Court Opinion

ID: 9793513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:48:51.17583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:39.761411
License: Public Domain

Justice HOBBS,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that the record is sufficient for review of the Board’s decision. Because the Board acted without the benefit of contemporaneous information required by statute, however, I respectfully dissent from Part II.B of the court’s opinion. I would hold that the Board abused its discretion by failing to re-refer the subdivision plan for current comment to all of the reviewing agencies specified in section 30-28-136, 9 C.R.S. (1999).1
The majority states the facts clearly; essentially, Respondent Jean Ann Leach (the subdivider) delayed eight years from the Planning Commission’s approval of her Preliminary Plan before seeking approval of the final plan and plat from the Board of County Commissioners (Board). The Board correctly recognized that this situation required referring her application back to the Planning Commission. Instead of circulating her proposal to all of the reviewing agencies specified in section 30-28-136, however, the Planning Commission engaged in an ad-hoc consultation with only some of those agencies. Consequently, the Board’s subsequent approval lacked the benefit of reasonably contemporaneous review by each of the agencies specified in the statute.
In my view, the purpose of section 30-28-136, within the context of the legislature’s land use statutes, is to assure that local decisionmakers have the benefit of expert review that is reasonably contemporaneous with the Board’s consideration of any subdivision plan and plat. Here, more than ten years elapsed between the initial referral to the section 30-28-136 agencies and the Board’s final approval of the subdivider’s plan and plat. Accordingly, the Board’s failure to consult with all of the agencies specified in section 30-28-136 before approving the plan frustrated the General Assembly’s purpose and should be held to constitute an abuse of discretion warranting reversal under C.R.C.P: 106(a)(4).2
I.
Colorado is one of the fastest growing states in the nation. Its natural resources and its existing infrastructure for delivery of crucial services, including schools, water, sewer, and parks, are undergoing tremendous stress. The Department of Local Affairs estimates that Colorado added 466,325 new residents between July 1993 and July *431998, an increase of nearly 13% in five years. See Department of Local Affairs, Colorado County Population Estimates.3 Park County’s population nearly doubled from 1990 to 1998, while Douglas County’s population more than doubled in that period. See id. Many other counties experienced similarly rapid growth.
The General Assembly has long recognized the importance of intelligently managing growth in Colorado. See § 24-65-102, 7 C.R.S. (1999) (Colorado Land Use Act) (“The general assembly finds and declares that the rapid growth and development of the state and the resulting demands on its land resources make new and innovative measures necessary to encourage planned and orderly land use development.”) Local land use regulation — taking into account statewide interests — is the mechanism our legislature has chosen as the primary vehicle for ensuring the safekeeping and nurturing of Colorado as it grows. See § 29-20-102, 9 C.R.S. (1999).
This ease might appear to involve decisions having a de minimis impact: the subdivision is small — 36 lots — and the Planning Commission did reconsult with some of the reviewing agencies. Nevertheless, the legal issue presented is fundamental to how Colorado evaluates growth impacts in the planning process. If some subdividers can cause a significant delay to accommodate their own considerations, yet be allowed to obtain final approval of their subdivisions based on very old consulting agency review, they will not be required to account for current conditions that subdividers with new applications must address. Public resources will inevitably be called upon to absorb the unexamined, unaddressed consequences.
A.

Purpose of the Agency Review Provision

Section 30-28-136, as the majority notes, is silent on the issue of whether the agency review specified in that section must occur reasonably contemporaneously with Board approval. I disagree, however, that the statute’s silence indicates the legislature considered this issue and resolved not to include a provision regarding outdated agency review. We must construe the statute to give it effect under a variety of circumstances — including those that the legislature did not specifically address, yet nonetheless intended to be covered. See Park County Sportsmen’s Ranch LLP v. Bargas, 986 P.2d 262, 268 (Colo.1999); Buckley v. Chilcutt, 968 P.2d 112, 117 (Colo.1998); In re Estate of Royal, 826 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Colo.1992) (“Since the statute is silent, we must abide by the well-settled rule of statutory construction that statutes should be construed to effectuate the General Assembly’s intent and the beneficial purpose of the legislative measure.”)
Our land use cases have recognized that legislative silence on a particular issue does not require courts to cease their efforts to ascertain legislative intent and purpose, and construe the statute reasonably to address the issue at hand. See Beaver Meadows v. Board of County Comm’rs, 709 P.2d 928, 935 (Colo.1985). The purpose of section 30-28-136 is clear. The legislature has required counties to obtain the opinions of interested agencies; implicit in this legislative design is that the consultation must be reasonably contemporaneous with the land use decisionmak-ing process, so that current circumstances inform the agencies’ opinions, and, ultimately, the Board’s decision.
The legislative concern with intelligent, coordinated, and effective growth management is visible not only in section 30-28-136 and the larger Article 28 of which it is a part, but throughout Colorado’s land use statutes. Section 30-28-107, 9 C.R.S. (1999), for instance, relates to preparation of county and regional master plans; it states that the plans are to be made “with the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development.” (Emphasis added.) Section 24-65-102(1), 7 C.R.S. (1999), the legislative declaration section of the Colorado Land Use Act, recites that “an increasing mutuality of interest and responsibility between the various levels of government in the state ... calls for coordinate and unified policies in planning *44for growth and development.” (Emphasis added.) The statute “clarify[ing] and providing]” authority to local governments in the land use context provides that “[l]ocal governments are authorized and encouraged to cooperate or contract with other units of government ... for the purposes of planning or regulating the development of land.” §§ 29-20-102 and 29-20-105(1), 9 C.R.S. (1999). These statutes — and, of course, section 30-28-136 itself — make clear that coordinated, well-informed decisionmaking is at the heart of the exercise of land use authority by local government, not merely a technical procedural requirement.
The majority correctly notes that section 30-28-136 does not specifically provide for re-referral of subdivision plans when a considerable period of time lapses between preliminary subdivision approval and submission of a final plat. This is not surprising. The General Assembly required under section 30-28-136(2) that the reviewing agencies respond within twenty-one days of the local government referral. It thereby anticipated that the local decisionmaking process would proceed expeditiously. Thus, the purpose of section 30-28-136 is manifest: to (1) require counties to consider the views of those agencies with expertise in the various resources that are impacted by subdivision growth, and (2) ensure that the information provided by the agencies is current, expeditiously provided, and considered by the land use decision-maker.
B.

Defeat Of Legislative Purpose

The majority defers to the Board’s decision here to seek updated comments from some, but not all, interested agencies. Deference to the Board’s “experience and specialization,” see maj. op. at 40-41, should not obviate the role of the consulting agencies— especially as to matters outside the Board’s expertise and experience. It is the various agencies to which the board must refer the subdivision plan — not the Board itself — that possess the expertise with which section 30-28-136 is concerned. Allowing the Board to ignore agencies and information that the legislature intended to inform its deliberations defeats the purpose underlying the mandatory submissions required by section 30-28-136.
The statute requires that the Board receive comments firom diverse agencies precisely because the General Assembly recognized that county commissioners do not themselves have the resources to correctly discern or predict how problems of particular concern to, and within the expertise of, the reviewing agency may be presented. Although Park County’s relatively sparse population makes it plausible that its Board of County Commissioners might be well-informed regarding changes that have taken place in the community over time, even there it is more prudent — and consistent with the legislature’s purpose — to require the Board to hear from the experts than to rely exclusively on its own judgment and perception of current circumstances.
Thus, the majority’s conclusion- — that the Board complied with the statute and was free to exercise its discretion as to whether re-referral was required — makes sense only if the passage of time has negligible impact on the legislative purpose of encouraging intelligent, coordinated growth. Given the reality that growth pressures accumulate over time, it is not reasonable to conclude that a more than ten-year delay in granting final approval of the subdivision plan from the date of initial agency comments has no bearing on the natural resources and infrastructure needs that the various reviewing agencies are called upon to address and protect under the statute.
Specific components of the statutory scheme illustrate the importance of how the passage of time can affect evaluation of a subdivision proposal. Section 30-28-136(l)(h)(II), for instance, requires municipalities to report how much water is available to a subdivision, and the state engineer’s office makes its own approval under that section contingent on a satisfactory demonstration that the municipality or water district can and will provide that supply. See State Engineer, Guidelines for Subdivision *45Water Supply Reports.4 Clearly, the amount of excess supply .held by a municipality or water district can diminish over time as other developments proceed. Much the same can be said of reports relating to potential flood hazards required under section 30-28-136(l)(f); available sewage treatment capacity and water quality under section 30-28-136(l)(g); and, of course, available school capacity under section 30-28-136(l)(a).
The legislature has made especially clear that the subdivision approval process is the context for examining the ability of the local schools to serve the residents of the new subdivision: “the General Assembly has designated subdivision regulations and subdivision review, taking into account recommendations of the commenting agencies, as the context for evaluating the educational opportunity which will be afforded to the future residents of the platted lots.” See County Comm’rs of Douglas v. Bainbridge, 929 P.2d 691, 701 (Colo.1996). Section 30-28-136(2) provides that the waiver of comment imposed upon other agencies if the very limited review time expires specifically does not apply to school districts:
The failure of any agency to respond within twenty-one days or within the period of an extension shall, for the purpose of the hearing on the plan, be deemed an approval of such plan; except that, where such plan involves twenty or more dwelling units, a school district shall be required to submit within said time limit specific recommendations with respect to the adequacy of school sites and the adequacy of school structures.
With respect to schools, the General Assembly could not have been clearer. The ability of the schools to handle the new growth is so important as to require the local school district to provide information to the local government land use decisionmaker; necessarily implied is the duty of the deci-sionmaker to ask the school district for current information before it gives final subdivision approval when the subdivider has caused an unreasonable delay in the Board’s consideration of final subdivision plan and plat approval. The use of outdated school district comments, especially in a time of rapid growth, undercuts the legislative purpose that focuses on the subdivision approval process as the context for addressing school availability for the new residents.
C.

How Much Delay Requires Reconsultation

How much delay between an initial referral for agency comments and actual final approval of a subdivision plan will constitute delay sufficient to require reconsultation with the agencies? No hard and fast rule would be workable here; instead, as courts often do, we must decide whether the Board’s failure to obtain relatively current review by the agencies constituted an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. When there is evidence that significant new information is available, or that significant changes have taken place in the community, or when the Board itself (as here) decides to re-refer the matter of subdivision approval to its Planning Commission because of delay, the statutory agency consultation requirement should be triggered.
Because it does not account for the importance of how growth impacts increase over time, the majority’s position would in effect allow speculation at the expense of the resources the General Assembly sought to protect through the subdivision statutes. A person with an initial approval may delay final approval without being held to conditions or mitigation requirements that new applicants in the same geographical area must take into account. This result is quite clearly inconsistent with the “familiar concept” that “development pay all or part of its way.” Bainbridge, 929 P.2d at 698. And because the referral agencies cannot be expected to track every development proposal independently,5 *46it would be unrealistic to expect these agencies to submit comments without notification from the Board that action was impending. Here, the subdivider patently caused the delay — not any of the reviewing agencies, not the Planning Commission, and not the Board. The Board recognized that the delay necessitated obtaining updated review by the Planning Commission. Under these circumstances, the Board should have required the Planning Commission to reconsult with all of the reviewing agencies and, in particular, obtain current information from the local school district. I would hold that its failure to do so was an abuse of its discretion.
II.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part II.B. of the court’s opinion.
Justice SCOTT joins in this concurrence and dissent.

. The statute specifies that subdivision plans be submitted to: (a) the appropriate school districts; (b) each county or municipality within a two-mile radius of the proposed subdivision; (c) any utility, local improvement and service district, or ditch company, when applicable; (d) the Colorado Forest Service, when applicable; (e) the appropriate planning commission; (f) the local soil conservation district board; (g) when applicable, to the county, district, or regional health department or the state department of health for sewage disposal and water quality review; (h) the state engineer and any municipality or quasi-municipality designated as a water source for the subdivision; (i) the Colorado Geological Survey. See § 30-28-136(1). Park County’s own subdivision regulations require submission to the same agencies, and also require submission to the U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, or Colorado State Land Board, when applicable. See Park County Subdivision Regulations, Art. IV § D.l.

. Rule 106(a)(4) provides relief to those aggrieved by a quasi-judicial act when the governmental agency abuses its discretion. Although we will not ordinarily find an abuse of discretion unless there is an absence of competent evidence in the record to support the governmental agency’s decision, see Board of Comm’rs of Routt County v. O’Dell, 920 P.2d 48, 50 (Colo. 1996), a misinterpretation or misapplication of governing law by an agency is an alternative ground for finding an abuse of discretion under Rule 106(a)(4). See Board of County Comm’rs v. Conder, 927 P.2d 1339, 1343 (Colo.1996).

. < http ://www.dlg.oem2 .state, co .us/demog/esti-mate.htm> (visited 11/16/99).

. <http://www.dnr.state.co.us/water/guidelines for subdivision water supply plans.html> (visited 11/17/99).

. The State Engineer's guidance on section 30-28-136 states explicitly that it will respond to a subdivision proposal only on referral from Coun- ■ ty authorities. See State Engineer, Guidelines for. Subdivision Water Supply Reports, supra.