Court Opinion

ID: 9725710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:04:20.790579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:18.718327
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting: The majority has affirmed the multiple convictions of defendant, Christ Walker, rejecting his challenge to the denial of his motion for a mistrial. I disagree with the legal analysis regarding the proposed mistrial and therefore dissent. The basis for the motion for mistrial was an incident involving four individuals who had been attending the trial and one of the jurors, Jennifer Smith. Ms. Smith reported to the trial judge that she had walked out of the courthouse the preceding evening behind four people who had been sitting on “the defense side” of the courtroom. She heard one of them say “something like shooting up the courtroom” and then another individual say “I object.” Upon hearing that, she “took off into the grass” and walked quickly to her car in the parking lot. She saw the same four individuals in the lot and “felt they purposely walked slow,” requiring her to “stop the car before [she] could go past them.” Each one of the four “made eye contact” with her. She “felt intimidated” even though she did not “know if that was their intention.” Upon returning to court the next morning, Ms. Smith, rather than reporting the incident to the bailiff or the judge, told the other jurors about it and asked if they, too, “felt intimidated when they leave.” Some other jurors, “mostly” the women, said they also felt intimidated when leaving the courthouse. It was only after this that they agreed to discuss the matter with the bailiff to see about getting escorts to their cars. Before going on to the proceedings with the trial judge, I would like to make a couple of observations. First, it is clear from her own words that Ms. Smith connected the four individuals with the defendant in her own mind. Second, she was walking behind the persons and gives no indication of whether they even knew that she was there. Third, she had no idea of what they were talking about or in what context, having only heard one say “something like” shooting up the courtroom and another say “I object.” Fourth, despite this, she interpreted the comments as a threat and felt sufficiently intimidated by them to move onto the grass and hustle to her car. Fifth, she believed, apparently because she had to stop for them to cross, that they had deliberately walked slowly for this purpose. Finally, the fact that these pedestrians crossing in front of her car made eye contact with her added to her sense of intimidation. Her interpretation of this incident and her connection of it to the defendant seems much more telling to me than her response that she “believe[d]” she could when asked whether she could still, after her experience, “be a fair and impartial juror in this case.” After sharing her take on this incident with her fellow jurors and assuring herself that at least some of them shared her fear, she finally, at the instance of the bailiff, reported the incident to the judge. After talking with Ms. Smith, the judge, with the agreement of the parties, spoke with the other jurors. Four of the jurors disclosed that Smith had identified the four men as having sat on the defendant’s side of the courtroom. One expressed the assumption that the men were associated with the defendant. Thus, 5 of the 12 jurors connected, to some degree, the four individuals with the defendant. This is important because, although the majority has chosen to omit it from its analysis, whether bad acts or bad actors are connected with the defendant in the minds of the jurors is a relevant and important consideration in assessing the potential for prejudice. People v. Staten, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 493 N.E.2d 1157 (1986). In Staten, to which the majority has frequently cited, in finding no prejudice, the court emphasized that “each juror stated unequivocally that they did not associate the incident in any way with defendant and that they could remain fair and impartial.” (Emphasis added.) Staten, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 1057. Although the majority asserts that “the incident that Smith described was substantially similar to the incidents described in Staten, Hunley, Robinson, and Novak” (386 Ill. App. 3d at 1030), this is, in fact, not true. These cases all differ significantly from the instant case in two ways. First, each case involved a real threat or occurrence rather than a figment, and, second, there was no connection to the defendant in any of them. Chronologically, the first is People v. Robinson, 68 Ill. App. 3d 747, 386 N.E.2d 559 (1979). In Robinson, which was a case alleging first degree murder, the purse of one of the jurors was stolen while she was sequestered in a motel. Thus, it would appear that this theft occurred in circumstances that excluded the possibility that defendant was the thief. Certainly there was no suggestion that the jury connected Robinson in any way with the theft. Nevertheless, the trial judge questioned each juror in open court to assess possible prejudice. In affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial, the appellate court held: “Considering both the nature of the alleged prejudicial incident itself and the statements of the jurors to the trial court, we believe the trial court properly denied defendants’ motion for a mistrial.” Robinson, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 754, 386 N.E.2d at 564. In People v. Novak, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 419 N.E.2d 393 (1981), defendant was convicted of murder and armed robbery. Defendant appealed, among other things, the denial of his motion seeking a mistrial because one of the jurors had been the victim of a robbery on an “L” train while going home at the end of a trial day. In his appeal, the defendant challenged the procedure that the trial court had used in discussing any potential impact on the victim and the other jurors. The appellate court concluded that the trial court’s finding that there was no showing of prejudice and denying a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. In arriving at that conclusion, the court noted: “The juror involved in the incident was questioned outside the presence of the other jurors. The circumstances surrounding his robbery were clearly distinct from and wholly unrelated to the armed robbery charge involved here. *** The juror stated that the incident would not affect his ability to decide the case. Moreover, the juror retrieved his property shortly after the robbery and saw the offender placed under arrest. Under the circumstances, we will not presume that the incident affected the juror’s impartiality. *** As for the remaining jurors, the judge was very circumspect in his inquiry as to their state of mind. The judge merely informed the jury that one of its members had ‘experienced an incident on an “L” train.’ When the jurors were asked to raise their hands if that experience would in any way affect their ability to be fair and impartial, there was no response.” (Emphasis added.) Novak, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1030-31, 419 N.E.2d at 399. The circumstances were quite different in People v. Staten, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 493 N.E.2d 1157 (1986). In that case, during a recess, a young man standing outside the courtroom exchanged words with the bailiff escorting the jury. As the bailiff and jurors walked away, the young man yelled “ ‘that if he had a gun, he would kill all of us.’ ” Staten, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 1056, 493 N.E.2d at 1168. The jurors proceeded to a restaurant without further incident. The defendant sought a mistrial on the basis of this incident. As noted earlier, the appellate court approved the denial of the motion for mistrial. The court found, after careful questioning of the individual jurors, that each had “stated unequivocally that they did not associate the incident in any way with defendant and that they could remain fair and impartial. Some even expressed surprise over being questioned, saying they had totally forgotten what had occurred.” Staten, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 1057, 493 N.E.2d at 1168. In the final case, People v. Hunley, 189 Ill. App. 3d 24, 545 N.E.2d 188 (1989), defendant was charged with murder and residential burglary. During deliberations the jury was sequestered in a hotel and several of the jurors were burglarized. There had been four jurors holding out for acquittal who voted to convict following the burglaries. The trial court questioned the jurors who had voted not guilty to determine if the hotel burglaries had influenced their change of vote. Although the appellate court did not specifically address whether the jurors associated the crimes with the defendant, the circumstances of the burglaries occurring while the jurors were sequestered and isolated from defendant, and the fact that defendant did not make any claim that the jurors associated these incidents with him both strongly suggest that no such association was made. The court found the jurors’ explanations for the change of vote satisfactory and also stated that the “strong evidence of defendant’s guilt at trial decreased the likelihood that the guilty verdict was influenced by the burglary.” Hunley, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 40, 545 N.E.2d at 199. The differences between these four cases and the case at bar are, as previously argued, vastly different. Each involved actual and concrete incidents while the instant case presents an ambiguous situation that only became sinister through the assumptions of the complaining juror. More importantly, in the present case, the “threat” is clearly tied to the defendant in the minds of at least five jurors. Thus this case lacks two significant indicators of the jurors’ impartiality and lack of prejudice that were found in the earlier four cases. I believe there is a high probability that the involved juror was biased based on the “spin” she put on the incident. I further believe there is a significant risk that at least four other jurors were tainted by her description of and conclusions about the incident. For these reasons, I would find that the denial of the motion for mistrial constitutes an abuse of discretion and that the defendant should have a new trial. I, therefore, dissent.