Court Opinion

ID: 9750731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:27:49.525701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:20.055584
License: Public Domain

Schreiber, J.,
concurring. The trial court charged the jury that as to the defendant Mellone
the allegation here is that he was negligent and the main allegation seems to be, or appears to be, and is the fact that if by parking that commercial vehicle there, which was a step-van, that he was in violation of the local ordinance of the Borough of Lodi. There was no question that he was, but that in itself is not negligence. You must consider that and all the other issues of the case in determining whether the driver of the Mellone vehicle was negligent in parking at that particular area and whether that had anything to do with the happening of the accident. In other words, was that a proximate cause of the happening of the accident.
No reference was made in the charge to whether the Mellone vehicle had been parked at an angle before the accident, and, if so, the extent of that angle and the extent to which the rear of the vehicle extended from the curb. In fact, the trial court upheld an objection to plaintiff’s comment during summation that the Mellone vehicle was parked at an angle. The trial court stated:
*370There’s no testimony in this that this truck was parked at an angle. I’m striking the comment. There is no testimony in this case that this truck was parked at an angle.
My review of the record satisfies me there was a dearth of evidence on each of these pertinent material facts.
Under all these circumstances a verdict of negligence cannot .be sustained on the factual premise that the truck was parked at an angle so that it protruded an unreasonable distance into the street. In any event the jury’s verdict was not based on the manner in which the Mellone vehicle was parked, but only on the theory that it was negligent to park the truck there contrary to the ordinance under the conditions then existent.
As the majority points out, the ordinance was evidence of a standard of care, the breach of which, when considered with other facts, was sufficient to constitute negligence and the jury so found. It is on this basis that I join in the Chief Justice’s opinion. The ordinance adopted by the municipality in accordance with authority vested in it by the State, N. J. S. A. 39:4-197, at least in part regulated the use of the street for safety reasons. This clearly was for the benefit of traffic on the street. Compare Yanhko v. Fane, 70 N. J. 528 (1976), where an ordinance imposed on abutting owners an obligation to construct sidewalks and to maintain them in good repair, and Lambe v. Reardon, 69 N. J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 1961), with dissenting opinion of Justice Jacobs in Moskowitz v. Herman, 16 N. J. 223, 228 (1954). See also Moore’s Trucking Co. v. Gulf Tire & Supply Co., 18 N. J. Super. 467, 472 (App. Div.), certif. den. 10 N. J. 22 (1952).
Justice Clifford joins in this opinion.
Clifford and Sohreiber, JJ., concurring in the result.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Sullivan, Pashman, Clifford, Sohreiber and Handler — 6.
For affirmance — Hone.