Court Opinion

ID: 9797234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:16:01.844153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:53:32.650759
License: Public Domain

Davis, J.,
dissenting: The majority opinion announces the following principle that will be applied in the context of the “intentional act” or “intentional injury” exclusion test for insurance policies:
“The insured must have intended both the act and to cause some land of injury or damage. Intent to cause the injury or damage can be actual or it can be inferred from the nature of the act when the consequences are substantially certain to result from the act.” 285 Kan. at 933.
I agree with the majority that this standard, as stated, is a just formulation of intent as it came to be understood in Kansas, as well as the majority of other states, and in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s modification of this standard by the sentence that immediately follows the newly adopted standard in its opinion: “It is not essential . . . that the harm be of the same character and magnitude as that intended.” 285 Kan. at 933. This broad statement has no basis in Kansas law and is unsupported by decisions in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it is upon this statement—which is the effective standard adopted by the majority opinion—that the majority bases its conclusion that the intentional act exclusionary clause in this case bars coverage for the claimed injuries in this case.
Up to the time of this decision, Kansas law interpreted exclusionary clauses of insurance policies to exclude only intentional acts resulting in intentional injury. If the act itself was intentional, e.g., shooting a BB gun at another child or shooting a gun at one person *937yet hitting another, and the resultant injury was the natural and probable consequence of such action, e.g., being shot by a BB gun or wounded by a bullet, it was determined that because the character and magnitude of the harm was the same that could be expected from the intentional act, the consequences of that act were not covered by the policy.
The majority opinion has now concluded that the harm caused or injury caused need not be of the same character and magnitude as that intended and that intent to cause the injury or damage can be inferred from the nature of the act when any injury is substantially certain to follow.
In this case, we have no actual evidence of an intent to injure on the part of the insured. In fact, the evidence demonstrates that the insured was attempting to elude the police, albeit in a reckless manner. Nevertheless, the majority opinion concludes that the recklessness of driving the automobile was “intentional” and, although there is no evidence of the insured’s intent to injure her passengers, the intent to injure may be inferred because of the insured’s reckless driving in a situation where some injury was almost certain to occur. I respectfully dissent because this new principle adopted by the majority, as modified by the statement that the character and magnitude of the injury intended do not matter to the determination of intent, does not fit comfortably into Kansas law, does not represent the majority view in the United States, and is inconsistent with the principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (and cited by the majority opinion) relating to intent. Moreover, the rule that is effectively adopted stands on its head one of the basic, long-accepted maxims of law in this state that exclusionary clauses in insurance policies must be narrowly construed against the insurer.
By adopting a standard where the character and magnitude of an injury are irrelevant to a court’s determination of intent, the majority opinion in this case forecloses the long-recognized principle in Kansas law that intentional act exclusionary clauses provide coverage for acts that may be deemed intentional in a theoretical context yet lead to unintended results. The result of this foreclosure is particularly evident in this case, where the majority finds that *938reckless acts that result in unintended injuries nevertheless bar coverage under the insurance policy’s intentional act exclusionary clause.
In Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 681, 512 P.2d 403 (1973), this court considered a similar policy provision to that involved in the case before us. There, an employee of the defendant ran over the plaintiff s foot while taking the plaintiff s vehicle after the plaintiff failed to pay for mechanic services. The defendant’s insurance company denied coverage, arguing that the act of taking the plaintiff s vehicle was “wrongful and intentional.’’ 212 Kan. at 687. Essentially, the insurance company contended that the court should adopt the standard articulated by the majority in this case—that because the act of taking the vehicle was an intentional act that could result in damage to the property and because the plaintiff was present at the time protesting the taking, the employee’s actions should not be covered by the insurance policy. See Benchmark, 285 Kan. at 935 (“Simply put, injury was substantially certain to result under these circumstances: driving the wrong way against traffic, failing to stop at a stop sign, and driving at 100 m.p.h. through neighborhoods.”).
The Spruill court rejected the insurance company’s argument, recognizing that “the act of taking possession of the truck, although intentional, was not the act which caused Rounkles’ [the plaintiff s] personal injury." 212 Kan. at 687. Instead, the court noted that the injury was caused “by the manner in which the employees were moving the truck.” 212 Kan. at 687. For this reason, the court held that the insurance policy covered the plaintiff s injuries, explaining:
“Under this policy, coverage is avoided only when an act results in an intentional injury. An intentional act may result in an unintended injury. As we pointed out in Gowing [v. Great Plains Mutual Ins. Co., 207 Kan. 78,] 82, [483 P.2d 1072 (1971),]’... the distinction between an intentional injury and an unintended injury resultingfrom an intentional act has been recognized by various authorities’ Since the undisputed facts disclose the personal injury to Rounkles was not the intended result of Spruill’s acts, the policy of insurance covered Spruill for Rounkles’ personal injury.” (Emphasis added.) 212 Kan. at 687.
It is true that, in a general sense, “ ‘all acts are intentional, save perhaps for involuntary muscle spasms.’ ” Benchmark, 285 Kan. at *939923 (quoting Dykes, Occurrences, Accidents, and Expectations: A Primer of These [and Some Other] Insurance-Law Concepts, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 831, 846-47 [2003]). However, as the Spruill court noted, Kansas courts have traditionally found that acts are not intentional in a legal sense when the resultant injury was unintended. See 212 Kan. at 687. By malting the blanket statement that “[i]t is not essential [for an act to be deemed intentional] . . . that the harm be of the same character and magnitude as that intended,” the majority opinion effectively does away with this longstanding principle of Kansas law. 285 Kan. at 933.
In Baska v. Scherzer, 283 Kan. 750, 756-63, 156 P.3d 617 (2007), we again recognized that an action is not considered intentional under Kansas law when it results in an unintended injury. Baska arose when the plaintiff stepped between two young men in a fistfight and was struck as a result. The plaintiff brought a negligence action against both fighters, claiming that while the men did intend to hit one another, her injuries were unintended. We rejected the plaintiff s claim that the action arose in negligence, finding instead that the plaintiff had stated a claim for assault and batteiy (intentional torts) based on the doctrine transferred intent. The court in Baska explained:
“The defendants’ acts of throwing punches in this case were intentional actions. Each defendant intended to strike at the other in order to cause harm. The defendants intended to punch, and they did punch. The fact that the punches in question hit the plaintiff rather than the defendants is immaterial to the analysis.” 283 Kan. at 764.
While Baska found that the conduct in that case was truly an assault and batteiy under the doctrine of transferred intent, and thus that the plaintiff s action was barred by the 1-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-514(b), we recognized in that case that a different result would have been reached if the resultant injury was unintended. In particular, Baska cited as examples two cases where Kansas courts determined that the conduct in question did not sound in intentional torts, but rather was rooted in negligence due to the fact that the plaintiff s injury was unintended: Hackenberger v. Travelers Mutual Cas. Co., 144 Kan. 607, 62 P.2d 545 (1936), *940and Vetter v. Morgan, 22 Kan. App. 2d 1, 913 P.2d 1200, rev. denied 257 Kan. 1096 (1995); see Baska, 283 Kan. at 759-63.
In Hackenberger, this court rejected an insurance company’s claim that an intentional act that resulted in unintended injury was barred by the 1-year statute of limitations for intentional torts. In that case, the plaintiff was a passenger in the back of a truck and was sitting with his legs hanging over the side. A cattle truck coming the other direction was passing another car as it was speeding around a curve; the cattle truck crowded the plaintiff s truck off of the highway and came into contact with the plaintiff s legs, causing him injury. The plaintiff filed suit in negligence. The defendant— the cattle truck driver’s insurance company—claimed that the petition actually stated an action for battery and thus was barred by the 1-year statute of limitations. This court clarified that had the driver of the truck intended to hit the truck on which the plaintiff was riding, the action should be dismissed. 144 Kan. at 609-10. Quoting from the Restatement of Torts § 13, the Hackenberger court explained:
“ ‘It is not enough that the act itself is intentionally done and this, even though the actor realizes or should realize that it contains a very grave risk of bringing about the contact or apprehension. Such realization may make the actor’s conduct negligent or even reckless, but unless he realizes that to a substantial certainty the contact or apprehension uAll result, the actor has not that intention which is necessary to make him liable under the rule stated in this Section.’ [Citation omitted.]” (Emphasis added.) 144 Kan. at 610-11.
Because “ ‘[t]he petition [was] not susceptible of an interpretation that [the driver of the cattle truck] intentionally inflicted the injury,’ the [Hackenberger] court held that the 2-year limitations period for negligence should be applied. 144 Kan. at 611.” Baska, 283 Kan. at 759.
In Vetter, the Kansas Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion. There, the plaintiff s van ran off the road after the defendant, a passenger in another vehicle, made verbal threats to the plaintiff and the car in which the defendant was riding veered at the plaintiff s van. The defendant claimed that he “did not intend to scare, upset, or harm Vetter,” but instead was attempting to amuse the other passengers in the car with him. 22 Kan. App. 2d *941at 2. The plaintiff brought a number of claims against the defendant, including a claim for negligence. The trial court dismissed the negligence claim as a matter of law, finding that the defendant’s actions were intentional. •
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff s negligence claim. It explained:
“[A] negligence claim may be based on actions the defendant intends to affect, or should realize are likely to affect, the conduct of another in a manner that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another. . . .
“. . . Although Morgan [the defendant] said his only intent was to amuse his friends, and he denied that he intended to frighten or harm Vetter, she testified that she was very, very frightened.’ The record supports a reasonable inference that Morgan should have realized Vetter would be frightened and that it was foreseeable that her fright would create a risk of harm.” 22 Kan. App. 2d at 5-6.
Under the standard that the majority adopts in this case, the outcomes of both Hackenberger and Vetter would have been different. In Hackenberger, the act of passing a vehicle at excessive speed, under the majority’s reasoning, could be substantially certain to cause some kind of damage to either the driver’s vehicle or the other vehicle; thus, the reasoning adopted by the majority may lead to the conclusion that intent can be inferred based upon the driver’s actions of passing a vehicle at excessive speeds around a curve. Likewise, in Vetter, the logical application of the majority’s standard in this case would indicate that Vetter intended to cause Morgan to drive into a pole, since he intended to scare her (i.e., cause her some injury). Clearly this is not the reasoning adopted by the Kansas courts in those cases.
Furthermore, the reasoning of the Hackenberger and Vetter decisions is not inconsistent with the Kansas cases cited by the majority opinion. Notably, all of the Kansas decisions discussed by the majority deal with factual scenarios where the actor fired a gun and caused injury when a person was shot by the projectile fired, though that injury was either to a different person or was more serious than the shooter desired. See Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 867 P.2d 325 (1994) (an insurance clause excluded coverage when the defendant shot and lulled the driver of a truck when the shooter had desired to shoot the passenger, not the driver); Shelter *942Mut Ins. Co. v. Williams, 248 Kan. 17, 804 P.2d 1374 (1991) (the exclusionary clause of an insurance policy applied when the insured’s son intentionally opened fire on school grounds, even though he did not understand his actions were wrongful); Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461, 674 P.2d 468 (1983) (an insurance policy barred coverage when a playmate fired a BB gun at a friend and ended up shooting him in the eye); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Thomas, 7 Kan. App. 2d 718, 647 P.2d 1361, rev. denied 231 Kan. 799 (1982) (a homeowner’s action in shooting a person at close range with a pistol was intentional and thus that the action was not covered by the homeowner’s insurance policy). None of these cases indicate that the character or magnitude of the act is immaterial to a determination of whether tire act was intentional. Instead, the character and magnitude of the intended actions are inexorably tied to the court’s determination in each case that the action was intentional—the shooters in each case intended to shoot at a person and carried out that intended action, and the resultant injuries were of the same character and magnitude that could be expected to occur from such actions.
Similarly, in Rankin v. Farmers Elevator Mutual Insurance Company, 393 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1968), where the driver of a pickup truck intentionally swerved his truck at a motorcyclist, forcing the motorcyclist to drive off the road, causing injuries, the character of the injuries intended (causing the motorcyclist to swerve off of the road) were rationally related to the character of the injuries received. As the Rankin court found, the injuries were “the natural and probable consequences of the act.” 393 F.2d at 720. In other words, the driver of the pickup truck, in swerving at the motorcycle, knew that the particular injury he caused was likely to result from his actions.
Even the out-of-state cases cited by the majority fail to support the overly broad standard adopted in this case. Most notably, the majority cites Loveridge v. Chartier, 161 Wis. 2d 150, 468 N.W.2d 146 (1991), as an example of where the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a similar rule to that created by the majority in this case. The Loveridge court did find that “the exclusion precludes coverage even if the harm that occurs is different in character or mag*943nitude from that intended by the insured. [Citations omitted.]” 161 Wis. 2d at 169. However, the example cited by the Loveridge court as an application of this statement—barring coverage for plaintiff s severe eye injuries that resulted when the defendant shot a pin at him with a slingshot—-belies the majority’s broad application of that statement here. Rather, as the majority notes, the Loveridge decision is similar to this court’s decision in Bell, where we found that “the act of shooting another in the face ... is one which is recognized as an act so certain to cause a particular kind of harm it can be said an actor who performed the act intended the resulting harm.” (Emphasis added.) Bell, 234 Kan. at 471.
Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Pachucki v. Republic Insurance Co., 89 Wis. 2d 703, 711, 278 N.W.2d 898 (1979), which was cited by the Loveridge court as the source of its rule and by the majority here, does not support the majority’s broad reading of intent in this case. The holding in Pachucki relied upon a case where a man intended to hit another man in the stomach with a pipe but ended up hitting him in the head. 89 Wis. 2d at 713-14 (citing Butler v. Behaeghe, 37 Colo. App. 282, 548 P.2d 934 [1976]). However, the Butler court noted that its reasoning was based on its conclusion that “since Behaeghe was found to have intentionally struck the plaintiff, he must be deemed to have intended the ordinary consequences of his voluntary actions.” (Emphasis added.) 37 Colo. App. at 287-88.
It does not follow from these cases that either the Wisconsin or the Colorado courts would support the broad reading of intent adopted by the majority here—that if a person intends some damage or injury, then he or she is deemed to intend for exclusionary clause purposes any other damage or injury. Rather, these cases appear to recognize the effect of the principle articulated in the comments of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1964), which we cited in Baska and which was cited by the majority here:
“All consequences which the actor desires to bring about are intended, as the word is used in this Restatement. Intent is not, however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.
*944“As the probability that the consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less than substantial certainty, the actor’s conduct loses tire character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness .... As the probability decreases further, and amounts only to a risk that the result will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence . . . .” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, comment b.
See Baska, 283 Kan. at 757; Benchmark, 285 Kan. at 931.
This passage from the Restatement recognizes that the character and magnitude of a particular consequence do matter in the determination of whether an action is intentional. If a particular result is not substantially certain to arise from the actor’s behavior, then he or she cannot be said to have intended that result (even if he or she could be deemed to have intended some other consequence). This nuance has heretofore been reflected in Kansas case law as a determination of whether an intentional action leads to unintended results. See Hackenberger, 144 Kan. at 609-10. Because the majority opinion does away with this longstanding rule and provides that intent to cause some injury is sufficient to infer intent to cause any injury, see 285 Kan. at 933,1 must dissent from this holding.
The underlying facts in this case illustrate the problems with the majority’s formulation of intent. It is clear that Gutierrez intended to flee from the police in this case. However, as in Spruill where the employee wrongfully took the plaintiff s truck, “the act of taking possession of the truck [or of driving away from the police], although intentional, was not the act which caused . . . injury.” 212 Kan. at 687. Instead, the injury was caused “by the manner in which” the action was taken. 212 Kan. at 687. As in Spruill, the manner in which Gutierrez drove her vehicle during the ensuing chase can only be described as reckless. See Hackenberger, 144 Kan. at 610-11.
However, the majority opinion finds that the injuries in this case that occurred when Gutierrez’ car flipped several times and Sanchez was thrown from the car were intentional. The court explains that “injury was substantially certain to result under these circumstances: driving the wrong way against traffic, failing to stop at a stop sign, and driving at 100 m.p.h. through neighborhoods.” 285 Kan. at 935. Essentially, the majority opinion concludes that be*945cause it was substantially certain that Gutierrez’ excessive speeding would result in some injury to some thing—namely, bottoming out the vehicle when it ran a stop sign at the bottom of a hill—the court may also infer that Gutierrez intentionally caused the injury and death of the passengers in her vehicle.
This extension of intent runs contrary to Kansas law. As this court explained in Hackenberger, where the defendant’s truck passed a vehicle while speeding, causing the vehicle to run off the road and causing the plaintiff, who was riding on the bed, to break his leg:
“Defendant further contends the allegation that assured was traveling at an excessive and unlawful rate of speed is in its nature a criminal charge and implies an element of intent to injure. No intent to injure is expressly alleged nor is the language open to such implication. Speed was simply alleged as one of the elements of negligence in connection with the time, place and traffic on the highway. The mere fact unreasonable speed under circumstances is prohibited and made an offense does not necessarily mean that injury resulting from such speed was intentional. Speed may be an element of negligence without disclosing an intention to injure.” 144 Kan. at 611.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a similar hypothetical as an example of behavior that does not rise to the level of intentional conduct under § 8A:
“On a curve in a narrow highway A, without any desire to injure B, or belief that he is substantially certain to do so, recklessly drives his automobile in an attempt to pass B’s car. As a result of this recklessness, A crashes into B’s car, injuring B. A is subject to liability to B for his reckless conduct, but is not hable to B for any intentional tort.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, Illustration 2.
These illustrations provide examples that are indistinguishable from Gutierrez’ actions in this case. Although the driving at excessive speed and failure to obey traffic laws in this case are clearly reckless and could result in some injury, it does not follow that the particular injury in this case—flipping the car and injuring its passengers—was substantially certain to result. Moreover, as Judge Bukaty indicated in his dissent below, the facts do not even indicate that the injuries were the natural and probable consequences of Gutierrez’ actions. See Thomas v. Benchmark Ins. Co., 36 Kan. App. 2d 409, 427-29, 140 P.3d 483 (2006) (Bukaty, J., dissenting).
*946It is true that the underlying facts of this case are not empathetic—the driver fled the police at excessive speeds and bottomed out at an intersection; as a result of these actions, the driver and one passenger were killed and one other passenger was severely injured. There can be no question that the driver’s actions were reckless. However, our understanding of intent in Kansas does not support a conclusion that the driver intended to cause those injuries. The standard effectively adopted by the majority nevertheless excludes those injuries from coverage under the intentional act exclusionary clause of Guiterrez’ insurance policy.
More importantly, if the adopted standard excludes from coverage injuries based on recklessness, it must also be deemed to exclude from coverage virtually any action, even those based in simple negligence, when it is substantially certain that any injury would result. The majority opinion thus results in the unreasonable interpretation of “intent” within the context of insurance policies to be synonymous with “causation.” This interpretation is not supported by either Kansas law or by the plain language of the insurance policy in this case. See Murray v. Modoc State Bank, 181 Kan. 642, 646, 313 P.2d 304 (1957) (“the fundamental distinction between assault and battery, on the one hand, and negligence, on the other, is that the former is intentional and the latter is unintentional”); Johnson County Bank v. Ross, 28 Kan. App. 2d 8, 10-11, 13 P.3d 351 (2000) (“The law favors reasonable interpretations, and results which vitiate the purpose of the terms of the agreement to an absurdity should be avoided.”).
Thus, although the majority makes the policy judgment that it is adopting a standard that is less favorable to the insurance companies than the previous “natural and probable consequences” test, the facts in this case demonstrate that this is not the case. Kansas courts have consistently reiterated that exclusionary clauses in insurance contracts should be narrowly construed against the insurer. See Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 265 Kan. 317, 327, 961 P.2d 1213 (1998); Benchmark, 285 Kan. at 922. The standard adopted by the majority in this case cannot be reconciled with this principle. Rather, the standard effectively adopted by the majority opinion leads to a much broader reading of intent than that pre*947viously applied in this state. As a result, the language of the exclusionary clause in this case, which bars coverage for “bodily injury caused intentionally by [the insured],” is interpreted to exclude from coverage not only intentional injury, but also injuries that may be inferred under the new standard as intentional since some injury was substantially certain to result from the insured’s actions. This interpretation is by no means a narrow construction of the policy language.
Moreover, if this standard, as it is explained in the majority opinion, were to be applied only in the context of intentional act exclusionary clauses, the result would be the exclusion of acts from coverage under such clauses when those same acts might be considered reckless or negligent in Kansas tort law. This standard therefore leads to the unreasonable result of an insurance company denying coverage based on its intentional act exclusion for conduct that would not be considered intentional under Kansas tort law. Such confusion in the new standard’s application leads to additional questions that the majority opinion fails to consider: How should courts determine how certain an injury must be in order to be deemed intentional, and is there any limitation to the court’s announcement that an injury will be deemed intentional regardless of its relation to the character and magnitude of the probable injury? (For example, what if Gutierrez had been driving the vehicle at 60 miles per hour, or 45 miles per hour? Would this change the majority’s analysis?) Likewise, how will this new rule affect the insurance company’s duty to defend its insured, when acts are excluded from coverage that would be otherwise considered negligent or reckless?
Finally, the standard adopted by the majority opinion and its application of that standard to the facts in this case cannot be reconciled with the understanding of intent in Kansas. An act is deemed intentional under Kansas law when “ ‘the actor desires to cause [the] consequences of his act, or . . . believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.’ ” Baska, 283 Kan. at 757 (quoting Restatement [Second] of Torts § 8A); see Benchmark, 285 Kan. at 931. The character and magnitude of the result in question are inexorably tied to this determination.
*948The majority opinion fails to take into account these important elements of contract interpretation and Kansas law, and the standard adopted and explained in that opinion is contrary to the law of other jurisdictions and the legal principles set forth in the Restatement. For the reasons set forth, I respectfully dissent.
Luckert, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.