Court Opinion

ID: 9786673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:00:32.406861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:47.476076
License: Public Domain

HALL, Pi’esiding Judge,
dissenting.
¶ 24 When sentenced in 2003 after pleading guilty to possessing a dangerous drug for sale, a class 2 felony, Defendant was placed on intensive probation for five years, and ordei’ed to pay a fine of $5400 (including applicable surchai’ges) and perfoi’m community sexvice at the i’ate of foi’ty houi’s per month.7 As Defendant was nearing the end of his five-year probationary temí, an Apache County pi’obation officer filed a petition for termination of px’obation requesting that his “probation be terminated unsuccessful” because he “has not been in compliance with the tex-ms and conditions of probation.” The petition noted Defendant was “delinquent 245 hours of Community Restitution[8] and $6660 in Court oi’dei’ed Fines/Fees.”9
¶ 25 The State objected to the petition and filed a petition to x’evoke Defendant’s probation based on the delinquencies. After the petition to x’evoke was filed on September 4, 2008 but before a pre-revocation hearing *517scheduled for November 3, Defendant made a $3000 payment towards the outstanding fines/fees. Based on Defendant’s admissions at the hearing, the trial court found that Defendant violated his probation by not completing the required hours of community service and failing to pay the full amount of the fines/fees. Following this hearing, but before disposition proceeded on December 8, Defendant paid an additional $1200.
¶ 26 At the disposition hearing, the State acknowledged the substantial payments Defendant made after the petition to revoke had been filed but requested that his period of probation be extended so he could be supervised until the remaining balance was paid.10 The court, after commenting that “I’m not certain that there’s anything that probation can assist you with at this point in time to complete any rehabilitative process!,]” discharged Defendant from probation as “unsuccessfully terminate[d]” and directed that a judgment be entered against Defendant for the unpaid balance of the fines/ fees. Believing such a disposition to be unauthorized, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 27 Defendant’s violations do not set him apart from many other probationers found in violation of probation for nonpayment of fines/fees. Nor is Defendant unlike other probationers who make minimal payments towards court-ordered financial obligations until faced with the possible imposition of severe sanctions. Furthermore, as the majority notes, A.R.S. § 13-901(E) vests substantial discretion in the trial court to terminate a defendant’s probation before the originally imposed period expires if the court believes that “the ends of justice will be served and if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants it.” However, A.R.S. § 13-901(E) does not authorize a trial court to grant early release to a defendant whose performance while on probation has been unsatisfactory. See State v. Moore, 149 Ariz. 176, 177, 717 P.2d 480, 481 (App.1986) (“The trial court does not have authority to terminate a probation as unsuccessfully completed.”).11 The performance of a defendant who made practically no payments towards his court-ordered financial obligations over a period of five years but found the wherewithal to do so only after a petition to revoke his probation was filed can hardly be characterized as satisfactory.
¶ 28 But the key question here is whether a trial court may discharge a defendant from probation after finding that he violated it. Rule 27.8(c)(2) provides: “Upon a determination that a violation of a condition or regulation of probation occurred, the court may revoke, modify or continue probation.” The majority, relying on the general permissive meaning of the word “may,” holds that the listed alternatives are not exclusive; therefore a trial court also acts within its discretion when it releases a probation violator from probation. I disagree.
¶ 29 The use of the word “may” in a rule or statute does not always imply an unlimited discretion. Rather, “[t]he word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion. This common-sense principle of statutory construction is by no means invariable, however, and can be defeated by indications of legislative intent to the contrary or by obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute.” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983). See also Frye v. S. Phoenix Volunteer Fire Co., 71 Ariz. 163, 167, 224 P.2d 651, 654 (1950) (meaning of “may” as mandatory or permissive depends on legislative intent); see also United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir.1970) (“While it is true in construction of statutes, and presumably also in the construction of federal rules, that the word ‘may’ as opposed to ‘shall’ is indicative of discretion or a choice between two or more *518alternatives, the context in which the word appears must be the controlling factor.”). Indeed, the word “may” is used elsewhere in Arizona’s criminal procedure rules as a restrictive term. See Rule 2.1 (“Misdemeanor actions may be commenced in Superior Court by indictment, or by information filed directly in Superior Court.”); Rule 7.5(a) (stating that “the court ... may issue a warrant or summons ... to secure [a] defendant’s presence in court”).
¶ 30 The evident purpose of Rule 27.8(c)(2) is to limit the court’s discretion at disposition by requiring it to choose between one of three authorized courses of action. If the supreme court had intended that a trial court actually have the option of discharging a defendant found to have violated a condition or regulation of probation, it certainly would have said so rather than leave it as an unspoken fourth option. Given the lack of a clear directive from the supreme court, I am unable to agree that Rule 27.8(c)(2) should be read in conjunction with A.R.S. § 13-901(E) to authorize the discharge of a probationer who has willfully violated probation by failing to meet his court-ordered obligations. Doing so sends the wrong message that probationers may not be held accountable if they fail to take their probation obligations seriously and will tend to lessen public confidence in the judiciary.

. Defendant's monthly community service requirement was reduced to eight hours after he was placed on standard probation.

. In 2005, the legislature substituted the term "community restitution" for "community service." 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 187, § 15 (1st Reg. Sess.).

. According to a probation worksheet filed with the petition, Defendant still owed $4292 of the $5400 fine. The additional amount was attributable to other unpaid assessments and fees totaling $2368.

. The maximum period of probation for a class 2 felony is seven years. A.R.S. § 13-902(A)(1) (2001). Therefore, Defendant's period of probation could have been increased by up to two years.

. According to the worksheet accompanying the probation officer's petition. Defendant’s probation expiration date was September 13, 2008. Thus, Defendant's probation was terminated nine days early. See A.R.S. § 13-903(D) (2001) (running of period of probation ceases from filing of petition to revoke to termination of revocation proceedings if defendant is found in violation of probation).