Court Opinion

ID: 9810792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:59:14.300043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:13.627259
License: Public Domain

Clark, J.
(dissenting): An examination of The Godér Section 3216, will show that it does not authorize the Governor to call out the militia under the preceding section or in any case whatever. Its very plain provision is that “in all cases” when the Governor does call out the militia “ for the benefit of any particular county ” they are to be paid in the manner provided by Section 3215, i. e. “By the county commissioners, who may lay a sufficient tax to pay said militia.” The power' to call out the militia is conferred on the Governor by the Constitution, Art. 12, Sec. 3, and the Legislature has no authority to restrict the constitutional power thus conferred on the Executive, and has not attempted to do so. The Constitution authorizes the Governor to call out the militia in three cases; (1) To execute the law. (2) To suppress riots or insurrections, and (3) To repel invasion. While the Legislature has no authority to restrict the power of the Governor to call out the militia, it devolved appropriately upon *124that body to provide for payment of the forces thus called. The law at first, which is now Section 3246 of The Code, provided that in all cases the militia, when 'called out by the Governor for the benefit of a particular county, should be paid by that county (just as when the militia were called out by three justices of the peace under Section 3245). As this might leave it an open question in what cases the call might be said to be for “ the benefit of a particular county,” the latter act was passed, which is now Section 3257 of The Code, which seems to indicate that where the militia or State Guard is called out to resist invasion or suppress insurrection, the troops are to be paid by the State, but leaving no provision for their payment in the first contingency provided by the Constitution, i. e., “ to execute the law,” except that contained in Section 3246, which provides for their payment by the county. And this seems a wise and just discrimination. Local self-government is conferred upon the counties. They build their own bridges, erect their own public buildings, work their own loads, maintain their paupers and “execute the law” by their jurors, sheriffs and other officers. When the resistance to constituted authority is so great as to amount to invasion or insurrection, it is just that the State should come to the aid of the county with the “ power of the State” and at the State’s expense. But, as to the lesser matters of the law, as the simple enforcement of the process of the courts, as in this case, the mere execution of a writ of possession under a judgment in ejectment, then it is clearly contemplated that it is the duty of the county to execute the process in its own borders, and, if the sheriff is resisted, the remedy is to call in, not the State, but the “ power of the county ” — the posse oomitatus. This is expressly provided by statute — Code, Sections 329, *1251121 and 1643. The sheriff did call for the posse eomi-tatus, and there was ample power, of good and lawful men, in the county to enable the sheriff to execute the writ. Had the posse aomitatus responded, the cost thereof would have been charged in the bill of costs and -would have fallen on the wrongdoers — the defendants in the execution. But the posse oomitatus failed to-respond. It was thereupon made to appear to the satisfaction of the Governor that it had become necessary to-send troops to Graven county “ to execute the law,” and under his constitutional authority he did so. But, as to the payment, the occasion not being “ to repel invasion or suppress insurrection,” there is no authority for the payment of the troops by the State under Section 3257, but payment is imposed on the-county as provided by Section 3246. Why should the citizens of Iredell, or Wayne or Wake county be taxed to-execute a writ of ejectment in Graven county, when it is the duty of the citizens of that county to aid the sheriff to-do so, and there is no invasion or insurrection which is beyond the power of the county ? The legislative discrimination as to the cases, in which payment should be by the State (invasion or insurrection) and when by the county (to execute process,) is eminently just. The first two cases-may be beyond the reasonable power of a county. The latter is always within its power. If this discrimination were not made, the citizens of a county may always refrain from aiding the sheriff to execute any process and throw the duty of doing so upon citizens of other counties, and the enormous expense entailed by this mode of “ executing the law ” upon the people of the whole State. If there is invasion or insurrection, the whole State is interested and will cheerfully aid both with men and money. But if the people of Craven county are too indifferent to aid the-*126sheriff of their county to execute a simple writ of ejectment, and the Governor has to be called on for men from other counties to do it, ought the people of Craven to pay the expenses which their failure to support the execution ■of the law has caused, or should other counties not only furnish the men to do the work for them but be taxed for the privilege of doing it? It is enough that men of other counties should be called on to execute a writ of ejectment in Craven county. That county and not the State should pay the expenses of furnishing men to perform a duty which devolved properly on the citizens of that county. Invasion or insurrection is a State matter. The statute so contemplates. But the execution of process is a county matter, and if there is resistance the men of the county (theposse aomitatus) should aid the sheriff to execute the law, and if they fail to do their duty, then the troops are sent there to do it for them “ for the benefit of the particular county” and the expense justly and by the plain provision of the Statute in all such cases falls upon that county. Code, Sec. 3216. If this were not the law, the number of instances would greatly multiply in which some locality wonld fail to aid the sheriff to execute the law, and would leave it to the military and the public treasury to ■execute the law for them.
Montgomery, J.: I concur in the dissenting opinion.