Court Opinion

ID: 9645993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 00:00:29.59236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:52.331026
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40555     Document: 00516867747        Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/22/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                               FILED
                                                                    August 22, 2023
                                No. 22-40555                         Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                               Clerk

   Pizza Hut L.L.C., as successor-in-interest to Pizza Hut,
   Incorporated,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                      versus

   Jignesh N. Pandya; Ronak Foods, L.L.C.; Pandya
   Restaurants L.L.C.; JNP Foods, L.L.C.; 8 New Britain
   Pizza L.L.C.,

                                                      Defendants—Appellants,

   Ronak Capital, L.L.C.,

                                           Intervenor—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 5:21-CV-89
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:
         Jignesh Pandya was one of Pizza Hut L.L.C.’s largest franchisees in
   Pennsylvania, operating 43 restaurants there (plus one in Connecticut).
   Ultimately, though, Pandya failed to fulfill his contractual obligations, so
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                                    No. 22-40555

   Pizza Hut terminated the parties’ various franchise agreements. Hoping to
   keep the restaurants open, Pizza Hut entered into two post-termination
   agreements with Pandya for him to continue operating the restaurants while
   the parties tried to find a buyer. The first agreement was unsuccessful. The
   second ended in this litigation. After several rounds of pleading, Pandya
   demanded a jury trial. Pizza Hut moved to strike the request under the
   second post-termination agreement’s bilateral jury waiver. The district court
   enforced the waiver, and the case continued to a bench trial in which Pizza
   Hut prevailed.
          The only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in striking
   Pandya’s jury demand. Pandya contends that the jury waiver was procured
   by fraud and that the district court failed to give due weight to the Seventh
   Amendment’s inviolability. In his view, the history of the Seventh
   Amendment shows that pre-dispute jury waivers were non-existent, and,
   even if they did exist, fraud can always invalidate a contract.
          The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is unassailable but not
   unwaivable. Courts have long honored parties’ agreements to waive the jury
   right if the waiver is knowing and voluntary. We follow our sister circuits in
   holding that general allegations of fraud do not render contractual jury
   waivers unknowing and involuntary unless those claims are directed at the
   waiver provision specifically. Because Pandya failed to show that the jury
   waiver was unknowing and involuntary, we hold him to his bargain and
   AFFIRM.
                                          I
          Between 2010 and 2012, Pandya, through his various L.L.C.s—Ronak
   Foods, Pandya Restaurants, and JNP Foods—entered into multiple 20-year
   franchise agreements with Pizza Hut to operate a total of 43 restaurants in
   Pennsylvania and one restaurant in Connecticut. In Pandya’s view, he did his

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   best to run the franchises in an increasingly competitive market, and Pizza
   Hut’s outdated business model is to blame for any failures. According to
   Pizza Hut, however, Pandya failed to pay certain franchise fees and violated
   brand and operational standards. In any event, Pandya’s default was grounds
   for termination under the Franchise Agreements, and, effective October 15,
   2018, Pizza Hut terminated the agreements.
          To salvage the restaurants, the parties entered into a Forbearance
   Agreement, allowing Pandya to continue operating the franchises while
   Pandya tried to find a buyer. Pandya’s search for a buyer proved
   unsuccessful, and the parties negotiated a second post-termination
   agreement, the Transfer Agreement. They discussed the agreement’s terms
   for weeks, ultimately settling on an agreement in which Pandya would
   continue running certain restaurants in compliance with the Franchise
   Agreements. Pandya also agreed to cooperate with Pizza Hut in transferring
   the restaurants to an approved buyer free and clear and to maintain workers’
   compensation insurance. In turn, Pizza Hut “agree[d] to use commercially
   reasonable efforts to identify a Purchaser.” If Pandya complied “with all of
   the terms and conditions of” the Transfer Agreement and a purchaser paid
   $2 million or more, then Pandya’s capital group, Ronak Capital, L.L.C.,
   would receive the first $2 million from the sale and Pandya would be released
   from certain outstanding franchisee fees. If a buyer was not found by the end
   of the term of the agreement, then the remaining stores would be closed and
   Pandya would still be on the hook for his outstanding payments to Pizza Hut.
         The last paragraph of the Transfer Agreement provides in full
   (emphasis added):
         13. Miscellaneous: This agreement will be binding on the
         parties hereto. This Agreement and all disputes arising or
         related to this Agreement will be governed by, and will be
         construed in accordance with, the internal laws of the state of

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          Texas (without giving effect to Texas choice of law rules). The
          parties hereto hereby consent and waive any objections they
          might otherwise have to the jurisdiction and venue of any state
          or federal court of general jurisdiction in Collin County, Texas,
          or any other county or district in which [Pizza Hut] then has its
          principal place of business, with respect to any proceedings
          arising out of this Agreement or the relationship between the
          parties. The parties to this Agreement explicitly waive their
          respective rights to a jury trial in any litigation between or
          among them and hereby stipulate that any such trial shall
          occur without a jury. The parties hereto irrevocably waive, to
          the fullest extent permitted by law, any right to or claim for any
          punitive,      exemplary,     incidental,    indirect,    special,
          consequential or other similar damages in any action or
          proceeding whatsoever between such parties and/or any of
          their affiliates and covenant never to advance or pursue any
          such claim for punitive damages. The parties hereto agree that
          mailing of any process to a party’s address set forth on the
          signature pages to this Agreement, by registered or certified
          mail or reputable private delivery service, will constitute lawful
          and valid process.
   Embedded in this paragraph is an agreement by the parties to “explicitly
   waive their respective rights to a jury trial in any litigation between or among
   them and hereby stipulate that any such trial shall occur without a jury.”
          Once again, the parties were dissatisfied with each other’s
   performance. Pizza Hut terminated the agreement and filed suit against
   Pandya and his entities, alleging various breach of contract and intellectual
   property claims. Pandya counterclaimed, alleging that Pizza Hut breached
   the Transfer Agreement. 1 Both parties amended their claims. In his third and

          _____________________
          1
            Ronak Capital intervened and filed a complaint against Pizza Hut for breaching
   the Transfer Agreement.

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   final amended counterclaims, Pandya alleged new tort counterclaims for: (1)
   fraud/fraudulent inducement; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) tortious
   interference with prospective business relations; (4) tortious interference
   with existing contracts and business relations; and (5) business
   disparagement and defamation. Pandya also demanded a jury trial.
          Pizza Hut moved to strike Pandya’s jury demand based on the waiver
   in the Transfer Agreement and to dismiss the Third Amended
   Counterclaims. In response, Pandya argued that the Transfer Agreement’s
   waiver does not apply to disputes arising under the other agreements, the jury
   demand was proper under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39, and
   the jury waiver provision was invalid. In making this last point, at the hearing,
   Pandya argued that the Transfer Agreement and its provisions were procured
   by fraud.
          The district court held a combined hearing on the motion to strike and
   the motion to dismiss. The court ultimately granted the motion to strike. The
   court held that the parties explicitly waived their rights to a jury trial under
   the Transfer Agreement’s plain language and that the waiver was knowing
   and voluntary. In determining knowledge and voluntariness, the court
   concluded that: (1) the parties had relatively equal bargaining power; (2)
   Pandya is an experienced businessman; (3) Pandya had an opportunity to
   negotiate the Transfer Agreement’s terms; and (4) the jury waiver was
   conspicuously placed in the short contract. The court addressed Pandya’s
   fraud claim in a footnote, following other courts in holding that the fraud
   allegations lobbed against the whole contract and not the waiver provision
   specifically cannot void the waiver agreement. Having found the waiver valid,
   the district court did not reach the parties’ arguments on whether the jury
   request was proper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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           The district court further granted in part Pizza Hut’s motion to
   dismiss. It dismissed with prejudice Pandya’s breach of fiduciary duty and
   business disparity counterclaims and dismissed without prejudice the
   tortious interference with existing business relations counterclaim. The court
   allowed the other counterclaims—fraud/fraudulent inducement, tortious
   interference with prospective business relations, and defamation—to go
   forward.
           After a round of summary judgment motions, which the district court
   denied at the pretrial conference, the case proceeded to a five-day bench trial.
   The district court ruled for Pizza Hut and awarded $6,688,751.14 in damages
   and interest. Pandya timely filed this appeal.
                                                 II
           Pandya argues that the district court erred in striking his jury
   demand. 2 The Seventh Amendment provides, “In Suits at common law,
   where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
   by jury shall be preserved.” 3 This right “occupies so firm a place in our
   history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury
   trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.” 4 Still, the Supreme Court

           _____________________
           2
             Generally, whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is a legal question we review
   de novo. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 761 F.3d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 2014);
   Apache Corp. v. Global Santa Fe Drilling Co., 435 F. App’x 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
   curiam). We have not explicitly adopted this standard in reviewing the granting of a motion
   to strike under a prospective contractual waiver. But because whether a party can
   contractually waive the jury right involves the same legal question, we review that inquiry
   de novo.
           3
               U.S. Const. amend. VII.
           4
               Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).

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   has long recognized that parties can waive their jury right. 5 We, too, have
   explained that a party can “expressly or impliedly waive[] their right to a jury
   trial.” 6 An express waiver “requires only that the party waiving such right do
   so ‘voluntarily’ and ‘knowingly’ based on the facts of the case.” 7
           But which party has the burden to establish or negate that a
   prospective contractual waiver was knowing and voluntary? Our sister
   circuits are split on the issue. The Second 8 and Fourth 9 Circuits have placed
   the burden on the party seeking to enforce the contractual jury waiver to
   show that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. By contrast, the Sixth
   Circuit has placed the burden on the party resisting the waiver. 10 We have
   not firmly planted our flag on the issue. But we find the Sixth Circuit’s
   reasoning persuasive.
           As the Sixth Circuit noted, facially valid contractual waivers, like
   other valid contractual provisions, are assumed enforceable unless the party

           _____________________
           5
              Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1986) (listing
   the civil jury trial right among the waivable rights); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
   (1938).
           6
               Bowles v. Bennett, 629 F.2d 1092, 1095 (5th Cir. 1980).
           7
              Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
   (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 5 (1966)). Federal courts “overwhelmingly
   appl[y]” the knowing and voluntary standard in considering a contractual jury waiver’s
   validity. K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Tr., Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985) (collecting
   cases).
           8
               See, e.g., Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977).
           9
               See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp, v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986).
           10
              See Irving Tr., Co., 757 F.2d at 758 (citing 5 Moore’s Federal Practice
   ¶ 38.46, at 38–40 (2d ed. 1984)).

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   seeking to avoid the waiver proves otherwise. 11 To be sure, this general rule
   assumes that the party invoking the waiver has shown that a facially valid
   contract exists between the parties. 12 But once a party establishes that a
   contractual waiver exists, the burden shifts to the party objecting to
   enforcement of a waiver to explain why the contractual waiver is invalid.
           That a contractual jury waiver involves a constitutional right does not
   change the analysis. After all, the Seventh Amendment jury right is not
   compulsory; a party must affirmatively request a jury trial. Consider how the
   jury right operates without a waiver: A party must demand it in accordance
   with the federal rules. If a party fails to do so, even accidentally, then the party
   forfeits the right to have his case heard by a jury. 13 And if the opposite party
   challenges the right’s applicability, the party requesting the right bears the
   burden of showing it is entitled to a jury. Thus, we follow the Sixth Circuit in
   holding that the party objecting to the enforcement of a waiver in a facially
   valid contract bears the burden of showing the waiver’s unenforceability.
                                               III
           Having determined who bears the burden, we turn to whether Pandya
   has met his. Paragraph 13 of the Transfer Agreement provides: “The parties
   to this Agreement explicitly waive their respective rights to a jury trial in any

           _____________________
           11
              See id. (“In determining whether to give effect to the contractual waiver against
   an objecting party the court should start with a presumption in favor of validity in the
   interest of liberty of contract. This would require the objecting party to point to some one
   or more matters that render the provision improper.”).
           12
               Cf. Hulsey v. West, 966 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1992) (declining to address the
   circuit split on which party bears the burden because the party seeking to strike the demand
   “did not meet their initial burden of showing that petitioner was personally bound by the
   jury waiver provision”).
           13
             See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d); see also Daniel Int’l Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc.,
   916 F.2d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir. 1990).

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   litigation between or among them and hereby stipulate that any such trial
   shall occur without a jury.” Pandya challenges the provision’s enforceability
   and scope. On enforceability, Pandya argues that (1) Pizza Hut fraudulently
   procured the Transfer Agreement, and (2) the factors that courts commonly
   consider in determining whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary weigh
   against enforcing the waiver. Pandya argues on the second point that the
   district court erred in considering irrelevant factors in granting the motion to
   strike. On the scope of the waiver, Pandya argues in a footnote that the waiver
   does not include claims brought under the Franchise or Forbearance
   Agreements. We address these issues in turn, starting with the fraud claim.
                                                 A
           Pandya first argues that under the “constitutional framework” from
   New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 14 we must assess
   constitutional rights in accordance with their historical context. According to
   Pandya, that historical record shows that at common law, pre-dispute jury
   waivers were nearly non-existent and, if they did exist, were unenforceable if
   fraudulently induced. From this, Pandya seemingly argues that we should
   reject the jury waiver provision outright. We are unpersuaded.
           For one, Bruen was not a Seventh Amendment case. Even considering
   Bruen’s instructions relevant to our inquiry, the Supreme Court has been
   careful to instruct lower courts not to read new pronouncements as
   overruling any related precedent. 15 The Supreme Court has never

           _____________________
           14
                See 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2130–31 (2022).
           15
              Cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
   (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
   rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
   directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”);

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   backtracked on the jury right’s waivability. So entrenched is this principle
   that “[i]t is elementary” that the Seventh Amendment jury right can “be
   relinquished knowingly and intentionally.” 16 Courts have long blessed pre-
   dispute jury waivers if they are knowing and voluntary. 17 Pandya offers no
   binding authority to contradict this.18 Accordingly, he has not shown that
   Bruen should alter our analysis.
           Pandya next argues that the waiver was unknowing and involuntary
   because: (1) Pizza Hut allegedly procured the entire Transfer Agreement by
   fraud, and (2) no factor that the district court considered shows the
   agreement was knowing and voluntary. On this second point, Pandya argues

           _____________________
   Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (lower courts may not “conclude [that] recent
   cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent”).
           16
                Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
           17
            See id.; K.M.C., Co., Inc., 757 F.2d at 755 (“It is clear that the parties to a contract
   may by prior written agreement waive the right to jury trial.”); Crane, 804 F.2d at 833.
           18
              To make his case against pre-dispute contractual waivers, Pandya points to states
   which have barred recognition of such waivers. But the Supreme Court has held, “[T]he
   right to a jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in
   diversity as well as other actions.” Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (per curiam);
   see also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (“The question of a waiver of a federally
   guaranteed constitutional right is, of course, a federal question controlled by federal law.”).
   The federal circuits courts have overwhelmingly addressed the enforceability of jury
   waivers under federal law. See, e.g., Hergenreder v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., LLC, 656
   F.3d 411, 420–21 (6th Cir. 2011); Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 222
   (3d Cir. 2007); Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 188 (2d Cir.
   2007); Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002); Telum, Inc.
   v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988);Crane, 804 F.2d at 832–33.
           Even if we were to look to state law, the parties agreed that Texas law governs their
   dispute. Like federal law, pre-dispute jury waivers are enforceable under Texas law if they
   are knowing and voluntary. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex.
   2004).

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   that the district court erred in considering irrelevant factors in granting the
   motion to strike.
                                               1
           Neither the Supreme Court nor we have addressed whether a fraud
   claim must target the waiver provision specifically to invalidate the waiver.
   But the Second and Tenth Circuits have. Both concluded that a fraud claim
   must be alleged against the jury waiver specifically. Faced with the issue first,
   the Tenth Circuit analogized to the arbitration context. 19 The court reasoned
   that, like standalone jury waiver agreements, contractual agreements to
   arbitrate also require parties to bypass their jury rights. 20 Looking to the
   Supreme Court’s instruction on fraud claims in the arbitration context, the
   Tenth Circuit applied the rule that only “fraud in the inducement relating
   specifically to an arbitration provision may suspend application of such a
   provision.” 21 The Tenth Circuit applied the rule to the jury waiver context,
   holding that a district court cannot vitiate the jury waiver provision for
   general fraud allegations. 22 The Second Circuit followed this analysis in
   Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc. 23
           The district courts within our circuit have followed the Second and
   Tenth Circuits. 24 Pandya asks us to split from our sister circuits and impliedly

           _____________________
           19
                Telum, 859 F.2d at 837.
           20
                Id. at 838.
           21
            Id. at 837–38 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
   403–04 (1967)).
           22
                Id.
           23
                500 F.3d at 188.
           24
             See, e.g., BMC Software, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 2019 WL 324626, at *5
   (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2019); Williams v. Aire Serv, LLC, 2019 WL 13150025, at *2 (W.D. Tex.

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   overrule these district courts. He contends that both circuits erred in
   comparing jury waivers to arbitration clauses because, unlike arbitration,
   courts must construe every reasonable presumption against waiver of the jury
   right. The Second Circuit explicitly considered the presumption against jury
   waivers in deciding to follow the Tenth Circuit and hold that fraud allegations
   must be against the waiver provision specifically. 25 We find the Second
   Circuit’s reasoning persuasive. If parties can waive their right to a jury—
   indeed, a whole trial—through an arbitration clause, then a contractual jury
   waiver, which only waives a specific type of trial, should receive the same
   treatment. 26 We agree with the Second and Tenth Circuits.
           Applying the arbitration rule, we hold that Pandya failed to allege that
   the jury waiver specifically was procured by fraud. Pandya alleged in his
   Third Amended Counterclaims that Pizza Hut fraudulently induced him into
   signing the Transfer Agreement by representing that it would help him find
   a buyer although it never intended to do so. Instead, Pizza Hut allegedly made
   this promise to get Pandya to release any potential claims before it sued.
   These allegations target the agreement as whole, not just the waiver
   provision, and thus cannot void the waiver provision.
           Pandya argues that Pizza Hut added the jury waiver at the last minute,
   after obtaining litigation counsel, to gain a litigation advantage. But Pandya

           _____________________
   June 12, 2019); Evans v. Union Bank of Switzerland, 2003 WL 21277125, at *2 n.1 (E.D. La.
   May 30, 2003).
           25
                Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., 500 F.3d at 188.
           26
              See Orr, 294 F.3d at 711 (“[B]y agreeing to arbitration, Appellants have
   necessarily waived the following: (1) their right to a judicial forum; and (2) their
   corresponding right to a jury trial.”); cf. IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit
   Union, 512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Agreement to a bench trial cannot logically be
   treated less favorably than agreement to confess judgment, or arbitrate, or litigate in a
   forum that will not use a jury.”).

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   did not allege any of this in his Third Amended Counterclaims. There, he
   alleged only that Pizza Hut fraudulently induced him into signing the
   Transfer Agreement as a whole. This is insufficient to render the jury waiver
   provision void. Accordingly, the district court correctly held that Pandya’s
   fraud claim does not invalidate the jury waiver. 27
                                                 2
           Courts, including the district court below, generally consider four
   factors in determining whether a pre-dispute jury waiver is knowing or
   voluntary: 28 “(1) whether both parties had an opportunity to negotiate the
   terms of the agreement, (2) whether the provision waiving jury trial was
   conspicuous, (3) the relative bargaining power of the parties, and (4) the
   business acumen or professional experience of the party opposing the
   waiver.” 29 Some courts within our circuit also consider whether the party
   was represented by counsel. 30 We agree that the above are helpful, though

           _____________________
           27
              Pandya argues for the first time in reply that the district court should have
   bifurcated the fraud question and had a trial on that issue before ruling on the motion to
   strike. Because we adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach that fraud must be alleged at the
   waiver provision specifically and Pandya has failed to do so, we do not address this
   argument.
           28 See Crane, 804 F.3d at 833. Pandya argues this test is insufficient because it does

   not adequately consider instances of fraud. But he does not suggest what test should replace
   it. In any event, as explained above, general fraud allegations do not void a jury waiver. He
   also argues that the district court should have considered whether he met the demand in
   Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39. But those rules do not address pre-dispute
   waivers. Further, whether Pandya timely demanded a jury is relevant only if he did not
   waive his right to a jury in the first place.
           29
            Servicios Comerciales Lamosa, S.A. de C.V. v. De la Rosa, 328 F. Supp. 3d 598,
   619–20 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
           30
             See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Classic Home Fin., Inc., 2012 WL 201533,
   at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2012); Westside–Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., Inc., 56
   F. Supp. 2d 694, 707 (E.D. La. 1999) (citation omitted).

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   not exhaustive, factors in determining whether, under the totality of the
   circumstances, a contractual jury waiver is knowing and voluntary. Each
   factor supports upholding the Transfer Agreement’s jury waiver. 31
           First, Pandya argues that he had no chance to negotiate because the
   jury waiver was added at the end of negotiations. The record supports the
   district court’s determination that Pandya negotiated the Transfer
   Agreement’s terms. Generally, the fact that a jury waiver is bilateral
   “suggests the parties had a meaningful opportunity to negotiate.” 32 Also,
   Pizza Hut responded to Pandya’s requests throughout the negotiation
   process. Although Pizza Hut inserted the jury waiver at the end, Pandya
   questioned certain terms in the paragraph containing the waiver on the last
   turn before signing. His active participation in negotiations over the contract,
   including over the paragraph containing the waiver, distinguishes this case
   from the cases that Pandya relies on. 33 Thus, Pandya has failed to show that
   this factor weighs against enforcing the waiver.
           Second, Pandya argues that the jury waiver is inconspicuously placed
   because it was not bolded, highlighted, or otherwise set apart. A waiver
   provision does not have to be set apart to be conspicuous. The Transfer

           _____________________
           31
               We have not decided what standard we apply in assessing whether a waiver is
   knowing and voluntary. The Fourth Circuit seemingly views this as a fact question and
   applies a “clearly erroneous on the evidence” standard. See Crane, 804 F.2d at 833. We do
   not decide which standard to follow here because Pandya’s argument fails whether we view
   this as a legal question or a factual question we view anew, cf. K.M.C., Co., Inc., 757 F.2d at
   758 (noting the mixed question of law and fact “subject to . . . independent review” in
   addressing a contractual waiver), or under a clearly erroneous standard.
           32
                Miramontes v. Peraton Inc., 2022 WL 17364263, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2022).
           33
               For example, in Servicios Comerciales Lamosa, changes were still being made to
   the document up to the moment the non-movant arrived to sign the agreement. So there
   was little time for the non-movant to review the changes before signing. See 328 F. Supp.
   3d at 621.

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   Agreement is short for a legal document (nine pages). The jury waiver is in
   the final paragraph before the signatures. 34 Pandya circled the paragraph
   containing the waiver, 35 so he was aware of it. 36 In other words, Pizza Hut did
   not place the waiver in the middle of a paragraph of inconsequential terms
   that are easily skippable. The district court thus rightly concluded that
   Pandya failed to show that this factor weighed in his favor.
           Third, Pandya argues that Pizza Hut was the larger party and the one
   who terminated the franchise agreements, and so it had more bargaining
   power. But Pandya, too, had significant bargaining power. Pandya admits that
   he was “the largest owner of Pizza Huts in Pennsylvania.” Pizza Hut thus
   had a strong interest in keeping his restaurants open. Pandya also successfully
   negotiated several favorable terms in the contract. So while there was “some
   inequality of bargaining power,” Pandya did not have “the kind of ‘extreme
   bargaining disadvantage’ or ‘gross disparity in bargaining position’ that
   occurs only in certain exceptional situations.” 37

           _____________________
           34
              See Crane, 804 F.2d at 833 (considering the length of the agreement); Zavala v.
   Aaron’s Inc., 2015 WL 5604766, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 23, 2015) (“Courts determine the
   conspicuousness of jury waiver clauses on a case-by-case basis, and consider factors such
   as the typeface, the length of the document, and the location of the waiver clause.”).
           35
             When viewed with track changes, the sentence containing the waiver was also
   underlined.
           36
             See Crane, 804 F.3d at 833 (upholding jury waiver when the defendants marked
   up other sections of the agreement).
           37
               Westside–Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d at 709; see also, e.g., Jeffrey J.
   Glaser, MSD v. Compass Bank, N.A., 2010 WL 11553124, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2010)
   (noting that gross disparity only “exists only when the party with less bargaining power is
   completely unable to reject the terms of an agreement, even if those terms are utterly
   unacceptable”); Classic Home Fin., Inc., 2012 WL 201533, at *3 (“That Plaintiff has more
   assets, offices of operation, employees, and consumers does not amount to a gross disparity
   in bargaining power, particularly in light of Defendant’s business sophistication.”).

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           On this factor, Pandya further argues that Pizza Hut pressured him
   into signing the agreement by threatening to close the stores immediately. In
   support he again points to Servicios. There, the defendant had to sign the
   unilateral jury waiver or else risk stalling his business operations. 38 No such
   bargaining chip is present here. The parties were already discussing closing
   certain stores as the Franchise Agreements had been terminated. We thus do
   not find Servicios persuasive.
           Fourth, Pandya argues that Pizza Hut presented no supporting
   evidence that he had sufficient business acumen. But Pandya undercuts this
   argument with his own words. Pandya stated in his complaint that he is a
   “well-known and successful businessman with multiple companies” and
   “decades of experience in the franchise industry.” He even highlighted that
   he had won an award for his business acumen. 39 His annotations on the
   version of the draft containing the jury waiver back up his words. In these
   annotations, he questioned some provisions, further showing that he was able
   to “comprehend[] the import of the language contained in the waiver
   clause,” which was clear. 40 Pandya argues that business acumen cannot
   overcome fraud. But, as discussed above, he does not claim that the waiver
   was procured by fraud, which is the proper inquiry in determining whether a
   waiver is knowing and voluntary.

           _____________________
           38
                Servicios, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 621.
           39
             See also, e.g., Williams, 2019 WL 13150025, at *4 (considering that plaintiff had
   run several businesses for a decade in assessing business acumen).
           40
              Westside–Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d at 707; see also, e.g., Crane, 804
   F.2d at 833 (“[T]he Cranes’ insistence on the execution of the handwritten agreement
   which limited the lessor’s remedies in the event of a default indicates their understanding
   of the situation and of their interests.”).

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           Finally, Pandya argues that the district court considered other
   irrelevant factors such as prejudice to Pizza Hut and judicial economy in
   assessing whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary. We read the
   district court’s opinion as simply noting the potential prejudice to Pizza Hut
   and the delay if the court changed the proceedings to a jury trial. The court
   did not treat these realities as additional, equally weighty factors. In any
   event, even if we ignore these “additional” factors, the others favor the
   district court’s determining that Pandya contractually waived his jury right
   here.
                                          B
           There is still the question of the waiver’s scope. Pandya argues in a
   footnote that the Transfer Agreement does not purport to supersede the
   Franchise Agreements and Forbearance Agreements and thus cannot apply
   to all his claims. The Transfer Agreement’s plain text contradicts Pandya’s
   position.
           The jury waiver states: “The parties to this Agreement explicitly
   waive their respective rights to a jury trial in any litigation between or among
   them and hereby stipulate that any such trial shall occur without a jury.” This
   waiver language is broad, covering “any litigation between or among” the
   parties. Thus, the district court was correct that the jury waiver’s plain
   language “applies to the universe of litigation between” Pizza Hut and
   Pandya. Moreover, the jury wavier only channels any claims from the parties’
   prior agreements into a bench trial; it does not alter the parties’ obligations
   under those other agreements. So it does not supersede those agreements.
                                         IV
           The district court correctly struck Pandya’s jury demand because he
   knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Having concluded

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                                   No. 22-40555

   the waiver is valid, we need not evaluate the parties’ arguments on Federal
   Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39.
         AFFIRMED.

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