Court Opinion

ID: 9723573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:20:53.009097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:49.905649
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring: I suggest that it is not necessary to discuss whether the amendments to Rule 274 and Rule 303(a) were retroactive. The amendments did not change the law; they only restated existing law: “where a trial court amends its initial final order, the clock is reset regarding the filing of posttrial motions attacking this new final judgment and, thus, the time is reset regarding the time for the filing of a notice of appeal.” Gibson v. Belvidere National Bank & Trust Co., 326 Ill. App. 3d 45, 50, 759 N.E.2d 991, 995-96 (2001). As to Petco’s appeal, it is important to consider the details of the State’s June 22, 2004, “request for reconsideration.” A mere request for reconsideration does not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2). The State’s June 22, 2004, postjudgment motion, however, was not a mere request for reconsideration. Petco had filed a postjudgment motion after the original judgment was entered, and the original judgment was modified in Petco’s favor on May 26, 2004. The State’s June 22, 2004, motion accordingly was its “one postjudgment motion directed at the superseding judgment or order.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 274. If it had been the State that had filed the original postjudgment motion and the State had filed a “request for reconsideration” after its motion was denied, Petco’s time for appeal would not have been extended, and Petco would have been required to ignore the State’s June 22, 2004, motion and file its notice of appeal within 30 days of the modified order, as it did.