Court Opinion

ID: 9772171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:09:28.584317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:41.921636
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, Concurring in part; dissenting in part. I concur completely in the majority’s reversal of the verdict for tort of outrage but would affirm the jury’s verdicts for wrongful discharge. While Hugh Morse may well have been an at-will employee, he was fired in significant part for fulfilling his duties as a law enforcement officer and that raises a jury question of whether the public policy of the State of Arkansas has been contravened. As the majority points out, this court has held that one exception to the at-will doctrine occurs when an employee is discharged for performing a duty which that employee is obligated by statute to perform. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988), citing Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982). That is what occurred in this case. The public policy of this state is found in its constitution and statutes. The statute applicable to these circumstances, according to the majority, defines the duty of police officers: (3) Pursue and arrest any person fleeing from justice in any part of this state; and (4) Apprehend any persons in the act of committing any offense against the laws of the state or the ordinances of the city and forthwith to bring such persons before the mayor or other competent authority, for examination or trial. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-44-113(b)(3) & (4) (1987). By dismissing Morse for a high speed chase of a DWI offender, Chief Andrews appears to have terminated Morse for doing precisely what he was supposed to do — pursue one who violates the law and flees from authority. Here, the chase began when Morse observed a suspicious individual get in a brown Dodge pick-up truck and begin driving erratically in the wrong lane. Morse pulled behind the truck and put on his blue lights. The driver refused to pull over and increased his speed to over 80 miles per hour. Morse got on his radio and reported the matter. He testified that he was told to give pursuit. He did so on a dusty road and wrecked his police car. Chief Andrews responded to the accident scene. Morse told the Chief that the suspect must have rammed him. The Chief disagreed. Morse said he was pressured by the Chief to file his report of the incident as soon as possible. In his report, Morse apparently stated that the suspect rammed him. Chief Andrews did not believe that this occurred. Morse then prepared a second report which included information that he said he omitted from his first report. Chief Andrews still did not believe Morse’s version of the events. Chief Andrews sent the City Council a memo setting out his belief that Morse’s actions violated police procedures outlined in his manual entitled “Andy’s Red Book”. The manual lists seven factors that should be considered before an officer engages in a high speed chase. They are: (1) type of violation; (2) weather conditions; (3) road conditions; (4) visibility; (5) danger to motorists and pedestrians; (6) availability of assistance; and (7) probability of success. Applying these' seven factors to the case at hand, the City Council first suspended Morse and then dismissed him. At trial, Morse maintained that the high speed chase and accident was the sole reason for his dismissal. Chief Andrews disagreed but did admit that he too would have initiated pursuit against the suspect driver. The issue then seems to be when should Morse have broken off the chase. It is clear that the dogged pursuit by Morse was an integral reason for his termination. It is also clear that Chief Andrews and Morse had a personality problem and that Morse believed that the Chief used the chase and accident as a means of getting rid of him. This, to my way of thinking at least, raises the spectre of penalizing Morse for doing his duty according to statute with unfortunate results. We have said that a firing caused by an employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits runs afoul of state policy. Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991). In that case we noted that the employee had presented sufficient facts for the matter to go to the jury. That the public policy exception presents a fact question has been referenced in other cases. See Cross v. Coffman, 304 Ark. 666, 805 S.W.2d 44 (1991); Webb v. HCA Health Services of Midwest, Inc., 300 Ark. 613, 780 S.W.2d 571 (1989). Police chiefs and city councils must be endowed with the authority to fix policy and criteria for termination. And a law enforcement officer who goes too far and is overly zealous in executing his duties should be subject to punishment. The circumstances in this case, however, do present an issue as to whether other motives were at work here. At least a sufficient fact question has been raised. In my judgment, this was a proper matter for the jury’s resolution. The jury found in Morse’s favor. I would defer to that verdict and affirm the judgments for wrongful discharge. Holt, C.J., and Newbern, J., join. Corbin, J., not participating.