Court Opinion

ID: 9396812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:08:23.529125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.889439
License: Public Domain

J-S10026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 STEVEN R. MILLER                          :
                                           :
                     Appellant             :    No. 2173 EDA 2021

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 6, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0011245-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                FILED MAY 23, 2023

      Steven R. Miller appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post-

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After review, we

affirm.

      On June 10, 2013, Miller shot and killed Maurice Kimble following an

argument at a restaurant/bar in the Northern Liberties section of Philadelphia.

At trial, Miller took the stand and testified that he shot Kimble in self-defense,

while Kimble was reaching for a gun concealed under his shirt. Several

eyewitnesses, however, testified otherwise.      On October 28, 2013, a jury

convicted Miller of third-degree murder, possessing an instrument of crime,

carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on the public

streets of Philadelphia. The trial court sentenced Miller to 23½ to 47 years’

imprisonment.      Following sentencing, Miller filed a post-sentence motion,
J-S10026-23

which was denied by operation of law. This Court affirmed on direct appeal,

see Commonwealth v. Miller, 1626 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 5,

2015) (unpublished memorandum decision), and the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 494 EAL

2015 (Pa. filed Feb. 1, 2016). Miller did not seek review in the United States

Supreme Court. At trial, sentencing, and on direct appeal, Miller was

represented by Samuel C. Stretton, Esquire.

      On December 20, 2016, Miller, represented by Cheryl J. Sturm, Esquire,

filed a timely PCRA petition and, on December 22, 2017, Miller filed an

amended petition, alleging after-discovered evidence that would demonstrate

the victim, Kimble, had a firearm on the night of the altercation.             The

Honorable Steven R. Geroff granted an evidentiary hearing, which was held

on May 10, 2018, May14, 2018, and December 7, 2018.

      At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel, Attorney Stretton, testified regarding

an alleged conversation he had with Gary Silver, Esquire, the attorney

representing prosecution witness Wiair Hand, who had been charged with

illegal possession of a firearm on the night of the murder.           This Court

summarized the salient testimony as follows:

      According to trial counsel, Attorney Silver indicated that his client,
      Hand, lied when he testified at [Miller’s] trial that he was in
      possession of [Jamal] Chapman’s handgun before the shooting
      and that the victim[, Maurice Ronnie Kimble,] was unarmed when
      he was shot. Instead, trial counsel testified that Attorney Silver
      shared that Hand actually possessed the victim’s handgun.
      However, at the PCRA hearing, trial counsel became confused
      when initially reporting this statement. Trial counsel stated that
      “Mr. Silver told me that his client[, Hand] had misled the court

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       and that it was his gun. The client, Mr. Hand’s gun. Sorry.” [N.T.]
       PCRA Hearing, 5/10/18, at 43-44. Trial counsel indicated that
       Attorney Silver shared that Hand had admitted that he [re]moved
       the handgun from the victim’s body after [Miller] shot the victim
       and [Hand] disposed of the firearm in some weeds to make it look
       like the victim was unarmed at the time of the shooting.[1]

       Acknowledging that he had become confused on Hand’s alleged
       statement to Attorney Silver, trial counsel explained that he has
       litigated almost 1,000 cases since [Miller’s] trial and he does not
       remember names well. Trial counsel candidly admitted that he
       would get names “mixed up in [his] head sometimes” and
       conceded that there was a possibility that his cases could “get
       conflated over the years.” Id. at 16, 44-45.

       At the time of [Miller’s] trial, trial counsel believed he was bound
       by attorney-client privilege to keep Attorney Silver’s statement
       confidential, as trial counsel had served as Attorney Silver’s
       counsel in an unrelated matter years before this case. However,
       trial counsel revealed Attorney Silver’s communication to assist
       [Miller] in seeking collateral relief as he now takes a “different
       position” on this ethical question. Id. at 43-44, 79-80, 113.

       [Miller] presented the testimony of Attorney Silver, who denied
       telling trial counsel that Hand picked up the victim’s firearm and
       disposed of it after the shooting. Attorney Silver adamantly
       claimed he did not make this statement, indicating[,] “I would
       remember that.” Id. at 109-10.

       In his PCRA petition, [Miller] claimed trial counsel was not bound
       by the attorney-client privilege and could have used Attorney
       Silver’s statement to show that a witness had committed perjury
       at [Miller’s] murder trial. As noted above, [Miller] characterized
       his claim in terms of “new evidence” that could be presented at a
       new trial and did not claim trial counsel was ineffective in failing
____________________________________________

1 At trial, Hand testified that, while sitting in the dining area of the restaurant,
he did not extract or display the revolver to anyone. Nor did the victim ever
have that gun in his possession that night. See N.T. Trial, 10/23/13, at
12. Hand further testified that, when he saw Miller lift up his shirt and reveal
his gun, Hand ran, at which time he still had the revolver with him. Id. Hand
testified that before taking the gun out and discarding it in the weeds, he—
from the time they were seated at the table, throughout walking through the
breezeway and seeing Miller reveal his gun—did not display his gun in any
way, shape, or form. Id. at 14.

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      to reveal this testimony. [Miller’s] PCRA counsel indicated that
      she had intended to call [] Hand as a witness at the evidentiary
      hearing but she had difficulty locating him even after hiring a
      private investigator. Although PCRA counsel never found Hand’s
      address, she noted that she was able to reach him on a phone
      number provided by Attorney Silver. Hand told PCRA counsel that
      he did “not wish to be involved.” Id. at 4-5.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 3358 EDA 2018, 74 EDA 2019,             at 9-11, (Pa.

Super. filed Apr. 17, 2020) (unpublished memorandum decision).

      After the PCRA hearing, Judge Geroff stated that he believed trial

counsel, Attorney Stretton, was “caught in an ethical conflict because of his

representation years before of the attorney who represented [] Hand.” N.T.

PCRA Hearing, 12/7/18, at 5.    Judge Geroff clarified, however, that he was

not accusing Attorney Silver “of lying.”   Id.   Instead, he was finding that

when trial counsel explained what happened he believed his testimony and “at

that point, he had—when all of that had developed at trial, he had an

obligation to the client he was representing in a homicide case; that was more

important than the obligation he had to his former client, [Attorney] Silver.”

Id. at 5-6.

      Judge Geroff granted Miller a new trial, finding trial counsel was

ineffective. The Commonwealth appealed and Miller cross-appealed.          On

appeal, this Court disagreed with Judge Geroff’s finding of ineffectiveness,

vacated the order granting a new trial, and remanded for consideration of

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Miller’s four remaining claims that Judge Geroff had summarily denied.2 We

determined that the record established that Attorney Silver would not have

been willing to testify for the defense because he denied that he told trial

counsel that Hand had committed perjury at Miller’s trial. See Miller, supra

at 16 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wantz, 84 A.3d 324, 331 (Pa Super.

2014) (“To satisfy the prejudice prong of this test when raising a claim of

ineffectiveness for the failure to call a potential witness at trial, our Supreme

court has instructed that the PCRA petitioner must established that: (1) the

witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense; (3)

____________________________________________

2   Those claims are:

        I.    Whether [Miller] was denied effective assistance of counsel
        arising from a failure to investigate and find Anthony Bright?

        II.   Whether [Miller] was denied effective assistance of counsel
        arising from the failure to investigate and find [the victim's]
        criminal record?

        III. Whether [Miller] was denied effective assistance of counsel
        arising from the failure to investigate viewed cumulatively?

        IV.  Whether [Miller] was denied due process when the
        Commonwealth failed to correct the false testimony of Wiair
        Hand?

Commonwealth v. Miller, supra at 13 (citing Miller’s Brief on Cross-Appeal,
at 15-16). Specifically, our decision stated that on remand, the PCRA court
was to “review the four claims raised in [Miller’s] cross-appeal that were not
fully evaluated by Judge Geroff.” See Miller, supra at 18-19. The PCRA
court made no factual findings with respect to the remaining claims Miller had
raised in his PCRA petition, and simply stated at the hearing, “[I]f all I had to
decide were the other issues in the case, I would have denied the petition.”
N.T. PCRA Hearing, 12/7/18, at 3-4.

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counsel knew, or should have known, of the existence of the witness; (4) the

witness was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the

testimony of the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a

fair trial.”)) (emphasis added). Further, this Court emphasized that the PCRA

court failed to explain how trial counsel could have “used” Attorney Silver’s

statement to Miller’s advantage.

      Even if Attorney Silver was willing to testify for the defense, trial
      counsel could not ask Attorney Silver to testify to Hand’s out-of-
      court statement (which would constitute inadmissible hearsay),
      could not admit Hand’s prior inconsistent statement to Attorney
      Silver as substantive evidence, and would be limited to using the
      statement to impeach Hand.

Miller, supra at 16-17. On December 22, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court denied Miller’s petition for allowance of appeal.    Commonwealth v.

Miller, 223 EAL 2020 (Pa. filed Dec. 22, 2020).

      On April 18, 2021, Miller, through counsel, filed a “Brief on Remand,”

which the Honorable Scott DiClaudio reviewed as an amended PCRA petition.

On August 11, 2021, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the

petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 907. On August 17, 2021,

Miller filed a response to the Rule 907 notice, arguing the Rule 907 notice was

procedurally defective because “it does not appear to be the product of

independent judicial review.”   Miller’s Response to Rule 907 Notice, 8/17/21,

at 2. On October 6, 2021, the PCRA court denied Miller’s petition. The docket

indicates the PCRA petition was dismissed “due to [l]ack of [s]tanding.” See

Criminal Docket, CP-51-CR-0011245-2012, at 16.

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        Miller filed this timely appeal.       Both Miller and the PCRA court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3           Miller raises the following issues for our

review:

              1. Whether the PCRA court’s decision acting on the
                 Superior Court’s remand order is procedurally
                 deficient because it does not appear to be the product
                 of independent judicial review of the totality of the
                 evidence?

              2. Whether the PCRA court’s decision is defective
                 because it did not decide all of the issues before the
                 court on remand?

              3. Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
                 for failing to investigate, find, and introduce into
                 evidence the decedent’s conviction for armed robbery
                 based on a misunderstanding of the law set forth in
                 [Commonwealth v.] Amos[, 284 A.2d 748 (Pa.
                 1971)]?

              4. Whether the PCRA court erred when it did not find that
                 Miller was denied due process when the prosecution
                 failed to correct the false testimony of Wiari Hand?

              5. Whether the PCRA court erred in not finding a
                 Brady[4] violation based on the failure on the part of
                 the prosecution to correct the false testimony of Wiari
                 Hand?

              6. Whether the PCRA court erred in not holding an
                 evidentiary hearing on the claim that trial counsel was
                 ineffective for failing to investigate, interview, and call
                 Anthony Bright as a defense witness?

Appellant’s Brief, at 2.

____________________________________________

3 Miller’s Rule 1925(b) statement consists of nineteen pages and reads more
like a brief than a Rule 1925(b) statement.

4   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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      We begin by noting our standard and scope of review:

      This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most favorable to
      the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review is limited to
      the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record and we
      do not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence
      of record and is free of legal error. Similarly, we grant great
      deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not
      disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record.
      However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.
      Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of
      review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Finally, we
      may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record
      supports it.

Commonwealth v. Dozier, 208 A.3d 1101, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      Miller’s first two claims challenge the PCRA court’s procedural disposition

on remand from this Court. Specifically, Miller claims in his first issue, as he

did in his response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice and again in his Rule

1925(b) statement, that the PCRA court’s decision is “procedurally deficient”

because it is not the product of independent judicial review and that the PCRA

court did not address the claims this Court required it to address on remand.

See Appellant’s Brief, at 2. See also supra n. 2.

      We note several concerns here. Foremost, Miller does not address his

first issue in the Argument section of his appellate brief. Instead, his first

argument is entitled “The Newly-Discovered Fact Issue,” and it does not

address the issues of “procedural deficiency” on remand. Miller, therefore,

has abandoned this claim on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); Commonwealth

v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding waiver where

appellant abandoned claim on appeal); Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d

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1276, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2006) (appellate court required to deem abandoned

those issues identified on appeal, but unsupported by argument in brief). To

further confuse matters, Miller conflates the issue of after-discovered

evidence, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2), with the issue of a newly-discovered

fact—an exception to the one-year time requirement for the filing of a PCRA

petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). See Appellant’s Brief, at 12.

There is no issue of PCRA timeliness here.           However, for the reasons

stated below, we do not find that any of these errors affected PCRA counsel’s

effectiveness, the PCRA court’s merits review, or this Court’s review.     Cf.

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021) (remand may be

proper in certain cases where ineffectiveness claims are raised on appeal in

first instance).

      Additionally, our review indicates at least three statements on the part

of the PCRA court that we are unable to reconcile.

      First, the PCRA court states: “By order dated August 11, 2021, the

parties were given notice of this court’s intent to dismiss the PCRA Petition

without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. No response to the notice

was filed.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Opinion, 7/25/22, at 2. This is incorrect.

      As noted above, Miller filed a comprehensive Rule 907 response on

August 17, 2021, within the required 20-day time period. In that response,

Miller argued that the Rule 907 notice was procedurally defective because “it

does not appear to be the product of independent judicial review.” See Miller’s

Response to Rule 907 Notice, 8/17/21, at 2.

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       Second, the PCRA court refers to findings in the record that this Court

is unable to locate. Here, the PCRA court provided the following Rule 907

notice:

       You are hereby advised that in twenty (20) days from the date of
       this NOTICE, your request for post[-]conviction relief will be
       denied/dismissed without further proceedings. No response to
       this Notice is required. If, however, you choose to respond, your
       response is due within twenty (20) calendar days of the above
       date. The reason for denial is as follows:

       _X_ (1) The Court has determined that the issues raised in the
       Amended Post Conviction Relief Act petition are without merit.

Rule 907 Notice, 8/11/21. As stated above, Miller objected to the “checklist”

form of the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice in his response to the Rule 907

notice. And, although the PCRA court states that it placed its reasons for

finding the claims in the PCRA meritless on the record on August 4, 2021,

prior to the August 11, 2021 dismissal, see Rule 1925 Opinion, supra at

12, our review of the record indicates only that a PCRA hearing was

scheduled for August 4, 2021, but never held. The docket entry for August

4, 2021 reads: “PCRA Continued for Formal Dismissal after 907 Notice[.]”

What followed was the court’s Rule 907 “checklist” notice on August 11, 2021,

and a subsequent order dismissing the PCRA petition on October 6, 2021.5

____________________________________________

5We are unable to locate this order in the record. It is listed in the criminal
docket at CP-51-CR-0011245-2012, at page 16, and the entry reads: “PCRA
Petition Dismissed due to Lack of Standing[.]” In his notice of appeal, Miller
does not attach a copy of an October 6, 2021 order and, instead, attaches a
copy of that docket sheet.

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      Third, PCRA court misconstrues our Supreme Court’s Bradley decision

with respect to Rule 907 “checklist” notices. In its opinion, the PCRA court

states that “[s]uch ‘checklist’ notices were not held to be insufficient by the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court until October 20, 2021,” subsequent to the

court’s August 11, 2021 Rule 907 notice. However, in Bradley, the Court

stated:

      [W]hile Rule 907 requires the PCRA court to provide the reasons
      for dismissal, often, as is the case here, a court may give only a
      cursory statement, including merely checking a form box
      indicating that the claims were “without merit,” with nothing
      more. Such a summary statement would challenge even a
      seasoned attorney to understand why a petition was being
      dismissed, let alone a pro se petitioner.

261 A.3d at 399. In a footnote, the Court emphasized: “Indeed, this check-

the-box    approach      is   impermissible      under    our   decision    in

Commonwealth v. Williams, 782 A.2d 517, 527 (Pa. 2001) (holding that

the PCRA court must provide “sufficiently specific reasons for the disposition

such that the potential for amendment may be reasonably evaluated by

counsel”).” Bradley, supra at 399 n. 15 (emphasis added).

      Despite these oversights, we find it unnecessary to remand for further

proceedings. Contrary to Miller’s assertion, Judge DiClaudio did comply with

this Court’s remand order and addressed, at length, the four issues Judge

Geroff summarily dismissed.    See supra n. 2.

      The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without a
      hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine
      issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
      to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose

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      would be served by further proceedings. To obtain a reversal of
      a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an
      appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of material
      fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to
      relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying
      a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted).   See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).         As the PCRA court's opinion

indicates, and our review of the record confirms, the PCRA court considered,

and correctly disposed of, each issue this Court ordered it to review on

remand.

      Miller first claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate and find putative witness Anthony Bright. He asserts Bright would

have testified that he arrived at the scene of the shooting just in time to see

Hand take the gun from the victim, supporting Miller’s self-defense claim.

      Trial counsel is presumed to be effective, and the appellant has the

burden of proving ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Howard, 749 A.2d

941, 946 (Pa. Super. 2000).

      To carry this burden, the appellant must plead and prove: (1) the
      underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis
      existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) he suffered
      prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice measured
      by whether there is a reasonable probability the result of the
      proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v.
      Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (employing ineffective
      assistance of counsel test from Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527
      A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987)). [] Additionally, counsel cannot be
      deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Finally,
      because a PCRA petitioner must establish all Pierce prongs to be
      entitled to relief, we are not required to analyze the elements of
      an ineffectiveness claim in any specific order; thus, if a claim fails

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      under any required element, we may dismiss the claim on that
      basis.

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (citations

modified); see also Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 380 (Pa. 2011)

(when evaluating ineffectiveness claims, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential).

      In order to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Pierce test when raising

a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call a potential witness at trial, a

PCRA petitioner must established that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness

was available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew, or should have

known, of the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify

for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness was so

prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial. Commonwealth v.

Wantz, 84 A.3d 324, 331 (Pa Super. 2014).

      First, even assuming the first three prongs were met, see Wantz,

supra, Miller suffered no prejudice as this proposed testimony would be

unlikely to change the outcome of the case. Seven witnesses testified that

they did not see the victim with a gun; two of those witnesses were servers

at the restaurant, and one was a patron, none of whom had any bias or motive

to lie. The jury found those witnesses credible. Second, even assuming this

proposed testimony by Bright is true, that does not establish the core of

Miller’s claim—that Miller saw the victim with a firearm. Bright did not witness

the shooting, and thus his proposed testimony would not have supported

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Miller’s claim that Miller feared for his life. We agree with Judge DiClaudio’s

assessment that this claim of ineffectiveness is meritless.

      Next, Miller claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate

and find the victim’s criminal record—in particular, a prior robbery conviction.

When self-defense is properly at issue, evidence of the victim’s prior

convictions involving aggression may be admitted, if probative, either (1) to

corroborate the defendant’s alleged knowledge of the victim’s violent

character, to prove that the defendant was in reasonable fear of danger, or

(2) as character/propensity evidence, as indirect evidence that the victim was,

in fact, the aggressor. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740-41

(Pa. 2012).

      Here, Miller presented no evidence that he knew of the victim’s prior

conviction. Miller and the victim did not know one another. Further, the

evidence established that the victim and his friends were leaving the

establishment when Miller followed them and made comments.                  Miller

admitted to being the first to display a firearm, and all other evidence indicated

that Miller was the aggressor. As a result, evidence of the victim’s prior record

would not have been admissible under Mouzon. Because his underlying claim

is meritless, trial counsel was not ineffective.    Pierce, supra.     See also

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010) (no prejudice from

counsel’s purportedly deficient performance unless reasonable probability that

verdict would have been different, and probability must be sufficient to

undermine confidence in outcome of proceedings).

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        In his third claim, Miller argues trial counsel’s failure to investigate

“cumulatively” amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.               This claim,

properly considered and disposed of by Judge DiClaudio on remand, was not

argued in Miller’s appellate brief.       Thus, this issue has been waived.        See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also McGill, supra; Love, supra.

        Finally,   Miller   claims   he   was      denied   due   process   when   the

Commonwealth failed to correct Hand’s alleged false testimony6 regarding

Hand’s prior record and that this was a Brady violation. Miller contends the

following testimony should have been corrected by the prosecution:

              Q: You pled guilty to violation of the Uniform Firearms Act,
              a handgun, the gun that was found in the weeds that day?

              A. Yes, sir.

              Q: Had you ever been arrested before that day?[7]

              A: No, sir.

N.T. Trial, 10/23/13, at 6-7. PCRA counsel provided the court with a docket

from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, demonstrating Hand had

been arrested and arraigned on 34 counts, including robbery and related

offenses. Arrest on those counts, however, did not occur until August 15,

____________________________________________

6 To clarify, this alleged perjured testimony does not refer to trial counsel’s
confused testimony regarding Attorney Silver’s statement about Hand lying
about whose firearm he possessed and threw into the weeds. See supra at
2-3. This Court has addressed this issue and it has been finally litigated.

7   “That day” refers to the date of the crime, June 10, 2013.

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2012, two months after the date of the instant offense, June 10, 2013, to

which the prosecutor’s question referred.

      Miller argues that Hand was “the crucial witness for the prosecution

because he testified that the [victim] was unarmed[,] thus contradicting []

Miller’s theory of self-defense[,]” and there was a “reasonable probability that

but for the perjury, [Miller] would not have been convicted.” Appellants Brief,

at 24-26. Miller cites to and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and

Haskell v. Superintendent, 866 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2017) to support this

claim.

      In Haskell, the Court held a prosecutor violates a defendant’s

constitutional rights when the prosecutor fails to correct witnesses’ testimony,

known by the prosecutor to be false, and there was “a reasonable likelihood

that [the] false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Id.

at 146, 152.

      In Napue, the witness, who had been serving a 199-year sentence for

the same murder for which the petitioner had been on trial, falsely testified

that the prosecutor did not offer the witness a reduction in sentence in

exchange for the witness’ testimony. 360 U.S. at 265.        There, the United

States Supreme Court determined that the failure of a prosecutor to correct

the testimony of the witness, which he knew to be false, denied the petitioner

due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States. Id. at 265, 271.

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      To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show:           (1) the

Commonwealth suppressed evidence either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the

evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was

material.   Commonwealth v. Chambers, 807 A.2d 872, 887 (Pa. 2002),

citing Brady, supra at 87. Evidence is favorable to the defendant where, “if

disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction

and acquittal.” Chambers, supra at 888. Further, “when the reliability of a

witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence, non-disclosure of

evidence effecting that witness’ credibility runs afoul of [Brady's] disclosure

requirement.” See Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265, 1272 (Pa.

1992).

      Here, Miller’s argument fails on several grounds.       First, as Judge

DiClaudio explained, Hand’s response to the prosecutor, that he had never

been arrested prior to “that day,” meaning June 13, 2012, was not false.

Though noting the interpretation may be subjective, the statement, in fact,

“was not false.” See Rule 1925(a) opinion, supra at 16. Further, Miller’s

statement that Hand was a critical witness for the prosecution misapprehends

the record. Hand was not an eyewitness. The eyewitnesses presented by the

Commonwealth—restaurant employees and patrons, as well as the victim’s

friends—testified that as the victim and his friends were leaving the

restaurant, Miller went after the victim, lifted his shirt to expose a handgun,

and then drew the weapon and fired at the victim twice, firing twice more after

the victim had fallen to the ground. See N.T. Trial, 10/23/13, at 9-11, 70-82,

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J-S10026-23

102-10, 117, 120, 162-64, 200-02, 218-20, 225-28. Moreover, the record

shows that Miller conceded that he was the aggressor, that he followed the

victim out of the restaurant, threw the murder weapon in a sewer, fled the

scene in a car, and then took a bus to Los Angeles the next morning upon

learning he was wanted for murder. Id. at 143-46, 168-76, 180-81. In sum,

not only has Miller failed to establish that Hand’s testimony was perjured,

Haskell, supra, but Miller’s argument that his conviction was achieved

through the use of materially false or perjured testimony is belied by the

overwhelming evidence of record. Thus, the PCRA court correctly determined

there was no Brady violation here.

     After our review of the record, we conclude the PCRA court properly

considered the remanded issues, and Miller’s claims to the contrary are

unfounded.    Further, we agree with the PCRA court’s determination that

Miller’s claims are meritless. The PCRA court’s determination is supported by

the evidence of record, and no legitimate purpose would be served by further

proceedings. Dozier, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order.

     Order affirmed.

      Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023

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