Court Opinion

ID: 9844178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:58:32.008936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:29.376469
License: Public Domain

SCHROEDER, Justice,
concurs in part; dissents in parts IV, V and VI.
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT APPLY A CAP.
The Court holds that the trial court erred by applying a cap rather than an evidence-driven standard in determining whether any additional support above the $70,000 figure should have been awarded. While the trial court used the term “cap,” the record indicates the trial court in fact considered the relevant factors set forth in I.C.S.G. Section 10(e). The trial court rejected as inapplicable four of the seven factors, finding that the children had no independent financial resources; the standard of living the children enjoyed during the marriage was about the same as their present standard; neither child had a special impairment, limitation, disability or need for special education; and, the children did not have any special living condition needs that would require additional costs. The record supports these findings.
The trial court next considered the financial resources and obligations of Carla and Stephen, based upon each party’s exhibits indicating their monthly expenses. I.C.S.G. Section 10(c)(2). The trial court found that Stephen had a sufficient amount of disposable income to cover the needs of the children found to be lacking after an analysis of Carla’s income and expenses. The record supports, and the appellant did not challenge, the trial court’s finding.
Carla’s exhibit 10 and testimony regarding exhibit 10 was the focus of the trial court’s inquiry as to whether the physical and emotional condition and needs of the children required additional support. I.C.S.G Section 10(c)(4). The trial court found that some of the expenses represented in Carla’s exhibit 10 were unreasonable. The trial court cited the following problems: (1) Carla’s representation that she could live on only $944 per month if the children were not living with her; (2) the appearance that Carla was interpreting an increase in child support over the $70,000 figure as a substitute for alimony and ex-spouse maintenance; (3) the fact that Carla spent $433 a month on clothes for the children; (4) the fact that some of the items listed in exhibit 10 were either exaggerations of actual costs or expenses or, if they were accurate, that they were so unreasonable that the trial court would not accept them; and (5) some of the items in exhibit 10 should not have been included (e.g., travel, because Stephen had agreed to pay for travel ex*608penses) or were substantially over-estimated (e.g., school meal tickets were overestimated by $450, child care was over-estimated by $2,467, and “mise., mailings” would equate to about 3,682 mailings per year3). In addition the trial court found that there was no evidence indicating that additional support was needed for the educational needs of the children.
The trial court applied the evidence offered by Carla to the factors set forth in the I.C.S.G. Section 10(e)(4). The appellants did not challenge the trial court’s finding that the child care costs were overstated in exhibit 10 by $2,467 per year or that Stephen had agreed to pay travel expenses, eliminating $1,020 of expenses from exhibit 10’s budget. There was no testimony indicating that the children had any physical or emotional conditions that required additional support, except for Carla’s testimony regarding the sudden and predicted continuing physical growth of the children. Carla did not provide any firm dollar amounts as to the continuing costs of the children’s physical growth, and the trial court correctly refused to speculate as to an appropriate amount for such future physical growth.
While the trial court concluded that it could not rely upon the figures that it found to be unreasonable and/or incorrect as grounds for awarding additional support, the trial court did rely upon the amount in exhibit 10 for Jordan’s violin lessons. Jordan has a special talent and ability for playing the violin. The evidence supports the expense in exhibit 10 for violin lessons, which the trial court properly awarded as additional support pursuant to I.C.S.G. Section 10(c)(6).
Carla’s assertion that Stephen should be required to provide a lifestyle comparable to his own is not supported by the present language in I.C.S.G. Section 10(c)(3). Section 10(c)(3) provides that in determining any additional support for Guidelines Income above $70,000, the court shall consider all relevant factors, which may include, “[t]he standard of living the child enjoyed during the marriage.” I.C.S.G. Section 10(e)(3) (emphasis added). The trial court found that the standard of living the children enjoyed during the marriage was approximately the same as their current standard. The trial court did not err in the determination that under the current version of I.C.S.G. Section 10(c)(3) Stephen was not required to provide the children with his current high income class standard of living.
The trial court’s use of the term “cap” in the decision was inappropriate. However, the .trial court actually applied the factors listed in Section 10(c) of the I.C.S.G. to the evidence presented. The trial court did not in fact impose a cap on support above the $70,000 Guidelines. The expense for Jordan’s violin lessons was a proper expense to award as additional support pursuant to Section 10(c)(6) of the I.C.S.G., but Carla failed to provide other credible evidence indicating that the children had needs that would require additional support from Stephen.
The Court has hinged its decision on the use of the term “cap” in the trial court’s decision, although a cap was not in fact imposed. It is clear that had there been credible evidence to support an additional award it would have been allowed.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO APPORTION HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES BETWEEN CARLA AND THE CHILDREN.
The Court holds that the trial court erred in holding that the calculation of the children’s expenses could not be established by a pro-rata estimate.
The trial court found that expenses such as rent, utilities, child care, and entertainment, were “unreasonable and unbelievable estimates on what the mother’s actual expenses [were] as compared to the children’s” and concluded that “[t]he calculation of the children’s expenses [could not] be established by a pro-rata estimate,” based on the evidence presented. The trial court did not hold that expenses can never be apportioned between parents and children but that the evidence *609did not support an apportionment of expenses in this ease.
Apportionment of expenses between a custodial parent and a child is permissible, but the trial court’s conclusion that an apportionment in the present case would not be appropriate is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING CARLA’S EXHIBIT 10 WAS IN PART UNREASONABLE.
The Court holds that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that certain expenses in exhibit 10 were unreasonable and unreliable. As the appellant, Carla has the burden of proving that by rejecting certain expenses as unreasonable in exhibit 10, the trial court committed prejudicial error. Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 119 Idaho 299, 306, 805 P.2d 1223, 1230 (1991). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 states that any error in a proceeding must be disregarded if such error does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
The trial court closely examined the items and amounts listed in exhibit 10 and concluded that some of the amounts were exaggerated or, in the alternative, the amounts were unreasonable. The cross examination of Carla supported the finding that some of the amounts were exaggerated, improperly included as a monthly expense, or could be viewed as being unreasonable. Although some of the trial court’s criticism of exhibit 10 was not supported by the record (e.g., the interpretation of “mise., mailings”), Carla has failed to satisfy her burden of proving that the trial court’s finding that certain expenses in exhibit 10 were unreasonable and unreliable constituted prejudicial error. Burgess, 119 Idaho at 306, 805 P.2d at 1230.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
If the trial court had in fact applied a cap, and if there were credible evidence to support an additional award of child support, the Court’s opinion would follow. But a cap was not imposed, and the trial court determined that there was insufficient credible evidence to justify an additional award beyond that allowed. This case reduces itself to factual issues that should have been left to the trial court.

. The trial court may have misinterpreted the term "mise., mailings” in exhibit 10 in that the trial court did not consider that the term could have included items other than mailings.