Court Opinion

ID: 9828234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:13:34.248734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:44.994303
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee presents a forceful motion and argument for rehearing. Our conclusion as to the legal effect of the extension of the notes in question must be upheld, we think, in obedience to the statutes and authorities cited in our original opinion. Nor do we feel .able to concur-in the view that the extension of the notes in controversy operated as a legal fraud on the homestead right' of the wife. In addition to the cited case of Jackson v. Bradshaw, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 30, 57 S. W. 878, relating to this subject, we venture to call attention to the fact that, generally speaking, the husband is given by our laws the management, control, and power of disposition of all community property, and that the homestead exemption-does not arise until after the payment of the purchase money. So far as pertinent, section 50 of article 16 of the Constitution provides that:
“The homestead of a family shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for the purchase money thereof, or a part of such purchase money,” etc.
It thus appears that there is no-foundation for a claim of the homestead exemption in eases where “the purchase money thereof or a part of such purchase money” has not been paid, as has been frequently so decided. Clements v. Lacy, 51 Tex. 150; De Bruhl v. Maas, 54 Tex. 464; Roy v. Clarke, 75 Tex. 28, 12 S. W. 845. It may be said that in the cases cited it does not appear that the purchase-money notes were barred by limitation, but we think this distinction is immaterial under the facts of this case, for while the original purchase-money notes were barred by limitation, the debt evidenced thereby still existed, and the evidences thereof subject to effective restoration by the express terms of articles 5694 and 5695, Y. S. Statutes. This when done, under the circumstances of this case, revitalized the debt, regardless of the fact so strongly urged that the renewal in the present case was not made within the twelve months specified in article 5695. This must be true, we think, under the terms of article 5522, Rev. Statutes of 1925, stating that the renewal may be made at “any time so long as it does not prejudice the rights of lienholders or purchasers, subsequent to- the date such lien became barred,” etc. We can but think that the construction *496suggested is clearly supported in the cases of Amonette v. Taylor (Tex. Civ. App.) 244 S. W. 238, and Watson v. Bank (Tex. Com. App.) 285 S. W. 1050, both cited in our original opinion, as well as by the constitutional principles relating to the freedom of contract. If so, there is no other theory presented in the pleadings or in the evidence upon which ap-pellee’s recovery can be properly' based, for the renewal note was certainly not barred by the four years’ statute of limitation pleaded as against the original purchase-money notes, and a careful reading of appellee’s pleading, which we have again reviewed, discloses that neither the five nor ten years’ statute of limitation, under and by virtue of which title might be acquired, has been pleaded.
While the allegations and evidence show that the land in controversy was occupied by appellee and her deceased husband ten years or more after the bar of the original purchase-money notes and before the execution of the renewal note, yet a necessary element of recovery under the statutes of limitation must be “adverse possession.” See articles 5509 and 5510, Rev. Statutes of 1925,- and article 5515 of the statutes provides that:
“ ‘Adverse possession’ is an actual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued under a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another.”
Neither the appellee’s pleadings nor the evidence discloses that during the limitation period the possession of herself and husband was hostile to the claim of appellant or of her assignor. For aught that appears in either pleading or proof, the delay in presenting the claim for the original purchase money was a matter of grace, by virtue of which appellee and her husband were enabled to occupy the land rent free and without payment of either the principal or interest for many years. However, regardless of this suggestion, as already noted, appellee did not plead either the five or ten years’ statute of limitation, and the statute (article 5540, Rev. Statutes of 1925) declares that:
“The law of limitation shall not he available in any suit unless it be specifically set forth by the party who in bis answer invokes it as a defense.”
This article of the statute is not limited in its application to a defendant, but applies as well to a plaintiff claiming title through the operation of the statutes of limitation. Erp v. Tillman, 103 Tex. 574, 131 S. W. 1057; Mayers v. Paxton, 78 Tex. 196, 14 S. W. 568; Molino v. Benavides, 94 Tex. 415, 60 S. W. 875.
Without further discussion, we think the motion for rehearing must be overruled, and it is so ordered.