Court Opinion

ID: 9837001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:56.08462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.723246
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(concurring in the result):
The Government concedes that the speedy-trial requirements of RCM 707, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984 (1994 edition) were not complied with in this case with respect to Charge II, the indecent-act specification. Counsel states:
Summary of Argument
Both the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals and the military judge correctly ruled that the Government did not violate UCMJ, Article 10 in appellant’s case. The Government acknowledges, however, that as to Charge II, indecent acts with a female under 16 years old, it did take more than 120 days to bring appellant to trial because, even though the Government dismissed what became Charge II, appellant remained in pretrial restraint. The Government contends that where it complies with UCMJ, Article 10, but violates RCM 707 by taking longer than 120 days to bring an accused to trial, this Court should test for prejudice. After testing for prejudice in appellant’s case, this Court should conclude that he was not prejudiced and affirm the lower court’s decision.
Answer to Final Brief at 4.
Later on in its brief the Government more particularly addressed this issue:
Therefore, the Government did not violate RCM 707 with respect to Charge I, appellant was not denied a speedy trial on this charge, and his assignment of error as to Charge I is without merit. RCM 707.
The Government is responsible for taking 141 days to try appellant on charge II.4 Appellant’s case presents the peculiar situation where the Government complied with the more rigorous standards of UCMJ, Article 10, yet due to the unique factual circumstances of this case took more than 120 days to try appellant on Charge II.
4. Since appellant remained in continuous pretrial restraint, the 53 days attributable to the Government from October 28, 1994, the day that appellant was placed in pretrial confinement, until his February 28, 1994, arraignment must be added to the 88 days August 5 and October 31, 1994. RCM 707(b)(3).
Answer, supra at 10.
The majority summarily rejects this specific concession and affirms on the basis that RCM 707 was generally complied with in this case. It cites United States v. Ruffin, 48 MJ 211, 212 (1998). However, in Ruffin, we noted:
The Drafters’ Analysis of RCM 707, Manual, supra at A21-41, provides the following explanation:
Subsection (3)(B) clarifies the intent of this portion of the rule. The harm to be avoided is continuous pretrial restraint. See United States v. Gray, 21 MJ 1020 (NMCMR 1986). Where an accused is released from pretrial restraint for a substantial period, he will be treated the same as an accused who was not restrained. Therefore, unless the restraint is reimposed, the 120-day time period will run from the date of prefer-ral ... regardless of whether that event occurs before or after the accused was released from restraint.
II
Appellant was placed in pretrial restriction on December 10, 1993, and released on February 15, 1994. He was not subjected to any further pretrial restraint. Charges were preferred on February 16, 1994, and trial was commenced on August 30,1994.
(Emphasis added.) We then resolved that case on the basis of RCM 707(b)(3)(B).
Appellant, however, was subject to further pretrial restraint. The court-martial rule being applied in appellant’s case by the Government is RCM 707(b)(3)(A). It states:
(3) Events which affect time periods.
(A) Dismissal or mistrial. If charges are dismissed, or if a mistrial is granted, a new 120-day time period under this rule shall begin on the date of dismissal or *450mistrial for cases in which there is no repreferral and cases in which the accused is in pretnal restraint. In all other cases, a new 120-day time period under the rule shall begin on the earlier of
(i) the date of repreferral;
(ii) the date of imposition of restraint under RCM 30Jp(a)(2)-(4.).
(b) Release from restraint. If the accused is released from pretrial restraint for a significant period, the 120-day time period under this rule shall begin on the earlier of
(i) the date of preferral of charges; (ii) the date on which restraint under RCM 304(a)(2)-(4) is reimposed; or
(iii) the date of entry on active duty under RCM 204.
(Emphasis added.) Unlike Ruffin, appellant was not released from pretrial restraint, and the charges were repreferred. The Government considered this a continuous pretrial restraint situation and concluded that RCM 707(b)(3)(A) was at least technically violated in this case.
I think the majority should address this argument before this case can be properly resolved.