Court Opinion

ID: 7817309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:41:04.678008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:38.087154
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice,, dissenting. I dissent from the holding of the majority affirming the award of the proceeds of Account No. 6035 to the estate of Thucie Nolen. In the first place, I cannot find any compliance with Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1838 (5) (Repl. 1966) on which to base the holding. I cannot find an execution and filing of a designation in the proxy card. It is to be noted that the chancellor did not find that there was a designation executed and filed by Nolen on this account, but based his finding on evidence of Nolen’s intention. Intention of the account holder is not sufficient unless the expression thereof is executed and filed. While the statute does not prescribe a form of designation, surely there must be some expression of intention therein on the part of the party opening it to create such an account. The proxy card does not purport to do this. It only purports to be a continuing’ revocable proxy vesting J. D. Nolen’s voting power as a member of the association in the President of the association. Only two instruments were executed by Nolen, the proxy card and a signature card. The latter constitutes an application for membership and a savings share account. Nowhere is there any mention of Thucie Nolen’s name or any indication that Nolen intended the account for which he then applied, to be payable on death to anyone. If there was any one of the documents prepared at the time this account was opened about which a lesser degree of care would be exercised, it would be the proxy card. The employee of the association who attended to the opening of this account said that Mr. Nolen never had any trouble reading papers involved in the transaction of his business. She opined that he was familiar with a proxy and its function so that she felt it unnecessary to explain it to him. He certainly had many experiences in the opening and closing of accounts. It only stands to reason that he knew that the signature card was the basis of the opening of the account and that the proxy was for the benefit of management instead of his own. Consequently, he or any other prudent person would be very attentive about the correctness of the signature card but prone to be careless about the proxy card. This seems particularly true when the documents were executed virtually simultaneously. I would reverse the lower court on the part of the decree relating to Account No. 6035. I am authorized to state that Harris, C. J., and Brown, J., join in this dissent.