Court Opinion

ID: 2964661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:04.42442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:53.883921
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2221

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                          LAMAR R. BOOTH, A/K/A LAMAN BOOTH,
                        A/K/A LAMAR COEVAN, A/K/A LAMAR GOVAN,
                       A/K/A LAMAR BARTON, A/K/A LOMAR BARTON,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________
                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                                 ____________________

            Diana  L.  Maldonado,  Federal  Defender  Office,  on  brief   for
            ____________________
        appellant.
            Donald K.  Stern, United  States Attorney, and  Gary S.  Katzmann,
            ________________                                _________________
        Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                    April 10, 1997
                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.    Appellant appeals from his  conviction as
                 __________

            a felon in possession of a firearm.  He now contends that the

            jury instructions  defining constructive possession  may have

            allowed the jury to convict him even if he did  not know that

            a  gun was  present within  an area  over which  he exercised

            dominion and control.   The instructions in this case  do not

            warrant  reversal, but  we write  for the  benefit  of future

            cases  to  pinpoint  a  correctable ambiguity  in  previously

            approved language.

                 Appellant,  a convicted  felon,  was  apprehended  while

            driving alone in a stolen  car.  A knapsack was on  the front

            passenger  seat,  and it  contained,  among  other things,  a

            loaded gun and a  camera.  Appellant denied ownership  of the

            knapsack  and its  contents,  but the  film  from the  camera

            subsequently  revealed  photos of  appellant.   Appellant was

            indicted on counts including felon in possession of a firearm

            under 18 U.S.C.    922(g), and,  after a  jury trial, he  was

            convicted on that count.

                 The   district  court   instructed  the   jury   on  the

            requirement of  "knowing" possession as follows.   First, the

            jury  was told twice that "the government must prove beyond a

            reasonable doubt . . . that the defendant knowingly possessed

            a firearm . . . ."  Next, "knowingly" was defined as:

                      An act  is done  knowingly if it  is done
                      voluntarily  and  intentionally  and  not
                      because of mistake or accident.  I'll say
                      that again.  An  act is done knowingly if

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                      it is done voluntarily  and intentionally
                      and not  because of mistake  or accident.
                      In  order for  the government  to satisfy
                      this  element, it  must  prove  beyond  a
                      reasonable doubt that the  defendant knew
                      he was possessing a firearm . . . .

            And then "possession" was defined as:

                      The   law   recognizes   two   kinds   of
                      possession,    actual   possession    and
                      constructive possession. . . .  Even when
                      a  person  does not  actually  possess an
                      object,   he   may  be   in  constructive
                      possession    of   it.       Constructive
                      possession exists when a person knowingly
                      has the  power  and the  intention  at  a
                      given  time  of  exercising dominion  and
                      control over  an object or  over the area
                                              _________________
                      in which the object  is located.  The law
                      _______________________________
                      recognizes no  distinction between actual
                      and constructive  possession, either form
                      of possession is sufficient.   Possession
                      of an object may be established by either
                      direct  evidence   or  by  circumstantial
                      evidence.   It is not  necessary to prove
                      ownership  of  the  object,  but   it  is
                      necessary  for  the  government to  prove
                      beyond a reasonable  doubt [the]  knowing
                      possession of [the] object. 

            (emphasis added)  Finally, the  jury also was instructed that

            "the  government must prove beyond  a reasonable doubt  . . .

            that  the defendant's knowing possession of the firearm . . .

            was in or affecting commerce." 

                 Thus, in  instructing the jury, the  district court said

            that  constructive possession exists when a person "knowingly

            has the power and the intention at a given time of exercising

            dominion and control over an object or over the area in which
                                                _________________________

            the object is located."   Appellant complains belatedly about
            _____________________

            the italicized portion  of the quoted language  on the ground

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            that  it might  allow the  jury to  convict if  the defendant

            controlled  the area  but did  not know  that the  weapon was

            there.

                 Although  the  language  in  question is  more  or  less

            consistent with United  States v. Wight, 968  F.2d 1393, 1398
                            ______________    _____

            (1st   Cir.  1992),   it   is  probably   susceptible  to   a

            misinterpretation.  The underlying  thought, which is correct

            but could be more precisely  conveyed, is that knowledge  can

            be inferred in some  circumstances from control of the  area.

            See  United States  v. Lochan,  674 F.2d  960, 966  (1st Cir.
            ___  _____________     ______

            1982).  Wight, despite its literal language, should no longer
                    _____

            be  read as  an  endorsement of  the above-quoted  italicized

            language  as  an   independent  definition  of   constructive

            possession.    There is  nothing  wrong  with explaining  the

            Lochan  inference where  appropriate, and  we do  not suggest
            ______

            that the Wight language where it has been used in the past is
                     _____

            necessarily reversible error, taking the charge as a whole. 

                 In  this case the jury was told several times that proof

            of "knowing"  possession was  required; the evidence  linking

            appellant  to the gun was substantial; and, given the absence

            of a contemporaneous objection, the italicized phrase did not

            constitute  plain  error,  creating  a  risk  of  fundamental

            unfairness or miscarriage  of justice.  See  United States v.
                                                    ___  _____________

            Hallock, 941 F.2d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 1991).
            _______

                 Affirmed.  See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.
                 ________   ___

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