Court Opinion

ID: 9777340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:07:51.73046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:31.928876
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
SPARLING, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority has overruled the State’s motion for rehearing, leaving intact its judgment reversing the conviction for voluntary manslaughter. I would grant the motion for rehearing and affirm the conviction.
The majority reverses for the failure of the trial court to charge the jury on a lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide. I would hold that the evidence raised an issue of a “reckless” culpable mental state, thereby warranting, if requested, a charge on involuntary manslaughter. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.-05(a)(1) (Vernon 1974). A substantial difference between “reckless” conduct and “criminally negligent” conduct as defined by Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03 (Vernon 1974), is that a negligent suspect does not know of the risk, but should have known; whereas a reckless suspect does, in fact, know of the risk, but disregards it. The majority takes inconsistent positions if the same evidence that the majority claims raises the issue of negligent homicide also reflects that appellant knew of the risk.
In reversing, the majority omitted highly relevant portions of that testimony they contend raised the issue of negligent homicide. Appellant’s grandmother, Mary Wells, testified that a group of people crashed through the front door and in the ensuing scuffle, the deceased was stabbed. She said the victim was “shoved right into” a paring knife being held by the appellant. However, the portion of her testimony omitted by the majority was:
PROSECUTOR: Well, did you see Steve holding the knife out, I mean just before they burst through the door into the house?
WELLS: He had the knife laying down by the side of the door.
Q: Oh, on the floor?
A: On the floor. And he grabbed it up and the door was kicked in. And he — he had already told them if they kicked the door in they were going to run into it. And that’s exactly the way it looked. (Emphasis added)
Not only is there no evidence that appellant failed to perceive the risk of holding a knife in such circumstances, but rather the evidence affirmatively reflects that he did perceive the risk involved and disregarded that risk by continuing to hold the knife. Such conduct is “reckless,” not “criminally negligent.” See Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); accord, Moore v. State, 574 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(d) (Vernon 1974). Though an accused is entitled to an instruction on every defensive issue raised by the evidence, Warren v. State, 565 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), negligent homicide was not raised. I would, therefore, hold that the trial court properly refused to charge on negligent homicide.
I have reviewed appellant’s remaining grounds of error and found no reversible error. Therefore, I would grant the State’s motion for rehearing and affirm the judgment of the trial court.