Court Opinion

ID: 9590142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:51:53.223169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:05.076621
License: Public Domain

DAVISON, Justice
(specially concurring).
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority of the court in the opinion adopted in the above styled and numbered cause, and, although I am not in disagreement with the general line of reasoning therein, I am firmly of the opinion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants, ab initio. I think the motion of the defendants to quash issuance and service of summons, based upon jurisdictional grounds, should have been sustained prior to trial, and, for that reason, I feel that I should give the reasons for that conclusion.
*756Succinctly stated, the .facts, are that the plaintiff, Emmett O. Williams, by his petition, alleged that the defendants, Bing-ham and Collins, were oil and gas lessees of adjoining tracts of land from which oil was. being produced; that defendant Rake was the pumper and immediately in charge of the lease; that plaintiff had suffered damage by oil, salt water and other deleterious substances being allowed to flow over his lands in violation of 52 O.S.1951, § 296. It was further alleged that it was the duty of each of the three defendants to prevent the escape of said substances. The action was filed in Osage County, wherein Rake was served with summons. Bingham and Collins were served in Tulsa county, the county of their residence. Therefore, if the amended petition did not state a cause of action against Rake, the venue was in the county where service of summons was had on the other defendants, and the Osage county court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the defendants. In my opinion, no such cause of action was stated.
In the recent case of Summers v. Williams, 206 Okl. 164, 242 P.2d 139, a petition, essentially the same as the one here, was held not to state a cause of action against the pumper. It was there said:
“ * * * It is not alleged that he was responsible for the small size of the pits into which the salt water was run or that he had any responsibility or duties whatever in connection therewith, except to pump the salt water from the wells into the pits. * * * ”
There being no reason therefor in the reported case, the underlying reasons for the conclusion were not discussed in detail. I think they should be -here pointed out. Whenever the question has been presented, this court has uniformly held that the duty imposed by 52 O.S.1951 § 296, is upon the lessee or owner of the oil an'd gas wells and is non-delegable. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Graham, 174 Okl. 438, 50 P.2d 722. It was further held in the last cited case, that, where the master and servant are both sued, the master is liable because of failure to discharge a duty placed upon him by the statute and not by reason of the doctrine of respondeat superior. That holding was in harmony with, and'founded upon, the opinion in the case of Texas Company v. Aired, 167 Okl. 128, 28 P.2d 556. To the same effect is the opinion in the case of Texas Company v. Taylor, 178 Okl. 21, 61 P.2d 574.
Iñ no case, however, have we been presented with the proposition of what facts are necessary to be alleged and proved to fix a liability upon tire servant or employee of the oil well owner, because of the provisions of the statute. In each of the reported cases, the verdict of .the jury has been in favor of the employee and the judgment thereon as to his liability was not appealed from. The closest approach to the question was in the case of Franklin Drilling Company v. Jackson, 202 Okl. 687, 217 P.2d 816, 819, 19 A.L.R.2d 1015. In that case, it was held that where an independent drilling contractor was employed by the lessee to drill the well, both the lessee and the contractor were liable for a violation of the statute. The contractor was held liable because he had charge of the operations. In other words, he could choose the tools, the equipment and the method used in obtaining the result contracted for. An employee, in the position of Rake in the case at bar, has no choice as to either tools, equipment or method. In order to state a cause of action against a mere employee of a lessee for violation of the statute, it is necessary to state facts sufficient to impose a duty upon such employee personally to prevent the escape of the deleterious substances.
The primary duty is by the statute placed upon the lessee or owner of the well who cannot delegate that duty to an employee. Therefore, the employee of the well owner does not share that duty, merely because of the employment, any more than the employer is responsible by reason of the theory of respondeat superior. The statutory duty, a violation of which is negligence per se, has no connection with negligence generally for there is liability “for the damages resulting from such violation of the statute without proof of specific acts of negligence.” Franklin Drilling Co. v. Jackson, supra.
*757In the case at bar, the amended petition contained no allegation of facts which placed the duty, imposed by the statute, upon the employee, Rake, individually. For that reason it did not state a cause of action against him. It follows that the venue of the cause of action against the other defendants was in the county where service of summons could be had on them or either of them. That being Tulsa county, the District Court of Osage County had no jurisdiction over them. I, therefore, think that the trial court should have sustained the defendants’ motion to quash when the question of jurisdiction was first raised.