Court Opinion

ID: 9707434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:11:34.474111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:32.740394
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Crumpacker, J.;
The appellees’ petition for a rehearing" questions the validity of our initial decision *533herein because it reverses the judgment appealed from and was rendered by the court, sitting in banc, with one judge not participating and was concurred in by three judges only. It'is argued that this is a statutory court and its decisions must be reached in the manner provided by statute and under the circumstances above indicated, four judges having failed to agree, our authority in the matter was- limited to a transfer of the appeal to the Supreme Court for decision as provided by Burns’ Stat., §4-209.
. Our attention is called to the fact that, in the 51 years this court has been comprised of six judges, this is the first instance in which we have reversed the judgment of a trial court by a decision in which only. three judges concurred. However in Aetna Securities Co. v. Sickels (1950), 120 Ind. App. 300, 88 N. E. 2d 789, 90 N. E. 2d 136, sitting in banc with One judge-not participating, we affirmed the judgment below by a decision in which three judges concurred and two dissented. On petition to transfer the invalidity of a three judge decision under such circumstances was urged upon the Supreme Court but arguments in support of the contention, almost identical with those made here,-were rejected and transfer denied. The fact that in the. Sickels case we affirmed the trial court while in this .one we reversed, seems to us of little consequence. If we had the power to decide upon the concurrence of three judges certainly we had the power to decide either way.-'
The appellees urge another reason as to why the Sickels decision should not control this one. They say that' the opinion in that case indicates that the nonparticipating judge- was disqualified to .sit by Burns’ Stat., §4-223, while in this case no such disqualification, appears and therefore the three judge statute was never: *534brought into application. We realize that there is law to the effect that “In order that a judge may be disqualified, there must exist a ground authorized by law to disqualify him, and it is not for the courts to add other grounds of disqualification. As a general rule, where the grounds which will operate as a disqualification of a judge are expressly and comprehensively set out in a constitution or statute, such provisions are held to be exclusive, particularly where the grounds for disqualification prescribed by the statutes comprehend all those recognized at common law, ..48 C. J. S. Judges, §77, p. 1045. Also “It is the duty of a judge, however, to exercise the judicial functions duly conferred on him by law, and he has no right to disqualify himself in the absence of a valid “reason, or when rio party to the case could legally recuse him, . . .” 48 C. J. S., Judges, §93, p. 1080.
However, we must assume, until the contrary appears, that a judge of this court who, being physically able, chooses not to participate in a particular decision, does so for reasons compatible with legal ethics and recognized by law as conducive to the fair and impartial administration of justice.
We regard the refusal of the Supreme Court to transfer the Sickels case was decisive of the question under consideration and if the ruling in that case is erroneous the Supreme Court should say so and not us.
The appellees next contend that we erred in holding that if an administrator can but refuses to avail himself of the 30 day statute in order to bar a valid pending claim, its subsequent allowance and payment does not constitute a devastavit. The appellees have convinced us that this holding, as applied to the bare facts recited in our opinion, is contrary to the great weight of authority elsewhere than in Indiana *535but it was predicated upon the express words of the Supreme Court that “payment of a just and legal claim against an estate is not, however, a devastavit” where the rights of other creditors are not affected. Beardsley, Executor v. Marsteller (1889), 120 Ind. 319, 22 N. E. 315. We realize that case did not involve the duty of an administrator to file his final report on time and thus bar a pending claim under the 30 day statute but it was concerned with what constitutes a devastavit and in that connection the court announced the rule above quoted. As the only result of the appellant’s failure, in the present case, to file its report when due was the allowance and payment of pending claims found to be “just and legal,” we concluded it was not liable for doing that which the Supreme Court says does not constitute a devastavit.
Quoting from appellees’ brief it appears that “On June 28, 1932, the decedent Englehart as the surviving partner filed a schedule of the May 1 assets and liabilities of the Klingler-Englehart Company existing at the time of the death of Earnest G. Bush, a deceased partner. This appears in the bill of exceptions in the Celce, Moon claims and shows total assets of $93,047.35 and after deducting all indebtedness including notes which appellant itemizes the net value of the partnership at that time was $39,350. . . . Six months later Theodore Englehart died, and thereafter John Klingler did nothing to settle and close up the partnership affairs although such was his statutory duty as a surviving partner. Burns’ Stat., §§5-301, et seq. Had he done so, all indebtedness of the partnership obviously would have been paid and a substantial net balance would have remained for distribution for the Englehart estate. Instead of complying with his statutory duty Mr. Klingler saw fit to renew existing notes and continue the operation of the business for four and one-half years, during *536which time it became.insolvent,” and during almost two years of. which time he was also -administrator of the Englehart estate. - :
-Thus, in apt language, the appellees have identified the .devastavit which'destroyed their father’s estate— a devastavit in which they acquiesced and which they could have prevented by resort to the remedy afforded by Burns’ Stat., §50-305. The appellees made no effort to have their father’s estate administered upon his death, as .they had the right., to do, but on the contrary they were content to allow the same to remain in statu quo for almost five years. They had the right to withhold administration if - there was no need for. it but having elected to do so they cannot be heard to complain if claims developed, which- otherwise would never have come into existence. Obviously the appellant had nothing to do with these things and it does not seem to square with justice, the administrative objective of all law, that the appellant should be held liable to the appellees in damages for its failure to extricate them from a difficulty which could not have risen but for their own indifference and lack of diligence in the protection of their own interests. Their belated- demand that the appellant do so by resort to the 30 day statute in no way relieves them from responsibility for their, past omissions. In this respect we think this case differs from the many authorities to which the appellees refer us in support of their position.
The appellees take exception to our reference to the lost note claims as “the decedent’s honest debts” and .. as “valid claims” against the estate. We did so because, having been filed, they were disallowed by the appellant, transferred to the trial docket of the Clay .Circuit Court and there tried and reduced to .judgments which stand unappealed from and unim*537péached except through the present proceedings which we consider a collateral attack upon them. We are compelled to regard them as the embodiment of “valid claims” against the estate until disturbed through proper procedure. No contention is made that they are void and upon collateral attack neither this court nor the trial court can rightfully consider the appellees’ evidence as to mere error in their makeup.
We are also charged with error in reversing the judgment based on the second paragraph of the complaint. This attack seems to rest upon the theory that our decision completely nullifies Burns’ Stat., §6-1013, which réáds as follows:
“It shall be the duty of every executor or admin- . istrator to inquire into the correctness of all claims filed against the estate that he represents, and make • all available defenses thereto, and if he fails so to • do, he shall be liable on his bond,. at the suit of any person interested in the estate, for all damages sustained by the estate in consequence of such neglect.”
This statute imposes two duties upon an administrator: (1) he must inquire into the validity of all claims against the estate; and (2) he must make all available defenses thereto. As to the first duty imposed on the appellant by the statute it seems to us that it submitted the claims involved to the highest type of inquiry — the judicial determination of their validity of a court of competent jurisdiction. The appellees seem to feel that the appellant should have allowed the claims and thus given them the opportunity to resist them despite such allowance as provided by Burns’ Stat., §6-1017.- This, they say, would have given them control of the litigation and, as parties thereto, their right to appeal would have been unquestioned. If we *538accept the appellees’ position in this regard we still cannot charge the appellant with an actionable breach of the duty imposed upon it by §6-1013, supra, because of the speculative nature of its consequences. Whether or not the procedure suggested by the appellees would have changed the result of the claims trials can only be surmised and certainly §6-1017, supra, was not designed to facilitate the appellees’ right to appeal from a decision by which they considered themselves aggrieved. Their right to appeal such a decision was assured them by Burns’ Stat., §6-2001, as was held in Jaqua v. Reinhard, Admr. (1934), 99 Ind. App. 261, 190 N. E. 887. On the facts, that case is distinguishable from this one but in deciding it the court announced the rule that any person was entitled to appeal from a decision of a circuit court growing out of any matter connected with a decedent’s estate, who could show himself to have been aggrieved by such decision, as the word “aggrieved” is used in the statute. If rules and principles announced by courts were only applicable in cases involving identical facts we would have no science of law as an abstract theory.
The second duty imposed upon the appellant by §6-1013, supra, is that it was required to make all available defenses to the lost note claims. In what respect the appellant failed in that regard is not indicated by the evidence. Certainly thé appellant’s refusal to venue said claims to another county or to move for new trials preparatory to appeals does not constitute a failure to make available defenses within the meaning of the statute. As we construe thé statute the word “defense” is used as meaning something that can be urged at the trial which, if established, will defeat the demand. Obviously a change of venue will not do that nor will a motion for a new trial *539which, even if sustained, could have no bearing on the claimant’s ultimate right to recover.
Sec. 6-1013, supra, does not sanction the retrial of claims already reduced to judgments nor does’ it constitute the court in which an action within its purview is filed, a court of appellate review. It contemplates a suit for damages against an administrator if a claim against the estate, by reason of his failure to properly investigate its validity or urge an available defense against it in court, is reduced to judgment. Under such circumstances no attack is made on the judgment. It is recognized as valid and unimpeached but proof is made that had the administrator properly investigated the claim upon which it rests he would have discovered, for example, that such claim had been paid or, being chargeable with knowledge of such defense, he failed to urge it as a result of which it became a binding judgment which the administrator was legally obligated to pay and thus the estate suffered a needless loss.
The appellant is not chargeable, of course, with the court’s refusal to permit the appellees to file motions for new trials in the lost note cases but they say that because the procedure through which they might enforce their right to do so was burdensome and expensive the appellant should be charged with a devastavit because it refused to file such motions through its own attorney or through theirs, as a consequence of which the lost note judgments had to be paid without the benefit of a review for error. We are not convinced that such a situation constitutes an exception to the rule against collateral attacks on erroneous judgments.
*540*539This appeal presents other questions which, in view of the conclusions expressed in our initial opinion, we *540considered it unnecessary to discuss. Perhaps it is well that we do so now. At the trial the appellant sought to prove that on November 22, 1939, one month and two days after its final report was due, it filed a petition in the Clay Circuit Court to continue the administration of the Englehart estate because its affairs were- extensively involved in the Klingler-Englehart Company receivership. That the court found such facts constituted good cause for not closing the estate at that time and entered a formal order granting the petition. The appellant objected to the reception of this evidence on the theory that the petition and order came too late and could not retroactively exonerate the appellant for its failure to close the estate on October 20, 1939. They were sustained in this position and the evidence was excluded. The appellant insists that this was error and we agree. Granting that the appellant was under a positive statutory duty to file its final accounting not later than October 20, 1939, it must be conceded that such duty was not an absolute one if good cause existed at that time for not doing so. Whether or not there was good cause for delaying settlement necessarily depended upon circumstances existing at the time the final report was due and not upon events developing thereafter. The court judicially knew that the affairs of the Englehart estate and the Klingler-Englehart Company receivership were co-mingled .on October 20, 1939, because both proceedings had been pending before it for several years and its adjudication that such fact constituted good cause for not closing the estate on November 22,1939, was necessarily an adjudication that the same “good cause” existed on October 20, 1939. As far as we can see the fact that the adjudication of the issue was tardy is of no consequence. •
*541It also appears that the appellant sought to prove' that the probate court, in considering matters pertaining to the Englehart estate, orally announced from the bench its decision to keep such estate open until the affairs of the Klingler-Englehart Company receivership had progressed to the point where the estate’s liability for the partnership’s debts could be determined and that such time had not arrived when its final report became due under the statute. This evidence was excluded on the theory that a court of record speaks only through its orderbook entries. We agree that the existence of such a decision could be shown only by the court’s records, State ex rel. Davis v. Achor, Judge (1947), 225 Ind. 319, 75 N. E. 2d 154; State ex rel. Thompson v. Rhoads (1946), 224 Ind. 136, 65 N. E. 2d 248, but as bearing on the culpability of the appellant’s conduct in failing to perform its ostensible statutory duty we think it was admissible. Surely the appellant ought not to be charged with an actionable wrong because it heeded oral orders of the court, whose officer it was and under whose supervision it administered its trust, rather than seeing to it that the court' reduced such orders to formal record on the very day its report was due. We find but one case in Indiana which throws any light upon this question. In State ex rel. Rosenbrock v. Wilson (1939), 106 Ind. App. 357, 14 N. E. 2d 319, the decedent’s heirs sought recovery on the bond of the executors of his will. The breach claimed was a failure of the executors to use due diligence in collecting notes due the estate and recovery was denied upon trial. There was evidence that the, executors thought the notes were uncollectible and so informed the judge of the court in which the estate was pending who orally directed that no suit be brought *542to collect them. After the death of such judge the executors again reported the situation to his successor who “likewise told the executors” not to sue. In affirming the judgment this court said: “We believe that the executors were entitled to heed the advice of the judges of the court wherein the estate was pending.” The appellees discount this decision because there was ample evidence in the record showing that the notes involved were in fact worthless and no amount of diligence on the part of the executors could have effected their payment and therefore the judgment of the lower court would have been affirmed even though the judges of the probate court had issued no oral instructions. This court, however, did not see fit to rest its decision wholly on that ground but chose to consider such oral instructions in determining whether the facts warranted the release of the executors from personal responsibility. It necessarily follows that if an administrator or executor is entitled to govern his conduct by the attitude of the judge of the court wherein the estate is pending, as expressed orally, it is proper for him to prove that he knew of such attitude.
The record is not clear as to when the probate court in the present case made the oral announcement in question.' If made after the appellant’s final report was due it could afford no justification for a failure to comply with the mandate of the statute. However no ojection to the proffered evidence was made on that ground and we cannot assume that the time would not have been' fixed had the appellant been given an opportunity to do' so.
Inasmuch as this opinion announces rulings on the admissibility of testimony which were not discussed in our initial opinion we will entertain a supplemental petition for rehearing if the appellees desire to seek one.
*543Rehearing denied.
Royse, J., not participating.
Bowen, J. and Martin, J., dissenting.
Note: Reported in 106 N. E. 2d 465.