Court Opinion

ID: 9605565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:38:56.273338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:28.973332
License: Public Domain

PORT, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result. I believe that the police had reasonable cause, because of the totality of the circumstances relating to the extraordinary volume of noise disturbance of the surrounding area, to approach the private home to investigate the reason therefor. Here such activity within the home clearly extended into public areas and, indeed, unreasonably violated the reasonable expectations of privacy of other persons in private premises over a two-block area at a late hour of the night or early morning. Thus, entry onto the front porch was, whatever the declared purpose of the police, reasonable. Upon such entry, the extreme volume of the noise was such that pro*356longed efforts to attract a response from persons within by the police, shouting and hammering on the door, went unheeded, and thus presumably unheard. Under such unusual and exigent circumstances, the entry into the house in the manner used here was no more unreasonable than had the police been drawn to the premises by signs of a dwelling on fire and entered under similar circumstances.
It has long been the rule that where there is probable cause to arrest a person, the fact that the police arrest him for the wrong reason, i.e., one for which probable cause does not exist, does not invalidate the arrest nor a reasonable search incident thereto. State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 12, 456 P2d 67 (1969); State v. Somfleth, 8 Or App 171, 492 P2d 808, Sup Ct review denied (1972). Thus, the entry onto the front porch and also into the dwelling were lawful on these unusual facts. Following the entry into the home, the contraband was in plain view and thus its seizure was valid.
Accordingly, I do not find it necessary to decide whether the opinion of the majority is consistent with the rationale of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 91 S Ct 2021, 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1972) and cases therein discussed. Nor do I understand that, as the court seems to imply, a warrantless entry into and search of a private home is to be measured by the same standards as those governing the seizure of evidence in a motor vehicle. See, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 US 433, 439, 93 S Ct 2523, 2537, 39 L Ed 2d 706 (1973).