Court Opinion

ID: 9394173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 16:06:57.134657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.682751
License: Public Domain

J-S01023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RICHARD LEONARD WILLIAMS                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 637 WDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 3, 2022,
               in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County,
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001064-2021.

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                             FILED: MAY 12, 2023

        Richard Leonard Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered after a jury convicted him of aggravated assault, simple assault, five

counts of recklessly endangering another person, four counts of terroristic

threats, and three counts of unlawful restraint.1 We are constrained to vacate

in part and remand for a new trial.

        The trial court recounted the facts adduced at trial:

              On February 15, 2021, Officer Thomas O’Barto of the
        Masontown Police Department was dispatched to Fort Mason
        Village for a reported fight and potential stabbing at approximately
        10:30 pm. When Officer O’Barto arrived on scene, he observed a
        male bleeding in front of apartment 33, who he identified as Mark
        Smith. Mr. Smith was bleeding from the right arm and had several
        other injuries. Officer O’Barto then moved to the inside of the
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 2705, 2706(a)(1), and 2902(c)(1).
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      apartment to clear the residence and to check for other victims.
      Officer O’Barto found Crystal Jackson and her [three c]hildren in
      the upstairs room, everyone was crying and visibly distraught.
      The officer then moved the family to outside the apartment so he
      could continue to clear the scene.

            The officer cleared the scene with no sight of Williams. The
      victim, Crystal Jackson, told the officer that the perpetrator was
      Williams. While the officer was speaking to [Jackson], she showed
      him messages she received from Williams. Then Williams called
      [Jackson’s] phone. Officer O’Barto answered the phone, identified
      himself and told Williams to turn himself in. Williams was adamant
      that he would not turn himself in.

             From the scene Officer O’Barto collected two knives, one in
      the living room at the bottom of the staircase, and the other in
      the bedroom where the family was located when he arrived on
      scene. The knives were properly collected for evidence. Later
      that night[, Williams] sent [Jackson] messages saying, “I’m
      getting a gun and I’m coming after [all] y’all.” Williams was
      eventually located and arrested for his preliminary hearing.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/11/22, at 4–5.

      Jackson testified that Williams came to her apartment and, with their

three children in Jackson’s bedroom, cut his arm and told Jackson she could

stop the cutting by not talking to Smith. Smith testified that he came to tell

Williams to leave; as Williams ran down the stairs, Smith grabbed Williams’

legs and took him to the floor. Williams then cut Smith with a knife and fled.

The jury also heard that the previous night, Smith and Williams fought outside

Jackson’s apartment.

      Williams represented himself at trial and testified in his own defense.

He argued that he acted in self-defense against Smith. As described below,

Williams sought to introduce his knowledge of Smith’s criminal charges from

2018. Based on Williams’ limited documentary evidence of Smith’s record,

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the trial court took the matter under advisement.         Following its review of

Smith’s case, the court told the jury that Smith had a conviction for criminal

trespass, which the jury could use only in assessing Smith’s credibility.

       The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense. It gave instructions

on the elements of the charged crimes that substantially tracked the standard

jury instructions. Williams did not object to the trial court’s final instructions.

       The jury found Williams not guilty of attempted murder and guilty of the

remaining offenses.       On May 3, 2022, the court sentenced Williams to an

aggregate term of 9 to 30 years of imprisonment, consecutive to his sentence

in a related case.      Williams timely appealed.   Williams and the trial court

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.2

       Williams presents seven questions for our review:

       1. Whether the Commonwealth’s evidence in this case is
          insufficient by failing to prove [Williams] was not acting in self
          defense in regards to aggravated assault (Count 2) beyond a
          reasonable doubt?

       2. Whether self defense was justified and the verdict was against
          the weight of the evidence?

       3. Whether the Commonwealth furnished evidence to justify the
          assault upon [Williams]?

____________________________________________

2  Williams, pro se in this case and a related case, received extra time to file
his concise statements of error. After Williams filed his concise statement in
his other case, the trial court entered its opinion in both cases. Williams then
filed his concise statement in this case, before the extended due date. We
remanded for a supplemental trial court opinion to address the other issues
that Williams briefed in this case. The trial court promptly entered a
supplemental opinion on March 27, 2023.

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       4. Whether the trial court erred by not permitting inquiry into
          victims crimen falsi conviction?

       5. Whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction
          for terroristic threats regarding [Williams’] children, Counts 9,
          10, 12?

       6. Whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions
          of unlawful restraint, Counts 13, 14 and 15?

       7. Whether the trial court erred in its instructions by withholding
          explanation between malice and self defense?

Williams’ Brief at 7. The Commonwealth did not file a brief.

                  1. Sufficiency of the evidence – self-defense

       Williams’ first issue concerns the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s

evidence to prove that he was not acting in self-defense for the charge of

aggravated assault against Smith.3 He emphasizes Smith’s testimony that

Williams had not yet reached Smith when Smith grabbed his feet. Because of

this evidence that Smith initiated physical contact, Williams argues that the

Commonwealth did not meet its burden to disprove self-defense.

       As with any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we employ the

following well-settled standard of review:

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
       is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
       most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
       to enable the [jury] to find every element of the crime beyond a
       reasonable doubt. In applying this test, we may not weigh the
____________________________________________

3The trial court instructed the jury that self-defense applied to the charges of
attempted murder, aggravated assault, and simple assault. As noted infra,
self-defense should also apply to the charge of recklessly endangering Smith.
The jury acquitted Williams of attempted murder. Williams limits his challenge
on appeal to the charge of aggravated assault.

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      evidence and substitute our judgment for the [jury’s]. In addition,
      we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
      Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
      Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
      [jury] unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a
      matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
      combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
      burden of proving every element of the crime [and disproving self-
      defense] beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
      circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,
      the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
      received must be considered. Finally, the [jury] while passing
      upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
      produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Boyer, 282 A.3d 1161, 1171 (Pa. Super. 2022) (brackets

omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613, 618–19 (Pa.

Super. 2012)).

      Once there is some evidence to justify a finding of self-defense, the

Commonwealth has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant was not acting in self-defense. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53

A.3d 738, 740–43 (Pa. 2012) (cataloguing the history of this burden).

Pennsylvania’s self-defense law is found in Section 505 of the Crimes Code,

“Use of force in self-protection”:

      (a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.--
      The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when
      the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the
      purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
      such other person on the present occasion.

      (b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.--

                                 *    *     *

      (2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section
      unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect

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      himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual
      intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:

            (i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or
            serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force
            against himself in the same encounter; or

            (ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using
            such force with complete safety by retreating, except the
            actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of
            work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his
            place of work by another person whose place of work the
            actor knows it to be.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a), (b)(2) (emphasis added).        Under this law, when a

defendant uses deadly force, the three elements of a self-defense claim are:

      (1) the defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent
      danger of death or serious bodily injury and that it was necessary
      to use deadly force against the victim to prevent such harm; (2)
      the defendant was free from fault in provoking the difficulty which
      culminated in his use of deadly force; and (3) the defendant did
      not violate any duty to retreat.

Commonwealth v. Steele, 234 A.3d 840, 846 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing

Mouzon, 53 A.3d at 740).       The Commonwealth may meet its burden by

disproving any of these three elements.         Here, the trial court properly

instructed the jury on self-defense. N.T., Trial, 4/27/22, at 340–344.

      As a threshold matter, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams

committed aggravated assault. His use of a knife (of any length) was deadly

force. Commonwealth v. Cutts, 421 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Pa. Super. 1980)

(citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 332 A.2d 464, 466–67 (Pa. Super. 1974)).

Also, Williams knew that a knife was readily capable of causing serious bodily

injury or death, having cut himself and threatened to kill himself moments

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earlier. The evidence was thus sufficient to prove that when Williams used a

knife to slice Smith’s arm, he was using deadly force.

      Likewise, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams did not act

in self-defense. Here, evidence was presented that Williams provoked Smith’s

use of force against him. As Jackson testified, Williams said that he was going

to kill Smith. N.T., 4/26/22, at 65. Additionally, Smith testified that Williams,

who had fought him the previous night, told him to leave and then started

“charging down the stairs” towards him. Id. at 130. The jury was free to

believe this testimony, which was sufficient to establish that Williams intended

to kill or seriously injure Smith and that Williams did not act in self-defense

because he provoked Smith to grab his feet and restrain him.          Therefore,

Williams’ first issue fails.

                    2. Weight of the evidence – self-defense

      In Williams’ second issue, he argues that the weight of the evidence at

trial favored his self-defense claim. He notes that Smith arrived with at least

one other person and put him in a chokehold when he sliced Smith’s arm.

      Williams has waived this issue. A defendant must preserve a claim that

the verdict was against the weight of the evidence by moving for a new trial,

either: orally, on the record, before sentencing; in a written motion before

sentencing; or in a post-sentence motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). “Failure to

properly preserve the claim will result in waiver, even if the trial court

addresses the issue in its opinion.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d

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482, 497 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d

478, 490 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

      Here, a review of the transcripts from the trial and sentencing, as well

as the rest of the certified record, reveals that Williams never moved for a

new trial based on the weight of the evidence. He filed no post-trial motions,

instead appealing the same day as his sentence. Therefore, he has waived

this issue.

              3. Sufficiency of the evidence – aggravated assault

      Williams’ third issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that

he intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to Smith. This was an

element of aggravated assault as well as an element that the Commonwealth

had the burden to disprove for Williams’ self-defense claim.

      As above, Jackson testified that when Williams left the bedroom, he said

that he was going to kill Smith. N.T., 4/26/22, at 65. And Smith testified that

Williams charged down the stairs towards him. Id. at 130. The jury was free

to believe this direct and circumstantial evidence that when Williams provoked

Smith to grab and restrain him, his intent was to cause death or serious bodily

injury. Williams’ third issue fails.

               4. Admissibility of evidence – Smith’s conviction

      Williams’ fourth issue concerns the trial court’s treatment of evidence of

Smith’s criminal record. Williams tried to cross-examine Smith about Smith

previously entering another person’s residence at night.       N.T., 4/26/22, at

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149. The Commonwealth objected, and Williams offered an exhibit showing

that Smith was charged with certain offenses in 2018 (two and a half years

before the incident being tried).          The trial court reserved ruling on the

admissibility of Smith’s prior crimes based on Williams’ documentation.4

Williams continued questioning Smith without reference to the prior incident.

        During a recess, the trial court reviewed Smith’s criminal case and

determined that Smith had pled guilty to criminal trespass, loitering and

prowling at night, and harassment.5 The court therefore ruled that it would

instruct the jury that it could consider Smith’s criminal trespass conviction in

judging Smith’s truthfulness. Williams explained that he was not seeking to

use it for that purpose but rather to substantiate his own fear of serious bodily

harm. N.T., 4/26/22, at 201–202.6 In response to the trial court’s concern

that there was no evidence that Williams had known about Smith’s conviction,

Williams explained, “I knew it. I knew he had done it before because he was

in jail. I’ve known him for ten years.” Id. at 202.

        Ultimately, the trial court ruled that Smith’s conviction for criminal

trespass would be admissible only as crimen falsi evidence. It thus did not
____________________________________________

4 It is not clear exactly what documents Williams had. The trial court states
he had an affidavit of probable cause and a transcript from a magistrate
hearing. Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/23, at 7. Williams included a criminal
information with his brief. From the substance of the discussion, it appears
he may have had a docket sheet, which is informally known as a transcript.
5   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3503(a)(1)(i), 5506, and 2709(a)(3).
6 It appears that Williams cited Commonwealth v. Stewart, 394 A.2d 968
(Pa. 1978), which was spelled as Hoover in the notes of testimony.

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allow Williams to testify to Smith’s prior violence, except for violence toward

Williams. The court instructed:

             Ladies and gentlemen, while they’re talking, you heard
      some discussion yesterday about a prior criminal record for Mark
      Smith, and also while we were discussing this matter outside of
      your presence the parties stipulated that Mark Smith has a
      criminal conviction for criminal trespass. The only purpose for
      which you may consider this evidence of his prior conviction is
      deciding whether or not to believe all, part, or none of Mark
      Smith’s testimony. In doing so, you may consider the type of the
      crime committed, how long ago it was committed, and how it may
      affect the likelihood that he testified truthfully in this case.

             So there are two types of crimes—we call them “crimen
      falsi”—that you’re allowed to consider in determining credibility
      only. Not that [Smith is] a bad person or he’s a criminal, but he
      committed a crime where at the heart of that crime is some type
      of dishonesty, and that’s a relevant factor for you to consider in
      weighing the credibility of his testimony, and for that purpose only
      we are advising you of that prior conviction in making that
      determination as to how, if at all, it affects his credibility on the
      witness stand.

N.T., 4/27/21, at 286–287.

      On appeal, Williams argues that Smith’s prior criminal case was relevant

to Williams’ reasonable belief that his life was in danger. He notes similarities

between Smith’s actions in the prior case and in this case, which he asserts

he should have been allowed to explore at trial. Williams concludes that the

jury should have known about Smith’s prior similar conduct, which would have

affected its deliberations.

      Our review recognizes that evidentiary rulings are within the discretion

of the trial court; we will reverse an evidentiary ruling only if the trial court

abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Gallaway, 283 A.3d 217, 222–23

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(Pa. 2022) (citing Commonwealth v. Le, 208 A.3d 960, 970 (Pa. 2019)).

“An abuse of discretion is not simply an error of judgment, but is an overriding

misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly

unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by

the evidence of record.” Id. at 223 (citing Commonwealth v. Talley, 265

A.3d 485, 530 (Pa. 2021)).

       In general, evidence of a person’s character is not admissible to show

that the person acted in accordance with that character on a particular

occasion. Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1). Likewise, evidence that a person committed a

crime “is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that

on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1).

       As an exception to this general rule against character evidence, our

Supreme Court recognized two related purposes to admit a victim’s criminal

record. Commonwealth v. Amos, 284 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1971). “[W]here a

defendant alleges self-defense, he may use his deceased victim’s criminal

record either (1) to corroborate his alleged knowledge of the victim’s

quarrelsome and violent character to show that the defendant reasonably

believed that his life was in danger; or (2) to prove the allegedly violent

propensities of the victim to show that the victim was in fact the aggressor.”7

____________________________________________

7 These purposes are legally distinct from attacking a witness’ character for
truthfulness. Commonwealth v. Minich, 4 A.3d 1063, 1071–72 (Pa. Super.
2010); see Pa.R.E. 608, 609.

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Id. at 751; see Pa.R.E. 404(a)(2)(B) (codifying the second purpose). These

purposes also apply when the victim is alive.             See Commonwealth v.

Christine (Christine II), 125 A.3d 394, 399–400 (Pa. 2015). If the victim’s

criminal charges and violent acts did not result in a conviction, they are

admissible only for the first purpose in Amos, to corroborate the defendant’s

belief that his life was in danger. Commonwealth v. Darby, 373 A.2d 1073,

1074–75 (Pa. 1977).

      Both purposes for admitting a victim’s criminal record require the

defendant to establish admissibility with specific showings of probative value.

Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275 A.3d 513, 519 (Pa. Super. 2022). First, to

corroborate a defendant’s claim that he reasonably believed his life was in

danger, he must show that he knew about the victim’s record when he used

force against the victim. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Stewart, 647 A.2d

597, 599 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1994)). Second, to prove that the victim was the

aggressor, a defendant must show that the victim’s crimes “are similar in

nature and not too distant in time” as compared to the crimes being tried. Id.

(quoting Commonwealth v. Christine (Christine I), 78 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (en banc) (Mundy, J., in support of affirmance), aff’d, 125 A.3d

394 (Pa. 2015)).      These threshold determinations are within the sound

discretion of the trial court. Amos, 284 A.2d 748, 752; accord Christine II,

125 A.3d at 399 n.9 (“[T]rial courts may determine whether the facts are

sufficiently similar on a case-by-case basis . . . .”).

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       If a defendant claims self-defense and shows the probative value of the

victim’s criminal record, this evidence is admissible. Our courts have found

the exclusion of such evidence to be reversible error. Commonwealth v.

Beck, 402 A.2d 1371, 1373 (Pa. 1979)8 (granting a new trial based on

exclusion of victim’s conviction for assault and battery); see Commonwealth

v. Carbone, 707 A.2d 1145, 1155 (Pa. Super. 1998) (post-conviction case,

remanding for a new trial where counsel did not present testimony that the

victim had accosted another woman); see also Commonwealth v. Dillon,

598 A.2d 963, 965 (Pa. 1991) (reversing based on exclusion of evidence of

victim’s violent propensities when drunk).

       Here, Williams claimed that he acted in self-defense against Smith.

Therefore, Williams could introduce evidence of Smith’s prior record upon a

showing of probative value under either of the two purposes from Amos. We

conclude that the trial court erred in excluding this evidence under the first

purpose—corroborating Williams’ claim that he feared for his life when he used

force against Smith.

       For Williams to use Smith’s criminal history to corroborate his own

mental state, he had to show that he knew of Smith’s record at the time of

the incident. Amos, 284 A.2d at 752. He told the trial court that he did.

N.T., 4/26/22, at 202.        This is enough to raise a question for the jury if

____________________________________________

8 Beck was overruled in holding “that all assault convictions are sufficiently
similar to demonstrate the victim’s violent propensities.” Christine II, 125
A.3d 394, 399 n.9. Current law calls for a case-by-case determination. Id.

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Williams knew about Smith’s criminal involvement and if he reasonably

believed his life was in danger. The trial court did not allow Williams to use

Smith’s record for this purpose. Instead, the court instructed the jury that it

could only consider Smith’s conviction for criminal trespass in determining

Smith’s credibility.    This was a misapplication of the law and therefore an

abuse of discretion. The trial court erred by ruling that Williams could not

present evidence of Smith’s prior criminal case as proof of Williams’ own

reasonable fear of Smith.9

       The other purpose from Amos, using Smith’s convictions to prove that

Smith was the first aggressor, requires analyzing how long ago Smith’s crimes

occurred and how similar they were to his actions when Williams claimed self-

defense. This is similar to the test for admissibility of a “common plan or

scheme” under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) and is within the

discretion of the trial court. See Amos, 284 A.2d at 752. Here, the trial court

bypassed this analysis and precluded Williams from presenting evidence of

Smith’s convictions as proof that Smith was the initial aggressor.10        We

observe that Smith’s crimes occurred two and a half years prior to the incident

____________________________________________

9 Because this purpose relates only to Williams’ fear, Williams should have
been able to present evidence of charges of violent offenses against Smith,
even if those charges did not result in convictions. Darby, supra.
10  The trial court acted within its discretion by first taking the matter under
advisement to determine the disposition of Smith’s charges. However, once
it found that Smith had been convicted, the court should have analyzed the
crimes’ similarity and remoteness, rather than proceed under a crimen falsi
theory not requested by Williams.

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at hand and did not require the Commonwealth to prove a physical attack.

We leave it to the trial court to determine on retrial the admissibility of Smith’s

convictions under this purpose.

      We pause to assess whether the trial court’s error was harmless, which

we may do sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486 (Pa.

2020). For this Court to find harmless error, we must be “convinced beyond

a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless.” Commonwealth v. Story,

383 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. 1978). That is, “the error could not have contributed

to the verdict. Whenever there is a reasonable possibility that an error might

have contributed to the conviction, the error is not harmless.”        Id. at 164

(internal quotation marks omitted). Because the error was the exclusion of

evidence, our inquiry is whether the exclusion only minimally prejudiced the

defendant or whether, comparing the evidence of guilt and the prejudicial

effect of the error, the exclusion could not have contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 240 A.3d 881, 892 (Pa. 2020) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475, 493 (Pa. 2018)).

      Under either standard, the error was not harmless.         Mainly, the trial

court’s ruling prejudiced Williams by preventing him from presenting his full

defense. Williams’ knowledge of Smith’s criminal history gives credence to

his claim that he believed Smith was attacking him. By all accounts, Smith’s

physical interaction with Williams began abruptly.       Williams made the first

physical contact with Smith on the stairs. While the jury heard that the two

had fought the night before, it did not hear Williams’ full explanation that he

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believed Smith to be violent based on Smith’s criminal history. We cannot say

based on this record that the exclusion of Williams’ knowledge of Smith’s

criminal history did not contribute to the rejection of Williams’ self-defense

claim and in turn the verdict.

       Therefore, we are constrained to grant Williams a new trial for his

convictions for crimes in which Smith was named as the victim. Beck, supra.

This includes aggravated assault, simple assault, and recklessly endangering

Smith. See Commonwealth v. Fowlin, 710 A.2d 1130, 1133 (Pa. 1998)

(following Commonwealth v. Hilbert, 382 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1978)) (applying

self-defense to reckless endangerment). Williams’ other convictions remain

intact.

              5. Sufficiency of the evidence – terroristic threats

       Williams’ fifth issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his convictions of terroristic threats to his children. He argues that

his only statement that could be construed as a threat was a message to

Jackson: “I’m getting a gun and I’m coming after y’all.” Williams contends

that because he did not send this message to the children, the evidence is

insufficient for the convictions of terroristic threats that named the children as

victims.11

____________________________________________

11To the extent that Williams also challenges the weight of the evidence, he
waived this challenge. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A); Rivera, supra.

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      By statute, “[a] person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the

person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to . . . commit any

crime of violence with intent to terrorize another.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1).

The elements of the offense are that (1) the defendant made a threat to

commit a crime of violence and (2) the threat was communicated with the

intent to terrorize another. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 253 A.3d 346,

348 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Vergilio, 103 A.3d 831,

833 (Pa. Super. 2014)). “The offense does not require that the accused intend

to carry out the threat; it does require an intent to terrorize. The harm sought

to be prevented is the psychological distress which follows from an invasion

of another’s sense of personal security.” Commonwealth v. Hardwick, 445

A.2d 796, 797 (Pa. Super. 1982).

      For this crime, “‘communicates’ means conveys in person or by written

or electronic means.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(e). Depending on context, making

non-verbal gestures can constitute communication.         Commonwealth v.

Kline, 201 A.3d 1288, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2019).          In making a threat, a

defendant does not need to specify which crime of violence he intends to

commit if the statement and surrounding circumstances support the inference

of the type of crime. Commonwealth v. Hudgens, 582 A.2d 1352, 1358

(Pa. Super. 1990).    A threat may be communicated indirectly, such as by

posting content online. Commonwealth v. Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 47 (Pa.

Super. 2016). Based on the statutory purpose, a threat is not communicated

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until it is received by the victim. Id. at 46–47 (citing Vergilio, 103 A.3d at

833–34).

      Here, there was no evidence at trial that Williams’ subsequent message

to Jackson was ever received by their children. If this were the only alleged

threat to the children, the evidence would be insufficient.          However, this

ignores Williams’ statements and actions in the bedroom and the surrounding

events. Jackson testified that Williams prevented his oldest child from calling

911 and his youngest child from hiding. When they were all in the bedroom,

Williams cut his arm with a knife and told the children it was their mother’s

fault. The children could interpret Williams’ statements and actions to imply

that Williams would also hurt them with the knife. Therefore, the evidence is

sufficient to establish terroristic threats, and Williams’ fifth issue fails.

             6. Sufficiency of the evidence – unlawful restraint

      Williams’ sixth issue challenges his convictions for unlawfully restraining

the three children. He argues that the evidence was insufficient because the

children were physically free to leave Jackson’s bedroom and he never tried

to restrain them or keep them in the room.

      The statute provides: “If the victim is a person under 18 years of age,

a parent of the victim commits a felony of the second degree if he knowingly

. . . restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of

serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(c)(1).

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      We find the evidence to be sufficient. The statutorily prohibited conduct

is not limited to restraint by physical force. At trial, Jackson testified that

Williams had threatened to kill himself if she had not gone to her bedroom.

Although Williams testified that he did not want her to bring the children,

Jackson interpreted Williams’ statements this way. It is reasonable to infer

that the children did, too. Based on this psychological force, the jury could

find that Williams unlawfully restrained his children by making them go to and

stay in Jackson’s room. Therefore, Williams’ sixth issue fails.

               7. Jury instruction – malice and self-defense

      Williams’ final issue concerns the trial court’s instructions to the jury.

He notes that when the evidence supports a claim of self-defense, a trial court

should provide a requested instruction on self-defense. Commonwealth v.

Bailey, 471 A.2d 551, 553 (Pa. Super. 1984). Williams also indicates that an

instruction on aggravated assault must require the jury to find malice in order

to convict. See Commonwealth v. Kling, 731 A.2d 145, 147–48 (Pa. Super.

1999).

      We have explained that a defendant who does not object to a jury

instruction cannot challenge the instruction on appeal.

            A specific and timely objection must be made to preserve a
      challenge to a particular jury instruction. Failure to do so results
      in waiver. Generally, a defendant waives subsequent challenges
      to the propriety of the jury charge on appeal if he responds in the
      negative when the court asks whether additions or corrections to
      a jury charge are necessary.

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Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 178 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations

omitted).

     Here, Williams did not object to the trial court’s instructions to the jury.

N.T., 4/27/22, at 348. As such, he has waived his final issue.

     In sum, we reverse and remand for a new trial only on the convictions

for which Williams had claimed self-defense.       Williams’ other convictions

remain intact. Mindful that this outcome may upset the sentencing scheme,

we will vacate Williams’ entire judgment of sentence at this docket and

remand for resentencing following disposition of Williams’ aggravated assault

and simple assault charges. Commonwealth v. Williams, 997 A.2d 1205,

1210–11 (Pa. Super. 2010).

     Judgment of sentence vacated.           Convictions vacated at Count 2

(aggravated assault), Count 3 (simple assault), and Count 4 (recklessly

endangering another person—Smith). Case remanded for new trial on Counts

2, 3, and 4. Remaining convictions affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/12/2023

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