Court Opinion

ID: 9692423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:53:49.676938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:34.423705
License: Public Domain

SCOTT BRISTER, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I disagree with the Court that admission of the contested evidence in this case was error. Sometimes the rules of evidence require us to say “Pay no attention to that sawed-off shotgun within easy reach.” Normally, we should hesitate to do so, both because we are not the ones who must face the consequences of a mistake, and because it may interfere with jurors’ expectations.1 But because the Court finds this alleged error to be harmless, I concur in its judgment.

The Relevance to the Charge

I disagree that appellant did not contest possession in this case. He did not plead guilty, nor did he stipulate to a single element of the prosecution’s case. Defense counsel’s statement during voir dire that appellant did not contest the possession charge was not evidence, and did not relieve the State of its burden of proof. See Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 26 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (reiterating that statements made in voir dire are not evidence); Tex.CRIm. PROc.Code art. 1.15 (requiring State to produce evidence on each element in felony guilty pleas); see also Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 883 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (finding extraneous offense evidence admissible to meet State’s burden of proof despite defendant’s insanity defense). Nor could appellant’s testimony limit the *356State’s evidence, as his concession came after the contested evidence was offered during the State’s case-in-chief.
At the end of the trial, the court charged the jury to decide whether appellant was guilty of possession of cocaine.2 The jury was instructed to acquit if consent to search or any element of the possession charge was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The challenged evidence was certainly relevant to the latter.
Appellant’s possession of the shotgun was admissible to prove he knew the cocaine was illicit, and knowingly possessed it. See, e.g., Johnigan v. State, 69 S.W.3d 749, 755-56 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2002, pet. ref'd) (finding possession of gun relevant to show control and dominion over cocaine); Hawkins v. State, 871 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, no pet.) (same); Levario v. State, 964 S.W.2d 290, 296-97 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.) (finding evidence of handgun admissible to show defendant’s willingness to protect narcotics). The presence of the shotgun and marijuana is also admissible to prove appellant’s knowledge of and control over the cocaine. See Hyett v. State, 58 S.W.3d 826, 830 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. refd) (listing presence of other contraband as “affirmative link” from which to infer knowledge and control); Levario, 964 S.W.2d at 295 (considering presence of marijuana in sufficiency review); see also Moore v. State, 983 S.W.2d 15, 21 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (finding previous drug activity admissible to prove identity). Alternatively, given the connection in time and location between the shotgun and the cocaine, this evidence was admissible as same-transaction contextual evidence. See Malone v. State, 849 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1993, no pet.) (holding handgun found in search of car after arrest was relevant' res gestae evidence); United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 211 (5th Cir.1981) (finding pistols were “inextricably intertwined” with rest of offense); State v. Rodriguez, 781 So.2d 640, 645 (La.Ct.App.2001) (finding gun was relevant to provide narrative completeness).
Evidence does not become irrelevant merely because it could be proved some other way, such as by an admission by the defendant. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179, 117 S.Ct. 644, 649, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). Nor does it become irrelevant just because it is undisputed. Id. A defendant cannot avoid the full force of the facts by selectively stipulating to some of the evidence. Id. at 186-87, 117 S.Ct. 644. The prosecution must prove its case, and may do so even if the defendant would prefer a more antiseptic version. See United States v. Hill, 249 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir.2001) (admitting extraneous evidence of intent despite offer to stipulate); see also United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1213 (10th Cir.2001).
It is true a defendant may force the State to stipulate to jurisdictional facts unrelated to the facts of the alleged crime, if the probative value is outweighed by potential prejudice. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190, 117 S.Ct. at 654-55 (holding that in prosecution of felon for possessing a firearm, government was required to accept stipulation of felon’s status rather than offer proof of nature of prior felony); Robles v. State, 85 S.W.3d 211 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (holding that in prosecution for third or subsequent DWI, State was required to accept stipulation that defendant had two prior convictions rather than offer proof of prior convictions). But this case involved neither proof of jurisdictional *357facts nor a defendant’s offer of a stipulation. Thus, I would hold the evidence was relevant and admissible.

The Relevance to Consent

Even if the only issue in the case had been consent to the search, I believe the challenged evidence was still admissible. Appellant signed a written statement at the scene that included several excuses for what occurred — blaming the presence of crack cocaine on his uncontrollable drug addiction, stating that he did not know the car under investigation had been reported stolen, and asserting the gun under the bed belonged to “a Mend.” But as the prosecutor argued throughout the case, appellant mentioned nothing in the statement about improper entry of the room. Although defense counsel argued this omission was because appellant was “not a lawyer,” appellant admitted he had gained rather extensive personal knowledge of criminal law and police procedures from his prior experiences with the justice system, and did not lock the motel room door because he knew the police could not enter without a warrant. Excluding all references to the shotgun (including appellant’s excuses) would have weakened the State’s argument that appellant did not mention unauthorized entry into the room in his statement because he made it up later.
Second, the State’s offer of appellant’s entire statement bore on the credibility of the police. The statement was signed by appellant but written out by one of the police officers. Admission of appellant’s statement with all its exculpatory explanations (including his denial that the shotgun was his) was relevant to show the police were telling the truth, not that appellant was lying.
Further, throughout the trial the defense sought to portray the police as men who would do anything to get access to the motel room. The police testified they sought entry only for Ms. Peters’s privacy and their own safety. Defense counsel questioned whether they really believed it was better to interview Ms. Peters in the motel room rather than outside, or at the police station. On this question, the presence of the hidden shotgun gave vivid confirmation to the officer’s testimony that routine precautions precluded standing outside an occupied motel room without knowing who or what might be inside.
Finally, defense counsel opened the door to the challenged evidence by offering proof that a can and razor blade were found in the room, and suggesting that the crack cocaine was for personal use, not sale.3 Although appellant was not charged with distribution, apparently his counsel offered this evidence (though not directly relevant) to make sure the jurors did not assume otherwise. In these circumstances, the State should be allowed to offer the presence of gun, which might suggest some activity other than recreational use. See Menefee v. State, 928 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, no pet.) (finding presence of pistol probative of whether defendant was conducting narcotics operation).

Harmless Error and the Final Argument

Our respected dissenting colleague would hold the trial court’s admission of this evidence was not harmless because it was used for the sole purpose of damaging appellant’s credibility. As shown above, I do not believe that was the case. Moreover, I agree with the Court that it likely *358had no effect on the verdict. Appellant admitted three prior felony convictions: unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, auto theft, and burglary of motor vehicle. He also volunteered a recent conviction for misdemeanor marijuana possession. His wife admitted prior convictions for forgery and possession of a controlled substance. Appellant also admitted he was under the influence of narcotics when the occurrence took place, and was trying to dispose of the 25 to 30 rocks of crack cocaine when the officers “burst” into the room. In sum, there were many uncontested reasons to doubt the Peters’s testimony besides the presence of marijuana and a shotgun.
The prosecutor did mention these matters in closing argument, but only in response to an argument by appellant’s counsel. In his closing, defense counsel argued the jury could sustain his constitutional claim without fear of harm to the community because “my client is not going anywhere because the parole board will still have jurisdiction over him.” In response, the prosecutor pointed out appellant admitted possessing and using crack cocaine, marijuana, the shotgun gun, and alcohol — all of which were violations of his conditions of parole. Given the defense argument, I believe it only fair for the State to respond that supervision by the parole board had little effect on appellant’s behavior in the past.
For these reasons, I join the Court in affirming the trial court’s judgment.

. "If suddenly the prosecution presents some occurrence in the series [of its proof] differently, as by announcing a stipulation or admission, the effect may be like saying, ‘never mind what’s behind the door,’ and jurors may well wonder what they are being kept from knowing. A party seemingly responsible for cloaking something has reason for apprehension, and the prosecution with its burden of proof may prudently demur at a defense request to interrupt the flow of evidence telling the story in the usual way.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189, 117 S.Ct. 644, 654, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997).

. In fact, the only narrowing of issues in the charge was the admonition to the jury to "restrict your deliberations solely to the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant.”

. There was conflicting testimony whether the amount of cocaine found was very large (thus suggesting intent to sell) or rather ordinary (thus suggesting only personal use).