Court Opinion

ID: 9668746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:24:37.343303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:47.846352
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of appellant’s third point of error.
The majority opinion sustains appellant’s third point of error because it finds that the State failed to offer racially neutral reasons for peremptorily striking venire-person three. I disagree. I would find that the trial court’s finding that the State offered racially neutral explanations was not “clearly erroneous.”
The prosecutor stated that she struck venireperson three because she indicated she would have a problem assessing punishment. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked venireperson three if she could consider the full range of punishment; venire-person three indicated she would be hesitant to impose a sentence of life, but would do it if she felt it was deserved. Reluctance to consider the full range of punishment is a racially neutral explanation for *201the exercise of a peremeptory strike. Cf. Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 35.16(b)(3) (Vernon 1989) (State may challenge a venireper-son for cause if he or she has a bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which the State is entitled to rely for punishment).
In addition, the prosecutor stated that she struck venireperson three because she indicated she was a member of a club, which the State felt might bias her in favor of appellant. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked if anyone belonged to any clubs. Five venirepersons, including veni-reperson three, indicated they belonged to clubs. Two of the venirepersons were struck for cause; the State exercised per-emtory strikes on the remaining three veni-repersons, including venireperson three, who belonged to clubs. The trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that club membership was a racially neutral reason for the exercise of peremptory strikes. Cf. Munson v. State, 774 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1989, no pet.) (trial court’s finding that prosecutor’s explanation was racially neutral was supported by the record when prosecutor stated he struck venireperson because he was a truck driver); York v. State, 764 S.W.2d 328, 330-31 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d) (prosecutor’s hunch that social workers were not the kind of jurors he wanted was racially neutral).
I would overrule appellant’s third point of error.
I concur with the majority’s disposition of appellant’s other points of error.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.