Court Opinion

ID: 9661483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:40:05.953042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:29.034528
License: Public Domain

Gordon J.
(dissenting). Wisconsin is dedicated to the principle of liberal construction of pleadings. Sec. 263.27, Stats.; Merchandising Corp. v. Marine Nat. Exchange Bank (1960), 12 Wis. (2d) 79, 83, 106 N. W. (2d) 317; Boek v. Wagner (1957), 1 Wis. (2d) 337, 342, 83 N. W. (2d) 916; 2 Callaghan’s, Bryant, Wisconsin Pleading and Practice (3d ed.), pp. 298, 299, sec. 19.06; see Page, Application of the Derogation Rule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1955 Wisconsin Law Review, 91, 100,101.
*132It seems to me consistent with the legislative requirements of sec. 66.05 (3), Stats., that one can “apply to the circuit court for an order” by means of a summons and complaint so long as the demand of the complaint requests the relief contemplated by the statute. This is precisely what the plaintiff did when, in his complaint, he demanded that an order be issued restraining the razing of his building. The summons and complaint were served within the thirty days required by sec. 66.05 (3).
The statute also requires that the court hear such matter within twenty days. This must be construed to be directory and not mandatory, since the legislature does not have the power to establish a circuit court’s agenda. See John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck (1932), 208 Wis. 650, 660, 242 N. W. 576; Anno. 168 A. L. R. 1125. The twenty-day requirement is merely an expression by the legislature that the courts should hear such matters promptly. As so construed, the circuit court could give swift resolution of the plaintiff’s demand, all consistent with the spirit of the statute.
The absence of legislative power to prescribe the courts’ order of business is clearly asserted in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Long (1926), 122 Okla. 86, 89, 251 Pac. 486, 489, where the court struck down a statutory requirement that the district court must try a certain type of case within ten days after the answer. The court said:
“No one will deny that the legislative arm of the government has the power to alter and regulate the procedure in both law and equity matters, but for it to attempt to compel the courts to give a hearing to a particular litigant at a particular time, to the absolute exclusion of others who may have an equal claim upon its attention, strikes a blow at the very foundation of constitutional government. The right to control its order of business and to so conduct the same that the rights of all litigants may properly be safeguarded has always been recognized as inherent in courts, . . .”
*133It is my belief that the twenty-day provision in sec. 66.05 (3), Stats., adds no weight to the contention that a motion must be brought to qualify under the statute.
In sec. 260.03, Stats., an action is defined as a proceeding in which a party prosecutes another for (among other things) the “prevention of a wrong.” Since the plaintiff sought to prevent a wrong, it was appropriate for him to proceed with a summons and complaint.
In my opinion, the legislative requirement that anyone affected by an order to raze a building should apply to the circuit court for an order of restraint is reasonably met by the service of a complaint which specifically demands such judicial relief. The legislature did not require in express language any specific mode for such application, and I find no persuasive reason for this court’s precluding counsel’s use of a summons and complaint.