Court Opinion

ID: 9488858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:57:33.348083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:08.817843
License: Public Domain

BIRCH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur in the court’s affirmance of the district court’s dismissal of Davis’s section 1983 claim, I disagree with the majority’s holding that Davis’s allegations state a valid claim against the Monroe County Board of Education under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1990 & Supp.1995) (“Title IX”).
This case does not involve allegations that an employee of the school district sexually harassed LaShonda D., but rather that the school district negligently failed to prevent another student from harassing LaShonda. The majority is correct in noting that the Supreme Court has held that “Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of action.” Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1032, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). However, Franklin involved a high-school student’s allegations that a teacher had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and that school officials, who had actual knowledge of the *1196teacher’s conduct, failed to intervene. 503 U.S. at 63-64, 112 S.Ct. at 1031-32. The student-on-student sexual harassment alleged in this case is analytically quite distinct from that in Franklin, and the majority makes an unprecedented extension in holding that Title IX encompasses a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment based on the conduct of a student. There is no indication in the language of Title IX that such a cause of action was intended to be covered by its scope; rather, the statute states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, ... be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). In this case, the school board, which is clearly an educational “program or activity” under 20 U.S.C. § 1687, is not alleged to have committed any act of harassment against LaShonda, nor is any employee of the school board. Rather, the plaintiff seeks to hold the school board liable for negligently failing to prevent another student, not its employee, from sexually harassing LaShonda. In my opinion, this student-on-student sexual harassment case clearly falls outside the purview of Title IX.
Even if I were to accept the majority’s conclusion that Title IX encompasses student-on-student sexual harassment, I would limit that holding to intentional conduct on the part of the school board. Here, what is alleged is that the school board was negligent in failing to intervene to prevent the recurring student-on-student harassment. The majority relies on Franklin in reaching its conclusion that Title IX covers such behavior, even though the Franklin case involved intentional behavior on the part of a teacher; absent an indication to the contrary, Franklin should be limited to its facts. But rather than do this, the majority not only broadly reads it to cover student-on-student sexual harassment, but also to cover negligent behavior on the part of the school board.
Lastly, I would limit the remedy available to a plaintiff in the ease of unintentional violations of Title IX to injunctive relief. Franklin involved intentional discrimination by the school board on the basis of sex, and thus involved an intentional violation of Title IX. The Supreme Court has held that in the case of intentional violations of Title IX, monetary damages are available to the victim of the sexual harassment. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-75, 112 S.Ct. at 1037. What the Supreme Court did not decide in Franklin, however, was whether monetary damages are available in eases involving unintentional violations of Title IX. Most courts have interpreted Title IX along the same lines as similar statutes, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4a (1994 & Supp.1995). Since the Supreme Court has expressly found that Title VI does not support a monetary damages remedy for Title VI violations not involving intentional discrimination, Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Comm’n, 468 U.S. 582, 602-03, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3232-33, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983), we similarly should find that monetary damages are limited to intentional violations of Title IX.1 Therefore, even if I were to accept the majority’s argument that Title IX applies to the conduct at issue in this case, I would limit the remedy available to the plaintiff to injunctive relief.
Accordingly, I CONCUR in part and DISSENT in part.

. At least one federal district court has reached this conclusion as well. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F.Supp. 1560, 1571 (N.D.Cal.1993) (finding that "Title DC does prohibit hostile environment sexual harassment but that to obtain damages (as opposed to declaratory or in-junctive relief), one must allege and prove intentional discrimination on the basis of sex by an employee of the educational institution”). The Doe court specifically held that "[t]o obtain damages, it is not enough that the institution knew or should have known of the hostile environment and failed to take appropriate action to end it.” Id.