Court Opinion

ID: 9469480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:41:36.92075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:24.533444
License: Public Domain

JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The pivotal question is whether or not the company and the Union did in fact reach agreement on the terms of a new collective bargaining contract. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s position on this point.
I cannot agree that mutual understanding was reached and decline to join the ALJ and the NLRB in their processes of using inferences and “indicators” to construct a bargaining agreement.
We are here reviewing events that took place in a heated and volatile environment,1 and yet the Board would find a contract despite sharp differences in the recollections of the people who handled the actual negotiations.
These differences are significant. First, the Company maintains there was no discussion of the effective dates for the second and third years of the proposed contract. Despite testimony from Union negotiators Luffey and Boots that support the Company’s contention (appendix B-564-65; appendix B-589-90), the ALJ inferred from past contracts between the two parties, and also from the failure of the Company to object to Mannarino’s proposal of the anniversary date as the effective date, that April 1, 1979 was in fact agreed upon. However, mere failure to object to a pro*743posal does not imply agreement to it. See E. W. Means and Co. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1967).
Second, the Company argues that no agreement was reached regarding the extent of the Incentive Bonus Plan. Several issues remain unresolved, including whether an employee has to be employed for a certain period of time or on a particular date in order to receive payment, and whether payment is to be made to all eligible employees or only those who have actually received money under it. The Union contends that agreement was reached on the plan and finds support from the ALJ who states that “the facts do tend to support such an inference" (emphasis supplied) that the Company is using this issue as “a last minute after thought designed to avoid the bargaining contract.” Appendix at 259a. To me, such an “inference” is the shade of a shadow.
Third, the question of whether the work rules should be made part of the contract is in dispute. While the Company maintains that the rules should be part of the contract, the Union and the ALJ contend otherwise. In affirming the ALJ, the NLRB finds that since the parties agreed in substance to the rules this issue is “of little substance.” Appendix A-258. I see a sharp remaining difference and am unwilling to accept the ALJ’s characterization.
Fourth, there really is no final language. The Company maintains that the ALJ has made a contract out of a few pieces of paper initialed by the parties, and that there are still vital terms on which no meeting of the minds has been reached. Obviously if agreement is not reached on all terms, then there can be no contract. Pittsburgh DeMoines Steel Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 880, 888 (1973). The Union contends that a complete, final agreement has been reached. The ALJ comes to the same conclusion as the Union; however, his decision is once again based on inferences and conjecture. He speculates “that the Union would not talk about calling off a strike for less than a complete bargain; also, that the parties2 would not consider it necessary to call counsel at home on Sunday evening to report acceptance of some part of, but not all of, an agreement; moreover, that the parties did not contemplate another negotiating session of the kind to which they were accustomed.” Appendix at 256a.
To me, this symbolizes the vice of the ALJ’s approach. There could well be reasons why a strike would be abated even without a complete bargain. There could be a need for cooling off, for more study of one or more areas or even to allow time to check back to get a gauge on the chances of ratification. The ALJ accords weight to a Sunday evening call to counsel. In any negotiating context, quiet or tense, it is, to me, naive to attach any significance to an evening call — even on Sunday.
Finally, other unresolved issues include the status of the repairman classification, whether employees should be required to work outside in extreme temperatures, and the nature of an employee stock ownership plan. The Company maintains that these proposals are unresolved, while the Union contends they are withdrawn from the putative contract. The ALJ, in finding for the Union, infers from the failure to discuss these issues that they were withdrawn by the Union. The rationale used by the ALJ is that the Union negotiators’ declaration that a ratification vote would be taken was, in fact, a withdrawal of these proposals. However, on more than one prior occasion the Union had taken the Company’s offers to the membership for ratification even though unresolved issues remained. Appendix B-103-104.
While it is, of course, possible that some of the arguments raised by the NLRB in support of oral contracts might have validity in a placid and routine renegotiation context, my position goes further than the majority which is “reluctant to endorse” oral bargaining agreements (maj. op. p. 736). *744I am totally unwilling to find an agreement where the atmosphere is highly charged and where sharp differences emerge and remain. It is for the parties to reach an agreement, not for the ALJ and the NLRB to construct it for them by “indicators” and speculative hindsight. In NLRB v. N.Y.-Keansburg-Long Branch Bus, 578 F.2d 472, 477 (3d Cir. 1978) we said:
This teaching [that in the field of labor relations parties may sometimes be held to oral contract terms] is necessarily subject however to the overriding precondition that the parties in the first instance must have agreed to the terms of the contract which is sought to be enforced. H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102, 90 S.Ct. 821, 822, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (emphasis added). It is only a written contract embodying agreed terms which the Board may require the company to sign. H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, supra, 311 U.S. at 526, 61 S.Ct. 320 (emphasis in original).
It therefore becomes apparent that the first inquiry to be made is whether, in fact, the parties did agree on the terms and the conditions of the contract. . .. [I]f the substantive terms had not been agreed to by the employer, then of course we may not compel, as the Board may not, the execution of any document.
Our holding in Keansburg controls the case before us.3
If the record proves anything; it proves that there was confusion, and that sharp differences in important areas exist. This is the natural result of intensity and emergency.
I cannot find support for a finding of complete agreement here and do not feel that it is proper for the missing pieces to be filled by administrative inference.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. Witness the violence which is the subject of the individual discharges.
Vannatten — throwing cobblestones at employees and at a building;
Senchak — threats to kill, endangering employees by weaving in and out between suppliers’ truck and company car on a motorcycle;
Mann — assisting in impeding passage by vehicles through company gate.
Further there is of record a stipulation revealing discharges of:
(a) Mijavic and Taylor — smashing windshields and window with rocks;
lb) Miles and Regna — physical personal assaults with tire iron and baseball bat;
(c) Rankin — throwing rocks through windshield and chasing supply truck and company escort car;
(d) Bathhurst — hitting supplier’s truck with nail studded board and placing that board under tires;
(e) Hill —jumping on hood of company car;
(f) Trott — breaking company windows with rocks.
Appendix B-526-28.

. In fact it was the Union negotiator Mannarino who suggested the procedure (appendix B-69, 91, 343).

. The factual and procedural posture of Keansburg was very similar to the case at bar. In that case we denied enforcement of an NLRB order forcing the Company to execute a collective bargaining contract after it had allegedly reached agreement with the Union. Our denial was based on the fact that the record contained evidence indicating that the parties never reached a final agreement on two issues: a minimum work force provision and a provision providing for waiver of part-time driver representation. 578 F.2d at 478, 480. It is beyond cavil that the issues on which the parties in the case before us did not reach agreement are at least as significant, if not more so, than those in Keansburg.