Court Opinion

ID: 9393411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 06:08:32.085954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.038000
License: Public Domain

Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part and Opinion Filed May 4,
2023

                                             S   In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                           Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                        No. 05-22-01223-CV

                         IN THE INTEREST OF D.C., A CHILD

                   On Appeal from the 304th Judicial District Court
                                Dallas County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. JC-20-00985-W

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Smith
                               Opinion by Justice Goldstein
        This is an appeal from the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental

rights to, and appointing the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

(Department) as managing conservator of, minor child D.C.1 In seven issues, Father

contends the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial

court’s (1) findings that Father’s rights should be terminated pursuant to Family

Code §§ 161.001(b)(1)(E) and 161.001(b)(1)(O); (2) best-interest finding; and

(3) appointment of the Department as D.C.’s managing conservator. We affirm in

    1
     The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother has not filed a notice of appeal.
Therefore, the portions of the trial court’s order pertaining to Mother’s parental rights are not before us.
part, reverse in part, and remand for a new trial in this memorandum opinion. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a).

                                 BACKGROUND

      D.C. was born on November 15, 2020. At the time of her birth, both D.C. and

Mother tested positive for methamphetamines. Upon her birth, D.C. was admitted

into the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and remained there for two months.

D.C. had trouble feeding due to prenatal exposure to methamphetamine. She also

required neurological and ophthalmological care.

      The Department was notified of the positive drug results and became involved

on November 16, 2020. The Department contacted Father, who stated that he wanted

to have D.C. placed with him. Father had signed an affidavit of paternity at the

hospital. The Department requested that Father submit to a drug test. Father’s hair

follicle test returned positive for methamphetamine and marijuana.

      On December 2, 2020, the Department filed its original petition for protection,

conservatorship and termination. The Department sought termination of Mother’s

parental rights. The Department alleged that it had made, and would continue to

make, “reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for the child’s removal and to enable

the return of the child to the parent.” The Department also alleged that Father was

D.C.’s father and, in the alternative, that the identity and location of D.C.’s father

was unknown. The Department sought termination of Father’s parental rights and,

                                         –2–
in the event that Father’s paternity of D.C. could not be established, termination of

the rights of the unknown father.

        The trial court entered an ex parte order for emergency care and temporary

custody and appointed the Department as D.C.’s temporary managing conservator.

Mother filed a general denial, requesting that the case be dismissed and that D.C. be

returned to her care. Father filed a motion for DNA testing to determine his paternity.

The trial court granted the motion on December 31, 2020, and Father submitted

DNA samples shortly thereafter. While the results were pending, on January 14,

2021, the trial court entered a temporary order following adversary hearing pursuant

to § 262.201 of the Family Code. The trial court ordered Father to undergo

psychological evaluation, attend counseling, attend parenting classes, and submit to

drug testing “if and when he is adjudicated as the father of the child the subject of

this suit.” D.C. was released from the NICU on January 21, 2021 and placed in foster

care.

        On April 7, 2021, the results of Father’s DNA test were filed with the trial

court. The report confirmed Father’s parentage of D.C. Two weeks later, the trial

court entered an interlocutory order adjudicating Father’s parentage. On May 24,

2021, Father filed his original answer and counter-petition for conservatorship.

Father requested that he be appointed managing conservator, or alternatively that his

parents be appointed managing conservators and he be appointed as the possessory

conservator.

                                         –3–
      The case was tried to the court on October 19, 2022. After the close of

evidence the trial court found that termination was in D.C.’s best interest and

warranted under §§ 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (b)(1)(O) of the Family Code. The trial

court entered final judgment terminating Father’s parental rights under those

sections and appointing the Department as D.C.’s permanent managing conservator.

Father timely appealed.

                                   DISCUSSION

      Father raises seven issues on appeal. In his first four issues, Father challenges

the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial court’s findings that his parental rights

should be terminated pursuant to §§ 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (b)(1)(O). In his fifth and

sixth issues, Father asserts that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that termination was in D.C.’s best interest. In his

seventh issue, Father asserts that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient

to support the trial court’s order appointing the Department as D.C.’s permanent

managing conservator.

I.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

      Because the fundamental liberty interest of a parent in the care, custody, and

control of his or her child is one of constitutional dimensions, involuntary parental

termination must be strictly scrutinized. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66

(2000); In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014). A trial court may order

involuntary termination of parental rights only if the court finds that (1) the parent

                                          –4–
has committed one or more of the statutory enumerated predicate acts or omissions,

and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b); see also In re S.Y., 435 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no

pet.). “Given the constitutional magnitude of the interests at stake, the trial court’s

findings must be made by clear and convincing evidence to reduce the risk of

erroneous terminations.” Id. (citing In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 351–52 (Tex.

2003)).

      The supreme court has identified the appropriate standards for appellate courts

reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of findings made under this heightened

burden of proof. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2002) (defining the

standard of review for legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)

(defining the standard of review for factual sufficiency). In both instances, we ask

whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or

conviction about the truth of the matter on which the department bears the burden of

proof. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265–66; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. However, in J.F.C., the

Court explained that we must approach the evidence differently in legal and factual

sufficiency reviews. When reviewing legal sufficiency, we look at the evidence in

the light most favorable to the finding. In the clear-and-convincing context, this

means we must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its

finding, if a reasonable factfinder could do so. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We must

disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found

                                         –5–
incredible. Id. We do not, however, disregard undisputed facts that do not support

the finding. Id. When reviewing factual sufficiency, we must give “due

consideration” to any evidence the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear

and convincing. Id. This means we must look at the disputed evidence and adjudge

whether a reasonable factfinder could have resolved that evidence in favor of the

finding. The evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the

disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the

finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm

belief or conviction. Id.

II.   DISCUSSION

      A.     Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E)

      In his first two issues, Father asserts that there was legally and factually

insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings under § 161.001(b)(1)(E)

of the Family Code. The Department argues that the record reveals that Father

“physically and emotionally endangered D.C. through his habitual drug use,

temperament, and lifestyle.”

      Subsection (E) authorizes termination if the parent “engaged in conduct or

knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers

the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(E). In this context, “endanger” means to expose to loss or injury, or

to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical well-being. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726,

                                         –6–
748–49 (Tex. 2022); In re C.V. L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 750 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019,

pet. denied). Ground (E) “refers only to the parent’s conduct, as evidenced not only

by the parent’s acts, but also by the parent’s omissions or failures to act.” In re C.V.

L., 591 S.W.3d at 750. Termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(E) must be based on more

than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of

conduct by the parent is required. Id.

      At the outset, we note that there is a dearth of evidence pertaining to Father’s

conduct and his relationship with Mother prior to D.C.’s birth. This deficiency is

important because the relevant time frame within which to determine whether there

is clear and convincing evidence of endangerment to the child is before the child was

removed. In re J.K.F., 345 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). The

record reflects that when D.C. was born, she was immediately placed in the NICU

and remained there for two months. During that time, the Department filed for and

was granted temporary conservatorship. After being discharged from the hospital,

the Department placed D.C. with a foster family, who maintained possession

throughout the pendency of the proceedings below. Father was granted visitation,

but nothing in the record suggests he did anything during visitation to endanger

D.C.’s physical or emotional well-being.

      In the absence of such evidence, the Department argues that Father’s conduct

following D.C.’s removal “would have” endangered D.C.’s well-being. In support,

the Department cites evidence in the record that Father was charged with assault and

                                          –7–
compelling prostitution; altercations between Father and Mother, Father and his

neighbors, and Father and other women; and Father’s angry outbursts, verbal abuse,

and threats toward Department personnel and mental health professionals. The

record before us, however, is remarkably scant on details. For example, the criminal

charges were still pending at the time of this trial, and there was no evidence offered

about the underlying facts of the criminal case. Absent any evidence that Father

engaged in the conduct for which he was charged, we cannot conclude that a

reasonable fact-finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the alleged

conduct endangered D.C.’s well-being. See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

         Moreover, much of the evidence on which the Department relies was about

Mother’s misconduct, not Father’s. For example, the Department cites the testimony

of Latisha Redman, the Department case worker assigned to the case, stating that

Father called the police twice because Mother had thrown soda cans at him. Redman

also testified that Father texted her photographs of his car with bullet holes in it,

stating that Mother had shot at him while he was in the car.2 The Department urges

us to hold this conduct against Father because he “continued to associate” with

Mother after D.C.’s removal. We decline to do so as the record is not fully developed

about the parties’ post-removal relationship. During Father’s cross-examination by

D.C.’s attorney ad litem, the following exchange occurred:

   2
       Neither the text message nor the photographs were introduced in evidence.
                                                   –8–
        Q: And, you stated that you and [Mother] stayed in contact through the
        pendency of this case; is that right?

        A: Of course. We have a child together.

        Q: Okay. And, you said right now you have a good relationship with
        her?

        A: Yes.

        Q: Have you always had a good relationship with her?

        A: Yes.

        Q: Okay. Did you have a good relationship with her in February of 2021
        when you called the police on her, and said that she was knocking on
        your door, and threw a Dr. Pepper can at you?

        A: She didn’t throw a Dr. Pepper can at me, more, like, the window.
        But, yes, I mean, I could only say -- this is what I will say. It’s just a --

        [D.C.’s counsel]: I’m going to object, Your Honor; nonresponsive.

        THE COURT: Sustained.

        Q (By [D.C.’s counsel]): The question was: Did you have a good
        relationship with her when you called the police on her when she would
        not leave your home?

        A: I don’t know how to answer that, ma’am.

        Q: Okay. Did you have a good relationship with her when she called
        the police on you and said that you hit her with a car?

        A: No, I definitely didn’t have a good relationship with her then.

We cannot determine from this exchange, or indeed anywhere else in the record,

whether these calls to the police were the result of the same or separate altercations.3

    3
      We note that February 2021 was three months after D.C.’s birth, two months after her removal, and
one month after Father filed a motion for DNA testing. It was also the same month that D.C. was placed in
foster care. The record is inadequate to establish Mother and Father’s post-birth relationship or whether this
exchange evidences Father’s active avoidance of Mother.
                                                    –9–
It is therefore impossible to determine whether the violent conduct the Department

attributes to Father was based on a single act or a voluntary course of conduct. See

In re C.V. L., 591 S.W.3d at 750.

      Finally, the Department argues that the trial court’s endangerment finding is

supported by Father’s knowledge of, and failure to act upon, Mother’s drug use

during the course of her pregnancy. Generally, a parent’s knowledge of the other

parent’s drug use during pregnancy and corresponding failure to protect the unborn

child from the effects of that drug use can support an endangerment finding. In re

J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749. As the supreme court explained in J.W., a contrary rule

“would effectively endorse a parent’s willful ignorance of the significant risk that a

pregnant mother’s drug use poses.” Id. at 750. Here, however, Father testified that

he called the Department to report Mother’s drug use when he first discovered it

“about halfway through the pregnancy.” The Department asserts that “father

recanted his claim of reporting Mother during his psychological exam.” We disagree

with the Department’s characterization of the evidence. Lara Hastings, the clinical

psychologist who conducted Father’s psychological examination, testified that

Father “claimed that he first did report [Mother’s drug use during the pregnancy],

and then he later did not report it because he did not want to stress the mother out.”

The Department apparently interprets this statement to mean that Father initially

claimed to have reported Mother’s drug use, but later admitted he did not. That is a

misinterpretation; Dr. Hastings testified that Father told her that he initially reported

                                         –10–
Mother to the Department, but did not make a second report due to his concern over

Mother’s stress. Additionally, Dr. Hastings’s report states that Father claimed to

have confronted Mother about her drug use during the pregnancy: “[Father]

indicated that when he suspected [Mother] was using drugs, he told her that he

thought she was using drugs and she was defensive.” Father’s testimony was

therefore consistent with his statements to Dr. Hastings that reported Mother’s drug

use to the Department at least once. On this record, we cannot conclude that a

factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that Father did nothing to curb

Mother’s drug use.

      That is not the end of the inquiry, however. As the factfinder and sole judge

of credibility, the trial court was free to disbelieve Father’s claim. We also cannot

reject as unreasonable the Department’s observations and factual evidence that

Father engaged in conduct during Mother’s pregnancy, including Father’s own

habitual drug use, which may have affected D.C.’s well-being. Further, even if the

trial court had credited Father’s testimony that he reported Mother’s drug use to the

Department, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that one phone call to

DPS was not enough to protect D.C.’s well-being. Given the appropriate deference

to the trial court’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence and viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude the evidence was

legally sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment finding. However,

because the record is undeveloped regarding the parties’ relationship prior to

                                        –11–
removal and specifically during the gestation period, we conclude the evidence is

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Father engaged in

conduct that endangered D.C.’s physical or emotional well-being.

       “Appellate courts have broad discretion to remand a case for a new trial in the

interest of justice.” In re H.H., No. 05-15-01322-CV, 2016 WL 556131, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Feb. 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.3(b)).

“Remand is appropriate when, for any reason, a case has not been fully developed

below.” Id. We conclude a remand of the case is appropriate to further develop the

record and is in the interest of justice. See id. We overrule Father’s first issue, sustain

his second issue, and remand this case for a new trial.

       B.     Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O)

       In his third and fourth issues, Father asserts that the evidence was factually

and legally insufficient to support a finding under § 161.001(b)(1)(O) of the Family

Code. Subsection (O) authorizes termination upon clear and convincing evidence

that the parent

       failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically
       established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of
       the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing
       conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services
       for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the
       parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161(b)(1)(O) (emphasis added). The Texas Supreme Court

has held that subsection (O) requires the Department to prove that the child was

removed from her parent because of abuse or neglect. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239,
                                          –12–
246 (Tex. 2013); See also In re A.T., No. 05-19-00346-CV, 2019 WL 4126603, at

*8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). The evidence at trial

showed that D.C. was removed as a result of Mother’s drug abuse during pregnancy.

D.C. was in the NICU from the time of her birth until her discharge, whereupon she

was placed in foster care. She was never in Father’s care or custody. “Given that the

evidence undermines application of subsection (O), we conclude evidence that

Father failed to follow the service plan cannot, of its own weight, serve as clear and

convincing evidence of [D.C.]’s best interest.” Id.

      We sustain Father’s third issue as it pertains to subsection (O). Because of our

disposition of Father’s first, second, and third issues, we need not address his fourth

issue challenging factual sufficiency under subsection (O) or his fifth and sixth

issues challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the best interest findings. TEX.

R. APP. P. 47.1.

      C.      Conservatorship

      We review the trial court’s conservatorship order for abuse of discretion. In

re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007). The issue of sole managing

conservatorship was part of a larger proceeding that resulted in termination of the

parents’ parental rights. We have concluded that the trial court’s termination of

Father’s parental rights was not supported by the evidence in the record before us

and therefore his pre-termination status should be reinstated. Mother’s parental

termination is not challenged. In the absence of termination of both of D.C.’s

                                         –13–
parents’ rights, appointing the Department as sole permanent managing conservator

was an abuse of discretion. Id. Therefore, the Department’s pre-termination status

as temporary managing conservator of D.C. should be reinstated. In re M.K., No.

05-18-01297-CV, 2019 WL 2283886, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 29, 2019, no

pet.) (mem. op.). We sustain Father’s seventh issue and remand the conservatorship

issue for a new trial. See In re F.E.N., 579 S.W.3d 74, 75 (Tex. 2019) (affirming

court of appeals decision to remand issue of conservatorship for a new trial after

reversing trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights).

                                   CONCLUSION

      We conclude that the evidence was factually insufficient to support

termination under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) and legally insufficient under

§ 161.001(b)(1)(O). We further conclude the trial court abused its discretion in

appointing the Department the sole permanent managing conservator of D.C.

      We reverse the Final Order of the trial court naming the Department the sole

permanent managing conservator of D.C., render judgment reinstating the

Department as the temporary managing conservator of D.C., render judgment

reinstating Father to his pre-termination status, and remand the issues of termination

and conservatorship to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

                                         –14–
     In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                          /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
                                          BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
                                          JUSTICE

221223F.P05

                                       –15–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

 IN THE INTEREST OF D.C., A                    On Appeal from the 304th Judicial
 CHILD                                         District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. JC-20-00985-
 No. 05-22-01223-CV                            W.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice
                                               Goldstein. Justices Pedersen, III and
                                               Smith participating.

        In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the final order of the
trial court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE that
portion of the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights to D.C.
and the portion of the final order appointing the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services (Department) as permanent managing conservator of the child.
We RENDER judgment reinstating the Department as temporary managing
conservator of D.C. and reinstating Father to his pre-termination status. In all other
respects, the trial court’s final order is AFFIRMED. We REMAND this cause to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judgment entered this 4th day of May 2023.

                                        –16–