Court Opinion

ID: 9541976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:30:21.417296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:31.285588
License: Public Domain

Bronson, P. J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority opinion’s characterization of the Bristow burden, I cannot accept its criticism and limitation of Bristow, its precedents and antecedents. I write separately to state my views of the intended purpose and effect of Bristow.
The majority cites language from Bristow that the proponent of a preferred use who has established a prima facie case casts upon the municipality the burden of going forward to justify its exclusion of this legitimate and beneficial use. The distinction drawn by the majority between the burden of going forward and the burden of proof based upon this language is sound. Bristow was never intended to be a substitute for plaintiffs obligation to try his lawsuit. Although plaintiff properly bears the burden of "ultimate persuasion”, Bristow provides a vehicle for encouraging municipalities to recognize their responsibilities to the development of not only their community but that of the surrounding community.
The purpose of Bristow was to circumvent the problem of one community "pushing off’ undesirable uses to another community. It is in this context that the recognized need for particular types of housing justifies our imposition of the burden of going forward to justify the exclusion of such uses *470upon governmental units. Concededly, a plaintiff does not establish a prima facie case by pleading a preferred use, citing Bristow, and proclaiming, "I win”. A plaintiff is not entitled to this procedural advantage until he has submitted the appropriate evidence to establish the exclusion of a use which "has acquired a 'favored* status and is appropriate for the given site”. Bristow, p 212.
The motivation for Bristow’s shifted burden concept was to require municipalities to justify their failure to adequately provide for the necessary and varied housing needs of the public. Recently, in Johnson v Lyon Twp, 45 Mich App 491, 493-494 (1973), Judge John H. Gillis, the author of Bristow, described the rationale behind this shifted burden concept. Judge Gillis stated:
"Practically speaking, the shifting of the burden of going forward is not only a rule of procedural convenience but is grounded in considerations of fairness to the parties as well: The governmental unit legislating zoning restrictions should have superior access to facts and justifications for the zoning exclusion. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)
If the zoning authority fails to offer such rebuttal evidence, plaintiff after satisfying the burdens of establishing a prima facie case is entitled to judgment.
The type of evidence which will satisfy the municipalities’ burden was defined by Judge Gillis as:
" 'clear, positive, and credible evidence’ that would challenge either the existence of a 'favored’ status of the proposed use, the suitability of the site for such a use, the degree of exclusion, or the legal conclusion of invalidity.”
Several factors upon which the governmental unit *471may rely to satisfy its burden are traffic patterns, availability of water supply , and sewage disposal systems, availability of police and fire protection, and a comparison with surrounding uses. See Cohen v Canton Twp, 38 Mich App 680 (1972). Believing that these principles place the parties’ respective rights and duties in the proper perspective, I find the criticism of Bristow unfounded.
Part of my disagreement with the majority is directed toward their criticism of the emphasis Bristow placed upon the existence of a master plan. Green v Lima Twp, 40 Mich App 655 (1972), in which this writer participated, emphasized the veritable necessity for governmental units to properly adopt carefully prepared, well-reasoned, and flexible master plans. The caveat that our courts will accord special weight only to plans which are noticeably implemented provides an unambiguous encouragement for master plan development. Only our strict adherence to this principle will insure progress toward the rationale and just zoning control Bristow intended.
The present case serves as an unfortunate example of the evils occasioned by local zoning authorities’ disregard of Bristow. Only a single parcel of land in Shelby Township is zoned for the construction of mobile home parks. This parcel is not being developed for mobile homes and its current use for agricultural purposes belies such use. Although Shelby Township has recently enacted an ordinance permitting mobile home use, the significance of its conduct lies in the fact that its zoning map has not been similarly amended to designate appropriate areas for mobile home development. Defendant is merely paying lip service to the proposed use by accompanying a single unused parcel designated for mobile homes with an ordi*472nance which finally recognizes mobile homes as a legitimate use.
Upon these facts I would characterize defendant’s conduct as discrimination by design and find that plaintiff has established a prima facie case. Defendant’s failure to offer any evidence justifying its exclusion of the proposed use constitutes a failure to satisfy its burden of going forward, and I would reverse.