Court Opinion

ID: 9678736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:30:53.959525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:08.739071
License: Public Domain

*688BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting opinion on appellant’s petition for Discretionary Review.
We granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly held the trial judge did not err in overruling appellant’s motion to quash the indictments on the ground the “on or about” allegations failed to provide sufficient notice of the date of the alleged offenses. Believing the majority fails to appreciate the real issue in this case, I dissent.
I.
Appellant was charged in three separate indictments, each returned on April 28, 1993. All three indictments, in identical language, allege the same victim, the same crime (indecency with a child), and the same specific conduct ( sexual contact by touching with his hand the genitals of [victim]) carried out under the same circumstances (with a child younger than seventeen years of age and not the spouse of the Defendant).1 The only differences between the three indictments are the allegations of the “on or about” dates of the alleged offenses, and the docket numbers.2 The three cases were consolidated for trial. The jury found appellant guilty under all three indictments and the Court assessed punishment at imprisonment for ten years for each offense with the sentences to run concurrently.
II.
The majority holds the “on or about” dates alleged in the three indictments provide sufficient notice pursuant to this Court’s opinion in Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). Ante at 684; In Sledge, 953 S.W.2d at 255-56, this Court held “... the ‘on or about’ language of an indictment allows the State to prove a date other than the one alleged in the indictment as long as the date is anterior to the presentment of the indictment and within the statutory limitation period.” See also, Scoggan v. State, 799 S.W.2d 679, 680 n. 3 (Tex.Cr.App.1990); Thomas v. State, 753 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); and, Mitchell v. State, 168 Tex.Crim. 606, 330 S.W.2d 459, 462 (1959).
Sledge, however, is not applicable to the instant case for two reasons. First, unlike appellant in the instant case, Sledge did not file a motion to quash the indictment for failure to provide sufficient notice. Rather, when the State charged Sledge with aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child alleging an “on or about” date for the offenses, Sledge filed a “Request for Notice of State’s Intention to Introduce Evidence of Other Ciimes, Wrongs, and Acts.” Sledge, 953 S.W.2d at 254. A request as to notice of intent to introduce extraneous conduct is simply not the same, nor specific enough to object to the failure of an indictment to provide sufficient notice of the offense charged in the indictment. Importantly, appellant in the instant case filed the requisite motion to quash, specifically contending the “on or about” dates alleged in the indictments failed to comport with the notice requirement.
Second, Sledge is not applicable because appellant does not contend the indictments fail to provide sufficient notice simply because they allege “on or about” dates instead of specific dates. Rather, appellant objects to the unique problem created by the fact all three indictments in the instant case allege identical offenses, were presented on the same date, and are alleged to have occurred within the exact same statutory period. This means the proof required to convict on one indictment is the very same proof required to *689convict on all three.3 Therefore, as charged, appellant is exposed to triple jeopardy for what may well be the same instance of conduct. Of course it is conceivable appellant committed the exact same offense of indecency with a child, in the exact same manner, on three separate occasions between April 28, 1988 and April 28, 1993. However, as charged, it is just as conceivable appellant committed the offense of indecency with a child only one time between April 28, 1988 and April 28, 1993 but has been indicted three times for the one offense. In order to properly allege appellant committed the exact same offense three times rather than once, the State simply must narrow the time frame within which each offense is alleged to have occurred. Failure to allege the dates of the offenses with more certainty violates the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Texas Constitutions, Art. I § 10 of the Texas Constitution, applicable statutory law, and case law from this Court.
In Garber v. State, 145 Tex.Crim. 44, 165 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Cr.App.1942), this Court held art. I, § 10 of the Texas Constitution requires the offense alleged in the indictment be charged in plain and intelligible words, and with such certainty as to enable appellant to plead the judgment that may be given on it in bar of any further prosecution for the same offense:
... Art. I See. 10 of the Constitution, Vernon’s Ann. St. Const, has been interpreted to mean that the indictment, or in this case the complaint and information, shall on its face give the accused the information on which he may prepare his defense. He is not required to look further than the charge itself, which must be brought in plain and intelligible terms. More than one misdemeanor may be charged in the one proceeding, but it must be so described as to each that it is capable of definite ascertainment as to the offenses charged.
Garber v. State, 165 S.W.2d at 741-42.
In McElroy v. State, 720 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), this Court explained the certainty requirement:
... to be valid, an indictment must set forth in plain and intelligible words all the essential and constituent elements of the offense sought to be charged, and the charge must particularize the act complained of so that its identity cannot be mistaken, and, if convicted or acquitted, and same becomes final, the defendant can plead it in bar to a like prosecution.
McElroy v. State, 720 S.W.2d at 492, citing Reeves v. State, 144 Tex.Cr.R. 270, 162 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.Cr.App.1942).
In Wilson v. State, 520 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), this Court explained:
... the rule is that an offense should be charged in plain and intelligible words with such certainty as to 1) enable the accused to know what he will be called upon to defend against and 2) to enable him to plead the judgment that may be given on it in bar of any further prosecution for the same offense, [numbering mine].
See also, Gaines v. State, 501 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Voelkel v. State, 501 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Moore v. State, 473 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Staggs v. State, 145 Tex.Crim. 263, 167 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Cr.App.1943); and, Gilliam v. State, 145 Tex.Crim. 242, 167 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.Cr.App.1943). In addition to the constitutional notice requirement of art. I, § 10, Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.04 requires certainty in notice:
The certainty required in an indictment is such as will enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any prosecution for the same offense.
Accordingly, appellant is correct in contending that the applicable statutory period for each offense is the same; the “on or about” dates alleged in the indictments fail to provide sufficient notice of the alleged dates of the three offenses. The majority’s holding to the contrary overlooks the unique issue presented in this case. If the State needs *690only to prove these identical offenses occurred within the same ten year period of time, the State need only prove the elements of one indictment against appellant in order to obtain automatic convictions on the other two. This means, that in violation of the United State’s and Texas double jeopardy clauses, the State is free to seek and obtain multiple convictions for what might very well be only one instance of conduct.
III.
Texas constitutional law, statutory law, and case law all require the accused be given adequate notice as to the nature and particulars of the charges against him. This requirement enables the accused to prepare his defense to the charge, and plead the judgment that may be given on the charge, in bar of any further prosecution for the same offense. Application of the Sledge rule to the instant ease however, relieves the State of more than proving the alleged offenses occurred on specific dates. In this case, it relieves the State of having to prove the alleged offenses, all identical, are even separate instances of conduct. Because conviction on one of the indictments is sufficient also to convict on the other two, it is impossible to ascertain with any certainty, at any given time in the proceeding, which of the three indictments the State’s proof is supporting. This is so because the proof required for a conviction on each indictment is the same. Believing the law requires more specific notice, I dissent.

. Specifically, each indictment alleges that appellant:
.... with the intent to arouse and gratify the sexual desire of the Defendant, engage in sexual contact by touching with his hand the genitals of [victim], a child younger than seventeen years of age and not the spouse of the Defendant ...

. 1) Indictment No. 1176-95 alleged appellant committed the offense of indecency with child, with this victim “on or about the 15 th day of May, 1990 ...”
2) Indictment No. 1177-95 ) alleged appellant committed the offense of indecency with child, with this victim "on or about the 5 th day of October, 1987 ...”
3) Indictment No. 1178-95 ) alleged appellant committed the offense of indecency with child, with this victim "on or about the 15 th day of August, 1989.

. Each of the three identical offenses are alleged to have occurred, in an identical manner, anytime within the same ten year period beginning April 28, 1983 (date marking the ten year statute of limitations) and April 28, 1993 (the date the three indictments were presented). Therefore, by proving one indictment, the State proves all three.