Court Opinion

ID: 9960046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 08:10:04.213799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:06.557489
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-23-00207-CV
     ___________________________

      KHASIA WILSON, Appellant

                     V.

      GEORGE MURPHY, Appellee

  On Appeal from the 352nd District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 352-331600-22

   Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this car-wreck case, Appellant Khasia Wilson was injured after her vehicle

was rear-ended by Appellee George Murphy. Wilson sued Murphy, and the case

proceeded to a jury trial where Wilson obtained a verdict in her favor and was

awarded $15,879.55 in damages. Wilson raises two issues on appeal: (1) that the jury’s

awards of zero dollars for her past physical pain and past mental anguish were against

the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and (2) that the trial court abused

its discretion by excluding the expert testimony of her chiropractor, Dr. Michael

Davis. We will affirm.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

                     A. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      The car wreck at the center of this case occurred on April 12, 2021, and Wilson

sued Murphy on January 25, 2022, for negligence stemming from the wreck. She

requested damages for property damage and also for past and future medical

expenses, earnings, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and impairment. In

an agreed scheduling order entered on June 17, 2022, the trial court set the following

dates and deadlines: (1) Wilson’s deadline to designate expert witnesses on

October 27, 2022; (2) end of discovery period on January 27, 2023; and (3) trial on

February 27, 2023.

      On January 11, 2023, Wilson filed a verified motion for continuance of the trial

setting and scheduling order deadlines, stating that her counsel had five other cases set

                                           2
for trial on February 27, 2023. She also stated that the parties had “completed the

investigation and discovery phase” and that the case would “benefit from mediation.”

Wilson requested a 180-day continuance.

      On February 9, 2023, Murphy filed his witness list. The record is unclear as to

whether Wilson also filed a witness list before trial,1 though she did supplement her

Rule 194 disclosures on February 9, 2023. These disclosures referenced Dr. Davis

within a narrative description of the various medical treatments that Wilson had

received after the wreck but did not specifically list him as a person who had

knowledge of relevant facts or as a potential witness for trial. Then, on February 16,

2023, Wilson filed an amended motion for continuance, in which she explained that

her counsel had “recently had a large staff turnover at his office and calendaring issues

arose,” which “resulted in a missed expert deadline and late discovery

supplementation.”2     She requested a 180-day continuance so that she could

“supplement and complete discovery.”

      Murphy opposed the continuance and any alteration of the discovery deadlines,

chiefly because of his age. He was almost 90 years old and looking to resolve the

      1
       There is no witness list from Wilson in the appellate record, and Murphy
claims in his appellee’s brief that she did not file one before trial. However, at a
hearing on the first day of trial, the trial court indicated that Wilson may have filed a
witness list on February 13, 2023, that included, among others, Dr. Michael Davis, a
chiropractor at Health First Chiropractic Injury & Pain Center (Health First), where
Wilson had received treatment.
      2
       Wilson concedes that she did not timely designate any experts.

                                           3
case, which had “brought stress and anxiety to him and his family.” He also argued

that allowing the reopening of discovery and expert designation “would allow

[Wilson] to present an entirely new and different case at trial, which [would] cause

[Murphy] to incur new significant expenses in this matter.” [Emphasis in original.]

       At a February 22, 2023 hearing on Wilson’s continuance motion, the parties

agreed to move forward with trial as scheduled with the stipulation that Wilson’s life

care planner, Dr. Thomas Garzillo, would be allowed to testify as an expert.3 No

discussion was had or agreement made at the hearing as to any other experts that

Wilson desired to use at trial—including Dr. Davis—and her continuance motion was

not explicitly ruled on at that time.

       The issue of Wilson’s expert designations was raised again on the first day of

trial. Wilson’s counsel stated that it was his understanding after the February 22

hearing that he could call Dr. Garzillo and other experts to testify—including Dr.

Davis, who would testify about the reasonableness of the costs of care that Wilson

had received at Health First.4 The trial court and Murphy’s counsel both disagreed

       3
        At the hearing, Murphy’s counsel told the trial court she only knew of Dr.
Garzillo’s existence as a possible expert “through a demand letter that was sent
directly to [Murphy’s insurance company] that was never CC’d to us.” However, she
expressed Murphy’s strong desire to proceed with trial as scheduled and stated that,
“If that means allowing [Dr. Garzillo to testify], we would agree to that.”
       4
        Wilson’s counsel explained that, even though the Health First billing records
were attested-to (by another official at Health First) and, thus, self-authenticated, Dr.
Davis’s testimony was necessary to refute controverting affidavits that Murphy had
filed disputing the reasonableness of the Health First charges.

                                           4
with this understanding. The trial court explained that Murphy had waived any issue

related to Dr. Garzillo’s having not been designated as an expert but had not waived

the issue as to Dr. Davis or any other potential experts. Wilson’s counsel argued that,

even so, Murphy could not claim to have been surprised or prejudiced by Dr. Davis’s

untimely designation because his name had appeared “all over” the medical records

delivered to Murphy in discovery.5 To that, Murphy’s counsel responded, “[W]e don’t

even know what [Dr. Davis] is going to say. I mean, we don’t know what opinions

he’s going to give. . . . I don’t know anything about Michael Davis. I’ve never heard

that name.”

      The trial court ordered that Dr. Davis was excluded from testifying as an expert

because he had not been properly designated. That evening, Wilson filed her first

expert designation, which included Dr. Davis. The next day, February 28, 2023,

Wilson reurged her motion for continuance of the trial and expert designation

deadline. The trial court denied the motion, and Wilson called Dr. Davis to make an

offer of proof as to what his testimony would be if submitted to the jury.

      Dr. Davis testified that he was a chiropractor at Health First. He said that he

had never personally treated Wilson but was familiar with her case and her medical

      5
       Of the more than 300 pages of medical records appearing in the appellate
record, we see Dr. Davis’s name on only two pages, both from Wilson’s initial
appointment at Health First on April 15, 2021: (1) in the header of a referral form
alongside the names of two other doctors that work at Health First and (2) on an
assignment of benefits form.

                                           5
and billing records. After summarizing the treatment provided to Wilson, Dr. Davis

opined that her treatment and billed charges were reasonable and necessary. Wilson

then reurged her motion to allow Dr. Davis to testify as an expert. The trial court

again denied her motion.

                           B. RELEVANT TRIAL EVIDENCE

      At trial, Wilson’s sister, Lowanna Jones, testified that Wilson had become less

active after the car wreck with Murphy. She said that Wilson used to enjoy trips to

the lake and doing yard work but that the pain from the wreck had kept her from

doing those things. Also, Wilson had difficulty getting comfortable while sitting and

was generally more limited in her everyday activities due to the wreck. However,

Jones said that, though Wilson still had good days and bad days, she had gotten “her

joy back” and had continued to improve since the wreck. This included that Wilson

was now able to complete her work-from-home job, though with modified seating.

      Terry Pimpleton, Wilson’s friend, also testified that Wilson had complained of

pain after the wreck and had been less active because of it.

      Wilson testified that the wreck occurred as she was waiting to turn right at a

yield sign. She said that she came to a stop at the yield sign behind the crosswalk to

check for traffic and that she was “bumped” from behind by Murphy. The impact

was strong enough to push her car through the crosswalk with her brake applied, but

she did not hit her head, lose consciousness, or suffer any cuts or bruises; her airbag

                                           6
did not deploy, and her car was still operable. The damage to her vehicle consisted

mainly of a dented bumper and damage to four sensors underneath the bumper.

          First responders recommended that Wilson take an ambulance to the hospital

due to her elevated blood pressure. At the hospital, Wilson complained only of

having neck pain and a headache. However, she had full range of motion in her neck,

and x-rays showed no abnormalities. A CT-scan performed on her neck showed “no

radiological evidence of acute” injury. Within three days of the wreck, Wilson says

that she started experiencing additional pain in her neck, shoulder, arm, back, and leg.

She met with an attorney who advised her to visit a chiropractor at Health First and to

also see a doctor at Momentum Spine and Joint (Momentum), a pain management

clinic.

          On her first visit to Health First for chiropractic care, Wilson was x-rayed

again, which showed that she had scoliosis in her middle back but that her shoulders

were unremarkable.       In total, Wilson visited Health First more than sixty times

between April 2021 and April 2022. Initially, Wilson was treated for about four

months with only electrical stimulation, ultrasounds, and hot and cold packs. She

then took a six-month break from visiting Health First before returning in

February 2022. After that, her treatment appears to have been similar except that she

added minor exercises and occasional manipulations and adjustments to her regimen.

The report from her last visit at Health First in April 2022 indicates that Wilson was

still complaining of pain in her neck, shoulder, arm, and back.

                                            7
      Wilson visited Momentum about a dozen times between April 2021 and

May 2022.6    Her treatment included occasional steroid injections and MRIs and

prescription pain medications. The reports from her last visits at Momentum in

May 2022 indicate that Wilson’s pain levels were “mild” and that she had reported

improved pain in her neck and back. One note stated that “despite residual pain

[Wilson] has, she does feel closer to her functional baseline and pain is more tolerable

than before.” At her final visit at Momentum, her doctor noted this improvement

and recommended that Wilson “defer any further interventions” at Momentum while

also recommending that she continue with chiropractic and other therapies to deal

with any lingering pain.

      Wilson also visited her primary care physician (PCP) several times after the

wreck. The first of these visits occurred in September 2021—about five months after

the wreck—at which Wilson complained of sciatic pain, hip pain, and neck pain. The

records from this visit discuss the events of the wreck and note that Wilson had not

felt this pain immediately after the wreck but that it had started sometime later. One

note even indicates that Wilson’s hip and neck pain did not start until

September 2021.

      Other than at the September 2021 visit, Wilson’s PCP records do not show

that she complained again of having any pain associated with the wreck. Wilson

      6
        As with her visits to Health First, Wilson also took a six-month break from
visiting Momentum in the middle of her treatment.

                                           8
testified that her pain came and went and that she would only report symptoms that

she was experiencing on the day that she visited her PCP. Instead, it appears that her

PCP visits focused largely on treating her diagnoses of obesity, high blood pressure,

and diabetes. At an August 2022 visit, her PCP noted that Wilson had started a new

“hybrid” job, that her anxiety was “better,” and that she was swimming “every few

days.”

         Wilson testified that she had been in one previous auto accident in 2014 in

which another car backed into her at a restaurant. She said that she suffered no

bodily injuries from that accident but that her car required repairs. Murphy sought to

impeach this testimony by first questioning Wilson why she had testified at a

deposition that she had never been in any other automobile accidents. Murphy then

entered into evidence insurance records purporting to show that Wilson had been in

two previous auto accidents: the one in 2014 and another with a date of loss from

2013. Wilson intimated that she may have forgotten about the previous wreck while

being deposed and explained that the 2013 and 2014 insurance records were actually

from the same accident that occurred at the restaurant.

         Wilson also testified that she had been in a four-wheeler accident7 in which the

four-wheeler “flipped” onto Wilson and her son. She suffered a hairline fracture in

her arm from that accident.

         It is not clear from the record when the four-wheeler accident occurred.
         7

                                             9
      Wilson testified that she had been forced to miss about ten days of work due to

the wreck. She said that her pain persisted, that it had made her less active than

before the wreck, and that it had taken “the little things” from her life. She was

unable to sit or stand for long periods of time and she could not cook, clean, shop, or

attend her son’s football games as much as she used to. For these reasons, she would

need future medical care such as injections and massages to alleviate her pain.

      Testifying via deposition, Murphy admitted that he had acted negligently but

also stated that it appeared to him that Wilson had intentionally caused the wreck by

stopping at the yield sign: “I have no reason – no idea why she stopped.” Murphy

also said that he believed that Wilson had embellished her injuries at the scene of the

wreck because he had hit Wilson’s car “very softly.” He elaborated that he had just

barely hit her car but that “she acted like she had been in a fast, busy wreck” and that

“she wouldn’t walk” after it occurred. According to Murphy, he had taken his foot

off the brake pedal and turned to look for traffic; his car then rolled forward and hit

Wilson’s car at a speed of one or two miles per hour.

      Finally, Dr. Garzillo—Wilson’s life care planner and a licensed chiropractor—

testified as an expert. Dr. Garzillo did not treat Wilson directly but viewed her

medical records to calculate her future medical expenses. He explained that Wilson’s

records showed that she had multiple herniated discs in her back and neck.8 He

      8
       Garzillo’s testimony related to Wilson’s herniated discs was drawn from two
scans performed on her spine. The first was a CT-scan of her lower back performed

                                          10
conceded that obesity has been shown to play a role in causing lower-back disc

herniations but not in neck herniations. He also testified that it was common for car-

wreck injuries not to present immediately but to arise later and opined that the

treatment Wilson had received was reasonable for her conditions.

      Dr. Garzillo said that Wilson’s condition would only worsen as she aged and

that she would never be completely cured. According to Dr. Garzillo, Wilson would

suffer not from constant pain in the future but from “flare-ups” that would increase

as time went on. In his estimation there was a reasonable probability that Wilson

would need future medical care and that her care would cost between $18,000 and

$156,000. This care would likely not be immediately necessary9 and would consist of

yearly x-rays, between six and twelve chiropractic manipulations per year, and physical

therapy.

                            C. VERDICT AND JUDGMENT

      After the close of evidence, Wilson moved for and was granted a directed

verdict on the issue of Murphy’s negligence. The jury then found that Wilson had not

also been negligent and awarded her damages as follows:

on April 26, 2021—about two weeks after the wreck—showing that Wilson had two
herniated discs in her back. The second was an MRI of her neck performed on
April 26, 2022—more than a year after the wreck—showing that Wilson had three
herniated discs in her neck.
      9
        Based on the relevant research, Dr. Garzillo explained that Wilson’s “post-
traumatic accelerated degeneration” would likely present initially between five and
fifteen years after the wreck.

                                          11
   • Past medical expenses: $6,879.55.10

   • Future medical expenses: $5,875.76

   • Past loss of earning capacity: $3,124.24.

It awarded her nothing for the remaining damages categories, including past physical

pain and mental anguish.     The trial court entered judgment on this verdict on

April 14, 2023. Wilson filed a timely motion for new trial, raising many of the same

arguments that she raises on appeal. The trial court denied this motion, and Wilson

appealed.

                                  II. DISCUSSION

                        A. JURY’S ZERO-DAMAGES AWARDS

      In her first issue, Wilson argues that the jury’s awards of zero dollars for her

past physical pain and past mental anguish were against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence. In her view, the evidence of her past pain and mental

anguish was objective and unconflicted—particularly in light of her diagnoses, the

jury’s award of past and future medical expenses, and Dr. Garzillo’s testimony

regarding her future medical needs—thus making the jury’s award clearly wrong and

unjust. We disagree.

      10
        Wilson had entered into evidence bills for past medical expenses totaling
$10,902.83, which included records from the ambulance company ($1,556.92), the
hospital at which she was treated after the wreck ($5,322.63), a pharmacy ($2,797.00),
and another medical group ($809.28).

                                           12
                                1. Standard of Review

       A court may overturn a jury’s damages finding only if the evidence supporting

it is so weak or is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence

that it is clearly wrong and unjust. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242

(Tex. 2001); see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). An

appellate court cannot set aside a jury finding merely because it would have weighed

the evidence differently or made a different finding. Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,

754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988).

      Thus, when presented with an argument that a jury’s failure to award damages

is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we must consider and

weigh all of the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support the verdict.

Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); see Gregory v.

Chohan, 670 S.W.3d 546, 557 (Tex. 2023). In conducting our factual-sufficiency

review, we must bear in mind that, as always, “[w]hen evidence conflicts, the jury’s

role is to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and reconcile any inconsistencies,

and as a general proposition, the jury may ‘believe all or any part of the testimony of

any witness and disregard all or any part of the testimony of any witness.’” Anderson v.

Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 616 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Golden Eagle Archery, 116 S.W.3d at

774–75).

                                           13
                                  2. Applicable Law

         Generally, a jury has great discretion in considering evidence on the issue of

damages, and its findings are entitled to great deference from an appellate court. See

In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 483 S.W.3d 249, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2016, orig. proceeding); Hammett v. Zimmerman, 804 S.W.2d 663, 664–65 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1991, no writ). This is especially true of damages for physical pain and

mental anguish because they are inherently speculative in nature. Hunter v. Tex. Farm

Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 639 S.W.3d 251, 260 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no

pet.).

         When addressing a jury’s findings as to such speculative damages, Texas courts

uniformly recognize a distinction between cases where the plaintiff presented

uncontroverted “objective” evidence of an injury and those where the plaintiff’s

injuries are more “subjective” in nature. Rumzek v. Lucchesi, 543 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied) (collecting cases). “[T]he more subjective the

damages alleged, the more deference we give to jury findings on those damages.”

Hudetts v. McDaniel, No. 07-96-0353-CV, 1997 WL 716883, at *6 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Dec. 17, 1997, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (citing Hyler v. Boytor,

823 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ)); see Rumzek,

543 S.W.3d at 333–35 (contrasting types of objective injuries—fractures, organic brain

syndrome, nerve damage, burns, cuts, and lacerations, tendinitis, and torn muscles

requiring surgery—against soft-tissue injuries that are more subjective in nature—

                                           14
strains, sprains, and “degenerative disc disease”). “When there is uncontroverted,

objective evidence of an injury and the causation of the injury has been established,

appellate courts are more likely to overturn jury findings of no damages for past pain

and mental anguish.” State Farm, 483 S.W.3d at 263.

      “But ‘more likely’ does not necessarily mean ‘must.’” Blevins v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., No. 02-17-00276-CV, 2018 WL 5993445, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Nov. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Even objective evidence of an injury does

not mandate a damages award if the injury is “less serious and accompanied only by

subjective complaints of pain,” particularly where an award of past medical expenses

is made. State Farm, 483 S.W.3d at 264; see also McGuffin v. Terrell, 732 S.W.2d 425, 428

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (noting that jury evidently found injury “so

minimal as to not warrant an award for past pain and suffering” despite awarding

medical expenses for treatment of muscle spasms).

      It follows, then, that evidence of an injury is more subjective in nature when

the injury’s existence and symptoms largely depend on the plaintiff’s word, rather than

medical testing that yields reasonably certain results. Hunter, 639 S.W.3d at 260; see

Ononiwu v. Eisenbach, 624 S.W.3d 37, 45–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no

pet.) (holding that evidence was more subjective where sole objective evidence of

injury was plaintiff’s inconclusive x-rays and MRIs, and remaining evidence of injury

consisted of plaintiff’s testimony and medical records reflecting what he told his

treaters). In such cases, the jury may decline to award damages for physical pain or

                                           15
mental anguish because their existence essentially turns on the plaintiff’s credibility—

the evaluation of which lies solely with the jury. Hunter, 639 S.W.3d at 260.

      Moreover, to recover damages for mental anguish, the “record must provide

either direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of a plaintiff’s mental

anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in his daily routine, or evidence of a

high degree of mental pain and distress that exceeds mere worry, anxiety, vexation,

embarrassment, or anger.”       Bearden v. LeClair, No. 02-20-00177-CV, 2022 WL

3273598, at *18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 11, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                          3. Past Pain and Mental Anguish

      The evidence of Wilson’s past pain and mental anguish was almost entirely

subjective, consisting primarily of her testimony and the testimonies of Jones and

Pimpleton, medical records that reflected what she reported to her treaters, and

radiological scans of her spine showing conflicting results. Thus, Wilson’s credibility

and, to a lesser extent the credibility of Jones and Pimpleton, were central to her

claims for physical pain and mental anguish. Accordingly, the jury’s role in analyzing

this evidence and assessing her damages was “paramount.”            Stone v. Christiansen,

No. 02-22-00450-CV, 2023 WL 5766076, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 7,

2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      The jury had reason to believe that the wreck between Wilson and Murphy was

not severe enough to have caused an injury from which Wilson suffered compensable

pain and mental anguish. Wilson agreed that she was “bumped” from behind by

                                           16
Murphy’s car. Murphy described hitting Wilson “very softly” while traveling only one

or two miles an hour, and he also questioned whether she had embellished her injuries

at the scene of the wreck. Wilson did not hit her head, lose consciousness, or receive

any cuts or bruises from the wreck. Additionally, the only damage to Wilson’s car was

a dented bumper and damaged sensors; the airbag did not deploy, and the car was still

operational after the wreck.

      The jury also had reason to question whether Wilson’s injuries allegedly caused

by the wreck were severe enough to have caused compensable pain and anguish.

Wilson showed no overt injuries at the scene of the wreck and only took an

ambulance to the hospital upon the advice of the first responders because she had

elevated blood pressure. At the hospital she complained of only a headache and neck

pain, though she had full range of motion in her neck.          X-rays and CT scans

performed at the hospital showed no abnormalities and specifically showed that she

did not have any acute injuries to her neck.

      Wilson testified that she started feeling additional neck, back, shoulder, and hip

pain a few days after the wreck and, on the advice of her attorney, sought treatment

with Health First and Momentum. However, her PCP notes indicated that her neck

and hip pain did not start until September 2021—five months after the wreck. Her

chiropractic treatment consisted mainly of electrical stimulation, ultrasounds, and hot

and cold packs with the occasional manipulations and adjustments.            An X-ray

performed at her first visit to Health First was not remarkable. Her treatment at

                                           17
Momentum consisted of a few injections, prescribing of pain medications, and

radiological scans.    And Wilson took a six-month break in the middle of her

treatments at both facilities.

       The herniated discs in Wilson’s lower back first appeared in a CT-scan

performed about two weeks after the wreck. But this evidence was tempered by Dr.

Garzillo’s concession that obesity—with which Wilson had been diagnosed—could

cause such herniations. The herniated discs in Wilson’s neck first showed up in an

MRI that was performed more than a year after the wreck. These herniations had not

appeared on the CT-scans performed at the hospital on the day of the wreck, and

there was no comparison evidence admitted to show the condition of Wilson’s neck

prior to the wreck. Thus, the evidence of Wilson’s herniated discs was not so certain

or objective that it required the jury to award her damages for pain and mental

anguish. See Hyler, 823 S.W.2d at 428 (“Weighing the many subjective complaints

against the one objective injury that might have been caused by this accident, it is

apparent that the indicia of injury are more subjective than objective.”).

       Though Wilson, Jones, and Pimpleton testified that Wilson continued to feel

pain and discomfort and was less active due to the wreck, Jones also stated that

Wilson had improved and gotten “her joy back.” Further, the notes from her last

visits to Momentum in May 2022 indicated that Wilson only had “mild” pain and that

she was “closer to her functional baseline.” Finally, Wilson complained only once of

wreck-related pain to her PCP five months after the wreck—pain that she never

                                           18
mentioned again despite meeting subsequently with her PCP numerous times. In fact,

her PCP noted in August 2022 that Wilson had started a new “hybrid” job, that her

anxiety was “better,” and that she was swimming “every few days.”

       Wilson posits that it is “confounding” that the jury awarded her damages for

past and future medical expenses but failed to also award her damages for past pain

and mental anguish. We disagree.

       Texas courts—including this court—have found no issue with a jury’s awarding

damages for medical expenses but refusing to also award damages for pain or mental

anguish. See, e.g., Stone, 2023 WL 5766076, at *6; Oninwu, 624 S.W.3d at 47. These

cases often involve facts very similar to Wilson’s—a car wreck where the plaintiff

complains of back or neck pain from a soft-tissue injury. See, e.g., Oninwu, 624 S.W.3d

at 47; Rumzek, 543 S.W.3d at 334; Laquey v. Cox, No. 02-17-00005-CV, 2017 WL

4413353, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 5, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Ultimately,

such awards are not made in error because they concern highly subjective evidence of

pain and anguish the evidence of which comes almost solely from the plaintiff herself.

The jury is thus free to disbelieve this evidence entirely or to decide that the plaintiff’s

pain and mental anguish does not rise to compensable levels. See Ononiwu, 624 S.W.3d

at 47 (“A jury may reasonably find that a plaintiff should be compensated for seeking

enough medical care to confirm that he has not been seriously injured, but that he did

not suffer pain or impairment warranting damages.”)              Accordingly, we cannot

                                            19
conclude that the jury erred by awarding Wilson past and future medical expenses

while also declining to award her damages for past pain and mental anguish.

      Wilson also suggests that Dr. Garzillo’s testimony gave grounding for at least

some award of past pain and mental anguish. However, Dr. Garzillo had never

treated Wilson and could only provide opinion testimony related to Wilson’s need for

future medical care and the likelihood that her condition would worsen into pain

“flare-ups” that would increase in intensity as she aged. We fail to see how this

evidence speaks materially to Wilson’s past pain and mental anguish to an extent

requiring the jury to have awarded her such damages.

      For these reasons, we hold that the damages awards for past physical pain and

past mental anguish were not against the great weight and preponderance of the

evidence, and we overrule Wilson’s first issue.

                    B. EXCLUSION OF DR. DAVIS’S TESTIMONY

      In her second issue, Wilson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

excluding Dr. Davis’s expert testimony because she showed (1) that there was good

cause for her untimely expert designations and (2) that allowing Dr. Davis to testify

would not have unfairly surprised or prejudiced Murphy. Wilson also argues that the

trial court’s exclusion of Dr. Davis’s testimony constituted a Rule 215 sanction for

discovery abuse and that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing this sanction

without first considering lesser sanctions.

                                              20
                      1. Standard of Review and Relevant Law

      We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings and enforcement of a scheduling

order for an abuse of discretion. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753

(Tex. 1995); Gunn v. Fuqua, 397 S.W.3d 358, 377 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet.

denied); see Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). A

trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or

principles—that is, if its act is arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d

609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004). An

appellate court must uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if the record shows any

legitimate basis for the ruling. Owens-Corning, 972 S.W.2d at 43.

      “When a party fails to timely designate an expert, exclusion is mandatory and

automatic unless the court finds there was good cause for the failure to amend or

supplement, or the failure will not unfairly surprise or prejudice the other party.”

Pjetrovic v. Home Depot, 411 S.W.3d 639, 646–47 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.)

(internal quotations omitted); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6; Fort Brown Villas III Condo.

Ass’n v. Gillenwater, 285 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex. 2009); see also Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co.,

830 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tex. 1992) (“[T]he trial court has no discretion to admit

testimony excluded by the rule without a showing of good cause.”). “A party who

fails to timely designate an expert has the burden of establishing good cause or a lack

of unfair surprise or prejudice before the trial court may admit the evidence.”

Gillenwater, 285 S.W.3d at 881.

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                                   a. Good cause

      Wilson argues that good cause existed to explain her counsel’s “inadvertent

failure to timely designate” Dr. Davis due to “calendaring issues that arose as a result

of a large staff turnover.” But the good-cause exception is usually available only in

“difficult or impossible circumstances.” Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914; Cresson Int., LLC

v. Rooster, No. 02-21-00366-CV, 2022 WL 3904968, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Aug. 31, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). And it is well-settled that inadvertence of

counsel does not generally constitute good cause for failure to adhere to discovery

deadlines. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 915 (“If inadvertence of counsel, by itself, were

good cause, the exception would swallow up the rule, for there would be few cases in

which counsel would admit to making a deliberate decision not to comply with the

discovery rules.”); Cresson, 2022 WL 3904968, at *6 (holding that appellant failed to

show good cause for untimely discovery when its counsel cited pandemic-related

reasons for missing deadlines).

      Here, Wilson’s counsel vaguely credits “calendaring issues that arose as a result

of large staff turnover” as the reason why the expert-designation deadline was missed.

The trial court was provided no particulars about what caused the staff turnover—a

problem that law offices regularly combat—or even the time-period affected by that

turnover.   Essentially, Wilson asked the trial court to find that her attorney’s

commonplace inadvertence was good cause for missing the deadline. Faced with this,

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we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not finding good cause to

excuse Wilson’s untimely expert designation.

                           b. Unfair surprise or prejudice

      Wilson next argues that she showed that allowing Dr. Davis to testify would

not have resulted in unfair surprise or prejudice to Murphy because Dr. Davis’s name

was contained in medical records and other discovery responses and because his

testimony would have been “materially the same as what was contained in the records

and affidavit previously produced.” Thus, says Wilson, Murphy was provided all

information necessary to prepare to cross examine Dr. Davis at trial in a timely

fashion.

      While there is a preference for cases to be decided on a full presentation of

their merits, Texas law also recognizes that “[a] party is entitled to prepare for trial

assured that a witness will not be called because opposing counsel has not identified

him or her in response to a proper interrogatory.” Pjetrovic, 411 S.W.3d at 646–47

(citing Smith v. Sw. Feed Yards, 835 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Tex. 1992)). Though Wilson

contends that Dr. Davis’s name was “all over” her medical records, she did not—

despite bearing the burden to do so—identify any such specific records to the trial

court or on appeal. To the contrary, Dr. Davis’s involvement in Wilson’s care and the

possibility that he would be used as an expert at trial is not as obvious from the record

as she would have it. Our investigation of the medical records available to us reveals

that Dr. Davis’s name appears on only two of hundreds of pages of records, and even

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then only once in the header of a Health First referral form and on a routine intake

form. And, of course, Dr. Davis himself testified that he had never actually treated

Wilson.

       Beyond these two passing mentions in the medical records, Dr. Davis’s name

does not appear again in the record until February 9, 2023—less than three weeks

before trial and after the discovery deadline had passed—when Wilson supplemented

her Rule 194 disclosures and included him in a narrative outlining all of her medical

treatment. And, importantly, the first time that Wilson explicitly indicated to Murphy

that she desired to call Dr. Davis as an expert did not come until a hearing on the first

day of trial.

       Wilson contends that Elliot v. Elliot is factually similar to her case and supports

her argument that Murphy was not unfairly surprised or prejudiced by her failure to

timely designate Dr. Davis. 21 S.W.3d 913, 921 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet.

denied). We disagree.

       In Elliot, the trial court excluded mental-health-expert testimony at a pretrial

bill-of-review hearing. Id. The appellant had failed to include any medical experts

within her answer to an interrogatory requesting a list of experts. Id. However, within

the same set of interrogatories, she did provide a list of her mental-health providers in

response to an interrogatory requesting the identities of all providers from whom she

had received treatment. Id. We held that the trial court abused its discretion because

the appellant’s mental health was at issue and she had timely and specifically listed

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each potential expert in response to an interrogatory within the same set of

interrogatories.11 Id.

         Unlike in Elliot, Wilson never explicitly identified Dr. Davis in a timely

response to discovery. As we just pointed out, except for being buried in hundreds of

pages of medical records, Dr. Davis’s name does not appear in the record until Wilson

supplemented her Rule 194 disclosures after the close of discovery and on the eve of

trial.

         On these facts, we hold that the trial court did not act “without reference to

any guiding rules or principles” when it determined that Wilson had failed to show

that her failure to timely designate Dr. Davis as an expert would not unfairly surprise

or prejudice Murphy. See Low, 221 S.W.3d at 614.

                            c. Sanction for discovery abuse

         Finally, Wilson argues that the exclusion of Dr. Davis’s testimony was

effectively a Rule 215 sanction for discovery abuse and that the trial court abused its

discretion by enacting that sanction without first considering lesser sanctions. See

Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992) (explaining that for a

sanction to be just it must be no more severe than necessary to satisfy the legitimate

purpose of discouraging further discovery abuse). But Wilson failed to preserve this

          Ultimately, we held that the error was harmless. Id. at 922.
         11

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argument for review and, regardless, the law does not support her characterization of

the trial court’s ruling as a sanction for discovery abuse.

       Wilson never presented this argument to the trial court—neither at trial when

the trial court excluded Dr. Davis’s testimony nor in her motion for new trial. In

general, a party must first present its complaint to the trial court and cannot raise it

for the first time on appeal—this includes complaints that the trial court abused its

discretion by issuing a certain sanction for discovery abuse. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a);

Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. 2014); see Jurgens v. Martin, 631 S.W.3d

385, 408 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.) (holding that appellant failed to

preserve Rule 215 discovery-abuse-sanctions complaint); Lucchese Boot Co. v. Licon,

388 S.W.3d 365, 376 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) (same). We hold that

Wilson failed to preserve this complaint for our review.

       Even if Wilson had preserved her complaint, it would be unavailing. A trial

court’s exclusion of an expert witness on the grounds that he was untimely

designated—as occurred here—has been repeatedly held to be a ruling on a

substantive deficiency rather than a Rule 215 sanction. See White v. Browning, No. 03-

04-00273-CV, 2006 WL 151980, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 19, 2006, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (collecting cases). This makes sense because a trial court must exclude an

untimely-designated witness absent a showing of good cause or unfair surprise or

prejudice. Because Wilson failed to make such a showing, the trial court’s only option

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was to exclude Dr. Davis’s testimony; doing so could not have been an abuse of

discretion. See id.

       For these reasons, we overrule Wilson’s second issue.

                                III. CONCLUSION

       Having overruled both of Wilson’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                     /s/ Brian Walker

                                                     Brian Walker
                                                     Justice

Delivered: April 11, 2024

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