Court Opinion

ID: 9408312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 14:10:40.563977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:42.991534
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-22-00130-CR

         JAMES HENRY ELROD, III, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

          On Appeal from the 6th District Court
                Lamar County, Texas
                Trial Court No. 29421

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

           A Lamar County jury convicted James Henry Elrod, III, of the capital murder1 of Eddie

Hostetler and Cassie Head. In accordance with the jury’s assessment of punishment, the trial

court sentenced Elrod to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Elrod appeals, claiming

that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to suppress because he validly invoked his

right to counsel,2 (2) in failing to include a self-defense instruction with regard to both Hostetler

and Head, (3) in failing to include a defense-of-third-person instruction, and (4) in failing to

include an instruction on the lesser-included offense of murder with regard to Head and

Hostetler. Because we find that the trial court (1) did not err in refusing to suppress the

recording of Elrod’s interrogation, (2) did not err in declining to give the requested defensive

instructions, and (3) did not err in failing to include an instruction on the lesser-included offense

of murder in the jury charge, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.         Background

           Texas Ranger Stacey McNeal was called to the scene of the double homicide of Hostetler

and Head by the Lamar County Sheriff’s Office. When McNeal arrived at the residence outside

of Tigertown in the northwestern part of Lamar County, the first thing he noticed was a strong

odor of what he believed to be human decomposition. Head’s body had already been discovered

by sheriff’s deputies on the floor in the closet of the master bedroom. The body was covered

with articles of clothing and bags in what appeared to be an attempt to conceal it. A dog food

1
    TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7) (Supp.).
2
 Elrod claims in his brief that he invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Nevertheless, the briefing relies
primarily on Fifth Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence, as is appropriate.
                                                        2
sack had been pulled over the head. The medical examiner discovered a gunshot wound to the

forehead and determined that to be the cause of death. McNeal believed that the body had been

moved to the closet after Head was killed. He opined that the murders happened on or before

April 21, 2021, several days before the bodies were discovered.

       Hostetler’s body was discovered in an equipment shed affixed to the carport

approximately one hour after Ranger McNeal arrived on the scene. The body was concealed by

tools and equipment, and a dog food sack had been tied over the head. The medical examiner

discovered a gunshot wound to the forehead and determined that to be the cause of death.

Hostetler’s car was unaccounted for.

       The unaccounted-for car was a 2008 Cadillac loaned to Hostetler by his mother so that

Hostetler could drive Elrod and his wife, Carolyn Elrod, to Oklahoma. Elrod did not have

permission to use the Cadillac. Elrod was arrested in McCurtain County, Oklahoma, on April

28, two days after the bodies were discovered.

       Carolyn did not testify at trial. Consequently, the only other living eyewitness to what

happened in the Hostetler residence was Elrod. At trial, Elrod testified that he met Hostetler

when Hostetler came to a party at his house in Idabel, Oklahoma, in January 2021, although he

had known him before that time.3 During the course of the party, Hostetler offered Elrod

employment as a mechanic in Tigertown. As a result of that agreement, Elrod and Carolyn

moved to Tigertown, where Elrod worked as a mechanic for Hostetler and Carolyn worked as

Hostetler’s housekeeper. The couple stayed in Hostetler’s residence with him as compensation

3
At the party, Elrod and Hostetler smoked methamphetamine together.   Elrod admitted that he was a
methamphetamine addict.
                                                 3
for their work. At some point, Hostetler brought Head home with him. Elrod had known Head

for a number of years because they were both from Mt. Herman, Oklahoma.

       In April 2021, Hostetler told Elrod that he needed to leave because his mother did not

want Elrod and Carolyn staying in the house. Hostetler was planning to drive Elrod and Carolyn

back to Oklahoma and borrowed his mother’s Cadillac for that purpose. Elrod was working

outside when Hostetler returned with the Cadillac and entered the house. Eventually, Elrod

entered the house to check on Carolyn’s progress in packing for the trip. When Elrod entered his

bedroom, he found Head holding Carolyn down as Hostetler was sexually assaulting Carolyn.

Elrod stated that he pulled Hostetler out of the room and that Head jumped over him to try to get

out of the room. After he checked on Carolyn, Elrod started looking for Head and Hostetler.

       He discovered Head in the master bedroom laughing at him. Head had not spoken, but

was still giggling, when Elrod picked up a wrench, threw it at her, and hit her in the head. After

having offered that testimony, Elrod stated that Head was reaching for something as she was

laughing at him. He testified that he did not “know what she was reaching for” but that he

believed it was a weapon. Head stood up and looked at Elrod as he threw the wrench. When the

wrench struck her, she fell to the floor in front of the dresser. After Head fell to the floor, she

said nothing, and she was not moving.

       After that, Elrod “went looking” for Hostetler. He found Hostetler in the shed where

Hostetler was holding a hammer in his hand. Hostetler did not say anything to Elrod as Elrod

approached; instead, he giggled. According to Elrod, Hostetler “c[a]me toward” him as Elrod

“picked up the other shop hammer,” threw it at Hostetler, and “hit him in the head with it.”

                                                4
Hostetler fell to the ground and did not speak. Elrod “didn’t stick around long enough to see if

he was moving anymore.” Instead, he returned to the house to check on Carolyn.

       At some point, he felt the need to protect himself because he “didn’t know if they was

going to get back up or not.” Elrod testified that he “feared for [his] life the whole time.” When

Elrod entered the house through the kitchen, he saw a .22 rifle with ammunition laying on the

table. He took the rifle and went to the bedroom where Head laid, motionless, on the floor.

Elrod testified that he shot Head because he “didn’t want them to get up . . . and try to harm

[him] or [his] wife.” He stated, “I was fearing for my life.”

       Next, Elrod returned to the shed where Hostetler was laying where he fell following the

hammer blow to the head. Elrod shot Hostetler with the rifle. Elrod returned to the house, threw

the rifle onto the couch, and told Carolyn to get in the car. Twenty minutes later, after Elrod

finished loading the car, he and Carolyn left. Elrod denied moving Head’s body and denied

placing a dog food sack over her head. Elrod testified that he left both Head and Hostetler as

they were after he shot them. He and Carolyn drove to Nancy Russell’s house in Idabel, where

Elrod was eventually arrested. Elrod testified that he had not used methamphetamine on the day

of the murders and that he was clearheaded at the time.

       On cross-examination, Elrod admitted that, since he already had the keys to the Cadillac

before the shootings, he could have gotten in the car and left without shooting Hostetler and

Head. Elrod further admitted that Hostetler, while lying on the ground before he was shot, was

unable to hurt him.

                                                 5
           Elrod’s son, Dallas Elrod, testified that Elrod came to see him in Broken Bow on

April 19, 2021. Elrod was driving a Cadillac. Elrod told Dallas that he beat two people to death

and then he shot them. He told Dallas that he killed Hostetler first and then killed Head, because

she was a witness to the first murder. Elrod did not tell Dallas that he killed Hostetler and Head

because Carolyn was sexually assaulted by them. Carolyn, however, told Dallas that she had

been sexually assaulted. Dallas testified that he did not believe Carolyn was an honest person.

II.        The Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Suppress Elrod’s Interrogation Video

           In connection with his investigation, Ranger McNeal conducted a recorded interrogation

of Elrod after reading Elrod his Miranda4 rights. Elrod waived those rights and agreed to speak

with McNeal. Based on his claim that he clearly requested counsel during the interrogation,

Elrod filed a motion to suppress all portions of the recording following his request. The trial

court overruled Elrod’s motion to suppress and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.5

The complete interrogation recording was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.

4
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5
                                               FINDINGS OF FACT

           1.      The Defendant was suspected of a double homicide alleged to have occurred in Lamar
           County, Texas. After the killings, it was believed that the Defendant had fled, along with his wife,
           to Oklahoma in a vehicle taken from the scene. Defendant had been arrested in Oklahoma after
           Lamar County authorities had issued a warrant for unauthorized use of the vehicle taken from the
           scene.

           2.      The Defendant was therefore in custody on April 29, 2021, when he was interviewed by
           Ranger Stacey McNeal.

           3.       Prior to the interview beginning, Ranger McNeal mirandized the Defendant.

           4.       The Defendant agreed to give an interview.

           5.       During the interview, the following exchange took place at the 19:18 mark:
                                                            6
                  Ranger McNeal: I don’t know because I don’t believe you.

                  The Defendant: Well then get me my lawyer then . . . . This is over with then. I ain’t
                                 get my family killed for nobody.

                  Ranger McNeal: You don’t want to talk to me anymore?

                  The Defendant: You trying to say I am a liar and I say I haven’t done nothing.

We do not repeat the entirety of the excerpt here because it appears in the body of the opinion.

                                             CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

         1.        It is well settled that a custodial interrogation must cease when the Defendant invokes his
         right to an attorney. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 293, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297
         (1980) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)).

         2.       However, for the invocation to be effective, it must be unequivocal and unambiguous.
         Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994); Dinkins v.
         State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

         3.       At a minimum, Davis requires that a suspect express a definite desire to speak to an
         attorney. Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 351; Lucas v. State, 791 S.W.2d 35, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
         (“The right to counsel is considered invoked where a person indicates he or she desires to speak to
         an attorney or have an attorney present during questioning.”).

         4.      Proper inquiry for a court considering an issue such as the one presented here requires
         a[n] examination of not only the statement itself but also the totality of the circumstances
         surrounding the statement. Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 351.

         5.        This inquiry is objective. In other words, would a reasonable officer in the circumstances
         understand the Defendant’s request to be definite? As was stated, in Davis, “But if a suspect
         makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light
         of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to
         counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.[”] Davis v. United States, 512
         U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994).

         6.       The Defendant’s consent to the interview was self-serving, if anything, as evidenced by
         his repeated requests to know “what he had done.” Ranger McNeal was not forthcoming with that
         information. Therefore, to keep the interview going, the Defendant began to give a version of
         events that conflicted with the information law enforcement had already acquired. At the point in
         time when the Defendant made the statement at issue, it is objectively reasonable for an officer to
         have construed the statement on different levels. In other words, was this a deflection by the
         Defendant because he was caught in a lie? Was this a threat by the Defendant to squeeze the
         Ranger for more details of their investigation? Or, as the Defendant argues, was this truly an
         invocation of the Defendant’s desire to stop the interview and receive counsel? These reasonable
         ambiguities led to the Ranger seeking clarification[,] and silence speaks volumes. If it was the
                                                          7
       Elrod contends that, even though he implicitly waived his right to counsel by continuing

to answer questions during a law enforcement interrogation, that implicit waiver was ineffective

because it was the result of “further unconstitutional interrogation by law enforcement.”

                 A.     Standard of Review

       We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated

standard. We “afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of the historical

facts, especially when that determination involves an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor

of witnesses.”    Masterson v. State, 155 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing

Maldonado v. State, 998 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). We also “afford nearly total

deference to trial courts’ rulings on application-of-law-to-fact questions, also known as mixed

questions of law and fact, if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of

credibility and demeanor.” Carrillo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007,

pet. ref’d) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).

       “[W]e review de novo . . . mixed questions of law and fact which do not turn on witness

credibility and demeanor.” Cagle v. State, 509 S.W.3d 617, 622 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016,

no pet.) (citing Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). “Consequently,

we review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the trial

court’s ruling.” Id. (citing State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

       “Where, as here, the trial court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, we

determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

       latter, the interview would have stopped when the Defendant said “yes.” He didn’t reply in that
       manner[,] so the conversation continued voluntarily.
                                                     8
ruling, supports those fact-findings, and review de novo the trial court’s legal conclusions unless

its explicit fact-findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling.”

Id. (citing Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 819). “Since all the evidence is viewed in the light most

favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we are obligated to uphold the denial of [Elrod’s] motion to

suppress if it was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to

the case.” Young v. State, 420 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (citing

Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).

               B.      Analysis

       After Elrod signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights, he gave an account of his

arrival in Oklahoma. Elrod stated that he and Carolyn had left Paris on a Monday two weeks

hence. He recounted that they had been staying with Hostetler—someone he had known from

years past—in Tigertown. Elrod paid rent to Hostetler by working on cars for him. Elrod

explained that Hostetler’s grandmother owned the house in which they were residing, and at

some point, Hostetler’s mother indicated that she did not want anyone else living in the house.

       In his account, Elrod explained that he and Carolyn left Hostetler’s home a little before

noon after Hostetler asked them to leave. Elrod told Ranger McNeal that he and Carolyn paid

someone—whose name was unknown to him—$100.00 for a ride to Oklahoma in a turquoise,

Ford Ranger, extended-cab pickup. Elrod explained that he had been staying at “Nancy’s place”

in Oklahoma for approximately two weeks, where he had done some mechanic work. Neither

Elrod nor McNeal mentioned the murders of Hostetler and Head. Elrod repeatedly denied

having possession of the Cadillac and offered different excuses for having the keys to the

                                                  9
Cadillac and for having Head’s ring. Elrod also denied having any physical confrontation with

either Head or Hostetler. Following Elrod’s account, the following discussion ensued:

              Ranger McNeal:        The problem, Jamie, is what you told me now—
                                    none of that’s true. And you already know that.
                                    And you know that I know that.

              Elrod:                What was I was supposed to have done? Please tell
                                    me.

              Ranger McNeal:        You didn’t get a ride in a turquoise-colored Ford
                                    Ranger to Nancy’s. I know that and you know that.
                                    So it would be better if you just told me the truth.

              Elrod:                Tell me what I’ve done, please.

              Ranger McNeal:        Tell me the truth.

              Elrod:                I ain’t done nothing to nobody.         When people
                                    threaten me, I leave.

              Ranger McNeal:        Who threatened you?

              Elrod:                Ask Eddie’s momma and them.

              Ranger McNeal:        Who threatened you?

              Elrod:                That’s the Mexican boys who came out there
                                    f*****g threatening me.

              Ranger McNeal:        I thought you said you didn’t talk to them.

              Elrod:                When I get s**t stuck in my f*****g face and told
                                    me to f*****g leave.

              Ranger McNeal:        Well you didn’t tell me none of that.

              Elrod:                Sometimes it’s best to keep your f*****g mouth
                                    shut because I ain’t trying to get myself in a
                                    f*****g . . . getting myself f*****g hurt.

                                              10
              Ranger McNeal:        So what’d they tell you?

              Elrod:                What do you think they told me?

              Ranger McNeal:        I don’t know because I don’t believe you.

              Elrod:                Well then get me my lawyer then . . . . This is over
                                    with then. I ain’t getting my f*****g family killed
                                    for nobody.

              Ranger McNeal:        You don’t want to talk to me anymore?

              Elrod:                You trying to say I’m a liar and I say I haven’t done
                                    nothing.

              Ranger McNeal:        I’m saying you’re not telling me the truth.

              Elrod:                I just don’t understand what the f**k I’ve done.

              Ranger McNeal:        Where’s the Cadillac?

              Elrod:                Huh?

              Ranger McNeal:        Where is the Cadillac?

              Elrod:                I ain’t got no Cadillac.

              Ranger McNeal:        You ain’t got no Cadillac?

              Elrod:                No.

              Ranger McNeal:        Where’s Eddie’s Momma’s Cadillac?

              Elrod:                I don’t have Eddie’s Momma’s Cadillac.

       The interrogation proceeded with no further mention of a lawyer. During the remainder

of the interrogation, Elrod confessed to striking Head in the head with a wrench and striking

Hostetler in the head with a hammer. He denied shooting either victim in the head, moving their

bodies, or placing dog food sacks over their heads. Elrod contends that the interrogation should
                                              11
have ended immediately after he said, “Well then get me my lawyer then . . . . This is over with

then.”

         “When a suspect asks for a lawyer, interrogation must cease until counsel has been

provided or the suspect initiates further communication with the police.” Davis v. State, 313

S.W.3d 317, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85

(1981)). “This secondary Miranda right to counsel is ‘designed to prevent police from badgering

a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.’” Beham v. State, 476 S.W.3d

724, 729 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (footnote omitted) (quoting Davis v. United

States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994)). “However, in the context of invoking the Miranda right to

counsel, a suspect must do so ‘unambiguously.’” Id. (citing Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.

370, 381 (2010)).

         “[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in
         that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only
         that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,” then an officer is required
         neither to end the interrogation nor ask questions to clarify whether the accused
         wants to invoke his or her Miranda rights.

Id. at 730 (alteration in original) (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459).

         As a result, “[n]ot every mention of a lawyer will suffice . . . to invoke the Fifth

Amendment right to the presence of counsel during questioning.” State v. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d

888, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).          “Whether the mention of a lawyer constitutes a clear

invocation of the right to counsel will depend upon the statement itself and the totality of the

surrounding circumstances.” Id. In determining whether “a reasonable police officer in the

circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney,” we employ an

                                                  12
objective test. Id. at 893. “We look to the totality of circumstances to determine whether any

statement referencing counsel was really a clear invocation of the Fifth Amendment right; we do

not look to the totality of the circumstances, however, to determine in retrospect whether the

suspect really meant it when he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.” Id. The question,

then, is whether a reasonable police officer would have understood Elrod’s statement to be a

request for an attorney given the totality of the circumstances.

       The trial court reviewed Elrod’s recorded interrogation as its sole basis for denying the

motion to suppress. The recording reflects Elrod’s demeanor and attitude much more clearly

than a dry transcript.   During the interrogation, Elrod spoke quickly and seemed eager to

volunteer information. He often interrupted Ranger McNeal to offer additional information and

often seemingly extraneous information. In other words, McNeal had no occasion to prod Elrod

to talk. Beyond that, Elrod spoke quickly and, at times, flippantly. By the time McNeal told

Elrod that he did not believe Elrod’s story, Elrod stated with a flippant, casual offhandedness,

“Well then get me my lawyer then . . . . This is over with then.” Without pausing (and thus

without further questioning by McNeal) Elrod said, “I ain’t getting my f*****g family killed for

nobody.” This statement—made after Elrod said, “[G]et me my lawyer then”—appears to be an

invitation for further inquiry by McNeal rather than an expression of the desire to cease the

interrogation.

       The totality of these circumstances, when viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable

officer, reflect that Elrod’s statement was not an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the

right to counsel. See Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 338–41; Beham, 476 S.W.3d at 730. Rather than

                                                 13
continue questioning, though, Ranger McNeal reasonably asked Elrod whether he wanted to talk

with McNeal any longer—a statement far removed from the substance of the investigation.

Rather than confirm that he no longer wished to talk with McNeal, Elrod continued talking, as

reflected in the printed dialogue above.6

        For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to

suppress Elrod’s recorded interrogation. We overrule this point or error.

III.    No Error in Declining to Give Defensive Instructions

        At the charge conference, Elrod requested a jury instruction on self-defense as to both

Head and Hostetler. He also requested an instruction on defense of third persons based on the

alleged sexual assault of Carolyn. The trial court denied each of those requests.

        On appeal, Elrod claims that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction with regard to

Head because he testified that he believed that she was reaching for a weapon when he threw a

wrench at her and knocked her unconscious. He points to the following testimony in support of

his claim:

                 Q.       [By defense counsel] All right. Where did you get the wrench
        from?

               A.     [By Elrod] Out of the floor, right there by the toolbox. I didn’t
        know what she was grabbing. She was -- Cassie was facing me at the door at that
        house and giggling and I don’t know what she was reaching for so I throwed the
        wrench and hit her in the head with it.

              Q.      Okay. Let’s back up a little bit. When you confronted her in the
        room and she was laughing she was reaching for something, is that correct?

6
 Because we find that Elrod’s invocation was ambiguous, we need not address the question of whether he waived his
right to counsel by continuing to speak with McNeal. See Cross v. State, 144 S.W.3d 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
                                                       14
               A.      She was right there beside the dresser whenever -- the wrench
       struck her she fell right in front of the chest.

             Q.        Okay. But prior to that happening you said she was reaching for
       something?

               A.      Yes.

               Q.      Do you know what she was reaching for?

               A.      No, sir, I don’t know what she was reaching for.

               Q.      What did you think it was?

               A.      It was a weapon I know --

              Q.     At that point you threw the wrench at her. Was she still reaching
       for something? Was she standing up?

              A.       She stood up and looked at me as I throwed the wrench. I throwed
       the wrench.

       In addition, Elrod testified that he was in fear for his life.

       Next, Elrod claims that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction as to Hostetler

because the evidence showed that Hostetler was holding a hammer and moving toward him.

Elrod therefore claims that he reasonably believed that attacking Hostetler was immediately

necessary to protect himself against Hostetler’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force.

Elrod points to the following testimony in support of his claim:

               Q.      [By defense counsel] After that happened what did you do?

               A.      [By Elrod] I went looking for Eddie.

               Q.      Did you hear him? How did you find him?

               A.      He was making noise in the shed.

                                                  15
               Q.     When you say making noise what kind of noise was it?

               A.     He was moving stuff around.

               Q.     Like moving tools, what?

               A.     Tools. It was just -- he was in there --just a light was in it.

               Q.     So you went outside?

               A.     Yes, sir.

               Q.     And what did you see?

               A.     I seen Eddie with a hammer in his hand.

               Q.     Did he say anything to you?

               A.     No, he -- he was giggling too. I didn’t quite think it was too funny.

               Q.     Did he threaten you with a hammer?

               A.     Yes, sir. He picked it up in his hand.

               Q.     Did he come towards you?

               A.     He come toward me as I picked up the other shop hammer and hit
                      him with it.
                      ....

               Q.     So you picked up the hammer. What did you do next?

               A.     I throwed it and hit him in the head with it.

       Elrod argues that the trial court erred by omitting his requested jury instructions on self-

defense as to both victims and defense of third persons.

                                                16
       A.      Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       We review these claims “under the two-pronged test set out in Almanza v. State, 686

S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g).” Graves v. State, 452 S.W.3d 907, 910

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d). “We first determine whether error exists.” Id. (citing

Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). “If there is no error, our analysis

ends.” Id. (citing Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

       “Regardless of the strength or credibility of the evidence, a defendant is entitled to an

instruction on any defensive issue that is raised by the evidence.” Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d

340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “A defensive issue is raised by the evidence if there is

sufficient evidence to support a rational jury finding as to each element of the defense.” Id.

(citing Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 657–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “We view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the defendant’s requested defensive instruction.” Id. (citing

Gamino v. State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)). “A trial court errs to refuse a

self-defense instruction if there is some evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

defendant, that will support its elements.” Id.

       “[I]f the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, does not establish

self-defense, the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the issue.” Gaspar v. State, 327

S.W.3d 349, 356 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (quoting Ferrel v. State, 55 S.W.3d 586,

591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). “The defendant’s testimony alone may be sufficient to raise a

defensive theory requiring a charge.” Dyson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Tex. Crim. App.

                                                  17
1984). “Whether a defense is supported by the evidence is a sufficiency question reviewable on

appeal as a question of law.” Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

       B.      Elrod Was Not Entitled to a Self-Defense Instruction Regarding Hostetler or
               Head

       In accordance with Section 9.32(a) of the Texas Penal Code, “[a] person is justified in

using deadly force against another . . . when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the

deadly force is immediately necessary . . . to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted

use of unlawful deadly force.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a).

       Here, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Elrod, reflects no basis on

which the trial court could have submitted a self-defense instruction with respect to either victim.

As Elrod acknowledged in his brief, the forensic pathologist testified that both Head and

Hostetler were killed by a gunshot wound to the head. The evidence showed that both victims

were lying motionless on the ground when Elrod shot them, thus posing no threat to Elrod. Even

if the jury disbelieved the pathologist’s testimony—as defense counsel argues could have been

the case—and instead believed that Head and Hostetler died as a result of the respective wrench

and hammer blows to the head, the record nevertheless fails to support the submission of the

requested self-defense instructions.

       This is because Elrod testified that both Head and Hostetler fled the bedroom when he

walked in. Head retreated to her bedroom, and Hostetler retreated to the shed. Having retreated,

neither Head nor Hostetler used or attempted to use unlawful deadly force against Elrod.

Instead, though, Elrod went looking for Head and Hostetler. As the trial court explained, Elrod

and Carolyn could have left the scene after Head and Hostetler retreated:
                                                 18
       What the Court understands is Ms. Head retreated to a bedroom, Mr. Hostetler
       allegedly retreated to a shed. The assault was over, quite clearly. If this were the
       case Mr. Elrod and [Carolyn] could’ve gotten in a car and left the scene and so be
       it. So, whether or not the use of deadly force was immediately necessary, it was
       not. And if it’s not -- if there is not that evidence then the Court is not obliged to
       include that instruction.

       To get self-defense though you have to also look at the defense of the others,
       whether or not Mr. Elrod could have used deadly force to protect himself. His
       argument is that once he went to look for Ms. Head or Mr. Hostetler that he
       became in fear of his life. The question though is he was not protecting another at
       that time, instead he was advancing on someone. The question is what threat was
       there to him as he went to search them out. The law is supposed to make sense.
       I’ve always believed that the law is supposed to make sense and it is nonsensical
       to believe that a self-defense instruction would be applicable under these
       circumstances.

       The trial court was correct in its ruling. The use of deadly force is justified “to the degree

the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary.” TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 9.32(a)(2) (emphasis added). After the alleged sexual assault, Elrod testified that he

checked on Carolyn for “about three seconds” and then “went to looking for . . . . Cassie or

Eddie, either one, whoever [he] got to run across first.” (Emphasis added). After he knocked

Head unconscious, Elrod testified that he then “went looking for Eddie.” (Emphasis added). At

that point, Elrod, who was in no immediate danger from either victim, became the aggressor

looking to retaliate against Head and Hostetler. This type of behavior—which may prompt a

victim to act in such a way as to defend himself—does not fall within the ambit of self-defense.

This is because “[s]elf-defense implies defensive and not offensive acts.” Witty v. State, 203

S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947); Wilcox v. State, No. 06-22-00100-CR, 2023 WL

2546504, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 17, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); see Gibson v. State, 202 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947) (“[Self-defense]
                                                19
must not exceed the bounds of defense and prevention. There must be an apparent necessity to

ward off by force an unlawful act. It is a right based upon necessity.”); see Smith v. State, 965

S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“The rule of law is that if the defendant provoked

another to make an attack on him, so that the defendant would have a pretext for killing the other

under the guise of self-defense, the defendant forfeits his right of self-defense.”).

       For this reason, and because there is no evidence that the use of deadly force against

either victim was immediately necessary at any point, we overrule this point of error.

       C.      Elrod Was Not Entitled to an Instruction on the Defense of Third Persons

       Elrod also complains that he was entitled to, but did not receive, a jury instruction

regarding the defense of Carolyn. This complaint is based on Elrod’s testimony that, when he

entered his bedroom, he found Head holding Carolyn down as Hostetler sexually assaulted

Carolyn. Elrod testified that he pulled Hostetler out of the room and that Head jumped over him

to get out of the room.

       Section 9.33 of the Texas Penal Code provides:

       A person is justified in using force or deadly force against another to protect a
       third person if:

               (1)     under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to
               be, the actor would be justified under Section 9.31 or 9.32 in using force
               or deadly force to protect himself against the unlawful force or unlawful
               deadly force he reasonably believes to be threatening the third person he
               seeks to protect; and

               (2)    the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately
               necessary to protect the third person.

                                                 20
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.33. “In other words, a defendant is justified in defending a third

person if, under the circumstances as the defendant reasonably believes them to be, the third

person would be justified in defending himself.” Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 89 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016) (plurality op.). To support his claim of entitlement to a defense of third persons

instruction, Elrod was required to present some proof of a reasonable belief “that his intervention

[was] ‘immediately necessary’ to protect [Carolyn].” Id.

         Yet, the uncontroverted evidence shows that, when Elrod entered the bedroom, he pulled

Hostetler out and Head fled the room. At that point, as the trial court noted, the threat was over.

Elrod’s murder of Hostetler and Head was not accomplished to protect Carolyn from deadly

force or the threat of deadly force. See Arnwine v. State, 20 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (“[A] defendant’s belief that conduct was immediately necessary to

avoid imminent harm may be deemed unreasonable as a matter of law if undisputed facts

demonstrate a complete absence of immediate necessity or imminent harm.” (citing Brazelton v.

State, 947 S.W.2d 644, 648–49 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.))). We overrule this point

of error.7

7
 To the extent Elrod claims that the altercation in the bedroom carried through to the time at which he struck
Hostetler with a hammer because he was still “under the excitement and passion of the [original] moment,” we find
this argument to be without merit; it is based on authority that pre-dates, and is at odds with, our current statutory
scheme. See Young v. State, 180 S.W. 686, 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 1915) (“[I]f deceased was advancing on appellant
when he drew his pistol and fired the first shot, and deceased then abandoned the difficulty and fled, and appellant,
while laboring under the excitement and passion of the moment, shot as he fled, this would be a case of
manslaughter and not murder.”).
                                                         21
IV.    Elrod Was Not Entitled to a Jury Instruction on the Purported Lesser-Included
       Offense of Murder with Regard to Head or Hostetler

       In his final points of error, Elrod claims that he should have received a lesser-included-

offense instruction in the charge with respect to both Head and Hostetler. In support of this

contention, he argues that murder is a lesser-included offense of capital murder, because the only

difference between the two offenses was that he murdered more than one person during the

course of the same criminal transaction. Elrod maintains that, because he testified that his

actions were taken in his own defense and that of Carolyn—if that should be true in either

instance—then he committed murder rather than capital murder. We find that the trial court did

not err in refusing to submit a lesser-included-offense instruction.

       We apply a “two-step analysis . . . to determine whether an instruction on a lesser-

included offense should be given to the jury.” State v. Meru, 414 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013). “The first step of the analysis is a question of law that does not depend on the

evidence presented at trial.” Id. At this level of inquiry, we compare “the elements of the

offense as alleged in the indictment with the elements of the requested lesser offense.” Id. “An

offense will be a lesser-included offense where ‘it is established by proof of the same or less than

all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.’” Id. (quoting TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(1)).

       The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has long held that murder is a lesser-included

offense of capital murder. Smith v. State, 297 S.W.3d 260, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“This

                                                 22
Court has long held that murder is a lesser-included offense of capital murder.”)8 Indeed, the

State concedes as much. We, therefore, proceed to the second step of our analysis.

        The second step of our analysis “requires us to determine whether the evidence admitted

at trial ‘would permit a jury rationally to find that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of

the lesser offense.’” George v. State, 634 S.W.3d 929, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting

Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). “‘[I]f some evidence from any

source raises a fact issue on whether [the defendant] is guilty of only the lesser [offense],’ the

defendant is entitled to the instruction ‘regardless of whether the evidence is weak, impeached,

or contradicted.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 383

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). “[T]he ultimate inquiry is whether the lesser offense is a valid,

rational alternative to the charged offense.” Id.

        Here, Elrod was charged with capital murder for intentionally and knowingly causing

Hostetler’s death by shooting him with a firearm and for intentionally and knowingly causing

Head’s death by shooting her with a firearm during the same criminal transaction. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7); see Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 752 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002) (jury authorized to convict if it found that appellant murdered both victims during same

criminal transaction),9 superseded by statute on other grounds, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art

37.071 (Supp.).

8
 In this case, the indictment charged Elrod with murdering two people during the same criminal transaction. The
elements of murder are subsumed within this definition. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(a).
9
 The “same criminal transaction” means “a continuous and uninterrupted chain of conduct occurring over a very
short period of time . . . in rapid sequence of unbroken events.” Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim.
                                                       23
        Elrod argues that an instruction on the lesser-included offense of murder as to both Head

and Hostetler should have been included in the charge because there was some evidence of self-

defense and defense of another person. “Had those instructions been submitted, there was a

potential for a jury to have found that Elrod committed one, but not two murders,” and would

therefore not be guilty of capital murder.

        This argument rests precariously atop the assumption that self-defense and defense of

third-party instructions were (or should have been) included in the charge. They were not. We

have further determined that the trial court did not err in declining to submit those instructions.

As a result, we overrule this point of error.

V.      Conclusion

        We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                  Jeff Rambin
                                                  Justice

Date Submitted:          June 14, 2023
Date Decided:            July 12, 2023

Do Not Publish

App. 2000) (quoting Rios v. State, 846 S.W.2d 310, 311–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Elrod does not contend that
the murders did not take place during the same criminal transaction.
                                                     24