Court Opinion

ID: 9611624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:58:36.691882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:15.552824
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION

JOHNSON, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion,
in which MEYERS and PRICE, JJ., join.
I respectfully dissent. Appellant was convicted of evading arrest. The Beaumont Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s request for a jury instruction on the defense of mistake of fact. Grant v. State, No. 09-94-181CR, slip op. at 5, 1998 WL 809413(Tex.App. — Beaumont November 18, 1998) (not designated for publication), 1998 WL 809413, at 2. Finding that this error was harmful, it remanded the cause for a new trial. Id. at 5-6, 1998 WL 809413, at *2-*3.
Today this court reverses the Court of Appeals because the mistake of fact instruction which appellant requested “was encompassed in the trial court’s jury charge which instructed the jury to convict only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knew the officer in question was a police officer.” Ante, at 732. As has been noted, because mistake of fact merely negates an element of the offense, the culpable mental state, there would normally need be “no instruction specifically directed to mistake of fact because the matter is adequately covered in the instruction on the elements of the offense .” 42 Geohge E. Drx & Robert O. Dawson, Texas Practice-. CRIMINAL PRACTICE and Procedure § 36.48 (1995). In so reasoning, the majority implicitly acknowledges that the defense of mistake of fact is not a true affirmative defense.
This, however, does not end the matter. While mistake of fact is not a true affirmative defense, our legislature has chosen to enact it as a statutory defense. TexPen. Code § 8.02(a).1 Pursuant to this statuto*733ry mandate, we have consistently held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on mistake of fact when it is raised by the evidence. Willis v. State, 790 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Hill v. State, 765 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Woodfox v. State, 742 S.W.2d 408, 409-10 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Lynch v. State, 643 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Montgomery v. State, 588 S.W.2d 950, 952-53 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Miller v. State, 815 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (plurality).2 The offense with which appellant in the instant case was charged provides that “[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.” TexPen. Code § 38.04. The jury charge tracked the specific language of the statute. Thus, under the logic of the majority, so long as the jury charge properly sets out the requisite culpable mental state of the offense charged, any erroneous refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of mistake of fact is, per se, harmless.
However, because the legislature has statutorily designated mistake of fact as a defense, it must be treated as something more than simply the negation of an element of the charged offense. To treat it as merely the negation of an element of the charged offense is to ignore its conferred legislative status and, in effect, to judicially repeal § 8.02. See Jackson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (to affirm conviction on basis of state’s argument that charge on mistake of fact is merely denial of element of state’s case would be to strike § 8.02 from the Penal Code); see also Tex. Const, art. II, § 1 (division of powers).
Thus, when a trial court erroneously refuses to give such an instruction, our courts do not conduct a harm analysis on the “theoreti cal” basis asserted by the majority today; instead, we realistically consider whether there was harm “in fight of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g); see, e.g., Hill v. State, 765 S.W.2d 794, 797-98 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (citing Almanza ); Miller, 815 S.W.2d at 585-86 (citing Almanza ); Bang v. State, 815 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no pet.) (citing Almanza ); Anderson, 11 S.W.3d 369, 373-74 (citing Almanza ). The majority opinion is in conflict with this approach.
Moreover, the majority opinion conflicts with two recent cases decided by this court. In Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36, 41 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), we held that the trial court had erred in not submitting the requested instruction on mistake of fact to *734the jury, and we remanded the cause to the Court of Appeals for an Almanza harm analysis. Yet, the majority now refuses to apply an Almanza harm analysis to such error.
In the second case, Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 59-61 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), we held that when a defendant has not requested a mistake of fact instruction, the trial court does not err in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on such a defensive issue; therefore, an Almanza harm analysis is not appropriate. An implication of that holding is that if a defendant does request an instruction on a defensive issue such as mistake of fact and the trial court erroneously refuses to charge the jury on that issue, then an Almanza analysis is the appropriate manner in which to determine harm. Again, the majority opinion is in conflict with this approach.
In the instant case, the court of appeals found that the trial court erroneously refused appellant’s requested instruction on mistake of fact. Grant, slip op. at 5, 1998 WL 809413, at *2. Consistent with our case law, the court of appeals then conducted the appropriate harm analysis, and found that there was harm. Id. at 6-6, 1998 WL 809413, at *2-*3. I would affirm its decision. Because a majority of this court reverses that decision in a manner that conflicts with both the legislature’s mandate and our own case law, I dissent.
Date Delivered: February 16, 2000
Do Not Publish

. More than half the states have similar statutes. See Ala .Code § 13A — 2—6(a)(1) (1999); Alaska Stat. § 11.81.620(b)(1) (1999); Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 13-204(A)(1) (1999); Cal.Penal Code § 26(3) (1999); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-1-504(l)(a) (1999); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-6(a)(1) (1999); Del.Code tit. 11, § 441(1) (1999); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 702-218(1) (1999); Idaho Code § 18-201(1) (1999); Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/4-8(a) (1999); Ind.Code § 35-41-3-7 (1999); Iowa Code § 701.6 (1999); Kan.Stat. § 21-3203(1) (1999); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 501.070(l)(a) (1999); La.Rev .Stat. § 14:16 (1999); Me.Rev.Stat. tit. 17 A, § 36(1) (1999) Mo.Rev.Stat. § 562.031(1) (1999); Nev.Rev. Stat. § 194.010(4) (1999); N.H.Rev.Stat § 626:3(I)(a) (1999); N.J.Stat. § 2C:2-4(a)(l) (1999); N.Y. Penal Law § 15.20(l)(a) (1999); Okla .Stat. tit. 21, § 152(5) (1999); Pa. Cons. Stat. § 304(1) (1999); S.D.Codified Laws § 22-3-1(3) (1999); TennCode § 39-11-502(a) (1999); Utah Code § 76-2-304(1) (1999); Wis.Stat. § 939.43(1) (1999).
Several other United States jurisdictions have similar statutes. See 9 Guam Code § 7.55(a) (1999); P.R. Laws tit. 33, § 3092 (1999); V.I.Code tit. 14, § 14(5) (1999). The *733Model Penal Code also has such a provision. Model Penal Code § 2.04(l)(a).

. Recently, we held that a defendant is not entitled to a separate jury instruction on the defense of alibi. Giesberg v. State, 984 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1147, 119 S.Ct. 1044, 143 L.Ed.2d 51 (1999). We noted that an alibi defense is not a true affirmative defense, but merely negates an element of the offense. Id. at 250. However, our holding ultimately rested upon the basis that an alibi defense is not recognized by the legislature as either a defense or an affirmative defense. Id. In the present case, although mistake of fact is not a true affirmative defense, it has been recognized by the legislature as a defense. Thus, Giesberg is consistent with our case law concerning a defendant’s entitlement to a jury instruction on mistake of fact. See Anderson v. State, 11 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.]no pet. h.).