Court Opinion

ID: 9940539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 18:01:26.990893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:58.789843
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 14 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID CERVANTES-AGUILAR,                        No. 21-1371
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A088-750-771
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted February 8, 2024**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: SCHROEDER, BUMATAY, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

      David Cervantes-Aguilar, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for withholding of

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

      1.     To prevail on a withholding of removal claim, an applicant must show

a nexus between a protected ground and the harm feared. Umana-Escobar v.

Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 551 (9th Cir. 2023). That means Cervantes-Aguilar needed

to show “that a cognizable protected ground is ‘a reason’” for his feared persecution.

Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

Cervantes-Aguilar claims only that he experienced harm previously, citing a single

incident where he was kidnapped after being removed from the United States and

released after his family paid a ransom. We have previously held that criminal acts

targeting “anyone [criminals] believe can pay, regardless of their victim’s

background” does not demonstrate a nexus between the harm and a protected

ground. Macedo Templos v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2021); see also

Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free

from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang

members bears no nexus to a protected ground.” (citation omitted)). Given the clear

financial motive for the kidnapping, substantial evidence supports the agency’s

determination that Cervantes-Aguilar failed to establish the necessary nexus. See

Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2018) (reviewing the denial of

withholding of removal for substantial evidence).

                                        2                                   21-1371
      2.     Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief.

See id. (reviewing the denial of CAT relief for substantial evidence). To qualify for

CAT relief, an applicant must show that the claimed torture would be “inflicted by

or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or

other person acting in an official capacity.” Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1188

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). Cervantes-Aguilar only claims

that the local police disregarded the police report he filed after his kidnapping

because they failed to call him to follow up after accepting Cervantes-Aguilar’s

report. This is insufficient to show acquiescence.     See Garcia-Milian v. Holder,

755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Evidence that the police were aware of a

particular crime, but failed to bring the perpetrators to justice, is not in itself

sufficient to establish acquiescence in the crime.”). Cervantes-Aguilar also failed to

demonstrate that he could not relocate elsewhere in Mexico to avoid the threat of

future torture. See Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 704–05 (9th Cir.

2022).

      PETITION DENIED.

                                        3                                   21-1371