Court Opinion

ID: 9698753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:59:15.898801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:02.738401
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge:
This is an appeal from a dispositional order entered against the minor appellant following his adjudication of delinquency for indecent assault upon a child of four year old.
This is a companion case to Matter of Smith, 393 Pa.Super. 39, 573 A.2d 1077 (1990), in which we held that juveniles are entitled to the benefit of effective representation of counsel at delinquency hearings. In the instant case *81appellant alleges, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to safeguard appellant’s constitutional and statutory rights to confrontation of witnesses.1
Introduced into evidence at appellant’s adjudicatory hearing was the deposition of videotaped testimony of the child complainant. Appellant was not permitted to be present at the taping of the testimony and, therefore, was not afforded the opportunity to confront his accuser face-to-face. Counsel did not raise this allegation of error in the court below.
In order to establish a claim of ineffectiveness, appellant must establish that: by act or omission counsel was arguably ineffective; counsel’s act or omission could not have had a reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant’s interests; and that counsel’s commission or omission prejudiced him. Commonwealth v. Durst, 522 Pa. 2, 559 A.2d 504 (1989). The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses attaches to juvenile proceedings. In re: Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1967); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6338(a); In Interest of Bonner, 301 Pa.Super. 431, 447 A.2d 1043 (1982). Further, the law has sought to protect this right to confrontation even with the advent of videotape. See, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5984 which states:
(a) Depositions. — In any prosecution involving a child victim or child material witness, the court may, for good cause shown, order the taking of a videotaped deposition of the victim or material witness on motion of the child through his parent or guardian, or where applicable, the child’s advocate or the attorney for the Commonwealth. Such videotaped deposition, if taken for use at the preliminary hearing, may be used only at the preliminary hearing in lieu of the testimony of the child. The depositions shall be taken before the court in chambers or in a special facility designed for taking the depositions of children. Only the attorneys for the defendant and for the Com*82monwealth, persons necessary to operate the equipment, a qualified shorthand reporter and any person whose presence would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child, including persons designated under section 5983 (relating to rights and services), may be present in the room with the child during his deposition. The court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the child in person but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant. Examination and cross-examination of the child shall proceed in the same manner as permitted at trial. The court shall make certain that the defendant and defense counsel have adequate opportunity to communicate for the purpose of providing an effective defense. (Emphasis added).
The validity of this statute is subject to question in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988) which held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is violated where face-to-face confrontation, through the use of screens, is precluded. Similarly, this court’s pre-Coy decision in Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa.Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987), allowing the use of testimony via closed circuit television where the child witness does not see the defendant, may no longer be constitutionally valid. However, we will not base our determination of ineffectiveness on the Coy decision as it was decided on June 29, 1988, and after the adjudicatory proceedings in this case were held. Assuming, arguendo, the continued efficacy of § 5984 and Ludwig, at least for purposes of assessing effectiveness of counsel, we find that remand is required.
In Ludwig, there was testimony that the child victim had been psychologically injured by her attempts to testify in the presence of the defendant. Closed circuit T.V. was found to be necessary to protect the welfare of the child. The law will deny the right to confrontation only when necessary. See, Coy; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5984.
*83Instantly, however, there was no determination that the child witness was unable to testify when confronted by appellant. There was no indication that he would suffer psychological damage or that he would be unable to communicate. In short, there was no “good cause shown” as required under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5984.
Additionally, it appears from the record that appellant was not permitted “to observe and hear the testimony of the child in person ...”. Nor were appellant and his counsel given an “adequate opportunity to communicate for the purposes of providing an effective defense” — both of which are provided for under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5984.
We find no objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant’s interest in counsel’s failure to safeguard appellant’s rights. Had counsel sought to have the videotaped testimony stricken, or at the very least, made sure that the procedures set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5984 were complied with, the outcome could very likely have been affected, especially in view of the fact that the alleged victim was the chief witness against appellant.
Because we can find no reasonable basis for counsel’s actions, we will remand for an evidentiary hearing on this matter. See Commonwealth v. Petras, 368 Pa.Super. 372, 534 A.2d 483 (1987); Commonwealth v. Shablin, 362 Pa.Super. 289, 524 A.2d 511 (1987).
Order vacated and case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.2
TAMILI A, J., files concurring and dissenting opinion, joined by CIRILLO, President Judge.
POPOVICH, J., files concurring statement.
JOHNSON, J., files dissenting opinion.

. Although no post-trial motions were filed in this case, we will address the merits of the appeal since the question of ineffectiveness is raised for the first time by new counsel.

. Because we find remand on the issue of ineffectiveness is required, we do not reach the other issues argued by appellant.