Court Opinion

ID: 9447915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:03:22.445364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.964042
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/3/23

               CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION FIVE

In re A.B., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,                            A165499
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.                                     (Contra Costa County
                                       Super Ct. No. J09-01517)
A.B.,
        Defendant and Appellant.

       The juvenile court granted a petition to seal A.B.’s juvenile
records and ordered five government agencies to seal any records
in their custody. A few months later, A.B. petitioned to seal
additional records in the possession of agencies not subject to the
initial sealing order. Although the petition was unopposed, the
juvenile court denied it, ruling that it lacked authority to seal
additional records after granting the original petition. A.B.
appeals from the latter order. We agree with A.B. and the People
(who concede the issue) that the juvenile court misconstrued
Welfare and Institutions Code section 781. 1 The statute allows a
court to grant a petition to seal documents not addressed in an
earlier petition. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

        Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
        1

Institutions Code.

                                   1
                          BACKGROUND

                                 A.

       “Section 781 provides for a noticed petition procedure for
sealing a person’s juvenile court records and related records in
the custody of the probation department, law enforcement
agencies, and other agencies.” (In re O.C. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
1196, 1204; accord, § 781, subd. (a)(1)(A).) To obtain relief, the
petition “is required to show that, since the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction was terminated . . . , the person was not convicted of
a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and the
person has attained rehabilitation to the satisfaction of the
court.” (In re O.C., at p. 1200.) Once the juvenile records are
sealed, “the proceedings in the case shall be deemed never to
have occurred.” (§ 781, subd. (a)(1)(A); S.V. v. Superior Court
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1181.)

                                 B.

      In 2009, when A.B. was 13 years old, the Contra Costa
County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition
(§ 602, subd. (a)) against him. A.B. pled no contest to two
charges, was declared a ward of the juvenile court, and was
placed on probation. The juvenile court successfully terminated
his probation and wardship in 2014.

       Almost eight years later, A.B. and the Contra Costa County
Probation Department petitioned to have his juvenile court and
public agency records sealed, pursuant to section 781. In support
of his request, A.B. stated that, since his juvenile adjudication, he
had not sustained any criminal convictions; had married and
produced a child; and had remained steadily employed in the
information technology sector. The People did not oppose the
petition.

      In January 2022, the juvenile court granted the petition,
finding that A.B. had been rehabilitated “and seems to be

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thriving in his life.” The court also found that A.B.’s offenses
were not listed in section 707, subdivision (b). (See § 781, subd.
(a)(1)(D).) In addition to sealing its own records, the court
ordered the five government agencies listed in the petition to seal
and ultimately destroy any of A.B.’s juvenile records in their
custody.

      About three months after the sealing order was entered,
A.B. discovered that several public agencies not subject to the
original sealing order had retained and were able to access his
juvenile records.

       A.B. petitioned to seal these additional agency records,
pursuant to section 781. Again, the People did not oppose the
petition. After a hearing, the juvenile court denied A.B.’s
supplemental petition, concluding that it lacked the authority to
seal additional records after the initial sealing order was entered
in January 2022.

       The juvenile court agreed that, had the additional agencies
been listed in A.B.’s first petition, they would have been ordered
to seal their records. But it denied the second petition,
explaining: “I think it’s truly an issue of timing. . . . [B]ecause
[A.B.’s juvenile] records are in fact sealed at this time, I have no
access except under very limited circumstances that do not
pertain here to access the records, so I don’t believe I have the
ability to seal further records after a sealing order has been
issued. . . . [¶] . . . I do think this is an issue of once records are
ordered sealed, except under extremely limited purposes, the
Court has no access to do anything further after the sealing has
occurred.”

                             DISCUSSION

                                  A.

      A.B. maintains, and the People concede, that the juvenile
court erred by concluding it lacked authority to seal records from

                                   3
additional agencies after entry of the initial sealing order. We
agree.

                                  1.

      We generally review a juvenile court’s ruling on the sealing
of juvenile records for abuse of discretion. (In re Jeffrey T. (2006)
140 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1018.) Here, however, our review is de
novo because this case involves a question of statutory
interpretation. (Ibid.)

      We apply the familiar rules of statutory interpretation.
Our central task is to effectuate the law’s purpose, as intended by
the Legislature. We focus initially on the language of the statute,
being careful to harmonize its terms in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole. We avoid constructions that
would produce absurd outcomes, which we assume the
Legislature did not intend. (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393,
406.) The plain meaning of the language controls our analysis
unless it is ambiguous, in which case we consider extrinsic aids
such as the legislative history, the evils to be remedied, and
public policy. (People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172.)

         Section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides (in relevant
part): “[I]n any case at any time after the person has reached 18
years of age, [the person or the county probation officer may]
petition the court for sealing of the records, including records of
arrest, relating to the person’s case, in the custody of the juvenile
court and probation officer and any other agencies, including law
enforcement agencies, entities, and public officials as the
petitioner alleges, in the petition, to have custody of the records.
. . . If, after hearing, the court finds that since the termination of
jurisdiction . . . the person has not been convicted of a felony or of
any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that
rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, it
shall order all records, papers, and exhibits in the person’s case
in the custody of the juvenile court sealed, including the juvenile

                                  4
court record, minute book entries, and entries on dockets, and
any other records relating to the case in the custody of the other
agencies, entities, and officials as are named in the order. Once
the court has ordered the person’s records sealed, the proceedings
in the case shall be deemed never to have occurred, and the
person may properly reply accordingly to any inquiry about the
events, the records of which are ordered sealed.” (Italics added.)

                                 2.

      Although the statute does not expressly state whether a
supplemental or amended petition is permitted, we agree with
A.B. and the People that section 781 does not bar such a petition
(when the first fails to seal all juvenile records) and that, on
A.B.’s request, the juvenile court was authorized to access his
records. The juvenile court erred by ruling otherwise.

      The statute explicitly allows a qualifying person with
juvenile records, such as A.B., to file a petition to seal such
records “at any time” after age 18. (§ 781, subd. (a)(1)(A).) If, as
here, the court finds that the person has not been convicted of a
felony, or of any disqualifying misdemeanor, and that they have
been rehabilitated to the court’s satisfaction, the court “shall
order” the records to be sealed. (Ibid.) Nothing in the statute
limits the qualifying person to a single petition. When a juvenile
offender’s initial section 781 petition is denied, they may file a
subsequent petition. (See In re J.W. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 663,
670.) Likewise, a successful petition poses no barrier.

       To the extent the statute is ambiguous, our interpretation
is consistent with the legislative intent underlying section 781:
“ ‘to protect minors from future prejudice resulting from their
juvenile records.’ ” (In re Jeffrey T., supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p.
1020.) 2 Giving rehabilitated juvenile offenders a clean slate also

      2 A.B. asked that we take judicial notice of legislative

history for sections 781 and 786. We deny the request because it

                                  5
serves one of the main objectives of the juvenile delinquency
system—rehabilitation. (See § 202, subd. (b); In re Carl N. (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 423, 432.)

       Adopting the juvenile court’s construction would arbitrarily
frustrate the statutory purpose. A mistake by a juvenile
offender’s attorney or by the probation department—which is
tasked with identifying all agencies having custody of the
person’s juvenile records (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.830(a)(4)) 3—
would be forever irremediable. When a rehabilitated juvenile
offender is eligible for section 781 relief, no purpose is served by
permanently barring them from correcting an omission in the
initial petition.

       Finally, to the extent the juvenile court needed to inspect
any sealed records (such as the underlying case file) to rule on
the supplemental petition, it had authority to do so. (See § 781,
subd. (a)(4) [allowing the “person who is the subject of records
sealed pursuant to this section . . . to permit inspection of the
records”]; T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767, 777, fn.
12 [“[s]ection 781 envisions that a sealed record may be opened
for inspection upon the petition of the juvenile concerned”].)

is unnecessary to seek judicial notice of published legislative
history. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19
Cal.4th 26, 45, fn. 9.) “Citation to the material is sufficient.”
(Ibid.)
       3 “[T]he probation officer must do all of the following: [¶] (A)

Prepare the petition; [¶] (B) Conduct an investigation under
section 781 and compile a list of cases and contact addresses of
every agency or person that the probation department knows has a
record of the ward’s case-including the date of each offense, case
number(s), and date when the case was closed-to be attached to
the sealing petition; [¶] (C) Prepare a report to the court with a
recommendation supporting or opposing the requested sealing;
and [¶] . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.830(a)(4), italics added.)

                                   6
      The juvenile court erred by concluding it lacked authority
to grant a supplemental petition under section 781.

                           DISPOSITION

       The order denying A.B.’s supplemental petition to seal is
reversed. Because the juvenile court has already found that A.B.
is eligible for relief, the matter is remanded to the juvenile court
with directions to grant the petition. The court shall provide a
copy of its order to each agency named therein, as required by
section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(B).

                                 7
                                   ______________________
                                   BURNS, J.

We concur:

____________________________
JACKSON, P.J.

____________________________
CHOU, J.

A165499

                               8
Contra Costa County Superior Court, No. J09-01517, Hon.
Barbara C. Hinton.

Eileen Alisa Manning-Villar for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and Gabriel
Bradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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