Court Opinion

ID: 9911772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 20:00:53.538199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:31.069825
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 20 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDREA KANE, MD; BROOK LANG,                    No.    22-36010
MD; CHRISTOPHER RABIN, DO,
                                                D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00159-TOR
                Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MEDNAX SERVICES, INC., a foreign
corporation; PEDIATRIX MEDICAL
GROUP OF WASHINGTON, INC. PS, a
Washington professional services
corporation,

                Defendants,

and

PROVIDENCE HEALTH & SERVICES-
WASHINGTON, DBA Providence Sacred
Heart Medical Center,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Washington
                    Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

                     Argued and Submitted December 6, 2023
                              Seattle, Washington

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Plaintiffs-Appellants Drs. Andrea Kane, Brook Lang, and Christopher Rabin

(“Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims against

Defendant-Appellee Providence Health & Services-Washington (“Providence”).

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s

decision on a motion to dismiss de novo. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home

Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We reverse and remand.

      Plaintiffs are three physicians who were employed by a physician group

named Mednax1 and who worked at a hospital owned by Providence. They allege

that their supervisor Dr. Ronald Ilg, a fellow Mednax employee, subjected them to

sexist comments and threatened their jobs and physical safety. The district court

held that Plaintiffs did not state cognizable employment and negligence claims

against Providence and dismissed those claims. The district court then denied

Plaintiffs leave to amend on futility grounds, stating: “Based on the detailed

allegations of the employer-employee relationship with Mednax and Pediatrix, the

Court finds amendment futile for claims against Providence.”

      We will affirm a dismissal without leave to amend on futility grounds only if

“it is clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any

1
 Defendants Mednax Services, Inc. (“Mednax”) and Pediatrix Medical Group of
Washington, Inc., P.S. (“Pediatrix”) are not involved in this appeal.

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amendment.” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir.

2011) (citation omitted). We conclude that the district court abused its discretion

in denying leave to amend for two reasons.

      First, the district court failed to articulate why Plaintiffs’ negligence claims,

which are not predicated on an employment relationship, warrant dismissal with

prejudice. See Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir.

2003) (“A simple denial of leave to amend without any explanation by the district

court is subject to reversal.”). Second, Plaintiffs’ employment claims are not futile

simply because Mednax is Plaintiffs’ employer. Plaintiffs have also alleged that

Providence may be held liable as an employer under the Washington Law Against

Discrimination (“WLAD”), which includes “any person acting in the interest of an

employer.” See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(11).

      The district court did not explain why the merits of Plaintiffs’ discrimination

and retaliation claims could not be saved by further amendment. The district court

stated that Plaintiffs’ complaint “plead[ed] no facts” showing that Providence itself

committed discriminatory acts, but that analysis failed to consider whether

Plaintiffs’ allegations stated, or could state, a cognizable hostile work environment

theory that Providence knew of Dr. Ilg’s sexual harassment but failed to take

adequate corrective action. See Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 693 P.2d 708,

711–12 (Wash. 1985). Even if the district court identified pleading deficiencies,

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our precedent generally requires that Plaintiffs be given an opportunity to cure

such deficiencies through amendment. See Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d at 995.

      We reverse the order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims, and we remand to allow

Plaintiffs to amend their complaint and conduct limited discovery as appropriate.

See, e.g., In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186,

1190–91 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2015).

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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