Court Opinion

ID: 9793428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:47:25.259763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:57.113273
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(concurring in the result).
I concur in the result, but for one reason only; That a stay of execution was granted to a date certain, the date expired, and there is nothing in the record to justify any other action than that of the lower court in committing the accused upon such expiration.
That should end the matter, without any discussion of factually dissimilar cases, not pertinent here, as indulged in the main opinion. I believe such obiter but fans the flame of debate as to the elasticity of prison walls and the like, suggests possible incompetence and unfairness on the ’part of parole officials and sentencing judges, and provokes a disposition on the part of judges to commit offenders without stay of execution, leaving the matter to the pardoning authorities.
I cannot agree with the main opinion’s statement that “The question is: what pro*12cedure should- be followed in connection with revocation of probation,” The question in this case simply is: Should the defendant be granted a further stay of execution? There was no revocation of probation here at all. There simply was an expiration of the period during which a stay of execution was granted, followed by commitment. The gratuitous language of the main opinion and that lifted from other cases, in my opinion, should be reserved for an appropriate case when it arises, none of the cases cited therein, save Demmick v. Harris, having any pertinency here, and most of the language of the main opinion having to do with revoking probation in the middle of the probation period, a factual circumstance far removed from the instant case.
Even though most of the language has to do with termination of a probation period, the main opinion indicates that if there is a dispute about the accused’s conduct during the stay period, a hearing must be had to determine if another stay of execution should be granted. What would happen if the sentencing court refused to grant a further stay under such circumstances ? Would we order the court to conduct a hearing? If so, and such a hearing were had, would' we order the sentencing .court to grant a further stay of execution? And for how long? Or would we grant a further stay of execution? And for how long? If so, to whom would the accused report? And would we conduct a hearing at the end of the stay period? Or would we release the accused by writ of habeas corpus without further hold or restraint?
In my opinion the philosophy of the main opinion, so- ar as it relates to forcing sentencing courts to grant further stays of execution that they deem inadvisable, simply will operate to the disadvantage of accused persons, by encouraging trial courts to refrain from granting stays of execution at all, if, as the main opinion asserts, a hearing must be had if there is any dispute as to the conduct of the accused during the stay of execution period. I venture the guess that in every instance where such further stay is refused, promptly a dispute would arise by every defendant displaying his good conduct medal. Italics supplied.