Court Opinion

ID: 9449228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 07:10:03.41123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:47.645953
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                               __________________

                               NO. 09-22-00197-CV
                               __________________

                         IN THE INTEREST OF D.E.T.

__________________________________________________________________

            On Appeal from the 75th Judicial District Court
              (Assigned to the County Court at Law No. 2)
                         Liberty County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. CV1610614
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This is an appeal from a “Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship”

(hereinafter “SAPCR”). 1 After a bench trial, “Megan” appeals a modification order

      1
         The original case was filed in the 75th Judicial District Court in Liberty
County, Texas, and later assigned to County Court at Law No. 2 by the 75th Judicial
District Court. The County Court at Law No. 2 explained on the record that the
request for modification was assigned to County Court at Law No. 2 on August 24,
2020. See Ward v. Ward, No. 09-17-00024-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11385, at
**10-14 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 7, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding
that an order by a district court assigning a case to a statutory county court at law
was a proper assignment of the case) (citing In re Nash, 13 S.W.3d 894, 896-97
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, orig. proceeding)).
                                          1
(“the Order”) entered by the trial court with respect to her daughter “Darla.”2 The

Order granted Darla’s father “David” the exclusive right to designate Darla’s

primary residence within Liberty County and ordered Megan to pay child support.

Megan appeals the Order, raising three issues. We affirm.

                                   Background

      Megan and David’s Final Decree of Divorce was rendered November 21,

2016, and signed on January 12, 2017. In March 2018 the Judge of the 75th Judicial

District Court signed a Reformed Final Decree of Divorce (“Reformed Decree”). In

the Reformed Decree Megan was granted the exclusive right to designate the

residence of Megan and David’s child, Darla, without geographic restriction.

      David filed a Request for Emergency Hearing, First Amended Counter

Petition to Modify a Prior Order and Notice of Emergency Hearing on August 25,

2020. Therein he alleged that circumstances had materially and substantially

changed since the date of the Reformed Decree. He alleged that he had sustained

injuries in a work-related accident, and he requested modification of his child

support. He also alleged that he had learned that Megan was moving to Brownsville

and that the relocation was not in Darla’s best interest. David asked the court to

impose a geographic restriction on Darla’s residence and to name David the

      2
        To protect the privacy of the parties, we use pseudonyms for the parties,
witnesses, and the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d).
                                         2
conservator with the exclusive right to establish Darla’s residence. David attached

his Affidavit to his First Amended Counter Petition to Modify a Prior Order.

Therein, he made the following allegations:

    •     David learned that Megan planned to move to South Texas from a
          “third party” without notifying him in advance.
    •     David learned of Darla’s extracurricular activities through third
          parties.
    •     Megan has “never been able to provide [Darla] with a stable home
          life.”
    •     David and Megan’s marriage ended when Megan became involved
          with another man, she and Darla lived with that man for about three
          years, and then Megan became involved with a second man.
    •     Megan told Darla not to tell the first man that she and Darla were
          staying at the home of the second man.
    •     Megan lacks financial responsibility, and she had often been late
          paying Father on a note for property she was awarded in their
          divorce.
    •     Megan’s poor record of payment damaged David’s credit, and David
          lost financing for a home he had hoped to buy.
    •     When Megan has possession of Darla, she often leaves Darla in the
          care of boyfriends and other relatives.
    •     School officials reported that Megan is difficult to reach and fails to
          return required school materials timely.
    •     School officials noted “a decrease in [Darla’s] readiness to school”
          when she returns from Megan’s possession.
    •     All of Darla’s extended family live in Liberty County.
    •     A move to South Texas would significantly impair Darla’s physical
          health or emotional development.
    •     It was in Darla’s best interest for David to have the right to determine
          Darla’s residence and for her residence to be restricted to Liberty
          County.

        Megan then filed a Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship on

November 6, 2020. In her Petition, she alleged that circumstances had materially and

                                           3
substantially changed since the date of the Reformed Decree, she alleged the

requested modification was in the child’s best interest, and she sought an increase in

child support payments to be paid by David.

      David filed a Request for Emergency Hearing in December 2020, again

seeking to modify the Reformed Decree. David alleged that, after the divorce, he

was seriously injured in a work-related accident, that he had undergone a series of

surgeries, that he had a reduced income, and that his return to full employment was

undetermined. He also alleged that he learned through a third party that Megan was

moving to Brownsville or Harlingen, and that relocation of the couple’s child

Darla—then six years old—was not in the child’s best interest. David asserted that

the child was then enrolled in elementary school in Liberty County and that

relocation to Harlingen or Brownsville would significantly impair her physical

health or emotional development and was not in the child’s best interest. David asked

the court to modify the prior order and impose a geographic restriction on the child’s

residence and to name David as the conservator with equal periods of possession and

with the exclusive right to establish the child’s residence. He also asked the court to

“render appropriate orders to allocate his increased expenses on a fair and equitable

basis because of the relocation of [Megan].” David also attached his affidavit to his

Second Amended Counter Petition to Modify a Prior Order.

                                          4
      The parties tried the matter to the bench on July 30, 2021, and January 6 and

7, 2022. At trial, David’s attorney told the court that David “either wants the

restriction that she, the child, lives in Liberty County or that [David] be given the

right to establish the residency of the child and [] both [parents] continue as joint

managing conservators.” At the time of trial, Darla was six-and-a-half years old.

                                  Evidence at Trial

David’s Testimony

      David testified that he lives in Dayton, Texas (in Liberty County) with his

new wife “Hannah,” and he works six days a week at a ranch. According to David,

when his daughter Darla lived in Liberty County, he would visit her at school, go to

the movies, go fishing, dance, and he was involved with her participation in T-ball

and various “daddy/daughter” functions. Photographs of David and Darla were

admitted into evidence that David testified depicted him with Darla after the divorce.

These photographs depict David and Darla at “Donuts with DAD[,]” doing

homework, at a ranch, at Sea World, going fishing, in Fredericksburg, at the San

Antonio River Walk, Darla with her pony, and Darla and Hannah “doing facials[.]”

According to David, because Darla had moved to Brownsville, David no longer was

able to visit her at school, take her to school or pick her up, his participation with

her extracurricular activities was limited, and he no longer had Darla for overnights

on Thursday or Sunday.

                                          5
      David testified that Megan did not notify him before she moved to

Brownsville, and he found out through a third party. He also testified that he had

difficulty getting Darla’s school records in Brownsville because the school did not

have a copy of the divorce decree nor his contact number, so he drove to Brownville

to take the decree and provide his phone number. He further testified that he was not

listed as a contact with Darla’s doctor, and he obtained Darla’s doctor’s name by

looking at a prescription medication bottle. According to David, it had been a

continuing problem to get Megan to cooperate with him about Darla’s doctors and

schools. In David’s opinion the schools in Liberty County were better because they

are smaller and “can do more one-on-one with the children.”

      David testified that he and his new wife, Hannah, have family in Liberty

County, and Darla has no relatives in Brownsville except for Megan and Megan’s

new husband. He also testified that it is a six-and-a-half-hour drive to Brownsville

and that, when he has visitation with Darla, he does not have her for forty-eight hours

because “drive time interferes with it.” David agreed that he had suggested he and

Megan hand off Darla for visitations in Refugio, halfway between Liberty County

and Brownsville, and Megan had agreed. He further testified that he has incurred

extra expense traveling back and forth because of the distance to Brownsville.

According to David, Megan did not timely make payments on the loan she was

ordered to pay in the divorce decree, and that David’s credit had “taken a hit[]” as a

                                          6
result. David agreed that he filed a motion requesting a geographic restriction to keep

his daughter in Liberty County. David also agreed that he wanted Darla returned to

the school district in Liberty County.

Megan’s Testimony

      Megan, Darla’s mother, testified that she had been living in Brownsville for

about two years with her husband Micah, her daughter Darla, her son Cyrus, who is

two years older than Darla, and her infant son Dorian. Megan testified that she works

from home as an interviewing specialist, and she lives in a three-bedroom brick

home that she bought in November 2020. According to Megan, she is the sole

caregiver, but her husband helps with the children, he cooks dinner, he plays with

the children, and he teaches them how to do things like riding bicycles. Megan also

testified that she was working on a bachelor’s degree online in human resources that

she expected to complete next year, and she has been accepted into a master’s

program.

      Megan explained that the reason Darla missed school for a trip to Disney

World was because David gets Darla for forty-five days during the summer, which

meant Megan’s family was “unable to take any kind of [] vacation or extended

vacation because of that, so [they] had to do it in September.” According to Megan,

the absence from school did not affect Darla’s school work, and Darla is a “straight

A student.” Megan testified that Darla has “a ton” of friends at her school and more

                                          7
friends in the neighborhood in Brownsville. Megan also testified that she was in the

PTO, had been involved in fund raisers, and she was asked to be on the campus

improvement committee at Darla’s current school.

      Megan agreed that one time she drove to Refugio so David could pick up

Darla for his visitation, and David did not show up, although Megan believed David

knew it was “his weekend[.]” She agreed she had not been informing David of school

activities, and she stated “It’s not my job to inform him. He has the same access that

I do[,]” and Megan said she gives David school information when he requests it.

According to Megan, David does not come to pick up Darla on Fridays, but rather

Hannah picks up Darla. Megan testified that Darla does not seem to have any issues

with the visitation schedule and drive, and Megan testified she has given David

additional hours on occasion.

      Megan recalled that initially David was paying about $500 a month for child

support, which was reduced to “three something[]” after he had a work-related

accident and based on his income. Megan testified that expenses for Darla have

increased because of the need for school supplies, new clothes, and “substantially[]”

higher costs of housing. Megan testified that Darla is involved in ballet, tap, and jazz

in Brownsville, and she planned to take karate.

      According to Megan, when she was in Liberty County, she lived in a camper

trailer on a ranch that she owned, and at one point, she got behind on paying a land

                                           8
note due to illness and being laid off. Megan testified that, if she was required to

move back to Liberty County, she would have to move back into her camper and

“[i]t would be a bad thing.” She also testified that her husband works for Space X,

and if she had to move back to Liberty County, he could not be able to continue in

that job. Megan agreed that as an alternative, it would be reasonable for Darla to fly

between Brownsville and Houston for visitation and the extra cost could be a credit

against David’s child support. She testified that she did not have family in the

Brownsville area and her relatives live in Liberty County. Megan agreed she could

work in her current job from anywhere if she has high-speed internet, but she stated

she had considerable problems getting high-speed internet when she previously lived

in Liberty County.

      Megan testified that she got behind on paying the note on the land (as ordered

in the divorce decree) due to illness and being laid off and that “may have damaged

[David’s] credit.” She agreed that after she and David divorced, she was in a

relationship with “John” for several years, John put his mobile home on her property,

and she and Darla lived with him in that home. She also testified that she knew her

new husband Micah had a criminal history, and she agreed that he had either been

incarcerated or possibly just arrested once, although she was uncertain about the

details. Megan believed Micah had been charged with “something regarding theft.”

                                          9
Micah’s Testimony

      Micah is Megan’s husband, and he testified that he works for Space X in the

Brownsville area where he is “on call 24/7” and his salary is about $102,000 plus

stock benefits. According to Micah, he has made several updates to the house he and

Megan bought in Brownsville, and he believed Darla has benefited from the

improvement to the house. Micah testified that he loves Darla like she is his own

daughter, and sometimes he can go to events at Darla’s school. Micah also testified

that his relatives live in Rosharon, and if the court determined that Darla needed to

live in Liberty County, he replied, “I guess it would split our family up.” Micah

agreed he had received deferred adjudication probation on a misdemeanor charge

seventeen years earlier that was ultimately dismissed.

Holly’s Testimony

      Holly testified that she is eighteen years old and is David’s cousin and adopted

sister. According to Holly, she has witnessed David and Hannah argue a lot in front

of Darla, she has seen David and Hannah slap each other, and when David got mad

at Darla, he would whip her. She also testified that David had a “drinking

problem[.]” On cross-examination, Holly was asked whether she had accused her

biological father of molesting her, and Holly replied, “I was under the influence at

the time when that happened.” She also testified that her adoptive parents restricted

the times she could see her boyfriend, which caused conflict.

                                         10
Millie’s Testimony

      Millie, who is the grandmother of Megan’s oldest child Cyrus, testified that

she lives in Liberty County, and she thought David and Hannah had a “very close, a

good relationship” with Darla and they tried to be as involved with Darla as possible.

Hannah’s Testimony

      David’s new wife Hannah testified that she and Darla have “a great

relationship[]” and they “cook together, we play games, we go out on different

adventures, Sea World, elephant experiences.” According to Hannah, “[a] lot has

changed[]” since Darla moved to Brownsville, and their time together is “short now

as far as any activities on the weekends.” Hanna is concerned that Darla missed

“quite a bit” of school time over the past school year due to a trip to Disney World

with Megan. Hannah also testified that communication with Megan is difficult and

became more difficult after Megan and Darla moved to Brownsville.

      Hannah also testified that when David’s cousin Holly does not get her way,

“she lashes out and calls CPS or any other authority.” Hannah testified that David

drinks occasionally, but she stated she has never seen him drink and drive. According

to Hannah, at one point Holly asked to live with her and David, but they said no

“[b]ecause [Holly] causes a lot of problems[]” by lying and making false allegations.

                                         11
                                        Issues

      In her first issue, Megan argues that David did not show a substantial and

material change in circumstances because there was no “historical comparison” or

evidence of how Darla’s relocation to Brownsville had materially and substantially

changed David’s ability to care for Darla or to participate in Darla’s life. In her

second issue, Megan argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a change

in custody because David did not explain why it would be in Darla’s best interest for

David to have the exclusive right to determine Darla’s residency and because “the

record is void of the Holley factors.” In her third issue, Megan argues that the trial

court erred by changing conservatorship because a judgment must conform to the

pleadings and evidence, and David only requested a judgment that ordered a

geographical restriction to Liberty County—or in the alternative, that if Megan did

not return to Liberty County, that David should be appointed the parent with the

right to determine Darla’s domicile. Megan asks this Court to vacate the

modification order, or in the alternative, to reform the modification order restricting

Darla’s residence to Liberty County in accordance with David’s testimony.

                                 Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s decision in a case concerning a modification of

conservatorship under an abuse of discretion standard. In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611,

616 (Tex. 2007); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982). “The trial

                                          12
court is given wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child.”

Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d at 451. Conservatorship determinations are “‘intensely fact

driven,’” and the trial court is in the best position to “‘observe the demeanor and

personalities of the witnesses and can “feel” the forces, powers, and influences that

cannot be discerned by merely reading the record[.]’” In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211,

218 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002); Echols v.

Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)). Therefore, we

give the court great latitude in determining whether to believe a witness’s testimony.

See In re Doe 4, 19 S.W.3d 322, 325 (Tex. 2000). When the evidence is conflicting,

we presume that the factfinder resolved the inconsistency in favor of the judgment

if a reasonable person could do so. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,

822 (Tex. 2005). We will reverse the trial court’s judgment only when it appears

from the record as a whole that the court has abused its discretion. See In re J.J.R.S.,

627 S.W.3d at 218 (citing Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d at 451). A trial court abuses its

discretion when it acts arbitrarily or without reference to any guiding rules or

principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.

1985); In re M.A.M., 346 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). “In

determining whether a trial court abused its discretion, we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the trial court’s decision and indulge every legal presumption

in favor of the judgment.” See In re W.J.B., 294 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. App.—

                                          13
Beaumont 2009, no pet.) (citing Royer v. Royer, 98 S.W.3d 284, 285 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2003, no pet.)). We may not reverse for abuse of discretion simply

because we would have decided the matter differently. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242.

      The court that has continuing exclusive jurisdiction may modify an order that

provides for the conservatorship, support, or possession of and access to a child. Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 155.003(a). Section 156.101 of the Family Code sets out the

grounds for modifying a conservatorship order:

      (a) The court may modify an order that provides for the appointment of
      a conservator of a child, that provides the terms and conditions of
      conservatorship, or that provides for the possession of or access to a
      child if modification would be in the best interest of the child and:

             (1) The circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party
             affected by the order have materially and substantially changed
             since the earlier of:

                    (A) the date of the rendition of the order; or

                    (B) the date of the signing of a mediated or collaborative
                    law settlement agreement on which the order is based[.]

Id. § 156.101(a)(1); In re A.E.M., No. 09-18-00288-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS

1439, at *36 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). “‘The

change-in-circumstances requirement is a threshold issue for the trial court and is

based on a policy of preventing constant re-litigation with respect to children.’” In

re A.E.M., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1439, at *36 (quoting Smith v. Karanja, 546

S.W.3d 734, 738 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.)). Unlike

                                          14
termination of parental rights cases in which the statutory grounds for termination

must be established by clear and convincing evidence, the standard of proof for a

conservatorship decision is preponderance of the evidence. See In re J.A.J., 243

S.W.3d at 616. Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence. See

Cavanaugh v. Davis, 235 S.W.2d 972, 977 (Tex. 1951) (citing Duke v. Houston Oil

Co. of Tex., 128 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1939, writ dism’d, judgm’t

cor.)); see also In re S.C., No. 09-21-00325-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 2263, at

*39 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining a best

interest determination may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence); In re K.P., No.

09-13-00404-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9263, at *42 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug.

21, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). The party seeking modification bears the

burden of demonstrating a material and substantial change in circumstances has

occurred since the time of the previous order. See In re R.A., No. 09-20-00275-CV,

2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 7575, at *17 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 13, 2022, no pet.)

(mem. op.); In re J.G.M., No. 09-11-00368-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4300, at *2

(Tex. App.—Beaumont May 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 156.101; Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 589 (Tex. App.—Austin

2006, pet. denied)).

      In family law cases, the traditional sufficiency standard of review overlaps

with the abuse of discretion standard; thus, legal and factual sufficiency are not

                                         15
independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial

court abused its discretion. Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 549 (Tex.

2018). We make a two-pronged inquiry: “(1) Did the trial court have sufficient

information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) Did the trial court err in

its application of discretion?” Id.; see also In re R.H.C., No. 09-15-00429-CV, 2016

Tex. App. LEXIS 11388, at *12 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 20, 2016, no pet.)

(mem. op.).

      Section 156.101 of the Texas Family Code provides that a trial court may

modify an order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship when the

circumstances of the child or conservators have materially and substantially changed

since the date of the rendition of the prior order, and if modification would be in the

best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101(a)(1)(A). “‘In

reviewing determinations regarding modifications of residency restrictions to permit

a custodial parent’s relocation, we look to the public policy the legislature has set

forth in the family code for custody issues and the guidelines from that policy.’” In

re R.H.C., 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11388, at *13 (quoting In re Cooper, 333 S.W.3d

656, 660 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, orig. proceeding)); see also Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at

14. “Texas’s public policy calls for frequent and continuing contact with parents

when both parents are able to act in the child’s best interest; providing the child with

a safe, stable, nonviolent environment; and encouraging divorced parents to share in

                                          16
the raising of the child.” Id. (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.001; Cooper, 333

S.W.3d at 660).

      Determination of a substantial and material change is not controlled by a set

standard of criteria; instead, it is fact specific. In re A.E.M., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS

1439, at *37 (citing Epps v. Deboise, 537 S.W.3d 238, 243 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)). Some examples of material and substantial changes

include (1) remarriage by a party, (2) poisoning of the child’s mind by a party,

(3) change in the home surroundings, (4) mistreatment of the child by a parent or

step-parent, and (5) a parent’s becoming an improper person to exercise custody. Id.

      The child’s best interest is the trial court’s primary concern in determining

issues of conservatorship, possession, and access. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002.

On appeal, we assess the trial court’s best-interest finding by using the Holley

factors. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). The Holley

factors include (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s current and future physical and

emotional needs; (3) any physical or emotional danger to the child in the present or

future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals involved; (5) the programs

available to those individuals to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for

the child by these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) acts or omissions by

a parent tending to show that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper

one; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id.

                                          17
      The Holley factors are not exclusive, and in the conservatorship modification

context, a court may consider other factors, such as the child’s need for stability. See

In re A.E.M., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1439, at **36-38. Because this modification

involves residency restrictions and relocation, we also consider the factors identified

by the Texas Supreme Court in Lenz. See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 14. In Lenz, the Court

identified the following factors as being potentially relevant in determining the

child’s best interest as to a relocation: (1) the reasons for and against the move;

(2) the relocation’s effect on a child’s education, health, and leisure opportunities;

(3) accommodating any special needs or talents; (5) the effect on extended family

relationships; (6) how the move will affect the noncustodial parent’s visitation and

communication with the child; and (7) the noncustodial parent’s ability to relocate.

Id. at 15-16; In re R.H.C., 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11388, at **14-15.

                 Material and Substantial Change in Circumstances

      When both parties allege in counter-petitions that there has been a material

and substantial change in circumstances since the last order and both seek a

modification of that order, the allegations constitute a judicial admission that there

has been a material and substantial change in circumstances since the last order. See

In re A.E.M., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1439, at *37; see also In re A.E.A., 406 S.W.3d

404, 410 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (“One party’s allegation of changed

circumstances of the parties constitutes a judicial admission of the common element

                                          18
of changed circumstances of the parties in the other party’s similar pleading.”).

“‘Admissions in trial pleadings are regarded as judicial admissions’” in the case and

require no proof of the admitted fact, and “‘authorize the introduction of no evidence

to the contrary.’” In re A.E.M., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1439, at *38 (quoting In re

L.C.L., 396 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.)). Accordingly, we

conclude that the trial court could have reasonably found that there had been a

material and substantial change in circumstances since the last order.

      We overrule Appellant’s first issue. Next, we determine whether a

modification was in Darla’s best interest.

                              Best Interest of the Child

      In cases involving relocation, “no bright-line test can be formulated[,]” and

because such lawsuits are intensely fact-driven, issues of the child’s best interest are

resolved on a case-by-case basis. See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 18-19. Upon consideration

of the record, we conclude that the record includes sufficient evidence to support the

trial court’s determination that the modification was in Darla’s best interest. See id.;

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.

      Megan’s move to Brownsville resulted in David having to make a six-and-a-

half-hour drive to pick up and return Darla for visitation. Megan and David agreed

to an alternative arrangement whereby Megan and David would meet halfway for a

hand-off. David testified that since Megan moved to Brownsville with Darla, David

                                          19
no longer can take her to school or pick her up, it limited or prevented his

involvement with Darla’s extra-curricular activities, and he could not visit Darla at

school. David also testified that he had trouble getting Darla’s records from her

school in Brownsville because the school did not have a copy of the divorce decree,

and he had to drive to Brownsville to deliver a copy of the decree and give the school

his contact information. Megan testified that she had listed David as a contact with

the Brownsville school, but she told the school if there was an emergency situation,

the school should contact Megan. David also testified that he had not been listed as

a contact with Darla’s doctors, and he found out her doctor’s name from prescription

medicine Darla had. Megan testified that Darla missed a week of school to go on a

trip to Disney World because David has possession of Darla for forty-five days

during the summer, which meant Megan’s family could not take a vacation during

the summer and had to wait until September. Megan testified that she could work

anywhere there is high-speed internet, and she also testified that she is pursuing a

bachelor’s degree through an online program. Both David’s and Megan’s extended

families live in the Liberty County area, and Darla has no relatives in the Brownsville

area except for Megan and Micah and their other children. Megan also testified that

her extended family members live in the Liberty County area.

      We consider the evidence in light of the factors articulated in Holley and Lenz.

See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 14; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72. Deferring to the trial

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court’s assessment of the credibility and weight of the evidence, we conclude that

the record includes sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have

concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that a modification was in Darla’s

best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101(a)(1); In re B.C.C., No. 09-21-

00001-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 8785, at **33-34 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec.

1, 2022, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.). The trial court could have considered the testimony

that showed David was unable to be involved with Darla’s schooling and her extra-

curricular activities, the distance and time of travel, the location of family members,

the lack of communication between David and Megan about Darla’s medical

providers and school, David’s health problems from his injuries, as well as Megan’s

testimony that she can work from anywhere if she has access to the Internet.

Applying the factors set forth in Lenz, the trial court could have concluded that

Megan and Darla’s relocation to Brownsville had an adverse effect on “the

continuation of a meaningful relationship between the noncustodial parent and the

child[.]” See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15. The trial court could also have concluded that

the communication issues between David and Megan related to “the parents’ good

faith in requesting or opposing the move[.]” See id.

      Appellant argues that the trial court erred in its modification order because

David failed to introduce any evidence showing why it would be in Darla’s best

interest to reside with him and because “[t]he record is void of the Holley factors.”

                                          21
The Holley factors are not exhaustive, and in Lenz the Texas Supreme Court

addressed other considerations that are especially relevant when one parent has

relocated. See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 14; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.

      The Final Order in the SAPCR states that the court found “it is in the best

interest of the child to modify the Prior Order as herein provided.” Because no party

requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, we imply all necessary findings

of fact to support the trial court’s order. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v.

Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); In re W.J.B., 294 S.W.3d at 878.

      We are mindful that we may not reverse under an abuse-of-discretion standard

simply because we might have decided the matter differently. See Downer, 701

S.W.2d at 242. We defer to the trial court’s role as factfinder to determine the weight

and credibility of the evidence, to believe or disbelieve the witnesses, and to resolve

inconsistencies in the testimony. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 832. On this

record, even if we might have reached a different conclusion, we cannot say that the

trial court’s decision is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id. at 822.

We overrule Appellant’s second issue.

                            Sufficiency of the Pleadings

      In her third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court’s final order was not

supported by the pleadings or the evidence. More specifically, Appellant argues that

“[e]ntering a judgment granting Father the exclusive right to determine the child’s

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residency was error because the trial record is void of such request.” In our analysis

of Appellant’s first and second issues, we have already concluded that the evidence

and testimony was sufficient to support the trial court’s order.

          In his Request for Emergency Hearing, Second Amended Counter Petition to

Modify a Prior Order, the live pleading at the time of trial, David pleaded in relevant

part, 3

          [David] requests that the Court modify the prior order and impose a
          geographic restriction on the residence of the child, and name [David]
          as the conservator with equal periods of possession and with the
          exclusive right to establish the residence of the child.

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s final order conformed to the live

pleading at the time of trial. See Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682-83 (Tex.

1979) (explaining that “judgment must be based upon pleadings[]”). We overrule

Appellant’s third issue. Having overruled all of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the

trial court’s final order (“Modification Order in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child

Relationship”).

          AFFIRMED.

                                                      _________________________
                                                          LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                                Justice
Submitted on June 22, 2023
Opinion Delivered August 3, 2023

Before Horton, Johnson & Wright, JJ.

          3
              Emphasis added.
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