Court Opinion

ID: 9392302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 16:10:53.006385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.279243
License: Public Domain

J-S26021-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
                v.                         :
                                           :
                                           :
    JOSEPH ROBERT MARKLE                   :
                                           :
                      Appellant            :    No. 1030 MDA 2021

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 4, 2018
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-08-CR-0000643-2017

BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                            FILED: MAY 4, 2023

        Joseph Robert Markle (Appellant) appeals nunc pro tunc from the

judgment of sentence entered in the Bradford County Court of Common Pleas

after his jury conviction of conspiracy to commit possession with intent to

distribute (PWID) methamphetamine.1            On appeal, he challenges the

admission of his recorded prison phone calls and the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm.

        On November 10, 2016, Appellant and Carol Westefer, his girlfriend,

sold methamphetamine to Sayre Borough confidential informant (CI) Harry

Smith during a controlled buy. Appellant and Westefer were arrested for this

transaction approximately 10 months later, and charged with conspiracy to

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
J-S26021-22

commit PWID.2 Appellant elected to proceed pro se during his preliminary

hearing and throughout pre-trial proceedings.

        Meanwhile, after the November 10, 2016, drug sale, but before he was

charged criminally for that offense, Appellant was arrested for other unrelated

drug offenses. In March 2017, while incarcerated for these unrelated offenses,

Appellant made phone calls to his mother in which he stated that he sold

narcotics. See Commonwealth’s 404(b) Notice and Motion to Admit Evidence,

5/30/18, at 1-2 (unpaginated). On May 30, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a

Pa.R.E. 404(b) notice seeking to admit, inter alia, these phone calls, arguing

the evidence demonstrated “identity, intent to deliver controlled substances,

consciousness of guilt, and to prove [Appellant’s] participation in the

[November 10th] sale . . . was not that of an unwilling bystander.” Id. at 1.

The trial court scheduled a hearing on the admission of the Rule 404(b)

evidence for July 17, 2018.      See Order, 6/4/18.    The court also granted

Appellant’s request for the appointment of standby counsel.3 Id.

        During the July 17th hearing, Appellant was assisted by standby counsel

Carrie Donald, Esquire, but continued to proceed pro se. He informed the trial

court that he would be asserting an innocent bystander defense at trial. N.T.,

2 Westefer was charged as a co-defendant but pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
commit PWID. Trial Ct. Op., 2/8/19, at 2. She later sought to withdraw her
guilty plea, but the trial court denied her motion. Id. As we discuss infra,
she testified as a Commonwealth witness at Appellant’s trial, but contradicted
the admissions in her guilty plea.

3   It is not apparent from the record when Appellant made this request.

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7/17/18, at 10.    Based on this information, the trial court granted the

Commonwealth’s motion to admit the Rule 404(b) evidence on the following

conditions: (1) “the Commonwealth [must] first introduce evidence relevant

to the [November 10, 2016,] drug transaction[;]” and (2) Appellant must then

be afforded the opportunity to supplement the statements for “completeness

and context.” Order, 7/23/18; see N.T., 7/17/18, at 7, 10-11. The court also

stated: (1) it would provide a limiting instruction to the jury explaining the

evidence was not admitted to prove Appellant’s character, but instead only to

prove opportunity, intent, knowledge, lack of coincidence, or consciousness of

guilt; and (2) based on Appellant’s purported innocent bystander defense, the

probative value of the evidence outweighed any potential prejudice. Order,

7/23/18. At the end of the hearing, Appellant informed the court that that

standby counsel, Attorney Donald, would be taking over at trial.         N.T.,

7/17/18, at 25.

      On August 8, 2018, this matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial, where

the Commonwealth presented the testimony of CI Smith. See N.T., 8/8/18,

at 115-16. Smith stated that Sayre Borough Police Officer Bruce Hoffman

used his cell phone contact list to develop a list of potential drug dealers in

the area.   See id. at 116-17. Based on this information, Officer Hoffman

coordinated Smith’s controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Carol

Westefer.   See id. at 118-19.     On November 10, 2016, Smith went to

Westefer’s home “between 2 and 6” in the afternoon to purchase

methamphetamine. Id. at 118-20, 126. Westefer told Smith she did not have

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any narcotics at that time, but to come back later that evening because “Joe[4]

would be coming down” and she would “get it from him[.]” Id. at 120-21.

Smith stated that he knew Appellant before November 10th because he had

purchased methamphetamine from him between 10 to 15 times. N.T., 8/9/18,

at 22. It does not appear these previous sales took place in Westefer’s home.

Id. Smith then testified that he returned to Westefer’s home later that night

after she told him “[Appellant] is here[,] you better hurry up cause . . . he’s

leaving.” N.T., 8/8/18, at 121.

      Before going to Westefer’s home, Smith met with Officer Hoffman to

retrieve pre-recorded buy money. N.T., 8/8/18, at 123. When Smith arrived

at Westefer’s home, Appellant and Westefer were in the kitchen and the

narcotics were on the kitchen table. Id. at 123-24, 127. Smith noted that

Appellant was “pretty nervous” during the encounter. Id. at 123. When Smith

“went to hand [Appellant] the money[,]” Appellant “just shook his head[.]”

Id. at 124, 127. Smith “believe[d]” that Appellant then pointed to Westerfer,

so he handed her the money, which she proceeded to hand to Appellant. Id.

at 124, 127. Appellant then stated, “I got to get the fuck out of here this

place makes me uncomfortable as fuck. I don’t like it down here” and left.

Id. at 124, 128.

4The Commonwealth did not ask Smith or any other witnesses to identify
Appellant at trial. Appellant, however, does not raise any claim related to
mistaken identity.

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      On cross-examination, Attorney Donald asked Smith if Appellant sold

Smith drugs on November 10, 2016.          N.T., 8/8/18, at 132.    The below

interaction followed:

      [Smith]: Him personally[,] I mean he never gave it to me, . . . it
      was on the table, . . . I just assumed it was his. . . .

      [Attorney Donald]: You had no conversation with him though,
      correct?

      [Smith]: No, no, not prior to this[,] no.

      [Attorney Donald]: All your conversations . . . about that purchase
      of meth were with [Westefer?]

      [Smith]: Correct.

      [Attorney Donald]: And she took the money?

      [Smith]: She took the money.

Id. at 132-33. Smith also stated that there was a third man in Westefer’s

home that he did not know, but was not “100% sure” if that man was present

during both interactions that day. Id. at 135.

      The Commonwealth then presented the testimony of Westefer.            She

acknowledged she entered a guilty plea to conspiracy on October 18, 2017.

The facts provided as the basis for her guilty plea stated that on November

10, 2016, she “entered into an agreement with [Appellant] to deliver . . .

methamphetamine to another individual[,]” and that she “was dealing with”

Appellant. N.T., 8/8/18, at 168-69. Westefer did not contest the factual basis

of her plea at the time it was entered. Id. at 168-70.

      At Appellant’s trial, Westefer recanted her admission and testified she

was in a relationship with Appellant on November 10, 2016, and on that day,

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he was in her home to “collect some money that [she] owed him for helping

with the rent[;]” however, she claimed Appellant did not provide her with the

methamphetamine sold to Smith. N.T., 8/8/18, at 165, 188.

      The Commonwealth then played for the jury the recorded prison phone

calls, in which Appellant spoke about past drug dealing activity. N.T., 8/8/18,

at 222, 225-28.    After this, the Commonwealth read into the record, the

testimony of Bradford County Probation Officer Molly Murphy.5 Id. at 231.

Officer Murphy had interviewed Appellant in July 2017, in order to prepare a

presentence investigation (PSI) report for Appellant on a separate matter. Id.

at 234. During the interview, Appellant told Officer Murphy he “sold drugs for

income but not for use.”    Id. at 236.    The Commonwealth argued Officer

Murphy’s testimony was admissible for the same purpose as the recorded

phone calls.   See N.T., 8/7/18, at 2-3.    Attorney Donald objected at the

hearing, but the trial court stated it would admit the testimony under the same

circumstances as the recorded phone calls. See id. at 2-3, 5.

      At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of conspiracy

to commit PWID. On October 4, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to

27 to 72 months’ incarceration. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion,

5 Officer Murphy was unavailable on the date of trial. The trial court allowed
the Commonwealth to preserve her testimony at a hearing the day before.
N.T., 8/7/18, at 1.

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which was denied on February 8, 2019.6 On March 8, 2019, Attorney Donald

filed a timely notice of appeal, but later failed to file an appellate brief. This

Court then dismissed Appellant’s appeal. See 430 MDA 2019, Order, 9/25/19.

         Subsequently, Appellant filed a timely Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)7

petition alleging Attorney Donald was ineffective for failing to file an appellate

brief.    See Appellant’s Pro Se Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief,

5/10/21.      The trial court appointed the Bradford County Public Defender’s

office to represent Appellant and thereafter entered an order, by way of

stipulation, wherein the parties agreed that Appellant’s appeal rights shall be

reinstated, and he had 30 days from that order to file a notice of appeal nunc

pro tunc. See Order, 5/17/21; Stipulation of Counsel as to PCRA, 7/15/21.

On August 30, 2021, the Bradford County Public Defender’s office filed a

motion to withdraw from representation, which the trial court granted after a

Grazier8 hearing.      The court then appointed Jason Beardsley, Esquire, to

represent Appellant.      With new counsel, Appellant filed a timely notice of

appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

         Appellant raises the following claims:

6 The trial court’s order is dated February 8, 2019, but was not sent to
Appellant until February 14, 2019. See Criminal Docket No. CP-08-CR-
0000643-2017, at 19.

7   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

8   Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

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      [1.] Did the [trial c]ourt commit reversible error by admitting
      impermissible character/propensity evidence/bad acts evidence —
      over trial counsel’s objection — in the form of jailhouse recordings
      purportedly to show that . . . Appellant was familiar with the drug
      industry and that Appellant was not at a drug deal by mistake
      when in fact those recordings were admitted to show that . . .
      Appellant had acted in conformity with past drug dealing behavior
      and those instances that were spoken of in the recordings were
      not in any way related or shown to be similar to the drug deal that
      formed the basis of the conspiracy that . . . Appellant was
      convicted of, and when the prejudicial effect of that evidence so
      far outweighed any probative value that it should have been
      excluded and the recordings did not meet all of the requirements
      as a matter of law to be properly admitted as “bad acts” evidence?

      [2.] Must . . . Appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit
      [PWID] be vacated because there was insufficient evidence as a
      matter of law to sustain the conviction?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      In his first claim, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion

when it admitted phone calls he made to his mother while incarcerated on an

unrelated matter. Appellant’s Brief at 10. By way of background, in a March

9, 2017, recorded prison phone call, the following exchange occurred: 9

      [Appellant’s] Mother: . . . at the jail, I can’t help ya.

      [Appellant]: I know I’m at the jail Mom, you can’t sell the heroin.

      [Appellant’s] Mother: Ya, well[.]

      [Appellant]: What?

      [Appellant’s] Mother: You can’t do the things you do.

9 The Commonwealth presented additional phone call recordings, but they
were inaudible or only partially audible. As such they were not accurately
recorded in the transcripts. See N.T., 8/8/18, at 227-28. Appellant does not
raise a challenge to the inaudible phone calls. See Appellant’s Brief at 7-8, 9
n.2.

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      [Appellant]: Well I was selling drugs mom[.] I wasn’t doing them,
      I’m sorry.

      [Appellant’s] Mother: Okay. . . . Well that makes it better? No.

      [Appellant]: No it doesn’t make it better[,] but don’t make it sound
      like I’m in jail because I’m on drugs.

N.T., 8/8/18, at 225.      In a March 17, 2017, recorded prison phone call,

Appellant stated the following:

      [Appellant]: [D]on’t yell at me mom, Jesus this fucking shit is
      getting ridicul[ous], so what I fucked up, I sold drugs, I’m in
      fucking jail . . . for [three] months with nothing[.]

Id. at 227.

      Before playing the above recordings, the trial court issued the following

instruction to the jury:

       . . . You’re [going] to be hearing evidence in the form of a
      statement made by [Appellant] while on the phone while he was
      incarcerated. The statements do not specifically relate to the
      conduct for which he is on trial here, but they do involve the sale
      of drugs and given that he was incarcerated at the time they tend
      to support the notion that he may have been separately charged
      for offenses. [T]his evidence is being offered for [the] limited
      purpose [that] it tends to show [Appellant] was an intentional
      participant in the alleged drug sale and was not present at the
      alleged drug sale by accident, by mistake or coincidence. This
      evidence must not be considered by you in any way other than for
      that limited purpose. You must not regard this evidence as
      showing [Appellant] is a person of bad character or criminal
      tendencies from which you might be inclined to infer guilt in this
      particular case. [T]here is an issue as to whether [Appellant] was
      present at this drug sale, by coincidence or if he was there as part
      of a conspiracy. [T]hat’s what they are being offered for, to tend
      to show that it was not just a coincidence. They are not being
      offered to show he has . . . bad character, or that he is a drug
      dealer, or that he has used drugs in the past.

N.T., 8/8/18, at 223-24.

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     We review a challenge to the admissibility of evidence by the following

standard:

     Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the
     sound discretion of the trial court, and its discretion will not be
     reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion
     is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
     misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
     manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or
     partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. Furthermore, if in
     reaching a conclusion the trial court over-rides [sic] or misapplies
     the law, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate
     court to correct the error.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(quotation marks & citations omitted).

     Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Pa.R.E. 402. Evidence is

relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable” and

“the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b).

We note, though, that the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence generally prohibit

the admission of evidence of other crimes or bad acts “to prove a person’s

character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in

accordance with the character.”     Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1).     However, character

evidence may be admitted for another purpose:

     This evidence may be admissible [to prove] motive, opportunity,
     intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
     mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is
     admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs
     its potential for unfair prejudice.

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).

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      Returning to Appellant’s argument, he avers the above recordings were

“only admitted to blacken” his character and demonstrate that “based upon

his prior drug dealing activities[,]” he was guilty of the present offense.

Appellant’s Brief at 10. He maintains that the Commonwealth needed to show

a “logical connection or nexus” between the present matter and the subject of

the phone calls to admit such evidence to prove intent or absence of mistake.

Id. at 10-12.    Appellant insists the evidence only consisted of general

statements that he dealt drugs on other occasions and were inadmissible

under the rules of evidence.    Id. at 11.   He contends that “no evidence

presented at . . . trial . . . made absence of mistake relevant.” Id. at 12-13.

Lastly, he argues that any probative value the evidence offered was “vastly

outweighed by its potential for prejudice,” as the jury would assume that

because “he was a drug dealer before[,] he must have been a drug dealer”

during the incident at issue. Id. at 13.

      The trial court concluded the evidence was admissible to show that

Appellant was not merely present during the drug transaction by mistake.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Specifically, it opined that the evidence was admissible

because Appellant was asserting to the court that he was not involved in the

drug transaction, even if only through Commonwealth witness Westefer. Id.

at 5-6.   Further, the court concluded the probative value of the evidence

outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice, and the phone calls were not

character evidence.   Id. at 7-8.   Instead, the trial court determined, and

instructed the jury, that the calls went directly to whether Appellant was

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present by accident or coincidence. Id. at 8-9. Lastly, the court relied on the

fact that it required the Commonwealth to present evidence of the crime

charged before it admitted the phone calls. Id. at 8. Upon our review, we

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the prison

phone calls.

      The Commonwealth may offer other bad acts evidence under Rule

404(b)(2), which requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate that there was

a “logical connection” between the proffered conduct and the crime at issue.

See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114, 1125 (Pa. 2017) (holding

that evidence of other crimes is admissible where its probative value

outweighs its potential for prejudice and “show a logical connection between

them and the crime currently charged.”). Here, one can arguably draw a line

between this evidence and the present crime. The trial court concluded that

the evidence was not presented to establish Appellant’s propensity to

participate in such similar crimes, but instead was offered to merely show

“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence

of mistake, or lack of accident[,]” as permitted by Rule 404(b). See Pa.R.E.

404(b), Trial Ct. Op. at 8. We agree.

      In making this determination, the trial court relied on this Court’s

decision in Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en

banc).   See Trial Ct. Op. at 10-11 n.2.      In Kinard, the defendant’s co-

conspirator, his cousin, sold drugs in three controlled purchases to a CI in her

home. Kinard, 95 A.3d at 281. After the transactions, the police executed a

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search warrant at the co-conspirator’s home, where the defendant was the

only person present at the time. Id. Upon searching the defendant’s person,

police found evidence indicative of his involvement in the sales. Id. at 282.

At trial, the defendant’s co-conspirator testified that the defendant provided

her narcotics to sell and that they often spoke in code to elude the police,

using such terms as “cat food,” “cream of wheat,” “to get it ready,” and

“chicken” when discussing drug transactions. Id.

      The Commonwealth sought to admit evidence that while the defendant

was incarcerated and awaiting trial on this matter, he made phone calls in

which he used this same coded language to discuss the sale of narcotics.

Kinard, 95 A.3d at 282.      The trial court admitted the evidence to show

absence of mistake and a common scheme.                Id. at 285.      At trial, the

Commonwealth presented an expert witness to further discuss the coded

language the defendant used in these phone calls. Id. at 282-83. This Court

noted that though the defendant did not present a defense, it “was clear” that

he was asserting “he was merely present” during the search of the co-

conspirator’s home and had no connection to the sale of drugs. Id. at 283.

The jury convicted the defendant of PWID and conspiracy.

      On   appeal,   the   defendant    argued   the    phone   calls    constituted

inadmissible character evidence. Kinard, 95 A.3d at 284. This Court affirmed

his judgment of sentence, concluding the phone calls: (1) demonstrated the

defendant’s “knowledge and awareness of drug trafficking[;]” (2) showed he

was not in his co-conspirator’s home innocently, but was conducting business;

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(3) revealed a common plan, scheme, and design; (4) “demonstrated that

[the defendant] was engaged in ongoing drug transactions even after he was

arrested” that were “were similar, if not identical, to the drug transactions for

which he was charged[;]” and (5) because the phone calls happened after his

arrest, they established “the chain of events and course of criminal conduct[.]”

Id. at 285.

      We conclude the above case is similar enough to the present matter that

we may conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. In Kinard, the

Commonwealth admitted evidence that showed the defendant was engaging

in “similar, if not identical” drug transactions while incarcerated even after his

arrest.   See Kinard, 95 A.3d at 285.          The evidence demonstrated the

defendant was using the same coded language during these phones calls that

his co-conspirator confirmed he used while dealing drugs. It was evident that

while the defendant was awaiting trial on those charges at issue, he was also

continuing to orchestrate further transactions in the same way he did before

his arrest.

      Here, Appellant’s phone calls with his mother demonstrate a similar

connection. While incarcerated on unrelated drug charges, Appellant admitted

that he previously sold “heroin.”     N.T., 8/8/18, at 225.      The phone calls

established   Appellant’s   general   “knowledge    and     awareness    of   drug

trafficking[,]” and that he was not an innocent bystander who just happened

to be at Westefer’s home when these drug transactions took place — similar

to the conversations of the defendant in Kinard.          Further, the trial court

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specified on more than one occasion that these statements were not to be

offered to show Appellant’s propensity to commit similar crimes, but again to

merely show whether Appellant was present by accident or coincidence. See

N.T. 7/17/18, at 10-11, 18-20; Order, 7/23/18; N.T. 8/18/18, at 223-24. The

trial court then gave the jury a limiting instruction. “Juries are presumed to

follow instructions given by the court.”     Commonwealth v. Hairston249

A.3d 1046, 1068 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted).       For these reasons, we

determine Kinard is similar to the present facts, and therefore applicable to

our determination. We conclude no relief is due.

      Nevertheless, in the event the phone calls did amount to inadmissible

evidence, we would still conclude no relief is due because the trial court’s

admission constituted harmless error. Harmless error may be found where

“the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted

evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 185 A.3d 316, 330 (Pa. 2018). While

we acknowledge that to reach a harmless error analysis, normally the

Commonwealth must raise the argument, this Court may affirm a valid

judgment on any basis in the record. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 937

A.2d 1062, 1073 (Pa. 2007) (holding that even though the Commonwealth

did not raise the argument, the admission of hearsay testimony was harmless

error because the appellate courts may affirm “a valid judgment based on any

reason appearing as of record, regardless of whether it is raised by the

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appellee”) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 234

A.3d 486, 492 (Pa. 2020).

      Here the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Probation Officer

Murphy, who stated Appellant told her that he “sold drugs for income but not

for use.”     N.T., 8/8/18, at 236.   This evidence was admitted at trial and

Appellant does not challenge it on appeal.          Officer Murphy’s testimony

demonstrated that Appellant had a general history of drug dealing, similar to

Appellant’s statements in the recorded phone calls. Because the contents of

the phone calls were merely cumulative of Officer Murphy’s testimony, we

would conclude the court’s improper admission of the prison phone calls

amounted to harmless error. See Brown, 185 A.3d at 330. We note that

Officer Murphy’s testimony was offered under the same argument and

circumstances as the recorded phone calls. Further, Appellant’s statements

to Officer Murphy also occurred after he was incarcerated for unrelated drug

offenses happening before he was charged for the present offense. Akin to

the recorded phone calls, this evidence is similarly problematic.    However,

Appellant did not raise a challenge to this testimony on appeal, and therefore,

the jury heard testimony relaying that Appellant previously was involved in

drug sales.

      In his second claim on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence.      Appellant’s Brief at 13.     Our standard when reviewing a

challenge to the sufficiency is well-settled:

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      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

      Here, Appellant avers the Commonwealth failed to prove that he and

Westefer had a shared criminal intent or made an agreement to deliver drugs

to Smith during the November 10, 2016, transaction. Appellant’s Brief at 14-

15.   Appellant maintains that Smith did not testify that he saw Appellant

provide drugs to Westefer.          Id.   Instead, he insists the evidence

demonstrated: (1) Smith stated only that Westefer told him Appellant would

provide the drugs; (2) Appellant did not handle the drugs during the

transaction; and (3) at trial, Westefer testified “she did not receive the drugs

. . . from Appellant.” Id. at 15.

      Criminal conspiracy is defined, in relevant part, as follows:

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      (a) Definition of conspiracy — A person is guilty of conspiracy
      with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent
      of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

         (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or
         one or more of them will engage in conduct which
         constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to
         commit such crime . . . .

18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1). This Court has summarized the following factors to

be analyzed in determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

existence of a conspiracy:

      Among the circumstances which are relevant, but not sufficient by
      themselves, to prove a corrupt confederation are: (1) an
      association between alleged conspirators; (2) knowledge of the
      commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the crime;
      and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the
      conspiracy. The presence of such circumstances may furnish a
      web of evidence linking an accused to an alleged conspiracy
      beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed in conjunction with each
      other and in the context in which they occurred.

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(citation omitted). Additionally,

      [m]ere association with the perpetrators, mere presence at the
      scene, or mere knowledge of the crime is insufficient to establish
      that a defendant was part of a conspiratorial agreement to commit
      the crime. There needs to be some additional proof that the
      defendant intended to commit the crime along with his co-
      conspirator. Direct evidence of the defendant’s criminal intent or
      the conspiratorial agreement, however, is rarely available.
      Consequently, the defendant’s intent as well as the
      agreement is almost always proven through circumstantial
      evidence, such as by the relations, conduct or
      circumstances of the parties or overt acts on the part of the
      co-conspirators. Once the trier of fact finds that there was an
      agreement and the defendant intentionally entered into the
      agreement, that defendant may be liable for the overt acts
      committed in furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of which
      co-conspirator committed the act.

                                    - 18 -
J-S26021-22

Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 229 A.3d 622, 633 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted & emphasis added).

      In finding there was sufficient evidence that Appellant conspired with

Westefer    to   sell   methamphetamine,      the   trial   court,   relied   on   the

Commonwealth’s argument, and determined the Commonwealth sustained its

burden through the testimony of both Smith and Westefer. Trial Ct. Op. at 4.

We agree.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

as verdict winner, we find it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the

“relations, conduct[,] circumstances[,] or overt acts” between Appellant and

Westefer demonstrated that Appellant conspired with Westefer to sell drugs

to Smith. See Dunkins, 229 A.3d at 633; Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1016; see

also Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 756.            The Commonwealth presented the

testimony of Smith, which established that Westefer told him she would

retrieve drugs from Appellant and directed Smith to return to her home later

that evening to complete a drug transaction. See N.T., 8/8/18, at 118-20.

Further, Smith’s testimony established that Westefer told him to “hurry up”

and arrive before Appellant left so that Smith could retrieve the narcotics, and

that Westefer handed Appellant the money after the completed transaction.

See id. at 121, 124, 127. The Commonwealth also presented evidence that

at Westefer’s guilty plea hearing for the same offense, she agreed that she

and Appellant entered an agreement to deliver drugs on November 10th and

that she “was dealing [drugs] with” Appellant.          N.T., 8/8/19, at 168-69.

                                     - 19 -
J-S26021-22

Though Westefer later recanted these admissions, the jury was free to credit

the admissions she made at her guilty plea hearing over those she made at

trial. See Antodormi, 84 A.3d at 756. No relief is due.

      We agree the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted

the recorded phone calls, and moreover, this evidence was cumulative.

Further, Appellant cannot establish the evidence was insufficient to support

his conviction, and as such, he is not entitled to relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/04/2023

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