Court Opinion

ID: 9945122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 13:01:34.263741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:22.893726
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

                                        UNITED STATES

                                                 v.

                                    Francis R. CHOCK
                    Boatswain’s Mate Third Class (E-4), U.S. Coast Guard

                                         CGCMSP 25011
                                         Docket No. 1490

                                        20 February 2024

Special court-martial sentence adjudged on 13 September 2022.

       Military Judge:                           CDR Emily P. Reuter, USCG
       Appellate Defense Counsel:                LCDR Jennifer S. Saviano, USCG
       Appellate Government Counsel:             LT Tae W. Chon, USCG

                                       BEFORE
                         MCCLELLAND, BRUBAKER & MANNION
                                Appellate Military Judges

MCCLELLAND, Chief Judge:

       A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted Appellant, consistent with his
pleas entered in accordance with a plea agreement, of one specification of abusive sexual
contact, in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Appellant was
sentenced to confinement for ten months and reduction to E-1. Judgment was entered
accordingly.

       Before this Court, Appellant has assigned as error that his due process right to timely
appellate review was violated when the Government delayed providing notice of his right to
appeal and ultimately took 213 days to transmit his record of trial to this Court.

       This case comes to us as a non-automatic appeal under Article 66(b)(1), UCMJ. It took
181 days from sentencing to provide Appellant his Notice of Right to Appeal (NORA). Once
           United States v. Francis R. CHOCK, No. 1490 (C. G. Ct. Crim. App. 2024)

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, it took the Government 32 days to transmit a complete
record of trial (ROT) with attachments and transcript.

          Appellant argues, citing United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2006), that
post-trial delay in this case is facially unreasonable. The Court in Moreno established specific
time standards: “[W]e will apply a presumption of unreasonable delay that will serve to trigger
the Barker four-factor analysis [to determine whether delay violates due process] where the
action of the convening authority is not taken within 120 days of the completion of trial. We will
apply a similar presumption of unreasonable delay . . . when the record of trial is not docketed by
the service Court of Criminal Appeals within thirty days of the convening authority’s action.” Id.
at 142.

          We observed, in United States v. Tucker, 82 M.J. 553, 570 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2022),
that the Military Justice Act of 2016 (MJA 2016) and the ensuing Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States (2019 ed.) (MCM) changed the post-trial process, so that “treating the convening
authority’s action as a terminal landmark in post-trial processing has been superseded by” the
amendments to the UCMJ and MCM. In the absence of new guidance from the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, we combined the 120-day and thirty-day Moreno time standards, and
declared a new standard that a presumption of unreasonable delay will be applied if the record of
trial is not docketed with this Court within 150 days after completion of trial. Id.

          The post-trial process begins with preparation of the ROT and attachments, which is
governed by Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1112 for every special and general court-martial.
Upon completion of that preparation, the ROT and attachments are transmitted to the Judge
Advocate General, in accordance with R.C.M. 1116(a). At this point, the paths of cases diverge
depending on whether or not they are qualified for automatic review. In a case qualified for
automatic review (an “Article 66(b)(3)” case, governed by Article 66(b)(3), UCMJ), the ROT
and attachments are to be immediately forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals, in
accordance with R.C.M. 1116(b)(1). A copy is forwarded to appellate defense counsel in
accordance with R.C.M. 1116(b)(1)(A).

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         United States v. Francis R. CHOCK, No. 1490 (C. G. Ct. Crim. App. 2024)

       In a case not qualified for automatic review (an “Article 66(b)(1)” case, governed by
Article 66(b)(1), UCMJ), the Judge Advocate General is to provide notice to the accused of the
right to file an appeal in accordance with R.C.M. 1116(b)(2), and a copy of the ROT and
attachments is forwarded to appellate defense counsel in accordance with R.C.M. 1116(b)(2)(A).
The accused has 90 days to file an appeal after receiving notice of appellate rights. Article
66(c)(1)(A). This introduces a new segment to the timeline of post-trial processing before a case
reaches the Court of Criminal Appeals. If the accused does appeal, the Judge Advocate General
will then provide the record of trial and attachments to the Court.

       In short, the Moreno/Tucker time standards cannot be applied to an Article 66(b)(1) case
without modification. Although both parties offer ideas concerning a standard of presumptively
unreasonable delay for Article 66(b)(1) cases, we need not adopt a standard here because even if
there was a due process violation, it was harmless.

       If an appellant has been denied the due process right to speedy post-trial review and
appeal, “we grant relief unless this court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
constitutional error is harmless.” United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 363 (C.A.A.F.2006).
       As a general matter, we can dispose of an issue by assuming error and proceeding
       directly to the conclusion that any error was harmless. . . . Thus, in cases involving claims
       that an appellant has been denied his due process right to speedy post-trial review and
       appeal, we may look initially to whether the denial of due process, if any, is harmless
       beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Allison, 63 M.J. 365, 370-71 (C.A.A.F. 2006). To determine whether a due
process violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we consider the totality of the
circumstances. Id. at 371; United States v. Bush, 68 M.J. 96, 103 (C.A.A.F. 2009).

       Appellant has not asserted any error in this case other than the post-trial delay issue. He
submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury setting forth his anxiety and concern, which was
attached to the record pursuant to his motion to attach, but it did not present any cognizable
prejudice. Beyond that, delay in the post-trial processing of this case, in which there are no
appellate issues (other than post-trial delay), is surely harmless. Having considered the entire

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         United States v. Francis R. CHOCK, No. 1490 (C. G. Ct. Crim. App. 2024)

record, we conclude that if there was a violation of due process arising from post-trial processing
delay, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

       We turn now to whether we should grant relief under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ, and United
States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002). This Court may, regardless of whether there is a
due process violation, “provide appropriate relief” if an appellant demonstrates “excessive delay
in the processing of the court-martial after the judgment was entered into the record,” Article
66(d)(2), UCMJ.

       The record, including items attached to the record pursuant to Government and Defense
motions to attach, shows the following sequence of post-trial events:
       Date            Event                                                Days elapsed

       13 SEP 22       Sentence adjudged                                            0
       15 NOV 22       SJA signed Post-Trial Action SJA Review page                63
       21 NOV 22       Convening authority signed CA Action page                   69
       23 NOV 22       Entry of Judgment (EOJ)                                     71
       28 DEC 22       ROT and attachments sent to MJ (first attempt)             106
       4 JAN 22        MJ received ROT and attachments for verification           113
       11 JAN 23       MJ signed verification                                     120
       13 JAN 23       ROT & attachments sent to records custodian                122
       7 MAR 23        Defense request for speedy post-trial processing           175
       10 MAR 23       NORA signed                                                178
       14 MAR 23       NORA received by Appellant                                 182
       5 JUN 23        Appeal received; CCA ordered filing dates                  265
       7 JUL 23        ROT & attachments received at CCA                          297

       There are several separate delays within the timeline, some of which are partially
explained. First, there was a delay from 1 October 2022 until 1 November 2022, awaiting some
sort of support from the Legal Services Command (LSC). The LSC supports all Coast Guard
special and general courts-martial, providing a trial counsel among other things. The delay
appears to be a result of both ignorance about required process and communication failures.
Second, there was an unexplained delay between the EOJ, on 23 November 2022, and the first
attempt, more than a month later, to provide the record of trial (ROT) to the military judge for
verification, as required by the Coast Guard Military Justice Manual (MJM), COMDTINST
M5810.1H, second para. 21.E.4.a. Third, between the military judge’s verification on 11 January

                                                 4
           United States v. Francis R. CHOCK, No. 1490 (C. G. Ct. Crim. App. 2024)

2023 and the signed NORA on 10 March 2023, issues with (requiring additions to) the ROT and
attachments were resolved, although there is nothing specific mentioned after 3 February 2023.
Fourth, after the appeal was filed with this Court, it took 32 days for the ROT and attachments to
be transmitted to the Court, even though a transcript had been made months earlier.

       These delays bespeak a lack of institutional diligence and are unreasonable, warranting
some relief. The Government unquestionably has responsibility for required post-trial
processing, including sufficient knowledge and supervision to accomplish it in a timely manner.
This includes responsibility for correctly assembling the ROT and attachments. As we noted in
United States v. Woods, No. 1481, 2023 WL 7555387 at *4 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2023)
(unpublished), both quality and timeliness of records have been suffering in recent years, and
improvement to post-trial processing is important to the integrity and perception of military
justice in the Coast Guard. We look forward to such improvement, which we are aware is being
pursued.

       We will disapprove one month of Appellant’s sentence to confinement.

                                            Decision
       We determine that the findings are correct in law and fact and, on the basis of the entire
record, should be approved. Accordingly, the findings of guilty are affirmed. Only so much of
the sentence as provides for confinement for nine months and reduction to E-1 is affirmed.

Judges BRUBAKER and MANNION concur.

                                                            For the Court,
                                                         VALDES.SARAH Digitally signed by
                                                                       VALDES.SARAH.P.1503854704

                                                         .P.1503854704 Date: 2024.02.20 11:53:02
                                                                       -05'00'

                                                            Sarah P. Valdes
                                                            Clerk of the Court

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