Court Opinion

ID: 9461121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:06:20.519504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:54.116177
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Daniel J. Avena, a longshoreman employed by Maude James, Inc. (the stevedore), was allegedly injured aboard the S.S. Gronnebek, owned by Clauss & Co. (the shipowner) in July 1967. In March 1970, plaintiff sued defendant shipowner; the latter impleaded the stevedore as third-party defendant. In October 1973, the case was tried in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York before Charles L. Brieant, Jr., J., and a jury on the questions whether the vessel was un-seaworthy and the ship’s officers negligent. At the close of plaintiff’s case, the latter theory was voluntarily abandoned. Then, after hearing argument from the parties, the judge also dismissed plaintiff’s claim of unseaworthiness on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to create a jury issue. Plaintiff appeals, claiming that he had made out a prima facie case. We agree, and therefore reverse the judgment dismissing the complaint.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as we must when a case is taken away from the jury, the facts are as follows: Plaintiff, a longshoreman for many years, was moving a 300-pound cardboard carton off a wooden pallet when he was injured. Plaintiff had inserted the end of his longshoreman’s hook under one of the several metal bands which secured the carton. The band was about one inch *471wide and when plaintiff pulled on it with the hook, the band broke, lacerating his hand and causing him to lose his balance and fall backwards. Plaintiff testified that longshoremen in New York customarily hook bands like these to haul such cargo and that he was doing so in the usual way. No other witness testified for plaintiff. On this record, the judge held that there was
no evidence at all before me which would warrant a reasonable juror to reach the inference that the steel tape, or metal tape around the carton broke because of any defect in the steel strap or tape.
A defective strap is an essential element in a cause of action for unseaworthiness, and that, gentlemen, is about all there is to it, and I find that there has been a failure of proof
Plaintiff argues that this holding was incorrect because it was based on the faulty assumption that he had to prove why the band broke. Plaintiff asserts that he only had to show “that the device in question failed under conditions when it should have functioned properly.” Oliveras v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 431 F.2d 814, 816 (2d Cir. 1970). He further contends that if “an appliance or piece of equipment breaks or fails in the normal course of use, a plaintiff need not show why the failure occurred, but only that it did occur with the resulting injury.” Greene v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 163 (4th Cir. 1972). We agree with these propositions but they do not decide the crucial issue before us; they merely state it. That issue is whether sufficient evidence existed that the use being made of the band when it snapped was an “intended” one. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941 (1960).1 See Blier v. United States Lines Co., 286 F.2d 920, 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836, 82 S.Ct. 32, 7 L.Ed.2d 37 (1961). To this question we now turn.
One “intended” use of the steel bands wrapped around the 300-pound carton was to secure it so that its contents would not fall out during loading — that proposition is so clear as to be self-evident. What is less obvious is that any one of the bands was meant to be used to support the weight of the carton while it was being moved. For the doctrine of unseaworthiness to apply here, we believe that plaintiff was required to prove that a longshoreman’s use of the band to yank it off a pallet and into stow was “intended.” Plaintiff apparently accepts this burden and relies on his own brief testimony as to the custom in New York to provide the necessary evidence. Defendant shipowner argues in response: “Testimony that a paint brush broke while being customarily used aboard ship to hammer spikes would not be prima facie evidence that the brush was unseaworthy.” 2 In other words, as defendant also contends: “Customary hooking which breaks bands would not make the bands unseaworthy unless the custom were proper.” 3
But this reply begs the question. To claim in effect that custom does not evince intended use unless the custom itself is proper brings the argument full circle without shedding light on the basic problem — whether plaintiff’s proof sufficed to go to the jury. To be sure, evidence of custom need not be conclusive on the matter of proper or “intended” use. Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193, 201, 202 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 828, 88 S.Ct. 86, 19 L.Ed.2d 84 (1967); The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662, 53 S.Ct. 220, 77 L.Ed. 571 (1932). But it cer*472tainly has some probative value, Parker v. S/S Dorothe Olendorff, 483 F.2d 375, 379-380 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905, 94 S.Ct. 1609, 40 L.Ed.2d 110 (U.S. April 2, 1974); Siderewicz v. Enso-Gutzeit O/Y, 453 F.2d 1094, 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 912, 92 S.Ct. 2441, 32 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972); Shenker v. United States, 322 F.2d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U. S. 907, 84 S.Ct. 659, 11 L.Ed.2d 606 (1964), and in fact would seem to constitute the usual form of proof on this issue, Nuzzo v. Rederi, A/S Wallenco, 304 F.2d 506, 510-511 (2d Cir. 1962)— at least where the questioned practice is neither patently proper nor obviously unintended (as in defendant’s paint brush example). Cf. Tropea v. Shell Oil Co., 307 F.2d 757, 763 (2d Cir. 1962) (custom in trade relevant on issue of due care in negligence cases).
Here, the dragging of a heavy carton by its band was not a clearly unintended use. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit recently held that upon evidence of a “long standing custom” of moving bales “by inserting longshoremen’s hooks under the bale bands”, the longshoreman-was entitled to a “peremptory instruction that the shipowner warranted the bands to be safe as appliances for handling the bales.” Parker v. S/S Dorothe Olendorff, supra, 483 F.2d at 379-380. Admittedly, the evidence in this case was fairly skimpy. Cf. Parker v. S/S Dorothe Olendorff, supra. But the fact remains that proof is often meager in cases like this. In Rice v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 484 F.2d 1318, 1321 (2d Cir. 1973), we noted “the liberal attitude displayed toward unseaworthiness claims such as the present one, . ... which are closely analogous to claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act . . . .” No argument has been made, to us or to the court below, that plaintiff — a longshoreman with 31 years of experience at the time of trial— lacked sufficient expertise to testify to custom in the trade regarding the moving of cargo. Cf. Tropea v. Shell Oil Co., supra, 307 F.2d at 763 (service station operator of 20 years qualified to testify to custom of trade in disposing of waste pumped from full storage tanks); T. H. Browning S.S. Co. v. F. H. Peavey & Co., 235 F.2d 5, 9 (8th Cir. 1956) (witness who had been seaman on Great Lakes for 25 years and chief engineer for a number- of years qualified to give evidence as to customary manner of conducting dock tests). Besides, expert testimony may not even have been required since the behavior at issue (use of a metal band to drag a carton) was susceptible to lay jurors’ common sense evaluation as to its propriety. See Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962); Eaton v. Long Island R.R., 398 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1968). Cf. Nuzzo v. Rederi, A/S Wallenco, supra, 304 F.2d at 512 (Clark, J., dissenting, would not require plaintiff workman to engage in battle of experts with industry defendants).
On the record before us, plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence to entitle him to a jury trial. Therefore, we reverse the judgment dismissing the complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. On the doctrine of liability for unseawortliiness, the Court stated :
What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish an accident-free ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use.
Id.

. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 3.

. Id. at 2.