Court Opinion

ID: 9391460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 14:00:21.431383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:42.830248
License: Public Domain

21-6472
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                      BIA
                                                                              A201 105 722

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of May, two thousand twenty-
 4   three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              GUIDO CALABRESI,
 8              RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 9              WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   CHARNJIT SINGH,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                      v.                                          21-6472
17                                                                  NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                    Jaspreet Singh, Esq., Law Office of Jaspreet
24                                      Singh, Richmond Hill, NY.
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
 2                                        Attorney General; Carl McIntyre, Assistant
 3                                        Director; Nancy E. Friedman, Senior
 4                                        Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration
 5                                        Litigation, United States Department of
 6                                        Justice, Washington, DC.

 7         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

 8   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10         Petitioner Charnjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of an

11   August 16, 2021, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Charnjit

12   Singh, No. A 201 105 722 (B.I.A. Aug. 16, 2021). We assume the parties’ familiarity

13   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

14         We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion,

15   but review adverse credibility determinations and findings regarding country

16   conditions     evidence      for    substantial     evidence,     and     ineffective

17   assistance of counsel claims de novo. See Esposito v. INS, 987 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir.

18   1993) (“A reviewing court uses its own judgment as to whether counsel was

19   effective . . . .”); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (adverse

20   credibility determination); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168–69 (2d Cir.

21   2008) (motions to reopen and country conditions).
                                               2
 1         It is undisputed that the July 2019 motion was untimely filed more than 90

 2   days after the final order of removal in June 2018. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)

 3   (providing 90-day deadline for motions to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same).

 4   We find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Singh did not satisfy an exception to

 5   the deadline. The deadline does not apply if the noncitizen moves to reopen to

 6   apply for asylum based on “changed country conditions arising in the country of

 7   nationality” if those conditions are material to the alien’s asylum claim. 8 U.S.C.

 8   § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).   And the time to file may be

 9   equitably tolled based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rashid v. Mukasey,

10   533 F.3d 127, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2008).

11         Singh did not satisfy either exception because his motion to reopen was

12   based on the same alleged political activities and past persecution as his original

13   claim, and he did not produce evidence to overcome the underlying adverse

14   credibility determination. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146 (2d

15   Cir. 2007) (upholding BIA’s decision not to credit new documentary evidence

16   given underlying adverse credibility determination); Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232,

17   233–34 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion in BIA’s conclusion that

18   evidence filed with a motion was not material where it did not rebut underlying

                                                3
 1   adverse credibility determination); Matter of F–S–N–, 28 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A.

 2   2020) (“[T]o prevail on a motion to reopen alleging changed country conditions

 3   where the persecution claim was previously denied based on an adverse

 4   credibility finding in the underlying proceedings, the respondent must either

 5   overcome the prior determination or show that the new claim is independent of

 6   the evidence that was found to be not credible.”). Singh does not dispute the

 7   BIA’s finding that he made no new allegations independent of his original claim

 8   that he would be persecuted because of his membership in the Shiromani Akali

 9   Dal Mann (“Mann”) Party. Moreover, the BIA addressed Singh’s challenges to

10   the underlying adverse credibility determination and reasonably found no clear

11   error in that determination.

12         As the BIA concluded, the inconsistency findings are supported by the

13   record. Singh testified that the Congress Party kidnapped him in 2009, but did

14   not physically harm him during that incident; but his written declaration alleged

15   that he was beaten many times. The immigration judge (“IJ”) was not compelled

16   to accept Singh’s explanation that he “remembered later” that he was injured,

17   especially because he had to be prompted multiple times for an explanation and

18   was initially unresponsive. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005)

                                             4
 1   (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent

 2   statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder

 3   would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)).           A

 4   hospital record corroborating a May 2009 injury added inconsistency given

 5   Singh’s testimony that he was not physically harmed.

 6         The BIA also reasonably concluded that Singh’s omission of four incidents

 7   of persecution during an interview and one incident from his written declaration

 8   further undermined his credibility. While omissions, particularly trivial ones, are

 9   less probative of credibility than inconsistencies, the BIA did not err in relying on

10   these omissions because they were central to Singh’s claim of past persecution.

11   See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78 (“[T]he probative value of a witness’s prior silence

12   on particular facts depends on whether those facts are ones the witness would

13   reasonably have been expected to disclose.”). The inconsistencies and omissions

14   together provided substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination.

15   See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single

16   inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to

17   find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more

18   forcefully.”). Accordingly, given the adverse credibility determination, Singh did

                                              5
 1   not establish that the BIA should credit his new allegation that political opponents

 2   and the police were still looking for him in India, and his allegation of worsening

 3   conditions for Mann Party members was not material. See Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234

 4   (upholding agency’s determination “that the evidence submitted by petitioner in

 5   support of her motion was not ‘material’ because it did not rebut the adverse

 6   credibility finding that provided the basis for the IJ’s denial of petitioner’s

 7   underlying asylum application”).

 8         Singh’s failure to rebut the adverse credibility determination is also

 9   dispositive of his claim for equitable tolling based on ineffective assistance of

10   counsel. The doctrine of equitable tolling provides an exception to the deadline

11   if a movant demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rashid, 533 F.3d at

12   130–31. To establish ineffective assistance, Singh had to establish prejudice, i.e.,

13   that the outcome would have been different had his former attorney timely filed a

14   brief on appeal.    See Debeatham v. Holder, 602 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 2010)

15   (concluding that applicant failed to state ineffective assistance claim because he

16   failed to show “that the outcome of his removal proceedings would have been any

17   different”). Because, as discussed above, the BIA considered Singh’s challenges

18   to the adverse credibility determination and the record supports that

                                              6
 1   determination, Singh has not established that the BIA would have found otherwise

 2   had it considered these same arguments on appeal from the IJ’s decision.

 3         Given that Singh did not establish an exception to the 90-day deadline based

 4   on either changed conditions in India or equitable tolling, the BIA did not abuse

 5   its discretion by denying his motion to reopen as untimely.         See 8 U.S.C.

 6   § 1229a(c)(7)(C); Rashid, 533 F.3d at 130–31.

 7         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

 8   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

 9                                          FOR THE COURT:
10                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
11                                          Clerk of Court

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