Court Opinion

ID: 9745573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:10:41.285207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:32.004409
License: Public Domain

*162Abrams, J.
(concurring with the result). I concur with the result. I write separately to emphasize that the complaint should not have been dismissed. The Superior Court judge should have allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint to remedy any defects he perceived therein, or directed the parties to submit affidavits so that the validity of the plaintiff’s claims could be tested on a motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff’s complaint, liberally construed, states a claim. A complaint need not set forth facts with great specificity. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 8 (a), 365 Mass. 749 (1974). “The rules of pleading in Massachusetts are generous.” Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 390 Mass. 604, 615 (1983). ‘“[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. ’ Furthermore, the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor, are to be taken as true.” Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
The judge erred by reading the complaint so narrowly that he failed to see that, on the pleaded facts and the inferences fairly drawn, the plaintiff stated an enforceable contract claim. In Count II the plaintiff seeks recovery on an implied contract theory for services rendered to the defendant in exchange for promises of support given on “divers other occasions.” The phrase “divers other occasions” may refer to occasions other than the initial exchange of promises before the plaintiff’s divorce. The plaintiff may be able to prove that these occasions were subsequent to her divorce and were independent of any pre-divorce promises she had made. Thus, regardless of the enforceability of any agreements made before the divorce, the complaint may state an express or implied contractual claim for services given in exchange for promises made after the divorce.
Similarly, Count III may state an enforceable claim in quantum meruit. In exchange for the later (i.e., post-divorce) promises of support, the plaintiff gave the defendant “personal love, emotional and spiritual support and care for a family environ*163ment” and “provided companionship . . . [and] acted as a loyal and dutiful friend and companion.” These services of love, support and companionship are indistinguishable from the services provided by the plaintiff in Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47 (1975). In that case, the court affirmed a quantum meruit recovery for services provided under an unenforceable contract to make a will and held that it was up to the jury to determine whether consideration that amounted to illegal conduct was essential or incidental to the performance of the contract. Id. at 51-52. In Rizzo v. Cunningham, 303 Mass. 16 (1939), the court affirmed a quantum meruit recovery for a plaintiff who had provided companionship and friendship to the defendants’ testatrix.1 Under Green and Rizzo, the unamended complaint here is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. On remand, however, the plaintiff should amend Counts II and III to state more clearly these theories of recovery. Assuming that she does proceed with a claim under Green, she may be entitled to a jury determination of whether any consideration that amounted to illegal conduct was essential or incidental to the performance of the contract.
Thus, on its face, the plaintiff’s complaint states at least two claims apart from those based on promises to forgo her marital rights. Even if the judge did not recognize those claims, he should have considered whether “the plaintiff may be entitled to any form of relief, even though the particular relief [she] has demanded and the theory on which [she] seems to rely may not be appropriate.” Nader v. Citron, supra at 104. Or, if it was not clear whether the plaintiff could state claims based on promises exchanged by the parties after the plaintiff’s divorce, the judge should have allowed the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to state such claims more explicitly. Even if the judge had properly concluded that the complaint should be dismissed, he should have done so with leave to amend. *164See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1985); Triplett v. LeFlore City, 712 F.2d 444, 446 (10th Cir. 1983); 5 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 611-612 (1969) (following dismissal under rule 12 (b)(6), “the court normally will give plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint”).
In general, such a generous approach to the plaintiff’s complaint is required by rule 12 (b)(6) and the case law under it. That approach is especially appropriate in this case for several reasons. First, as noted above, the complaint stated at least two obvious theories of relief. The plaintiff may be able to state other grounds, and will have the opportunity to do so on remand. Second, before today, this court has never considered and ruled on the enforceability of a contract in which the consideration is the abandonment of marriage or marital rights. The decisions of this court which bear on elements of that question have been mixed. For example, as the court observes, we often have spoken of the importance of the social institution of marriage. Yet, in some circumstances, this court has subordinated marital harmony to other social values. See, e.g., Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 361 (1983) (“There is, however, no privilege for a spouse not to testify against the other spouse in a civil action, even if that testimony may be highly destructive of the marital relationship”); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619 (1976) (abolishing interspousal immunity in tort). In one case involving an attorney’s contingent fee arrangement in a divorce action, we stated that “the court takes an especially dim view of any penalty clause that discourages reconciliation, as such a provision is manifestly contrary to public policy.” Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 606 n.12 (1981). Later, in Guenard v. Burke, 387 Mass. 802 (1982), we permitted a quantum meruit recovery for an attorney who had performed services in a divorce action under an unenforceable contingent fee agreement. An important factor in that decision was the absence of anything “in the record to show that either party to the divorce action had the slightest interest in reconciliation. Thus, on the facts, the purpose of *165[the rule forbidding contingent fee arrangements in divorce actions] to eliminate any inducement to counsel to proceed with the divorce rather than to seek reconciliation was not thwarted.” Id. at 807. Where the decisions of this court yield such conflicting guidance to the trial court, the trial court may not with any certainty conclude that the plaintiff cannot state a claim. In such circumstances, the judge should deny the motion to dismiss and allow the litigation to proceed so that the controversy may be decided on the merits either by summary judgment or at trial.
A third and related reason why this complaint should not have been dismissed is that it is based on a legal theory that, although novel to this Commonwealth, enjoys reasonable support elsewhere. The plaintiff argued that even where the general rule is that a contract in which the consideration is the abandonment of marriage or marital rights is unenforceable, there is an exception where the marriage is not a stable, fruitful, and productive union at the time the contract is formed. In support of her argument, she cited the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 190(2) comment c (1981), and two California cases, Glickman v. Collins, 13 Cal. 3d 852 (1975), and Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210 (1957). The question whether such an exception ought to be recognized in this Commonwealth remains open after today’s decision. See Guenard v. Burke, supra.
Where, as here, a plaintiff presents novel legal claims that have been recognized by other eminent courts and legal authorities, the better practice is for the trial court to deny a motion to dismiss under rule 12 (b)(6) and instead permit the parties to develop the facts so that the novel theory may be “explored and assayed in the light of actual facts rather than a pleader’s suppositions.” 5 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 603 & n.81 (1969), citing Shull v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 313 F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1963). See M. Aschheim Co. v. Turkanis, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 968 (1983); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 934 (1983). See also George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 249 (1971). After completion of discovery, the issue will be whether *166a trial or a motion for summary judgment under rule 56 is the appropriate procedure for obtaining a decision on the legal issues raised by the new theory.

 In a similar case decided the same year as Rizzo, the court apparently found it of no particular significance that the defendants’ testator was a married man at the time he entered into a contract to support the plaintiff in return for her care, nursing, attention and companionship. Taub v. United States Trust Co., 303 Mass. 339 (1939).