Court Opinion

ID: 9962303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 15:01:02.149826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:19.367283
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 6, 2023               Decided April 23, 2024

                        No. 22-5308

   AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
    NATIONAL COUNCIL OF HUD LOCALS COUNCIL 222,
                     AFL-CIO,
                     APPELLEE

                             v.

 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND SUSAN TSUI
 GRUNDMANN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF
      THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,
                    APPELLANTS

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Columbia
                    (No. 1:19-cv-00998)

    Thomas Tso, Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations Authority,
argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were
Rebecca J. Osborne, Deputy Solicitor, and Nariea K. Nelson,
Attorney.

    Andres M. Grajales argued the cause for appellee. With
him on the brief were David A. Borer and Mark L. Vinson.

    Before: WILKINS and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and
                                2

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

   Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
RANDOLPH.

   Opinion concurring in the result filed by Circuit Judge
WILKINS.

    RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge:

    The salaries for most civilian federal jobs are set out in the
General Schedule, a payscale that spans fifteen “grades.” The
higher the grade the greater the compensation.

     In 2002, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development advertised job openings having a promotion
potential to grade thirteen. At the time, existing employees in
comparable positions could be promoted only to grade twelve.
The existing employees were represented by the American
Federation of Government Employees, National Council of
HUD Locals Council 222, AFL-CIO. The union took the
position that the difference in the treatment of existing
employees and those to be hired violated its collective
bargaining agreement with HUD. The union filed a grievance
to that effect. HUD rejected it and the union’s grievance
proceeded to arbitration.

     Now, more than twenty years after it began, the controversy
has reached our court.

                                I.

    The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute—the FSLMRS—established a framework for resolving
disputes between federal agency employers and unions
                                 3

representing agency employees. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101 et seq.; id.
§ 7121(b)(1)(C)(iii). Most grievances may be settled through
arbitration, but an arbitrator generally has no authority to decide
grievances involving the classification of employees’ positions.1
Id. § 7121(c)(5).

     If a dispute goes to arbitration, a party dissatisfied with the
result—commonly called an “award”—may contest the result by
filing exceptions with the Federal Labor Relations Authority.
Id. § 7122(a). If neither party files exceptions, the arbitrator’s
award becomes “final and binding.” Id. § 7122(b). The FLRA
may overturn an arbitrator’s award if it finds that the award is
“contrary to any law, rule, or regulation,” or if the award is
deficient on “grounds similar to those applied by Federal courts
in private sector labor-management relations.” Id. § 7122(a).

    In cases not involving an arbitration, a party dissatisfied
with an FLRA decision may obtain judicial review in a federal
court of appeals. Id. § 7123(a).

     The law treats FLRA decisions in arbitration cases
differently. Excluded from judicial review are FLRA orders
“involving an award by an arbitrator,” “unless the order involves
an unfair labor practice” as defined elsewhere in the FSLMRS.
Id. § 7123(a)(1); see id. § 7116.

    From the outset of this protracted dispute, the union and
HUD disagreed on a fundamental issue: whether the union’s
grievance involved classification. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb.
Dev. Wash., 59 F.L.R.A. 630, 630 (2004). Was the grievance
based on reclassification—the promotion potential of the

    1
         Classification-related grievances are arbitrable when
reclassification results in a reduction in pay or grade. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7121(c)(5). That exception does not apply here.
                                   4

employees’ permanent positions—or reassignment—the
employees’ right to be placed in the new positions that HUD had
posted? Only a request for reassignment could be potentially
resolved in arbitration.

     The parties submitted the question to the arbitrator, who
concluded in an interim order that the dispute involved the
fairness of the vacancy announcements, not classification. See
id. HUD filed an interlocutory exception challenging the
arbitrator’s jurisdiction. Id. The FLRA declined to resolve the
jurisdictional issue at that time and remanded the matter to the
arbitrator for “clarification.” Id. at 632.

     Upon remand, the arbitrator again determined that the
grievance was arbitrable. On the merits, the arbitrator, finding
that HUD had violated the parties’ collective bargaining
agreement, ordered a retroactive “organizational upgrade of
affected positions.” Again, HUD filed exceptions, arguing that
the “organizational upgrade” remedy required reclassification
and therefore violated the FSLMRS.

     The FLRA agreed with HUD. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb.
Dev., 65 F.L.R.A. 433, 436 (2011). So the FLRA vacated the
arbitrator’s remedial award and remanded for an alternative
remedy. Id.

    The arbitrator then issued new remedies.            During
implementation of these remedies, the parties raised various
exceptions to the arbitrator’s written progress summaries,
resulting in five more FLRA decisions.2 Those FLRA decisions
did not reconsider the arbitrator’s threshold decision that the
dispute was arbitrable.

     2
        The parties and the district court treat each of the arbitrator’s
interim summaries as separate “awards.”
                                   5

     In 2018, the FLRA rendered its eighth decision in this
matter. On review of exceptions to the arbitrator’s tenth written
summary, the FLRA held that “the essential nature of this
grievance . . . concerned classification.” U.S. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urb. Dev., 70 F.L.R.A. 605, 608 (2018) (“HUD VIII”). This
meant that “the [a]rbitrator has always lacked jurisdiction over
the grievance, as a matter of law.” Id. The FLRA therefore
vacated all of the arbitrator’s pronouncements and its own prior
decisions. Id. One Member dissented. Id. at 609–10. The
FLRA denied the union’s motion for reconsideration. U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 71 F.L.R.A. 17, 20 (2019).

     The union then filed a four-count complaint in district court
claiming that the FLRA’s decision was “ultra vires.” The
complaint invoked § 7122(b) of the FSLMRS, a provision
stating that an arbitrator’s award becomes “final and binding” if
no exceptions are filed within thirty days.3 The union claimed
that in vacating awards that had become final and binding, the
FLRA had violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706. The district court rejected the union’s APA claim but
denied the FLRA’s motion to dismiss the entire complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that it had
jurisdiction because “the [FLRA] exceeded its delegated

    3
        Section 7122(b) provides in full:

         If no exception to an arbitrator’s award is filed under
         subsection (a) of this section during the 30-day period
         beginning on the date the award is served on the
         party, the award shall be final and binding. An
         agency shall take the actions required by an
         arbitrator’s final award. The award may include the
         payment of backpay (as provided in section 5596 of
         this title).
                               6

powers.” The court concluded that “the Union has stated a
claim as to Count I, which alleges that the [FLRA’s] decision to
vacate final and binding arbitration awards was ultra vires.”
The court later granted the union’s motion for summary
judgment on that count.

    The issues on appeal concern the district court’s denial of
the FLRA’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and the
court’s grant of summary judgment.

                              II.

     Section 7123(a) of the FSLMRS provides for judicial
review of some FLRA decisions. The provision establishes that:

       (a) Any person aggrieved by any final order of
       the Authority other than an order under--

                 (1) section 7122 of this title
            (involving an award by an arbitrator),
            unless the order involves an unfair
            labor practice under section 7118 of
            this title, or

                (2) section 7112 of this title
            (involving an appropriate unit
            determination),

       may, during the 60-day period beginning on the
       date on which the order was issued, institute an
       action for judicial review of the Authority’s
       order in the United States court of appeals in the
       circuit in which the person resides or transacts
       business or in the United States Court of Appeals
       for the District of Columbia.
                                 7

5 U.S.C. § 7123(a).

     Neither the grievance nor the FLRA’s decision in this case
involves an “unfair labor practice.” Section 7123(a)(1) therefore
“flatly” foreclosed the jurisdiction of this court to conduct direct
judicial review of the FLRA’s order vacating the arbitration
awards. U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. FLRA, 981 F.2d 1339, 1342 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).4 Even so, the union contends that as a matter of
statutory interpretation § 7123(a) prohibits only court of appeals
direct review of FLRA arbitration decisions, not district court
review of agency actions when the agency exceeds its statutory
authority. On this theory, the union claimed that its suit in the
district court circumvented the § 7123(a) bar against judicial
review of arbitration decisions. Our court has already answered
the union’s argument: “We cannot imagine that Congress,
having vested in courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to
review all [FLRA] decisions except those relating to appropriate
unit determinations [and arbitration orders], would have
intended that such determinations could nevertheless be
reviewed by district courts.” Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v.
FLRA, 283 F.3d 339, 341–42 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

     This brings us to the union’s argument from Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), a case dealing with the National
Labor Relations Act. That Act foreclosed direct judicial review
in the courts of appeals of the National Labor Relations Board’s
collective bargaining unit certifications.5 Even so, Kyne upheld
district court review of a particular Board unit certification. Id.
at 190–91. As Judge Friendly explained, the “conflict” between
the Act’s prohibition and the NLRB’s action was “plain”: “[The

    4
     We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the district court.
See United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936).
    5
        See Am. Fed’n of Lab. v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 411 (1940).
                                8

National Labor Relations Act] declared that the Board ‘shall
not’ decide that any unit including professional and
non-professional employees is appropriate for collective
bargaining unless a majority of the professionals vote for
inclusion. The Board conceded it had done exactly what it was
forbidden to do.” Local 1545, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127, 132 (2d
Cir. 1960).

     Kyne treated the jurisdictional issue as one of statutory
interpretation: did the relevant legislation bar judicial review in
the district court? 358 U.S. at 188–90. The Court answered the
question by declaring that Congress could not possibly have
intended to bar district court review of “an order of the Board
made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific
prohibition in the Act.” Id. at 188. The Court’s opinion neither
quoted nor cited the statutory language it was interpreting. This
omission may be explained in light of the loose concept of
“legislative intent” dominating statutory interpretation in 1958,
when Leedom v. Kyne issued. Then the Court generally believed
if “the text deviate[d] markedly from [a statute’s] apparent
purpose, Congress must have ‘intended’ to use the statute’s
words in something other than their conventional sense.” John
F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2001). But by the close of the twentieth
century, that approach was largely rejected in favor of a stricter
focus on a statute’s text. Id.

    Relying on Leedom v. Kyne, the union claims that § 7123(a)
means that only courts of appeals are barred from reviewing
FLRA arbitration rulings, leaving the district courts free to do so
whenever the FLRA violates a “definite statutory prohibition of
conduct.” See Kyne, 358 U.S. at 189 (quoting Tex. & New
Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548, 568 (1930)). Many decisions of our court have dealt with
                                   9

the meaning of § 7123(a). Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), for instance, decided that “the specific language of
§ 7123” precluded not just court of appeals judicial review but
also district court review of FLRA arbitration decisions not
involving unfair labor practices. Id. at 493. The court’s
reasoning deserves full quotation:

     To be sure, Congress did not explicitly deny to district
     courts the power to review FLRA decisions.
     Nevertheless, where Congress has set out a complex
     scheme authorizing certain types of review but not
     others, the express preclusion of review of FLRA
     orders under § 7122 in the one mention of the subject
     [(arbitration decisions] powerfully suggests an intent to
     preclude review in every court. See United States v.
     Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988); Block [v. Community
     Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340,] 346–47 [(1984)];
     Switchmen’s Union of North America v. National
     Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 305–06 (1943). This
     is especially true in light of Congress’s having
     explicitly given the district courts review authority in
     one area, namely temporary relief in unfair labor
     practice proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. § 7123(d).

Id. at 491 (italics in original). The Griffith court also relied on
the legislative history of § 7123 and quoted, adding italics, the
Conference Committee’s statement that “there will be no
judicial review of the Authority’s action on those arbitrators’
awards in grievance cases which are appealable to the
Authority.” Id. at 492 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717, at 153
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2887).6

     6
      Griffith’s analysis gains further support from the requirement in
§ 7123(c) that “[r]eview of the Authority’s order shall be on the record
in accordance with [5 U.S.C. §] 706,” the judicial review provision of
                                  10

“Congress,” the court concluded, “could hardly have made its
view on the matter clearer.” Id.

     The analysis portion of Griffith dealing with non-
constitutional claims was in two parts. Part “A,” from which the
block quotation above is taken, dealt with the question whether
in § 7123(a), Congress precluded judicial review of FLRA
arbitration decisions, not only in the courts of appeals, but also
in the district courts.7 Griffith concluded that Congress had
clearly barred judicial review in both. Id. at 492.

     In the second non-constitutional portion of Griffith
concerning Leedom v. Kyne—Part “B”—the court stated that
even if “Congress is understood generally to have precluded
review,” Kyne could, in some circumstances, permit the district
court to exercise judicial review of an FLRA arbitration order.
Id. at 493. The beginning of the Griffith opinion also seemed to
suggest that even though Congress had foreclosed judicial
review in any federal court, the rationale of Leedom v. Kyne
could potentially confer jurisdiction on the district court.8

the Administrative Procedure Act. Yet as the district court held, and
as the union conceded, the APA did not apply in this case.
     7
       Griffith was on appeal from the judgment of the district court
“holding that 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) barred judicial review of non-
constitutional claims.” 842 F.2d at 489–90.
     8
       The court put it this way: “We first address the availability of
judicial review for nonconstitutional claims. We find unusually clear
congressional intent generally to foreclose review. Although we find
that the statute leaves the door ajar for review of clear violations of
statutory authority under Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), we
conclude that none of the errors asserted here qualifies.” 842 F.2d at
490.
                                 11

     By that, Griffith could not have meant that Kyne creates
jurisdiction where Congress has expressly eliminated it. The
problem arises because “the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts is determined by Congress.” Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428, 433
(1989) (italics added). Congress’s constitutional authority to
“constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,” U.S.
CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 9, “includes [the] lesser power to limit the
jurisdiction of those courts.” Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U.S. ___,
138 S. Ct. 897, 906 (2018) (plurality opinion); see also Mark v.
Republic of Sudan, 77 F.4th 892, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting
Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 906)). “It is a fundamental precept that
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The limits upon
federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by
Congress, must be neither disregarded nor evaded.” Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978).
Thus, at least in non-constitutional cases like this one, the
federal judiciary cannot create its own jurisdiction, even if that
jurisdiction is “extraordinarily narrow,” Hartz Mountain Corp.
v. Dotson, 727 F.2d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1984), or “extremely
limited [in] scope.” Griffith, 842 F.2d at 493. So in non-
constitutional cases, if a federal statute clearly bars district court
jurisdiction—as § 7123(a) does over arbitration-related
decisions—that ends the matter.9 See Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. MCorp. Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 44 (1991).

    9
       As Judge Easterbrook has explained, there can be no “doubt[]
about the power of Congress to restrict the jurisdiction of district
courts—for until 1875 the inferior courts lacked any federal-question
jurisdiction, and until 1980 the federal-question jurisdiction was
qualified by an amount-in-controversy requirement. No one thinks the
Judiciary Act of 1789 a colossal violation of Article III on this
account.” Czerkies v. Dep’t of Lab., 73 F.3d 1435, 1434–44 (7th Cir.
1996) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
                                12

    Griffith, in interpreting § 7123(a), did not confront these
constitutional difficulties. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly
held that the existence of unaddressed jurisdictional defects has
no precedential effect.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2
(1996). We see no need to say more on the subject, except to
emphasize that Griffith interpreted § 7123(a) as a bar to district
court jurisdiction.

     Our court has consistently held that § 7123(a) bars district
court review of FLRA arbitration decisions. In American
Federation of Government Employees v. Loy, another panel of
our court held: “If an FLRA order falls within one of
§ 7123(a)’s two exceptions to review in the court of appeals, this
does not mean the district courts are open. It means that review
is precluded in any court.” 367 F.3d 932, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
That considered and succinct statement regarding non-
constitutional claims admits of no qualifications.

     Other opinions of our court interpreted § 7123(a) as the
court did in Loy. For example, U.S. Department of Justice v.
FLRA held that “it is not the business of the courts to second-
guess arbitral judgments that fall within the compass of
§ 7123(a)(1).” 981 F.2d 1339, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In U.S.
Department of Treasury v. FLRA, the court held “that the district
courts lack jurisdiction to review arbitration awards arising
under the FSLMRS.” 43 F.3d 682, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In
Association of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. FLRA, our court
stated: “Pointing out that FLRA section 7123 mentions only
‘courts of appeals,’ the [plaintiff] insists that the provision does
not bar district courts from reviewing appropriate unit
determinations. . . . [W]e disagree.” 283 F.3d at 341. In
American Federation of Government Employees v. Secretary of
the Air Force, the court held again that under § 7123(a)(1) the
district courts are not available. 716 F.3d 633, 637 (D.C. Cir.
2013). In yet another case, U.S. Department of Homeland
                                  13

Security v. FLRA, the court wrote: “In Griffith, we held that
. . . there was ‘unusually clear congressional intent generally to
foreclose review’ of ‘nonconstitutional claims.’”10 784 F.3d
821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Griffith, 842 F.2d at 490).

     As against this solid, unbroken line of circuit precedent
dealing with § 7123(a), the union invokes a case dealing with an
entirely different statute, Nyunt v. Chairman, Broadcasting
Board of Governors, 589 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 2009). There we
stated that “[t]he Leedom v. Kyne exception applies . . . only
where (i) the statutory preclusion of review is implied rather
than express.” Id. at 449. The union’s claim, with which the
district court agreed, is that Leedom v. Kyne establishes district
court jurisdiction to review FLRA arbitration decisions because
§ 7123 does not “expressly” preclude it.

     There are several reasons why the statement in Nyunt
cannot supplant or even detract from the interpretation of
§ 7123(a) in our circuit precedents just discussed. Assume, for
the moment, that Nyunt is inconsistent with our court’s decisions
under § 7123(a). Even so this would not support the union’s
position. Nyunt, as stated above, involved a different and
unrelated statute. When “a precedent of [our court] has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in
some other line of decisions, [a later panel] should follow the
case which directly controls, leaving to [the court en banc] the
prerogative of overruling” the earlier decision. Rodriguez de

     10
         The Griffith court held that a constitutional challenge, as
distinguished from a non-constitutional challenge, to an FLRA
arbitration decision could be brought in the district court. 842 F.2d at
495. The Supreme Court drew a similar distinction between
constitutional and non-constitutional claims in Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592, 603 (1988), over Justice Scalia’s dissent. The union’s
claims here are non-constitutional.
                               14

Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989);
see, e.g., United States v. Torres, 115 F.3d 1033, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
1997). Here the directly controlling cases from our circuit are
those dealing with § 7123(a), not Nyunt.

     We recognize that even without a reversal en banc, panel
opinions of our court might be overcome by a Supreme Court
decision or decisions. E.g., Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear Regul.
Comm’n, 863 F.2d 968, 978 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1988). And so we
have considered whether the Supreme Court has ever embraced
Nyunt’s implied-express formula to decide whether a statute
precluded judicial review. We have found that whether “the
statutory preclusion of review” is “express” or “implied” has
never been the test.

      The Supreme Court’s opinion in Block v. Community
Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984), makes this as clear as
can be. The Court held: “Whether and to what extent a
particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not
only from its express language, but also from the structure of the
statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the
nature of the administrative action involved.” 467 U.S. at 345.
The Supreme Court reiterated this standard in Thunder Basin
Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994): “Whether a statute
is intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from
the statute’s language, structure, and purpose, [and] its
legislative history . . ..” And in 2012—three years after Nyunt
was decided—Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court that
“in determining ‘[w]hether and to what extent a particular
statute precludes judicial review,’ we do not look ‘only [to] its
express language.” Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 128 (2012)
(alterations in original) (quoting Block, 468 U.S. at 345).
Sackett directly contradicted the implied-express dictum in
Nyunt. The holdings in many other Supreme Court cases
dealing with preclusion of judicial review are to the same effect.
                                   15

See, e.g., S. Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S.
444, 456–60 (1979); Lindahl v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S.
768, 779 (1985); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476
U.S. 667, 673 & n.4 (1986); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S.
439, 444 (1988).11

     Our decisions were therefore on solid ground in construing
§ 7123(a)(1) with the “traditional tools of statutory
construction,”12 including legislative history, and in concluding
that Congress had not only foreclosed direct review in the courts
of appeals but also in the district courts.

     We have not attempted to place our court’s construction of
§ 7123(a) into Nyunt’s “express” category, although there are
strong arguments for doing so. Griffith itself ruled that § 7123
contained “specific language” barring judicial review in any
federal court and that Congress “could hardly have made its
view on the matter clearer.” 842 F.2d at 492. To the extent that
Nyunt is inconsistent with our earlier § 7123(a) line of cases,
settled circuit law dictates that those cases, not Nyunt, control.
E.g., De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1105
(D.C. Cir. 2017); Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 854
(D.C. Cir. 2011).

     11
        Nyunt also stated in dictum that application of Leedom v. Kyne
turned on whether the plaintiff had an alternative avenue of review.
589 F.3d at 449. This statement too seems to contradict circuit
precedent. See Physicians Nat’l House Staff Ass’n v. Fanning, 642
F.2d 492, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (“[I]t is not the unavailability
of a remedy which triggers the [Leedom v.] Kyne exception, but the
violation of a clear statutory demand.”) (citation omitted).
     12
       Overseas Educ. Ass’n v. FLRA, 824 F.2d 61, 66 (D.C. Cir.
1987), quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984), and construing § 7123(a)(1) in a case raising a related issue
about judicial review of FLRA unfair labor practice decisions.
                                 16

     We end this part of our opinion where perhaps we should
have begun, with Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967). There the Supreme Court held that “the Administrative
Procedure Act . . . embodies the basic presumption of judicial
review to one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute.’” Id. at 140 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 702). Judicial opinions often cite this presumption in cases
dealing with statutes allegedly foreclosing judicial review, and
with Leedom v. Kyne. See, e.g., Griffith, 842 F.2d at 490; Dart
v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

     In this case the premise of the Abbott Laboratories
presumption is absent. The APA does not apply when “(1)
statutes preclude judicial review[] or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a); see
Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140. When introduced, the bill that
became the APA required for the first exception that “statutes
expressly preclude judicial review.” S. 7, 79th Cong. § 10 (as
introduced in Senate, Jan. 6, 1945) (italics added). The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary deleted the word “expressly.”
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 94 n.4 (1947). Under the APA as enacted, a
“statute may in terms preclude, or be interpreted as intended to
preclude, judicial review altogether.” Id. at 94.13 As we have
discussed, § 7123(a)(1) has been so interpreted by our court.

    13
        The Supreme Court has relied on the ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
MANUAL to interpret the APA. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness
All., 542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 302 n.31 (1979); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435
U.S. 519, 546 (1978). So too has this court. See, e.g., Am. Min. Cong.
v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1993); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38
n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
                                17

     Even if the presumption applied despite the inapplicability
of the APA from which it is derived, the result here would be no
different. The “presumption favoring judicial review is not to be
applied in the ‘strict evidentiary sense,’” but may be
“‘overcom[e] whenever the congressional intent to preclude
review is ‘fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.’” Block,
467 U.S. at 350–51 (quoting Data Processing Serv. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970)). “Here, as in Block, we think
Congress’ intention is fairly discernible, and that ‘the
presumption favoring judicial review . . . [has been] overcome
by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a
whole.’” Fausto, 484 U.S. at 452 (quoting Block, 467 U.S. at
349) (alterations in original).

                               III.

     Nor did the FLRA defy the FSLMRS in the same way that
the NLRB had defied the statute in Leedom v. Kyne. In Kyne the
National Labor Relations Board admitted that it had acted “in
excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific
prohibition in the Act.” 358 U.S. at 188. The “specific
prohibition” stated that the Board “shall not” take a certain
action. Id. The Board took the action anyway. So for Leedom
v. Kyne to apply here, the FLRA must have violated “a specific
and unambiguous statutory directive” or engaged in an action
that “‘on its face’ violated a statute.” Nat’l Air Traffic
Controllers Ass’n AFL-CIO v. Fed. Serv. Impasses Panel, 437
F.3d 1256, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); Dart, 848
F.2d at 222. Kyne does not apply if the FLRA made a
“[g]arden-variety error[] of law.” Griffith, 842 F.2d at 493.

     Section 7122(b) of the FSLMRS states: “If no exception to
an arbitrator’s award is filed under subsection (a) of this section
during the 30-day period beginning on the date the award is
                                 18

served on the party, the award shall be final and binding.” 5
U.S.C. § 7122(b). If exceptions are filed, the award becomes
final and binding when appellate procedures are exhausted.
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. Soc. Sec. Admin., 41 F.L.R.A.
755, 766 (1991); see also Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Soc.
Sec. Admin. v. FLRA, 976 F.2d 1409, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

      The union’s argument is that the FLRA, in vacating for lack
of jurisdiction the arbitrator’s award and summaries and the
FLRA’s own prior decisions in the matter, violated § 7122(b).
But at most, that is a “[g]arden-variety error[] of law,” and we
express no opinion about whether it even is that. Griffith, 842
F.2d at 493. To begin with, § 7122(b) may only govern the
conduct of the parties to the arbitration. If neither party files an
exception within thirty days, the employing “agency shall take
the actions required by an arbitrator’s final award.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 7122(b). After thirty days, if neither party files an exception,
the award becomes final and binding—on the parties. Under
this theory, § 7122(b) is not, as in Kyne, a “specific prohibition”
directing the FLRA to refrain from vacating an arbitrator’s
finalized award because of a jurisdictional defect.

     That the FLRA may reconsider an arbitrator’s jurisdiction
when hearing exceptions after deciding earlier exceptions in the
same case seems fairly obvious. The union’s contrary
claim—that Congress prohibited the FLRA from having second
thoughts about the arbitrator’s jurisdiction—creates some
tension with FLRA precedents14 and with the judicial principle

    14
        In the challenged decision, the FLRA reasoned that not only
can it sua sponte consider whether an arbitration matter involves
classification, but it “is required to address” the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction “regardless of whether the issue is also presented to the
arbitrator.” HUD VIII, 70 F.L.R.A. at 607 & n.35; see also Off. &
Pro. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 2001, 62 F.L.R.A. 67, 69 (2007); U.S.
                                19

that jurisdictional questions may be raised at any time, including
by the court itself. See Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 126, 127 (1804); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). True, the FLRA is not a court. But
Congress “intended that in the area of arbitral awards the
[FLRA] would play in federal labor relations the role assigned
to district courts in private sector labor law.” Griffith, 842 F.2d
at 491. So, like a court, the FLRA could have the prerogative to
verify subject-matter jurisdiction at every stage of a proceeding.

     Institutional reform cases dealing with prisons, for example,
provide another comparison. A district court may enter multiple
decrees or injunctions over time, revising and amending its
initial order. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 331–32
(2000). While a particular injunction or decree is in effect, it
binds the parties. But the district court retains the power to
modify the ongoing equitable relief. See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates
of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1992); United States
v. W. Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In short,
an order that is final and binding on the parties is often not final
and binding on the court. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380–81.

     The same principle arguably applies here. After the
arbitrator issued the operative remedial award, the parties began
implementation proceedings. During those proceedings, the
arbitrator created ten written summaries.15 See HUD VIII, 70

Dep’t of the Army, 61 F.L.R.A. 8, *4–7 (2005); USDA, Food &
Consumer Serv., 60 F.L.R.A. 978, 981 (2005); U.S. EEOC, Memphis
Dist. Off., 18 F.L.R.A. 88, 89 n.2 (1985).
    15
       Early on, HUD filed exceptions claiming that the arbitrator
impermissibly modified the remedial award through the summaries,
which had, among other things, expanded the class of employees
covered by the remedy. HUD VIII, 70 F.L.R.A. at 606. The FLRA
                                20

F.L.R.A. at 607. Through the summaries, the arbitrator “slightly
changed the award at every implementation meeting.” Id. at
608. Given that an arbitrator can adjust an award throughout its
implementation, awards are not categorically “final and binding”
on arbitrators. See Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emps. Local 3615, 54
F.L.R.A. 494, 496, 498 (1998). It would be somewhat
anomalous to suppose that § 7122(b) restricts the FLRA but not
arbitrators.

     Other than § 7122(b), the union also relies on § 7122(a), the
provision dealing with FLRA review of exceptions to arbitration
awards. Section 7122(a) provides that “[i]f upon review [of
exceptions] the Authority finds that the award is deficient[,]
. . . the Authority may take such action and make such
recommendations concerning the award as it considers
necessary . . ..” 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a). The union claims that the
word “the” in “the award” (italics added) is an affirmative
command: the FLRA can only review the singular award before
it. The district court, too, emphasized that “the award” refers to
a “single object.”

     Perhaps. But it is debatable whether § 7122(a)’s use of the
term “the award” is a statutory mandate that amounts to a
specific prohibition. Section 7122(a) gives the FLRA the power
to review exceptions. It does not, by its text, limit the FLRA’s
review of jurisdictional defects. Section 7122(a) thus lacks the
clarity required to support the application of Leedom v. Kyne.

     “[T]he distinction between violation of a clear and of a not
so clear statutory command is neither completely satisfying nor,
save where the violation is conceded, as it was in Leedom v.

dismissed the exceptions as untimely without considering the merits
of HUD’s argument. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 68 F.L.R.A.
631, 634–36 (2015).
                              21

Kyne, readily applied.” Local 1545, 286 F.2d at 133 (italics
added). To sum up, in holding that the arbitrator lacked
jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute, the FLRA did not violate
an obvious statutory prohibition.

     Still another problem with the union’s argument is that the
FSLMRS says nothing about the finality of awards when
exceptions are filed. Because exceptions were filed to the
arbitrator’s operative remedial award, the FLRA might well
have violated no statutory provision when it vacated that award.
Once the FLRA vacated the remedial award, the arbitrator’s
implementation summaries—whether vacated or not—at least
arguably became unenforceable.

                          *    *   *

     Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s orders denying
the FLRA’s motion to dismiss and granting summary judgment
to the union and remand the case to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the complaint.

                                                    So ordered.
WILKINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result:

     In order to avail itself of Leedom jurisdiction, see Leedom
v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), the American Federation of
Government Employees, National Council of HUD Locals,
Council 222 (the “Union”) needed to show that the Federal
Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”) decision below was
plainly ultra vires. Because the Union cannot meet that high
bar, the Leedom exception does not apply, the District Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the present lawsuit, and its
judgment must be reversed. That should end the matter.

     The majority wanders further, opining that 5 U.S.C. §
7123(a) categorically bars district court review of FLRA
arbitration decisions even if a party can show that the FLRA
action was ultra vires. The majority also declares that our
decision in Nyunt v. Chairman, Broadcasting Board of
Governors, 589 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J.), is
both irrelevant and incorrect, even though no party made those
contentions. Those musings are not only unnecessary to the
result, but they are also inconsistent with precedent. I therefore
cannot join the majority opinion and must write separately.

                                I.

     The Leedom exception is one of vanishingly few avenues
that provide the “availability of nonstatutory review for
statutory claims,” 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, CHARLES H.
KOCH & RICHARD MURPHY, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 8362 (2d ed. 2018). Jurisdiction for ultra vires
review does not arise out of an agency’s statutory scheme but
instead “evolved out of courts’ use of their equitable
jurisdiction to enjoin illegal agency action.” Id. § 8307.
Indeed, “[j]udicial review for ultra vires agency action ‘rests
on the longstanding principle that if an agency action is
unauthorized by the statute under which [the agency] assumes
to act, the agency has violate[d] the law and the courts
                               2
generally have jurisdiction to grant relief.’” Fed. Express
Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 39 F.4th 756, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2022)
(quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Postal Supervisors v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
26 F.4th 960, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

     Accordingly, the Leedom exception, “premised on the
original federal subject matter jurisdiction of the district
courts,” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. Local 3690 v. FLRA, 3 F.4th
384, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original) (quoting Am.
Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 2510 v. FLRA, 453 F.3d 500, 506
(D.C. Cir. 2006)), “permits, in certain limited circumstances,
judicial review of agency action for alleged statutory violations
even when a statute precludes review,” Nyunt, 589 F.3d at 449.

      This Circuit employs the test articulated in Nyunt to guide
application of the Leedom exception. See generally Changji
Esquel Textile Co. Ltd. v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 722 (D.C.
Cir. 2022); Fed. Express Corp., 39 F.4th at 763; DCH Reg’l
Med. Ctr. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 503, 509 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Am.
Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 716 F.3d 633,
639 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v.
Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Relying on
existing caselaw, then-Judge Kavanaugh devised a three-factor
test that explains the Leedom exception applies “only where (i)
the statutory preclusion of review is implied rather than
express,” “(ii) there is no alternative procedure for review of
the statutory claim,” and “(iii) the agency plainly acts ‘in
excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific
prohibition in the’ statute that is ‘clear and mandatory[.]’”
Nyunt, 589 F.3d at 449 (quoting Leedom, 358 U.S. at 188) (first
citing Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc.,
502 U.S. 32, 44 (1991); then citing McBryde v. Comm. to Rev.
Cir. Council Conduct & Disability Ords. of the Jud. Conf. of
the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 63–64 (D.C. Cir. 2001); and then citing
                              3
Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n AFL-CIO v. Fed. Serv.
Impasses Panel, 437 F.3d 1256, 1263–64 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).

     Thus, if the party seeking review cannot show that the
agency action being challenged was taken plainly in excess of
the agency’s powers and contrary to a statutory prohibition, it
loses. That is the case here.

                              II.

     In its complaint, the Union alleged that the FLRA “acted
contrary to a clear and mandatory provision of [5 U.S.C. §
7122(b)]” when it “refus[ed] to uphold the final and binding
arbitral decisions underlying and in HUD I through HUD VII
and Summaries 1 [through] 9.” J.A. 391. In the contested
action, upon review of HUD’s exception to the tenth summary
of the arbitrator, the FLRA vacated all of the arbitrator’s
previous awards, set aside all of her summaries (except the
tenth summary), and vacated all of the agency’s own prior
decisions in HUD I through HUD VII on the grounds “the
[a]rbitrator has always lacked jurisdiction over the grievance,
as a matter of law” and “should have declared this grievance to
be non-arbitrable from the outset.” U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb.
Dev., 70 F.L.R.A. 605, 608 (2018) (“HUD VIII”).

     The FLRA rejected the contention that vacating the
arbitrator’s decisions violated 5 U.S.C. § 7122(b), which
provides that arbitral decisions are “final and binding” once
any exceptions are resolved. As it explained, while “the prior
arbitration awards and written summaries, with the exclusion
of the tenth written summary, were final and binding[,]” the
“[FLRA] may consider jurisdictional questions even where the
merits of an underlying final and binding award are not at
issue.” U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 71 F.L.R.A. 17, 18
                                4
(2019) (“HUD IX”). Unfortunately for the Union, the FLRA is
correct.

                               A.

     The Union claims that the “final and binding” language in
the statute compelled the FLRA to treat its prior jurisdictional
finding as law of the case and consequently prevented the
FLRA from revisiting that finding. There are several
weaknesses to this argument. First, it is not even clear that the
law of the case doctrine, which provides that “the same issue
presented a second time in the same case in the same court
should lead to the same result,” LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d
1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (emphasis in original),
even applies to administrative agencies like the FLRA. See
Biltmore Forest Broad. FM, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,
321 F.3d 155, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting “that the law of the
case doctrine is of uncertain force in the context of
administrative litigation”); see also 18B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478 (3d ed. 2019) (while
“agencies . . . may find it desirable to invoke law-of-the-case
principles[,] . . . [t]he increased flexibility that distinguishes
administrative procedure from judicial procedure may,
however, lead agencies to take a somewhat more relaxed view
of the need for consistency[.] . . .”). And even if the law of the
case doctrine applied to the FLRA, “[t]he doctrine is a
discretionary prudential doctrine, not a jurisdictional bar[.] . .
.” Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, 45 F.4th 306, 312 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Thus, because
“[l]aw of the case directs a court’s discretion [and] does not
limit the tribunal’s power[,]” Arizona v. California, 460 U.S.
605, 618 (1983), the FLRA’s failure to employ the doctrine
cannot support a claim that the FLRA acted ultra vires (in
excess of its power), even if the doctrine applied.
                                5
                                B.

     The Union’s argument that the “final and binding”
language in Section 7122(b) precludes the FLRA from vacating
these arbitral awards also falls flat. First, the most natural
reading of the text is that “final and binding” refers to the
parties to the award because it is the parties to the dispute who
are bound by the decisions and remedial provisions set forth by
the arbitrator. At most, whether the “final and binding”
language applies to the FLRA—upon review of the arbitrator’s
decision—is ambiguous.

     The FLRA has concluded that it has the obligation to
review and set aside even “final and binding” awards if it
determines that the underlying grievance was outside of the
arbitrator’s statutory jurisdiction, HUD IX, 71 F.L.R.A. at 18,
which is consistent with the approach it has taken for many
years, see U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Food & Consumer Serv., 60
F.L.R.A. 978, 981 (2005) (noting FLRA precedent from 1999
holding that “the Authority’s subject matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any stage of the Authority’s proceedings” has
“been applied subsequently in several decisions”). Given the
ambiguity of the statute, we must defer to the FLRA’s
interpretation of its statutory jurisdiction, if it is reasonable.
See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms v. FLRA, 464
U.S. 89, 97 (1983) (“[R]eviewing courts should uphold
reasonable and defensible constructions of an agency’s
enabling Act”); see also City of Arlington, Tex. v. Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 303 (2013) (“The U.S.
Reports are shot through with applications of Chevron to
agencies’ constructions of the scope of their own
jurisdiction.”). And the FLRA’s interpretation does appear to
be reasonable, as it is consistent with the view of the Federal
Circuit that “the arbitrator’s jurisdiction cannot extend to a case
over which the statute does not grant him authority, and such
                                6
jurisdictional issue may be raised at any time.” Devine v.
Levin, 739 F.2d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

                              ***

     In sum, because the Union cannot show that the FLRA
plainly acted “‘in excess of its delegated powers and contrary
to a specific prohibition in the statute’ that is ‘clear and
mandatory,’” Nyunt, 589 F.3d at 449 (quoting Leedom, 358
U.S. at 188), it cannot avail itself of district court review under
Leedom. As we observed recently when applying this third
prong of the Nyunt test, “[t]o be ruled ultra vires, the
challenged action must ‘contravene[] a clear and specific
statutory mandate[,]’ . . . and the statutory construction adopted
by an agency will be held ‘impermissible’ only if it is ‘utterly
unreasonable[.]’” Fed. Express Corp., 39 F.4th at 766
(citations and quotations omitted).

                               III.

      Reaching the conclusion that the Union cannot meet the
third prong of the Nyunt test was all that was necessary for the
majority to decide this case. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women's
Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 348 (2022) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in judgment) (“If it is not necessary to decide more
to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more.”).
I am tempted to ignore this surplusage, but I would be remiss
if I did not call attention to a couple of major problems.

                                A.

     First, the majority stretches the holding of Griffith v. FLRA
to proclaim a rule that conflicts with our precedent. 842 F.2d
487 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
                                7
     The majority asserts that Griffith and subsequent
authorities demonstrate that “in non-constitutional cases, if a
federal statute clearly bars district court jurisdiction—as §
7123(a) does over arbitration-related decisions—that ends the
matter.” Maj. Op. 11. The majority’s assertion directly
contradicts Griffith’s statement that “we find that the statute [§
7123(a)] leaves the door ajar for clear violations of statutory
authority under Leedom v. Kyne. . . .” Griffith, 842 F.2d at 490
(emphasis added).          The majority acknowledges the
contradiction, Maj. Op. 10 n.8, but nonetheless protests that we
did not really mean what we said in Griffith, id. at 11. The
majority’s strained protests are belied by what we said barely
one year later, when we observed—in a case about the scope of
review of FLRA arbitration decisions—that we really did mean
what we said in Griffith:

       [O]ur earlier opinion in Griffith . . . h[eld] that
       the merits of arbitration awards appealed to the
       FLRA are not further reviewable in any federal
       court unless the arbitrators’ decision (and the
       FLRA’s affirmance) is challenged as
       unconstitutional or falls within the narrow
       bounds of the Leedom v. Kyne[.] . . exception to
       statutory provisions.

Dep’t of Treasury, Off. of Chief Couns. v. FLRA, 873 F.2d
1467, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Supplemental Opinion) (second
emphasis added).

     More of our precedent undermines the majority’s reading
of Griffith. If the majority were correct, Griffith established a
rule that in cases challenging an FLRA arbitration decision as
contrary to a statute (rather than contrary to the constitution),
Leedom jurisdiction is absolutely foreclosed because “that ends
the matter.” Maj. Op. 11. Accordingly, under the majority’s
                               8
rule, we would not need to determine whether the challenged
FLRA arbitration decision violated a plain statutory command
in order to disclaim Leedom jurisdiction because only
constitutional violations can confer Leedom jurisdiction in
FLRA arbitration cases in the first place. But we did just that
in U.S. Department of Justice v. FLRA, where notwithstanding
our citation of Griffith, we examined whether the challenged
FLRA arbitration order was a “facial violation or a patent
misconstruction of the Statute” before we ruled there was no
Leedom jurisdiction. 981 F.2d 1339, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Likewise, in U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Customs
Service v. FLRA, another case involving an FLRA arbitration,
we said—notwithstanding our citation of Griffith—that
“Leedom stands for the proposition that if an agency openly
violates a clear mandate of a statute even a preclusion of
judicial review (in that case implied) will not bar judicial
intervention. . . . There is no such clear transgression of a
substantive statutory mandate here.” 43 F.3d 682, 688 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (emphases added). Again, there would have been
no need for us to examine whether a statute was “clear[ly]
transgress[ed]” if non-constitutional challenges to FLRA
arbitration decisions were indeed unqualifiedly outside of
Leedom review.

     The majority’s categorical reading of Griffith cannot be
squared with precedent where we did not treat the fact that the
plaintiffs raised statutory violations in FLRA arbitration cases,
rather than constitutional violations, as if it were the “end of
the matter.” I grant that the majority cites language from our
cases that supports its view, see Maj. Op. 12–13, but where
resolution of this case does not turn on which reading of
Griffith is correct, I would think it wise for us to avoid trying
to solve that riddle today.
                                9
                                B.

     Second, the majority insists that our precedent in Nyunt is
not controlling because it “deal[s] with an entirely different
statute[,]” Maj. Op. 13, even though no one made or briefed
that argument. To the contrary, both sides asked us to apply
the Nyunt test to resolve this case. Appellant Br. 57, 62;
Appellee Br. 22, 38; Appellant Reply Br. 1–2. Furthermore, it
was unnecessary to decide whether Nyunt “controlled” this
case or not because the Union could not satisfy the Nyunt test
anyway.

     As explained above, the third prong of the Nyunt test
requires a plaintiff to show that the “agency plainly act[ed] ‘in
excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific
prohibition in the’ statute that is ‘clear and mandatory[.]’”
Nyunt, 589 F.3d at 449 (quoting Leedom, 358 U.S. at 188). The
majority found that the Union’s contention that the FLRA
violated Section 7122(a) was at best “debatable,” Maj. Op. 20,
and that the FLRA “might well have violated no statutory
provision” at all, id. 21. Accordingly, because the Union did
not show that the FLRA had “plainly acted” in excess of its
powers or in violation of any statute, the Union crashed at
Nyunt’s third prong and there was no need to deem Nyunt
irrelevant to this dispute.

                                C.

    Third, the majority piled onto Nyunt even further, by
suggesting that certain language in the opinion is erroneous,
even though, as noted above, none of the parties argued that
Nyunt was wrong.

    This tack is especially curious. After all, if, as the majority
contends, Nyunt does not supply the correct test for FLRA
                               10
arbitration cases, all the majority had to do was to say so. That
would make Nyunt immaterial to the present dispute.

     Apparently, the majority wasn’t finished with Nyunt. My
colleagues hazard on, asserting that they have reviewed
“whether the Supreme Court has ever embraced Nyunt’s
implied-express formula to decide whether a statute precluded
judicial review[,]” and concluding that “[they] have found that
whether ‘the statutory preclusion of review’ is ‘express’ or
‘implied’ has never been the test.” Maj. Op. 14. Conscious
that a subsequent panel of our court cannot overrule an earlier
panel decision without the assent of a majority of the full court,
see LaShawn A., 87 F.3d at 1395, the majority invokes
authority holding that a panel can discard one of our precedents
if that precedent has been subsequently “eviscerated” by the
Supreme Court. See Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n,
863 F.2d 968, 978 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (cited at Maj. Op. 14).

   But Nyunt has never been “eviscerated” by the Supreme
Court. Not even close.

     The majority cites Supreme Court cases to support the
proposition that a court can find Congress expressly precluded
judicial review not only by examining the statutory text by
itself, but also by examining the text in conjunction with the
statutory scheme, the statute’s purpose and any other tool of
statutory construction. Maj. Op 15–16. I agree with this
proposition, but I disagree that Supreme Court cases
expounding this proposition somehow “eviscerate” Nyunt. To
the contrary, Nyunt says nothing about what interpretive tools
a court can (or cannot) use to construe a statute that is claimed
to preclude judicial review, and the majority cites to no such
language.
                               11
     The majority appears to take exception to the fact that
Nyunt says that “statutory preclusion of review” can be either
“express” or “implied.” Nyunt, 589 F.3d at 449 (cited at Maj.
Op. 13). But this language from Nyunt only means that when
the statute is fairly construed as “expressly” evincing
congressional intent to preclude judicial review, that is the end
of the matter—the courts have no jurisdiction. On the other
hand, if a fair construction of the statute is ambiguous or merely
“implies” that Congress may have intended to preclude judicial
review, then we should review other considerations to ensure
that the presumption of judicial review has been clearly
overcome. Far from being eviscerated, this understanding of
the law is absolutely consistent with Supreme Court precedent,
both before and after Nyunt.

     Indeed, the Supreme Court has never considered the
concept of “implied” preclusion of judicial review as
anathema.       In Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, which is favorably cited by the majority, see Maj.
Op. 15, the Court first examined the statutory text and found
no express preclusion of judicial review of the matter in
dispute, and then went on to hold that the asserted claim was
“not impliedly insulated from judicial review” by the statute.
476 U.S. 667, 678 (1986) (emphasis added). In Barlow v.
Collins, the Court first concluded that none of the pertinent
statutes “expressly preclude[d] judicial review,” 397 U.S. 159,
165 (1970), and then, citing Leedom, stated that “[t]he question
then becomes whether nonreviewability can fairly be inferred”
before ruling that there was no preclusion, id. at 166 (emphasis
added). In De Martinez v. Lamagno, the Court reviewed the
statutory text, context, scheme and history to conclude there
was no express preclusion of judicial review “[b]ecause the
statute [was] reasonably susceptible to divergent
interpretation[.]” 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995). Thus, the Court
“adopt[ed] the reading that accords with traditional
                               12
understandings and basic principles: that executive
determinations generally are subject to judicial review,” and
found no preclusion to judicial review. Id. But implied
preclusion is no one-way ratchet. In Block v. Community
Nutrition Institute, also favorably cited by my colleagues, see
Maj. Op. 17, the Court held that “[t]he structure of this Act
implies that Congress intended to preclude consumer
challenges to the Secretary’s market orders[,]” and thus denied
review. 467 U.S. 340, 352 (1984) (emphasis added).

     In each of these cases, the Court examined statutes where
preclusion of judicial review was deemed to be ambiguous,
“implied,” or “inferred,” rather than express. Sometimes the
implication (or inference) of preclusion was strong enough to
overcome the presumption favoring review. Sometimes it was
not.

     Thus, in Nyunt, we were absolutely correct to say that
Leedom jurisdiction “applies . . . only where . . . the statutory
preclusion of review is implied rather than express[.]” 589
F.3d at 449. If the preclusion of review is express, then the
answer is that there is no jurisdiction; but if the preclusion of
review is implied, then the answer to whether a court has
jurisdiction is that “it depends.” MCorp is not to the contrary.
There, the Court noted that the pertinent statutory provision
expressly precluded judicial review of the asserted claim,
which distinguished that statute from the law at issue in
Leedom, which only “implied, by its silence, a preclusion of
review of the contested determination.” MCorp, 502 U.S. at
44. If the distinction between an implied preclusion of review
and an express preclusion of review were completely
irrelevant, as the majority contends, the Court would have had
no need to comment on the difference between the two statutes.
                               13
     But perhaps the best defense of then-Judge Kavanaugh’s
opinion in Nyunt is an opinion from now-Justice Kavanaugh.
Writing for the Court in American Hospital Association v.
Becerra, Justice Kavanaugh considered the government’s
argument that the district court had no jurisdiction to review
the agency determination because “Congress implicitly granted
the agency judicially unreviewable discretion[.]” 596 U.S.
724, 733 (2022); see also id. at 733 (“[T]he detailed statutory
formula for the reimbursement rates undermines HHS’s
suggestion that Congress implicitly granted the agency
judicially unreviewable discretion”) (emphasis added). The
Court rejected the asserted “implicit” preclusion of review,
holding that “[the government’s] arguments against judicial
review cannot override the text of the statute and the traditional
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative
action.” Id. at 734.

    The moral to the story is that implied preclusion of review
is different than express preclusion. Unlike with express
preclusion, implied preclusion sometimes does not override the
presumption in favor of judicial review. That is the point of
Nyunt and that principle has not been “eviscerated.” See
Dellums, 863 F.2d at 978, n.1. To the contrary, that principle
has been confirmed.

                              ***

    My colleagues in the majority went too far and said too
much. I agree with the result, but I cannot join their opinion. I
respectfully concur.