Court Opinion

ID: 9384707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 19:01:03.103525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.831758
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11250    Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2023   Page: 1 of 16

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11250
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        LONNIE LORENZO HOLLINGSWORTH, JR.,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00035-JA-PRL-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11250

        Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Lonnie Hollingsworth, Jr., appeals his conviction and sen-
        tence for unlawful possession of ammunition by a convicted felon.
        See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Police officers found a single
        round of ammunition in Hollingsworth’s backpack upon taking
        him into custody for an involuntary mental-health examination un-
        der Florida’s Baker Act. See Fla. Stat. § 394.463. The district court
        denied Hollingsworth’s motion to suppress the evidence, conclud-
        ing that probable cause existed to detain him under the Baker Act.
        Then, after finding Hollingsworth guilty at a bench trial, the court
        sentenced him to three years of imprisonment, with three years of
        supervised release to follow. Among the conditions of his super-
        vised release, he was required to notify others of any risk he posed
        to them, as instructed by the probation officer. On appeal, he ar-
        gues that suppression was required because the officers lacked
        probable cause to detain him under the Baker Act, and that the dis-
        trict court plainly erred by imposing the risk-notification condition,
        which, in his view, unconstitutionally delegated judicial authority
        to the probation officer. After careful review, we affirm.
                                          I.
              On April 5, 2021, Hollingsworth made a 911 call. Claiming
        an “emergency,” he told the dispatcher to relay a message to Mar-
        ion County Sheriff Billy Woods for Woods’s role in a 2013 incident
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        22-11250               Opinion of the Court                       3

        involving Hollingsworth. The gist of the message was that, when
        “God can put [him] in a position to do it,” Hollingsworth was “go-
        ing to unload a whole fucking clip in his fucking face, in his whole
        fucking cranium in front of all his employees and his bosses.” Hol-
        lingsworth continued to discuss the 2013 incident and then ended
        the call. During the call, Hollingsworth sounded angry and was
        cursing beyond what he said in the message set forth above.
                Officer Robert Crossman was dispatched to a RaceTrac gas
        station in Ocala, Florida, to address the threatening 911 call. When
        Crossman arrived, Hollingsworth was outside livestreaming the
        events on his cell phone and “ranting” about the 2013 incident.
        Stating that he had unsettled business or “beef” from that incident,
        in which he had been shot multiple times, he demanded the “sher-
        iff’s department to come out in full force” and to “bring all your
        boys,” including “helicopters and everybody,” with “them guns
        drawn.” He said he had “already died before” and “didn’t care.”
              Soon after Crossman arrived at the scene, Officer Shelby
        Prather arrived with her field trainee, Officer Branden McCoy and
        took over primary responsibility. The officers questioned Hol-
        lingsworth further about the 911 call and the 2013 incident.
               Hollingsworth explained to the officers that he had been
        shot multiple times during an incident in March 2013. It appears
        that he later pled guilty to and was convicted of attempted stron-
        garm robbery based on that incident. But Hollingsworth believed
        that the Marion County Sheriff’s Office had lied about the circum-
        stances surrounding the shooting. He also discussed problems
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11250

        obtaining disability benefits for his injuries or other redress for the
        2013 incident because of his conviction. It’s not clear whether
        Woods, who became sheriff in 2017, played any personal role in
        the prior incident.
               Hollingsworth was generally calm, cooperative, and respon-
        sive during the encounter, but his “behavior was pretty erratic and
        obsessive about . . . the incident that occurred back in 2013,” ac-
        cording to Prather. He continued to insist that Sheriff Woods and
        the Sheriff’s Office respond to the scene and that he had business
        or a score to settle. He denied threatening Sheriff Woods in the
        911 call, and he was “adamant” that the officers listen to the record-
        ing. Hollingsworth also denied wanting to harm anyone, stating
        that he wanted only to meet Sheriff Woods.
               Based on Hollingsworth’s behavior at the scene, neither
        Crossman nor Prather believed Hollingsworth met the criteria for
        the Baker Act (or any criminal offense). Crossman told Prather that
        Hollingsworth had called 911 “to vent,” that he did not want to
        hurt himself or anyone else and knew where he was, and that Race-
        Trac “love[d] him.” Likewise, Prather told her supervisor, Ser-
        geant Kyle Howie, who had arrived on the scene but did not inter-
        act with Hollingsworth, that the circumstances were “not 329”—
        329 being code for the Baker Act—and that she would close the
        case with an incident report “just because it’s kind of weird.”
               When they made these observations, though, the officers
        had not yet listened to Hollingsworth’s 911 call, which Prather be-
        lieved was relevant to the investigation. As a result, Hollingsworth
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        22-11250               Opinion of the Court                       5

        was detained outside the RaceTrac for approximately 45 minutes
        while Howie obtained a recording of the call. After listening to the
        recording, Prather notified Hollingsworth that Hollingsworth
        would be detained and transported for examination under the
        Baker Act.
               Hollingsworth was handcuffed and searched. While being
        checked for and questioned about weapons, Hollingsworth told
        the officers he was homeless and did not own any weapons, and he
        asked the officers to collect his backpack by the RaceTrac. Cross-
        man retrieved the backpack and searched it, finding a single 9mm
        bullet, which Hollingsworth later described as his “lucky bullet.”
        Because Hollingsworth was a convicted felon, he was taken to jail
        for unlawful possession of ammunition, rather than to a mental-
        health facility for evaluation.
                                        II.
               After his indictment on one count of unlawful possession of
        ammunition by a convicted felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), Hol-
        lingsworth moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the offic-
        ers lacked probable cause to seize him under the Baker Act or to
        search his backpack.
              At an evidentiary hearing, the government presented the
        testimony of the four police officers involved: Crossman, Howie,
        McCoy, and Prather. In addition to the witness testimony, both
        the government and Hollingsworth introduced body-worn camera
        footage from Crossman, McCoy, and Prather; the audio and
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11250

        transcript of a 911 call placed by Hollingsworth on April 5, 2021;
        and the rear-seat in-car camera video from Prather’s patrol vehicle.
               After the hearing, the magistrate judge issued a report rec-
        ommending the denial of the motion to suppress. In the magistrate
        judge’s view, the officers had probable cause to detain Hol-
        lingsworth under the Baker Act based on the totality of the circum-
        stances. The magistrate judge noted that Hollingsworth, after
        threatening in a 911 emergency call to shoot Sheriff Woods in the
        head, “continued to obsess over the opportunity to meet with Sher-
        iff Woods” and demanded that he and the Sheriff’s Office respond
        to the scene with their guns drawn. Based on these comments, the
        magistrate judge concluded that the officers had probable cause to
        conclude that “there was a substantial likelihood that Hol-
        lingsworth would inflict serious bodily harm to Sheriff Woods or
        others in the near future.”
               Hollingsworth filed objections, arguing that his behavior at
        the RaceTrac established he was not a threat and instead simply
        wanted to air his grievances. He also asserted that the 911 call was
        not an “actual threat,” but was, “at worst, a conditional threat that
        gives no indication [he] ‘will’ cause serious bodily harm in the near
        future,” as required by the Baker Act. The district court overruled
        the objections and adopted the magistrate judge’s report and rec-
        ommendation.
              Thereafter, the district court found Hollingsworth guilty at
        a bench trial based on stipulated facts, and it sentenced him to 36
        months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised
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        22-11250                Opinion of the Court                           7

        release. Among other “Standard Conditions” of supervised release,
        the court imposed the following risk-notification condition:
               If the probation officer determines that you pose a
               risk to another person (including an organization),
               the probation officer may require you to notify the
               person about the risk and you must comply with that
               instruction. The probation officer may contact the
               person and confirm that you have notified the person
               about the risk.
        Hollingsworth did not object to any condition of supervised re-
        lease. This appeal followed.
                                          III.
               We start with the district court’s denial of the motion to sup-
        press. We review the court’s factual findings for clear error and its
        application of the law to the facts de novo. United States v. Pierre,
        825 F.3d 1183, 1191 (11th Cir. 2016). In doing so, we view the evi-
        dence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the district
        court, affording substantial deference to the factfinder’s credibility
        judgments. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir.
        2012).
               Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a right to
        be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” Skop v. City of
        Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007), including sei-
        zures “to ascertain that person’s mental state (rather than to inves-
        tigate suspected criminal activity),” Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11250

        899, 905 (11th Cir. 2011). To be reasonable, a custodial seizure
        must be supported by probable cause. Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137; see
        Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Mental-
        health seizures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when
        the officer has probable cause to believe that the seized person is a
        danger to himself or to others.”).
                The question here is whether there was probable cause to
        take Hollingsworth into custody under Florida’s Baker Act, the
        only justification offered for the seizure. See Khoury v. Mi-
        ami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th 1118, 1126 (11th Cir. 2021) (re-
        viewing whether arguable probable cause existed to detain a plain-
        tiff under Florida’s Baker Act in a civil rights action); cf. Crosby v.
        Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Whether a
        particular set of facts gives rise to probable cause . . . to justify an
        arrest for a particular crime depends, of course, on the elements of
        the crime.”). We look to the “totality of the circumstances to de-
        termine whether . . . probable cause existed to detain [Hol-
        lingsworth] under Florida’s Baker Act.” Khoury, 4 F.4th at 1126.
               Florida’s Baker Act permits police officers to take a “person
        who appears to meet the criteria for involuntary examination into
        custody” and deliver the person to a mental-health facility. Fla.
        Stat. § 394.463(2)(a)2. The criteria provide, as relevant here, that
        there must be “reason to believe” the following: (1) the “person has
        a mental illness”; (2) he has refused a voluntary examination or is
        unable to make that decision for himself; and (3) “[t]here is a sub-
        stantial likelihood that without care or treatment the person will
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        22-11250                Opinion of the Court                         9

        cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or others in the near
        future, as evidenced by recent behavior.” Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1).
               Relevant recent behavior may include “causing, attempting,
        or threatening to do [serious bodily] harm.” D.F. v. State, 248 So.
        3d 1232, 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). That an individual might
        need treatment for a mental illness alone is insufficient to justify
        involuntary commitment. Id.; Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 983,
        984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). So too are “[v]ague notions about
        what a person might do—for example, a belief about some likeli-
        hood that without treatment a person might cause some type of
        harm at some point.” Khoury, 4 F.th at 1126.
                Here, the district court did not err in denying Hol-
        lingsworth’s motion to suppress. The record shows that Hol-
        lingsworth made a 911 call threatening “to unload a whole . . . clip
        in [Sheriff Woods’s] . . . face, in his whole . . . cranium in front of
        all his employees and his bosses.” Then, once the officers arrived,
        Hollingsworth was fixated on the alleged injustice he suffered in
        2013 and the alleged culpability of the Sheriff’s Office. And he re-
        peatedly sought to provoke a confrontation with Sheriff Woods
        and “all [his] boys” with “them guns drawn,” stating that he “didn’t
        care” about the consequences because he had “already died be-
        fore.”
               Given this recent behavior, which included threatening to
        do serious bodily harm to Sheriff Woods and then being “erratic
        and obsessive” about meeting the sheriff to settle an old score,
        probable cause existed to believe that Hollingsworth had a mental
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                        22-11250

        illness and that there was a “substantial likelihood that without care
        or treatment [he] [would] cause serious bodily harm to . . . others
        in the near future.” 1 Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1); D.F., 248 So. 3d at 1234;
        see also Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (ex-
        plaining that “[p]robable cause is not a high bar” and does not re-
        quire “convincing proof” (quotation marks omitted)). Because that
        recent behavior properly grounded the officers’ Baker Act assess-
        ment, we need not consider whether it was reasonable for the of-
        ficers to rely on the criminal history Hollingsworth disclosed.
              While Hollingsworth was generally calm, respectful, and
        nonthreatening with the officers, and nothing indicates he was de-
        lusional or incompetent, we disagree that his behavior “dispelled
        any suspicion” about the risk he posed, as he asserts. Notably,

        1 Hollingsworth also challenges whether there was reason to believe he either
        had refused a voluntary examination or was unable to make that decision for
        himself. See Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1)(a). But he does not identify any authority
        applying this requirement to invalidate a Baker Act seizure. Nor would its
        absence result in a Fourth Amendment violation in this case. Because we have
        concluded that Hollingsworth’s seizure was supported by probable cause to
        believe he was dangerous to others, it follows that the seizure was reasonable
        under the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding that a defect under state law
        may or may not exist. Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (“Mental-health seizures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when
        the officer has probable cause to believe that the seized person is a danger to
        himself or to others.”); see also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 174–76, 178
        (2008) (holding that an officer’s violation of state law arrest rules did not ren-
        der an arrest unconstitutional because “it is not the province of the Fourth
        Amendment to enforce state law”).
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        22-11250               Opinion of the Court                        11

        although he denied making any threats to Sheriff Woods in the 911
        call or having any violent intent, the recording reflected a graphic
        threat to murder the sheriff in a public setting. And Hollingsworth
        seemed obsessed with confronting the sheriff over the 2013 inci-
        dent, which had affected his life profoundly. He also indicated he
        had exhausted other means of redress, potentially a sign that his
        behavior was escalating. So on hearing the recording, the officers
        had reason to discount the credibility of Hollingsworth’s assur-
        ances at the scene that he did not want to harm anyone. See In-
        gram, 30 F.4th at 1250–51 (holding that, in light of a recent suicide
        attempt, an officer “was not required to believe [the suspect’s] in-
        nocent assurances that he no longer desired to harm himself”).
        Plus, officers are not “required to sift through conflicting evidence
        or explanations or resolve issues of credibility” when assessing
        probable cause. Huebner v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1188 (11th
        Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
                That the officers did not believe the Baker Act criteria were
        satisfied before listening to the 911 call recording does not make
        the resulting seizure unlawful. The recording was part of the to-
        tality of the circumstances facing the officers, and it could reasona-
        bly inform an officer’s judgment about Hollingsworth’s behavior
        at the scene and whether the Baker Act criteria were satisfied. See
        Khoury, 4 F.4th at 1126; Huebner, 935 F.3d at 1187.
               Hollingsworth suggests it was unreasonable for the officers
        to detain him “outside in the sun without water” for 45 minutes so
        they could listen to a recording of the 911 call. But he made no
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11250

        distinct claim that he was subject to an unlawful investigatory de-
        tention while the officers obtained the recording, nor would he pre-
        vail on such a claim if he had. See e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
        U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth
        Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer
        has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
        afoot.”). The recording was relevant to the investigation of the 911
        call, which the officers believed contained threats against a local
        public official. And there is no evidence that Hollingsworth,
        though not free to leave, was detained longer or under more severe
        conditions than necessary to obtain the 911 call recording. See
        United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 2000) (inves-
        tigatory stops must be “reasonably related in scope to the circum-
        stances which justified the interference in the first place” (quotation
        marks omitted)).
             For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Hollingsworth’s
        motion to suppress.
                                         IV.
               Hollingsworth also challenges a condition of his supervised
        release. Because this challenge was raised for the first time on ap-
        peal, our review is for plain error. United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d
        1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006). To constitute plain error, the district
        court must have made an error that was plain and that affects Hol-
        lingsworth’s substantial rights. Id. When plain error occurs, we
        may reverse if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
        reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
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        22-11250               Opinion of the Court                        13

                “A court may not delegate a judicial function to a probation
        officer” because “[s]uch a delegation would violate Article III of the
        United States Constitution.” United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d
        1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001). “[I]mposing a sentence on a defendant
        is a judicial function.” United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1315
        (11th Cir. 2005).
                To determine whether the district court improperly dele-
        gated its sentencing authority, we draw a distinction between the
        delegation “of a ministerial act or support service” and “the ulti-
        mate responsibility” of imposing the sentence. Nash, 438 F.3d at
        1304–05. The district court may not delegate the ultimate respon-
        sibility of deciding whether to impose a condition of supervised re-
        lease. Id. at 1305. But the district court may delegate the ministe-
        rial function of how, when, and where the defendant must comply
        with the condition. Id.
               The Guidelines recommend a number of “standard” condi-
        tions for all terms of supervised release. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c). Num-
        ber twelve on the list is a risk-notification condition, which states,
              If the probation officer determines that you pose a
              risk to another person (including an organization),
              the probation officer may require you to notify the
              person about the risk and you must comply with that
              instruction. The probation officer may contact the
              person and confirm that you have notified the person
              about the risk.
        U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(12).
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11250

                In Nash, we held that an earlier version of this condition did
        not improperly delegate judicial authority. 438 F.3d at 1306. The
        defendant in that case was obligated to “notify third parties of risks
        that may be occasioned by [his] criminal record or personal history
        or characteristics” “[a]s directed by the probation officer.” Id. We
        explained that, under the language of the condition, “[t]he proba-
        tion officer may ‘direct’ when, where, and to whom notice must be
        given, but may not unilaterally decide whether Nash ‘shall’ do so
        at all.” Id. For that reason, we held that the condition did not im-
        permissibly delegate the ultimate responsibility of determining
        Nash’s sentence to the discretion of the probation officer. Id.
               After we decided Nash, the Sentencing Commission revised
        the risk-notification condition to clear up “potential ambiguity in
        how the condition [was] phrased.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
        App. C, Amend. 803 (2016) (citing United States v. Thompson, 777
        F.3d 383, 379 (7th Cir. 2015) (criticizing the former risk-notification
        condition as vague)). It rephrased the condition to make it “easier
        for defendants to understand and probation officers to enforce,” id.,
        though it did not address Nash or the delegation issue.
               We have not addressed the current version of the risk-noti-
        fication condition (Standard Condition 12) in a published opinion.
        Most circuits to address the issue have held that the current version
        does not improperly delegate judicial authority. United States v.
        Cruz, 49 F.4th 646, 654 (1st Cir. 2022); United States v. Mejia-Bane-
        gas, 32 F.4th 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Janis, 995 F.3d
        647, 653 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Hull, 893 F.3d 1221, 1226
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        22-11250                Opinion of the Court                        15

        (10th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Gibson, 998 F.3d 415, 423
        (9th Cir. 2021) (stating that “Standard Condition 12 is constitutional
        and may be imposed in appropriate cases” in part because “proba-
        tion officers do not have unfettered discretion under this condi-
        tion”). One circuit, though, has vacated the imposition of a risk-
        notification condition as an “improper delegation of judicial
        power.” United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687, 699 (10th Cir. 2019);
        see also United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95, 112 (7th Cir. 2019) (va-
        cating and remanding for the court “to clarify the scope” of the risk-
        notification condition because, as written, it “gives the probation
        office unfettered discretion”).
                Under our precedent, “where neither the Supreme Court
        nor this Court has ever resolved an issue, and other circuits are split
        on it, there can be no plain error in regard to that issue.” United
        States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319, 1321 (11th Cir. 2000). But cf.
        Heath, 419 F.3d at 1319 (holding that plain error occurred where
        other circuits were unanimously in favor of the defendant’s view).
        Because other circuits are split on, if not mostly against, the view
        that the risk-notification condition (Standard Condition 12) im-
        properly delegates judicial authority to probation officers, and be-
        cause we have upheld a prior version of that condition and have
        not spoken on the current one, Hollingsworth cannot establish that
        any error was plain or obvious under current law. See Aguillard,
        217 F.3d at 1321.
              For these reasons, we affirm Hollingsworth’s conviction and
        sentence.
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        16                  Opinion of the Court             22-11250

              AFFIRMED.