Court Opinion

ID: 9734003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:22:30.354065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:45:13.333188
License: Public Domain

Wennerstrum, J.
(dissenting) — I am unable to agree with the majority opinion and consequently respectfully dissent.
It should be kept in mind that there were only two witnesses in this case, the plaintiff, the minor herein, who testified in his own behalf and the salesman for the defendant who testified for the defendant. As noted in the majority opinion under section 599.3, 1954 Code of Iowa, there can be no disaffirmance of a minor’s contract where by reason of the minor’s own misrepresentation as to his majority, or from having engaged in business as an adult, the other party had good reason to believe, him capable of contracting. Under such circumstances it is the responsibility of this court to determine whether under the evidence the minor made any misrepresentations regarding his majority or whether there is sufficient evidence in this ease of his having engaged in business as an adult which would give the representative of the defendant reason to believe the plaintiff capable of contracting.
In considering-a contract wherein a minor is involved the person or party who asserts that it is binding has the burden of proving matters in avoidance of the infancy asserted, such as fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of age, ratification after reaching majority, or engaging in trade. 43 C.J.S., Infants, section 117a, page 330.
In considering whether there was any misrepresentation on the part of the minor plaintiff and particularly as relates to the order which was' signed, the plaintiff’s testimony is in part as follows: “A. Well, when I signed it (the ear order), I was in a hurry to leave at the time, and he had me sign it to *212prove that they didn’t have any — I mean, he brought out the fact that they didn’t have any insurance to cover that. I would be assuming full responsibility of the car when I drove it out of the garage. Q. All right. Did you read that paper before you signed it? A. No, I didn’t. I was in a hurry to leave.”
We therefore have a situation wherein the only claimed misrepresentation as to the plaintiff’s minority is that set forth in the written car order, and as regards this statement it is shown, by the minor’s previous testimony, he was asked to sign the car order so that it could be shown there was no insurance carried by the company on the ear. There is no showing.the salesman called the minor’s attention to the words pertaining to the age of the purchaser although he did do so concerning the stamped insertion relative to insurance. It is true the salesman testified that in negotiating the contract involved in the purchase of the ear he relied on this statement. However, as hereinafter set forth, in answer to a question by the court whether he had asked the plaintiff what his age was, all the witness was able to answer was: “I can’t remember.”
From the foregoing excerpts from the testimony it must be apparent there was no misrepresentation made by the plaintiff relative to his age. The fact that the printed statement was incorporated in the car order should not be held against him, particularly when it is not shown it was brought to his attention. And this is particularly true when the defendant’s salesman could not remember whether he had asked plaintiff what his age was. This would indicate the salesman did not call the plaintiff’s attention to the statement in the car order regarding his age.
It is the conclusion of the writer of this dissent the defendant has failed to meet the burden of proof required of it to show misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff concerning his age. Friar v. Rae-Chandler Co., 192 Iowa 427, 429, 430, 185 N.W. 32.
It cannot be said that the manner in which the car order was signed wherein the statement of age was incorporated was, under the circumstances, an affirmative or definite statement intended to mislead and to create a belief ¡u the mind of the representative of the sales company that the minor was capable of contracting.
*213II. The defendant, in its answer, pleaded the plaintiff engaged in business as an adult and that the representative of the defendant had good reason to believe the plaintiff capable of entering into a contract. There was no evidence presented of any other business transaction than the one here involved. There is an entire lack of. evidence relative to the plaintiff being engaged in business. The fact the plaintiff was employed during the summer in an industrial plant in Keokuk does not justify a conclusion he was engaged in business. As bearing on somewhat similar situations see Beickler v. Guenther, 121 Iowa 419, 96 N.W. 895; Friar v. Rae-Chandler Co., supra.
III. There is evidence to the effect the plaintiff appeared to be of age. This evidence was proper but not necessarily conclusive. 43 C. J. S., Infants, section 117b, page 331.
It is the conclusion of this dissenter the defendant has failed to sustain the burden placed on it. The action of the plaintiff may not be commendable but it is my conclusion the defendant has failed to sustain its contention by a preponderance of the evidence and a reversal in this case is justified. Then too, we must consider we are dealing with a minor. I would reverse.
Hats, J., joins in this dissent.