Court Opinion

ID: 9914796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 14:01:48.796687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:30.702500
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STEPHANIE AND ALEXANDER ABBOTT, )
Individually, and as Personal Representatives )
of the Estate of their minor daughter, M.P.A., )
                                               )
              Plaintiffs,                      )
                                               ) C.A. No.: N20C-05-175 FJJ
       v.                                      )
                                               )
DEDICATED TO WOMEN OB/GYN, P.A., )
BAYHEALTH MEDICAL CENTER, INC., )
And CHRISTIANA HEALTH CARE                     )
SERVICES, INC.,                                )
                                               )
              Defendants.                      )

                          Submitted: December 18, 2023
                            Decided: January 2, 2024

                        OPINION AND ORDER
               ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
                               DENIED
                  ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR COSTS
                  GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART

Bruce L. Hudson, Esquire, and Josh Inkell, Esquire, Hudson Castle & Inkell, LLC,
Wilmington, De., Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Gregg Luther, Esquire, Keenan Law Firm, Atlanta, GA, Attorney for Plaintiffs.

Gregory S. McKee, Esquire, and Jonathan Landau, Esquire, Wharton, Levin,
Ehrmantraut & Klein, P.A., Wilmington, De. Attorneys for Dedicated to Women
Ob/Gyn, P.A.

Colleen Shields, Esquire, Alexandra Rogin, Esquire, and Randall MacTough,
Esquire,, Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Wilmington, De., Attorneys for
Bayhealth Medical Center

Jones, J.
      This is a medical malpractice case brought by Stephanie and Alexander

Abbott individually and as personal representatives of the Estate of Maisy Abbott

(hereinafter referred to the “Abbotts” or “Plaintiffs”). The Plaintiffs sued Dedicated

to Women OB/GYN, (hereinafter “DTW”), Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc.

(hereinafter referred to as “Bayhealth”) and Christiana Care Health Services, Inc.

(hereinafter referred to as “CCHS”). After a 2½ week trial, the jury returned a

verdict in favor of the Defendants. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for a New Trial.

DTW has filed a Motion for Costs. This is the Court’s decision on both of these

motions.

                                      FACTS

      After jury selection but before opening statements, CCHS settled with the

Plaintiffs. The Court ascertained that DTW and Bayhealth intended to proof up their

cross claims against CCHS. Once DTW and Bayhealth indicated their intent to

proceed with their crossclaims the Court determined that a preliminary instruction

was required to advise the jury of CCHS’s involvement in the trial. The parties

debated whether the words “settlement” or “resolved” should have been in the

instruction to the jury or not; the Plaintiffs argued for resolved and the Defendants

for settlement. The following instruction was given to the jury before opening

statements:

              Ladies and gentlemen, the Plaintiffs have resolved their
              dispute with Christiana Care. Christiana Care will not be
              participating in this trial. You may, however, be asked to
              assess Christiana Care’s actions during your deliberations,
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                    but I will instruct you further about that at the end of the
                    case during my jury instructions.

Prior to any testimony, the Plaintiffs advised the Court that they were “no longer

pursuing the remaining claims against the Bayhealth employees who were under Dr.

Stefano for any negligence because, quite frankly, causally, the damage was done,

and Dr. Stefano will tell the jury that.”1 In reliance on this statement, Bayhealth

eliminated a number of witnesses. During its case, DTW called and read into

evidence portions of Dr. Soltau’s deposition to prove the cross claim against CCHS.

Plaintiff also read portions of Dr. Soltau’s deposition to the jury. At the conclusion

of this read-in, Plaintiffs moved to reopen their case against Bayhealth. The Court

denied this request. The Court ruled that because Bayhealth had relied on the

Plaintiffs’ representation that these claims were not going to be presented in

choosing not to call certain witnesses, including experts, it would be inappropriate

to allow Plaintiffs to reopen their case.

           At the conclusion of DTW’s case the Plaintiffs moved for directed verdict on

the grounds that DTW did not read into evidence the following question and answer

of Dr. Soltau, “Question: Do you hold all the opinions that you have provided here

today to a reasonable degree of medical probability? Answer: Yes, ma’am.” The

Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict finding that when taking the

testimony as a whole and considering Delaware case law, DTW had made a prima

1
    Trial Transcript, October 16, 2023, pg. 32, lines 16-20.
                                                               2
facia case even without the referenced question and answer. To avoid any confusion

on the issue the Court exercised its discretion and allowed DTW to reopen its case

to read the foresaid question and answer to the jury. The question and answer was

then read to the jury.

      The jury was given the following instruction during the course of final

instructions.

                           RESOLVED CO-DEFENDANT

                When this case began, the Abbotts alleged that the joint
                negligence of Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc.
                (“Bayhealth”), Dedicated to Women (“DTW”) and
                Christiana Care Health Services (“CCHS”) was the
                proximate cause of their injuries and the death of Maisy
                Abbott. Before this trial, CCHS resolved with Plaintiffs
                on all of Plaintiffs’ claims against it. Your deliberations,
                however, must determine whether CCHS, DTW, or
                Bayhealth, were negligent and whether that negligence
                was the proximate cause of the injuries to the Abbotts.

                DTW and Bayhealth have asserted crossclaims against
                CCHS, asserting that CCHS’s negligence was the
                proximate cause of the injuries to the Abbotts. You must
                determine whether either or all of Bayhealth, DTW, and
                CCHS were negligent, and whether that negligence
                proximately caused the Abbotts’ injuries. If you find that
                either one or all of the Defendants committed medical
                negligence and that the negligence was a proximate cause
                of the injuries to the Abbotts, you must then determine
                the amount of damages you should award to the Abbotts
                to compensate them fairly and reasonably for their
                injuries.

                In computing these damages, don’t be concerned with the
                fact that a resolution was made with CCHS. You must
                not speculate about why the Abbotts resolved their claims
                with CCHS. If you find from the evidence that each
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                     Defendant committed medical negligence and that
                     negligence proximately caused injury to the Abbotts,
                     then you should award damages to compensate the
                     Abbotts for their fair and reasonable damages in full. In
                     addition, you should apportion your verdict to attribute a
                     percentage of negligence to each Defendant in a
                     percentage range from zero to 100. You will be provided
                     with a verdict form to guide you in this process.

The jury was given a verdict sheet to complete. The first two questions related to

the liability of DTW and Bayhealth and the third question related to the liability of

CCHS. The jury answered in the negative as to the liability of DTW and

Bayhealth. The jury never reached the questions regarding CCHS. A verdict for

the Defendants was entered.

                          PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

           Plaintiffs have moved for a new trial pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule

59 on two grounds: (1) Plaintiffs contend that counsel for DTW during his closing

argument violated the rule set forth in Atwell v. RHIS, Inc. by arguing to the jury

that CCHS’s settlement with Plaintiffs was an admission of liability,2 and (2)

Plaintiffs claim that the Court committed error in allowing DTW to reopen its case

to ask a question of Dr. Soltau as to whether all of his opinions were within a

reasonable degree of medical probability.

           In Atwell, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the Defendant’s closing

argument justified a new trial because counsel’s closing argument was not a

2
    974 A.2d 148 (Del. 2009).
                                                   4
reference to a settlement, but “clearly implied that [the settling Defendant] had

admitted liability by settling.”3 In Atwell, the Supreme Court, citing Sammons v.

Doctors For Emergency Services, P.A.,4 reaffirmed the concept that it is proper for

a jury to be told that one of the parties has settled to avoid confusion. 5 The Court

also affirmed the notion that “it would be justly inconceivable that a jury couldn’t

be informed of [settling Defendants], otherwise they are not going to have any

understanding as to why they are not here.6 Moreover, there is no question that

evidence of previous settlements with joint tortfeasors is necessary to determine

the amount by which Plaintiffs claims against the remaining Defendants should be

reduced.7 What Atwell prohibits is an argument whose purpose is to persuade the

jury that the persons to blame for the accident had already admitted liability.8 In

Sammons the Court wrote:

                   Here, the trial judge properly acted within his discretion
                   by instructing the jury that one defendant “was no
                   longer in the case” and that they should not speculate
                   why. This instruction is permissible to define the
                   alignment of the parties and to avoid confusing the jury.
                   When necessary, the trial judge may instruct the jury
                   that a party has settled but that they should not speculate
                   why. Our decision in Sammons, however, permits trial
                   judges to allow counsel to refer to the settlement in
                   opening statements and closing arguments only after
                   counsel tells the judge what counsel intends to say, so
                   that the trial judge can assess the purpose of the
                   reference.

3
  Atwell, at 148.
4
  913 A.2d 519 (Del. 2006).
5
  Atwell, at 153.
6
  Sammons, at 534.
7
  Id. at 535.
8
  Atwell, at 154.
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        In the instant case counsel did not violate the Atwell restriction. Counsel

made it known to the Court both before openings and closings, when discussing

the preliminary instructions and the final instructions, that it intended to pursue its

cross claim and argue CCHS’s negligence and that the jury had to apportion fault if

it found two or more of the Defendants, including CCHS, at fault.9 Counsel’s

remarks emphasized Plaintiffs’ alternative causation theories and were made to

assist the jury in understanding the alignment of the parties. No settlement figures

were disclosed and there was no attempt to persuade the jury that CCHS had

admitted fault by settling.10 Counsel’s closing remarks on this issue align with the

remarks made by counsel in Sammons and not the remarks in Atwell. There is no

error associated with DTW counsel’s closing remarks.11

        Plaintiffs further maintain that the Court erred in allowing DTW to reopen

its case when Plaintiffs were not permitted to reopen their case. The decision on

whether to allow a party to reopen its case is within the sound discretion of the trial

court.12 The Court allowed DTW to reopen its case to ask Dr. Soltau a question to

confirm that all of his opinions were within a reasonably degree of medical

probability. There was no surprise to the Plaintiffs as to this testimony as it was

clearly in Dr. Soltau’s deposition transcript. There was no prejudice to the

9
  Trial Transcript, October 16, 2023, pages 7-8.
10
   Id.
11
   Even assuming that there was some error in the remarks during closing any error is moot as the jury never
reached a decision on causation or liability as to CCHS because it found that the remaining defendants were not
liable.
12
   Pepe v. State, 51 Del. 417, 171 A.2d 216, 219 (1961); Zeglin v. Hayden, 1995 Del.Super. LEXIS.
                                                            6
Plaintiffs other than the inevitable “I got you.” Additionally, any fair reading of

the portions of the deposition of Dr. Soltau that were initially read to the jury can

only lead to a conclusion that Dr. Soltau’s had clear expert opinions on causation

and the breach of the standard of care as to CCHS.13

         The fact that the Court denied a similar request to the Plaintiffs to reopen

their case does not establish the law of the case for this issue. Each of the requests

to reopen the case involved unique situations that called for the Court to exercise

its judgment on the two separate individual situations. As to the Plaintiffs’ request,

it came well after Plaintiffs had advised the Court that they would not be pursuing

these claims and the effected Defendant had relied on these representations.

Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot claim surprise because they knew from the preliminary

jury instruction dialogue that DTW was going to prove its cross claims and was

going to do it through Dr. Soltau.

         There was no error in allowing DTW to reopen its case.

         Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial is DENIED.

                            DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR COSTS

     I now turn to Defendant DTW’s Motion for Costs. Having considered the

Motion, the Plaintiffs’ response, and the entire record, I award a total of $36,319.57

broken down as follow:

13
  Green v. Weiner, 766 A.2 492 (Del. 2001) The Delaware Supreme Court has written that Del. Code 18 § 6853
does not require medical experts to couch their opinions in legal terms or to articulate the standard of case with a
high degree of legal precision or with “magic words”, In this Court’s view, this is a magic word situation especially
where it is clear from the testimony ready that Dr Soltau’ s testimony met the requirements of Section 6853.
                                                             7
      1. Costs associated with Steven Nelson M.D. $8,655.92. I reduced his trial rate
         from $8,000 to $5,000 as I found the rate to be excessive. For the same
         reasons I reduced his travel time from $4,000 to $2,000.

      2. Costs associated with Michelle Owens, M.D. $9,348.70.

      3. Costs associated with Joseph Adashek, M.D. $10,552.96. I reduced his rates
         from $12,000 to $9,000 as the second day was for travel which should be at
         ½ of the full rate. I also reduced the travel expenses from $5,404.56 to
         $1,552.96 as the flight charge of $4,851.60 was excessive. I awarded $1,000
         for flight travel.

      4. Meditator’s fee of $600.00.

      5. Cost of technology $7,161.99 reduced from $10,753.75 as all three parties
         utilized the costs. I have included the amount of Plaintiffs’ portion. If the
         Plaintiffs have separately paid for this, then the amount Plaintiffs have paid
         should be deducted from this amount.

         For the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a New Trial is DENIED and

Defendant’s Motion for Costs are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

         IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                             /s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
                                            Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge

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