Court Opinion

ID: 9686084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:26:25.93825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:14.326364
License: Public Domain

Hoekstra, P.J.,
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with parts I, n, and iv of the opinion of the majority, but respectfully dissent from the conclusions reached in part m.
*351In part m, the majority holds that the trial court correctly determined that forfeiture proceedings, under the circumstances of this case, were untimely. I disagree. My disagreement is based on a differing view of how the standard employed by the majority to determine timeliness that is found in In re Forfeiture of $109,9011 should be applied to the facts of this case. In that case, this Court identified four factors to be analyzed when considering the timeliness of a forfeiture proceeding. Those four factors are. the lapse of time, the reason for delay, the prejudice resulting from the delay, and the nature of the property seized.
Unlike the majority, I conclude that there was no significant lapse of time in this case. The money was seized on October 24, 1993, was administratively forfeited on November 30, 1993, and plaintiffs filed this action on December 16, 1993. Because MCL 333.7523; MSA 14.15(7523) does not address situations where a claim is made for the seized property by an individual different from the one originally notified pursuant to the statute, I conclude that plaintiffs’ filing served the same purpose as a notice of forfeiture for purposes of calculating lapse of time. Plaintiffs’ complaint in this case accomplished the essential function of a notice by identifying plaintiffs as parties interested in the disposition of the seized property. To rely on the date that defendant requested that the trial court set aside the original forfeiture and allow new proceedings, as the majority does, exalts form over substance, in my opinion. Thus, the lapse of time in this case, by my calculation, only amounts to less than two months.
*352Additionally, the reason for the delay in this case was occasioned by defendant’s failure to properly notify plaintiffs of the forfeiture. Although defendant erred in this respect, there is no evidence in the record to show that defendant’s decision not to serve notice upon plaintiffs was based on bad faith or for any reason other than a mistaken notion regarding its obligation to give notice to plaintiffs. Further, I find no prejudice or even a claim of prejudice by plaintiffs resulting from the circumstances of this case. The majority asserts that prejudice occurred, but offers no factual support for that conclusion. Finally, the property seized was cash money that is totally fungible. If, following a hearing, defendant is ordered to return the seized money, this can be accomplished with no detriment to plaintiffs in terms of diminution of the property.
This case presents a factual situation that MCL 333.7523; MSA 14.15(7523) does not contemplate. Our primary interest should be to put the parties in a position to litigate their respective claims to this property, unless it can be shown that the actions of defendant harmed plaintiffs. For the reasons stated above, I find plaintiffs have not been harmed and, consequently, I would order the case remanded to the trial court with directions to allow defendant to serve notice, and thereafter permit forfeiture proceedings to commence as provided by statute.

 210 Mich App 191; 533 NW2d 328 (1995).