Court Opinion

ID: 9649237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:46:13.297004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:09.213425
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority in the disposition it has made of Issues II “delay compensation”, III “bill for rental of bulldozer,” and IV “consequential damages for the reduction in the fair value of the property,” but I dissent as to Issue I relating to the chancellor’s right to apportion the damages. The majority agrees with the lower court in its conclusion of law finding the defendants jointly and severally liable, but reverses the lower court’s apportionment of damages. I disagree with the majority and the lower court that the defendants were acting jointly, but support the chancellor’s apportionment of damages.
*486The majority rightly notes that joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, and any damages resulting from their negligence cannot be apportioned. While I agree with that axiomatic statement of law, I do not find that principle applicable to the case at bar.
To imply joint liability, the defendants must act in concert to bring about the single injury, 37 P.L.E. Trespass Sect. 44. I do not agree that the defendants herein were acting jointly. The lessee Groves created the condition causing the damage to plaintiff’s property by dumping fill on the lessor’s land in a negligent manner, by failing to provide adequate terracing, ditching and sedimentation ponds on the waste area, in failing to provide adequate erosion resistant vegetation growth after stripping away what was there, and in generally failing to take necessary steps or provide adequate supervision to insure proper drainage to the area for the protection of adjoining properties. As the lessee, Groves was in full control of the land fill operation, and as such received the complaints from affected parties as to the manner in which it was doing the work. After four years of operation, Groves did finally succeed in correcting the negligent conditions, since the chancellor was satisfied that the early damage caused by the run off of water and waste material was over.
As to the lessor-land owner Williams, it is unrefuted that she had a legitimate right to use her property in any manner she chose, so long as that use did not create an unreasonable risk of harm to adjacent property owners. Furthermore, she was permitted to make improvements to her land which resulted in a not unreasonable increase of the natural flow of water from a higher to a lower property. See Chamberlin v. Ciaffoni, 373 Pa. 430, 96 A.2d 140 (1953), Leiper v. Heywood-Hall Construction Company, 381 Pa. 317, 113 A.2d 148 (1955). When the flow onto plaintiff’s property became excessive, it is difficult to visualize how Williams could have taken any affirmative steps to correct the conditions when Groves was in the process of attempting such remedial steps, or when she should have properly done so.
*487The only negligence that could be attributed to Williams was possibly her failure to supervise the corrective measures taken by Groves to insure that the defect was cured as soon as possible. I believe the facts of the instant case are analogous to the situations involving a tortfeasor and a physician who later negligently treats the victim. We have recently held in such a case that:
“a tortfeasor originally causing an injury and a physician who subsequently aggravates or causes a new injury are not joint tortfeasors.”
Lasprogata v. Qualls, 263 Pa.Super. 174, 179, 397 A.2d 803, 805 (1979).
McArthur v. Balas, 402 Pa. 116, 166 A.2d 640 (1961) can be viewed as supporting this proposition as applied to landowners and lessees. Therein, the landowner’s liability for a landslide from his property onto the adjoining property was based upon his failure to take corrective or preventive measures to eliminate the damages to the adjacent property, and not upon the artificial conditions which caused the harm. Prom the above analysis, it is clear to me that the acts of the tortfeasors upon which liability was based were, like the tortfeasor physician, subsequent in time and in negligence and cannot be viewed as a joint act.
Since they were not joint tortfeasors, joint and several liability is inappropriate herein. Rather, the chancellor properly followed the Restatement of Torts, 2nd Ed. Sect. 433A, which provides:
Apportionment of Harm to Causes
“(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more harms.”
Since I find the acts of negligence of Groves and Williams to be separate and identifiable from each other in nature *488and in time, they are properly subject to apportionment pursuant to § 433A of Restatement 2nd. Torts. I would affirm the apportionment of damages.