Court Opinion

ID: 9462387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:39:54.531196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:34.140617
License: Public Domain

MULLIGAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I think that United States v. Roemer, 514 F.2d 1377 (2d Cir. 1975) is controlling here. In that case we held that the order directing a trial for Roemer did not become final even though he did not pursue possible appellate reversal because his co-appellees had sought certiorari and he “stood to benefit” from their efforts. 514 F.2d at 1381 n. 4. Here Yagid clearly would be benefited if his co-defendant had succeeded in persuading the Supreme Court to dismiss the indictment. He would not have to stand trial at all — the benefit here obviously would be greater than the new trial sought in Roemer. How then does the majority distinguish Roemer? We are told that the criminal justice system was benefited since a needless trial might have been avoided in that case. Had Badalamente succeeded in the Supreme Court in dismissing the indictment, Yagid’s retrial would have become perforce *968unnecessary. The fact that many other defendants would have also benefited does not change the ratio decidendi of Roemer. Badalamente was a co-defendant in Yagid’s trial and hardly an accidental or peripheral beneficiary.
We are also told by the majority that to expand Roemer would not serve the public interest in the prompt adjudication of criminal cases nor the accused’s interest in a speedy trial. But Judge Smith pointed out in Roemer, 514 F.2d at 1381, that the public also has a concomitant interest “in the punishment and deterrence of criminal behavior.” Moreover, since the dismissal below was without prejudice and Yagid can be reindicted, the question of “speed” is not now an issue. The trial court here also found that Yagid himself in any event had not made any effort to bring the case to trial.
The majority finally warns that to extend Roemer could mean that a defendant, by asserting “spurious” claims “in a petition for certiorari seeking greater relief than his co-defendant has sought and won, could bind his co-defendant insofar as a speedy trial is concerned.” The prospect of a defendant making a spurious claim in order to prevent his co-defendant from enjoying the benefits of a speedy trial is indeed far-fetched. If the majority simply means that irrespective of intent the co-defendant who has taken no appellate steps is 'therefore deprived of a speedy trial, the position is unrealistic. The prospect of no trial is much more attractive than a speedy retrial to any normal criminal defendant. In any event, there is nothing at all to suggest here that Badalamente’s petition for a writ of certiorari was spurious. Although the majority notes that United States v. Crispino, 392 F.Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y.1975) upon which he relied was subsequently reversed in this court, it did represent the considered view of a district court judge. We cannot therefore characterize a writ based on that opinion as spurious. A defendant who is convicted has the untrammelled right to appellate review and we cannot premise a re-trial rule upon the assumption that the ground for the review is flimsy or phony. The co-defendants of Roemer were also unsuccessful in obtaining certiorari but there is no indication in that case that this court made any assessment of the odds of appellate success in formulating its re-trial rule. In this case the ninety-day period for the re-trial under Rule 6 commenced when Badalamente’s petition for certiorari was denied on April 14, 1975. The Roemer rule thus spares the government and the defendant the burden of an unnecessary trial if appellate review ultimately exonerates the defendant; if review is not successful, the public’s interest in the punishment and deterrence of criminal behavior will be accommodated by allowing re-trial within 90 days from the time review proves fruitless. It thus seems to me that this case is well within the rationale of Roemer, that it does not represent an expansion of that case, and that the distinctions proffered by the majority are not at all meaningful.
I fully concur with that part of the majority opinion upholding the propriety of the direction that on re-trial the case be assigned to a different district court judge.