Court Opinion

ID: 9860786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:32:36.834732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:41.410726
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DiVITO, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that this conviction must be reversed and the case retried. I do so because the majority, though stating the proper standard of review, fails to apply it correctly, thus erroneously concluding that the trial judge’s comment constituted such prejudicial error that his corrective efforts were ineffective. By dissenting, I in no way condone the trial judge’s comment; that it was improper is conceded by everyone. Indeed, the principle that a judge should not vouch for the credibility of a witness in the presence of the jury is well established and needs no vindication here. The majority provides the proper standard for our review of this issue: “In reviewing the trial judge’s alleged errors, this court must determine whether reversible error occurred. For the comments or questioning by a trial judge to constitute reversible error, the defendant must demonstrate that they were a material factor in the conviction or that prejudice appears to have been the probable result.” (People v. Brown (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 566, 577, 588 N.E.2d 309.) But, having provided the proper standard, without analysis and relying solely upon People v. Crane (1976), 34 Ill. App. 3d 850, 341 N.E.2d 97, the majority draws the conclusion that the trial judge’s conduct “improperly lent the exalted weight of the trial court to the victim’s testimony.” 250 Ill. App. 3d at 537. The majority’s reliance upon Crane is misplaced. In that case, the appellate court made clear that the facts it dealt with presented no “alleviating factors.” There, the trial court put to the principal witness, an accomplice, leading questions designed to establish the witness’ knowledge of the penalties for perjury; that his answers were “true and correct”; and that notwithstanding his motivation to testify, what he said was “absolutely true and correct.” This questioning, unlike the situation here, came “at the end of lengthy and possibly effective impeachment by defense counsel, served to rehabilitate [the witness] and lend the exalted weight of the court to [the witness’] credibility.” (Crane, 34 Ill. App. 3d at 854-55.) In that case, except for the pattern instruction concerning accomplice testimony at the end of the trial, there was no curative instruction given by the trial court. In contrast, here “alleviating factors” are plentiful. The trial judge’s comment was made during a proper attempt to clarify complainant’s testimony and there is no indication that the comment was intended to rehabilitate the witness or lend the “exalted weight” of the court to his credibility. Rather, the circumstances of the trial justified the judge’s intervention. The complaining witness was a young child who hesitated, apparently was unfamiliar with certain words referring to parts of the anatomy, and was testifying while being interrupted by the prosecutor and by defense objections. We have held that a trial court should intervene in the questioning of a witness if justice requires that a fact be better developed or a line of inquiry more thoroughly pursued. People v. Puhl (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 457, 471, 570 N.E.2d 447 (holding that it was “not only proper but necessary” for the trial court to interrupt the State’s questioning of a minor complainant in order to clarify his version of the alleged sexual assault); see also People v. Hicks (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 636, 646, 539 N.E.2d 756. In Cupp v. Naughten (1973), 414 U.S. 141, 142, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368, 371, 94 S. Ct. 396, 398, in a case where the defendant neither testified nor offered any witnesses, the trial judge’s charge to the jury included this instruction: “Every witness is presumed to speak the truth.” Pursuant to due process analysis under the fourteenth amendment, the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ reversal of the defendant’s conviction, because the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the appropriate standards for judging witness credibility. Similarly, in this case the trial judge gave all the instructions deemed to have an ameliorating effect in Naughten. Moreover, here the trial judge’s misstatement not only did not carry the weight of a final instruction, he specifically instructed the jury to disregard it. Also, despite the majority’s statement to the contrary, the evidence against defendant in this case was not closely balanced. Complainant’s testimony1 was substantially corroborated by defendant’s own statement to the police, in which he admitted that complainant and the other boy spent the night at his house following a party for their baseball team. In that statement, he admitted that he gave complainant a bath that night and the other boy a bath the next morning, and that both boys slept in the bed with him and wore shorts while he wore underwear. Although in his statement he did not admit placing his finger in complainant’s anus, that aspect of complainant’s testimony was corroborated by Dr. Feinstein’s findings, and by the fact that, although contested, complainant’s testimony was not rebutted and remained constant through defense counsel’s cross- and re-cross-examinations. See People v. Walton (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 324, 332, 254 N.E.2d 190 (holding that because defense counsel had adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and could not challenge or impeach the witness concerning the very area in dispute, the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s erroneous remarks). Furthermore, the majority’s statement that the “trial court did not immediately admonish the jury to disregard the remark” (250 Ill. App. 3d at 537) is disingenuous.2 Despite the majority’s criticism that the limiting instruction was not given until after the lunch break,3 defendant did not make a contemporaneous objection to the trial judge’s remark.4 Instead, defense counsel moved for a mistrial only after he completed his re-cross-examination of complainant and after complainant had been excused as a witness. Thus, defendant’s own actions, constituting waiver in most instances, denied the trial judge an opportunity to remedy the situation at an earlier time. Under the circumstances, the trial judge acted promptly and effectively. Finally, the trial judge’s limiting instruction sufficiently negated any prejudice defendant may have suffered. Our supreme court has recently reiterated that limiting instructions are effective in reducing the prejudicial effect of a court’s improper comments. (People v. Peeples (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 422, 467-68.) In Peeples, before the entire venire the trial court expressed its agreement with a prospective juror’s opinion that the rules of evidence should be relaxed because they “tied” the hands of the prosecution. On appeal, the supreme court held that the trial court improperly allowed the venire to hear the remarks, but found the error to be harmless because, in its written instructions to the jury, the court said that it did not intend to indicate an opinion as to the evidence or what the verdict should be. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d at 467-68. In the instant case, the trial judge emphatically instructed the jury that he had formed no opinion as to the outcome of the case and that the jury was required to draw its own conclusions. The majority provides only a small portion of the trial judge’s limiting instruction. An examination of the entire statement reveals that the judge acted carefully to cure the misstatement without highlighting it: “[THE COURT]: Ladies and gentlemen, before we begin again it was brought to my attention that possibly during part of this trial I may have made a statement or said something which could have been construed the wrong way by the jury, if they even heard it. I don’t plan on repeating what I said. But, remember that I told you at the beginning of the trial that you will decide the credibility of the witnesses. Not me. And, if a statement was made as to possibly credibility of a witness it was not even to be. [sic] My opinion as to whether or not that witness was credible or not. As I told you before we started the trial I’m not the one who is going to decide whether the witness is credible or not. It is up to you people. So, if there was any misinterpretation or any idea of any of the jurors I may have been leaning one way or anothér with a certain witness I would like you to take that out of your mind. Because I’m — I know I have not made up my mind in this case. I have not made up my mind in this case. I have not listened to case [sic] — It is not for me to make up my mind. It is not my job. I’m not going to make the decision in this case, you are. So, as far as anything about credibility of the witnesses that by my statement may have been said to [sic] by me I want you to disregard that. Because it was not said in that vain [sic]. Like I said you may not have even heard what I said when I made the statement. Just remember the rules that I told you before. I will rule on the law. You will rule on the facts and evidence. And, you will decide the credibility of every witness, not me. Do you all understand that? [ALL JURORS]: Yes.” Thus, the jury was fully informed of its responsibility to determine the credibility of the witnesses, that the trial judge did not have that responsibility, and that it was not to be influenced by the trial judge’s earlier remark. By their response in unison to the trial judge’s specific question, the jurors stated that they understood his instructions. There is thus no basis for concluding, as the majority does, that “prejudice to the defendant was the probable result of the trial court’s comments.” (250 Ill. App. 3d at 538.) Likewise, there is no basis for the majority’s conclusional statements that “[t]he trial court’s lengthy admonishment highlighted the improper remark and focused the jury’s attention on the trial court’s opinion of the credibility of the witness” (250 Ill. App. 3d at 538), or that the “belated admonishment” in this case “may well have increased the prejudicial effect of the improper remark” (250 Ill. App. 3d at 538). Those statements by the majority are inconsistent with the long-established principle, found in Peeples and in countless other cases, that limiting instructions have curative value. Moreover, in addition to the trial judge’s curative instruction soon after the event, the jury received the following instruction as part of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.01 (2d ed. 1981): “Neither by these instructions nor by any ruling or remark which I have made do I mean to indicate any opinion as to the facts or as to what your verdict should be.” Because “[f]aith in the ability of a properly instructed jury to separate issues and reach a correct result is the cornerstone of the jury system” (People v. Illgen (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 353, 376, 583 N.E.2d 515), there is simply no basis for concluding here, in conformance with the appropriate standard of review, that defendant has demonstrated that the trial judge’s improper comment either was a material factor in his conviction or that prejudice was the probable result. On the contrary, this record indicates that the trial judge adequately admonished the jury and that his earlier remark served no role in the ultimate verdict. This conviction should be affirmed.  here is no basis for the majority’s assertions that complainant’s testimony was “replete with expressions of uncertainty” (250 Ill. App. 3d at 536) and that it was “uncertain” (250 Ill. App. 3d at 538). On the contrary, except for the confusion evidenced by the quoted portions of his testimony, complainant displayed no uncertainty about any of the matters about which he testified, including the fact of penetration.   In its effort to distinguish this case from the holding in People v. Black (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 996, 266 N.E.2d 468, the majority says that there, “the immediate retraction partially cured the effect of the improper comment, and the error was not prejudicial because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.” (250 Ill. App. 3d at 537.) A reading of Black, however, reveals that the majority places undue emphasis on the “immediacy” of the trial court’s retraction, and that the overwhelming nature of the evidence, though alluded to earlier in the opinion concerning a different issue, was not related to the holding concerning the court’s improper comment.   The majority’s gratuitous statement, “[b]y that time the jurors had already made their preliminary evaluations of the witnesses’ credibility, after absorbing the trial court’s remarks” (250 Ill. App. 3d at 537) has absolutely no record support and is inconsistent with the trial judge’s specific admonition, before the beginning of trial, that the jury was to keep an open mind and refrain from making a decision until the close of the evidence.   The majority says “defense counsel pointed [the error] out in chambers, when counsel could comment without calling undue attention to the trial court’s apparent assessment of credibility in the jury’s presence.” (250 Ill. App. 3d at 537.) Of course, the need for a hearing outside the jury’s presence in no way implicates the well-established requirement of a contemporaneous objection to preserve error. A simple sidebar request after the trial judge made his statement would have resulted in a hearing outside the jury’s presence. If, however, by the above-quoted statement, the majority intends to explain and condone defendant’s delay in objecting, it must be rejected. Concern about “calling undue attention” to error is inconsistent with the contemporaneous objection rule. Arguably, every objection has the danger of calling undue attention to the error that is addressed; for that reason, there is no “undue attention” exception to the contemporaneous objection rule. In any event, how could it be said that there was danger of calling undue attention to error the majority deems to be fatal?