Court Opinion

ID: 9957381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 15:01:40.159966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:17.976728
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-13273   Document: 12-1    Date Filed: 04/04/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-13273
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       DWIGHT SMITH,
       CATHERINE SMITH,
       BRYANT SMITH,
                                                 Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
       versus
       AMH 2014-1 BORROWER, LLC,
       AMERICAN HOMES 4 RENT SFR, LLC,
       AMERICAN HOMES 4 RENT, L.P.,
       AH4R MANAGEMENT - GA, LLC,
       DAVID SINGELYN, et al.,

                                               Defendants-Appellees,
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-13273

       DOES 1-25, INCLUSIVE, et al.,

                                                                Defendants.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00805-SEG
                           ____________________

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Dwight Smith, proceeding pro se along with his wife and
       daughter, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his discrimination
       and retaliation claims under the Fair Housing Act for failure to state
       a claim. He argues on appeal that the district court erred because
       AMH 2014-1 failed to provide accommodations after being given
       notice of his disability, and because it unlawfully retaliated against
       him after he requested accommodations. He also appeals the
       court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a third amended
       complaint, which the court found would be futile. Because the
       district court did not err in either of these respects, we affirm.
                                         I.
             We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to
       dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Am. Dental
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       23-13273               Opinion of the Court                         3

       Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). To survive
       this motion, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
       accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
       face.” Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.
       2011) (quotation omitted). This analysis generally has two steps.
       First, we must “eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are
       merely legal conclusions,” and then, “where there are well-pleaded
       factual allegations, assume their veracity and then determine
       whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Am.
       Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1290 (quotation omitted). Pro se
       pleadings, however, “are held to a less stringent standard than
       pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
       construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
       Cir. 1998). Even so, a pro se litigant is “subject to the relevant law
       and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
       Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
               We also review the denial of leave to amend by reason of
       futility de novo because “futility is a legal conclusion that the
       amended complaint would necessarily fail.” L.S. ex rel. Hernandez
       v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020). A party may freely
       amend their complaint once within 21 days, but after that the party
       must seek either the consent of the opposing party or the court’s
       leave to amend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The court should permit
       amendment “when justice so requires.” Id. A district court need
       not grant leave, however, when “a more carefully drafted
       complaint could not state a claim”—in other words, when
       amendment would be futile. Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty Bd. of Educ.,
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-13273

       885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted); see also
       Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004).
                                         II.
              We begin, as Smith did, with his claim that AMH
       discriminated against him because of his disability by failing to
       provide a reasonable accommodation. The Fair Housing Act
       provides that it is unlawful to refuse to rent or otherwise
       discriminate against any person in the “terms, conditions, or
       privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,” including by refusing to
       “make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or
       services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford
       such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42
       U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f)(3)(B). To state a failure-to-accommodate
       claim, a plaintiff must show four elements: “(1) he is disabled
       within the meaning of the FHA, (2) he requested a reasonable
       accommodation, (3) the requested accommodation was necessary
       to afford him an opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, and (4)
       the defendants refused to make the accommodation.” Bhogaita v.
       Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014).
               Smith’s discrimination claim fails because he did not plead
       sufficient facts to show that he is disabled within the meaning of
       the Fair Housing Act, and even if he did, his requested
       accommodation was not reasonable. Under the Fair Housing Act,
       a person is disabled if he has or is regarded as having “a physical or
       mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
       person’s major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). “Major life
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       23-13273                Opinion of the Court                            5

       activities,” in turn, “means functions such as caring for one’s self,
       performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
       breathing, learning and working.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b). All
       Smith has alleged, however, is that he has Crohn’s disease, which
       in September of 2021 required him to be hospitalized for three days
       and to receive a blood transfusion. But he did not allege any further
       facts about his health or how his Crohn’s disease affects his major
       life activities. This, by itself, is insufficient to allege that Smith met
       the statutory definition of disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 24
       C.F.R. § 100.201(b).
              Even if Smith could allege a disability, he has not met his
       burden of showing that the proposed accommodation is facially
       reasonable. Schaw v. Habitat for Human. of Citrus Cnty, Inc., 938 F.3d
       1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2019). Smith alleges that he asked for “more
       time to move” due to his disability, and that this was a “Reasonable
       Accommodation Disability Request.” But calling his request
       reasonable does not make it so. Judging the reasonableness of an
       accommodation request requires us to consider “whether the
       requested accommodation is both efficacious and proportional to
       the costs to implement it.” Schaw, 938 F.3d at 1265 (quotations
       omitted). An accommodation is unreasonable if it would require
       “a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program” or if it would
       impose “undue financial and administrative burdens.” Id.
       (quotation omitted). Put differently, “the difference between an
       accommodation that is required and a transformation that is not is
       the difference between saddling a camel and removing its hump.”
       Id. (quotation omitted and alteration adopted). Smith asks AMH
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                23-13273

       to remove the hump. In fact, his requested accommodation is not
       really an accommodation at all. He is not asking for a modification
       in his dwelling that would ameliorate the effects of his handicap—
       he is asking for AMH to cease or substantially delay his eviction.
       This requested accommodation in no way addresses the needs
       created by his alleged disability—Crohn’s disease. Schwarz v. City
       of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1226 (11th Cir. 2008). Instead, it
       goes beyond those needs to place him in a better position than a
       non-disabled resident under the same circumstances, which is an
       improper interpretation of the Fair Housing Act. Id.
              Smith’s claim that he was retaliated against in violation of
       the Fair Housing Act also fails. The Fair Housing Act makes it
       “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
       person in the exercise or enjoyment of” any right granted or
       protected by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. The district court found
       that Smith’s retaliation claim suffered from fundamental timing
       issues—any allegedly retaliatory action occurred before Smith’s
       allegedly protected activities. We agree. According to Smith’s
       own pleading, AMH first notified Smith that he had broken the
       terms of the lease and needed to vacate the premises on March 4,
       2021. Then, on March 5, 2021, Smith notified AMH that he had
       just had surgery and would need time to vacate. AMH sent move-
       out notices again on March 9, March 10, March 15, and March 19.
       It was not until March 20 that Smith sent his accommodation
       request to delay his eviction. Even assuming that this was
       protected activity, it came after AMH had already tried to remove
       Smith multiple times for an independent violation of the terms of
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       23-13273                  Opinion of the Court                               7

       Smith’s lease. Because Smith has not alleged facts sufficient to
       support a claim that AMH retaliated against Smith, the district
       court did not err when it dismissed this claim.
              Finally, the district court did not err in denying Smith’s
       motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. Smith had
       already amended his complaint twice, and had received specific
       instructions about how to resolve the deficiencies in his prior
       pleadings. His latest round of proposed revisions would not cure
       the fundamental problems with his Fair Housing Act claims,
       discussed above. Accordingly, the district court was correct to
       deny Smith’s motion for leave to amend based on futility.1
             Because the district court did not err in dismissing Smith’s
       second amended complaint for failing to state a claim, nor in
       denying his motion to amend his complaint a third time, the
       judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

       1 Smith also moved to add a supplemental addendum to his appellate brief.

       This proposal consists of a table of contents and jurisdictional statement, but
       does not include any substantive changes to his legal arguments on appeal.
       Though it does not change the outcome of his appeal, this motion is
       GRANTED.