Court Opinion

ID: 9394441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 14:08:42.225126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:59.931831
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Lake, 2023-Ohio-1619.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                SENECA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                               CASE NO. 13-22-15

        v.

TAYLOR J. LAKE,                                           OPINION

        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                  Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
                            Trial Court No. 21 CR 0222

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                              Date of Decision: May 15, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Brian A. Smith for Appellant

        Stephanie J. Kiser for Appellee
Case No. 13-22-15

ZIMMERMAN, J.

        {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Taylor J. Lake (“Lake”), appeals the October 17,

2022 judgment entry of his conviction and sentence from the Seneca County

Common Pleas Court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

        {¶2} On December 22, 2021, Lake was indicted for failing to reregister

annually as an arson offender in violation of R.C. 2909.15(D)(1), (H), a fifth-degree

felony.1 Lake appeared for arraignment on February 28, 2022 and entered a plea of

not guilty.

        {¶3} A jury trial was held in the trial court on May 4, 2022 wherein the jury

found Lake guilty of the charge set forth in the indictment. On October 13, 2022,

the trial court sentenced Lake to three years of community control.

        {¶4} Lake timely appeals and raises three assignments of error for our

review. We will review his first and second assignments of error together followed

by his third assignment of error.

                                  First Assignment of Error

        Because the State’s evidence was not legally sufficient to support
        a conviction, Appellant’s conviction for Required Personal
        Registration as an Arson Offender was not supported by
        sufficient evidence.

1
 Lake’s duty to reregister as an arson offender stems from a felony conviction for arson in Wyandot County
Common Pleas Court in case number 15-CR-0134.

                                                   -2-
Case No. 13-22-15

                           Second Assignment of Error

       Because the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage
       of justice in finding Appellant guilty, Appellant’s conviction for
       Required Personal Registration as an Arson Offender was against
       the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶5} In his first and second assignments of error, Lake argues that his

conviction is based upon insufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of

the evidence.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶6} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are

clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389

(1997), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89

(1997). Thus, we address each legal concept, individually.

       {¶7} “‘“[S]ufficiency” is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is

applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is

legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.’” Id. at 386, quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th Ed.1990). “In essence, sufficiency is a test of

adequacy.” Id. “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of

the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted

at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional

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Case No. 13-22-15

amendment on other grounds, Smith at 89. Accordingly, “[t]he relevant inquiry is

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we

neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both

are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos.

C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33, citing State v. Williams, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-110097, 2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25. See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist.

Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19, citing Thompkins at 386; State v.

Williams, 3d. Dist. Logan No. 8-20-54, 2021-Ohio-1359, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Croft,

3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-15-11, 2016-Ohio-449, ¶ 5.

       {¶8} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the

manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,

“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of

witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). But we must

give due deference to the fact-finder, because

       [t]he fact-finder * * * occupies a superior position in determining
       credibility. The fact-finder can hear and see as well as observe the

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Case No. 13-22-15

       body language, evaluate voice inflections, observe hand gestures,
       perceive the interplay between the witness and the examiner, and
       watch the witness’s reaction to exhibits and the like. Determining
       credibility from a sterile transcript is a Herculean endeavor. A
       reviewing court must, therefore, accord due deference to the
       credibility determinations made by the fact-finder.

Williams, 2021-Ohio-1359, at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Dailey, 3d Dist. Crawford No.

3-07-23, 2008-Ohio-274, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Thompson, 127 Ohio App.3d 511,

529 (8th Dist.1998). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact

appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the

credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When

applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the

evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn

the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-

5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

                                       Analysis

       {¶9} Lake was found guilty by a jury of failing to reregister annually, in

person, as an arson offender with the Seneca County Sheriff’s Office’s registrar

under R.C. 2909.15(D)(1). R.C. 2909.15 states, in its relevant part:

       (D)(1) Each arson offender * * * shall reregister annually, in person,
       with the sheriff of the county in which the offender resides * * * within
       ten days of the anniversary of the calendar date on which the offender
       initially registered. The registrant shall reregister by completing,
       signing, and returning to the sheriff * * * a copy of the registration
       form prescribed by the attorney general and described in divisions
       (C)(1) and (2) of this section, amending any information required

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Case No. 13-22-15

         under division (C) of this section that has changed since the
         registrant’s last registration, and providing any additional registration
         information required by the attorney general. The sheriff * * * shall
         obtain a new photograph of the offender annually when the offender
         reregisters. Additionally, if the arson offender’s * * * most recent * *
         * reregistration was with a sheriff * * * of a different county, the
         offender shall provide written notice of the offender’s change of
         residence address to that sheriff * * *.

         ***

         (H) Whoever fails to * * * reregister as required by this section is
         guilty of a felony of the fifth degree. * * *.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2909.15(D)(1), (H).

         {¶10} We address the second portion of Lake’s argument regarding whether

the State must establish a culpable-mental state to gain a conviction first. To us,

this is an issue of first impression in Ohio as it pertains to the arson-offender registry.

Significantly, no Ohio appellate court has held that violations of R.C. 2909.15(D)(1)

require any degree of culpability as defined in section 2901.21(F)(3) of the Revised

Code.2

         {¶11} In this portion of his argument, Lake asserts that because R.C.

2909.15(D)(1) does not explicitly delineate a culpable-mental state, recklessness is

implied, and thus, the State must prove such at trial. Accordingly, Lake argues that

R.C. 2901.21(B) is triggered. R.C. 2901.21(B) states in its pertinent part:

         When the language defining an offense does not specify any degree
         of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal

2
  R.C. 2901.21(F)(3) defines culpability as “purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, as defined in
section 2901.22 of the Revised Code.”

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Case No. 13-22-15

       liability for the conduct described in the section, then culpability is
       not required for a person to be guilty of the offense. The fact that one
       division of a section plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict
       liability for an offense defined in that division does not by itself
       plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for an
       offense defined in other divisions of the section that do not specify a
       degree of culpability.

       {¶12} Lake contends that since R.C. 2901.21(B) is triggered and because

R.C. 2909.15 does not plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict-criminal liability,

the prosecutor in the instant case was required to prove the culpable-mental state of

recklessness at trial. In support of his position, Lake directs us to R.C. 2901.21(C),

which states:

       (1) When language defining an element of an offense that is related
       to knowledge or intent or to which mens rea could fairly be applied
       neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose
       strict liability, the element of the offense is established only if a person
       acts recklessly.

       (2) Division (C)(1) of this section does not apply to offenses defined
       in Title XLV of the Revised Code.

       (3) Division (C)(1) of this section does not relieve the prosecution
       of the burden of proving the culpable mental state required by any
       definition incorporated into the offense.

R.C. 2901.21(C)(1)-(3).

                     The Arson-Offender-Registry Scheme

       {¶13} The arson-offender-registration scheme is contained in R.C. 2909.13,

R.C. 2909.14, and R.C. 2909.15. Those sections define an arson offender, the

registration requirements, provide guidelines for notifying arson offenders of their

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Case No. 13-22-15

duty to register and for maintaining the registry, and impose penalties for an arson

offender’s failure to register or reregister.

       {¶14} Under the scheme, registration is mandatory for all “arson offenders”.

R.C. 2909.14(A). An “arson offender” includes, a person who “on or after the

effective date” of the statute “is convicted of or pleads guilty to an arson-related

offense,” as well as any person who is “serving a prison term, term of imprisonment,

or other term of confinement” “in a jail, workhouse, state correctional institution, or

other institution” for an arson-related offense “on the effective date” of the statute.

R.C. 2909.13(B)(1) and (2).         See also R.C. 2909.14(A)(2).         “Arson-related

offense[s]” are arson and aggravated arson, including any attempt, conspiracy, or

complicity in committing those crimes. R.C. 2909.13(A)(2).

       {¶15} If an offender is incarcerated, the official in charge of the facility is to

notify the offender of the registration requirements prior to his release. R.C.

2909.14(A)(1). If an offender’s sentence does not include any term of imprisonment

or confinement, then the statute requires the judge to provide notification at the time

of sentencing. R.C. 2909.14(A)(2). The person providing notice must also require

the offender to sign a form indicating an understanding of the registration

requirements. R.C. 2909.14(B).

       {¶16} Arson offenders must complete their first registration within ten days

after being released from a “jail, workhouse, state correctional institution, or other

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Case No. 13-22-15

institution” or upon receiving notice at the sentencing hearing. R.C. 2909.15(A)(1)

and (2). Thereafter, an arson offender must reregister annually with the sheriff of

the county in which the offender resides. R.C. 2909.15(D)(1). The following

information must be provided: name and any aliases; residence address; social

security number; driver’s license or state identification number; the crime of

conviction; employer or school or institution attended; license plate number, vehicle

identification number, and a vehicle description; any distinguishing physical marks;

and any other information required by the Attorney General. (Emphasis added.)

R.C. 2909.15(C)(2)(a) through (j). The offender also must provide finger and palm

prints, and allow his photograph to be taken. R.C. 2909.15(C)(3).

       {¶17} The statutes impose a lifetime registration duty on all arson offenders.

R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(a). However, a limited-duty exception exists permitting the

trial court to shorten the reporting period to a specified term of “not less than ten

years”, but only upon the request of both the prosecutor and the investigating law

enforcement agency. R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b).

       {¶18} The registry is maintained by the Bureau of Criminal Identification

and Investigation. R.C. 2909.15(E)(2). The fire marshal’s office, state and local

law enforcement officers, and certain authorized firefighters are permitted to access

the registry. Id. The registry is not, however, a public record under Ohio’s public

records law. Id.; see R.C. 149.43.

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Case No. 13-22-15

       {¶19} The failure to register or reregister is a felony of the fifth degree, and

also constitutes a violation of postrelease- and community-control sanctions, parole,

or other type of supervised release. R.C. 2909.15(H).

                                 Strict-Liability Analysis

       {¶20} We agree with Lake that the language defining the offense set forth in

R.C. 2909.15(D)(1) does not specify any degree of culpability. However, we do not

find that the State is required to prove the culpable-mental state of recklessness and

that R.C. 2909.15(D)(1) does not plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict-criminal

liability. Here, it is the act of failing to reregister alone that triggers criminal liability

under R.C. 2909.15(D)(1) and punishment under R.C. 2909.15(H). Hence, we

conclude that R.C. 2909.15 does not have a scienter requirement (i.e. degree of

culpability specified). Consequently, we look to R.C. 2909.15(D)(1) to determine

whether it is the General Assembly’s intent to impose strict liability.

       {¶21} A statute imposes strict liability when the statute clearly shows a

legislative intent to do so. State v. Moody, 104 Ohio St.3d 244, 2004-Ohio-6395, ¶

5-18 (analyzing R.C. 2919.24 Contributing to unruliness or delinquency of a child

and concluding, “for strict liability to be the mental standard, the statute must plainly

indicate a purpose to impose it.”). While the words of the statute here (“[e]ach arson

offender or out-of-state arson offender shall”) do not automatically impose strict

liability, other indicia may demonstrate the General Assembly’s intent to do so. See

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Case No. 13-22-15

generally State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130571, 2014-Ohio-4030, ¶ 8-9

(analyzing this issue regarding whether failing to provide notice of an address

change under the Megan’s Law version of R.C. 2950.05 was a strict-liability

offense). These indicia include (1) whether the statute specified a mental state for

one element of the crime and omitted it from another, (2) whether the offense was

malum prohibitum (i.e., the acts are made unlawful for the good of the public

welfare regardless of the person’s state of mind), and (3) whether the legislature had

taken a “strong stance” against that type of crime. State v. Clay, 120 Ohio St.3d

528, 2008-Ohio-6325, ¶ 6-27.

         {¶22} Addressing the first consideration, no portion of R.C. 2909.15(D)(1)

specifies an element of culpability. Thus, the first consideration provides us with

no guidance on the issue of whether the General Assembly intended to define R.C.

2909.15(D)(1), a strict-liability offense. We do note, however, that R.C. 2909.15 is

similar, though not identical, to former R.C. 2950.05 (Megan’s Law), which has

been repealed.3 Importantly, many of our sister districts (i.e., First, Second, Fifth,

Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Appellate Districts) have

3
  An arson offender can have a limited duty to reregister for 10 years or a duty to reregister until the offender’s
death; however, there are no community-notification requirements. See R.C. 2909.15(2)(a)-(b). Compare
with Former R.C. 2950.07(B)(3) and 2950.06(B)(2), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180 (“H.B. 180”), 146 Ohio Laws,
Part II, 2617 and 2613, Former R.C. 2950.06(B)(1) and 2950.07(B)(1), H.B. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II,
2613 and 2616, and Former R.C. 2950.11(A), H.B. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2627. Under Megan’s Law,
if an offender was classified at the lowest risk level, i.e., as a sexually oriented offender, he or she was
required to register annually for a period of ten years with no community notification, and a sexual-predator
classification was the highest-risk offender under Megan’s Law. Sexual predators were required to register
every 90 days for life, with community notification required.

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Case No. 13-22-15

concluded that R.C. 2950.05 imposes strict liability. See State v. Ramsey, 12th Dist.

Fayette No. CA2022-02-003, 2022-Ohio-3389, ¶ 13, fn. 3 (citations omitted).

Further, no appellate district has held that R.C. 2950.05 requires any element of

culpability.      Id.    Thus, we find this to be persuasive in our strict-liability

consideration of R.C. 2909.15(D)(1).

        {¶23} Regarding the second indicia, we have previously held that

“‘[g]enerally, strict liability attaches to criminal offenses which are regulatory in

nature and which are designed to protect the health, safety, and well-being of the

community.’” State v. Bowersmith, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-02-02, 2002-Ohio-3386,

¶ 18, quoting State v. Shaffer, 114 Ohio App.3d 97, 102-103 (3d Dist.1996), citing

State v. Buehler Food Markets, Inc., 50 Ohio App.3d 29, 30 (9th Dist.1989).

Significantly, “the arson offender registry ‘allows law enforcement officials to

remain vigilant about possible recidivism by arson offenders’ and, thus, ‘objectively

serves the remedial purpose of protecting the local community from repeat arson

offenders[]’”. State v. Daniel, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1104, 2022-Ohio-1348, ¶

24, certifying a conflict, 167 Ohio St.3d 1466, 2022-Ohio-24904, quoting State v.

Reed, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-130, 2014-Ohio-5463, ¶ 79. That is–the arson-

4
 The Supreme Court of Ohio recently certified a conflict between the Sixth Appellate District (in State v.
Daniel, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1104, 2022-Ohio-1348) and the Fourth Appellate District (in State v.
Dingus, 4th Dist. Ross No. 16CA3525, 2017-Ohio-2619) in Supreme Court case number 2022-0603. The
certified question before the Supreme Court is “Does R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) unconstitutionally violate the
doctrine of separation of powers?” However, the constitutionality of R.C. 2909.15 was not challenged by
Lake on appeal, and thus will not be addressed.

                                                  -12-
Case No. 13-22-15

offender registry database “provide[s] a tool to law enforcement and protect[s] the

public from harm”, which is indicative that it is designed to protect the health,

safety, and well-being of the community, and hence is mala prohibita. State v.

Gaeth, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-21-075, 2022-Ohio-2906, ¶ 14.

       {¶24} Indeed, none of our sister districts have been asked nor have they

concluded that the arson-offender-registration law is mala prohibita. However,

several appellate districts have concluded that the sex-offender-registration laws,

which are similar in nature to the arson offender registry, are mala prohibita. See

Ramsey at ¶ 16, citing State v. Stansell, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 23630, 2010-

Ohio-5756, ¶ 20, State v. Stewart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94863, 2011-Ohio-612,

¶ 17, Smith, 2014-Ohio-4030, at ¶ 7, and State v. Hardy, 9th Dist. Summit No.

21015, 2002-Ohio-6457, ¶ 17. See also Daniel, 2022-Ohio-1348, at ¶ 21, citing

State v. Caldwell, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130812, 2014-Ohio-3566, ¶ 33-34. In

Ramsey, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, concluded that because those laws

are mala prohibitum that it was indicative that the General Assembly’s intended to

impose strict-criminal liability for that conduct.      Id.   We find this rationale

persuasive and apply it to our analysis of R.C. 2909.15(D)(1) concluding that R.C.

2909.15(D)(1) (like the sex-offender-registration laws) is mala prohibita, and thus

it is indicative that the General Assembly intended to impose strict-criminal liability

for the conduct required by R.C. 2909.15(D)(1).

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Case No. 13-22-15

       {¶25} Finally, we must consider whether the General Assembly has taken a

“strong stance” against these types of crimes–failure to register/reregister crimes.

See Clay, 120 Ohio St.3d 528, 2008-Ohio-6325, at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Maxwell,

95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, ¶ 30; see also Bowersmith, 2002-Ohio-3386,

at ¶ 14. For the reasons herein stated above and because of the General Assembly’s

imposition of a lifetime registration duty on all arson offenders (even misdemeanor

offenders with limited exceptions) it is clear to us that the General Assembly has

taken a strong stance against registration/reregistration crimes involving arson. R.C.

2909.15(D)(2)(a)-(b).

       {¶26} Therefore, we conclude that R.C. 2909.15(D)(1) imposes strict-

criminal liability and no degree of culpability is required under R.C. 2909.15(D)(1).

Hence, the prosecutor was not required to prove that Lake acted with recklessness.

Thus, this portion of Lake’s argument is without merit.

       {¶27} Next, we address the portion of Lake’s argument that the prosecutor

did not present sufficient evidence to establish that Lake was required to reregister

in Seneca County. He asserts that the prosecutor failed to establish a prima facie

case by failing to establish Lake’s residency address. According to Lake, he

hypothetically could have either resided in another Ohio county or out-of-state, and

therefore, the State failed in its burden of proof. We disagree.

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Case No. 13-22-15

          {¶28} To gain a conviction in this case, the State is required under R.C.

2909.15(D)(1) to prove: 1) that the arson offender; 2) failed to reregister; 3)

annually; 4) in person; 5) with the sheriff of the county in which he resides; 6) within

10 days of the anniversary of the calendar date on which he initially registered.

(Emphasis added.) See R.C. 2909.15(D)(1). Contrary to Lake’s argument, the

record reveals that the State did establish a prima facie case as to the county in which

Lake resides. Here, the facts reveal that Lake relocated (from Wyandot County) to

Seneca County in 2020. (See State’s Ex. 3). Then, pursuant to R.C. 2909.15(C)(1),

Lake registered in person with the Seneca County Sheriff’s Office as an arson

offender (on August 28, 2020). When he registered, Lake provided William

Cunningham (“Lt. Cunningham”), a lieutenant with the Seneca County Sheriff’s

Office, his expected residence address. (Id.). See also R.C. 2909.15(C)(2)(b) and

(D)(1). In turn, Cunningham gave Lake a copy of his “Notice of Duties to Register

as an Arson Offender (ORC 2909.14)”, which instructed him to reregister in person

at the Seneca County Sheriff’s Office no later than September 6, 2021. (See State’s

Ex. 3).

          {¶29} At trial, the State proved that Lake did not reregister or provide

another sheriff’s office with written notice of his change of residence address. See

R.C. 2909.15(D)(1). Put more plainly, Lake’s most recent registration contained

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Case No. 13-22-15

his expected residence address, which establishes the State’s prima facie case that

Lake was required to reregister in Seneca County on or before September 6, 2021.

         {¶30} When Lake failed to reregister (in Seneca County) by the

aforementioned date, Lt. Cunningham received an alert from the arson-registry

database informing him that Lake’s reregistration was past due. Lt. Cunningham

then checked the database to ensure that Lake was not registered as an arson

offender in a different Ohio county.5 After concluding that Lake had not registered

elsewhere (in Ohio), Lt. Cunningham attempted to contact Lake by telephone at the

number Lake provided. Unable to reach Lake by phone, Lt. Cunningham then sent

Lake a warning letter (by ordinary mail) advising him to reregister in person at the

Seneca County Sheriff’s Office. Here, the State proved that Lake never appeared

in person at the Seneca County Sheriff’s Office to reregister or at any other sheriff’s

office in Ohio to register anew as an arson offender. Further, the State also proved

that no sheriff’s office received Lake’s notice of a change in his residence address.

See R.C. 2909.15(D)(1). Thus, this portion of Lake’s argument is without merit.

         {¶31} Next, Lake asserts that it is possible that he relocated to another state

where he potentially would not be subject to the registration requirements under

R.C. 2909.15. Even if we assume without deciding that R.C. 2909.15(D)(1) would

then be inapplicable, there is no evidence in the record that Lake ever maintained

5
 Indeed, this arson-registry software and database is specifically configured for Ohio. Significantly, there is
no national arson-offender registry Lt. Cunningham could utilize to verify any out-of-state registration.

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Case No. 13-22-15

any residence in another state. Moreover and notably, the record specifically

contradicts this portion of Lake’s argument and supports that Lake was actually

found in Wyandot, Hancock, and Lucas Counties (all Counties in Ohio) in

September, October, November, and December of 2021 with an identified last

known residence address in Seneca County.             (See State’s Ex. 3); (PSI).

Consequently, this portion of Lake’s argument is without merit.

       {¶32} Based on the evidence highlighted above, we conclude that a rational

trier of fact (the jury) could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Lake failed to

reregister as an arson offender in Seneca County under the facts presented.

Accordingly, Lake’s conviction is based on sufficient evidence.

       {¶33} Accordingly, Lake’s first assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶34} Next, we turn to address Lake’s arguments regarding the weight of the

evidence. Lake asserts in his manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge that Lt.

Cunningham lacks credibility because he should have made reasonable efforts to

contact Lake in addition to his (Cunningham’s) search of the arson-registry database

and attempts to reach Lake by telephone and ordinary mail. Importantly, the statute

places no burden on the sheriff to make reasonable efforts to contact the arson

offender, which Lake concedes. See R.C. 2909.15(D)(1); (Appellant’s Brief at 13).

       {¶35} To us, Lake is attempting to shift the burden under R.C. 2909.15(D)(1)

from Lake (the arson-offender) to Lt. Cunningham (the registrar). On the contrary,

                                        -17-
Case No. 13-22-15

it was Lake’s responsibility to reregister by September 6, 2021 in person in Seneca

County or to register in a different Ohio county if his residence address changed as

well as provide that registrar with written notice of his change of address. See R.C.

2909.15(D)(1).

       {¶36} Even though Lake’s credibility argument appears to test the

persuasiveness of the State’s evidence, his argument sounds in sufficiency, which

we have already addressed. Consequently, we limit our review here to the weight

of the evidence.

       {¶37} Upon the facts presented, we conclude that the evidence we

summarized in our sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis (supporting Lake’s

conviction) is weightier than the evidence against it, and thus, the evidence does not

weigh heavily against Lake’s conviction. Therefore, we do not conclude that the

jury clearly lost its way, which created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

Lake’s conviction must be reversed.

       {¶38} Accordingly, Lake’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                            Third Assignment of Error

       Because the trial court’s sentence deferred Appellant’s remaining
       jail time to the discretion of Appellant’s probation officer, the
       trial court’s sentence was contrary to law and in violation of
       Appellant’s right to Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
       Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
       Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

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Case No. 13-22-15

       {¶39} In his third assignment of error, Lake argues that the trial court erred

by reserving part of his sentence (i.e., 113 days) to be scheduled at the sole and

absolute discretion of Seneca County Probation Services. Specifically, Lake argues

that the trial court vested its authority under R.C. 2929.15(B) to impose a penalty

upon Lake to his probation officer, which he argues is contrary to law and violates

his due-process rights.

                                Standard of Review

       {¶40} R.C. 2953.08 provides specific grounds for a defendant to appeal a

felony sentence. State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 10.

Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence “only if it

determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the

trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise

contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear

and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts

a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id. at ¶ 22,

quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶41} However, “[a] ‘sentencing court has broad discretion to shape

community control sanctions provided that the sanctions are constitutionally and

statutorily permitted.’” State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, ¶

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Case No. 13-22-15

19, quoting Katz, Lipton, Gianneli, & Crocker, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Criminal

Law, Section 119:2 (3d Ed.2014).

                                       Analysis

       {¶42} Importantly, R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) directs the court imposing a felony

sentence to utilize one or more community control sanctions authorized under R.C.

2929.16, R.C. 2929.17, and R.C. 2929.18. R.C. 2929.16, R.C. 2929.17, and R.C.

2929.18 each state that the community-control sanctions “include, but are not

limited to, the following” and then give examples. One such example relevant to

the instant case includes a community residential sanction of “a term of up to six

months in jail[]”. R.C. 2929.16(A)(2).

       {¶43} To us, the sentence of the trial court is clear; Lake must serve 113-

days in the county jail as a community residential sanction. See R.C. 2929.16(A)(2).

Importantly, Lake does not dispute the authority of the trial court to impose 113

days, rather he contends that the trial court erred by conveying its authority to the

probation department to impose a jail term. However, we conclude that the trial

court did not convey its authority to the probation department, but rather was

permitting the probation officer to schedule when the jail sentence commences. We

conclude that the trial court’s sentence is not contrary to law, and that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in permitting the probation department to schedule when

the jail sentence begins.

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Case No. 13-22-15

       {¶44} Since we have concluded that Lake’s sentence is not contrary to law,

any argument he asserts regarding due process is rendered moot since it was

predicated upon our reaching a contrary conclusion. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

Therefore, this portion of his argument lacks merit.

       {¶45} Accordingly, Lake’s third assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶46} Having found no error prejudicial to Lake in the particulars assigned

and argued, the judgment of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas, is

affirmed.

                                                              Judgment Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

/jlr

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