Court Opinion

ID: 9407625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 18:00:55.464409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.271307
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20579      Document: 00516812389         Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/07/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                  FILED
                                                                            July 7, 2023
                                   No. 21-20579
                                                                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                  Clerk

   Fidel Flores,

                                                            Petitioner—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
   Correctional Institutions Division,

                                            Respondent—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:20-CV-2252
                  ______________________________

   Before King, Jones, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   King, Circuit Judge:
          A Texas jury found Fidel Flores guilty of aggravated sexual assault of
   a child under the age of six, and he was sentenced to forty-five years’
   imprisonment. Flores challenged his conviction both on direct appeal and
   through state habeas proceedings, but the Texas courts denied his requests
   for relief. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
   denied his subsequent federal habeas petition and his request for a certificate
   of appealability. This court granted Flores’ application for a certificate of
   appealability on one issue: whether trial counsel rendered unconstitutionally
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                                    No. 21-20579

   ineffective assistance by failing to object to expert and lay opinion testimony
   regarding the truthfulness of G.P., the complainant. For the reasons
   articulated herein, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Flores’ habeas
   petition.
                                         I.
                                         A.
          In October 2012, G.P., the complainant, told his mother that he was
   experiencing rectal pain, and she twice took him to his pediatrician, Dr. Ciro
   Porras, for examination. During the second visit, G.P. told the pediatrician
   that Flores—G.P.’s uncle—had “put a stick in his bottom several times.”
   Upon hearing this, Dr. Porras concluded that G.P. had been sexually abused
   and reported the abuse to police and Child Protective Services. Flores was
   charged with a single count of aggravated sexual assault of a child.
          At trial, the State presented testimony from numerous witnesses.
   G.P.’s mother testified that Flores previously lived with her, her husband,
   and G.P. in a one-bedroom apartment and, beginning in 2011, would babysit
   G.P. on the days that she worked. Around April 2012, G.P. began
   complaining of rectal pain and started exhibiting anger and aggression toward
   Flores. In May 2012, G.P. told his mother that he did not want to stay with
   Flores and that Flores was hurting him.
          G.P.’s mother arranged for alternate childcare but, fearing
   deportation and lacking the resources to move, did not report the abuse. In
   September 2012, however, Flores picked up G.P. from school because his
   normal caretaker was unavailable. The next morning, G.P. told his mother
   that Flores had hurt him again and that he was hurting “on the inside.” She
   took G.P. to Dr. Porras on October 2, 2012, but she did not mention G.P.’s
   reports of abuse. Dr. Porras testified that he observed an area of thinning on
   the complainant’s anus. He diagnosed constipation, of which G.P. had no

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   prior history, and prescribed a stool softener. G.P.’s mother took him to Dr.
   Porras again on October 23, 2012, because of continuing rectal pain. Dr.
   Porras’ examination of the complainant revealed a small anal fissure, or tear,
   and G.P. told Dr. Porras about the abuse, at which point Dr. Porras contacted
   the relevant authorities. Soon after, Child Protective Services contacted
   Flores about the allegations, and he eventually left for El Salvador, though he
   voluntarily returned to the United States after speaking with a Houston
   police officer about the charge.
          The jury heard testimony over two days of trial from nine witnesses,
   including G.P. himself. Flores contends that the trial testimony of multiple
   expert and lay witnesses offered direct opinions as to the truthfulness of
   children generally and G.P. specifically, which is impermissible under Texas
   law. See Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc)
   (“[Texas Rule of Evidence] 702 does not permit an expert to give an opinion
   that the complainant or class of persons to which the complainant belongs is
   truthful.”). He argues that the following statements of seven witnesses all
   crossed this line:
          First, the State asked Dr. Porras if G.P.’s disclosures to another
   witness were “consistent with” what G.P. had told Dr. Porras during his
   examination. He replied, “Yes, it was.” He also testified that he “had reason
   to believe that there was some sort of a sexual encounter.”
          Second, the State asked the investigating police officer why it was
   “important to you as an officer investigating a sexual assault crime” that G.P.
   was able to provide “sensory details.” The officer replied, “Those kind of
   details are important because they lend to the credibility of the outcry.”
          Third, the State asked a former forensic interviewer at the Children’s
   Assessment Center why it was “important to you as a forensic interviewer”
   that G.P. was able to provide “sensory details.” She responded, “Just adds

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   validity to what the child has experienced. But also . . . it would be difficult to
   describe something that is memorized as opposed to having a sensory [sic]
   attached to it.” The State then asked her whether G.P. was consistent in his
   telling of the abuse, to which she responded, “Yes.”
          Fourth, the State asked several questions to a staff psychologist at the
   Children’s Assessment Center. When asked whether there was “any specific
   type of emotion you would expect to see with a kid to think that you should
   be able to believe their word,” she responded, “No. I’ve seen all sorts of
   emotions from kids on the stand.” When asked to list “some factors that
   would be important to you to determine reliability or validity of the
   disclosure” by children, she answered, “[T]hings that are of importance
   would be sensory details. If a child can describe what they felt, what they
   smelled, what they heard, what they saw, things of that nature, then you
   don’t really need the context of the importance of the sexual act to describe
   that.” She also testified,
          Children can lie about a lot of things in their lives, but sexual
          abuse is not typically one of them. It is one of the most
          shameful, embarrassing things for a child to talk about. It’s not
          something that would ever be chosen as a form of lying just for
          fun. It’s not a fun experience for children. And oftentimes,
          their lives significantly change in a negative way.
   When asked whether “kids know how to lie about things that they don’t have
   knowledge of, such as sex,” she responded,
          No. . . . A child to make up something that they have no
          knowledge of—because a child that young shouldn’t know
          anything about that. So, it wouldn’t make sense that they’d
          even be able to conjure up an incident, you know, such as sexual
          abuse to come up with something to lie about.

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   And when asked “if a kid doesn’t know what anal sex is or anal penetration,
   . . . it’s not within his wheelhouse to even try to make something up about it,
   is that what you’re saying,” she said, “Yes.”
          Fifth, the State asked G.P.’s psychotherapist at the Children’s
   Assessment Center whether G.P.’s actions in “play therapy” were “the
   kinds of things that five, six year olds come in and just fake to go through the
   motions.” She responded, “No. Absolutely he seemed very authentic.”
          Sixth, the State asked G.P.’s mother whether the statements she
   heard G.P. make to his father, to his mother’s friend, and to Dr. Porras were
   “consistent with” what G.P. had told her. Each time, she responded, “Yes.”
   She also testified that she “believed the words of the child because he was
   only four years old. And the words that he was saying to [her] were terrible.”
          Seventh, the State asked Flores whether G.P. “has been consistent
   about the type of sexual abuse with every single witness that has testified
   here.” He responded, “Yes, I’ve heard that he’s always said the same
   thing.”
          Flores’ trial counsel did not object to any of this testimony. However,
   he objected in other instances to testimony that he argued impermissibly
   opined on G.P.’s credibility. Sometimes these objections were sustained, and
   other times they were overruled.
          On August 20, 2015, the jury found Flores guilty of aggravated sexual
   assault of a child under the age of six, and he was sentenced to forty-five
   years’ imprisonment.
                                         B.
          Flores unsuccessfully appealed his sentence and then filed a state
   application for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that his trial counsel had
   unconstitutionally deprived him of effective assistance by, inter alia, failing

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   to object to inadmissible expert and lay testimony concerning truthfulness
   and to jury instructions that did not require a unanimous verdict for
   conviction. The state habeas trial court entered recommended findings of
   fact and conclusions of law regarding this claim, finding that trial counsel’s
   failure to object to witness testimony on truthfulness was not deficient, as it
   was part of his trial strategy, and that Flores was not prejudiced by his trial
   counsel’s performance; however, the trial court recommended that habeas
   relief be granted because trial counsel did not object to the jury instruction
   concerning unanimity.
          The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) nonetheless denied
   state habeas relief in a written order. Regarding the jury instructions, the
   TCCA stated that the trial court incorrectly analyzed the case “under the
   appellate standard of review for jury charge issues rather than the Strickland
   standard.” More generally, the TCCA ruled that Flores had “not satisfied
   the prejudice component of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.”
          Flores subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in the Southern
   District of Texas that listed four grounds for relief, including his claim that
   trial counsel repeatedly failed to object to inadmissible testimony concerning
   truthfulness. Applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s
   (“AEDPA”) deferential standard of review, the district court denied his
   petition in a summary judgment. Regarding Flores’ claim concerning witness
   testimony, the court determined that “trial counsel set forth a thorough
   explanation of his actions, his reasons for those actions, and how the actions
   fit his trial strategies.” Though this strategy was ultimately unsuccessful, the
   court concluded that such assistance was not unconstitutionally ineffective.
   The district court also denied Flores a certificate of appealability (“COA”).
          Flores then motioned this court for a COA with respect to two of his
   habeas claims: his claim that trial counsel failed to object to inadmissible

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   testimony concerning truthfulness, and his claim that trial counsel failed to
   object to jury instructions that did not require a unanimous verdict. This
   court granted the motion in part, granting Flores a COA concerning his claim
   that “his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper expert
   and lay testimony commenting on the victim’s truthfulness.”
                                         II.
          Because the district court denied Flores’ habeas petition in a summary
   judgment, we review the district court’s factual and legal conclusions de novo.
   Guy v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003).
          The parties agree that Flores’ claim is subject to the deferential
   standard set out in AEDPA because it was adjudicated by Texas courts on
   the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (“When a federal
   claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief,
   it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits
   in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the
   contrary.”). Under that standard, a federal court may not grant habeas
   corpus relief with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in
   state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a
   decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
   clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or
   “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
   the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
   U.S.C. § 2254(d).
          Under AEDPA, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks
   merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could
   disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Richter, 562 U.S.
   at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). A state
   court’s findings of fact must be presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts

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   the presumption “by clear and convincing evidence,” 28 U.S.C.
   § 2254(e)(1), and its application of clearly established law is not unreasonable
   unless it is “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood
   and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
   disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
                                         III.
          Flores contends that the TCCA erroneously applied Strickland v.
   Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which provides the benchmark for
   constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, in its denial of his habeas
   petition. Under Strickland, Flores must satisfy a two-part test and show that
   (1) “his counsel provided deficient assistance,” and (2) “there was prejudice
   as a result.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 104; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
          We may review these prongs in either order, and a failure to satisfy
   one part of the test dooms the entire claim. See Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d
   589, 595 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Strickland decision does not require us to
   analyze these criteria in any particular order; if we can dispose of this case on
   the prejudice prong the Strickland Court urged that we do so.”). Concluding
   that Flores cannot satisfy the prejudice prong under its onerous standard of
   review, we do not reach the deficiency prong of the test.
                                          A.
          To establish prejudice under Strickland, a defendant must
   demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
   errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,
   466 U.S. at 694; see also id. (“A reasonable probability is a probability
   sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). But Flores must show
   more, because under AEDPA our review of a state court’s application of
   Strickland is “doubly” deferential. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (quoting
   Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)); Anaya v. Lumpkin, 976 F.3d

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   545, 554 (5th Cir. 2020) (viewing the prejudice prong “with the requisite
   double deference”).
          To satisfy this doubly deferential standard of review, we must be
   convinced that “every reasonable jurist would conclude that it is reasonabl[y]
   likely” that Flores would have been acquitted had his trial counsel objected
   to the contested testimony. Adekeye v. Davis, 938 F.3d 678, 684 (5th Cir.
   2019); see also Fears v. Lumpkin, No. 20-40563, 2022 WL 3755783, at *5 (5th
   Cir. Aug. 30, 2022). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state
   court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 684
   (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102).
                                         B.
          Flores argues that his trial was a contest of credibility—his credibility
   against the credibility of G.P.—and that there is a reasonable probability that,
   without the inclusion of inadmissible credibility testimony by lay and expert
   witnesses, the result of the proceedings would have been different. He thinks
   that “[t]rial counsel’s repeated failure to properly object to this testimony
   had the effect of repeatedly hammering home for the jury the ‘most
   important piece of evidence to know [is] if that child is being truthful.’”
          But as this court has previously explained, such testimony is arguably
   cumulative evidence of G.P.’s credibility—and therefore harmless—where
   the jury had other opportunities to assess the complainant’s credibility itself.
   Fears, 2022 WL 3755783, at *6. Here, the jury heard from G.P. directly,
   providing it with the opportunity to evaluate his demeanor in court firsthand
   and to compare his trial testimony to the earlier statements other witnesses
   alleged that he made. Because “[o]ne rationally could conclude that the
   bolstering evidence gave the jury nothing it didn’t already have,” id.,
   whether trial counsel’s supposed error prejudiced Flores is debatable by
   reasonable jurists.

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          Furthermore, the jury was provided with more than enough evidence
   to convict Flores without the challenged testimony, and we are unable to say
   that every reasonable jurist would believe it reasonably likely that Flores
   would have been acquitted if trial counsel had objected. Under Texas law, a
   sexual assault conviction “is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of
   the victim of the sexual offense if the victim informed any person, other than
   the defendant, of the alleged offense within one year after the date on which
   the offense is alleged to have occurred.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
   art. 38.07(a). G.P. testified at trial and told multiple people—including his
   mother and his pediatrician—about the assaults well within one year of their
   taking place. The jury could have convicted Flores on this testimony alone,
   which is detrimental to Flores’ prejudice argument.
          The jury was presented with other evidence supporting Flores’
   conviction as well. Dr. Porras testified at length about his multiple
   examinations of G.P., and the jury was presented with G.P.’s medical records
   from these visits, which together support the jury’s guilty verdict. The
   medical records and testimony show that in early October 2012, Dr. Porras
   observed thinning of a portion of G.P.’s rectum, which could have resulted
   from constipation or penetration. He diagnosed G.P. with constipation and
   prescribed Miralax, a stool softener, in addition to a robust treatment plan.
   G.P. returned later that month, at which point Dr. Porras observed a tear in
   G.P.’s anal lining, which, for Dr. Porras, “raise[d] a big red flag that this is
   actually a case of potential sexual abuse.” This led to Dr. Porras’ diagnosis
   of sexual abuse. In December 2012, Dr. Porras again treated G.P. and
   observed “complaints related to genitalia and anus” that he suspected were
   “related to psychological trauma of the incident.” In addition to the medical
   evidence, the jury could have considered Flores’ flight to El Salvador after
   finding out that there were sexual abuse allegations against him as an
   acknowledgment of wrongdoing.

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          Ultimately, we are unconvinced that every reasonable jurist would
   believe it reasonably likely that Flores would have been acquitted absent the
   challenged testimony. AEDPA’s demanding standard of review thus requires
   us to defer to the TCCA’s decision, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the
   district court.

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