Court Opinion

ID: 9727693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:48:03.313275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:06.144753
License: Public Domain

STEADMAN, Associate Judge,
with whom Senior Judge KING joins,
concurring:
As the principal author of the per cu-riam opinion, I must agree that to sustain the first degree theft conviction on the record before us would strain our extensive case precedents relating to proof of value and binding upon a panel of this court. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971). One might wonder, however, whether the time has come to re-examine that body of case law.
As set forth in Part 11(B) of the per curiam opinion addressing proof of intent, our normal standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence gives great deference to the role of the fact-finder in assessing evidence and drawing inferences. It is somewhat of a mystery to me why we have singled out the element of value and imposed what we have repeatedly referred to as a “strict rule” of proof, Wilson v. United States, 358 A.2d 324, 325 (D.C.1976) (per curiam), and in particular why we have so grudgingly treated the probative value of the purchase price of a stolen item.
In our cases, we do not deal with Ming dynasty ceramics or first editions of Milton’s Paradise Lost. Rather, in the main, they involve items of furniture and other personal possessions that are undoubtedly utterly familiar to lay fact-finders. I would daresay that for most, the logical starting point for assessing the current value of such items would be the purchase price. While of course the proof should be sufficient to “eliminate the possibility that the jury’s verdict was based on surmise or conjecture,” Terrell v. United States, 721 A.2d 957, 959 (D.C.1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), this important and long-established rule holds true across the entire range of the criminal law, see, e.g., Smothers v. United States, 403 A.2d 306, 312 (D.C.1979). I have to question whether the establishment of value in theft cases is somehow so unique as to require an additional, higher standard of proof.
For example, while it would seem reasonable to presume that four-month-old furniture was in its original condition, absent any evidence to the contrary, invocation of the normal rule that all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the government, Jones v. United States, 743 A.2d 1222, 1224 (D.C.2000), does not seem to be allowed in the circumstances of this case but rather affirmative proof is required of its “mint condition.” Likewise, despite the fact that the property here was “virtually new,” such that depreciation and obsolescence in their normal sense are not even applicable, we still seem to require that the government provide evidence as to “whether the chattel was subject to prompt depreciation or obsolescence.” Chappelle v. United States, 736 A.2d 212, 215 (D.C.1999). Furthermore, what is *275strikingly odd is that, in contrast to our strict rule where purchase price is offered as a determinant of value, we are quite willing to accept as sufficient the owner’s own estimate of the current market value of the stolen items, hardly a demanding standard. See, e.g., In re R D.J., 348 A.2d 301, 304 (D.C.1975) (per curiam).
What is to be determined is not the value of the stolen items in absolute terms — this is not a condemnation action— but simply whether their value, whatever it is, exceeds the statutory requirement. I should think that in normal circumstances, a jury of twelve individuals addressing the question of value of familiar household items could reasonably make such a judgment without all the requirements of a strict standard of proof such as we now impose. Somebody who strips an apartment bare of all the owner’s furniture, clothing, and personal effects can hardly operate under the illusion that he is committing only petty theft. I have to question whether our present doctrine of proof of value could survive what the Supreme Court in another criminal context termed “the saving grace of common sense.” Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955).