Court Opinion

ID: 9897484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:15:04.817575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:50.501632
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion 00

                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC, A               No. 79658
                NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY
                CORPORATION, D/B/A CENTENNIAL
                HILLS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,
                Appellant,
                vs.
                                                             RLE
                DWAYNE ANTHONY MURRAY,                       AUG 1 7 2023
                INDIVIDUALLY, AS AN HEIR, AS A
                GUARDIAN AND NATURAL PARENT
                OF BROOKLYN LYSANDRA MURRAY,                   EF DEPtire CLERK

                AND AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
                OF THE ESTATE OF LAQUINTA
                ROSETTE WHITLEY-MURRAY,
                DECEASED,
                Respondent.

                VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC, A               No. 80113
                NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY
                CORPORATION, D/B/A CENTENNIAL
                HILLS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,
                Appellant,
                vs.
                DWAYNE ANTHONY MURRAY,
                INDIVIDUALLY, AS AN HEIR, AS
                GUARDIAN AND NATURAL PARENT
                OF BROOKLYN LYSANDRA MURRAY,
                AND AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
                OF THE ESTATE OF LAQUINTA
                ROSETTE WHITLEY-MURRAY,
                DECEASED,
                Respondent.

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                                                                 2 3- 2-1, 810C
t I ql—N et,

                                                                Viikt.            sAgiiiktliiis
                VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC, A                          No. 80968
                NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY
                CORPORATION, D/B/A CENTENNIAL
                HILLS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,
                Appellant,
                vs.
                DWAYNE ANTHONY MURRAY,
                INDIVIDUALLY, AS AN HEIR, AS
                GUARDIAN AND NATURAL PARENT
                OF BROOKLYN LYSANDRA MURRAY,
                AND AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
                OF THE ESTATE OF LAQUINTA
                ROSETTE WHITLEY-MURRAY,
                DECEASED,
                Respondent.

                            Objection to senior justice assignments and motion to designate
                replacements for disqualified justices in accordance with the Nevada
                Constitution, article 6, section 4(2).
                            Objection overruled,• motion denied.

                Pisanelli Bice PLLC and Jordan T. Smith, Las Vegas; Greenberg Traurig,
                LLP, and Kendyl Hanks, Austin, Texas,
                for Appellant.

                Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP and Daniel F. PoIsenberg and
                Abraham G. Smith, Las Vegas; The Gage Law Firm, PLLC, and David O.
                Creasy, Las Vegas,
                for Respondent.

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                    BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.'

                                                      OPINION2
                    By the Court, STIGLICH, C.J.:
                                 In 1976, the people of Nevada amended our state constitution
                    to provide for the recall to active service of any consenting retired state court
                    justice or judge not removed or retired for cause or defeated for retention of
                    office. Under that amendment, article 6, section 19(1)(c), the chief justice
                    c4may assign [the recalled senior justice or judge] to appropriate temporary

                    duty within the court system," and over the 45 years since the amendment's
                    effective date, successive chief justices have regularly assigned such senior
                    justices to temporary duty in supreme court cases when a sitting justice is
                    disqualified. Appellant now claims that pursuant to article 6, section 4(2)
                    of the constitution, only the governor has authority to temporarily replace
                    a disqualified justice on the supreme court. We are unable to read either
                    provision so restrictively, however, and conclude that, under the Nevada
                    Constitution, both the governor and the chief justice may designate
                    temporary substitutes for disqualified justices on the supreme court.

                           'The Honorable Elissa F. Cadish and the Honorable Patricia Lee,
                    Justices, being disqualified, did not participate in the resolution of this
                    objection and motion. The Honorable Michael Cherry and the Honorable
                    Abbi Silver, Senior Justices, who were assigned on March 30, 2023, to hear
                    oral argument and participate in the determination of these consolidated
                    appeals in the disqualified justices' places, also did not participate in the
                    resolution of this objection and motion.
                         2We entered an order denying the motion to designate justices in this
                    matter on April 17, 2023, indicating that this opinion would follow.
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                                                 BACKGROUND
                              In these consolidated appeals, appellant Valley Health System,

                LLC, doing business as Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center,
                challenges a $48.6 million wrongful death judgment, as well as several post-
                judgment orders, resulting from a jury verdict finding that, in relation to a
                deceased patient, Centennial Hills had both breached the standard of care
                applied to medical providers and intentionally breached a fiduciary duty
                owed to the patient. The appeals raise important issues of first impression
                in Nevada and thus are assigned to the en bane court for decision. Justices
                Elissa F. Cadish and Patricia Lee, however, are disqualified from
                participating in that decision. As a result, before oral argument was heard
                and the appeals' merits decided, the chief justice entered orders assigning
                Senior Justices Michael Cherry and Abbi Silver to participate in the
                disqualified justices' places.
                              Centennial Hills objected to the senior justice assignments and
                moved to designate replacement justices in accordance with the Nevada
                Constitution, article 6, section 4(2), which authorizes the governor to
                designate court of appeals or district judges to sit in the place of disqualified
                or disabled supreme court justices.3 According to Centennial Hills, section
                4(2) bestows upon the governor sole authority to designate substitute
                justices in cases of disqualification, and those substitutes must be sitting
                lower court judges.     Moreover, Centennial Hills argues, as a specific
                provision addressing disqualification, section 4(2) trumps the more general
                authority of the chief justice under section 19(1) to recall senior justices and
                assign them to temporary duty when sitting justices are disqualified. It

                      30ralargument was vacated upon the filing of Centennial Hills'
                emergency objection and motion.
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                thus asks that the senior justice assignments be vacated, and that the
                governor designate t.wo substitute judges to participate in place of the
                disqualified justices.
                             Respondent Dwayne Anthony Murray, as heir, parent to the
                patient's child, and estate representative, filed a response to the objection
                and motion, arguing that the chief justice's authority to temporarily assign
                senior justices under section 19(1) is "concurrent, complementary, and
                compatible.' with the governor's authority under section 4(2), such that we
                should overrule the objection and deny the motion. Specifically, Murray
                asserts that section 19(1) merely extends the chief justice's general and

                broad authority to substitute a sitting justice for a disqualified justice by
                including senior justices as available substitutes, while section 4(2) gives
                the governor a limited power over judicial assignments that the chief justice
                does not otherwise hold---that of elevating lower court judges to temporary

                assignment in the supreme court—a power that is not inherent to the
                executive branch under Nevada's separation-of-powers doctrine.
                             After reviewing the parties' arguments in light of the
                constitution's plain language and contemporaneous understanding of each
                provision,   we   conclude   that   the       senior   justice   assignments   were

                constitutionally permissible and thus overrule the objection and deny the
                motion to designate replacement justices.
                                               DISCUSSION
                             Resolving Centennial Hills' objection and motion requires
                examination of two provisions of article 6 of the Nevada Constitution:
                section 4(2) and section 19(1).      As noted, section 4(2) addresses the
                governor's designation of district and court of appeals judges to sit in the
                places of disqualified or disabled supreme court justices:

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                             In case of the disability or disqualification, for any
                             cause, of a justice of the Supreme Court, the
                             Governor may designate a judge of the court of
                             appeals or a district judge to sit in the place of the
                             disqualified or disabled justice. The judge
                             designated by the Governor is entitled to receive his
                             actual expense of travel and otherwise while sitting
                             in the Supreme Court.
                  Under section 4(2), then, the governor may designate lower court judges to
                  temporarily act in supreme court cases but has no power to recall senior
                  justices or judges to temporary service. After the provision's ratification in
                  1920, the governor routinely designated district judges to replace supreme
                  court justices who were "disqualified," who "disqualified themselves," and
                  who "voluntarily recused" themselves.'
                              Section 19(1), on the other hand, recognizes the chief justice as
                  the administrative head of the court system and provides for the recall and
                  temporary assignment of senior justices, among other things:
                              The chief justice is the administrative head of the
                              court system. Subject to such rules as the supreme
                              court may adopt, the chief justice may:
                                    (a) Apportion the work of the supreme court
                              among justices.

                        4E.g., State v. Jepsen, 46 Nev. 193, 196, 209 P. 501, 502 (1922)
                  (replacing a "disqualified" justice); Mirin v. State, 93 Nev. 57, 60 n.1, 560
                  P.2d 145, 146 n.1 (1977) (replacing a justice who "voluntarily disqualified
                  himself'); State v. Fitch, 65 Nev. 668, 693, 200 P.2d 991, 1004 (1948)
                  (replacing a justice who "disqualified himself), overruled on other grounds
                  by Graves v. State, 82 Nev. 137, 413 P.2d 503 (1966); Schneider v. State, 97
                  Nev. 573, 575 n.3, 635 P.2d 304, 305 n.3 (1981) (replacing a justice "who
                  voluntarily recused hirnself'). See Jeffrey T. Fiut, Recusal and Recompense:
                  Amending New York Recusal Law in Light of the Judicial Pay Raise
                  Controversy, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 1597, 1598 n.3 (2009) (noting that the terms
                  "recuse" and "disqualify," while varying slightly in rneaning, are often used
                  interchangeably).
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                                   (b) Assign district judges to assist in other
                             judicial districts or to specialized functions which
                             may be established by law.
                                    (c) Recall to active service any retired justice
                             or judge of the court system who consents to such
                             recall and who has not been removed or retired for
                             cause or defeated for retention in office, and may
                             assign him to appropriate temporary duty within
                             the court system.5
                By permitting the assignment of senior justices to "appropriate temporary
                duty within the court system," section 19(1)(c) plainly authorizes the chief
                justice to temporarily assign senior justices to service in the supreme court.
                See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 1 ("The judicial power of this State is vested in a
                court system, comprising a Supreme Court, a court of appeals, district
                courts and justices of the peace."); We the People Nev. ex rel. Angle v. Miller,
                124 Nev. 874, 881, 192 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2008) (recognizing that, as with
                statutory interpretation, a constitutional provision's plain language
                controls).
                             This authorization has long been understood to include the
                power to assign senior justices in cases of supreme court disqualification.
                Pursuant to section 19(1), the supreme court implemented rules governing
                senior justice assignments without delay. Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 243
                was adopted contemporaneously with the amendment's 1977 effective date
                and provided that the chief justice could assign a senior justice or judge to
                any state court at or below the level" served at retirement. SCR 243(1)
                (effective October 12, 1977).     SCR 243 further acknowledged that the

                      5Section 19 was ratified by the people in 1976 and became effective on
                July 1, 1977. Const. Amend. to Be Voted Upon in State of Nev. at Gen.
                Elec., Nov. 2, 1976, Ballot Question 6.
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                    assigned senior justice or judge would hold "all the judicial powers and
                    duties, while serving under the assignment, of a regularly elected and
                    qualified justice or judge of the court to which he is assigned." SCR 243(4).6

                          6The    provisions of SCR 243 were transferred to SCR 10 in 1979.
                    Today, SCR 10, at subsections 6 and 9, reads similarly: "A senior justice,
                    senior court of appeals judge, or senior district judge, with his or her
                    consent, is eligible for temporary assignment to any state court at or below
                    the level of the court in which he or she was serving at the time of retirement
                    or leaving office . . . . Each senior justice, senior court of appeals judge, or
                    senior district judge assigned as provided in this rule has all the judicial
                    powers and duties, while serving under the assignment, of a regularly
                    elected and qualified justice or judge of the court to which he or she is
                    assigned."

                           We note that other courts have interpreted analogous language
                    governing chief justice administrative powers similarly. See generally City
                    of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1091-93 (Ala. 2006) (on second
                    application for rehearing) (recognizing that a 1973 amendment to the
                    Alabama Constitution broadly allowing the chief justice to "assign appellate
                    justices and judges to any appellate court for temporary service" authorized
                    the chief justice's consistent use of the constitutional provision in cases of
                    supreme court disqualification); Legacy Found. Action Fund v. Citizens
                    Clean Elections Comm'n, 524 P.3d 1141, 1143 (Ariz. 2023) (replacing a
                    recused justice with a senior justice per Arizona Constitution, article VI,
                    section 3, which states that "[t]he chief justice, or in his absence or
                    incapacity, the vice chief justice, shall exercise the court's administrative
                    supervision over all the courts of the state"); Commonwealth v. Wetton, 648
                    A.2d 524, 526 (Pa. 1994) (recognizing that Pennsylvania Constitution
                    article V. section 16(c), which provides that "[a] former or retired justice or
                    judge may, with his consent, be assigned by the Supreme Court on
                    temporary judicial service as may be prescribed by rule of the Supreme
                    Court," allowed assignment of a senior justice to the Pennsylvania Supreme
                    Court by the chief justice pursuant to court rules generally authorizing
                    assignment to "any court").
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                                 Moreover, the chief justice's power to assign senior justices to
                     temporary service was used immediately to obtain substitutes for supreme
                     court justices in cases of disqualification and otherwise, sometimes in
                     conjunction with the governor's power to designate district judges. See, e.g.,
                     Covington Bros. v. Valley Plastering, Inc., 93 Nev. 355, 363 n.4, 566 P.2d
                     814, 819 n.4 (July 1, 1977) (recalling a senior justice to participate in the
                     case under section 19(1)); Nev. State Apprenticeship Council v. Joint
                     Apprenticeship & Training Comm. for Elec. Indus., 94 Nev. 763, 766 n.5,
                     587 P.2d 1315, 1317 n.5 (1978) (designating senior justice to sit in place of
                     disqualified justice under section 19(1) and SCR 243); Ressler v. Mahony,

                     99 Nev. 352, 353 n.1, 661 P.2d 1294 n.1 (1983) (acting chief justice
                     designating senior justice under section 19(1) and obtaining governor
                     assignment of district judge under section 4(2) as substitutes for voluntarily
                     disqualified justices); Sacco v. State, 105 Nev. 844, 849 nn.1 & 2, 784 P.2d
                     947, 950-51 nn.1 & 2 (1989) (per curiam) (same). Indeed, the chief justice
                     assigned a senior justice to participate in supreme court cases in place of a
                     disqualified justice at least seven times in the first two years following
                     section 19(1)'s adoption,7 and regularly thereafter.8

                           7 Nev. State Apprenticeship Council, 94 Nev. at 766 n.5, 587 P.2d at
                     1317 n.5; Hynds Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 94 Nev.
                     776, 779 n.3, 587 P.2d 1331, 1333 n.3 (1978); Dep't of Motor Vehicles v.
                     Rebol, 95 Nev. 64, 66 n.4, 589 P.2d 178, 179 n.4 (1979); Dougla.s County v.
                     Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 95 Nev. 101, 102 n.2, 590 P.2d 160, 160 n.2
                     (1979); Cooper u. State, 95 Nev. 114, 115 n.1, 590 P.2d 166, 167 n.1 (1979);
                     Bradley u. Bradley, 95 Nev. 201, 201 n.2, 591 P.2d 663, 663 n.2 (1979);
                     Cranford v. State, 95 Nev. 471, 474 n.3, 596 P.2d 489, 491 n.3 (1979).

                           8 E.g., Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween, 96 Nev. 215, 220 n.4,
                     606 P.2d 1095, 1098 n.4 (1980); Jacobson v. Best Brands, Inc., 97 Nev. 390,
                     394 n.6, 632 P.2d 1150, 1153 n.6 (1981); Haromy v. Sawyer, 98 Nev. 544;
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                            In examining the relationship between section 19(1) and section
                4(2), we must read the constitution as a whole, giving effect to and
                harmonizing each provision. We the People, 124 Nev. at 881, 192 P.3d at
                1171. If the constitution's language can be interpreted in more than one
                reasonable way, we look to its history and the constitutional scheme to
                ascertain what was intended at the time of ratification. Id. When exploring
                Nevadans' historical understanding of the constitution, contemporary
                construction and legislation is relevant and given great weight. Strickland
                v. Waymire, 126 Nev. 230, 234-35, 235 P.3d 605, 608-09 (2010). This is
                particularly so when other means of determining the voters' intent is
                unavailable, as "such [contemporaneous] construction is 'likely reflective of
                the mindset of the framers." Halverson v. Sec'y of State, 124 Nev. 484, 489,
                186 P.3d 893, 897 (2008) (discussing the Legislature's interpretation of a
                constitutional provision and quoting Director of Office of State Lands &
                Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., 70 P.3d 241, 256 (Wyo. 2003) (examining
                historical aspects of both the legislative and the executive branches'

                548 n.1, 654 P.2d 1022, 1024 n.1 (1982); Tompkins v. Buttrum Constr. Co.,
                99 Nev. 142, 146 n.5, 659 P.2d 865, 868 n.5 (1983); Foley v. City of Reno, 100
                Nev. 307, 309 n.1, 680 P.2d 975, 976 n.1 (1984); Rust v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist.,
                103 Nev. 686, 691 n.2, 747 P.2d 1380, 1383 n.2 (1987); Smith v. Clough, 106
                Nev. 568, 570 n.3, 796 P.2d 592, 594 n.3 (1990); DeLee v. Roggen, 111 Nev.
                1453, 1459 n.2, 907 P.2d 168, 171 n.2 (1995); LeasePartners Corp. v. Robert
                L. Brooks Tr. Dated Nov. 12, 1975, 113 Nev. 747, 757 n.2, 942 P.2d 182, 188
                n.2 (1997); Staccato v. Valley Hosp., 123 Nev. 526, 527 n.1, 170 P.3d 503,
                504 n.1 (2007); Nev. Classified Sch. Ernps. Ass'n v. Quaglia, 124 Nev. 60, 61
                n.1, 177 P.3d 509, 510 n.1 (2008); C.R. Homes, Inc. v. Fifth Judicial Dist.
                Court, No. 55151, 2011 WL 4434860, at *2 n.1 (Nev. Sept. 22, 2011) (Order
                Denying Petition for Writ of Prohibition or Mandamus); Shores u. Glob.
                Experience Specialists, Inc., 134 Nev. 503, 503 n.1, 422 P.3d 1238, 1239 n.1
                (2018); Cox v. Copperfield, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 27, 507 P.3d 1216, 1220 n.1
                (2022).
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                interpretation of and exercise of power under a constitutional provision in
                discerning its meaning)).
                            Although Centennial Hills contends otherwise, these two
                sections do not necessarily conflict. Cf. Piroozi v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
                Court, 131 Nev. 1004, 1009, 363 P.3d 1168, 1172 (2015) (explaining that
                when a general and specific statute conflict, the specific controls). As
                originally added in 1920, section 4(2) read, "In case of the disability or
                disqualification, for any cause, of the chief justice or either of the associate
                justices of the supreme court, or any two of them, the governor is authorized
                and empowered to designate any district judge or judges to sit in the place
                or places of such disqualified or disabled justice or justices ...."
                (Emphasis added.) Thus, with respect to supreme court disqualifications,
                section 4(2) gives the governor limited power to designate lower court judges
                to participate in disqualified justices' places. But nothing in section 4(2)
                gives the governor the sole power to select substitutes for disqualified
                justices, and to the extent that section can be read otherwise, the provisions
                must be harmonized. We the People, 124 Nev. at 881, 192 P.3d at 1171.
                            Section 19(1) provides the chief justice broad power to laterally
                assign judges and justices but, per SCR 243, does not give the chief justice
                power to elevate district and court of appeals judges to act in supreme court
                cases. The constitution thus authorizes both the governor to designate

                      9"Authorized and empowered to" was changed to "may" and court of
                appeals judges were added in 2014, without public comment and seemingly
                as a stylistic change and recognition of the new court of appeals,
                respectively. See Nevada Ballot Questions 2014, Nevada Secretary of State,
                Question No. 1; 2013 Nev. Stat., file no. 47, at 3969; 2011 Nev. Stat., file no.
                26, at 3836. In any event, as the concurrence/dissent points out, 'may"
                typically indicates permission, not directive. Ewing v. Fahey, 86 Nev. 604,
                607, 472 P.2d 347, 349 (1970).
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                     lower court judges for temporary assignment in the supreme court in cases
                     of disqualification and the chief justice to assign senior justices to the
                     supreme court for temporary assignment in cases of disqualification. The
                     powers are complementary. Centennial Hills' interpretation, on the other
                     hand, would restrict the chief justice's power to make senior justice
                     assignments "within the court system," by excluding from purview one of
                     the courts in the systern. See McClain, 957 So. 2d at 1092 (recognizing that
                     courts cannot interpret provisions of a constitution to restrict their plain
                     meaning or "ignore words in the constitutional scheme"). Because there is
                     no indication from its text, history, or context that section 19(1) means
                     anything less than what it says, and as section 19(1) has since its inception
                     been viewed as allowing senior justice assignments in cases of
                     disqualification, we decline to read such a restriction into the constitution.
                                 Thus, under the constitution, Nevada has two methods for
                     selecting substitutes for disqualified justices: the governor can designate
                     lower court judges, or the chief justice can assign senior justices. These dual
                     methods are expressly recognized in this court's Internal Operating
                     Procedure 1(g)(4), which states that the chief justice can either randomly
                     select a district judge's name to forward to the governor or recall a senior
                     justice for temporary assignment, and as noted supra, on occasion both are
                     invoked in the same proceeding. Further, this dual-method system is not
                     completely unique: Tennessee, for instance, also allows both the governor
                     and the chief justice to appoint substitutes. Don R. Willett, Supreme
                     Stalemates: Chalices, Jack-0'-Lanterns, and Other State High Court
                     Tiebreakers, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. 441, 494-95 (2021) (citing Hooker v.
                     Sundquist, No. 01A01-9709-CH-00533, 1999 WL 74545, at *3 (Tenn.
                     Feb. 16, 1999) (separate statutes authorizing governor and chief justice to

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                appoint substitute justices were consistent with constitutional directive and
                "the traditional practice of this Court," and thu s both the governor arid the
                chief justice hold power to designate temporary judges)).            As the chief

                justice's senior justice assignments here were not made in violation of
                section 4(2), we overrule Centennial Hills' objection, rendering moot its
                motion for section 4(2) gubernatorial designation of substitute judges.
                            Having answered the question raised by Centennial Hills'
                objection   and    having    reached        the   same       conclusion   as    our

                concurring/dissenting colleague as to that question, it would seem that this
                matter is resolved and nothing more need be said.               Nevertheless, the

                dissenting opinion addresses a topic neither raised by the parties nor
                addressed in resolving the objection and motion—selection methods and
                timing. As to those issues, we note only that the dissent points to no facts
                suggesting an untoward selection process in this case (nor, we believe, could
                it) and that neither IOP 1(g)(2) nor any other provision of which we are
                aware restricts substitutions when necessary to bring the court to full
                strength before hearing and determining an appeal en banc, existing
                quorum or not. While we do not disagree that selection methods and timing
                may be important to the public trust, they are not in question here and
                would be better addressed on the administrative docket.
                                               CONCLUSION
                            When     supreme    court       justices   are     disqualified    from

                participating in a case, the Nevada Constitution authorizes both the
                governor's designation of lower court judges and the chief justice's
                temporary assignment of senior justices to take the places of the
                disqualified justices. Accordingly, the chief justice's assignment of senior
                justices to this case was constitutionally authorized, and Centennial Hills'

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                objection is overruled and its motion to designate lower court judges is
                denied.

                                                                            , C.J.
                                                   Stiglich

                We concur:

                                              J.
                Her

                Parraguirre

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                PICKERING, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
                            This case comes before the court on the emergency motion of

                appellant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills (Centennial
                Hills). The motion challenges the chief justice's appointment of two retired
                senior justices to sit in place of two current justices, who voluntarily
                disqualified themselves under NRS 1.225(3). Article 6, section 4(2) of the
                Nevada    Constitution provides that "[i]n case of the           disability or

                disqualification, for any cause, of a justice of the Stipreme Court, the
                Governor may designate a judge of the court of appeals ,or a district judge
                to sit in the place of the disqualified or disabled justice."        A separate

                provision of the Nevada Constitution, article 6, section 19, more generally
                declares that the "chief justice is the administrative head of the court
                system" who, as such, "may . . . Mecall to active service any retired justice
                or judge of the court system who consents to such recall .1. . and may assign
                him to appropriate temporary duty within the court system."              These

                provisions raise an important question in their overlap—does the chief
                justice's power to assign senior justices to temporary duty extend to filling
                a vacancy arising in a supreme court en banc case 1when a justice is
                disqualified from that case?
                            In its opinion, the majority finds no conflict between sections

                4(2) and 19 and broadly holds that the chief justiCe may replace a
                disqualified justice with a senior justice. Public confidence in the legitimacy
                of the judiciary depends on the utmost transparency regarding questions of
                judicial assignments. For that reason, while our results are the same, I
                analyze the constitutional question differently and conchide that it is closer
                and   affords   a   narrower   permission   than    the   majority    suggests.

                Furthermore, and more importantly, I respectfully submit that the method

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                of selection should be random. as provided for gubericatorial selections
                under Internal Operating Procedure (I0P) 1(g)(4); that1 the same method
                should be used by both the governor and the chief justice out of respect for
                their shared power; and that a replacement is only necessary in en banc
                cases to "avert a possible tie vote," IOP 1(g)(2). BecauSe the IOPs do not
                adequately define a random or evenly applied method; and because two
                justices were disqualified, leaving both a quorum of four and an uneven
                number of five to hear this case without risking a tie, I respectfully dissent
                to the extent the majority's opinion endorses a selection process that differs
                from the random process used for gubernatorial selections.
                                                       I.
                            Beginning on ground fully shared: The senior judge program
                authorized by the 1976 addition of article 6, section 19(1)(c) to the Nevada
                Constitution has hugely benefited Nevada's trial and appellate court

                systems, expanding the pool of experienced judges avalilable without the
                expense of more judgeships. Nor is it disputed that under article 6, section
                19(1)(c), the chief justice can recall and assign a retired, senior justice to
                "appropriate temporary duty" in the supreme court—for example, finishing
                up the cases left by a justice who retires midterm while the permanent
                replacement process runs its course. See, e.g., Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v.
                State, No. 83014, 2022 WL 17367603 (Nev. Dec. 1,1 2022) (Order of
                Affirmance) (Senior Justice Gibbons filling in for retired Justice Silver, who
                retired effective September 29, 2022). The question is NA/hether appointing
                a senior justice to replace a disqualified justice is an "appropriate temporary
                duty" within the meaning of article 6, section 19(1)(c), 1, given the specific
                provision article 6, section 4(2) makes for the governor to appoint a court of
                appeals or district judge to serve in a case of disqualification or disability.

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                                 A court must interpret constitutional provisions reasonably, 6
                       Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law
                       § 23.11 (4th ed. 2023 update), as the voters who enacted i woUld, Strickland
                       v. Waymire, 126 Nev. 230, 234, 235 P.3d 605, 608 (2010),,, and in a way that
                       "will prevent any clause, sentence or word from being superfluous, void or
                       insignificant," id. at 236, 235 P.3d at 610 (quoting Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev.
                       212, 222 (1874)). Drawing on these principles, Centennia] Hills argues that
                       a reasonable reader could conclude that assignment to ;temporary duty is
                       not "appropriate" if the person making the appointment' lacks authority to
                       do so. In its view, given the speci.fic provision article 6, Section 4 makes for
                       the governor to replace a disqualified justice with a cOurt of appeals or
                       distilict judge, the chief justice lacks authority to replace a disqualified
                       •
                       justle   with a senior justice.
                                   Article 6, section 4 provides that the governor "may" appoint a
                       court of appeals or district court judge to replace a disqualified justice. The
                       use of"may" connotes permission, not mandate, and supports the majority's
                       cone usion that sections 4(2) and 19(1)(c) are complementary, not
                       conflicting. See majority op. at 11 (citing Piroozi v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
                       C'ou t, 1.31 Nev. 1004, 1009, 363 P.3d 1168, 1172 (2015)). But "may" can as
                       easil y be read to say the governor has the choice: He or she can--but has
                       the discretion not to—appoint a replacement for a disqualified justice.
                       Further complicating matters is NRS 1.225(5)(a),1 which provides that
                                   [u]pon the disqualification of [a] justice of the
                                   Supreme Court under this section, a judge of the

                             1NRS 1.225 provides for t.he disqualification of a justice for actual or
                       implied bias and provides in subsection 3 that "[a] justice of the Supreme
                       Court . . . , upon his or her own motion, may disqualify himself or herself
                       from acting in any matter upon the ground of actual or implied bias."
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                           Court of Appeals or •district judge shall be
                           designated to sit in place of the justice [by the
                           governor] as provided in Section 4 of Article 6 of the
                           Constitution.
                (emphasis added). Enacted in 1957, two decades before article 6, section
                19(1)(c) was added to the Nevada Constitution, see 1957 Nev. Stat., ch. 314,
                at 521, NRS 1.225(5) has survived without change, except for its
                amendment in 2013 to make similar provision for the governor to appoint a
                district judge to sit in place of a disqualified court of appeals judge, see 2013
                Nev. Stat., ch. 343, at 1711. The parties do not cite, and so the majority
                opinion does not address, NRS 1.225(5)(a)'s seeming mandate to use the
                gubernatorial appointment route in article 6, section. 4 in replacing a
                disqualified supreme court justice.
                            The opinion does not dwell on the language of the two
                constitutional provisions. Instead, it shifts focus, to history • and
                contemporaneous construction" and concludes that the chief justice's
                "authorization [under section 19(1)(c)] has long been understood to include
                the power to assign senior justices in cases of supreme court
                disqualification." Majority op., supra, at 7. Citing Coutngton .Brothers v.
                Valley Plastering, Inc., 93 Nev. 355, 363 n.4, 566 P.2d 8114, 819 n.4 (1977)—
                which the opinion emphasizes was decided on July 1, 1977, the day article
                6, section 19(1)(c) took effect, majority op., supra, at 9—the majority states
                that "the chief justice's• power to assign senior justices toitemporary service
                was used immediately to obtain substitutes for supreMe court justices in
                cases of disqualification and otherwise, sometimes in coojunction with the
                governor's power to designate district judges." Majority op., supra, at 9.
                But the majority's reliance on Covington is misplaced. The docket sheet in
                Covington Brothers, No. 8519, shows that it was Orally argued on
                December 16, 1976, when Justice Zenoff was an active member of the court,
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                and resolved by opinion on July 1, 1977, with Justice Zenoff still
                participating despite his midterm retirement effective April 30, 1977. See
                https://nvcourts.gov/aoc/judicialhistory (last visited June 19, 2023). Justice
                Zenoff was not named to sit in place of a disqualified justice; he returned to
                complete a case he deliberated on before he retired.         This qualifies as

                 appropriate temporary duty" under the then-newly enacted section
                19(1)(c), but it does not address the more specific issue of replacement of a
                sitting justice who is "disabled or disqualified" under section 4.
                            Nor does Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 243, as adopted in 1977
                and transferred to SCR 10 in 1979, resolve the tension between sections 4(2)
                and 19(1)(c). True, SCR 243 implemented the then-newly adopted section
                19's permission to use senior justices and judges, but it did so in general
                terms—"A senior justice or judge, with his consent, is eligible for ternporary
                assignment to any state court at or below the level of the court in which he
                was serving at the time of his retirement." See majority op., supra, at 7
                (quoting this sentence from SCR 243(2) (1977)). And the next sentence of
                SCR 243(2) stated that, "[i]f designated by the governor, at the request of
                the chief justice, a senior judge may also hear specific cases in the supreme
                court upon disqualification of a justice thereof." See also SCR 243(3) (1977)
                (stating that "in the case of a senior judge assigned to hear and determine
                a case in the supreme court, the governor shall issue a special commission,
                as in the case of other judges of the district court"). SCR 243's specific
                reference to gubernatorial appointment of senior judges in cases of a
                justice's disqualification and its silence as to the chief justice's appointment
                of senior justices in the same instance suggests the opposite historical
                understanding than the majority claims for it and is, at best, ambiguous.

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                            For historical evidence to sway constitutional interpretation, it
                should clearly evidence the contemporaneous understanding of the adopters
                thernselves--here, the voters. See Strickland, 126 Nev. at 239, 235 P.3d at
                611 (considering ballot materials as evidence of the voters'
                contemporaneous understanding of a constitutional amendment). Here, the
                ballot materials the 1976 voters received on article 6, section 19 explaining
                the measure said nothing about the interaction between article 6, section 4
                and proposed section 19, even though a technical amendment to article 6,
                section 4 was presented to and passed by them in the same election. See
                Constitutional Amendments and Other Propositions to Be Voted Upon in
                State cf Nevada at General Election, November 2, 1976, Question
                No. 6 (adding section 19(1) to article 6) and Question 7 (making a
                technical amendment to article 6, section 4 (available at Nevada
                LCB Library and https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/VoteNV/
                BallotQuestions/1976.pdf (last visited June 22, 2023)). I acknowledge that,
                in the near half-century that. has followed section 19(1)(c)'s adoption, there
                have been cases in which a chief justice has appointed a senior justice to
                replace a disqualified justice. See majority op., at 9-10 nn.7 & 8 (collecting
                cases).   But this seems more a matter of individual interpretation by
                Nevada's successive chief justices, see Nev. Const. art. 6, § 3 (providing for
                a rotating chief justice) than evidence of the contemporaneous
                understanding of the voters who approved section 19(1)(c)'s adoption in
                1976. On this record, I submit, history and contemporaneous construction
                do not offer much to the analysis.
                      And so, I return to the text of sections 4 and 19(1)(c) and the evident
                purpose each serves. Before section 4(2)'s adoption in 1920, Nevada's then-
                three-justice supreme court had no way to replace an absent or disqualified
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                       justice, creating the risk of deadlock in tie-vote cases. Like most states,
                       Nevada opted to provide a means to appoint a replacement justice. See Don
                       R. Willett, Suprerne Stalemates: Chalices, Jack-0'-Lanterns, and Other
                       State High Court Tiebreakers, l 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 441, 448 (2021) (noting
                       that 37 states make provision to replace an absent or disqualified justice).
                       The choice of the governor, as opposed to the court or its chief justice, to pick
                       the temporary replacement is one other states have made and does not
                       appear policy-driven. See id. at 485. When section 19 was added in 1976,
                       it conferred administrative powers on the chief justice in terms other states
                       have interpreted to permit appointment of senior justices to sit in place of
                       disqualified justices. See Legacy Found. Action Fund u. Citizens Clean
                       Elections Comrn'n, 524 P.3d 1141, 1143 (Ariz. 2023); Commonwealth v.
                       Wetton, 648 A.2d 524, 526 (Pa. 1994). Allowing the governor and the court
                       to share replacement-justice appointment powers, while unusual. is not
                       unique. See Willett, supra, at 494-95 (discussing the practice in Tennessee).
                       Given the use of the permissive "may" in section 4(2)'s gubernatorial
                       appointment powers, I therefore conclude, as does the majority, that
                       sections 4(2) and 19(1)(c) do not conflict and can reasonably be read in
                       harmony with one another.2

                             21 acknowledge that this interpretation conflicts with NRS 1.225(5),
                       which seems to mandate gubernatorial appointment. But in cases involving
                       conflict between constitutional and statutory text, the former prevails. See
                       Thomas v. Neu. Yellow Cab Corp., 130 Nev. 484, 489, 327 P.3d 518, 521
                       (2014) ("Statutes are construed to accord with constitutions, not vice
                       versa."). Nor does it make section 4(2) meaningless, as Centennial Hills
                       argues, because the governor alone has the power to commission a district
                       court judge to sit in place of a disqualified justice, a power the chief justice
                       does not appear to have.
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                                     More important than who appoints whom, however, is when
                      and by what method the selection is made. Discretionary selection in
                      individual cases has provoked controversy in states elsewhere because it
                      can "seem to invite political considerations to enter and perhaps dominate
                      the process." James C. Brent, Stacking the Deck? An Empirical Analysis of
                      Agreement Rates Between Pro Tempore Justices and Chief Justices of
                      California, 1977-2003, 27 Just, Sys. J. 14, 14 (2006) (discussing
                      discretionary selection in California); see Willett, supra, at 489 (describing
                      ,
                          can extraordinary crisis" that arose from certain temporary assignments in
                      New Hampshire); id. at 492 (summarizing the appointment process in West
                      Virginia); and id. at 501-11 (detailing the "angst" caused by the divergent
                      tiebreaking approaches of various states).       The model code of judicial
                      conduct acknowledges as a foundational principle that even when all is not
                      as it seems, the appearance of judicial impropriety damages the public trust
                      equal to any fact. See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Preamble. In
                      recognition of this reality, many of our sister states have enacted "apolitical
                      and mechanical" methods that provide for rotating or random selection from
                      an available pool of substitutes, thereby removing the threat of such
                      damage. Brent, supra, at 14 (noting neutral methods such as picking names
                      from a jar or selecting them alphabetically); see Willet, supra, at 448
                      (explaining that in Louisiana the clerk draws a name from a Jack-o-
                      Lantern).
                                     This court has not kept up with these developments. Our
                      Internal Operating Procedures (I0Ps), first adopted in 2002, see In re: Nev.
                      Supreme Court IOPs, ADKT 288 (Order Adopting Nevada Supreme Court
                      Internal Operating Procedures, July 26, 2002), have variously provided for
                      random selection from index cards naming both the eligible district court
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                 judges and senior supreme court justices, see id. IOP 1(b)(3) (Order, filed
                 July 28, 2007), to selection solely by the chief justice, see id. (Order filed
                 December 24, 2008), to a mix that specifies random selection of a district
                 judge's name to send to the governor but that gives the chief justice the
                 power to choose the selection method for senior justices, see id. (Order filed
                 May 9, 2013). See also Willett, supra, at 493-94 (describing Nevada's
                 "random, index-card selection" based on a 2016 interview with the former
                 clerk of the court). Even today, the IOPs remain unclear as to the process
                 by which replacement judges and justices are chosen to replace disqualified
                 or disabled justices in particular cases. Ideally, the selection process would
                 be clearly laid out and as randomized as possible. But regardless of the
                 process chosen, if the governor and the chief justice share the power to
                 replace disqualified justices in individual cases, as both the majority and I
                 have concluded, that power and responsibility is not truly shared or equal
                 between branches if they do not employ the same selection method. If, for
                 instance, the governor must select from a list of names provided by the chief
                 justice, while the chief justice retains for himself or herself total discretion,
                 this court loses credibility in the eyes of the citizenry and unevenly
                 discharges its shared power.
                             Furthermore, while the IOPs do not currently provide a
                 uniform, randomized process for replacing disqualified justices, they do
                 specify under what circumstances a substitution is to be made in an en banc
                 case. Four justices are necessary for an en banc quorum. See IOP 1(e). "To
                 avert a possible• tie vote in en banc matters, the court will endeavor to
                 convene a quorum comprised of an odd number of justices before taking the
                 matter under submission."        IOP 1(g)(2).     In this case, two justices
                 disqualified themselves, leaving five justices to hear the case.. This court
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                has heard cases before under such circumstances without seating additional
                justices, and the majority does not articulate why additional justices are
                needed in this case.
                            As noted, I concur with the majority in deeming the governor's
                and the chief justice's appointment powers complementary and in denying
                Centennial Hills' objection and motion on that basis. But I respectfully
                dissent from the majority's opinion to the extent it endorses a disparate,
                discretionary approach to judicial replacements in cases involving judicial
                disqualification.

                                                  Pickering

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