Court Opinion

ID: 9624305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:57:41.69278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:43.175812
License: Public Domain

Finley, C. J.
(dissenting) — The question here on appeal is whether the evidence as to defendant’s negligence was sufficient to take the case to the jury. In my judgment it was, and defendant’s motion challenging its sufficiency should not have been granted by the trial court.
It is an elusive juristic function or operation to determine whether the evidence was “sufficient” for a case to go to *801the jury. We have stated that “sufficient” evidence means “substantial” evidence, e.g., Knight v. Trogdon Truck Co., 191 Wash. 646, 71 P.2d 1003 (1937), but this juxtaposition-ing of quantitative adjectives is more tautological than illuminating. “Substantial” evidence has been described as “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence, e.g., Schorzman v. Brown, 64 Wn.2d 398, 391 P.2d 987 (1964). But, again, this nomenclature, although interesting and even ingenious conceptually, is hardly enlightening. Substantial evidence is perhaps best described as evidence which would convince an unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed, Grange v. Finlay, 58 Wn.2d 528, 364 P.2d 234 (1961), or as evidence which would be convincing to reasonable men, Trudeau v. Haubrick, 65 Wn.2d 286, 396 P.2d 805 (1964). See Trautman, Motions Testing the Sufficiency of Evidence, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 787 (1967). However, even this additional exploration for a more realistic technique or amenable means of measurement provides only scanty help or guidelines for determining whether evidence is sufficient to take a case to the jury. With these considerations in mind, it is with some trepidation that I assume the task of dissenting from the majority opinion. Be this as it may, I am convinced, albeit intuitively or as a matter of personal judgment, that plaintiff’s evidence was substantial enough to withstand defendant’s attack. Consequently, I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority sustaining the trial court’s dismissal of this lawsuit.
Testimony of two doctors was introduced in the instant case in plaintiff’s behalf. Dr. Fred R. Crutcher, an orthodontist, was deposed by plaintiff prior to trial. He was one of two doctors who performed the operation in which plaintiff’s jaw was refractured and reset. While being deposed, Dr. Crutcher testified that he examined X rays of plaintiff’s jaw taken subsequent to the time defendant set the fracture and that these X rays indicated that plaintiff’s mandible was five millimeters out of alignment — an amount he considered excessive. In Dr. Crutcher’s opinion, it was this *802malalignment which caused plaintiff’s pain. According to Dr. Crutcher, it is standard post-operative procedure to X-ray a fracture when a patient, such as plaintiff, complains of discomfort and pain. Furthermore, he stated that the excessive malalignment was visible to anyone who understood how to interpret X rays. In short, it would seem that defendant’s course of action deviated substantially from the standard of care described by Dr. Crutcher.
Dr. Donald A. Smith, an orthopedic surgeon, also testified for plaintiff. He, along with Dr. Crutcher, performed the second operation on plaintiff’s jaw. Dr. Smith’s version of plaintiff’s condition differed from that of Dr. Crutcher. Dr. Smith testified that in his opinion the mandible’s malalignment amounted to approximately two, rather than five, millimeters. It was his view that this malalignment would not have been intolerable had it not pinched a nerve and thereby caused plaintiff excessive pain. Dr. Smith stated that, while 4 to 6 weeks would be a proper time for a doctor to wait for pain to subside from an operation such as that undergone by plaintiff under most circumstances, in the instant case he felt plaintiff’s pain was probably sufficiently more severe to require earlier action. According to Dr. Smith, earlier action might well have avoided the necessity of rebreaking plaintiff’s jawbone. It thus would seem that defendant’s course of action also deviated substantially from the standard of care described by Dr. Smith.
The majority observe that any inference of negligence which arises from Dr. Crutcher’s statement concerning the standard practice of X-raying a treated fracture which is causing the patient difficulty is negatived by Dr. Smith’s statement that an X ray would merely confirm what the treating physician already knew from visual observation. This pronouncement by the majority seems to me quite dubious. Dr. Smith’s statement concerned the need for an X ray prior to performing an operation while Dr. Crutcher’s statement concerned post-operative care. One of these statements can hardly be said to negative the other.
The majority also state that the testimony of the two doctors merely establishes a difference of medical opinion *803as to the proper treatment, rather than establishing standards of care from which defendant deviated to plaintiff’s detriment. Therefore, says the majority, the rule announced in Richison v. Nunn, 57 Wn.2d 1, 340 P.2d 793 (1959) — that differences of opinion will not establish negligence — is controlling. I disagree, however, with this interpretation of the instant case. The testimony of each doctor described a standard of care from which defendant deviated, and thus constitutes far more than a difference of opinion with defendant. Regardless of which version is believed, there is at least some evidence of defendant’s negligence. The rule cited by the majority may be correct but it is not relevant and controlling in the instant case.
In an impressive opinion written for the court by Weaver, J. in Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wn.2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967), this court forthrightly and courageously effected some needed and constructive changes in the law concerning medical malpractice cases. The changes were, in my best judgment, needed and overdue to adjust and put the “scales of justice” in better balance and working condition in such cases. Having done this, I see no reason to start backing up in the instant case by attempting to distinguish Pederson v. Dumouchel, supra, and whittle down its effect.
It may be conceded that plaintiff’s case is not a strong one. Nevertheless, and despite the inherent difficulties in making such a determination, her case appears to be supported by evidence of a reasonably and rationally convincing quality. Consequently, it should not have been taken from the jury.
Having challenged an elusive windmill to mortal combat, the dissent rests.
July 22, 1968. Petition for rehearing denied.