Court Opinion

ID: 9634340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:59.437138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:00.749407
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The General Assembly has clearly identified the important state interest sought to be furthered by the Ethics Act:
The Legislature hereby declares that public office is a public trust and that any effort to realize personal financial gain through public office other than compensation provided by law is a violation of that trust. In order to strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of the State in their government, the Legislature further declares that the people have a right to be assured that the financial interests of holders of or candidates for public office present neither a conflict nor the appearance of a conflict with the public trust. Because public confidence in government can best be sustained by assuring the people of the impartiality and honesty of public officials, this act shall be liberally construed to promote complete disclosure.
Act of October 4, 1978, P.L. 883, No. 170, § 1, 65 P.S. § 401 (Supp. 1983-84).
We are here concerned with a conflict between the spousal disclosure provisions of the Ethics Act and the constitutional right to privacy. The right of privacy as has been defined by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court encompasses two distinct privacy interests. First, there is an “autonomy” interest, which relates to personal decision-making in matters of fundamental importance. See e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). This autonomy interest may be overridden by the legislature *204only where the state can demonstrate a compelling interest which cannot be effectuated by less restrictive means. See e.g., Paul v. Davis, supra; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra; Roe v. Wade, supra. Second, there is a lesser but nonetheless important interest in the “confidentiality” of one’s personal affairs. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). The constitutionality of legislation which impinges upon this right to confidentiality is determined by balancing the public interest to be served against the personal interest affected. In addition, there must be a rational relationship between the means employed by the legislature and the goals sought to be achieved. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).
The privacy interest implicated in the instant matter, namely the right of the spouse of a public official to confidentiality in his or her financial dealings, clearly falls within the “confidentiality” category. Thus the balancing test and the rational relationship test are here applicable.
Employing the balancing test, I am of the view that the state interest in strengthening and maintaining public confidence in government far outweighs the interest of spouses of government officials in their personal financial affairs. I do not believe such a conclusion works an undue hardship. Public service, with its attendant sacrifices to spouses as well as office holders, is not forced upon the public official. The spouse of a public official undoubtedly plays a role in that official’s career and shares in the prestige and honor as well as the inevitable sacrifices of public office. Thus the burden of public financial disclosure is merely an additional inconvenience that must be accepted by the marital unit if one of the members seeks to hold public office.
I am also convinced that the Ethics Act’s mandatory periodic disclosure scheme is a reasonable and practicable means of achieving the legislature’s purposes. The majority improperly projects that public officials will deliberately evade the Ethics Act’s disclosure requirements, thus frustrating those purposes. I question the propriety of prejudg*205ing the efficacy of the legislation under scrutiny, nor do I impute to the average hard working and dedicated public official such a nefarious intent. This Court has declared on innumerable occasions that it is not our function to pass upon the wisdom of legislation. E.g., Wanamaker v. Philadelphia School District, 441 Pa. 567, 274 A.2d 524 (1971); Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Eagles, Inc., 437 Pa. 25, 261 A.2d 309 (1970); Shankey v. Staisey, 436 Pa. 65, 257 A.2d 897 (1969); Williams v. Department of Highways, 423 Pa. 219, 223 A.2d 865 (1966). Thus under both tests the spousal disclosure provisions clearly fall within permissible constitutional bounds.
I am likewise in disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the penal provisions of section 9(b) of the Ethics Act, 65 P.S. § 409(b), violate due process. Section 5 of the Ethics Act, 65 P.S. § 405, which specifies the contents of a statement of financial interests, is not mentioned in section 9(b). The majority nevertheless interprets section 9(b) as imposing absolute criminal liability upon individuals unable to comply with section 5, and bases its finding of a due process violation upon that interpretation. Such a reading violates two well established principles of statutory construction. First, it must be presumed that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitutions of the United States or of this Commonwealth. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3). Second, penal provisions such as section 9(b) must be strictly construed. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1).1
Section 9(b) explicitly provides criminal sanctions for violation of section 4 of the Ethics Act, 65 P.S. § 404, which prescribes who must file a statement of financial interests and when and where such statements must be filed. Normal usage commands the conclusion that the conduct proscribed by section 9(b) is failure to file the required statement in compliánce with section 4. Since section 9(b) does not refer to the conduct described in section 5, there is no *206basis for suggesting the applicability of section 9(b) to section 5.
More importantly, the liability for the content of the disclosure statement is explicitly governed by section 5(a), which requires that document to be “signed under penalty of perjury.” 65 P.S. § 405(a). Therefore, in my judgment, section 9(b) may not be interpreted as providing that a public official or candidate unable to obtain financial data from his or her spouse is subject to the “automatic” penalties of section 9(b). It is clear in such case the disclosure of the spouse’s unwillingness to supply such information satisfies the mandate of section 5.
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.
LARSEN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Section 105 of the new Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 105, is not applicable since this is not a provision under that Code.