Court Opinion

ID: 9687770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:47:35.042379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:31.686920
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Justice
(dissenting):
The plaintiffs seek declaratory relief as to their rights as employees of the City Fire Department in their dealings with the city governing body.
From the judgment rendered, plaintiffs appeal and argue two assignments of error, to wit:
"ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
“1. The Court erred in not including in its judgment rendered herein declaring the rights, status and other legal relations between the parties in this cause the following declaration:
“That a written agreement relative to salaries and other conditions of employment of Decatur Fire Department Employees, between the City of Decatur and the Decatur Fire Fighters Association, as representative of said employees, is legally permissible where the agreement is terminable at will by the City of Decatur and is subject to the continuing legislative discretion of the City of Decatur. (Tr. 55-61).
“ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER SIX
“6. For that the Trial Court erred in failing to find, rule, adjudge, decree and declare to what extent the law of Alabama limits the right of the City of *60Decatur to enter into written agreements with the Decatur Firefighters Association, as representative of Decatur Fire Department employees, regarding salaries and conditions of employment of said employees. (Tr. 55-61).”
I agree with the majority that plaintiffs’ assignments 1 and 6 are not sustained.
Defendants have cross assigned errors. Cross assignment No. 3 recites as follows:
“ ‘3. The trial court erred in finding, determining and declaring as a part of the final judgment in said cause, that part of Paragraph 8 thereof which reads as follows :
“ ‘8. Petitioners and the defendants may enter into a written memorandum of proposals and plans relative to wages and working conditions, their respective opinion and intentions concerning the same if it is agreeable to both parties that they do so; .’ (Transcript Page 61).’”
In the opinion of the trial court, at the end of Paragraph 8, the following words appear in addition to the words set out in cross assignment No. 3, to wit:
“ . . . but, neither the petitioners nor the defendants are compelled to enter into such written memorandum.”
The following definition of memorandum is found in Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition 1951, pages 1135, 1136:
“MEMORANDUM. Lat. To be remembered; be it remembered. A formal word with which the body of a record in the court of king’s bench anciently commenced. Townsh. PL 486 ; 2 Tidd, Pr. 719.
“Also an informal note or instrument embodying something that the parties desire to fix in memory by the aid of written evidence, or that is to serve as the basis of a future formal contract or deed. Plott v. Kittelson, 58 N.D. 881, 228 N.W. 217, 221.
“This word is used in the statute of frauds as the designation of the written agreement, or note or evidence thereof, which must exist in order to bind the parties in the cases provided. The memorandum must be such as to disclose the parties, the nature and substance of the contract, the consideration and promise, and be signed by the party to be bound or his authorized agent. See 2 Kent. Comm. 510; Des Brisay v. Foss, 264 Mass. 102, 162 N.E. 4, 6.”
In 1964, in International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 321 v. Water Works Board, 276 Ala. 462, 163 So.2d 619, this court held that a public employer, such as the defendants, has no authority to engage in collective bargaining or enter into collective bargaining contracts without specific legislation authorizing the public employer to do so. The following is an excerpt from the opinion:
“The rule stated by the annotator in 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 at page 1170 seems to be the rule of the majority, and supported by well reasoned cases:
“ ‘Public employers cannot abdicate or bargain away their continuing legislative discretion and are therefore not authorized to enter into collective bargaining agreements with public employee labor unions. Constitutional and statutory provisions granting the right to private industry to bargain collectively do not confer such right on public employers and employees.’
“The opinions of the Alabama Attorneys General are likewise without conflict to the effect that state, county, and municipal agencies of this State are without legal authority to negotiate or to enter into collective bargaining agreements with labor unions. See Attorney General Reports, April-June, 1941, p. 55; . . In the April 10, 1941 opinion of the Attorney General of Alabama, su*61pra, it appears that the President of the County Board of Revenue of Gadsden, Alabama presented an inquiry to the Attorney General as to whether or not said Board of Revenue ‘may legally enter into a contract or agreement with a labor organization * * * as a bargaining agent for county employees with respect to hours of employment, wages, etc.’ The opinion of the Attorney General was as follows:
“ ‘It is my opinion that your inquiry must be answered negatively.
“ ‘ . . . The beneficial results of cooperative action on the part of labor generally is apparent. But the question raised by your inquiry does not involve the power or authority of the employee class. Solely presented is the right of a county, a mere political subdivision of the State (First National Bank v. Jackson County, 227 Ala. 448, 150 So. 690; Pickens County v. Williams, 229 Ala. 250, 156 So. 548; Moore v. Walker County, 236 Ala. 688, 185 So. 175) — an agency of limited jurisdiction having only those powers expressly authorized by statute or necessarily implied therefrom (Corning v. Patton, 236 Ala. 354, 182 So. 39) — to enter into a contract, the ultimate effect of which might be to remove the control of the government from the people as a whole, acting through their duly constituted officials.

“‘. . .’

“Thus the public agencies of Alabama have long been advised, without conflict, that matters of wages, hours, and conditions of employment never have been, and cannot become, a matter of collective bargaining and contract in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority and of course such administrative rulings having been in force and effect for many years, are highly persuasive authority of the correctness of the rule. . .”
276 Ala. 464, 465, 163 So.2d at 621, 622
As it appears to me, the declaration in the instant case in Paragraph 8 of the judgment, that the city governing body (the defendants) “ . . . may enter into a written memorandum of proposals and plans relative to wages and working conditions, their respective opinion and intentions concerning the same . . . ” (Emphasis Supplied), is a declaration that the parties may bargain as to wages and working conditions and “may enter into” an agreement concerning the same “if it is agreeable to both parties that they do so.” Plaintiffs argue that the declaration in Paragraph 8 is now authorized by a statute enacted in 1967 which recites as follows:
“Section 2. All firefighters serving the state or any municipality in the state either as paid firemen or as volunteer firefighters who comply with the provisions of this Act are assured the right and freedom of association, self-organization, and the right to join or to continue as members of any employee or labor organization which complies with this Act, and shall have the right to present proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment by representatives of their own choosing. No such person shall be discharged or discriminated against because of his exercise of such right, nor shall any person or group of persons, directly or indirectly, by intimidation or coercion, compel or attempt to compel any firefighter or fireman to join or refrain from joining a labor organization.” Act No. 229, 1967 Acts, page 598, approved August 16, 1967; see Pocket Parts, 1958 Recompiled Code, Title 37, § 450(3).
The statute provides that firefighters are assured of the right and freedom of association, self-organization, to be members of any labor organization which complies with the statute, and to present proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment by representatives of their own choosing. Nowhere in the quoted statute is authority granted to any municipality, or its governing body, to engage in *62collective bargaining as to salaries or conditions of employment, or to “enter into” a written memorandum relative to wages and working conditions. In fact, the statute does not grant any authority of any kind to a city or its governing body. Since no express power is granted to the municipality, there can be no implication that any implied power is reasonable or necessary to enable the exercise by the city or any power expressly granted.
In International Union, supra, this court quoted with approval from an opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in Miami Water Works Local No. 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So.2d 194, 165 A.L.R. 967, as follows:
“ ‘The City of Miami is a governmental entity created by the state. It derives its powers and jurisdiction from the sovereign authority. It is limited to the exercise of such powers as are expressly granted to it by the state, or as are necessarily and fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. * * * It is a public institution designed to promote the common interests of the inhabitants in their organized capacity as a local government. Its objects are governmental, not commercial. * * * It has no authority to enter into negotiations with the labor union, or any other organized group, concerning hours, wages, or conditions of employment * * *” (276 Ala. at 464, 163 So.2d at 621)
Assuring or granting to firefighters the rights of freedom of association, of organization and membership in unions, and to present proposals relative to conditions of employment, is not a grant to the governing body of a city of the right to engage in collective bargaining with the representatives of employees of the city or to “enter into” a written memorandum as to conditions of employment. No grant of such authority to the city may properly be implied from the statute as I understand it.
In the absence of the grant of such authority to the defendants, the declarations of Paragraph 8 of the judgment appear to me to be directly in conflict with the holding of this court in International Union, supra. Being of the opinion that the statute relied on does not grant such authority to defendants, I would hold that the declaration in Paragraph 8 of the judgment appealed from is erroneous and would reverse the judgment in this respect.
MERRILL, J., concurs.