Court Opinion

ID: 9445285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:24:38.234298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:11.925903
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I think the District Court erred in admitting the testimony of the psychiatrist that the decedent was mentally incompetent to execute a will.
The circumstances under which the witness examined the decedent were these: Upon being retained by a bank to give an opinion as to her mental competence to transact business, he sought and obtained the permission of her personal physician to visit her at the nursing home where she was confined. He made the visit and was introduced to her as a doctor by one of the nurses. He examined her in the same manner as he would have examined one of his own patients for a similar purpose. Decedent was not specifically informed by anyone whether the doctor was there to treat her, examine her or pay a social visit.
The statute which renders a doctor’s testimony incompetent,1 “very broad” though it is,2 does not bar from evidence what the doctor has learned from an examination avowedly made for testimonial rather than therapeutic purposes. 3 The *689policy of the statute is to encourage between doctor and patient the free communication which is essential for proper treatment of illness, by assuring the patient that his disclosures will be kept secret. This policy is “particularly clear and strong” where mental patients are concerned.4 Where the “patient” knows that the doctor is there to obtain evidence rather than to give treatment, there is no inducement to convey confidences and, consequently, no need to protect his communications against disclosure.
Here the psychiatrist’s purpose was unquestionably testimonial, but it does not appear that the decedent was aware of that fact. Her normal assumption would have been that the doctor who was examining her was doing so qua doctor, not qua bank investigator. To admit the doctor’s testimony in these circumstances would make the patient’s rights dependent on the doctor’s intentions. The statute, however, is designed for the patient’s protection. Her frame of mind, therefore, rather than the doctor’s, should determine whether the statute applies.5 Unless it appears that she submitted to examination with knowledge that the doctor might broadcast his findings, her confidences should be respected. To make the testimony competent, it must be found from the record not only that the purpose of the examination was testimonial, but also that such purpose was clearly announced to the person examined or her legal representative. No such finding being possible here, the testimony should have been excluded.
Although there was other evidence that decedent was mentally incompetent to execute the will, it cannot be said that the inadmissible testimony was merely cumulative and without prejudicial effect upon the jury. I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.

. D.C.Code § 14-308 (1951).

. Slier v. DeHaven, 1952, 91 U.S.App. D.C. 257, 260, 199 F.2d 777, 780, 36 A.L.R.2d 937, certiorari denied, 1953, 345 U.S. 936, 73 S.Ct. 797, 97 L.Ed. 1363.

. Taylor v. United States, 1955, 95 U.S. App.D.C. 373, 377, 222 F.2d 398, 402; Annot., 1937, 107 A.L.R. 1495.

. Taylor v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. at page 376, 222 F.2d at page 401, quoting Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Uaw (1952) 272: “ ‘The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. * * * It would be too much to expect them to do so if they knew that all they say — and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they say — may be revealed to the whole world from a witness stand.’ ”

. The witness’ opinion that decedent did not think there was a patient-physician relationship is. in my judgment, not sufficient, in the light of the circumstances, to support a finding that such was in fact her state of mind.