Court Opinion

ID: 9593465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:22:35.398796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:44.738164
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Presiding Judge
(concurring):
In setting forth our standard of review, the main opinion refers generally to a grant of discretion from the legislature to the commission. I believe it is necessary to clarify that what is at issue in this case is a grant of discretion to apply the law, not a grant of discretion to interpret a statute. While the resulting standard of review is the same, each grant is distinct under Morton International, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 588 n. 38 (Utah 1991).1
In this case, Bhatia does not assert that the commission’s interpretation of “just cause,” as set forth in its administrative rules, is erroneous; instead, he claims his actions simply did not constitute “just cause” for dismissal. This case is not, therefore, a review of the commission’s interpretation of the term “just cause.” Rather, it is a review of whether the commission’s administrative rules were properly applied to the facts of this ease.
As the main opinion correctly notes, the phrase “if so found by the commission,” located in Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-5(b)(l) (1988), is an explicit grant of discretion to apply the law. This language designates the commission as the tribunal that must determine whether there is, or is not, “just cause.” In order to make such a determination, the commission must apply the law to the facts of the case.
This explicit grant of discretion, however, goes only to the application of the law. It does not, as has been intimated in past decisions of this court,2 explicitly *581grant any discretion to the agency to interpret statutory terms. See Ferro v. Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 514 n. 12 (Utah App.1991). In order for there to be an explicit grant of discretion to interpret a statute, the legislature must direct or authorize the agency to define the statutory term by rule.3 Anything less is not an explicit grant of discretion to interpret the statute.
While the distinction between an explicit grant of discretion and an implicit grant of discretion may seem esoteric, an erroneous finding of an explicit grant of discretion prematurely ends the analysis set forth in Morton. See Morton, 814 P.2d at 589 (an implicit grant of discretion to interpret a statute may only be found after an unsuccessful attempt to interpret the statute through traditional rules of statutory construction); Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1992) (no implicit grant of discretion found until after supreme court concluded that traditional rules of statutory construction did not “aid in determining [the] issue”). If an explicit grant of discretion is mistakenly found, we risk giving deference to an agency interpretation that is contrary to the legislature’s own interpretation. Cf. Morton, 814 P.2d at 589 (legislature’s interpretation governs over agency’s); Ferro, 828 P.2d at 514 (agency’s interpretation rejected because it would have nullified the statutory provision).4
Even though the analytical framework set forth by the supreme court in Morton is admittedly quite complex, parties would be wise to assist this court in properly determining our standard of review by distinguishing between UAPA and non-UAPA cases.5 For UAPA cases, the parties should then distinguish between grants of discretion to apply the law and grants of discretion to interpret a statute. In some cases, both grants may need to be shown. We must also know whether the grant of discretion is explicit or implicit. The practical reality is that we do not have the judicial resources to test all the possible *582rules of statutory construction in each case before concluding that there is an implicit grant of discretion. Unless the legislative intent is obvious, or is identified by a petitioner, we will likely defer to an agency’s action. If a petitioner believes that an agency’s action is contrary to legislative intent, the petitioner must present the rules of statutory construction that will disclose the legislature’s intent. Otherwise, we may erroneously find an implicit grant of discretion and defer to the agency’s action to the detriment of the petitioner.

. In particular, it should be noted that the analysis set forth in Morton for discovering an implicit grant of discretion refers only to the discretion to interpret a statute. See Morton, 814 P.2d at 588-89. There is no analysis set forth in Morton regarding an implicit grant of discretion to apply the law. That analysis has yet to be developed.

. See, e.g., Johnson-Bowles Co. v. Division of Secs., 829 P.2d 101, 113 (Utah App.1992); Tasters Ltd. v. Department of Employment Sec., 819 P.2d 361, 364-65 (Utah App.1991).

. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 7-3-19(4) (1988) (“The commissioner may, by rule or regulation, define the terms ‘loans and extensions of credit’ and ‘person’ as used in this section.”); Utah Code Ann. § 26-6-3(2)(b) (1989) ("The department shall, by rule, define persons who shall be considered 'partners' for purposes of this section.”); Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-13.5(3) (1989) (“The department has authority to define by rule ‘small health care facility’ for purposes of licensure under this section....”); Utah Code Ann. § 31A-20-107(5)(b) (1991) (“The commissioner shall define ‘insignificant market share’ by rule.”); Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (1987) (“For purposes of this subsection, the commission shall by rule define ‘new or expanding operations’ and ‘establishment.’ ”). Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(2), (3) (1989) (when rule-making is required).

. We may not defer to an agency’s interpretation until we know that the legislature itself did not render its own discernible statutory interpretation. Mor-Flo Indus. Inc. v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm’n, 817 P.2d 328, 330 (Utah App.1991) ("where legislative intent can be discerned, the agency’s interpretation is given no deference"). We presume that the legislature drafted the statute anticipating that the traditional rules of statutory construction would be applied by the agency. See Ferro, 828 P.2d at 509. Until we apply the traditional rules of statutory construction, we simply cannot know whether the legislature has rendered its own statutory interpretation, nor whether the agency’s interpretation is at odds with the legislative intent.

.It helps in understanding Morton to note that while the supreme court refers to the common law tests as "prior law," Morton, 814 P.2d at 588, they are still applicable in non-UAPA cases. See Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-l(2) (1989). The common law tests are therefore referred to throughout Morton in the present tense, thereby creating some confusion as to whether the traditional common law tests or the new statutory tests are being discussed. Common law, non-UAPA, tests identified in Morton from past administrative law cases include (1) whether the issue raised may be characterized as a mixed question of fact and law, Morton, 814 P.2d at 586, see abo Johnson-Bowles, 829 P.2d at 107, Tasters, 819 P.2d at 363-64; (2) whether the agency was in a better position than the courts to give effect to legislative intent, Morton, 814 P.2d at 586; and (3) whether the use of broad and generalized statutory language "bespeaks” a legislative intent to delegate interpretation to the agency. Id. at 588. Despite the supreme court's express declaration that common law analysis does not apply in UAPA cases, language from the foregoing tests has unfortunately found its way into UAPA opinions. See, e.g., Johnson-Bowles, 829 P.2d at 107, 113; Tasters, 819 P.2d at 363-64, 365; and Armstrong v. Department of Employment Sec., 834 P.2d 562, 565 n. 6 (Utah App.1992).