Court Opinion

ID: 9628055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:06:13.824134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:37.518810
License: Public Domain

Dimmick, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur with the result the majority reached in the matter of the marriage of Mary Jane and Ralph E. Little. I dissent from the result the majority reached in the matter of Nancy C. and Ronald S. Zinter.
The majority in this case has held that failure to settle ancillary matters at the time the decree of dissolution is rendered does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the parties, or the subject matter, or of the power to render a decree of dissolution. The validity of decrees which have previously been entered is not affected, as only a procedural error was made which may be waived. Majority, at 197-98. It necessarily follows that the parties may also waive that procedural requirement in the future. If this be the case, I see no reason not to treat all petitioners the same and allow each one to present to the court reasons why it is desirable for their decree to be entered while reserving such matters as property distribution to a later time. The majority holds this cannot be done over the objection of one of the parties.
I respectfully disagree and maintain the plain language of the present statute allows this result. The majority based its decision on case law construing a prior statute. The holding in State v. Bird, 95 Wn.2d 83, 622 P.2d 1262 (1980) substantiates my position that in the absence of language to the contrary the courts have authority to take discretionary action. Bird, at 89.
The present statute, RCW 26.09.030, provides that "when ninety days have elapsed" and if the parties agree "the marriage is irretrievably broken" (as is the case before us), "the court shall enter a decree of dissolution." (Italics mine.) Disposition of property is not a condition precedent. RCW 26.09.050 provides that "the court shall consider . . . *200disposition of property" (italics mine) in entering a decree. It would appear the court can consider and decide to delay ancillary proceedings in its discretion.
The reasons for granting bifurcated decrees to agreeing parties remains the same for any petitioner; that is, permitting the parties to file tax returns as single individuals, terminating property rights under a community property agreement, clarifying the legal status of the parties in dealing with debtors and creditors, allowing the parties to acquire property and rebuild their lives independent of each other and permitting the parties to remarry. Therefore, when, as here, a respondent resists the entry of such a decree, that party should come forward with some reason. I opine the court has the discretion to consider the reasons advanced by the nonagreeing party to see if merit for the delay exists, or if vindictiveness or possible property settlement advantage is really the basis.
Obviously, there may be cases where the court may wish to decide all ancillary matters at one time and it clearly has that authority, in which case an early trial date should be set. In most counties, dissolution matters can be heard within a reasonable time after the 90 days, so there would be no reason for two court appearances as would be required by bifurcation. However, in King County, the Zinter matter had been set for trial almost 2 years after the filing and after both parties had indicated the marriage was irretrievably broken. Such a delay is not within the contemplation of the legislative intent for no-fault speedy termination of marriages.
Likewise, the contention that dire consequences would result if all matters were not decided at one time overlooks the fact that since the act was passed in 1973, various courts have been following the procedure of bifurcation and not one example has been cited to this court that justifies that ominous prediction.
Since In re Marriage of Hermsen, 27 Wn. App. 318, 617 P.2d 462 (1980), was decided, the King County Superior Court has set out uniform discretionary procedure for *201bifurcation and, likewise, none of the parties have cited one instance of a disastrous result. This approach is practical. When the stress of drawn-out court proceedings is relieved by entry of the decree, the result may well be an amicable property settlement agreement, which was also contemplated by the statute. RCW 26.09.070.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals and remand the matter to the trial court for the exercise of its discretion.
Brachtenbach, C.J., and Utter and Hicks, JJ., concur with Dimmick, J.