Court Opinion

ID: 9689571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:40:27.576909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:50.507079
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Justice
(dissenting).
For the most part I concur with the majority opinion, but I dissent with respect to what I consider to be a misinterpretation of Minnesota law by the majority.
At page 134 of the majority opinion, the court states that, “Minnesota law requires proof of the actual identity of the substance, the defendant’s belief is not sufficient,” citing as authority State v. Dick, Minn., 253 N.W.2d 277, 279 (1977). The majority opinion here then goes on to hold that the evidence relied on by the judge was not sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict.
In the Dick case, supra, this court made it clear that one of the essential elements of the crime of distribution of marijuana is that the trier of fact must find that the substance distributed was indeed marijuana. With this statement I am in agreement, but in Dick this court did not hold or state that a defendant’s statement that the substance in question was marijuana was' not sufficient evidence to prove that fact. Nor did this court indicate that inferences from the facts and circumstances present at the time of the making of the statement could not be made to corroborate the evidence.
The use of permissible inferences in analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence has long been a normal judicial practice.
“ * * * The process of thought, by which we reason from evidence toward proof, is termed Inference. This process, for any one piece of evidence, does not mean complete persuasion, i. e., proof; it means merely a sort of mental push to*137wards proof. Many inferences may be required, in combination, to reach proof. * * * The term ‘tends to show’ or ‘indicates’ describes its force.” Wigmore, Students’ Textbook of The Law of Evidence, § 22.
In the instant case there was credible evidence that the defendant stated that the substance he was distributing was “high of grade marijuana.” Such a statement of declaration made by the defendant was properly admitted as proof of an independent fact, to-wit: that the substance was indeed marijuana.1 Naturally, such proof is not conclusive and, like any other evidence, may be rebutted. In this case however, no such contradictory evidence appears in the record.
The other evidence considered by the judge to infer that the substance was marijuana is also significant. The fact that the defendant bought a large quantity of the substance himself and presumably paid a high price for the same raises an inference that he ascertained for himself that the substance was marijuana. It need not be decided whether or not defendant’s statement, standing alone, would be sufficient evidence of the identity of the substance for there is an abundance of evidence, both scientific and otherwise, which would corroborate the defendant’s statement. Furthermore, as was pointed out above, the defendant may rebut the inference by the introduction of contradictory evidence. If the scientific and opinion evidence was not strong enough to sustain the conviction, the declaration of the defendant and the inferences drawn by the court from all of the attendant circumstances were more than sufficient to sustain the conviction. I would affirm.
With respect to all other portions of the opinion, I would concur with the majority.
TODD, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of KELLY, J.
SCOTT, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of KELLY, J.

. “Statements or declarations made by one accused of a crime, which relate to the crime with which he is charged, including those contained in a statement purporting to be exculpatory in nature, from which, in connection with other evidence, an inference of guilt may be drawn, are admissible in evidence against him, at least insofar as such statements have been made by the accused freely and voluntarily, without deprivation of his constitutional rights. Such a statement is admitted as proof of an independent fact, rather than as a confession of guilt. * * 29 Am.Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 611.