Court Opinion

ID: 9962065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 16:12:15.661814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:48.412750
License: Public Domain

J-A27029-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: ESTATE OF OWEN EUGENE                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MEALS, SR.                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: ESTATE OF OWEN                    :
  EUGENE MEALS, SR.                            :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 394 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Orphans’ Court at
                           No(s): 21-20-0239

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                              FILED: APRIL 22, 2024

       Appellant, the Estate of Owen Eugene Meals, Sr. (the Estate), appeals

from the order awarding attorney’s fees to the Estate. The Estate argues that

it was owed $65,687.58 in attorneys’ fees, and it asserts that the orphans’

court abused its discretion in reducing the award of attorneys’ fees to $6,600.

We affirm.

       The orphans’ court summarized the relevant facts and procedural

history of this matter as follows:

       The decedent in this case, Owen Eugene Meals, Sr. (hereinafter
       Decedent), died on January 23, 2020, leaving his personal
       residence at 1501 Shirley Avenue, Carlisle, Pennsylvania to
       [Appellee Norma Smith1 (Ms. Smith)] and the rest of his property
       to his son, Owen E. Meals, Jr. (hereinafter Mr. Meals).

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See Opinion and Order, 7/1/22, at 1 (unpaginated).
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     A dispute arose between Mr. Meals and Ms. Smith when Mr. Meals
     requested to remove his inherited property from the home that
     was bequeathed to Ms. Smith. Ms. Smith took issue with his
     request because she had resided in that home for at least 15 years
     and had accumulated property of her own amidst the property
     that now belonged to the Estate. There was also a dispute as to
     whether certain items requested by Mr. Meals were actually
     present in the home.

     The resistance by Ms. Smith to allow Mr. Meals in his role as
     executor to examine or remove the contents of the home resulted
     in Mr. Meals filing three separate petitions to gain access to the
     property, to remove personal property belonging to the Estate,
     and to determine ownership of disputed personal property.
     Ultimately, as a result of her actions to impede the ability of Mr.
     Meals to effectively review, appraise, and remove property
     belonging to the Estate, the court ordered Ms. Smith to pay a sum
     of $2,000.00 based on her contempt.

     The court also ordered that Ms. Smith was to pay the reasonable
     attorney’s fees associated with the Estate’s petition for
     adjudication of personal property claims and for costs and
     contempt of court orders (hereinafter the petition for
     adjudication), and [the orphans’ court] gave the parties 60 days
     to negotiate the amount. Having failed to reach an agreement, a
     hearing was held on December 8, 2022, on the limited topic of the
     reasonable attorney[s’] fees relevant to the petition for
     adjudication.

     At the hearing, Steven Grubb, Esquire (hereinafter Attorney
     Grubb) testified in support of the Estate and discussed the invoice
     for legal fees and costs that his firm, Salzmann Hughes, P.C.,
     submitted to the Estate for payment totaling $65,687.58. In
     support of Ms. Smith, testimony was provided by Michael Scherer,
     Esquire and Andrew Sheely, Esquire to oppose the assertion that
     the legal fees requested were “reasonable.”

     Following the hearing, the [orphans’] court permitted the parties
     to file post-hearing briefs. Both the Estate and Ms. Smith filed
     briefs on January 20, 2023, and reply briefs on January 27, 2023.

     On February 17, 2023, the [orphans’] court issued an order of
     court awarding the Estate reasonable attorney’s fees in the
     amount of $6,600.00 to be paid by Ms. Smith within 120 days. In
     doing so, the [orphans’] court concluded that the Estate’s

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        submission of $65,687.58 in attorney’s fees and costs was
        manifestly excessive and patently unreasonable. . . .

Trial Ct. Op., 5/1/23, at 1-2 (citations and quotation marks omitted and some

formatting altered).

        On March 9, 2023, the Estate filed a timely appeal from the February

17, 2023 order.2 Both the trial court and the Estate complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        On appeal, the Estate raises the following issues:

        1. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion in awarding the
           Estate . . . attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of
           $6,600.00, which was only approximately ten percent (10%)
           of the actual amount the Estate expended on attorneys’ fees
           and costs associated with the Estate’s petition for adjudication
           of personal property claims and for costs and contempt of court
           orders (the petition) where:

           A. The [orphans’] court failed to justify a 90% reduction in
              the fees and costs it awarded the Estate as a sanction
              and, further failed to justify the basis for its award of only
              $6,600 in attorneys’ fees and costs;

____________________________________________

2 Generally, an order awarding counsel fees is a final and appealable order.

See Carmen Enterprises, Inc. v. Murpenter, LLC, 185 A.3d 380, 388 (Pa.
Super. 2018). However, although the July 1, 2022 order in this case stated
that the Estate was entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees, it was not final as
it specifically anticipated further proceedings. See also West v. West, 446
A.2d 1342, 1343 (Pa. Super. 1982) (explaining that, generally, an order that
anticipates further proceedings is interlocutory and unappealable); Pa.R.A.P.
341(b)(1) (stating that a final order is one that “disposes of all claims and all
parties”). Therefore, we conclude that the order awarding attorneys’ fees was
not final until the February 17, 2023 order was entered which directed Ms.
Smith to pay the Estate a specific amount of attorneys’ fees and resolved all
outstanding claims. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). Accordingly, we conclude that
the Estate’s appeal from the February 17, 2023 order is properly before this
Court.

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         B. The [orphans’] court failed to properly consider and rely
            upon the legal factors used to assess and award
            reasonable attorneys’ fees; and

         C. The [orphans’] court failed to properly sanction a litigant
            for their contemptuous conduct.

The Estate’s Brief at 5 (formatting altered).

      All of the Estate’s claims concern the order awarding reasonable

attorneys’ fees. The Estate argues that the orphans’ court failed to justify how

it determined that $6,600 was a reasonable amount for attorneys’ fees and

claims that the trial court abused its discretion and failed to consider relevant

factors in reaching its conclusion. The Estate’s Brief at 15-19. The Estate

asserts that the attorneys’ fees were intended as a sanction for Ms. Smith’s

conduct in hindering the Estate’s actions in this matter, and asserts that the

February 17, 2023 order “re-shaped” the proceedings.         See id. at 17-23.

Therefore, the Estate contends that the orphans’ court failed to properly

sanction Ms. Smith for her conduct. See id. at 25-31.

      Ms. Smith argues that the orphans’ court judge, the Honorable Carrie E.

Hyams, presided over this case from its inception to its conclusion, and Judge

Hyams was in the best position to evaluate the reasonableness of attorneys’

fees in this matter. Ms. Smith’s Brief at 4. Ms. Smith asserts that the orphans’

court did not arrive at an award of $6,600 in a vacuum, as it held hearings

and carefully considered the relevant factors in determining the amount of

attorneys’ fees. See id. at 5-6. Ms. Smith concludes that the orphans’ court’s

award of attorneys’ fees in this matter was reasonable. See id. at 9.

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      “[A]ttorney’s fees in an estate are based on the reasonable value of the

service actually rendered.” In re Estate of Rees, 625 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Pa.

Super.1993) (citation omitted). “Attorneys . . . seeking compensation from

an estate have the burden of establishing facts which show the reasonableness

of their fees and entitlement to the compensation claimed.” Id. (citation

omitted).

      What is a fair and reasonable fee is sometimes a delicate, and at
      times a difficult question. The facts and factors to be taken into
      consideration in determining the fee or compensation payable to
      an attorney include: the amount of work performed; the character
      of the services rendered; the difficulty of the problems involved;
      the importance of the litigation; the amount of money or value of
      the property in question; the degree of responsibility incurred;
      whether the fund involved was ‘created’ by the attorney; the
      professional skill and standing of the attorney in his profession;
      the results he was able to obtain; the ability of the client to pay a
      reasonable fee for the services rendered; and, very importantly,
      the amount of money or the value of the property in question.

In re LaRocca’s Trust Estate, 246 A.2d 337, 339 (Pa. 1968). “By now it is

hornbook law that the reasonableness of the fee is a matter for the sound

discretion of the [orphans’ c]ourt and will be changed by an appellate Court

only when there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.

      The Pennsylvania Judicial Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:

      The following participants shall be entitled to a reasonable
      counsel fee as part of the taxable costs of the matter:

                                   *    *    *

         (7) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a
         sanction against another participant for dilatory, obdurate
         or vexatious conduct during the pendency of a matter.

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                                   *    *    *

         (9) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees because the
         conduct of another party in commencing the matter or
         otherwise was arbitrary, vexatious or in bad faith.

42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7), (9) (emphasis added).           Further, this Court has

explained:

      We have a limited power of review of court awarded fees. As the
      Supreme Court has so frequently stated, the responsibility for
      setting such fees lies primarily with the trial court and we have
      the power to reverse its exercise of discretion only where there is
      plain error. Plain error is found where the award is based either
      on factual findings for which there is no evidentiary support or on
      legal factors other than those that are relevant to such an award.
      The rationale behind this limited scope of review is sound. It is
      the trial court that has the best opportunity to judge the
      attorney’s skills, the effort that was required and actually
      put forth in the matter at hand, and the value of that effort
      at the time and place involved.

Carmen Enterprises, Inc. v. Murpenter, LLC, 185 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (emphasis in original and some citations omitted and formatting

altered). “[T]he burden is on the claimant to justify a fee request[, and the

orphans’ court] does not have to address every LaRocca factor.” Id. (citation

omitted).    “Additionally, it has long been the law of Pennsylvania that

attorney’s fees should be on a moderate scale of compensation, and none

should be allowed but such as are fair and just.” Id. (citation omitted and

formatting altered).

      Here, in calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees, the trial court reiterated

that it was not required to address each factor from LaRocca, and then

explained:

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       Still, it is important to note that here the [orphans’ court]
       considered all of the LaRocca factors in coming to its decision. In
       doing so, the February 17, 2023 order of court focused on the
       factors that were most important to the [orphans’ c]ourt in this
       case. Specifically, the court addressed the following LaRocca
       factors:

          -   the amount of work performed (The billing statements
              demonstrate that there was an inordinate amount of
              work performed on this dispute[]);

          -   the character of the services rendered (The Estate spent
              an extensive amount of time in trial preparation, trial
              attendance and preparing legal argument on property
              items that were not awarded to the Estate.);

          -   the difficulty of the problems involved (The overall case
              was not complex[]); and

          -   the amount of money or value of the property in question
              (The amount of money and value of the property that
              one reasonably could presume would be awarded to the
              Estate was not a large sum.).

       The statements above further demonstrate why the Court reduced
       the fees and costs awarded to the Estate. Specifically, among
       other reasons, the court concluded that there was an inordinate
       amount of work performed on this dispute and that an extensive
       amount of time was spent in trial preparation, trial attendance and
       preparing legal argument on property items that were not
       awarded to the Estate. The court’s conclusion that the Estate
       created complexities by seeking several high-priced property
       items with no evidence demonstrating that [Ms.] Smith possessed
       those items, further serves to justify the reduction in fees and
       costs awarded to the Estate.[3]
____________________________________________

3 The Estate asserts that the orphans’ court erred in concluding that the Estate

performed an “inordinate” amount of work on this dispute and that an
extensive amount of time was spent in trial preparation, trial attendance, and
preparing argument on property that was ultimately not awarded to the
Estate. See The Estate’s Brief at 25-26. The Estate argues that “[e]xpending
over $65,000.00 in a thirteen-month litigation in pursuit of invaluable family
heirlooms is not unreasonable.” Id. at 25. However, the Estate has not
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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See Trial Ct. Op., 5/1/23, at 5 (citations and quotation marks omitted and

some formatting altered).

       As noted previously, the Estate also claimed that the orphans’ court

February 17, 2023 order awarding attorneys’ fees conflicted with the July 1,

2022 order and “re-shaped” the proceedings. See The Estate’s Brief at 23.

We conclude that there is no merit to this claim.      The July 1, 2022 order

directed Ms. Smith to pay the Estate $2,000 as a sanction for her contempt,

____________________________________________

challenged the orphans’ court’s findings as to ownership of the property, the
valuation of the property, or the valuation of the estate as a whole. As the
orphans’ court noted, “[t]he burden of proof is on anyone who claims property
in the possession of another to establish facts essential to the validity of his
claim of ownership.” Opinion and Order, 7/1/22, at 2 (quoting Whitenight
v. Whitenight, 278 A.2d 912, 914 (Pa. 1971)). The July 1, 2022 order
concluded that the Estate failed to sustain its burden with respect to whether
Ms. Smith had contemptuously retained or distributed other personal property
including coins, jewelry, cash, guns, furniture, dishes, and other
miscellaneous items. See Opinion and Order, 7/1/22, at 5-6 (unpaginated).
The orphans’ court found that the Estate failed to demonstrate that the
Decedent possessed many of these personal property items at the time of his
death and that the items were in the possession of Ms. Smith after Decedent’s
death. See id. at 5-6 (unpaginated). In support of its conclusions, the Court
noted that much of the Estate’s evidence involved claims that Ms. Smith
possessed Decedent’s personal property five to twenty years ago during the
time they lived together. See Opinion and Order, 7/1/22, at 6 (unpaginated).
Because the Estate has not challenged the orphans’ court’s conclusions
regarding ownership or valuation of the property, any challenges to these
issues are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that “[i]ssues not raised in
the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”);
see also See Korman Commercial Props. v. Furniture.com, LLC, 81 A.3d
97, 102 (Pa. Super. 2013) (explaining that claims not raised before the trial
court and not presented in the Rule 1925(b) statement are waived on appeal).

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and it further awarded the Estate “reasonable” attorneys’ fees. See Opinion

and Order, 7/1/22, at 7 (unpaginated). The order directed:

      Counsel for the Estate shall submit a reasonable attorney’s fee
      invoice/exhibit to counsel for Ms. Smith within 30 days of the date
      of this opinion and order of court. The parties shall have 60 days
      from the date of this order to attempt to negotiate a reasonable
      attorney’s fee award. If the parties are unable to negotiate a
      reasonable attorney’s fee award agreement, they shall notify
      chambers . . . and a hearing on the limited topic of the reasonable
      attorney’s fees relevant to the petition for adjudication of personal
      property claims and for costs and contempt of court orders will be
      scheduled.

Id. (formatting altered).

      The parties could not arrive at an agreed-upon amount of attorneys’

fees, and the orphans’ court held a hearing to address only the amount of

reasonable attorneys’ fees.    As stated, the orphans’ court considered the

LaRocca factors, and it directed Ms. Smith to pay $6,600 in reasonable

attorneys’ fees. See Order, 2/17/23, at 2-3 (unpaginated). On this record,

we do not agree with Appellant that the orphans’ court’s order failed to

properly sanction Ms. Smith nor that somehow it erroneously “re-shaped” the

proceedings with its determinations. Further, the Estate did not challenge the

$2,000 sanction for Ms. Smith’s contempt in its Rule 1925(b) statement.

Therefore, to the extent the Estate seeks to raise that issue on appeal, it is

waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also See Korman Commercial Props.,

81 A.3d at 102.

      Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the orphans’ court in awarding the Estate $6,600 as reasonable attorneys’

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fees. See Carmen Enterprises, Inc., 185 A.3d at 390; LaRocca’s Trust

Estate, 246 A.2d at 339. The Estate has the burden to establish facts to

support its contentions that the orphans’ court’s assessment of attorneys’ fees

was unreasonable. See LaRocca’s Trust Estate, 246 A.2d at 339. Here,

the orphans’ court judge has presided over this matter since the beginning of

the case, therefore, it is in the best position to directly observe and value legal

counsel’s efforts in this matter rather than an appellate court that only reviews

a cold record. See, e.g., A.L. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 274 A.3d 1228,

1239 (Pa. 2022) (recognizing that appellate courts rely on a cold record and

defer to the fact-finder’s factual findings because the fact-finder “hears

witness testimony first-hand [and] is able to take into account not only the

words that are spoken and transcribed, but the witnesses’ demeanor, tone of

voice, mannerisms, and the like”); Interest of H.H., 42 WDA 2023, 2023 WL

3884674, at *9 (Pa. Super. filed Jun. 8, 2023) (stating “we must defer to the

trial court’s factual findings when they are supported by competent evidence

of record, as unlike this Court, which reviews proceedings based on the cold

record, . . . the lower court reaches its conclusions often based on first-hand

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.”) (unpublished

mem.).4 Absent an abuse of discretion or legal error, this Court will not disturb

the orphans’ court’s conclusions duly supported by the record as in this case.

See Carmen Enterprises, Inc., 185 A.3d at 390; LaRocca’s Trust Estate,
____________________________________________

4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that unpublished memoranda filed after May

1, 2019 may be cited for persuasive value).

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246 A.2d at 339. We observe that the orphans’ court thoroughly explained

its consideration of the LaRocca factors, applied those factors to the case at

bar, and awarded the Estate $6,600 in attorneys’ fees based on the facts of

this case.   On this record, we conclude that the orphans’ court properly

considered these factors and acted within its discretion in assessing the

amount of attorneys’ fees due the Estate, therefore no relief is due.    See

Carmen Enterprises, Inc., 185 A.3d at 390; LaRocca’s Trust Estate, 246

A.2d at 339.

     For these reasons, we affirm.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/22/2024

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