Court Opinion

ID: 9915808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 17:18:15.700068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:01.548763
License: Public Domain

J-S41021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  GREGORY AHSAN COMANS                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1090 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 12, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0007423-2017

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED: JANUARY 8, 2024

       Appellant, Gregory Ahsan Comans, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on April 12, 2022 in the Criminal Division of the Allegheny

County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.

       The trial court ably summarized the relevant facts as follows.

       [Appellant] was charged with one count each of criminal
       attempt – criminal homicide (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a)), aggravated
       assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1)), and, recklessly endangering
       another      person      (18      Pa.C.S.A.       § 2705)       at
       CP-02-CR-0007423-2017 in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The
       charges stemmed from a shooting incident where [Appellant]
       discharged over a dozen shots from a handgun at the victim. The
       unarmed victim was struck, leaving him seriously injured and
       permanently disabled. After a non-jury trial, [Appellant] was
       found guilty [of aggravated assault] and sentenced on April 12,
       2022[. Appellant] received six to 12 years’ incarceration[.]
       Timely post-sentence motions were filed and the trial court denied
       relief [on Appellant’s request that the trial court exercise its
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S41021-23

      discretion to reduce Appellant’s sentence given his extended
      pretrial detention on home electronic monitoring]. [Appellant]
      appealed [and both the trial court and Appellant complied with
      Pa.R.A.P. 1925].

Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/23, at 2 (cleaned up).

      At sentencing, and in his post-sentence motion, concise statement, and

brief on appeal, Appellant raised a single claim.       Specifically, Appellant

asserted that “[g]iven the considerable length of time [he] spent on electronic

home monitoring pending trial [(four years),] coupled with 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9721(b)’s requirement that sentencing must take into account the facts and

circumstances of the defendant’s case as well as his character and

rehabilitative needs, the trial court abused its discretion in not giving

[Appellant] any credit for the time he spent on home electronic monitoring.”

Appellant’s Brief at 26. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Appellant

is not entitled to relief.

      Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing.

“[S]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, whose judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”

Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 779 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic right to appeal the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Instead,

Appellant must petition this Court for permission to appeal the discretionary

aspects of his sentence. Id.

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      As this Court explained:

        [t]o reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we
        conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
        appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902,
        903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
        sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
        Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal
        defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
        substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
        appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [42 Pa.C.S.A.]
        § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007).

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his claim at

sentencing and in a timely post-sentence motion, and included a statement

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in his brief.     Hence, we turn to whether

Appellant raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Faulk, 928

A.2d 1061, 1071–1072 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“[t]o be reviewed on the merits, a

challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence must raise a substantial

question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate. A substantial question

is raised when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentence

was either inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or

contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.

This Court determines whether an appellant has raised a substantial question

by examination of the appellant's concise statement of the reasons relied upon

for allowance of appeal[.]”).

      On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion

when it imposed an upper standard range sentence of six to 12 years’

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incarceration for aggravated assault, without considering the extended period

he spent on electronic home monitoring prior to trial. A claim which alleges

merely that the trial court failed to consider (or adequately consider) a

mitigating circumstance when imposing its sentence does not raise a

substantial question that supports appellate review. See Commonwealth v.

Crawford, 257 A.3d 75, 79 (Pa. Super. 2021); see also Commonwealth v.

Velez, 273 A.3d 6, 10 (Pa. Super. 2022) (noting that the “weight accorded to

the mitigating factors or aggravating factors presented to the sentencing court

is within the [sentencing] court's exclusive domain.”); Commonwealth v.

Ladamus, 896 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. Super. 2006).           This is particularly true

where a challenged sentence falls within the standard range of the sentencing

guidelines. See Commonwealth v. Maneval, 688 A.2d 1198, 1199-2000

(Pa. Super. 1997). Hence, Appellant is not entitled to appellate review of his

claim.

      Further, even if we were to address the substance of Appellant’s claim,

we would hold that the claim fails on its merits. It is well-established that

“[w]hen imposing a sentence [of total confinement], a [trial] court must

consider the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).” Commonwealth

v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 383 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 963 A.2d

467 (Pa. 2008). Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, in pertinent part,

states,

      the [trial] court shall follow the general principle that the sentence
      imposed should call for total confinement that is consistent with
      [S]ection 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection

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      of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
      on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
      rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The [trial] court shall also
      consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted
      by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect
      under [S]ection 2155 (relating to publication of guidelines for
      sentencing, resentencing and parole, risk assessment instrument
      and recommitment ranges following revocation).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).       Appellate review of a trial court’s sentencing

determination and application of the foregoing principles is governed by

Section 9781(c) of the Sentencing Code.

      Section 9781(c) specifically defines three instances in which the
      appellate courts should vacate a sentence and remand: (1) the
      [trial] court applied the guidelines erroneously; (2) the sentence
      falls within the guidelines, but is “clearly unreasonable” based on
      the circumstances of the case; and (3) the sentence falls outside
      of the guidelines and is “unreasonable.”

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2009), citing

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c).

      We have carefully reviewed the certified record, the pertinent case law,

and the submissions of the parties. Based upon our review, we agree with

the trial court that Appellant would not be entitled to relief on his discretionary

sentencing claim. At the outset of its analysis, the trial court observed that

no defendant is entitled to credit for time served on pretrial electronic home

monitoring. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/23, at 2, citing Commonwealth

v. Kyle, 874 A.2d 12, 20-21 (Pa. 2005) (defendant is not in custody in such

circumstances); see also Commonwealth v. Druce, 868 A.2d 1232 (Pa.

Super. 2005). Moreover, as the sentencing transcript makes clear, the court

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imposed a reasonable punishment based upon its sensible assessment of the

gravity of the offense, the need to protect the public, and the permanent

nature of the injuries and disabilities suffered by the victim. Finally, the trial

court was aware of and considered a pre-sentence investigation report, which

raised a presumption that the court meaningfully weighed and assessed all of

the factors relevant to sentencing.    See Commonwealth v. Devers, 546

A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988). Hence, no relief is due.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

FILED: 1/8/2024

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