Court Opinion

ID: 9462535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:43:01.944606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:37.913128
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The majority, like the district court, focuses on the potential conflict between Gopman’s representation of union institutional interests and the interests of the individual union officials. With deference, I suggest that the inquiry must be limited to the effect Gopman’s dual union and witness representation has upon the grand jury function. Since the union’s interest parallels that of the grand jury, no obstructive conflict with that process is created by Gopman’s union representation at this stage of the proceedings. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s approval of the district court’s interference with this client-attorney relationship.
Disqualification of an attorney in the course of representation deprives his client of the right to choose counsel. As a sanction with direct constitutional repercussions, it must be prefaced by a careful balancing of the individual and public interest involved. Recently, courts in two other jurisdictions have confronted this heretofore novel question. In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F.Supp. 1176 (D.D.C.1975), vacated, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C.Cir. 1976); Pirillo v. Takiff, 341 A.2d 896 (Pa.1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3424, 423 U.S. 1083, 96 S.Ct. 873,47 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976). These cases test for whether the harmful public effects of allowing continued witness representation by an attorney with other clients whose interests create a conflict with the grand jury function justify an encroachment on private civil liberties.1
The officer-witnesses who have been denied Gopman’s assistance have a right to be represented by an attorney of their own choosing2 and a right to associate for the purpose of retaining legal representation.3 Correlatively, Gopman should be allowed to pursue his profession free from arbitrary governmental limitations.4 None of these rights is absolute. They all may be counterbalanced against the governmental interest in the effective functioning of the grand jury.
Initially, it must be recognized that Gopman’s union representation in no way inter*269fered with the rights of the officer-witnesses.5 Conceding arguendo that a union’s interest in full disclosure may be at odds with a wrongdoing officer’s interest in refusing to incriminate himself, it is obvious that this hypothetically possible conflict did not taint Gopman’s advice to his individual clients in this case. Nor is there a basis for assuming that the choice of counsel by the officer-witnesses was made in ignorance of the possibility that a conflict could develop if they subsequently became targets of the grand jury. In contrast to the situation faced by the other courts who have dealt with disqualification at the grand jury stage, there is not the slightest suggestion here that the rights of an innocent witness will somehow be sacrificed to protect the guilty.6 In sum, nothing appears in the present record to indicate that the interests of the officer-witnesses are not well protected by Gopman.
More significantly, the grand jury’s investigation of union corruption has not been hampered by Gopman’s dual allegiances. I don’t see the officers’ “stonewall” as precipitated by anything other than protection of their own interest. It simply could not have been a byproduct of an improper conflict situation when the supposed conflict was a pressure for more, not less, disclosure. There is just no basis for assuming that Gopman’s union ties improperly promoted non-cooperation. While it is clear that one attorney cannot serve the interest of a non-witness client who wants silence by tailoring his representation of a witness client who could serve the truth with non-incriminating testimony, those facts are the reverse of the ones in this case. Indeed, both the majority and the government insist that the union wanted full disclosure. Thus, Gopman’s association with his “other” client, the union, can create no problems for the grand jury function at this point in the criminal process.
The bare fact that Gopman’s advice to his clients was to involve the Fifth Amendment’s protection must never be a part of the weighing process. If Gopman had represented only the officers, he certainly could not be disqualified for instructing them to remain silent. That he gave the same advice in spite of his union-client’s theoretical interest does not alter the equation. In each case, the attorney has no incentive to impede the investigatory process except insofar as the rights granted by the Fifth Amendment allow him to protect his witness-clients. Unless a showing is made that the supposed conflict could have at least an apparent ability to interfere with the grand jury function, disqualification is inappropriate.
Of course I do not insist that Gopman’s dual role as union/officer advisor would always be permissible. If any individual client should become the object of criminal or civil actions as a result of illegal union activities, Gopman could not continue to counsel both that interest and those of the union. Even at this later stage, however, the courts should allow union counsel to stay long enough to ascertain the nature of the lawsuit and protect the interest of all. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 145 U.S. *270App.D.C. 252, 448 F.2d 1175, 1177 (1971).7 Unless and until such a contingency occurs, I would refuse to order disqualification.

. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pirillo v. Takiff, 341 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1975) recently upheld a disqualification order prohibiting two attorneys retained by the Fraternal Order of Police from representing 12 policemen subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury. The court was concferned that the union’s avowed policy of noncooperation would interfere with “the rights of any witness who might stand to gain from a strategy of cooperation with the Special Prosecutor’s office . [and] could result in a complete frustration of the grand jury’s function.” Id. at 903.

. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) recognized the right of self-representation and emphasized that the accused is master of his own defense and should be given freedom of choice to decide questions pertaining to his representation. See also United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1969) (accused has right to fair and reasonable opportunity to obtain particular counsel).

. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963).

. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968) (disbarment); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623 (1889).

. In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F.Supp. 1176 (D.D.C.1975), vacated 531 F.2d 600 (D.C.Cir. 1976), provides an instructive contrast to our case. In that litigation, 21 pressmen who worked at the Washington Post were subpoenaed before the grand jury to answer questions concerning the destruction of newspaper equipment occurring during a union strike. Acting on the general advice of the union attorney, all but two witnesses invoked the Fifth Amendment, even as to routine questions concerning age, marital status, number of children, etc. The district court chose to break the “stonewall” by requiring separate representation. In spite of potential harmful effects to innocent pressmen and the grand jury, the D. C. Circuit vacated the disqualification order and instructed the government to remedy the situation by challenging any unwarranted claims of privilege.

. As the majority points out, Gopman’s practice is to voluntarily resign from the representation of any official who becomes a “target.”

. The government does not assert that the past representation by Gopman’s firm of the “target” officer presents a conflict of interest with Gopman’s present representation of the non-target officers. If there were any reason to believe that the witnesses’ noncooperation was caused by a desire to protect the target, this case would present an entirely different issue.