Court Opinion

ID: 9837056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:09.050425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:20.111117
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge
(dissenting):
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that enlisted persons in pay grade E-4 and below were not systematically excluded. 50 MJ at 69-70. In my view, the Government has not carried its burden to show that appellant’s court-martial was properly selected.
In United States v. McClain, 22 MJ 124 (CMA 1986), this Court held that the court-martial was improperly selected because enlisted persons below pay grade E-7 were systematically excluded. In United States v. Daigle, 1 MJ 139 (CMA 1975), this Court held that the court-martial was improperly selected because lieutenants and warrant officers were systematically excluded. In United States v. Greene, 20 USCMA 232, 43 CMR 72 (1970), this Court held that the court-martial was improperly selected where membership was limited to colonels and lieutenant colonels.
In none of these cases did this Court place the burden on the defense to show unlawful command influence. To the contrary, this Court placed the burden on the Government to show that the court-martial was properly selected. See Greene, 20 USCMA at 238, 43 CMR at 78 (“[W]e are not convinced that an improper standard was not used for the selection of the members of this court.”). All that was required of the defense was a showing that qualified, potential members appeared to be systematically excluded. The only systematic exclusion permitted by this Court thus far is the exclusion of enlisted persons in pay grades E-l and E-2. See United States v. Yager, 7 MJ 171 (CMA 1979) (E-l and E-2 are presumptively unqualified under Article 25(d)).
In my view, our holdings in the above-cited cases compel the conclusion that categorically excluding all persons below the pay grade of E-5 is improper. Persons in pay grade E-4 are sergeants in the Air Force, with the full legal authority of noncommissioned officers. See Arts. 91 and 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 891 and 892, respectively. As such, I do not believe that they can be considered presumptively unqualified.
Furthermore, I do not believe that the exclusion of enlisted members in pay grades EVt and below can be characterized as an administrative mistake as it was in United States v. Upshaw, 49 MJ 111 (1998). In Upshaw, the exclusion of qualified members was inadvertent; in this case, it was intentional.
The staff judge advocate, Lieutenant Colonel Tuley, was acting with the mantle of command authority when she tasked subordinate commands to nominate enlisted members in grades E-5 through E-9. See United States v. Hilow, 32 MJ 439, 441 (CMA 1991) (actions of staff judge advocate and deputy adjutant general attributed to commander). Her testimony that she would consider nominees in pay grades E-4 and below does not pass the reality test. Subordinates respond to taskings literally; they do not *71nominate persons in pay grade and below when the tasking specifies pay grade E-5 and above.
Finally, I believe that systematic exclusion of qualified persons is a structural error that cannot be tested for prejudice. Except for leaving guilty pleas undisturbed, because findings in such cases are by the military judge even though the trial is by members, we have not attempted to assess the impact of systematic exclusion on findings or sentence. See United States v. Daigle and United States v. Greene, both supra.
In my view, appellant is entitled to relief because of the improper exclusion of qualified nominees. I would reverse the decision of the court below.