Court Opinion

ID: 9405862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 15:08:21.182273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:27.102601
License: Public Domain

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        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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                                                  RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2023
                                                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                    2022-SC-0059-MR

ANGELA WAUGH                                                         APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
V.            HONORABLE BRIAN CHRISTOPHER MCCLOUD, JUDGE
                             NO. 19-CR-00101

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                      AFFIRMING

      Angela Waugh appeals as a matter of right1 from a judgment of the

Greenup Circuit Court convicting her of first-degree sodomy; incest; complicity

to first-degree rape; two counts of complicity to first-degree sodomy; complicity

to attempted first-degree sodomy; complicity to first-degree sexual abuse; use

of a minor in a sexual performance; and fourth-degree assault. She received a

total sentence of forty years’ imprisonment. Waugh raises three claims of

error: (1) her convictions for complicity to first-degree sodomy and complicity

to attempted first-degree sodomy violated the prohibition against double

jeopardy; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for

      1   Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
complicity to first-degree sodomy; and (3) the trial court improperly allowed the

Commonwealth to interpret the contents of a recorded telephone call between

Waugh and her mother. Discerning no error, we affirm.

      Waugh resided with her 14-year-old daughter, H.W., her two sons, and

Waugh’s boyfriend, Kevin Bowling, in a house owned by Waugh’s mother, Gayle

Waugh. Waugh and Bowling kept their bedroom in the garage. H.W. spent a

lot of time socializing with Waugh and Bowling in the garage. Waugh and

Bowling provided H.W. with marijuana, prescription pain pills, and alcohol.

Over time, Waugh and Bowling engaged in increasingly sexually charged

conversations with H.W. Waugh and Bowling told H.W. that they wanted her

to watch them have sex and that they wanted to set up video cameras to watch

H.W. have sex with boys.

      In January 2019, H.W. fell asleep in the garage while waiting for Waugh

and Bowling to return. Upon their arrival, the three smoked marijuana,

snorted pills, and drank alcohol. H.W. became so intoxicated that she lost

consciousness. As H.W. drifted in and out of consciousness, she awoke with

no clothes on. Waugh’s mouth was on H.W.’s vagina and she was placing her

fingers in H.W.’s vagina. Bowling also placed his mouth on H.W.’s vagina while

Waugh again placed her fingers inside H.W.’s vagina. Bowling later had sexual

intercourse with H.W. while she was bent over the arm of the couch. Waugh

told H.W. to arch her back. H.W. could not move or speak and continued to

drift in and out of consciousness. When H.W. awoke, Bowling was again

having sexual intercourse with her. Bowling began to masturbate and

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ejaculated on H.W.’s stomach and face. At this point, H.W. heard her

grandmother knocking on the door. Waugh and Bowling told H.W. “to shut the

f--- up and don’t say anything.” H.W. tried to scream, but she could not make

a sound.

      The next morning, H.W. awoke naked under a comforter on the couch.

Bowling asked her if she remembered anything from the night before. H.W.

told him that she did not remember anything. Bowling told her they had a

threesome and that H.W. wanted it. H.W. gradually remembered the events of

the night before and asked Waugh to not let anything like that happen to her

again. Waugh told H.W. they would never make her do anything that she did

not want to do.

      H.W. continued to spend time with Waugh and Bowling in the garage.

She tried to protect herself by placing trust in her mother and by cutting down

on her intake of drugs and alcohol. On a second occasion, Bowling repeatedly

tried to touch H.W. and tried to put his penis in her mouth. H.W. told Bowling

to stop, but he continued. H.W. then tried to kick him off her and asked

Waugh to help her. A heavily intoxicated Waugh responded by telling H.W. to

“just f--- him, [H.]. I can’t do it. Just f--- him.”

      On the third occasion, H.W. was with Waugh and Bowling in the garage.

Waugh was heavily intoxicated. Bowling repeatedly touched H.W.’s breasts

and buttocks through her clothing. He hugged her and tried to unhook her

bra. Waugh again told H.W. to “just f--- him.” Bowling and Waugh began

                                           3
fighting. When H.W. tried to calm Waugh down, Waugh bit H.W. on the thigh

with such force that it left a bruise.

      Several days later, H.W. became distraught at school and could not stop

crying. She told her teacher what had happened. The teacher informed the

school counselor who then contacted the authorities. During the investigation,

H.W. told the social workers about another incident where Bowling took a

photograph of Waugh and H.W. with their breasts bared because he wanted to

compare their breast size. Bowling also sent H.W. a photograph of his penis.

      A Greenup County grand jury indicated Waugh on one count of first-

degree sodomy, one count of incest, one count of complicity to first-degree

rape, three counts of unlawful transaction with a minor, two counts of

complicity to first-degree sodomy, one count of complicity to attempted first-

degree sodomy, one count of complicity to first-degree sexual abuse, and one

count of fourth-degree assault. The grand jury issued a superseding

indictment to charge one count of use of a minor in a sexual performance.

Prior to trial, the Commonwealth dismissed the three counts of unlawful

transaction with a minor.

      Following a jury trial, Waugh was found guilty of all charges. The trial

court entered a judgment of conviction in accordance with the jury’s verdict

and sentenced Waugh to a total of forty years’ imprisonment. This appeal

followed.

      For her first contention of error, Waugh argues her convictions for

complicity to first-degree sodomy and complicity to attempted first-degree

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sodomy violated the prohibition on double jeopardy because the charges arose

from the same incident. Waugh specifically argues Bowling’s conduct

constituted a single offense. She does not contend her own actions or

omissions as an accomplice constituted a single course of conduct. Waugh

concedes this argument was not properly preserved and requests palpable

error review under RCr2 10.26.

      Double jeopardy violations are subject to palpable error review. Cardine

v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 641, 651 (Ky. 2009). This Court has long held

convictions tainted by double jeopardy cannot stand. Id. A double jeopardy

violation satisfies the palpable error rule because it necessarily requires a

different result. Id. In other words, a conviction tainted by double jeopardy

results in manifest injustice. Id.

      The Double Jeopardy Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall “be subject for the

same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” U.S. Const. amend.

V. Similarly, Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution ensures no person shall

“be twice put in jeopardy of his life or limb” for the same offense. This Court

applies the Blockburger3 test to determine whether a double jeopardy violation

has occurred. Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996). In

Blockburger, the United States Supreme Court held that “where the same act or

transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test

      2   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
      3   Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).

                                            5
to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is

whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” 284

U.S. at 304. When read together, Section (1)(a) and (2) of KRS4 505.020

represent the codification of the Blockburger test. Kiper v. Commonwealth, 399

S.W.3d 736, 742 (Ky. 2012).

      KRS 505.020(1) recognizes “[w]hen a single course of conduct of a

defendant may establish the commission of more than one (1) offense, he may

be prosecuted for each such offense.” Under KRS 505.020(1)(c), a defendant

may not be convicted of more than one offense when “[t]he offense is designed

to prohibit a continuing course of conduct and the defendant’s course of

conduct was uninterrupted by legal process, unless the law expressly provides

that specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses.” Double

jeopardy does not prohibit the prosecution and conviction of a defendant “upon

multiple offenses arising out of a single course of conduct when the facts

establish that two or more separate and distinct attacks occurred during the

episode of criminal behavior.” Spicer v. Commonwealth, 442 S.W.3d 26, 31 (Ky.

2014). To distinguish separate attacks during a single course of conduct,

“there must have been a cognizable lapse in [the defendant’s] course of conduct

during which the defendant could have reflected upon his conduct, if only

momentarily, and formed the intent to commit additional acts.” Id. (citation

omitted) (alteration in original).

      4   Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                       6
      We conclude the completed offense of first-degree sodomy and the

attempted offense of first-degree sodomy constituted separate and distinct

criminal acts. H.W. testified:

      He [Bowling] would try to touch on me and stick his penis in my
      mouth when I would tell him to stop. And I would try to kick him
      off of me and I yelled for my mom who was sitting next to me on
      the couch and she yelled at him and told him to stop. . . . He just
      kept trying . . . and I was trying to get my mom to help me, but she
      looked at me and she told me, “just f--- him, [H.]. I can’t do it.
      Just f--- him.”

H.W. verbally told Bowling to stop trying to put his penis in her mouth, but

Bowling did not stop. H.W. subsequently tried to kick Bowling off her in an

effort to stop him, but, again, he did not stop. H.W.’s separate verbal and

physical actions in rebuffing Bowling provided a “cognizable lapse” that would

have allowed Bowling to reflect upon his conduct and form the intent to

commit additional criminal acts. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably

infer that Bowling actually touched H.W.’s mouth with his penis and separately

attempted, but failed, to make contact with H.W.’s mouth. Therefore, Waugh

was not subjected to double jeopardy.

      For her second contention of error, Waugh argues she was entitled to a

directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of complicity to first-degree sodomy

because there was insufficient evidence Bowling committed first-degree

sodomy. Specifically, Waugh argues there was insufficient evidence Bowling

placed his penis in H.W.’s mouth. We disagree. Again, Waugh does not

contend the evidence of her own actions or omissions failed to establish

complicity.

                                        7
      This allegation of error was not properly preserved for review. At the

close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Waugh moved for a direct verdict

“on the grounds that it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial court denied the motion. Although

Waugh did not present any evidence, Waugh subsequently renewed her motion

for directed verdict and objected to the giving of jury instructions. Again,

Waugh did not offer any specific basis for the renewed motion. A generalized

motion for a directed verdict is not sufficient to preserve the issue of sufficiency

of the evidence for appellate review. Ray v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 250,

266 (Ky. 2020). On a motion for directed verdict, a criminal defendant must

“identify the particular charge the Commonwealth failed to prove, and must

identify the particular elements of that charge the Commonwealth failed to

prove.” Id. Nevertheless, the failure to grant a direct verdict based on the

insufficiency of evidence is subject to palpable error review because “it is clear

that a different result would occur, since a defendant convicted on insufficient

proof should be acquitted.” Commonwealth v. Goss, 428 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Ky.

2014). A conviction based on insufficient evidence necessarily results in

manifest injustice. Id. We will accordingly review for palpable error.

      A trial court’s failure to grant a directed verdict should not be reversed

unless the appellate court determines “it would be clearly unreasonable for a

jury to find guilt.” Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).

When confronted with a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must

assume the truth of the Commonwealth’s evidence and “draw all fair and

                                         8
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth.” Id.

Direct evidence of guilt is not required to support a conviction. Southworth v.

Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 32, 42 (Ky. 2014). A conviction may rest on purely

circumstantial evidence if the Commonwealth can prove each of the elements of

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Similarly, the ability of a jury to

draw a reasonable inference does not depend on the existence of direct

evidence. McGruder v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Ky. 2016). A

reasonable inference arises from “a process of reasoning by which a proposition

is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts already proven.” Id.

(quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 232, 253 (Ky. 1999)). Because a

conviction may stand on circumstantial evidence, a reasonable inference may

also be drawn from circumstantial evidence. Id.

      A finding of guilt by complicity requires: “(1) proof of commission of an

offense by another person and (2) proof of the defendant’s participation in

commission of that offense.” Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 318, 327

(Ky. 2006) (quoting Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune, Kentucky Criminal

Law § 3–3(d)(2), at 117 (1998)). An accomplice “occupies the same status as

one being guilty of the principal offense.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth,

601 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Ky. 1980)). Therefore, “to convict a defendant of guilt by

complicity, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was,

in fact, committed by the person being aided or abetted by the defendant.” Id.

      KRS 510.070 defines first-degree sodomy in pertinent part:

      (1) A person is guilty of sodomy in the first degree when:

                                        9
      (a) He engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person
      by forcible compulsion; or

      (b) He engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person
      who is incapable of consent because he:

            1. Is physically helpless;

“Deviate sexual intercourse” is defined as “any act of sexual gratification

involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth . . . of another.” KRS

510.010(1). Penetration of the mouth is not required to sustain a conviction for

first-degree sodomy. Bills v. Commonwealth, 851 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Ky. 1993).

Mere contact between the penis of one person and the mouth of another, for

the purpose of sexual gratification, is all that is necessary under the statute.

Id. Further, this Court has previously held “the only possible inference” to be

drawn from a victim’s testimony that the defendant “tried to put his penis in

her mouth” was that the defendant’s “penis came in contact with her mouth.”

Watson v. Commonwealth, No. 2005–SC–000727–MR, 2006 WL 3386620 at *3

(Ky. November 22, 2006).

      As stated above, H.W. testified that Bowling repeatedly tried to place his

penis in her mouth despite her verbal and physical protests. H.W. testified

that she tried to get Bowling “off of” her. Assuming the truth of this evidence

and drawing all fair inferences therefrom in the Commonwealth’s favor, we

conclude a jury could reasonably find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

Bowling’s penis made contact with H.W.’s mouth for the purpose of Bowling’s

sexual gratification. The jury was not required to find that Bowling’s penis

penetrated H.W.’s mouth. We note the jury was instructed that it must find
                                         10
that “Kevin Bowling engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with the child, H.W.

by placing his penis in the child H.W.’s mouth.” However, “jury instruction

issues and directed verdict issues are distinct for purposes of appeal.” Sutton

v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.3d 836, 847 (Ky. 2021). The issue of whether a

defendant is entitled to a directed verdict depends on the evidence presented at

trial. Id. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Waugh’s motion for directed

verdict on the charge of complicity to first-degree sodomy.

      For her third and final contention of error, Waugh argues the trial court

erred by allowing the Commonwealth to interpret the contents of a recorded

telephone call between Waugh and her mother. We disagree.

      Like any evidentiary ruling, the admission of audio recordings is

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Ky. 2002), overruled on other grounds by

McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010). However, a trial

court should not allow parties to interpret inaudible portions of recordings.

Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Ky. 1988). It is an abuse of

discretion for a “court to provide the jury with the prosecutor’s version of the

inaudible or indistinct portions.” Id. The purpose of the rule is that the

interpretation of a recording invades the jury’s role “to determine as best it can

what is revealed in the tape recording without embellishment or interpretation

by a witness.” Gordon v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Ky. 1995).

Recently, this Court held that it was error to allow the Commonwealth to

project a self-produced transcript before the jury while a recording of a jail

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house phone call was being played. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 730,

744 (Ky. 2020). We explained “an attorney is not allowed to present a self-

transcribed summary of what he thinks is being said on a phone call or

recording” because “[t]his misleads the jury to hear the specific interpretation

of one party.” Id. This type of evidentiary error is subject to harmless error

analysis. Id. at 745.

      The Commonwealth played recordings of phone calls Waugh made to her

mother, Gayle Waugh, from jail. The Commonwealth called Stacia Moreland to

identify the voices on the recording. Waugh neither objected to the admission

of the recordings nor to Moreland’s competency to identify the voices contained

therein. The Commonwealth repeatedly stopped the recording and asked

Moreland to identify whether Waugh’s voice or her mother’s voice was being

heard. The Commonwealth continued this line of questioning as follows:

      Commonwealth: And whose voice said, “deleted all that stuff off the
      phone?”

      Moreland: Angela Waugh.

      [Recording plays and then is stopped].

      Commonwealth: Who said, “This is for me, it isn’t for anyone else?”

      Moreland: Angela Waugh.

      Commonwealth: And who said, “she needed to stay away from the
      courthouse,” who’s voice was that?

      Moreland: Angela Waugh.

      Defense Counsel: Objection. That’s leading, the tape says what it says.
      Ms. Malone can’t go back and read it again.

                                       12
Trial Court: Well, she’s getting her to identify who said what statement,
so that’s overruled.

Defense Counsel: She can ask her whose voices those are, but she can’t
read back a transcript.

Trial Court: She can ask her, who said what piece. So, overruled. Go
ahead.

Commonwealth: Whose voice said, “she shouldn’t have been out there,
period.”?

Defense Counsel: Objection.

Trial Court: Overruled.

Moreland: Angela Waugh.

Commonwealth: And who was the other voice on the phone?

Moreland: Gayle Waugh.

Commonwealth: Whose voice said, “I need you to be straight with her. I
need her one f’ing time.”?

Moreland: Angela Waugh.

Commonwealth: And any other voices on that phone call?

Moreland: Gayle Waugh.

[Recording plays and is stopped].

Commonwealth: Whose voice says, “I will never forgive [H.] for this
one.”?

Moreland: Angela Waugh.

Defense Counsel: Objection.

Trial Court: Mr. Lyon, I’ve ruled on these, she can do that. That’s the
only way to identify who said which thing, so I’ve noted your objection,
they’re overruled.

[Recording plays and is stopped].

                                13
      Commonwealth: And who said, “I’ll never forgive her for this.”? Whose
      voice was that?

      Moreland: Angela Waugh.

      [Recording plays and is stopped].

      Commonwealth: And who said to “keep her away from the courthouse,
      just don’t let her testify about s---.”?

      Moreland: Angela Waugh.

      The situation in the present appeal is distinguishable from Taylor and

Sanborn. There is no allegation that the recording of the telephone call

between Waugh and her mother was inaudible or difficult to understand.

Additionally, there is no allegation that the prosecutor misstated or otherwise

mischaracterized the contents of the recording. The Commonwealth did not

self-produce a written transcription for the jury. Instead, the Commonwealth

orally repeated statements that were clearly audible on the recording. The

purpose of the repetition was not to interpret the content of the statement, but

to identify the voice of the speaker. It is permissible for a court to allow the

jury to use a transcript to follow a recording “in order to delineate the voices of

the speakers.” Norton v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Ky. App. 1994)

(citing United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.

Watson, 594 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wilson, 578 F.2d 67

(5th Cir. 1978)).

      We cannot conclude the oral repetition of clearly audible statements

constituted an impermissible interpretation of the recording. Even assuming

the Commonwealth’s questioning crossed the line into impermissible

                                        14
interpretation, we would nevertheless find any error to be harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. The subject-matter of the recordings involved Waugh’s state

of mind and consciousness of guilt following the incidents in question. The

recordings did not provide any evidence of the elements of any of the charged

offenses. We are convinced the jury would have convicted Waugh on all

charges regardless of whether the Commonwealth’s repetition of Waugh’s

recorded statements had not been permitted.

      For the foregoing reasons and discerning no error, the judgment of the

Greenup Circuit Court is affirmed.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, Nickell,

JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Roy A. Durham, II
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny L. Sanders
Assistant Attorney General

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