Court Opinion

ID: 9796937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:08:39.37254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:49.200663
License: Public Domain

Judge PICCONE
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that pursuant to § 19-2-517(l)(a)(IV), C.R.S. 2005, so long as the juvenile is fourteen years old at the time he or she is charged in district court, the juvenile’s age at the time the offense was committed does not matter. In my view, the juvenile must be at least fourteen years old at the time the offense is committed before the district attorney has the discretion to file the charge in district court. The majority’s interpretation is contrary to the objective sought to be achieved by the legislation and leads to an unreasonable result.
The majority recognizes the statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Our goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. We must presume that the General Assembly intends a just and *899reasonable result. We will not follow a statutory construction that either defeats legislative intent or leads to an unreasonable result. People v. Trujillo, 983 P.2d 124 (Colo.App.1999).
To determine legislative intent, we first look to the language of the statute, giving the words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986); Trujillo, supra. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted as written, without resort to interpretive rules and statutory construction. People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234 (Colo.1994); see also Trujillo, supra. “If, however, the statutory language lends itself to alternative constructions and its intended scope is unclear, a court may apply other rules of statutory construction .to determine which alternative construction is in accordance with the objective sought to be achieved by the legislation.” Trujillo, supra, 983 P.2d at 126; see also People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo.1990).
A court may also consider the consequences of a particular construction and the legislative policy declaration at the outset of the legislation to determine legislative intent. Trujillo, supra; see § 2 — 4—203(l)(d)—(e), C.R.S.2005.
The Children’s Code was designed to benefit youthful offenders and should not be construed to diminish their rights. C.C.C. v. Dist. Court, 188 Colo. 437, 535 P.2d 1117 (1975).
[T]he intent of [the Code] is to protect, restore, and improve the public safety by creating a system of juvenile justice that will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law .... The general assembly further finds that, while holding paramount the public safety, the juvenile justice system shall take into consideration the best interests of the juvenile ... in providing appropriate treatment to reduce the rate of recidivism in the juvenile justice system and to assist the juvenile in becoming a productive member of society.
Section 19-2-102(1), C.R.S.2005.
One of the fundamental differences between the juvenile system of justice and an adult criminal prosecution “is the overriding goal of the Children’s Code to provide guidance and rehabilitation of an adjudicated delinquent child in a manner consistent with the best interest of the child and the protection of society rather than fixing criminal responsibility, guilt, and punishment.”
People v. J.J.H., 17 P.3d 159, 163 (Colo.2001) (quoting S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86, 91 (Colo.1988)); see People in Interest of M.C., 750 P.2d 69, 70 (Colo.App.1987)(“The Children’s Code’s, sole emphasis is on rehabilitating children, assisting them in becoming responsible and productive members of society, and preventing them, while at an impressionable and vulnerable age, from becoming criminals.”), aff'd, 774 P.2d 857 (Colo.1989).
As pertinent here, § 19-2-517(l)(a), C.R.S. 2005, states:
A juvenile may be charged by the direct filing of an information in the district court or by indictment only when: ...
(IV) The juvenile is fourteen years of age or older, has allegedly committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony, and has previously been subject to proceedings in district court as a result of a direct filing pursuant to this section or a transfer pursuant to section 19-2-518 ....
Thus, § 19-2-5l7(l)(a)(IV) provides that if certain conditions are met, a juvenile can only be charged in district court if the juvenile is fourteen years old or older and has committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony. The statute’s two most obvious and basic limitations are the offender’s age— fourteen — and the nature of the offense — a felony.
The majority’s interpretation focuses on the word “charged” and concludes that the absence of language requiring that the juvenile be fourteen when the offense was committed gives the district attorney discretion to wait to file the charge until the juvenile turns fourteen. Section 19-2-517(l)(a)(IV), however, focuses on the conduct of the juvenile and requires that the juvenile be fourteen years old and have committed a delinquent act. The statute by its very terms requires that the offense be committed when the juvenile is fourteen years of age or older, and has allegedly committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony, and has previously *900been subject to proceedings in district court. The statute does not suggest that the delinquent act can be committed before the juvenile turns fourteen.
Colorado case law and the Children’s Code support this interpretation.
First, in People v. Trujillo, supra, the defendant argued that pursuant to § 19-2-517(l)(a)(III), C.R.S.2005, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the People did not file the information within two years of his previous adjudication. The division held that the required two-year period was to be measured from the date of the previous adjudication to the date of the juvenile’s current offenses. The division stated:
Focusing on the defendant’s conduct is consistent with the legislative purpose of encouraging juveniles to reform their behavior and to become productive members of society. Defendant’s interpretation of the statute focuses on the People’s conduct, rather than on the juvenile’s conduct, and would result in there being different consequences for a juvenile’s conduct depending upon the date the People file the information.
Trujillo, supra, 983 P.2d at 126.
Thus, the focus must be on the conduct of the juvenile, not on the date of the indictment or information. Any other interpretation would authorize different consequences for a juvenile’s conduct depending on the date the prosecution files the information. For example, if the date of the indictment or information is controlling, a child who commits an offense at age eleven could be charged as an adult by direct filing in district court merely because the information or indictment is filed when he or she turns fourteen. Under the majority’s interpretation, the delinquent act turns into an alleged felo^ ny merely because of the lapse of time. Likewise, the district court acquires jurisdiction merely because of the lapse of time.
Second, the juvenile court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over juveniles from ten years to eighteen years of age who have violated state law. Section 19-2-104(l)(a), C.R.S.2005; see §§ 19-1-103(18), (68) & 19-2-103(10), C.R.S.2005. The juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction yields to the jurisdiction of the district court only in certain limited circumstances. See §§ 19-1-104, 19-2-517,19-2-518, C.R.S.2005.
In People in Interest of M.C., supra, the defendant asserted that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction because although he was seventeen years old at the time of the offense, he turned eighteen before the dispo-sitional hearing. The division held that “[t]he age at which the acts were committed is the determinative factor [for jurisdiction], not the age at which disposition was imposed.” M.C., supra, 750 P.2d at 70.
Further, § 19-2-104(6), C.R.S.2005, states that the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction until the statute of limitations applicable to any offense that may be charged has run, regardless of whether the juvenile has attained the age of eighteen years and regardless of the age of such person. In conferring jurisdiction on the juvenile court, the statute expressly focuses on the age at the time the offense was committed. Thus, the date the offense is committed is determinative to invoke the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Third, the purpose of the Code is defeated if prosecutors charged with the execution of the law may defer action until the child turns fourteen. The majority’s interpretation would authorize different consequences for a juvenile’s conduct, depending upon the date the prosecution files the information.
In enacting the direct filing statute, the General Assembly authorized prosecutors to treat juvenile offenders meeting certain criteria as adults and thereby subject them to adult penalties. It strictly limited the circumstances in which a juvenile may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the district court. The most basic limitation set forth by the legislature is the age of the offender. A juvenile who commits an offense before his or her fourteenth birthday is only subject to prosecution in the district court in extremely limited circumstances as set forth in § 19-2-518, the “transfer” statute, which states in pertinent part:
(l)(a) The juvenile court may enter an order certifying a juvenile to be held for criminal proceedings in the district court if:
*901(I) A petition filed in juvenile court alleges the juvenile is:
(A) Twelve or thirteen years of age and is a juvenile delinquent by virtue of having committed a delinquent act that constitutes a class 1 or class 2 felony or a crime of violence, as defined in section 18-1.3-406, C.R.S.; or
(B) Fourteen years of age or older and is a juvenile delinquent by virtue of having committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony; and
(II) After investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court finds it would be contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of the public to retain jurisdiction.
Thus, a juvenile who commits an offense at thirteen years of age is only subject to prosecution in district court if he or she is alleged to have committed a delinquent act that constitutes a class 1 or class 2 felony, and only if, after an investigation and hearing, the juvenile court determines it is contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of the public to retain jurisdiction.
This statute must be read in conjunction with §§ 19-2-104 and 19-2-517, resulting in a coherent allocation of jurisdiction based on the age of the child at the time of the offense:
• Children who commit offenses before they turn ten years old are presumed incapable of a delinquent act and are immune from proceedings in either the juvenile court or the district court.
• Children who commit offenses when they are over the age of ten but younger than the age of twelve are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
• Children who commit offenses when they are over the age of twelve but younger than the age of fourteen are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court except when they commit a delinquent act that constitutes a class 1 or class 2 felony or a crime of violence. In such limited cases, the juvenile court may certify the juvenile for proceedings in the district court but only after a full investigation and hearing.
• Children over the age of fourteen who commit felony offenses may be subject to the jurisdiction of the district court through judicial transfer.
• Children over the age of fourteen who commit felony offenses also may be subject to the jurisdiction of the district court through prosecutorial direct filing, but only when they meet all the statutory prerequisites.
Thus, the offender’s age at the time of the offense is decisive, not the age when proceedings are commenced.
Accordingly, in my view, § 19-2-517 utilizes age and offense criteria to limit prosecu-torial discretion to direct file in the district court.
Finally, an interpretation that focuses on the age of the child at the time of the offense also is supported by the legislative declaration in the Children’s Code that the juvenile justice system shall take into consideration the best interests of the child and the state and the interest in reducing recidivism and assisting juveniles in becoming productive members of society. Although the majority’s opinion focuses on the goal of public safety, it ignores the declaration that the juvenile justice system shall consider the best interests of the child and the interest in reducing recidivism and assisting juveniles in becoming productive members of society.