Court Opinion

ID: 9911323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 20:04:28.24993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:26.253531
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 230121-U

                                                                             SECOND DIVISION
                                                                             December 19, 2023

                                          No. 1-23-0121

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                      )     Cook County.
                                                )
      v.                                        )     No. 21 CR 6338
                                                )
KASHIF MUHAMMAD,                                )     Honorable
                                                )     Kenneth J. Wadas,
      Defendant-Appellee.                       )     Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       PRESIDING JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Ellis and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed; the unlawful use of
       a weapon by a felon (UUWF) statute is constitutional as applied to defendant and on its
       face under the second amendment to the United States Constitution.

¶2     The State charged defendant, Kashif Muhammad, with unlawful use of a weapon by a

felon (UUWF) in violation of section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS

5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020)). Following a jury trial, the circuit court of Cook County convicted and

sentenced defendant for UUWF. For the first time in this direct appeal of defendant’s conviction,

defendant argues that section 24-1.1(a) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him in

violation of the second amendment to the United States Constitution pursuant to the test

announced by the United States Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,
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597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2411 (2022). We find that section 24-1.1(a) is constitutional as applied

to defendant and on its face because the second amendment does not protect felons’ “right to

keep and bear arms.” See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111,

2156 (2022) (“The Second Amendment guaranteed to ‘all Americans’ the right to bear

commonly used arms in public subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions. *** New

York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment in that it prevents law-

abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear

arms.” (Emphases added.))

¶3     Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶4                                      BACKGROUND

¶5     A police officer stopped a vehicle defendant was driving for a traffic violation. Based on

defendant’s movements, the officer suspected defendant possessed something he did not want

the officer to find. The officer performed a pat-down search of defendant, whereupon the officer

discovered that defendant possessed a handgun. The officer arrested defendant and, in May 2021,

the State charged defendant with two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW)

and one count of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF).

¶6     Defendant represented himself in the trial court. Defendant filed a pro se motion to quash

arrest and suppress evidence. At a hearing on the motion, the officer who arrested defendant

testified the officer stopped defendant because the driver’s view was obstructed by an air

freshener hanging from the rearview mirror. When the officer stopped defendant’s vehicle, there

was a passenger in the front passenger seat, the officer could detect the smell of burnt cannabis in

the vehicle, and defendant failed to produce proof of insurance. Based on defendant’s

movements during the stop and the smell of burnt cannabis the officer suspected defendant was

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hiding something. The officer performed the pat down search and found a loaded handgun on

defendant’s person. Defendant failed to produce a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID)

card or a valid Concealed Carry License (CCL). Defendant told the officer he did not have a

FOID card or a CCL. The officer later discovered additional live rounds of ammunition in

defendant’s pants pocket.

¶7     Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to quash arrest and suppress

evidence. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the UUWF count only. The State moved to bar

defendant from arguing at trial that the UUWF statute is unconstitutional. The court granted the

State’s motion. At trial, the State entered a certified copy of defendant’s prior felony conviction

for theft into evidence. After the State rested its case, defendant did not present any evidence.

The jury found defendant guilty of UUWF.

¶8     The trial court appointed the public defender to represent defendant for posttrial

proceedings. Defendant, through counsel, filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict or new trial. The posttrial motion did not argue the UUWF statute is unconstitutional.

The trial court denied the motion. Defendant, through counsel, also filed an amended motion for

a new trial and a motion to reconsider sentence. The trial court denied both motions.

¶9     This appeal followed.

¶ 10                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 11   The issue in this appeal is whether section 24-1.1(a) of the Code (the UUWF statute)

violates the second amendment to the United States constitution (U.S. const., amend. II) both as

applied to defendant and on its face because there is allegedly “no founding-era analogue of

permanent status-based revocation of the right to keep and bear arms” applicable to convicted

felons under the second amendment test the United States Supreme Court articulated in Bruen.

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The sole issue on appeal involves the constitutionality of a statute; and the constitutionality of a

statute is an issue this court reviews de novo. Blanchard v. Berrios, 2016 IL 120315, ¶ 16 (“The

interpretation of constitutional provisions is governed by the same general principles that apply

to statutes”), People v. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 21 (“the interpretation of a statute

presents a question of law that we review de novo”). Initially, we note that defendant’s as-

applied challenge to the statute is not forfeited. See Baker, ¶ 35 (and cases cited therein finding

that the Illinois Supreme Court and the First, Second, and Third Districts of the Illinois Appellate

Court have all held that a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute may be raised at any time

and that this proposition applies equally to as-applied claims as to facial claims).

¶ 12    It is universally accepted that Bruen “set out a new framework for lower courts to

evaluate gun laws.” Herrera v. Raoul, 23 CV 532, 2023 WL 3074799, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25,

2023), aff'd sub nom. Bevis v. City of Naperville, Illinois, 23-1353, 2023 WL 7273709 (7th Cir.

Nov. 3, 2023) (citing Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126-34; United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443, 450-

51 (5th Cir. 2023) (“acknowledging that ‘Bruen clearly fundamentally changed our analysis of

laws that implicate the Second Amendment, rending our prior precedent obsolete’ (cleaned up

and internal citation omitted)”)). See also Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 2; People v.

Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 68 (“in Bruen, the Supreme Court announced a new

analytical framework for evaluating the constitutionality of firearm regulations”).

               “The Bruen Court outlined a two-step analysis to determine whether a

       challenged gun regulation is constitutional. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126-34. The

       Court must first determine whether ‘the Second Amendment's plain text covers an

       individual’s conduct.’ [Citation.] If the plain text does not cover the challenged

       regulation, then the regulation is outside of the Second Amendment’s scope and is

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        unprotected. [Citation.] However, if the text does include such conduct, ‘the

        Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.’ [Citation.] As such, for the

        regulation to be upheld as constitutional, ‘[t]he government must *** justify its

        regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical

        tradition of firearm regulation.’ [Citation.]” Herrera, 23 CV 532, 2023 WL

        3074799, at *5.

¶ 13    We have no need to reach the test the government must pass “[t]o demonstrate that a

regulation is ‘consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.’ ” Herrera,

23 CV 532, 2023 WL 3074799, at *5. This case can be disposed of on the ground the second

amendment’s plain text does not cover the conduct at issue; specifically, possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon regardless of the nature of the felony, or, in other words, defendant’s status-

based prohibition on gun possession. Id.; Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37.

¶ 14    In Baker, the defendant argued that the UUWF statute was unconstitutional as applied to

him. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 33. The difference between an as-applied challenge to

the constitutionality of a statute and a facial challenge is that an as-applied challenge “alleges

only that the statute violates the constitution as applied to the particular facts and circumstances

in the instant case” whereas a facial challenge alleges the statute is unconstitutional under any set

of facts (id. ¶ 34); that is, a facial challenge alleges there is no set of facts under which the statute

could be applied constitutionally (People v. Ruth, 2022 IL App (1st) 192023, ¶ 35 (citing Lebron

v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 228 (2010))). Our analysis in this case can end

with defendant’s as-applied challenge, for if the statute may be constitutionally applied to

defendant, clearly there is a set of circumstances under which the statute could be

constitutionally applied, and the facial challenge must also fail. See People v. Villareal, 2023 IL

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127318, ¶ 52 (“Since he acknowledges there may be situations where the statute may be

constitutionally applied ***, his facial challenge fails”); In re Jawan S., 2018 IL App (1st)

172955, ¶ 48 (“A facial challenge fails if we can conceive of any set of circumstances in which

the statute could be validly applied—including as applied to the very party before us.”).

¶ 15   In Baker, as in this case, the defendant argued that the UUWF statute is unconstitutional

under the second amendment pursuant to the test for constitutionality the United States Supreme

Court announced in Bruen. In Baker, the defendant’s predicate felony was manufacturing and

delivery of heroin. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 5. This court found that

               “[t]he problem with defendant’s argument is that Bruen just does not

       apply to him. The Bruen Court could not have been more clear that its newly

       announced test applied only to laws that attempted to regulate the gun possession

       of ‘law-abiding citizens,’ and not felons like defendant. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ––––,

       142 S. Ct. at 2156 (the holding was limited to laws affecting ‘law-abiding

       citizens’).” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___,

       142 S. Ct. at 2156).

The Baker court also noted that “Justice Kavanaugh in his concurrence quoted an earlier case

that stated: “ ‘[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding

prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons ***.’ Bruen, 597 U.S. at ––––, 142 S. Ct. at

2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.) (quoting [District of Columbia v.]

Heller, 554 U.S. [570,] 626-27 [(2008)]).” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37. In Heller, the

Court wrote that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited” and that

“nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the

possession of firearms by felons.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. This court held that based on “the

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plain, clear, and repeated language of the justices in the majority, [the] defendant is simply

outside the box drawn by Bruen.” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37.

¶ 16   In this case, defendant does not dispute, and agrees, writing in defendant’s opening brief,

that “[t]o evaluate the constitutionality of Section 24-1.1(a) of the unlawful use of a weapon by a

felon statute, this Court must answer two questions: (1) whether [defendant] falls within the

Second Amendment’s protections at all, and (2) if he does, whether the historical record justifies

a permanent ban on his ability to possess any firearm at any time.” (Emphasis added.) In aid of

defendant’s preferred answer to the first question, defendant argues that “[t]he Supreme Court’s

analysis in Heller began with a ‘strong presumption’ that the right to keep and bear arms

belonged to ‘all Americans.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Defendant argues this necessarily includes

Americans with felony convictions. Defendant attempts to refute the idea that language

describing the second amendment right as belonging to “law abiding citizens” is evidence that

the second amendment excludes people with felony convictions from its protections by asserting

that the Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly refused to ‘read too much into the [Supreme] Court’s

“precautionary language” ’ ” and that “the reference to ‘law abiding’ citizens in Heller was

dicta,” presumably to little if any effect. Defendant also argues that Bruen itself abrogates any

such presumption—that is, felon dispossession—because “[t]he only presumption active in

Bruen was its presumption about conduct: ‘when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an

individual’s conduct.’ ”

¶ 17   We disagree with defendant’s conclusion that the second amendment “presumptively

applies to him.” We agree with the Baker court’s reasoning that the Bruen court expressly and

repeatedly limited its holding to “law abiding citizens” and, as importantly, confirmed that

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“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” (Heller, 554 U.S. at 627)

remained unharmed by its decision.

¶ 18   In further reply, defendant claims that this court’s decision in People v. Brooks, 2023 IL

App (1st) 200435, ¶ 89, rejects the argument that the burden is on defendant to establish that the

regulated activity falls within the protection of the second amendment and a defendant’s—a

felon’s—possession of a firearm is presumptively constitutional. We are not swayed by Brooks.

¶ 19   As a threshold matter, even if we were to follow Brooks rather than Baker, defendant’s

outcome would remain the same. This court in Brooks acknowledged that “since Bruen, courts of

various jurisdictions have grappled with this issue and in the vast majority of cases have found

that, as applied to nonviolent felons, statutes prohibiting felons from possessing weapons are

constitutional under Bruen.” Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 79. See also id. ¶ 105.

¶ 20   In Brooks, the State did argue that the plain text of the second amendment did not

encompass the defendant because he was “not a ‘law abiding citizen,’ ” and the Brooks court did

hold that the defendant’s status as a felon is irrelevant at the stage of the analysis that asks

whether the regulated conduct falls under the conduct protected by the plain language of the

second amendment. Brooks, ¶¶ 87-89. Instead, according to Brooks, “[h]ow the defendant’s prior

felony might impact his second amendment right to possess a firearm is more properly evaluated

under the second step’s historical tradition analysis.” Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 89.

The Brooks court engaged in that analysis and concluded that:

       “there is a historical tradition of legislatures exercising their discretion to impose

       ‘status-based restrictions’ disarming entire ‘categories of persons’ who, based on

       their past conduct, were presumed unwilling to obey the law. Range, 69 F.4th at

       129 (Krause, J., dissenting). ‘Legislatures did so not because the individuals in

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         these groups were considered dangerous [or violent], but because, based on their

         status, they were deemed non-law-abiding subjects.’ [Citations.] While the

         particular groups varied over time, the founders understood that felons were one

         such group. Range, 69 F.4th at 129.” Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 97. But

         see Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 38 (finding Range “does not cause us to

         reconsider our decision”, in part because it “is limited to misdemeanor

         convictions [and] does not aid [the] defendant”).

¶ 21     Nonetheless, we find support for our view in the Brooks court’s own analysis. See

Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 95. 1 The Brooks court ultimately held that: “Since the

defendant in the instant case was twice convicted of a felony, albeit nonviolent ones, he is not a

law-abiding citizen, and the armed habitual criminal statute that prohibits his possession of

firearms is constitutional as applied to him.” Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 100.

Ironically, in reaching that decision allegedly under the second step of the Bruen analysis, the

Brooks court agreed that categorical restrictions on the possession of firearms such as by felons

“are inextricably linked to the notion of ‘law-abiding citizens.’ ” Id. ¶ 92. Later, the court further

found:

1
         “Prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791, during the ratification process, the ‘highly
influential minority proposal’ [citations], published by the Anti-Federalist delegates in Pennsylvania,
suggested that the people should have a right to bear arms ‘ “unless for crimes committed, or real danger
of public injury from individuals.” ’ [Citation.] While this amendment was not adopted, it is important
because it reflects the understanding of the founders that ‘crimes committed,’ whether dangerous or not,
justified disarmament.” Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 95. This “important” proposal does not say
that the people would lose the right to bear arms for crimes committed; it conditioned the right based on
whether crimes were committed.

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             “The majority of legal historians agree with this position, noting that in

      ‘classical republican political philosophy’ the right to bear arms was ‘inextricably

      and multifariously tied to’ the concept of a ‘virtuous citizenry.’ [Citations.] In

      other words:

                     ‘[T]he right to bear arms in the Founding era [was] a civic

             right. Such a right was not something that all persons could claim

             but was limited to those members of the polity who were deemed

             capable of exercising it in a virtuous manner.’ (Emphasis in

             original and emphasis added.) [Citation.].

             As such ‘[f]elons simply did not fall within the benefit of the common law

      right to possess arms,’ which turned on one’s law-abiding character. [(Emphasis

      added.) Citations.].

             This conclusion is further bolstered by Supreme Court precedent. In

      Heller, the Court held that the second amendment ‘elevates above all other

      interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of

      hearth and home.’ (Emphasis added.) Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. *** Subsequently,

      in Bruen, the Supreme Court characterized the holders of second amendment

      rights as ‘law-abiding citizens’ no fewer than fourteen times. [Citation.] These

      included its instruction to identify historical analogues to modern firearm

      regulations by assessing how and why the regulations burden a ‘law-abiding

      citizen’s’ right to armed self-defense. [(Emphasis added.) (Citation.)] In addition,

      the Bruen Court indicated that it would not disfavor a licensing regime that

      required applicants to undergo criminal background checks that are ‘designed to

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       ensure’ that ‘those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact law-abiding,

       responsible citizens.’ (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.)

       [Citation.]” Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 98-99.

¶ 22    Based on our reading of the Brooks court’s historical analysis, we find that the history on

which Brooks relies finds that categorical prohibitions on felons’ possession of firearms are

“consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” under Bruen’s second

prong and lends support to the Baker court’s finding that “Bruen just does not apply” because

“defendant is simply outside the box drawn by Bruen.” Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37.

We note that the Brooks court did nothing to elucidate the distinction it drew between the

conduct of possessing a firearm and the status of the actor possessing the firearm for second

amendment purposes. We agree with Baker’s implicit finding that the regulated conduct in this

context is not mere possession but possession by a felon.

¶ 23   We reject Brooks’ holding that relying on the defendant’s status as a felon to find that the

defendant’s possession of a firearm is removed from the protections of the second amendment

“conflates Bruen’s first step with its second” because the first step “asks only whether ‘the

Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct” (emphasis in original), meaning

only the conduct of possession, not the conduct of a particular actor engaged in the conduct. See

id. ¶ 89. We find this to be an overly narrow view of the first step of the Bruen analysis that the

Supreme Court did not intend. As evidence the Supreme Court did not intend the first step to be

read in this way, we agree with Baker: “Just in case a reader missed the first time that the court

said it, the court repeated it 18 times. Bruen, 597 U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 2111 passim (the six

justices in the majority repeated the phrase ‘law-abiding’ 18 times in their majority opinion and

their concurrences).” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37.

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¶ 24    We find defendant’s argument the UUWF statute is unconstitutional as applied to him

fails at the first step of the Bruen analysis. Therefore, we find that section 24-1.1(a) is

constitutional as applied to defendant and, because the statute may be constitutionally applied to

felons, it is not unconstitutional on its face.

¶ 25                                        CONCLUSION

¶ 26    For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 27    Affirmed.

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