Court Opinion

ID: 9364222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 19:01:59.964562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.738974
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/23 Perham v. Salazar CA4/1

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 JAMES PERHAM, as Assignee, etc.,                                           D079713

            Plaintiff and Appellant,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-
                                                                              00059072-CU-BC-CTL)
 JONATHAN SALAZAR,

            Defendant and Respondent.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Ronald F. Frazier, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
          Landay Roberts, John K. Landay, and Waddy Stephenson for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
          Webb Law Group, Lenden F. Webb, and Christopher E. Nichols for
Defendant and Respondent.

          James Perham, the chief executive officer of and assignee of a default
judgment obtained by Extreme Transportation, Inc. (ETI) against its former
contractor, Jonathan Salazar, appeals from a postjudgment order granting
Salazar’s motion to set aside the judgment on grounds of ineffective service of
process. Perham asserts that ETI’s service of its summons and complaint
was effective, and therefore the trial court did not have authority to set aside
the default judgment as void. As we shall explain, we agree with Perham
that ETI’s substitute service on Salazar was effective and, therefore, the trial
court’s order setting aside the judgment was in error. Accordingly, we
reverse the order and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to
enter an order denying Salazar’s motion and to re-enter the default
judgment.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On November 6, 2019, ETI filed its complaint against Salazar for
breach of an Independent Contractor Service Agreement (Agreement) they
entered the prior year. Under the Agreement, Salazar provided ETI with
freight transportation services. In the Agreement, Salazar listed his address
as 14031 Woodland Drive, Fontana, California. ETI’s complaint alleged that
Salazar breached the Agreement by failing to reimburse ETI for fuel costs
and by damaging property he was responsible for transporting. According to
the complaint, Salazar stopped providing services to and responding to email
messages from ETI on July 8, 2019.
      On three consecutive days, November 8, 9, and 10, 2019, a registered
process server attempted to personally serve the summons and complaint on
Salazar at the Woodland Drive address, the only address for him known to
ETI. The following day, November 11, 2019, to effect substitute service under

Code of Civil Procedure1 section 415.20, subdivision (b), the process server
left a copy of the summons and complaint with Salazar’s sister, Yesemia
Salazar, at the Woodland Drive address and mailed copies of the documents

1    Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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to the same address. In a declaration submitted in connection with ETI’s
opposition to Salazar’s subsequent motion to set aside the default judgment,
the process server stated that Yesemia confirmed to him that Salazar resided
at the address and that he also received mail there.
      On January 8, 2020, ETI submitted a request for entry of default,
which the court clerk entered that day. Default judgment was eventually
entered by the court clerk on August 20, 2020 for $61,332.46. Over a year
later, on September 13, 2021, a bank levy was executed on Salazar’s personal
bank account by the Los Angeles Sheriff. That day, Salazar saw that his
bank balance was $0. He contacted the bank and was informed that he was
subject to a levy.
      As a result, on September 22, 2021, Salazar filed a claim of exemption
with the Los Angeles Sheriff. After receiving the claim of exemption, Perham
responded by filing a motion in the trial court for an order to determine the
claim. Salazar then filed an ex parte application to shorten time to file a
motion to stay execution of the judgment and to set aside the default
judgment as void under section 473, subdivision (d). In his motion, Salazar
asserted that service of the complaint was ineffective because he did not live
at the Woodlands Drive address at the time of the substituted service.
      Perham opposed the application, arguing that a stay of enforcement
was not appropriate because Salazar could not show a likelihood of prevailing
since he was properly served with the summons and complaint. Perham
pointed to Salazar’s address on the Agreement and other evidence suggesting
Salazar received mail at Woodland Drive. Perham also asked the trial court
to take judicial notice of documents filed by Salazar with the California
Secretary of State showing that Salazar formed and operated a business,

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Jonathan’s Transportation Inc., from the Woodland Drive address around the
time of the substituted service.
      The trial court granted the ex parte application to shorten time and set
a hearing and briefing schedule on Salazar’s motion to set aside the default
judgment. The court also denied the request to stay enforcement of the
judgment. On October 28, 2021, after a brief hearing, the court issued a
minute order ruling on the motion. The court granted Perham’s request for
judicial notice of the documents Salazar filed with the California Secretary of
State, and granted Salazar’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The
court also vacated the hearing on Perham’s opposition to the claim of
exemption of the bank levy.
      Perham timely appealed from the order.
                                   DISCUSSION
      On appeal, Perham asserts that the court’s order must be reversed
because ETI’s substituted service on Salazar was effective and, therefore, the
default judgement was not void. Salazar responds that the trial court
correctly concluded that he did not reside or work at the Woodland Drive
address, nor was it his usual mailing address, at the time ETI attempted
substituted service. Salazar also argues that the process server’s three
attempts at personal service did not constitute reasonable diligence because
he did not live at the Woodland Drive address. For these reasons, Salazar
argues the court’s order granting his motion to set aside the default judgment
was correct and should be affirmed.
                                       I
                               Legal Standards
      “[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is
essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] Thus, a default

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judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons
in the manner prescribed by statute is void.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction
Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444 (Dill).) Pursuant to section 473,
subdivision (d), the court may set aside a judgment which, although valid on
its face, is void due to improper service. (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94
Cal.App.4th 540, 544.)
      Strict compliance with the service requirements, however, is not
required. “In deciding whether service was valid, the statutory provisions
regarding service of process ‘ “ ‘should be liberally construed to effectuate
service and uphold the jurisdiction of the court if actual notice has been
received by the defendant ….’ ” ’ [Citation.] Thus, substantial compliance is
sufficient.” (Dill, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1436–1437.) The provisions
are “liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold jurisdiction if actual
notice has been received by the defendant, ‘ “ ‘and in the last analysis the
question of service should be resolved by considering each situation from a
practical standpoint.’ ” ’ ” (Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc. (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1387, 1392, citing Pasadena Medi–Center Associates v. Superior
Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 773, 778.)
      “The Supreme Court’s admonition to construe the process statutes
liberally extends to substituted service as well as to personal service.
[Citation.] ‘To be constitutionally sound the form of substituted service must
be “reasonably calculated to give an interested party actual notice of the
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard ... [in order that] the traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice implicit in due process are
satisfied.’ ” (Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1392.)

                                        5
      Section 415.20, subdivision (b) authorizes substituted service of process
in lieu of personal delivery. It states, “If a copy of the summons and
complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the
person to be served … a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode,
usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States
Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the
household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of
business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service
post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents
thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the
complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at
the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a
summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the
mailing.”
      The reference to “reasonable diligence” in section 415.20,
subdivision (b) means that “an individual may be served by substituted
service only after a good faith effort at personal service has first been made:
the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the summons and complaint
‘cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered’ to the individual
defendant. (§ 415.20, subd. (b); Evartt v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d
795, 801.) Two or three attempts to personally serve a defendant at a proper
place ordinarily qualifies as ‘ “reasonable diligence.” ’ ” (American Express
Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 389.)
      Where a motion to vacate is made more than six months after entry of a
judgment, a trial court may grant a motion to set aside that judgment as void
when it is void on its face. (Dill, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1441.) “ ‘A

                                        6
judgment or order is said to be void on its face when the invalidity is
apparent upon an inspection of the judgment-roll.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “When
a judgment by default has been entered, the judgment-roll is limited to the
summons, proof of service of the summons, complaint, request for entry of
default, copy of the judgment, notice of any ruling overruling a demurrer
interposed by the defendant and proof of service thereof, and, if service was
by publication, affidavit for publication and order directing it. (§ 670,
subd. (a).) Because any defect in service must appear on the face of the
judgment-roll as delimited by the documents specified in section 670,
subdivision (a), our review of a trial court’s order finding such a facial defect
is of necessity de novo.” (Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 1434, 1440.)
      “However, where a plaintiff has contested a motion to vacate a default
judgment by way of affidavits or other evidence that goes beyond the
judgment-roll as set forth in section 670, subdivision (a), of necessity our
review goes beyond the judgment-roll. (See, e.g., Dill[, supra,] 24 Cal.App.4th
at [p.] 1441 [defect in service that appears on face of judgment-roll shifts
‘evidentiary burden’ to plaintiff].) In determining any issues raised by such
evidentiary matters, our review is governed by the familiar abuse of
discretion standard. [Citation.] That standard requires we defer to factual
determinations made by the trial court when the evidence is in conflict,
whether the evidence consists of oral testimony or declarations.” (Ramos v.
Homeward Residential, Inc., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1440–1441.)
      We accept the trial court’s factual findings as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, i.e. evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value. (See Stafford v. Mach (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182
[assessing whether substantial evidence in the record supports trial court’s

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implicit finding that summons and complaint properly served by substituted
service].) “When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that
of the trial court.” (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478–479.) We
do not reweigh evidence, reassess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve
conflicts in the evidence. (Pope v. Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246.)
Factual findings that are not supported by any evidence, obviously, constitute
an abuse of the court’s discretion.
                                         II
                                      Analysis
      In this case, inspection of the judgment-roll does not establish the
default judgment was invalid. Rather, the proofs of service show that ETI’s
process server served Salazar by substitute service in accordance with
section 415.20, subdivision (b). No defect in service appears on the face of the

documents.2 Thus, to show that substitute service was ineffective, Salazar
was required to present extrinsic evidence that ETI failed to meet the
statutory requirements. Specifically, Salazar had to show that ETI was not
reasonably diligent in attempting personal service and that the Woodland
Drive address did not qualify as any of the three proper places for service
contained in section 415.20, subdivision (b), i.e. that the address was not
Salazar’s (1) “dwelling house” or “usual place of abode,” (2) “usual place of
business,” or (3) “usual mailing address.”
      As an initial matter, and as Perham points out in his reply brief,
Salazar did not argue in the trial court that ETI was not reasonably diligent
in its attempts at personal service before its process server used substitute

2      Salazar also does not dispute that he had actual notice of the lawsuit
prior to the default judgment.
                                         8
service. Rather, Salazar argued only that the address was not “his ‘dwelling
house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing
address.’ ” Because Salazar did not make any argument related to this issue
in the trial court, Perham contends he had no opportunity to demonstrate
ETI’s reasonable diligence and Salazar forfeited the argument. We agree.
(See JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 168, 178 [“Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on
grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the
trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.”].)
      However, even if we assume the argument was not forfeited, Salazar
has not shown that ETI was not reasonably diligent in its attempts to
personally serve him. The undisputed evidence shows that the process server
satisfied this requirement by making three attempts to personally serve
Salazar at his usual mailing address before he resorted to substitute service.
(See American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at
p. 389.) Further, Salazar’s only argument concerning this issue is that the
process server was not diligent because the Woodland Drive address was not
a proper place for service. As we shall explain, we reject this argument.
Thus, Salazar’s claim that ETI was not sufficiently diligent in its attempts at
personal service also fails.
      With respect to the issue of whether the Woodland Drive address was a
proper place for service, we agree with Salazar that he did present sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s implicit findings that the address was not
his home or usual place of business. Critically, however, Salazar did not
present any evidence supporting his claim that Woodland Drive was not his
usual mailing address.

                                        9
      As noted, in support of his motion to set aside the judgment under
section 473, subdivision (d), Salazar submitted his declaration asserting that
he did not reside at the Woodland Drive address at the time of the service
and that he did not use the address to conduct business. The declaration,
however, contains no statement concerning whether Woodland Drive was his
usual mailing address. On the other hand, Perham’s evidentiary submissions
included the updated declaration from the process server, who stated that on
November 11, 2019, Salazar’s sister informed him that Salazar lived at the
Woodland Drive address and, importantly, that Salazar also regularly
received mail there.
      Perham’s evidence also included the declaration of Matthew Johnston,
the managing member of JPM Recovery, LLC, a company that performs skip-
tracing services. Johnston stated that he performed a records search on
Salazar that revealed his most recent address was Woodland Drive, that his
current driver’s license showed the same address, and that a business search
showed Salazar was the chief executive officer of Jonathan’s Transportation
Inc. and that the company’s address was the Woodland Drive address.
Johnston’s declaration also stated that his search showed that Salazar had
not filed a forwarding address for Woodland Drive with the United States
Postal Service (USPS) in the prior four years. Johnston’s declaration
attached documents supporting each assertion.
      Further, Perham asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the
initial articles of incorporation and statement of information that Salazar
filed with the California Secretary of State for Jonathan’s Transportation Inc.
in April 2018, and a subsequent statement of information Salazar filed in
October 2020, indicating no change in the information filed in the 2018

                                      10
statement of information.3 The original statement of information lists 14031
Woodland Drive as the address both for the corporation and for Salazar
individually as the sole officer, director, and agent for the company.
      To determine whether the default judgment was void based on
ineffective service of process, the trial court was required to make factual
findings as to whether Perham’s evidence showed that substitute service at
the Woodland Drive address was effective because Salazar either (1) resided
there, (2) used the home as his usual place of business, or (3) used the
address as his usual mailing address. (§ 415.20, subd. (b).) With respect to
the first two categories, as stated, we agree with Salazar that he presented
evidence disputing both, which could support the court’s implied findings that
the Woodland Drive address was not his home or usual place of business.
Salazar’s declaration, attaching the lease he entered into for a residence in
Eastvale, California from December 2018 through January 2020, supported
his assertion that he did not reside at the Woodland Drive home at the time
of service. Likewise, Salazar’s statements that his usual place of business
was the trucking company he worked for in Eastvale, not the transportation
company he formed in 2018, supported the finding the home was not his
usual place of business.

3     The trial court granted the request “as to the existence of the
documents, but not as to the truth of their contents.” Perham requests we
take judicial notice of the statements of information Salazar filed with the
Secretary of State in April 2018 and October 2020. These documents are
appropriate subjects for judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452,
subdivisions (c) and (h). Accordingly, the request is granted. (See e.g.,
Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 23, 37 [taking judicial notice of the records of the California
Secretary of State under Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (h)].)
                                       11
      However, Salazar presented no evidence to support his claim that the
Woodland Drive address was not his usual mailing address. Instead, all of
the evidence before the trial court pointed to the opposite conclusion.
Specifically, Salazar’s declaration contains no statement refuting the fact
that it was his usual mailing address. Johnston’s declaration and
attachments showed that Salazar continued to use the address on his driver’s
license, and that Salazar had never changed his mailing address from

Woodland Drive with the USPS.4 Further, Salazar himself submitted a
statement of information to the California Secretary of State in October 2020,
after the default judgment was entered, representing his personal address
remained at Woodland Drive. His declaration provides no refutation or
explanation of this submission.
      We agree with Perham that this evidence established Woodland Drive
was Salazar’s usual mailing address. Critically, Salazar submitted no
evidence showing otherwise. (See Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146
Cal.App.4th 488, 499 [rejecting defendant’s claim that he was not properly
served where plaintiff showed statutory requirements for service were
established and defendant presented “no evidence to the contrary”]; Neadeau
v. Foster (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 234, 237 [“Defendant, having the clear
opportunity to refute what otherwise appears to be competent evidence that

4     Salazar argues that failure to change your mailing address from your
parents’ home cannot support a finding that that home is a child’s usual
mailing address because then “it would be possible to serve the children at
their parent’s residence in perpetuity until they formally updated their
address with the postal service.” We disagree. Service at a parent’s home is
appropriate if it is a child’s usual mailing address; but this does not lead to
the conclusion that such status continues in perpetuity. Rather, like any
other home, a defendant can establish that a parent’s home is no longer their
usual mailing address by presenting evidence of that fact. Salazar made no
such showing in this case.
                                      12
he was served with process, has failed to do so.”].) Because there was no
evidence before the trial court to support its implied finding that Salazar did
not use the Woodland Drive address as his usual mailing address, the court
erred by finding the default judgment void for lack of effective service.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Salazar’s motion to
set aside the default judgment.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The order is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court
with directions to enter an order denying Salazar’s motion to set aside the
default judgment and to re-enter the default judgment. Costs of appeal are
awarded to Appellant.

                                                            McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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