Court Opinion

ID: 9890567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 16:10:23.419066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:31.989579
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Shaeffer v. FC Industries, Inc., 2023-Ohio-3732.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 CHARLES R. SHAEFFER                                     :
                                                         :
       Appellant                                         :   C.A. No. 29758
                                                         :
 v.                                                      :   Trial Court Case No. 2021 CV 04424
                                                         :
 FC INDUSTRIES INC ET AL.                                :   (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                         :   Court)
       Appellees                                         :
                                                         :

                                                 ...........

                                                 OPINION

                                      Rendered on October 13, 2023

                                                 ...........

JENNIFER L. LAWTHER & ERIN E. SAWYER, Attorneys for Appellant

KARL R. ULRICH, JOSHUA R. SCHIERLOH & COREY H. BUSHLE, Attorneys for
Appellee

                                               .............

LEWIS, J.

        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant Charles R. Shaeffer appeals from an order of the

Montgomery County Common Pleas Court granting summary judgment to Defendant-

Appellee FC Industries Inc. (“FCI”) on Shaeffer’s workers’ compensation claim. For the

following reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court.
                                                                                            -2-

   I.      Facts and Course of Proceedings

        {¶ 2} On February 28, 2020, Shaeffer was injured when he fell during the course

of his employment at FCI.       Shaeffer filed an application for workers’ compensation

benefits, which was allowed for the conditions of “right hip contusion and right shoulder

sprain.”

        {¶ 3} On May 10, 2021, Shaeffer filed a request that his claim be amended to

include the additional condition of “substantial aggravation of pre-existing right rotator cuff

tear.” Following a hearing, the District Hearing Officer issued an administrative order

denying the request. Shaeffer appealed the decision of the District Hearing Officer to a

Staff Hearing Officer of the Ohio Industrial Commission. The Staff Hearing Officer issued

an order affirming the District Hearing Officer’s order and denying the request. Shaeffer

appealed to the Ohio Industrial Commission, but the Commission issued a September

13, 2021 order refusing the appeal.

        {¶ 4} On October 27, 2021, Shaeffer filed a notice of appeal and a complaint in the

Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County. Shaeffer requested the court grant him

judgment allowing for his further participation in the Ohio workers’ compensation system

for the substantial aggravation to his pre-existing injury.

        {¶ 5} On September 7, 2022, FCI filed a motion to compel responses to its first

request for production of documents.        Attached to this motion was a “Certificate of

Impasse” in which counsel for FCI explained his efforts to resolve the discovery dispute

informally. According to FCI’s counsel, Shaeffer’s previous counsel and current counsel
                                                                                          -3-

both had ignored the discovery requests submitted by FCI despite multiple reminders sent

by FCI’s counsel.

       {¶ 6} On September 30, 2022, while its motion to compel was pending, FCI filed a

motion for leave to file a motion for summary judgment. FCI requested permission to file

a motion for summary judgment past the deadline contained in the trial court’s final pretrial

order, because Shaeffer had completely failed “to litigate this action and engage in

discovery, which prejudiced FCI’s ability to formulate a defense and move for relief under

Rule 56.” Motion for Leave, p. 1. The trial court granted FCI’s motion for leave.

       {¶ 7} In its motion for summary judgment, FCI argued that there was no genuine

issue of material fact, because Shaeffer had failed to disclose any evidence in support of

his claim. According to FCI, “[s]ince Plaintiff alleges a substantial aggravation, objective

medical evidence is necessary for him to support his claim.”          Motion for Summary

Judgment, p. 5.     FCI contended that Shaeffer “cannot possibly prevail on his claim

because [he] has submitted neither a single expert report nor a single document within

the discovery period showing whether [Shaeffer] suffered from a pre-existing condition,

and to what extent, if any, the condition was aggravated by an alleged workplace injury.”

Id. at 6. FCI also noted that “any evidence [Shaeffer] might try to attach to a response

to this Motion could not be used at trial since [Shaeffer] did not exchange any discovery

before the discovery cutoff.” Id.

       {¶ 8} Shaeffer filed a response in opposition to FCI’s motion. Shaeffer noted that

FCI had presented no evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment.

According to Shaeffer, FCI “must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the
                                                                                       -4-

type listed in Civ.R. 56 which affirmatively demonstrates the nonmoving party has no

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claims.”          November 18, 2022 Brief in

Opposition, p. 4, citing Leech v. Schumaker, 5th Dist. Richland No. 15CA56, 2015-Ohio-

4444, ¶ 13, quoting Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). Shaeffer

also attached to his opposition brief two letters authored by Paul A. Nitz, M.D. that were

addressed to Shaeffer’s prior counsel. The letters were dated August 10, 2020, and

September 21, 2020. In the latter of these two letters, Dr. Nitz stated, in part: “Mr.

Shaeffer’s previous pathology of his shoulder was made significantly worse and

subsequently more functionally challenging for him as the result of his traumatic event

that occurred to his shoulder in his injury on 2-28-20. Therefore, in the wording of BWC,

he has a diagnosis of rotator cuff tear, massive retracted, that was substantially

aggravated by this fall at work on 2-28-20.” These two letters were not attached to an

authenticating affidavit and were not accompanied by a curriculum vitae.

      {¶ 9} In its reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, FCI

argued that the evidence submitted by Shaeffer in opposition to the motion for summary

judgment was “not properly before this court as it was not disclosed in discovery and is

not properly incorporated into an affidavit as required by the Civil Rules. Moreover, the

evidence contains improper expert testimony under Evid.R. 702.” November 28, 2022

Reply Brief, p. 1. FCI concluded that the trial court should grant summary judgment,

because there was no evidence before the trial court related to Shaeffer’s claim of

aggravation of a pre-existing workplace injury. Id. at 5.

      {¶ 10} On February 28, 2023, the trial court granted FCI’s motion for summary
                                                                                         -5-

judgment and found that FCI’s motion to compel was moot. In its decision, the trial court

noted that “Defendant claims the only evidence of Defendant’s injury is that which is

stated in the Complaint. Defendant points out that it has not received any discovery

documenting objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test

results; specifically, it has not received an expert report within the discovery deadline.”

Decision Granting Summary Judgment, p. 4. Based on the record before it, the trial court

found, in pertinent part:

              Plaintiff claims that Defendant has not met its initial burden under

       Civ.R. 56. * * * Defendant has pointed to evidence in the Complaint and

       the Motion to Compel and attached Certificate of Impasse which are all part

       of the record to establish that no evidence has been submitted in a timely

       manner that can substantiate Plaintiff’s claim. Defendant has met its initial

       burden under Civ.R. 56.

              However, Plaintiff has not met his reciprocal burden. Plaintiff has

       not offered any evidence which complies with Civ.R. 56 to substantiate his

       claim. The only evidence offered by Plaintiff and attached to his Response

       were what appear to be two letters written by Dr. Nitz and addressed to

       Plaintiff’s original counsel.   The letters do not have an accompanying

       affidavit to authenticate their contents. As such the letters are not proper

       Civ.R. 56 evidence. Plaintiff must produce evidence for which they have

       the burden of production at trial and they have not done so. To establish

       that he aggravated a pre-existing injury, Plaintiff must produce expert
                                                                                          -6-

         testimony. There is no evidence before the court to establish a genuine

         issue of material fact remains on Plaintiff’s claims, specifically the element

         of his claim that he aggravated a pre-existing injury.

Decision Granting Summary Judgment, p. 4-5.

         {¶ 11} Shaeffer filed a timely notice of appeal.

   II.      The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to FCI Where FCI Failed

            to Carry Its Initial Summary Judgment Burden

         {¶ 12} Shaeffer’s sole assignment of error states:

                THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE FC

         INDUSTRIES, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

         {¶ 13} When reviewing a summary judgment ruling made by a court of common

pleas from an appeal of a decision by the Industrial Commission, we apply the same

standard used to assess any other summary judgment ruling, which is de novo review.

Lafon v. Iron Tiger Logistics, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-11, 2015-Ohio-2428, ¶ 8. “De

novo review means that this court uses the same standard that the trial court should have

used, and we examine all the Civ.R. 56 evidence, without deference to the trial court, to

determine whether, as a matter of law, no genuine issues exist for trial.” McAlpine v.

McCloud, 2021-Ohio-2430, 175 N.E.3d 948, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), citing Ward v. Bond, 2d Dist.

Champaign No. 2015-CA-2, 2015-Ohio-4297, ¶ 8.

         {¶ 14} “Civ.R. 56(C) provides that summary judgment may be granted when the

moving party demonstrates that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the
                                                                                         -7-

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most

strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one

conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for

summary judgment is made.”        (Citations omitted.)   Taylor v. Meijer, Inc., 182 Ohio

App.3d 23, 2009-Ohio-1966, 911 N.E.2d 344, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 15} The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue

exists as to any material fact. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., Inc., 54 Ohio St.2d

64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978).       Once the moving party has satisfied its burden of

identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact, the nonmoving party bears a reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d

264 (1996). The nonmoving party cannot rely upon the mere allegations or denials in

the pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial. Civ.R. 56(E). If no genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment must

be awarded as a matter of law.

       {¶ 16} Shaeffer contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment,

because “[t]here were no affidavits, transcripts of evidence, stipulations or any other form

of evidence described in Civ.R. 56(C) in support of [FCI’s] Motion for Summary

Judgment.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 6. Further, Schaeffer argues that he attached medical

records and reports of his expert, Dr. Nitz, to his response in opposition to FCI’s motion,

which demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding his underlying workers’

compensation claim. Id. at 7.
                                                                                       -8-

      {¶ 17} FCI responds that Shaeffer’s failure to support his claim with properly

authenticated objective medical evidence required the trial court to grant the summary

judgment motion. Further, FCI contends that the “expert reports” relied on by Shaeffer

in opposition to the summary judgment motion were not produced in discovery and were

not admissible under Evid.R. 702.     Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting

summary judgment to FCI.

      {¶ 18} Although we summarized the summary judgment standard above, the

arguments of the parties in this appeal require us to take a closer look at the summary

judgment standard, especially the burdens it imposes on the respective parties.        In

Dresher, the Ohio Supreme Court laid out the shifting burdens in the context of a motion

for summary judgment. The Court held:

             * * * [A] party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the

      nonmoving party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing

      the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of

      the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

      on the essential element(s) of the nonmoving party's claims. The moving

      party cannot discharge its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making

      a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove

      its case. Rather, the moving party must be able to specifically point to

      some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively

      demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the

      nonmoving party's claims.     If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial
                                                                                      -9-

      burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. However, if the

      moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has

      a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts

      showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does

      not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against

      the nonmoving party.

(Emphasis added.) Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264.

      {¶ 19} The Dresher Court went on to address the situation where neither party

provides evidentiary materials demonstrating that there are no material facts in dispute.

The Supreme Court explained:

             The question certified by the court of appeals in this case is, “[m]ay

      a court grant summary judgment when neither the movant nor the non-

      movant provides evidentiary materials demonstrating that there are no

      material facts in dispute and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

      of law?” (Emphasis sic.)    We answer that question in the negative. As

      stated in our discussion supra, the moving party bears the initial

      responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and

      identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of

      a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's

      claim. The “portions of the record” to which we refer are those evidentiary

      materials listed in Civ.R. 56(C), such as the pleadings, depositions, answers

      to interrogatories, etc., that have been filed in the case. Here, [the moving
                                                                                            -10-

       party] could point to no such evidence clearly demonstrating that appellees

       lacked proof of the negligence claim. Where, as here, the moving party

       does not satisfy its initial burden under Civ.R. 56, the motion for summary

       judgment must be denied.

Id. at 295-296.

       {¶ 20} The essence of FCI’s argument to the trial court was a conclusory assertion

that Shaeffer had no evidence to prove his case. But FCI did not submit or point to any

evidence in support of this conclusory allegation. Rather, it simply cited the fact that

Shaeffer did not timely produce documents in response to FCI’s discovery requests and,

from that fact, it inferred that Shaeffer must not have any documents to support his claim.

The Dresher Court, however, cautioned that such conclusory allegations cannot be the

basis on which summary judgment is granted.

       {¶ 21} We acknowledge the frustration a party like FCI may have when the

opposing party does not meet its discovery obligations in a timely fashion. Moreover, we

acknowledge that a trial court has authority in limited circumstances to dismiss an action

based on a party’s failure to comply with a discovery order or the party’s failure to diligently

prosecute the action. Civ.R. 37 and 41. However, dismissal of an action pursuant to

Civ.R. 37 or 41 should be seen as a last resort after sufficient notice has been given by

the trial court and the offending party continues to ignore its responsibilities and the court’s

orders. In short, a motion for summary judgment is not the proper mechanism to resolve

a discovery dispute.

       {¶ 22} Civ.R. 37 provides the parties and the trial court with the appropriate
                                                                                         -11-

mechanism for addressing alleged discovery violations. Indeed, FCI recognized this and

filed a motion to compel responses to its first request for production of documents. This

Civ.R. 37 motion to compel was pending at the time FCI moved for summary judgment.

But the trial court never addressed the merits of FCI’s motion to compel. Instead, the

trial court granted the motion for summary judgment based on an incorrect finding that

FCI had satisfied its initial summary judgment burden. The trial court erred in granting

summary judgment to FCI. Civ.R. 56; Dresher.

          {¶ 23} The sole assignment of error is sustained.

   III.      Conclusion

          {¶ 24} Having sustained the sole assignment of error, we will reverse the judgment

of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings.

                                       .............

WELBAUM, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.