Court Opinion

ID: 9682900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:19:19.126489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:43.047117
License: Public Domain

HOWARD, Judge.
Michael Taylor was convicted by a Franklin Circuit Court jury of violating Ky.Rev. Stat. Ch. 515.030 (hereinafter KRS), to wit second degree robbery. Evidence was presented that Taylor along with an accomplice went twice to the home of James Maddox on the evening of February 16, 1976. On the second visit when Maddox again would not allow them to enter his home, Taylor hit him and took his wallet and house key. Taylor and Maddox were the only witnesses to testify at the trial. Maddox testified that he had known Taylor for approximately 15 years and was certain he was the person who robbed him. The appellant denied the robbery testifying that he was in a parked automobile with three other persons the entire evening.
Defense counsel tendered and requested that an instruction on presumption of innocence be given to the jury. The trial court refused the request, but gave an instruction on reasonable doubt. The appellant contends that he was substantially prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to instruct on presumption of innocence. We *814find no evidence to support this contention. The well established law of Kentucky has been that as long as the trial court instructs the jury on reasonable doubt an instruction on the presumption of innocence is not necessary. Mink v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 674, 15 S.W.2d 463 (1926); Swango v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 690, 165 S.W.2d 182 (1942). We find no reason to change the established law on this point.
The second error appellant asserts on appeal is that he was substantially prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to instruct on the indictment’s lack of evidentiary value. We find no merit in the appellant’s argument that failure to give such an instruction denies the defendant due process of the law.
In his closing argument the prosecutor made reference to facts which had not been placed into evidence concerning the defendant’s character. While the Kentucky court has held in several cases that such remarks are improper and allowed reversal of the case on that point, the defendant failed to object to these remarks thus not preserving them for appellate review. Lynch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 263 (1971). Wé do not feel that the statements meet the standard of prejudice of being so apparent and great as to result in a manifest injustice as set forth in Ferguson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 501 (1974) and Futrell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 487 (1969), to allow reversal on the impropriety in the argument despite defendant’s failure to object at the proper time.
The appellant contends that no pre-sentencing investigation was made in his case as required by KRS 532.050 before he was sentenced nor was the question of probation or conditional discharge as provided in KRS 533.010 considered. It appears after examining the record that these allegations are correct. The recent Supreme Court case of Brewer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 474 (1977) (24 Ky.Law Summary 1) held that the requirements of KRS 532.050 are mandatory and not within the discretion of the trial court judge. In regard to KRS 533.010 the Supreme Court in Brewer, supra stated that this determination by the court is discretionary rather than mandatory but stated that the statute requires that probation or conditional discharge be given consideration.
Therefore, we find no error in the verdict of the jury, but we do find error in the trial court’s sentencing procedure. On the latter point, this case is reversed with directions to the Franklin Circuit Court to take appropriate action consistent with this opinion.
HAYES, J., concurs.
WILHOIT, J., dissents.