Court Opinion

ID: 9595950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:44:44.6598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:16.917837
License: Public Domain

*689MACK KIDD, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. I agree that Dubai has changed the jurisdictional landscape, and I agree that the trial court clearly had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this cause. I also agree with the majority that Dubai has overruled our decision in McKillip in its entirety. However, I choose to write separately to emphasize that under the law there is, in actuality, no statutory impediment present in this case.
This is a suit for judicial review of an agency order. The Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (the “Commission”) granted TXI Operations, L.P. (“TXI”) a permit to burn solid waste in TXI’s cement kilns at Midlothian. Appellants, Sierra Club and Downwinders at Risk, challenged the issuance of the permit and after losing before the Commission, sought judicial review in district court. Appellants brought their appeal in district court, alleging in their petition jurisdiction under the authority of, inter alia, section 382.032 of the Health and Safety Code (the “Clean Air Act”) and section 5.351 of the Texas Water Code.1 See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.032 (West Supp.2000); Tex. Water Code Ann. § 5.351 (West 2000). These statutes contain detailed provisions regarding the steps necessary to appeal a ruling, order, decision, or other act of the Commission. With minor irregularities not relevant to this appeal, all require that the appeal be filed in district court within thirty days and that service of citation be had upon the Commission within thirty days of the filing of the petition.2 Nowhere within the organic statutes governing the Commission is there any requirement that TXI, the applicant, be served at all, either by citation or by the more informal methods of providing notice under rules 21 and 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the district court relied upon our decision in McKillip and held that certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) mandate that each party of record in the agency proceedings be served a copy of the petition. I disagree with this decision.
First, as the majority observes, McKil-lip has been overruled in its entirety by Dubai. Second, the section of the APA relied upon by appellees and cited by the district court in its order of dismissal applies only in the absence of other controlling provisions. That section states in pertinent part: “Unless otherwise provided by statute ... a copy of the petition must be served on the state agency and each party of record in the proceedings before the agency-” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.176(b)(2) (West Supp.2000). In this case, other applicable statutes exist that explicitly deal with service and notice of *690appeals made pursuant to the Clean Air Act, Solid Waste Disposal Act, and the Water Code. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 361.321, 382.032; Tex. Water Code Ann. § 5.357 (West 2000). As a consequence, the APA provision is inapplicable to this appeal. None of the provisions applicable to the instant case require service of citation on all parties involved at the agency level. As stated previously, the Clean Air Act requires only that the Commission be served with citation within thirty days after the date of the order. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.032(a). The corresponding provisions of the Solid Waste Disposal Act and Water Code are entirely silent on the issue of what parties, if any, other than the Commission must be served with citation. See id. § 361.321(c); Tex. Water Code Ann. § 5.357. Because these specific provisions are controlling on the issue and none require service of citation on all parties involved at the agency level, service on TXI was not a statutory prerequisite necessary in this case before the district court could undertake a review of the Commission’s order. Thus, although I concur with the result reached by the majority, I would venture even further to emphasize that the present case in no way implicates the statutory impediments this Court discussed in McKillip.

. Although not specifically cited in the petition for judicial review, appellants in their brief added section 361.321 of the Texas Health and Safety Code (the "Solid Waste Disposal Act”) as an additional section authorizing an appeal from the Commission’s final order. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 361.321 (West Supp.2000).

. For example, section 382.032, entitled "Appeal of Commission Action,” provides that where a person affected by a ruling, order, decision, or other act of the Commission or executive director appeals by filing a petition in a Travis County district court, "[s]ervice of citation on the commission must be accomplished within 30 days after the date on which the petition is filed.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.032(a) (emphasis added). "Citation may be served on the executive director or any commission member.” Id. § 382.032(c). This section specifically applies to appeals made pursuant to the Clean Air Act, and nowhere does it require service of citation on every entity that was a party to the proceedings at the agency level. The remaining two provisions found in the Solid Waste Disposal Act and the Water Code are entirely silent on who must be served but by implication strongly suggest that it is the Commission that must be served. See id. § 361.321(c); Tex. Water Code Ann. §§ 5.351, 5.357 ("Law suits filed by and against the commission or executive director shall be in the name of the commission. In suits against the commission or executive director, citation may be served on the executive director.”).