Court Opinion

ID: 9688649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:59:26.863255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:40.917937
License: Public Domain

FAULKNER, Justice
(dissenting in Part II of the opinion).
At the outset it may appear to the reader of this opinion that it is somewhat peculiar for me to be writing the majority opinion on one issue, while at the same time writing the dissenting opinion as to the other issue. This calls for an explanation. The case was originally assigned to me for preparation of the opinion of the court. The majority of the court agreed with my views on the minimal due process issue. Likewise, a majority of the court disagreed with my view on the issue involving the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices.
Even though the probation officer referred to Armstrong’s managing a place of ill repute, and having been found guilty of selling beer on Sunday in violation of law, two seemingly valid reasons for revoking probation, it is obvious the probation officer was concerned only with the robbery and kidnaping charges. His recommendation is, “If testimony is offered implicating Armstrong in the robbery and kidnaping of Mr. and Mrs. Lewis Faucett, it is my recommendation that his probation be revoked.” As noted above, the only testimony implicating Armstrong in the crimes came from accomplices.
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that while a felony conviction cannot be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, probation may be revoked based upon such testimony. I do not agree with this conclusion. I am of the opinion that the “reasonable satisfaction from the evidence” standard applied by a trial judge in a revocation hearing would not include uncorroborated testimony of accomplices. That standard would at least be equal to evidence of probable cause required to bind a person over to the grand jury.
In State v. Smith, 138 Ala. 111, 35 So. 42 (1902), Chief Justice McClellan wrote to the question whether the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may be sufficient to show probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the party under inquiry is guilty thereof. The Chief Justice stated:
“Can there be said to be even probable cause shown in any case by testimony which the law expressly and positively *107declares to be insufficient to support a conviction? We think not. The whole theory of holding accused persons to the grand jury is that the evidence before the examining magistrate or the judge on habeas corpus is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt by a petit jury when he shall be indicted and brought to the bar of the court. When there is not such evidence, it is not the contemplation of the law that the accused shall be held. To hold him would be a vain and useless thing, involving his incarceration not as a punishment for crime, and not really to the end that he should be tried for a crime charged of his probable guilt of which there is evidence to prove, but at. the best upon a mere speculation that evidence may be found to corroborate that of the accomplice-.”
I would not be as unkind to Smith as Mr. Justice Bloodworth. If Smith is going to be buried it should have a decent funeral — maybe not a requiem mass — but at least, a few kind words before it is lowered in a grave.
It does not appear that Armstrong has ever been tried for the charges in the indictment. The position of the State in this case may be as that described in Morrissey by Chief Justice Burger speaking of revocation of parole:
“Sometimes revocation occurs when the parolee is accused of another crime; it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State.”
Because of the danger that accomplice’s testimony may be polluted, it is my opinion that such testimony must be corroborated in order to warrant revocation of probation when that is the sole basis of revocation. Here it appears that the probationer was implicated in a crime only on the accomplices’ testimony, which was not corroborated.
I respectfully dissent to the ruling of the court as to Issue II.