Court Opinion

ID: 9834226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:24:31.034853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:12.921635
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
If we admit that there was a sufficient consideration moving to and from each of the parties at the time Murray said he would raise $7,000 from some of his homefolks or friends, the agreement itself did not create a lien upon and was not tantamount to an assignment of the fund, because there was no,fund; in fact, the $7,000 was never raised ; Murray only succeeded in obtaining $5,500 of that amount. In the motion it is asserted that this money was paid over to Peck under the contract. This statement, is at variance with the record. Peck and Murray both testified that the money was paid and received to satisfy Murray’s individual -indebtedness to Peek for acreage. Let it be admitted that there was a valid binding contract between all the parties to deal with some fund not then in existence; the fact that money was subsequently raised does not bring it within the terms of such a contract so as to constitute an assignment or create an equitable lien upon it. In addition to the authorities cited in the original opinion we desire to quote from and add the following: 1 Jones on Liens (2d Ed.) § 34, says:
“It is essential to an equitable lien that the, property to be charged should be capable of identification so. that the claimant of the lien may say with a reasonable degree of certainty what property it is that is subject to the lien.”
“A mere agreement, whether by parol or in writing to pay a debt out of a designated fund when received, does not give an equitable lien upon that fund, or operate as an equitable assignment of it. The agreement is personal merely. There must be an order or something that places the creditor in the position to demand and receive the amount of the debt from the holder of the fund without action on the part of the debtor. * * * A covenant by a debtor to pay certain debts out of a particular fund, when the same should be received, is a personal covenant.” Id. § 48.
“To oonstitute an equitable lien on a fund, there must be some distinct appropriation of the fund by the debtor,' such as an assignment or order that the creditor should bo paid out of it. * * * It is not enough that a debtor authorizes a third person to receive a fund and pay it over to the creditor.” Id. § 50.
“The rule that an equitable assignment can be effected only by a surrender of control over the funds or property assigned is one that is strictly held to. A promise that certain goods shall be held in trust for the benefit of another, and that the’ proceeds shall be paid to him does not amount to an equitable assignment of the goods or a specific lien upon them, for in such case the owner retains control of the goods, and may appropriate them or the proceeds to the payment of other creditors, and the holder of such promise cannot follow the goods any more than he could follow their proceeds. He has no ljen either upon the goods or their proceeeds. The owner has violated his promise, and for this he is personally responsible.” Id. § 51.
In Colleps v. Smith Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 185 S. W. 1043, it is said:
“To create an equitable assignment of the fund, there must be delivery, actual or symbolic, or some act to place the fund beyond the control of the assignor, and a mere promise or agreement to pay a debt out of such fund is not an equitable assignment.”
In First National Bank v. Campbell (Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 197, the court, said:
“If the contracts under which the $5,084 was earned 'by the irrigation company were not in existence at the time the agreement between appellant and the irrigation company was made, said earnings had no potential existence, and any attempt to assign or mortgage such earnings was void." 5 C. J. 871, § 41; Campbell v. Grant (Tex. Civ. App.) 82 S. W. 794.
See, also, Lockett v. Farmers’ State Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 205 S. W. 526; Provine v. First National Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 1107; Davis & Goggin v. State National Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321: Patterson v. Citizens’ National Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 236 S. W. 130.
The motion is overruled.
On Second Motion for Rehearing.
The appellee, Powell, now moves the court to set aside the judgment reversing and rendering the judgment of the trial court, in so far as his rights are concerned, because he insists that this court is -without jurisdiction to reverse his judgment against Peek, for the reason that he was not made an obligee in Peck’s supersedeas bond. This *648matter is now called to the attention of this court for the first timer It appears that that part of the judgment wherein Morris recovers against Peck is alone mentioned in the supersedeas bond and that Morris is the sole obligee. It is possible that the irregularity fir^t pointed out in the original opinion, viz. the action of the court in trying three cases without formally consolidating .them, and requiring a repleader, is in a measure responsible for the appellant’s defective super-sedeas bond. All parties are equally responsible for that irregularity. The defective appeal bond gave this court jurisdiction of the case. Hugo v. Seffel, 92 Tex. 414, 49 S. W. 369. ,
The rule announced by this court in Sham-burger v. Glenn (Tex. Giv. App.) 255 S. W. 815, to the effect that, where there are sefc-arate causes of action, the judgment upon each cause is a separate judgment, and that the failure of one party to appeal from that judgment against him renders that judgment final, does not apply here. In this case there is practically one issue upon which the rights of the parties turn. If the agreement between Mórris, Powell, Peck, and Murray is not tantamount to an equitable assignment ■ of a fund, or is not such an agreement as will create an equitable lien upon the money which Murray thereafter raised, then neither Morris nor Powell would be entitled to recover. Recognizing this fact, Morris and Powell have joined their forces in the fight. The same facts are pleaded, they are represented by the same counsel, arid the right of both to recover must necessarily be sustained by the same evidence. Their cause of action is the same, and their rights are so interwoven and interdependent that the determination of one necessarily fixes the rights of the other. Such being the condition presented by the record, a reversal as to either Morris or Powell-inevitably results in a reversal as to the other. In the early case of Burleson v. Henderson, 4 Tex. 60, the action was by Henderson against Burleson and tw.o others upon a bond. Judgment was rendered against all three of the defendants. Burleson alone appealed. The case was reversed as to all parties, .the court saying:
“It appears to be the more convenient rule, that where a judgment is entire, where the judgments are not distinct and independent, or where the parties have not distinct and independent interests, and where the judgment operates to the prejudice of all the defendants, a reversal as to one shall operate a reversal as to the whole.”
In Hamilton v. Prescott, 73 Tex. 565, 11 , S W. 548, the court said:
“Where the rights of one party are dependent in any manner upon those of another, it will treat the judgment as an entirety, and, where a reversal is required as to one, it will reverse the judgment as a whole.”
In Drake et al. v. Yawn et al., 248 S. W. 726, the court said:
■ “But if said defendants had not given such notice, and had in no manner attempted to appeal from said judgment, still the judgment against them could not be affirmed, for there was but one question, one issue, in litigation, and that was the validity of the so-called ‘consolidated county line school district.’ ”
In Fidelity Oil Co. v. Swinney (Tex. Civ. App.) 254 S. W. 137, it appears that one of the appellees was not made an obligee in the appeal bond. The rights of this appellee to a foreclosure were dependent upon the rights awarded his coappellees. The court held that-such a judgment was an entirety and the judgment was reversed as to all parties. This case seems to be directly in point with the instant case, but the same principal is announced in the following cases: A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.) 190 S. W. 774; Bell Oil & Refining Co. v. Price (Tex. Civ. App.) 251 S. W. 559; Bradford v, Taylor, 64 Tex. 171; Ferguson v. Dickenson (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 221; G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 91 Tex. 569, 44 .S. W. 1067; Long v. Garnett, 45 Tex. 400, and authorities therein cited.
Since this is not such a judgment as can be affirmed in part and reversed in part, we properly disposed of the appeal in so far as our former opinion reversed the judgment as to both appellees. Article 1609, Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. governing procedure in the Courts of Civil Appeals, provides:
“When there is a defect of substance or form in any appeal or writ of error bond, on motion to dismiss, the same for such defect, the court may allow the same to be amended by filing in the said Courts of Civil Appeals a new bond, on such terms as the court may prescribe.”
Article 2104, Id., provides:
“When an appeal has been or shall be taken from the judgment of any of the courts of this state by filing a bond or entering into a recognizance within the. time prescribed by,law in such cases and it shall be determined by the court to which appeal is taken that such bond or recognizance is defective in fqrm or substance such appellate court may allow the appellant to amend such bond or recognizance by filing a new bond on such terms as the court may prescribe.”
These articles of the statutes are so plain that a discussion of them is unnecessary. They have been frequently held to authorize the filing of a new bond where the original was defective in failing to name an adverse party as obligee. Crawford v. Wellington Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 174 S. W. 1004; First State Bank & Trust Co. v. O. D. Mann & Sons (Tex. Civ. App.) 209 S. W. 683; Ricker v. Collins, 81 Tex. 662, 17 S. W. 378; Appel v. Childress, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 607, 116 S., W. 129; Wandelohr v. Grayson County National Bank (Tex, Civ. App.) 90 S. W. 180.
*649It is the general rule that statutes relating to the right of appeal must he liberally construed in favor of the appellant; Eppstein & Co. v. Holmes, 64 Tex. 560, 565; Shelton v. Wade, 4 Tex. 148, 51 Am. Dec. 722. And the rule has been applied specially to the above-quoted statutes. Lewellyn v. Ellis, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 453, 115 S. W. 84. It was held before these statutes were enacted that, even after an appeal had been dismissed because of a defective bond, the case would be reinstated upon the docket, and upon application of the plaintiff in error time would be granted him to file a new bond. Boggess v. Howard, 40 Tex. 153. The same procedure is permitted since the enactment of said statutes'. Texas Mexican Railway v. Cahill (Tex. Civ. App.) 23 S. W. 45; Giddings v. Odom-Lucket Land & Livestock Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 34 S. W. 383. Fisher, C. J., in the last-named case, said:
“The motion for rehearing filed in this cause calls our attention to the fact that the ap-_ peal bond executed by appellants was not" made payable to all of the appellees and for this reason we are asked to set aside our former judgment and to dismiss this appeal. In reply to this the appellant tenders an appeal bond payable to all of the appellees. We make the following ruling upon the question: The judgment reversing and remanding the case is set aside and the appellants are 'allowed to file the bond tendered and it is so ordered to be filed and is approved as the appeal bond in the ease; and it is further ordered that the judgment below, as to all parties, is reversed and remanded for the reasons stated in the opinion heretofore delivered, and that said opinion be filed as the opinion disposing of the case.”
The statutes themselves áx no limit as to the time within which amended bonds may be filed. When the defect is one that can be waived, the general appearance of the appellee in the appellate court, or his failure to call the defect to the attention of that court promptly, is held to be a waiver. First State Bank <fc Trust Co. v. O. D. Mann & Sons, supra; Drake v. Yawn, supra. Under all the circumstances disclosed by the record, even a fair construction of s^id statutes demands that appellant be permitted to file á new bond. Supersedeas bonds are required primarily for the benefit of the appellee. Powell has had his day in court. Although he was not required to appear here, he has appeared, both by brief and by counsel ih oral argument; he has filed, jointly with Morris, one motion for rehearing, in which the contention now urged was not mentioned, and, even if it be conceded that these acts do not amount to a waiver of the defect, still appellee has assumed an inconsistent position,' which courts do not favor. If the appellant tenders a new bond when the sufficiency of the original bond is first attacked, he is in time, even though it be after a second motion for rehearing is presented. '
We therefore order that our former judgment, in so far as it is rendered for the appellant, Peck, be and the same is set aside, and he is given 20 days from this date in which to file a good and sufficient superse-deas bond, to be approved by the clerk of this court. If such bond is so filed and approved, the former opinions will be refiled as the opinion disposing of the appeal; otherwise, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed and remanded.
The motion is overruled.