Court Opinion

ID: 9577697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:37:11.777599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:05.466134
License: Public Domain

VOLLACK, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with Part II of the majority opinion affirming the award of costs. I *1321respectfully dissent to Part III., A. and B., of the majority opinion which would permit the amount of restoration cost to exceed diminution of market value.
I agree with the majority opinion that the selection of the appropriate measure of damages in each case lies within the discretion of the trial court based upon the facts involved in each case. The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact or in instructing a jury, should apply the appropriate measure of damages, either the diminution of market value of the property as a result of the tort, or the cost of restoration of the property to the pre-tort condition. I disagree with the majority opinion’s failure to limit total damages to the market value of the property at the time of the tort. The better rule would be for the trial court to determine in its discretion whether there can be restoration, and to award such damages only if the cost of restoration is less than or equal to the difference between the value of the land before and after the occurrence of the injury. Mikol v. Vlahopoulos, 86 Ariz. 93, 340 P.2d 1000 (1959); Blanton and Co. v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 24 Ariz.App. 185, 536 P.2d 1077 (1975).
If the majority opinion is applied with no cap on the limit of damages which may be awarded, an unwarranted windfall to the injured party may result. The purpose of compensation for the invasion of property rights is to place the injured party in a pre-tort position. In no instance should recovery of damages in excess of the market value of the property immediately preceding the damage be allowed. The plaintiff should not be able to recover a greater amount for partial destruction than one could recover for total destruction than one could recover for total destruction of the subject property. If the cost of repair exceeds the market value of the property, the proper measure of damages would be the difference between the market value of the property just before the damages and the market value after the damages. “L” Investments, Ltd. v. Lynch, 212 Neb. 319, 322 N.W.2d 651 (1982).
The majority opinion in Part III. B. considers whether the plaintiffs would be entitled to damages for loss of use and enjoyment, annoyance, and discomfort resulting from the acts of the defendant. The ruling by the trial court lacks findings concerning these matters, and the trial court should expressly determine in its findings on remand whether or not there is sufficient evidence to award such damages. If need be, further testimony may be taken, but need not if the trial court can make appropriate findings and conclusions from the record as it presently exists.
Because of certain rulings by the court during trial based on the plaintiffs’ request for a determination as to the applicable measure of damages, I would concur in Part III. C. of the majority opinion that the county should be afforded an opportunity to put on testimony as to the cost of restoration. Furthermore, based on the lack of evidence in the record, testimony should be produced to establish the value of the property prior to the flood and the value of the property after the flood. I agree the matter should be remanded for retrial on the question of damages only, and the determination of either cost of repair damages or diminution of value damages, as long as the judgment amount does not exceed the difference between the market value of the property at the time of the injury and the market value of the property after the injury-
I am authorized to state that Justice ROVIRA joins in this concurrence and dissent.