Court Opinion

ID: 9939737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 17:01:01.636402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:52.281267
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10034   Document: 18-1    Date Filed: 02/12/2024   Page: 1 of 5

                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-10034
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       ANTONIO R. DAVIS,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       FORT LAUDERDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT (INTERNAL
       AFFAIRS),
       MARDIE LEVEY COHEN,
       ( Judge),
       CHARLES M. GREENE,
       ( Judge),
       HENRI SAINT JEAN,
       #1647,
       LUC VAVAL,
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10034

       #2065, et al.,

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-60769-RS
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Antonio Davis appeals the district court’s order dismissing
       his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against the Fort Lauderdale Police
       Department (“FLPD”), several officers and employees of the
       FLPD, and two state court judges for failure to state a claim under
       28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and as deficient under
       Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and denying his motion to proceed in forma pau-
       peris. Davis argues on appeal that the district court erred in dis-
       missing his complaint for failure to state a claim and abused its dis-
       cretion in dismissing his complaint as deficient under Rule 8(a).
              We review a district court’s dismissal of an in forma pauperis
       action for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) using the
       same standard as when reviewing a dismissal under
       Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), that is, de novo and viewing the allegations
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       23-10034                Opinion of the Court                           3

       in the complaint as true. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490
       (11th Cir. 1997). We review dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
       under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.
       Sheriﬀ’s Oﬀ., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). We give “liberal
       construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, [but] ‘we neverthe-
       less [require] them to conform to procedural rules.’” Albra v. Advan,
       Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309
       F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)).
               When a plaintiﬀ proceeds in forma pauperis, the district court
       “shall dismiss the case at any time if [it] determines that” the action
       “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.
       § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to
       state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiﬀ is
       not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
               Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
       that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
       showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
       It is within “the district court’s inherent authority to control its
       docket and ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits, which in
       some circumstances includes the power to dismiss a complaint for
       failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2).” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320. A
       dismissal under Rule 8(a)(2) “is appropriate where ‘it is virtually im-
       possible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support
       which claim(s) for relief.’” Id. at 1325 (emphasis in original) (quot-
       ing Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364,
       366 (11th Cir. 1996)).
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                    23-10034

               “Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides every person with the right
       to sue those acting under color of state law for violations of federal
       constitutional and statutory provisions.” Williams v. Bd. of Regents
       of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007). A police
       department generally is not a legal entity that is subject to suit un-
       der § 1983, but capacity to be sued is determined by the law of the
       state in which the district court is located. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d
       1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)). Under Flor-
       ida law, a police department does not have the capacity to be sued.
       Fla. City Police Dep’t v. Corcoran, 661 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
       App. 1995). Moreover, “[j]udges are entitled to absolute judicial im-
       munity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in
       their judicial capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all
       jurisdiction.’” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2002) (in-
       ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435
       U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). “This immunity applies even when the
       judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her
       jurisdiction.” Id.
              “Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a
       claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the
       complaint before the district court dismisses the action with preju-
       dice.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in
       part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542
       (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a] district court is not required to
       grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the
       plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to
       amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.”).
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       23-10034                Opinion of the Court                          5

       However, “if a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a
       claim . . . , dismissal with prejudice is proper.” Id. A dismissal for
       failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is a dismissal on the
       merits and with prejudice. White v. Lemma, 947 F.3d 1373, 1376-77
       (11th Cir. 2020), receded from on other grounds by Wells v. Brown, 58
       F.4th 1347 (11th Cir. 2023).
               Here, we conclude that the district court did not err in dis-
       missing Davis’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and it did not
       abuse its discretion in dismissing it as deficient under Fed. R. Civ.
       P. 8(a). But we conclude that the district court did err by dismissing
       Davis’s complaint with prejudice without first providing him an
       opportunity to amend as to all defendants except for the Fort
       Lauderdale Police Department itself and Judges Mardi Cohen and
       Charles Greene because police departments are not subject to suit
       under § 1983, and judges are entitled to absolute immunity while
       acting in their judicial capacity.
               We thus affirm the district court’s order dismissing the com-
       plaint with respect to defendants FLPD, Judge Greene and Judge
       Davis, but vacate and remand for further proceedings with respect
       to all other defendants.
           AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN
       PART.