Court Opinion

ID: 9793574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:50:11.405855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:06.432788
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE SHEA
dissenting:
I would affirm the conviction but I would reverse on the issue of sentencing. The prosecution should not have been allowed to rely, under the circumstances of this case, on the persistent felony of*71fender statute because notice was given in violation of due process of law.
When the majority acknowledges “the only question presented ... is whether the giving of notice violates due process insofar as defendant is concerned;” they fail to address the issue. Instead, the decision rests on literal construction of the statute under which due process was allegedly violated. It is not enough to say the prosecutor’s conduct complied with the statute; our duty is to determine the constitutionality of the statute and state action taken under it.
In State v. Sather (1977), 172 Mont. 428, 564 P.2d 1306, this Court analyzed the constitutionality of state action under the persistent felony offender provision and found due process was denied when it was invoked on the eve of trial. The decision was firmly grounded on the United States and Montana Constitutional due process provisions. We need not adopt the rationable and standards expressed in Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978), 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 65 L.Ed.2d 604.I think we are sadly misled in doing so. The 5 to 4 decision is of little moment. Its narrow ruling began:
“It may be helpful to clarify at the outset the nature of the issue in this case. While the prosecutor did not actually obtain the recidivist indictment until after the plea conferences had ended, his intention to do so was clearly put forth at the outset of the plea negotiations. Hayes was thus fully informed of the true terms of the offender when he made his decision to plead not guilty. This is not a situation therefore, where the prosecutor without notice brought an additional and more serious charge after plea negotiations relating only to the original indictment had ended with the defendant’s insistence on pleading not guilty.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, 434 U.S. at 357, 98 S.Ct. at 666, 54 L.Ed.2d at 609.
The Court thus clearly distinguished the case of a prosecutor with full prior knowledge of defendant’s prior conviction, who invoked the harsher penalty for defendant’s withdrawal of a guilty plea on appeal. The cases treat such “unilateral” imposition of a more severe sentence in response to defendant’s exercise of a constitutional right as “vindictive” or “retaliatory”, and an impermissi*72ble denial of due process. United States V. Ruesga-Martinez (9th Cir. 1976), 534 F.2d 1367, 1369; Blackledge v. Perry (1974, 417 U.S. 21, 27, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2102, 40 L.Ed.2d 628, 634; North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 725, 726, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080, 2081, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 669, 670. I agree with the dissenters in Bordenkircher:
“Prosecutorial vindictiveness, it seems to me, in the present narrow context, is the fact against which the Due Process Clause ought to protect. I perceive little difference between vindictiveness after what the Court describes, ante, p. 667, as the exercise of a ‘legal right to attack his original conviction,’ and vindictiveness in the ‘give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.’ Prosecutorial vindictiveness in any context is still prosecutorial vindictiveness. The Due Process Clause should protect an accused against it, however, it asserts itself.” Borkenkircher v. Hayes, supra, 434 U.S. at 357, 98 S.Ct. at 670, 54 L.Ed.2d at 613, 614 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J. dissenting.)
Moreover, we cannot say that the State’s action in the instant case was part of a “give-and-take” or bilateral negotiation process for the very reason the majority cited; we do not have a well-documented record before us.
If we are to adopt the “give-and-take” plea negotiation analogy, we must embrace it fully. All bargaining contemplates the parties’ appreciating at the outset certain and definite terms of the bargain. There can be no “mutuality of advantage” enjoyed by the parties without full disclosure of the terms involved. Here, we have no record that defendant was apprised of what was at stake in negotiation.
The timing of notice given in this case raises an inference of retaliation on the prosecutor’s part which offends due process. The prosecutor should at least be obligated to show that invocation of the persistent felony offender statute was included in the broken plea negotiations.
The meaning the majority ascribes to the phrase “called for trial” “(section 95-1506, R.C.M.1947), renders the notice require*73ment to which it refers meaningless. Notice, after all, is intended to inform the recipient in time to act or react. It would not be legislating to deem the notice required be reasonable. While it may be argued to require reasonable notice would only prompt aggressive prosecutors to invoke the statute as a matter of course, this unfortunate happenstance is far preferable to inviting prosecutors to threaten or retaliate and defendants to guess, gamble and hazard surprise.
When examined in light of the arraignment process, the importance of reasonable notice is better appreciated. It is at arraignment that defendant must enter his plea. Section 95-1506, R.C.M. 1947. If he pleads guilty, and if the prosecutor has not served him with notice prior to his plea, by the clear terms of section 95-1506, R.C.M. 1947, the prosecutor is foreclosed from invoking the persistent felony offender statute. Therefore, the State has a duty to act promptly, evaluate the defendant’s background and determine if the public interest will be served by seeking a harsher penalty in order to avoid foreclosure should defendant plead guilty. Assuming the prosecutor performs this duty, it seems unfair to impose different standards on when to notify defendant of this decision depending solely on whether defendant pleads guilty or not guilty. It is unfair to provide no standard because defendant pleads not guilty. There is no rational basis for the distinction.
By holding notice of intent to rely on prior convictions for sentencing need only be given before trial commences, the Court is encouraging prosecutorial gamemanship of the most offensive nature. Defendant is clearly entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for trial. Section 94-1907, R.C.M.1947. At some point in time prior thereto defense counsel should be relatively secure in advising his client on the advantages and disadvantages of accepting a tendered plea or going to trial. I believe the Court is here setting a dangerous precedent. If plea negotiation is to have any fair meaning, the prosecutor’s cards should be placed on the table in the negotiation process and long before trial commences.