Court Opinion

ID: 9964291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 17:00:45.619279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:17.069042
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LUIS A. LOPEZ,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                  DE-0752-18-0098-I-1

             v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: April 26, 2024
              Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Steve Newman , Esquire, New York, New York, for the appellant.

      Melinda Varszegi , Esquire, Sandy, Utah, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained the appellant’s removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one
only in the following circumstances:        the initial decision contains erroneous
findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial
decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                 BACKGROUND
      Effective November 22, 2017, the agency removed the appellant from his
position as a Sales and Services Distribution Associate with the agency’s Murray
Post Office in Salt Lake City, Utah, based on a charge of unacceptable conduct.
Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 11-16. In support of the charge, the agency
alleged that on October 11, 2017, one of the appellant’s coworkers (T.W.)
repeatedly asked him to excuse her because she did not have sufficient space to
move around him; however, he ignored her requests.         Id. at 14.   The agency
alleged that T.W. then crouched down and leaned over equipment in order to
proceed, and may have touched the appellant as she was moving past him. Id.
      The agency further alleged that a few minutes later, the appellant and T.W.
were walking down an aisle in opposite directions when the appellant stepped
into T.W.’s path and collided with her, striking her body with such force that she
lost her balance, stumbled back a couple of steps, and sustained an injury. Id.
The agency alleged that T.W. then reported the appellant’s actions to an agency
manager, who instructed the appellant to leave the workroom floor; however,
instead of doing so, the appellant repeatedly shouted, “What did I do?” and left
the facility only after the manager told him that the police would be notified if he
                                                                                  3

did not follow her instructions.      Id.   Later that day, T.W. sought medical
treatment for her injury and filed a police report. Id. at 56.
      The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging his removal and he
requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. He did not raise any affirmative defenses. IAF,
Tab 5. After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
that affirmed the appellant’s removal. IAF, Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID). The
administrative judge found that the agency proved the charge by preponderant
evidence, ID at 7-14, that there was a nexus between the charge and the efficiency
of the service, ID at 16, and that the penalty of removal was reasonable. ID
at 16-18.
      The appellant has filed a petition for review in which he denies the alleged
misconduct and asserts that, in finding that the agency proved the charge, the
administrative judge failed to consider inconsistencies between T.W.’s hearing
testimony and statements she made during an October 16, 2017 interview with a
supervisor who was investigating the October 11, 2017 collision. Petition for
Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 3; IAF, Tab 7 at 41-43. He also argues that the
administrative judge improperly denied his witness requests and that the agency
withheld evidence from him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3.
      The agency has filed a response in opposition to the appellant’s petition.
PFR File, Tab 3. The appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. PFR
File, Tab 4.

                                    ANALYSIS
The Board need not consider the documents the appellant submits on review.
      The appellant submits several documents on review, including the
following: the police report filed by T.W. on October 11, 2017; the first page of
a 3-page summary of T.W.’s October 16, 2017 interview, in which she recounts
her history with the appellant; and two stalking injunctions and a summons that
were served on the appellant in April and May of 2018. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-9,
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Tab 4 at 4-7. The Board will not consider evidence submitted for the first time on
review unless the appellant shows that the evidence was unavailable before the
record closed below despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal
Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d)(1).       Further, the
Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a
showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that
of the initial decision. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349
(1980). To constitute new and material evidence, the information contained in
the documents, not just the documents themselves, must have been unavailable
despite due diligence when the record closed.         Grassell v. Department of
Transportation, 40 M.S.P.R. 554, 564 (1989).
      The excerpt from the summary of T.W.’s October 16, 2017 interview that
the appellant submits on review is already part of the record and thus is not new.
Compare PFR File, Tab 1 at 9, with IAF, Tab 7 at 41; see Meier v. Department of
the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980) (evidence that is already part of the
record is not new). Although the stalking injunctions and the summons postdate
the close of the record, these documents pertain to various criminal proceedings
against the appellant and have no bearing on this appeal. PFR File, Tab 4 at 5-7.
      The rest of the documents that the appellant submits on review, including
the police report, are either undated or significantly predate the close of the
record, and the appellant has made no showing that any of those documents were
unavailable before the close of the record despite his due diligence. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 5-8, Tab 4 at 4.   In that regard, we note that, although the appellant
contends that he was unaware that T.W. had filed a police report until he was
served with a stalking injunction on April 7, 2018, i.e., 5 days after the close of
the record below , documentation in the record explicitly states that T.W. filed a
police report following the collision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2; IAF, Tab 7 at 56,
Tab 23 at 2. This information was provided to the appellant and his attorney in
January of 2018, more than 2 months before the record closed. IAF, Tab 7 at 63.
                                                                                   5

Thus, the appellant was or should have been aware of the police report but made
no effort to obtain it before the record closed. Given these circumstances, we
find that the appellant failed to show that the police report was unavailable before
the close of the record despite his due diligence.
      Moreover, the appellant indicates on review that he is submitting the police
report to impeach T.W.’s credibility. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3 (alleging that T.W.’s
statements to the police as to the location of the first incident are inconsistent
with her hearing testimony and that there are other unspecified discrepancies
between T.W.’s statements to the police and her statements to the agency official
during T.W.’s October 16, 2017 interview). It is well established that evidence
offered merely to impeach a witness’s credibility is not generally considered new
and material.   Bucci v. Department of Education, 42 M.S.P.R. 47, 55 (1989).
Therefore, the Board need not consider any of the documents that the appellant
submits on review. Avansino, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980).

The administrative judge correctly found that the agency proved the charge by
preponderant evidence.
      In finding that the agency proved the charge, the administrative judge fully
set forth the facts underlying the charge and considered the hearing testimony and
documentary evidence relevant to the charge, including the written statements of
the appellant, T.W., the manager who instructed the appellant to leave the
workroom floor on October 11, 2017, and several employees who witnessed the
appellant’s response to that instruction. ID at 2-14; IAF, Tab 7 at 17-20, 25-46.
The administrative judge observed that witness credibility was critical in this
appeal because the appellant and T.W. provided very different versions of their
collision and there were no eyewitnesses.      ID at 8.   Applying the factors for
resolving credibility issues set forth in Hillen v. Department of the Army,
35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), the administrative judge credited T.W.’s testimony
regarding the October 11, 2017 collision over the appellant’s conflicting
testimony, finding that the appellant’s version of events was inherently
                                                                                  6

implausible and that T.W.’s description of the events leading to the collision, and
of the collision itself, was far more plausible than the appellant’s version. ID
at 11-12.
      Moreover, contrary to the appellant’s assertion on review, in his Hillen
analysis, the administrative judge explicitly considered the inconsistencies
between T.W.’s hearing testimony and her October 16, 2017 account of her initial
encounter with the appellant on October 11, 2017. ID at 8-9. Specifically, the
administrative judge noted that T.W. testified that she “brushed past” the
appellant such that her “back and butt brushed passed him,” whereas she stated in
her written account of the incident, “I think our bodies may have touched
slightly.”   Id.; IAF, Tab 7 at 42.    The administrative judge found that the
difference between the two statements was insignificant because T.W.’s statement
and her hearing testimony both acknowledged the likelihood of bodily contact
during the first incident. ID at 9.
      By contrast, the administrative judge found that there was a significant
inconsistency between the appellant’s testimony and the statement he provided
during the agency investigation regarding the issue of whether he refused to leave
the workroom floor in response to the manager’s directions.              ID at 9.
Specifically, the administrative judge noted that, during the agency investigation,
the appellant “flatly denied” that he refused to leave the workroom floor;
however, he testified at the hearing that he clocked out because he did not want to
be arrested. Id.; IAF, Tab 7 at 34. The administrative judge found that this was a
significant inconsistency because the potential for arrest only arose because the
appellant refused to leave. ID at 9. The administrative judge concluded that the
appellant’s significant inconsistency far outweighed T.W’s minor inconsistency.
Id. Therefore, the administrative judge found, this credibility factor weighed in
favor of the agency. Id.
      The administrative judge further found that T.W. and the agency’s other
witnesses, including the manager who asked him to leave the workroom floor
                                                                                         7

following the collision, provided straightforward testimony that was consistent
and plausible, whereas the appellant’s testimony was disjointed and confused. ID
at 13. In sum, the administrative judge found that the Hillen factors significantly
weighed in favor of the agency and against the appellant, and that the agency
therefore proved the charge by preponderant evidence. ID at 14.
       Although the appellant disagrees with the administrative judge’s credibility
findings, the initial decision reflects that the administrative judge considered the
evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned
conclusions.    Consequently, we discern no reason to reweigh the evidence or
substitute the Board’s own judgment on the issue of the credibility of the
witnesses. See Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Davison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 115 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 9 (2011)
(finding that mere disagreement with an administrative judge’s explained findings
is not a basis to grant a petition for review).         Accordingly, we find that the
appellant’s arguments on review do not provide a basis for disturbing the
administrative judge’s well-reasoned finding that the agency proved its charge.

The appellant’s remaining arguments are unpersuasive.
       In support of his argument that the administrative judge improperly denied
his witness requests, the appellant asserts that his attorney informed him that the
administrative judge did not approve the witnesses he requested because they did
not “see anything.” 2 PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. The appellant’s contention that the
administrative judge denied his witness requests is contradicted by the record,
which shows that the appellant requested three witnesses, all of whom were

2
  In his reply to the agency’s response to the petition for review, the appellant asserts
that his attorney failed to adequately represent him, and he submits a witness list that he
purportedly provided his attorney, which includes several agency employees who were
not requested as witnesses for the appellant. PFR File, Tab 4 at 1, 4; IAF, Tab 13 at 5.
To the extent that the appellant blames his attorney for failing to request additional
witnesses, this argument provides no basis for disturbing the initial decision, as the
Board has long held that an appellant is responsible for the errors of his chosen
representative. Sofio v. Internal Revenue Service, 7 M.S.P.R. 667, 670 (1981).
                                                                                        8

approved by the administrative judge; 3 however, the appellant did not call these
witnesses at the hearing. IAF, Tab 23 at 1.
      Lastly, the appellant asserts that he requested a copy of a file pertaining to
an investigation that the American Postal Workers’ Union conducted on his
behalf; however, they 4 have denied him access to the file. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3.
We consider the appellant’s argument that the agency failed to provide him
documents that he requested as an allegation that the agency denied his discovery
request.    Because the appellant did not file a motion to compel below, his
argument that he was denied discovery provides no basis for reversal of the initial
decision.   Szejner v. Office of Personnel Management, 99 M.S.P.R. 275, ¶ 5
(2005) (finding that an appellant’s failure to file a motion to compel discovery
precluded him from raising an agency’s failure to respond to discovery for the
first time on petition for review), aff’d, 167 F. App’x 217 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

                          NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

3
  In the order approving the appellant’s requested witnesses, the administrative judge
also provided the appellant the opportunity to supplement his witness list; however, he
did not do so. IAF, Tab 13 at 5.
4
 It is unclear whether the appellant is referring to the union or the agency; however, for
purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the appellant is referring to the agency.
5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        9

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                 10

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC    review    of   cases   involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.         See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
                                                                                      11

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant    to   the    Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b)    other   than   practices   described    in   section 2302(b)(8),   or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                12

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.