Court Opinion

ID: 9479160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:10:13.900936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:51.806131
License: Public Domain

NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the police had probable cause to believe that the methamphetamine came from Lindsey’s house. I also agree that exigent circumstances would have existed had the police reasonably believed that the source in Lindsey’s house was expecting Ogata to return with the money, because a delay in Ogata’s return might have made the source nervous about the possibility of police involvement. If that thought had crossed the source’s mind, it might have led to the destruction of evidence, flight by the source, or “some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts,” the evils toward which the exigency exception to the warrant re*784quirement of the Fourth Amendment is directed. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984).
The critical inquiry, then, is whether the police had a reasonable basis for believing that the source expected Ogata to return promptly with the money. In other words, was there a reasonable basis for believing that the source fronted Ogata with the drugs?
Detective Cook testified, as the majority notes, that he believed the source had fronted Ogata the drugs and was awaiting payment. The question, however, is whether that subjective belief was objectively reasonable. The majority holds that it was on the strength of the following analysis:
Cook formed this belief based on his two years of experience as a narcotics officer and his participation in 50 to 75 methamphetamine transactions. His belief was reasonable in light of Ogata’s initial failure to bring the drugs and his request that Cook pay for them before delivery.
Majority Opinion at 7. In other words, the majority grounds the reasonableness of Detective Cook’s subjective belief in his experience as a narcotics officer, and in the factual circumstances of this case, i.e., the fact that Ogata did not bring the drugs with him initially and asked Cook for payment before delivery. The majority’s rationale, however, not only fails to find any support in the record, it is flatly contradicted by Detective Cook’s own testimony. On redirect examination, the following exchange took place between the government’s attorney, Mr. Walsh, and Detective Cook:
Mr. Walsh: Detective Cook, when you spoke with Mr. Ogata at the outset of the buy bust, did he ask for money?
Detective Cook: Yes, he did.
Mr. Walsh: And did you give it to him?
Detective Cook: No, I didn’t.
Mr. Walsh: And what did he do after you didn’t give it to him?
Detective Cook: He told me that he would go to his connection and bring it [the drugs] back.
Mr. Walsh: Now, in your experience under those particular circumstances, is methamphetamine generally fronted? (emphasis added)
Mr. Stokke (defense counsel): Object. Speculation.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Walsh: Thank you, your Honor. You can answer the question.
Detective Cook: No, generally it isn’t. (emphasis added)
Reporter’s Transcript (11/24/87) at 41-42.
Thus, Detective Cook expressly testified that in his experience methamphetamine is generally not fronted in cases such as this one, which squarely contradicts the majority’s assertion that Detective Cook’s narcotics experience and the particular facts of this case provide an objectively reasonable basis to support a subjective belief that the source fronted Ogata the drugs.
In light of his testimony that methamphetamine is generally not fronted in these kinds of cases, why did detective Cook later testify that it was his subjective belief that Ogata was in fact fronted the drugs? The record provides no answer. It is barren of any evidence that an objectively reasonable basis existed for Detective Cook’s testimony that he believed that the drugs had been fronted.
In sum, then, the government has completely failed to carry its burden of proving exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry. See United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1465 (9th Cir.1983). Accordingly, I dissent.