Court Opinion

ID: 9953424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 05:06:21.449014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:13.449456
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re WILFORD/ELLIS, Minors.                                         March 21, 2024

                                                                     No. 367999
                                                                     Saginaw Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 22-050171-NA

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Respondent1 appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
minor children, CLW and EJE under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication
continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood
of harm if returned to parent). We affirm.

                   I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        In January 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition
requesting that the trial court take jurisdiction over CLW and EJE and remove them from
respondent’s care. DHHS alleged that respondent was homeless, abusing drugs, and inadequately
caring for her children. DHHS also alleged that EJE had significant medical needs as a result of
respondent’s substance abuse during pregnancy and premature birth, and that, due to the minimal
amount of time that respondent had spent with EJE in the hospital, respondent had not
demonstrated that she could appropriately care for EJE’s medical needs. The trial court authorized
the petition, the children were removed and placed with respondent’s mother (the children’s
maternal grandmother), and the court granted respondent supervised parenting time.

       The trial court conducted an adjudication hearing in February 2022, and respondent
pleaded to several allegations in the petition and to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction under
MCL 712A.2(b)(1) (reason to believe child at substantial risk of harm) and (b)(2) (unfitness of

1
  Respondent is the mother of the minor children at issue. Neither child’s biological, putative, or
legal father was identified in the proceedings below.

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parental home). Respondent admitted that she lacked appropriate housing for the children, lacked
the skills necessary to adequately care for EJE’s medical needs, and had a substance abuse
problem, including with alcohol and marijuana, that negatively impacted her ability to care for the
children. The trial court ordered that respondent continue to have supervised parenting time and
that petitioner make reasonable efforts toward reunification of respondent and the children. The
trial court ordered respondent to comply with her case service plan and participate in and benefit
from substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, and mental health services. The trial court also
ordered respondent to complete substance-abuse and psychological evaluations, submit to random
drug screenings, obtain and maintain suitable housing and a legal source of income, participate in
parenting time, and complete whatever training was recommended by EJE’s physicians so that she
could learn how to properly care for EJE.

        From February 2022 until April 2023, respondent made minimal progress on her case
service plan. Respondent did obtain housing. Respondent reported to her caseworker that she had
obtained a job in July 2022, though respondent’s caseworker struggled to verify respondent’s
source of income because respondent consistently failed to provide proof of her employment. At
a dispositional review hearing in November 2022, respondent’s caseworker reported that
respondent was unemployed and had stated that she did not want to get a job at this time over
concerns that she would have to “pay additional child support for her children being in foster care.”
Respondent never provided proof of a legal source of income during the proceedings below,
although she did claim to have obtained employment at a restaurant shortly before the termination
hearing began. Respondent completed a substance abuse evaluation, but she did not attend any
outpatient services. Respondent completed 61% of her drug screenings and consistently tested
positive for alcohol and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)2 when she did complete them. Respondent
completed a psychiatric evaluation, but she minimally participated in the weekly case
management, individual counseling, and drug management appointments that were required of
her. Respondent completed a parenting education program multiple times, but, according to her
caseworker, had demonstrated no benefit from it. Respondent attended only five of EJE’s
numerous medical appointments, and, during the appointments that she attended, respondent was
on her cell phone, acted hostile toward the medical staff, and left early.

        Respondent attended roughly half of her supervised parenting times, and, while she was
able to split her attention between the two children, DHHS employees reported that she often acted
erratically and aggressively toward DHHS employees, the children, and the children’s maternal

2
  THC is the primary psychoactive substance in marijuana. Marijuana is now legal for recreational
use in Michigan under the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA),
MCL 333.27951 et seq. Despite this, however, if a parent’s use of marijuana creates an
unreasonable danger to a minor “that can be clearly articulated and substantiated,” the person can
be “denied custody of or visitation with a minor.” MCL 333.27955(3). Trial courts are generally
required to evaluate a parent’s marijuana use in the same manner as alcohol or any other legal
intoxicant. The relevant inquiry is whether use of the substance will have a negative effect on a
parent’s ability to parent, or will cause a risk of harm to the child. In re Richardson, 329 Mich
App 232, 252; 961 NW2d 499 (2019). As previously stated, respondent admitted in this case that
her alcohol and marijuana use negatively impacted her ability to parent her children.

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grandmother. Respondent’s parenting time was repeatedly restricted due to her inappropriate
behavior until it was suspended entirely in March 2023 because it was too detrimental to the
children’s health and well-being. Criminal charges were filed against respondent after a January
2023 parenting time visit at which respondent became intoxicated, assaulted CLW and the
children’s grandmother, and threatened to burn the house down with the children in it. CLW was
diagnosed with anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to living with respondent
and her behavior during the January 2023 parenting time, and CLW’s therapist recommended that
CLW no longer have contact with respondent. CLW also reported that he was scared of
respondent, no longer wished to see respondent, and wanted to live with his grandmother
“forever.” CLW’s behavior and mental health improved dramatically after respondent’s parenting
time was suspended.

         In April 2023, DHHS filed a supplemental petition requesting termination of respondent’s
parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). At the termination hearing, which
began in June 2023 and was concluded in August 2023, respondent’s caseworker testified that
DHHS had provided numerous services to respondent, but respondent failed to participate in the
services. Respondent was dismissed from substance abuse outpatient services for failing to
participate, and she did not attempt to engage in any other outpatient services until approximately
one week prior to the final termination hearing in August 2023. Respondent had reported that she
was attending recovery meetings similar to Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and had provided
attendance sheets to her caseworker, but the attendance sheets showed that respondent had
attended less than half of the monthly meetings between October 2022 and January 2023.
Respondent’s caseworker was unable to verify whether respondent attended any meetings after
January 2023. Respondent missed more than half of her required drug screenings, and she
frequently tested positive for alcohol and THC when she completed her drug screenings.
Respondent refused to complete any drug screenings after January 2023. Respondent also
testified, despite her earlier admission, that she did not believe that her continued alcohol and
marijuana use was “a problem,” and she even admitted that she would test positive for THC at the
termination hearing if she were asked to complete a drug screening on that day.

         Regarding respondent’s mental and behavioral health issues, respondent’s caseworker
testified that respondent was dismissed from counseling services for failing to complete a
psychological evaluation or attend scheduled appointments. Respondent completed a psychiatric
evaluation at Hope Network in February 2022, but she did not provide the evaluation to her
caseworker until November 2022. The caseworker was able to obtain Hope Network appointment
logs from February 2022 to March 2023 only after they were subpoenaed. The logs indicated that
respondent missed the majority of her weekly case management, individual therapy, and
medication review appointments each month. Respondent refused to sign an updated release form
so that her caseworker could verify her participation and progress after March 2023. The
caseworker did not believe that respondent had benefited from the offered mental health services
given her inconsistent attendance and erratic behavior throughout the case.

       The caseworker testified that respondent was dismissed from a supportive visitation and
parenting education program for repeated absenteeism, and, despite completing a different
parenting education program on her own, respondent had demonstrated no improvement in her
parenting skills. Respondent had attended only five of EJE’s medical appointments and, as a result,
was unable to adequately learn about EJE’s medical impairments or how to adequately care for

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them. As stated, respondent attended only approximately half of her scheduled parenting time
visits, and she often exhibited inappropriate, erratic, aggressive, and even violent behavior when
she attended. Additionally, respondent brought unapproved adults to parenting time visits, used
alcohol and marijuana during the visits, often left EJE unsupervised, and once took CLW from a
supervised visitation without authorization and left in an unknown person’s car. Respondent’s
behavior at parenting time never improved, and parenting time was continually restricted until it
was suspended entirely as a result of her assaults of and threats toward the children and their
grandmother. By the time that respondent’s parenting time was suspended, respondent had already
stopped attending them, possibly to avoid being arrested for the assault against the children’s
grandmother.

        Respondent’s caseworker and the children’s grandmother both testified that termination
was in the children’s best interests because it was harmful to both children to return to respondent’s
care, respondent had largely failed to participate in or benefit from her services, and respondent
had not demonstrated that she could provide the children with adequate care or a stable home
environment. The caseworker testified that it was unclear whether EJE had a bond with respondent
specifically, given that EJE was very affectionate toward everyone. The caseworker testified that
CLW had a very unstable bond with respondent. Respondent’s caseworker testified that CLW
repeatedly expressed significant concern about returning to respondent’s care, and he reported that
he no longer wanted to see respondent and that he wanted to live with his grandmother “forever.”
The children’s grandmother testified that CLW was “scared” of respondent, “would come home
angry all the time” after parenting times, and would pray nearly every night that he could remain
at her house. Both children were bonded with their grandmother and thriving in her home, and
she provided adequate care and a stable home. The children’s grandmother explicitly stated that
she wanted to adopt the children as opposed to having a guardianship because there was significant
discord between her and respondent and she feared for the children’s safety as well as her own.

        After the hearing, the referee recommended termination of respondent’s parental rights.
The referee found that clear and convincing evidence existed to warrant termination under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). The referee acknowledged that respondent had obtained
housing and a job, but noted respondent’s continued substance abuse and lack of parenting skills,
as well as her failure to comply with various aspects of her case service plan, including failing to
complete substance abuse and mental health services and failing to demonstrate any benefit from
the parenting education program. For many of the same reasons, the referee also concluded that
termination was in the children’s best interests. The referee expressly noted the different needs
and interests of the children, and concluded that returning EJE to respondent would be dangerous
to her physical health, while returning CLW to respondent would be extremely detrimental to his
mental health. The referee also expressly acknowledged the children’s relative placement, which
he found weighed in favor of termination because the children’s grandmother had no interest in
maintaining a guardianship and only wished to adopt the children to provide them with stability
and permanency. The trial court adopted the referee’s recommendations and entered an order
terminating respondent’s parental rights in September 2023. This appeal followed.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review for clear error a trial court’s finding that a statutory ground for termination of
parental rights has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination is in a

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child’s best interests. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A
finding is clearly erroneous if, even if some evidence supports the finding, the reviewing court is
nevertheless left with the firm and definite conviction that the lower court made a mistake. Id. at
41. “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).
This Court gives deference to “the special ability of the trial court to judge the credibility of
witnesses.” In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 227; 894 NW2d 653 (2016) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

                      III. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

       Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding clear and convincing
evidence supporting the statutory grounds cited in support of termination. We disagree.

       “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be
made.” MCL 712A.19b(5).

       A court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) if it finds clear and
convincing evidence of the following:

              (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
       182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
       and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . . . the following:

              (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
       no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
       time considering the child’s age.

Termination is appropriate pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) when “the totality of the evidence
amply supports that [the respondent] had not accomplished any meaningful change in the
conditions” that led to the adjudication, In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286
(2009), and would not be able to rectify those conditions within a reasonable time,
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). In this case, the record supported the trial court’s findings that more than
182 days had elapsed since the issuance of the initial dispositional order, the conditions that led to
the adjudication continued to exist, and there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions
would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages.

       The conditions that led to adjudication in this case were primarily respondent’s substance
abuse and lack of parenting skills, although mental health, housing instability, and employment
were also concerns. The children were removed from respondent’s care after she was expelled
from a homeless shelter for abusing alcohol and marijuana, repeatedly left CLW with relatives
who had no legal authority to care for him, and visited EJE at the hospital so infrequently that
medical staff determined that she had not learned how to adequately care for EJE’s extensive
medical needs. Respondent was offered numerous services to enable her to reunite with the
children for more than 16 months, but she failed to participate in and benefit from most of the
services. Respondent obtained housing, but the caseworker was never able to determine if the

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home or the unknown individuals living in it were appropriate for the children because respondent
never allowed the caseworker to view the home. Respondent also reported that she had obtained
a job shortly before the termination hearing, but she never provided her caseworker paystubs or
other documents as proof of income. Respondent completed only slightly more than half of her
drug screenings, consistently tested positive for alcohol and THC, and stopped completing drug
screenings entirely after January 2023. Respondent admitted at the termination hearing that she
still used alcohol and marijuana and did not see her continued substance use as a problem, and she
admitted that she would have tested positive for THC if tested that day. Respondent refused to
participate in substance abuse outpatient services, and minimally participated in recovery
meetings. Respondent also refused to participate in mental health services, and only minimally
participated in the weekly counseling that she reported to her caseworker. Respondent’s
caseworker did not believe that she had benefited from the services given her poor attendance and
erratic behavior throughout the case.

         Respondent also completed a parenting education program multiple times, but
respondent’s caseworker testified that she demonstrated no benefit from the program. Respondent
participated in only half of her parenting times and continued to act inappropriately at the
visitations. Respondent’s parenting time was continually restricted due to her inappropriate,
erratic, and aggressive behavior until it was suspended entirely after she became intoxicated,
assaulted CLW and her mother (the children’s grandmother), and threatened to burn the house
down with the children inside. Criminal charges were filed against respondent as a result, and her
mother obtained a personal protection order against her, both of which were still pending at the
time of the termination hearing. Respondent’s caseworker testified that respondent could
adequately divide her attention between the two children at parenting time, but had no apparent
parent-child bond with either child.

        Respondent testified that she had benefited from the parenting education program and had
a great relationship with CLW, but the caseworker and the children’s grandmother both testified
that CLW was scared of respondent and required constant assurance that he would not be returned
to respondent’s care, and CLW’s mental health and behavior drastically improved after
respondent’s parenting time was suspended. EJE had several medical appointments each week
throughout the case, but respondent admitted that she had attended only five of them, and the
children’s grandmother stated that respondent was unengaged and hostile at the appointments that
she did attend. As a result, respondent had no true understanding of EJE’s medical conditions or
how to adequately care for them on a day-to-day basis. Given respondent’s lack of participation
and failure to demonstrate any benefit from the few services that she completed during the 16-
month pendency of this case, respondent’s caseworker did not believe that respondent would
participate in services and rectify her barriers if given additional time. The trial court therefore
did not clearly err by concluding that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would

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rectify the conditions that led to adjudication within a reasonable time.                           See
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).3

                            IV. BEST-INTEREST DETERMINATION

       Respondent also argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We disagree.

        When determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests, the court should place
its “focus on the child rather than the parent.” In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890 NW2d
676 (2016). “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s
best interests,” and it should consider a variety of factors, including “the child’s bond to the parent,
the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713-714;
846 NW2d 61 (2014). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence,
the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the
child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” Id. The trial court
must “explicitly address each child’s placement with relatives at the time of the termination
hearing.” Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 44. The trial court must also determine each child’s
interests individually, and if the best interests of the individual children significantly differ, the
trial court should address those differences when making its determination of the children’s best
interests. White, 303 Mich App at 715-716. The trial court must state on the record or in writing
its findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding its best-interests determination. See
MCL 712A.19b(1); MCR 3.977(I)(1).

        Respondent argues that the trial court gave inadequate weight to the fact that she had
obtained a house and a job, and had completed a parenting education program as directed by her
case service plan. However, the caseworker was unable to determine whether the house was
appropriate for the children and was unable to verify respondent’s employment because she never
provided proof of income. Additionally, the record shows that respondent had not demonstrated
any benefit from the parenting education program that she completed, and that she refused to
consistently participate in mental health and substance abuse services. Respondent also tested
positive for alcohol and THC throughout the case and admitted that she continued to use the
substances because she did not believe it was a problem, despite the role of these substances in her
children’s removal and their effects on her behavior that were apparent during parenting time
visits. The caseworker and the children’s grandmother testified that respondent continued to act
inappropriately and even violently at the parenting times that she attended, and she never obtained
the knowledge or skills necessary to adequately care for EJE’s extensive medical issues because
she attended only five of EJE’s medical appointments and was unengaged at the few appointments
that she did attend. Respondent’s parenting time was suspended after she physically assaulted and

3
  Because only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to
terminate a respondent’s parental rights, we need not address respondent’s arguments regarding
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).

                                                  -7-
threatened her mother and CLW. Overall, the trial court did not clearly err by determining that
respondent had showed no improvement in her ability to adequately parent the children.

         Respondent also argues that she had a strong bond with the children, particularly CLW,
and that the trial court failed to consider the needs of each child individually, but the record
suggests the opposite. The referee expressly noted the different needs and interests of the children,
including EJE’s significant medical needs. The referee found—and the record supports—that EJE
could be seriously physically harmed if returned to respondent’s care because respondent had not
learned the skills necessary to adequately care for her medical needs. The referee also found that,
while CLW “may not suffer the same kind of physical harm as his sister,” there was a high
likelihood that he “would suffer mental harm” if returned to respondent. Respondent testified that
she had “a great relationship” with CLW, but the children’s grandmother and the caseworker
testified that CLW was afraid of respondent and required constant reassurance that he would not
have to return to respondent’s care. CLW was diagnosed with generalized anxiety and PTSD and
required therapy to process the trauma that he had experienced while living with respondent,
particularly after she assaulted him during a parenting time visit. CLW’s mental health and
behavior dramatically improved after the suspension of respondent’s parenting time. Therefore,
respondent is simply not correct that the trial court failed to consider her bond with the children or
evaluate the children’s best interests individually; nor do we find that the trial court clearly erred
in finding that the children would suffer individualized harm if returned to respondent and were
not strongly bonded to her. White, 303 Mich App at 715-716.

         Additionally, the caseworker testified that it was crucial for EJE’s physical health and
CLW’s mental health to no longer have contact with respondent and to remain in their
grandmother’s care because respondent would be unable to care for the children if they were
returned home due to her continued substance abuse and inadequate parenting skills. The children
were happy, healthy, and thriving in their grandmother’s care and had a strong bond with her, and
all of the children’s needs were being met in her home. The referee also expressly considered the
children’s relative placement, but it noted that the children’s grandmother had explicitly stated that
she was interested only in adopting the children because continued contact with respondent
through a guardianship presented too much of a risk to the children’s safety as well as her own.
The referee therefore concluded that the children’s relative placement did not outweigh the factors
in favor of termination of parental rights. The trial court did not clearly err by doing so.
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 40. The mere fact that children are placed with a relative does not
prevent a trial court from ordering termination if it is in the children’s best interests. Id. at 43.

       In sum, given respondent’s issues with substance abuse, mental health, and lack of
parenting skills, EJE’s specific medical needs, CLW’s specific mental-health needs, and the

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children’s young ages and need for permanency and stability, the trial court did not clearly err by
finding that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Id. at
40.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                              /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                              /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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