Court Opinion

ID: 9905520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:06.280618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.839134
License: Public Domain

J-S30032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: T.K.C., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: T.C., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 820 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered March 13, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0000055-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: T.C., A MINOR :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                   :            PENNSYLVANIA
                                   :
 APPEAL OF: T.C., FATHER           :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :       No. 821 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Decree Entered March 13, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000455-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.C., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: T.C., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 822 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered March 13, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0000326-2021
J-S30032-23

  IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.C., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: T.C., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 823 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered March 13, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-AP-0000454-2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                         FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2023

       T.C. (“Father”) appeals from the March 13, 2023 decrees granting the

petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to

involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his sons, T.C. a/k/a T.K.C.

(“T.K.C.”) (born September 2019), and S.C. a/k/a S.T.C. (“S.C.”) (born

December 2020) (collectively, “the Children”).1 Father further appeals from

the March 13, 2023 orders changing the Children’s permanency goals to

adoption. We affirm the decrees and dismiss the appeal of the orders as moot.

____________________________________________

1 By separate decrees of the same date, the Orphans’ court terminated the

parental rights of the Children’s mother, S.C. (“Mother”). Mother did not file
appeals and submitted a letter indicating no position as to Father’s appeals.
We refer to Mother and Father collectively herein as “Parents.”

By order dated and entered March 14, 2013, the court additionally terminated
the parental rights of any unknown father as to T.K.C., as there is no named
father on his birth certificate. No unknown father filed separate appeals or
was a participating party to the instant appeals.

                                           -2-
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      The family became known to DHS as a result of a child protective

services (“CPS”) report that four-week-old S.C. was brought, unresponsive,

to St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children (“St. Christopher’s”) the previous day

with evidence of shaken baby syndrome, including bleeding on the brain and

a skull fracture.    See N.T., 3/13/23, at 11-13, 27-28.        This report was

indicated against Father and Mother, and DHS ultimately determined it was

founded. See Exhibit DHS-7 (CPS Report); N.T., 3/13/23, at 11-13, 15-16,

28.

      Upon examining S.C. at the hospital, the doctors found that he suffered

the following injuries:

      1. Extensive bilateral mixed density extra-axial (subdural and
      subarachnoid) and parenchymal hemorrhages, cerebral edema
      and areas of ischemic injuries to the brain.

      2. Linear left parietal skull fracture with associated soft tissue
      swelling.

      3. Cervical ligamentous injury (C2-C5).

      4. Epidural hemorrhage to the thoracolumbar spinal canal (T11-
      L4).

      5. Rib fractures - multiple bilateral acute and healing posterior rib
      fractures.

      6. Left paraspinal musculature soft tissue edema/swelling.

      7. Possible pulmonary contusion/hemorrhage.

      8. Bilateral healing clavicle fractures.

      9. Classic metaphyseal lesion (CML) to the right proximal
      humerus.

                                      -3-
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     10. Classic metaphyseal lesion (CML) to the right and left
     proximal femurs.

     11. Cutaneous injuries to the neck (bilateral).

     12. Cutaneous injuries to the chest.

Exhibit DHS-10 (Child Protection Team Consultation Report) at 10-11

(punctuation added and numbering corrected); N.T. 3/13/23, at 11-13, 28-

30. DHS investigative social worker Tierra Dunn attempted to speak to Father

and Mother but both declined to speak or offer any explanation for S.C.’s

injuries. See N.T., 3/13/23, at 16, 19-20. Dr. Norrell Atkinson, an expert in

child abuse, examined S.C. upon his arrival at St. Christopher’s and found he

had twenty-four unexplained fractures, some of which had been inflicted ten

to fourteen days before, and some of which were new. See id. at 34. Dr.

Atkinson diagnosed S.C. as the victim of severe physical child abuse. See id.,

at 12, 37-38.

     The police arrested Parents       on charges of attempted murder,

conspiracy, endangering the welfare of children, recklessly endangering

another person, aggravated assault, and simple assault relating to S.C.’s

injuries. DHS obtained an order of protective custody (“OPC”) of T.K.C. in

January 2021, and of S.C. in March 2021, upon his discharge from the

hospital. See N.T. 3/13/23, at 17. T.K.C. was placed with his maternal great-

grandmother, and S.C. was placed in a medical group home; both remained

in those placements at the time of the termination proceeding two years later.

See N.T., 3/13/23, at 17, 22-23, 48-49, 65.      In January 2021, the court

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entered a one-year no-contact/stay-away order as to Parents.              See

Dependency Protective Order, 1/20/21; N.T., 3/13/23, at 24. Parents were

permitted one joint 30-minute virtual visit per week during that year. See

Shelter Care Order, 1/20/21. Father did not participate in the virtual visits.

See N.T., 3/13/23, at 63.

      The court adjudicated the Children dependent in June 2021, and

established permanency goals of reunification. See Orders of Adjudication

and Disposition, 6/8/21.     In the related criminal cases, stay-away orders

against Father were entered. See id.; N.T., 3/13/23, at 63. Those orders

remained in place at the time of the hearing on all of DHS’s petitions. See

Exhibits DHS-3 and DHS-4 (Dependency Dockets).

      In furtherance of the Children’s reunification with Parents, DHS

established a single case plan with objectives for Father focused on parenting,

anger management, and mental health. See N.T., 3/13/23, at 61. Father

completed both parenting and anger management courses in 2022 after the

filing of the termination petitions and engaged in medical management and

therapy. See id. at 61-63.

      In July 2022, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of

parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2),

(5), (8), and (b), as well as petitions to change the Children’s permanency

goals from reunification to adoption. The court established concurrent goals

of adoption in January 2023. See Permanency Review Orders, 1/10/23.

                                     -5-
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       In March 2023, the court held a hearing on DHS’s petitions to terminate

Father’s and Mother’s parental rights and change the Children’s goal to

adoption. The Children, who were three and two years old at the time, were

represented by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”), Maria D’Adamo, Esquire, whom

the court appointed in January 2020.2          Parents remained incarcerated at the

time of the hearing.       Father was present and represented by counsel but

presented no evidence. Mother appeared by telephone and testified on her

own behalf. See Exhibit DHS-5 (Certified Criminal Record); Exhibit DHS-6

(Criminal Docket); N.T., 3/13/23, at 11-13, 28, 49.3

____________________________________________

2 Because the Children’s preferences were incapable of ascertainment due to

their young age, we conclude that Attorney D’Adamo’s representation satisfied
the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) to protect the Children’s legal
interests and best interests. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092 (Pa. 2018)
(holding that “if the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment
because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict
between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests; as such, the
mandate of Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act is satisfied where the court
has appointed an attorney-guardian ad litem who represents the child’s best
interests during such proceedings”).

Attorney D’Adamo died during the pendency of these appeals. This Court
therefore vacated her appearance and directed the Orphans’ court to appoint
a new GAL within 30 days. This Court further ordered that the briefing
schedule be vacated and re-established upon the appointment of a new GAL.
The Orphans’ court appointed Robin Bannister, Esquire, and this Court re-
established a briefing schedule with a GAL brief due October 24, 2023.
Attorney Bannister has indicated she does not intend to file a brief. No party
has asserted that Attorney D’Adamo failed to represent Children’s interests at
the hearing effectively, and we discern no deficiency in that representation.
3 Mother had been sentenced to a period of three-and-one-half to seven years

of incarceration, plus a period of three years of probation, following her guilty
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -6-
J-S30032-23

       Dr. Atkinson testified at the hearing about a conversation she had with

Mother in person and Father via speakerphone. She testified S.C’s injuries

were inconsistent with Mother’s suggestion that her sixteen-month-old,

T.K.C., caused them, and Father offered no explanation for S.C.’s injuries

during the thirty-to-sixty-minute conversation. See id. at 30-31, 38, 40-41.

Dr. Atkinson also testified Mother said S.C. was fine when she put him down,

Mother asked Father to check on S.C. when he started crying, and when Father

retrieved S.C., he was unresponsive.             See id. at 42-43.    The evidence

established Parents were S.C.’s caregivers during the relevant time period,

and he was not in daycare. See id. at 45-46.

       Natasha Triplett (“Triplett”), a case manager for the Community

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”), testified at the hearing that S.C., who was then two

years old, was receiving speech services and being taught to swallow. See

N.T., 3/13/23, at 65. Triplett testified S.C. receives twenty-four-hour care

including early intervention services for occupational therapy, physical

therapy,    and    speech,    and    treatment    from   numerous    specialists   for

neurological, endocrinological, and visual issues. See id. Triplett testified

Mother asks about the Children, but Father failed to ask about them during

____________________________________________

plea to aggravated assault and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, as
well as endangering the welfare of children. See Exhibit DHS-5 (Certified
Criminal Record); N.T. 3/13/23, at 49-50; see also Exhibit DHS-8 (CPS
Investigation Report/CY-48). Father had not yet had his criminal trial. See
N.T., 3/13/23, at 49-51.

                                           -7-
J-S30032-23

his meetings with CUA. See id. at 53, 63. Triplett also testified that maternal

great-grandmother with whom T.K.C.’s is bonded meets all of his needs, S.C.

does not have a bond with Father, and it would be in the children’s best

interests to have Father’s parental rights terminated. See id. at 64-65.

       By decrees dated and entered March 13, 2023, the Orphans’ court

involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).     In addition, by separate

orders dated and entered March 13, 2023, the court changed the Children’s

permanency goals from reunification to adoption.

       Father filed timely notices of appeal and complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The Orphans’ court filed a responsive opinion.4

       On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Whether the [Orphans’] court committed reversible error when
       it involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights where such
       determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence
       under . . . 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8)?

       2. Whether the [Orphans’] court committed reversible error when
       it involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights without giving
       primary consideration to the effect that the termination would
       have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the
       child as required by . . . 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 8 (some capitalization added and punctuation corrected).5

____________________________________________

4 Father’s appeals were consolidated by this Court sua sponte in April 2023.

5 Although Father filed notices of appeal regarding the goal change orders, he

did not raise them is his statement of questions involved. We could find that
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
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       Father’s issues implicate the involuntary termination of parental rights.

Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs involuntary termination of

parental rights proceedings.        See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.   We review

involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion, which requires an

error of law or a showing of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice,

bias, or ill-will. See In re L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (citation

omitted). In applying this standard, an appellate court must accept the trial

court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if supported by the

record. See Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021); see also

In re C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021).           This standard “reflects the

deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand

across multiple hearings.” In re S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. 2012).

       In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a court must

balance the parent’s fundamental right “to make decisions concerning the

care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs

for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” See C.M., 255 A.3d at 358.

____________________________________________

Father has waived such challenges for failing to raise them in his statement of
questions involved portion of his brief. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462,
466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that issues not included in a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved are
waived). However, given our decision to affirm the court’s termination decree
disposition, Father’s challenges are moot. See In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616
(Pa. Super. 2002) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue
the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.”).

                                           -9-
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Termination of parental rights can have “significant and permanent

consequences for both the parent and child.”         L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591.

Pennsylvania law requires the moving party in a parental rights termination

case to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,

evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier

of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the

precise facts in issue.”    Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super.

2022). We remain mindful that “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the

custody and rearing of [his] child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill [his]

parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of

his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,

N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004). An abuse of discretion in this

context exists “only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id.

      Here, the Orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm the decree, we

need only agree with the court’s decision as to any one section of 2511(a),

along with section (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super.

2004) (en banc).      Accordingly, we analyze the court’s termination decree

pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

                                        - 10 -
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                                     ****

            (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
            neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
            to be without essential parental care, control or
            subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
            being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
            abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
            remedied by the parent.

                                     ****

         (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
         rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
         developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
         of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
         solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
         inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
         medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
         With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
         (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
         the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
         are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
         filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      To prove the application of subsection (a)(2), the party petitioning for

termination must establish: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,

neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3)

that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot and will not

be remedied. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super.

2021). Subsection (a)(2) emphasizes the child’s present and future needs,

not the parent’s refusal to perform their duties and thus “should not be read

to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong

                                     - 11 -
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continuous parental ties. . .. This is particularly so where disruption of

the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect

for reuniting it.”    In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Section 2511(a)(2) grounds are not

limited to affirmative misconduct; they may also include acts of refusal and

incapacity to perform parental duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104

(Pa. Super. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by In re K.T., 296 A.3d 1085,

1110 n.23 (Pa. 2023). We have long recognized that a parent is required to

make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full

parental responsibilities. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super.

2017).

      Our Supreme Court has, in its words, “definitively h[e]ld” that although

incarceration is not a “litmus test for termination,”

      [it] can be determinative of the question of whether a parent is
      capable of providing “essential parental care, control, or
      subsistence,” and the length of the remaining confinement can be
      considered as highly relevant to whether “the conditions and
      causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
      not be remedied by the parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for
      termination pursuant to [section 2511(a)(2)].

S.P., 47 A.3d at 830 (citation omitted). Further, with respect to no-contact

orders, in In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 896-97 (Pa. Super. 2014), this Court

concluded that a no-contact order is relevant to parental “incapacity.”

      On appeal, Father asserts that the Orphans’ court improperly relied on

his incarceration alone in terminating his parental rights. See Father’s Brief

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at 16-17. Specifically, Father asserts that he “has continually professed his

innocence since the incident occurred and at all times thereafter has

conducted himself with the intent of regaining custody of his children.” Id. at

17.

      The Orphans’ court found that criminal stay-away orders rendered

Father incapable of parenting the Children. In addition, the court found that

Father’s continued refusal and neglect caused the Children to be without

essential parental care and control. The Orphans’ court explained as follows:

      The evidence established that “incapacity” and “refusal” under
      2511(a)(2) existed given that Father failed to demonstrate a
      concrete desire or ability to care for the Children. Mother and
      Father lived together when S.C. was severely physically abused
      and deemed a near fatality at only four weeks old. Father listened
      on the phone while Mother spoke with Dr. Atkinson about S.C.’s
      injuries, but he failed to provide an explanation as to how S.C.
      received 24 fractures and was in life-threatening conditions.
      Father was criminal[ly] charged with [] attempted murder,
      criminal conspiracy, aggravated assault, endangering the welfare
      of children wherein the parent/guardian/other commits the
      offense, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another
      person. As a result of Father’s charges, a criminal stay away order
      was issued on behalf of the Children due to Father’s actions or
      inactions.

             Moreover, the evidence established that “neglect” existed
      given that Father has failed to concern himself with [the]
      Children’s medical, educational, and therapeutic needs. Father is
      unable to visit the Children or speak to [the] Children due to the
      stay away order and no-contact order issued on their behalf.
      Father has shown that he is unable to keep the Children safe and
      cannot explain how S.C. was injured. Throughout the life of this
      case, Father has not parented the Children . . .. Based on the
      foregoing, this [c]ourt found that competent evidence existed to
      justify the termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to
      section 2511(a)(2).

                                    - 13 -
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Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/25/23, at 18-19 (internal and record citations

omitted).

       A review of the record supports the Orphans’ court’s findings, and

refutes the assertion that the court relied solely on Father’s incarceration as

the basis for termination.        S.C. suffered serious, extensive, and repeated

injuries, determined to be severe child physical abuse, inflicted while in

Father’s and Mother’s primary care. See N.T., 3/13/23, at 37-38, 45; Exhibit

DHS-7 (CPS Report).6 Further, Father failed to offer an explanation for S.C.’s

injuries, or how S.C. went from crying to unresponsive when he looked in on

the child immediately prior to S.C.’s hospitalization. See Exhibit DHS-8; N.T.,

3/13/23, at 19-20, 30-31, 37, 42-43. The Orphans’ court’s conclusion is also

supported by the fact that according to the expert medical evidence, S.C.

suffered not only recent traumatic injury but repeated traumatic injury with

old and new injuries. It is reasonable to conclude Father would have been

aware of those old injuries, and his failure to act on them speaks to his inability

or unwillingness to protect S.C.          Further, although Father completed his

objectives aimed at reunification, see N.T., 3/13/23, at 61-63, 70, there was

evidence at the hearing to support the Orphans’ court’s conclusion Father

made no effort to find out about the children or overcome the limits on his

____________________________________________

6 Father had been subject to stay-away orders for nearly two years at the time

of the hearing. See Orders of Adjudication and Disposition, 6/8/21; N.T.,
3/13/23, at 63; see also Exhibits DHS-3 and DHS-4.

                                          - 14 -
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contact with them by, for instance, participating in the court-authorized

weekly virtual calls with them. See id. at 63 (testimony that Father he had

no contact with the Children and failed to inquire about them during meetings

with CUA).7 Based on the foregoing, we find evidence to support the Orphans’

court’s termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2)

because his abuse, neglect and refusal caused the Children to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for their physical or

mental well-being.       Further, the conditions and causes of his incapacity,

abuse, neglect and refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See S.C., 247 A.3d

at 1104; A.D., 93 A.3d at 897. As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot

be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary

to assume parenting responsibilities.              The court cannot and will not

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re R.J.S., 901 A.2d

502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

       Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to section

2511(a)(2), we next must determine whether termination was proper under

section 2511(b).       Section 2511(b) requires a separate consideration of

whether termination will meet the child’s needs and welfare. See Z.P., 994

A.2d at 1121. The Supreme Court has recently re-emphasized that pursuant

____________________________________________

7 We are unable to discern from the certified record the nature and frequency

of Father’s contact with CUA.

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to   section    2511(b)    courts    “shall     give   primary       consideration   to   the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. . ..

This of course requires the court to focus on the child and consider all three

categories of need and welfare.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105 (Pa. 2023). K.T.

specifically directs courts to “consider the matter from the child’s

perspective, placing [his] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and

welfare above concerns for the parent.” Id. (citation omitted; emphasis

added). The child’s emotional needs and welfare include intangibles, such as

love, comfort, security, and stability.          See T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa.

2013).8

       When it considers the parental bond, the court must examine whether

termination of parental rights “will destroy a necessary and beneficial

relationship,    thereby     causing    a      child   to   suffer     extreme   emotional

consequences”. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1110 (quotation marks and original case

citation omitted). That focus enables a court to properly prioritize the child’s

needs:

       [B]y evaluating the impact of severance to determine if it will
       impose more than an adverse or detrimental impact, courts
____________________________________________

8 Courts considering an involuntary termination petition “must keep the ticking

clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number of
years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development
quickly.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1108 (citation omitted; emphasis in original)
(also noting that T.S.M. advised courts to move toward an alternative
permanent home when it is clear the parent will be unable to provide for the
child’s basic needs in the near future, so as not to impair the bond with pre-
adoptive parents).

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      correctly refine their focus on the child’s development and mental
      and emotional health rather than considering only the child’s
      “feelings” or “affection” for the parent, which even badly abused
      and neglected children will retain.

Id. The subsection (b) inquiry must consider not only the parental bond, if

any, but also the child’s need for permanency, the length of time in foster

care, whether the child is in a foster home and bonded with foster parents,

and whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs, including intangible ones. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1106.

      Father argues that a bond does exist with the Children and cites the fact

that T.K.C. still asked about Father as late as 2023. See Father’s Brief at 18-

19.

      In concluding that termination of Father’s parental rights best serves

the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

pursuant to section 2511(b), the Orphans’ court emphasized its contact with

the case since its inception and its sense of the progress of the case. See

N.T., 3/13/23, at 88. The court stated:

      In the instant matter, this court determined the Children would
      not suffer irreparable emotional harm if Father’s parental rights
      were terminated. There was compelling testimony that the
      Children would not suffer harm if Father’s parental rights were
      terminated and that T.K.C. was significantly bonded with his
      great-grandmother. Father has been in contact with CUA for the
      purposes of completing his single case plan objectives but has
      failed to contact CUA for updates on the Children. The testimony
      demonstrated that T.K.C.’s primary bond is with his maternal
      great-grandmother. S.C. is still recovering from his life-
      threatening injuries, but he receives consistent visits from his
      paternal grandmother. Additionally, the testimony demonstrated
      that T.K.C.’s foster mother meets all of his educational, medical

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       and emotional needs and S.C.’s needs are being met by the
       medical group home. In determining that termination would best
       serve the needs and welfare of the Children, this court considered
       that Father has not been able to meet the Children’s emotional,
       physical, and developmental needs for over one year prior to the
       termination hearing.    For the foregoing reasons, this court
       properly granted DHS’s petition to involuntarily terminate Father's
       parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b).

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/25/23, at 22-23 (some capitalization changed and

record citations omitted).

       We perceive no error in the Orphans’ court’s determination.         Triplett

opined that the Children would not suffer irreparable harm from Father’s rights

being terminated and changing permanency goals to adoption would be in

their best interests. See N.T., 3/23/23, at 64-65. Although T.K.C. knows

who Mother and Father are and has their photos in his bedroom, Triplett

testified that Father does not have a parent-child relationship with either

child.9   Id. at 63-64, 71.        Triplett explained, “There has been a lack of

meaningful contact over the life of the case.” Id. at 64. She further stated

T.K.C.’s maternal great-grandmother was a pre-adoptive resource, and

“[T.K.C.] depends on his current caregiver for all of his needs to be met. He

is bonded to his maternal great[-]grandmother.”         Id.   at 59, 64.   Triplett

further testified that S.C., then two years old, remained in the same medical

group home where he receives twenty-four-hour care.                  Id. at 65.

____________________________________________

9 Triplett was unable to estimate the date that T.K.C. last asked about Father

but stated that it was possibly in 2023. N.T., 3/13/23, at 71. She was not
asked and did not testify as to the frequency of T.K.C.’s inquiries.

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Significantly, the Children were sixteen months old and three months old,

respectively, at the time of placement. See N.T., 3/13/23, at 48. They had

been in care for twenty-six months and twenty-four months, respectively, at

the time of the hearing without contact with, or inquiry by, Father. See id.

at 63.

         Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the Orphans’ court’s

best interests determination. Considered from the appropriate perspective,

the Children’s, termination of Father’s parental rights best served the

Children. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. Even if there had been evidence that

the Children were bonded to Father – and there was not – termination would

still be the proper result. As this Court has recognized, “concluding a child

has a beneficial bond with a parent simply because the child harbors affection

for the parent is not only dangerous, it is logically unsound.” In re K.K.R.-

S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (also stating that “it is the rare child

who, after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through the

emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent”). The record supports

the finding that the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs

and welfare favor termination of parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b).

See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

         Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decrees terminating Father’s

parental rights and dismiss as moot Father’s challenges to the orders changing

the Children’s permanency goals to adoption.

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     Decrees affirmed. Orders dismissed as moot.

Date: 11/28/2023

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