Court Opinion

ID: 9773926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:04:11.679845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:59.416392
License: Public Domain

LIMBAUGH, Judge,
concurring.
This Court granted transfer to resolve a conflict among the appellate courts regarding the propriety of an administrative license suspension predicated on probable cause to arrest but obtained after an unlawful stop. The majority skirts this important issue by putting the proverbial cart before the horse, that is, by holding (accurately, I believe) that the stop was not unlawful in the first place. I find no need to make that determination because the lawfulness of the initial stop is irrelevant in civil eases. As I will explain, even if the stop was unlawful, the exclusionary rule is only applicable in criminal cases and should not be used to preclude the subsequent finding of probable cause to arrest necessary to support an administrative license suspension.
A license revocation or suspension under section 302.505.1 requires that the arresting officer have probable cause to believe that the person driving the motor vehicle is intoxicated, and the facts of this case clearly support the majority’s conclusion on that point. In addition to challenging the officer’s probable cause determination, however, Respondent also challenges the legality of the initial stop. This claim has no statutory basis be*332cause section 302.505.1 does not require the arresting officer’s initial stop to be based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See Gordon v. Director of Revenue, 896 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Mo.App.1995). Instead, the language of the statute focuses solely on the officer’s basis for believing that the driver is intoxicated, which is a different issue.
There is also no constitutional basis for excluding the evidence that Respondent was intoxicated. Of course, in criminal cases, evidence that has been obtained as the result of an unconstitutional stop may be subject to the exclusionary rule. See State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995). In civil cases, though, evidence is not subject to the exclusionary rule despite the fact that it has been obtained in an illegal manner. See Peach v. Boykins, 779 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Mo. banc 1989); In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772, 775 n.2 (Mo. banc 1986); Gordon, 896 S.W.2d at 740; Sullins v. Director of Revenue, 893 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Mo.App.1995). Missouri courts have recognized that a license revocation or suspension proceeding is a civil proceeding, see Sullins, 893 S.W.2d at 850; Green v. Director of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Mo.App.1988), and thus, it is repeatedly held in those cases that evidence obtained as the result of an illegal stop is not subject to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Gordon, 896 S.W.2d at 740; Sullins, 893 S.W.2d at 850; Barish v. Director of Revenue, 872 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Mo.App.1994).
Respondent contends that his ease is controlled by this Court’s decision in Aron v. Director of Revenue, 737 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. banc 1987). While the Aron decision correctly recognized that the arresting officer must have probable cause to believe that the driver was intoxicated, the opinion went further by holding, at least by implication, that the requirement of probable cause extended also to the initial stop of the driver. Aron, 737 S.W.2d at 719-20. A number of appellate court decisions have followed suit, citing Aron to support the contention that a license revocation or suspension must be based upon a lawful stop. See, e.g., Cook v. Director of Revenue, 890 S.W.2d 738, 739-40 (Mo.App.1995); Stark v. Director of Revenue, 774 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Mo.App.1989); Edwards v. Director of Revenue, 769 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Mo.App.1989).
In imposing the requirement for probable cause to stop, the Aron Court, in a rather cursory, two-page per curiam opinion, not only failed to cite authority for its holding, but also failed to address the issue of whether the exclusionary rule should apply in the civil context. In fact, the Aron case is directly contrary to other decisions of this Court holding that the exclusionary rule is not applicable in civil cases. Peach, 779 S.W.2d at 237; Littleton, 719 S.W.2d at 775 n. 2. In my view, Aron is simply an aberration and should be overruled to the extent that it imposes a probable cause requirement on the initial stop.
To conclude, neither statutory nor constitutional considerations make the admission of intoxication evidence in a license revocation or suspension proceeding dependent on the legality of the initial stop. It is unnecessary, therefore, for this Court to reach the issue of whether the arresting officer’s initial stop was supported by probable cause or by an articulable and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. For these reasons, I am unwilling to join the majority opinion, but I would nevertheless reverse the judgment of the trial court.