Court Opinion

ID: 8140419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 20:03:33.973665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:31.736433
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD
delivered the opinion of the court.
Separate libels were filed by the appellees, in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, against the steamboat Rio Grande, to enforce the payment of certain claims made by those parties against the steamboat for materials furnished for repairs and for necessary supplies, which it is alleged constituted a maritime lien upon the steamboat. Process was issued and served and the parties appeared and were heard, and the decree states that the court ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the claims contained in the libels in this cause, do not constitute such a maritime lieu as to give the court jurisdiction, and the court entered a decree that the libel in each case be dismissed with costs. Immediate application was made to the court by the claimants for an order that the possession of the steamboat should be delivered to them by the marshal, and the record shows that on the twelfth of May, 1868,. the motion was granted. Notice of appeal was immediately given by the libellants, and .tw.o days after the order was passed delivering the steamboat to the trustees named in the application for the order, the appeal bonds were filed. During the pendency of the several libels in the District Court and before the final decree, to wit, on the tenth of December, 1867, the causes were consolidated by the court upon a written agreement being filed that the consolidation should not prejudice the officers of the court in respect to costs.
On the eighth of June, 1871, the same material-men filed a libel in the District Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, against the same steamboat, to enforce the maritime lien for the same claims, in which they alleged that during the pendency of the said admiralty proceedings *188in the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, the court there ordered the marshal to deliver the possession of the same, as in the order previously described, and that the order was executed as made, notwithstanding the libellants appealed and gave appeal bonds operating as a supersedeas within the period allowed by law for perfecting such appeals. Process was issued and served and the appellants appeared as claimants and filed an answer. Testimony was taken, and the parties having been heard, the court entered a.decree dismissing the libel, and the libellants appealed to the Circuit Court, where the parties were again heard, and the Circuit Court reversed the decree of the District Court and entered a decree that the libellants do have and recover from the steamboat the following sums, to wit: William. Otis, $1508; Lyons & Keyland, $1411,83; Joseph Hastings,-$83.75; R. D. Port & Co., 121.25; G. 13. & C. B. Gwin & Co., $713.14, with eight per cent, interest on said different amounts, from the first of August, 1867, until paid, and costs of suit as therein specified. By the record it appears that the decree was entered on the first day of March, 1873, and of course five years and seven months’ interest must be added to each of the several sums awarded in the decree. Whereupon the respondents appealed to this court.
Two grounds for dismissing the appeal are set forth in the motion under consideration:
1st. That the transcript does not contain a true copy of the record aud of all the proceedings in the case, under the hand and seal of th.e Circuit Court.
2d. That this court has no jurisdiction in the case, as the amount in dispute is less than $2000.
1. Probably the stipulation filed in the case allowing the appellants to complete and perfect the transcript in the case may be regarded as an answer to the first ground of the motion, but if not it is quite clear that the certificate of the clerk of the court must be regarded as primd facie evidence that the matter of fact alleged in the motion is not well founded. Deficiencies, if any, may be supplied by certiorari.
*1892. Nor can the motion be sustained for the other reason set forth, as it is certain that the decree against the appellants here in favor of two of the respective appellees exceeds the sum of $2000. True, the sums recovered by the other three appellees respectively were not sufficient to give this court jurisdiction, but the motion is to dismiss the appeal, which must be denied, as the decree in favor of the two libellants first named in the decree is, as it respects each of those, greater than $2000, when the interest allowed by the Circuit Court to the date of the decree is included with the principal.* Interest to that date being specifically allowed by the decree must be included with the principal in order to determine what “the sum or value in dispute was” at the time the appeal was taken and allowed.
Motion denied.

 The Patapsco, 12 Wallace, 451.