Court Opinion

ID: 9795667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:35:21.897955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:31:01.748220
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
This case involves an action for money damages brought under Oregon’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, ORS 166.715 to 166.735, and commonly known as ORICO. The named parties to this proceeding are American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the Oregon Education Association (OEA), plaintiffs, the Oregon Taxpayers United PAC (OTU-PAC) and Oregon Taxpayers United Education Foundation (OTU-EF), defendants, and the State of Oregon (state), intervenor. Defendants appeal after the trial court entered judgment awarding money damages to plaintiffs on Counts 1 and 3 of their claims and enjoining defendants, their successor political committees, and Bill Sizemore from receiving political contributions in the future. 1
Plaintiffs allege that employees and agents of defendants engaged in racketeering activities by forging signatures on statements of sponsorship and initiative petitions and by submitting false contribution and expenditure reports *380and that, as a result of those activities, plaintiffs were required to expend resources in opposition to the measures in order to defeat them. In their first assignment of error, defendants contend that the trial court erred when it denied their motions under ORCP 21A to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that plaintiffs’ claims for damages are not legally cognizable because it appears from the face of the complaints that the plaintiffs’ expenditures to oppose the ballot measures were not directly caused by defendants’ wrongdoing. For the reasons that follow, I agree with defendants’ argument and therefore would reverse plaintiffs’ judgment for money damages.
The second part of the appeal concerns the injunctive relief that was awarded to the state against defendants, their successor organizations, and Sizemore, the person whom the trial court found was actively involved in the wrongdoing that is the subject of this case. For the reasons explained more fully below, the grant of injunctive relief in this case, in some particulars, extended beyond that authorized by law.
I. PLAINTIFFS’CLAIMS UNDER ORICO FOR MONEY DAMAGES
Plaintiffs’ claims arise under ORS 166.725(7)(a), which provides:
“Any person who is injured by reason of any violation of the provisions of ORS 166.720(1) to (4) shall have a cause of action for three-fold the actual damages sustained, and, when appropriate, punitive damages.”
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs allege in Counts 1 and 3 of their complaints that defendants committed certain election offenses in procuring sponsorship signatures for initiative measures and in filing false campaign financing and expenditure reports. They also allege that they were injured by reason of those offenses when they were required to expend monies in order to defeat the measures.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs are not persons who have been injured “by reason of’ a violation of ORICO because liability under the act requires direct uninterrupted causation between the violations of the act and the injury *381complained of by the plaintiff. Pointing to the federal analogue of the Oregon act, they explain,
“RICO civil liability requires more than “but for,’ or ‘factual,’ causation — much more; ‘but for’ causation, although certainly necessary, has never proven sufficient for RICO purposes, as the Supreme Court made plain in Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 US 258, 265-71, 112 S Ct 1311, 1316-19, 117 LEd 2d 532 (1992)[.]”
Indeed, the Court in Holmes required that there be some “direct” relationship between the injury asserted and the RICO violations before liability arises under the federal act. 503 US at 268-69. Thus, some federal courts have held that a direct relationship between the injury and the alleged wrongdoing is one of the central elements of the federal RICO act and have applied a three-factor “remoteness” test based on Holmes to determine whether a plaintiffs injury is too remote from a defendant’s alleged wrongdoing to allow recovery.2 See, e.g., Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Incorporated, 185 F3d 957 (9th Cir 1999) (affirming grant of judgment on the pleadings to defendants on claims that alleged injury suffered by employee health and welfare benefit plans was too remote from alleged wrongdoing of tobacco companies, nonprofit research councils, and public relations firm that allegedly misrepresented and concealed information about health risks of smoking).
It is obvious, however, that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal statute in Holmes in 1992 and its three-part test for “remoteness” could not have been the meaning of the words “by reason of’ in ORS 166.725(7)(a) that the Oregon legislature had in mind in 1981. See State v. Cooper, 319 Or 162, 168, 874 P2d 822 (1994) (holding that, when the Oregon legislature enacts a statute modeled after the statute of another jurisdiction, an interpretation of that statute by the highest court of that jurisdiction rendered *382before the enactment of the statute by the legislature is considered the interpretation intended by the Oregon legislature). Moreover, the “remoteness” test used by Holmes and the federal courts is derived from Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 US 519, 103 S Ct 897, 74 LEd 2d 723 (1983), which interpreted the words “by reason of’ in the Clayton Act. In addition, insofar as I can ascertain, no Oregon appellate court has interpreted the phrase “by reason of’ in ORICO with the exception of this court in Ainslie v. First Interstate Bank, 148 Or App 162, 187-90, 939 P2d 125 (1997), rev dismissed, 326 Or 627 (1998), and in Loewen v. Galligan, 130 Or App 222, 230-32, 882 P2d 104, rev den, 320 Or 493 (1994).
In. Ainslie, however, we did not undertake the analysis required by PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and the template that it established. Indeed, the defendant in Ainslie pointed to the fact that the federal courts have used something akin to a “proximate cause” standard, which in their view demands a direct connection between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged, in order to legally limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s act based on concepts of what justice demands and what is administratively possible and convenient. The defendant suggested that the injuries asserted by the plaintiffs were not “reasonably foreseeable” in light of what the plaintiffs claimed were ORICO violations. In response to the defendant’s application of concepts, and without adopting the defendant’s terminology or legal theses, we agreed with the defendant’s conclusion that, under the plaintiffs’ theory of damages, “their proof supports nothing but speculation” and “[i]t is simply an imponderable” whether the plaintiffs had been injured by the defendant’s violations. Ainslie, 148 Or App at 189.
In Loewen, the issue was whether former shareholders could bring an ORICO action against a corporation, its directors, and other entities who were involved in a business transaction with the corporation. Observing that the plaintiffs’ claim was based on the language of ORS 166.720 and that that language was analogous to the federal RICO act, we followed the lead of federal courts who had considered similar questions and held that, if the claim was derivative, then the *383aggrieved shareholders had no standing to bring an ORICO claim. 130 Or App at 231. Thus, unaided by any controlling judicial interpretation of the phrase “by reason of’ in ORS 166.725(7)(a), we are left to employ the ordinary rules of statutory construction under PGE.
Our overarching task is to discern the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020. The best evidence of the legislature’s intent are the words of the statute themselves. Unless the legislature has assigned a specialized meaning to them, which it has not done here, the words “by reason of’ in the statute are to be given their ordinary meaning. The ordinary meaning of the word “reason” in the phrase “by reason of’ in ORS 166.725(7)(a) means “c: a sufficient ground of explanation or of logical defense; esp : a general principal, law, or warranted presumption that supports a conclusion, explains a fact, or validates a course of conduct [.]” Websters Third New Int’l Dictionary 1891 (unabridged ed 2002). That general definition of the word “reason” is not particularly helpful for our purposes until it is put into the context of ORICO.
When the legislature enacted ORICO in 1981, its definition of “racketeering activity” included election offenses defined in former ORS 260.542, repealed by Oregon Laws 1993, chapter 383, section 1; ORS 260.575; and ORS 260.665. ORS 166.715(5)(a)(V) (1981). Former ORS 260.542 prohibited the use of the term “reelect” in any campaign material unless it satisfied certain requirements. ORS 260.575 and ORS 260.665 remain in the current version of ORICO as predicate offenses. ORS 260.575 makes it unlawful to use threats or intimidation for the purpose of extorting money involving initiative, referendum, and recall petitions. ORS 260.665 makes “undue influence” that affects voting and other aspects of political campaigns unlawful. ‘Undue influence” is defined as “force, violence, restraint or the threat of it, inflicting injury, damage, harm, loss of employment or other loss or the threat of it, or giving or promising to give money, employment or other thing of value.” ORS 260.665(1).
The fact that the 1981 legislature expressly contemplated that some election offenses but not others could operate as predicate offenses for purposes of ORICO gives rise to an inference that the omission of nonlisted election offenses *384as predicate offenses in ORICO was purposeful.3 PGE, 317 Or at 611. Applying that inference leads to the following reasoning. Under the current version of ORICO, ORS 166.715(6)(a)(V) lists violations of ORS 260.575 and ORS 260.665 as predicate offenses. ORS 166.720 defines what constitutes unlawful racketeering activity based on the commission of the predicate offenses listed in ORS 166.715(6)(a). ORS 166.725(7)(a) provides that “[a]ny person who is injured by reason of any violation of the provisions of ORS 166.720(1) to (4) shall have a cause of action for * * * damages [.]” Thus, when all three statutes are read in combination, ORS 166.725(7)(a) provides for a cause of action for damages that arise “by reason of’ racketeering activity involving the commission of the predicate crimes listed in ORS 166.715(6)(a). The legislature’s failure to include in ORS 166.715(6)(a) the election offenses that defendants allegedly committed gives rise to an inference that the legislature did not intend those omitted election offenses to operate as predicate offenses for purposes of ORICO. See, e.g., Perlenfein and Perlenfein, 316 Or 16, 22, 848 P2d 604 (1993) (holding that when the legislature uses a particular term in one provision of a statute but omits that same term in a parallel and related provision, it can be inferred that the omission was deliberate). Nonetheless, our court has held that the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” (the expression of one is to the exclusion of another) is merely a guide to understanding legislative intent and is not conclusive on that question. State ex rel City of Powers v. Coos County Airport, 201 Or App 222, 234, 119 P3d 225 (2005), rev den, 341 Or 197 (2006). Thus, the text and the context of the statute are not necessarily dispositive regarding the issue presented in this case, and I turn to the legislative history underlying the statute.
My review of the Oregon legislative history does not reveal any controlling statements by the legislature as to what it intended, other than that the statute was intended to be a counterpart to the federal RICO statute. If, after consideration of the text, context, and legislative history of a *385statute, the intent of the legislature remains unclear, we are required to resort to statutory construction maxims including the maxim that we construe a statute how the legislature would have intended the statute to be applied, had it considered the issue before us. PGE, 317 Or at 612. Certainly, the federal legislative history underlying the federal counterpart would have been persuasive to the Oregon legislature had it considered the issue presented by this case, inasmuch as the legislature intended ORICO to constitute Oregon’s version of the federal RICO act. Cf. McKean-Coffman v. Employment Div., 312 Or 543, 550, 824 P2d 410 (1992) (holding that because Oregon adopted language from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act virtually verbatim, federal legislative history was persuasive in interpreting the Oregon analogue).
That reasoning causes the analysis to return to what the Holmes Court said about Congress’s intent when it enacted the federal RICO act. The Court explained:
“We may fairly credit the 91st Congress, which enacted RICO, with knowing the interpretation federal courts had given the words earlier Congresses had used first in §7 of the Sherman Act, and later in the Clayton Act §4. It used the same words, and we can only assume it intended them to have the same meaning that courts had already given them. Proximate cause is thus required.”
Holmes, 503 US at 268 (citations omitted).
Also, in State v. Blossom, 88 Or App 75, 744 P2d 281 (1987), rev den, 305 Or 22 (1988), we observed that ORICO was modeled after the federal RICO statute, 18 USC sections 1961 to 1968, and for purposes of interpreting an ORICO statute, we reasoned that it was likely that the Oregon legislature would have had the same intent that Congress had regarding the federal analogue. In light of our reasoning in Blossom and what the Holmes Court said about Congress’s intent, I would hold that, when the Oregon legislature enacted the RICO act and more particularly, ORS 166.725(7)(a), had it considered the issue before us and the legislative history underlying the federal act, it would have intended a “proximate cause” standard for purposes of applying the “by reason of’ language in the statute. However, some *386further definition is necessary to explain what the 1981 legislature would have understood about the concept of “proximate cause” before that test can be applied in this case.
The concept of “proximate cause” in tort law in Oregon finds its roots in the common law. Historically, for purposes of common-law tort liability in Oregon, there must have been more than “but for” causation for liability for an injury to exist. Rather, “proximate” cause, also known as “legal cause,” was required before a person could be held legally responsible for conduct that was a part of the chain of causation of an injury. Sworden v. Gross, 243 Or 83, 86, 409 P2d 897 (1966). Under the common law, a “remote” cause was not a “legal” or “proximate cause” of an injury. In contrast to a “remote” cause, a proximate cause of injury was an injury that “continuously extend [ed] through every event, fact, act and occurrence related to the tortious conduct of the defendant and [was] itself the logical and natural cause of the injury complained of.” Zickrick v. Cooke et al., 197 Or 87, 92, 252 P2d 185 (1953). Also, the connection between a tortious act and the plaintiffs injury could be broken by an intervening cause that either supersedes earlier causes or by its nature makes the intervening cause the proximate or legally responsible cause. Johnson v. Hoffman et al., 132 Or 46, 56, 284 P 567 (1930).
Thus, in creating statutory tort liability under ORS 166.275(7)(a), the legislature would likely have relied on its understanding of the common-law concept of “legal” or “proximate cause.” Because that concept is the likely meaning that the legislature would have afforded to the words “by reason of’ in the statute, it follows that the legislature would not have intended for every event in a chain of causation to give rise to liability for a plaintiffs injury. Said otherwise, it is likely that the legislature would have intended the statute to regard as actionable only the direct results of a defendant’s racketeering activity. Cf. Chambers v. Everding & Farrell, 71 Or 521, 143 P 616 (1914).4
*387To summarize: The issue before us is whether the legislature intended plaintiffs’ claims, as alleged, to be actionable based on defendants’ racketeering activity. What we know about the legislature’s intent in 1981 is the following. It intended to model ORICO after the federal law. Presumably, in 1981, the legislature would have been aware of the concept of “proximate cause” as interpreted by Oregon common law. The legislature would also have been aware of the provisions of ORS 174.010, which require courts in the construction of a statute “simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted [.]” Finally, the legislature would have been aware of the rule of statutory construction employed by courts that the inclusion of one statutory term implies that the legislature intended to exclude other related terms.5
With those principles in mind, I turn in greater detail to the allegations in plaintiff AFT’s second amended complaint and plaintiff OEA’s third amended complaint that were the subject of defendants’ ORCP 21A motion. There are two preliminary caveats to keep in mind with regard to the following discussion: First, the operative language in each complaint is similar, if not identical. Second, the jury ultimately found for defendants on plaintiffs’ second count on the basis that plaintiffs had not been damaged by defendants’ ORICO signature-gathering violations.6
In response to defendants’ ORCP 21A motion, plaintiff AFT grouped its claims into three counts and characterized them to the trial court as follows:
*388“The first count involves criminal activity on gathering signatures on the sponsorship petitions for Measures 92 and 98; the second count involves criminal activity in gathering signatures in order to place Measures 92 and 98 on the ballot; and the third count involves criminal activity in raising and reporting funds to place Ballot Measures 92 and 98 on the ballot.”
AFT also alleged that, “[a]s a result of the racketeering activities of Defendant’s agents, Plaintiff expended funds, as Defendants knew they would, by contributing to campaigns to oppose Measure 92 and 98.” Similarly, Plaintiff OEA explained to the trial court,
“Plaintiffs complaint is organized in three counts. The first count involves criminal activity in gathering signatures on the sponsorship petitions for Measures 92 and 98; the second count involves criminal activity in gathering signatures in order to place Measures 92 and 98 on the ballot; and the third count involves criminal activity in raising and reporting funds to place Ballot Measures 92 and 98 on the ballot.”
Plaintiff OEA further alleged that “[t]he further purpose of the enterprise was to force plaintiff to expend its resources opposing such initiatives, thereby preventing plaintiff from initiating and implementing programs for improvement of public education and the working conditions of plaintiffs members.”
For purposes of defendants’ ORCP 21 A motion, we presume that all of the facts alleged above are true, and we give plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences that arise from those facts. The issue then, when properly framed, is whether the above allegations state legally cognizable claims for damages under ORICO. Defendants argue that there is no direct connection for purposes of ORICO between the allegations that its agents submitted false signatures on the sponsorship petitions for the ballot measures and made false expenditure reports to the Secretary of State and the injury for which plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, i.e, the expenditures of monies by plaintiffs to oppose the ballot measures. Plaintiffs counter that their
*389“losses are direct, not derivative; defendants’ racketeering activity certainly resulted in plaintiffs’ need to expend funds. While it may be true that the public at large was victimized by Highley’s crimes, the public was not affected as directly as were plaintiffs. One of the objectives of the enterprise was to place initiative measures on the ballots to limit plaintiffs’ ability to conduct business and to force plaintiffs to expend money to fight the measures. Wfiiile the criminal activities affect other people, plaintiffs’ claims are not derivative of the damages suffered by the electorate at large.”
It can be easily said, based on the above allegations, that plaintiffs allege a “factual” or “but-for” causation, i.e., that there is a causal link between defendants’ conduct and plaintiffs’ harm, but there remains the issue of legal responsibility under ORICO. One subissue involving legal responsibility is whether the complaints allege ORICO violations that are too remote to plaintiffs’ injury to make them actionable under ORS 166.275(7)(a). Another subissue involving legal responsibility is whether the intervening events occurring after the violations operate, in accordance with the legislature’s intention, to interrupt the chain of legal causation with respect to the alleged violations and plaintiffs’ injuries.7
With regard to the issue of remoteness, the Zickrick court explained:
“The essence of the rule is found in the maxim ‘Causa próxima, non remota spectatur.’ The proximate, as distinguished from the remote cause, ‘involves the idea of continuity, that the negligent act continuously extends through every event, fact, act and occurrence related to the tortious conduct of the defendant and is itself the logical and natural cause of the injury complained of.”
197 Or at 92 (quoting 1 Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (rev ed) 92, § 33).
Plaintiffs’ Count 1 claims, as alleged, do not satisfy the above maxim. They allege that Kelli Highley, as an *390“employee” and “agent” of defendants, committed racketeering activity that included falsifying information regarding sponsorship statements and that
“As a result of Highley’s racketeering activities, Measure 92 and Measure 98 were approved by the Oregon Secretary of State for circulation pursuant to ORS 250.045(1). Thereafter Defendants circulated the petitions and obtained sufficient signatures to place Measures 92 and 98 on the 2000 general election ballot.
* * * *
“As a result of Highley’s racketeering activities, Plaintiffs] expended funds in its efforts to oppose certification of the ballot titles, and by contributing to campaigns to oppose these measures.”
Plaintiffs’ injury, as alleged above, was the expenditure of monies to oppose the measures once they were on the ballot.8 The harm-producing event that ultimately caused plaintiffs’ injury was the fact that the measures were certified by the Secretary of State to be on the ballot. Until that event occurred, there was nothing legally in place for plaintiffs to oppose. Rather, the forgeries of the sponsorship statements occurred long before the measures were placed on the ballot by the Secretary of State.
Under ORS 250.045(1), before circulating a petition to initiate a state measure, a petitioner must file with the Secretary of State a prospective petition accompanied by a statement of sponsorship signed by at least 25 electors. The signatures in the statement of sponsorship must be accompanied by a certificate of the county clerk of each county in which the sponsors reside, stating the number of signatures believed to be genuine. When a prospective petition for a state measure is filed, the Secretary of State forwards the *391proposed petition to the Attorney General, who supplies a draft ballot title pursuant to ORS 250.065(2). The Secretary of State then provides notice of the public’s right to comment and supplies the Attorney General with all timely comments as required by ORS 250.067(1). After receiving any comments, the Attorney General then certifies the ballot title to the Secretary of State. That decision is subject to review by the Supreme Court. Following that review, if any, the petitioners of the initiative may circulate the proposed petition for elector signatures. To qualify for the ballot, a petition to put an initiative amendment to the constitution on the ballot must be signed by a number of qualified voters equal to eight percent of the total number of votes cast for the office of Governor at the election at which a Governor was elected preceding the filing of the petition. Or Const, Art IV, § l(2)(c). An initiative petition relating to a state measure must then be filed with the Secretary of State for the purpose of verifying whether the petition contains the required number of signatures of electors. If the requisite number of signatures is verified by the Secretary of State, the measure qualifies for the ballot.
In light of the number of steps involved in the above process, the forgeries of the statements of sponsorship were not a direct, but rather a remote, cause of plaintiffs’ expenditures. ORS 250.045(1) directly addresses that issue by placing the responsibility on county clerks of the counties in which the electors reside to certify whether the signatures are genuine. That procedure is followed by other steps in the process before the harm-producing force of plaintiffs’ expenditures opposing certification of the ballot titles and the measures themselves occurred. The logical consequence of forging sponsorship statements was already an accomplished fact “before the forces were set in motion which resulted in the injury to plaintiff[s]Zickrick, 197 Or at 95. Even when plaintiffs’ allegations are viewed in the light most favorable to them, the forged sponsorship statements are not a direct harm-producing event that caused plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. In light of the legislature’s inclusion of other election offenses in the list of predicate crimes and the remoteness of defendants’ ORICO violations to plaintiffs’ injuries, it is unlikely that the legislature would have intended that plaintiffs could *392recover damages under the circumstances alleged. Accordingly, the trial court should have granted defendants’ ORCP 21 motion as to plaintiffs’ allegations under Count l.9
Plaintiffs’ Count 3 claims involve the filing of false contribution and expenditure forms. Plaintiffs allege that defendants were required by Oregon law as a political action committee to file periodic contribution and expenditure reports. They also allege that for the years 1998 through 2000, “William Sizemore and Becky Miller, acting as agents of OTU-PAC, signed and filed” false reports concerning Measures 92 and 98 “knowing such reports to contain false written statements, including misstatements on the amount of funds received by OTU-EF and other contributors for use by OTU-PAC.” They further allege that the “forms were intentionally false, concealing the actual use of funds raised by OTU-EF to support OTU-PAC activity related to Measures 92 and 98, concealing the source of contributions to Measures 92 and 98, and enabling more funds to be raised to support Measures 92 and 98 through the tax exempt OTU-EF.” Finally, they allege, “As a result of the agents’ racketeering activities, Defendants were able to raise the necessary funds to collect signatures to qualify Measures 92 and 98 for the 2000 general election ballot.”
Thus, giving plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences from their allegations, it can be inferred that, had defendants not falsified their campaign and expenditure reports, they would have been unable to raise or allocate sufficient monies to obtain enough signatures to place their measures on the ballot. Here, in contrast to their first count, plaintiffs allege a more direct cause of their injury, i.e., that the falsifying of campaign and finance reports resulted in defendants being able to obtain enough signatures, which resulted in them being able to qualify their measures for the *393ballot.10 Nonetheless, with regard to plaintiffs’ third count, there remains the question of the legal responsibility of defendants for plaintiffs’ expenditures to defeat the measures after their certification by the Secretary of State for placement on the ballot.
Two initial observations need to be kept in mind in assessing the legislature’s intent in that regard. First, the more direct harm-producing event that caused plaintiffs’ alleged injury is the fact that defendants were able to procure enough signatures to get the measures on the ballot rather than the filing of falsified campaign financial reports. Second, the certification of the petition signatures presented to the Secretary of State by defendants preceded the ballots being placed on the ballot, the direct harm-producing event under plaintiffs’ theory.
The general common-law rule was that, where it appeared from the complaint that between the defendant’s act and the plaintiffs injury there had intervened an independent cause without which the injury would not have happened, the latter will be held to be the proximate cause of the loss and the defendant will be excused from liability. See, e.g., Aune v. Oregon Trunk Railway, 151 Or 622, 633, 51 P2d 663 (1935) (affirming the dismissal of an action for damages resulting from the burning of the plaintiffs buildings caused by a fire started by “hobos” in the defendant’s railroad car). Applying the general rule to the context of this case, it can easily be said that, without the Secretary of State’s certification of the signatures, the ballot measures that produced plaintiffs’ injury would not have been placed on the ballot. Thus, in the context of ORICO, it could be argued that plaintiffs’ injury did not occur directly “by reason of’ defendants’ *394campaign report violations, but “by reason of’ the placement of the ballot measures on the ballot, and it follows, for that reason, that defendants would not be responsible under ORS 166.725(7)(a) for plaintiffs’ expenditures.
Nevertheless, the provisions of ORS 166.715 to 166.735 “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” ORS 166.735(2). In that light, an intuitive question arises: why is the Secretary of State not just another victim of defendants’ fraud? It therefore follows that the legislature would not have intended the Secretary of State’s action in certifying the initiative petition signatures to cut off the chain of causation between defendants’ false campaign financing reports and plaintiffs’ alleged injury under the statute. In order to properly assess the merits of that argument, it is appropriate to consider plaintiffs’ claim under ORICO in the context of the initiative process and the statutes that expressly apply to that process.
Article IV, section l(2)(a), of the Oregon Constitution provides that “[t]he people reserve to themselves the initiative power, which is to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and enact or reject them at an election independent of the Legislative Assembly.” Section l(4)(a) provides that “[t]he Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for the manner in which the Secretary of State shall determine whether [an initiative] petition contains the required number of signatures of qualified voters.” Section l(4)(b) provides that “[initiative and referendum measures shall be submitted to the people as provided in this section and by law not inconsistent therewith.” Pursuant to the authority granted by section l(4)(a), the legislature has enacted ORS 250.045 to 250.135, which govern the Secretary of State’s obligations regarding state measures, including the certification of signatures on initiative petitions, and ORS chapter 260, which governs the monitoring of campaign contributions and expenditures of political committees. Also, ORS 260.993 provides for criminal penalties, and ORS 260.995 provides for civil penalties, for violation of the provisions of the chapter, although the statutes presently providing for civil penalties were enacted when ORICO was enacted.
*395The remedy that plaintiffs seek to invoke under ORICO is solely statutory in nature, and the legislature has enacted other statutes that address plaintiffs’ concerns but do not afford opponents of ballot measures a private remedy. Clearly, the legislature could have provided an express remedy through ORICO for defendants’ election offenses, had it so intended, because it included other ORS chapter 260 offenses in its list of predicate offenses. Also, the legislature could have provided for plaintiffs to recover their expenditures in opposing a ballot measure as part of the sanctions available under ORS chapter 260. The legislature’s silence in both regards persuasively suggests that we should not recognize the remedy that plaintiffs seek under ORICO by judicial interpretation. In effect, under Article IV and the applicable statutes, the Secretary of the State acts as a gatekeeper as to what measures are placed on the ballot. That function serves to validate for election purposes what measures are before the voters. In light of the fact that the legislature also charged the Elections Division of the Secretary of State with the monitoring of campaign reporting practices and with prosecuting violations for which there are available sanctions under other statutory schemes, it appears unlikely that the legislature would have contemplated that opponents of ballot measures could recover their expenditures as compensatory damages under ORICO on the grounds alleged by plaintiffs.
There are also additional reasons that lead to the above conclusion. First, I am unaware of any precedent that existed in 1981 that would have caused the legislature to think in conceptual terms that plaintiffs’ expenditures to oppose defendants’ ballot measures constituted “compensatory damages” within the ordinary meaning of those words, whether for ORICO purposes or for purposes of any other torts. Second, and perhaps most important, I have significant policy concerns about recognizing plaintiffs’ theory of damages under ORICO. According to Article IV, section l(2)(a), the people of Oregon have reserved to themselves the initiative power to propose laws and amendments to the constitution. It is a process whereby ordinary citizens can enact or repeal laws or create or modify provisions of the Oregon Constitution, and it is an integral part of the democratic process
*396along with the representative form of democracy that is exercised by the legislature. Moreover, the initiative process serves as an important part of the system of checks and balances that ensures that citizens in Oregon have a voice in how they are governed, what authority they vest in the branches of government authorized under the constitution, and what authority they retain to protect their personal interests and liberties.
If ORICO is construed to afford a remedy for opponents of initiative measures in the event of the kind of election law violations that plaintiffs allege, that remedy affects more than the pocketbooks of individual wrongdoers who commit ORICO violations; it will have a chilling effect on those innocent participants who contribute monies or who otherwise participate in promotion of ballot measures, whether it be in support of a ballot measure sponsored by defendants or by other political committees and individuals who wish to participate in the political process. For instance, in this case, the trial court awarded damages against defendants to plaintiff OEA in the amount of $2,014,974 and to plaintiff AFT in the amount of $510,000. When other potential participants or political committees view the result of this case, it is likely that they will be less willing to participate in the initiative process because of the exposure to liability under ORICO arising from the actions of an agent or representative. Again, in light of the fact that the legislature has enacted legislation that addresses election misconduct and targets wrongdoers with criminal and civil penalties to deter further conduct, it seems unlikely that the legislature would have contemplated providing an additional remedy through ORICO for opponents of initiative measures to recover their expenditures, given the chilling effect of civil damage awards on the initiative process itself. Rather, because the initiative process is a constitutionally guaranteed process, the legislature presumably would have intended to promote citizen involvement regarding the debate of political issues that arise through the initiative process rather than to provide a statutory remedy that inhibits participation in the process.
In summary, the issue before us is one of statutory interpretation of the phrase “by reason of’ in ORS *397166.725(7)(a). Our task is to discern the legislature’s intent regarding that phrase. Because the text, context, and legislative history of the statute do not inform the issue sufficiently for us to declare the legislature’s intent with any. degree of certainty, we are required to determine what the 1981 legislature would have intended, had it considered the issue that is now before us. For the reasons discussed above, I believe that the legislature would not have intended to hold defendants liable for civil damages under the circumstances alleged by plaintiffs. I would hold, therefore, that plaintiffs failed to allege legally cognizable claims for damages under ORICO and that the trial court erred in denying defendants’ ORCP 21 A motion to dismiss their complaints for compensatory damages.
II. THE GRANT OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
I turn now to the third and fourth assignments of error, which challenge the award of injunctive relief against defendants on behalf of intervenor, State of Oregon. The injunctions against defendants provide,
“4. OTU-EF is hereby dissolved.
“5. OTU-EF successor organizations are hereby enjoined from making any contributions or providing anything of value, including loans or in-kind contributions, to any political action committee and are so enjoined for a period of five years from the date the judgment is entered in this action. An ‘OTU-EF successor organization’ is defined as any educational foundation, or similar organization, that is eligible for I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) tax exempt status in which Bill Sizemore is a manager, officer, director, trustee, or controlling person of the successor organization or otherwise participates, directly or indirectly, in the direction or control of the activities of the OTU-EF successor organization.
“6. OTU-PAC and its successor political action committees are hereby enjoined from receiving any contribution of anything of value from any I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization, including but not limited to OTU-EF or any OTU-EF successor organization, and are so enjoined for a period of five years from the date the judgment is entered in this action. An ‘OTU-PAC successor political action committee’ is defined as a political action committee in which Bill Sizemore is a director or treasurer or chief petitioner of *398the successor political action committee, or otherwise participates, directly or indirectly, in the direction or control of the activities of the successor political action committee, and shall include but not be limited to the Committee to Restore Freedom in the Workplace, No More Political Fund-raising at Taxpayer Expense, Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings Committee, Committee to Preserve Self Government, Committee for Teacher Merit Pay, No New Taxes Without a Vote Committee, and Oregonians Against Double Taxation.
“7. OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their successor organizations and successor political action committees which are jointly referred to herein as ‘OTU successors’ are hereby enjoined from transferring or destroying any of their assets, whether cash, personal property or real property, and including documents, computers, and computer hardware, software and files, and are so enjoined until the judgment entered in this action is fully satisfied or until further order of this Court.
“8. OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their OTU successors are hereby enjoined from doing business with I&R Petitions Services, Inc. (T&R’), and any and all I&R successors and are so enjoined for a period of five years from the date the judgment is entered in this action. An T&R successor’ is defined as any corporation, sole proprietorship, partnership or other business which is owned in whole or in part by any owner of I&R, and performs similar services as I&R.
“9. OTU-PAC and its OTU successor political action committees are hereby enjoined from any violation of Oregon law in connection with their reporting on Contribution and Expenditure Reports (‘C&E Reports’) of any in-kind and direct contributions from OTU-EF or any other non-profit corporation, or other corporation, entity or person.
“10. OTU-EF and its successor organizations are hereby enjoined from any violation of Oregon law in connection with reporting on their CT-12 Reports and Form 990s.
“11. OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their OTU successors are hereby enjoined from any violation of Oregon law in connection with the filing or submission of any statements of sponsorship for prospective petitions for a state measure.
*399“12. OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their successors are hereby enjoined from any violation of Oregon law in connection with the filing or submission of signature sheets on an initiative petition for a state measure.
“13. OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their OTU successors are hereby enjoined from any violation of Oregon law in connection with the filing or submission of CT-12 Reports, Form 990s and C&E Reports.
“14. The injunctions set forth above in paragraphs 7 though 13 shall be effective April 30, 2003 and shall continue for five years from the date of this judgment.”
In their third, assignment of error, defendants argue that the trial court’s injunction impermissibly restrains protected expression and political activities in violation of Article I, section 8, and Article IV, sections 1 and 2, of the Oregon Constitution. In their fourth assignment of error, defendants argue that the trial court erred in enjoining nonparties from participating in future political conduct activities protected by the Oregon Constitution.
The parties subject to the trial court’s injunction are OTU-EF, its successor organizations, OTU-PAC, its successor organizations, and Bill Sizemore. Although Sizemore is permitted under the injunction to participate in political activities, the injunction significantly restricts his involvement in political committees that meet the injunction’s definition of an OTU-EF and OTU-PAC successor political committee, including certain named political committees. Only OTU-EF and OTU-PAC are named defendants. Injunctive relief in this case was granted pursuant to ORS 166.725, which provides, in relevant part:
“(1) Any circuit court may, after making due provision for the rights of innocent persons, enjoin violations of the provisions of ORS 166.720(1) to (4) by issuing appropriate orders and judgments!.]
«íJí jjí íj: ^
“(b) Imposing reasonable restrictions upon the future activities or investments of any defendant, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any defendant from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise in which the *400defendant was engaged in violation of the provisions of ORS 166.720(1) to (4).”
The above statutory language authorizes the grant of injunctive relief against only those persons who are “defendants.”
The successor organizations and Bill Sizemore are not named defendants as ORS 166.725(l)(b) expressly requires. In response to defendants’ arguments that the trial court was without authority to grant injunctive relief against unnamed parties, the state responds that ORCP 79 D embodies the common-law rule that an injunction binds not only the parties, but also those who are “successors in interest and Bill Sizemore, the man who exercised control over both entities.” In support of its argument, the state relies on our decision in Von Ohlen v. German Shorthaired Pointer Club, 179 Or App 703, 710, 41 P3d 449, rev den, 334 Or 693 (2002). In Von Ohlen, the trial court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the German Shorthaired Pointer Club of America from “collaring” dogs during field trials.11 The injunction was based on the club’s rules. Three years later, the German Shorthaired Pointer Club of America Foundation moved to dissolve the injunction because, as a successor organization, it had changed the rules to permit collaring. The threshold issue before us was whether the foundation was subject to the injunction. We concluded that its rights and interests were represented and adjudicated in the original injunction proceeding so as to be properly bound by it. We explained,
“Although ORCP 79 D does not apply to permanent injunctions, such as the one here, we cite it for two reasons. First, as explained below, ORCP 79 D and its federal analogue reflect the common-law doctrine, which does apply. Second, we see no reason for applying a different rule to permanent injunctions.”
179 Or App at 710 n 12.
This case presents a different issue from the issue that existed in Von Ohlen. The state does not seek injunctive relief for five years under the common law but rather based on the authority granted to the trial court under ORS *401166.725(l)(b). Consequently, the issue is one of statutory interpretation: Did the legislature intend to grant authority under ORICO to enjoin those nonparties who are identified with the named defendants or who may be in privity with them as successors in interest? The usual rules of statutory construction apply, and we are therefore charged with ascertaining the legislature’s intention by first examining the text and the context of the statute itself. As pointed out above, the text of the statute does not refer to successors in interest or those who control entities that are named defendants; it refers only to “any defendant.” Moreover, ORS 166.715(2) and (5) expressly define who is subject to the provisions of the statute in terms of “person[s]” and “enterprise[s].”12 Significantly, none of those definitions encompasses “successors in interest” or persons in control of an enterprise. Clearly, Bill Sizemore is a “person” within the meaning of ORICO and could have been included as a named defendant.
Finally, ORCP 79 D is not proper context for ORS 166.725(l)(b) because it refers only to “preliminary injunctions” and “restraining orders.”13 If we were to hold that the statute authorizes injunctive relief to any defendant, their successors in interest, and to any person identified with them, we would be adding words to the statute that do not appear, in contravention of ORS 174.010. Accordingly, I would hold that in issuing judgments against nonparties, the trial court exceeded its statutory authority under ORS 166.725(l)(b).14
*402Moreover, the trial court’s judgment in paragraph 4 dissolves OTU-EF. As the majority points out, defendants do not assign that provision of the judgment as error, and, therefore, for purposes of appeal, it constitutes a final judgment. Because, under the judgment, OTU-EF is adjudicated to no longer exist as a legal entity, it cannot be a “defendant” subject to future injunctive relief under ORS 166.725(l)(b) and any injunction pertaining to it should be vacated for that reason. The result of the analysis in this paragraph and the preceding one leaves only defendant OTU-PAC as the remaining defendant against whom the trial court was authorized to grant injunctive relief.
The trial court found that OTU-PAC, through its agents, knowingly submitted false signature sheets for Measure 98, acts that constituted the crimes of forgery under ORS 165.007 and ORS 165.013, and unsworn falsification under ORS 162.085. It also found that OTU-PAC through its agents knowingly submitted false statements of sponsorship for Measures 92 and 98, acts that constituted forgery under ORS 165.007 and ORS 165.013, and unsworn falsification under ORS 162.085. The trial court also concluded that OTU-PAC’s activities constituted racketeering activity under ORS 166.715(6)(B) and a pattern of racketeering within the meaning of ORS 166.715(4). I agree with those findings and conclusions. Because OTU-PAC violated the provisions of ORS 166.720(1) to (4), it follows that intervenor is entitled to injunctive relief under ORS 166.725 unless OTU-PAC is entitled to prevail on its argument that the injunction against it is unconstitutional.
OTU-PAC first argues that its political contributions and expenditures qualify as constitutionally protected activities within the meaning of Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution and, therefore, the injunction prohibiting it from engaging in those activities is unlawful.15 The state *403acknowledges that, in the abstract, contributions to political committees by citizens and expenditures by political committees on behalf of citizens advocating a particular political position constitute protected expression under Article I, section 8. Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 520-24, 931 P2d 770 (1997). I understand OTU-PAC not to challenge the constitutionality of ORS 166.725(1) directly but rather to make an “as applied” challenge to the injunctive relief issued against them that is based on the authority of ORS 166.725(1). Under State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 412, 649 P2d 569 (1982), the first inquiry is whether the injunction on its face is
“directed to the substance of any ‘opinion’ or any ‘subject’ of communication unless the scope of the restraint is wholly confined within some historical exception that was well established when the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably were not intended to reach.”
Here, the injunction, on its face, prohibits OTU-PAC from making or receiving any political contributions. It is clear that the injunction, on its face, targets protected political expression. See Vannatta, 324 Or at 538 (holding ballot measure providing for limits on contributions to state political campaigns unconstitutional in part under Article I, section 8).
It follows that the injunction is constitutionally infirm unless it fits within a historical exception or unless the actual focus of the injunction is on an effect of a proscribed harm rather than on the substance of the communication itself. State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 543, 920 P2d 535 (1996). “Historical exceptions” include “perjury, solicitation or verbal assistance in crime, some forms of theft, forgery and fraud and their contemporary variants.” Robertson, 293 Or at 412. However, the injunction in this case is much broader than any of the above exceptions, operating to enjoin OTU-PAC from any political activity as well as the violation of any campaign law.16
Nonetheless, if the actual focus of the injunction is on a proscribed harm rather than on the substance of the *404communication itself, the injunction can survive scrutiny under Article I, section 8. Thus, the question becomes whether ORS 166.725(l)(b), as applied through the trial court’s grant of injunctive relief, is constitutionally over-broad. Stoneman, 323 Or at 543. Here, the harm that the injunction focuses on is the violation of election laws, rather than the content of the political expression by OTU-PAC. As the state argues, “[g]iven the long history of multiple violations of the law, it was proper for the trial court to assume that the violations would resume in the absence of a suitable injunction, and to order remedial relief accordingly.” I would therefore reject OTU-PAC’s challenge under Article I, section 8, in light of the focus of the injunction on harmful effects.
OTU-PAC also argues that the injunction violates Article IV, sections 1 and 2, of the Oregon Constitution, which reserve to citizens the legislative power of the initiative, including the ability to solicit signatures for initiative sponsorship and petitions. In its view, “the injunction purports to disable OTU and others from doing that which Article IV separately preserves.” The state responds, “Nothing prohibits the defendants or any individual associated with the defendants from gathering signatures or using some legitimate business to assist in so doing.” The state is correct as to the provisions contained in paragraphs 9 to 13 of the injunction. However, the remaining paragraphs of the injunction enjoin OTU-PAC from making or receiving political contributions for the initiative process. The next question, ’ however, is whether OTU-PAC, a political action committee, can assert any rights under Article IV.
As stated above, Article IV, sections 1(1) and l(2)(a) reserve the initiative power to the “people.” In determining the meaning of a provision of the constitution, we are to examine its text, the historical circumstances that led to its adoption, and any case law construing it. Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992). We assume that the framers of a provision and the people who caused it to become part of our constitution intended ordinary meanings for the words in the provision. Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 560, 871 P2d 106 (1994).
*405The word “people” in the context used in Article TV refers to the people of Oregon. In that context, the word “people” refers to “human beings making up a group or assembly” such as “the members of a geographically distinct community.” Webster’s at 1673.17 In contrast, political committees like OTU-PAC are defined by statute. ORS 260.005(16)(a) defines a “political committee” as a combination of two or more individuals or a person other than an individual that has received a contribution for the purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate, measure, or political party or who makes an expenditure for the purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate, measure, or political party. By definition, a political committee is not an “individual” and therefore cannot be for purposes of Article TV, part of the “people” of the State of Oregon. Consequently, OTU-PAC cannot assert any rights under Article IV.
III. SUMMARY
In summary, I would vacate the award of money damages to plaintiffs because there is no indication that the legislature intended that a remedy under ORICO is available to them. I would also dismiss the injunctions against all entities and persons who were not named as defendants. Finally, I would affirm the injunctive relief awarded by the trial court against OTU-PAC. For these reasons, I concur in part with the majority opinion and otherwise dissent.
*406APPENDIX “A”
ER-6
1 " 17. What is the amount of damages you award to plaintiff AFT?
2 "5170,000.
3
“Dated this 27* day of September, 2002. .
4
" fsi_
5 "Presiding Juror"
6 On December 20,2002 the court granted the motion of the State of Oregon to
7 intervene.
8 On February 3,2003 this matter came on for a bench trial on the requests of plaintiffs
9 and intervenor for equitable relief, the court having before it the evidence received at the prior
10 jury trial. Plaintiff OEA was represented by Gregory A. Hartman and Bennett. Hartman,
11 Morris & Kaplan, LLP and Marie S. Toledo. Plaintiff AFT was represented by Gene
12 Mechanic and Goldberg, Mechanic, Stuart & Gibsoa LLP. intervenor-plaintiff State of
13 Oregon was represented by .Assistant Attorney General Christine B. Miller. Defendants OTU-
14 PAC and OTU-EF were represented by Gregory W. Byrne.
15 On April 30,2003 the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
16 introduction Thereto, which are incorporated herein by reference, and entered its Injunction
17 Order.
18 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
19 THAT:
20 1. Plaintiff OEA have judgment against defendants OTU and OTU-EF, jointly and
21 severally, for 5671,658, to be trebled pursuant to ORS 166.725(7)(a), foratotalof
22 $2,014,974;
23 2. Plaintiff AFT have judgment against defendants OTU and OTU-EF, jointly and
24 severally, forS170,000, to be trebled pursuant to ORS I66.725(7)(a), for a total of $510,000;
25 3. All claims against John Does be dismissed without prejudice;
26 4. OTU-EF is hereby dissolved.
Page 5 - MONEY JUDGMENT AND EQUITABLE DECREE &V3EVOÉA Km 4««JUXI J.I0I9 OfiA *
*4071 5. OTO-EF successor organizations are hereby enjoined from making any
2 contributions or providing anything of value, including loans or in-kind contributions, to any
3 political action committee and are so enjoined for a period of five years from the date the
4 judgment is entered in this action. An "OTO-EF successor organization" is defined as any
5 educational foundation, or similar organization, that is eligible forl.RX. § 501(c)(3) tax
6 exempt status in which Bill Sizemore is a manager, officer, director, trustee, or controlling
7 person of the successor organization or otherwise participates, directly or indirectly, in the
8 direction or control of the activities of the OTO-EF successor organization.
9 6. OTO-PAC and its successor political action committees are hereby enjoined from
10 receiving any contribution of anything of value from any I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization,
11 including but not limited to OTO-EF or any OTO-EF successor organization, and aré so
12 enjoined for a period of five years from the date the judgment is entered in this action. An
13 "OTU-PAC successor political action committee" is defined as a political action committee in
14 which Bill Sizemore is a director or treasurer or chief petitioner of the successor political
15 action committee, or otherwise participates, directly or indirectly, in the direction or control of
16 the activities of the successor political action committee, and shall include but not be limited
17 to the Committee to Restore Freedom in the Workplace, No More Political Fund-raising at
18 Taxpayer Expense, Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings Committee, Committee to
19 Preserve Self Government, Committee for Teacher Merit Pay, No New Taxes Without a Vote
20 Committee, and Oregonians Against Double Taxation.
21 7. OTO-PAC and OTO-EF and their successor organizations and successor political
22 action committees which are jointly referred to herein as "OTO successors” are hereby
23 enjoined from transferring or destroying any of their assets, whether cash, personal property or
24 real property, and including documents, computers, and computer hardware, software and
25 files, and are so enjoined until the judgment entered in this action is fully satisfied or until
26 further order of this Court.
Page 6 - MONEY JUDGMENT AND EQUITABLE DECREE
CVJEAiOCA Km 44ISU*t J-IOHOEA TOTUVJ»lcrw«*.wpi
*408ER-8
1 8. OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their OTU successors are hereby enjoined from
2 doing business with I&R Petitions Services, Inc. fT&R"), and any and all l&R successors and
3 are so enjoined for a period of five years from the date the judgment is entered in this action.
4 An "I&R successor” is defined as any corporation, sole proprietorship, partnership or other
5 business which is owned in whole or in part by any owner of I&R, and performs similar
6 services as I&R.
7 9. OTU-PAC and its OTU successor political action committees are hereby
8 enjoined from any violation of Oregon law in connection with their reporting on Contribution
9 and Expenditure Reports ("C&E Reports") of any in-kind and direct contributions from OTU-
10 EF or any other non-profit corporation, or other corporation, entity or person.
11 10. OTU-EF and its successor organizations are hereby enjoined from any violation
12 ofOregon law in connection with reporting on their CT-12 Reports and Form 990s.
13 11. OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their OTU successors are hereby enjoined from any
14 violation of Oregon law in connection with the filing or submission of any statements of
15 sponsorship for prospective petitions for a state measure.
16 12. OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their successors are hereby enjoined from any
17 violation of Oregon law in connection with the filing or submission of signature sheets on an
18 initiative petition for a state measure.
19 ■ 13. OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their OTU successors are hereby enjoined from any
20 violation of Oregon law in connection with the filing or submission of CT-12 Reports, Form
21 990s and C&E Reports.
22 14. The injunctions set forth above in paragraphs 7 through 13 shall be effective
23 April 30,2003 and shall continue for five years from the date of this judgment.
24 IS. That plaintiffs are entitled to costs and attorney fees to be determined pursuant to
25 ORCP68.
26 ///
Page 7 - MONEY JUDGMENT AND EQUITABLE DECREE
G'OEA'OEAM*» <*!2UJtS-iai»0€A » OlWWf**"?1

 The jury found that neither OEA nor AFT had been “damaged” with regard to the “Count 2” claims.

 The “remoteness” test examines (1) whether there are more direct victims of the alleged wrongful conduct who are available to vindicate the law as private attorneys general; (2) whether it will be difficult to ascertain the amount of the plaintiffs damages attributable to the defendant’s wrongful conduct; and (3) whether courts would be required to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries. Holmes, 503 US at 269-70.

 The same inference arises from the fact that not all predicate offenses are subject to the treble damage provision in ORS 166.725(7)(a). See, e.g., ORS 166.725(7)(a)(B) (providing that the election statutes listed in ORS 166.715(6)(a) are subject to a treble damage award, but other enumerated offenses are not).

 Oregon courts no longer use a proximate cause standard. Under the present law, legal responsibility depends on what is the “reasonably foreseeable result” of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 336 Or 329, 344, 83 P3d 322 (2004) (holding that even if a plaintiff proves in a common-law negligence claim factual or “but for” causation, there *387remains the issue of whether there is legal responsibility for the plaintiffs harm). But because the Oregon Supreme Court first rejected the use of traditional concepts of proximate or legal cause in Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No 1J, 303 Or 1, 734 P2d 1326 (1987), some six years after the Oregon legislature enacted ORICO, the legislature would not have had the benefit of that case law. See also Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Div., 316 Or 499, 853 P2d 798 (1993) (holding that as a matter of law, a prison escapee’s crimes committed two days after his escape were not the reasonably foreseeable consequence of a prison employee’s failure to remove the keys from the prison van from which the inmate escaped).

 The principle that a statute limiting a thing to be done in a particular manner implies that it shall not be done otherwise appears in the Oregon common law as early as 1908. See, e.g., Scott v. Ford, 52 Or 288, 97 P 99 (1908).

 Thus, for purposes of this appeal, there is no need to consider the legal sufficiency of the allegations in plaintiffs’ second count.

 In Holmes, the Court opined, “the very unlikelihood that Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover persuades this Court that RICO should not get such an expansive reading.” 503 US at 266.

 According to plaintiffs’ complaints, they also expended monies to oppose the certification of the ballot titles before the Secretary of State placed the measures on the ballot. Presumably, plaintiffs are referring to attorney fees incurred in that effort. While plaintiffs certainly have the right to expend monies at any stage of the initiative process that they choose to prevent an effort to place a measure on the ballot, I am unaware of any statute enacted by the legislature that provides a remedy to recoup those kinds of expenditures, particularly in light of the general principle that attorney fees are not awardable, absent a statute or contract that provides for their recovery.

 Defendants also argue that each county clerk’s certification that the signatures on the statements of sponsorship were genuine in accordance with ORS 250.045(1) operated as an intervening and superseding cause that prevents defendants from being held legally responsible for plaintiffs’ expenditures in opposition to the measures. See the following discussion regarding the effect of ORS 250.045. 208 Or App at 394.

 The majority rejects defendants’ argument that plaintiffs’ theory of causation is too attenuated to satisfy the requirements of proximate cause based on defendants’ motivation in putting several initiatives on the ballot to stretch plaintiffs’ ability to collect dues from their union members thereby restricting their participation in the political process and to force them to expend substantial monies to defeat the measures so as to divert those resources from other efforts. 208 Or App at 368. That argument appears to beg the proper question, which is whether plaintiffs have been injured by reason of “any violation of the provisions of OES 166.720(1) to (4).” Assuming without deciding that defendants’ motivations were malevolent, those motivations do not violate any criminal or OEICO statute of which I am aware.

 “Collaring” within the context of Von Ohlen referred to the controlling of a dog during field trials by the collar around its neck rather than by voice command.

 For purposes of ORICO, an “enterprise” includes “any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust or other profit or nonprofit legal entity, and includes any union, association or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and both illicit and licit enterprises and governmental and nongovernmental entities.” ORS 166.715(2). A “person” within the meaning of ORICO is “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in real or personal property.” ORS 166.715(5).

 ORCP 79 D provides:
“Every order granting a preliminary injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance, shall be specific in terms, shall describe in reasonable detail (and not by reference to the complaint or other document) the act or acts sought to be restrained, and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.”

 I do not reach my conclusion based on anything other than the language of the statute itself. But see, e.g., Polygon Northwest v. NSP Development, Inc., 194 Or *402App 661, 96 P3d 837 (2004) (holding that the general rule is that a nonparty to an injunction proceeding who has notice or knowledge of its terms is bound thereby and subject to contempt sanctions for violating its provisions). Here, however, the issue is not whether the unnamed defendants can be subsequently held in contempt for disobeying the terms of a prior injunction but whether the trial court had statutory authority to enter judgment against any artificial or natural person who was not named as a party defendant.

 Article I, section 8, provides that “[n]o law shall be passed restraining free expression of opinions, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever, but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.”

 In Vannatta, the court said, “The earliest indication that we have found of Oregon’s distrust of the role that money plays in the political process is the 1909 ‘Corrupt Practice Act Governing Elections.’ ” 324 Or at 538 n 23.

 That definition conforms with definitions in dictionaries used in the promulgation of the Oregon Constitution and in existence during the enactment of Article IV, section 1. See, e.g., Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (defining “people” as “1. The body of persons who compose a community, town, city or nation”); Francis Rawle, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 649 (1897) (“When the term the people is made use of in constitutional law or discussions, it is often the case that those only are intended who have a share in the government through being clothed in the elective franchise.”).