Court Opinion

ID: 9946126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 15:06:53.892139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:27.445785
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13405

    COLUMBIA PLAZA ASSOCIATES   vs.   NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY.

         Suffolk.    October 2, 2023. - February 29, 2024.

     Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                          & Georges, JJ.1

"Anti-SLAPP" Statute. Redevelopment Authority. Practice,
     Civil, Motion to dismiss, Summary judgment, Retroactivity
     of judicial holding, Fraud, Attorney's fees. Contract,
     Construction contract, Performance and breach, Implied
     covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Unjust enrichment,
     Promissory estoppel. Constitutional Law, Right to petition
     government. Unlawful Interference. Unjust Enrichment.
     Declaratory Relief. Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or
     deceptive act. Fraud. Frauds, Statute of.

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
December 15, 2020.

     A special motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a
motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment were heard
by Rosemary Connolly, J.; a motion for attorney's fees was heard
by Jackie A. Cowin, J., and entry of judgment was ordered by
her.

     The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.

     1 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case
prior to his retirement.
                                                                  2

     Henry F. Owens, III (Richard K. Latimer & Robert Patrick
Cooper also present) for the plaintiff.
     Daryl J. Lapp (Elizabeth H. Kelly also present) for the
defendant.
     The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
     Robert S. Mantell, Audrey Richardson, & Emma Hornsby for
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & others.
     Robert C. Ross for NAIOP Massachusetts, Inc.
     Jeffrey J. Pyle for New England First Amendment Coalition.
     Mark S. Furman & Emily C. Shanahan for JACE Boston, LLC,
& another.
     Ruth A. Bourquin for American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts, Inc.

     KAFKER, J.   This case is before us after a judge in the

Superior Court allowed Northeastern University's

(Northeastern's) special motion to dismiss various claims,

pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, and otherwise dismissed or

entered summary judgment in favor of Northeastern on the

plaintiff's remaining claims arising out of plans to develop a

disputed parcel of land.   We conclude that all the claims were

properly dismissed.   We also analyze the judge's ruling on the

special motion to dismiss using a revised framework for

assessing such motions under § 59H, known more commonly as the

anti-SLAPP statute.   That revised framework, and the reasons

necessitating such revision, have been set out in detail in a

companion opinion issued today.   See Bristol Asphalt Co. v.

Rochester Bituminous Prods., Inc., 493 Mass.       (2024) (Bristol

Asphalt).   Applying this framework, and upon consideration of

the remaining issues before us on appeal, we affirm.
                                                                          3

     1.    Background.   a.   Facts.2   i.    Linkage program.   In the

late 1980s, the city of Boston (city), through the Boston

Redevelopment Authority (BRA), created a "Parcel-to-Parcel

Linkage Program" (linkage program) to develop land in its

Roxbury section.    The linkage program sought to promote urban

revitalization and to increase opportunities for minority

participation in development by "linking" two parcels of

property -- i.e., development of a profitable downtown property

was linked to the development of property in Roxbury considered

to be less commercially attractive.          A development team, with a

required minority partner, was to be selected by the BRA.           An

area identified for development in Roxbury, designated as parcel

18 and consisting of five subparcels (18-1A, 18-1B, 18-2, 18-3A,

and 18-3B), is at the heart of the instant dispute.

     ii.   1991 agreement and foreclosure.         The plaintiff,

Columbia Plaza Associates (CPA), was formed for the purpose of

participating in the linkage program and developing parcel 18.

In 1991, CPA entered into a sale and construction agreement with

     2 On appeal from a grant of a special motion to dismiss, we
state the facts as set forth in the pleadings and affidavits
before the trial court. See North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd.
Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 854 & n.5 (2009). Here,
because the plaintiff moved for summary judgment in response to
the defendant's special motion to dismiss, and the court
considered all the parties' pleadings and documentary evidence
in ruling on both the special motion to dismiss and the motions
for summary judgment, we do the same on appeal.
                                                                    4

the BRA (1991 agreement) in which the BRA agreed to sell and CPA

agreed to buy parcel 18 or certain subparcels thereof as

designated by CPA and approved by the BRA, and CPA agreed to

develop the land according to a master development plan approved

by the BRA and the city's zoning commission.3    Specifically,

under the 1991 agreement, CPA was to inform the BRA of its

desire to develop and purchase a particular subparcel.     After

providing notice, CPA was then supposed to "proceed in good

faith and with all reasonable efforts" to satisfy the various

conditions imposed on the sale and development under the 1991

agreement, including submission and approval of a development

plan.

        Under the 1991 agreement, CPA was allowed to mortgage the

subparcels to secure debt related to their acquisition and

development.    A party acquiring parcel 18 in foreclosure was

limited to the three following options:     (1) complete

construction on the subparcels in compliance with the

requirements of the 1991 agreement, (2) sell title to the

subparcels to a purchaser who would assume all "covenants,

agreements and obligations of [CPA]" under the 1991 agreement,

       CPA formed a joint venture with another entity for the
        3

purpose of developing the subparcels. CPA is the successor in
interest to this joint venture, and for simplicity, we shall
refer to actions or obligations undertaken by the joint venture
as being undertaken by CPA.
                                                                       5

or (3) reconvey fee simple title to the subparcels to the BRA.

CPA obtained a mortgage on parcel 18 and built an office

building on subparcel 18-1B.      For a short time, this building

housed the registry of motor vehicles.       However, by the mid-

1990s, the registry had vacated this location and the building

was condemned.     CPA's mortgage was foreclosed upon, and an

affiliate of CPA's lender acquired parcel 18 in a foreclosure

sale.    Northeastern subsequently purchased the land from this

affiliate in November 1997.      The quitclaim deed conveying parcel

18 to Northeastern also conveyed the affiliate's "rights arising

under [the 1991 agreement], between [the BRA] and [CPA]," and

provided that Northeastern would "assume the obligations set

forth in [the 1991 agreement]."

        iii.   1999 agreement.   On June 30, 1999, the BRA, CPA, and

Northeastern executed a "Second Amended and Restated Sale and

Construction Agreement" (1999 agreement).       The 1999 agreement

expressly rendered the 1991 agreement "null and void and of no

further force and effect."       The 1999 agreement also stated that

Northeastern intended "individually and/or through an affiliated

entity of Northeastern meeting the definition of 'Developer'" to

develop parcel 18.      The 1999 agreement defined "Developer" to

mean "Northeastern or an affiliated entity of Northeastern,

specifically including coventures with CPA, designated by

Northeastern to develop the applicable phase."      The subparcels,
                                                                     6

referred to as "Phase Parcels," were designated for separate

development from one another, with subparcel 18-2 selected for

the construction of a parking garage (garage parcel), and the

remaining subparcels intended for the construction of buildings.

     Additionally, the parties agreed in 1999 to enter into a

joint venture to acquire the garage parcel (second 1999

agreement).    The second 1999 agreement also contained a

provision whereby the parties agreed to enter into a joint

venture agreement to develop a new building on subparcel 18-3A.

Any such joint venture agreement was to be executed by the

parties no later than six months after the closing date of the

second 1999 agreement or a later date if the parties mutually

agreed on an extension.    However, the parties never executed any

such joint venture agreement within the six-month period and did

not agree to extend the deadline.

     iv.   2007 development plan.   Over the next six years

following the 1999 agreement, the parties explored the

possibility of developing together a hotel on subparcel 18-3A,

including hiring an outside firm to assess its economic

feasibility.   However, the parties never entered into any formal

agreement and, in 2007, Northeastern, in consultation with CPA

and the BRA, abandoned plans to develop a hotel or other

commercial building on subparcel 18-3A.    CPA agreed to the

removal of subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B from the development plans
                                                                     7

so that Northeastern could build a dormitory on those

subparcels.   In turn, Northeastern agreed to seek to develop a

hotel on subparcel 18-1A "in partnership" with CPA.    Thereafter,

Northeastern and the BRA executed a new development plan (2007

development plan).   The 2007 development plan stated that

"Northeastern University in partnership with [CPA] . . . intends

to proceed with construction on [subparcel 18-1A] (currently

anticipated for use as a hotel)."   The 2007 development plan

also formalized the removal of subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B from

the master development plan and the linkage program.

     Between 2006 and 2008, the parties discussed development of

a hotel on subparcel 18-1A.   After several months of silence

from CPA in 2008, Northeastern sent a letter to CPA on March 26,

2008, seeking to reinitiate discussions.   CPA responded on April

2, 2008, stating that it intended to review the appropriate

documents in order to foster an "informed dialogue."    On May 14,

2008, Northeastern sent a letter to follow up with CPA, noting

that while CPA's previous correspondence had indicated readiness

to discuss the project in "two to three weeks," CPA had yet to

respond to Northeastern's request to meet, and that, "despite

repeated attempts," Northeastern had had "no substantive

discussions" with anyone from CPA in the preceding five months.

     Nearly one year later, in March 2009, Northeastern

communicated to CPA that while the economic situation had
                                                                    8

deteriorated, raising concerns about the financial viability of

the hotel project, Northeastern remained "dedicated to following

through on its commitment to . . . proceed with the development

of a hotel on Parcel 18."   Northeastern also noted the

possibility of obtaining funding for the hotel project and

requested a meeting to discuss financing.   Afterward,

communications between Northeastern and CPA fell silent.

     v.   Subsequent court proceedings.   In 2013, CPA filed suit

against Northeastern, raising various contractual and other

claims arising out of allegations that Northeastern was

contractually required to work with CPA in any development of

subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B and that Northeastern's decision to

build a dormitory on those parcels wrongfully deprived CPA of

its development rights (2013 litigation).    CPA asserted that

Northeastern had concealed its intentions and falsely

represented to the BRA that it remained in partnership with CPA

in order to obtain the necessary BRA approvals for construction

of the dormitory.   After a trial, a judge in the Superior Court

entered judgment for Northeastern.   On appeal, the Appeals Court

affirmed the decision of the trial judge, and this court denied

CPA's application for further appellate review.   See Columbia

Plaza Assocs. v. Northeastern Univ., 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1113

(2018).
                                                                   9

     On May 9, 2017, CPA sent a letter to the BRA's successor,

the Boston Planning and Development Administration (BPDA),

demanding that it "compel Northeastern to present CPA with a

joint venture for [subparcel 18-1A, i.e., the proposed hotel

project], to provide a significant return to CPA, as

Northeastern . . . clearly will not do [so] on its own

initiative."   On May 25, 2017, Northeastern sent a letter to the

BPDA denying CPA's claims.   Northeastern asserted that it owned

all of parcel 18, including "all of the development rights" and

that CPA did not own any "development rights in Parcel 18 or any

of its sub-parcels."   In support, Northeastern pointed to the

trial judge's decision in the 2013 litigation, arguing that she

had ruled that "CPA does not have -- and never had -- any actual

'development rights' in relation to" subparcel 18-3A or 18-1A.

     In June 2019, CPA contacted Northeastern about developing a

hotel on subparcel 18-1A, but Northeastern rejected CPA's

outreach, again claiming CPA had no interest of any kind in

subparcel 18-1A.   In November 2019, Northeastern notified the

BPDA of its intent to develop subparcel 18-1A for its own use.

     b.   Procedural history.   In December 2020, CPA commenced

the instant suit against Northeastern, alleging breach of

contract (counts I and II), breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing (count III), interference with

advantageous economic relations (count IV), unjust enrichment
                                                                  10

(count V), commercial fraud (count VI), and unfair or deceptive

acts in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11 (counts VII and VIII),

and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (counts IX and X,

respectively).   Northeastern filed a special motion to dismiss

pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, or, in the alternative, a

motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass.

754 (1974).   CPA in turn moved for partial summary judgment on

counts I, II, III, VII, and VIII.   A judge in the Superior Court

(motion judge) allowed Northeastern's special motion to dismiss

under § 59H, with respect to CPA's claims of fraud, as well as

CPA's claims of unfair or deceptive acts in violation of G. L.

c. 93A, § 11, insofar as those counts were based on allegations

of misrepresentations by Northeastern to the BPDA.   The motion

judge denied the special motion to dismiss as to all remaining

counts, but allowed Northeastern's motion to dismiss, pursuant

to rule 12 (b) (6), as to CPA's claims for interference with

advantageous economic relations, unjust enrichment, declaratory

judgment, and injunctive relief.    The motion judge granted

summary judgment in favor of Northeastern on all remaining

claims.4   CPA appealed, and we accepted this case on direct

appellate review.

     4 In its opposition to CPA's motion for partial summary
judgment, Northeastern requested that the court enter summary
judgment in favor of Northeastern on the counts at issue. With
                                                                    11

     2.   Special motion to dismiss.   a.   Simplified anti-SLAPP

framework.   In Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass. at     , also issued

today, we have simplified and clarified the existing framework

for assessing special motions to dismiss filed under G. L.

c. 231, § 59H, the so-called anti-SLAPP statute, and explained

in detail our reasons for doing so.

     Under the first stage of this revised framework, the

special motion proponent has a threshold burden to show that the

challenged claim is based solely on the proponent's exercise of

its right to petition, with no "substantial basis other than or

in addition to the petitioning activities implicated."

Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167

(1998).   As we clarify today in Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass.

at    , we no longer parse the factual basis for a claim to

determine if some portion of the claim could independently

support the asserted cause of action, so as to permit partial

dismissal of the claim under Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp.,

Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 155-156 (2017) (Blanchard I), S.C., 483

Mass. 200 (2019).   Rather, if the special motion proponent

cannot demonstrate that the claim is based solely on the

the parties' agreement, the motion judge ruled on these counts
using a summary judgment standard.
                                                                     12

proponent's own petitioning activity, the special motion must be

denied.5

       If, however, the claim is based solely on the special

motion proponent's petitioning activity, the burden shifts to

the special motion opponent.      See G. L. c. 231, § 59H, first

par.       To defeat the motion at this second stage, the special

motion opponent must show by a preponderance of the evidence

that the special motion proponent's petitioning activity (1) was

devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable legal

basis; and (2) caused the special motion opponent actual injury.

See id.      If the special motion opponent makes both showings, the

special motion is denied.      Otherwise, the special motion is

allowed.

       As we explain in Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass. at      , we

abandon the "second path" for defeating the special motion,

which allowed a special motion opponent to prevail by

demonstrating that its claims were "colorable" and had not been

raised for the primary purpose of chilling the special motion

proponent's legitimate petitioning activity.      See Blanchard I,

477 Mass. at 159-161.      Additionally, as we also clarify in our

       This revision to the existing anti-SLAPP framework is
       5

particularly relevant in the instant case as the motion judge
employed such analysis to dismiss the portion of the G. L.
c. 93A claims that were based solely on petitioning activity.
                                                                   13

companion opinion, a ruling on a special motion to dismiss is

subject to de novo review on appeal.

     b.   Applicability of simplified anti-SLAPP framework to

instant case.    As an initial matter, we address whether the

simplified anti-SLAPP framework that we set forth today applies

to the instant case.   When this court construes a statute, our

holding is presumptively given retroactive application, although

we retain discretion to apply the rule prospectively in limited

circumstances.   See McIntire, petitioner, 458 Mass. 257, 261

(2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1012 (2011) ("Where a decision

does not announce new common-law rules or rights but rather

construes a statute, no analysis of retroactive or prospective

effect is required because at issue is the meaning of the

statute since its enactment"); Mouradian v. General Elec. Co.,

23 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 542 n.3 (1987), quoting 1 K.C. Davis,

Administrative Law Treatise § 5.09 (1958) (Davis) ("If an

interpretative rule is merely an interpretation of a statute,

and if the meaning of the statute has been there from the time

of its original enactment, then no problem of a retroactive

interpretative rule can arise, for either the interpretative

rule expresses the true meaning of the statute or it does not;

if it does, then that is what the statute has always meant and

the rule has not changed the law").    See also Eaton v. Federal

Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 587-588 (2012) (explaining
                                                                     14

presumption of retroactive application, with prospective-only

application being reserved for exceptional circumstances).

     Our holding today is intended to "give effect to the clear

meaning of a statute," a meaning that has not changed for these

purposes since its original enactment.     Dellorusso v. PNC Bank,

N.A., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 84, 87 (2020).    See Davis, supra.   This

"purpose is best accomplished through retroactive application."

Dellorusso, supra at 87-88.     In today's decision, we also return

to the framework that governed special motions to dismiss for

twenty years, until our holding in Blanchard I.     Thus we are

returning to an earlier interpretation, rather than developing a

brand new one, limiting any possible disruptive effect of

imposing the change at issue.     Accordingly, the simplifications

to our existing anti-SLAPP framework, set forth in Bristol

Asphalt, 493 Mass. at      , also issued today, are applicable to

cases in which an anti-SLAPP motion or appeal remains pending as

of this court's issuance of the rescript in Bristol Asphalt.

     i.   Stage one:    Northeastern's threshold burden.   Applying

the simplified anti-SLAPP framework, Northeastern had a

threshold burden to show that the claims at issue were based

solely on Northeastern's exercise of its right of petition, as

defined in G. L. c. 231, § 59H.     Northeastern contended that all

of CPA's claims were based solely on Northeastern petitioning

the BPDA to unilaterally develop subparcel 18-1A.     However, the
                                                                  15

alleged factual basis for most of CPA's claims was not solely

Northeastern's petitioning of the BPDA, but the existence of

contractual agreements between the parties.   That is, the

alleged conduct that gave rise to CPA's claims sounding in

contract was Northeastern's decision to enter into agreements

with CPA, and then act in violation of CPA's alleged rights

under those agreements.   See Duracraft Corp., 427 Mass. at 165

("Many preexisting legal relationships may properly limit a

party's right to petition, including enforceable contracts in

which parties waive rights to otherwise legitimate

petitioning").   Accordingly, the motion judge properly found

that Northeastern failed to meet its threshold burden as to the

claims for breach of contract (counts I and II), breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count III),

interference with advantageous economic relations (count IV),

unjust enrichment (count V), and declaratory and injunctive

relief (counts IX and X), as each of these claims was based on

preexisting contractual agreements, not solely communications

with the BPDA.   See id. at 168 (nondisclosure agreement

constituted substantial basis other than defendant's petitioning

activity to support breach of contract claims).

     The motion judge, however, distinguished CPA's claims for

unfair or deceptive acts in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11,

which are based upon both the allegation that Northeastern
                                                                  16

petitioned the BPDA in violation of CPA's alleged contractual

rights, as well as the allegation that Northeastern

"misrepresent[ed] to the BPDA that CPA's rights on [subparcel]

18-1A were extinguished."   The motion judge analyzed the c. 93A

claims under each theory of liability, in order to determine

whether a portion of either claim was based solely on

Northeastern's petitioning activity, in accord with the

augmented framework set forth in Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 143

(holding that defendant may meet threshold burden as to portion

of claim that is based solely on petitioning activity).

     Applying this augmented framework, the motion judge

determined that Northeastern was entitled to dismissal of these

claims in part.   However, under the simplified anti-SLAPP

framework we adopt today, such parsing analysis is not

appropriate.   Because a substantial factual basis for the c. 93A

claims was the allegation that Northeastern acted in violation

of its contractual agreements with CPA, Northeastern failed to

meet its threshold burden of showing that these claims are based

solely on its petitioning activity.   Accordingly, the special

motion to dismiss should have been denied as to both c. 93A

claims.6

     6 Although we do not join in the conclusion reached by the
motion judge that Northeastern was entitled to dismissal under
G. L. c. 231, § 59H, as to a portion of the c. 93A claims, we
                                                                   17

     Finally, we address CPA's remaining claim for "commercial

fraud."    Unlike the counts described above, this claim appears

to be based entirely on the allegation that Northeastern

"false[ly] represent[ed] to the BPDA that a Superior Court judge

found that CPA has no remaining development rights on Parcel

18," in reference to the outcome of the 2013 litigation

concerning subparcel 18-3A.    Because this allegation relied on a

written statement that Northeastern submitted to a governmental

agency, the BPDA, it constituted petitioning activity.     See

G. L. c. 231, § 59H, sixth par. (defining petitioning activity

to include "any written or oral statement made before or

submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any

other governmental proceeding").    See also North Am. Expositions

Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 862 (2009), and

cases cited (statements made to governmental bodies need not be

made within context of formal government proceedings to

constitute petitioning activity).    Thus, Northeastern met its

threshold burden, as the special motion proponent, with respect

to count VI of CPA's complaint.

     ii.   Stage two:   CPA's burden.   For count VI, the burden

then shifted to CPA, the party opposing the special motion, to

show that Northeastern's petitioning activity (1) was devoid of

nonetheless affirm the entry of judgment in favor of
Northeastern on these claims, for reasons detailed infra.
                                                                     18

any reasonable factual support or any arguable legal basis; and

(2) caused CPA actual injury.    See G. L. c. 231, § 59H.    Here,

CPA focused on a passage toward the end of Northeastern's

letter, which, after summarizing the 2013 litigation, stated

that, "as the Superior Court has ruled, CPA does not have -- and

never had -- any actual 'development rights' in relation to

[subparcel] 18-3A or 18-1A."

     Far from being "devoid" of reasonable support,

Northeastern's statement was squarely supported by the judge's

ruling in the 2013 litigation.   Although the 2013 litigation

concerned whether CPA's "rights" to parcel 18 had been

extinguished in subparcel 18-3A specifically, and not 18-1A, the

judge defined the nature of CPA's "rights" as follows:      "they

were not much better than a fishing license:   they essentially

gave CPA the opportunity to become a developer on a project

provided that it met the BRA's rigorous prerequisites, which

included a demonstration that it had a specific and economically

feasible development plan" (emphasis in original).

Northeastern's letter stated that CPA did not have "any actual

'development rights'" to subparcel 18-1A because its "rights"

amounted to no more than an opportunity to participate as a

developer in the event that certain prerequisites were met,

effectively paraphrasing the above-quoted language from the
                                                                     19

judge's decision.   Accordingly, we affirm the allowance of the

special motion to dismiss count VI of CPA's complaint.

     3.   Adjudication of remaining claims.    The motion judge

disposed of CPA's remaining claims by ruling on Northeastern's

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the parties'

cross motions for summary judgment.   On appeal, both types of

motions are subject to de novo review.   See Santos v. U.S. Bank

Nat'l Ass'n, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 691 (2016).    Where, as here,

both parties have moved for summary judgment, see note 4, supra,

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party

against whom judgment was entered -- here, CPA -- to determine

whether all material facts have been established such that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.        Twomey

v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 267 (2014).     See Abrahamson v.

Estate of LeBold, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 223, 225 (2016) (applying

standard of review applicable to summary judgment where motion

to dismiss was converted to motion for summary judgment).

     a.   Count I -- breach of 1999 agreement.    CPA's first

breach of contract claim is based upon its contention that

Northeastern committed a breach of the 1999 agreement by

rejecting CPA's request to develop subparcel 18-1A in June 2019

and notifying the BPDA of Northeastern's intent to develop that

subparcel for its sole institutional use.     We review the record

in the light most favorable to CPA.   That record nonetheless
                                                                   20

reveals that after the 1999 agreement, CPA lost development

rights in all the subparcels, except for the right to develop

the garage parcel.

     To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff

is required to demonstrate that "there was an agreement between

the parties; the agreement was supported by consideration; the

plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform his or her

part of the contract; the defendant committed a breach of the

contract; and the plaintiff suffered harm as a result."    Bulwer

v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 690 (2016).   To determine

the intent of contracting parties, we consider the "words used

by the parties, the agreement taken as a whole and the

surrounding facts and circumstances."   MCI WorldCom

Communications, Inc. v. Department of Telecomm. & Energy, 442

Mass. 103, 112 (2004).   If the words of a contract are clear,

they are dispositive as to the meaning of the contract.    See

EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness, 473 Mass. 540, 549 (2016).

     Section 102(r) of the 1999 agreement states that "for every

Phase, the Developer shall be Northeastern or an affiliated

entity of Northeastern, specifically including coventures with

CPA, designated by Northeastern to develop the applicable Phase

. . . .   It is hereby agreed that the Developer of the Garage

Parcel shall be the Northeastern/CPA Venture."   While this

language provides CPA with the right to develop the garage
                                                                  21

parcel with Northeastern, it does not grant CPA development

rights in any of the other subparcels.    Rather, the 1999

agreement specifies that Northeastern "shall be" the developer

for every subparcel and that Northeastern may designate an

affiliated entity, specifically including CPA, as a developer

for the other subparcels.

     If the parties intended to make CPA a codeveloper for every

subparcel, the language in § 102(r) allowing Northeastern to

"designate" CPA as a developer and agreeing that Northeastern

and CPA "shall be" the garage parcel developers would be

superfluous.     Gibraltar Fin. Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,

400 Mass. 870, 872 (1987) ("It is a standard rule of

construction that interpretations which result in meaningless

words are to be avoided").

     Moreover, the 1999 agreement extinguished any remaining

rights in parcel 18 that CPA might have had under the 1991

agreement.    Section 101 of the 1999 agreement states that the

1991 agreement is "null and void and of no further force and

effect."     The intent of § 101 is unambiguous:   the 1991

agreement is no longer in force and the parties' rights and

obligations are now governed by the 1999 agreement.

     CPA nonetheless argues that language in the preamble

reveals an intent to amend and restate the 1991 agreement, thus

incorporating CPA's development rights under the 1991 agreement
                                                                     22

into the 1999 agreement:    "the [BRA], Northeastern and CPA wish

to further amend and restate the terms of the Original Sale

Agreement and Original Amended Sale Agreement as set forth

herein."    While recitals may assist us in interpreting the body

of the 1999 agreement, they do not create enforceable rights in

and of themselves.    See Cullinet Software, Inc. v. McCormack &

Dodge Corp., 400 Mass. 775, 776 n.1 (1987).    Here, the general

language contained in the preamble is undercut by the more

specific statement in § 101 that the 1991 agreement is null and

void.

        CPA also posits that § 302 of the 1999 agreement gave it

veto rights over development on all of parcel 18.     Section 302

refers to the "Master Plan and the . . . Development Plan for

each Phase [(i.e., the development plans for each subparcel)],

as they may be amended and revised by the agreement of the

parties thereto."    CPA reads this as requiring that Northeastern

obtain agreement of all the parties to the 1999 agreement (i.e.,

both CPA and the BRA) before making changes to the development

plans for any of the subparcels.    Thus, CPA would have a veto

right over the development of subparcel 18-1A, even if the 1999

agreement extinguished its development rights.     A more sensible

reading is that Northeastern must get agreement from the parties

to each individual development plan for any modifications to

that development plan.    As CPA was only designated as a
                                                                  23

"Developer" for the garage parcel, Northeastern only needed

CPA's permission to make changes to the development plan for the

garage parcel.     CPA's position is further undermined by the fact

that the 1999 agreement reserves Northeastern's right to amend

the master development plan and submit a new development plan,

subject to approval by the BRA and the city's zoning commission.

Nowhere in this section is CPA's approval required or discussed.

      "[A]n unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to

its terms."   Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 412 Mass. 703,

706 (1992).   By its terms, the 1999 agreement states that (1)

the 1991 agreement, including any development rights conferred

to CPA, was rendered "null and void," and (2) except for the

garage parcel, CPA did not have any development rights in parcel

18.   Therefore, Northeastern did not commit a breach of the 1999

agreement by seeking to unilaterally develop subparcel 18-1A and

the Superior Court correctly granted summary judgment on count I

in Northeastern's favor.

      b.   Count II -- breach of 2007 agreement.   CPA's second

breach of contract claim centers around its assertion that

Northeastern's attempt to unilaterally develop subparcel 18-1A

violated an unwritten agreement between the parties in 2007

(2007 agreement), in which CPA surrendered its rights in

subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B in exchange for development rights on

subparcel 18-1A.    CPA appears to find proof of the 2007
                                                                  24

agreement in the 2007 development plan, in which Northeastern

removed subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B from the original development

plan and stated its intent to develop a hotel on subparcel 18-1A

"in partnership" with CPA.   CPA's second breach of contract

claim also fails.

     Viewed in the light most favorable to CPA, CPA had no

contractual rights in subparcel 18-1A.   The parties had

previously discussed possible projects on various subparcels,

including subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B, but none of these

discussions ever ripened into a final, written agreement.    As of

2007, the parties had conducted some preliminary discussions

around developing a hotel on subparcel 18-3A.   When Northeastern

decided to develop a dormitory on subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B, it

appears the parties agreed to shift the possible hotel

development to subparcel 18-1A.   Again, the record indicates

that, for a time, both parties engaged in some discussions

around developing a hotel but failed to reach an agreement that

would give CPA enforceable rights.   Nothing in the record

indicates that Northeastern ever agreed to a binding commitment

to build a hotel on subparcel 18-1A.   Cf. Mendel Kern, Inc. v.

Workshop, Inc., 400 Mass. 277, 280-281 (1987) (letter of intent

to enter into lease was not binding promise because it merely

expressed "intention to do something" at future date).

Therefore, CPA had no contractual rights to subparcel 18-1A and
                                                                   25

Northeastern was under no binding obligation to build a hotel

with CPA on subparcel 18-1A.

     Moreover, any oral agreement would be unenforceable under

the Statute of Frauds.    See G. L. c. 259, § 1.   Nor could the

2007 development plan render a verbal agreement enforceable, as

it was not signed by either Northeastern or CPA.     See id.

(agreement must be "in writing and signed by the party to be

charged therewith or by some person thereunto by him lawfully

authorized").

     The 2007 development plan similarly does not "contain

directly, or by implication, all of the essential terms of the

parties' agreement."     See Simon v. Simon, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 705,

709 (1994) (holding lease agreement did not satisfy Statute of

Frauds where it failed to define lease duration).     It states

that Northeastern, in partnership with CPA,

     "intends to proceed with construction on [subparcel 18-1A]
     (currently anticipated for use as a hotel) as contemplated
     by the [2007] Development Plan, continuing the
     revitalization of the development now known as Renaissance
     Park. The purpose of this Development Plan is to remove
     [subparcels 18-3A and 18-3B] . . . from the Development
     Area and to rescind the Master Plan, prior to proceeding
     with development on [subparcel 18-1A]."

While this suggests the outline of a possible agreement, the

2007 development plan itself is at most a statement of intent.

See Schwanbeck, 412 Mass. at 706-707 ("[a] promise made with an

understood intention that it is not to be legally binding, but
                                                                   26

only expressive of a present intention, is not a contract"

[citation omitted]).

     Indeed, the references to "proposed" actions and

"anticipated uses," and the use of the future tense throughout,

suggest an intent to set forth preliminary terms that were to be

finalized at a later date.   Mendel Kern, Inc., 400 Mass. at 279

(statements in future tense of actions to be taken indicative of

future contractual intent, not existence of current agreement).

While a valid contract may be "contingent on future events," the

contract must "provide mechanisms to narrow present

uncertainties to rights and obligations."   Lafayette Place

Assocs. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 427 Mass. 509, 518 (1998), cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 1177 (1999).   Here, many aspects of the

development are merely proposed and thus subject to change until

approved by the BRA.   Accordingly, it does not create a binding

contract.   Contrast id. (holding that agreement was enforceable,

despite lack of firm purchase price, because agreement provided

for pricing formula and "most of the information needed to

complete that formula was available").

     Nor can the 2007 agreement be enforced against Northeastern

under the theory of promissory estoppel.7   Promissory estoppel

     7 CPA also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the
2007 agreement can be enforced under the theory of judicial
estoppel. By failing to raise this argument below, CPA has
                                                                  27

requires "(1) a representation intended to induce reliance on

the part of a person to whom the representation is made; (2) an

act or omission by that person in reasonable reliance on the

representation; and (3) detriment as a consequence of the act or

omission."   Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the

Trial Court, 448 Mass. 15, 27-28 (2006), quoting Bongaards v.

Millen, 440 Mass. 10, 15 (2003).   A promissory estoppel claim

"is equivalent to a contract action, and the party bringing such

an action must prove all the necessary elements of a contract

other than consideration."   Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank

v. Varadian, 419 Mass. 841, 850 (1995).   However, as discussed

above, both the 2007 agreement and the 2007 development plan are

statements of intent or agreements to negotiate, not unambiguous

promises to develop property with CPA.    See id. (rejecting

promissory estoppel claim where evidence failed to support

finding that "'promise' in the contractual sense had been

made").8   Nor does CPA point to facts in the record demonstrating

waived it. See Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270,
285 (2006).

     8 To the extent CPA seeks to base its theory of promissory
estoppel on Northeastern's position as articulated in the 2013
litigation, it must also fail. The trial judge's decision in
that case referenced Northeastern's position that CPA "has
certain rights in connection with development of [subparcel 18-
1A] and does not seek any order that would extinguish them." As
discussed supra, the trial judge characterized the nature of
CPA's rights as "not much better than a fishing license."
                                                                   28

actions that it took in reliance on Northeastern's alleged

promise to develop a hotel with CPA on subparcel 18-1A, or any

detriment suffered as a result.   Contrast Sullivan, 448 Mass. at

28-29 (plaintiffs stated claim for promissory estoppel where

they alleged that they had refrained from suing defendant in

reliance on defendant's promises to address safety concerns in

office building).

     c.   Count III -- breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing.   We turn next to CPA's claim that

Northeastern committed a breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing.   "Every contract implies good faith and

fair dealing between the parties to it" (citation omitted).

Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 471

(1991).   However, the covenant does not create new rights and

duties not already provided for in the contract.   Ayash v. Dana-

Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 385, cert. denied sub nom.

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Ayash, 546 U.S. 927 (2005) ("The scope of

the covenant is only as broad as the contract that governs the

particular relationship").   Accordingly, because the 1999 and

Acknowledging these rights in relation to subparcel 18-1A,
without more, is not an unambiguous promise by Northeastern to
develop a hotel on that parcel. Cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland,
425 Mass. 756, 760 (1997) (rejecting plaintiff's estoppel
argument on basis that no enforceable promise existed, where
plaintiff asked about regular work hours, and was so informed,
but ultimately worked much later hours).
                                                                  29

2007 agreements did not create any contractual obligation for

Northeastern to involve CPA in the development of subparcel 18-

1A, Northeastern's failure to do so cannot constitute a breach

of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.   Contrast

Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., supra at 471-473 (refusal to approve

changes to developer's plan constituted breach of implied

covenant where developer had already spent years working on

development and approval was unreasonably withheld in order to

extract more favorable concessions).

     d.    Counts VII and VIII -- unfair or deceptive business

practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A.    We turn to CPA's claims

that Northeastern violated G. L. c. 93A by unilaterally

petitioning the BPDA to develop subparcel 18-1A for its own use

and repudiating CPA's rights in that subparcel.    General Laws

c. 93A, § 2 (a), makes unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition

and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any

trade or commerce."   To determine whether conduct rises to the

level of an unfair act or practice, courts look to the following

factors:   "(1) whether the conduct is within at least the

penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established

concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,

oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes

substantial injury to consumers or other businesses" (quotation

and citation omitted).   H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South Washington
                                                                    30

St., LLC, 489 Mass. 1, 14 (2022).    Business conduct "in

disregard of known contractual arrangements" and aimed at

securing benefits for the breaching party is an unfair act or

practice under G. L. c. 93A.   Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., 411

Mass. at 474, quoting Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives,

Inc., 398 Mass. 854, 857 (1986).    However, a mere refusal to

deal, without more, is not an unfair trade practice.      See PMP

Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596 (1975).

     Viewed in the light most favorable to CPA, the facts show

no conduct by Northeastern that rises to the level of an unfair

or deceptive practice.   The record before us only establishes

that Northeastern refused to deal with CPA after multiple

unsuccessful attempts to advance the hotel project.      See PMP

Assocs., Inc., 366 Mass. at 596.    And contrary to CPA's

contention, this case is markedly dissimilar to Anthony's Pier

Four, Inc., 411 Mass. at 453 n.3, 467-468, where the underlying

contract clearly required that the landowner work with the

developer on the development of the property.    Here,

Northeastern had no contractual obligation to involve CPA and

thus did not act unfairly or deceptively in repudiating CPA's

claims.   Nor did Northeastern use its refusal to deal to extract

some sort of benefit from CPA.     Contrast H1 Lincoln, Inc., 489

Mass. at 15 (unfair trade practice where defendant provided

"pretextual and unreasonable grounds" for terminating lease and
                                                                     31

then offered to reinstate lease to extract financial concessions

from plaintiff); Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., supra at 473.

       Lastly, we consider whether Northeastern's characterization

of the 2013 litigation in its letter to the BPDA constitutes a

deceptive business act or practice.     As discussed supra in our

discussion of the special motion to dismiss, Northeastern's

characterization was essentially accurate, and not a

misrepresentation constituting deception in violation of G. L.

c. 93A.     See generally Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass.

381, 394 (2004) (act or practice is deceptive if it possesses

tendency to deceive).    See also Nissan Autos. of Marlborough,

Inc. v. Glick, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 312 (2004) (lawyer's

refusal to convey property under lease's purchase option was not

"unfair or deceptive act" because "it was a prophylactic action

taken in accordance with his earnestly held interpretation of

the document and the law").

       e.   Count IV -- intentional interference with advantageous

economic relationship.    To succeed on a claim for intentional

interference with advantageous relations, a plaintiff must prove

that

       "(1) [it] had an advantageous relationship with a third
       party (e.g., a present or prospective contract or
       employment relationship); (2) the defendant knowingly
       induced a breaking of the relationship; (3) the defendant's
       interference with the relationship, in addition to being
       intentional, was improper in motive or means; and (4) the
       plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's actions."
                                                                     32

Blackstone v. Cashman, 448 Mass. 255, 260 (2007).

     The improper means or motive required to support a claim

for intentional interference is "actual malice" or "a spiteful,

malignant purpose, unrelated to the legitimate corporate

interest" (citations omitted).     King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576,

587 (1994), S.C., 424 Mass. 1 (1996).    "The motivation of

personal gain, including financial gain, however, generally is

not enough" to constitute improper motive.    Id.

     Here, the requirements are not satisfied.      In particular,

CPA has identified no improper motive or means as required by

our case law.    Viewed in the light most favorable to CPA, the

record establishes only that Northeastern acted in its own

corporate self-interest when it sought to develop subparcel 18-

1A for its own institutional use after multiple unsuccessful

attempts to advance the hotel project.    This, without more, is

not an improper means or motive.    See King, 418 Mass. at 587.

See also Pembroke Country Club, Inc. v. Regency Sav. Bank,

F.S.B., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 39 (2004) (defendant's "legitimate

advancement of its own economic interest" was not improper

motive or means for purposes of tortious interference claim).

Accordingly, CPA was not entitled to relief on this claim as a

matter of law.
                                                                   33

     f.   Count V -- unjust enrichment.   CPA's claim for unjust

enrichment similarly fails as a matter of law.   Unjust

enrichment is the "retention of money or property of another

against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good

conscience" (citation omitted).   Sacks v. Dissinger, 488 Mass.

780, 789 (2021).   A plaintiff must show that (1) he or she

conferred a measurable benefit on the defendant, (2) he or she

reasonably expected compensation from the defendant, and (3) the

defendant accepted the benefit with knowledge of the plaintiff's

reasonable expectation.   Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Kelly, 97

Mass. App. Ct. 325, 335 (2020).

     CPA's unjust enrichment claim fails because the record does

not establish a monetary or property benefit that CPA conferred

on Northeastern.   See Tedeschi-Freij v. Percy Law Group, P.C.,

99 Mass. App. Ct. 772, 780 (2021) (attorney's unjust enrichment

claim, based on law firm's continued use of her name after she

had departed firm, failed as matter of law where record

contained no evidence that firm derived quantifiable benefit

from continued use of name).   Contrast Liss v. Studeny, 450

Mass. 473, 479 (2008) (lawyer's competent representation of

client in course of lawsuit conferred "measurable benefit" to

client, notwithstanding fact that lawsuit was ultimately

unsuccessful).
                                                                    34

     g.     Counts IX and X -- declaratory and injunctive relief.

CPA's complaint also requested entry of a judgment declaring

that Northeastern must include CPA on any development of

subparcel 18-1A or otherwise compensate CPA for the value of

such development, as well as an injunction mandating that

Northeastern negotiate in good faith with CPA for payment of the

"fair and reasonable value" of CPA's alleged development rights

in subparcel 18-1A as a condition precedent to proceeding with

its development application before the BPDA.     Both counts fail

as a matter of law because CPA has no development rights for

which Northeastern must provide compensation.      See School Comm.

of Cambridge v. Superintendent of Sch. of Cambridge, 320 Mass.

516, 518 (1946) (declaratory judgment available if party

demonstrates it has "definite interest" in legal right denied by

another).    See also Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d

349, 353 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that injunctive relief is

not stand-alone cause of action under Massachusetts law).

     4.     Attorney's fees.   Finally, we address the issue of

attorney's fees in light of CPA's contention that Northeastern

should not have been awarded attorney's fees under G. L. c. 231,

§ 59H, because this is not a "SLAPP suit."      Where, as here, a

judge allows a special motion to dismiss a plaintiff's claim,

"[t]he judge has no discretion in deciding whether to award

costs and fees."    McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 349–350
                                                                     35

(2000).   Such an award is mandatory under the statute.    See

G. L. c. 231, § 59H.

     Because Northeastern was entitled to attorney's fees under

the statute, and because CPA does not argue that the amount

awarded was unreasonable, we do not consider the reasonableness

of the award on appeal.    See McLarnon, 431 Mass. at 349–350.   In

its brief, Northeastern has requested an award of appellate

attorney's fees and costs as well.    Because we affirm the ruling

of the motion judge allowing the special motion to dismiss as to

count VI, Northeastern is entitled to such an award.    See Benoit

v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 154 (2009).    Accordingly, within

fourteen days of issuance of the rescript in this matter,

Northeastern may file a petition for reasonable appellate

attorney's fees and costs in accordance with the procedure set

forth in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10–11 (2004).      See O'Gara

v. St. Germain, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 501 (2017).

     5.   Conclusion.   We affirm the allowance of Northeastern's

special motion to dismiss count VI of CPA's complaint.     We also

affirm the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of

Northeastern on counts I, II, III, VII, and VIII, as well as the
                                                                  36

allowance of Northeastern's motion to dismiss counts IV, V, VI,

IX, and X.9

                                   Judgment affirmed.

     9 Northeastern has moved to strike a letter that CPA filed
after oral argument in this case. Because our decision does not
rest on the contents of CPA's letter, we need not consider the
motion. See Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 442 Mass.
660, 674 n.29 (2004).