Court Opinion

ID: 9750996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:55:59.174302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:33.851933
License: Public Domain

King, J.
(dissenting). I do not disagree with the basic statements of the applicable fundamental principles of law as given in the majority opinion. My disagreement is with their application to this case. I think the verdict of the jury, which in effect allowed but $5000 for post-mortem damages, while low, was reasonable on a permissible view of the evidence. The court’s memorandum of decision *120granting the motion to set aside the verdict does not suggest that anything occurred during the trial which was calculated to arouse passion, prejudice or bias in the jury, nor that the charge was incorrect. See cases such as Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 555, 102 A.2d 352. The only substantial reasons advanced by the court for its action in setting aside the verdict were, first, that the defendant James Steck, Jr., made a fine appearance and the jury must have been unduly moved by him, and second, that the jury must have failed to understand the charge as to proximate cause in the law of damages. Nothing, except the bare amount of the verdict, is cited in support of either theory.
The burden of proof of damages in any case is, as it was here, on the plaintiff. In a wrongful death action, such as this, the plaintiff is of course entitled to recover some post-mortem damages for the death itself. Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 668, 136 A.2d 918. But since under the modern statement of our rule post-mortem damages are allowed as compensation for the destruction of the decedent’s capacity to carry on life’s activities, including his capacity to earn money, a basic issue on which the plaintiff has the burden of proof is to what extent the decedent would probably have been able to carry on life’s activities but for his death.
Under the accepted and best method of proceeding in wrongful death cases, a plaintiff asks the court to take judicial notice of the actuarial life expectancy of the decedent and also offers any available evidence tending to prove that the decedent’s health and activities were such as to make it likely that his actual life expectancy would equal or exceed his actuarial life expectancy. Sims v. Smith, 115 Conn. 279, 286, 161 A. 239; Miner v. McKay, 145 Conn. 622, *121624, 145 A.2d 758. Bnt this is not all. In a proper charge in a case of this character, the jury should be told, in substance, that in the determination of the probable duration of the decedent’s life and the extent of his activities during that period, the expectancy shown in the mortality tables may well be qualified in the judgment of the jury by the physical condition and surroundings of the decedent and the natural incidents of life which in the normal process of existence might be expected to reduce the extent of his activities, including his aggregate earning capacity. Sims v. Smith, supra, 285. “Accident, sickness, disability, old age and the like, are such common incidents of life that they are to be expected in greater or less measure by all men, and certain of them especially by men in certain employments or environments. Any true estimate of what a given man may be expected to do in the future, especially in the way of earning, must take note of them, and one which ignores them is not impartial.” Lane v. United Electric Light & Water Co., 90 Conn. 35, 39, 96 A. 155; Sims v. Smith, supra. A refusal so to charge, even in a case involving, not death, hut a claimed permanent disability resulting in an impairment of earning capacity, has been held reversible error. Losier v. Consumers Petroleum Corporation, 131 Conn. 161, 166, 38 A.2d 670.
The ability to carry on life’s activities is subject to complete destruction by death and to curtailment in varying amount by any nonfatal disabling injury. Thus the plaintiff has the burden of proving two factors. The first is the probable actual life expectancy of the decedent, as distinguished from the actuarial life expectancy of one of his age. The second is the probable extent to which he would have been able to carry on life’s activities during his probable ac*122tual life expectancy. The first is affected by the risk of death prior to the expiration of the actuarial life expectancy, while the second is affected by the risk and extent of any disability arising prior to the expiration of the probable actual life expectancy. As in the case of most of the other elements which the jury must consider in making an award of postmortem damages, exact proof is impossible. Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 675, 136 A.2d 918. All that can be required is proof of reasonable probabilities. But this requires something more than proof of the mere fact that the injured party died, and at a given age. O’Connor v. Zavaritis, 95 Conn. 111, 117, 110 A. 878. In determining either of the foregoing factors under our rule, the jury must consider not only a decedent’s state of health but also the hazards of injury or death incident to his activities, whether these are recreational or vocational.
Here there was abundant credible evidence that the decedent had engaged in motorboat racing; that one of his favorite recreations was riding a motorcycle; that he hoped and expected to engage in the sale and repair of motorcycles as an occupation; that he had participated in motorcycle “scramble” races and had, until it was canceled, expected to take part in one to be held on the very day on which he was killed; and that in such a race the objective is to operate the motorcycle over a rough course with sharp turns as fast as possible and still stay on the vehicle. From all this, the jury might reasonably have believed that there was such a risk of death or disabling injury from the probable activities of the decedent that they could not find that the plaintiff had sustained his burden of proving (a) that the decedent had a probable actual expectancy of more *123than a few years or (b) that he would be likely to escape, for more than a few years, a disabling injury materially affecting his ability to carry on life’s activities.
It is imperative to keep in mind that it was not the burden of the defendant to prove, or even to offer evidence tending to prove, that motorboat racing or motorcycle riding or racing was dangerous, nor was it necessary that the jury so find as a proven fact. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) § 1698, and cases cited. But it was the duty of the jury to consider the evidence as to these activities, and if they did so, they might reasonably fail to find that the plaintiff had proved that the decedent had an actual life expectancy approaching the normal or actuarial expectancy for one of his age and health or would probably have escaped a disabling injury during a normal expectancy. Lane v. United Electric Light & Water Co., 90 Conn. 35, 39, 96 A. 155; Donoghue v. Smith, 114 Conn. 64, 66, 157 A. 415.
A further consideration which may well have properly influenced the jury is the fact that the postmortem damages, at least as far as the element of destruction of earning capacity was concerned, were in compensation for losses which would occur from time to time during the decedent’s probable lifetime. In such a situation, “due allowance . . . [must be] made for the anticipation of these . . . [losses] by force of a judgment which was payable immediately.” Nelson v. Branford Lighting & Water Co., 75 Conn. 548, 553, 54 A. 303. In other words, the jury must, as best they could, discount to its present fair value any compensation made for loss of future earnings. Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 469, 45 A.2d 789. We must assume that the charge correctly instructed the jury on this point and that they followed it.
*124These considerations, even without other less important ones which I shall not mention, seem to me adequate to sustain the verdict of the jury as a reasonable result reached on a permissible view of the evidence. If this is correct, then the verdict should stand even though the jury awarded less damages than the court would have awarded had it tried the case without a jury. While the verdict is certainly low, it was substantial, and I do not feel that the trial court had any legal basis for setting it aside or any legal right so to do. “It must always be borne in mind that litigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by the jury and not by the court.” Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 555, 102 A.2d 352. “One obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court... [to set aside a verdict in a death case] is the constitutional right of trial by jury, which in a proper case includes the right to have issues of fact, as to the determination of which there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men, passed upon by the jury and not by the court.” Robinson v. Backes, 91 Conn. 457, 460, 99 A. 1057; Schlag v. Paffney, 103 Conn. 683, 685, 131 A. 420.
I think the case should be remanded for the rendition of judgment on the verdict.
In this opinion Muepby, J., concurred.