Court Opinion

ID: 2959722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-17 16:15:57.233866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:48:21.145696
License: Public Domain

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                C:;·;:107 Wn.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986). Defense counsel argued

that "directing a threat at somebody means not keeping it to yourself; it means-

directing it to somebody, not necessarily . . . to the intended victim, but to

       1
        He acknowledged there have been instances where junior members act on their
own initiative but stated that is not the nonn and that the junior member could be punished
by higher authorities in the gang for doing so.

                                            -6-
State v. Ozuna (Adrian Bentura), No. 90666-1

somebody." 1 TP at 20 (emphasis added). The judge believed there were disputed

facts and denied the motion.

      The trial ensued. After the State rested its case (evidence discussed above),
Ozuna moved to dismiss the charge.             Defense counsel argued that "there's

no ... evidence that [a threat] was communicated to anybody" and that "this element

of the offense simply has not been addressed by the prosecution's case." Jd. at 463.

The judge denied the motion. The judge reasoned that State v. Anderson, 111 Wn.

App. 317,44 P.3d 857 (2002), and State v. Hansen, 122 Wn.2d 712,862 P.2d 117

(1993), held that a communication does "not require that ... the threat actually be

communicated to the person who is the target of the threat." 1 TP at 465. Defense

counsel retorted, "[But] [i]t has to be communicated to somebody though." Id.

(emphasis added). The judge replied, "I'm not even sure that that's it; it just has to

be made as far as I can tell from reading ... those cases." I d. at 465-66 (emphasis

added). Defense counsel offered a hypothetical situation about a person writing

threatening language in his personal diary, and the diary then being discovered by

police, to suggest this could not constitute communicating a threat. The judge said,

"and that's what happened here"-but then denied the motion. !d. at 466.
       The trial proceeded, and the jury returned a verdict convicting Ozuna of

intimidating a former witness under RCW 9A.72.110(2). The trial court entered

judgment and imposed an exceptional sentence of 10 years based on the jury's

finding of gang-related aggravating factors.

                                          -7-
State v. Ozuna (Adrian Bentura), No. 90666-1

      Ozuna appealed to the Court of Appeals. He raised several issues, including

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial ofhis motion to suppress.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. State v. Ozuna, noted at

182 Wn. App. 1024, 2014 WL 3930471. Chief Judge Siddoway dissented on the

sufficiency issue.     2014 WL 3920471, at *7-12. Ozuna petitioned for review,

abandoning all of his contentions except the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he

directed a threat. We granted review. State v. Ozuna, 181 Wn.2d 1023, 339 P.3d

635 (2014).

                                      II. DISCUSSION

                                      A. Legal Standard

       A person is guilty of intimidating a witness "if the person directs a threat to a

former witness because of the witness's role in an official proceeding." RCW

9A.72.110(2). The only disputed element in this case is whether Ozuna "direct[ed]

a threat."2 Id. The statute in tum defines "threat" to mean:

              (i) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to
       use force against any person who is present at the time; or
              (ii) Threat as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(27)YJ

Id. at (3). The cross-referenced statute defines "threat" to mean

       to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:

       2
          The parties stipulated that "Augustine Jaime Avalos was a former witness in an
official proceeding against the Defendant," Clerk's Papers (CP) at 144; see also 1 TP at
499, and the circumstances and evidence make clear that if Ozuna directed a threat, he did
so because of Avalos's former testimony.
        3
          The reviser's note explains that the asterisk in the statute reflects that the definition
of "threat" in RCW 9A.04.110 has since been renumbered as subsection (28), not
subsection (27).

                                               -8-
State v. Ozuna (Adrian Bentura), No. 90666-1

             (a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to
      any other person; or

             G) To do any other act which is intended to harm substantially the
      person threatened or another with respect to his or her health, safety,
      business, financial condition, or personal relationships.

!d. 9A.04.11 0(28). The statute does not define the word "communicate."

      This court has not previously interpreted the intimidating a former witness

statute, RCW 9A.72.110(2), but has interpreted the statute creating the crime of

intimidating a judge, RCW 9A.72.160. See Hansen, 122 Wn.2d 712. The two

statutes have an identical "directs a threat" element and use an identical definition

of"threat." Compare RCW 9A.72.11 0(2), with RCW 9A.72.160. We therefore look

to Hansen for guidance.

       In Hansen, the defendant sought to sue the superior court judge who presided

over his prior criminal matter. 122 Wn.2d at 714. He called various attorneys and,

in one call, stated he was"' going to get a gun and blow them all away, the prosecutor,

the judge and the public defender."' !d. at 715. The attorney reported this comment

to authorities. !d. Eventually Hansen was convicted of intimidating a judge under

RCW 9A.72.160. !d. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the statute required

proof that Hansen intended or had knowledge that the threat would reach the threat's

target, i.e., the judge. !d. at 716. We disagreed and held that whether Hansen

intended the threat to reach the judge was irrelevant. !d. at 718. Instead, the

communication of a threat to a third party (the lawyer) concerning the target (the

judge) satisfied the communication element because the statute expressly includes

                                            -9-
State v. Ozuna (Adrian Bentura), No. 90666-1

communications made "in an indirect fashion as well as direct threats." !d. We

found sufficient evidence and affirmed Hansen's conviction. !d. at 718-19, 722.

      The Court of Appeals has since adopted Hansen's rule in the context of two

similar crimes. See Anderson, 111 Wn. App. at 321-22 (regarding the crime of

intimidating a former witness, RCW 9A.72.11 0(2)); State v. Williamson, 131 Wn.

App. 1, 6, 86 P.3d 1221 (2005) (regarding the crime of tampering with a witness,

RCW 9A.72.120). These cases all stand for the proposition that a threat need not be

communicated to the threat's target but instead can be communicated indirectly to a

third party.

       Yet the trial court reasoned and the State suggests that the cases stand for

something much broader-that a threat does not need to be communicated to

anyone, i.e., that it is sufficient if the threat is uttered or written in private. We reject

this notion. The very concept of a "communication" conveys the idea that something

is communicated to someone. E.g., BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 337 (lOth ed. 2014)

(defining "communication" as "the process of bringing an idea to another's

perception"); WEBSTER'S       THIRD   NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 460 (2002)

(defining "communication" as "the act or action of imparting or transmitting" and

as "interchange of thoughts or opinions : a process by which meanings are

exchanged between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language,

signs, or gestures)").      In the context of another crime that uses the word

"communicate" without defining it, we held that to "communicate" requires a

message be both "transmitted by the person and received by the [recipient]." State

                                            -10-
State v. Ozuna (Adrian Bentura), No. 90666-1

v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d 1, 9, 133 P.3d 936 (2006) (regarding the cnme of

communication with a minor for immoral purposes under RCW 9.68A.090).

      In short, a communication must be transmitted and received. Id. However, a

person may "direct[] a threat" under the intimidation of a former witness statute,

RCW 9A.72.110(2), without that threat being communicated to the threat's target.

The threat may be transmitted to a third party.         Hansen, 122 Wn.2d at 718;

Williamson, 131 Wn. App. at 5-6; Anderson, 111 Wn. App. at 321-23. With this

understanding of the relevant statutory elements in mind, we turn to the evidence

presented at Ozuna's trial.

                              B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

      We review the sufficiency of the evidence to determine "whether any rational

trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v. McKague, 172 Wn.2d 802, 805,262 P.3d 1225 (2011). We assume the truth

of the state's evidence, State v. Mines, 163 Wn.2d 387, 391, 179 P.3d 835 (2008),

view reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the state,

id., and deem circumstantial and direct evidence equally reliable, State v. Myers, 133

Wn.2d 26, 38, 941 P.2d 1102 (1997). Applying these principles, we conclude

sufficient evidence was presented at trial for a rational jury to find that Ozuna

directed a threat to a third party or to Avalos.

       We first note that a rational jury could find Ozuna had the state of mind,

motivation, and opportunity to direct a threat regarding Avalos. Avalos had been a

longtime gang member with Ozuna, and Avalos testified against Ozuna. They were

                                           -11-
State v. Ozuna (Adrian Bentura), No. 90666-1

incarcerated in the same prison. Ozuna had gang allies in the prison. Avalos had

enemies. Testimony established the gang follows a strict "no snitch" code, enforced

by violent retaliation. Ozuna's confiscated letter reveals his state of mind. It said,

for example, "[L]et that fool feel the wrath and let' em know the rata that he is and

tell him that I siad that bad things come to those that snitch. May he rest in piss."

State Ex. lD at 2. Additionally, the jury could consider the timing of Avalos's

assault by a member of Ozuna's gang, David Soto. The evidence is sufficient insofar

as it establishes Ozuna's state of mind, motivation, and opportunity to direct a threat

regarding Avalos.

      A rational jury could also rely on several pieces of circumstantial evidence to

conclude that Ozuna directed a threat to Avalos or a third party.

      Though Ozuna's confiscated letter was not delivered to anyone, 4 a reasonable

inference from its content is that Ozuna had engaged in a prior conversation with

the intended recipient of the letter. The letter opens, "Hey homie, I just got your

[unreadable]. Well it was a blessing to hear from you. It put's a smile on my face to

know that your ready to ride for me . ... [A]s you already know, I [agreed to a plea

deal for] 10 years 9 months cause of a pussy that don't know how to ride or Die."

!d. at 1 (emphasis added). Drawing a reasonable inference in the State's favor, we

       4
        We reject any suggestion that Ozuna delivered the letter to the corrections officer
who confiscated it because Ozuna did not intend to communicate the letter to him. Though
a communication to any third party is enough to satisfy the "directs a threat" element of
intimidating a former witness under RCW 9A.72.110(2), as discussed above, the
communication must be an intentional act.

                                           -12-
State v. Ozuna (Adrian Bentura), No. 90666-1

find that a rational jury could view this evidence as establishing that Ozuna

participated in a prior conversation directing a threat to harm Avalos. 5

      A rational jury could also rely on the expert testimony that gangs follow a

hierarchical decision-making structure where serious actions, including witness

retaliation, can occur only when someone with elevated decision-making authority
in the gang directs the action to occur. An officer in the Yakima County Jail

specifically testified that Ozuna was a shot caller or tank boss with such elevated

decision-making authority. A member of Ozuna's gang later assaulted Avalos.

Viewing a reasonable inference from this testimony in favor of the State, a rational

jury could conclude that the only way Soto had authority to engage in the assault on

Avalos was because Ozuna directed him to do so.

       Further, a rational jury could conclude Ozuna directed a threat based on the

testimony of Brandon Perren. Perren was also in the Yakima County Jail, and he

admitted he was member of Ozuna's gang. Perren testified that he communicated
with Ozuna in the prison through letters. Most importantly, Perren testified that after

the officers confiscated Ozuna's letter, Ozuna sent him a different letter instructing

him to "leave [Avalos] alone." 1 TP at 475. Perren testified that he "forward[ed

the] message" to an unspecified group of prisoners so that "they could leave him
alone, anybody that came across him." !d. at 476. Viewing a reasonable inference

       5
        The letter was confiscated on June 8, and the information charged that the crime
occurred"[ o]n, about, during or between" June 8 and July 9. CP at 1. Viewing a reasonable
inference in the State's favor, a rational jury could have found that the prior communication
happened earlier in the day of June 8 or otherwise "about" June 8.

                                            -13-
State v. Ozuna (Adrian Bentura), No. 90666-1

in the State's favor, a rational jury could conclude that Ozuna's letter to Perren

showed Ozuna exercising his authority as a shot caller in an attempt to revoke his

previously communicated directive for Perren or others to harm Avalos.

      A rational jury could also find that Avalos's testimony corroborates the theory

that Ozuna directed others to harass Avalos. For example, this exchange supports

that Avalos received threats:

      Q. And you received some verbal threats?
      A. Like 1 said, people talk a lot through their doors. I mean, it happens all
          the time.
       Q. Okay. How-how were you threatened?
       A. Well, it-I mean he-you-people yell things through the doors and you
          can't see who it is, they just yell things out.

Id. at 422. Though Avalos never testifies who was responsible for the threats, a

rational jury could infer from the evidence that Avalos was harassed and assaulted

and that it was the shot caller with the motivation to retaliate against Avalos who

directed the harassment and violence.

       Considering the totality of the evidence and viewing the reasonable inferences

in the State's favor, we conclude sufficient evidence allowed the jury to find Ozuna

committed the crime of intimidating a former witness.

                                  III. CONCLUSION

       We hold that a defendant "directs a threat" under RCW 9A.72.110(2) when

he communicates a threat to someone, though not necessarily the intended victim of

the threat. Viewing the reasonable inferences in the State's favor, we hold that

                                           -14-
State v. Ozuna (Adrian Bentura), No. 90666-1

sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented at trial to permit a rational jury to

find that Ozuna committed the crime of intimidating a former witness. We affirm.

                                          -15-
State v. Ozuna (Adrian Bentura), No. 90666-1

WE CONCUR:

~~.g·

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