Court Opinion

ID: 9574659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:06:51.464309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:47.587638
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
This case is controlled by our Supreme Court’s holding in Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Glawson, 140 Ga. 507 (79 SE 136) (1913). Glawson involved a situation where the Supreme Court overruled a principle of law established in a Court of Appeals decision, although it apparently did not specifically overrule the case by name. As Glawson makes clear, where the Supreme Court, in a different case, overrules the principle of law contained in a decision of this Court, such decision nevertheless remains binding on the parties and on this Court in subsequent appearances of that same case. The majority is therefore correct that the “law of the case rule” applies herein and that our prior decision remains the law of the case. I write separately, however, to urge that this Court overrule Hart v. Eldridge, 163 Ga. App. 295 (293 SE2d 550) (1982), because it is in direct conflict with Glawson.
In Hart, a decision of this Court was expressly repudiated by the Supreme Court in a separate action. When the case appeared before this Court a second time, we held that our earlier decision no longer remained the law of the case following its repudiation by the Supreme Court. We held that “the pronouncement of the highest court in our state that the rule of law relied upon by this court was incorrect and would not be followed effectively became ‘law of the case.’ ” Id. at 298 (1). The Hart opinion did not mention the Supreme Court’s decision in Glawson.
In Glawson, the Supreme Court in another case overruled a principle of law without overruling our case which had applied the *452subject principle. Whereas in Hart, rather than simply overruling the principle outlined therein, it expressly refused to follow the holding in Hart. This factual difference, however, does not authorize distinguishing Hart from Glawson to avoid overruling Hart.
Where the Supreme Court overrules a decision of this Court in a separate action between different parties, the effect of such holding is simply to preclude the use of such case as authority in any future case. It is only where the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the overruled case itself that the decision becomes the law of the case in that case. Therefore, the effect is the same where, in a later case, the Supreme Court overrules a decision by name or by simply overruling the principle of law contained therein. In either circumstance, the Supreme Court’s holding does not become the law of the overruled case. Thus, it is apparent that Hart was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
The majority, in refusing to overrule Hart, contends that it is distinguishable because this case “involve[s] ‘application and interpretation of the common law, (while) Hart involved the interpretation of a statute which, in the interim between the two appearances of the case before this court, was interpreted differently by the Georgia Supreme Court.’ ” Majority opinion at 450, quoting Navistar Intl. Transp. Co. v. Ogletree, 199 Ga. App. 699, 700 (1) (405 SE2d 884) (1991).
The majority offers no explanation why such a distinction is significant, and no basis for such distinction can be found in Glawson. Moreover, the supposed distinction is factually incorrect. Our earlier decision in this case and the Supreme Court’s decision overruling it were both founded upon the interpretation of a statute, the Workers’ Compensation Act, and not merely upon application and interpretation of the common law.
In Doss v. Food Lion, 267 Ga. 312, 313 (1) (477 SE2d 577) (1996), the Supreme Court held that the exclusivity provisions of the Act preclude an independent cause of action for intentional delay in authorizing treatment. Doss, supra at 312-313 (1). Contrary to the majority’s contention, the Supreme Court’s decision in Doss was not based on mere “policy” considerations “related” to the statute, but on its interpretation of the effect of the exclusivity provisions of the Act, an interpretation contrary to that of this Court in our earlier opinion in this case. Id. Thus, as in Hart, this case involves “interpretation of a statute which, in the interim between the two appearances of the case before this court, was interpreted differently by the Georgia Supreme Court.” Majority opinion at 450, quoting Navistar, supra.
Hart is indistinguishable from the facts of the present case and, if Hart is valid, we would be compelled to hold that our earlier decision in this case is no longer the law of the case because our Supreme *453Court has expressly repudiated its holding. This would then require us to reject our Supreme Court’s holding in Glawson, which we have no authority to do.
Decided March 20, 1998
Jeffrey W. Frazier, for appellant.
Hawkins & Parnell, Michael J. Goldman, for appellee.
Therefore, we are obligated to overrule Hart.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Presiding Judge Pope, Judge Smith and Judge Eldridge join in this special concurrence.