Court Opinion

ID: 9943674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-24 01:09:38.476013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:42.849386
License: Public Domain

02/23/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                         Assigned on Briefs February 6, 2024

                  STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KHALIL YOUNG

                Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
       Nos. C2300396, C2300551, W2300114, 23-00323      Chris Craft, Judge
                    ___________________________________

                           No. W2023-01139-CCA-R3-CD
                       ___________________________________

The defendant, Khalil Young, pleaded guilty to attempted carjacking and kidnapping, and
the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying
his request for diversion and alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and
considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR.,
and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Phyllis Aluko, District Public Defender, Barry W. Kuhn (on appeal), and Javier Bailey (at
guilty plea hearing), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, Khalil Young.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Christian N. Clase, Assistant Attorney
General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Paul Lichlyter, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

                              Facts and Procedural History

I.     Guilty Plea
       On August 1, 2023, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted
carjacking (count one) and one count of kidnapping (count three).1 Pursuant to the plea
agreement, the defendant agreed to a six-year sentence as a Range I offender for count one
to be served concurrently with an eight-year sentence as a Range II offender for count
three, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.2 The facts underlying
the plea, as explained by the State, were as follows:

               [On] August 26, 2022, Coleman Garrett reported that he was driving
        his 2012 Mercedes Benz with two females – two males and one female
        inside. Garrett reported that he pulled into a parking lot near Macon and
        Sycamore View and began arguing with one of the females. Garrett reported
        that during the argument one male grabbed a handgun from the female and
        pointed it at Garrett. The armed male got into the driver’s seat while the
        second male got into the passenger’s seat and they fled the scene.

               On August 31, 2022, MPD responded to a disturbance at 590
        Washington Avenue. Officers detained [the defendant] as a party involved
        in the disturbance with Diamond Wright. Officers contacted Diamond
        Wright during the call who directed officers to where Garrett’s Mercedes was
        parked. [The defendant] was in possession of a Mercedes Benz key.

               While dealing with the disturbance, other officers located Garrett’s
        Mercedes at 245 Winchester. Officers verified the key [the defendant] was
        in possession of was in fact the key to Mr. Garrett’s Mercedes.

               [The defendant] waived his Miranda rights, gave a statement
        admitting his involvement in the carjacking of Mr. Coleman Garrett. Mr.
        Garrett came to violent crimes, identified Mr. Wright out of the six-person
        photo line-up.

                ....

               On Wednesday, December 28, 2022, MPD responded to a criminal
        assault at the Regional One hospital located at 877 Jefferson, Victim R.E.

        1
          The defendant was also charged with one count of employing a firearm during the commission of
a dangerous felony (count two), but that count was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
        2
          The defendant agreed to an out-of-range sentence for count three pursuant to Hicks v. State, 945
S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tenn. 1997).
                                                  -2-
        stated that she and her boyfriend [the defendant] along with three other
        female friends traveled to Memphis to hang out on Tuesday, December 27th.3

                [The victim] stated that while they were inside a club in the downtown
        area, she and [the defendant] got into a verbal argument. [The victim] stated
        that [the defendant] was asked to leave the club and he forced her to leave
        with him. She stated everyone left the club and entered her Toyota Camry
        driven by [the defendant].

               [The victim] stated that they drove to a nearby gas station, that [the
        defendant] became irate with her friends. She stated that – she stated as her
        friends went into the gas station, [the defendant] pointed an AR-style weapon
        at them and followed them into the store.

                [The victim] stated that the clerk – the store clerk intervened and
        allowed them to take cover inside of a room inside the store. She stated that
        [the defendant] dragged her out of the room at gunpoint, forced her to walk
        to a nearby apartment complex. [The victim] stated that [the defendant] fired
        a shot in the air from the AR-style weapon as they walked.

                [The victim] stated that [the defendant] choked her, slapped her in the
        face several times. She stated that [the defendant] pointed the gun at her and
        told her you have five seconds to run or I’m going to shoot you. [The victim]
        stated that she began to cry and did not run. She stated [the defendant] told
        her I hope you know you’re about to give me some p***y and stated [the
        defendant] forced her to remove her clothes before he forced penile vaginal
        sex without a condom inside the stairway of the apartments.

               [The victim] stated [the defendant] later met with one of the friends
        who allowed them to stay inside of his hotel room. [The victim] stated she
        attempted to leave when [the defendant] fell asleep. She stated that [the
        defendant] was awakened by his friend and [the defendant] would not allow
        her to leave. [The victim] stated on Wednesday, December 28th at
        approximately 1200 hours, [the defendant] rented room 227 at the Skyline
        Inn located at 1900 block of Shelby Drive.

                Stated once inside the room, [the defendant] pointed a black handgun
        at her and made her – [make] face calls to her mother pretending she is okay.

        3
         It is the policy of this Court to refer to victims of sexual abuse by their initials. However, we note,
the defendant was not charged with any sexual crimes against R.E. in this case.
                                                     -3-
        She stated [the defendant] then forced her to have penile vaginal sex again.
        [The victim] stated she convinced [the defendant] to take her to the hospital
        in her Toyota Camry. [The victim] sustained injuries to both sides of her
        neck. While at the hospital Memphis police were called. [The defendant]
        was taken into custody at Regional One. [The victim] signed a consent to
        search her vehicle and officers recovered a black 9 millimeter Taurus
        handgun.

               A search warrant was executed at Skyline Inn in room 227. A
        Mossberg AR-style 22 was recovered along with the victim’s purse and
        phone.

              During the investigation, [the victim] identified [the defendant] from
        a single shot photo as her boyfriend and the person responsible for
        kidnapping and raping her at gunpoint. [The defendant] was advised of his
        Miranda rights, at which he invoked his rights and refused to give a
        statement.

                This offense occurred in Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee.4

II.     Sentencing Hearing

       During the sentencing hearing, the State introduced a copy of the defendant’s
presentence report. The victim testified that she did not believe the defendant should
receive probation in this case. She stated that she suffered from anxiety as a result of the
incident and wondered what would have happened to her if she had not convinced the
defendant to take her to the hospital that night. The victim also testified that, following the
incident, she was harassed on social media.

        In denying diversion, the trial court articulated its reasoning, as follows:

               First thing I’ll consider is diversion. State v. Parker is of course the
        diversion considerations, 932 S.W.2d at page 958. So I have considered his
        amenability to correction, whether or not he will conform himself to the
        requirements of the law.

        4
          Following the State’s recitation of the facts, trial counsel informed the court that the defendant
did not “stipulate to the allegations of rape. Any handgun firing or pointing, we don’t stipulate to those
facts. But we will stipulate to the facts that allege the kidnapping [and attempted carjacking] charge[s] that
[are] before the [c]ourt.”
                                                    -4-
       The circumstances of the offenses are somewhat egregious but not
very bad. His criminal record, he does not have much of a criminal record,
just a resisting arrest and another thing but there’s really not much of a
disposition for that in Mississippi.

       His social history is not that good. He basically from 18 to age 22
before he went to jail, he went to jail December 28, 2022. During those four
years he basically was working different part-time jobs and ten days before
he committed the kidnapping he left his job. He was discharged and had no
job. Yet, for some reason he was out clubbing with the victim in the
kidnapping. But it doesn’t show during those four years that he was working
solid at a full-time job. He also had – was smoking marijuana during that
time.

       The status is accused – and mental health. I’m gonna consider his
bipolar nature in Exhibit A they talked about his mental health.

        The deterrence value to the accused as well as others, I don’t think
that it would have a deterrent – putting him on diversion or not putting him
on diversion wouldn’t have much of a deterrent value to other people. I think
it might have some deterrent value as to him but not as to others. This wasn’t
crimes that were in the newspaper or public knowledge. He wasn’t a gang
member that had all his friends that need to be taught a lesson to so that
wouldn’t be a consideration.

       [Section] G, whether judicial diversion would serve the interest of the
public as well as the accused. He has committed two violent crimes. No
question he’s committed these crimes. This wasn’t an Alford plea. Some
months apart. In other words, he committed one violent crime and before he
was charged [in] that one, he committed another violent crime at a time when
he was unemployed and smoking marijuana.

        And I find that this basically sustained intent to violate the law. He
had – I find that under these circumstances it would not be in the interest of
the public at all for him not to have two felonies on his record. I would want
him never ever to have a handgun again. And for everyone that hired him or
knows him to be able to find out that he kidnapped a girl and carjacked a car
at different times. So I don’t find that diversion is applicable at all.

       Also, I can also according to another case under State v. Washington
866 at page 951, his attitude, his behavior since his arrest. Of course when
                                    -5-
      he was arrested then he’s been in jail ever since then. His home environment,
      current drug usage which I’m going to consider. His past employment has
      not been good, his general reputation and I’m looking at his Strong-R report
      in the probation report Exhibit A that he is moderate to re-offend. They score
      him as moderate because of his issues with the factors that have been
      mentioned in the report.

              And so I’ve weighed all that and there’s just not any way I think that
      we can get him in a situation where we can defer these sentences and wipe
      them off his record. I think he’s a person who needs to have this on his record
      for the rest of his life.

       Next, in considering and denying the defendant’s request for probation, the trial
court noted,

             Looking at probation considerations under the statute, the presentence
      report which I have gone through, taken a break to do that. Again, under the
      probation considerations, they’re somewhat the same as the diversion
      considerations. His physical and mental condition and his social history, his
      mental condition, although having this mental condition at some point when
      he was younger, it’s not affecting his ability to get a job or work or appreciate
      the seriousness of what he did. And his social history again from somebody
      that graduated from school and just doesn’t really focus in his life, having
      part-time jobs which the presentence report says he can’t even remember the
      names of them and the only proof we have of these jobs is his word that he
      did work those part-time jobs except for one job where he worked four
      months for a tire company.

            So he has a poor social history, even though he’s only 23 years old.
      That doesn’t give him time to have a long history but from 18 to 22 doesn’t
      speak well of him.

              I’ve also considered the facts and circumstances surrounding each
      offense and the nature and circumstances of the criminal conduct involved
      and I understand why the State did not prosecute the sex offense because of
      the facts that the victim testified to are somewhat equivocal as far as when
      they have sex, when they don’t have sex and whether or not it’s by consent
      or willing.

             His prior criminal history. He does have a prior criminal history but
      it’s not a significant one, other than considering when he commits his
                                            -6-
kidnapping that he’s already committed a carjacking that was part of his
history.

        His previous actions and character, we don’t know anything good that
he’s done with his life basically. Whether or not the defendant might
reasonably be expected to be rehabilitated and his potential for – or lack of
potential of rehabilitation is another statutory consideration, including the
risk that during the period of probation he will commit another crime. And
I find from the facts of these offenses that were stipulated to, not everything
that the State said but the things that were stipulated to, I think that there’s a
great risk that during his period of probation if he’s placed on probation he
will commit another crime. He will smoke marijuana, he’ll get a gun. I think
the facts are high.

       Whether or not it appears the defendant will abide by the terms of the
probation, I think not. I have doubts about that, serious doubts. Whether or
not the interest[s] of society [are] protected from possible future criminal
conduct of the defendant are great. I think they are because these are two
violent offenses, allegedly with guns but they were plea-bargained down to
carjacking which only requires force and kidnapping which does not require
a weapon.

         I also have to consider whether or not measures less restrictive than
confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully, not
really(,) he’s never been placed on probation before so they haven’t been
used before on him so that’s – I don’t find that factor to be of consequence.

        And whether or not a sentence of full probation would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of the offense. I think it’s true. We have – and
I’ll take judicial notice of our court dockets in Shelby County. The number
one crime right now in Shelby County other than murder is carjacking. It’s
getting to where people are afraid to drive down the street. And carjacking
is a very, very serious crime that needs to be deterred. I don’t know that this
is going to make the news or anything so it won’t be a deterrent to others but
carjacking is something we do not want to depreciate in seriousness.

       And then the last statutory factor was whether the offense was
particularly enormous, gross, or heinous and they were not. Neither one of
these cases were gross or heinous or enormous. But it’s very significant to
me, very significant that he committed both of these crimes, one after the

                                      -7-
       other one, which shows a sustained intent in my mind for him to commit
       crimes and not care.

              So(,) for that reason, I find that he is not deserving of probation and
       so I will deny that sentence of probation at this time and also diversion.

                                           Analysis

      On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion
and probation. The State contends the trial court acted within its discretion when it
sentenced the defendant to confinement. Following our review, we agree with the State.

I.     Denial of Diversion

       The defendant argues the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. Although
the defendant qualified for judicial diversion, the defendant submits the trial court failed to
“fully consider the judicial diversion criteria and disregarded the information presented.”
The State contends the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied the defendant
judicial diversion. Upon our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

       A defendant is eligible for judicial diversion if he is found guilty or pleads guilty to
a Class C, D, or E felony, has not been previously convicted of a felony or a Class A
misdemeanor, has not been previously granted judicial or pretrial diversion, and is not
seeking deferral for certain sexual offenses. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(B)(i).
“Eligibility under the statute does not, however, constitute entitlement to judicial diversion;
instead, the decision of whether to grant or deny judicial diversion is entrusted to the
discretion of the trial court.” State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tenn. 2014). The trial
court must consider several common law factors:

       (a) The accused’s amenability to correction, (b) the circumstances of the
       offense, (c) the accused’s criminal record, (d) the accused’s social history,
       (e) the accused’s physical and mental health, and (f) the deterrence value to
       the accused as well as others. The trial court should also consider whether
       judicial diversion will serve the ends of justice – the interests of the public as
       well as the accused.

Id. at 326 (quoting State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)). “[T]he
trial court must weigh the factors against each other and place an explanation of its ruling
on the record.” Id. (citing State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1998)).

                                             -8-
       When the trial court considers the common law factors, “specifically identifies the
relevant factors, and places on the record its reasons for granting or denying judicial
diversion,” then this Court will “apply a presumption of reasonableness and uphold the
grant or denial so long as there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
decision.” Id. at 327. Our supreme court previously explained:

       Although the trial court is not required to recite all of the Parker and
       Electroplating factors when justifying its decision on the record in order to
       obtain the presumption of reasonableness, the record should reflect that the
       trial court considered the Parker and Electroplating factors in rendering its
       decision and that it identified the specific factors applicable to the case before
       it. Thereafter, the trial court may proceed to solely address the relevant
       factors.

Id.

       Here, the trial court properly weighed the required factors. The trial court concluded
the defendant’s social history, the deterrence value to the defendant, the interests of the
public, and the circumstances of the offenses weighed against diversion. The trial court
found that the defendant’s commission of two violent crimes “some months apart” showed
a “sustained intent to violate the law”; that the circumstances of the offenses were
“somewhat egregious but not very bad”; that the defendant’s social history was “not that
good” because he had a history of drug use and sporadic part-time employment; that
granting diversion would have “some deterrent value as to [the defendant] but not as to
others; and that “it would not be in the interest of the public at all for [the defendant] not
to have two felonies on his record.”

       We read the trial court’s findings regarding the defendant’s criminal history and
physical and mental health as determining that these factors were neutral. The trial court
found that the defendant “does not have much of a criminal record” and that it was going
to “consider [the defendant’s] bipolar nature.” Although the trial court mentioned the
amenability to correction factor, it did not make any findings regarding this factor.

        While the defendant requests that we reevaluate the trial court’s determinations
regarding each factor, because the trial court adhered to the requirements of Parker and
Electroplating, our review is limited to determining whether “any substantial evidence”
exists in the record to support the trial court’s decision. King, 432 S.W.3d at 326. We
conclude that the record supports the trial court’s decision, and accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying judicial diversion. The defendant is not entitled to
relief on this issue.

                                             -9-
II.    Denial of Probation

       The defendant also argues the trial court erred in denying probation. Specifically,
the defendant argues the trial court failed to consider all relevant facts and circumstances
when making its determination. The State contends the trial court acted within its
discretion in ordering the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. We agree with
the State.

        A trial court’s decision to grant or deny probation is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness when the sentence reflects the
purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn.
2012). “[A] trial court’s decision to grant or deny probation will not be invalidated unless
the trial court wholly departed from the relevant statutory considerations in reaching its
determination.” State v. Sihapanya, 516 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tenn. 2014) (order) (per
curiam). The burden of establishing suitability for probation rests with a defendant, who
must demonstrate that probation will “‘subserve the ends of justice and the best interest of
both the public and the defendant.’” State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2002) (quoting State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1990)); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(b); State v. Russell, 773 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn.
1989); State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 2008).

       Generally, probation is available to a defendant sentenced to ten years or less. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a). A defendant who is convicted as an especially mitigated or
standard offender of a Class C, D, or E felony is considered a favorable candidate for
probation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(A). In determining whether incarceration is
appropriate, the trial court should consider whether:

       (A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant
       who has a long history of criminal conduct;

       (B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the
       offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective
       deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

       (C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently
       been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). Additionally, “[t]he sentence imposed should be
the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is
imposed,” and “[t]he potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or treatment of the

                                            - 10 -
defendant should be considered in determining the sentence alternative or length of a term
to be imposed.” Id. § 40-35-103(4), (5).

        In denying probation, the trial court specifically found that the defendant “has a poor
social history, even though he’s only 23 years old”; that if probation was granted there was
a “great risk” that the defendant would commit another crime such as smoking marijuana
or obtaining a weapon; that the interests of society should be protected “because these are
two violent offenses”; and that full probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of
the offenses, noting that “[t]he number one crime right now in Shelby County other than
murder is carjacking.” The trial court properly considered the statutory criteria as well as
other facts and circumstances supported by the record. Additionally, the trial court’s
determination is consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing. Therefore, the
trial court was within its discretion in imposing a sentence of confinement. The defendant
is not entitled to relief on this issue.

                                         Conclusion

        Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

                                               ____________________________________
                                               J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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