Court Opinion

ID: 9775439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:58:39.568263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:25.773831
License: Public Domain

McCRAW, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s disposition of the present case because the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury as required under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23. I would not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the roadblock. Constitutional issues should not reached unless it is absolutely necessary and the matter cannot be resolved on another basis. See Smith v. State, 658 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Ex parte Salfen, 618 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). King properly submitted and requested an instruction which traced the language of the statute:
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.
TEX.CODE CRIM.PRO.ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1979).
When the issue of unlawful arrest is raised by a motion to suppress, the State has the burden of showing that there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest. Roberts v. State, 545 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. Crim.App.1977). Further, when the evidence raises a fact issue concerning probable cause, the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed in accordance with article 38.23. Washington v. State, 663 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, pet. ref’d). I would hold that a fact issue concerning probable cause was raised on whether the questioned roadblock was a driver’s license check that is statutorily authorized under Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 6687b, § 13, or an unauthorized D.W.I. check.
King’s third point of error alleges that the jury should have been instructed on the legality of his seizure, and his motion to suppress states that the arrest was illegal. The motion continues by stating:
If the State contends that the arrest was conducted within a lawful roadblock, Defendant alleges that the arrest was without probable cause in violation of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America and also in the matter repugnant to Article 1, Section 9,10, 19 and 29 of the Constitution of the State of Texas and Article 15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
(Emphasis added.)
The issue of probable cause was placed in dispute by the motion to suppress. See Roberts, 545 S.W.2d at 158. In order to determine if there is conflicting evidence on the issue, this court must review the testimony concerning the purpose of the roadblock as presented to the jury, disregarding any evidence presented outside the jury’s presence in the suppression hearing. See Skatell v. State, 688 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 1985, no pet). Our review discloses that the following facts were presented to the jury by testimony of the officers present at the scene of the roadblock: (1) Arresting Officer Gibbons and Officer Ellzey were members of the DWI Selective Enforcement Unit (DWI Unit) at the time of King’s arrest; (2) all the officers who initially set up the roadblock were part of the DWI Unit; (3) part of the focus of the DWI Unit was to apprehend intoxicated drivers; (4) officers in the DWI Unit *710were specially trained for the job; (5) “target areas” were set out for DWI enforcement and one of those areas was Harry Hines and Northwest Highway — the roadblock was located one-quarter to one-half mile from that target area; (6) Officer Gibbons stated, “There was a large amount of people who were driving while intoxicated in [the target] areas;” (7) there was a large concentration of bars and restaurants serving alcoholic beverages in the target areas; (8) the roadblock was conducted only on the westbound lane of a divided highway; (9) the roadblock commenced at 1:30 a.m. and ended at 2:30 a.m., while the bars and restaurants closed at 2:00 a.m.; and (10) ten of the twelve officers present at the roadblock on the evening in question were certified to operate the intoxilyzer machine used by the Dallas Police Department. I would hold that this evidence raises a question concerning the factual issue of the nature of the roadblock and the probable cause for the initial stop of King. The trial court erred by not submitting the requested instruction. See Stone v. Stone, 703 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). I would sustain King’s third point of error, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for new trial.