Court Opinion

ID: 9585586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:01:54.328144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.322069
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I do not subscribe to the Court’s interpretation of the applicable statute, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering....1
The legislative intent behind the foregoing statute can be readily ascertained by examining the history of the adoption of the Utah comparative negligence law. Utah’s comparative negligence statute, enacted in 1973, is virtually identical to the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute in effect in 1971, from which it was adopted.2 The general rule regarding the statutory construction of “adopted statutes” is as follows:
In the case of a statute adopted from another jurisdiction, the legislature may be presumed to have been familiar with the decisions of the courts of the foreign jurisdiction having a bearing on the operation of the statute in the absence of an expression of legislative intention to the contrary, to have adopted the statute in view of the construction put upon it by the courts of such jurisdiction, and with the intention that the adopted statute should receive the same interpretation. Indeed, it is the well-settled rule that when a statute is adopted from another state or country, the judicial construction already placed on such statute by the highest courts of the jurisdiction from which it is taken is treated as incorporat*911ed therein so as to govern its interpretation [citing cases].3
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has consistently construed its comparative negligence statute to require individual or one-on-one comparison (i.e., the negligence of the plaintiff is weighed against that of individual defendants rather than all defendants combined).4 This construction was clearly articulated in the case of Soczka v. Rechner,5 which involved facts nearly identical to those of the present case. In Soczka, plaintiff was found 45 percent negligent and the defendants, 30 percent and 25 percent respectively. In response to the plaintiffs attempt to combine the negligence of the defendants, in order to recover, the Wisconsin court stated:
However, this court has repeatedly interpreted the comparative negligence statute as clearly providing that the comparison of negligence between the plaintiff and the multiple tort-feasors involves a separate comparison between the plaintiff and each of the defendants.
Soczka v. Rechner, 242 N.W.2d at 914.
Other states that have adopted the Wisconsin statute and have incorporated the Wisconsin interpretation thereof are Idaho, Wyoming and New Jersey. Because these states’ comparative negligence statutes were derived from the same source and are nearly identical to Utah’s, their judicial interpretations of those statutes are also significant and pertinent in this case. A further rule regarding statutory construction by foreign courts of the same or similar statutory language directs:
It is a general rule of law that where a question of statutory construction is one of novel impression, it is proper to resort to decisions of courts of other states construing statutory language which is identical or of similar import [citing cases]. Indeed, it is highly desirable that a statute be given a similar interpretation by the courts of the several states wherein it is in force.6
The state of Idaho adopted the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute in 1971 and construed that statute, with respect to its effect in multiple-defendant litigation, in the case of Odenwalt v. Zaring,7 In that case, a jury found the plaintiff to be 25 percent negligent and the defendants, 10 percent and 65 percent respectively. The trial court, relying on these allocations, entered judgment on the verdict in favor of plaintiff against the defendant whose negligence was 65 percent, but denied plaintiff any judgment against the defendant whose negligence was only 10 percent. Plaintiff appealed, seeking a judgment against the 10 percent negligent defendant based on the “unit rule” construction of the statute. The Idaho State Supreme Court rejected the combined comparison approach and affirmed the trial court on the following basis:
This court has consistently held that “[a] statute ’ which is adopted from another jurisdiction will be assumed to be adopted with the prior construction placed upon it by the courts of such other jurisdiction” [citing eases]. Therefore, in the absence of some other legislation which would clearly suggest a different result, we should follow the interpretation which the Wisconsin Supreme Court had placed upon their comparative negligence statute prior to 1971.8
The Idaho court was further called upon to reconcile its decision in Odenwalt with a statutory provision, identical to U.C.A., 1953, § 68-3-12(6), providing that “[u]nless otherwise defined for purposes of a specific statute ... the singular number includes *912the plural and the plural the singular, .9 The court held:
Appellant argues that application of this section alters the literal language of I.C. § 6-801 as follows: that the plaintiff can have no recovery unless “his negligence was not as great as the negligence ... of the person [or persons] against whom recovery is sought.” Such a reading would, of course, tend to support the unit rule construction. However, I.C. § 73-114 is to be used only to give effect to legislative intent, not to determine it. We have recently held that “I.C. § 73-114 is not mandatory by its terms but merely instructive that the singular may be extended or applied to the plural. It is not a rule of general application and applies only when necessary to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature” [citing cases].10
I believe this reasoning to be sound.11 The legislative intent regarding U.S.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-37 clearly emerges from a literal (singular) reading of the statute. Application of U.C.A., 1953, § 68-3-12(6) to this particular statute is therefore unnecessary and inappropriate.
In any event, the fallacy of concluding that the term “person” as it appears in the Utah statute, supra, also includes the plural is borne out by the fact that the term not only designates the person entitled to recover, but also the person against whom recovery is sought. As a necessary consequence, if the plural is to be applied, the combined negligence of multiple plaintiffs, as well as that of multiple defendants, must then be compared to determine liability. Obviously, this would be wholly unworkable, and it has long been recognized that a separate comparison of the negligence of the parties, both plaintiffs and defendants, is appropriate.12
Wyoming construed its comparative negligence statute in the case of Woodward v. Haney.13 The Wyoming court acknowledged the adoption of the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute and further held:
Where a statute that has been construed by the courts of last resort of another state has been enacted in the same terms by the Wyoming legislature, the legislature is presumed to have adopted it as part of the law and intended the same construction apply in this state ....14
The conclusion was then reached that the legislature intended to adopt Wisconsin’s judicial construction of the comparative negligence statute.15
The Wyoming court also made an important distinction between states that follow the “Wisconsin rule” and those that do not. Referring to the latter category, the court said:
Other state legislatures that have adopted comparative negligence statutes based upon Wisconsin’s have inserted specific language to demonstrate their intent to apply the “Arkansas rule” when multiple defendants or potential defendants are present. For example in Kansas, recovery is allowed if the plaintiff’s “negligence was less than the causal negligence of the party or parties against whom claim for recovery is made ...,” K.S.A. § 60-258(a) (1976). In Connecticut, liability will exist if the plaintiff’s negligence “was not greater than the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought .... ” Connecticut General Statute § 52-572h(a) (1975). However, the Wyo*913ming legislature did nothing to indicate that its intent was to deviate from the “Wisconsin rule.” 16
Likewise, the Utah legislature has done nothing to indicate an intent to deviate from the “Wisconsin rule.” Consequently, the language of the statute must be given its plain, literal meaning. Particularly is this true in light of the fact that the legislature adopted not a “pure” kind of comparative negligence where the plaintiffs damages are simply reduced by the percentage of his own negligence, but instead adopted a “modified” type that deprives the plaintiff of recovery if his negligence was as great or greater than “the person against whom recovery is sought.”
New Jersey’s comparative negligence statute is also nearly identical to Utah’s. The following observations have been made by the New Jersey State Supreme Court regarding that statute:
By 1973 the field of comparative negligence was no longer open country. Courts and legislatures throughout the nation had charted clear paths which led to specific results. New Jersey considered the alternatives over a long period of time prior to selecting its own brand of comparative negligence law [citing cases]. The chosen package included not only the Wisconsin statute but also the state’s judicial interpretations. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4 ed. 1973), § 52.02 at 329. In the absence of some express legislative intent or statutory pronouncement, the words of the statute must be given their simple and ordinary meaning [citing cases]. Therefore, plaintiff’s degree of negligence must be measured against that of each individual defendant.17
The legislative intent behind U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-37 can be further ascertained by reviewing this Court’s recent decision in the case of Yost v. State, Utah, 640 P.2d 1044 (1981). There, although the precise issue as to whether this state has adopted the “Wisconsin rule” or the “unit rule” was not addressed, the Court did reveal, in its discussion of contribution among joint tortfeasors, that the negligence of each tortfeasor was to be compared individually against the plaintiff. The appellant-defendant Petersen had been assessed 10 percent of the negligence contributing to the plaintiff’s (Yost) injuries. The plaintiff was found 5 percent negligent and the remaining defendants, 80 percent and 5 percent respectively. In response to appellant’s argument that these allocations of negligence were improper, this Court cited U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-37 for the proposition that:
[T]he liability of the various tort-feasors being joint and several, the percentage of negligence attributable to each of them does not affect Petersen’s liability because his negligence was found to be greater than that of Yost. Regardless of the percentage of liability attributable to Petersen relative to the other defendants, he is liable ....18
Thus, the liability of each tortfeasor was determined by comparing his individual negligence to that of the plaintiff in causing the injuries. This reasoning is clearly consistent with the “Wisconsin rule.”
I also view as significant and pertinent in the resolution of this matter the scholarly article entitled “Comparative Negligence, Contribution Among Tortfeasors and the Effect of a Release — A Triple Play by the Utah Legislature,” 1973 Utah L.Rev. 406, 412, wherein the late Professor E. Wayne Thode described our Comparative Negligence Act as follows:
The Act makes clear that plaintiff’s degree of negligence must be less than the degree of each of the defendants against whom he seeks judgment.28 [Footnote 28: If plaintiff’s negligence is 40% and the negligence of each of three defendants is 20%, then plaintiff recovers noth*914ing ....] If the plaintiff’s degree of negligence is found by the trier of fact to be the same as, or greater than, the degree of negligence of a party defendant, that defendant is granted an immunity from liability by the specific terms of the Act. [Emphasis contained in original text.]
The Supreme Court of Colorado recently addressed the issue presented by this appeal.19 In that case, the negligence of the plaintiff and the two defendants was equally apportioned at 33V3 percent each. In permitting the plaintiff to recover by combining the negligence of the two defendants, the court acknowledged the marked split of authority and cited a rather exhaustive number of cases that have been decided on both sides of the issue.20
The Colorado court chose to base its holding on what it termed the “unfairness” of the individual comparison rule, observing:
The only unfairness resulting from the combined comparison approach is in-the situation where the primarily negligent tortfeasor is judgment proof and the remaining tortfeasors are less negligent than the plaintiff. For example, assume that the plaintiff is 25% negligent, one defendant is 35% negligent and insolvent, and two other defendants are each 20% negligent. The defendants who are 20% negligent could be liable for the damages recoverable against all defendants even though their individual negligence was less than the plaintiffs. We are persuaded that this hypothetical injustice is more illusory than real. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, sections 13-50.5-101 to 106, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Supp.), provides for the equitable apportionment of damages among tort-feasors according to relative degrees of fault. Section 13-50.5-103. Under the act, a single tortfeasor does not have to bear the entire losses for a [sic] injury where others are also to blame. However, the contribution act specifically retains the common law doctrine of joint and several liability for each tortfeasor. [Cites omitted.] Thus, joint tortfeasors will have to bear more than their pro rata share of the losses only when one tortfeasor is unable to pay judgment.21
It appears that the foregoing example is not the only unfairness that accompanies the application of the combined comparison rule. As the court aptly observed:
The comparative negligence statute was intended to ameliorate the harshness of the common law rule of contributory negligence as a bar to any recovery and to apportion damages more equitably among those who cause the losses. [Cites omitted.]22
Applying the equitable principles of comparative negligence, it not only appears unfair, but it is also contrary to the Utah statute to require a defendant whose negligence is less than or only equal to that of the plaintiff to respond in damages. It further appears that even a greater unfairness results should a 40 percent negligent plaintiff be permitted to recover against a 5 percent negligent defendant whose code-fendant is 55 percent negligent, but is insolvent or otherwise insulated against the recovery of damages. A similar unfairness is to be seen should a 40 percent negligent plaintiff be permitted to recover against any one of three defendants, each of whom is 20 percent negligent, despite the fact that their individual negligence is only one-half that of the plaintiff.
The Utah statute also retains the common law doctrine of joint and several liability for each tortfeasor.23 Nevertheless, application of the individual comparison rule is not in conflict therewith. This is to be seen inasmuch as the statute defines a “joint tort-feasor” as “one of two or more *915persons, jointly or severally liable in tort _”24 Again applying the literal language of the comparative negligence statute, a defendant whose negligence is “not as great as” that of the person seeking to recover has no liability as a tortfeasor, and in the absence of liability to the plaintiff, no right of contribution exists against him.25
Numerous other examples have been cited by the proponents of both rules of construction to illustrate the inequities that may arise from the application of either the individual comparison rule or the combined comparison rule. However, the following language from Board of County Commissioners of the County of Campbell v. Ri-denour, supra, articulates this author’s view concerning these possible inequities:
Weighing the effects of either rule does not lead to a decisive conclusion one way or the other. Whatever examples we attempt to build, depending upon the posture the beholder has in or believes about litigation, some will find fairness and others will visualize unfairness.
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... We as a court represent neither plaintiffs nor defendants.
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... When we consider the “advantages” one way or the other, we become more convinced that we are dealing with what is a legislative function to establish concepts of fairness and unfairness. The legislature created the doctrine; and when we construe its language to carry out its intent, our function ends. There remains in a debatable subject such as this a societal decision for the legislature.26
In accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, I echo the conclusion reached by the Idaho State Supreme Court in Odenwalt v. Zaring, supra:
Whatever this court may feel about the complex field of comparative fault, we are not given free rein. We are bound by the intent of the legislature. In view of our legislature’s adoption of the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute, legislative intent is readily ascertainable. We adopt the Wisconsin or individual rule.27
I would affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal.
DEE, District Judge, concurs in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice HALL.

. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-37.

. In 1971, the Wisconsin legislature changed the phrase "as great as” to “not greater than,” thus permitting the plaintiff to recover where the negligence of plaintiff and defendant are both determined to be 50 percent. This change did not affect the phrase “person against whom recovery is sought” or the judicial construction thereof and therefore has no bearing in the present case.

. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 333 at 476 (1974).

. See Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis.2d 461, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980); Mariuzza v. Kenower, 68 Wis.2d 321, 228 N.W.2d 702 (1975); Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co., 14 Wis.2d 601, 111 N.W.2d 495 (1961).

. 73 Wis.2d 157, 242 N.W.2d 910 (1976).

. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 166 at 370 (1974).

. 102 Idaho 1, 624 P.2d 383 (1980).

. Id. at 387.

. I.C. § 73-114.

. 624 P.2d at 387 n. 5.

. See also Board of County Commissioners of the County of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174 (1981).

. Callan v. Wick, 269 Wis. 68, 68 N.W.2d 438 (1955); Bouchard, "Comparative Negligence,” 55 Mass.L.Q. 125 (1970).

. Wyo., 564 P.2d 844 (1977). See also Board of County Commissioners of the County of Campbell v. Ridenour, supra n. 11.

. 564 P.2d at 845.

. Id. at 846.

. 623 P.2d at 1184.

. Rawsort v. Lohsen, 145 N.J.Super. 71, 366 A.2d 1022, 1024-25 (1976).

. Yost v. State, 640 P.2d at 1048.

. Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, Colo., 660 P.2d 883 (1983).

. Id. at 886.

. Id. at 888-89.

. Id. at 888.

. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-40(2).

. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-40(3).

. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-37.

. 623 P.2d at 1185, 1186.

.624 P.2d at 388.