Court Opinion

ID: 9957454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 16:00:57.645904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:20.732349
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 4 2024
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LISA MARIE BELYEW,                              No.   22-15495

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                2:17-cv-01213-JAM-JDP
 v.

DUCH, Captain; et al.,                          MEMORANDUM*

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of California
                    John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted April 4, 2024**

Before: BENNETT, BADE, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

      Prisoner Lisa Belyew appeals pro se from the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the Defendants due to Belyew’s failure to exhaust available

administrative remedies as to her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Belyew also argues the district court abused

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to the Defendants “due to undue hardship

it would cause” her. We note, however, that the district court did not award

attorneys’ fees; it taxed costs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Albino v. Baca, 747

F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). We will treat Belyew’s attorneys’ fees

objection as an objection to the taxation of costs. We review a district court’s

taxation of costs for abuse of discretion. Garcia v. Gateway Hotel L.P., 82 F.4th

750, 753 (9th Cir. 2023). We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment,

but we reverse its taxation of costs.

      The district court adopted the findings and recommendations of the magistrate

judge and properly dismissed Belyew’s action because it was clear from the record

that she failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit. See

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638, 642 (2016) (explaining an inmate must exhaust

available administrative remedies before filing an action). In her informal opening

brief, Belyew asserts she “exhausted [her] administrative remedies.”1 But Belyew’s

argument before the district court was that she was unaware of any further process

1
 Belyew does not support this assertion. She states that she is unable to provide any
such support, because she does “not have the file” and she “can only go off memory”
because she is housed in administrative segregation. Given her pro se status, we
nevertheless construe her brief as arguing the court’s exhaustion holding was
erroneous.

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available for exhausting a denied grievance.2 The district court correctly noted that

Belyew’s argument was belied by the record, because she had exhausted other

denied grievances, including exhausting one prior denial just one month before one

of the two denials here. Because Belyew argued she was unaware of how to exhaust

denied grievances, but the record shows she understood the process, we affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants.

      Belyew contends that the district court abused its discretion in awarding

attorneys’ fees. As we noted, however, the district court did not award attorneys’

fees; it taxed costs. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that “[u]nless

a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs . . . should be

allowed to the prevailing party.” (emphasis added). We ordered supplemental

briefing on the applicability of Rule 54(d)(1) when a complaint is dismissed without

prejudice. In response, the Defendants abandoned their costs request, recognizing a

“dismissal without prejudice does not confer prevailing party status upon [the]

Defendants.” Because the Defendants have conceded they were not the prevailing

party, they were not entitled to costs under Rule 54(d)(1). We affirm the district

2
 Belyew argues for the first time in her reply brief that administrative remedies are
unavailable to her but cites nothing to support that argument. The magistrate judge
broadly construed Belyew’s complaint to advance this argument but rejected it
because Belyew had exhausted other grievances and admitted the jail provided
access to the procedures needed to exhaust the available administrative remedies.

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court’s grant of summary judgment and reverse the district court’s award of costs.3

      AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part.

3
  The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. Belyew’s motion for ‘reversal of
the U.S. District Court’s ruling for summary judgment,’ Dkt. 10, is DENIED as
moot.

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