Court Opinion

ID: 9765437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:02:47.95457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.645497
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
The issue raised in this case is similar to that raised in Palmeri v. Pennsylvania State Police, 508 Pa. 544, 499 A.2d 278 (1985). We held in Palmeri, that the employer is required to prove by competent evidence that an employee’s disability will permanently prevent him from resuming the duties of his employment before Heart and Lung Act1 benefits can be terminated. The standard of proof required to show a permanent disability is evidence which raises a reasonable inference of permanency. And a reasonable inference of permanency may be established by evidence connecting the disability to a scientific probability that the incapacity will not improve to a point where the disabled employee can resume his employment duties. There is no cause to re-examine, restate, or disturb in any way this recently adopted standard.
The majority2 agrees that the employer has the burden of proving that a disability is permanent before Heart and Lung Act benefits may be terminated. The majority, how*89ever, expresses disagreement with the concept that a reasonable inference of permanency is established by evidence connecting the disability to a scientific probability that the incapacity will not improve to a point where the disabled employee can resume his employment duties. The majority equates “scientific probability” to “absolute certainty” and then opines that requiring proof that a disability is permanent to the degree of “absolute certainty” is much too onerous of a burden for an employer to meet. The “absolute certainty” criterion is created by the majority and set up as a strawman to be rejected as unrealistic.
After disapproving the standard we announced in Palmeri, the majority goes on to say “that the correct standard of proof is one which requires the employer to prove by substantial evidence a ‘reasonable inference’ that the disability is of lasting or indefinite duration.” The concept of “indefinite duration” is too nebulous of a notion to embrace as the standard for proving a permanent disability. A disability of indefinite duration is one which has no limits. It is a disability that will not end. This then is another way of saying that the disability is permanent. That is to say, if a disability is expected to continue on without limitation, then that disability is permanent. The criterion purportedly adopted by the majority can be expressed thusly; the standard of proof to establish that a disability is permanent is proof by substantial evidence of a reasonable inference that the disability is a permanent one. This is hardly a satisfactory standard. There remains a question of the evidence required to raise an inference that the disability is of “lasting or indefinite duration.” It is entirely unsatisfactory to say that a disability is permanent if it is of lasting and indefinite duration; and a disability is of lasting and indefinite duration if it is shown to be permanent. Proof that a disability is of indefinite duration may be met by the standard we adopted in Palmeri, namely, evidence connecting the disability to a scientific probability that the disabled employee has reached the maximum benefit from medical treatment, or he is as far restored as the permanent charac*90ter of his injuries will permit and he cannot resume the duties of employment. Palmeri v. Pennsylvania State Police, supra.
There is nothing mystical about the kind and quality of evidence we required in Palmeri. Expert medical opinion can be offered to establish permanency. The majority elects to forego necessary medical evidence and sanctions a finding of permanency based upon the length of time a disability has persisted coupled with the absence of a favorable prognosis. This is precisely the inadequate standard we rejected in Palmeri.
Additionally, in Palmeri, we said:
It is not necessary that an injured trooper recover so that he is able to perform every conceivable function that could possibly arise in connection with a policeman’s duties generally. It is enough that his recovery enable him to perform the duties of a position that is regularly assigned to state policemen even though the job be entirely sedentary.
In this case, Cunningham testified that he believed he could return to work at a desk job providing that he did not have to travel a great distance to and from his place of employment. The majority suggests it is not enough that the evidence show that the injured employee has recovered to a point when he is capable of assuming the duties of certain sedentary positions regularly assigned to state troopers. The majority would require the evidence to demonstrate a recovery that permits the employee to assume every conceivable duty associated with employment as a State Trooper. This directly conflicts with our opinion in Palmeri. I find no reason to deviate from the principles we recently adopted in Palmeri and I believe they should be applied here.
Reviewing the testimony and evidence in this case under our holding in Palmeri, it is apparent that the record lacks substantial evidence from which it reasonably can be inferred that the appellee Cunningham has a permanent inca*91pacity that will prevent him from resuming a position with the Pennsylvania State Police.
I dissent.
PAPADAKOS, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. 53 P.S. § 637.

. The majority opinion in this case is authored by Chief Justice Nix who joined in the majority in Palmeri v. Pennsylvania State Police, supra.