Court Opinion

ID: 9444633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:07:18.394027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:56.761979
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge.
I dissent.
RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Insofar as my learned brothers apply familiar and well settled principles so as to reach the stated conclusion that this record contains no testimony of “probative facts capable of supporting, with reason,” a jury verdict of willful or wanton misconduct, I must respectfully disagree. It seems to me that in reaching that conclusion they obviously evaluate the credibility of, and in fact necessarily reject as unworthy of belief, contrary testimony and plausible inferences therefrom, as to the origin and progress of the fire, some of which was given by appellee’s own witnesses, and which fairly required submission.
The majority’s apparent adoption of appellee’s theory that there were two separate and distinct fires, and their further assumption that the first fire discovered by appellee’s brakeman, Duncan, between 5:00 and 6:00 P.M. “was smothered by him,” seem to me unjustified on the basis of this record, particularly in view of Duncan’s candid admission even on direct examination by appellee’s counsel that he merely thought he extin*8guished the first fire.1 And while appellants’ testimony may not positively identify and connect up chronologically the first 6:00 P. M. fire as identical with that which admittedly destroyed their property between 7:30 and 8:00 P. M., with deference I submit that the testimony, as well as the surrounding physical facts and time element involved, at least created a strong inference for the jury that the fire ultimately causing the damage was but a continuation of the fire which Johnson testified he had observed approximately an hour earlier being used for cooking purposes by appellee’s employees.
Johnson testified that he first observed the fire from “shortly after five” until “somewhere around five-thirty,” when he left the packing house, and again upon his return “a few minutes after six.” Warren testified that he first noticed the fire “something after six o’clock” and again at 7 P. M., “or a little after” in “approximately the same place” where he had seen the previous fire, and that at that time he saw appellee’s train leaving the Lake Harbor station with the fire still burning. Crouch testified that he first saw the fire at about 7:05 P. M., shortly after he arrived home, and that when he got to the scene “there was nobody around the fire,” which was then “at the far end of the packing house,” and that “the train, a car and the engine, had just cleared the crossing.” Hoskins, the brakeman on appellee’s train crew, testified by deposition that he first observed the fire in the maiden cane “blowing across the track * # * at an angle” toward the packing house between 6:00 and 7:00 P. M., and that he “did not do anything” or turn in any alarm because he assumed someone else had done so and wanted to get back to his work. Revels first noticed the fire, according to his testimony, around 7 o’clock, at which time it was in the maiden cane “probably 75 or 100 feet from the packing house,” and stated that when he drove away he “looked back * * * to see if they had gotten the fire out” and could still see it burning in “the same place”, though appellee’s train had just departed. Finally, Embry testified by deposition that he saw the fire at about 7:30 P. M., at which time it was burning about “50 to 75 feet from the packing house.”
In view of all the foregoing and other testimony, the majority’s conclusion that there exists a “complete break” in the testimony connecting “the 5:30 to 6:00 o’clock fire with that which between 7:30 and 8:00 o’clock destroyed the packing house,” seems to me unjustified, and simply an invasión of the jury’s province by drawing inferences adverse to parties against whom a verdict has been directed. Viewing the testimony most favorably to appellants, as here we must, it seems to me that reasonable and fair-minded jurors quite justifiably might have concluded from all the testimony and reasonable inferences that the fire which ultimately destroyed appellants’ property was started by appellee’s employees;2 that it was recklessly left *9unattended in either a burning or smouldering condition by appellee’s train crew when they departed , sometime thereafter;3 that appellee’s crew well knew, as evidenced by Duncan’s testimony, footnote (1), supra, that a “muck fire” was diincult to put out and, if left unattended, might easily re-ignite the dry grass and maiden cane surrounding appellants’ property, particularly with even a “little breeze blowing”; 4 and that, with knowledge of appellants’ property thus imperiled by their own acts, they took no positive action to fully extinguish any remaining embers, but even departed leaving it unattended, and, insofar as this record reveals, without informing appellants, as nearby property owners, or anyone else, of the possibility of its recurrence.
*10To my way of thinking, all of the foregoing testimony certainly constitutes “probative facts capable of supporting, with reason,” a jury verdict of willful or wanton misconduct, Myers v. Reading Co., supra [331 U.S. 477, 67 S.Ct. 1339], and proof from which the jury might reasonably have inferred “an ethical or moral wrong committed by agents of the appellee.” The majority, however, say that it does not, but to add a favorite quotation of that master of the apt phrase, the late Mr. Justice Jackson, “ ‘The more (they) explain it, the more I don’t understand it.’ ” Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, at page 214, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1762, 91 L.Ed. 1995. Somewhat facetiously, I might add that, if appellee’s main theory as to the extinction of the first fire be accepted, this is probably the only fire known that may well have burned appellants’ property after it had been completely “smothered.”
The majority suggestion that wantonness should not be attributed to appellee’s agents from the testimony as to the origin and supposed extinction of the first fire, merely because appellant Plank departed from the warehouse area allegedly after himself being “satisfied that it was quenched,” seems to me a purely speculative and unwarranted assumption under this record. Certainly, that argument is hardly referable to restrict any right of recovery which might have been found by the jury to exist in favor of appellant Thomas, and its effect, if any, as a probative fact tending to negative wantonness, was at most a minor circumstance for the jury’s consideration in resolving the basic issue of wanton misconduct. I actually find no testimony or inferences one way or the other in this record that Plank departed from the warehouse so satisfied,5 but conceding arguendo that he did, it seems to me that a jury would still have been justified in making a finding of wanton misconduct, if they believed that Plank was justified, from all the proven facts and circumstances, in assuming that appellee’s train crew would not recklessly depart the warehouse area without notification to him or someone else that they were leaving unattended a smouldering condition for which they were responsible, so as to imperil his property. In any event, to draw such an adverse inference merely from Plank’s departure does not appear warranted in view of the undisputed fact that Thomas owned the packing house and Plank’s sublease of a small, open lean-to shed “on the east end” hardly justified any grave apprehension on his part as to the safety of the property.
Furthermore, though I regard the testimony as to the damage having actually been caused by the first fire as more credible,6 I still doubt whether the majority is justified in holding that no wanton misconduct could reasonably have been found by the jury under appellee’s theory that a second and subsequent fire actually caused the damage. I would not belabor this point, for regardless of whether the fire which de*11stroyed appellants’ property was the “first fire” observed by the witness Johnson, or the “second fire” caused by appellee’s engine having discharged hot coals on the track, as revealed by the testimony of Embry, there is still direct testimony in this record as to the existence of a fire, caused in one way or the other by appellee’s servants, dangerously near appellants’ property, from about 5:30 P.M. almost continuously until approximately 7:30 P. M. when the property was destroyed.7
All of the above detailed factual argument, both by the majority and myself, as to the sufficiency of the evidence on the issue of wantonness, is simply illustrative of the inherent impracticability of appellate courts attempting to resolve, through infinitely varying interpretations, ultimate factual issues and inferences from conflicting and equivocal testimony. Every factual argument here invoked could more appropriately have been addressed to a jury below. The basic difficulty in close cases is that varying interpretations result not so much from a literal reading of the testimony, as from the inferences “reasonably” to be drawn therefrom. But it is not a court’s province to draw or weigh inferences for a jury any more than it is its privilege to resolve direct testimonial conflicts. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610; Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520. While I agree with my brothers that a jury’s speculation and conjecture as to wantonness may not be permitted, in the absence of probative proof tending to reveal its existence, I think they mistakenly assume there must be “direct evidence” of wantonness in order to justify submission. Surely a prima facie showing of wantonness above and beyond simple negligence may reasonably be inferred from all the probative facts and circumstances here proved. The Supreme Court has itself upheld direction of a verdict only after giving “full credence to all of the testimony” and “making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party whose case is attacked.” Cf. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395, 396, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 1090, 87 L.Ed. 1458. And, as Mr. Justice Black there observed, “the judges of the District Courts and the Circuit Courts of Appeal are the primary custodians of the (Seventh) Amendment”, and have almost the entire responsibility of insuring compliance with the rule that a verdict is directed “only when, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there is in the evidence no room whatever for honest difference of opinion over the factual issue in controversy.” Galloway v. United States, supra, at page 407, 63 S.Ct. at page 1096, Black, J., dissenting.
I confess an abiding conviction that the right to a jury trial is one of the great bulwarks of our constitutional system, and can only view with alarm the ever present tendency of both trial and appellate courts inadvertently to deprive some litigants of this constitutionally guaranteed right, simply because of our fallible human tendency to reject, by means of subjective rather than objective analysis, sworn testimony which, as individuals, we do not consider worthy of belief. See Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916.
I respectfully dissent.

. Actually, Duncan testified:
“Q. When you finished putting water on that fire will you tell us whether or not there was any fire left?
“A. I wouldn’t say there was any fire left, because I wouldn’t know, but I don’t believe there was any fire left at all.
“Q. Was there any smoke left?
“A. There was some smoke there, yes, sir.
“Q. At the time you were putting it out, I suppose it was your purpose to use the water to put it out; is that right?
“A. That is right, yes, sir.
“Q. What is your belief as to whether you put that fire out?
“A. I believe I put it out. Of course, like I am telling you, you don’t know whether you put a muck fire out or not.”

. Johnson testified:
“Q. Will you tell the Court and jury, Mr. Johnson, just what these railroad employees were doing and just where they were located? A. Well, they were located just a little bit in front of the caboose, between the tracks, between the two tracks.
* * * * *
“Q. What were they doing? A. Well, they had a fire there under some kind of a grill of some sort and a coffee pot, and what looked, to be a skillet of some *9description. They were going about there as though they were preparing something to cook.
“Q. About what time in the afternoon would you say that was? A. That was shortly after five.
“Q. This fire, you say this fire was under this sort of grate thing? A. Sort of a grill.
“Q. Was it on the ground or in some sort of a container, or what? A. The fire was on the ground.
“Q. Was the coffee pot and the skillet over the fire? A. On the grill, yes, sir.
“Q. About what time of the day did you leave the packing house there, Mr. Johnson? A. Well, somewhere around five-thirty.
“Q. Did you have occasion to observe the men (sic) as you left the packing house at five-thirty, the men over there? A. Well, yes, they were still there.”
Johnson further identified that same fire on his return trip “shortly after six” as the fire which he had previously seen being used by appellee’s employees, as follows:
“Q. What did you observe as you came up by the tracks there? A. Well, there was some grass and weeds around there that were burning, around the area where these fellows had been, where the cooking was.
“Q. In other words, there was a fire in the area where you saw the men cooking is that correct? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Approximately how wide would you say, the fire was? Could you tell from there? A. Oh, maybe twelve or fifteen feet.
“Q. How many men did you see over by the grill at between five and five-thirty when you went over there? A. Two.
“Q. Did you observe any men over by the fire as you came by there sometime after six o’clock? A. They were around there.
“Q. They were around there? A. Around the fire, yes, sir.”

. Appellee’s own employee, Warren, testified :
“Q. In other words, when the train moved out you looked and saw the fire; is that right?
“A. That is right.
“Q. Was that fire approximately the same place where you saw the fire about six o’clock?
“A. Yes.”
Also, the witness Crouch testified that appellee’s train and crew had “just cleared the crossing” when the fire which destroyed appellants’ property really broke out, and the witness Revels further testified:
“Q. Where was this fire with reference to the fire that you saw when you went by there?
“A. It was the same place.
“Q. As I understand, you saw the train pull out?
“A. Yes, sir.”

. The witness, Guy Bender, testified:
“Q. If the fire is actually in the muck- and there remains, we will say, after the extinguishment of the blaze from a grass fire a smouldering condition, would you have any opinion as to whether that smouldering condition could ignite at a subsequent time and cause a rising of the fire?
“A. Maiden cane is very easy to reignite. The roots of the maiden cane will smoulder a little, and a little breeze will pick it up and it will re-ignite into a blaze very rapidly. Even after you extinguish the top fire if you don’t continue to wet it down and watch it, it will re-ignite very easily in the maiden cane roots.”
The witness Embry further testified:
“Q. How big a fire was burning?
“A. It was a pretty good field of fire. In other words, the grass was high and the wind was blowing, and it was spreading fast.
“Q. Did it look like a grass fire.
“A. Yes, you could see it was a grass fire.
“Q. In what direction was the wind blowing.
“A. Unfortunately, it was blowing and just pushing it right on in to the packing house. It wasn’t losing any time getting-. there.”

. Actually, appellant Plank did not testify that the first fire “was apparently out” when he departed, but only as follows:
“Q. At the time that you got into your car and the time you drove away did you again look back to see what the men were doing? A. Yes, sir. As I crossed the railroad at the depot I looked back down the track and they were carrying water from the tender.
“Q. They were still carrying water?
A. Still carrying water.
“Q. As far as any fire or smoke at that time, did you observe any fire or smoke at that time?
* * * * *
“Q. Are you certain that those men were still carrying water over to this area where the fire had been when you crossed the track there and looked back?
A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you later learn that there was a fire at the packing house or the packing house had caught afire? A. Yes, sir.”

. The only testimony as to the existence of the “second fire” was that from the witness, T. P. Embry, quoted by the majority, and though unobjected to, it was pure hearsay. Moreover, its existence at any time was vigorously disputed by appellee’s own employee-witnesses.

. While there may he no testimony that “any railroad employee” later observed any fire “identified as a railroad kindled fire” subsequent to that fire originally observed by the witness Johnson at 5:30 P.M., certainly the record contains testimony of other witnesses that, except possibly for a lapse of some 30 to 40 minutes between 6:15 and shortly before 7 P.M., during which time the previous fire may well have been smouldering in the maiden cane, a fire was almost continuously observed in the packing house area,