Court Opinion

ID: 9555265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 14:11:33.159059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:06.527581
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
08/11/2023 09:11 AM CDT

                                                       - 875 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        314 Nebraska Reports
                                   MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                                              Cite as 314 Neb. 875

                            Yvonne McPherson, appellee, v. Walgreens
                            Boot Alliance, Inc., appellee, Ferrandino
                                & Son, Inc., appellant, and Patera
                                   Landscaping, LLC, appellee.
                                                   ___ N.W.2d ___

                                        Filed August 11, 2023.   No. S-22-603.

                 1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does
                    not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a
                    matter of law.
                 2. ____: ____. Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is
                    the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction
                    over the matter before it.
                 3. Courts: Jurisdiction: Legislature: Appeal and Error. For an appellate
                    court to have jurisdiction over an appeal, appellate jurisdiction must be
                    specifically provided by the Legislature.
                 4. Arbitration and Award: Federal Acts: Contracts. In Nebraska, arbi-
                    tration is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act if it arises from a
                    contract involving interstate commerce; otherwise, it is governed by
                    Nebraska’s Uniform Arbitration Act. In analyzing whether the Federal
                    Arbitration Act applies, the initial question is whether the parties’
                    contract evidences a transaction involving commerce as defined by the
                    Federal Arbitration Act.
                 5. Arbitration and Award: Federal Acts: Final Orders: Appeal and
                    Error. Even when an arbitration provision is governed by the Federal
                    Arbitration Act, Nebraska courts still determine finality for purposes of
                    appeal by first applying state procedural rules.
                 6. Courts: Legislature: Appeal and Error. The Nebraska Legislature has
                    authorized appeals from judgments, decrees, and final orders made by
                    the district court.

                  Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Jeffrey
               J. Lux, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
                            - 876 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
           MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 875

  Jennifer D. Tricker and Brian Barmettler, of Baird Holm,
L.L.P., for appellant.
  Michael T. Gibbons and Raymond E. Walden, of Woodke &
Gibbons, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee Patera Landscaping, LLC.
  Heavican, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and
Freudenberg, JJ.
   Stacy, J.
   This is an interlocutory appeal from a district court order
granting a motion to stay arbitration proceedings between
codefendants in a negligence action. Because we conclude the
order staying arbitration was not immediately appealable, we
must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
                       BACKGROUND
   Walgreens Boot Alliance, Inc. (Walgreens), is a national
retail pharmacy chain that contracted with Ferrandino & Son,
Inc. (Ferrandino), a national facility maintenance company
incorporated and headquartered in New York, to provide land-
scaping and maintenance services at various pharmacy loca-
tions across the United States. In February 2018, Ferrandino
subcontracted with Patera Landscaping, LLC (Patera), to per-
form landscaping and snow and ice removal services at three
pharmacy locations in Omaha, Nebraska. Patera is a limited
liability company registered in Nebraska.
   The subcontract between Ferrandino and Patera contained
a clause that required Patera to defend, indemnify, and hold
harmless Ferrandino and its customers from “any and all
claims reasonably related to [s]ervices you provided or failed
to provide under [the subcontract].” The subcontract also con-
tained the following arbitration and choice-of-law provisions:
         A. Arbitration. All disputes, controversies and claims
      of any kind arising out of or relating to this Agreement
      or the rights and obligations of the parties shall be
      settled through arbitration by the American Arbitration
      Association at its Philadelphia, Pennsylvania office, in
                            - 877 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
           MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 875

      accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act and the
      Commercial Arbitration Rules. . . .
         B. Governing Law and Jurisdiction. THE LAWS OF
      THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA SHALL GOVERN
      THE VALIDITY, PERFORMANCE, INTERPRETATION,
      AND EFFECT OF THIS AGREEMENT. . . . IF
      THERE IS AN APPEAL FROM OR RELATING TO
      AN ARBITRATION, THEN THE PARTIES AGREE TO
      THE JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF THE COURTS
      IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
      OR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
      THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA IN
      PHILADELPHIA.
   In December 2018, Yvonne McPherson was injured when
she slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside a Walgreens
pharmacy in Omaha. In March 2022, McPherson filed a per-
sonal injury action against Patera, Ferrandino, and Walgreens
in the district court for Douglas County. McPherson’s com-
plaint alleged “[t]here was no ice melt, salt, sand, or other
abrasive on the sidewalk” where she fell, and she alleged her
fall was proximately caused by the negligence of all three
named defendants.
   The three defendants filed separate answers, represented by
separate counsel. As relevant to the issues on appeal, Patera’s
answer specifically denied that it had a duty, under the sub-
contract, to provide snow and ice removal at the Walgreens
pharmacy on the date of McPherson’s fall. Ferrandino’s answer
included a cross-claim against Patera for indemnity and contri-
bution. In answering the cross-claim, Patera denied the allega-
tions regarding indemnity and contribution and alleged several
affirmative defenses, including that the cross-claim failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
           Demand for Arbitration and Motion
                    to Stay Arbitration
   Shortly after the defendants filed their responsive plead-
ings, Walgreens tendered defense of the negligence claims
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
            MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 875

to Ferrandino under the terms of its contract. Ferrandino,
in turn, tendered defense of the claims against Walgreens
and Ferrandino to Patera under the terms of the subcon-
tract. When Patera refused the tender of defense, Ferrandino
filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association seeking a determination that under the terms
of the subcontract, Patera had a contractual duty to defend
and indemnify both Ferrandino and Walgreens against
McPherson’s claims. The arbitration demand described the
nature of the dispute as a “[b]reach of contract” and asked that
the arbitration be conducted in Pennsylvania using an arbi-
trator who was an “[a]ttorney experienced in [Pennsylvania]
law as it applies to contractual disputes involving defense/
indemnification provisions.”
   On July 1, 2022, Patera filed a motion in the district court
case to stay the arbitration, expressly relying on Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-2603 (Reissue 2016) of Nebraska’s Uniform Arbitration
Act (UAA). 1 Section 25-2603(b) provides in part: “On appli-
cation, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding com-
menced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement
to arbitrate.”
   The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Patera’s
motion to stay arbitration, and several exhibits were received
without objection, including the subcontract agreement and
the arbitration demand. Patera took the position that the arbi-
tration provision in the subcontract was governed by the UAA
and not the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 2 Patera argued
that under the UAA, the arbitration provision was unenforce-
able for the following reasons: (1) specific notice language
required by § 25-2602.02 was not included, (2) claims “arising
out of personal injury based on tort” are not subject to arbi-
tration under § 25-2602.01(f)(1), (3) Ferrandino exceeded the
1
  See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-2601 to 25-2622 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp.
  2022).
2
  9 U.S.C. §§ 1 through 16 (2018).
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
            MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 875

scope of the arbitration clause by including Walgreens in the
scheduled arbitration, (4) Ferrandino waived arbitration by fil-
ing a cross-claim for indemnification and contribution before
filing a demand for arbitration on the same issue, and (5) arbi-
tration of the right to indemnity was premature because there
had not yet been a determination of liability entered against
either Ferrandino or Walgreens.
    In opposing the motion to stay arbitration, Ferrandino took
the position that the arbitration provision was governed by
the FAA and not the UAA, because the subcontract involved
interstate commerce and the parties to the subcontract were
domiciled in different states. Ferrandino denied it had waived
its right to arbitration by filing a cross-claim for indemnity
and contribution, reasoning that its demand for arbitration
was based on an alleged breach of contract and that its cross-
claim was based on an alleged common-law right to indemnity
and contribution between joint tort-feasors. Finally, Ferrandino
argued that its demand for arbitration was not premature,
because even though the underlying lawsuit was in its early
stages and no liability had been determined, Ferrandino was
already incurring defense costs as a result of Patera’s refusal to
accept the tender of defense under the subcontract.

                 Order Staying Arbitration
   On August 1, 2022, the district court entered an order grant-
ing Patera’s motion to stay arbitration “until further Order
of this Court.” The court did not purport to determine many
of the legal issues raised by the parties and, instead, con-
cluded generally that arbitration was premature. The district
court reasoned:
        It appears to the Court at the present moment in this
     case that there is nothing to indemnify. There is no judg-
     ment favoring [McPherson] against any of the defendants
     in this case to this point. . . . As such, it seems premature
     to decide the indemnity issue via arbitration.
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     314 Nebraska Reports
              MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                         Cite as 314 Neb. 875

         Without deciding on the issue of whether the arbitration
      provision [in the subcontract] fall[s] under Nebraska’s
      [UAA] or the [FAA], the Court grants the Motion to
      Stay Arbitration due to the fact that such a determination
      is premature.
         The Court is aware of the fact that two parties
      (Walgreens & Ferrandino) are actively paying attorneys
      to litigate the case when they believe Patera should be
      indemnifying them. However, depending on the potential
      outcome of this case, the payment of those attorney fees
      may be attributable to others.
   Ferrandino filed a timely notice of appeal, after which
the Nebraska Court of Appeals directed the parties to brief
whether the order filed by the district court was a final,
appealable order. We subsequently granted Ferrandino’s peti-
tion to bypass.
                   ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
   Ferrandino assigns, restated and consolidated, that the dis-
trict court erred in granting the motion to stay arbitration.
                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a fac-
tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
of law. 3
                          ANALYSIS
   [2] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it
is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over the matter before it. 4
   In briefing the jurisdictional issues, Ferrandino argues
that the order staying arbitration is immediately appealable
3
    Seldin v. Estate of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 939 N.W.2d 768 (2020).
4
    Charter West Bank v. Riddle, ante p. 263, 989 N.W.2d 428 (2023); Shasta
    Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 290 Neb. 640, 861 N.W.2d 425
    (2015).
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    314 Nebraska Reports
             MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                        Cite as 314 Neb. 875

“pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-2620(a)(2) or 25-1902(1)(b),
and, alternatively, 9 U.S.C. §16(a)(2).” 5 Patera disagrees, and
generally argues there is no statute that authorizes an inter-
locutory appeal of the order staying arbitration in this case.
Furthermore, Patera argues that under our holding in Shasta
Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 6 an order staying arbi-
tration is not considered a final, appealable order under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 25-1902(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
   [3] For this court to have jurisdiction over an appeal,
appellate jurisdiction must be specifically provided by the
Legislature. 7 In other words, unless a Nebraska statute provides
for an appeal, such right does not exist. 8 However, before we
address whether the Legislature has specifically provided for
appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal, we must
first determine whether the arbitration issues are governed
by the UAA or the FAA. 9 The parties disagree on that ques-
tion, too.
   Ferrandino contends the FAA applies because the arbitration
provision in the subcontract expressly provided that arbitra-
tion would be “in accordance with” the FAA and, furthermore,
because the subcontract involved interstate commerce. Patera
contends the UAA applies, reasoning that the subcontract
involves snow and ice removal services performed in Nebraska
and thus involves only intrastate commerce.
   [4] We have explained that in Nebraska, arbitration is
governed by the FAA if it arises from a contract involving
interstate commerce; otherwise, it is governed by the UAA. 10
5
   Brief for appellant at 9.
6
   Shasta Linen Supply, supra note 4.
 7
   See Nebraska Republican Party v. Shively, 311 Neb. 160, 971 N.W.2d 128
   (2022).
 8
   See id.
 9
   See Seldin, supra note 3.
10
   Id. See Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel v. Hunan, Inc., 276 Neb. 700,
   757 N.W.2d 205 (2008).
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   314 Nebraska Reports
             MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                        Cite as 314 Neb. 875

In analyzing whether the FAA applies, “the initial question is
whether the parties’ contract ‘evidenc[es] a transaction involv-
ing commerce’ as defined by the FAA.” 11 As we explained in
Webb v. American Employers Group: 12
      “Commerce” as defined by the [FAA] includes “com-
      merce among the several States.” 9 U.S.C § 1. The U.S.
      Supreme Court has given the FAA an expansive scope
      by broadly construing the phrase “‘a contract evidenc-
      ing a transaction involving commerce.’” Allied-Bruce
      Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277, 115 S.
      Ct. 834, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995) (cited in Kelley v.
      Benchmark Homes, Inc., 250 Neb. 367, 550 N.W.2d 640
      (1996)). The Court has held that the phrase “‘involving
      commerce’” requires a broad interpretation in order to
      give effect to the FAA’s basic purpose, which is to put
      arbitration provisions on the same footing as a contract’s
      other terms. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
      U.S. at 277. The Court has further noted that “the word
      ‘involving,’ like ‘affecting,’ signals an intent to exercise
      Congress’ commerce power to the full.” Id. The statutory
      phrase “‘evidencing a transaction’” has been construed
      by the Court to include transactions involving interstate
      commerce even where the parties did not contemplate an
      interstate commerce connection. Id.
Given this broad federal authority, we have observed that “it
is difficult to imagine an economic or commercial activity that
would be outside the scope of the Commerce Clause and, by
extension, the FAA.” 13
   At oral argument before this court, Patera suggested that
the removal of snow and ice from a Walgreens pharmacy in
11
   Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, supra note 10, 276 Neb. at 704, 757
   N.W.2d at 209, quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2.
12
   Webb v. American Employers Group, 268 Neb. 473, 478-79, 684 N.W.2d
   33, 39 (2004).
13
   Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, supra note 10, 276 Neb. at 706, 757
   N.W.2d at 210.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    314 Nebraska Reports
             MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                        Cite as 314 Neb. 875

Omaha should be viewed as a purely local activity. But we
have recognized that interstate commerce can be implicated
even by purely local activities, 14 and we have consistently
stated that transactions involving commerce include contracts
for services between parties of different states. 15
   Here, parties from different states contracted for snow and
ice removal services on commercial properties in Nebraska.
We agree with Ferrandino that the subcontract involves a trans-
action that comes within the scope of the FAA and that the
arbitration provision in the subcontract is therefore governed
by the FAA.
   [5] But concluding that the FAA governs the arbitration
provision in the subcontract merely establishes the framework
for our jurisdictional analysis and does not answer whether we
have appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. This
is so because even when the FAA applies, Nebraska courts
determine finality for purposes of appeal by applying state pro-
cedural rules. As we explained in Webb:
      [T]o determine whether state law governs the finality for
      purposes of appeal of an order . . . under the FAA, we
      must first apply our state procedural rules to determine if
      the order is final for purposes of appeal and then deter-
      mine whether the result of that inquiry would undermine
      the goals and policies of the FAA. 16
   [6] The Nebraska Legislature has authorized appeals from
judgments, decrees, and final orders made by the district
court. 17 No final judgment or decree has been entered in this
case, so under Nebraska’s procedural rules, appellate juris-
diction over this interlocutory appeal turns on whether the
14
   Wilczewski v. Charter West Nat. Bank, 295 Neb. 254, 889 N.W.2d 63
   (2016).
15
   See, Seldin, supra note 3; Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, supra note
   10; Webb, supra note 12; Smith Barney, Inc. v. Painters Local Union No.
   109, 254 Neb. 758, 579 N.W.2d 518 (1998).
16
   Webb, supra note 12, 268 Neb. at 481, 684 N.W.2d at 41.
17
   See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
               MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                          Cite as 314 Neb. 875

order staying arbitration is a final, appealable order under
§ 25-1902 and, if so, whether Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
(Reissue 2016) is implicated.
   In Shasta Linen Supply, we held that an order temporarily
staying arbitration was not a final order under any of the pro-
visions of § 25-1902. 18 Patera relies on Shasta Linen Supply
to argue that the district court’s order staying arbitration was
not a final order under § 25-1902, and Ferrandino argues that
Shasta Linen Supply is procedurally distinguishable. But we
conclude it is not necessary, in this case, to decide whether
the order staying arbitration was a final, appealable order
under § 25-1902, because § 25-1315 is implicated on the
facts of this case and the failure to comply with § 25-1315
is dispositive.
   Section 25-1315 provides, in relevant part:
         (1) When more than one claim for relief is presented
      in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-
      claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
      involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judg-
      ment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims
      or parties only upon an express determination that there is
      no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
      the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
      tion and direction, any order or other form of decision,
      however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
      claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
      parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
      claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision
      is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judg-
      ment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabili-
      ties of all the parties.
   In Mann v. Mann, 19 we held that “in cases where
§ 25-1315(1) is implicated, and no more specific statute
18
     Shasta Linen Supply, supra note 4.
19
     Mann v. Mann, 312 Neb. 275, 292, 978 N.W.2d 606, 618 (2022).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                           Cite as 314 Neb. 875

governs the appeal, an order resolving fewer than all claims
against all parties is not final and appealable if it lacks proper
§ 25-1315 certification.” Mann held “[t]his is so even if the
order otherwise satisfies one of the final order categories in
§ 25-1902(1).” 20
   It is undisputed that this case involves multiple parties
and multiple claims for relief, and no one contends the order
staying arbitration resolved all claims against all parties. But
Ferrandino argues that § 25-1315 is not implicated in this case,
because the order staying arbitration was made in a special
proceeding. We expressly rejected such reasoning in Mann,
where we held, “Section 25-1315(1) can be implicated in civil
actions, in special proceedings, and in civil actions joined with
special proceedings.” 21
   Section 25-1315(1) is implicated here because the case
involves multiple parties and multiple claims for relief and
because the order staying arbitration was not a decision “adju-
dicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.” Because there has been no proper certification under
§ 25-1315, we lack appellate jurisdiction over this appeal and
it must be dismissed.
   For the sake of completeness, we address Ferrandino’s argu-
ment that § 25-2620(a)(2), a provision in the UAA, is a more
specific statute authorizing appeals that renders the appeal
procedure in § 25-1315 inapplicable. We are not persuaded.
Section 25-2620(a)(2) authorizes an appeal from “[a]n order
granting an application to stay arbitration made under sub-
section (b) of section 25-2603.” Section 25-2603(b) in turn
provides, in part, that “[o]n application, the court may stay an
arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened on a showing
that there is no agreement to arbitrate.”
   While Patera cited to § 25-2603(b) in its motion to stay
arbitration, we cannot read the district court’s order as
20
     Id.
21
     Id. at 294, 978 N.W.2d at 620.
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                           Cite as 314 Neb. 875

having stayed arbitration because “no agreement to arbitrate”
was shown. To the contrary, the district court’s order stayed
arbitration based solely on a finding that it was “premature
to decide the indemnity issue via arbitration” before the legal
liability of any of the codefendants had been determined. We
express no opinion on the district court’s reasoning, except to
observe that it does not fall within § 25-2620(a)(2). We there-
fore reject Ferrandino’s contention that § 25-2620(a)(2) specifi-
cally authorizes this interlocutory appeal and renders the more
general appeal procedure in § 25-1315 inapplicable.
   Although we have concluded that the order staying arbi-
tration is not immediately appealable under Nebraska’s pro-
cedural rules, Webb instructs that when the FAA applies, the
analysis of appellate jurisdiction includes one additional step:
We must still “determine whether the result of [the appeal-
ability] inquiry would undermine the goals and policies of
the FAA.” 22
   In Webb, after concluding that an order denying a motion
to compel arbitration was a final, appealable order under
§ 25-1902, we went on to note that the result of our appeal-
ability determination was consistent with the goals and policies
of the FAA, because 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) also authorized
appeals from such orders. As such, in Webb, the application of
our state procedural rules on appealability resulted in the same
outcome as application of the FAA’s appeal provisions. 23
   This case presents a different scenario. Under our state
procedural rules, the order staying arbitration is not immedi-
ately appealable, because § 25-1315 is implicated but was not
followed and no more specific statute authorizes an interlocu-
tory appeal. Conversely, appeals under the FAA are governed
by 9 U.S.C. § 16(a), which provides in relevant part: “An
22
     Webb, supra note 12, 268 Neb. at 481, 684 N.W.2d at 41.
23
     Accord Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 606
     (Tenn. 2013) (observing “Most courts that have addressed this issue have
     held that the Federal Arbitration Act’s appeal provisions do not preempt
     state appeal provisions consistent with the Uniform Arbitration Act”).
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    314 Nebraska Reports
             MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                        Cite as 314 Neb. 875

appeal may be taken from . . . (2) an interlocutory order grant-
ing, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbitra-
tion that is subject to this title[.]” So although the order staying
arbitration is not immediately appealable under Nebraska’s
appellate procedure, it would be appealable under the FAA.
   We considered a similar scenario in Kremer v. Rural
Community Ins. Co. 24 There, we concluded that an order com-
pelling arbitration and staying litigation was immediately
appealable under § 25-1902 because it was made in a special
proceeding and affected a substantial right. But Kremer noted
that under the FAA, an order compelling arbitration is not
immediately appealable unless the trial court also dismisses
the underlying action. 25 Although the outcomes under the FAA
and our state procedural rules were different, Kremer held that
applying our state procedural rules and allowing an immediate
appeal would not undermine the goals and objectives of the
FAA, reasoning:
      “The FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor
      does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire
      field of arbitration.” And other courts have concluded that
      state appellate procedures only affect the timing of an
      appeal; they neither preclude the enforcement of a valid
      arbitration agreement nor interfere with the parties’ sub-
      stantive rights. 26
Kremer thus concluded the FAA did not preempt Nebraska’s
procedural rules, because the goals of the FAA were not under-
mined by allowing an immediate appeal of the arbitration
order. We conclude the goals of the FAA are not undermined
on these facts either.
24
   Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538
   (2010).
25
   Id., citing Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121
   S. Ct. 513, 148 L. Ed. 2d 373 (2000).
26
   Kremer, supra note 24, 280 Neb. at 602, 788 N.W.2d at 549, quoting Volt
   Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. U., 489 U.S. 468, 109 S. Ct. 1248,
   103 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1989) (emphasis supplied).
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
            MCPHERSON V. WALGREENS BOOT ALLIANCE
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 875

   Even though the FAA would presumably allow for an inter-
locutory appeal from an order staying arbitration, and applica-
tion of our state procedural rules does not allow an interlocu-
tory appeal absent compliance with § 25-1315, we conclude
that requiring compliance with § 25-1315 affects only the
timing of an interlocutory appeal. It does not preclude enforce-
ment of a valid arbitration agreement, and thus, it would not
undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.
                         CONCLUSION
   For the foregoing reasons, this court lacks appellate jurisdic-
tion over this interlocutory appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.
                                             Appeal dismissed.
   Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.