Court Opinion

ID: 9535886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:46:08.774663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:22.702927
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Pfaff, J.
I find that I am unable to concur in the majority opinion written by Judge Sharp. On several recent *404occasions this court has had the opportunity to re-examine and re-assess the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act and the decisions thereunder in cases questioning awards of the Industrial Board. The questions presented by these appeals have produced the divergence of opinion between the judges of this court that is both necessary and beneficial to changes in the law through increased understanding and interpretation of the Act.
The majority opinion resolves the particular problem of this case by giving liberal interpretation to the question of when an accident arises out of and in the course of employment.
The Industrial Board is, in my opinion, the body to determine and interpret a workable definition of such an accident. The majority opinion speaks of a liberal interpretation of the Act, and I am in agreement with this view, but only to the extent that it applies to the policies of the Industrial Board. Our legislature established the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the procedures thereunder, and in so doing the Industrial Board was designated to be the administrative organization that performs interpretative and compensatory functions. If it was the intent of the legislature to liberally construe the Act, then the Industrial Board’s actions must reflect this legislative mandate. As an appellate court having jurisdiction of appeals from awards of the Board, we are constrained to follow the case law that I believe to be determinative of the question in the instant case.
In Steele v. Anderson Company (1956), 126 Ind. App. 445, 451, 133 N. E. 2d 896, this court, in affirming an award denying compensation, stated:
“It must be conceded that there is ample evidence in the record to support an affirmative award based on the appellant’s theory of liability had the Industrial Board seen fit so to do. We further recognize that where an accidental injury, arising out of and in the course of the employment^ aggravates,. accelerates or activates a pre-existing *405condition of or injury to an employee, the right is compensable. Heflin v. Red Front Cash and Carry Stores, Inc. (1947), 225 Ind. 517, 75 N. E. 2d 662; Earhart v. Cyclone Fence Company (1934), 99 Ind. App. 48, 190 N. E. 558; Brooks v. International Furniture Company (1951), 122 Ind. App. 300, 101 N. E. 2d 197, Transfer Denied (1952).
“Such a situation, however, does not justify this court in reversing the present unfavorable award unless the controlling facts are such that reasonable men are forced to a conclusion contrary to that reached' by the Industrial Board. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Company (1940), 217 Ind. 93, 26 N. E. 2d 399; Wright v. Peabody Coal Company (1948), 225 Ind. 679, 77 N. E. 2d 116; James v. Zimmerman Coal Company (1938), 105 Ind. App. 28, 13 N. E. 2d 315.
“The award of the Board cannot be set aside in this case unless all the evidence is undisputed and not contradicted and leads inescapably to the sole conclusion that the appellant was entitled to an award under our Workmen’s Compensation Act.”
I find the evidence in the Steele case so identical to the evidence in the case at bar that the majority was in grave error in a recitation of a portion of the Steele opinion. The following quotation is from our opinion in Steele, at page 448:
“The appellant’s testimony was corroborated, as to physical pain suffered by her on the day of the alleged accident, by the testimony of a fellow employee. She was also corroborated in other portions of her testimony by her husband, who was a witness in her behalf. The appellant.insists that the above evidence is undisputed and entitled her to the relief sought as a matter of law. However, the record discloses that during a physical examination conducted by Dr. Richard G. Nilges, on the 24th day of July, 1954, she gave the following past history: ‘That she had a similar severe attack in the right lower lumbar area with pain two years ago; that the pain started in the same way and that she had received six chiropractic treatments with relief.’ The record also discloses that a witness for the appellee testified, in substance, as follows: ‘She complained of a sore back a year prior to this occasion (June 11, 1954) and throughout that year prior she had complained several times of a sore back.’
*406“The appellant says that the only medical testimony was that of Dr. Richard G. Nilges, who testified that on the basis of appellant’s history there could be a causal connection between her condition as he found it and the incident at her work; and that assuming her history was correct the accident on June 11, 1954, could have either caused or aggravated the condition which was found at surgery, namely, a ruptured intervertebral disc. Some of the questions propounded to him and his answers are as follows:
“Q. Doctor, do these ruptured intervertebral discs, such as Mrs. Steele had, ever result from accidental means?
“A. Yes, sir, they usually do.
“Q. Doctor, in your opinion, is it possible that the strain of lifting display boxes of windshield wiper blades which weighed approximately ten (10) pounds and, that is, for a woman lifting such boxes that weighed ten pounds and turning sideways and placing those boxes into a larger box at a slightly lower level from the table from which she picked them up, so that as she puts these smaller boxes into the larger boxes she twists her back and she stoops over, is it possible for such a movement to cause enough strain upon her body as to in turn cause a ruptured intervertebral disc such as you found Mrs. Steele had?
“A. Such a motion of the body could cause or aggravate a ruptured intervertebral disc such as Mrs. Steele had.
“Q. Do you have any history of a traumatic history, have you?
“A. We have a history as given by the patient of a twisting strain to her back that could cause her condition.
“Q. Now when you have one of these latent disc conditions most anything will create the true final hernia that requires surgery, won’t it? By way of illustration, getting up and down on a chair, coughing, sneezing, bending over to dress or undress; any of those things would be the spark that sets off the final condition, may it not?
“A. Not in my experience; it requires some sort of twisting straining injury of greater or less severity to the back.
“Q. Doctor, assuming there was no latent disc condition and that’a woman had successfully been doing a cer*407tain type of work for as long as two (2) years and on the particular date that falls in question in a judicial proceeding just doing what she had been doing day after day a hernia disc developed, what in that particular day’s work is it would tie that condition in with the woman’s work?
“A. It is always possible that the back can be placed in such a position or a strain to be placed on the back that at various times of the day a strain could occur at any time and apparently according to the woman’s history did occur on the 11th day of June.
“Q. Well, what according to her history was unusual in the form of strain, what was it that she suffered?
“A. She states and I quote, ‘she was bending over to pick up some windshield wiper frames and upon straightening up felt a catching in the right lower part of her back,’ and if I may continue, I have had numerous patients of the same history, bending over and placing an object, and I have known the accident or incident to occur at any time, heavy or light.
“Q. And similarly it can occur, Doctor, from as simple a thing as bending over to lace your shoe if you have a latent condition ?
“A. It could, but not usually. In my experience it usually is associated with picking up something.”
In my opinion, the evidence and testimony of the Steele case is so identical to that set out in the majority opinion in this case that the two cannot be distinguished. In Steele the injury complained of was of the aggravation type, the same as in this case. However, the controlling facts of this case, viewed in light of the decision in Steele, lead me to the conclusion that the award should be affirmed here on appeal as it was in the Steele case.
In keeping with my views on this subject, I refer to Gill v. James A. Gill & Sons (1959), 130 Ind. App. 1, 159 N. E. 2d 734, wherein Judge Eyan, speaking for this court, stated:
“The question of whether or not an injury arises out of and in the course of the employment is a question of fact. *408The burden of establishing such fact rests upon the claimant and on appeal we may view only that evidence most favorable to the appellee. Kinsey v. Sheller Manufacturing Corp. (1955), 125 Ind. App. 493, 499, 126 N. E. 2d 267.
“A finding and award will not be disturbed upon the evidence unless it is of such a conclusive nature with all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom as to force a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Board. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Dykes (1958), 238 Ind. 599, 154 N. E. 2d 111.”
My belief that reasonable men might have questioned whether appellant’s accident arose out of the course of his employment'requires that I vote to affirm the award of the Industrial Board.
Hoffman, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 246 N. E. 2d 410.