Court Opinion

ID: 9854879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:15:54.807473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:33.173303
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 34. (dissenting). Assuming chapter 980 is constitutional,1 I conclude that the jury instruction in the present case is prejudicial error.
¶ 35. The State acknowledges, as it must, that this case is governed by Kansas v. Crane, in which the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that "there must be *210proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior."2 The State concedes, therefore, that in order to commit a person under chapter 980, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person has serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior.
¶ 36. The majority opinion concludes that chapter 980 is constitutional because the statute implicitly requires the mental disorder to cause the individual serious difficulty in controlling behavior.3 I accept that the majority can, if it wishes, apply a "saving construction" to the statute in this manner to render it constitutional.4
¶ 37. The issue before us then is whether thé jury instructions in the present case correctly advised the jury that it must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Laxton had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. The jury instructions do not explicitly state that the jury must be so persuaded. The jury instructions never use the phrase "has serious difficulty in controlling his behavior."
*211¶ 38. The jury instructions are set forth at ¶ 27 of the majority opinion. The jury was instructed in relevant part that it must determine the following:
(A) whether Laxton has a mental disorder. "Mental disorder means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to engage in acts of sexual violence"; and
(B) whether Laxton "is dangerous to others because he has a mental disorder which creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. A substantial probability means much more likely than not."
¶ 39. The majority opinion concludes, without explanation, that the jury instructions correctly instructed the jury. Essentially the majority opinion holds that "[b]y concluding that Laxton has a mental disorder and that his mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence, the jury had to conclude that Laxton's mental disorder involved serious difficulty for him in controlling his behavior." Majority op. at ¶ 27. Accordingly, the majority opinion concludes that the jury instructions are correct and do not violate substantive due process.
¶ 40. The majority opinion's linkage or nexus analysis of the jury instructions adopts Justice Scalia's dissenting view in Crane. According to Justice Scalia, "proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior," as required by the Crane majority, is totally unnecessary because the "very existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that causes a likelihood of repeat *212sexual violence in itself establishes the requisite 'difficulty if not impossibility' of control."5
¶ 41. The court is obliged to follow the majority opinion in Crane, not the dissent.
¶ 42. Rather than read into the jury instructions the constitutional gloss that the court has read into chapter 980, I apply the body of law the court has developed for reviewing alleged erroneous jury instructions.
¶ 43. Wisconsin case law instructs this court to review jury instructions with the following principles in mind: The validity of the jury determination depends on the correctness of the instructions. A proper jury instruction is a crucial component of the fact-finding process. A jury instruction must fully and fairly inform the jury of the principles of law it should apply. A court must consider the jury instructions as a whole. The test for determining the correctness of the jury instructions is to ask how a reasonable jury would interpret the instructions.6
¶ 44. I conclude that the jury instructions in the present case, when taken as a whole, did not inform a reasonable jury that it must determine whether Laxton had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.
¶ 45. A statute is interpreted by lawyers, but jury instructions are directed to and interpreted by non-lawyer jurors. Thus, although lawyers and judges might read words or meaning into a statute to render the *213statute constitutional, reasonable non-lawyers serving on a jury might not read "a constitutionally required judicial gloss" into jury instructions that adhere to the original words of the statute now subject to the interpretive gloss. Although the words of chapter 980 might be interpreted by lawyers and judges to include a link between the mental disorder and a serious difficulty in controlling behavior, the jury instructions based directly on the language of chapter 980 do not set forth this link for non-lawyers.
¶ 46. To a jury, a mental disorder "affect[ing] an individual's emotional or volitional capacity," as the jury instruction states, does not equate to a mental disorder that causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior. To a jury, a "mental disorder that... predisposes the person to engage in acts of sexual violence," as the jury instruction states, means a tendency, a predilection, or a susceptibility to commit an act of sexual violence, not an interference with free will, not a "serious difficulty" in controlling behavior. To a jury, "a mental disorder which creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence," as the jury instruction states, does not require the jury, as Crane directs, to "distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case."7
¶ 47. I conclude that the instruction misstates the law under Crane, misleads the jury, violates Laxton's substantive due process rights, and constitutes prejudicial error.8
*214¶ 48. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 49. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762, also released today.

 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 870 (2002).

 The majority opinion further concludes that the State met its burden of proof because "proof that due to a mental disorder it is substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence necessarily and implicitly includes proof that such person's mental disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling his or her sexually dangerous behavior." Majority op. at ¶ 23.
I have reviewed the record. At least one witness gave expert testimony that Laxton had difficulty in controlling his behavior.

 State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 139, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999); State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 82, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997).

 Crane, 122 S.Ct. at 874 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

 See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2000 WI 46 ¶¶ 41-46, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762; State v. Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 87, 580 N.W.2d 181 (1998); State v. Paulson, 106 Wis. 2d 96, 108, 315 N.W.2d 350 (1982); State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 426-427, 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981).

 Crane, 122 S.Ct. at 870.

 Brown v. Dibbell, 227 Wis. 2d 28; 54, 595 N.W.2d 358 (1999); Lemberger v. Koehring Co., 63 Wis. 2d 210, 225, 216 N.W.2d 542 (1974); Bokelkamp v. Olson, 254 Wis. 240, 244, 36 N.W.2d 93 (1949).