Court Opinion

ID: 9546954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:38:29.811737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:05.123409
License: Public Domain

PlERRON, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The “mode-of-operation” rule earnestly suggested by the majority is a clear departure from previous case law of this State.
“[We] have often stated the duty of a proprietor toward a business invitee. He is not an insurer of the safety of his business invitee and the mere fact the latter slips and falls upon foreign material present on the floor of a retail *726establishment does not raise an inference of negligence (Relahan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 145 Kan. 884, 67 P.2d 538).
“In Knowles v. Klase, 204 Kan. 156, 460 P.2d 444, we iterated these guidelines:
‘A proprietor must use ordinary care to keep those portions of the premises which can be expected to be used by business invitees in a reasonably safe condition. If an unsafe condition is created by the proprietor or those for whom he is responsible, or if it is traceable to their actions, proof of notice of the condition is unnecessary. When a dangerous condition is neither created by the proprietor or those for whom he is responsible, nor traceable to their actions, proof of negligence with respect to .a floor condition requires some showing they had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. A proprietor may be charged with constructive notice of the condition if the condition existed for such length of time that the proprietor, his agents or employees should have known of it in the exercise of ordinary care.’ (p. 157.)
“Our recent case of Elrod v. Walls, Inc., 205 Kan. 808, 473 P.2d 12, involved a slip and fall in a supermarket. Plaintiff there fell on a lettuce leaf in a produce aisle in which other debris was observable. The condition of the lettuce leaf was variously described in such a manner as to indicate the length of time it had been on the floor. In affirming recovery for the plaintiff we emphasized the duty of a proprietor engaged in a particular type of selling thus:
‘When greens are sold from open bins on a self-service basis, there is the likelihood that some will fall or be dropped to the floor and if the operator chooses to sell in this way, he must do what is reasonably necessary to protect the customer from the risk of injury that mode of operation is likely to generate.
‘Vigilance of a storekeeper in keeping his floor clean must be commensurate with the risk involved.’ (Syl. ¶ ¶ 4, 5.)” Carter v. Food Center, Inc., 207 Kan. 332, 335-36, 485 P.2d 306 (1971).
In other words, to prove fault in a classic “slip and fall” case occasioned by something having been dropped on the floor of a business, the plaintiff must establish it was there due to the negligence of the defendant; it had been there for such a time that constructive notice is presumed; or there had been actual notice to the defendant of its presence.
The reason for the rule is obvious. Negligence for such occurrences is not presumed. Due to the kinds of merchandise available and the size and normal operating procedures of many mercantile establishments, it is not reasonable to demand and expect completely litter-free floors at all times. Actual negligence *727by the defendant in either dropping it or failing to pick it up must be shown.
Although the majority presents a reasoned argument for what I would argue is an expansion of tort liability in this state, such change, if it is to be made, must come from the legislature or our Supreme Court.
The distinction suggested as a basis for this decision — that the failure to keep avocado juice drinkers confined to one part of the store created an unusually dangerous condition — is one without a difference. The real issue is still whether the defendant had active or constructive notice of the litter. This is true whether the plaintiff slips on avocado juice, a grape, or a lettuce leaf.
Adoption of this “mode-of-operation” rule would effectively overrule the bright line approach we have long followed as set out in Carter and numerous other cases for determining negligence in cases of this sort.
The Little case does offer some support for the majority position. A close reading of Little, however, reveals a fact situation where an independent business operating in the store caused an unusual risk. In any event, the approach suggested by Little, which may be an aberration from. Kansas law before and since, has generated no progeny in the last 30 years and should be restricted to its peculiar facts.
I would affirm the judgment of the able trial judge.