Court Opinion

ID: 9787044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:09:20.962236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.626239
License: Public Domain

J. JONES, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur with much of the Court’s opinion, I dissent with regard to the determination that the School District denied Richards’ leave request on proper grounds. The denial was based on an incorrect legal interpretation of the term “professional development.” For that reason, I would reverse the district court’s holding.
There are a number of conclusions in the Court’s opinion with which I agree. The *636Court correctly states that the Master Agreement provides the school principal some discretion in approving or denying a request for professional leave. I agree that the principal must employ good faith in exercising that discretion. However, I do not believe that the principal can deny a request for professional leave based upon an incorrect legal interpretation of the contract. In my view, “professional development” encompasses the purpose for which Richard sought professional leave. The principal denied his leave request solely on the ground that the purpose for which he sought leave did not qualify as professional development.
While both parties contended in their written briefing that the term “professional development” was unambiguous, we are not particularly required to assume that to be the case. Parties continually come before the Court arguing that a contract is unambiguous in them favor and this Court always reserves the option of making that determination on its own, as it is a question of law. When there are two different reasonable interpretations of a contract term, the contract is ambiguous. Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). During oral argument, the School District’s counsel candidly admitted what is clear from the record — that the interpretation of “professional development” depends upon the standpoint from which it is viewed. The School District contends that it must be viewed from its standpoint and that professional development means development that serves the interests of the School District. The development must be confined to enhancing the knowledge and abilities of the particular teacher in his or her particular area. On the other hand, the appellants contend that it must be interpreted from the standpoint of the professional and that it means enhancement of the professional teacher’s knowledge and abilities in the educational profession. Both are reasonable interpretations.
The record discloses facts upon which the ambiguity of the term can be resolved. The Master Agreement contains the professional leave provision. There is no separately-tailored provision contained in Richards’ contract. During oral argument, the School District’s counsel conceded that the provision, as used in the Master Agreement, encompasses a broad range of professional development activities. It is not confined to any particular teacher’s specialized area. When Richards’ contract was negotiated, no limiting language was inserted to indicate that professional development had any different meaning for him. He is entitled to the broad ranging definition contemplated in the Master Agreement.
Further, the Master Agreement utilizes the term “professional” in a number of regards. The profession involved in this case is the educational profession. Richards sought leave on the day in question to defend his final project for his master’s degree in education, albeit in educational administration. However, the degree sought was in the educational profession. The Master Agreement does not deal with subspecialities, but rather, deals with the educational profession. Similarly, with reference to professional teachers, the Idaho Code deals with teachers as being professionals involved in the education profession. See Chapter 12, Title 33, Idaho Code and, particularly, I.C. sections 33-1251, et. seq. (the Public Schools Professional Standards Act). The Code, like the Master Agreement, treats professional teachers as being members of the education profession rather than its various subspecialities.
Because the term is ambiguous, it is appropriate to consider how it was developed. The PEA, acting on behalf of Richards and the other teachers, proposed a broader leave provision for professional employees when the Master Agreement was being negotiated. The Board of the School District provided the critical language that was later agreed to between the parties. It was somewhat more limited than what the PEA had suggested but it provided, in pertinent part, “If any teacher wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to ... pursue professional development ...” Where language is ambiguous, as this language is, the language “should be construed most strongly against the party ... employing the words concerning which doubt arises.” J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 616, 167 P.3d 748, 753 (2006). *637Under this principle of contract interpretation, the language is to be construed against the School District, the party that furnished the language.
Also, it is appropriate to consider who the provision is designed to benefit. During oral argument before the Court, appellants’ attorney stated that the provision was primarily designed to benefit professional teachers, but he also contended that the provision benefit-ted the School District by 'increasing the amount of its allocation under the state distribution formula. The School District’s counsel countered that the School District did not really benefit because the increased allocation essentially passed through to the teacher in question. Thus, it appears that the professional teacher, rather than the School District, is the beneficiary of the provision. Where the provision is designed to benefit the professional teacher by allowing the teacher to enhance his or her professional credentials, it is only reasonable to interpret the provision from the teacher’s standpoint.
Thus, I would make the determination that the term “professional development” must be interpreted from the standpoint of the teacher, in this case Richards, and that the principal incorrectly determined that the purpose for which Richards sought leave was not a permissible one. While the principal could have utilized his discretion to deny the leave request on other grounds, such as the ground that Richards had already exceeded his two allotted annual professional leave days by the time he requested leave in this instance, as alluded to in footnote 1 of the Court’s opinion, the School District did not rely on this fact at any point during the grievance process and therefore could not raise it as a defense. Neither can the School District raise any other discretionary reason to support the denial, which was made on an incorrect legal interpretation of the contract provision.
I would hold that the principal improperly denied the leave request based on an incorrect legal interpretation of the contract and that the School District incorrectly affirmed his action, requiring reversal of the district court’s decision. With regard to the question of attorney fees, I believe the Court correctly denied the School District’s request for fees under I.C. section 12-117 and would similarly hold that provision to be inapplicable were the majority to have held as I suggest. There is a legitimate dispute as to the proper interpretation of the contract language and neither party has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Justice BURDICK concurs.