Court Opinion

ID: 9761866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:57:19.449913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:26.934331
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, President Judge,
concurring:
I join the majority’s opinion but write separately to emphasize the following matters. The appellant was covered by a written contract in this case. In interpreting a contract, a court is bound by that contract, and absent fraud, mistake or ambiguity, cannot look outside its terms, or *421redraft it under the guise of interpretation. Borrell v. Borrell, 346 Pa.Super. 1, 10, 498 A.2d 1339, 1344 (1985); Trumpp v. Trumpp, 351 Pa.Super. 205, 209, 505 A.2d 601, 603 (1985). The plain terms of the contract in question lack a provision specifying the amount of time appellant was to work for Stroehmann’s. In an employment situation, as the majority correctly points out, there is a presumption that if the parties fail to set out the duration of the employment relationship, that relationship is terminable at any time by either party. Greene v. Oliver Realty Inc., 363 Pa.Super. 534, 541, 526 A.2d 1192, 1196 (1987). As there has been no showing of fraud, ambiguity or mistake, we must consider only the language of the contract, and cannot resort to the employee handbook for guidance in interpreting it. According to those provisions, Reilly was an at-will employee of Stroehmann’s, subject to discharge at any time.
Further, Reilly has been unable to overcome the presumption of at-will employment raised by his contract. The presumption may be overcome if the party seeking to destroy it can present clear evidence that both employer and employee intended to allow the employee greater rights than the at-will relationship provides. Greene, 363 Pa.Super. at 543, 526 A.2d at 1202. The presence of consideration is only a single factor in the court’s determination of intent. The dissent finds consideration in the fact that Reilly continued to work during the period following the publication of the handbook. I see no need to discuss that issue. Considering the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom1, no meeting of the minds occurred between Stroehmann’s and Reilly that would allow Reilly to overcome the at-will presumption raised by his contract.
In his dissent, Judge Montemuro contends that the arbitration provisions outlined by the handbook provide that *422meeting of the minds. He argues that a reasonable employee would have understood the arbitration provisions to create a subjective “just cause” standard for discharge. I disagree. In the instant case, it is reasonable to infer that the employer did not intend to create an employment relationship that could not be altered absent a finding of “just cause” by a neutral arbitrator. The arbitration provision was offered only to non-union employees. Clearly the inference may be drawn that the provision was intended by the employer to keep them non-union, not to provide them with a settled term of employment. No meeting of the minds can be said to have occurred here, and thus the at-will presumption is not overcome.
Although we may deplore the use of such methods by Stroehmann’s, and although Stroehmann’s may indeed be reaping the benefits of the bargain without fulfilling its obligations, the proper forum to rectify these injustices is the National Labor Relations Board, not the courts of this Commonwealth.
I therefore concur in the opinion of the majority.

. As the majority points out, in reviewing the grant of a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, the appellate court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts of the complaint as well as the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them. Mahoney v. Furches, 503 Pa. 60, 66, 468 A.2d 458, 461-2 (1983).