Court Opinion

ID: 7947639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-08 23:22:29.574071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:33:59.895497
License: Public Domain

Ostrander, J.
(after stating the facts). The charge that forcible possession of the property was taken by defendant and that objections thereto were made by the Marvel Motor Car Company is not proved. On the contrary, it appears that one note fell due on August 7th, the day the removal of machinery was begun; that notice of a meeting of creditors of the Marvel Motor Car Company, to be held August 8th at 2 o’clock p. m., had been given; that defendant had information of the precarious financial condition of the Marvel Motor Car Com*161pany, had been told by the manager of the Marvel Motor Car Company that it was not possible to meet the obligations of the concern; that no objection was made by representatives of that company to the retaking of the property by defendant. It was all retaken before 2 o’clock p. m., August 8th.
The testimony compels the conclusion that on August 7, 1907, when removal of the machinery was begun, all parties in interest had concluded that only a miracle could save the Marvel Motor Car Company and that it was proper for the defendant, before further complications had arisen, to repossess itself of the machinery. Indeed, there was an understanding between the defendant and the manager of the Marvel Motor Car Company that if the miracle was worked the machinery should be available to carry on the business. It was held for some time by defendant, awaiting developments. It is said in the brief for complainant:
“The contracts when the machinery was resold were still subsisting; defendant could not declare them void and does not pray here to have them declared void or its rights defined as in Hickman v. Chaney, 155 Mich. 217 [118 N. W. 993]. This surplus was therefore created by an unauthorized appropriation of property excusing vendee from a tender of the balance due as by its own act defendant was not in a position to redeliver the machinery.”
It is further said in the brief:
“Complainant submits that under these facts and conclusions the retaking of the property and a resale created a fund which in equity imposes a trust relation between the parties hereto; that possibly the trust so imposed might give to complainant the entire sum realized on the resale but that complainant does not here urge, recognizing the rule that ‘he who comes into equity must do equity,’ and only asking that the equitable surplus be decreed to be due complainant. Counsel has made an elaborate research *162of the cases and fails to find a case where vendor has been shown to have a surplus under the circumstances of this case but herewith appends a synopsis of Michigan cases indicative of the conviction of the court that the vendee might have relief if the facts so warranted.”
The Marvel Motor Car Company had no interest in the machinery, certainly none which was not defeasible by demand of possession or by voluntary surrender of possession; it had, at most, after the machinery was reclaimed, a .personal claim against defendant. New Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Bothane, 70 Mich. 443 (38 N. W. 326); Ryan v. Wayson, 108 Mich. 519 (66 N. W. 370); Wiggins v. Snow, 89 Mich. 476 (50 N. W. 991); Thirlby v. Rainbow, 93 Mich. 164 (53 N. W. 159); Wood v. Kaufman, 135 Mich. 5 (97 N. W. 47); Perkins v. Grobben, 116 Mich. 172 (74 N. W. 469, 39 L. R. A. 815, 72 Am. St. Rep. 512); McBryan v. Elevator Co., 130 Mich. 111 (89 N. W. 683, 97 Am. St. Rep. 453). Rejecting, as we do, all argument based upon the idea of an unauthorized retaking of the property, we necessarily reject the conclusions referred to in the foregoing excerpt from complainant’s brief.
There is no trust fund. And there is no money due to complainant, unless, when the property was retaken, some of the money which had been paid to defendant by the Marvel Motor Car Company ought to have been returned to it. That defendant made a good second sale of the machinery concerns only the defendant; just as it alone would have been concerned if a bad sale had resulted in a loss in the entire transaction. It owed to the Marvel Motor Car Company, or its receiver, no duty to sell the machinery. It is clear, of course, that after defendant reclaimed the machinery it had both the machinery and $3,650.52 which the Marvel Motor Car Company had paid on account of the machinery. Whether *163it had the right to keep all or some of this money is .the question suggested by the facts, as we find them. The money which had been paid, was less than the sum which the vendee agreed to pay as rent. If the agreement to pay rent is enforceable, defendant had the right to keep all of the money. To determine this question, there was no occasion to resort to a court of equity. If defendant has money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the complainant, it is recoverable in an action of assumpsit. The contracts require no construction. They either are or are not enforceable according to their plain terms. There are apparent reasons for referring the matter to a court of law.
The decree of the court below is reversed, and a decree will be entered here dismissing the bill of complaint, with costs of both courts to defendant.
Steere, C. J., and Moore, McAlvay, Brooke, Kuhn, Stone, and Bird, JJ., concurred.