Court Opinion

ID: 9900338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:12.936021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.555305
License: Public Domain

554                 October 11, 2023             No. 533

        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                STATE OF OREGON

              MANCHESTER SOLAR, LLC,
                      Petitioner,
                           v.
                 YAMHILL COUNTY,
                     Respondent.
               Land Use Board of Appeals
                   2023016; A181678

  Argued and submitted August 15, 2023.
   Peter Livingston argued the cause for petitioner. On
the brief were Brian R. Talcott, Damien R. Hall, and Dun
Carney Allen Higgins & Tongue LLP.
   Jodi Gollehon argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent.
  Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Hellman, Judge, and
Armstrong, Senior Judge.
  LAGESEN, C. J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 328 Or App 554 (2023)                            555

        LAGESEN, C. J.
        Petitioner Manchester Solar seeks judicial review
of an order of the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA). In
that order, LUBA affirmed respondent Yamhill County’s
interpretation of Yamhill County Zoning Ordinance (YCZO)
402.08(A), which implements and adopts OAR 660-003-
0140(1), a rule promulgated by the Land Conservation
and Development Commission (LCDC). Specifically,
LUBA affirmed the county’s conclusion that the ordinance
required petitioner to obtain an extension of its conditional
use permit (CUP) to continue developing its solar farm proj-
ect; LUBA rejected petitioner’s contrary argument that an
extension was not required if petitioner had initiated devel-
opment action within the meaning of the ordinance before
the expiration of the permit period. We review LUBA’s order
to determine if it is “unlawful in substance or procedure,”
ORS 197.850(9)(a), and conclude that it is not unlawful.
Accordingly, we affirm.
         We begin by outlining the applicable law to provide
context for the dispute before us. OAR 660-033-0140(1) is an
administrative rule promulgated by LCDC. It governs the
expiration of discretionary permits, like petitioner’s CUP
here, for development on agricultural land. Yamhill County
has implemented the administrative rule nearly verbatim
through its county ordinance, YCZO 402.08(A); the ordi-
nance differs slightly from the rule, but those differences
are not relevant to this matter. Because, in this context, we
treat a county ordinance that echoes an LCDC rule as one
and the same, our references to the rule throughout this
opinion are a shorthand reference to the rule and the ordi-
nance. See Forster v. Polk County, 115 Or App 475, 478, 839
P2d 241 (1992) (explaining that, where a county ordinance
is materially the same as an LCDC rule, this court treats
the rule and the ordinance as if they were the same).
          OAR 660-033-0140(1) provides that “a discretion-
ary decision * * * approving a proposed development on agri-
cultural or forest land outside an urban growth boundary
* * * is void two years from the date of the final decision if
the development action is not initiated in that period.” See
also YCZO 402.08(A) (providing the same expiration period
556                    Manchester Solar, LLC v. Yamhill County

for discretionary permits for development in the Exclusive
Farm Use district). The rule allows a county to extend a per-
mit for 12 months if the permittee “makes a written request
for an extension” to the county before the end of the two-year
period. OAR 660-033-0140(2)(a) - (b); YCZO 402.08(A)(1).
In that request, the permittee must state the “reasons
that prevented the applicant from beginning or continuing
development within the approval period.” OAR 660-033-
0140(2)(c); YCZO 402.08(A)(1). Before granting an exten-
sion request, the county must determine that the permittee
“was unable to begin or continue development during the
approval period for reasons for which the applicant was not
responsible.” OAR 660-033-0140(2)(d); YCZO 402.08(A)(2).
         The relevant facts are not in dispute. On
November 29, 2018, the county issued petitioner a CUP to
develop a 10-acre photovoltaic solar power generating facil-
ity on land zoned for Exclusive Farm Use (EFU). The CUP
was subject to OAR 660-033-0140(1) and YCZO 402.08(A)’s
validity period and had an expiration date of November 29,
2020. Petitioner requested, and the county granted, a one-
year extension of the CUP to December 14, 2021.
         That date came and went without petitioner complet-
ing the use authorized under the CUP. Then, on January 5,
2022, petitioner requested a second extension of its CUP.
The county denied the second request because petitioner did
not request it before the extended expiration date. Petitioner
sought review of the county’s denial of its second extension
request before the Yamhill County Board of Commissioners,
which declined to review. Petitioner then appealed the
county’s denial of the extension request to LUBA. LUBA
remanded to the county at the parties’ request. Petitioner
asked the county to limit the scope of the remand proceed-
ings to two questions, only one of which is pertinent to our
review:1 whether petitioner had a vested the right to com-
plete development of its solar facility project under YCZO
402.08(A), the equivalent of OAR 660-033-0140(1).
    1
      The second question presented by petitioner was whether “the CUP’s con-
struction blackout time period” should “be excluded from the substantial com-
pletion deadline required under YCZO 1202.05(D).” The “blackout time period”
refers to a condition on petitioner’s CUP prohibiting constructing activities from
November through February.
Cite as 328 Or App 554 (2023)                             557

         The county held a hearing. At that hearing, peti-
tioner introduced evidence of its expenses related to the
solar facility project. Petitioner argued that its expenses
demonstrated that petitioner had initiated development
action under OAR 660-033-0140(1), something that, in peti-
tioner’s view, gave it a vested right under the rule to con-
tinue its development. The county assumed without deciding
that petitioner’s reported expenses constituted “initiating”
“development action.” It then concluded that OAR 660-033-
0140(1) does not render petitioner’s CUP “valid indefinitely
simply by initiating a development action before the permit’s
expiration date.” The county read OAR 660-033-0140(2) as a
limitation on the first subpart in that it “makes clear that a
permit extension may be required to ‘continue development’
after expiration of the [authorized] period, even if the devel-
opment action was begun or ‘initiated’ within” the autho-
rized period. The county also, on its own initiative, analyzed
whether petitioner had a common law vested right to con-
tinue development of its solar project and concluded that it
did not.
         Petitioner appealed to LUBA and assigned error
to the county’s determination that it did not have a vested
right to continue development under the CUP; petitioner
contended that the county’s decision erroneously construed
the rule to require an extension, notwithstanding the fact
that petitioner, in its view, had initiated development action.
Petitioner argued that its CUP did not expire or become void
because it initiated development action before December 14,
2021, and therefore had a vested right under the county
ordinance to complete its solar project without the need for
extensions. Petitioner also argued that the county’s com-
mon law vested-rights analysis was incorrect, and that the
county did not adopt sufficient findings by substantial evi-
dence to support the conclusion that petitioner did not have
a common law vested right in the CUP.
        LUBA affirmed. LUBA determined that the county
properly construed the rule as implemented in the ordi-
nance. Relying on its decision in Landwatch Lane County
v. Lane County, 74 Or LUBA 299 (2016), LUBA concluded
that the county’s decision rested on a correct interpretation
558               Manchester Solar, LLC v. Yamhill County

of the rule. As to the county’s common-law vesting analysis,
LUBA concluded that that analysis was in addition to, and
independent from, the county’s vesting analysis under the
ordinance and thus provided no basis for remand. Petitioner
petitioned this court for review of LUBA’s decision.
          We review LUBA’s order to determine whether it
is unlawful in substance or procedure. ORS 197.850(9)(a).
A LUBA order is unlawful in substance if it represents a
“mistaken interpretation of the applicable law.” Schaefer v.
Marion County, 318 Or App 617, 620, 509 P3d 718 (2022)
(quoting Mountain West Investment Corp. v. City of Silverton,
175 Or App 556, 559, 30 P3d 420 (2001)). As noted earlier,
because the LCDC rule and the county’s provisions are
“materially the same in substance,” we treat the ordinance
as if it were the rule. Forster, 115 Or App at 478. That also
means that we do not defer to the county’s interpretation of
its ordinance, as we do when reviewing a county’s interpre-
tation of a land use ordinance that is not materially identi-
cal to an LCDC rule. Gilmour v. Linn County, 279 Or App
584, 589, 379 P3d 833 (2016).
          When we interpret an administrative rule, absent
a controlling interpretation by the rule’s authoring agency,
“we apply the same analytical framework that applies to
the construction of statutes.” Schaefer v. Marion County, 323
Or App 390, 400, 523 P3d 1142 (2022). That means that we
“ ‘seek to divine the intent of the rule’s drafters’ by consid-
ering ‘the text of the rule in its regulatory and statutory
context.’ ” Id. at 400-01 (quoting Noble v. Dept. of Fish and
Wildlife, 355 Or 435, 448, 326 P3d 589 (2014)). “The text
of a rule ‘is the starting point for interpretation and is the
best evidence of the [enacting body’s] intent.’ ” Schaefer,
323 Or App at 401 (quoting PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (brackets
in original)).
         In its first assignment of error, petitioner contends
that LUBA erred when it concluded that OAR 660-033-
0140(1) required petitioner to timely seek and obtain exten-
sions of its CUP regardless of whether petitioner had ini-
tiated its development action. As mentioned, LUBA relied
on Landwatch Lane County for its conclusion. While LUBA’s
Cite as 328 Or App 554 (2023)                            559

opinions are not binding authority on this court, its deci-
sions are relevant for persuasive value. Friends of Yamhill
County v. Board of Commissioners, 351 Or 219, 251-52, 264
P3d 1265 (2011). Because we find its reasoning persuasive,
we set forth the reasoning in Landwatch Lane County, and
explain why we are convinced that it represents the proper
interpretation of the rule.
         In Landwatch Lane County, Lane County granted
a discretionary permit to a developer in 2005 to construct
a private school with three buildings on EFU land. 74 Or
LUBA at 301. In 2006, the developer applied for a building
permit for one building, obtained it in 2007, and completed
its construction in 2008. Id. at 302. Also in 2008, the devel-
oper applied for a building permit for a second building and
received it in 2009. Id. Due to a nationwide economic reces-
sion, the developer reduced its operations and did not seek a
permit for its third building until 2014. Id. at 302-03.
         The Lane County Board of Commissioners approved
the permit in 2016. 74 Or LUBA at 304. The county inter-
preted OAR 660-033-0140(1) to mean that “once develop-
ment action is ‘initiated’ within the two-year period, the
discretionary permit never expires and there is no need for”
the permittee to obtain extensions to continue and complete
its project. Id. The county decided that the school developer
“initiated” development action by applying for a construc-
tion permit for its first building within the validity period
in 2006 and thus the permit to complete the entire school
project would never expire and the developer would not need
to apply for extensions. Id. at 304.
         LUBA reversed. LUBA concluded that OAR 660-
033-0140(1) must be read in context with OAR 660-033-
0140(2). 74 Or LUBA at 307. LUBA reasoned that, “[i]f initi-
ation of the development action within the two-year period
is sufficient in itself to authorize continued development
after expiration of the two-year period, then the ‘continue
development’ element of OAR 660-033-0140(2) is meaning-
less language.” Id. at 307. Had LCDC intended for OAR 660-
033-0140(1) to allow a discretionary permit to be valid indef-
initely without the need for extensions, LUBA reasoned, it
would not have included the text in OAR 660-033-0140(2)(d)
560               Manchester Solar, LLC v. Yamhill County

requiring a permittee to “demonstrate that it was unable to
‘continue development during the approval period.’ ” Id.
         We find that reasoning persuasive under the ana-
lytic framework that governs our interpretation of the LCDC
rule. To date, LCDC has not provided a controlling inter-
pretation of OAR 660-033-0140, so we begin our analysis of
OAR 660-033-0140 by looking to the text to discern LCDC’s
intent. Schaefer, 323 Or App at 401. The first subsection
of the rule states that a discretionary permit “is void two
years from the date of the final decision if the development
action is not initiated in that period.” OAR 660-033-0140(1).
The rule then states that a county can extend the two-year
period if certain criteria are met. OAR 660-033-0140(2). The
permittee must submit its extension request “prior to the
expiration of the” approval period and must “state[ ] the rea-
sons that prevented the applicant from beginning or con-
tinuing development within the approval period.” OAR 660-
033-0140(2)(b) - (c).
          We recognize that OAR 660-033-0140(1) is ambigu-
ous. Taken in isolation, the phrase “void two years from the
date of the final decision if the development action is not ini-
tiated” might plausibly be read as petitioner argues it should
be: to signal that the converse is also true—that a permit is
valid indefinitely without the need for extensions when the
permittee does initiate development action within the per-
mit period. But the text can also reasonably be understood a
different way. It can be read to be silent as to what a permit-
tee who initiates, but does not complete, development action
within the permit period must do to ensure that the CUP
remains valid. In other words, LCDC’s decision to specify
that the failure to initiate development action within the
permit period will void the permit does not equate unam-
biguously to the conclusion that LCDC intended that initi-
ation of development action, standing alone, would render a
permit valid in perpetuity, absent any further action by the
permittee.
         As was LUBA, we are persuaded by the context
of the rule that petitioner’s interpretation of OAR 660-
033-0149(1) is incorrect and that, in view of OAR 660-033-
0140(2), petitioner was required to obtain a permit extension
Cite as 328 Or App 554 (2023)                             561

to continue development of the use approved under the CUP.
See Sky Lakes Medical Center v. Dept. of Human Services, 310
Or App 138, 149, 484 P3d 1107 (2021) (“ ‘[C]ontext’ includes,
among other things, other parts of the statute at issue.”)
(quoting Force v. Dept. of Rev., 350 Or 179, 188, 252 P3d 306
(2011)); see also PGE, 317 Or at 611 (“the court considers the
context of the statutory provisions at issue, which includes
other provisions of the same statute”).
          Specifically, OAR 660-033-0140(2) provides that a
“county may grant one extension period of up to 12 months”
if the permittee, “makes a written request for an exten-
sion * * * prior to the expiration of the approval period” that
“states the reasons that prevented the [permittee] from
beginning or continuing development within the approval
period.” OAR 660-033-0140(2)(a) - (c). As noted, OAR 660-
033-0140(1) provides for a two-year approval period, stat-
ing that discretionary permits are “void two years from the
date of [issuance] if the development action is not initiated
in that period.” Subsection (2) of the rule then spells out
the process a permittee must follow for a county to consider
extending a permit’s validity period to allow a developer to
“continue development” beyond the two-year period provided
in subsection (1). When the subsections are read together,
subsection (2) contemplates that, even when development is
ongoing under subsection (1) at the time a permit is set to
expire, the ongoing validity of the permit is predicated on a
permittee demonstrating an entitlement to an extension.
          That context signals that simply initiating devel-
opment action within the two-year approval period in OAR
660-033-0140(1) is not enough to render a permit valid
indefinitely. The “continue development” phrase in OAR
660-033-0140(2) limits a permittee’s ability to move forward
with its development project even when development action
is initiated by requiring permittees to provide justification
to extend their permit past the approval period. Petitioner’s
proffered reading of the rule would have us exclude LCDC’s
reference to a permittee’s need for extensions in OAR 660-
033-0140(2) to continue development. It is not our role to
“omit what has been inserted” into the rule. ORS 174.010;
SAIF v. Donahue-Birran, 195 Or App 173, 177, 96 P3d 1282
562               Manchester Solar, LLC v. Yamhill County

(2004) (applying ORS 174.010 to construction of administra-
tive rules). Accordingly, we conclude that OAR 660-033-0140
requires a permittee to obtain an extension of their permit
to continue any development that the permittee initiated
during the permit period.
         LUBA and the county thus were correct to conclude
that petitioner’s CUP expired, and that OAR 660-033-040(1)
did not give petitioner a vested right to continue develop-
ment. Petitioner’s approval period expired on December 14,
2021, and it submitted its extension request on January 5,
2022. Even assuming that petitioner initiated the devel-
opment action within the meaning of OAR 660-033-040(1)
before December 14, 2021, it is undisputed that any develop-
ment action was ongoing on that date, and also undisputed
that petitioner did not timely submit an extension request
before its CUP expired. Because petitioner did not do so, its
2018 CUP expired.
          Arguing for a different result, petitioner asserts that
we can give effect to the “continue development” wording
while at the same time adopting petitioner’s view that initi-
ating development action means that a permittee obtains a
vested right to continue development. Petitioner asserts that
it would be possible for a permittee to start development but
still fall short of initiating development action. Petitioner
posits that those circumstances are ones in which an exten-
sion is required. We do not find that argument persuasive
because nothing in the text of the rule suggests different
gradations of starting or initiating development action.
Beyond that, we think the most natural reading of the pro-
vision allowing for an extension to continue development
beyond the approval period is that an extension is required
to continue whatever development has begun during the
approval period.
         Petitioner also points to our recent decision in
Central Oregon Landwatch v. Deschutes County, 326 Or App
439, 533 P3d 67 (2023), asserting that it demonstrates that
petitioner’s interpretation of the rule is correct. In Central
Oregon Landwatch, we examined Deschutes County Code
(DCC) 22.36.010(B)(1), which is Deschutes County’s imple-
mentation of OAR 660-033-0140(1). Id. at 447-48. We held
Cite as 328 Or App 554 (2023)                              563

that, under Deschutes County’s implementation of the
administrative rule, “a land use approval is not void if the
use has been initiated.” Id. at 448. In essence, we concluded,
much as petitioner argues here, that initiating development
action effectively vests in a permittee the right to continue
to develop the use. Id.
          At first blush, petitioner’s argument has some force.
Like YCZO 402.08(A)(1) (and the LCDC rule), the DCC pro-
vides that “a land use permit is void two years after the date
the discretionary decision becomes final if the use approved
in the permit is not initiated within that time period.”
Central Oregon Landwatch, 326 Or App at 441 (quoting DCC
22.36.010(B)(1)). Unlike Yamhill County’s ordinance and the
LCDC rule, however, the DCC spells out a specific process
for determining whether development action has been initi-
ated for purposes of the code and also specifically states that,
by initiating development action during the approval period,
a permittee gains a vested right to continue an approved
land use. In particular, the DCC provides that Deschutes
County shall determine whether an approved land use has
been initiated through a declaratory ruling and provides ele-
ments for Deschutes County to make that determination. Id.
at 441-42. Further, and critically, unlike Yamhill County’s
ordinance and the LCDC rule, the DCC expressly states: “If
it is determined that the use was ‘initiated’ during the life of
the permit, the permit will be considered to be a valid exist-
ing permit and any land use described in the permit will
be deemed to be authorized[.]” DCC 22.36.025(B). In Central
Oregon Landwatch, we relied on that wording to hold that, in
Deschutes County, “a land use approval is not void if the use
has been initiated.” Central Oregon Landwatch, 355 Or App
at 448. By contrast, no part of YCZO 402.08(A) or the Yamhill
County Zoning Ordinances provide that the initiation of
development action, standing alone, means that the permit
remains valid. Because Central Oregon Landwatch turned
largely on specific provisions of the Deschutes County Code
that are not replicated in either the LCDC ordinance or the
Yamhill County Code, we are not persuaded that it stands
for the proposition that petitioner’s CUP remains valid, not-
withstanding petitioner’s failure to extend the expiration
date of the CUP.
564                    Manchester Solar, LLC v. Yamhill County

        In its second assignment of error, petitioner con-
tends that LUBA’s decision not to address whether peti-
tioner had a vested right to continue developing its solar
farm under the common law was unlawful in substance or
procedure under ORS 197.850(9)(a).
         LUBA declined to address the county’s common-law
vesting discussion because it concluded that it was in addi-
tion to and independent from the county’s interpretation and
application of the administrative rule and thus provided no
basis for remand. Having reviewed the county’s decision, we
agree with LUBA’s assessment; the county’s common-law
vesting analysis was collateral to the issue before the county.
Under those circumstances, we have no basis for conclud-
ing that LUBA erred in declining to address the county’s
common-law vesting analysis.2
           Affirmed.

    2
      Our conclusion that the county’s common-law vesting analysis was collat-
eral to the question of whether petitioner had a vested right to continue devel-
opment under the terms of the rule necessarily means that the law-of-the-case
doctrine will not preclude petitioner from challenging that analysis, should peti-
tioner seek a determination that petitioner has a common-law vested right to
continue development, as distinct from a right under the terms of the rule. As
the county’s lawyer explained at oral argument, the way for petitioner to obtain
a ruling on the common-law vesting issue is to expressly request a common-law
vesting determination under the applicable county guidance. In this proceeding,
petitioner did not seek a common-law vesting determination but, instead, sought
only a determination whether the LCDC rule, as implemented by the county ordi-
nance, applied to give petitioner a vested right in continuing development under
the circumstance of this case. Consistent with the limited scope of the proceed-
ing, petitioner affirmatively argued to the county that it should not consider the
common-law vesting analysis in answering the rule/ordinance-based question
before it.