Court Opinion

ID: 9746328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:12:15.14921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:12.179613
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In this case the medical testimony was thorough, and it is clear that there is no basis for precisely determining the contribution of each of the two causes present under these facts. Thus a remand for a new trial limited to the issue of damages will serve no purpose. If we are to follow the Restatement formulation it should be properly applied.
Section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts establishes the test for liability as being whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Unquestionably, the environment was a substantial factor. However, from the medical testimony, cigarette smoking was also a substantial factor.1 Since the employer created one of the substantial causes, it should not escape liability because a precise measurement cannot be made as to the *387effect of that harm. The jury in this case did find that the harm caused by the employer was a substantial factor, for which the amount of proper contribution was found to be Sixty-seven Thousand Dollars ($67,000). The fact that the majority is not satisfied as to the amount assigned by the jury is of no moment. The majority criticizes the Superior Court for accepting what they characterized as a “rough approximation” of the employer’s responsibility. On this record only a “rough approximation” can be made. If we accept that a verdict may be returned in favor of claimant where his own actions were also a substantial cause in bringing about the harm he sustained, then we must accept the “rough approximations” that juries must render. The alternative is to suggest that no recovery should be allowed. Such a result would, in my judgment, be unconscionable where, as here, it is established that the employer’s action was a substantial factor in producing the resultant harm.
I therefore would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. This is not a situation as described in the Comment on Clause (a) of section 433. That comment in pertinent part states: “... although no one of the contributing factors may have such a predominant effect, their combined effect may ... so dilute the effects of the actor’s negligence as to prevent it from being a substantial factor.” Here both factors were active in bringing about the harm.