Court Opinion

ID: 9759529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:19:25.091421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.625499
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County (trial court) erred in allowing Curtis John Kovalesky (Licensee) to appeal nunc pro tunc from the driver’s license suspension imposed by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) pursuant to the Driver’s License Compact (Compact), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581. For the following reasons, I cannot agree.
Licensee was arrested in West Virginia on January 19, 2002, and was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a violation of W. Va.Code § 17C-5-2. (R.R. at 67a.) On January 30, 2002, West Virginia revoked Licensee’s driving privileges in that state pursuant to W. Va.Code § 17C-5A-1(c). (R.R. at 8a.) Licensee challenged the revocation, requesting a hearing before the Commissioner of West Virginia’s Division of Motor Vehicles (Commissioner). (R.R. at 15a.)
On April 24, 2002, in Hancock County Magistrate Court, the DUI charge was dismissed, and Licensee pleaded no contest to a lesser offense, driving while under the age of twenty-one years with a blood alcohol concentration of .02 or more, but less than .10, a violation of W. Va.Code § 17C-5-2(h). (R.R. at 10a, 67a.) The Magistrate certified this conviction to DOT in an abstract of judgment. (R.R. at 67a, 77a.) On July 9, 2002, DOT suspended ■ Licensee’s driving privileges in Pennsylvania for “a violation that is similar to violating Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, DRIVING UNDER INFLUENCE.” 1 (R.R. at 64a.)
On August 19, 2002, Licensee received an administrative hearing in West Virginia on the revocation of his driving privileges. (R.R: at 15a-16a.) Because West Virginia failed to present any evidence at the hearing,. the Commissioner reversed the revocation of Licensee's driving privileges by order dated August 30, 2002. Id.
Licensee, who was represented by counsel, believed that, under the Compact, West Virginia was required to notify DOT of the Commissioner’s restoration of Licensee’s driving privileges, and DOT was required to rescind its license suspension in Pennsylvania. When that did not occur, Licensee sought to appeal DOT’s suspension nunc pro tunc before the trial court. On January 9, 2003, the trial court held a hearing solely to determine whether to allow a nunc pro tunc appeal in this case.2 {See R.R. at 18a, 28a, 50a, 55a.)
The majority states, “Licensee ■ argued that nunc pro tunc relief was appropriate *33because there was a ‘breakdown in the court operation.’ ” (Majority op. at 28.) I submit that this is incorrect. Although the majority does quote from a statement made by counsel for Licensee,3 the “breakdown” argument was not the argument made by Licensee on January 9, 2003, nor was it the argument that persuaded the trial court to allow a nunc pro tunc appeal in this case. Indeed, when DOT made the “breakdown” argument, Licensee’s attorney responded, “I don’t believe that there has to be a breakdown.... The case law is [that a nunc pro tunc appeal is allowed if there is] a unique circumstance_” (R.R. at 29a-30a.)
Counsel for Licensee was correct. “[C]ourts have held that an appeal nunc pro tunc may be granted in a unique case upon a showing that unusual circumstances prevented a party from timely filing....” Hanoverian v. Lehigh County Board of Assessment, 701 A.2d 288, 289 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). Counsel for Licensee argued that the unusual circumstances of this case prevented Licensee from filing a timely appeal. Essentially, the argument was that, until West Virginia restored Licensee’s driving privileges, it was impossible for Licensee to challenge DOT’s suspension based on the restoration of his driving privileges in West Virginia. Of course, by the time West Virginia acted to restore Licensee’s driving privileges, the period for appealing the DOT suspension had expired. The trial court recognized that these were unusual circumstances that prevented Licensee from filing a timely appeal to raise that issue. Thus, the trial court concluded that a nunc pro tunc appeal was necessary.4 I see no error in this determination.
Having granted a nunc pro tunc appeal, the trial court sustained the appeal based on Tripson v. Department of Transportation, 773 A.2d 195 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 690, 796 A.2d 320 (2002). In Tripson, as here, DOT attempted to offer into evidence a West Virginia Magistrate’s abstract of judgment to meet its burden of proving an out-of-state conviction. This Court held that a West Virginia Magistrate’s abstract of judgment was inadequate to satisfy Article III of the Compact, which requires the licensing authority of the party state to report the conviction to DOT.5 Id. Here, because the Magistrate’s abstract of judgment presented by DOT was not sufficient to meet DOT’s burden of proving an out-of-state conviction, the trial court did not err in sustaining Licensee’s appeal.
Accordingly, unlike the majority, I would affirm.

. At the hearing, DOT attempted to introduce documents relating to the merits of the case and moved to quash the appeal. (R.R. at 24a.) Licensee objected to the admission of *33the documents, arguing that they were irrelevant to the nunc pro tunc appeal issue. (R.R. at 24a-25a.) The trial court agreed with Licensee and sustained the objection to the admissibility of the documents. (R.R. at 42a.)

. Counsel for Licensee stated, "Your Honor, the purpose of this hearing ... is to establish the existence of some breakdown in the Court operation or some unique circumstance which would entitle my client to a hearing on whether or not his license privilege should be ... suspended.” (R.R. at 25a) (emphasis added).

. The majority states that the trial court permitted the nunc pro tunc appeal without an opinion or explanation. (Majority op. at 4.) However, I believe the basis for the trial court’s decision is clear from the argument presented by Licensee at the January 9, 2003, hearing.

. This court also stated that DOT may not certify a document to be the report of a conviction from a licensing authority if the document itself does not contain certification by the licensing authority. Tripson.