Court Opinion

ID: 9825380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 12:49:30.551644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:45.796171
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Upon application for rehearing in this cause, appellant requests a modification of the opinion, in so far as it may be construed as an inhibition of the lower court taxing the costs of the cause as to place the burdén of the litigation where he finds the fault to lie, or to apportion the burden where there has been mutual fault. Allen v. Lewis, 74 Ala. 381.
The discussion herein of the reversal of the cause, on former appeal, with directions, was not intended by the writer to be so construed as apprehended by appellant. The discussion had relation to directions on the former appeal as to the questions of merit presented by the litigation, and the matter of costs was given but incidental consideration.
The opinion in the instant case is therefore not to be construed as precluding the chancellor from the exercise of a sound judicial discretion in the matter of taxation of the cost (all of which is of course here subject to review) so as to apportion the burden of the litigation, if it should be concluded there has been mutual fault, and to that extent the original opinion is here modified.
Case No. 492.
The decree from which the appeal in ease No. 330, above considered, was prosecuted, bears date of -November 28, 1924. The security for costs of appeal in said cause was executed and duly approved and filed by the register on December 4, 1924, and the appeal to this court perfected. Section 6131, Code of 1923; Wyker v. Francis, 120 Ala. 509, 24 So. 895. That the decree of November 28, 1924, was such a final decree as supportive of an appeal is not questioned (Ex parte Elyton Land Co., 104 Ala. 88, 15 So. 939), and thereby this court acquired jurisdiction of the cause.
Subsequent to the perfection of that appeal, the register proceeded with the reference and rendered a report on February 10, 1925, and on May 23, 1925, the court rendered a decree upon exceptions to said report, and a final disposition of the cause.
Respondents (appellees in appeal No. 330) dissatisfied with the latter decree, prosecuted an appeal therefrom on that date. Mention is made of this appeal as a cross-appeal to No. 330, but this is clearly inaccurate, as the decree complained of on this appeal was rendered long subsequent to that of November *25028, 1924, appealed from by complainant on December 4, 1924, and tbe reference forming tbe basis thereof was also held after tbe perfection of said appeal. It must be considered, therefore, as a direct appeal.
Motion is made by appellee to dismiss tbis appeal upon tbe ground that, pending the appeal in case No. 330, the court below was without jurisdiction to render any decree affecting tbe rights and equities of the parties. The point is well taken. Allen v. Allen, 80 Ala. 154. As expressed in Ex parte Hood, 107 Ala. 520, 18 So. 176, if the rule were otherwise, a cause “would at one and the same time be pending in two courts, each having and capable of exercising authority over it.”
The recent case of Bell v. King, 210 Ala. 557, 98 So. 796, is directly in point, where apt authorities are cited. The decree from which the first appeal was taken contained nothing requiring the execution of a supersedeas bond. Ex parte Cudd, 195 Ala. 80 (more correctly reported in 70 South. 721); Anders v. Latimer, 198 Ala. 573, 73 So. 925. As said in Bell v. King, supra:
“It is of no moment that no supersedeas bond Jiad been given on the former appeal. A supersedeas is to suspend the execution of a decree already rendered, not to suspend proceedings in the pending cause further adjudicating the rights of the parties.”
Upon the authority of Bell v. King, supra, and the cases therein cited, the proceedings subsequent to the perfection of the appeal in the case No. 330 must be held as void, and the appeal in this cause, No. 492, dismissed.
It results from a consideration of the two appeals jointly, that, as to case No. 330; the decree appealed from must be affirmed, and, as to case No. 492, the appeal will be dismissed.
Affirmed as to case No. 330.
Appeal dismissed as to case No. 492.
ANDERSON, C. J., and SAYRE and MILLER, JJ., concur.