Court Opinion

ID: 9492510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:42:51.363304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:20.465854
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part I because I agree that the insurers have no duty to defend KCOM against Heet’s negligence claim for “property damage” caused by the release of pollutants when KCOM’s contractor *965ruptured the underground storage tank. The pollution exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage under Coverage A.
However, I dissent from Part II because I do not agree that the insurers have a duty to defend KCOM against Heet’s trespass claim for “personal injury” caused by the same conduct. I agree with the district court’s analysis, and with the majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the issue, and would refuse to allow the insured to “recast a claim for property damage that is excluded under Coverage A as a claim for personal injury under Coverage B so as to circumvent an applicable pollution exclusion.” Op. at 962. For this reason, I would hold that the pollution exclusion bars coverage under Coverage B as well and affirm the judgment of the district court.
The language of the pollution exclusion is unambiguous. Even though the pollution exclusion does not expressly apply to Coverage B, these policies, when read as a whole, clearly exclude coverage for property damage caused by pollution. An ordinary person of average understanding, if purchasing insurance, could not have reasonably expected coverage for a property damage claim which is clearly excluded under the pollution exclusion simply by recharacterizing it as “a personal injury claim unburdened by a pollution exclusion clause.” Lakeside Non-Ferrous Metals, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Co., 172 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir.1999). Policy language should be interpreted to give effect to every part if possible. KCOM’s interpretation would effectively negate the pollution exclusion. “[I]t is hardly a fair reading of the policy to permit property and environmental claims, under the guise of ‘personal injury,’ where the pollution exclusion clearly protects the insurer from precisely such claims.” East Quincy Services District v. Continental Insurance Co., 864 F.Supp. 976, 981 (E.D.Cal.1994).