Court Opinion

ID: 9491829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:24:43.760697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:57.722026
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Circuit Judge,
with whom SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, and EBEL, Circuit Judge, join, dissenting.
The court holds that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) does not apply to the government because government prosecutors are inseparable from the sovereign, and that its application would deprive the sovereign of its power to grant leniency in exchange for testimony and would conflict with various statutory provisions.1 Because courts must apply unambiguous statutes as they are written and § 201(c) does not admit of an exception for the government or its prosecutors, I respectfully dissent.
As an initial observation, since the panel issued its opinion in this case, prosecutors from coast to coast have attempted to portray it as the death knell for the criminal justice system as we know it. These are the same grave forecasts made by prosecutors after the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and the advent of the exclusionary rule. But experience has proven that the government, just like the private citizens it regulates and prosecutes, can live within the rules. No one would suggest that the criminal justice system has ceased to function because the Court or Congress has effectuated constitutional or statutory guarantees designed to promote a more reliable outcome in criminal proceedings.
In holding that § 201(c)(2) simply does not apply to the government, the court does not hold that leniency in exchange for testimony does not constitute “anything of value.” To *1309be sure, the investigation and prosecution of criminal wrongdoing is an important societal function. Yet, largely missing from the debate since the panel opinion was issued is any concern for the other deeply held values that § 201(c) was intended to protect and which, I believe, the panel opinion honored by applying § 201(e) as Congress wrote it. Those concerns center on maintaining the integrity, fairness, and credibility of our system of criminal justice. Criminal judgments are accepted by society at large, and even by individual defendants, only because our system of justice is painstakingly fair. An additional core value honored by the panel opinion is the preservation of the separation of powers carefully articulated in the Constitution between the legislative and judicial branches, and the proper role of the judiciary as the law-interpreting, rather than lawmaking, branch of the federal government.
Contrary to the concerns expressed by some commentators and courts, see United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414 (6th Cir.1998), a straight-forward interpretation of § 201(c), which encompasses a prohibition against the government buying witness testimony with leniency, actually aids the search for truth. In theory, the leniency is only in exchange for “truthful” testimony. See United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 366-67 (5th Cir.1998). But as the Supreme Court has recognized: “Common sense would suggest that [an accused accomplice] often has a greater interest in lying in favor of the prosecution rather than against it, especially if he is still awaiting his own trial or sentencing. To think that criminals will he to save their fellows but not to obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is indeed to clothe the criminal class with more nobility than one might expect to find in the public at large.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); see also Yvette A. Beeman, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea Agreements, 72 Cornell L.Rev. 800, 802 (1987) (“Accomplice plea agreements tend to produce unreliable testimony because they create an incentive for the accomplice to shift blame to the defendant or other co-conspirators. Further, an accomplice may wish to please the prosecutor to ensure lenient prosecution in his own case.”). To be sure, there are devices that partially ameliorate the problem. The government is required to disclose exculpatory information, including impeachment information, to a defendant. Testifying accomplices may be cross-examined. Their credibility may be impeached, and the jury is instructed that it may regard such testimony with caution. However, all of these devices have limitations. In the real world of trial and uncertain proof, and in view of § 201(c), a witness’s demeanor and actual testimony are simply too important to hinge upon promises of leniency. Although the court notes that a prosecutor who procures false testimony could be prosecuted for subornation of perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1622,2 such a remedy offers little practical advantage to a defendant facing trial. By barring an exchange of leniency for testimony, Congress in § 201(c) has sought to eliminate, at the source, the most obvious incentive for false testimony.
On the other side of the ledger is my concern for the institutional role of Article III courts. Much of this case'has been about policy. I accept the government’s position that accomplices can provide important information and interpreting § 201(c) to include prosecutors might require some changes to elicit testimony of some witnesses. While it would be up to the Department of Justice to devise ways of compliance, the government is not precluded from offering leniency in exchange for information and assistance short of actual testimony at trial. Likewise, the government could prosecute accomplices first, then compel their testimony by subpoena against co-conspirators.3 Finally, the gov*1310ernment could request that the district court order an accomplice to testify under a grant of immunity. Surely the Department has the ability and resources to come up with effective and lawful means for procuring necessary accomplice testimony. However, I also accept the defense attorneys’ position that government leniency in exchange for testimony can create a powerful incentive to lie and derail the truth-seeking purpose of the criminal justice system. The very nature and complexity of this policy debate reinforces my initial belief that this is an argument better left to Congress. This court must perform its constitutional duties and no more. Ours is not to explore the farthest meanings that the term “whoever” can bear so as to effectuate the policy we think best. Our duty is to interpret the plain meaning of the statute. I continue to believe that meaning is clear: § 201(e), as written, applies to prosecutors and criminal defendants alike. If the balance struck by § 201 is to be reweighed, that reweighing should be done by the policymaking branch of government — the Congress, and not the courts. In that regard, it bears repeating that the panel’s original opinion was purely a matter of statutory construction, not constitutional analysis, and it remains completely open for Congress to reweigh the conflicting values sought to be addressed in § 201.4
I. “Whoever” Means Whoever
The government argues that construing the word “whoever” to include the government is semantically anomalous because “whoever” connotes a being. As a textual and contextual matter, this is wrong. Textually, “whoever” clearly connotes more than a being and in fact denotes inanimate entities. The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, definition of “whoever” includes, but is not limited to, corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies — all inanimate entities. Contextually, the government concedes that “whoever” in § 201(b) applies to the government and it acknowledges that § 201(c) applies to the government if the government pays an informant money to testify. It makes absolutely no sense to give “whoever” one meaning in § 201(b) (and in § 201(c) when the inducement offered by the government is money) and to give the very same word a completely different meaning in § 201(c) when the inducement offered is leniency or some other promise to improve the informant’s position. After all, § 201(c) is a prophylactic rule to enforce § 201(b). “The interrelationship and close proximity of these provisions of the statute presents a classic case for application of the normal rule of statutory construction *1311that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’ ” Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250, 116 S.Ct. 647, 133 L.Ed.2d 611 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Bought testimony is so fraught with the potential for perjury that Congress imposed a blanket prohibition that also applies to the government, just as hearsay testimony is so fraught with the potential for unreliability that the Federal Rules of Evidence generally prohibit its admission, whether offered by the government or private litigants.
The court suggests that the prosecutor and the sovereign are inseparable, and therefore the word “whoever” cannot apply because the United States cannot be prosecuted for providing leniency in exchange for testimony. First and foremost, “the law in this social order is not self-executing — the necessary instrument is the lawyer.” Matter of Doe, 801 F.Supp. 478, 479 (D.N.M.1992). To suggest that government attorneys performing prosecutorial functions are beyond' scrutiny because of who they represent is anomalous because it merges attorney and client. No one would suggest that an accused and his attorney are one in the same for purposes of compliance with constitutional, statutory and ethical norms. As discussed below, constraints on government prosecutors áre not unusual, notwithstanding that the sovereign is the client. Merely because the government cannot be prosecuted if its agents violate a rule does not mean that the rule may be disregarded; to the contrary, the rule may be enforced by means other than prosecution, here by exclusion of evidence. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384-85, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937). The remedy of exclusion serves as a deterrent, protects a court’s integrity and allows a federal court the only means it has to enforce federal law.
Recently, Congress enacted a statute that explicitly subjects government attorneys, including federal prosecutors, to State laws and rules governing attorneys. See Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub.L. No. 105-277, tit. VIII, § 801, 112 Stat. 2681,-(1998) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) & (c)) (eff. April 1999); 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(a) (1998). This statute strongly suggests that the Congress does not view government attorneys as one with the sovereign, beyond regulation. It is indeed odd that federal prosecutors will soon be expressly subject to State laws and rules regarding professional conduct, yet may continue to ignore the federal prohibition contained in § 201(c)(2).
Beyond the government’s sui generis definition of “whoever,” the government’s argument rests upon the predicate that the government has the sovereign authority to prosecute criminal conduct, and applying § 201(c) to the government would impermis-sibly curtail that prerogative. However, applying § 201(c) to the government does not affect the core prerogative to prosecute or to withhold prosecution. The government erroneously conflates two distinct concepts: the vested sovereign prerogative of the government to prosecute and the obvious non-prerogative of how to prosecute. Prohibiting the government from granting witnesses leniency in exchange for testimony leaves the right to prosecute unfettered; the government can still prosecute anybody it wants and charge any way it wants. The anti-gratuity statute only limits how the government may prosecute its case and the government clearly has no vested sovereign prerogative to prove a case in any way it wishes. How the government proves its case is frequently restricted. Federal prosecutors must follow the Constitution, state codes of conduct, the rules of the individual courts, and. the rules of evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1341 & n. 13 (10th Cir.1991). Even the statute at issue in Nar-done banned prosecutors from using evidence (including vital evidence) in a criminal trial that was obtained by a federal officer tapping telephone wires, notwithstanding that suppression was not a statutory remedy.
Thus, the anti-gratuity statute leaves unfettered the sovereign’s established prerogative to charge; it merely places a restriction on one method of gathering admissible evidence, here testimony, for or against an accused. A federal prosecutor is not above the law and is not free to prove a case by any *1312process he or she wants. See Matter of Doe, 801 F.Supp. at 484-87; In re Howes, 123 N.M. 311, 940 P.2d 159, 164-65 (N.M.1997). Once the government falls into the crucible of the trial, the government, like the defendant, must follow the generally applicable rules governing the process. The government’s argument that discontinuing the pervasive practice of buying testimony for leniency would jeopardize law enforcement is just another way of saying that the end justifies the means; not only is such a premise unsound policy, it also serves to demean the profession and all who strive to continue our system of justice as the fairest in the world.
II. Section 201(c)(2) in Relation to Other Statutes
Contrary to the government’s contentions, the defendant’s reading of § 201(c)(2) can be reconciled with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)5; 28 U.S.C. § 994(n)6; Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b)7; and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a)(2)8. It has been argued that this collection of enactments demonstrates Congress’ sanction of the practice of offering various forms of leniency to a defendant in exchange for the defendant’s agreement to testify in the government’s prosecution of other individuals. See United States v. Arana, 18 F.Supp.2d 715, 718-19 (E.D.Mich.1998); United States v. Guillaume, 13 F.Supp.2d 1331, 1333-34 (S.D.Fla.1998).
First, the statutory language we do have in § 201(c)(2) is a better guide to legislative intent than the silence about leniency in exchange for testimony contained in these other enactments. Second, it would be pure speculation to assume that Congress intended to endorse existing practice. As noted in the panel opinion, nowhere in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), or Fed. R.Crim.P. 35(b) is “substantial assistance” defined to include testimony. The conspicuous absence of the word “testimony” from any of these sources would indicate that “substantial assistance” simply does not include testimony-a conclusion that avoids any conflict between these provisions and § 201(e)(2). In contrast, U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a)(2) does permit a court to consider “the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant” in deciding whether to depart from the guideline range in sentencing a defendant who has “provided substantial assistance” to the government. Even so, the fact that “substantial assistance” encompasses a defendant’s testimony still does not place § 5K1.1 in conflict with § 201(c)(2). Given the duty to reconcile seemingly conflicting statutes whenever possible, see Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, *13131490 (10th Cir.1997), it appears that § 5K1.1 creates a narrow exception to § 201(c)(2) by permitting a court to reward a defendant’s truthful testimony after it has been given. This narrow exception does not affect § 201(c)(2)’s prohibition against the prosecutor offering or promising leniency in advance to a defendant in exchange for his agreement to testify.
Likewise, the defendant’s reading of § 201(c)(2) can be harmonized with 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005, the statutes dealing with federal immunity. Under these statutes, where an individual has refused to testify on the basis of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and where, in the judgment of the federal prosecuting attorney, the testimony may be necessary to the public interest, the prosecutor may, with approval of the Attorney General, request the district court to order that individual to testify under a grant of immunity. These statutes allow the government to compel an unwilling witness to cooperate by precluding use of the Fifth Amendment privilege. This function is entirely distinct from promising or offering leniency ex ante in exchange for a defendant’s testimony, so the prohibition expressed in § 201(c)(2) does not conflict with the grant of immunity authorized by the §§ 6001-6005. Sections 6000-6005 provide a mechanism to take away from a defendant a right he otherwise would have — the right not to incriminate himself. Constitutionally, the only way that right can be taken from a defendant is by offering immunity in exchange. Thus, the quid pro qiio there is an exchange of immunity for a person’s Fifth Amendment privilege. Once that exchange is made, the government can compel the witness to testify even against his wishes. That is very different, both conceptually and in terms of the risks presented, from purchasing voluntary testimony with leniency.
Finally, the defendant’s reading of § 201(c)(2) does not conflict with the Witness Relocation and Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521(b)(1), (d)(1)(A) (authorizing the Attorney General to provide housing, living expenses and protection for a witness upon the witness’ agreement to testify), or with Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1) (permitting plea agreements). Section 3521 is primarily concerned with the welfare of the witness, not with obtaining testimony. Rule 11(e) does not concern a defendant’s testimony — it simply permits a defendant to bypass trial; at most, it allows a defendant to be rewarded for admitting his guilt through the dismissal of additional charges or the recommendation of a more lenient sentence.
III. Tradition
The government relies on the common law practice of sanctioning the testimony of accomplices against their confederates in exchange for leniency. Apparently, this practice has not always been an unquestioned part of the common law. The seventeenth century English common law scholar and judge, Sir Matthew Hale, reasoned:
If a reward be promised to a person for giving his evidence before he gives it, this, if proved disables his testimony.
And so for my own part I have always thought, that if a person have a promise of a pardon if he give evidence against one of his own confederates, this disables his testimony, if it be proved upon him.9
II Sir Matthew Hale, The History of Pleas of the Crown 280 (Sollom Emlyn ed. 1736) (footnote omitted). A narrow focus on this practice, however, ignores two other equally compelling traditions: the common law prohibition against paying fact witnesses, and the fundamental policy of ensuring a level playing field between the government and defendant in a criminal case.
Under the common law in most jurisdictions, “it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying.” Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4 cmt. [3]; cf. 2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 520 (Chadbourn rev.1979) (noting that conviction of suppression of testimony by bribery, a crime of infamy, has been adjudged to render individual incompetent to testify). “Fair competition in the adversary *1314system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.” Model Rules Rule 3.4 cmt. [1], The prohibition against improperly influencing witnesses is also expressed in the law of contracts, which invalidates agreements to pay fact witnesses on grounds of public policy and for lack of consideration, see Hamilton v. General Motors Corp., 490 F.2d 223, 227-28 (7th Cir.1973) (citations omitted); 7 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 15:6 (4th ed.1997); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 73 cmt. b (1981); 6A Arthur Linton Cor-bin, Corbin on Contracts § 1430 (1962); Restatement of Contracts § 552(1) (1932), as well as in ethical rules which bar an attorney from offering a witness compensation or other illegal inducements to testify — even for truthful testimony, see, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(b) (1996); Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-109(C) (1981).10
Congress has expressed its desire that government attorneys comply with state and local federal court rules governing the practice of law. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a). These ethical norms not only protect the individual, but also our system of justice within a democracy. In the words of the late Judge Burciaga:
[W]e must understand ethical standards are not merely a guide for the lawyer’s conduct, but are an integral part of the administration of justice. Recognizing a Government lawyer’s role as a shepherd of justice, we must not forget that the authority of the Government lawyer does not arise from any right of the Government, but from power entrusted to the Government. When a Government lawyer, with enormous resources at his or her disposal, abuses this power and ignores ethical standards, he or she not only undermines the public trust, but inflicts damage beyond calculation to our system of justice. This alone compels the responsible and ethical exercise of power.
Matter of Doe, 801 F.Supp. at 479-80.
Constitutional law manifests another vital legal tradition which the government’s position undercuts — the policy of ensuring a level playing field between the government and defendant in a criminal case. The Supreme Court long ago recognized that impartiality in criminal cases requires that “[bjetween [the accused] and the state the scales are to be evenly held.” Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70, 7 S.Ct. 350, 30 L.Ed. 578 (1887). Such a policy dates back to the Bill of Rights, which was “designed to level the playing field between the defendant and the state,” Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Chi. L.Rev. 361, 402 (1996), and indeed the policy has animated landmark constitutional decisions, see, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (stating that “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminals trials are fair”); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (stating that privilege against self-incrimination is required, inter alia, “[t]o maintain a fair state-individual balance”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Simply put, ours is an adversarial legal system, and implicit in this system, which pits the government against the defendant in a court of law, is the notion of fair play. See Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Stan. L.Rev. 1133, 1138 (1982).
Remaining faithful to the important common law prohibition against paying fact witnesses and the fundamental policy of ensuring a level playing field between the government and defendant requires applying § 201(c)(2) to the government as its plain language suggests.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent. A more detailed explanation of my *1315position has been set forth in the original panel opinion in this case. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir.1998).

. The concurring opinion incorrectly suggests that we should be concerned only with two promises made to the co-conspirator for his testimony. The co-conspirator's plea agreement contained three specific promises in exchange for testimony: (1) forbearance of prosecution, (2) advice to the sentencing court of the co-conspirator’s cooperation, and (3) the same advice to a Mississippi parole board. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1344 (10th Cir.1998). The concurring opinion suggests that the first of these promises should be interpreted as fully supported by the co-conspirator’s agreement to plead guilty to six counts of an indictment. Cone. Op. at 1303 n.l. The difficulty with this interpretation is that it contradicts the express language of the plea agreement. See I R. doc. 109 at 1, ¶ 2 ("In exchange for the plea of guilty set out in paragraph 1 and the defendant’s cooperation as set forth in paragraph 3 below, the United States agrees ....) (emphasis added); id. at 2, ¶ 3 ("The defendant agrees, in consideration of the items listed in paragraph 2 above, as follows: a. Defendant agrees to fully cooperate. ... This includes: ... 2. testifying truthfully in federal grand jury proceedings, as necessary; 3. testifying truthfully in federal and state court, as necessary;”). Plainly, all three promises by the government were made in partial consideration for the co-conspirator's testimony.

. Like § 201(c)(2), the subornation of perjury statute applies to “[w]hoever," and makes no exception for federal prosecutors.

. One way prosecutors could obtain information and assistance short of actual testimony at trial is to enter into a plea agreement with a defendant under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e). Section 201(c) does not prohibit Rule 11(e) plea agreements in which the defendant pleads in exchange for information helpful to the prosecution if the plea agreement is not conditioned on the defendant testifying. However, the prosecutor could record the plea discussions to preserve the information provided by the defendant. After the defendant enters his *1310guilty plea and is sentenced, the prosecutor could subpoena him as a witness in a trial of the other participants in the crime. If the defendant testified contrary to the statements he made during the plea negotiations, the government could impeach him with the record of his prior statements. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995) (upholding waiver of exclusionary provisions of Rule 11(e)). It is important to note that the defendant's trial testimony in this situation is compelled through subpoena, and is not given in exchange for anything of value.
Such a practice protects every legitimate pros-ecutorial concern expressed in this case by the government and refutes its contention that the criminal justice system would be crippled if it could not offer leniency to a defendant in exchange for testimony.

. The panel’s interpretation of § 201(c)(2) would not be retroactive. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the Court held that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced,” id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, unless the new rule "places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," or could be considered a "watershed rule[] of criminal procedure,” the observance of which is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Teague does not apply to the statutory construction of a substantive criminal statute, and therefore, there would be no retroactivity under Teague. See Bousley v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1610, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998).
Although the remedy of exclusion of evidence based upon a statutory violation arguably constitutes a non-constitutional rule of criminal procedure, see Amicus NACDL Br. at 15-19, such a rule also would not appear to come within Teag-ue or its exceptions to finality. Although the concerns of comity are not present when a federal court reviews federal convictions, the concern with finality apparent in Teague is no less important. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (one-year limitation period applicable to § 2255 motions).

. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) provides:
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code.

. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) provides:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b) provides:
The court, on motion of the Government ..., may reduce a sentence to reflect a defendant’s subsequent, substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code.

. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a)(2) provides:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant.

. Sir Matthew Hale acknowledged that "the contrary opinion hath prevailed.” II History of Pleas of the Crown 280 n.(c).

. The Model Code provides that “[a] lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a [fact] witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case.” Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7 — 109(C) (1981). It also suggests that "[w]itnesses should always testify truthfully and should be free of any financial inducements that might tempt them to do otherwise" and that "in no event should a lawyer pay or agree to pay a contingent fee to any witness.” Id. at EC 7-28. This rule is well served by an interpretation of § 201(c)(2) that prohibits payment of compensation in the form of leniency.