Court Opinion

ID: 9645331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:21:13.969823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:25.868517
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
On September 30, 1976, the majority struck the recall vote, directed to be held pursuant to the twenty-five year old Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, from the November 2 ballot.1 In reversing the trial court, the majority deprived the citizens of Philadelphia of their Charter right to decide at the polls whether to retain the Mayor.
Today, the Justices who struck the recall vote from the ballot attempt to explain their September 30 order and proceed to completely strip the people of Philadelphia of their Charter right to recall elected Charter officials.1a By abolishing recall, they plunge the city into the preCharter past, leaving the citizens without any procedure for removing elected officials.
The Opinion of the Chief Justice, announcing that the four Justices adhere to their September 30 order striking recall from the ballot, first declares the recall petition invalid. Not content just to invalidate that petition, the *82Opinion of the Chief Justice and the Concurring Opinions proceed to hold that recall, a time honored institution in American democratic government, is unconstitutional. Nothing in any of the opinions justifies this result. The trial court properly corrected the legal errors and arbitrary action of the Board of Elections which earlier rejected the recall petition. The trial court’s order, which directed the Board to hold the recall election, should be affirmed. In holding recall unconstitutional, the opinions striking down recall misunderstand the nature of recall and misconstrue the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Most shocked by the sudden and strange demise of the Charter recall would be the three civic leaders and legal scholars who drafted the Charter: William A. Schnader, Robert T. McCracken and Abraham L. Freedman; the twelve other distinguished members of the Charter Commission; the 259,896 voters who approved the Charter on April 17, 1951; and the thousands of Pennsylvanians who have adopted home rule charters containing recall provisions.
Today’s decision is without support in law, fact, reason or public policy. Denying the voters the right to recall officials elected under a Charter which reserves that power to the people reflects distrust of the judgment of the electorate. This compels vigorous dissent.
I.
A. Recall is a traditional institution in American local government.
Recall is a vote by the citizens to determine whether a public official shall be removed from office prior to the expiration of his term.2 Recall procedures similar to *83those adopted in Philadelphia were first introduced in this country in the Charter of the city of Los Angeles in 1903.3 Between 1903 and 1930, recall provisions were adopted in over one thousand municipalities in the nation.4 By 1976, recall for some or all state officers had been authorized in twelve states and for some or all local officers in twenty-eight states.5
6In Pennsylvania alone, twenty-three cities and townships have adopted charters with recall provisions, and recall has been included in the recommended charters of six counties.®
The recall power is founded upon the most fundamental principle of our constitutional system: all power stems from the people.7 In creating representative government, the people may reserve the power to change their representatives at will. As Thomas Jefferson wrote:
“I consider the people who constitute a society . the source of all authority in that [society]; as free to transact their common concerns by any *84agents they think proper; to change these agents individually . . . whenever they please . . .. ”8 ”8
Recall procedures give life to this fundamental principle of representative government. Elected officials are merely agents of the popular will; the recall process affords the electorate the opportunity to pass upon the performance of its representatives prior to the expiration of their terms of office.9 Recall is designed to maintain the continuous responsiveness of elected officials to the people.10 It establishes a tenure system for public office based upon the ability of the officeholder to maintain the confidence of the electorate.11
Recall should not be confused with impeachment. In recall, unlike impeachment, officials are not accused of *85high crimes and misdemeanors, nor are they removed from office by another branch of government. The elaborate, sometimes cumbersome, impeachment procedures are unnecessary when the people themselves remove their elected officials. Recall is designed to give the voters an expeditious and effective means of removing officials. Like any other popular vote, recall provides due process through the electoral process.12
In sum, recall was established as an instrument of democracy. It reserves to the electorate a direct role in government and embodies the best in the American political tradition. It is now, and for over seventy years has been, a respected institution in thousands of American municipalities. Drawing upon this tradition, the people of Philadelphia adopted recall as part of their Home Rule Charter.
B. Recall is basic to the objectives of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter.
A quarter of a century ago, the voters of Philadelphia overwhelmingly adopted the Home Rule Charter prepared and submitted to them by the Philadelphia Charter Commission. To foster a more efficient and economical city government, the citizens authorized concentrations of power in the Mayor, City Controller and Councilmen,13 but expressly reserved to themselves the power to recall their elected officials. It is this reservation of the power to recall that established the voters’ most important check on their city government.
Recall is indeed crucial to the proper functioning of the Charter. It affords voters dissatisfied with the performance of an official elected under the Charter the opportunity to call the official to account at the polls prior to the expiration of his term. Recall’s purpose is to keep *86elected officials responsive to the will of the electorate. It is the exercise of the same power that is invoked in electing an official in the first place. The voters of Philadelphia concluded, as have voters in thousands of other municipalities across the nation, that government is enhanced when elected officials are continuously accountable to the people. For these reasons, the Charter guaranteed that the power to elect included the power to recall.
The recall provisions do not, and were never intended to require the establishment of cause for removal. The Charter Annotations, prepared by the Charter’s distinguished drafting committee,14 specifically state that “ . . . no charges are required to be lodged . against an elected official to subject him to a recall election . . . ,”15 Indeed, the recall provisions were intended to replace the cumbersome and ineffective impeachment procedures of the 1919 Charter. The Charter Commission rejected impeachment and recommended to the voters that recall be adopted in the expectation that it would prove “a more satisfactory device for the removal of an elected official.”16 The voters overwhelmingly agreed with the Charter Commission and chose to rely upon recall to check the performance of their city officials. This reliance upon the electoral process fully conforms with basic democratic principles.
*87The opinions striking down recall unnecessarily and unwisely strip the Charter of its vital provision for insuring citizen control of government and leave the people of Philadelphia without any effective procedure for removing Charter officials.17 The concentration of power in city officers remains, but the voters’ right to recall has been abolished. The opinions striking down recall distort the Charter into a one-sided grant of power to the government without accompanying voter control over the exercise of those powers.
The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Charter indicate that the powers granted the Mayor and other city officials were dependent upon the reservation of the recall power. There is nothing to suggest that the voters would have authorized the powers granted in the absence of an effective voter check upon their use. Rather, the power to recall was reserved to the people as a comprehensive alternative to other limitations on official power which would have otherwise been imposed. Invalidating recall undermines the principal objectives of the Charter and abrogates the right of the people to control their city government.
II. THE RECALL PETITION IS SUFFICIENT
A. Genuine signatures cannot be rejected on the basis of technical imperfections in the attached affidavits.
The trial court held that the Board of Elections acted contrary to the law in rejecting 22,159 signatures be*88cause of what the Board determined were “irregular affidavits.” The Board rejected these admittedly genuine signatures because of “defects” it found in the affidavits attached to the sheets on which the voters signed. If this action was arbitrary, capricious, or based on erroneous interpretation of law, the trial court properly ordered the Board to accept the signatures. Garratt v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 442, 127 A.2d 738 (1956). Yet the Opinion of the Chief Justice states that the Board acted within its discretion in disenfranchising the 22,159 voters who correctly signed their names to the petition.
1.
The largest group of “irregular affidavits,” which the Board relied on to invalidate 20,304 signatures, suffered from what the Board called “patent falsities.” In the course of its investigation, the Board set up 15 categories of “defective” signatures. Among these was the category of “initials,” signatures which included an initial where none appeared on the registration card or which omitted an initial included on the registration card. Another category, which the Board called “forgeries,” included any instance where someone other than the voter filled in part of the line, for example the date or the voter’s ward, but the genuiness of these signatures was not challenged. The Board then tabulated all the “defective” signatures. Sheets having more than 25% “defective” signatures were rejected for “patent falsity,” and all of the signatures on those sheets were rejected.18
*89The irrationality of such a procedure becomes apparent in light of the Chief Justice’s determination that five of the categories, involving nearly half of the allegedly defective signatures, were valid. The Board erred as a matter of law in setting up these categories. If the adoption of these categories was an abuse of discretion, then surely it was an abuse of discretion to invalidate perfect signatures because other signatures on the same page had these so-called “defects.” The Chief Justice’s reasoning on “patent falsities” is totally inconsistent with his determination that the signatures in the “initials,” “abbreviations,” “insufficient signatures,” “incorrect ward,” and “forgeries/alterations” categories are valid. For example, if a petition containing 100 signatures included 75 perfect signatures and 25 which fell into the “initials” category, the Board could not reject the 25 signatures for defective initials. At the same time, however, the Opinion of the Chief Justice would allow the Board to use these 25 valid signatures as a basis for rejecting all 100 signatures, including the 75 perfect signatures, for “patent falsities.” Why are the 75 perfect signatures being rejected — is it because they are too good? No governmental body can possess the kind of discretion the Opinion of the Chief Justice would vest in the Board. The rejection of perfect signatures for “patent falsities,” when even the “defective” signatures are valid, is the epitome of arbitrary and capricious action.
*90Even if the Board limited itself to those categories of signatures which are legally invalid, its action in rejecting other signatures on the same page would be arbitrary and capricious:
“The difficulty with the position ... is that persons whose signatures are admittedly genuine and whose signatures were properly obtained, are disenfranchised through no fault of theirs and because their names happen to be on sheets which contain names that are irregular. In the absence of proof that the . . . signatures were not genuine, it would be unjust to rule out such signatures.”
Lefkowitz v. Cohen, 262 App.Div. 452, 456, 29 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821, aff’d, 286 N.Y. 499, 36 N.E.2d 680 (1941). The trial court properly held that the Board acted arbitrarily, and not in accordance with the law, in rejecting genuine signatures merely because they were on the same petition as some faulty ones.
The Board’s somewhat contorted reasoning for its action is that if a number of the signatures on a sheet are invalid, the affidavit must be false, because the affiant must have known that the petition included invalid signatures. One problem with this approach is that the affidavit only requires a statement that “to the best of the affiant’s knowledge and belief” the signers are registered voters who have given their correct addresses. 351 Pa.Code, § 9.9-101(2) (1974). By far the largest single category of signatures invalidated by the Board was of persons who were not registered to vote. As it is unlikely that the affiant will know, apart from what the signer tells him, whether the signer is registered, the invalid signature cannot support an inference that the affidavit is false. Furthermore, the affiant is not required to certify that the signatures do not fall into other categories set up by the Board, such as duplicates or incomplete lines. The invalidation of signatures on such grounds has no bearing on the truth of a circulator’s affidavit.
*91As the Supreme Court of Illinois held in In re Bower, 41 Ill.2d 277, 242 N.E.2d 252 (1968):
“[I]n the absence of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence that a circulator has acted fraudulently in obtaining false signatures, only those signatures proved to be unauthentic by the objectors should be stricken. See Kaesser v. Becker, 295 Mo. 93, 243 S.W. 346, 350. In State ex rel. Jensen v. Wells, 66 S.D. 236, 281 N.W. 99, it is said that in order to be considered fraudulent, an affidavit or verification attached to a petition for a referendum must not only be false but also be made fraudulently as established by the evidence, that is, with an intent to deceive. (281 N.W. at 103).”
Id. at 285, 242 N.E.2d at 257. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of South Dakota adopted the standard in State ex rel. Jensen v. Wells, supra, even though the affiant was required to know personally each person who signed the petition. Here, no such personal knowledge is required. There is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that an affidavit is false, let alone that it is fraudulent, simply because some of the signatures on the petition may be invalid. The trial court properly concluded that the Board did not act in accordance with the law when it invalidated over twenty thousand signatures because of “patent falsities” in the affidavits.19
*922.
The second group of “irregular affidavits” rejected by the Board involves affiants who were not registered voters and affiants who gave addresses different from those on their registration cards.20 This group affects such a small number of signatures, less than 2000, that even if the Board properly rejected these signatures, there would still be enough valid signatures to require the recall vote to be held. Once again, however, the trial court correctly determined that the Board abused its discretion:
“It is noted that under the provisions of the Charter, Section 9-101(2), the circulator/affiant of the recall petition need not be a registered voter, nor need his address be given on the affidavit. Therefore, the rejection of these signatures by the Board constitutes a triumph of form over substance.”
Opinion of Savitt, J., C.P. No. 3466, at 48 (filed September 16, 1976). In order to be actionable, a statement must not only be false, it must also be material, or made *93with the purpose of inducing reliance. Certainly there is no evidence here of any intent to deceive. The Board’s action, in rejecting these affidavits, was arbitrary and capricious.
3.
The Opinion of the Chief Justice insists that the trial court adopted its own standards for matters within the scope of the Board’s discretion. This includes the discretion, according to the Opinion of the Chief Justice, to reject signatures the Board has checked and determined to be genuine simply because the attached affidavit is false. Even when the falsity is immaterial — or amounts to no more than collecting signatures which turn out to be invalid or, as in the case of signatures in the “initials” category, are valid but imperfect — the Opinion of the Chief Justice would give the Board discretion to reject the petition. I cannot believe that the Board is vested with so arbitrary a power. I cannot believe that the distinguished committee which drafted the Charter, the Charter Commission, or the people who voted for the Charter, would reserve to the people the right to recall elected officials and then vest such broad discretionary powers in the Board of Elections as to render that power a nullity.
Indeed, the condonation of the Board’s use of “irregular affidavits” to invalidate the petition is inconsistent with the determination in the Opinion of the Chief Justice that five other categories rejected by the Board are valid. The Opinion states that it is an abuse of discretion to reject a signature merely because the voter gave an incorrect ward, even though the Charter requires signers to list their wards. Surely it is an abuse of discretion to reject an entire sheet of genuine signatures because of an “irregularity” in the attached affidavit having to do with matters which need not appear in the affidavit. Conclusory statements that “falsity was a question of fact” are not dispositive. What makes “falsity” a question of fact, but “forgery” a question of law? There *94must be a basis for any finding of falsity, and the effect of any such finding is a question of law.
Confronted with a similar case of an election board’s rejection of a petition because of technical inaccuracies in the affidavit, the Supreme Court of Ohio held:
“[W]e think that the determination made by the board against the validity of the petition was too technical, unreasonable and arbitrary — in short, an abuse of discretion — and that upon the facts which [the board] had in its possession it was under the clear legal duty to approve and accept the petition . . ..”
State ex rel. Schwarz v. Hamilton County Board of Elections, 173 Ohio St. 321, 323, 181 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1962). The same reasoning should be applied here.
In announcing the arbitrary powers held by the Board, the Opinion of the Chief Justice relies heavily on Fraser v. Cummings, 48 Cal.App. 504, 192 P. 100 (1st Dist. 1920). Accordingly, it is instructive to see how California courts, following the mandamus standard set out in Fraser, have treated cases involving allegedly defective affidavits attached to voters’ petitions. In Whittemore v. Seydel, 74 Cal.App.2d 109, 168 P.2d 212 (3d Dist. 1946), the court issued a writ of mandate against city officials who rejected a petition because the attached affidavits were not properly dated. The court reasoned:
“To construe the provision . . . regarding the affidavit so as to render the whole proceeding void . would be a case of the tail’s wagging the dog. Here the petition and the affidavits furnished [sufficient] evidence ... [to determine] that the requisite number of qualified electors had signed. Under such circumstances- the wishes of said electors should not be defeated by the omissions of the affidavits.”
Id. at 116,168 P.2d at 216.
*95In Truman v. Royer, 189 Cal.App.2d 240, 11 Cal.Rptr. 159 (1st Dist.1961), the affidavits were false in a material respect in that the law required the affiant to be a voter of the city and several of the affiants were not. Nevertheless, the city clerk proceeded to check the signatures on the sheets to which the affidavits were attached and found them to be satisfactory. The affidavit requirements were mandatory on the petitioners. The court stated, however, that the affidavits:
“ . . . are for the benefit and convenience of the clerk, and if he checks the petition with the voters register and finds the signers qualified, he must certify the petition as sufficient. People v. City of Belmont, 1929, 100 Cal.App. 537, 541, 280 P. 540. The defective affidavits accompanying the referendum petition are not part of the petitions themselves, and failure of such should not invalidate a petition which was in fact signed by the requisite number of qualified voters who themselves had complied with all statutory requirements to make their petition effective. Whittemore v. Seydel, supra, 74 Cal.App.2d at pages 115-116, 168 P. 2d at pages 217-218. Inasmuch as the power of referendum is one reserved to the people, and in order to protect the people in the exercise of this power, statutory and charter provisions dealing with such powers are always liberally construed in favor of the power. Blotter v. Farrell, 1954, 42 Cal.2d 804, 809, 270 P.2d 481. The Clerk was duty bound to certify the petition as sufficient when his investigation disclosed an ample number of qualified signers.”
Id. at 243, 11 Cal.Rptr. at 162. Clearly, here, where the alleged defects in the affidavits were not material — the affiants in this case were not required to be registered voters — the Board was duty bound to certify the signatures which it found to be genuine after its investigation.
Nothing in Nomination of Cianfrani, 467 Pa. 491, 359 A.2d 383 (1976), compels a contrary result. In Cian*96frani, the candidate, in his affidavit, falsely swore that he was a member of the Democratic Party. Such a false statement might be of considerable importance to the voters signing his petition. Even if a candidate intends to change his registration after filing his petition, it may be a matter of concern to the voters signing the petition that he will have been a member of their party for so short a period. It might also concern them that the candidate has falsely sworn to an affidavit. A voter who would not have signed the petition if he knew the truth about the candidate cannot be said to have been disenfranchised when the candidate is disqualified. The voter who signs a recall petition, on the other hand, does not care whether the circulator is registered or has moved since registering. The voter’s concern is with the official subject to recall, not with the individual circulating the affidavit. The voter signing a recall petition is disenfranchised if the petition is thrown out because of irregularities in the circulator’s affidavit.
More importantly, in Cianfrani it was the candidate himself who swore to the false affidavit. With a recall petition, where no candidate is trying to benefit by his own misconduct, there is no reason to penalize innocent voters who signed the recall petition. Petition of Smith, 114 N.J.Super. 421, 276 A.2d 868 (1971). Similarly, Lefkowitz v. Cohen, 262 App.Div. 452, 29 N.Y.S.2d 817, aff’d, 286 N.Y. 499, 36 N.E.2d 680 (1941), held that the strict standard applicable when the candidate himself has participated in fraud does not apply when the candidate was not involved in the petition irregularities.
Finally, this Court in Nomination of Cianfrani, supra, based its decision on Catherine Township Liquor Referendum Case, 382 Pa. 291, 114 A.2d 145 (1955). In a companion case, decided the same day, this Court held that an affidavit was not invalid because the circulator used her husband’s name preceded by the title “Mrs.” instead of *97signing her name as it appeared on the registration roles. In an unanimous decision this Court reasoned:
“[T]he objections to the petitions related to no more than innocent and immaterial irregularities, free of fraud, and therefore to be ignored and not permitted to prevent a full and free expression of the electorate’s will with respect to the questions submitted
Blair Township Liquor Referendum Case, 382 Pa. 295, 299, 114 A.2d 148, 149 (1955). Likewise here, the supposed defects of the affidavits to the recall petition were innocent and immaterial. The people of Philadelphia should not be deprived of their right to vote on the recall issue due to such technicalities. By signing the petition, over one hundred and fifty thousand voters have expressed their desire that a recall vote be held. It is a tragedy that the Opinion of the Chief Justice would allow the Board to disenfranchise these voters because of immaterial technicalities. There can be no doubt that the trial court correctly ruled that the Board’s efforts to prevent the recall because of claimed irregularities in the affidavits was an abuse of the Board’s discretion and contrary to the law.21
*98B. The Notarizations are legal.
The Opinion of the Chief Justice states that 115,818 signatures to the recall petition are invalid because they were on sheets notarized by persons who supported recall. These notaries include the attorney for the Recall Committee, salaried employees of the Committee, and in*99dividuals who circulated petitions. All were in fact notaries, and none notarized his own sheets. According to the Opinion of the Chief Justice, these persons were “directly or pecuniarily interested” in the transaction so as to render their notarizations in violation of the Notary Public Law. Act of August 21, 1953, P.L. 1323, § 19(e), 57 P.S. § 165(e) (1964). This conclusion ignores the well established principle that “general employment or employment as [an] agent or attorney in a matter gives a notary no such interest as to invalidate an official act done by him . . . .” 66 C.J.S. Notaries § 6 at p. 618; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Blau, 393 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1965). It also conflicts with prior case law in Pennsylvania.22
An almost identical argument was presented to the court in Gallipolis v. State, 36 Ohio App. 258, 173 N.E. 36 (1930), where an attorney for parties seeking a referendum had notarized the petition. The court found no impropriety in the attorney’s action, and upheld the grant of a writ of mandamus compelling the City to hold the referendum.23
*100That the Opinion of the Chief Justice has stretched the words of the Notary Public Law far beyond their intended application is revealed by its suggestion that to hold that petition circulators were not “directly or pecuniarily interested” would be inconsistent with the determination that they have standing to bring this action. The Notary Public Law and the law of standing serve different purposes, and the nature of the interest necessary to confer standing is far different, from that which would disqualify a notary public. The interest necessary to confer standing is relatively minor, see e. g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973), and to hold that such an interest would disqualify a notary public would foreclose many suits, because no person could be found who could validly notarize the pleadings. Indeed, some states have held that a taxpayer or elector has standing to bring an action in mandamus to compel a recall vote:
“The petition alleges that the plaintiff .is an elector and taxpayer of the city of Richmond, and as such it is clear that he is directly interested in the subject-matter of this action.”
Conn v. City of Richmond, 17 Cal.App. 705, 710, 121 P. 714, 716-17 (1st Dist. 1912) (emphasis added); accord, Miller v. Greiner, 60 Cal.2d 827, 36 Cal.Rptr. 737, 389 P. 2d 129 (1964). If the interest necessary to confer standing was enough to disqualify a notary, no voter or taxpayer would be able to notarize a recall petition.
It should be clear that the provision of the Notary Public Law is aimed at situations where the notary’s self-interest creates a serious danger of fraud — hence the emphasis on “pecuniary interest.” Such is not the case here, where, as the Board’s own investigation discovered, *101the petition sheets which the Opinion of the Chief Justice states were illegally notarized contain genuine and valid signatures.
Even if the Opinion of the Chief Justice has interpreted the Notary Public Law correctly, it provides no reason to invalidate the petition. Its interpretation of the Notary Public Law is unquestionably a strange and novel one, and it cannot be said that the circulators knew, or could have known, that the Opinion would reach such a conclusion. I would adopt the rule in Stern v. Board of Elections, 14 Ohio St.2d 175, 237 N.E.2d 313 (1968), where the Ohio Supreme Court held that, given the public policy in favor of free elections, a petition should not be invalidated for technical failure to comply with the notary public statute. The 156,214 citizens who signed the recall petition should not be disenfranchised simply because of a pronouncement that the petition was improperly notarized. As the court below observed: “It would be unconscionable to hold that the remedy for an improper notarization is the invalidation of the petition. It is the perpetrator of the wrong who may be subject to penalty, surely not the concerned elector who signed the petition.” Opinion of Savitt, J., C.P. No. 3466, at 51-52 (filed September 16, 1976).
The extreme technicality with which both the affidavits and the notarizations have been treated in this case can only be justified on the basis of a supposition that recall petitions are suspect. Such a view evinces a belief that the citizens of Philadelphia cannot be trusted to vote responsibly — that they cannot be expected, by their yes-no vote, to distinguish proper recall movements from those situations where an official should be retained. It rejects the expectations of the drafters of the Charter that “the electorate will exercise its power wisely . . . . ” 351 Pa.Code, § 9.9-100 Annot. 2 (1974). It ignores the interpretation given to other home rule charters that “legislation affording the people a right to *102. recall public officials is to be given the same liberal construction as that extended to election statutes generally.” Reites v. Wilkerson, 99 Cal.App.2d 500, 503, 222 P.2d 81, 83 (2d Dist. 1950). Courts are, and must be, extremely protective of the right to vote; the treatment of the recall petition in the Opinion of the Chief Justice is a drastic departure from this standard.
III. RECALL IS CONSTITUTIONAL
A. The Opinions striking down recall should not have reached the issue.
If the Board of Elections properly rejected the recall petition, this case should be decided on nonconstitutional grounds. By proceeding further and unnecessarily addressing the constitutional issue, the opinions striking down recall depart from basic principles of judicial decision making.23a It is well settled that courts do not decide constitutional issues where a nonconstitutional ground is dispositive. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314, 95 S.Ct. 992, 997, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1384, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring). This Court has consistently adhered to this *103principle.24 Most recently, in Lattzanzio v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 461 Pa. 392, 336 A.2d 595 (1975), this Court stated:
“[T]he basic law of this jurisdiction [is] that statutes are presumed constitutional, and we will not reach constitutional issues where the matter can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds.” 25
Id. at 395,336 A.2d at 597 (citations omitted).
There is no jurisprudential need to reach the constitutionality of the recall provisions. The Opinion of the Chief Justice and the Concurring Opinions dash “the hopes and expectations” of thousands of Pennsylvanians by unnecessarily and erroneously abolishing recall without affording them an opportunity to be heard. The opinions attempt to justify this abrupt departure from precedent by noting that many municipalities, boroughs and townships in Pennsylvania have, or are presently considering recall provisions in their governing *104charters.25a The Justices striking down recall should heed the principle that:
“ [U] nder our constitutional system courts are not roving commissions, assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws.”
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 602, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973).
B. Philadelphia’s recall provisions are constitutional.
The discussion of the constitutionality of recall in the Opinion of the Chief Justice and the Concurring Opinions is both inappropriate and erroneous. Recall does not violate Article VI, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This section provides:
“All civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime. Appointed civil officers, other than judges of the courts of record, may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed. All civil officers elected by the people, except the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, members of the General Assembly and judges of the courts of record, shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.” 25b
*105In order to invalidate the recall provisions of the Charter, the Opinion of the Chief Justice rewrites Article VI, section 7, and misconstrues the decisions of this Court which have interpreted it. The Concurring Opinions of Mr. Justice O’Brien and Mr. Justice Nix not only rewrite the Constitution, but would overrule the decisions of this Court which have distinguished between constitutional and non-constitutional officers in the application of the constitutional removal provisions. Moreover, the opinions striking down recall ignore the well developed body of law from other jurisdictions sustaining recall against the constitutional arguments presented here.26 There is nothing in the Pennsylvania Constitu*106tion or the decisions of this Court which prohibits the people of Philadelphia from holding their elected officials accountable through the recall mechanism. The opinions striking down recall have “ ‘wrest [ed] the words of the organic law to a purpose which it does not disclose.’ ” Richie v. Philadelphia, 225 Pa. 511, 517, 74 A. 430, 432 (1909), quoting Donohugh v. Roberts, 11 Wkly.N.C. 186 (1881).
The trial court properly determined that the recall provisions were not in conflict with the Pennsylvania Constitution. That decision should be affirmed.
1. The Opinion of the Chief Justice rewrites the Constitution.
The Opinion of the Chief Justice rewrites Article VI, section 7, in order to justify his result. Article VI, section 7 provides that “All civil officials elected by the people . . . shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.” The Opinion of the Chief Justice inserts the word “only” before the phrase “for reasonable cause” and holds that elected civil officials may be removed only for cause. This interpretation of Article VI, section 7 is not supported by the language of the section and is internally inconsistent. The Opinion states that although elected civil officials *107can be removed only for cause, the Legislature may provide for different methods of removal. If the Opinion interprets the phrase “shall be removed . . . for reasonable cause” to mean that elected officials can only be removed for cause, then it must also interpret “shall be removed by the Governor ... on the address of two-thirds of the Senate” to mean that officials can be removed only by the Governor on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.
The only reasonable interpretation of Article VI, section 7 is that when the Governor removes elected public officials he may do so only for reasonable cause on the address of two-thirds of the Senate. The requirement of “reasonable cause” only refers to the Governor’s removal powers; Article VI, section 7 reads that elected officials shall be removed “by the Governor for reasonable cause . .” It bears no relation to the voters’ right to recall.
Implicit in the Chief Justice’s interpretation of Article VI, section 7 is that the sole condition for holding elected office is that officers “behave themselves well while in office.” Just as the Opinion of the Chief Justice injects the word “only” to modify “for reasonable cause”, so it has inserted the word “sole” before the word “condition.” Nowhere does Article VI, section 7 provide that the exclusive condition for holding elected office is good behavior. The Opinion of the Chief Justice, under the guise of constitutional interpretation, again rewrites Article VI, section 7 to comport with his own notions of representative government. In so doing, the Opinion also confuses two distinct removal procedures.26a Since there is nothing in Article VI, section 7 which provides *108that elected officials hold office solely on the condition of “good behavior,” this provision does not preclude the people of Philadelphia from electing their public officials subject to the Charter recall provisions.
Article IX of the Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to provide for local governments.27 This article indicates that the framers of the Constitution recognized the importance of local control of municipal affairs. The power to recall municipal officials, who have been elected subject to charters providing for recall, is fully consonant with the constitutional scheme for local self-government. When Article VI, section 7 is interpreted in light of Article IX, it is clear that the constitutional framers did not intend its removal provisions for state officers to limit the right of municipalities to enact recall for local officials.
Other jurisdictions with similar home rule provisions in their constitutions have interpreted their constitutional removal provisions so as not to limit a municipality’s right to enact a Charter providing for recall of local officials.
In Bonner v. Belsterling, 137 S.W. 1154 (Tex.Civ.App.1911), aff’d, 104 Tex. 432, 138 S.W. 571 (1911), elected members of the Board of Education challenged the constitutionality of recall as violative of the state constitutional removal provisions which required cause and trial by jury. The court held that the constitutional removal provisions were inapplicable to municipal officers. As the constitution provided for local self-government the court reasoned that the constitutional removal *109provisions for state officers did not limit the municipality’s right to enact recall provisions:
“The office . . . is an office created by the charter . . . and such member is a municipal officer . . The office is created by the charter, which also contains the recall provision, and it was under this charter that . . . appellant was elected . . [Recall] is not in conflict with the Constitution. The Constitution recognizes that cities should be permitted to determine for themselves and in their own way the many important questions of local policy as they arise.”
137 S.W. at 1158.
In Dunham v. Ardery, 43 Okl. 619, 143 P. 331, 333 (1914), a leading case on recall, the court rejected the argument that the constitutional removal provisions were exclusive as to municipal officials.
“To so hold would be equivalent to holding that our Constitution was diametrically opposed to the charter form of government and the principle known as the recall. If it were not intended under the constitution to give cities adopting the Charter form of government, the power and right to put in practice the power to recall their officers, then there would have been some express inhibition; and in the absence of such, we are not warranted in holding that such power is by implication inhibited.”
2. The Opinion of the Chief Justice misapplies the decisions of this Court.
Prior decisions of this Court lend no support to the Chief Justice’s construction of Article VI, section 7. The decisions of this Court interpreting the removal provisions of the Constitution, have consistently distinguished between “constitutional” officers, those created by the Constitution, and “nonconstitutional” officers, those *110whose selection is not provided for in the Constitution.28 Sections 6 and 7 of Article VI form the sole basis for the removal of constitutional officers.29 Since the Legislature can neither create nor abolish constitutional offices, it has no power to alter the conditions of these constitutional offices by enacting alternatives to the constitutional removal provisions. Bowman’s Case, 225 Pa. 364, 367-68, 74 A. 203, 204 (1909). This rationale is not applicable to public officials whose positions are created by the Legislature. Article VI, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
“All officers, whose selection is not provided for in this Constitution, shall be elected or appointed as may be directed by law.”
Because the Legislature may “direct” the election or appointment of officers whose selection is not provided for in the Constitution, it may also “direct” a method of removal other than those provided for in the Constitution.30
*111The constitutional removal provisions are only pertinent for nonconstitutional officers where the Legislature has not provided for alternative removal procedures.31 Where the Legislature has provided alternative methods of removal, the constitutional provisions are simply not applicable.
The office of the Mayor of Philadelphia is not enumerated in the Constitution and is therefore not a constitutional office. The office of Mayor is created by the Charter and is subject to the Charter’s recall provisions. Article IX, section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution authorizes municipalities to enact home rule charters under which the municipality may exercise any function or power not denied by the Constitution or General Assembly. The Home Rule Charter Act,32 enacted pursuant to Article IX, section 2 provides:
“The city taking advantage of this act shall have complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its municipal functions, including the power and authority to prescribe the elective city officers . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 33
This Court, in Addison’s Case, 385 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d 272 (1956), held that the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter had the force and status of a legislative enactment. Therefore, the recall provisions of the Charter provide a valid legislative alternative to the constitutional removal *112provisions. Since the office of Mayor is a Charter office, and not a constitutional office, the Charter provisions and not the constitutional removal provisions apply-
This Court has consistently recognized the power of the Legislature to enact provisions for the removal of nonconstitutional elected officials. Today the Opinion of the Chief Justice adopts the long discredited position that Article VI, section 7 limits the Legislature’s power to prescribe the removal of nonconstitutional officers.34 The Opinion misapplies the decisions of this Court, and ignores the underlying rationale for the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers.
The Chief Justice’s reliance upon the decisions of this Court which have upheld legislative removal procedures for nonconstitutional officers is misplaced. In each of these cases, the removal procedure specifically provided for removal for cause. Therefore, this Court has never faced the question whether the Legislature may enact a removal procedure which does not require cause.35 Nothing in these cases suggests that this Court upheld these legislative removal procedures because they required cause. The Opinion of the Chief Justice infers the con*113stitutional necessity for cause from the mere fact that the Legislature has heretofore chosen alternatives which required cause. The error in the Chief Justice’s reasoning lies in his assumption that because legislative schemes have provided for removal for cause, cause is constitutionally mandated.
Thus, these cases do not support the conclusion of the Opinion of the Chief Justice that cause is essential in any means of removal established by statute or home rule charter for nonconstitutional offices. In fact, the decisions have no bearing on the constitutionality of Philadelphia’s recall provisions.
The Opinion of the Chief Justice primarily relies on Foltz Appeal, 370 Pa. 567, 88 A.2d 871 (1952), to assert that cause and due process are essential in any legislatively created means of removal for elected civil officials. This reliance on Foltz is unfounded. Foltz only addressed the issue whether the petitioners had established a “refusal or neglect to perform duties” as was required by the statutory removal procedure at issue. The complaint and petition in Foltz were brought pursuant to section 503 of the Second Class Township Law (1947 P. L. 1481, as amended, 53 P.S. § 19093-503) which provides that:
“[I]f any township officer refuses or neglects to perform, his duties, the court of quarter sessions, upon complaint in writing by five percentum of the registered electors of the township, may issue a rule upon such officer to show cause why his office should not be declared vacant and another appointed in his stead. . Upon hearing, and proof that the facts alleged in the complaint are true, the court may declare the office vacant and appoint another in his stead, to hold office during the term of the officer deposed, or to make such other order as to the court may seem just or proper.”
*114The Court in Foltz determined that there was insufficient evidence for the Court to remove the supervisors for the reasons required in section 503. The ,case did not hold that the electorate could not recall elected officials without cause.
The Chief Justice’s extensive quotation from Foltz, which involved the judicial removal of an elected official, is simply not relevant to recall. Removal by a recall election is vastly different from removal by another branch of the government. Removal of an elected official by another branch of government nullifies the electorate’s choice that a particular individual shall hold office. It also presents a danger that one branch of government may become dominant by abusing its power of removal, thus undermining our system of checks and balances. These may be important reasons for requiring that cause be established before another branch of government removes an elected official. Where the right of removal is reserved to the people these considerations are not present. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in Gordon v. Leatherman, 450 F.2d 562, 567 (5th Cir. 1971):
“[Tjhere is a fundamental difference between the expulsion or removal of a public official by the state and that same activity by the voters.”
The reasons for the recall of an official, as in every electoral process, are properly left to the people:
“[A]n elector may vote for a good reason, a bad reason, or for no reason whatsoever. That principle applies to recall elections as it does to all other elections.”
Gordon v. Leatherman, supra, 450 F.2d at 567.36
*1153. The Opinion of the Chief Justice confuses recall with impeachment.
The Chief Justice’s discussion of the alleged constitutional infirmities of recall evinces a misapprehension of the nature and purpose of recall. Because he confuses recall with impeachment, the Chief Justice ignores cases from other jurisdictions which have considered the validity of recall. Recall is based on the principle that elected officials take office on the condition that they be accountable to the electorate throughout their term of office. The Opinion of the Chief Justice confuses recall and impeachment by holding that elected officials can only be removed for cause.
The Opinion of the Chief Justice implicitly views the entire concept of recall as antithetical to the Pennsylvania Constitution. This offends the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Article I, section 2 proclaims that “[A] 11 power is inherent in the people” and reserves to the people the right to “alter, reform or abolish their government.” The recall of elected officials effectuates this basic declaration of the Constitution.
The theoretical basis of recall is found in the very section of the Pennsylvania Constitution which the Opinion of the Chief Justice uses to strike it down. Article VI, section 7, expressly permits the removal of appointed officials at the discretion of the appointing power.37 Recall has been characterized as the dismissal of an appointed officer one step removed. The electorate, the “appointing” and ultimate source of power in a democracy, can remove elected officials who are “appointed” by the electorate. State ex rel. Topping v. Houston, supra; *11663 Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees § 239 (1972). In Topping, the court reasoned:
“The idea of removing public officers at the discretion of the appointing power ... is not a novel one. The concept that this may be done at the direct instance and upon the motion of the electors, the ultimate source of power in a republic, only carries back the power of removal one step farther. If it is not obnoxious to the Constitution to allow an elected officer to remove an appointed one, how can it be a violation of that law to allow it to be done by the people themselves.”
94 Neb. at 455, 143 N.W. at 800.
Courts which understand the nature and purpose of recall have upheld its validity. Home rule charter provisions providing for recall of elected officials have been upheld against the contention that recall violates state constitutional provisions as to method of impeachment, length of tenure of office, and method of removal.38
In Hilzinger v. Gillman, supra, the court upheld the recall provisions of Everett, Washington against the contention that they violated the state’s constitutional removal provisions. The court noted:
“It is finally urged that the recall provision in the charter is violative of section 3, art. 5, of the Constitution, which provides that: ‘All officers not liable to impeachment shall be subject to removal for misconduct or malfeasance in office in such manner as may be provided by law.’ . . . The people of the city of Everett in framing the charter intended that their representatives should be held strictly amenable to both the existing and changing public sentiment on all local measures, and that, if the official conduct of any elective officer failed at any time to so respond, he was subject to recall if the majority of the electorate in his *117district so determined. The appellant accepted the trust subject to this power in his constituency, and the duration of his term of office is dependent upon the [wish] of the majority as expressed at the polls. The removal sought is not of the character provided for in the Constitution. Whether the interests of the city will be better subserved by a ready obedience to public sentiment than by a courageous adherence to the views of the individual officer on questions of public concern is a political, and not a legal, question.”
Hilzinger, 56 Wash, at 234, 105 P. at 473-74.
Courts have held that the validity of recall is not predicated on any requirement that officials be removed for cause.39 They have recognized that the recall of an elected official, like his election in the first place, is a political and not a judicial decision.40
In Conn v. City Council, supra, the court in upholding the validity of recall, noted:
“Manifestly the purpose of the charter in providing for a recall election is to give the people of the municipality the right to cut short the official term of every elected officer whose conduct in office is for any cause *118unsatisfactory or distasteful to the body of the community. . . . [N] owhere in the procedure . is anything said, either expressly or impliedly, which requires a recall petition to designate the specific acts for which a removal is sought. .
“It will not be disputed that the electors of a community are as well qualified to determine whether an . officer shall remain in office as they were to decide upon his qualifications for office in the first instance; and in so far as the charter of the city of Richmond is concerned, it is clearly the privilege of the people at the polls, rather than the province of the courts, to pass upon the sufficiency of the grounds . for the removal of an elected officer by the modern method of a recall election
17 Cal.App. at 712, 121 P. at 717 (1st Dist. 1911) (emphasis added).
Thus, there is no basis for any conclusion that public officials can be removed only for cause, after notice and a hearing. Such a conclusion can only be based on a failure to comprehend the differences between recall and impeachment.
Twenty-five years ago, the drafters, the Charter Commission and the people of Philadelphia recognized the difference between impeachment and recall, and overwhelmingly chose recall. In its report to the voters, the Charter Commission stated:
“There has been much public criticism of the process of impeachment prescribed by the present Charter. We have sought a more satisfactory device for the removal of an elected official .... [W]e have found it in recall . . . . ”
Report To The Voters, supra at 18. The abolition of recall is a judicial usurpation of what is clearly a decision for the people.
*1194. The Concurring Opinions misconstrue the Constitutions.
a. Like the Opinion of the Chief Justice, the Opinions of Mr. Justice O’Brien and Mr. Justice Nix are compelled to rewrite the Constitution in order to invalidate recall. Both opinions state that the constitutional removal provisions are the exclusive procedures for the removal of elected civil officials. While the two opinions use somewhat different reasoning, both reach their conclusion on the basis of a textual analysis of Article VI.
Mr. Justice Nix reasons that the provisions of Article VI, section 7, clauses 1 and 3 are mandatory and therefore exclusive. Although Mr. Justice Nix would have it appear that exclusivity is mandated from a “plain and untechnical reading” of Article VI, section 7, a textual analysis of the section does not support this interpretation.
Article VI, section 7, cl. 1 provides that all civil officers shall be removed upon conviction of misbehavior in office or for any infamous crime. Article VI, section 7, cl. 3 provides that elected civil officials shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause on the address of two-thirds of the Senate. Although the language of these provisions may be mandatory in the event of conviction for misbehavior in office or for an infamous crime, or upon the establishment of reasonable cause, there is no language indicating that they are exclusive.41
*120Mr. Justice O’Brien concludes that the inclusion of several removal mechanisms in the Pennsylvania Constitution necessarily excludes all others. He recognizes that while the Federal Government is a government of delegated powers, the State is not so limited. Nevertheless, he determines that the power to remove all civil officers is limited to those methods specifically enumerated in the Constitution. There is no basis for such a conclusion. In the absence of express language of limitation, it does not follow that a provision in the State Constitution, making procedures available without the need for legislative enablement, necessarily prevents the Legislature from enacting similar provisions.
The Concurring Opinions conclude, solely from the words of the Constitution, that the removal provisions are exclusive. Since there is no language of exclusivity in these provisions, however, any conclusion that they are exclusive cannot come from language of the Constitution, but must be derived from an analysis of the constitutional framework.42
*121Contrary to the approach taken in the Concurring Opinions, the Constitution is not to be interpreted by the application of mechanistic rules, so as to give the words a meaning which does not appear on their face and which undermines the basic purposes of the Constitution. Rather, this Court should interpret the constitutional removal provisions in light of the overall constitutional scheme. As this Court stated in Commonwealth ex rel. Smillie v. McElwee, 327 Pa. 148, 193 A. 628 (1937):
“ ‘Written constitutions should be construed with reference to and in the light of well-recognized and fundamental principles lying back of all constitutions, and constituting the very warp and woof of these fabrics.’ ” 43
*122Looking at the overall constitutional scheme, there is a basis for deciding that the constitutional removal provisions are exclusive as to constitutional officers. This principle, however, stems from the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers set out in Article VI, section l.44 It cannot be used to support the *123reasoning of the Concurring Opinions that the constitutional removal provisions are exclusive as to nonconstitutional officers as well.
When the Constitution created certain offices, rather than leaving them to be created by the Legislature, it intended that these offices be independent of the Legislature. Since the Legislature does not have the power to create the office, it cannot abolish it nor alter the conditions of tenure. This balance of power, envisioned by the Constitution, would be destroyed if the Legislature could enact conditions of tenure, including removal provisions, for constitutional officers other than those provided for in the Constitution.
None of these considerations are present, however, in the case of those offices which the Constitution specifically allows the Legislature to create. The Constitution envisions that the Legislature may provide for the selection and removal of both elected and appointed officers. To hold that the constitutional removal provisions proscribe the Legislature’s power to control officers which they have created subverts this constitutional framework.
The Concurring Opinions’ interpretation of the Constitution also subverts the constitutional provisions for local self-government. Article IX of the Pennsylvania Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to provide for local government. It provides for the delegation of comprehensive power to municipal government. Central to this constitutional scheme of local self-control is the power of local government to select and remove its own elected officials. When the removal provisions of Article *124VI are construed in light of Article IX it is clear that the constitutional framers did not intend the removal provisions enumerated in the Constitution to proscribe the power of local government to remove local officials.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Smillie v. McElwee, supra, this Court recognized the importance of home rule, and the importance of the proper distribution of power between state and local government, in our constitutional framework:
“ . . . the principle of ‘home rule,’ i. e., local self-government, which, like the triparte separation of governmental powers, is a vital part of both the foundations and the general framework of our state and federal governments.”
“ . . . [T]he primary and vital idea of [home rule] is, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities . . . .”
327 Pa. at 152, 193 A. at 630.
When construed in this context, it is clear that the constitutional removal provisions were not intended to limit the power of local government and its citizens to remove their own officials.
b. In order to invalidate recall, the Concurring Opinions are compelled to assert that the long line of cases which have distinguished between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers should be overruled. This distinction is articulated in the Constitution itself,45 and had *125been recognized by this Court at least since 1867.46 Yet the Concurring Opinions would have it appear that Milford Township Supervisors’ Removal, supra, created a new rule of decision when it held that Article VI, section 7, cl. 3 does not apply to the removal of nonconstitutional officers if the Legislature enacts alternative removal procedures. Milford did not announce a new doctrine; it merely applied a well established doctrine to facts well within the contemplation of the cases which established the doctrine.
Over a century ago, this Court recognized the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers and unequivocally sanctioned the power of the Legislature to select and remove nonconstitutional elected officers:
“Not having been mentioned by the Constitution, the legislature was left with unrestricted power to prescribe what the duties of the office should be, what the length of its tenure, what its emoluments, and how it should be filled. Having the power to create, they have also the power to regulate, and even destroy.”
*126Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436, 439 (1867). In discussing the constitutional removal provisions (then Article VI, section 9, now Article VI, section 7, cl. 1), this Court noted:
“It was never intended to put offices created by the legislature beyond the control and regulation of the creating power. It was not intended to ordain that an office for a term of years, once made, should not be modified or abolished, while the term remained unexpired.”
Id. at 441.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Braughler v. Weir, 165 Pa. 284, 30 A. 835 (1895), this Court, in a case involving an elected official, followed McCombs and reaffirmed the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers:
“ . . . as to offices which are legislative only and not constitutional, the power which created them may abolish or change them at pleasure without impinging upon any constitutional right of the possessor of the office, and without violating any duty of the legislative body.”
Id. at 288, 30 A. at 836.47
Several years later, this Court, in upholding legislation which had the effect of removing an elected municipal official before his term of office expired, again recognized the extensive legislative power over nonconstitutional officers:
“There is no right to a public office, unless it is under the express protection of the constitution, and such protection is nowhere given to municipal officers. . Merely official positions, unprotected by any special constitutional provisions, are subject to the ex*127ercise of the power of revision and repeal by the legislature. . . . ”
Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 548-49, 49 A. 351, 355 (1901) (citationsomitted).
In Bowman’s Case, supra, this Court held that the constitutional removal provisions were exclusive as to constitutional officers. In so doing, this Court noted the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers and expressly recognized that nonconstitutional officers might not be subject to the constitutional removal provisions:
“As a constitutional . . . officer, elected by the people, he is to be removed from his office only by the Governor for reasonable cause after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate, for, though others filling purely legislative offices may be without the constitutional provision as to removal, he is clearly within it.”
225 Pa. at 368, 74 A. at 204. (emphasis added). Bowman was not the first case to recognize the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers. Rather Bowman was merely referring to an already well established principle. In the same year that Bowman was decided, this Court stated:
“ . . .a clear distinction is recognized by our cases between a constitutional office enjoying exemption from legislative interference and control and one wholly legislative, created and abolished at the legislative will.”
Richie v. Philadelphia, 225 Pa. 511, 513, 74 A. 430 (1909).
Ten years after Bowman, this Court reemphasized the importance of the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers in Commonwealth ex rel. Vesneski v. Reid, supra. Although Reid specifically held that in the absence of a legislative enactment an elected *128official had to be removed on the basis of the constitutional removal provisions, the opinion clearly sanctions legislative alternatives to the constitutional removal provisions in the case of nonconstitutional elected officials.48
Thus, it is clear that Milford did not announce a new rule of decision. Rather, it merely applied a well established doctrine, articulated by the Constitution, and consistently adhered to by this Court for over a century. Moreover, subsequent cases have uniformly adopted Milford’s rationale.49 There is no reason to overrule this long line of cases.50 They are consistent with the letter of the Constitution and give effect to the constitutional *129distribution of power between state and local government.
c. The Concurring Opinions state that the constitutional removal provisions are exclusive, but there is no language in the Constitution which supports their interpretation. The opinions employ mechanistic rules of interpretation to give the removal provisions a meaning which does not appear on their face. They fail to comprehend Article VI, section 1, the constitutional provision which authorizes the Legislature to select and remove nonconstitutional officers, and assert that the cases interpreting this provision should be overruled. At the same time, the Concurring Opinions fail to give the constitutional removal provisions an interpretation which is consistent with the overall constitutional framework. If a majority of this Court were to adopt the position taken in the Concurring Opinions, local government and its citizens would be powerless to remove their own elected officials, and the constitutional provision for local self-government would be undermined.
Moreover, the Concurring Opinions only obfuscate the issue presented: the validity of recall. As the Concurring Opinions recognize, the position they take is contrary to the case law in this jurisdiction. Since the Concurring Opinions do not overrule these cases, the Legislature still has the power to enact removal provisions governing the offices it creates. While the Concurring Opinions may question whether the Legislature should have this power, they provide no basis for a conclusion that this power does not include the authority to provide for recall. Thus, the Legislature may provide for the removal of nonconstitutional officials, and this power must include the ability to authorize the recall of nonconstitutional elected officials. Provisions for the recall of the Mayor of Philadelphia have been adopted pursuant to this authority; the recall provisions of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter are constitutional.
*130IV.
The citizens of Philadelphia, by their vote adopting the Home Rule Charter, determined that officials elected under the Charter accept office subject to recall by the electorate. In reserving to themselves the power to recall elected officials, the citizens of Philadelphia, like thousands of other Pennsylvanians, have acted in accordance with well established principles of American self-government. Their decision to adopt a procedure for more direct control over city government “is a classic demonstration of ‘devotion to democracy . . . ” City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668, 679, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 2364, 49 L.Ed.2d 132 (1976), quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 1334, 28 L.Ed.2d 678 (1973).
Although they cannot agree on their reasons, the Opinion of the Chief Justice and the Concurring Opinions, without necessity or justification, pronounce recall unconstitutional. Like democracy itself, recall may not be perfect, but it is not for this Court to question the wisdom of its adoption. One can only hope that in the future, in another setting, this Court will come to a more realistic and enlightened view and restore to Pennsylvania their right to recall.
I dissent and would affirm the trial court’s order directing that the recall vote be held.

. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice O’Brien, Mr. Justice Nix and Mr. Justice Manderino voted to reverse, while Mr. Justice Eagen voted to remand. Mr. Justice Pomeroy and this writer dissented, and noted that the trial court’s order placing the recall vote on the ballot should be affirmed.

. The four Justices who voted to strike the recall vote from the ballot issue three opinions in support of their September 30 order. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice O’Brien file separate opinions, and Mr. Justice Nix files an opinion in which he is joined by Mr. Justice Manderino. Thus, there is no opinion of the Court. The four Justices who voted to reverse still maintain that the recall vote cannot be held, and that recall is somehow unconstitutional, but cannot find a common ground to justify their September 30 order.

. C. Adrian, State and Local Government 138 (4th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Adrian]; F. Bird & F. Ryan, The Recall of Public Officers 304 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Bird & Ryan]; Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (4th rev. ed. 1968); E. Phelps (ed.), The Recall 1 (1913) [hereinafter cited as Phelps].

. Bird & Ryan, at 4. Recall was not totally unknown in this country before 1903. The Articles of Confederation contained a recall provision.
“For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct with a power reserved to each state to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year.”
Articles of Confederation, art. V, quoted in id. 3 n. 2. One writer has noted that recall was effectively employed at a critical juncture in the history of this country. The Pennsylvania delegates to the Continental Congress were recalled because they refused to sign the Declaration of Independence and were replaced by delegates willing “to carry out the imperative mandate of the people.” Schaffner, Recall, in Phelps, supra at 37.

. Bird & Ryan, supra at 4.

. Adrian, supra at 139.

. Source: Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs.

. E. g„ Pa.Const. art. I, § 2; The Federalist No. 39 (J. Madison).

. Cabinet Opinion, April 28, 1793, quoted in E. Dumbauld, The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson 79 (1955).

. C. Beard & B. Shultz (eds.), Documents On the State-Wide Initiative, Referendum and Recall 52 (1970); D. Wilcox, Government By All the People 170-71 (1912) [hereinafter cited as Wilcox]. In the absence of recall provisions, the people can elect their representatives only at stated intervals. One commentator has stated:
“According to this theory . . . governors and mayors are temporary princes of [their] jurisdictions. . . . Under this theory, the people are regarded as incapable of self-government, as not qualified to express or have an opinion on specific governmental policies, but only to pass upon the efficiency of their government in a general way. . . . The Recall does not accept this theory of representative government. It holds that a representative is a servant, an agent, not a master.”
Wilcox, supra at 170-71; see Bird & Ryan, supra at 4.

. Proponents of recall assert that several benefits flow from its availability: it provides a check upon unresponsive public officials; it permits the people to correct their mistakes when incompetent officials are elected; it permits the concentration of responsibility in individual officers and the establishment of longer terms of office without sacrificing accountability to the public. See generally Adrian, supra at 130; Bird & Ryan, supra at 8-11; Wilcox, supra at 169-83.

. Gilbertson, The Recall — Its Provisions and Significance, in The Initiative, Referendum and Recall 218 (C. King ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited as Gilbertson],

. See Bird & Ryan, supra at 4-5; Gilbertson, supra at 219.

. See 351 Pa.Code § 9.9-100, Annot. 1 (1974); Report to the Voters by the Philadelphia Charter Commission 6-7 (February 14, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Report to the Voters],

. The three members of the committee were among the most experienced and respected members of the legal profession. Robert T. McCracken was a former President of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and a former Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association. William A. Schnader was a former Attorney General, a former President of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and was then First Vice-President of the American Law Institute. Abraham L. Freedman was a member of the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and American Bar Associations, the faculty of Temple University Law School and later served as a Judge on United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. This outstanding committee was aided by Paul A. Wolkin, who served as Legislative Draftsman. For many years he has been Assistant Director of the American Law Institute.

. 351 Pa.Code § 9.9-100, Annot. 2 (1974).

. Report to the Voters, supra at 13.

. The removal provisions of Article VI, section 7, cl. 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which require a two-thirds vote of the Senate after a full hearing, are unlikely to be used except in the most flagrant cases. These procedures would require the Senate to devote considerable time to matters which may be of purely local concern and their use could breed resentment against state intervention into purely local affairs. See E. Schultz, American City Government 280 (1949). Despite this, three Justices of this Court would hold that these removal provisions are exclusive. Their interpretation would force the citizens of a municipality to rely on state intervention for the removal of local officials and would leave local governments and their citizens powerless to remove their own elected officials.

. Joseph A. Migatz, voter registration supervisor, testified as to how the Board determined which sheets were “patently false”:
“A. I checked all the worksheets and where there were glaring defects I pulled them ....
Q. What rules of thumb did you use? How did you go about doing this?
A. Get the amount of signatures on the petition and how many defects were on the petition, and if there was a great percentage of defects, I would—
Q. Was there any particular number of defects?
A. Usually from 25 percent up.
*89Q. How did you determine whether there were defects on the petition, that is, what information did you use to make that determination?
A. I went right down the sheet, whatever it was, addresses outside of Philadelphia, bad address, can’t distinguish address, double signatures, the whole categories, all the categories.”
In one instance, a sheet containing 94 signatures was thrown out, even though 74 of the signatures were perfect. Another sheet, containing 102 signatures, was invalidated because three were by persons not registered, two had signed other petitions, 25 either omitted or included an initial not on the registration card, and seven suffered from similar defects.

. The Chief Justice’s effort to support the conclusion that the affidavits were false, by drawing a negative inference from the circulators’ failure to explain the invalid or imperfect signatures on the petition, is totally unpersuasive. The petitioners, asserting first amendment claims, failed to appear before the Board. As the cases on which the Opinion of the Chief Justice relies hold, however, and as the Opinion itself states, the negative inference arises “when a party having control over evidence fails to produce it.” (emphasis added). But the Chief Justice determines there were no parties before the Board.
For the Opinion of the Chief Justice to characterize the circulators’ failure to appear as a failure to explain the discrepancies is also misleading. The circulators were told only to appear before *92the Board; they were not told they would have the opportunity to demonstrate that their affidavits were valid.
Furthermore, as the trial court held:
“The Board sought neither enforcement of the subpoenas nor a further extension of time for this purpose. Therefore it must be assumed that it was the Board’s decision to voluntarily halt the inquiry. In these circumstances, the Board may not draw unfavorable inferences from the failure of the circulators to appear.”
Opinion of Savitt, J., C.P. No. 3466, at 46 (filed September 16, 1976).
In short, the circumstances giving rise to the negative inference, have not been established. Moreover, an inference in effect creates a presumption of the invalidity of the affidavits. If there is to be any presumption, it should be that affidavits are valid, in the absence of a showing of fraud, so that the voters who signed the petition are not disenfranchised. See In re Bower, 41 Ill.2d 277, 242 N.E.2d 252 (1968).

. The reason for the “incorrect address” is unclear. While a few affiants gave incorrect addresses, others may simply have moved since their last registration.

. The Opinion of the Chief Justice also suggests that the trial court should have accepted offers of proof made by the Mayor that the affidavits were irregular. As the authorities cited by the Chief Justice hold, the general rule is that when a mandamus action follows a formal administrative hearing, review is limited to the administrative record. It does not follow, however, that a court hearing a mandamus action is required to accept additional evidence in situations where no formal administrative hearing has been conducted. When informal administrative actions are reviewed, the trial court has discretion to admit or reject additional evidence.
“Typically . . mandamus is used where the administrator has acted or is entitled to act without a formal required hearing. . . There may have been an elaborate investigation, medical examinations, examination of objects, and opportunities to meet administrative objections. There may be what one might call a ‘quasi’ record, but in none of these cases is there a record in the strict sense. The court in the exercise of its discretion may . . permit simply the introduc*98tion of additional evidence on one or another issue; it may refuse to receive additional evidence .... Whether to feke new evidence will depend on the fairness and completeness of the administrative hearing or investigation.”
L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 186-87 (1965). The court below limited its review to the “record” before the Board and declined to accept the evidence offered by the Mayor. On appeal, our role is limited to determining if the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion.
Cases involving nomination petitions, see e. g., Socialist Labor Case, 332 Pa. 78, 1 A.2d 831 (1938), are not applicable to this proceeding. The Pennsylvania Election Code specifically provides for de novo review of the Board’s actions on nomination petitions. Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, art. IX, § 976, as amended, 25 P.S. § 2936 (Supp.1976). No such requirement is made for recall petitions, nor would one be appropriate. A nomination petition for a municipal office requires only 100 signatures, Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, art. IX, § 912(d), as amended, 25 P.S. 2872(a) (1953), whereas over 145,000 signatures were required for this recall petition. De novo review of such a large number of signatures could tie up a recall petition for an extended period, and would conflict with the timetable set out in the Charter. Section 9-101 of the Charter gives the Board only 15 days to review the petition and, if the incumbent does not resign within ten days afterwards, Section 9-103 requires a vote within 90 days. 351 Pa.Code §§ 9.9-101-9.9-103 (1974). Thus, as the Chief Justice states elsewhere in his Opinion, the usual standard of review on mandamus applies. Since the court is not expected to make a de novo review, it is not required to admit any additional evidence a party might offer.
The offers of proof related to matters into which the Board had already investigated. Especially given the efforts in the Charter to expedite procedures “so that the affairs of the City will not suffer from a longer postponement of the time for resolving the issue,” 351 Pa.Code § 9.9-103, Annot. 2 (1974), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit this time consuming evidence. As a court reviewing a challenge to a recall petition under the Los Angeles Home Rule Charter observed:
“The courts are ever mindful of the desirability of having recall petitions presented to the people . . . without delay or excessive expenditure of time.”
Reites v. Wilkerson, 99 Cal.App.2d 500, 502, 222 P.2d 81, 83 (2d Dist. 1950) (citation omitted).

. Representation of a party does not disqualify an attorney from notarizing documents for his client, except when the documents are filed in a lawsuit where he is attorney-of-record. American Bleacher Corp. v. Fried & Gerbert, Inc., 35 Pa.D. & C.2d 729 (C.P.Bucks 1965). Nor is an employee of an attorney disqualified. Educators Mutual Ins. Co. v. Serosky, 73 D. & C. 337 (C.P.Luzerne 1950). Even a partner of an attorney-of-record, who stands to share in any fees earned, is not disqualified. Geisweit v. Marden, 1 D. & C.2d 697 (C.P.Lycoming 1954). Commonwealth v. Pyle, 18 Pa. 519 (1852) is in no way inconsistent with these cases. Pyle was disqualified not because of his interest in any particular document he notarized, but because of a statute specifically prohibiting bank stockholders from holding the office of notary public.

. The cases cited in the Opinion of the Chief Justice State ex rel. Reed v. Malrick, 165 Ohio St. 483, 137 N.E.2d 560 (1956); Schirmer v. Myrick, 111 Vt. 255, 20 A.2d 125 (1941), both involve candidates who notarized their own petitions for nomination. A candidate, as opposed to a mere petition circulator, has a direct and pecuniary interest in his nomination and election. Also, courts enforce laws relating to petition procedures much more *100strictly when there is a suggestion that a candidate may be benefiting by his own wrongdoing. Compare Nomination of Cianfrani, 467 Pa. 491, 359 A.2d 383 (1976), with Petition of Smith, 114 N.J.Super. 421, 276 A.2d 868 (1971).

. The Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Nix accepts the conclusion of the Opinion of the Chief Justice that the recall petition is invalid because it was illegally notarized. Having reached this conclusion, it was inappropriate for either the Chief Justice or Mr. Justice Nix to proceed to address the issue of the constitutionality of recall.
The Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice O’Brien does not state whether the recall petition is sufficient. It may be that Mr. Justice O’Brien has decided that the petition is sufficient, in which case he must address the constitutional issue. Because his Concurring Opinion expresses no view on the validity of the petition, however, it is not clear whether Mr. Justice O’Brien has addressed the constitutional issues only after rejecting the other objections to placing the recall vote on the ballot.

. Binder v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 53 (1971); Commonwealth v. Haugh, 439 Pa. 212, 266 A.2d 657 (1970); Shuman v. Bernie’s Drug Concessions, 409 Pa. 539, 187 A.2d 660 (1963); Robinson Township School District v. Houghton, 387 Pa. 236, 128 A.2d 58 (1956); Altieri v. Allentown Officers & Retirement Board, 368 Pa. 176, 81 A.2d 884 (1951).

. Here, where the recall provisions have been submitted to the voters of Philadelphia and received their approval, the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of recall is strengthened. Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 16, 331 A.2d 198, 205 (1975).
“Courts may not declare a statute unconstitutional ‘unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution.’ Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963). This presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a statute is strengthened where, as here, the program has been submitted to the voters and has received their approval. We would be overstepping our constitutional bounds were we to strike down an act bolstered by such a strong presumption of constitutionality on the basis of a constitutional provision designed to eliminate an evil far removed from the public goals of this enlightened legislation.”

. The opinions striking down recall undermine their stated rationale for reaching the issue. They claim to address the constitutionality of recall in order to clear up the uncertainty in the area, but they only add to the confusion which they have created. The opinions striking down recall cannot agree on why recall is unconstitutional, and the two Concurring Opinions needlessly cast a cloud on the constitutionality of all local procedures for removing elected officials.

. The Pennsylvania Constitution contains several different removal mechanisms for public officials. Article VI, section 6 provides that all civil officers are subject to impeachment for misbehavior in office:
“The Governor and all other civil officers shall be liable to impeachment for any misbehavior in office, but judgment in such cases shall not extend further than to removal from office and *105disqualification to hold any office of trust or profit under this Commonwealth. The person accused, whether convicted or acquitted, shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, trial judgment and punishment according to law.”
Article VI, section 7, quoted in the text, provides for three distinct removal procedures. First, all civil officers shall be removed from office if convicted by a court of either misbehavior in office or any infamous crime. Second, appointed civil officers may be removed at the pleasure of the appointing power. Finally, elected civil officers may be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate. The Opinion of the Chief Justice inextricably focuses on this last procedure and gives it comprehensive and independent significance beyond its place in the constitutional scheme. Recognizing the untenability of this position, the other Justices voting to reverse claim that their decision follows from the existence of the various removal mechanisms in the Constitution. But their conclusion that these procedures are exclusive, so that local governments and their citizens are powerless to remove their own elected officials, is equally unpersuasive. Both views ignore the overall constitutional scheme, especially the relationship between state and local government. See Pennsylvania Constitution, article IX. Moreover, the Constitution itself recognizes the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers. Pennsylvania Constitution, article VI, section 1.

. See Conn v. City Council, 17 Cal.App. 705, 121 P. 714 (1st Dist. 1911) (recall upheld against contention that it violated state constitutional provisions regarding tenure of office, removal and impeachment); Good v. Common Council, 5 Cal.App. 265, 90 P. 44 (2nd Dist. 1907) (tenure of office); Campbell v. Johnson, 182 So.2d 244 (Fla.1966) (broad based constitutional attack); DuBose v. Kelly, 132 Fla. 548, 181 So. 11 (1938) (due process); Eckerson *106v. City of Des Moines, 137 Iowa 452, 115 N.W. 177 (1908) (tenure of office, impeachment); Pinder v. Board of Supervisors, 146 So. 715 (La.App.1933) (removal); Graham v. Roberts, 200 Mass. 152, 85 N.E. 1009 (1908) (tenure of office); State ex rel. Topping v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445, 143 N.W. 796 (1913) (removal, due process); Leers v. Diehl, 11 N.J.Misc. 525, 167 A. 216 (1933) (broad based constitutional attack); State ex rel. Hackley v. Edmonds, 150 Ohio St. 203, 80 N.E.2d 769 (1948) (removal); Dunham v. Ardery, 43 Okl. 619, 143 P. 331 (1914) (removal); State ex rel. Timothy v. Howse, 134 Tenn. 67, 183 S.W. 510 (1916) (removal); Roberts v. Brown, 43 Tenn.App. 567, 310 S.W.2d 197 (1957) (tenure of office, due process); Bonner v. Belsterling, 104 Tex. 432, 138 S.W. 571 (1911) (removal, tenure of office, due process); Hilzinger v. Gillman, 56 Wash. 228, 105 P. 471 (1909) (tenure of office, removal); but see Williams v. Schwarz, 197 Ala. 40, 72 So. 330 (1930).

. The phrase “on the condition that they behave themselves well while in office” modifies that section of Article VI, section 7 which provides for removal on conviction of misbehavior in office or any infamous crime. It does not refer to the separate procedure which provides for removal by the Governor for reasonable cause.

. Article IX, section 2 provides:
“Municipalities shall have the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters. ... A municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.”

. Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 386 Pa. 117, 125 A.2d 354 (1956); Marshall Impeachment Case, 360 Pa. 304, 62 A.2d 30 (1948); Commonwealth ex rel. v. Davis, 299 Pa. 276, 149 A. 176 (1930); Milford Township Supervisors’ Removal, 291 Pa. 46, 139 A. 623 (1927). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Vesneski v. Reid, 265 Pa. 328, 108 A. 829 (1919); Richie v. Philadelphia, 225 Pa. 511, 74 A. 430 (1909).

. Marshall Impeachment Case, 360 Pa. at 309, 62 A.2d at 32; Bowman’s Case, 225 Pa. 364, 74 A. 203 (1909). Current Problems in Pennsylvania Law, 99 U.Pa.L.Rev. 829, 829-30 (1951).

. In Milford Township Supervisors’ Removal, supra, this Court rejected the argument that the Constitution provides the exclusive procedure for the removal of nonconstitutional officers. The Court held that the Constitutional provisions were “not applicable” to nonconstitutional officers where the Legislature had provided an alternate method of removal. In Commonwealth ex rel. v. Davis, 299 Pa. at 279, 149 A. at 177-78, this Court rejected the contention that the “sweeping language . . . ‘all officers elected by the people . . shall be removed by the Governor,’ . . means that ‘officers elected by the people’ shall not be removed in any other way.” Subsequently, in Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, supra, this Court stated:
“It is therefore established in this State beyond respectable controversy that, where the legislature creates a public office, it may impose such terms and limitations with reference to the *111tenure or removal of an incumbent as it sees fit. There is nothing in the Constitution prohibiting such action while, on the other hand, Article XII, Section 1 [now Article VI, section 1] expressly admits of it.”
386 Pa. at 123, 125 A.2d at 356 (emphasis added).

. Milford, 291 Pa. at 52, 139 A. at 625.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Vesneski v. Reid, supra, the Court held that absent legislatively authorized removal procedures, a municipality must rely on the removal provisions in the Constitution for the removal of non-constitutional officers.

. Act of April 21, 1949, P.L. 665, §§ 1 et seq., 53 P.S. §§ 13101 et seq. (1949).

. Id. § 13131.

. At one time, there was some confusion as to whether Article VI, section 7 limited the power of the Legislature to enact alternatives for the removal of nonconstitutional officials. A lower court opinion, affirmed per curiam by this Court, included in dictum a statement that the removal provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution were exclusive, without making a distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers. Commonwealth ex rel. Lowell v. Hoyt, 254 Pa. 45, 98 A. 782 (1916). However, this Court in Milford, supra, clarified the matter and reaffirmed the distinction between those offices created by the Constitution and those which the Legislature can create and abolish. Since then, this Court has “made every effort to sustain statutory removal plans in their application to other than ‘constitutional’ officers.” Current Problems in Pennsylvania Law, 99 U.Pa.L.Rev. 829, 837 (1951).

. The Opinion of the Chief Justice would have it appear that the issue before this Court is well settled. Even the Mayor concedes that the issue whether cause is constitutionally required for the removal of nonconstitutional elected officials is novel.

. Gordon makes clear that in the context of recall the electoral process is the essence of due process.

. Article VI, section 7 provides:
“Appointed civil officers . . may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed.”

. See note 26.

. In Gordon v. Leatherman, supra, the court upheld recall provisions similar to those of the Philadelphia Charter against the contention that recall violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution because the recall provisions did not require cause. Noting that the Charter provided for a political system in which the elected officials serve at the will of the people, the court held “there is nothing inherently unconstitutional in such a system, and no court has held otherwise.” Id. at 566. The decision whether to require cause before an official can be removed by the electorate is a political decision. The people may recall an elected official without any statement of reasons.

. State ex rel. Topping v. Houston, supra; Conn v. City Council, supra. See also Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, 106 A.L.R. 555 (1937).
“Recall statutes do not contemplate a judicial inquiry into the truth of the specific charges of misconduct but are designed to afford relief from popular dissatisfaction with official misconduct of an officer.”
63 Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 238 (1972).

. Mr. Justice Nix argues that because the terms of Article VI, section 7, cl. 3 are mandatory, they are exclusive. He implies that when a provision is mandatory, it necessarily is exclusive. Even if the removal provisions of Article VI, section 7, cl. 3 are mandatory, and the Governor and the Senate could be compelled to exercise their removal powers, there is no basis for concluding that they are exclusive. Just because an officer must be removed under certain circumstances does not mean that he cannot be removed under other circumstances.
The fallacy that the removal provisions of Article VI, section 7 are exclusive because some of them are mandatory, has long been rejected by this Court. Mr. Justice Nix states that the provisions of Article VI, section 7, cl. 1 are mandatory. But in Common*120wealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436 (1867) this Court held that the provisions of this clause (then Article VI, section 9 of the Constitution of 1838) simply created a condition of tenure for nonconstitutional officers, and did not prevent the Legislature from enacting other conditions for holding office. This Court stated that any attempt to read this removal provision as exclusive “is a great perversion of its meaning. It was never intended to put offices created by the legislature beyond the control and regulation of the creating power.” Id. at 441.

. Mr. Justice O’Brien relies on Commonwealth ex rel. Smillie v. McElwee, 327 Pa. 148, 193 A. 628 (1937), to conclude that the provisions for the removal of civil officers enumerated in Article VI must be read to exclude all others. However, Smillie is not based on a textual analysis, such as Mr. Justice O’Brien’s, but on an analysis of the broader constitutional scheme.
This case involved an effort by the Legislature to replace members of the county tax boards, appointed by the county commissioners, with appointees of the Auditor General of the Commonwealth. This Court concluded that the statute:
“. . . violates the principle of ‘home rule,’ i. e., local self-government, which, like the triparte separation of governmental powers, is a vital part of both the foundations and the general framework of our State and Federal governments.”
*121Id. at 152, 193 A. at 630. Only after considering the effect of the statute on local government, and concluding that the legislation was “dissonant with American constitutional concepts,” Id. at 158, 193 A. at 632, did the Court read Article VI, section 7 (then Article VI, section 4) to invalidate the statute. Far from being based on a rule of construction for interpreting the language of the Constitution on its face, Smillie is based on the relationship between state and local government under the Constitution. It cannot be read to support Mr. Justice O’Brien’s interpretation of the Constitution, which would restrict the control of localities over their own officials.
Moreover, Smillie involved an interpretation of what is now Article VI, section 7, cl. 2, which only applies to the power to remove appointed officials. The statement that the clause was exclusive only means that appointed officials cannot be removed except by the appointing power: “As the Legislature did not appoint the incumbents, it cannot remove them.” Id. at 159, 193 A. at 633. Thus, the decision has no application to an effort by the citizens to remove from office an official they have elected.

. 327 Pa. at 158, 193 A. at 633, quoting State ex rel. White v. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 104, 89 N.W. 204, 207 (1902).
This guideline of constitutional construction is followed by the United States Supreme Court:
“[The meaning of constitutional provisions] is to be arrived at, not only by a consideration of the words themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the words were employed.”
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420, 93 S.Ct. 602, 604, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973), quoting Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co., Ltd., 302 U.S. 253, 258, 58 S.Ct. 167, 169, 92 L.Ed. 235 (1937).
In another context, the United States Supreme Court has noted that “constitutional analysis is not a ‘legalistic minuet in which *122precise rules and forms must govern.’ Instead we must ‘examine the form of the relationship for the light it casts on the substance.’ ” Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789-90, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2974, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973), quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2112, 29 L. Ed.2d 745 (1971).

. Article VI, section 1 provides:
“All officers, whose selection is not provided for in this Constitution, shall be elected or appointed as may be directed by law.”
For those offices whose selection is not provided for in the Constitution, the Legislature may determine the conditions of tenure, including procedures for removal. Thus, it is the Constitution itself which distinguishes between constitutional officers, those named in the Constitution, and nonconstitutional officers, those within the coverage of Article VI, section 1.
Since there is nothing in the language of the Constitution which supports the Concurring Opinions’ interpretation that the removal provisions are exclusive, there is no basis for their conclusion that Article VI, section 1 is inapplicable because it is inconsistent with the more specific removal provisions of Article VI, section 7. When these provisions are read together, they clearly indicate a constitutional scheme in which the Legislature is limited in its regulation of constitutional officers, but may attach conditions to the tenure of nonconstitutional officers. The Concurring Opinions fail to comprehend the significance of Article VI, section 1 and in effect read it out of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice O’Brien asserts that even if the Legislature has the power to determine conditions of tenure, it does not have the power to provide for the removal of nonconstitutional officers. This is both illogical and contrary to our case law. If an officer holds office subject to certain conditions, this means that he shall lose his office if he violates the conditions. In other words, when the conditions are violated, he shall be removed. Mr. Justice O’Brien, by distinguishing the power to establish conditions from the power to remove, renders the power to establish the conditions of tenure illusory. Our cases have recognized that the power to create nonconstitutional offices necessarily implies the power to abolish, and the lesser power of regulation and removal. See, e. g., Marshall Impeachment Case, supra; Milford Township Supervisors’ Removal, supra; Commonwealth v. McComb, supra.
Mr. Justice O’Brien also states that the Legislature’s power to abolish nonconstitutional offices does not establish the power to remove nonconstitutional officers. While there may be some *123merit to this distinction when the Legislature enacts a new removal provision after an incumbent takes office, it has no application where, as here, the removal provisions are enacted when the office is created. If the removal provisions are in effect when the incumbent is elected, they are a condition of his tenure. He takes office subject to the removal provisions. See Suermann v. Hadley, 327 Pa. 190, 200, 193 A. 645, 651 (1937).

. Article VI, section 1.
Mr. Justice Nix reasons that the cases establishing the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers are in fact based on the difference between appointed and elected officials. But these cases rely on Article VI, section 1 which makes no distinction between appointed and elected officials. It authorizes the Legislature to provide for both “elected or appointed” offices. The case law interpreting Article VI, section 1 has recognized that it does not make a distinction between appointed and *125elected officials and has applied the provision to both appointed and elected officials.
In fact, the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers was first announced in a case involving an elected official. Commonwealth v. McCombs, supra. Since then, this Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the doctrine in cases involving elected officials. See Marshall Impeachment Case, 360 Pa. 304, 62 A.2d 30 (1948); Commonwealth ex rel. v. Davis, 299 Pa. 276, 149 A. 176 (1930); Milford Township Supervisors’ Removal, 291 Pa. 46, 139 A. 623 (1927); Commonwealth ex rel. Vesneski v. Reid, 265 Pa. 328, 108 A. 829 (1919); Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 A. 351 (1901); Commonwealth ex rel. Braughler v. Weir, 165 Pa. 284, 30 A. 835 (1895).
Moreover, nothing in the cases which have treated constitutional and nonconstitutional officers differently in any way supports Mr. Justice Nix’s interpretation; their rationale is equally applicable to elected or appointed nonconstitutional officers. Compare Milford, supra, with Weiss v. Ziegler, 327 Pa. 100, 193 A. 642 (1937).

. Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436 (1867).

. In Lloyd v. Smith, 176 Pa. 213, 221, 35 A. 199, 201 (1896), this Court noted that “An office . . not constitutional, exists by the will of the legislature only, and may be abolished at any time . .

. “As it is, the people are entitled to the services of the officer during the entire term for which they elected him unless he be removed in the way prescribed by the Constitution, if the officer is a constitutional officer . . . or by the Legislature or under its authority in the manner provided by the Constitution or statute, if the officer is not a constitutional officer . . .”
265 Pa. at 333-34, 108 A. at 831.
“. . . [MJunicipalities of the State must be satisfied with the methods and causes of a motion therein provided, until and unless the legislature, in its wisdom, shall add thereto.”
Id. at 335, 108 A. at 832.

. Bowers v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 402 Pa. 542, 167 A.2d 480 (1961); Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 386 Pa. 117, 125 A.2d 354 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel. Bunch v. Beattie, 364 Pa. 572, 73 A.2d 664 (1950); Marshall Impeachment Case, 360 Pa. 304, 62 A.2d 30 (1948); Commonwealth ex rel. v. Davis, 299 Pa. 276, 149 A. 176 (1930).

. Our case law distinguishing between constitutional and non-constitutional officers is also significant in that it provides the background against which the present constitutional removal provisions were adopted. Cases interpreting both the Constitution of 1838 and the Constitution of 1874 relied on what is presently Article VI, section 1 to distinguish between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers. These cases hold that the removal provisions are not exclusive as to nonconstitutional officers. In 1966, the constitutional removal provisions were readopted. They were renumbered and modified in minor form, but there was no attempt to alter the language upon which the distinction had been based. Thus, the readoption of this section, in 1874 and again in 1966, lends support to the conclusion that the cases distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers give the proper effect to the constitutional provisions.