Court Opinion

ID: 9809772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:27:00.451043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:58.601240
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
concurring only in the result.
I can not agree with the opinion of the Court that, until the breach of condition, “the absolute estate was in the plaintiff, and, therefore, could not be in anyone else.” The deed of W. A. Har*13ris to the plaintiff conveyed a determinable fee, having the incidents of a fee simple except that of alienation, but liable to be entirely defeated. By its very terms it could never be enlarged into a fee simple absolute, except, of course, by the release of the grantor or his heirs. It contained no inherent power of enlargement. It is true such an estate is sometimes called a fee simple limited or conditional, which always seemed to me a misnomer; but it can never be an absolute fee. If it were, nothing would remain in the grantor, and hence no one could take advantage of the possible defeasance. There must remain in the grantor at least a possibility of reverter, which, while not an estate, is in itself a right, coupled with the contingent right of entry-. This right may be in abeyance, but if it exists at all, actually or potentially, it must exist in the grantor. It seems to me that the possibility of reverter is also an interest in the land, and thereby by a double title comes within the provisions of section 2140 of The Code. The word has been thus defined: “Interest means concern; also, advantage, good, share, portion, part, participation; any right in the nature of property, but less than title. Its chief use seems to designate some right attaching to property which either can not or need not be defined with precision.” 16 Am. and Eng. Enc. L. (2d Ed.), 1102.
Coke says: “Interest ex vi termini in legal understanding, extendeth to estates, rights and titles that a man hath of, in, to, or out of lands; for he is truly said to have an interest in them.” Co. Litt., 345a.
Interests may be vested, executory or contingent. In Young v. Young, 89 Va., 675; 23 L. R. A., 642, it was held, that a contingent remainder was an interest or claim to real estate, and might be disposed of by deed or will under a statute using those terms. In fact, the word seems to be one of extreme elasticity, which may be used to include nearly everything legally connecting the claimant with the subject-matter.
*14Section 2140 of The Code provides that, “Any testator * *' * may dispose of all real and personal estate, which he shall be entitled to at the time of his death, * * * and the power hereby given shall extend to all contingent, ex-ecutory or other future interest in any real or personal estate, whether the testator may or may not be the person or one of the persons, in whom the same may become vested, or whether he may be entitled thereto under the instrument by which the same was created, or under any disposition thereof by deed or will; and, also, to all rights of entry for condition broken, and other i-ights of entry,” etc.
It would be difficult for one to make the language of the statute any broader, and I can not doubt that it includes, and was intended to include, all contingent, executory or other future interests, as well as all rights of entry, whether vested or contingent. The possibility of reverter is a contingent interest, which becomes vested upon condition broken. Upon entry the grantor or his heir is remitted to his former estate, and the reversion, of course, becomes merged into the fee.
I see no reason of public policy why the statute should exclude a possibility of reverter, with its contingent right of entry, from the power of testamentary disposition; but a very strong reason why it should be included. In England, the home of the common law, the rule of primogeniture made the entry of the heir a very simple matter, as there was practically but one heir; but here, it is different. Determinable fees may last for a very long time, and the grantor may have a large number of descendants scattered over the country. Must 1 hey all enter upon condition broken, or can one enter for all and hold as tenant in common ? These are questions difficult of solution and inconvenient of application, which may be avoided by testamentary disposition.
I am, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the possibility of reverter could have been devised by either the grantor or *15bis daughter, Pattie; but, whether it can. be brought within the terms of the will of the latter, is a different question. I am not prepared to say that a person “may die seized and possessed” of a possibility of reverter. If it did not pass by Pat-tie’s will, it went to Walter as Pattie’s heir, and was by his deed conveyed to the plaintiff. I am thus brought to the conclusion of the Court.