Court Opinion

ID: 2964840
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:58.656863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.336978
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                              _________________________
          No. 96-1976
                                  DANIEL J. CURTIS,
                               Petitioner, Appellant,
                                         v.
                              RONALD T. DUVAL, ET AL.,
                               Respondents, Appellees.
                              _________________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                   [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
                              _________________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                            and Lagueux,* District Judge.
                              _________________________
               Wendy Sibbison for appellant.
               Gregory I. Massing, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth
          of Massachusetts, with whom Scott 
                                            Harshbarger, Attorney General,
          was on brief, for appellees.
                              _________________________
                                   August 13, 1997
                              _________________________
          _____________
          *Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.

                    SELYA, Circuit 
                                   Judge. Petitioner-appellant Daniel J.
          Curtis, a state prisoner serving a life sentence for second-degree
          murder, challenges the constitutionality of his conviction. He
          asseverates that three occurrences _ the absence of counsel when
          the trial judge delivered a supplementary jury instruction, the
          fact that the supplementary instruction impermissibly shifted the
          burden of proof, and the trial court's refusal to immunize a
          potential defense witness _ abridged his constitutional rights.
          The district court declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus. We
          affirm.
          I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                    A Suffolk County (Massachusetts) jury convicted the
          petitioner of second-degree murder on December 30, 1980, and the
          trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Massachusetts
          Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) turned down the petitioner's initial
          appeal, in which he argued that the trial court had transgressed
          his rights to due process and compulsory process under the Sixth
          and Fourteenth Amendments when it refused to immunize a prospective
          defense witness. See 
                               Commonwealth v. 
                                              Curtis, 448 N.E.2d 345 (Mass.
          1983) (Curtis I). Six years later, the petitioner filed a motion
          for new trial and raised for the first time two additional issues,
          both of which concerned the trial court's rendition of a
          supplementary jury instruction. The state superior court denied
          the motion and the SJC affirmed.  See Commonwealth v. Curtis, 632
          N.E.2d 821 (Mass. 1994) (Curtis II).
                    On April 12, 1995, the petitioner docketed an application
                                          2

          for habeas relief in the United States District Court for the
          District of Massachusetts, naming as respondents various state
          officials (who, for ease in reference, we refer to as "the
          Commonwealth"). In due course, the district court wrote a
          thoughtful opinion in which it refused to issue the writ.     See
          Curtis v. Duval, Civ. No. 95-10758-DPW (D. Mass. July 11, 1996)
          (unpublished). This appeal followed.
          II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
                    We sketch the evidence relevant to this appeal, referring
          readers who hunger for greater detail to the SJC's fuller accounts.
          See Curtis II, 632 N.E.2d at 824-26; Curtis I, 448 N.E.2d at 346-
          48. We propose to describe the pertinent procedural aspects of the
          petitioner's trial when we address his specific claims.
                    On the evening of July 14, 1980, Michael Robinson was
          severely beaten in a confrontation between a group of East Boston
          youths and a number of sailors. He died eight days later from head
          injuries.
                    The origin of the fracas is obscure. Its genesis
          apparently lies in an encounter between Lenny Curtis, the
          petitioner's brother, and four black sailors who were lounging
          outside the perimeter fence of an East Boston shipyard. Witnesses
          gave conflicting testimony about what transpired. Lenny Curtis
          testified that one of the sailors struck him when he rebuffed a
          request for a cigarette. A sailor testified that Lenny Curtis
          strolled by them unmolested but gave them "hard looks."
                    In any event, when Lenny Curtis spotted his friend, Eddie
                                          3

          Colon, riding a bicycle, he told Colon to scat and "get my two
          brothers." Word of the brewing storm spread. Soon the four black
          sailors were joined by several white sailors, including Robinson,
          while between twelve and twenty East Boston youths assembled in
          apparent opposition. Some of the youths reportedly hurled racial
          epithets.
                    When the petitioner arrived at the scene by car, someone
          told him that the sailors had assaulted his brother. A full-scale
          brawl erupted soon thereafter. Witnesses disagreed over the
          petitioner's role. According to some accounts, the sailors fled
          from the youths. On this version, Robinson either tripped or was
          pushed to the ground. Seaman Webb testified that he saw the
          petitioner hit a supine Robinson over the head with a baseball bat
          three times. Other witnesses testified that there were multiple
          assailants.
                    Lenny Curtis told a very different story. He said that
          when his brother approached Robinson, Robinson swung a bottle at
          him. The petitioner ducked, punched Robinson, and then backed away
          as Robinson fell to the ground. Lenny Curtis stated that he saw
          three or four other persons attack Robinson with bats and sticks as
          Robinson lay prostrate (whereupon the Curtis brothers skedaddled).
          III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
                    The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
          (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C.A. S 2254(d) (Supp. 1997), became law on April
          24, 1996 _ after the petitioner filed his habeas petition but
          before the district court acted upon it. Although the AEDPA alters
                                          4

          the standard of review governing the issuance of writs of habeas
          corpus, the Supreme Court has determined that the AEDPA does not
          apply to habeas petitions which were pending when the AEDPA became
          law. See 
                   Lindh v. 
                            Murphy, No. 96-6298, 1997 WL 338568, at *8 (U.S.
          June 23, 1997). The petitioner is therefore entitled to de novo
          review of his claim that the state court abridged his
          constitutional rights. See 
                                     Martin v. 
                                              Bissonette, ___ F.3d ___, ___
          (1st Cir. 1997) [No. 96-1856, slip op. at 7-8]; 
                                                         see 
                                                             also 
                                                                  Scarpa v.
          Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that federal
          courts, although respecting state courts' findings of historical
          fact, traditionally afford de novo review in regard to ultimate
          questions presented by state prisoners' habeas petitions),  cert.
          denied, 513 U.S. 1129 (1995).
          IV. THE MERITS
                    We turn now to the three claims that are before us. We
          discuss them seriatim.
                             A.  Deprivation of Counsel.
                    The basic facts pertinent to the petitioner's argument
          that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective
          assistance of counsel are as follows. The petitioner's trial wound
          down on December 29, 1980. On that date, final arguments were made
          and the trial court charged the jury. Deliberations began the next
          morning. At 2:00 p.m. on December 30, the trial judge conducted a
          chambers conference. He stated at the outset that he had tried
          unsuccessfully to locate the petitioner's attorney for at least
          twenty minutes.
                                          5

                    At 3:14 p.m., notwithstanding that the missing lawyer
          still had not surfaced, the judge ordered the jury returned to the
          courtroom and, acting 
                               sua 
                                   sponte, gave a supplementary instruction
          anent the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
                                                            The jury found
          the petitioner guilty of second-degree murder at 3:55 p.m.
                    The petitioner's paramount claim is that the judge's
          actions deprived him of counsel at a critical stage of the
          proceedings. He cites  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659
          (1984), as authority for the concept that, when such a deprivation
          occurs, it constitutes a structural error which makes the trial
          presumptively unfair and requires automatic reversal on habeas
          review. On this basis, he maintains that the state court's action
          unleashed a presumption of prejudice per se, which entitles him to
          habeas relief.
                    Cronic and its progeny do indeed stand for the
          proposition that the actual or constructive denial of counsel at a
          critical stage of a criminal trial constitutes prejudice per se and
          thus invalidates a defendant's conviction. 
                                                    See 
                                                        Perry v. 
                                                                 Leeke, 488
                              
               The supplementary instruction stated in pertinent part:
                    Now in case you are wondering about the
                    manslaughter, remember that I told you that
                    the only set of facts, if you believe them,
                    that would warrant a manslaughter verdict
                    would be the instance that I recalled to your
                    mind if one of the witnesses _ I think it was
                    Curtis' brother testified that the sailor was
                    the aggressor, that is, that he swung a bottle
                    at Mr. Curtis first, and that, then, if Curtis
                    used what you feel was unreasonable force in
                    defending himself that it would warrant a
                    verdict of manslaughter against Curtis.
                                          6

          U.S. 272, 278-79 (1989); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 (1988).
          It is apodictic that the right to counsel is not honored for its
          own sake, but rather because it ensures the accused a fair trial.
          The Cronic Court reaffirmed this aphorism, but recognized that,
          because of the presumption that counsel's assistance is essential,
          the denial of counsel at a critical stage renders an otherwise
          acceptable trial unfair.  See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.
                    The petitioner is also correct when he asserts that
          recalling the jury for supplementary instructions after
          deliberations are underway is a critical stage of a criminal trial.
          See 
             Rogers v. 
                       United States
                                    , 422 U.S. 35, 38-39 (1975); 
                                                                Siverson v.
          O'Leary, 764 F.2d 1208, 1214 (7th Cir. 1985). It is evident to us
          that giving a sua sponte jury instruction without consulting, and
          in the absence of, the defendant's attorney, as occurred here,
          denies the defendant the assistance of counsel at that critical
          stage.  See United States v. Parent, 954 F.2d 23, 25-26 (1st Cir.
          1992). And although this deprivation was short-lived, it occurred
          during a vital point in the trial and was, within its terms, total.
          Therefore, were we to apply Cronic, Penson, and Parent, we would
          hold that the error required reversal.
                    In a habeas proceeding, however, special protocols
          prevail. Under one such protocol, "new constitutional rules of
          criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have
          become final before the new rules are announced." Teague v. 
                                                                      Lane,
          489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality).
                    Although this protocol would seem to have a bearing on
                                          7

          the disposition of Curtis' habeas petition, there is a procedural
          glitch. The Commonwealth has not explicitly relied on Teague, and
          the district court decided the issue on other grounds. Moreover,
          the 
             Teague paradigm is not jurisdictional in the sense that a court
          is obliged to raise the point on its own initiative.  See Collins
          v. 
            Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990). Thus, by failing either to
          cite Teague or to rely on its rationale in connection with the
          petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim, the Commonwealth forfeited the
          right to insist that we recognize this potential line of defense.
          See id.
                    Withal, an appellate court possesses the authority to
          raise the Teague issue on its own initiative if it believes that
          doing so will further the ends of justice. See 
                                                         Caspari v. 
                                                                    Bohlen,
          510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). We recognize that this power must be
          used judiciously, and that many factors enter into the decisional
          calculus. Here, the interests of comity and orderly procedure loom
          large. Thus, we choose to invoke  Teague.
                    To apply the paradigm of nonretroactivity required by
          Teague, we must determine when the petitioner's conviction became
          final and "whether a state court considering [the petitioner's]
          claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt
          compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he]
          seeks was required by the Constitution." 
                                                  Saffle v. 
                                                            Parks, 494 U.S.
          484, 488 (1990). If the answer to this inquiry is in the negative,
          the petitioner may benefit from the new rule only if it falls
          within one of two isthmian exceptions. The first exception is
                                          8

          operative only "if the rule places a class of private conduct
          beyond the power of the State to proscribe," and the second only if
          the rule is a "`watershed rule[] of criminal procedure' implicating
          the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding."
          Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1531 (1997) (citations
          omitted).
                    The petitioner's conviction became final in 1983.
          Accordingly, the threshold question is whether a state court, at
          that time, would have felt compelled to adopt the 
                                                           Cronic principle
          that a deprivation of counsel during a critical stage amounts to
          prejudice per se and thus mandates automatic reversal. We think
          not.
                    We acknowledge that by 1983 it long had been established
          that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel attaches at
          all critical stages of the prosecution.    See, e.g., Simmons v.
          United States
                      , 390 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1968). Although this general
          precept was quite clear, it was by no means settled in 1983 what
          remedy a court should employ to redeem a violation of the right to
          counsel. On the one hand, the Court had stated that "there are
          some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their
          infraction can never be treated as harmless error,"   Chapman v.
          California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967), and had cited a deprivation-of-
          counsel case,  Gideon v.  Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), as
          authority for that statement. On the other hand, hot on the heels
          of Chapman, the Court remanded a case for harmless error analysis
          after finding that the petitioner had been denied counsel at a
                                          9

          critical stage of the prosecution. See 
                                                 Gilbert v. 
                                                            California, 388
          U.S. 263, 272 (1967) (involving the denial of the right to counsel
          at a post-indictment pretrial lineup).
                    We harmonize this dissonance by concluding that the
          Chapman Court was referring to a wholesale denial of counsel,
          whereas the 
                     Gilbert Court was referring to a short-term, localized
          denial of counsel. This interpretation receives a measure of
          confirmation from subsequent opinions in which the Court conducted,
          or ordered lower courts to conduct, harmless error analysis in
          response to an isolated deprivation of counsel at a critical stage
          of a criminal trial, yet refused to countenance such analysis when
          the right was denied throughout the proceedings in their entirety.
          Compare 
                 Moore v. 
                          Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (remanding for
          harmless error analysis after denial of assistance of counsel at a
          preliminary hearing) 
                              with 
                                   Holloway v. 
                                               Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-
          91 (1978) (rejecting harmless error analysis in a case involving
          joint representation of conflicting interests).
                    Any residual doubt about whether a state court judge
          would have felt propelled to presage   Cronic's prejudice per se
          principle is purged by  United 
                                         States v.  Morrison, 449 U.S. 361
          (1981). There the Court, after remarking "society's interest in
          the administration of criminal justice," stated that "[c]ases
          involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general
          rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from
          the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe
          on competing interests." Id. at 364. Bearing this preference for
                                         10

          proportionality in mind, the Court declared that, depending on the
          nature of the transgression, "certain violations of the right to
          counsel may be disregarded as harmless error."  Id. at 365.
                    Given the weight and direction of these precedents, we do
          not believe that a state court in 1983 would have felt that Sixth
          Amendment jurisprudence compelled the adoption of the principle
          established a year later by the Supreme Court's opinion in 
                                                                    Cronic.
          Consequently, we conclude that Cronic announced a "new rule" as
          that term is understood in the Teague context.
                    Since the Cronic principle does not fall into either of
          the Teague exceptions, the petitioner's position erodes. The
          principle does not place any conduct beyond the power of the state
          to regulate, and it does not implicate the fundamental fairness or
          accuracy of a criminal proceeding. Thus, under       Teague, the
          petitioner is not entitled to rely on the principle announced in
          Cronic.
                    We turn, therefore, to the petitioner's contention that
          he was actually prejudiced due to the transitory absence of his
          lawyer. Before launching into this examination, we are constrained
          to note that for six years no one intimately involved in the
          petitioner's trial apparently thought that counsel's absence during
          the supplementary instruction had been injurious enough to mention
          on direct review or more coeval collateral review. Although this
          observation is by no means dispositive, it does provide useful
          information as to the contemporaneous perception of prejudice as we
          today inquire into possible harmfulness.
                                         11

                    On collateral review, the standard for harmless error
          analysis, which derives from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
          750 (1946), affords relief only when the error "had substantial and
          injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."
          Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (quoting, without
          attribution, 
                      Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776). Applying this criterion,
          we find that the effect of this error was neither substantial nor
          injurious, and that, therefore, the error was harmless.
                    To determine whether the Sixth Amendment violation had a
          substantial or injurious effect, we focus primarily on the fruit of
          that violation: the supplementary instruction as given. The
          petitioner argues that the instruction was harmful for three
          related reasons: the trial court's supplementary charge was
          unconstitutional; the flawed instruction improperly induced the
          jury's verdict; and counsel's absence deprived the petitioner of
          any opportunity to influence the wording of the instruction.
          Finding none of these plaints persuasive, we hold the error to have
          been benign.
                    The petitioner's first complaint need not detain us. We
          explain fully in Part IV(B),      infra, why the supplementary
          instruction conformed with the applicable legal norms, and it would
          be pleonastic to rehearse that discussion here. It suffices to say
          at this juncture that the petitioner was not prejudiced on this
          account.
                    This conclusion also dooms the petitioner's second
          contention. As long as the instruction passes muster from a legal
                                         12

          standpoint, the fact that it may have helped to persuade the jury
          is unremarkable.  See United States v. Nichols, 820 F.2d 508, 512
          (1st Cir. 1987). Moreover, we cannot accept the petitioner's
          brazen assumption that because the jury returned its verdict a half
          hour after hearing the supplementary instruction, the instruction
          must have had some effect. The judge offered the instruction  sua
          sponte. Thus, we cannot infer that the jury was even concerned
          with the subject matter of the supplementary instruction. Because
          we can only speculate about the correlation, if any, between the
          giving of the supplementary instruction and the timing of the
          verdict, it cannot fairly be said that the instruction had any
          impact, let alone a substantial impact, or that it was injurious.
                    This leaves us with the last argument. Citing   Parent,
          the petitioner claims that he was undone by his attorney's absence
          because, whether or not the supplementary instruction was correct,
          he missed the opportunity to persuade the judge that some different
          language might have been more appropriate. 
                                                    See 
                                                        Parent, 954 F.2d at
          26 (finding denial of counsel to be reversible error on direct
          appeal because "defense counsel was powerless to prime the pump of
                              
               This case is unlike Rogers v. United States, where the jury
          returned a verdict five minutes after the court replied
          affirmatively (without consulting counsel) to a question from the
          jury about whether it would accept a particular verdict.  See 422
          U.S. at 36-37. When a jury indicates that it thirsts for knowledge
          on a particular point and the court subsequently slakes that
          thirst, the inference can reasonably be drawn that the court's
          input had a causal effect on a verdict returned within minutes of
          the court's action. The situation is vastly different where, as
          here, the jury never indicated an interest in the subject matter of
          the sua sponte supplementary instruction.
                                         13

          persuasion"). To the extent that this argument is of
          constitutional dimension, it strives to redeem the intangible
          might-have-been; after all, a harm that cannot be quantified,
          cannot be identified. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this
          Parent harm is the same harm addressed by the prejudice per se
          principle, and as such its application is also barred by Teague.
                    In this case, all roads lead to Rome. Because of the
          nonretroactivity paradigm, the brief deprivation of counsel which
          occurred at trial some seventeen years ago, while lamentable, does
          not constitute a lever that can be used on collateral review to
          overturn the petitioner's conviction.
                         B.  Supplementary Jury Instruction.
                    Due process requires that the government prove every
          element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.      See
          Francis v.  Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 309 (1985);     Sandstrom v.
          Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522-24 (1979). In  Anderson v. Butler, 23
          F.3d 593 (1st Cir. 1994), we described a three-pronged framework to
          be used in analyzing burden-shifting claims:
                    [A] reviewing court must first determine
                    whether a reasonable juror would have
                    interpreted the challenged portion of the
                    instruction as creating a mandatory
                    presumption. If so, the court must then
                    consider whether other parts of the charge
                    clarified the ill-advised language with the
                    result that a reasonable factfinder would not
                    have understood the instruction to create an
                    unconstitutional presumption. Finally, if the
                    court determines that the charge as a whole
                    left the jurors with an impermissible
                    impression, the court must proceed to evaluate
                    the harmlessness vel non of the error.
          Id. at 595 (citing 
                            Hill v. 
                                    Maloney, 927 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1990)).
                                         14

                    We will assume here that Lenny Curtis' testimony that
          Robinson initiated the fracas by swinging a bottle at the
          petitioner provided a basis for a claim of self-defense. Under
          Massachusetts law,
                    once the issue of self-defense has been fairly
                    raised, the jury should [be] instructed on the
                    legal consequences of using manifestly
                    disproportionate violence in the supposed
                    exercise of the right of self-defense. If the
                    jury [conclude] that [the defendant] had the
                    right to use force to defend himself but that
                    the force used was excessive . . . they would
                    [be] warranted in finding [the defendant]
                    guilty only of manslaughter.
          Commonwealth v.   Johnson, 589 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Mass. 1992)
          (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in
          original).
                    The petitioner posits that the court's supplemental jury
          instruction, quoted supra note 1, unconstitutionally shifted the
          burden to him to prove self-defense by telling the jurors in effect
          that they must believe Lenny Curtis' testimony in order to return
          a manslaughter verdict. We disagree with this assessment.
                    We start with the first prong of the three-pronged test.
          Although this supplementary instruction is not artfully phrased, we
          believe that no reasonable juror would interpret it as creating a
          mandatory presumption. To the contrary, we agree with the district
          court that a reasonable juror probably would have understood this
          instruction as clarifying the circumstances which would, if proved
          beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution, warrant a
          manslaughter conviction.
                    The second prong of the test also favors the
                                         15

          Commonwealth. On whole-record review, it seems highly likely that
          any prospect of confusion vis-a-vis the supplementary instruction
          vanishes when the instruction is considered in conjunction with the
          main charge. During the main charge the superior court judge
          explicated Massachusetts law clearly, accurately, and succinctly,
          telling the jury, inter alia, that "the defendant does not have to
          convince you that he acted in self-defense. The Commonwealth has
          to convince you that he did not, or that he used excessive force."
          In addition, the judge cautioned the jury that:
                    [I]f I refer to any of the evidence, it will
                    be by way of example only in order to make the
                    law a little easier for you to understand and
                    to apply, and I in no way intend or infer that
                    you are to give any more weight, place any
                    more importance, and more credibility on a
                    particular piece of evidence that I may
                    mention in the course of the charge than on
                    all the other evidence in the case.
          In light of these instructions, we believe that a reasonable juror
          would have understood that, through the supplementary instruction,
          the trial court sought merely to facilitate the jury's
          understanding of the applicable law.
                    The petitioner also objects to another portion of the
          supplementary charge: a portion which linked a manslaughter
          verdict for him to one for his codefendant, Giglio (another East
          Boston youth convicted of second-degree murder). In particular, he
          complains about the statement: "If there is any manslaughter
                              
               Since we do not believe that there is any appreciable risk
          that the supplementary charge confused the jurors or left them with
          an incorrect impression, the third prong of the 
                                                         Anderson test need
          not concern us.
                                         16

          verdict in the Giglio case there has to be two of them."
                    The vice in this statement, the petitioner says, is that
          it led the jury to believe that, in order to be found guilty of the
          lesser included offense, Curtis had the burden to prove that Giglio
          too was guilty only of manslaughter.
                    The petitioner's contention tortures the trial court's
          statement and distorts its meaning. This portion of the
          supplementary charge states that in order to find Giglio guilty of
          manslaughter, the jury must first find Curtis guilty of
          manslaughter. See 
                            Curtis II
                                     , 632 N.E.2d at 829. It neither states
          nor implies the converse: that in order to find Curtis guilty of
          manslaughter, the jury must first find Giglio guilty of
          manslaughter. The latter statement would have been incorrect, but
          the former statement merely fleshed out a specific theory of
          manslaughter in coming to the aid of another, touched upon in the
          main charge.
                              
               This portion of the supplementary charge addressed the use of
          excessive force in self-defense by the petitioner:
                    I told you that if you find that happened, and
                    that Giglio was helping him defend himself and
                    used excessive force, but that it was the bat,
                    not a bottle that caused the death, there
                    could be a manslaughter verdict in the case of
                    Giglio only if there is a manslaughter verdict
                    in the case against Curtis, that is, the idea
                    of the joint enterprise being that Giglio
                    would have been aiding Curtis' self-defense
                    effort, and then if Curtis used excessive
                    force and was found guilty of manslaughter,
                    then Giglio could also be found guilty of
                    manslaughter. But if there is any
                    manslaughter verdict in the Giglio case there
                    has to be two of them.
                                         17

                    To say more would be supererogatory. Because we discern
          no constitutional error in the trial court's supplementary jury
          instruction, we reject the petitioner's second claim.
                           C.  Refusal to Grant Immunity.
                    At trial, the petitioner attempted to call as a defense
          witness Joseph DeDominicis, one of the youths present during the
          brawl. DeDominicis refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds.
          The petitioner asked the court to immunize the witness, alleging
          that DeDominicis would then testify that he saw a person named
          Muzzone standing over the victim with a bat in his hand.    The
          prosecution opposed the grant of immunity, asserting that it would
          interfere with an ongoing grand jury investigation. The trial
          court declined the request and the SJC affirmed. 
                                                          See 
                                                              Curtis I
                                                                      , 448
          N.E.2d at 348-50.
                    The petitioner's claim that he was entitled to
          DeDominicis' immunized testimony encompasses both the "effective
          defense" theory _ which draws its essence from the Sixth Amendment
          right to compulsory process _ and the "prosecutorial misconduct"
          theory _ which draws its essence from the Fourteenth Amendment
          right to due process. See 
                                    United States
                                                 v. 
                                                    Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169,
          1190-93 (1st Cir. 1990) (limning both theories). On these facts,
          neither approach takes wing.
                    The effective defense theory originated in the Third
                              
               We note that this testimony, even if credited, would not have
          been wholly exculpatory; some witnesses testified that they saw two
          batsmen.
                                         18

          Circuit.  See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir.
          1980). Under its mantra, a trial court has the power to grant
          immunity based on a defendant's need to present exculpatory
          evidence. See 
                        id. Thus, a trial court should grant immunity "when
          it is found that a potential defense witness can offer testimony
          which is clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense case and
          when the government has no strong interest in withholding use
          immunity."  Id.
                    Notwithstanding the Third Circuit's pronouncement, the
          effective defense theory has been roundly rejected by other courts,
          most of which have agreed that the power to grant immunity properly
          belongs to the Executive Branch.    See, e.g.,  United 
                                                                 States v.
          Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1483 (7th Cir. 1993); In 
                                                             re 
                                                                Grand 
                                                                       Jury
          Proceedings  
                      (Williams), 995 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir. 1993);
          United States
                       v. 
                          Tindle, 808 F.2d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 1986); 
                                                                     United
          States v. Pennel, 737 F.2d 521, 526-29 (6th Cir. 1984);    United
          States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1980). We,
          ourselves, in a case decided only recently, explicitly rejected the
          effective defense theory.  See United 
                                                States v. Mackey, ___ F.3d
          ___, ___ (1st Cir. 1997) [No. 94-2264, slip op. at 8] (stating
          that, "in general, courts have no power to compel immunity in the
          face of a good faith refusal by the prosecutor [to grant it]").
                              
               To be sure, we added in Mackey that an occasional exception
          perhaps "might exist upon very extreme facts." 
                                                        Mackey, ___ F.3d at
          ___ [slip op. at 8]. The case at hand certainly is no stronger
          than Mackey from the defense standpoint. Consequently, it comes
          within the general rule, not within the hypothetical exception to
          that rule.
                                         19

                    The prosecutorial misconduct theory fares no better here.
          That theory is grounded in the notion that "the due process clause
          [constrains] the prosecutor to a certain extent in her decision to
          grant or not to grant immunity."  Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1191. But
          this constraint comes into play only when a prosecutor
          "intentionally attempt[s] to distort the fact-finding process."
          Id. A defendant can demonstrate such distortion in two ways: by
          showing an attempt to harass or intimidate potential witnesses, or
          by showing that the prosecutor deliberately withheld immunity for
          the purpose of hiding exculpatory evidence from the jury. See 
                                                                        id.
          at 1192.
                    Neither of these circumstances obtain here. The
          petitioner does not argue, and there is no evidence to suggest,
          that the prosecutor sought to silence DeDominicis through
          harassment or intimidation. And although the petitioner does argue
          that the prosecution intended to withhold exculpatory evidence from
          the jury, this argument comprises sheer speculation. On this
          record, we cannot peer behind the prosecution's plausible assertion
          of a legitimate interest in keeping the way clear for a possible
          future prosecution of DeDominicis.   See Mackey, ___ F.3d at ___
          [slip op. at 7-8];   Turkish, 623 F.2d at 776-77. Hence, the
          petitioner's professed reliance on the prosecutorial misconduct
          theory is unavailing.
          V. CONCLUSION
                    We need go no further. We have inspected the
          petitioner's asseverational array and found it wanting. There is
                                         20

          no sound basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus.
          Affirmed.
                                         21