Court Opinion

ID: 9699683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:46:20.758953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:55.680491
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
Summary judgment cannot be granted against a plaintiff simply upon oral statements made in a deposition by one of the defendants. I therefore dissent. It is well-settled that “[hjowever clear and undisputable may be the proof, when it depends on oral testimony it is nevertheless the province of the jury to decide.” Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 238, 163 A. 523, 524 (1932). The limited exception to this rule that when a party’s own “admissions le[ave] no issue for the jury to resolve, ... [but] rather have the effect of an unintentional but still unconditional surrender,” Rivoli Theatre Co. v. Allison, 396 Pa. 343, 346, 152 A.2d 449, 451 (1959), does not apply here. Appellee Simpson’s statements in his deposition about his relation to his employer, co-appellee Glenn Sand, though characterized by the majority as “admissions,” are not binding upon the adverse party, appellant Johnson. The credibility of these *28statements and their accuracy in describing the accident’s circumstances are questions of fact to be resolved by the factfinder. Only then may the court, or the jury under proper instructions, apply the law of agency. “When passing on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court is simply to determine whether there is a triable issue of fact; it is not to decide any issue of fact.” Kent v. Miller, 222 Pa.Superior Ct. 390, 393, 294 A.2d 821, 823 (1972). Accordingly, because summary judgment cannot be granted on this record, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.*

 The rule that an appellate court "will not reverse a judgment or decree on a theory that was not presented to the trial court," Kimmel v. Somerset County Commissioners, 460 Pa. 381, 384-385, 333 A.2d 777, 779 (1975), is inapplicable here. In Kimmel the court accurately noted that appellants were presenting on appeal “entirely different theories than they had presented to the trial court.” Id. Here, appellant contended consistently, and correctly, that a triable issue of fact precludes summary judgment. He specifically identified the weight and credibility of Simpson's testimony as such an issue both to the lower court, see Lower Court Op. at 3, and to our Court, see Appellant’s Brief at 4, 11-12. That he failed to cite Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co., supra, or other authority for this proposition, does not undermine its correctness or deprive him of the right to have a factfinder resolve the issue he has identified.