Court Opinion

ID: 9702945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:33:37.988848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:43.948674
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe that the acts of Schanno have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it reasonable in this case.1
Initially, I note that I fully agree with the majority that the requirement of Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa.Super. 12, 323 A.2d 11 (1974), that the *53cause of action must arise from a corporation’s activities within the forum state is disregarded if the corporation engages in substantial and continuous activities in this state.2
I also agree with the majority that the other requirements of Proctor & Schwartz must still be met3 and that in *54this case the first requirement that a defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting within the forum state has been met. Finally, I agree with the majority’s statement that the third requirement of Proctor & Schwartz is the most significant, but I believe that it is here where the majority’s analysis falls short.
The focus of the third part of the Proctor & Schwartz test is on whether “the exercise of jurisdiction in this particular case [would] be fair and reasonable under the circumstances.” Id., 228 Pa.Superior Ct. 20, 323 A.2d at 16. As previously noted, the determination of whether an exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable depends on the burden that would be imposed on the defendant, in light of several factors, including the forum state’s interest in resolving the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; the interstate judicial system’s interest in the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and the interest of the several states in furthering substantive social policies.
Kingsley & Keith (Canada) Limited v. Mercer International Corporation, 291 Pa.Super. 96, 108-109, 435 A.2d 585, 591 (1981), citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
The only treatment by the majority of the requirement appears to be its discussion of the Supreme Court case of Kingsley & Keith, supra. The only relevance the quoted portion of that case would seem to have is in the statement that Pennsylvania has an interest in highway safety. As noted above, there are, however, several other factors to be considered in determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.
Certainly, Pennsylvania has some interest in adjudicating this dispute, since appellant and Todd Trice are residents of Pennsylvania, as was James Gulentz. However, this inter*55est is not as strong as it would be had the accident taken place in Pennsylvania.
Also, I believe that exercise of jurisdiction by a Pennsylvania court would not advance appellant’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective and definitely would not further the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies.
Appellant has already filed a protective action in Ohio, where all parties involved are amenable to suit, in case of an adverse decision on the jurisdictional question in Pennsylvania. Since this appeal is only from that part of the order sustaining Schanno’s preliminary objections will have to pursue her action in Ohio against Wayne Fosdick and B & C Trucking regardless of the outcome of this appeal.
In addition, defendant Todd Trice filed cross-claims in the court below against Fosdick, B & C Trucking, and Schanno. These claims were dismissed on preliminary objections raising the question of jurisdiction. Thus, Schanno would almost certainly be subjected to suit in Ohio by Trice in addition to having to defend appellant’s suit in Pennsylvania under the result reached by the majority. Furthermore, two other lawsuits involving all the defendants in this case have also been filed in Ohio. Lastly, I note that appellant was not precluded from entering, and did, in fact, enter a forum where she could have obtained a resolution of her claims against all the defendants in this case.
I “believe that in these circumstances the exercise in Pennsylvania of jurisdiction over [Schanno] would be unreasonable within the meaning of the third part of the Proctor & Schwartz test. Crompton v. Park Ward Motors, Inc., 299 Pa.Super. 40, 47, 445 A.2d 137, 140 (1982); cf. Kingsley & Keith v. Mercer International Corp., 291 Pa.Super. 96, 435 A.2d 585 (1981) (exercise of jurisdiction reasonable when breach of contract affected Pennsylvania domiciliary and all other parties to the transaction were in Pennsylvania.)
Therefore, I would affirm the order of the court below.

. Although the majority states in footnote 1 of its opinion that Schan-no had, as the moving party, the burden of proof on the issue of jurisdiction, this question does not appear to have been settled under Pennsylvania case law. See and compare, Crompton v. Park, Ward Motors, Inc., 299 Pa.Super. 40, 445 A.2d 137 (1982) and cases cited therein with Holt Hauling and Warehousing Systems, Inc. v. Aronow Roofing Co., 309 Pa.Super. 158, 454 A.2d 1131 (1983) and cases cited therein.

. Subsection (b) of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301 states the following:
(b) Scope of jurisdiction.—When jurisdiction over a person is based upon this section any cause of action may be asserted against him, whether or not arising from acts enumerated in this section. Discontinuance of the acts enumerated in subsection (a)(2)(i) and (iii) and (3)(i) and (iii) shall not affect jurisdiction with respect to any act, transaction or omission occurring during the period such status existed. 1976, July 9, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, effective June 27, 1978; as amended 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 10(60), effective June 27, 1978. As amended 1981, July 10, P.L. 237, No. 77, § 3, effective in 60 days.
Thus, once the conclusion is reached that Pennsylvania activities that are continuous and substantial are encompassed by § 5301(2)(iii) (carrying on of a continuous and systematic portion of general business), subsection (b) clearly provides that the cause of action need not arise from those activities. Cf. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(c) (scope of jurisdiction limited to causes of action arising from acts enumerated in the section).

. Prior cases have not been entirely clear as to whether satisfaction of the “continuous and substantial activities" test enunciated in Bork v. Mills, 458 Pa. 228, 229, 329 A.2d 247, 249 (1974), is alone sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction or whether the test is only meant to be an alternative to the second requirement of Proctor & Schwartz. The case cited by the majority in regard to this issue, Koenig v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 284 Pa.Super. 558, 426 A.2d 635 (1980), appears to treat the Mills test as one that is independent of the Proctor & Schwartz requirements, but that should only be applied if the Proctor & Schwartz test is not satisfied.
However, in practical effect, I believe it would make very little difference which way the Mills test is applied. The test stated in Mills was that “jurisdiction ... may be found where the nonresident’s activities in the forum state are ‘so continuous and substantial as to make it reasonable’ to require the nonresident defendant to submit to the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts. Bork v. Mills, 458 Pa. 228, 232, 329 A.2d 247, 249 (1974).” Kingsley & Keith (Canada) Limited v. Mercer International Corp., 500 Pa. 371, 382, 456 A.2d 1333, 1339 (1983) (Opinion in Support of Reversal). Thus, it can be seen that this test actually incorporates the third requirement of Proctor & Schwartz of reasonability. Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of a case in which a defendant’s activities are so continuous and substantial as to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable, but in which it has not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting within the forum *54state. Therefore, it appears that if the Mills test is satisfied, so also will be the first and third requirement of Proctor & Schwartz.