Court Opinion

ID: 9539230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 15:00:31.137875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:38.543149
License: Public Domain

21-1929
     United States et al. v. City of New York

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                            SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1                   At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
 2   at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
 3   on the 7th day of August, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               JON O. NEWMAN,
 7               REENA RAGGI,
 8               MYRNA PÉREZ,
 9                     Circuit Judges.
10   _____________________________________
11
12   United States of America,
13
14                                Plaintiff-Appellee,
15
16   Vulcan Society, Marcus Haywood, Candido Nunez,
17   Roger Gregg, Jamel Nicholson, Rusebell Wilson,
18   Kevin Walker, Kevin Simpkins,
19
20                                Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees,
21
22                       v.                                                                     No. 21-1929
23
24   City of New York,
25
26                     Defendant-Appellant. *
27   _____________________________________
28
29
30   FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:                                          JAMISON DAVIES, Assistant Corporation
31                                                                     Counsel (Richard Dearing, Deborah A.
32                                                                     Brenner, of counsel, on the brief), for Hon.

     *
         The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
 1                                                          Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, Corporation Counsel
 2                                                          of the City of New York, New York, NY.
 3
 4   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:                                BARBARA SCHWABAUER (Bonnie I. Robin-
 5                                                          Vergeer, on the brief), Attorneys, for Kristen
 6                                                          Clarke, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
 7                                                          Rights Division, United States Department of
 8                                                          Justice, Washington, DC.
 9
10   FOR PLAINTIFFS-INTERVENORS-                            JESSICA I. APTER (Dana E. Lossia, Robert H.
11   APPELLEES:                                             Stroup, Rebekah Cook-Mack, on the brief),
12                                                          Levy Ratner, P.C. (Shayana Kadidal, Center
13                                                          for Constitutional Rights, on the brief), New
14                                                          York, NY.
15
16
17          Appeal from a post-judgment order of the United States District Court for the Eastern

18   District of New York (Nicholas G. Garaufis, J.).

19          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

20   DECREED that the order of the district court entered on June 9, 2021 is REVERSED and

21   REMANDED.

22          This is the latest iteration of a lawsuit involving the hiring practices of the New York City

23   Fire Department (“FDNY”). Defendant-appellant the City of New York (the “City”) appeals from

24   a post-judgment order finding it to have violated Paragraph 16 of the district court’s Modified

25   Remedial Order (“MRO”), a permanent injunction instituted in June 2013 after the district court

26   found that FDNY’s hiring practices had a disparate impact upon Black and Hispanic applicants.

27   See United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 99 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. City of New

28   York, No. 07-CV-2067 (NGG) (RLM), 2021 WL 2349500, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2021) (“MRO

29   Violation Op.”). Where a district court finds a violation of its order, its “interpretation of the terms

30   of the underlying order or judgment is subject to de novo review; its factual findings are accepted

31   unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous; and its ultimate ruling on the contempt motion is

                                                        2
 1   reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Latino Officers Ass’n City of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York,

 2   558 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2009). Applying that standard here, we conclude that the district court

 3   erred in finding that the City violated Paragraph 16 of the MRO by altering, without obtaining

 4   approval from the Court Monitor (the “Monitor”), the number of candidates called at a time for

 5   the Candidate Physical Ability Test (“CPAT”), a physical exam that entry-level firefighters must

 6   pass before entering the FDNY Academy. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

 7   facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to

 8   explain our decision.

 9      I.      Appellate Jurisdiction

10           Plaintiff-appellee the United States of America (“the United States”) and plaintiffs-

11   intervenors-appellees (“Plaintiffs-Intervenors” and, together with the United States, the

12   “Plaintiffs”) contest this Court’s jurisdiction to review the district court’s order. Appellate review

13   of violations of judicial decrees is subject to the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which requires

14   “final decisions.” We have held that civil contempt orders are appealable final decisions when the

15   proceedings “are instituted after the conclusion of the principal action rather than during the

16   pendency of the action.” United States v. O’Rourke, 943 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting

17   Vincent v. Local 294, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 424 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1970)); see also State of

18   New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 763 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[A] contempt adjudication is a

19   post-judgment proceeding from which an appeal may be taken, even if some aspects of the

20   underlying litigation . . . remain to be determined.”); 15B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

21   Federal Practice and Procedure § 3917 (2d ed.) (“[F]inality may be found because as a practical

22   matter nothing remains to be done, because the contempt seems separable from the remaining

23   proceedings, or because a long-continuing action yields several effectively final judgments.”); cf.

                                                       3
 1   N.Y. Tel. Co. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 445 F.2d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that contempt

 2   orders are nonreviewable where a proceeding “was in its initial stages and the final relief was a

 3   matter of conjecture”).

 4             While the challenged violation order is not expressly denominated as a contempt, it is

 5   sufficiently similar to support our exercise of jurisdiction. This matter before us is not a pending

 6   principal action. As we have noted, it is a long-standing case, the merits of which have already

 7   been decided. All that remains is enforcement of the MRO, which exists “to remedy the disparate

 8   impact . . . [and] put the FDNY on a course toward future compliance with Title VII.” United

 9   States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d at 99.

10             Plaintiffs’ attempt to frame the district court’s order as something other than a contempt

11   order is unpersuasive. The district court acknowledged that “[t]o determine whether the City

12   breached the MRO, [it and] the Monitor employed the legal standard for contempt of a court order

13   as set out in King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995).” MRO Violation Op.,

14   2021 WL 2349500, at *2. The district court also applied other case law that assessed the standard

15   for proving civil contempt of a court order. See id. at *4 (citing EEOC v. Local 638 . . . Local 28

16   of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 753 F.2d 1172, 1178 (2d Cir. 1985), for the proposition that

17   willful disobedience of a district court order is not necessary to prove civil contempt of a court

18   order).

19             Because we conclude that the challenged violation order is effectively an appealable

20   contempt order, we need not discuss Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ argument that this order is not

21   appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

                                                       4
 1       II.      Violation of the MRO

 2             Under King, a contempt order is warranted where a movant establishes that: “(1) the order

 3   the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is

 4   clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable

 5   manner.” King, 65 F.3d at 1058. The City challenges only the district court’s application of the

 6   first and third factors.

 7             Paragraph 16 of the MRO states that the City “shall not take any step in any process for the

 8   selection of entry-level firefighters . . . without first obtaining the approval of the . . . Monitor . . .

 9   through the processes specified by the Monitor.” Joint App’x at 246 (MRO ¶ 16). Looking within

10   the four corners of the MRO, Paragraph 11 defines the “[p]rocess for the selection of entry

11   firefighters” as “refer[ring] to any and all steps taken by the City of New York to hire entry-level

12   firefighters” and provides an illustrative list of steps. Joint App’x at 244 (MRO ¶ 11). None of

13   the steps mention the CPAT at all, much less delve into the number of candidates called to take

14   the test. And Plaintiffs, in briefing and at oral argument, could not convincingly explain why

15   management of this administrative detail is necessary to further the goals of the MRO. The most

16   applicable, granular example of a qualifying step provided in Paragraph 11 is “issuing a Notice of

17   Examination to open an application period for any person to apply to take any examination to be

18   hired by the City of New York as an entry-level firefighter.” Id.

19             Even with this qualifying step as an example, however, the MRO did not “clear[ly] and

20   unambiguous[ly]” require the City to obtain approval from the Monitor before altering the number

21   of candidates called for each CPAT. King, 65 F.3d at 1058. Specifically, the MRO cannot be said

22   to have left “‘no uncertainty in the minds of those to whom it is addressed,’ who ‘must be able to

23   ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden.’” Id. (first quoting

                                                         5
1   Hess v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 846 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1988); then quoting Drywall

2   Tapers & Pointers of Greater N.Y., Local 1974 v. Local 530 of Operative Plasterers & Cement

3   Masons Int’l Ass’n, 889 F.2d 389, 395 (2d Cir. 1989)).

4          We have considered Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and found them to be without merit.

5   Accordingly, we REVERSE the order of the district court, and REMAND for further proceedings

6   consistent with this order.

7
8                                                FOR THE COURT:
9                                                Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                                    6