Court Opinion

ID: 9676717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:31:00.856506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:50.491180
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I question whether the abstracting in this case is so flagrantly deficient under Supreme Court Rule 4-2(b)(2) as to warrant an affirmance on all issues. The Robertsons certainly did not think so, as they did not raise the issue. The majority does so on its own. I specifically question the majority’s assertion that Brenda Pyle did not abstract the affidavits attached to the Robertson’s Motion for Summary Judgment. She did. Pyle’s primary argument is that when she paid to redeem her land in 1984, she believed that she had paid all back taxes owing. No one at the time disabused her of this understanding. Her abstract contains the following: 1. The Petition to Set Aside the Sale and the Response where she avers that she redeemed her property on November 6,1984. 2. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Robert-sons with a summary of the affidavit by Jane Todd, County Clerk of Craighead County, an affidavit by Steve Hollowell, Assistant to the State Land Commissioner, and an affidavit by Carol Ward, Tax Collector for Craighead County. 3. The Response by Pyle to the appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment and a subsequent Reply to the Response. 4. The Order Granting Summary Judgment to the appellees, stating that the court finds that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the payment of taxes in 1984 did not excuse the plaintiff from the obligation of paying taxes for previous years. The Robertsons’ Supplemental Abstract includes the following: 1. Their Motion for Summary Judgment with summaries of the affidavits of the Craighead County Clerk, the executive assistant to the State Land Commissioner, and the Craighead County Collector. 2. An expanded description of the Reply by the appellees to the Response of Pyle. Brenda Pyle challenges the summary judgment on the basis that there is a material issue of fact regarding what transpired when she paid the delinquencies in 1984. Sufficient pleadings and affidavits are presented to this court, in my judgment, for a resolution of that issue on the merits. In determining the sufficiency of an abstract we have looked in the past at both the appellants’ abstract and the appellee’s supplemental abstract. See, e.g., Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992). Indeed, Supreme Court Rule 4-2(b)(l) contemplates consideration of a supplemental abstract by the appellee. There is no reason why we should not take into account the supplemental abstract in the present case. It is true that we do not have in the abstract the chancery court’s letter opinion and certain exhibits were not included. Those lapses do represent deficiencies. Yet, we do have the court’s order granting summary judgment and the pleadings, motions, and affidavits joining the issue. Accordingly, I do not agree that the abstract is flagrantly deficient as Supreme Court Rule 4-2 requires for an affirmance due to noncompliance with the rule. I respectfully dissent.