Court Opinion

ID: 9621555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:00:19.574496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:05.616478
License: Public Domain

Judge Greene
concurring.
I agree with the majority the Full Commission did not err in its award to plaintiff made pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31(24). I, *725however, write separately simply to clarify the test for determining whether an organ or body part is “important” under section 97-31(24).
Section 97-31(24) provides:
In case of the loss of or permanent injury to any important external or internal organ or part of the body for which no compensation is payable under any other subdivision of this section, the Industrial Commission may award proper and equitable compensation not to exceed twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
N.C.G.S. § 97-31(24) (1999) (emphasis added). An organ or body part is “important,” within the meaning of section 97-31(24), if it has some significant value to the body of the employee. See Porterfield v. RPC Corp., 47 N.C. App. 140, 143, 266 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1980); The American Heritage College Dictionary 682 (3d ed. 1993). Whether the organ or body part is “important” presents a question of law, see In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (determination requiring exercise of judgment or application of legal principles is conclusion of law), which must be supported by findings of fact that the organ or body part has some significant value to the body of the employee, see id. (determination reached through logical reasoning from evidentiary facts is finding of fact).
In this case, defendant-employer has assigned error to the award made by the Full Commission pursuant to section 97-31(24) for several organs and body parts. The Full Commission made findings of fact regarding the significant value of each of these organs and body parts to plaintiffs body. These findings of fact, which are supported by competent evidence, support the Full Commission’s conclusion of law1 these organs and body parts are “important” under section 97-31(24). See Lineback v. Wake County Board of Commissioners, 126 N.C. App. 678, 680, 486 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1997) (appellate review of decision of Industrial Commission is limited to whether the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and whether the Commission’s conclusions of law are supported by those findings of fact).

. Although this conclusion is contained in the Full Commission’s findings of fact, it is more properly labeled a conclusion of law. See State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Eddleman, 320 N.C. 344, 352, 358 S.E.2d 339, 346 (1987) (mislabeling of findings of fact and conclusions of law not fatal to opinion and award).