Court Opinion

ID: 9686681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:01:04.380624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:21.341713
License: Public Domain

*788SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 94. (dissenting). The majority ignores well-established case law. In so doing, the majority prohibitively raises the bar for a defendant raising a Batson challenge, lowers the bar for circuit courts that conduct Batson hearings, and neglects its duty to review circuit court determinations that no Batson violation has occurred, rendering the Constitution's prohibition on the exclusion of persons from jury service on account of race an illusion in Wisconsin courts. I therefore dissent.
¶ 95. Justice Thurgood Marshall, concurring in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), warned that the Batson decision would not effectively eliminate discrimination in the selection of juries if prosecutors' easily asserted race-neutral explanations were simply accepted at face value.1 Justice Marshall explained:
Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons. How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as the defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or "never cracked a smile" and, therefore, "did not possess the *789sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in this case"? If such easily generated explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court today may be illusory.2
¶ 96. The majority today approves of the very behavior against which Justice Marshall warned.
¶ 97. The circuit court in the present case did not fulfill its duty under the third step of the Batson analysis. It upheld the prosecutor's peremptory strike of Dondre Bell, the lone African-American on the ve-nire, without looking beneath the surface of the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons for striking him and without considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding jury selection. It summarily concluded that the State "made its case" without any analysis or findings of fact on the ultimate issue of whether the State discriminated when it struck Bell.
¶ 98. Instead of holding the circuit court to its duty, the majority rubber stamps the circuit court's conclusion under the guise of deference. Moreover, the majority misconstrues the law to hold that the mere ability to assert easily generated, facially neutral reasons for striking a juror discharges the State's constitutional obligation to select a jury without discriminating on the basis of race, thereby lowering the bar for circuit courts that conduct Batson hearings and raising the bar for defendants bringing a Batson challenge.
¶ 99. This case should be remanded to the circuit court for a proper Batson hearing. First, the law is clear that the circuit court has a duty under the third step of *790the Batson inquiry to consider all of the relevant facts surrounding jury selection and to determine whether the defendant has met her burden of proving purposeful discrimination based on race. Second, since there is no evidence in this case that the circuit court fulfilled its duty, the deference normally due its determination is inappropriate here. The majority opinion, far from recognizing this fact, fails in its own duty to properly review the decision of the circuit court. Third, had either the circuit court or the majority bothered to look, there are ample warning signs in this case that the prosecutor's actions were driven by the race of the struck venire member and were thus unconstitutional. A prosecutor's historical privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control is limited by the constitutional prohibition on exclusion of persons from jury service on account of race.3
HH
¶ 100. This case involves step three of the Batson analysis. Under Batson, three steps must be taken for the defendant to successfully prove that the State's peremptory challenge of Bell violated her constitutional right to equal protection: (1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race; (2) if the defendant satisfies this threshold, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to articulate a race-neutral justification for the disputed challenges; and (3) if a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the court has a duty to determine whether, in light of the proffered justification, the defendant has satisfied the burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
*791¶ 101. No dispute exists in the present case that the defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination against a black juror under the first step of the Batson analysis. Likewise, no dispute exists in this case that the State articulated race-neutral reasons for challenging the lone black juror under the second step of the Batson analysis. The issue presented in this case is whether the circuit court properly determined whether the defendant met her burden of establishing purposeful discrimination under the third step in the Batson analysis.
¶ 102. The majority opinion, however, never decides whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion under step three of the Batson analysis. The majority errs by conflating the second and third steps of the Batson analysis and by concluding that the State's satisfaction of step two is sufficient, in and of itself, to defeat a charge of purposeful discrimination. The majority opinion concludes, "[Biased on the race-neutral reasons offered by [the prosecutor] for her peremptory strike, we find that [the defendant] did not meet the burden of proof required to show that the State's reasons were not race-neutral."4 Furthermore, the majority opinion holds, "The decision of the circuit court was not clearly erroneous when it determined that the State's reasons for striking the juror were race-neutral; and, therefore, allowed the peremptory strike of Bell to stand."5 The majority's conclusions simply affirm what both parties have already conceded: the State's proffered reasons for striking Bell were race-neutral.
*792¶ 103. The step three determination under Bat-son requires more than a conclusion that a prosecutor has put forth race-neutral reasons for striking a particular juror.6 At step three, the circuit court is charged with testing those proffered reasons. A reason that appears on its face to be race-neutral may turn out to be, upon further examination, a pretext for racial discrimination. Similarly, a prosecutor may provide a reason that is in fact race-neutral, but that upon further examination is revealed not to be the actual reason that the prosecutor struck the potential juror.7 It is at the third step that the "persuasiveness of the [race-neutral] justification becomes relevant — the step *793in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination."8 At the third step, "implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination."9
¶ 104. The touchstone for the third step of the Batson inquiry is the credibility of the prosecutor: Does the circuit court believe that the prosecutor's race-*794neutral explanation is genuine?10 As the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear, in many cases, the "best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge."11
¶ 105. That said, however, an attorney's demeanor is far from the only evidence that a circuit court is obligated to consider under Batson's third step.12 "A prosecutor's motive may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts."13
¶ 106. The third step of the Batson analysis therefore imposes a "duty"14 on the circuit court to consider the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding jury selection in a given case.15 A circuit court faced with a *795Batson challenge is charged with examining the "entire res gestae" of the jury selection process;16 when determining whether a prosecutor acted with purposeful discrimination, a circuit court must undertake a "detailed analysis" of "all of the evidence."17 As the Seventh Circuit has explained, "One way or another, a trial court must consider all relevant circumstances before it issues a final ruling on a defendant's [Batson] motion."18
*796¶ 107. Moreover, a circuit court's examination of the totality of the circumstances should include, whenever possible, an evaluation of "the differential manner in which the State" interacted with minority and non-minority jurors, since the "crucial and determinative inquiry" in a Batson claim is whether similarly situated venirepersons have been treated differently based upon race.19 For example, in its most recent decision discussing Batson, the United States Supreme Court identified disparate questioning by a prosecutor, that is, a prosecutor's altering the way a question asked of all venire members is asked of African-American venire members, as "evidence of purposeful discrimination" when a defendant raises a Batson claim.20
*797¶ 108. In short, under step three, the circuit court had a duty to examine all the relevant facts and the totality of the circumstances surrounding jury selection before making an express determination as to whether the defendant has satisfied the burden of proving discrimination. The demeanor of the prosecutor when announcing race-neutral reasons for exercising a peremptory strike is merely one piece of evidence for the circuit court to consider.
II
¶ 109. In the present case, there is no evidence in the record that the circuit court fulfilled its step three duty under Batson.21 In a single, conclusory sentence the circuit court ruled, "Well, I think the State has made *798its case and it does have just cause for the strike." It made no findings of fact and reached no conclusions of law relevant to the Batson inquiry; it made "no effort to comply with the letter, much less the spirit, of Batson."22
¶ 110. When the circuit court concluded that the State "made its case," did it mean that the State provided race-neutral reasons? If so, which reasons provided by the State were race-neutral? Were any of them credible? When the circuit court concluded that the State had "just cause for the strike," did it mean that the State did not act with purposeful discrimination? "The limited record developed in the present case casts doubt on the trial court's ability to make the required finding regarding the prosecutor's intent, thereby undermining the deference due its conclusion."23 Thus the decision in the present case cannot be properly reviewed and the case must be remanded.24
*799¶ 111. Nothing, in the circuit court's determination demonstrates that the circuit court looked beyond the State's proffered reasons in "making its case" and nothing demonstrates that the court considered the totality of the circumstances, all the relevant facts, or the entire res gestae of the jury selection process.25 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a trial court need not make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it, but Batson does require that a trial judge make an "ultimate determination on the issue of discriminatory intent"26 and that the court adequately *800consider all of the relevant information and the totality of the circumstances.27 The circuit court in the present case did not fulfill its duty under the third step of Batson, and a circuit court commits error when it denies a. Batson motion without making the proper step three determination.28 This error undermines the deference due the circuit court.
¶ 112. Furthermore, the majority opinion here fails in its duty to review the decision of the circuit court. The majority is correct that under Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991), a circuit court's determination whether a prosecutor intended to discriminate on the basis of race in challenging a prospective juror is a question of historical fact that is entitled to deference. In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), however, the U.S. Supreme Court explained, "deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review. Deference does not by definition *801preclude relief."29 Furthermore, the Miller-El Court emphasized that appellate review includes a search for "any evidence demonstrating that, despite the neutral explanation of the prosecution, the peremptory strikes in the final analysis were race based."30
¶ 113. As discussed above, the majority opinion's review of the circuit court's step three analysis , in this case is actually an examination of the circuit court's step two analysis. Instead of analyzing whether the circuit court erroneously determined that the State did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution when it struck Bell from the venire, the majority opinion explains that the defendant's prima facie case was rebutted when "the State offered several race-neutral reasons for exercising her peremptory challenge against Bell."31 And, instead of reviewing all of the relevant circumstances in the record that might bear on the final analysis of whether the peremptory strike of Bell was race based, the majority examines only the extent to which each of the prosecutor's proffered reasons, in a vacuum, was properly considered race-*802neutral.32 It did not, as Miller-El requires, search for any evidence that the peremptory strike in the final analysis was race-based.
¶ 114. The majority also errs when it focuses exclusively on the circuit court's assessment of the prosecutor's subjective state of mind when offering race-neutral explanations for her strike. The burden in a Batson challenge is on the defendant, and ultimately it is the objective evidence in the record that must persuade the circuit court that a race-neutral reason is either pretextual or disingenuous. "Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened;"33 an explanation that is contrary to the objective facts is a sure sign of disingenu-ousness or pretext. Only by balancing the prosecutor's expressed subjective intent against the totality of the relevant objective evidence can a circuit court make its step three determination.
¶ 115. In sum, the circuit court did not look beyond the State's proffered reasons. It did not consider the totality of the circumstances. It made no findings of *803fact and made no ultimate determination on the issue of discriminatory intent. The circuit court's conclusory statement, "Well, I think the State has made its case and it does have just cause for the strike," is thus not entitled to the deference usually accorded step three Batson findings. The majority opinion, inappropriately focusing on step two of the Batson analysis, completely misses the point.
I — I HH HH
¶ 116. A close examination of the record — an examination that includes consideration of the totality of the circumstances — reveals some disturbing information about jury selection in the present case. In short, there are glaring signs in the record that Bell, the lone African-American juror on the venire, was singled out and treated differently than all other jurors, in part because of his race. Consequently, had the circuit court engaged in the inquiry demanded by Batson, it might have reached a different conclusion.
¶ 117. The State admits that the day before jury selection in the present case, it requested a report from the Beloit Police Department listing police contacts at Bell's address. There is no suggestion or indication that the prosecutor made a similar request for any other member of the venire. We do know, however, that it is not standard practice for Rock County assistant district attorneys to run police checks on the addresses of potential jurors.34
*804¶ 118. More importantly, by virtue of this police report, Bell became the only member of the venire for whom silence during voir dire created grounds for being struck due to lack of candor.35 The prosecutor asked a handful of questions during voir dire to uncover whether any of the venire members should be struck for cause or through her peremptory strikes. All of the questions were designed so that affirmative answers raised concerns and a venire member's silence meant that the prosecutor should not be concerned.36 For Bell, however, the exact opposite was true. The police report gave the prosecutor additional information about Bell that permitted her to construe his silence as "not being completely honest."37
*805¶ 119. This case, therefore, is a classic case of disparate questioning with a slight twist. The prosecutor altered the way she would perceive the answers given by Bell as opposed to the way she would perceive the same answers from all other venire members. Indeed, Bell, like more than half of the venire members, sat silently through the prosecutor's questions, but he *806was the only silent venire member who was peremptorily struck by the prosecutor.38
¶ 120. The circuit court did not pay any attention to this information before it. The circuit court never considered that the prosecutor had not obtained police reports for any of the other venire members or any of the other listed addresses for the venire members.39 The circuit court never considered whether there was reason to infer a lack of candor or dishonesty from the silence of any of the other eleven silent venire members.40 Neither does the majority opinion. In fact, the majority opinion commends the prosecutor, without flinching, for relying on the police report.41
*807¶ 121. The heart of the Batson inquiry in this case, in my opinion, is the role that race played in the prosecutor's decision to seek out a police report for Bell and not for any other member of the venire. Why was Bell not treated the same as other venire members?42
¶ 122. The record makes clear that the prosecutor was well aware of Bell's race in advance of voir dire. Any citizen who is placed on a venire in Wisconsin must fill out a juror questionnaire. The juror questionnaire is required by law to include the race of the prospective juror as well as the address and occupation of each person.43 The logical inference to be drawn from the record is that the prosecutor here had access to infor*808mation from this questionnaire, for she knew both that Bell would be in the venire and what his address was when she requested the police report the day before jury selection.44
¶ 123. In addition, the prosecutor anticipated that her peremptory strikes were going to be challenged and made arrangements before jury selection to have the challenge addressed outside of the presence of the venire. Prior to jury selection, when all parties were in chambers, the prosecutor made a special request that "if there is any objection to strikes of either party we either do it at the bench or in chambers." The court then clarified, "[Y]ou mean your peremptories?" The prosecutor responded, "Yes."
¶ 124. The prosecutor gave some indication of why she obtained the police report for Bell. In response to the circuit court's inquiry into whether she had a reason for striking Bell, the prosecutor responded:
Yes, your honor. As the court is probably well aware, our office as well as the federal prosecutor, has prosecuted a number of Bells who live in Beloit throughout the years. It's well known as a criminal name in Beloit. I would also note that he fives at 1216 Wisconsin *809Avenue which is a high crime area in Beloit. Urn, I also yesterday had the Beloit Police Department run information on the 1216 Wisconsin address.
The inference to be drawn is that the prosecutor saw the name "Bell" and noted where he lived.45
¶ 125. On its face, this would be a race-neutral explanation. Yet it is not so clear that race is uninvolved. Would the prosecutor have run a police check on Bell if his juror questionnaire identified him as Asian, Latino, or Caucasian? Familial relationship to people involved in the criminal justice system alone may not be the linchpin here.
¶ 126. For example, the record also reveals that one of the members of the venire was a man with the last name Gregory. The prosecutor's office in Beloit was prosecuting a man named Gregory at the same time that the defendant here was being prosecuted.46 The likelihood of a relationship between the two people named Gregory was greater than the likelihood of a relationship between Bell and the criminal Bell family since the telephone directory lists 14 people named Gregory but 54 named Bell.47 Both venire member Bell *810and the criminal Bells are African-American; the venire member Gregory, however, is not African-American, while the Gregory who was prosecuted is African-American. The prosecutor thus made the assumption of familial relation based on race, not just name. Yet numerous families have members of different races, including those of three of the seven justices on this court (my own included), as well as that of the governor of the state.
¶ 127. The circuit court did not engage in the inquiry required under step three of Batson and, as a result, the circuit court never noticed that Bell was treated differently than all other jurors on the venire and it never noticed the role that race played in the prosecutor's decision to treat Bell differently. As has been shown, a reasonable inference can be drawn from the totality of the circumstances in the present case that there was disparate treatment of venire member Bell based on race.
V
¶ 128. The ultimate burden of proving discrimination in a Batson challenge rests with the defendant. The defendant in the present case did not raise many of the above arguments during the Batson hearing, making it difficult to conclude here that the circuit court's decision to uphold the peremptory strike of Bell is clearly erroneous. Nevertheless, the circuit court has a duty to explore all of the relevant facts and make a finding about discrimination. "Batson requires a trial judge to ensure that a defendant on trial is afforded the equal protection of the law."48 The circuit court here *811failed to meaningfully take on this duty. Moreover, the majority has neglected to enforce this duty.
¶ 129. Under similar circumstances, appellate courts remand the matter to the trial court.49 I would remand this case to the circuit court to conduct a new hearing and engage in the analysis required at the third step of the Batson inquiry, including consideration of such matters as whether the prosecutor ran police checks on the addresses of any other potential jurors; whether any other potential jurors shared a name with an individual prosecuted by the Beloit District Attorney's office; and whether any other potential jurors indicated that they were unemployed or that their employment varied. If the circuit court determines, after the hearing, that there was no purposeful discrimination based on race, the conviction should be affirmed. If it determines that there was purposeful discrimination, the required remedy would be a reversal of the conviction and a new trial.
¶ 130. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).

 Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).

 Batson, 476 U.S. at 91.

 Majority op., ¶ 91.

 Id., ¶ 92.

 The Seventh Circuit, in Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1998), explained:
A facially neutral reason for striking a juror may show discrimination if that reason is invoked only to eliminate African-American prospective jurors and not others who also have that characteristic.... [A] procedure that omits the [step three] totality inquiry would exonerate the user of peremptories in virtually every case, unless the lawyer was foolish enough to announce her discriminatory purpose in so many words. Batson requires more....
Id. at 921 (citations omitted).

 See, e.g., Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to accept a list of neutral reasons at face value where they were unsupported or refuted by record); Davidson v. Harris, 30 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1994) (party's justification that African-American juror was likely to be sympathetic to the opposing party because she had young children was pretextual because white jurors with young children were seated on the jury); Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 973 (3d Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's explanation that he struck African-American juror because she had a son the same age as the defendant was pretextual when white jurors with children of the same age were seated).

 Burkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).

 Id. The majority opinion omits the three words "and probably will" when quoting this passage, subtly removing the Supreme Court's emphasis on the likelihood that such fantastic reasons will not be considered sufficient under step three of Batson. See majority op., ¶ 32. Moreover, immediately after the majority opinion quotes this passage, it incorrectly asserts that "in addition to accepting 'silly,' 'superstitious' justifications for striking a juror, intuitive strikes have been upheld as valid strikes" under step three. Majority op., ¶ 33. The cases the majority relies upon for this proposition, United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1988), and United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 1991), are not cases involving a Batson step three analysis.
In Williams, for example, the Seventh Circuit held only that "intuitive assumptions that are not fairly quantifiable" are valid race-neutral reasons that a prosecutor may offer for excluding a juror at stage two, not that they are valid under step three. Williams, 934 F.2d at 850. No Batson violation occurred in Williams because the district court "considered [the prosecutor's] explanation in light of of the circumstances of that particular case and concluded that the explanation was credible" — the stage three analysis. Id. Thus, Williams does not stand for the proposition that silly, superstitious, or intuitive race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike are constitutionally valid. Rather, Williams stands for the proposition that such explanations satisfy the State's burden to provide a race-neutral reason at step two of the Batson analysis.

 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991).

 Id.

 In State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 173-75, 453 N.W.2d 127 (1990), this court concluded that a court's duty to analyze "all relevant circumstances" includes consideration of:
[Wjhether the prosecution has eliminated all members of the defendant's race from the panel of prospective jurors; whether the race of the defendant or his or her witnesses is different than the race of the victim or the state's witnesses; whether the excluded jurors sharing the defendant's race responded to any questions of the judge or the lawyers in a manner that made them suitable candidates for exclusion by the prosecutor; how many venireper-sons share defendant's race; and the nature of the crime.

 McLain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000).

 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.

 United States v. Hill, 146 F.3d 337, 342 (6th Cir. 1998) ("At this [third] step of the analysis, the district court has the responsibility to assess the prosecutor's credibility under all of the pertinent circumstances, and then to weigh the asserted justification against the strength of the defendant's prima facie case under the totality of the circumstances."); United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 953 n.4 (4th Cir. 1994) ("If [the step two] burden is met, the court then addresses and evaluates all *795evidence introduced by each side (including all evidence introduced in the first and second steps) that tends to show that race was or was not the real reason and determines whether the defendant has met his burden of persuasion."); see also State v. Gregory, 2001 WI App 107, 244 Wis. 2d 65, 630 N.W.2d 711 (Vergeront, J., dissenting):
[T]he third step in the Batson analysis is not satisfied by a conclusory statement that the prosecutor's explanation is race-neutral. At the third step, the trial court has the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. The duty of assessing the credibility of the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons embodies the "decisive question" in the Batson analysis, and requires the trial court to consider all the facts and circumstances.
Id. ¶ 24 (citations omitted).
The majority correctly explains that a circuit court must consider the "totality of the circumstances" when determining whether the State discriminated in the exercise of its peremptory strikes. Majority op., ¶ 80 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991). The majority errs, however, when it asserts that this duty can be fulfilled "simply." Id. See also United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) (disapproving of a trial court's conducting its review of a Batson application with undue haste and ruling in a summary fashion).

 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 467 (1996).

 Coulter, 155 F.3d at 920.

 Id. at 921 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97).

 Coulter, 155 F.3d at 921; Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 1997) ("A comparative analysis of jurors struck and those remaining is a well-established tool for exploring the possibility that facially race-neutral reasons are a pretext for discrimination."); Doss v. Frontenac, 14 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (8th Cir. 1994) ("It is well-established that peremptory challenges cannot be lawfully exercised against potential jurors of one race unless potential jurors of another race with comparable characteristics are also challenged.").

 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1043 (2003). The Court also explained that statistical evidence of the disproportionate number of strikes used against African-American venire members, historical evidence of racial discrimination by a district attorney's office, and the decision to request a "jury shuffle" when a predominate number of African-Americans were seated in the front of the jury panel provided further evidence for a court to consider when determining whether a Batson violation had occurred. Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1043-44.
The State, in its brief, asserts that Wisconsin need not adopt a list of factors to be considered during the third step of the Batson analysis, like a number of southern states have done, *797because Wisconsin does not share the history of institutionalized race discrimination experienced by those jurisdictions. The State points to the recent Wisconsin Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System Study as evidence of Wisconsin's good record on racial equality, noting that the study "did not identify discriminatory peremptory strikes as a cause for concern or remedial action." (State's Br. at 20). What the State does not mention is that participants in focus groups "said that race and class matter [in the court system]. There is a feeling that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to escape bias in the justice system because bias permeates all levels-law enforcement, attorneys, judges, juries, and corrections officials." Public Trust & Confidence in the Justice System: The Wisconsin Initiative (October 2000), http://www.wisbar.org/bar/ptc/ptcap.html. I do not consider it significant that citizen respondents did not specifically identify "discriminatory peremptory strikes" as a reason, given this general finding.

 Both the majority opinion and the State's brief acknowledge the ambiguity of the circuit court's ruling. The majority writes: "The circuit court found that Bollendorf had just cause for the peremptory strike, but did not elaborate on its decision. As a result, Bollendorfs peremptory strike was allowed to *798stand." Majority op., ¶ 16. Similarly, the State noted in its brief, "Before reaching [his] summary conclusion, Judge Dahlberg did not expressly confirm that Assistant District Attorney Bollen-dorf had proffered race-neutral explanations for striking Bell." (State's Br. at 5).

 Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2000).

 Id.

 See, e.g., Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he limited record developed in the present case casts doubt on the trial court's ability to make the required finding regarding the prosecutor's intent, thereby undermining the deference due its conclusion."); United States v. Hill, 146 F.3d 337, 342 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Without a fuller indication of the circumstances that apparently led the district court to this conclusion, however, we cannot properly review the decision.").

 The relationship between a court's "duty" and the opponent of the strike's "burden" under Batson is not unlike the relationship this court has created between a court's "obligation" and the beneficiary of an error's "burden" in harmless error review. It is well established in Wisconsin that the beneficiary of an error during trial has the burden of proving that the error was harmless, that is, that it is true beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. See State v. Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, ¶ 40, 261 Wis. 2d 202, 661 N.W.2d 76 (citing State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶¶ 40-41, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189) (citing State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985))). Yet it is also true that the harmless error rule is an injunction on courts requiring that a court address the harmless error rule regardless of whether the parties do. Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 47 n.12 (citing Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2)). Similarly, under Batson, even though the burden of proving purposeful discrimination is on the opponent of the strike, a court has "the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
Here, the circuit court did not address whether the prosecutor's proffered reasons were pretextual. The circuit court ruled summarily after a brief colloquy and did not properly conduct the third Batson step.

 United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1991).

 See Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 291 (3d. Cir. 2001) ("Although the state court is not required to comment on all of the evidence before it, an adequate step three Batson analysis requires something more than a terse, abrupt comment that the prosecutor has satisfied Batson.").

 United States v. Thomas, 320 F.3d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 287 (3d Cir. 2001):
The state courts in this case rejected Riley's Batson claim without discussing any of the ample evidence that throws into question the explanations offered by the prosecutor for striking two of the black jurors and there is nothing relevant in the record that might otherwise support the state courts' decisions. Thus, we do not know why the state courts found the State's explanation was plausible and credible in light of the other evidence. It is because of the state courts' omission of a requirement under the third step of the Batson inquiry — of an ultimate determination on the issue of discriminatory intent based on all the facts and circumstances —that the State's argument founders.

 Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1042 (referring to review in the context of habeas relief under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, where the deference given to trial courts is even greater).

 Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1042 (referring to examination of a Batson claim in the context of a request for a certificate of appealability); see also Riley v. Taylor, at 286 ("Deference in a Batson case must be viewed in the context of the requirement that the state courts engage in the three-step Batson inquiry.").

 Majority op., ¶ 79.

 See majority op., ¶¶ 80-91. Moreover, the majority imputes some of its own conclusions to the circuit court, in an effort to bolster the circuit court's determination. For example, the majority asserts that "[h]ere, the circuit court judge relied on, inter alia, Bell's lack of response to general voir dire questions" and that this silence "appeared to show a lack of candor, when combined with the information in the police report" when determining if the prosecutor's explanations were credible. Majority op., ¶ 56. There is no evidence in the record that the circuit court even noticed that Bell did not respond to any questions asked during voir dire, let alone whether the circuit court drew the conclusion from this silence that Bell was being less than honest.

 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).

 In State v. Gregory, 2001 WI App 107, 244 Wis. 2d 65, 630 N.W.2d 711, a Beloit prosecutor struck the very same potential juror, Dondre Bell, the day after he was struck from the venire in the present case. Bell was the lone African-American on that venire as well. The prosecutor justified her strike, in part, *804because she "had received information from another assistant district attorney that police had responded to 1216 Wisconsin Avenue, Bell's residence, seventeen times between January 1996 and October 1998." Id. at ¶ 9. Clearly it is not a common practice that police checks are made for every juror in every case.

 More than just creating an avenue for gauging dishonesty, the police report made it possible for the prosecutor to strike Bell regardless of his answers during voir dire. She set him up. Had he answered affirmatively to the question whether he knew somebody who had been convicted of a crime, the prosecutor would have had grounds to use a peremptory strike against him. Had he failed to answer that question, as he did here, the prosecutor could use the police report as grounds for striking him. No other juror was destined to be struck in advance of voir dire as a result of pretrial actions taken by the prosecutor.

 See majority op., ¶ 10.

 It is worth explaining that Bell did not, in fact, evidence any dishonesty by his failure to respond. The prosecutor asked three specific questions about crime of the entire venire for which the police report might be used to indicate that Bell's *805silence was dishonesty. She asked whether (1) anyone had had contact with the prosecutor's office; (2) anyone had a close friend or relative who had been a victim of crime; and (3) anyone had a close friend or relative who had been convicted of a crime.
The police report does not indicate that anybody living at Bell's address has ever been arrested, convicted, or prosecuted for a crime. It does not indicate that Bell, the venire member, lived at the address during the time of any of the police contacts. It does not show that Bell, the venire member, is related to anyone involved in the incidents leading to police contact. In fact, the defendant in Gregory, 244 Wis. 2d 65 (Ct. App. 2001) (a case in which Bell, again the lone African-American on the venire, was struck from the venire based on the same police report), submitted a written offer of proof that Bell would testify that
he is not related to convicted cocaine dealer Christopher Bell; that he did not live at 1216 Wisconsin Avenue between September, 1995 and May, 1997 because he was attending college in Marshall, Minnesota; that if there were any police contacts at all with 1216 Wisconsin Avenue during that period he was unaware of them; and that he spent a week on jury duty in April, 1999 and was struck from several jury panels.
Gregory, Appellant's Br. at 9.
Thus, the prosecutor's decision to strike Bell out of a concern that he would be dishonest was, as she admitted during the Batson hearing, merely an assumption, not a decision based on fact.

 The record reveals that the venire in this case consisted of 20 people and that eleven jurors aside from Bell sat silently through the entire jury selection. Bell was the only juror who sat silently who was struck by the prosecutor.

 If a police check was run on other jurors as well, what did the police reports indicate? Did any of those jurors have contact with the police that they did not admit during voir dire?

 The record does not reveal whether any other members of the venire had indicated that they were unemployed or that their employment "varies." See Wylie v. Vaughn, 773 F. Supp. 775, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1991):
Because there is a far greater percentage of unemployed minorities than there are unemployed persons in the general population, giving prosecutors carte blanche to strike jurors simply because they are unemployed creates a far smaller pool of potential minority jurors.... Peremptory strikes on the basis of unemployment should therefore he considered suspect.

 Majority op., ¶ 74 ("In this case the record shows that the prosecutor had done research about Bell, which stands in stark contrast to the prosecutor in Walker who struck the only African-American without knowing anything about the juror.").
It is worth noting that the circuit court, in its post-conviction order, also commended the prosecutor for doing "her *807homework on Mr. Bell." The majority does not give any deference to the post-conviction order in this case, contrary to the State's request. I agree that the post-conviction decision is entitled to no deference here as it did not take any new evidence or establish any new facts.

 At the Batson hearing, the prosecutor stated that she did not ask Bell individual questions about the police report during voir dire because she did "not want to appear as though [she] was singling him out under the circumstances." The circuit court accepted this explanation without hesitation. The majority goes so far as to sympathize with the predicament in which the prosecutor found herself — accused of discrimination if she did not ask Bell individualized questions and accused of discrimination if she did. Majority op., ¶ 89. What neither the circuit court nor the majority appreciates is that the prosecutor had already singled out Bell when she obtained and used the police report during voir dire.

 See Wis. Stat. § 756.04(6); Legislative Council Comments, 1991, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 756.04 (West 2001). The questionnaire must also include "information necessary to determine if the person is qualified to serve as a juror in that circuit court" and "the prospective juror's declaration that the responses are true to the best of his or her knowledge," and "may request other information that the court needs to manage the *808jury system in an efficient manner, including information ordinarily sought during voir dire examination." Wis. Stat. § 756.04(6)(a), (c), (7).

 See also State v. Tucker, 2003 WI 12, ¶ 45, 259 Wis. 2d 484, 657 N.W.2d 374 (stating that despite restrictions on public access to juror information during jury selection, each party had access to juror questionnaires and therefore the restricted juror information); State v. Britt, 203 Wis. 2d 25, 33, 553 N.W.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1996) (same).
During the Batson hearing, the prosecutor also admitted that she knew from Bell's "juror card" that his employment varied.

 "As study after study has showed, residence, especially in urban centers, can be the most accurate predictor of race — more accurate, indeed, than social class." United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1992).

 It is realistic to believe that the prosecutor in this case knew of the prosecution of Gregory since she was in contact with the prosecutor of the Gregory case. Jury selection in the Gregory trial began the day after jury selection in this case, and as mentioned above, Bell was also on the venire in the Gregory case. The prosecutor in this case passed along her police report to the prosecutor in the Gregory case prior to voir dire, which resulted in Bell's being struck for the second day in a row.

 See SBC Janesville Area Smart Yellow Pages (April 2003).

 Jordan, 206 F.3d at 201.

 See State v. Gregory, 2001 WI App 107, ¶ 30, 244 Wis. 2d 65, 630 N.W.2d 711 (Vergeront, J., dissenting); see also Jordan, 206 F.3d at 201; Coulter, 155 F.3d at 922.