Court Opinion

ID: 9542256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:32:25.072372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:19.674512
License: Public Domain

EAKIN, Judge,
concurring:
T agree with my colleagues that appellant’s degree of responsibility for destruction of the vehicle is not irrelevant as a matter of law, but I find the prejudice here to overwhelm the rest of the considerations such that his fault is irrelevant under the facts of this case.
This vehicle was significantly modified by appellant after it left Landmark. Appellant had control of it before and after the fire. It was inspected before appellee was brought into the case by appellant’s suit, yet appellant’s expert offers only speculation as to the cause of the fire. The remains of the car were destroyed before Landmark could inspect it. There is substantial unfairness in forcing Landmark to try to explain why this modified vehicle caught fire in these circumstances. I find the prejudice caused by appellant’s action, or inaction if that be the case, in failing to preserve the vehicle outweighs any determination of the degree of fault between appellant and his scrapyard. If the scrapyard destroyed the car against appellant’s specific instruction, he may be less “at fault” in the destruction, but his remedy ought to be against the party who destroyed the evidence in contravention of his instructions.
While fault is not per se irrelevant in spoliation cases, there was an error in analysis by the Trial Court. However, any lesser remedy than that granted by the learned trial court herein is fundamentally unfair to appellee.