Court Opinion

ID: 9576451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:24:27.696739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:28.102923
License: Public Domain

Young, J.,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent. I conclude that three aggravating circumstances provided to the jury at the first penalty hearing were improper and therefore I cannot join in the majority opinion affirming the sentence.
Preliminarily, I note that, because the jury was improperly instructed during the first penalty hearing, appellant must be afforded a new penalty hearing. The second penalty hearing before the three-judge panel did not serve to cure the errors. Appellant correctly argues that, if the jury had been properly instructed, the jury may have been able to sentence appellant and the matter may not have proceeded to the three-judge panel. Thus, I conclude that the errors at the first penalty hearing before the jury require a new penalty hearing before a jury.
Jury Instruction No. 46 contained the State’s alleged aggravating circumstances. Aggravating Circumstance No. 1 stated “[t]he murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, to wit: Robbery.” In support of this aggravating circumstance, the State offered an April 1980 robbery conviction. At the second penalty hearing before the three-judge panel, it became clear that the robbery conviction had expired on July 18, 1987. Therefore, the instruction was incorrect because appellant was not under imprisonment for robbery when he killed Mrs. Oretha Hames. Hence, Aggravating Circumstance No. 1 had no basis in fact and was improperly presented to and considered by the jury. We have previously held that a penalty phase was flawed by reversible error where a jury found aggravating circumstances with no basis in fact. Jimenez v. State, 105 Nev. 337, 343, 775 P.2d 694, 698 (1989) (Jimenez I).
Aggravating Circumstance No. 3 in Jury Instruction No. 46 stated that “[t]he murder was committed while the person was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit any sexual assault.” Appellant correctly contends that the aggravating circumstance is unsupported by the evidence because, although appellant did commit a sexual assault, he did not kill the sexual assault victim. Rather, he killed someone else, whom he did not sexually assault. No evidence was presented at trial to suggest that appellant killed Oretha during the commission of, or during *974the attempt of the commission of, the sexual assault against Vanita.
Moreover, I conclude that construing NRS 200.033(4),1 strictly in favor of the accused and construing the words in their usual and ordinary sense, allows for the aggravating circumstance only when the victim of sexual assault is also the murder victim. McKay v. Board of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (words in a statute will be given their plain meaning unless this would violate the spirit of the act); Demosthenes v. Williams, 97 Nev. 611, 614, 637 P.2d 1203, 1204 (1981) (a penal statute should be construed in favor of the accused). Therefore, the district court erred in giving Aggravating Circumstance No. 3 in Jury Instruction No. 46 to the jury.
I turn now to the depravity of mind aggravating circumstance in Jury Instruction No. 46 and attendant Jury Instruction No. 47, defining depravity of mind. I conclude that instruction No. 46 was improperly given. We have recently stated that “we construe the instruction and the statute (NRS 200.033(8)) upon which it is based as requiring torture, mutilation or other serious and depraved physical abuse beyond the act of killing itself, as a qualifying requirement to an aggravating circumstance based in part upon depravity of mind.” Robins v. State, 106 Nev. 611, 629, 798 P.2d 558, 570 (1990). Accord Jimenez v. State, 106 Nev. 769, 801 P.2d 1366 (1990) (Jimenez II). In this case, no instruction regarding torture, mutilation or other serious and depraved physical abuse beyond the act of killing itself was provided to die jury; only the depravity of mind instruction was given. Therefore, the depravity of mind instruction was erroneous pursuant to our recent decisions in Robins and Jimenez II.
The majority’s conclusion that the depravity of mind aggravating circumstance is harmless error is mistaken. While I maintain that two other aggravating circumstances were erroneously supplied to the jury, the fact remains that, had the jury not received even one erroneous aggravating circumstance, it might have been able to sentence appellant and the three-judge panel would not have been appointed. I am most reluctant to conclude that the error is harmless when the stakes are a person’s life.
Lastly, I wish to remark on the constitutionality of NRS 175.556 and NRS 175.558. NRS 175.556 provides for the *975appointment of a three-judge panel to sentence a defendant convicted of first degree murder when the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict.2 Similarly, NRS 175.558 provides for the appointment of a three-judge sentencing panel when a defendant pleads guilty to first degree murder.
We have previously upheld NRS 175.556 as constitutional. Hill v. State, 102 Nev. 377, 724 P.2d 734 (1986). Accord Baal v. State, 106 Nev. 69, 787 P.2d 391 (1990). I have since informally researched the cases decided by this court or pending before this court since the enactment of the statutes in which a three-judge panel was appointed following a guilty plea or a split jury. It is an extreme rarity for a three-judge panel to deliver a sentence other than death. A three-judge panel sentenced the defendant to death in eighty-nine percent of the cases. Only eleven percent of the cases resulted in a sentence of life with or life without the possibility of parole. These statistics are illustrated by the following chart.

CASE NAME CITE/CASE#/YR. PLEA/ SPLIT JURY SENTENCE

1. PAINE 21983 Guilty Plea Death
2. JONES 21796 Guilty Plea Death
3. REDMEN 21729 Split Jury Death
4. BEETS 107 Nev 957 (1991) Split Jury Death
5. KIRKSEY 107 Nev 499 (1991) Guilty Plea Death
6. BAAL 106 Nev 69 (1990) Guilty Plea Death
7. FLANAGAN I 105 Nev 135 (1989) Guilty Plea Death
8. FLANAGAN II 105 Nev. 135 (1989) Guilty Plea Death
9. WILLIAMS 103 Nev 227 (1987) Guilty Plea Death
10. MORAN I 103 Nev 138 (1987) Guilty Plea Death
11. MORAN II 103 Nev 138 (1987) Guilty Plea Death
12. HILL 102 Nev 377 (1986) Split Jury Death
13. COLE 101 Nev 585 (1985) Guilty Plea Death
14. WILSON 101 Nev 452 (1985) Guilty Plea Death
15. OLAUSEN 101 Nev. 452 (1985) Guilty Plea Death
16. FARMER 101 Nev 419 (1985) Guilty Plea Death
17. MERCADO 100 Nev 535 (1984) Split Jury Life Without
18. PRICE 100 Nev 535 (1984) Split Jury Life With
19. BISHOP 95 Nev 511 (1979) Guilty Plea Death
Given these dire statistical odds, I have no alternative but to *976conclude that our present sentencing procedures fail to meet constitutional standards as established by the United States Supreme Court.
The Court has stated: “In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, the Court held that the penalty of death may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1979). Further, the Court has stated that “[a] capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” Id. at 427 (citations omitted).
Nevada has a system of elected judges. If recent campaigns are an indication, any laxity toward a defendant in a homicide case would be considered a serious, if not fatal, campaign liability. With sixty-one people on death row, Nevada has the highest per capita number of inmates under sentence of death of any state. Candidates, almost without exception, seek to be known for their tough stances on crime. A three-judge panel statistically imposes the death penalty with far greater frequency than a jury.3 If through the element of caprice, the jury is unable to reach a decision in the penalty phase and determination of the penalty in a death case is given to a three-judge panel, the outcome is fairly predictable. This portion of Nevada’s capital sentencing scheme, therefore, fails to distinguish cases in which the death penalty is imposed from those in which it is not.
Furthermore, Nevada and Indiana are the only jurisdictions in which a defendant may be sentenced to death by a judge after a jury is unable to unanimously sentence the defendant.4 In all other jurisdictions in which the jury sentences the defendant, after the jury is unable to reach a unanimous sentence, the judge must sentence the defendant to life without the possibility of parole.5 In *977four jurisdictions, the court alone imposes the sentence and, in three jurisdictions, the judge may override a jury’s recommendation of life.6 Because in all but one other jurisdiction a defendant is sentenced to life without the possibility of parole after a jury is split, I am further persuaded that NRS 175.556 is probably not constitutional.
As far as the constitutionality of NRS 175.558 providing for sentencing by a three-judge panel following a guilty plea, I conclude that it is similarly infirm. While other jurisdictions with capital sentencing procedures provide for sentencing by a judge or a panel of judges after a guilty plea, more than half of the jurisdictions extend the defendant’s right to be sentenced by a jury after the entry of a guilty plea.7 While I do not deny that such *978procedural schemes could pass constitutional muster in other jurisdictions, I remain unconvinced that allowing a three-judge panel to sentence a defendant following a guilty plea is constitutional in Nevada in light of the statistical odds of receiving death from the panel in Nevada.8 Thus, I conclude that NRS 175.558 is of doubtful constitutionality.
Moreover, returning to the case at bar, the erroneous aggravating circumstances supplied to the jury may well have been the determinant factor in the jury’s inability to sentence the appellant. Because of these erroneous instructions, therefore, appellant was then required to be sentenced by a three-judge panel which almost assuredly would sentence him to death. I am mindful that the appellant’s acts in this case were particularly reprehensible. However, Justice Hugo Black appropriately wrote: “Bad men, like good men, are entitled to be tried and sentenced in accordance with law . . . .” Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 309-310 (1961). The sentencing procedures utilized in this case were not in accordance with law because they contained a substantial risk that the punishment would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
In sum, I believe the three aggravating circumstances given to the jury were erroneous and require a new penalty hearing. I dissent because I cannot join the majority in afiirming the sentence when the jury received these erroneous instructions and when the sentencing procedures used were of dubious constitutionality.

NRS 200.033(4) authorizes an aggravating circumstance for murder committed in the perpetration of sexual assault. It states in pertinent part:
The murder was committed while the person was engaged, alone or with others, in the-commission of or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson in the first degree, burglary, invasion of the home or kidnaping in the first degree ....

NRS 175.556 states:
If a jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict upon the sentence to be imposed, the supreme court shall appoint two district judges from judicial districts other than the district in which the plea is made, who shall with the district judge who conducted the trial, or his successor in office, conduct the required penalty hearing to determine the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and give sentence accordingly. A sentence of death may be given only by unanimous vote of the three judges, but any other sentence may be given by the vote of a majority.

The Clark County Public Defender’s Office advises the court that, since July of 1988, seven defendants were represented before a three-judge panel and one-hundred percent of the defendants received a sentence of death. In contrast, defendants appearing before a jury received a sentence of death in only forty-five percent of the cases.

Moreover, Indiana is one of the three states in which the judge may override the jury’s sentence. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1990); Ala. Code § 13A-5-46 (1982); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (West 1985). Therefore, although Indiana is teamed with Nevada in defaulting to a judge when the jury is split, the jury’s sentence remains only a recommendation even when it is unanimous.

See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-4-603(c) (1977 and Supp. 1987); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.4 (West 1988); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-103 (1986); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a (1991); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 4209 (1987); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-31 (1990); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 9-1 (West Supp. 1991); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.025 (1990); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. *977905.8 (West Supp. 1991); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413 (1988); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 279, § 70 (Supp. 1991); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1990); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030 (West Supp. 1991); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630.5 (Supp. 1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:ll-3(c) (West Supp. 1991); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-3 (1990); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000 (1988); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.03 (1987); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1991); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150 (1989); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711 (West 1982); S.C. Code § 16-3-20 (Supp. 1990); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 23A-27A-4 (1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203 (Supp. 1990); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1991); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1990); Va. Code § 19.2-264.4 (1990); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.080 (West 1990); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-102 (1988).

See note 4 supra.

Sixty-two percent of the jurisdictions provide that a defendant will he sentenced by a jury after a guilty plea unless the defendant waives the right. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-4-103 and § 5-4-601 — 5-4-609 (1977); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.4 (West 1988); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 4209 (1987); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 9-1 (West Supp. 1991); Ky. Rules Ann. CR 9.84 (1990); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 557 (West Supp. 1991); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413 (1988); Ann. Laws Mass. GL,.ch. 263, § 6 (1980) and ch. 279, § 70 (Supp. 1991); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1990); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630.5 (Supp. 1990); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-1 (1990); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2001 (1988); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150 (1989); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711 (West 1982); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-205 (Supp. 1990); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1991); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1990); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.050 (West 1990).
Thirty-eight percent provide for sentencing by a judge or a panel of judges following a plea of guilty. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-103 (1986); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a (1991); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-32 (1990); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.006 and § 565.030 (West Supp. 1991); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(c) (West Supp. 1991); Ohio Rules of Crim. Proc. CR 11 (1987); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (West Supp. 1991); S.C. Code § 16-3-20 (Supp. 1990); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 23A-27A-4 and § 23A-27A-6 (1979); Va. Code § 19.2-257 (1990); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-102 (1988).
Additionally, of the remaining jurisdictions which impose the death penalty, out of the three which provide for a judicial override of the jury’s recommended sentence, two provide for sentencing by a jury after a guilty plea. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (West 1985); Ala. Code §§ 13A-5-42— *97813A-5-53 (1982). In Indiana, the third judicial override jurisdiction, the court sentences the defendant following a guilty plea. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(d) (Supp. 1990).

The United States Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to be sentenced by a jury. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). In Spaziano, a Florida judge overrode the jury’s recommendation of life and sentenced the defendant to death. The Supreme Court upheld Florida’s sentencing scheme as constitutional. Id. at 466.
While there is no constitutional right to be sentenced by a jury, there is a constitutional right to be fairly sentenced. I dissent in the instant case because I believe our sentencing procedures are probably unconstitutionally applied. I do not believe that our sentencing scheme is unconstitutional on its face. If the three-judge panel did not sentence a defendant to death in virtually all of the cases, I could confidently assert that the scheme is constitutional. However, this unfortunately is not the case.
It would thus appear that although the Florida sentencing scheme is constitutional on its face, a similar as applied challenge could be made if in Florida the judges always overrode a jury’s recommendation of life and sentenced the defendant to death.