Court Opinion

ID: 9581724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:17:50.634521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:12.339469
License: Public Domain

*1217QUINN, Chief Justice,
dissenting in part:
I dissent in part because, in my view, the majority erroneously discounts the importance of the informer’s identity to the defendant’s right to present relevant evidence in his defense. I believe the trial court properly weighed the qualified privilege applicable to an informer against the defendant’s right to prepare a defense and, in the exercise of sound discretion, ordered the disclosure of the informer. I would therefore discharge the rule as to the order of disclosure. Since, however, the trial court had available to it other sanctions less drastic than dismissal to redress the prosecution’s refusal to disclose the identity of the informer, I would make the rule absolute as to the order of dismissal.
I.
In determining whether to order the disclosure of the identity of an informer, a trial court must balance an accused’s right to prepare a defense against the public interest in protecting the flow of information to law enforcement agencies. E.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). In striking a balance between these sometimes divergent interests, a court should consider the total circumstances of the case including, where applicable, the following factors: whether the informer was an eyewitness or earwitness to the transaction; whether the informer is or can be made available with reasonable diligence; whether other witnesses to the transaction can testify to the facts known by the informer; whether the informer’s testimony varies significantly from other available witnesses; whether the defendant knows the identity of the informer or can discover that identity without undue effort; and whether the informer was only peripherally or centrally involved in the criminal transaction. People v. Marquez, 190 Colo. 255, 258-59, 546 P.2d 482, 485 (1976). Because a trial court is much better equipped than an appellate court to resolve the issue of disclosure, the trial court’s decision should be given substantial deference. People v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360, 365 (Colo.1986); People v. Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068, 1077 (Colo.1982). If there is evidence in the record to support the order of disclosure, the order should stand. Vigil, 729 P.2d at 365; People v. Korte, 198 Colo. 474, 476, 602 P.2d 2, 3 (1979).
In my view, the record adequately supports the trial court’s order of disclosure in this case. Although not an eyewitness to the offense, the informer nevertheless was a witness to a highly significant statement made by Leslie Yellowhorn concerning the manner in which the alleged crime occurred. In her statement to the informer, Yellowhorn stated that the child attempted to run away and the defendant, in anger, then beat and killed the child by placing a plastic bag over the child’s head. However, in Yellowhom’s other statements— her statement to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, her testimony at the extradition hearing, and her testimony at the hearing on the motion to disclose — she offered a different version of the events. In two of these three statements, Yellowhorn indicated that the defendant had been watching a football game on television, became upset with the child because he was crying, and then proceeded to kill the child. In all three statements, Yellowhorn stated that the defendant used pack sacks to immobilize the child and killed the child by placing a rag over the child’s mouth. There are thus two distinct versions given by Yellowhorn concerning the circumstances surrounding the child’s death. Although both versions are highly incriminating as to the defendant, the difference in the two versions points up the important impeachment value of Yellowhom’s statement to the informer and the significance of that statement to Yellowhom’s credibility as a witness.
The trial court’s order of disclosure was calculated to provide the defendant with access to this impeachment evidence in the event Yellowhorn testified at trial to a version of events different from her statement *1218to the informer. If at trial, for example, Yellowhorn were to testify to a version of the events different from her statement to the informer, then evidence regarding Yel-lowhom’s prior statement to the informer would be of great use to the defendant for its impeachment value. There is no claim here that the defendant knows the identity of the informer or could reasonably discover that identity without the order of disclosure. Nor are we dealing here with a situation of a paid or long-standing informer whom law enforcement authorities intend to use in the future. Under these circumstances, the state's interest in preserving the anonymity of the informer in order to protect the flow of information to law enforcement authorities is of much less significance than is the defendant’s opportunity to effectively cross-examine and possibly impeach a crucial prosecution witness in a case involving serious felony charges. Finally, although there was some indication that the informer harbored some fear of reprisal if his identity were to be disclosed, the evidence on this point was far from compelling and certainly not such as to require the district court to give it conclusive weight. The trial court, in my view, made adequate findings to support its conclusion that the balance should be struck in this case in favor of disclosure. I therefore would discharge the rule as to the order of disclosure.
II.
While I would discharge the rule on the issue of disclosure, I would make the rule absolute as to the sanction of dismissal. Dismissal “is a drastic remedy to be reserved for situations where no other sanction would attain the proper result.” People v. Sams, 685 P.2d 157, 163 (Colo.1984) (quoting People v. Holloway, 649 P.2d 318, 320 (Colo.1982)). In this case, a remedy far short of dismissal can adequately protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.
If at trial Yellowhorn testifies on direct examination to the version of events told to the informer, the defendant will have no need to impeach Yellowhorn on the basis of her statement to the informer. Yellow-horn, of course, would be subject to cross-examination regarding her other prior statements about the circumstances surrounding the child’s death, but no issue is raised here with respect to the defendant’s ability to prove those prior statements in the event Yellowhorn were to deny them. Similarly, if Yellowhom at trial testifies on direct examination to a version of events different from that told to the informer, but either on direct or cross-examination admits to the complete contents of her statement to the informer, the defendant will have no legal basis to further impeach Yellowhorn by introducing extrinsic evidence in order to prove the prior statement to the informer. CRE 613 states in this respect that “if a witness admits making the prior statement, additional extrinsic evidence that the prior statement was made is inadmissible.”
If, however, Yellowhom testifies at trial to a version of events different from that told to the informer and further denies her statement to the informer, the defendant will have a genuine need to offer into evidence Yellowhorn’s prior statement to the informer as the basis for impeaching her testimony. In the event Yellowhorn so testifies, the trial court can readily accommodate the defendant’s interest in making use of Yellowhom’s prior statement by adopting the following procedure: first, by requiring the prosecution, in lieu of a more drastic sanction, to concede the authenticity of the informer’s statement; next, by admitting into evidence the typewritten summary of the informer’s statement prepared by the Canadian police officer to whom the informer spoke; and last, by instructing the jury that the typewritten summary accurately reflects what in fact the informer did tell the officer and may be considered by the jury for impeachment purposes. This procedure, in my view, would place the defendant in virtually the same position he would have been in had the prosecution disclosed the identity of the informer.
*1219It might well be that at trial the defendant may desire to offer Yellowhom’s statement to the informer as substantive evidence of the facts to which Yellowhorn’s testimony and statement relate. Section 16-10-201, 8A C.R.S. (1986) authorizes the admission of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence under the following circumstances:
(1) Where a witness in a criminal trial has made a previous statement inconsistent with [her] testimony at the trial, the previous inconsistent statement may be shown by any otherwise competent evidence and is admissible not only for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of the witness, but also for the purpose of establishing a fact to which [her] testimony and the inconsistent statement relate, if:
(a) The witness, while testifying, was given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement or the witness is still available to give further testimony in the trial; and
(b) The previous inconsistent statement purports to relate to a matter within the witness’s own knowledge.
Although Yellowhom’s statement to the informer is highly incriminating as to the defendant, nonetheless if the defendant offers the statement as substantive evidence of the facts to which Yellowhom’s testimony and her prior statement relate, the trial court could again accommodate the defendant’s interest in making substantive use of Yellowhom’s prior statement to the informer by following the same procedures outlined above with respect to the impeachment use of the prior statement and then by additionally instructing the jury that the statement may be also considered by the jury as evidence of any fact to which Yel-lowhom’s testimony and her prior statement relate.
Since these procedures would adequately protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, I would make the rule absolute as to the order of dismissal.