Court Opinion

ID: 9717523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:05:07.87652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:53.695798
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring: I concur. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the circumstances in the present case fail to show that the defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial. Notably, the jury waiver signed by the defendant stated that it could not be revoked after a specified date. Thus, the defendant’s subsequent silence in open court, when both defense counsel and the trial judge referred to the impending proceeding as a bench trial, might not have represented acquiescence in the waiver, and instead could have simply been the product of the defendant’s mistaken belief that he could no longer change his mind and demand a jury trial. Under these circumstances, I agree with the majority that the defendant did not validly waive his right to a jury trial and that a new trial is therefore warranted. A different result would be required if the defendant’s jury waiver had not contained a deadline for its revocation and if the defendant had later, in open court, remained silent when the waiver was mentioned. In that event, the defendant’s silence could properly be construed as acquiescence. See People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327 (1984). Finally, unlike Justice Bilandic and Chief Justice Freeman, I do not believe that the majority abandons the totality-of-the-circumstances test, as applied in Frey and other cases, in assessing the validity of the present defendant’s jury waiver.