Court Opinion

ID: 9733736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:16:12.700917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:43.860094
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring).
During the course of litigation, the mother’s plans changed as to where she would live and what she would do for a living. Earlier, she filed an affidavit that she would live with her parents until she could locate a home; later, she testified she did not intend to live with them. She could not tell the trial court, at trial, where she would live, how she would make a living, or where the children would attend school. In discovery proceedings, she answered inter*522rogatories expressing her home as being “residence unknown.” Concerning the children’s school, the answer was “UNKNOWN.”
Under this vague, uncertain and shaky situation, the trial court determined it was not in the best interests of the children to remove these children from South Dakota. The trial court considered the best interests of the children in respect to their temporal, mental and moral welfare. Lindley v. Lindley, 401 N.W.2d 732, 735 (S.D.1987).
Father presented testimony demonstrating an immediate home available in Center-ville, South Dakota, a rural setting where there was an extended family in the area. Father’s mother has a close relationship with these children in this area and there are numerous cousins with whom the children may interact. We considered such factors as being important in Prentice v. Prentice, 322 N.W.2d 880 (S.D.1982).
It appears the children became unsettled and ill during litigation. The trial court found that this stress illness was caused by the mother. Mother told them they would be going to Indiana and specifically made arrangements to have divorce papers served on their father in their presence. She told the children they would be seeing the father a great deal less. Obviously, this upset these children. It appears she inflicted, intentionally, mental trauma upon them. This did not sit well with the trial court. The trial court considered the best interests of these children. See, Origins and Evolution of the “Best Interests of the Child Standard,” 34 S.D.L.Rev. 459, 477, and 489. This standard was considered by the trial court for it did not wish the father and his extended family to be eliminated from the children’s lives. An existing home in a wholesome, secure, and loving environment was far preferable than the domestic situation which encircled them in mother’s custody.
Unquestionably, the trial court was influenced by testimony that mother did not actively seek work; contrariwise, she reflected, under oath, that she could make more money from government programs than by working. Responsible employment is a good quality. Father and stepmother both had a history of steady employment. Inter alia, the trial court found (FF # 18) that this couple would provide a better work example for the children.
Under the Court’s scope of review, we must consider the trial court’s opportunity to gauge the credibility and the emotional stability of the parties. We owe a deference to the trial court’s personal observation of these parties in the courtroom. Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 255 (S.D.1984). Here, the trial court has broad discretion and we can only reverse upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Madsen v. Madsen, 456 N.W.2d 551, 553 (S.D.1990). Under the facts of this case, there is no abuse of discretion in awarding these children to the father. On July 1, 1979, our State Legislature specifically repealed the “tender years” rule. Furthermore, the trial court’s findings are presumptively correct. Hilde v. Flood, 81 S.D. 25, 130 N.W.2d 100 (1964).