Court Opinion

ID: 9430615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:12.60161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:25.214961
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist join, concurring in the judgment.
I agree that Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), does not bar consideration of respondent’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on federal habeas corpus. That conclusion flows logically from Stone and from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). The more difficult question is whether the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence can ever constitute “prejudice” under Strickland. There is a strong argument that it cannot. But that argument has neither been raised by the parties nor discussed by the various courts involved in this case. Consequently, the proper course is to reject petitioners’ Stone v. Powell argument and go no further. Though the Court appears to take this course, it employs unnecessarily broad language that may suggest that we have considered and resolved the broader Strickland issue in this case. E. g., ante, at 379-380. I write separately because that suggestion is mistaken, and also to express my view of the relationship between Stone and the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
HH
Respondent’s ineffective-assistance claim is uncomplicated. Respondent argues that his trial counsel incompetently failed to conduct any pretrial discovery. Had counsel conducted discovery, he would have known that the police had seized a *392bedsheet from respondent’s apartment without a warrant. The bedsheet contained hair samples matching hair of both respondent and the rape victim. The sheet also contained semen stains matching those found in the victim’s underpants. The State introduced the bedsheet and accompanying expert analysis at trial, and the trial judge denied respondent’s belated motion to suppress on the ground that it was untimely. Respondent contends that the sheet would have been excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds had the suppression motion been timely filed. Thus, respondent argues, counsel’s failure to conduct discovery led to the admission of evidence that was both damning and excludible.
Petitioners, the Attorney General of New Jersey and the Superintendent of Rahway State Prison, argue that because this claim depends on a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the claim cannot be heard by a federal court on habeas corpus. Petitioners’ argument rests on Stone v. Powell, swpra, in which we held that Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus as long as the State provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate those claims in state court.
The Court properly rejects petitioners’ argument. Stone’s holding derives from two propositions, neither of which applies to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, we reasoned in Stone that the exclusionary rule does not exist to remedy any wrong committed against the defendant, but rather to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment by law enforcement personnel. 428 U. S., at 486-489. Second, we concluded that collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims would add little to the exclusionary rule’s deterrent value, but would entail significant costs to federal-state relations and particularly to the public interest in convicting and punishing the guilty. Id., at 493-495.
Ineffective-assistance claims stand on a different footing. As Strickland makes clear, the right to effective assistance of counsel is personal to the defendant, and is explicitly tied to *393the defendant’s right to a fundamentally fair trial — a trial in which the determination of guilt or innocence is “just” and “rehable.” Strickland, supra, at 685-686, 696. See also United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 658 (1984) (“[T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial”). A criminal defendant who obtains relief under Strickland does not receive a windfall; on the contrary, reversal of such a defendant’s conviction is necessary to ensure a fair and just result. Strickland, supra, at 685-687. For this reason, Strickland explicitly stated that “[t]he principles governing ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions for a new trial.” 466 U. S., at 697. Strickland thus leaves no room for an argument that Stone indirectly bars some ineffective-assistance claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Nor is it possible to conclude that, since the only claimed prejudice is the admission of the illegally seized bedsheet, respondent’s claim actually is a Fourth Amendment claim barred by Stone directly. As Strickland teaches, the right to effective assistance of counsel ensures that defendants have a fair opportunity to contest the charges against them. A defendant has a valid ineffective-assistance claim whenever he has been denied that opportunity, regardless of the law on which counsel’s error is based. It follows that respondent’s claim must be judged as a Sixth Amendment claim, according to the standards set forth in Strickland, and not as a Fourth Amendment claim governed by Stone.1
*3941 — 1 ( — (
Applying Strickland, respondent must show both that his counsel fell below basic standards of competence and that he was sufficiently prejudiced by the resulting errors. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 687. Petitioners contend that trial counsel’s errors were not egregious enough to satisfy Strickland’s performance prong. In addition, they argue that the trial judge’s comments at a bail hearing constitute a factual finding that those errors were not prejudicial. The Court correctly finds that both arguments are mistaken. This holding disposes of the only claims petitioners make with respect to the legal standards for ineffective-assistance claims.
There is a far more serious argument that petitioners do not make, and that no court in this case has addressed. Respondent’s sole claim of prejudice stems from the admission of evidence that is concededly reliable although arguably inadmissible under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), and its progeny. The parties and the courts below have assumed that if the evidence in question was in fact inadmissible, and if there is a “reasonable probability” that its use at trial affected the verdict, Strickland’s prejudice prong is satisfied. Cf. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 695. In my view, that assumption is not justified. In Strickland we emphasized that ineffective-assistance claims were designed to protect defendants against fundamental unfairness. “The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.” Id., at 685. See also id., at 686 (“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a *395just result”). Accordingly, we cautioned that the “reasonable probability” test should not be applied too mechanically:
“A number of practical considerations are important for the application of the standards we have outlined. Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules. Although those principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.” Id., at 696 (emphasis added).
This reasoning strongly suggests that only errors that call into question the basic justice of the defendant’s conviction suffice to establish prejudice under Strickland. The question, in sum, must be whether the particular harm suffered by the defendant due to counsel’s incompetence rendered the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair. See id., at 687 (prejudice “requires [a] showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”).2
*396As many of our cases indicate, the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence does not lead to an unjust or fundamentally unfair verdict. We have held repeatedly that such evidence ordinarily is excluded only for deterrence reasons that have no relation to the fairness of the defendant’s trial. United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 486-488; United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). Indeed, it has long been clear that exclusion of illegally seized but wholly reliable evidence renders verdicts less fair and just, because it “deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 490. See also id., at 540 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that often “the only consequence” of exclusion “is that unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the truth-finding function of proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial totally aborted”). Thus, the harm suffered by respondent in this case is not the denial of a fair and reliable adjudication of his guilt, but rather the absence of a windfall.3 Because the fundamental fairness of the trial is not affected, our reasoning in Strickland strongly suggests that such harm does not amount to prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Common sense reinforces this conclusion. As we emphasized only last Term, and as the Court recognizes again today, ante, at 379-380, “ [t]he very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.’” Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387, 394 (1985) (emphasis added), quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U. S. 853, 862 (1975). The right *397to effective assistance of counsel flows logically from this premise. But it would shake that right loose from its constitutional moorings to hold that the Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants against errors that merely deny those defendants a windfall. In this case, for example, the bedsheet may have provided critical evidence of respondent’s guilt, evidence whose relevance and reliability cannot seriously be questioned. The admission of the bedsheet thus harmed respondent only in the sense that it helped the fact-finder make a well-informed determination of respondent’s guilt or innocence. In my view, nothing in Strickland compels us to conclude that such an “injury” establishes prejudice for purposes of respondent’s ineffective assistance claim.
I nevertheless do not vote to reverse the Court of Appeals, because neither the parties nor the courts below have considered the question I raise here. Nor do the questions presented in the petition for certiorari encompass this aspect of Strickland’s, application.4 I raise the issue only because the Court’s rhetoric might mistakenly be read to answer a question that has not been asked. E. g., ante, at 380 (“[W]e decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual guilt”). Courts and litigants should not be deceived by such pronouncements. Notwithstanding its broad language, the Court explicitly recognizes that the general applicability of Strickland in this context has not been discussed by the parties, ante, at 380, and limits itself to holding that the right to effective assistance of counsel is equally enforceable on direct *398appeal and on federal collateral review. Ante, at 382-383. Thus, the question whether Strickland prejudice encompasses the admission of reliable but illegally obtained evidence remains an open one that can be considered on remand in this case.
Because I agree that Stone v. Powell does not govern this case, I concur in the judgment. I leave the application of Strickland’s prejudice prong to claims such as this one to another day.

 For the same reason, petitioners’ argument that respondent’s claim is barred by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), lacks merit. The gist of this argument is that respondent failed timely to raise his Fourth Amendment claim on direct appeal, and thereby forfeited the right to rely on any Fourth Amendment violation on collateral review. The argument ignores the fact that respondent’s claim is not that evidence was admitted at trial in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, but rather that his counsel’s failure to so argue, together with counsel’s failure *394to conduct pretrial discovery, deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The two claims are distinct.

 Cf. United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648 (1984). In Cronic, we held that prejudice may be presumed in some kinds of extreme circumstances, as when counsel is given no time to prepare a defense. See id., at 660-661 (discussing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932)). In such circumstances, the defendant is in effect deprived of counsel altogether, and thereby deprived of any meaningful opportunity to subject the State’s evidence to adversarial testing. Prejudice is presumed for the same reason as it is presumed under Gideon v. Waimvright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 23, n. 8 (1967) (recognizing that denial of counsel at trial could never be harmless error).

 See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 389 (1964) (“Granted that so many criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering, pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest”), quoted in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 487, n. 24.

 The questions presented ask (1) “[wjhether Stone v. Powell bars a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on habeas corpus” where the basis for the claim is a failure to make a Fourth Amendment suppression motion at trial; (2) whether such a claim is barred by Wainwright v. Sykes where the Fourth Amendment issue was not preserved at trial; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals gave sufficient weight to certain supposed factual findings of the state trial judge. Pet. for Cert. i.