Court Opinion

ID: 2715204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-08-06 17:19:48.77413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:38.023261
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                                                                                                 o
                                                                                               coo
                                                                                               —tc:
                                                                                   -iT"        5;^o
IN RE DETENTION OF D.S.                         NO. 69768-4-1                      3C          rn
                                                                                                 * —4
                                                                                   3S»             o
                                                                                   ^a          o-n
                                                                                               Tl  "T;
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                                                   _H>

                                                DIVISION ONE                                   ^-3>—
                                                                                   -J          3£t»{~
                                                                                               i> -o pi
                                                                                   3»          ^CPa
                     Respondent,                                                    rr         -*" ^"

                                                                                               ^C
                                                                                    oo
                                                                                       •   •
                                                                                                ct<-"
                                                                                                —168 Wash. App. 621, 625-30, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). Alternatively, our Supreme
Court has long considered clarification of the involuntary treatment statutes a matter of
continuing and substantial public interest. See In re Pet, of C.W.. 147 Wash. 2d 259, 270,
53 P.3d 979 (2002); In re Pet, of Swanson, 115 Wash. 2d 21, 25, 804 P.2d 1 (1990).
Either of these grounds provides sufficient justification to address the merits.
       The sole issue is whether the trial court violated PS's statutory and due process

right to present evidence. PS claims, "The superior court violated the respondent's due
process and statutory rights to present evidence on his own behalf atthe hearing on the
State's 14-day involuntary commitment petition." Br. of Appellant at 1. He argues, "The
 14-day commitment order should be reversed and the petition dismissed." Br. of
Appellant at 11. We review issues of statutory interpretation, alleged errors of law, and
                                            -4-
69768-4-1/5

alleged due process violations de novo.2 In re Pet, of Fair, 167 Wash. 2d 357, 362, 219
P.3d 89 (2009): State v. R.G.P., 175 Wash. App. 131, 136, 302 P.3d 885 (2013).

       Under RCW 71.05.240(1), "If a petition is filed for fourteen day involuntary

treatment or ninety days of less restrictive alternative treatment, the court shall hold a

probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours of the initial detention of such person

as determined in RCW 71.05.180." PS does not expressly challenge the State's

compliance with the 72-hour requirement—nor could he, since the probable cause
hearing indisputably commenced before the 72-hour deadline passed. See Swanson,
115Wn.2d at 28-31 (court satisfies 72-hour requirement if the court calendar begins
and the parties are ready to proceed before the 72-hour deadline expires).
       PS contends that the court forced him to make a "Hobson's choice" between his

right to present evidence under RCW 71.05.360(5) and the right to a hearing within 72
hours of initial detention under RCW 71.05.240(1). For this point, he relies on State v.

Michielli, 132 Wash. 2d 229, 937 P.2d 587 (1997), and State v. Brooks, 149 Wash. App. 373,
203 P.3d 397 (2009). Neither case controls. Michielli involved dismissal of criminal
charges under CrR 8.3(b). Brooks involved CrR 8.3(b) dismissal based on allegations
of government mismanagement and discovery violations.
       PS also relies on CW and Swanson to argue that dismissal is warranted when

involuntary commitment requirements are disregarded. Neither case controls. PS
identifies no statute that requires the court to complete the probable cause hearing

      2The State argues an abuse of discretion standard ofreview applies. PS does
not address the proper standard of review. Given our discussion below, the State
prevails under either an abuse of discretion standard of review or the less deferential de
novo standard of review.
69768-4-1/6

within RCW 71.05.240's 72-hour requirement. We conclude no statutory violation

occurred.

      The record also undisputedly shows that OS's chronic pain "defense" was not

disputed by the State witnesses. Indeed, Pr. Thomas's medical opinion on this point
supported PS's complaints about his chronic pain. PS also testified repeatedly about

his chronic pain.

       In addition, defense counsel made no offer of proof as to what evidence PS

would provide if allowed additional time. By this point, the court had observed PS while
he testified extensively about his chronic pain and other details. The court expressed
concern that PS's testimony hurt his case.

       The court also allowed defense counsel an additional four minutes or more to

wrap up PS's testimony.3 Instead of using this time, counsel decided not to elicit further
testimony from PS. Pefense counsel asked the court "to finish today and have a ruling
today." RPat42.

       We also note the well-accepted principle that "[t]rial courts have the inherent

authority to control and manage their calendars, proceedings, and parties." State v.
Gassman, 175Wn.2d 208, 211, 283 P.3d 1113(2012). Our Supreme Court has noted

the need for control is especially vital in the involuntary treatment context:
              We are also aware of the need to avoid placing the impossible burden on
       the trial court of predicting how long any given calendar will last or exactly when
       a particular case will be heard. As [the State] said at oral argument, there are
       numerous ways in which the calendar's time restraints are buffeted by the mental
       instability of the individuals appearing before the court. By its very nature, the
       calendar is unpredictable. It is easy to visualize a circumstance where a single

       3The court also offered to resume the hearing on the next available date of
 January 2, 2013.
                                           -6-
69768-4-1/7

      disruptive patient could cause a significant delay in the hearing process. Thus,
      even if the court were to do its best to arrange the order of cases to reflect the
      expiration times, there would be no guaranty that the schedule would move
      forward according to plan.

Swanson, 115 Wash. 2d at 29. This case aptly illustrates this observation.

       Finally, we are unpersuaded by OS's due process challenge. He provides no

controlling authority and offers no specific due process analysis. This claim fails.
See Palmer v. Jensen, 81 Wash. App. 148, 153, 913 P.2d 413 (1996) ("Passing treatment

of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.").

       For the reasons discussed above, we affirm.4

WE CONCUR:

                                                             *y^      ^

       4 Even if we assume a statutory or due process violation on this record, any
alleged error is harmless.
                                            -7-