Court Opinion

ID: 9915501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 16:05:20.859056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:47.632119
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,388

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                     v.

                                     STEVEN KYLE BRAINARD,
                                           Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed January 5, 2024. Affirmed.

        Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before MALONE, P.J., GARDNER and CLINE, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: Steven Kyle Brainard appeals his two convictions of aggravated
criminal sodomy and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. He argues that the district
court erred by denying his requests to remove a juror and to appoint new counsel.
Brainard also raises a claim of cumulative error. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                                     1
Factual and Procedural Background

       Brainard met E.A. (Mother) in Oklahoma several years ago; they eventually
married and had two children together (S.B. and I.B.). Mother also had three older
children (G.B., Jo.B., and J.B.) from a previous relationship. During Brainard and
Mother's marriage, the family lived in several states before settling in Derby, Kansas. But
after 12 years of marriage, Brainard and Mother divorced in April 2021 and later moved
into separate houses. Brainard stayed in Derby, but Mother moved to Wichita with the
children. She allowed all the children to stay with Brainard most weekends.

       In August or early September, after a few months into this visitation agreement,
Mother noticed that her daughter (I.B.) started making excuses to avoid staying with
Brainard. I.B. would generally claim that she felt too sick to go. Although Mother did not
force I.B. to go to Brainard's when she made these excuses, Mother would encourage I.B.
to give Brainard a chance. I.B. eventually explained to Mother that she did not mind
spending time with Brainard when her brothers were around, but she did not want to
spend the night at Brainard's house.

       Yet sometime in October, I.B. and S.B. stayed overnight with Brainard and
without older siblings. When I.B. returned home, Mother noticed that she was not acting
like herself. Mother asked I.B. what was wrong but I.B. did not respond. Seemingly in
I.B.'s defense, S.B. made up an excuse for her behavior. Mother found S.B.'s excuse
nonsensical.

       A few days later, I.B. agreed to go to Brainard's for the day but told Mother she
did not want to spend the night. Jo.B. and J.B. accompanied I.B. to Brainard's. Mother
later called to tell I.B. that she needed to change their plan and that I.B. would need to
spend the night at Brainard's. I.B. became emotional and told Mother that she did not
want to do that. I.B. did not give a reason for her objection so Mother called S.B. to ask if

                                              2
he knew what was wrong with her. S.B. told Mother that he had some idea why I.B. did
not want to stay with Brainard but he did not want to talk about it over the phone. So
Mother drove to speak to S.B. in person.

       S.B. told Mother about two incidents involving I.B. and Brainard. First, he
explained that I.B. and Brainard sometimes disappear together. Once, I.B. left what she
was doing with S.B. to get a drink of water. When she had not returned after about 10
minutes, S.B. went into the house to find her. He found her crying while exiting a room
with Brainard. When S.B. asked I.B. what happened, she refused to explain.

       Second, S.B. said that when the family lived in Washington, he once left his room
to find Brainard. He went downstairs and peeked around the staircase to check if
Brainard was on the couch. S.B. then saw that Brainard had his penis pulled out of his
pants and heard him telling I.B. to kiss it. S.B. said nothing and ran back up the stairs.

       After learning this, Mother swiftly tried to locate and retrieve the children. She
eventually learned that Brainard had taken I.B. to Walmart. When she got there, she took
Brainard aside and confronted him with the information that S.B. had shared. Brainard
became angry and denied the allegations.

       Mother then took I.B. to the women's restroom to talk to her separately. I.B.
initially denied that Brainard had done anything to her. But after Mother asked S.B.
whether she was "telling . . . the truth the way God wants us to speak the truth," I.B.
started crying and revealed that Brainard had sexually abused her. As I.B. continued to
cry, Mother asked her several yes or no questions. Based on her responses, I.B. indicated
that S.B. had told Mother the truth about what he had seen in Washington. I.B. also
indicated that Brainard had "put his private to her private" and "near her face or her
mouth."

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       Mother then drove I.B. and S.B. to a hospital for an examination, notifying police
that they were on their way. During the examination, I.B. reported to the forensic
examiner that Brainard had sexually abused her a couple of weeks earlier. The examiner
visually inspected I.B. and found no wounds. And because I.B. declined additional
examinations, the examiner did not swab I.B. for physical evidence.

       While at the hospital, I.B. also spoke with a police officer. She reported that
Brainard "had been putting his penis in her mouth and . . . vagina." I.B. said more about
the abuse to a forensic interviewer the next day. S.B. also told an officer what he had seen
in Washington.

       Pretrial Proceedings and Voir Dire

       The State charged Brainard with single counts of aggravated criminal sodomy and
aggravated indecent liberties with a child.

       During the district court's initial remarks to the prospective jurors during voir dire,
one of them (Juror 30) stated that she did not speak English as her first language; she
spoke Ukrainian and Russian. She also explained that she hesitated to act as a juror
because she feared that she would not understand everything. The district court asked
Juror 30 several questions about her language skills. And after considering her responses,
including her demeanor, the district court found her removal unnecessary. The prosecutor
and defense counsel addressed Juror 30 during the rest of voir dire and ultimately
selected her as a jury member.

       When the parties reconvened for trial the next day, Juror 30 notified the district
court and the attorneys that as a young child and again as a teenager, she had twice been a
victim of sexually violent crimes. The district court allowed the parties to ask Juror 30

                                              4
more questions based on this new information. During that questioning, Juror 30
explained

   • she had not disclosed her abuse earlier because when the district court first read
       the charges, she did not understand the type of crime Brainard was charged with;
   • she may have understood more than half the information during voir dire, but she
       was not sure;
   • as voir dire progressed, she came to realize what Brainard was accused of and
       decided that she needed to notify the parties about her past experiences; and
   • her experiences would not affect her ability act fairly and impartially during
       Brainard’s trial.

       After counsel finished their inquiries, the district court heard arguments on her
removal. Defense counsel acknowledged that Juror No. 30 "might be a model juror" in
another case "because she clearly understands how the process should work when
something happens." But defense counsel asked the court to remove Juror 30 based on
"the language barrier" and because counsel did not believe, "despite what she [said] to the
court," that she could be impartial here.

       The district court told defense counsel that it would not rule on Juror 30's language
comprehension because defense counsel had not lodged a timely objection during voir
dire. Still, the district court made these findings and conclusion on the issue:

       "[l]f anything, her comments this morning make it clear that it's not a significant issue at
       all. Her English is very good.
               "Now, like a lot of Eastern European first language folks, she regularly leaves out
       certain English words, you'll see this . . . probably because they don't use those words in
       the native language. But it's clear she understands very well. And the[only] issue was
       when she first came in[,] . . . she described it . . . [as being] overwhelmed by . . . the
       process and the situation.

                                                      5
               "The other thing is, you know, aggravated criminal sodomy, aggravated indecent
       liberties with a child, you bring in English first language folks and ask them what . . . that
       mean[s] and non-law trained folks will probably not have a . . . good idea. And she made
       it clear that . . . as the process went on, she understood everything. So it's not an issue, . . .
       nothing changed, there's nothing new[.] . . . So I [will not remove Juror 30] for that."

The district court also found that Juror 30 did not purposefully fail to disclose her past
experiences sooner, and it accepted her testimony that despite these incidents, she would
remain fair and impartial.

       At the end of the trial, following closing arguments and before deliberations
began, the district court held a sidebar to ask counsel whether they wanted to designate
Juror 30 as the alternate juror. Yet both counsel declined this invitation and instead
agreed to designate a different person as alternate.

       Trial

       At trial, I.B. testified that in August or September, she stopped wanting to go to
Brainard's house because he started "sexually abusing [her]." She explained that when
she stayed at Brainard's, she would usually sleep on the couch, in her old room, or in
Brainard's room. And sometimes, when she shared a bed with Brainard, they did not wear
clothes. I.B. also detailed the acts that Brainard committed against her.

       In his testimony, Brainard denied doing "anything inappropriate" with I.B.,
exposing himself to her, having oral sex with her, touching her inappropriately, or
sleeping in the same bed with her.

       To attack I.B.'s credibility, defense counsel elicited testimony from Brainard, I.B.,
and Mother to indicate that I.B. had given an impossible timeline for the events she
described. Brainard suggested that I.B. did not stay at his house every weekend or on
                                                       6
some dates within the timeframe that she claimed the abuse had occurred. And Brainard
admitted some texts from Mother, showing that I.B. did not go to his house on one date
(October 29) within the charged time frame.

       Defense counsel's cross-examination of Mother tried to show that Mother had
goaded I.B. into accusing Brainard. In closing, the defense contended that I.B. had
initially denied any abuse to Mother, and that I.B. later agreed that the crimes had
occurred only because Mother "put the fear of God into her."

       Brainard also called two of Mother's older sons to testify. They stated that
Brainard never acted inappropriately with them and that they had not seen Brainard do
anything to I.B. On cross-examination, S.B. also testified that he never saw Brainard do
anything to I.B. while they lived in Kansas, but he was 100 percent sure that he saw
Brainard expose himself to I.B. in Washington.

       The jury convicted Brainard as charged. The district court sentenced him to two
concurrent terms of life in prison, with parole eligibility after 25 years. Brainard appeals.

Did the District Court Err in Denying Brainard's Request to Excuse Juror 30?

       Brainard first challenges the district court's denial of his request to remove Juror
30, claiming that the district court based its decision on legal and factual errors. Brainard
claims that Juror 30's statements about her ability to speak English established that she
was not qualified to sit on the jury, yet the district court substituted its own opinion about
her ability to understand the evidence, thus applying an erroneous legal standard when
making its decision.

                                              7
Invited Error

       The State first asks us to dismiss Brainard's argument under the invited error rule.
The State claims that by choosing not to designate Juror 30 as an alternate, Brainard
invited the error that he now challenges.

       Generally, a litigant may not invite an error and then challenge the error on appeal.
State v. Green, 315 Kan. 178, 183, 505 P.3d 377 (2022). But cf. State v. Sullivan, 307
Kan. 697, 707, 414 P.3d 737 (2018) (invited error inapplicable to structural constitutional
errors). There is no bright-line rule for the application of this doctrine. We must instead
determine whether, based on the record, Brainard induced the district court to make the
error that he now challenges. See State v. Douglas, 313 Kan. 704, 707, 490 P.3d 34
(2021).

       Brainard's decision not to select Juror 30 as an alternate did not cause Juror 30 to
be selected as a juror and his actions were not the but-for cause of Juror 30 staying on the
jury. Brainard did not induce the district court to keep her on the jury. To the contrary, he
asked the court to remove her from it and argued that position. The record thus does not
establish that Brainard's actions caused the claimed error. Cf. State v. Smith-Parker, 301
Kan. 132, 166, 340 P.3d 485 (2014) (finding invited error doctrine inapplicable when
appellant agreed with State's request to replace juror but did not make request himself).

       Brainard may or may not have avoided the claimed error had he agreed to
designate Juror 30 as an alternate. Even then, the district court may not have allowed her
to serve as the alternate if the State had objected. And even had both parties agreed to
choose her as the alternate, she could have served on the jury as a replacement. But the
State does not argue waiver so we do not consider that doctrine. We instead consider the
merits of Brainard's claim.

                                              8
       Standard of Review and Basic Legal Principles

       The Sixth Amendment and section 10 of the Kansas Bill of Rights guarantee an
accused the right to a fair and impartial jury. State v. Miller, 308 Kan. 1119, 1138, 427
P.3d 907 (2018). Voir dire is used to enable the parties to select jurors who are competent
and without bias, prejudice, or partiality. State v. Thurber, 308 Kan. 140, 181, 420 P.3d
389 (2018).

       K.S.A. 43-158(a) provides that persons unable to read, write, and understand the
English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out a jury questionnaire
form must be excused from jury service. Juror 30 adequately filled out her jury
questionnaire. Although Juror 30's juror questionnaire made the district court aware of
her doubts about her English fluency, neither party contends that the district court
violated this statute.

       Our focus is thus on the district court's authority to excuse a person from jury
service under K.S.A. 43-159. Subsection (a) of this statute authorizes the district court to
excuse persons "so physically or mentally infirm as to be unequal to the task of ordinary
jury duty." K.S.A. 43-159(a). Our Supreme Court has held that this rule requires a juror
to understand English to a degree which allows the juror to fully comprehend the
testimony and court instructions. See State v. Pham, 281 Kan. 1227, 1239, 136 P.3d 919
(2006); State v. Ji, 251 Kan. 3, 9, 832 P.2d 1176 (1992) (holding jurors must have
reasonable knowledge of language in which proceedings are conducted to enable them to
perform their duties and ensure defendant receives fair trial); State v. Pratt, 114 Kan. 660,
661, 220 P. 505 (1923) (holding potential juror "who cannot understand the language in
which the business of the court is conducted, is as much disqualified to serve as a juror as
though he were deaf, or had some other infirmity which made it impossible for him to
participate intelligently in the business before the court").

                                               9
       Whether a person is qualified or competent to sit as a juror is a question for the
district court, and we will not disturb the district court's ruling unless it is clearly
erroneous or we find an abuse of discretion. State v. Hayes, 270 Kan. 535, 537, 17 P.3d
317, 319 (2001). Judicial discretion is abused if the ruling is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) based on an error of fact. State v. Levy,
313 Kan. 232, 237, 485 P.3d 605 (2021). As the party asserting error, Brainard bears the
burden of showing the abuse of discretion. State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 708, 510 P.3d
706 (2022); Miller, 308 Kan. at 1138.

       Brainard Fails to Establish Error

       Brainard claims that the district court based its decision on both legal and factual
errors. Citing State v. Miller, 11 Kan. App. 2d 410, 722 P.2d 1131 (1986), he argues that
the district court replaced Juror 30's statements about her lack of English comprehension
with the court's opinion on the matter, applying an incorrect legal standard. Brainard also
asserts that the day after voir dire, Juror 30 stated that she had not understood some of the
district court's opening remarks, contradicting the district court's finding that Juror 30 was
able to understand the evidence.

       In Miller, a juror notified the district court at the end of the first day of trial in an
aggravated incest case that she had a hearing impairment and had not heard the two
victims' testimony or the court reporter. Despite these admissions, the district court found
that the juror was "overstating" her inability to hear critical testimony and questions. 11
Kan. App. 2d at 412. This court reversed, finding the district court abused its discretion
by not discharging the juror for cause and, absent a waiver by the defendant, declaring a
mistrial. 11 Kan. App. 2d at 413.

                                               10
       In making this determination, the panel considered both the district court's
authority in ruling on jury selection matters and the appropriateness of disregarding a
juror's assessment of their ability to hear:

       "Although a juror's competence is a matter for judicial determination, a juror's specific
       statement of such a factual matter, that is, what he or she could or could not hear, should
       control over a judge's opinion regarding the juror's ability to hear in the absence of some
       indication of insincerity or falsehood on the part of the juror." Miller, 11 Kan. App. 2d at
       412.

       Here, unlike in Miller, the district court made a factual finding that Juror 30
understood English sufficiently to allow jury service. See 11 Kan. App. 2d at 413 ("the
trial judge did not make a finding that the juror could hear; he merely said he thought the
juror had 'overstated'" her hearing disability). More importantly, the district court did not
merely disregard Juror 30's statements and base its decision on its own unfounded
opinion, as in Miller. Nor did the court substitute the juror's summary of her abilities for
its own legal conclusion. Rather, after Juror 30 questioned her ability to sufficiently
understand English, the district court properly inquired into the matter and allowed
counsel to do the same. It then considered her responses before weighing the facts and
deciding that she could serve as a juror.

       Juror 30 showed her ability to understand spoken English by her conversations
with counsel and the court. The district court began voir dire by informing the jury that
the State had charged Brainard with single counts of aggravated criminal sodomy and
aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The district court also asked several questions
to confirm that each prospective juror met the necessary qualifications, including an
ability to read and understand English. Juror 30 responded that English was her third
language and that she worried about being unable to understand at trial. After a short
discussion with Juror 30, the district court commended her English, stating she was

                                                    11
"speaking English extremely well." Juror 30 told the district court "I try, it's
embarrassing, but I try."

       The district court then asked about the amount of English that Juror 30 understood
when speaking and when reading, her career, and how much she generally spoke English
throughout the day. She reported that she understood "50/50," indicating that she
understood half the words spoken to her. She stated that she could read English but was
probably worse at reading than speaking. She had lived in the United States for the last
11 years and worked in retail for 10 of those years. She spoke English at work and had
chosen her job in part because of her desire to improve her English skills. When
addressing Juror 30 a second time, the district court asked about her family. She
explained that she was married and had one child, and she explained where her husband
worked.

       After defense counsel asked whether any of the prospective jurors had had a
"messy" breakup or divorce, Juror 30 explained that she had divorced her first husband
due to "physical abuse." But she maintained that she was "[p]erfectly fine" with her ex-
husband because they "have a daughter" together. The prosecutor asked Juror 30 about
her familial or other ties to Ukraine and Ukraine's ongoing conflict with Russia. She
explained that she still had family there, but she was not overly concerned about them
and could speak with them every day if she wanted to.

       Although Juror 30 estimated that she understood roughly half of what she heard in
her interactions outside the courtroom, Juror 30 responded appropriately to the court's
questions and demonstrated her ability to understand and discuss various topics. She
explained that she regularly spoke English as a part of her long-held job in retail. She
answered several questions from the prosecutor and defense counsel, discussing her
current and past relationships, the circumstances of her divorce, and her familial and
emotional ties to Ukraine and its ongoing political conflict with Russia. She also later

                                              12
discussed the circumstances of the abuse that she had suffered and assured the district
court that she could separate those experiences from her duty to remain fair and impartial
when deciding Brainard's guilt. The record thus contains sufficient evidence supporting
the district court's conclusion that Juror 30 was able to fully understand the trial
testimony and instructions.

       Brainard also asserts that Juror 30's statements the day after voir dire show that she
had not understood the district court when it had read the charges against Brainard.
Brainard does not challenge the district court's finding that Juror 30 did not purposefully
conceal pertinent information by waiting until after voir dire to make her disclosure. We
thus find this argument waived or abandoned. State v. Davis, 313 Kan. 244, 248, 485
P.3d 174 (2021) (issues not briefed are considered waived). Still, Brainard claims that
Juror 30 admitted she did not understand important trial information.

       The district court addressed this issue and determined that despite her initial
confusion, Juror 30 confirmed that as the voir dire inquiry continued, she figured out
what the charges entailed. The district court noted that non-law-trained prospective jurors
may initially lack an understanding of what aggravated criminal sodomy and aggravated
indecent liberties are, and that is true for native English speakers as well. And nothing in
the record shows that Juror 30 did not understand the evidence or instructions at trial.
Brainard essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence. Yet a reviewing court does not
reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make credibility determinations of
witnesses. State v. Chandler, 307 Kan. 657, 668, 414 P.3d 713 (2018). The record
contains sufficient evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that Juror 30 was
able to fully understand the trial testimony and instructions and was able to perform her
duty as a juror sufficiently to ensure the defendant received a fair trial.

                                              13
       Because we find no clear error or abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the
district court's ruling. Hayes, 270 Kan. at 537. We thus find it unnecessary to reach the
parties' additional arguments about prejudice and affirm the district court's ruling.

Did the District Court Err in Denying Brainard's Motion for New Counsel?

       In his next appellate claim, Brainard challenges the district court's denial of his
pretrial motion to appoint new counsel.

       Additional Facts About Brainard's Motion

       Several months before trial, Brainard filed a motion for new counsel. The motion
does not make any arguments against defense counsel specifically. In fact, the only time
that the motion references Brainard's attorney is by allusion, in requesting that the district
court "take notice of the amount of times [he] tried to get ahold [of] and contact" his
attorney.

       At the hearing on this motion, Brainard began by stating that while preparing for
trial, defense counsel had reviewed texts between Brainard and Mother. This prompted a
warning from the district court for Brainard to avoid disclosing confidential
communications or evidence during the hearing. After this warning, Brainard explained
that he disagreed with his attorney about whether the text messages should be used at
trial. Brainard believed that the texts proved his innocence, but defense counsel did not
believe that the texts would help his defense.

       Defense counsel admitted that this disagreement existed and that they sometimes
disagreed about what motions Brainard's case required. But he maintained that he had not
prevented Brainard from contacting him and that he was available to speak with Brainard

                                              14
any time. Counsel thus concluded that Brainard's motion failed to establish a conflict of
interest, and that if Brainard believed that a breakdown in communication or an
irreconcilable disagreement existed, counsel had not contributed to it.

       After considering these arguments, the district court found that Brainard had
shown no justifiable dissatisfaction with his attorney and denied his motion for new
counsel. The district court also found that defense counsel had acted appropriately in
weighing the strengths and weaknesses of Brainard's case when considering whether to
present certain evidence.

       Brainard filed a second motion for new counsel after trial, characterizing his
attorney's performance as negligent or incompetent. As a part of this motion, Brainard
reasserted his claim about the text messages. Brainard admitted in his motion that his
counsel had explained his reasoning for not using the texts but still argued that failing to
present them went against his wishes. The district court appointed substitute counsel to
represent Brainard at a hearing on his post-trial motion. But by the hearing date, Brainard
had withdrawn the motion. Because Brainard voluntarily withdrew his posttrial motion
and he does not raise it as an issue on appeal, we will not review it. We consider any
argument about the posttrial motion waived or abandoned. Davis, 313 Kan. at 248.

       Standard of Review and Basic Legal Principles

       We review the district court's decision about Brainard's pretrial motion for new
counsel under an abuse of discretion standard. Again, Brainard bears the burden of proof.
See State v. Hulett, 293 Kan. 312, 319, 263 P.3d 153 (2011); State v. McGee, 280 Kan.
890, 894, 126 P.3d 1110 (2006).

                                             15
       Defendants have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel but have
no right to choose which attorney the court will appoint to represent them. State v.
Brown, 300 Kan. 565, 574-75, 331 P.3d 797 (2014).

       "'[T]o warrant substitute counsel, a defendant must show "justifiable dissatisfaction" with
       appointed counsel. Justifiable dissatisfaction includes a showing of a conflict of interest,
       an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communications between counsel
       and the defendant. But ultimately, "[a]s long as the trial court has a reasonable basis for
       believing the attorney-client relation has not deteriorated to a point where appointed
       counsel can no longer give effective aid in the fair presentation of a defense, the court is
       justified in refusing to appoint new counsel."' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Breitenbach,
       313 Kan. 73, 90, 483 P.3d 448 (2021).

The focus of a justifiable dissatisfaction inquiry is the adequacy of counsel in the
adversarial process, not the accused's relationship with his attorney. State v. Staten, 304
Kan. 957, 972, 377 P.3d 427 (2016).

       No Error Shown

       Brainard's motion and argument at the hearing challenged defense counsel's
performance based on allegedly limited communications and counsel's decision not to
admit certain text messages at trial. We agree with the district court that these claims fail
to show justifiable dissatisfaction.

       To get relief, Brainard had to prove a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable
disagreement, or a complete breakdown in communication between him and his counsel.
See Breitenbach, 313 Kan. at 90. The closest that Brainard came to alleging a breakdown
in communications was his written request that the district court "take notice of the
amount of times [he] tried to . . . contact" his attorney. That cannot by itself meet his
burden.

                                                    16
       Brainard likewise failed to show an irreconcilable disagreement. Instead, the
record establishes that as a part of his trial preparation, defense counsel made a strategic
decision about which texts to admit at trial. Defense counsel admitted some of Brainard's
text messages with Mother at trial to show that Brainard was not with I.B. on October
29—a date within the timeframe alleged in the State's complaint. Brainard suggests that
other texts would have provided additional proof of his innocence but does not explain
how. He also does not contend that defense counsel made anything other than a tactical
decision in not submitting the texts at trial. And strategic and tactical decisions such as
deciding what exhibits to offer at trial are to be made by defense counsel, who is not
required to first consult the defendant. See generally State v. Rivera, 277 Kan. 109, 116-
17, 83 P.3d 169 (2004) (finding criminal defendants are charged with deciding what plea
to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify, but strategical and tactical
decisions like preparation, type of defense, and filing motions lie with defense counsel).

       Brainard does not address these weaknesses in his argument but alleges that the
district court's inquiry into his conflict with counsel was inadequate. Brainard claims that
the prosecutor's presence at the hearing prevented him from discussing the details of
specific text messages, so the district court should have excused the prosecutor to allow
Brainard to speak more freely. But Brainard never asked the district court to do so. And
he does not show any legal authority for his argument that the district court reversibly
erred by failing to sua sponte order the prosecutor out of the courtroom. He likewise fails
to explain what, if any, difference removing the prosecutor would have made. Although
an abuse of discretion is established when a district court fails to ask about a stated
potential conflict, Brainard failed to give "'an articulated statement of attorney
dissatisfaction'" which would have triggered this duty. See State v. Brown, 300 Kan. at
575.

       Brainard shows no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to deny his
pretrial motion for new counsel, so we affirm that decision.

                                              17
Does Cumulative Error Require Reversal?

       Finally, Brainard argues that the cumulative effect of his claimed trial errors
deprived him of a fair trial and requires reversal. Multiple trial errors, when considered
together, may require reversal of a defendant's conviction when the totality of the
circumstances establish that the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the errors and
denied a fair trial. State v. Alfaro-Valleda, 314 Kan. 526, 551, 502 P.3d 66 (2022). But
the cumulative error rule does not apply when there are no errors, as here. State v.
Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262, 277, 485 P.3d 622 (2021).

       Affirmed.

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