Court Opinion

ID: 9965880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 17:09:32.338704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:49.666381
License: Public Domain

J-A26010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JAMES BRYAN MALONEY                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2905 EDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 9, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001154-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                   FILED MAY 3, 2024

       Appellant, James Bryan Maloney, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on November 9, 2022, following his convictions for three

counts of Rape of a Child.1 Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to

dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 by specifically asserting that the

Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence in bringing his case to trial

during and after the COVID-19 judicial emergency.2 Upon careful review, we

affirm.
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c).

2 Due to the COVID pandemic, in March of 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court issued emergency orders suspending Rule 600 statewide through June
1, 2020. See In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d
1283, 1287 (Pa. filed March 18, 2020) (per curiam); In re General
Statewide Judicial Emergency, 230 A.3d 1015, 1019 (Pa. filed April 28,
2020) (per curiam). When the statewide judicial emergency ended, the Court
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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       On December 29, 2020, during the COVID-19 judicial emergency, the

Hatfield Township Police Department filed a criminal complaint against

Appellant for the sexual assault of his then-5-year-old daughter. On January

12, 2021, the court continued Appellant’s preliminary hearing by request of

the defense. On February 16, 2021, the court held a preliminary hearing. On

April 27, 2021, Appellant waived his formal arraignment. On December 6,

2021, the Commonwealth turned over discovery to defense counsel.              On

December 10, 2021, the Commonwealth filed the bills of information and

represented to the court that it was prepared to proceed to trial. On April 1,

2022, following the pre-trial conference, the court moved the case to the call

of the trial list scheduled for September 27, 2022.

       On April 29, 2022, new counsel for Appellant entered an appearance

and filed a request for pre-trial discovery.           On May 3, 2022, the

Commonwealth turned over all discovery that it had in its possession, and on

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expressly empowered each judicial district’s president judge to enter self-
effectuating declarations of judicial emergency, which could “[s]uspend
statewide rules pertaining to the rule-based right of criminal defendants to a
prompt trial.” In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 234 A.3d 408
(Pa. filed May 27, 2020) (per curiam); see Pa.R.J.A. 1952(B)(2)(m). On June
3, 2020, after issuing its prior orders declaring a judicial emergency, cancelling
all jury and non-jury trials, and suspending Rule 600, the Honorable Thomas
M. DelRicci, President Judge of the Montgomery Court of Common Pleas
ordered “that any postponement of criminal case scheduling caused by the
declaration of this juridical emergency, from March 12, 2020 though the
expiration of the judicial emergency, shall be considered a court
postponement and shall constitute excludable time for purposes of the
application of Rule of Criminal Procedure 600.” See DelRicci Order, 6/30/20.
On August 30, 2021, President Judge DelRicci issued an order vacating his
June 3, 2020 order effective August 31, 2021. See DelRicci Order, 8/30/21.

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June 29, 2022, the Commonwealth sent a discovery log to Appellant’s counsel.

On September 27, 2022, the trial court scheduled Appellant’s jury trial to

commence on November 9, 2022.

       On October 18, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss for violation of

Rule 600 and his right to a speedy trial, averring that 392 days had passed

between the August 31, 2021 order vacating the suspension of Rule 600 due

to the COVID judicial emergency and September 27, 2022, the date the court

listed the case for the call of the trial list.3

       On November 9, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the Rule 600

motion. The trial court heard testimony from First Assistant District Attorney

(“ADA”) Edward McCann; Lauren Heron, Deputy Court Administrator for the

Criminal Division; and ADA Karla Pisarcik.

       The trial court authored a thorough and accurate summary of testimony

in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, which we adopt for purposes of this appeal.

Trial Ct. Op., 2/10/23, at 5-7. In sum, ADA McCann testified that during the

judicial emergency, the leadership in the District Attorney’s Office instructed

the ADAs who were working remotely to keep their files prepared to be ready

when the court reopened; that the District Attorney’s Office did not resume

full in person operations until June 1, 2021; and that the Montgomery County

Court of Common Pleas did not resume any jury trials until July 1, 2021,
____________________________________________

3 Appellant further averred that he had never received a continuance or signed

a Rule 600 waiver. Finally, Appellant asserted that the Commonwealth never
made a special request to have the case listed and never notified the Court
that there was a Rule 600 issue in the case.

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despite requests from the District Attorney’s office to resume jury trials prior

to this date.

       Ms. Heron testified regarding the Montgomery Court of Common Pleas

court’s phased reopening. Although the court began holding jury trials in July

2021, it was not until July 2022 that the court had its full complement of seven

judges and the court could return to holding as many criminal trials as it did

before the pandemic began.4 She further explained that because of the COVID

restrictions, the court incurred a backlog of criminal matters so that the court’s

criminal case inventory went from of 4,200 cases prior to the judicial

emergency to over 9,000 active cases as of November 2021.            Finally, Ms.

Heron testified that if the District Attorney's office had requested court

administration to schedule every case with impending Rule 600 deadlines

caused by the judicial emergency, it would not have been able to

accommodate all requests.

       ADA Pisarcik testified that she was assigned to Appellant’s case on or

about April 8, 2022. She explained that she did not request any kind of special

listing in this matter because unlike many other cases under her supervision,

this matter had already had a pre-trial conference, was awaiting a call of the

trial list date, and was moving forward when it was assigned to her. ADA

____________________________________________

4 Ms. Heron explained that homicides were given priority upon the resumption

of jury trials, followed by incarcerated defendants and, lastly, non-
incarcerated defendants. Ms. Heron testified that one judge was assigned to
homicides, three judges were assigned to jury trials, two judges were assigned
to bench trials, and two judges were assigned to triage conferences.

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Pisarcik further indicated that the approximately one-year delay between the

formal arraignment and the pre-trial conference in this matter was common

in all of her cases during that time period, but she had no control over

scheduling matters for pre-trial conferences as that is a duty assigned to court

administration.      ADA Pisarcik further testified that there was a lot of

multimedia discovery in this case and she sent a discovery log in July 2022 to

defense counsel itemizing the discovery to ensure that defense counsel had

everything in the Commonwealth’s possession.          She explained that she

communicated with defense counsel consistently throughout the summer of

2022 to resolve any technical issues with discovery and/or any missing

discovery.

       On November 9, 2022, the trial court denied Appellant’s Rule 600 motion

to dismiss, finding that (1) the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence

throughout the case; (2) the time from December 29, 2020, to August 31,

2021, constituted excludable time pursuant to the judicial emergency in

Montgomery County; and (3) the time between the Commonwealth’s filing of

the bills of information on December 10, 2021 until the trial date constituted

excludable time due to scheduling backlog stemming from the judicial

emergency.5 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 11/10/22, at ¶¶ 9-10.

____________________________________________

5 On November 9, 2022, the court denied the Rule 600 motion on the record.

The next day, on November 10, 2022, the court docketed a written order as
well as findings of facts and conclusions of law.

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      The trial court proceeded directly to a stipulated bench trial, and the

trial court convicted Appellant of 3 counts of Rape of a Child and sentenced

him to an aggregate term of 10-20 years’ incarceration.

      Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises a sole issue for our review: “Whether the trial court

erred in denying Appellant’s motion for dismissal due to violation of

constitutional right to a speedy trial and/or violation of Pa.R.Cr[im].P. 600?”

Appellant’s Br. at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

      We review the trial court’s disposition of a Rule 600 motion for an abuse

of discretion.   Commonwealth v. Burno, 154 A.3d 764, 793 (Pa. 2017).

“An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching

a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will .

. . discretion is abused.” Id. (citation omitted). “Our scope of review is limited

to the record evidence from the speedy trial hearing and the findings of the

lower court, reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id.

(citation omitted).

      Rule 600 requires that trial “shall commence within 365 days from the

date on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Known as

the mechanical run date, that date may be extended under certain

circumstances.    Commonwealth v. Wendel, 165 A.3d 952, 956–57 (Pa.

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Super. 2017).6 When a defendant seeks dismissal based on a violation of Rule

600, the court first establishes the mechanical run date, then determines

whether any periods of delay are excludable and if so, it extends the

mechanical run date to account for the periods of excludable delay to, thus,

arrive at the adjusted run date. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). The Commonwealth

must bring a defendant to trial by the adjusted run date. Commonwealth

v. Roles, 116 A.3d 122, 125 (Pa. Super. 2015).

       “For purposes of [Rule 600(A)], periods of delay at any stage of the

proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has

failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of time

within which trial must commence.              Any other periods of delay shall be

excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

       Stated another way, where the Commonwealth has exercised due

diligence, delays caused by events out of the control of the Commonwealth

are not generally attributable to the Commonwealth, and the trial court may

extend the mechanical run date to account for such delays. Commonwealth

v. Wiggins, 248 A.3d 1285, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2021).                Likewise, judicial

delays, or delays caused by the court’s schedule, are excludable and thus,

extend the mechanical run date. Id.

       However, our Supreme Court has held that “in ruling on a defendant’s

Rule 600 motion to dismiss, a trial court must first determine whether the
____________________________________________

6 See generally Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1972); U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.

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Commonwealth has met its obligation to act with due diligence throughout the

life of the case[.]” Harth, 252 A.3d at 618. “[I]f the Commonwealth meets

its burden of proving due diligence, only then may the trial court rely upon its

own congested calendar or other scheduling problems as justification for

denying the defendant’s motion.” Id. The burden is on the Commonwealth

to demonstrate due diligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Wiggins,

248 A.3d at 1289.     “Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be

determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence does not require perfect

vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth

that a reasonable effort has been put forth.” Id. (citations omitted).

      It is undisputed that Appellant’s trial did not occur until November 9,

2022, 680 days after the Commonwealth filed the criminal complaint.

Appellant was charged on December 29, 2020, which meant his mechanical

run date—absent a judicial emergency—would have been December 29, 2021.

In light of the judicial emergency, the trial court calculated the mechanical run

date from the end of the judicial emergency on August 31, 2021, and found

the new mechanical run date to be adjusted to August 31, 2022.       Due to the

court’s scheduling backlog stemming from the judicial emergency, the court

excluded an additional 334 days, or 579 days total, for an adjusted run date

of July 31, 2023. Overall, the trial court found that the Commonwealth was

diligent throughout the life of the case, and that 579 of the 680 days between

the complaint’s filing and the date of trial were due to judicial delay beyond

the Commonwealth’s control and, therefore, excludable. Trial Ct. Op. at 10.

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The trial court found the only non-excludable time to be from August 31, 2021,

which was the end of the judicial emergency, to December 10, 2021, when

the Commonwealth filed the bills of information, which was 101 days. Id.

      In his sole issue, Appellant avers that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying his Rule 600 motion.       Appellant’s Br. at 12.    In his argument,

Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s finding that 579 days were

excludable due to the judicial emergency and/or judicial delay caused by the

backlog of scheduling cases following the termination of the judicial

emergency.     Rather, Appellant concentrates his argument solely on his

contention that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate the required due

diligence throughout the life of the case.

      Specifically, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to meet its

burden to show due diligence because (1) the Montgomery County District

Attorney’s Office did not have an official policy or office-wide system regarding

the tracking of Rule 600 date, (2) various ADAs assigned to the case did not

confirm the Rule 600 mechanical run date and/or inform the court and request

the case to be listed, and (3) the Commonwealth did not provide complete

discovery until September 26, 2022, after the mechanical run date, and

therefore was not trial ready at all stages of the proceeding. Id. at 10-11.

Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion.

      In finding that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence throughout

the life of the case, the trial court placed weight on the evidence that the

Commonwealth filed timely bills of information, exercised its best efforts to

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ensure discovery was complete, tracked the progress of the case, and was

satisfied that the case was moving forward in light of the scheduling of a pre-

trial conference and a call of the trial list. The court also acknowledged that

the Commonwealth had not requested any continuances. Id.

      Additionally, the trial court found that any missing discovery was not in

bad faith and did not contribute to the matter being tried past its mechanical

run date of August 31, 2022. Id. at 9.

      The court opined:

      [T]he record demonstrates that the Commonwealth acted in good
      faith in sending [Appellant] all discovery which was believed to be
      in its possession. Once the Commonwealth discovered that
      Defendant was missing a piece of discovery, it responded almost
      immediately and ensured [that Appellant] received the materials.
      The Commonwealth also demonstrated due diligence by sending
      a discovery log to defense counsel on July 28, 2022, to ensure
      that each party could confirm whether any discovery materials
      had not been given to the defense. The Commonwealth was not
      required to demonstrate perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but
      rather simply a reasonable effort. The Commonwealth’s actions
      throughout the pendency of this matter demonstrates the
      Commonwealth easily surpassed the reasonable effort threshold.
      Further, no matter how diligent the Commonwealth was in
      providing any missing discovery to the defense, it could not have
      brought Defendant to trial any faster. . . . The court’s congested
      docket resulted in this matter not being scheduled for a call of the
      trial list until September 27, 2022, which was approximately 6
      months following the pre-trial conference.

Id.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

we agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth demonstrated, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that it exercised due diligence throughout the

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life of the case.     The record supports the court’s conclusion that the

Commonwealth acted reasonably under the circumstances. Accordingly, we

find no abuse of discretion.

      Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that the

Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence because it did not have an

officewide policy to track Rule 600 dates and did not request an earlier listing

of the case.   Appellant’s Br. at 16, 18. To support this assertion, Appellant

relies on Commonwealth v. Browne, 584 A.2d 902 (Pa. 1990), and

Commonwealth v. McCutcheon, 488 A.2d 281 (Pa. Super. 1985), two cases

that are easily distinguished from the instant case because neither involves a

scenario where a court was dealing with a scheduling backlog of 9,000 cases

following a judicial emergency. The trial court here did not place weight on

the fact that the Commonwealth failed to request an earlier listing of the case,

and instead found that the Commonwealth was under no obligation to do so.

Trial Ct. Op. at 9. We agree. See Commonwealth v. Robbins, 900 A.2d

413, 417 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that the Commonwealth is not required

to inform the court of an imminent run date violation and the failure to do so

is not dispositive in a due diligence analysis).

      In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the

Commonwealth exercised due diligence throughout the case. Accordingly, we

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s Rule 600

motion.

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     Judgment of Sentence affirmed.

Date: 5/3/2024

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