Court Opinion

ID: 9606050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:46:11.108785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:32.056387
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(dissenting) — The decision of the court today is directly contrary to our holding in Jaime v. Rhay, 59 Wn.2d 58, 365 P.2d 772 (1961). We held there that a defendant who had violated the terms of his probation was *867subject to the jurisdiction of the court to extend that probation after the expiration of the original probationary period. This was true even though no hearing was held during the probationary period and thus no finding was made during that period that a violation had occurred. The mere elapse of time, we said, does not constitute compliance with RCW 9.95.240 and does not dissolve the order or deprive the court of its continuing jurisdiction. That holding was in harmony with the words of the statute, which give the defendant, after the successful completion of the terms of his parole but within the maximum period of punishment, the right to apply to the court for an order allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty. Whether such an order will be entered lies within the discretion of the court. Implicit within this provision is a legislative intent that the jurisdiction of the court shall continue until the expiration of the maximum period of punishment for the offense for which the defendant was convicted.
Also implicit in that holding is an intent that the court may impose further punishment (within the maximum allowed by statute) after the expiration of the probationary period, if the terms have not been complied with. The majority does not suggest that full compliance with the terms and conditions of the probation was shown in this instance by the petitioner.
It should be obvious that if the State requires full compliance throughout the term of the probation, a hearing to determine that there has been such compliance must necessarily occur after the expiration of that term. It is true that RCW 9.95.230 states that the court shall have authority at any time during the course of probation to revoke, modify or change its order, but this section pertains to the same subject matter as RCW 9.95.240, and the two must be read together.
Every defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire period thereof, or who shall have been discharged from probation prior to the termination *868of the period thereof, may at any time prior to the expiration of the maximum period of punishment for the offense for which he has been convicted be permitted in the discretion of the court to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty, . . .
(Italics mine.) RCW 9.95.240. This section makes it clear that the jurisdiction of the court continues throughout the maximum period of confinement permissible. It was the evident legislative intent that the defendant should escape the more severe penalties provided by statute only if he complies with the conditions of his probation throughout the period decreed by the court. With this intent in mind, it would appear logical to view the language of RCW 9.95-.230, giving the court authority to alter its order during the course of probation, as clarifying rather than restrictive, making it clear that the jurisdiction of the court is not suspended during that period.
I must admit that I signed the opinion in State v. Mortrud, 89 Wn.2d 720, 575 P.2d 227 (1978). Further reflection, however, has convinced me that we did violence to the legislative intent in that case and that we should overrule it, giving the sections of RCW 9.95 the more harmonious interpretation accorded them in Jaime v. Rhay, supra, to achieve the legislative purpose which they express.
Williams, J., concurs with Rosellini, J.
Reconsideration denied January 16, 1980.