Court Opinion

ID: 9908264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:04:57.842963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:04.436066
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 23–0099

           Submitted September 13, 2023—Filed December 8, 2023

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

      Appellee,

vs.

DAVID L. LEITNER,

      Appellant.

      On appeal from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance

Commission.

      In an attorney disciplinary action, the grievance commission recommends

revocation of an attorney’s license for violations of ethical rules. LICENSE

SUSPENDED.
      May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

      David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for appellant.

      Tara van Brederode and Alexis W. Grove, Des Moines, for appellee.
                                        2

MAY, Justice.
      David Leitner has held a license to practice law in Iowa since 1979. In

2022, the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board) filed a five-

count complaint against Leitner. The complaint charged Leitner with numerous

violations of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. Leitner did not file an

answer. Because Leitner did not answer, the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance

Commission (commission) deemed the allegations of the complaint to be

admitted. Based on those admissions and some additional evidence presented

at a hearing, the commission concluded that Leitner had violated several rules.

As a sanction for those violations, the commission recommends that we should

revoke Leitner’s license.

      We have carefully reviewed the commission’s recommendation and the

record as a whole. Following our review, we conclude that the Board proved that

Leitner violated numerous rules. In light of those violations, as well as the

aggravating and mitigating factors shown in the record, we conclude that the

proper sanction is a suspension of Leitner’s license for two years. This

suspension will commence ten days from the date of this opinion. Iowa Ct. R.

34.23(1).

      I. Our Review.

      We review de novo the record made before the commission. Iowa Sup. Ct.

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 988 N.W.2d 399, 406 (Iowa 2023). Through

that review, we must determine whether the Board has proven each “alleged

violation[] . . . by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Iowa

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d 119, 125 (Iowa 2022)). We

make this determination even where—as here—the responding attorney has

essentially admitted the Board’s allegations through the attorney’s failure to
                                         3

answer. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. O’Brien, 971 N.W.2d 584, 589

(Iowa 2022).

      With that said, because Leitner did not answer the complaint, “we deem

the factual allegations . . . in . . . the complaint admitted” for purposes of our

review. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moonen, 706 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Iowa

2005) (emphasis added). In light of those admissions, we find the facts alleged in

the complaint are established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.

But we do not necessarily adopt legal conclusions stated in the complaint.

      II. Merits.

      A. Mitchell and Foodprairie (Count I).

      1. Background. In count I of the complaint, the Board alleges that Leitner

violated two of our rules through his involvement with a client named Marvin

Mitchell and an entity known as Foodprairie, L.L.C. Specifically, the Board

claims that Leitner violated rules 32:1.2(d), which prohibits lawyers from

“counsel[ing] a client to engage, or assist[ing] a client, in conduct that the lawyer

knows is criminal or fraudulent,” and 32:8.4(c), which prohibits lawyers from

“engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”

Iowa Rs. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.2(d), 32:8.4(c). As support for these charges, the

Board alleges in its complaint the following facts, which we deem to be admitted:

             3. Leitner has long served as the attorney for an individual
      named Marvin Mitchell, representing him in various matters since
      at least 2004.

             4. Mitchell has been involved in the farming industry for
      several decades. Mitchell’s business has involved the sale and
      distribution of seed.

            5. In or around 2007, Mitchell was indicted for bankruptcy
      fraud in federal court and was subsequently sentenced to 18 months
      in prison. Mitchell pled guilty to concealing assets by creating
      various business entities and then transferring funds, land,
                                 4

equipment, and other assets to those entities prior to declaring
bankruptcy.

      6. Mitchell owes substantial sums of money to the federal
government and, as a consequence, any income he receives is
potentially subject to garnishment by federal authorities. Mitchell
owes approximately $71,000.00 to the United States Department of
Agriculture and also has several federal tax liens against his home.

        7. On or about March 27, 2013, Leitner filed a certificate of
organization with the Iowa Secretary of State creating a limited
liability company known as Foodprairie, L.L.C. (“Foodpra[i]rie”).

     8. In subsequent biennial reports filed by Leitner, he describes
himself as the “managing member” of Foodprairie.

      9. Foodprairie was created by Leitner as part of a deliberate
scheme to hide Mitchell’s funds from creditors, including the federal
government.

     10. On or about November 28, 2016, Leitner opened a bank
account for Foodprairie at Central Bank in Iowa. In the account
agreement Leitner signed when opening the account, he described
Foodprairie as a “single-member LLC.” Leitner further certified that
he was the “manager or designated member” of Foodprairie.

      11. Upon information and belief, Mitchell has continued to
work in the farming industry since his criminal conviction and has
received income from that work. At least part of that income has
been concealed using the Foodprairie business entity and bank
account established by Leitner.

      12. Mitchell’s work in the farming industry since his
conviction has included the sale of seed. In or around March of
2017, Mitchell entered into a contract to become a dealer of Pfister
Seed[s] (“Pfister”) products. Eric Schweinefus, a Pfister employee at
that time, knew Mitchell from previous business dealings and
approached Mitchell about becoming a Pfister dealer.

       13. Mitchell told Schweinefus that he wanted to become a
Pfister dealer but said that he did not want his own name associated
with the Pfister dealership. Mitchell told Schweinefus that his
lawyer, Leitner, could help establish the Pfister dealership without
using Mitchell’s name.

     14. Schweinefus provided Mitchell with a copy of Pfister’s
standard dealership agreement.
                                 5

       15. The dealership agreement was later signed by Leitner. The
completed dealership form listed Foodprairie as the dealer and
Leitner as Foodprairie’s “sole member.” Mitchell’s name does not
appear on the form. The completed dealership agreement form was
subsequently sent to Jim Riefenrath, an Assistant General Manager
for Pfister.

        16. Upon receiving the dealership agreement, Riefenrath was
initially confused, as he had previously been told by Schwein[e]fus
that the dealership agreement would be between Pfister and
Mitchell.

       17. Riefenrath subsequently participated in a telephone
conference call with both Mitchell and Leitner. During the call[,]
Leitner indicated that Foodprairie was his company. Leitner and
Mitchell both agreed that Mitchell’s dealership agreement with
Pfister should be in Foodprairie’s name.

       18. After executing the dealership agreement, Mitchell began
selling Pfister products and earning commissions and fees for his
sales.

      19. Some or all of the funds owed to Mitchell under the terms
of the dealership agreement were wired to the Foodprairie account
at Central Bank.

     20. While working as a dealer of Pfister products, Mitchell
earned substantial sums of money from Pfister, but the funds were
always cloaked in the Foodprairie name.

      21. Creating Foodprairie, opening a bank account in its name,
and entering into the contract with Pfister under the name of
Foodprairie were all an artifice developed with Leitner’s assistance
to provide Mitchell with a means of receiving funds without detection
by creditors, including the federal government.

      22. Leitner allowed Mitchell to use an LLC that Leitner
created—Foodprairie—to help Mitchell conceal income from his
creditors, including the federal government.

      23. Leitner opened a bank account in Foodprairie’s name and
allowed Mitchell to use the account to receive money surreptitiously.

       24. Leitner facilitated the contract between Mitchell and
Pfister and executed the dealership agreement with Pfister in the
name of Foodprairie so that Mitchell could do business without
detection or garnishment of funds earned.
                                            6

(Footnote omitted.) 1

       2. Analysis.

       a. Rule 32:8.4(c): conduct involving dishonesty. With these facts in mind,

we now consider the Board’s allegation that Leitner’s involvement with Mitchell

and Foodprairie violated rule 32:8.4(c). Rule 32:8.4(c) states: “It is professional

misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

deceit, or misrepresentation . . . .” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). “To find a

violation of rule 32:8.4(c), we must find that the attorney acted with ‘some level

of scienter’ rather than mere negligence.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.

Green, 888 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary

Bd. v. Haskovec, 869 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2015)). We have found violations

when an attorney has acted with a purpose to deceive. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. McCuskey, 814 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2012); Iowa Sup. Ct.

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 799 N.W.2d 524, 531 (Iowa 2011). But even

“[a]n attorney’s ‘casual, reckless disregard for the truth’ ” can be sufficient to

show a violation. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Heggen, 981 N.W.2d 701,

708 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Muhammad, 935

N.W.2d 24, 38 (Iowa 2019)).

       Viewing the record as a whole and considering the admitted allegations in

the complaint, we conclude that Mitchell and Leitner used Foodprairie in an

attempt to deceive Mitchell’s creditors. Although Mitchell was dealing seed for

Pfister and receiving money for that work, Mitchell and Leitner tried to create a

false impression that only Leitner—and not Mitchell—was involved with Pfister.

This conduct violated rule 32:8.4(c).

       1Footnote  1 to the complaint adds: “Pfister Seed[s] subsequently merged with NuTech
Seed, which is a subsidiary of Corteva, Inc.”
                                          7

      b. Rule 32:1.2(d): involvement with client in fraud. We next consider the

Board’s allegation that Leitner’s involvement with Mitchell and Foodprairie

violated rule 32:1.2(d). Rule 32:1.2(d) states in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer

shall not . . . assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is . . . fraudulent.”

Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.2(d). As explained, though, we have already found

that Leitner’s conduct with Mitchell violated rule 32:8.4(c), our general rule

against “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Id.

r. 32:8.4(c). So we need not determine whether the same conduct also violated

rule 32:1.2(d), which deals with similar concepts.

      3. Conclusions as to count I. As to count I, we conclude Leitner violated

rule 32:8.4(c) by assisting Mitchell’s efforts to mislead his creditors.

      B. Fries and Barney (Count II).

      1. Background. We now turn to count II of the complaint. There, the Board

charges Leitner with violating three of our rules through his representation of

Brooks Barney in a dissolution case. Specifically, the Board claims Leitner

violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1), which prohibits false statements to tribunals; rule

32:8.4(c), which prohibits “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation”; and rule 32:8.4(d), which prohibits “conduct . . . prejudicial

to the administration of justice.” Id. rs. 32:3.3(a)(1), 32:8.4(c)–(d). As support for

these charges, the Board alleges in its complaint the following facts, which we

deem to be admitted:

            26. On April 14, 2020, Leitner filed an appearance on behalf
      of Brooks Barney in Polk County District Court Case No.
      DRCV060024—a dissolution-of-marriage . . . action filed by Barney’s
      then-spouse, Deena Fries.

            27. Leitner had previously represented Barney in a criminal
      case in which Barney was charged with assaulting Fries (State v.
      Barney, Polk County District Court Case No. FECR336891).
                                  8

      28. The parties participated in a successful mediation
regarding the dissolution of marriage action and signed a mediated
agreement on July 21, 2020.

      29. Based upon the mediation agreement, Fries’s counsel,
Elizabeth Kellner-Nelson, prepared a stipulation comprised of the
agreed-upon terms and emailed it, in a PDF format, to Leitner on
August 3, 2020.

      30. Leitner returned what appeared to be the same PDF,
signed by himself and Barney, to Kellner-Nelson by email on or
about August 21, 2020.

      31. Unbeknownst to Kellner-Nelson, Leitner had modified the
PDF document containing the stipulation, adding a significant
provision regarding custody of the parties’ minor child.

      32. Paragraph 3 of the original PDF Kellner-Nelson sent to
Leitner states:

            Visitation. Unless otherwise agreed, Brooks will
      be entitled to time with B.S.B. every other weekend from
      Saturday at 4:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. and
      every Tuesday from 6:00 p.m. until Wednesday at 7:00
      a.m.

      33. Leitner modified the PDF to state:

            Visitation. Unless otherwise agreed, Brooks will
      be entitled to time with B.S.B. every other weekend from
      Saturday at 4:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. and
      every Tuesday from 6:00 p.m. until Wednesday at 7:00
      a.m. Respondent sha [sic] first right of refusal to have
      B.S.B. whenever Petitioner is otherwise unable to care for
      him.

(Emphasis added).

      34. At no point did Leitner notify Kellner-Nelson that he had
modified the PDF document to add the “right-of-first-refusal
provision.”

      35. The right-of-first-refusal provision was also not part of the
parties’ mediation agreement. Moreover, neither the parties nor their
respective counsel had ever previously discussed a right-of-first-
refusal provision. Rather, Leitner unilaterally inserted the provision
without notifying or consulting with Kellner-Nelson.
                                  9

      36. Because the stipulation had been sent and returned as a
PDF document, and because Leitner did not notify her of the
modification to paragraph 3, Kellner-Nelson reasonably believed the
PDF document Leitner returned to her was the same as the one she
had sent to him, changed only to add the signature of his client.

      37. Kellner-Nelson had reviewed the stipulation with Fries
before sending it to Leitner. After Leitner returned the stipulation
that he surreptitiously modified, Fries signed it, reasonably believing
it to be the stipulation she had previously reviewed with her
attorney.

     38. The stipulation was filed with the district court on
August 25, 2020.

      39. In January of 2021, Barney—who at the time was subject
to both a criminal and a civil no-contact order in which Fries was
the protected party—notified Fries of his right of first refusal based
upon the modified stipulation.

      40. On January 25, 2021, Kellner-Nelson filed a motion to
vacate the order approving the parties’ stipulation.

       41. On March 29, 2021, Leitner filed an application to initiate
contempt proceedings based in part on the allegation that Fries had
failed to honor the right-of-first-refusal provision Leitner had
furtively added to the stipulation.

       42. On June 29, 2021, a hearing was held on Fries’s motion
to vacate the stipulation agreement and Barney’s application to
initiate contempt proceedings.

      43. Following the hearing, the district court entered an order
granting Fries’s motion to vacate the order approving the stipulation.
The court found Leitner and his client engaged in fraud when
modifying the stipulation to include the right-of-first-refusal
provision.

      44. The court found that Leitner and his client intentionally
deceived Fries and Kellner-Nelson. The court found “an intent to
deceive based on the manner in which the provision was inserted
and returned without any suggestion that a revision had been
made.”

      45. The court further noted that Fries was damaged by the
fraudulent insertion of the right-of-first-refusal provision. The court
explained:
                                 10

            Fries is currently protected by a five-year criminal
      No Contact Order after Barney plead[ed] guilty to
      domestic abuse assault by impeding breathing without
      injury. Barney’s interpretation of the right of first
      refusal would require Fries to alert him anytime she
      decided to leave the minor child in someone else’s care
      (such as at home with her older children), even if it was
      only for an hour to go to the gym or the grocery store.
      Essentially Fries would have to disclose far greater
      information about her daily life to someone against
      whom she is protected by a No Contact Order.

            The testimony in this case demonstrates the
      problematic nature of Barney’s claims. Barney called
      two different witnesses to report that Fries had been
      seen at a bar on a weekend night and a Prairie Meadows
      on New Year’s Eve. He messaged Fries while she was at
      the grocery store to ask where the child was if he wasn’t
      with her. Clearly, Barney is keeping tabs on Fries’[s]
      whereabouts, despite the existence of a No Contact
      Order.
(Footnote omitted).

     46. The court also denied Barney’s application to initiate
contempt proceedings.

      47. Leitner’s covert modification of the stipulation was not
Leitner’s only dishonest act while representing Barney.

       48. On December 2, 2020, Kellner-Nelson filed an application
to initiate contempt proceedings based on Barney’s failure to pay
either child support or his required $200 monthly car payment to
Fries.

      49. In response, [Leitner] filed a motion to dismiss the
contempt application in which he falsely stated that Barney had
“brought his child support current,” Barney had paid the $200
monthly car payment, and the contempt application was “frivolous.”

       50. On January 14, 2021, the district court entered an order
holding Barney in contempt. The court found that Barney had
willfully failed to pay child support and the car payment.

      51. On February 25, 2021, Kellner-Nelson filed a motion to
waive a mediation that had been ordered in response to her
application to vacate the parties’ stipulation. On March 3, 2021,
Leitner filed a resistance to the motion in which he falsely claimed
                                         11

      that he had “tried, without success, to get opposing counsel to set
      up the mediation or at least provide alternative dates.” Leitner had
      made no effort to contact Kellner-Nelson about mediation.

             52. A hearing was scheduled for July 8, 2021, to determine if
      Barney had complied with the contempt order. Neither Leitner nor
      Barney appeared for the hearing. The presiding judge contacted
      Leitner by phone to inquire why he and his client had not appeared
      for the hearing. Leitner stated that he believed the hearing was by
      phone and that he had told his client he did not need to participate
      in the hearing. The hearing was rescheduled for July 19, 2021.

             53. At the July 19 hearing, Barney testified that Leitner had
      not notified him of the July 8 compliance hearing, and he was not
      told of any hearing until July 16.

(First alteration in original.)

      2. Analysis.

      a. Rule 32:3.3(a)(1): false statements to tribunals. We now consider whether

Leitner violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1) through his misrepresentations to the district

court in the Fries and Barney dissolution case. Rule 32:3.3(a)(1) states, “A lawyer

shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail

to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal

by the lawyer . . . .” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:3.3(a)(1). The requirement of a

“statement” can be met through oral or written statements. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 953 N.W.2d 156, 163 (Iowa 2021). The “knowingly”

requirement means actual knowledge. Id. at 163–64. Actual knowledge can be

inferred from circumstances. Id. But we don’t infer that “an attorney made a

misrepresentation knowingly simply because the misrepresentation occurred.”

Id. at 164 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d

466, 486 (Iowa 2014)).

      Applying these principles here, we conclude that Leitner violated rule

32:3.3(a)(1) on two occasions during the Fries and Barney dissolution case. First,

Leitner violated 32:3.3(a)(1) through a written filing in which Leitner falsely
                                             12

represented that he had tried to set up mediation. Leitner would have known

that this representation was false because it involved Leitner’s own behavior,

namely, his own failure to try to set up mediation. So we infer that this

misrepresentation was made knowingly and, therefore, in violation of rule

32:3.3(a)(1).

      Second, and likewise, Leitner violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1) by falsely

representing to the court that Leitner had notified his client of a hearing. Again,

this misrepresentation was about a matter within Leitner’s personal knowledge.

This conduct violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1).

      b. Rule 32:8.4(c): conduct involving dishonesty. We now consider whether

Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(c). As previously discussed, rule 32:8.4(c) prohibits

“conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa R. of

Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). From a strictly factual perspective, Leitner ran afoul of

rule 32:8.4(c) through the misconduct just discussed, that is, his false

representations to the court. But “[w]hen we find conduct violates a specific

provision”      of   our   rules   that   “involv[es]   dishonesty,   fraud,   deceit,   or

misrepresentation, we will not find the same conduct violates rule 32:8.4(c).”

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 885 N.W.2d 408, 422 (Iowa 2016)

(quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 605 (Iowa

2011)). That is the case here: we have already found that Leitner’s

misrepresentations to the court violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1). So we do not find that

these misrepresentations also violate rule 32:8.4(c).

      This does not, however, end our discussion of rule 32:8.4(c). Count II also

describes additional dishonest conduct by Leitner, namely, Leitner’s fraudulent

insertion of the right-of-first-refusal provision in a dissolution decree. See Iowa

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kallsen, 814 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Iowa 2012)

(finding “dishonesty” which separately “goes beyond [a] specific rule violation”
                                         13

can still violate rule 32:8.4(c)). We have no doubt that this behavior was designed

to mislead—and did mislead—both Fries and Fries’s counsel. This conduct

violated rule 32:8.4(c).

      c. Rule 32:8.4(d): conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. We now

consider whether Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d), which states, “It is professional

misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice . . . .” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). “An attorney’s

conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice when it violates the ‘well-

understood norms and conventions of the practice of law’ ” and thus “hampers

‘the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems upon

which the courts rely.’ ” Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 128 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 180 (Iowa 2013)). “We have

consistently held an attorney violates rule 32:8.4(d) when the ‘misconduct

results in additional court proceedings or causes court proceedings to be delayed

or dismissed.’ ” Johnson, 988 N.W.2d at 413 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Noel, 933 N.W.2d 190, 204 (Iowa 2019)).

      Here we conclude that Leitner’s behavior violated rule 32:8.4(d) in two

ways. First, Leitner’s fraudulent insertion of the right-of-first-refusal provision

was a radical violation of the “well-understood norms and conventions of the

practice of law.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Mbanza, 996 N.W.2d 711,

721 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Palmer, 825

N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2013)). This fraudulent conduct required additional court

proceedings to vacate the tainted stipulation. This conduct violated rule

32:8.4(d).

      Second, Leitner doubled down on his initial fraud by bringing a contempt

action to enforce the fraudulently added right-of-first-refusal provision. Through

this contempt action, Leitner again disregarded the “well-understood norms and
                                         14

conventions of the practice of law.” Id. at 721 (quoting Palmer, 825 N.W.2d at

325). And, again, Leitner’s actions required additional court proceedings to

dispose of the contempt action. This conduct violated rule 32:8.4(d).

      3. Conclusions as to count II. As to count II, we find Leitner violated rule

32:3.3(a)(1) twice by lying to the court about two different topics. We also find

Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(c) through his fraudulent insertion of the right-of-

first-refusal provision. And we find that Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d) twice by

fraudulently inserting the right-of-first-refusal provision and then filing a

contempt action to enforce the fraudulent provision.

      C. Jamison and Lu-Jen (Count III).

      1. Background. We now turn to count III of the complaint, in which the

Board charges Leitner with violating three of our conflict-of-interest rules

through his representation of clients with adverse interests. Specifically, count

III charges violations of rules 32:1.7(a)(2), 32:1.9(a), and 32:1.9(c). As support for

these charges, the Board alleges in its complaint the following facts, which we

deem to be admitted:

            55. On April 16, 2020, Leitner filed an answer on behalf of Lu-
      Jen Farms, Inc. and Cliff Bowie (“Lu-Jen”) in Cedar County District
      Court Case No. LACV036444.

            56. The suit was initiated by the James D. Jamison
      Irrevocable Trust (“Jamison”) against Lu-Jen and alleged breach of
      contract, among other claims. The petition alleged the parties
      entered into a contract in which Lu-Jen agreed to purchase all of its
      corn and soybean crop from Jamison, but Lu-Jen had failed to make
      payment to Jamison as required by the contract.

            57. Leitner previously represented Jamison; Leitner drafted
      the contract in question on behalf of Jamison.

             58. Although he himself drafted the contract, in the answer
      he filed on behalf of Lu-Jen, [Leitner] stated, “the alleged contract is
      unconscionable and void as against public policy.”
                                              15

             59. [Leitner] also stated in the answer that Jamison, his
       former client, “is not and was not at the time claimed a licensed
       dealer of agricultural seed.”

              60. On April 23, 2020, Jamison’s counsel, Daniel Rockhold,
       sent Leitner a letter asking Leitner to withdraw from representing
       Lu-Jen because of the conflict of interest. Rockhold also notified
       Leitner that he would likely be a witness in the case, as Leitner had
       firsthand knowledge regarding the formation and execution of the
       contract.

             61. Leitner replied to Rockhold by letter dated April 30, 2020.
       In the letter, Leitner acknowledged the conflict of interest, stating,
       “[U]pon further reflection, I do agree that I may have a conflict of
       interest.” Leitner indicated that he would be withdrawing because of
       the conflict of interest.

              62. Leitner did not withdraw his representation of Lu-Jen.

             63. On July 15, 2020, Rockhold filed a motion to disqualify
       Leitner, as Leitner had not voluntarily withdrawn. On August 3,
       2020, the district court entered an order disqualifying Leitner.

              64. Following Leitner’s disqualification, Jamison filed an
       amended petition on September 28, 2020. On October 20, 2020,
       Jamison served Lu-Jen with notice of intent to file an application for
       default judgment, as Lu-Jen had not filed an answer to the amended
       petition.

             65. On October 29, 2020, Leitner filed an answer to the
       amended petition on behalf of Lu-Jen. The answer was signed by
       Cliff Bowie, a representative of and co-defendant with Lu-Jen.
       However, the answer was filed by Leitner through his electronic
       document management system account.

(Alteration in original) (footnote omitted.) 2
       2. Analysis.

       a. Rule 32:1.9(a): conflict with former client. We now consider the Board’s

allegation that Leitner violated rule 32:1.9(a) through his representation of Lu-

Jen and Jamison. Rule 32:1.9(a) states, “A lawyer who has formerly represented

       2Footnote 2 to the complaint adds: “Leitner drafted the contract for Jamison and Sons, a

predecessor entity to the Jamison Irrevocable Trust.”
                                         16

a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or

a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives

informed consent, confirmed in writing.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.9(a). So

where (as here) there is no client consent, this rule is violated when three

conditions are met: (1) there are consecutive representations of two or more

different clients, (2) the representations involve “the same or a substantially

related matter,” and (3) the new client’s interests are “materially adverse” to those

of the former client. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 814 N.W.2d

532, 539 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.9(a)).

      We believe all three conditions are met through Leitner’s involvement with

Jamison and Lu-Jen. First, the consecutive-representation condition is met

because Leitner represented Jamison and then represented Lu-Jen. Second,

these consecutive representations both involved “the same or a substantially

related matter” because (1) Leitner’s representation of Jamison involved drafting

a contract between Jamison and Lu-Jen, and (2) Leitner’s representation of Lu-

Jen involved litigation against Jamison over the very contract that Leitner had

drafted for Jamison. Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.9(a). Third, and finally, Lu-

Jen’s interests were “materially adverse” to Jamison’s interests because Jamison

was suing Lu-Jen. Id. And so Leitner’s representation of Lu-Jen violated rule

32:1.9(a).

      This conclusion draws added support from the comments to rule 32:1.9.

Comment [1] states, in part, “Under this rule, for example, a lawyer could not

properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of

the former client.” Id. r. 32:1.9 cmt. [1]. This is exactly what Leitner did. First,

Leitner drafted the contract for Jamison. And then, when Leitner represented

Lu-Jen, Leitner filed a pleading in which Leitner claimed that the very contract
                                           17

Leitner had drafted was both “unconscionable” and “void as against public

policy.” This conduct violated rule 32:1.9(a).

      b. Rule 32:1.7(a): concurrent conflict. Next we consider the Board’s

allegation that Leitner violated rule 32:1.7(a)(2) through his representation of a

new client, Lu-Jen, against a former client, Jamison. Rule 32:1.7(a)(2) prohibits

lawyers from “represent[ing] a client if the representation involves a concurrent

conflict of interest.” Id. r. 32:1.7(a). For purposes of 32:1.7(a)(2), “[a] concurrent

conflict of interest exists if: . . . there is a significant risk that the representation

of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to

another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the

lawyer.” Id. r. 32:1.7(a)(2). An attorney’s representation is materially limited

when the attorney’s “ ‘ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an

appropriate course of action’ is restricted due to the attorney’s ‘other

responsibilities or interests.’ ” State v. Mulatillo, 907 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Iowa

2018) (quoting Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.7 cmt. [8]).

      We conclude that Leitner violated rule 32:1.7(a)(2) by representing Lu-Jen.

As just explained, because Leitner drafted the contract on behalf of Jamison,

Leitner was ethically prohibited from trying to rescind the same contract on

behalf of Lu-Jen. In other words, Leitner’s preexisting duties to Jamison

prohibited Leitner from pursuing an appropriate defense strategy on behalf of

Lu-Jen. In the words of rule 32:1.7(a)(2), Leitner’s duties to his “former client,”

Jamison, “materially limited” Leitner’s representation of Lu-Jen. Iowa R. of Prof’l

Conduct 32:1.7(a)(2). This conduct violated rule 32:1.7(a)(2).

      c. Rule 32:1.9(c): using information related to former representation. Next

we consider whether Leitner violated rule 32:1.9(c) by improperly using

information about his former client Jamison during Leitner’s representation of

Lu-Jen. Rule 32:1.9(c) places limits on when attorneys can “use” or “reveal”
                                         18

information “relating to the representation” of former clients. Id. r. 32:1.9(c). Rule

32:1.9(c)(1) generally prohibits attorneys from using that “information . . . to the

disadvantage of the former client.” Id. r. 32:1.9(c)(1). But there are exceptions.

See id. The prohibition does not apply “when the information has become

generally known” or when the rules otherwise “would permit or require [use of

the information] with respect to a client.” Id.

      Applying rule 32:1.9(c) here, we do not conclude that the Board has shown

a violation. The complaint does not specify what representation-related

information Leitner used to Jamison’s disadvantage. Nor does the complaint

explain whether that (unspecified) information was fair game because it was

“generally known” or because other rules “permit[ted] or require[d]” Leitner to

use it. Id. Nor do we find these details elsewhere in the record. So we are unable

to conclude that the Board established a violation of rule 32:1.9(c) “by a

convincing preponderance of the evidence.” Johnson, 988 N.W.2d at 406 (quoting

Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 125).

      3. Conclusions as to count III. As to count III, we conclude Leitner violated

rules 32:1.7(a) and 32:1.9(a).

      D. Elizabeth and Timothy John (Count IV).

      1. Background. We now turn to count IV of the complaint, in which the

Board charges Leitner with violating three rules in connection with his

representation of Elizabeth John and her son, Timothy. Specifically, count IV

charges Leitner with violating rule 32:1.7(a), which prohibits certain conflicts of

interest; rule 32:3.1, which prohibits certain frivolous filings; and rule 32:8.4(d),

which prohibits conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa Rs.

of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.7, 32:3.1, 32:8.4. As support for these charges, the Board

alleges in its complaint the following facts, which we deem admitted:
                                 19

      67. On April 2, 2019, Leitner filed an appearance on behalf of
Elizabeth John (“Elizabeth”) in Polk County District Court Case Nos.
TRPR074630 and TRPR074636. The cases were initiated by
Elizabeth’s daughter, Kimberly Milliken, and related to two trusts
for which Elizabeth was the designated trustee.

      68. The petitions filed by Milliken alleged Elizabeth had been
deemed by a medical professional incapable of making financial
decisions and sought to have Elizabeth replaced as trustee.

      69. After the cases were initiated, Elizabeth met with her
longtime attorney, Richard Howes, and informed him she wanted
him to represent her in the trust cases. Howes contacted Leitner and
informed him that he would be taking over representation of
Elizabeth. On July 11, 2019, Howes filed an appearance in the trust
cases on behalf of Elizabeth.

     70. On July 12, 2019, Leitner filed a withdrawal of his
appearance on behalf of Elizabeth.

       71. On August 1, 2019, Milliken and Elizabeth filed a joint
stipulation. In the stipulation, Milliken and Elizabeth agreed that an
amendment to the two trusts at issue should be revoked. The
amendment had been prepared by Leitner on or around March 28,
2019. The stipulation was signed by Elizabeth, Howes, and
Milliken’s counsel.

      72. The March 28 amendment made several changes to the
trusts, including eliminating or significantly reducing Milliken’s
interests in two properties, and granted those properties to
Elizabeth’s son, Timothy John (“Timothy”).

       73. Although he had withdrawn from the trust cases, Leitner
filed an objection on behalf of Timothy to the stipulation on August
2, 2019.

      74. In the objection, Leitner stated:

             The undersigned [Leitner] can attest to the fact
      that that amendment was executed by Betsey John at a
      time when she was fully competent and had total
      testamentary capacity as defined in Iowa law. She
      insisted that that amendment be drafted, and it was.
      She signed of her own free will fully understanding its
      terms and its import.
                                 20

       75. On August 8, 2019, the court entered an order approving
Milliken and Elizabeth’s stipulation and revoking the March 28
amendment to the trusts.

      76. On October 15, 2019, Milliken filed a petition to appoint a
guardian and conservator in which Elizabeth was the proposed
protected person. The petition was based on the same grounds as
the trust cases and alleged that Elizabeth’s decision-making
capacity was significantly impaired.

      77. On October 16, the court entered an order appointing
Richard Howes as counsel for Elizabeth. The order also appointed
Kim Walker of Transitional Life Consulting, LLC as Guardian ad
Litem for Elizabeth and Milliken as temporary guardian.

      78. Following the court’s October 16 order, Timothy brought
Elizabeth to meet with Leitner at Leitner’s office to discuss the
pending cases. Leitner did not notify Howes, Walker, or Milliken of
the meeting.

      79. Howes later learned of the meeting and thus contacted
Leitner to inform him that he did not have permission to
communicate with Howes’s client Elizabeth.

      80. On October 23, 2019, Howes sent the following email to
Leitner:

            David,

            You may know that Kim has been appointed as
      Bets[e]y’s temporary guardian. If not, I am, as a
      courtesy, attaching a copy of the order and affidavit of
      mailing.

           As Bets[e]y is my client at this time as stated in
      the court order[,] you do not have permission to
      communicate with her either alone or with anyone else.

            Please respect that request.

            Richard.

      81. On October 24, 2019, Howes sent the following email to
Leitner:
                                 21

            David,

            I understand Tim may be planning to bring
      Bets[e]y to meet with you. I am requesting again you do
      not meet with her or otherwise communicate with her
      as she is my client[,] per court order[,] and is under a
      guardianship and conservatorship and does not have
      the ability to make decisions for herself at this time.

            Please   take    notice   and    govern   yourself
      accordingly.

            Richard[.]

       82. Despite Howes’s emails, Leitner met with Elizabeth at his
office. Thereafter, Howes received a typewritten letter dated October
24, 2019, purportedly signed by Elizabeth, stating that she wished
to terminate Howes as her attorney and retain Leitner.

      83. On October 29, 2019, Howes sent the following email to
Leitner:

            David,

             I am following up [on] my previous emails to you
      regarding your contact with my client, Elizabeth John.
      Subsequent to my last email to you, I received in the
      mail a typewritten note purportedly signed by my client
      advising me that she is discharging me and engaging
      your services. To the extent you had contact with her
      and had any part in this communication[,] you have
      violated my admonition to not contact her and have
      crossed an ethical line.

             Elizabeth is under a court[-]ordered guardianship
      and conservatorship and at this time does not have the
      ability to engage or discharge attorneys on her own.
      That matter would have to be done under the auspices
      of the court.

             Again[,] I am admonishing you not to have contact
      with my client, Elizabeth John. As her court[-]appointed
      attorney[,] I am obligated to so advise you and warn you
      that further contact will not only again cross an ethical
      line but potentially violate a court order.

            Richard[.]
                                         22

             84. On October 29, 2019, Milliken, through counsel, filed a
      motion to disqualify Leitner from the guardianship case. The motion
      also sought an order preventing Timothy from having further contact
      with Elizabeth.

            85. The motion alleged Timothy, aided by Leitner, unduly
      influenced Elizabeth and interfered with her well[-]being and assets.
      The motion further alleged that Leitner’s attempts to represent
      Elizabeth created a conflict of interest due to his previous joint
      representation of Timothy and Elizabeth. The motion also noted that
      Leitner had met with Elizabeth while she was represented by Howes.

            86. On November 20, 2019, the district court entered an order
      prohibiting Leitner from having any further contact with Elizabeth
      without express permission from Howes.

             87. On March 6, 2020, Leitner filed a new petition in the Polk
      County District Court on behalf of Elizabeth and Timothy. The
      petition purported to be signed by Elizabeth.

            88. The petition named Milliken and Howes as defendants,
      among others. Leitner did not have permission from the court or
      Howes to communicate with Elizabeth about the petition or to file
      the petition on her behalf.

            89. The petition was not well-grounded in law or fact. Leitner
      alleged the defendants had violated Elizabeth and Timothy’s
      constitutional rights and sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C[.]
      §§ 1983 and 1985. The petition also sought to have the guardianship
      and conservatorship invalidated.

             90. The defendants moved to dismiss Leitner’s petition; on
      April 16, 2020, the district court dismissed the petition. The court
      also sanctioned Leitner for filing the petition. In the order
      sanctioning Leitner, the court noted that Leitner had been
      prohibited from having any contact with Elizabeth but nevertheless
      filed the petition on her behalf. The court further found that Leitner’s
      petition amounted to a collateral attack on the probate and
      guardianship cases.

(First and ninth alterations in original.)

      2. Analysis. We now consider whether these facts establish the violations

alleged by the Board in count IV. As a preliminary matter, we note that during

the proceedings before the commission, the Board withdrew its allegation that
                                        23

Leitner’s conduct violated rule 32:1.7(a), which prohibits certain conflicts of

interest. So we do not consider that issue further. We also note that the

commission did not find a violation of rule 32:3.1, which prohibits certain

frivolous filings, and the Board has not asked us to consider that issue further.

So we turn instead to the Board’s allegation that Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d).

      As explained, rule 32:8.4(d) prohibits “conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). This rule is

“violate[d] . . . when the ‘misconduct results in additional court proceedings or

causes court proceedings to be delayed or dismissed.’ ” Johnson, 988 N.W.2d at

413 (quoting Noel, 933 N.W.2d at 204).

      We conclude that Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d) in at least two ways. First,

Leitner’s repeated contact with a represented party led to a motion to prohibit

further contact and, ultimately, an order granting that motion. Then Leitner

violated that order by contacting the represented party and filing a petition on

her behalf. This required additional court action to dismiss the petition and

sanction Leitner for his violation of the prior order. This conduct violated rule

32:8.4(d).

      3. Conclusions as to count IV. As to count IV, we find that Leitner violated

rule 32:8.4(d) twice.

      E. CSA Audit (Count V).

      1. Background. In count V of the complaint, the Board charges Leitner with

violating several rules governing lawyers’ handling of client funds. The Board

also charges Leitner with violating rule 32:8.4(c), the general rule that prohibits

“conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa R. of

Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). As support for these charges, the Board alleges in its

complaint the following facts, which we deem admitted:
                                          24

              92. In July of 2020, the Iowa Supreme Court Client Security
        Commission (“CSC”) initiated an audit of Leitner’s client trust
        account (“CTA”). The audit revealed Leitner failed to comply with
        chapter 45 of the Iowa Rules of Court when handling money
        entrusted to him by clients.

              93. The audit revealed Leitner had negative sub-account
        balances in his CTA totaling $5,153.16.

              94. Leitner     did   not   perform    timely   monthly    triple
        reconciliations.

              95. In his 2020 Combined Statements and Questionnaire
        [(CSQ)], Leitner answered “yes” to the following question: “Are
        reconciliations of your trust account balances with bank statement
        balances and individual client ledger balances performed monthly?”

              96. Leitner knowingly provided a false answer to that
        question.

               97. The audit further revealed that Leitner received $1000.00
        from a client on May 22, 2020, as an advanced payment of fees but
        failed to deposit those funds in his CTA.

               98. The audit also showed that Leitner failed to provide clients
        contemporaneous written notice of withdrawals from his client trust
        account, nor did he provide clients an accounting of the funds he
        held from them in his trust account.

              99. The audit also revealed client trust ledger activity that was
        not reflected in the CTA records, meaning there were expenses paid
        with respect to a client from the operating account instead of from
        the CTA.

        2. Analysis and conclusion. We conclude Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(c),

which     prohibits    “conduct     involving   dishonesty,    fraud,    deceit,   or

misrepresentation,” by knowingly providing a false answer on his 2020 CSQ.

Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). Leitner also violated all of these trust fund

rules: rule 32.1.15(a) (requiring attorneys to keep others’ property separate from

their own property), rule 32:1.15(c) (requiring attorneys to deposit advance fees

into a CTA), rule 45.1 (mandating “identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts”
                                        25

for third-party funds), rule 45.2(3)(a)(9) (establishing requirements for proper

record keeping for CTAs), rule 45.7(3) (forbidding attorneys from withdrawing

advance payments from a CTA before they are earned), and rule 45.7(4)

(requiring attorneys to notify clients about withdrawals and balances). Iowa Rs.

of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(a), 32:1.15(c); Iowa Ct. Rs. 45.1, 45.2(3)(a)(9), 45.7(3),

45.7(4).

      III. Sanctions.

      Because we have found that Leitner violated several of our rules, we now

address the question of sanctions. Our harshest sanction—revocation—has been

recommended by the commission. “We give the commission’s recommendation

respectful consideration, but may impose a greater or lesser sanction.” Iowa Sup.

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ranniger, 981 N.W.2d 9, 18 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Iowa

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morse, 887 N.W.2d 131, 143 (Iowa 2016)).

Sanctions should reflect our goals of protecting “society from those unfit to

practice law, . . . uphold[ing] public confidence in the justice system,” deterring

future misconduct, and “maintain[ing] . . . the reputation of the bar as a whole.”

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 748 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 2008)

(per curiam). When deciding what sanction is appropriate in a particular case,

we put special emphasis on “the nature, number, and seriousness of the

[attorney’s] violations.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barry, 908 N.W.2d

217, 233 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.

Hansel, 558 N.W.2d 186, 192 (Iowa 1997)). We also consider our history of

sanctioning similar misconduct, any special mitigating factors that apply to the

particular case, and any special aggravating factors. See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Noyes, 936 N.W.2d 440, 448–50 (Iowa 2019).
                                         26

       A. Leitner’s Violations. We start by reviewing Leitner’s misconduct. As

explained, Leitner has committed numerous violations, some of which are

extremely serious. In brief summary:

   •   Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(c) by assisting a client’s effort to mislead the

       client’s creditors.

   •   Leitner violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1) by lying to the district court about two

       different topics.

   •   Leitner violated rules 32:8.4(c) and 32:8.4(d) by fraudulently inserting a

       right-of-first-refusal provision in a dissolution decree.

   •   Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d) by filing a contempt action to enforce the

       fraudulently inserted right-of-first-refusal provision.

   •   Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d) by repeatedly contacting a represented

       party.

   •   Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d) by violating a court order that required

       Leitner to refrain from contacting a represented party.

   •   Leitner violated rules 32:1.7(a) and 32:1.9(a) by drafting a contract for a

       client and then switching sides to litigate against his prior client in a suit

       about the very contract that Leitner drafted.

   •   Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(c) by knowingly providing a false answer on his

       2020 CSQ.

   •   Leitner also violated several other trust fund rules.

       B. Historical Sanctions. Now we consider the kinds of sanctions we have

given to attorneys whose misconduct is comparable to Leitner’s. Attorneys who

engage in dishonesty in violation of rule 32:8.4(c) have received “sanctions

ranging from reprimand to license revocation.” Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 129

(quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bartley, 860 N.W.2d 331, 338

(Iowa 2015)). Attorneys who actively disregard their obligation of candor toward
                                       27

the tribunal have received “substantial sanctions ranging from permanent

disbarment to six-month license suspensions.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary

Bd. v. Kieffer-Garrison, 951 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Kallsen, 814

N.W.2d at 239). Attorneys who engage in conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice have received suspensions ranging from sixty days to

eighteen months when, as here, the conduct is “compounded by additional

violations.” Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 129 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary

Bd. v. Turner, 918 N.W.2d 130, 153 (Iowa 2018)). Attorneys who violate our

conflict-of-interest rules have received sanctions ranging from a public

reprimand to revocation. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Willey, 889

N.W.2d 647, 657 (Iowa 2017); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 901

N.W.2d 513, 516 (Iowa 2017). “Sanctions for trust account and accounting

violations span from ‘a public reprimand when the attorney, in an isolated

instance, failed to deposit funds into his trust account because he believed the

fees to be earned’ to ‘suspensions of several months where the violations were

compounded by severe neglect, misrepresentation, or failure to cooperate.’ ” Iowa

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cross, 861 N.W.2d 211, 225 (Iowa 2015) (quoting

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 442 (Iowa 2012)).

      C. Potential Mitigating Factors. We next consider whether the record

shows any mitigating factors. Specifically, we consider whether mitigation

should be found because of (1) Leitner’s pro bono work, (2) Leitner’s service to

an underserved community, (3) Leitner’s poor health, or (4) Leitner’s limited

disciplinary history.

      1. Pro bono work. Mitigation has been found when an attorney performs

pro bono and reduced-fee work. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson,

884 N.W.2d 772, 781 (Iowa 2016). We find that Leitner has performed some of

this work. This is mitigating.
                                         28

      2. Underserved community. Mitigation has also been found when an

attorney “provides legal services to an underserved community.” Iowa Sup. Ct.

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Said, 869 N.W.2d 185, 194 (Iowa 2015). Leitner has

accepted appointments for indigent criminal defendants, an underserved

community. This is mitigating.

      3. Poor health. Mitigation is sometimes found when an attorney struggles

with physical and mental health issues. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.

Cannon, 821 N.W.2d 873, 881 (Iowa 2012). Like the commission, though, we see

no causal relationship between Leitner’s poor health and his failure to comply

with the rules. So we do not consider his health issues to be mitigating.

      4. Disciplinary history. Mitigation is often found when an attorney has no

prior disciplinary history. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bieber, 824

N.W.2d 514, 527–28 (Iowa 2012). Leitner’s lack of prior discipline is mitigating.

      D. Potential Aggravating Factors. We next consider whether the record

shows   aggravating    factors.   Specifically,   we   consider   whether   Leitner’s

misconduct is aggravated by (1) his substantial experience, (2) his failure to take

responsibility, or (3) his behavior in the grievance process.

      1. Substantial experience. Aggravation is often found when an offending

lawyer has substantial experience. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.

Jacobsma, 920 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Iowa 2018) (“Jacobsma’s twenty years of

experience are substantial[,] and we view them as an aggravating factor.”).

Leitner has been in practice since 1979. His extensive experience is an

aggravating factor.

      Leitner claims his experience should be viewed as mitigating because his

career has been distinguished. We find no basis in the record to characterize

Leitner’s career in this way. For instance, this is not a case in which the record

contains supportive letters from judges or lawyers.
                                        29

      2. Failure to take responsibility. Aggravation is also found when attorneys

“minimiz[e] or fail[] to take responsibility for [their] misconduct.” Iowa Sup. Ct.

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowers, 823 N.W.2d 1, 17 (Iowa 2012). This applies to

Leitner. At the disciplinary hearing, “Leitner categorically denied the charges that

were alleged against him.” In his appellate brief, Leitner repeated this denial.

Although Leitner has acknowledged the trust account issues discovered in the

audit, he has steadfastly denied his most serious violations. He takes no

responsibility for his worst behavior. This is aggravating.

      3. Failure to cooperate in the process. Aggravation is also found when

attorneys fail to cooperate with the disciplinary process. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 2007) (finding failure

to cooperate “is an independent act of misconduct”). But Leitner claims his

cooperation has been so exemplary that we should view it as mitigating. We take

the opposite view. Leitner failed to cooperate in two significant ways. First,

although rule 36.7 required Leitner to answer the Board’s complaint, Leitner

never did. Iowa Ct. R. 36.7. This is aggravating. See Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d at

380–81 (finding failure to answer board’s complaint violated rules DR 1–102(A)(5)

and DR 1–102(A)(6), predecessors to the current rules).

      Second, Leitner tried to mislead the commission about an alleged

settlement with the Board. During the hearing before the commission, Leitner

submitted emails and testimony suggesting that he had reached an agreement

with the Board for a particular term of suspension. But then the Board presented

an email from Leitner. That email showed that, in fact, Leitner had not accepted

the offer. Instead, the email showed, Leitner had rejected the offer and made a

counteroffer. Even so, Leitner testified that he actually accepted the Board’s

offer. The commission did not find that testimony credible. On our de novo
                                        30

review, we agree. We conclude Leitner tried to mislead the commission. This is

seriously aggravating.

      E. The Proper Sanction Here. We now consider the proper sanction for

Leitner. We have said that “[w]hat should dictate the sanction . . . is the nature,

number, and seriousness of the [attorney’s] violations.” Barry, 908 N.W.2d at

233 (first alteration in original) (quoting Hansel, 558 N.W.2d at 192). When

considering Leitner’s violations, we bear in mind that “[f]undamental honesty is

the [baseline] and mandatory requirement to serve in the legal profession.”

Johnson, 988 N.W.2d at 418 (quoting Barry, 908 N.W.2d at 233). And Leitner

has repeatedly breached his duty of honesty by assisting his client’s efforts to

mislead creditors, making false statements to the court, defrauding opposing

counsel in a dissolution matter, knowingly providing a false answer on his CSQ,

and trying to mislead the commission. This “pattern of deceit” raises an inference

that Leitner is “unfit to practice law.” Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d at 382. This

inference is made much stronger by Leitner’s failure to acknowledge—much less

repent from—his pattern of deceit.

      At the same time, we acknowledge that there are some mitigating factors

here. The most important mitigating factor is Leitner’s lack of prior disciplinary

history. Even so, given “the nature, number, and seriousness of” Leitner’s

violations, we think a two-year suspension is appropriate. Barry, 908 N.W.2d at

233 (quoting Hansel, 558 N.W.2d at 192). “This will serve to deter similar

conduct and preserve the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public.”

Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Honken, 688 N.W.2d 812, 820–22

(Iowa 2004) (imposing a two-year suspension against an attorney who engaged

in serious ethical breaches—including multiple acts of misrepresentation—

across multiple matters but who did not have a prior disciplinary history).
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      We have considered the Board’s argument that Leitner’s involvement with

Mitchell and Foodprairie justifies revocation. As support, the Board relies on

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Engelmann, 840 N.W.2d 156

(Iowa 2013), and Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Nelsen, 807

N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 2011). In those cases, we found that revocation was justified

by an attorney’s involvement with a client’s fraudulent scheme. Engelmann, 840

N.W.2d at 166–67; Nelsen, 807 N.W.2d at 267–68. But we believe both cases are

distinguishable. In Engelmann, the record showed that an attorney assisted in

fraudulent transactions that resulted in “losses of $392,937.73” for certain

lenders. Engelmann, 840 N.W.2d at 157–58. In Nelsen, the record showed that

an attorney had assisted clients to convert “at least $141,335.34 . . . from . . .

[a] court-appointed receiver” who was legally entitled to the funds. Nelsen, 807

N.W.2d at 261. But the record here does not show any comparable harm. For

starters, the record does not show that the federal government or any other

creditor had any lien or other possessory interest in Mitchell’s receivables. So,

as the Board concedes, neither Leitner nor Mitchell converted any funds from

anyone. Moreover, the record does not show that the federal government or any

other creditor was actually trying to collect Mitchell’s receivables. And so the

record does not show that the federal government or any other creditor was

actually deceived or otherwise hampered in its efforts to collect. At most, the

record shows that Mitchell and Leitner hoped to deceive any creditors who might

try to collect from Mitchell. This theoretical effect is substantially different from

the actual harm documented in Nelsen and Engelmann.

      IV. Conclusion.

      We hereby suspend Leitner’s license to practice law in Iowa indefinitely,

with no possibility of reinstatement for two years. This suspension will

commence ten days from the date of this opinion. Iowa Ct. R. 34.23(1). This
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suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. Id. r. 34.23(3). We further

direct Leitner to comply with the requirements set forth in Iowa Court Rule 34.24

and assess the costs of the instant disciplinary action to him, Iowa Ct. R.

36.24(1).

      LICENSE SUSPENDED.