Court Opinion

ID: 9475681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:35:43.866587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:52.609170
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the district court properly denied the federal parties’ request to enjoin the state court tax suit. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prohibits a federal court from granting such relief “except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” The request for an injunction was motivated by the federal parties’ concern that the state tax case may interfere with the fulfillment of the consent decree. The parties have not established, however, that an injunction of the state court litigation is necessary to protect or effectuate the federal judgment. It is far from clear, at least at this point in time, that the state court’s resolution of the tax claims will necessarily infringe upon the plaintiffs’ rights. Given the presumption against federal interference with state court proceedings, see Atlantic Coast Line RR v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 297, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1748, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970), I believe the district court was correct in allowing the state court proceeding to continue.
*561I do not believe, as the majority does, that the applicability of the “protect or effectuate” language contained in section 2283 depends upon whether the federal action ended in a consent decree. As the Supreme Court stated in Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 403 (1986), “consent decrees ‘have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees,’ a dual character that has resulted in different treatment for different purposes.” Id., 106 S.Ct. at 3074 (quoting United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 926, 934 n. 10, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975)). For purposes of section 2283, courts have treated consent decrees as judgments entitled to protection from inconsistent state court orders. See, e.g., United States v. District of Columbia, 654 F.2d 802 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Prince George’s County v. United States, 454 U.S. 1082, 102 S.Ct. 637, 70 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981); United States v. ASCAP, 442 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.1971); cf. New York State Association of Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 438 F.Supp. 440 (E.D.N.Y.1977) (although the court assumed it had the power to enjoin a third party from challenging a federal consent judgment in state court, the court determined that an injunction was not necessary to protect the consent judgment). Just as courts have used the “protect or effectuate” exception to prevent third parties from attacking final judgments, see, e.g., Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir.1975), they should be entitled to protect their consent decrees from third-party attack under appropriate circumstances. Whether the result of the state court tax suit will eventually furnish a basis for such action, however, is a question for another day.