Court Opinion

ID: 9752995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:49:40.918427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:27.433433
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join the majority opinion except with respect to the jury poll issue.
The court reaffirmed in Crowder v. United States, 383 A.2d 336 (D.C.1978), the long-acknowledged view that an important purpose of a jury poll is “to determine with certainty that every juror approves of the *710verdict as returned, and that no juror has been coerced or induced to agree to a verdict with which he dissents.” 383 A.2d at 340. See Arnold v. United States, 511 A.2d 399, 417 (D.C.1986) (citing Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190, 194, 19 S.Ct. 637, 638, 43 L.Ed. 944 (1899)). Consequently, the court has cautioned trial judges to avoid potentially coercive actions during jury polls because of the likelihood that even minimal coercion during deliberations may cause a dissenting juror to surrender his or her views despite sincere disagreement with the verdict supported by the majority. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States, 349 A.2d 464, 466 (D.C.1975); see also Perkins v. United States, 473 A.2d 841, 846 (D.C.1984). We also have made clear that while deference is owed to the trial judge’s view of circumstances surrounding a jury poll, each case turns on its own facts. See Crowder, supra, 383 A.2d at 341.
A complete statement of the interaction between the judge and the jury after its members completed their initial deliberations is required. Id. at 341. The jury first returned to the courtroom after advising the trial judge by note that it had reached a verdict. The foreperson advised the clerk that the jury had reached a unanimous verdict as to each defendant on all counts. When the foreperson began to announce the jury’s verdicts, she informed the judge that the jury had used “a minor charge” on one of the counts involving appellant Austin. The judge called counsel to the bench and advised that if the jury had not reached a unanimous verdict on the greater charge he was going to send the jury back to the jury room for further deliberations. In response to the judge’s inquiry in open court, the foreperson explained that the jury had used a “lesser charge,” and when pressed by the judge to clarify whether the jury had reached a verdict on the greater charge, the foreperson stated, “Not guilty, then.” The judge instructed the jury, “You need to go back and continue your deliberations.” The jurors thereupon returned to the jury room.
When the jury later returned to the courtroom, the foreperson announced the jury’s verdicts on each count for each defendant, and the jurors collectively responded affirmatively to the question whether the announced verdict was their verdict. Counsel for defendant Austin then requested a poll. The judge advised the jury that the poll would be only in reference to the charges for which the foreperson had announced a unanimous guilty verdict. Upon being polled on the first count, each juror announced a verdict of guilty. During polling on the second count (assault with a dangerous weapon) however, the first juror stated, “Not guilty.” The judge responded by saying, “Very well. The jury will have to go back and continue their deliberations.” The jury then returned to the jury room for a second time. Thereafter the jury sent a note to the judge asking whether each juror could bring a note or memo into the courtroom to keep track of the verdicts. The judge, after conferring with counsel, denied the request but agreed to instruct the jury again that he would be polling only on the guilty verdicts.
Upon the jury’s third appearance in the courtroom, the judge instructed the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, I am going to be asking you to indicate and indicate only your verdict with respect to those counts which the foreperson said your verdict was guilty. I will not be asking you your verdict in reference to those charges which the foreperson indicated that your verdict was not guilty.
I will only be asking you about those verdicts which the foreperson said your verdict was guilty.
I will be asking you to indicate whether your individual verdict on those charges that the foreperson says your verdict is guilty is guilty or not guilty.
When the second poll on the assault with a dangerous weapon charge commenced, the judge began by asking the foreperson what the jury’s verdict was on count two. When the foreperson inquired regarding the identity of the assault victim, the judge instructed that he would only be asking the jurors individually about the charges which the foreperson indicated the jury’s verdict *711was guilty. The judge then inquired of juror number one who announced her verdict as “not guilty” for a second time. The judge stopped the poll and told the jury, “Go back out and continue with your deliberations.” The jury then returned to the jury room for a third time.
While the jurors were deliberating, the judge told trial counsel that he thought the first juror “was just confused," but he did not think he could let the jurors take notes. The judge explained that note-taking would result in the jurors getting together and rendering only the verdict of the entire panel and not their individual verdicts. Trial counsel made no comment.
When the jurors returned to the courtroom, the judge again asked the foreperson for the verdict on count two and the foreperson announced guilty. The judge then instructed the jury that he would poll the jury only on those charges for which the foreperson had announced a guilty verdict. On the third poll, juror number one announced a guilty verdict on the assault count, and the judge proceeded to poll the rest of the jurors, who also announced guilty verdicts.
Viewed in its totality, the interaction between the judge and the jury casts doubt on the conclusion that juror number one’s verdicts were merely the product of confusion. The foreperson had advised the judge when the jury had first returned to the courtroom that the jurors had been unable to reach unanimous verdicts on several counts and had opted to convict on lesser counts. Thereafter, the judge gave the jury simple instructions on three occasions indicating that the poll would be limited to counts for which the foreperson had announced a guilty verdict. Nonetheless, without hesitation or apparent confusion, juror number one twice stated that her verdict was not guilty. Unlike the sitúation in Williams v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 419 F.2d 740 (1969) (en banc), where the record revealed several possible sources for the juror’s statement to the judge that she was confused, nothing in the record, other than the trial judge’s conelu-sory statement,10 suggests that juror number one’s verdict was the result of confusion.
This is not the first occasion on which the court has been confronted with a juror’s announcement of a non-conforming verdict that was dismissed as confusion. In Kendall, supra, 349 A.2d 464, when polled on the first count, juror number one announced a verdict of not guilty, and upon being asked by the judge whether she had said “not guilty,” she answered, “I think it was.” Id. at 465. The judge reminded the juror that the poll was on the armed robbery count, and she reaffirmed her original statement of not guilty, emphasizing her certainty by explaining how she remembered, “Yes, we had these little cards writing down which one.” Id. The poll of the other jurors continued on that and other counts and at the end returned to the first juror who then announced that her verdict was guilty; upon inquiry by the judge, the juror reaffirmed that her verdict was the same as those of the other jurors. On appeal the court stated:
“The government hypothesizes that the dissenting juror was confused by the multiple count indictment and such confusion was understandable since the trial was the first heard by this jury panel. However plausible the government’s theory, the record discloses that the first juror clearly stated as to the first count, T had not guilty on that.’ Indeed, the trial judge rather than stopping the poll and questioning the juror to determine if she were confused by the indictment *712chose to continue the poll. Thus, both the juror’s response and the trial judge’s actions do not support a conclusion that she was confused.”
Id. at 466-67 (footnotes omitted). The court reversed the convictions, notwithstanding the absence of objection by defense counsel to the continuation of the poll. Id. at 467.11
Likewise, in Jones v. United States, 273 A.2d 842 (D.C.1971), the court reversed, noting that when juror number one registered a non-conforming verdict, the judge “should have been alerted (and, no doubt, he was) that there might not be unanimity in the verdict.” Id. at 844. The court concluded that after the judge interrupted the poll, explained the question, and the juror again indicated “not guilty,” continuing the poll on that count was coercive. Id. “Because, in this case, the repeated efforts of the trial judge to obtain a unanimous verdict may have had a coercive effect upon the dissenting juror, ‘we cannot say with assurance that the jury freely and fairly arrived at a unanimous verdict.’ ” Id. at 845 (quoting Matthews v. United States, 252 A.2d 505, 507 (D.C.1969)). These cases followed our decision in Pearson v. United States, 262 A.2d 337 (D.C.1970) (error to continue poll after dissenting verdict announced).12
The trial judge in the instant case avoided the error of continuing the poll on the assault count and was not confronted with knowledge of the numerical division of the jury as has occurred in other cases. Nonetheless, he failed to be sufficiently alert to the indications of nonunanimity. The likelihood of nonunanimity arose both from the foreperson’s initial announcement that the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on certain counts, for which a lesser charge was employed, and from juror number one’s first announcement of a non-conforming verdict on count two. In Williams, supra, Judge Leventhal distinguished between cases in which “the proceedings in court ... [give] every indication that although one juror was confused in her answers, there had been unanimity in fact, and the return to the jury room served merely to obtain clarity in the expression of the previous fact of unanimity” from those in which “the announcements of the jurors make it clear that one juror differs with the others, and the return to the jury room is for the purpose of obtaining a unanimity that plainly did not exist when they first came in to announce their verdict.” 136 U.S.App.D.C. at 164 n. 8, 419 F.2d at 746 n. 8. The totality of the interaction between the judge and the jury in the instant case appears to be closer to the latter situation than the former given juror number one’s unequivocal dissent on two occasions.
Since juror number one was a possible dissenter, the issue is the propriety of the trial judge’s responses. Important to this analysis is whether the judge conveyed to the juror that the judge had identified her as the sole dissenter, so that she (much less the other jurors) could reasonably interpret *713the judge’s actions as directed at her in a manner that suggested that the judge was attempting to compel a particular verdict. See Jackson v. United States, 368 A.2d 1140, 1143 (D.C.1977) (per curiam) (judges’ remarks are more coercive “when obviously directed at a particular individual identified to the court, to the parties, and to her fellow jurors”).
The judge’s remark to trial counsel, after the jury had returned to deliberate for a third time, indicates that even if the judge did not think that juror number one was the sole dissenter, he had concluded that she was the problem. Cf. id. at 1142 n. 6 and accompanying text (judge’s reference to “she,” where jury note advising of a lone dissenter did not identify the juror, demonstrated the judge had identified the dissenter). The pattern of interaction between the judge and the jury could readily convey to a reasonable juror, as well as to other members of the jury, that the judge viewed juror number one as a lone dissenter and would accept only an announcement of a guilty verdict on the count in question. Cf. Crowder, supra, 383 A.2d at 342 n. 11. On three occasions the judge instructed the jury to return to the jury room for further deliberations. He did so twice in response to juror number one’s announcement of a “not guilty” verdict. On neither occasion did the judge give a cautionary instruction to the jury to protect her right to dissent. Thus, the instant case is unlike Artis, supra, 505 A. 2d 52, which the majority concludes is controlling, majority opinion at 704; in Artis the judge only ordered further jury deliberations once.
When the judge instructs the jury to return for further deliberation, especially in circumstances which decrease the likelihood of confusion and suggest that the judge has identified a lone dissenter, the coercive effect of returning the case to the jury increases substantially with repetition. Cf. Jones, supra, 273 A.2d at 845. It is not difficult to imagine a scene in the jury room, with the majority pressuring the dissenting juror to bend to the judge’s implicit order that the jury resume deliberations so that she could conform her verdict; the court warned of this in Crowder, supra, 383 A.2d at 341 n. 11. The possibility of coercion exists even when the jury is only sent back for further deliberations one time. Thus, in Ellis, supra, 395 A.2d at 404, where juror number ten registered disagreement when polled on a particular count, the court observed:
[H]ad the trial court not granted the government’s motion to dismiss the contested count, and had the case been returned to the jury, we would have been faced with a situation in which coercion was more likely to have occurred as to the contested count had a verdict of guilty resulted.
395 A.2d at 408 n. 2.
The court has suggested several ways to diminish the possibility of coercion. The trial judge can stop the poll on the count and proceed to the other counts. Artis, supra, 505 A.2d at 58 (citing Perkins v. United States, 473 A.2d 841, 846 (D.C.1984)); In re Pearson, supra, 262 A.2d at 337. The judge can give an instruction which points to the need for additional deliberation and at the same time assures minority jurors that they need not surrender strongly-held views. See Criminal Jury instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.93 (3rd ed. 1978).13 In Crow-der, supra, 383 A.2d 336, moreover, the court indicated that circumstances (there, the twelfth juror had announced not guilty) may require a stronger instruction than the standard instruction 2.93, and suggested what such an instruction would say.14 The *714judge also may act to clear up circumstances giving rise to juror confusion. Williams, supra, 136 U.S.App.D.C. at 164, 419 F.2d at 746 (juror unable to hear question).
If the protective purpose of the jury poll is to be effective, then, as the court pointed out in Kendall, supra, the trial judge must be sensitive to the coercive nature of the poll itself, and, as Williams, supra, teaches, the trial judge cannot assume that a juror’s dissenting verdict is a product of confusion. Otherwise the reason for a jury poll is defeated. Accordingly, in view of the repetition in the instant case which even exceeded that in Jones, supra, 273 A.2d at 845, the absence of any evidence to suggest such confusion, and the absence of a protective instruction after juror number one repeated her not guilty verdict, I would reverse appellant Austin’s conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon against Troy Pumphrey. Crowder, supra, 383 A.2d at 343 (reversing only on count for which juror announced a dissenting verdict); Kendall, supra, 349 A.2d at 467 (quoted at note 2, supra).

. Although the trial judge told trial counsel that he thought juror number one was confused, he did not give any reason for his conclusion. His only explanation referred to the reason he had decided not to allow the jurors to make a note of their individual verdicts. The judge’s subsequent remarks in dismissing the jury suggest that he may have thought that confusion arose because the case involved multiple counts and multiple defendants, but he did not say so directly nor did he indicate that he was referring only to juror number one. Hence, the majority’s reliance on the trial judge’s bare statement, majority opinion at 706, is misplaced; there is nothing in the record to support the judge’s conclusion with respect to juror number one.

. The court explained:
The request for a jury poll should immediately alert the trial judge that there may be a dissent voiced during the poll. Once a poll is begun and lack of unanimity is apparent, then Super.Ct.Crim.R. 31(d) requires that "the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberations or may be discharged.” The rule itself requires action by the trial judge and an objection at this point is redundant.
Id., 349 A.2d at 467. In Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52, 59 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S.Ct. 464, 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986), the court appears to have ignored this statement in Kendall. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971). The majority’s effort to distinguish Kendall is unpersuasive. Majority opinion at 704 n. 3. Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1151 (D.C.1985) (en banc), did not overrule Kendall.

. It may be coincidence, but with the exception of Artis, supra, 505 A.2d 52, the juror confusion or dissenting voice at issue involves a female juror and a male judge. See Ellis v. United States, 395 A.2d 404 (D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 2830, 61 L.Ed.2d 280 (1979); Crowder, supra, 383 A.2d 336; Jackson, supra, 368 A.2d 1140; Kendall, supra, 349 A.2d 464; United States v. Brooks, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 147, 420 F.2d 1350 (1969); Williams v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 419 F.2d 740 (1969). There may be communication problems which require examination as well as a need to consider group dynamics and individual response by members of the opposite sex. See generally D. Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand (William Morrow & Co., Inc. New York 1990); cf. Judicature, vol. 74, No. 3 (Oct.-Nov.1990) 138.

. Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 2.93 (Return of the Jury After Polling) advises the jury why it is being asked to return to the jury room and also states:
After you return to the jury room, any member is free to change his or her vote on any issue submitted to you. Each juror is free to change his or her vote until the jury is discharged.

. The Crowder instruction provides:
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do *714so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to réexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
383 A.2d at 342 n. 11. Such an instruction comports with the court’s admonition in Jackson that "supplemental instructions to a hung jury must be carefully worded and well-timed and ... it must be made clear, in substance, that a verdict is not being demanded.” Jackson v. United States, supra, 368 A.2d at 1143 (internal quotation marks omitted).