham
arrived, at which time she left and called her mother. We conclude that the trial court did
not err when it denied the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. The Defendant
highlights inconsistencies in Ms. Hale’s testimony, but the jury could have accredited her
testimony. Had the jury so done, it would have convicted the Defendant of this offense,
but, by it convicting him of the lesser-included offense of kidnapping, it clearly did not
accredit the testimony regarding the gun. The judge deciding a judgment of acquittal,
however, must determine whether there was sufficient evidence from which any rational

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trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
In this case the trial court did not err when it submitted this charge to the jury.

       The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction for the lesser-included offense of kidnapping. “Kidnapping is false
imprisonment as defined in § 39-13-302, under circumstances exposing the other person to
substantial risk of bodily injury.” T.C.A. § 39-13-303(a) (2018). As previously stated
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-302 defines false imprisonment as occurring
when, “[a] person . . . knowingly removes or confines another unlawfully so as to interfere
substantially with the other’s liberty.” The Defendant again takes issue with the
inconsistencies in Ms. Hale’s testimony and accuses the State of eliciting false testimony.
As we previously held, we do not think that Ms. Hale’s testimony was patently false, even
if inconsistent. Further, “[q]uestions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight
and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are
resolved by the trier of fact.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. The jury evaluated Ms. Hale’s
testimony and found some of it credible. It believed that the Defendant confined Ms. Hale
in the motel room, by holding her down physically and making her feel as if she could not
leave, and that his confinement exposed her to substantial risk of bodily injury. As we
have concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s denial of the
judgment of acquittal for especially aggravated kidnapping, that same evidence supports
the jury’s finding of the lesser-included offense. See State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d, 181 188
(Tenn. 2002) (holding that, “[i]n proving the greater offense the State necessarily has
proven the lesser offense because all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense are
included in the greater”). The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

                                F. Motion for New Trial

       Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion
for new trial. The Defendant again bases his argument on the testimony presented by Ms.
Hale and Officer Knoblock that he states is “false.” As we have previously stated, the
evidence presented by each witness was not “false,” even if inconsistent. Further,
“[q]uestions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the
evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of
fact.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied
the motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence.

                                      III. Conclusion

   Based on the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                              ____________________________________
                                                   ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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