Court Opinion

ID: 9427545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:08.158515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:07.889905
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree that the gender-based distinction of Ga. Code § 105-1307 (1978) does not violate equal protection.* I write separately, however, because I arrive at this conclusion by a route somewhat different from that taken by Mr. Justice Stewart.
To withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, gender-based distinctions must “serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976). See Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268, 279 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 14 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). We have recognized in various contexts the importance of a State’s interest in minimizing potential problems in identifying the natural father of an illegitimate child. See, e. g., Caban v. Mohammed, post, at 393 n. 15 (adoptions); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259, 268-269 (1978) (inheritance); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535, 538 (1973) (child support). Indeed, we have sought to avoid “impos[ing] on state court systems a greater burden” in determining paternity for purposes of wrongful-death actions. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 174 (1972).
The question, therefore, is whether the gender-based distinction at issue in the present case is substantially related to achievement of the important state objective of avoiding diffi*360cult problems in proving paternity after the death of an illegitimate child. In Ga. Code § 74-103 (1978), the State has provided a simple, convenient mechanism by which the father of an illegitimate child can eliminate all questions concerning the child’s parentage. Under that statute, a father can legitimate his child simply by filing a petition in state court identifying the child and its mother and requesting an order of legitimation. After notice has been served on the mother, the state court can enter an order declaring the child legitimate for all purposes of Georgia law.
It is clear that the Georgia statute is substantially related to the State’s objective. It lies entirely within a father’s power to remove himself from the disability that only he will suffer. The father is required to declare his intentions at a time when both the child and its mother are likely to be available to provide evidence. The mother, on the other hand, is given the opportunity to appear and either support or rebut the father’s claim of paternity. The marginally greater burden placed upon fathers is no more severe than is required by the marked difference between proving paternity and proving maternity — a difference we have recognized repeatedly. See, e. g., Lalli v. Lalli, supra, at 268-269.
I find the present case to be quite different from others in which the Court has found unjustified a State’s reliance upon a gender-based classification. In several cases, the Court has confronted a state law under which the burdened individual (whether a child born out of wedlock or the father of such a child) has been powerless to remove himself from the statutory burden — regardless of the proof of paternity. See, e. g., Caban v. Mohammed, post, p. 380; Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762 (1977). To require marriage between the father and mother often is tantamount to a total exclusion of fathers, as marriage is possible only with the consent of the mother. In the present case, however, no such requirement is imposed upon the father under Georgia law. In sum, therefore, I con-*361elude that the Georgia statute challenged in this case, unlike the statutes reviewed in our prior decisions, is substantially related to the State’s objective of avoiding difficult problems of proof of paternity.

I also agree with. Mr. Justice Stewart that the classification of § 105-1307 affects only fathers of illegitimates — not the illegitimates themselves:— and therefore that this case differs substantially from those in which we have found classifications based upon illegitimacy to be unconstitutional. See, e. g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762 (1977).