Court Opinion

ID: 9645002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:10:04.929744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:17.235275
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
The City of Pleasant Grove is a small municipal corporation in Alabama which is a suburb of the City of Birmingham. At times here relevant it had a population of 7,086, all of whom were white citizens except for one Oriental and 32 blacks who live in two nursing homes and require 24 hour-a-day supervision. There are no black voters in Pleasant Grove. This case involves primarily the annexation of the Western Addition, a large tract of completely vacant land that is contiguous to the western boundary of the City. The 1969 annexation of the much smaller Glasgow Addition, inhabited only by the white citizens of the Glasgow family, is also involved in this case. Despite the absence of any affirmative duty under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act for an electoral district to improve the position of minority voters or to reduce the strength of a majority, my colleagues decide that these annexations violate the Voting Rights Act because the City Council did not subsequently annex an area south of the City that is inhabited completely by black citizens. The majority have thus in effect denied preclearance of the annexation of both the Western and Glasgow Additions. While Pleasant Grove has a history of past racially discriminatory conduct, in my opinion subject annexations do not violate the Voting Rights Act. Pleasant Grove, moreover, has clearly met its burden by showing an economic justification for the annexation of the Western Addition.
I.
The Western Addition is a tract of completely vacant land contiguous to the western boundary of Pleasant Grove. The City of Pleasant Grove owns 50 acres of the land and the Mead Corporation and Gary H. Dobbs, Sr. owns the remainder, estimated from the map at approximately 389 acres. In the latter part of 1978, these owners contacted the mayor of Pleasant Grove and requested annexation of the Western Addition to Pleasant Grove. The *789proposal came before the Municipal Council on February 5, 1979. On that date the Council adopted a resolution, four to one (abstention), annexing the Western Addition. Since the Western Addition was completely vacant land with no residents, and thus no person would be made a resident of Pleasant Grove without an opportunity to vote on the issue, the local state senator introduced legislation in the Alabama legislature to formalize the annexation. The bill was advertised in local newspapers in February and March 1979.1
Shortly thereafter, some residents of nearby West Smithfield Manor2 (“Smith-field”) filed a petition jointly with some citizens of the adjacent “Five Acre Road” area (collectively “petitioners”) requesting annexation to Pleasant Grove. Petitioners’ areas are inhabited completely by black citizens. The petitioners’ request came before the Council on May 7, 1979, and was referred to a committee. The Smithfield petitioners explained that they sought annexation to Pleasant Grove because, according to the newspapers, Pleasant Grove was withdrawing their free fire protection. The continuation of paramedic services was also in doubt. At a meeting of the Pleasant Grove Council on June 18, 1979, however, the Council voted to continue providing free fire protection to Smithfield, and later paramedic services were also continued. The Council took no further action on petitioners’ request for annexation.
The Attorney General denied preclearance for the annexation of the Western Addition because the predominantly black Smithfield and the Five Acre Road areas had not been annexed by Pleasant Grove. Pleasant Grove subsequently brought in this court an action under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982), seeking a declaratory judgment that the annexation of the vacant land in the Western Addition did “not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color____”
Pleasant Grove later amended its complaint, pursuant to order of this court, to include the much smaller annexation 10 years before, in 1969, of the Glasgow Addition, which had not previously been approved. The Glasgow Addition is contiguous to Pleasant Grove on its northern boundary and, according to measurement of the map, comprises an area of slightly less than 40 acres. In 1969 the area contained four houses all belonging to the Glasgow family. Two houses have since been added. The population was 14 in 1969 and is currently 20; all are members of the Glasgow family, and are white. Otherwise the area is completely devoid of inhabitants.
Initially this court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 568 F.Supp. 1455 (D.D.C.1988), and the matter then came on for hearing on the merits. The majority today holds that the City’s proposed annexation violates the Voting Rights Act. Although the City of Pleasant Grove has a history of racial discrimination in other respects, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the City has violated the Voting Rights Act by subject annexations. A violation of the Act requires a “den[ial] or abridgement] of voting rights on account of race or color.” Incapable of finding any such effect, the majority finds a violation based on past racial discrimination in respects other than voting and on bare speculative future illegal discrimination in other respects that arguably would result in speculative dilution. As is demonstrated below, however, this conclusion is based on a number of assumptions that in truth are not supported by the record or by reason.
II.
As stated above, the annexed 430 acre Western Addition is completely uninhabited *790and the Glasgow Addition was practically uninhabited. Yet the majority opinion makes numerous references to the Western and Glasgow Additions as being “inhabited by whites.”3 There is not a single person, however, white or black, living in the large 430 acre area covered by the Western Addition, and the much smaller Glasgow Addition includes members of one family only—the Glasgows. But this mischaracterization of the facts is necessary to support the fallacious theory of my colleagues that these areas should be treated as being inhabited solely by white citizens because Pleasant Grove, through the years, has managed to remain all white in part by following racially discriminatory practices. The majority “therefore treats the annexation of vacant land exactly as if that land were already inhabited exclusively by whites. The majority thus treats its speculation as to the future development of the Western Addition to Pleasant Grove as a fact upon which a Voting Rights Act violation can be predicated.4
The majority is apparently persuaded by the government’s assertion that the uninhabited areas should be treated as “white” areas. The weakness in the government’s-evidence, however, is apparent in its response to the plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories, which indicates that the government refused to approve the annexation of the Western Addition and Glasgow areas because “said land was annexed for the express purpose of residential construction, which houses will be occupied by white persons. ” As indicated above, the italicized statement is completely speculative. The government points to the fact that the other annexations have generally developed with completely white populations. However, there is absolutely no way to guarantee, much less safely predict, that newly annexed areas will be occupied exclusively by white citizens or by black citizens. Even if the annexed areas become generally white, this will not necessary be the result of illegal discrimination. The majority, however, writes as if the City has an affirmative duty to pursue an annexation policy which will result in a higher proportion of voting blacks within the City. But the existence of such a duty has been explicitly denied by the Supreme Court in its interpretation of the Voting Rights Act. See discussion infra. Whenever land in the Western Addition is available for purchase, there is always the possibility that it will be bought by a black citizen.
My colleagues further state:
The Court [meaning the majority opinion on the motion] further decided that a political entity may not annex adjacent white areas while applying a wholly different standard to adjacent black areas and failing to annex them based upon that discriminatory standard. 568 F.Supp. at 1460.
Maj.Op. at 783. They contend that this statement from the prior majority decision states the law of the case. But it is not *791the law of the case because it is based on facts that are not the facts of this case. The true facts here bring into play uninhabited and black inhabited areas—not white and black inhabited areas.5
My colleagues spell out numerous racially discriminatory practices by Pleasant Grove over the last 45 years. These practices include racial discrimination in zoning and hiring, racial steering in the housing market, school segregation and discriminatory annexation. While some are overstated and recognize no adverse or ameliorative explanation, the allegations of substantial historical racial discrimination are generally accurate. The majority has some reason to conclude that Pleasant Grove has successfully excluded black citizens from becoming residents and from practically all facets of its local life. The court, relying upon Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624-26, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3279-80, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982) (discrimination in at-large voting), and Busbee v. Smith, 549 F.Supp. 494, 516-17 (D.D.C.1982), aff'd, 459 U.S. 1166, 103 S.Ct. 809, 74 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1983) (reapportionment of congressional districts splitting composite black area to minimize possibility of electing a black candidate), however, goes further and concludes that such historic discrimination in other respects validly evidences the discriminatory purpose required under the Voting Rights Act to justify denying preclearance of annexations. This last step is unwarranted and misconstrues the law of discriminatory purpose.
The discriminatory “purpose” which is required by decisions in the voting rights cases is a purpose related to voting.6 No such relation exists here. Rogers, relied on by the majority, involved the maintenance of an at-large system of electing county commissioners that was neutral in origin, but which was being maintained for discriminatory purposes. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 626-27, 102 S.Ct. at 3280-81. It did not in any way involve the speculation that some act, such as annexation, would eventually result in the denial or abridgement of minority voting strength. Busbee, on which the majority also relies, emphasized that discriminatory purpose alone would taint a voting change. But Busbee involved an actual voting change—the reapportionment of congressional districts involving actual voters. In this case, since the land is vacant, there is no voting change. If there is *792no concrete voting change at issue, there can be no “voting change” taken with a purpose of discriminating, see Busbee, 549 F.Supp. at 516 (emphasis added), and thus no violation of the Voting Rights Act, even one based on “purpose” alone.
In its denial of the City’s motion for summary judgment, the majority virtually conceded that because of the peculiar facts of Pleasant Grove—the complete absence of blacks in the City and the annexed areas—the annexations could not conceivably have any discriminatory effect. See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 568 F.Supp. 1455, 1458 (D.D.C.1983). It defies all reason and common sense to attribute to a governmental entity the purpose to achieve something that cannot conceivably be achieved, particularly when it is so obviously impossible that the voting rights of any black citizen could be adversely affected. Under the majority’s approach, the statutory concept of “purpose” is stretched entirely out of proportion, to the point of becoming a mere legal fiction: where a municipality had a history of racial discrimination, the majority seems to say that “purpose” to impair the voting rights of blacks can be presumed by an annexation of completely vacant land.
In my view the plaintiffs have demonstrated that the annexations do not “have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color____” Section 5 supra (emphasis added). Annexations pose problems slightly different than the ordinary Voting Rights Act case. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F.Supp. 1021 (D.D.C.1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962, 93 S.Ct. 1441, 35 L.Ed.2d 698 (1973); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 45 L.Ed.2d 245 (1975).
In City of Petersburg we were confronted with a substantial dilution of the voting strength of black citizens. Petersburg covered an eight square mile area with a population of 36, 103, and it annexed fourteen square miles of adjacent area containing 7,323 persons. Before the annexation Petersburg was 55% black and 45% white; after the annexation Petersburg was 54% white and 46% black. This represented an almost complete reversal in racial proportion—a substantial dilution. We approved the annexation on the grounds that it was conducive to the orderly development of Petersburg but, in order to ameliorate the substantial dilution of the black vote, we imposed the condition that Petersburg switch from an at-large to a ward system of electing the members of the council. The Supreme Court affirmed, 410 U.S. 962, and in City of Richmond stated that “Petersburg was correctly decided.” 422 U.S. at 370.
City of Richmond was followed by Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976), which held that “the purpose of § 5 has always been to ensure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the'position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” 425 U.S. at 141, 96 S.Ct. at 1364. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 103 S.Ct. 998, 74 L.Ed.2d 863 (1983), another Voting Rights Act case from a three-judge court of this district, followed. In Lockhart, Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson stated in dissent that “the voting strength of Lock-hart’s minorities, whether or not enhanced, [has not been] diminished one whit.” 559 F.Supp. 581, 595 (D.D.C.1981). In siding with the dissent, the Supreme Court found that “[t]he District Court erred in finding that the continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on minority voting strength.” 460 U.S. at 135,103 S.Ct. at 1004. The Court also stated that while “there may have been no improvement in [the] voting strength [of minorities] there has been no retrogression either,” and therefore “[a]pplying the standards of Beer v. United States” the Court ruled that “the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.” Id. at *793135-36, 103 S.Ct. at 1004. The result of the annexations here is practically identical—the annexation of the Western Addition and the Glasgow Addition will not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color of a single individual.
As stated above, however, the majority contends that the annexations in this case constitute a violation of the Voting Rights Act because Pleasant Grove cannot escape its history of numerous acts of racial discrimination extending all the way back to 1940 and beyond. In my view this conclusion is based on highly speculative reasoning and assumptions. Moreover, in my opinion, there is no violation of the Voting Rights Act here, since there is no showing of any retrogession in any respect in the Voting Rights of any minority by the speculative conclusion that such discrimination is “likely” to arise in the future. My colleagues are indulging in an unreasonable expansion of the Voting Rights Act. This is the first case I can find and none have been called to our attention where objection is raised to annexation of an uninhabited area by a municipality with no black voters. I would therefore approve the annexations, and to alleviate the speculative fears stemming from the historic racial discrimination, I would, as a condition to approving the annexations, enjoin the City of Pleasant Grove from taking any action affecting the Western and Glasgow Additions that would constitute any form of racial discrimination.7
It may be in the years ahead that the development of the Western Addition will turn out like the rest of Pleasant Grove and become exclusively or substantially occupied by white citizens. This could be accomplished by completely normal and legal activity. However, if black citizens want to move into the area, they have a constitutionally protected right to do so. If Pleasant Grove takes any discriminatory action based on race or color, it could be redressed under the injunction.
III.
Not only is the government’s contention that the Western Addition assuredly will develop all white occupancy essentially speculative, but both annexations may also be justified in terms of the City’s fiscal structure. The City points out that uninhabited land is open to development, and once developed will create a new market for municipal water and gas, thus producing substantial municipal income. On the other hand, the areas that the majority faults Pleasant Grove for not annexing are substantially inhabited, and are thus void prospects for producing potential municipal income from its most beneficial source. Revenue from taxes would merely be a standoff for services rendered.
The majority’s decision focuses on, inter alia, the economics of the various annexation decisions. The government pointed out that the City’s decisions not to annex petitioners and Dolomite (another area inhabited by black citizens) were not preceded by any comprehensive study, and argues that some of the figures subsequently produced by City officials distort the true comparative picture of costs and benefits to Pleasant Grove of annexing the black citizens’ areas, as opposed to the Western Addition. The majority largely follows the government in this approach. The City does not contest the absence of any formal economic analysis prior to its annexation decisions, and now concedes that some of the cost figures (those for the fire department and for streets and sanitation) were inaccurate. Plaintiff’s Reply Brief at 10.
The record, however, is in truth largely inconclusive on the comparative per capita costs to Pleasant Grove of providing vital services to the respective areas in question. Only as to police services was there any indication that petitioners might be more expensive, and the crime data was incomplete. Nonetheless, there is one very good fiscal reason that Pleasant Grove should *794prefer annexation of the Western Addition to that of the petitioners—and indeed prefer annexing any undeveloped area to most inhabited developed neighborhoods. The following statement, based on deposition and exhibits, sums up the City’s financial situation:
The City of Pleasant Grove derives most of its revenue, not from taxes or the other usual impositions of city governments, but from the sale of water and natural gas. The City, through its Utilities Board, is the distributor of water and natural gas for the area of Alabama which surrounds it. [Mays Affidavit, para. 3]. In the year ending September 30, 1980, Pleasant Grove’s “Total revenues and transfers” were $1,382,193. [Exhibit C to Attachment 3 to the Mays Affidavit]. “Revenues” contributed only $499,341 of this amount. $882,852 came from “Transfers from other funds.” Of that $882,852, $871,852 was transferred from the Utilities Board of the City of Pleasant Grove____ “Revenues” provided only 28% of Pleasant Grove’s expenditures in the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980.
[H]owever, not all items under “Revenues” could be expected to increase in approximate proportion to population if Pleasant Grove were to annex [petitioners]____ [T]he items of revenue which would grow proportionately with annexation total only $255,404, which is only 14% of “Total expenditures and transfers” for 1980. [Mays Affidavit, para. 4].
Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 10-11 (emphasis added). According to the deposi- • tion of the City’s clerk and treasurer, Sarah Mays, the updated figure for revenues that should increase proportionately to population is 23%. Mays Deposition at 12. The government nowhere contests the accuracy of these figures as a basic outline of the municipality’s finances.
The City’s heavy reliance on profits from the distribution of water and natural gas to the surrounding vicinity provides a powerful reason alone for aversion to annexation of already populated areas. Absent a complete restructuring of the fiscal system, revenues (taxes) from an already developed area could not possibly even approach the costs of services. In effect, the City would be subsidizing such an inhabited area—sharing the profit generated from water and gas distribution sold to new markets in newly annexed areas to pay for the services required in the already developed areas. Undeveloped areas, by contrast, may be expected to pay for the services they require by generating development fees, rather than tapping into the profits the City gains by selling gas and water. The exact levels of costs for services are entirely immaterial in this respect. This ability of Pleasant Grove to raise net revenue from the sale of water and gas alone provides a complete and presumably legitimate explanation for the failure of Pleasant Grove to annex the substantially developed areas of petitioners and Dolomite, and for preferring to annex the completely undeveloped Western Addition and the practically undeveloped Glasgow addition.
The only areas which could sensibly be annexed are those which remain undeveloped—i.e., still capable of yielding substantial development fees (for building permits). According to the affidavit of Mays and exhibits thereto, the City also relies to some significant degree on development fees as a source of revenue. Mays Affidavit, 11 5. In good years, the City’s receipts of development fees equal or exceed the total of revenues derived from such sources as sales, income, and property taxes. This suggests that the majority is incorrect in suggesting that if the sales, income, and property taxes of the petitioners’ areas were taken into account, it would be fiscally desirable to annex them. See Maj.Op. at 786. If the development of the Western Addition would produce a major potential source of such development fees, the City is thoroughly justified in desiring to annex the area which has that potential. The financial potential of the 1979 annexation is clearly distinguishable from the other situations, and constitutes a persuasive *795nonracial basis for the City’s decision to prefer annexation of the Western Addition.
The majority attempts to undercut the figures submitted by Pleasant Grove, pointing out that no prior studies were made. That, however, does not sully the present figures. Moreover, Pleasant Grove is a small town of slightly over 7,000 persons, and councilmen in such municipalities are traditionally close to the costs and benefits of a small municipal operation. They may not need the extensive studies of larger cities nor should this court require them. It is just plain common sense that Pleasant Grove would profit more from developing areas where they will have a new market for a profitable activity than from annexing areas that are already serviced.
The existence of these persuasive, nonracial purposes for the annexations of the Western and Glasgow Additions negates the inference based solely on speculative assumptions from historic discrimination policies. This is especially true in this case, where the finding of a racial purpose by the majority is little more than a presumption of discriminatory purpose inferred from the City’s history of racial discrimination. Historic racial discrimination can be a strong indication of discriminatory purpose, City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 362, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 2299, 45 L.Ed.2d 245 (1975), in cases where voting rights of actual resident citizens are involved, but this annexation of vacant land is not connected to voting and does not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color. For these reasons, I cannot join the majority in their conclusion that the evidence proves that the annexations were arranged to advance a discriminatory purpose that is violative of the Voting Rights Act. On the contrary, the City has provided adequate fiscal reasons for its annexation of the Western and Glasgow Additions, and enjoining the municipality from any racially discriminatory action in the annexed areas will ensure that voting rights, and other civil rights, are not denied in contravention of the Constitution and statutes of the United States.

. The bill was signed by the Governor on July 17, 1979.

. The name of West Smithfield Manor was changed to Pleasant Grove Highlands after its petition for annexation was filed. There were approximately 80 black families in the Highlands. See Defendant’s Statement of Genuine Issues at 3.

. In footnote 5 my colleagues state "while the Western Addition is undeveloped, its location and the city’s plans indicate that it is likely to be developed for use by white persons only” (emphasis added). Nevertheless, my colleagues continue to state that the annexations are white areas. They reason illogically that if it is likely to be developed it must be treated as a white area. The majority assumes that the City will lawlessly participate in the segregated development of the Western Addition. While I recognize that the City has acted previously in a racially discriminatory fashion, I am unwilling to fully join the majority’s assumption as to the City’s future conduct. Moreover, if the City does discriminate on the basis of race or color in developing the Western Addition, federal redress would be available by an action under the Fourteenth Amendment or the more appropriate Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1982). However, since the majority’s fears are based on historical practices, I would issue an injunction under the Voting Rights Act. See discussion infra.

. It must be kept in mind that the City’s refusal to approve the annexation requests of the Smithfield, Five Acre Road, and Dolomite areas is not at issue in this action. On the authority of Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976), it is clear that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to the refusal to alter electoral procedures. Thus the City’s failure to annex these areas is not properly before the court, although the majority seems unaware of this point. See Maj. Op. at 784.

. The 40 acre Glasgow Addition differs from the Western Addition insofar as it was inhabited by 14 white citizens at the time of annexation, in contrast to the 430 acres of completely vacant land in the Western Addition. However, the fact remains that the Glasgow Addition is a forty-acre parcel populated by members of a single extended family, albeit a white family. In addition, the record shows that annexation of the Glasgow Addition was approved as a personal favor to the Glasgow family, a reason not foreign to the action of city councils in small towns. While the majority may look askance at municipal decisions based on such factors, I am unprepared to say that the Glasgow decision was made for the "purpose or will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). Such effect is in no way demonstrated. Even if the presence of the Glasgow family were to cause a different result, the annexation of the Western Addition should still be approved. Since the Western Addition poses the primary problem here, this opinion is generally directed at the issue raised by its annexation.

. The statute itself indicates that a discriminatory purpose must be related in some way to voting: "Whenever a [jurisdiction covered by the Voting Rights Act] shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting ... such [jurisdiction] may institute an action ... for a declaratory judgment that such qualification [etc.] does not have the purpose ... of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color____” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 45 L.Ed.2d 245 (1975), which held that annexation decisions may in some instances be subject to review under the preclearance procedures of section 5, is not to the contrary. In Richmond the proposed annexation had a direct and substantial bearing on the electoral position of the city’s black voters, whereas the proposed annexation in this case will not affect the position of minority voters, either by dilution or exclusion. To include all annexation decisions within the Voting Rights Act would not only hamper municipal decision-making, but would detract from the Act’s central purpose of assuring that minority voters are free to exercise their constitutionally protected suffrage rights.

. I also rely on my opinion in City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 568 F.Supp. at 1460-64 (1983).