Court Opinion

ID: 9899135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 22:09:58.249323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:26.257114
License: Public Domain

11/15/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                          Assigned on Briefs October 10, 2023

          MARCUS ANTHONY ROBEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County
                      No. F69191C       Barry R. Tidwell, Judge

                              No. M2022-01257-CCA-R3-PC

In 2013, the Petitioner, Marcus Anthony Robey, pleaded guilty to evading arrest and
criminal impersonation in exchange for an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-
nine days. In a bifurcated proceeding, a jury convicted the Petitioner of aggravated robbery
following which he pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. For
these convictions he received concurrent thirty- and fifteen-year sentences, respectively.
State v. Robey, No. M2015-00306-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4487954, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Aug. 25, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2016). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a
petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction related to the indictment, and
that the State withheld evidence resulting in prosecutorial misconduct. The post-conviction
court denied his petition after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction
court’s judgment.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN W.
CAMPBELL, SR., and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

John D. Drake, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Marcus Anthony Robey.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Brooke A. Huppenthal, Assistant
Attorney General; Jennings H. Jones, District Attorney General; and Marla R. Holloway,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                          OPINION
                                  I. Facts and Background

        There is little in the record regarding the underlying facts of this case, but it appears
that the indictment arose from the Petitioner’s involvement in a bank robbery during which
he and multiple co-defendants robbed a bank employee at gunpoint. In a prior opinion,
this court recited the following procedural history:

               [The Petitioner] was indicted by a Rutherford County Grand Jury in a
       multi-count indictment for aggravated robbery, evading arrest, criminal
       impersonation, and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon (“firearm
       charge”). The trial court ordered that the firearm charge would be heard in a
       bifurcated hearing following the verdict on the aggravated robbery, evading
       arrest, and criminal impersonation charges. Prior to trial, [the Petitioner]
       pled guilty to evading arrest and criminal impersonation. He was sentenced
       to eleven months, twenty-nine days for evading arrest and six months for
       criminal impersonation. [The Petitioner] went to trial on the aggravated
       robbery charge on August 12-14, 2013, and he was found guilty as charged
       in the indictment. During the subsequent hearing on the firearm charge, [the
       Petitioner] and the State reached a plea agreement in which [the Petitioner]
       pled guilty to the firearm charge, and he agreed to a fifteen-year sentence.
       Pursuant to the plea agreement, [the Petitioner’s] sentence for the firearm
       charge would be served concurrently to the sentence [the Petitioner] would
       receive for his aggravated robbery conviction. [The Petitioner] also agreed
       to waive his right to appeal all charges included in the indictment, including
       the aggravated robbery conviction. The sentences for evading arrest and
       criminal impersonation were also ordered to be served concurrently with the
       sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction.

               [The Petitioner] filed a subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea
       on September 4, 2013, alleging that at the time of the guilty plea he was “not
       in [his] right frame of mind,” that he did not understand he was losing his
       right to appeal his aggravated robbery conviction, and that he made a mistake
       with the guilty plea. State v. Marcus Anthony Robey, No. M2014-00773-
       CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 1648241, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2015),
       perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 23, 2015). A hearing was held, and the trial
       court denied [the Petitioner’s] motion. On appeal, this court affirmed the
       denial of [the Petitioner’s] motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at *3-4.

Robey, 2016 WL 4487954, at *1.

        The Petitioner filed an appeal of the aggravated robbery conviction, contending that
the trial court had erred when it instructed the jury and that the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction. This court concluded, as it had previously, that the Petitioner
had waived his right to appeal his conviction and therefore dismissed his appeal. Id.

                            II. Post-Conviction Proceedings

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       The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that: (1) he had
received the ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to convict him; and (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by
withholding evidence.

        At the hearing on the petition, post-conviction counsel made a statement detailing
that the Petitioner had been indicted for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery and that,
just before trial, the State amended the indictment to the charge of aggravated robbery.
Thus, post-conviction counsel alleged that the Petitioner’s due process rights had been
violated because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed to trial on the
aggravated robbery charge. Post-conviction counsel argued that the State should have been
required to reconvene a grand jury to seek a subsequent indictment. Post-conviction
counsel noted that trial counsel (“Counsel”) objected to the amendment of the indictment.
The State responded to post-conviction counsel’s argument that the Petitioner had, in fact,
been charged with aggravated robbery acting in concert with others, which the State alleged
was an improper enhancement of the robbery charge. The State asserted that the
amendment, which lowered the indicted charge from an A felony to a B felony, did not
prejudice the Petitioner, and that the trial court did not err when it had allowed the State to
proceed on the aggravated robbery charge.

       Following these statements by the parties, the following evidence was presented at
a hearing on the petition: Counsel testified that he had been practicing criminal law for ten
years. Counsel recalled that the Petitioner was charged with multiple offenses, the main
one being the aggravated robbery charge. The Petitioner had two co-defendants who were
represented by other attorneys. Counsel was assisted by two other attorneys in his
representation of the Petitioner.

       Counsel recalled that the State sought to amend the indictment, and he objected.
Counsel recalled that the indicted charge of aggravated robbery was impermissibly
enhanced with the “in concert” language, which was a separate statute. Counsel had
engaged in trial preparation prior to this amendment being sought and discovery had
already been reviewed. Counsel raised a subject matter jurisdiction issue with the
amendment, because the Petitioner had been charged with a non-existent crime, and he also
argued that the State was not procedurally amending the indictment correctly. Counsel
argued that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 did not permit such an amendment
without the Petitioner’s consent.

       On the topic of discovery, Counsel recalled that contained in the file was a
photograph of an armored car that the State presented to the jury (“Loomis photograph”).
Counsel recalled that either he or co-counsel objected to the introduction of the Loomis
photograph, which the trial court sustained. Counsel did not request a curative instruction
or motion for a mistrial, although he acknowledged that the Loomis photograph could have
been prejudicial to the Petitioner. Counsel stated that the Loomis photograph was shown

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to the jury for a very short period of time, and Counsel objected but did not want to draw
extra attention to it. The parties argued about its admissibility outside of the presence of
the jury and when it was ruled inadmissible, “the photo was gone and we moved on. I felt
that was the best way to handle that.” Counsel agreed he could have asked for a curative
instruction or motioned for a mistrial, but he did not believe that the Loomis photograph
was prejudicial enough to warrant a mistrial.

         Counsel recalled that the jury asked a question about whether the bank employee
was involved in the crime and how they could determine that the employee felt actual fear
during the robbery, which was a required element. Counsel recalled that as part of his
defense strategy he was able to elicit testimony on cross-examination that the bank
employee did not act fearful during the robbery, as if he had prior knowledge. Counsel felt
he was somewhat successful in planting the idea with the jury based on the jury questions
asked during deliberations. When asked about evidence of a “shirt sleeve” being presented
at trial that had not been disclosed to Counsel, Counsel agreed that there was “some issue”
with the shirt, but he did not have “any recollection of the particulars.”

        On cross-examination, Counsel clarified that the Petitioner was indicted along with
several co-defendants and that his case was severed. He agreed that none of the defendants
were indicted with conspiracy to commit robbery, but aggravated robbery acting in concert
with others, which the State sought to amend to aggravated robbery. Counsel did object to
the amendment. Had the trial court denied the State’s motion to amend, Counsel would
have motioned for a mistrial on the basis that the Petitioner was charged with an offense
that did not exist. If the State’s motion had been denied, the State could have sought a
superseding indictment or attempted to re-indict the Petitioner properly. Counsel opined
that having to re-indict the Petitioner might have benefitted his case if the witnesses had
not shown up to the grand jury hearing. Counsel recalled the State’s winning argument
that the same elements of aggravated robbery remained in the amended indictment.

      Regarding the Loomis photograph, Counsel stated that he had seen it prior to trial
and made an immediate objection when it was shown.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order denying
the petition, stating the following:

              Here, the original indictment charged the Petitioner with Aggravated
       Robbery “. . . while acting in concert with two or more persons,” an A felony.
       The amended indictment removed the phrase “. . . while acting in concert
       with two or more persons” and reclassified the Aggravated Robbery to a B
       felony. The [P]etitioner asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction
       to proceed on the amended indictment because the amended indictment was
       a “new charge” prohibited under Rule 7. The Court finds that the amended
       indictment was not a “new charge” under Rule 7 and therefore the trial court

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      did have jurisdiction to proceed with the amended indictment. The State
      asserts that the amendment to the indictment removed superfluous language
      because all elements of the charge and facts remained the same after the
      removal, therefore causing no prejudice to the Petitioner. The Court agrees
      that the amended indictment did not include a new charge and finds that as a
      duplicitous indictment it did not remove jurisdiction from the trial court.
      This ground for relief is without merit and therefore denied.

             ....

             Further, the Petitioner alleges that the District Attorney committed
      prosecutorial misconduct when the District Attorney failed to provide notice
      that a photograph of a Loomis armored car would be shown to the jury and
      was denied effective assistance of counsel when [Counsel] failed to request
      curative instructions and/or request a mistrial from the trial court. The Court
      finds that the District Attorney did not commit prosecutorial misconduct in
      showing the photo to the jury. First, mere moments after the photo was
      revealed to the jury [Counsel] objected to the display of the photo and it was
      removed from the jury’s view. Second, there is no evidence that the District
      Attorney intentionally showed the photo to the jury to prejudice the Petitioner
      in any way and when objected to the District Attorney removed it
      immediately. Therefore, the Court does not find that the District Attorney
      committed prosecutorial misconduct on this matter, and the claim of
      ineffective assistance is moot.

             ....

              The Court finds the testimony of [Counsel] as to his representation of
      the [P]etitioner in this case credible and declines to find ineffective assistance
      of counsel. [Counsel’s] representation of the Petitioner was not deficient and
      it did not prejudice the Petitioner. As to the issue involving the brief showing
      of the photo during the trial, [Counsel] timely objected. [Counsel] testified
      that the reason he did not request a curative instruction or a mistrial from the
      trial court is that he did not want to draw any further attention to the improper
      photo.
              ....

             Therefore, the Court finds that [Counsel’s] representation was not
      deficient and that his actions did not prejudice the Petitioner.

Accordingly, the post-conviction court denied relief. It is from this judgment that the
Petitioner now appeals.

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                                        II. Analysis
                                       A. Indictment

       On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it
denied his petition because the trial court improperly allowed the indictment to be
amended, without his consent, leading to him being charged with a different offense with
an increased range of punishment. He contends that the case should have been resubmitted
to the grand jury. The State responds that this claim is previously determined on direct
appeal, making it an invalid claim for post-conviction review.

        In order to obtain post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that his or her
conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of a constitutional
right. T.C.A. §40-30-103 (2014). The petitioner bears the burden of proving factual
allegations in the petition for post-conviction relief by clear and convincing evidence.
T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f) (2014). The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive
on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against it. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450,
456-57 (Tenn. 2001). A post-conviction court’s conclusions of law are subject to a purely
de novo review by this court, with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 457. “Where a
petition conclusively shows that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, it is properly
dismissed without the appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing.” Givens
v. State, 702 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).

       Issues that have been “previously determined” may not be re-litigated in a post-
conviction procedure. See T.C.A. § 40-30-106(f). A ground for relief has been previously
determined when “a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on the merits after a full and
fair hearing.” See T.C.A. § 40-30-106(h). “A full and fair hearing has occurred where the
petitioner is afforded the opportunity to call witnesses and otherwise present evidence,
regardless of whether the petitioner actually introduced any evidence.” Id.; see Miller v.
State, 54 S.W.3d 743, 747-48 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that the issue raised and resolved in
the petitioner’s direct appeal “cannot be revisited in this post-conviction proceeding.”).

        We agree with the State that this court has previously determined that the Petitioner
waived his right to appeal his convictions as part of his guilty plea, making his claim related
to the indictment invalid for post-conviction relief. See Robey, 2015 WL 1648241, at *1.
Furthermore, we conclude that the indictment did not prejudice the Petitioner, as the
elements of the offense of aggravated robbery did not change as a result of the indictment.
See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 7(b) (stating “if no additional or different offense is thereby charged
and no substantial rights of the defendant are thereby prejudiced, the court may permit an
amendment without the defendant’s consent before jeopardy attaches); see also State v.
Beal, 614 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (holding that an amendment of an
indictment that deleted reference to statute proscribing assault with intent to commit
robbery and replacing it with reference to statute proscribing robbery did not charge an

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additional or different offense and did not prejudice substantial rights of defendant was
permissible). The Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

                           B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

        The Petitioner also contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.
He asserts that Counsel should have moved for a mistrial after the Loomis photograph was
erroneously shown to the jury by the State. He also argues that Counsel did not raise an
issue of authentication of evidence related to a “cut-off portion of [a] shirt sleeve.” Finally,
he contends that Counsel failed to present a defense or give him an opportunity to present
his version of the facts of the case. The State responds that Counsel made a reasonable and
strategic decision not to address the Loomis photograph, beyond his initial objection, so as
not to draw the jury’s attention to it further. The State further contends that the Petitioner
has not established prejudice with regards to the Loomis photograph being shown. The
State contends that the Petitioner did not present evidence related to the shirt sleeve
sufficient to meet his burden of proving deficient representation, nor did he present
evidence that an alternative trial strategy on the part of Counsel would have changed the
outcome of his case. We agree with the State.

       In order to obtain post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that his or her
conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of a constitutional
right. T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2018). The petitioner bears the burden of proving factual
allegations in the petition for post-conviction relief by clear and convincing evidence.
T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f) (2018). The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive
on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against it. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450,
456-57 (Tenn. 2001). Upon review, this Court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate the
evidence below; all questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value
to be given their testimony and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved
by the trial judge, not the appellate courts. Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tenn.
1999); Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tenn. 1997). A post-conviction court’s
conclusions of law, however, are subject to a purely de novo review by this Court, with no
presumption of correctness. Id. at 457.

       The right of a criminally accused to representation is guaranteed by both the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee
Constitution. State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d
453, 461 (Tenn. 1999); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). The following
two-prong test directs a court’s evaluation of a claim for ineffectiveness:

              First, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s performance was
       deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
       counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the [petitioner] by
       the Sixth Amendment. Second, the [petitioner] must show that the deficient

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       performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s
       errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose
       result is reliable. Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be
       said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the
       adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419
(Tenn. 1989).

        In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine
whether the advice given or services rendered by the attorney are within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936. To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” House v.
State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).

       When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing court
should judge the attorney’s performance within the context of the case as a whole, taking
into account all relevant circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. Mitchell, 753
S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The reviewing court must evaluate the
questionable conduct from the attorney’s perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690; Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). In doing so, the reviewing court must
be highly deferential and “should indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462.
Finally, we note that a defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to perfect representation,
only constitutionally adequate representation. Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1996). In other words, “in considering claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, ‘we address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally
compelled.’” Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984)). Counsel should not be deemed to have been ineffective
merely because a different procedure or strategy might have produced a different result.
Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). “The fact that a
particular strategy or tactic failed or hurt the defense does not, standing alone, establish
unreasonable representation. However, deference to matters of strategy and tactical
choices applies only if the choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation.”
House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996)).

        If the petitioner shows that counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable
standard, then the petitioner must satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by
demonstrating “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002). This reasonable probability must
be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;

                                                8
Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994).

       The Petitioner contends that Counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a
mistrial after the Loomis photograph was shown to the jury. The post-conviction court
found that Counsel timely objected to what it noted was the “brief” showing of the Loomis
photograph and that Counsel did not request a curative instruction or a mistrial to prevent
any further attention to the improper photo. The post-conviction court found that Counsel’s
strategic decision to not draw more attention to the Loomis photograph did not amount to
deficient representation, nor did it cause prejudice to the Petitioner. The evidence does not
preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings. Counsel testified that he did not
want to draw the jury’s attention to the Loomis photograph, which was removed from the
projector almost as soon as it was shown. He objected and made an argument outside the
presence of the jury, and he decided to move on after his objection was sustained. This
was a strategic decision on the part of Counsel, and the Petitioner has not presented
evidence that Counsel was deficient in this respect or that this strategy prejudiced him.
Thus, the Petitioner has not met his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that Counsel was deficient when he chose not to move for a mistrial or object further to the
Loomis photograph, and he is not entitled to relief.

         The Petitioner makes an additional argument in his appellate brief that Counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the admission of a “cut-off shirt.” However, the
Petitioner did not elicit any testimony on the topic of this item of evidence and has therefore
not met his burden of proving deficient performance or prejudice. Additionally, regarding
Counsel’s defense strategy, the Petitioner did not present any evidence of an alternative
trial strategy that may have resulted in a different outcome. The Petitioner is not entitled
to relief.

                                      III. Conclusion

       After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude the post-
conviction court properly denied the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. In
accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

                                                    ________________________________
                                                     ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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