Court Opinion

ID: 9927560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 14:09:55.93805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:18.969578
License: Public Domain

[J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.]
              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                            MIDDLE DISTRICT

ALLEGHENY REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH     :   No. 26 MAP 2021
CENTER, ALLENTOWN WOMEN'S         :
CENTER, DELAWARE COUNTY           :   Appeal from the Orders of the
WOMEN'S CENTER, PHILADELPHIA      :   Commonwealth Court at No. 26 MD
WOMEN'S CENTER, PLANNED           :   2019 dated January 28, 2020 and
PARENTHOOD KEYSTONE, PLANNED      :   March 26, 2021.
PARENTHOOD SOUTHEASTERN           :
PENNSYLVANIA, AND PLANNED         :   ARGUED: October 26, 2022
PARENTHOOD OF WESTERN             :
PENNSYLVANIA,                     :
                                  :
                Appellants        :
                                  :
                                  :
           v.                     :
                                  :
                                  :
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF        :
HUMAN SERVICES, VALERIE A.        :
ARKOOSH, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY :
AS SECRETARY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA :
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,     :
ANDREW BARNES, IN HIS OFFICIAL    :
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DEPUTY      :
SECRETARY FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA    :
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES’     :
OFFICE OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE      :
PROGRAMS, AND SALLY KOZAK, IN HER :
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY       :
SECRETARY FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA    :
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES’     :
OFFICE OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE      :
PROGRAMS,                         :
                                  :
                Appellees         :

               CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE TODD                       DECIDED: January 29, 2024
       I join sections I and II(A) of the majority opinion, which concludes that Appellants

– providers of abortion services in the Commonwealth – have standing to pursue the

instant litigation on their own behalf, and on behalf of patients who are eligible for medical

assistance, but are denied coverage for sought-after abortion services pursuant to

Section 3215(c) 1 and (j) (collectively, “Coverage Exclusion”) of the Abortion Control Act,

18 Pa.C.S. § 3201-3220. I also join section II(B) of the majority opinion, which concludes

that the Commonwealth Court erred in permitting various state legislators (“Intervenors”)

to intervene in this matter pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2327, based

on Intervenors’ assertion that a decision invalidating the Coverage Exclusion would affect

their authority to appropriate government funds. However, despite the thoughtful and

comprehensive exposition by my learned colleague, I dissent from the remainder of the

majority opinion and its ultimate mandate, as I conclude that we are bound to follow our

1 Section 3215(c) provides:
      (c) Public funds.--No Commonwealth funds and no Federal funds which
      are appropriated by the Commonwealth shall be expended by any State or
      local government agency for the performance of abortion, except:
          (1) When abortion is necessary to avert the death of the mother on
          certification by a physician. When such physician will perform the
          abortion or has a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the abortion
          there shall be a separate certification from a physician who has no
          such interest.
          (2) When abortion is performed in the case of pregnancy caused by
          rape which, prior to the performance of the abortion, has been
          reported, together with the identity of the offender, if known, to a
          law enforcement agency having the requisite jurisdiction and has
          been personally reported by the victim.
          (3) When abortion is performed in the case of pregnancy caused by
          incest which, prior to the performance of the abortion, has been
          personally reported by the victim to a law enforcement agency
          having the requisite jurisdiction, or, in the case of a minor, to the
          county child protective service agency and the other party to the
          incestuous act has been named in such report.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3215(c).

                             [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2
decision in Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985), under the

doctrine of stare decisis.

       Preliminarily, I note that this case does not concern the right to an abortion. Rather,

the issue before this Court is whether the Commonwealth, because it provides funds to

indigent women who choose to give birth, is also required to provide funds to indigent

women for the performance of an abortion when the abortion is not necessary to preserve

the life of the mother, or where the pregnancy did not result from rape or incest.

       Appellants contend that the Coverage Exclusion violates the Equal Rights

Amendment of Art. I, § 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 2 because, inter alia, it treats

women differently “on the basis of a physical condition peculiar to their sex.” Appellants’

Brief at 35. Appellants further maintain that the Coverage Exclusion violates the equal

protection guarantees contained in Art. I, § 1; Art. I, § 26; and Art. III, § 32, of the

Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 because it favors one fundamental right (the right to carry a

2 Article I, Section 28 provides: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or

abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.” Pa.
Const. art. I, § 28.
3 Article I, Section 1 provides: “All men are born equally free and independent, and have

certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending
life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 1.
Article I, Section 26 provides: “Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision
thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of an any civil right, nor discriminate
against any person in the exercise of any civil right.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 26.
Article III, Section 32 provides, in part: “The General Assembly shall pass no local or
special law in any case which has been or can be provided for by general law,” and sets
forth specific examples. Pa. Const. art. III, § 32.
As noted by the Majority, although Appellants identify three provisions that “collectively
guarantee equal protection of the law and prohibit discrimination,” see Majority Opinion
at 167, their argument relative to Art. I, § 1 concerns the recognition of an inherent right
to reproductive autonomy and not equal protection, and they fail to demonstrate that Art.
(continued…)

                             [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 3
pregnancy to term) over another (the right to terminate a pregnancy). Appellants’ Brief at

69.

       Central to this appeal, however, this Court addressed these identical issues more

than forty years ago in our unanimous decision in Fischer. In Fischer, the appellants −

who included, inter alia, several recipients of medical assistance who were pregnant and

desired abortions, abortion providers, and an organization which counseled rape victims

− challenged the coverage exclusion contained in the Abortion Control Act of 1982 (the

“Act”) on the basis that it violated Art. I, § 28, and the equal protection guarantees

contained in Art. I, § 1, Art. I, § 26, and Art. III, § 32, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. As

the majority observes, for present purposes, there is no “meaningful difference” between

the language of Section 3215(c) as it appeared in 1982, and the current language of

Section 3215(c). Majority Opinion at 56 n.32. 4

       We first considered their assertion that, because the Commonwealth provided

funds to indigent women for childbirth, it was “equally obliged to fund an abortion,”

Fischer, 502 A.2d at 116, and we began by examining the relevant federal jurisprudence.

We observed that the United States Supreme Court had acknowledged that states have

a significant interest in protecting potential life, and may take certain steps to further that

interest by encouraging childbirth. Id. at 118 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162

(1973)5; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1976)). We further noted that, in Maher v. Roe,

432 U.S. 464 (1970), the high Court held that there is “no constitutional requirement for a

III, § 32 applies herein. See id. at 177. Thus, Appellants’ equal protection argument rises
and falls on Art. I, § 26.
4 For this reason, I refer to “Coverage Exclusion” when discussing the Abortion Control

Act of 1982 and the current version of the Abortion Control Act.
5 As discussed by the majority, and below, in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, 142 S.Ct. 2228 (2022), the United States Supreme Court overruled Roe,
and held that the federal constitution does not confer a right to abortion.

                             [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 4
state to ‘accord equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth,’” Fischer, 502 A.2d at 118

(quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 470), and that “it was not unconstitutional for a state to pay

for the expenses of childbirth while at the same time refusing to pay for nontherapeutic

abortions.” Fischer, 502 A.2d at 118. Finally, we recognized that, in Harris v. McRae,

448 U.S. 297 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that a state may enact a

statute limiting funding to medically necessary abortions without offending the United

States Constitution. Fischer, 502 A.2d at 118. We highlighted the high Court’s reasoning

in Harris that a woman’s freedom of choice does not carry with it “a constitutional

entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself to the full range of protected choices”

because, as explained in Maher, “although government may not place obstacles in the

path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its

own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category.” Fischer, 502 A.2d at 119 (quoting

Harris, 448 U.S. at 316) (emphasis original).

       Notably, this Court acknowledged in Fischer the appellants’ argument that our

state constitution should be interpreted more expansively than the United States Supreme

Court has interpreted the federal constitution. Id. at 120. 6 Moreover, we explained that

we are “free to interpret our Constitution in a more generous manner than the federal

courts,” and we observed that we have “not been shy” in doing so.                    Id. at 121.

Nevertheless, we noted that, while the high Court’s interpretation of the federal

constitution is not binding, we may use as guidelines in interpreting our state constitution

the same principles used by the high Court. Id.

       Ultimately, we determined in Fischer that the provisions of our state constitution

did not afford the appellants relief. Specifically, with respect to the appellants’ claim that

6 In this regard, although the Fischer Court did not specifically refer to Art. I, § 26 in setting

forth the appellants’ argument, the appellants’ argument necessarily was limited to § 26,
as Art. I, § 28 has no concomitant provision in the federal constitution.

                              [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 5
the Coverage Exclusion violated equal protection principles under Art. I, § 1, and Art. III,

§ 32, we explained that, for purposes of analyzing state equal protection claims, there are

three types of classifications, each of which requires a specific standard of judicial review,

or scrutiny. Id. at 121 (citing James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation

Authority, 477 A.2d 1302, 1306 (Pa. 1984)). Classifications which implicate neither

suspect classes, nor fundamental rights, will be sustained if they meet the rational basis

test, which requires that the classification be directed at the accomplishment of a

legitimate governmental interest, and does so in a manner that is not arbitrary or

unreasonable. Id. at 122. Classifications that involve a suspect class, or burden a

fundamental right, will be sustained only if they survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 121 (citation

omitted). Finally, if a classification involves an important, but not a fundamental right, or

if it consists of a sensitive classification, a heightened, or intermediate, level of scrutiny is

warranted. Id. at 121 (citation omitted).

       We observed in Fischer that the right at issue was the “purported right to have the

state subsidize the individual exercise of a constitutionally protected right, when it

chooses to subsidize alternative constitutional rights.” Id. We further noted that this right

is not found in our state constitution, and, thus, cannot be considered a fundamental right.

Id. Finally, we determined that the Coverage Exclusion did not affect a suspect class, as

neither the United States Supreme Court, nor this Court, has held that “financial need

alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.” Id. at 121-22

(citation omitted). Accordingly, we concluded that the state’s “disparate treatment” of

indigent and non-indigent women, id., need only satisfy the rational basis test. Id. at 123.

Finding that the Coverage Exclusion was directed at the accomplishment of a legitimate

governmental interest, namely, the preservation of life, and that it did so in a manner that

was not arbitrary or unreasonable – i.e., by preserving the life of the unborn child unless

                             [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 6
an abortion was necessary to save the life of the mother, thereby preserving the maximum

number of lives − we held that the Coverage Exclusion satisfied the rational basis test,

and, therefore, did not violate our state constitution. 7

       We next considered in Fischer the appellant’s claim that the Coverage Exclusion

violated Art. I, § 26, which provides, as pertinent here, that the government shall not

“discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 26.

We explained that, although Art I, § 26 “does not in itself define a new substantive civil

right,” it does make “more explicit the citizenry’s constitutional safeguards not to be

harassed or punished for the exercise of their constitutional rights.” Fischer, 502 A.2d at

123 (citation omitted). We cautioned, however, that Art. I, § 26 cannot “be construed as

an entitlement provision; nor can it be construed in a manner which would preclude the

Commonwealth, when acting in a manner consistent with state and federal equal

protection guarantees, from conferring benefits upon certain members of a class unless

similar benefits were accorded to all.” Id.

       Recognizing that we had not previously adopted a method for analyzing claims

under Art. I, § 26, we determined in Fischer that it was appropriate to utilize the “penalty”

analysis used by the United States Supreme Court, the focus of which is on whether a

person has been penalized for exercising a constitutional freedom. Id. at 123-24 (citing,

inter alia, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)). We noted that, under this analysis,

relief is not warranted in situations “where a state merely seeks to encourage behavior by

offering incentives, as distinct from where a state refuses to subsidize a person’s exercise

of a constitutional right.” Id. (citing Maher, supra). Observing that the government,

through the Coverage Exclusion, was not penalizing individuals for exercising a right to

terminate their pregnancies, but, rather, “merely decid[ing] not to fund that choice in favor

7  We noted that, even assuming that the classification warranted heightened
(intermediate) scrutiny, it would still pass constitutional muster. Id. at 123.

                             [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 7
of an alternative social policy,” we held that the state’s actions did not offend Art. I, § 26.

Id.

         Finally, we considered the appellants’ claim that the Coverage Exclusion violated

the Equal Rights Amendment in Art. I, § 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The

appellants in Fischer argued that the Act’s disparate treatment of pregnant women who

chose to give birth and those who chose to have an abortion violated the Equal Rights

Amendment because “all medically necessary services for men are reimbursable, while

a medically necessary abortion, which by its nature can only affect women, is not

reimbursable,” and, therefore, the state “adopted a standard entirely different from that

which governs eligibility for men.” Fischer, 502 A.2d at 124 (record citation omitted).

         In addressing the appellants’ argument, we first reiterated the purpose and intent

of § 28, quoting from our 1974 decision in Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60 (Pa.

1974):

               The thrust of the Equal Rights Amendment is to insure
               equality of rights under the law and to eliminate sex as a basis
               for distinction. The sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is
               no longer a permissible factor in the determination of their
               legal rights and legal responsibilities. The law will not impose
               different benefits or different burdens upon the members of a
               society based on the fact that they may be man or woman.

Fischer, 502 A.2d at 124 (quoting Henderson, 327 A.2d at 62).

         We then observed that we have applied and relied on Art. 1, § 28 “numerous

times” to strike or modify various rules which we found “offensive to its terms.” Id. at 124-

25 (collecting cases). We explained that,

               [i]n each of [these] cases, we have vigilantly protected the
               rights of women and men to be treated without reliance upon
               their sexual identity. In doing so we have recognized that
               distinctions which “rely on and perpetuate stereotypes” as to

                             [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 8
              the responsibilities and capabilities of men and women are
              anathema to the principles of the [Equal Rights Amendment].
Id. at 125.

       We rejected, however, the Fischer appellants’ contention that, because only a

woman can have an abortion, the Act necessarily utilizes “sex as a basis for distinction,”

emphasizing that “the basis for the distinction here is not sex but abortion, and the statute

does not accord varying benefits to men and women because of their sex, but accords

varying benefits to one class of women, as distinct from another, based on a voluntary

choice made by the women.” Id. We further stated:

              The mere fact that only women are affected by this statute
              does not necessarily mean that women are being
              discriminated against on the basis of sex. In this world there
              are certain immutable facts of life which no amount of
              legislation may change. As a consequence there are certain
              laws which necessarily will only affect one sex. Although we
              have not previously addressed this situation, other ERA
              jurisdictions have; and the prevailing view amongst our sister
              state jurisdictions is that the [ERA] “does not prohibit
              differential treatment among the sexes when, as here that
              treatment is reasonably and genuinely based on physical
              characteristics unique to one sex.”

Id. (citations omitted). For all of the foregoing reasons, we concluded in Fischer that the

Coverage Exclusion was not unconstitutional because it provided funds to indigent

women for childbirth, but not for “nontherapeutic abortions.” Id. at 118.

       As noted, although the parties are different, Appellants in the case sub judice raise

precisely the same arguments we addressed in Fischer – i.e., that the Coverage

Exclusion violates Art. I, § 28 because it uses sex as a basis of distinction, and violates

Art. I, § 26 because it favors the right to childbirth over the right to terminate a pregnancy.

Indeed, the majority acknowledges as much. See Majority Opinion at 55 (“In Fischer, . .

. the Court addressed arguments like those presented here"); id. at 206 (“we are faced

                             [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 9
with the same question answered by this Court in Fischer”). Despite this, the majority

concludes that we are not bound to follow our unanimous decision in Fischer, and, indeed,

overrules it. I cannot agree.

       As we repeatedly have explained, the doctrine of stare decisis “promotes the

evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance

on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial

process.” Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 954 n.31 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted).

It aims to foster the conviction that our decisions reflect the reasoned thought of a

collective, of the court as a whole, and not the individual views of the judges who happen

to be seated on the court at that time. Thus, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, “for

purposes of certainty and stability in the law, ‘a conclusion reached in one case should

be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the

parties may be different.’” Id. at 966-67 (citation omitted).

       Of course, stare decisis “is not a vehicle for perpetuating error, but rather a legal

concept which responds to the demands of justice and, thus, permits the orderly growth

processes of the law to flourish.” Id. at 967 (citation omitted). Further, the demand of

stare decisis “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our

interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior

decisions.” Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 197 (Pa. 2020) (citing Agostini

v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)). At the same time, we have acknowledged that

legislators “rely on this Court’s interpretation of the law and precedent when crafting

legislation, and that such reliance should not be undercut except for good reasons.” Stilp,

905 A.2d at 967.

                            [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 10
      In determining whether it is appropriate to overrule precedent, we must consider a

number of factors, including the quality of reasoning of the decision, its consistency with

other decisions, the age of the decision, reliance interests, and the workability of the

existing standard. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2177-78 (2019).

Critically, “[o]verruling a case always requires ‘special justification’−over and above the

belief ‘that the precedent was wrongly decided.’” Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S.

446, 447 (2015) (citation omitted).

      Beginning with Art. I, § 28, I cannot conclude Fischer’s reasoning was “patently

flawed.”   Majority Opinion at 109.      Indeed, Fischer appropriately recognized the

underlying purpose and intent of the provision, which, as we described in Henderson,

supra, is “to eliminate sex as a basis of distinction,” and eliminate the imposition of

“different benefits or different burdens” on the basis of sex. Fischer, 502 A.2d at 124

(quoting Henderson, 327 A.2d at 62).

      We observed in Fischer that the Coverage Exclusion does not impose different

benefits or burdens on any individual based on the fact that they are a man or woman.

Rather, the Coverage Exclusion distinguishes between two different groups of women –

those who choose to have a child and those who choose to terminate a pregnancy. For

this reason, we determined that it was not sex-based.

       The majority suggests that Fischer’s reasoning was flawed because it ignored that

“[l]aws that create subclasses within one sex have been found violative of the Equal

Rights Amendment,” Majority Opinion at 111, and it cites several cases in support of its

position, including Hartford Accident and Indemnity v. Insurance Comm’n, 482 A.2d 542

(Pa. 1984) (holding that an insurance company’s calculation of motor vehicle insurance

                           [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 11
rates that factored in gender ran afoul of the Art. I, § 28), and Henderson, supra (holding

that provisions of the divorce code that allowed alimony pendente lite to women but not

men violated Art. I, § 28). However, as we explained in Fischer, in those cases, the

disparate treatment was based on “distinctions which ‘rely on and perpetuate stereotypes’

as to the responsibilities and capabilities of men and women,’” whereas the Coverage

Exclusion, which affects only women, “accords varying benefits to one class of women,

as distinct from another, based on a voluntary choice made by the women.” Fischer, 502

A.2d at 125. In my view, this was not an unreasonable conclusion by the Fischer Court.

       I also disagree with the majority’s suggestion that Fischer’s Art. I, § 28 analysis

was inconsistent with this Court’s prior holding in Cerra v. East Stroudsberg Area School

District, 299 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1973). See Majority Opinion at 98. In Cerra, a school district

regulation required women who were more than five months pregnant to resign. We

concluded that the regulation constituted sex discrimination because it was based on an

unsupported and erroneous presumption that pregnancy was a disability that warranted

dismissal, and there was no equivalent presumption applicable to any disability

attributable to men. In Fischer, we specifically distinguished Cerra, observing that “the

decision whether or not to carry a fetus to term is so unique as to have no concomitance

in the male of the species,” and, therefore, that the Coverage Exclusion was “in no way

analogous to those situations where the distinctions were ‘based exclusively on the

circumstance of sex, social stereotypes connected with gender, [or] culturally induced

dissimilarities.’” Fischer, 502 A.2d at 126 (citations omitted).

                           [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 12
        Finally, while the majority asserts that its own Edmunds8 analysis “leads to the

unremarkable conclusion that to treat woman differently based on a characteristic unique

to her sex is to treat her differently because of her sex,” Majority Opinion at 83, I note that

an Edmunds analysis is most salient when the state constitutional provision at issue has

a federal counterpart. There is no federal counterpart to our Equal Rights Amendment

and, thus, little force to an Edmunds analysis in this regard. See League of Women

Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 802-03 (Pa. 2018) (“Free and Equal Elections

Clause has no federal counterpart, and, thus, our seminal comparative review standard

described in Commonwealth v. Edmunds [] is not directly applicable.”). Moreover, every

Pennsylvania case cited by the majority in its Edmunds analysis was discussed and/or

acknowledged by this Court in Fischer.

       I also am unable to conclude that Fischer’s treatment of the appellants’ Art. I, § 26

claim “suffers from incomplete reasoning and a disregard of our unique constitutional

provisions in favor of blind (and incomplete) adherence to federal principles of Equal

Protection.” Majority Opinion at 212. As discussed above, for purposes of analyzing

claims under Art. I, § 26, we embraced the “penalty” analysis utilized by the high Court,

which focuses on whether a person has been penalized for exercising a constitutional

freedom. Fischer, 502 A.2d at 123-24. The majority suggests that Fischer “offered no

insight as to what constitutes a ‘penalty’ for purposes of our constitutional analysis,” and

it further submits that, “[p]ursuant to its most natural meaning, the term ‘discriminate,’

does not mean punishment, but rather partiality,” Majority Opinion at 210-11. However,

in Probst v. Com., Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 849 A.2d 1135 (Pa. 2004)

8 Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).

                            [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 13
(holding that the denial of driving privileges for an additional year to recidivist DUI

offenders who could not pay to install a required ignition interlock on their vehicles did

not violate Art. I, § 26), we reiterated that a claim under Art. I, § 26 “is associated with an

equal protection claim that focuses on the assertion that a person has been penalized for

the exercise of a constitutional freedom.” Id. at 1142 n.14 (citing Fischer, 502 A.2d at

123–24) (emphasis added).

       Assuming, arguendo, that our state constitution guarantees a right to reproductive

autonomy, as the majority concludes, I find Fischer’s application of the penalty test to be

reasonable, as it is consistent with our recognition that Art. I, § 26 underscores “the

citizenry’s constitutional safeguards not to be harassed or punished for the exercise of

their constitutional rights,” but at the same time cannot be “construed in a manner which

would preclude the Commonwealth, when acting in a manner consistent with state and

federal equal protection guarantees, from conferring benefits upon certain members of a

class unless similar benefits were accorded to all.” Fischer, 502 A.2d at 123.

       Finally, in my view, the Coverage Exclusion does not penalize an indigent woman

for exercising her right to obtain an abortion simply because, unless the abortion is

necessary to preserve the life of the mother, or the pregnancy resulted from rape or

incest, the legislature has chosen not to fund it. In this regard, I am unpersuaded by the

majority’s suggestion that Fischer improperly “flipped the table” by viewing the case as

one involving “the right to a government-funded abortion,” not about the right to abortion.

See Majority Opinion at 204. Indeed, in my view, Fischer precisely and accurately

characterized the issue. Through the Coverage Exclusion, the legislature has decided

not to fund a woman’s choice to obtain an abortion, except in three limited circumstances,

                            [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 14
“in favor of an alternative social policy.” Fischer, 502 A.2d at 124. This is a quintessential

legislative function.

       Contrary to the majority, I also find reliance interests favor adherence to Fischer.

Since Fischer was decided nearly four decades ago, we have cited it with approval on

numerous occasions, and in various contexts. See, e.g., Klein v. State Employees’ Ret.

Sys., 555 A.2d 1216, 1224 (Pa. 1989) (finding classifications created by the two-tiered

retirement compensation scheme creating unequal classes of judges based solely upon

their date of entry into the system were arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional under

the equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution); Love v. Borough of

Stroudsburg, 597 A.2d 1137, 1139-40 (Pa. 1991) (holding ordinance restricting parking

by nonresidents within primarily residential district was a valid exercise of borough's police

power and had a rational basis in promoting governmental interests in safety of residents

and reducing traffic and did not violate equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania

Constitution); Driscoll v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197, 213 (Pa. 2013) (concluding mandatory

retirement provision for judges at age 70 did not violate Art. I, § 26).

       The majority discounts the reliance interests with respect to Fischer’s analysis of

Art. I, § 28 by observing that, “[o]utside of repeated reenactment of the Coverage

Exclusion, we have no indication of the Legislature’s reliance on the Fischer Court’s

interpretation of the Equal Rights Amendment.” Majority Opinion at 118. However, as

this Court has recognized, legislators “rely on this Court’s interpretation of the law and

precedent when crafting legislation, and . . . such reliance should not be undercut except

for good reason.” See Stilp, 905 A.2d at 967.

                            [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 15
        While acknowledging that “this Court has cited Fischer multiple times for its equal

protection analysis framework,” the majority suggests it has been “seldom cited and never

applied” for its “unique holding” that we embrace a “penalty” analysis. Majority Opinion

at 213. The majority reasons:

                While the General Assembly has continued to fund the current
                Medical Assistance scheme with the Coverage Exclusion in
                place, no legislation has been brought to our attention and our
                review has uncovered no evidence that the General Assembly
                has otherwise crafted any statutes since Fischer that have
                relied upon the Fischer Court’s interpretation of Section 26
                and its adoption of a penalty analysis.

Id. at 214. Once again, however, we have recognized that legislators rely on this Court’s

interpretation of the law when crafting legislation. The Coverage Exclusion is, for all

intents and purposes, identical to the one challenged almost 40 years ago in Fischer,

suggesting, at least implicitly, that the General Assembly relied on our decision.

        Further, neither the majority, nor any party, has suggested that Fischer is

“unworkable.” See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178 (explaining that the workability of the rule

is a relevant factor in determining whether a past decision should be overruled). Indeed,

Fischer sets forth clear parameters within which legislators, who are elected by taxpayers,

can make funding decisions based on social policy, while at the same time protecting

citizens from discrimination on the basis of their sex, or on the basis of their exercise of

their civil rights.

        Finally, I see little merit to Appellants’ argument that the high Court’s ruling in

Dobbs, see supra note 6, provides “special justification” for overruling Fischer.

Appellants’ Supplemental Brief at 3. Although the majority offers that, in light of the

decision in Dobbs, “it is logical and necessary for this Court to reconsider the premise of

                             [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 16
Fischer and address the unique state constitutional questions that are otherwise

unanswered,” Majority Opinion at 212, in a non-majority expression, Justice Donohue

offers that, “[r]egardless of whether Fischer is overruled, under current Pennsylvania law,

a woman may obtain an abortion, subject to statutory regulations, until the gestational

age of the fetus is twenty-four weeks.” Opinion (Donohue, J., joined by Wecht, J.) at 130

n.93 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 3211). As I noted at the outset, the issue in Fischer, and in the

case sub judice, is not a woman’s right to abortion, but, rather, an indigent woman’s right

to have the government pay for an abortion in all circumstances.

       Accordingly, I would reject Appellants’ challenge to the Coverage Exclusion based

on Fischer, as I find it to be binding precedent and, under the doctrine of stare decisis,

controlling. For this reason, I dissent to sections III and IV of the majority opinion.

                            [J-65-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 17