Court Opinion

ID: 9819384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:24:12.589084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:30.458296
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE O’MALLEY, specially concurring: I agree with all aspects of our opinion in this case, but write separately to point out the existence of a competing line of cases that muddies the analytical field. Both lines of cases state that a reviewing court will not vacate an arbitration award unless, among other things, “a gross error of law or fact appears on the face of the award.” Edward Electric Co. v. Automation, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 89, 97 (1992). Unfortunately, the lines are divided in their application of the “gross error” standard. Our opinion in this case sufficiently illustrates a strict application of the “gross error” standard. In addition, one of the cases cited above, Hawrelak v. Marine Bank, Springfield, 316 Ill. App. 3d 175, 181 (2000), is illuminating in its discussion of the “gross error” standard. It states, relevantly: “Once parties bargain to submit their disputes to the arbitration system (a system essentially structured without due process, rules of procedure, rules of evidence, or any appellate procedure), we are disinclined to save them from themselves. For instance, Hawrelak’s claim that the arbitrators erred by refusing to exclude nontestifying witnesses from the hearing room is wholly without merit. While this might be a serious issue in trial court proceedings, it is not an issue in arbitration proceedings. Absent any evidence that this award was made in bad faith, that any of the arbitrators were guilty of fraud or corruption, or that the arbitrators deliberately chose not to follow the law, the trial court’s vacatur of the arbitration award cannot stand. In so concluding, we reaffirm what we wrote in Tim Huey, 272 Ill. App. 3d 100, 649 N.E.2d 1358, in which we affirmed the trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration award: ‘We see no principled way to inject ourselves into this case, to correct an award of damages we suspect is insufficient, where the parties have exercised their right to select an alternate forum. That is not to say that we are satisfied with the arbitrators’ award in this case. If a jury had made this award, we might well reverse it. *** We should not concoct some reason to review arbitration awards we do not like, however, at the same time stating that we will not set aside an award because of errors in judgment or mistakes of law or fact.’ Tim Huey, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 108-09, 649 N.E.2d at 1364.” (Emphasis in original.) Hawrelak, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 181. Hawrelak and Tim Huey both demonstrate that, when strictly applied, the “gross error” standard provides for a very limited review on the part of the appellate court. On the other hand, a number of cases oxymoronically delve into the record in order to determine whether the arbitrator made a gross error on the face of the award. For example, in Everen Securities, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 268, 275 (1999), the court noted that “because the [arbitration] panel in the instant case failed to provide any rationale for its award in the award document, we are compelled to review the arbitration hearing transcripts provided in the record to determine the propriety of the award.” The Everen court then proceeded to search the record far beyond the face of the arbitration award. In addition, Ryan v. Kontrick, 304 Ill. App. 3d 852, 859 (1999), contains the following interesting discussion: “We next address Kontrick’s claim that the arbitrator’s award of attorney fees must be vacated because it lacked supporting evidence. This issue is not reviewable. *** A mistake of law or fact will not serve as a basis to vacate an award, unless the error is gross and apparent on the face of the award. [Citations.] Kontrick has waived review of this issue where he did not object to the lack of supporting evidence before the arbitrator but argued only that the award was improper because both parties were ‘at fault.’ [Citations.] Moreover, the award of attorney fees does not constitute a gross error that was apparent on the face of the award.” This passage indicates that the court reviewed the record to determine what the appellant had argued before the arbitration panel, even though it also invoked the “gross error” standard of review. This searching review of the record is wholly at odds with the stated manner of review. In my view, the method employed to review the arbitration award in this case satisfies both the logic and the purposes behind arbitration. If a reviewing court is to carefully sift the record of an arbitration case, then no longer will the parties receive the nonjudicial dispute resolution for which they bargained. Instead, the review of an arbitration case will proceed exactly like the review of any case from the circuit court and provide an expensive and judicial resolution to the dispute. Thus, the line of cases including Tim Huey, Hawrelak, and this one provide a significantly better reasoned and logical application of the “gross error” standard.