Court Opinion

ID: 9961088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 20:08:01.903222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:12.767857
License: Public Domain

Matter of Scott-Heron
               2024 NY Slip Op 31287(U)
                     April 12, 2024
          Surrogate's Court, New York County
         Docket Number: File No. 2011-2283/J
                    Judge: Rita Mella
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
 Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
 State and local government sources, including the New
  York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.
 This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
                       publication.
                                                                                                      New York County Surrogate's Coult
                                                                                                           DATA ENTRY DEPT.
        SURROGATE'S COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK                                                           APR 12 2024
        COUNTY OF NEW YORK
        -------------------------------------------------------------------------x
        Accounting by Rumal Rackley as the Temporary
        Administrator of the Estate of
                                                                                      DECISION and ORDER
                 GILBERT SCOTT-HERON,                                                 File No.: 2011-2283/J

                                                    Deceased.
        -------------------------------------------------------------------------x

        MEL LA, S.:

        The following submissions were considered in deciding the cross-motions described below:
        Documents Considered 1                                                                          Numbered
        Notice of Motion to Compel Production and Affirmation of
        Albert V. Messina, Jr., in Support, with Exhibits                                                     1,2

        Affirmation of Raquiyah Kelly-Heron, in Support of Motion                                            3

        Notice of Cross-Motion for a Protective Order, Affirmation of                                        4,5
        Matthew B. Abrams, with Exhibits

        Reply Affirmation of Albert V. Messina, Jr., with Exhibit                                            6

                In this contested accounting proceeding by Rumal Rackley (Rumal) as Temporary

        Administrator of the estate of Gilbert Scott-Heron, Respondent Chegianna Newton (Chegianna)

        moves, pursuant to CPLR 3124, to compel Rumal to produce documents responsive to her SCPA

        2211 document demand dated March 29, 2021, and Rumal cross-moves for a protective order

        pursuant to CPLR 3126.

        Background

                Decedent, noted musician and spoken word artist Gilbert Scott-Heron, died intestate on

        May 27, 2011, leaving behind a complex estate of contested artistic rights and few liquid assets.

        1
          Although the Notice of Motion and the Notice of Cross-Motion both state that a memorandum of law is appendt,d,
        the court has no record of the filing of any memoranda.

[* 1]
        Pursuant to this court's order, Rumal acted as Temporary Administrator beginning on November

        30, 2011. Following a kinship hearing held on December 5, 2018, the court determined that

        decedent was survived by four adult children as his sole distributees: Rumal, Chegianna, G,a

        Scott-Heron (Gia), and Raquiyah Nia Kelly Heron (Raquiyah). By Decision and Order dated

        May 2, 2019, the court granted Rumal 's petition for Letters of Administration and denied

        Raquiyah's cross-petition for same. The issuance of full letters to Rumal was contingent upon

        the posting of a bond in the amount of $373,404, which he has not posted. 2

                 Rumal subsequently filed a court-ordered accounting on October 1, 2018, covering the

        period from October 1, 2013 through March 6, 2018 (Account, as amended). 3 Chegianna then

        served her pre-objection SCPA 2211 document demand dated March 29, 2021. The demand

        includes 124 separate requests for documents supporting Rumal's Account and concerning

        decedent's estate generally. Although Rumal served a response dated April 30, 2021, his

        response did not include any documents. With respect to numerous document requests, however,

        Rumal advised that he would produce nonprivileged, responsive documents in his possession,

        custody, or control. He further stated that he would seek a protective order with respect to other

        document requests. The instant motions followed.

        Discussion

                The standards for evaluating discovery motions such as these are clear:

                     "Disclosure should be permitted for all evidence 'material and necessary'
                     to the prosecution or defense of an action (CPLR 3101 ). What constitutes
                     'material and necessary' should be construed liberally to require
                     disclosure of any facts bearing on the controversy which assist by

        2
         Ruma! has not secured a bond allegedly due to excessive litigation regarding decedent's estate.
        3
         Ruma! had previously filed an account for his proceedings as Temporary Administrator for the period from
        November 30, 20 I I (the date of his appointment) through September 30, 2013.
                                                                2

[* 2]
                    sharpening the issues and reducing delay. 'The test is one of usefulness
                    and reason'"

        (Polygram Holding, Inc. v Cafaro, 42 AD3d 339, 340-341 [1st Dept 2007], quoting Allen v

        Crowell-Collier Puhl. Co., 21 NY2d 403,406 [1968]). The court has wide discretion to

        determine the scope of disclosure (Allen, 21 NY2d at 406). In addition, SCPA 2211 (2) states:

                     "The fiduciary may be examined under oath by any party to the
                    proceeding either before or after filing objections, if any, to the account,
                    as to any matter relating to his or her administration of the estate. The party
                    conducting such examination shall be entitled to all rights granted under
                    article thirty-one of the civil practice law and rules with respect to
                    document discovery, regardless of whether such examination takes place
                    before or after such party files objections."

               The Parties' Contentions

               In her moving papers, Chegianna contends that her motion to compel must be granted

        because her demand seeks documents clearly relevant to Rumal' s Account. She asserts that she

        will suffer severe prejudice if the documents are not produced, as she will be unable to asses,;;

        whether valid objections exist and will be prevented from conducting a proper SCP A 2211

        examination of Rumal. Chegianna observes that although Rumal agreed to produce certain

        nonprivileged, responsive documents in his possession, custody or control, he did not provide

        any documents, did not submit a privilege log in compliance with CPLR 3122(b), and failed to

        state that he is not in possession of responsive documents. With respect to the specific document

        requests to which Rumal objected on the ground that either a protective order or confidentiality

        agreement was warranted, she notes that Rumal secured neither. Chegianna posits that she "is an

        equal owner of the same [estate assets as Rumal] with an equal right to the information, income

        and distributions" (Messina's Aff. in Support Jrl5). She further claims that Rumal's "self-dealing

                                                          3

[* 3]
        and lack of transparency must be scrutinized, which starts with his discovery obligations"

        (Messina's Aff. in Support Jrl5). 4

                   In opposition to Chegianna's motion and in support of his cross-motion, Rumal argues

        that any claim of prejudice due to his failure to produce requested documents is suspect, because

        Chegianna did not immediately move to compel their production. In addition, Rumal asserts that

        by requesting certain documents that are readily accessible to her, Chegianna is showing

        disregard for estate resources. He further opines that the document requests are overbroad,

        unduly burdensome, and irrelevant, and that Chegianna is essentially seeking the production of

        every scrap of paper pertaining to the administration of decedent's estate. Rumal next invokes

        the attorney-client privilege with respect to certain enumerated requests. He also claims that his

        home "was tragically destroyed by fire several years ago and several years into the

        administration of this Estate," and that much original documentation relevant to Chegianna's

        discovery demand has been lost (Abrams' Aff. in Opp. Jr14).

                   As for Chegianna's self-dealing allegation, Rumal disputes the claim that he engaged in

        any improper conduct and states that the expenses listed in his Account are reasonable and

        necessary. According to Rumal, Chegianna's motion to compel is part of a long-running smear

        campaign against him orchestrated not only by Chegianna, but by decedent's other distributees.

        He complains that his siblings (and individuals related to them) have denigrated both him and

        decedent on social media.

                   Rumal contends that in September 2022, Chegianna usurped an estate opportunity

        regarding a studio-backed documentary production, which would allow Chegianna to obtain

        4
            Raquiyah submitted an affidavit in support dated August 25, 2023, echoing Chegianna's concerns.

                                                                  4

[* 4]
        money "on the side" to the estate's detriment (Abrams' Aff. in Opp. !r!r5-6). He opines tha1

        Chegianna would likely pass on to her documentary collaborators sensitive information rec:eived

        through her discovery demand. More generally, Rumal posits that none of his fellow distributees

        can be trusted with estate-related financial records, because to promote their individual interests

        they "have previously contacted third parties, posted publicly about Estate business and disputes,

        [and] jeopardized the Estate's reputation as an entity which can be dealt with reasonably and

        professionally" (Abrams' Aff. in Opp. !r13). He predicts that his siblings would not abide by a

        confidentiality agreement with respect to such documents. Rumal instead requests a protective

        order with an "attorneys' eyes only" restriction, as well as additional unspecified restrictions. He

        reasons that such relief is warranted because he and the other distributees are competitors, the

        details contained in the requested licensing-related documents are trade secrets, and a protective

        order of this nature "would significantly reduce the likelihood of catastrophic consequences of an

        unredacted and unfiltered disclosure" to Chegianna and the other distributees (Abrams' Aff. in

        Opp. lrJrl 9-21 ).

                 In reply, Chegianna points out that after threatening in April 2021 to move for a

        protective order, Rumal did not in fact seek such relief until after Chegianna filed the instant

        motion to compel in 2023. She explains that the timing of her motion was driven by a desire for

        judicial economy, noting that the court directed Rumal in March 2023 to account for a

        subsequent period, and Chegianna sought to conduct SCP A 2211 examinations with respect to

        the instant accounting and the subsequent accounting at the same time. Chegianna states that her

        document requests are not overbroad, as they are generally limited to the time frame between

        October 1, 2013 and March 6, 2018, with the exception of documents created after March 6,

        2018 that refer to events during the accounting period. She surmises that Rumal has failed to
                                                          5

[* 5]
        produce any documents thus far because he is reaping personal benefits at the expense of the

        estate's other distributees, and has become complacent in his role as Temporary Administrator.

               Regarding the fire that allegedly destroyed Rumal' s home, Chegianna observes that

        Rumal' s motion papers do not state whether the fire occurred before the deadline to respond to

        her discovery demand had passed, nor do they include an explanation for why the documents

        were not properly protected. She points out that Rumal never notified anyone of the fire before

        responding to the motion, and did not provide a change of address to the court.

               With respect to Rumal's complaints regarding Chegianna's alleged efforts to usurp an

        estate opportunity for personal gain, Chegianna asserts that the purported events to which he

        refers are beyond the scope of this accounting, and occurred well after April 30, 2021, the date

        that Rumal' s document production was due. She further opines that Rumal has provided only

        speculation to support his contention that any distributee harmed the estate or diverted any estate

        benefit. As for Rumal's request for a protective order, Chegianna argues that cases cited by

        Rumal are inapposite because Rumal and the other distributees are not competitors, and the

        alleged "trade secrets" are not actually secrets since the information requested by Chegianna is

        already known to licensing and contracting parties.

               Analysis

               As an initial matter, the court rejects Rumal's assertion that Chegianna took a

        lackadaisical approach to outstanding discovery. The record reflects that on April 30, 2021, one

        month after Chegianna served her discovery demand, Rumal advised her that he would begin a

        "rolling production" of some documents in one week's time (Ex. G. to Motion to Compel), and

        further stated that with respect to other documents, he would either move for a protective order

        or obtain a confidentiality agreement. However, Rumal did not produce a single document over
                                                         6

[* 6]
        the next two years, nor did he seek a protective order. Between 2021 and 2023, Chegianna sent

        multiple follow-up letters and emails noting Rumal's non-responsiveness, and also sought court

        intervention by requesting a conference. 5 Accordingly, Rumal' s attempt to cast Chegianna as the

        dilatory party is, at best, disingenuous.

                 Although Rumal complains that he should not be required to produce various documents

        because they are public records that can be accessed by Chegianna without burdening the estate,

        he provides no citations to support this contention. In any event, relevant case law does not

        support his position (see Z.D. v MP Mgt., LLC, 150 AD3d 550, 552 [1st Dept 2017] [observing

        that "[t]he fact that plaintiffs may have been able to access some evidence of lead paint

        violations in the building from HPD does not preclude plaintiffs from seeking these records

        directly from defendants in discovery"]; Matter of Steam Pipe Explosion at 41st St. & Lexington

        Ave., 127 AD3d 554, 556 [1st Dept 2015] [stating that defendants/third-party

        plaintiffs' "independent efforts to obtain publicly-available documents ... do not extinguish

        third-party defendant's obligations to comply with the CPLR"], affd 27 NY3d 985 [2016]).

        Moreover, although Rumal broadly objected to Chegianna's discovery demand on this ground in

        the "General Responses and Objections" portion of his discovery response, in his specific

        responses, he essentially agreed to produce responsive, nonprivileged documents even though

        Chegianna could glean the information from other sources. Accordingly, with respect to

        document request Nos. 1, 3,4, 11, 12,46,47,48,49, 52, 53,55,56,57, 58, 59, 60,61,62,63,

        64,65,66,67,68,69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,80,81,82,83,84,96,97,98,99,

        100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,112,113,114,115,116,117,118, 119,and 120, the

        5
         At the time the conference was requested, jurisdiction had still not been obtained over all necessary parties, so the
        conference was premature.
                                                                  7

[* 7]
        motion to compel is granted, and Rumal must produce all responsive, nonprivileged documents

        in his possession, custody, or control within 30 days of service of this order upon him. In the

        event that a privilege is asserted with respect to any responsive documents, he must provide a

        privilege log (CPLR 3122[b]). In the event that no responsive documents exist, he must so state.

                 With respect to document request Nos. 9, 10, 50, 51, 54, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92,

        93, 94, and 95, Rumal stated in his response to Chegianna's demand that he would provide

        nonprivileged, responsive documents in his possession, custody, or control. To date, he has not

        done so. Accordingly, Chegianna's motion to compel is granted as to these document requests,

        and within 30 days of service of this order upon him, Rumal must produce responsive,

        nonprivileged documents in his possession, custody, or control, if any. In the event that a

        privilege is asserted with respect to any responsive documents, he must provide a privilege log

        (CPLR 3 l 22[b ]). In the event that no responsive documents exist, he must so state. The motion is

        also granted as to document request No. 39 (to which Rumal responded that he was "reviewing

        the Estate's records in an effort to produce those [responsive] non-privileged documents in his

        possession, custody, or control, if any" (Ex. F to Motion to Compel)), and the same directives

        apply.

                 Rumal's response to document request No. 2 (seeking safe deposit box information)-

        namely, that no responsive documents are in his custody or control-is satisfactory. In addition,

        Rumal properly objected to document request Nos. 121 (seeking documents "not previously

        demanded" pertaining to distributions), 123 (seeking certain "complete records ... not

        previously produced"), and 124 (seeking "[a]ll other non-privileged documents that were relied

        upon or consulted in preparing the Accounting"), as the requests are indeed vague and overbroad

                                                          8

[* 8]
        (see Mendelowitz v Xerox Corp., 169 AD2d 300 [1st Dept 1991]). Accordingly, the motion is

        denied with respect to these document requests.

               By contrast, Rumal's objection to document request No. 122, which seeks "[c]opies of

        any records of appointments, calendar books, diaries or logs maintained by [Rumal] regarding

        the performance of his duties as Administrator," is improper (Ex. F to Motion to Compel).

        Chegianna's request is for specific, relevant items within a limited time frame (see id. at 303-

        304). Accordingly, the motion to compel is granted with respect to request No. 122, and within

        30 days of service of this order upon him, Rumal is directed to produce the requested items,

        provide a privilege log if any privilege is claimed with respect to a responsive document (CPLR

        3122 [b ]), or state that no responsive documents are in his possession, custody, or control.

               The remaining discovery requests are the subject of Rumal's cross-motion for a

        protective order, based on the theory that Rumal and the other distributees are competitors and

        the documents sought constitute trade secrets. Pursuant to CPLR 3103(a),

                    "[t]he court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any
                    party or of any person from whom or about whom discovery is sought,
                    make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the
                    use of any disclosure device. Such order shall be designed to prevent
                    unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other
                    prejudice to any person or the courts."

        The burden of showing that the disclosure sought is improper is upon the party seeking the

        protective order (see Roman Catholic Church of the Good Shepherd v Tempco Sys., 202 AD2d

        257,258 [1st Dept 1994]).

               "Attorneys' eyes only" orders, as Rumal requests, "have been upheld in order to protect

        the confidentiality of trade secrets obtained in the course of discovery" (Bernstein v On-Line

        Software Intl., 232 AD2d 336, 337 [1st Dept 1996]). However, "information cannot qualify for

                                                          9

[* 9]
         trade secret protection unless it is, in fact, secret" (Mann v Cooper Tire Co., 33 AD3d 24, 32 [1st

         Dept 2006]; see Susan D. Fine Enters., LLC v Steele, 66 AD3d 613,614 [1st Dept 2009]). Rumal

         has not established the element of secrecy. Moreover, "a trade secret exists where there is a

         'formula, pattern, device or compilation of information ... used in one's business ... which

         gives [one] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it"

         (Mann, 33 AD3d at 31 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, although Rumal's siblings have

         expressed displeasure regarding Rumal's behavior, the court is unpersuaded by Rumal's claim

         that he and the other distributees are competitors. Thus, Rumal has failed to meet his burden of

         showing that the requested documents constitute trade secrets protected from disclosure (see

         Susan D. Fine Enters., LLC, 66 AD3d at 614), and is not entitled to an order limiting disclosure

         to legal counsel. For these reasons, his motion for a protective order in the form of an

         "attorneys' eyes only" directive is denied.

                    In light of this ruling, within 30 days of service of this order upon him, Rumal must

         produce any nonprivileged documents in his possession, custody, or control responsive to

         document request Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 18, 6 19, 20, 31, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, and 109. In

         the event that a privilege is asserted as to any responsive documents, he must provide a privilege

         log (CPLR 3122[b]). If no responsive documents exist, Rumal must so state.

                    However, Rumal is not required to produce documents responsive to request Nos. 14, 15,

         16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 110, and 111. Although Rumal

         failed to establish his entitlement to a protective order based on his trade secrets argument, the

         court agrees with his alternative contention that the demands are vague and/or overbroad.

         6
             Ruma! failed to serve an initial response to demand number 18.
                                                                    10

[* 10]
                Having issued directives regarding each of Chegianna's document requests, the court is

         constrained to address the parties' behavior, both past and future. There is some support in the

         record for Rumal 's claim that various distributees have publicly criticized him and failed to

         consult with him on matters pertaining to decedent. However, Rumal's prolonged silence in the

         face of repeated requests for discovery presumably exacerbated an already fraught situation. The

         court is deeply troubled by Rumal' s decision to proceed in this manner while acting as a

         fiduciary. Nevertheless, there is merit to his position that reputation is important, and a tarnished

         legacy due to social media wars could have an impact on the estate's ability to flourish

         financially, to the detriment of all distributees. Accordingly, all parties are cautioned that estate

         information to which the public does not have access should not be disseminated to the public or

         to nonparties who might disseminate the information.

                In sum, Chegianna's motion to compel is granted to the extent that within 30 days of

         service of this order upon him, Rumal must produce responsive documents, provide a privilege

         log in the event that a privilege is asserted with respect to any responsive document, or state that

         no responsive documents exist with respect to each of Chegianna' s document requests, except

         fordocumentrequestnos.2, 14, 15, 16, 17,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,32,33,34,35,

         38, 110, 111, 121, 123, and 124. In addition, should Rumal claim that he is unable to produce

         documents responsive to a particular demand because such documents were destroyed in the fire

         that allegedly consumed his home, he is directed to produce an affidavit (signed by him)

         detailing the circumstances of the incident and itemizing the specific documents that were

         lost. Rumal must file the affidavit with the court on the same date that he provides it to

         Chegianna, which, again, shall be within 30 days of service of this order upon him.

                                                           11

[* 11]
                  Rumal's cross-motion for a protective order in the form of an "attorneys' eyes only"

         directive is denied. However, all parties are advised that estate information to which the public

         does not have access should not be disseminated to the public or to nonparties who might

         disseminate the information.

                  This decision constitutes the order of the court.

                  Clerk to notify.

         Dated:    April 12, 2024

                                                           12

[* 12]