Court Opinion

ID: 9414705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 16:01:08.579647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.470111
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 20-2398
                        ___________________________

                          Olvin Antonio Recarte-Cruz

                                             Petitioner

                                        v.

            Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States

                                        Respondent
                                 ____________

                      Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals
                                  ____________

                            Submitted: May 10, 2023
                             Filed: August 2, 2023
                                 [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before SHEPHERD, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

PER CURIAM.

      The Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings against
Olvin Recarte-Cruz in 2016. Recarte-Cruz applied for cancellation of his removal,
and the Immigration Judge denied the application. Recarte-Cruz appealed to the
Board of Immigration Appeals and moved to remand his case to the IJ to consider
new evidence. The BIA dismissed the appeal, and Recarte-Cruz petitioned this
Court for review. We deny Recarte-Cruz’s petition for review.

       Recarte-Cruz argues that the BIA abused its discretion by denying his motion
to remand.1 “Motions to remand are disfavored, and we review their denial under a
highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Campos Julio v. Barr, 953 F.3d
550, 553 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). If a petitioner wants to bring new,
previously unavailable evidence, “the BIA will remand only if the evidence is of
such a nature that . . . [it] would likely change the result in the case.” Berte v.
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The BIA abuses its
discretion in denying a motion to remand to consider new evidence “only when its
decision is without rational explanation, departs from established policies,
invidiously discriminates against a particular race or group, or where the agency fails
to consider all factors presented by the alien or distorts important aspects of the
claim.” Rodriguez v. Barr, 952 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see
also Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992) (explaining that motions to
remand for the consideration of new evidence are treated as motions to reopen).

       At his hearing, Recarte-Cruz argued that his removal would cause exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives—his citizen children. At
the time, Recarte-Cruz’s two older children lived with him while his two younger
children lived with their mother. Recarte-Cruz maintained that if he were deported,
his two oldest children would move back to Honduras with him while the younger
two would stay in the United States with their mother. In 2016, Recarte-Cruz’s
youngest son, Christian, was diagnosed with an autoimmune disorder. Ultimately,

      1
        As an initial matter, the Government argues that we do not have jurisdiction
to review Recarte-Cruz’s petition under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Patel
v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614 (2022), because it requires us to make a judgment
relating to cancellation of removal. We recently rejected this argument in Llanas-
Trejo v. Garland, 53 F.4th 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2022) (distinguishing Patel and finding
we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen a petitioner’s
cancellation of removal proceedings).
                                         -2-
the IJ denied Recarte-Cruz’s application for cancellation of removal because his two
children’s relocation to Honduras was not an exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship. The IJ also acknowledged that Christian would be able to receive
appropriate medical care because he lived with his mother.

      After his hearing, Recarte-Cruz gained sole custody of all four children. He
then moved for the BIA to remand his case to consider this evidence, asserting that
he would take all four children to Honduras with him if he were deported. The BIA
denied the motion, determining that Recarte-Cruz’s new custody arrangement would
not change the outcome of his removal proceedings.

       The BIA did not abuse its discretion by determining that the new custody
arrangement would not affect Recarte-Cruz’s case. The BIA acknowledged that the
new custody order did not indicate that Recarte-Cruz ever informed the court of his
immigration proceedings or his desire to relocate his children. Rather, the custody
order indicated that the court would need to approve any travel or residency changes
for the children. 2 The BIA reasoned that that “[e]ven assuming [Recarte-Cruz] was
granted the ability to take all four of his children to Honduras with him . . .
[Christian’s] medical condition does not appear particularly serious nor has
[Recarte-Cruz] submitted documentation to show [Christian] would be unable to
obtain medical treatment in Honduras.”3 We conclude that it was not an abuse of
discretion to deny Recarte-Cruz’s motion to remand.

      2
         Recarte-Cruz argues that the BIA misstated the evidence. We acknowledge
that the BIA stated that the custody order “does indicate” that Recarte-Cruz informed
the court of his immigration proceedings. But when read in context, it is clear that
this was a scrivener’s error, and the BIA meant to say that the custody order “does
not indicate” such. Accordingly, we decline to entertain Recarte-Cruz’s claim that
the BIA based its opinion on factual error.
       3
         Recarte-Cruz argues that the BIA engaged in impermissible factfinding by
remarking that Christian’s condition did “not appear particularly serious.” See
Garcia-Mata v. Sessions, 893 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 2018) (noting that “[t]he
[BIA] lacks authority to engage in factfinding of its own”). We disagree. Prior to
making this statement, the BIA reiterated the IJ’s conclusion that Christian’s
                                          -3-
      We deny Recarte-Cruz’s petition for review.
                    ______________________________

condition is usually mild and goes away without treatment within four to six weeks.
It did not engage in factfinding with its comment summarizing the severity of
Christian’s condition.
                                        -4-