Court Opinion

ID: 9411772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 20:04:45.624715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:11.993515
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/27/23 In re J.S. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re J.S., a Person Coming                                  B316323
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP04850)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 D.L.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.
      Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel and Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________

      Mother appeals the denial of her Welfare and Institutions
Code section 388 petition.1 Her sole contention on appeal is that
the juvenile court erred in not ordering the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to send
notice to the Apache Tribes because the court had reason to know
mother’s child, J.S., is an Indian child. Mother’s premise is
incorrect; the juvenile court did not have reason to know J.S. is
an Indian child. We thus affirm.

                        BACKGROUND
       We summarize only those facts relevant to this appeal.
Mother has six children. The youngest, J.S., was born in
September 2020. Prior to the current dependency proceedings,
all of mother’s children, except J.S., were removed from her
custody because of mother’s longstanding drug abuse. The case
before us involves only J.S.
       DCFS filed a section 300 petition on September 15, 2020
when J.S. was only weeks old and born with a positive toxicology
for Benzodiazepines. The juvenile court sustained allegations
that mother has a history of drug abuse and currently abuses
benzodiazepine, marijuana, opiates, and prescription medication,

     1   Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                   2
and that this substance abuse renders her incapable of caring for
J.S. The juvenile court also sustained similar allegations of past
and current substance abuse against father, which substance
abuse renders him unable to provide regular care for J.S. and
places J.S. at risk of serious danger.
       In September 2020, DCFS placed J.S. with maternal uncle,
G.L. In October 2020, G.L. indicated he wanted to adopt J.S. and
later, he became J.S.’s prospective adoptive parent. G.L.
previously had adopted J.S.’s half sister.
       When the case started, mother told a social worker her
family might be part of the Apache Tribe. Mother’s attorney
signed a parental notification of Indian status on behalf of
mother in which mother indicated one or more of her parents,
grandparents, or other lineal ancestors was a member of the
Apache Tribe. Mother identified the ancestor as Lorenzo L.; he
died in 2018.
       At a hearing on September 18, 2020, mother told the
juvenile court that “my real father, was Native American.”
Mother continued, “[H]e’s Apache Indian so he’s from up north.”
The court asked mother if she had any new information
concerning Indian heritage since the juvenile court previously
made findings that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA)2
did not apply to a half sibling. Mother answered, “No.”
       On September 18, 2020, the juvenile court found ICWA
does not apply as to mother.3 DCFS later provided further
information regarding ICWA.

      2   Title 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq.
      3 The court ordered DCFS to investigate father’s potential
Indian status with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. The Tribe
responded that J.S. was not eligible for membership. Father has

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       In a last minute information dated May 12, 2023, DCFS
reported that a 2016 report indicated “ ‘mother stated she was
not found eligible for ICWA through Apache [T]ribe in sibling’s
case.’ ” (Italics omitted.) A 2015 report indicated that social
workers spoke to maternal uncle, who reported “ ‘none of the
family members are [sic] affiliated with a tribe.’ ” He further
stated, “[T]he family believes great-great grandfather had some
Apache heritage but there is no contact with any relative [who]
could verify any Indian affiliation.” (Italics omitted.) In 2014,
mother signed an affidavit stating she had no knowledge of any
tribal affiliation or membership. Also in 2014, the juvenile court
found no reason to believe that two of mother’s children (J.S.’s
half siblings) were Indian children as defined by ICWA.
       In the last minute information report dated May 12, 2023,
the social worker stated that in December 2022, mother said
neither she nor J.S. has Indian ancestry, and that any further
inquiry was a “ ‘waste of time.’ ” Mother did not return the social
worker’s call when the social worker attempted to further
inquire. Maternal grandmother also did not return the social
worker’s call when the social worker attempted to ask her about
J.S.’s potential Indian status. Maternal uncle denied any
affiliation with the Apache Tribe and reiterated that he “just
want[ed] to adopt [J.S.]”
       On May 12, 2023, the court terminated parental rights.
Mother timely appealed.

not appealed and mother raises no issue on appeal with respect
to patrilineal Indian ancestry.

                                    4
                          DISCUSSION
       On appeal, mother’s only request is that “this Court
remand the matter to the juvenile court with an order that the
Department and the juvenile court comply with the duty to notice
the Apache [T]ribes.” The duty to notify the relevant Indian
tribes is triggered if the Department or the court “knows or has
reason to know . . . that an Indian child is involved.” (§ 224.3,
subd. (a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)
       Whether there is reason to know a child is an Indian child
“requires the juvenile court to determine, based on the evidence
before it, whether any one of six statutory criteria is met—e.g.,
(1) the court has been advised that the child ‘is an Indian child,’
(2) the child’s or parent’s residence is on a reservation, (3) any
participant in the proceeding informs the court that it has
discovered information indicating the child is an Indian child,
(4) the child gives the court reason to know that he or she is an
Indian child, (5) the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court,
or (6) either parent or the child possess an identification card
indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2,
subd. (d).) If none of these six factors is met, the court must
make a finding that there is no reason to know the child is an
Indian child.” (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984,
1004.)
       We review a finding that ICWA does not apply for
substantial evidence. (In re Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1004.) ICWA defines an Indian child as an unmarried person
under the age of 18 who “is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe
or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4).)

                                    5
       Here, mother identifies no evidence triggering a “reason to
know” under any of the above criteria. Mother’s sole contention
is that she “informed the juvenile court that the maternal
grandfather is an Apache Indian” and therefore, “the court was
obligated to order that the Department notice the tribe about
[J.S.’s] dependency proceedings.”
       Mother’s statement to the juvenile court that her father
may have Apache heritage does not satisfy any of the criteria
supporting a statutory reason to know that J.S. is an Indian
child. (See In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 321 [“At most,
Mother had provided information indicating she may have Indian
heritage. Although it would follow that the children might also
have some Indian heritage, the information Mother provided to
[DCFS] did not rise to the level of ‘information indicating
that the child[ren] [are] [ ] Indian child[ren].’ (See 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.107(c)(2), (3); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (d)(2), (3).)”];
In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 571 [“A suggestion of Indian
ancestry is not sufficient under ICWA or related California law to
trigger the notice requirement.”].)
       Neither J.S.’s nor mother’s residence was on a reservation.
No participant in the proceeding informed the court that J.S. is
an Indian child. J.S. himself did not give reason to know that he
is an Indian child. J.S. was not a ward of a tribal court. Nor did
mother possess identification indicating citizenship in an Indian
tribe. Mother relies on the notice described in title 25 of the Code
of Federal Regulations part 23.11(a),4 but as noted above, that

      4 The regulation provides in pertinent part: “In any
involuntary proceeding in a State court where the court knows or
has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, and where
the identity and location of the child’s parent or Indian custodian

                                      6
regulation’s notice requirement is triggered by reason to know an
Indian child is involved. Mother failed to provide any evidence
below supporting any such reason to know.5

                         DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s order denying mother’s Welfare and
Institutions Code section 388 petition is affirmed.6
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:

      CHANEY, J.                          WEINGART, J.

or Tribe is known, the party seeking the foster-care placement of,
or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child must directly
notify the parents, the Indian custodians, and the child’s Tribe by
registered or certified mail with return receipt requested, of the
pending child-custody proceedings and their right of
intervention.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.11(a).)
      5 We observe that mother does not argue DCFS’s inquiry
was insufficient. Nor does she acknowledge her unequivocal
denial of Indian ancestry postdating her initial claim that
maternal grandfather may have Apache heritage, or that
maternal grandmother refused to return DCFS’s telephone calls,
maternal grandfather was deceased, and maternal uncle did not
have any contact information for other maternal relatives.
      6 Because we conclude mother demonstrates no error,
we need not consider respondent’s other arguments either urging
dismissal or advocating affirmance of the juvenile court’s order.

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