Court Opinion

ID: 9733149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:55:09.914561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:38.802664
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
concurring.
I agree that under the particular circumstances of this case the trial judge did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the theory of loss of a substantial chance of survival. A claim for damages for loss of a substantial possibility of survival is inherently inconsistent with the element of proof of causation of death that is required for the successful maintenance of a wrongful death action. 1 *556Additionally, as the majority points out, neither the allegation nor the proof supported a claim for loss of a substantial chance of survival in Count I (the survivorship action).
I write separately because I am concerned that the majority suggests that we have rejected the concept of a claim for loss of a substantial chance of survival when in fact we hold only that the issue is not presented by this case.
I can agree with much of the dictum in the majority opinion—that our earlier cases have not modified the ordinary requirements of burden of proof and causation to accommodate the theory of loss of a substantial chance of survival. As I view it, however, a claim under that theory does not involve the creation of a new tort, but rather involves a redefinition of damages involved in the claim. Traditional principles of law relating to duty, breach, causation, and burden of proof remain the same—what changes is the acceptance of the concept that damages may be recovered for the loss of a chance of survival where that chance is substantial and can be identified and quantified (and thus valued) without resort to conjecture or speculation. I am unwilling to say that neither Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.1966), nor Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972) suggests a favorable inclination toward a claim for damages resulting from the loss of a substantial chance of survival. Our holding today is simply that these interesting questions must await resolution on another day.

. This is not to be confused with the question of causation that may arise when two or more tortfeasors combine to produce a condition that more probably than not resulted in death. The negligence of a number of people may combine to produce such a condition, and each will be liable if his or her negligence was a proximate cause of the condition. Here, however, we are concerned with identifying the condition that caused death, and not with the number of people who contributed to the occurrence of that condition. If, for example, the actions of the preceding physicians left the child with less than a fifty percent chance of survival, it could not be said that negligence on the part of the subsequent treating physician was a cause of death. The most that could be said in that situation is that the negligence of the *556subsequent treating physician deprived the patient of a chance of survival, and that claim cannot be made in a wrongful death action.