Court Opinion

ID: 9539240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:00:34.100634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:01.864155
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 20-1725
OTIS R. ELION,
                                                Petitioner-Appellant,
                                 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                               Respondent-Appellee.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                    Southern District of Illinois.
            No. 3:17-cv-01349 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.
                     ____________________

    ARGUED JANUARY 19, 2023 — DECIDED AUGUST 7, 2023
                ____________________

   Before BRENNAN, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
    BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. After Otis Elion pleaded guilty to
distributing methamphetamine, a federal district court
sentenced him as a career oﬀender under U.S. Sentencing
Guideline § 4B1.1. Elion’s attorney did not challenge that des-
ignation, and the court imposed a 167-month prison term.
Through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Elion argues his at-
torney’s failure to object amounts to ineﬀective assistance.
The district court denied relief, concluding that Elion was
2                                                           No. 20-1725

properly sentenced as a career oﬀender and, therefore, did not
suﬀer prejudice from counsel’s performance. Though we
commend the district court for its close and careful analysis,
after our application of the categorical approach, we conclude
that Elion does not qualify as a career oﬀender. So, we reverse
the denial of Elion’s § 2255 motion and remand for an evalu-
ation of counsel’s performance.
                                    I
                                    A
    In 2017, Elion pleaded guilty to three counts of distrib-
uting methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(C). Because Elion had prior state and federal drug-
related convictions, the United States Probation Oﬃce classi-
ﬁed him as a career oﬀender. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1(a),
4B1.2(b). That designation yielded a heightened Guidelines
range, which the Probation Oﬃce identiﬁed as 151–188
months. 1 Elion’s attorney did not challenge this enhancement,
and the district court adopted the Presentence Investigation
Report without modiﬁcation.
    Elion timely appealed his sentence, but his attorney
moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744 (1967). Elion voluntarily dismissed his consolidated direct
appeals in September 2017. Then in December 2017, Elion
ﬁled a pro se motion in the district court to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In his motion

    1 We agree with the parties that without the § 4B1.1 enhancement, El-

ion’s criminal history category would have been V rather than VI, and his
total offense level would have been 21 instead of 29. Per the 2016 Sentenc-
ing Table, which applied at the time, those metrics yield a Guidelines
range of 70–87 months.
No. 20-1725                                                  3

Elion argued that had trial counsel objected to the career of-
fender designation at sentencing, he would have received a
lower Guidelines range and a much-reduced sentence.
    Under Guideline § 4B1.1(a), a federal defendant qualiﬁes
as a career oﬀender, and likely faces an elevated Guidelines
range, if:
      (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old
      at the time the defendant committed the instant
      oﬀense of conviction; (2) the instant oﬀense of
      conviction is a felony that is either a crime of vi-
      olence or a controlled substance oﬀense; and (3)
      the defendant has at least two prior felony con-
      victions of either a crime of violence or a con-
      trolled substance oﬀense.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Elion was over 18 when convicted of the
2017 felony methamphetamine charges, so all agree he satis-
ﬁes the ﬁrst two requirements. Elion’s arguments focus en-
tirely on the third requirement: whether he has at least two
prior convictions for controlled substance oﬀenses.
   A controlled substance oﬀense under § 4B1.1(a) is:
      an oﬀense under federal or state law, punisha-
      ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
      year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-
      port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled
      substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the
      possession of a controlled substance (or a coun-
      terfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,
      import, export, distribute, or dispense.
4                                                            No. 20-1725

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). The Presentence Investigation Report
identiﬁed three of Elion’s prior convictions as controlled sub-
stance oﬀenses.
    1. A 1999 Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery
       of a look-alike substance within 1,000 feet of
       public housing property, in violation of 720 ILL.
       COMP. STAT. 570/407(b)(3).
    2. A 2000 Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery
       of a look-alike substance, in violation of 720 ILL.
       COMP. STAT. 570/404(b).
    3. A 2006 federal conviction for distribution of a
       cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
       and (b)(1)(C). 2
    Elion argues that neither the 1999 nor the 2000 Illinois con-
viction is a controlled substance oﬀense, and he asserts con-
stitutionally suﬃcient counsel would have recognized as
much. Reviewing Elion’s § 2255 motion, the district court con-
cluded that Elion’s 2006 federal conviction and at least his
2000 Illinois conviction qualify as controlled substance of-
fenses. Those determinations meant Elion was properly sen-
tenced as a career oﬀender and could not prevail on his inef-
fective assistance claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (requiring a showing of prejudice for

    2 Elion rightly points out that 1999, 2000, and 2006 refer to the years

when the offenses occurred, not the dates of his convictions. But the par-
ties and the district court used those dates, so we do as well. We also rec-
ognize that the Presentence Investigation Report inaccurately suggests
that Elion’s 2000 Illinois conviction was for a 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/407
violation. As the parties now note, that conviction was for violating 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/404(b).
No. 20-1725                                                              5

ineﬀective assistance of counsel). Still, the district court
granted Elion’s certiﬁcate of appealability, and he timely ap-
pealed. We recruited counsel to act as amicus curiae and to
make written and oral arguments on Elion’s behalf. 3
   If we were considering Elion’s sentencing arguments on
direct review, the question for this court would be straightfor-
ward: Does Elion qualify as a career oﬀender under Guideline
§ 4B1.1(a)? But Elion’s case arrives by way of his § 2255
motion for ineﬀective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we
outline Elion’s route to potential relief before examining the
merits of his arguments.
    In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 authorizes a prisoner in
federal custody to challenge his sentence “upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Here, Elion
claims a Sixth Amendment violation—he argues that he was
denied eﬀective assistance of counsel at sentencing. See gener-
ally Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685–86; see also Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566
U.S. 156, 165 (2012) (explaining that Strickland applies to coun-
sel’s representation at sentencing). To prevail on this claim,
Elion must satisfy two components. He “must show that
counsel’s performance was deﬁcient.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687. Deﬁcient performance turns on whether “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness.” Id. at 688. He must also “show that the deﬁcient perfor-
mance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. To establish preju-
dice, “[Elion] must show that there is a reasonable probability

    3 The court thanks Aaron Z. Roper, Esq., and Claire R. Cahill, Esq., of

Williams & Connolly LLP for serving as amicus curiae and providing ex-
ceptional assistance. For simplicity, we attribute all arguments to Elion.
6                                                     No. 20-1725

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been diﬀerent.” Id. at 694. As the dis-
trict court correctly recognized, Elion can show prejudice only
if he should not have been sentenced as a career oﬀender. So,
we start by analyzing the applicability of Guideline § 4B1.1(a).
                                B
    To determine whether Elion’s previous Illinois convic-
tions qualify as controlled substance oﬀenses for Guideline
§ 4B1.1(a), we must apply the categorical approach. United
States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Mathis
v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016); Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
The categorical approach is essentially a matching exercise:
We look to see whether the Guidelines deﬁnition of controlled
substance oﬀense is broad enough to encompass the elements
of Elion’s statutes of conviction. Smith, 921 F.3d at 712; United
States v. Carter, 961 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 2020). “If the ele-
ments of the crime of conviction are the same as, or narrower
than, the elements of the” Guidelines oﬀense, “the crime of
conviction qualiﬁes as a predicate oﬀense.” Smith, 921 F.3d at
712 (citation omitted). And, under this approach, we focus
solely on the statute of conviction’s elements, not the facts of
the defendant’s conduct. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 504.
    The analysis is straightforward when the Guidelines of-
fense is broad enough to include all the elements of the statute
of conviction. See id. at 504–05. But the inquiry is more com-
plex if one or more elements of the statute of conviction is
broader than the elements of the Guidelines oﬀense. Id. Then,
we must determine whether the statute is “divisible.” Id. at
505–06.
No. 20-1725                                                       7

    A statute is divisible if, rather than deﬁning a single set of
elements for a single crime, it deﬁnes multiple crimes by
“list[ing] elements in the alternative.” Id. at 505. When a stat-
ute is divisible, we can use the “modiﬁed categorical
approach” and scrutinize certain record documents “to deter-
mine what crime, with what elements, [the] defendant was
convicted of.” Id. at 505–06; Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26. With the
precise elements of conviction identiﬁed, we “can then com-
pare that crime … with the relevant” Guidelines oﬀense.
Mathis, 579 U.S. at 506. If the elements of that crime fall within
the coverage of that oﬀense, then there is no mismatch, even
if the same statute lists other oﬀenses with broader elements.
Id. at 505–06. By contrast, if a prior statute of conviction is both
broader than the Guidelines oﬀense and indivisible, then our
work ends. Such a prior conviction cannot serve as a predicate
oﬀense even if the Guidelines oﬀense covers the facts of the
defendant’s actual conduct. See Bridges v. United States, 991
F.3d 793, 800 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted) (“The categori-
cal method presumes that a conviction rests on the least seri-
ous acts that would satisfy the statute, regardless of the
oﬀender’s actual conduct.”); Descamps v. United States, 570
U.S. 254, 261, 265 (2013).
    Using that framework, the district court compared 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 570/404(b), the statute for Elion’s 2000 conviction,
to the Guidelines controlled substance oﬀense. Though the
court found that 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/404(b) punishes con-
duct more broadly than the Guidelines oﬀense, it concluded
the Illinois statute is divisible. From there, the court used the
modiﬁed categorical approach to determine that Elion’s 2000
conviction was for “distribution” of a look-alike substance.
The Guidelines controlled substance oﬀense also covers
8                                                   No. 20-1725

“distribution,” so the court held that Elion was properly sen-
tenced as a career oﬀender.
    We review the district court’s denial of Elion’s § 2255 mo-
tion de novo. Delatorre v. United States, 847 F.3d 837, 843 (7th
Cir. 2017).
                               II
                               A
    We begin by conﬁrming the relationship between Elion’s
two Illinois convictions, a point on which the parties agree. As
indicated, Elion has one conviction for violating 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 570/404(b) in 2000 and one for violating 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 570/407(b)(3) in 1999. For purposes of the categor-
ical approach, however, we need only examine the ﬁt between
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/404(b)—which we refer to as the Illi-
nois “look-alike statute”—and the Guidelines controlled sub-
stance oﬀense. Elion’s 1999 statute of conviction, 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 570/407(b)(3), is just an enhancement statute—it
elevates sanctions for oﬀenders who commit enumerated of-
fenses in certain locations. All agree the underlying oﬀense
for Elion’s 1999 conviction was a violation of the look-alike
statute near public housing. In essence, this means Elion was
convicted of committing the look-alike statute’s elements
twice—once outright in 2000, and once in addition to a loca-
tional element in 1999. As the government acknowledges, this
returns the focus of the categorical approach to the look-alike
statute’s elements. See United States v. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 796–
97 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 649–50
(7th Cir. 2020). If the look-alike statute criminalizes conduct
more broadly than the Guidelines controlled substance
No. 20-1725                                                   9

oﬀense, and is not divisible, then neither of Elion’s convic-
tions count towards his career oﬀender status.
                                   B
    We now use the categorical approach to examine the ﬁt
between the Illinois look-alike statute and Guideline
§ 4B1.1(a). The look-alike statute makes it “unlawful for any
person knowingly to manufacture, distribute, advertise, or
possess with intent to manufacture or distribute a look-alike
substance.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/404(b) (emphasis added).
By comparison, the Guidelines controlled substance oﬀense
covers, in relevant part, “the manufacture, import, export, dis-
tribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a coun-
terfeit substance).” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). Like
the district court, we start with whether the term look-alike
substance in the Illinois statute has the same or narrower
meaning as the term counterfeit substance in Guideline
§ 4B1.2(b). If the term look-alike substance encompasses a
broader range of substances than the term counterfeit sub-
stance, then Elion’s Illinois convictions cannot qualify as con-
trolled substance oﬀenses.
    Elion believes the two terms have diﬀerent meanings, ar-
guing that counterfeit substance refers to a narrower set of
substances. Speciﬁcally, he asserts that the plain meaning of
counterfeit substance contains an intent component. Quoting
United States v. Hudson, 618 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2010), he
says a counterfeit substance is a substance “(1) ‘made in imi-
tation of something else’ (2) ‘with intent to deceive.’” He then
argues that Illinois’s statutory deﬁnition for look-alike sub-
stance 4 contains no corresponding intent to deceive

   4 Look-alike substance is defined as:
10                                                             No. 20-1725

component. So, the Guidelines’ narrower, intent-focused
meaning of counterfeit substance cannot match the broader
meaning of look-alike substance. The district court partially
agreed with Elion, concurring that the plain meaning of coun-
terfeit substance includes an intent to deceive component. But
the district court still found no categorical mismatch because,
unlike Elion, it discerned an intent to deceive component in
the look-alike substance deﬁnition.
    For reasons explained below, we need not conclusively re-
solve this dispute. 5 Still, we recognize the ongoing debate in
this area, so we make a few observations. Because the United
States Sentencing Commission has not supplied a deﬁnition
for counterfeit substance, we must give the term its plain
meaning. See Ruth, 966 F.3d at 652 (citation omitted).

         [A] substance, other than a controlled substance which
         (1) by overall dosage unit appearance, including shape,
         color, size, markings or lack thereof, taste, consistency, or
         any other identifying physical characteristic of the sub-
         stance, would lead a reasonable person to believe that the
         substance is a controlled substance, or (2) is expressly or
         impliedly represented to be a controlled substance or is
         distributed under circumstances which would lead a rea-
         sonable person to believe that the substance is a con-
         trolled substance.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/102(y).
     5 Elion asks us to resolve this issue even if we hold for other reasons

that he is not a career offender. He argues that an answer to this question
will aid the district court’s evaluation of deficient performance on remand.
We decline to do so. On remand, the district court will examine the per-
formance prong in the first instance. The potential mismatch between
counterfeit and look-alike substance may, but need not necessarily, factor
into that analysis.
No. 20-1725                                                 11

Dictionary entries are often helpful for that exercise. Indeed,
when searching for the plain meaning of counterfeit in Hud-
son, this court referenced a dictionary entry that deﬁned coun-
terfeit as “made in imitation of something else with intent to
deceive; forged.” 618 F.3d at 703 (quoting Counterfeit,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 285 (11th ed.
2005)). The Eighth Circuit took a comparable approach in
United States v. Robertson, 474 F.3d 538 (8th Cir. 2007), while
examining the same two terms now at issue—look-alike sub-
stance and counterfeit substance. Also relying on dictionary
entries, that court held that the term counterfeit substance
contains an intent component. Id. at 541. Given Hudson and
Robertson, we understand why Elion and the district court
identify an intent requirement in the term counterfeit sub-
stance.
    Still, the issue is complex. Dictionary entries vary in the
meaning they ascribe to counterfeit, with some—but not all—
suggesting intentional deception is part of the plain meaning
of counterfeit. Compare Counterfeit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 285 (deﬁning counterfeit as “made
in imitation of something else with intent to deceive”), with
Counterfeit,     WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 519 (1986) (deﬁning counterfeit as “spurious; not
genuine or authentic”). As such, in the future the plain mean-
ing of counterfeit substance warrants careful consideration,
especially because the deﬁnition of the term likely impacts the
scope of Guideline § 4B1.1(a)’s applicability. But the issue is
not dispositive here, so we need not resolve it. Elion prevails
for an unrelated reason, which we turn to next.
12                                                   No. 20-1725

                                C
    Beyond diﬀering terminology, Elion also argues that the
elements of the Illinois look-alike statute punish conduct
more broadly than does the Guidelines controlled substance
oﬀense. Recall that the look-alike statute makes it “unlawful
for any person knowingly to manufacture, distribute, adver-
tise, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute a look-
alike substance.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 507/404(b) (emphasis
added). By comparison, a controlled substance oﬀense is “an
oﬀense … that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, dis-
tribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a coun-
terfeit substance)” or possession with intent to do the same.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). Juxtaposing those provisions reveals an
outlier—Illinois punishes advertisement while the controlled
substance oﬀense does not.
    The government disagrees. It argues that a defendant can-
not violate the look-alike statute by merely marketing an ille-
gal substance; instead, he must oﬀer the substance for sale and
intend to sell or distribute the substance. That additional
intent to sell requirement, says the government, makes “ad-
vertise” synonymous with attempted distribution. The con-
trolled substance oﬀense covers attempted distribution so, in
the government’s view, there is no categorical mismatch. See
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2; id. at cmt. n.1 (establishing that controlled
substance oﬀense includes attempt). The government cites
United States v. Thomas, 886 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 2018), and
other out-of-circuit case law in support of this position. See id.
(explaining that “a state law must require something more
than a mere oﬀer to sell,” such as a “bona ﬁde oﬀer showing
intent” for it to qualify as a controlled substance oﬀense).
No. 20-1725                                                   13

     To test the government’s thesis, we start with the term ad-
vertise, which Illinois deﬁnes as “the attempt, by publication,
dissemination, solicitation or circulation, to induce directly or
indirectly any person to acquire, or enter into an obligation to
acquire, any substance within the scope of this Section.” 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/404(a)(1). That deﬁnition uses the verb
“induce”—not “distribute” or “sell.” And, contrary to the
government’s argument that “[i]nducing a person to acquire
is just a longer way of saying ‘sell’ or distribute,” those words
as used by Illinois have diﬀerent meanings. Comparing the
terms “distribute” and “induce” shows this.
    For purposes of the look-alike statute, Illinois deﬁnes “dis-
tribute” as “the actual, constructive or attempted transfer of
possession of a controlled substance.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
570/102(h), (r). “Induce” lacks a statutory deﬁnition, but its
plain meaning is diﬀerent than the deﬁnition assigned to
distribute. An individual can “by publication, dissemination,
solicitation or circulation,” induce another to acquire a sub-
stance without ever personally attempting to transfer posses-
sion of that substance, as the deﬁnition of distribute requires.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/404(a)(1); see also Induce, OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“To lead (a person), by
persuasion or some inﬂuence or motive that acts upon the
will, to … some action, condition, belief, etc.”). As such, the
government’s contention that an advertising oﬀense neces-
sarily involves the advertiser attempting to distribute or sell
the substance he is advertising lacks textual support.
    The government directs us to People v. American Daily Pub-
lishing Co., 481 N.E.2d 859, 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). There, a
defendant newspaper published “an advertisement for diet
pills placed by a third party.” Id. The State charged the
14                                                   No. 20-1725

newspaper with “having knowingly advertised” the diet
pills, a look-alike substance. Id. The trial court dismissed the
information, and the state appellate court aﬃrmed. Id. On ap-
peal, the court concluded that advertising and publishing are
distinct activities with diﬀerent meanings. Id. at 860–61. One
can publish content without inducing another to acquire a
look-alike substance and, as the court explained, the newspa-
per also “had no pecuniary interest in the sale of the pills.” Id.
at 861. It had “no supplies from which to ﬁll orders and it was
not a conduit for the sale of the pills.” Id.
    The government reads American Daily Publishing as con-
ﬁrming that an individual cannot be convicted of advertising
under the look-alike statute unless he intends to sell an illegal
substance. For the government, it was the publishing newspa-
per’s lack of intent to sell that insulated it from liability. We
see it diﬀerently. The state court in that case did not hold that
an individual only advertises a look-alike substance if he in-
tends to sell or distribute that substance. Rather, the court
more narrowly concluded that “publishing” is a distinct
action from “advertising.” Id. at 860–61. The defendant news-
paper may have published the advertisement at issue but, in
doing so, it “did nothing of its own volition to induce anyone
to buy the pills.” Id. at 861 (emphasis added). To emphasize
this point, the court explained that the newspaper had no
stake in the diet pills, no role in ﬁlling orders, and no business
relationship with the advertiser apart from the advertisement.
Id. At no point, though, did the court ascribe an “attempted
distribution” or “intended sale” requirement into the statute.
Nor did the court suggest that “induce” is synonymous with
distribute or sell.
No. 20-1725                                                   15

    To read the Illinois look-alike statute as the government
urges would also render language in the statute superﬂuous.
Namely, Illinois already criminalizes attempt in 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/8-4, and the look-alike statute already criminal-
izes distribution. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/404(b). So, even if
the term advertise were excised from the statute, attempted
distribution of a look-alike substance is still a crime. The gov-
ernment tries to counter this point by arguing for “belt and
suspenders” drafting—they suggest Illinois added the redun-
dant term advertise to match the statute’s preamble and to
clarify that the statute addresses a particular concern. We are
not persuaded. Advertise is an independent word in the stat-
ute, and its deﬁnition uses the term induce, not sell or distrib-
ute. Given this, we decline to read advertise as merely restat-
ing, in narrower terms, what other statutory language already
covers.
   For these reasons, the look-alike statute’s inclusion of ad-
vertise means it punishes a broader range of conduct than the
Guidelines controlled substance oﬀense. Unless the statute is
divisible, Elion cannot qualify as a career oﬀender.
                               III
                               A
    Because the Illinois look-alike statute covers more conduct
than the Guidelines controlled substance oﬀense, we must ex-
amine whether the statute is divisible. Ruth, 966 F.3d at 648–
49. If it is, then we may turn to the modiﬁed categorical ap-
proach to discern Elion’s particular oﬀense of conviction. Id.
   A criminal statute that can be violated in more than one
way is sometimes phrased with alternatives. When scrutiniz-
ing an alternatively phrased statute, such as the Illinois look-
16                                                  No. 20-1725

alike statute, our ﬁrst task is “to determine whether its listed
items are elements or means.” Mathis, 579 U.S. at 517. “Ele-
ments are the constituent parts of a crime’s legal deﬁnition—
the things the prosecution must prove to sustain a convic-
tion.” Id. at 504 (cleaned up). By comparison, factual means
“are ‘circumstances’ or ‘events’ that need not be speciﬁcally
proven.” Parzych v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021)
(citing Mathis, 579 U.S. at 504).
    The Supreme Court in Mathis set a roadmap for discerning
between elements and means. 579 U.S. at 517. We start by
checking if a state court decision answers the divisibility ques-
tion. If the state’s highest court has previously ruled on the
divisibility of the relevant statute, then we simply apply that
decision. Id. at 517–18. We have also held that “reliance on a
state intermediate court decision is appropriate in the absence
of a decision from the State’s highest court or a compelling
reason to think the highest court would disagree with the in-
termediate decision.” United States v. Garcia, 948 F.3d 789, 793
(7th Cir. 2020).
    But when no state court decision answers the divisibility
question, we turn to the statute itself. Mathis identiﬁes two
textual clues as dispositive. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 518. “[A] stat-
ute may itself identify which things must be charged (and so
are elements) and which need not be (and so are means).” Id.
And “[i]f statutory alternatives carry diﬀerent punishments,
then under Apprendi they must be elements.” Id.; see Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Statutes that merely
identify “illustrative examples,” by contrast, recite means of
commission, not elements. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 518 (quoting
United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014)).
No. 20-1725                                                     17

    If neither the state’s highest court nor the statute’s text re-
solve divisibility, “federal judges have another place to look:
the record of a prior conviction itself.” Id. At this step, we peek
at the record documents, such as the indictment and “correl-
ative jury instructions” for the limited purpose of discerning
between elements and means. Id. at 518–19. Our focus re-
mains on the divisibility of the statute, and “review of the rec-
ord is truly limited because if by peering into the record the
sentencing court learns that the listed items are means, the
court must cease further consideration of the record and re-
turn to strictly applying the categorical approach.” Smith, 921
F.3d at 713 (citing Mathis, 579 U.S. at 518–19).
    If, using these tools, we conclude the Illinois look-alike
statute is divisible, then we can deploy the modiﬁed categor-
ical approach. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 517. Essentially, the modi-
ﬁed categorical approach allows us to discern which of a
statute’s divisible oﬀenses the defendant was convicted of
committing. To apply the modiﬁed categorical approach, we
“look[] to a limited class of documents (for example, the in-
dictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy)
to determine what crime, with what elements, [the] defendant
was convicted of.” Id. at 505–06. We “then compare that crime,
as the categorical approach commands, with the relevant”
Guidelines oﬀense. Id. at 506.
   Elion argues the Illinois look-alike statute is indivisible.
For him, “section 404(b)’s ‘manufacture, distribute, advertise,
or possess with intent’ are best read as indivisible means of
committing a single oﬀense, not divisible elements of distinct
oﬀenses.” The government sees it diﬀerently. Relying mainly
on Elion’s record of conviction, the government asserts that
18                                                    No. 20-1725

the look-alike statute lists elements in the alternative and is
divisible.
                                B
    The Illinois Supreme Court has not resolved the divisibil-
ity of the look-alike statute, so we turn to intermediate state
appellate court decisions. Elion rightly identiﬁes that some of
those decisions refer to look-alike statute convictions as con-
victions for “manufacturing or delivering” a lookalike sub-
stance. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 2016 IL App (2d) 140614-U,
¶ 5; In re Tajannah O., 8 N.E.3d 1258, 1261 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
Those “passing references,” says Elion, show that the Illinois
statute recites alternative means, not elements.
    While we agree that those decisions hint at indivisibility,
they are not dispositive. As Elion concedes, the cited cases
mention “manufacture or delivery” only in passing and do
not directly opine on whether the look-alike statute is divisi-
ble. We decline to put too much weight on language that does
not squarely address the relevant issue, especially when most
of those decisions are unpublished. See Najera-Rodriguez v.
Barr, 926 F.3d 343, 355 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mathis, 519 U.S.
at 517) (“Mathis directs us to look for a ‘state court decision
that deﬁnitively answers the question’ … not to construct our
own patchwork theory of state statutory elements through a
pastiche of dicta in cases that do not address the issue di-
rectly.”).
                                C
    Given the lack of dispositive state case law, we must turn
to the look-alike statute’s text. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 518. The dif-
ferent components of the Illinois look-alike statute all share
one punishment, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/404(b), so we
No. 20-1725                                                     19

cannot resolve divisibility on that basis. Mathis, 579 U.S. at
518. The statute also does not “identify which things must be
charged … and which need not be.” Id. So, the two dispositive
clues for divisibility are not present. That means we must
scrutinize the look-alike statute more broadly. See Najera-Ro-
driguez, 926 F.3d at 350–52 (examining “text and structure”).
    Both parties identify textual evidence as supporting their
preferred positions. But before we consider those arguments,
we recall the relevant portion of the look-alike statute: “It is
unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, distrib-
ute, advertise, or possess with intent to manufacture or dis-
tribute a look-alike substance. Any person who violates this
subsection (b) shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony, the fine for
which shall not exceed $150,000.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
570/404(b). Looking to that text, Elion highlights the singular
article “a” used in the phrase “a Class 3 felony.” For Elion,
that means the different verbs all culminate in a single, indi-
visible crime. Yet, as the government points out, the statute’s
construction cuts both ways. The look-alike statute lists the
different components in the disjunctive, so it would make
sense for the second sentence to use a singular “a” whether
the preceding list identifies elements or means. Given the vi-
ability of both readings, the statute’s text and structure do not
resolve the question of divisibility.
    Viewing things more broadly, both parties ask us to com-
pare the Illinois look-alike statute to similar federal or state
statutes. Elion offers Illinois’s first-degree murder statute, 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a), Illinois’s theft statute, 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/16-1(a), and part of the Federal Controlled Substances
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which have all been held indivisi-
ble. See People v. Cooper, 743 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ill. 2000) (citation
20                                                   No. 20-1725

omitted) (murder); People v. Price, 850 N.E.2d 199, 203 (Ill.
2006) (citation omitted) (theft); United States v. Orzechowski,
547 F.2d 978, 986–87 (7th Cir. 1976) (§ 841(a)(1)). The govern-
ment musters its own examples, including an Eighth Circuit
case, United States v. Maldonado, which concluded divisibility
for Nebraska and Iowa statutes. 864 F.3d 893, 898 (8th Cir.
2017).
    We acknowledge that several of the cited statutes—espe-
cially 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)—resemble the structure of the
look-alike statute. But this back and forth ultimately does not
resolve the divisibility question. In Mathis and related deci-
sions, the Supreme Court outlined the proper sources for de-
termining divisibility. 579 U.S. at 517–19. That framework
does not endorse comparing unrelated state and federal stat-
utes to conclusively discern divisibility. Comparing statutes
may have analytical value, but we are reluctant to resolve the
case on that basis alone. Many statutes undergo divisibility
analysis, and parties will often be able to identify statutes that
support their preferred conclusion. Still, we are not without
options to break the stalemate. Where “state law fails to pro-
vide clear answers,” the Court allows reference to “the record
of a prior conviction” to determine divisibility. Id. at 518. We
turn to those documents now.
                               D
   We start with Elion’s record of conviction documents, in-
cluding the information, indictment, and judgment, before
turning to the applicable jury instruction. Elion’s information
charged him with “unlawful delivery of a look-alike sub-
stance.” The grand jury indictment and judgment reflect the
same offense: “[U]nlawful delivery of a look-alike substance.”
While those documents suggest Elion was charged with—and
No. 20-1725                                                   21

convicted of—distributing a look-alike substance, they do not
plainly say so. Each document uses the word “delivery,”
which is not included in the look-alike statute. To be sure, the
statutory definition of delivery closely aligns with distribu-
tion. Illinois defines “delivery” as “the actual, constructive or
attempted transfer of possession of a controlled substance,
with or without consideration, whether or not there is an
agency relationship.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/102(h). And the
same statute defines “distribute” as “to deliver, other than by
administering or dispensing, a controlled substance.” 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 570/120(r). Nonetheless, there is a gap between
the term used in Elion’s record documents and the term used
in the look-alike statute. We do not know whether the docu-
ments use “delivery” in its definitional sense or as a general
reference to the look-alike statute.
    The government suggests United States v. Redden speaks to
this question. 875 F.3d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 2017). There, we ex-
amined 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/401 to determine if it crimi-
nalized conduct more broadly than the Guidelines controlled
substance offense. Id. at 374–75. We held it did not, conclud-
ing that “[a]ny conduct meeting the state’s definition of ‘de-
livery’ comes within § 4B1.2(b).” Id. at 375. While true
enough, we fail to see the relevance of that determination. The
issue here is whether the use of delivery in Elion’s record doc-
uments means the look-alike statute is divisible. On that crit-
ical point, Redden offers no guidance. So, we turn next to the
applicable jury instruction.
   In full, Illinois Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 17.34
reads:
       To sustain the charge of [ (manufacture of) (dis-
       tribution of) (advertisement of) (possession of)
22                                                No. 20-1725

      (possession with intent to manufacture) (pos-
      session with intent to distribute) ] a look-alike
      substance, the State must prove the following
      proposition:
      That the defendant knowingly [ (manufactured)
      (distributed) (advertised) (possessed) (pos-
      sessed with intent to manufacture) (possessed
      with intent to distribute) ] a look-alike sub-
      stance.
      If you find from your consideration of all the ev-
      idence that this proposition has been proved be-
      yond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
      defendant guilty.
      If you find from your consideration of all the ev-
      idence that this proposition has not been proved
      beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
      defendant not guilty.
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions—Criminal, 17.34. The Com-
mittee Notes provide additional detail on using the cited in-
struction. They explain that the instructing court should
“[u]se applicable bracketed material,” and that “[s]eparate is-
sues and definitional instructions may have to be given, along
with separate verdict forms, if the jury is to consider more
than one charge under Section 570/404.” Id. at cmt. n.1. Like
Elion’s record of conviction documents, the jury instruction is
subject to competing interpretations. It is unclear whether the
bracketed segment can permissibly contain multiple paren-
thetical components—which would mean indivisibility—or if
it may contain only one component to the exclusion of others.
No. 20-1725                                                   23

    Ultimately, our prior decision in Parzych v. Garland guides
how we interpret the record documents and jury instruction.
2 F.4th 1013. There, we examined the divisibility of Illinois’s
burglary statute, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/19-1(a), which states
that an individual commits burglary when without authority
he “knowingly enters or without authority remains” in cer-
tain buildings or vehicles, “with intent to commit therein a
felony or theft.” Parzych, 2 F.4th at 1015, 1017. The question in
Parzych was whether the two types of intent listed in the stat-
ute—intent to commit “a felony” or intent to commit
“theft”—qualified as means or elements. Id. at 1017.
    As here, the divisibility analysis in Parzych led us to exam-
ine the underlying record of conviction. Parzych’s indict-
ments showed that he was charged with “unlawful entry with
intent to commit theft.” Id. at 1019 (emphasis added) So, like
Elion’s charging documents, those documents included one
component of the statute (intent to commit theft) and left oth-
ers out (intent to commit a felony). While at a high level that
suggests divisibility, we cautioned in Parzych that charging
documents must be used with care. Such documents “regu-
larly include factual details that are not elements of the crime,
so the indictment’s inclusion of intent to commit theft—with-
out more—[did] not show that it is an element.” Id. The same
is true here with Elion’s record documents. We cannot con-
clusively determine whether their inclusion of “delivery” was
intended to describe the look-alike statute generally or meant
to identify “distribute” as an element.
   We also examined the Illinois jury instructions. In Parzych,
the relevant instructions “direct[ed] jurors to decide whether
a defendant unlawfully entered a property ‘with intent to
commit therein the offense of      .’” Id. (quoting Illinois
24                                                           No. 20-1725

Pattern Jury Instructions—Criminal 14.07–.10). The instruc-
tion thus left the intent component open-ended, with the
Committee Notes “direct[ing] that an ‘offense alleged in the
charge’ be identified on the blank line before providing the
instructions to the jury.” Id. On our review, we concluded that
“neither the blank line nor the committee’s notes require a sin-
gle form of intent to be inserted, nor do they clarify whether
multiple offenses could be added, if alleged.” Id. Accordingly,
“the jury instructions d[id] not suggest that the information
to be inserted [was] a single element of the crime.” Id. Given
all that, the record documents and jury instructions did not
conclusively establish divisibility.
    Here, Elion’s jury instruction is similarly—if not more—
ambiguous than the one in Parzych. As noted, we cannot con-
clusively determine whether multiple bracketed components
may be included in the jury instruction. This means the record
documents do not “speak plainly,” and we cannot satisfy
“Taylor’s demand for certainty” that Elion was convicted of a
controlled substance offense. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 519 (quoting
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 21). The Illinois look-alike statute is over-
broad and indivisible, so Elion’s convictions do not qualify as
predicate offenses. 6
   Our holding also accords with the warning we gave in
Najera-Rodriguez, 926 F.3d at 356. There, we explained the risk

     6 We understand this holding conflicts with two of our unpublished

orders, United States v. Phenegar, 809 F. App’x 323, 324–25 (7th Cir. 2020),
and United States v. Green, 458 F. App’x 568, 568–69 (7th Cir. 2012). But
those orders, responding to Anders briefs, did not benefit from the detailed
arguments and analysis now before us. In any event, we do not defer to
non-precedential dispositions. United States v. Prado, 41 F.4th 951, 953 n.1
(7th Cir. 2022); see also Circuit Rule 32.1.
No. 20-1725                                                   25

involved when federal courts interpret state statutes through
the categorical approach: “If federal courts interpret state law
incorrectly, by finding that state laws include essential ele-
ments that state courts have not treated as such, we could mis-
takenly cast doubt on the much higher volume of state crimi-
nal prosecutions under those same state statutes.” Id. So, “[t]o
reduce that risk,” we insist on clear signals, “signals that con-
vince us to a certainty that the elements are correct and sup-
port divisibility before imposing additional federal conse-
quences for those state convictions.” Id. Simply put, those
clear signals are absent here.
    Before ending, we acknowledge that our decision “ele-
vates the abstract and artificial categorical approach over the
known facts of the case.” Bridges, 991 F.3d at 810. At a certain
level of abstraction, the match between Illinois’s look-alike
statute and the Guidelines controlled substance offense seems
obvious—the statute and the Guideline both deal with phony
drugs. It is also plausible that Elion distributed a look-alike
substance instead of advertising one. But the categorical ap-
proach requires diligent adherence to a rigid framework. In-
deed, the Court has told us time and again that we may not
consider the facts of the defendant’s conduct, no matter how
apparent. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261. That precedent binds us.
So, adhering to the categorical approach, we hold that Elion’s
1999 and 2000 Illinois offenses cannot qualify as controlled
substance offenses.
   It follows that Elion suffered prejudice from counsel’s fail-
ure to object. He should have been sentenced under a lower
Guidelines range, and there is no indication the sentencing
court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of
§ 4B1.1(a)’s applicability. See Bridges, 991 F.3d at 808 (quoting
26                                                 No. 20-1725

Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 200 (2016)) (“In
most cases a defendant who has shown that the district court
mistakenly deemed applicable an incorrect, higher Guide-
lines range has demonstrated a reasonable probability of a
different outcome.”). Had counsel objected to the career of-
fender Guideline, there is a reasonable probability that Elion’s
sentence would have been lower.
                              IV
    The district court determined that Elion was properly sen-
tenced as a career offender and, therefore, could not show
prejudice for his Strickland claim. But the Illinois look-alike
statute punishes conduct more broadly than the Guidelines
controlled substance offense, and it is indivisible. As such,
Elion’s prior Illinois convictions do not qualify as Guideline
§ 4B1.1(a) predicate offenses, and he should not have been
sentenced as a career offender. We REVERSE the denial of
Elion’s § 2255 motion and REMAND so the district court may
examine Strickland’s deficient performance prong in the first
instance. Though we leave consideration of counsel’s perfor-
mance to the sound discretion of the district court, our deci-
sion in Bridges v. United States may provide helpful direction
on remand. 991 F.3d at 802–06.