Court Opinion

ID: 9636377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:25:59.162249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:44.726856
License: Public Domain

GRONER, C. J.,
concurring in No. 9153; ■dissenting in No. 9224 (separate appeals).
I concur in the conclusion reached by the Court in No. 9153 (Skiskowski v. United States), but I feel obliged to dissent in No. 9224 (Quinn v. United States).
The ground of my dissent is that in the ■course of the joint trial of both defendants an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was called by the Government to testify in relation to a written statement he had obtained from one Boley, an alleged participant in the crime, but who for some reason that does not appear was not on trial and was not produced as a witness. Boley’s statement contained a detailed story ■of the plans for the robbery, preparations for its consummation and the ultimate division of the loot. The Agent testified that he took this statement to Quinn while the latter was under arrest and read or told him the portions implicating him in the commission of the crime. Objection was made in Quinn’s behalf on the ground that Boley’s statement was taken out of his presence, was hearsay and, therefore, was not admissible against him. The trial judge, however, permitted the Agent to testify in detail as to the contents of the statement relating to Quinn’s participation in the robbery. The Agent said that when he read the statement to Quinn, the latter nodded his head, but that when he had completed reading it Quinn denied any participation in the robbery or any association with Boley. I think the Agent’s testimony was inadmissible.
Presumably the testimony concerning the contents of Boley’s statement was permitted on the theory of admission by standing mute. See, Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed. 1940, § 1072. But the fact is that as soon as the Agent completely disclosed to Quinn the contents of the statement, Quinn denied that it was true in any respect. The rule, I believe, is that if Boley’s statement had been made at such time and under such conditions that Quinn, if innocent of the crime, would naturally be expected to reply or deny the charge and if he made no reply, the statement would be admissible since the inference would be that he admitted it to be true. But even if it be admitted this is the rule, there is nothing in the circumstances related by the Agent to make it applicable in the present case. The fact that Quinn nodded his head certainly is not of itself, and in the face of his absolute denial at the conclusion of the Agent’s recitation of the statement, sufficient to make it admissible. Moreover, I believe the better rule, and that adopted by the majority of federal courts, is that a person’s failure to make a reply while under arrest cannot give rise to any inference of admission. Yep v. United States, 10 Cir., 83 F.2d 41; McCarthy v. United States, 6 Cir., 25 F.2d *184298; Hauger v. United States, 4 Cir., 173 F. 54.
Nor am I in accord with the view of the majority that the admission of this, testimony was not prejudicial to'the defendant, or that it should be characterized as “harmr less” error. The evidence of Quinn’s guilt was circumstantial and Boley’s statement, as the argument of Government counsel on the motion in Quinn’s behalf for an instructed verdict demonstrates, was largely relied upon to make out the case against him. The fact that Quinn’s counsel may have argued to the Court and to the jury that Quinn’s denial of the statement made it unworthy of belief does nót in my opinion change the situation. It was the only tactic left to the defense under the circumstances.
I am, therefore, in favor of awarding Quinn a new trial. Cf. Bihn v. United States, supra.