Court Opinion

ID: 86642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:00:43+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:39.930762
License: Public Domain

52 U.S. 232 (____)
11 How. 232
RICHARD C. STOCKTON, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES C. FORD.
Supreme Court of United States.

*236 It was argued by Mr. Volney E. Howard and Mr. Walker, for the appellant, and Mr. Bibb, for the appellee.
*242 Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States held in and for the District of Louisiana.
The action was commenced in a District Court of the State, and was removed by the defendant to the Circuit Court of the United States, under the twelfth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
James C. Ford, the defendant, being the owner of a plantation and slaves in the parish of Carroll, State of Louisiana, on the 11th of March, 1835, sold and transferred the same to Nicholas W. Ford, of Louisville, Kentucky, for the consideration of $80,000 the payment of which was secured by a mortgage upon the property sold. A subsequent mortgage was also given by N.W. Ford and wife, dated the 10th of June, 1837, to the defendant, to secure him against several heavy liabilities he was under for him, and in which mortgage was included some $32,000 of the original purchase-money then remaining unpaid.
*243 On the 26th of November, 1839, N.W. Ford sold and transferred all his interest and estate in the plantation and slaves to William Ford, Jr., for the consideration of $116,207.41, to secure the payment of which, the property sold was mortgaged by the vendee.
On the 12th of May, 1841, William Ford, Jr., resold and conveyed back to Nicholas W. Ford the plantation and slaves, for the same consideration which he had agreed to pay for them, and which was paid by delivering up and cancelling the securities given at the original purchase.
And on the same 12th of May, 1841, Nicholas sold and transferred the plantation and slaves back to the defendant, from whom he had originally purchased them, for a large consideration, made up of a balance remaining due upon the first mortgage and liabilities he was under for Nicholas, and the payment of which he had assumed.
The interest and estate of the defendant in this plantation and slaves, under the title thus derived, are involved in the result of this suit. I have not gone into the particular facts and circumstances attending these several sales and transfers of the property, as the view we have taken of the case, and upon which we shall place our decision, renders it unnecessary to a proper understanding of the question.
The claim of Stockton, the plaintiff, is as follows.
On the 3d of December, 1839, one William B. Pryor recovered a judgment in the Commercial Court of New Orleans against N. & E. Ford & Co., of which Nicholas W. Ford was a member, for $7,442.74, with interest at five per cent. from the 4th of December, 1837, and costs.
On the 2d of January, 1841, this judgment was filed and recorded in the office of the registry of mortgages, and became a lien on the real estate and other immovable property of Nicholas W. Ford. And on the 7th of February, 1842, the firm of Way & Bainbridge recovered a judgment against William B. Pryor for $718.12, with five per cent. interest from the 22d of April, 1837, and costs. An execution upon this judgment against Pryor was issued to the sheriff on the 26th of February, 1842, who seized all his interest in the judgment he had recovered against N.W. Ford; and, on the 17th of March following, in pursuance of such seizure, and after public notice according to law, sold the said judgment to Stockton, the plaintiff in this suit, for $300, he being the highest bidder; and on the 19th of April conveyed the same to him by deed.
The suit before us was instituted by the plaintiff, under a title thus derived to this judicial mortgage, for the purpose of foreclosing the same, and calling upon James C. Ford, the *244 defendant, to pay the amount of the judgment, principal and interest, or that a sale of the mortgaged premises be ordered.
It will be seen from the foregoing statement that the sale and transfer of the plantation and slaves in question by N.W. Ford to William Ford, Jr. took place on the 26th of November, 1839, and the judgment of Prior against him was filed with the recorder of mortgages on the 2d of January, 1841, although recovered on the 3d of December, 1839, some seven days after the above conveyance.
It further appears, also, that on the 12th of May, 1841, William Ford, Jr. resold and transferred the property to N.W. Ford, who, on the same day, conveyed it to the defendant.
The plaintiff insists, therefore, that this judicial mortgage of Pryor against N.W. Ford, to which he had derived title under the sheriff's sale, became a lien upon the property;  1st. On the ground that the conveyance of the 26th of November, 1839, was made in fraud of the rights of judgment creditors; but, if not, 2d. That it became a lien from the time of the reconveyance to N.W. Ford, on the 12th of May, 1841, as he then became reinvested with the title.
The view we have taken of the case renders it unimportant to enter upon an examination of either of these questions; and we shall assume that the judgment was a lien upon the interest of N.W. Ford upon one or the other of the grounds above stated.
On the 12th of March, 1840, William B. Pryor assigned this judgment against N.W. Ford to Dr. Jones, to secure him for responsibilities he had assumed for the former, he agreeing to pay over the balance, if any remained after satisfying them. Dr. Jones is a witness in the case, and testifies that the judgment was assigned to him by Pryor as an indemnity for large sums of money which he had paid and was liable to pay for him as surety; and that he had paid for him demands exceeding the amount of the said judgment for which he had no other satisfaction or security. That Pryor took the benefit of the bankrupt act of 1841. That soon after the assignment of the judgment to him he placed on file in the office where the judgment was entered notice of the said assignment; and that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the fact.
These facts are confirmed by the testimony of Pryor, who is also a witness in the case.
The suit was not commenced by Way & Bainbridge against Pryor until the 15th of January, 1842, nearly two years after this assignment of judgment of Pryor against N.W. Ford to Jones. The assignment, as we have seen, was made upon full consideration, without any concealment, or, for aught that appears, *245 intent to hinder or delay creditors; and was well known to the plaintiff long before he became the purchaser at the sheriff's sale. It passed the legal interest in the judicial mortgage out of Pryor, and vested it in Jones, as early as the 12th of March, 1840; and we are wholly unable to perceive any ground of equity in the plaintiff, or those under whom he holds, for disturbing it through a judgment against the assignor rendered nearly two years afterwards.
The sheriff's sale, therefore, could not operate to pass any interest in it to the plaintiff.
After the parties had proceeded to issue upon the pleadings, the plaintiff applied and obtained leave to withdraw the replication and amend his bill; and in that amendment he set forth, that on the 17th of February, 1842, the recorder of mortgages had entered on the mortgage book in his office a satisfaction and discharge of the judicial mortgage, which at that date was the property of Pryor; that afterwards it had become the property of the plaintiff by virtue of the sheriff's sale and conveyance; and charges, that the entry of satisfaction was illegal and void, as the judgment was then under seizure by the process of attachment in the suit of Way & Bainbridge against Pryor; that Pryor had no right to release the judgment; that he never received payment or satisfaction of the same; and that the discharge of record was fraudulently procured by Jones at the request of James C. Ford, the defendant; and that Jones had no interest or property in the same.
No answer was put in to this amendment, and the allegations were taken as confessed by the defendant.
This branch of the case has occasioned some embarrassment; and it is not readily perceived why the solicitor for the defendant should have omitted to put in the proper answer to the allegations, or have allowed them to be entered as confessed.
It will be seen, however, that the object of the amendment was to get rid of the entry of satisfaction of the judicial mortgage of record, which had been entered by the recorder of mortgages in due form; and which, while it remained, afforded a complete answer to the title set up by the plaintiff under the sheriff's sale; but which, of itself, was not essential, as it respected the ground of defence set up by the defendant. That rested upon the assignment from Pryor to Jones of the 12th of March, 1840. There is no charge made in the amendment of fraud in this assignment, nor any impeachment of its validity, except as may be inferred from the allegation that Jones was not the owner of the judgment, which is stated by way of showing that he possessed no authority at the time to cause the satisfaction to be entered.
*246 The defendant had set up in his first and supplemental answers, expressly, as one of the grounds of his defence, this assignment of the judgment from Pryor to Jones, and from Jones to himself; and that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the same. The fact, therefore, was at issue on the bill, answers, and replication; and, unless it had been directly impeached in the amended bill, no further answer was necessary to enable the defendant to maintain it by the proofs.
This being the state of the pleadings at the time of the amendment of the bill, the admission that the entry of satisfaction of the judgment by the recorder of record was made without authority, and void, did not materially affect the ground and posture of the defence. For while the pleadings were such as enabled the defendant to maintain the force and validity of the assignment by the proofs, he was in a situation to defend himself against the claim of the plaintiff, independently of the question in respect to the entry of satisfaction.
If the amended bill had charged that the assignment had been made in fraud of the rights of creditors, and the charge had been taken as confessed for want of an answer, the question would have been very different. But there is no such allegation.
Indeed, it is somewhat remarkable, that neither in the original bill, nor in the amendments (for there were two amendments), is there to be found a charge impeaching the good faith or validity of this assignment, although its existence was well known to the plaintiff; and while it remained, it was fatal to his deduction of title under the sheriff's sale.
In any view, therefore, that can be properly taken of the case, the plaintiff has shown no right or interest in the judicial mortgage which he seeks to enforce against the plantation and slaves in question. The whole interest had passed to the defendant.
There is another ground of defence set up in the pleadings, and supported by the proofs, which has not been satisfactorily answered. And that is, that the plaintiff was the attorney of Pryor in the judgment against N.W. Ford, employed to enforce its collection; and while holding this relation to him, and after the assignment of Jones to the latter, he became the purchaser in his own name, without communicating the fact to his client, and obtaining his consent. Holding this relation to Jones at the time of the purchase, it was his duty to have advised him of the seizure and sale, so as to have enabled him to prevent a sacrifice of the judgment on the sale; and having not only neglected to do this, but having purchased the judgment *247 himself, a court of equity will fasten upon the purchase a trust for the benefit of the client.
The defendant, therefore, standing in the place of Jones, would, upon clear principles of equity, have a right to demand of the plaintiff the title acquired at the sheriff's sale to the judicial mortgage, on paying the purchase-money. And if the purchase was made in bad faith, and with the intent to speculate at the expense of the rights and interests of the client, using the knowledge derived from that relation for this purpose, the remedy might not be too strong even to set aside the sale, and relieve the property from the encumbrance without the terms mentioned.
It is true, this is not the case of an attorney purchasing property under an execution which he has issued on a judgment, the usual case in which a court of equity has interfered, and declared the purchase to have been made in trust for the client. But the principle is the same. He had the charge of the judgment, and was intrusted with the management of it for the purpose of collection; and can be allowed to do no act in the absence of the client, and without his consent concerning it, by which he may derive an advantage at the expense of the client.
Instead of the judgment, suppose the plaintiff had the charge and management of a plantation and slaves for his client, and an execution should come against them under which they were seized and sold; can it be doubted, if purchased in by the attorney in the absence of the client, and without his consent, that he could not hold the property discharged of the trust growing out of the relation existing between the parties? We suppose not. A court of equity, from the mere fact of such relation, would fasten upon the purchase a trust, without any inquiry into the motives or intentions of the attorney in making the purchase, and compel him to give up its benefits and advantages on the reimbursement of the purchase-money. Neither fraud nor imposition need be shown. The client may, at his election, treat the act as done for his benefit.
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or, generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it.
But it is unnecessary to pursue this branch of the case, or to *248 place our decision upon it, as the ground already taken, and stated more at large, affords a full and conclusive answer to the claim set up by the plaintiff.
The decree of the court below is affirmed.

Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs.