Court Opinion

ID: 9671022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:29:37.596873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.762055
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. After careful consideration and evaluation of the evidence, I find that there was insufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter.
*593When determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979); People v Johnson, 112 Mich App 483, 489; 316 NW2d 247 (1982).
In People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 590-591; 218 NW2d 136 (1974), the Court discussed the crime of involuntary manslaughter:
"The elements of involuntary manslaughter, although not completely exclusive of those found in voluntary manslaughter are distinguishable in several respects. They define a crime that originates out of circumstances often quite different from those found in voluntary manslaughter and apply to a defendant who did not proceed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. In the leading case of People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923), the Court approved the following definition of involuntary manslaughter:
" 'Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.’4
"The usual situations in which involuntary manslaughter arise are either when death results from a direct act not intended to produce serious bodily harm, People v Carter, 387 Mich 397, 419; 197 NW2d 57 (1972), People v Austin, 221 Mich 635, 643-645; 192 NW 590 (1923), or when death results from criminal negligence. People v Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329; 28 NW 883 (1886); People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267; 183 NW 177; 16 ALR 902 (1921).”
*594Defendant was a Detroit police officer working as a lock-up doorman on the 11 p.m. to 8 a.m. shift on February 2 and 3, 1980. Fred Warren, also known as Edgar Smith, was brought to the lock-up at approximately 1:30 a.m. on February 3, 1980, following his arrest. Defendant processed Warren and another prisoner. During processing, defendant and Warren argued. After shutting Warren into a cell, a spitting incident occurred between the defendant and Warren, as well as more arguing. Defendant testified that he noticed a belt on Warren’s coat and requested that Warren give him the belt. When Warren refused, the defendant went into the cell. Warren, who was 6' 3" tall and weighed 228 pounds, began throwing punches at the defendant, who was 6' 1" tall and weighed 225 pounds, as the defendant approached him. Defendant warded off the punches and hit Warren once with a blackjack on the left side. The defendant took the belt and then left the cell. At 6:30 a.m., two officers checked on Warren and radioed for an EMS unit. Warren had a very distended abdomen, no vital signs, and signs of rigor mortis. Warren’s body was taken to the morgue. A medical examiner testified that Warren had cirrhosis of the liver which caused the liver to become enlarged and hardened. Warren’s spleen was also enlarged and in contact with the liver, unlike a normal, healthy adult’s liver and spleen. The cause of death was a trauma to Warren’s left side causing the spleen to rupture on contact with the hardened liver. Due to the deceased’s alcoholic disabili*595ties, a hard blow was not necessary for this chain of events to occur.
The trial court found that the defendant was not acting in self-defense. Further, the court found that because there was no fear of escape, no measure of force was justified, and the defendant committed an assault on the deceased. The court stated:
"The idea of carrying a night stick or using a night stick, blackjack, to acquire a belt from a prisoner for purposes of forcefully acquiring this belt which is believed might be used by the prisoner to injure himself, it seems a poor exercise of discretion because it’s like doing to the prisoner what one fears he might do to himself.
"Now, if there had been — and there was no testimony to this, that there was any noticeable indications of severe depression or any other conditions that would warrant immediate interference in this matter.
"The court wonders why, one, he wasn’t just left alone. Defendant testified that he was — he noticed that he had been drinking, strong odor of alcohol on his breath when he admitted him. I think it can be fairly well assumed that he might fall asleep; just leave him alone.
"The language of the prisoner, if we are to accept the testimony of the defendant, when he hurled the expletives at him when he asked for the belt, indicated — at least his feeling when he went in — he wasn’t going to be cooperative. Since he was behind locked doors, why not get another officer to help so that the belt could, if it must be, could be acquired without resorting to violence? It would have seemed to me that a second party may have — might well have rendered violence unnecessary.”
I cannot agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant intended to injure the deceased, nor can I agree with the trial court’s *596conclusion that, considering the deceased’s uncooperative attitude, the defendant should not have attempted to retrieve the belt because there was no testimony that the deceased was severely depressed and it could be assumed that the deceased would fall asleep.
The defendant, a police officer, was lawfully performing the responsibilities of his job as a lockup doorman at the jail. Although the three prisoner eyewitnesses made no mention of the defendant’s contention that he entered the cell to retrieve the decedent’s belt, the trial court believed the defendant’s testimony that he did enter the cell for the purpose of obtaining the belt. Further, even though the testimony did not reveal that the deceased was suicidal, the defendant had an obligation to retrieve any article that could be used in a suicide attempt. A belt is a common article used for suicide. If a prisoner committed suicide, the officer in charge could very well be accused of negligence in not removing all objects or articles that could be used in a suicide and civil liabilities might attach. See Young v Ann Arbor, 119 Mich App 512; 326 NW2d 547 (1982), where a police officer was sued by a plaintiff after her husband committed suicide by hanging himself with his belt while held in a detention cell at the police station. Also, see Michigan Department of Corrections Rule 791.632. As pointed out in the defendant’s brief:
"Indeed, this court may take judicial notice of the number of prisoners who have committed suicide in Michigan jails by the use of belts or similar articles. With the first six months of the same year as the offense charged here against the defendant, 11 people committed suicide in Michigan jails. Of these, seven were alcohol-related and two were drug-related. More*597over, since 1976, alcohol has been a factor in fully one-third of the suicides occurring in jails and lock-ups; and a majority of these occurred in the Wayne County area. Michigan Police Officer, vol 8 (December, 1980).”
In addition, the evidence revealed that the defendant and the deceased were approximately equal in size. Contacts between the two during the time the defendant processed the deceased indicated that the deceased was not going to be cooperative. Therefore, the defendant was on notice that the deceased would not give up the belt voluntarily but that the defendant would have to take it forcibly from him. The fact that the defendant chose to retrieve the belt himself, instead of obtaining the assistance of other police officers, does not indicate that the defendant intended to inflict any type of injury on the deceased.
Also, it is not unreasonable for a police officer to carry a blackjack. This fact does not indicate that the officer intended to do an unlawful act, and in this instance the manner and use of the blackjack was not an unlawful act. The blackjack is a protective instrument that jailers and police have to use to repel possible assault. Here the defendant had all the reason to believe that this might occur. We must remember that the atmosphere around a jailhouse, especially when unruly prisoners are there, is not akin to a church bazaar. Different and distinct modes of conduct and duties must be put into motion to maintain and convey a clear picture or impression as to who is in charge; if not, there would be chaos.
Moreover, the evidence established and the trial court found that there was only one blow struck which was to the deceased’s side and not to his head or other parts of his body. No beating took place; there were no repeated blows. Further, the *598officer clearly was not aware of the deceased’s liver and spleen problem. From these facts, I cannot find that the defendant intended to inflict any injury or commit an unlawful act.
This opinion does not condone the use of force by police officers when dealing with prisoners, and I note that each case must be decided on its own facts. However, under the facts of this case, I find that where the police officer had a lawful duty to retrieve the prisoner’s belt and had to use some force to retrieve the belt, the elements of involuntary manslaughter were not present.. Therefore, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction.
Resolution of the foregoing issue being dispositive, I find it unnecessary to discuss defendant’s remaining allegations of error.

"4 The negligence required to establish involuntary manslaughter *594is different in kind from ordinary negligence. Such negligence is variously referred to as 'criminal negligence’ or 'gross negligence’ and has been discussed thoroughly in several cases. See for example, People v Orr, 243 Mich 300; 220 NW 777 (1928); People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267; 183 NW 177; 16 ALR 902 (1921).”