Court Opinion

ID: 9896292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 21:05:23.676368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:38.029671
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/9/23 P. v. Rios CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B326828

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. VA091171)
           v.

 JUAN CARLOS RIOS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Andrew C. Kim, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
                       __________________
       Juan Carlos Rios was convicted by a jury in February 2009
of special-circumstance first degree murder and other crimes
committed when he was 23 years old. Rios was sentenced on the
murder count to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
Rios appealed, and we affirmed. (People v. Rios (May 18, 2011,
B218445) [nonpub. opn.] (Rios I).)
       On October 31, 2022 Rios, representing himself, filed a
motion seeking to develop a record of his youth-related mitigating
factors for an eventual youth offender parole hearing pursuant to
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re
Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook) (Franklin proceeding). In his
motion, Rios argued Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h),1 of
the youth offender parole hearing statute violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying the
right to a youth offender parole hearing to inmates sentenced to
LWOP for crimes committed when they were 18 to 25 years old,
while authorizing youth offender parole hearings for similarly
situated young adults who were sentenced to an indeterminate
term. The trial court summarily denied the motion on the basis
that Rios was statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole
hearing.
       On appeal, Rios contends section 3051, subdivision (h),
violates the equal protection clause because there is no rational
basis for excluding 18-to 25-year-old offenders sentenced to
LWOP from the benefits of section 3051. For the reasons
expressed in our opinion in People v. Hardin (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 273 (Hardin), review granted Jan. 11, 2023,
S277487, we agree with Rios. We also reject the People’s

1     All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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alternative contention that there is no equal protection violation
because Rios was also ineligible for the benefits of section 3051
because he was sentenced under the three strikes law.
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12; see § 3051, subd. (h).)
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions for the trial
court to schedule a hearing so that Rios may present information
concerning his youth-related mitigating factors.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Killing
       Early on the morning of June 17, 2005, Alex Gutierrez
drove to a house on Clarkdale Avenue in Hawaiian Gardens,
where Lizbeth Figueroa and her sister Paola Figueroa lived with
their family.2 Gutierrez was a friend of Paola’s ex-boyfriend.
Paola reluctantly agreed to sell stereo speakers for Gutierrez.
Lizbeth and Paola drove to a house about five blocks away to try
to sell the speakers. One of Lizbeth’s friends, Carlos Gallardo,
was there with five or six other men. Gallardo was a member of
the Varrio Hawaiian Gardens gang, and the house was a regular
hangout for members of the gang. Rios, who was a member of the
same gang, approached the women and demanded to know who
gave Paola the speakers. Paola replied that it was “just some
friends.” Rios asked if they were “gangsters” and whether they
had guns, a nice car, and money. He also inquired whether they
looked like “Paisa[s],” meaning Mexican nationals. Paola told
Rios they were Paisas and had no money. Rios responded he

2     The summary of facts is taken from our prior opinion in
People v. Rios (May 18, 2011, B218445) [nonpub. opn.] (Rios I).

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“was planning on jacking them.” Paola later drove Rios,
Gallardo, and Omar Ramirez to Rios’s home, which was close to
where the Figueroa sisters lived.
       At around 3:00 a.m. Gutierrez and David Quesada drove to
Lizbeth and Paola’s house for Gutierrez to pick up money for
what he described as a completed job. Rios, Gallardo, and
Ramirez were near the house when they saw Gutierrez’s car
make a U-turn and come to a stop on the street. Gallardo
thought the occupants of the car looked like Paisas. Rios,
wearing a hockey mask, approached the driver’s side of
Gutierrez’s car and asked Gutierrez for a cigarette. Gutierrez
said he did not have one. Rios whistled, and Gallardo and
Ramirez, whose faces were covered, ran to the passenger’s side of
the car from behind a nearby van. Rios drew a gun and told
Gutierrez to park the car and get out. Rios told Quesada in
Spanish that nothing would happen to him if he got out of the
car. Quesada started to get out of the car.
       Rios argued with Gutierrez, who then began to drive away.
Rios fired several shots at the car. One of the bullets struck
Gutierrez, who lost control of the vehicle. The car hit a van that
was parked in front of the Figueroas’ house. Gutierrez later died
from a gunshot wound to his torso.

B.    The Jury Conviction and Sentence
      A jury convicted Rios of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)), attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246),
two counts of attempted carjacking (§§ 215, subd. (a), 664), and
two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021,
subd. (a)(1).) The jury also found the special circumstance

                                4
allegation true that the murder was committed while Rios was
engaged in the attempted carjacking and to further the activities
of a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17) & (22)), that he
and a principal personally used and discharged a firearm during
the commission of the murder, causing great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)), and that the crime was
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court found true the allegation Rios
had one prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of
section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
       The trial court sentenced Rios to LWOP for first degree
murder, a consecutive sentence of 30 years to life for the
attempted murder (15 years doubled under the three strikes law),
and a concurrent term of four years for possession of a firearm
(the middle term of two years doubled). The trial court also
imposed consecutive 25-years-to-life terms for the firearm use
enhancements on the murder and attempted murder counts, and
five years for the prior serious felony conviction. The court
stayed the sentences on the remaining counts and enhancements.

C.    Rios’s Franklin Motion
      On October 31, 2022 Rios, representing himself, filed a
motion seeking to develop a record for an eventual youth offender
parole hearing. In his motion Rios argued he was 23 years old at
the time of the offenses and section 3051, subdivision (h), violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
denying defendants sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed
when they were 18 to 25 years old the right to a youth offender
parole hearing while authorizing the hearings for similarly

                                 5
situated individuals “who have been sentenced to the functional
equivalent to [LWOP].”
       On November 8, 2022 the trial court summarily denied
Rios’s request for a Franklin proceeding. The trial court found
that Rios was statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole
hearing “because (1) he was sentenced pursuant to
sections 1170.12 and 667(b) through (i) for a prior serious ‘strike’
conviction and (2) he received a life without the possibility of
parole sentence for a controlling offense (namely, first degree
murder committed while engaged in an attempted carjacking and
to further the activities of a criminal street gang), which he
committed when he was 23 years old.” Rios timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

A.     Youth Offender Parole Hearings
       In 2013, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), which added section 3051 and
amended sections 3041, 3046, and 4801, effective January 1,
2014. Section 1 of the bill states, “The purpose of this act is to
establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person
serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a
juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has
shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity,
in accordance with the decision of the California Supreme Court
in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, and the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 48, and Miller v. Alabama (2012) [567 U.S. 460] . . . . It
is the intent of the Legislature to create a process by which
growth and maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a

                                 6
meaningful opportunity for release established.”3 (Stats. 2013,
ch. 312, § 1; see In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 431
[“Youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 were
established by the Legislature in 2013, following a series of
United States and California Supreme Court cases addressing
the constitutionality of lengthy prison sentences for juvenile
offenders.”].)
       Section 3051 initially applied to offenses committed before
the offender turned 18 years old and required the Board of Parole
Hearings, with limited exceptions, to conduct a youth offender
parole hearing no later than a juvenile offender’s 25th year of
incarceration (and at earlier points depending on the offender’s
“controlling offense”).4 (See People v. Ochoa (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.) Section 4801, subdivision (c), directed
the Board of Parole Hearings, when considering parole eligibility

3      In Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. 48, the United
States Supreme Court determined that LWOP sentences for
nonhomicide offenses committed by juvenile offenders violated
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. In Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 460, the
Supreme Court extended the holding of Graham to include
juvenile homicide offenders given mandatory LWOP sentences.
In People v. Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th 262, the California
Supreme Court held, in the context of a 110-years-to-life sentence
imposed on a juvenile for nonhomicide offenses, that parole-
eligible sentences for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth
Amendment if the parole eligibility date falls beyond the
offender’s natural life expectancy.
4     “Controlling offense” refers to “the offense or enhancement
for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of
imprisonment.” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)

                                7
for youth offenders, to “give great weight to the diminished
culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features
of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity.”
      Section 3051 was subsequently amended to apply to
offenders who had committed the controlling offense before the
age of 23 (Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1), and later to offenders who
committed the controlling offense when 25 years old or younger
(Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5). In addition to raising the threshold
age to 25, the Legislature extended youth parole hearings in the
25th year of incarceration to juveniles sentenced to LWOP for a
controlling offense committed before the age of 18. (§ 3051,
subd. (b)(4), added by Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5; see People v.
Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 381.) Section 3051,
subdivision (h), expressly excludes from eligibility for a youth
offender parole hearing cases in which the sentence was imposed
pursuant to the three strikes law (§§ 667, 1170.12, subds. (b)-(i)),
the one strike law (§ 667.61), “or to cases in which an individual
was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.”
(Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.)
      Following the enactment of section 3051, Franklin, supra,
63 Cal.4th 261, established a procedure by which an inmate at
the time of sentencing may make a record of youth-related
mitigating factors in anticipation of a future youth offender
parole hearing under section 3051.5 The Court in Cook, supra,

5     As the Franklin court explained, “[S]ection 3051,
subdivision (f)(2) provides that ‘[f]amily members, friends, school
personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from community-
based organizations with knowledge about the individual before
the crime . . . may submit statements for review by the board.’
Assembling such statements ‘about the individual before the
crime’ is typically a task more easily done at or near the time of

                                 8
7 Cal.5th at page 458 held that a juvenile offender with a final
judgment could move in a postjudgment proceeding under
section 1203.01 to present evidence of youth-related factors.

B.    Equal Protection Analysis
      Both the federal and California Constitutions guarantee
individuals the equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 14th
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7; see People v. Chatman (2018)
4 Cal.5th 277, 287.) “The concept of equal treatment under the
laws means that persons similarly situated regarding the
legitimate purpose of the law should receive like treatment.
[Citation.] ‘“The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under
the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has
adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly
situated groups in an unequal manner.” [Citations.] This initial
inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all
purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of
the law challenged.”’” (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399,
408; accord, People v. Foster (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1202, 1211-1212.)

the juvenile's offense rather than decades later when memories
have faded, records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or
community members may have relocated or passed away. In
addition, section 3051, subdivision (f)(1) provides that any
‘psychological evaluations and risk assessment instruments’ used
by the Board in assessing growth and maturity ‘shall take into
consideration . . . any subsequent growth and increased maturity
of the individual.’ Consideration of ‘subsequent growth and
increased maturity’ implies the availability of information about
the offender when he was a juvenile.” (Franklin, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.)

                                 9
       As we explained in Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
pages 283 to 284, review granted, “‘The next step of an equal
protection analysis asks whether the disparate treatment of two
similarly situated groups is justified by a constitutionally
sufficient state interest. [Citation.] Varying levels of judicial
scrutiny apply depending on the type of claim. “[M]ost legislation
is tested only to determine if the challenged classification bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” [Citation.]
However, differences “in statutes that involve suspect
classifications or touch upon fundamental interests are subject to
strict scrutiny, and can be sustained only if they are necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest.”’” (Quoting Conservatorship
of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1107.)6

6      On October 4, 2023 the Supreme Court in Hardin, supra,
S277487, directed the parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing “[w]hether the first step of the two-part inquiry used
to evaluate equal protection claims, which asks whether two or
more groups are similarly situated for the purposes of the law
challenged, should be eliminated in cases concerning disparate
treatment of classes or groups of persons, such that the only
inquiry is whether the challenged classification is adequately
justified under the applicable standard of scrutiny.” (See
Conservatorship of Eric B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1108 (conc.
opn. of Kruger, J.) [“The simple fact that a law differently
benefits or burdens two identifiable groups is—or at least ought
to be—sufficient reason for us to examine whether the difference
in treatment is consistent with equal protection. To the extent
our cases have taken a different approach, it is probably time to
reevaluate.”].) The Supreme Court has also granted review in
People v. Williams (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 475, 493, review
granted July 22, 2020, S262229, to decide whether section 3051,
subdivision (h), violates the equal protection clause by excluding
from youth offender parole consideration young adults who have

                                10
       “If we deem the groups at issue similarly situated in all
material respects, we consider whether the challenged
classification ultimately bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose.” (People v. Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th
at p. 289; see Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 283, review
granted.) Pursuant to rational relationship review, the
challenged statute only denies equal protection of the law where
the challenger shows there is no reasonably conceivable rational
basis for the disparity of treatment. (Chatman, at p. 289; Hardin
at p. 284.)

C.     Section 3051, Subdivision (h), Violates Rios’s Right to
       Equal Protection Under People v. Hardin
       In Hardin, we considered whether section 3051,
subdivision (h), violated equal protection in treating young adult
offenders between 18 and 25 years old who committed a special-
circumstance murder and were sentenced to life without parole
differently from other young adult offenders in the same age
group who committed serious or violent crimes and received
parole-eligible indeterminate life sentences, including those that
were the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence.
       While acknowledging that “individuals who commit
different offenses are not similarly situated for many purposes”
(Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 286, review granted), we
explained that the purpose of section 3051 “was not to assess
culpability or measure the appropriate level of punishment for
various crimes, but ‘to account for neuroscience research that the

been convicted and sentenced for serious sex crimes under the
one strike law (§ 667.61).

                                11
human brain—especially those portions responsible for judgment
and decisionmaking—continues to develop into a person’s mid-
20’s.’” (Hardin, at p. 287; accord, People v. Acosta (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779 [“‘“[t]he purpose of section 3051 is not to
measure the extent of punishment warranted by the offense the
individual committed but to permit the evaluation of whether,
after years of growth in prison, that person has attained the
maturity to lead a law-abiding life outside of prison.”’”]
Therefore, “an individual serving a parole-eligible life sentence
and a person who committed an offense at the same age serving a
sentence of life without parole are similarly situated.” (Hardin,
at p. 287.)
       We next considered in Hardin whether there was any
plausible rational basis for distinguishing between a young adult
offender sentenced to life without parole and other young adult
offenders sentenced to parole-eligible life sentences for purposes
of section 3051. We concluded there was not, explaining, “[I]f, as
the legislature stated, the goal of section 3051 was to apply the
[Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 460] youth-related mitigating
factors to young adults up to the age of 26 in light of neuroscience
research that demonstrated the human brain continues to
develop into a person’s mid-20’s, and thus to permit youth
offenders a meaningful opportunity for parole if they demonstrate
increased maturity and impulse control, then for that purpose
there is no plausible basis for distinguishing between same-age
offenders based solely on the crime they commit.” (Hardin,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 288, review granted.) We explained
that “while for some purposes it might be reasonable to view
special circumstance murder differently from murder with no
special circumstance finding, that is not a rational basis for the

                                12
distinction in eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing made
by section 3051.” (Id. at p. 290.) Accordingly, “[a]bsent a rational
basis for that exclusion, the disparate treatment of offenders like
Hardin cannot stand.” (Id. at p. 291.)
       The People argue that Hardin was incorrectly decided and
urge us to follow the cases that have found no equal protection
violation, including People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 125,
review granted May 17, 2023, S279458 [disagreeing with Hardin
that there was an equal protection violation, explaining “the
‘rational basis’ inquiry is not limited to the purposes of the
challenged law”]; People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 203
[section 3051 does not violate equal protection because “there is a
rational basis for the disparate treatment”]; People v. Morales
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 349 [“there is a rational basis for the
Legislature’s decision to treat youthful offenders sentenced to
LWOP differently than youthful first degree murderers not
sentenced to LWOP based on public safety concerns and the
desire to punish those who commit special circumstance multiple
murder more harshly than those who commit first degree murder
without such aggravating circumstances”]; People v. Jackson
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 200 [“Given the deferential standard
we apply in determining rationality for equal protection
purposes, we conclude public safety, and the desire to punish
those persons who commit first degree special circumstance
murder more harshly than persons who commit first degree
murder without aggravating circumstances, provide a plausible
basis for our Legislature to treat these two classifications
differently for purposes of section 3051.”]; People v. Acosta, supra
60 Cal.App.5th at p. 780 [“There is also a rational basis for
distinguishing between a young adult LWOP offender and a

                                13
young adult offender serving a non-LWOP sentence: the severity
of the crime committed.”]; and In re Williams, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436 [“In excluding LWOP inmates from
youth offender parole hearings, the Legislature reasonably could
have decided that youthful offenders who have committed such
crimes—even with diminished culpability and increased potential
for rehabilitation—are nonetheless still sufficiently culpable and
sufficiently dangerous to justify lifetime incarceration.”].
Notwithstanding the cases cited by the People, we do not find the
arguments made by the People persuasive. In the light of
section 3051’s stated purpose, unless the Supreme Court directs
us otherwise, we decline the People’s invitation to deviate from
our holding in Hardin. (Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 289,
review granted.)
       Finally, the People contend in the alternative that, even if
we continue to follow our decision in Hardin, we should affirm
because Rios was ineligible for a Franklin proceeding because he
was sentenced under the three strikes law, citing recent cases
that have not found an equal protection violation. (See People v.
Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856, 864 [“we conclude the
differential treatment of youth offenders sentenced under the
Three Strikes law for purposes of early parole consideration for
youth offenders is rationally related to the legitimate
governmental purpose of addressing recidivism”]; People v. Wilkes
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1166 [“Assuming a Three Strikes
youth offender is similarly situated to other youth offenders for
purposes of section 3051, the Legislature could rationally
determine that the former—‘a recidivist who has engaged in
significant antisocial behavior and who has not benefited from
the intervention of the criminal justice system’ [citation]—

                                14
presents too great a risk of recidivism to allow the possibility of
early parole.”].)
       The People argue there is a rational basis for treating
young adult offenders sentenced under the three strikes law
differently because the three strikes law applies to more
dangerous recidivists with prior serious or violent felony
convictions. But, like an LWOP sentence, the imposition of a
three-strikes sentence is based on the crimes committed by the
offender, not his or her maturity or impulse control. As we
reasoned in Hardin with respect to young adult offenders
sentenced to LWOP, the goal in enacting section 3051 was to
apply youth mitigating factors to young adults in light of
neuroscience research showing the human brain continues to
develop into a person’s mid-20’s, and on that basis to allow youth
offenders “a meaningful opportunity for parole if they
demonstrate increased maturity and impulse control.” (Hardin,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 288, review granted.) Thus, there
was no plausible reason to distinguish between offenders of the
same age based solely on the crimes they committed. (Ibid.)
Similarly, given the goal of section 3051, there is no reason to
distinguish between young adult offenders of the same age based
on whether the crimes they committed fell within the three
strikes law or another sentencing scheme.7 (Id. at p. 289 [“By

7      We decline to find, as requested by the People, that Rios
has forfeited the argument his three-strikes sentence made him
ineligible for the benefits of section 3051. (See People v. Heard
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 626-627 [court exercised its discretion
to consider equal protection challenge because “‘appellate courts
have discretion to address constitutional issues raised on appeal’
where, as here, ‘the issue presented is “a pure question of law”
turning on undisputed facts’”]; see also People v. Williams (1998)

                                15
defining the youth parole eligible date in terms of a single
‘controlling offense,’ rather than by the offender’s aggregate
sentence, the Legislature has eschewed any attempt to assess the
offenders’ overall culpability, let alone his or her amenability to
growth and maturity.”].)
      Because Rios will be entitled to a youth offender parole
hearing in the future, Rios should be given the opportunity under
Franklin and Cook to make a record of his youth-related
mitigating factors.

                         DISPOSITION

      The order denying Rios’s motion for a Franklin proceeding
is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with
directions to schedule a hearing so that Rios may assemble
information concerning his youth-related mitigating factors.

                                          FEUER, J.

      We concur:

            PERLUSS, P. J.

            SEGAL, J.

17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is generally not
prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved
for review by a party.”].)

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