Court Opinion

ID: 9384360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 17:02:57.955927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.929076
License: Public Domain

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

                  STATE O F ARIZONA,
                     Respondent,
                          v.
               BOBBY CHARLES PURCELL,
                      Petitioner.

                  STATE O F ARIZONA,
                       Appellee,
                          v.
                 SCOTT LEE D ESHAW,
                     Appellant.

                 Nos. CR-21-0398-PR
                   CR-21-0400-PR
                    (Consolidated)
                  Filed April 3, 2023

   Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
         The Honorable Patricia A. Starr, Judge
                 Nos. CR1998-008705
                    CR1994-011396

      Order of the Court of Appeals, Division One
                 Nos. 1 CA-CR-21-0541
                   1 CA-CR-21-0512
                Filed December 7, 2021
                    REMANDED
                     STATE V. BOBBY CHARLES PURCELL
                          Opinion of the Court

COUNSEL:

Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney, Julie A. Done (argued),
Deputy County Attorney, Eric Basta, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix,
Attorneys for State of Arizona

Gary Kula, Maricopa County Public Defender, Kevin D. Heade (argued),
Deputy Public Defender, Tara R. DeGeorge, Deputy Public Defender,
Phoenix, Attorneys for Bobby Charles Purcell and Scott Lee Deshaw

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Joshua Bendor, Solicitor
General, Alice Jones, Deputy Solicitor General, Chief Counsel of Criminal
Appeals Section, Celeste Kinney, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorney General

                             _______________

JUSTICE BOLICK authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICES
BEENE and KING joined. *
                         _______________

JUSTICE BOLICK, Opinion of the Court:

¶1            We hold in these consolidated cases that the court of appeals
erred by concluding it did not have appellate jurisdiction over the dismissal
of resentencing proceedings. The United States Supreme Court ordered the
resentencings, but the trial court dismissed them following a subsequent
Supreme Court decision that changed the precedent on resentencing
juvenile offenders. The court of appeals dismissed each subsequent appeal
for lack of jurisdiction for failure to comply with the petition for review

*Justice John R. Lopez IV and Justice William G. Montgomery have recused
themselves from this case.

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                      STATE V. BOBBY CHARLES PURCELL
                           Opinion of the Court

procedures set forth in Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.16(a)(1). We
conclude that these were direct appeals over which the court of appeals had
jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4033(A).

                              BACKGROUND

¶2            Petitioners Purcell and DeShaw were convicted in unrelated
proceedings of first degree murder and other crimes committed when they
were under the age of eighteen. They were both sentenced to natural life
for the murders. The convictions and sentences were upheld on appeal.
State v. Purcell, No. 1 CA–CR 13–0614, 2015 WL 2453192, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz.
App. May 21, 2015) (mem. decision); State v. DeShaw, No. 1 CA–CR 13–0635,
2015 WL 1833801, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Apr. 21, 2015) (mem. decision).

¶3            While Petitioners were serving their sentences, the Supreme
Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which prohibited
mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders convicted
of homicide. The Court made that ruling retroactive in Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).

¶4            Petitioners filed post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petitions to
vacate their sentences under Miller. The trial court and court of appeals
denied relief, and this Court denied review. Following its decision in
Montgomery, the Supreme Court issued a decision remanding several
Arizona cases, including Petitioners’, for resentencing. See Tatum v. Arizona,
137 S. Ct. 11 (2016), granting, vacating, and remanding No. 2 CA–CR 2014–
0460, 2015 WL 728080 (Ariz. App. 2015). Simultaneously, the Court issued
each Petitioner a grant, vacate, and remand (“GVR”) order requiring
resentencing in light of Montgomery. Purcell v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016),
granting, vacating, and remanding No. CA–CR 13–0614, 2015 WL 2453192
(Ariz. App. 2015); DeShaw v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 370 (2016), granting, vacating,
and remanding No. 1 CA–CR 13–0635, 2015 WL 1833801 (Ariz. App. 2015).
The cases were returned to the court of appeals for further proceedings.

¶5            Subsequently, in State v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206 (2016), this
Court held that Miller and Montgomery created “a new substantive rule of
constitutional law” requiring trial courts to distinguish crimes that reflect
“irreparable corruption” from those that reflect the “transient immaturity
of youth” before imposing a natural life sentence for juvenile murderers.

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                      STATE V. BOBBY CHARLES PURCELL
                           Opinion of the Court

Id. at 209 ¶ 15. But see id. at 210–12 ¶¶ 23–30 (Bolick, J., concurring)
(criticizing Miller and Montgomery).

¶6            Thereafter, the State stipulated to Petitioners’ resentencings,
and the court of appeals granted review and relief, remanding the cases to
the superior court. State v. Purcell, No. 1 CA-CR-13-0614 PRPC, at 1 (Ariz.
App. Feb. 16, 2018) (dec. order); State v. DeShaw, No. 1 CA-CR 13-0635
PRPC, at 1 (Ariz. App. Feb. 16, 2018) (dec. order).

¶7             While the resentencing proceedings were pending in the trial
court, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021),
in which it clarified that “in making the rule retroactive, the Montgomery
Court unsurprisingly declined to impose new requirements not already
imposed by Miller.” Id. at 1317. The Court concluded that under Miller,
sentencers need not make separate findings of permanent incorrigibility,
but need only consider the offender’s “youth and attendant characteristics,”
id. at 1311, “so long as the sentence is not mandatory,” id. at 1314.

¶8             The State then moved to withdraw its stipulations, arguing
that Miller did not apply to the case because Petitioners’ life sentences were
not mandatory and the original sentencings were constitutionally sufficient
because the trial court had considered their youth. The trial court, in
identically worded orders in the two cases, concluded that it could deviate
from the GVR mandate because “the state of the law changed between the
time the mandate issued and now,” and therefore the resentencing is “not
constitutionally required.” The court vacated the resentencings and
dismissed the PCR petitions.

¶9            Petitioners appealed pursuant to § 13-4033(A)(3). The court
of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the
“superior court’s final decision in a post-conviction relief proceeding is not
an appealable order,” and may be challenged in the court of appeals only
pursuant to a petition for review under Rule 32.16(a)(1). State v. Purcell, No.
1 CA-CR 21-0541, at 1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Dec. 7, 2021) (dec. order).

¶10          Petitioners urge that because the resentencing proceedings
were not PCR proceedings, and because the trial court’s orders affected
their substantial rights, the court of appeals had jurisdiction under
§ 13-4033(A)(3). Because their petitions present an important and recurring

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                      STATE V. BOBBY CHARLES PURCELL
                           Opinion of the Court

issue of state law, we granted review. We have jurisdiction under article 6,
section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

                                DISCUSSION

¶11           Unlike the United States Constitution, which does not
guarantee the right to a criminal appeal, see, e.g., Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct.
2058, 2066 (2017), the Arizona Constitution guarantees convicted
defendants “the right to appeal in all criminal cases.” Ariz. Const.
art. 2, § 24.

¶12          Once appeals are exhausted following conviction and
sentencing, our rules provide for post-conviction relief in certain
circumstances. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2. Appellate review from PCR
proceedings is discretionary and must be sought through a petition for
review. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16(i); see, e.g., State v. Gause, 112 Ariz. 296, 297
(1975).

¶13           In addition to appeals from convictions, § 13-4033 provides
for appeals from certain other rulings, including “[a]n order made after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the party,” § 13-4033(A)(3), and
“[a] sentence on the grounds that it is illegal or excessive,” § 13-4033(A)(4).
As we resolve the case on the first ground, we need not reach the second.

¶14            In deciding that it lacked jurisdiction over the trial court’s
orders vacating resentencing, the court of appeals reasoned that this is a
PCR proceeding from which no right to appeal exists. Because Petitioners
failed to file a petition for review, the court determined it had no
jurisdiction to proceed. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16.

¶15            Petitioners make two arguments why they are entitled to
appeal. First, they assert the PCR proceedings concluded with the Supreme
Court’s mandate for resentencing, which essentially vacated their original
sentences. Second and relatedly, each Petitioner contends that the
dismissals of his resentencing affected his substantial rights. We agree with
both arguments.

¶16          Although the courts below characterized the proceedings as
PCRs, the substance of the proceeding controls over the form. Engineers v.

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                       STATE V. BOBBY CHARLES PURCELL
                            Opinion of the Court

Sharpe, 117 Ariz. 413, 416 (1977) (“[T]he appealability of an order ‘turns
[up]on the character of the proceedings which resulted in the order
appealed from.’” (quoting Kemble v. Porter, 88 Ariz. 417, 419 (1960))).
Although Petitioners initiated their quest for resentencing as a PCR
proceeding, they ultimately secured full relief when the Supreme Court and
subsequently our court of appeals issued their mandates. Pursuant to those
mandates, Petitioners were restored to the status of convicted but
unsentenced defendants. At that point, the PCR process had effectively
ended 1 and the trial court was to consider anew the appropriate sentences
in light of the applicable Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., State v. Ortiz,
104 Ariz. 493, 495 (1969) (holding that when a conviction is reversed due to
an illegal sentence, “[t]he slate has been wiped clean and it is a new case”).

¶17            The State concedes that if the trial court had conducted a
resentencing rather than dismissing the PCRs, Petitioners would have been
entitled to appeal even if the original sentences were reinstated. But that is
a distinction without a difference, because restoring a prior sentence
through dismissal and reinstating the original sentence through
resentencing have the same effect. As a resentencing is in essence a new
case for sentencing purposes, see Ortiz, 104 Ariz. at 495, the constitutional
right to appeal “in all [criminal] cases” is implicated in this case, Ariz.
Const. art. 2, § 24.

¶18            In Jordan v. Jordan, 132 Ariz. 38 (1982), this Court held that
“after decision on appeal and remand the lower court is bound to follow
the law set forth in the . . . mandate,” but that is subject to the exception that
“while the case is still pending, and in the interim between the rendition
and implementation of the mandate, there has been a change in controlling
law.” Id. at 43–44. Here, the trial court determined that “the state of the
law changed” in that Jones dictates that the original sentences conform to
Miller and Montgomery. But restoring a prior sentence due to changed legal
circumstances is still a decision on the merits: it is the outcome of the
mandated resentencing even if it is the same as the original sentence
rendered. And the legal determination that produced the outcome is no

1
 At oral argument, the State did not dispute this analysis, relying instead
on the trial court’s characterization of the proceeding as PCR, and was
unable to cite any authority for that characterization.
                                        6
                      STATE V. BOBBY CHARLES PURCELL
                           Opinion of the Court

less subject to appeal. Cf. Engineers, 117 Ariz. at 416 (holding that granting
a motion for reconsideration after judgment is an appealable order).

¶19           Indeed, regardless of the nature of the proceedings,
§ 13-4033(A)(3) ensures a right to appeal because the dismissal of the
resentencing is “[a]n order made after judgment affecting the substantial
rights of the party.” Here, the Supreme Court determined and the State
stipulated that Petitioners were entitled to resentencing. The resentencings
were dismissed based on the trial court’s determination that an intervening
Supreme Court decision changed the law.                 That determination
unquestionably affected Petitioners’ substantial rights, and therefore it is
subject to appeal.

¶20            The State relies on State v. Jimenez, 188 Ariz. 342 (App. 1996),
for the proposition that a defendant may not circumvent the PCR process
through a direct appeal. In that case, the defendant sought to appeal from
a trial court’s post-conviction decision not to modify conditions of
probation contained in a plea agreement. Id. at 343. The appeals court
noted that § 13-4033(B) expressly prohibits direct appeal of judgment that
results from a plea agreement, and thus appellate review of a denial of
modification is confined to a Rule 32 PCR proceeding. Id. at 344.
Petitioners here are in a tangibly different situation. They are not
attempting to appeal from a judgment that resulted from a plea agreement,
which is precluded under § 13-4033(B). Rather, Petitioners successfully
secured relief through the PCR process, but that relief was abrogated by the
trial court’s determination that the controlling law had changed. That
ruling, in contrast to the denial of a motion to modify probation in Jimenez,
affects Petitioners’ substantial rights and is subject to direct appeal.

¶21             The State’s reading of § 13-4033(C) to forestall direct appeal of
a trial court’s dismissal of a Supreme Court mandated resentencing could
create a situation where a defendant can neither file a direct appeal nor a
PCR given that Rule 32.1 prohibits a petition for review where the order is
appealable. The law cannot tolerate a situation where either avenue a
person chooses to exercise his constitutional right to appeal is a dead end.
See, e.g., Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019) (overruling a
Supreme Court case that prevented property owners from bringing their
claims in federal court without going to state court first and also barred a
federal claim if a plaintiff lost in state court). Section 13-4033(A)(3) makes

                                       7
                     STATE V. BOBBY CHARLES PURCELL
                          Opinion of the Court

clear that where an individual’s substantial rights are affected by a post-
conviction order, such order is appealable. The contrary court of appeals
decisions elevate form over substance and, therefore, diminish Petitioners’
constitutional right to appeal.

                             CONCLUSION

¶22           For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the court of appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeals in these cases. We remand to that court
for consideration of the issues presented.

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