Court Opinion

ID: 9701959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:47:16.821204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:31.427601
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
This case presents a question that has divided previous Court of Appeals panels—whether there should be “judicial tolling” of the one-year period of limitation on property damage claims under subsection 3145(2) of the no-fault insurance act.1 We agree with the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case that there is no such tolling, and affirm its ruling that the plaintiffs claim was barred by the one-year limitation period.
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On March 2, 1996, a car driven by defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company’s insured, William J. Glore, Jr., left the road and struck a utility pole. Plaintiff Secura Insurance Company’s complaint alleges that the impact caused electrical power lines to fall across the electrical service line running to the home of its insureds. This, in turn, caused substantial damages to the house’s circuits and wiring, and an electrical surge igniting several fires in the home, with resulting smoke and fire damage to the house and its contents. Secura alleges that it reimbursed its insureds some $157,000, and, under the terms of the *384policy, became subrogated to their claims for that amount.
On May 3, 1996, Secura’s adjuster, James Disbrow, wrote to Glore seeking reimbursement for the fire loss. An Auto-Owners claims representative, J. D. Beyerhelm, wrote back about a month later, advising Disbrow that defendant insured Glore, asking Dis-brow to “forward your proofs,” and requesting documentation that the loss resulted from the accident. The letter also noted that police reports made no mention of the fire that it was alleged that Glore started. Auto-Owners apparently assigned a claim number to the matter at that time.
Over the next several months, there were discussions and exchanges of correspondence between Secura and Auto-Owners. Disbrow’s affidavit states that he advised Auto-Owners of the total monetary value of the plaintiffs’ damages in “late January, 1997.” Further, there appears to be no dispute that at that time Disbrow called Beyerhelm. During the conversation, Disbrow asked if Auto-Owners was willing to waive the one-year period of limitation on the plaintiffs’ property protection insurance benefit claim. After consulting with his superior, Beyerhelm advised Disbrow that Auto-Owners would not waive the statute, and that Secura would have to bring suit to recover property protection benefits.
This action was filed on April 1, 1997, just short of thirteen months after the March 2, 1996, accident.
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Defendant Auto-Owners moved for summary disposition on the ground that the action was not filed within one year after the accident and thus was barred under MCL 500.3145(2); MSA 24.13145(2).
*385The circuit court noted that panels of the Court of Appeals had reached different results on the issue whether the one-year period was tolled during negotiations between the parties. Preferred Risk Mut Ins Co v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 123 Mich App 416; 333 NW2d 303 (1983), concluded that such tolling was available.2 However, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Amerisure Ins Co, 195 Mich App 1; 489 NW2d 115 (1992), said that it was not. The circuit court believed that Preferred Risk was the better reasoned opinion, but felt compelled to follow USF&G and its no-judicial-tolling rule under former Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 1994-4, 445 Mich xci.3
Secura appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.4 It agreed that the USF&G decision was binding precedent under Administrative Order No. 1994-4. However, it also concluded that USF&G was correctly decided.
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Secura argues that the doctrine of judicial tolling is well established. For example, Tom Thomas Organization, Inc v Reliance Ins Co, 396 Mich 588, 591; 242 NW2d 396 (1976), treated a contractual one-year limitation in an insurance policy as tolled from the date of the insurance claim until the insurer formally denied liability. That was extended to the one-year period of limitation in statutory fire insurance policy cases, with the courts reasoning that the insured should not be penalized for the time the insurer *386spends evaluating the claim. In re Certified Question (Ford Motor Co v Lumbermens Mut Casualty Co), 413 Mich 22; 319 NW2d 320 (1982). The principle has also been applied in no-fault insurance cases. In Lewis v DAIIE, 426 Mich 93; 393 NW2d 167 (1986), the judicial tolling principle was applied to no-fault personal protection insurance claims under subsection 3145(1).5
However, we agree with the Court of Appeals panels in USF&G and the instant case that there is no tolling in property protection insurance cases. The difference in the language of subsections 1 and 2 of § 3145 is decisive. The Lewis majority recognized tolling under subsection 1. However, that subsection includes language indicating that the Legislature intended that the one-year limitation period would be suspended by the giving of notice:
An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced. The notice of injury required by this subsection may be given to the insurer or any of its authorized agents by a person claiming *387to be entitled to benefits therefor, or by someone in his behalf. The notice shall give the name and address of the claimant and indicate in ordinary language the name of the person injured and the time, place and nature of his injury. [Emphasis added.]
The language of subsection 2, applicable to this case, is starkly lacking in such a qualification and merely provides:
An action for recovery of property protection insurance benefits shall not be commenced later than 1 year after the accident.
It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that, “a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993). This is a case where the statute speaks for itself, and there is no need for judicial construction. The Legislature has decreed that property damage claims must be brought within one year of the accident. There is no hint in the language of subsection 2 that the Legislature intended that there be any tolling of that time.6
The Court of Appeals correctly read the statute as precluding creation of a judicial tolling provision, and *388its judgment is therefore affirmed. Preferred Risk Mut Ins Co v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, supra, is overruled.
Weaver, C.J., and Taylor, Corrigan, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred.

 MCL 500.3145(2); MSA 24.13145(2).

 Preferred Risk was followed in Norfolk & W R Co v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 894 F2d 838 (CA 6, 1990).

 Now MCR 7.215(H).

 232 Mich App 656; 591 NW2d 420 (1998).

 The correctness of the holding in the divided Lewis decision is not before us.

 The defendant has suggested several plausible reasons why the Legislature would provide for tolling of personal protection insurance claims under subsection 1, but not for property damage claims. The former may involve ongoing damages, which may not be entirely known within the first year. Property damages are more likely to be determined soon after the accident. Second, property protection insurance benefit claims are often between insurance companies, sophisticated parties aware of statutory limitation periods and their ramifications.
However, given the clear language of the statute, evidencing no intention that there be tolling in property damage cases, we need not resort to such a policy-based analysis.