Court Opinion

ID: 9517445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:17:22.115167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:29.589590
License: Public Domain

Bronson, P. J.,
(dissenting). I am unable to agree with the decision reached by my colleagues. Failure to advise the defendant of his constitutional *299right of confrontation against his accuser and his constitutional right against self-incrimination violates the standards established in Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 US 238 (89 S Ct 1709, 23 L Ed 2d 274).
Contrary to the interpretation given to the Boykin decision by the majority opinion in the instant case, I am of the opinion that the Court in Boykin established specific minimum requirements for the acceptance of a valid guilty plea in state courts. The Court stated (395 US 238, 243):
“Several Federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination quaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v. Hogan (1964), 378 US 1 (84 S Ct 1489, 12 L Ed 2d 653). Second, is the right to trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), 391 US 145 (88 S Ct 1444, 20 L Ed 2d 491). Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers. Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 US 400 (85 S Ct 1065, 13 L Ed 2d 923). We cannot presume a waiver of these three important Federal rights from a silent record.”
If the Court did not intend that the defendant, when entering a plea of guilty, be required to expressly waive these constitutional rights, why did the Court choose to enumerate the specific rights as a basis for a valid waiver? I can conclude only that the Court in Boykin believed that an appellate court would be unable to determine whether the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his plea of guilty when the record is silent as to these enumerated rights. People v. Jaworski (1970), 25 Mich App 540 (Lesinski, C. J., dissenting); People v. Sepulvado (1970), 27 Mich App 66 (Lesinski, C. J., dissenting).
*300Since the record in the instant case is silent with respect to the defendant’s right against self-incrimination and his right to confront his accuser, I am unable to determine whether the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly. The plea should be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial.