Court Opinion

ID: 9819617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:28:45.296123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:21.321043
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KAPALA, dissenting: I cannot agree that the trial court’s judgment in this case was against the manifest weight of the evidence; therefore, I respectfully dissent. Preliminarily, it is important to clarify respondents’ appellate contentions. Respondents’ first appellate contention is that the trial court erred in finding respondents unfit. Respondents’ second appellate contention is that the trial court improperly terminated their parental rights. In regard to their first appellate contention, respondents are not claiming that the ultimate opinion articulated by Dr. Bouchard is inadequate to support the findings of unfitness. Respondents’ focus is narrower. They argue that the trial court erred in receiving into evidence Dr. Bouchard’s ultimate opinion as to fitness, because the facts adduced at the fitness hearing were insufficient to support that opinion. In short, respondents’ first appellate contention attacks the basis for Dr. Bouchard’s opinion, not its sufficiency if accepted. As such, I believe that the majority inappropriately raises an issue that respondents have waived under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (210 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7) (points not argued on appeal are waived)) and reverses the trial court by concluding that “Dr. Bouchard’s findings *** did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of respondents’ unfitness” (351 Ill. App. 3d at 567). It is not the function of this court to search the record for grounds upon which to base a reversal. Jacobs v. Mundelein College, Inc., 256 Ill. App. 3d 476, 480 (1993). I would proceed to consider the merit of the contentions respondents do raise on appeal. Respondents’ first appellate contention is that the trial court’s finding that respondents are unfit persons was against the manifest weight of the evidence because Dr. Bouchard’s opinion that respondents are unfit persons under section 1(D) (p) was based on inaccurate facts and questionable tests. Respondents support their first appellate contention with three arguments: (1) that Dr. Bouchard’s testimony regarding her assessment of the parent-child observation session was contradicted by four witnesses called by respondents at the fitness hearing; (2) that the Rorschach Ink Blot Test and the Rotter Incomplete Sentences Test “are subjective, severely criticized and open to any interpretation by the interviewer”; and (3) that respondents’ defensiveness, as a result of being referred to Dr. Bouchard by their caseworker, whom they neither trusted nor liked, had a “likelihood” of affecting Dr. Bouchard’s findings. For the following reasons, I would reject these three arguments. With respect to fitness determinations, it is up to the trial court to make factual findings and to assess the credibility of witnesses; we will not reweigh the evidence on review. In re T.Y., 334 Ill. App. 3d 894, 908 (2002). We defer to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations during a fitness hearing and will reverse them only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Jamarqon C., 338 Ill. App. 3d 639, 649 (2003). “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001). At the fitness hearing, the trial court heard the testimony of respondents and their mothers, who all had interpretations of the events that occurred at the visits between respondents and the children that differed from Dr. Bouchard’s. The trial court was entitled to accept Dr. Bouchard’s version and reject those of respondents and their mothers. It would certainly be reasonable to conclude that these four witnesses were biased in favor of respondents. The fact that Dr. Bouchard’s testimony on this point was contradicted in this manner does not make it clearly evident that her account of the parent-child observation session was inaccurate. Dr. Bouchard admitted that the Rorschach Ink Blot Test and the Rotter Incomplete Sentences Test are criticized for being subjective. However, contrary to respondents’ assertion, there is no indication in the record that these tests have been “severely criticized.” Nevertheless, the trial court was aware of this criticism and I fail to see how it nullifies Dr. Bouchard’s opinion. The trier of fact is permitted to accept an expert’s opinion despite efforts to impeach such testimony. See Jarke v. Jackson Products, Inc., 282 Ill. App. 3d 292, 298 (1996). Moreover, Dr. Bouchard’s opinion that respondents suffer from mental impairments and mental illnesses preventing them from discharging their normal parental responsibilities was based on more than these two tests. For example, in addition to the clinical interviews and the parent-child observation session, Dr. Bouchard’s opinion was based on the results of three objective tests: the IQ test, the Symptoms Checklist, and the Wide Range Achievement Test. Dr. Bouchard also conceded that respondents had expressed frustration with the system and the caseworker who referred respondents to her. Dr. Bouchard explained her views as to the effect of these circumstances on various test results. Contrary to respondents’ assertion, however, Dr. Bouchard conceded only that respondents’ defensiveness “could have” affected the test results, not that it was likely. The trial court was thereby made aware of the potential problems with various test results and nevertheless chose to accept Dr. Bouchard’s opinion. The possibility that frustration with the system affected the outcomes of certain tests given to respondents does not convince me that the trial court should have rejected those test results or the opinion that was partially based thereon. See Jarke, 282 111. App. 3d at 298. A finding that the test results were part of a valid basis upon which to opine that respondents had mental impairments and mental illnesses making them unable to discharge their parental duties was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, because the opposite conclusion is not clearly evident. Contrary to respondents’ position and the majority’s conclusion, in my judgment the facts of this case provided ample support for Dr. Bouchard’s opinion. “It is well settled that, in order to find a parent unfit under section 1(D) (p) of the Act, the State must (1) present competent evidence that the parent suffers from a mental impairment, mental illness, or mental retardation sufficient to prevent her from discharging a parent’s normal responsibilities; and (2) there must be sufficient evidence to conclude that the inability will extend beyond a reasonable time period.” In re M.M., 303 Ill. App. 3d 559, 566 (1999). The trial court’s finding of unfitness will not be set aside unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. M.M., 303 Ill. App. 3d at 565. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite result is clearly evident from a review of the evidence. M.M., 303 Ill. App. 3d at 565. Dr. Bouchard testified that respondent father had an IQ of 69 which, according to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Ill classification, is in the extremely low range of intellectual functioning. According to Dr. Bouchard, respondent father reads and spells at a third-grade level and performs arithmetic at a fifth-grade level. Respondent father scored 45 of a possible 100 on the global functioning scale, indicating impairment in daily functioning. Dr. Bouchard also diagnosed respondent father with dysthymic disorder, early onset, a mental disorder classified in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 345 (4th ed. 1994). Dr. Bouchard explained that her diagnosis of respondent father as having dysthymic disorder means that, in her expert opinion, he has a history of chronic depression. Dr. Bouchard opined that, within a reasonable degree of psychological or clinical psychological certainty, respondent father was unable to parent due to his mental disorder and low level of intellectual functioning. With respect to respondent mother, Dr. Bouchard testified that she has a full-scale IQ of 74, placing her in the borderline range of intellectual functioning. Respondent mother reads at a third-grade level, spells at a fifth-grade level, and performs arithmetic at a fourth-grade level. Her global functioning score of 35 out of 100 indicated impairment in her daily functioning. Dr. Bouchard diagnosed respondent mother as having the mental disorders of chronic depression (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 345 (4th ed. 1994)), intermittent explosive disorder (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 609 (4th ed. 1994)), and dependent personality disorder (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 665 (4th ed. 1994)). Dr. Bouchard opined that, within a reasonable degree of psychological or clinical psychological certainty, respondent mother was unable to successfully and safely care for the children because of her borderline intellectual functioning and the very significant personality disorganization noted in the psychological testing. Dr. Bouchard also opined that neither respondent is capable of taking care of one child, let alone six children. Dr. Bouchard opined further that there is no prospect of respondent mother’s parenting abilities improving markedly in the near future. The DSM-IV is based on clinical research and is nationally recognized as a text of mental disorders. In re Detention of Hughes, 346 Ill. App. 3d 637, 644 (2004). According to Dr. Bouchard, a licensed clinical psychologist, each respondent meets the criteria for dysthymic disorder under the DSM-IV Respondent mother also meets the criteria for intermittent explosive disorder and dependant personality disorder under the DSM-IV Under section 1 — 119 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (405 ILCS 5/1 — 119 (West 2002)), a person is mentally ill if the person has an organic, mental, or emotional disorder that substantially impairs the person’s thought, perception of reality, emotional process, judgment, behavior, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life. People v. Lang, 113 Ill. 2d 407, 453 (1986). Dr. Bouchard also testified to respondents’ low levels of intellectual functioning. Although the evidence of respondents’ mental functioning does not establish mental retardation, “[a] finding of unfitness can be based on a respondent’s mental impairment sufficient to prevent her from discharging a parent’s normal responsibilities.” (Emphasis omitted.) M.M., 303 Ill. App. 3d at 567. While Dr. Bouchard’s opinion was certainly subject to criticism on the ground that it was based on limited exposure to respondents and their children, I do not believe that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Our supreme court has stated that “[t]he requirement that the evidence of mental illness be ‘competent’ refers to the type of evidence, not the quantum.” In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 302 (2001). The trial court was free to accept Dr. Bouchard’s opinion, which was uncontroverted by another expert, and the trial court’s finding that respondents were unfit persons under section l(D)(p), based upon that opinion, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the majority, and I would proceed to address respondents’ second appellate contention, that is, whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that it was in the minors’ best interest to terminate respondents’ parental rights.