Court Opinion

ID: 9908267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:07.813754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:04.624188
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

            Commonwealth of Kentucky
                   Court of Appeals
                     NO. 2022-CA-1419-MR

DANIEL CAMERON, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL                            APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
                    ACTION NO. 22-CI-00298

ALLISON BALL, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS KENTUCKY STATE
TREASURER; ANDY BESHEAR, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
GOVERNOR OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
HOLLY M. JOHNSON, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE FINANCE &
ADMINISTRATION CABINET;
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
COMMISSION; MATTHEW KOCH,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CO-
CHAIR OF THE LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH COMMISSION’S
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
REVIEW COMMITTEE; AND
STEPHEN MEREDITH, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CO-CHAIR
OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
COMMISSION’S GOVERNMENT
CONTRACT REVIEW COMMITTEE                        APPELLEES

AND

                     NO. 2022-CA-1490-MR

ALLISON BALL, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS KENTUCKY STATE
TREASURER                                        APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
                    ACTION NO. 22-CI-00298

ANDY BESHEAR, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
DANIEL CAMERON, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL;
HOLLY M. JOHNSON, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE FINANCE &
ADMINISTRATION CABINET;
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
COMMISSION; MATTHEW KOCH,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CO-
CHAIR OF THE LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH COMMISSION’S
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
REVIEW COMMITTEE; AND
STEPHEN MEREDITH, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CO-CHAIR
OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH

                                -2-
COMMISSION’S GOVERNMENT
CONTRACT REVIEW COMMITTEE                                             APPELLEES

                                        OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING IN PART,
                                 AND VACATING IN PART
                                 AND DISMISSING IN PART

                                          ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: Attorney General Daniel Cameron and State Treasurer Allison

Ball appeal the summary judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court entered on

November 10, 2022, in favor of Governor Andy Beshear and Finance Secretary

Holly McCoy Johnson. We affirm in part and vacate and dismiss in part after our

review.

                 During its 2022 Regular Session, the Kentucky General Assembly

passed House Bill 248 and House Bill 388. These two statutory enactments are the

subject of this appeal.

                House Bill (HB) 2481 created a new section of KRS2 Chapter 48

concerning the administration of the state budget. The provision prohibits

constitutional officers elected statewide (except the Attorney General) and any

1
    2022 Ky. Acts ch. 195 (HB 248) (eff. Jan. 1, 2022).
2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                                 -3-
state official, employee, or agency (except the Department of Public Advocacy in a

criminal matter) from expending appropriated funds to challenge or to support a

challenge to the constitutionality of any legislative act or resolution of the General

Assembly. Because an emergency was declared to exist, the provision was to take

effect immediately upon its becoming law and was to apply retroactively from

January 1, 2022.

                 The provisions of HB 3883 addressed Kentucky’s Model Procurement

Code (KRS Chapter 45A) and amended those portions of the Kentucky Model

Procurement Act related to review of executive branch contracts. HB 388 repealed

and reenacted provisions of KRS 45A.705 to give the State Treasurer a role in the

contract review process. Once again, an emergency was declared to exist, and the

provision was to take effect immediately upon becoming law. Governor Beshear

vetoed each bill in its entirety. The General Assembly overrode the vetoes, and the

bills became law.

                 Governor Beshear and Finance Secretary Johnson filed a declaratory

judgment action in Franklin Circuit Court. Attorney General Cameron, State

Treasurer Ball, and others were named as defendants. Governor Beshear and the

Finance Secretary alleged that the measures: unconstitutionally usurped the

Governor’s executive authority; unlawfully blocked access to the courts; and

3
    2022 Ky. Acts ch. 205 (HB 388) (eff. Apr. 14, 2022).

                                                -4-
wrongfully interfered with the function and authority of the Court of Justice. They

sought a temporary restraining order and a declaration that the measures were

unconstitutional.

                 On April 18, 2022, the Franklin Circuit Court entered an order

temporarily restraining the Attorney General and State Treasurer from

implementing the measures. After the parties filed their briefs and appeared for

oral argument, the circuit court concluded that the challenged provisions were

indeed unconstitutional. By order entered on November 10, 2022, the circuit court

granted summary judgment to Governor Beshear and to Finance Secretary Johnson

and issued a permanent injunction. This timely appeal followed.

                 On appeal, Attorney General Cameron challenges the trial court’s

decision with respect to HB 248. He argues that the trial court erred by failing to

recognize that the challenged enactment is a proper exercise of the General

Assembly’s absolute power of the purse. Therefore, he contends that the measure

does not violate provisions of the Kentucky Constitution.

                 With respect to the trial court’s decision regarding HB 388, Attorney

General Cameron and State Treasurer Ball contend that the issue was rendered

moot by the passage of HB 3294 during the General Assembly’s 2023 legislative

session. With HB 329, the legislature again amended the process of review for

4
    2023 Ky. Acts ch. 141 (HB 329) (eff. Mar. 30, 2023).

                                                -5-
executive branch contracts as set out in KRS 45A.705. They argue that the new

statutory scheme addressed and overhauled key provisions that had been contested

in the litigation below. Thus, they submit that our review of the prior legislation

would result in our impermissibly rendering an advisory opinion as to issues that

are now moot.

            We agree that the new legislation rendered moot the issue decided by

the circuit court in its judgment entered on November 10, 2022. We address the

decision with respect to HB 388 first in our review.

                                      HB 388

            The Kentucky Model Procurement Code governs the disposition of

state property and applies to every expenditure of public funds by the

Commonwealth (and every payment by contingency fee) under all contracts --

except those between the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions or other

governments. KRS 45A.020. It imposes a host of requirements for state

contracting. The Finance Secretary is empowered to adopt necessary

administrative regulations and is expressly directed to “consider and decide matters

of policy with regard to state procurement.” KRS 45A.035. However, the General

Assembly exercises some degree of oversight of state contracting through the

Government Contract Review Committee (GCRC), a permanent committee of the

Legislative Research Commission (LRC). KRS 45A.695.

                                         -6-
                 Prior to 2021, whenever the GCRC determined that a contract was not

needed or was inappropriate, it forwarded a “written notation of the reasons for its

disapproval or objection” to the Finance Secretary. KRS 45A.705(5) (2009). The

Finance Secretary then considered whether the contract should: (i) be revised “to

comply with the objections of the committee,” (ii) be cancelled, or (iii) remain

effective as originally approved. KRS 45A.705(6) (2009).

                 In 2021, the General Assembly modified the contract review process

pertaining to personal service contracts, tax incentive agreements, and memoranda

of agreement. With Senate Bill (SB) 165,5 a critical function of the Finance

Secretary was replaced by the State Treasurer. The Finance Secretary had

previously determined whether a particular contract to which the GCRC objected

should be revised, canceled, or continued. Pursuant to the new statute, the “final

determination” would instead be made by the State Treasurer. SB 165 §3 (6)(c).

                The constitutionality of SB 165 was immediately challenged in

Franklin Circuit Court, and the circuit court declared it invalid on procedural

grounds. The court held that the General Assembly had violated the three-readings

clause of Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution. The General Assembly acted

quickly to correct the procedural defect and then passed HB 388 in its 2022

5
    2021 Ky. Acts ch. 151 §3 (SB 165) (eff. Jun 29, 2021).

                                                -7-
legislative session. Subsequently, State Treasurer Ball’s first appeal to this Court

was dismissed as moot by our order entered August 19, 2022.

             HB 388 reiterated and enacted the same changes as had SB 165. It

designated the State Treasurer (instead of the Finance Secretary) to be the reviewer

of the GCRC’s determination as to whether a contract should be revised, canceled,

or continued. Since the prior procedural defect was no longer at issue, this

litigation challenged HB 388 on its merits. The circuit court determined that HB

388 was unconstitutional as an unlawful usurpation of the executive powers of the

Governor.

             The circuit court relied upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court of

Kentucky in Legislative Research Commission by Prather v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d

907 (Ky. 1984). The Brown Court held a statute unconstitutional where it

permitted the Administrative Regulation Review Subcommittee (a subcommittee

of the LRC) to veto administrative regulations adopted by the executive branch.

Prior to the enactment of the challenged statute, the subcommittee had merely

made recommendations with respect to adopted regulations. The court observed

that “[t]he adoption of administrative regulations necessary to implement and carry

out the purpose of legislative enactments is executive in nature and is ordinarily

within the constitutional [provision] of the executive branch of government.” Id. at

919. Consequently, the court concluded that the enactment constituted an

                                         -8-
unlawful legislative encroachment upon the authority of the executive branch in

violation of the constitutional provisions on separation of powers. (Sections 27

and 28 of the KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION.)

             With respect to HB 388, the Franklin Circuit Court determined that it

infringed upon the Governor’s executive authority and his constitutionally

enumerated powers by revising the former advisory function of the GCRC to now

give it final and binding authority with respect to executive branch contracts. The

court concluded that provisions impairing the decision-making authority of the

Finance Secretary, an executive branch appointee of the Governor, necessarily

encroached upon power granted to the Governor by our Constitution. Cameron

and Ball argued that the constitutionality of the measure was preserved by the

availability of an appeal of the GCRC’s decision to the State Treasurer. However,

the court disagreed and concluded that that appeal procedure also circumvented the

Governor’s authority and discretion.

             After entry of the circuit court’s judgment on HB 388 (that is the

subject matter of this appeal), the General Assembly passed HB 329 during its

2023 legislative session. HB 329 addressed and attempted to remedy the

constitutional defects that had been identified by the Franklin Circuit Court in its

summary judgment. Pursuant to the HB 329, the GCRC reviews all qualifying

personal service contracts, tax incentive agreements, or memoranda of agreement.

                                         -9-
If the GCRC objects to a contract, the GCRC “attach[es] a written notation of its

nonbinding recommendations” to a copy of the contract, which is then sent to the

Treasurer for review. HB 329 §1 (6)(b) (emphasis added). However, if the GCRC

objects to any “contract necessary in the exercise of the enumerated powers

specifically granted to the Governor pursuant to Sections 75 [through] 80 of the

Constitution of Kentucky[,]” that objection is not sent to the Treasurer and has no

effect on the contract. HB 329 §1 (6)(a). Similarly, a GCRC objection to “an

emergency contract approved by the . . . Finance [Secretary] or his or her

designee” is not sent to the Treasurer for review. For these two kinds of contracts,

the GCRC’s nonbinding recommendations are sent to the Finance Secretary just as

had been done previously. HB 329 §1 (8). Upon reviewing nonbinding

recommendations, the Finance Secretary can revise the contract, cancel it, or allow

it to proceed as written -- again, just as had been done prior to the legislation.

Governor Beshear vetoed the provision, the General Assembly overrode his veto,

and the measure became law.

             Governor Beshear and Finance Secretary Johnson immediately filed a

complaint in Franklin Circuit Court against Attorney General Cameron, State

Treasurer Ball, and others, alleging that this provision, too, was unconstitutional.

In its order entered on May 24, 2023, the Franklin Circuit Court granted summary

judgment to Governor Beshear and Secretary Johnson. Another timely appeal was

                                          -10-
made to this Court, but that new appeal regarding HB 329 is not before us at this

juncture. Our review is from the order of November 10, 2022, pertaining to HB

388.

             A case is rendered moot when -- pending an appeal -- an event occurs

which “would render the judgment that might be pronounced ineffectual[.]”

Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Ky. 2014) (quoting Louisville Transit Co. v.

Dep’t of Motor Transp., 286 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Ky. 1956)). Within our system of

government, where a separation of powers is fundamental, our “role does not

extend to the issuance of merely advisory opinions.” Id. (citing Commonwealth,

Dep’t of Corr. v. Engle, 302 S.W.3d 60 (Ky. 2010)).

             We endeavor to avoid rendering an opinion that decides an abstract

proposition of law. If we were to review the circuit court’s judgment with respect

to the provisions of HB 388 and render an opinion, we would violate the very

principles underlying the mootness doctrine. The provision enacted and

challenged by Governor Beshear and Secretary Johnson in 2022 has been replaced

by an amended measure. The new amended provision has been tested in the circuit

court and is now the subject of a separate appeal in this Court. But in the case now

before us, we are asked to scrutinize a provision that no longer exists.

             Governor Beshear and Finance Secretary Johnson argue that the new

legislation is merely an exercise in semantics and that it is not materially different

                                         -11-
from the provisions of HB 388 examined by the trial court in its judgment entered

on November 10, 2022. On this basis, it contends that the previous controversy is

not moot. We disagree with this characterization of HB 329.

             The modifications included in the new statute are not insignificant. In

fact, they appear to have been enacted by the General Assembly in an attempt to

cull or to avoid the specific constitutional infirmities identified by the circuit court

in its judgment. The new legislation (HB 329) rendered moot the issues decided

by the circuit court in its judgment entered on November 10, 2022, with respect to

HB 388. Although an appeal has been filed with respect to HB 329, that appeal is

not before us at this time.

             Alternatively, Governor Beshear and Finance Secretary Johnson argue

that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness

doctrine applies under the circumstances. They contend that we should render an

opinion because a pattern of the General Assembly’s various enactments reveals an

unrelenting desire to strip the Governor of his constitutional authority. They argue

that Governor Beshear has had to challenge enactments of the General Assembly

time and again and that with respect to this specific issue, “[t]hree times is

enough.”

             For the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to apply,

two elements must be met. First, “the challenged action must be too short in

                                          -12-
duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.” Bevin v. Beshear,

526 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Ky. 2017); Commonwealth v. Collinsworth, 628 S.W.3d 82

(Ky. 2021); Windstream Kentucky West, LLC v. Kentucky Public Service Comm’n,

362 S.W.3d 357 (Ky. App. 2012), as modified (Feb. 24, 2012). Next, “there must

be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to

the same action again.” Bevin, 526 S.W.3d at 90 (citation omitted).

             The litigation satisfies neither requirement. First, it is not capable of

repetition. The General Assembly’s enactment of HB 329 substantially replaced

the provisions challenged in HB 388. The amended statutory scheme materially

altered the process of executive contract review. Consequently, the Finance

Secretary and the Governor cannot be subjected again to the provisions of HB 388.

It is simply a dead letter. Moreover, as to duration, the General Assembly’s

amendments to statutes do not easily evade review because of “cessation or

expiration.” They typically are subjected to scrutiny by way of litigation. As

observed above, the new amendments (HB 329) to the Model Procurement Code

have already been challenged in court and are currently under review by a separate

panel of this very Court.

             Governor Beshear and Finance Secretary Johnson also argue that the

voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine also applies. We disagree.

                                         -13-
             Under the voluntary cessation exception, an appeal may proceed

despite a defendant’s decision to stop the challenged activity. Morgan, 441

S.W.3d 94. The exception is grounded upon judicial disfavor of parties who

evasively would manipulate mootness so as to frustrate the “public interest in

having the legality of the[ir] practices settled.” Id. at 99 (citing United States v.

W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S. Ct. 894, 97 L. Ed. 1303 (1953)).

             Neither Attorney General Cameron nor Treasury Secretary Ball

orchestrated the mootness of the litigation. That mootness wholly resulted from

the activity of the General Assembly. Moreover, there is no indication that the

General Assembly amended the challenged provision merely to manipulate

mootness. Instead, the General Assembly addressed and remedied the specific

constitutional infirmities identified by the circuit court in its judgment. Thus, the

voluntary cessation exception does not apply.

             In the event that we might conclude that the issue has been rendered

moot and that no exception applies, Governor Beshear and Secretary Johnson

argue that we should refrain from applying the equitable doctrine of vacatur to

invalidate this portion of the trial court’s judgment. We disagree.

             The United States Supreme Court explained: “[a] party who seeks

review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of

circumstance . . . ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in that ruling.”

                                          -14-
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 712, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2035, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1118

(2011) (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S.

18, 25, 115 S. Ct. 386, 130 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1994)). Instead, “[t]he equitable remedy

of [vacatur] ensures that ‘those who have been prevented from obtaining the

review to which they are entitled [are] not . . . treated as if there had been a

review.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39, 71 S.

Ct. 104, 95 L. Ed. 36 (1950)).

             Again, the issue on appeal was not rendered moot by the actions of

either Attorney General Cameron or State Treasurer Ball. Permitting the judgment

against them to stand could arguably imply that they acquiesced in its holding or

that it successfully survived judicial review. Under these circumstances, it would

appear that Governor Beshear and Finance Secretary Johnson received a victory

from the judgment rendered in their favor below and that Cameron and Ball

suffered a defeat. See Windstream Kentucky West, LLC, 362 S.W.3d at 360-61.

The fact remains that the judgment below -- by having been rendered moot by the

subsequent acts of the General Assembly -- has lost all meaning for either side in

the litigation. Nothing remains except for it to be erased or judicially nullified.

             Consequently, vacatur is warranted.

             Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the appeal as moot and order

that this portion of the judgment of the circuit court be vacated.

                                          -15-
                                       HB 248

             We turn now to HB 248. We are asked to review the circuit court’s

conclusion that its provisions are unconstitutional. To recapitulate, this measure

prohibited elected statewide constitutional officers (except the Attorney General)

and any state official, employee, or agency (except the Department of Public

Advocacy in a criminal matter) from expending legislatively appropriated funds to

challenge or to support a challenge to the constitutionality of any legislative act or

resolution of the General Assembly.

             In its summary judgment, the circuit court recognized that statutory

enactments of our General Assembly enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.

Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 570 (Ky. 2001). “A constitutional

infringement must be ‘clear, complete and unmistakable’ in order to render the

statute unconstitutional.” Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle

Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 806 (Ky. 2009) (citing Kentucky Indus. Util.

Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 983 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Ky. 1998)). The

court also noted that Governor Beshear chose to mount a facial challenge (as

distinguished from an “as applied” challenge) to HB 248 and that, therefore, he

bore the burden to “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the

[statute] would be valid.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 213 S.W.3d 671, 681 (Ky.

                                         -16-
2006) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 73, 183, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767, 114 L.

Ed. 2d 233 (1991)).

             The circuit court evaluated the provisions of HB 248 in light of

Sections 14, 26, 27, 28, and 109 of the Kentucky Constitution. It concluded that

on its face, HB 248 denied Governor Beshear (and all to whom it applies) access to

the courts and that it violated the separation of powers doctrine. It rejected the

argument of Attorney General Cameron that the individuals to whom the act

applies are not actually precluded from seeking redress in the courts but are merely

prohibited from expending state funds to do so. It also rejected his argument that

the provision is an appropriation measure within the exclusive purview of the

General Assembly.

             On appeal, Attorney General Cameron argues that the circuit court

erred in its summary judgment by failing to recognize the “plenary power” of the

General Assembly to make public policy by restricting executive spending. He

contends that the circuit court erred by concluding that the legislation violated the

constitutionally mandated doctrine of separation of powers. We disagree.

             Summary judgment is properly granted where “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

                                         -17-
law.” CR6 56.03. The parties agree that there are no questions of material fact and

that the court’s judgment addresses only matters of law. Consequently, upon our

review, we do not defer to the judgment of the trial court’s. Goldsmith v. Allied

Building Components, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1992). Instead, we review the

decision de novo. Cumberland Valley Contrs., Inc. v. Bell County Coal Corp., 238

S.W.3d 644 (Ky. 2007).

                The doctrine of separation of powers provides an essential structural

safeguard in our analysis of conflicts between and among the co-equal branches of

our government. Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, (Ky. 2005).

Consequently, an allegation that legislation violates the doctrine of separation of

governmental powers is appropriate for review. In a facial challenge to its

constitutionality, the provision is attacked at its root and in its every application.

See Commonwealth v. Bredhold, 599 S.W.3d 409 (Ky. 2020) (citing

Commonwealth v. Claycomb by & through Claycomb, 566 S.W.3d 202 (Ky. 2018)

(citations omitted); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 158

L. Ed. 2d 891 (2004)). As the circuit court observed, we “‘presum[e] that the

challenged statutes were enacted by the legislature in accordance with

constitutional requirements.’” Cameron v. Beshear, 628 S.W.3d 61, 73 (Ky. 2021)

(quoting Beshear v. Acree, 615 S.W.3d 780, 805 (Ky. 2020)).

6
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           -18-
            Kentucky’s Constitution “contains explicit provisions which, on the

one hand, mandate separation among the three branches of government, and on the

other hand, specifically prohibit incursion of one branch of government into the

powers and functions of the others.” Legislative Research Comm’n by and through

Prather v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Ky. 1984).

            The provisions of our Constitution require a strict separation of

governmental authority. Id.

            Section 27 provides as follows:

            The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of
            Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments,
            and each of them be confined to a separate body of
            magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one;
            those which are executive, to another; and those which
            are judicial, to another.

            Section 28 provides as follows:

            No person or collection of persons, being of one of those
            departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging
            to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter
            expressly directed or permitted.

            Section 29 vests the legislative power in the General Assembly;

Section 69 vests the executive power in the Governor. Section 109, as amended,

establishes judicial authority in the Court of Justice. That demarcation of powers

and functions was ably discussed by the Supreme Court of the United States as

follows:

                                        -19-
                     The essential purpose of the separation of powers
             is to allow for independent functioning of each coequal
             branch of government within its assigned sphere of
             responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or
             intimidation by other branches.

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 760-61, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2707, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349

(1982).

            In the case now before us, the primary issue to be decided is whether

HB 248 violates the principle of separation of powers by impermissibly interfering

with Governor Beshear’s exercise of his executive authority to administer

government. We hold that it does.

             The state budget provides the revenue for the Commonwealth and

determines how that revenue shall be spent. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 925. It “is

fundamentally a legislative matter.” Id. The budgeting process consists of two

steps: (1) the appropriation of funds and (2) the expenditure of funds.

Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear v. Commonwealth Office of the Governor ex rel.

Bevin, 498 S.W.3d 355 (Ky. 2016). The first step consists primarily of the

legislative appropriation process required by the Constitution. Id. at 369 (citing

KY. CONST. § 230 (“No money shall be drawn from the State Treasury, except in

pursuance of appropriations made by law . . . .”)). An appropriation is “an

authorization by the General Assembly to expend a sum of money.” Id. (citing

KRS 48.010). The General Assembly exercises plenary power over

                                         -20-
appropriations. Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W. 3d 852 (2005). (We also

note, parenthetically, that plenary is not synonymous with absolute.) The second

step of the budgeting process is the spending of money authorized in the

appropriation. Id.

             HB 248 does not make an appropriation. Instead, it is -- by its terms

-- an act “relating to the expenditure of appropriated funds.” (Emphasis added.)

             Governor Beshear is chief executive of the Commonwealth. KY.

CONST. § 69. Inherent in his responsibility for administering the executive branch

of government is the authority to control how appropriated funds are allocated.

Governor Beshear has comprehensive authority to direct the expenditure of funds

appropriated to his office as he sees fit.

             It is unnecessary for this Court to identify the breadth of the chief

executive’s authority to expend sums appropriated to his office as that issue is not

before us. But he clearly has a special duty with respect to the law, and he alone is

commanded by our Constitution to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

KY. CONST. § 81. Where the General Assembly seeks to prohibit the Governor’s

expenditure of appropriated funds to challenge or to support a challenge to the

constitutionality of any legislative act or resolution, the General Assembly

undoubtedly intrudes upon the authority of the executive branch of government.

The General Assembly has acted beyond the bounds of its constitutional authority

                                             -21-
by attempting to prevent Governor Beshear from complying with his unique

constitutional duties.

             We acknowledge and agree that Attorney General Cameron is charged

with representing the interests of the people of the Commonwealth. However,

there could be instances where some endangered interests might not be identified

or addressed by the office of the Attorney General. When and if the Governor

believes that some legislative enactment may be unconstitutional (as, for example,

this very litigation) or that some conduct may arguably be unlawful, he has both

the authority and the duty to launch a challenge in order to fulfill his oath to ensure

that the law is faithfully executed.

             The General Assembly is not permitted to interfere with the

executive’s power to administer appropriated funds -- including a decision to

choose to expend funds to mount a challenge to actions of the General Assembly

that he perceives to be unconstitutional. HB 248 violates the doctrine of separation

of powers by attempting to give the General Assembly excessive power to impede

the Governor in performing his constitutionally mandated duties. To hold

otherwise would be to disregard and jeopardize the critical balance between and

among the co-equal branches of government. To hold otherwise would indeed be

a violation of our sworn duty to preserve, protect, and defend our Constitution.

The Kentucky Constitution commits the authority and the duty to run the executive

                                         -22-
branch to the Governor. He has an obligation to see that the law is faithfully

enforced. In order to do so, he must have the ability and the means to challenge

the constitutionality of acts of the General Assembly. Therefore, we hold that HB

248 is an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of powers as set

forth by Sections 27 and 28 of the Constitution of Kentucky.

             In summary, with respect to HB 388, we vacate and declare void the

judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court and dismiss that portion of this appeal

pertaining to it. With respect to HB 248, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin

Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                        -23-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT DANIEL BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
CAMERON:                    ANDY BESHEAR:

Matthew F. Kuhn               S. Travis Mayo
Frankfort, Kentucky           Frankfort, Kentucky

Alexander Y. Magera           Taylor Payne
Frankfort, Kentucky           Frankfort, Kentucky

Harrison Gray Kilgore         Laura C. Tipton
Frankfort, Kentucky           Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT ALLISON BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
BALL:                       HOLLY M. JOHNSON:

Brittany J. Warford           Brian C. Thomas
Frankfort, Kentucky           Frankfort, Kentucky

REPLY BREIF FOR APPELLANT     Mitchel T. Denham
ALLISON BALL:                 Louisville, Kentucky

Lorran Hart Ferguson
Frankfort, Kentucky

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