Court Opinion

ID: 9673423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:11:35.002229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:21.839454
License: Public Domain

GREEN, Justice,
concurring.
I fully join in the majority opinion, but I write separately to highlight what I believe to be a problem posing ever increasing harm to the orderly administration of justice in this court and, most likely, in all other appellate courts in this state — frivolous appeals.
In my brief year on this court I have come to realize that far too many practitioners are failing to give due regard to the burdens they face when seeking to overturn a trial court judgment, whether in civil or criminal cases. The decision to appeal should not be taken lightly; it involves the careful consideration of a number of factors. A bad result below, by itself, is simply not a reason to appeal— not every case is properly appealable.
It seems to me, though, that some civil cases are appealed not because they involve arguable reversible error, but because of “appellate economics.” Litigation is enormously expensive and, after a huge investment in the trial of a case, the cost of an appeal may be minor by comparison — so why not appeal? On the criminal side of the docket, while the deprivation of liberty would suggest that ap*357pellants have more leeway on appeal, there are still too many eases that fail to rise to minimum levels of legitimacy.
The decision to appeal should not be driven by comparative economies or wishful thinking; rather, it should be based on professional judgment made after careful review of the record for preserved error and after applying applicable standards of appellate review. It is not a mechanical exercise, but requires the dutiful application of lawyering skills.1
The practice of “let’s just throw as much mud as we can up on the wall and see if any of it sticks” must be discouraged. Because where there is no legitimate basis for appeal, the result most often occurring is that nothing “sticks” — and the lawyer not only loses his client’s appeal, but his credibility and reputation with the court suffer.
The legal profession has been roundly criticized by the non-lawyer public over the years for failing to take action against lawyers who make frivolous filings.2 And there is universal complaint that the justice system moves too slowly. The State Bar certainly has a role in policing its ranks of unethical lawyers. But I believe the courts also have a responsibility, both to the profession and the taxpaying public, to challenge any action that impedes the efficient and orderly flow of legitimate court business. And that includes taking steps to reduce the number of frivolous appeals.
Judicial resources around the state are already severely strained. About fifteen years ago, before criminal appellate jurisdiction was added to the courts of civil appeals, each of the three justices on this court disposed of an average of 35 cases per year.3 The court was expanded to seven justices in 1981 when criminal jurisdiction was added but, even so, today we will dispose of an average of well over 100 cases per year per justice. And annual filings in this court continue to increase. The Fourth Court of Appeals this year is responsible for roughly thirty-five percent more cases than just five years ago.
There are, obviously, very serious negative side effects to all of this, not the least of which is that we are afforded much less time to devote to each case. Appellate litigants are entitled to deliberate and studied consideration of their appeals by the elected members of this court. Frivolous appeals divert scarce resources away from those more deserving cases involving legitimate appellate issues. As our caseload continues to mount, it is a problem we can no longer afford to ignore. While at present we are limited in our authority to deal with the problem, we must not be hesitant to use the tools that we have.4
When they are identified, frivolous appeals should be promptly disposed of and the lawyers and parties who file them should be sanctioned in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations.5 In time, those who would continue to abuse the judicial system will learn that they do so at their own peril.
*358This case is a particularly egregious example of a frivolous appeal. As stated in the majority opinion, the appeal was brought with no reasonable expectation of reversal, the motivation therefore apparently being for delay or harassment only. But what is worse is that the appellant’s attorney, in a futile attempt to enhance his cause, compounded his transgression by flagrantly misrepresenting the law to the court in his brief on appeal.
As indicated in the majority opinion, appellant’s lawsuit complains of rain damage to personal property that was removed from his home and left in the front yard pursuant to a writ of possession following a forcible entry and detainer action. Appellant relies on Texas Property Code section 24.0061 in support of his claim that appellee was negligent when exercising control over his property. In his brief, appellant asserts that section 24.0061 “specifically prohibits a party from leaving items in the rain, etc., or when the party knows it will rain.” (emphasis added) But that is not what the statute says. Section 24.0061 actually states that a landlord may move a tenant’s property to a “nearby location, but not ... while it is raining, sleeting, or snowing.” Tbx.PROP.Code Ann. § 24.0061(c)(3) (Vernon Supp.1996).
The statute clearly does not place a weather forecasting burden on those who would remove a tenant’s property. But, having changed the law more to his liking, appellant proceeded to argue that appellee breached its duty to appellant and that “it was foreseeable for a reasonable, prudent person that in May and in particular that day, if one listened to weather reports, that there was tendency (sic) for rain and precautions should have been made.”
The embellishment of the statutory language was a material misrepresentation of law to this court clearly calculated to induce a reversal of this summary judgment appeal. This is conduct beyond the pale of any legitimate advocacy and is a violation of the disciplinary rules.6 Moreover, I can think of few examples of conduct by a lawyer more offensive to the court, or more damaging to his client’s interests.
Even though the lawyer is responsible for advising his client and for writing the brief on appeal, the consequences of filing a frivolous appeal must rest at least in part with the client because, ultimately, the decision to appeal is the client’s. But the consequences for the misrepresentation of the facts or the law before this court should fall exclusively upon the lawyer, who is an officer of the court. Under our current appellate rules, we are authorized to sanction only the client in the former instance. In the latter instance, apart from the appellate rules, we retain the inherent power to discipline misconduct before this court when reasonably necessary and to the extent deemed appropriate. Public Util. Com’n of Texas v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex.1988) (“We recognize that a court has inherent powers it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in preservation of its independence and integrity.”); Kutch v. Del Mar College, 831 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (Texas courts have certain inherent powers, “including the power to sanction for bad faith abuse of the judicial process.”).
The court refrains in this instance from exercising its inherent disciplinary powers but chooses instead to invoke the maximum sanctions authorized by the appellate rules. I concur.

. See Paul W. Nye, Chief Justice (Ret.), The Decision to Appeal, in Appellate Practice Institute: For Lawyers and Legal Assistants, at W-3, W-5 (State Bar of Texas Professional Development Series) (1995).

. Every lawyer in this state is on notice as to what is meant by a frivolous filing. See Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct 3.01 & cmts. (1990) reprinted in TexGov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit G app. A (Vernon Supp.1996) (State Bar Rules art. X, § 9).

. Texas Judicial Council and Office of Court Administration Annual Report (1979).

. There is no authority in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure that corresponds with the trial court’s ability to sanction attorneys for frivolous filings. See TexR.Civ.P. 13. Oddly enough. TexR.App.P. 84 authorizes limited sanctions only against the offending party and not the attorney when of course it is the attorney who is in the best position to know whether or not an appeal is meritless. Perhaps this is an area in which the supreme court, through its rule making power, can expand to the appeals courts the same or similar rule authority it has granted to the trial courts to police their dockets.

.Judges are required by the Code of Judicial Conduct to take “appropriate action” when learning of disciplinary rules violations by lawyers. TexCode Jud.Conduct, Canon 3, pt. D(2) (1994), reprinted in TexGov't Code Ann. tit. 2, subtit. G app. B (Vernon Supp.1996). "Appropriate action" is left undefined.

. TexJDisciplinary R.Prof.Conduct 3.03(a)(1) (1990).