Court Opinion

ID: 9667021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:32:58.092363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:34.177954
License: Public Domain

CALLOW, WILLIAM G., J.
(dissenting). I dissent and maintain that we should affirm our earlier decision in this case, Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 139 Wis. 2d 833, 407 N.W.2d 895 (1987). The analysis in that opinion was correct and it is not affected in any way by the United States Supreme Court decision in Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988).
The majority is wrong in concluding that the principles set forth in Clark require us to find that the child in this case was denied the equal protection of law. Clark *578dealt with a six-year statute of limitations for bringing paternity and child support actions on behalf of nonmarital children. The Court in Clark noted that it was questionable whether a mother would bring such an action within the six-year period and therefore found that the Pennsylvania statute of limitations placed an unconstitutional burden on nonmarital children.
The case before us does not involve a statute of limitations. Rather, it involves a statute which makes it easier for nonmarital children to obtain child support. The statute does not deny a right, it simply grants an alternative right. As we held in the original opinion, the statute provides "an additional, optional method for satisfying a support obligation." Gerhardt, 139 Wis. 2d at 846. Where the statute of limitations in Clark, according to the Supreme Court, might prevent a mother from bringing a support claim on behalf of the nonmarital child because she might not act to protect the child's interest in a timely manner, the settlement provision of the Wisconsin Statutes at issue in this case encourages her to do so. The application of res judicata in this case merely bars a second child support action after the child, through its mother, had already exercised its rights and received child support.
The original opinion is correct when it concludes that the Wisconsin statute, by relying on the mother to enforce the child's support rights, adequately protects the child's interests. The child's interests are virtually represented by the mother who, like the child, has a powerful interest in obtaining child support. Gerhardt, 139 Wis. 2d at 840. When support is not provided by the father the obligation for support of the child falls upon the mother. Id. at 841. When the support statute was in effect the mother and the child's interest could be accommodated by initiating an action for support as was *579done in this case. When such an action was commenced the mother who virtually represented the child's interest could negotiate a settlement and avoid a trial which might result in a finding that the defendant was excluded from paternity. Alternatively, the alleged father might not be excluded from paternity. At the time of this settlement agreement medical technology did not have the necessary expertise to identify the father. Our many cases recognized that blood typing could only exclude a person from parenthood. Accordingly, the legislature gave the parties the option of contracting to settle paternity subject to court approval. This was a reasonable alternative to a trial. It encouraged reluctant mothers to seek support and avoid trials which could be traumatic for the parties and could result in the alleged father being excluded from paternity and the child receiving no support.
Having incorrectly concluded that the statute violates the equal protection clause, the majority arrives at a result that is fundamentally unfair in two ways. First, on remand this case may result in a sum of money being paid to the nonmarital child who is now an adult and who may have contributed little or nothing to her own support during her minority. Such an amount would essentially be a windfall to her.
Second, the majority opinion is unfair in its treatment of the original settlement. As we noted in the original opinion, a settlement of this kind by its nature involves the making of compromises on such issues as the amount of the child support to be paid and the admission of paternity itself. Id. at 843. The statute recognized there may be compelling reasons to settle the case. Although the record in this case is unclear, it is possible that Moore admitted his paternity only as part of a bargain which limited his liability. The child's *580mother obtained the admission of paternity and $4,600.00 for the child's support and medical expenses and was able to avoid the costs and uncertainties of a full-scale paternity suit. This was a bargain accepted by all parties who participated in it.
It is patently unfair and a violation of contract law principles to reopen, nineteen years later, one part of the bargain, the amount of child support, without reopening the other, the admission of paternity itself. But this is what the majority has done. Fairness and equity require that the original settlement be upheld. If it is not upheld the whole matter should be reopened and the burden to prove paternity should be placed on the child seeking additional support.
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE LOUIS J. CECI joins in this dissenting opinion.