Court Opinion

ID: 9959460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 18:01:31.008472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:34.281555
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30657          Document: 30-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/11/2024

         United States Court of Appeals
              for the Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                                  No. 23-30657                                      FILED
                                Summary Calendar                                 April 11, 2024
                                ____________                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk
Dominic J. Ross,

                                                                Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

Ceres Gulf, Incorporated; Ceres International
Terminals, Incorporated; Dennis Cucinello, Officially; Joe
Lala, Officially and Personally; Juan Galloway, Officially and
Personally; Midgulf Association of Stevedores,
Incorporated; Ports America Louisiana, L.L.C.;
Waterfront Employers of New Orleans; Waterfront
Tutor, Incorporated,

                                          Defendants—Appellees.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                          USDC No. 2:19-CV-13929
                 ______________________________

Before Dennis, Wilson, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *

     _____________________
     *
         This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30657        Document: 30-1       Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/11/2024

                                  No. 23-30657

       Plaintiff-Appellant Dominic Ross, proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-
Appellees, Ceres Gulf, Inc. (“CGI”), Ceres International Terminals, Inc.
(“CIT”), Dennis Cucinello in his official capacity, Joe Lala in his official and
personal capacities, Juan Galloway in his official and personal capacities,
Midgulf Association of Stevedores, Inc. (“MAS”), Ports America Louisiana,
L.L.C. (“PAL”), Waterfront Employers of New Orleans (“WENO”), and
Waterfront Tutor, Inc. (collectively, “the defendants”). We AFFIRM.
           I. Factual and Procedural Background
       Ross briefly worked in the maintenance shops of two different parties
to this case, PAL and CGI, who are waterfront employers in the Port of New
Orleans. He worked for PAL from roughly June 22, 2018, through August 22,
2018, and for CGI from December 20, 2018, through May 29, 2019.
Throughout his work for both companies, Ross claims to have been subject
to race-based discrimination and retaliation. During his employment with
PAL, Ross worked primarily for Dennis Cucinello, the Maintenance and
Repair Manager. With CGI, Ross worked for Joe Lala, the Manager of the
Chassis Repair Shop, and Juan Galloway, a foreman.
       Ross filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on June 20 and 21, 2019, against PAL
and CGI respectively. On September 24, 2019, the EEOC dismissed Ross’s
charge against PAL because it was untimely, informed him that the EEOC
was unable to conclude that any of the alleged violations against CGI
occurred, and informed him of his right to file the instant lawsuit within
ninety days.
       Ross then filed suit pro se on November 27, 2019, alleging nineteen
different causes of action against eleven different defendants. He was later
represented by two different attorneys before the district court. On

                                       2
Case: 23-30657        Document: 30-1       Page: 3     Date Filed: 04/11/2024

                                  No. 23-30657

December 11, 2020, Defendant International Longshoremen’s Association,
Local Union No. 2036 (the “Union”), who is not a party to this appeal, filed
a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As Ross did not timely object, the
district court granted the Union’s motion as unopposed. Eventually, the
remaining defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Ross,
represented by counsel, filed a limited opposition to summary judgment. In
that opposition, Ross only addressed the race-based discrimination claim
against CGI, so the district court entered summary judgment on all other of
Ross’s claims as conceded. It also found that despite Ross’s arguments, CGI
was entitled to summary judgment on the remaining claim. Ross timely
appealed.
                      II. Standards of Review
       “This court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standard as the district court.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d
473, 477 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Tango Transp. v. Healthcare Fin. Servs. LLC,
322 F.3d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 2003)). Summary judgment is only appropriate
when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts
of materials in the record . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “[T]he plain
language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). We must draw all
justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. TIG Ins. Co. v.
Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

                                       3
Case: 23-30657        Document: 30-1        Page: 4    Date Filed: 04/11/2024

                                  No. 23-30657

       We review a district court’s denial of a motion to compel discovery as
untimely for abuse of discretion. Brand Servs., L.L.C. v. Irex Corp., 909 F.3d
151, 156 (5th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
       Ross appeals pro se. We “liberally construe briefs of pro se litigants
and apply less stringent standards to parties proceeding pro se than parties
represented by counsel.” Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted). So long as the party has “at least argued some error on the
part of the district court,” we will consider the argument. Id. at 524-25
(emphasis in original). However, a pro se litigant, like all other parties, “must
identify the facts relevant to the issues presented for review, with appropriate
references to the record.” United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir.
1994) (quotation omitted).
                             III. Discussion
       Liberally construing Ross’s brief on appeal, Ross argues the district
court erred when it granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
because it (1) “dismiss[ed] indispensable parties” in violation of Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) denied his motion to compel
discovery, and (3) misapplied the summary judgment standard by weighing
evidence and ignoring remaining disputed material facts. We address each
argument in turn.
            A. Ross Failed to Preserve His Rule 19 Argument
       Ross argues that the district court erred when it dismissed the Union
because it was an indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Ross’s argument amounts to an attack against the district
court’s decision to grant the Union’s unopposed Rule 12(b)(5) motion to
dismiss. By failing to oppose this dismissal at the district court, Ross forfeited
his argument for appeal. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 8 F.4th 393, 397
(5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the first

                                        4
Case: 23-30657        Document: 30-1       Page: 5     Date Filed: 04/11/2024

                                  No. 23-30657

instance in the district court—thus raising it for the first time on appeal . . .
.”) (citations omitted).
 B. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Ross’s Motion to
                             Compel Discovery
       Ross also argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because
the district court improperly denied his motion to compel discovery. But
Ross filed his motion to compel on March 8, 2022, over a month after the
discovery deadline. And the “district court has discretion to deny as untimely
a motion filed after the discovery deadline.” Brand Servs., L.L.C., 909 F.3d
at 156 (citations omitted); see also Curry v. Strain, 262 F. App’x 650, 652 (5th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (finding no abuse of discretion where the district
court dismissed a motion to compel in part because it was filed almost one
month after the discovery deadline). In this case, we find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ross’s motion to compel as
untimely.
  C. The District Court Properly Granted the Defendants’ Motion for
                             Summary Judgment
       Because Ross only opposed the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment with respect to his claim against CGI for race-based discrimination,
only that claim is properly before us. See Fields v. City of South Hous., 922
F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[M]aterials not presented to the district
court for consideration of a motion for summary judgment are never properly
before the reviewing court.”) (quoting John v. Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 710
(5th Cir. 1985)). To avoid summary judgment on a claim of race-based
discrimination, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. See Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507,
513 (5th Cir. 2001). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Ross
must point to evidence in the record demonstrating that he “(1) is a member

                                       5
Case: 23-30657        Document: 30-1       Page: 6     Date Filed: 04/11/2024

                                  No. 23-30657

of a protected class; (2) was qualified for [his] position; (3) was subject to an
adverse employment action; and (4) . . . that others similarly situated were
treated more favorably.” Id (quoting Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP,
190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999)) (citation omitted). We find that Ross failed
to point to evidence in the record demonstrating the fourth element—that
others similarly situated were treated more favorably than him. In opposition
to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment below, Ross pointed to
deposition testimony suggesting a general pattern of discrimination, but, as
the district court found, that testimony was too broad. To meet the final
element, Ross must point to evidence showing that the comparable employee
was in “nearly identical circumstances” to him. Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft
Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up). He failed to do so. The
evidence offered could not support a reasonable juror’s finding that he was
treated differently than an employee outside of his protected class. Summary
judgment was therefore warranted.
                             IV. Conclusion
       Because the district court properly granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

                                       6