Court Opinion

ID: 9730749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:22:39.306597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:09.030454
License: Public Domain

OPINION
FELIPE REYNA, Justice.
After the trial court denied Jimmie Dewayne Hudson’s suppression motion, Hudson pleaded nolo contendere to burglary of a vehicle. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the court sentenced Hudson to ten months’ confinement. Hudson contends in three points that the court abused its discretion by: (1) denying his suppression motion because his interrogation without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion constitutes an unlawful seizure; (2) denying his suppression motion because his DNA was obtained from a Dr. Pepper can which had been unlawfully seized; and (3) denying his motion for new trial premised on the same issues presented in his first two points. We will affirm.
Background
This case involves the burglary of three semis and an equipment trailer. The deputy who responded to the initial report found a piece of a tooth in the driver’s seat of one of the semis. About three weeks after the burglary, an investigator identified Hudson as a potential suspect because of his prior involvement in similar cases. Hudson was in jail on other charges when he was identified as a suspect.
The investigator asked jailers to bring Hudson to his office to discuss the burglary. Hudson asked for a Dr. Pepper, which was given him. Before asking questions, the investigator read Hudson his statutory warnings. Hudson denied knowing anything about the burglary. He refused to allow the investigator to look at his teeth to see if one was chipped or broken. He refused the investigator’s request to use a swab and obtain a DNA specimen.
When the jailers came to return Hudson to his cell, Hudson smashed the Dr. Pepper can and threw it in a trash can in the investigator’s office. After Hudson left, the investigator retrieved the can and submitted it for DNA analysis. A DNA specimen obtained from Hudson’s Dr. Pepper can matched the DNA of the tooth. Based on this information, an arrest warrant was *603obtained, and Hudson was arrested for the offense.
Interrogation
Hudson contends in his first point that his interrogation without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion constitutes an unlawful seizure.
[A] defendant is not required to have the evidence which he sought to suppress admitted in order for the court of appeals to address the merits of an appeal challenging denial of a pretrial motion to suppress.... [Ajppellate courts must use a two step inquiry when deciding whether to address the merits of a claim regarding the trial court’s denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence prior to a guilty plea. First, the appellate court must identify “the fruits” that the trial court held would not be suppressed. Second, the appellate court must determine that these fruits have “somehow been used” by the State. If it is not clear from the testimony and exhibits what “the fruits” are, then the appellate court need not address the merits of the claim. Likewise, if the fruits have not “somehow been used” by the State, then the appellate court need not address the merits of the claim.
Gonzales v. State, 966 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (citations omitted); accord Badgett v. State, 79 S.W.3d 581, 584 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd).
Here, it is clear that the “fruit” Hudson wanted suppressed is the result of the DNA testing made possible by the seizure of the Dr. Pepper can following his interrogation. See Badgett, 79 S.W.3d at 584.
In Kraft v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained what it means for evidence to have been “used” against a defendant in this context.
[S]o long as it may be concluded that particular evidence the accused maintains should have been suppressed pursuant to a motion raising Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations would in any measure inculpate the accused, that evidence has been “used” against him in securing his misdemeanor conviction, and hence, the appellate court should entertain the merits of his appeal.
762 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (quoted by Gonzales, 966 S.W.2d at 523-24); accord Badgett, 79 S.W.3d at 584.
Here, the result of the DNA testing inculpated Hudson and was relied on as the basis for his arrest warrant. Thus, this evidence was used against him. See Gonzales, 966 S.W.2d at 523-24; Kraft, 762 S.W.2d at 615; Badgett, 79 S.W.3d at 585.
Hudson was in custody at the time of his interrogation. See Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 776 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Cooks v. State, 844 S.W.2d 697, 734 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Nevertheless, the investigator properly read Hudson the required constitutional and statutory warnings before questioning him.
The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit custodial interrogation.1 Rather, as interpreted by Miranda v. Arizona, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the State from using “statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the [Fifth Amendment] privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 *604L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); accord Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 526 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). The preferred “procedural safeguards” are the well-known Miranda warnings, which the investigator properly-read to Hudson before questioning him. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure likewise does not prohibit custodial interrogation. Rather, it provides that no written or oral statement of an accused resulting from custodial interrogation is admissible unless the requisite statutory warnings are provided. See Tex.Code Grim. Proo. Ann. art. 38.22, §§ 2, 3 (Vernon 2005). Again, the investigator read Hudson the required warnings before questioning him.
[EJven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual’s identification, and request consent to search his or her luggage — as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). “In such a situation, the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Id. at 436, 111 S.Ct. at 2387.
The investigator properly warned Hudson of his right to remain silent. Hudson promptly refused to answer any questions or cooperate in the investigation. Thus, he apparently felt free to decline to answer the investigator’s questions and terminate the interview. Accordingly, we hold that his questioning while already in custody on other charges was not an unlawful seizure. Thus, we overrule Hudson’s first point.
Seizure of Can
Hudson contends in his second point that the seizure of his DNA specimen from the Dr. Pepper can was unlawful because it was done without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. The State responds that the seizure was not unlawful because Hudson voluntarily abandoned the can.
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the seizure of property which has been voluntarily abandoned. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); Hawkins v. State, 758 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Mouton v. State, 101 S.W.3d 686, 690 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.). Property is considered to have been voluntarily abandoned “if (1) the defendant intended to abandon the property and (2) his decision to abandon the property was not due to police misconduct.” Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 507 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); accord Mouton, 101 S.W.3d at 690; Shelley v. State, 101 S.W.3d 606, 611 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd).
Here, when Hudson was about to be taken from the investigator’s office, he threw his Dr. Pepper can in the trash of his own volition.2 This indicated an intent on his part to abandon the can. Cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-41, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1628-29, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988) (person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in items deposited in trash).
*605There is nothing in the record to indicate that Hudson’s decision to throw the can away was induced by police misconduct. See Hollingsworth v. State, 15 S.W.3d 586, 593 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). Moreover, we essentially determined in connection with Hudson’s first point that there was no police misconduct. Accordingly, we overrule Hudson’s second point.
Motion for New Trial
Hudson contends in his third point that the court abused its discretion by denying his motion for new trial, which raised the same issues presented in his first two points. Because we have overruled Hudson’s first two points, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by denying a motion for new trial premised on the same issues raised in those points. Accordingly, we overrule Hudson’s third point.
We affirm the judgment.
Chief Justice GRAY concurring.

. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const, amend. V.

. Hudson suggests that he would not have been allowed to take the can back to his cell. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the record to support this assertion or contradict it. In any event, it was within the court’s discretion to find that Hudson threw the can in the trash of his own accord and not because the jailers required him to. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (appellate court should "assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported in the record that buttress its conclusion”).