Court Opinion

ID: 9832808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:13:00.324555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:53.123752
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing. .
Appellee earnestly insists that issues, of fact were raised by the evidence on the question of payment. We have again reviewed the entire statement of facts'in an effort to discover whether any evidence is contained therein raising a fact issue, and such study has confirmed us in the belief that a correct conclusion was announced in the original opinion. Appellee admitted the execution of the note for $720. There was no question as to the amount of payments made by him thereon. The only fact issue on the question of payment was whether Shaffer had received all the credits due him on sales made by him. Appellee’s testimony on cross-examination with reference to the agreement had between him and the appellant’s manager was as follows:
“No; he told'me in that conversation that Shaffer had something over $400 commission due, if the notes representing the sales made by Shaffer were paid. • * * I do not know whether any notes were ever paid or not that Shaffer took for the Hall Music Company. I knew nothing of the repossession of the pianos ■ or anything Shaffer sold.”
The burden was upon appellee, who had pleaded payment, to offer some evidence thereof. Not one scintilla of evidence was offered by him to show or tend to show that Shaffer did not receive ali commissions coming to him, but it is insisted by appellee that, since the witnesses for appellant who testified to the fact that Shaffer did receive all credits coming to him were interested witnesses, their testimony presented only, fact issues, and the jury was authorized to resolve such fact issues against appellant. While it is true that testimony of interested witnesses presents only a fact issue, yet that rule cannot be extended so as to convert such testimony ' into positive testimony . directly contrary thereto. To illustrate, suppose A should sue B for damages caused by B’s alleged negligence. A’s testimony fails to raise any issue as to B’s negligence, and B takes the stand and denies any acts of negligence. Such denial would not have the effect of furnishing positive evidence of his negligence.
 It is again insisted that the fact that one of the sheets of the books offered shows to have had an erasure made at the top of it raises an issue of fact as to whether Shaffer got. all the credits to which he was entitled. It is sought to convert that circumstance into positive evidence for appellee. This ques*627tion is decided adversely to appellee’s contention in the familiar ease of Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574, 44 S. W. 1059. Doubtless no other opinion by Justice Denman has been quoted and followed so many times as this one, and the rule there announced that mere surmises and suspicions do not constitute any evidence has become the established rule of law in our state. Appellant’s books disclosed the names of each person to whom Shaffer had .sold pianos and other musical instruments, and appellee could have brought to the court some evidence, if any existed, that some one of these purchasers paid appellant some money, or other thing of value, on his indebtedness, in which event Shaffer would have been entitled ito some credits. This ap-pellee did not do, but asks this court to uphold a finding of payment based upon mere surmises and suspicions with not one scintilla of positive testimony in support thereof. "We cannot consent for a judgment relieving one from the payment of his obligations represented by his promissory note to stand upon that character of testimony.
The appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.