Court Opinion

ID: 9825459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:02:31.378213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:50.512319
License: Public Domain

BROWN and KNIGHT, JJ.,
dissent, being of the opinion that interpreting the opprobrious epithet, “low-down, yellow, cur dog,” to mean that the defendant was *493“a very low, mean, base, cowardly, worthless fellow,” it was nevertheless the statement of a fact, not material to the issues as to whether or not the homicide was unlawful or justifiable, and it would not have been permissible to prove such fact by any sort of evidence on the trial.
In Wolffe v. Minnis, 74 Ala. 386, 389, the statement that one of the parties was “a large-hearted, great-souled man, confiding and trusting,” was held to be the statement of a fact and not permissible. The court, speaking through Justice Stone, observed:
“We think the language complained of in this case should not have been indulged; and coming as it did from able, eminent counsel, it was well calculated to exert an improper influence on the minds of the jurors. The court might, and probably should, have arrested it ex mero motu. It is one of the highest judicial functions, to see the law impartially administered, and to prevent, as far as possible, all improper, extraneous influences from finding their way into the jury-hox. And when opposing counsel objected to the improper language employed, and called the attention of the court to it, it was not enough that offending counsel replied, ‘Oh, well, I’ll take it back.’ Such remark cannot efface the impression. The court should have instructed the jury, in clear terms', that such remarks were not legitimate argument, and that they should not consider any thing, thus said, in their deliberations. Nothing short of a prompt, emphatic disapproval of such line of argument, and that from the court itself, can avert the probable mischief.” For the error of the court in not excluding the remarks and instructing the jury to disregard them, the judgment was reversed. See, also, Chambers v. State, 17 Ala.App. 178, 84 So. 638.
In the face of the epithet applied to the defendant and approved by the ruling of the court, though the evidence which he offered made a case of self-defense, as the opinion of the Court of Appeals holds, he had no more chance to a fair consideration of such defense, than did the proverbial snowball have to maintain its icy existence.
We therefore respectfully dissent.