Court Opinion

ID: 9732854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:39:57.71206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:35.432034
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: A defendant in a death case should not be required to file a motion for a new trial as the majority holds. The majority states: “Defendant also raises several issues regarding his second sentencing hearing. However, he filed no post-trial motion after this hearing, and therefore the State argues that any sentencing issues are waived. We agree. In a capital case the jury’s determination whether the death penalty will be invoked is part of the ‘trial.’ Failure to raise trial errors in a post-trial motion, as required by section 116 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 116 — 1), waives those errors.” 113 Ill. 2d at 93. The majority then explains that an exception to this rule is made when there is plain error, which is so substantial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 113 Ill. 2d at 93-94. I believe the above-quoted language from the majority opinion is in conflict with this court’s opinion in People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 23, wherein this court stated: “Since this is a death penalty case, which under our constitution is automatically reviewed by this court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 4(b)), we must review the case whether or not a written motion for a new trial has been filed. Otherwise, the constitutional provision for an automatic appeal would be meaningless.” 102 Ill. 2d 23, 32. In the instant case, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial after the original trial. This court then remanded the case to the circuit court for an in camera inspection of certain notes. After the inspection of the notes and the trial court’s decision that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial, the defendant filed a second motion for a new trial. The second motion for a new trial was denied and a second sentencing hearing took place. To now hold that the defendant was required to file yet another motion for a new trial after his second sentencing hearing narrows the defendant’s constitutional right to a direct appeal. The relief the defendant would be requesting in the case at bar is a new sentencing hearing, not a new trial. Since the defendant knew that his second sentence of death would automatically be reviewed on direct appeal, as is constitutionally mandated, it would not have been logical for him to have filed a third motion for a new trial when all he is seeking is a new sentencing hearing. It should be noted that the constitutional provision providing for direct appeal to this court in death cases does not place any limitation on the scope of review. I believe the restriction which the majority is placing on the scope of review improperly narrows the defendant’s constitutional right to a direct appeal. In Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280, 305, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, the United States Supreme Court stated: “This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Because the United States Supreme Court has stated that a sentence of death is qualitatively different, I believe these cases should be treated differently under the waiver rule. For all of the above-stated reasons, I respectfully dissent, and I would consider the several issues that are raised by defendant on appeal.