Court Opinion

ID: 9706174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:33:24.781285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:19.869660
License: Public Domain

*842JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The summary judgment order reflects that the relief awarded by the trial court — a judicial foreclosure to recover on a loan agreement and deed of trust — is exactly the relief Household sought in its live pleading and in its summary judgment motion. The record does not contain any special exceptions from the Marks seeking clarification about the relief sought by way of the summary judgment motion. Under these circumstances, any error in the summary judgment motion in identifying or labeling the cause of action under which relief was sought is harmless.1 I would, therefore, overrule the Marks’s first point.
In their second point, the Marks contend that summary judgment was improper because Household did not establish legal ownership of the promissory note and lien upon which it sued. Under Texas law, to recover on a promissory note, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the existence of the note; (2) that defendants signed the note; (3) that plaintiff is the legal owner and holder of the note; and (4) that a certain balance is due and owing on the note.2
In FFP Marketing Co. v. Long Lane Master Trust IV3 we stated that “a photocopy of a note attached to the affidavit of the holder, who swears that it is a true and correct copy of the note, is sufficient as a matter of law to prove the status of owner and holder of the note absent controverting summary judgment evidence.”4 Household verified two documents — its original petition and the demand letter from its counsel — -that identify it as the legal owner and holder of the note. This evidence sufficiently established that Household owned and held the note and lien, shifting the burden to the Marks to present controverting summary judgment evidence.5 The Marks did not present any summary judgment evidence. I would, therefore, overrule the Marks’s second point.
In their third and fourth points, the Marks challenge Household’s summary judgment evidence as incompetent, inconsistent, and unreliable. I address each of the Marks’s specific complaints in turn:
The Marks assert that the affidavit of Tom Lenz, filed in support of Household’s summary judgment motion, is incompetent as a business record affidavit. However, the Marks did not obtain a ruling from the trial court on any objections to the Lenz affidavit. Accordingly, this ground is waived.6
The Marks also argue that the Lenz affidavit is incompetent because Lenz does not assert directly in the affidavit that Household is the legal owner and holder of the note and lien. But the Lenz affidavit states that Lenz has reviewed the assertions of fact in Household’s original petition and swears that those assertions are true and correct. Among the assertions in *843Household’s petition is that Household “is the legal owner and holder of the Loan Agreement and Deed of Trust.” The affidavit sufficiently alleged ownership.
The Marks further assert that the Lenz affidavit is unreliable and inconsistent because it refers to an interest rate different than the one stated on the promissory note. The Marks failed, however, to present this issue to the trial court and raise it for the first time on appeal. This issue is, therefore, waived.7
Finally, the Marks contend that Household’s failure to produce the promissory note as part of its summary judgment evidence precludes summary judgment for Household. The Marks overlook that Household did not sue directly on the note but rather sought a declaratory judgment for judicial foreclosure based on the loan agreement and deed of trust. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment, despite the absence of the promissory note from the summary judgment proof,8 and overrule the Marks’s third and fourth points.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s summary judgment.

. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a)(1).

. See Montgomery First Corp. v. Caprock Inv. Corp., 89 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, no pet.); see also Cadle Co. v. Bankston & Lobingier, 868 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex.App.-Forl Worth 1994), writ denied, per curiam on other grounds, 893 S.W.2d 949 (Tex.) (stating that plaintiff must prove that "plaintiff is the present holder of the note” to recover under the note), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 810, 116 S.Ct. 58, 133 L.Ed.2d 21 (1995).

. 169 S.W.3d 402 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).

. Id. at 410.

. See id.

. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); Kyle v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 232 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied); see also Tex.R. Evid. 902(10)(b).

. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a).

. See Kyle, 232 S.W.3d at 362 (rejecting argument that original note was required as proof when lender did not seek to recover on note but sued to quiet title and for declaratory judgment for judicial foreclosure pursuant to deed of trust).