Court Opinion

ID: 9702193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:58:58.261726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:34.763352
License: Public Domain

GILBERT, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur that it was error to admit the expert testimony cited by the majority as well as Chief Schmidt’s testimony about appellant’s request for an attorney, but would hold that these errors were harmless. As to the alleged remaining errors, either they were not errors at all, were brought on by defense counsel, or were waived and forfeited at trial or on appeal. Therefore, I respectfully dissent to the balance of the opinion.
The majority sets the stage in support of its holding by reversing the natural order of things that actually occurred at trial. First of all, it overemphasizes the “prominent role the substance of the informant’s tip took on at trial.” The majority next discounts and then disregards the threats of harm that the appellant allegedly made about the confidential informant. Rather than address that issue, or set appropriate standards for addressing that issue, the majority then inexplicitly states that the trial court’s error “was compounded by the denial of appellant’s request for disclosure of the informant.” This rationale rewards appellant for the alleged threat.
The trial court was confronted with the serious dilemma of what to do about appellant’s request for the disclosure of the confidential reliable informant when appellant allegedly threatened to physically harm whoever “snitched” on him. The court was informed that the informant was afraid for his/her safety and the safety of his/her family. There is nothing in the record to rebut this allegation. Although there was no trial court finding relative to the informant’s safety, I would affirm the court of appeals’ holding that the trial court was “legitimately concerned about the informant’s safety.” The threat to the informant’s safety was a factor that overshadowed the trial court’s decision and not a factor that this court should simply ignore, especially in light of appellant’s extensive past criminal record.1
The majority acknowledges that the trial court correctly considered the four factors outlined in Ford in determining whether disclosure was necessary. However, the majority then glosses over significant facts relating to materiality of the informant’s information. While the informant may have been a material witness to the fact that there was methamphetamine in the *188air cleaner of appellant’s vehicle, the informant’s testimony was immaterial to the ultimate issue of guilt. The informant’s statement was used solely to explain the surveillance and stop — issues appellant never appealed. The informant’s identity was immaterial since appellant voluntarily consented to the search that enabled the state to gather the evidence to prove its case without the informant’s testimony. It was only after appellant’s voluntary consent that the police officers, with the help of a trained dog, discovered a plastic bag with several smaller bags inside of it, containing a total of 86.5 grams of methamphetamine worth approximately $9,000, hidden inside the air cleaner of appellant’s vehicle. None of this evidence is disputed. After the discovery of the methamphetamine, the only issue remaining in the case became whether appellant knowingly possessed methamphetamine. As to this issue, the informant adds nothing because the vehicle, at the designated address, had drugs in it and was being used for trafficking in these drugs. At the omnibus hearing, Chief Schmidt testified the informant had not seen appellant in possession of the drugs. Contrary to the “prominent role” the majority assumes that this testimony played, the informant’s tip added nothing about whether appellant knowingly possessed the drugs found in his car. The trial court reasonably concluded any further testimony would not be of any probative value.
The informant was a mere transmitter of information, rather than an active participant and/or material witness to the crime. Accordingly, the informant’s name did not have to be disclosed. State v. Houle, 257 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Minn.1977). There was at best mere speculation that the informant may have framed the appellant, but there was no testimony by appellant or any other evidence to support this speculation, meaning disclosure was not required. State v. Ford, 322 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Minn.1982). Appellant simply argues on appeal that he was denied a fair trial because his defense hinged on his ability to provide some plausible explanation for the presence of the methamphetamine in his vehicle. The only “evidence” in the record to support this explanation was appellant’s assertion that he was somehow framed, but this was not evidence at all; it was mere speculation.
The informant merely told the police what the informant observed about the car and drugs. He/she did not participate in the crime nor offer any evidence about what knowledge the appellant had or role he played, if any, in placing the drugs in the air cleaner. The facts of this case are similar to the facts in Ford, where the informant supplied conclusory information to the police leading to surveillance and ultimately to the gathering of evidence independent from the informant’s tip used to convict the defendant of the charged offense. See Ford, 322 N.W.2d at 613-14. While it is true that the informant did witness the methamphetamine in appellant’s car on the date appellant was arrested, the state did not rely on the informant’s testimony in establishing appellant’s guilt, as in Ford. 322 N.W.2d at 614.
Although appellant in this case asserted that someone else must have placed the methamphetamine in his vehicle, no offer of proof was made indicating that anybody else had access to appellant’s vehicle during the time in question. There was nothing in the record to indicate that the state’s evidence was suspect in any manner or that any of the Ford factors were implicated. On these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing either to require disclosure of the informant’s identity or to hold an in camera hearing.
*189With regard to the admittedly hearsay testimony of the contents of the informant’s tip, the appellant failed to object to this particular error at trial. A defendant who does not object to the admission of evidence waives the right to appeal such admission, even if the evidence should not have been admitted. State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 602 (Minn.1993). The trial court’s final ruling on this issue did not allow the state to introduce the details of the informant’s tip. The majority focuses on the trial court’s initial ruling that testimony concerning the informant would be limited to the fact that a tip was received and that “the record reflects some confusion as to the intent of the trial court’s comments concerning the informant’s tip at the beginning of trial * *
Appellant’s attorney did not object to the trial court’s ruling the morning of trial, did not object to the state’s opening statement, and did not object to Chief Schmidt’s testimony about what the informant said. Instead, appellant’s counsel proceeded to cross-examine Chief Schmidt as to the exact nature of the informant’s tip over the hearsay objection of the state rather than pursue “the better practice * * * to renew the objection at trial,” as the majority recommends. Appellant’s counsel embarked upon a detailed cross-examination of the disputed statement to make it perfectly clear what the exact nature of the informant’s tip was by not only repeating this information but going into more detail about the tip. Therefore, the jury was left with a full understanding of exactly what the informant said.
It is true that some of Chief Schmidt’s testimony may have been hearsay; however, appellant’s counsel knowingly and intentionally cross-examined á witness to insert this information in the record and it is this same testimony that appellant now argues was admitted in error. Appellant cannot now argue that allowing the content of the tip was prejudicial. This argument is not based on any precedent, does not articulate any workable rule of law under these facts, and negates the better practice recommendation of making an objection to help remind the judge of either an objection or of its prior ruling. Many of these issues relate to the quality of legal representation that the appellant received from his counsel. While an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may have merit, that claim is not before us.
The majority then ventures to establish new law as to when an in camera inquiry would be held. This is done without any cite to authority and supported by the mere conclusion that “it seems to us that the failure to afford at least an in camera inquiry exacerbated the error in admitting the substance of the tip in the first instance.” The majority gives no explanation as to how this may have exacerbated the error or what standard should be used by the trial court in deciding when to use an in camera hearing when the request is based on mere speculation. If there was any exacerbation of an error, that occurred because of appellant’s alleged threats, with which the appellant is now rewarded.
The majority should not simply dismiss the alleged threat because it “was confirmed by neither live testimony nor affidavit.” This offer by the state was done in compliance with the offer of proof analysis we recently reiterated in Santiago v. State, 644 N.W.2d 425, 441-43 (Minn.2002). Appellant did not even put into contention the legitimacy of the alleged threat. Contrary to what the majority asserts, we have never held that an offer of proof would require “live testimony” or an “affidavit” in this context and any suggestion to that effect is contrary to our precedent. See id. at 442-43.
*190Finally, the majority incorrectly concludes that it was plain error for the trial court to give the permissive inference of possession instruction. This instruction was based on a statute. Appellant failed to object to this jury instruction, thereby requiring him to show that giving this instruction was plain error. While we discussed concerns about this sort of permissive inference instruction in State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212, 215-16 (Minn.1992), we reversed and remanded for a new trial in that case because the instruction was not a balanced one and failed to inform the jury that it was not required to infer that the defendant knowingly possessed the drugs. Id. at 216. Here, the trial court’s instruction was balanced, explicitly telling the jury that “[t]he law allows, but does not require, you to find knowing possession * * * ” and that the jury “may, but [is] not required to, find that the defendant knowingly possessed methamphetamine.” (Emphasis added). Under these facts, the instruction was neither erroneous nor did it affect appellant’s substantial rights.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm appellant’s conviction.

. The trial court was also aware of appellant’s two prior controlled substance convictions and burglary conviction.