Court Opinion

ID: 9663628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:45:39.29304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:53.893375
License: Public Domain

HANSON, Judge
(dissenting).
An application for modification of child custody is addressed to the sound and broad discretion of the trial court and its discretion should not be disturbed on appeal unless the record reflects a clear abuse of that discretion. No abuse of discretion whatsoever is evident in this case and I am, therefore, unable to concur in a reversal.
According to SDC 14.0724 the trial court is vested with continuing authority before or after judgment to "give such direction for the custody, care, and education of the children of the marriage as may seem necessary or proper, and may at any time vacate or modify the same." This and its' companion section 14.0726 were "adopted for the purpose of enabling the court to make such modifications or changes in its decree or orders relating to alimony, or the support and maintenance of minor children, from time to time, as the circumstances of the parties might require, and they should therefore receive a liberal construction in furtherance of justice." Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 6 S.D. 348, 61 N.W. 42.
The above statute does not require "a change of circumstances" as a condition precedent to modification of child custody. This requirement has been grafted unto our statute by judicial interpretation in order to prevent vexatious and repetitious applications for changes in child custody matters. However, the doctrine of res adjudicata is absolutely contrary to the spirit of our law which gives a trial court continuing jurisdiction in child custody cases to give such direction for their custody, care, and education as may be necessary or proper at any time. As a matter of expediency there must be some degree of finality in ordinary child custody orders and decrees, but the doctrine of res adjudicata should never be exalted, as it is being done in this case, above and beyond the best interests and welfare of the child. At all times a trial court should have the power, *155authority, and freedom to correct an inadvertent order respecting custody of a minor child. See Annotation in 9 A.L.R.2d 623.
In construing a statute similar to ours the California court in Dotsch v. Grimes, 75 Cal.App.2d 418, 171 P.2d 506 said "If, as it has been repeatedly held, the welfare and best interest of the child are the paramount concern of the court, then what governs is not the rule of 'changed circumstances,' but what at the time of the hearing is, in the sound discretion of the court, for the child's welfare." See also Briscoe v. Briscoe, 221 Cal.App.2d 668, 34 Cal. Rptr. 663, Harris v. Harris, 186 Cal.App.2d 788, 9 Cal.Rptr. 300, and Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719, 68 P.2d 719. When the welfare of the child demands a modification the changed circumstance does not have to be substantial in nature. This is illustrated by the case of Gonyea v. Gonyea, 232 Or. 367, 375 P.2d 808, in which the court said the "mere putting into operation of a decree may in some cases qualify as a change of circumstances". See also cases cited in Annotation in 92 A.L.R.2d p. 737.
In the present case, the weekly visitation provision providing for delivery of the child at the property line of the grandparents proved to be an ill conceived, unworkable and unfortunate order. It has been the source of constant contention between the parties provoking public quarrels, bickering and hostility. To gain her end defendant falsely accused plaintiff of sexually molesting the child. Certainly the conduct of the parties and the hostile, belligerent, antagonistic and uncooperative atmosphere to which the child is now being subjected demands a change in the custodial order so that the parents will not come in constant contact with each other.
There is another ground upon which the trial court's modified order can and should be sustained. The child custody provision in the final decree which the majority of this court reinstates was based on stipulation of the parties. It was not the result of a hearing or court determination as to what would be for the best interest of the child. Under these circumstances, the reason for the rule of res adjudicata does not exist and should not apply. As the Wisconsin court said in King v. King, 25 Wis.2d *156550, 131 N.W.2d 357, "Since custody of the children was granted upon the stipulation of the parties without testimony being taken on the issue and no finding of fitness was made, the court's determination is not res judicata nor does the rule of changed circumstances apply".
In my opinion there are ample facts and circumstances subsequent to the final decree constituting changed circumstances warranting a modification of the child custody order in this case and the best interest and welfare of the child demand it.