Court Opinion

ID: 9779261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:41:47.980103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:24.425902
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
Respondent, Gertrude Duke, has filed an earnest petition to rehear wherein she contends, in part, that this Court has overlooked several prior Tennessee decisions, and as a result, said prior decisions were effectively overruled. Several cases are cited as overlooked, however, in fact only the case of Garis v. Eberling, 18 Tenn. App. 1, 71 S.W.2d 215 (1934), was not considered when we originally decided this case. Having studied the case, it is clear that it adds no new authority. In fact, the language used therein is remarkably simi*780lar to the language found in the cases previously cited to this Court. Moreover, Respondent makes no new argument based on Eberling, hut merely reiterates her prior contentions. The foregoing is no basis for a petition to rehear. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Garrett, 510 S.W.2d 894 (Tenn.1974).
Respondent further contends that the instant decision places this jurisdiction in the minority, in that we have adopted the “economic benefit” test. Respondent has apparently misconstrued our original opinion, and a careful reading of the opinion and authorities cited therein discloses that we did in fact apply the majority rule based upon the facts of this case.
In W. Prosser’s, treatise, Law of Torts 386-87 (4th ed. 1971), the minority rule is succinctly examined and defined as follows :
“[The economic benefit theory], which has received approval from a number of legal writers, and was adopted by the First Restatement of Torts, is that the duty of affirmative care to make the premises safe is imposed upon the man in possession as the price he must pay for the economic benefit he derives, or expects to derive, from the presence of the visitor; and that when no such benefit is to be found, he is under no such duty. On this basis the rbusiness’ on which the visitor comes must be one of at least potential pecuniary profit to the possessor.” (Emphasis added).
We did not adopt the foregoing rule. In fact, we specifically stated that under our holding “one can be an invitee even though no pecuniary benefit is to be found”. (Emphasis added). We also stated that “[t]he key test under this holding is whether the person is invited with the implied or express assurance that the place is prepared and safe for him”. These statements and our holding herein are in accord with “the great majority of the courts . . . ” See generally, W. Prosser, Law of Torts 389 (4th ed. 1971). Moreover, the Second Restatement of Torts § 330 et seq. which we adopted in this case, is in accord with this rule. See, W. Prosser, Law of Torts 391 (4th ed. 1971). It is therefore apparent that Respondent’s contention, which stated that this Court by adopting the Second Restatement of Torts adopted the minority economics benefit rule, is erroneous.
It results, therefore; any previous cases notwithstanding, that we do not reverse our previous decision herein, but reaffirm said decision which is in accord with the majority of other jurisdictions.
The petition to rehear is denied.
DYER, C. J., and CHATTIN, Mc-CANLESS and FONES, JJ., concur.