Court Opinion

ID: 9529348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:50:01.814806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:45.264691
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Hunter, C. J.
— I am unable to concur in the conclusion of the majority opinion and must respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that possession of stolen property shortly after a theft is discovered establishes a prima facie case showing defendant’s guilt of the larceny beyond a reasonable doubt, unless he comes forward and rebuts the prima facie case and convinces the jury that they should believe his explanation thus casting upon the defendant the burden of proving his innocence. I know of no such rule of law and upon examination and analysis I do not believe the authorities cited in support thereof sustain such a rule. In Mims et. al. v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 439, 140 N. E. 2d 878 and in Gilley et al v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 701, 88 N. E. 2d 759 the stolen items were found in the possession of defendants a few hours after the theft and defendants were linked to the immediate vicinity of the theft. It is well settled that the scintilla of evidence rule does not obtain in Indiana and where the evidence is circumstantial it “must be so conclusive and compelling in character that it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of the presumption of innocence of the defendant.” Easton v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 338, 228 N. E. 2d 6, and cases cited therein.
I read the cases decided by this Court dealing with the inferences arising from possession of stolen property to require other corroborating circumstances pointing to a guilty possession of the property or linking the defendant with the actual taking of the property. In this case, just as Judge Arterburn *16pointed out in Bruck v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 466, 193 N. E. 2d 491:
“. . . we have no conduct on the part of the appellant to arouse any suspicion, other than possession.” Id. at 492.
Since the State’s case rests solely on the ground that appellant had possession of a pair of earrings on October 10, 1962 and the exact date of the theft was unknown, I do not find sufficient evidence substantial in character to support an inference of larceny by the appellant. For the foregoing reasons the cause should be reversed and remanded with instruction to sustain appellant’s motion for a new trial.