Court Opinion

ID: 9476735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:03:46.799687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:28.609240
License: Public Domain

GEE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the Court’s opinion and judgment, although — were I writing upon a clean slate — I would not. Chief Judge Roney, of the Eleventh Circuit, expresses my views exactly:
The district court noted that because the EEOC received the claim within the 300-day period, “it would appear, at first glance, that Plaintiff ... had filed a timely charge of race discrimination with EEOC.” 595 F.Supp. 148 at 150. The court then held, however, that because the state had a 180-day limitation period for bringing discrimination complaints, and because plaintiff did not file within that period, the extended 300-day filing period did not apply.
It seems to us that a sound argument can be made to support the district court's decision. The whole purpose of deferral of federal action is to ensure that a state or local agency will have priority in answering a claim, by giving “state agencies an opportunity to redress the evil at which the federal legislation was aimed, and to avoid federal intervention unless its need was demonstrated.” Mokasco Corp. v. Silver, 447, U.S. 807, 821, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2494, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980).
To require the institution of proceedings with a state or local agency with authority to grant relief as a condition to getting the extended 300 days, but not require plaintiff to institute those proceedings within the state’s limitation period, defeats the purpose of deferral. Obviously, filing an untimely claim with a state or local agency is a meaningless gesture because the agency does not have authority to grant relief on an untimely claim.
Whatever the merits of that and other arguments to support the district court’s decision, however, there is more merit in having federal courts follow the same course in cases of this kind in order to establish country-wide uniformity in the application of merely regulatory statutes and regulations. With no underlying ideological principles involved, the courts should not unnecessarily conflict on the application of regulatory laws such as the one at issue here. The Congress or administrative agency can readily change the rules if interpreted wrongly. In the meantime, all citizens are required to follow the same rules.
Thomas v. Florida Power and Light Co., 764 F.2d 768, 771 (11th Cir.1985).
The Court gives no reason for adopting the rule that it selects except that it is the rule of a growing number of circuits. In my view, the rule trivializes the deferral mechanism, which must have been meant to have some significance or it would not have been devised and put in place. As Chief Judge Roney notes, however, this is one of those relatively uncommon situations in which it is more important to have one rule than it is to have the right one. Thus, although I think the rule the wrong one, I concur in its adoption.