Court Opinion

ID: 9719384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:50:21.710826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:06.722038
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The issue in this case is whether the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant asserts that he was so denied, because of an alleged conflict of interest arising from the fact that his attorney had previously served as assistant State’s Attorney in preliminary matters concerning the same criminal proceeding. The majority places great reliance on its interpretation of People v. Newberry, 55 Ill.2d 74, 302 N.E.2d 34 (1973). In Newberry, defendant’s appointed counsel had been employed by the State’s Attorney’s office while defendant’s case was prepared, but had no direct involvement in that case, although he served as head of the Criminal Division of the Cook County State’s Attorney’s office. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that under these circumstances, defendant’s general allegations of constitutionally defective representation were insufficient. The majority states that the holding in Newberry “* * * authorizes reversal whenever the prosecutor is personally involved in the same criminal proceeding in which he subsequently becomes defense counsel.” I cannot agree with this reading of Newberry. While never directly addressing the issue before us here, the Supreme Court did state: “We do not believe the premise urged by defendant — that a disqualifying conflict of interest requiring reversal exists whenever a former assistant prosecutor, employed as such at the time of defendant’s indictment, subsequently is appointed defense counsel — is either necessary or desirable. We perceive no inherent prejudice to defendant in that factual setting, and, conceivably, some advantage could inure to defendant, although it is neither claimed nor established here that defense counsel, while assistant State’s Attorney, had any actual knowledge of defendant’s case.” 55 Ill.2d 74, 77. This passage, taken with the court’s holding, suggests two points overlooked by the majority. First, the conflict per se rule is not applicable where a prosecutor has turned defense counsel. Secondly, the court suggests that where the former prosecutor was actually involved in defendant’s case, rather than there being prejudice, benefits could quite possibly inure to the defendant. I also disagree with the majority’s interpretation of People v. Darby, 30 Ill.App.3d 37, 332 N.E.2d 64 (4th Dist. 1975). There a similar contention was raised where the attorney who had appeared on behalf of the People at defendant’s arraignment subsequently represented defendant at the sentencing hearing as an assistant public defender. The court rejected defendant’s claim that a conflict of interest existed, noting that the attorney did not have “* * * any connection with the prosecution of defendant other than his routine attendance at the arraignment.” The court further noted that as there then was “* * * no allegiance * * * to the prosecutorial function of the State,” no conflict per se existed as in Stoval and Meyers. Finally, even though in Darby the attorney had been personally involved in the same criminal proceeding in which he subsequently became defense counsel, the court there cited Newberry for the proposition that no inherent prejudice existed, contrary to the interpretation of Newberry by the majority here. I do not find persuasive the majority’s assertion that Darby is distinguishable because the attorney was involved in the sentencing hearing and not a determination of guilt or innocence. It is so well established that a sentencing hearing is a critical stage of the proceedings that a citation is unnecessary. Surely a defendant is entitled to the same standard of representation at each critical stage. This is particularly evident when one considers that the sentencing hearing in Darby was a contested proceeding following a jury trial, whereas in this case, the guilty plea and sentence were negotiated. Thus, the same standard should be equally applicable in both cases. There are certain facts in evidence which the majority has failed to consider in reaching its decision. Most significant is that on August 13, 1973, while submitting his plea of guilty to the charge of burglary and one charge of unlawful delivery of cannabis, the trial court admonished the defendant fully in compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402. The defendant was asked, “Are you satisfied with the representation provided you so far by the public defender’s office?” The defendant answered “Yes, your honor.” (Transcript at 111.) In addition, the court inquired of defendant, “Are you making this plea of guilty voluntarily and as a result of your own decision?” The defendant answered, “Yes, I am.” (Transcript at 118.) It appears to me that it is clear from the foregoing and from the entire record that defendant was satisfied with his attorney’s services and should not now be heard to complain. The cases relied upon by the majority are concerned with two situations: where the prosecutor may use confidences obtained from defendant while the prosecutor was his defense counsel and where the defendant’s attorney has present commitments to others in positions antagonistic to the defendant. Neither situation exists here. The attorney had left the office of State’s Attorney and was thus committed only to the defendant. Any information which the attorney had would be prosecutorial information concerning the defendant or that office’s trial tactics, which could be of benefit to the defendant and certainly would not prejudice his rights. In Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1968), defendant’s attorney had previously defended the government’s informer and chief witness against the defendant. The court there held that no conflict existed, and that this prior representation of the government’s witness would probably help the defendant. To state that the attorney’s assistance here may be ineffective because of preformed notions concerning defendant’s guilt due to the attorney’s prior prosecutorial involvement is to ignore the fact that !‘by education, training and practice members of the legal profession have been inculcated with the principle of objectivity.” (People v. Stoval, 40 Ill.2d 109, 115 (Justice House, dissenting).) Ignoring the fact that the attorney’s prosecutorial participation in this case was only as to preliminary matters, by the time of trial, most defense attorneys have made some assessment of their client’s guilt, based on their pretrial investigations. Therefore, this charge could also be made against them, and would be equally inappropriate. I cannot believe that lawyers appointed to represent indigents are so likely to be lacking in diligence, competence or professional honesty. Even if some conflict could be imagined, as the majority opinion does, defendant should be deemed to have waived the issue. The proceedings below consisted of a negotiated plea of guilty as opposed to a contested trial. The record reflects that defendant’s guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly made, with extensive participation both by defendant and by his attorney. In Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 921, 3 L.Ed.2d 240, 79 S.Ct. 294, defendant challenged his conviction following a guilty plea, contending an alleged conflict of interest arising from his appointed counsel’s representation of other codefendants. After reviewing the record, the court stated at page 349: “[S]ince * * * the guilty plea was voluntary the appellant must be said to have waived the conflict of interest theory.” See also People v. Richardson, 16 Ill.App.3d 830, 306 N.E.2d 886 (3d Dist. 1974). The United States Supreme Court, in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 36 L.Ed.2d 235, 243, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973), a case involving a guilty plea on the advice of counsel who had failed to make inquiry into the composition of the grand jury, held, as follows: “[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann [v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441 at 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)]." It is interesting to note that the majority opinion takes the opposite view of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice relating to The Prosecution Function and The Defense Function where they state, on the subject of possible conflict, at page 216 (1971): “In all of these situations the controlling consideration is the avoidance of any possibility of division or dilution of loyalties # # # [T]here are advantages to the operation of the adversary system if lawyers can avoid being stereotyped in their roles. See THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Introduction, supra, at 20-21. Obviously, in our system of institutionalized prosecution offices, unlike England, for example, it is difficult if not impossible for prosecutors to appear in the defense role. More feasible is the interchange of roles by having experienced defense counsel appointed as special prosecutors from time to time. The long range benefits of interchange, however, are such that lawyers who have been trained in prosecution offices should be encouraged to devote some period of their professional careers in defense work, whether privately or as a public defender, after they have left prosecution offices. Correspondingly, public defender staff members should be encouraged to move into prosecution offices.” (Emphasis added.) In the absence of a clear and specific showing of prejudice, the issue here should be controlled by the criteria governing constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. The record here negates the appellant’s claim on this point. On the contrary, I believe the appellant was helped rather than harmed by his counsel’s former experience as a prosecutor in light of his counsel’s efforts. In my opinion the conviction should be affirmed.