Court Opinion

ID: 9764996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:47:30.674732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:03.116152
License: Public Domain

KINKEADE, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that the discovery rule applies in childhood sexual abuse cases where psychological defense mechanisms prevent discovery. Accordingly, I dissent.
The majority relies on L.C. v. A.D., No. 05-92-02867-CV (Tex.App.—Dallas, March 1, 1994, n.w.h.) in holding that the discovery rule applies in this ease. L.C. was a plurality opinion of this Court. In L.C., no majority for this Court expressed a single rationale supporting the application of the discovery rule in childhood sexual abuse cases where psychological defense mechanisms prevent discovery. Because this principle of law has not been agreed upon by a majority of this Court, the plurality opinion in L.C. is not authority for determination of this case. See University of Tex. Medical Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 176-77 (1994).
Because there is no binding precedent on this issue from this Court and the Texas Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, I would hold that the discovery rule does not apply in such cases for the reasons stated by Justice Barber in his dissent in L.C. and by the San Antonio Court of Appeals in a recent opinion addressing this issue. See L.C. v. A.D., No. 05-92-02867-CV (Tex.App.—Dallas, March 1, 1994, n.w.h.) (Barber, J., dissenting); Sanchez v. Archdiocese of San Antonio, 873 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.App.—San Antonio, 1994, n.w.h.). Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment granting a directed verdict for the father.