Court Opinion

ID: 5486588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-10 02:15:10.28841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:33:41.514027
License: Public Domain

Smith, J. (dissenting).
I would affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
As a general matter, it is true that whether a particular event is an “accident” should be viewed from the point of view of the insured. The insured here was Spicehandler, the event was an accident from his point of view, and his estate was therefore properly allowed to recover under the so-called PIP and Coverage S endorsements.
But uninsured/underinsured motorists (UM) coverage is different. Its purpose is to protect an insured who is injured by a tortfeasor without liability insurance—a purpose accomplished by putting the insured in the position that he would have been in if the tortfeasor had been insured. This requires a determination of whether the tortfeasor could have made a claim under a hypothetical policy of liability insurance—and the tortfeasor should thus be treated as the “insured” for purposes of analysis. Since Popadich drove his car into Spicehandler on purpose, the event was not an accident from Popadich’s point of view; *358Popadich could not have obtained indemnification from a liability insurer; and Spicehandler’s estate should not be permitted to recover under the UM endorsement.
This is essentially what we held when we affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision in McCarthy v Motor Veh. Acc. Indent. Corp. (16 AD2d 35 [4th Dept 1962], affd 12 NY2d 922 [1963]). The majority tries to distinguish McCarthy on what it calls two grounds, which seem really to be one—that UM coverage is “part of the insured’s own policy” and that “the insured is the victim in this case, not the tortfeasor” (majority op at 356). The distinction will not withstand analysis. The purpose of UM coverage is the same as the purpose of the MVAIC endorsement at issue in McCarthy: “to afford coverage,” as the majority puts it, “to a person injured by an uninsured or unidentified motorist, equal to that available to one injured by a motorist covered by an applicable liability policy” (majority op at 356). The essential rationale for McCarthy is that the victim of an uninsured motorist should not be in a better position than the victim of an insured one. That rationale was sound in McCarthy, and is sound here.
I see no justification for departing from McCarthy. A more serious argument might be made—though it is not made here— for a more significant change in the law: modifying, in cases involving automobile liability policies required by statute, the general rule that liability insurance cannot cover intentional torts. As McCarthy mentions, a standard automobile liability policy provides coverage only for accidents, and thus would not cover “an assault and battery committed by the insured” (16 AD2d at 41; see also e.g. Matter of Travelers Indent. Co. v Richards-Campbell, 73 AD3d 1076 [2d Dept 2010]; Matter of Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v Perry, 220 AD2d 497 [2d Dept 1995]). This limitation seems to be derived from the long-established rule, based on public policy, that insurance may not indemnify a tortfeasor for intentional wrongdoing (Messersmith v American Fid. Co., 232 NY 161, 165 [1921]; Town of Massena v Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 98 NY2d 435, 445 [2002]). Courts in some jurisdictions have made compulsory liability insurance an exception to this rule, reasoning that the purpose of liability insurance, to the extent that it is required by law, is to protect injured victims, not tortfeasors, and that victims should be protected no less against intentional than against negligent torts (e.g. Speros v Fricke, 98 P3d 28, 36-38 [Utah 2004]; Dotts v Taressa J.A., 182 W Va 586, 390 SE2d 568 [1990]; Wheeler v *359O’Connell, 297 Mass 549, 9 NE2d 544 [1937]). Whether such an exception is justified, and if so whether it should be created by judges or by legislators, are questions that we should not address until we have a case that presents them.
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Pigott and Jones concur with Chief Judge Lippman; Judge Smith dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judge Read concurs.
Order modified, etc.