Court Opinion

ID: 9449134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:58:30.890375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:43.589635
License: Public Domain

MURRAH, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I would grant the petition for rehearing because, upon reflection, I am convinced that the seizure and consequent search, or the search and consequent seizure, as the case may be, is not constitutionally sustainable.
When the vehicle was seized, or when the federal officer declared the same to have been seized, it was parked by the side of the courthouse adjacent to the County Sheriff’s office, and the accused driver was securely in jail. There was no likelihood that the automobile would be moved or in any way molested until judicial authority for the search and seizure could have been obtained. No reason or excuse is suggested for failure to obtain a search warrant.
*703It is conceded that probable cause alone did not authorize the search of the automobile without a warrant. Nor is the search and seizure sustained as an incident to a lawful arrest. Instead, the seizure is sustained on the authority of the statute which empowers federal officers to seize a vehicle which is subject to forfeiture for unlawful transportation of any contraband article. 49 U.S.C. § 783. The opinion seems to find constitutional sanction for this statutory authority in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543; and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879. Those cases do grudgingly sanction the authority of the officers to stop and search a moving vehicle without a warrant, based on probable cause to believe that it is being used to transport contraband goods and “where it was not practical to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality of jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” But Carroll emphasized that “where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used.” And, the courts have been careful to scrutinize every transaction to make sure, (1) the existence of probable cause; and (2) the impracticability of securing a search warrant. And see Hart v. United States, 10 Cir., 162 F.2d 74, and cases cited; United States v. One 1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup Truck, 10 Cir., 265 F.2d 21. The decisions do recognize a distinction between statutory authority to search and seize things which it is unlawful for a person to have in his possession, such as counterfeit money, and private property in lawful possession. But the distinction has no relevancy here, for it is significant only when considered in connection with the prohibitions of the Fifth Amendment against self crimination. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652; Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319; Carroll v. United States, supra; and see Frankfurter dissenting in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 612, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 165, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399.
The effect of this decision is to hold that the officers may seize without a warrant for probable cause that which they could not search for probable cause. And, having seized, they may then search for and seize contraband. I have found no authority to sanction this circumvention of the constitutional mandate which safeguards the citizen against unreasonable searches by requiring judicial authority in the form of a search warrant, except under circumstances which precludes its timely issuance. If this decision is now to be the law of search and seizure, officers need no longer trouble themselves to secure a search warrant for the seizure of a vehicle, be it standing or moving, for, all they need to do is to decide for themselves whether there is probable cause to believe that it is being used to violate the federal law. The only recourse of the citizen is a retrospective judicial review of the officers’ determination when the thing seized is sought to be used against him in a prosecution.
As I now view this decision, it opens up a new loophole for stealthy encroachment on the citizen’s fundamental right to privacy — a right which the courts have so jealously guarded, because, as Mr. Justice Jackson once said: “We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit. We must remember, too, that freedom from unreasonable search differs from some of the other rights of the Constitution in that there is no way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection.” See dissent in Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. p. 182, 69 S.Ct. p. 1314, 93 L.Ed. 1879.
I am constrained to register my tardy protest.
HILL, Circuit Judge, concurs in the dissent.