Court Opinion

ID: 9721159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:49:55.848687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.697867
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Justice KELLER
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I simply cannot decide what I find most troubling about Part IV (Witness Deposition) of the majority opinion. I have, however, prepared a “short list.” First, despite the fact that the Commonwealth has never — either in the trial court or in its brief to this Court — uttered or written the word “waiver” as a justification for its introduction at trial of the videotaped deposition of licensed physical therapist Timothy Nichol, the linchpin of the majority’s basis for affirming Appellant’s Second-Degree Assault conviction is the majority’s factual determination that Appellant’s federal and state constitutional rights of confrontation were waived by his trial counsel’s agreement to depose Nichol.1 Second, the majority opinion’s finding that the Appellant acquiesced in the waiver is unreasonable because the wording of the multiple part question asked by the trial court and the Appellant’s answer do not support the majority opinion’s conclusion that Appellant acquiesced in the waiver of his right to confront Nichol, particularly so because “‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights.”2 Third, the majority opinion proceeds with optimism reminiscent of Charlie Brown’s inexplicable faith that his placeholder, Lucy, will *790break form “the next time” and keep the football in place rather than yank it away at the last second when it bases its “waiver” finding upon the same legal conclusion — that counsel can unilaterally effect such a waiver — for which the Sixth Circuit “took us to the woodshed” a decade ago in Carter v. Sowders.3 And, fourth, although it is black-letter law that the right of confrontation secured by the Sixth Amendment is “basically a trial right[,]”4 the majority employs a harmless error analysis that appears to render harmless the introduction at trial of any videotaped deposition as long as the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the deposition itself. Suffice it to say that I disagree with the majority’s view that Appellant’s trial counsel’s agreement to depose Nichol waived Appellant’s constitutional rights of confrontation or that Appellant acquiesced to a waiver. Accordingly, consistent with my consistently-held position that any waiver of important constitutional protections must come from the defendant himself or herself,5 I dissent in part as to Appellant’s Second-Degree Assault conviction, which I would reverse and remand for a new trial because there is no evidence in this record to suggest that Appellant himself knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently relinquished or abandoned his right to confront Nichol at trial.
Before I elucidate further regarding the concerns that made my “short list,” however, I feel the need to clarify the record. The majority opinion states:
On the morning of the second trial date, November 6, 2001, Appellant again requested and was granted a continuance, this time because defense counsel’s investigator, who might be called as a witness, was ill (the defense counsel’s investigator did not testify when the trial was finally held), and because defense counsel might possibly have a medical problem as well.6
Although Appellant’s trial counsel, Robert D. McIntosh (“McIntosh”) cited the unavailability of a defense investigator as one *791reason for his request for a continuance, his written motion also stated that “[c]oun-sel for the defendant will be potentially unavailable one day of the week of November 5 — November 9, 2001[,]” and his affidavit attached to the motion explained that “I, the attorney for Mr. Parson, will be potentially be [sic] unavailable due to a personal medical condition which will require further medical tests during the week of November 5 — November 9.” The majority opinion grudgingly mentions this alternative basis although the record clearly reflects that the trial court granted the requested continuance primarily because of defense counsel’s medical concerns:
Court: We have talked several times this morning off the record. This is the first time we have been on the record. And Mr. McIntosh, you’ve tendered to the Court this morning a motion to reassign the trial date and first of all, I assume you’ve talked to your client about it, your client knows you are asking the Court to do this.
McIntosh: Yes. I have your honor.
Court: Do you want to address your motion on the record?
McIntosh: To a certain extent, yes, but to some extent as I have expressed this morning, I don’t want to.
Court: And the Court understands that and I think counsel do also, but as I understand it, you are asking the CouH to continue the case for tñal both because an investigator from your office is not available and also because of some medical tests that you have to go through
McIntosh: That’s correct. Ms. Nunn should be back on the 19th. She had surgery last Thursday, I believe it was and will be available on the 19th. As far as the other issue, I’m supposed to know something more by tomorrow afternoon at 3:00. As I have told the Court, I have not told Ms. McCleod. I will be happy to do so. I just don’t want to do it on the record.
Court: Obviously, [Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney] Ms. McCleod, I know it puts you in an awkward position, but I assume the Commonwealth, at least for the record, objects to any continuance.
McCleod: Judge, it does put me in an awkward position, but I just want to, for the record, and I feel it’s important, not for today’s [unintelligible], but in case the case is continued and we have another date, the Commonwealth is objecting to this continuance .... The other thing, I just want to note for the record so the Court will be sensitive to this, if we come back again, is that I have three doctors in this case. The medical testimony is going to be important in this case. I have three medical doctors, Judge, that have cleared their calendar now for the second time. They’ve shifted patients, or they’ve changed their shift or done something so in fact that they are free to testify at the Commonwealth’s disposal tomorrow. Again, for a second time, I have now to call them and tell them that they now have wasted another day where patients won’t be treated and that they, I don’t know what they do. My eyewitnesses here today are not paid when they leave work. I have four witnesses, they have again taken another day, come to court, some witnesses have been here four times and are not paid to come and are now going to be told they need to come back another time.
McIntosh: [Interrupting, during a pause] Judge, if—
McCleod: [Interrupting] If I could just finish.
*792Court: Okay, Ms. McCleod finish up and then we’ll talk about what we need to do about this.
McCleod: Thank you, .Judge. As to Ms. Nunn, I don’t, the only person she has even talked to is one witness who said she didn’t know anything. And I would be able to — the Commonwealth could stipulate that Ms. Nunn doesn’t know anything, the witness for the defense attorney. And I don’t know what the medical condition is and I want to be sensitive to that but if it’s ■possible, I don’t know if it’s possible, if we could roll this case to tomorrow in the event that Mr. McIntosh is able to continue, if he’s going to be at work tomorrow, and we could try this case, roll it at least to tomorrow.
Court: Well, I guess first of all Mr. McIntosh, is that an option, to roll the case one day?
McIntosh: Um, Judge, I’ve expressed what my concern is. If the Court wants to roll this until tomorrow then that’s the Court’s decision. I would prefer to pass it a week,, but if that’s -
Court: Well, there is no passing it a week. As you all know, if we get a new trial date, you are looking at February at the earliest would be a new trial date. The Court has several concerns.
McIntosh: If I could address some of the things that were stated -
Court: You don’t need to because if you want a • continuance and given the medical reasons, the Court’s going to grant the continuance. I would do it for any attorney. I don’t think there’s any need to discuss that farther.
Regarding the merits of the issue addressed in Part IV of the majority opinion, I agree completely with the majority opinion’s observation that “[ojbviously, Nichol was not ‘unavailable’ in the constitutional sense.”7 And, I hardly need mention that constitutional unavailability is an absolute precondition to the admission at a criminal trial of an out-of-court testimonial statement.8 Accordingly, “unless petitioner did actually waive his right to be confronted with and to cross examine th[is] witness! ], his federally guaranteed constitutional rights have been denied.”9 Therefore, the dispositive issue in this case is whether Appellant waived his right to confront Ni-chol at trial. We cannot presume a waiver of Appellant’s Confrontation Clause rights from a silent record.10 Thus, we must examine the record and evaluate “the facts which allegedly support the waiver”11 in accordance with the relevant constitutional standards, under which “[tjhere is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ”12 In addition, “[t]he determination *793of whether there has been an intelligent waiver ... must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”13 The videotaped record in the case reveals the following:
Court: ... Depending upon what’s going on medically, if these doctors are available tomorrow, one option would be to take video depositions of them. They could come into court, they could take video depositions and that way their testimony would be secured, they wouldn’t have to come back for trial. That would be one option at least as to the medical doctors. The Court realizes that it’s an inconvenience for the prosecuting witnesses, that’s just something we have to deal with all the time.I think maybe counsel and I need to talk off the record about what where exactly Mr. McIntosh, you stand with medical things to see at a minimum if these doctors can be deposed tomorrow to take care of that.
McIntosh: I would be willing to do that, Judge. That’s, I understand Ms. McCleod’s issue with the doctors and certainly they have schedules that are just like ours. If that was to be done tomonvw, I can do that.
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Court: [To Appellant] I understand that you thought that their offer was too high, and I talked to the Commonwealth about possibilities of what a jury could do, what they could not do, and tried to get it in a range where we thought that it might be negotiable, so I will at least talk to them briefly and see if we are even, and give you a number, and then you can just decide, if it’s a number that you can either accept or come back with a reasonable counter offer, we can talk more. If not, then we will at least get these doctors deposed tomorrow and the next trial date, we’ll let a jury decide the whole thing.
Parson: That would be fine, your honor.
The court then went off the record and the parties discussed the possibility of a negotiated plea, but apparently were unable to reach a mutually-agreeable disposition. The trial court then reconvened the proceedings on the record and continued the discussion with Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney Foster:
Court: It’s my understanding you all [can] at least bring in the doctors tomorrow and take video depositions to preserve their testimony.
Foster: Your honor, I’m coordinating the medical proof in this case and I’m going to try, what I’m going to do is basically give them the option, if that’s okay with the Court, give them the new trial date. I know one of the, the physical therapist, would like to do the video deposition14 but he asked if we could have it another day. Would it be possible for me to just work it *794out with the Court, when we come back and use the courtroom, to take the deposition? • .
McIntosh: Judge, we have no problem with that.
Foster: We’ll work with everybody.
Court: That’s fíne. My concern is we’re scheduled to be here tomorrow anyway.
McIntosh: I think they’ve already -
Foster: I called them thinking that the case was going to be continued and had already said, you know, that’s what I was doing when I left the courtroom, and I’ve only been able to get one of them back on the phone.
McIntosh: I think that it would be better to wait and see if they’re going to even be unavailable.
Foster: They may want to come to the trial.
Court: Okay, then I’ll just get Maggie and get another trial date and we’ll go from there.
Later, after the video deposition, at which Appellant learned more information relevant to Nichol’s alleged inability to testify in person at trial, Appellant’s trial counsel moved the trial court to prohibit the Commonwealth from introducing Ni-chol’s video deposition at trial. The transcript of the hearing on Appellant’s motion reveals that: (1) apparently neither the trial court nor the Commonwealth were cognizant of the constitutional dimensions of “unavailability,” and (2) the Commonwealth never asserted Appellant’s waiver as a basis for the introduction of Nichol’s video deposition:
Court: What issues do we need to take up this morning?
McIntosh: I think, Judge, what we need to take up is the issue of the use of this video deposition at the trial. I think that’s pretty much -
Court: [Interrupting] Which video deposition is that?
McIntosh: Well, we’ve only taken one, and that would be of Mr. Tim Nichol.
Court: Okay. And, what’s the issue about the use of the deposition?
McIntosh: Well, he has to be unavailable for the trial and I don’t think that, he stated in his deposition that he was going to be on vacation through January 2nd and then would be at a national meeting from January 3rd through January 7th. And I, on my chent’s behalf, I don’t think that that’s a valid excuse for his unavailability. Someone’s vacation, be it unfortunate that he would not be able to go on vacation, does not excuse him from the fact that he has to testify. If they don’t want him to testify, I certainly think they’ve got enough other doctors to bring in, if they wanted to use them. I don’t think "that that constitutes unavailability.
Court: Ms. McCleod?
McCleod: Ms. Foster’s going to address the Court, Judge.
Foster: Judge, under Rule [RCr] 7.10, the Court is granted discretion to determine when a witness may be unavailable for trial. And we actually brought Mr. Nichol in today, if the Court has any additional concerns about his unavailability. Mr. Nichol, he testified in his deposition that he is out of town for vacation through the 2nd of January. He will not be coming in until that night, and then he’s going to turn around the next day and fly out to Las Vegas? To Las Vegas.
Court: And that quote the next day, is the day the trial is supposed to start. Right?
McIntosh: January 2nd is the day
Foster: The trial starts on the 2nd.
*795Court: Okay, then when does he get back from vacation?
Nichol: [From the audience] I will be back on Monday, the 7th.
Court: Okay, so when do you go on vacation?
Nichol: Well, the day that I was supposed to be here is the day that I’m leaving for a national meeting for our company, which would be the 3rd.
Court: Okay, so you are leaving on the 3rd to go to this meeting and then vacation after the meeting or -
Nichol: Vacation is before, I will be leaving on December 28th and returning on the 2nd.
Court: Okay. Mr. McIntosh, I don’t understand what the issue is.
McIntosh: That constitutes unavailability? Unavailability is someone who is dead, someone who is in the hospital or unable to communicate, I don’t think, I haven’t seen anything that indicates vacation constitutes unavailability. It’s unfortunate and I’m sorry for that, but at the same time -
Court: It doesn’t sound like the vacation is the issue. The issue is this meeting he has to go to.
McIntosh: His vacation is from the 28th until the 2nd. He could be called in on the 2nd to testify and then he can fly out and be at his meeting by the 3rd.
Foster: First of all, Judge, I think Mr. McIntosh needs to provide some sort of authority that says you have to be dead to be unavailable.
Court: First of all, you are presuming that we going to get a jury seated and selected and be ready, I mean we just started a trial Tuesday and the first witness was called Wednesday morning. I mean you are presuming we will get that far, you are presuming that the Commonwealth will want to call him early in the proof, we’ve got his deposition. I don’t understand what, I assume the deposition was also videotaped.
Foster: We have a videotape deposition, Judge, and he had an opportunity to fully cross-examine the witness
Court: Okay, it’s real easy. I’ll note your objection, overrule the objection, you all can do it by videotape, if the Court of Appeals says it’s wrong, it’s wrong, but he’s going to be out of town at a meeting during the period of the trial. I think that dearly establishes unavailability.15 If you disagree, that’s why we got the Court of Appeals. They found me wrong before, if they don’t agree, I’m sure they will tell us to do it differently.
Foster: Mr. Nichol is here, are you excusing him from the subpoena that he is under?
Court: Yes, I mean if you’ve got his video deposition
McIntosh: I think the subpoena he is referring to, correct me if I’m wrong, I subpoenaed him at our video deposition to be here on January 2nd for this trial.
Court: Okay, then he’s excused for that, given the video deposition, he’s excused, Mr. McIntosh’s objection is *796noted for the record, but that way we’ve got his testimony.-
The majority opinion finds that “Appellant clearly waived his right to confront Nichol at trial when defense counsel, with Appellant’s acquiescence, agreed that the testimony of medical witnesses could be presented by deposition,”16 and, in support of that finding, cites Richmond v. Commonwealth,17 with the parenthetical explanation “waiver by counsel: [The defendant] could have been present if his attorney had so chosen.” I have previously explained my view that Richmond does not support this “waiver by counsel” notion.18 Because I stand by my previous analysis, which employs the novel analytical method of quoting what the Richmond court actually said, ie., “obviously [Appellant’s] absence was by choice. He could have been there. It is our opinion that he waived the right of confrontation.” 19 To separate its holding from the “spin” placed upon it, I will not repeat that analysis here and will simply express my opinion that Richmond does not support today’s majority’s holding and reference my previous comments in that regard. Instead, I intend to focus in more depth on the question of whether counsel can waive a defendant’s confrontation rights.
It is beyond dispute that an attorney cannot waive a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights if the waiver is “inconsistent with his client’s expressed desire.”20 In other factual situations, however, where the record is less clear as to whether the client objects to or agrees with counsel’s purported waiver, or whether the client had been sufficiently informed to make such a choice, the waiver issue becomes more difficult to assess. While “[t]he majority of circuits that have addressed this question have stated that a defendant’s attorney can waive his client’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right ‘so long as the defendant does not dissent from the attorney’s decision, and so long as it can be said that the attorney’s decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy[,]” ’21 the Sixth Circuit does not subscribe to the majority view.22 In Carter v. Sowders,23 the Sixth Circuit stated that a waiver of confrontation rights requires the defendant’s personal and knowing consent:
Although a waiver may be implied and not express, there must be evidence in the record to support that implication. This court’s statement in Evans v. United States, 284 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1960) is directly applicable: “the record does not show that defendant knew or was advised of his rights. In order to constitute a waiver, there must be a voluntary relinquishment of a knoim right.” Id. at 395. We find Carter did not personally waive his right to confront Elam.
The district court found that Carter nonetheless effected a waiver of this right through the actions of his attorney, *797who appeared for the deposition and then departed. We find this conclusion inconsistent with Zerbst. As the Second Circuit stated in United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239, 243 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908, 89 S.Ct. 1018, 22 L.Ed.2d 219 (1969), referring to defense counsel’s decision to proceed with jury impaneling in the defendant’s absence: “[E]ven assuming [counsel] had the authority to act as Payne’s counsel, he would not have had the ability to bind Payne to a decision of this type without obtaining Payne’s consent.” The Tenth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Larson v. Tansy, 911 F.2d 392, 396 & n. 2 (10th Cir.1990):
The record indicates defendant’s counsel, and not defendant, waived defendant’s right of presence at trial. The trial court never directly addressed defendant concerning his counsel’s request to conduct the remainder of the trial in defendant’s absence. We hold that defendant did not waive his right to be present.... Even if defense counsel could have validly waived defendant’s right to be present for the conclusion of his trial, where defense’ counsel did not consult with defendant concerning the waiver and did not obtain defendant’s consent, the waiver will not be binding on defendant.
We similarly find that, even if Waller’s action at the deposition could constitute a waiver of the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, the waiver would not bind Carter in the absence of a showing that he consented.3 As the Supreme Court stated in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975): “It is the accused, not counsel, who must be ‘informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,’ who must be ‘confronted with the witnesses against him’ .... The right to defend is given directly to the accused, for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”
3 The Kentucky Supreme Court found that “Carter’s right to confront Elam at the deposition was waived” because “[a]mple notice of the deposition was provided to Carter’s counsel ... There was no evidence that Carter, personally, had a legal reason why he was unable to attend, and no proof that his presence would have made a difference.” Carter, -782 S.W.2d at 599. This obviously conflicts with our reading of Zerbst. Moreover, the Kentucky Supreme Court made statements in an opinion decided the same day, Dean v. Commomvealth, 777 S.W.2d 900 (Ky.1989), that would lead to precisely the opposite result from that reached in Carter:
We hold that because the right to be present and to confront is personal to the accused under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, and more particularly under [Ky. R.Crim.Proc.] 7.12, only the defendant can waive this right. The waiver must be sufficiently clear “as to indicate a conscious intent.” Powell v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 731, 734 (1961).... Appellant’s counsel waived appellant’s right to be present at the depositions of the two prosecution witnesses. There is no indication in the record that it was appellant’s conscious intent to waive this right and his consequent right to cross-examination. Counsel’s waiver being ineffective, there was no waiver.... Appellant was not present; nor was he afforded the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses called to testify against him.
Id. at 903. We can discern no reason why a different standard was used in *798deciding Carter’s fate.24
In other words, “a waiver cannot be based on statements made by a defendant’s lawyer who has not first consulted with his or her client[,]”25 and a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights of confrontation can be waived only by the personal consent of the defendant — although the consent itself can be communicated either expressly, e.g., in an on-the-record colloquy, or by conduct, e.g., through informed acquiescence in counsel’s agreement to the admission of an out-of-court statement.26
In the case at bar, the majority' suggests that Appellant acquiesced in the waiver of his fight to confront Nichol when he responded “[t]hat would be fine, your honor.” However, this response was to a somewhat meandering “question” from the trial court that touched upon (1) Appellant’s past belief that the Commonwealth’s plea offer was unreasonable, (2) the trial court’s past and proposed future communications with the Commonwealth regarding the possibility of obtaining a new plea offer that Appellant might find more palatable, (3) the fact that, if the Commonwealth extended a new plea offer to Appellant, it would be his choice whether to accept the offer, to make a counter-offer, or to reject further plea negotiations, and' (4) that if the parties were “too far apart” in the plea negotiations, the possibility of deposing “the doctors” the next day, but setting the case itself for trial by jury on a future date. Based on the multitudinous nature of the “question” and other concerns developed later in this opinion, I do not believe it is reasonable to characterize Appellant’s affirmative response as an express, knowing, and voluntary waiver of his right to confront Nichol at trial. The majority also hangs its hat on what it paraphrases as Appellant’s trial counsel’s agreement “that the testimony of medical witnesses could be presented by deposition.”27 Given that “ ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights,”28 however, I believe that it is necessary to engage in a more-exacting scrutiny of what exactly Appellant’s trial counsel agreed to do before we even reach the issue of the validity of counsel’s purported waiver.
In my view, the majority opinion adopts an overly-broad and factually-suspect interpretation of Appellant’s trial counsel’s *799statements. My review of the record, which can be verified from the above verbatim recitation of it, reveals that Appellant’s trial counsel first agreed to take the video depositions of “the doctors” (or “the medical doctors”) with the understanding that those witnesses “wouldn’t have to come back for trial.” Later, after the Commonwealth indicated that a physical therapist witness (Nichol) had expressed an interest in “doing the video deposition” on a future occasion, the Commonwealth asked the trial court whether “it [would] be possible ... to just work it out with the Court, when we come back and use the courtroom, to take the deposition?” and counsel responded “we have no problem with that.” Unlike the earlier discussion concerning “the doctors,”29 however, there was no warning to Appellant, on the record or otherwise, that taking Nichol’s video deposition would excuse him from testifying at trial, and Appellant’s trial counsel specifically noted that the “wait and see” approach made the most sense because it was not clear whether the witnesses were “going, to even be unavailable.” Thus, if we are faithful to the presumption against waiver that United States Supreme Court jurisprudence requires us to apply, we should construe Appellant’s trial counsel statements as an agreement only to take Nichol’s deposition in the event that Ni-chol was unable to testify in person at trial — not, as the majority interprets those statements, as an agreement that Nichol’s video deposition could be admitted at trial.
Of course, it is unnecessary to devote a great deal of energy to interpreting the scope of Appellant’s trial counsel’s agreement because it is crystal-clear from the video record that Appellant’s trial counsel did not engage in any consultation with Appellant on November 6, 2001 before counsel agreed to take Nichol’s deposition. At no point does trial counsel ever lean over to Appellant to inform him of what such an agreement would entail or to solicit his input on the decision. It is also worthy of note that although the trial court had previously verified with counsel that the request for a continuance was the product of consultation with Appellant (presumably to verify that the waiver of Appellant’s right to a speedy trial was Appellant’s own), ie., “1 assume you’ve talked to your client about it, your client knows you are asking the Court to do this[,]” the trial court made no such effort to determine whether Appellant gave his consent for his counsel’s agreement to take the video depositions. Under prevailing Sixth Circuit jurisprudence, any agreement made by Appellant’s trial counsel could not prevent Appellant from asserting his constitutional right to confront Ni-chol.30
Of course it is undeniable that Appellant was present when the parties actually took Nichol’s video deposition, and an argument can be made that his acquiescence in his trial counsel’s actions indicated his waiver of his right to confront Nichol. However, *800“we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ ”31 And, in the context of this case, the mere fact that Appellant participated in the taking of Ni-chol’s video deposition does not come close to demonstrating that Appellant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his confrontation rights at trial. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Appellant had ever been informed that taking Nichol’s video deposition would forfeit his right to confront Nichol at trial. In fact, Appellant’s trial counsel’s service of a subpoena upon Nichol following the video deposition and his subsequent motion to prohibit the introduction of the video deposition reflect that counsel himself believed that the admissibility of the deposition would be subject to a finding that Nichol was unavailable to testify in person at trial, and we certainly have no reason to suspect that he counseled Appellant otherwise. Without evidence that Appellant was cognizant of the nature of his Confrontation Clause rights or the consequences of agreeing to take Nichol’s testimony, i.e., that the trial court would permit the Commonwealth to introduce the video deposition in lieu of Nichol’s live testimony, there could be no constitutionally valid waiver.32
Simply stated, the record before the Court is insufficient to support a finding that Appellant himself waived his constitutional right to confront Nichol at trial. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to introduce Nichol’s video deposition at trial. The majority opinion makes no attempt to argue that the substance of Niehol’s testimony was harmless, and it is clear that Nichol’s testimony, which tended to support a finding of one of the hallmarks of a serious physical injury, e.g., “prolonged impairment of health,”33 could have been a significant factor in the jury’s verdict finding Appellant guilty of Second-Degree Assault. Instead, the majority asserts that .the error was harmless because Ni-chol had been cross-examined by Appellant at the video deposition.34 After considerable research, I can report that there is a complete dearth of authority for this proposition, which would be akin to “Tide.with Bleach®” for improperly-admitted out-of-court testimonial statements as it would render any and all cross-examined deposition testimony admissible at a criminal trial. The opportunity for face-to-face confrontation at some point either at or prior to trial is not the only interest at stake. Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”35 The majority’s *801harmless error analysis ignores the “and” by allowing the opportunity for cross examination to swallow the constitutional requirement of unavailability. I find it an inescapable conclusion that Nichol’s testimony was erroneously admitted, and it prejudiced Appellant in connection with his Second-Degree Assault conviction. Because I see none of the “footprints” of “invited error”36 that would warrant additional fact-finding by the trial court, I would reverse Appellant’s Second-Degree Assault conviction and remand that count of the indictment to the trial court for a new trial.
STUMBO, J., joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

. Parson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 144 S.W.3d 775, 783 (2004) ("Appellant clearly waived his right to confront Nichol at trial when defense counsel agreed that the testimony of medical witnesses could be presented by deposition.”).

. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938) (quoting Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 811, 812, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937) and Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412, 1 S.Ct. 307, 27 L.Ed. 169 (1882)).

. 5 F.3d 975 (6th Cir.1993) (granting habeas relief in the face of a confrontation clause violation that, in Carter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 597 (1989), this Court found had been waived). See id. 5 F.3d at 981 n. 3 (6th Cir.1993) (observing that this Court’s opinion in Carter "conflicts with our reading of [Johnson v.] Zerbst [304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)]" and suggesting that the “personal waiver by defendant" view applied in the plurality opinion in Dean v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 900 (1989) was correct). I would observe that the majority's holding is difficult for me to comprehend because it is clear that the majority is cognizant of Carter v. Sowders, which it not only cites, Parson, 144 S.W.3d at 784 n. 2, but also implicitly references while acknowledging the possibility that the federal courts will someday, "on habeas review, disagree with our Confrontation Clause analysis in Part III[sic] of this opinion[.]” Parson, 144 S.W.3d at 788 n. 6. "By abdicating its responsibility to correct the error ... today’s majority needlessly prolongs this litigation and [gives the Commonwealth what will likely turn out to be a] hollow victory.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 170 (2001) (Keller, J., dissenting).

. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260 (1968).

. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 113 S.W.3d 128 (2003) (right to trial by jury); Crawley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 107 S.W.3d 197, 203-04 (2003) (Keller, J., dissenting) (right to testify); Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 103 S.W.3d 687, 700 n. 6 (2003) (Keller, J., dissenting) (right to trial by jury and right to protection from compelled self-incrimination); Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 62 S.W.3d 15, 22-28 (2001) (Keller, J., dissenting) (right to be present).

. Parson, 144 S.W.3d at 782.

. Parson, 144 S.W.3d at 783.

. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, -, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, - (2004) ("Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” (emphasis added)).

. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1247, 16 L.Ed.2d 314, 317 (1966).

. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 .S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-80 (1969).

. Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4, 86 S.Ct. at 1247, 16 L.Ed.2d at 317.

. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, *7931466 (1938)). See also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260 (1968) (also applying Zerbst’s definition of a waiver); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1060, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 359 (1970) (citing Zerbst).

. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023, 82 L.Ed. at 1466.

. I find it worthy of note that Nichol, who is neither an M.D. nor a Ph.D. — and was thus not contemplated in any of the previous discussions about taking video depositions of "the doctors” — apparently informed the Commonwealth of his desire to testify via video deposition before the new trial date was selected, and thus before any scheduling conflict presented itself.

. I would observe that today’s majority opinion is the Kentucky appellate court "say[ing] it’s wrong” that the trial court foreshadowed. Although framing its discussion in terms of the Commonwealth’s argument rather than the trial court’s ruling, the majority opinion explains that the trial court’s analysis was incorrect. See Parson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 144 S.W.3d at 783 (2004) ("Contrary to the prosecutor’s assertion at the December 20, 2001, hearing, the mere absence of the witness from the jurisdiction does not constitute 'unavailability,' and RCr 7.10(1) cannot be so interpreted.”).

. Parson, 144 S.W.3d at 783.

. Ky., 637 S.W.2d 642 (1982).

. Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 62 S.W.3d 15, 26-27 (2001)(Keller, J., dissenting).

. Richmond, 637 S.W.2d at 646 (emphasis added).

. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1248, 16 L.Ed.2d 314, 319 (1966).

. United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 418 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Reveles, 190 F.3d 678, 683 n. 6 (5th Cir.1999)).

. Id. (citing Carter v. Sowders, 5 F.3d 975, 981-82 (6th Cir.1993) as a "but see”).

. Carter v. Sowders, 5 F.3d 975 (6th Cir.1993).

. Carter v. Sowders, 5 F.3d at 981-82. I wish to make a couple of additional observations with regard to this Court's prior “waiver” jurisprudence. First, the Sixth Circuit’s apparent approval of the "personal waiver” approach taken by a plurality of this Court in Dean fits nicely with the view I express today and have expressed in the past. See Fugate, 62 S.W.3d at 26 (Keller, J., dissenting) ("I find the reasoning in Dean not just persuasive, but compelling, and I note that today’s majority makes no serious attempt to refute [it].”). Second, Carter v. Sowders also provides support for my criticism that Richmond has been misapplied by this Court. The only authority this Court cited in Carter v. Commonwealth in support of its conclusion that Carter's right of confrontation "was waived” was Richmond. Carter v. Commonwealth, 782 S.W.2d at 602. The Sixth Circuit’s holding in Carter v. Sowders thus casts doubt upon Richmond’s utility as authority for a "waiver by counsel” hypothesis.

. United States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525, 535 (6th Cir.2001).

. Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 8, 86 S.Ct. at 1249, 16 L.Ed.2d at 319; Marshall, 248 F.3d at 535 ("Waiver may also be implied from the defendant’s conduct.”).

. Parson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 144 S.W.3d at 783 (2004).

. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938) (quoting Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 811, 812, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937) and Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412, 1 S.Ct. 307, 27 L.Ed. 169 (1882)).

. The discussions in the trial court regarding taking the video depositions of "doctors” and "medical doctors” is clearly traceable to Assistant Commonwealth Attorney McLeod's reference to the Commonwealth’s "three medical doctor[]” witnesses who would be inconvenienced by the continuance. And, any agreement reached to take the video depositions of "the doctors” could not possibly represent a waiver of Appellant’s right to confront Nichol, who, as stated previously, supra note 15, is not a doctor. In fact, however, this first agreement was never performed because the medical doctors in question testified in person at Appellant’s trial.

. Marshall, 248 F.3d at 535. Cf. Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 113 S.W.3d 128, 133 (2003) (“[Appellant’s] attorneys' statements did not and cannot constitute a constitutionally valid waiver of his right to trial by jury.”).

. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023, 82 L.Ed. at 1466 (quoting Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 307, 57 S.Ct. 724, 731, 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1103 (1937)).

. Cf. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260 (1968) (holding that Barber’s failure to cross-examine a witness at a preliminary hearing did not constitute a waiver of his right to confrontation because Barber could not have anticipated that the witness would be unavailable to testify at trial); Carter v. Sowders, 5 F.3d 975, 981 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that, even if Carter had received a letter from his attorney advising him of the scheduled deposition, the letter did not “urge him to exercise” his right to be present and "did not provide Carter with any notice of the consequences if he failed to appear”).

. KRS 500.080(15).

. Parson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 144 S.W.3d at 784-85 (2004).

. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, -, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, (2004) (emphasis added).

. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 113 S.W.3d 128, 134-36 (2003).