Court Opinion

ID: 9738770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:02:26.10356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.351551
License: Public Domain

Braucher, J.
(concurring in the result, with whom
Quirico and Wilkins, JJ., join). At the trial in 1977, the defendants properly raised the point that the prosecutor was using his peremptory challenges to cause the Commonwealth to discriminate against prospective black jurors on the basis of race. Given an opportunity to respond, the prosecutor declined, and the judge overruled the objections without further inquiry. The result was that twelve of the thirteen prospective black jurors, otherwise qualified, were excused. On the basis of the record of extraordinary circumstances in this particular case, and notwithstanding our decision in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 367 Mass. 419, 420 (1975), I concur in the court’s conclusion that the pattern of the prosecutor’s conduct must fee held to have exceeded the broad, but not limitless, range of discretion permitted in the exercise of peremptory challenges and to have violated the basic requirements of fairness. The defendants are therefore entitled to the relief ordered in the concluding paragraph of the court’s opinion. Early in 1976 the then Chief Justice of the Superior Court declared a mistrial in similar cir*494cumstances in the same county. See Commonwealth v. Flowers, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 569 (1977) (Brown, J., concurring).
I see no occasion, however, for the decision of any constitutional question, State or Federal, for critical review of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, or for ápproval or disapproval of the decision of a sharply divided court in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978). In particular, I refrain from attributing speculative types of "group bias” to members of "discrete groups.” Moreover, this case presents no issue as to misuse of peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant, as to discrimination by reason of sex, or as to the quashing of a venire, and the court’s discussion of such issues is not necessary to its decision. If we must ultimately consider such issues on a constitutional basis, it may be wise to defer to any guidance which may come from the United States Supreme Court on the basis of the United States Constitution. Holdings involvipg interpretation of the Massachusetts Constitution seem gratuitous and premature.