Court Opinion

ID: 9728101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:58:45.659745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:45.828269
License: Public Domain

SMITH, J.
I respectfully dissent. Simply put, this case involves the imposition of statutory sanctions by a trial court upon a defendant who has disappeared from the county without notifying his attorney of his whereabouts. To reverse the action below, it is not enough that we find that the trial court could have acted differently, or that we would have acted differently. Rather we must find the action of the trial court to have been arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical. Conduct beyond tne bounds of reason. Not only has there been no such conduct in this case, but my colleagues have misapplied the abuse-of-discretion standard of review thereby placing new limitations on the sanction of striking an answer under Code of Civil Procedure section 2034, subdivision (d) (hereafter section 2034(d)).
Section 2034(d) expressly provides for striking a defendant’s answer and entering his default as a sanction for willful failure to appear at a deposition or answer interrogatories.1 That sanction is the “ultimate” sanction at the court’s disposal and so should be used sparingly and consistently with the statutory purpose of furthering the efficient, economical disposition of cases on the merits. (Kaplan v. Eldorado Ins. Co. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 587, 591 [127 Cal.Rptr. 699].) Nevertheless, the ultimate sanction, which avoids trial on the merits, is one of the discretionary alternatives authorized by statute. “‘In the final analysis, the test on appeal is whether the lower court abused its discretion, and each case must be decided on its own facts, with the appellant having the burden of showing an abuse. [Citations].’ ... ‘In a legal sense, discretion is abused whenever, in its exercise, a court exceeds the bounds of reason, all the circumstances before it being considered.’” (Id., at pp. 591-592, quoting Scherrer v. Plaza Marina Coml. Corp. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 520, 524 [94 Cal.Rptr. 85], and Sharon v. Sharon (1888) 75 Cal. 1, 48 [16 P. 345].) (Italics added.)
*84My colleagues conclude that a number of lesser sanctions in some combination could have, fully protected Thomas against the loss of discovery. They suggest that the court below could have struck those parts of the answer contesting liability and causation, and let the case proceed solely contested on damages. Further, they suggest that the trial court could have additionally employed sanctions hindering but not altogether foreclosing a defense on damages.
On the limited record before us, I am not convinced that the lesser sanctions would have adequately bridged the discovery gap or that, assuming some acceptable alternative to striking existed, choosing the ultimate sanction was beyond the bounds of reason.
I particularly doubt that striking the liability and causation parts of the answer could have put Thomas in as good a position as she would have enjoyed had she obtained the discovery she sought. (Wilson v. Jefferson (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 952, 958 [210 Cal.Rptr. 464].) Much of the new information sought through the interrogatories pertained to damages, and the deposition presumably would have covered damages as well. I therefore cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that an admission of liability would have rendered the deposition “superfluous.” (Maj. opn. at p. 82.) Luong was, of course, an eyewitness who personally felt the impact of the accident. He probably observed Thomas’s physical and emotional condition immediately afterward, and could have spoken with her or other eyewitnesses on the scene. Damages were obviously a substantial issue. In fact, the trial court could reasonably have seen damages as the only substantial issue in the case. Luong’s attorney had offered, in settlement and again by arbitration, to limit the case to damages. We do not have the entire case file before us, but the trial court did, and was obligated to, review the entire record in determining whether the ultimate sanction should be imposed. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 796 [149 Cal.Rptr. 499].) Based on the record we do have—which does not even include a transcript of the sanctions hearing or any of Luong’s first round of answers to interrogatories—I would defer to the trial court’s better perspective. The court was not impressed with Luong’s counsel’s offer to admit liability as a sanction, and the record on appeal supports the court’s apparent view that this was a damages case, where liability was a minor issue likely to be conceded in any event.
More was needed than an admission of liability or causation. My colleagues apparently agree. They propose additional sanctions aimed at narrowing the defense of damages at trial or in arbitration. One suggestion is to preclude Luong from testifying. However, this is a hollow sanction. Four months had passed, and Luong had not been found. For all that anyone *85knew, he would not be available to testify anyway, and if he did show up, Thomas might have wanted his testimony for the damages aspect of the case.
Other suggested sanctions include denying Luong the right to introduce medical testimony, to contest the reasonableness or costs of medical services, to introduce evidence contradicting prior answers, or to dispute claimed lost income. In the aggregate, those sanctions do not differ much from the ultimate sanction itself. Assuming that some combination of those sanctions could have placed Thomas in approximately the same position as though her discovery efforts had been rewarded in full, the difference between that option and the option taken by the court is too small to compel the exercise of discretion either way as a matter of law. (Kaplan v. Eldorado Ins. Co., supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 587, 592.) I cannot say, as the majority does, that no reasonable judge would have chosen the striking-default alternative given the relatively narrow range of alternatives presented. We can reverse only where the action taken was arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. (Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Cropper (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 901, 904 [190 Cal.Rptr. 593].) This is not such a case, even though we might not personally agree with the choice made.
The majority decline to state whether their proposed lesser sanctions, either individually or collectively, would have been proper (maj. opn. at p. 82), yet they find abuse of discretion in the course chosen. They say, “Even if all the lesser sanctions were imposed, at the very least defendant would have retained the fundamental right to cross-examine the plaintiff, to object to inadmissible evidence, and to argue the issue of the value of pain and suffering and the extent of residual disability before the trier of fact.” (Maj. opn. at p. 82, italics added.)
I submit that if preserving those “fundamental rights” is the test by which discretion must be scrutinized, then abuse of discretion will be found in every case where the ultimate sanction is chosen. This is contrary to legislative intent.
The sanction of striking an answer under section 2034(d) operates by law in this state to deprive the defendant of those “fundamental rights” every time. The defendant is left in the same position as if no answer had ever been filed, and he is denied any participation in the subsequent prove-up hearing on damages. (Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 828 [231 Cal.Rptr. 220, 726 P.2d 1295]; Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) The Legislature knew that when it authorized the striking-default sanction as a discretionary alternative. Thus to suggest, as the majority does, that preserving a participatory damages hearing is the way that discretion must be exercised rewrites the statute.
*86I do agree, generally, with the case law proposition that the sanction chosen should not give the moving party more than he could have obtained by having his discovery efforts rewarded with “completely favorable” results. (Deyo v. Kilbourne, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 793; Wilson v. Jefferson, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d 952, 958.) However, imposing the ultimate sanction always gives the defendant more than he could have had from the discovery, and the Legislature says that that can be a permissible exercise of discretion. The Deyo-Wilson rule accordingly cannot be literally followed in every case or it would effectively prohibit the ultimate sanction altogether.2
I would uphold the court’s exercise of discretion.
I briefly address one remaining issue that my colleagues do not reach. I find that the requisite finding of “willfulness” for the section 2034(d) sanction is supported by the record. A party’s failure to keep his attorney informed of his whereabouts may be deemed willful failure to comply with discovery. (Cornwall v. Santa Monica Dairy Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 250, 253 [135 Cal.Rptr. 761].) This is so because the noncomplying party has the burden of showing that his failure to comply was not willful, and that burden cannot be met when the party is not present and his counsel cannot show where the party is or how long the absence will continue. (Id., at pp. 252-253.) That was the case here. Luong protests that his absence was “temporary,” noting that detectives succeeded in finding him some six weeks after the notice of appeal herein was filed. However, that is a hindsight view. At the time of the sanctions hearing, counsel had been unable to locate Luong for four months and could not predict when he might be found.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 4, 1987.

Section 2034(d) reads in part: “If a party . . . willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after . . . proper notice . . ., the court on motion and notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, or impose other penalties of a lesser nature the court may deem just, . . .”

Deyo and Wilson both recognize that the ultimate sanction of striking a defendant’s answer is available when appropriate to the defendant’s dereliction. (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 793 & fn. 26; Wilson, supra, 163 Cal. App.3d 952, 958.) The sanction was inappropriate in Deyo because the defendant, while serving objectionable answers to interrogatories in response to a discovery order, nevertheless had filed the discovery. (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at pp. 797-798.) In Wilson, the defendant’s dereliction affected only discovery about a single affirmative defense that would not have been dispositive of other issues in the case. (Wilson, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at pp. 958-959.)