Court Opinion

ID: 9389300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 15:00:56.028738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:26.539812
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10009     Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 04/25/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10009
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        JAMES MEDARD,
         a.k.a. James Menard,
        a.k.a. James Joseph,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
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        2                      Opinion of the Court               22-10009

                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20241-KMW-1
                           ____________________

        Before GRANT, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               James Medard appeals his convictions and total sentence of
        81 months’ imprisonment for wire fraud and aggravated identity
        theft. He argues that his guilty plea and his waiver of the right to
        appeal his sentence are invalid because neither was knowingly and
        voluntarily entered, and he challenges his sentence on several
        grounds. We conclude that both Medard’s guilty plea and his sen-
        tence appeal waiver were knowing and voluntary, and we there-
        fore affirm.
                                         I.
               A federal grand jury charged Medard with thirteen counts of
        wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; seven counts of money
        laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957; and four counts of ag-
        gravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Medard
        entered into a written plea agreement with the government in
        which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of wire fraud (Count
        9 of the indictment) and two counts of aggravated identity theft
        (Counts 22 and 23), and the government agreed to dismiss the re-
        maining charges. Medard also agreed to waive his right to appeal
        his sentence except if the district court imposed a sentence above
        the statutory maximum or above the Sentencing Guidelines range
        calculated by the court at sentencing, or if the government
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        22-10009               Opinion of the Court                       3

        appealed. Medard and his counsel each signed the plea agreement
        and a supporting factual proffer.
               The district court conducted a change-of-plea hearing pur-
        suant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. At
        the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Medard was
        competent and aware of the nature of the charges and the conse-
        quences of pleading guilty; and that his plea was knowing, volun-
        tary, and supported by an independent basis in fact satisfying each
        of the essential elements of the offenses. The court therefore ac-
        cepted his guilty plea and adjudicated him guilty as charged in
        Counts 9, 22, and 23 of the indictment.
               At sentencing, the district court calculated a Guidelines
        range of 33–41 months in prison for Count 9, which carried a stat-
        utory sentence of 0–20 years. Counts 22 and 23 each carried a man-
        datory statutory penalty of two years in prison. The district court
        imposed a total sentence of 81 months in prison, consisting of 33
        months for Count 9 and 24 months consecutive for each of Counts
        22 and 23, all followed by three years of supervised release. Medard
        now appeals.
                                        II.
              A guilty plea may be invalid if it is not entered knowingly
        and voluntarily. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005);
        United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005).
        Rule 11 sets out steps that a district court must take during a
        change-of-plea hearing to ensure that a defendant’s guilty plea is
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10009

        knowing and voluntary. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58
        (2002). Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must spe-
        cifically address the three “core principles” of Rule 11 by “ensuring
        that a defendant: (1) enters his guilty plea free from coercion,
        (2) understands the nature of the charges, and (3) understands the
        consequences of his plea.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019.
               Medard does not contend that his guilty plea was coerced;
        he argues that he was not adequately informed of the nature of the
        charges against him and (to some extent) the consequences of his
        plea. He failed to raise these issues in the district court, so our re-
        view is for plain error only. Id. at 1018–19. The failure to address
        any of Rule 11’s core principles constitutes prejudicial plain error.
        United States v. Telemaque, 244 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2001).
                Medard argues that flaws in the indictment and plea process
        made it impossible for him to understand the nature of the charges
        against him. Specifically, he argues that (1) the indictment was con-
        fusing because Counts 22 and 23 (the aggravated identity theft
        counts) each charged him with three counts of wire fraud, (2) the
        district court failed to adequately explain the elements of the
        charged offenses, and (3) the court erred in finding that the charges
        were supported by a sufficient factual basis.
               Whether the court adequately informed the defendant of
        the nature of the charges against him “turns on a variety of factors,
        including the complexity of the offense and the defendant’s intelli-
        gence and education.” Id. Rule 11 does not specifically require that
        the court separately outline each element of each offense during
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        22-10009                Opinion of the Court                         5

        the plea colloquy; a statement by the court that incorporates “the
        substance of those elements” may be sufficient. United States v.
        Wiggins, 131 F.3d 1440, 1442–43 (11th Cir. 1997). For simple
        charges, “a reading of the indictment, followed by an opportunity
        given the defendant to ask questions about it, will usually suffice.”
        Id. at 1443 (quotation omitted). In other cases, “a factual proffer
        may set forth in such detail the facts of the crime that it effectively
        incorporates the substance of the elements of the offense.” United
        States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2018).
               The district court adequately addressed the Rule 11’s second
        core principle here. The charges of wire fraud and aggravated iden-
        tity theft were not complex, and Medard’s education and experi-
        ence lend weight to his testimony at the plea hearing that he un-
        derstood the charges against him. He has college and graduate de-
        grees in business administration and business management, and he
        has also owned or run several businesses, including businesses in
        finance and tax preparation. During the plea colloquy, the court
        questioned Medard about his background and education, and it ad-
        vised him that he could ask questions of the court or consult with
        his attorney at any time during the hearing. The court confirmed
        that Medard had read the indictment and reviewed it and discussed
        the charges, the government’s evidence, and his defenses with his
        attorney. It read the portions of the indictment containing the fac-
        tual allegations and charges that were the subject of Medard’s
        guilty plea, and it confirmed that Medard understood those
        charges. It also informed Medard in clear terms of the elements of
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        6                      Opinion of the Court               22-10009

        wire fraud and aggravated identity theft and confirmed that
        Medard understood what the government would have to prove.
               Specifically, the court informed Medard that to prove the of-
        fense of wire fraud charged in Count 9, the government would
        have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he knowingly
        devised or participated in a scheme to defraud or obtain money or
        property by using false pretenses, representations, or promises;
        (2) the false pretenses, representations, or promises were about a
        material fact; (3) he acted with the intent to defraud; and (4) he
        transmitted or caused to be transmitted by wire some communica-
        tion in interstate commerce to help carry out the scheme to de-
        fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343; United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d
        1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009). Regarding the aggravated identity theft
        charges, the court explained that the government would have to
        prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Medard knowingly trans-
        ferred, possessed, or used another person’s means of identification;
        (2) he did so without lawful authority; (3) the other person was a
        real person; and (4) Medard did these things during and in relation
        to another felony alleged in the indictment—in this case, the wire
        fraud offenses charged in Counts 7, 9, and 12. See 18 U.S.C.
        § 1028A; United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1192 (11th Cir.
        2011). Medard confirmed under oath that he understood the
        charges and their elements.
              Contrary to Medard’s argument, the indictment did not
        charge multiple crimes in each count of aggravated identity theft.
        The indictment alleged that the four specific aggravated-identity-
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        22-10009               Opinion of the Court                        7

        theft offenses charged in Counts 21–24 were committed “during
        and in relation to” the felony wire fraud offenses charged in Counts
        7, 9, and 12. The indictment then provided more specific details of
        the charged offenses for each count, showing that the unauthorized
        use of personal identifying information in various loan documents
        described in the aggravated-identity-theft counts was related to the
        electronic transmission of those documents alleged in the three
        specified wire-fraud counts. Because one element of the offense of
        aggravated identity theft is that the offense be committed “during
        and in relation to” wire fraud or another enumerated felony of-
        fense, the indictment’s allegation that each aggravated-identity-
        theft count was committed during or in relation to the specified
        wire-fraud offenses was necessary to fully charge a single offense of
        aggravated identity theft; it did not make the count duplicitous.
        See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5).
               As to the factual basis for Medard’s guilty plea, the district
        court referred Medard to the seven-page factual proffer that
        Medard signed in connection with his plea agreement, confirming
        that Medard had “thoroughly read and review[ed] it” and thor-
        oughly reviewed it with his attorney—including asking any ques-
        tions he might have had about the language in the document and
        having those questions answered in full by his attorney—and that
        Medard had signed the factual proffer and initialed any changes.
        The court also confirmed that Medard agreed that the factual prof-
        fer accurately described his conduct with respect to the crimes
        charged.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court               22-10009

               The factual proffer established an adequate factual basis for
        Medard’s guilty plea. It described Medard’s scheme of knowingly
        and intentionally submitting fraudulent loan applications to the
        Small Business Administration using the SBA’s online portal—de-
        spite the fact that, as a convicted felon who was on supervised re-
        lease at the time, Medard was ineligible for the loans. The loan
        applications contained material misrepresentations and falsified
        supporting documents about who owned the relevant businesses,
        the number of people employed there, or about the businesses’ fi-
        nances. Two of the applications were granted, and Medard spent
        the loan proceeds on personal expenditures.
               With respect to Count 9 (wire fraud), the factual proffer
        stated that as part of his scheme, Medard electronically submitted
        an Economic Injury Disaster Loan application that concealed his
        identity by (among other things) using the Social Security number
        of a minor child (A.L.) as his own. Regarding Count 22, the proffer
        stated that Medard electronically submitted a Paycheck Protection
        Plan loan application that falsely identified J.M.—who Medard
        knew to be a real person—as an employee of the company seeking
        the loan, without J.M.’s permission. (The electronic submission of
        the fraudulent loan application containing J.M.’s name was charged
        as wire fraud in Count 7 of the indictment.) And in support of
        Count 23, the proffer stated that Medard used the Social Security
        number of A.L., a minor child, on an Economic Injury Disaster
        Loan application that he submitted electronically (which corre-
        sponded to the wire fraud charged in Count 9).
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        22-10009               Opinion of the Court                        9

               As to the third “core principle,” ensuring that the defendant
        understands the consequences of his plea, Rule 11 provides that be-
        fore the court may accept a guilty plea, it “must inform the defend-
        ant of, and determine that the defendant understands” any applica-
        ble maximum or mandatory minimum penalty; any applicable for-
        feiture; the court’s authority to order restitution; and the court’s
        obligation to impose a special assessment. Fed. R. Crim.
        P. 11(b)(1)(H)-(L). A court’s failure to advise a defendant of each
        of the enumerated items, even if preserved, is harmless error if
        there is no reasonable probability that the error affected his deci-
        sion to plead guilty. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h); Dominguez Beni-
        tez, 542 U.S. at 81.
                Medard argues briefly that the district court failed to accu-
        rately inform him of the statutory term of imprisonment for aggra-
        vated identity theft and of the applicable forfeiture, but his argu-
        ment is contradicted by the record. The district court advised
        Medard during the plea colloquy that each count of aggravated
        identity theft carried a mandatory statutory penalty of two years in
        prison. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. In discussing the plea agreement, the
        court also confirmed that the parties had agreed to recommend
        that the two-year terms of imprisonment for the two aggravated-
        identity-theft charges run consecutively to each other and to the
        sentence for wire fraud, so that Medard would be sentenced to at
        least four years in prison regardless of what sentence the court im-
        posed for the wire-fraud offense. The court also confirmed that
        Medard had agreed to a forfeiture money judgment in the amount
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-10009

        of $310,000 and to the forfeiture of certain real property. Medard’s
        question during the plea colloquy about whether he would get an
        interim accounting after the forfeited real property was sold did not
        reflect any confusion about the forfeiture as a consequence of his
        guilty plea.
                                        III.
               We turn next to Medard’s argument that the sentence ap-
        peal waiver in his plea agreement was invalid, an issue that we re-
        view de novo. United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th
        Cir. 2008). An appeal waiver is valid and enforceable if it was made
        knowingly and voluntarily. Id. The government can establish that
        a waiver was knowing and voluntary by showing “either that:
        (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about
        the waiver; or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant other-
        wise understood the full significance of the waiver.” Id. For exam-
        ple, we have held that an appeal waiver was valid where the waiver
        was set out in the plea agreement and the defendant confirmed
        during the plea colloquy that she had read and understood the en-
        tire agreement, including the appeal waiver provision, and that she
        had agreed to the waiver provision freely and voluntarily. United
        States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001). Our
        “touchstone for assessing” whether a defendant entered a waiver
        knowingly and voluntarily is whether the district court “clearly
        convey[ed] to [the defendant] that he was giving up his right to
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        22-10009               Opinion of the Court                        11

        appeal under most circumstances.” United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d
        1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020) (alterations and emphasis in original).
               We are satisfied, based on the plea agreement and the plea
        colloquy, that Medard entered his sentence appeal waiver know-
        ingly and voluntarily. The plea agreement clearly provided that
        Medard was waiving his right to appeal any sentence imposed, un-
        less the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum sentence or the
        Sentencing Guidelines range calculated by the court. The provi-
        sion also stated that if the government chose to exercise its right to
        appeal the sentence, Medard would be released from the appeal
        waiver. During the plea colloquy, the court confirmed that
        Medard had thoroughly reviewed the plea agreement with his at-
        torney and understood the parties’ respective obligations under the
        agreement. The court specifically discussed the appeal-waiver pro-
        vision with Medard, confirming that he understood that he was
        generally giving up his right to appeal his sentence, except if the
        sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or the guideline range
        determined by the court. Medard’s sentence appeal waiver is
        therefore valid, and since none of the enumerated exceptions ap-
        ply, we decline to consider his arguments challenging the sentence
        imposed. See Weaver, 275 F.3d at 1333.
                                         IV.
               The district court here fully addressed Rule 11’s core princi-
        ples during the change-of-plea hearing, ensuring that Medard’s
        guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. The plea col-
        loquy and the written and signed plea agreement also establish that
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        12                    Opinion of the Court              22-10009

        Medard entered his sentence appeal waiver knowingly and volun-
        tarily, so that the waiver is valid and enforceable. We therefore
        affirm Medard’s conviction and sentence.
              AFFIRMED.