Court Opinion

ID: 9375718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 18:00:40.161611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.168507
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 28 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SOKHON NELMS, AKA Sokhon Khourn,                No.    18-71922

                Petitioner,                     Agency No. A099-292-630

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                          Submitted February 21, 2023**

Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

      Sokhon Nelms, a native and citizen of Cambodia, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of her appeal from the

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her motion to reopen. The BIA dismissed

Nelms’s appeal because her motion to reopen was untimely and she did not qualify

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
for the changed country conditions exception to the filing deadline because 1) she

did not show a material change in country conditions in Cambodia and 2) she did

not show that she was prima facie eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or

Convention Against Torture protection (“CAT”), the ultimate forms of relief she

sought. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition for review.

      We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.

Hernandez-Ortiz v. Garland, 32 F.4th 794, 800 (9th Cir. 2022). The agency

abuses its discretion when its decision is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”

Id. (citation omitted).

      A noncitizen ordered removed has a statutory right to file a motion to reopen

within ninety days of the date of their final removal order.

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Nelms filed her motion to reopen on October 31,

2017, approximately ten months after her removal order became administratively

final on January 3, 2017. Her motion is therefore untimely unless she meets the

changed country conditions exception.

      There is no time limit for a motion to reopen where the motion “is based on

changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such

evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or

presented at the previous proceeding.” Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). To qualify for this

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exception the petitioner must, among other things, demonstrate prima facie

eligibility for the underlying relief sought. Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198,

1204 (9th Cir. 2017). “Prima facie eligibility for relief is established when the

evidence reveals a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief

have been satisfied.” Sarkar v. Garland, 39 F.4th 611, 622 (9th Cir. 2022)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      Nelms failed to show prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding,

or CAT. To qualify for asylum absent past persecution, a petitioner must

demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id. For withholding

of removal and CAT, respectively, a petitioner must show that they are more

likely than not to suffer persecution or torture. Id. at 622-23. Nelms has not

previously suffered persecution in Cambodia, and she did not demonstrate

that it is reasonably likely that she has a well-founded fear of persecution or

that she is more likely than not to suffer persecution or torture there.

      At most, her evidence shows that her marriage to a U.S. immigration

officer and her conviction for witness tampering appeared in the Cambodian

media and that she has received reports that people would hurt her if she

stayed with her husband and phone calls accusing her of being a U.S.

government spy. Nelms does not specifically allege that any of the threats

originated in Cambodia. Many, and maybe all, of the threats or accusations

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she received came from within the United States. She also cites lists and

emails supposedly showing deportees to Cambodia who allegedly want to

hurt her and her husband because her husband caused them to be deported.

However, the source of the lists is uncertain and there is no indication that

anyone listed has expressed a desire to harm her or her husband or even that

they know about her husband’s role in their deportation. Finally, the Human

Rights Report she includes sheds little light on her situation.

      On this record, we agree with the BIA that her fear of persecution and

torture in Cambodia is “unduly speculative.” Therefore, we cannot say that

the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to overturn the IJ’s denial of

Nelms’s motion to reopen.

      Because the failure to establish a prima facie case is an independently

sufficient ground on which to deny a motion to reopen in this context,

Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010), we do not address

whether Nelms demonstrated changed country conditions.

      Lastly, we do not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to

grant sua sponte reopening because the BIA’s decision did not rest on any

errors of law. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).

      PETITION DENIED.

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