Court Opinion

ID: 9549802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:24:54.797972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:55.534822
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
specially concurring in the result:
When the petition in delinquency was filed M.C. was a seventeen-year old juvenile. M.C. was initially charged with the felony offense of second-degree burglary and subsequently was charged with the second-class petty offense of possession of not more than one ounce of marijuana. Pursuant to a plea agreement, M.C. pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor marijuana charge and the felony charge was dismissed. The plea agreement was entered *864into and the dispositional hearing was held after M.C. attained the age of eighteen years.
The Children’s Code was intended to afford juveniles with protections not afforded adults under the Criminal Code and in nearly all instances lesser sanctions are imposed than those under the Criminal Code. When M.C. allegedly committed the offenses charged he was a juvenile subject to prosecution under the Children’s Code. It is for this reason petitioner’s equal protection claim fails. It is hornbook law that in order to state an equal protection claim, it must be shown that a law treats similarly situated groups unequally. See People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117 (Colo.1986); People v. Childs, 199 Colo. 436, 610 P.2d 101 (Colo.1980). In this case, there are no similarly situated groups.
Juveniles prosecuted under the Children’s Code are not similarly situated with adults prosecuted under the Criminal Code. As the court said in In re Eric J., 25 Cal.3d 522, 601 P.2d 549, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317 (1979), when denying appellant’s equal protection claim:
[Ajppellant has not been denied equal protection of the laws. The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. Adults convicted in the criminal courts and sentenced to prison and youths adjudged wards of the juvenile courts and committed to the Youth Authority are not “similarly situated.”
Id. at 527, 601 P.2d at 553, 159 Cal.Rptr. at 320-21 (citation and footnote omitted).
Juvenile sentencing is tailored to rehabilitate and treat, not punish, the juvenile. Even though criminal charges and sanctions are addressed in a delinquency petition under the Children’s Code, a delinquency proceeding is essentially a civil action that is materially different from criminal prosecution. In my view, the equal protection claim is without merit, and People in the Interest of A.L., 713 P.2d 934 (Colo.App.1985), was wrongly decided.
I also note that because the proceedings against M.C. were initiated and conducted under the Children’s Code, the disposition of M.C. must also be conducted under the Children’s Code. Pursuant to section 19-1-104(4)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1986), a juvenile court has discretion to determine whether the juvenile should be held for felony criminal charges under the Criminal Code in the district court. Before the juvenile court exercises its discretion and transfers its jurisdiction over the juvenile to the district court, it must hold a transfer hearing in accordance with section 19-3-108. If the juvenile is transferred to the district court, he is no longer subject to the remedies contained in the Children’s Code. Instead, he becomes subject to the provisions contained in the Criminal Code.
As the logical corollary to this system, when the juvenile court does not transfer jurisdiction to the district court, it retains sole jurisdiction of the juvenile. Consequently, the juvenile court can apply only those remedies available to it, namely those contained in the Children’s Code. It has no authority to impose a sentence contained in the Criminal Code. Applying this law to the facts before us, I would hold that the juvenile court was limited to applying the remedy found in sections 19-3-112(l)(a) and 19-3-113(l)(c) of the Children’s Code. It had no authority to impose a sentence pursuant to section 18-18-106(1) of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice QUINN and Justice VOLLACK join in this special concurrence.