Court Opinion

ID: 9718978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:39:16.583715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:03.771060
License: Public Domain

OPINION CONCURRING IN RESULT
Garrard, P.J.
While I concur with the result reached by the majority, I do so under a different analysis of the due process issue which has been raised concerning the modification of awards.
It seems to me that the right to which due process attaches is that of an employee injured in an industrial accident to recover for her injuries. It would therefore appear that an assessment of whether the statute affords due process should depend upon a consideration of the entire act, rather than merely one section, IC 22-3-3-27, which deals with the modification of awards.
The specific provision attacked permits modification of an award to either increase or decrease the amount of permanent partial impairment because of a changed condition within specified time limits. As discussed by the majority, the statutory period for modification commences to run as of the last date for which compensation was paid under the original award. As urged by appellant, when considered apart from *496the balance of the act and the facts of the given case, the operation of this section creates an appearance of unfairness for those originally awarded a small permanent partial impairment. Indeed, the period to seek a modification (as here) may well have “expired” when the original award is entered.
However, when the entire statute and the rights it affords are considered one must conclude that the appearance of unfairness is illusory (and for this reason is, additionally, particularly unfortunate).
The statutory purpose is to provide injured employees who qualify for benefits the full amount to which they are entitled under its various provisions. The statute also imposes time limitations for the assertion of liability similar to those imposed in civil actions. In this regard, however, the statute departs from the principal of finality which normally attends civil litigation by permitting the modification of final awards for a one-year period according to the section in question.
For those originally determined to have suffered substantial permanent impairment the effect of this provision is to defer finality for a substantial period beyond the two year limitation generally applicable for filing claims. See IC 22-3-3-3. This does not, however, mean that those originally determined to have suffered little impairment were denied the year’s time within which to assure themselves of the correctness of the award.
I believe this is well illustrated by two of the specifications urged by Gibson. Her issue (2) queries whether she should be “compelled to file for a modification... prior to an initial award notwithstanding [that] no modification petition may be filed prior to an initial adjudication of the claim by the Board?” Similarly, (3) questions whether the act requires her to attempt “to perform an ‘impossible task;’ that is, to file for additional benefits, where no initial benefit rights have ripened into existence?”
The answers to these questions are apparent when one considers that Gibson’s right is not to secure an award and have it modified. Her right is to recover for her injuries. This is well illustrated by the facts at hand.
Upon the award made she was entitled to six (6) weeks benefits for *497permanent impairment. These were to commence as of the end of her tempoary disability on November 4,1969. Under the modification section she and her employer were to be accorded one year from the end of the six week period, or until December 17,1970, to determine whether there was a change in circumstances which required a modification so that she would receive the correct impairment award for her injury. Because no award had been made both parties, in fact, received more time than this in which to determine the extent of impairment. Nearly six months later on June 10,1971 both agreed that the extent of her impairment was equivalent to six weeks, and on June 21st the Board approved the award. She was not deprived of the ability to recover for her injury because she was not limited by the impairment claimed by her original Form 9. Instead, she was entitled to prove at the Board hearing the extent of her impairment.
The statute did not deny her due process and the decision should be affirmed.
NOTE —Reported at 376 N.E.2d 502.