Court Opinion

ID: 9368109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 20:01:09.25586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.678681
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12002    Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 02/02/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12002
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       ONEIL JOHNSON,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-80399-WPD
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12002         Document: 17-1        Date Filed: 02/02/2023         Page: 2 of 5

       2                          Opinion of the Court                      22-12002

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Oneil Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
       dismissal of his pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, which he purport-
       edly had filed in March 2021, but which was not discovered by the
       district court until November 2021, 1 and the denial of his subse-
       quent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion. On appeal,
       Johnson argues that his pro se petition, which was filed shortly after
       the filing of a counseled petition, was not successive because the
       counseled petition was frivolous.
               Generally, a party forfeits a claim on appeal by failing to
       “plainly and prominently” raise that claim in his initial brief.
       Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir.
       2014). “When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal
       one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment,
       he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and
       it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Id. at 680.

       1 After locating Johnson’s pro se § 2254 petition, the court found that, had the
       petition been received in March—when Johnson handed it to prison officials
       for mailing—it would have stricken the petition as an unauthorized pro se fil-
       ing because Johnson was still represented by counsel at the time he attempted
       to file it. The court further noted that, had the court determined the pro se
       § 2254 petition to be filed when it was located in November, it would have
       been dismissed as successive and untimely, and that the claims were procedur-
       ally barred and unexhausted. The court also found that Johnson was not en-
       titled to relief on the merits.
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       22-12002                Opinion of the Court                         3

       However, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard
       than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
       construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
       (11th Cir. 1998).
               Generally, appeals from § 2254 proceedings require a certif-
       icate of appealability (“COA”), but “no COA is necessary to appeal
       the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of a successive
       habeas petition because such orders are not ‘a final order in a ha-
       beas corpus proceeding.’ Instead, we may review such a dismissal
       as a ‘final decision’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Osbourne v. Sec’y,
       Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 1261, 1264 n.3 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation
       omitted) (quoting Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th
       Cir. 2004)). “The key inquiry into whether an order is ‘final’ for [28
       U.S.C.] § 2253 purposes is whether it is an order ‘that disposes of
       the merits in a habeas corpus proceeding.’” Jackson v. United
       States, 875 F.3d 1089, 1090 (11th Cir. 2017) (alteration adopted)
       (quoting Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009)).
               “Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s court fil-
       ing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities
       for mailing.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir.
       2014) (quoting United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th
       Cir. 2012)). Absent contrary evidence, such as prison logs or other
       records, we assume that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison au-
       thorities on the day when the prisoner signed it. Washington v.
       United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). The govern-
       ment bears the burden of proving that the filing was delivered to
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-12002

       prison authorities on a date other than when the prisoner signed it.
       Jeffries, 748 F.3d at 1314.
               As to representation by counsel, an individual does not have
       a right to hybrid representation. Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d
       1287, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 1990). Additionally, the Local Rules and
       Procedures of the Southern District of Florida provide, in part,
       “[w]hen a party has appeared by attorney, the party cannot there-
       after appear or act on the party’s own behalf in the action or pro-
       ceeding, or take any step therein, unless an order of substitution
       shall first have been made by the Court, after notice to the attorney
       of such party, and to the opposite party.” S.D. Fla. Local R.
       11.1(d)(4).
              “It is the law of this [C]ircuit that the right to counsel and
       the right to proceed pro se exist in the alternative and the decision
       to permit a defendant to proceed in a hybrid fashion rests in the
       sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. LaChance, 817
       F.2d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court likewise has
       held that the right to proceed pro se, recognized by Faretta v. Cal-
       ifornia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), does not require a trial judge to permit
       hybrid representation. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183
       (1984).
               Here, in light of Johnson’s pro se status, we liberally con-
       strue his arguments on appeal, despite him abandoning in his ap-
       pellate brief some of the grounds on which the district court based
       its dismissal. Regardless of the other bases for its dismissal, we con-
       clude that the district court did not err in dismissing Johnson’s pro
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       22-12002               Opinion of the Court                        5

       se § 2254 petition because it had not permitted hybrid representa-
       tion, and accordingly, his pro se petition was an unauthorized filing
       after his retained counsel had filed a § 2254 petition just nineteen
       days prior. Accordingly, we affirm.
             AFFIRMED.