Court Opinion

ID: 9953670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 16:09:39.408549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:38.621087
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. 294A22

                               Filed 22 March 2024

DAVID BEAVERS

             v.
JOHN MCMICAN

      Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of

the Court of Appeals, 285 N.C. App. 31 (2022), reversing an order of summary

judgment entered on 14 October 2020 by Judge Keith O. Gregory in Superior Court,

Wake County, and remanding the case for further proceedings. Heard in the Supreme

Court on 13 September 2023.

      Matheson & Associates, PLLC, by John R. Szymankiewicz and Jammie L.
      Wacenske, for plaintiff-appellee.

      Batch, Poore & Williams, PC, by J. Patrick Williams, for defendant-appellant.

      EARLS, Justice.

      This appeal raises a narrow legal issue of statutory interpretation involving

the controversial heartbalm torts recognized in North Carolina. Plaintiff David

Beavers brought civil claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation

against his ex-wife’s alleged paramour, defendant John McMican. The first question

before this Court is whether the holding in Rodriguez v. Lemus, 257 N.C. App. 493
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                                     Opinion of the Court

(2018)1, concerning which evidence is relevant to prove pre-separation conduct, is

inconsistent with the enacted language and legislative intent of N.C.G.S. § 52-13,

which specifies that post-separation conduct cannot give rise to liability in these

circumstances. The second related issue for this Court is whether the trial court

improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. McMican. After reviewing the

text of section 52-13 and finding it unambiguous, we hold that the Court of Appeals’

opinion in Rodriguez is consistent with legislative intent. Accordingly, evidence of

post-separation conduct may be used to corroborate pre-separation conduct, so long

as the evidence of pre-separation conduct gives rise to more than mere conjecture.

Rodriguez, 257 N.C. App. at 498. Nonetheless, because we find the evidence of pre-

separation conduct in this case does not give rise to more than mere conjecture

regarding the identity of Mrs. Beavers’ paramour, we reverse the decision of the Court

of Appeals and hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor

of Mr. McMican.

                               I.    Procedural History

       On 13 December 2018, Mr. Beavers sued Mr. McMican on theories of alienation

of affection and criminal conversation. On 14 January 2020, Mr. McMican filed a

motion for summary judgment on both claims. On 17 August 2020, the trial court

conducted a hearing on Mr. McMican’s motion during which both parties referenced

       1 This Court denied discretionary review and dismissed a petition for writ of certiorari

to review the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Rodriguez. See 371 N.C. 447 (2018).

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recent depositions of Mrs. Beavers and Mr. McMican’s ex-wife, Jessica McMican;

however, neither deposition was certified until 20 August 2020, three days later. On

14 October 2020, the trial court entered an order granting Mr. McMican’s motion for

summary judgment. Mr. Beavers timely appealed.

       At the Court of Appeals, Mr. Beavers submitted a record supplement pursuant

to Rule 11(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure containing, inter alia, the

depositions of Mrs. Beavers and Mrs. McMican discussed by counsel during the

summary judgment hearing. On 23 November 2021, the Court of Appeals entered an

order remanding the matter to the trial court and inquiring which, if either, of the

depositions the trial court considered in granting Mr. McMican’s motion for summary

judgment. Beavers v. McMican, 285 N.C. App. 31, 34 (2022). In response, on 24

February 2022, the trial court entered an amended order granting Mr. McMican’s

motion for summary judgment and confirming that it had not considered either of the

depositions at the original hearing on the matter. Id. Accordingly, the Court of

Appeals stated that neither deposition would inform its review of the trial court’s

order granting Mr. McMican’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 32, 35. We

similarly do not consider any evidence not properly before the trial court when it

decided Mr. McMican’s motion for summary judgment.2

       2 Our decision is based on the principle that “[i]nformation adduced from counsel
during oral arguments cannot be used to support a motion for summary judgment under Rule
56(c).” Huss v. Huss, 31 N.C. App. 463, 466 (1976). Therefore, we limit our consideration to
“evidence consisting of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions,
documentary materials, facts which are subject to judicial notice, and any other materials

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          The Court of Appeals determined that Mr. Beavers presented sufficient

evidence of post-separation conduct involving his former wife and defendant, and that

under Rodriguez, such evidence is corroborative of pre-separation conduct even when

the identity of a pre-separation extramarital sexual partner is unknown. Id. at 41.

Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in granting Mr. McMican’s

motion for summary judgment. Id. Judge Jackson dissented, opining in relevant part

that Mr. Beavers’s allegations lacked evidentiary support, and thus, the trial court

properly granted Mr. McMican’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 46, 63

(Jackson, J., dissenting). Based on Judge Jackson’s dissent, Mr. McMican filed a

notice of appeal with this Court on 21 September 2022, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-

30(2).3

                                  II.      Background

          David and Alison Beavers were married on 23 October 2004. Together they had

three children. On 18 January 2016, Mr. Beavers discovered text messages on Mrs.

Beavers’s phone in which she had sent nude pictures of herself to a person identified

only as “Bestie.” Until this discovery, Mr. Beavers believed he and his wife had a

loving marriage. In addition to the pictures, Mrs. Beavers and “Bestie” had exchanged

messages referencing an instance of sexual intercourse that had occurred before the

which would be admissible in evidence at trial.” Id., (citing Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem,
280 N.C. 513 (1972); Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460 (1972)).
       3 Judge Jackson’s dissent also explained his rationale for eliminating heartbalm torts,

but this issue was not raised or argued by either party in this appeal.

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                                  Opinion of the Court

exchange of the messages and pictures. At the time of this discovery, Mr. Beavers did

not look at the phone number associated with the contact labeled “Bestie” or take any

steps to determine “Bestie’s” identity.

      After confronting Mrs. Beavers, Mr. Beavers left the marital home to stay with

his parents. When he returned several days later, he and Mrs. Beavers discussed the

extramarital affair, and Mrs. Beavers admitted that she had engaged in sexual acts

with the person identified as “Bestie.” Nonetheless, she stated that she and “Bestie”

had not engaged in sexual intercourse. Mrs. Beavers also told Mr. Beavers that her

paramour was a coworker named “Dustin.”

      In the weeks that followed, Mr. Beavers, who was skeptical of the story Mrs.

Beavers told during their first conversation, accused Mrs. Beavers of engaging in

sexual intercourse with another man. In response, Mrs. Beavers ultimately admitted

that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with someone from her workplace, but

she did not specify if that person was “Dustin.” Mr. Beavers was unable to discover

Dustin’s identity, and because Mrs. Beavers did not have anyone named “Dustin” in

her contacts, Mr. Beavers guessed “Dustin” was a pseudonym. The Beaverses

separated for the final time on 16 December 2016.

      On 1 April 2017, three and a half months after she and her husband separated,

and over a year after Mr. Beavers discovered the compromising text messages with

“Bestie,” Mrs. Beavers began openly dating her coworker, Mr. McMican. The two had

known each other through work since the summer of 2011 and had attended work

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events together with other coworkers. The record shows that in October 2016, the two

exchanged ninety-eight text messages. There is also evidence that Mrs. Beavers and

Mr. McMican interacted via Facebook. After learning that Mrs. Beavers and Mr.

McMican were dating, Mr. Beavers concluded that Mr. McMican was his then-

estranged wife’s alleged paramour. But while Mr. McMican admitted to becoming

romantically and sexually involved with Mrs. Beavers in April 2017, there is no

evidence the two were romantically involved before that time.

                           III.    Standard of Review

      We apply de novo review to both issues in this case. Issues of statutory

interpretation are legal issues subject to de novo review. E.g., Saunders v. ADP

TotalSource Fi Xi, Inc., 372 N.C. 29, 38 (2019). Moreover, “[t]his Court reviews

decisions arising from trial court orders granting or denying motions for summary

judgment using a de novo standard of review.” Cummings v. Carroll, 379 N.C. 347,

358 (2021). Rule 56(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure states that

summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56 (2021). When evaluating a

trial court’s decision to “grant or deny a summary judgment motion in a particular

case, ‘we view the pleadings and all other evidence in the record in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.’ ”

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Cummings, 379 N.C. at 358 (quoting N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sadler, 365

N.C. 178, 182 (2011)).

       To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must meet “the burden

(1) of proving an essential element of the opposing party’s claim is nonexistent, or (2)

of showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to

support an essential element of his or her claim.” Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366,

369 (1982) (first citing Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467 (1979); and then

citing Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24 (1974)). “If the moving party

meets this burden, the non-moving party must in turn either show that a genuine

issue of material fact exists for trial or must provide an excuse for not doing so.” Id.

(first citing Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp. v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 200 (1980); then citing

Moore, 296 N.C. at 470; and then citing Zimmerman, 286 N.C. at 29).

IV.    N.C.G.S. § 52-13 and the Court of Appeals’ Decision in Rodriguez v.
                                     Lemus

       Our Court and the Court of Appeals previously have held that sexual conduct

which occurs after a married couple separates but before the couple divorces, can be

used to support alienation of affection and criminal conversation claims. See

McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 284 (2006); Jones v. Skelley, 195 N.C. App.

500, 511–12 (2009).4 But in 2009 the General Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. § 52-13,

       4 Both of these decisions were superseded by statute N.C.G.S. § 52-13(a), as enacted

by An Act to Clarify Procedures in Civil Actions for Alienation of Affection and Criminal
Conversation, S.L. 2009-400, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 780, 780, as recognized in Rodriguez,
257 N.C. App. 493.

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which supersedes these decisions. This statute applies to both alienation of affection

and criminal conversation claims and states:

             No act of the defendant shall give rise to a cause of action
             for alienation of affection or criminal conversation that
             occurs after the plaintiff and the plaintiff's spouse
             physically separate with the intent of either the plaintiff or
             plaintiff's spouse that the physical separation remain
             permanent.

N.C.G.S. § 52-13(a) (2021). In other words, a defendant may be liable only for conduct

that occurs during the marriage and before physical separation. Id.; see also

Rodriguez, 257 N.C. App. at 496–97.

      The Court of Appeals interpreted subsection 52-13(a) in Rodriguez v. Lemus,

and determined that, based on the language of the statute, alienation of affection and

criminal conversation claims could not be sustained without evidence of pre-

separation conduct that met the elements of each respective claim. 257 N.C. App. at

496–97. There the court also determined that evidence of post-separation conduct

could be used to corroborate evidence of pre-separation conduct in either an alienation

of affection or criminal conversation claim, as long as the evidence of pre-separation

conduct was “sufficient to give rise to more than mere conjecture.” Id. at 498.

      Defendant argues that Rodriguez’s holding is inconsistent with the legislative

intent behind N.C.G.S. § 52-13. While it is true that the “principal goal of statutory

construction is to accomplish the legislative intent,” the General Assembly’s intent

“may be found first from the plain language of the statute.” Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353

N.C. 659, 664 (2001). “It is well settled that, ‘[w]here the language of a statute is clear

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                                    Opinion of the Court

and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must

construe the statute using its plain meaning.’ ” In re Est. of Lunsford, 359 N.C. 382,

391–392 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh,

Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209 (1990)).

       Because the text of N.C.G.S. § 52-13 is unambiguous, there is no need for this

Court to engage in statutory construction. Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ holding in

Rodriguez is consistent with our appellate precedent. In In re Estate of Trogdon, 330

N.C. 143 (1991), this Court in addressing an intestate succession claim and being

tasked with determining how much evidence was necessary to show that sexual

intercourse had occurred between the spouse and someone other than her now

deceased husband, explained that “adultery is nearly always proved by

circumstantial evidence . . . as misconduct of this sort is usually clandestine and

secret.” Id. at 148 (cleaned up). In that case the circumstantial evidence consisted of

the spouse voluntarily moving from the marital home and then living with the

suspected paramour, as well as the spouse’s refusal to testify regarding the nature of

her relationship with that person. Id. at 151.

       Additionally, in Pharr v. Beck, 147 N.C. App. 268 (2001), overruled by

McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280,5 the Court of Appeals concluded that post-separation

conduct, namely, sexual intercourse between the defendant and the plaintiff’s spouse,

       5 McCutchen overruled Pharr “to the extent it requires an alienation of affection[]

claim to be based on pre-separation conduct alone.” 360 N.C. at 285.

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                                    Opinion of the Court

 could be used to corroborate the existence of a romantic pre-separation relationship

 between those parties. Id. at 274. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ holding in

 Rodriguez is consistent with both the text of N.C.G.S. § 52-13(a), which requires that

 alienation of affection and criminal conversation claims arise from pre-separation

 conduct and our appellate precedent, which not only acknowledges the frequent need

 for circumstantial evidence to prove these types of claims but also expressly allows

 for evidence of post-separation conduct to corroborate pre-separation conduct.

 Essentially,

                N.C.G.S. § 52-13 prevents defendants in cases involving
                criminal conversation and alienation of affection from
                being held liable for acts taking place after two spouses
                have separated, and Rodriguez effectuates that policy by
                ensuring that, if a factfinder considers evidence of post-
                separation conduct, it does so only insofar as it
                contextualizes pre-separation conduct.

 Beavers, 285 N.C. App. at 39. Thus, we hold that the Court of Appeals’ opinion in

 Rodriguez is consistent with N.C.G.S. § 52-13’s legislative intent, and evidence of

 post-separation conduct can be used to corroborate evidence of pre-separation conduct

 in alienation of affection and criminal conversation claims, if the pre-separation

 conduct gives rise to more than mere conjecture.

V.   Mr. Beavers’s Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation Claims

       To establish an alienation of affection claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the

 plaintiff and his or her spouse “were happily married, and that a genuine love and

 affection existed between them; (2) that the love and affection so existing was

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alienated and destroyed; and (3) that the wrongful and malicious acts of the

defendant produced and brought about the loss and alienation of such love and

affection.” McCutchen, 360 N.C. at 283 (cleaned up). “A malicious act ‘has been loosely

defined to include any intentional conduct that would probably affect the marital

relationship.’ ” Rodriguez, 257 N.C. App. at 495 (quoting Pharr, 147 N.C. App. at 272).

In cases in which the defendant has engaged in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff’s

spouse, “[m]alice is conclusively presumed.” Id. at 495–96. To establish a claim for

criminal conversation, a plaintiff must prove two elements: first, the plaintiff must

show marriage between the spouses, and second, sexual intercourse between the

defendant and the plaintiff’s spouse during the marriage. Id. at 495 (citing Coachman

v. Gould, 122 N.C. App. 443, 446 (1996)).

      Moreover, “while a measure of certainty is required for guidance in deciding

future cases,” our Court has recognized that there is no “brightline test for

determining how much evidence is necessary to permit a jury or trial judge to infer

adultery.” In re Est. of Trogdon, 330 N.C. at 145. Instead, “each . . . case[ ] will demand

a fact-specific inquiry.” Id. Furthermore, “[a]dultery is nearly always proved by

circumstantial evidence” because such evidence “is often the only kind of evidence

available.” Id. at 148 (cleaned up). Accordingly, “adultery is presumed if the following

can be shown: (1) the adulterous disposition, or inclination, of the parties; and (2) the

opportunity created to satisfy their mutual adulterous inclinations.” Id.

      Importantly, and as noted above, if evidence of post-separation conduct is used

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                                  Opinion of the Court

to corroborate pre-separation conduct, the evidence of pre-separation conduct must

“give rise to more than mere conjecture.” Rodriguez, 257 N.C. App. at 498.

Determining what constitutes more than “mere conjecture” is particularly important

“[g]iven the highly emotional nature of the subject matter” in these types of cases.

Chappell v. Redding, 67 N.C. App. 397, 401 (1984) (quoting Horney v. Horney, 56 N.C.

App. 725, 727 (1982)). Thus, a “definite line must be drawn between permissible

inference and mere conjecture.” Id. (quoting Horney, 56 N.C. App. at 727).

      In In re Estate of Trogdon, our Court addressed the issue of mere conjecture in

the context of proving adultery. While this case did not involve an alienation of

affection or criminal conversation claim, its analysis is instructive for both types of

claims. There, this Court noted that the following evidence was sufficient to show

adultery: (1) the wife, Mrs. Trogdon, began arriving home late at night, and began

staying away from the marital home for days at a time until eventually moving out

of the home to an apartment; (2) shortly thereafter, Mr. Winfrey, a man who lived in

the same apartment complex as Mrs. Trogdon, moved into Mrs. Trogdon’s apartment;

(3) when asked about the two living together, Mrs. Trogdon noted that they “couldn’t

see paying rent for two different apartments”; (4) when asked to testify about their

living arrangement, Mrs. Trogdon invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination; (5) Mrs. Trogdon admitted to her son that she and Mr. Winfrey were

“living together”; (6) a private investigator testified that he saw Mrs. Trogdon and

Mr. Winfrey stay in their apartment throughout the night and subsequently

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witnessed Mr. Winfrey leave the apartment to start Mrs. Trogdon’s car before he

returned to their shared apartment; and (7) a witness testified that one morning the

two exited the apartment and left together. Id. at 145–46. Based on this evidence,

this Court concluded that the conduct at issue amounted to more than conjecture. Id.

at 151.

      Regarding the opportunity and inclination prongs, this Court also noted that

the above evidence amounted to “more than suspicion and conjecture.” Id. In doing

so, the Court explained that, while it would “not presume every male-female living

together situation to be amorous,” this living arrangement, when combined with the

other factors present in In re Estate of Trogdon, permit[ted] a “reasonable inference

of adultery.” Id. Specifically, when taken together, the factors listed above supported

an inference that Mrs. Trogdon had both an adulterous inclination and the

opportunity to satisfy that inclination. Id. at 148.

      Our Court of Appeals has also addressed the issue of mere conjecture in both

alienation of affection and criminal conversation claims. In Coachman v. Gould, 122

N.C. App. 443 (1996), the court analyzed the following pre-separation conduct and

determined that it did not rise above mere conjecture: (1) a car ride between the

plaintiff’s wife and the defendant; (2) phone calls between the plaintiff’s wife and the

defendant; and (3) a statement by the plaintiff’s wife while she was in a “medicated

stupor” that she had “been with” the defendant, which the court characterized as

“ambiguous” and “subject to multiple interpretations.” Id. at 446.

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       Regarding the criminal conversation claim, the court noted that, even after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the interactions

between the defendant and the plaintiff’s wife amounted to no more than “mere

conjecture” that the defendant and the plaintiff’s wife had engaged in sexual

intercourse. Id. at 447. To arrive at this conclusion, the court explained that telephone

calls and a car ride were not the types of “opportunities” for sexual intercourse

required under this Court’s precedent in In re Estate of Trogdon. Id. Accordingly, “in

this legal context,” the defendant’s conduct was “innocuous” and did not “amount to

more than mere conjecture.” Id. (cleaned up).

       Regarding the plaintiff’s alienation of affection claim, the court concluded that

the only evidence that might support a finding that the defendant engaged in

wrongful and malicious conduct was phone calls the defendant made to the marital

home. Id. at 447–48. But the defendant’s phone calls could not support this element

for two reasons. First, the defendant and the plaintiff’s wife “had an ongoing business

relationship” and the plaintiff had not met his burden of forecasting evidence that

the phone calls were made for non-business purposes. Id. at 448. Second, even

assuming the calls were of a non-business nature, the plaintiff’s allegation that the

phone calls were “only partially business” and the rest was just “talk, talk, talk, talk,

talk” did not rise to the level of malicious conduct by the defendant designed to

alienate the affections of the plaintiff’s spouse. Id.

       In contrast, in Pharr v. Beck the Court of Appeals addressed an alienation of

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affection claim and determined that the pre-separation conduct at issue rose above

mere conjecture. That pre-separation evidence consisted of: (1) meetings between the

defendant and the plaintiff’s spouse; (2) the defendant holding the plaintiff’s

husband’s hand in front of the plaintiff during the husband’s hospitalization; (3) the

defendant giving plaintiff’s husband several gifts; (4) the defendant giving the

plaintiff’s husband flirtatious looks; (5) the defendant inviting the plaintiff’s husband

to her home and then offering to move out of the home when her husband found her

there with the plaintiff’s husband; (6) the defendant’s husband observing the

plaintiff’s husband and the defendant coming out of the defendant’s bedroom after

the two consumed alcoholic beverages together; (7) the defendant giving the plaintiff’s

husband a calling card and instructions on how to call her while he was on vacation

with the plaintiff; (8) the defendant allowing the plaintiff’s husband to use her post

office box; and (9) the defendant asking the plaintiff’s husband to help her remodel

the house that the two subsequently lived in together. Id. at 273–74. Based on this

pre-separation conduct, which appears to give rise to more than mere conjecture, the

court concluded that post separation sexual intercourse between the defendant and

the plaintiff’s husband could be used to corroborate the existence of a pre-separation

relationship between the parties. Id. at 274. Thus, this evidence could be used to

substantiate the malice element of the plaintiff’s alienation of affection claim. Id. at

271–72, 274.

      Moreover, in Rodriguez the Court of Appeals also concluded that the parties’

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pre-separation conduct gave rise to more than mere conjecture that they were

engaged in an intimate relationship. 257 N.C. App. at 498–500. There the court

addressed both alienation of affection and criminal conversation claims. Id. at 495–

99. The pre-separation evidence in Rodriguez included: (1) 120 phone contacts, which

took place over a one-month period, between the defendant and the plaintiff’s

husband during times when the husband was away from the home; (2) two hotel

charges on the plaintiff’s husband’s credit card; (3) a receipt from a third hotel stay

and information from that hotel that the plaintiff’s husband was there with a woman;

(4) social media posts between the defendant and the plaintiff’s husband, using their

initials, which the plaintiff interpreted as a code used by the two to communicate. Id.

at 498.

      Because the pre-separation evidence in Rodriguez gave rise to more than mere

conjecture, the Court of Appeals also reviewed post-separation evidence. Id. at 498–

99. This evidence, as found by the trial court, consisted of: (1) the plaintiff’s husband

and the defendant living together; (2) the defendant giving birth to a child, which she

named after the plaintiff’s husband; (3) the plaintiff’s husband having told the

plaintiff that he loved the defendant; (4) the plaintiff’s husband telling his wife they

could not reconcile because the defendant was pregnant; and (5) the defendant

admitting at trial that she and the plaintiff’s husband had sexual intercourse after

he had separated from the plaintiff. Id. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that

the evidence of post-separation conduct in Rodriguez corroborated the evidence of pre-

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separation conduct and allowed for two “reasonable inference[s]” to be drawn: first,

that the defendant was the woman who had accompanied the plaintiff’s husband to

the hotel on a specified occasion and, second, that the two engaged in sexual

intercourse on that occasion, which preceded the plaintiff’s separation from her

husband. Id. at 499. Accordingly, this evidence could be used to meet the malice

element of an alienation of affection claim and the sexual intercourse requirement of

a criminal conversation claim. Id. at 495–96, 499.

      In the present case the Court of Appeals determined, and the parties do not

dispute, that whether a marriage existed, whether there was love and affection

between the spouses, and whether that love and affection were alienated are not at

issue here. Beavers, 285 N.C. App. at 36–37. Thus, evidence supports the first two

elements of Mr. Beavers’s alienation of affection claim and the first element of his

criminal conversation claim. As for the alienation of affection claim, the issue is

whether through “wrongful and malicious acts,” Mr. McMican “produced and brought

about the loss and alienation” of Mrs. Beavers’s “love and affection” for her husband.

McCutchen, 360 N.C. at 283. These circumstances can be shown through “any

intentional conduct that would probably affect the marital relationship,” Rodriguez

257 N.C. App. at 495 (quoting Pharr, 147 N.C. App. at 272), or through sexual

intercourse between Mr. McMican and Mrs. Beavers, id. at 495–96. Similarly, at

issue for the criminal conversation claim is whether sexual intercourse occurred

between Mr. McMican and Mrs. Beavers. Id. at 495.

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      It is also apparent that Mrs. Beavers admitted to having sexual relations with

someone else before she and Mr. Beavers separated. The only question is whether

there is any pre-separation evidence that Mr. McMican was that person. Mr.

Beavers’s complaint alleges that he first suspected Mr. McMican and his wife were

having an affair in January 2016, and that he had “found detailed conversations”

between his wife and Mr. McMican, which recounted sexual encounters between the

two and included nude photos. Yet, the allegations in Mr. Beavers’s complaint are

refuted by his deposition testimony, which states that the communications at issue

were between Mrs. Beavers and someone named “Bestie.” Mr. Beavers also admitted

that he did not know the phone number associated with “Bestie” nor did he have

knowledge of “Bestie’s” identity. In fact, the only information Mr. Beavers had about

Mrs. Beavers’s alleged paramour, was that the two worked together and that,

according to Mrs. Beavers, his name was “Dustin.” Moreover, Mr. Beavers did not

suspect Mr. McMican was Mrs. Beavers’s paramour until the two began openly dating

in “the spring of 2017.” Based on this information, Mr. Beavers states he “put two

and two together.”

      But even taking this evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Beavers, as is

required under our summary judgment standard, Cummings, 379 N.C. at 358, this

evidence is insufficient to survive summary judgment because there is no pre-

separation evidence that Mr. John McMican is “Bestie,” “Dustin,” or any other

iteration of the man with whom Mrs. Beavers had an affair before she and Mr.

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                                BEAVERS V. MCMICAN

                                  Opinion of the Court

Beavers separated. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56. The contact designated as “Bestie”

in Mrs. Beavers’s phone, as well as her description of her paramour as “Dustin,” is

“ambiguous” and “subject to multiple interpretations.” Coachman, 122 N.C. App. at

446. Accordingly, the evidence does not give rise to more than mere conjecture that

Mr. McMican is the man with whom Mrs. Beavers had an affair in January of 2016.

      Mr. Beavers notes that, while there is no direct evidence showing that Mr.

McMican is “Bestie” or “Dustin” such evidence is not required under In re Estate of

Trogdon. Although it is true that In re Estate of Trogdon acknowledges that

“[a]dultery is almost always proved by circumstantial evidence,” in that case Mrs.

Trogdon’s paramour was conclusively identified. 330 N.C. at 148, 151. Thus, while

circumstantial evidence may have been used to show that Mrs. Trogdon had an affair,

there was no question as to whom Mrs. Trogdon had that affair with. Id. at 151.

Without evidence of Mrs. Beavers’s alleged paramour’s identity, Mr. Beavers “cannot

produce evidence to support an essential element of his . . . claim.” Lowe, 305 N.C. at

369. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in Mr.

McMican’s favor.

      Additionally, Mr. Beavers argues that Mr. McMican’s malicious intent is

evidenced by his phone and social media contacts with Mrs. Beavers; however,

without evidence that Mr. McMican is “Bestie” or “Dustin,” Mr. Beavers has not

provided enough evidence to support the malice prong of his alienation of affection

claim. Similar to the situation in Coachman, Mr. McMican and Mrs. Beavers worked

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                               BEAVERS V. MCMICAN

                                   Opinion of the Court

together at Merck Durham. Thus, to meet the malice standard for an alienation of

affection claim, Mr. Beavers needs to show that Mr. McMican’s conversations with

Mrs. Beavers “were marked by salacious whisperings, plans for clandestine meetings,

or any other intonation of improper conduct by [the] defendant.” Coachman, 122 N.C.

App. at 448.

      Mr. Beavers cannot meet this standard because he has produced only a

wireless phone call record, which does not include any information regarding the

content of Mrs. Beavers’s and Mr. McMican’s phone conversations. He also has

produced no information regarding the content of Mr. McMican’s and Mrs. Beavers’s

text messages. Moreover, the Facebook contacts between Mr. McMican and Mrs.

Beavers are platonic in nature and consist of a “happy birthday” post from Mrs.

Beavers to Mr. McMican, Mr. McMican’s having added Mrs. Beavers to a Facebook

group, and Mr. McMican “liking” Mrs. Beavers’s posts. These Facebook contacts do

not rise to the level of those present in Rodriguez, which included the parties’

purported use of a secret communication code. See 257 N.C. App. at 498. Mrs. Beavers

“had a right to speak” to Mr. McMican “if she chose to do so.” Coachman, 122 N.C.

App. at 448. Thus, without any verification of Mr. McMican as “Bestie” or “Dustin,”

the pre-separation conduct in this case does not give rise to more than mere

conjecture that Mr. McMican was the person that Mrs. Beavers was seeing

romantically in January of 2016.

      While Mrs. Beavers admitted to having an adulterous relationship prior to her

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                                BEAVERS V. MCMICAN

                                   Opinion of the Court

separation from Mr. Beavers, there is no pre-separation evidence sufficient to

establish that Mr. McMican was the individual involved. Therefore, there is

insufficient evidence to support either the sexual intercourse element of Mr.

Beavers’s criminal conversation claim against Mr. McMican, or an alienation of

affection claim predicated on sexual intercourse with Mr. McMican. Moreover, the

evidence presented is not sufficient to fulfill the inclination prong of In re Estate of

Trogdon. While the evidence detailed above reflects communication between Mrs.

Beavers and Mr. McMican, it does not reflect an “adulterous disposition[ ] or

inclination.” In re Estate of Trogdon, 330 N.C. at 148. Finally, under the opportunity

prong in In re Estate of Trogdon, there is no evidence that Mrs. Beavers had the

opportunity to commit adultery with Mr. McMican because there is no evidence that

she was ever alone with him in circumstances that reasonably could be inferred along

with all the other evidence in the case to constitute an opportunity to engage in sexual

intercourse. See In re Estate of Trogdon, 330 N.C. at 151; Rodriguez, 257 N.C. App.

at 498-99; Pharr, 147 N.C. App. at 273.

      Accordingly, because Mr. Beavers cannot show that Mr. McMican was Mrs.

Beavers’s paramour during the relevant period based on pre-separation evidence, nor

can he show the malice prong of an alienation of affection claim or the sexual

intercourse element of a criminal conversation claim, the trial court was correct to

grant Mr. McMican’s motion for summary judgment. See Lowe, 305 N.C. at 369

(stating that summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows “that

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                               BEAVERS V. MCMICAN

                                 Opinion of the Court

the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or

her claim.”). Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and instruct that

court to reinstate the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of

defendant.

      REVERSED.

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