Court Opinion

ID: 9710586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:12:35.329424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:58.132862
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I agree that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. I also agree that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions of the offenses properly submitted to the jury. I dissent, however, from that portion of the majority opinion that affirms appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit second degree murder.
The State’s evidence against appellant was sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder, but the trial judge granted appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on that charge. That ruling, in my judgment, disposed of the conspiracy to murder charges. The conspiracy to commit second degree murder should not have been submitted to the jury.
*363Conspiracy to commit murder means conspiracy to commit first degree murder. It is the agreement to kill that constitutes “the premeditating factor.” Bell v. State, 48 Md.App. 669, 680, 429 A.2d 300, cert. denied, 291 Md. 771 (1981) (citations omitted).
Deliberation and premeditation are essential elements of an agreement to participate in an intentional killing. In this case, the jurors were instructed that, to convict appellant of conspiracy to commit murder in the second degree, “the State must prove that [appellant] ... entered into the agreement with the intent that murder in the second degree ... be committed.” In accordance with those instructions, the jurors convicted appellant of a charge that the court had already resolved in his favor. I would therefore reverse (only) appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit second degree murder.