Court Opinion

ID: 9850163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:52:55.994648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:32.685757
License: Public Domain

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.
¶ 87. (dissenting). The majority concludes that Jane E. Chen's (the mother's) decision to reduce or forego income was reasonable and did not constitute shirking in the context of a modification of the child support portion of a divorce judgment that required John J. Warner (the father) to pay $4,000 per month in child support. I agree with the majority that the proper standard of review normally requires an appellate court to independently review reasonableness, while giving appropriate deference to the trial court. Majority op., ¶ 3.
¶ 88. However, because the circuit court misapplied the shirking analysis, no deference is warranted in this matter. In addition, because the majority merely pays lip service to the proper standard for shirking, I would reverse the court of appeals decision1 and remand the matter to the circuit court for a determination of whether the mother's employment decision is unreasonable "in light of her child support obligations." I therefore respectfully dissent.
*384HH
¶ 89. The mother and father, who are both millionaires, divorced in 1999. The divorce judgment, which incorporated their marital settlement agreement, provided for joint custody and equal physical placement. The judgment provided that neither would pay child support and that each parent would be responsible for the children's daily expenses when the children were with that parent. Other than an education fund the father contributed to each month, expenses were to be equally divided.
¶ 90. At the time of the divorce, both parents were employed as physicians at the Marshfield Clinic. The mother, a clinical anesthesiologist and administrative physician, earned $236,000 per year, while the father, a neuroradiologist, earned $256,452 per year. The mother worked on average in excess of 60 hours per week, which included her on-call requirements.
¶ 91. Although the children were doing extremely well before, up to and after the divorce, the mother testified at the child support modification hearing that she felt that the children were not seeing either herself or their father enough and were being raised by surrogates.2 This, the mother felt, was not fair to the children. When asked if she perceived the children were experiencing any "stresses or changes" during the divorce, the mother did not respond, except to say that she attended courses on what kind of effects divorce has on children. She did state, however, that she determined it was more desirable to be available for her children on a more regular basis. When asked if the medical literature supported "whether or not it's desir*385able to have a parent available for a child," the father stipulated that it's in the children's best interests to have regular supervision provided by their parents, when possible.
¶ 92. Shortly after filing for divorce in the summer of 1998, the mother asked Marshfield Clinic to reduce her work schedule to part-time. Apparently, the clinic delayed answering her réquest.
¶ 93. During 1999, the first year after the divorce was finalized, the mother noted that given the equal placement agreement she was seeing the children half the time. In addition, she stated that she had not made it to any of her preschooler's or kindergartener's events and had only made it to one of her first grader's field trips. She said the children were extremely disappointed at her absences. When the children asked why she was not in attendance, the mother said she did not have a good answer for being at work.
¶ 94. In 2000, the mother pressed Marshfield Clinic for an answer regarding part-time employment, accusing the clinic of not supporting family values. After the clinic made clear it could not offer her part-time employment, the mother decided her children's needs took precedence over her personal career goals. Because her children "weren't going to be young forever" and needed somebody to be there for them, she retired in May 2000 at the age of 43. She testified that she thought she had no alternatives within her profession to continue working and still have more time for her children. Once her children are "launched," however, she plans on returning to work.
¶ 95. During retirement, the mother is now very involved with the children's lives. She stated she is extremely active in the children's school activities: she volunteers in each of their classrooms and has partici*386pated in nearly all the class field trips as a driver or chaperone. She is also very involved with the children's social activities. She takes them to all their lessons, and she carefully monitors the children's friends and families.
¶ 96. Before retiring, the mother consulted with a financial advisor. Based on her savings of $1.1 million, the financial advisor told her that she could anticipate an annual interest income of $110,000. As her budget was $84,000 per year, she did not seek child support from the father at that time.
¶ 97. In 2001, due to a decline in the stock market, the mother earned only $32,000. During that time, she spoke to a recruiter at Marshfield Clinic about part-time employment. Although there were no current positions available, the mother submitted an application should there be any openings. She testified she also spoke with a "locum tenens company," the medical profession's equivalent of a temporary employment agency, but no part-time positions were available within a reasonable commuting distance. Although she almost secured part-time employment in March 2002 at a hospital in Eau Claire when she was fortuitously there for her significant other's surgery,3 those arrangements fell through.
¶ 98. Thus, all told, the mother submitted two applications for part-time employment: one at Marsh-field Clinic and another at a hospital in Eau Claire. The *387mother also admitted that despite living in Marshfield, she did not look for part-time employment in Wausau, Neillsville, Wisconsin Rapids, or Stevens Point. In addition, she conceded that she did not file any applications with the locum tenens companies for part-time employment, because, apparently, they first require an opening before they accept applications. Regardless, the mother asserted that she could make $108,000 per year if she worked part-time.
¶ 99. In 2002, after failing to find a part-time job close to home and after using some of her savings, the mother filed a motion to amend the divorce judgment, seeking child support from the father. He was then earning $472,000 per year, with assets of over $1.2 million and his employer contributing to a retirement plan.
¶ 100. The mother requested $4,000 per month in child support based on her monthly budget of $7,000. The father argued that the mother's termination of employment in 2000 and her refusal to seek part-time work were unreasonable and amounted to shirking her obligation to support their children.
¶ 101. The circuit court agreed with the mother, and ordered the father to pay child support in the amount of $4,000 per month. The circuit court concluded that "even if [the mother] became completely unable to provide financial support for the minor children of the parties, even if [the mother] were shirking, it would not follow that the children would not be entitled to [the father's] support." The court proceeded to find that the mother's retirement did not constitute shirking.
¶ 102. The court noted that when the mother retired, there was no concern about support money given her financial adviser's advice. That the market fell, the court concluded, did not transform the mother's *388benevolent decision to retire into malevolent shirking. The court observed that the mother attempted to find part-time employment, but was unsuccessful. The court then turned attention to the father. Noting that the father's income has doubled since the divorce, the court found that Warner could afford to pay the $4,000 child support the mother sought.
¶ 103. In setting the amount, the court did not excuse the father from contributing $1,200 to the children's education funds. Because child support was imposed, the marital settlement agreement provided that the father's obligation to pay into the fund was rendered null and void.
II
¶ 104. The general rule regarding the level of child support is that it "must be established according to the needs of the custodial parent and children and the ability of the noncustodial parent to pay." Roellig v. Roellig, 146 Wis. 2d 652, 657, 431 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1988). However, this general rule is subject to a "shirking" exception. If a parent is shirking, courts will refuse to modify child support obligations based on the parent's actual earnings and will instead look to that parent's earning capacity. Voecks v. Voecks, 171 Wis. 2d 184, 188, 491 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1992). While shirking usually arises to disadvantage a payor, it applies equally to a payee, or in this joint custody case, to one who seeks to become a payee. See Finley v. Finley, 2002 WI App 144, ¶¶ 12-13, 256 Wis. 2d 508, 648 N.W.2d 536.
A
¶ 105. The proper articulation and application of the standard for determining if a parent is shirking has been lost in this case. Citing Sellers v. Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d 578, 549 N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1996), the circuit court *389determined that shirking "requires a showing of a person's voluntary4 and unreasonable employment decision." The court of appeals in Sellers did indeed use that terminology in describing shirking. Id. at 587. It indicated that shirking occurs where a court finds "the employment decision both voluntary and unreasonable under the circumstances." Id. at 587 (citing Van Offeren v. Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d 482, 496 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992)). The majority has accepted the "unreasonable under the circumstances" terminology as the appropriate shirking test. Majority op., ¶¶ 22-27. Unfortunately, that language from Sellers misstates the correct test, and has apparently taken on a life of its own.
¶ 106. As the court of appeals stated in Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 496, shirking normally implies a finding of intent to avoid support obligations. When a voluntary reduction in income is well-intended, however, it is proper "to assess the reasonableness of that decision in light of the person's support or maintenance obligations." Id. (emphasis added). Accord, Kelly v. Hougham, 178 Wis. 2d 546, 555, 504 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1993), Smith v. Smith, 177 Wis. 2d 128, 136, 501 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1993); In re R.L.M., 143 Wis. 2d 849, 853, 422 N.W.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1988). Indeed, our court has indicated that whether a person decides to reduce one's income is subject to reasonableness commensurate with one's support obligations to both children and former spouse. Balaam v. Balaam, 52 Wis. 2d 20, 28, 187 N.W.2d 867 (1971). The court of appeals in Van Offeren did not interpret reasonableness with the cosmic focus of what is reasonable "under the circumstances."
*390¶ 107. The test's focus is much narrower. It is the mother who bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of her reduction in income commensurate with her child support obligations. See Kelly, 178 Wis. 2d at 556; Smith, 177 Wis. 2d at 134. Contrary to the majority's assertion, "commensurate with a spouse's obligations to the children" does refer to obligations of financial support. See majority op., ¶ 23. Shirking is established where the obligor intentionally avoids the duty to support or unreasonably terminates his or her income in light of the support obligation. Compare majority op., ¶ 23, with Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 492. And child support is "designed to maintain children, insofar as possible, at the economic level they would have enjoyed had there been no divorce." See Sommer v. Sommer, 108 Wis. 2d 586, 590, 323 N.W. 2d 144 (Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis added). Thus, the whole purpose of the shirking analysis is to inquire whether a parent is reasonably fulfilling his or her financial support obligations. In this case, the shirking analysis must focus on the mother's financial circumstances, as she unilaterally terminated her employment, which later impacted her ability to provide support for her children in the manner required by the divorce judgment.5
¶ 108. A well-intended voluntary change in financial circumstances that nonetheless provides a sufficient income to meet one's child support obligations may not be unreasonable at that particular time. But *391just as well-intended employment decisions may be unreasonable, Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d at 587, a well-intended reasonable decision can become unreasonable. And when that happens, it is up to that parent to then take reasonable steps to remedy the situation, commensurate with his or her child support obligations. Just like the father, the mother also has a legal obligation to meet her child support obligations. See Rottscheit v. Dumler, 2003 WI 62, ¶ 31, 262 Wis. 2d 292, 664 N.W.2d 525; and Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 497.
¶ 109. Certainly, the mother has the right to make career decisions that will diminish the income available for support. See Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d at 498. However, that right "is qualified — not absolute." Id. "[TJhere must be some limit to the degree of underemployment one may elect to choose when the former spouse is being presented the bill for the financial consequences of the choice." Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d at 586. The same can be said of voluntary unemployment. Although the interests of the children of divorced parents are at the heart of the child support system, "parents have cognizable interests too." Cameron v. Cameron, 209 Wis. 2d 88, 108, 562 N.W.2d 126 (1997).
B
¶ 110. This is a difficult case, but it requires remand because the circuit court did not properly consider whether the mother's continued unemployment, not initial retirement, is reasonable in light of her child support obligations.6 The circuit court's con-*392elusion that the mother was not shirking boils down to the following: (1) her homemaking services are valuable; (2) she expected sufficient income; (3) the father has sufficient income.7 These points miss the mark on whether the mother was shirking after the stock market declined.
¶ 111. As explained above, the shirking analysis focuses on whether the mother's earning capacity will be attributed to her as a result of her employment decisions in light of her child support obligations. Compare R.L.M., 143 Wis. 2d at 853-54 (working part-time to obtain college degree, although advantageous to increasing earning capacity and eventual ability to support child, deprives child of support to which child is entitled), with Kelly, 178 Wis. 2d at 556-58 (temporarily reducing income by leaving well-paying job to pursue postgraduate education was reasonable because future earning capacity may benefit children in financial and intangible ways). Concluding that her full-time parenting care skills are valuable may certainly be a factor in whether the mother's employment decision was reasonable in light of her financial child support obligations, but it should not come first or necessarily be a deter*393mining factor. The court cannot simply ignore the mother's financial obligation to support her children. .
¶ 112. The circuit court's second point is relevant only as it relates to the mother's initial decision to terminate her employment. It is irrelevant as to her conduct subsequent to the market decline. Once her investments did not return the expected income, the analysis should focus on what she did afterwards. The record indicates she submitted just two applications for part-time work, one of which was at Marshfield Clinic. However, she has not looked for part-time employment in many of Marshfield's surrounding communities, including Wausau, Neillsville, Wisconsin Rapids, or Stevens Point. Although the locum tenens company indicated that there is work in Milwaukee or LaCrosse, the mother testified that those locations were not within a reasonable commuting distance. In any case, the mother has not submitted any applications for part-time work through the locum tenens company. The trial court did not consider the mother's actions, except to say that she looked for part-time employment. That is true, as far as it goes. However, the court should gauge her employability. See Wallen, 139 Wis. 2d at 227. If she is employable, then by the mother's own testimony she could be earning $108,000 per year at a part-time job.
¶ 113. The circuit court's third point must also be viewed with deliberative caution. See Forester v. Forester, 174 Wis. 2d 78, 496 N.W.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding ex-spouse should not be allowed to make a career choice that involves a substantial reduction in her earning capacity and simultaneously insist that her former spouse maintain her at her accustomed stan*394dard of living).8 But as far as the third point is appropriate, it cuts both ways. While the father's income has doubled since the divorce, the record indicates that had the mother continued to work, her income would have doubled too. Aside from that, the circuit court also did not consider that the mother has sufficient assets to financially support her children. These are all factual circumstances the trial court should have considered.
¶ 114. The majority carefully adopts the Van Offeren/Wassenaar9 standard of appellate review in shirking cases. Majority op., Part II. While I agree that this is the appropriate standard of review, we cannot give "appropriate" deference to the circuit court determination if that determination is based on an incorrect legal standard. Under the Van Offeren/Wassenaar standard, therefore, appropriate deference here is no deference at all. We are thus left with the options of either conducting a review de novo or remanding this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. See Cameron, 209 Wis. 2d at 99 ("When there is a failure to make findings of fact, we may affirm the judgment if it is clearly supported by a preponderance of the evidence, reverse the judgment if it is not so supported, or remand for the making of findings and conclusions."). Since the question of reasonableness is a question of law that is extensively intertwined with factual conclu*395sions, unlike the majority, I would opt for remand, as a de novo review would necessarily require us to make both factual and legal conclusions. See Kenyon v. Kenyon, 2004 WI 147, ¶¶ 36, 39-40, 277 Wis. 2d 47, 690 N.W.2d 251 (remanding maintenance modification to circuit court for consideration in light of new maintenance modification test. "[I]t is clear that the circuit court proceeded under an incorrect standard of law, and we simply do not know how the circuit court would have determined the matter had it applied the correct standard. . ."). Id., ¶ 36.
III
¶ 115. In sum, each parent has a duty to support his or her children. Rottscheit, 262 Wis. 2d 292, ¶ 31. That duty is continuous and ever evolving. In light of unforeseen circumstances, parents must act reasonably. But reasonableness is not assessed in a vacuum. The reasonableness of the mother's voluntary decision to terminate employment and her refusal to accept or seek meaningful employment after the stock market declined must be assessed in light of her obligation to support the children. Neither the circuit court nor the majority determined that her decision was reasonable in view of her obligation to provide financial support pursuant to the original judgment of divorce. Because the circuit court failed to apply the correct legal standard in this matter we cannot give any deference to the trial court's conclusions. Accordingly, I would remand this case to the circuit court to apply the correct standard.
¶ 116. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 Chen v. Warner, 2004 WI App 112, 274 Wis. 2d 443, 683 N.W.2d 468.

 The mother also agreed that the children do not have special needs.

 As an aside, the mother also conceded that she lives with this significant other. This person is also not employed and has 50-50 placement of his two teenage children, though he spends most of his time with the children at his lake house. During 2001, this significant other had taxable income of roughly $5,000. The mother stated she had no idea how the significant other made ends meet.

 It is undisputed that the mother voluntarily retired from Marshfield Clinic.

 Even using the proper test, "[t]here is no set list of factors which are decisive in a shirking determination." Wallen v. Wallen, 139 Wis. 2d 217, 225, 407 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1987). The most common factor associated with a finding of shirking is a voluntary or self-inflicted change in financial circumstances, such as quitting employment, rejecting job offers, or retiring early. Id. at 226.

 Although not entirely clear, the circuit court seemed to conclude that even if the mother was shirking, she could still seek child support from the father. The circuit court stated that "even if [the mother] became completely unable to provide *392financial support for the minor children of the parties, even if [the mother] were shirking, it would not follow that the children would not be entitled to [the father's] support." While it is true that the mother may (or may not) be entitled to support, the whole point of the shirking analysis is to impute earning capacity in order to determine the appropriate level of support.

 The majority affirms the order on essentially the same grounds, despite advancing an extensive, non-exhaustive list of factors that should be considered. Majority op., ¶ 50. These grounds do not take into account the mother's obligation to financially support her children.

 Although Forester v. Forester, 174 Wis. 2d 78, 496 N.W.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1993), dealt with maintenance, it has been cited with approval in child support cases. See Smith v. Smith, 177 Wis. 2d 128, 138, 501 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1993); and Sellers v. Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d 578, 586-87, 549 N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1996).

 See Van Offeren v. Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d 482, 492-93, 496 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992), and Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 525, 331 N.W.2d 357 (1983).