Court Opinion

ID: 9893805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:09:20.607564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:10.034251
License: Public Domain

J-A12020-23

                            2023 PA Super 220

 JACKS AUTO PARTS SALES, INC.           :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 MJ AUTO BODY AND REPAIR, LLC           :
 AND MARK RITALDATO                     :
                                        :    No. 1946 EDA 2022
                                        :
 APPEAL OF: AMAZON.COM                  :
 SERVICES, INC., AMAZON FLEX,           :
 AMAZON.COM DEDC LLC, AMAZON,           :
 AMAZON CORPORATION, AMAZON             :
 FULFILLMENT SERVICES INC.,             :
 AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC., AMAZON         :
 SERVICES LLC AND AMAZON INC.           :

                Appeal from the Order Entered July 27, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                     Civil Division at No(s): 211101194

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.:                         FILED OCTOBER 30, 2023

      Appellants Amazon.com Services, Inc., Amazon Flex, Amazon.com

DEDC LLC, Amazon, Amazon Corporation, Amazon Fulfillment Services Inc.,

Amazon Logistics, Inc., Amazon Services LLC, and Amazon Inc. (collectively,

Appellants) appeal from the order denying their petition to open a default

judgment entered against Appellants in favor of Appellee Jacks Auto Parts

Sales, Inc. (Jacks) in the amount of $42,621.49. We affirm.

      The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this matter as follows:
J-A12020-23

       Jacks . . . initiated this landlord/tenant action in the Philadelphia
       Municipal Court in August 2021.[1] On September 16, 2021, Jacks
       obtained a default judgment in the amount of $31,812.82 against
       Defendants MJ Auto Body & Repair, LLC and Mark Ritaldato. On
       November 15, 2021, Jacks transferred the default judgment to the
       Court of Common Pleas and filed writs of execution against
       numerous Amazon entities. The specific Amazon entities named
       are as follows: Amazon, Amazon Corporation, Amazon Fulfillment
       Services, Inc., Amazon Logistics, Inc., Amazon Services, LLC,
       Amazon, Inc., Amazon, LLC, Amazon.com Services, Inc., Amazon
       Flex, and Amazon.com DEDC, LLC (collectively [Appellants]).
       Jacks, via the Sheriff, served [Appellants] at 2400 Weccacoe
       Avenue upon James Russo, who was identified in the Sheriff’s
       Affidavit/Return of Service as the person in charge. Jacks later
       served interrogatories in aid of execution upon all the same
       entities.

____________________________________________

1 The trial court did not discuss how the underlying landlord tenant case
involved Appellants, other than as garnishees on the writ of execution.
Appellants maintain that they were named as garnishees solely based on a
claim that a truck bearing the Amazon logo was observed at MJ Auto Body &
Repair. See Pet. to Open, 4/25/22, at ¶25; Appellants’ Brief at 6. Further,
on this record, it is difficult to discern what occurred in the original matter
between Jacks and defendants MJ Auto Body & Repair, LLC and Mark Ritaldato
and the relationship that Appellants may have had with MJ Auto Body & Repair,
LLC and Mark Ritaldato, if any. In its opinion, the trial court described the
action between Jacks and MJ Auto Body & Repair, LLC and Mark Ritaldato as
a landlord/tenant action. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 2. Moreover, upon
review of the trial court record and the judgment entered in favor of Jacks and
against MJ Auto Body & Repair, LLC and Mark Ritaldato, including the docket
entries attached to that judgment, which is included in the certified record,
the landlord/tenant action involved outstanding rent and utility payments
owed by MJ Auto Body & Repair, LLC and Mark Ritaldato to Jacks. See Trial
Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 2; see also Judgment (against MJ Auto Body & Repair,
LLC and Mark Ritaldato), 11/15/21. It appears from the certified record that
Appellants were named as garnishees in the action for the first time in the writ
of execution and interrogatories that Jacks filed and served on James Russo,
a warehouse manager of an Amazon facility on Weccacoe Avenue. The
interrogatories inquired, inter alia, whether Appellants had any business
relationship, owed any outstanding debts, or had any financial obligation to
MJ Auto Body & Repair, LLC and Mark Ritaldato, to which Appellants did not
respond. See Interrogs., 11/23/21, at ¶¶1-14.

                                           -2-
J-A12020-23

     When [Appellants] did not respond to the interrogatories, Jacks
     obtained a default judgment against [Appellants] on December
     21, 2021[,] pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 3146. Thereafter, Jacks filed
     a motion for an assessment of damages hearing.           No one
     appeared at the assessment of damages hearing on behalf of
     [Appellants], and, on February 16, 2022, this court entered an
     order assessing damages in favor of Jacks and against
     [Appellants] in the amount of $42,621,49. On April 25, 2022,
     [Appellants], through counsel, filed the petition to open and/or
     strike the default judgment, and [Appellants] also filed an
     emergency motion to stay the writ of execution. This court
     granted the emergency motion and stayed further execution until
     resolution of the petition to open and/or strike.

     At the oral argument, [Appellants’ counsel] conceded that the
     default judgment and the entry of the default judgment complied
     with all of the applicable rules. Stated another way, while
     [Appellants] did not specifically waive [their] argument that the
     default judgment should be stricken, [Appellants] essentially
     conceded Jacks had properly entered the default judgment.
     [Appellants] then proceeded with its argument that the court
     should open the default judgment, based on improper service and
     that [Appellants] had complied with the three-part equitable test
     for opening default judgments.

     With respect to service, [Appellants] did not dispute that an
     Amazon entity operated out of a facility at 2400 Weccacoe
     Avenue. [Appellants] did not dispute that James Russo worked
     for an Amazon entity at 2400 Weccacoe Avenue, although
     [Appellants] did not concede that Mr. Russo worked for one of the
     named Amazon garnishees[/Appellants]. Amazon did not dispute
     that Mr. Russo was a manager at 2400 Weccacoe Avenue.
     [Appellants] did not dispute that Mr. Russo received service of the
     interrogatories at 2400 Weccacoe Avenue. It is unclear what Mr.
     Russo did with the interrogatories when he received them, and it
     is unclear what happened with all of the other legal papers Jacks
     served on the Amazon entities at 2400 Weccacoe Avenue.

     Following the hearing, this court determined Jacks had properly
     served [Appellants] at a regular place of business upon a manager
     and/or a person then in charge. The court further concluded, upon
     balancing the equities, that [Appellants] failed to satisfy the three-
     part test for opening a default judgment. Thus, this court denied
     the petition.

                                     -3-
J-A12020-23

Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 2-4 (some formatting altered). Appellants filed a

timely appeal, and both the trial court and Appellants complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Appellants raises the following issues on appeal:

        1. Did the [trial court] err in denying [Appellants’ petition] to open
           the default judgment, where it lacked jurisdiction to enter that
           judgment because [Appellants] had never been served with the
           underlying writs of execution?

        2. Did the [trial court] abuse its discretion in denying [Appellants’
           petition] to open the default judgment, where [Appellants]
           timely sought relief, have a complete defense to the underlying
           claim, and explained the reasonable cause for its lack of
           objection in advance of having the default judgment entered
           against them?

Appellants’ Brief at 5.

        Our standard of review regarding the denial of a petition to open a

default judgment is as follows:

        It is well settled that a petition to open a default judgment is an
        appeal to the equitable powers of the court, and absent an error
        of law or a clear, manifest abuse of discretion, it will not be
        disturbed on appeal. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial
        court, in reaching its conclusions, overrides or misapplies the law,
        or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or the
        result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

        To succeed on a petition to open a default judgment, a moving
        party must show: (1) the petition to open or strike was promptly
        filed; (2) the default can be reasonably explained or excused; and
        (3) there is a meritorious defense to the underlying claim. Also,
        as a petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the
        equitable powers of the court, where the equities warrant opening
        a default judgment, this Court will not hesitate to find an abuse of
        discretion.

                                        -4-
J-A12020-23

ABG Promotions v. Parkway Pub., Inc., 834 A.2d 613, 615-16 (Pa. Super.

2003) (en banc) (citations omitted and formatting altered). Further, the party

petitioning to open a judgment bears the burden of establishing such relief.

See id.

       Additionally, this Court has explained:

       [A] court is also to balance the equities when considering whether
       to grant a petition to open a default judgment. This Court has
       recognized that where some showing has been made with regard
       to each part of the test, a court should not blinder itself and
       examine each part as though it were a watertight compartment.
       A court should, instead, consider each part in light of all the
       circumstances and equities of the case. Where the equities weigh
       strongly in favor of granting the petition to open, this Court will
       find an abuse of discretion in denying such a petition.

Id. at 618 (citations omitted and formatting altered).2
____________________________________________

2 As the trial court noted, Appellants filed a petition to “open and/or strike”

the default judgment. Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 5. However, the trial court
further explained that at oral argument concerning Appellants’ petition,
Appellants conceded that there was no fatal defect on the face of the record,
and therefore, Appellants had no basis upon which to assert that the trial court
should strike the default judgment. See id.; see also Williams v. Wade,
704 A.2d 132, 134 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation omitted) (“[a] petition to strike
a judgment operates as a demurrer to the record [and] may be granted only
where a fatal defect in the judgment appears on the face of the record”). On
this record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants argued
facts outside of the record which included information from the Pennsylvania
Department of State website and Pennsylvania business entity numbers,
therefore, the petition was not a petition to strike or demurrer to the record,
and that the trial court properly considered the filing as a petition to open the
default judgment. See N.T., 7/21/22, at 16. Moreover, in its issues presented
on appeal, Appellants contend that the trial court did not have personal
jurisdiction over it because of improper service, and that the trial court did not
have the power to enter the default judgment against Appellants.
Alternatively, Appellants argue that the judgment should be opened because
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -5-
J-A12020-23

       “However, where the party seeking to open a judgment asserts that

service was improper, a court must address this issue first before considering

any other factors.”      Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 700

A.2d 915, 916 (Pa. 1997) (citations omitted); see also Century Sur. Co. v.

Essington Auto Center, LLC, 140 A.3d 46, 53-54 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(reiterating that “we need not [] engage in the [three-factor] analysis if the

party seeking to open the judgment has not received valid service or notice

of the proceedings” (citations omitted)). “If valid service has not been made,

then the judgment should be opened because the court has no jurisdiction

over the [party] and is without power to enter a judgment . . . .” Cintas

Corp., 700 A.2d at 916 (citation omitted). “In making this determination, a

court can consider facts not before it at the time the judgment was entered.”

Id. (citations omitted).

       Garnishment actions are defined as follows:

       Garnishment is a proceeding wherein the judgment creditor seeks
       to determine whether the garnishee owes a debt to the judgment
       debtor, or has property of the judgment debtor in his possession.
       The garnishment proceedings starts with service upon the
       garnishee of a writ of execution and interrogatories. The object
____________________________________________

Appellants have a complete defense to the claim; acted promptly to seek the
reopening of the judgment; and that the default resulted from the warehouse
manager’s mistaken belief that the papers he received were courtesy copies.
See Appellants’ Brief at 2-5. We note that Appellants’ allegation that service
was improper can also provide a basis upon which to open the judgment. See
Deer Park Lumber, Inc. v. Major, 559 A.2d 941, 943 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1989)
(citing U.S. Dept. of Housing v. Dickerson, 516 A.2d 749 (Pa. Super.
1986); Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Cooper & Reese, 416 A.2d 549 (Pa. Super.
1979)).

                                           -6-
J-A12020-23

      of the interrogatories is to determine whether the suspected debt
      exists. The judgment previously obtained by the judgment
      creditor works an equitable assignment of the debt owed to the
      judgment debtor to the extent necessary to satisfy the
      judgment[,] and[] the judgment creditor stands in the same
      position vis a vis the garnishee as would the judgment debtor.
      After garnishment, the only obligations upon the garnishee are to
      answer the interrogatories and to notify the judgment debtor, by
      registered or certified mail at his last known address, of the
      impending garnishment proceedings.

Wheatcroft v. Smith, 362 A.2d 416, 419 (Pa. Super. 1976) (footnotes

omitted). “Garnishment is a remedy created to enable a judgment creditor to

reach assets of [its] debtor held by a stranger and is the means by which a

creditor collects his debt out of property of the debtor in the hands of a third

party.” Brown v. Candelora, 708 A.2d 104, 107 (Pa. Super. 1998) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). Further,

      [a]ny person may be a garnishee and shall be deemed to have
      possession of property of the defendant if the person

         (1) owes a debt to the defendant;

         (2) has property of the defendant in his or her custody,
         possession or control[.]

Pa.R.Civ.P. 3101(b)(1)-(2).      Execution shall be commenced by filing a

praecipe for a writ of execution. Pa.R.Civ.P. 3103(a). Service of the writ upon

the garnishee shall attach all property of the defendant which may be

attached. Pa.R.Civ.P. 3111(b).

      The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows concerning

service of interrogatories on a garnishee:

      (a) The procedure between the plaintiff and the garnishee shall,
      as far as practicable, be the same as though the interrogatories

                                     -7-
J-A12020-23

     were a complaint and the answer of the garnishee were an answer
     in a civil action.

     (b) The garnishee in the answer under “new matter” may include

        (1) the defenses of the immunity or exemption of property;

        (2) any defense or counterclaim which the garnishee could
        assert against the defendant if sued by the defendant but the
        garnishee may not assert any defense on behalf of the
        defendant against the plaintiff or otherwise attack the validity
        of the attachment;

           Note: Objections to the attachment, other than the
           defenses of immunity or exemption, must be raised
           preliminarily. See Rule 3142.

        (3) any claim which the garnishee could assert against the
        plaintiff if sued by the plaintiff.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 3145.

     Further, the Rules provide:

     Service of original process upon a corporation or similar entity
     shall be made by handing a copy to any of the following persons
     provided the person served is not a plaintiff in the action:

     (1) an executive officer, partner or trustee of the corporation or
     similar entity, or

     (2) the manager, clerk or other person for the time being in charge
     of any regular place of business or activity of the corporation or
     similar entity, or

     (3) an agent authorized by the corporation or similar entity in
     writing to receive service of process for it.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 424. “In the context of an attachment proceeding, interrogatories

are analogous to a complaint and are designed to ascertain the property in

the possession of a garnishee.” Jones v. McGreevy, 270 A.3d 1, 7 n.5 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 280 A.3d 867 (Pa. 2022).

                                    -8-
J-A12020-23

      Rule 405 addresses return of service and states, in relevant part, as

follows:

      (a) When service of original process has been made the sheriff or
      other person making service shall make a return of service
      forthwith. If service has not been made and the writ has not been
      reissued or the complaint reinstated, a return of no service shall
      be made upon the expiration of the period allowed for service.

      (b) A return of service shall set forth the date, time, place and
      manner of service, the identity of the person served and any other
      facts necessary for the court to determine whether proper service
      has been made.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 405(a) and (b) (note omitted). Our courts have consistently held

that in the absence of fraud, the return of service of a sheriff, which is full and

complete on its face, is conclusive and immune from attack by extrinsic

evidence. See Grady v. Nelson, 286 A.3d 259, 265-66 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citing, inter alia, Hollinger v. Hollinger, 206 A.2d 1, 3-4 (Pa. 1965)).

Instantly, Appellants have not claimed that the sheriff’s return of service was

inaccurate nor fraudulent. It is the petitioners’ burden to establish that service

was improper. See American Express Co. v. Burgis, 476 A.2d 944, 950

(Pa. Super. 1984).

                            Service and Jurisdiction

      In their first issue, Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it

denied the petition to open because Appellants were not properly served with

the writs of execution and interrogatories.     Appellants argue that although

Jacks served Mr. Russo at 2400 Weccacoe Ave., Mr. Russo was not an agent

or employee of any of the Amazon entities named in the underlying action.

                                       -9-
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See Appellants’ Brief at 14-17. Appellants assert that Mr. Russo worked for

a separate Amazon entity named Amazon.com Services, LLC, which was not

a specifically named garnishee on the writ of execution or named in the

underlying action. See id. at 17-20. Appellants aver that the trial court erred

in concluding that service upon Mr. Russo at Amazon.com Services, LLC

constituted proper service upon the Amazon entities named as garnishees in

the writ of execution. See id. at 17.

      The trial court addressed Appellants’ challenge to service and

jurisdiction as follows:

      The affidavit of service filed by the Sheriff shows that service of
      the writ of execution was made upon Mr. Russo at [Appellants’]
      facility located at 2400 Weccacoe Avenue. [Appellants do] not
      dispute that this is a regular place of business for an Amazon
      entity. The Sheriff’s return of service for all of the named Amazon
      entities identifies Mr. Russo as a person authorized to accept
      service. [Appellants] did not call Mr. Russo to testify or introduce
      any evidence from outside the record challenging the facts in the
      Sheriff’s return of service. Instead, as best as the court can
      surmise, Mr. Russo received the writ of execution, the
      interrogatories, and all other legal papers served upon him at the
      Weccacoe Avenue location, and he either set them aside and
      forgot about them or simply ignored them. If Mr. Russo had not
      been authorized to accept service on behalf of one or all of the
      Amazon entities named in the writ of execution, or Jacks named
      an incorrect Amazon entity in its Writ of Execution, the appropriate
      procedure for Amazon to follow would have been to file
      preliminary objections. Pa.R.Civ.P. 3142, 3145. Instead, Amazon
      did nothing until it filed its petition [to open].

      Thus, based on the Sheriff’s return of service, this court concluded
      that (i) Jacks served Mr. Russo; (ii) Mr. Russo accepted service;
      (iii) Mr. Russo represented to the Sheriff that he was authorized
      to accept service; (iv) [Appellants] knew or should have known
      about the pending writ of execution and interrogatories. Based

                                     - 10 -
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     on these unassailable and uncontroverted conclusions, the court
     submits that service upon [Appellants] was proper.

                                   *     *      *

     [Appellants] contend that the writ . . . did not identify the correct
     Amazon entity and/or Mr. Russo was not an employee of any of
     the Amazon entities named in the writ . . . . [Appellants’] counsel
     represented that the current Amazon entity that operates out of
     2400 Weccacoe Avenue is Amazon.com Services, LLC, which is
     not a garnishee named on the writ of execution. [Appellants]
     repeatedly argued that because Jacks did not serve the correct
     Amazon entity, the court should have opened the default
     judgment. But [Appellants’] argument puts the cart before the
     proverbial horse. [Appellants do] not dispute that the Sheriff
     served Mr. Russo with the writ . . . and interrogatories. Thus, the
     time and place for Amazon to raise these “corporate” defenses
     was through properly filed timely preliminary objections, not in a
     post-judgment petition [to open]. Moreover, [Appellants] never
     called Mr. Russo or introduced any evidence, beyond that which is
     publicly available through the Pennsylvania Bureau of
     Corporations.    Even if the petition was a proper place for
     [Appellants] to raise the corporate defense, this court is not
     persuaded that [Appellants’] assertions have merit. The writ of
     execution identifies the following entities:

        • Amazon

        • Amazon Corporation

        • Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc.

        • Amazon Logistics, Inc.

        • Amazon Services, LLC

        • Amazon, Inc.

        • Amazon, LLC

        • Amazon.com Services, Inc.

        • Amazon Flex

        • Amazon.com DEDC, LLC

     Jacks presented a summary of the Amazon entities that have or
     currently conduct business at 2400 Weccacoe Avenue.

                                       - 11 -
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       Filing    Entity    Prior Name     Resulting      Corporate      Named as     Sheriff’s
       Date      Number                   Name           Document       Garnishee?   Return of
                                                         Filed                       Service?
       8/10/17   6591882   Amazon         N/A [First     Foreign        Yes          Yes
                           Fulfillment    Filing]        Registration
                           Services,                     Statement
                           Inc.
       1/23/18   6591882   Amazon         Amazon.com     Amendment      Yes, both    Yes, both
                           Fulfillment    Services,      of Foreign     names        names
                           Services,      Inc.           Registration
                           Inc.
       1/1/19    6591882   Amazon.com     Amazon.com     Transfer of    Yes, both    Yes, both
                           DEDC LLC       Services,      Foreign        names        names
                                          Inc.           Registration
                                                         (conversion)
       1/13/20   6591882   Amazon.com     Amazon.com     Transfer of    Yes, first   Yes, first
                           Services,      Services LLC   Foreign        name only    name only
                           Inc.                          Registration
                                                         (conversion)
       1/27/20   6591882   Amazon         Amazon.com     Transfer of    Yes, first   Yes, first
                           Services LLC   Services LLC   Foreign        name only    name only
                                                         Registration
                                                         (merger)

      The Pennsylvania Bureau of Corporations’ entity number for all of
      these Amazon entities has remained unchanged through all of the
      variously named iterations: 6591882. Thus, the entity that
      [Appellants] now says was doing business at 2400 Weccacoe
      Avenue — Amazon.com Services, LLC — shares the same entity
      number as all of the other entities that were included on the writ
      of execution. . . .

Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 6-9 (some formatting altered).

      Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s conclusion that Jacks satisfied the requirements for service on

a corporation and that jurisdiction was properly before the trial court. See

Century Sur. Co., 140 A.3d at 53-54; ABG Promotions, 834 A.2d at 616.

Appellants as petitioners bore the burden of establishing that service was

improper, and that Mr. Russo was not authorized to accept service.                                See

American Express Co., 476 A.2d at 950; see also Grady, 286 A.3d at 265-

66. As the trial court noted, Appellants did not call Mr. Russo, nor any other

witness to challenge the facts in the sheriff’s return of service. See Trial Ct.

                                               - 12 -
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Op., 9/23/22, at 6. The sheriff’s return of service stated that Mr. Russo was

an adult person in charge, and he accepted service.        See id.; see also

Sheriff’s Return of Service, 11/23/21.    Moreover, it is undisputed that Mr.

Russo is a manager of an Amazon warehouse facility at Amazon.com Services,

LLC.   See Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 3; see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 424(2)

(addressing who may accept service for a corporate entity). Further, the trial

court explained that Appellants and Mr. Russo’s employer, Amazon.com

Services, LLC, use nearly identical business names, the same address, and

the same Pennsylvania business entity number See Order, 7/27/22, at 1 n.1

(stating that Appellants do not actually argue that they were was not served,

“[r]ather, [Appellants] argue[] that [Jacks] served the incorrect entity.”). The

trial court concluded that two of the named Amazon garnishees/Appellants,

Amazon.com Services, Inc. and Amazon Services LLC, were converted or

merged into Amazon.com Services, LLC, which was the Pennsylvania business

entity that employed Mr. Russo and for whom he accepted service. See Trial

Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 9-10.      The trial court found that Jacks reasonably

concluded that service upon an Amazon entity bearing the same Pennsylvania

business entity number and located at 2400 Weccacoe Avenue, provided

proper service and that this conclusion is further supported by the fact that

Mr. Russo accepted service. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 6, 10; see also

Cintas Corp., 700 A.2d at 920 (providing that “there must be a sufficient

connection between the person served and the defendant to demonstrate that

service was reasonably calculated” to provide notice). The trial court further

                                     - 13 -
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noted that Appellants did not challenge service by filing timely filed preliminary

objections. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 7 (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 3142, 3145).

      On this record, we discern no error of law nor abuse of discretion

because the sheriff’s return of service, the accuracy of which was not

challenged by Appellants, supported the trial court’s conclusion that Mr. Russo

was a person in charge who properly accepted service. See Trial Ct. Op.,

9/23/22, at 6; see also Sheriff’s Return of Service, 11/23/21. Simply stated,

Appellants did not meet their burden to establish that service was improper.

See Grady, 286 A.3d at 265-66; American Express Co., 476 A.2d at 950.

Accordingly, Appellants are not entitled to relief on their claim that the trial

court lacked jurisdiction to enter the default judgment based on defective

service.

                               Petition to Open

      In its second issue, Appellants assert that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying the petition to open because Appellants satisfied the

requirements of the equitable test necessary to open a default judgment.

Appellants’ Brief at 21-27. Specifically, Appellants contend that they: 1) filed

a prompt petition to open the default judgment; 2) stated a reasonable excuse

for its failure to appear or respond; and 3) provided a meritorious defense.

See id. at 22-27.

      The first prong of the test set forth in ABG Promotions concerns

whether the petition to open the default judgment was filed promptly. See

                                     - 14 -
J-A12020-23

ABG Promotions, 834 A.2d at 616. When considering whether a petitioner

filed a prompt response to the entry of a default judgment, we note as follows:

      The timeliness of a petition to open a judgment is measured from
      the date that notice of the entry of the default judgment is
      received. The law does not establish a specific time period within
      which a petition to open a judgment must be filed to qualify as
      timeliness. Instead, the court must consider the length of time
      between discovery of the entry of the default judgment and the
      reason for delay.

                                  *     *      *

      In cases where the appellate courts have found a “prompt” and
      timely filing of the petition to open a default judgment, the period
      of delay has normally been less than one month.

Myers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 986 A.2d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citations omitted).

      As the trial court noted, Jacks filed a praecipe for default judgment on

December 21, 2021, and the trial court entered an order assessing damages

on the default judgment on February 16, 2022. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22,

at 10; see also Praecipe, 12/21/21; Judgment, 2/16/22.                However,

Appellants did not file their petition to open until April 25, 2022. See Pet. to

Open, 4/25/22.

      Although Appellants’ petition to open was filed more than one month

after the default judgement was entered, Appellants argue that we must look

to when Appellants discovered the entry of the default judgment. Appellants’

Brief at 23-24. Appellants contend that they were not aware of the default

judgment until April 8, 2022, three days after the sheriff’s levy on April 5,

                                      - 15 -
J-A12020-23

2022. Appellants’ Brief at 24. Appellants assert that they filed their petition

to open seventeen days after discovering the default judgment. See id.; see

also Pet. to Open, 4/25/22.

       Here, in concluding that Appellants failed to meet the requirements to

open the default judgment, the trial court explained:

       Jacks filed its praecipe for default judgment on December 21,
       2021, and this court entered an order assessing damages on the
       default judgment on February 16, 2022. [Appellants] filed [their]
       petition [to open] on April 25, 2022. At best for [Appellants], it
       filed its petition 67 days after this court entered the order
       assessing damages. If the passage of time is calculated from
       the entry of default judgment on the docket, [Appellants]
       waited 125 days to file [the] petition[ to open]. The
       timeliness of a petition is measured from the receipt by the
       defendant, or garnishee in this case, of the notice of entry of
       default judgment. A petition is typically considered prompt if it is
       filed within a month of the default judgment.[3] Here, even giving
       [Appellants] the benefit of the doubt and evaluating the
       promptness claim based on 67 days, [Appellants] were beyond
       what is typically considered prompt. It goes without saying that
       125 days is well beyond prompt. Thus, the equities weigh against
       opening the judgment on the basis of promptness.

       [Appellants] did not provide any reasonable excuse for [their]
       failure to file a timely responsive pleading, beyond the service
       arguments it previously made. A reasonable or justifiable excuse
       in this context means that the defendant has been without fault,
       as opposed to having demonstrated a dilatory attitude.

____________________________________________

3 “In cases where the appellate courts have found a ‘prompt’ and timely filing

of the petition to open a default judgment, the period of delay has normally
been less than one month.” Myers, 986 at 176 (citations omitted and
formatting altered).

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Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 10-11 (citations omitted, some formatting altered,

and emphases added).4

         As support for its position regarding the promptness of the petition,

Appellants cite to Mr. Alex Rivera’s5 affidavit or “declaration” which was

appended to Appellants’ petition to open. Appellants Brief at 24.6 Although

the declaration was attached to Appellant’s petition, on this record, it does not

appear that Appellants proffered it to the trial court to enter it into the record

as evidence.     Further, during the hearing on Appellants’ petition to open,

Jacks’    counsel   made     the    following   objection   concerning   the   Rivera

Declaration:

         MR. SALAMAN [(Jacks’ counsel)]: Your Honor, may I make one
         housekeeping note?

         THE COURT: If it’s just a housekeeping note, I will let you make
         it. We are not going to veer off into merits argument here.

____________________________________________

4 In its opinion, the trial court concluded that Appellants did not file a prompt

response, and that Appellants did not have a reasonable excuse for its default.
See Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 10-11. However, the trial court accepted that
Appellants had a meritorious defense. See id. at 12 n.1 (stating “[t]his court
accepts arguendo that [Appellants] maintain[] a meritorious defense, but the
equities strongly weigh against opening the judgment based on the other two
prongs of the test.”).

5 The record reflects that Mr. Rivera is a paralegal for Appellants’ counsel.    See
Pet. to Open, 4/25/22, at ¶8.

6 Appellants cite to “declaration evidence,” and we note that the Russo
Declaration was also appended to Appellants’ petition to open. See Pet. to
Open, 4/25/22. However, as noted, Appellants did not call either Mr. Russo
or Mr. Rivera to testify at the hearing.

                                          - 17 -
J-A12020-23

      MR. SALAMAN: No, no. I will just object to paragraphs two
      through six as double hearsay for the declaration, at the
      appropriate time.

      THE COURT: All right. All right. It’s noted, but I’m not going to
      preliminarily do anything. If you want to raise something when it
      comes up and it’s relevant to what we are doing, you can certainly
      re-raise the objection.

N.T., 7/21/22, at 6.    Immediately following this exchange, the following

discussion occurred:

      THE COURT: . . . Mr. O’Brien [(Appellants’ counsel)], through your
      communication to us you indicated that you don’t intend to call
      any witnesses. So we are deciding this based on what has been
      submitted either through argument or other written documents
      that you believe support your position. Do I have that correct?

      MR. O’BRIEN: Yes. We reached out to the court to inquire as to
      whether or not the court expected testimony. If necessary, Judge,
      we do have Mr. Rivera on standby to testify, but I would note, just
      for purposes of the record, a petition to strike, of course, is a
      demur. So that is not an effort to which we would ask for
      testimonial evidence. If the court thinks it’s appropriate, if there
      is a question raised by Attorney Salaman as to the Rivera
      declaration, Mr. Rivera is on standby to testify.

      THE COURT: As a typical matter of process, I wouldn’t tell you one
      way or the other whether you need testimony, one way or the
      other. That is completely up to you as to how to proceed. . . .

Id. at 6-7.

      However, although the Rivera Declaration was never mentioned again

during the hearing, Jacks’ counsel referred to paragraph four of the Russo

Declaration that was also appended to Appellant’s petition to open, but

apparently not proffered to the trial court to enter it into evidence. See Jacks’

Brief at 15-16. Paragraph four reads as follows:

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J-A12020-23

      4. To the best of my recollection, on November 17, 2021, when I
      received copy of the Writ of Execution, I did not realize that this
      was an original copy of a document, and instead believed that I
      had received a courtesy copy of the document that had already
      been received by Amazon’s legal team.

Russo Declaration, at ¶4. Regarding paragraph four, Jacks’ counsel stated

during the hearing: “I mean, Mr. Russo [laid] the papers aside because he

thought they were duplicates.”      N.T., 7/21/22, at 41.     Appellants did not

present any witness testimony.

      In order to support its petition to open the default judgement, Appellant

has the burden to support its allegations of fact with competent evidence,

which could include deposition transcripts or live witness testimony, “a burden

which cannot be avoided by substituting an ex parte affidavit unless the

respondent either files no answering affidavit or does not deny the veracity of

the facts recited in the petition or affidavit.” Hudgins v. Jewel T. Discount

Store, 505 A.2d 1007, 1010 (Pa. Super. 1986) (citation omitted).

      Here, Jacks answered Appellants’ petition to open and denied the

veracity of Appellants’ claims concerning when Appellants allegedly learned of

the default judgement and whether Mr. Russo was a proper person to accept

service. See Answer to Pet., 5/16/22, at ¶¶4, 8, 20. Specifically, Jacks denied

Appellants’ claim that Appellants only learned of the default judgment in April

of 2022 after the sheriff’s levy, and Jacks stated that the notice of the February

16, 2022, default judgment was mailed to Appellants on February 17, 2022,

and that this was the ninth notice of these proceedings.             Id. at ¶8.

Additionally, Jacks denied Appellants’ claim that Mr. Russo was an improper

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person to accept service. Jacks stated it “believes and avers” that Mr. Russo

is the “Senior Operations Manager at Amazon and representative of all

Amazon entities identified in the Writ of Execution, including but not limited

to his payroll employer Amazon.com Services LLC, originally and formerly

known as Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc. also formerly known as

Amazon.com Services, Inc.” Id. at ¶4 (formatting altered).

       Moreover, Jacks objected to the Rivera Declaration and argued that the

declaration was double hearsay. See N.T., 7/21/22, at 6. The record reveals

no further discussion of the Rivera Declaration and apparently, the trial court

did not rule on Jacks’ hearsay objections. Although Jacks’ counsel referred to

paragraph four of the Russo Declaration, it was not proffered nor entered into

evidence during the hearing.7 The trial court concluded that “[i]t is unclear

what Mr. Russo did with the interrogatories when he received them, and it is

unclear what happened with all of the other legal papers Jacks served on the

Amazon entities at 2400 Weccacoe Avenue.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 3-4.

On this record, the trial court as fact finder and arbiter of the law was free to

accept all, part, or none of the arguments and documents presented at the

hearing. See, e.g., Stocki v. Goble, 755 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 653029 (Pa.

Super. filed Feb. 19, 2021) (unpublished mem.).8 Indeed, neither Mr. Rivera,
____________________________________________

7 See N.T., 7/21/22, at 41; see also Jacks’ Brief at 15-16.

8 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that an unpublished, non-precedential
memorandum decision filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for its persuasive
value).

                                          - 20 -
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Mr. Russo, nor any other witness testified in support of Appellants’ challenges.

Accordingly, on this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s conclusion that Appellants failed to file their petition to open the default

judgment timely. See Myers, 986 A.2d at 176; ABG Promotions, 834 A.2d

at 618.

       We note that the trial court opined that Appellants arguably maintained

a meritorious defense to the underlying claim9 but concluded that the equities

strongly weighed against opening the judgment based on the two prongs of

Appellant’s lack of promptness in filing the petition to open and Appellant’s

lack of reasonable explanation for its failure to file a responsive pleading. See

Trial Ct. Op., 9/23/22, at 12 n.1.; see also ABG Promotions, 834 A.2d at

616. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

conclusion that Appellants failed to file a prompt petition to open the default

judgment, and we conclude that Appellants are not entitled to relief.          See

ABG Promotions, 834 A.2d at 616 (stating that in order to satisfy the

requirements to open a default judgment, the petitioner must meet all three
____________________________________________

9 Appellants assert that the Amazon entities were named as garnishees solely

based on a claim that a truck bearing the Amazon logo was observed at MJ
Auto Body & Repair and that Appellants have no business relationship with MJ
Auto Body & Repair, LLC and Mark Ritaldato, and further that the trial court
should have granted equitable relief by opening the default judgment against
it to avoid a windfall for Jacks. See Appellants’ Brief at 26. In Queen City
Elec. Supply Co. v. Soltis Elec. Co., 421 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1980), our Supreme
Court considered that the garnishor in that case would reap a windfall if the
trial court denied the garnishee’s petition to open judgment. See id. at 175.
However, in Queen City Elec. Supply Co., the petitioners satisfied all three
prongs required to open a default judgment. See id. at 177-78.

                                          - 21 -
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prongs including filing a prompt petition, having a reasonable excuse, and

providing a meritorious defense); see also Myers, 986 A.2d at 176 (holding

that the trial court is not permitted to open a default judgment based on the

equities of the case when the petitioner has failed to establish all three prongs

of the required criteria). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying

Appellants’ petition to open the default judgment.

       Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.10

____________________________________________

10  On May 5, 2023, Jacks filed a motion asserting that Appellants cited
Meekins v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 1835 EDA 2011, 2013 WL 11257222
(Pa. Super. filed July 29, 2013) (unpublished mem.), Salari-Lak v.
Fellowship of Faith, Inc., 946 WDA 2013, 2015 WL 8674509 (Pa. Super.
filed Dec. 14, 2015) (unpublished mem.), and Elsherif v. All City Taxi, Inc.,
1296 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 531900 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 8, 2017) (unpublished
mem.) which are unpublished cases. See Motion, 5/5/23, at 2-3. Jacks
requests that this Court order said cases stricken from consideration in our
disposition and admonish Appellants’ counsel for citing these unpublished
cases. See id. at 3. We note that unpublished memoranda filed by this Court
prior to May 1, 2019, have no precedential value and citing to them violates
our Internal Operating Procedures. See D’Amelia v. Toll Bros., Inc., 235
A.3d 321, 330 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2020); Superior Court Internal Operating
Procedures, 210 Pa.Code § 65.37. Based on our disposition, we need not
address Jacks’ motion and DENY it as moot. However, we caution Appellants’
counsel to comply with this Court’s Operating Procedures, and in the future,
not to cite to unpublished cases filed prior to May 1, 2019. See Pa.R.A.P.
126(b) (stating that non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed
after May 1, 2019, may be cited as persuasive).

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Date: 10/30/2023

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