Court Opinion

ID: 9734740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:44:51.631218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:50.936600
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Staton,
J.—Failure to specify the consecutive or concurrent nature of the sentence in a trial court’s judgment is not error unless the conviction is one specifically covered by a special statute which permits consecutive sentencing.
In Baromich v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 412, 416, 249 N.E.2d 30, 33, our Indiana Supreme Court stated:
*602“The rule in this State then is that the court does not have authority to impose sentences which are to run consecutively unless there is a specific statute which authorizes such a thing. The Legislature has enacted several statutes which allow consecutive sentencing in specific situations. For example, Burns’ § 10-1807 (where the defendant commits a crime while escaped from prison) ; § 10-1809 (where defendant commits a crime while escaped from jail) ; § 10-4709 (committing a crime while armed) ; § 9-2250 (committing a crime while on parole). In the absence of such a specific statutory provision consecutive sentencing is not permitted.”
In Stuck v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 291, 286 N.E.2d 652, 654, the defendant had been convicted and sentenced in Marion County, Indiana for second degree burglary before he was taken to Boone County, Indiana where he received a life sentence on a second degree murder conviction. The parole board attempted to let his second degree burglary minimum sentence expire before starting his life sentence on the second degree murder conviction. Justice Givan writing for the full court stated:
“ ‘Although the weight of authority is that courts have power derived from the common law to impose cumulative sentences on conviction of several offenses charged in separate indictments, or in separate courts of the same indictment, the imprisonment under one to commence at the termination of that under the other, 8 R.C.L. 240; note, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 125, it has long been settled to the contrary in this state, Miller v. Allen (1858), 11 Ind. 389; Kennedy v. Howard (1881), 74 Ind. 87; Peed v. Brewster (1906), 168 Ind. 51, 79 N.E. 1039, and the effect of a conviction of separate offenses and judgments for imprisonment rendered on the same date, is that the time of imprisonment on each judgment will run at the same time, Peed v. Brewster, supra, the judgment, in effect, being on the count giving the longest sentence.’ [Lawson v. State] 202 Ind. [583] at 587-588, 177 N.E. [266] at 267....”
The trial court need not clarify its judgment unless the record indicates that a specific statute permitting consecutive sentencing is applicable.
Note.—Reported at 303 N.E.2d 835.