Court Opinion

ID: 9666854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:28:54.471839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:33.053589
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
{concurring). I join fully in the majority opinion on all issues, but, in light of the Dissent, write separately to note the basis for my agreement with part II. A. {Right to Testify) of the majority opinion.
The Dissent fails to recognize the continuing vitality of the "principles of waiver" established by State v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980). See State v. Wilson, 179 Wis. 2d 660, 672 n.3, 508 N.W.2d 44, 48 n.3 (Ct. App. 1993) (declining to adopt rule *787"requiring the trial court to undertake an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant at the close of the defense's case-in-chief concerning his or her right to testify"). In Albright the "trial record [was] silent." 96 Wis. 2d at 134, 291 N.W.2d at 492. Nevertheless, the supreme court, in the face of ambiguous evidence adduced at a post-conviction motion, could not conclude that the defendant was deprived of her right to testify. Id., 96 Wis. 2d at 134-135, 291 N.W.2d at 492-493. Here, by contrast, the post-conviction record is not ambiguous: the facts as found by the trial court establish a clear waiver.