Court Opinion

ID: 9770688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:19:16.362115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:19.891151
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the majority has correctly decided this cause. The majority has ignored an issue that should be addressed and which controls the disposition of this cause.
This is an appeal from a conviction for robbery by firearms,1 enhanced by two pri- or felonies, under our former Penal Code. The appellant pleaded guilty before the trial judge, who found the enhancement paragraphs true and assessed the appellant’s punishment at life in the Texas Department of Corrections.
The trial judge’s admonitions were not in compliance with Article 26.13, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., which states:
“(a) Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall admonish the defendant of:
“(1) the range of punishment attached to the offense; and
*554“(2) the fact that any recommendation of the prosecuting attorney as to punishment is not binding on the court.
“(b) No plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere shall be accepted by the court unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary.
“(c) In admonishing the defendant as herein provided, substantial compliance by the court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court.”2
The only admonishments given by the trial judge were as follows:3
“THE COURT: How do you plead to that indictment, Mr. Bouie?
“THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
“THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty now because you are guilty and for no other reason, and are you satisfied in your own mind that you are guilty of this offense?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Has anyone induced you to make this plea because of any threat or fears or delusive hope of pardon; anything of that nature?
“THE DEFENDANT: No.
“THE COURT: You understand this is punishable by confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections by not less than five years nor more than 99 years or by life?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: You have elected to accept your punishment under the provisions of the new Code. Have you ever been a patient in a mental hospital or treated psychiatrically for any mental illness?
“THE DEFENDANT: No.
“THE COURT: Are you satisfied Counsel, that he does appreciate the nature of this proceeding and the consequences of his plea?
“MR. FUNCHESS [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, I am, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: All right. Have your seat.”
It is clear that the trial judge did not comply with Article 26.13(a)(2) — “. . the fact that any recommendation of the prosecuting attorney as to punishment is not binding on the court.” In Murray v. State, 561 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), delivered October 5, 1977, this Court held that the trial judge’s failure to comply with Article 26.13(a)(1) — “. . . the range of punishment attached to the offense . . ” was reversible error. See Walker v. State, 524 S.W.2d 712 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
This Court is not confronted with a situation involving substantial compliance. Article 26.13(c). Rather, there was absolute noncompliance with the mandate of Article 26.13(a)(2). We should therefore hold that despite the absence of an objection, the trial judge’s failure to comply with Article 26.-13(a)(2) was reversible error.
I feel compelled to make one further comment in light of the concurring opinion filed in this case. The Legislature in passing the Code of Criminal Procedure intended that the rules governing criminal trials should be uniform throughout the state. When the Legislature amended Article 26.-*55513 of that Code in 1975, it provided that the trial judge in a guilty plea has two mandatory duties:4 He must tell the accused what the range of punishment is, and he must advise the accused that the prosecutor’s punishment recommendation is not binding on the judge.
Once again: These duties are mandatory. The Legislature intended that they should be complied with in all cases. To say that a trial judge may ignore these requirements is to hold that a mandatory statute of statewide application may be ignored in certain “exceptional” circumstances. This is the equivalent of standing aside from our duty as an appellate court. As the Chief Justice recently wrote in a somewhat different context:
“A legislature appropriately inquires into and may declare the reasons impelling legislative action but the judicial function commands analysis of whether the specific conduct charged falls within the reach of the statute and if so whether the legislation is consonant with the Constitution.” Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,-U.S.-,-, 98 S.Ct. 1535,1544, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
When a trial judge fails to follow a mandatory statute, the failure should be called to his attention. As an appellate court, our only way of calling attention is by reversing the case. To do so is neither nonsense nor an absurdity; it is nothing less than our duty.
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.

. Vernon’s Ann.P.C., Article 1408.

. The appellant’s plea of guilty was entered on January 14, 1976. Article 26.13, supra, was amended to its present form in 1975, and was effective as of June 19, 1975.

. A number of procedural irregularities must be noted. First, the appellant was arraigned only on the primary offense of robbery by firearms. At that point, the appellant entered a plea of guilty and the admonitions here quoted were given. After a trial before the court, the trial judge found the appellant guilty of robbery by firearms. The appellant was then re-arraigned on the two prior felonies. The appellant pleaded not true, but no admonitions were given. The State then proved up the two prior felonies.
Thus, it appears that the appellant was at no time admonished that if he pleaded guilty, and the trial judge found that the two prior felonies were true, the punishment would necessarily be life imprisonment. The majority also ignores the issue of whether the trial judge’s admonitions regarding the range of punishment substantially complied with Article 26.13(a)(1).

. The 1977 amendment to Article 26.13 expands these duties to provide (1) that the judge shall determine if a plea bargain was made, (2) that he shall then, before finding the accused guilty, tell the accused whether he will go along with the agreement, and (3) that he shall allow the accused to go withdraw the plea if he does not do so.