Court Opinion

ID: 9505342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:03:49.896173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:24.207202
License: Public Domain

BOEHM, J.,
concurring in result.
As I see it, disposition of this appeal is governed by the basic rules of summary judgment practice. The plaintiffs plead in their complaint that they were injured in Indiana by a defective umbrella. They plead negligent design and manufacture in Count I and strict liability in Count IIL. Both counts are governed by the Indiana Product Liability Act. Ind.Code § 34-20-1-1 (1998). The plaintiffs allege that Guess (the licensor of the trademark) and Callanen (the distributor) are liable for a defect in a product manufactured by Inter-asia. To get summary judgment, these defendants must establish by uncontro-verted evidence that plaintiffs have no claim.
Both Guess and Callanen establish by undisputed evidence that they had no role in the design or manufacture of the umbrella. For the reasons the majority gives, I agree that Guess may be liable as an "apparent manufacturer" but Callanen is entitled to summary judgment on the negligence claim. And, as the majority holds, summary judgment as to Guess is proper on the strict liability claim. Guess established by undisputed evidence that its sole relationship to the product is as trademark licensor. It is therefore neither a manufacturer nor a principal distributor and has no strict liability under the Product Liability Act. The plaintiffs designated no evidence that controverted the facts relevant to Guess's motion, so Guess is entitled to summary judgment.
I agree with the result, but not the reasoning, as to Callanen's motion for summary judgment on the strict Hability claim. Callanen established that it was not the manufacturer of the umbrella, but designated no evidence establishing that it is not the "principal distributor" of a product manufactured by a manufacturer who cannot be haled into court in Indiana Because plaintiffs' complaint pleads that Cal-lanen is strictly liable for the defect, I think that allegation is sufficient under notice pleading to claim that Callanen is either a manufacturer or a "principal distributor." Under Trial Rule 56 it is Cal-lanen's burden to establish neither is the case, which it could do by showing that 1) it is not a distributor, or 2) somebody else is Interasia's principal distributor, or 3) that Interasia is susceptible to suit in Indiana. Whatever "principal distributor" means, any of these facts would negate Callanen's status as a person liable under the Product Liability Act. But Callanen's motion and designated evidence established none of these. The only reference in the designated evidence to Callanen's status as a "principal distributor" is the bald assertion in an affidavit by a Callanen executive that "Callanen is not the principal seller or distributor for Interasian Bag Manufacturers, LTD." As the majority holds, this is a legal conclusion, not an assertion of facts. As such it is insufficient to support summary judgment. Meyer v. Marine Builders, Inc., 797 N.E.2d 760, 768 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). So Callanen's motion should be denied on that ground, and there is no need to consider the materials the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion.
I also do not believe the plaintiffs' efforts to serve Interasia are relevant to Callanen's liability under the Product Liability Act. Callanen is liable, if at all, as a *788"principal distributor" of a product from a manufacturer over whom Indiana is "unable to hold jurisdiction." Plaintiffs' failure to effect service of process at the address it used for Interasia relates to service of process, not to whether Intera-sia is subject to personal jurisdiction in Indiana. For all we know from the record cited by the majority, Interasia operates a major manufacturing facility in Indiana, and certainly could be sued in this state, but moved its headquarters in Hong Kong to a new address. As the majority points out, the purpose of distributor liability is to provide someone who is responsible for a defective product shipped into Indiana if its manufacturer is beyond the reach of the courts of this State. Lack of personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer, not defective service, is the test whether the manufacturer can be sued in Indiana. Defective service of process is curable, but only if the manufacturer is not subject to the jurisdiction of Indiana courts is this state "unable to hold jurisdiction." For that reason as well, I do not subscribe to the majority's methodology of resolving Callanen's motion.
DICKSON, J., joins.