Court Opinion

ID: 9586192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:08:08.347348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:14.617118
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision insofar as it finds the public duty doctrine to be inapplicable to the facts of this case, I dissent. However, I cannot join Justice Hunstein’s dissent and write separately to explain my view regarding the exact nature of the drastic change which City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26 (426 SE2d 861) (1993) effected in Georgia law. Although Justice Hunstein’s special concurrence in City of Rome expressed the opinion that the Court had created an across-the-board exception to governmental immunity, I do not think that the majority in City of Rome actually intended such a change. In City of Rome, supra at 27, this Court’s quotation from 38 ALR4th 1194, § l[a] indicates that the public duty doctrine is normally defined as a limitation on the liability of governmental units or officers, and not as a means of piercing an immunity defense. See also 18 McQuillen, Municipal Corporations, § 53.04.25 (3d ed. rev. 1993); Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 131, p. 1049 (5th ed. 1984); 5 Harper, James and Gray, The Law of Torts, § 29.6A, pp. 640-641 (2d ed. 1986). The question of duty and the inroads on that tort element by the public duty doctrine precede and are separate and distinct from the issue of the defense of immunity. City of Rome v. Jordan, supra at 27 (1), fn. 1. The incorporation of the public duty doctrine into Georgia’s tort jurisprudence has resulted in a limitation on liability which is in addition to that provided by constitutional governmental immunity. For that reason alone, it is a radical departure from previous Georgia law and ought to be severely restricted, if retained at all. See Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier, 638 A2d 561, 566-568 (I) (B) (Vt. 1993); Leake v. Cain, 720 P2d 152, 158-160 (II) (A) (2) (Colo. 1986); Harper, James and Gray, supra; 18 McQuillen, supra at § 53.04.25, p. 167. Indeed, I agree with the following rationale of Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier, supra:
[T]his doctrine ... in recent years has been rejected or abolished by most courts considering it. [Cits.] Courts have rejected or abolished the doctrine because], as shown by this Court’s cases,] it is confusing and leads to inequitable, unpredictable, and irreconcilable results. [Cits.] These courts have stressed that concerns over excessive government or public employee liability are baseless considering the limitations on liability afforded by conventional tort principles, various types of official immunity or exceptions *724to waivers of sovereign immunity. [Cits.] . . . We decline to adopt the confusing and inconsistent public duty doctrine as a means of limiting the liability of government employees who are already protected to some extent by the doctrine of qualified official immunity. ...
Decided March 19, 1999.
Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Thomas F. Richardson, for appellant.
Evans & Evans, Larry K. Evans, Samuel F. Greneker, Barry R. Chapman, Long & Denton, Allen D. Denton, Freeman, Mathis & Gary, Theodore Freeman, Hollberg, Weaver & Kytle, George M. Weaver, for appellees.
Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier, supra at 566, 568 (I) (B).