Court Opinion

ID: 9774093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:08:32.771514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:01.890178
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The majority’s guidelines for interpreting statutes are articulate and precise; how*787ever, the application of these guidelines to Article 4476-15b is clearly misguided. Because the majority’s “plain reading” of the statute leads to the absurd result that only drug dealers with the ability to call controlled substances by their statutory scientific terms can commit an offense under Section 2(a)(1) (hereafter “Subsection 1”), I dissent.
The Legislature provides two different methods in this statute for a person to represent that a delivered substance is a controlled substance.1 Subsection 1 requires a person to “expressly represent,” that is, to directly or unmistakably state that the substance is a controlled substance. Subsection 2 requires a person to “represent the substance in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to believe,” that is, to imply by conduct, that the delivered substance is a controlled substance. The Legislature emphasized this distinction by simultaneously enacting an evidentiary rule that pertains uniquely to conduct and refers only to Subsection 2. Specifically, Section 32 of the statute permits a court to consider the physical appearance, the packaging and the consideration exchanged in a transaction to determine whether a substance was represented to be a controlled substance. Thus, it is clear from this statutory scheme that the Legislature intended Subsection 2 to describe a representation to be inferred from conduct and Subsection 1 to describe a direct verbal expression.
The majority correctly states that “we may not go beyond the text of the statute in interpreting it” if a literal application of the “plain language” does not lead to absurd consequences. In fact, however, the majority goes beyond a literal reading of the text to impose a condition on the statute which is neither apparent from its language nor logical in its results.
I cannot dispute that when and if a drug dealer ever uses the statutory scientific terminology his representation could not be more “clear, definite, explicit, plain, direct, and unmistakable.” The majority accurately employs these synonyms, but fails to explain where the language of the statute or even the definition of “express” indicates that an “express” is or should be limited to “verbatim.”3 The majority “plain reading” imposes a condition on the statute that is not apparent from its text.
In addition, the majority fails to include a significant part of the definition of “express” in Black’s Law Dictionary, which states that “express” is:
“declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and distinctly stated. Made known distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference. Manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is inferred *788from conduct. The word is usually contrasted with implied.” (emphasis added).
When the complete definition is applied to the statute, the “plain meaning” of “express representation” in Subsection 1 is obvious — an “express representation” is “directly stated or verbal” — in contrast to Subsection 2, which applies to a representation manifested or implied by conduct.
The majority’s contrived definition ultimately leads to ludicrous consequences. Does the majority really believe that drug dealers know the scientific terms listed in the Controlled Substances Act — let alone use them in drug transactions? By ignoring the realities of drug transactions, the majority again disregards its own guidelines for statutory interpretation. Declaring that “the meaning of § 2(a)(1) [Subsection 1] should have been plain to legislators reading it in context at the time of its enactment,” the majority then ignores the context of the statute.
Reading in context means that we consider words in the situation in which they are used, together with the purpose for which they are stated and the person to whom the statement is made. For example, if a person has a headache and asks for “aspirin,” he is given “aspirin.” In the context of this request, it is both direct and unmistakable what is being delivered, despite the failure to use the scientific term, “acetyl-salicylic acid.” See PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE FOR NONPRESCRIPTION DRUGS (1981) at p. 539. Likewise, in the context of a drug transaction, a request for and offer to deliver “acid” is a direct and unmistakable offer to deliver the controlled substance of “lysergic acid diethyla-mide.” 4 Thus, even though the scientific terms are unmistakable, street names are as specific and unmistakable in their meanings when considered in the context of drug transactions. Indeed, only one other court to decide this issue has concurred with the majority. See Jenkins v. State, 788 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1990) (“twenty-cent rock” unambiguously meant cocaine in the context of this transaction); Simpson v. State, 787 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990) (“hash or hashish” is street name for marihuana tetrahydrocannabinol and “expressly represents” a controlled substance); Dunn v. State, No. 10-89-002-CR (Tex.App.—*789Waco, Sept. 28, 1989) (not published) (“By calling the substance ‘rock’ appellant ‘expressly represented’ the substance to be cocaine.”). Contra Boykin v. State, 779 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989) (“rock” is street name for cocaine but is not an “express representation”).
The sole justification for the majority’s (mis)interpretation of the statute is its purported attempt to give “meaning” to both subsections. However, by interpreting Subsection 1 to require a “verbatim” recitation of terms in the Controlled Substances Act, the majority renders Subsection 1 useless in all but the rarest of cases. My “plain reading” of the statute gives both subsections a logical and common-sense meaning. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that evidence showing slang or street terminology clearly spoken and understood by all parties involved to represent a controlled substance is sufficient to prove an offense under Article 4476-15b, Section 2(a)(1).
WHITE, J., joins this dissent.

. Section 2 of Article 4476-15b of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes provided:
"A person commits an offense if the person knowingly or intentionally ... delivers a simulated controlled substance and the person: "(1) expressly represents the substance to be a controlled substance [or]
"(2) represents the substance to be a controlled substance in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is a controlled substance."
In 1989, Article 4476-15b was repealed and re-codified in Chapter 482 of the Texas Health & Safety Code. Section 2 is now codified as Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. Section 482.002 (1989).

. Section 3 of Article 4476-15b of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes provided:
“In determining whether a person has represented a simulated controlled substance to be a controlled substance in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to believe the substance was a controlled substance, a court may consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, whether:
"(1) the simulated controlled substance was packaged in a manner normally used for the delivery of a controlled substance;
"(2) the delivery or intended delivery included an exchange of or demand for property as consideration for delivery of the substance and the amount of the consideration was substantially in excess of the reasonable value of the simulated controlled substance; and
"(3) the physical appearance of the finished product containing the substance was substantially identical to a controlled substance.”
In 1989, Section 3 of Article 4476-15b was repealed and recodified in Chapter 482 of the Texas Health & Safety Code. Section 3 is now codified as Tex.Health & Safety Code Ann. Section 482.003(a) (1989).

.After a careful perusal of dictionaries, I cannot find one that equates the definition of “express” with “verbatim.”

. The following is only a partial list of slang or street terminology that has been recognized in the courts of this State as well as federal courts: Culmore v. State, 447 S.W.2d 915, 919 n. 3 (Tex.Cr.App.1969) (acid = lysergic acid diethylamide or LSD); Black v. State, 739 S.W.2d 638, 641 n. 5 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.) (angel dust = phencyclidine); United States v. Martin, 869 F.2d 1118, 1119 (8th Cir.1989) (same); De Freese v. United States, 270 F.2d 730, 732 n. 2 (5th Cir.1959) (bennies = tablets of Benzedrine, the product name for amphetamine); Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 108 n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (black molly = amphetamine); Belmarez v. State, 509 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (Morrisson, J., dissenting) (same); United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 838 (7th Cir.1985) (coke = cocaine); United States v. Moser, 509 F.2d 1089, 1090 n. 2 (7th Cir.1975) (same); United States v. Horton, 646 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.1981) (crack = cocaine); Eminger v. State, 718 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, no pet.) (crank = amphetamine); Layton v. State, 738 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1987, no pet.) (crystal = methamphetamine); United States v. Simpson, 709 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir.1983) (same); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 880 (7th Cir.1975) (horse = heroin); United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169, 170 (3rd Cir.1954) (same); Bean v. State, 641 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, no pet.) (number four = K-4 dilaudid tablet containing hydromorphone); Black v. State, supra, at 641 n. 5 (PCP = phencyclidine); United States v. Martin, supra, at 1119 (same). Texas State Board of Pharmacy v. Seely, 764 S.W.2d 806, 808 n. 2 (Tex.App.— Austin 1988, writ denied) (trade name Preludin = phenmetrazine); United States v. Hooker, 541 F.2d 300, 304 (9th Cir.1975) (reds = seconal tablets); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 192 n. 3 (9th Cir.1975) (same); United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir.1974) (same); Clark v. State, 777 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1989, no pet.) (rocks = cocaine); Jones v. State, 685 S.W.2d 86, 89 n. 2 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, 1984, no pet.) (set = combination of tripellanimine and pentazocine); United States v. Bourbon, 819 F.2d 856, 857 (8th Cir.1987) (snow = cocaine); Culmore v. State, supra, at 919 n. 3 (speed — methamphetamine); United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 333 (6th Cir.1988); United States v. Quintana, supra, at 877 n. 1 (same); United States v. Larson, supra, at 388 (same); Culmore v. State, supra, at 919 n. 3 (weed = marihuana); Hernandez v. State, 159 Tex.Crim. 178, 262 S.W.2d 200 (1953) (same); Holliman v. State, 692 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex.App.—Waco 1985, pet. refd) (same); United States v. Murray, 527 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir.1976) (same); United States v. Rosenberg, supra, at 192 n. 4 (whites — dextroamphetamine).