Court Opinion

ID: 9641708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:38:51.94276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:49.579604
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Nix :
I dissent.
The majority states that an appeal from a refusal to quash a grand jury subpoena is interlocutory and then goes on to hold that the extraordinary circum*521stances necessary to justify a writ of prohibition are not present in this case. In my view, such a holding ignores existing precedent and violates the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Petitioner alleges that she was subpoenaed to appear before an investigating grand jury investigating crimes far beyond the scope of its authority. The majority would require that she place herself in jeopardy of criminal contempt in order to realize her right to appellate review guaranteed by Art. V, Sec. 9.1
I recognize that the ordinary route for challenging a subpoena is through contempt. However, I am in fundamental disagreement with such an approach where there is substantial question concerning the authority to issue the subpoena. In such a case, a party with real doubt as to his legal status is forced to act upon that status at his peril. If he refuses to obey the subpoena and his challenge is not sustained, he will be subject to criminal sanction. If he obeys the subpoena, his challenge may well be moot because the harm he sought to avoid—be it unreasonable search and seizure, self-incrimination or a general invasion of privacy—has already occurred.
A civil litigant in such a dilemma would be allowed the assistance of a declaratory judgment in order to avoid future litigation. See generally, Friestad v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 452 Pa. 417, 306 A. 2d 295 (1973). The primary thrust of our criminal law is to prevent crime. It is fundamentally inconsistent to force a citizen to commit a crime in order to preserve his right to appeal, while at the same time affording civil litigants access to the courts.
*522TMs petitioner has raised a substantial challenge to the grand jury’s authority, and in my view, it is a miscarriage of justice and an emasculation of Art. Y, Sec. 9 to force her to suffer contempt in order to pursue that challenge. Leaving aside the issue of whether an appeal would be interlocutory,2 this is clearly a case of extreme necessity for a writ of prohibition to secure order and regularity in judicial proceedings under the standard of Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 102, 61 A. 2d 426, 480 (1948).
In essence the petitioner’s claim that the grand jury was acting beyond its scope is an allegation of lack of jurisdiction. Traditionally we have held that a claim that a tribunal is acting without jurisdiction is cognizable by a writ of prohibition. McNair’s Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 64, 187 A. 498, 505 (1936); Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, supra at 98, 61 A. 2d 426 at 428.
Mr. Justice Manderino joins in this dissenting opinion.

 “There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record ... to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by law.”

 The rule against interlocutory appeals is a flexible one, Commonwealth v. Ragone, 317 Pa. 113, 176 A. 454 (1935), and we have said that: “where the interlocutory order, for all practical purposes, presents a somewhat final aspect, an appellate court will review it in order to safeguard basic human rights or to prevent a great injustice to a defendant.” Commonwealth v. Novak, 384 Pa. 237, 240, 120 A. 2d 543, 544, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 825 (1956).