Court Opinion

ID: 9372301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 13:05:14.296622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:34.307817
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA22-675

                               Filed 21 February 2023

Buncombe County, Nos. 17CRS93149-50

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

LEWIS RODNEY LYTLE, JR., Defendant.

      Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 January 2022 by Judge Alan Z.

Thornburg in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10

January 2023.

      Yoder Law PLLC, by Jason Christopher Yoder, for defendant-appellant.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Cheryl L.
      Kaminski, for the State-appellee.

      GORE, Judge.

      On 6 August 2018, defendant Lewis Rodney Lytle, Jr., pled guilty to possession

of a firearm by a felon and possession of a stolen firearm. The two charges were

combined into one judgment with defendant receiving a sentence of 17 to 30 months

in prison. This sentence was suspended for 18 months of supervised probation.

Defendant’s probation expired on 6 February 2020.

      Defendant presents three issues on appeal: (i) whether the trial court failed to

make a finding of good cause to revoke his probation in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
                                    STATE V. LYTLE

                                   Opinion of the Court

15A-1344(f); (ii) whether his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary under N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242; and (iii) whether the trial court erred in failing to address all

filed violations of probation individually in its judgment. Upon review, we vacate

without remand.

      Defendant filed written notice of appeal from a final judgment revoking

probation entered against him in Buncombe County Superior Court. This Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b) and 15A-1347.

      Defendant contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court failed to find

good cause to revoke probation after the expiration of the probation period as required

by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(f)(3). We agree. This issue is preserved for appellate

review without objection entered upon the ruling because § 15A-1344(f)(3) is a

statutory mandate that requires the trial judge to make a specific finding before

revoking probation after expiration of the probationary period. State v. Morgan, 372

N.C. 609, 617, 831 S.E.2d, 254, 259 (2019); see also State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 39, 331

S.E.2d 652, 659 (1985) (“[W]hen a trial court acts contrary to a statutory mandate

and a defendant is prejudiced thereby, the right to appeal the court’s action is

preserved, notwithstanding defendant’s failure to object at trial.”).

      “Alleged statutory errors are questions of law, and as such, are reviewed de

novo.” State v. Mackey, 209 N.C. App. 116, 120, 708 S.E.2d 719, 721, (internal citation

omitted), rev. denied, 365 N.C. 193, 707 S.E.2d 246 (2011).

      The statute provides:

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                                   STATE V. LYTLE

                                  Opinion of the Court

             The court may extend, modify, or revoke probation after
             the expiration of the period of probation if all of the
             following apply:

             (1) Before the expiration of the period of probation the
             State has filed a written violation report with the clerk
             indicating its intent to conduct a hearing on one or more
             violations of one or more conditions of probation.

             (2) The court finds that the probationer did violate one or
             more conditions of probation prior to the expiration of the
             period of probation.

             (3) The court finds for good cause shown and stated that
             the probation should be extended, modified, or revoked.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(f)(1)-(3) (2022).

      Under subsection (f)(3), the trial court is “required . . . to make an additional

finding of ‘good cause shown and stated’ to justify the revocation of probation even

though the defendant’s probationary term has expired.” Morgan, 372 N.C. at 617,

831 S.E.2d at 259 (emphasis added). “In the absence of statutorily mandated factual

findings, the trial court’s jurisdiction to revoke probation after expiration of the

probationary period is not preserved.” State v. Bryant, 361 N.C. 100, 103, 637 S.E.2d

532, 534 (2006). Our review of the transcript and record does not show that the trial

court made any findings, oral or written, that good cause existed to revoke

defendant’s probation after expiration of his probationary term.

      “Ordinarily, when the trial court fails to make a material finding of fact, the

case must be remanded so that proper findings can be made.” State v. Sasek, 271

N.C. App. 568, 575, 844 S.E.2d 328, 334, (citation omitted), rev. denied, 376 N.C. 543,

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                                    STATE V. LYTLE

                                   Opinion of the Court

851 S.E.2d 49 (2020). However, when the trial court fails to make a finding of good

cause under § 15A-1344(f)(3), this Court “may only remand where the record

contain[s] sufficient evidence to permit the necessary finding of ‘reasonable efforts’

by the State to have conducted the probation revocation hearing earlier.”            Id.

(alteration in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

      Defendant argues, and the State concedes, that the appropriate remedy under

these facts is to vacate without remand.

      Here, defendant’s probation expired 700 days prior to the revocation hearing.

The record on appeal provides no persuasive evidence that the trial court made

reasonable attempts to hold the probation revocation hearing prior to the expiration

of defendant’s probation. We, therefore, “vacate the trial court’s judgments revoking

[d]efendant’s probation without remand.” Id. at 576, 844 S.E.2d at 335 (citing Bryant,

361 N.C. at 101, 637 S.E.2d at 534). In light of our resolution of this matter above, it

is unnecessary to reach defendant’s remaining arguments.

      VACATED.

      Judges ARROWOOD and WOOD concur.

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