Court Opinion

ID: 9464371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:31:33.664659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:35.455223
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
Most of the issues in this case have in effect been mooted by the union’s success in the fourth representation election at the company’s Hamilton plant. Under these circumstances I think the Board’s “broad form” order is inappropriate, and I thus concur in the result reached by the majdrity regarding the issues discussed in parts I-IV of Judge Skelton’s opinion.
The alleged section 8(a)(3) violations — the discharge of employee Emerson and the suspension of employee Roberts — are more troublesome, and I write separately to emphasize the closeness of the issues and the nature of our review. Moreover, language employed by the majority seems to suggest an improper legal test in the critical area of employee discharge, a test I view as contrary to our previous decisions.
Emerson was hardly a model employee, his record having been sullied with what can fairly be labeled excessive absences. The majority examines his chronic absenteeism in considerable detail, but fails to mention that despite such a record, he was not discharged until he became quite vocal in the union’s organizing campaign. The timing of a discharge can be an indication of an employer’s motivation, see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. N. L. R. B., 456 F.2d 465 (5 Cir. 1972); N. L. R. B. v. Central Power & Light Co., 425 F.2d 1318 (5 Cir. 1970), and discharging union adherents is a rather hefty club an employer can swing against an incipient unionization movement.
Roberts, on the other hand, had performed well on the job. During his first two years with the company, his work was such that only one minor infraction appeared in his file. However, his performance began to suffer, and a foreman made numerous entries in his records regarding Roberts’ poor workmanship. However, this decline in quality paralleled Roberts’ display of support for the union, suggesting that the company was going out of its way *1264to find flaws in Roberts’ work. See Central Power & Light, supra (company officials were “lying in wait” to discover infractions by employee who backed union). Unlike Emerson, however, Roberts was not disciplined by the company until well after the third representation election on May 30. He was suspended for three days on July 24, 1975, while Emerson was discharged on March 24, just over two weeks after the union’s victory in the second election on March 7. That election was subsequently set aside because of union misconduct.
Obviously, the record in a case such as this will not contain an employer’s statements suggesting his motivation in discharging an employee. Any employer who has competent legal advice is not about to state blatantly that a particular discharge was prompted by his anti-union sentiment or that a pro-union employee was suspended “to set an example” for the other workers. Rather, such motivation must be inferred from the actions of the employer and the supervisory personnel, much like the existence of a criminal conspiracy must often be inferred from the actions of the alleged co-conspirators. In this case the majority refuses to draw any such inferences or to accept the inferences drawn by the administrative law judge. In my view, these inferences are certainly permissible on this record, and under the substantial evidence rule we are obligated to consider them as part of the record as a whole. See N. L. R. B. v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., 441 F.2d 765 (5 Cir. 1971).
Of course, it is incumbent on the Board to prove unlawful conduct, and improper motivation is not to be lightly inferred. N. L. R. B. v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406 (5 Cir. 1956); Federal Pacific Electric Co., supra. Moreover, we have said that the record must establish a “reasonable inference of causal connection between the employer’s anti-union motivation and the employee’s discharge.” N. L. R. B. v. O. A. Fuller Super Mkts., Inc., 374 F.2d 197, 200 (5 Cir. 1967). “If there are two grounds for discharge, one proper and the other unlawful, and the evidence as a whole would make the inferences as to which was the motivating cause reasonably equal, the conclusion reached by the Board should be sustained.” N. L. R. B. v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Co., 273 F.2d 660, 666 (5 Cir. 1960); N. L. R. B. v. Longhorn Transfer Service, Inc., 346 F.2d 1003, 1006 (5 Cir. 1965); Cramco, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 399 F.2d 1, 6 (5 Cir. 1968).
In this case, the Board has failed to carry its burden, for the inferences set forth above fall considerably short of being “reasonably equal” to the inferences and evidence that the discharge and suspension were lawful, especially since improper motivation is not to be lightly inferred. Therefore, I agree that the discharge and suspension were not prompted by anti-union motivation, but I do feel that in fairness we should discuss the inferences of improper action on the company’s part.1
Another difficulty for me is language in the majority opinion suggesting a departure from this court’s established rules concerning employee discharge. There is no doubt that, absent a showing of anti-union motivation, an employer may discharge an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all without running afoul of the labor laws. When there appears to be more than one reason for the discharge, one proper and the other improper, the employer has the burden of establishing good cause, and when that burden is met, the Board must show that union animus was the motivating factor.
The majority apparently applies these principles and concludes that there was good cause to fire Emerson and that there was an insufficient showing of anti-union motivation. Ante at 1260, 1261. As indicated previously, I agree. However, the majority opinion also contains language *1265suggesting that a “but for” test is applicable in the discharge context, a sugsion, ante at 1259, the majority seems to embrace the rule that when there are both proper and allegedly improper grounds for discharge, the Board’s burden is to show that the discharge would not have occurred but for the improper reason. See Coletti’s Furniture, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 550 F.2d 1292 (1st Cir. 1977).
However, this Court has repeatedly held that the existence of a good cause to fire an employee cannot validate a dismissal that was in fact motivated by union animus. E. g., N. L. R. B. v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 497 F.2d 43, 49 (5 Cir. 1974); N. L. R. B. v. Central Power & Light Co., supra at 1322. This standard is obviously contrary to a “but for” test under which an employer filled to the brim with union animus can nonetheless fire an employee who is a union activist if that employee would have been fired anyway.
The Supreme Court has utilized a “but for” test in first amendment cases, e. g., Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), but that hardly means the test is appropriate in the labor context. In Mt. Healthy the Court, as it has done so often, struck a balance between competing interests. Similar competing interests exist in the labor setting, but there Congress has already established a balance by passing the labor laws. That balance favors the employee, for Congress clearly recognized the superior bargaining position of the employer. See American Shipbuilding Co. v. N. L. R. B., 380 U.S. 300, 316, 85 S.Ct. 955, 966, 13 L.Ed.2d 855 (1965) (labor laws attempt to redress the “imbalance of economic power between labor and management”). The “but for” standard significantly restrikes this balance in favor of the employer, and such a test is contrary to Congressional policy and the case law in this Circuit.

. I note here that the inferences of improper unlawful action were much stronger in Emerson’s case than in Roberts’, since Emerson’s discharge came between two representation elections and immediately after his union activism surfaced. Roberts, however, was suspended some five months after he began to display support for the union, and some two months after the third election.