Court Opinion

ID: 9669222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:44:21.920966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:54.001563
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but write separately. The majority opinion glosses over what I believe is the *829dispositive fact in this case — Ms. Beach consented to the blood test. There was absolutely no need to go beyond this fact in resolving this case. Instead, the majority has written an opinion holding, first, that the provisions of the informed consent statute had not been breached; second, that, even if the provisions had been breached, said breach is not grounds for suppression in the absence of the violation of a constitutional right; and third, there was no constitutional violation. Once it had been determined that the statutory provisions had not been breached, the other issues need not have been addressed.
I agree with Appellant’s contention that the legislature has impliedly expressed a preference for breath testing via its provision for breathalyzer machines for each county and the wording of KRS 189A.103(5); however, the expression of a preference does not amount to a directive, which is consistent with the majority’s holding. My concern is that the breadth of the majority opinion will make it difficult to mount a challenge to an arbitrary or punitive exercise of the broad discretion granted the arresting officer in requiring excessive testing that is bodily intrusive, when the less intrusive breath testing is both available and sufficient to preserve the evidence necessary for a conviction.
STEPHENS, C.J., joins this opinion.