Court Opinion

ID: 9960328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 21:17:57.12366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:22.419625
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

MARIJKE DEUTSCHER and ALLEN
DEUTSCHER, husband and wife, and                             No. 85898-0-I
their marital community,
                                                             DIVISION ONE
                         Respondents,
                                                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                 v.

RAMIRO CORTES †, a single person,
and ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF
9234 MOUNTAIN VIEW ROAD SE,
YELM, WASHINGTON,

                         Appellant,

YOUR LANDSCAPE COMPANY, LLC,
a Washington limited liability company,

                 Third-Party Defendant.

        HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — Ramiro Cortes lived in a residence jointly owned by

his longtime employer Marijke Deutscher and her husband as their tenant. In May

2021, the Deutschers notified Cortes that they intended to sell the property and,

when he refused to vacate, brought an action for ejectment. Cortes answered the

suit and filed counterclaims against the Deutschers, asserting an equitable interest

in the property and alleging, among other causes of action, breach of an oral

contract to purchase the property, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The trial court

        † Though the Deutschers set out their former employee’s name as “Romero Cortez” in

their pleadings, he spelled his own name “Ramiro Cortes” in all of his pleadings filed in the trial
court and on appeal. We adopt the spelling used by the appellant.
No. 85898-0-I/2

granted the Deutschers’ motion for summary judgment dismissal of Cortes’

counterclaims against them and ordered the writ of ejectment. Because Cortes

demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to his counterclaim for unjust

enrichment, the court erred in ordering its dismissal. We reverse and remand on

the unjust enrichment cause of action, but otherwise affirm.

                                              FACTS

        Ramiro Cortes was a longtime employee of Your Landscape Company LLC,

a business owned by Marijke Deutscher. 1 On or about October 18, 2008, Marijke 2

and her husband, Allen Deutscher, purchased the property of 9234 Mountain View

Road SE, Yelm, Washington (the property) for a purchase price of $295,000. The

property consisted of two residences: a 2,499-square-foot home at 9234 Mountain

View Road and a 1,176-square-foot home at 9040 Mountain View Road. It was

insured under a policy issued to Allen and Marijke Deutscher. While the parties

fundamentally disagree about their arrangement regarding Cortes’ access to and

residence at the property, they agree that Cortes and his family moved onto the

property at some point in 2008. 3 There was no written lease agreement between

         1 Although Marijke did not provide specifics as to when Cortes began working for her

business, there was evidence presented in her pleadings and supporting documents that she had
previously stated in a text message to Cortes that she was sad his employment had to end “like
this after nearly 20 years.” Cortes asserts his employment with the Deutschers started in
approximately 2002.
         2 The complaint for ejectment and damages was filed by Marijke and Allen Deutscher as a

marital community and references to the litigation are ascribed to “the Deutschers.” However, in
the interest of clarity, in descriptions of the interactions between Cortes and Mrs. Deutscher we will
use her first name, Marijke. No disrespect is intended.
         3 Cortes contends that he approached Marijke asking for assistance to buy a home, he

moved into the property thereafter, and then he and Marijke entered into an oral contract for Cortes
to buy it from the Deutschers. In his answer to the complaint for ejectment, Cortes alleges that

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No. 85898-0-I/3

the parties governing Cortes’ use of the property. 4 At various times, Cortes’

extended family also lived on the property in the 9040 residence and paid rent to

Marijke. 5 Despite language in the complaint for ejectment wherein the Deutschers

asserted Cortes “has never paid rent for the [p]remises and never been asked to

pay rent for the [p]remises,” the parties now agree on appeal that, at least for the

first year of his tenancy, Cortes was to pay $1,250 to Marijke monthly. 6 Cortes

initially paid Marijke cash for his monthly rent. 7 He alleges that Marijke eventually

started withholding earnings from his paycheck in order to meet the monthly

payment obligations. The Deutschers deny that any money was withheld from

Cortes’ checks and aver that, instead, he simply stopped paying rent altogether

when he encountered personal hardships.

        Cortes’ employment with Your Landscape Company was terminated in May

2021. Shortly thereafter, the Deutschers decided to sell the property and notified

Cortes that he would need to vacate it. Cortes refused and, on November 15, the

Deutschers filed a complaint for ejectment in Thurston County Superior Court. On

Marijke “let [him] know that she found a potential home for him” after Cortes approached her for
help but prior to the Deutschers purchasing the property.
         In contrast, the Deutschers assert in briefing that they allowed Cortes and his family to
move into the 9234 residence on the property in order to help him and his family. At the time of the
complaint for ejectment, Cortes asserted that he, his two children, his disabled brother, and his
elderly mother lived in the 9234 residence.
         4 Marijke asserted that the agreement was “mainly oral, because Ramiro did not

understand contracts much or, you know, even if I explained things to him, I sometimes had to do
it two or three times before he really got it.” Cortes’ answer to the Deutschers’ complaint asserts
his primary language is Spanish and he characterizes his English-language proficiency as “limited.”
         5 Marijke asserts that her realtor, Margo Street, has communicated with the 9040 tenants

through her business, Networks Real Estate LLC, screened some of them, and deposited their rent
checks at Marijke’s direction.
         6 Cortes further asserts that another $1,000 “payment” was credited to his monthly

payments by recruiting tenants to live in the 9040 residence on the property.
         7 Again, directly contradicting the language in the original complaint, Marijke admitted in

deposition testimony that cash rental payments were made for between eight months and one year.
Cortes does not provide a time frame for his cash payments for rent.

                                               -3-
No. 85898-0-I/4

December 29, Cortes responded with his answers, affirmative defenses,

counterclaims against the Deutschers, and third-party claims against Your

Landscape Company. 8 His counterclaims included allegations that the Deutschers

violated an oral contract for Cortes to purchase the property, Marijke committed

fraud, and the Deutschers were unjustly enriched by Cortes’ uncompensated

improvements to the property. On February 18, 2022, the Deutschers moved for

partial summary judgment on the ejectment action and Cortes’ three counterclaims

against them. Cortes filed a response on May 20, arguing that there were material

issues of fact as to his three counterclaims that necessarily prevented their

dismissal and precluded an order of ejectment.

       On June 3, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Deutschers’ motion.

After considering the argument and briefs of the parties, including multiple

declarations in support of each party’s position, the court granted the Deutschers’

motion for partial summary judgment dismissing Cortes’ counterclaims and

ordered a writ of ejectment. On June 8, Cortes filed a notice for discretionary

review in Division Two of this court. A commissioner denied review and Cortes

moved to modify that ruling. Cortes’ motion to modify the commissioner’s ruling

was granted, as was review of the case, which was subsequently transferred to

this division.

       8 The claims against Your Landscape Company are not before this court, as they survived

the Deutschers’ motion for summary judgment and are proceeding to trial.

                                             -4-
No. 85898-0-I/5

                                     ANALYSIS

       Cortes argues that the summary judgment dismissal of his counterclaims

was improper because he established that there were genuine issues of material

fact as to each of his three causes of action and that the court similarly erred as to

the order for writ of ejectment.

       This court reviews a summary judgment order de novo. Berry v. King

County, 19 Wn. App. 2d 583, 587, 501 P.3d 150 (2021). “A party seeking summary

judgment bears the initial burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Hung Dang v. Floyd, Pflueger & Ringer, PS, 24 Wn. App. 2d 145,

158, 518 P.3d 671 (2022), review denied, 200 Wn.2d 1032 (2023). Summary

judgment is appropriate “‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.’” Berry, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 587 (quoting CR

56(c)). All facts and reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Id. “The moving party is held to a strict standard” and any

doubts regarding the existence of a genuine issue of material fact are resolved

against the moving party. Atherton Condo. Apt.-Owners Ass’n Bd. of Dirs. v.

Blume Dev. Co., 115 Wn.2d 506, 516, 799 P.2d 250 (1990).

       If the moving party meets their initial burden, then the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Hung

Dang, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 158. The nonmoving party must provide “more than

conclusory allegations, speculative statements, or argumentative assertions of the

existence of unresolved factual issues” to survive summary judgment. Walker v.

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No. 85898-0-I/6

King County Metro, 126 Wn. App. 904, 912, 109 P.3d 836 (2005). Absent specific

circumstances, at the summary judgment stage, the court must only determine

whether the nonmoving party has met a burden of production, “not whether the

evidence produced is persuasive,” as that role belongs to the jury.        Renz v.

Spokane Eye Clinic, PS, 144 Wn. App. 611, 623, 60 P.3d 106 (2002). Accordingly,

when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the “trial court may not weigh the

evidence, assess credibility, consider the likelihood that the evidence will prove

true, or otherwise resolve issues of material fact.” Haley v. Amazon.com Servs.,

LLC, 25 Wn. App. 2d 207, 217, 522 P.3d 80 (2022). Although summary judgment

exists to avoid pointless trials where no material fact is in dispute, a trial is

“absolutely necessary where there is a genuine issue as to any material fact.” Id.

(quoting Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wn.2d 195, 199, 381 P.2d 966 (1963)). Finally,

and separately from the summary judgment framework, we may affirm on any

basis supported by the record on appeal. Performance Constr., LLC v. Glenn, 195

Wn. App. 406, 415, 380 P.3d 618 (2016).

I.    Counterclaim for Breach of Contract

      Cortes alleges that the Deutschers breached an oral contract between them

to purchase the property. To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must

show that a valid agreement existed between the parties, the agreement was

breached, and the plaintiff suffered damages. Univ. of Wash. v. Gov’t Emp. Ins.

Co., 200 Wn. App. 455, 467, 404 P.3d 559 (2017). Generally, to survive summary

judgment, a party must make a prima facie showing of each of these three

elements. See Boguch v. Landover Corp., 153 Wn. App. 595, 609, 224 P.3d 795

                                       -6-
No. 85898-0-I/7

(2009) (explaining if plaintiff fails to make prima facie showing on element essential

to case, summary judgment should be granted).                 However, because Cortes

expressly requested specific performance of the alleged contract in his

counterclaim, he must meet a heightened standard of proof, even at the summary

judgment stage.

       “[W]here specific performance of the agreement is sought, the contract must

‘be prove[d] by evidence that is clear and unequivocal and which leaves no doubt

as to the terms, character, and existence of the contract.’” Berg v. Ting, 125 Wn.2d

544, 556, 886 P.2d 564 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller v.

McCamish, 78 Wn.2d 821, 829, 479 P.2d 919).                  In the context of summary

judgment, this standard requires us to determine “‘whether, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a rational trier of fact could find

that the nonmoving party supported [their] claim with clear, cogent, and convincing

evidence.’” In re Est. of Kolesar, 27 Wn. App. 2d 166, 176, 532 P.3d 170 (2023)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Woody v. Stapp, 146 Wn. App. 16, 22,

189 P.3d 807 (2008)).

       Our state Supreme Court has provided 13 material terms of a real estate

contract as follows:

          (a) time and manner for transferring title; (b) procedure for
          declaring forfeiture; (c) allocation of risk with respect to damage
          or destruction; (d) insurance provisions; (e) responsibility for: (i)
          taxes, (ii) repairs, and (iii) water and utilities; (f) restrictions, if any,
          on: (i) capital improvements, (ii) liens, (iii) removal or replacement

                                            -7-
No. 85898-0-I/8

          of personal property, and (iv) types of use; (g) time and place for
          monthly payments; and (h) indemnification provisions.

Kruse v. Hemp, 121 Wn.2d 715, 853 P.2d 1373 (1993). Cortes asserts that he

had an oral contract with Marijke to purchase the property for $270,000 and that

he made monthly payments toward the sale amount. He alleges that he was to

make monthly payments of $2,250 to Marijke, which were later lowered to $1,800

by agreement, until the purchase price of $270,000 was reached. The monthly

payment would consist of $1,250 in cash and a $1,000 “credit” for Cortes’

assistance in obtaining renters for the 9040 residence.       While this evidence

arguably supports one term of a real estate contract, time and place for monthly

payments, Cortes does not offer any facts as to the other terms outlined in Kruse.

Neither does he present facts as to the general terms of a contract, such as timing

of the payments, payment of taxes, or interest.

       Cortes also submitted declarations from several witnesses who heard

statements made by Marijke affirming the alleged contract, including his friend,

sister, nephew, and two nieces. These declarations include general statements

from each of the witnesses about what they heard concerning the existence of a

contract to buy the property, such as Cortes’ niece, who explained that Marijke told

her “eventually the property would be Ramiro’s.” However, even viewing these

declarations in the light most favorable to Cortes as the nonmoving party at

summary judgment, none of these statements introduce any evidence as to the

essential terms of a real estate contract, much less evidence sufficient to satisfy

the clear, cogent and convincing standard that applies in the specific procedural

posture before us. Therefore, Cortes is unable to meet the heightened burden

                                       -8-
No. 85898-0-I/9

required by his request for specific performance of the purported oral contract to

purchase the property. Because he fails to satisfy this initial burden, we need not

reach his remaining arguments on this issue.          The trial court did not err in

dismissing the counterclaim for breach of contract.

II.    Writ of Ejectment

       In a related assignment of error, Cortes also challenges the court’s order

for a writ of ejectment. An ejectment is a legal remedy used to evict tenants who

have not paid rent. Bar K Land Co. v. Webb, 72 Wn. App. 380, 383, 864 P.2d 435

(1993). The entirety of Cortes’ argument on this issue is premised on his claim of

equitable title based on the alleged oral contract to purchase the property. In his

counterclaims, Cortes expressly sought specific performance of the contract. Had

he prevailed at the summary judgment stage, the issuance of the order on the writ

would have been premature. However, as Cortes’ breach of contract claim was

properly dismissed by the trial court, it did not err when it issued the order on writ

of ejectment.

III.   Counterclaim for Fraud

       As an alternative cause of action, Cortes also brought a counterclaim

against the Deutschers for fraud, alleging that Marijke made a material and false

misrepresentation to him that he was purchasing the property from her for

$270,000. To prove fraud in a civil context, the plaintiff must establish each of the

following elements:

       (1) A representation of an existing fact, (2) its materiality, (3) its
       falsity, (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its

                                        -9-
No. 85898-0-I/10

       truth, (5) [their] intent that it should be acted on by the person to
       whom it is made, (6) ignorance of its falsity on the part of the person
       to whom it is made, (7) the latter’s reliance on the truth of the
       representation, (8) [their] right to rely upon it, (9) [their] consequent
       damage.

Kirkham v. Smith, 106 Wn. App. 177, 183, 23 P.3d 10 (2001). If Cortes is unable

to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on any of the nine factors of fraud,

dismissal of this claim was proper.          The Deutschers specifically challenge

elements (1), (2), and (9), however, we evaluate each element in our de novo

review of this summary judgment action and conclude that Cortes did not produce

a prima facie showing of element (4).

       The trial court acknowledged that Cortes had presented evidence in support

of his fraud claim, but dismissed it nonetheless, ruling that

       [t]he nine elements of fraud have not been prove[d] by clear, cogent
       and convincing evidence. There is some evidence—I’ll acknowledge
       that there are declarations from other individuals, not just Mr.
       Corte[s], but the standard required has not been met.

(Emphasis added.)       In briefing, the Deutschers also state that Cortes must

establish the elements of fraud under the same evidentiary standard as they aver

applied to the breach of contract counterclaim.         Both the trial court and the

Deutschers are mistaken. The heightened standard applied only to the breach of

contract claim and only because he expressly sought specific performance of the

purported contract. See Berg, 125 Wn.2d at 556; Kolesar, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 176.

His prayer for relief specifically limits that remedy to that one cause of action:

“Cortes respectfully request[s] the following relief: . . . [a]n order requiring specific

performance of the contract entered into for the sale of the [p]roperty; . . . [i]n the

alternative, an award of damages in [an] amount to be prove[d] at trial.” (Emphasis

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No. 85898-0-I/11

added.) Cortes did not, and more critically could not, seek specific performance in

either a claim for fraud or unjust enrichment. In the procedural posture of this case,

Cortes need only make a prima facie showing that there is a genuine issue of

material fact for each element of his fraud claim to survive summary judgment.

Hung Dang, 24 Wn. App. at 158.

       For this cause of action, Cortes relied on his own declaration, as well as

those of his friends and family that he offered to support his assertion of the

existence of an oral contract. Despite the Deutschers’ focus in briefing on their

erroneous argument about the evidentiary standard, the evidence Cortes

produced was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Marijke made the requisite representation to him. The evidence was also sufficient

to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the purported

representation was material, as Cortes’ witnesses stated that he made

improvements to the property and that monthly payments were made to Marijke

toward the purchase of the property based on that representation.             Cortes

produced an invoice marked “Paid cash,” photographs, and testimony that he

made uncompensated improvements to the property, which also establish a

genuine issue of material fact that he incurred damages. Therefore, the only three

elements of this cause of action that the Deutschers contest have been met for

purposes of summary judgment.

       Nevertheless, as we engage in de novo review of orders on summary

judgment, we conclude that Cortes is unable to demonstrate a genuine issue of

material fact regarding the fourth element of a fraud claim: the speaker’s

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No. 85898-0-I/12

knowledge of the falsity of their representation. Taking Cortes’ evidence and

associated inferences in the light most favorable to him, there is nothing to

demonstrate that Marijke made a promise to him about the purchase of the

property that she knew to be false. Although Cortes and his witnesses all claim

awareness of the existence of the agreement, none asserted that Marijke acted

with knowledge of the falsity of her representation. Again, we may affirm on any

basis supported by the record. See Performance Constr., 195 Wn. App. at 415.

Because Cortes cannot show a genuine issue of material fact on an essential

element of the cause of action, summary judgment dismissal of the claim for fraud

was proper.

IV.   Counterclaim for Unjust Enrichment

      Cortes’ final cause of action, also pleaded in the alternative to breach of

contract, alleged that the Deutschers were unjustly enriched by the repairs and

improvements he made on the property without compensation. Unjust enrichment

is an equitable claim. Columbia Cmty. Bank v. Newman Park, LLC, 177 Wn.2d

566, 574, 304 P.3d 472 (2013). “Unjust enrichment allows a party to recover the

value of a benefit it has conferred on another party, absent any contractual

relationship, if fairness and justice require it.” Samra v. Singh, 15 Wn. App. 2d

823, 837, 479 P.3d 713 (2020). “To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, the

plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant received a benefit, (2) the received

benefit is at the plaintiff’s expense, and (3) the circumstances make it unjust for

the defendant to retain the benefit without payment.” Id. Again, in the context of

summary judgment, Cortes need only make a prima facie showing that there is a

                                      - 12 -
No. 85898-0-I/13

genuine issue of material fact as to each of these elements. See Crabtree v.

Jefferson County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 20 Wn. App. 2d 493, 507, 500 P.3d 203

(2021) (“A motion for summary judgment must be denied if the nonmoving party .

. . shows specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact.”).

        Cortes argues that the trial court improperly dismissed this claim by looking

at the work he performed for Marijke as an employee and the withholdings on his

tax return, rather than at the thousands of dollars of improvements he asserts that

he made to the property, including those for the 9040 residence despite the fact

that he never occupied that home. This assertion is supported by the record; in

analyzing the evidence offered in support of this cause of action, the court stated,

        With respect to unjust enrichment, I look at the record. Mr. Corte[s]
        was paid for the work that he did for Ms. Deutscher. At times, he
        was paid even when he was not working, and the parties agreed to
        that. There’s no evidence that [Cortes] made the mortgage
        payments on this home. There’s no evidence that he paid the
        property taxes on this home, and there’s no evidence that he
        collected the rent from the residence that is on the property. If he did
        have $270,000 withheld from his tax returns over those 13 years as
        a housing allowance, a significant benefit, that is not evidenced.

It is clear that the court focused on the evidence highlighted by the Deutschers to

the exclusion of the evidence presented by Cortes that pertained to the crux of his

claim: the tangible improvements to the property for which he was not

compensated. Further, the ruling indicates that rather than taking all inferences in

favor of Cortes as the nonmoving party, the court weighed the evidence presented

by each side. This is a misapplication of the summary judgment standard. 9 See,

        9 The Deutschers similarly do not address property improvements in their argument

regarding unjust enrichment. Instead, they assert that the trial court properly found that the
evidence potentially shows that the labor Cortes claimed he performed on the property was the
equivalent of a reasonable amount of rent. This argument fails to account for the expenses Cortes

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No. 85898-0-I/14

e.g., Haley, 25 Wn. App. 2d at 217 (“On summary judgment, the trial court may not

weigh the evidence, assess credibility, consider the likelihood that the evidence

will prove true, or otherwise resolve issues of material fact.”); Am. Exp. Centurion

Bank v. Stratman, 172 Wn. App. 667, 676, 292 P.3d 128 (2012) (“The trial court

does not weigh the evidence or assess witness credibility on a motion for summary

judgment.”); Silves v. King, 93 Wn. App. 873, 880, 970 P.2d 790 (1999) (“A genuine

issue of credibility should not be resolved at summary judgment.”).

       Again, as with each of the other causes of action, we review the dismissal

of this claim de novo and do not weigh the evidence or make credibility

determinations. Bale v. Allison, 173 Wn. App. 435, 458, 294 P.3d 789 (2013)

(“‘The function of the appellate court is to review the action of the trial courts.

Appellate courts do not hear or weigh evidence, find facts, or substitute their

opinions for those of the trier-of-fact.’” (quoting Quinn v. Cherry Lane Auto Plaza,

Inc., 153 Wn. App. 710, 717, 225 P.3d 266 (2009)).               The evidence Cortes

presented in support of his counterclaim for unjust enrichment consisted of

photographs of landscaping improvements on the property, an invoice for a new

vapor barrier and removal and replacement of insulation in the 9040 residence,

and an invoice marked “Paid cash” for a pressure check of the well that provided

water to both residences on the property. He also provided a declaration asserting

that he performed substantial landscaping work and repairs on the property,

including replacement of fixtures and appliances. He declared that he had not

been compensated for this work, so, if there was no enforceable contract to buy

said he incurred for repairs and maintenance completed by others or for the replacement of
appliances or fixtures.

                                          - 14 -
No. 85898-0-I/15

the property, the improvements would benefit only the Deutschers. In response,

the Deutschers claimed that they received no benefit at Cortes’ expense; he

worked for Marijke and she paid him for his labor. 10 This discrepancy in testimony

is precisely the sort that precludes summary judgment because only a fact-finder

may weigh credibility to resolve this type of competing evidence. Similarly, the

determination of the persuasiveness of the invoices and photographs that Cortes

has produced is reserved for the fact-finder. Again, the burden at the summary

judgment stage is one of production, not persuasion. Renz, 114 Wn. App. at 623.

The trial court erred in dismissing Cortes’ counterclaim for unjust enrichment.

        We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

WE CONCUR:

         10 The Deutschers’ response to this cause of action also included an argument that Cortes

may not claim unjust enrichment because he has “unclean hands” for purportedly not reporting to
the Internal Revenue Service the $270,000 he alleges was withheld from his paycheck. Aside from
the fact that this framing rests on a misapplication of the unclean hands doctrine, we decline to
address this argument as Cortes’ unjust enrichment claim pertained only to improvements to the
property.

                                             - 15 -