Court Opinion

ID: 9741495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:56:37.193955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.403469
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because I believe it is quite clear that questions of fact were properly presented to the jury, and its resolution of conflicts and assessments of creditability should not be disturbed by a reviewing court.
The authorities cited by the majority, particularly, Berryman v Kmart Corp, 193 Mich App 88; 483 *145NW2d 642 (1992), and Ritter v Meijer, Inc, 128 Mich App 783; 341 NW2d 220 (1983), compel affirmance.
A storekeeper’s liability for injuries on its premises is well established:
“It is the duty of a storekeeper to provide reasonably safe aisles for customers and he is liable for injury resulting from an unsafe condition either caused by the active negligence of himself and his employees or, if otherwise caused, where known to the storekeeper or is of such a character or has existed a sufficient length of time that he should have had knowledge of it.” [Serinto v Borman Food Stores, 380 Mich 637, 640-641; 158 NW2d 485 (1968), quoting Carpenter v Herpolsheimer’s Co, 278 Mich 697, 698; 271 NW 5 (1937) (emphasis in Serinto; citations omitted).]
In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that defendant owed plaintiffs a duty to provide reasonably safe aisles. Instead, the parties dispute whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, was sufficient to establish that defendant breached its duty. I find that it was. I do not accept the majority’s view that plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue whether the grapes were present on the floor long enough to give defendant actual or constructive notice of hazard. Taken in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence showed that the grapes had been smashed by someone wearing heavy, lug-soled shoes sometime before Mrs. Clark slipped. The legitimate inference is that, since the grapes occupied a very small amount of floor space, it would take some time before someone would step on them, especially because the grapes were located in an otherwise closed checkout lane at a time of day when defendant’s business was greatly reduced. See Ritter, supra at 786-787. Although defendant’s employee *146described the grapes as being fresh and juicy, the jury was properly permitted to infer from defendant’s act of discarding the grapes before they could be preserved as evidence that the grapes actually were discolored, dirty, or in an advance stage of rot. Id. At 785-786. Although defendant presented testimony that the accident area was constantly inspected during the course of business and the hazardous condition was not discovered, a reasonable juror could infer from the evidence that defendant’s employees acted negligently by carelessly inspecting the floor and that the hazardous condition did not come into existence just before Mrs. Clark’s accident. Indeed, evidence that the floor of the checkout aisle was dirty suggested that the cashier who closed the aisle did not properly clean or inspect it, as defendant required. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict because, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence established a prima facie case of negligence.
In discarding the Ritter precedent, the majority has substituted its view of the facts for that of the jury. It hefts the jury’s view and dismisses it as “too logically attenuated.” It enhances the plaintiff’s burden with the curious statement that plaintiffs “were required to show more in order to remove their case from the realm of conjecture.” More what? The majority’s analysis is fatally flawed by its failure to appropriately weigh the evidence that defendant’s employee removed and destroyed the grapes before they could be photographed as part of the scene of Mrs. Clark’s fall. According to defendant’s own evidence, its policy dictated that photographs be taken at the scenes of customer accidents. It was clearly for the jury to *147determine whether defendant’s excuses for removing the grapes were reasonable.
n
Because its reversal is based on the failure to grant defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the majority opines that defendant’s jury instruction issues need not receive “a full discussion.” I agree.
However, I believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving SJI2d 6.01, which concerns the failure to preserve evidence and the negative presumption arising therefrom. Because the defendant’s employees failed to follow defendant’s policies regarding photographs, the instruction was necessary to guide the jury in determining whether defendant’s excuses for removing the grapes were reasonable. The trial court was clearly within its discretion in giving the instruction.
Defendant’s second allegation of instructional error implicates the duty of a possessor of land. Mr. Clark saw a set of dirty footprints from “some big, thick, rubber-soled shoes” leading away from the smashed grapes and going approximately three feet into defendant’s store. Obviously, circumstantial evidence indicated that someone had stepped on the grapes before Mrs. Clark’s accident. I believe the instruction was proper.
I would affirm.