Court Opinion

ID: 9661896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:54:12.296713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:34.921226
License: Public Domain

STOREY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority has concluded that because section 8 of article 8306 affords a widow a reversionary interest in benefits payable to children who have become ineligible, the legislature necessarily intended also to afford the children a reversionary interest in the widow’s benefits upon her death or remarriage. This conclusion is reached despite the clear and unequivocal language of the statute to the contrary. It is unreasonable to assume that the failure to provide for a reversion of the widow’s benefits resulted from legislative oversight. Rather, it is more logical to assume that the statute, plainly expressed, resulted from the normal legislative process of debate and compromise.
The 1973 amendment to section 8 of article 8306 made important changes in benefits payable to surviving beneficiaries. Pri- or to amendment, benefits were limited to a fixed period of 360 weeks. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon 1967). The *153benefits are now payable for no fixed or limited number of weekly payments but rather the statute now provides for benefits until the widow dies or remarries and the minor children are provided for during their minority, or until age 25 if attending school, or so long as they are dependent. It cannot be assumed that these far reaching changes in benefits were not reached by the making of important concessions by all parties at interest. To now add to these benefits by judicial construction is an invasion of the legislative prerogative. Particularly is this invasion emphasized by the fact that the Industrial Accident Board’s administration of the statute has been subjected to six years of legislative overview. If the Board’s refusal to recognize the reversion-ary interest during this period is incorrect, the legislature has had ample opportunity to correct it by amending the statute.
The rule of construction that the inclusion of the specific limitation excludes all others is a sound one and should be applied here. It is also a well settled rule of construction that interpretation by implication is permitted only to supply an obvious intent not expressly stated, but never to contradict or add to a statute. Massachusetts v. United North & South Development Co., 140 Tex. 417, 168 S.W.2d 226 (1942). Furthermore, subsections (b) and (c) are specific provisions, and it is fundamental that a general provision of a statute must yield to a succeeding specific provision. Twin City v. Cortez, 576 S.W.2d 786, 793 (Tex.1978) (dissenting opinion).
The well reasoned opinion of the majority does not reach an unjust result, but if the legislature intended a reversion of the widow’s benefits upon death or remarriage, it should amend the statute. I do not believe we should do so by judicial construction. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.