Court Opinion

ID: 9834463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:37:05.693018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:16.004487
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The earnestness with which defendants in error, in their motion for rehearing, insist that our original opinion manifests an erroneous disposition of the case, moves us to a further expression of our views, more particularly with reference to the argument made. It is insisted that the words “and when so entered,” appearing in subdivisions 88, 91, R. S. 1925, art. 199, should be construed to refer to the immediately preceding requirement that the clerk “shall docket any such case in the court to which it shall have been transferred,” and not to the requirement that the order of transfer be “entered on the minutes of his court.” The only question is: What is meant by “so entered”? The employment of “so” shows- that, whatever is meant by “entered,” it is something previously mentioned. What previous mention is -made of something to be -entered? Olearly it is provided that the order of transfer shall be entered -on the mAnutes. If the clerk performs the duty enjoined that he “shall docket any such case in the court to which the case shall have been transferred,” how would such, act be appropriately denominated? Would it be said he had entered the case, or rather would it not be said that he had docketed the case? If we undertake, *82in this connection, to treat “docketed” and “entered” as synonymous terms, we encounter more than one difficulty. “Docketed” includes “entered” to be sure, but it includes something more. Besides, orders are not entered on dockets, particularly orders such as the one in question, which is provided to be entered upon the minutes. Therefore the entry which is an element in “docketed” is of something other than and different from an order, namely, a case. Whatever ambiguity there may be in the statute, it is certainly an order that is to be entered on the minutes and a case that is to be docketed. But there is no previous mention of entering a ease, as there is of entering an order, and therefore that could not appropriately be referred to as “so entered.” A more plausible argument could be made that “so entered” meant “case entered in court,” but cases are not usually referred to as being entered in court, and such construction would likewise be subject to the objection that it could not properly be referred to as “so entered.”
That “so. entered” refers back to the entry of the order of transfer in the minutes is further indicated, we think, as pointed out by plaintiffs in error, by the language “shall docket any such case in the court to which it shall have been transferred." (Italics ours.) The fact of the transfer is thus referred to in the past perfect tense as something already completed at the time it becomes the duty of the clerk to docket the case.
The reasonableness of the construction we have given the statute is further reinforced by a consideration of the fact that the docket meant must be the judge’s trial docket. ¡Presumably the case had been entered in the clerk’s file docket when it was first filed in the Ninety-First district court. That filing was without reference to which court would take jurisdiction of the case, the clerk being the clerk of both courts. But the judge’s trial docket is not even a part of the record in the case, as we have had occasion only recently to hold. Erwin v. Griffin, 23 S.W. (2d) 78, by this court; Burleson v. Moffett (Tex. Civ. App.) 3 S.W. (2d) 544.
Since whatever it is that is to be entered, and whatever it is in which the entry is to be made is a jurisdictional matter, which is it the more reasonable to believe was intended, an act that is properly and necessarily a part of the record of the case, or one which is not?
While fully appreciating the difficulty of the question, we think it the more reasonable construction to hold that “so entered” refers to the entry of the order or transfer in the minutes..
The point is against stressed that the proceeding in question is not a civil ease within the meaning of the statutory provision for transfer of “any case or cases, civil or criminal.” Brown v. Wheelock, 75 Tex. 385, 12 S. W. Ill, 841, is relied upon as authority. When that case was decided, it was thought that, had the Legislature sought to confer upon the district court, as a court, jurisdiction of such a proceeding, the act would be ■unconstitutional. Rather than strike down the act then under consideration, the’ construction was forced that the jurisdiction was conferred upon the judge as a commissioner. But in 1891 the Constitution was amended so as to’ authorize the Legislature to confer upon district courts, not only the jurisdiction previously conferred, but in addition thereto “such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be provided by law.” Const, art. 5, § 8. Under authority of the Constitution as amended, we think undoubtedly the Legislature had the authority to confer upon district courts the jurisdiction which it purported to confer by the provisions of R. S. 1925, art. 4626. Having such authority, the legislative construction of whether or not such a proceeding should be regarded as a case would, we think, be controlling. That such a proceeding was by the Legislature construed to ■be a case is clearly shown by that part of the statute reading “and shall be filed and docketed as in other eases.” (Italics ours.) But even aside from this legislative construction we would be loath to read into the provisions of this statute governing the Eight-Eighth and Ninety-First district courts an intent to provide for the transfer of some ■of the matters properly addressed to the jurisdiction of said courts and to deny such power did not exist as to all matters addressed to the jurisdiction of said courts.
The motion for rehearing will be overruled, and it is accordingly so ordered.