Court Opinion

ID: 9703292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:50:45.750834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:47.285343
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Montgomery, J.:
Although our Supreme Court has spoken on the troublesome subject of “Suspension of Sentence” in Commonwealth v. Duff, 414 Pa. 471, 200 A. 2d 773 (1964), and has held therein that, under the Acts of June 19, 1911, P. L. 1055, §1, 19 P.S. §1051* and August 6, 1941, P. L. 861, 61 P.S. §331.25, “. . . where no sentence is imposed, the defendant should be placed on probation for a fixed period of time, not to exceed the maximum period of imprisonment allowed by law for the particular offense,” I have difficulty in applying that principle to the present case, wherein the. relator was sentenced on one charge and, impliedly, by reason thereof, had sentences suspended in other cases before the court at the same time.
In the present case the statutes aforesaid were not involved. Relator was not placed on probation, but he was committed to a penal institution for an indefinite period of time on one of several bills of indict*291ment, to all of which he had entered pleas of guilty. It is not unusual for a trial judge to suspend the imposition of sentence on other indictments being considered at the same time, after sentence has been imposed on one or more of them, rather than to impose similar sentences in each case and provide for them to run concurrently. I have seen situations wherein a trial judge has had before him as many- as one hundred similar indictments against the same defendant at one time. Although these cases involved pleas of guilty, the same practice is followed when sentences follow verdicts of guilty, in which instances appeals may follow the judgments of sentence. If the case in which the sentence is imposed is reversed on appeal, the defendant should not go free on the other charges. I find nothing in the Duff case or in any other case to justify his discharge under those circumstances.
I recognize that the original sentence imposed by Judge Carroll on Bill 847 was illegal since the maximum thereof was beyond that provided by law. However, it must be recognized also that in the judgment of that experienced jurist the maximum which the defendant should serve on all of the indictments before the court at that time was that which he provided. Had Judge Carroll been aware of the fact that he could not legally impose that maximum in one sentence, he would have done what he did subsequently,which was to impose consecutive sentences on two bills. I find nothing wrong with this practice. The initial action of that court in suspending sentences on five of the bills of indictment was by reason of the fact that the defendant had been sentenced to -confinement on one bill for a period sufficiently long to satisfy the demands of society for the six crimes that he had committed. Since the condition of the suspension was not capable of legal performance, the court could properly and legally reconsider the entire matter. No *292rights of the defendant would be violated by permitting it to do so and he should not be given the benefit of such a technicality or mistake of law.
When Commonwealth v. Duff, 201 Pa. Superior Ct. 387, 192 A. 2d 258 (1963), was before us I had read into the suspensions of sentence an implication that such action was taken by reason of the probation granted in the other case (which probation had been violated by the commission of another crime within the duration of same). Although, by reason of the acts aforesaid relating to probations, our Supreme Court did not accept such an implied inclusion, I am compelled to adopt a similar implication in this case. When a sentence is suspended without probation or without sentence being imposed in any other case, or for other temporary causes as referred to by the Supreme Court in the Duff case, I would not hesitate to condemn the practice. However, when either a probation or a sentence is involved in other cases before the court at or about the same time, I have difficulty in justifying the discharge of such defendants simply because the trial court failed to state the reason for suspending the other sentences. In the case of probation the law as stated by our Supreme Court in the Duff case is binding. However, that tribunal has not spoken in regard to sentences such as we have before us at this time.
I concur in the result reached by the majority since the corrected maximum sentence on Bill 847 had not expired. I cannot agree that it was error for Judge Carroll to impose a sentence on Bill 848 after rectifying his mistake concerning the maximum term of the sentence on Bill 847.
Flood, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.