Court Opinion

ID: 9891147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 17:04:11.748635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:12.218946
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/17/23 Schweissinger v. Crown Dodge CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 DONNA SCHWEISSINGER et                                       2d Civil No. B326690
 al.,                                                       (Super. Ct. No. 56-2019-
                                                             00524183-CU-PA-VTA)
      Plaintiffs and Respondents,                              (Ventura County)

 v.

 CROWN DODGE et al.,

      Defendants and Appellants.

       Crown Dodge (Dodge) appeals from the judgment after a
jury trial and an order denying Dodge’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The jury found in favor of plaintiffs,
Donna Schweissinger and her children, in a wrongful death
lawsuit against the driver in a fatal car accident and the driver’s
employer, Dodge. On appeal, Dodge contends the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the driver was in
the scope of his employment at the time of the car accident. We
affirm.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Aaron Lane was an internet sales manager at Dodge. His
job required him to contact customers to get them into the
dealership to purchase cars. He did his job “anywhere and at any
time.” Lane’s income was based fully on commission.
       Lane testified that selling cars and meeting clients to close
a sale were a part of his regular duties. Dodge trained him to see
a sale through to the end, which included meeting a customer at
the dealership to close a sale. Dodge trained its salespeople: “one
vehicle, one salesman, one customer.” The president of Dodge
testified that whenever possible, the dealership preferred one
salesperson to handle an entire deal.
       In June 2018, Lane was at the beach on his day off from
work when he received a call from a coworker. The coworker told
Lane that one of his customers was in the dealership to close a
sale. The coworker asked if Lane wanted to close the deal
himself or if he wanted another salesperson to handle it. If Lane
went to the dealership himself, he would earn full commission on
the sale. If another salesperson handled the sale, Lane would
have to split half of the commission with that salesperson.
       Lane told his coworker that he would handle the sale and
immediately left the beach to go to the dealership. On his way to
the dealership, Lane struck and killed Jeffery Schweissinger.
       Plaintiffs, the surviving heirs, sued Lane and Dodge for
negligence-wrongful death and a “survival action.” They alleged
Lane was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the
accident.
       At trial, the parties stipulated Lane was negligent and
caused decedent’s death. The sole liability question remaining
for the jury was whether Lane was acting in the scope of his

                                 2
employment for Dodge at the time of the collision. Lane, several
Dodge employees, and the president of Dodge testified regarding
the company’s policies, its expectations for its salespeople, and
the job duties of its salespeople. At the conclusion of trial, the
jury found that Lane was acting in the scope of his employment
for Dodge. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs.
       Dodge filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of
law to support the jury’s verdict. The trial court denied the
motion.
                            DISCUSSION
       Dodge contends there was no substantial evidence to
support the jury’s finding that Lane was acting in the scope of his
employment at the time of the collision. We disagree.
       We review the jury’s finding for substantial evidence. We
read the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. We
accept as true all evidence and reasonable inferences in support
of the jury’s verdict and resolve every conflict in favor of the
judgment. (Stubblefield Construction Co. v. City of San
Bernardino (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 687, 703 [applying substantial
evidence review to a denial of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict]; Mendoza v. Western Medical Center
Santa Ana (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1343.)
       The sole liability question before the jury was whether
Lane acted within the scope of his employment at the time of the
collision. Conduct is within the scope of employment if it is
“reasonably related to the kind of tasks that the [employee] was
employed to perform” or if it is “reasonably foreseeable in light of
the employer’s business or the [employee’s job] responsibilities.”
(CACI No. 3720.) Scope of employment “has been interpreted

                                 3
broadly under the respondeat superior doctrine in California.
[Citation.] . . . The employer’s liability extends to risks inherent
in or incidental to the employer’s enterprise. [Citation.]”
(Morales-Simental v. Genentech, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 445,
452 (Morales).)
       An exception to the respondeat superior doctrine is the
“going-and-coming rule.” “Generally, an employee is outside the
scope of his employment while engaged in his ordinary commute
to and from his place of work.” (Felix v. Asai (1987) 192
Cal.App.3d 926, 931 (Felix).) The going-and-coming rule is
“based on the theory that the employment relationship is
suspended from the time the employee leaves his job until he
returns and on the theory that during the normal everyday
commute, the employee is not rendering services directly or
indirectly to his employer.” (Ibid.)
       An exception to the going-and-coming rule is the “special
errand rule.” “If the employee is not simply on his way from his
home to his normal place of work or returning from said place to
his home for his own purpose, but is coming from his home or
returning to it on a special errand either as part of his regular
duties or at a specific order or request of his employer, the
employee is considered to be in the scope of his employment from
the time that he starts on the errand until he has returned or
until he deviates therefrom for personal reasons. [Citations.]”
(Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 789 (Boynton).)
The errand must be performed as either (1) part of the employee’s
regular duties, or (2) at the specific request or expectation of the
employer. (Ibid.; Morales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 452-454.)
It is not necessary for the employee to be directly engaged in

                                 4
their job duties; included are errands that incidentally or
indirectly benefit the employer. (Morales, at pp. 452-453.)
       Substantial evidence supports a finding that Lane was
acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the collision.
Plaintiffs presented evidence that Lane’s drive to the dealership
on the day of the collision was not his ordinary commute to work,
but rather a commute to perform a special task benefiting Dodge.
The special errand rule “may be applicable to the employee who
is called to work to perform a special task for the employer at an
irregular time.” (Felix, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 932.) Lane
was on his day off from work and at the beach when he received a
call from his coworker. He testified that he would not have
driven to the dealership on that day if he had not received the
phone call. He testified that he was on a “special trip” to the
dealership to meet his customer and that prior to that day, he
had never driven from the beach to the dealership. This evidence
showed that Lane’s commute into work at the time of the collision
was “not simply on his way from his home to his normal place of
work . . . for his own purpose.” (Boynton, supra, 139 Cal.App.2d
at p. 789.) But instead, Lane drove to the dealership while
performing a special errand in service of his employer. (Compare
with Sullivan v. Thompson (1939) 30 Cal.App.2d 675, 677-678
[employee was within the scope of his employment at the time of
a car accident where the evidence established that he was
scheduled to work at one location, but was on his way to the
employer’s other location to meet with a customer one hour
earlier than his scheduled shift].)
       There is also substantial evidence that Lane was on a
special errand as either a part of his regular duties or at the
request of his employer. Lane testified that his regular duties

                                5
included “selling cars and meeting clients to close a sale” and that
he performed his job “anywhere and at any time.” He also
testified that he would always come in on his day off when he was
called. Another employee testified that it was common for a
salesperson to come in on their day off to complete a sale.
       Plaintiffs also presented evidence that Dodge requested or
expected Lane to partake in the errand. (Boynton, supra, 139
Cal.App.2d at p. 789 [special errand rule may apply to tasks that
the employer requests or at least expects the employee to
perform].) Plaintiffs presented evidence that Dodge paid its
salespeople through commission and bonuses. Lane’s income at
the dealership was based fully on commission. Dodge’s policy
was that in order to receive full commission, a salesperson must
be at the dealership to close a sale. Otherwise, the commission
would be split in half. Dodge’s president also testified that the
company “prefer[red] one salesperson to handle an entire deal.”
Dodge trained its salespeople: “one vehicle, one salesman, one
customer.” Thus, employees such as Lane were incentivized to
complete a sale from start to finish.
       Lane also testified that he went into work on the day of the
collision because Dodge “trained” him to see the sale through to
the end. Another employee testified that management would
recognize the salesperson’s “performance” when they came in to
close a deal on their day off. A former employee testified that one
time, Dodge’s management made derogatory comments towards
him during a sales meeting because he did not come in on his day
off to meet with a customer. Based on this evidence, a jury could
reasonably find that coming into work on a day off to complete a
sale was either a part of Lane’s regular duties or requested or
expected by Dodge.

                                 6
       Dodge argues that the special errand rule does not apply
because Lane was not required to come in on his day off to
complete the sale. But a special errand need not be mandatory
for the rule to apply. In Boynton, supra, 139 Cal.App.2d at p.
789, the Court of Appeal held that “attendance at a social
function, although not forming part of the normal duties of the
employee, may come under the ‘special errand rule’ if the
function or the attendance was connected with the employment
and for a material part intended to benefit the employer who
requested or expected the employee to attend.” There, the
employee caused a car accident while driving back home from a
banquet honoring employees who had five or more years of
service. Although the employer testified the banquet was “purely
social, a friendly get-together, without any compulsion to attend,”
the employee was invited, the employer benefited by promoting
employment continuity, and employee attendance was “at least
expected.” (Id. at p. 791.)
       Dodge also compares this case to Morales, supra, 16
Cal.App.5th 445, but that case is inapposite. In Morales, an
employee struck and killed the decedent while he was driving to
work on his night off. The employee claimed that he was going to
work to review resumes in preparation for job interviews. (Id. at
pp. 448-449.) The Court of Appeal upheld the order granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer,
concluding there was no triable issue of fact as to whether the
employee was acting in the scope of his employment at the time
of the accident. (Id. at p. 448.) Notably, there was no evidence
his employer requested or expected him to drive into the office
that night to prepare for the interviews. (Id. at pp. 455, 458.)
Furthermore, the plaintiffs did not present any evidence the

                                 7
employee “had even once before made a special trip to [work] to
review resumes or perform any task connected to hiring.” Thus,
it could not be inferred that such trip was part of his regular
duties. (Id. at p. 460.)
       Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs presented substantial
evidence that Dodge had expected its salespeople to come into
work on their day off in order to complete a sale and that Lane
was performing his regular duties at the time of the collision.
Thus, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict.
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs
on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             CODY, J.

                               8
                   Jeffrey G. Bennett, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad, Mitchell C. Tilner;
Daniels, Fine, Israel, Schonbuch & Lebovits, Michael Schonbuch
and Bernadette Castillo Brouses for Defendant and Appellant.
      Alan Charles Dell’Ario; Chang Klein, Deborah S. Chang,
Candice S. Klein, Patrick Gunning and Sarah S. Kim for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.