Court Opinion

ID: 9829823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:39:13.70827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:06.947861
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We are unable to bring ourselves to the point of believing that the Legislature, in amending articles 1757 and 1844, R.C.S. (Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. arts. 1757, 1844), ever intended to deny the Supreme Court of Texas the right to adopt wholesome rules for the proper presentation of causes on appeal, or that the Legislature has by such amended statutes actually denied that right.
Article 1844, as amended (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 1844), is in all essential particulars the same as the former statute, excepting only that the necessity for filing assignments of error in the trial court has been done away with, arid where a motion for a new trial has been filed, the appealing party is not restricted to the contents of such motion in presenting his assignments of error.
Article 1757, as amended (Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 1757), simply undertakes to set forth the essentials of a proper brief. It stipulates that a proper brief shall contain a statement disclosing the nature and result of the suit, the error or errors upon which the appeal is predicated, the authorities relied upon, and a statement, “and/or argument on the errors assigned.”
As a people, we are prone to take up and adopt new expressions and phrases. Some lawyer, a few years ago, used this rara avis “and/or,” and since that day thousands have used it where its use was either meaningless or contradictory. There is no doubt in our minds that the Legislature meant to stipulate that there must be af “statement” in the brief which discloses the matters upon which the appealing party relies as constituting error. This “statement” must be taken from' the record made in the trial of the suit. And the Legislature likewise meant to stipulate that the appealing party could incorporate an argument in his brief.
To construe the amended statute to mean that the appealing party could either incorporate a “statement” in his brief, or “an argument,” just as he wills, or desires, is tantamount to saying that the Legislature, by such amended statute, has left the matter 'of the manner and form ot briefing causes, on appeal, to the will, or whim, of each individual appealing party, so' long as the brief contains the subject-matter mentioned in the statute.
The Legislature meant no such thing, and, to thus construe the amended statute, means that the labors of the appellate courts have been tremendously increased rather than ip some measure relieved.
In the face of the hue and cry with which we have been confronted, in recent years, complaining of the failure to dispose of causes on appeal with reasonable dispatch, we are loathe to believe such was the purpose of the lawmakers.
The fact that the statute (Vernon’s Ann. Civ.St. art. 1757) contains the following proviso: “Provided, however, that the Supreme Court may adopt rules' with reference to the form and time of filing of briefs generally, but not inconsistent with the provisions hereof,” does not destroy our conclusions, but, in our judgment, confirms. them.
The Supreme Court has never formulated and promulgated rules that are inconsistent with any statute, and the rules now in force are assistant rather than inconsistent.
 We do not believe that a brief which does not contain an assignment of error that distinctly specifies the ground, or asserted error, on which the appealing party relies, is sufficient, or should be considered. Neither do we believe that an assignment of error which-is not a proposition of law *612within itself, should be considered, unless it is supported by a proposition of law that clearly and distinctly points out why the alleged error constitutes an error on the part of the trial court, or the Court of Civil Appeals.
And we do not believe that an assignment of error which is not supported by a plain statement, taken from the record, disclosing the acts, rulings, and happenings on which the appealing party relies to show error committed, should be considered.
We do not believe that it is our iduty to search the entire clerk’s transcript and the entire statement of facts, in order to ascertain whether or not an assigned error is in fact an error, unless the error is fundamental, and we are called upon to look for fundamental error.
If in fact the Legislature, by the amended statutes, here discussed, intended to say to the Supreme Court of Texas, “You shall not formulate and promulgate rules, with reference to the form, the essentials, and the proper presentation of causes on appeal, but every appellant shall be permitted to file and have considered his briefs, if they contain the subject matter mentioned in this statute, regardless of the manner and form in which it is presented,” then the sooner this is known the sooner is it manifestly necessary that the lawmakers take appropriate action for the investiture of the Supreme Court with the authority that is essentially necessary for an expeditious and orderly dispatch of causes on appeal.
Section 25, of article 5 of the State Constitution, invests the Supreme Court with the authority to make the rules for all courts, “to expedite the dispatch of business therein,” and limits this power to rules “not inconsistent with the laws of the State.”
These rules are for our government and guidance and will be followed until we are otherwise directed by the court of last resort.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
On Appellant’s Motion for Leave to Withdraw and Amend its Brief and to Refile the Same.
Appellant presents us with a motion to be permitted to withdraw his brief and file amended brief in lieu thereof.
This motion comes after submission and after the court has considered the case, delivered its opinion, and rendered judgment.
We cannot grant the motion and set such a precedent, under the circumstances.
It is settled that defects and omissions, in the record, cannot be cured or supplied, after a cause is submitted. The Supreme Court permitted amendments to the record, for the last time, after submission, as is reflected in Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Parker, 104 Tex. 162, 135 S.W. 369, and Patrick v. Pierce, 107 Tex. 620, 183 S.W. 441. Since these decisions, under rule 22, there can be no amendments of the record, after a cause is submitted.
The appellant makes application for the record, and the defects, or omissions, may be occasioned by the clerk, or person who prepares the record, but appellant’s brief is wholly prepared by him.
The statutes and rules governing the preparation of briefs are not difficult to understand, and may be substantially complied with by the average lawyer. In Glover v. Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 163 S.W. 1063, 1064, Mr. Justice Higgins uses the following language : “After defendant in error had filed its brief in this court, the plaintiff in error filed what is styled a ‘Written Argument and Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff in Error.’ We will consider only the argument contained in same. In great part it is an amendment to the original brief filed, undertaking to re-present and re-brief various assignments of error. This is not such an amendment to the original brief as is permitted by rule 38 (142 S.W. xiii), and consideration thereof will be limited as stated. Peck v. Morgan [Tex.Civ.App.] 156 S.W. 917 [writ refused]; Greene Gold-Silver Co. et al. v. Silbert [Tex.Civ.App.] 158 S.W. 803 [writ refused].” (Italics ours.) Neal v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 37 Tex.Civ.App. 235, 83 S.W. 402, writ expressly denied.
Should we grant this motion and permit appellant’s briefs to be withdrawn and new briefs filed, in every case brought before us, where there is a defective brief filed, we will be confronted with a similar motion, and the orderly dispatch of business will be rendered impossible.
While we regret the necessity for so doing, the motion is overruled.