Court Opinion

ID: 9899457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 19:03:46.489198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.553446
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/16/23 Mena v. Muscolino Inventory Services CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 ANDY MENA,                                                           B321559

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. 21STCV33994)
           v.

 MUSCOLINO INVENTORY
 SERVICES, INC.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kenneth R. Freeman, Judge. Affirmed.
     CDF Labor Law, Todd R. Wulffson, Nancy N. Lubrano,
Brian E. Cole II; Quarles & Brady, E. Joseph Connaughton and
Douglas R. Ottenwess for Defendant and Appellant.
     Justice Law Corporation, Douglas Han, Shunt Tatavos-
Gharajeh, Chris Petersen and Shelby Miner for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                  ____________________________
       This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel
arbitration. The trial court found that the arbitration agreement
is unconscionable and refused to enforce it on that basis.
       Defendant and appellant Muscolino Inventory Services,
Inc. (Muscolino) hired plaintiff and respondent Andy Mena and,
as part of the hiring process, required Mena to execute an
arbitration agreement. That agreement obligated the parties to
arbitrate most disputes arising out of or relating to Mena’s
employment relationship with Muscolino.
       Several years after Mena’s employment relationship ended,
Mena filed a class action complaint against Muscolino, alleging a
claim under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17200 et seq.; UCL). He based that claim on Muscolino’s
purported violations of Labor Code wage and hour provisions.
When Muscolino sought to compel arbitration of Mena’s UCL
claim, the trial court refused. The trial court found a low level of
procedural unconscionability, but, because the court concluded
the agreement was permeated with unconscionability, it ruled
that the contract was unenforceable. In particular, the court
found the agreement contained three substantively
unconscionable components: (1) the agreement excluded
Muscolino’s claims for equitable relief from the obligation to
arbitrate but required Mena to arbitrate his equitable claims;
(2) an informal dispute resolution provision shortening the
statute of limitations on Mena’s UCL claim, as well as the
limitations period for the underlying alleged Labor Code
violations; and (3) a waiver of certain claims under the Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).1

      1   (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)

                                        2
      We agree with the trial court’s findings and affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
      We summarize only those facts relevant to this appeal.
      Mena is a former employee of Muscolino who was hired as
an auditor in 2017. At the time Mena was hired, Muscolino
required Mena to sign its mediation and arbitration agreement
(Agreement), which provides, with certain exceptions, that
Muscolino and Mena submit any dispute “arising out of or
relating to [Mena’s] employment relationship with [Muscolino] or
the termination of that relationship . . . for . . . mediation before a
neutral third-party and (if necessary) for final and binding
resolution by a private and impartial arbitrator . . . .”3 Mena’s
tenure at Muscolino ended later in 2017.
      On September 13, 2021, Mena filed a class action complaint
against Muscolino, alleging a single claim under the UCL arising

      2  We derive our Factual and Procedural Background in
part from undisputed aspects of the trial court’s ruling and
admissions made by the parties in their appellate briefing.
(See Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 340, 349, fn. 2 [utilizing the summary of facts
provided in the trial court’s ruling]; Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make
use of statements [in briefs and argument] . . . as admissions
against the party [advancing them].’ ”].)
      3 We describe the pertinent portions of the Agreement in
greater detail in our Discussion. We observe the Agreement
indicates that “Phyle Inventory Control Specialists (PICS),”
which appears to be an affiliate of Muscolino, is also a party to
the Agreement. Because neither party discusses PICS on appeal,
we do not address this point further.

                                      3
from Muscolino’s alleged “policy and practice of wage abuse
against its hourly-paid or non-exempt employees within the State
of California.” “This scheme allegedly involved, inter alia, failing
to properly calculate employee overtime pay and failing to pay
them for all hours worked, missed meal and rest periods, and
failing to reimburse business expenses, in violation of California
law.” “[Mena] brings the UCL claim on behalf of a putative class
of ‘[a]ll current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees
of [Muscolino] within the State of California at any time during
the period from March 15, 2017 to final judgment.’ ”
        Muscolino moved to compel arbitration.4 Mena opposed the
motion, and Muscolino filed a reply in support of its motion.
        On May 19, 2022, the trial court denied Muscolino’s motion.
At the outset of its decision, the court found, “Muscolino has
shown . . . that an agreement to arbitrate exists, . . . said
agreement covers the dispute at the heart of the litigation,” and
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to the Agreement.
        Regarding Mena’s unconscionability defense to the
Agreement, the court found “a slight degree of procedural
unconscionability attributable to the adhesive nature of the
agreement,” given that “the agreement was presented on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis” and “[t]here was no meaningful choice on the
part of [Mena].”
        The court further concluded, “[T]here are three
substantively unconscionable components of the arbitration
agreement— . . . lack of mutuality on equitable and injunctive
relief claims; [a] one-year limitations period; and [a] waiver of

      4 As we explain in Discussion, part A, post, Muscolino also
sought an order dismissing Mena’s class claims and staying the
action.

                                    4
representative PAGA claims.” As to the first substantively
unconscionable provision, the court found, “While [Muscolino] is
excused from seeking all injunctive relief or other equitable relief
against [Mena] in arbitration (including injunctive or equitable
relief for non-trade secret claims), [Mena] may seek such relief
only before the arbitrator.” Concerning the second defective
provision, the court remarked, “[T]he Agreement . . . provides
that the employee ‘must notify [Muscolino’s] Human Resources of
any claim as soon as possible after the Employee first knew or
should have known of the facts giving rise to the claim and any
claim must be presented to Human Resources by this procedure
within one year of that time or it shall be deemed invalid.’ ” Next,
the court ruled that the Agreement impermissibly “purport[ed] to
waive [Mena’s] right to bring a representative PAGA claim”
because the contract “states that there ‘will be no right or
authority for any claim to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a
class, collective or representative action . . . .”
       The trial court declined to sever the three substantively
unconscionable provisions. The court reasoned, “[T]he agreement
is permeated with unconscionability, and the Court cannot strike
a single provision to render the agreement enforceable.”
Consequently, the court found the Agreement “cannot be
enforced.”
       Muscolino timely appealed the trial court’s May 19, 2022
order.

    STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
    REGARDING ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION
                 AGREEMENTS
      “ ‘In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the trial
court shall order parties to arbitrate “if it determines that an

                                     5
agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists . . . .” [Citation.]
“[T]he party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the
existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the
evidence, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence any defense . . . .”
[Citation.]’ ” (Western Bagel Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 649, 662.)
       “Unconscionability in a contract is one reason a court may
decline enforcement [of an arbitration agreement].” (See Lange v.
Monster Energy Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 436, 445 (Lange).)
“ ‘ “[U]nconscionability has both a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’
element,” the former focusing on “ ‘oppression’ ” or “ ‘surprise’ ”
due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on “ ‘overly harsh’ ”
or “ ‘one-sided’ ” results. [Citation.] “The prevailing view is that
[procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be
present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to
enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of
unconscionability.” [Citation.] But they need not be present in
the same degree. . . . [T]he more substantively oppressive the
contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is
required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable,
and vice versa.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       “If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1670.5, subd. (a).) “ ‘Although “th[is] statute appears to give a
trial court some discretion as to whether to sever or restrict the

                                    6
unconscionable provision or whether to refuse to enforce the
entire agreement[,] . . . it also appears to contemplate the latter
course only when an agreement is ‘permeated’ by
unconscionability.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lange, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th
at p. 453.)
        “ ‘Unconscionability is ultimately a question of law, which
we review de novo when no meaningful factual disputes exist as
to the evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Lange, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
p. 445.) “We review a trial court’s order declining to sever . . .
unconscionable provisions from an arbitration agreement for
abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 453.) “ ‘ “The discretion of a trial
judge . . . is subject to . . . reversal on appeal where no reasonable
basis for the action is shown.” ’ ” (Miyamoto v. Department of
Motor Vehicles (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218.) “ ‘ “The scope
of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied,
i.e., in the ‘legal principles governing the subject of [the]
action . . . .’ Action that transgresses the confines of the
applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and
we call such action an ‘abuse’ of discretion.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
pp. 1218–1219.)
        “ ‘ “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be
correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are
indulged in favor of its correctness.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
Thus, ‘ “ ‘it is the appellant’s responsibility to affirmatively
demonstrate error’ ” ’ by ‘ “ ‘supply[ing] the reviewing court with
some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to
the record.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The appellant bears this
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness accorded to
the trial court’s decision, regardless of the applicable standard of
review.” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of

                                     7
Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 776–777 (Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs).)

                          DISCUSSION
       We conclude the trial court did not err in ruling that there
is “a slight degree of procedural unconscionability attributable to
the adhesive nature of the agreement,” and that “there are three
substantively unconscionable components of the arbitration
agreement—the lack of mutuality on equitable and injunctive
relief claims; the one-year limitations period; and the waiver of
representative PAGA claims.” (Fn. omitted.) (Discussion,
parts B–C, post.) Further, Muscolino fails to demonstrate the
trial court abused its discretion in declining to sever the
unconscionable terms from the Agreement and, thus, refusing to
compel arbitration of Mena’s UCL claim. (Discussion, part D,
post.) In light of these conclusions, we do not address Mena’s
other arguments in support of the trial court’s ruling, although
we do not condone his reliance on withdrawn case authority and
an obviously inapplicable statute in making these arguments.5

      5  Mena argues (1) he was deprived of a meaningful
opportunity to negotiate the Agreement; (2) Muscolino failed to
explain the provisions of the Agreement to him; (3) Muscolino
failed to attach the arbitral forum’s rules to the Agreement and
designate clearly which rules govern; (4) the Agreement requires
Mena to pay the mediator’s and arbitrator’s fees; (5) “the
Agreement’s complex, three-step process” for dispute resolution
“demonstrates significant substantive unconscionability”; and
(6) Mena’s UCL cause of action falls beyond the scope of the
Agreement. (Some capitalization omitted.)
     In connection with argument (1) above, Mena relies on
Labor Code section 432.6. This provision does not apply because

                                    8
      Before reviewing the trial court’s rulings, we discuss the
appealability of the May 19, 2022 order and the scope of our
review.

A.    Appealability and Scope of Appellate Review
       In its notice of motion, Muscolino sought an order
“compelling arbitration of [Mena’s] individual claims, dismissing
class claims, and . . . stay[ing] the action pending resolution of
the arbitration.” In its order, the trial court denied Muscolino’s
motion to compel arbitration. Although the court did not state
that it was denying Muscolino’s motion to dismiss the class
claims and stay the action pending arbitration, the parties
proceed on the assumption that the court denied the entirety of
Muscolino’s motion.

Mena executed the Agreement in 2017 and left Muscolino later
that year. (See Lab. Code, § 432.6, subd. (h) [“This section
applies to contracts for employment entered into, modified, or
extended on or after January 1, 2020,” italics added].) Further,
Mena supports his assertion that the FAA does not preempt
Labor Code section 432.6 with a citation to a Ninth Circuit
opinion that was withdrawn nearly a year before Mena filed his
respondent’s brief. (Citing Chamber of Commerce of the United
States v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2021) 13 F.4th 766, 772, 780, opinion
withdrawn by Chamber of Commerce of the United States v.
Bonta (9th Cir. 2022) 45 F.4th 1113 [Aug. 22, 2022 order].)
Nearly six months before Mena filed his respondent’s brief, the
Ninth Circuit reversed course and held that the FAA preempts
Labor Code section 432.6. (See Chamber of Commerce of the
United States v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2023) 62 F.4th 473, 478–481, 490
[Feb. 15, 2023 opinion holding that the legislation that added
Lab. Code, § 432.6 is preempted by the FAA].)

                                    9
       “The denial of a motion to compel arbitration is an
appealable order.” (Hernandez v. Ross Stores, Inc. (2016)
7 Cal.App.5th 171, 176; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a)
[“An aggrieved party may appeal from: [¶] . . . An order . . .
denying a petition to compel arbitration.”].) Muscolino does not
argue that the court’s implicit denial of its requests to dismiss the
class claims and stay the action is appealable as well.
       We need not decide whether those other aspects of the trial
court’s ruling are directly appealable. Although Muscolino asks
us to instruct the trial court to grant the motion, Muscolino
does not clarify whether that would entail the dismissal of the
class claims and a stay of the action. In its briefing below,
Muscolino suggested that its entitlement to an order dismissing
the class claims and staying the action was predicated on
Muscolino’s position that the Agreement “passes ‘muster’ as to
enforceability.” Because we affirm the trial court’s ruling that
the Agreement is unenforceable (Discussion, parts B–D, post),
any challenge to the court’s refusal to dismiss the class claims
and stay the proceedings is now moot.

B.    The Agreement Is Procedurally Unconscionable to a
      Limited Degree
       The trial court ruled “[t]here is . . . a slight degree of
procedural unconscionability attributable to the adhesive nature
of the agreement” because Muscolino presented the instrument to
Mena “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,” meaning “[t]here was no
meaningful choice on the part of [Mena].” We agree. (See
Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704 [“It is well settled that adhesion
contracts in the employment context, that is, those contracts
offered to employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, typically

                                    10
contain some aspects of procedural unconscionability. . . . [¶] . . .
When, as here, there is no other indication of oppression or
surprise, ‘the degree of procedural unconscionability of an
adhesion agreement is low . . . .’ ”].)
       Muscolino does not contest the trial court’s characterization
of the Agreement as an adhesion contract, but cites Roman v.
Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, for the proposition
that “in the employment context, ‘[t]he adhesive nature of the
contract will not always make it procedurally unconscionable.’ ”
(Quoting Roman, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1470, fn. 2.)
Muscolino, however, overlooks the next sentence in Roman, in
which the court limited its observation to relationships where
“bargaining power is not grossly unequal and reasonable
alternatives exist . . . .” (See Roman, at p. 1470, fn. 2.) Muscolino
fails to connect Roman’s observation with the facts before us;
Muscolino does not contend that Mena had bargaining power or
reasonable alternatives. Accordingly, Muscolino fails to
demonstrate the trial court erred in concluding that the
Agreement is minimally procedurally unconscionable. (See
Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555 (Golden Door Properties, LLC)
[“ ‘Even when our review on appeal “is de novo, it is limited to
issues which have been adequately raised and supported in [the
appellant’s opening] brief[,]” ’ ” italics added].)

                                    11
C.    Three Provisions of the Agreement Are
      Substantively Unconscionable

      1.    The provision that allows Muscolino, but not Mena, to
            litigate claims for equitable relief is unconscionable
       Although the Agreement requires that “any . . . claim[ ] for
which the employee has an alleged cause of action” “arising out of
or relating to [the employee’s] employment relationship with”
Muscolino be submitted to binding arbitration, certain claims
unique to Muscolino are excluded: “Claims covered by this
Agreement do not include: [¶] . . . [¶] A claim by [Muscolino] for
injunctive or other equitable relief, including without limitation
claims for unfair competition and the use or unauthorized
disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information, for which
[Muscolino] may seek and obtain relief from a court of competent
jurisdiction . . . .” The Agreement does not similarly provide that
Mena may litigate his claims for injunctive or other equitable
relief against Muscolino in a court of competent jurisdiction.
       In its opening brief, Muscolino argues, without any
supporting analysis or citation to authority, that this “carve-out
for injunctive or other equitable relief sought by Muscolino . . .
does not make the agreement so one-sided as to ‘shock the
conscience’ or ‘unfairly one-sided.’ ” Yet, Muscolino offers no
justification for requiring Mena to submit his claims for equitable
relief to binding arbitration while it is free to pursue equitable
claims against Mena in a judicial forum. “While a contract ‘ “ ‘can
provide a “margin of safety” that provides the party with superior
bargaining strength a type of extra protection for which it has a
legitimate commercial need without being unconscionable’ ” ’
[citation],” an arbitration agreement’s carve-out for an employer’s
claims that lacks any justification and is “not limited to

                                   12
provisional judicial remedies” is substantively unconscionable.
(See Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1257,
1263, 1273 (Farrar); see also Lange, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
p. 447 [“ ‘ “[U]nconscionability turns not only on a ‘one-sided’
result, but also on an absence of ‘justification’ for it . . . .” ’ ”].)
Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that this one-sided
clause is unconscionable.
      In a footnote in its reply brief, Muscolino suggests the
Agreement’s carve-out for Muscolino’s equitable relief claims has
“no bearing on the present dispute whatsoever” because Mena
does not seek injunctive relief. This argument fails for three
reasons. First, Muscolino did not make this argument in its
opening brief.6 Second, in claiming the carve-out is immaterial
because Mena has not prayed for injunctive relief, Muscolino
ignores that (1) the Agreement excludes Muscolino’s claims for
“injunctive or other equitable relief” (italics added); and (2) Mena
does seek equitable relief, which is the only type of relief
available to him on a UCL cause of action.7 Third, because Civil
Code section 1670.5 requires a court to determine whether a

      6    (See Golden Door Properties, LLC, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th
at p. 518 [“ ‘ “ ‘Obvious considerations of fairness in argument
demand that the appellant present all of his points in the opening
brief.’ ” ’ ”].)
      7  (See Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group,
Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 132, 155 [noting that the UCL
“provide[s] for only equitable relief, specifically injunctive relief
and restitution”].)

                                      13
contract was unconscionable at the time the agreement was
made, it is irrelevant that Mena has not sought injunctive relief.8
      In sum, the Agreement’s carve-out for Muscolino’s
injunctive or other equitable claims is substantively
unconscionable.

      2.    The one-year limitations period in the Agreement’s
            informal dispute resolution provision is
            unconscionable because it is unfairly one-sided
       Although the Agreement provides that Mena and
Muscolino “agree to make good faith efforts at resolving any
dispute internally on an informal basis through . . . management
channels” “[a]s a prerequisite for submitting an employment
dispute to mediation and, if necessary, arbitration,” the contract
includes a prerequisite applicable only to Mena: “[Mena] must
notify [Muscolino’s] Human Resources of any claim as soon as
possible after [Mena] first knew or should have known of the
facts giving rise to the claim and any claim must be presented to
Human Resources by this procedure within one year of that time
or it shall be deemed invalid.”
       The trial court found that this provision “gives [Mena]
essentially a one-year statute of limitations on his UCL claim,
which, if heard in court, has a four (4) year statute of
limitations.” The court further observed, “Most of the underlying

      8  (See Civ. Code, § 1670.5, subd. (a); cf. Najarro v. Superior
Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871, 882–883 [in assessing whether
a waiver of PAGA claims in an arbitration agreement was
substantively unconscionable, the Court of Appeal explained it
was “irrelevant that [the plaintiffs] ha[d] not brought a PAGA
action”].)

                                    14
wage-and-hour claims, premised on violations of the . . . Labor
Code, have three-year statutes of limitations. The one-year
limitations period stands to significantly restrict [Mena’s] rights,
and is substantively unconscionable.”
       Muscolino does not challenge the trial court’s findings that
Mena’s UCL claim would be subject to a four-year statute of
limitations if heard in court, or that most of his predicate Labor
Code claims would have a three-year statute of limitations.
Instead, Muscolino characterizes the one-year limitation as “an
internal resolution procedure” that is “intended to address
potential disputes first through internal measures expeditiously
and in no way impacts the legal statute of limitations related to
the applicable substantive law.”
       Muscolino, however, overlooks the text providing that his
claims “shall be deemed invalid” if he does not present them to
Human Resources “within one year of” when he “knew or should
have known of the facts giving rise to the claim[s] . . . .” (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 [“In the construction of a[n] . . .
instrument, the office of the Judge is . . . not to insert what has
been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted . . . .”].)
Muscolino also does not proffer any explanation for shortening by
several years the limitations periods on Mena’s UCL claim and
its predicate Labor Code violations. (See Lange, supra,
46 Cal.App.5th at p. 447 [indicating that whether a one-sided
term is unconscionable depends on whether there exists an
adequate justification for it].) Accordingly, Muscolino fails to
show the court erred in finding this provision unconscionable.
(See Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th
1267, 1271, 1273–1274 & fn. 4, 1282–1283, 1287–1288 [holding
that an arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable

                                    15
because, among other reasons, the agreement shortened the
limitations periods on the employee’s—but not his employer’s—
claims].)

      3.    Part of the PAGA waiver is unenforceable under the
            applicable case authority
       The Agreement states in pertinent part: “Because
[Muscolino] is providing the [Mediation and Arbitration]
Procedure as a streamlined means to deal with disputes, there
will be no right or authority for any claim to be brought, heard or
arbitrated as a class, collective or representative action or other
federal, state or local statu[t]e or ordinance or similar [sic]
effect. . . . I understand, however, that to the maximum extent
permitted by law, I retain the right to bring claims in arbitration,
including PAGA claims, for myself as an individual, and only for
myself.”
       The trial court concluded that the portion of this provision
that “purports to waive [Mena’s] right to bring a representative
PAGA claim” “in any forum” is unenforceable under Iskanian v.
CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348.
       Muscolino acknowledges that this part of the Agreement
“purports to waive [Mena’s] ability to bring a representative
PAGA claim.” Muscolino nonetheless apparently contends that
because the instant Agreement does not contain a “wholesale
waiver of PAGA actions,” given that it waives only
representative/non-individual PAGA claims, the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana
(2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906 (Viking River Cruises), establishes “there is

                                   16
no ‘invalid’ PAGA waiver and no void or unenforceable provision
to be severed . . . .”9
       Muscolino misreads Viking River Cruises. Our high court
explained that Viking River Cruises has left “intact” Iskanian’s
holding that an agreement “compel[ling] waiver of claims on
behalf of other employees (i.e., [representative/]non-individual
claims)” is unenforceable because it “ ‘frustrates the PAGA’s
objectives.’ [Citations.]” (See Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 1117–1118.) We are bound by our high court’s interpretation
of Viking River Cruises. (See People v. Madrid (1992)
7 Cal.App.4th 1888, 1895 [“[W]e are bound by decisions of the
United States Supreme Court [citation] and, of course, by
California Supreme Court cases interpreting those decisions.”].)
       Additionally, our Supreme Court has rejected Viking River
Cruise’s holding that “an aggrieved employee who has been
compelled to arbitrate individual [PAGA] claims” loses “statutory
standing to pursue [representative/]non-individual ‘PAGA
claims . . .’ [citation] . . . .” (See Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 1114, 1119; see also id. at p. 1119 [“Because ‘[t]he highest
court of each State . . . remains “the final arbiter of what is state
law” ’ [citation], we are not bound by the high court’s
interpretation of California law.”].) Thus, Mena’s contractual

      9  Viking River Cruises refers to “alleged Labor Code
violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff” as
“ ‘individual’ claims” and Labor Code violations sustained by
other employees as “ ‘non-individual’ claims . . . .” (See Adolph v.
Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1113–1114
(Adolph) [describing Viking River Cruises].) Iskanian refers to
non-individual claims as “representative” claims. (See Adolph, at
pp. 1117–1118, italics omitted.)

                                    17
obligation to submit individual PAGA claims to arbitration
does not deprive him of statutory standing to raise
representative/non-individual PAGA claims against Muscolino.
       Lastly, insofar as Muscolino argues that the Agreement’s
waiver of representative/non-individual PAGA claims is not
unconscionable because Mena has not asserted any such claims
in this action, we have already rejected that contention as
irrelevant. (See fn. 8 & accompanying text, ante.)
       In sum, we conclude that the Agreement’s waiver of Mena’s
right to pursue representative/non-individual PAGA claims is
substantively unconscionable.

D.    Muscolino Fails To Demonstrate the Trial Court
      Abused Its Discretion in Not Severing the
      Substantively Unconscionable Terms
       The final page of the Agreement includes the following
severability clause: “In the event that any provision of this
Agreement is determined to be invalid or void, that shall not
affect or invalidate the rest of our Agreement which shall
continue in full force and effect.”
       In determining whether to sever substantively
unconscionable terms, “ ‘[c]ourts are to look to the various
purposes of the contract’ . . . . [Citation.] ‘If the central purpose of
the contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a
whole cannot be enforced. If the illegality is collateral to the
main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision can be
extirpated from the contract by means of severance or restriction,
then such severance and restriction are appropriate.’ [Citation.]”
(See Lange, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 454.) “ ‘An arbitration
agreement can be considered permeated by unconscionability if it
“contains more than one unlawful provision . . . .” ’ [Citation.] . . .

                                      18
But the presence of multiple unconscionable clauses is merely one
factor in the trial court’s inquiry; it is not dispositive.” (Ibid.)
       In its opening appellate brief, Muscolino does not argue the
three substantively unconscionable provisions are collateral to
the main purpose of the Agreement. In that appellate brief,
Muscolino does not address whether these provisions could be
“ ‘extirpated from the contract by means of severance or
restriction . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See Lange, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th
at p. 454.) Instead, it announces, with no supporting analysis,
that “any provision that is deemed unconscionable . . . should be
severed and the rest of the Arbitration Agreement remain
enforceable.”
       In its reply brief, and for the first time, Muscolino:
(1) complains “the trial court failed to perform any meaningful
severability analysis;” (2) suggests “ ‘the court’s decision [was]
influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law,”
that is, “ ‘severance is not proper when there [is] more than one
unlawful provision[ ] in a contract’ ”; (3) “[t]he heart of the
arbitration agreement is the covered claims provision” in which
“the parties agreed that the panoply of likely employment-related
claims . . . should be decided by” arbitration; and (4) the carve-out
provision for Muscolino’s claims is similar to a provision the
Court of Appeal found was severable in Farrar.
       Because Muscolino did not raise these contentions in its
opening brief, we may disregard them. (See Golden Door
Properties, LLC, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 518.) In addition,
Muscolino’s belated arguments are meritless.
       It is true that the trial court’s order does not detail its
severability analysis. Muscolino, however, does not cite any
authority requiring such particularity. (See Hernandez v. First

                                    19
Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez)
[“We may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not
supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the
reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he
wants us to adopt.’ ”].)
      Regarding Muscolino’s claim that the trial court
misapprehended the scope of its authority, “we
[normally] . . . presume the trial court was aware of and
understood the scope of its authority and discretion under the
applicable law.” (See Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 299, 333–334 (Barriga).) “ ‘If the record
affirmatively shows’’ ” that the court’s “ ‘decision [was] influenced
by an erroneous understanding of applicable law[,]’ ” however,
“the presumption has been rebutted, and the order must be
reversed.” (See id. at p. 334, italics added.)
      To rebut this presumption, Muscolino intimates “the trial
court [had] been led astray by [Mena’s] citations” to authority
suggesting that a court may not sever more than one
substantively unconscionable term from a contract. Muscolino
provides no record citation to support this assertion, and our
appellate record does not contain Mena’s opposition to
Muscolino’s motion. In its May 19, 2022 order, the trial court
did not assert that the presence of more than one defective
contract term barred the court from enforcing the Agreement.
Muscolino thus fails to demonstrate affirmatively that the court’s
decision was predicated on an error of law. (See Barriga, supra,
51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 333–334; see also Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 777
[holding that an appellant must affirmatively demonstrate
error].)

                                    20
       Muscolino’s next contention is perplexing. Muscolino
concedes that the covered claims provision is “[t]he heart of the
arbitration agreement,” yet fails to explain why the carve-out for
Muscolino’s claims for injunctive or other equitable relief against
Mena is nonetheless collateral to the main purpose of the
contract. We thus do not address this argument further. (See
Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)
       We also fail to discern Farrar’s relevance to our review of
the trial court’s finding that the Agreement is permeated with
unconscionability. The employee in Farrar had significant
bargaining power and was presumably familiar with the
importance of confidentiality agreements to employers in the
technology sector. The defendant-employer was a national
developer and marketer of software; the employee was
defendant’s former vice-president of development and an
experienced executive in technology companies before her
employment with defendant. (Farrar, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1261.) The employee had actively negotiated her job
responsibilities and compensation package. (See id. at pp. 1261–
1262.) The draft and final offer letters each contained an
arbitration provision, albeit not identical ones; the arbitration
clause in the final offer letter excluded from arbitration claims
“based on or related to” a separate assignment of inventions and
confidentiality agreement. (See id. at pp. 1261–1263.)
       In concluding that this carve-out was severable from the
remainder of the arbitration agreement, Farrar explained that
severance would not “result in an agreement contrary to that
intended by” the employer because the employer “retain[ed] its
statutory rights under the Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.8,
subdivision (b) to seek provisional judicial remedies pending

                                   21
arbitration, satisfying any need for ‘quick judicial intervention’ to
‘safeguard’ its ‘proprietary information.’ ” (See Farrar, supra,
9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1275.)
       The Farrar court found significant that “the arbitration
provision in th[at] . . . case [was] afflicted with only one
substantively unconscionable provision, the exception for claims
arising from the confidentiality agreement . . . .” (See Farrar,
supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1274–1275.) Under these
circumstances, Farrar concluded that severing the carve-out
would not have “ ‘ reformed’ ” the parties’ agreement, and the
trial court abused its discretion in not severing that provision and
refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement. (Id. at p. 1275.)
       In contrast, Muscolino does not direct us to evidence that
Mena had any bargaining power or access to reasonable
alternatives. (See Discussion, part B, ante.) Furthermore,
excluded from the instant Agreement are “claim[s] by [Muscolino]
for injunctive or other equitable relief, including without
limitation claims for unfair competition and the use or
unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or confidential
information . . . .” (Italics added.) Because of the breadth of this
provision, we cannot conclude that it was merely collateral to the
main purpose of the contract, e.g., it is not apparent the
availability of provisional judicial remedies would have been an
adequate substitute for this provision. Nor is Muscolino’s
willingness now to sever this carve-out pertinent.10 Also, in

      10  (See Ramos v. Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
1042, 1069 [“[A party’s] willingness to have the court sever the
invalid clauses is insufficient to save [an] agreement. . . . ‘ . . .
Such a willingness “can be seen, at most, as an offer to modify the
contract; an offer that was never accepted. No existing rule of

                                    22
further contrast to Farrar, the carve-out is but one of three
substantively unconscionable provisions evidencing an effort to
impose an inferior forum on an employee. (See Lange, supra,
46 Cal.App.5th at p. 454; Discussion, parts C.2–C.3, ante.)
      In conclusion, Muscolino has not shown the trial court
abused its discretion in finding “the agreement is [so] permeated
with unconscionability” as to prevent its enforcement.

                         DISPOSITION
     We affirm the trial court’s May 19, 2022 order denying
defendant and appellant Muscolino Inventory Services, Inc.’s
motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff and respondent
Andy Mena is awarded his costs on appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

      CHANEY, J.                           WEINGART, J.

contract law permits a party to resuscitate a legally defective
contract merely by offering to change it.” ’ ”].)

                                   23