Court Opinion

ID: 9365614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 17:07:52.416878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:46.363269
License: Public Domain

J-S35018-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    AUSTIN TEXAS HOUSTON KELLEY                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 271 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 20, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-21-CR-0003462-2018

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                         FILED JANUARY 24, 2023

        Austin Texas Houston Kelley appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered following his convictions for three counts of unlawful contact with a

minor; two counts each of indecent assault, criminal solicitation to commit

statutory sexual assault, and criminal trespass; and one count each of

burglary, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault,

and statutory sexual assault.1 Kelley argues the trial court erred in denying

his motion to sever, permitting the Commonwealth to present expert

testimony on the dynamics of sexual violence, and determining that he was a

sexually violent predator (“SVP”). We affirm.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6318(a)(1), 3126(a)(8), 902(a), 3503(a)(11), 3502(a)(i),
3123(a)(7), 3125(a)(8), 3122.1(a)(1), respectively.
J-S35018-22

       The Commonwealth filed one Information, listing charges related to

three victims. On August 27, 2019, the parties informed the court that the

case was ready for trial, and the court scheduled trial for September 9, 2019.

On August 27, the Commonwealth indicated to Kelley’s counsel that she would

seek to introduce expert testimony. Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, filed Sept. 5,

2019, at ¶ 10. The following day, August 28, 2019, the Commonwealth

provided written notice of its intent to present expert testimony on

“generalities with regard to sexual offender/predator behaviors.” Motion to

Continue Pretrial/Trial, filed Sept. 4, 2019, at Exh. A. The Commonwealth

stated in the written notice that it was late because the parties had been

working toward a plea agreement and, therefore, “there [had been] no need

to pursue the retention of an expert.” Id. The Commonwealth attached to the

notice a copy of the expert’s curriculum vitae and stated it would forward a

report when it received one. Id. Kelley filed an unopposed motion to continue,

which was granted.2

       In September 2019, Kelley filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, which he

later amended. The omnibus motion included, among other things, a motion

to sever and a motion to preclude the expert testimony.

____________________________________________

2Trial originally was rescheduled for November 2019, but, following additional
continuances, did not occur until October 2020.

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      The parties submitted briefs regarding the motion to sever. The trial

court summarized the alleged facts from the hearing on the pretrial motion to

sever as follows:

         [I]n August 2016, [Kelley] met M.M. at the Midway Skating
         Rink when she was approximately 14 years old. He then
         communicated with her via social media, utilizing the screen
         name “Superman100” on Facebook, and referring to himself
         as a “superhero.” On February 9, 2017, [Kelley] went to
         M.M.’s house, and entered through her bedroom window;
         he did not have her parents’ permission to be in the home.
         While M.M. denies any sexual contact between her and
         [Kelley], her father did see [Kelly] in M.M’s bed.

         [Kelley] also met 15-year-old K.W. at the Midway Skating
         Rink in August of 2016, following which he communicated
         with her as “Superman.” Around the same time period,
         [Kelley] met 14-year-old S.B. at the Midway Skating Rink,
         and began an ongoing sexual relationship with her, which
         lasted for approximately eight months.

         On one particular occasion, March 12, 2017, [Kelley]
         climbed in the window of S.B.’s bedroom, while K.W. was
         visiting S.B. [Kelley] was watching a movie on S.B.’s bed
         with the two girls, when he attempted to kiss K.W., saying
         he was a superhero and would “save her.” He touched her
         butt and breasts, and put his hands and mouth on her
         vagina; K.W. became very uncomfortable and moved to the
         floor. [Kelley] and S.B. then engaged in sexual conduct on
         S.B.’s bed.[1]
            1Since his arrest, [Kelley] and S.B. have continued to
            correspond in writing, with [Kelley] continuing to
            utilize his “superhero” persona.

Trial Court Opinion, filed Oct. 7, 2020, at 1-2.

      The trial court denied the motion to sever. It found the Commonwealth

had demonstrated the existence of a common scheme, plan, or design, the

evidence would support a finding of Kelley’s intent, and the jury would be

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capable of avoiding confusion. It also found the consolidation would not unduly

prejudice Kelley. Id. at 4-5.

      In the motion to preclude the expert testimony, Kelley claimed, among

other things, that the Commonwealth provided its notice of expert testimony

late, which hindered his ability to respond to the testimony. He also argued

that the proposed basis of the testimony was “likely to be confusing, vague,

and [was] not opinion testimony relevant to the facts of [the] case.” Amended

Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, filed Nov. 7, 2019, at ¶ 11. At the hearing, Kelley

again argued the testimony was not relevant and would be confusing to the

jury. N.T., Oct. 14, 2020, at 24. The Commonwealth asserted it informed

Kelley of its intention to present expert testimony after defense counsel

certified the case for trial, stating that the late notice was due to the

Commonwealth’s impression the case would be resolved by plea agreement.

      The trial court summarized the testimony from the hearing on the expert

testimony as follows:

         At a hearing on the expert witness issue, testimony was
         received from the Commonwealth’s proposed expert,
         Matthew     Shollenberger,    Ph.D.,  P.C.,   and   two
         Commonwealth exhibits were admitted in the form of his
         curriculum vitae and his report.

         Dr. Shollenberger testified that he was a sex offender
         counselor, with a Ph.D. in counseling, who had been working
         with sex offenders for 25 years, had been approved as a
         provider by Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offenders Assessment
         Board since 2002, and had presented expert testimony in
         court hundreds of times. The gist of his opinions of
         pertinence to the present case was contained in a report
         dated September 17, 2019:

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          This letter is a very brief summary of sexual offenders’
          characteristics based on over 25 years of education
          and experience: Sexual exploit is about control, and
          overwhelmingly statically [sic] the sexual exploiter is
          a biological male. Most sexual offenders have multiple
          victims, sometimes dozens, due to the secrecy of the
          crime and the reluctance for victims to come foreword
          [sic], hence encouraging the sexual predator to
          believe he has gotten away with the crime(s). Sexual
          predators will most likely tell their victims to remain
          secretive about the sexual abuse and/or threaten
          them with retaliation should they tell. The large
          majority of victims are not strangers; sexual
          predators get to know their victims (as quickly as
          possible) in order to assess vulnerability and establish
          trust. The sexual predator may use special favors like
          excessive attention, praise, favoritism, or gifts to
          establish trust. They use the trust that has been
          established as a control mechanism, exploiting the
          victims' feelings of guilt, loyalty, or dependency.
          Adolescents who have special needs, are having
          identity issues, feeling unloved, or having peer issues
          are vulnerable to the attention of a sexual predator.
          Many times, pedophiles in particular do not relate to
          peers their own age; they do not think or feel like a
          responsible adult, and they “fit in” with younger peers.
          Pedophiles tend to frequent locations where children
          and/or adolescents are found with minimal
          supervision, intent on preying upon naive,
          impressionable, and vulnerable victims. Sexual
          predators rationalize their crimes to themselves and
          minimize their crimes to other[s] when caught. Lastly,
          many sexual predators are narcissistic[.] Narcissism
          is clinically defined as a grandiose sense of self-
          importance and preoccupation with fantasies of
          power, a belief that he is unique, has a need for
          excessive admiration, has a sense of entitlement, a
          lack of empathy, envious of others and an arrogant
          attitude.

       On cross-examination, Dr. Shollenberger was acknowledged
       by [Kelley’s] counsel to be an expert in the field of sexual
       offense counseling.

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Trial Court Opinion, filed Apr. 16, 2022, at 14-15 (alterations in original)

(“1925(a) Op.”).

       The trial court denied the motion to preclude the expert testimony and

permitted the Commonwealth to present the expert opinion of Dr. Matthew

Shollenberger. However, it put limits on his testimony and barred him from

testifying “regarding specifics of this case.” Order, filed Oct. 15, 2020.

       After a trial, the jury convicted Kelley of the above-referenced offenses.3

The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of 18 to 50 years’

incarceration.4 It then held an SVP hearing and heard testimony from both an

expert presented by the Commonwealth and an expert presented by Kelley.

       The Commonwealth’s expert, Corrine Scheuneman, M.A., L.P.C., a

member of Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”),

opined that Kelley has hebephilia, which is a condition where “an individual

[is] sexually attracted to adolescents whose pubescence or secondary sex

characteristics are just emerging.” N.T., July 2, 2021, 17, 20. She stated this

was considered a lifetime disorder. Id. at 21. Scheuneman testified that

____________________________________________

3Kelley had been charged with two counts of burglary. The jury found Kelley
not guilty of one count of burglary.

4 The trial court originally sentenced Kelley to an aggregate of 28 to 56 years’
incarceration. Kelley filed a post-sentence motion challenging the grading of
two of the unlawful contact with minor convictions and the mandatory
minimum applied to the involuntary deviate sexual intercourse conviction. The
trial court granted the motion, and re-sentenced Kelley to an aggregate
sentence of 18 to 50 years’ incarceration.

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hebephilia is not listed as a disorder in the DSM-V.5 She stated that although

a lot of paraphilic disorders are not listed in the DSM-V, individuals “still may

suffer from” the disorders and the disorders “might be addressed in the clinical

setting.” Id. at 18. She stated that “there are so many that it would be

exhaustive to print them all on the pages of the DSM.” Id. at 18. She further

testified that she uses the DSM for diagnosing a person in a clinical setting,

but at the hearing she “was charged with . . . mak[ing] a conclusion that’s

consistent with the law and the way the law defines mental abnormality,

personality disorder.” Id. at 34. She pointed out that “hebephilia has been

accepted in courts of law as significant because [they are] not just talking

about urges and arousal patterns that we might treat in a clinical setting, but

rather [they] are talking about behavior that follows those urges and arousing

patterns.” Id.

        Scheuneman discussed the statutory factors for determining whether a

person should be classified as an SVP. She noted, among other things, that:

the offense included multiple victims with multiple sex acts; Kelley used

coercion and manipulation and broke into homes to accomplish the offenses;

the victims were between 13 and 15 years of age; and Kelley befriended the

victims and engaged in conversation to identify emotional vulnerability. She

acknowledged that Kelley did not have a prior history of sexual offenses, and

____________________________________________

5   Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Ed.

                                           -7-
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that he was 19 years of age at the time of the offenses. See id. at 8-24; Trial

Court Opinion, at 17-19.

      Thomas F. Haworth, Ph.D., L.P., a former member of the Sexual

Offenders Assessment Board, testified that hebephilia is not a disorder

recognized in the DSM-V and “there is enormous controversy within the

scientific field around the validity of hebephilia being a paraphilic disorder.”

Id. at 52, 54. He testified that he believed Kelley’s conduct was attributable

to a previously undiagnosed condition of bipolar disorder and “histrionic

personality traits,” which both could be treated through pharmacotherapy and

cognitive behavioral therapy. See id. at 48, 61; Trial Court Opinion, at 17-19.

Dr. Haworth was able to interview Kelley and administer psychometric tests.

      The trial court found that the Commonwealth had proven, by clear and

convincing evidence, that Kelley was an SVP. Kelley timely appealed.

      Kelley raises the following issues:

         I. Did the trial court err in denying [Kelley’s] motion to
         sever, when one course of conduct against a victim differed
         substantially from the common scheme alleged by the
         Commonwealth for the remaining two victims?

         II. Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to
         present expert testimony when the testimony elicited was
         confusing to the finder of fact when applied to so many
         complainants with varying and unique allegations of
         misconduct by [Kelley]?

         III. Did the trial court err in determining that [Kelley] is a
         sexually violent predator?

Kelley’s Br. at 7 (suggested answers and unnecessary capitalization omitted).

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      In his first issue, Kelley argues the trial court erred in denying his motion

to sever. He argues that “the trial court should have severed at the very least

M.M’s charges from those of K.W. and S.B.” Id. at 23. He points out there was

no evidence at the severance hearing that M.M. and Kelley engaged in sexual

behavior and he alleges he did not “groom” her or swear her to secrecy. Kelley

maintains that M.M. was not a friend of K.W. and S.B. and did not observe

any interactions between S.B. or K.W. and Kelley. He claims the events with

M.M. were totally separate, with no common plan or scheme. He argues the

evidence regarding K.W. and S.B.’s allegations served “only to present

propensity to commit crimes of sexual misconduct.” Id. at 24. He further

argues the expert testimony would not have been permissible at M.M.’s trial

because it would have been irrelevant. He maintains the evidence was most

relevant to S.B.’s allegations. He maintains that by joining the trial of M.M.’s

allegations with the trial for K.W. and S.B.’s allegations the trial court

“muddied the waters of the facts and abused its discretion in the interest of

judicial economy.” Id. at 25.

      We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for severance for an

abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 901

(Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Melendez–Rodriguez, 856

A.2d 1278, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc)).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 582 governs the joinder of

separate informations for trial and provides:

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        (1) Offenses charged in separate             indictments   or
        informations may be tried together if:

           (a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be
           admissible in a separate trial for the other and is
           capable of separation by the jury so that there is no
           danger of confusion; or

           (b) the offenses charged are based on the same act
           or transaction.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1).

     Rule 583 governs severance of offenses and provides:

        The court may order separate trials of offenses or
        defendants, or provide other appropriate relief, if it appears
        that any party may be prejudiced by offenses or defendants
        being tried together.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 583. “Under Rule 583, the prejudice the defendant suffers due

to the joinder must be greater than the general prejudice any defendant

suffers when the Commonwealth’s evidence links him to a crime.” Dozzo, 991

A.2d at 902 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 107

(Pa.Super. 2003)). Rather, the prejudice required under Rule 583 is “that

which would occur if the evidence tended to convict [the] appellant only by

showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury was incapable

of separating the evidence or could not avoid cumulating the evidence.” Id.

(quoting Lauro, 819 A.2d at 107).

     Reading Rules 582 and 583 together, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

determined that to decide whether to grant severance, courts must ask

whether the evidence would be admissible in separate trials, the evidence is

capable of separation by the jury, and the defendant will be unduly prejudiced

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if the offenses are tried together. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d

206, 210-11 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d

418, 422 (Pa. 1997)) (brackets in original).

      Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is not admissible to prove that the

defendant acted “in conformity with those acts or to demonstrate a criminal

propensity.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 320, 325 (Pa.Super. 2012);

Pa.R.Evid. 404(b). The evidence, however, may be admissible for another,

proper purpose. Brown, 52 A.3d at 325. One such proper purpose is to

demonstrate a common plan, motive, scheme, or intent. Dozzo, 991 A.2d at

902 (quoting Collins, 703 A.2d at 422-23).

      Here, the trial court analyzed the three factors and denied the motion

to sever the charges:

         In looking at the first prong of the . . . test, this court will
         examine whether [Kelley’s] conduct constituted a common
         scheme, plan or design, whether the evidence would
         support proving [Kelley’s] intent, and whether the evidence
         would be admissible in separate trials. This court concludes
         that the Commonwealth has demonstrated the existence of
         a common scheme, plan or design evidenced in [Kelley’s]
         conduct, and demonstrated that this evidence would
         support finding [Kelley’s] criminal intent. Specifically,
         [Kelley’s] conduct with regard to meeting his alleged minor
         victims at a local skating rink, adopting a “superhero”
         persona with his victims via referring to himself as
         “Superman” and claiming a desire to “help” them, sneaking
         into the alleged victims’ residences by way of bedroom
         windows, acting without any knowledge or consent from the
         alleged victims’ parents, and communicating with his
         victims while attempting to isolate them from family and
         support structures through both social media and written
         mail represent a common scheme, plan or design.

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         Therefore, the Commonwealth has met the first prong of the
         . . . test.

         Regarding the second prong . . ., it is clear that the jury
         would be capable of avoiding confusion, and be able to
         separate the different allegations. “Where a trial concerns
         distinct criminal offenses that are distinguishable in time,
         space and the characters involved, a jury is capable of
         separating the evidence.” Com. v. Collins, supra, 550 Pa.
         at 56. There are three separate alleged victims, and
         separate crimes connected with each alleged victim over a
         span of roughly nine months. The jury will, presumably,
         hear from each alleged victim, and will be able to evaluate
         their credibility regarding the individual offenses related to
         each of them. Therefore, the Commonwealth has met the
         second prong of the . . . test.

         Finally, under the third prong of the . . . test, while [Kelley]
         may suffer some prejudice as a result of the jury hearing
         allegations involving three alleged victims, regarding
         incidents spread over a nine month period, he will not be
         unduly prejudiced by consolidation. . . .

         Here, as discussed previously, the jury would not be
         confused by the evidence submitted during a consolidated
         trial, and the Commonwealth is not seeking to convict
         [Kelley] on the basis of any purported propensity to commit
         crimes. Therefore, the Commonwealth has passed the . . .
         test, and [Kelley’s] motion to sever should properly be
         denied.

Trial Court Opinion, filed Oct. 7, 2020, at 4-5.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The evidence would have

been admissible in separate trials, as it was admissible to establish a common

plan, motive, scheme, or intent. Further, the jury could separate the evidence,

avoiding the danger of confusion. In addition, Kelley would not be unduly

prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses, as any prejudice would not be

greater than other evidence linking him to the crime and the Commonwealth

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was not seeking to convict Kelley based on a purported propensity to commit

crimes.

      Kelley next claims the court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to

present expert testimony on grooming behavior. He argues the expert

testimony “was dumped on defense counsel on the eve of trial,” which limited

Kelley’s ability to contest it and hire an expert. Kelley’s Br. at 25. He further

claims the expert testimony focused on Kelley’s “savior complex” and

“‘Superman’ persona that was alleged to be predatory,” which he alleges had

nothing to do with M.M. Id. at 26. He argues “[t]he wide range of allegations

made by each complainant rendered the expert testimony wholly confusing as

to how it was relatable to any single victim.” Id.

      “[T]he admission of expert testimony is a matter left largely to the

discretion of the trial court, and its rulings thereon will not be reversed absent

an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 945 A.2d 174, 176

(Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 596 A.2d 840, 842

(Pa.Super. 1991)).

      Section 5920 of the Judicial Code governs expert testimony in criminal

proceedings. Where a defendant is charged with certain offenses, including

sexual offenses, solicitation, corruption of minors, and unlawful contact with

minors, Section 5920 permits a witness to be qualified as an expert if the

witness has “specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by the average

layperson” based on the witness’s experience, specialized training, or

education in “criminal justice, behavioral sciences or victim services issues,

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related to sexual violence or domestic violence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920(b)(1).

The witness may be so qualified if the proffered testimony will assist the trier

of fact “in understanding the dynamics of sexual violence or domestic violence,

victim responses to sexual violence or domestic violence and the impact of

sexual violence or domestic violence on victims during and after being

assaulted.” Id.

      The trial court cited Section 5920 and concluded that the General

Assembly expressly authorized “the presentation of expert testimony in a case

of the present type,” and the court permitted “Dr. Shollenberger’s testimony

as proffered by the Commonwealth, subject to the restriction imposed in the

order,” that is, he was not permitted to testify regarding specifics of the instant

case. 1925(a) Op. at 25. It further concluded that any prejudice to Kelley due

to the timing of the notice, would have been “obviated by the passage of more

than a year from the date of the notice until trial.” Id.

      Kelley’s challenges to the admission of the testimony are meritless.

Section 5920 permits the use of expert testimony about the dynamics of

sexual violence in cases, such as the current case, where sex crimes are

charged. Here, the expert provided testimony of the sort contemplated by the

statute. Further, although the Commonwealth did not provide notice of its

intent to use an expert until shortly before the initial date for trial, the trial

was continued for more than a year following the retention of the expert,

giving Kelley time to respond to the testimony.

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      In his final claim, Kelley contends that the evidence that he was an SVP

did not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence. He argues that his

expert, Dr. Haworth, “presented compelling testimony that due to the age of

Mr. Kelley and his specific mental health conditions needing valid and

accessible treatment regimens, that it is hard to say the Commonwealth met

its burden of proof by a clear and convincing standard.” Kelley’s Br. at 26-27.

Kelley argues that Dr. Haworth had more experience as an evaluator and more

education than Ms. Scheuneman and had conducted an in-person examination

of Kelley. He argues that Dr. Haworth “did not try to categorize [] Kelley with

a label that does not have general acceptance in the greater scientific

community.” Id. at 27. Kelley further claims that he “is an immature man-

child who has delusion of grandeur amplified by bipolar disorder, not that he

is an incurable sociopath who will always be a sexually violent predator.” Id.

He points out he was 19 at the time of the crimes and claims that when K.W.

asked him to stop, he did.

      We review an SVP designation to determine whether the Commonwealth

presented clear and convincing evidence that the defendant meets the

statutory definition of an SVP. Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d

186, 189 (Pa.Super. 2015). “As with any sufficiency of the evidence claim, we

view all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Baker, 24

A.3d 1006, 1033 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

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      To be classified as an SVP, the Commonwealth must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the defendant has “a mental abnormality or

personality disorder that makes [him] likely to engage in predatory sexually

violent offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12 (“Sexually violent predator”).

The statute defines “mental abnormality” as “[a] congenital or acquired

condition of a person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the

person in a manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal

sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and

safety of other persons.” Id. (“Mental abnormality”) The defendant’s

conduct must also have been “predatory,” which the statute defines as “[a]n

act directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been

instituted, established, maintained, or promoted, in whole or in part, in order

to facilitate or support victimization.” Id. (“Predatory”); Commonwealth

v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034, 1038 (Pa.Super. 2013).

      To determine whether the defendant meets the above definition, the

SOAB evaluates the following factors, “which are mandatory and are designed

as criteria by which the likelihood of reoffense may be gauged”:

         (1) Facts of the current offense, including:

            (i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.

            (ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means
            necessary to achieve the offense.

            (iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.

            (iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.

            (v) Age of the victim.

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           (vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual
           cruelty by the individual during the commission of the
           crime.

           (vii) The mental capacity of the victim.

        (2) Prior offense history, including:

           (i) The individual's prior criminal record.

           (ii) Whether the individual completed any prior
           sentences.

           (iii) Whether the individual participated in available
           programs for sexual offenders.

        (3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

           (i) Age.

           (ii) Use of illegal drugs.

           (iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental
           abnormality.

           (iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the
           individual's conduct.

        (4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender
        assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of
        reoffense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165,

1168-69 (Pa.Super. 2011). We have found that “a trial court may conclude,

based upon the expert testimony and facts in a given case, that a hebephilia

diagnosis is sufficient to find a defendant has a mental abnormality.”

Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 193. We concluded that “the debate about

surrounding hebephilia diagnoses, and their use in SVP proceedings, goes to

the weight of the expert witness’ testimony.” Id.

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      The trial court found the Commonwealth proved by clear and convincing

evidence that Kelley was an SVP:

         In the present case, an independent review of the factors to
         be considered in a sexually violent predator determination,
         the opinions of the experts, and the caselaw concerning
         hebephilia led th[e trial] court to concur with the factor-
         oriented analysis of the Commonwealth’s expert, including
         her diagnosis, and to find that the Commonwealth had met
         its burden of proving that [Kelley] met the criteria for a
         sexually violent predator by clear and convincing evidence.

1925(a) Op. at 27-28.

      We conclude the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to

support the court’s conclusion Kelley was an SVP. Scheuneman testified to her

analysis of the factors and concluded he suffered from a mental disorder and

his actions were predatory. This testimony, which the court credited, supports

its conclusion that Kelley was an SVP. Any controversy regarding hebephilia

diagnoses in SVP proceedings goes to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the

testimony. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 193.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/24/2023

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