Court Opinion

ID: 9879617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 18:28:39.069996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:58.205241
License: Public Domain

Wyrick, J., with whom Gurich, V.C.J., and Winchester, J,, join, concurring in part and dissenting'in part: • ¶ 1 Our Constitution grants the Court the power to decide justiciable cases — i.e., live controversies where there is a plaintiff with standing and an issue that is ripe for review. This limitation is a crucial component of the separation of powers between the co-equal branches of our government. It is what keeps our non-political branch out of the business of resolving policy disputes. ¶ 2 Because the litigants who bring it lack standing under our well-accepted three-part test (no member of the Court argues otherwise), this matter does not meet the constitutional standard for justiciability. The Court nonetheless invokes a boundless “public importance” exception to our normal standing rules so that it may assume jurisdiction and declare SB 643 unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court disregards constitutional limits on its jurisdiction and does damage to the separation of powers between the co-equal branches of government. I respectfully dissent, except to that part of the judgment correctly dismissing the claims against the legislative Respondents. [[Image here]] [[Image here]] ¶3 The Court grants standing to the DUI attorneys who challenge SB 643 based on what it calls its “discretion to grant standing to private parties to vindicate the public interest in cases presenting issues of great public importance.”1 We have no-such discretion. Rather, we have repeatedly said that the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”2 requires that a litigant establish (1) a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact that is not conjectural or hypothetical in nature, (2) that is fairly traceable to the complained of actions, and (3) which will be redressed by a favorable decision.3 We also require “the party who invokes the court’s authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.”4 In other words, the injury must be personal to the party suing, rather than a generalized grievance suffered by the public at large5 — a key limitation that seemingly forecloses the possibility of any standing based on a generalized “public interest.” The DUI attorneys who bring this case do not come close to meeting this standard. ¶'4 First, the attorneys claim that the new law might harm them in the future if they decide to drive drunk, if they happen to be arrested for doing so, and if they are then charged with driving under the influence. This is precisely the sort of remote, hypothetical, “future eventuality” that we have repeatedly said does not give rise to an injury in fact.6  ¶ 5 Second, they claim that the new law might 'harm unidentified 'members of the public who also might choose to drive drunk, who might bo, arrested for drunk driving, and who then might choose to retain the Petitioners as counsel. This claim not only suffers from the same imminence problem as their first claim, but also has the additional fatal defect of being an attempt to vindicate vicariously an injury to a third party.7  ¶ 6 Third, the attorneys claim that the new law might cause them a decrease in business, presumably by reducing the number of administrative hearings they might have the opportunity to litigate. But we have never recognized standing in an attorney bn the basis that a change in the law might reduce their business. This is so because an attorney has no “legally protected interest” in the law remaining static for the benefit of the attorney’s practice.8 Moreover, these attorneys’ claim of lost business is still both hypothetical and remote, given that it mil be many months before the rules and regulations defining the scope and nature of future administrative proceedings are implemented. Thus, even if these attorneys had a protectable interest in the law, because we don't yet know its true impact, any claim that it will produce fewer billable hours for these attorneys is too speculative to support standing.9  ¶7 To .this point, we quite recently reaffirmed our adherence to the rale that “[t]o be appropriate for judicial inquiry, a controversy must be ... definite [and] concrete.”10 In Richardson v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, we rejected as not ripe a challenge to HB 2348 because the effect of the law was “unclear at this time,” due to the fact that the relevant impact of the law would not be known until action was taken by a federal administrative agency (the IRS) to promulgate' rules setting the federal standard deduction amount.11 Just as was the case there, the actual effects of SB 643 will not be known until state administrative agencies promulgate rules defining the processes that will be utilized to implement the new law. Given all this, our judicial process would be better served by waiting for an actual case to arise where an actual person is charged with DUI and is actually subjected to the new procedures, so that we can examine the legality of the law as it actually is, rather than as we speculate it may be. B. ¶8 The Court doesn’t bother to analyze these claims, and understandably so; they fail our standing test by every measure. The Court instead focuses solely on the DUI attorneys’ claim that they possess “public interest” standing. Pointing to comments made at oral argument about “the great number of Oklahoma citizens in all counties of the State subject to the ... new Act,” and “the negative consequences attendant to enforcing alleged unconstitutional provisions,” the Court concludes that the matter is publici juris.12 And in the Court’s view, that means it has “discretion to grant standing to private parties to vindicate the public interest in cases presenting issues of great public importance,” discretion that is “properly exercised ... where there are ‘competing policy considerations’ and ‘lively conflict between antagonistic demands.’ ”13  ¶ 9 Let that sink in. The Court believes it can reduce to nil “the irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing anytime it is presented with two parties disagreeing over important policy considerations. In other words, the Court can disregard constitutional limits on its jurisdiction anytime it is presented with precisely the type of policy dispute that those constitutional limits are designed to bar it from deciding. But nothing in our Constitution permits us to assume jurisdiction over a case merely because the issue it presents is “important,” and the Court’s invocation of the publici juris standard as a measure of justiciability is without precedent. ¶ 10 The Court cites two cases in support of its claim of unfettered “discretion to grant standing to private parties to vindicate the public interest in cases presenting issues of great public importance.”14 But neither case justifies today’s remarkable expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction. In Gentges v. Oklahoma State Election Board, the Court found that an individual voter had standing to challenge a new state law requiring that she present a valid driver’s license at her polling place prior to voting.15 Because she was “no doubt” a member of the class that was the object of the challenged legislation, the voter had standing to sue, even if her injury was shared by other voters.16 To be sure, the Court also recognized that Gentges’s vindication of her right to vote necessarily worked to vindicate the rights of all others in the class of voters affected by the law, but that wasn’t to say that Gentges would have standing even if she wasn’t a member of the class regulated by the law.17 It was merely a recognition of the broad reach of the voter-identification law, and the far-reaching impact of a judgment in Gentges’s favor. ¶ 11 State ex rel. Howard v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, meanwhile, presented a highly unusual fact pattern that dictated its sui generis result.18 The Legislature enacted a measure imposing certain obligations on the Corporation Commission. The Attorney General — a former Corporation Commissioner who had opposed the measure in that capacity — opined that the measure violated Article V, Section 57, due to an allegedly deficient title. The Attorney General’s opinion was advisory only, but the Commission nonetheless declined to follow the new law. In response, members of the Legislature brought an original action seeking a writ that would force the Commission to comply with the new law. Staff attorneys for the Commission entered appearances as counsel for the Commission, but the Attorney General did the same, arguing that only he could legally represent the Commission. The Attorney General also argued that the members of the Legislature lacked standing and that he was the sole party entitled to vindicate the State’s interest in execution of the law — an interest he intended to vindicate by dismissing the legislators’ lawsuit so as to thwart judicial review of the issue upon which he had opined. ¶ 12 The Court first rejected the Attorney General’s claim that the legislators lacked standing, finding that the legislators possessed “an interest in vindicating the State Legislature’s exercise of its power, sought to be nullified by the Attorney General’s opinion in question.”19 With regard to whether the Attorney General was the sole party entitled to pursue the State’s interest, the Court concluded that “[generally the Attorney General as chief law officer of the State, would be the proper party to maintain litigation to enforce a matter of public interest.”20 But given the highly unusual circumstance where “the Attorney General!,] in pursuing a minority view he had previously asserted as a member of the Commission, now under the cloak of authority of chief law officer of the state, asserts the right to negative an act of the legislative branch,” the Court allowed “a private citizen in the name of the State” to “vindicate a public right.”21 Weighing these “competing policy considerations” over who could bring the case, the Court ultimately allowed the legislators to sue, the Commission to be represented by its own counsel, and the Attorney General to appear ex officio such that the ease would proceed “as a three-cornered proceeding” with “lively conflict between antagonistic demands.”22  ¶ 13 Nothing in State ex rel. Howard stands for the proposition that the mere presence of important “competing policy considerations” allows the Court to grant standing to those who otherwise lack it. Indeed, the Court found that the suing legislators possessed standing to vindicate their interests as legislators in having the State’s laws enforced. The only question was whether state law required that the Attorney General pursue that interest on their ; behalf. The “competing policy considerations” the Court described were the policy concerns relating 'to who ought to bring such a suit — -the legislators or the Attorney General — and not the competing policy considerations raised by the underlying ’ merits question. The result the Court reached, meanwhile, ensured that the matter wouldn’t evade judicial review — a concern not present in this case. f 14 These cases do not compel today’s decision, nor is today’s outcome a logical extension of those cases; today’s decision is an outright abandonment of any pretense that the Constitution limits the Court’s jurisdiction in any meaningful way. Thé Court treats our “irreducible” jurisdictional rules as mere technical requirements that sometimes hamper its ability to be the final arbiter of the thorniest issues facing our State. But when we say that a plaintiff must have standing in order to bring suit, we aren’t describing, a limitation for limitation’s sake; we’re talking about a key structural feature of our Constitution designed to maintain the separation of powers between' the. co-equal branches of government. Our Constitution requires that “the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others,”23 and Article VII, Section 4’s grant of jurisdiction to this Court; to hear “cases” is key to this- design. By limiting our jurisdiction to justiciable “cases,” the Constitution ensures that the judicial branch stays confined to its role of exercising judicial judgment rather than political will. ¶ 16 Our Constitution empowers us to be judicial, but with that power comes the obligation to be judicious.24 Because decisions like today’s are unreviewable, we meet that obligation only by adhering to objective legal standards, that demonstrate the ability to constrain judicial discretion, The “public interest” standing test the. Court invokes fails this test. When is a case “important” enough to trigger this form of standing?. When we tell you it is, of course. That , isn’t a power-confining legal standard, but rather a consti-tutionTtrumping card to be invoked at the will of five. II. ¶ 16 The Court’s decision on the merits is no less problematic. The Court invokes Article V, Sectión 57’s single-subject rule as a basis- for invalidating all of SB 643. This shouldn't come as a surprise; our increasingly permissive standing rules and amorphous single-subject (and special-law) jurisprudence have created a potent one-two punch that allows the Court to judicially veto virtually any of the Legislature’s and People’s laws so long as someone files the proper papers in the clerk’s office to initiate suit — this despite the fact that the single-subject rule was never intended “to be so exactingly enforced and in such technical manner as to cripple legislation.”25 But even as flawed as our single-subject jurisprudence is, this law passes the test; there is nothing to suggest that any legislator lacked notice of the effects of SB 643 or that the measure passed only because unpopular provisions were logrolled with popular provisions.26  ¶ 17 In concluding otherwise, the Court first errs by misidentifying SB 643’s subject. The Court points to a portion of the Act’s stated purpose (“administrative monitoring by the Department of Public Safety”) as the reference point for its single-subject analysis.27 But an act’s purpose (what it is designed to accomplish) is not the same as its subject matter (the area or realm in which it operates). Article V, Section 57 requires that an act’s subject be contained in its title,28 and SB 643’s title describes the Act as “[a]n Act relating to impaired 'driving”29 — a subject confirmed by reading the Act to ascertain the answer to the question: “What is this bill about?” Thus, for our purposes, the subject of SB 643 is “impaired driving,” and our analysis should turn on whether the Act’s contents fairly relate to that subject (they do). The Court’s identification of a more narrow subject, and subsequent insistence that most of the Act does not relate to it, demonstrates the result-driven approach that our single-subject jurisprudence invites. That the bulk of the Act doesn’t relate to the Court’s narrowly crafted subject isn’t proof that the Act violates the single-subject rule; it is evidence that the Court misidentified the actual subject of the Act. It should go without saying that the identification of the subject of a legislative act should be driven not only by its title or stated purpose, but also by its contents. ¶ 18 The Court begins with section 13 of the Act, which authorizes license seizure and destruction when a person is arrested for impaired driving or where a person arrested on suspicion of impaired driving refuses to take a breath or blood test.30 This section is related to the subject of impaired driving, and as the linchpin section of the Act, no one can seriously argue that the Legislature was forced to compromise the integrity of its “impaired driving” bill by adding it. Accordingly, the Court says nothing about section 13’s subject or its potential for logrolling. Its only explanation for striking section 13 as a single-subject violation is that “[s]ection 13’s license seizure-and destruction upon arrest does not advance an articulated goal related to administrative monitoring of an [sic] impaired driving.”31 But whether section 13 is effective in advancing the Legislature’s goal is irrelevant in a single-subject analysis; the relevant question is whether the provision relates to the subject of the Act. Because it plainly does, the inquiry is complete. And even if the Court is correct in identifying the subject as administrative monitoring of those arrested for drunk driving, this séction relates to that subject too, as an arrest for impaired driving is a necessary predicate to any subsequent administrative monitoring, and seizure of the plastic license is an administrative consequence of such an arrest. ■ ¶ 19 The same is true for section 12, which makes it a misdemeanor to refuse to take a breath test Upon suspicion of impaired driving.32 The Court" acknowledges that the- section relates to the subject of impaired driving, but argues that “While this subject relates generally to ‘impaired driving’ its function within the legislatively stated purpose of the Act, ‘administrative monitoring by .the Department of Public Sáfete -is not present on the face of the Act.”33 Again, how the provision functions or how well it furthers a stated purpose is immaterial. If section 12 relates to the Act’s subject of impaired driving — and it does — the single-subject inquiry is complete. And just as before, even if the Court is correct in identifying the subject as administrative monitoring of those arrested for drunk driving, this section relates to that subject too, as an arrest is a "necessary predicate to any" subsequent" administrative monitoring, and a breath test is an important component of an impaired-driving arrest. ¶ 20 Section 11, meanwhile, expands the class of persons eligible to perform blood tests on suspected impaired drivers to include EMT’s and paramedics.34 No one disputes that a law regulating who can perform blood tests on those suspected of impaired driving relates to the subject of impaired driving.35 Despite that uniformity of subject, the Court nonetheless concludes that this section violates the single-subject rule because “the individual legislator’s calculus in deciding whether to vote for or against such language involves the legislator’s discretion concerning the professional expertise of the classes of individuals named for the statutory task and not the Department’s administrative monitoring of impaired drivers.”36 But whether a legislator may have to consider broader policy implications in deciding whether to make an amendment to a particular section of law has nothing to do with whether the law survives single-subject scrutiny; all that matters is whether the amendment fairly relates to the same subject as its sister provisions. According to the Court’s logic, the Legislature would be constitutionally prohibited from enacting any comprehensive regulatory scheme,37 as doing so inevitably involves legislative consideration of crosscutting policy concerns. And the same would be true for any law that lists classes to which it applies,38 as any additions or deletions to the list inevitably involves weighing the relative characteristics of the classes and their appropriateness for inclusion. The single-subject rule requires uniformity of subject, not singularity of legislative policy concern. And again, even if the Court is correct in its identification of the subject, any provision relating to an arrest that is a necessary predicate to any subsequent administrative monitoring is necessarily related to that administrative monitoring, and blood tests are certainly integral to that scheme. ¶ 21 Section 15 establishes certain procedures for introducing the results of an alcohol-concentration test as evidence in proceedings pertaining to impaired driving.39 This section pertains to the subject of impaired driving. Subpart A of the law begins Upon the trial of any criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other intoxicating substance ... evidence of the alcohol concentration in the blood or breath of the person as shown by analysis of the blood or breath of the person performed in accordance with [applicable law] ... is admissible.40  Again, even assuming the Court is correct in defining the subject of the Act more narrowly as the “administrative monitoring of impaired driving,” the Court admits that section 15 “is sufficiently broad to include DPS administrative enforcement of the impaired driving statutes and administratively monitoring impaired drivers.”41 That should end the inquiry, but somehow it doesn’t. The Court concludes that section 15 nonetheless violates the single-subject rule because the evidentiary rules it creates apply in all impaired-driving proceedings, both criminal and administrative. With no citation of authority or meaningful analysis, the Court simply says that “[sjection 15’s reach into District Court criminal proceedings is beyond administrative monitoring and violates the single subject rule.”42  ¶ 22 This conclusion is unsupportable. Section 15 — like the rest of this bill — is amenda-tory; it amends 47 O.S. § 756, which already applies to both criminal and administrative proceedings related to impaired driving. Indeed, the above-quoted portion of subpart A exists as part of 47 O.S. § 756 and was unchanged by the Act.. SB 643 merely adds subpart D, which lists-things that may be offered as proof that a breath test was “validly administered”; subpart -E, which prohibits reference to measurement uncertainty when admitting breath or blood tests; and subpart F,, which requires the district attorney to share documents pertaining to the maintenance of the breath-test instruments and makes the persons responsible for such logs available to testify. Nothing added by SB 643 expands the reach of 47 O.S. § 756 into proceedings it didn’t already, reach. In fact, only subpart D even references the scope of the law, and merely parrots the language used in the preexisting subpart A: “Upon the trial of any criminal action or proceeding arising out' of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol ... .”43 Thus, the rules for admitting evidence of impaired driving were already codified in a single section and applied to both criminal and administrative proceedings.44 Under the Court’s logic, the prior version of 47 O.S. § 756 must also be unconstitutional because it too was enacted in a single bill, and thus the result of invalidating the new version of the statute would be to reanimate a prior version presumably suffering from the same constitutional infirmity.45 While the Court may prefer that the Legislature enact separate laws establishing the rules for admission of breath- and blood-test results into evidence in criminal and administrative proceedings — even where the rules are to be identical — nothing in the Constitution compels the Legislature to operate in such an inefficient manner. ¶23 The Court employs similar logic to invalidate section 4, which requires DPS to now receive notice of not just convictions, but also deferred sentences and deferred prosecution agreements “for any offense for which' this title makes mandatory the revocation of the driving privilege.”46 According to the Court, section 4 violates the single-subject rule because the offenses for which title 47 requires revocation (and thus for which section 4 requires notice) include more than just impaired-driving offenses.47 As an initial matter, title 47 requires revocation for impaired-driving offenses48 and accordingly section 4 relates to the subject of impaired driving. Moreover, like with section 16, section 4 merely amends a statute that already contained the laundry list of traffic offenses to which it applied, Thus, prior to the amendment, 47 O.S. § 6-204 required DPS to receive notice of all convictions for which title 47 required revocation,49 and § 6-206 already included those non-impaired-driving offenses.50 SB 643 merely adds that notice also be given of deferred sentences and deferred prosecution agreements. So again, it appears that to satisfy this Court’s single-subject rules, rather than merely add deferred sentences and deferred prosecution agreements to the existing notice provision, the Legislature would have to enact one law that requires notice of deferred sentences and deferred prosecution agreements for impaired-driving offenses, and then enact another law doing exactly the same thing for non-impaired-driving offenses. Nothing in Article V, Section 67 compels such legislative, inefficiency- ¶ 24 The Court concludes its single-subject analysis with sections 6 and 6 of the Act, which respectively define the offenses for which driving privileges are revoked and prescribe the length? of those revocations.51 Section 6, which amends 47 O.S. § 6-205, includes impaired driving as a revocation-triggering offense, and section 6, which amends 47 O.S.- § 6-205.1, sets the lengths of time a person’s driving privileges are revoked for impaired-driving offenses. Sections 5 and 6 thus relate to the subject of impaired driving. But rather than strike down sections 5 and 6 for relating to some other subject, the Court strikes sections 5 and .6 because they relate to section 4 — specifically, because they depend on section 4⅛ notice requirements .in order to be effective. The, Court does notr— and cannot — explain how sections -5 and 6 create disuniformity of subject. Indeed, this is the first time of which I am aware that the Court has ever held that being too related to another section of the bill amounts to a violation of the single-subject rule. . • ¶ 25 SB 643 doesn’t violate the single-subject rule; its title adequately describes its effect, and the entirety of the bill relates to impaired driving. There is nothing to suggest that this overwhelmingly popular piece of legislation52 passed only because our legislators were bamboozled as to its contents or were forced to vote for it despite their objection to unpopular provisions unrelated to impaired driving. That the Court nonetheless manages to invoke Article V, Section 57 as a basis for invalidating this duly enacted law demonstrates just how broken our single-subject--jurisprudence has become. We say that the single-subject rule-isn’t “to be so exactingly enforced and in such technical manner as to cripple legislation,”53 yet today we quibble over whether provisions all plainly related to the common subject of impaired-driver regulation are closely related enough to satisfy an entirely subjective standard. This isn’t what the rule was meant to be. It is high time we take a critical look at our single-subject jurisprudence and ask ourselves whether we are providing the Legislature with adequate notice of what the law requires, whether we are applying the single-subject rule in line with the text and original understanding of Article V, Section 57, and whether we are providing the public with confidence that our invalidations of democratically enacted statutes are the predictable product of even-handed application of a neutral rule. In my view, we are not. III. ¶ 26 Despite having deemed the law unconstitutional in its entirety for violating the single-subject rule,54 the Court volunteers that section 13 of the Act also violates the DUI attorneys’ “substantive” due process rights because the hypothetical seizure of their license card advances no legitimate “State purpose, regulatory goal, or law enforcement goal.”55 This conclusion will likely come as a surprise to the parties because this matter, has at all times proceeded as a procedural due process challenge to SB 643 — i.e,, a claim that section 13 of the Act did .not provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of the license.56 The phrase “substantive due process” makes its first appearance in this case not in the parties’ briefs or oral arguments, but in the Court’s opinion, where it is abruptly unveiled as a basis for striking down the law.57 There is much wrong with this, both as a matter of process and as a matter of substance. . ¶ 27 First, because, the claim wasn’t raised in the Application, wasn’t briefed, and wasn’t supported by a single citation , to substantive due process authority, we would normally refrain from deciding the case on that basis — fair process demands as much.58 This is particularly true where the Court bases its substantive,,due process conclusion on the fact that “no State purpose, regulatory goal, or law enforcement goal for the seizure and destruction was articulated during oral arguments by Respondents, or is revealed in their filings.”59 If due process means anything, it means not penalizing a party for failing to anticipate that the Court will decide a case on grounds the parties never briefed. ¶ 28 Second, it is “[t]he party seeking a statute’s invalidation as unconstitutional [that] has the burden to show the statute is clearly, palpably, and plainly inconsistent with the Constitution.”60 And there is a “strong presumption” in favor of the validity of legislative enactments,61 a presumption that is particularly strong when a law is alleged to be facially invalid because such a challenge is “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”62 Because of these presumptions, the Court cannot insist that the State supply it with a legitimate basis for its law when the DUI attorneys have not met their initial burden of demonstrating that no such legitimate basis is conceivable.63 The burden, after all, isn’t on the State to prove the law is constitutional, but rather on the DUI attorneys to prove it is not. ¶ 29 Third, substantive due process is typically invoked to protect unenumerated “fundamental” rights,64 but no one argues that SB 643 implicates any such right. Even on the exceedingly rare occasion where substantive due process has been invoked to invalidate laws without specifically identifying a fundamental right, a legally protected life, liberty, or property interest of some sort must be implicated.65 The DUI attorneys have no such protected right in their plastic drivers’ license card because the law explicitly says so: “No person shall have a property interest in the physical driver license issued pursuant to the laws of this state.”66 In concluding otherwise the Court merely cites a case where we held that persons have a protected property interest in their driving privileges.67 It is possible that the Court is implicitly holding that the driving privilege and the plastic license card are inextricably intertwined such that deprivation of one always works a deprivation of the other. But all parties agree that isn’t so because SB 643 allows arrestees to retain their driving privileges after their plastic license card is seized.68 And given the Court’s ultimate con-elusion that section 13 is irrational because it allows arrestees to lose their plastic card but not their driving privileges, it seems that even the Court ultimately thinks that the two things are distinct (it can’t have it both ways). Additionally, the Court upheld a previous version of the statute that also allowed seizure of the plastic license upon arrest, finding that the previous version raised no due process concerns.69 Given the constitutionality of this long-existing statutory scheme, the Court’s sudden reversal of course is not only puzzling, but it results in a return to the prior scheme that also allows for seizure of the plastic license without notice and an opportunity to be heard. If there is in fact a protected property interest in the plastic license, a due process challenge to that preexisting law will surely follow. ¶ 30 Lastly, even if the DUI attorneys had a protected interest in them plastic license card, it is possible to conceive of legitimate reasons why the Legislature would allow for its seizure without also suspending the privilege to drive. For example, the Legislature might have concluded that the prior statutory scheme, which caused automatic suspension of driving privileges unless the arrestee requested an administrative hearing, was too costly in light of this Court’s recent decision requiring that those administrative hearings occur at a faster pace.70 Given the State’s dire financial situation, the Legislature may well have concluded that satisfying the Court’s directive would be too- costly, and thus determined that the financial costs of administrative suspension of driving privileges were simply more than it could bear. The Legislature would also have a legitimate reason to retain the requirement that the plastic card be seized if it rationally determined that the inconvenience of loss of that plastic card (a plastic card that people use daily to verify purchases, to access airports, etc.) might serve as a deterrent to even a single drunk-driving incident. Or perhaps, given the goal of increasing enrollment in the IDAP program and the proven success of interlock-device programs in other states, the Legislature may have concluded that eliminating immediate loss of privileges with protracted administrative review would encourage arrestees to opt into the IDAP program to soften the criminal consequences of their impaired driving. Recall, we have said that our obligation is to uphold a law under rational basis review if we can conceive of any rational basis for the law.71 The Court makes no attempt to do so here, opting instead to stop at the State’s failure to offer such a basis in response to a claim that was never made. ¶ 31 As best I can tell, the United States Supreme Court has in 227 years invalidated only a single law applying rational basis review to a substantive due process claim72— appropriately so, given that “[r]ational-basis scrutiny is a highly deferential standard that proscribes only that which clearly lies beyond the outer limit of a legislature’s power.”73 This Court, however, has now done so twice in two years,74 this time to tell the Legislature that it “clearly lies beyond the outer limits” of its power to enact a law allowing law enforcement to seize licenses from drunk drivers — licenses that exist only under the condition that “[n]o person shall have a property interest” in them. The rub of today’s decision is that no matter how much process is provided prior to the seizure, the Legislature is now constitutionally forbidden from authorizing law enforcement to take the licenses of, drunk drivers unless it comes up with a better reason for doing so. And who gets to decide whether the reason is good enough? Who else but the Court. We may well insist that “it is not the place of this Court, or any court, to concern itself with a statute’s propriety, desirability, wisdom, or its practicality,”75 but the version of substantive due process review that we unveil today is a proxy for doing just that. [[Image here]] ¶ 32 For .these reasons, the application to assume original jurisdiction should be denied. I respectfully dissent to all of the judgment except that part dismissing the legislative Respondents.  . Majority Op. If 5.   . E.g., Toxic Waste Impact Grp., Inc. v. Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, ¶ 8, 890 P.2d 906, 910 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). That we have repeatedly said that federal standing jurisprudence guides our state law standing jurisprudence should come as no surprise; the language of the state and federal Constitutions closely parallel one another, with Oklahoma's grant of jurisdiction to this Court modeled on Article III’s grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts. See U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity!.]”); Okla. Const, art. VII, § 4 ("The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be co-extensive with the State and shall extend to all cases at law and in equity!.]”).   . Toxic Waste Impact Grp., 1994 OK 148, ¶ 8, 890 P.2d at 910-11 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130).   . Hendrick v. Walters, 1993 OK 162, ¶ 5 n.14, 865 P.2d 1232, 1236 n.14 (emphasis added) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)).   . Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (“[W]hen the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”).   . See Toxic Waste Impact Grp., 1994 OK 148; ¶ 9, 890 P.2d at 911.   . See Barzellone v. Presley, 2005 OK 86, ¶ 18 n.32, 126 P.3d 588, 594 n.32 ("[The] Court does not address a party’s asserting vicariously the constitutional rights of others."(citing Forest Oil Corp. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 1990 OK 58, ¶ 31, ,807 P.2d 774, 788)); see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 131, 125 S.Ct. 564, 160 L.Ed.2d 519 (2004) (denying standing to vindicate rights of hypothetical clients),   . Toxic Waste Impact Grp., 1994 OK 148, 119, 890 P.2d at 911. The majority cites a handful of federal cases that it says stand for the proposition-that "economic loss occasioned by governmental regulation has been sufficient to show Article III standing in a federal court.” Majority Op. ¶ 4 & n,4. But each of the cases cited merely stands for the non-controversial proposition that when a business is the target of a new regulation that causes it economic harm, the business has suffered an injury-in-fact. None of the cases stand for the proposition that a business not actually regulated by the new law — and these DUI attorneys' law practices are in no way the target of these regulations — has standing merely because the regulation might have an attenuated negative effect on their revenues.   . To that point, this Court has in the past said that "[sjpeculation as to which of many paths the law in a given area will take in the future is a transparent veil behind which people act out their own policy preferences,” and that " '[gjuesses’ about the future development of any rule of law have never been an acceptable rule of decision in Anglo American jurisprudence.” In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 1992 OK 122, ¶ 13, 838 P.2d 1, 7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (relying on those statements as a basis for preventing the people of this State from voting on a measure that would have placed in our Constitution a provision preempted under current federal law). The Court today engages in just that sort of speculation so that it may preemptively invalidate a law duly enacted by the People’s representatives.   . Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 2017 OK 85, ¶ 5, 406 P.3d 571.   . Id.   . Majority Op. ¶¶ 6-7.   . Id. ¶ 5 (quoting Gentges v. Okla. State Election Bd., 2014 OK 8, ¶7, 319 P.3d 674, 676; State ex rel. Howard v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 1980 OK 96, ¶¶ 37-38, 614 P.2d 45, 52).   . Id. ¶5 & n.5 (citing Gentges, 2014 OK 8, ¶ 7, 319 P.3d at 676; State ex rel. Howard, 1980 OK 96, ¶¶ 29, 31, 614 P.2d at 51).   . 2014 OK 8, ¶¶ 9, 12, 319 P.3d at 677.   . Id. ¶¶ 10-12, 319 P.3d at 677.   . For example, no one would seriously argue that Gentges would have possessed standing had she been a resident of Texas or not otherwise been registered to vote in Oklahoma.   . 1980 OK 96, 614 P.2d 45.   . Id. ¶ 34, 614 P.2d at 52.   . Id. 1135, 614 P.2d at 52.   . Id.   . Id. ¶¶ 37-38, 614 P.2d at 52.   . Okla. Const. art. IV, 1.   , The Federalist No. SI, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed„ Signet Classic 2003) (1788) ("If men were angels, no government would be necessary. ... In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”).   . Brooks v. State, 1931 OK 580, ¶ 17, 152 Okla. 119, 3 P.2d 814, 816.   . Douglas v. Cox Ret. Props., Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶ 4, 302 P.3d 789, 792 ("The purposes of the single-subject rule are to ensure tire legislators or voters of Oklahoma are adequately notified of the potential effect of the legislation and to prevent logrolling.” (citing Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 2010 OK 21, 233 P.3d 380)).   . E.g., Majority Op. ¶ 32 (quoting Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 [hereinafter IDEA2], ch. 392, § 2, 2017 O.S.L. 1560, 1561-62).   . Okla. Const. art. V, § 57 -("Every act of the Legislature shalhembrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title .... ”).   . IDEA2, 2017 O.S.L. at 1560-61.   . Id. § 13; 2017 O.S.L. at 1576-78 (to be codified at 47 O.S. § 754).   . Majority Op. ¶ 32.   . IDEX2, sec. 12, § 753(B), 2017 O.S.L. at 1576 (to be codified at 47 O.S. § 753).   . Majority Op. ¶32.   . IDEA2, sec. 11, § 752(A), 2017 O.S.L. at 1573 (to be codified at 47 O.S. § 752).   . Majority Op. ¶ 32; OA at 26:29 (counsel for Petitioners, in response to a question about how the section relates to the subject of impaired driving, conceded that it "actually would be related to impaired driving in that when there’s an accident, if they believe somebody is driving under the influence, it just provides for an EMT to be one of the designated people to draw blood in that instance”).   . Majority Op. ¶ 32.   . But see Bond v. Phelps, 1948 OK 76, ¶ 35, 200 Okla. 70, 191 P.2d 938, 947 ("The constitutional prohibition of more than one subject in an act does not impose any limitation on the comprehensiveness of tlie subject, which may be as comprehensive as the Legislature chooses to make it, provided it constitutes, in the constitutional sense, a single subject and not several. To constitute plurality of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects, that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to each other. Within the meaning of the constitutional provision, matters which apparently constitute distinct and separate subjects are not so where they are not incongruous and diverse to each other. Generally speaking, the courts are agreed that a statute may include every matter germane, referable, auxiliary, incidental, or subsidiary to, and not inconsistent with, or foreign to, the general subject or object of the act.”) (quoting 50 Am. Jur. Matters Germane to the General Subject or Object § 197, at 178 (1941)).   . See, e.g., 5 O.S.2011 § 1 (listing persons disqualified from practicing law); 10A O.S.Supp. 2017 § 1-1-105(21) (listing those that qualify as a “deprived child”); 12 O.S.Supp.2017 § 95 (listing the limitation periods for various causes of action); 12 O.S.2011 § 134 (listing the various venues in which it is appropriate to sue a domestic corporation); 12 O.S.Supp.2017 § 2004(C) (listing methods to effectuate service in a civil proceeding); id. § 2023(B) (listing the kinds of cases appropriate for class-action treatment); 12 O.S.2011 § 2103 (listing the tribunals and decisions to which the rules of evidence apply); 20 O.S.Supp.2017 § 3.1 (listing the salaries for the various members of this Court); 21 O.S.Supp. 2017 § 701.7(B) (listing all the offenses that qualify as first degree, "felony” murder); 31 O.S.2011 § 1 (listing all property exempt from attachment and forced sale); 51 O.S.Supp.2017 § 24A.3(2) (listing public bodies to which the Open Records Act applies); 63 O.S.Supp.2017 §§ 2-204, 2-206, 2-208, 2-210, 2-212 (listing the scheduled "controlled dangerous substances”).   . IDEA2, § 15, 2017 O.S.L. at 1579-80 (to be codified at 47 O.S. § 756).   . Id. sec. 15, § 756(A), 2017 O.S.L. at 1579.   . Majority Op. ¶ 33.   . Id.   . IDEA2, sec. 15, § 756(A), (D), 2017 O.S.L. at 1579.   . See 47 O.S.2011 § 756(A) ("Upon the trial of any criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other intoxicating substance ....”). Indeed this language dates back to the original version of section 756 enacted in 1967. See Act of April 19, 1967, ch. 86, § 6, 1967 O.S.L. 135, 136-37 ("Upon the trial of any criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or intoxicating liquor ....”).   .See Ethics Comm'n of State of Okla. v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, ¶29, 850 P.2d 1069, 1079 ("[A]n invalidly enacted statute is a nullity. It is as inoperative as if it had never been passed. The natural effect of this rule ... is that once the invalidly enacted statute has been declared a nullity, it ‘leaves the law as it stood prior to the enactment.” (citations omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Goodner v. Speed, 96 Wash.2d 838, 640 P.2d 13, 16 (1982))).   . IDEA2, sec. 4, § 6-204(0, 2017 O.S.L, at 1562 (to be codified at 47 O.S. § 6-204).   . Majority Op. ¶ 34.   . 47 O.S,Supp.2017 § 6-205(A)(2).   . 47 O.S.2011 § 6-204.   . 47 O.S.Supp.2016 § 6-205(A)(l), (3)-(ll) (requiring revocation for committing a felony while using a vehicle, failing to pay for gasoline pumped into a vehicle, failing to stop for a school bus loading or unloading children, etc.),   . IDEA2, §§ 5-6, 2017 O.S.L. at 1562-66.   . The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 33 to 9, ' and the House by a vote of 58 to 26. Senate Journal, 56th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 1203 "(Okla. 2017); House Journal, 56th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 1350 (Okla. 2017).   . Brooks v. State, 1931 OK 580, ¶ 17, 152 Okla. 119, 3 P.2d 814, 816.   . Majority Op. ¶ 2 ("We hold the [Act] is unconstitutional -in its entirety due to violating the single subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57. We [also] hold one provision of the Act, section 13, violates the Due Process Clause in Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7.”).   . Id. ¶20.   . See Pet’rs’ Appl. to Assume Original Jurisdiction ¶ 10, at 4 (identifying the due process question presented as "whether the Act’s requirements of the taking and destroying of an individual’s driver’s license without due process of law” violates the Due Process Clause.); id. ¶25, at 8 (”[T]he Act requires DPS to destroy the license upon receipt. The Act also repeals all hearing requirements from the statute. Since there is no automatic revocation of the license under SB 643 there is no need to take an individual's property and certainly no reason to destroy it, both of which occur without the due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard ."(citing Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, ¶ 11, 725 P.2d 1254, 1259-60 (a case without any substantive due process claim))); Pet'rs’ Br.-in-Chief 10-11 (repeating the arguments in their Application and providing no authority in support of anything other than a procedural due process claim); Pet’rs’ Reply Br. 14 (re-, peating their claim as one that SB 643 "provides for the seizure and destruction of property without due process" (emphasis added)); see also Exec. Resp'ts’ Br. 12-13 (understanding the claim to be a procedural due process claim.); Legis. Resp'ts' Br. 8-11 (same).   . The Court's solé basis for insisting that a substantive due process claim was raised is a line in the Application stating that "there is no need to take an individual’s property and certainly no reason to destroy it.” Majority Op. ¶ 13. The Court lifts this line in' the Application out of context, omitting the latter half of the sentence, which makes clear the DUI attorneys are complaining that the deprivation occurs "without the due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard,” and which is followed by a citation to a case involving no substantive due process claim or discussion. See Pet’rs' Appl, to Assume Original Jurisdiction ¶25, at 8 (citing Price, 1986 OK 43, ¶ 11, 725 P.2d at 1259-60).   . Additionally, because "the adversary system is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence,” the prece-dential value of a case "is diminished by the fact that the case was submitted without argument, or on scanty or insufficient argument.” Bryan A, Garner et al. The Law of Judicial Precedent 226 (2016); see also McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1447, 188 L.Ed.2d 468 (2014) (plurality opinion) (dismissing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), as lacking prece-dential weight on a certain issue because the opinion in the case was “written without the benefit of full briefing or argument on the issue”); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998) (disregarding House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 65 S.Ct. 517, 89 L.Ed. 739 (1945) (per curium), for the same reasons).   . Majority Op. ¶ 20.   . LaFalier v. Lead-Impacted Comtys. Relocation Assistance Trust, 2010 OK 48, ¶ 15, 237 P.3d 181, 188.   . Jacobs Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, 2006 OK 34, ¶ 18, 148 P.3d 842, 848.   . Davis v. Fieker, 1997 OK 156, ¶35, 952 P.2d 505, 514 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)).   . See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976)' ("[T]he burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.”); In re Okla. Dev. Fin. Auth., 2004 OK 26, ¶ 15, 89 P.3d 1075, 1080 ("[A] heavy burden is placed on those challenging a legislative enactment, and every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.”).   . Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) ("Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmaking, that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.” (internal quotation marks & citations omitted)).   . See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (invalidating a Texas law without specifically defining the fundamental right implicated); see also id. at 586, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   . 47 O.S.Supp.2016 § 6-209(D).   . See Majority Op. ¶ 15 & n.20 (citing Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, ¶ 11, 725 P.2d 1254, 1260 (holding that due process was required prior to revocation of driving privileges)).   . At oral argument, counsel for Petitioners agreed that under the new law the arrestee is "going to be given a piece of paper that is 45 days with no driving privilege lost, at all. ... They face no ramifications [to] their driving license until they plead to the charge down the road in the criminal case.” OA at 6:25. Under preexisting law, an impaired driver's plastic license was seized and his driving privilege was automatically revoked after arrest unless he timely requested an administrative hearing. See 47 O.S,Supp.2016 §§ 6-205.1, 753; 47 O.S.2011 § 754. SB 643 thus changes the law in a manner that is favorable to arrestees because it allows the arrestee to retain his driving privilege pending resolution of his criminal case.   .Price, 1986 OK 43, ¶¶ 11, 15,-725 P.2d at 1259-61 (citing Robertson v. State ex rel. Lester, 1972 OK 126, ¶ 9, 501 P.2d 1099, 1101 (holding that "[a] driver’s license is not a contract or a property right in the constitutional sense, and therefore its revocation does not constitute the taking of property”)). While the Price Court disagreed with the Robertson Court’s conclusion that no property right exists in the driving privilege, the Price Court ultimately rejected the due process challenge to the statute, holding that no violation of "the fundamental law's due process safeguards” had been identified. Id. ¶ 15, 725 P.2d at 1261. If Price had, as the Court claims, found a protected property right in the plastic license card, as opposed to the driving privilege, that conclusion makes no sense, given that no process was afforded to the seizure of the plastic license.   . See Nichols v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2017 OK 20, ¶ 29, 392 P.3d 692, 698 (holding that "if the driver requests a hearing, the proceeding should be held within sixty (60) days of the Department’s receipt of notice”).   . Gladstone v. Bartlesville Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 30 (1-30), 2003 OK 30, ¶ 12, 66 P.3d 442, 448 (noting that a law will survive rational-basis scrutiny "so long as 'there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.' ” (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993))); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980) ("Where ... there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end.").   . Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003).   . Gladstone, 2003 OK 30, ¶ 12, 66 P.3d at 448.   . See Majority Op. ¶20; Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC, 2016 OK 20, ¶¶ 47-48, 373 P.3d 1057, 1079 (holding that no rational basis existed for a workers' compensation law requiring that employees be employed with their current employer for a continuous 180-day period before being able to file a claim for cumulative trauma).   .Fent v. Okla. Capital Improvement Auth., 1999 OK 64, ¶ 4, 984 P.2d 200, 204.