Court Opinion

ID: 9710533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:11:26.527605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.507896
License: Public Domain

LEDERBERG, Justice,
with whom WEISBERGER, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion because I believe that the state in this ease failed to prove that Michael Mendoza is guilty of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. It is my opinion that the trial justice was clearly wrong in denying this defendant’s motion for a new trial.
It is well settled that in deciding a motion for a new trial, the trial justice must determine “whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Scurry, 636 A.2d 719, 725 (R.I.1994). A trial justice’s ruling on a new trial motion is entitled to great weight, State v. Dame, 560 A.2d 330, 332 (R.I.1989) (citing State v. Henshaw, 557 A.2d 1204, 1207 (R.I.1989)), provided that the trial justice has “articulated an adequate rationale for denying a motion.” State v. Bleau, 668 A.2d 642, 646 (R.I.1995). In so doing, the trial justice must pass upon the weight and the credibility of the evidence and accept or reject conflicting testimony, using his or her independent judgment. See id.
In this case the transcript from the hearing on the motion for a new trial reveals that the trial justice faded to assess independently the credibility of the witnesses. At that hearing, the trial justice correctly explained that “[w]hen the Court considers a motion for a new trial, as you know, I sit in the capacity effectively as the 13th juror, so to speak, at which time I am expected to assess credibility and weigh the evidence.” If the trial justice had fulfilled his responsibility, he would have been compelled to conclude that the inconsistencies in Luis Nunez’s testimony, coupled with the undisputed facts about the physical environment in which Nunez claimed that he witnessed defendant discharge a weapon, created a serious credibility problem such that Nunez’s testimony-—the only testimony that identified defendant as the shooter—could not carry the state past its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In contrast to the majority’s benign reference to “those perceived ‘weaknesses’ ” in Nunez’s testimony and identification of defendant, the record reveals that Nunez was an extremely problematic witness who contradicted himself on more than one occasion.7 *1039He was an admitted perjurer who had been convicted three times in New York for possessing illegal drugs with the intent to sell. He told the police his name was Juan Rodri-gues when he first identified defendant from a photo lineup, and he again offered this false name when testifying at the pretrial hearing. Nunez was also in the United States illegally and was deported to his native Dominican Republic after having been convicted of yet another drug-related offense subsequent to defendant’s arrest. He denied at trial what even the prosecutor admitted was true—that at Nunez’s own request the Rhode Island Attorney General agreed to write a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service attesting to Nunez’s cooperation with the Department should Nunez return to this country and testify against defendant. At the time of defendant’s trial Nunez had been allowed back into the United States only because he promised to leave immediately after the trial, and he was under twenty-four-hour police supervision while in this country.
Nunez’s testimony at the trial was seriously impeached by his prior testimony at a pretrial hearing and by his own statements to the police. For example, he first testified at trial that he was standing on the sidewalk when Alexis Abreu exited the apartment and began shooting; he then claimed that he was standing on the steps to the apartment at the time. When first recounting the shooting to the police, Nunez explained that “I dove down to the street and hid. After the shooting stopped, I got up and ran home.” At the trial, in contrast, he claimed that as the second shooter came to the door and started firing toward Abreu, “I fell on my knees, and then I tried to go through [the second shooter’s] leg[s] and started to crawl and went up and through the back door, [and I then] went out through the back door.” Accepting Nunez’s trial testimony would require believing that in his effort to escape the life-threatening hail of bullets, Nunez ran up the steps, onto the porch, and through the legs of the very individual at whom Abreu was, by Nunez’s own account, firing his weapon. To assert that one’s instinct for self-preservation would operate in such counterproductive fashion defies reason.
Furthermore, Nunez’s testimony revealed that the physical conditions were exceedingly poor for making a positive identification of the second shooter. He conceded that there was no porch light, and no evidence was presented to suggest that there were street lights illuminating the porch, in the “two or three seconds” interval during which Nunez viewed the person shooting from the porch. Incredibly, in Nunez’s first statement to police he described the shooter as five-foot-six or five-foot-seven inches tall and “dark skinned like a black guy.” The defendant has a light complexion and his claim that he *1040is five-foot-eleven inches tall was never controverted. Moreover, at trial, Nunez, when shown a picture of the house where the shooting occurred, could not confirm that the house depicted was the same house at which he had been that night, but nonetheless he claimed to be certain that the individual who barely emerged from the house and started shooting from the dark porch was defendant. The trial justice himself remarked of Nunez that “the independent recollection of the witness is not as strong as I have seen in other cases.”
In light of the undisputed characteristics of the environment in which Nunez—the sole identifying witness—claimed to have seen defendant fire the shot that allegedly caused Diaz’s death and given the inconsistencies in Nunez’s version of events, the trial justice’s assessment of Nunez’s credibility was of paramount significance in ruling on defendant’s motion for a new trial. It is this fact that renders particularly troublesome the trial justice’s assessment during the hearing on defendant’s new trial motion that
“Mr. Nunez did positively identify [defendant] as the shooter at the top of the stairs. As to whether or not his testimony on identifying the shooter was impeached or not impeached is really an issue of credibility. Issues of credibility are essentially issues for a jury.”
The trial justice thus deferred to the jury this crucial issue and thereby abdicated his role as “the 13th juror.” Hence, he failed “properly [to] applfy]” the well-settled standard of review for evaluating new trial motions.
Moreover, Nunez’s assertion that defendant was the person shooting from the porch was directly contradicted by two witnesses for the defense. Both Crystal Lovegrove8 and Marion Marrow, who were present at the after-hours club on the night in question, testified that defendant never left the kitchen area during the shooting. Lovegrove testified that she was in the kitchen area of the club, obtaining a drink from defendant, when the shooting broke out and a general panic ensued. Her testimony was unequivocal:
“Q. And what did you hear as you were getting the drink from [defendant]?
“A. Shooting.
* *
“Q. And at any point, did you see [defendant] go outside when the shooting was happening?
“A. No.” (Emphases added.)
On cross-examination, when asked what she did when the shooting started, she answered:
“I was waiting. It was like I was standing still, waiting for the shooting to stop, because I thought it was in the house[, it sounded so close.] So, I was scared. Everyone was coming towards [defendant] asking him what’s going on. I was following the crew to get out.” (Emphasis added.)
Lovegrove’s cross-examination also included the following:
“Q. You didn’t have your eye on [defendant] for that entire time when panic set out, did you?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. You did?
“(WITNESS NODDING).”9
*1041Lovegrove was insistent that defendant did not go out the door at any time during or prior to the shooting.
Marrow also testified that defendant was still in the kitchen area when the shooting started and that he did not leave the area until after the shooting stopped. She explained that she was quite confident in her recollection because she had gotten a drink from defendant shortly before the shooting broke out and had been paying close attention to him because she found him attractive.
The presence of .357 Magnum cartridges in a drawer in the pantry of the after-hours club certainly constitutes circumstantial evidence but not proof of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The state’s own witness, FBI Special Agent John Lewoczko, testified that there are literally millions of these bullets, made by the same manufacturer as those found in the drawer, in the United States today. The trial justice based his denial of the motion for a new trial on his opinion that “the eyewitness identification of the defendant by Mr. Nunez, together with the strong circumstantial evidence of the shells, is more than ample to support the jury’s verdict.”
It is my opinion that the evidence in this case was not sufficient to support the jury’s finding that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is axiomatic that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt “is an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1242, 127 L.Ed.2d 583, 590 (1994). At the time the United States Supreme Court expressly held that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970), it declared that
“the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable for it ‘impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.’ Dorsen & Rezneek, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 Family Law Quarterly, No. 4, pp. 1, 26 (1967).
“Moreover * * * [i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.” Id. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d at 375. (Emphases added.)
Nearly ten years after its pronouncement in Winship, the United States Supreme Court observed that the reasonable-doubt standard “impress[es] upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of guilt of the accused.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 571 (1979). (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that not only must a juror be convinced of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but the government also must prove its case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, 114 S.Ct. at 1240, 127 L.Ed.2d at 588. The frail evidence presented in this case does not constitute proof that meets the requisite standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, nor has the government met its burden of proof.
A trial justice’s ruling on a motion for a new trial must be overturned if the justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong. Scurry, 636 A.2d at 725. The transcript from the hearing on the motion for a new trial revealed that the trial justice clearly overlooked material evidence by not passing at all upon the testimony of defense witness Lovegrove, who was unequivocal in her assertion that the defen*1042dant had remained in the kitchen area during the entire time of the shooting. The trial justice failed to discuss his opinion of her testimony in ruling on the new trial motion and thereby erred by ignoring the directive of our past cases that “the record should reflect a few sentences of the justice’s reasoning on each point.” State v. Banach, 648 A.2d 1363, 1367 (R.I.1994) (citing State v. Girouard, 561 A.2d 882, 890 (R.I.1989)). The majority’s assertion that the trial justice’s “ultimate ruling on the defendant’s motion [for a new trial] more than satisfies us that he found Lovegrove’s testimony to be [incredible]” improperly draws a conclusion that has not been stated in the record. If the trial justice disbelieved and therefore disregarded Lovegrove’s testimony, he was required to provide his rationale for doing so.
For all the foregoing reasons, I would sustain the defendant’s appeal and remand the case for a new trial.

. The majority’s two-sentence summation of Nunez's identification of defendant at police headquarters errs by oversimplifying the circumstances surrounding Nunez's identification. For example, Nunez did not travel to the police station alone, but rather, he was accompanied by the family of the victim. Moreover, Nunez was aware that defendant had been arrested for the murder of Diaz when he went to the station.
At a pretrial hearing, the following colloquy occurred during direct examination of Nunez by the prosecutor in respect to Nunez's identification of defendant from a photo lineup:
"Q. Okay. What did they ask you to do with those six photos?
*1039"A. To point to the one I knew as Michael Mendoza.
* *
"Q. Did the police tell you which photo was the photo of Mendoza?
"A. First they showed to me, and then I told them which one it was.”
On cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred:
"Q. Did the officer state to you to point to the person you knew as Michael Mendoza?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And was it at this point that you pointed out Michael Mendoza in the photo display? "Yes.”
Subsequent attempts to clarify the circumstances in which Nunez identified defendant from the photo display highlighted the equivocal nature of Nunez's recollection and testimony. For example, when Nunez was asked by the prosecutor if the officer used defendant’s name before or after Nunez selected defendant's photo from the array, Nunez replied, "After I pointed it out.” Yet, when defense counsel asked immediately thereafter, "Isn’t it a fact that once [the officer] showed you the photo array the officer said—he mentioned Michael Mendoza’s name when he showed you the photo array? ”, Nunez replied, "I don’t remember very well.” (Emphasis added.) The import of Nunez’s equivocal testimony is highlighted by the following interchange between Nunez and the trial justice:
"THE COURT: Do you have a clear memory that the man who. was shooting was the man who is in this courtroom?
"THE WITNESS: Yes.
"THE COURT: Did you need to look at the photographs to remember that?
"THE WITNESS: Yes.” (Emphases added.)
In addition, at the pretrial hearing Nunez identified Providence Police Detective Michael Pan-zarella as the individual who showed him the photo display, but Panzarella testified that the photographs were shown to Nunez by another officer and that he (Panzarella) was not even in the room when the photographs were shown to Nunez.

. The majority’s claim that Lovegrove "testified that she had been friends with the defendant and his wife for three years” is misleading. It was in the context of testimony that she had been a repeat customer at the after-hours club—at which entrance was controlled by either defendant or his wife—that the following colloquy occurred:
"Q. Okay. How long have you known [defendant’s wife]?
"A. Maybe three years.
"Q. Okay. And how long have you known [defendant]?
"A. About the same amount of time.
"Q. Okay. And you're friendly; they didn't have to subpoena you to come here today, did they?
"No.” (Emphases added.)

. The majority’s reference to an inconsistency in Lovegrove's testimony in this regard is also misleading. A review of the transcript reveals that Lovegrove did respond in the negative when asked by defense counsel if she had been "watching [defendant] the whole time.” However, this question was disconnected from any questioning about the actual shooting incident, and it appears that Lovegrove likely construed defense counsel to be asking her if she had been watching defendant during the entire time she was in *1041the after-hours club. This interpretation finds ample support in the record. Upon redirect examination following the allegedly inconsistent statement, the following was elicited:
"Q. Miss Lovegrove, at the time the shooting was occurring, was [defendant] in the kitchen during the whole period of time?
"A. He was in the pantry serving drinks.” (Emphases added.)