Court Opinion

ID: 9959515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 21:00:37.81568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:44.428088
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4222     Doc: 57          Filed: 04/10/2024   Pg: 1 of 18

                                             PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-4222

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                    Plaintiff - Appellee

        v.

        JEROD MONTREL ASKEW

                    Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, Senior District Judge. (2:21−cr−00008−RBS−DEM−1)

        Argued: January 26, 2024                                       Decided: April 10, 2024

        Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Niemeyer and Judge Benjamin joined.

        ARGUED: Robert James Wagner, ROBERT J. WAGNER PLC, Richmond, Virginia, for
        Appellant. Jacqueline Romy Bechara, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney,
        Aidan Taft Grano-Mickelsen, Assistant United States Attorney, Matthew Heck, Assistant
        United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond,
        Virginia, for Appellee.
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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

               Following a jury trial, Jerod Montrel Askew was convicted of various crimes related

        to drug trafficking, including two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug

        trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He now appeals his convictions on

        various grounds. First, he asserts that the jury instructions for the firearm-related charges

        were erroneous and prejudicial. Second, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to

        support a guilty verdict for the firearm-related convictions. Next, he claims that the district

        court abused its discretion in offering a sua sponte jury instruction about the legality of the

        search warrants underpinning the investigation. Finally, he argues that the district court

        abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecution referred to

        his invocation of the right to counsel during closing arguments. After carefully reviewing

        each claim, we affirm Askew’s conviction.

                                                      I.

                                                      A.

               Law enforcement began investigating Askew for suspected drug trafficking in early

        2020. Police first employed visual and electronic surveillance, tracking Askew to the turf

        of known narcotics distributors. Based on the information gleaned from surveillance, the

        police obtained search warrants for Askew’s vehicle and apartment. With the warrants

        secured, police pulled Askew over while he was driving his Jeep and prompted their K-9

        detection dog to sniff the car. The dog alerted to the center console, inside of which officers

        discovered a loaded firearm and a crumpled, empty plastic baggie. Askew told the police

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        that “there was probably marijuana in it earlier.” J.A. 305. Police recovered the firearm,

        the baggie, and two cellphones from the vehicle.

               While the traffic stop was ongoing, a different squad of officers executed the search

        warrant at Askew’s apartment. By all indications, the apartment appeared to be the nerve

        center for a drug trafficking enterprise. There police found a noteworthy collection of drugs

        and drug paraphernalia: copious quantities of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, in addition

        to packaging supplies, cutting materials, scales, sifters, and blending equipment. Police

        also discovered six firearms, some of them loaded; over $11,000 in cash hidden in a

        trashcan; multiple cellphones; and a storage unit rental agreement in Askew’s name. Upon

        these findings, Askew was placed under arrest and transported to the storage unit listed on

        the rental agreement, accompanied by a new search warrant for that property.

               The storage unit contained more investigatory fruits. Law enforcement discovered

        multiple bags of marijuana, as well as various tools which could be used to package and

        distribute the drug, including a kilo press form, a sifter, and cutting agents. There were also

        various baggies containing cocaine residue. Within a safe, police found more marijuana,

        cash, a loaded firearm, and firearm magazines. All of this evidence would be collected and

        used by the government in its case-in-chief in the trial to come.

                                                      B.

               Askew ultimately proceeded to trial on eight charges, including one count of

        conspiracy to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846; five counts of

        possession with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; and two counts of

        possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.

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        § 924(c). 1 Along with the physical evidence recovered from Askew’s apartment and

        storage unit, the prosecution presented evidence from the cellphones found in Askew’s

        vehicle. Data extractions revealed several text conversations between Askew and his

        contacts in the drug industry, where they discussed selling and trading narcotics and

        firearms. Two of the firearms discussed in these text conversations matched the

        descriptions of those recovered from the searches. The prosecution also discussed its

        electronic surveillance of Askew and testified that his patterns of movement were

        consistent with drug dealing. Additionally, the prosecution offered a police detective as an

        expert witness in drug distribution and firearms, who testified that firearms are considered

        “a tool of the trade” in drug trafficking, “not only to protect yourself from robbery but also

        to protect the assets.” J.A. 590.

               After a three-day trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. Askew

        moved for a new trial as well as for a judgment of acquittal, both of which the district court

        denied. He was sentenced to a total term of 198 months of imprisonment and five years of

        supervised release. Askew timely appealed.

               1
                 The specific counts were as follows: (1) Conspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine,
        cocaine base, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), 846;
        (2) Possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21
        U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); (3) Possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
        trafficking crime (heroin), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); (4) Possession with
        intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); (5) Possession
        with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C);
        (6) and (7) Possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
        § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); (8) Possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime
        (marijuana), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).

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                                                    II.

                                                    A.

               Askew first claims that the jury instructions for his firearm-related charges were

        worded in such a way as to compel the jury to find him guilty. We begin by recounting

        what the jury was told about the firearm-related charges.

               Askew’s convictions were for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug

        trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The court informed the jury that the

        government had to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain its

        burden of proof on this charge: (1) that Askew “committed the drug trafficking crime of

        possession with intent to distribute”; (2) that he “knowingly possessed a firearm”; and

        (3) that his “possession of a firearm was in furtherance of the commission of a drug

        trafficking crime.” J.A. 765. It is this third element, the “in-furtherance-of” element, at

        issue in this appeal.

               The court defined the relevant terms of this element as follows: “The word ‘possess’

        means to own or to exert control over something.” J.A. 766. “The term ‘knowingly’ . . .

        means that he was conscious and aware of his actions, realized what he was doing or what

        was happening around him, and he did not act because of ignorance, mistake, or accident.”

        J.A. 742. And the phrase “‘[i]n furtherance of’ means the act of furthering, advancing, or

        helping forward,” meaning “the government must prove that the possession of a firearm

        furthered, advanced, or helped forward the drug trafficking crime.” J.A. 767.

               The court then discussed how the jury could reach the conclusion that the firearms

        were used in furtherance of the drug trafficking crimes:

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               For drug trafficking crimes, factors that the jury may consider in making the
               determination include the following: The type of drug activity that was being
               conducted, the accessibility of the firearm, the type of firearm, whether the
               firearm was stolen, the status of the possession, whether it was legitimate or
               illegal, whether the firearm was loaded, the proximity of the firearm to either
               drugs or drug profits, the time and circumstances under which the firearm
               was found, whether the firearm provided a defense against the theft of drugs
               and/or reduced the probability that such theft might be attempted. The
               possession is in furtherance if the purpose of the firearm is to protect or
               embolden the defendant.

               Distribution of drugs and the common sense recognition that drug dealing is
               a dangerous and violent enterprise may support an inference that the
               defendant’s possession of a firearm was to facilitate drug dealing.

        J.A. 767–78.

               Askew challenges the last paragraph of these instructions. He argues that this

        portion of the charge compelled the jury to find that “a gun found in the presence of drugs

        will necessarily be connected to the violence inherent in drug dealing” and thus conclude

        that “the mere presence of firearms in the general vicinity of controlled substances”

        satisfied the in-furtherance-of element. Appellant’s Opening Br. 29–31.

               We disagree. When reviewing the propriety of jury instructions, we inquire

        “whether the instructions construed as a whole, and in light of the whole record, adequately

        informed the jury of the controlling legal principles without misleading or confusing the

        jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” Noel v. Artson, 641 F.3d 580, 586 (4th Cir.

        2011). Further, “we accept at the outset the well-established proposition that a single

        instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the

        context of the overall charge.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1973). Such an

        approach “recognize[s] that a judgment of conviction is commonly the culmination of a

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        trial which includes the testimony of witnesses, argument of counsel, receipt of exhibits in

        evidence, and instruction of the jury by the judge.” Id. at 147. In other words, “not only is

        the challenged instruction but one of many such instructions, but the process of instruction

        itself is but one of several components of the trial which may result in the judgment of

        conviction.” Id.

               Here, the jury was repeatedly informed that it needed to find that the firearms

        furthered, advanced, or helped forward the drug trafficking counts, in precise conformity

        with the way this court has interpreted the in-furtherance-of element. See United States v.

        Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002). The jurors were supplied with a range of factors

        to consider that this court has endorsed for making that exact determination. See id. We

        have little problem, then, in concluding that “the district court adequately instructed the

        jury regarding the elements of the offense.” United States v. Wilson, 198 F.3d 467, 469

        (4th Cir. 1999).

               Nonetheless, Askew asserts that the jury instructions were defective in that they

        outright compelled the jury to find Askew guilty of the charge. This obligation, he claims,

        came from a false legal premise. The court’s reference to “the common sense recognition

        that drug dealing is a dangerous and violent enterprise” led inexorably, in Askew’s view,

        to a mandatory conclusion—that the firearm was used in furtherance of the drug trafficking

        crimes.

               We are not so convinced. There is no false legal premise in these instructions. Jurors

        were told that the dangerous and violent nature of drug dealing was “a common sense

        recognition.” But the jurors were then advised that the province of common sense was fully

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        their own. In other portions of the charge, the court informed the jury that it could draw

        “such reasonable inferences as you feel are justified in light of your experience and

        common sense.” J.A. 731. Jurors were “expected to use [their] good sense in considering

        and evaluating the evidence in the case” and to “give such evidence a reasonable and fair

        construction in the light of [their] common knowledge of the natural tendencies and

        inclinations of human beings.” J.A. 729. They were told “several times” that they were “the

        sole judges of the facts of this case.” J.A. 736.

               It is difficult to imagine that jurors, repeatedly told that they were in control of their

        own common sense, would believe that the court somehow wrested that very control from

        them. Such a result would defy the nature of common sense—something not to be

        prescribed from above, but instinctively formed within each juror. Common sense is among

        the distinctive contributions that jurors bring to criminal justice, and the instructions left it

        fully intact. The jury was thus not force-fed a false legal premise. Rather, it was encouraged

        to use its own perceptions about the defendant’s activities and to draw its own conclusions.

               The language to which Askew now objects was at most a permissive inference,

        which the jury was free to accept or reject at will. See Cnty. Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157

        (1979). Such inferences “suggest[] to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State

        proves predicate facts, but do[] not require the jury to draw that conclusion.” Francis v.

        Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985), holding modified on other grounds by Boyde v.

        California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990). Viewing the instructions as a whole, which we are

        required to do, we discern nothing approaching reversible error here.

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                                                      B.

               Askew also contends that the instructions were erroneous and prejudicial because

        they were incomplete. He asserts that the district court erred in failing to sua sponte provide

        the jury with two clarifying instructions. First, he claims that the district court should have

        informed the jury that the mere presence of firearms at the scene of a drug crime, without

        further evidence, was insufficient to show that the firearms were possessed in furtherance

        of the drug trafficking crimes. Second, he posits that the district court should have told the

        jury that Askew had a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess

        firearms for his own protection, given he was a legal possessor of firearms at the time of

        his arrest. Because Askew failed to raise these claims below, our review is for plain error.

        Such review, of course, erects a demonstrable hurdle for Askew to overcome. See Greer v.

        United States, 593 U.S. 503, 508 (2021).

               It is a hurdle that Askew cannot surmount. First, Askew’s “mere presence”

        instruction was unnecessary. The jury was already well-informed that the government

        needed to prove something more than bare proximity to drugs in order to demonstrate that

        the firearms were used in furtherance of trafficking. The district court emphasized to the

        jury that the government had to show that Askew had knowing ownership or control over

        the firearms, which he then used to further, advance, or help forward his drug trafficking

        crimes. There is no “reasonable probability” that the jury could have convicted Askew of

        this offense while also believing that the mere presence of the firearms near the narcotics

        sufficed to prove the government’s case. Id. at 504. “To whatever extent [Askew’s]

        proposed instruction is relevant, the district court’s charge to the jury—taken as a whole—

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        sufficiently accounted for it.” United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 222 (4th Cir. 2009).

        Thus, it is highly unlikely that the jury would have changed its mind had it been offered

        this redundant clarification.

               As for Askew’s proposed Second Amendment instruction, it is unclear how the

        knowledge that Askew, prior to this conviction, could legally possess firearms would alter

        the jurors’ calculus. While Askew may have had a right to possess firearms, he had no right

        to possess them in furtherance of his drug dealings. Indeed, a government witness testified

        that drug dealers employ guns for personal protection in order to help forward their

        trafficking enterprises. See J.A. 595 (“Drug dealers possess firearms, number one, for

        personal protection[.] [W]hen you have a large amount of extremely valuable drugs, or you

        have a large amount of cash . . . you need those firearms to protect yourself.”). The

        instruction, then, would have been irrelevant to the whole purpose of Askew’s possession,

        and there is not a reasonable probability that its issuance would have led to an acquittal.

               For the foregoing reasons, we see no error in the totality of the district court’s

        instructions.

                                                     III.

               Askew next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions

        on the firearm-related charges. This court will sustain a jury’s verdict when there is

        substantial evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the government, to support

        it. United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 258 (4th Cir. 2019). A reviewing court “assume[s]

        that the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor of the government” and

        will “reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the prosecution’s failure is

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        clear.” United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               Askew contends that the government was only able to demonstrate that the firearms

        were present and proximate to the narcotics, not that they were used to further or advance

        the drug trafficking activities. But this seriously understates the array of evidence the

        government presented to tie the guns to the drugs, and the reasonable inferences the jury

        could have made in light of that presentation.

               Law enforcement testified to the results of data extractions performed on Askew’s

        cell phones. These text message conversations revealed that Askew carried firearms with

        him for protection during his drug transactions. See, e.g., J.A. 526 (“Mr. Askew . . . [is]

        talking about the firearm. Doesn’t want anyone to know he’s back out here selling drugs

        and has a gun.”). The evidence clearly showed that Askew’s drug contacts overlapped with

        his gun contacts, with Askew’s dealers offering him unlicensed firearms and Askew

        promising the dealers more work or drugs in return. Time and time again, the jury saw that

        in Askew’s drug trafficking business, guns and drugs went hand in hand. See J.A. 526 (“So

        he’s asking if he’s going to give him the gun, and he will give him a Q, which is slang for

        a quarter . . . ounce.”); 530 (“So they are negotiating on the price for a firearm. Askew

        responds, ‘I give you [drugs] when I get it.’”); 536 (“So he’s going to trade narcotics for

        the firearm.”). These examples were buttressed by expert testimony that, in general,

        “firearms are a very significant tool of the [drug] trade.” J.A. 595.

               Moreover, the jury was presented with evidence of a substantial quantity of drugs,

        drug paraphernalia, cash, and firearms scattered throughout Askew’s apartment and storage

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        unit. The evidence in its totality painted a picture of a sophisticated drug trafficking

        enterprise of which every component was a vital tool. Not only was it reasonable to see the

        apartment and storage unit as hubs for narcotics distribution, but it was also reasonable to

        conclude that any drug-related devices located there were helping to forward the business.

        See United States v. Moore, 769 F.3d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding substantial evidence

        supported § 924(c) conviction where a distribution-level quantity of narcotics, a large

        amount of cash, and drug distribution equipment were found in the same apartment as

        firearms); United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (same). Just as

        a juror could have reasonably concluded that any scale or sifter was employed by Askew

        to advance his drug trafficking business, so too could that juror have concluded that the

        firearms present furthered the same mission.

               The question of whether the possession of a firearm furthered, advanced, or helped

        forward a drug trafficking crime “is ultimately a factual question.” Lomax, 293 F.3d at 705.

        Askew has not made the case for upsetting the jury’s factual conclusion.

                                                    IV.

               Askew next claims that the district court abused its discretion in offering a sua

        sponte jury instruction about the propriety of the search warrants issued.

               The challenged sua sponte instruction was the result of trial testimony that the

        district court found troublesome and potentially misleading. During cross examination of

        a government witness, defense counsel sought to undermine the proposition that Askew

        had knowledge of the narcotics found in his apartment, as many of them were inside a

        zipped suitcase. Defense counsel asked the witness, “In your line of work, you heard the

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        phrase something in plain view?” J.A. 414. The witness responded affirmatively. Defense

        counsel continued, “As far as you can tell, the drug evidence was not in plain view because

        it was inside a piece of luggage?” J.A. 414. At this point, the court interrupted and excused

        the jury.

               Outside the presence of the jury, the district court expressed its concerns with

        defense counsel’s line of questioning, telling him that his mention of plain view was

        misleading because the doctrine was not at issue in the case. Thus, it cautioned, defense

        counsel’s questioning about whether the drugs were in plain view could give the jury the

        impression the search was illegal, though its legality had not been challenged. Defense

        counsel explained he was merely trying to get at Askew’s lack of knowledge, and that his

        questions had “nothing to do with the search doctrine.” J.A. 417. The court advised defense

        counsel that he could make that point without using obviously legal language.

               The court brought the jury back and the cross-examination continued. Defense

        counsel was able to question the witness about Askew’s knowledge while avoiding the

        phrase “plain view.” Court thereafter adjourned for the day. The next morning, the court

        addressed the legality of the government’s searches in a sua sponte instruction to the jury:

               One thing that I would tell you as you start today, that as a matter of law the
               search warrants in this case were properly issued by a judge of proper
               jurisdiction, and they were properly executed by law enforcement. There are
               no legal issues involving the search warrants in this case. We may proceed.

        J.A. 437–38.

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               Askew challenges this comment on appeal, contending it lacked a legal foundation

        and that it biased the jury by placing an imprimatur on the government’s case and calling

        into question the competence of defense counsel.

               We review the district court’s decision to give a jury instruction for abuse of

        discretion. Passaro, 577 F.3d at 221. In doing so, we “give space to the trial’s court’s

        discretion, asking only whether the judge ran out of bounds.” United States v. Smith, 21

        F.4th 122, 136 (4th Cir. 2021). The choice is “entitled to substantial deference, because a

        district court is much closer than a court of appeals to the pulse of the trial.” United States

        v. Russell, 971 F.3d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               We find no abuse of discretion here. The district court worried that the case might

        skitter off into a debate over plain view search doctrine. It appropriately sought to head off

        any confusion by issuing a short and sweet corrective. Trials by their very nature can be

        subject to detrimental detours, and the job of a trial judge is to keep a case on track. “[T]he

        decision whether to issue a[] clarification” is thus “left to the sound discretion of the district

        court.” United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.

        Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 677 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that it was “within the court’s discretion”

        for it to “instruct[] the jurors that . . . an extraneous consideration was not their concern.”);

        United States v. Shirley, 435 F.2d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 1970) (affirming liberty of trial

        judge to “giv[e] a supplemental or modified instruction designed to prevent the jury from

        becoming confused and deciding the case on a false basis.”).

               Here the corrective instruction was minimally invasive, intentionally tailored to

        reduce any perceived endorsement or criticism of one side or the other. The district court

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        intervened without signaling any disapproval of defense counsel, merely asking the jury to

        step out for a moment. The corrective was not even issued until the next morning, and then

        only briefly and casually. Its accuracy as a statement of law was apparent, and Askew’s

        challenge to the comment is unavailing.

                                                      V.

               We turn finally to Askew’s contention that he was entitled to a new trial because the

        prosecution referred to his invocation of the right to counsel during closing argument.

                                                      A.

               The portion of the prosecution’s closing argument being challenged on appeal

        relates back to testimony from earlier in the trial. The detective who initiated the traffic

        stop of Askew testified that, after Askew was pulled over, he was read his Miranda rights

        and informed he was under investigation for drug trafficking, to which Askew replied they

        “must have the wrong person.” J.A. 333. However, when Askew was told that law

        enforcement had been tracking his whereabouts, his “eyes got big, he broke eye contact

        and looked away . . . and immediately asked for his lawyer.” J.A. 333. Defense counsel did

        not object to this testimony when it was brought out at trial. Instead, on cross-examination,

        defense counsel doubled down on the point, asking the witness, “And Mr. Askew, after he

        said you must have the wrong person, when you questioned him further, he said he would

        like to talk to an attorney, correct?” J.A. 350.

               This testimony laid the groundwork for portions of the parties’ closing arguments.

        During closing, defense counsel opined to the jury that Askew was “polite and respectful”

        to the police, which is “not the normal behavior” for someone who is guilty of drug

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        trafficking. J.A. 694. Defense counsel emphasized that “when they confront[ed] [Askew]

        and said we are investigating [him] for drug dealing, he said, ‘You got the wrong man.’

        That’s what he said. That’s what you’d expect somebody who is innocent to say to police.”

        J.A. 694–95.

               The prosecution picked up on this thread in its rebuttal argument, noting that denial

        of guilt is “an obvious thing to say” whether one is guilty or innocent. J.A. 718. But the

        prosecution noted how Askew’s demeanor changed when law enforcement informed him

        that he had been surveilled: “that is when he got nervous, that’s when he asked for an

        attorney.” J.A. 718. At that point in the closing argument, defense counsel interrupted the

        prosecution, and the jury was excused. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, asserting

        that the government violated Askew’s due process rights by commenting on his “exercise

        of his right to remain silent and to ask for an attorney.” J.A. 719.

               The district court denied the motion, finding that the prosecutor’s “stray reference”

        to Askew’s use of his Miranda rights did not amount to an impermissible “argument that

        the jury should use Defendant’s Constitutional right to remain silent as evidence of his

        guilt.” J.A. 1082–83. Thus, no due process violation had occurred.

                                                      B.

               Askew challenges the district court’s determination on appeal, asserting that the

        prosecution’s reference to his invocation of the right to counsel violated his due process

        rights and entitled him to a new trial. We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a

        mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wallace, 515 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2008).

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               As established by the Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio, the Due Process Clause

        guarantees that defendants who invoke their constitutional rights to silence and counsel

        will not have that invocation used against them at trial. See 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976);

        Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 n.13 (1986). Such protection comes from the

        “implicit promise[]” in Miranda warnings “that any exercise of those rights will not be

        penalized.” Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 292.

               This does not mean, however, that every fleeting reference to those invocations

        constitutes a per se due process violation. Instead, Doyle and its progeny protect against a

        very specific danger: that the government will exploit the defendant’s invocation of his

        right by using it as evidence of his guilt or unreliability at trial. See Noland v. French, 134

        F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that Greenfield “does not impose a prima facie bar

        against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to request counsel, but instead

        guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right by the prosecutor.”). So long as

        the allusion to the invocation was “not designed to draw meaning from silence,” the

        defendant’s rights have not been violated. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 409 (1980).

        The fact that some matter may naturally surface in the course of a trial narrative does not

        answer the important question of whether the government sought to take impermissible

        advantage of it.

               We conclude that the prosecution’s brief remark here did not amount to

        impermissible exploitation. As an initial matter, the prosecution was not alluding to

        anything that had not already been revealed and unobjected to during trial testimony.

        Indeed, defense counsel himself had referenced the invocation during cross-examination.

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        Moreover, during closing argument, the prosecution only mentioned the invocation in

        rebuttal, after defense counsel characterized Askew’s interaction with law enforcement as

        entirely innocuous. In large part, then, the prosecution was simply contesting Askew’s

        behavior towards police and providing a clarification on the “narrative[] . . . regarding

        [Askew’s] apprehension and arrest.” Noland, 134 F.3d at 216; see also United States v.

        Meredith, 824 F.2d 1418, 1429 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that “defense counsel appears to

        have invited the prosecutor’s comment by his own remarks” and that “[w]hen defense

        counsel opens the door in this way, we allow the prosecutor broad latitude in response.”).

        Further, the prosecution did not linger on the point or encourage the jury to draw an

        inference of guilt from the invocation, instead segueing directly into its next line of

        argument. Thus, because the “testimony only made passing reference to Miranda, and the

        prosecutor did not specifically exploit [Askew’s] exercise of his Miranda rights,” we find

        no Due Process violation. Id. at 216–17.

              The prosecution’s remark in no event warrants a new trial. We have long been

        cautioned not to allow the smallest part of a proceeding to supplant the larger whole. See

        Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 202 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The

        contested remark was one-off and cursory. Indeed, the entirety of the comment comprises

        one line in a 425-page transcript. If this remark is not deemed “isolated,” it is hard to

        imagine what would be. United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 1993).

                                                   VI.

              For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

                                                                                     AFFIRMED.

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