Court Opinion

ID: 9518008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:40:29.768813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:49.610912
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. PARKER, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the opinions of my fellow Judges, Johnson and Justice, as they relate to the 15th and 27th Districts in South Texas. It is entirely appropriate for this Court to remedy, temporarily, those areas found objectionable under the Voting Rights Act so that congressional elections in Texas can proceed on schedule. I cannot, however, concur in the changes made in S.B. 1 which are not needed to remedy that defect. I also, therefore, concur with Judge Johnson’s opinion in those areas of the State in which S.B. 1 is retained. I dissent from those changes made in the Dallas County area to districts 3, 5, 24 and 26. Those changes are not predicated on a Voting Rights objection or a finding that S.B. 1 is unconstitutional under City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980).
In my opinion, the Supreme Court has set forth clear guidelines for courts required to make substantive intrusions into the reapportionment process. The Court has said that “reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites...” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1394, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), and that “redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the federal courts should make every effort not to pre-empt... . ” Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 2496, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-415, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833-1834, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977).
In this vein, the Court has indicated that a finding of unconstitutionality in a legislative redistricting plan does not suspend the deference owed the legislative will embodied in those portions which are not offensive. In White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973), the Supreme Court, in upholding a district court’s determination of unconstitutionality in the Texas congressional districts plan prepared by the State, nevertheless, overturned the remedy selected by that district court. In substituting another plan, the Supreme Court stated “The District Court erred in [its] choice. .. It should have implemented [the plan] which most clearly approximated the reapportionment plan of the state legislature, while satisfying constitutional requirements. . .. The District Court’s preferences do not override whatever state goals were embodied in [the State plan] . .. Id. at 796, 93 S.Ct. at 2355. See also, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1878, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971) (“The remedial powers of an equity court must-be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited. Here the District Court erred in so broadly brushing aside state apportionment policy without solid constitutional or equitable grounds for doing so.”
This policy of judicial deference in fashioning equitable remedies recognizes the principle that such remedies should not exceed the scope of the violation for which they are required.1 To allow otherwise would unjustifiably thwart the clear and legitimate will of the people.
*1029Recently, the 5th Circuit has recognized and applied this principle in the context of voting dilution challenges such as ours. Addressing what was at that time felt to be the Constitutional test in this area, Judge Wisdom indicated that it was improper for a court, in remedying a constitutional violation, to draw a plan which sought proportional representation. “If a plan passes the dilution test, race is no longer an important factor.... [W]e are not legislatures.” Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927, 937 (1978) (citations omitted). Further, he stated “[P]roportional racial representation, though attractive, is an abuse of the district court’s equitable discretion.” Id. at 938.
Absent specific statutory or constitutional violations, any changes to S.B. 1 made in this Court’s remedial plan on behalf of the minorities which brought this suit, are merely substitutions by this Court of its preferences for those of the legislature. This can only be understood as an affirmative attempt to enhance minority voting strength in the state beyond the requirements of the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution. Such actions run afoul of the premise that “a court is forbidden to take into account the purely political considerations that might be appropriate for legislative bodies.” Wyche v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 635 F.2d 1151, 1160 (5th Cir. 1981).
I am aware that the Supreme Court has indicated that a court-ordered plan will be reviewed under “stricter standards” than a legislative plan. Such standards have only been developed in and applied to two specific aspects of court-ordered plans, neither of which are implicated in this instance.2
In those contexts, stricter standards are appropriate because such goals are essentially apolitical. Political ends, such as affirmative action for particular groups, should not and cannot be the subject of a stricter standard without the Court entering the legislative domain. As indicated, this is forbidden.
Further, the Supreme Court makes it clear that the reasons for such stricter standards are precisely those which require judicial deference to the legislative plan in those areas in which it passes constitutional and legal muster.
These high standards reflect the unusual position of federal courts as draftsmen of reapportionment plans. We have repeatedly emphasized that ‘legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination ...,’ for a state legislature is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality. The federal courts by contrast, possess no distinctive mandate to compromise sometimes conflicting state apportionment policies in the people’s name. In the wake of a legislature’s failure constitutionally to reconcile these conflicting state and federal goals, however, a federal court is left with the unwelcome obligation of performing in the legislature’s stead while lacking the political authoritativeness that the legislature can bring to the task. Connor, supra 431 U.S. at 414-15, 97 S.Ct. at 1833-34.
Thus, these stricter standards only come into play when a court must, in effect, legislate in the absence of legitimate state legislative pronouncement. They are applicable to the changes this Court must make to remedy the Justice Department’s objections to the 15th and 27th districts. In the rest of the state, however, the interests which motivate these high standards can best be served by adopting the legislature’s plan which has survived constitutional scrutiny.
*1030In short, it is my opinion that the Justice Department’s objection to the two South Texas districts requires this Court to draw an interim plan which corrects the Voting Rights Act violations which exist there so that congressional elections can be held on schedule in Texas. The Justice Department’s objections are not, however, an invitation for this Court to redraw other districts according to our preferences when no constitutional violation has been or can be found. To do so is an unwarranted usurpation of the democratic processes of our society.

. “The well-settled principle that the nature and scope of the remedy are to be determined by the violation means simply that federal-court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself. Because of this inherent limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation.... ” Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2757-58, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (citations omitted).

. “We have made clear that in two important respects a court will be held to stricter standards in accomplishing its task than will a state legislature: ‘[U]nless there are persuasive justifications, a court-ordered reapportionment plan of a state legislature must avoid use of multimember districts, and as well, must ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation.’” Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1976) (citing Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26-27, 95 S.Ct. 751, 765-766, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975).