Court Opinion

ID: 9776378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:32:26.617297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:38.124784
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM RAY PRICE, Jr., Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the principal opinion because it allows the exercise of a Rule 51.05 automatic disqualification of a trial court judge after the judge has ruled on a substantive matter in the case. In failing to recognize that a party waives the right to *552disqualification by submitting a matter to a judge for the exercise of his or her judicial discretion, the principal opinion not only departs from previous Missouri law and the established law in almost all other jurisdictions, but it also will allow no end of wasteful procedural nonsense that will inevitably follow from this newly established rule of “peek and run”.
The basis for Missouri’s Rule 51.05 automatic disqualification of one trial court judge per side is well established and well reasoned. A party should not be forced to try a dispute before a judge who, for whatever reason, the party believes may not be completely fair and impartial. There is no indication that this was the case here. Re-lators raised no objection to Judge Riley before submitting this matter to him for ruling plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction. Only after receiving an unfavorable ruling did Relators seek Judge Riley’s disqualification, presumably to search for a judge more sympathetic to their position. This was not the purpose for which Rule 51.05 was established, nor should the rule be transformed into one that mandates forum shopping by a disgruntled litigant.
Missouri law has consistently prohibited utilization of an automatic disqualification after a judge has made a ruling that might indicate his or her inclination on the merits. In State ex rel. Nassau v. Kohn, 731 S.W.2d 840, 842, (Mo. banc 1987), it was stated,
Accordingly we hold that a party who unduly delays the filing of a motion to disqualify under section 472.060 waives his right to automatic disqualification under that statute. Such a rule is necessary in order to prevent the unnecessary burden upon judicial administration caused by an unreasonable delay and to prevent a party from disqualifying a judge after first determining the judges inclination on the merits, (emphasis added).
In State ex rel. Director of Revenue v. Scott, 919 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Mo. banc 1996), we specifically recognized as a defense to a Rule 51.05 motion to disqualify that a party’s right thereunder “has been waived by allowing the judge to rule on a substantive matter in the case.” Finally, in State ex rel. Bates v. Rea, 922 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Mo.App.1996), it was noted that,
A party may waive the right to disqualify a judge if it is clear from the record that a trial or hearing has commenced, or the cause taken under submission. (emphasis added, citations omitted).
This same reasoning underlies the reported cases throughout the country. Waiver of an automatic right to disqualify a judge was extensively discussed in Note, State Procedures for Disqualification of Judges for Bias and Prejudice, 42 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 484, 508 (1967). There it was said,
Most automatic disqualification jurisdictions provide, either by statute or by judicial decision, that in addition to filing by a fixed period before the trial, the litigant must also file his disqualifying affidavit before the presiding judge has exercised his judicial discretion. These jurisdictions hold that the judge will be deemed to have exercised his discretion after he has ruled on a preliminary contested motion of law or fact. Thus even if the litigant’s disqualifying affidavit is filed well before the fixed stage of the proceeding designated by statute, it will be ineffective if the judge has previously ruled on a contested motion.
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This supplementary limitation is designed to prevent the litigant from delaying disqualification until he has some indication of the judge’s receptiveness to his cause. It also aids judicial administration by preventing the replacement of a judge already familiar with the litigation. Automatic disqualification has therefore been held unavailable after a contested motion to amend the com*553plaint, after preliminary hearings, or after a ruling on a demurrer, (footnote omitted).
American Law Reports surveyed cases from around the country concerning the issue of waiver of the right to disqualify a judge by participation in proceedings. There it was said,
[A]ll of the cases reported herein support, albeit in varying language and with varying explicitness, the proposition that, although the right to a trial before a fair and impartial judge is a valuable right, ... a party should not be permitted to participate in an action or proceeding to the extent that he is able to ascertain the attitude of the judge toward important aspects of his case and then avoid an adverse ruling by belatedly raising the issue of disqualification.
24 ALR4th 877 section 2(a) (1984).
In Meeting the Challenge:Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 Cal. L.Rev 1445, 1464 (1981), the author noted that “[d]elay in filing the motion [to disqualify] deserves harsh treatment, because counsel may use disqualification in a manipulative way: not raising the issue if the trial is going well, but filing the motion if the litigant’s prospects appear bleak.” See generally, John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 287, 240 (1987) (detailing and reconstructing the foundations of federal judicial disqualification law); Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 Val. U.L.Rev. 543, 550 (1994) (discussing, briefly, Missouri disqualification procedures).
In Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 925 P.2d 240, 242 (Wyo.1996), the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that “a party cannot utilize a motion to change a judge as a means of picking and choosing between judges after he or she is given an impression of the court’s view on the matter in dispute.” The Wyoming rule for change of judge stated that a judge “may be peremptorily disqualified from acting in a case by the filing of a motion requesting that the judge be so disqualified. The motion ... shall be filed within five days after the complaint is filed;.... ” The court found that under this rule, “a party may waive the right to invoke a peremptory disqualification ... when a party allows a judge to determine substantive material issues in the case to be set for trial.” Id. at 243.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also has held that a party may waive the right to substitution of judge by participating in preliminary matters where evidence is received which goes to the merits of the case. Pure Milk Products Co. v. NFO, 64 Wis.2d 241, 219 N.W.2d 564, 569 (1974). The holding in Pure Milk was later codified in W.S.A. section 801.58 (1986). Since then Wisconsin courts have consistently noted that the reason parties are prohibited from substituting a judge after the judge has ruled on a contested matter is because “ ‘a litigant who does not like the way a judge is handling a matter should not be able to substitute a second judge simply because the litigant believes things are going badly before the first judge and hopes to obtain a more favorable tribunal.’ ” State ex rel. Carkel, Inc., v. Circuit Court for Lincoln County, 141 Wis.2d 257, 414 N.W.2d 640, 643 (1987) (quoting State ex rel. Tarney v. McGormack, 99 Wis.2d 220, 298 N.W.2d 552 (1980)). See also State v. Chamley, 568 N.W.2d 607, 619 (S.D.1997) (noting that a criminal defendant’s submission of motions to a judge assigned to the case constituted a waiver of defendant’s right to seek substitution of judge); Hanno v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 67 Wash.App. 681, 838 P.2d 1144, 1145 (1992) (“A party has the right to one change of judge, without demonstrating actual prejudice, if he or she files an affidavit of prejudice before the court rules on any motion or issues that require the exercise of discretion.”); Adrian S. v. Superior Court of State, 190 Ariz. 517, 950 P.2d 593 (1997)(noting that even a stipulated submission to juvenile court may invoke a discretionary ruling that reveals the judge’s viewpoint on a significant aspect of *554the case; therefore, a stipulated submission may constitute a waiver of a juvenile’s right to change of judge); Juvenile in Mohave Cty. v. Superior Court in and for Cty. of Mohave, 189 Ariz. 515, 943 P.2d 875 (1997) (same).
Courts similarly have held that a party with knowledge of facts that would disqualify a judge must file the motion to disqualify at the first available opportunity. “One cannot know of improper judicial conduct, gamble on a favorable result by remaining silent as to that conduct, and then complain that he or she guessed wrong and does not like the outcome.” State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591, 610 (1998). See also Streater v. Woodward, 7 F.Supp.2d 1215 (N.D.Ala.1998); City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelop. Agency v. Hecht, 113 Nev. 644, 940 P.2d 134 (1997); Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn.App.1998); Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997).
The danger I foresee from the majority opinion is obvious. The basis for filing a Rule 51.05 motion will shift from protecting judicial integrity and fairness to promoting procedural manipulation and gamesmanship. In any case in which a preliminary matter is ruled within the Rule 51.05 time period, the losing side will inevitably disqualify the disappointing judge in hopes of a more favorable successor. Perhaps attorneys will even attempt to obtain “test” rulings very early in the litigation to discover a judge’s inclination. Perhaps, they even will fear a malpractice claim if they do not! Instead of promoting the fair, prompt, and efficient resolution of claims, we will have created a system in which judges are disqualified merely because they must rule in favor of one party and against another and in which preliminary matters must be relitigated and relit-igated until all parties have exhausted their Rule 51.05 rights. Lawsuits will become more time consuming and more expensive for all concerned. Worst of all, we will have created an image of justice that varies from judge to judge instead of one based upon the objective application of legal principles. “Peek and run” will be bad law.
Accordingly, I would quash the order of mandamus.