Court Opinion

ID: 9926290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 16:01:03.584597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:31.344033
License: Public Domain

22-6026
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                       BIA
                                                                                 Wright, IJ
                                                                               A205 138 192

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 24th day of January, two thousand
 4   twenty-four.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                      DENNIS JACOBS,
 8                      PIERRE N. LEVAL,
 9                      JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   JATINDER SINGH,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                      v.                                           22-6026
17                                                                   NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                        Heena Arora, Esq., Richmond Hill, NY.
1    FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
2                                        Attorney General; Anthony P. Nicastro,
3                                        Assistant Director; Dana M. Camilleri, Trial
4                                        Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
5                                        United States Department of Justice,
6                                        Washington, DC.

7          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

8    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

9    DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10         Petitioner Jatinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a

11   December 13, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming a February 28, 2019, decision of

12   an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

13   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jatinder

14   Singh, No. A 205 138 192 (B.I.A. Dec. 13, 2021), aff’g No. A 205 138 192 (Immig. Ct.

15   N.Y. City Feb. 28, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

16   facts and procedural history.

17         We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See Wangchuck v.

18   Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review factual findings

19   for substantial evidence, and we review questions of law and the application of

20   law to fact de novo. Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he

21   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
                                              2
1    would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

2          “The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s

3    burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact

4    that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts

5    sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).

6    Accordingly, “in some cases . . . an applicant may be generally credible but his

7    testimony may not be sufficient to carry the burden of persuading the fact finder

8    of the accuracy of his claim of crucial facts if he fails to put forth corroboration that

9    should be readily available.” Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2018);

10   see also Pinel-Gomez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523, 529–30 (2d Cir. 2022) (explaining that

11   the agency may find testimony credible but “still decide that the testimony falls

12   short of satisfying the applicant’s burden, either because it is unpersuasive or

13   because it does not include specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the

14   applicant is a refugee” (quotation marks omitted)).          “Where the trier of fact

15   determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates

16   otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the

17   applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”

18   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).

                                                3
 1         Thus, a lack of corroboration can be an independent basis for the denial of

 2   relief if the agency identifies reasonably available evidence that should have been

 3   presented. See id.; Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 27–29. Before denying a claim solely on

 4   an applicant’s failure to provide corroborating evidence, the IJ must, either in his

 5   or her decision or otherwise in the record, “(1) point to specific pieces of missing

 6   evidence and show that it was reasonably available; (2) give the applicant an

 7   opportunity to explain the omission; and (3) assess any explanation given.” Wei

 8   Sun, 883 F.3d at 31. Where the IJ has identified the missing evidence, we may

 9   reverse the agency’s decision only if “a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to

10   conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4);

11   see Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2011). The agency did not

12   err in denying asylum and withholding of removal for lack of corroboration.

13         Singh testified that members of an opposing political party assaulted him

14   and threatened to kill him twice because of his religion and political opinion, that

15   the police threatened to charge him with a crime when he attempted to report the

16   first assault, and that his assailants came to his family’s house looking for him

17   after he left India. But his limited documentary evidence corroborated little of

18   that account: only that he was a Sikh and supporter of the Akali Dal Simranjit

                                              4
 1   Singh Mann Party (“Mann Party”), and that he was treated in a clinic for injuries

 2   at the time of the second alleged assault. Notwithstanding Singh’s testimony

 3   that one or both of his parents witnessed these aspects of his alleged persecution,

 4   Singh offered no corroboration of the injuries resulting from the first beating and

 5   their home treatment; of his unsuccessful effort, accompanied by his father, to

 6   report that incident to the police; of the fact that the injuries treated at the clinic

 7   were the result of a beating; of the statements of his assailants in his parents’

 8   presence attributing the beating they inflicted to his religion and political

 9   affiliation; or of his assailants’ subsequent efforts to find him after he had left

10   India.

11            The agency did not err in requiring additional corroboration. Singh argues

12   that his credible testimony was sufficient to satisfy his burden on its own, and that

13   the agency overlooked or gave insufficient weight to his corroborating evidence.

14   However, “we presume that an IJ has taken into account all of the evidence before

15   him [or her], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.” Xiao Ji Chen v.

16   U.S. Dep’t of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006). As outlined above, the

17   agency is entitled to require corroboration of even credible testimony, and Singh’s

18   documentary evidence failed to corroborate material aspects of his claim. The

                                                 5
 1   burden is on the petitioner to introduce corroborating evidence “without

 2   prompting from the IJ.” Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 31 (quotation marks omitted). And

 3   the record supports the IJ’s observation that some of Singh’s testimony was vague,

 4   such that it was insufficiently persuasive without corroboration. For example,

 5   Singh testified that he attended more rallies in the months preceding the second

 6   assault, but he was not responsive when repeatedly asked to explain how

 7   frequently he attended rallies before and after this increase.

 8         Further, the agency identified specific missing evidence that could have

 9   corroborated Singh’s testimony: statements from his mother (who is said to have

10   treated his injuries from the first assault and witnessed part of the second assault)

11   and father (who is said to have witnessed the police officer’s refusal to take his

12   report of the first assault, part of the second assault, and Singh’s medical treatment

13   at the clinic). Singh was given an opportunity to explain the absence of such

14   statements at his hearing. And his explanations do not compel the conclusion

15   that he could not have obtained statements from his parents.             See 8 U.S.C.

16   § 1252(b)(4).   Singh testified that his father was hospitalized in the months

17   immediately preceding his February 2019 hearing, but he did not allege that his

18   mother was incapacitated, and he did not establish that he could not have obtained

                                               6
 1   a statement from his father before his hospitalization. Singh’s asylum application

 2   had been pending since 2012, and he testified that his father had gathered his other

 3   documentary evidence from India in about 2015, but that he had not thought to

 4   ask his father to write a statement. And while Singh alleged that prior counsel

 5   failed to instruct him to make such a request, he did not file a disciplinary

 6   complaint or explain his failure to do so; and he had retained his new counsel by

 7   September    2018    (months    before    his   father’s   alleged   December     2018

 8   hospitalization).   See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988)

 9   (requiring party asserting ineffective assistance of counsel to (1) submit an

10   affidavit detailing the agreement with former counsel, (2) inform counsel of

11   allegations and give counsel an opportunity to respond, and (3) file a complaint

12   with an appropriate disciplinary authority, or explain why a complaint was not

13   filed); see also Garcia-Martinez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 511, 513 (2d Cir.

14   2006) (holding that an “applicant . . . who has failed to comply substantially with

15   the Lozada requirements . . . forfeits [his] ineffective assistance of counsel claim in

16   this Court” (quotation marks omitted)).

17         The agency’s corroboration finding is bolstered by its observations about

18   other gaps in the record. As the IJ noted, Singh provided a letter from the Mann

                                               7
1    Party to confirm his role and character, and he testified that its author knew about

2    both attacks.   When asked why the letter did not corroborate the attacks, he

 3   offered no explanation for the omission. 1       And even Singh’s own written

 4   statement, drafted a few days before his hearing with the benefit of new counsel’s

 5   advice, failed to corroborate his testimony that his assailants came to his home

 6   looking for him after he fled India.    Singh’s explanation that he omitted this

 7   information because he had not mentioned it during a prior interview was not

 8   compelling, particularly as he conceded that he understood that this information

9    was important support for his claim that he feared return to India.

10         In sum, the agency did not err in finding that Singh failed to satisfy his

11   burden of proof for asylum because the record does not compel the conclusion that

12   evidence to corroborate his allegations of persecution was unavailable.         See

13   8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). That finding is also dispositive of withholding of removal

14   because both claims were based on the factual predicate. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616

15   F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010). As to CAT relief, Singh’s argument that the IJ

     1 Singh’s current argument here about the letter’s reliability is misplaced. The
     agency could only rely on the letter as evidence of matters it addressed; and Singh
     has not shown that a letter corroborating the assaults from the same author was
     unavailable, as he received one letter, the author knew about the assaults, and he
     could not give a reason why the author did not mention them.
                                               8
1    failed to separately consider his claim is belied by the record, and this argument

2    fails to engage with the BIA’s reasoning in affirming the denial of CAT protection.

 3   See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (issues not

 4   discussed in a petitioner’s brief are considered abandoned or waived).

 5   Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Singh failed to

 6   demonstrate that he is “more likely than not to be tortured “by or at the instigation

 7   of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in

 8   an official capacity,” as required for CAT protection. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2),

 9   1208.18(a)(1); see Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A

10   determination of what will occur in the future and the degree of likelihood of the

11   occurrence has been regularly regarded as fact-finding . . . .”).      As discussed

12   above, Singh failed to establish that he suffered past harm, that he was threatened

13   with future harm, or that the police refused to protect him from such harm.

14   Moreover, abuses inflicted by members of a political party are generally not

15   equivalent to abuses by a public official. See Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 116 (2d

16   Cir. 2021) (finding that the agency was not “required to attribute an attack by

17   members of a regional party in Punjab to the national government of India” or to

18   “local authorities”); see also Lecaj, 616 F.3d at 119–20 (when petitioner fails to

                                               9
1   demonstrate likelihood of persecution required for grant of asylum, he

2   “necessarily fails” to demonstrate the likelihood of torture required for CAT

3   relief).

4          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

5   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

6                                        FOR THE COURT:
7                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
8                                        Clerk of Court

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