Court Opinion

ID: 9565718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:26:29.876604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:50.928607
License: Public Domain

*191SCHWAB, C. J.
Claimant appeals from a decision of the Employment Appeals Board that denied her claim for unemployment compensation.
Claimant began working for the Coos County Education Service District (formerly known as the Coos County Intermediate Education District) in March, 1976, as a secretary/receptionist. She worked year-round, including summer months, until June, 1978, when she was informed that her job had been changed to a 10-month position; that June 15 would be her last day; and that she was to return to work on August 21. Claimant applied for unemployment compensation for the period of her summer layoff.
Her claim was denied at all levels on the basis of ORS 657.221(1), which provides that, for nonacademic employes of an educational institution, unemployment compensation
" * * * benefits shall not be paid * * * for any week of unemployment which commences during a period between two successive academic years or terms if the individual performs such [i.e., nonacademic] services in the first academic year or term and there is a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform any such services in the second academic year or term for any educational institution.”
Claimant is seeking unemployment compensation for "a period between two successive academic years.” She received a firm assurance that she was to return to the same job with the Coos County Education Service District at the end of the summer. ORS 657.221(1) thus bars this claim if son. education service district is an "educational institution” within the meaning of that statute.
ORS 657.010(16) provides that for purposes of the unemployment compensation law
" 'Educational institution,’ except an institution of higher education as defined in subsection (14) of this section, means an institution:
*192"(a) In which participants, trainees or students are offered an organized course of study or training designed to transfer to them knowledge, skills, information, doctrines, attitudes or abilities from, by or under the guidance of an instructor or teacher, and
"(b) Which is accredited, registered, approved, licensed or issued a permit to operate as a school by the Department of Education or other government agency, or which offers courses for credit that are transferable to an approved, registered or accredited school; and
"(c) In which the course or courses of study or training which it offers may be academic, technical, trade or preparation for gainful employment in a recognized occupation; and
"(d) In which the course or courses of study or training are offered on a regular and continuing basis.”
There is some dispute about whether the question, "Is an Education Service District an educational institution within the meaning of ORS 657.221(1) and 657.010(16),” is one of law or fact. The parties seemingly join issue in part over whether there is substantial evidence to support the Employment Appeals Board’s conclusion that claimant’s employer is an educational institution. The dissent joins the parties in contending or assuming the question is one of fact.
We conclude, however, that — as the parties alternatively argue — the question presented is one of law. The functions and duties of education service districts are described in ORS ch 334. ORS 657.010(16) defines what is an educational institution for purposes of the unemployment compensation law. All we need do is compare ORS ch 334 with ORS 657.010(16).
Before making that comparison, it should first be noted that the legal question presented is for the court, rather than the administrative agency, to resolve under the test of McPherson v. Employment Division, 285 Or 541, 591 P2d 1381 (1979). The relevant statutes are complete and detailed. The relevant statutes state *193legislative policy rather than delegating authority to make policy to the Employment Division.
The statutes governing education service districts include ORS 334.005, which provides:
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"(2) In its state role, the education service district:
"(a) Performs the function of financial equalization among local school districts in its area to assist the state in providing equal educational opportunity to each student; and
"(b) Serves to assist the State Board of Education, through contract, in providing state-level services and support of state laws and state minimum standards.
"(3) At the local level, the education service district shall provide professional services and facilities in education and shall furnish such services and facilities, on a cooperative basis with local districts, as may further the intent and purposes of this chapter.”
ORS 334.125(3) provides:
"The education service district board shall perform all duties required by law, including but not limited to:
"(a) Distribution of such school funds as it is empowered to apportion;
"(b) Conduct of audits;
"(c) Duties as district boundary board;
"(d) Budget and tax levying duties;
"(e) Curriculum improvement;
"(f) Registration of contracts and teaching certificates; and
"(g) Special education programs.”
ORS 334.175(1) provides:
"The education service district or a combination of education service districts or a school district under contract with an education service district or districts may provide services and facilities, including but not limited to, central purchasing, library, curriculum material, special teachers and special programs un*194der ORS chapter 343 to all school districts which are a part of the education service district or districts.”
The basic thrust of these statutes and the balance of ORS ch 334 is that an education service district provides various services and facilities on a contract basis to local school districts. It is apparent from ORS ch 334 that an education service district: (1) is not accredited as a school, ORS 657.010(16)(b); and (2) does not have its own students, ORS 657.010(16)(a); and (3) does not offer a course of study, ORS 657.010(16)(c), on a regular and continuing basis, ORS 657.010(16)(d). We therefore conclude and hold that an education service district is not, as a matter of law, an educational institution within the meaning of ORS 657.221(1) and 657.010(16).1
The dissent argues that the term "educational institution” in ORS 657.221 means something other than — the dissent does not say what — the definition stated in ORS 657.010(16). We reject that argument because those two statutes were simultaneously enacted in their present form. Oregon Laws 1977, ch 241, § 1 amended ORS 657.010 by adding the definition of "educational institution” that now appears as ORS 657.010(16). Oregon Laws 1977, ch 241, § 3 amended ORS 657.221 to provide that certain employes of an "educational institution” are not entitled to unemployment compensation under certain circumstances. In enacting Oregon Laws 1977, ch 241, the legislature could only have intended that "educational institution” as used in ORS 657.221 (ch 241, § 3) means "educational institution” as defined in ORS 657.010(16) (ch 241, § 1).
The dissent contends claimant was "neither 'unemployed’ nor 'available for work’ ” during her summer *195layoff. 41 Or App at 199. "An individual is deemed 'unemployed’ in any week during which he performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to him * * ORS 657.100. There is no basis in the record for the suggestion that claimant was other than unemployed under this definition. The concern about claimant’s availability for work may be warranted. But see Anderson v. Employment Division, 24 Or App 503, 546 P2d 779 (1976). However, at this stage of this proceeding no question regarding availability has been raised.
Finally, the dissent states the construction of ORS 657.010(16) and 657.221 we here adopt is "incongruous.” 41 Or App at 199. Given that loggers have been awarded unemployment compensation during a seasonal layoff, Anderson v. Employment Division, supra, the claimed incongruity of awarding compensation to a secretary/receptionist during a comparable layoff is not self-evident. Moreover, there are many lines drawn and distinctions made in a social program as comprehensive and complex as unemployment compensation. All of us could probably find at least one rule in this program that strikes us, subjectively, as rather incongruous. But we decline the dissent’s invitation to, for that reason, disregard the plain meaning of a statute and instead to enact what we regard, subjectively, to be the least incongruous set of rules.
Reversed and remanded.

The only possible point to a remand for a factual determination of whether this educational service district is an educational institution within the meaning of ORS 657.010(16) — as urged by the dissent — would be to invite this district to try to prove that it has been operating beyond the authority conferred by ORS ch 334.