Court Opinion

ID: 9447110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:25:45.174611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:54.064536
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
One ground of the present appeal is that the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity because the prosecution had failed to bear its burden of proof of sanity. This ground of the appeal is untenable. As we said in Wright v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 39, 250 F.2d 4, 7, what the prosecution must prove to sustain its burden depends upon the kind of evidence of insanity that has been adduced to bring the issue into the case. The facts and circumstances here brought out by the witnesses, if they contain some proof of insanity so as to bring the issue into the case, also contain sufficient proof of sanity to preclude directing a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity. The learned trial judge was therefore right in refusing such a direction and determining to submit the issue of mental responsibility to the jury under proper instructions.
The next day, however, the trial judge reversed himself and refused to submit the issue to the jury. That refusal, *550which is the principal basis of this appeal, was, in my view, reversible error.
We held in Tatum v. United States, 1951, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 386, 389, 190 F.2d 612, 615, that “Sanity is an ‘essential’ issue which, if actually litigated — that is, if ‘some proof is adduced’ tending to support the defense — must be submitted to the jury under the guidance of instructions.” We added:
“We are aware, of course, that any attempt to formulate a quantitative measure of the amount of evidence necessary to raise an issue can produce no more than an illusory definiteness. But if some such measure is to be attempted, we think the best approach is that expressed by us in Kinard v. United States, 1938, [68 App.D.C. 250, 253-254, 96 F.2d 522, 525-526], a prosecution for murder in which the trial judge had not submitted the issue of manslaughter to the jury. We said there that ‘ “The evidence might appear to the court to be simply overwhelming to show that the killing was in fact murder, and not manslaughter or an act performed in self-defense, and yet, so long as there was some evidence relevant to the issue of manslaughter, the credibility and force of such evidence must be for the jury, and cannot be matter of law for the decision of the court.” ’ ” 88 U.S.App.D.C. at pages 389-390, 190 F.2d at pages 615-616.
And we pointed out that, under Davis v. United States, 1895, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499, it was of no consequence whether the “some proof” of insanity be adduced by the defense or the prosecution.
The question here before us, then, is whether, in the totality of the evidence heard by the jury, there was “some proof” of insanity, requiring submission of the issue to the jury under proper instructions.
The evidence upon which appellant grounded his request for an insanity instruction, all adduced through prosecution witnesses, was, as my brethren summarize it, that appellant had “become increasingly indolent, [had] a violent temper, and then [made] an unprovoked and unusually violent attack upon another because of some concocted grievance * * * .” Added to this summary should be the fact that the circumstances of the attack were such that the jury could have considered them bizarre1 and the further fact that a police officer testified that appellant was not coherent after the arrest (about which last fact I shall say more below).
My brethren say that to present the insanity issue to the jury in this case “would be tantamount to holding, as many psychiatrists profess to believe, that any person who commits a crime is mentally ill and should receive treatment instead of punishment.” I respectfully suggest that they misconceive the role of judge and jury. By sending the insanity issue to the jury, the judge does not decide that the defendant is mentally ill and should be acquitted by reason of insanity. He simply allows the jury to decide the issue on the evidence. It seems to me that not to present the insanity issue to the jury is tantamount to holding, as a matter of law, that no person who commits a crime in the circumstances of this case is mentally ill and should receive treatment instead of punishment. I doubt that any court should ever be prepared to make such a ruling.
Whether it is a fact, as my brethren say, that many psychiatrists believe that all criminals are mentally ill or whether, if that is a fact, those psychiatrists are *551correct in that belief are matters not before us. Nor is it for us to decide whether this appellant was mentally ill when he committed the assault. We need not even decide whether the proof of insanity in the record was sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to appellant’s sanity. Tatum v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. at page 390, 190 F.2d at page 616. The single question before us is whether there was “some proof” of insanity. If there was, it was error to prevent the jury from exercising its prerogative of deciding whether or not appellant should go to a hospital for treatment, rather than to a prison for punishment. To me it is plain that there was “some proof” of insanity.
Perhaps the most significant item in the proof of insanity adduced in the trial was the following testimony of the police officer under cross-examination by defense counsel:
“Q. At the time you talked to him did you advise him that he didn’t have to tell you anything?
A. I advised him — -I asked him what happened.
“Q. You just asked him what happened? A. Yes sir, I did.
“Q. You didn’t tell him he had any right not to talk to you or say anything? A. I advised him that he had a right to counsel. He just more or less told me that without me asking.
“Q. Was he coherent at the time ? A. No sir, I don’t believe he was coherent.
“Q. He was not? A. No, sir.
“Q. And you say he told you he just didn’t know why he did this? A. He told me it was more a fit of temper.
“Q. In a fit of rage? A. Yes, sir.”
Although the prosecutor then examined the officer on re-direct, he made no attempt to elicit any revision of the above testimony. The next day, however, after both sides had rested and after the trial judge had stated that he would give the jury instructions on the issue of sanity, the prosecutor stated that he thought the officer had meant to testify that the appellant was coherent, rather than incoherent. There ensued a long discussion in open court, in the course of which the prosecutor said, inter alia: “I submit that if that officer were put on the stand, he would tell you that he misunderstood the question * * * The officer was present during this discussion and heard all that was said. The court, over objection, then allowed the prosecution to reopen its case to place the officer on the stand again. The witness then testified as follows:
“Q. Officer Owens, yesterday you were asked this question by counsel for Walter U. Smith * * * :
“‘Was he coherent at the time?’ To which your answer was: ‘No sir, I do not believe he was coherent.’
Now did you understand that question when it was placed to you, sir? A. I was confused with that question. My apologies to counsel and to the Court.
“The Court: I can’t understand you.
“The Witness: I was confused about that question, and my apologies to the Court and counsel.
“Q. [Assistant U. S. Attorney], How were you confused ? A. I thought, I was confused by the word ‘incoherent’ and the word ‘coherent.’
“Q. Is it your testimony that you thought that the word used was ‘incoherent’? A. Yes, sir, I believe that is right.”
On cross-examination, the officer stated that he had heard every word of the preceding argument about what his testimony meant. He further testified that the prosecutor had approached him in the corridor the previous day; that they “had a talk about the word ‘incoherent’ and ‘coherent’ ”; that the prosecutor explained to him that he had “made a mistake” in the words; and that, when he went to roll call that night, he found in the precinct complaint book an order for *552him to report back to the courtroom in the morning. A defense motion to strike the officer’s new testimony was denied.
On the strength of the officer’s new testimony, my brethren treat the record as showing appellant was coherent after the arrest, rather than incoherent. I do not suggest that it is improper for the prosecutor to attempt to correct mistaken testimony. While the fact that the discussion of the nature of the alleged mistake was conducted in the presence of the witness is disturbing, that was a matter of the trial court’s discretion and I need not disagree with my brethren’s conclusion that there was no abuse of that discretion. What my brethren disregard, however, is that the prosecutor could very easily have clarified the officer’s confusion, if there was any, in his re-direct examination; that rather than follow that natural course, he waited until he could have a private talk with the witness in which he “explained” to the witness the nature of the alleged mistake; and that, only after this explanation, was the witness recalled. Such conduct on the part of the prosecutor is grossly improper. The trial court, of course, knew nothing of these circumstances when he permitted the witness to be recalled. But, the circumstances having come out in the witness’ testimony, it was an abuse of discretion to deny appellant’s motion to strike the “corrected” testimony.
I would, therefore, hold that the officer’s revision of his testimony should have been stricken and would read the record, minus that evidence, as presenting some proof of insanity requiring submission of the issue to the jury. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
Another matter which appears in this record deserves comment.
Even before the officer “corrected” his testimony, the trial judge had refused to submit the issue of insanity to the jury on the ground that:
“ * * * There has been no lay testimony — lay, expert or professional testimony that this defendant is suffering from any mental disease.
“Now maybe incoherence might be a symptom in some cases to a practiced, experienced mind, of insanity. But the jury doesn’t have that, I don’t have that, and you [defense counsel] don’t have that capacity. You are not trained in that. * * * what is there here to justify an instruction on insanity? Only an inference that a jury may draw that incoherency shows a mental disease. You don't even have a lay witness to say that he is of unsound mind. That is my difficulty.”
The foregoing statement seems to reflect the clearly erroneous view that, unless there is opinion testimony to the effect that evidence offered of symptoms or manifestations of mental disorder or defect does reflect mental disorder or defect, such evidence may not be considered either by the court for the purpose of raising the insanity issue, Tatum v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. at page 390, 190 F.2d at page 616, or by the jury for the purpose of resolving that issue.
Opinion testimony, of course, may be helpful, and even persuasive to the court or jury.2 But it is crystal clear from *553our decision in Tatum v. United States, supra, that such testimony is not essential to raise the issue of insanity. And it is equally clear from our decision in Misenheimer v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. -, 271 F.2d 486, that the jury may consider “under proper instructions, any symptoms and manifestations of mental disorder” in resolving that issue. As we reiterated in Carter v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 237, 252 F.2d 608, 616, 618, “The conclusions, the inferences from the facts are for the trier of the facts.”

. Appellant’s wife, the victim of the attack, testified that he first placed his hands over her eyes, that he said nothing for a while, and that he then began to beat her and continued the beating as they went down the street for a distance of about a block and a quarter, all the while saying things that made no sense to her. Another witness testified that, as appellant was dragging his wife along the street, he stopped to bind up her wound with a handkerchief; and that, when the police arrived, appellant sat down and held the victim in his arms.

. An explanation for the failure of the de-. fense to obtain a psychiatric examination and investigation appears from the following:
“Defense Counsel: If it were necessary, your Honor, I perhaps might be able to obtain a psychiatrist, without money I can’t pay him, I can’t get him. If I could make a phone call to get him to come in, if your Honor will permit me to open my case again, I can put him on the stand and he will tell your Honor that these facts which have been put into the record indicate that it is quite likely that this poor man is suffering from some mental disease or defect.
“The Court: Of course I will let you do that.
“Counsel: Now I have no money. I can’t bring him in. This poor man is indigent. I am court-appointed as your Honor knows.
*553“The Court: I know. I think if you applied to the Court you probably could have gotten the government to pay for a psychiatrist, to make some showing.
“Counsel: Frankly, your Honor, at this point I am so convinced in my mind that there is some evidence in the record sufficient to meet the requirements of the law as laid down in this jurisdiction * * * it