Court Opinion

ID: 9549517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:20:03.115362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:26.651856
License: Public Domain

TRAYNOR, J., dissenting and concurring.
Under section 402 of the Vehicle Code the owner of a motor vehicle is not liable for an injury resulting from the negligence of another unless the latter was using or operating the vehicle with the express or implied permission of the owner when the injury occurred. It is settled that the owner does not become liable under this section merely by entrusting control of the vehicle to another, for if he qualifies his permission by specifying that the vehicle is to be used for a limited time, for a particular purpose, or in a particular locality, and such limitations are substantially violated, the permission terminates. (Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Cal. 2d 526 [75 P.2d 1051] ; Engstrom v. Auburn Auto Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 [77 P.2d 1059] ; see 61 A.L.R. 866; 83 A.L.R. 878; 112 A.L.R. 416; 136 A.L.R. 481.) When the owner grants permission, however, he cannot insure its termination upon the occurrence of an injury and thus defeat the purpose of the statute, by specifying that the vehicle is not to *463be used in a manner that could lead to injuries. It would be an obvious circumvention of the statute if permission could terminate upon violation of a general instruction that the vehicle was not to be operated negligently or in any manner that would violate the Vehicle Code. It would be just as much a circumvention if the owner gave permission to use the vehicle subject to particular restrictions that would free him from the risks of injury that normally attend use of a motor vehicle.
There is no circumvention of the statute, however, when an owner imposes restrictions to protect himself against undue risks, as when he restricts the use of the vehicle to certain times, places, or purposes. The object of such qualifications is to limit the use of the vehicle, not to free the owner from the risks that attend its use. The same object motivates the qualification that the one who receives permission to use a vehicle must not allow any one else to use it. It is more likely that this qualification would be made than any other, for an owner would hardly accord the privilege of using the vehicle except to someone in whom he had confidence. When he takes the precaution to restrict the privilege to a single person, he refuses his consent to the use of the vehicle by others and cannot properly be regarded as liable for injuries that might result from such a use under a statute that predicates the owner’s liability on his consent to the use or operation of the vehicle. A qualification that forbids the operation of the vehicle by others also restricts the use of the vehicle by the person entrusted with it. He is precluded not only from lending the vehicle to anyone else, but from using it in any way himself that would involve its operation by another except as compelled by emergencies or the exigencies that arise in the normal use of a motor vehicle. Thus in the present case, the owner’s qualification applied not only to Corti’s use of the vehicle to transport himself and the girl that accompanied him to Rocca’s but to Arthur Gigli’s use of it by thus having it brought to him at Rocca’s. I therefore dissent from the judgment of reversal as to the owner, Joseph Gigli.
I concur in the judgment of reversal as to Arthur Gigli. There is no conflict in the evidence that while Corti used the vehicle for his own purposes, he operated it at the same time on behalf of Arthur Gigli in getting the vehicle to Rocca’s for him. He was thus Arthur Gigli’s agent regardless of the accomplishment of his own purposes. (Brimberry v. Dud field *464Lumber Co., 183 Cal. 454, 462 [191 P. 894] ; Ryan v. Farrell, 208 Cal. 200, 204 [280 P. 945]; see Restatement, Agency, sec. 236, California Annotations—171; Mechem on Agency (2d ed.) see. 1895.)