Court Opinion

ID: 9883019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:35:37.791264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:27.564947
License: Public Domain

'Mr. Justice Stout
delivered the opinion'of the Court.
• This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, brought under the 25th section of the' judiciary act of 1780, ch. 20, for .the purpose of revising- the judgment of that Court, in a case involving the construction of the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The facts are briefly these: The plaintiff in error was indicted in the Court of Oyer and-Terminer for York county, for having, with force and violence, taken and carried'away from that county to the'state of Maryland, a certain négro woman, named Marga.ret Morgan, with a design and intention of selling and. disposing of, and keeping her as a slave or servant for life, contrary to a statute of Pennsylvania, passed on the 26th of March, 1826. Thát statute in the first section, in substance, provides, that if any person or persons shall, from and after the passing of the act, by fome and violence take and carry away, or cause to be taken and carried away, and shall by fraud or false pretence, seduce, or cause to be seduced, or shall attempt to take, carry away, or seduce any negro or mulatto from any part of that commonwealth, with a design and intention of selling and disposing of, or causing to be sold, or of keeping and detaining, or of causing to be kept and detained, such negro or mulatto as a slave or servant for life, or for any term whatsoever; every such person or persons, his or their aiders or abettors, shall,.on conviction thereof, be deemed ■guilty of a felony,-and shall forfeit and pay á m not less than five hundred, nor more than one thousand dollars; and moreover,' shall be sentenced to undergo a servitude for any term or terms of years, not less than seven years nor exceeding twenty-one years; and'sball be confined and kept to hard labour, &c. There ■ are many other provisions in the statute which is recited at large in the record, but ,to which it is in our view unnecessary to advert-upon.the present occasion.-
The plaintiff in ertor pleaded not guilty to. the indictment;'. and' at the trial the jury found a special verdict, which, in substance, states, that the negro woman, Margaret Morgan, was a slave for life, and held' to labour and service under and according.:to . the *609laws of Maryland, tó a certain Margaret Ashmore, a citizen of. Maryland; that the. slave escaped-and ñed from Maryland-into Pennsylvania in. 1832; .that -the plaintiff in 'error,.being legally constituted the agent.and, attorney of the said Margaret Ashmore,, in 1837,-caused, the said negro woman, to- be taken and -apprehended.as a fugitive-.from-labour, by a stpte constable, under .a warrant from-.a Penpsylvania pnagistrate; .that the said' negro woman was thereupon brought before the .said, magistrate., who refused to take further, cognisance of the case-; .and thereupon the plaintiff -in error .did- remove, take, and carry away the .said, negro woman -and her children out of Pennsvlvania into .Maryland, and 'did- deliver the said negro woman and her children into the custody and possession of the said Margaret Ashmore.- Tire special verdict, further-finds, that one-of-the children was born in-Pennsylvania, more than a year after the said negro woman .had .fled and escaped -from Maryland.
Upon this special verdict, the Court of Oyer, and Terminer, of York county, adjudged that the plaintiff, in error was guilty of the offence charged in the - indictment. A writ-of error was brought from that judgment to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, where the judgment was, pro forma, affirmed.' From this latter judgment, the present writ of error has been brought to this Court.-
Before- proceeding to discuss the very-important and interesting questions. involved in this record, it is fit' to say, that the cause has been conducted in the Court below, and has been brought hereby the eo-opérátion and sanction, both of the state-of Maryland,'.and the state of Pennsylvania, in the most friendly and courteous spirit, with, a view; to have those questions finally disposédmf by the adjudication of.this Court; -so that the agitations on this.subject in both states, which have had a tendency to interrupt the -har-rpopy- betweén.- them,, may subside, and the conflict 'qf opinion he put at rest., It" should also be added, that the statute qf Penpsylvania of-1826, was (as has.been suggested at the bar) passed- with á view of meeting the supposed wishés of Maryland on the subject of- fugitive slaves; and that,-although it has failed to -produce the good effects intended in its practical construction, the.-result was unforeseen and undesigned.
- 1. The question arising -in the case, as to the constitutionality of -the statute .of Pennsylvapia, has been most elaborately argued at *610the-.bar. The 'counsel for-the plaintiff in-error, have contended that the statuté of Pennsylvania is unconstitutional;, first, because Congress has the exclusive.power of-legislation upon the subject-matter under the Constitution, of-the United States,and under the act of the 12th of February, 1793, ch- 51, (7), which was passed.in pursuance thereof;, secondly, that if this power is. not'exclusive in Congress, still the concurrent power of the state legislatures is suspended by the actual exercise- of the power by Congress; and-thirdly, that if not suspended,.still the statute of Pennsylvania, in fill its provisions applicable to this, case, is. in direct collision with the, act of Congress, and therefore is unconstitutional and-void. The counsel for Pennsylvania maintain the, negative of all these points.
New questions which have ever come before this Court involve mort delicate and important considerations; and few'upon which the public at large' may be presumed to feel a moré profound and pervading interest: We have Accordingly given them our most-deliberate examination; and it has become my duty to .state the result to which we have arrived, and the' reasoning by which it is supported.
Before, however, we proceed to the points more immediately' before us, it may be well — in order to'clear the Case of difficulty— to say, that in the exposition of this part of the Constitution, we shall limit ourselves to those considerations'which appropriately and exclusively belong to it, without laying down any rules of interpretation of -a .inore ■ géneral nature. • -It. will, indeed, probably, be found, w.hen we look to the character' of the Constitution itself,, the objects which it seeks' to-attain, the powers which it confers, the'‘duties-, which it enjoins., and the rights" which it secures, as-well as. the 'known historical, fact that, many of its provisions were matters of Compromise of opposing interests and opinions; that no Uniform rule of-interpretation can be- applied, to it which'may not allow^ even if It does, not positively demand, many’modifications in its actual application to particular clauses.And, perhaps, the safest., rule óí interpretation after all will-be found to :be-, to look ,to :the ‘nature and objects of the particular powers, duties, and rights, with all the lights and aids of eontém- - porary history; and to give' to- the words.of each just Such opera-. *611tion and force, consistent with their legitimate meaning, as may fairly secure and attain the ends proposed.
There are two clauses in the Constitution upon-the subjéct of fugitives, which stand in juxtapósition with each other, and have been thought mutually to illustrate each other. They are both contained in the second'section of the fourth article, and are in the following words: “Á person charged in any. state' with treason, felony, or other cripie, who shall flee from justice, and be' found in .another state, shall, on demand of the' executive authority of the.state from which he fled, be delivered tip, to-be removed to the state haying jurisdiction of the crime.”
“No person heldto service or.labour in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another,.shall in .consequence' of any Mw or regulation therein, be discharged from, such service or labour; but shall he delivered up, .on claim of the party to whom- such service or labour may be due.”
The last-clause .is that, the true interpretation whereof is directly in- judgment before us. Historically, it is well known,-that the object of this clause was to secure to the citizens-of the slaveholding states the complete right and title of ownership- in their slaves, as property, in every state in. the Union into which they might escape from the state where they were held in servitude. The frill recognition of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this'species of property in all the slaveholding states*, and, indeed, was so vital to the-preservation of their domestic interests and institutions, that it- cannot be doubted that it constitinted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which-the Union could not have been formed, > Its true design, was to guard against the doctrines and principles prevalent in the nomsiaveholding states, by. preventing them from Intermeddling with, or obstructing, .or abolishing the rights of the owners of slaves.
By the general law of nations, no,nation is bound to recognise the state of slavery, .'as to foreign slaves found within its territorial dominions, when, it is'in . opposition .to it's own. policy .and' institutions, infayour of the subjects of other nations where slavery is recognised. If it does it, it is as a naatter-of comity, and not as a matter of international right. The state of: slavery’is ¡deemed to be a mere municipal regulation; founded upon and limited bo the rángeoftbe territoriallaws;- This was fullyrecognised in Somerset’s *612Case, Lofft's Rep. 1; S. C., 11 State Trials by Harg. 340; S. C. 20 Howell's State Trials, 79; which was decided before the Ame-i rican revolution. It is manifest from this consideration, that if the Constitution had not contained this clause,-every non-slave-holding state in the Union would have been at liberty to have •declared free all runaway slaves,coming within,, its. limits, and to have giyen them entire, immunity and protection against the claims of their masters; -a course which would have -created the most bittér' animosities, and engendered perpetual strife between the different states. , The clause was, therefore, of the last importanee-to íhe safety and security of the southern .states; and could not • have been surrendered by them without endangering, their whole property in slaves: The clause was ■ accordingly adopted into -the ,Constitution by the unanimous consent of the framers of'it;. a proof at once of its intrinsic and: practical necessity..
■ How, then, aré we.to interpret the'language,,of the clause? The true answer is, in. such amanner, as,-consistently with the words,"shall fully and completely effectuate the whole objects of it. If by one mode of interpretation the right must become, shadowy .and unsubstantial, arid- without any remedial power adequate to the éndy and by another mode it will attain its just end-and secure its manifest-purpose; it would seem, upon principles of reasoning, absolutely irresistible, that the. latter ought to prevail: No Court of justice can be authorised-so to„construe any clause of the Constitution as to defeat its-obvious ends, when another .construction, equally accordant with the; words and sense thereof, will enforce ana protect them.
The clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive, unqualified right on the part of the owner of the Slave, which no State law or regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain. ■ The slave is mot. to he discharged from service or labour, in consequence of any. state law or regulation. Now, certainly, without indulging in any nicety of criticism upon words, it may fairly and reasonably be said, that any .state lafv or state regulation, which interrupts* limits,..delays, or. postpones the right of-the owner to the immediate possession.'of the- slave, and the immediate command-of-his service and labour, operates, pro tanto, a discharge of the slave therefrom* The question can nevér be, how much.the slave is discharged'from; but whether he is *613discharged from any, by the natural or necessary operation of state laws or state regulations. The question is not one of quantity or degree, hut of withholding, or controlling the incidents of •a positive and absolute right.
We have said that the clause contains a positive and unqualified recognition! of the right of the owner in the slave, unaffected by any state law or regulation whatsoever, because there is no qualification or restriction of it to be found therein ; and we have no right to insert any which is not, expressed, and cannot he fairly implied; especially are we estopped from so doing, when the clause puts the right to the service or labour upon the same ground aftd to the same- extent in every other state as in the state from which the slave escaped, and in which .he was held 'to the service or labour. • If this be so, then all the incidents to that right attach also; the owner must, therefore, have the right to seize and repossess the slave, which the local laws of his own state confer upon him as • property.; and we all know that' this right of seizure and recaption is universally acknowledged in all the slaveholding states. Indeed, this is no more than a mere affirmance of the principles of the common law applicable to' this very subject. Mr. Justice Blackstone (3 Bl. Comm. 4) lays it down as unquestionable doctrine. a Recaption or reprisal (says he.), is another species of remedy by the mere act of the party .injured. This happens when any one hath deprived another of his property in goods or chattels personal, or wrongfully detains one.’s wife, child, or servant; in which case the owner of the goods, and the husband, parent, or master may lawfully claim and retake them, wherever he happens to find them, so it he not in a riotous manner, or attended with a breach of the peace.” Upon this ground We have not the slightest hesitation in holding, that, under and in virtue of the Constitution, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in' every sta.te in the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, whenever he can do it without any breach of the peace, or any illegal violence. In this sense, and to this extent, this clause of the Constitution may properly be said to execute itself; and to require no aid from legislation, state or national.
Buv the.clause of the Constitution does not stop here; nor indeed, consistently with its professed objects, could it do so. Many *614cases must arise in. which, if the remedy of the owner were confined to the mere right, of seizure and recaption, he would be utterly without any adequate redress. He may not be able to lay his. hands upon the slave. He may not be able to enforce his rights against persons who either secrete or conceal, or withhold the slave. He may be restricted by local legislation as to the mode of proofs of his ownership; as to the Courts in which he shall sue, and as to the actions which he may bring; or the process he may use to' compel the delivery of the slave. Nay, the local legislation may be utterly inadequate to furnish the appropriate redress, by authorizing no process in rem, or no specific mode of repossessing the slave, leaving the owner, at best, not that right which the Constitution designed to secure — a specific delivery and repossession of the slave, but a mere remedy in damages; and that perhaps against persons utterly insolvent or worthless. The state legislation may be entirely silent on the whole subject, and its ordinary remedial process framed with different views and objects; and this may be .innocently as well as designedly done, since every state is perfectly competent, and has the exclusive right to prescribe the remedies in its own judicial tribunals, to limit the time as well as the mode of redress^ and to deny jurisdiction over cases, which its own policy and its own institutions either prohibit or discountenance.
If, therefore, the clause of the Constitution had stopped at tlfe mere recognition of the right, without providing or contemplating any means by which it might be established and enforced in cases where it did not execute itself, it is plain that it would have, in a great variety of cases, a delusive ahd empty annunciation.' If it did not contemplate any action.either through state or national 'legislation, as auxiliaries to its more perfect enforcement in the form of remedy, or of protection, then, as there would be no duty on either to aid the right,-it would be left to the mere comity of the states to act as they should please; and would depend for its security upon the changing, course of public- opinion, the mutations of public policy, and the general 'adaptations of remedies for purposes strictly according -to the lex fori.
And this leads us to the consideration of the other part of the clause, which implies at once a guaranty and duty. It says, “ But he (the . slave) shall be delivered up on claim of the party- to *615whom such service or labour may be due.”' Now, we think it exceedingly difficult, if not impracticable, to read this language and not to feel that it contemplated some, farther remedial redress than that which might be administered at the hands of the owner himself.- A claim is to be. made. What is a claim ? It is, in a just juridical sense, a demand of some matter as.of rightmade by one person upon another,, to do or to forbear to do some act or thing as a matter of duty. A mote limited, but at the same time an equally expressive definition was given by Lord Dyer, as cited in Stowell v. Zouch, Plowden, 359; and it is equally applicable to the present case:. that “ a claim is a challenge by a man of the propriety or ownership of a thing, which he has not in possession, but which is wrongfully detained from him.” The slave is to be delivered qp on the claim. By whom tp be delivered Up ? In what mode to be delivered up ? ' How, if a refusal takes place, is the right of delivery to be enforced ? Upon what proofs ? What shall be the evidence of a rightful recaption or delivery ? When and under what circumstances shall-.the possession of the owner,, after it is obtained, be conclusive of his right, so as to preclude any further inquiry or examination into.it by local .tribunals'or otherwise, while the slave", in possession of the owner, is in transitu to the state from which he fled ?
" These, and many other questions, will readily occur , upon the slightest attention to the clause; and it is obvious that they can receive but one satisfactory answer. They .require the aid of legislation to protect the right, to enforce' the delivery, and to secure the .subsequent possession of the slave. If, indeed, the, Constitution guarantees. the right, and if it requires the delivery upon the claim of the owner, (as cannot well be doubtéd,) the natural inference certainly is, that the national government is clothed with the appropriate authority and functions to enforce it. The fundamental principle applicable to-all cases of this sort, would seem to be, that where the end is required, the means are . given; and where the duty is enjoined, the. ability to perform it is conteniplated to exist on the part of the functionaries to whom it is entrusted. The clause is found in the national Constitution, and not in that of any state. It does not point out any state functionaries,,or any state action to carry its provisions into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to enforce them; jand / *616it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of me national government, nowhere delegated or intrusted to them by the Constitution. On the contrary, the natural, if. not the' necessary conclusion is, that the national government, .in the absence of all positive provisions •to the contrary, is bound, through its own proper departments, legislative,' judicial, or executive, as the case may require, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution. The remark of Mr. Madison, in the Federalist, (No. 43,) would seem, in such cases to apply with peculiar force. “ A right (says he).implies a remedy; and where else would the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution ?” meaning, as the context shows, in the government of the United States.
. It is plain, then, that where a claim is made by the owner, out of possession, for the delivery of a slave, it must be made, if at áll, against some other person; and inasmuch ,as the right is a right of property capable of being recognised and asserted by proceedings before a Court of justice, between parties adverse to each other, it constitutes, in the strictest sense, a controversy" between the parties, and a case “ arising under the Constitution” of thé United States; within the express delegatiomof judicial power given by that -instrument. Congress, then, may call that, power into activity for the very purpose of giving effect to that right; and if so, then it may prescribe'' the mode and extent in which it shall be applied, and how, and under what circumstances the proceedings, shall'afford a complete protection and guaranty to the. right.
Congress has táfcen this very view of. the power and duty of the national-government. As early as the >year 1791, the attention of Congress was drawn to it, (as we shall hereafter more fully seé,) in consequence of some practical difficulties arising under the other clause, respecting fugitives from justice escaping into other states. The result of their deliberations; was the passage of the act of the 12th of February, 1793, ch. 51, (7,) which, after having, in the first and second sections, provided for the base of fugitives. from justice by a demand to be made of the delivery through the executive authority of the state where they are found, *617proceeds, in the .third section, to provide, that when á person hel<J to labour or service in, any of the United States, shall escape into any otherpf the states or territories/ the person td whom such labour or service may be due, his agent or attorney, is hereby empowered to seize or arrest Such. fugitive from labour, and take him or her before any judge of the Circuit pr district Courts of the United States, residing or being within the state, or before any magistrate of. a county, city, or town corporate, wherein such seizure or arrest shall be. made; and upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge or magistrate, either.by oral evidence of affidavit, &c., that the person so seized or arrested, doth, under the laws of the state or territory from which he or she-fled, owe service or labour to the person claiming him or her, it shall be the duty of such judge or magistrate, to give a.certificate thereof .to such claimant, his agent or attorney, which shall be sufficient .warrant for removing the said fugitive from labour/to the state pi territory from which he-or she fled, The fourth section provides, a penalty against any person who shall, knowingly and willingly obstruct' or hinder such -claimant, his agent, of attorney, in so seizing or arresting, such fugitive from labour, or rescue such fugitive from the claimant, or his agent, or attorney when so arrested, or who shall harbour or conceal such fugitive after notice that he is such/' and it also saves to the person claiming such labour or service, his right of action for'or on account of such injuries.
In a general sense, this act may bé truly said to cover, thé wholé ground of the Constitution, both as. to fugitives from justice, and fugitive slaves; - that is, it covers' -both the subjects, in its enactments 5 not because it exhausts the remedies which may be ap-plied by Congress ■ to enforce the rights, if the provisions of . the act shall in practice be found not to attain the object of the Constitution; but because it points out fully all the modes of attaining those objects, which Congress, in their discretion, have as yet deemed expedient or proper to meet the exigencies of the Constitution. ■ If this be so, then it would seem, upon just principles of construction, that the legislation of Congress, if constitutional, must supersede all state legislation upon the sanie subject; and by necessafy- implication prohibit it, For if Congress have a constitutional power to regulate a particular subject, and they do' actually regulate it in a given manner, and in a certain form, it cannot *618be that the state legislatures have a right to interfere; and, as it were, by way of complement to the . legislation pf Congress, to prescribe additional regulations, and whát they may deem auxiliary provisions for the same purpose. In such a case, the legislation of Congress, in' what it does prescribe, manifestly indicates that it does not intend that there shall be any farther legislation to act upon the subject-matter. Its silence as to what it does not do, is as expressive of what its intention is as the direct provisions made by it. This doctrine was fully recognised by this Court, in the case of Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 1, 21, 22; where it was expressly held, that where Congress have exercised a power over a particular subject given them by the Constitution, it is not competent for state legislation to add to the provisions of Congress upon that subject; for that the will of Congress upon the whóle subject is as clearly established by what it had not declared, as by what,it has expressed.
But it has been argued, that the act of Congress is unconstitutional, because it does not fall within the scope of any of the. enumerated powers of legislation confided to that body ;.and therefore it is void. Stripped of its «artificial and technical structure, the argument comes to this, that although rights, are exclusively secured by> or duties are exclusively imposed upon the national government, yet, unless the power to enforce these rights, or to execute these duties cah he found among the express powers of legislation enumerated in the Constitution, they remain without any means of giving them effect by any act of Congress; and they must operate solely proprio vigore, however defective may be their operation; nay, even although, in a practical sense, they may become a'nullity from the want of a proper remedy to enforce them, or to provide against their violation. If this be the true interpretation of the Constitution, it must, in a great measure, fail fo attain many of its avowed and positive objects as a security of rights, and a recognition of duties. , Such á limited construction of the Constitution has never yet been adopted as correct, either in theory or practice. No one has ever supposed that Congress could, constitutionally, by its legislation, exercise powers, or enact laws beyond the powers delegated to it by the Constitution; but it has, on various occasions, exercised powers which were necessary and proper us means to carry into effect rights expressly *619given, and duties expressly enjoined thereby. The end being required, it has been deemed a just and necessary implication,' that the means to accomplish it are given also; or, in other words, that the power flows as a necessary means to accomplish the end.
Thus, for example, although the Constitution has declared that representatives shall be apportioned among the states according to their respéctive federal numbers; and, for this purpose, it has expressly authorized Congress, by law, to provide for an enumeration of the population every ten years; yet the power- to apportion representatives after this enumeration is made, is nowhere found among the express powers given to Congress, but it' has always beeni acted upon as irresistibly flowing from the duty positively enjoined by the Constitution. Treaties made between the United States and foreign powers, often contain special provisions, which do .not execute themselves, but require the interposition of Congress to carry them into effect, and Congress has constantly, in such cases, legislated on the subject; yet, although the power is given to the executive, with the consent of the senate, to make treaties, the power is nowhere in positive terms conferred upon Congress to make laws to carry the stipulations of treaties into effect. . It has .been supposed to result from the duty of the national government to fulfil all the obligations of treaties. The senators and representatives in Congress are, in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, exempted from arrest during their attendance at the sessions thereof, and in going to and returning from the same. May not Congress enforce this right by authorizing a writ of habeas corpus, to free them from an illegal arrest in violation of this clause of the Constitution ? If it may not, then the specific remedy to enforce it must exclusively depend upon the local legislation of the states; and may be granted or refused according to their own varying policy, or pleasure. The Constitution also declares that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless,when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. No.express power is given to Congress to secure.this invaluable right in the' non-enumerated cases, o-r to suspend the writ in cases of rebellion or invasion. And yet it would be difficult to say, since this' great writ of liberty is usually provided for by the ordinary functions of legislation, and can be effectually *620provided for only in this way, that.it ought not to be deemed By necessary implication within the scope of the legislative power of Congress.
• These cases are put merely by way of illustration, to show that the rule of interpretation, insisted upon- at the argument, is quite too narrow to provide for the .ordinary exigencies of the national government, in cases where rights are intended to be absolutely secured, and duties are positively enjoined by the Constitution.
The very act of 1793, now under consideration, áífórds the-most- conclusive proof that. Congress has acted upon a very different rule- of interpretation, and has supposed that the right as well as the duty of legislation on the subject of fugitives from justice, and fugitive slaves was within the scope of the constitutional authority conferred on the. national legislature. • In respect to fugitives from justice, the Constitution, although it expressly provides that the demand shall be made By the executive authority of the state from which the fugitive has . fled, is silent as to the party upon whom the demand -is to be made, and as to the mode in which it shall be made. This very silence occasioned embarrasments in enforcing the fight • and duty at an. early period after the' adoption of the Constitution; and produced a hesitation on the part of the executive authority of Virginia to deliver up a fugitive from justice, uppn the demand of the executive Of Pennsylvania, in the year 1791; and as we historically know from the message of President Washington and the public documents of that period, it was the immediate cause of the passing of the act of 1793, which- designated the person (the state executive) upon whom- the demand should b.e made, and the mode and proofs upon and in which- it should be made. From that time down to the present hour, not a doubt has been breathed upon the constitutionality of this part of the act ^ and every executive in the Union has constantly acted upoñ and admitted its validity. . Yet the. right and the. duty are dependent, as to their mode of execution, solely o'n the act of Congress; and. but for that, they would remain a nominal fight and passive duty; the. execution of which being intrusted to and required of no one in particular, all persons might be at libérty-to disregard it. This very acquiescence, under such circumstances, of the highest state functionaries, is a most decisive proof of the universality of the opinion that the *621act is founded in a just construction of the Constitution; inde? pendent of the vast influence which it ought to have as a contemporaneous exposition, of the provisions, by those who were its immediate framers, or intimately connected with its adoption.
The same uniformity of acquiescence in the validity of the act of 1793, upon the other part of the subject-matter, • that of fugitive slaves, has prevailed, throughout the whole Union until a comparatively recent period. Nay; being from its nature and. character more readily susceptible, of being brought into controversy, in Courts of justice, than the former, and-of enlisting in opposition to it the feelings, and it maybe the prejudices of some portions of the non-slaveholding states; it has naturally been brought under' adjudication in several states in the Union, and particularly in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, andón all these occasions its validity has been-affirmed. The cases cited at the bar, of Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. and Rawle, 62 ; Glen v. Hodges, 9 Johns. Rep. 67; Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. Rep. 311; S. C., 12 Wend. Rep. 507; and Com. v. Griffin, 2 Pick. Rep. 11; are directly in point. So far as. the judges of the Courts of the United Statés have been called upon to. enforce it, and to grant the certificate required by it; it is believed, that it has been uniformly recognised as a binding and valid law; and as imposing a constitutional duty. Under such circumstances, if the question were one of-doubtful construction, such long acquiescence in it, such contemporaneous expositions of it, and such extensive and uniform recognition' of its validity, would in our judgment entitle the question to be. considered qt rest; unless indeed the interpretation of the Constitution is tó be delivered over to interminable doubt throughout the whole progress of legislation, and of - national operations.. Congress, the executive, and the judiciary have, upon various occasions, acted upon this as a sound and reasonable doctrine. Especially did this Court in the cases of Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch Rep. 299; and Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. Rep. 304; and in Cohen v. The Commonwealth of Virginia, 6 Wheat. Rep. 264; rely, upon contemporaneous expositions of the Constitution, and long acquiescence in it, with great confidence, in the discussion of questions of a highly interesting and important nature.
But we do not wish to rest our present opinion upon the ground *622either of- contemporaneous exposition, or long acquiescence, or even practical action; neither do we mean to admit the question to be of a doubtful nature, and therefore as properly calling for the aid of such, considerations. On the contrary, our judgment would be the same if the question were entirely new, and the act of Congress were of recent enactment. We hold the act to be clearly constitutional in all its leading provisions, and, indeed, with the exception of that part which confers authority upon state magistrates, to be free from reasonable doubt and difficulty upon the grounds already stated. As to, the authority so conferred upon state magistrates, while a difference of opinion has existed, and may exist still on the point, in different states, whether state magistrates are bound to act under it; none is entertained by this Court that state magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that,authority, unless prohibited by state, legislation.
' The remaining question is, whether the power of legislation upon this subject is exclusive in the national government, or cdncurrent in the states, until it is exercised by Congress. In our opinion it is exclusive; • and we shall now proceed briefly to state our reasons for that opinion. The doctrine stated by this Court, in Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 122, 193, contains the true, although not the sole rule or consideration, which is applicable to this particular subject. ’ “Wherever,” said Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court, “ the terms in which a power is granted to Congress, or the nature Of the ■power require that it should be exercised, exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the state legislatures, as if they had been forbidden to act.” The nature of the power, and the true objects to be attained by it, are then as important to be weighed, in considering the question of its exclusiveness, as the words in which it is granted.
In the first place, it is material to state, (what has been already incidentally hinted at,) that the right to seize and retake fugitive slaves, and the duty to deliver them up, in whatever state of the Union they may be found, and of course the corresponding power in Congress to use the appropriate means to enforce the right and duty, derive their whole validity and obligation exclusively from the Constitution of the United States; and are there, for the first time, recognised and established in that peculiar cha*623racter. Before the adoption of the Constitution, no state had any power whatsoever over .the subject, except within its own territorial limits, and could not bind the sovereignty or the legislation of other states. Whenever the right was acknowledged or the duty enforced in any state, it was .as a matter of comity and favour, and not as á matter of strict moral, political, or international obligation or duty. Under the Constitution it is recognised as an absolute, positive, right and duty, • pervading the whole Union with an equal and supreme force, uncontrolled and uncontrollable by state sovereignty or state legislation. It is, therefore, in a just sense a new and positive right, independent of comity, confined to no. territorial limits, and bounded by no state institutions or policy. The natural inference deducible,'from-this consideration certainly is, in the absence of any positive delegation of power to the state legislatures, that it belongs to-the legislative department of the national government, to which it owes its origin and establishment. It. would be a strange anomaly, and forced construction, to suppose that the national government meant to rely for the due fulfilment of its own proper duties and the rights which it intended to secure, upon state legislation; and riot upon that of the Union.. A fortiori, it would be more objectionable to suppose that a power] which was to be the same throughout the Union,-should be confided to state sovereignty, which could not: rightfully act beyond its-own territorial limits.
In the next .'place, the nature of the provision and the objects to be - attained' by it, require that it should be controlled by one and the same will, and ac,t uniformly by the same system of regulations throughout the Union. If, then, the states have a right, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to act upon the subject, each state is at liberty to prescribe just such regulations as suit its own policy, local convenience, and local feelings. The legislation of one state may not only be different from, but utterly repugnant to and incompatible with that of another. The time, and mode, and limitation of the remedy; the proofs of the title,, and all other incidents applicable thereto, máy be prescribed in one state, which are rejected or disclaimed in another. One state may require the owner to sue in one mode, another in a different mode.. One state may make a statute of limitations as to the remedy, in its own tribunals, short and summary; andther *624may prolong the period; and yet restrict the proof?: nay, some states may utterly refuse to act upon the subject at all; and others may refuse to open its Courts to any remedies in rem, because they would interfere with their own domestic policy, institutions, or habits. The right, therefore, would never, in a practical sense be the same in all the states. It would have nó unity-of purpose, or uniformity of operation. The duty might be enforced in some states; retarded, or limited in .others;. and denied, as compulsory in many, if not in alL Consequences like these must .have been foreseen as very likely to occur in the non-slaveholding states; where legislation, if hot silent on the. subject, and purely . voluntary, coidd Scarcely be presumed to be favourable to the exercise of the fights of the pwner.
It is scarcely conceivable that the slaveholding states would have been satisfied with leaving to the legislation of the non-slaveholding states, a power of regulation,'in the absence of that ..of Congress, which would or might .practically amount to a power to destroy the rights of the owner. If the argument, therefore, of a concurrent power in the states to act upon the subject-matter ift the absence of legislation by Congress, be wellfounded; then, if Congress hád never acted at all; or if the act of Congress should be repealed without providing a substitute, there would be a resulting authority in each of the states to regulate the whole subject at its pleasure.; and to dole put its own remedial justice, or withhold it at its pleasure. and according'toits own views of policy and expediency Surety-such a state of things never could have been intended, under such a solemn guarantee of right and. duty. On the other hand, construe the right of legislation as exclusive in Congress, and every evil, and every danger vanishes. The right and the duty: are' then co-extensiye and uniform in remedy and operation , throughout the whole Union. The owner has the same security, and the same remedial 'justice, and .the same exemption from state regulation and control, through, howeyer many states he may pass with his fugitive slave in his possession, in transitu, to his own domicile. But, upon the other supposition, the moment he passes the' state' line, he becomes amenable to the laws of another sovereignty, whose regulations may greatly embarrass or delay the exercise of his fights; and even be repugnant to those of the state \yhere he first arrested the fugitive. Consequences like these show that *625the nature and objects of the provision imperiously require, that; to make it effectual, it shouldsbe construed to be exclusive of state authority. We adopt the language of this Court in Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 193, and say, that “it has never been supposed that the concurrent power of legislation extended to every possible case in which its exercise by the states has not. been expressly ■ prohibited. The confusion .of such a practice would be endless.” And we know no case in which the confusion and public inconvenience and mischiefs thereof, could be more, completely exemplified than the present.
These are some of the reasons, but by no means all, upon which we hold the power of legislation on this subject to be exclusive in Congress. To. guard, however, against any possible misconstruction of our views, it is proper to state, that we are by,no 'means to be understood in any manner whatsoever to doubt of to interfere with the police power belonging to the dtates in virtue of their general sovereignty. ■ That police powerextends over all subjects within the territorial limits of the states; and has'never been conceded to the United States. It is wholly distinguishable from the right and duty secured by the provision now under consideration; which "is exclusively, derived from and secured by the Constitution of the United States, and dwesits whole efficacy thereto. We entertain no doubt whatsoever, that the states, in virtue of théir general police power, possess full jurisdiction to arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and.'remove them from their borders, and otherwise to secure themselves against their depredations and evil example, as they certainly may dp in cases of idlers,-vagabonds, and paupers. The rights of the owners of fugitive slaves are in no just sense interfered with, or regulated by such a course; and in many eases, the operations of this police-power, although designed essentially for other purposes, for the protection, safety, and peace of the state, may essentially promote and aid the interests of the owners. But such regulations can never be permitted .to interfere with or to obstruct the jüst rights of the owner to reclaim his slave, derived from the Constitution of the United States; or with the remedies prescribed by'Congress to aid and enforce the same. '
Upon these grounds, we are of opinion that the act of Pennsylvania upon which this indictment is founded/ is unconstitutional *626and void. It purports to punish as a public offence against that state, the very act of seizing and removing a slave by his master, which the Constitution of the United States was designed to justify and uphold.. The special verdict finds this fact, and the State Courts have rendered judgment against the plaintiff in error upon that verdict. That judgment must, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; with directions to carry into effect the judgment of this Court rendered upon the special verdict in favour, of the plaintiff in error.