Court Opinion

ID: 9741499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:56:42.648123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.860461
License: Public Domain

*402RUCKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While I agree Lindsey v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 351, 295 N.E.2d 819, guides our analyses of the case before us, I read Lindsey differently than does the majority. Here, the majority takes the position that once the trial court is apprised the jury has been exposed to possibly prejudicial information, the court then has the responsibility of taking remedial action. I cannot agree.
In Lindsey, our supreme court makes clear, that once presented with possibly prejudicial information, the trial court must first make a threshold determination whether there is an actual likelihood of prejudice. The trial court makes that determination by examining the content of the alleged prejudicial publication. If and only if, “the risk of prejudice appears substantial, as opposed to imaginary or remote” should the court then “interrogate the jury collectively to determine who, if any, has been exposed” and take additional remedial action. Id., 295 N.E.2d at 824; see also, Gregory v. State (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 585, 589 quoting Lindsey, supra. Absent a showing, in the first instance, that the supposed prejudicial information actually raised a “risk of substantial prejudice” the trial court has no responsibility to interrogate the other jurors or take any further remedial action.
The record before us shows the trial court made an initial inquiry in this case and apparently determined there was no risk of substantial prejudice. Moss was questioned in some detail and revealed he advised his fellow jurors that he was acquainted with the defendant as well as defendant’s wife. After this revelation the jurors opined that Moss should not continue deliberating. Moss advised the court and counsel as follows:
They didn’t ask me. I volunteered the information that I know him. All right? But I didn’t know who he was married to or his wife, so I didn’t know until she came in, you called her in and it’s the wife that I saw at that time. So, I was in there deliberating, I was the foreman of the jury and I made mention and they thought it was hard on me, that it was unfair to me, you know, because I know, you know the wife as well as the husband, to deliberate, I guess.
Record at 310. Moss further indicated:
Do you know what they refer to, your Honor, if I can explain to you? The one guy said that it was a case that he was dealing with a while back and one of the jurors knew the defendant. All right? And they found the man guilty. All right? And the man got up on his way out of the courtroom and pointed his finger and said when I get out, you know, and so that’s the kind of stipulation that they were running to, you know, maybe you’re in trouble now or something, you know, if you decide to go this away or the other way, you know.
Record at 319.
The majority in this case seems to suggest the foregoing conversation, by itself, warrants further inquiry of the remaining panel because we cannot determine what impact, if any, it may have had on them. However, unlike the newspaper article in Lindsey, supra, here, Moss’ conversation with his fellow jurors on its face is harmless and non-prejudicial. There was no need for the trial court sua sponte to conduct further inquiry.
The record here also shows defendant did not request the trial court to question the jurors to determine whether they were prejudiced by Moss’ conduct. Rather, after the trial court decided to remove Moss from the panel, defendant queried whether the trial court would “call the jury in now and explain to them why you did this?” Defendant’s failure to make such a request is critical and the case of Smedley v. State (1990), Ind., 561 N.E.2d 776, is instructive. In Smedley, appellant moved to strike the entire panel when, on the second day of voir dire, one juror indicated she heard a conversation .in the jury room to the effect that appellant had “killed a lady.” The motion was denied. On appeal, appellant, citing Lindsey, argued when this “possibility of bias and prejudice” was brought to the attention of the trial court, the court should have examined the jury to deter*403mine whether any prospective juror had been influenced by the discussion of the case and that failure to do so was error. Our supreme court disagreed and held:
We see little danger of prejudice from such a general characterization of the case as alleged in counsel’s verbatim objection. Moreover, we observe that appellant never requested the trial court to question the jurors whether they had been prejudiced by any such remarks.
Smedley, supra at 780.
In the case before us Moss’ conversation with his fellow jurors, in my opinion, demonstrated no danger of prejudice. Further, as in Smedley, the defendant here never requested the trial court to interrogate the jury. The trial court did not err in this case and defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.