Court Opinion

ID: 9533063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:27:56.122947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:54.353244
License: Public Domain

GOODWIN, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the majority’s statement of applicable law. The opinion, however, should not be understood as a tacit approval of the administrative proceedings which resulted in the appeal to the circuit court. I do not believe the State Board of Education followed either the statutes or its own rules (III-C-5-a-(3) and *609III E)① which have to do with the conduct of hearings. As I read the applicable statutes, the original decision was for the Superintendent of Public Instruction to make. ORS 342.060 (2). Any hearing under ORS 183.410 should have been before the superintendent and not before the State Board of Education. The state board has certain hearing functions under ORS 342.180, but this section has no application to the case at bar. Another section, ORS 342.170, provides for a review committee, which may have an advisory function in the granting of certificates upon original application. However, the function of this committee does not appear to have been invoked. The only statutory provision I have found under which a hearing would have been appropriate is that of the declaratory-ruling section of the administrative procedures act, ORS 183.410. Under that section, the superintendent is the “agency” required to hold the hearing. See ORS 342.015; 342.060.
If the correct procedure had been followed at the administrative level, the trial court probably would not have been led into the error of treating the view of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction as *610the mere opinion of a witness in the case. The views of the superintendent were, indeed, the final decision of the only agency having any authority in the'matter, and should have been considered accordingly. If that officer acted arbitrarily, and without' cause, there would be a case for judicial review. We have held there was no such abuse of power. While the net result might have been the same, correct administrative procedure no doubt could have saved the state and the private litigant both time and money.
On the merits, I concur fully in the views expressed in the majority opinion.

 Rule III-C: “5. Institution of declaratory ruling. (ORS 183.410).
“a. A hearing may be instituted by:
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“(3) Petition for review by any person who has had a license summarily revoked, denied or renewal thereof refused by the Board or Superintendent.
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Rule III-E: “Conduct of hearing
“Hearings before the Superintendent shall be conducted by him personally, and hearings required to be heard before the Board shall be conducted by the Chairman of the Board, or in his absence, the Vice-chairman, or a member of the Board elected by the majority of the members present at the meeting to serve as temporary chairman.”