Court Opinion

ID: 9390721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 14:05:12.907533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.382477
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0607-MR

ANGEL SMITH                                                          APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-005976

METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT                                            APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: This an appeal from a Jefferson Circuit Court order granting

summary judgment in favor of an employer, and dismissing an employee’s claims

of gender discrimination, hostile work environment based on gender, and

retaliation. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the employee, we find

she failed to meet her burden on all three claims, and we affirm.
                I.      FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

              In 1999, Appellant Angel Smith (“Smith”) was hired by Appellee

Metropolitan Sewer District (“MSD”) as a Utility Worker I Trainee. She remained

employed by MSD as of the filing of this appeal. During her more than 20 years

with MSD, her advancement continued: after Utility Worker I Trainee, she moved

to Utility Worker I, then Utility Worker II, and on to Utility Worker III. In 2007,

she was promoted to Assistant Supervisor (later retitled as a Field Specialist).

              Smith argues that

              [f]rom 2005-2017 [she] worked hard and achieved any and
              all goals set for her within the televisual inspection (TVI)
              department but was unable to achieve any further
              promotion. In fact, Smith watched as she was passed over
              on at least five (5) different occasions by individuals,
              male, with less experience, seniority and education than
              she, some of whom she trained or worked with at the
              beginning of their careers, were promoted over her within
              the TVI department.[1]

              Conversely, MSD argues that “in the last decade, [Smith’s]

supervisors identified [in her evaluations] a need to improve her communication

1
  It is unclear from Smith’s appellant brief what specific promotions she is contesting. In 2016,
Smith applied for two supervisor positions in the Drainage Department, but the positions were
awarded to Val Winburn and Glen Cooper. In 2017, Smith applied for TVI Supervisor, but the
position was awarded to Tony Woods, Jr. In her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
complaint she contested promotions that were given to Keith Gallai, William Cunningham, and
Glenn Eilers. MSD mentions that she contested a promotion to “Cunningham” and also states in
its appellee brief that Smith “applied and interviewed for a few manager-level openings in mid-
2021 but was not offered those positions.” However, she did not amend her complaint to include
those.

                                              -2-
with co-workers, subordinates, and customers.” MSD “encouraged” Smith in

2011, 2012, and 2015 reviews to improve her leadership and communication skills

by being assertive “without being overly aggressive.”

             After failing to receive applied-for promotions, Smith filed complaints

with her supervisor and with MSD’s human resources department alleging she had

more seniority than those hired, and that she was passed over due to her gender. In

2016, Smith filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) claiming MSD promoted less qualified men over her. The

EEOC investigated and stated it was unable to conclude MSD violated any

statutes. Smith contends that her EEOC filing prompted retaliatory conduct by

MSD.

             In 2017, she was promoted outside the TVI department to “Slip Line”

Supervisor in the sanitation/construction department. At that time, she was the

only female supervisor in the three field departments (TVI, Drainage, and

Sanitary). She has since applied for, but not received, various other promotions.

As of the filing of briefs before this Court, Smith remains employed by MSD.

             In 2020, Smith filed this underlying action with the Jefferson Circuit

Court against MSD alleging gender discrimination, age discrimination, hostile

work environment, retaliation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. After

discovery, MSD filed a motion rebutting Smith’s claims. In her response, Smith

                                         -3-
conceded her age discrimination and negligent infliction of emotional distress

claims, but defended the remaining claims. MSD moved for summary judgment,

and in April 2022, the Jefferson Circuit Court granted the motion, dismissing

Smith’s remaining claims of gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and

retaliation. Smith appealed. Additional facts will be added within the pertinent

sections below.

                      II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

             The standard of review upon appeal of an order granting summary

judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine

issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996) (citing

Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03). Upon a motion for summary

judgment, all facts and inferences in the record are viewed in a light most favorable

to the non-moving party and “all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest,

Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991) (citation

omitted). “Findings of fact, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due

regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of

the witnesses.” CR 52.01. Summary judgment looks only to questions of law, and

thus, we review a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.

Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. App. 2016) (citation omitted); see also

                                          -4-
Blackstone Mining Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Ky. 2010).

However, “[a] party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot rely on the hope

that the trier of fact” would simply “disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed

fact, but must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported

motion for summary judgment.” Ryan v. Fast Lane, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 787, 790

(Ky. App. 2012) (citing Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 481).

                                 III.    ANALYSIS

               In determining whether MSD was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law, we apply authority construing the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”) as

codified in Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) Chapter 344.2 Relevant here, the

KCRA prohibits employment discrimination based on one’s gender and protects

employees from a hostile work environment. KRS 344.040. Further, the KCRA

prohibits retaliation for reporting discrimination or otherwise exercising one’s civil

rights under the Act. KRS 344.280. However, before analyzing the claims of

gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, we must establish

the appropriate timeline.

2
  KRS Chapter 344 was modeled after, and is virtually identical to, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, codified in 42 United States Code § 2000e-2(b). Stewart v. Univ. of Louisville, 65
S.W.3d 536, 539 (Ky. App. 2001) (citation omitted). Thus, “[b]ecause of its similarity to federal
civil-rights legislation, the KCRA tracks federal case law for guidance on claims based on
gender discrimination.” The Bd. of Regents of N. Ky. Univ. v. Weickgenannt, 485 S.W.3d 299,
306 (Ky. 2016) (citation omitted).

                                               -5-
             Smith filed the underlying action in October 2020. Her claims

partially pointed to promotions that she had applied for prior to October 2015, but

which had gone to male MSD employees. MSD argues that “[w]hen an alleged

failure to promote based on a discriminatory motive falls outside the KCRA’s five-

year statute of limitations, the conduct is not actionable.” We agree.

             Kentucky law states that actions “upon a liability created by statute,”

such as the KCRA, “shall be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of

action accrued[.]” KRS 413.120(2). Moreover,

             [a]n action for discrimination or retaliation accrues on the
             date the act of discrimination or retaliation occurs. . . .
             However, where a plaintiff can establish that the alleged
             discriminatory act or series of acts constitutes a continuing
             violation, principles of equity allow the limitations period
             to run anew from each succeeding discriminatory action.

Walker v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.3d 165, 172 (Ky. App. 2016) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

             Smith contends the continuing violation doctrine allows the Court to

consider promotions that occurred more than five years prior to her filing suit, but

precedent does not support that contention. “Discrete acts such as termination, [or]

failure to promote . . . are easy to identify. Each incident of discrimination and

each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable

unlawful employment practice. [The employee] can only file a charge to cover

discrete acts that occurred within the appropriate time period.” Nat’l R.R.

                                         -6-
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2073, 153 L. Ed.

2d 106 (2002) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Smith’s

allegation of discrimination and retaliation – manifested in the form of a repeated

failure to promote – are “discrete acts” that are “easy to identify.” Therefore, each

promotion that Smith applied for, but did not receive, is subject to the five-year

limitations period from the date that it occurred. See also Walker, 503 S.W.3d at

172-73. Thus, promotions prior to October 2015 are not part of our analysis.

              A. Gender Discrimination

             The United States Supreme Court established the burden-shifting test

reviewing courts employ in discrimination actions against a private employer in

McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d

668 (1973). Weickgenannt, 485 S.W.3d at 306. Applying the McDonnell Douglas

test here, first, Smith must establish a prima facie discrimination action:

             In a failure to promote employment discrimination case,
             the Sixth Circuit has modified the elements of the
             [McDonnell Douglas] test to fit the specific context.
             Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 562-63 (6th
             Cir. 2000). Under Nguyen . . . a plaintiff with a
             discrimination claim based on a failure to promote must
             demonstrate that (1) she is a member of a protected class;
             (2) she applied for and was qualified for a promotion; (3)
             she was considered for and was denied the promotion; and
             (4) an individual of similar qualifications who was not a
             member of the protected class received the job at the time
             plaintiff’s request for the promotion was denied. Id. at
             562-63.

                                         -7-
White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F. 3d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 2005).

               Smith does so. Smith is female, applied for promotions for which

she was qualified, and was denied those promotions, which went to men who were

similarly situated (similar experience level and knowledge base).

               Next, the burden then shifts to MSD to offer a “legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason” for denying her the promotions. Id. at 238 (citation

omitted). MSD “identified a need [for Smith] to improve her communication with

co-workers, subordinates, and customers.” She was encouraged to be “assertive

without being overly aggressive” by at least three superiors. Additionally, co-

workers gave depositional testimony about situations where they had witnessed

Smith treating co-workers disrespectfully and/or was difficult to communicate

with.3 MSD argued that Smith’s sometimes aggressive and hostile demeanor

toward both subordinates and customers made her a less desirable candidate for the

positions at issue.

3
  Keith Gallai, during his deposition, testified that Smith responded “aggressively” and
“defensive[ly]” when asked about her schedule. He also stated there were “complaints [about
Smith] from union staff about the way that she spoke to people; there were complaints from
customers.” Jermaine Van Lee Murphy described Smith as “on the defense all of the time” and
that she was perceived to be “hard to deal with, hard to get along with, hard to gauge, up and
down, inconsistent.” William Cunningham testified that he witnessed Smith being “outright kind
of rude” and “openly yelling, screaming, talking down to [an employee] about some of the work
he was performing on her truck.” Glenn Eilers testified that communication with Smith was
difficult at times, and Smith’s subordinates would complain to him about not receiving timely
information from Smith about classes.

                                             -8-
                Lastly, the burden then shifts a final time, back to Smith to be

afforded a “fair opportunity” to show that MSD’s stated reason for denying her the

promotions was “in fact pretext” for discrimination. Id. (citation omitted). Smith

was afforded such an opportunity but did not meet her burden. Smith argued she

had more seniority than the men hired, but MSD stated that seniority was not the

central factor in hiring decisions for the non-union positions in question.4 MSD’s

Operations Director for Sanitary Sewers testified that Smith was not offered the

promotions because “she was not considered to be the best candidate, particularly

in terms of interpersonal managerial skills. The applicants who were selected for

these positions had all the required credentials, extensive knowledge of operations

within their departments, and demonstrated acumen for leadership in managerial

roles.” A review of the record confirms that Smith was similarly situated to the

men who received the promotions, but she did not establish that MSD’s rationale

for promotions had a discriminatory basis.

                Here, Smith established a prima facie case of discrimination. MSD

rebutted her claim with non-discriminatory rationale for its promotion decisions.

In the face of this rebuttal, Smith failed to show that the stated reason MSD

presented in support of its decision to choose other candidates over her was a mere

4
 Glenn Eilers testified that seniority would “get you in the room” for the interview, but the
emphasis on seniority faded after that.

                                                -9-
pretext for discrimination. Therefore, the circuit court correctly found Smith did

not establish “discriminatory intent . . . on the basis of gender” in MSD’s

promotion process. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of this gender

discrimination claim.

             B. Hostile Work Environment

             Next, Smith challenges the circuit court’s finding that her complaints

were not severe, pervasive, or gender specific and therefore not sufficient to

maintain a claim of hostile work environment. On appeal, Smith lists the alleged

instances of harassment that occurred during her 23 years with MSD:

      • Smith was denied help every occasion she requested it.

      • Smith was forced to constantly work both her position and that of
        a field specialist due to MSD’s refusal to offer coverage.

      • Smith was isolated and ridiculed.

      • Smith was referred to as an “angry bitch,” “honey,” “sweetie,”
        “baby,” and “girl” on more than one occasion.

      • On at least one occasion a male employee stated publicly that he
        did “not want that bitch as his supervisor.”

      • On at least one occasion Smith’s supervisor, whom she
        complained about, stated “I’m not giving that bitch any help.”

      • On more than one occasion Smith was confronted by males in
        scary and physically aggressive ways, including her own director.

      • Smith was forced to engage in job duties to functions no other
        supervisor was asked to engage in.

                                        -10-
      • Smith was micromanaged aggressively about when and how long
        she needed for restroom breaks even up to and including Smith
        being asked to keep a log for her supervisor of said breaks.

             Smith argues that, taken as a whole, the incidents created an abusive

working environment, but as a matter of law, we do not agree. Under KRS

344.040, “it is unlawful for an employer, on the basis of sex, to ‘discriminate

against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment . . . [or] to limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way which

would . . . tend to deprive an individual of employment opportunities or otherwise

adversely affect status as an employee.’” Ammerman v. Bd. of Educ. of Nicholas

Cnty., 30 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Ky. 2000) (quoting KRS 344.040). In other words, the

KCRA prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace that creates “a hostile or

abusive work environment.” See id. at 798.

             To establish a prima facie cause of action predicated upon hostile

work environment based on sex, Smith must demonstrate that “(1) she is a member

of a protected class, (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the

harassment was based on her sex, (4) the harassment created a hostile work

environment, and that (5) the employer is vicariously liable.” Clark v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 400 F.3d 341, 347-48 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

             First – as it relates to gender specificity – the lower court found that

“there [was] no evidence MSD discriminated on the basis of gender.” However,

                                         -11-
on appeal Smith does not make a gender specific argument (on this claim) except

that one must be assumed. Smith argues she was treated differently than other

employees, the other employees were similarly situated men, and therefore,

discrimination based on gender must have occurred. And yet, correlation does not

prove causation. Sexual harassment, to be actionable, needs to be shown to be

“based on her sex” with evidence beyond mere inference or assumption. See

Weickgenannt, 485 S.W.3d at 307-08; see also Fast Lane, Inc., 360 S.W.3d at 790

(requiring affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary

judgment).

             The Supreme Court explained in the recent case of Oncale
             v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S. Ct.
             998, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998), that “Title VII does not
             prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the
             workplace; it is directed only at ‘discriminat[ion] . . .
             because of . . . sex.’ We have never held that workplace
             harassment, even harassment between men and women, is
             automatically discrimination because of sex merely
             because the words used have sexual content or
             connotations.” Id. at 1002.

Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 790 (6th Cir. 2000).

             Notwithstanding, even if Smith could prove gender specificity, she

needed to show that the harassment she received was egregious enough to be

actionable. In order for conduct to be actionable, it must be severe or pervasive so

as to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. Harris v. Forklift

Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993).

                                        -12-
Whether the harassment is severe and pervasive is determined by a totality of the

circumstances test – circumstances including frequency and severity of the

conduct, whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether

it unreasonably interferes with the employee’s work performance. Id. at 23, 114

S. Ct. at 371.

             Our Supreme Court defined hostile work environment as meaning:

“the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult

that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s

employment and create an abusive working environment[.]” Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp., 536 U.S.at 116, 122 S. Ct. at 2074. See also Lumpkins ex rel. Lumpkins v.

City of Louisville, 157 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Ky. 2005) (“hostile work environment

discrimination must be severe or pervasive and more than episodic”). Moreover,

“simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely

serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of

employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S. Ct.

2275, 2283, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Smith, we agree with

the circuit court that the conduct was not so severe or pervasive as to create an

objectively hostile work environment.

                                          -13-
             Here, Smith argued that she was denied help, but MSD stated that

filling in for absent employees was commonplace for her position because certain

positions could not “be replaced by interchangeable members of the union

workforce.” She points to instances where she was called inappropriate names,

and while offensive, those names were infrequent and non-threatening. She felt

threatened once when a male employee threw his water bottle in anger and walked

toward her with fists clenched, but that was an isolated incident, the employee

apologized, and Smith reported no further acts of aggression. Also, Smith

contends she was micromanaged on her restroom breaks, but the record indicated

that she was asked to report when she left a jobsite (to return home to use the

restroom) and again when she returned to the jobsite so management could monitor

people and trucks during the workday. These incidents are not so severe nor

pervasive to be actionable. See Gray v. Kenton County, 467 S.W.3d 801 (Ky. App.

2014) (finding a male supervisor’s comments to a female employee about his

erectile dysfunction medicine, overtly sexual innuendoes and requests, and

physical critiques of her clothing and body were not sufficiently severe or

pervasive); see also Morris, 201 F.3d 784 (finding a male supervisor’s dirty jokes,

verbal sexual advances, calling a female subordinate “Hot Lips,” and commenting

on her clothing were not severe enough to create an objectively hostile

environment).

                                        -14-
               Additionally, Smith contends that “the severe and pervasive nature of

the harassment is a fact question for the jury – the trial court’s only role is to

determine whether facts have been presented not whether the facts are sufficient[,]”

citing Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814, 821 (Ky. 1992).

True, “[d]eciding whether the evidence presented proves misconduct ‘severe or

pervasive’ is not a question of law but a question of fact, albeit a question of

ultimate fact.” Id. However, a court has discretion5 to address the sufficiency of

the severe or pervasive claims “if the only reasonable inference from the evidence

fails to sustain the claim.” Id. at 822; see also Gray, 467 S.W.3d at 805 (“We do

not believe the trial court erred by finding that as a matter of law, no appellant

presented evidence of conduct sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to create a

hostile work environment.”).

               Therefore, we do not believe the circuit court erred in finding Smith’s

claim of hostile work environment insufficient; Smith did not present evidence of

conduct sufficiently severe and pervasive to establish a prima facie claim of hostile

work environment.

5
  The holding in Meyers discussed judicial discretion as permitted in granting a directed verdict,
but we find the analysis helpful here. “[W]e hold that a question of this nature [interpretive
function in factfinding as to whether harassment is severe or pervasive] remains essentially a
question of fact for the jury; a directed verdict is appropriate if the only reasonable inference
from the evidence fails to sustain the claim.” Meyers, 840 S.W.2d at 822 (citation omitted).

                                               -15-
             C. Retaliation

             Lastly, the circuit court found that Smith’s retaliation claim failed

because she could not “establish a causal connection between her protected activity

and any retaliatory conduct by MSD.” On appeal Smith argues that circumstantial

evidence is sufficient to establish a causal connection, citing to Nguyen, 229 F.3d

at 566, but even accepting that low bar, she does not establish the required causal

connection. Further dissection of this claim is not necessary as it was so aptly

addressed by the lower court, and we incorporate that analysis in this Opinion.

                    To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a
             plaintiff must demonstrate the following: (1) he engaged
             in activity protected by KRS § 344; (2) the defendant knew
             she was exercising her protected rights; (3) thereafter, the
             defendant took an employment action adverse to Plaintiff;
             and (4) there was a causal connection between the
             protected activity and the adverse action. Mountain Clay,
             Inc. v. Com., Com’n on Human Rights, 830 S.W.2d 395,
             396 (Ky. App. 1992); see also Arendale v. City of
             Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 606 (6th Cir. 2008). With respect
             to the last element, the causal connection is established by
             proving that “(1) the decision-maker responsible for
             making the adverse decision was aware of the protected
             activity at the time that the adverse decision was made, and
             (2) there was a close temporal relationship between the
             protected activity and the adverse action.” Banker v. Univ.
             of Louisville Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 466 S.W.3d 456, 461
             (Ky. 2015). Absent direct evidence of retaliation, the
             McDonnell Douglas framework applies. Canitia v. Yellow
             Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir. 1990)
             (internal citations omitted). The jury uses an objective
             standard: a reasonable employee must find the challenged
             action materially adverse. Burlington N. & Santa Fe [Ry.

                                         -16-
               Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415, 165
               L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006)].

                      A plaintiff alleging retaliation must adhere to a
               heightened causation standard as compared to
               discrimination. She “must establish that his or her
               protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged
               adverse action by the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
               Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). “’But for’
               causation exists where ‘the unlawful retaliation would not
               have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful
               action or actions of the employer.” Beard v. AAA of Mich.,
               593 F. App’x 447, 451 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nassar at
               360). However, “the ‘but for’ test does not require that the
               jury find discrimination was the exclusive motive for the
               [adverse employment action], but only that it was an
               essential ingredient.” Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co.,
               840 S.W.2d 814, 824 (Ky. 1992).

                      Ms. Smith cannot establish a causal connection
               between her protected activity and any retaliatory conduct
               by MSD. Although Ms. Smith’s response brief states that
               she complained to many people about alleged
               discrimination, she testified during her deposition about
               only three specific instances of protected activity: (1)
               making a verbal complaint to MSD’s Human Resources
               Department after Mr. Gallai’s[6] promotion; (2) filing her
               EEOC complaint about the respective promotions of [three
               male employees] in 2016 and 2017;[7] and (3) discussing
               her issues with [then-director of MSD].[8] As for how

6
 Smith alleges that Keith Gallai was promoted over her, then later as her supervisor, gave her a
negative review.
7
  Smith states this EEOC charge was filed “around” June 2017, however MSD states the charge
was filed in July 2016. This is relevant because – as MSD argues in its appellee brief – three of
the promotions (she complains of) happened before her complaint was filed in July 2016 and
could not thereby be the basis of a retaliation claim.
8
 Smith’s appellant brief states that in an undated conversation, Smith spoke with the then-
director of MSD and stated to him that she felt she was being passed over for promotion in part

                                              -17-
               MSD retaliated, she identified “not getting jobs” and
               “being shoved around,” which the Court takes to mean not
               getting overtime or event pay; not being called for
               additional shifts; her issues with [filling in for absent
               subordinates]; and Mr. Gallai’s stating she has a bad
               attitude in his review of her job performance. As for the
               prior, the temporal proximity of other’s promotions and
               her complaints are tenuous, and, more importantly, there
               is no evidence that anyone in a position to make decisions
               on promotions knew of her EEOC complaint or discussion
               with [the then-director].

                      The same is true for the latter, there is no evidence
               that Mr. Gallai knew about any of Ms. Smith’s respective
               complaints. To the extent that the conditions of her
               employment as Slip Line Supervisor could be considered
               a position used to retaliate against troublesome employees,
               there is also no evidence that anyone with authority to take
               such action knew of her complaints. Instead, the record
               includes scant evidence about who makes decisions
               regarding promotions. Some of the deponents participated
               in the interviewing process but had no decision making
               authority regarding hiring decisions. In sum, Ms. Smith
               points to insufficient evidence to make even a tenuous ‘but
               for’ connection between her complaints and anything that
               could be characterized as an adverse action.

               We agree. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not err in

finding Smith did not establish a prima facie claim for retaliation.

because of her gender. The director told her that “being the only woman in the department will
not necessarily give [her] the right to a job position” and that her “attitude” was probably the
prohibitive factor.

                                              -18-
                           IV.      CONCLUSION

             Considering the foregoing – and viewing all facts and inferences in

the record in a light most favorable to Smith – we AFFIRM the order of the

Jefferson Circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of MSD and

dismissing Smith’s claims of gender discrimination, hostile work environment

based on gender, and retaliation.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Marilyn “Linsey” Shrewsbury               Edward L. Lasley
Eddyville, Kentucky                       Bradley R. Palmer
                                          Louisville, Kentucky

                                       -19-