Court Opinion

ID: 9777017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:51:55.267829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:46.107961
License: Public Domain

CRAHAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion except for its disposition of plaintiffs consortium claim and defendant’s comparative fault claim.

Plaintiffs Consortium Claim

Although they are lumped together in the majority’s analysis of defendant’s collateral estoppel contentions, there are key differences between plaintiffs claim for his own injuries and his claim for loss of his wife’s consortium that compel different results.
Plaintiffs claim for his own injuries cannot be barred by collateral estoppel by reason of the adverse judgment in his wife’s prior suit because two of the elements required for collateral estoppel are missing. Defendant concedes that plaintiff was not a party to his wife’s suit and, as the majority correctly holds, the mere fact that he is married to a party is insufficient to establish privity. Majority Opn. at 213; see generally 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. *218Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4459, at 522-24 (1981). Nor was the issue of the other driver’s negligence necessarily decided in wife’s prior suit. Although the jury may have determined that Webb was not negligent, such finding was not essential to the verdict. The jury may have determined that the other driver (Webb) was negligent but his negligence was not the proximate cause of any injury to wife. Collateral estoppel may only be applied to those issues that were necessarily and unambiguously decided in the prior suit. King Gen. Contr. v. Reorganized Church, 821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. banc 1991). Accordingly, collateral es-toppel cannot properly be applied to bar plaintiffs claim for his own injuries.
In contrast, the elements of collateral es-toppel are satisfied with respect to plaintiffs claim for loss of his wife’s consortium. Privity exists as to this claim not by reason of the marital relationship but by reason of the fact that plaintiffs claim derives from wife’s right to recover for her own injuries. Just as a grantee or assignee is considered in privity with and may properly be held bound by a determination adverse to his grantor or assignor from whom his rights are derived, so too a spouse’s claim for loss of consortium is derivative in nature and cannot exist in the absence of a viable claim on the part of the injured spouse to recover for her own injuries. Although the claims are independent, separate and distinct in the sense that they seek redress for separate and distinct types of damage, both claims are necessarily dependent upon the injured spouse’s right to recover from the defendant for her own injuries. Thus, where a jury has already determined that the injured spouse has no viable claim, it is not sensible to permit the other spouse to recover for loss of consortium.
Explicit recognition of the unique and derivative nature of consortium claims justifying the conclusion that the privity requirement is satisfied can be found in Rule 66.01(c), which became effective on July 1, 1965. At the time of trial, Rule 66.01(c) provided:1
(c) Consolidation — Injury to Spouse. If an injury not resulting in death is inflicted upon the person of one spouse, and causes of action therefor accrue to the injured spouse and also to the other spouse for loss of consortium or services or medical expenses, they shall be enforced in one action by both spouses if they have ever been co-parties in such action or if notice is given.
If any party against whom a claim is asserted gives written notice of the pen-dency of the action and of the necessity to join therein to the spouse whose claim was not joined, the claim of such spouse shall be barred unless the spouse makes application to be added as a party therein within thirty days after such notice. The spouse so required to join shall have an unconditional right to be added as a party pursuant to Rule 52.06.
With the adoption of Rule 66.01(c), cases such as Womach v. City of St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 100 S.W. 443 (1907), and the dicta in Marusic v. Union Electric Company, 377 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Mo.1964), relied upon by the majority, should no longer be deemed controlling. The principal rationale for the rule articulated in Womach, i.e., that the causes of action for personal injuries and loss of consortium were so distinct they could not properly be joined in one action2, is squarely overturned by the grant of an unconditional right of joinder in Rule 66.01(c).
Although General Accident has not cited or discussed Rule 66.01(e) in its brief, it has urged, and the minute entries from both cases reflect, that motions to consolidate were filed in both cases and overruled by the court. Contrary to the majority opinion, in view of the provisions of Rule 66.01(c), a consortium claimant is no longer to be “afforded an opportunity to seek redress for that loss in the way that he or she sees fit.” *219Majority Opn. at 214. Rather, upon notice by the defendant of the necessity of joining in the personal injury suit, the spouse asserting the consortium claim must join in the action or be barred from pursuing the claim. Garland v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 458 S.W.2d 889, 892-93 (Mo.App.1970).
Even in the absence of such express provision barring separate assertion of the consortium claim regardless of the outcome of the personal injury suit, a consortium claimant who actively resists consolidation should not be heard to complain of the bar of collateral estoppel by reason of an adverse judgment in the spouse’s suit. Given the unconditional right of joinder provided by Rule 66.01(c), the consortium claimant has unquestionably had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit,” as contemplated for the application of collateral estoppel. Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. banc 1979) (emphasis added). See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 48, Reporter’s Note to cmt. c, at 33 (1982)3. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment in plaintiffs favor on Count II for loss of consortium.

Submission of Comparative Fault

In reviewing the submissibility of a comparative fault instruction, we are obliged to consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the instruction and to give the defendant the benefit of any favorable inferences. Berra v. Union Elec. Co., 803 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Mo.App.1991). The plaintiffs evidence must be disregarded unless it tends to support the grounds of comparative fault submitted in the instruction. Id. The majority’s analysis does not comport with these well-established requirements.
To properly analyze the evidence supporting defendant’s comparative fault submission, it is essential to understand the physical layout of the intersection. The accident occurred where Germania/Hampton Avenue crosses Gravois. For convenience, most of the witnesses characterized Gravois as an east/west street with Hampton joining the intersection on the north and Germania joining the intersection on the south.4 However, from the photographs introduced at trial it is clear that Hampton intersects with Gravois at an appreciable angle. In fact, plaintiffs exhibits no. 4, a view from the west side of Hampton looking south directly down Ger-mania, and no. 5, a view from the west side of Germania looking north down Hampton, clearly shows that a car traveling north on Germania in the lane used by plaintiff would run directly into the southbound left turn lane on Hampton where Mr. Webb was located unless the driver veered to the right as he exited the intersection northbound onto Hampton. Copies of these two exhibits are attached.
Significantly, throughout his testimony, plaintiff consistently maintained that he was following the line of traffic in front of him “straight through Gravois.” Plaintiff was specifically asked, “Did you ever vary from that lane ever travel, [sic] ever go right or left?” to which he replied, “No, sir.” Although neither plaintiff nor his wife had any recollection of the impact and the precise point of impact was never established, both testified that they were more than halfway through the intersection when wife called out her warning and the accident occurred.
From the photographs in evidence, it is clear that it is at a point just over halfway through the intersection that a pronounced *220turn to the right must be initiated in order to remain in the proper lane of travel. A turn any sooner would align the vehicle with the right northbound lane. Delaying the turn would present the risk of crossing the center-line into the southbound left turn lane occupied by Mr. Webb’s vehicle. At no point in his testimony did plaintiff ever indicate that he was aware of the necessity of initiating a turn to the right. Rather, his testimony was as recounted above which, coupled with the photographs in evidence and viewed in the light most favorable to the submission, supports the inference that he failed to turn his vehicle as required by the physical layout of the intersection, crossed the centerline, and struck the Webb vehicle.
In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Webb’s deposition testimony concerning the movements of his vehicle up to the point of impact further supports the inference that plaintiff, not Webb, crossed the centerline. In this testimony, read to the jury as part of plaintiffs case, Webb stated that as he approached the intersection from the north he slowed, entered the left turn lane and turned on his turn signal. Although he also had no specific recollection of the actual impact, he was quite specific about the movements of his vehicle up to the point of impact. Webb testified that he slowed his vehicle to a point where it was rolling at a speed of no more than five to ten miles per hour, glanced down at his stick shift to shift it into neutral, and felt the impact. As to the direction of movement of his vehicle just prior to impact, Webb testified:
Q. Okay. And you were moving forward?
A. Yes.
Q. Or were you moving to the left?
A. No. I was moving forward.
Once again, viewed in conjunction with the photographs of the intersection in evidence before the jury, the inference that plaintiff, not Webb, crossed the centerline and caused the accident is clear. From the photographs it is apparent that a vehicle in the southbound left turn lane of Hampton that is proceeding forward and not to the left will not cross the centerline at any point and, in fact, from the moment it enters the intersection will begin moving away from the center-line to the right. Thus, if the movement of Webb’s vehicle was as he described it, the accident could only have occurred if plaintiff crossed the centerline. Accordingly, this specification of comparative fault was supported by the evidence and was properly submitted to the jury.
The majority dismisses Webb’s testimony as insubstantial on the ground that Webb “does not remember the accident,” a proposition refuted by the testimony recounted above, and with the pronouncement, unsupported by any citation to authority, that “[ejven in the most favorable light, statements by a driver about his position in the road does not carry substantial weight where that driver admits that he was not even looking at the road.” Majority Opn. at 215. Such reasoning clearly invades the province of the jury. It is not the proper function of this court to substitute our views about the proper weight to be accorded clear and unequivocal testimony by an eyewitness.
Contrary to the impression created by the majority opinion, Webb’s testimony does not suggest that he was staring fixedly at his gearshift lever, oblivious to the movement of his vehicle. Webb “glanced” down at the lever to shift it into neutral while traveling no more than five to ten miles per hour. Common experience suggests that drivers frequently glance at the controls of their vehicles without losing track of their direction of travel. Even while the eyes may be diverted from the roadway, a driver can be expected to know whether he has turned the steering wheel and can quite often sense a change in direction by sensation or peripheral vision. That a driver could become sufficiently distracted to lose track of direction is certainly a possibility the jury would be entitled to consider in determining the weight that should be accorded Webb’s testimony, but it cannot properly be said as a matter of law that Webb’s ability to perceive his direction of travel was so impaired that the jury was not entitled to accord his observations substantial weight in arriving at a verdict.
*221It is true, as the majority observes, that mere evidence of the positions of vehicles after a crash raises conflicting inferences and does not, standing alone, make a submissible case. Defendant did not, however, rely solely on the post-accident position of the vehicles, either at trial or in this court. Defendant urged that the photographic evidence showing the obvious jog to the right, plaintiffs statements that he was proceeding straight through the intersection and Webb’s testimony that he was in the left turn lane supported the inference that plaintiff failed to appreciate the necessity of veering to the right to remain in the proper lane of travel, and, due to the physical layout of the intersection, proceeded on a straight path across the center line and into the southbound left turn lane, where he collided with Webb. As discussed above, this was a reasonable inference from the evidence.
The evidence pertaining to the post-accident position and condition of the vehicles was argued to the jury as corroborating the foregoing evidence that plaintiff crossed the center line. The fact that the principal damage to both vehicles was to the left front does logically tend to corroborate defendant’s theory. Likewise, the fact that all of Webb’s vehicle and half of plaintiffs vehicle ended up in the southbound left turn lane on Hampton is consistent with defendant’s theory. Although the post-accident position of the vehicles would not, standing alone, support the submission, such evidence was admissible and could properly be considered by the jury.
The evidence was also sufficient to support defendant’s submission based on failure to keep a careful lookout. Plaintiff conceded he never saw Webb’s vehicle prior to impact. The majority concludes that the evidence was nonetheless insufficient to support submission because there was no evidence to show that plaintiff would have had time to avoid the collision had he been keeping a careful lookout. The majority’s analysis, however, assumes that it would have been necessary for plaintiff to change lanes to the open traffic lane on his right in order to avoid the collision. If, as the foregoing evidence suggests, the accident occurred because plaintiff, not Webb, crossed the center line, plaintiff did not need to change lanes in order to avoid the accident. He need only have veered to the right to stay in his own lane.
Plaintiff testified that he was proceeding straight through the intersection at least one car length behind another car at a speed of 20 or 25 miles per hour. Although given the layout of the intersection it is conceivable that his view of Webb’s vehicle directly ahead may initially have been blocked by the preceding vehicle, if he was keeping a careful lookout he should have been able to see Webb’s vehicle directly ahead of him with its headlights illuminated shortly after the car ahead began to veer to the right to proceed northbound on Hampton. This would have been at least a car length before the straight path travelled by plaintiff would have taken him across the center line and would have left ample time for plaintiff to initiate the required partial turn to remain in his proper lane of travel. Indeed, the fact that the preceding vehicles proceeded in the proper traffic lane without incident is itself evidence supporting submission of the instruction. See Wellhausen v. Harris, 654 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Mo.App.1983) (evidence that other vehicles were able to swerve into open lanes supportive of lookout instruction).
Because both specifications of the comparative fault submission were supported by substantial evidence, I would affirm the judgment as to plaintiffs comparative fault.
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. This Rule was amended effective January 1, 1994, but the changes are not material to any issue involved in this appeal.

. Womach, 100 S.W. at 448, 449. Further, Womach did not consider or discuss the derivative nature of the claims, a proposition first acknowledged by the Missouri Supreme Court in Huff v. Trowbridge, 439 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Mo.1969).

. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 48(2) (1982) provides:
When a person with a family relationship to one suffering personal injury has a claim for loss to himself resulting from the injury, the determination of issues in an action by the injured person to recover for his injuries is preclusive against the family member, unless the judgment was based on a defense that is unavailable against the family member in the second action.

. At this intersection, the streets involved do not precisely align with these directions and, in fact, although there is no confusion in the record, Mr. Webb’s deposition testimony was predicated on the assumption that Gravois ran north/south and Hampton/Germania ran east/west. For the sake of clarity, this opinion treats all testimony as if the witnesses had all used the same directional orientation, treating Gravois as running east/west and Hampton/Germania as running north/south, which are also the directions used in the majority opinion.