Court Opinion

ID: 9580573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:06:16.0307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:22.061509
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority correctly holds that the “transcript of proceedings” standing alone did not meet the State’s burden of showing that Green was cognizant of all three of the constitutional rights set out in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969), but then concludes that trial counsel’s affidavit is insufficient to make that showing. I strongly disagree because I believe that the affidavit constitutes exceptionally strong evidence that trial counsel advised Green of his Boykin rights.
As the majority recognizes, this Court held in Bazemore v. State, 273 Ga. 160, 162 (1) (535 SE2d 760) (2000) that testimony by defense counsel regarding his “routine or standard practice or procedure” can be used to demonstrate compliance with constitutional standards. See also Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480, 482 (1) (591 SE2d 802) (2004). Bazemore cited as authority for this principle Jackson v. Hopper, 243 Ga. 41, 42 (252 SE2d 467) (1979), which affirmed the denial of habeas relief based on trial counsel’s deposition testimony that it was the “general policy” of the Public Defender’s Office to advise convicted defendants of the right of appeal and that he “felt he had advised” the defendant of that right. If such testimony regarding defense counsel’s feeling and the general policy of his employer is sufficient to prove his standard or customary practice, then surely the unequivocal affirmation by Green’s attorney that “I know that I would have personally advised” him of his Boykin rights is likewise sufficient.
In reaching the contrary conclusion, the majority relies on the failure of the affiant to recite specific words such as “routine,” “customary,” or “standard” “practice” or “procedure.” See Scott v. State, 206 Ga. App. 23, 25 (1) (a) (424 SE2d 328) (1992). However, such reliance is erroneous, as it elevates form over the substance of the lawyer’s affidavit. A reasonable finder of fact could certainly infer from the affidavit of Green’s trial counsel the import of those magic words which the majority would require. See Ponder v. State, 191 Ga. App. 503, 504 (2) (382 SE2d 204) (1989). The fact-finder is entitled to draw any reasonable inferences from the evidence. Barber v. Perdue, 194 Ga. App. 287, 290 (390 SE2d 234) (1990); Pledger v. State, 193 Ga. App. 588, 590 (2) (c) (388 SE2d 425) (1989). The only apparent meaning attributable to the affidavit is that trial counsel’s fixed and habitual practice was to advise his clients of all three Boykin rights, *691and the majority fails to suggest any other reasonable inference. Compare Baisden v. State, 279 Ga. 702 (620 SE2d 369) (2005) (where prosecutor’s “affidavit merely state [d] that the trial judge would have asked questions ‘similar’ to a list which included inquiries regarding the Boykin rights, but which also addressed other matters”).
Decided October 3, 2005.
Christopher D. Green, pro se.
Richard E. Currie, District Attorney, for appellee.
Moreover, the inference drawn by the habeas court from the affidavit is supported by “the presumption that an attorney has adequately discharged his responsibilities and duties----” Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 476 (2) (211 SE2d 764) (1975). That presumption is not sufficient by itself to support a holding that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, but it may still be considered in determining whether the plea was valid. Roberts v. Greenway, supra. When that presumption is considered in conjunction with the only reasonable construction of the words appearing in the affiant’s statement, the habeas court was authorized to find that Green’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered after a valid waiver of his constitutional rights.
Because the majority ignores the precedential basis of Bazemore and erroneously imposes a novel and rigid rule of evidence requiring the incantation of certain words in habeas hearings involving challenges to guilty pleas, I dissent to the reversal of the habeas court’s judgment.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Sears and Justice Melton join in this dissent.