Court Opinion

ID: 9710654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:14:09.589168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:58.793062
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Staton, P.J.
I dissent. The purpose of the motion in limine has been exceeded by the trial court’s order which granted Blacketor’s motion in limine.1 A fair trial has been denied. A motion in limine should be granted to¡ exclude prejudicial matter which has no bearing on the issues or the rights of the parties. Burrus v. Silhavy (1973), 155 Ind. *229App. 558, 293 N.E.2d 794.2 A twenty-mile an hour speed limit sign near the scene of a collision between a motorist and a twelve year old girl on a bicycle bears on the issue of Blacketor’s negligence when he exceeded the posted speed. See Mazon v. Druxman (1966), 68 Wash. 2d 701, 415 P.2d 86. Evidence regarding the presence of the speed limit sign should not have been excluded by a motion in limine. Legal placement of the sign at the scene and negligence per se is a different matter which may be properly reached by a motion in limine.3 The *230trial court’s judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted.
*229‘The purpose in filing a motion in limine to suppress evidence or to instruct opposing counsel not to offer it is to prevent the asking of prejudicial questions and the making of prejudicial statements in the presence of the jury with respect to matters which have no proper bearing on the issues in the case or on the rights of the parties to the suit. It is the prejudicial effect of the questions asked or statements made in connection with the offer of the evidence, not the prejudicial effect of the evidence itself, which the motion in limine is intended to reach. . . .’
“Its effect has been to shorten the trial, simplify the issues and reduce the possibilities of a mistrial.” 293 N.E.2d at 796-97 (footnote omitted).
*230The majority’s rationale that a traffic sign must warn of a specific hazard to qualify as a warning to motorists is not supported by reason or authority. A speed limit sign which reduces a previously authorized speed is a warning to a motorist that to exceed the posted speed is a hazard. The hazard need not be specific. A hazardous condition is implicit — congested traffic condition, heavy pedestrial traffic, business district, dangerous intersections or numerous intersection, a residential area, a recreational park is near, a playground, a hospital with emergency traffic is near, a school area is ahead, a construction area with heavy oversized trucks is ahead, condition of the road is unsafe at greater speeds, and many more. A speed limit sign which reduces a previously authorized speed warns the motorist that he must reduce his speed so that he will have sufficient reaction time to avoid a variety of hazards. A separate sign listing each possible hazard at a greater speed is both unnecessary and unreasonable. Whether a sign is a yellow caution light, a *231fixed slow sign or a reduce speed sign, all implicitly warn the motorist of a hazardous condition which may require some alteration in the operation of his vehicle. Even the “yield” sign in Geisking v. Sheimo (1960), 252 Iowa 37, 105 N.W.2d 599, 2 A.L.R.3d 268, did not warn of a specific hazard. Indeed, there may not be any hazard of converging traffic at all. The “yield” sign is merely a warning to slow down and be on the lookout for traffic which may be traveling across the road. It does not specify the number of intersecting roads, the type or density of traffic. To require a warning of a specific hazard is not only unreasonable but unsupported by the weight of authority.
Blacketor’s negligence was an issue in this cause. The speed limit sign which reduced the previously authorized speed bears on the issue of Blacketor’s negligence when he exceeded that speed and struck twelve year old Dawn Enyart who was riding a bicycle. The evidence that a speed limit sign was at the scene should not have been excluded by the trial court. Its exclusion by a motion in limine denied a fair trial of all the issues to Dawn Enyart. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed, and this cause should be remanded for a new trial.
Note. — Reported at 342 N.E.2d 654.

. The court granted defendant’s “Motion for Protective Order” by its order entered June 11, 1973, that:
“It is now ordered and adjudged that the defendant’s motion be granted and the plaintiffs are now directed to offer no evidence in the trial of this cause as to whether or not signs were in place on or adjacent to 46th Street in the City of Rochester, Indiana, between Indiana and Ohio Streets, or in proximity thereto on July 11, 1968, or whether after said date such signs were removed, which said signs designated 4th Street at said location as an area where the maximum . permissive speed was 20 miles per hour for vehicular traffic on said 4th Street, without first proving on July 11, 1968, a valid ordinance of the City of Rochester, Indiana, was in effect, which ordinance was based upon an engineer and traffic investigation and which ordinance reduced the prima facie speed limit permitted by statute from a miximum [sic] of 30 miles per hour to a maximum of 20 miles per hour at said location.”

. “. . . Its purpose has been succinctly expressed in Bridges v. City of Richardson (1962), 163 Tex. 292, 354 S.W.2d 366, 367:

. The trial court’s order and the majority’s rationale take the position that signs erected without statutory compliance have no legal effect whatever, and no one is required to pay any attention to such signs. But see Cook v. Hunter (1935), 52 Ohio App. 354, 357, 3 N.E.2d 680, 682. In Hoover v. Blackmore (1949), 87 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Mun. Ct. of Dayton, Ohio 1949), the Court stated:
“Unauthorized ‘courtesy’ traffic controls, if clearly visible, require operators of vehicles to take such factor into consideration in exercising ordinary care under the circumstances. Mere failure to stop is not, and cannot be, negligence ‘per se’, however, if the sign is visible from an approaching vehicle, that fact may be considered by the judge or jury just as in any other case involving the exercise of ordinary care.”
In Geisking v. Sheimo (1960), 252 Iowa 37, 41, 105 N.W.2d 599, 601, the Court stated:
“But the great weight of authority is that even an unauthorized sign is not meaningless when questions of negligence are under consideration. We agree with the rule stated in 164 A.L.R., at page 216, under the heading ‘Anno — Traffic Control at Street Intersection’. It is there said:
‘Furthermore, many courts take the view that even if it is shown that the traffic signal involved was not property authorized, it is still effective to control the question of the negligence or contributory negligence of a pedestrian or vehicle driver who disregards it, at least to the extent that such disregard may be taken into consideration by the trier of the facts as one of the circumstances to *230be passed upon, in determining the question of a violator’s negligence or contributory negligence.’
“Numerous authorities are cited in support.”
In Mazon v. Druxman (1966), 68 Wash.2d 701, 415 P.2d 86, the trial court had instructed the jury that the maximum lawful speed limit at the scene of the accident was 15 m.p.h., even though there was no evidence that the speed limit had been reduced from 25 m.p.h. by proper municipal action. Defendant admitted that he knew of the presence of the 15 m.p.h. sign. The Washington Supreme Court approved the instruction and noted:
“In fact, many courts take the view that even if it is shown that the traffic signal was not properly authorized, it is still effective to control the question of the negligence or contributory negligence of a vehicle driver who disregards it.” 415 P.2d at 88, citing Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 180,290 (1965).
The court further noted:
“Travelers upon public highways are not expected to first ascertain and determine whether such signs are established in strict compliance with law before respecting them.” 415 P.2d at 88, quoting from Comfort v. Penner (1932), 166 Wash. 177, 6 P.2d 604.
See also, e.g., King v. Gold (1937), 224 Iowa 890, 276 N.W. 774; Mathias v. Eichelberger (1935), 182 Wash. 185, 45 P.2d 619; Warner v. Ambrose (1958), 53 Wash.2d 231, 332 P.2d 941.