Court Opinion

ID: 9449335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:09:44.508727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:48.004625
License: Public Domain

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Using some unfortunate adolescent acts as its springboard, the court drives a gaping hole in the wall of protection which has surrounded civil service workers for almost a hundred years.1 For the first time in the fifty years of the Lloyd-LaFollette Civil Service Act2 which first limited the power of discharge,3 a court has held that a permanent civil service worker, including one with veteran’s preference,4 can be fired *590for pre-employment acts unrelated to his Government service.5 More than this, going beyond the facts of this case, the court holds that permanent civil service workers, including those with veterans’ status, may be fired for any reason which would disqualify an applicant 6 for civil service in spite of the fact that the reason may have arisen long prior to employment and be totally unconnected with the civil service worker’s conduct as such.7
If this ruling remains the law, no civil service job is safe. Any civil service worker who becomes persona non grata with the powers that be may have some historical research made on his pre-employment background in an effort to turn up something “disqualifying.” Even the innermost secrets8 of the civil service worker, long buried and known only to himself, may be the subject of inquiry. For example, as here, a lie detector test9 may be administered to the worker during which he may be asked all manner of questions, the scope of which may be directly proportional to the intensity of the desire of the Government agency to get the worker’s job. The mere threat of this kind of inquiry would be sufficient in most cases to cause the resignation of the worker marked for dismissal.
Of course, it will be suggested that no Government agency would indulge in this sort of thing, that it just cannot happen here. But it has happened here. And I venture to suggest that “the efficiency of the service” would be enhanced much more by an assurance to civil service workers that no court will place its imprimatur on such pre-employment background investigations of permanent civil service workers, than by the elimination of this one man.10
*591Here the Government admits that there is no connection between the preemployment acts in suit and Dew’s conduct as a civil service worker.11 Nor are there any administrative findings indicating a connection.12 The court makes an effort to fill the vacuum by suggesting that Dew’s pre-employment acts may affect his work as an airport control tower operator. Dew’s employer, the Federal Aviation Agency, whose duty it is to operate airports, made no such finding. Nor did the Board of Appeals and Review, acting for the Civil Service Commission, or the Appeals Examiner. This court’s rationalization on the subject can hardly serve in the absence of findings. Under the law, the court’s responsibility is to review administrative findings, not to make them. An administrative order “cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.” Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95, 63 S.Ct. 454, 462, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943).
The reason why there were no such findings below is that there is no evidence to support them. There is no suggestion here that Dew is a homosexual13 or a dope addict. The Government admits this. And the uncontradicted psychiatric testimony, as shown by the court’s opinion, confirms that Dew is normal in all respects. Thus the net effect of Dew’s dismissal, in addition to undermining the integrity of the civil service system, is wrongfully to deprive an Air Force veteran with permanent civil service status of his job which he badly needs to support his wife and two children.

. For a history of the Civil Service Acts, see Van Riper, History of United States Civil Service (1958).

. 37 Stat. 555, 5 U.S.C. § 652.

. President Taft had by executive order limited the power of discharge to “cause as will promote the efficiency of the service” in 1911. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act was the first Congressional limitation.

. Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, 390, 5 U.S.C. § 863. There is no difference in the grounds upon which veterans and non-veterans may be discharged. Veterans, however, have greater procedural protections.

. The purpose of footnote 12 of the court’s opinion is not clear. There is no suggestion in the record that Deto was discharged for misrepresentations in obtaining employment or for any reason other than the pre-employment acts in suit.

. For this holding majority first relies on 5 C.F.R. § 9.101 (Rev.1961) and then derives much comfort from its repeal. But the superseding regulation is simply a repetition of the language of the statute, which language the court finds supportive of its interpretation of the regulation here relied upon.

. The Civil Service Commission’s own regulations, which govern the powers of the agencies to discharge, strongly indicate that an agency is not to discharge permanent employees simply for pre-hire misconduct which is not tied to current civil service performance. 5 C.F.R. § 2.301(c) (2), formerly 5 C.F.R. § 9.103 (b), 22 F.R. 10029, provides a special procedure for discharge of probationary employees for pre-hire misconduct. This constitutes specific recognition of the problem, and the elaborate safeguards provided indicate that it is not favored. There is no provision at all for discharge of permanent employees simply for prehire misconduct. The omission seems significant.

. Dr. Kinsey’s report, which was received in evidence by the Civil Service Appeals Examiner, indicates that 40 per cent of American males have homosexual experiences prior to age 20. Kinsey, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, p. 625, fig. 156 (1948). It also indicates that approximately 50 per cent of married males have extra-marital intercourse. Id. at p. 585.

. See, e. g., Robert L. Scott v. The United States, Ct.Cl., No. 372-60, decided January 11, 1963, 31 L.W. 2351.

. “Unless limited by constitution or statute, ‘the power of appointment to public-office carries with it the right of removal.’ ” Levy v. Woods, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 138, 139, 171 F.2d 145, 146 (1948) Levine v. Farley, 70 App.D.C. 381, 385, 107 F.2d 186, 190 (1939). Congress has, however, limited the power of removal to those dischai’ges which will “promote the efficiency of the service.” 5 U.S.C. 652, 803. Judicial review is available to determine if discharges subject to this, limitation are arbitrary and capricious. See Williams v. Cravens, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 382, 210 F.2d 874, 876 (1954), cert. denied, sub nom. Williams v. Robbins, 348 U.S. 819, 75 S.Ct. 30, 99 L.Ed. 646 (1954) ; Norden v. Royall, D.D.C., 90 F.Supp. 834 (1949); Crocker v. United States, 130 Ct.Cl. 567, 127 F.Supp. 568 (1955) . Compare Carter v. Forrestal, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 53, 175 F.2d 364 (1949). Until today no court has ever approved the discharge of a permanent civil service employee for pre-employment acts alone.

. The court cites the brief on appeal written by the United States Attorney’s office to show that the administrative agency and the Oivil Service Commission actually discharged Dew for present incompetence to perform his control tower duties. The record does not support the brief. In fact, the record is affirmatively to the contrary.
As for the first abortive attempt to remove Dew, the agency’s position was stated very succinctly by Mr. Riley, deputy .personnel director for the agency:
“ * * * In summary, the entire situation to us comes down to this one basic point that his appointment was made subject to investigation. The investigation, which did take quite a bit of time, disclosed certain information which, if we had known that information at the time we were considering him for appointment, we would not have employed him. Our whole case as an agency comes back to that basic issue. * * * ”
That attempt at removal was reversed because the agency refused to receive evidence bearing on Dew’s present competency.
At the second hearing, where the evidence concerning present competency was received over repeated agency objection that it was irrelevant, the following colloquy occurred between Mr. Sullivan, personnel relations officer and sole witness for the agency, and Mr. Deikman, attorney for Dew:
“Mr. Sullivan: I read from the record, in my inquiry as to the responsible people his services were satisfactory.
Mr. Deikman: You would say that you had no evidence whatsoever that he was an incompetent employee?
Mr. Sullivan: None whatsoever.” (Emphasis supplied.)

. The finding of the Appeals Examiner noted in the court’s opinion, footnote 10, was neither referred to nor adopted by the Oivil Service Commission which limited itself to the narrow holding quoted in the court’s text, page 9. But if it should be considered, I would note that there is no evidence that fellow employees knew of Dew’s past acts. Nor is there evidence that they in fact found his presence obnoxious. Of. Orocker v. United States, supra, Note 10.

. Appellee’s memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment filed in the court below states:
“In the administrative proceedings, plaintiff acting through counsel made reference to tile first removal proceedings and again sought to show that plaintiff is not now a homosexual and would not bo likely to repeat the type of acts concerned. Such matters, however, were entirely irrelevant to the matter under inquiry as the letter of charges specifically concerned ‘disgraceful personal conduct’ by plaintiff, not whether or not plaintiff is now, or likely to be in the future, a homosexual. * * * ”