Court Opinion

ID: 9785736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:17:12.808353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:14.565053
License: Public Domain

CHAPEL, J.,
DISSENTING:
{1 I find merit in Proposition II. Nelson had long-standing mental problems, with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. As is common among people with that disease, he often refused to take medication that would control his illness. He was originally found incompetent to stand trial and his "severe persistent mental illness" delayed a finding of competency for a year. After a brief return to competency, he was found incompetent and treated for over a year again before he was adjudged competent to stand trial. Finally, he had a non-jury trial in which he insisted on pleading not guilty, and refused to claim insanity despite his evident mental illness. Nelson now claims his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to pursue an insanity defense. The majority admits Nelson's best defense was insanity, which was amply supported by the evidence. However, the majority holds. that, since Nelson was competent to stand trial, he was competent to instruct his attorney to waive the insanity defense. Therefore, the majority finds counsel could not be ineffective for following his client's express wish regarding his plea. I disagree.
12 I do not disagree with the majority's conclusion that counsel would be ethically bound to accept a competent client's decision regarding the plea to be entered. The issue is whether Nelson was competent to make that decision. Our standard for competency to stand trial is minimal: can a defendant understand and appreciate the nature of the charges against him and rationally and effectively assist his counsel in his defense.1 As *63happened here, persons with severe and long-standing mental illness are routinely found competent to stand trial, usually after prolonged drug therapy. This is because, after treatment, they can recognize and repeat what they are charged with, what could happen to them, and what happens in a courtroom, and can speak reasonably to an attorney. If a defendant can accomplish these things he will be adjudged competent even if he continues to suffer from a serious mental disorder.
13 Our criminal justice system continues to see more and more defendants with a variety of serious mental illnesses. Indeed, it appears that our prisons are being inundated with people who only a few years ago would be residing in state institutions for the mentally ill and retarded which have been closed. Often these people have either received no treatment or have refused treatment, due to their mental condition, before committing crimes. After being charged with a crime, they may be treated until they can stand trial-that is, they can meet the low threshold for competency. Most, like Nelson, can only meet that threshold while on medication, which they often refuse to take unless hospitalized. These drugs are often given in doses so strong that people without mental problems cannot take them; they tend to have serious and, sometimes, bizarre side effects. I am not prepared to join in a decision that would allow, indeed require, a person who meets the low threshold of competency to stand trial, but who is otherwise mentally incompetent to carry on his affairs, to make critical legal decisions over the objection of counsel.
T4 I recognize that other courts and the majority disagree. The majority relies in part on State v. Tenace2 and cases discussed therein. I note that none of these cases addresses my concern-is a mentally ill defendant, found competent to stand trial, actually competent to make important decisions regarding his defense. Rather, these cases, like the majority, assume the answer is "yes". Similarly, the reliance on professional ethical standards does not address my question; those standards require an attorney to consult, and in some circumstances, to defer to a defendant who is presumed able to make rational decisions. In my view any discussion of whether a mentally ill but competent defendant may have good reasons for avoiding an insanity defense miss the point. In other areas of life we would not assume the mentally ill person was making decisions on a rational basis. Why should we do so here, where the consequence are so grave?
[ 5 I believe it is time for us to reconsider our treatment of mentally ill defendants. Nelson may have been found competent to stand trial, but he was clearly mentally ill. Nothing in the record persuades me he had the ability to make reasonable, much less rational, choices regarding his case. Nelson had originally pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, but retracted that plea onee he was medicated enough to understand the proceedings. I am not persuaded this was a rational, intelligent or voluntary choice. Courts must not merely abide by the letter of the law, but must give life to its spirit. It is wrong to hold a trial for someone who cannot understand the charges or assist in his defense. It is also wrong to force or allow a person with a severe mental illness who may be competent to stand trial to make and abide by important decisions concerning his case. The Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is a fundamental right underlying our entire criminal justice system. It violates both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution to deprive mentally ill defendants of the advice of effective counsel, and require counsel to abide by irrational client decisions, merely because the client knows where he is and what is happening to him in the courtroom. I conclude defense counsel was not bound by Nelson's decision, and would find counsel ineffective for failing to pursue an insanity defense.
T6 I am authorized to state that Judge Strubhar joins in this dissent.

. 22 0.S.Supp.2000, § 1175.1. During a court-ordered competency evaluation, a doctor must examine the defendant to determine (a) whether the defendant can appreciate the nature of the charges; or (b) whether he can consult with his attorney and rationally assist in preparation of his defense; (c) if the answer to (a) or (b) is no, whether the defendant, if treated, can atiain competency within a reasonable time; (d) if the defendant is mentally ill or requires treatment as defined by law; and (e) whether the defendant would pose a significant threat to the life or safety of others if released without treatment. 22 O0.$.Supp.2000, § 1175.3.

. 121 Ohio App.3d 702, 700 N.E.2d 899 (1997).