Court Opinion

ID: 9937396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 19:01:16.339969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:41.568646
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 9 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-10335

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:13-cr-00355-GMN-CWH-1
 v.

GREGORY VILLEGAS,                               MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Nevada
                   Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted January 22, 2024
                               Pasadena, California

Before: GOULD and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,** District Judge.

      Gregory Villegas appeals his $5,261,218 forfeiture judgment imposed after

he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. We previously vacated and

remanded a forfeiture judgment imposed on Villegas for $5,261,218 with

instructions for the district court to assess the forfeiture judgment in light of the

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Supreme Court’s decision in Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017).

United States v. Villegas, 747 F. App'x 600 (9th Cir. 2019). Upon remand, the

district court again entered a forfeiture judgment for $5,261,218. Although the

district court had already entered forfeiture orders against two of Villegas’s co-

conspirators in the amount of $2,300,508.86, the court held that Villegas obtained

the sum of all the proven proceeds in the conspiracy, totaling $5,261,218.1 The

district court found that Villegas, as the leader of the conspiracy, exercised control

over his co-conspirators, who each held a different portion of the proceeds in bank

accounts registered under their names. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we reverse the forfeiture judgment.

      We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of federal forfeiture laws.

United States v. Pollard, 850 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2017). Under forfeiture

statutes like those involved in this case,2 a defendant cannot “be held jointly and

severally liable for property that his co-conspirator derived from the crime but that

the defendant himself did not acquire.” Honeycutt, 581 U.S. at 445. “Honeycutt does

1
  Christine Gagnon and Mickey Gines, two of Villegas’ many co-conspirators, were
each ordered to forfeit $1,684,462 and $616,046.86, respectively. These amounts
reflected the proceeds held in the bank accounts for which Gagnon and Gines were
the authorized users.
2
  United States v. Thompson, 990 F.3d 680, 689 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Honeycutt does
apply to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C).”); United States v. Prasad, 18 F.4th 313, 320–21
(9th Cir. 2021) (applying Honeycutt to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)).

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not allow for an interpretation that any conspirator who at some point had physical

control is subject to forfeiture of all the proceeds.” United States v. Thompson, 990

F.3d 680, 691 (9th Cir. 2021). Rather, a defendant is only subject to forfeit the

amount that “came to rest with him as a result of his crimes.” Id. The Government

has the burden to prove a nexus between the property and the crime by a

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Mancuso, 718 F.3d 780, 798–99

(9th Cir. 2013).

      We conclude that the forfeiture judgment violates Honeycutt as interpreted in

Thompson. In cases involving co-conspirators, the district court must usually make

“findings establishing how the loot was divided among the conspirators.”

Thompson, 990 F.3d at 691. Here, however, the district court could not make such

a finding because the Government only provided evidence regarding the amount of

proceeds that were initially deposited into the co-conspirators’ bank accounts. The

record suggests that Villegas had his co-conspirators withdraw the proceeds and

bring the proceeds to him, after which he divided the proceeds among his co-

conspirators. The Government did not present evidence proving the amounts that

each co-conspirator ultimately received. For the forfeiture orders entered against

Villegas’ co-conspirators, the Government agreed to use the amounts of money

processed through each co-conspirator’s bank account as a proxy for the amounts

that actually “came to rest” with each co-conspirator.

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      In contrast, Villegas was ordered to forfeit $5,261,218, the sum of the

proceeds held in all of the co-conspirators’ bank accounts. $5,261,218 is neither the

amount that “came to rest” with Villegas as that phrase was used in Thompson (i.e.,

“the money [that] came to rest after the swindlers split it up”) nor the amount that

was held in Villegas’ bank accounts (i.e., the amount consistent with the proxy the

Government used for the actual amounts that “came to rest” with Villegas’ co-

conspirators). Id. Villegas’ forfeiture judgment violates Honeycutt because he will

be required to satisfy the order from untainted assets if his co-conspirators do not

first satisfy their forfeiture judgments. See Honeycutt, 581 U.S. at 449.

      We reverse and remand to the district court to enter a forfeiture judgment for

$156,962, which is the amount of proceeds that the Government proved was held in

Villegas’ bank accounts. We do not remand to the district court to determine afresh

the amount of money that “came to rest” with each conspirator. In Thompson, such

a remand was appropriate because the district court could determine on the existing

record the amount of proceeds that came to rest with each of the defendants. See

Thompson, 990 F.3d at 685. Here, the amount to be forfeited by the two other

convicted conspirators has already been finally determined. And, the Government,

with regard to the funds that “came to rest” with Villegas, presented evidence only

of the amount of money in his bank accounts. There is no other evidence of the

amount ultimately distributed to Villegas. Having had an opportunity to present

                                          4
other evidence of the tainted money Villegas personally received—quite possibly

much more than the amount in the accounts the Government identified—the

Government did not do so. Because the only evidence in the record that could be

used to approximate the amount that “came to rest” with Villegas is the $156,962 in

his bank accounts, no further findings on that issue could cure that failure of proof.

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

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