Court Opinion

ID: 9766652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:56:00.675879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:24.488276
License: Public Domain

PUDLOWSKI, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
An accused must be afforded a full panel of qualified jurors before he is required to expend his peremptory challenges. The failure of a trial court to excuse for cause a partial or prejudiced venireman denies the accused this right and constitutes reversible error. State v. Stewart, 692 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Mo. banc 1985). In determining the qualification of a venireman, the court is vested with wide discretion and the court’s ruling will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. However, our review of a trial court’s action will be more searching when, as here, the trial court fails to independently examine the particular juror. State v. Wolff, 701 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Mo.App.1985). Finally, “[ejrrors in the exclusion of potential jurors should always be made on the side of caution.” State v. Carter, 544 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Mo.App.1976).
The venireman in this case initially opined: “if he (the appellant) is not guilty, then why can’t he stand up and defend himself.” Seizing on that, the defense counsel then re-enforced the prejudice via a series of questions. The prosecution next attempted to rehabilitate the venireman. Finally, the defense counsel attempted to weaken the rehabilitation and the venireman's once firm answers to the rehabilitation waivered (“Yes, I think I can.”). As in Stewart, no questions were asked by the trial court.
The majority agrees that our review of such cases is more searching when the trial court does not independently interview the witnesses, but then goes on to hold that when the opposing attorneys are exhaus*108tive in their explanation of the law and questioning of the venireman, the necessity for an independent questioning by the trial court becomes redundant. I would characterize the questioning by both the prosecutor and defense counsel as exhausting rather than exhaustive.
When the venireman becomes a badminton birdie knocked back and forth over the net by aggressive counsel who are attempting to mold a bewildered venireman’s responses to fit their game plan, I believe it becomes absolutely necessary for the trial court to step in and preserve our judicial process. This is no game. The venireman here responded to the great proportion of interrogation with answers such as: “That’s right;” “Yes,” “No,” “Well, no; I could be changed;” “Yes, I guess I could,” “I think I can, yes;” “Oh yes; I will;” “Yes, I will. I have to;” etc. In short, her answers once certain became equivocal depending on questions asked and we never learned if she truly could have put aside defendant’s assertion of his fifth amendment rights. In fact, wherever the venireman volunteered more than a simple retort, she conspicuously betrayed her uneasiness with a silent defendant. (“Well, unless— why couldn’t he stand up and state that he is innocent?” or “If he is not guilty, then why can’t he stand up and defend himself?”)
I agree that the trial court need not strike every venireman who admits to an expectation that an accused ought to testify in his own defense. Also, I see less need for trial court intervention when the venireman fully articulates an unequivocal view that he will not draw inferences of guilt from the failure to testify. But rehabilitation must consist of more than docile affirmative responses to rapid fire leading questions from the prosecutor. Cases such as this one cry out for the trial court to intervene and discover the true beliefs of the venireman. Here the trial court did not and I am left with the distinct impression that defendant was denied his right to an impartial panel.