Court Opinion

ID: 9465696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:53:11.013103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:19.083661
License: Public Domain

BOWNES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The warrants which were issued for the search of defendant Melvin’s home and car were fatally defective in that no adequate showing of probable cause was made. The affidavit upon which the warrants were premised was facially insufficient1 to meet the fourth amendment’s requirement that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”
The facts we are presented with are skimpy indeed. At approximately 2:00 A.M. a man was seen in front of Rooney’s Tavern.2 A white Cadillac was parked outside in front. At 3:55 A.M. an explosion ripped through the tavern. According to the affidavit of a police officer who was not present at the time, an “unknown male” had said that a white Cadillac had left the scene moments before the explosion. James Melvin, defendant, at that time owned a white Cadillac. He was part owner of the tavern and lived in another town Weymouth. Leg wires were found outside the back of the building leading inside, thus suggesting that it had been bombed. Two officers of the bomb squad said they thought the bomb which caused the explosion would generally be made in a workshop of some sort. The patrol officer, when shown a photo of defendant, said that the man he had noticed at 2:00 A.M. bore a “strong resemblance” to the picture of defendant. On the basis of these facts— which were all that were before the justice issuing the warrants — a search warrant for defendant’s car and another warrant to search his home were obtained.
Even reading the affidavit, which is reproduced in its entirety in the margin,3 in the most generous light, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09, 91 S.Ct. *5022075 (1965), the affidavit does not support a finding of probable cause necessary to underpin the warrants. Neither the facts therein recited nor the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom supports a finding of a probable cause.
In its skeletonized form, the information presented in the affidavit4 was that a white Cadillac and a man who resembled defendant were seen in front of the tavern at 2:00 A.M.,5 that defendant owned a white Cadillac, and that an “unknown *503male”6 had stated that a white Cadillac had left the tavern shortly before the explosion at 3:55 A.M.7
To uphold a search of defendant’s home on the basis of the affidavit here is a brazen intrusion upon historic fourth amendment rights. A man who resembled defendant was observed entering his own establishment, a car of the same make as that owned by defendant8 was later observed shortly before the explosion. Two bomb experts concluded that the explosive was probably built in a workshop. In boiled down format, this was the basis upon which the warrant issued. I cannot believe the constitution’s requirement for a finding of probable cause can be satisfied on these facts.
There is a disturbing circularity to the majority’s argumentation. It proceeds on inferences to find it reasonable to suspect defendant of having bombed the tavern and then assumes that the tools for the bomb making are likely to be found at his residence. The defendant’s white Cadillac, on this bootstrap merry-go-round, becomes the key that opens his home to a search and seizure.
The affidavit contains the assertion that it is the “collective opinion” of the police that there is probable cause to believe defendant was responsible for the explosion. That this conclusory statement could not— at least in my understanding — support an arrest warrant (and I find it interesting that no arrest warrant was ever sought by police despite their collective opinion that there was probable cause) is beyond peradventure. It is, however, the necessary building block in the affidavit’s construct since, from this, the affidavit skips to the fact that two members of the bomb squad ventured their opinion that the bomb which caused the explosion would “generally be *504assembled in a workshop of some sort.” On this basis — the collective opinion by the police that defendant was responsible and the opinion of two bomb experts that a workshop of some sort might have been used in making the explosive — a warrant to search defendant’s home was obtained. This eviscerates the fourth amendment’s mandate that no warrant issue except on probable cause.
We are asked to link inference to inference until the final chain of probable cause is forged. The first set of inferences culminated in the conclusion that it was reasonable to assume that defendant had played a role in the bombing. Next, we are told that it was reasonable to believe that the bomb would have been constructed in a workshop of some sort. From there, the inference is that the bomb was a homemade device which the person responsible would have built himself. Since we have already inferred that defendant was probably responsible — so the argument goes — it then becomes reasonable to suspect that he built the bomb and that his home, which lies in another town (though we are assured, is not too distant from the tavern) would have been the locus of the bomb making activity. Finally, we are faced with the linchpin that if the bomb had been assembled in the house, the traces of bombmaking would still be present.9
I reiterate what this court said on an earlier occasion:
It is one thing to expect the magistrate to give a commonsense reading to facts set forth and to draw inferences from them. It is quite another thing to expect the magistrate to reach for external facts and to build inference upon inference in order to create a reasonable basis for his belief[.]
Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 317 (1st Cir. 1966).
There must be a “substantial basis” for the magistrate or justice to conclude that evidence of the crime would be found at defendant’s home. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). “Facts or circumstances” from which the justice can find probable cause must be presented. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933). Here, no such basis was present. No facts or circumstances were described which would have permitted the justice to conclude that evidence of the bombmaking would likely be found at the home. There was no allegation that more than one bomb was constructed, compare United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222, 224—26 (1st Cir. 1978); there was no statement that defendant had a workshop in his home; no one reported seeing any such bomb making implements at the home, compare United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1975); no one had personally witnessed defendant making such a bomb, compare United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); the affidavit claimed no direct knowledge of explosive making material at defendant’s home, compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 268, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1960).
The cases cited by the government and relied upon by the majority are clearly distinguishable. In United States v. Samson, 533 F.2d 721 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 126, 50 L.Ed.2d 116 (1976), there was a recitation of specific facts by the informant who had been directly involved in the criminal activity; there was no question about defendant’s involvement in the purported illegality. The informant also stated that defendant, who had illegally brought guns to the informant’s apartment for sale, then brought the guns back *505to his own apartment as far as the informant knew.
Haefeli v. Chernoff, 526 F.2d 1314 (1st Cir. 1975), upheld a warrant to search defendant’s apartment following his arrest for possession of stolen property and after other evidence and fruits of criminal activity had been seized from a search of his ear. Other known pieces of property which had been stolen during the burglary were still missing. On these grounds, as well as evidence which had been gathered as the result of surveillance and general identification of defendant by other victims, we found the search warrant validly issued.
In United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1970), defendant mail clerk had signed for a registered pouch containing $29,000; several hours later, he reported the pouch stolen. Defendant was seen leaving the post office and returning approximately thirty-five minutes later, time enough for him to have gone to his home and returned. Shortly thereafter, he reported the pouch missing. The affidavit contained detailed descriptions of his movements, as well as glaring discrepancies in the story he told his supervisor and others. His own version was internally inconsistent.
United States v. Picariello, supra, 568 F.2d 222, is clearly not apposite. There, over 1,200 pounds of explosives had been stolen and only a small portion recovered; defendant had been under surveillance for two months prior to the search, following tentative witness identification of defendant as a participant in a bombing incident. Defendant was observed by agents leaving his house carrying a box and an attache case, entering a car which was tailed by police, then which was engaged in a high speed chase with police, and was found abandoned hours later with fifty sticks of the stolen dynamite in it.
Here, by contrast, we have no eyewitness or participant to the alleged illegality; we have no positive identification of defendant as directly involved in the explosion; there was no valid arrest and simultaneous discovery of part of the incriminating material; there was no showing that defendant had ever possessed explosives; there was no suggestion that more than one bomb had been manufactured; there were no grounds for a reasonable belief that additional explosive making material was extant or would be found at defendant’s home.
For a series of cases which have held that no probable cause existed to search defendant’s home, even after defendant had been lawfully arrested (here, there is not even this to suggest a permissible link for a search of defendant’s house), see e. g. United States v. Gramlich, 551 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1977) (no circumstance upon which magistrate could base his determination that incriminating evidence would be found in defendant’s home; search invalid); United States v. Bailey, 458 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1972) (nothing in the affidavits to support affiant’s conclusion that fruits of the crime might be in either the house or car; search invalid); United States v. Flanagan, 423 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1970) (affidavit merely raises the suspicion that goods would be found in the home sought to be searched; search invalid).
The affidavit here presented “no more than an anemic suspicion,” United States v. Whitlow, 339 F.2d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 1964), that evidence of bomb making would be found at defendant’s home. No adequate foundation for a finding of probable cause was laid and the resulting warrant was, therefore, illegally issued.
I am also troubled by the implications of the majority’s comments regarding the degree of certitude required for a finding of probable cause. Ante at pp. 495-496. The majority states that probable cause is properly defined as reasonable cause and cites to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 565 (1978), and Brine-gar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175—76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). The focus of the discussion in Zureher was whether the premises of a third party, not implicated in criminal wrongdoing, could lawfully be the subject of a search warrant when there was probable cause to believe evidence of a crime could be found there. The majority, by focusing narrowly on lan*506guage relating to “reasonableness,” compels the inference that the degree to probity required for probable cause to obtain a search warrant is somehow of a lesser cali-bre than other forms of probable cause. This is patently incorrect. Probable cause for a search warrant requires the same degree of certitude as probable cause to arrest.10 Zurcher at 556-57 n.6, 98 S.Ct. 1970; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 n.5, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637; (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 n.3, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 451, 2 L.Ed. 495 (1806). While that degree need not be calibrated according to mathematical formula, the strong showing which must be made cannot be ignored.
In reviewing the affidavit for probable cause, my brethren analyze the information provided by the “unknown male” and discuss the distinction which has been drawn by some courts between crediting information which comes via an informant and that from a bystander witness. According to the distinction, the latter is not subject to the precise requirements of Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, and Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. However, the cases cited by the majority in support of the application of this principle to the instant case do not aid the affidavit here relied on. In United States v. Burke, supra, 517 F.2d 377, the eyewitness had actually seen the illegal gun in the place to be searched, there was particularity of detail, and the witness was named. In United States v. McCoy, 478 F.2d 176 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828, 94 S.Ct. 53, 38 L.Ed.2d 62 (1973), eyewitnesses aboard a skyjacked plane gave detailed information concerning defendant; the F.B.I. laboratory in Washington matched the handwriting on the demand note to defendant’s Army personnel records; there were several other corroborating details, all directly linking defendant with the crime. In United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972), there was positive identification by witnesses of defendant, there were several corroborating witnesses. In United States v. Mahler, 442 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993, 92 S.Ct. 541, 30 L.Ed.2d 545 (1971), there was a self-corroborating aspect to the information transmitted since the informant had been the victim of defendant’s extortion scheme.
The important point these cases make is that an affidavit does not fail merely because it relies on hearsay evidence of a bystander to establish probable cause. So long as the hearsay evidence includes indi-cia of credibility and internal reliability, it poses no problem. The problem arises when, in a case such as that presented here, there is no method for ascertaining the truth or accuracy of the bystander’s comments. He was listed solely as an unidentified male; there was no statement that he himself had seen the car leave the scene of the explosion;11 there were no other witnesses who could place the car at the scene moments before the explosion. On this last point, I think it important to say that, unlike my brethren, I do not consider the patrol officer’s observation of a white Cad-*507iliac two hours earlier as corroborating evidence that a white Cadillac was seen shortly before the explosion. The unidentified male had not seen defendant or anyone else at the tavern, so there was no positive identification unlike the cases cited above. There was no self-corroborating aspect to Arky’s comment, since he had been neither the victim nor accomplice of the alleged illegality. In short, there is lacking the type of firm and concrete detail shown in the witnesses’ statements in the cases relied on by the government and the majority. I have no quarrel with the principle that the Aguilar/Spinelli analysis might need adaptation where the informant is a witness or bystander rather than a professional informer. What I think is necessary, however, is a recognition that the focus should not be on drawing this distinction, but rather on whether the information transmitted is credible and contains sufficient indices of credibility for a neutral magistrate to be able to justifiably rely on it in finding probable cause.
There are other troubling aspects to this case which raise grave questions. The most serious of these concerns the subfacial problems of the affidavit. Since I believe the affidavit failed on its face to make a showing sufficient to find probable cause, I do not reach the questions raised by defendant concerning the subfacial irregularities of the affidavit, but their mere recitation is unsettling: the failure of the police to disclose that the informant Arky (1) recanted on his identification of the car as a “white Cadillac,” (2) may never have identified the car as a white Cadillac, (3) never said that he had seen the car leave the scene of the incident “moments before the explosion,” (4) was not an “unidentified male” since he was known at least by the nickname Arky and was known to have at least a managerial (in fact he was the owner) interest in a nearby competing bar, the Circle Cafe.12 The majority excuses these failures by noting that the lapses by the police were “even-handed” since they also failed to report that Arky had purportedly received threatening calls. There might be a balancing of the scales were the recantation weighed against the threats. However, the fact that Arky never said that he saw the car “moments before” the explosion, that he never said that he saw the car leaving the scene, and that he, himself, was not even at the scene at the time of the explosion, tips the scale heavily against a conclusion of even-handedness.
The court below also forgave these flaws, on the grounds that the affidavit was prepared in haste because of “evolving and ambiguous circumstances[.]” Although the talisman of time pressure and haste is invoked, I do not succumb to its spell. The police sought the warrant at 5:30 P.M. on November 19, a full 37V2 hours after the explosion. This is not the situation of United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1976), cited below, where the setting was indeed one of a series of rapid-fire events: a plane landed without authority, a car was observed speeding away from the air field abandoning the aircraft. The errors in the affidavit there were minimal and were based on direct observation by the police. Here, the police waited a day and a half before seeking the warrant, during which time little or no effort was made to flesh out the factual details surrounding the explosion. The police did interview Arky, by phone. Notwithstanding this, the affidavit still referred to him as “an unidentified male.” Even more alarming is the failure of the police to recount Arky’s recantation, during that conversation, of his comments of the previous day. This is not the proper setting for applying the rubric of quickly occurring events as an excuse for slight discrepancies or omissions in an affidavit. Everything that was to happen had already occurred. All that remained was for the police to do proper investigative *508work so that they could lay the basis for a neutral justice to conclude that probable cause existed to search defendant’s car and home. This, the police did not do. In fact, the only investigative work which was done resulted in a recantation which the police suppressed from the affidavit.
The protection afforded by the fourth amendment stands as an important bulwark for people in a free society. Unreasonable searches, made without probable cause, threaten the very fabric of our democratic system. The search here was executed in the absence of probable cause. I think nothing is clearer in our jurisprudence than that the fruits of that search should be suppressed. I fear that by upholding the constitutionality of the search here, the majority’s opinion will be read as an open invitation to issue warrants upon the gos-samers of suspicion and conjecture.
I would reverse.

. I discuss, infra, some of the subfacial problems of the affidavit.

. At the suppression hearing, Officer Amstein stated that, while he thought Rooney’s had only a 1:00 A.M. license, it still appeared to be open at 2:00 A.M. with several people inside.

. The affidavit is here reproduced in its entirety:
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Suffolk, ss. Superior Court

AFFIDAVIT

I, JOHN E. LYDSTONE, a detective in the Boston Police Department, assigned to the Intelligence Division, Vice Control Section, being duly sworn, state:
(1) That I have been a police officer in the City of Boston for the past ten years and for the last three years assigned to the Intelligence Division, Vice Control Section. During that time as a detective in the Intelligence Division, it has been my assignment in part, to investigate organized criminal activity in and around the City of Boston.
(2) That about 9:30 AM on Thursday, November 18, 1976 I and other officers from the Intelligence Division had occasion to respond to 417 Neponset Avenue, Dorchester, which is Rooney’s Tavern, on report that an explosion had taken place tnere. Upon arrival and after conversing with members of the Boston Fire Department Arson Squad who were already on the scene, I notified the Boston Police Emer*502gency Service Unit, Bomb Squad and requested them to conduct an investigation.
(3) Boston Police Sergeant Ruglario and Patrolman Cunningham of the Bomb Squad responded and conducted an investigation and reported the following facts to me: a length of brown wire was found at the rear of Rooney’s Tavern, partially concealed in the grass. This wire was about one hundred and three feet in length with the insulation stripped at both ends and extended from the rear of the Tavern to the sidewalk along Cradick Street. It is the opinion of the Bomb Squad officers that this wire is capable of and consistent with the type used to explode a bomb. The officers further reported that inside of the tavern a length of similar brown wire was found. Attached to the end of this wire was a piece of yellow wire and a piece of blue wire which is consistent with the kind used to detonate a blasting cap which would detonate a stick of dynamite. It is the opinion of these bomb squad officers that the above paraphernalia was in facts [sic] used to cause the explosion at Rooney’s Tavern.
(4) That at about 6:00 PM on Thursday, November 18, 1976, I and other officers of the Intelligence Division interviewed Patrolman John Arnstein of Boston Police District 11. Patrolman Amstein stated that at about 2:00 AM on Thursday, November 18, 1976, he had been on duty and patrolling the area of Rooney’s Tavern and noted that a white Cadillac was parked at the front door and that a white male, about 35 years, 5-10, 180 lbs. was standing at the front door. Later that same morning, at about 3:56 AM, Patrolman Arnstein responded to a radio call relative to an explosion at Rooney’s Tavern. Unon [sic] and during his investigation, an unknown male stated that a white Cadillac had left the scene moments before the explosion.
(5) That I gave photographs of persons known by me to frequent the area of Rooney’s Tavern and Patrolman Amstein indicated that a photograph of James Melvin bore a strong resemblance to the man that he had seen at the Tavern door at 2:00 AM that morning.
(6) That James Melvin is a white male, 34 years old 5'9" 165 lbs., is listed as an owner of Rooney’s Tavern and that he operates a 1976 Cadillac, color white, Mass. Reg. D66-105 and he resides at 38 Ells Ave., Weymouth.
(7) That at about 10:00 PM Thursday, November 18, 1976, Detective Martin Coleman of the Intelligence Division responded to 38 Ells Aven., Weymouth and observed that the white Cadillac belonging to Melvin was parked at that location.
(8) That I have discussed the above stated facts and their inferences with other members of the Intelligence Division and it is our collective opinion that there is probable cause to believe that James F. Melvin was responsible for the explosion at Rooney’s Tavern and respectfully request that the Court issue search warrant for Melvin’s white Cadillac, Mass. Reg. D66-105.
(9) I have discussed the facts and inferences of this case with Sgt. Ruglario and and [sic] Patrolman Cunningham of the Bomb Squad. They inform me that the type of device capable of causing the above damage (at Rooney’s Tavern) would generally be assembled in a workshop of some sort, as opposed to in the vehicle, because of the type of tools and materials needed to assemble the bomb. Therefore, I also request a search warrant for James Melvin’s residence at 38 Ells Avenue, Weymouth, Massachusetts. That residence is described as a single-family, brown, two-story house with a garage attached.
Respectfully submitted,

John E. Lydstone

John E. Lydstone

Detective

Boston Police Department

. There is no contention that information other than that in the affidavit was presented to the justice who issued the warrants. Any finding of probable cause must, therefore, be found in the affidavit. Spineili v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n.3, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958).

. This fact in and of itself imputes no wrongdoing. Even if the bar had a closing time of 1:00 A.M., it is not unreasonable that the owner should come to the premises an hour later, perhaps to check receipts for the evening, close the bar for the night, check to make sure that everything had run smoothly. In short, neither the fact, nor any reasonable inference therefrom, that a man strongly resembling defendant had been seen in front of the tavern at 2:00 A.M. is suggestive of criminal liability.

. The “unknown male” was the owner of a nearby bar and was known to the police at the scene of the explosion as Arky. As Arky was approaching the throng of police, he asked Officer Amstein, “Am I a prime suspect in this?”. His query was made in a joking manner according to his deposition testimony. There is nothing in the record before us to suggest that he was in any way involved in the explosion. I note the remark simply for the tint it casts over the question of his credibility as a witness.

. From these facts, a jump is made that probable cause existed to search defendant’s car. The search of defendant’s car is not the focus of attention here since the guns which formed the basis of the indictment and conviction were found in the house, not the car. Since, however, the car forms a necessaiy step on the road to finding probable cause to search the house, I briefly consider it. On the basis of the facts contained in the affidavit, I think that no warrant should have issued for a search of the car. I reach this conclusion recognizing full well that automobiles have been accorded special treatment by the Supreme Court for fourth amendment purposes. An exception to the warrant requirement has been formulated for searches of automobiles under certain circumstances. The rationale has been articulated in terms of the unique status automobiles enjoy in our society, with their inherent mobility and relatively fewer expectations of privacy associated with them. See, e. g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S.Ct. 567, 38 L.Ed.2d 467 (1974) (plurality opinion); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Nonetheless, there is a bedrock upon which any such search must rest: probable cause. “[T]he Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.” Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2537, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) (footnote omitted). Cf. Delaware v. Prouse,-U.S.-, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (either probable cause or articulable reasonable suspicion necessary for spot checks of automobiles). Here, there was no information in the affidavit concerning the year of the Cadillac seen at 2:00 A.M. and the one seen later. No license plate numbers were obtained, to check against whether the car purportedly seen at 3:55 A.M. bore tags registered to defendant, no year or model of the Cadillacs was included, matching either the 2:00 A.M. car with the 3:55 A.M. one or matching either vehicle with the one owned by defendant. In short, I find no clearly identifying information linking the cars seen with that owned by defendant.

. I do not believe, as the majority suggests— nor is there anything in the record to support a finding — that white Cadillacs are “relatively] unique!]” in Boston. In a city the size of Boston, Cadillacs — even white ones — are not an endangered species.

. No traces of bombmaking were found in defendant’s house, though some evidence was found in the car. Instead, the police uncovered a veritable arsenal of dangerous and highly suspicious weapons and ammunition. Seven guns were seized, including sawed-off weapons. A cache of ammunition, including armor piercing bullets, was taken by the police. The munitions are highly suggestive, of course, of criminal behavior. Their discovery cannot, however, justify post facto the illegal search, initiated without probable cause.

. Relaxation of this standard has been condoned in a few specifically recognized exceptions, i. e., routine searches which occur at our national borders and their functional equivalents and which involve no more than a visual inspection of occupants and contents visible from the outside, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); searches of luggage at the border; “stop and frisk” limited searches for weapons under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In these limited cases, the personal interest protected by the fourth amendment has been weighed against the public interest in the search and the intrusion has been found to be reasonable.

. In fact, we know now that he never said that he had seen the car leave the scene shortly before the explosion. We further know that he was not at the site when the explosion occurred, but had left fifteen to thirty minutes earlier and was at his home and was called by an employee whose house faces Rooney’s Tavern. Arky then drove from his house back to the area.

. The district court, pursuant to United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1974), see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), held an evidentiary hearing and determined that suppression would not be required for the asserted flaws in the affidavit, ruling that they did not constitute material omissions or misstatements made either intentionally or recklessly.