Court Opinion

ID: 9571763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:34:57.66081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:55.131223
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion and would affirm the Court of Appeals.
Workers’ compensation laws were enacted so that the “employee receives the right to swift and sure compensation; the employer receives immunity from tort actions by the employee. This quid pro quo approach to workers’ compensation has worked to the advantage of society as well as the employee and employer.” Parker v. Williams and Madjanik, Inc., 275 S.C. 65, 70, 267 S.E.2d 524, 526 (1980). The purpose of workers’ compensation is to settle claims quickly and efficiently. Id. One of the ways the legislature sought to insure this result was by enacting statutes that require the exchange of medical information so that claims can be evaluated and settled in a timely manner.
*442Both the employer’s representatives and the claimant’s'representatives must comply with the statutes and regulation compelling disclosure of relevant medical information. S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-95 (1976) provides:
All eodsting information compiled by a health care facility, as defined in Section 44-7-130, or a health care provider licensed pursuant to Title 40 pertaining directly to a workers’ compensation claim must be provided to the insurance carrier, the employer, the employee, their attorneys or the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission, within fourteen days after receipt of written request----
(emphasis supplied).
25A S.C.Code Ann. Reg. § 67-1301(A) (Supp.2001) provides “[a] medical practitioner or treatment facility shall furnish upon request all medical information relevant to the employee’s complaint of injury to the claimant, the employer, the employer’s representative, or the Commission .... ” (emphasis supplied). The claimant’s health care providers and treatment facilities are thus compelled by the statute, and by the regulation, to disclose information relevant to the claimant’s injury to all parties and their representatives.
The question before us is whether the Commission properly interpreted its regulation to allow Employer and its representatives to contact the health care providers “ex parte” 1 whether face to face, through written correspondence, or through oral communications. The decision of an agency interpreting its own regulation is given great deference. Goodman v. City of Columbia, 318 S.C. 488, 458 S.E.2d 531 (1995). I would find *443that such an interpretation of the regulation2 was not an abuse of discretion.3
Both the statute and the regulation compel the claimant’s health care provider to furnish the employer’s representatives medical information pertaining to the worker’s claim.4 The providers are limited to furnishing information that is relevant to the patient’s claim. So long as the information is relevant to the claim, the provider is not limited as to the manner of its communication. While “existing information” will most often take the form of written records nothing precludes the provider from communicating verbally or in writing with anyone authorized to receive such information. I would hold that neither the claimant nor his attorney is permitted, in the workers’ compensation setting, to limit the communication between the employer’s representatives and the claimant’s medical provider as to matters relevant to the claim.
Petitioner expresses concern that the doctor may exceed the scope of relevant medical information when responding to such an inquiry. Physicians must be guided by their code of medical ethics.5 In my opinion, since the responses are com*444pelled by law, the physician who respects the line between information relevant to the claim, and that which is irrelevant, would not be exposed to liability for improper disclosure.6
I respectfully disagree with the majority and would find that the Commission did not err in ordering Petitioner’s attorney to cease and desist from seeking to limit contact between the Employer’s representatives and Petitioner’s health care provider. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

. I agree with the majority that the phrase "ex parte communication” is not the appropriate term. The exchange of information sought by Employer is not an "ex parte communication.” An ex parte communication is defined as "prohibited communication between counsel and the court when opposing counsel is not present.” Black's Law Dictionary 597 (Bryan A. Gamer ed., 7th ed., West 1999). The phrase "ex parte communication” implies that the communication was with the court. Here, the communication was between the employer’s representative and a witness. Further, the phrase implies the communication was done without notice to the other party. In this case, the claimant was on notice that the Employer’s representatives could communicate with the physician because she initiated the workers' compensation claim.

. There is no challenge to the regulation as exceeding the agency's authority.

. I agree with the majority that decisions of North Carolina courts construing that state’s workers' compensation statutes are entitled to great weight. Nelson v. Yellow Cab Co., 349 S.C. 589, 564 S.E.2d 110 (2002). However, I respectfully disagree that North Carolina's precedent is entitled to great weight in the case at bar. North Carolina recognizes a physician-patient privilege, Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990), while South Carolina does not. McCormick v. England, 328 S.C. 627, 494 S.E.2d 431 (Ct.App.1997). North Carolina’s Supreme Court first held that ex parte communications were inappropriate in a medical malpractice case in Crist v. Moffatt, supra. The North Carolina Court of Appeals then held that ex parte communications, therefore, were also banned in workers’ compensation cases, but stated were they "writing on a clean slate” the defendant’s arguments for ex parte communications "would carry great force ... we nonetheless are bound by Crist.” Salaam v. N.C.D.O.T., 122 N.C.App. 83, 468 S.E.2d 536, 539 (1996). We are writing on a "clean slate.”

. S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-95 (1976); 25A S.C.Code Ann. Reg. § 67-13 01 (A)(Supp.2001).

. A physician is governed by the ethical guidelines adopted and published by the Board of Medical Examiners. S.C.Code Ann. § 40-47-200 *444(1976). The relevant provision reads, "A physician shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law.” 26 S.C.Code Ann. Reg. § 81-60(D) (Supp.1995).

. See South Carolina State Bd. of Med. Exam. v. Hedgepath, 325 S.C. 166, 480 S.E.2d 724 (1997) (Court held "[a] physician acts ethically when she maintains patient confidences, and when she provides confidential information to others as required by law or as authorized by the patient”); McCormick v. England, 328 S.C. 627, 494 S.E.2d 431 (1997) (Court allowed that under certain circumstances, a physician might be required to reveal confidences when public interest dictates disclosure, and that even though the breach of confidentiality tort exists, “the right is not absolute and must give way when disclosure is compelled by law or is in the best interest of the patient or others”).