Court Opinion

ID: 9641892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:42:48.97693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:40.435077
License: Public Domain

MANTON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The theory of the appellee’s case, and the statement of the essential facts which sustain it, may be found in Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co., 72 F. (2d) 236. Concededly, the appellee presented jury questions as to the monopolistic control of the aluminum business and the consequent damages from unlawful restraint and competition in trade through its control in domestic and foreign commerce.
The learned trial court exhibited patience, learning, and integrity in this trial, and an appellate court should not cause a reversal, requiring another and third trial — necessarily protracted, unless some serious error has been committed. Each of the two trials occupied upwards of nine weeks, with a record here presented of some 2,275 pages of testimony and 559 exhibits.
At the commencement of the trial, the court cautioned’ the jury: “Now, maybe you will hear discussions, but we must be emphatically sure to cast anything that occurred in the other trial or any decision out of our minds. The responsibility is on us to try this case as we think it ought to be tried and decide it just as you think it ought to be decided.” And at its conclusion, the court said: “The responsibility to the plaintiff and to the defendant is yours on all the questions of fact. Decide them as your reason and conscience dictate. I do not think I have said anything during the trial or in charging you from which you can infer which way I think you should decide the case, but if you have drawn any such inferences, you should strike them out of your mind and not consider them in the least. It is no concern of mine which way your verdict goes. ‘That is for you, and you alone, to decide.”
During the course of this trial, questions as to the admissibility of evidence arose and, over the appellant’s objection, the trial court permitted the appellee to read parts of this court’s opinion on the former appeal for Ms instruction and enlightenment. Appellant assigns the reading of such parts as prejudicial error, requiring the granting of a new trial. Properly to decide whether or not this action on the part of the trial judge constituted error requires an examination of the circumstances occasioning the reading. The appellee, in presenting its case, called one Babson as a witness and inquired of him as to what the sales director of the Swiss Aluminum Company said to him when the witness was in Switzerland in 1929. The Swiss Company was shown to have been affiliated with the appellant. It was objected to as hearsay testimony, and considerable argument followed, much of which is found in the prevailing opinion. The court ruled the question admissible on one particular ground. Counsel urged broader grounds for its admission because of our former decision. Appellee’s counsel, in his argument to the court, read from our opinion, as he clearly should, since the court requested it. What was read from the opinion was our pronouncement of the law of the case. What was read did not state facts or evidence. Indeed, what was written by us was to point out the error of excluding evidence of like character offered at the first trial. What was read stated that evidence was admissible for described purposes and that such evidence would be sufficient to support a finding by the jury. When the reading was concluded, the trial judge declared that he had not thought of that theory of the case. Appellant’s objection was that such reading of the opinion constituted introducing hearsay testimony — which, of course, it was not.
During the argument, the foreman of the jury, in a very matter of fact and common sense way, answered the claim of this alleged error by suggesting that the judge would probably have instructed the jury in the language of the opinion read in ultimately stating the law of the case to them. And so he did, being guided, as he must, by what this court announced to be the rule of law applicable. In the charge, the court said, as to declarations of coconspirators in pursuance of a con*229spiracy: “If you find that there was a conspiracy to fix or maintain prices, then you will consider the declarations of Morrison of the British company to Haskell, the declarations of Barrand of the French company to Haskell, and the declarations of Kaufman of the Swiss company to Babson, if you decide those declarations were made. If you fail to find there was a conspiracy, then you will not consider the declarations of Morrison, Barrand or Kaufman. Strike all those declarations out of your mind for they are not evidence against the defendant unless there was a conspiracy.”
The question asked of Babson, to which objection was made, appears in the prevailing opinion. Its pertinency and relevancy is made clear in that part of our opinion quoted.
Appellant called MacDowcll, a sales agent for Aluminium, Limited, who, through its subsidiary, was selling aluminum in Japan. Aluminium, Limited, was controlled by appellant. On cross-examination appellee inquired as to the prices of aluminum in Japan. Objection was made that the prices in Japan were “too remote.” In the course of the discussion that followed, the court asked if this court said anything in its opinion about its admissibility. Thereupon the trial judge asked appellee’s counsel to read to him that part of the opinion which appellee’s counsel contended covered the point. The prevailing opinion contains that part of the record covering the discussion which followed and the opinion read in response to the court’s request, which clearly established the relevancy of the testimony as to the Japanese price. MacDowcll’s testimony which followed this discussion tended to show a conspiracy to monopolize the foreign markets as well as the domestic. Likewise, it showed the importance of price maintenance in the scheme of monopolizing the aluminum business. Aluminium, Limited, and tlie foreign producers entered into an agreement relative to trade in Japan. Prior thereto they had been selling in competition in Japan. Japan is further removed from tlie plants of the Aluminium, Limited, and of the foreign producers, than is the United States, and it -was of importance to show the price in Japan was under 16 cents, whereas it was 24.3 cents in the United Slates. We pointed this out in our opinion 72 F.(2d) 236, 240.
We are not here concerned with the reading of a reversing opinion to a jury on the second trial. A sound distinction has been drawn between reading such opinion to a jury as part of an argument to them, and reading such opinions as being instructive to the court in persuading it as to a legal question. State court cases which consider the reading of reported cases to a jury are: Ray v. C. & O. Ry. Co., 57 W. Va. 333, 50 S. E. 413; Clark v. Iowa Central Ry. Co., 162 Iowa, 630, 144 S. E. 332, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 457; Olney v. B. & M. R., 73 N. H. 85, 59 A. 387; Hudson v. Hudson, 90 Ga. 581, 16 S. E. 349; Huckabee v. Grace, 48 Ga. App. 621, 173 S. E. 744; Baker v. City of Madison, 62 Wis. 137, 22 N. W. 141, 583; Warren v. Wallis, Landes & Co., 42 Tex. 472.
But some state courts hold that even reading law books during the course of argument to the jury does not constitute reversible error. Steffenson v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co., 48 Minn. 285, 51 N. W. 610; Williams v. Spokane Falls & N. Ry. Co., 39 Wash. 77, 80 P. 1100.
Other cases hold that the reading of opinions to the jury is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. Gilberson v. Miller Mining & Smelting Co., 4 Utah, 46, 5 P. 699; Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Stalcup (Tex. Civ. App.) 167 S. W. 279; Gallagher v. Town of Buckley, 31 Wash. 380, 72 P. 79; Mahoney v. Dixon, 34 Mont. 454, 87 P. 452; Boltz v. Town of Sullivan, 101 Wis. 608, 77 N. W. 870; City of Tuscalloosa v. Hill, 14 Ala. App. 541, 69 So. 486.
But cases involving the reading of opinions to the jury are not in point. We are here concerned with the propriety of reading a decision to the court in the jury's presence. We are referred to no case, either in the prevailing opinion or in the briefs, which holds that reading a reversing opinion to the court in the presence of the jury constitutes error. The cases dealing with the question have held that such leading is a proper practice. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co. v. Ross, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 622, 119 S. W. 725; Denison v. Lewis, 5 App. D. C. 328; Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 222 Ala. 20, 130 So. 541; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Bell, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 579, 58 S. W. 614; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Dunbar, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 12, 108 S. W. 500. In the last-cited case, the court distinguished particularly between reading to *230the jury and reading to the court in the hearing of the jury. See, also, Betts v. Western Union Tel. Co., 167 N. C. 75, 83 S. E. 164; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Benson, 159 Ala. 254, 48 So. 712; Dismukes v. Trivers Clothing Co., Inc., 221 Ala. 29, 127 So. 188; Cashwell v. Fayetteville Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 174 N. C. 324, 327, 93 S. E. 901.
Here the court was confronted on two occasions with the question of admissibility of evidence. Counsel for the appellee had the professional duty, and therefore the absolute right, to advise the court on these questions if the court deemed such advice to be helpful to aid him in arriving at the proper conclusion as to the admissibility of the evidence, and this is all that was done by counsel in reading the pertinent portions of this court’s opinion on the former appeal. It is an everyday incident in the trial of cases and not subject to review on appeal. Grunburg v. United States (C. C. A. 1) 145 F. 81. The trial judge was capable of determining whether the course of action pursued by counsel was calculated to prejudice the minds of the jury and make them incompetent triers of the facts. To grant this reversal greatly 'underestimates the discretion and capabilities, both of the judge and the jurors. Any fair reading of what transpired during this trial shows that the portions of the opinion were read, not to show how the jury should find the facts in the case before them, but merely to show that certain evidence was relevant and admissible.
The federal authorities considering the subject are: Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 7 S. Ct. 614, 30 L. Ed. 708; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 20 Ann. Cas. 1138; Mich. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Oliver (C. C. A.) 256 F. 212, 215, cert. denied Id., 250 U. S. 646, 39 S. Ct. 494, 63 L. Ed. 1187.
In Press Publishing Co. v. McDonald (C. C. A.) 63 F. 238, 248, an opinion of a judge overruling a demurrer to the complaint was read to the jury in extenso wherein the judge writing concluded with the statement, “whether a libelous sense or an innocent sense is to be attributed to the publication (in this case) must -be determined by the jury under proper instructions,” but added more as his interpretation of the libel there charged. This court said: “Judge Wallace unmistakably indicated that in his opinion ‘the first impression upon reading a paragraph like this would be that the person referred to had been guilty of some breach of trust,’ etc.” The case was reversed for reading to the jury the opinion of the appellate court on the facts. In Michigan Life Ins. Co. v. Oliver, supra, the Fifth Circuit considered a case wherein counsel reading to the jury was prohibited on objection, but was permitted, over objection, to read the opinion for the court’s enlightenment in the presence of the jury. There, as here, the court indicated the desire to have the law expounded by the appellate court read to him, and it was held not to be error to so read to the court. In Grunberg v. United States (C. C. A.) 145 F. 81, 86, the First Circuit, over objection, permitted a plea of guilty by one jointly indicted with others to be received in the presence of the jury. What the court stated there is applicable here: “The true answer to the whole is that this was one of the ordinary incidents of a trial which is within the discretion of the court, and which we cannot revise.”
In the instant case what was read to the court in each instance bore on the questions under consideration by the judge. He wanted assistance and asked that the opinion be read each time. If he thought what was being read to him was immaterial to the question, it was he who could and would have stopped further reading. Moreover, it is plain from that portion of the opinion read, that the evidence was admissible for the purposes urged by the appellee’s counsel. A reading of the opinion justified the contentions made. Moreover, as stated, the court instructed the jury to make their own decision as of the facts; there was “no curtailment of the scope of the jury’s independent judgment as to the weight of the evidence,” as suggested.
What is said in the prevailing opinion as to-the influence exerted in reading the law of the case, hot to the jury, but to th.e judge at his request, ignores the ordinary intelligence and integrity found in juries. What was read in their presence later became a part of the charge in the submission of the case to them. It was intended by this court as directions as to the law of the case. “Universal distrust creates universal incompetence. In the courts of the United States the judge and jury are assumed to be competent to play the parts that always have belonged to them in the *231country in which the modern jury trial had its birth.” Graham v. United States, 231 U. S. 474, 480, 34 S. Ct. 148, 151, 58 L. Ed. 319.
It is an unfortuate precedent to hold that a reversal should be granted for counsel responding to the request of the trial judge in reading to him the law of the case as stated for his guidance by his immediate appellate court. Indeed, this record is barren of any evidence that the jury heard what was read, but if it did, no possible harm could follow because jurors heard at an earlier stage of the trial what was in substance the charge of the trial court.
The only other error found in this long record is in permitting Hall to answer a hypothetical question as to the value of the appellee’s plant in 1925, assuming “a reasonable prospect of profitable operation.” It is said that this was an assumption impossible to make in view of the loss sustained by the appellee from 1919 to 1924. Iiall’s qualifications as engineer and expert were fully established. The weight of his testimony was for the jury. His qualifications were for the court. Gila Valley, G. & N. R. Co. v. Lyon, 203 U. S. 465, 27 S. Ct. 145, 51 L. Ed. 276; Chateaugay Ore & Iron Co. v. Blake, 144 U. S. 476, 12 S. Ct. 731, 36 L. Ed. 510.
The nominal value of $30,975 placed on the land could not have affected the result or prejudiced the appellant. There was ample evidence of a reasonable prospect in 1925 that the plant might be operated at a profit but for the reductions in prices below costs, made by the appellant. Obviously the value of the plant would be affected by the possibility that it might be used profitably. A reasonable probability of profitable use would cause the value to approach its cost of reproduction or cost of acquiring a similar plant. If it could not be used at a profit, it would have but junk value. Since the conditions which resulted in unprofitable operations were caused by the appellant, the diminution in value was an item of damages. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 567, 51 S. Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 544. In the cited case, an action brought under the anti-trust act, recovery was allowed for losses in profit which the plaintiff might make but was forbidden to make because of the defendant’s cutting prices below costs in competition and also for depreciation of plant, the difference between its value with a profitable business and without, or in an abandoned condition. If the jury could award damages for both these items, it surely was proper for a qualified expert, in fixing values, to assume a plant used in a reasonably profitable business, and one not used due to the defendant’s unlawful acts. It must not be overlooked that appellee’s unprofitable business from 1914 to 1925 was due to appellant’s wrongful acts. It was for the jury to determine the weight of the evidence, the credit to be given the witness, and the extent to which his testimony should be acted upon. That there was actual damage due to depreciation in the value of the plant was not a matter of speculation. The amount of the jury’s verdict seems to indicate that it was based upon this only, using the comparative values.
The judgment should be affirmed.