Court Opinion

ID: 9628591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:25:45.227061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:08.176646
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I regret that I cannot concur in the disposition of this case by the majority of the Court. The sole issue presented to this ■Court by the application to abandon the proceedings with respect to appellee-lessees, is whether, when the condemning authority •acquires a title in fee simple to property by Tight of eminent domain, lesser interests in the property, such as a leasehold, are -thereby included in the taking. If the answer lies in the affirmative, the decision in this case must be regarded as wholly erroneous.
A lessee of property is an “owner” in the constitutional sense for the taking of whose interest, in whole or in part, just compensation is due. Lookholder v. Ziegler. 354 Mich. 28, 91 N.W.2d 834; McGhee v. Floyd County, 95 Ga.App. 221, 97 S.E.2d 529; Illinois Power Co. v. Miller, 11 Ill.App.2d 296, 137 N.E.2d 78; Eisenring v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 183 Kan. 774, 332 P.2d 539; Veirs v. State Roads Commission, 217 Md. 545, 143 A.2d 613; Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, Ct.Cl.1958, 161 F.Supp. 952; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311; 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 5.23 (3d ed. 1950). And if less than the entire leasehold estate is taken by a taking of the underlying premises, the lessee is entitled to whatever remedies any other owner of land would have, including the right to a consideration of severance damages. Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Warford, 69 Ariz. 1, 206 P.2d 1168; Veirs v. State Roads Commission, supra; City of Cincinnati v. Smythe, 57 Ohio App. 70, 11 N.E.2d 274; 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 143, p. 990; 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 12.4 (3d ed. 1950).
It is the position of the majority, however, that because the November 4, 1957 judgment did not award damages to the lessees and was “directed solely” to the *284interests of the Mcjunkins, the owners of the premises in fee, the lease itself remained untouched, as it were, in full flower, and that, therefore, the State could abandon with respect to the leasehold without liability, the theory being that no compensable interest of the lessees was taken in the proceedings.
Since it is a conceded fact that the State of Arizona owns the subject property in fee simple, I take it that the question whether the leasehold has additionally been taken can only be resolved upon a consideration of the nature of a fee-taking in eminent domain. While the precise point has never been judicially ruled upon in this State, the widely prevailing doctrine is that an eminent domain proceeding is an action in rem against the land described. Village of LaGrange v. Smith, 104 Ohio App. 19, 146 N.E.2d 462; Wilson v. Frederick R. Ross Inv. Co., 116 Colo. 249, 180 P.2d 226, 170 A.L.R. 1410; Bayle-Lacoste & Co. v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 46 Cal. App.2d 636, 116 P.2d 458; Marist Society of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115, 90 S.E.2d 564; Reeves v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 575; State ex rel. Long v. Superior Court for Lewis County, 80 Wash. 417, 141 P. 906; Matter of Union El. R. Co. of Brooklyn, 112 N.Y. 61, 19 N.E. 664, 2 L.R.A. 359; Millhouse v. Drainage Dist. No. 48 of Dunklin County, Mo.App., 304 S.W.2d 54; In re Improvement of Third St., St. Paul, 177 Minn. 146, 225 N.W. 86; Beekman v. Saratago & S. R. Co., 3 Paige, N.P., 45, 22 Am.Dec. 679; Palo v. Rogers, 116 Conn. 601, 165 A. 803; People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N.Y. 225, 54 N.E. 689; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Kraus, 325 Pa. 581, 190 A. 874, 110 A.L.R. 538; Grand River Dam Authority v. Gray, 192 Okl. 547, 138 P.2d 100; State, By and Through State Highway Commission v. Burk, 200 Or. 211, 265 P.2d 783; In re Kansas Turnpike Project, 181 Kan. 840, 317 P.2d 384; United States v. Burnette, D.C.W.D.N.C.1952, 103 F. Supp. 645; State of Minnesota v. United States, 8 Cir., 1942, 125 F.2d 636; United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729; Swetland v. Curry, 6 Cir., 1951, 188 F.2d 841; United States v. 127.03 Acres of Land, D.C.Puerto Rico 1957, 148 F.Supp. 904; Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 4 Cir., 1955, 223 F.2d 868; Phillips v. United States, 9 Cir., 1957, 243 F.2d 1; A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149, 45 S.Ct. 38, 69 L.Ed. 216; Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, 5 Cir., 1947, 160 F.2d 182; United States v. 2979.72 Acres of Land, 4 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 327; Meadows v. United States, 4 Cir., 1944, 144 F.2d 751; 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 1.142 (3d ed. 1950). “It is true, as the defendants say, that the constitution deals with persons, but the condemnation statutes deal with land. The action may be commenced, as in many tax statutes, against the person or persons *285in whose name the record title appears * * *. Such proceedings have been repeatedly held to be in rem, although, of course, the pleadings, as a rule, though not always, carry the names of the owners as defendants.” State, By and Through State Highway Commission v. Burk, supra, at 265 P.2d 799. Also, “A condemnation proceeding is an action in rem. It is not the taking of rights of designated persons, but the taking of the property itself.” Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, supra, at 160 F.2d 184. So then, when the state condemns and acquires the fee title to a tract or part of a tract of land, it does not take merely a derivative title, rather it takes a new and independent title, including all interests which aggregate the fee, although they are not specified in detail. State ex rel. Long v. Superior Court for Lewis County, supra; Beekman v. Saratago & S. R. Co., supra; City of Corning v. Stirpe, 262 App.Div. 14, 27 N.Y.S.2d 418; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 17 Conn. 454, 44 Am.Dec. 556; Davis v. Board of Education, 166 Md. 118, 170 A. 590; Balch v. County Com’rs of Essex, 103 Mass. 106; City of Detroit v. Judge, 253 Mich. 6, 234 N.W. 445; Independent-Consolidated School Dist. No. 27 of Mower County v. Waldron, 241 Minn. 326, 63 N.W.2d 555; Houston North Shore R. Co. v. Tyrrell, 128 Tex. 248, 98 S.W.2d 786, 108 A.L.R. 1508; Carlstrom v. Lyon Van & Storage Co., 152 Cal.App.2d 625, 313 P.2d 645; Millhouse v. Drainage Dist. No. 48 of Dunklin County, supra; Knocklong Corp. v. Seaman, 6 Misc.2d 895, 162 N.Y.S.2d 71; Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo 597; Stubbings v. Village of Evanston, 136 Ill. 37, 26 N.E. 577, 11 L.R.A. 839; Corrigan v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N.E. 746, 21 L.R.A. 212; State, By and Through State Highway Commission v. Burk, supra; Reeves v. City of Dallas, supra; United States v. 2979.72 Acres of Land, supra; Meadows v. United States, supra; A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, supra; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of Baltimore, D.C.Md.1944, 55 F. Supp. 257; United States v. Belle View Apartments, 4 Cir., 1954, 217 F.2d 636; Brennan v. United States, 1957, 153 F. Supp. 377, 139 Ct.Cl. 433; Phillips v. United States, supra; Richland Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 9 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 112; United States v. 19.86 Acres of Land, 7 Cir., 1944, 141 F.2d 344, 151 A.L.R. 1423. “No leasehold can survive the appropriation of the land itself, and, where the ci,ty takes annexations to leased real property, it takes them, not because they are owned by either landlord or tenant or are appurtenant to some interest in the property, but because they are part of the real property. The public right is exercised upon the land itself, without regard to subdivisions of interest by which the subject is affected through the various contracts of individual owners.” In re Allen Street *286and First Avenue, 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377, 379; Edmands v. City of Boston, 108 Mass. 535. And, finally, “That a title in fee to land is a title to everything seems an elementary statement, without the necessity for extensive citation of authority.” Brooks v. Shepard, D.C.S.D.Ala.1957, 157 F.Supp. 379, 382.
Since the power of eminent domain acts upon the land itself and not upon the title, nor upon the sum of titles if there are diversified interests, upon appropriation of the fee all owners of compensable interests in the fee become vested with a right to compensation for the taking of their respective interests. There is left in the individual owner no title to the premises affected, and he is relegated to a claim in personam based upon his right to compensation. The determination of this claim for compensation is dependent upon the interest of the party in the title at the moment title vested in the condemning party. 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 1.142 (3d ed. 1950). Therefore, whenever a parcel of land which is subject to a lease is taken in whole or in part for public use, the lessee is entitled to compensation for the taking of or injury to his interest in the property. County of Maricopa v. Shell Oil Co., 84 Ariz. 325, 327 P.2d 1005; Thompson v. City of Mobile, 240 Ala. 523, 199 So. 862; People v. Ganahl Lumber Co., 10 Cal.2d 501, 75 P.2d 1067; Leonard v. Autocar Sales & Service Co., 325 Ill.App. 375, 60 N.E.2d 457, affirmed 392 Ill. 182, 64 N.E.2d 477, 163 A.L.R. 670; Fort Worth & D. S. P. Ry. Co. v. Judd, Tex.Civ.App., 4 S.W.2d 1032; Brazos River Conservation and Reclamation Dist. v. Adkisson, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 294; Mason v. City of Nashville, 155 Tenn. 256, 291 S.W. 1074; In re Kansas Turnpike Project, supra; Tinnerholm v. State, 15 Misc.2d 311, 179 N.Y.S.2d 582; State ex rel. Morrison v. Carlson, 83 Ariz. 363, 321 P.2d 1025; United States v. General Motors Corp., supra; A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, supra.
Thus, it is merely an exercise in fundamentals in reaching the conclusion that when the State acquired the fee in this case, it acquired the leasehold. And when the leasehold was taken, the lessees received in exchange a vested right to compensation. A.R.S. Constitution, art. II, Section 17, and cases cited. The discussion in the majority opinion, therefore, on the right of a condemner to abandon condemnation proceedings, while a sound statement of the law, has no application to the facts in this case; for the majority admits that once rights have reciprocally vested, there is no right to abandon whatsoever, the right to vest title in the condemner and the right to abandon after such vesting being mutually exclusive rights. 6 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 26.42(2) (3d ed. 1950).
Furthermore, the fact that the State has decided to abandon its proposed use of the taken property is immaterial as to the initial *287right of the lessees to compensation for the taking of their interests in the property. It is a universal principle in eminent domain that damages to be recovered in condemnation proceedings are controlled by the actual legal rights acquired by the condemner and not by the use it may make of the rights in the future. Carolina Central Gas Co. v. Hyder, 241 N.C. 639, 86 S.E.2d 458; Perkins v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 150 S.W.2d 157; Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. Woolfolk, 331 Mo. 410, 53 S.W.2d 917; Coos Bay Logging Co. v. Barclay, 159 Or. 272, 79 P.2d 672; Purdy v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. R. Co., 172 Iowa 676, 154 N.W. 881; Union R. Co. v. Raine, 114 Tenn. 569, 86 S.W. 857; Pierce v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation Dist., 143 Neb. 898, 11 N.W.2d 813; Little v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 150 Neb. 864, 36 N.W.2d 261, 7 A.L.R.2d 355; State ex rel. Poison Logging Co. v. Superior Court, 11 Wash.2d 545, 119 P.2d 694; Wiggins v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 160, 107 So. 85; Baucum v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 179 Ark. 154, 15 S.W.2d 399; Weeks-Thorne Paper Co. v. City of Syracuse, 139 App.Div. 853, 124 N.Y.S. 317; Guthrie & W. Ry. Co. v. Faulkner, 12 Okl. 532, 73 P. 290; May v. Westmoreland County, 98 Pa.Super. 488; Riddle v. Lodi Telephone Co., 175 Wis. 360, 185 N.W. 182, 19 A.L.R. 380; Wateree Power Co. v. Rion, 113 S.C. 303, 102 S.E. 331; 75 A.L.R. 857. * * damages to be recovered in condemnation proceedings must cover all future uses of the condemned property that are or should be within the contemplation of the parties at the time of taking, irrespective of the extent of present needs * * * are controlled not by the extent of present use, but by the right to use that is acquired’ * * Some cases recognize the power of the condemning party to reduce the damages to be paid by limiting, through agreement or stipulation at the time of condemnation, the mode of use or extent of right that is to be acquired. In the present case there has been no agreement or stipulation as to such limitation.'” (Emphasis supplied.) Coos Bay Logging Co. v. Barclay, supra, at 79 P.2d 677.
Since A.R.S. Section 12-1122 requires that separate interests in condemned property be separately valuated, the lessees in this case cannot seek apportionment of the $33,000 paid to the Mcjunkins for the taking of the fee title. Section 12-1122 entitles these lessees to a separate determination of their damages for the taking of their interests. Such a determination was made in the trial court, and deeming it excessive, the State appealed. By its subsequent attempt to abandon, however, the State sought not to decrease the award, but to escape liability for the taking of the leasehold altogether. The decision of this Court supporting the petition of the State in this matter is totally without foundation in law or fact. The State’s motion to dismiss should be denied, *288and its original appeal considered on the merits.
Lastly, I find it difficult to understand why the matter of the lessees’ costs and attorney fees must be referred back to the trial court. I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the State failed to prosecute the proceedings with diligence, but disagree entirely with its decision to thrust the burden of determining the State’s liability upon the lower court. This is the type of action which precipitates future litigation.