Court Opinion

ID: 9759039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:01:02.530306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:58.342507
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge:
Marlin E. Sesler, Jr. was tried by jury and was found guilty of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol1 and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent.2 He was also found guilty by the court of speeding, a summary offense. On direct appeal, Sesler argues that the results of the intoxilyzer test should not have been received into evidence because the equipment had not been calibrated as required by statute. We reject this argument and affirm the judgment of sentence. However, the fine for speeding will be modified to comply with the statutory mandate.
Sesler was arrested and an intoxilyzer test was administered on May 26, 1984. It measured the alcohol in Sesler’s blood at .18 percent. At an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the test results, the evidence showed that the police had used a Model 4011-AS. This was an approved device. It had been tested and found accurate on May 9, 1984. The equipment had been calibrated permanently at the factory. The qualifications of the officer using the equipment to administer the test were not challenged. Sesler argued that the results of the test were inadmissible because the Model 4011-AS had not been calibrated pursuant to regulations of the Departments of Health and Transportation as required by statute. The trial court rejected Sesler’s argument, and the test results were received in evidence. On appeal, Sesler renews his argu*585ment that the test results were inadmissible because the intoxilyzer had not been calibrated. It is undisputed that at the time when the test was conducted, regulations with respect to calibration had not been adopted by the Departments of Health and Transportation.
“The technique of testing breath samples for blood alcohol content has general acceptance in the scientific community, and thus meets the test for admissibility of scientific evidence....” See: United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 892, 898 (10th Cir.1985). The failure to “calibrate” the instrument, if relevant to attack the weight of test results, does not render those results inadmissible. See: United States v. Smith, supra; United States v. Benally, 756 F.2d 773 (10th Cir.1985).
In Pennsylvania, the legislature has established by statute that the amount of alcohol in a person’s blood, as shown by chemical testing of the person’s breath, is admissible in evidence if the tests “were conducted by qualified persons using approved equipment.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c). See also: Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 511 Pa. 520, 515 A.2d 847 (1986). The intoxilyzer used to measure the alcoholic content of appellant’s blood was an approved device, and the qualifications of the person using the equipment were not challenged.
Appellant contends that the results of tests “conducted by qualified persons using approved equipment” are nevertheless inadmissible unless the equipment “shall have been calibrated and tested for accuracy within a period of time and in a manner specified by regulations of the Departments of Health and Transportation.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c)(1). On the date of appellant’s arrest, the Departments of Health and Transportation had by regulations established the time and manner for testing devices for accuracy. On that date, however, the Departments had not adopted regulations pertaining to the calibration of such devices. The reason was explained by the Departments when regulations were subsequently promulgated:
*586This calibration procedure has been added to the proposal to remove whatever confusion may have existed relating to the phrase “calibrated and tested for accuracy within a period of time and in a manner specified by regulations of the Departments of Health and Transportation,” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c). The Departments believe that “calibrated” refers to the requirement that breath test devices be tested and adjusted for accuracy in accordance with the manufacturer’s specifications, particularly following malfunction and prior to being placed back into service. It is the position of the Departments that §§ 77.5(b) and 77.6(b)(4) of the interim regulations require that this be done. However, defense attorneys in several counties have raised the issue that the existing regulations do not specifically provide for “calibration” and several judges ... have held that “calibrated” means that breath test devices should be tested for accuracy across a range of readings on a periodic basis. Although the Departments do not agree with this reading of section 15j7(c) of the Vehicle Code, they have added such a procedure to remove any doubt about the validity of breath test results.
Pa.Bull., Vol. 14, No. 51, Saturday, December 22, 1984 (emphasis added).
We reject appellant’s argument that the absence of regulations establishing the time and manner of calibration on May 26, 1984 rendered inadmissible the results of the breath test administered to him. In the first place, the statutory requirement for admissibility of test results is that the tests be “conducted by qualified persons using approved equipment.” These requirements were met in the instant case.
Secondly, the statutory language “within a period of time and in a manner specified by regulations ...,” refers only to the words “tested for accuracy.” This language was not intended to require regulations pertaining to the “calibration” of breath testing devices. If approved equipment has been calibrated at the factory and has been tested for accuracy as “specified by regulations,” there is *587no reason for refusing to receive test results in evidence so long as the equipment has been used by a qualified person. Here, the calibration had been done at the factory. Moreover, the equipment had been tested for accuracy within thirty (30) days of its use as required by regulations of the Departments of Health and Transportation. This was sufficient to render the test results admissible in evidence. The failure to make a recent test of the equipment’s calibration, if such was the case, was relevant with respect to the weight to be given the test results, but it did not render the results incompetent or inadmissible.
We have also examined the trial court’s instructions to the jury, particularly as they pertained to the Commonwealth’s burden of proving appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. These instructions were full, complete, and accurate. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, they did not cause the burden of proof to be shifted because of the test results. With respect to the burden of proof, the trial court was quite clear. The court specifically instructed the jurors that if they had any reasonable doubt as to whether appellant had violated either subsection (1) or (4) of 75 Pa.G.S. § 3731(a), they should find appellant not guilty of either or both charges. These instructions were not erroneous.
Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of sentence for driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(1) and (4). However, we will reduce the fine for speeding from $85.00 to $65.00. The trial court in an opinion written pursuant to Pa.R.App.P. 1925(a) has conceded with commendable candor that the fine imposed was in violation of the statute. See: 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362. Rather than remanding for resentencing, we will amend the fine to $65.00.
The judgment of sentence for driving while under the influence of alcohol is affirmed. The judgment of sentence for speeding is modified as set forth in the foregoing opinion and as so modified is affirmed.
DEL SOLE, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1).

. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(4).