Court Opinion

ID: 9775195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:49:02.466525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:23.127246
License: Public Domain

Opinion on Petition to Rehear
Mr. Justice Humphreys.
A petition to rehear has been filed making points for a reversal of our opinion, which we shall consider according to their order and merits.
The first point is that the legislative policy in Tennessee does not provide for or authorize amendments in criminal process. In support of this point reference is made to T.C.A. sec. 19-425, T.C.A. sec. 20-1504, 20-1505, *118authorizing’ amendments in civil cases and calling’ attention to the fact there is no provision authorizing- amendments in criminal proceedings before a justice of the peace or general sessions courts by any particular Code section. We were aware amendments in criminal proceeding’s are not authorized by any particular Code section. Had there been such a Code provision this case would not have been before us on this question. It is not reasonable to infer from the absence of a statutory provision for such amendments a legislative intention to prevent this Court from exercising its suprevening jurisdiction as it has in this case. If we were bound to nonaction by nonaction of the General Assembly we would be in a pitiful plight indeed. We know that that body recognizes the jurisdiction of this Supreme Court, and leaves to it the filling in of some of the gaps and voids where this not proscribed by the constitution or-an act of the General Assembly.
In support of this point it is also argued that on trials in criminal courts amendments are permitted to indictments and informations when agreed to by the defendant. T.C.A. sec. 40-1713. This, of course, is true. But it was never thought that this statute could be read as preventing the amendment of an indictment without the agreement of the defendant. To the contrary, in spite of this statute, which would seem to imply that this is the way indictments and information may be amended, this Court, as pointed out in our opinion, has held that an indictment may be amended or substituted without the consent of the defendant.
The second point is that cases cited in our opinion from other jurisdictions as permitting amendments to criminal warrants are based on legislative authority. This point *119"is of no importance or effect. Our references to other authorities and cases was for the sole purpose of pointing out that it has now come to be considered to be in the public’s best interest — the best public-policy — -that arrest warrants on which defendants elect to go to trial should be subject to amendment or substitution. It wouldn’t matter whether this public policy is first recognized by the legislature or by the courts. The point is the public policy is there, and it should be served if it can be served.
The third point for reversal is that there is no affirmative showing by the record that the person swearing to the warrant was present in the court or that he approved the amendment; that there is no bill of exceptions in this case. It is suggested State v. Nash, 51 S.C. 319, 28 S.E. 946, referred to in our opinion is of no help to our opinion on this point.
State v. Nash, 51 S.C. 319, 28 S.E. 946, has application, because the court held in an amendment case it would “assume that the changes (warrant amendment) were made at her instance, or with her full assent.” p. 947. This assumption of assent and change at prosecutrix’s instance was indulged in spite of the fact the prose-cutrix’s testimony was before the Court and contained nothing indicating that the amendment was at her instance, or with her full assent. That court simply followed the indispensable and ever applied rule that every presumption must be in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and the validity of the orders and judgment in the lower court, except where the record affirmatively shows otherwise. Kornik v. Kornik, 3 Tenn. C.C.A. (Higgins) 418 (1913); Kincaid v. Bradshaw, 65 Tenn. 102 (1873); Jones v. State, 79 Tenn. 468 (1883); Cravens v. Robbins, 8 Tenn.App. 435 (1928); Southern Railway Co. *120v. Black Diamond Collieries, Inc., 9 Tenn.App. 225 (1928); Stepp v. Stepp, 11 Tenn.App. 578 (1930); Tiffany v. Shipley, 25 Tenn.App. 539, 161 S.W.2d 373 (1941); Matthews v. Southern Coach Lines, 190 Tenn. 282, 229 S.W.2d 340 (1949); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Lipford, 194 Tenn. 216, 250 S.W.2d 79 (1952).
The cases just cited state in varying ways the proposition stated in our opinion that “we must presume in favor of the regularity and validity of the amendment,” which presumption would necessarily carry with it an assumption on our part that it was with the acquiescence and participation of the prosecuting witness present in court at the time.
The fourth point is that the warrant involved did not make a criminal charge and so was void. We have, of course, already considered this question, and have held to the contrary. We abide by that holding.
The fifth point malees the argument that in reaching the conclusion the warrant is sufficient, the Court based an inference upon an inference. In arguing this point petitioner seeks refuge under the wing of the State Constitution and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Just exactly how these great guarantees have gotten involved in this point of an inference upon an inference is not too clear. It would seem the argument has progressed from concern with whether the warrant contains statements from which it is reasonable to infer T.C.A. sec. 59-1035 is involved, to the proposition that the alleged offenses which might make the increased punishment provided by sec. 59-1035 applicable, were in fact, not proved at the trial. But this is beside the point. We were consider*121ing the effect, of the statements in the warrant; ' The question of guilt of successive offenses has never been before the Court — and is not.in the record. We have not based an inference on an inference.. We have simply held that the warrant must be read in its entirety, and that when it is so read the allegations therein reasonably indicating that increased punishment may be warranted under T.C.A. sec. 59-1035, are allegations of fact, (not inferences), which tend to explain the balance of the warrant. And that when all of the allegations are considered it is quite reasonable to infer petitioner was arrested and charged with being a successive violator of the law prohibiting the operation of a. motor vehicle on the state highways in an intoxicated condition.
As pointed out in our opinion, T.C.A. sec. 40-708, provides in effect, that a criminal warrant is adequate if it states the offense either by name, “or so that it can be clearly inferred”. We repeat, we think the warrant even prior to amendment, contained statements from which it could be clearly inferred that defendant was charged with successive violations of the drunk driving statutes. The possibility that we can be mistaken in this judgment is made even more remote when it is remembered the defendant, upon being arraigned in general sessions court, understood the charge against him sufficiently well to waive his right to have the offense investigated by the grand jury, and submitted the case to the general sessions court on a plea of guilty. And we point out that in the circuit court defendant was charged in another warrant with “driving while license revoked”, and while this warrant did not explain what Murff was driving without a license or where he was driving it — and so was at least equal in effect to the other warrant, the impli*122cation of the statement was sufficiently clear, so that petitioner Murff pleaded guilty to that warrant.
It is argued this is the first case in Tennessee holding that a criminal warrant can be amended. The Court recognizes this is so. There is, likewise, no opinion to the contrary. This opinion was written for the purpose of remedying this situation. This Court concluded by reasoning parallel to that on which we have held presentments and indictments may be amended or substituted, and in the interests of the same public policy 'served thereby, that the time had come to declare that arrest warrants should be subject to amendment and to substitution, so as to defeat their dismissal upon technical grounds.
■ The petition to rehear is denied.
Burnett, Chiep Justice, and Dyer, Chattin and Cre-son, Justices, concur.