Court Opinion

ID: 9846021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:32:59.329933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:31.373200
License: Public Domain

Judge McCULLOUGH
dissenting:
The majority has concluded that the affidavit filed in support of a search warrant issued by a magistrate for the search of defendant’s *65residence lacked probable cause and therefore should not have been issued. From this conclusion, I respectfully dissent.
Evidence seized in violation of the United States Constitution or the North Carolina Constitution shall be suppressed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-974(1) (2003). Section 20 of Article I of the North Carolina Constitution should not be read to enlarge or expand such rights beyond those afforded by the Fourth Amendment. State v. Gamer, 331 N.C. 491, 417 S.E.2d 502 (1992).
Probable cause is required for the issuance of a search warrant. The totality of the circumstances test has been adopted for determining probable cause. State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984).
In the case sub judice a detective with the Raleigh Police Department documented that defendant resided at a single-family residence, 3300 Pinecrest Drive in Raleigh. The detective reported that defendant had prior arrests for the possession of drugs (marijuana and methaqualone). The detective further stated that on the normal trash day and at the normal time he recovered a single, white plastic bag of trash from defendant’s front yard at the curbline next to the driveway leading to defendant’s house. Inside the bag were dried up marijuana plants. No documents with defendant’s name were found in the trash nor did the detective see who placed the bag at this spot. Based on the discovery of marijuana in the trash pickup, the warrant in question was issued.
The trial court and the majority refused to find that this search warrant affidavit was adequate as there were no documents inside the trash bearing defendant’s name nor did surveillance establish who placed the bag curbside. At the suppression hearing the trial court noted that in Raleigh the garbage collectors go behind the houses and place the trash curbside for later pickup. While the trial court noted that “[t]here were other garbage bags in front of other houses along Pinecrest Drive,” the court refused to draw the inference that the bag in front of 3300 Pinecrest Drive implicated that residence without evidence along the lines set forth above. While it would have been the better practice for the police to determine from the garbage collectors where the target bag came from, operational security may on some occasions make that impractical.
In any event, I believe the trial court erred in not allowing the inference to be drawn that the trash bag implicates the residence *66where it was located. I believe the magistrate was entitled to draw the inference that a single bag in front of a residence more likely than not emanated from that residence.
In State v. Arrington, our Supreme Court stated a search warrant affidavit is sufficient when it
supplies reasonable cause to believe that the proposed search for evidence probably will reveal the presence upon the described premises of the items sought and that those items will aid in the apprehension or conviction of the offender. Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause nor import absolute certainty. The facts set forth in an affidavit for a search warrant must be such that a reasonably discreet and prudent person would rely upon them before they will be held to provide probable cause justifying the issuance of a search warrant. A determination of probable cause is grounded in practical considerations.
Arrington, 311 N.C. at 636, 319 S.E.2d at 256-57 (citations omitted).
I believe the trial court improperly applied a de novo review to the warrant in question and did not give proper deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause. State v. Ledbetter, 120 N.C. App. 117, 121-22, 461 S.E.2d 341, 344 (1995) (Great deference should be paid to determination of probable cause and the reviewing court is not to conduct de novo review of evidence.).
Numerous decisions note that “probable cause” is a common sense, practical determination and that reviewing courts should not take a grudging, negative attitude toward warrants. See, e.g., State v. Riggs, 328 N.C. 213, 400 S.E.2d 429 (1991). The issuing official is allowed to draw every reasonable inference from the information supplied by the affiant. Id.
Numerous cases- can be found where search warrants were upheld when the affidavit was similar to the one here with there being no documents linking the defendant by name to the trash recovered nor was the property owner surveilled placing the trash curbside nor were the collectors interviewed.
In Perkins v. State, 197 Ga. App. 577, 398 S.E.2d 702 (1990), the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld a search warrant predicated on a tip from a concerned citizen, the defendant’s prior criminal history and several trash seizures where drugs, drug records and paraphernalia were found. The trash was located curbside in front of the defend*67ant’s residence, although the defendant was not observed placing the trash there, nor were any records bearing the defendant’s name found in the trash. The defendant moved td suppress arguing that no one personally observed the defendant place the trash nor did the affidavit contain enough facts to establish an ownership connection between appellant and the trash searched.
In rejecting his arguments the Georgia Court stated:
“In determining whether probable cause supported issuance of a search warrant, a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test is employed. ‘The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . ., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis . . . for concluding)’ that probable cause existed.’ [Cit]” Butler v. State, 192 Ga. App. 710 (1) (386 S.E.2d 371) (1989)_
Reviewing all the circumstances set forth in the affidavits, we conclude that there was a substantial basis for the magistrate’s determination of probable cause. The information provided by Craft, [the affiant] arising out of his official investigation, was sufficient to establish probable cause. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751 (2)(b) (279 S.E.2d 678 (1981). In addition, the magistrate was entitled to rely on the officer’s knowledge of appellant’s past criminal conduct. Id. at 755. The affidavit indicated the existence of an ongoing scheme to sell drugs, consequently, we cannot say that the statements in the affidavit were so stale as to make it unlikely that illegal drugs would be found on the premises at the time of the issuance of the warrant. See id. at 755. Although not all of the recitations in the affidavits were entirely accurate and despite the lack of statements regarding personal observations of appellant and his criminal activity, on the whole the affidavits supported the finding of probable cause. See Ayers, supra at 248.
As to the connection between appellant and the trash, Craft stated that the trash was located at the curbside or at the roadway of the residences observed, and further stated the bases for connecting appellant to each of these residences, such as appellant’s name on the lease of one residence, and the other residence being listed by appellant in connection with an auto accident together with a car registered to appellant located at that resi*68dence. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection at the curb outside the home. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (108 S. Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30) (1988). Utilizing the deferential standard of review appropriate for searches conducted pursuant to a search warrant, State v. Morrow, 175 Ga. App. 743(4) (334 S.E.2d 344) (1985), we conclude that appellant’s first enumeration of error is without merit and the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
Perkins, 197 Ga. App. at 578-79, 398 S.E.2d at 703-04.
The Georgia court applied the same legal standards that we utilize in North Carolina as noted herein and found that the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause.
Many decisions from other jurisdictions reach the same result. See, e.g., United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2004) (affidavit upheld that recounted defendant’s criminal record and results of a trash cover of container placed in front of defendant’s home where drugs and paraphernalia were found); United States v. Shanks, 97 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1135, 136 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1997) (garbage containers seized from land between alley and defendant’s garage where drugs were found held to establish probable cause to search defendant’s house); United States v. Scull, 321 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2003), Bono v. United States, cert. denied, — U.S. —, 157 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2003) (evidence of a “trash pull” of trash in front of defendant’s residence properly admitted at defendant’s trial); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959, 59 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1979) (trash in front of defendant’s residence with drugs inside justified issuance of search warrant); State v. Duchene, 624 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 2001) (garbage search along with defendant’s prior record justified issuance of search' warrant); United States v. Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211, 115 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1991) (trash curbside); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1981) (three searches of curbside trash upheld),- United States v. Biondich, 652 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 975, 70 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1981) (garbage left curbside with drug trash and other incriminating numerical notations justified issuance of search warrant); United States v. Williams, 75 Fed. Appx. 480 (2003) (curbside trash seizure); United States v. Harris, 6 Fed. Appx. 304 (2001) (curbside trash seizure upheld).
*69In its brief the State cites State v. Bordner, 53 S.W.3d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019, 152 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2002) which has facts similar to those cases listed above and where the search warrant was upheld.
The important lesson from the cases cited above is that the courts normally do infer that garbage on the property normally implicates that property. The evidence of record shows the other neighborhood homes had trash bags in front also. There was no evidence of a communal pickup point. The only evidence that the target bag did not originate with defendant’s residence is the trial court’s own speculation. By refusing to allow the magistrate to infer that trash in defendant’s front yard came from his house, the trial court evinces a grudging review and would require absolute certainty before upholding this warrant. As noted in Arrington, probable cause is grounded in practical considerations. The fact that so many jurisdictions have upheld warrants with similar facts set forth in their affidavits demonstrates the logic behind the inference.
In all of the cases set forth above, the only evidence implicating the defendant’s residence was the location of the trash. No garbage collectors were interviewed; surveillance did not establish who placed the trash curbside, nor was any documentary evidence bearing the defendant’s name discovered. Yet all of these reviewing courts concluded that it was reasonable to draw the inference that trash located in front of the target residence implicated that residence. I do not believe that merely because Raleigh sanitation workers go behind houses to collect garbage the inference that a solitary bag of trash in front of a residence originated from that location is thereby destroyed.
Many other reported cases have held that the location of trash in front of or near the defendant’s residence justifies a search warrant once incriminating evidence is found in the trash. See United States v. Briscoe, 317 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 239 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841, 58 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1978); State v. Jacobs, 437 So. 2d 166 (Fla. App. 1983), pet. dismissed, 441 So. 2d 632 (1983); State v. Kyles, 513 So. 2d 265 (La. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1027, 100 L. Ed. 2d 236, reh’g denied, 487 U.S. 1246, 101 L. Ed. 2d 955 (1988).
*70Many of these courts, in applying the totality of the circumstances test also noted the defendant’s prior criminal history whereas the trial court here ignored defendant’s criminal record even though it is described by the affiant. It was error to fail to credit the inference that this factor made it more likely to be defendant’s trash. While a subject’s criminal record can never be the central factor, it is error to simply ignore this issue. See State v. Watson, 119 N.C. App. 395, 458 S.E.2d 519 (1995). In United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2002) the Fourth Circuit stated:
An officer’s report in his affidavit of “the target’s prior criminal activity or record is clearly material to the probable cause determination,” United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), see also United States v. Sumpter, 669 F.2d 1215, 1222 (8th Cir. 1982) (“An individual’s prior criminal activities and record [cited in a search warrant application] have a bearing on the probable cause determination. ”)[.]
Id. at 197-98.
In summary, I believe the trial court and this Court have failed to give proper deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause. The fact that garbage collectors go behind houses and place bags on the street does not destroy the inference that a bag in front of a residence most likely came from that residence, particularly when other trash bags are observed in front of other residences in the neighborhood. I further believe the trial court, and this Court, failed to properly apply the totality of the circumstances test and give proper weight to the fact that defendant’s prior record makes it more likely that the trash is his rather than that of someone else. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court and deny the motion to suppress.