Court Opinion

ID: 9531759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:14:20.797758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:34.539586
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes that admission of the testimony of the clinical psychologist to bolster the veracity of extrajudicial statements of the victim, although error, was, nevertheless, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence of Ortega’s guilt was so overwhelming. In order to have reached this result, the majority must have found that there is no “reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963). I cannot say, in this case, that there is no reasonable possibility that the testimony of the psychologist adversely influenced the jury against the defendant. Thus, I do not agree that the requirements of the harmless error rule have been met.
“An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot ... be conceived of as harmless. It is for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment. There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. Connecticut about ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.... [B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
Applying the Chapman standard here, I have no doubt that the error in admitting *221the psychologist’s testimony was not harmless to the defendant. The district attorney chose not to call the child as a witness, and the entire case against the defendant depended upon the veracity of the extrajudicial statements made by the boy. If the jury doubted the child’s truthfulness, the entire case against the defendant collapsed.
The district attorney recognized the weakness in the case caused by the absence of the victim. To fill this void, he introduced into evidence two snapshots of the child having marginal relevance at best, and called a clinical psychologist to assure the jury of what it could not observe for itself from the child’s demeanor, namely, his appearance of truthfulness. The testimony thus received was that the child was “able to tell right from wrong, [and] there were indicators that showed that the boy was able to discriminate between appropriate versus non-appropriate behavior.” The psychologist also testified that it was his opinion that the child was not fabricating the sexual assault. Carrying the imprimatur of the psychologist’s expertise, see United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners’ Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.1977), this testimony told the jury what it most needed to know: the victim was truthful.
It may be that the jury would have convicted Joseph Ortega even without the clinical psychologist’s testimony. However, I cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it would have done so. It is possible that the admission of this testimony contributed to the conviction, and it being possible, then the defendant is entitled to a reversal and a new trial which is consonant with due process principles.