Court Opinion

ID: 9860510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:24:09.850495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:16:00.917096
License: Public Domain

The following opinion was filed on March 5, 1957:
Per Curiam
(on motion for rehearing). Nothing has been presented in the briefs in support of .the motion for rehearing on the question of the construction of the class bequest to the grandchildren which we deem requires any alteration in our original opinion.
However, as to the issue of the original final decree being res adjudicata as to the unborn grandchildren, the contention is advanced that we did not give due consideration to the fact that probate proceedings are in rem and not in personam. However, as' pointed out by the United States supreme court in Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co. 339 U. S. 306, 70 Sup. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865, the due-process requirements of the Fourteenth amendment, as regards notice and hearing, do not depend upon a distinction between actions in rem and those in personam, however useful such distinction may be on other issues. By analogy we consider such distinction to be immaterial as to whether *471bstrangers to a proceeding are concluded by a particular judgment, except that there probably is more latitude extended in finding that there has been class or virtual representation of persons not having received notice of the proceeding in an action in rem than one in personam.
As a general rule a judgment in rem cannot deprive any person of personal or property rights where he was neither made a party to the proceeding, nor given notice or opportunity to be heard. 50 C. J. S., Judgments, pp. 554, 555, sec. 910, 3. A recognized exception to such rule is where there has been virtual or class representation of such person.
This brings us to the contention that there was virtual representation of the three unborn grandchildren in the instant probate proceeding as a result of the appointment of the guardian ad litem for all the grandchildren and his participation in the proceeding. However, there can be no binding effect of the judgment entered upon persons not parties to the proceeding upon the theory of virtual representation, if the interests of such persons are antagonistic to those of the party, or parties, whom it is contended represented the interests of such strangers to the proceeding. 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, p. 963, sec. 228.
By way of illustration, if in the instant probate proceeding an issue had been raised that an adopted child of a daughter of the testator should be included as a member of the class of grandchildren, and the court in the final decree had included such adopted child as being a member of the class, the three after-born grandchildren would be concluded thereby. This is because the guardian ad litem for the grandchildren was a party to the proceeding and there would have been no antagonistic position between the living and the after-born grandchildren. It would have been to' the mutual interest of all to have excluded the adopted child from the class.
However, as pointed out in the original opinion, the interests of the after-born grandchildren were antagonistic to those of the living grandchildren as to whether the former *471cshould be included in the class. This prevented there being any virtual representation of the after-born grandchildren by the guardian ad litem so as to make the final decree res ad judicata as to such after-born grandchildren.
On this issue of virtual representation the appellant trustee places great reliance upon Ruggles v. Tyson, 104 Wis. 500, 79 N. W. 766, 81 N. W. 367. In that case the court considered the power of a county court to direct a sale of real estate held in trust so as to convey merchantable title as against interests of contingent remaindermen, including persons not born. It was held that there was representation of the interests of the unborn remaindermen by the life tenant and the living remaindermen which made the judgment binding on all. However, there was no antagonism there between the various remaindermen on the issue of the sale, it being to the interests of all to obtain as good a sales price as possible.
Perkins v. Burlington L. & I. Co. 112 Wis. 509, 88 N. W. 648, is also distinguishable from the instant case. It was there held that the trustee of an active trust represents unborn contingent remaindermen beneficiaries in a proceeding where the first remaindermen, in an adversary proceeding against the trustee, sought to, and was successful, in wresting the land constituting the trust as from the trustee freed from the trust. Here again there was no antagonistic interest between the trustee and the contingent remaindermen as to the issue being litigated. There was no showing of collusion between the trustee and the first remainderman who had instituted the suit, and it must be presumed that the trustee properly and diligently defended the action.
Our attention has been called to the provisions of sec. 323.10, Stats., promulgated by this court under its rule-making power, which section became effective September 1, 1956. This section reads as follows:
*471d“Possible persons unborn or presently unascertainable, having successor or contingent interests in a trust estate as beneficiaries, heirs, or next of kin, if hot already represented by a fiduciary, may be represented in an accounting by a guardian ad litem if the court deems it necessary. The court may dispense with or terminate the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a person having a successor or contingent interest who is legally incompetent, unborn, or presently unascertainable, if there is a living person, sui juris, having in the judge’s opinion a substantially identical interest, who is represented by counsel and whose interest is not adverse.”
While such section was not in effect when any of the proceedings in the instant case took place in the trial court, we fail to see any conflict between its provisions and our holding herein.
Complaint is also made that we failed to consider sec. 330.52, Stats. The legislative history of this statute discloses that it was enacted in 1951 because of the United States supreme court’s decision in the Mullane Case. Its purpose was to establish a one-year statute of limitations as to any action which is instituted to set aside a judgment or order entered before June 10, 1951, where the cause of action is grounded upon the inadequacy of the notice given, even though such notice complied with all statutory requirements existing as of the time the same was given. Such statute has no application whatsoever to the instant case.
We have also been requested by appellant’s brief on rehearing to delete the finding of fact of the trial court that Maxine Perry Tesia (the oldest grandchild) should have received distribution of a one-ninth interest, instead of a one-sixth interest, in the corpus of the trust upon arriving at the age of thirty years. Such finding is in accord with our own determination of the issues on appeal, and we can perceive no good reason for deleting it.
The motion for rehearing is denied with $25 costs.