Court Opinion

ID: 9720958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:45:26.633843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.516674
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: Although this is a close case, I conclude that Gallagher acted reasonably and appropriately. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes (and I agree) that the initial traffic stop was justified. Further, under Illinois law, an appropriately conducted canine sniff can lead to probable cause to arrest a vehicle’s occupants. See People v. Staley, 334 Ill. App. 3d 358, 368, 778 N.E.2d 362, 369-70 (2002). Thus, the focus of this court’s inquiry should be on whether Gallagher properly called for the canine unit to conduct a sniff of defendant’s car after it was pulled over for the traffic stop. In Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 509, 802 N.E.2d at 204, the supreme court discussed its earlier canine sniff decision in Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 782 N.E.2d 275, and wrote the following: “In Cox, we concluded that evidence obtained by a canine sniff was properly suppressed because calling in a canine unit unjustifiably broadened the scope of an otherwise routine traffic stop into a drug investigation. [Citation.] We emphasized that the sniff was impermissible without1 “specific and articulable facts” ’ to support the stopping officer’s request for the canine unit. [Citation.]” Accordingly, the question before us is whether the information Gallagher possessed constituted “specific and articulable facts” to support his request for the canine unit. I believe the answer is yes. The United States Supreme Court has recently provided some guidance in this area. In United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740, 749-50, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750-51 (2002), the Court wrote the following: “When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing. [Citation.] This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ [Citation.] See also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699[, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 920, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663] (1996) (reviewing court must give ‘due weight’ to factual inferences drawn by resident judges and local law enforcement officers). Although an offleer’s reliance on a mere ‘ “hunch” ’ is insufficient to justify a stop [citation], the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” In Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 918, 116 S. Ct. at 1661, the Supreme Court wrote the following: “Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible. They are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” ’ [Citations.]” Here, the trial court found that Gallagher was a credible witness who was experienced and well-versed in drug-related behavior in the north part of Champaign, particularly the three- or four-block area that harbored crack-cocaine activity, from which this case arose. The record supports this finding. Given the circumstances before Gallagher and viewing them — as we must — with “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life in which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act” (Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 918, 116 S. Ct. at 1661), I conclude that Gallagher was possessed with sufficient “specific and articulable facts” to support his request for the canine unit. Once that unit arrived at the scene (only a few minutes later) and the positive canine sniff occurred, the police conduct that followed was entirely justified. Thus, the evidence they seized should not be suppressed.