Court Opinion

ID: 9901425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 19:02:18.468902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.584655
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/21/23 P. v. Dwyer CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096721

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 16FE013953)

           v.

 MICHAEL DWYER,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Michael Dwyer assaulted his then-wife, bound her, put her in the trunk
of her car, drove her to another location, and then violently interrogated her. After he
took some pills and lost consciousness, his wife was able to escape and call 911. Shortly
after, while in the presence of the police, defendant took his wife’s car and fled the scene
until he crashed her vehicle following a police chase.

                                                             1
       The trial court held two competency hearings, and following each, found
defendant competent to stand trial. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of, among
other offenses, kidnapping during a carjacking under Penal Code1 section 209.5.
       Defendant makes two arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court’s competency
finding lacked substantial evidence; and (2) the conviction for kidnapping during a
carjacking lacked substantial evidence. We affirm the trial court’s competency finding
but reverse the conviction for kidnapping during a carjacking, because there was no
evidence defendant committed the kidnapping with the specific intent to facilitate the
carjacking as required by section 209.5.
                                     BACKGROUND
       Defendant was charged with kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), corporal injury
(§ 273.5), evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), kidnapping during a
carjacking (§ 209.5, subd. (a)), criminal threats (§ 422), and driving under the influence
of drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f)).
   A. First competency hearing
       On May 7, 2019, the trial court appointed Dr. Eugene Roeder, a psychologist, to
determine whether defendant was mentally competent to stand trial. The trial court held
a court trial on defendant’s competency on November 18, 2019.
       At the hearing, Dr. Martin Williams, a psychologist, testified for the defense.
Dr. Williams met with defendant in person for one to two hours and concluded defendant
was not psychotic and had adequate knowledge of courtroom procedures, understood his
status as a criminal defendant, knew the charges against him, and understood the possible
sentence he faced. However, defendant had memory issues. He did not remember
anything about his alleged crimes, had short-term memory impairment, and would

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                             2
unknowingly mask or hide the impairment by unintentionally acting as if an inaccurate
memory was accurate. In Dr. Williams’s opinion, this was a “big concern” for
competency to stand trial as defendant “could not accurately follow the proceedings and
he wouldn’t make that clear” to his attorney. So, “the trial would probably go the same
whether [defendant] was present or not based on his inability to properly assist” his
counsel.
       The defense also called Marsha Whiten, defendant’s current wife who lived and
worked with defendant. She testified she had been living with him for about a year and
had seen several instances of his poor memory.
       The prosecutor called Dr. Roeder, who testified defendant had difficulties with his
memory. He said defendant had no recollection of the events underlying his case and
presented some “significant memory deficits.” But defendant was able to answer
questions about courtroom procedures and he understood he was facing felony charges
and serious potential consequences, so Dr. Roeder felt defendant met “the basic criteria
for the understanding prong of trial competence.” Defendant also told Dr. Roeder he had
fired two previous attorneys because he “just didn’t feel like they were quite enough in
talking with him about his defense.” Defendant also expressed frustration with his
medical provider and efforts to seek a transfer to another hospital.
       Dr. Roeder concluded that, despite defendant’s inability to remember the relevant
events and other memory issues, he was “cognitively able to corroborate and assist” his
attorney in present time because defendant demonstrated the ability to do so during his
initial evaluation.
       Defendant hired Dr. Roeder to reevaluate him and so he met with defendant again
for another hour a few months after their initial meeting. Dr. Roeder did not change his
fundamental opinion of defendant’s understanding of the criminal proceedings and
competence after the second meeting.

                                             3
       The prosecutor also called Dr. David Konczal, defendant’s psychiatrist who met
with defendant six to eight times. Dr. Konczal tested defendant twice for cognitive
deficiencies and defendant scored at normal levels. Dr. Konczal did not diagnose
defendant with dementia, found “[i]t seems like the memory was intact as well,” and
testified he had not seen any test showing defendant had memory issues.
       On December 3, 2019, the court found that, although defendant was “suffering
from some cognitive issues,” the evidence showed defendant “can hold a logical
conversation and can consult with others.” This conclusion was based on defendant
communicating his frustrations with his medical provider and desire to receive a referral
for better treatment. Defendant also expressed dissatisfaction with his prior attorneys and
stated he was happy with his current attorney. The court also noted “amnesia and not
remembering the event doesn’t get you there. The issue is, can he hold a logical
conversation in consulting with counsel with a rational degree of understanding.” The
court found the defense had “not overcome the presumption of competency by a
preponderance of the evidence. And, therefore, I do find that the defendant is competent
to stand trial. And, as a result, criminal proceedings will be reinstated.”
   B. Second competency request
       On August 19, 2020, defense counsel filed a motion for a second competency
hearing, asking the court to review information indicating defendant might have
experienced a prior traumatic injury.
       On November 9, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the motion and defendant’s
counsel argued he needed to gather more information on defendant’s potential traumatic
brain injury because it could have impacted the doctors’ opinions. The court denied the
motion, finding a brain scan could not show a change of circumstances, but at most
“show more detail of his condition,” and “the scan and the diagnosis do not appear to cast
serious doubt on the prior findings of competence at this time, because they don’t offer a
serious challenge to the prior doctors’ reports showing how defendant’s brain issues were

                                              4
affecting his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings or assist counsel in his
defense.” The trial court denied the motion for a second competency trial, but also stated
“there’s nothing in the law to prevent the defense from bringing this motion again should
they develop that evidence.”
   C. Marsden hearing
       On May 3, 2022, the trial court held a Marsden2 hearing and discussed
defendant’s opinion of his counsel. Among other grievances, defendant told the court he
thought “somebody is watching me, they must be trying to gather evidence.” This was
based in part on cameras in his house being re-registered to a username indicating
“district attorney” but with his current wife’s e-mail address. Defendant told the court
this was evidence the district attorney was trying to gather evidence against him, and his
attorney “dismissed” these concerns. Defendant also complained about the plea
negotiation process, saying he e-mailed his previous attorney “some things that I thought
were pertinent to the case and I never got a response.” He did not find out for some time
that he had a new attorney.
       Defendant also complained his attorney was not meeting with him enough and
would appear on defendant’s behalf without his consent. He then expressed concern
about the police confiscating his computer because he allegedly had evidence indicating
some Oakland Police were potentially protecting human trafficking organizations.
Defendant’s counsel advised the court he originally did not think he could challenge
defendant’s competency because “obviously if you know what’s going on in the case and
giving me arguments, I can’t . . . [section] 1368 you.”
   The trial court denied the Marsden motion.

2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

                                              5
   D. Trial
       The victim, C.D., testified she was married to, but not living with, defendant on
July 15, 2016. On that day, she opened her garage to leave in her car when defendant
rushed inside. She backed up to try and figure out what he wanted but he grabbed her
hair, hit her in the head, and she fell over. The next thing she remembered was being in
her bedroom on her knees with her hands taped in front of her and her mouth taped shut.
Defendant then walked C.D. downstairs to the garage, pulled things out of her trunk, and
told her to get in the trunk. C.D. repeatedly said “no” but eventually relented. C.D. did
not remember defendant ever driving her car before as they each had their own cars, and
she had not given him permission that day to drive her car. C.D. was “scared to death”
and, although defendant had taken her phone, she was able to call for help from inside the
trunk by using her watch.
       The car eventually stopped, and defendant opened the trunk. C.D. noticed she was
in defendant’s sister’s garage in Elk Grove, where he also lived, about six miles from
C.D.’s house. Defendant walked C.D. upstairs, zip-tied her hands behind her and her legs
together, placed her in the tub, and then began “waterboarding” her by putting a
washcloth over her face and pouring water over her face. He asked C.D. who she was
sleeping with because he thought she was cheating.
       C.D. complained she was losing feeling in her hands, so defendant sat her up and
untied her hands. Defendant then swallowed some pills. He said, “they were going to
find both of us,” put a grocery bag over his head, got down on the floor, and eventually
stopped moving. C.D. was able to escape while defendant was motionless, and she ran
out of the house to call police. When officers arrived, defendant pulled out of the garage
in C.D.’s car and drove away.
       C.D.’s 911 call was played for the jury. On it, C.D. explained what happened and
said, “He told his sister to go away [from the house] so he could talk to me.” Defendant

                                             6
had told C.D. this during the kidnapping. The parties also stipulated defendant’s sister
told police defendant asked her to leave because he was bringing C.D. over to talk to her.
       Officers testified they found C.D. upset outside of the house. One officer then
followed defendant until he crashed C.D.’s car. Defendant was found in the car
unconscious. Defendant testified he had no memory of these events and that his first
related memory was waking up in the hospital.
       As will be discussed later, the jury instruction for the kidnapping during a
carjacking charge included as one of the elements: “The defendant moved or caused the
other person to move with the intent to facilitate the carjacking or to help himself escape
or to prevent the other person from sounding an alarm.” During closing argument, the
prosecutor asserted this element was met because defendant “was going to do what he
needed to do to take her car. And taking her, moving her, helped him to both continue to
keep her car and to help him get away. [¶] . . . [¶] [H]e had already kidnapped her when
he took her to her room. But that wasn’t enough for him. . . . He was stealing that car,
and he was using everything in his power to take her and that car.”
       The jury found defendant guilty of all charges except for driving under the
influence of drugs. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of seven
years to life for the kidnapping during a carjacking conviction and a consecutive
determinate term of four years eight months, comprised of four years (upper term) for
corporal injury to a spouse and eight months for evading a police officer. The court also
imposed three years (upper term) for criminal threats but ran that sentence concurrent and
imposed eight years (upper term) for kidnapping but stayed that sentence under
section 654.

                                             7
                                        DISCUSSION
                                              I
                                   Competency Findings
       Defendant first argues he “was forced to go to trial where there was substantial
evidence indicating that his memory impairment would prevent him from assisting
counsel at trial and he would be unable to tell counsel when he did not understand or did
not remember.” Defendant also challenges the court’s denial of his request for a second
competency hearing and asserts his statements made during the Marsden hearing
“displayed paranoid and delusional thinking,” requiring sua sponte reconsideration of his
competency. We disagree.
       A. Applicable legal standards
       “The United States Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly and consistently recognized
that “the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process.” ’ [Citation.] A
defendant is deemed incompetent to stand trial if he lacks ‘ “ ‘sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . [or] a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 690.)
       “The applicable state statutes essentially parallel the state and federal
constitutional directives.” (People v. Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 691.)
Section 1367, subdivision (a) provides: “A person shall not be tried or adjudged to
punishment . . . while that person is mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally
incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result of a mental health disorder or
developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” There
is a presumption of competence to stand trial, and the defendant bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she lacks competence. (§ 1369,
subd. (f).)

                                              8
       “We apply a deferential substantial evidence standard of review on appeal. ‘In
reviewing a [factfinder’s] determination that a defendant is competent to proceed to trial,
we give due deference to the trier of fact, and therefore view the record in the light most
favorable to the verdict.’ [Citations.] When the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict is challenged, our review is limited to the evidence presented at the
competency trial.” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 871-872.)
       B. First competency hearing
       There are two aspects of competency: (1) the ability to understand the nature of
the criminal proceedings, and (2) the ability to assist counsel in a rational manner.
Defendant is not challenging the first prong. Dr. Williams and Dr. Roeder both testified
they believed defendant understood the relevant criminal procedures and charges against
him.
       The contested issue here is the second prong, whether defendant could rationally
assist his counsel. We conclude there is also substantial evidence supporting this finding.
Initially, we reject any argument that defendant’s alleged amnesia requires finding an
inability to assist his counsel. Memory impairment “does not, standing alone, establish
incompetency.” (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 809.) Instead, “the
propriety of trying an amnesic defendant should be determined on a case-by-case basis.”
(People v. Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1455.) Here there was no evidence that
an inability to remember the crimes would render defendant unable to assist his counsel
any more than if “he was drunk, drugged, unconscious or asleep at the time of the crime.”
(Id. at p. 1454.)
       There was evidence defendant had short-term memory issues distinct from not
remembering the crimes, but this also did not preclude him from assisting his attorney.
Defendant’s main evidence on this point is Dr. Williams’s testimony that defendant had
short-term memory issues making it difficult for him to follow the proceedings and assist
his attorney in real time. In his opinion, defendant could not contribute at all during the

                                              9
trial. But this conclusion was based on one meeting lasting one to two hours. Dr. Roeder
and Dr. Konczal offered differing opinions, and Dr. Konczal was defendant’s own
psychiatrist who met with defendant at least six times. Dr. Konczal testified defendant
tested at normal levels, he had not seen any test showing defendant had memory issues,
and he concluded “it seems like the memory was intact as well.” Dr. Roeder similarly
concluded defendant was “cognitively able to corroborate and assist” his attorney in
present time because defendant demonstrated the ability to do so during his initial
evaluation. Even when defendant hired Dr. Roeder to reevaluate him, Dr. Roeder did not
change his underlying conclusion. There is substantial evidence defendant did not
overcome the presumption of competency.
       C. Request for second competency hearing
       We similarly reject defendant’s contention the trial court erred in denying him a
second competency hearing. “ ‘[A] second competency hearing is required only if the
evidence discloses a substantial change of circumstances or new evidence is presented
casting serious doubt on the validity of the prior finding of the defendant’s
competence.’ ” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1415.)
       Defendant presented no evidence of a change of circumstances, let alone a
substantial change. He argued there was evidence he had experienced a traumatic head
injury, but this head injury occurred prior to the doctors’ evaluation and testimony
regarding defendant’s competency. Therefore, even assuming defendant had experienced
such trauma, the doctors would have already evaluated the effects and incorporated such
into their analyses. Further, the trial court stated defendant was not prohibited from
bringing the motion again should additional relevant evidence be obtained. There is no
evidence in the record that any such request was made. For these reasons, the trial court
did not improperly deny the request for the second competency hearing.

                                             10
       D. Marsden hearing
       Finally, defendant asserts statements he made during the Marsden hearing indicate
incompetence. Trial courts do have “a sua sponte duty to evaluate competency at any
time such a concern arises.” (People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 813.) “A trial
judge must suspend proceedings and hold a hearing ‘whenever the court is presented with
substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona
fide doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial.’ ” (People v. Johnson
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 575.)
       When looking at the entirety of the hearing, defendant’s comments establish that
he continued to understand criminal procedure and the charges against him. For
example, he clearly articulated why he did not feel his attorney was adequately
representing him citing: 1) his failure to routinely meet with him, 2) his failure to
consider relevant evidence, and 3) appearing on defendant’s behalf without his consent.
Defendant’s discussion regarding relevant evidence allegedly disregarded by his counsel
also demonstrates defendant’s ability to rationally assist his counsel in his defense.
       The statements defendant focuses on do not counteract this evidence. Defendant
contends his discussion regarding the district attorney monitoring him and that defendant
supposedly had evidence the Oakland Police Department was protecting human
trafficking “displayed paranoid and delusional thinking right before trial.” Defendant
does not explain how this establishes incompetence, even assuming these comments were
irrational. Again, to be incompetent, defendant must not be able to understand the
procedures and charges against him and be unable to rationally assist his counsel in his
defense. Brief and potentially nonsensical or irrelevant dialogue does not establish this
showing, especially when weighed against the entirety of the hearing where defendant
demonstrated his competence. Even his attorney at the Marsden hearing said he did not
think he could again challenge competency because defendant showed he knew “what’s
going on in the case and giving me arguments.”

                                             11
                                             II
                             Kidnapping During a Carjacking
       Defendant next argues the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence that he
had the specific intent to kidnap “to facilitate a carjacking.” The People contend there is
substantial evidence supporting the conviction.
       A. Legal standards
       In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction, we view the
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208.)
Substantial evidence is evidence of ponderable legal significance which is reasonable in
nature, credible, and of solid value. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) We
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
have deduced from the evidence (People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 346-347) and
will conclude there is no substantial evidence to support the conviction only if it can be
said that on the evidence presented no reasonable fact finder could find the defendant
guilty on the theory presented (Johnson, at p. 576).
       Kidnapping during a carjacking occurs when the person, “during the commission
of a carjacking and in order to facilitate the commission of the carjacking, kidnaps
another person who is not a principal in the commission of the carjacking.” (§ 209.5,
subd. (a).) Carjacking is taking a vehicle from another person through force or fear with
the intent to deprive the person of possession of the vehicle. (§ 215, subd. (a).) And
kidnapping is forcibly taking and moving another person. (§ 207, subd. (a).)
       B. Analysis
       The egregious and violent facts here are not in dispute and support the jury’s
verdicts finding defendant guilty of carjacking and kidnapping. Defendant assaulted C.D.
in her garage, took control of her car without her permission, and drove away,

                                             12
establishing substantial evidence for a carjacking conviction. Defendant also forcibly
restrained C.D. at her house, forced her into the trunk of her car, and moved her to his
house, where he then forced her upstairs and violently interrogated her, more than
establishing substantial evidence for a kidnapping conviction. The kidnapping and
carjacking also happened at the same time, so there is substantial evidence defendant
committed a kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking, partially satisfying
section 209.5.
       But section 209.5 has an extra step: one must kidnap another person “in order to
facilitate the commission of the carjacking.” (§ 209.5, subd. (a), italics added.)
“Facilitate” means to make the occurrence or commission of something easier. (See
Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) pp. 734-735; Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993)
p. 812.) Thus, section 209.5 not only requires committing a kidnapping during the
commission of a carjacking, but the kidnapping must be done to make the carjacking
easier. For example, if defendant had forced C.D. to drive her car during the carjacking,
this kidnapping would arguably have made it easier for him to carjack her vehicle thus
satisfying section 209.5’s “facilitation element.” (See People v. Duran (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377 [“When Duran entered the car he threatened to kill the entire
family if Beardsley did not take him where he wanted to go”].) Defendant did not force
C.D. to drive the car, nor is there any other evidence that at any point during defendant’s
criminal behavior the kidnapping facilitated the carjacking.
       Though the facilitation element is unambiguous, legislative intent helps provide
context for this language. As our Supreme Court explained, the Legislature enacted
section 209.5 and the simple carjacking statute, section 215, because of the inability for
the robbery statute to address the “ ‘ “considerable increase in the number of persons
who have been abducted” ’ ” during car thefts, and “ ‘ “[t]his relatively ‘new’ crime
appears to be as much thrill-seeking as theft of a car. If all the thief wanted was the car, it
would be simpler to hot-wire the automobile without running the risk of confronting the

                                              13
driver.” ’ . . . Such concern for the abduction and safety of a driver or passenger is
particularly evident in section 209.5, which provides for significant punishment if the
victim is also moved a substantial distance with the risk of increased harm.” (People v.
Medina (2007) 41 Cal.4th 685, 298.)
       It appears the Legislature sought to punish with section 215 taking cars in the
presence of occupants, and then with section 209.5 further punishing car thieves who
kidnap the occupants to make the carjacking easier, significantly increasing the risk of
harm. The Legislature does not appear to have been addressing the circumstance here
where the evidence establishes defendant’s only intent in kidnapping C.D. was to kidnap
C.D., not to help him take her car; the carjacking was just another crime defendant
committed in the process of the kidnapping. But regardless of the Legislature’s
reasoning, it enacted section 209.5 with a clear requirement the kidnapping must facilitate
the carjacking, and we cannot find evidence of this here.
       The People’s main argument for support of the facilitation element is that
defendant kidnapped C.D. to help him escape. Courts have found “if there is substantial
evidence that [the defendant] intended the kidnapping to effect an escape or prevent an
alarm from being sounded, his conviction for kidnapping during the commission of a
carjacking must stand.” (People v. Perez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 856, 861.) The
kidnapping at C.D.’s house does not establish this because the only evidence for why
defendant kidnapped C.D. from her house was to bring her to his house, not escape or
otherwise facilitate the carjacking. Defendant did later take C.D.’s car to flee from police
after C.D. escaped his house. But immediately prior to this attempted escape, defendant
had bound C.D. in the bathroom, taken some pills, said “they were going to find both of
us,” put a grocery bag over his head, got down on the floor, and eventually stopped
moving. With these facts, it is theoretically possible defendant still intended to
eventually leave with the car. Maybe defendant intended to restrain C.D. in the bathroom
to permit his later escape with her car and becoming unconscious was unintended. But

                                             14
there is no evidence supporting these conjectures; there is no evidence defendant ever
intended to leave the bathroom. The People’s argument therefore rests exclusively on
speculation, which is insufficient to support the conviction. (People v. Goode (2015) 243
Cal.App.4th 484, 488 [“ ‘[A] jury may not rely upon unreasonable inferences, and . . .
“[a]n inference is not reasonable if it is based only on speculation” ’ ”].)
       Finally, the People argue at length for how “[t]here was also evidence of
appellant’s plan to steal C.D.’s car to effect an escape or prevent an alarm from being
sounded,” such as “[t]he parties stipulated that over an hour before appellant had
kidnapped and transported C.D. to his house he had called his sister and asked her to
leave because he was bringing C.D. over to talk to her. [Citation.] This reasonably infers
that appellant knew that he needed to carjack her in order to take her with him so he
would not be caught at her house.” But carjacking her “in order to take her with him” is
evidence the carjacking facilitated the kidnapping, not the kidnapping facilitating the
carjacking. Whether defendant used the carjacking to help him commit the kidnapping of
C.D. does not bear on whether there is evidence defendant kidnapped C.D. to facilitate
the carjacking, the relevant issue here. This is a subtle but fundamentally crucial point in
order for section 209.5 to apply.
       In short, the only supported inference here is that the kidnapping concluded when
defendant went unconscious and C.D. escaped and dialed 911. Defendant then formed
the intent to use the car to escape the police. There is no evidence that at any point in this
entire process the kidnapping was intended to make, or did in fact make, the carjacking or
his attempted escape easier.
       Without any doubt, the facts of this case are serious and troubling. There is more
than enough evidence to establish a kidnapping occurred during the commission of a
carjacking. But section 209.5 requires more than that; there must also be evidence the
kidnapping facilitated the carjacking. There simply is no evidence that occurred here.

                                              15
       Defendant’s conviction for kidnapping to facilitate a carjacking is not supported
by substantial evidence and is reversed. However, because there is substantial evidence
to support the lesser included offenses of carjacking and kidnapping, and defendant was
already convicted for the kidnapping, we modify the section 209.5 conviction to reflect a
conviction for carjacking under section 215 and remand for a full resentencing. (§§ 1181,
case (6), 1260; People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 671, 681.)
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is modified to reduce the conviction of kidnapping to facilitate
carjacking (§ 209.5) on count four to reflect a conviction of the lesser included offense of
carjacking (§ 215). The case is remanded for a full resentencing. In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed.

                                                   /s/
                                                  Wiseman, J.*

We concur:

 /s/
Mauro, Acting P. J.

 /s/
Renner, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                             16