Court Opinion

ID: 9572399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:41:25.875707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:48.811066
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting).
It is my impression that in setting forth certain portions of the evidence to reach its result, the main opinion departs from important and fundamental principles: that due to the advantaged position and responsibilities of the trial court (in this instance the Juvenile Court) we should allow it the prerogative of finding the facts; and that, where there is dispute, we should assume that the court believed those aspects of the evidence which support its findings and conclusions.1
Walter will be 14 years old next month (April, 1978). His maladjustment is sufficiently severe that he has spent the largest part of his life as a ward of the state in foster homes; and the strong likelihood is that this will continue during his minority and on indefinitely until and unless his difficulties are sufficiently remedied that he can become a self-sufficient individual. The main consideration for the trial court was, and for this Court should be, the accomplishment of that objective in the best interests and welfare of Walter, rather than the relative fault or innocence of the appellant or anyone else involved in the proceeding.2
In that regard it is significant that the appellant is not asking for Walter’s custody and seeks no association with him. These things she admits in her own testimony; and further, that she does not feel that she can do him any good. What she says is that she doesn’t feel that it is right that she should be denied being his mother. She only wishes to preserve that legal relationship, even if it is not in the best interest of the child.
This provides support for the testimony of Dr. Delbert Goates, child psychiatrist at Primary Medical Center. He testified that appellant has a narcissistic (that is, excessive self-love) character disorder, so that she is more concerned with the negative effect of the judgment on her, than she is with the positive effects it may have on Walter. Dr. Goates saw little likelihood of the relationship between Walter and his mother becoming more stable in the foreseeable future; and he recommended permanent termination of the relationship.
*126This diagnosis and recommendation is the same as that of social worker Edward Fa-cey, who had worked with Walter for approximately seven (7) months. He testified that the boy has severe problems; and that the relationship is “very hurtful to this child and it provides no redeeming benefits to help pay for the pain that accompanies it”; and that contacts with his mother would result in “massive regression” for Walter.
According to the professionals just referred to, and other supporting testimony, the attitude of Walter himself is totally antagonistic to his mother. Dr. Goates said that this attitude of Walter was “not on an impulsive basis,” nor one fed to him by those around him, but was a “long-term, well-reviewed decision.” Further, that although the boy harbors an “enormous sadness” that the relationship with his mother could not work, he recognizes that it was a destructive relationship that was “wrecking his life”; and he “adamantly desired to end the relationship.” It should also be observed that Dr. Gill, upon whom appellant seems to place reliance, had never met nor examined Walter; and that even he recommended continuing psychotherapy for the appellant.
Implicit in the position of the appellant is the idea, somewhat strange and impractical to me, that the state should assume the responsibility, not only for supporting, caring for, and training this maladjusted boy, but that this should extend to taking similar responsibility for the parents of such children; that it is at fault for not doing so, and should be prevented from taking remedial action for the child until it cures the parent.
The main concern of the trial court did not appear to be whether its order constituted some kind of a “judgment” or of a penalty upon the appellant.3 It is not necessary that the appellant be found guilty of any crime, nor even of any wilful or intentional wrongful conduct.4 For whatsoever unfortunate and regrettable cause, his relationship to his mother, and equally important, her relationship to him, are such that the trial court has properly perceived and concluded it is wholly unrealistic to suppose that there is any value in it to either of them. In that regard the court’s findings include:
that the child has minimal brain dysfunction, is intensely hyperactive, anxious and impulsive; that he responds to contacts by his mother in an emotionally explosive and destructive manner; that the child's physical and emotional condition and his response to the relationship with his mother, is a condition that is seriously detrimental to the child; that by reason of this condition the mother is rendered unfit to care for this child. [Emphasis added.]
There is this thought which also has a bearing on this situation: if there is indeed any value to be salvaged in the child-parent relationship, it could and likely would persevere and be recaptured sometime, without much help or hindrance because of the technicality of legal status herein dealt with.
In accordance with what has been said herein, it is my opinion that if this entire record is surveyed in the light of the established rules of review, allowing the Juvenile Court its prerogative of finding the facts, and of exercising its judgment as to the best interest and welfare of this child, there is no basis shown which should persuade this Court to disturb the findings and order made. I would therefore affirm them.
ELLETT, C. J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, J.

. State v. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 P.2d 948. That case also sets forth my ideas as to this court’s affirmance of social surgery where necessary to prevent a continuation of existing evils.

. That the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration, see Miller v. Miller, 8 Utah 2d 290, 333 P.2d 945.

. That the long-term interests of the child should supersede the emotional needs of the parent, see State in Interest of A, 30 Utah 2d 131, 514 P.2d 797.

. U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 78-3a-48, authorizes deprivation of parental rights when (a) the parent is unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child: (Emphasis added); and see State in Interest of Jennings, 20 Utah 2d 50, 432 P.2d 879, affirming termination of parental rights where emotionally unstable mother could not provide proper care and supervision.