Court Opinion

ID: 9907633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 19:01:54.467738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:29.728795
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
WALKER, POND, and PARKER
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
Vv.
Specialist RYAN R. BOOTHBY
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20210445

Headquarters, Fort Liberty
Albert G. Courie III, Military Judge
Colonel Warren L. Wells, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial)
Colonel Joseph B. Mackey, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial)

For Appellant: Colonel Philip M. Staten, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Autumn R. Porter,
JA; Major Robert W. Rodriguez, JA; Captain Rachel M. Rose, JA (on brief).

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline J. DeGaine, JA; Major Chase C.
Cleveland, JA; Major Kalin P. Schlueter, JA (on brief).

28 November 2023

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

POND, Judge:

Appellant requests this court grant appropriate relief for excessive post-trial
delay where 583 days elapsed from adjournment to this court’s receipt of appellant’s
64-page record of trial. We agree and grant 15 days of sentencing relief.

BACKGROUND

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant,
consistent with his pleas, of one specification of possession of child pornography
and one specification of viewing child pornography in violation of Article 134,
BOOTHBY — ARMY 20210445

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934. The military judge
sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge and seven months confinement.”

Appellant’s court-martial adjourned on 27 July 2021. On 19 August 2021, the
convening authority acted on appellant’s requests for deferment and waiver and took
no action on the findings or sentence. Almost a year after appellant’s trial, on 21
July 2022, the military judge authenticated the record. Appellant’s record then sat
for seven months until 23 February 2023, when appellant demanded speedy post-trial
processing. Four days later, the court reporter authenticated the record on 27
February 2023. This court received appellant’s record of trial on 2 March 2023, 583
days after appellant’s court-martial adjourned. Excluding 18 days of defense delay,
the government took 565 days to process and forward appellant’s 64-page record of
trial for appellate review.

In explanation for the delay, the Acting Chief, Military Justice provided a
memorandum in the record stating the delay was due to high turnover of their court
reporter personnel and the abrupt vacancy of their post-trial paralegal. When
appellant’s court-martial adjourned, there was a backlog of twelve courts-martial
constituting 104 hours of transcription. After the military judge authenticated
appellant’s record, their office prioritized the processing of cases older than
appellant’s, which included conducting redactions of ten records which did not
include the record in this case.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

This court reviews claims of excessive post-trial delay de novo. United States
v. Anderson, 82 M.J. 82, 85 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (citing United States v. Moreno, 63
M.J. 129, 135 (C.A.A.F. 2006)). When an appellant demonstrates excessive post-
trial processing, this court has the discretion to determine whether relief is
appropriate. See UCMJ Art. 66(d)(2).

In determining whether relief is appropriate, this court considers the totality
of the circumstances “balancing the interplay between factors such as chronology,
complexity, and unavailability, as well as the unit's memorialized justifications for
any delay.” United States v. Winfield, 83 M.J. 662, 666 (Army Ct. Crim. App.
2023). But legitimate justifications of post-trial delay do not include issues with
personnel and administration. United States v. Arriaga, 70 M.J. 51, 57 (C.A.A.F.
2011). “To allow caseloads to become a factor in determining whether appellate

“Under segmented sentencing, the military judge sentenced appellant to seven
months confinement for possessing child pornography in Specification 1 of The
Charge and six months confinement for viewing child pornography in Specification
2 of The Charge to be served concurrently.
BOOTHBY — ARMY 20210445

delay is excessive would allow administrative factors to trump the Article 66 and
due process rights of appellants.” Moreno, 63 M.J. at 137 (quoting Diaz v. JAG of

the Navy, 59 M.J. 34, 38 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

The post-trial processing delay of appellant’s sixty-four-page record of trial is
excessive. The unit’s explanation of the delay does not justify it. The record was
not authenticated until a year after appellant’s trial after which it appears nothing
happened for seven months until appellant demanded speedy post-trial processing.
Appellant has alleged no prejudice and based upon the serious nature of the offenses
of possessing and viewing child pornography, he received the benefit of his plea
agreement. Even so, the government’s delay in processing such a short record, even
considering the backlog of cases and shortage of personnel, warrants appropriate

relief.

CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of the entire record, the findings of guilty are
AFFIRMED. Only so much of the sentence as provides for a bad-conduct discharge
and six months and fifteen days of confinement is AFFIRMED.

Senior Judge WALKER and Judge PARKER concur.

FOR THE COURT:

JAMES W. HERRING, JR.
Clerk of Court