Court Opinion

ID: 9625846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:52:51.945911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:50.754541
License: Public Domain

Donworth, J.
(dissenting in part) — I find myself unable to fully agree with the construction of the deed of April *53817, 1909, which is adopted by the majority.. In my opinion, the instrument conveyed a fee simple title to the strip of land fifty feet in width extending through the east half of the northeast quarter of section twenty-four.
The operative portion of the deed reads:
“[The grantor] has remised, released and forever quit-claimed, and by these presents do sell, convey, remise, release and forever quit-claim unto said party of the second part, and to his heirs and assigns, the following described premises, situate, lying and being in the County of Thurston, State of Washington, for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way to-wit: — a strip of land 50 feet in width . . . [Here follows a definite description of a parcel of land.]”
After the legal description of both noncontiguous parcels, the instrument recites:
“Together with all and singular the tenements, heredita-ments and appurtenances thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.
“To Have and to Hold, All and singular the said premises together with the appurtenances, unto said party of the second part, and to his heirs and assigns forever.”
Construing the instrument to be a quitclaim deed as defined by Rem. Rev. Stat., § 10554 [P.P.C. § 499-5], the legal effect of such a conveyance is thereby declared to be as follows:
“Every deed in substance in the above form, when otherwise duly executed, shall be deemed and held a good and sufficient conveyance, release and quit claim to the grantee, his heirs and assigns in fee of all the then existing legal and equitable rights of the grantor in the premises therein described, but shall not extend to the after acquired title unless words are added expressing such intention.”
Consequently, applying this statute to the language used in the deed of April 17, 1909, the legal effect of its execution and delivery was to convey to the grantee all of the grantor’s then existing equitable and legal rights in the parcel of land described therein.
*539The use of the words “for the purpose of a railroad right of way” is merely a declaration of the purpose of the conveyance and does not operate to limit the grant. Quinn v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376.
Therefore, the grantee and his successors in interest hold fee simple title to this strip of land in the northeast quarter óf section 24 notwithstanding the abandonment of its use for railroad purposes in 1942.
I agree with the majority with respect to the second parcel described in the deed, that is, that the words “a right of way of the same width” constituted an easement for railroad purposes across the southwest quarter of section 24. There is no definite description from which the exact position of the land involved could be ascertained. It was a floating easement, although not as indefinite as to location as the description involved in Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 278 Pac. 686. Hence, when the rails were removed in 1942, all rights of the grantee in the land within the fifty foot right of way terminated.
The result suggested in this dissent may seem incongruous but the parties are bound by the legal terminology used in the instrument of conveyance regardless of the ineptitude of the draftsman. If this construction is not what the parties to the instrument intended, the responsibility is their own because the court must consider the instrument as drawn and apply to the words used therein their ordinary legal meaning.
I'would revise the trial court’s decree accordingly.