Court Opinion

ID: 9631352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:35:07.635924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:52.319848
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
concurring specially.
I write separately to focus the litigants and the Commission on one aspect of our ruling today. We have affirmed a “dismissal without prejudice.” We have further ruled that on the basis of the facts in this record claimant has no basis for recovery.
If there were a basis for claimant to re-file under Woodvine at the time of the Commission’s order, the appeal has tolled any further running of the statute, and this opinion does not preclude such re-filing.
BISTLINE, Justice concurring only with HUNTLEY, Justice special concurrence, and dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s narrow, hypertechnical construction of I.C. § 72-706(2). Specifically, I object to the following judicial gloss that is placed on the statute:
This latter portion of the statute referring to the discontinuance of compensation necessarily implies that the compensation was being paid on the fifth anniversary of the accident and was thereafter discontinued. That was the case in Woodvine. It is not the case here.
Maj.Op., p. 242, 787 P.2d p. 228 (emphasis added).
No reason or rationale is given to support the “necessary implication” that compensation must be paid on the fifth anniversary of the accident, other than that the statement is an ipse dixit, or judicial decree. What is the magic about payment being in progress on the “fifth anniversary”? I suppose if Mr. Walters had the good fortune to have scheduled surgery to relieve increased back pain earlier than July 1984, the majority might not now deny him a hearing.
Because the facts in Woodvine, regarding dates of compensation payment, differ from those here is not a basis supporting the majority’s construction of the statute. The tail does not wag the dog. The Wood-vine facts create a distinction without a difference. The Woodvine majority placed no emphasis on the claimant’s receiving compensation on the “fifth anniversary.”
“Compensation” includes medical benefits, I.C. § 72-102(5), Woodvine, supra, and the fact that Blincoe’s surety last paid medical expenses on December 28, 1987, surely brings this case within I.C. § 72-706(2)’s ambit. The crabbed, technical reading of the statute offered by today’s majority violates a cardinal principal of worker’s compensation law endorsed by cases too numerous to cite — the act is to be construed liberally in favor of a claimant since the humane purposes which it seeks to serve leave no room for narrow, technical construction. See, e.g., Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P.2d 829 (1977).
The act has been revised extensively and interpreted variously for over 60 years. It’s not surprising, as here, that gray areas arise where the statutes cannot anticipate and definitively encompass all possible fac*244tual situations. That is why the rule of liberal construction is mandated.
ON REHEARING
Rehearing was granted on the petition of Walters. Following the rehearing, we adhere to our original opinion with some additions. On rehearing it was suggested by the employer and its surety that our opinion implicitly overruled Steinebach v. Hoff Lumber Co., 98 Idaho 428, 566 P.2d 377 (1977). We disagree.
In Steinebach we held that what was then I.C. § 72-407 (now I.C. § 72-706 in an amended form) “contemplates a bar to claims for compensation except those based on necessary medical payments claims which are made within a reasonable time of the injury.” 98 Idaho at 432, 566 P.2d at 381. This conclusion was based on a reading of what was then I.C. § 72-307 (now I.C. § 72-432(1)). This statute provides:
The employer shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicines, crutches and apparatus, as may be required by the employee's physician or needed immediately after an injury or disability from an occupation disease, and for a reasonable time thereafter. If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured employee may do so at the expense of the employer. (Emphasis added.)
To eliminate any confusion there may be about the continued viability of Steinebach following our decision in this case and in Ryen v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 115 Idaho 791, 770 P.2d 800 (1989), we hold that by these decisions we did not intend to overrule Steinebach. I.C. § 72-432(1) specifically provides for the obligation of the employer to pay medical benefits. As to when these medical benefits must be paid, I.C. § 72-432(1) takes precedence over I.C. § 72-706(2), which deals generally with all matters of compensation. Steinebach, 98 Idaho at 431, 566 P.2d at 380. Because medical benefits are included in the definition of compensation under I.C. § 72-102(5), the payment of medical benefits under I.C. § 72-432(1) must be taken into account under I.C. § 72-706(2) to determine whether compensation was being paid when the limitation period provided in I.C. § 72-706(2) expired. However, this does not mean that I.C. § 72-706(2) controls whether an employee is entitled to compensation in the form of medical benefits after the expiration of this limitation period. As to this question, the more specific provisions I.C. § 72-432(1), as interpreted in Steinebach, controls.
Costs on rehearing to respondents.
BAKES, C.J., BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.