Court Opinion

ID: 9703079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:38:41.544028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:45.337714
License: Public Domain

*65OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
dissenting:
Since I believe that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction, I must respectfully dissent.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine “whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to establish all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86, 91, 645 A.2d 1300, 1303 (1994).
The majority found that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the business element of promoting prostitution. As used in the prostitution statute, the term “business” has been defined as “commercial activity engaged in for gain.” Commonwealth v. Potts, 314 Pa.Super. 256, 271, 460 A.2d 1127, 1135 (1983). Thus, the Commonwealth must produce evidence that will prove the existence of certain activity, commercial rather than personal in nature, that was performed in anticipation of some type of payment or benefit. In each of the two undercover massage incidents in this case, an employee offered a certain sexual service to a stranger/customer along with vague representations about price. In light of all of the evidence and the given context, I simply cannot agree with the majority that this is arguably a consensual sexual act between two adults, rather than a business transaction.
Regarding the first undercover massage, every aspect of this encounter reinforces the notion of a commercial and fee-oriented service relationship. It certainly began as a service relationship when Detective Carroll paid for a massage. After the massage, the masseuse, Ms. Vanderburg, did not indicate that she had any particular affinity for Carroll, or that she was in any way seeking a social relationship. Instead, she continued to act as a provider of services by notifying Carroll that “hand releases” were available. When he inquired about other sexual options, Ms. Vanderburg responded that only “hand releases” were available, as opposed to “full service” or oral sex. She also indicated that a number of other customers *66took advantage of the “hand release” service. This is simply not the kind of language used by a social partner, but rather is the kind of language used by a provider of services discussing available options.
Ms. Vanderburg’s response to Carroll’s price inquiry, that tips would be appreciated, further reinforced the notion of a service rather than a social relationship. . It is of no consequence that Ms. Vanderburg did not give a specific price or demand payment up front. By responding to the price inquiry with a reference to a type of payment, she clearly indicated that the service was not being performed for free.1 The facts of this encounter simply do not lend themselves to the conclusion that this was a social relationship between consenting adults; rather the facts indicate that these services were being offered commercially, in anticipation of some type of payment or benefit.
Similarly, the evidence regarding the second undercover massage reveals the same kind of service-oriented relationship. Once again, Detective Carroll paid a stranger for a massage. At the completion of the massage, Carroll asked about additional sexual options. In response, Ms. Grama explained that house rules prohibited any service other than a “hand release,” which was available. In this encounter, there was no discussion of price because Carroll had indicated that he was not interested in the “hand release.” As in the first incident, the masseuse indicated that many customers took advantage of the “hand release” service.
Based on the evidence obtained in these two encounters, I would find that a reasonable inference could be drawn that the two masseuse/employees were regularly and commercially offering a sexual service to customers in anticipation of payment or benefit; stated another way, that they were engaged in commercial activity for gain.
*67Since the underlying actions constitute a prostitution business, I must next examine appellant’s relationship to that business. One of the statutory definitions of promoting prostitution is “owning, controlling, managing, supervising, or otherwise keeping ... a prostitution business.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5902(b)(1). Citing Commonwealth v. Blankenbiller, 362 Pa.Super. 477, 524 A.2d 976 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 591, 535 A.2d 81 (1987), the majority found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that appellant owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept a prostitution business. I disagree.
In Blankenbiller, this Court found the evidence insufficient to connect a corporate officer to a prostitution business operating at a party on corporate property. Id. at 482-84, 524 A.2d at 979. In discussing the weakness of the evidence, the Blankenbiller Court noted that although the officer promoted and attended the party, he was not automatically liable for everything that occurred there. Id. Since there was no evidence that the officer planned, arranged, or took part in the illicit activities, or that he received any income from the operation of the business, he could not be found guilty of owning, controlling, managing, supervising, or keeping a prostitution business. Id.
The circumstances of the instant case differ markedly from those in Blankenbiller. As an initial matter, I note that the illicit activity in Blankenbiller occurred at a party, while the activities at issue here were a regular and integral part of appellant’s business. Common sense dictates that we require more oversight and diligence from a business owner running his daily operations than from a party-going corporate officer who attends an event on corporate property.
Secondly, the corporate officer in Blankenbiller did not plan, organize, or otherwise take part in the illicit activity that occurred at the party. In contrast, appellant took a very active part in planning and organizing his business. During the job interview with undercover Officer Libby Hagger, appellant informed her of a detailed set of house rules, the most significant of which was the rule prohibiting intercourse. *68Appellant made it very clear that he would be checking on his employees to be sure that they followed this rule. In the same interview, appellant explicitly stated that “hand releases” were allowed. These clear rules given to a prospective employee indicate that appellant was actively involved, as a business owner should be, in determining what would and what would not take place in his establishment. Since “hand releases” are no different than actual intercourse under the prostitution statute, however, appellant was making a useless distinction. Pursuant to his own stated house rules, appellant was allowing a prostitution business to flourish at his establishment.
Lastly, appellant was indirectly benefiting from the prostitution business on his premises. As the majority correctly notes, we cannot assume, based on the available evidence, that the “hand release” was included in the price of the massage. Similarly, we have no evidence to suggest that appellant was collecting a portion of the “tips” that his employees received for “hand releases.” Therefore, the Commonwealth has failed to prove that appellant was receiving any direct benefit from the prostitution business. Nevertheless, both masseuse/employees informed Detective Carroll that many men came to the club for the “hand release” service, and that the place was “busy for that purpose.” N.T. 12/14/93 at 16. Thus, even if appellant was not receiving a direct portion of the payments from “hand releases,” he was receiving the indirect benefit of increased business by customers specifically seeking the sexual service.
Therefore, unlike Blankenbiller, we are presently faced with an on-site business owner, who is actively involved in the day-to-day operations of his business, specifically allowing a prostitution business to exist as an integral and profit-enhancing part of his business. While appellant’s “it’s up to you” style may preclude the finding that he managed; supervised, or controlled a prostitution business, I must conclude that his actions do rise to the level of “otherwise keeping” a prostitution business.
*69Since I would find that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for promoting prostitution, and that appellant’s two remaining claims are meritless,21 would affirm this judgment of sentence.

. It is trae, as the majority notes, that Ms. Vanderburg was not clear about whether the "hand release” was included in the price of the massage. For the purposes of finding the existence of an underlying prostitution business, however, it is irrelevant whether the "hand release” service was included or offered "a la carte," so long as it was offered for a fee. .

. Appellant alleges that certain statements made by Ms. Vanderburg and Ms. Grama were admitted in violation of the corpus delicti rule. This rule requires that “independent evidence, beyond the statement of the accused, suggests that a crime has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Buck, 426 Pa.Super. 26, 29, 626 A.2d 176, 177 (1993). Since I agree with the trial court that the testimony of the undercover officers provided sufficient independent evidence to suggest that prostitution was occurring, I reject appellant’s assertion that the corpus delicti rule was violated.
Appellant also alleges that the trial court erred in not requiring Officer Hagger to demonstrate the hand gesture she used to indicate male masturbation when she interviewed with appellant. Appellant believes that Hagger impermissibly testified as to her opinion of what the gesture meant. I find this argument totally devoid of merit. The transcript of the interview between appellant and Officer Hagger indicates that immediately after Hagger made the gesture, appellant responded by stating "That’s up to you. You talking about a hand release?" Hagger answered “Yeah." Since both parties clarified their understanding of the gesture in the ensuing conversation, which was captured on tape, Officer Hagger’s trial testimony was not an impermissible opinion, but was merely cumulative evidence of the parties' understanding of the term.