Court Opinion

ID: 9960922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 16:05:06.22988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:05.891664
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Apr 17 2024, 9:01 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

                                             IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
           Andrew Nemeth Properties, LLC, and Andrew J. Nemeth,
                                          Appellants-Plaintiffs

                                                     v.

          William A. Panzica, Thomas C. Panzica, Philip E. Panzica,
                               & NP3, LLC,
                                         Appellees-Defendants

                                             April 17, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-PL-1383
                             Appeal from the Marshall Circuit Court
                             The Honorable Curtis D. Palmer, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                          50C01-2202-PL-2

                             Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                    Chief Judge Altice and Judge Kenworthy concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024                    Page 1 of 20
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   Andrew Nemeth and three brothers—William, Thomas, and Phillip Panzica

      (the Panzica Brothers)—allegedly agreed to form a limited liability company

      (LLC) for the purpose of developing and leasing out a piece of commercial real

      estate. Nemeth filed articles of organization for the company, dubbed NP3,

      LLC after himself and the three Panzica Brothers. But nearly six months later,

      the Panzica Brothers seemingly sought to exclude Nemeth from the project by

      executing a backdated operating agreement for NP3 that listed the Panzica

      Brothers’ separately owned company, Panzica Investments, LLC, as NP3’s sole

      member. Nemeth therefore sued NP3 and the Panzica Brothers (collectively,

      Defendants) for breach of oral contract and unjust enrichment.

[2]   The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Nemeth’s

      breach of contract claim, essentially concluding a written operating agreement

      is required to establish LLC membership. Nemeth’s unjust enrichment claim

      was then tried to the bench, despite his request for a jury trial, and the court

      entered judgment in Defendants’ favor. On appeal, Nemeth argues that an

      LLC’s initial membership can be established by oral contract and that there

      exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether Nemeth and the Panzica

      Brothers orally agreed to form NP3 as equal members. Nemeth also argues that

      he was entitled to a jury trial on his unjust enrichment claim. We agree on all

      counts and therefore reverse.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024         Page 2 of 20
      Facts
[3]   Nemeth is a real estate consultant, broker, and developer in South Bend,

      Indiana.1 The Panzica Brothers are principals in a South Bend architecture and

      construction corporation. They are also the sole members of Panzica

      Investments, LLC, a South Bend real estate holding company. Between 2012

      and 2016, Nemeth and the Panzica Brothers were involved in a real estate

      development project initiated by NELLO Corporation, a fabricator of steel

      cellphone towers and utility poles. That project lies at the heart of this litigation.

[4]   In 2012, Nemeth began working with NELLO to relocate its manufacturing

      operations to South Bend (the Nello Project). Among other things, Nemeth

      helped NELLO obtain approximately $13 million in economic incentives for

      the project. He also agreed to purchase a piece of South Bend real estate on

      which NELLO could construct a new manufacturing facility. NELLO initially

      planned to finance the construction portion of the project and to purchase the

      developed land from Nemeth upon the facility’s completion. But in July 2014,

      after Nemeth had entered into a purchase agreement for the land, NELLO

      asked Nemeth if he would finance the construction, own the facility, and lease

      it to NELLO instead.

      1
        Nemeth is also the sole member of Andrew Nemeth Properties, LLC, through which he provides his real
      estate services. Though Nemeth and his company are both plaintiffs/appellants in this lawsuit, we refer only
      to Nemeth for simplicity.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024                               Page 3 of 20
[5]   Nemeth was amenable to the leasing arrangement and soon invited the Panzica

      Brothers to partner with him on the Nello project. According to Nemeth, he

      and the Panzica Brothers orally agreed to form and be equal members of a new

      LLC, which would build, own, and lease to NELLO the manufacturing facility.

      The four members’ capital contributions to the new LLC would be their

      respective services on the Nello Project, and they would “split” everything

      “equally,” including distributions. App. Vol. IV, pp. 153-54, 180.2

[6]   In August 2014, Nemeth emailed the Panzica Brothers a proposed name for the

      new company, “NP3, LLC,” derived from the names “Nemeth” and “Panzica”

      (there being three of the latter). Id. at 180. A month later, Nemeth officially

      formed NP3, LLC by filing articles of organization with the Indiana Secretary

      of State. These articles did not identify NP3’s membership but indicated that

      the company would be managed by its “Members.” App. Vol. III, p. 25.

[7]   In October 2014, NELLO entered into a 15-year lease with NP3 for the

      forthcoming manufacturing facility. William Panzica signed the lease on NP3’s

      behalf, and his signature block identified him as a “Member” of the company.

      Id. at 185. The lease also contained a Real Estate Broker’s Disclosure, which

      provided: “It is hereby disclosed and accepted that Landlord [NP3] includes

      among its members licensed Indiana Real Estate Brokers including Thomas C.

      Panzica, William A. Panzica[,] and Andrew J. Nemeth.” Id. at 184.

      2
          All citations to the Appendix in this opinion refer to Appellants’ Appendix.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024                 Page 4 of 20
[8]    To expedite financing for the Nello Project, Nemeth and the Panzica Brothers

       decided that Panzica Investments would purchase the land for which Nemeth

       already had a purchase agreement and then transfer the land to NP3. In an

       October 2014 email to a title company representative involved in the land

       purchase, William Panzica advised that “NP3, LLC (Nemeth and the 3

       Panzica Brothers)” would ultimately be buying the land. App. Vol. IV, p. 226.

[9]    In November 2014, Nemeth assigned his purchase agreement for the land to

       Panzica Investments. But according to Defendants, Nemeth had for months

       concealed the fact that the purchase agreement entitled him to a $256,000

       broker’s fee. When the Panzica Brothers allegedly learned about the fee in

       December 2014, they believed it was too late to withdraw from the Nello

       Project without subjecting themselves to certain liabilities. Therefore, Panzica

       Investments proceeded to close on the land two weeks later and eventually

       transferred the land to NP3, as intended.

[10]   At some point, the Panzica Brothers decided to proceed with the Nello Project

       without Nemeth. And on or after February 20, 2015, William Panzica prepared

       a written operating agreement for NP3 that identified Panzica Investments as

       NP3’s sole “initial member.” Id. at 133. The agreement was backdated to

       January 1, 2015, and it listed a retroactive effective date of September 12,

       2014—the day NP3 was organized. William executed the agreement on behalf

       of Panzica Investments, and all three Panzica Brothers signed it as NP3’s

       managers.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024       Page 5 of 20
[11]   Fast forward to 2020. Nemeth filed a complaint against Defendants, seeking a

       declaratory judgment that he was a member of NP3 and asserting claims for

       breach of oral contract and unjust enrichment, among other things.3 Defendants

       moved for summary judgment on Nemeth’s declaratory judgment and breach

       of contract claims, designating the written operating agreement that identified

       Panzica Investments as NP3’s sole member. The trial court granted Defendants’

       motion, finding: “There is no written operating agreement naming [Nemeth] as

       a member and there is no written consent from all of the members of [NP3] for

       him to become a member as is required by [Indiana Code §] 23-18-6-1(a)(1).”

       App. Vol. II, p. 23.4

[12]   The case then proceeded to trial on Nemeth’s unjust enrichment claim. Though

       Nemeth timely requested a jury trial on this claim, the trial court sua sponte

       ordered a bench trial. At that trial, Defendants denied being unjustly enriched

       and also argued that Nemeth’s alleged concealment of his broker’s commission

       barred any recovery under the doctrine of unclean hands. The trial court

       ultimately entered judgment in Defendants’ favor, concluding Nemeth failed to

       prove his unjust enrichment claim and, alternatively, that Defendants

       successfully proved Nemeth had unclean hands.

       3
         Nemeth’s complaint asserted three other claims, which sought: (1) an injunction compelling distributions
       from NP3; (2) compensation for his efforts in procuring the NELLO lease; and (3) damages for conversion.
       Nemeth voluntarily dismissed his conversion claim, and the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
       Defendants on the other two.
       4
         None of the parties appear to have asked the trial court to certify its partial summary judgment as a final
       judgment under Indiana Trial Rules 54(B) or 56(C).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024                                  Page 6 of 20
       Discussion and Decision
[13]   Nemeth appeals the trial court’s summary judgment on his breach of contract

       claim as well as the court’s bench trial judgment on his unjust enrichment

       claim. We find reversible error in both.

       I. Breach of Contract Claim
[14]   Our analysis begins with the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of

       Defendants on Nemeth’s breach of contract claim. “We review a summary

       judgment ruling de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court.” Arnette

       v. Estate of Beavins, 184 N.E.3d 679, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Summary

       judgment is appropriate only if “the designated evidentiary matter shows that

       there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

       entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). In conducting

       our review, “[w]e construe all factual inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor,

       and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party.”

       Fox v. Barker, 170 N.E.3d 662, 665-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[15]   Nemeth argues that summary judgment on his breach of contract claim was

       inappropriate because: (1) a pre-formation oral contract may establish an LLC’s

       initial membership under Indiana’s Business Flexibility Act; and (2) the

       evidence designated on summary judgment established a genuine issue of

       material fact as to whether Nemeth and the Panzica Brothers orally agreed to

       form NP3 as equal members. We agree as to both issues.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024       Page 7 of 20
       A.      A Pre-formation Oral Contract May Establish a Limited
               Liability Company’s Initial Membership
[16]   Codified as Article 18 of Title 23 of the Indiana Code, the Business Flexibility

       Act controls the creation, operation, and dissolution of LLCs in Indiana. Brant

       v. Krilich, 835 N.E.2d 582, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The Act’s stated policy is

       “to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the

       enforceability of operating agreements of limited liability companies.” Ind.

       Code § 23-18-4-13. Case law applying its provisions is sparse, but the Act

       reveals the following principles regarding LLC formation.

[17]   First, nothing more than the filing of articles of organization is required to form

       an LLC. Ind. Code § 23-18-2-4(a) (“At least one (1) person may form a limited

       liability company by causing articles of organization to be executed and filed for

       record with the office of the secretary of state.”); Ind. Code § 23-18-2-7 (“The

       fact that articles of organization of a limited liability company are on file in the

       office of the secretary of state is notice that the limited liability company has

       been organized.”).

[18]   Second, an LLC must have at least one member at the time of formation. See

       Ind. Code § 23-18-6-0.5 (“A limited liability company formed under this article

       . . . may have at least one (1) member.”); Ind. Code § 23-18-9-1.1(c) (“A limited

       liability company is dissolved and the limited liability company’s affairs must

       be wound up if there are no members.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024         Page 8 of 20
[19]   Third, the person who executes and files an LLC’s articles of organization need

       not be a member of the company. Ind. Code § 23-18-2-4(a) (“A person does not

       need to be a member of the limited liability company at the time of formation

       or after formation has occurred.”).

[20]   Fourth, an LLC’s articles of organization need not identify the company’s

       initial membership. See Ind. Code § 23-18-2-4(b) (requiring articles of

       organization to include only the LLC’s name, the address of its registered

       office, the name of its registered agent, its dissolution date or a statement of its

       perpetual duration, and a statement of whether it will have a manager or

       managers).

[21]   These principles collectively beg the question: How is an LLC’s initial

       membership established? Nemeth argues that a pre-formation oral contract is

       sufficient. Defendants contend, as the trial court concluded, that the Act

       requires a written instrument.

[22]   Defendants point to Indiana Code § 23-18-1-15, which defines “member” as “a

       person admitted to membership in a limited liability company under IC 23-18-

       6-1 . . . .” Defendants in turn rely on Indiana Code § 23-18-6-1, which provides,

       in pertinent part:

               [A] person may become a member in a limited liability company
               . . . in the case of a person acquiring an interest directly from the
               limited liability company, upon compliance with the operating
               agreement or if the operating agreement does not provide in
               writing, upon the written consent of all members.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024          Page 9 of 20
       Ind. Code § 23-18-6-1(a)(1) (Membership Acquisition Statute).

[23]   The problem with Defendants’ argument is that the Membership Acquisition

       Statute presupposes the existence of LLC members. Without existing members

       to either execute a written operating agreement or provide their written consent,

       a membership interest cannot be acquired directly from the LLC under the

       statute. Indeed, Indiana Code § 23-18-4-6(a) provides, “The initial operating

       agreement must be agreed to by all persons who are members at the time the

       initial agreement is accepted.” See generally Ind. Code § 23-18-1-16 (defining

       “operating agreement” as “any written or oral agreement of the members as to

       the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business that is

       binding upon all the members”).

[24]   We therefore conclude the Membership Acquisition Statute does not control

       the establishment of an LLC’s initial membership. Moreover, we find no

       provision in the Act that specifically addresses the initial membership issue.

       This apparent omission seems to have originated in the American Bar

       Association’s Prototype Limited Liability Company Act (Prototype Act), on

       which Indiana’s Business Flexibility Act was later based, in part. David C.

       Worrell & Marci A. Reddick, The Indiana Business Flexibility Act (Limited Liability

       Companies), 27 Ind. L. Rev. 919, 925-26 (1994).

[25]   The Membership Acquisition Statute is identical to Prototype Act § 801.

       Prototype Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 801 (1992), reprinted in 3 Ribstein and Keatinge

       on Limited Liability Companies app. C (2d ed. 2014). And Prototype Act § 801

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024        Page 10 of 20
       was based on a provision in Georgia’s Revised Uniform Limited Partnership

       Act (GRULPA). Id. § 801 cmt. Specifically, GRULPA § 301 provides:

               [A] person may become a limited partner in a limited partnership
               . . . [i]n the case of a person acquiring a partnership interest
               directly from the limited partnership, upon compliance with the
               partnership agreement or, if the partnership agreement does not
               so provide in writing, upon the written consent of all partners.

       Ga. Code § 14-9-301 (1988).

[26]   Like the Membership Acquisition Statute, GRULPA § 301 presupposes the

       existence of partners to either execute a written partnership agreement or

       provide their written consent to a person’s acquisition of a limited partnership

       interest directly from the limited partnership. But unlike the Membership

       Acquisition Statute, GRULPA expressly provides for the establishment of

       initial partners at the time of a limited partnership’s formation. See Ga. Code §

       14-9-101(9) (defining “partner” to include a “general partner”); id. § 101(5)(A)

       (defining “general partner” as a person who “[b]ecomes a general partner upon

       the formation of a limited partnership . . . .”); id. § 201(a) (requiring nothing

       more than the filing of a “certificate of limited partnership” to form a limited

       partnership); id. § 201(a)(3) (requiring the certificate of limited partnership to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024         Page 11 of 20
       identify “[t]he name and the business address of each general partner.”). 5

[27]   Without a provision in the Business Flexibility Act that specifically addresses

       the initial membership issue, we have only the formation principles set forth

       above to guide us. Most notable among them is that an LLC must have at least

       one member at the time of its formation. See Ind. Code § 23-18-6-0.5; Ind. Code

       § 23-18-9-1.1(c). From this, we conclude an LLC’s initial membership must be

       established before the company’s formation. And considering that the Act’s

       stated policy is, in part, “to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom

       of contract,” Ind. Code § 23-18-4-13, we see no reason why a pre-formation oral

       contract cannot be the means of establishing that membership.

       B.      Genuine Issues of Fact Remain as to the Existence of a
               Pre-formation Oral Contract
[28]   As for the existence of a pre-formation oral contract in this case, the designated

       evidence included Nemeth’s deposition testimony that he and the Panzica

       Brothers orally agreed to form NP3 as equal members. According to Nemeth,

       the four members’ capital contributions to the new LLC would be their

       respective services on the Nello Project, and they would “split” everything

       5
         Notably, the American Bar Association’s Revised Prototype Limited Liability Company Act includes
       separate provisions for admitting a person as an LLC member “[i]n connection with the formation” of the
       company and “after formation” of the company. Revised Prototype Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 401 (2011), reprinted
       in 3 Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies app. G.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024                           Page 12 of 20
       “equally,” including distributions. App. Vol. IV, pp. 153-54, 180. The evidence

       also included:

           • NP3’s articles of organization, indicating that the LLC would be
             managed by its “Members,” plural, App. Vol. III, p. 25;

           • William Panzica’s email to the title company representative advising that
             “NP3, LLC (Nemeth and the 3 Panzica Brothers)” would ultimately be
             buying the land, App. Vol. IV, p. 226; and

           • The NELLO lease, which was signed by William as a “Member” of NP3
             and contained a Real Estate Broker’s Disclosure that also identified
             Nemeth and Thomas Panzica as NP3 members, App. Vol. III, 184-85.

       This evidence establishes a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of Nemeth’s

       alleged oral contract with the Panzica Brothers to form NP3 as equal members.

[29]   Defendants claim Nemeth was required to designate evidence that he and the

       Panzica Brothers orally agreed to terms regarding the agreed value of their

       respective capital contributions and the allocation of NP3’s profits and losses.

       See generally Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“If a

       party cannot demonstrate agreement on one essential term of the contract, then

       there is no mutual assent and no contract is formed.”).

[30]   But such things are not essential to an LLC’s formation. Ind. Code § 23-18-2-

       4(a); see Ind. Code § 23-18-4-8(a), (e) (generally requiring LLC to document

       agreed value of members’ capital contributions while also indicating that failure

       to comply has no effect on LLC formation or membership status); Ind. Code §

       23-18-4-5(2) (stating “[m]embers may enter into an operating agreement to . . .

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024      Page 13 of 20
       establish . . . [t]he manner in which the members will share in distributions of

       the assets and the profits or losses of the limited liability company” (emphasis

       added)). Thus, we conclude the agreed value of each member’s capital

       contributions and the allocation of profits and losses were not terms essential to

       Nemeth’s alleged oral contract with the Panzica Brothers to form NP3.

[31]   Because there exists a genuine issue of a material fact as to Nemeth’s breach of

       oral contract claim, the trial court erred by granting Defendants’ motion for

       summary judgment thereon.

       II. Unjust Enrichment Claim
[32]   Turning to the trial court’s bench trial judgment on Nemeth’s unjust enrichment

       claim, Nemeth argues that the court violated his right to a jury trial under the

       Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 20 provides that, “[i]n all civil cases,

       the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 20. As our

       Supreme Court recently observed, “[t]his fundamental guarantee secures the

       right to a jury trial as it existed at common law at the time Indiana adopted its

       current constitution.” $2,435 in U.S. Currency, 220 N.E.3d 542, 545 (Ind. 2023)

       (internal quotation omitted). For cases or claims tried in equity at that time, “it

       is a well-settled tenet that a party is not entitled to a jury trial.” Id.

[33]   Indiana Trial Rule 38(A) embodies this principle, stating in pertinent part:

       “Issues of law and issues of fact in causes that prior to the eighteenth day of

       June, 1852, were of exclusive equitable jurisdiction shall be tried by the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024           Page 14 of 20
       court[.]” Thus, to determine whether Article 1, Section 20’s jury-trial right

       applies in a particular case,

               we first ask whether the cause of action existed in 1851. If so,
               then history settles the matter. But if the cause of action did not
               exist in 1851, we must decide whether the claim is analogous to
               one at law or one in equity, as those terms were then understood.

       $2,435 in U.S. Currency, 220 N.E.3d at 545 (internal citations omitted).

       “Whether certain claims are entitled to a trial by jury presents a pure question

       of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review.” Id. (internal quotation

       omitted).

[34]   Nemeth argues that he was entitled to a jury trial on his unjust enrichment

       claim because it sought legal relief, in the form of damages, based on a theory

       of contract implied-at-law. Nemeth also claims the trial court’s finding of

       unclean hands did not render harmless the court’s failure to conduct a jury trial

       because the equitable doctrine of unclean hands is not available as a defense to

       a legal claim in Indiana. Again, we agree with Nemeth on both issues.

       A.      Nemeth Was Entitled to a Jury Trial on His Unjust
               Enrichment Claim
[35]   Nemeth’s unjust enrichment claim incorporated the operative factual

       allegations of his complaint, including the following:

               In addition to originating the deal over the course of multiple
               years and then inviting the Panzicas to participate, Andrew
               Nemeth and Nemeth Properties contributed the value of their
               brokerage, financial, and development services in procuring the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024        Page 15 of 20
               lease with Nello Corporation and in overall development with
               Nello Corporation.

       App. Vol. II, p. 51. Nemeth’s claim further alleged: “A measurable benefit has

       been conferred on the defendants by Andrew J. Nemeth” and “[u]nder the

       circumstances, the defendants’ retention of the benefit without payment would

       be unjust.” Id. at 55.

[36]   As Nemeth contends, the theory underlying his unjust enrichment claim is that

       of contract implied-at-law, also known as quasi-contract and quantum meruit.

       See Woodruff v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 964 N.E.2d 784, 791 (Ind. 2012)

       (stating that, to prevail on such a theory, “a plaintiff must establish that a

       measurable benefit has been conferred on the defendant under such

       circumstances that the defendant’s retention of the benefit without payment

       would be unjust”).

[37]   This Court long ago recognized that contract implied-at-law, quasi-contract,

       and quantum meruit were “triable at law and not in equity” in 1851; therefore,

       a claimant was “entitled to jury trial upon them.” Nehi Beverage Co. v. Petri, 537

       N.E.2d 78, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). Indeed, our own research reveals that a

       court of law, not a court of chancery, was the “proper tribunal” to resolve a

       claim in the “nature of a quantum meruit” before Indiana adopted its current

       constitution in 1852. McKinney v. Springer, 6 Blackf. 511, 515 (1843).

[38]   Defendants cite several cases for the proposition that unjust enrichment is an

       “equitable doctrine.” See, e.g., Galanis v. Lyons & Truitt, 715 N.E.2d 858, 861

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024         Page 16 of 20
       (Ind. 1999) (“Quantum meruit is an equitable doctrine that prevents unjust

       enrichment . . . .”). But none concerned whether the claimant was entitled to a

       jury trial on the issue. Moreover, our Supreme Court has more recently

       explained that quantum meruit “is a legal fiction invented by the common-law

       courts in order to permit a recovery where, in fact, there is no contract, but

       where the circumstances are such that under the law of natural and immutable

       justice there should be a recovery as though there had been a promise.”

       Woodruff, 964 N.E.2d at 791 (cleaned up) (quoting Clark v. Peoples Sav. & Loan

       Ass’n, 221 Ind. 168, 171, 46 N.E.2d 681, 682 (1943)).

[39]   As similarly explained in Nehi, contract implied-at-law, quasi-contract, and

       quantum meruit are “legal fictions.” 537 N.E.2d at 85 (emphasis in original).

       The theories were created by courts of law “to prevent unjust enrichment,

       thereby promoting justice and equity.” Id. But they provide a distinctly legal

       remedy—money damages. Id. “Unjust enrichment . . . is but the equitable

       reason for requiring payment for value of goods and services received.” Id.

       (emphasis in original).6

       6
         “The confusion with equity emanates from the decision of the King’s Bench in 1760 in the case of Moses v.
       Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, where Lord Mansfield stated that the defendant’s [quasi-contract]
       obligation came ‘from the ties of natural justice’ founded in ‘the equity of the plaintiff’s case.’” Partipilo v.
       Hallman, 510 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987) (citing George E. Palmer, 1 Law of Restitution at 7-8 (1978)).
       “[T]he statement concerning the action of quasi-contract being equitable has been repeated many times, but
       merely refers to the way in which a claim should be approached ‘since it is clear that the action is at law and
       the relief given is a simple money judgment.’” Id. (quoting Palmer, supra at 9).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024                                  Page 17 of 20
[40]   Accordingly, we conclude Nemeth was entitled to a jury trial on his unjust

       enrichment claim under Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution.

       B.      The Denial of Nemeth’s Right to a Jury Trial Was Not
               Harmless Error
[41]   Defendants argue that the failure to hold a jury trial on Nemeth’s unjust

       enrichment claim was harmless error. To evaluate harmlessness in this context,

       we consider “whether the trial court would have been required to enter a

       directed verdict had a jury trial been held, or whether a jury verdict in favor of

       the losing party could have been sustainable.” Corrigan v. Al-Trim Corp., 700

       N.E.2d 481, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); accord Midwest Fertilizer Co. v. Ag-Chem

       Equip. Co., 510 N.E.2d 232, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).

[42]   Defendants do not contest that a jury could have found in Nemeth’s favor on

       his unjust enrichment claim. Rather, they claim the trial court would have been

       required to enter judgment in their favor based on its finding that Nemeth’s

       unclean hands precluded his recovery. According to Defendants, “unclean

       hands is an equitable doctrine decided by the court and may defeat both

       equitable and legal claims.” Appellees’ Br. p. 41. We disagree with the latter

       proposition.

[43]   “[The unclean hands] doctrine is one of a number of maxims applied when

       deciding if a party who seeks equitable relief has behaved in a manner justifying

       that relief.” Woodruff v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 964 N.E.2d 784, 792 n.5

       (Ind. 2012) (emphasis added). It requires that “he who seeks equity come into

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       court with clean hands and closes the door of a court of equity to one tainted

       with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief,

       however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.” Id. (internal

       quotations and ellipses omitted).

[44]   Of course, Indiana has long since abolished courts of equity and, with them, the

       distinction between actions at law and suits in equity. See generally Denny v.

       State, 203 Ind. 682, 182 N.E. 313, 316 (1932); see also Ind. Trial Rule 2(A)

       (“There shall be one [1] form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’”). But the

       equitable doctrine of unclean hands has not crossed over to be available as a

       defense to a legal claim in Indiana. In both Elwood v. Parker, 77 N.E.3d 835, 838

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), and Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Golden Foods, Inc., 59

       N.E.3d 1056, 1070 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), this Court held that the unclean hands

       doctrine did not apply to a claimant seeking legal relief. See generally Am.

       Healthcare Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Aizen, 285 A.3d 461, 485-93 (Del. Ch. 2022)

       (exploring the historical evolution of the unclean hands doctrine and evaluating

       its “moderate but not universal success in crossing the equity-law divide”).

[45]   Our Supreme Court also hinted at the unavailability of uncleans hands as a

       defense to a legal claim in Woodruff, a quantum meruit case in which an

       intermediate care facility sought to recover Medicaid funds for care the facility

       gave its residents after losing its Medicaid certification due to “deplorable

       health conditions.” 964 N.E.2d at 787. Though recognizing the facility’s claim

       as a “common-law remedy,” the Court stated: “At the outset, the doctrine of

       ‘unclean hands’ certainly gives us pause.” Id. at 792. The Court then noted that

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       the record “probably reflects enough wrongdoing on [the facility’s] part to deny

       it recovery on an equitable claim flowing from that wrongful conduct.” Id.

       (emphasis added). But the Court ultimately held that the facility’s quantum

       meruit claim failed as a matter of law because the facility could not show that it

       expected Medicaid payments for any services it provided post decertification.

       Id. at 794.

[46]   For the foregoing reasons, the trial court committed reversible error by sua

       sponte ordering a bench trial on Nemeth’s unjust enrichment claim.

       Conclusion
[47]   We reverse both the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of

       Defendants on Nemeth’s breach of contract claim and its bench judgment in

       favor of Defendants on Nemeth’s unjust enrichment claim.

       Altice, C.J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
       Carol Nemeth Joven
       Ronald J. Waicukauski
       Williams Law Group, LLC
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       John D. LaDue
       Jonathan S. Lawson
       SouthBank Legal LLC
       South Bend, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1383 | April 17, 2024      Page 20 of 20