Court Opinion

ID: 7368299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-27 23:53:50.986933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:20:50.024895
License: Public Domain

ON application for rehearing.
GARDNER, J.
(1) Upon this application for rehearing counsel for appellee, for the first time during this litigation, it *142would seem, insist that the proceeding brought against the appellant was not for the purpose of acquiring an easement in the right of way, but was merely to ascertain the amount of compensation which should be paid therefor. This theory rests upon the assumption, on their part, that the appellee already owned a perpetual easement on the right of way by virtue of the contract of 1884. By what is here said we do not intend to indicate that such theory would support a condemnation pro•ceeding. That might be conceded, for the sake of argument and for that purpose only, but we pass that question by as unnecessary to be determined. There is no intimation in the entire record that such a theory was even hinted at on the former trials of this cause, and the former opinion in the case discloses no such intimation upon the first appeal. This court, so far as cases of this character are concerned, is a court of review only, and is expected to pass only upon questions arising in the court below.
(9) The petition filed in this cause, seeking a- condemnation of the right of way, conceded that the appellee went upon and occupied the right of way under a contract, soon to expire and is disclosed by the following quotation from section 1 thereof: “Your petitioner has for many years, to wit, 20 years, occupied the right of way of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, with its lines of telegraph, consisting of poles, wires, appurtenances and fixtures, under a contract with the said railroad company, which will expire on or about the 17th day of August, 1912; and your petitioner desires to continue to occupy said right of way and maintain and operate its said lines of telegraph where they are now placed and located,” etc.
But notwithstanding this question is presented now for the first time, in view of the carefully prepared briefs of the able and diligent counsel for appellee, we have deemed it proper to give it consideration.
This record shows, indeed the petition itself discloses, that appellee went upon the right of way of appellant under contract of 1884. The opinion in this cause recited that it was conceded by counsel in argument that the contract was terminated by the act of the petitioner. This was in accordance with the very terms of the contract, which provided a continuation of the same for a period of 25 years, and that at the expiration of said period *143either party thereto might terminate the contract on giving one years’ notice. There is nothing in the contract giving a perpetual easement to the appellee, and nothing that would lead thereto by necessary implication. No such insistence was made by counsel in their former brief, but on this appeal, in one of their briefs, they referred to the contract in the following language: “We then have left a working agreement which, by its terms, implies a permissive occupation of the property for telegraph purposes, possibly something in the nature of a tenancy at will.”
.It is thus seen that there was no contention that by the contract a perpetual easement was granted. Section 3 of the petition avers the ownership by the railroad of the easement sought to be condemned.
But we need not pursue the subject further. The contract was terminated according to its terms, and terminated in its entirety. No effort seems to have been made — and we do not see how it could have been made — to terminate that part. of the contract which is burdensome and retain that which is beneficial.
As an exhibit to the last brief filed by appellee, there is attached the opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, recently delivered in the case of W. U. Tel. Co. v. Ga. R. R. & Banking Co. (D. C.) 227 Fed. 276, and counsel seem to be impressed with the idea that that decision lends color to the theory now advanced. The statement of facts, as well as the opinion itself show, however, that the telegraph company in this instance had acquired by contract a perpetual easement in the right of way. We quote from the opinion as follows: “A reading of these two contracts discloses beyond question that the predecessors of the Western Union Telegraph Company were granted perpetual easement in -and upon the rights of way of the said railroads for the construction, maintenance, and operation of telegraph lines on same, and that such grants became irrevocable and assignable upon the construction of said telegraph lines as long as same should’ be kept in operation.”
A reading of the case therefore discloses that it is easily differentiated from the one here under consideration. We are therefore not at all impressed with this last theory of counsel for appellee, and the application for rehearing will be overruled.
Mayfield, Sayre, and Thomas, JJ., concur.