Court Opinion

ID: 9364582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 18:00:37.234094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.198115
License: Public Domain

FILED
                           NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                               JAN 19 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.    21-50238

              Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
                                                 3:20-cr-02546-AJB-1
 v.

DELILAH GUADALUPE DIAZ,                          MEMORANDUM*

              Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of California
                   Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted December 8, 2022**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: BEA, IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

      Defendant-Appellant Delilah Diaz appeals a jury verdict finding her guilty

of importing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. Diaz

appeals her conviction on four main grounds, alleging that the district court erred

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
by: (1) admitting only some clips from the recording of her post-arrest interview;

(2) precluding Diaz from arguing an adverse inference arising from the

government’s decision not to introduce the entire recording; (3) excluding a

witness the defense untimely disclosed in the middle of the trial; and (4) admitting

the government expert’s testimony. Because the parties are familiar with the facts,

we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we affirm the district court’s rulings.

      1. Diaz argues that the district court erred by denying her motion in limine

seeking the admission of the entire recording of her post-arrest interview. She

identifies six unplayed clips of the recording that were relevant for a non-hearsay

purpose and, in her view, should have been admitted. We review de novo the

district court’s interpretation of the hearsay rule but review for abuse of discretion

the district court’s rulings on objections based on hearsay, prejudice, and the rule

of completeness. See United States v. Gomez, 6 F.4th 992, 1007 (9th Cir. 2021);

United States v. Town of Colorado City, 935 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 2019); United

States v. Vallejos, 742 F.3d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2014). In the district court, Diaz did

not identify particular excerpts of the recording that were relevant for non-hearsay

purposes, and sought only to “admit the entire [recording of her statement] if the

government seeks to play any portion thereof” to show how the interrogating

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officer’s “adversarial tone” affected Diaz’s answers and to “provide a full picture

of what happened.” When it denied that motion, the court noted that the recording

contained hearsay but was clear that the entire video was inadmissible merely to

show the context of the interview. The rule of completeness permits the

introduction of the remainder of an excerpted statement to prevent the factfinder

from being misled by the excerpted portion that is introduced. See Vallejos, 742

F.3d at 905. The district court did not err by ruling that context is an insufficient

justification for admitting the entirety of Diaz’s interview. See United States v.

Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 434–35 (9th Cir. 1985). When the district court denied the

motion in limine, it explicitly invited Diaz to offer any specific clips at trial that

were admissible under either Rule 106 or any of the hearsay exceptions. Diaz

declined to do so. When the government played its clips at trial, Diaz neither

objected to them nor sought to introduce the six clips she identifies for the first

time on appeal. Diaz thus forfeited the opportunity to challenge the denial of the

motion in limine to the extent it prevented her from offering any additional

portions of the recording. See Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 542–43 (9th Cir.

2008).

       2. Diaz contends the court erred by precluding her from making an adverse

inference argument based on the government’s decision not to introduce the entire

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recording. We review limitations on the scope of closing argument for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Lazarenko, 564 F.3d 1026, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009). As

the district court explained, “I ruled certain portions of these [video clips] can be

shown and certain portions cannot. And the parties are limited to showing what I

am allowing. It’s not their doing. It’s mine” (emphasis added). The court did not

abuse its discretion by ruling that the defense’s efforts to attribute the absence of

the entire recording to the government was improper argument. See United States

v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134, 1149 (9th Cir. 2013) (observing that it “is well within the

court’s discretion” to “prevent[] [the defendant] from arguing incorrect

statements”). The court instructed the jury that both parties were presenting only

as much of the video as the court had admitted, and Diaz assented to this

instruction. Diaz’s challenge to the district court’s limitation on the scope of her

closing argument therefore fails.

      3. Diaz contends the district court violated her Sixth Amendment rights by

excluding the cell phone witness, whom Diaz identified for the first time during the

lunch recess on the second day of trial. The district court excluded this witness as

a discovery sanction, which we review for abuse of discretion. Liberty Ins. Corp.

v. Brodeur, 41 F.4th 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2022). We see no error. The court had,

on Diaz’s motion, set a cut-off date two months before trial for “all remaining

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disclosures [and] discovery” and specified that, after that date, “anything new”

would not be admitted without “a showing that despite the exercise of reasonable

diligence it couldn’t have been produced sooner.” Although Diaz cites United

States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 509 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), in support of

her argument that the court’s discovery order exceeded its authority, we need not

reach Diaz’s constitutional challenge. Diaz requested a discovery cut-off and the

exclusion sanction was within district court’s inherent power to achieve the orderly

and expeditious disposition of its cases, which includes “broad discretion . . . to

exclude testimony of witnesses whose use at trial is in bad faith or would unfairly

prejudice an opposing party.” S.M. v. J.K., 262 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2001),

amended, 315 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2003). The district court observed that the

defense’s untimely disclosure of the witness in the middle of the second day of

trial was “last-minute sandbagging,” “intent[ional],” and “unfair.” The district

court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the witness. See Taylor v. Illinois,

484 U.S. 400, 415–16 (1988) (rejecting a criminal defendant’s argument that

preclusion of a defense witness is never a permissible sanction for an intentional

discovery violation).

      4. Diaz argues the district court erred by admitting the government expert’s

modus operandi testimony on drug trafficking organizations’ use of unknowing

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couriers. We review objections to the admissibility of expert testimony for abuse

of discretion. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999). Diaz

argues that the court’s reliability finding was improper. A district court “abdicates

its gatekeeping role, and necessarily abuses its discretion, when it makes no

reliability findings,” but the district court has “flexibility” in “how to determine

reliability.” United States v. Valencia-Lopez, 971 F.3d 891, 898 (9th Cir. 2020)

(emphasis omitted). Here, the district court made a reliability finding on the record

that mentioned not only the expert’s qualifications, but also his “technical or

specialized knowledge,” “training[] and experience,” and “a reliable

methodology.” The court also noted that it had heard this particular expert testify

“at least ten times” before. Diaz contends that the expert testimony was irrelevant

and unduly prejudicial, but we have held that this type of modus operandi evidence

is relevant when a defendant puts on an unknowing courier defense because it goes

“right to the heart of” that defense. United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1177

(9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93

(2005). Diaz “opened the door” to expert testimony by calling her own expert to

testify to facts that supported her blind mule defense. See United States v.

Sepulveda-Barraza, 645 F.3d 1066, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2011). Finally, Diaz argues

that testimony that drug trafficking organizations rarely use unknowing couriers is

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the “functional equivalent” of a prohibited opinion on mental state. This is

contrary to our precedent. Diaz is correct that the Fifth Circuit has adopted this

view, see, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir.

2002), but we have allowed such testimony so long as the expert does not provide

an “explicit opinion” on the defendant’s state of mind, see, e.g., United States v.

Gomez, 725 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted), and the expert did not do so here. Diaz’s challenges to the expert

witness’s testimony therefore fail.

      AFFIRMED.

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