Court Opinion

ID: 9418383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:24:14.352368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:02.445741
License: Public Domain

Mr, Justice McReynolds
dissenting.
. While I earnestly join in the dissent written by Mr. Justice McK>una, it seems not inappropriate to state my own views somewhat more fully. The important and underlying question is common to the five cases. Number 232 is typical and to. detail certain facts and circumstances disclosed by the record therein may aid the discussion.
Basing his, claim upon the Arizona Employers’ Liability Law, Dan Veázey sued plaintiff in error in the United States District Court to recover damages for personal injuries received by him February 10, 1916, while engaged as millwright and carpenter in constructing a “flotation system” at the company’s mill or reduction works in Gila County, Arizona “wherein steam, electricity' and other mechanical power was then and there usted to operate machinery.” He alleged that while exercising due care he “suffered severe personal and bodily injuries by an accident arising out of arid in course of such labor, service and • employment, and due to a condition or conditions of supb occupation or employment,” which injuries were *441not caused by his negligence but were sustained in the manner following: “Plaintiff in the due course of his said labor, service and employment was standing upon a certain timber or joist incorporated in said ‘flotation system’ engaged in bolting and fastening together the timbers thereof. That the said timber or joist upon which plaintiff was then and there standing was then and there elevated above the ground or floor of said mill or reduction wórks a distance of approximately ten. feet. That while so engaged as aforesaid, plaintiff slipped from said timber or joist and fell to the ground . ... with great force and violence . . . ,” was permanently injured and will forever remain sick, sore, lame and crippled. ,
No charge of negligence or failure to perform any duty was made againgt the company. It unsuccessfully set up and relied upon invalidity of the Employers’ Liability Law because in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment; judgment went against it; and the cause is here by writ of error to the trial court (Jud. Code, § 237).
Article XVIII of the Arizona Constitution provides:
“Section 4. The common law doctrine of fellow servants, so far as it affects the liability of a master for injuries to his servants resulting from the acts or omissions of any other servant or servants of the common master is forever abrogated.
“Section.5. The defense of contributory’negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.
. “Section 6. The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.
“Section 7. To protect the safety of employees in all hazardous occupations, in mining, smelting, manufacturing, railroad or street railway transportation, or any other industry the Legislature shall enact an Employer’s Liability law, by — the- terms- of which any-employer, *442whether Individual, association, or corporation shall be hable for the death or injury, caused by any accident due to a condition or. conditions of such occupation, of any employee in the service of such employer in such hazardous occupation, in all cases in which such death or injury of such employee shall not have been caused by the negligence of the employee killed or injured.
“Section 8. The .Legislature shall enact a Workmen’s Compulsory Compensation. law applicable to workmen engaged in manual or mechanical labor in such employments as the Legislature may determine to be especially dangerous, by which compulsory, compensation shall be required to be paid to any such workman by his employer, if in the course of such employment personal injury to any such workman from any accident arising out of, and in the course of, such employment is caused in whole, or in part, or is contributed'to, by a necessary, risk or danger of such employment, or a necessary risk or danger inherent in the nature thereof, or by failure of such employer, or any of his or its officers, agents, or employee, or, employees, to exercise due care, or to comply .with any [law] affecting such employment; Provided, that it shall be optional with said employee to settle for such compensation, or retain the right to sue said employer as provided by the Constitution.”
Obeying the constitutional mandate, the legislature enacted the “Employers’ Liability Law,”, approved Máy 24, 1912, (c. 89, Laws of Ariz., 1912, p. 491;.-Rev. Stats. Ariz., l9l3, pars. 3153-3162) which provides:
That to protect the safety of workmen at manual or mechanical labor in many occupations declared hazardous and enumerated in § 4 — among them all work in or about mines and in mills, shops, plants and factories where. steam or electricity is used to operate machinery — every employer; whether individual, association or corporation “shall be liable for the death or injury, baused by any *443accident due to a condition or conditions ©f such occupation, of any employee in the service of such employer in such hazardous occupation, in all cases in which such death or injury of such employee shall not haye been caused by the negligence of the employee killed or injured.”,
“Sec. 6. When in the course of work in any of the employments or occupations enumerated in Sec. 4 of this Act, personal injury or death by any accident arising out of and in the course of such labor, service and employment, and due to a condition or conditions of such occupation or employment, is caused to or suffered by any workman-engaged. therein, in all cases in which such injury or death of such employee shall not'have been caused by the negligence of the employee killed or injured, then the employer of such employee shall be liable in damages to [the] employee injured, or, in case death ensues, to the personal representative of the deceased for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee;. and, if none, then to such employee’s parents; and, if none, then to the next of kin dependent upon such employee, and if none, then to his personal representative, for the benefit of the estate of the deceased.” Section 7 requires that questions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk shall be left to the jury. (The full text of the act is in the margin.1)
*444Likewise, the legislature enacted a Compulsory Compensation Law, approved June 8,1912, applicable to work*445men in the same occupations as those declared hazardous by the Employers’ liability Law (c. 14, Laws of Ariz., *446Spec. Sess. 1912, p. 23). Material portions of it are in the margin.1
*447In Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Ujack, (1914) 15 Arizona, 382, 384, the upreme Court declared: — ‘-Under the laws of Arizona, an employee who is injured in the course of his employment has open to him three avenues of redress, any one of which he may pursue according to. the facts of his case. They are: (1) The common-law liability relieved of the fellow-servant defense arid in which the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of. risk are questions to be left to the jury. Const., secs. 4, 5, art. 18. (2) Employers’ liability law, which applies to hazardous occupations where' the injury or death is not caused by his own negligence. Const., sec. 7, art. 18. (3) The compulsory compensation law, applicable to especially dangerous occupations, by which he may recover compensation without fault upon the part of the employer. Const., sec. 8, art. 18.”
In Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Mendez, (July 2,1917) 19 Arizona, 151, 154, 157, 161, the Supreme Court specifically held that the Employers’ Liability Law does not conflict with the . Fourteenth Amendment, and, among other things, said: — ‘ ‘ That the liability statute must *448be construed as one creating a liability for accidents resulting in injuries to the workmen engaged in hazardous occupations due to the risks and hazards inherent in such occupations, without regard to the negligence of the employer, as such negligence is understood in the common law of liability; in other words, such statute creates a liability for accident arising from the risks and hazards inherent in the occupation without regard to the negligence or fault of the employer. ... In other words, this statute creates a liability of the master to damages suffered from any accident befalling his servant while engaged in the performance of duties in dangerous occupations without requiring the negligence of the master to be shown as an element of the right to recover; and it likewise takes away from the master his common-law right of defense of assumption of ordinary risk by the servant, and leaves to the master the right to defend upon the grounds that the servant assumed the ordinary risks other than risks inherent in the occupation.” This opinion was reaffirmed in Superior & Pittsburg Copper Co. v. Tomich, (July 2, 1917) 19 Arizona, 182.
In Arizona Copper Co. v. Burciaga, (1918) 177 Pac. Rep. 29, 31, 32, 33, the Supreme Court said: — “As clearly intimated by this court in Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Mendez, 19 Arizona, 151; 166 Pac. 278, 1183, the Employers’ liability Law is designed to give a right of action to the employee injured by accident occurring from risks and hazards inherent in the occupation and without regard' to the negligence on the part of the employer. Such is the clear import of the said Employers’ Liability Law. ...
“The liability incurre^ by the employer from a personal injury, sustained by his employee from an accident arising opt of and in the course of labor, service, and employment in hazardous occupations specified in the. statute, and due to a condition or conditions of such occupation *449or employment, if such shall not have been caused from the negligence of such employee, is such an amount as will compensate such employee for the injuries sustained by him directly attributable to such accident. . . . ‘Liable in damages,’ as used in paragraph 3158, c. 6, of title 14, Employers’ Liability Law, Rev. Stat. of Ariz. 1913, has •reference to and means that the employer becomes obligated to pay to the employee injured in an accident while engaged in an occupation declared hazardous, occurring without fault of the employer, all loss to the employee which is actually caused by the accident and the amount of which is susceptible of ascertainment. ... Of course, mental and physical suffering experienced by the employee injured, proximately • resulting from the accident, the reasonable value of working time lost by the employee, necessary expenditures for the treatment of injuries and compensation for the employee’s diminished earning power directly resulting from the injury, and perhaps other results causing direct loss, are matters of actual loss and as such recoverable.”
From the foregoing it appears that we have for consideration a statute which undertakes, in the absence of fault, to impose upon all employers (individual and corporate) engaged in enterprises essential to the public welfare, not subject to prohibition by the State and often not attended by any extraordinary hazard, an unlimited liability to employees for damages resulting from accidental injuries — including physical and mental pain — which may be recovered by the injured party or his administrator for benefit of widow, children, parents, next of dependent kin or the estate. The individual who hires only one man and works by his side is put on the same' footing as a corporation which employs thousands; no attention is given to probable ability to pay the award; length of service is unimportant — -a minute seems enough; wages contracted for bear no necessary relationship to what may be re*450covered; and a single accident which he was powerless to prevent or provide against may pauperize the employer. And by reason of existing constitutional and statutory provisions an injured workman may claim under this act or under the Compensation Law or according to the common law materially modified in his favor by exclusion of the fellow-servant rule and otherwise. On the, other hand, while the employer is declared subject to new, uncertain and greatly enlarged liability, notwithstanding the utmost care, nothing has been granted him in return.
In such circumstances, would enforcement of the challenged statute deprive employers of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment? Plainly, I think, nothing short of an'affirmative answer is compatible with well-defined constitutional guarantees.
Of course the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to render immutable any particular rule of law nor did it by fixation immortalize prevailing doctrines concerning legal rights and liabilities. Orderly and rational progress was not forestalled. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S.366, 387. But it did strip the States of all power to deprive any person of life, liberty or property by arbitrary or oppressive action — such action is never due process of law.
In the last analysis it is for us to determine what is arbitrary or oppressive upon consideration of the natural and inherent principles of practical justice which lie at the base of our traditional jurisprudence and inspirit our Constitution. A legislative declaration of reasonableness is not conclusive; no more so is pppular approval— otherwise, constitutional inhibitions would be futile. And plainly,.! think, the individual’s fundamental rights.are not proper subjects for experimentation;: they :,ought not to be sacrificed to questionable theorization.'
. Until now I had supposed that a man’s liberty and property — with their essential incidents — were under the' *451protection of our charter and not subordinate to whims or caprices or fanciful ideas of those who happen for the day to constitute the legislative majority. The contrary doctrine is revolutionary and leads straight towards destruction of our well-tried and successful system of government. Perhaps another system may be better — I do not happen to think so — but it is the duty of the courts to uphold the old one unless and until superseded through orderly methods.
After great consideration in Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, this court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to both employer and employee the liberty of entering into contracts for service subject only to reasonable restrictions. “The principle is fundamental and vital.”
In the first case an act of Congress prohibiting interstate carriers from requiring one seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into an agreement not to become or remain a member of a labor organization was declared in conflict with the Fifth Amendment. In Coppage v. Kansas a state statute which declared it unlawful to require one to agree not to be a member of a labor association as a condition of securing employment was held invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment and we said: “An interference with this liberty so serious as that now under consideration, and so disturbing of equality of right, must be deemed to be arbitrary, unless it be supportable as a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.” In Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41, an Arizona - statute prohibiting employment of aliens except under certain conditions was struck down. We there said: “It requires no 'argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”
The right to employ and the right to labor are correl*452ative — neither can be destroyed nor unduly hindered without impairing the other. The restrictions imposed by the act of Congress, struck down in the Adair Case, by the Kansas statute, declared invalid in the Coppage Case, and by the Arizona statute, held inoperative in the Truax Case, viewed as practical matters seem rather trivial in comparison with the burden laid on employers by the statute before us. Ajad the grounds suggested to support it really amount in substance to asserting that the legislature has power to protect society against the consequences of accidental injuries and, therefore, it may impose the loss resulting therefrom upon those wholly without fault who have afforded others welcomed opportunities to earn an honest living under unobjectionable conditions. As a measure to stifle enterprise, produce discontent, strife, idleness and pauperism the outlook for the enactment seems much too good.
In New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, and Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 188, 219, as I had supposed for reasons definitely pointed out, we held the challenged statutes not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment although they imposed liability without fault and introduced a plan for compensating workmen, unknown to the common law. The elements of those statutes regarded as adequate to save their validity we specified; if such characteristics had not been found, the result, necessarily, would have been otherwise unless we were merely indulging in harmful chatter.
Here, without fault, the statute in question imposes liability in some aspects more onerous than either the New York or Washington law prescribed; and the grounds upon which we sustained those statutes are wholly lacking. The employer is not exempted from any liability formerly imposed; he is given no quid pro, quo for his new burdens; the common-law rules have been set aside without a reasonably just substitute; the employee is relieved from *453consequences of ordinary risks of the occupation and these are imposed upon the employer without defined limit to possible recovery which may ultimately go to non-dependents, distant relatives, or, by escheat, to the State; “the act bears no fair indication of a just settlement of a difficult problem affecting one of the most important of social relations” — on the contrary it will probably intensify the difficulties.
The liability is riot restricted to the pecuniary loss of a disabled employee or those entitled to look to him for support, but includes compensation for physical and mental pain and suffering; a recovery resulting in bankruptcy to an employer may benefit only a distant relative, financially independent; the prescribed responsibility is not “to contribute reasonable amounts according to a reasonable and definite scale by way of compensation for the loss of earning power arising from accidental injuries,” but is unlimited, unavoidable by any care, incapable of fairly definite estimation in advance and enforceable by litigation probably acrimonious, long drawn out and expensive. While the statute is inattentive to the employer’s fault it permits recovery in excess of the employee’s pecuniary misfortune; and provides for compensation, not general, but sporadic, uncertain, conjectural, delayed, indefinite as to amount and not distributed over such long period as to afford actual protection against loss or lessened earning capacity with insurance to society against pauperism, etc.
I am unable to see any rational basis for saying that the act is a proper exercise of the State’s police power. It is unreasonable and oppressive upon both employer and employee; to permit its enforcement will impair fundamental rights solemnly guaranteed by our Constitution and heretofore, as I think, respected and enforced.
The11 Chief Justice, Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr. Justice Van Devanter concur in this opinion.

 Laws of Arizona, 1912, Chap. 89, p. 491; Rev. Stats., Ariz. Civil Code, 1913, pars. 3153-3162, p. 1051.
“Sec. 1. That this Act is and shall be declared to be an Employer’s Liability law as prescribed in Sec.. 7 of Article XVIII of the State Constitution. ...
“See. 2. That to protect the safety of employees in all hazardous occupations in mining, smelting, manufacturing, railroad, or street railway, transportation, or any other industry, as provided in said Sec. 7 of Article XVIII of the State Constitution, any employer, whether individual, association, or corporation, shall be liable for the death or injury, caused by any accident due to a condition or conditions of such occupation, of any employee in the service of such- em*444ployer in such hazardous occupation, in all cases in which such death or injury of such employee shall not have been caused by the negligence of the employee killed or injured.
“Sec. 3. The labor and services of workmen at manual and mechanical labor, in the employment of any person, firm, association, company, or corporation, in the occupations enumerated in Sec. 4 of this Act are hereby declared and determined to be service in a hazardous occupation within the meaning of the terms of Sec. 2 of this Act.
“By reason of the nature and conditions of, and the means used and provided for doing the work in, said occupations, such service is especially dangerous and hazardous to the workmen therein, because of risks and hazards which are inherent in such occupations and which are unavoidable by the workmen therein.
“ Sec. 4. The occupations hereby declared and determined to be hazardous, within the meaning of this Act are as follows:
“1.. The operation of steam,'railroads, electrical railroads, street railroads, by locomotives, engines,'trains, motors, or cars of any kind propelled by steam, electricity, cable or other mechanical power, including the construction^ use or repair of machinery, plant, tracks, switches, bridges, roadbeds, upon, over, and by which such railway business is operated.
“2. All work when making, using or necessitating dangerous proximity to gunpowder, blasting powder, dynamite, compressed air, or any other explosive.
“3, The erection or demolition of any bridge, building or structure in which there is, or jn which the plans and specifications require, iron or steel frame work.
“4. The operation of all elevators, elevating machines or derricks or hoisting apparatus used within or on the outside of any bridge, building or other structure for conveying materials in connection with the erection- or demolition of such bridge, building or structure.
“5. All work on ladders or scaffolds of any kind elevated twenty (20) feet or more above the ground or floor beneath in the erection, construction, repair, painting or alteration of any building, bridge, structure or other work in which the same are used.
“6i All work of construction, operation, alteration or repair where wires, cables, switchboards, or other apparatus or machinery are in use charged with electrical current.
; “7. All Work in the construction, alteration, or repair of pole lines for telegraph, telephone or other purposes.
*445“8. All work in or about quarries, open pits, open cuts, mines, ore reduction works and smelters.
“9. All work in the construction and repair of tunnels, sub-ways and viaducts.
“ 10. All work in mills, shops, works, yards, plants and factories where steam, electricity, or any other mechanical power is used to operate machinery and appliances in and about such premises.
“Sec. 5. Every employer, whether individual, firm, association, company or corporation, employing workmen in such occupation, of itself or through an agent, shall by rules, regulations, or instructions, • inform all employees in such occupations as to the duties and restrictions of their employment, to the end of protecting the safety of employees in such employment.
“Sec. 6. When in the course of work in any of the employments or occupations enumerated in Sec. 4 of this Act, personal injury or death by any accident arising out of and in the course of such labor, service and employment, and due to a condition or conditions of such occupation or employment, is caused to or suffered by any workman engaged therein, in all cases in which such injury or death of such employee shall not have been caused by the negligence of the employee killed or injured, then the employer of such employee shall be liable in damages to employee injured, or, in case death ensues, to the personal representative of the deceased for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then to such employee’s parents; and, if none, then to the next of kin dependent upon such employee, and if none, then to his personal representative for the benefit of the estate of the deceased.
“Sec. 7. In all actions hereafter brought against any such employer under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act to recover damages for personal injuries to any employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the question whether the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence, or has assumed the risk, shall be a question of fact and shall at all times be left to the jury, as provided in Sec. 5 of Article XVIII of the State Constitution.
“Sec. 8. That any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any employer to exempt himself or itself from any liability created by this Act, shall to that extent be void; provided, that in any action, brought against any such employer under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this *446Act, such employer may set off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity or that [it] may have paid to the injured employee or his personal representative on account of the injury or death for which said action was brought.
“Sec. 9. In all actions for damages brought under the provisions of this Act,-, if the plaintiff be successful in obtaining judgment; and if the defendant appeals to a ;higher court; and if the plaintiff in the lower court be again successful; and the judgment of the lower court is sustained by the higher court or courts; then, and in that event the plaintiff shall have added to the amount of such judgment by such higher court or courts, interest at the rate of 12 per cent, per annum on the amount of such judgment from the date of the filing of the suit in the first instance, until the full amount of such judgment is paid.
“Sec. 10. No action shall be maintained under this Act unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued.
“Sec. 11. All Acts and parts of Acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.
“Whereas, the State Constitution commands the enactment of an Employers’ Liability law by the Legislature at its first session; and ; “Whereas, this Act'being said Employers’ Liability law is immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall be in full force, and effect from and after its passage and its approval by the Governor, and is hereby exempt from the operation of the Referendum provision of the State Constitution.”

 Workmen’s. Compulsory Compensation Law.
Sec. 2. That compensation graduated according to average earnings and limited to $4,000.00, “shall be paid by his employer to any workman engaged in any employment , declared and determined . ' . . to be especially dangerous, whether said employer be a person, firm, association, company, or corporation, if in the course of the employment of said employee personal injury thereto from any accident arising out of, and in the course of, such employment is caused in whole, or in part, or is contributed to, by a necessary risk or danger of such employment, or a necessary risk or danger inherent-in the nature thereof, or by failure of such employer, or any of his or its officers, agents, or employee or employees, to exercise due care, or to comply vdth any law affecting such employment.”
“Sec. 4. In case such employee or his personal representative shall *447refuse to settle for such compensation (as provided in Sec. -8 of Article XVIII of the State Constitution) and chooses to retain the right to sue said employer (as provided in any law provided for in Sec.' 7, Article XVIII of the State Constitution) he may so refuse to settle and may retain said right.” “Sec. 6. The common-law doctrine, of no liability without fault is hereby declared and determined to be abrogated in Arizona as far as it shall be sought to be applied to the. accidents hereinbefore mentioned.” “Sec. - 14.- . . . Provided, if, after the accident, either the employer or the workman shall refuse to make or accept compensation under this Act or to proceed-under or rely upon the provisions hereof for relief, then the other'may pursue his remedy or make his defense under other existing statutes, the State Constitution, or the” common law, except as herein provided, as his rights may at the time exist. Any suit brought by the workman for a recovery shall be held as an election to ‘pursue such remedy exclusively.”