Court Opinion

ID: 9953860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 21:01:49.014194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:53.531254
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-13375    Document: 28-1     Date Filed: 03/22/2024   Page: 1 of 3

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-13375
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       PATRICIA JACKSON,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       THE KROGER CO.,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-02328-TWT
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-13375        Document: 28-1         Date Filed: 03/22/2024        Page: 2 of 3

       2                         Opinion of the Court                      23-13375

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Patricia Jackson filed a personal injury lawsuit against The
       Kroger Co. on April 24, 2023, in Georgia’s Gwinnett County State
       Court. Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations on her claim
       expired on May 2, 2023. On May 23, Kroger filed a special
       appearance answer in state court and raised the defense of
       insufficient service of process. That same day, it also filed a motion
       to dismiss for the same defects in service of process. Kroger then
       removed the case to federal court on May 24, and Jackson served
       Kroger on May 31. The district court granted Kroger’s motion to
       dismiss, concluding that Jackson’s claim was barred by the state
       statute of limitations.
               On appeal, Jackson makes two principal arguments. First,
       she argues that the district court erred by using Georgia law to
       evaluate her service of process. And second, she argues that the
       district court abused its discretion by denying her request for a
       voluntary dismissal without prejudice.1
              We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and
       application of a statute of limitations. Foudy v. Miami-Dade Cnty.,
       823 F.3d 590, 592 (11th Cir. 2016). When sitting in diversity

       1 Jackson also argues that dismissal with prejudice was too extreme of a

       sanction for the district court to have ordered. But the district court did not
       dismiss her complaint as a sanction.
USCA11 Case: 23-13375         Document: 28-1        Date Filed: 03/22/2024         Page: 3 of 3

       23-13375                  Opinion of the Court                                3

       jurisdiction, federal courts apply state substantive law. Erie R.R. Co.
       v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). One such substantive law is the
       applicable state statute of limitations. Guar. Tr. Co. of New York v.
       York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945). Because Georgia courts have
       interpreted Georgia’s service of process statute as an integral part
       of the state statute of limitations, Georgia law also governs
       whether service made after the statute of limitations expires relates
       back to the date the action was filed. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. v. City
       of Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 1983). The district
       court properly evaluated Jackson’s service of process under
       Georgia law.2
               The district court did, however, err by refusing to consider
       Jackson’s request for a voluntary dismissal. The court concluded
       that, because Jackson had not complied with Federal Rule of Civil
       Procedure 7(b) by filing a formal motion, it could not grant her
       request for a voluntary dismissal. But “Rule 41(a)(2), by its plain
       language, doesn’t require a motion.” Sanchez v. Disc. Rock & Sand,
       Inc., 84 F.4th 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2023). The district court need
       only be alerted of the plaintiff’s request for a court-ordered
       voluntary dismissal. Id. Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND
       for the district court to consider Jackson’s request for a voluntary
       dismissal.

       2 On appeal, Jackson does not argue that she complied with the state-law

       service of process requirements. As a result, she has forfeited any challenge to
       the district court’s conclusion that she did not comply. See Sapuppo v. Allstate
       Floridian Ins., 739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases).