Court Opinion

ID: 9709997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:59:11.882803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:53.273323
License: Public Domain

*541BAKER, Judge,
concurring in result.
The language of IND.CODE 9-8-2-1 leads me to concur in the result reached by the majority, but for a different reason. IND.CODE 9-8-2-1 provides that the notice of service and a copy of the process, sent by registered mail, are to be returned to the plaintiff by the Secretary of State when "the defendant refuses to accept or claim such registered mail...." (emphasis added). Thus, the "unclaimed" summons can serve as sufficient process only if the defendant refuses to accept or claim the registered mail.
When interpreting the language of a statute, words and phrases are to be given their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. Dishman v. Hill (1990), Ind.App., 561 N.E.2d 498, n. 2. Indiana courts have not yet had the occasion to define "unclaimed" in this situation, although the courts in New York have done so. Faced with a similar non-resident motorist service of process statute,1 a New York court determined:
[The Legislature intended "unclaimed" to cover that situation where the defendant was notified that he had a letter at the Post Office and he does not claim it, and "notation of refusal" to cover both the "unclaimed" letter and the situation where the letter itself is actually refused by the defendant or his agent. In either case the defendant has had notice of the letter.
LaVallee v. Peer (1980), 104 Misc.2d 943, 429 N.Y.S.2d 383, 385, aff'd, 80 A.D.2d 992, 441 N.Y.S.2d 435. It appears to me from the plain language of Indiana's statute that our legislature had a similar intent, and thus IND.CODE 9-3-2-1 requires that the defendant be notified by the United States Postal Service and refuse to pick up the registered mail before there can be sufficient service of process under this branch of the statute. Our supreme court has recently addressed this issue with respect to a statute similar to the one in this case. Shotwell v. Cliff Hagan Ribeye Franchise, Inc. (1991), 572 N.E.2d 487. In Shotwell, the court held registered mail returned marked "Return to Sender Forward Order Expired" and "Moved Not Forwardable" was insufficient service under the statute which required a return receipt showing delivery and acceptance, or upon the refusal of the acceptance, a return receipt noting such refusal. "[The return receipts reveal that there was neither acceptance nor rejection of the suit papers. Therefore, by the express terms of the statute, service was not accomplished." Id., at 489.
Because there is no evidence the defendant was ever actually notified by the Postal Service of her registered letter, she did not "refuse" service as anticipated by the statute. For this reason, I concur in the majority's determination that the default judgment must be set aside.

. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 253 (McKinney 1986).