Court Opinion

ID: 9941651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 17:11:34.173067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:50.534462
License: Public Domain

J-S02024-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DANIEL A. BURRUS                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2690 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 6, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0008742-2009

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2024

       Daniel A. Burrus (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his first

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

       The PCRA court competently detailed the underlying facts in its opinion:

             On March 30, 2009, police officers responded to reports of
       gunshots in West Philadelphia. When they arrived at the scene,
       they heard the faint noise of someone calling for help. They ran
       down an alley and found Richard Jackson [(Jackson or the victim)]
       lying on his back and bleeding from numerous gunshot wounds.
       Jackson told the officers that he was standing in the alley with
       “Danny” when the gunshots rang out and “Danny” fled. The victim
       was taken to the hospital in critical condition but ultimately
       survived the injuries. N.T., 7/5/2012, at 64-72; N.T., 7/10/2012,
       at 49-50, 57.

             Police were able to recover seven spent cartridges and a
       bullet casing near the victim, all of which matched a .25 caliber
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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       Beretta [handgun] that [police] found in a nearby yard a month
       after the shooting. There was a bullet fragment removed from
       the victim’s body that was too large to be from the recovered
       Beretta. Police also recovered a .357 caliber revolver near the
       crime scene. N.T., 7/5/2012, at 73-75; N.T., 7/6/2012, at 24-25;
       N.T., 7/9/2012, at 110-13, 128-31, 153-59; N.T., 7/10/2012, at
       57-58.

             Following the police investigation, [Appellant] and Daniel
       Byrd were charged in connection with the shooting. Their cases
       were joined, but Byrd entered a negotiated guilty plea shortly
       before the trial was set to start.1     Byrd did not testify at
       [Appellant’s] trial.

             At [Appellant’s] preliminary hearing, the victim testified that
       he, [Appellant], Byrd, and an individual named Robert Sharp, who
       were all childhood friends, had been drinking at [Appellant’s]
       house. The victim testified that he was very drunk. Furthermore,
       the victim testified that the four men had gone into the alley and
       the victim got in a verbal altercation with [Appellant] before
       [Appellant] struck the victim with a gun. Shortly thereafter,
       [Appellant] and Byrd shot the victim. N.T., 7/10/2012, at 4-47.

             Robert Sharp gave a statement to detectives regarding the
       incident. He told them that the four men were drinking outside
       [Appellant’s] house and at some point[, Appellant] pulled out a
       .38 caliber gun and pointed it at the victim[,] saying “I should
       blow your fucking head off.” This was in reference to a prior
       occasion where victim knocked out [Appellant’s] tooth.
       [Appellant] later gave the gun to Byrd. As the group was making
       its way through the alley, using it as a shortcut, [Appellant]
       stepped away from the group, claiming he had to urinate, and
       returned with a .25 caliber handgun, which he used to hit the
       victim in the head. [Appellant] and Byrd then shot the victim and
       told Sharp not to talk to the police. N.T., 7/10/2012, at 135-44;
       N.T. 7/11/2012 at 138.

              At trial, Sharp recanted his statement to the detectives and
       testified … that [shortly before the shooting,] he had moved away
       from the group to send a text [on his cellular phone,] and then
____________________________________________

1 In exchange for his negotiated plea, Byrd received a sentence of six to
thirteen years in prison, followed by seven years of probation.

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       fled when he heard gunshots.         However, the prosecution
       introduced evidence that Sharp recanted due to threats from
       [Appellant] and Byrd[,] including a phone call [(the prison call)]
       between Byrd and Sharp that talked about “D Money” threatening
       Sharp.2 [Sharp’s] police statement [and the prison call] was
       admitted as substantive evidence. N.T., 7/6/2012, at 175-98;
       N.T., 7/9/2012, at 4; N.T., 7/11/2012, at 190-91.

             The victim was unable to testify at trial due to being
       involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility for treatment of a
       schizoaffective disorder. The victim’s psychiatrist testified that
       the victim was not competent to testify and was very unlikely to
       improve. Therefore, the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony
       was read into evidence.       N.T., 7/5/2012, at 16-20; N.T.,
       7/6/2012, at 6-14; N.T., 7/10/2012, at 4-47.

              There was a third witness who testified, Al Timothy. He
       testified that he saw both [Appellant] and the victim on the night
       of the shooting shortly before the incident occurred. Later that
       evening, [Appellant] knocked on Timothy’s door and warned him
       not to snitch[,] but Timothy, who did not know of the shooting
       yet, thought [Appellant] was referring to a different incident.
       N.T., 7/6/2012, at 107-09, 112-13, 141.

              Finally, [Appellant] testified in his defense at trial. He
       testified that he had been drinking with the other men on the night
       of the shooting but around 8:30 p.m.[,] he left them to go to a
       family party[,] where he remained for the rest of the night. He
       denied going into the alley with the men, owning the type of
       firearms recovered from the area, warning Timothy to not snitch,
       and shooting the victim. [Appellant] also testified that he had
       been angry about the victim knocking out his tooth years earlier
       but did not hold a grudge because he understood that the victim’s
       “mental capability was kind of shaky.” N.T., 7/13/2012, at 138,
       148-50.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/6/23, at 2-4 (footnotes added; citations modified).

____________________________________________

2 Appellant explains “‘D-money[]’ [] is a street-name used by [Appellant].
                                                                         ‘D-
Money’ is also tattooed on [Appellant’s] arm.” Appellant’s Brief at 24; see
also N.T., 7/11/12, at 190-91 (parties stipulating to the admission of the
prison call referencing “D-Money”).

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       In June 2012, the jury found Appellant guilty of attempted murder,

aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit

aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of crime (PIC), and firearms

not to be carried without a license.3 The trial court deferred sentencing and

ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI).4         On

January 23, 2013, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 20 to 40

years in prison.5 Notably, Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.

       Appellant filed a timely direct appeal, raising two claims of trial court

error: (1) the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence for the fact-

finder to convict Appellant of attempted murder; and (2) Jackson’s declaration

to the police immediately after his shooting (Jackson’s statement), “was a

testimonial statement made in violation of the Confrontation Clause.”6

Commonwealth v. Burrus, 116 A.3d 684, 631 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(unpublished memorandum at 5-9); see also id. at 4-6 (addressing

____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 901(a), 903(a), 2702(a), 907(a), 6106(a)(1).

4 The PSI is not contained in the certified record.
5 At sentencing, Appellant’s counsel, Fred Harrison, Jr., Esquire, asked the trial

court for permission to withdraw as counsel, and to appoint Appellant new
counsel. N.T., 1/23/13, at 48. The trial court granted Attorney Harrison’s
request. Id. at 48-49. The trial court subsequently appointed Jennifer
Santiago, Esquire, to represent Appellant. For purposes of the instant appeal,
we collectively refer to Attorneys Harrison and Santiago as “trial counsel.”

6 “Under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, a criminal
defendant has a right to confront witnesses against him.” Commonwealth
v. Rivera, 773 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa. 2001).

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Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s admission of Jackson’s statement

under the “excited utterance” exception to the rule against hearsay). This

Court rejected Appellant’s issues and affirmed the judgment of sentence. See

id.   Appellant did not petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court.

       On December 8, 2015, Appellant, pro se, filed a timely, first PCRA

petition. As the PCRA court correctly stated in its opinion, “[o]ver the next

several years, two different PCRA attorneys were appointed and subsequently

dismissed after rendering inadequate representation.” PCRA Court Opinion,

4/6/23, at 1. This Court previously explained the convoluted PCRA history in

Commonwealth v. Burrus, 258 A.3d 496, 110 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(unpublished memorandum at 1-4);7 see also Amended PCRA Petition,

2/1/22, at 1-5 (correctly summarizing the procedural history).

       The PCRA court appointed Appellant new counsel in June 2021. PCRA

counsel filed an amended, first PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf on

February 1, 2022. PCRA counsel claimed (1) trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a post-verdict motion challenging the weight of the evidence; (2)

____________________________________________

7 In Burrus, we addressed Appellant’s appeal from a prior PCRA court order

dismissing Appellant’s first PCRA petition.    We vacated the order and
remanded, for either (1) the appointment of new PCRA counsel; or (2)
Appellant’s previous PCRA counsel to file an amended PCRA petition or
properly comply with the requirements for withdrawal as counsel detailed in
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). Burrus, 258 A.3d 496
(unpublished memorandum at 12).

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trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion for

reconsideration of sentence; (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing

to raise a Confrontation Clause claim challenging the Commonwealth’s

introduction of the victim’s out-of-court statements into evidence; (4)

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the admission of the

prison call into evidence; and (5) the Commonwealth violated Appellant’s

rights by failing to provide the defense with all required discovery prior to trial.

Amended PCRA Petition, 2/1/22, at 6.

      The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition

on June 2, 2022.         On September 12, 2022, the PCRA court issued

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without an

evidentiary hearing. Appellant did not respond.

      October 6, 2022, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition,

without an evidentiary hearing. This timely appeal followed. Appellant and

the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents five issues for review:

      Whether the PCRA [c]ourt’s finding[s] are supported by the record
      and free of legal error by refusing to grant the relief requested in
      Appellant’s PCRA Petition based upon the following:

      1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post
         sentence motion to reconsider sentence?

      2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-
         verdict motion that the verdict was against the weight of the
         evidence?

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      3. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
         issues of merit?

      4. Whether Appellant was not given discovery thus preventing
         him from preparing for trial?

      5. Whether the PCRA court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA
         petition without an evidentiary hearing?

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (issues enumerated and reordered for ease of

disposition).

      Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s denial of relief is “limited to

whether the court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether

its conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Small,

238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa. 2020). We review the PCRA court’s decision for an

abuse of discretion.   Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 603 (Pa.

2013); see also Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 744 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (en banc) (“This Court grants great deference to the findings of

the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the

record could support a contrary holding.” (citation omitted)). The scope of

our review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of

record, which we view in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed

in the PCRA court.     Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa.

2011).

      In his first issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court abused its

discretion in denying relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a motion for reconsideration of sentence. See Appellant’s Brief

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at 16-18. Appellant contends his “aggregate sentence of 20 to 40 years [of]

incarceration was harsh and unreasonable.”         Id. at 16.     According to

Appellant, the sentencing court improperly

      did not consider the fact that [Appellant] was offered a guilty plea
      offer of 8-16 years [in prison] prior to trial. Nor did the [c]ourt
      consider the fact that [] Byrd received a sentence of 6-13 years
      [of] incarceration as a result of a negotiated plea agreement.

Id. at 17.    Finally, Appellant claims that “consecutive sentences for the

inchoate offenses of conspiracy and [PIC] was prohibited under law.” Id. at

18 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 (providing a “person may not be convicted of

more than one of the inchoate crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation

or criminal conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the

commission of the same crime.”)).

      The Commonwealth counters that the PCRA court properly rejected

Appellant’s claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, where any post-sentence

motion to reconsider Appellant’s sentence would be “meritless.”              See

Commonwealth Brief at 9-11. According to the Commonwealth, Appellant’s

“aggregate sentence was reasonable, and trial counsel was not ineffective for

not filing a post-sentence motion that would have been denied by the [trial]

court.” Id. at 9.

      Appellant raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.          The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that a

      PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by a
      preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
      resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the

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     circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
     determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
     innocence could have taken place.”

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (quoting 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii)).

     In order to establish a claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner must

plead and prove:

     (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
     basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) he
     suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice
     measured by whether there is a reasonable probability the result
     of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v.
     Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (employing ineffective
     assistance of counsel test from Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527
     A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987)). … Additionally, counsel cannot be
     deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Finally,
     because a PCRA petitioner must establish all the Pierce prongs to
     be entitled to relief, we are not required to analyze the elements
     of an ineffectiveness claim in any specific order; thus, if a claim
     fails under any required element, we may dismiss the claim on
     that basis.

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (citations

modified). Pennsylvania law presumes counsel is effective; a PCRA petitioner

bears the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d

130, 150 (Pa. 2018); see also Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 380

(Pa. 2011) (“When evaluating ineffectiveness claims, judicial scrutiny of

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” (citation and quotation

marks omitted)).

     Where a PCRA petitioner asserts that defense counsel is ineffective for

failing to file a motion for reconsideration of sentence, the petitioner must

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prove actual prejudice. Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1131-

32 (Pa. 2007). To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must plead and prove

that a motion for reconsideration of sentence, if filed, would have led to a

“different and more favorable outcome,” namely, “if counsel’s objection

secured a reduction of his sentence.” Id. at 1132.

      Instantly, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence. Such a claim is

cognizable under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 199 A.3d 436, 455

(Pa. Super. 2018) (“claims implicating the discretionary aspects of sentencing

raised in the context of an ineffectiveness claim are cognizable under the

PCRA.”).

      Sentencing “is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion.”   Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 122 n.9 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v.

Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating an abuse of discretion

is not merely an error of judgment, but rather where the judgment is

manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record

shows that the action is a result of “partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.”

(citation omitted)).

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

      The reason for this broad discretion and deferential standard of
      appellate review is that the sentencing court is in the best position

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      to measure various factors and determine the proper penalty for
      a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual
      circumstances before it. Simply stated, the sentencing court
      sentences flesh-and-blood defendants and the nuances of
      sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript
      used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court
      enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to
      its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should
      not be lightly disturbed.

Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 27 (Pa. 2014) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

      A sentencing court must also consider the sentencing guidelines. See

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here, it

is undisputed that the sentences imposed for each charge fall within the

standard range of the sentencing guidelines. Therefore, we may only vacate

Appellant’s sentence if “the case involves circumstances where the application

of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2);

see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2014).

An “unreasonable” decision is “one that is irrational or not guided by sound

judgment.” Sarvey, 199 A.3d at 456 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

      Here, the PCRA court rejected Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim based

on trial counsel’s failure to challenge the discretionary aspects of sentence,

reasoning as follows:

            [Appellant] was sentenced to consecutive terms of 15 to 30
      years in prison for attempted murder, 3 to 6 years for carrying an
      unlicensed firearm, and 2 to 4 years for [PIC]. None of these
      sentences exceeded the maximum limit. See 18 Pa.C.S. §
      1102(c) (40-year maximum for attempted murder when serious
      bodily injury occurs); Id. § 6106 (carrying an unlicensed firearm

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       is a third-degree felony); Id. § 1103(3) (7-year maximum for
       third-degree felonies); Id. § 907(a) (possessing an instrument of
       crime is a first-degree misdemeanor); Id. § 1104(1) (5-year
       maximum for first-degree misdemeanors).

             The Commonwealth and [trial] counsel agreed on the
       guideline ranges for the offenses and the Commonwealth
       recommended an aggregate sentence of 25 to 50 years [in
       prison], which was within the [sentencing] guidelines.
       [The sentencing c]ourt took the recommendation into account but
       decided that based on the relevant information[,] the sentence
       imposed [(i.e., 20 to 40 years in prison),] would be less
       than that recommended by the Commonwealth. Among the
       information considered, this [c]ourt noted the credibility of the
       defense witnesses as well as the age of [Appellant] at the time of
       the offense. See N.T., 1/13/2013, at 44-45.8

             In addition to the length of the sentence, [Appellant] also
       argues that it was improper for [the trial c]ourt to impose
       consecutive sentences for conspiracy and [PIC] under 18 Pa.C.S.
       § 906, which prohibits convictions for multiple inchoate crimes
       designed to commit the same offense. … However, [Appellant]
       was not sentenced on the conspiracy or [aggravated]
____________________________________________

8 The trial court stated as follows in imposing Appellant’s sentence:

              I’ve considered the arguments of counsel, the statement of
       [Appellant, and] the [PSI] reports. I’ve reviewed my notes from
       the trial.    I’m familiar with the facts of this case.       The
       recommendation of the district attorney is not unreasonable
       considering the seriousness of this offense. And 25 to 50 [years
       in prison] would certainly be a legal sentence and consistent with
       the [sentencing] guidelines.

              However, I am impressed by the defense witnesses who
       testified today. I am also mindful of [Appellant’s] youth. None of
       that in any way excuses what he did in this case. The real driving
       force in this sentencing is the seriousness of that conduct that
       night and the seriousness of the [victim’s] injuries. However, I’m
       not going to impose the sentence recommended by the DA.

N.T., 1/13/13, at 44-45 (formatting modified).

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       assault convictions, which merged for sentencing purposes.
       N.T., 1/23/2013, at 10-11.        If [Appellant] is arguing that
       consecutive sentences for attempted murder and [PIC] are
       prohibited, his claim fails where the latter offense is “specifically
       excluded” when section 906 was revised. Commonwealth v. Ly,
       599 A.2d 613, 623 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Ah Thank
       Lee, 566 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Pa. Super. 1989).

             [Appellant’s] sentence is proper, and [trial] counsel was not
       ineffective for not filing a meritless motion to reconsider.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/6/23, at 8-9 (emphasis and footnote added; some

citations modified).9

       Our review confirms the PCRA court’s foregoing reasoning is supported

by the record and the law. See id. Contrary to Appellant’s bald claim, his

standard-guideline-range         sentence      was   not   unreasonable.10     See

Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating

“where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania

law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code.”); see

____________________________________________

9 The PCRA court, which also presided over the proceedings prior to Appellant’s

direct appeal, previously opined that Appellant’s sentence was reasonable and
not an abuse of discretion. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/19/14, at 14-15.

10 We further note that the sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI.
Accordingly, this Court will presume that the sentencing court was aware of,
and considered all relevant factors, and “[h]aving been fully informed by the
[PSI], the sentencing court’s discretion should not be disturbed.”
Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988); see also
Commonwealth v. Conklin, 275 A.3d 1087, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(stating, “where the sentencing judge had the benefit of a [PSI], it will be
presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the
defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating
statutory factors.” (citation omitted)).

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also Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 443 (Pa. 2011) (“stress[ing]

that boilerplate allegations and bald assertions … cannot satisfy a petitioner’s

burden to prove that counsel was ineffective.”); Commonwealth v. Walls,

926 A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007) (stating “rejection of a sentencing court’s

imposition   of   sentence    on      unreasonableness     grounds      [should]   occur

infrequently”). There is no reasonable probability that Appellant would have

received a reduction in his sentence had trial counsel challenged the sentence;

thus, Appellant is unable to establish prejudice. Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1132.

      Finally, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that the sentencing court

erred in failing to consider the facts that (1) “[Appellant] was offered a guilty

plea offer of 8-16 years [in prison] prior to trial”; and (2) Appellant received

a higher sentence than Byrd, Appellant’s co-conspirator. Appellant’s Brief at

17. Byrd, unlike Appellant, chose to accept the Commonwealth’s negotiated

plea offer and take responsibility for his crimes.

      Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court did not abuse its

discretion   in   denying    relief    on    Appellant’s   claim   of   trial   counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief.

      In his second issue, Appellant contends the PCRA court improperly

denied relief on his ineffectiveness claim based on trial counsel’s failure to file

a post-verdict motion challenging the verdict as against the weight of the

evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-20. According to Appellant, the trial

“testimony of [Appellant] and his defense witnesses established that []he did

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not take any part” in the crimes. Id. at 20; see also id. at 19 (“there is no

evidence linking [Appellant] to either of the firearms … that were allegedly

used in the shooting.”).

      The Commonwealth counters that the PCRA court properly denied relief

on this claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, where Appellant’s foregoing

arguments

      constitute[] an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. And on
      direct appeal, the trial court and this [C]ourt both found that the
      Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for [Appellant’s]
      convictions.    See … Burrus, 631 EDA 2013 [(unpublished
      memorandum at] 6–9[)]; see also [Trial Court] Opinion[,]
      2/19/14 … [at] 9-12.

Commonwealth Brief at 12 (emphasis in original). We agree.

      It is well settled that sufficiency of the evidence claims are distinct from

weight of the evidence claims, as there are different standards of review as

well as separate remedies. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745,

751-52 (Pa. 2000) (discussing the distinctions between the separate claims).

This Court has explained:

      [A] challenge to the weight of the evidence is distinct from a
      challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in that the former
      concedes that the Commonwealth has produced sufficient
      evidence of each element of the crime, but questions which
      evidence is to be believed.

Commonwealth v. Richard, 150 A.3d 504, 516 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

      Instantly, Appellant’s arguments go to the sufficiency, not weight, of the

evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 19; cf. Richard, 150 A.3d at 516. This

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Court addressed on direct appeal Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence underlying his attempted murder conviction. See Burrus, 116

A.3d 684 (unpublished memorandum at 6-9). Previously litigated claims are

not cognizable under the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3); Commonwealth

v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50, 55 (Pa. Super. 2000).

      Nevertheless, even if Appellant had properly raised a claim of trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to raise a weight challenge, we conclude

that such claim would lack merit.      Our Supreme Court has explained that

“[r]elief on a weight of the evidence claim is reserved for extraordinary

circumstances, when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to

shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that

right may be given another opportunity to prevail.”         Commonwealth v.

Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 27 (Pa. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact[,] who is free

to believe all, none, or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility

of the witnesses.”   Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

      In its opinion, the PCRA court determined that “[t]rial counsel was not

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless challenge to the weight of the

evidence.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/6/23, at 10. The PCRA court reasoned:

            It is the jury’s prerogative to find Jackson’s account credible.
      Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 464 (Pa. 2019)
      (“The jury is the ultimate fact-finder and the sole arbiter of the
      credibility of each of the witnesses.”).          Jackson identified

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      [Appellant] as one of the shooters at both the scene of the crime
      and the preliminary hearing. While Jackson was intoxicated at the
      time of the shooting, his account was strongly supported by other
      evidence. Sharp’s police statement aligns with Jackson’s
      account and unequivocally identifies [Appellant] as one of
      the shooters. See N.T.[,] 7/6/2012[,] at 175-83. The fact that
      the victim was unavailable at trial does not render his account less
      valid. Furthermore, the verdict is not against the weight simply
      because [Appellant] testified that he did not take part in the
      shooting. The jury [wa]s free to disbelieve [Appellant’s] self-
      serving assertion. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211,
      1222 (Pa. 2009). … Statements and testimony by Jackson,
      Sharp, and Timothy strongly support the verdict and it is up to the
      jury to determine the credibility of the statements.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/6/23, at 9-10 (emphasis added; formatting modified).

      Our review discloses the PCRA court’s above reasoning is supported by

the record and the law. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 262

A.3d 1283, 1288-89 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“Where issues of credibility and weight

of the evidence are concerned, it is not the function of the appellate court to

substitute its judgment based on a cold record for that of the trial court. The

weight to be accorded conflicting evidence is exclusively for the fact finder,

whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the

record.” (internal citations omitted)). Thus, as there was no merit to a weight

challenge, trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a weight claim

in a post-verdict motion. See Treiber, 121 A.3d at 445 (counsel cannot be

deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim). Appellant’s second

issue does not warrant relief.

      In his third issue, Appellant contends that he was entitled to PCRA relief,

where appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the

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Commonwealth’s violation of the Confrontation Clause. See Appellant’s Brief

at 20-25.11 Appellant first claims appellate counsel should have challenged

the admissibility of (1) Jackson’s statement to police at the scene of the

shooting; and (2) Jackson’s preliminary hearing testimony, where Jackson

was improperly deemed “unavailable” due to his hospitalization. See id. at

21-23; see also id. at 22 (claiming “[t]here was no reasonable basis for

deeming Jackson, the main witness in this case, to be unavailable.”).

Appellant complains he was denied “a full and fair opportunity to cross-

examine Jackson, thus violating the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 23.

       “Whether the admission of [certain evidence] violated appellant’s rights

under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law, for which our standard of

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.

Banko, 268        A.3d    484, 487      (Pa.   Super. 2022) (citations   omitted).

“The Confrontation Clause … prohibits out-of-court testimonial statements

by a witness unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior

opportunity for cross-examination.” Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520,

531 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added; footnote omitted)); see also Banko, 268

A.3d at 488-89 (explaining test to determine whether a statement is

testimonial). “[N]on-testimonial statements do not implicate Confrontation

Clause concerns.” Banko, 268 A.3d at 487 (footnote omitted).

____________________________________________

11 Appellant’s third issue presents two separate claims of appellate counsel’s

ineffectiveness with respect to the Confrontation Clause.

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      Instantly, the PCRA court rejected Appellant’s claim of appellate

counsel’s ineffectiveness:

              In the present case, the victim was unavailable to testify at
      trial because he was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric
      facility. An expert witness testified that the victim suffered from
      schizoaffective disorder, which rendered him incompetent to
      testify[,] and that the victim’s health was very unlikely to improve.
      N.T.[,] 7/5/2012[,] at 16-20; N.T.[,] 7/6/2012[,] at 6-14. Due to
      the victim’s unavailability, his statement to [police] officers at the
      scene and his preliminary hearing testimony were both allowed
      into evidence. Neither of these statements violated [Appellant’s]
      Confrontation Clause rights.

             First, appellate counsel argued on direct appeal that the
      officer’s testimony about what Jackson told him after being shot
      violated the Confrontation Clause. The Superior Court rejected
      this claim on the merits, explaining that the victim’s statement
      was not testimonial and therefore did not implicate the
      Confrontation Clause.      See [Burrus, 116 A.3d 684] at 6
      [(unpublished memorandum)]; Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S.
      344, 374-75 (2011) (finding shooting victim’s statements non-
      testimonial because police officers were responding to an ongoing
      emergency when they found victim in critical condition and asked
      what happened); … Banko, 268 A.3d [at] 487 (Pa. Super.
      2022)…. Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise
      a meritless claim, or for failing to raise a claim that counsel did,
      in fact, raise. [Commonwealth v.] Robinson, 82 A.3d [998,]
      1005 [(Pa. 2013)]; … Hanible, 30 A.3d [at] 461….

             Second, the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony was
      admissible under the Confrontation Clause because the victim was
      unavailable for trial and [Appellant] previously had the
      opportunity to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary
      hearing. The victim was unavailable due to his mental health
      pursuant to section 804(a)([4]) of the Pennsylvania Rules of
      Evidence.      [Pa.R.E. 804(a)(4) (providing a “declarant is
      considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant … cannot
      be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of … a then-
      existing infirmity … or mental illness….”).] Furthermore, defense
      counsel cross-examined the victim extensively at the
      preliminary hearing.        N.T.[,] 6/29/2009[,] at 13-48.       In
      Commonwealth v. Wholaver, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

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      stated “[w]here the defendant has had the opportunity to cross-
      examine a witness at a preliminary hearing, probing into areas
      such as bias and testing the veracity of the testimony, cross-
      examination, and thus confrontation, within the meaning of the
      Sixth Amendment has been accomplished.” 989 A.2d 883, 904
      (Pa. 2010). Therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for
      failing to raise a meritless challenge.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/6/23, at 10-11 (emphasis added). The PCRA court’s

reasoning is supported by the record and the law. See id. We conclude the

PCRA court did not err in rejecting Appellant’s instant claim of appellate

counsel’s ineffectiveness.

      With respect to Appellant’s second claim of appellate counsel’s

ineffectiveness under the Confrontation Clause, he contends counsel should

have challenged admission of the recorded prison call between Byrd and Sharp

(i.e., wherein Byrd made inculpatory statements, identified Appellant by his

nickname, “D Money,” and talked about Appellant threatening Sharp). See

Appellant’s Brief at 24-25. Appellant contends that admission of the prison

call constituted a violation of his Confrontation Clause rights and deprived him

of a fair trial. Id. (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36

(1968) (holding that in a joint trial, the admission of a non-testifying

codefendant’s prior statement against a defendant violates the Confrontation

Clause)).

      In its opinion, the PCRA court rejected Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim

and distinguished Bruton, reasoning as follows:

      Bruton does not apply here. Byrd entered a guilty plea prior to
      the start of trial so there is no joint trial as required by Bruton.

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      Furthermore, the p[rison] call conversation was not
      introduced as evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt, but instead, to
      show that Sharp recanted his police statement only after being
      threatened. Nothing in the record indicates that Byrd implicated
      [Appellant] in the shooting during that p[rison] call conversation.

             Regardless, “non-testimonial statements do not implicate
      Confrontation Clause concerns.” Banko, 268 A.3d at 487. The
      comments made between Byrd and Sharp on the p[rison]
      call were not testimonial.             Statements are considered
      testimonial when their primary purpose is to create a record for
      trial, which typically involves situations like police interrogations
      or preliminary hearings. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358-
      59 (2011); Crawford [v. Washington], 541 U.S. [36,] 51
      [(2004)] (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to
      government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who
      makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”).

             The [prison call] conversation between Byrd and Sharp is
      clearly non-testimonial.       It is a conversation between
      acquaintances and there [wa]s no intent to use it at trial. Even if
      Byrd and Sharp “were aware that the prison was recording their
      conversation, a declarant’s understanding that a statement could
      potentially serve as criminal evidence does not necessarily denote
      `testimonial[] intent.’” United States v. Jones, 716 F.3d 851,
      856 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
      813, 822, (2006) (holding that statements made during 911
      emergency phone call were non-testimonial when uttered only “to
      enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”). There
      is no indication that the phone conversation here was intended for
      use at trial.

            Since the statement was non-testimonial, the Confrontation
      Clause did not apply[,] and therefore[, appellate c]ounsel was not
      ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/6/23, at 12-13 (emphasis added). The PCRA court’s

reasoning is again supported by the record and the law. See id. Accordingly,

we conclude the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Appellant’s

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claims of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness. Appellant’s third issue does not

merit relief.

      In his fourth issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court improperly

denied his PCRA petition, where the defense “was never provided any

discovery materials prior to trial[,] which deprived [Appellant] of the ability to

prepare in his defense.” Appellant’s Brief at 26.

      We first address whether Appellant preserved this issue.         Under the

PCRA, “an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do

so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state

postconviction proceeding.”     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b); Commonwealth v.

Jones, 815 A.2d 598, 607 (Pa. 2002). Appellant raised the discovery claim

for the first time in his PCRA petition. Appellant could have raised this claim

on direct appeal, but he failed to do so.     Accordingly, this claim is waived

pursuant to section 9544(b). See Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d

876, 879 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“An issue is waived if it could have been raised

prior to the filing of the PCRA petition, but was not.” (citation omitted)); see

also Commonwealth v. Rivers, 786 A.2d 923, 929 (Pa. 2001) (“PCRA claims

are not merely direct appeal claims that are made at a later stage of the

proceedings, cloaked in a boilerplate assertion of counsel’s ineffectiveness.”

(citation omitted)).

                                     - 22 -
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      In his fifth and final issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court

improperly denied his PCRA petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.

See Appellant’s Brief at 15-16.

      This Court has explained:

      A PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary
      hearing.    We review the PCRA court’s decision dismissing a
      petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. The right to
      an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is not
      absolute. It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold
      a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no
      support either in the record or other evidence.            It is the
      responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine each
      issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record … to
      determine if the PCRA court erred in its determination that there
      were no genuine issues of material fact in controversy and in
      denying relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 244 A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citations   and   brackets   omitted;    formatting    modified);   see      also

Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (Where

there are no genuine issues of material fact that exist with respect to a claim

in a PCRA petition, the PCRA court is not required to hold an evidentiary

hearing).

      We have already determined that none of Appellant’s claims under the

PCRA merit relief. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in

declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s PCRA petition. See

Williams, 244 A.3d at 1287.

      Based on the foregoing, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying

Appellant’s first PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing.

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     Order affirmed.

Date: 2/16/2024

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