Court Opinion

ID: 9666800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:27:44.876061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:40.506464
License: Public Domain

WHITHAM, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In his sole point of error, Alford contends that it was error for the trial court to dismiss his cause of action for want of jurisdiction because he properly pleaded deprivations of his rights under the state and federal constitutions in the administrative actions complained of, and thus invoked an inherent right of appeal to the courts. I agree. Consequently, I would sustain Alford’s sole point of error and reverse and remand. I write to express my disagreement with the majority in its disposition of Alford’s claimed deprivation of a property right without procedural due process under Article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. To my mind, Alford’s pleadings show jurisdiction in the district court. Whether Alford can win on the merits is a question not before us. I re*319spectfully submit that the majority fails to recognize the distinction.
As the majority states:
In 1982, the Dallas Police Department adopted section 401.05 of its personnel regulations which contains specific rules and procedures governing transfers. Pursuant to section 401.05, Alford again requested a transfer to the helicopter section. Alford’s name was placed on a transfer list that contained the names of four other officers who had requested a transfer to the helicopter section. In the spring of 1982, two vacancies arose in the helicopter section. One was filled by an officer whose name was on the transfer list. However, the other position was filled by an officer whose name was not on the list. By transferring an officer whose name was not on the list, the police department failed to follow the procedures set forth in section 4-01.05.
Alford v. City of Dallas, 738 S.W.2d 312, 313-14 (Tex.App.—Dallas, 1987, no writ) (emphasis added). Thus, we have a case in which a political subdivision of the State of Texas failed to follow its own promulgated employment rules. The majority, however, concludes that: “It is clear from the face of [section 401.05] that Alford does not have a vested property right in a transfer to the helicopter section.” Alford, at 315. The majority further states that “At most, Alford had an expectancy of a transfer. That expectancy does not rise to the level of a vested property interest that is protected under the due process clause.” Alford, at 315-16.
In my view, the majority fails to address Alford’s true argument. I quote Alford’s brief:
In short, Officer Alford’s argument is not based on the premise that the transfers made were simply unwise or ill-informed, but rather that they were illegal under the Police Department’s own rules, and that the Trial Court has jurisdiction to decide his claim on its merits.
* # * ⅜ He *
[0]nce a governing body makes rules and regulations, even if it was under no obligation to do so, it is bound by such rules and regulations.
* * * * * *
The fact that a regulation like Section 401.05 is binding as long as it is in force means that the minimum requirements of procedural due process include the procedures specified in the regulation.
* * * * * *
In the present case, Appellant alleges that the procedures provided in Section 401.05 of the Dallas Police Personnel Regulations gave rise to expectations on his part in connection with his application for transfer to the Helicopter Section; expectations which were entitled to due process protection, but which were frustrated by Appellees’ failure to abide by Section 401.05. To the extent that Ap-pellees differ from Appellant in their contentions as to the meaning of Section 401.05 and its application to Appellant’s request for transfer, these matters involve the merits of the ease to be decided in the Trial Court once it has assumed jurisdiction over this lawsuit. What must be emphasized is that Appellant’s position is not simply that the transfer of other officers into the Helicopter Section, along with the denial of Appellant’s request for transfer, was simply a bad personnel decision; rather, Appellant’s position is that these personnel decisions were made in violation of the Dallas Police Department’s own rules governing how they must be made, depriving him of his property right created by such rules without due process of law. Appellant asks only that the Department be ordered to comply with its own rules in deciding on his application for transfer. It would then be the function of the Trial Court to look at the merits of the case to determine if Appellant was refused the opportunity to be transferred because of some bias or prejudice on the part of the Division Commander.
*320Thus, I read Alford to contend that his expectation that the Dallas Police Department will abide by its own regulations constitutes a property right and that he has been deprived of this property right without the due process set forth in the Police Department’s regulations. Thus, Alford contends that he has invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction of this constitutional due process question. By promulgating rules governing and setting transfer procedures, the Dallas Police Department has created, in Alford and others similarly situated, a reasonable and protectable expectation that the rules and procedures prescribed by the regulations will be scrupulously and conscientiously followed. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Department of Energy, 451 F.Supp. 281, 283 (S.D.Tex.1978). When the published rules and regulations of an arm of state government establish a particular statutory procedure and they add to the constitutional minimum, then they must be followed. Wells v. Dallas Independent School District, 576 F.Supp. 497, 503 n. 13 (N.D.Tex. 1983) (citing Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir.1970)). Accord United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268, 74 S.Ct. 499, 503, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954).
I agree with the majority that, by transferring an officer whose name was not on the list, the police department failed to follow its own procedures as set forth in section 401.05. I conclude that Alford’s application for a transfer to the helicopter division under the procedure prescribed in section 401.05 resulted in his reasonable and protectable expectation that the police department would scrupulously and conscientiously follow its own regulations. Thus, in failing to abide by its own regulations, the police department deprived Alford of his reasonable expectation that the department would follow its own regulations, a property right.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” U.S. CONST, amend. XIV. To set forth a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary to allege that one’s constitutional rights were infringed upon as a result of “state action.” Robinson v. Price, 553 F.2d 918, 919-20 (5th Cir.1977). Public employers or their agents are clothed with the responsibility for public affairs which attaches to their actions the color of state involvement for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Crawford v. Short, 387 F.Supp. 282, 285 (S.D.Tex.1975). See Childers v. Dallas Police Department, 513 F.Supp. 134, 143-44 (N.D.Tex.1981). Alford contends that the Dallas Police Department, as a public employer, has deprived him of a property right without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In my view, Alford has properly alleged the state action portion of his cause of action.
I now turn to the question of whether the police department’s transfer decisions deprived Alford of any property right. A protected property interest in employment exists only when the employee has a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Conley v. Board of Trustees of Grenada County Hospital, 707 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.1983) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). The source of such a claim can be a state statute, a local ordinance, a rule, or a mutually explicit understanding. Conley, 707 F.2d at 179. Whatever the source, however, the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state law. Conley, 707 F.2d at 179. The Dallas Police Department voluntarily promulgated its Personnel Regulations including section 401.05 which establishes its transfer procedure. I conclude that the Dallas Police Department created a reasonable expectancy in Alford and all other transfer applicants that the department would follow its promulgated procedures. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-30 & 435-36, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 & 1157-58, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982) (where state statutes provided scheme to adjudicate alleged discrimination based on physical handicap, state’s failure to follow *321statutory procedure deprived appellant of cause of action which constituted property right); Conley, 707 F.2d at 178-81 (hospital employee had reasonable expectancy of continued employment where hospital guidebook listed 36 reasons for dismissal and employee had not committed any of listed violations); Glenn v. Newman, 614 F.2d 467, 471-72 (5th Cir.1980) (police officer had reasonable expectancy of continued employment where police department manual listed violations warranting dismissal and police officer had not committed any of listed violations); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d at 856-57 (5th Cir.1970) (where school department’s regulations established procedure for termination of teacher’s employment in addition to constitutional minimum, school must follow its own rules). Accord, United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 751 & n. 14, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 1471 & n. 14, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979) (concerning Internal Revenue Service wiretap regulations, “[w]here the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures”). Accordingly, I conclude that the police department’s procedural regulations provided Alford a constitutionally protected property right to have the department follow its promulgated transfer procedures. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 429-30, 102 S.Ct. at 1154; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578, 92 S.Ct. at 2709; Conley, 707 F.2d at 180-181; Glenn v. Newman, 614 F.2d at 471-72; Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d at 856-57.
I further conclude that, in failing to abide by its own regulations, the police department deprived Alford of his reasonable expectation that the department would follow its own regulations, a property right. When published rules and regulations establish a particular statutory procedure, they must be followed. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d at 856-57. Accordingly, I conclude that the police department must follow its own published procedures to afford a transfer candidate like Alford procedural due process. By transferring an officer whose name was not on the list, the police department failed to follow the published procedures set forth in section 401.-05. Consequently, I conclude that the police department, by failing to follow its own published transfer procedure, deprived Alford of a constitutionally protected property right without due process of law. Therefore, Alford’s pleadings show that he has an inherent constitutional right to appeal from the City’s administrative decision not to transfer him. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Alford’s cause of action for want of jurisdiction and remand this case to the trial court for proceedings on the merits. I express no opinion on the merits of Alford’s cause of action.