Court Opinion

ID: 9897469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:30.574711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:49.990535
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion   'IQ
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                 ANTONIO CRUZ ALDAPE,                                   No. 83622
                 Appellant,
                 vs.
                 THE STATE OF NEVADA,                                    FiLED
                 Respondent.

                                                                           ,EF DEPUTi CLERK

                           Appeal from a judgment of conviction, enteied pursuant to a
                guilty plea, of two counts of attempted lewdness with a child under 14.
                Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johns'on, Judge.
                           Affirrned in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

                Darin Imlay, Public Defender, and Katherine E. Sitsis and Nadia Hojjat
                Wood, Chief Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County,
                for Appellant.

                Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B, Wolfson, District
                Attorney, Jonathan VanBoskerck, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Elan
                Adam Eldar, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,    I
                for Respondent.

                Christopher M. Peterson, Las Vegas, and Randolph M. Fiedler, Las Vegas,
                for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada and Nevada
                Attorneys for Criminal Justice.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.'

                      'The Honorable Douglas W. Herndon, Justice, is disqualified from
                participation in the decision of this matter.
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                                                 OPINlON
                By the Court, PICKERING, J.:
                           Appellant Antonio Aldape pleaded no contet to two counts of
                attempted lewdness with a child. The district court placed him on probation
                and imposed the special condition mandated by NRS 176A.410(1)(q), which
                prohibits any defendant who is on probation for a sexual offense from
                accessing the internet or possessing a device capable of accessing the
                internet without their probation officer's permission. On appeal„Aldape
                challenges the mandatory internet ban on First Amendment grounds. He
                argues that it fails intermediate scrutiny because a categorical.prohibition
                on internet access by any probationer convicted of a sex offense is not
                narrowly tailored to the risk of online predatory behavior the indi.vidual
                probationer rnay pose.    We agree and reverse the judgment aS to the
                probation condition banning access to the internet. We otherwise affirm
                and, in doing so, reject Aldape's separate challenge to the additional
                probation condition forbidding him frorn visiting places such as playgrounds
                and schools that primarily cater to children.
                                                     I.
                            Aldape pleaded guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400
                U.S. 25 (1970), to two counts of attempted lewdness with a child under 1.4
                for interactions with his step-granddaughter, V.I. The interactions occurred
                at Aldape's home and did not involve other children or the internet. The
                plea *agreement permitted Aldape to substi.tute a guilty plea to two counts
                of sexually motivated coercion upon successful completion of probation and
                waived Aldape's right to a "direct appeal of [the] conviction." When the
                district court canvassed Aldape before accepting his plea, it asked Aldape if
                he understood that he was "waiving, that is giving up[,] Your right to a jurY
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                trial and all the other rights I've just d.iscussed and the rights that are set
                out and mentioned in your Guilty Plea Agreement[.1" The court did not ask
                any questions specific to the appeal waiver.
                            Aldape was adjudged guilty and given a suspended aggregate
                prison term of 8 to 20 years, with probation not to exceed 5 years. His
                judgment of conviction imposed the two probation conditions he now
                challenges: specia]. conditien 15, which prohibits Aldape from accessi.ng the
                internet or possessing a device that can access the internet; -and special
                condition 11, which prohibits Aldape from-being "in or near" playgrounds,
                parks, schools, and businesses that primarily cater to children. Aldape
                challenged both conditions in district court on substantially the same
                grounds he raises on appeal. The district court rejected Aldape's challenges,
                and this appeal timely followed.
                                                      II.   .
                            As a threshold issue, the State argues that Aldape waivcid his
                right to appeal the conditions of his' probation pursuant to the section- of his
                Plea agreement waiving hiš "right to a direct appeal of this cenViction." In
                evaluating appeal waiver claims, Courts consider "whether: (1) the appeal
                falls within -the scope of the waiver; (2) both the waiVer and plea agreement
                were entered into knowingly and voluntarily; and (3) enforcing the waiver
                would . . . result in a miscarriage of justice." United States v.- Adams, 1.2
                F.4th 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2021); United States-v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325
                (10th .Cir. 2004) (en banc); see Burns v. State, 137 Nev.. 494, 499-500, 495 •
                P.3d 1.091, 1099-1100 (2021)..     Although • the. parties address 'all three

                criteria, we only need to discuss the first—the scope of the waiver: In- the
                plea Agreement, Alclape waived the right to appeal his conviction; not his
                sentence or the probation conditions Associated with his sehtence. We

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                therefore conclude that Aldape's appeal may proceed because his challenges
                to his probation conditions fall outside the scope of the appeal waiver. See
                Garza u. Idaho, 586 U.S. _ ,       . 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2019) ("As courts
                widely agree, a valid and enforceable appeal waiver only precludes
                challenges that fall within its scope.") (internal quotations omitted).
                            Contract principles apply to plea agreements, Burns, 137 Nev.
                at 496, 495 P.3d at 1097, and to appeal waivers in plea agreements, see
                Garza, 586 U.S. at     , 139 S. Ct. at 744. A plea agreement. is enforced as
                written, Burns, 137 Nev. at 497, 495 P.3d at 1097, "according to what the
                defendant reasonably understood when he or she entered the plea,"
                Sullivan v. State, 115 Nev. 383, 387, 990 P.2d 1258, 1260 (1999). In the
                appeal waiver context, given the important rights at stake, the State "bears
                the burden of proving that the plea agreement clearly and unambiguously
                waives a defendant's right to appeal." Adams, 12 F.4th at 888. Ambiguities
                as to the scope of the waiver are construed against the State as the drafter
                of the plea agreement. Id.; see Burns, 137 Nev. at 497, 495 P.3d at 1098.
                            The appeal waiver clause in Aldape's plea agreement did not
                refer to his sentence or probation conditions. It stated that he waived his
                right to appeal his conviction:
                                  By entering my plea of guilty, I. understand
                            that I am waiving and forever giving up the
                            following rights and privileges:

                            (6) The right to appeal the conviction with the
                            assistance of an attorney, either appointed or
                            retained, unless specifically reserved in writine- and
                            agreed upon as provided in NRS 174.035(3). I
                            understand this means I arn unconditionally
                            waiving my right to a direct appeal of this
                            conviction, including any ch.allenge based upon.
                            reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other
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            grounds that challenge the legality of the
            proceedings as stated. in NRS 1.77.015(4). However,
            I remain free to challenge my conviction through
            other post-conviction remedies including a habeas
            corpus petition pursuant to. NRS Chapter 34.
(emphases added). As Aldape argues, the words "conviction" and "sentence"
mean two different things. "Conviction" denotes guilt: "The act or process
of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been
proved guilty" or "Nile judgment (as by a jury verdict) that a person is guilty
of a crime." Conviction, Black's Law Dictionary .(11th ed. 2019). "Sentence,"
by contrast, means "Mlle judgment that a court formally pronounces after
finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal
wrongdoer." Sentence, id.
            The State argu.es that Aldape's appeal waiver covers the
probation conditions imposed at time of sentencing, citing United States v.
Wells, 29 F.4th 580 (9th Cir. 2022)., and •United States v. Holzer, 32 F.4th
875 (10th Cir. 2022), as• support. But n close reading, Wells and Holzer
support Aldape's position, not the State's. Unlike Aldape's appeal waiver,
which only referenced his conviction, the waivers in Wells and Hazer
applied to both the conviction and the sentence. Thus, in Wells, the waiver
stated: "I agree to give up my right to appeal the judgment and all orders of
the court. I also agree to give up my right to appeal any Ospect of My
sentence," 29 F.4-th at 584 (emphasis added), while in-Holzer, the defendant
waived "the right to appeal any matter in connection with this prosecution;
conviction, or sentence," 32 F.4th at 880 (emphasis added). The defendants
in Wells and Holzer could not appeal their supervised release conditions
because the conditions are an aspect of sentencing, which their- appeal
waivers covered. Wells, 29 F.4th at 584 (noting that an Appeal waivers
"reference to 'any aspect of the sentence' unambigu.ousiy encompassed
                supervised release terms") (internal quotation omitted); see Holzer,'32 F.4th
                at 882; accord United States v. Andis, 333 .li1.3d 886, 893 n..7 (8th Cir. 2003).
                             Most reported cases consider appeal waivers that, like those in
                Wells and Holzer, apply to both conviction and sentence. But in cases where
                the appeal waiver is not specific, or only references the conviction, courts
                have held• that appeals challenging the sentence or conditions of supervised
                release fall outside the appeal waiver and can proceed.. See, e.g., Williams
                v. Indiana,. 164 N.E,3d 724, 725 (Ind. 2021)- (alloWing the defendant to
                appeal his sentence where the appeal waiver did riot specificallÿ preclud.e i.t
                and noting that "the plea agreement, guilty plea and sentencing hearing
                colloquy, and sentencing order must be clear arid consistent as to whether
                the defendant waives only the right to appeal the conViction or the right to
                appeal the conviction and sentence");-Kansas v. Patton, 195 P.3d 758, 771
                (Kan. 2008) (declining to construe an a.ppeal waiver aSprecluding An'appeed
                of a sentencing decision where the waiver did not. exPlicifly refer to the
                sentence); cf. Garza, 586 U.S. at       & n.5,* 139 S. Ct. at. 744 & .n.5 (citing
                Patton and referencing other. examples of appeal waiVers that alle-oied
                challenges to the sentence); United States v. Pam, 867 17.3d 1191., 1201 (loth
                Cir. 2017) (holding that a waiver .of collateral attack to the cOnvictiori does
                not include attacks on the sentence), abrogated on 'other grounds.by Borden
                v.. United States,    U.S. • * , 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). And this*Is•
                Given the difference in meaning between "conviction" and "sentence," a
                defendant signing an agreement .that waives the right. to.- appeal the
                conviction would not logically understand it to preolude appeal Of probation
                condition§ imposed later, at tinie ofsentencirig. See Williams, 164 *N.E.3d
                at 725. This is ešpecially true where, as here, the plea agreeinent. did *not
                bind the district court td a particular sentence and the deferidarit was. not
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                canvassed about the appeal waiver's scope. See Sullivan, 115 Nev. at 387,
                990 P.2d. at 1260 (construing plea agreement according to what a defendant
                reading it would reasonably understand).
                            Shifting focus, the State argues that Aldape gave up his right
                to appeal his probation conditions because he waived the right to challenge
                the legality of the proceedings in the appeal waiver. But in making this
                argument, the State misquotes the text of the appeal waiver clause—Aldape
                waived his •"right to a direct- appeal of this conviction, including any
                challenge based upon reasonable constitutional. . grounds that challenge
                the legality of the . proceedings." (emphasis added). The State omits the
                italicized language—"of this conviction, including"--which grainniatically
                ties what follows the word "including" to its antecedent, "this conviction."
                The appeal waiver's reference to "the legality of the proceedings" does not
                expand the word "conviction" to include sentencing ann release conditions.
                Cf. People u. ÐeVaughn, 558 P.2d 872, 875 (Cal. 1977) (construing the
                phrase to mean "the legality of the proceedings resulting in the plea"). At
                hest, the phrase introduces an ambiguity, which is resolved. against the
                State. See Burns, 137 Nev. at 497, 495 P.3d •at 1098. The 'State S final
                point—that we should construe "conviction" to include 'sentence" because
                NRS 1.76.1.05 requires both for a "judgment of conviction"--also fails as .a
                niatter of contract construction.     The appeal waiver used the word
                "conviction," not the phrase "judgment of conviction." .As the drafter of the
                plea agreement, the State is bound by the plain meaning of thé,.wordsit,
                used, and those words do not preclude this appeal.
                                                    111.
                            If a district court grants probation-to a defendant convicted of a
                sexual Offense as defined in NRS 1.79D.097, it must impose• the probation
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                conditions enumerated in NRS 176A.410(1)., including subsection (q), which
                requires that the defendant "[nlot possess any electronic d.evice capable of
                accessing the Internet and not access the Internet through any such device
                or any other means, unless possession of such a device or such access is
                approved by the [defendant's] probation officer."         The dist.rict court
                incorporated subsection (q) verbatim as special condition 15 of Aldape's
                probation. On appe.al, Aldape challenges the constitutionality of subsection
                (q) and special condition 15 under the First Amendment. Although we
                review a district court's discretionary imposition of a prebation condition for
                an abuse of discretion, Igbinovia. v. State, 111 Nev. 699, 707, 895 P.2d 1304,
                1309 (1995), the constitutionality of a statutorily mandated probation
                condition presents a question of law to which de novo review applies, see
                Mangarella v. State, 11.7 Nev. 130, 1.33-.36, 17 P.3d 989, 991-93 (2001).
                                                      A.
                            The internet affords a First Amendment forum of historically
                                                                                   -
                unimaginable reach. "A fundamental principle of the First Amen.dmentis
                that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and
                then, after reflection, speak and listen once inOre." Packingham v..North
                Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104. (2017). Today, that place is'cyberspace—the
                vast democratic forums of the Internet." Id. (internal qu.otation omitted).
                            In Packingharn, the Supreme Court struck down a North
                Carolina statute that made it a felonY for a registered sex offender to access
                social media sites like Facebook that children frequent.         Packingharn
                recognized for the first time a broad First Amendment right to 'internet
                aCcess, inclusive Of individuals who 'had been convicted of and served their
                sentences for serious sex offenses. Id. at• 108. While that right Could :be
                abridged by "specific, narrowly tailored laws". aimed at ''condUCt that often

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                presages a sexual crime," it could not be snuffed out by North Carolina's
                "sweeping" statute •without a showin.g that its breadth was necessary to
                "keep[ ] convicted sex offenders away from vulnerable victims." ld. at 107.
                            The State would limit the rights recognized in Packingharn to
                people who, unlike Aldape, have completed their sentence and are no longer
                under court-supervised release. Probationers "do not enjoy the absolute
                liberty to which every citizen is entitled," Griffin u. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
                874•(1987) (internal quotations omitted), and "plust as other punishments
                for criminal Convictions curtail an offender's freedoms, a court granting
                probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of
                some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens," United States v. Knights,
                534 U.S. 112, 1.1.9 (2001). For these reasons, on a continuum ra.nging from
                incarceration to release following completion of sentence, defendants on
                probation '`enjoy less freedom than those who have finished serving their
                 entences." United States u. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir: 2018). But
                that does not mean that the First Amendment right to internet aCceSs
                recognized in Packingharn 'has no application to probationers. While a
                probationer's First Amendment          rights may be        restricted, under
                Packinghani those restrictions must be narrowly tailored with a vieW to the
                goals of supervised release--"deterring crime, prote6ting the public, [and]
                rehabilitating the defendant." Icl:; see United States u. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88,
                97 (2d Cir. 2019) (applying.Packingharn and hOlding that "the imposition of
                a total Internet ban as a Condition of supervised l'elease inflids a severe.
                deprivation of liberty" that can only be justified in "highly.. unusual
                circumstances"); People u, Morger, 160 N.E.3d 53, 69 (Ill. 2019) (invalidating
                a statutorily mandated • probation condition banning • social media accesS
                under Packingharn).
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                                       The State cites United States u. Carson, 924 F.3d. 467, 473 (8th
                           Cir. 2019), United States . v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 658 (5th Cir. 2018),
                           and United States v. Rock, 863 F.3d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2017), as support for
                           limiting Packingham to people who have finished serving their sentences.
                           These opinions evaluated internet restrictions discretionarily imposed by
                           the sentencing court as conditions of their court-supervised release. Since
                           the defendan.ts in the cited cases did not raise their First Amendment
                           challenges in district court, their appeals Were' decided on plain error
                           review, a deferential standard requiring that -the district Court -commit a.
                           legal error that is "clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable
                           dispute." Halverson, 897 F.3d at 657; see Carson, 924 F.3d at 473, Rock,
                           863 F.3d at 831.       By contrast, Aldape preserved his First: Amendment
                           challenge to subsection (q) and. special condition 15. i.n district court, so our
                           review is de novo, not for plain error. While the differen.ce in the defendants'
                           ,supervision status 'sufficiently distinguished Packingham to prevent
                           reversal for plain error in Carson, Halverson., an.d Rock, that difference does
                           not limit Packingharn's application on de novo review: •
                                       Finally,    and   most   importantly,    in   applying   the   I.   n st

                           Amendment to 21st century norms, Packingham formalized an undeniable
                           truth--there is simply no way to participate in modern' society Without
                           internet access or a "device capable of accessing the Internet". That fact
                           does not ch.ange, and perhaps becomes even more salient, when applied to
                           people under active'court supervision. It would, for exaniple, be hopelesslY
                           difficult to meet with one's probation officer without using a cell phone to
                           make the appointment, get directions, arrange tranSportation, and set
                           reminders. Then there are the rehabilitative steps: fin.dii-ig a job, renting a
                           home, communicating with family and friends, and civic • participation all

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                 often require an internet connection. See Packingharn, 582 U.S. at 108
                 ("Even convicted criminals—and in some instances especially convicted
                 criminals—might receive legitimate benefits from these means for access to
                 the world of ideas, in particular if they seek to reform, and to pursue lawful.
                 and rewarding lives."). And one could avoid interactions with "internet-
                 connected devices" only by never leaving the home--but even there, th.e
                 television, phone, speakers, and appliances all pose a threat. It makes little
                 sense to differentiate by supervision statuš a -constitutionally protected
                 right to access. these everyday necessities when Modern life makes no .such
                 distinctions.
                             Packingharn therefore assists us in holding that 'the First
                 Amendment protects the right of court supervisees; including Aldape, to
                 access the internet.
                                                       B.
                             When a government 'imposes a Content-neutral restrictidn
                 speech or conduct protected by the F'irst AmendMent,                     apPly
                 intermediate scrutiny to evaluate whether the restriction is "narrowl.y
                 tailored to serve .a significant government interest" and "leaves 'open ample
                . alternative channels for communication." Ward v. Rock . Against ,Racistn,
                 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see Packingharn, 582 U.S. at 105-06. Because NRS
                 176A.410(1)(q) restricts the time, place, and manlier of a probationer's
                 access to the• internet and is otherwise neutral as to the . &intent of a-gy
                 expressions made therein, intermediate scrutiny -applieS. See Wa.rd, :491
                 U.S. at 791 (noting that "a regulation thatserves purposes unrelated to the.
                 content of expression is deemed neutral," including time; place, Or manner
                 restrictions): In such circumstances, the State "bears the burden of proving
                 the constitutionality of its actions." 'Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y.,

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                       Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 170 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
                       (quoting United States v.• Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 808, 816
                       (2000)).
                                   The State undoubtedly has a significant interest in protecting
                       the public from online conduct that constitutes or "presages a sexual crime."
                       Packingharn, 582 U.S. at 107.2 The parties agree on that much but diverge
                       as to whether and how narrowly subsection (q) is tailored to that goal.
                                   The State argues that subsection (q) is • necessary to pre-nt
                       every person convicted of a sexual offense frcm getting online 'because they
                       are both more likely to recidivate than other offenders. an.d more li.kely to do
                       so online. But even assuming the State's data to that effect are true,
                       subsection (q) does not "alleviate th[o]se harms in a direct and material
                       way," as is required by narrow tailoring. Turner Broad. Sys., Ine. V: Fed.
                       Cornmc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994); The categork of '0,exual
                       offenses" includes everything from public indecency to violent Assaults t;.)
                       production of pornography. NRS 176A.410(7), NRS .179D.097. it is illogical
                       that each sexual offender, regardless .of crime, rehabilitative needs, history
                       of internet usage, or victim, pOses an equally grave threat Online, And-the
                       State cannot enact such. a sweeping prohibition based on: grneraiiZationS.
                       See PaCkingham, 582 U.S. At 108 (concluding that North Call •olina failed to
                       show the "sweeping law" at issue was necessary or legitimate to. serve "its

                             2This court   has long recogni.zed an equally significant government
                       interest in the defendant's rehabilitation: See Mangarella, 11_7 Nev. (.:11;137,
                       1.7 P.3d- at 993 (stating that probation conditions must be. "reasonably
                       related to rehabilitation or the health, safety or welfare of the coinmunity");
                       Seim. v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 93, 590 P.2d 1152, 1154 (1979) ("[T]he' broad
                       objective of • probation is rehabilitation with .incidental pub1ic safety,
                       and. the conditions of probation should further provide th s objective.").
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                         preventative purpose of keeping convicted sex offenders away from
                         vulnerable victims");. Morger, 160 N.E.3d at 69 (addressing Packingharn's
                         conclusion that "Nile broad ban of the laW could not be sustained solely on
                         the ground that it protected the public against sex offenders").
                                     This is not to say that a court cannot, in an appropriate case,
                         limit internet access by a person convicted of a sexual. offense.        Broad

                         restrictions on internet access may be justified "where (1) the defendant
                         used the internet in the 'underlying offense; (2) the defe.ndant had a history
                         of iniproperly using the internet to engage in illegal. conduct; or
                         (3) particular and identifiable characteristics of the defendant suggested
                         that such a restriction was warranted." United State3 v. Perazza-Mercado,
                         553 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2009) (collecting cases); see United :States v.
                         Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that a comPlete ban "will
                         rarely be sufficiently tailored"). In these scenarios, a broad internet ban is
                         necessary because the supervisee's individual traits pose an equally broad
                         threat. See, e.g., Albertson, 645 F.3d at 197-200 (noting that a broad ban
                         may be "imposed temporarily on those 'offenders who have used or have
                         clearly demonstrated a willingness to use the internet as a direct
                         instrument of physical harrn" and invalidating the irnpositio.n of such a ban
                         On a supervisee convicted of possessing child pornography); United States v.
                         johnson, 446 F.3d 272,. 282-83 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that'a complete
                         ban was justified by a supervisee?s "sophisticated cornpUter us[age]" and
                         skills in. "circumventing the software needed for moriitoring' after his
                         conviction for using the internet .to Contact and lure minors); Holenct,.906
                         F.3d at 292 (invalidating a blanket internet ban'imposed as a' Condition a
                         supervised release but noting that, where a defendant used the internet to
                         solicit a child for sex, "it is almost certainly appropriate to. prevent [thernl

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                from using social media, chat rooms, peer-to-peer file-sharing services, a.nd.
                any site where he could interact with a c.hild" and to "consider the efficacy
                of filtering and rnonitoring softWare"). The problem with subsection (q) is
                not that an internet ban can never be applied; it is that it cannot
                mandatorily be applied to every person convicted of a sexual offense without
                the sentencing court considering the individualized factors that would
                justify such a ban.
                              Nor does subsection (q) permit the 'sentencing court to *tailor
                internet restrictións to prevent only that "First Amendment acti.vity [that
                is] necessary to protect anyone from misconduct that is a consequence of
                internet use."       Mutter • v. Ross, 81.1 S.E.2d 866, 871 (W. Va. 2018)
                (invalidating a condition of parole similar to the probation condition
                mandated by subsection (q)). Tailoring a condition .of supervision to the
                individual empowers the sentencing court to serve the government's
                in.terests   i.n   supervision   while   respecting the   su.pervisee's extant
                constitutional rights. The court thereby restricts only those aspects of th.e
                d.efendant's FirSt Amendment rights iniplicated by their crim.e of conviction
                and threat to the community, rather than "treat[ingi          individu.als wh.o
                commit a sex offense as though they • are• highly soPhisticated, Online
                extortionists" or Prohibiting economic, political, or interpersbnal speech
                online that poses no threat of sexual misconduct.         Jacob Hutt, Offline: •
                Challenging Internet and Social Media'Bans for Individuals on SuperbiSion
                for Ser Offense's, 43 N.Y.U. ReV. L. &Soc. Change 663, 67786 (2019) (noting
                that internet restrictions run afoul of the First Amendment. when they
                target the "wrong people" Or the "Wrong speech."). Our sister courts and.the
                federal government have solved. this .nroblem by im.posing statutory or
                common law guidelines for tailoring internet restricti.ons on sUpervisees.

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                See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D) (requiring that
                conditions of super6sed release be "reasonably related" to the defendant's
                offense and rehabilitation, need for deterrence, and. community safety); 18
                U.S.C. § 3583(4) (requiring that conditions "involveH no greater
                deprivation of liberty than. is reasonably necessary"); Morger, 160 N.E.3d at
                60 (invalidating as facially unconstitutional a statute imposing a blanket
                social media ban on probationers convicted of sexual offenses, while
                adknowledging more narroWly tailored measures that could achieve • the
                same protective and rehabili.tative objectives); Weida v. State, 94 N.E13d.
                682, 690 (Ind.. 2018): (requiri.ng that probation conditions be "reasOnably
                related to rehabilitating the probationer and protecting the Oublic"); see
                Dalton v.. State, 477 P.3d 650, 651 (Ala.ska Ct. App. 2020) (applying "special
                scrutiny" to "probation conditions that infringe constitutional rights");
                Pozili v. Commonwealth, 835 S.E.2d 87, 94 (Va. Ct. App. 2019) (invalidating
                an internet ban where the record did- not show that the internee played
                role in the crime and the sentencing court did not arti.culate hOw the broad
                restriction. "would serve any rehabilitative or public purPose").
                            By. contrast, Nevada apPearS to be the only state in the nation •
                that statutorily mandates its Sentencing courts to impose an identical and
                total internet ban on even/ defendant who is granted prObation 'after:being
                convicted of a. sexual offense, without regard for the nature cif -the
                defendant's crime of conviction, internet Usage history, of threat to Online
                users. See HUM supra, at 681 n.92-and accompanying text (collecting state
                statutes th t impose internet bans, none of Which is a.s broad aS.subsection.
                (q)). This breadth would h.ave been less- remarkable in 2001., when the
                statute was first added- and the First Ainendment irnplicatiorrs.of internet
                connectivity had-not yet matured.. But the internet.haS since evelved into
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                an essential public forum, while subsection (q) has gone unamended. See
                Hutt, supra, at 667 n.17 (collecting scholarship examining Packingharn's
                "treatment of the Internet as a public foru.m"). As evidenced by the rigorou:s
                tests placed 6n such restrictions in the interim, the statute has become
                fatally outmoded.
                             The State argues that subsection (q) is adequately tailored
                because (1) Aldape is only subject to the condition for five years; (2) the
                district   court    dan   modify   the • conditions    under    "extraordinary

                cirCumstances," NRS 176A.410(6); and (3) AldaPe Can'access the internet .or
                connected devices with the prior approval of his probation officer? NRS
                176A.410(1)(q). But because Aldape challenges the facial validity of the
                statute, its finite application to him does not change the analysis. And the
                phrase "extraordinary circumstances" denotes "a highly unusual set of facts
                that are not commonly associated with a particular thing or event."
                Extraordinary Circumstances, Black's Law Dictionaoi (11th ed: 2019).
                Confining the court's discretion to •only extraordinary circunistances does
                p.ot permit the tailoring necesSary to save the statute's constitutionality.
                             Other courts have spoken directly and' convincinglY 'about the
                dangers of entrusting the constitutionality of a statute to the sole discraikin
                of nonjudicial officers. See, e.g., Holena, 906 F.3d at 293 (finding fa.ult With
                the district court offering "no guidance on the sorts of internet use" that the
                probation office should approve); United States b. Ramos,.769 F.3c1. 45, 61
                (1st Cir. 2014) (finding that such permission "does not immunize the ban
                from an inquiry that evaluates the justification for the ban in the first
                instance"); Doe v. elindal, 853 F. SuPp. 2d 596, 604 (M.D. La. 2012)
                permission inadequate becau.se the z--:tatute did "not define. the 'standards to
                be .used in evaluating the requests for an exemption"); Dalton, 477 P.M. At

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                      653 (recognizing that under more recent jurisprudence, prior approval "is
                      not a sufficient safeguard for First Amendment rights in this context"); cf.
                      J.I. u. NJ. State Parole Bid., 1.55 A.3d 1008, 1023 (N.J. 2017) (stating that
                      the justification for internet restrictions must be based on "more than the
                      caprice of a parole officer") (internal quotations omitted). The approval
                      escape valve cannot save the statute's constitutionality, particularly
                      without any guidelines on. how and when it applies.
                                  Aldape's case is the perfect example of the iinpropriety• of a
                      blanket internet ba.n. His -victim was a family member who lived with or
                      near him, and the record does not demonstrate any predatory online
                      behaviors that. would justify a gen.eralized internet rastrictioh. Because
                      NRS 176A.410(1)(q) is both mandatory and restricts more speech than
                      necessary to serve the government's interest with. no tailoring mechanism,
                      and the State fails its burden to show otherwise, it is facially
                      unconstitutional under the Fi.rst Arnendment.3 .
                                                          Iv.
                                  Aldape also challen.ges speci.al probation condition .11, which
                      reads:
                                  Unless approved by the Parole and Probation
                                  Officer assigned to •the Defendant and by a
                                          •

                                  psychiatrist, psychologist or counselor treating the
                                  Defendant, if any, [the Defendant must] not be in
                                  or near:
                                  1. a playground, park, school or school grounds.

                             3We do not address the State's request. that •we instruct the district
                      court to determine whether a narrower internet restriction. should be
                      imposed under its discretionary authority in NRS 176A.400, because it is
                      not adequately briefed. This is a matter for the State to a.d.dress to the
                      district court in the first instance.
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                            2. a motion picture theater, or
                            3. a business that primarily has children as
                            customers or conduct:3 events that primarily
                            children attend.
                He argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing this
                condition pursuant to NRS 176A.400(1)(c)(3) because it mirrors a
                mandatory condition imposed on Tier III offenders pursuant to NRS
                176A.410(1)(m), but he is only a Tier II offender. That subsection (m) is
                mandatory for Tier Hi offenders, however, does not impede the district
                court's   discretion   to   irnpose         similar   cenditioi[i   under   NRS

                176A.400(1)(c)(3), permitting any reasonable condition "prohibiting the
                probationer from entering certain geographic areas."
                            The district court's imposition of a nonmandatory condition of
                probation i.s reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Igbinovia,.1.11 Nev. at 707,
                895 P.2d at 1309. but questions of statutory interpretatioi are reviewed de
                novo, State v. Lucero, 127 NeV. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011).
                "[S]tatutory provisions of the probation scheme must be sjictlY construed,'
                .1gbinovia, 111 Nev. at 710, 895 13,2d at 1311, including any Penal. statutes
                that "negatively impact a defendant," Mangarella, 117 Ne‘t at 134, 17•P.3d
                at 992. A.ny "[d]iscretionary powers of the district coult .accorded by a
                                                                           )
                statutory grant of authority must be interpreted liberally. ! IgbinOvia, 111
                Nev. at 710, 895 P.2d at 1311.
                            To resolve Aldape's arguMent that the -distriClt court bkceeded
                its atithority •ander NRS 176A.410(1)(M)- -becaUse it iMposed on him 4
                condition meant only for Tier 111 offènders, we reView stibsection (in) de
                novo. Aldape's challenge is easily answered by'the statu.te'c. Plain language.
                See Ramoi; v. State, 137 Nev.. 721, 722, 499 P.3d 1178, 1180 (2021) ("{Wje
                                                                                •
                first look to the statute's plain language to determine its meaning, and we
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will enforce it as written if the l.anguage is clear and unambiguous."). When
read in conjunction svith the sentence stein in NRS V6A.410(1), subsection
(m) provides, "[T]he court shall... order as a condition of probation or
suspensiOn of sentence that the defendant . . . not knowingly be Within . 500
feet of any place...that is designed primar0 for use by or for
children.    . The provisions of this paragraph apply only to a defendant
who is a Tier III offender." (emphasis add.ed). The Meaning i.s clear—if the
defend.ant is a Tier III offender, the Court must impoSe sUbsection (in). The
converse propOsition is that the court is not required to impose subsection
(m) if the defendant is a non-Tier III offender, not that the court cannot
impose the restriction on non-Tier III offenders. Therefore, condition 11•is
not prohibited by NRS 176A.410(1)(m).
             Even so, condition 11 must be a proper exercise of the district
court's discretion under NRS 176A.400, reviewed for an abuse of diScretion.
NRS 176A.400(1)(c)(3) permits the imposition of any reaSonable conditions
                                                                        •
including, without limitation, "[p]rohibiting the .probationer from entering
a certain geographic area." Given this broad languge and our obligation
to liberally interpret the discretionary powers of the .district court, see
Igbinovia, 111 Név. at 710, 895 P.2d at 1.311, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion becau.se it is reasonable -to restrict 'ana.dult
convicted of a sexual offense involving a child from areas where -children
commonly are found. We do not reach Aldape's argunient that condition n
violates his First Amendment rights because he did Inot present, a Cogent
argument to that effect in his Opening brief; see Powell v. Liberty Mut-Fire
Ins. Co., 1.27 Nev. 156, 161 n.3; 252 P.3d 668, 672 n,3 (2011) ("Issues not.
raised in an appellant's opening brief are deemed witived."), although Sve
note that similar restrictions are regularly upheld aVainst constitutional

                                       19
                    challenges wh:en reasonable, see, e.g., Unitecl States v. Senke, 986 F.3d 300,
                    318-19 (3d Cir. 2021); United States u. MaeMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir.
                    2008).
                                Therefore, the diStrict court permissibly imposed condition 11
                    on Aldape, both as a matter of statutory interpretation and pursuant to the
                    discretion granted under NRS 176A.400.
                                                  CONCLUSION
                                 Because Aldape's appellate waiver did not preclude challenges
                    to the conditions of his probation, and because subsection (q) is facially
                    unconstitutional, we reverse and remand to the district court to remove
                    condition 15, restricting Alda.pe's access to the internet and: internet-
                    connected devices, from the judgment of con.viction. We otherwise affirm
                    the district court's convicti.on, including the imposition of condition 11
                    restricting Aldape's entry into specific geographic areas, pursuant to NRS
                    176A.400.

                                                                &OA                  ,   j.

                                                        Pickering

                    We concur:

                      ___04e4auf)             , C.J.
                    Stiglich                                   Cadish

                    Lee                                        Parraguirre

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