Court Opinion

ID: 9722014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:14:38.355701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:30.084371
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring: The trial court imposed a sentence of natural life in prison for the two first degree murders and a consecutive sentence of 60 years for the aggravated arson. The legislature has determined in which cases consecutive sentences may be imposed: "The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, or where the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12 — 13 or 12 — 14 of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8— 4(a).) The aggravated arson here was a Class X felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 20 — 1.1(b)), and severe bodily injury was imposed. Therefore, it is not necessary under section 5 — 8—4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8— 4(a)) to consider whether there was a substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. Consecutive sentences are mandatory under the statute. See People v. Bole (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 188, 198, 613 N.E.2d 740, 745. The supreme court’s statement in King regarding instances "where more than one offense is carved from the same physical act” addresses the imposition of concurrent sentences, and has nothing to do with consecutive sentences. The only reason King addressed concurrent sentences was because the legislature had not done so. If King did apply here I would disagree with the majority’s statement that "[t]he court in King held that a defendant cannot be convicted of multiple offenses based upon a single act where some of those convictions are, by definition, lesser included in another.” (265 Ill. App. 3d at 149.) King set out separate rules for situations where a single act is involved, and for situations involving multiple acts and lesser included offenses. See People v. Yeast (1992), 236 Ill. App. 3d 84, 88, 601 N.E.2d 1367, 1369-70; People v. Bowen (1993), 241 Ill. App. 3d 608, 628, 609 N.E.2d 346, 361-62. The one-act-one-crime rule applies only where the charges involve precisely the same physical act. (People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70, 77, 533 N.E.2d 802, 805; People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 281, 289, 426 N.E.2d 535, 538 (two separate invasions of victim’s body, even though closely related, were not one physical act); see People v. Cobern (1992), 236 Ill. App. 3d 300, 303, 603 N.E.2d 693, 695 (test for determining whether separate acts involved).) A single act can result in multiple convictions if there are multiple victims. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 363, 512 N.E.2d at 1201. Only if a court gets past the one-act-one-crime rule is it necessary to consider King’s multiple act/lesser included offense rule. In Shum, defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of Grace Whipple and was sentenced to a concurrent prison term for the feticide of Whipple’s unborn child. The supreme court first addressed the one-act-one-crime rule and determined that it did not apply (in effect, that there was not just a single act) where there were two distinct victims. (Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 363, 512 N.E.2d at 1201.) Only then did the court go on to consider whether feticide was a lesser included offense of murder, concluding that it was not. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 364, 512 N.E.2d at 1202. Again, the question whether consecutive sentences are permissible is controlled by section 5 — 8—4(a) of the Code, and not by King. Beyond the statute, is there any constitutional problem with consecutive sentences in this case? The double jeopardy clause provides "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” (U.S. Const., amend. V.) It has been held that the clause "protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” (North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 665, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076.) It has further been held that a lesser included offense is the "same offense.” (Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 76 L. Ed. 306, 309, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182.) Pearce and Blockburger, however, have most recently been held to state only rules of statutory construction, not of constitutional limitation. Missouri v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 366, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535, 542, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678 ("With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended”). The one-act-one-crime rule has never been viewed as a rule of constitutional dimension. (Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 76 L. Ed. at 309, 52 S. Ct. at 182 (where single act violates two statutes, double punishment proper if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not); King, 66 Ill. 2d at 565, 363 N.E.2d at 844.) If the legislature so intended, a single physical act could support multiple convictions. See People v. Donaldson (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 164, 168,435 N.E.2d 477, 479 (legislature did not so intend when it enacted the armed violence statute). There may, however, be a constitutional bar to multiple punishments for a greater offense and a lesser included offense where only a single physical act (section 5 — 8—4(a) of the Code refers to a "single course of conduct”) is involved. (See Eisenberg, Multiple Punishments for the "Same Offense” in Illinois, 11 S. Ill. U. L.J. 217, 249 nn.210, 260 (1987) (hereinafter Eisenberg); see People v. Davis (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 149, 160, 619 N.E.2d 750, 756; cf. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 542, 103 S. Ct. at 678 (no constitutional limitation on legislature).) Where a defendant chooses to commit murder by-conduct which is itself a crime, such as arson, why should defendant not be punished for both crimes? For that reason the term "lesser included offense” has been defined strictly, to include only those situations where proof of the greater offense must necessarily prove the lesser included offense — where the statutory elements of the greater offense include all those of the lesser. (Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410, 416, 65 L. Ed. 2d 228, 235, 100 S. Ct. 2260, 2265; Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 363-64, 512 N.E.2d at 1202.) Not many offenses are lesser included offenses under that strict test. Professor Eisenberg argues that, under the strict test, even the predicate offense of a compound offense such as armed violence is not a lesser included offense. Eisenberg, 11 S. Ill. U. L.J. at 252-53. As the majority correctly determines, arson is not a lesser included offense of murder in this case. It is not necessary to commit arson, or any other separate crime, in order to commit murder. Accordingly, there can be no constitutional problem with the application of section 5 — 8—4(a) of the Code, and consecutive sentences are mandatory in this case.