Court Opinion

ID: 9622447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:17:53.437062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:39.836415
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that defendant continued to have a privacy interest in his ice chest, which was lawfully in the possession of the police, even though it was apparent to anyone in the vicinity of the chest that it contained marijuana because of its odor.* 1 As a result, the majority concludes that the police were required under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, to procure a search warrant before they could open the cooler. The majority’s reasoning is contrary to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in State v. Herbert, 302 Or 237, 729 P2d 547 (1986), and accordingly, it errs.
When analyzing the issue in this case, it is important to keep in mind the general principles underlying Article I, section 9. Section 9 provides:
*626“No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”
Section 9 protects privacy and possessory interests in articles which the government wishes to use as evidence in criminal proceedings by requiring the government to demonstrate to a magistrate that probable cause for a search or seizure exists. Of course, not all searches or seizures are subject to the warrant requirement. For instance, when exigent circumstances exist or a search is conducted incident to an arrest, the warrant requirement is obviated. Another example of when a warrant is not required is when evidence of a crime is in plain view. Under those circumstances, no privacy interest exists, so no warrant is required under section 9.
In this case, only a purported privacy interest in the chest is at issue. The parties agree that the chest that was opened by the officer was in the lawful possession of the police. A “search” within the meaning of section 9 occurs when a person’s privacy interests are invaded. State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206, 729 P2d 524 (1986). Although the opening of the lid of a container could always be described as a “search” in the ordinary parlance of the community, section 9 requires the particularized requisite of an invasion of a privacy interest before a “search” occurs within the meaning of the constitution. For instance, the opening of a transparent container does not constitute a “search” within the meaning of section 9 because there can be no privacy interests in a container whose contents are visible. See, e.g., Owens, 302 Or at 206. Similarly, the opening of an opaque container that discloses its contents when its exterior is viewed is not a “search” within the meaning of section 9. Those kinds of containers announce their contents to anyone that is in their vicinity and provide no cognizable privacy interest. In addition, the uniqueness of containers, such as balloons or tinfoil bindles in particular circumstances, disclose their contents without the need to open them. Herbert, 302 Or at 242. In sum, a possessor of a container cannot maintain a legally cognizable privacy interest in a container whose contents are *627evident from observing it, hearing it, touching it, feeling it or smelling it. Owens, 302 Or at 206.
The underlying reason that section 9 does not extend its protection to the contents of containers that announce the presence of some of their contents is rooted in common law as well as in common sense. At common law, officers could arrest those who committed crimes in their presence and seize evidence of their crimes. No search warrant was required to seize evidence of crimes discovered in the presence of a government agent. Section 9 acknowledges the common-law rule by requiring a search warrant for articles or contraband hidden from the senses. See State v. Lee, 120 Or 643, 253 P 533 (1927) (holding that no search or seizure occurred when an officer, in a place where he was lawfully entitled to be, smelled the odor of illegal mash used for the manufacture of intoxicating liquors from a neighboring barn and seized it without a warrant). Thus, “[n]ot all government intrusions, however, trigger Article I, section 9, protections.” Owens, 302 Or at 206. Rather, a “search” for purposes of section 9 requires a legally “significant interference” with a person’s privacy interests, State v. Juarez-Godinez, 326 Or 1, 6, 942 P2d 772 (1997), and that principle frames the inquiry in this case.
With that background, I turn to the holding in Herbert. Herbert is controlling because it involved the search of an opaque container that was already in the lawful possession of the government. In that case, a police officer seized an opaque paperfold from the defendant as he was being arrested on an outstanding warrant. The defendant unsuccessfully sought to hide the paperfold from the officer. The officer, based on his training and experience in the identification of controlled substances believed that the paperfold contained contraband. At the police station and in the absense of any exigent circumstance, he opened it and tested its contents. The test revealed the presence of cocaine. No search warrant was obtained before he opened it or tested it. The defendant was indicted and moved to suppress the paperfold and its contents. The trial court ruled that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that the paperfold contained contraband, and thus a reasonable belief that a crime *628was being committed in his presence, which would have justified the seizure. The Supreme Court disagreed:
“We have stated that the officer had probable cause to seize the paperfold and that the officer believed that the paperfold contained contraband. Because the officer, based upon his experience, had probable cause to believe that the paper contained contraband, he had the right to search the paperfold for controlled substances and, therefore had the right to open that container. Once the container was opened and the contraband discovered, he had the right to test it. State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 729 P2d 524 (1986).”
Herbert, 302 Or at 243 (emphasis added).
This case is legally indistinguishable from Herbert. The police had defendant’s ice chest lawfully in their possession, and defendant does not contend otherwise. The ice chest is an opaque container, like the paperfold in Herbert. Its contents were not visible from outside the container. Compared to Herbert where probable cause to believe that the paperfold contained contraband was based on the defendant’s furtive gestures, the uniqueness of the container and the officer’s experiences, probable cause exists in this case because of the odor coming from the chest. Nonetheless, “probable cause” is “probable cause” regardless of its source, and even defendant does not controvert that the officer smelled the odor of marijuana coming from the chest. As in Herbert, a crime was occurring in the officer’s presence when he smelled the marijuana. Consequently, the chest could “not support a cognizable privacy interest under Article I, section 9.” Owens, 302 Or at 206.
The majority ignores the court’s holding in Herbert and attempts to circumvent the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Owens. The major point that it makes is that the chest could have and did contain other items that were not contraband. Its analysis flows from that fact. It says, “[t]he rationale in Owens and its progeny is confined to situations in which there is no reason to believe that opening the container will result in any greater intrusion into a person’s privacy than already has occurred through viewing or smelling the container.” 156 Or App at 622-23. The majority cites no authority for that proposition, and there is no precedent of *629which I am aware that would support its reasoning. Certainly, its reasoning is incorrect in instances when, the shape of an opaque container discloses evidence of a crime or where the writing on a container discloses what is in the container. For instance, a gun case or holster announces its contents by its very nature. The fact that it may contain other articles besides a gun, such as cleaning tools or solvent, does not make probable cause any less that it contains a gun. In State v. Ready, 148 Or App 149, 156, 939 P2d 117, rev den 326 Or 68 (1997), the label on a videotape announced its contents. The videotape could have contained more than what its title indicated, but that would not have affected the authority of the officers to seize it without a warrant.
In a comparable situation, if probable cause exists to search an automobile, the fact that the automobile could contain noncontraband items does not defeat probable cause to search the car. For example, if the officer had smelled marijuana from outside of the van in this case, he could have searched it for marijuana without obtaining a search warrant because of the van’s mobility. State v. Burr, 136 Or App 140, 150, 901 P2d 873, rev den 322 Or 360 (1995). In the event that he had entered the van, sorted the contents of the van to find the source of the odor and uncovered the ice chest from which the odor was coming together with a backpack from which there was no odor of marijuana, the privacy interest in the backpack would have continued unaffected by the search for the marijuana. Even though the search of the van for the source of the odor of marijuana resulted in a greater intrusion into the privacy of the driver regarding noncontraband articles, the privacy interest in those articles remains.2 Thus, the fact that the van contained a number of items is of no legal significance. The ramifications of the majority’s reasoning are extensive. Under its rationale, many containers that could have been subject to a warrantless search because they announced that they contained contraband or evidence of a *630crime will now require a warrant to be searched merely because they are large enough to contain other items. The established law imposes no such qualification based on the size of the container.
Second, the majority’s reasoning is oblivious to the understanding that the warrant requirement in section 9 is aimed at testing probable cause. When contents of a container are visible and they constitute contraband or evidence of a crime, probable cause is a foregone conclusion. An odor coming from a container supplies the same degree of probable cause, which is why the court in Owens equates transparent containers with opaque containers that give off an odor. As the court observed in State v. McDaniel, 115 Or 187, 238, 237 P 373 (1925), “Sense of smell is often more unerring than that of sight. Lipton’s tea might look ever so much like Scotch whiskey and fool many people dependent solely upon sight, but few would be misled through the sense of smell.”3 In this case, the odor of marijuana coming from the chest was uncontroverted evidence of the commission of a crime in the presence of the officer standing by the container. The fact that there were other items in the container could not have made probable cause any less, nor does that fact diminish probable cause based on the odor merely because the chest was opaque rather than transparent. The privacy interest in preventing the lid of the chest from being opened was lost because the chest announced through its odor that it contained contraband. The officer, having probable cause to open the lid, was in a place where he had a right to be, and, under section 9, he was entitled to observe all that was in plain view, once he opened the lid. Thus, the fact that there are other items in the trunk does not detract from the legality of his observations of a crime occurring in his presence.4
*631The majority worries that if the officer in this case was legally entitled to open the lid of the chest without procuring a warrant, then it follows that the police walking by on the street would be justified in entering a person’s home to look for contraband on the ground that it had “announced its presence.” “Not to worry!” Owens makes it clear that the contents of containers, depending on their circumstances, have varying degrees of protection under section 9. 302 Or at 206. The Owens rationale is confined to those situations in which the container is lawfully in the possession of the government and then, only to certain kinds of containers.5 Types of containers to which the Owens reasoning applies are containers, such as paperfolds, balloons or bindles, which are so unique that under particular circumstances, they announce their contents. Other kinds of containers such as transparent vials, paper bags or bales of marijuana may announce their contents to the human senses. There is no precedent that suggests that a house is a “container” within the meaning of Oregon law. Finally, the touchstone in the Owens analysis begins with whether the container is in the lawful possession of the police. The majority’s hypothetical meets neither of those requirements.
Also, the majority’s reasoning is at odds with the Fourth Amendment. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753, 764 n 13, 99 S Ct 2586, 61 L Ed 2d 235 (1979), the Court said that “[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment.” The Court recognized that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) because by their very nature, their contents are evident from their outward appearance. Id.6 See also United States v. Norman, 710 F2d 295, 298 (4th Cir), cert den 464 US 820 (1983) *632(warrantless search of bales on ship was held lawful because under the plain view doctrine, the smell of marijuana revealed itself to the senses). In fact, this court held in State v. Nichol, 55 Or App 162, 166, 637 P2d 625, rev den 292 Or 581 (1981), that the smell emanating from a lawfully seized paper bag revealed its contents so that the opening of the bag did not require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. Under the majority’s rationale, an ice chest that emits the odor of marijuana requires a search warrant to open it while a paper bag does not (at least under the Fourth Amendment).* *****7 While we are free to provide greater protection under section 9 than is provided by the federal constitution, the majority advances no compelling reason why there should be dual standards under the circumstances of this case. After all, not even defendant seriously contests that the officer had probable cause to believe the chest contained marijuana, and probable cause is what the warrant requirement in section 9 is all about. In light of the purpose of section 9, the majority’s requirement that the officer should have obtained a warrant when a crime was being committed in his presence elevates form over substance.
For all of these reasons, I dissent.
*633Deits, C. J., and Warren, J., and Riggs, J., pro tempore, join in this dissent.

 On appeal, defendant argues: “The mere fact that [the officer] developed probable cause to believe the chest contained marijuana did not mean the chest was not private [.]”

 See also State v. Jacobsen, 142 Or App 341, 922 P2d 677 (1996) (holding that when an owner of an automobile consents to the general sweep of his vehicle, he nonetheless retains a privacy interest in the contents of a zipped duffel bag inside the vehicle); State v. Binner, 131 Or App 677, 886 P2d 1056 (1994) (holding that, although the defendant agreed to provide a blood sample for alcohol content, his refusal to be tested for drug content preserved a privacy interest in the blood sample as to drug content).

 In State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 936 P2d 642 (1998), the Supreme Court held that there is no privacy interest in an odor in public airspace.

 That is not to say that if the officer observed other closed containers within the container he opened, he could also open them without a warrant. Unless those containers announced their contents in a manner that made probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed in the officer’s presence a foregone conclusion, section 9 would require the officer to procure a search warrant. In the event that cognizable privacy interests exist in the other contents in the chest, they continue to have protection under section 9, and defendant needed only assert that argument in a court of law to prevent the contents from being used against him in a criminal proceeding.

 As Judge De Muniz pointed out in his dissent in State v. Dickerson, 135 Or App 192, 197, 898 P2d 193 (1995), the word “container” is a word of art in Oregon search and seizure law. It describes things that are receptacles with a cover for purposes of storage or transportation such as briefcases, a fishing tackle box, a black plastic box, a cigarette case, a metal Sucrets box, a purse and a backpack.

 In California v. Acevedo, 500 US 565, 575-76, 111 S Ct 39, 112 L Ed 2d 619 (1991), the Court rejected the specific holding of Sanders, that although officers had probable cause to believe that a suitcase in an automobile contained contraband, they had to obtain a search warrant because of the heightened privacy expectation in personal luggage. The Court concluded,
*632“it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders.

yt in

“* * * The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.”
Id. at 579, 580.

 A distinction without a difference except for the majority’s interpretation of section 9. We should interpret the Oregon Constitution in a manner that is consistent with the historical understanding of its framers. The Fourth Amendment states:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ‘shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause’ supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Although section 9 protects “privacy interests” while the Fourth Amendment focuses on “expectations of privacy,” it is difficult to reasonably conceive how the framers of the Oregon Constitution would have understood section 9 to have compelled a different result than the Fourth Amendment in regard to an ice chest that reeked of marijuana.