Court Opinion

ID: 9849383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:39:17.664014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:21.428727
License: Public Domain

Carter, J.,
dissenting.
The, Nebraska State Railway Commission had before it nine applications for extended certificates of public convenience, and necessity. The commission granted the application of eight of the applicants and denied the, other made by the appellant in this appeal. It is conceded at the outset that all the applicants were equally qualified in all respects to enter into the common carrier field here involved. The real issue is whether or not, under these circumstances, this court has the power to direct or coerce the grant of a certificate of public convenience and necessity after the commission, after notices and hearings, has declined to do so.
The creation of the commission is by virtue of Article IV, section 20, Constitution of Nebraska, as implemented and limited by Chapter 75, R. R. S. 1943. By this constitutional amendment, the commission was given plenary and absolute power over common carriers except to the extent the Legislature has occupied the field or limited the powers of the commission by statute. While it is true that the commission has certain legislative and judicial powers, it is, in a broad sense, an administrative agency. Yellow Cab Co. v. Nebraska State Railway Commission, 175 Neb. 150, 120 N. W. 2d 922. The commission has the sole original jurisdiction to grant or deny a certificate of public convenience and necessity to a common carrier. In re Application of Effenberger, 150 Neb. 13, 33 N. W. 2d 296. See, also, Marconnit v. Effenberger, 135 Neb. 564, 283 N. W. 226. True, an objector may appeal from the grant of a certificate of public convenience and necessity on the, basis that it is not supported by evidence and consequently arbitrary, and *211will unjustly injure the reasonable financial return of those in the field which the commission is required to protect. True, also, the revocation of a certificate in whole or in part may be reviewed by this court to determine if such action is arbitrary as not being supported by evidence. But the denial of an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity is something else and must be considered on a different basis.
As I have stated, the commission has absolute and plenary power over common carriers except where limited by statute. By section 75-311, R. R. S. 1943, a certificate is required to be issued by the commission, after notice and hearing, if the applicant is fit, willing, and able to properly perform the proposed! service and conform to the provisions of sections 75-301 to 75-347, R. R. S. 1943, if it is consistent with the public interest. By section 75-301, R. R. S. 1943, the commission must regulate common carriers by motor vehicle, in intrastate commerce to foster sound economic conditions in such transportation among such carriers in the public interest. It is required by the same statute to promote adequate economical and efficient service to the public at reasonable charges. These sections mean that adequate common carrier service must be furnished to the public at a reasonable charge and, on the other hand, the financial stability of common carriers already in the field must also be protected. Both are in the public interest. And in protecting the rights of each, a balance must be maintained between the, volume of business and the number of common carriers required to perform the service at a reasonable, charge. In making such a balance to protect the rights of users of the service and those performing the service, it is necessary that applicants for certificates be limited, however qualified they may be, to the number of carriers needed. This necessarily means that in the case of more applicants than needed, some must be denied certificates. The determination of the number of certificates to be granted rests exclusively *212with the commission. This determination by the commission is an administrative or legislative function, and not a judicial one. The commission has the facilities, such as the requiring of reports and the making of investigations, to provide the expertise to make such administrative decisions. This court has neither the facilities to acquire such expertise, nor the expert knowledge to determine these questions which were granted solely and exclusively to the administrative agency.
This court has never had the precise point before it, although our cases point the way. The question has been raised in other jurisdictions. There are cases holding that the determination of the right to a certificate, is for the commission and the court is bound by the commission’s findings on that question. Pirie v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Colo. 65, 209 P. 640. A denial of a certificate in the public interest is a purely administrative question from which an unsuccessful applicant cannot appeal. Modeste v. Public Utilities Commission, 97 Conn. 453, 117 A. 494. The question of which petitioners could best serve the public is a matter left by the Legislature to the sound judgment and discretion of the Public Utilities Commission. It is not a judicial question subject to review by the courts. In re The Samoset Co., 125 Me. 141, 131 A. 692. Commission orders “purely negative-negative in form and substance — are, not subject to review by this court or any other.” Sparta Foundry Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, 275 Mich. 562, 267 N. W. 736. Under the laws of Missouri, matters of public service are directly under the legislative agency and the, granting of certificates of public convenience and necessity do not come within the jurisdiction of any of the courts of that state. State ex rel. Ringo v. Public Service Commission, 234 Mo. App. 549, 132 S. W. 2d 1080. It was within the province of the commission to determine from the proof which of the. applicants was best equipped to render the service needed. There was ample évidence offered by each of the applicants to jus*213tify the commission in deciding that question either way, depending on where the public convenience and necessity would be best served. The courts would not be justified in such case to substitute their judgment for that of the, commission. Tri-State Transit Co. v. Mobile & Ohio Transp. Co., 191 Miss. 364, 2 So. 2d 845. But the denial of an application as not being in the public interest is not a refusal to exercise the power granted to it, and is not reviewable.
The majority opinion cites no case from any court anywhere where the denial of a certificate by a railway or public utilities commission was reversed by the court. I have not found such a case and I am confident there is none. The appellant cites Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pleasant Valley Tel. Co., 181 Neb. 799, 150 N. W. 2d 922, in support of its position. In that case the area involved had no service at all and a qualified applicant was denied a certificate to serve the community. The underlying principle of that case is that the commission is required by law to furnish adequate service at a reasonable charge. It may not arbitrarily deny a qualified applicant to render service under such circumstances, although the remedy in some states is by quo warranto and not by appeal as here.
I submit that by the majority opinion, this court determines the public interest involved in the denial of the application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity, a matter placed by the Constitution solely and exclusively in an administrative agency. This is so even if it appears that the denial of the application is unreasonable, discriminatory, and arbitrary, for in no other way can the financial stability of certificate holders already .in the field be protected from a saturation of the area by the issuance of new certificates to the damage or destruction of their investments in stations, offices,- equipment, and other necessary facilities. The order made by this court is nothing less than an en*214croachment on the exclusive powers of the commission given it by constitutional provision.
The majority opinion appears to assume that discrimination and arbitrariness are always bad and that the courts have inherent power to correct all discriminatory or arbitrary orders. But this is not so. The Constitution, by Article IV, section 20, vested the commission with absolute power over common carriers, including the making of discriminatory and arbitrary orders, subject only to limitations provided by the Legislature. The Legislature has provided for the issuance of certificates to all qualified persons except where it would be contrary to the public interest to so do. The purposes of commission control of common carriers would be completely defeated if the commission lacked the power to limit the number of qualified applicants and to select the, applicants from those qualified which, in its judgment, would best serve the public interest. Without the powers granted by the constitutional amendment, the issuance of arbitrary and discriminatory orders would violate the, fundamental concepts of our free enterprise system and the right of every person to pursue the trade, business, or profession of his choice.
The Constitution grants to the commission the power to determine the public interest. The Legislature has not restricted this power in this area as is evidenced by section 75-301, R. R. S. 1943, when it refers to “unjust discriminations” and “undue preferences or advantages.” (Emphasis supplied.) The majority opinion avoids the constitutional issues by the simple expedient of ignoring them and citing a rule of law, correct as a general statement of the law, but having no application whatever to the situation before us. By the majority opinion, this court undertakes to determine the public interest involved in the denial of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and assumes this power unto itself when the Constitution places it exclusively in the hands of the commission. It is fundamental that it is one of the duties *215of the courts to restrain the executive and legislative branches of government against the exercise of power that is constitutionally denied them. But it is just as important that the courts restrain themselves from the exercise of powers constitutionally denied them. It is hardly a justifiable reason to assume such an unjustified exercise of power by the, simple expedient of ignoring the limitations imposed on the courts by the Constitution in placing the power elsewhere exclusively.
The law involved and the manner in which administrative orders are reviewed in the courts, is summarized in the following authorities: Jaflfe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, c. 14, p. 565; Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 62 S. Ct. 326, 86 L. Ed. 301; National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 64 S. Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed. 1170; Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 340 U. S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456. In this case the, commission found in effect that the grant of eight certificates was all that was required and determined that the eight applications granted would best serve the public interest. This is the exclusive prerogative of the commission. In a similar case, in principle, the Supreme Court of the United States said: “In our view, the Court of Appeals in this case indulged in an unwarranted incursion into the administrative domain. The Commission’s order had adequate support in the record and should have been affirmed.” Securities & Exchange Commission v. New England Electric System, 390 U. S. 207, 88 S. Ct. 916, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1042.
The order appealed from in this case is an administrative order from an administrative agency. The power to deny an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity is solely and exclusively that of the commission in determining the public interest. The courts are devoid of power under the constitutional provision to determine that the commission was in error in deciding that only eight certificates should be granted and the further determination that the eight granted *216would best serve the public interest. The reversal of the order of the commission in this case is not only a direct violation of the constitutional power conferred on the commission, but it will have the effect of defeating one of the, fundamental purposes of commission control over common carriers. It purports to reverse or coerce the commission in an area over which the commission has the sole and exclusive constitutional power to act. The majority opinion unlawfully encroaches on the exclusive power of the commission as an administrative agency. In my judgment, the applicant whose application was denied in the public interest has failed to present a justiciable issue, to this court and its appeal should be dismissed.
White, C. J., concurs in this dissent.