Court Opinion

ID: 9731585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:50:34.805532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:02.928585
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting: I join in Mr. Justice Ward’s dissent, and consider the majority’s creation of a “knock and announce” rule to be particularly undesirable in the drug cases. Mr. Chief Justice Weintraub, writing for the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Smith (1962), 37 N.J. 481, 499-500, 181 A.2d 761, 770-71, puts the question in its proper context: “We must identify precisely what is involved. We are not dealing with the sufficiency of the basis for a search. Probable cause existed. The right to invade the privacy of the occupant was clear. And it is of no moment that a search warrant had not issued; the problem would be the same if the magistrate’s warrant were in hand. The State was entitled to seize the contraband. The nature of the contraband was such that if the officers’ mission had first been announced, the articles likely would have literally gone down the drain. Indeed, the tourniquet was successfully secreted despite the nature of the entry. In short, if admittance had first been demanded, the State’s clear right to search and seize as an incident to the arrest could have been defeated. Pushers of narcotics usually have but small quantities with them, the easier to part with their wares in the face of an arrest, and users rarely have a large supply. The question then is whether the Fourth Amendment intended to nullify the State’s clear right to search by imposing a condition which would defeat it. If the State’s right to the contraband is to be denied, it must be because of the evident danger and rudeness of a sudden entry. But the danger and the rudeness are not the gratuitous product of official insolence or indifference; they are the consequences of the criminal enterprise, made inescapable by its nature. Moreover, in striking a balance between the right of the State and the rights of the individual, the need to protect the innocent is not a conspicuous factor; for, as we have said, the hypothesis includes the existence of probable cause and indeed a reasonable basis to believe a criminal event is in progress. Hence, to require that admittance be demanded and the mission revealed before entry into the premises would, overall, benefit the guilty alone. It seems to us that the Fourth Amendment does not transmute a ‘reasonable’ search into an ‘unreasonable’ one merely because the officer discharged his duty to arrest and search in a manner which fairly appeared necessary for the successful enforcement of the State’s right.” If we must have a “knock and announce” rule in criminal cases, I would except the narcotics cases from that requirement. Exempting them would eliminate the troublesome questions posed by Mr. Justice Ward which the police officers must now answer in deciding whether the “exigent circumstances” test of the majority has been met. Apart from these observations regarding the rule created by the majority of my colleagues, it seems to me they have clearly misapplied that rule as to the defendant Smith. Despite the fact that Officer Coash knew Smith had a handgun at an earlier time, the majority refuses to excuse the “knock and announce” requirement unless “the officers reasonably believe the weapon will be used against them.” Since Smith was known to have had a handgun at an earlier time, it does not seem to me unreasonable to believe he might still have it. Were I the officer obliged to search the occupied apartment of one possessing, and perhaps using, drugs, and reasonably believed to have a gun, I think I would prefer he not be warned of my arrival. The circumstances here seem to me to be sufficiently “exigent” to meet even the majority’s test. I would reverse the appellate and circuit courts and deny the motions to suppress the evidence.