Court Opinion

ID: 9757832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:00:47.684946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:44.641365
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
The majority holds that, because of the ultimate risk for a defendant in a paternity action,1 a non-indigent defendant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to secure counsel. With this I heartily agree.
The majority then holds that this defendant was deprived of that right and must have a new trial. With this I disagree.
The first petition for support was filed by the petitioner on October 27, 1978. At a hearing on December 8, 1978, the defendant, represented by counsel, denied paternity. Blood studies were ordered, and a date set for a civil non-jury trial. There were then five continuances, with the defendant still represented by counsel, until September 1979, when the petitioner withdrew her complaint.
The petitioner filed a new petition for support in November 1980. A hearing was held on January 8, 1981. Petitioner and her counsel were present, as was the defendant. The defendant was without counsel. The defendant stated to the court at that hearing that he wished to deny paternity. The following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: I want to tell Mr. Gordon that the next time we are in court there is going to be a trial. You may *191come into court with or without a lawyer, since it is a civil case. If you come into court without a lawyer, you will have to represent yourself. It won’t be continued for you to get a lawyer.
THE RESPONDENT: I can understand that.
THE COURT: And if you come back to court and your lawyer says he can’t be here, he is busy, we are going to trial. We cannot continue to postpone this matter as we have in the past, because it is really making a mockery of the system. It had been listed at least about eight times, maybe more. So, Mr. Gordon, my advice to you is to be prepared to stand trial at the next listing in this civil case.
Now, before we leave you, do you have an attorney?
THE RESPONDENT: Your Honor, I do not, Sir.
THE COURT: Well, you don’t have to. It is better that you have one.
THE RESPONDENT: Yes.
THE COURT: But if you come to court without an attorney, I want to repeat myself, you are going to represent yourself.
THE RESPONDENT: Fine.
THE COURT: Because we are not going to continue it anymore.
Where do you live, Mr. Gordon?
THE RESPONDENT: 1043 E. Vernon Road.
THE COURT: And where do you work, Mr. Gordon?
THE RESPONDENT: I am currently unemployed, Your Honor.2
N.T. January 8, 1981 at 6-7.
At the trial on February 4, 1981, the defendant appeared, again without counsel. The following dialogue ensued:
THE COURT: Okay. We are here today for a civil trial. Are you Mr. Gordon?
THE RESPONDENT: Yes, I am.
*192THE COURT: Do you have a lawyer?
THE RESPONDENT: My lawyer withdrew from the case, and so I am currently unemployed, I could not secure another attorney.
THE COURT: Do you know that this is not a criminal case, this is a civil case?
THE RESPONDENT: Yes.
THE COURT: So that if you choose to represent yourself you may do so.
THE RESPONDENT: Correct.
THE COURT: So, Miss White apparently is ready to proceed so we will proceed today with the civil trial. And you will have to act as your own lawyer; do you understand that?
THE RESPONDENT: Yes, Sir.
N.T. February 4, 1981, at 10-11.
The trial began. After direct examination of the plaintiff by her counsel, the defendant conducted-1 a vigorous cross-examination of her. He then presented his own case in an articulate, coherent and lengthy statement. The judge found the defendant to be the father of the child and ordered support payments of $40 per week.
If, in light of Corra v. Coll, 305 Pa.Superior 179, 451 A.2d 480 (1982), I apply to these facts the stricter standard used in criminal cases where the issue of a denial of the right to counsel arises, I find that in this case there was no deprivation of due process.
First, the defendant was warned well ahead of time that he must appear with counsel or proceed without counsel. On January 8, 1981, he asked for, and received, a date certain when the continued hearing would be held. On the day of the trial he made no attempt to ask for delay, or to request aid in acquiring counsel, or even to inquire if such aid were possible. He appears from the testimony to have made no attempt to obtain counsel and to have been satisfied to represent himself. I shall however view this matter in light of the cases where a defendant has been refused the time and opportunity to retain counsel.
*193The allowance of continuances is largely a matter within the discretion of the lower court, and the denial of a continuance does not constitute reversible error unless there is an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Kittrell, 285 Pa.Super. 464, 427 A.2d 1380 (1981). The Supreme Court of the United States has said:
[I]t is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party ... is compelled to defend without counsel____ Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality____ There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case ____
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849-850, 11 L.Ed.2d 921, 931 (1964) (citations omitted) (no deprivation of the right to counsel where the appellant had been given five days’ notice of the hearing in question, where the witnesses were available, the evidence fresh and available, two short continuances had already been granted, and a motion for continuance was made on the day of the hearing).
In Pennsylvania the courts have applied a balancing test, weighing the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice against the state’s right to the efficient administration of justice. See Moore v. Jamieson, 451 Pa. 299, 306 A.2d 283 (1973). See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 468 Pa. 575, 364 A.2d 665 (1976) (no abuse of discretion in the denial by the trial court of a continuance where privately retained counsel had taken no action to prepare for trial, not communicated with his client, not responded to any notices of the date of trial, one continuance had already been granted, and a substitute counsel had been appointed well in advance of trial); Commonwealth v. Nicolella, 307 Pa.Super. 96, 452 A.2d 1055 (1982) (abuse of discretion to deny continuance where on day of trial defendant requested to discharge counsel and retain new counsel because of disagreement *194over trial strategy); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 306 Pa.Super. 152, 452 A.2d 260 (1982) (no abuse of discretion to deny continuance on day of trial where defendant, represented for four months by public defender, requested time to retain private counsel); Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 301 Pa. Super. 187, 447 A.2d 305 (1982) (where defense counsel withdrew mid-trial, substitute counsel was appointed, and no inquiry was conducted into feasibility of defendant’s request for time and opportunity to obtain private counsel, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the request); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 282 Pa.Super. 115, 422 A.2d 855 (1980) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance where defendant had appeared at trial seventeen months after his arrest, without counsel, after due notice); Commonwealth v. Atkins, 233 Pa.Super. 202, 336 A.2d 368 (1975) (denial of right to counsel where the defendant refused representation at trial by associate of her own counsel and therefore had to represent herself when trial court denied continuance).
In light of these cases it is my view that Mr. Gordon was given due notice of the advisability of counsel, and of the fact that if he appeared for trial without counsel he would have to represent himself. I would therefore find no abuse of discretion or deprivation of due process and would affirm the order of the trial court.

. See Corra v. Coll, 305 Pa.Super. 179, 451 A.2d 480 (1982).

. At the trial a month later the defendant informed the judge that he had been doing part-time work (20 hours a week) since mid-December, at $250 per week, and that his previous full-time job was as a data processor and computer programmer. N.T. February 4 at 56, 59.