Court Opinion

ID: 9945329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:10:49.055611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.721133
License: Public Domain

J-S02002-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JAMES GRAHAM                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 22 EDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 1, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0010428-2007

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2024

       James Graham appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.         After review, we

affirm.

       This Court has previously adopted the following factual summary:

       On March 12, 2007, at approximately two o’clock p.m., a group of
       basketball players arrived at Dickinson Square Park, a
       neighborhood [park] with a basketball court, a recreation center,
       and a playground, surrounded by 3rd Street, 4th Street, Morris
       Street, and Tasker Street. George Ocasio [] and Justin Davis []
       arrived in Ocasio’s white Mercury Sable and parked on Morris
       Street. Mark Wilson [], David Stokes [], Terrell Drummond [],
       and [Albert] Hughes arrived together in Wilson’s silver Oldsmobile
       Intrigue. They parked directly behind Ocasio’s car on Morris
       Street. William Duncan [] parked his blue Grand Marquis directly
       behind Wilson’s car.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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     Duncan, Ocasio, and Davis were from 5th Street and played for
     one team. Stokes, Drummond, and Wilson were from 7th Street
     and played for the other team. Most of the players had known
     each other for years. Each team bet $300 on the game.

     Markel White [], [Graham], and [Graham]’s brother, Kareem
     Graham (“Kareem”), all from 5th Street, sat next to the basketball
     court and watched the game, along with Hughes[, who was] from
     7th Street. There were many other people in the park at that time
     as well—some watching the game, others playing on the
     playground.

     The game went on for approximately twenty minutes until a foul
     call started an argument between the two teams. Stokes and
     [Graham] were verbally arguing when Stokes asked Hughes to
     pass him his gun. When Hughes passed Stokes a gun, people
     began to leave the basketball court.      Stokes, Hughes, and
     Drummond walked back to Wilson’s Oldsmobile. Stokes entered
     the passenger seat, while the other two men sat in the backseat,
     Hughes behind the driver seat, and Drummond behind the
     passenger seat.

     From approximately 50-55 yards away from the car, on a pathway
     in Dickinson Square Park, [Graham] pulled out a gun, aimed it
     with two hands at the Oldsmobile and fired twice at the car. Two
     fired cartridge casings were found on the pathway where
     witnesses placed [Graham].

     One of the shots went through the glass window of the Oldsmobile
     and hit Hughes in his head. He was taken to the hospital and[,]
     on March 13, 2007, he was pronounced dead as a result of this
     gunshot wound. The Medical Examiner [found] stippling on
     Hughes’ face[,] which he testified could be a result of a close range
     shot or due to the shattered car window glass.

     On March 13, 2007, March 15, 2007, and March 19, 2007,
     respectively, Duncan, White, and Davis gave statements to
     detectives identifying [Graham] as the shooter.

     On March 16, 2007, an arrest warrant was issued for [Graham]
     and the Fugitive Squad went to his house that morning at 6 a.m.
     When police saw a man fitting [Graham]’s description, he showed
     them identification with the name “Malik Lamore Graham” and
     claimed that he was [Graham]’s brother. However, the police

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      investigated further, [they determined that] this man was[,] in
      fact[, Graham,] himself. He was arrested at this time. On May
      17, 2007, Kareem [] told a social worker at his juvenile detention
      facility that he had witnessed his brother murder someone. The
      social worker called [h]omicide [h]eadquarters and Kareem gave
      a statement identifying [Graham] as the shooter on March 12.

Commonwealth v. Graham, 239 A.3d 53 (Pa. Super. 2020) (Table).

      Graham proceeded to a jury trial in 2008, which resulted in a hung jury.

Following a second trial, the jury convicted Graham of third-degree murder

and possessing instruments of crime. The trial court sentenced Graham to an

aggregate term of 17½ to 45 years’ imprisonment. Graham filed an appeal,

and, on October 8, 2010, this Court affirmed Graham’s judgment of sentence.

See Commonwealth v. Graham, 15 A.3d 520 (Pa. Super. 2010) (Table).

Graham filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which our Supreme Court

denied on March 8, 2011.

      Over the next 10 years, Graham filed four PCRA petitions, all of which

were dismissed. See Commonwealth v. Graham, 239 A.3d 53 (Pa. Super.

2020) (Table) (denying Graham’s third PCRA petition and summarizing factual

and procedural history); see also PCRA Court Opinion, 12/1/22, at 2

(indicating Graham had filed fourth PCRA petition, and appealed, but withdrew

his appeal on May 25, 2022).

      On July 20, 2022, Graham filed, through his counsel, the instant PCRA

petition, his fifth, in which he argued that the arrest of former Philadelphia

Detective James Pitts constituted a newly-discovered fact. On October 26,

2022, Graham filed a supplemental PCRA petition arguing that he was entitled

to a new trial based upon a newly-discovered fact in the form of a new witness,

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Antonio Jardine.      In his supplemental PCRA petition, Graham included a

supplemental memorandum of law and an unsworn certification containing

Jardine’s purported testimony. On November 3, 2022, the PCRA court issued

notice of its intent to dismiss Graham’s petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

Graham did not file a response.           On December 1, 2022, the PCRA court

dismissed Graham’s petition.

       Graham filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.1 Graham now

raises the following claims for our review:

       I. Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion in failing to find that []
       Pitts’ arrest and the proposed testimony of [] Jardine []
       constituted “new” evidence for the purpose of the PCRA statute’s
       time bar exception of 4[2] Pa.C.S.A. § 9545[(b)(1)(ii)]?

       II. Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion in failing to find that
       [Graham] suffered prejudice as a result of the exclusion of Pitts’
       arrest record and Jardine’s testimony from the PCRA record?

Brief for Appellant, at 2.

       Before addressing Graham’s issues on appeal, we must determine

whether his PCRA petition was timely filed and, if not, whether he has satisfied

an exception to the PCRA time bar. Any PCRA petition “shall be filed within a

year of the date judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A
____________________________________________

1 On May 18, 2023, this Court entered an order dismissing Graham’s appeal

for failure to file a brief. See Order, 5/18/23, at 1. On June 1, 2023, Graham’s
counsel filed an application for reconsideration.           See Application for
Reconsideration, 6/1/23, at 1-2. On June 7, 2023, this Court granted
Graham’s motion for reconsideration, vacated the May 18, 2023 order, and
reinstated the briefing schedule. See Order, 6/7/23, at 1. Graham’s counsel
subsequently filed a timely brief.

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judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review,

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking

review.”   Id. at 9545(b)(3).       The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are

jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues

raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht,

994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

      Instantly, Graham’s judgment of sentence became final, for purposes of

the PCRA, on June 6, 2011, when the time expired for him to file a writ of

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.            See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1)-(3); Sup.Ct.R. 13. Consequently, Graham’s instant PCRA petition,

filed on July 20, 2022, is patently untimely.

      However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely petition if the

petitioner can explicitly plead and prove one of the three exceptions set forth

at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Those three exceptions are as follows:

      (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
      interference by government officials with the presentation of the
      claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
      or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

      (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
      the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
      of due diligence; or

      (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
      by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
      of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
      has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

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Id. Any petition invoking one of these exceptions “shall be filed within one

year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id. at § 9545(b)(2).2

“The PCRA petitioner bears the burden of proving the applicability of one of

the exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017).

       Here, Graham purports to invoke the newly-discovered facts exception.

First, he argues that Pitts’ arrest and subsequent perjury charge constitute a

newly-discovered fact that satisfies the exception to the PCRA time-bar. See

Brief for Appellant, at 8-12. We disagree.

       The newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA time bar “renders a

petition timely when the petitioner establishes that the facts upon which the

claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Small, 238

A.3d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 2020) (quotation omitted). A PCRA court must first

determine “whether the facts upon which the claim is predicated were

unknown to the petitioner.” Id. at 1282 (quotation marks omitted). “The

focus of the exception is on [the] newly[-]discovered facts, not on a newly[-

]discovered     or   newly[-]willing      source   for   previously   known   facts.”

____________________________________________

2 We observe that section 9545(b)(2) was amended on October 24, 2018,
effective in 60 days (i.e., December 24, 2018), extending the time for filing
from 60 days of the date the claim could have been first presented, to one
year. The amendment applies to claims arising on December 24, 2017, or
thereafter. See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, N. 146, § 3. Instantly, as we
discuss infra, Graham was aware of Jardine and his purported testimony as
early as March 12, 2007, and, therefore, the original 60-day limit applies to
Graham’s second claim that Jardine’s purported testimony would constitute a
newly-discovered fact.

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Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (internal citation

and quotation marks omitted). In other words, the fact that a petitioner has

“discovered yet another conduit” for a claim previously presented “does not

transform his latest source into evidence falling within the ambit of section

9545(b)(1)(ii).” Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 745 (Pa. Super.

2020) (en banc) (citation omitted). If the PCRA court concludes that the facts

were unknown, then the PCRA court must next examine whether “the facts

could have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, including an

assessment of the petitioner’s access to public records.” Small, 238 A.3d at

1271. Further, “[d]ue diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable

steps to protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not

have obtained the new facts earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This

rule is strictly enforced.” Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080

(Pa. Super. 2010).

      Here, it is clear that Graham was aware of Pitts’ misconduct in coercing

witness statements since at least 2019. See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/1/22,

at 6 (summarizing Graham’s prior PCRA claims raising Pitts’ misconduct); see

also Commonwealth v. Graham, 239 A.3d 53 (Pa. Super. 2020) (Table)

(addressing   timeliness   of   Graham’s   challenge   to   Pitts’   misconduct).

Therefore, Pitts’ arrest for perjury in an unrelated case merely constitutes a

new “conduit” presenting the same evidence.            See Maxwell, supra.

                                     -7-
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Consequently, Graham cannot satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception,

and the PCRA court did not err in dismissing this claim.3

       In his second claim, Graham argues that Jardine is a new witness who

would testify that Graham could not have been the shooter because Graham

was with Jardine at the time of the shooting. See Brief for Appellant, at 8-

12.   Graham contends that Jardine’s new testimony satisfies the newly-

discovered fact exception because Jardine refused to come forward until

October 10, 2022, when Jardine spoke with Graham’s counsel. See id. at 10-

11. Graham acknowledges that police initially interviewed Jardine, but asserts

that Jardine attempted to avoid involvement in the case because Jardine did

not want to jeopardize his basketball scholarship to Syracuse University. See

id. Graham argues that Jardine is not merely a new source of a previously

known fact, but is the only source. See id. at 12. Graham claims that “he

was unable to provide any evidence [of his alibi] because of Jardine’s

unavailability.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Graham argues that he acted with

due diligence in discovering Jardine’s testimony because, due to Jardine’s

avoidance of law enforcement, Jardine was unavailable at all relevant times

____________________________________________

3 Moreover, we observe that even if we could address the merits of this claim,

we would be constrained to find that it is meritless. As we stated in Graham,
supra, Pitts only interviewed Duncan. See Graham, supra. Additionally,
the jury heard, from Duncan, that Pitts had coerced his police statement.
Nevertheless, there were several other witnesses, interviewed by different
detectives, who identified Graham as the shooter. See PCRA Court Opinion,
12/1/22, at 6-7.

                                           -8-
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until he agreed to provide a statement to PCRA counsel on October 10, 2022.

See id.

     The Commonwealth, in its brief, agrees with Graham, and asks that we

find Graham’s PCRA petition meets the newly-discovered fact exception. See

Appellee’s Brief, at 26-28. The Commonwealth concedes that Graham could

not have discovered Jardine’s testimony until October 10, 2022, when Jardine

agreed to speak with Graham’s counsel. See id. The Commonwealth points

out that Jardine, aside from his initial interview with police, was entirely

uninvolved with the investigation and did not appear at any court hearings.

See id. at 27-28. Consequently, the Commonwealth requests that we find

Graham’s PCRA petition timely filed, and remand for an evidentiary hearing,

at which Jardine may testify to determine whether his testimony would satisfy

the after-discovered evidence test. See id.

     In its opinion, the PCRA court concluded that Jardine’s testimony did not

satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception, and determined that Graham’s

PCRA petition was untimely. See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/1/22, at 8-12. In

so finding, the PCRA court noted that Graham would have known if he was

with Jardine at the time of the shooting and, therefore, Jardine’s testimony

could not have been a newly-discovered fact. See id. at 8, 12. After review,

we agree with the PCRA court’s determination.

     Assuming arguendo that Jardine’s testimony is true, Graham was with

Jardine, was aware of Jardine’s existence as a witness, and knew that Jardine

would be able to provide him with an alibi. See id. at 8, 12. Additionally,

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Graham is required to demonstrate that he acted with due diligence in

securing Jardine’s testimony. See Monaco, supra. However, Graham’s bald

averments that Jardine avoided police contact, and did not appear “at all

relevant times,” are insufficient. Graham does not point to any attempts by

him or his prior counsel to secure Jardine’s testimony at any time prior to July

20, 2022. See Unsworn Certification of Counsel, 10/12/22, at 1-3 (detailing

Jardine’s proposed testimony and PCRA counsel’s due diligence efforts).4

Indeed, the record indicates that Jardine gave an initial statement to police

on March 13, 2007, after which Jardine was entirely uninvolved in the case.

Fifteen years have passed from the time Jardine gave his initial statement

until October 12, 2022, with no evidence of any diligence exercised by or on

behalf of Graham. Consequently, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err

in dismissing this claim and we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing

Graham’s PCRA petition. See Monaco, supra.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

4 We note that current PCRA counsel has represented Graham since July 20,

2022, and the unsworn certification only contains his actions of due diligence
since becoming counsel. See id.

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Date: 2/27/2024

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