Court Opinion

ID: 9399182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 14:06:25.837287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.637785
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 26, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2021-CA-0410-MR

KYREK PURDIMAN                                                    APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE LISA PAYNE JONES, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 18-CR-00256

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                  OPINION
                                 AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Kyrek Purdiman, pro se, brings this appeal from a March 3,

2021, order of the Daviess Circuit Court denying his motion pursuant to Kentucky

Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 to vacate his judgment and sentence of

imprisonment. We affirm.

            On or about December 30, 2017, Jason Junkerman went out drinking

with a group of acquaintances, including Kyrek Purdiman, Jeffery Bond, and
Ronnie Bailey. Around 2:00 a.m., the group left a bar in two vehicles and stopped

at a gas station before heading to Bailey’s residence. Upon leaving the gas station,

Junkerman got into a green Ford Taurus driven by Purdiman; Bond was in the

front passenger seat. According to Bailey’s security camera footage at Bailey’s

residence, the Taurus pulled into Bailey’s driveway around 2:30 a.m. Shortly

thereafter, Bailey came out of his residence and discovered Junkerman lying alone

in the driveway in a pool of blood. Bailey called 911. Junkerman was taken to the

hospital by ambulance and put into a medically induced coma. Due to the extent

of Junkerman’s injuries, emergency room staff initially believed Junkerman had

suffered a gunshot wound. It was later determined that Junkerman’s injuries were

caused by a violent assault.

             Subsequent investigation revealed that Purdiman and Bond used

Junkerman’s debit card to purchase fast food shortly after Junkerman was

assaulted. Bond also purchased items at a convenience store using Junkerman’s

bank card. Then, Bond and Purdiman were both seen on security footage selecting

other items to purchase at the convenience store. Junkerman’s bank card was

presented as payment for the second purchase, but the transaction was cancelled

due to insufficient funds.

             Purdiman was subsequently indicted upon robbery in the first degree,

assault in the first degree, tampering with physical evidence, and fraudulent use of

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a credit card under $500.1 Pursuant to a plea agreement with the Commonwealth,

Purdiman entered a plea of guilty to the indicted charges pursuant to North

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Purdiman was sentenced to a total of

twelve-years’ imprisonment.

               Purdiman subsequently filed a motion to modify his sentence of

imprisonment pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. By

order entered November 7, 2019, the circuit court denied Purdiman’s CR 60.02

motion.

               Then, on September 4, 2020, Purdiman filed a motion to vacate the

judgment and sentence of imprisonment pursuant to RCr 11.42. By order entered

March 3, 2021, the circuit court denied Purdiman’s RCr 11.42 motion without an

evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.

               When a guilty plea has been entered and movant collaterally attacks

the judgment by filing a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, movant must demonstrate:

               (1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel’s
               performance fell outside the wide range of professionally
               competent assistance; and (2) that the deficient
               performance so seriously affected the outcome of the
               plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a

1
  Jeffery Bond was also indicted upon robbery in the first degree, assault in the first degree,
tampering with physical evidence, and fraudulent use of a credit card under $500 in relation to
the Kyrek Purdiman incident. Bond subsequently pleaded guilty to facilitation to commit
robbery in the first degree, assault in the second degree, tampering with physical evidence, and
fraudulent use of a credit card under $500.

                                               -3-
             reasonable probability that the defendant would not have
             pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.

Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001).

             As Purdiman’s RCr 11.42 motion was denied without an evidentiary

hearing, “[o]ur review is confined to whether the motion on its face states grounds

that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate

the conviction.” See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967).

However, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary where the defendant’s

allegations, even if true, would be insufficient to invalidate his conviction. Harper

v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Ky. 1998) (citation omitted).

             Purdiman asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform

Purdiman that had he proceeded to trial, he would have been entitled to a jury

instruction upon theft by unlawful taking as a lesser included offense of robbery in

the first degree. For the following reasons, we disagree.

             Robbery in the first degree is codified in KRS 515.020(1), which

provides, in relevant part:

             (1) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree
             when, in the course of committing theft, he or she uses or
             threatens the immediate use of physical force upon
             another person with intent to accomplish the theft and
             when he or she:

                (a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a
                participant in the crime[.]

                                         -4-
Theft by unlawful taking (TBUT), on the other hand, is codified in KRS 514.030,

and provides, in relevant part:

               (1) Except as otherwise provided in KRS 217.181, a
               person is guilty of theft by unlawful taking or disposition
               when he or she unlawfully:

                    (a) Takes or exercises control over movable property
                    of another with intent to deprive him or her thereof[.]

               It is well-settled that TBUT is a lesser included offense of robbery in

the first degree. Mack v. Commonwealth, 136 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Ky. 2004).

However, the inquiry does not end there. Even if Purdiman had been informed by

counsel that TBUT was a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree,

there is not a reasonable probability that Purdiman would not have pleaded guilty,

but rather would have insisted upon going to trial. See Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 486-

87.2

               In this case, Purdiman failed to identify any facts that would have

made it reasonable for a jury to believe that he unlawfully took Junkerman’s debit

card (under a TBUT instruction), without resort to the use of physical force upon

Junkerman as required by the robbery instruction. The extent of Junkerman’s

injuries clearly demonstrate that physical force was used upon Junkerman causing

2
  “However, an instruction on a lesser included offense is required only if, considering the
totality of the evidence, the jury might have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt of the
greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the
lesser offense.” Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 668 (Ky. 2003).

                                                -5-
physical injury. There was no evidence that Junkerman had lost possession of his

debit card before the robbery. Furthermore, Purdiman was facing the possibility of

a 45-year sentence of imprisonment upon the indicted charges. Purdiman’s plea

agreement, on the other hand, provided for a total sentence of twelve-years’

imprisonment. Therefore, we believe Purdiman failed to demonstrate there is a

reasonable probability that if he had known about the possible jury instruction

upon the lesser included offense he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have

insisted upon going to trial.

             Purdiman also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

inform him about the availability of the “defense of self-protection against

violence, sexual threats KRS 503.050(2), that would have exonerated him of the

Assault 1st Degree charge.” Purdiman’s Brief at 8.

             KRS 503.050 provides, in relevant part:

             (2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon
             another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only
             when the defendant believes that such force is necessary
             to protect himself against death, serious physical injury,
             kidnapping, sexual intercourse compelled by force or
             threat, felony involving the use of force, or under those
             circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055.

KRS 503.050(2). Had Purdiman been aware of the defense of self-protection, he

claims he would not have pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree but would

have insisted upon going to trial.

                                         -6-
             We find no merit in this argument. Even if Purdiman had been

successful, upon a theory of self-protection, he still faced a sentence of up to

twenty-years’ imprisonment upon the first-degree robbery charge and up to five

years on the tampering with physical evidence charge. We again must emphasize

that Purduman’s guilty plea resulted in a total of only twelve-years’ imprisonment.

Therefore, we do not believe that if Purdiman had known about the possible self-

protection defense that he would have insisted upon going to trial, rather than

accepting the plea bargain.

             Purdiman also makes several other assertions of error on appeal. He

claims: that counsel failed to inform him of the affirmative defense of assault

under extreme emotional disturbance; counsel failed to retain an expert to evaluate

and challenge the evidence regarding the victim’s location in the pool of his own

blood; and counsel failed to investigate the evidence for first-degree robbery to

determine if there was any intent on Purdiman’s part to commit a theft. However,

these issues were not raised in Purdiman’s RCr 11.42 motion below and were not

addressed by the circuit court’s March 3, 2021, order denying him RCr 11.42

relief.

             It is well-established that where an issue was not presented to the

court below and was not addressed in the order appealed from, there is nothing for

this Court to review. Hensley v. Commonwealth, 305 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Ky. App.

                                          -7-
2010) (citing Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976),

overruled on other grounds by Wilburn v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321 (Ky.

2010)). In fact, it has been stated that an appellant will not be permitted to “feed

one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court.” Hensley,

305 S.W.3d at 436. Simply stated, if an allegation of ineffective assistance of

counsel is advanced for the first time on appeal, it generally will not be addressed

by this Court. Id.

             In the case sub judice, the above three issues were not raised by

Purdiman before the circuit court and thus were not addressed by its March 3,

2021, order denying Purdiman’s RCr 11.42 motion. As such, we decline to review

these contentions of error. See Hensley, 305 S.W.3d at 436.

             Purdiman also asserts that the circuit court erred by denying his

motion for post-conviction relief because of the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s

errors. However, since we have found no individual error in this case, we likewise

cannot find any cumulative error. Furnish v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.3d 656,

668 (Ky. 2007). Thus, this argument also fails.

             For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Daviess Circuit Court is

affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -8-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kyrek Purdiman, Pro Se    Daniel Cameron
Burgin, Kentucky          Attorney General of Kentucky
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                          Robert Baldridge
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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