Court Opinion

ID: 9726906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:12:09.014737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.470762
License: Public Domain

WIENER, J., Concurring and Dissenting
I agree with the majority that further proceedings to determine Hoffman’s MDSO condition are barred. I respectfully dissent from the holding directing the trial court upon remand to pronounce judgment on count 5. Because of the circumstances surrounding the sentencing in this case, the trial court, under the impression defendant had sufficient credit to satisfy whatever sentence might be imposed, found it unnecessary to orally articulate the sentence on the additional count. Accordingly, this case falls within Penal Code section 669, requiring the sentence on count 5 to be served concurrently. Although Penal Code section 669 generally permits a *726court which has not determined whether the second judgment shall run concurrently or consecutively to a prior judgment to correct the judgment within 60 days, the sentencing court cannot do so here because the “prior” consisted of another conviction in the same case. (In re Calhoun (1976) 17 Cal.3d 75, 80-81 [130 Cal.Rptr. 139, 549 P.2d 1235].)
My point of departure from the analysis made by the majority is their assumption there was “[no] error ... ‘in the pronouncement of judgment’” because “. .. the trial judge did not pronounce any judgment whatsoever” on the omitted count. (Ante, p. 724.) I do not believe their unequivocal positivism excluding other reasonable inferences is warranted. A brief review of the events occurring after criminal proceedings were resumed is helpful.
After Hoffman waived arraignment for judgment and sentence, on December 5, 1980, the third continued sentencing hearing, the judge said, “. .. I’ve done my mathematics on my computer this morning, and it turns out that the credit time that you computed . . . exceeds by quite a little bit the maximum period of commitment as computed by the Community Release Board .... [I]n that statement [the] maximum term of commitment indicates that the maximum term of commitment for the crime of forcible rape with an armed allegation for Mr. Hoffman was six years eight months and sixteen days; and at that time, they set his release date on January 12th, 1980. . ..
“It will be the judgment and sentence of this court that the defendant be sentenced to the state prison for the term prescribed by law. This offense was as a result of a plea of guilty under the indeterminate sentence law; but as I’ve indicated, the amount of time to be served has been served, six years, eight months and sixteen days. You’ll be given credit for that time, for the time that you have served, which has been computed by the probation officer at 2462 days, plus 3 ... . ” (Italics supplied.)
Shortly thereafter, the judge caught the error made by the Community Release Board which had computed the release date on the basis of a one-count conviction of rape with an armed allegation overlooking Hoffman’s conviction of a second count. The court on its own motion set the matter down for a further hearing. During that hearing, the court acknowledged its reliance on the mistake which had been made “by the Community Release Board [to reach] a threshold assumption at *727the time of sentencing.” The commitment previously made was recalled and the case continued for resentencing.
At this further hearing, the judge again explained his assumption at the time of sentencing was based upon the Community Release Board’s error in computing the maximum amount of time the defendant could serve. He said, “I don’t think the record ever reflected, at least not with clarity, other than the clerk’s minutes, that count 2 was by this court sentenced to have been run consecutive to—or the second count was to have run consecutive to the first one.” (Italics supplied.) Also, “We’re here today for two things, and that is to, certainly, correct the record with regard to the second count so that the record clearly reflects the court's intention that that count was to run consecutive or, originally, that that was the court's intention; ...” (Italics supplied.) At this juncture proceedings were deferred because Hoffman sought a writ of prohibition.
In light of this history, I believe at least two inferences may be drawn from the court’s pronouncement of judgment. One possible inference is that made by the majority—the trial judge’s failure to refer to count 5 indicates he overlooked that count, thereby retaining the power, absent prejudice to the defendant, to exercise judicial discretion to sentence at a later time. But an equally plausible inference may also be drawn. Here, the trial judge, thoughtfully grappling with the many difficult issues presented over a period of several weeks at six different hearings, finally reached the frustrating, perhaps exasperating, time to sentence a potentially dangerous person under circumstances which appeared to furnish no alternative other than to release the defendant because of the time he had already served. With this mind set, it would hardly have been necessary or even expected, that a trial judge recite the sentence on each count when doing so would have been an exercise in futility. In that setting, the court’s silence can reasonably be interpreted to reflect its intent that the sentence on the omitted count was included within the count upon which sentence was imposed. This logical inference is also consistent with the judge’s later expression of his intention to have sentenced on both counts. Where two inferences can be drawn in a criminal case, one favorable to the defendant and the other unfavorable, we are compelled to adopt the inference which favors defendant. (See generally, In re Tartar (1959) 52 Cal.2d 250, 257 [339 P.2d 553].) Thus, pursuant to Penal Code section 669, the court may not now impose consecutive sentences. *728More importantly, the rule the majority has fashioned will have dramatic consequences inviting the exercise of judicial discretion at sentencing on more than one occasion. In its present form, the opinion authorizes an appellate court after affirmance of a multicount judgment to remand to the trial court for resentencing on affirmed counts which were not mentioned during the pronouncement of judgment. Now as a matter of law, a record which does not reflect pronouncement of judgment on every count of which a defendant stands convicted will necessarily mean the trial court failed to sentence on the omitted count(s) rather than having exercised discretion to allow a defendant to serve the omitted counts concurrently. The authorities cited by the majority do not support this holding.
The question in People v. Williams (1944) 24 Cal.2d 848 [151 P.2d 244], was whether sentence could be imposed at the time of revocation of probation where it was not pronounced at the time probation was granted. The court held the failure to pronounce judgment within the time prescribed by Penal Code section 1191 was not jurisdictional and sentence was properly imposed at the time of probation revocation where the defendant was confined in another state there being no duty to pronounce judgment against an absent defendant. (Id., at pp. 850-854.) People v. Benton (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 92, 102 [161 Cal.Rptr. 12], involved the imposition of an unauthorized sentence, not the case here, which could be corrected upon remand. In People v. Morrow (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 507, 514-515 [80 Cal.Rptr. 75], the trial judge expressly refused to impose sentence on a specific count. There being no doubt as to the trial court’s failure to exercise discretion, the appellate court in dictum opined mandate would lie for the performance of this judicial responsibility. (Ibid.) Both People v. Harrison (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 602, 610 [85 Cal.Rptr. 302], and People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 638, 642 [82 Cal.Rptr. 658], required a remand to the trial court for sentencing after reversal of convictions because the trial court had failed to stay execution of the less severely punishable offenses pending appeal or during service of the term imposed on other counts pursuant to People v. Niles (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 756 [39 Cal.Rptr. 11].
Thus, without legislation or case authority, the majority has developed a new proposition wholly contrary to the rationale and holdings of In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705 [91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729], and People v. Hartsell, supra, 34 Cal.App.3d 8, 12-15. Accord*729ingly, I would issue the writ of prohibition without remand for further proceedings.