Court Opinion

ID: 9705111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:56:52.963855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:08.070981
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
While I agree with, and join in, most of what the majority says, I believe some additional comment regarding Edward DePiso’s testimony is required. The lower court held that the testimony was within the co-conspirator exception to the rule against hearsay evidence. The majority doesn’t dis*72cuss this issue, only observing that “[a]t most, [the lower court’s ruling] was harmless error.” At 70. While I agree that the ruling was harmless error, I believe that it is important that we explain why it was error, so that in another case, in which it would not be harmless, the error may be avoided.
Sometime in March, before the shooting, appellant went to see John Chairmonte, who was at the time working on an automobile with a friend, Edward DePiso. Chairmonte stopped his work and went for a ride with appellant in appellant’s pick-up truck. Chairmonte testified that during the ride, appellant gave him a gun and a box of bullets, and told him “[t]hat he wanted a babysitter shot.” N.T. Vol. II at 19. The Commonwealth asked Chairmonte what he told DePiso after appellant dropped him off:
Q. [By the assistant district attorney] Did you talk to Eddie [DePiso] then?
A. Yes.
Q. How long were you gone?
A. I’d say about twenty minutes.
Q. Did you show Eddie the gun?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What did you tell him?
A. I told him that the guy just dropped it off to me.
Q. Did you say that guy or did you use a name if you remember?
A. I don’t remember.
N.T. Yol. II at 22.
Later the Commonwealth called DePiso, and he testified as follows:
Q. [By the assistant district attorney] Did John [Chairmonte] have the box of shells and the gun to your knowledge before Mr. Todt had arrived in his green truck?
*73A. No, he didn’t.
Q. Did John say anything to you thereafter?
A. Yes. He said that’s the guy that—
MR. FREEDMAN [defense counsel]: Objected to as to what he said.
MR. RUBENSTEIN [assistant district attorney]: It’s been testified to by John Chairmonte, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. I’ll permit it. You may answer.
THE WITNESS: John Chairmonte said, “That’s the guy Todt that wants me to bump off his old lady.”
N.T. Yol. IX at 72, 73.
Since DePiso’s testimony of what Chairmonte said was offered for its truth—it had no relevance except as it was true—it was hearsay. The lower court held, however, that the testimony was admissible as within the co-conspirator exception to the rule against hearsay evidence. The majority doesn’t discuss the issue raised by this ruling, only observing that “[a]t most, [the ruling] was harmless error.” At 70. The issue, however, involves an aspect of the co-conspirator exception that our cases do not address, and I believe we should discuss it.
The co-conspirator exception “allows statements by a co-conspirator to be admitted against an accused if the statements are made during the conspiracy, in furtherance thereof, and where there is other evidence of the existence of a conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Dreibelbis, 493 Pa. 466, 475, 426 A.2d 1111, 1115 (1981). See also, Commonwealth v. Hirsch, 225 Pa.Super. 494, 311 A.2d 679 (1973). This exception extends to “declarations of acts of one conspirator made to third parties in the absence of his co-conspirator ... provided that such declarations were made during the conspiracy and in furtherance of the common design ....” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 394 Pa. 588, 607, 148 A.2d 234, 244 (1959) (citations omitted).
*74Chairmonte’s statement to DePiso was made “during the conspiracy,” for appellant had just given Chairmonte the gun and bullets, but it was not made “in furtherance” of the conspiracy. Although no Pennsylvania appellate court has explained the “in furtherance” requirement, several federal decisions have. These decisions are pertinent, for Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) is virtually identical to the Pennsylvania rule; the only difference is that under the particular terminology of the Federal Rule a statement to a co-conspirator is “not hearsay,” rather than being an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
In United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049, 96 S.Ct. 775, 46 L.Ed.2d 637 (1976), the court found that a co-conspirator’s statement to a third party was not in furtherance of the conspiracy because he was not “seeking to induce [the witness] to deal with the conspirators or in any other way to cooperate or assit in achieving the conspirators’ common objectives____ Rather, the statement was, at best, nothing more than [the declarant’s] casual admission of culpability to someone he had individually decided to trust.” Id. at 1077 (citations omitted). In United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.1979) (per curiam), the court stated that “[sufficient evidence had to exist to support an inference that the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy, while the conspiracy was in existence....” Id. at 519. The court explained that “mere conversation between co-conspirators” or “merely narrative declarations” are not admissible as they are not in furtherance of the “common objectives of the conspiracy.” Id. at 520. See also, United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719 (9th Cir.1981).
*75Chairmonte’s statement to DePiso, “That’s the guy Todt who wants me to bump off his old lady,” was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. Nothing indicates that Chairmonte was seeking DePiso’s assistance. Cf Commonwealth v. Garcia, 478 Pa. 406, 387 A.2d 46 (1978) (“Do you know anybody who would bump off her old man for a thousand dollars?”). Chairmonte’s statement was “nothing more than [his] casual admission of culpability to someone he had individually decided to trust.” Chairmonte’s statement was therefore not within the co-conspirator exception, and DePiso’s testimony quoting the statement should not have been admitted.
The question therefore arises whether the lower court’s error in admitting DePiso’s testimony requires a new trial. A new trial will not be granted if the error was harmless. In Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978), the Supreme Court said that “an error cannot be held harmless error unless the appellate court determines that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Whenever there is a ‘ “reasonable possibility”' that an error ‘ “might have contributed to the conviction,” ’ the error is not harmless.” Id., 476 Pa. at 409, 383 A.2d at 164 (citations omitted). The appellate court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Id., 476 Pa. at 406, 383 A.2d at 162.
I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that DePiso’s inadmissible hearsay statement did not contribute to appellant’s conviction. Chairmonte himself testified that he was hired by appellant to kill Mrs. Todt. N.T. Vol. II at 40, 46, 47, 53, 60. Despite some inconsistencies, on critical points Chairmonte’s testimony was corroborated. The opinion of the lower court adequately details this corroboration. Slip op. at 5-8. I am satisfied that had DePiso’s statement not been admitted, the jury’s verdict would have been the same.
I concur in the majority’s order remanding the case for resentencing.