Court Opinion

ID: 9497551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:53:46.726714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:56.287037
License: Public Domain

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
1. Any modified categorical approach analysis must start with Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). Where the substantive statutes under which the defendant was convicted (here, 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 371 and 1001) are broader than the generic statute (here, an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)), we may “go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of’ the generic crime. 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (emphasis added). To be convicted of a specific offense is to be convicted of the generic offense “if either its statutory definition substantially corresponds to [the generic offense], or the charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements of [the generic offense] in order to convict the defendant.” Id. (emphasis added).
But this approach only works when the difference between the crime of conviction and the generic crime lies in the fact that particular elements in the former are broader than their counterparts in the latter. By contrast, when the crime of conviction is broader because it is missing an element of the generic crime altogether, we can never find that “a jury was actually required to find all the elements of’ the generic crime.
To illustrate the first kind of “broader,” suppose the generic crime requires that defendant have used a gun, while the crime of conviction can be committed with any kind of weapon. The government may then use the indictment and other documents in the record to prove that, because the jury convicted the defendant, it must have done so by finding that he used a gun — for instance, if that was the only way that element of the offense was charged in the indictment. Cf. id. (example of a state burglary statute including “entry of an automobile as well as a building”).
In our case, the crime of conviction is the second kind of “broader.” It simply lacks an element of the generic crime — as when the generic crime requires use of a gun while the crime of conviction doesn’t require a weapon at all. In such circumstances, the crime of conviction can never be narrowed to conform to the generic crime for the simple reason that the jury is not required — as Taylor mandates — to find all the elements of the generic crime. It’s true that some of the counts against petitioner alleged losses greater than $10,000, but since the crimes with which petitioner was charged did not make the amount of loss an element of the crime, the jury had no need to pass on the issue.
The modified categorical approach thus can’t be used to conform petitioner’s crime of conviction to the generic statute. Under the Taylor approach, the BIA improperly determined he was convicted of an aggravated felony.
2. This is the simple rule I would use to resolve the case if all I had before me were Taylor., But we are bound not only by Supreme Court precedent but also by our own.
In United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam), decided about two years after Taylor, we held that a conviction under Cal.Penal Code § 459 *900qualified as a generic burglary conviction even though generic burglary, as defined by the Supreme Court in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598-99, 110 S.Ct. 2143, requires unlawful entry and the California statute does not. We did so because the information charged that Alvarez “did unlawfully enter a building with intent to commit theft," and the jury found Alvarez “Guilty of the crime of Burglary, in violation of Penal Code section 459, as charged in the Information.” 972 F.2d at 1005.
Alvarez, which came down before we understood the full implications of Taylor, was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. I am not convinced that finding someone guilty “as charged in the Information” is the same as finding every fact alleged in the charge, regardless of its relationship to a statutory element of the crime. But even if the jury had found that Alvarez entered a building unlawfully, finding a fact isn’t the same as being required to find it — and Taylor calls for the latter. Alvarez explicitly recognized the Supreme Court’s focus on what the jury was required to find, see id. (“The Supreme Court in Taylor held that ... [an] enhancement was appropriate if the charging paper and jury instructions required the jury to find the elements of generic burglary.” (emphasis added)), but then inexplicably forgot it, see id. (“[Tjhese two particular items are not the only ones that can be used to show that burglary was proven." (emphasis added)).
Other cases have perpetuated the Alvarez error. In United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir.1993), where the same California statute was at issue, we wrote that “the Court’s main concern in Taylor was ensuring that the jury actually found all the requisite facts to render the offense a ‘violent felony,’ ” id. at 1327 (emphasis added) (citing Alvarez, 972 F.2d at 1005-06), again confusing finding with being required to find. There, the confusion didn’t do any harm to the defendant because, unlike in Alvarez, the verdict form did not reference the charging allegations but merely “reeite[d] that the jury [found] Parker guilty of violating CaLPenal Code § 459.” Id. This was insufficient to satisfy the modified categorical approach, we held, for “[w]ithout a verdict form verifying the jury’s findings of the truthfulness of all of the requisite charging allegations, the instructions are indispensable.” Id. The Al-varezian heresy also makes its way into our opinion. See Maj. op. at 897 (“Thus, if the record of conviction demonstrates that the jury in Petitioner’s case actually found that Petitioner caused, or intended to cause, a loss to the government of more than $10,000, the modified categorical approach will be satisfied.” (emphasis added)). This approach is not only contrary to Taylor but also unfair to defendants because it denies them notice and a reasonable opportunity to rebut the charges against them. Since the amount of loss wasn’t an element of the charges against Li, he had no reason to believe it would be relevant to his conviction, and thus no reason to cast doubt on the government’s evidence as to amount of loss. For all we know, Li might have had overwhelming evidence that any loss suffered by the government was less than $10,000, but presenting it to the jury would have been a waste of time and probably excluded as irrelevant, since amount of loss was not an element of the offense for which he was being tried. We are “especially reluctant to rely solely on the charging document and the judgment to establish a fact that the government was not required to prove, and the jury was not required to find, to convict Petitioner.” Maj. op. at 898. We should be equally reluctant to rely on any document to establish an element that the jury was not required to find and that *901defendant had no chance to rebut or disprove.
Though Alvarez took a wrong turn, it does not prevent us from reaching the right result here, just as it didn’t in Parker. We have no instructions here to show that the jury was required to find the amount of loss, and I agree that Parker prevents us from relying on the judgment of conviction: In the first place, the judgment was prepared by the court, not by the jury; and, in the second place, it states only that Li was found guilty of certain counts, which doesn’t necessarily mean that all the facts .recited in those counts were found to be true. See Maj. op. at 897-98.
Alvarez has caused, and will continue to cause, mischief. Though its error makes no difference to the outcome in this case, it needs to be overruled by an en bane court. But, because Judge Graber’s opinion properly applies the law of the circuit — wrong though it be — and reaches the right result, I join.