Court Opinion

ID: 9449221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 06:00:35.253593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:47.388977
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KEVIN RAY ZYGMUNT,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         PH-0752-15-0292-B-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: August 3, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Susan L. Kruger, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Courtney Hatcher, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

           Kimberly Miller, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
     which found that he failed to prove his affirmative defense of reprisal for
     whistleblowing.    Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case ; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner ’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order reassessing the administrative judge’s analysis of the factors set
     forth in Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
     1999), we AFFIRM the remand initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The agency proposed to suspend the appellant for 30 days, which the
     deciding official reduced to a 15-day suspension beginning in March 2015, for
     failure to carry out a work assignment, disruptive behavior, and careless
     workmanship. Zygmunt v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-
     15-0292-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 22-25, 71-73. The appellant filed
     a Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1. On appeal, he alleged that the agency suspended
     him in retaliation for making protected disclosures. IAF, Tab 41 at 1. First, he
     alleged that he reported the theft of Government property to a work lead in the
     summer of 2012.       IAF, Hearing Transcript (HT) at 14-17 (testimony of the
     appellant).   Specifically, he reported that he observed a coworker use an
     agency-owned forklift to load an industrial refrigerator and an industrial mixer
     onto his personal vehicle and drive off site.      Id.   Second, he alleged that he
     reported to management on November 13, 2013, and in mid-September 2014, that
                                                                                            3

     he was being subjected to a hostile work environment. Id. at 17-26. Third, he
     alleged     that   he   reported   various   safety   concerns   to   the   agency    on
     November 18-19, 2014, including, inter alia, issues concerning fire alarms, fire
     doors, unsecured racks, and electrical hazards. Id. at 26-29.
¶3         During the course of the appeal, the agency rescinded the suspension action
     and returned the appellant to the status quo ante. IAF, Tab 26. Although the
     appellant did not dispute that he was returned to the status quo ante, the
     administrative judge held a hearing based on her finding that the appellant made a
     nonfrivolous claim of retaliation for whistleblowing under the Whistleblower
     Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat.
     1465. IAF, Tab 47, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2. After holding the hearing, she
     issued an initial decision finding that the appellant failed to prove his
     whistleblowing reprisal claim and denying his request for corrective action. ID
     at 2, 14.     The administrative judge concluded that the appellant made three
     protected disclosures before the agency issued the notice proposing to suspend
     him and that the timing of his disclosures relative to the age ncy’s suspension
     action satisfied the timing part of the knowledge/timing test.              ID at 5-14.
     However, she also found that the appellant did not prove that his protected
     disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to suspend him
     because he failed to establish the knowledge element of the knowledge/timing
     test. ID at 13-14.
¶4         The appellant filed a petition for review and the Board issued a Remand
     Order, which affirmed the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant
     made three protected disclosures but disagreed with her finding that the deciding
     official lacked knowledge of the disclosures. Zygmunt v. Department of the Navy,
     MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-15-0292-I-1, Remand Order, ¶¶ 3, 5, 7-10 (May 13,
     2016).      The Board found that the appellant made a prima facie case of
     whistleblower reprisal because he proved, under the knowledge /timing test, that
     his protected disclosures were a contributing factor in his suspension.              Id.,
                                                                                            4

     ¶¶ 10-12.    Based on this finding, the Board remanded the appeal for the
     administrative judge to determine whether the agency proved by clear and
     convincing evidence that it would have suspended the appellant absent his
     protected disclosures. Id., ¶¶ 12-13.
¶5         In the remand initial decision, the administrative judge evaluated the factors
     set forth in Carr and found that the agency met its burden.                 Zygmunt v.
     Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-15-0292-B-1, Remand File,
     Tab 2, Remand Initial Decision (RID) at 3-12; see Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323. Based
     on this finding, the administrative judge denied the appellant ’s whistleblower
     reprisal affirmative defense. RID at 11-12.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review in which he disagrees with the
     administrative judge’s findings on the Carr factors. Remand Petition for Review
     (RPFR) File, Tab 3. The agency has filed a response in opposition to his petition,
     and the appellant has replied. RPFR File, Tabs 5-6.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         As set forth in the Board’s Remand Order, the appellant proved his prima
     facie case of whistleblower reprisal. Remand Order, ¶¶ 10-12. The burden of
     persuasion then shifted to the agency to show by clear and convincing evidenc e
     that it would have taken the same personnel action absent the appellant’s
     protected disclosures. 2 Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R 11, ¶ 12
     (2015); Alarid v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 14 (2015); see
     5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2).     For the reasons explained below, we agree with the
     administrative judge that the agency met its burden.

     2
       We have considered the appellant’s additional argument that the administrative judge
     erroneously shifted the burden of proof to him, based on her finding, inter alia, that he
     presented no evidence that any agency official had motive to retaliate against him.
     RPFR File, Tab 3 at 6-7, 10. We disagree. The administrative judge correctly stated
     that the burden of proof remained on the agency to prove by clear and convincing
     evidence that it would have taken the same action against the appellant absent his
     whistleblowing disclosures. RID at 3.
                                                                                        5

¶8        Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof that
     produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the allegations sought
     to be established. Chavez v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285,
     ¶ 17 (2013).    In determining whether an agency has met this burden and
     successfully rebutted an employee’s prima facie case by demonstrating
     independent causation, the Board will consider the following nonexclusive
     factors: (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the
     existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency
     officials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency
     takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are
     otherwise similarly situated. See Miller v. Department of Justice, 842 F.3d 1252,
     1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323). The Board does not view
     these factors as discrete elements, each of which the agency must prove by clear
     and convincing evidence. Lu v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R.
     335, ¶ 7 (2015). Rather, the Board will weigh the factors together to determine
     whether the evidence is clear and convincing as a whole. Id.

     The administrative judge properly found that the agency’s evidence in support of
     its suspension action is strong.
¶9        Regarding the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of the
     suspension action, including the hearing testimony of the appellant and the
     agency’s witnesses, the record reflects the following: (1) the appellant admittedly
     failed to carry out a work assignment, which the agency claimed delayed the
     shipment of nuclear reactor materials; (2) he engaged in disruptive behavior by
     admittedly using profanity and making rude comments during an altercat ion with
     his work lead; and (3) he admittedly labeled a technical manual for a reactor plant
     incorrectly, which the agency determined could have resulted in the improper
     disclosure of classified materials.   RID at 4-7; HT at 30-39 (testimony of the
     appellant). The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s finding
                                                                                        6

      that the agency presented strong evidence to support the charges, and we decline
      to disturb this finding. RID at 9.
¶10         On review, the appellant argues that the agency failed to support its penalty
      determination. RPFR File, Tab 3 at 8-10. For example, he argues that the agency
      failed to consider that the verbal altercation underlying charge 2 was the result of
      unusual job tensions between him and his work lead. Id. at 9. He also asserts
      that the agency did not mitigate the penalty to account for his lack of intent and
      his prior good performance.      Id. at 8-9.   These factors, which an agency is
      required to consider in determining the appropriate penalty, may also be relevant
      to assessing the Carr factors.       See Schneider v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 98 M.S.P.R. 377, ¶¶ 5, 21-22 (2005) (finding that a witness’s
      anticipated testimony regarding his allegedly more favorable treatment under
      circumstances similar to those that led to the appellant’s suspension was relevant
      and material to the Carr factors, as well as to the reasonableness of the penalty);
      Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981) (providing a
      nonexhaustive list of factors that are relevant to determining the reasonableness
      of a penalty). 3 The administrative judge found that the deciding official properly
      considered the applicable mitigating and aggravating factors before imposing a
      15-day suspension. RID at 7-9. We agree.
¶11         As to the potential mitigating factor of unusual job tension s, the deciding
      official considered the appellant’s claim that he used profanity and made rude
      comments as alleged in charge 2 because his work lead stepped close to him,
      making him feel “threatened and trapped.”       IAF, Tab 7 at 69.     However, the

      3
        The appellant also disputes administrative judge’s determination that he was not
      similarly situated to employees who were not whistleblowers. RPFR File, Tab 3
      at 7-10. We have analyzed this argument, below, under Carr factor 3. Regardless of
      under which Carr factor we have discussed the appellant’s arguments, we have weighed
      the Carr factors together in analyzing whether the agency met its burden. Mithen v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 489, ¶ 36 (2015), aff’d per curiam,
      652 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
                                                                                             7

      deciding official concluded that the appellant “was the instigator of the
      altercation.”   Id.   Therefore, he did not find that any tension between the
      appellant and his work lead was a mitigating factor. Id.
¶12         As to the appellant’s intent, the deciding official considered this fact or as
      part of the overall seriousness of the offense, which he found to be an aggravating
      factor. Id. at 67. We discern no error in the deciding official’s finding, which
      was based in large part on the altercation at issue in charge 2.         Id. As to the
      appellant’s prior work record, the deciding official considered the appellant’s
      lack of prior discipline to be a mitigating factor. Id. However, he did not find
      the appellant’s prior satisfactory performance to be mitigating because “his
      supervisor as well as their customer has lost all faith in his ability to properly
      package materials following the required security protocols.” Id. at 68. We again
      discern no error.
¶13         Having considered the appellant’s misconduct and the aggravating and
      mitigating factors, the deciding official mitigated th e proposed 30-day suspension
      to a 15-day suspension.       Id. at 69, 72.     Thus, as the administrative judge
      concluded, the first Carr factor strongly favors the agency. 4           RID at 9; see
      generally Shibuya v. Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 36 (2013)

      4
        We find that the agency’s decision to rescind the suspension action during the course
      of this appeal does not detract from the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of
      the suspension action at the time it made its decision.              See Social Security
      Administration v. Carr, 78 M.S.P.R. 313, 335 (1998) (finding that it was appropriate to
      examine the strength of the evidence before the agency when it sought to remove the
      appellant), aff’d, 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We also find that the evidence does
      not support the appellant’s argument that an agency official recommended that the
      appellant receive training, rather than a suspension, in connection with charge 1. RPFR
      File, Tab 1 at 8; IAF, Tab 7 at 22. Instead, the official in question recommended that
      the appellant’s entire division receive refresher training. HT at 211-12 (testimony of
      the Director of the Energy Material Office); IAF, Tab 35 at 107-08.                  This
      recommendation appears to be an effort to avoid future incidents of mislabeling naval
      reactor technical manuals, and it was not specifically directed to the appellant, who was
      on leave at the time. HT at 211-12 (testimony of the Director of the Energy Material
      Office); IAF, Tab 35 at 107-08.
                                                                                        8

      (finding that the agency proved the charges, which weighed in favor of the agency
      on the clear and convincing evidence issue).

      We modify the remand initial decision to find that the agency officials involved
      in the suspension decision had a slight motive to retaliate against the appellant.
¶14         As for the second Carr factor, the strength of any motive to retaliate on the
      part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision, the administrative
      judge found no evidence that any agency official had motive to retaliate against
      the appellant. RID at 9-10. We disagree.
¶15         As to the deciding official, the administrative judge found that he knew of
      the appellant’s disclosure. Id. However, the administrative judge found that the
      deciding official had no motive to retaliate against the appellant based in part on
      her finding that “nothing in his physical demeanor or tone of voice suggested any
      animosity toward the appellant,” and his testimony was “forthright and fluid.” Id.
      The administrative judge also considered that the deciding official mitigated the
      suspension    to   15 days   because    he     empathized   with   the   appellant’s
      sole-breadwinner status as additional evidence of a lack of animosity toward the
      appellant. Id. at 10.
¶16         The administrative judge further found that other individuals involved in
      the suspension action, including the individual who reported the appellant’s
      failure to carry out the work assignment at issue in charge 1, the proposing
      official, and the Director of the Energy Material Office in which the appellant
      was employed, had no motive to retaliate against him because they were not the
      focus, or disciplined as a result, of his disclosures. Id. The administrative judge
      found no evidence that these officials pressured or influenced the deciding
      official’s penalty determination. Id. at 11.
¶17         The appellant argues that the administrative judge’s finding that the
      deciding official had no motive to retaliate “should be disregarded” because he
      testified by telephone. RPFR File, Tab 3 at 7; RID at 9-10; HT at 72-73. The
      appellant did not object to taking this testimony telephonicall y on the record
                                                                                          9

      below.     Therefore,    we    decline   to   vacate   the    administrative   judge’s
      credibility-based finding regarding the motive of the deciding official.          See
      Parker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 353, ¶ 22 (2015) (finding
      that an appellant could not raise on review an objection that she did not preserve
      below); Robertson v. Department of Transportation, 113 M.S.P.R. 16, ¶¶ 10,
      13-15 (2009) (vacating an administrative judge’s findings based on the testimony
      of witnesses that the administrative judge permitted to testify by telephone over
      the appellant’s objections).   Further, we have examined the testimony of the
      deciding official regarding his suspension decision, and we agree with the
      administrative judge that his testimony is credible.         Haebe v. Department of
      Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that when an
      administrative judge’s findings are not based on observing witnesses’ demeanor,
      the Board is free to re-weigh the evidence and substitute its own judgment on
      credibility issues). Specifically, he testified in a logical manner, consistent with
      the proposed suspension and his Douglas factor worksheet, that the basis for his
      suspension decision was the appellant’s conduct, including his failure to
      safeguard classified information and his altercation with his work lead.           HT
      at 79-82, 93 (testimony of the deciding official); IAF, Tab 7 at 22-25, 71-72; see
      Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987) (listing factors
      relevant to resolving credibility issues).    During the altercation, the appellant
      stood close to his work lead, yelling obscenities and referring to him as
      “sweetcakes.” IAF, Tab 7 at 22, 30-31; HT at 35-36 (testimony of the appellant).
¶18        The appellant also argues that the agency’s offer of a “clean slate”
      agreement 3 months before he received the proposed suspension, promising to
      leave his allegations of improper behavior “in the past” if he dropped his
      complaints or face possible removal, was evidence of retaliatory motive. RPFR
      File, Tab 3 at 11; IAF, Tab 7 at 37, 39. We are not persuaded by this argument.
      The clean slate agreement reflected the proposing official’s expectation that those
      under his supervision, including the appellant, would behave in a professional and
                                                                                       10

      safe manner.   IAF, Tab 35 at 94; HT at 177-78 (testimony of the proposing
      official). It was not conditioned on the appellant taking any actions regarding his
      prior complaints. IAF, Tab 35 at 94.
¶19        Nonetheless, we disagree with the administrative judge’s finding that the
      proposing and deciding officials had no motive to retaliate against the appellant.
      Criticisms that reflect on individuals in their capacities as managers an d
      employees are sufficient to establish substantial retaliatory motive.       Chavez,
      120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 33.      The appellant’s disclosures to the proposing and
      deciding officials of safety violations, theft of Government property, and an
      alleged hostile work environment implicated their managerial and supervisory
      capabilities. IAF, Tab 35 at 30, 32-33; HT at 170-71, 174-75 (testimony of the
      proposing official). For example, the appellant informed the proposing official
      that the agency was rewarding bad behavior when “nothing was ever done about”
      a coworker’s theft of property. HT at 171 (testimony of the proposing official).
      The appellant also indicated to the proposing official that management was
      failing to respond to his allegations of coworker harassment, stalking, and threats.
      IAF, Tab 35 at 30. In response to the proposed suspension, the appellant stated
      that he was aware that he was “sometimes an irritation to management” when he
      reported safety concerns within the deciding official’s chain of command. IAF,
      Tab 7 at 38; HT at 73 (testimony of the deciding official).
¶20        Although we find that the agency had a motive to retaliate, we find the
      motive was slight based on the prompt action that the proposing and deciding
      officials took to resolve the appellant’s concerns. In response to his harassment
      allegations, the proposing official immediately offered to reach out to Human
      Resources and the Employee Assistance Program. IAF, Tab 35 at 33-34. When
      the appellant’s allegations continued, the proposing official contacted the
      agency’s Office of Counsel and confirmed that the agency had begun an inquiry
      into a possible hostile work environment.         Id. at 43.    He conveyed this
      information to the appellant. Id. He also put in work orders to correct some of
                                                                                        11

      the alleged safety violations raised by the appellant. HT at 174-76 (testimony of
      the proposing official).   Finally, he determined that a supervisor already had
      investigated the appellant’s allegations of theft and concluded that employees
      were invited to take the items in question because they were going to be thrown
      away. Id. at 170-72 (testimony of the proposing official).
¶21         Similarly, the deciding official testified that he reported to his subordinate,
      the Director of the appellant’s unit, the appellant’s allegations of a coworker’s
      theft for further investigation.    HT at 73, 81-82 (testimony of the deciding
      official).   The deciding official also reduced the appellant’s suspension from
      30 to 15 days, which we find is additional evidence that he did not have a strong
      motive to retaliate. IAF, Tab 7 at 7.
¶22         Accordingly, we conclude that the second Carr factors weights slightly
      against the agency.

      We modify the remand initial decision to find that the absence of evidence related
      to the agency’s treatment of similarly situated nonwhistleblowers cuts slightly
      against the agency.
¶23         Applying the third Carr factor, the administrative judge concluded that “the
      appellant failed to prove that he was treat[ed] more harshly than a
      non-whistleblower.” RID at 11. We disagree.
¶24         The absence of evidence on Carr factor three can either be neutral or “cut[]
      slightly against the Government,” depending on the circumstances.             Miller,
      842 F.3d at 1262 (citing Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1374
      (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The agency “is required to come forward with all reasonably
      pertinent evidence” regarding Carr factor 3 because it has greater access to such
      information. Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374-75.
¶25         The agency provided evidence that, from 2009 to 2014, it issued discipline
      ranging from counseling to probationary termination for conduct involving one of
      the three charges at issue here. IAF, Tab 7 at 26. However, the agency did not
      provide any specific information, such as whether there were multiple charges,
                                                                                            12

      the identities of the proposing and deciding officials, or whether the individual
      employees engaged in protected activity.         Id.   Therefore, we agree with the
      appellant that the agency had, but did not present, evidence as to whether it
      treated similarly situated nonwhistleblowers more favorably. 5 We thus modify
      the remand initial decision to find that this Carr factor cuts slightly against the
      agency. RPFR File, Tab 3 at 9-10; see Miller, 842 F.3d at 1262.
¶26         On review, the appellant argues that the union president’s testimony that he
      had never seen 15-day or 30-day suspensions for similar charges supports a
      finding against the agency on Carr factor 3. RPFR File, Tab 3 at 9-10; HT at 6-7
      (testimony of the union president). However, the union president only spoke in
      general terms, and provided no specific information to support his assertion. HT
      at 6-10 (testimony of the union president). Thus, we give little weight to this
      testimony. See Spurlock v. Department of Justice, 894 F.2d 1328, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
      1990) (observing that omissions and imprecisions “detract from the weight to be
      accorded . . . evidence”).

      The administrative judge properly found that the agency proved by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have suspended the appellant absent his
      protected disclosures.
¶27         Although we have modified the administrative judge’s analysis to find that
      Carr factors 2 and 3 weigh slightly against the agency, we agree with her finding
      that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
      suspended the appellant absent his protected disclosures. RID at 11-12.
¶28         The agency had a sufficient objective basis to suspend the appella nt and
      thus the first Carr factor strongly supports a finding that the agency met its clear

      5
        The proposing official testified that he considered issuing discipline to the employee
      with whom the appellant had the altercation underlying charge 2. HT at 183-84
      (testimony of the proposing official). However, that individual retired 13 days after the
      altercation, and 9 days before the agency issued the appellant his proposed 30-day
      suspension. Id. at 183-84, 187-88 (testimony of the proposing official); IAF, Tab 7
      at 22. Thus, we find that the absence of evidence regarding this individual does not
      weigh against the agency.
                                                                                    13

      and convincing burden. Specifically, we agree with the administrative judge’s
      finding that the relevant testimonial and documentary evidence unequivocally
      supports all three charges on which the appellant’s suspension was based. RID
      at 9; IAF, Tab 7 at 22-25. Moreover, his mislabeling of technical manuals could
      have caused the disclosure of classified information regarding nuclear reactors .
      IAF, Tab 7 at 23-24; HT at 13, 30-39, 93 (testimony of the appellant and the
      deciding official).
¶29         We have found that the second Carr factor weighs against the agency, but
      that this weight is slight in light of evidence that the proposing and deciding
      officials attempted to remedy the appellant’s concerns and that the deciding
      official mitigated the suspension. RID at 10; ID at 12. We also have found that
      the third Carr factor weighs slightly against the agency because it provided no
      evidence showing that it took similar actions against employees who are not
      whistleblowers but who were otherwise similarly situated to the appellant. See
      Miller, 842 F.3d at 1262.
¶30         Looking at the evidence in the aggregate, we agree with the administrative
      judge’s conclusion that the agency met its burden to prove by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have demoted the appellant absent his
      protected disclosures. Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1368 (explaining that, in evaluating
      whether the agency met its burden, all of the relevant evidence must be
      considered in the aggregate).
¶31         Accordingly, we affirm the remand initial decision finding that the
      appellant did not prove his affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal .
                                                                                     14

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failu re to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       15

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
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      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                16

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     17

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 7   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           18

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.