Court Opinion

ID: 9459902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:34:53.176737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:23.194344
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
In spite of the beacon provided by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972), the majority seems to have run aground on the rocks of admiralty jurisdiction. Had I been in command, I would have charted our course differently by holding that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over this cause of action.
After years of intellectual erosion, the “pure locality” test for admiralty jurisdiction has been washed to sea. Since Executive Jet, a condition of admiralty *527tort jurisdiction is that “the wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.” 409 U.S. at 268, 93 S.Ct. at 504, 34 L.Ed.2d at 467. Everyone agrees that “locality plus” is the test in this case,1 but we are still faced with the question, “locality plus what?” The majority holds that, “we must look to all the circumstances for a substantial maritime relationship.” I agree with them that the important considerations are the functions and roles of the parties, the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved, the causation and type of injury and the role of admiralty law.
But an additional consideration is present when assertion of admiralty jurisdiction involves a potential conflict with applicable state law. Such a conflict exists here, because state rules also govern these events. Even if brought in federal court on diversity grounds, the state substantive law, including its statute of limitations, would apply. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 530, 69 S.Ct. 1233, 93 L.Ed. 1520 (1949). Thus, by asserting admiralty jurisdiction, we effectively deprive the state of its-control over this cause of action. Such deprivation is justified in many cases, but only if the federal interest in uniformity outweighs the other interests at stake.
In this sense our analysis of the admiralty clause of the Constitution can be analogized to be now well-developed body of case law interpreting Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 78 S.Ct. 893, 2 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958), Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (Harlan, J. concurring) and Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 349 F.2d 60 (4 Cir. 1965).
Using this type of analysis, we must examine the relevant federal and state interests in this case to see which is more important. The State of Mississippi has a strong interest in the outcome. This is shown by the fact that state substantive rules would apply if the case were based on diversity jurisdiction, by the existence of a state criminal penalty for the actions of some of the parties, and the local nature of the tort of assault and battery. The local nature of the incident is further emphasized by imagining a case in which the terrestrial, as opposed to maritime, participants in this battle were injured, and sued their attackers. Essentially, that case is the same as the one we are called upon to decide, yet the assertion of admiralty jurisdiction in the hypothetical would be a gross overextension of federal power into areas of local concern.
The federal interest, on the other hand, is minimal. The majority states that rifle fire directed at a vessel presents a danger to maritime commerce which the federal courts ought to recognize. But this language obscures the facts of this ease. Mr. Kelly and his cohorts used a 15-foot boat to sneak across the Mississippi River onto Woodstock Island to engage in poaching. There is simply no overriding federal interest in protecting such conduct. This is not to say that trespassers should not be protected against over-reaction by their victims. But the extent to which they should be protected is a matter of purely local concern, not of federal concern. The law of admiralty has purely commercial origins and purposes. Its usefulness is derived from the strong federal interest in controlling interstate and foreign commerce on water, and in fashioning a body of rules to govern the unique (sometimes uniquely hazardous) aspects of waterborne transportation. Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5 Cir. 1970). The complex and peculiar rules of admiralty are particularly suited for deciding suits arising out of “traditional maritime activities, involv*528ing navigation or commerce on navigable waters.” Executive Jet Aviation v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. at 256, 93 S.Ct. at 498, 34 L.Ed.2d at 460. . In particular, one of the essential characteristics of admiralty jurisdiction is its uniformity, providing predictable and constant relationships between parties engaged in maritime activities. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970). But uniformity is hindered, not advanced by the majority’s decision in this case. A slight change in physical location would have produced entirely different results. The plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation as to which substantive law would be applied to their actions. No federal interest would be served by extending the admiralty rules to cover their activities, and, as shown above, significant state interests would be abrogated.
For these reasons, I believe that no admiralty jurisdiction exists over this case, and I must respectfully dissent.

. The progeny of Executive Jet may abandon the requirement of a maritime locality altogether, and physical location will be only one factor in the equation. But since the district court found that this tort occurred in navigable waters, and that finding is not clearly erroneous, we are not faced with that question.