Court Opinion

ID: 9893809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:09:22.495651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.214888
License: Public Domain

J-S15036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :          PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant            :
                                        :
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 EMERSON PAUL LOUIS SEGER               :     No. 1425 MDA 2022

           Appeal from the Order Entered September 29, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0001016-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                 FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2023

     The Commonwealth appeals from the order which: (1) granted, in part,

the post-sentence motion filed by Emerson Paul Louis Seger (“Seger”); (2)

dismissed his conviction for attempted murder; and (3) vacated his judgment

of sentence. We affirm.

     The trial court summarized the relevant trial evidence as follows:

           On May 7, 2020, . . . four individuals arrived at Frislet
     Joseph’s [(“Joseph”)] home [at 142 Lincoln Way West in
     Chambersburg] around 11:58 p.m. Angela Lawyer, a neighbor,
     called the police after she heard arguing and looked out her
     window to see two men with machetes and one man with a gun.
     N.T.[,] 4/5/[]22, [at] 47. She saw a man wearing a black jacket
     with white sleeves point a gun at a window of [Joseph’s] home
     and then heard three shots. Id. at 47-49. [Joseph] also called
     911 where he screamed “home invasion” repeatedly. Id. at 153.

           Detective James Iverson testified that the Chambersburg
     Borough has a camera system that law enforcement used to
     investigate the incident. On the video, individuals can be seen
     leaving 31 North Franklin Street. Four individuals can be seen
     standing outside [Joseph’s] home. A man in a black jacket with
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     white sleeves points a firearm at one of the windows and pulls the
     trigger. N.T.[,] 4/6/[]22, [at] 23. After the incident, two
     individuals went back inside the home located at 31 North Franklin
     Street. The other two individuals did not go into the home and
     continued on foot away from the scene. N.T.[,] 4/5/[]22, [at]
     134.

            Detective Iverson was on call that evening. His sergeant
     informed him that an individual known as John Foreus may have
     been involved. Id. at 136. Detective Iverson learned that the
     individuals were observed running and heading to the area of
     North Franklin Street. Law enforcement created a perimeter
     around the residence. Id. at 138-[]39. Detective Iverson was
     notified that Mr. Foreus had exited the home. Id. Once he was
     apprehended, Mr. Foreus was transported back to the police
     department so that he could be interviewed. Id. Detective
     Iverson requested a warrant for 31 North Franklin Street. He
     learned that Maria Manzo, who owned the home, was in a
     relationship with Mr. Foreus. Id. at 141. Law enforcement did
     not find the machetes or the gun in Ms. Manzo’s home.

            Mr. Foreus identified the other individuals as Dormsley
     Audath, Jeffrey Leandre, and “King.” [N.T.,] 4/4/[]22, [at] 46.
     [Seger] was later identified as “King” by using his driver’s license
     photo. Mr. Foreus explained to law enforcement that he knew
     [Joseph] and, at one point in time, they were friends. Id. He
     went to [Joseph’s] house because [Joseph] approached his wife
     and said, “your pussy husband needs to come because I have
     something for him.” Id. at 57. Mr. Foreus went to talk to
     [Joseph,] but [Joseph] would not allow him in the home. [Mr.
     Foreus] then contacted Mr. Audath, Mr. Leandre, and [Seger] who
     then arrived at [Joseph’s] home. Id. Mr. Audath and Mr. Leandre
     brought machetes, that Mr. Foreus took from them. Id. at 56.
     Mr. Foreus testified that [Seger] kicked [Joseph’s] door and then[,
     as the assailants were running away, Seger] fired a gun three
     times [into a window]. Id. at 58. . . . Mr. Foreus did not know
     what type of gun [Seger] used. He described the gun as having
     “the little wheel that pops out and you load it up and it kind of
     spins.” [Id. at] 59. No shell casings were found at the scene
     which lead [sic] law enforcement to believe that a revolver was
     used. N.T.[,] 4/5/[]22, [at] 126-[]27.

          Detective Todd Hardin located a Chevy Malibu near the
     corner of Lincoln Way and North Franklin Street in a parking lot

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     that belonged to the Salvation Army. [Id. at] 111. An empty gun
     holster was on the passenger seat.         Id. Detective Hardin
     identified this as the type of holster that would be used with a
     revolver. Id. He ran the license plate and learned that the vehicle
     was registered to Nelson Destinville. Id. at 111. Mr. Destinville’s
     name is on the registration[,] but a woman described as “Fabiola”
     owned the vehicle. Id. at 144. “Fabiola” was identified as Esthere
     Raphael, [Seger’s] paramour. Id. at 150. [Seger] was also
     known to drive the vehicle. Law enforcement obtained a search
     warrant for the vehicle and found the gun holster, various rounds
     of ammunition, and [Seger’s] Indiana driver’s license. Id. at 150.
     Mr. Leandre revealed that he saw [Seger] park his car in the
     Salvation Army parking lot on the night of the incident. Id. at 38.

           [Seger] was not apprehended on May 7, 2020. Detective
     Iversen received a Crime Watch tip that [Seger] left the area and
     returned to Indiana. [N.T.,] 4/6/[]22, [at] 9. Detective Iversen
     received information from Indiana Trooper Beam who saw
     [Seger]. Id. Over a week after the incident, [Seger] was arrested
     in Indiana and brought back to Pennsylvania. [Seger’s] jury trial
     [took place in] April [] 2022.

            The jury found [Seger] guilty of one count of conspiracy to
     commit burglary, one count of aggravated assault, three counts
     of discharging of a firearm into occupied structure, one count of
     recklessly endangering another person, and one count of
     attempted murder. Th[e trial] court sentenced [Seger] to an
     aggregate of 84 to 264 months of incarceration at a state
     correctional institution on June 15, 2022. [Seger] filed a post-
     sentence motion [in which he argued, inter alia, that the
     Commonwealth produced insufficient evidence to support his
     conviction for attempted murder]. After the Commonwealth filed
     a continuance, a hearing to address [Seger’s] post-sentence
     motion was scheduled for August . . . 2022. After the hearing,
     the court allowed defense counsel to file an amended post-
     sentence motion and brief. [Seger] filed his amended post-
     sentence motion [i]n August . . . 2022. [On September 29, 2022,
     the trial court entered an order granting, in part, and denying, in
     part, Seger’s post-sentence motion. The trial court determined
     that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for
     attempted murder. The trial court then dismissed the charge for
     attempted murder, vacated Seger’s judgment of sentence, and
     scheduled a resentencing hearing.]

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Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/22, at 2-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).1

       The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.2

       The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review: “[w]hether

the lower court erred when it granted [Seger’s] post-sentence motion that

there was insufficient evidence to support [Seger’s] conviction for attempted

murder?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

       Questions of evidentiary sufficiency present questions of law; thus, our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.             See

Commonwealth v. Sanford, 863 A.2d 428, 431 (Pa. 2004).                       When

conducting a sufficiency review:

             [W]e evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the
       verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
       inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be
       deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each
       material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof
       by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the
       Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
       certainty. [T]he facts and circumstances established by the
       Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with the
       defendant’s innocence. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is
____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth filed its notice of appeal prior to the resentencing
hearing; consequently, the trial court cancelled the resentencing hearing
pending resolution of this appeal.

2 We note with disapproval that the trial court did not author a Rule 1925(a)

opinion or a letter to this Court indicating the place in the record where an
explanation may be found for its order granting, in part, Seger’s post-sentence
motion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1). Nevertheless, we have located the trial
court’s opinion, filed simultaneously with its order granting, in part, Seger’s
post-sentence motion, which states the reasons for its order.

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       to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
       and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact
       can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).           In conducting our review, we consider all

evidence actually admitted at trial and do not review a diminished record.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. 1989).

       “A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific

crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the

commission of that crime.”         18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).   “Criminal attempt to

murder is defined by reading the attempt statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a), in

conjunction with the [first-degree] murder statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).”

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 650 A.2d 20, 23 (Pa. 1994).3 Thus, a

“conviction for attempted murder requires the Commonwealth to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to kill

and took a substantial step towards that goal.”              Commonwealth v.

Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 652 (Pa. 2008).             In sum, attempted murder is

composed of two primary elements: (1) the mens rea element, which is the

specific intent to kill (which is identical to the mens rea element of murder in

the first degree); and (2) the actus reus element, which is the commission of

____________________________________________

3 Attempted murder is, by definition, attempted first-degree murder. See
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 456 A.2d 171, 177 (Pa. Super. 1983). Thus, the
crimes of attempted murder in the second degree and attempted murder in
the third degree do not exist. Id.

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one or more acts which collectively constitute a substantial step toward the

commission of a killing. See Commonwealth v. Predmore, 199 A.3d 925,

929 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

      The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in granting

Seger’s post-sentence motion insofar as it related to the insufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction for attempted murder. The Commonwealth

initially challenges the trial court’s observation that none of the co-

conspirators testified that Seger had any personal issue with Joseph or that

Seger had a specific intent to kill Joseph. The Commonwealth asserts that no

such testimony was required to establish that Seger acted with the requisite

intent when he fired three shots into the window of the residence in which

Joseph was located.    The Commonwealth claims that the only reason that

Seger was in the area was because Foreus called him, and Foreus had a

disagreement with Joseph earlier that day. According to the Commonwealth,

“[i]t is reasonable for the jury to conclude that Seger arrived at the residence

with the intent to handle the disagreement between Foreus and Joseph.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 21. The Commonwealth next argues that the trial

court incorrectly concluded that there was no evidence that Seger fired his

gun at Joseph.    Although the Commonwealth concedes that there was no

testimony regarding Joseph’s actual location, it nevertheless argues that

Foreus stated that Joseph was speaking on the other side of the front door.

The Commonwealth asserts that it presented video which showed that Seger

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moved from the door of the apartment to the window located to the left of the

front door and then fired rounds into the window toward the direction of the

door. The Commonwealth claims that this “evidence showed that Seger fired

the gun in the direction of where he believed [Joseph] to be.” Id. at 22. The

Commonwealth further argues that the bullet strike on the stove indicates that

shots were fired at a height intended to strike a person, rather than at a floor

or ceiling.

      The trial court considered the Commonwealth’s issue and concluded that

it lacked merit. The court reasoned:

            The Commonwealth failed to demonstrate how that [Seger]
      had the specific intent to kill. . . .

             The courts have long upheld that the Commonwealth may
      sufficiently prove the mens rea element for attempted murder by
      looking at the circumstances that demonstrate a defendant’s
      intent to kill. These circumstances can range from a variety of
      situations.    The courts have upheld an attempted murder
      conviction where a defendant shot at a man while he was sitting
      in his car, but suffered no injury[, when] . . . the defendant’s
      statements at the scene along with other evidence of a
      long[-]standing feud created sufficient evidence to establish the
      requisite intent to support an attempted murder conviction. The
      Commonwealth noted in it[s] sentencing memorandum that
      “[Seger], at the time these acts took place, had no personal issues
      with the victim.” Commonwealth’s Sentencing Memorandum, [at]
      2. Despite having the testimony of Mr. Foreus, Mr. Audath, and
      Mr. Leandre, none of the coconspirators testified that [Seger
      provided] any indication that he possessed the specific intent to
      kill.

             Court[s] have long held that firing a bullet in the general
      direction in which vital organs are located can create sufficient
      evidence to support an attempted murder conviction.              The
      Commonwealth did not show any evidence to demonstrate what
      direction [Seger] fired his gun. At no point during the trial did the

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      Commonwealth present any evidence as to what room [Joseph]
      was in during the incident. The only facts that the Commonwealth
      did establish is that [Joseph] was home at the time of the incident,
      that [Seger] fired the gun at a window, and that [Joseph] was on
      the phone with 911. The Commonwealth presented evidence that
      [Joseph] “[was] in terror screaming, home invasion. Home
      invasion. Repeatedly.” N.T.[,] 4/5/[]22, [at] 153. However, this
      evidence does not equate to a presumption that [Seger] pointed
      his gun at [Joseph] nor does this evidence create any indication
      that [Seger] wanted to kill [Joseph].

            There is no possible presumption that can be made that the
      presence and firing of a revolver, without any additional
      statements or actions by [Seger], indicated the specific intent to
      kill. The Commonwealth failed to demonstrate the appropriate
      mens rea. The actus reus is not enough to support this conviction.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/22, at 18-20 (some citations and unnecessary

capitalization omitted).

      Here, the facts are not in serious dispute. The core issue is whether the

reasonable inferences derived from those facts were sufficient to permit a jury

to conclude that Seger possessed the specific intent to kill Joseph.         More

specifically, the question is whether the record evidence presented by the

Commonwealth supports a reasonable inference that Seger intended to kill

Joseph. Our review confirms that the record evidence does not support such

an inference.

      What is reasonable in any given case is not easily susceptible to bright-

line rules.     Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts have established some

guidelines with respect to intent-to-kill jurisprudence. For example, the “use

of a deadly weapon directed at a vital organ of another human being justifies

a factual presumption that the actor intended death unless the testimony

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contains additional evidence that would demonstrate a contrary intent.”

Commonwealth v. Alston, 317 A.2d 229, 231 (Pa. 1974). This presumption

clearly does not apply in this case, as Seger did not shoot at or near a vital

organ of Joseph’s body.      Accordingly, the Commonwealth was required to

establish   a   specific   intent   to   kill   through   other   evidence.   See

Commonwealth v. Cross, 331 A.2d 813 (Pa. Super. 1974) (affirming a

conviction for attempted murder where the appellant fired at the victim while

he was sitting in a vehicle, the bullet lodged in the vehicle exterior at a height

near the stomach of the victim, the Commonwealth presented evidence of a

longstanding feud between appellant and the brother of the victim, and

appellant shouted “this is for your brother” immediately prior to firing at the

victim); see also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 392 A.2d 1366, 1369 (Pa.

1978) (affirming a conviction for attempted murder where appellant shot a

gas station attendant in the shoulder—in the general area in which vital organs

are located—during the course of a robbery of the station, and where other

circumstances demonstrated appellant’s intent to kill, including his statement

to his accomplice that “he knows me” before shooting at the attendant in the

dark).

      In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth did not proffer any evidence

that Seger verbally indicated, directly or indirectly, his intent to kill Joseph.

Nor did the Commonwealth present any other circumstantial evidence to

suggest such an intent. At trial, Foreus testified that when he and his cohorts

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went to Joseph’s apartment, the door to the apartment was open, although

there was pushing of the door.      See N.T., 4/4/22, at 57; see also N.T.,

4/5/22, at 28-29 (where Audath confirmed that the assailants were pushing

on Joseph’s door). At some point, Seger kicked the door. Id. Foreus further

testified that, when he and his cohorts realized that law enforcement was

aware of the situation, they fled. Id. at 58. Foreus explained that, as the

assailants were running away from Joseph’s apartment, Seger fired three

shots into the window. Id.

      The Commonwealth asserts that “Seger and Audath attempted to gain

entry into the residence by pushing and kicking the door, and Joseph was

speaking from the other side of the door.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 7 (citing

Commonwealth Exhibit 138, which is a recorded police interview of Foreus).

If Seger could hear Joseph on the other side of the door, an intent to kill might

have been inferred if Seger had shot—at stomach or chest level—through the

door toward where the sound of Joseph’s voice could be heard. However,

Seger did not do so. Instead, Seger moved away from the door and fired

shots through a window located to the left of the door as he and the other

assailants fled.   See N.T., 4/4/22, at 58.     Moreover, the Commonwealth

presented no evidence that Joseph was near the window, or that he was visible

to Seger from outside of the window when the shots were fired. Indeed, the

Commonwealth concedes that “there was no testimony regarding Joseph’s

actual location.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 22.

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      In sum, the Commonwealth only describes its proof of the actus reus

element of attempted murder (i.e., the act of shooting into the window), and

then summarily concludes that the mens rea element naturally follows from

the proof of the former.    It does not.      As explained above, the crime of

attempted murder occurs when “the defendant had the specific intent to kill

and took a substantial step towards that goal.” Blakeney, 946 A.2d at 652

(emphasis added). That the Commonwealth established that Seger took a

substantial step does not operate to satisfy its separate burden of proving that

Seger had a specific intent to kill Joseph.      Thus, even when viewing the

evidence of record in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the facts

cannot support a reasonable inference that Seger intended to kill Joseph.

See Franklin, 69 A.3d at 722.

      Order affirmed.

      Judge Stabile joins the majority decision.

      Judge Bowes files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/30/2023

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