Court Opinion

ID: 9626036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:59:50.439391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:50.042788
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I concur in the judgment and the majority’s analysis in Division 2, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion in Division 1 that Jones rescinded the contract by efforts to renegotiate the same *407and would hold that such efforts did not amount to a rescission. I also do not agree that Roller-Ice v. Skating Clubs of Ga., 192 Ga. App. 140 (384 SE2d 235) (1989) needs to be overruled or disapproved.
1. In Division 1, the majority concludes that Jones’ actions in renegotiating the contract adequately communicated his intent to rescind the contract on the basis of the alleged fraudulent representations regarding the finances of the golf course. “ ‘If a party to a contract seeks to avoid it on the ground of fraud . . ., he must, upon the discovery of the facts, at once announce his purpose and adhere to it.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 685 (5) (132 SE 442) (1926). While I agree with the majority that a party, upon learning of fraud, may rescind the contract and then seek to renegotiate the agreement, he must first clearly announce his intent to rescind the original agreement. In the absence of such a clear repudiation, renegotiation of the original contract will amount to an affirmance thereof. Because I do not believe that Roller-Ice stands for a different proposition, I do not think that it needs to be overruled or disapproved.
On the facts of this case, it does not appear that Jones clearly announced his repudiation of the original contract, but merely sought to renegotiate one term of the contract. If Jones had rescinded the entire contract by renegotiating a single term, as contended by the majority, then such term would be left standing alone with no related terms being of force and effect. The single renegotiated term must be supported by the related terms, and therefore, Jones clearly affirmed rather than rescinded such terms during renegotiation. Moreover, the trial court expressly found that Jones did not in fact rely on the allegedly false financial data in entering into the agreement. Accordingly, even if Jones attempted to rescind the contract based on fraudulent inducement, he had no grounds for doing so.
2. As I would hold that Jones failed to rescind the contract, I believe he is bound by the terms thereof and that it is necessary to consider the merits of his claim that the seller breached the contract by providing him with the false financial estimate.
Section 6 (p) of the contract provided that “[n]o representation or warranty of Seller . . . nor any written statement or certificate furnished ... to Purchaser pursuant hereto or in connection with the transactions contemplated herein, contains or will contain any untrue statement of a material fact.” Jones contends that Cartee breached this provision of the contract by providing an estimate of income and expenses which did not accurately reflect the golf course’s finances.
However, the trial court found that Jones did not rely on the estimate and had indeed been repeatedly informed prior to entering into the agreement that the estimate was not correct and should not be *408relied upon. Section 10 of the agreement provides that the seller’s representations regarding the accuracy of documents provided in connection with the transaction are waivable by the purchaser. By entering into the agreement with knowledge of the unreliability of the estimate, Jones clearly waived any right to claim breach based upon the inaccuracy of such document. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found against Jones on his breach of contract claim.
Decided July 16, 1997.
Andrew & Threlkeld, Reid A. Threlkeld, for appellant.
Joseph M. Hall, for appellees.
3. With respect to Jones’ claim for fraud, I agree with the majority’s analysis in Division 2 that Jones is not entitled to recover.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews, Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Pope join in this special concurrence.