Court Opinion

ID: 9914176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 19:02:19.215867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:27.637312
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/29/23 P. v. Tarkington CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B329627

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA134487)
           v.

 ANTHONY L. TARKINGTON,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
     Anthony Tarkington, in pro. per.; and James M. Crawford,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       In 1997, a jury found Anthony Tarkington guilty of second
degree murder and found that he personally used a knife. He
thereafter petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6,1 which limited accomplice liability for murder. The trial
court denied the petition, and Tarkington appealed. His
appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Tarkington filed a supplemental
brief. As we now explain, the trial court did not err in denying
the petition.
                        INTRODUCTION
      In 1996, Tarkington fatally stabbed Donald Fitzpatrick
during a fistfight. Consequently, Tarkington was charged with
murder, and a jury found him guilty of second degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation that he personally
used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)).2 That same year, the trial court
sentenced Tarkington to “46 years to life” in prison.
      In 2022, Tarkington petitioned for resentencing on his
murder conviction under section 1172.6, and the trial court
appointed counsel to represent him. The People opposed the

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
      Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2     At the close of evidence at Tarkington’s trial, the trial court
found the evidence insufficient to show Tarkington acted with
premeditation and deliberation and granted a judgment of
acquittal on the first degree murder charge.

                                  2
petition on the ground that the trial court did not instruct
Tarkington’s jury on felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any theory that imputed malice to him.
Instead, he was prosecuted and convicted as the actual killer who
acted with malice aforethought. With its opposition, the People
submitted the jury instructions. The trial court denied the
petition, noting that the jury was not instructed on an invalid
theory and that the jury had found Tarkington personally used a
knife.
       This appeal followed. Tarkington’s appellate counsel filed
an opening brief that raised no issues and asked this court to
independently review the record under Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th 216. We directed appellant’s counsel to send the record
and a copy of the opening brief to Tarkington, and we advised
that within 30 days of the date of the notice, he could submit a
supplemental brief or letter stating any grounds for an appeal, or
contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider.
Tarkington submitted a supplemental brief in which he argued
that his petition for resentencing was improperly denied without
an evidentiary hearing and that errors in his trial require
reversal of the judgment of conviction.
                         DISCUSSION
      To the end of ensuring a person’s sentence is commensurate
with the person’s individual criminal culpability, Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) limited accomplice liability
under the felony-murder rule, eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, and
eliminated convictions for murder based on a theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14

                                3
Cal.5th 981, 986; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959;
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) Senate Bill
No. 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e) (limiting application
of the felony-murder rule) and section 188, subdivision (a)(3)
(stating that “to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought” and malice “shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime”).
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedure, codified at
section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder under the former
law to be resentenced if the person could no longer be convicted of
murder under the amended law. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
At the prima facie stage, the trial court takes as true the
petitioner’s factual allegations and assesses whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations were
proved. (Lewis, at p. 971.) In determining whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief, the trial court may look at
the record of conviction, including jury instructions, verdicts and
closing argument, to determine readily ascertainable facts such
as the crime of conviction. (People v. Duchine (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see, e.g., People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 56.) At the prima facie stage, the trial court does
not engage in fact finding that involves weighing evidence or
exercising discretion. (Lewis, at p. 972.) If a petition establishes
a prima facie case for relief, the trial court must appoint counsel
if requested, issue an order to show cause, and hold an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c), & (d)(1).)
Otherwise, the trial court may dismiss meritless petitions that do
not establish a prima facie case for relief. (Lewis, at p. 971.)

                                 4
       Tarkington did not establish a prima facie case for relief.
Tarkington’s jury was not instructed on felony murder, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or any theory under
which malice could have been imputed to him. The jury also
found that he personally used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The
record of conviction therefore shows that Tarkington was the sole
participant in the crime and actual killer, and he was convicted
as such. (See, e.g., Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233
[defendant ineligible for § 1172.6 relief where record made clear
he was actual killer and only participant in killing].)
       As for arguments Tarkington raises in his supplemental
brief, they primarily concern alleged error at his trial, including
that being tried for second degree murder after being acquitted of
first degree murder violated his constitutional rights. Such
claims are not properly before us, as a section 1172.6 petition is
not a vehicle to relitigate alleged trial errors. (See, e.g., People v.
Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 549 [§ 1172.6 “is not a means by
which a defendant can relitigate issues already decided”]; People
v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“mere filing” of
§ 1172.6 petition doesn’t afford petitioner new opportunity to
raise trial error claims or attack sufficiency of evidence to support
jury’s findings]; People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438
[§ 1172.6 is not a direct appeal].)
       To the extent Tarkington asserts that the trial court was
biased in ruling on his petition for resentencing, the record
contains no evidence to support that assertion. Rather, a trial
court’s rulings against a party do not establish judicial bias.
(Lewis v. City of Benicia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1539.)
       Similarly, to the extent Tarkington asserts his appellate
counsel was incompetent, he did not file a motion to have him

                                  5
removed as counsel, and the record contains no evidence to
support any assertion of incompetence.
                         DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                   EDMON, P. J.
We concur:

             LAVIN, J.

             EGERTON, J.

                               6