Court Opinion

ID: 9834566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 00:02:33.672055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:22.745019
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
When the foregoing opinion was handed down, at the defendant’s request, the entry order was held and leave was granted to file a motion for rehearing and an amended bill of exceptions tendered therewith.
It is said in support of the motion that we wrongfully precluded the defendant from the benefit of a substantial .error *297committed below: (1) By turning the point on a shortage in the record concerning which the parties did not disagree, and to which the defendant’s attention was not called by opposing counsel or the Court at argument; (2) by not construing the bill as covering the omission referred to in the opinion; (3) by overlooking the fact that the transcript was made a part of the bill by reference, and that, fairly construed, it shows that counsel below relied upon the point briefed; (4) by holding that the defendant should not have the benefit of the error committed, notwithstanding the condition of the record.
1. It is no part of the duty of counsel to point out to his opponent defects in the record, and his failure to do so here is of no consequence — except, possibly, upon the question of the exercise of our discretion hereinafter referred to. As said in the opinion, the excepting party carries the responsibility of presenting here a record that affirmatively shows error. He, alone, carries the risk of mistakes and omissions therein. He cannot shift this responsibility onto opposing counsel or the court, either here or below. If he fails by reason of the insufficiency of the record here, that result is chargeable to his own inattention. We affirm a judgment whenever this can legally be done, whether the ground on which we put our decision is urged by counsel or not; but we do not search for grounds on which to predicate error. With us, the record imports absolute verity, and anything not shown by it is out of the case in this Court.
2. True it is that the transcript is made a part of the bill, and it is urged that it shows that the defendant relied below upon the failure of the jury to reduce its award to its present worth by “the statement in the record respecting the tenor and effect of the plaintiff’s closing argument, the copy of the computation referred to, and grounds 5 and 6 of the motion to set aside the verdict.” The transcript, however, only shows what was said at the trial by counsel and court relative to present worth. This was all before verdict. There was no disagreement about it. The charge covered it. But the transcript makes no reference whatever to what was said or done after the verdict was rendered. If it showed that the motion to set aside the verdict covered the point under discussion, we would be in error in denying the defendant the benefit of it. But it does not. The original motion, being a part of the files, is before us, *298though not referred to in the bill. Frost v. Bates, 16 Vt. 145, 146; Wheelock v. Bears, 19 Vt. 559, 563. But it, too, is in the general language of the exceptions, and does not show that it was predicated upon the failure of the jury to reduce its award to' its present worth. We are specially referred to grounds 5 and 6 of the motion. But all that these assert is: “ (5) That the verdict is contrary to the instructions of the court”; and “ (6) that upon the evidence in said cause, under the instructions of the court, there is no basis for the verdict returned.” Wherein the verdict was contrary to the instructions, or wherein there was a shortage of evidence is not specified. The trial court was entitled to know; it was the duty of complaining counsel to point out the defect relied upon. Moreover, he must present here a record affirmatively showing that he did point out the very defect here relied upon.
Our attention is called to French v. Wheldon, 91 Vt. 64, 99 Atl. 232, and Whitman v. Dailey, 95 Vt. 454, 115 Atl. 559, wherein similar general grounds were set out as bases for motions to set aside verdicts, and were passed upon by this Court. It is enough to say of those cases that the lack of specific grounds for the motions was not noticed or considered; and that they afford no precedent for disregarding or disposing of the omission here. See In re Bean’s Will, 85 Vt. 452, 82 Atl. 734, wherein the 'subject of general exceptions to' a charge were considered.
3. The third ground of the motion is nothing more than a restatement in different terms of the ground just considered, and does not require separate treatment.
4.' In denying the defendant the benefit of the error, we followed the unquestioned rule of this Court. Error is never presumed. It must be made to appear. The construction of a record on review is always against the excepting party. As we have already said if through inadvertence or inattention that party presents here an imperfect or erroneous bill, he must suffer the consequences. We can not overturn established rules to save him.
This brings us to the most important question involved in this application: Shall we grant a rehearing on the amended bill? It is nowhere denied that a record may, on seasonable application, be so amended as to speak the truth. Courts differ, however, in their views as to what applications are to *299be deemed, seasonable. In the interests of public policy and a reasonably prompt disposition of cases in court, there must be set a time limit within which application for. such correction shall be made. Otherwise, appellate -courts would be swamped with applications of this kind and the final results of many cases would be much delayed. We said, in effect, in Castonguay v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 91 Vt. 371, 374, 100 Atl. 908, that the presiding judge could amend the bill at any time before the case was submitted to us. We did not say, and do not now say that the submission of the case foreclosed the excepting party— though some courts say that amendments will not be permitted thereafter. Pittsburgh Gas & Coke Co. v. Goff-Kirby Coal Co., 81 C. C. A. 76, 151 Fed. 466. We do not doubt that in a proper case we could, in the exercise of a sound discretion, grant a rehearing on a bill corrected by remission to the trial court or otherwise — even after an opinion predicated on the original bill had been handed down. We quite agree, however, with those courts that hold that it is only in very special and exceptional cases that a rehearing will be granted after a decision has been announced in the appellate court, to enable the excepting party to supply defects in the record. Such a holding was made in Ricks v. Bergsvendsen, 8 N. D. 578, 80 N. W. 768, where the situation was much like the one here. That case was approved and followed in Garbush v. Firey, 33 N. D. 154, 156 N. W. 537, 539, and in Black Hills Brewing Co. v. Middlewest Fire Ins. Co., 34 S. D. 262, 141 N. W. 358. To the same effect are Huntington v. Cline (Ind. App.), 97 N. E. 365; State, ex rel. v. Ludwig, 146 Wis. 385, 132 N. W. 130; Board, etc., of Marion Co. v. Center Tp., etc., 105 Ind. 422, 7 N. E. 189; Smith v. Gustin, 169 Ind. 42, 81 N. E. 722; Hatfield v. Jakway, 102 Neb. 831, 170 N. W. 181; Hansen v. De Vita, 77 N. J. Law, 267, 72 Atl. 60; U. S. v. Adams, 9 Wall. 554, 19 L. ed. 584. In the case last cited, the defect was known to counsel in time to have the correction made before hearing. But relying on its immateriality counsel did not apply until after an adverse decision was announced. Therein the case differs from this ease, and is like McAllister v. Benjamin, 96 Vt. 475, 121 Atl. 263, where the excepting party was appraised of the claim made by his adversary that the transcript was not a part of the record. In both these cases relief was denied. The fact of knowledge of the defect is a circumstance affecting the exercise of our discretion in grant*300ing or withholding the opportunity sought. In the case before us, the defendant was not informed of the defect until our decision was announced. But his was the fault, and therefore his ignorance does not make his case “very special” or “very exceptional. ’ ’

Motion overruled. Let full entry be made.