Court Opinion

ID: 9945280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:00:32.748297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:25.883828
License: Public Domain

22-6537
    Toxtega-Olin v. Garland
                                                                                         BIA
                                                                                   Hochul, IJ
                                                                                 A216 279 912

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                               SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 27th day of February, two thousand twenty-four.

    PRESENT:
                RICHARD C. WESLEY,
                GERARD E. LYNCH,
                EUNICE C. LEE,
                      Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    VALENTIN TOXTEGA-OLIN,
              Petitioner,

                     v.                                                22-6537

    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
                Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                      Jose Perez, Law Offices of Jose Perez, P.C.,
                                         Syracuse, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT:                        Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                                       Attorney General; Nancy Friedman, Senior
                                       Litigation Counsel; Gregory A. Pennington, Jr.,
                                       Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
                                       United States Department of Justice, Washington,
                                       DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioner Valentin Toxtega-Olin, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of

an October 24, 2022 decision of the BIA affirming a June 26, 2019 decision of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying a continuance and finding his application for

cancellation of removal abandoned. In re Valentin Toxtega-Olin, No. A216 279 912 (B.I.A.

Oct. 24, 2022), aff’g No. A216 279 912 (Immigr. Ct. Buffalo June 26, 2019).        For the

purposes of our review of this petition, we have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s

decisions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d

524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

procedural history.

      Following two continuances for attorney preparation, Toxtega-Olin applied for

cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) and identified his qualifying relative as

his U.S. citizen wife. At the merits hearing, he sought a third continuance to attempt to

reconcile with his wife so that he would be able to continue with his application for

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cancellation of removal. The record indicates that Toxtega-Olin’s wife did not appear in

court because of a medical appointment. Toxtega-Olin did not provide other testimony

or documentary evidence supporting his request for a continuance or his cancellation

application. The IJ found no good cause for a continuance and deemed the application

for cancellation of removal abandoned, and the BIA dismissed the appeal.

I.     Jurisdiction

       As an initial matter, the Government argues that we lack jurisdiction to review the

agency’s denial of a continuance and determination that Toxtega-Olin abandoned his

application for cancellation. We disagree.

       Toxtega-Olin sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.             Section

1252(a)(2)(B)(i) of Title 8 provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to review “any

judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1229b.”                  Section

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) adds that this jurisdictional restriction also applies to “any other decision

or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for

which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General

or the Secretary of Homeland Security,” except for a discretionary ruling on asylum. We

have held that, while § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of certain discretionary

agency decisions, “the decision by an IJ or the BIA to grant or to deny a continuance in

an immigration proceeding is not [such] a decision.” Sanusi v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193, 198

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(2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).    Thus, we have held that the denial of a motion for a

continuance is reviewable for abuse of discretion. Id.

       The Government asserts that the Supreme Court’s holding in Patel v. Garland that

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “prohibits review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief,”

includes the denial of a request for a continuance where the relief sought is cancellation.

596 U.S. 328, 338 (2022). In Patel, however, the Supreme Court discussed the judgments

the agency makes in determining an applicant’s eligibility for discretionary relief and

whether such relief should be granted as a matter of discretion, and did not directly

address decisions made prior to adjudicating an application for discretionary relief. See

id. at 333–35, 338–45. Patel has thus not abrogated our decision in Sanusi, which remains

binding precedent in this Circuit.

       Toxtega-Olin requested a continuance to attempt to reconcile with his wife so that

he could possibly continue to apply for cancellation of removal with her as his qualifying

relative under the required standard. The IJ found no good cause for a continuance

based on his wife’s failure to appear at the hearing, the speculative nature of

reconciliation, and Toxtega-Olin’s failure to present alternate evidence to support his

application. Thus, the IJ denied a continuance because Toxtega-Olin did not show good

cause—not because he was ineligible for cancellation. The IJ’s conclusion relied on the

regulation allowing a continuance for good cause (8 C.F.R. § 1003.29); the IJ did not find

                                            4
that Toxtega-Olin’s wife was not a qualifying relative, nor did the IJ make any express

hardship findings, i.e., the IJ did not determine the merits of Toxtega-Olin’s eligibility for

cancellation or that cancellation was not available as a matter of discretion. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b) (listing requirements for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents).

       In sum, the IJ denied relief on procedural grounds—Toxtega-Olin did not show

good cause for granting a continuance, and failed to submit any evidence to support his

application for cancellation, thereby abandoning it.            Accordingly, we find no

jurisdictional bar to our review of the agency’s decisions to deny a continuance and deem

the application for cancellation abandoned.

II.    Denial of Continuance and Determination of Abandonment

       We review the denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Gonzales,

445 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2006). An IJ “may grant a motion for continuance for good

cause shown,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, and we accord IJs “wide latitude in calendar

management,” Morgan, 445 F.3d at 551. “An IJ . . . abuse[s] [her] discretion in denying a

continuance if (1) [her] decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong

legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding or (2) [her] decision—though not

necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be

located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. at 551–52 (internal quotation

marks omitted). To successfully challenge the denial of a continuance to obtain evidence

                                              5
or apply for relief, a petitioner “at least must make a reasonable showing that the lack of

preparation occurred despite a diligent good faith effort to be ready to proceed” and “that

[the IJ’s] denial caused him actual prejudice and harm and materially affected the

outcome of his case.”      Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec. 354, 356–57 (B.I.A. 1983).

Similarly, to prevail on a due process claim, a petitioner must show that he was deprived

of a “full and fair opportunity” to present his case, Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134

(2d Cir. 2007), and resulting prejudice, Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir.

2008). There was no abuse of discretion or due process violation here.

       First, Toxtega-Olin argues that the IJ should have considered the factors laid out

in Matter of Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 790 (B.I.A. 2009). However, the IJ noted these

factors in its decision. Moreover, the Hashmi factors apply to a request that an IJ continue

proceedings because there is a petition for relief, specifically a visa petition, pending

before another agency.      See id. at 790–91.     In contrast, Toxtega-Olin requested a

continuance to provide evidence to support his application for cancellation of removal.

       Second, the agency did not abuse its discretion or deprive Toxtega-Olin of an

opportunity to present his case. He had two prior continuances, and before granting the

second continuance, the IJ explained that “the Court is under great requirements not to

continue cases indefinitely.” Certified Admin. Rec. at 64.

                                              6
      Toxtega-Olin’s third request was based on an assertion by his counsel that

Toxtega-Olin and his wife were attempting to reconcile.       However, “arguments of

counsel are not evidence.” Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 651 (2d Cir. 2013). And

Toxtega-Olin provided no other evidence or documentation to support his assertions that

he and his wife would reconcile, that she would suffer hardship if he were removed, or

that he met the other requirements for cancellation.     See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).   His

argument that he needed to reconcile with his wife to present evidence of her medical

condition was not sufficient alone to warrant a continuance, and he did not explain his

failure to produce evidence in support of the other requirements. See Matter of Sibrun,

18 I. & N. Dec. at 356–57 (requiring showing of good faith effort to be prepared to

proceed).   Given the lack of evidence, the agency did not abuse its discretion in

determining that it was speculative that Toxtega-Olin would reconcile with his wife or

present evidence to support his application.     See Sanusi, 445 F.3d at 200 (finding

applicant failed to show abuse of discretion where the “IJ granted two continuances, and

nothing in the record suggests that his decision to deny a third request after months of

delay was an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding [the applicant’s] contention that

further evidence would be forthcoming”).

      Nor did the denial of a continuance deprive Toxtega-Olin of due process. He was

informed in January 2019 that the June 2019 hearing would be a merits hearing. He had

                                           7
an opportunity to present his claim for relief: he had counsel and was given the

opportunity to submit evidence and present witnesses at that hearing.             And as an

applicant for cancellation of removal, he bore the burden of establishing his eligibility for

that relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A). An applicant for relief “bears the ultimate

burden of introducing [] evidence without prompting from the IJ.” Wei Sun v. Sessions,

883 F.3d 23, 31 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009)).

       Finally, the agency also determined that Toxtega-Olin abandoned his cancellation

application by failing to provide supporting documentation or testimony. In his brief,

Toxtega-Olin argues only that the IJ’s decision to pretermit his application denied him

due process. But, as described above, he had the burden of establishing his eligibility.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A). Toxtega-Olin does not otherwise challenge the agency’s

determination that he failed to support the application. He has thus abandoned any

such argument. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We consider

abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an

appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

                                           FOR THE COURT:
                                           Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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