Court Opinion

ID: 9406292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 16:08:02.032846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:28.789805
License: Public Domain

J-S17027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JAMISON MICEL DOWARD                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 130 WDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 6, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                      at No(s): CP-65-CR-0002637-2020

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: June 30, 2023

       Appellant, Jamison Micel Doward, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on September 6, 2022, following his bench trial convictions

for driving under the influence (DUI): general impairment, DUI: high rate of

alcohol, and driving on roadways laned for traffic.1 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

       Officer Brian Cope of the Penn Township Police Department []
       testified that [he was] working [his 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
       patrol] shift on December 29, 2019 when he received a [call from
       police] dispatch concerning a single-vehicle accident, causing
       damage to a mailbox [on] Meadowbrook Road [in Westmoreland
       County, Pennsylvania]. Officer Cope spoke with the owner [of the
       mailbox], Beverly Shickel, who said that she had heard a loud
       commotion and then saw her damaged mailbox and a white truck
       pulled over on the side of the road a couple of houses away from
       hers. The officer noticed tire marks in the grass approximately
       four (4) to five (5) feet before the damaged mailbox. He also

____________________________________________

1   75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 3802(b), and 3309(1), respectively.
J-S17027-23

     observed several one (1) foot high, sharp, metal posts, lining the
     Shickel’s yard, leading up to the mailbox.

     As Officer Cope approached the vehicle Shickel identified as the
     one that had damaged her mailbox, [Appellant] exited from the
     driver’s seat. The only passenger in the vehicle remained inside.
     The officer explained to [Appellant] that he was investigating the
     accident, and he asked if [Appellant] had been the one driving.
     [Appellant] admitted that he had and that he had hit the mailbox.
     During their conversation, Officer Cope detected the odor of
     alcohol on [Appellant’s] breath. He asked [Appellant] if he had
     been drinking. Officer Cope testified that [Appellant] admitted to
     drinking a 16-ounce beer and possibly a second one. Several
     indicators of intoxication were observed by the officer:
     [Appellant’s] speech was slurred and slow, his eyes were
     bloodshot, and his face was red. Officer Cope asked [Appellant]
     to perform field sobriety tests [and Appellant] agreed.

     Defense [c]ounsel stipulated that [Appellant] did not pass the field
     sobriety tests and showed signs of impairment. Officer Cope
     testified that based upon [Appellant’s] admissions that he had
     consumed alcohol shortly before driving and striking the mailbox,
     the odor of alcohol on [Appellant’s] breath, and [Appellant’s]
     failure to satisfactorily perform the field sobriety tests, he arrested
     [Appellant].     Officer Cope examined [Appellant’s] truck and
     observed damage to the passenger-side tires and mirror. He also
     observed an unopened shot-sized bottle of Fireball lying on the
     passenger side in plain view.

     Officer Cope [gave proper] blood-testing notice to [Appellant who]
     refused the [blood] test [but] agreed to take a breathalyzer test.
     […] The parties stipulated that the results of the [subsequent]
     breath test were accurate and noted a [blood alcohol content
     (BAC)] of .147 %.

     Based on his observations of [] Shickel’s yard and [Appellant’s]
     vehicle, Officer Cope opined that [Appellant] had veered off the
     roadway and drove approximately four (4) to five (5) feet in[to]
     [] Shickel’s yard. He surmised that the passenger’s side tires had
     struck the sharp metal posts, causing punctures, and that the
     vehicle then struck the mailbox, damaging the passenger side
     mirror.

     [… Appellant testified], on the day in question, he and his
     passenger, Alex Hook, had gone to the Red Robin restaurant at
     the Monroeville Mall for lunch. He [drank] a glass of wine, and

                                      -2-
J-S17027-23

      Hook [drank] one (1) or two (2) beers. [Appellant], who denied
      ever drinking beer, believed that Officer Cope had incorrectly
      recalled Hook’s statement about alcohol consumption rather than
      his. After lunch, [Appellant] and Hook walked around the mall
      and then left around 5:30 p.m. On their way home to Greensburg,
      [Appellant] stopped at the liquor store and bought a ten-pack of
      [single serving-sized bottles of] Fireball hard liquor. While driving
      on Meadowbrook Road, [Appellant] felt his truck “go out of
      control.” He swerved towards the side of the road. He collided
      with the mailbox and then pulled into the nearest driveway,
      adjacent to the yard where the mailbox was struck. After exiting
      his truck to access the damage, [Appellant] asked Hook to give
      him his [cellular tele]phone, so he could call his father for a ride.
      He also requested from Hook (who did not testify) three (3) [single
      serving-sized bottles] of Fireball so that he could calm down. He
      [testified that he] drank them in five (5) minutes. When asked by
      [defense] counsel if he believed it had been a good idea to start
      drinking in a stranger’s driveway, [Appellant] responded that his
      “car wasn’t going anywhere, and [he] was calling for a ride.” The
      [owner of the property where the truck eventually came to a stop]
      gave him permission to leave his truck in the driveway until
      someone could fix it or pick it up. [Appellant] then intended to
      speak with the owner of the mailbox; however, the police arrived
      and he was detained. When he started speaking with Officer
      Cope, he felt “threatened,” so he “quieted down.” He knew he
      was intoxicated when Officer Cope arrived. He refused a blood
      test because he has a fear of needles, so “he didn’t think it was a
      good fit.” When asked on direct [examination] why he did not tell
      Officer Cope that he had consumed three (3) Fireball shots
      immediately after the accident, [Appellant] stated it was because
      of “embarrassment.” Later, on cross-examination, he changed his
      reason to “fear.” [Appellant] admitted on cross[-examination]
      that he told [Officer] Cope, during the field sobriety tests,
      “congratulations, you got me.”

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/2023, at 1-4 (record citations omitted).

      The trial court found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned offenses on

July 14, 2022. On September 6, 2022, the trial court imposed an aggregate

                                      -3-
J-S17027-23

sentence of 48 hours to six months of imprisonment.         This timely appeal

resulted.2

       On appeal, Appellant presents a sole issue for our review:

       Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in determining [] Appellant’s
       convictions were supported by the weight of the evidence despite
       evidence that [] Appellant was not intoxicated while he operated
       his motor vehicle and the alleged accident was caused by the
       sudden loss of control?
____________________________________________

2   Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on September 7, 2022. On
October 19, 2022, the trial court entered an order directing the parties to file
briefs on Appellant’s post-sentence motion and extending its deadline to rule
on the post-sentence motion by 30 days. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a)-(b)
(Generally, “the judge shall decide the post-sentence motion … within 120
days of the filing of the motion” but “the judge may grant one 30-day
extension for decision on the motion.”) As such, the trial court had 150 days
from the date Appellant filed his post-sentence motion, or until February 4,
2023, to rule. Ultimately after reviewing the parties’ briefs, on January 30,
2023, the trial court entered a timely order, and accompanying opinion,
denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal on January 31, 2023. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 820 A.2d 734,
735 (Pa. Super. 2003) (when a trial court denies a post-sentence motion after
the 120-day period set forth under Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a) and the
appellant then files an appeal within 30 days of the date of that decision, this
Court has found that the notice of appeal is timely). Although Appellant
claims, in his notice of appeal, that the appeal resulted from the “judgment of
sentence” imposed on July 14, 2022 (the date that he was found guilty), his
judgment of sentence did not become final until September 6, 2022 (the date
he was sentenced). See Commonwealth v. Trunzo, 589 A.2d 1147, 1149
n.3 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citation omitted) (“As is well known, the judgment in
a criminal case is the sentence and not the conviction; final judgment in a
criminal case means sentence.”). As such, we have corrected the caption
accordingly. See Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2
(Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc) (correcting caption to reflect that an appeal in a
criminal case properly lies from judgment of sentence). On February 2, 2023,
the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On March 7, 2023,
after the grant of a trial court extension, Appellant complied timely. On March
13, 2023, the trial court filed a statement in lieu of an opinion pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), relying upon its earlier decision filed on January 30, 2023.

                                           -4-
J-S17027-23

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (numbering omitted).

      Appellant argues that his convictions were against the weight of the

evidence presented at trial. Id. at 8-15. More specifically, Appellant claims

that the trial court was confronted with:

      two (2) plausible explanations for the cause of a minor accident
      by Appellant’s failure to safely operate a motor vehicle: (1) that
      [] Appellant was intoxicated to such a degree that he could not
      operate the vehicle safely and (2) [] Appellant suddenly lost
      control of his car due to damaged tires, causing the accident [and
      that] he became intoxicated after his vehicle was disabled[].

Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). Appellant asserts that “the only evidence the

Commonwealth produced that the vehicle became disabled once off the

roadway was Officer Cope’s speculation that the vehicle hit a post in the

grass[, a] theory [] unsupported by any physical evidence as Officer Cope

admitted[.]”   Id. at 13 (record citations omitted; emphasis in original).

Hence, in sum, Appellant concludes:

      The evidence offered in this case is inherently unreliable as it is
      premised on the surmise of how the accident occurred. When
      both theories are viewed together, it is difficult to determine which
      is truth. As this difficulty appears to have been resolved in favor
      of the speculative conclusion that [] Appellant was intoxicated to
      such a degree that he could not operate the vehicle prior to the
      accident, the guilty verdicts are not supported by the weight of
      the evidence. To accept one speculative conclusion and ignore
      other essential facts before the [c]ourt is a miscarriage of justice
      that should shock the conscience of the [c]ourt. [] Appellant’s
      convictions should therefore be discharged.

Id. at 14-15 (emphasis in original).

      Our standard of review is well-settled:

                                       -5-
J-S17027-23

     A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
     the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
     trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
     conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
     would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
     the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
     certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
     or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
     It has often been stated that a new trial should be awarded when
     the [] verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's
     sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that
     right may be given another opportunity to prevail.

     An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a
     weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
     applied by the trial court:

        Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise
        of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the
        verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the
        trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the
        evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
        consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the
        trial judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that
        the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the
        least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial
        is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was
        not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial
        should be granted in the interest of justice.

     This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial court
     in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a
     challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In describing
     the limits of a trial court's discretion, we have explained:

       The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
       wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion
       within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the
       purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion
       must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed
       to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary
       actions. Discretion is abused where the course pursued
       represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the
       judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not

                                     -6-
J-S17027-23

        applied or where the record shows that the action is a result
        of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Soto, 202 A.3d 80, 97 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation and

some quotations omitted).

      Here, the trial court determined:

      [Appellant] argues that because there are two (2) equally
      plausible explanations how the accident occurred – because of
      [DUI] or because the [] tires blew out, and why he was intoxicated
      when Officer Cope arrived – because he consumed alcohol at lunch
      or because he quickly downed three (3) shots [of alcohol] after
      the accident, the Commonwealth cannot sustain its burden of
      proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite suggesting that both
      stories are plausible, [Appellant] argues that the opinion offered
      by Officer Cope is unreliable and premised on speculation, and
      therefore cannot be used to prove [his] guilt. However, the
      [c]ourt is free to believe all, some, or none of a witness’ testimony.
      The [trial c]ourt found Officer Cope to be credible and his
      testimony to be sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth’s burden
      of [proof to support Appellant’s convictions]. On the other hand,
      the [trial c]ourt did not believe [Appellant’s] explanation of why
      he was intoxicated when Officer Cope arrived or why he never told
      Officer Cope that he had consumed three (3) shots [of alcohol]
      after the accident. The [c]ourt is free to make that determination.
      Only when the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock
      one’s sense of justice should the evidence be disregarded. In this
      case, Officer Cope’s observations of the damaged mailbox, tire
      marks in the grass, damage to [Appellant’]s vehicle and indicators
      of intoxication all support the [trial c]ourt’s decision to convict
      [Appellant] of two (2) counts of DUI and a summary offense of
      leaving the roadway.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/2023, at 4-5 (record citation omitted).

      The trial court ultimately determined that, in this case, the verdict was

not contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. Initially, we

note that a new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the

testimony or because another judge on the same facts would have arrived at

                                      -7-
J-S17027-23

a different conclusion. The role of the trial judge was to determine whether

certain facts were so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give

them equal weight with all the facts was to deny justice. Here, the trial court

made credibility determinations and gave greater weight to Officer Cope’s

testimony than Appellant’s testimony. While Appellant suggests that the trial

court should have given more weight to his testimony, we must give the

gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge.

Because the verdict was not so shocking to the conscience of the court, we

find no abuse of discretion in ruling on Appellant’s weight of the evidence

claim. For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s sole appellate claim lacks

merit.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/30/2023

                                     -8-