Court Opinion

ID: 9844317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:00:45.980067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:32.605399
License: Public Domain

SILAK, Justice,
specially concurring:
I concur in the Court’s opinion, and write only concerning the argument made by the state at the hearing that the impoundment and subsequent search of Pearl Weaver’s vehicle were authorized by I.C. § 49-662(3)(c). This statute authorizes impoundment of a vehicle when the person driving or in control of the vehicle is arrested for an offense requiring an appearance before a magistrate. The state did not rely upon this statute as authorization for impoundment at the hearing in the district court on Weaver’s motion to suppress evidence, but raised the issue only on appeal as an alternative ground for affirmance of the district court’s order.
The state argues that the statute provides authority for the actions of the officers here. The authorization for impoundment under I.C. § 49-662(3)(c) does not establish compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372, 96 S.Ct. at 3098 (the inquiry is not whether the search was authorized by state law but whether it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). Thus, even if the Court concluded that the impoundment was authorized under § 49-662(3)(c), a matter upon which the Court’s opinion does not pass, the remainder of the constitutional analysis, with which I concur, would still be necessary.