Court Opinion

ID: 9838958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-09 00:00:25.535737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:59.613422
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10452         Document: 00516889050               Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/08/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                          FILED
                                                                                     September 8, 2023
                                       No. 22-10452                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                          Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                              versus

   Phillip Matthew Sincleair,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:19-CR-354-2
                      ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Circuit Judge:*
         Defendant-Appellant Phillip Matthew Sincleair challenges the district
   court’s reapplication of an enhancement to his 210-month sentence for
   conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute a mixture and substance
   containing methamphetamine. For the following reasons, we VACATE
   Sincleair’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing.
                I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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          Sincleair pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to
   distribute a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine. As part of
   his plea proceedings, Sincleair signed a stipulation that, from late 2016 to
   June 2017, he conspired with Jade Kuhn and Craig Wilbur to possess
   methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. According to the
   presentence report (“PSR”), a drug trafficking investigation revealed that
   Kuhn supplied methamphetamine to Sincleair, who then distributed it to
   others.
          On May 18, 2017, during an investigation into methamphetamine
   distribution, officers of the Cooke County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”)
   executed a search warrant at a residence owned by Chase Wood (described
   in the PSR as an “unindicted co-conspirator”). At that residence, officers
   discovered methamphetamine and detained those present: Sincleair, Wood,
   Amanda Blackman (Sincleair’s girlfriend), Mahalia Markezinis and Mark
   Ilczyszyn (also described in the PSR as “unindicted co-conspirators”).
   According to the PSR, the CCSO’s investigation revealed that “Sincleair was
   the methamphetamine [source of supply] for Ilczyszyn, who was the [source
   of supply] for Wood.” The PSR further stated that Sincleair, Ilczyszyn, and
   Blackman had met at Wood’s residence so that Ilczyszyn could distribute one
   ounce of methamphetamine to Wood. When officers searched the residence,
   the occupants were sitting in the living room smoking methamphetamine.
   There was a firearm on a table near the living room couch, but the officers
   did not determine who owned it.
          In calculating Sincleair’s offense level, the PSR included a two-level
   enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a dangerous
   weapon. The PSR explained that, during the May 18, 2017 search of the
   residence where a drug transaction was in progress, Sincleair was present for
   the transaction and a firearm was found on a table in plain view of all present.
   Id. Sincleair filed written objections, including an objection to the §

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   2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement. He argued that his presence at Wood’s
   home on the night of May 18, 2017, was not relevant conduct as part of the
   alleged drug conspiracy because the firearm was later confirmed to be owned
   by and registered to Wood. Sincleair asserted that it is “not foreseeable that
   a firearm would be needed in a social setting amongst two couples involved
   in recreational drug use.”
          In response, the probation officer issued an addendum which
   explained that the May 18, 2017 drug transaction was relevant conduct
   because Sincleair was Ilczyszyn’s source of methamphetamine and was
   present for the drug transaction between Ilczyszyn and Wood. The
   addendum further noted that the firearm’s connection to the
   methamphetamine transaction was “probable.” Based on Sincleair’s total
   offense level of 35 and Category V criminal history, his advisory U.S.
   Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) imprisonment range would typically
   be 262 to 327 months. However, his statutory maximum sentence was 240
   months, which is what the PSR listed as the Guidelines term of
   imprisonment.
          At sentencing, the district court tentatively overruled Sincleair’s
   objection to the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. That court did not make specific
   fact findings, but instead adopted the statements of fact made in the PSR
   “subject to and including changes and qualifications made” in the PSR
   addendum, except for the findings on issues related to the sustained
   objections. The district court calculated a new offense level of 33 based on
   the sustained objections, resulting in a Guidelines imprisonment range of 210
   to 262 months of imprisonment. That court ultimately sentenced Sincleair to
   210 months of imprisonment. He received credit for time served in a related

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   state court case,1 resulting in a net term of imprisonment of 194 months and
   24 days.2
           Sincleair appealed, challenging the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement.3
   United States v. Sincleair, 16 F.4th 471, 473 (5th Cir. 2021). This court
   vacated his sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 477. We
   reasoned that “[t]he PSR addendum attempts to attribute both methods of
   possession—personal and co-conspirator—to Sincleair, but it is not clear
   that either applies.”4 Id. at 475–76 (noting that the district court did not
   explain which form of possession it attributed to Sincleair). We instructed
   the district court on remand to “make the appropriate findings and state
   plainly the basis for its decision” if it determined that the enhancement was
   still applicable. Id. at 477 (quoting United States v. Zapata-Lara, 615 F.3d 388,
   391 (5th Cir. 2010)).
           On remand, the probation officer prepared a second addendum to
   Sincleair’s PSR, reiterating the initial PSR’s findings that Sincleair was
   identified as a source of supply of methamphetamine for Ilczyszyn, who then
   sold the drugs to Wood, and that they all met on May 18, 2017, so that
   Ilczyszyn could supply one ounce of methamphetamine to Wood. The

           _____________________
           1
               Case no. CR17-00306 in the 235th Judicial District Court, Cooke County, Texas.
           2
             Sincleair’s projected release date is March 11, 2029. See https://inmate.tdcj.
   texas.gov/InmateSearch/start (TDCJ # 02251300).
           3
             Without the enhancement, the Guidelines range would have been 168 to 210
   months of imprisonment. United States v. Sincleair, 16 F.4th 471, 474 n.5 (5th Cir. 2021).
   Sincleair alleges that the firearm enhancement also prohibits him from partaking in certain
   programs within the Bureau of Prisons.
           4
              Judge Oldham dissented in the opinion, asserting that the district court’s
   rationale for applying the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement was very clear. Id. at 477–79. Judge
   Oldham further asserted that the record supports the enhancement under the personal
   possession theory. Id. at 478–79.

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   addendum further detailed that “a firearm was present in plain view on a
   table near the sofa where Sincleair and the others were sitting and smoking
   methamphetamine when officers arrived.” As to whether Sincleair
   personally possessed the firearm, the second addendum acknowledged that
   there was no evidence that Sincleair owned the firearm or brought the firearm
   to the house, or that Sincleair actively engaged in any drug transactions while
   the firearm was present. The probation officer added that the district court
   must determine if § 2D1.1(b)(1) remains applicable and, if so, that the court
   “must make the necessary findings that either Sincleair personally possessed
   the firearm or if the firearm was possessed by a coconspirator during the
   offense.” In a written response, Sincleair “persist[ed] in his objection” to
   the firearm enhancement.
          Prior to resentencing, the district court issued written Findings and
   Conclusions (“FAC”) to discuss its application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1)
   enhancement. The court stated that, on May 18, 2017, officers discovered a
   Ruger “lying out on a living-room table near the couch, within easy access of
   all,” and that Sincleair’s purpose for going to Wood’s house “was to
   accompany Ilczyszyn in his distribution of one ounce of the
   methamphetamine that Sincleair had supplied to [him] and apparently, to
   join in the smoking of the Sincleair-supplied methamphetamine while they
   were there.” The district court determined that Sincleair had constructive
   possession of the firearm while engaging in part of his drug conspiracy, as he
   had knowledge of, and immediate access to, the firearm “lying in plain view
   on a table near him.” The court also concluded that the enhancement likely
   applies under the co-conspirator possession theory. It stated that there was a
   temporal and spatial relationship between Sincleair and the drug trafficking
   offense, as he was the “ultimate supplier” of the methamphetamine involved
   in the transaction at Wood’s house.

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          At resentencing, Sincleair objected to the district court’s FAC. He
   called as a witness Blackman, who testified that she and Sincleair traveled to
   Wood’s house with Ilczyszyn on May 18, 2017, that there was no discussion
   of a firearm, and that she did not see a firearm at the house. Blackman
   described the house as “a little efficiency” with the bed, living room, and
   kitchen all in one small area. Blackman stated that she was looking at her
   phone and did not pay attention to what was happening in the house until the
   officers arrived. She denied that there was a firearm present on the coffee
   table or TV table when she and Sincleair arrived at the house and denied ever
   seeing a firearm near the sofa. On questioning by the court, Blackman
   affirmed that it was possible a firearm was present, but that she did not notice
   or see it. Sincleair too also offered evidence that Wood owned the firearm.
   After hearing argument from the parties, the district court overruled
   Sincleair’s objection to the written FAC and adopted as its “final findings of
   fact the statements of fact made in the [PSR], subject to and including
   changes and qualifications made by the addendum to the [PSR] . . . and the
   findings and conclusions just announced.”
          The district court determined that Sincleair’s total offense level was
   33 and that his Guidelines range of imprisonment was 210 to 262 months.
   The court sentenced Sincleair to the same term of 210 months of
   imprisonment, with credit for time served, to be followed by three years of
   supervised release. Sincleair did not make any further objections. He timely
   appealed. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i).
                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          The district court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines is
   subject to de novo review. Its factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
   Sincleair, 16 F.4th at 474. In Sincleair’s first appeal, this court reviewed the
   district court’s enhancement application de novo because “the district court

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   did not explain the basis for its decision that the two-level firearm
   enhancement applied to Sincleair.” Sincleair, 16 F.4th at 475 (quoting
   Zapata-Lara, 615 F.3d at 391). In doing so, we relied on our previous opinion
   in Zapata-Lara, in which we reviewed de novo the district court’s application
   of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement.5 Id.
           On the other hand, clear error exists “if a review of the record results
   in a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United
   States v. Zuniga, 720 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is
   plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Id.; see also United States v. Hebert,
   813 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[U]nder clear error review, even [w]here
   there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice
   between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted)). Moreover, “a district court is permitted to draw
   reasonable inferences from the facts, and these inferences are fact-findings
   reviewed for clear error as well.” United States v. Caldwell, 448 F.3d 287, 290
   (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
           The question here is whether Sincleair’s challenge concerns only the
   legal sufficiency of the facts underlying the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement or
   whether it also includes the district court’s findings of fact. Sincleair does not
   take a position on the appropriate standard of review and discusses both de
   novo and clear error review in his briefing. He does not, however, expressly
   challenge the district court’s specific findings of fact on remand. Rather, he

           _____________________
           5
             In that case, de novo review was appropriate because of “the district court’s purely
   legal application of the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 391. We explained that “Zapata–
   Lara’s argument does not concern the specifics of the factfinding, but, rather, whether the
   facts found are legally sufficient to support the enhancement.” Id. (quoting United States
   v. Hooten, 942 F.2d 878, 881 (5th Cir. 1991)).

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   contends that the district court made no new findings of fact, and that the
   court’s reliance on the same previous facts at resentencing, which this court
   previously deemed insufficient to support the enhancement, is error.
   Sincleair contends that the record, as it stands, cannot support the
   enhancement because there are no facts that sufficiently connect him to the
   handgun at issue under the elements of personal or co-conspirator
   possession.
           The government, on the other hand, contends that this court should
   review the enhancement application for clear error. Relying on United States
   v. King, 773 F.3d 48, 52 (5th Cir. 2014), the government claims that clear
   error review is appropriate because the district court has now explained its
   rationale for applying the enhancement: personal, constructive possession.
   The government asserts that, as a result, the instant appeal relates only to the
   factual findings underpinning the enhancement application.
           “It is well-established that our court, not the parties, determines the
   appropriate standard of review.” United States v. Suchowolski, 838 F.3d 530,
   532 (5th Cir. 2016). As we explain further below, no new factual findings were
   presented in the second addendum to the PSR, nor were any made at
   resentencing.6 Therefore, Sincleair’s appeal entails a purely legal application
   of the Guidelines, warranting de novo review. Sincleair separately contests the
   district court’s alleged failure to resolve disputed factual issues (and thus

           _____________________
           6
              The only finding of fact potentially made was that “Sincleair was present for and
   likely a knowing participant in the drug transaction between [Ilczyszyn and Wood],” as the
   PSR did not mention Sincleair’s “knowledge” or the degree of Sincleair’s participation in
   the drug transaction. However, this finding does not pass muster under the clear error
   standard because it is unsupported by the record. The second addendum to the PSR
   actually contradicts it, stating that there was “no evidence that Sincleair engaged in drug
   transactions” at Wood’s residence, “or that he assisted in any transactions.”

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   make specific factual findings) under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B), which
   we review under the plain error standard.
                                        III. ANALYSIS
           On appeal, Sincleair asserts that the district court erred in applying
   the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. He contends that the district court failed to
   follow this court’s mandate on remand because it “relied on the same
   information that formed the basis for the firearm enhancement. . . which the
   Court found lacking.” Sincleair asserts that, at resentencing, the government
   did not present any new facts and that the district court did not consider
   Blackman’s testimony regarding the firearm at issue. Sincleair alternatively
   argues that the district court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal
   Procedure 32(i)(3)(B) because it did not consider or credit Blackman’s
   testimony.7
           A. Application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement
           The § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement applies if a “dangerous weapon
   (including a firearm) was possessed” during the drug offense, § 2D1.1(b)(1),
   “unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
   offense,” § 2D1.1, cmt. n.11(A). For the enhancement to apply, the
   government must show by a preponderance of the evidence “that a temporal
   and spatial relation existed between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity,

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           7
             Although Rule 32(i)(3)(B) was likely violated, Sincleair’s challenge fails because
   he did not appropriately brief it. Sincleair did not raise this issue at resentencing, so plain
   error review applies. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134-35 (2009); see also United
   States v. McMillion, 827 F. App’x 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (applying plain
   error review where defendant did not raise his Rule 32(i)(3)(B) objection in the district
   court). Under plain error review, Sincleair was required to show forfeited error that is clear
   or obvious and that affects his substantial rights. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Sincleair did
   not state how his substantial rights were affected or how he suffered prejudice from the
   court’s alleged Rule 32 violation. We therefore do not further consider this challenge.

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   and the defendant.” United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764–65
   (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Hooten, 942 F.2d 878, 882 (5th Cir.
   1991)). “Alternatively, when another individual involved in the commission
   of an offense possessed the weapon, the government must show that the
   defendant could have reasonably foreseen that possession.” United States v.
   Rodriguez-Guerrero, 805 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted). “If the government satisfies this burden, then
   the burden shifts and the defendant must show that it is clearly improbable
   that the weapon was connected to the offense.” Id.
          In the instant appeal, Sincleair argues that the district court
   procedurally erred in applying the enhancement at resentencing because (1)
   it relied on facts that were deemed insufficient by the Fifth Circuit in his first
   appeal and (2) it “incorrectly characterize[d] facts contained in the PSR and
   addendum.” He contends that the district court’s FAC “relied on nothing
   more than the PSR and original addendum” and that the second addendum
   to the PSR “contained no additional facts.” Sincleair also asserts that the
   district court disregarded this court’s directive to plainly state its basis for his
   sentence by merging the theories of constructive and personal possession and
   then imposing the same § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement without any additional
   evidence to support it. Sincleair further alleges that the district court erred
   by “embellishing those facts contained in the PSR in support of the firearm
   enhancement, without further evidence confirming those facts.” He goes on
   to assert that the district court ignored the testimony of Blackman, who
   provided evidence that Sincleair did not exercise personal or co-conspirator
   possession of the handgun at issue.
          The government counters that the district court did not clearly err in
   applying the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement at resentencing because it clarified
   its rationale for applying the enhancement, which is supported by the record.
   The government asserts that the district court, in accordance with this

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   court’s mandate, plainly stated that it solely relied on a personal, constructive
   possession theory in its application of the enhancement. The government
   further asserts that the record as a whole supports this finding because there
   was “a temporal and spatial relationship between Sincleair, his drug
   trafficking activity, and the Ruger pistol.” According to the government,
   although Sincleair was not directly engaged in the methamphetamine sale
   between Wood and Ilczyszyn, the district court correctly found that Sincleair
   “was present for and likely a knowing participant in the drug transaction”
   and “the ultimate supplier of the methamphetamine involved in the
   transaction.” Relying on this court’s opinions in United States v. Vital, 68
   F.3d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1995) and King, 773 F.3d 48, the government asserts
   that § 2D1.1(b)(1) applies because the handgun was connected to Sincleair’s
   relevant conduct.
          The record does not support the district court’s application of the §
   2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement a second time under either the constructive or the
   co-conspirator theories of possession. At resentencing, the government was
   unable to demonstrate a temporal and spatial relation between the Ruger,
   Wood and Ilczyszyn’s drug trafficking activity, and Sincleair. Moreover, the
   district court did not definitively state that the enhancement was based on
   constructive or co-conspirator possession. Neither did it make any additional
   findings regarding these theories. It merely “adopt[ed] as its final findings of
   fact the statements of fact made in the [PSR], subject to and including
   changes and qualifications made by the addendum to the [PSR] . . . and the
   [FAC] just announced.” The second addendum to the PSR expressed doubts
   about applying the enhancement, and the FAC is based on facts that we
   previously deemed insufficient under either theory.
          In Sincleair’s first appeal, we noted that the key PSR facts included:
   “Sincleair was Ilczyszyn’s source for methamphetamine, and Sincleair and
   Ilczyszyn and their girlfriends were present at Wood’s home for a social

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   gathering around the time that Ilczyszyn sold an ounce of methamphetamine
   to Wood.” Sincleair, 16 F.4th at 473. The second addendum to the PSR did
   not add any new facts to support the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. Rather, the
   second addendum expressed doubt about applying the enhancement under
   both the personal and the co-conspirator possession theories. The second
   addendum explained that “[t]here was no evidence Sincleair owned the
   firearm or brought the weapon to the transaction or was otherwise connected
   to the firearm. Additionally, there was no evidence that Sincleair engaged in
   any drug transactions while the weapon was present, or that he assisted in
   any transactions.”
          The second addendum to the PSR also expressed doubts about
   applying the enhancement based on co-conspirator possession, stating:
          none of the individuals present with the defendant and the firearm are
          charged as coconspirators or mentioned in the Factual Resume. The
          only individual that Sincleair is known to engage in drug distribution
          with was Ilczyszyn; however, [as] the Fifth Circuit noted in United
          States v. Mata, 491 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir. 2007) it was found that
          ‘evidence of a buyer-seller relationship is not, by itself, sufficient to
          support a conviction for conspiracy.’ Further, there is no evidence the
          defendant assisted in a methamphetamine transaction between
          Ilczyszyn or Wood on this occasion.
   The second addendum noted that if the court reapplied the enhancement, it
   would have to do so based on the same facts that it previously relied on, i.e.,
   that Sincleair “was near the gun, which was in plain view and smoking
   methamphetamine” and “a coconspirator ‘involved in the commission of an
   offense’ possessed the weapon and ‘the defendant could have reasonably
   foreseen that possession.’”
          The FAC relies on the PSR and its second addendum to support the
   constructive possession rationale. The FAC asserts that “Sincleair had clear
   ‘knowledge and access to the weapon’” because “[the firearm] was lying in

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   plain view on a table near him.” However, we previously concluded that the
   same, PSR-sourced facts were insufficient to support personal possession
   because they do not demonstrate “a temporal and spatial relationship
   between the gun, the drug trafficking activity, and Sincleair.” Sincleair, 16
   F.4th at 476. The district court cited United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898,
   902 (5th Cir. 1992), in support of its conclusion, asserting that “even if none
   of the weapons belonged to [Sincleair], he had immediate access to them.”
   However, McKnight involved a situation where five guns were strewn about
   the defendant’s home in plain view, with additional evidence connecting the
   defendant to these firearms. Id. Here, the Ruger was not located in Sincleair’s
   own home, and Sincleair presented compelling evidence that the firearm
   belonged to Wood.
          Even if the government had met its burden of showing that “a
   temporal and spatial relation existed between the weapon, the drug
   trafficking activity, and the defendant,” Sincleair offered rebuttal evidence
   that was not properly considered at resentencing. Under this circuit’s
   burden-shifting framework, once the government makes its showing, “the
   burden shifts and the defendant must show that it is clearly improbable that
   the weapon was connected to the offense.” Rodriguez-Guerrero, 805 F.3d at
   195. At resentencing, the district court stated that, through the FAC, it “has
   determined that the facts do not support a finding that it is clearly improbable
   that the weapon was counted -- was connected with this offense.” During the
   proceedings, however, Sincleair presented the testimony of Blackman, who
   provided more information and context about the Ruger at issue. Sincleair
   also offered a portion of the transcript from the Texas state court case against
   Wood, during which he admitted that he owned the Ruger that was seized on
   May 18, 2018. Rather than addressing these factual disputes, the district
   court chose not to address them at all, as explained further below under Issue

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   3. Instead, the district court chose to apply the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement
   once more, based on the same facts that we previously deemed insufficient.
            Assuming that the district court relied on the co-conspirator
   possession theory instead, the record remains deficient to support the
   enhancement. In Sincleair, we explained that the PSR and its addendum
   “d[id] not provide enough facts to support a finding that Sincleair was
   engaged in a drug trafficking conspiracy with Ilczyszyn and Wood” and that
   the “temporal connection between the firearm and any drug trafficking by
   Sincleair was . . . tenuous at best.” Id. at 477. Moreover, the second
   addendum to the PSR casts doubt on the viability of this rationale, explaining
   that “none of the individuals present with the defendant and the firearm are
   charged as coconspirators or mentioned in the Factual Resume. The only
   individual that Sincleair is known to engage in drug distribution with was
   Ilczyszyn.” The second addendum cited United States v. Mata, wherein this
   court held that “evidence of a buyer-seller relationship is not, by itself,
   sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy.” 491 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir.
   2007).
            We conclude, under the de novo standard of review, that the record
   does not support the district court’s reapplication of the § 2D1.1(b)(1)
   enhancement under either the constructive or co-conspirator possession
   theories. We turn next to the question whether the district court failed to
   comply with our mandate in Sincleair.
            B. Whether the district court complied with our mandate in Sincleair
            The mandate rule “provides that a lower court on remand must
   implement both the letter and the spirit of the appellate court’s mandate and
   may not disregard the explicit directives of that court.” United States v.
   Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Becerra,
   155 F.3d 740, 753 (5th Cir. 1998)). “Absent exceptional circumstances, the

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                                    No. 22-10452

   mandate rule compels compliance on remand with the dictates of a superior
   court and forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by
   the appellate court.” United States v. Lee, 358 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2004).
   “In the context of remands for resentencing, this circuit employs a restrictive
   approach: The resentencing court may consider only that which we direct—
   no more, no less.” United States v. Pineiro, 470 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 2006).
   Additionally, “[a]ll other issues not arising out of this court’s ruling and not
   raised before the appeals court, which could have been brought in the original
   appeal, are not proper for reconsideration by the district court below.”
   United States v. Marmolejo, 139 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1998).
          We previously remanded this matter because we could not “be sure
   what rationale the court had in mind to support the [§ 2D1.1(b)(1)]
   enhancement.” Sincleair, 16 F.4th at 475 (quoting Zapata-Lara, 615 F.3d at
   391). Although we declined to take a position on the appropriate sentence to
   be imposed, we emphasized the lack of evidence in the record to support the
   district court’s application of the enhancement under either the personal or
   the co-conspirator possession theories. Id. at 477. We then provided specific
   instructions to the district court on remand, stating that “[i]f, on remand, the
   district court determines that the two-level firearm enhancement is
   applicable, it should make the appropriate findings and state plainly the basis
   for its decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We now
   look to the district court’s FAC and its statements at resentencing to
   determine whether it complied with our mandate.
          The government claims that the district court relied solely on the
   constructive possession theory and that it made this clear to the parties at
   resentencing. That is not the case, however. At resentencing, the court only
   indirectly endorsed the constructive possession theory, stating that “the
   facts do not support a finding that it is clearly improbable that the weapon
   was counted – was connected with this offense or that you were not in

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                                     No. 22-10452

   constructive possession of that weapon.” The district court further stated
   that it had adopted as its “final findings of fact the statements of fact made in
   the [PSR], subject to and including changes and qualifications made by the
   addendum to the [PSR] . . . and the [FAC] just announced.” As noted above,
   the second addendum to the PSR actually casts doubt on both the
   constructive and co-conspirator possession rationales. Moreover, the FAC
   does not “state plainly” the district court’s basis for applying the
   enhancement.
          The FAC does not clearly indicate that the district court relied solely
   on the constructive possession theory. The FAC states that “Sincleair had
   constructive possession over the firearm,” but then continues, in the next
   paragraph, to state “[w]hile not directly engaged in the methamphetamine
   sale between Wood and Ilczyszyn, Sincleair was present for and likely a
   knowing participant in the drug transaction between the two.” The next
   three pages of the FAC are devoted mostly to a discussion of co-conspirator
   possession. During various points in that discussion, however, the FAC
   references elements of constructive rather than co-conspirator possession. It
   is therefore unclear which rationale the district court relied on for its
   application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. The district court instead
   merged both theories into its analysis.
          Because the district court did not clearly state its rationale for
   reapplying the enhancement at resentencing or in the FAC, it did not
   “implement both the letter and the spirit of the appellate court’s mandate.”
   See Matthews, 312 F.3d at 657. We therefore conclude that the district court
   violated our mandate in Sincleair to “make the appropriate findings and state
   plainly the basis for its decision” 16 F.4th at 477.

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                               IV. CONCLUSION
          For these reasons, we again VACATE Sincleair’s sentence and
   REMAND for resentencing in a manner consistent with this opinion and
   within the limits of our mandate in Sincleair, 16 F.4th at 477.

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