Court Opinion

ID: 9582894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:32:38.806221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:43.700117
License: Public Domain

*215Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting in part. That the State court had jurisdiction was originally held in this case in the opinion which I prepared for the then majority, and with the portion of the majority opinion and judgment so ruling I now concur. But I dissent from all other rulings of the majority.
Though admittedly there is conflict in our decisions as to when relief may be granted under the Declaratory Judgment statute there is no exception to the rule that, if one can not possibly be in doubt and uncertainty as to his rights, he may not obtain any relief under this statute. It is not possible for this petitioning minority stockholder to be in doubt but that his bank may establish branch banks where a State statute grants the same privilege to State banks. This fact is unmistakably expressed by the Federal law in these words: “if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State.” The statute law of the State (Ga. L. 1956, p. 309, sec. 3) grants to State banks precisely what this national bank claims the right to do. Therefore, the petitioner could not be heard to deny that he was sure of what the law was and what it authorized his bank to do. The action of the Comptroller of' the Currency in granting his permit to the bank to do what the law authorizes shows that he was not in doubt of its meaning. Indeed, this petitioner makes no claim that he is in doubt as to the meaning of the law. His asserted doubt arises because of his erroneous fear that, should the State statute be declared unconstitutional, the bank would lose what it has expended in the establishment of branch banks thereunder. Such groundless apprehension grows out of a misconception of the source of the bank’s powers. That source is exclusively Federal. Not one particle of the rights and powers of this national bank is conferred by State statute. The State statute is merely a condition precedent to the enjoyment of powers conferred solely by the Federal statute. Do the majority maintain that, when the conditions precedent, including a permit by the Comptroller of the Currency to the establishment of branch banks, are present, and the bank enters upon the task of establishing such branch bank, any expenditures thus lawfully made could or would be lost if the condition precedent is later removed, either by a court *216decision declaring the State law void or by legislative repeal? It would require complete lack of faith in the Constitution to seriously think private property could thus be squandered by government. I make the positive assertion that neither government, State or Federal, could force the bank to lose one cent it has thus expended. I think the majority should face up to and frankly answer this same question. If I am right — and no legal reason has yet been given for denying I am right — then this petitioner is neither in doubt nor uncertainty, nor can he or his bank lose one cent or forfeit any right by actions taken before the State law is declared void or repealed.
The general rule of law (11 Am. Jur. 748, Constitutional Law, § 111; 16 C. J. S. 226, Constitutional Law, § 76) as well as the uniform rulings of this court (Harrell v. Cane Growers Co-op Assn., 160 Ga. 30, 45 (7), 126 S. E. 531; Felton v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S. E. 264; Johnson v. Georgia-Carolina Retail Milk Producers Assn., 182 Ga. 695, 697, 186 S. E. 824; Mulling v. Houlihan, 205 Ga. 735, 55 S. E. 2d 150; Kryder v. State, 212 Ga. 272, 91 S. E. 2d 612), is that one not adversely affected by a law will not be allowed to challenge its constitutionality in the courts. A decision can not be rendered in this case without dealing with this rule, by either following it or violating it. The petitioning minority stockholder claims no- wrong to himself except such as he erroneously fears will befall the bank when and if sec. 3 of Georgia Laws, 1956, p. 309, is held invalid, and he seeks a judgment declaring said section 3 of the statute unconstitutional, upon the ground that it specially benefits his corporation and offends the uniformity requirement of the State Constitution. He makes no1 claim that the statute injures him or his bank, but shows that it benefits them both. I am astounded that, with such a clear-cut case, the majority sees proper to ignore the foregoing applicable decisions and law, and proceed to rule that thispetitioner is entitled to attack the law, and cite as authority for such ruling the Code section on rights of minority stockholders to prevent ultra vires acts by the corporation, and Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; Cherokee Iron Co. v. Jones, 52 Ga. 276; Macon Gas Co. v. Richter, 143 Ga. 397 (85 S. E. 112); and South Western R. Co. v. Benton, 206 Ga. 770 (58 *217S. E. 2d 905), none of which has the remotest bearing upon the constitutional question, but all deal with attempted violations of statutes by the corporation. Thus we have a ruling allowing a minority stockholder to challenge the constitutionality of a statute upon the sole ground that it confers special rights upon his corporation, in which he as a stockholder must inevitably share, despite the foregoing cited and countless other decisions holding he can not do so unless the law injures him; and to sustain such fallacious ruling, cases are cited that do not touch that question but hold that the corporation must act within the law. The total irrelevancy of the law cited by the majority to the question being decided illustrates just how illogically and unsoundly their conclusion is reached.
Any sound decision on the validity of the law under attack, which permits existing banks with a holding-company connection to become branch banks, and branch banks when and if the population limitations therein are met to establish other branch banks in the city where they are located, requires a keen awareness of the public policy of this State with reference to banks as evidenced by Title 13, Banks and Banking, of the Code. Here we find careful regulations, manifesting the State’s desire to allow the people the convenience and benefits of banks, and exercising great caution to protect the customers of the banks, and limiting their establishments by prospects of success and whether or not the services are needed.
It must be conceded without question that the - Constitution, art. 1, sec. 4, par. 1 (Code, Ann., § 2-401), forbids enactment of a special law the subject matter of which is covered by a general law. Also, as contended by counsel for the plaintiff, this court has held numerous acts void because they were special laws, and as cases so holding counsel cites Lorentz v. Alexander, 87 Ga. 444 (13 S. E. 632); Thomas v. Austin, 103 Ga. 701 (30 S. E. 627); Futrell v. George, 135 Ga. 265 (69 S. E. 182); Worth County v. Crisp County, 139 Ga. 117 (76 S. E. 747); Stewart v. Anderson, 140 Ga. 31 (78 S. E. 457); Gibson v. Hood, 185 Ga. 426 (195 S. E. 444); Sumter County v. Allen, 193 Ga. 171 (17 S. E. 2d 567); Estes v. Jones, 203 Ga. 686 (48 S. E. 2d 99); Tift v. Bush, 209 Ga. 769 (75 S. E. 2d 805); Walden v. Owens, 211 *218Ga. 884 (89 S. E. 2d 492). It must be also conceded that the legislature may, under the provision of the Constitution, make classifications, provided the basis of such classification relates to the objective of the legislation. Sasser v. Martin, 101 Ga. 447 (29 S. E. 278); Union Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606 (34 S. E. 217); Abbott v. Commrs. of Roads & Revenues of Fulton County, 160 Ga. 657 (129 S. E. 38); Rourke v. U. S. Fidelity &c. Co., 187 Ga. 636 (1 S. E. 2d 728). In the light of the foregoing legal principles, we examine the basis for the classification here complained of. The legislature by an act (Ga. L. 1919, p. 135) had expressly authorized banks to establish branches in the city in which they were located and “elsewhere.” Then by an act (Ga. L. 1927, p. 195) it is provided that, “after this act takes effect no new or additional branch banks shall be established.” The 1927 act authorized the continuous operation of already-established branch banks. Then, by two acts in 1929 (Ga. L. 1929, pp. 214, 215), banks in cities then or thereafter having a population of not less than 80,000 or more than 125,000 or having a population of not less than 200,000 may establish branch banks in the municipality in which their principal offices are located. Thereafter in 1956, another law was enacted (Ga. L. 1956, p. 309), which prohibited further establishment of banks with holding-company connections, but expressly allowing those already established according to law to continue. Thus the legislation on branch banking authorizes banks to establish branches in cities where the home bank is located when and if the population of those cities is not less than 200,000 and where the population is not less than 80,000 nor more than 125,000. And the 1956 act allows branch banks in cities other than those of the home bank existing at that time to continue in operation.
With this situation we have for determination if a reasonable basis existed for classifying branch banks that were established in conformity with the law, and allowed to continue by the 1956 act although the future establishment of other such branch banks is forbidden by that act and the 1927 act cited above. Would it have been constitutional to have destroyed such lawful banks by the 1956 act? I think not. Then, since they were expressly allowed to continue, can it be seriously contended that they *219should have been rendered unable to serve the convenience of their customers, or meet the competition of other banks which, under the two 1929 acts above referred to-, can lawfully establish additional branch banks in cities defined by population which is the method of identification used in sec. 3 of the 1956 act, here attacked? It would have been better for the branch banks to have simply been wiped out by the 1956 act, thus making their demise less painful than to have allowed them to continue under circumstances rendering their success impossible and subjecting them to the excruciating slow death by strangulation and starvation. Either treatment would have constituted an abandonment of the public policy of the State concerning banking as exemplified by the law establishing the Banking Department and empowering it to seek solvency and success in all banks.
Coming now to the basis upon which sec. 3 classifies, I find the population part obviously related and pertinent to the number of banks. Also, the branch banks constitute all of a class and their success depends upon their ability to meet competition and serve the convenience of their customers. Therefore it can not be said that the relevant facts do not make the classification reasonable, since a classification is valid if it relates to the subject matter of the legislation and is not unreasonable or arbitrary. Sasser v. Martin, 101 Ga. 447, supra; Aetna Insurance Co. v. Brigham, 120 Ga. 925 (48 S. E. 348); Georgia S. & F. R. Co. v. Adkins, 156 Ga. 826 (120 S. E. 610); City of Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150 (145 S. E. 57); Felton v. McArthur, 173 Ga. 465 (160 S. E. 419); Family Finance Co. v. Allman, 174 Ga. 467 (163 S. E. 143); Rourke v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 187 Ga. 636, supra.
The provision, “in the future in cities of over 80,000 population, according to the 1950 or any subsequent census,” will include a census taken by the Superintendent of Banks or others if correct and is not limited to the decennial census taken by the United States Government. This clause relating to population is in accord with the rulings in Sumter County v. Alien, 193 Ga. 171, supra; Estes v. Jones, 203 Ga. 686, supra; Tift v. Bush, 209 Ga. 769, supra; Walden v. Owens, 211 Ga. 884, supra, which hold that such classification must open to let in and also to- let out. *220Only when the two conditions are met, can the branches referred to be established, i. e., (1) branches existing at the date of the enactment of the law, and (2) when and only when the population of the city in which such branch is located is over 80,000. No such branch can be established before the population is over 80,000 and none can be established when the population ceases to be 80,000. Of course, those established while the population is over 80,000 would continue to exist lawfully when the population declined below 80,000. Furthermore, the only period in which this portion of the act is operative is when branch banks are “permitted to other banks.” This merely places this classification of branch banks on precisely the same competitive level and equality with all other banks throughout the State. In the event no additional branch banks are permitted to other banks in Georgia, then no additional branches will be allowed under this section of the act.
Branches of a bank with a holding-company relation may make branches of existing holding-company banks, irrespective of population. I construe this to mean simply that existing holding-company banks may be made branches of a bank with a holding-company relation. This establishes no new banks, but merely authorizes changing the name and organization of existing banks of a holding company to- branches of a bank with a holding-company relation.
Having thus classified in conformity with law, the uniformity requirement of the Constitution (art. 1, sec. 4, par. 1) is satisfied when it operates uniformly upon those within that class. Union Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606 (2), supra; McGinnis v. Ragsdale, 116 Ga. 245 (42 S. E. 492). There is no question but that such uniformity is provided for all in the class here. From what has been said it follows that sec. 3 of the 1956 act above cited is not a special law, and does not offend art. 1, sec. 4,. par. 1 of the Constitution. Therefore it required no advertisement. There is neither a plurality of subject matter in the act nor a denial of equal protection required by the Constitution of the State and the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. It follows that the constitutional attacks on sec. 3 of the 1956 act cited above are without merit. Further*221more, since petitioner’s entire case depends upon his constitutional attacks being sustained, his petition alleges no cause of action.
For the reasons stated in this dissent, it is my opinion that the court has jurisdiction, but did not err in sustaining the general ■demurrers to the petition, which (a) aver that the petition fails to allege insecurity and uncertainty entitling the petitioner to a declaratory judgment; and (b) even so, the statute is not subject to the constitutional attacks made. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Candler and Mr. Justice Hawkins concur in this dissent.