Court Opinion

ID: 9960684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 20:07:06.942249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:45.162485
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0324-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSHUA MALMGREN,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted December 11, 2023 – Decided March 15, 2024
                   Motion for reconsideration granted.
                   Resubmitted April 16, 2024 – Decided April 16, 2024

                   Before Judges Gilson and Bishop-Thompson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Cape May County, Indictment No. 12-11-
                   0748.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated
                   Counsel, on the briefs).

                   Jeffrey H. Sutherland, Cape May County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Gretchen Anderson Pickering,
                   Senior Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
                   brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant appeals from a July 27,2022 order denying his petition for post-

conviction relief (PCR). The PCR court found that defendant had filed the

petition late, without excusable neglect. The court also held that defendant had

failed to establish grounds for withdrawing his guilty plea. Having conducted a

de novo review, we agree and affirm.1

                                        I.

      In November 2012, a grand jury returned an indictment, charging

defendant with two counts of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A.

2C:11-4(a), and two counts of vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5. Defendant

killed two teenage girls when he swerved onto the shoulder of the road while

driving under the influence of alcohol and prescription drugs and driving while

distracted.

      On September 2, 2014, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first-

degree aggravated manslaughter. Before defendant entered his guilty plea, he

1
  On March 15, 2024, we issued an opinion in this matter. Thereafter, defendant
filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning whether we had addressed the
points raised in his appellate brief. We granted defendant's motion for
reconsideration and issue this opinion, which amends and supersedes our earlier
opinion.

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moved to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test. Defendant preserved

this issue on appeal pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(d) because the issue was decided

prior to our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Adkins, 221 N.J. 300 (2015).

      Three months later, on December 19, 2014, defendant was sentenced to

two consecutive nine-year terms, with periods of parole ineligibility and parole

supervision as prescribed by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

Defendant was also sentenced to a concurrent thirty-day jail term for driving

under the influence, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.

      The details of defendant's offenses are recounted in our unpublished

opinion remanding the matter for further review to determine whether sufficient

exigency existed to draw defendant's blood absent a warrant. State v. Malmgren,

No. A-3119-14 (App. Div. December 15, 2016) (slip op. at 2). In that opinion,

we did not address defendant's excessive sentencing argument.

      In accordance with our direction, a plenary hearing was held. Following

the hearing, the trial court rendered an oral decision finding sufficient exigency

existed to justify testing defendant's blood without a search warrant after the

fatal automobile accident.

      Defendant filed a second appeal challenging the trial court's decision,

arguing the blood draw was not supported by the evidence and that his sentence

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was excessive. On July 21, 2020, we affirmed the trial court ruling on the blood

draw, holding that there were sufficient facts showing that the blood draw was

permissible. We also affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. State v.

Malmgren, No. A-4095-17 (App. Div. July 21, 2020) (slip op. at 2-3).

      On April 19, 2021, defendant, then self-represented, filed a PCR petition.

Appointed PCR counsel filed an amended PCR petition.              After hearing

argument, the PCR court issued a written decision on July 27, 2022, denying

defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. The PCR court rejected

defendant's explanation that the delay in filing his PCR was due to the

prosecution of his direct appeal, the misadvise of trial counsel in 2014 that he

had to wait until his direct appeal was completed prior to filing a PCR petition,

and the COVID-19 pandemic prevented him from timely filing an appeal. The

court also rejected defendant's argument that his plea agreement was conditioned

on the preservation of his right to appeal pre-trial motions. The PCR court

concluded defendant failed to establish excusable neglect for filing his petition

487 days after the five-year PCR time bar under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1).

                                       II.

      On appeal, defendant argues the following:

            POINT ONE

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           THE IMPOSITION OF THE TIME BAR IN THIS
           CASE   WAS    MANIFESTLY   UNFAIR  AS
           DEFENDANT    HAD   SHOWN    EXCUSABLE
           NEGLECT AND THAT THE INTERESTS OF
           JUSTICE REQUIRED RELAXATION OF THE
           PROCEDURAL BAR.

           POINT II

           AS DEFENDANT, DID NOT VOLUNTARILY,
           KNOWINGLY[,] AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE
           HIS APPELLATE RIGHTS WHEN HE ENTERED A
           GUILTY PLEA, THE PLEA SHOULD BE
           WITHDRAWN AND THE MATTER REMANDED
           FOR TRIAL.

           1. Defendant did not voluntarily, knowingly, and
              intelligently waive his appellate rights.

           2. The State's failure to timely object to trial counsel's
              notice that defendant preserved his appellate rights
              precludes it from now arguing in opposition.

           POINT III

           APPELLATE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO RAISE ON
           DIRECT APPEAL DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF
           TRIAL COURT ERRORS WAS PREJUDICIAL AS IT
           AMOUNTED     TO  "FOREITURE    OF   THE
           PROCEEDING."

     We apply a de novo standard of review when a PCR court does not conduct

an evidentiary hearing. State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div.

2016) (citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004)). When petitioning

for PCR, a defendant must establish entitlement to "PCR by a preponderance of

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the evidence." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 370 (App. Div. 2014)

(citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)).

      "'Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of

habeas corpus.'" State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576, (2015) (quoting Preciose,

129 N.J. at 459). Post-conviction relief provides "a built-in 'safeguard that

ensures that a defendant was not unjustly convicted.'" State v. Nash, 212 N.J.

518, 540 (2013) (quoting State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997)). A

petition for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for a direct appeal. State v.

Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 583 (1992).

      Rule 3:22-12 prescribes the time limitations for filing a first PCR petition.

Generally, the rule provides that "no petition shall be filed . . . more than [five]

years after the date of the entry . . . of the judgment of conviction that is being

challenged." R. 3:22-12(a)(1). The five-year time limitation of Rule 3:22-12

runs from the date of the conviction or sentencing, whichever the defendant is

challenging. State v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486, 491 (2004); State v. Goodwin, 173

N.J. 583, 594 (2002).

      This time bar may be relaxed if the PCR petition "alleges facts showing

that the delay beyond said time was due to defendant's excusable neglect and

that there is a reasonable probability that if the defendant's factual assertions

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                                         6
were found to be true[,] enforcement of the time bar would result in a

fundamental injustice." R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). To establish excusable neglect, a

defendant must provide more than "a plausible explanation for a failure to file a

timely PCR petition." State v. Norman, 405 N.J. Super. 149, 159 (App. Div.

2009). "To determine whether a defendant has asserted a sufficient basis for

relaxing the Rule's time restraints, [a court] 'should consider the extent and cause

of the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the petitioner's

claim in determining whether there has been an "injustice" sufficient to relax the

time limits.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52 (1997)).

      Here, the record is clear that defendant's PCR petition is time-barred.

Defendant was sentenced and the judgment of conviction was entered on

December 19, 2014. He was, therefore, required to file his PCR petition no later

than December 19, 2019 in accordance with Rule 3:22-12(a)(1).              Instead,

defendant's petition was filed well over one year later. We agree with the PCR

court that defendant did not show excusable neglect, and thus, we are not

persuaded by defendant's argument that COVID-19 quarantine procedures

precluded access to the law library. The COVID restrictions did not become

effective until March 2020, approximately ninety days after the PCR filing

deadline. Defendant's implausible "explanation" for failing to timely file his

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PCR petition fails to satisfy circumstances justifying excusable neglect.

Norman, 405 N.J. Super. at 159.

      We also point out that defendant's appeal challenging the judgment of

conviction and sentence did not toll the filing of this PCR petition. It is well-

established the time to file a PCR petition is neither stayed nor tolled by

appellate or other review proceedings. See State v. Dillard, 208 N.J. Super. 722,

727 (App. Div. 1986) (citing R. 3:22-12); State v. Dugan, 289 N.J. Super. 15,

19 (App. Div. 1996).

      To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must

satisfy a two-part test: (1) "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,"

and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."           Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52 (1987).

A failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard requires the denial of

a PCR petition. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52.

      In the context of a guilty plea, when a defendant claims ineffective

assistance of counsel, he or she must show: "counsel's assistance was not 'within

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases'; and . . . 'that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant]

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                                        8
would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v.

Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State

v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).

      "Generally, a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all issues which were or

could have been addressed by the trial judge before the guilty plea." State v.

Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577, 585 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Robinson,

224 N.J. Super. 495, 498 (App. Div. 1988)). However, "pursuant to Rule 3:9-

3(f), a defendant may appeal those adverse decisions specifically reserved by a

conditional guilty plea entered in accordance with the Rule."       Id. at 586.

Defendant's argument that he entered a conditional plea premised on the

preservation of his appeal rights lacks merit. In the plea agreement, defendant

preserved only two motions on appeal: the motion to suppress physical evidence

and the denial of his acceptance into the pretrial intervention program. In

contrast, defendant waived his right to appeal the denial of all other pretrial

motions. During the plea hearing, trial counsel placed on the record that the

negotiated plea pursuant to "[Rule] 3:9-3(d) [was a] no appeal provision."

Moreover, when questioned by the court defendant testified that he reviewed

with his attorney and understood each question in the plea agreement.

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                                          9
      Having reviewed the record, we conclude, as did the PCR court, that

defendant's various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not meet either

the performance or prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. To the extent

we have not expressly addressed any arguments made in support of defendant's

appeal, we have determined they are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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