Court Opinion

ID: 9916716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 16:00:31.628303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:50.781997
License: Public Domain

22-3193-cv
Lipsett v. Popular Bank

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                         SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND
IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR
AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

      At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 10th day of January, two thousand twenty-four.

         PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,
                          RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
                          MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
                                  Circuit Judges.
         ------------------------------------------------------------------
         FRANKIE LIPSETT, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF
         AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

                          Plaintiff-Appellee,

                   v.                                                         No. 22-3193-cv

         POPULAR BANK,

                          Defendant-Appellant. *
         ------------------------------------------------------------------

*
    The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
      FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:                      MICHAEL Y. KIEVAL, Weiner
                                                    Brodsky Kider PC,
                                                    Washington, DC

      FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:                       SUE JUNG NAM (Sophia Goren
                                                    Gold, Kaliel Gold PLLC,
                                                    Washington, DC, on the brief),
                                                    Reese LLP, New York, NY

      Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Victor Marrero, Judge).

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the order of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

      Defendant Popular Bank (or the “Bank”) appeals from a December 9, 2022

order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Marrero, J.) denying its motion to compel arbitration of claims filed by Plaintiff-

Appellee Frankie Lipsett. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to

explain our decision to affirm.

      “We review a district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration de

novo.” Zachman v. Hudson Valley Fed. Credit Union, 49 F.4th 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2022).

“The threshold question of whether the parties indeed agreed to arbitrate is

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determined by state contract law principles.” Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834

F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 2016). Here, the parties agree that New York law applies.

      In holding that Lipsett was not required to arbitrate his dispute with

Popular Bank, the District Court focused primarily on Lipsett’s inability to opt

out of arbitration. We need not address this issue, however. Instead, we affirm

on the sole basis that Lipsett did not receive sufficiently clear notice that he was

bound by the arbitration provision at issue in this case, as required under New

York law. We are “free to affirm an appealed decision on any ground which

finds support in the record, regardless of the ground upon which the trial court

relied.” McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks

omitted). We do so here.

      “It is a basic tenet of contract law that, in order to be binding, a contract

requires a meeting of the minds and a manifestation of mutual assent.” Starke v.

SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 288 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).

Under New York law, the “manifestation of mutual assent must be sufficiently

definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all

material terms.” Id. at 289. “Impenetrable vagueness and uncertainty will not

do.” Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109 (1981).

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Where the requested assent is largely passive, courts focus on whether the terms

were “reasonably communicated to the user.” Starke, 913 F.3d at 289 (quotation

marks omitted). The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the initial burden

of demonstrating the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Zachman, 49 F.4th at

101‒02.

      Lipsett opened his account in 2004 under terms and conditions that did not

include an agreement to arbitrate. The Bank contends that Lipsett is required to

arbitrate under the Bank’s 2008, 2013‒14, and 2021 updates to its account terms

and conditions, all of which include an arbitration provision. But the Bank

conceded at oral argument that it produced evidence demonstrating that, of

these documents, Lipsett was mailed only the 2013‒14 Agreement, along with an

attached notice letter (the “2014 Notice”). Accordingly, only the 2013-14

documents can give rise to a contract to arbitrate in this case.

      It is true that no evidence was presented that Lipsett read the 2013‒14

materials. But we have held that where an offeree lacks “actual notice of certain

contract terms, he is nevertheless bound by such terms if he is on inquiry notice

of them and assents to them through conduct that a reasonable person would

understand to constitute assent.” Starke, 913 F.3d at 289. Whether an individual

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is on inquiry notice “turns on whether the contract terms were presented to the

offeree in a clear and conspicuous way,” id., taking into account the “totality of

the circumstances,” id. at 297.

      We conclude that, for an existing customer in Lipsett’s circumstances, the

2014 Notice and the 2013‒14 Agreement’s arbitration provisions are insufficiently

clear or conspicuous to represent a “definite offer” to arbitrate this dispute.

Express Indus. & Terminal Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Transp., 93 N.Y.2d 584, 589

(1999); see Starke, 913 F.3d at 289. While the 2014 Notice draws attention to the

arbitration provision, it misleadingly states that there “continues to be a

Mandatory Arbitration Provision.” Joint App’x 159 (emphasis added). This

statement signals to a reasonable customer like Lipsett, who was not previously

informed of the arbitration provision or consented to arbitration and therefore

not bound by any previous iteration of the arbitration provision, that it does not

apply to him and that his agreement with the Bank remained effectively

unchanged. See Express Indus. & Terminal Corp., 93 N.Y.2d at 589 (requiring an

“objective meeting of the minds” before finding a binding and enforceable

contract). The 2014 Notice renders the arbitration provision less conspicuous. See

Starke, 913 F.3d at 289.

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      The 2014 Notice also fails to clearly notify Lipsett about the terms on

which he could accept or decline the arbitration provision. The 2014 Notice

provides only one avenue for Lipsett to reject the updates included in the 2013‒

14 Agreement: by rejecting the agreement in its entirety by means of closing his

account and withdrawing his funds from the Bank within sixty days. According

to the 2014 Notice, Lipsett would be considered to have accepted the changes if

he used his account after five days from the date of the notice. These terms differ

significantly from the language of the 2013‒14 Agreement, which provides that if

Lipsett is an “existing customer” asked to “enter into a new deposit agreement,”

he would be able to reject the arbitration provision without having to close his

bank account. Joint App’x 167. The text of the 2013‒14 Agreement does not

suggest that Lipsett would be bound by the arbitration provision if he used his

account more than five days after receiving the agreement.

      Lastly, the 2014 Notice does not clearly state whether the 2013‒14

Agreement was an entirely “new” deposit agreement or merely one that

amended Lipsett’s prior agreements. The 2014 Notice states both that the

enclosed agreement “replace[d]” prior agreements and that the 2013‒14

Agreement is an “Amended Account Agreement,” which merely includes

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“changes” and “[m]odifications,” rather than a new agreement. Joint App’x 159.

This ambiguity is reinforced by the fact that the Bank argues that its 2021

Agreement, which contains a near-identical arbitration opt-out provision, was

not a new deposit agreement, while maintaining that the 2013‒14 Agreement

provided to Lipsett was a new agreement. A reasonable customer would not be

sufficiently aware of which of these opt-out provisions governs.

      In sum, the specific language of the 2013-14 materials does not permit

existing accountholders like Lipsett to clearly understand their options for

rejecting arbitration. Under the totality of the circumstances contained in this

record, therefore, we conclude that Lipsett has not assented to mandatory

arbitration under New York law. This analysis may not be the same for

individuals who, unlike Lipsett, had received notice of Popular Bank’s account

changes and previously consented to arbitrate.

      We have considered Popular Bank’s remaining arguments and conclude

that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District

Court is AFFIRMED.

                                      FOR THE COURT:
                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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