Court Opinion

ID: 9412556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-31 19:04:47.706969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:37.315026
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/31/23 Roman v. Pacific Beach House CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     DIVISION THREE

 JOHN ROMAN,                                                    B323162

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No.
      v.                                                       21STCV26863
 PACIFIC BEACH HOUSE, LLC,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mel Red Recana, Judge. Affirmed.
      Tyson & Mendes, Kathryn C. Lee, Scott M. Nenni, and
Jeffrey R. Siegel for Defendant and Appellant.
      Eldessouky Law, Mohamed Eldessouky, Grach Bekaryan;
Law Office of Maximilian Lee and Maximilian Lee for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
            _______________________________________
                         INTRODUCTION

       Code of Civil Procedure1 section 1281.97 provides that if a
company or business that drafts an arbitration agreement does
not pay its share of required arbitration fees or costs within 30
days after they are due, the company or business is in “material
breach” of the arbitration agreement. (§ 1281.97, subd. (a)(1).) In
that event, an employee or consumer may, among other things,
withdraw his or her claims from arbitration and proceed in court.
(Id., subd. (b)(1).)
       Plaintiff and respondent John Roman (plaintiff) sued his
former employer, defendant and appellant Pacific Beach House,
LLC (employer). Employer moved to compel arbitration under the
terms of an arbitration agreement signed by plaintiff when he
was hired. The court granted the motion. But employer failed to
pay its share of the arbitration fee within the required 30 days.
Citing section 1281.97, plaintiff moved to withdraw the matter
from arbitration. Employer moved under section 473,
subdivision (b), to excuse the late filing of the arbitration fee. The
court concluded, under section 1281.97, that employer was in
material breach of the parties’ arbitration agreement. The court
granted plaintiff’s motion and denied employer’s motion, thereby
allowing plaintiff to pursue his employment-related claims in
court rather than in arbitration.
       Employer appeals and argues the question of whether
employer was in “material breach” of the arbitration agreement
should have been decided by an arbitrator rather than the court.
It also complains that the notification it received from the

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

                                   2
arbitrator was not an “invoice” within the meaning of section
1281.97 and therefore did not trigger the 30-day payment
window. Finally, employer asserts that the trial court should
have excused its late payment of the arbitration fee under
section 473, subdivision (b), because the late payment was the
result of a mistake by the accounting office of its counsel and the
fee was paid only a few days after the due date. We reject each of
these arguments and affirm.

        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.    The Arbitration Agreement
       The material facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff filed a civil
complaint against employer in February 2021, asserting eight
causes of action relating to his former employment. Employer
subsequently filed a petition to compel arbitration based on an
arbitration agreement with plaintiff.
       Two documents contain the parties’ arbitration agreement.
The first is a two-page document signed by plaintiff titled
“Acknowledgment of Receipt,” in which plaintiff acknowledged
that he received a copy of employer’s employee handbook. After
the signature line for that acknowledgment, a second section
titled “Agreement to Arbitrate” states: “In consideration of our
mutual promises and our at-will employment relationship, The
Beach House and I (Employee) agree as follows: [¶] Any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to Employee’s
employment or termination of employment (including post-
termination claims) which cannot be resolved among the parties
themselves, shall on the written request of either party served on
the other within one year of the event which forms the basis of
the controversy or claim, be submitted and resolved by final and

                                  3
binding arbitration in a manner consistent with the California
Code of Civil Procedure. Service of the written request shall be
made only by certified mail, with a return receipt requested and
the arbitration shall take place in San Mateo County, California.
Time is of the essence; if the request is not served within said
one-year period, the complaining party’s claim(s) shall be forever
waived and barred before all forums. The Arbitrator shall have
no authority to amend or modify the parties’ at-will employment
relationship or any of the terms of this Agreement. The decision
of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding and judgment thereon
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The
parties shall equally divide all costs of the arbitration, but the
parties shall bear their own expenses for attorneys’ fees and
witness costs. [¶] The parties intend that this arbitration
procedure shall be the exclusive means of resolving all claims
whether founded in fact or law between Employee and the Beach
House and/or its employees, directors, officers or managers
arising out of or relating to the parties’ employment relationship
and/or its termination, whether occurring during or after the
employment relationship, including, but not limited to, any
controversies or claims pertaining to wrongful or constructive
discharge, personal injuries or other civil wrongs, [and] violations
of public policies or anti-discrimination statutes. THE PARTIES
EXPRESSLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO HAVE ANY SUCH
DISPUTE DECIDED IN A COURT OF LAW AND/OR BY A
JURY IN A COURT PROCEEDING.” This provision was
separately dated and signed by plaintiff and a representative of
employer.
       The second relevant document is titled “Employment
Agreement.” Paragraph five of the document states: “Arbitration.

                                 4
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the
Agreement or the breach thereof, or arising out of or relating to
Employee’s employment or termination of employment (including
post[-]termination claims) which cannot be resolved among the
parties themselves, shall on the written request of either party
served on the other within one year of the event which forms the
basis of the controversy or claim, be submitted and resolved by
final and binding arbitration in a manner consistent with the
California Code of Civil Procedure. Service of the written request
shall be made only by certified mail, with a return receipt
requested. Time is of the essence; if the request is not served
within said one-year period, the complaining party’s claim(s)
shall be forever waived and barred before any and all forums,
including, without limitation, arbitration or judicial forums. The
Arbitrator shall have no authority to alter, amend, modify or
change any of the terms of this Agreement. The decision of the
Arbitrator shall be final and binding and judgment thereon may
be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The parties
shall equally divide all costs of the arbitration, but the parties
shall bear their own expenses for attorneys’ fees and witness
costs. [¶] The parties intend that this arbitration procedure shall
be the exclusive means of resolving all claims whether founded in
fact or law between Employee and Beach House and/or its
employees, directors, officers or managers arising out of or
relating to this Agreement, the parties’ employment relationship
and/or the termination of that relationship, including, but not
limited to any controversies or claims pertaining to wrongful or
constructive discharge, personal injuries or other civil wrongs,
violations of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied
contract, public policies, or anti-discrimination statutes. THE

                                 5
PARTIES EXPRESSLY WAIVE ANY CONSTITUTIONAL OR
STATUTORY RIGHT TO HAVE ANY SUCH DISPUTE
DECIDED IN A COURT OF LAW AND/OR BY A JURY IN A
COURT PROCEEDING.” The document was signed and dated by
plaintiff and a representative of employer.
      The court granted employer’s petition to compel arbitration
on December 3, 2021.
2.    Employer’s Failure to Pay Arbitration Fee
       Plaintiff submitted his demand for arbitration to the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) on December 6, 2021.
       On January 18, 2022, AAA sent counsel for plaintiff and
employer an email with a letter attachment (January 18th
letter). The letter is two pages in length and addresses several
administrative issues relating to the opening of the arbitration.
Among other things, the January 18th letter indicates that
plaintiff had satisfied his filing requirements, including the
payment of a $300 filing fee. The letter then states, in bold
typeface: “Accordingly, we request that the employer pay its
share of the filing fee in the amount of $1,900.00 on or before
February 1, 2022.” After indicating that AAA would proceed to
administer the arbitration after it received the employer’s
payment, the January 18th letter states in a separate paragraph,
again in bold typeface: “This letter shall serve as the invoice
pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section[ ] 1281.97.
Payment is due on upon [sic] receipt of this letter. As this
arbitration is subject to California Code of Civil Procedure
1281.97, payment must be received by February 17, 2022 or the
AAA will close the parties’ case. Pursuant to California Code of
Civil Procedure 1281.97, the AAA cannot grant any extensions to
this payment deadline.” At the bottom of the second page, the

                                6
letter states in a final paragraph, in bold typeface: “We would like
to remind the employer that Under the Costs of Arbitration
Section of the Employment/Workplace Arbitration Rules, the
‘employer’s full share is due as soon as the employee meets his or
her filing requirements, even if the matter settles or is
withdrawn’. This notice confirms that employee’s filing
requirements have been met.”
       On February 3, 2022, AAA sent an email to counsel for
plaintiff and employer with a letter attachment (reminder letter).
The reminder letter states, in pertinent part: “Dear Counsel for
Respondent: [¶] We have not yet received payment from the
employer to cover their portion of the filing fee, as described in
our letter dated January 18, 2022.” The letter continues, in bold
typeface: “Please note in accordance with California Code of Civil
Procedure 1281.97 and 1281.98, the AAA will close its case on
February 17, 2022 if payment is not received.”
       On February 18, 2022, AAA sent an email to all counsel
with a letter attachment. The first paragraph of the letter reads:
“The Respondent has failed to submit the previously requested
filing fee; accordingly, we have administratively closed our file in
this matter. Any filing fees received from the Claimant will be
refunded under separate cover.” Within two business days,
counsel for employer issued a check for payment of the
arbitration fee.
3.    Employer’s Motion for Relief from Nonpayment of
      Arbitration Fee
       On April 5, 2022, employer filed a motion seeking to enforce
the court’s December 3, 2021 order compelling arbitration. The
motion explained that employer’s failure to pay the arbitration
fee to AAA within the 30 days required under section 1281.97

                                 7
was the result of a mistake by counsel, not employer, and that
the fee had been paid only a few days after that deadline.
Employer asked the court to grant it relief from counsel’s mistake
and excusable neglect under section 473, subdivision (b), and
resubmit the matter to arbitration. Employer also argued that
the letter from AAA was not “a proper invoice” sufficient to
trigger the 30-day time limit under section 1281.97.
4.    Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Arbitration
       Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the court’s arbitration
order, lift the stay of proceedings, and reinstate the matter on
calendar. Plaintiff argued that under section 1281.97, he was
entitled to prosecute his case in court because employer had
failed to pay its share of the arbitration fee within 30 days of the
January 18th letter. Further, plaintiff sought sanctions, i.e.,
attorney’s fees and costs of $6,885 under section 1281.99.
5.    Trial Court Ruling
      The court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied employer’s
motion.
      Addressing plaintiff’s motion, the court noted that under
section 1281.97, subdivision (a)(1), employer’s payment of the
arbitration fee was required no later than “30 days after the due
date.” Subdivision (a)(2) further provides, “To avoid delay, absent
an express provision in the arbitration agreement stating the
number of days in which the parties to the arbitration must pay
any required fees or costs, the arbitration provider shall issue all
invoices to the parties as due upon receipt.” It was undisputed
that the January 18th letter stated, consistent with section
1281.97, that payment was due upon receipt and that the
statutory deadline for payment was February 17, 2022. The

                                  8
parties’ arbitration agreement contained no contrary deadline.
Thus, employer’s issuance of a check on February 22, 2022 failed
to meet the statutory deadline.
       The court rejected employer’s argument that it was not in
material breach of the arbitration agreement because it paid the
required fee within a few days of the deadline and the brief delay
caused no prejudice to plaintiff. The court found that contention
to be foreclosed by the plain language of section 1281.97. The
court was also unpersuaded by employer’s contention that the
January 18th letter was not “a proper invoice” within the
meaning of section 1281.97, subdivision (a)(2). The court noted
the January 18th letter plainly stated that employer’s share of
the arbitration fee was $1,900 and that such amount was due
upon receipt of the letter. The letter also stated the statutorily
required deadline, in bold typeface, and noted that no extension
of the payment deadline was permitted under section 1281.97.
       Finally, the court concluded that it, not an arbitrator, was
empowered to decide the motion at hand. Employer had asserted
that the arbitration agreement included an expansive clause that
clearly and unmistakably delegated all issues, including
threshold issues such as the timeliness of payment of arbitration
fees, to the arbitrator. The court found that applying a delegation
clause in that manner would “be in complete contravention with
the purposes of the statute” and would cause a plaintiff to suffer
further delays in the event a recalcitrant employer again failed to
pay its share of the arbitration fee. In any case, the court found,
the delegation clause at issue did not contain a clear and
unmistakable delegation to the arbitrator to decide issues
relating to the breach of the arbitration agreement. The court

                                 9
also imposed sanctions against employer in the amount of $3,960
under section 1281.99.
       With respect to employer’s motion for relief under
section 473, subdivision (b), the court noted that employer sought
relief from AAA’s administrative closure of the arbitration. But
section 473 applies only to court proceedings and is therefore
inapplicable to actions taken by AAA. Moreover, the court found
that even if it were to set aside AAA’s closure of the arbitration,
employer would still be in material breach of the arbitration
agreement under section 1281.97 and therefore no relief would be
available.
       The court entered the order on both motions on August 15,
2022. Employer timely appeals.

                         DISCUSSION

       Employer advances three arguments: (1) An arbitrator,
rather than the court, should have decided whether employer
violated section 1281.97; (2) the January 18th letter is not an
“invoice” within the meaning of section 1281.97 and therefore did
not trigger employer’s obligation to pay its share of the
arbitration fee within 30 days; and (3) employer, as an innocent
party, should not be required to forfeit its right to arbitrate
plaintiff’s claims due to the mistake and excusable neglect of its
counsel. We address these issues in turn.
1.    The arbitration agreement does not contain a “clear
      and unmistakable” delegation clause.
      Employer claims the arbitration agreement delegates to an
arbitrator threshold questions of arbitrability including the
question presented here, i.e., whether employer materially
breached the arbitration agreement by failing to pay its share of

                                10
the arbitration fee in a timely manner. We conclude the
arbitration agreement does not delegate such issues to an
arbitrator.2
      1.1.   Standard of Review
      The interpretation of a contractual arbitration provision is
an issue of law we review de novo. (See, e.g., Wilson-Davis v. SSP
America, Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1087 (Wilson-Davis)
[noting where facts underlying a request for arbitration are
undisputed, appeal presents legal issues subject to de novo
review].)
      1.2.   Legal Principles and Analysis
       “Courts presume that the parties intend courts, not
arbitrators, to decide threshold issues of arbitrability.” (Wilson-
Davis, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 1087.) Accordingly, the
“ ‘gateway’ ” question of arbitrability—here, whether plaintiff’s
claims are arbitrable notwithstanding employer’s failure to
comply with section 1281.97—“ ‘ “is an issue for judicial
determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably
provide otherwise.” ’ (Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
(2002) 537 U.S. 79, 83; see also [Henry] Schein, [Inc. v. Archer &
White Sales, Inc. (2019)] 139 S.Ct. [524,] 530 [court will decide
threshold issue of arbitrability unless agreement delegates
question to arbitrator by ‘ “clear and unmistakable” evidence’];
Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters (2010) 561 U.S. 287, 296 … [‘It is

2 Because the arbitration agreement at issue does not contain a “clear

and unmistakable” delegation clause, we have no occasion to consider
how such a delegation clause might be construed in relation to
section 1281.97.

                                  11
well settled … that whether parties have agreed to “submi[t] a
particular dispute to arbitration” is typically an “ ‘issue for
judicial determination’ ” ’]; Sandoval-Ryan [v. Oleander Holdings,
LLC (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 217,] 223 [to be effective, clause
delegating issue of arbitrability to arbitrator must be ‘clear and
unmistakable’].)” (Id. at pp. 1087–1088.)
       Examples of “clear and unmistakable” delegation clauses
provide guidance in the present case. In Rent-A-Center, West,
Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 68 (Rent-A-Center), for
instance, the arbitration agreement stated that “ ‘[t]he
Arbitrator … shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute
relating to the … enforceability … of this Agreement including,
but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this
Agreement is void or voidable.’ ” (Italics added.) Similarly, in
Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 892, the
arbitration agreement provided that the parties “ ‘agree to
arbitrate all disputes, claims and controversies arising out of or
relating to … (iv) the interpretation, validity, or enforceability of
this Agreement, including the determination of the scope or
applicability of this Section 5 [the “Arbitration of Disputes”
section]... .’ ” (Italics added, underscoring omitted.) And, in
Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 848 F.3d
1201, 1207–1208, the arbitration agreement provided that
disputes subject to arbitration “include without limitation
disputes arising out of or relating to interpretation or application
of this Arbitration Provision, including the enforceability,
revocability or validity of the Arbitration Provision or any portion
of the Arbitration Provision.” (Italics added.) Under these
circumstances, the courts held that the gateway questions of
arbitrability had been delegated to the arbitrators under the

                                 12
express language of the arbitration agreements. (Rent-A-Center,
at pp. 65, 68; Aanderud, at p. 892; Mohamed, at p. 1209.)
       Employer urges that the arbitration agreement here
contains a similarly “clear and unmistakable” delegation of
threshold issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Specifically,
employer points to the following language which is found in the
employment agreement: “Any controversy or claim arising out of
or relating to the Agreement or the breach thereof … shall on the
written request of either party served on the other within one
year of the event which forms the basis of the controversy or
claim, be submitted and resolved by final and binding arbitration
in a manner consistent with the California Code of Civil
Procedure.” (Italics added.) Unlike the cases cited ante, however,
this language contains no reference to the arbitration provision in
particular or to the resolution of issues relating to arbitration—as
opposed to the issues relating to plaintiff’s employment. It
therefore fails to evidence a “clear and unmistakable” intent to
arbitrate threshold issues regarding arbitrability including the
breach of the arbitration agreement itself.
       The only case employer relies on is a Ninth Circuit
decision, Dekker v. Vivint Solar, Inc. (9th Cir., Oct. 26, 2021,
No. 20-16584) 2021 WL 4958856 [mem. dispo.].) There, the
appellate court held that in light of the scope of the parties’
arbitration agreement, an arbitrator should decide, in the first
instance, whether the defendant violated section 1281.97.
(Dekker, at p. *2.) Employer urges us to reach the same
conclusion here. But whatever persuasive value this opinion may
have in the abstract, it has none here. In Dekker, “the delegation
clauses delegated issues of ‘breach, default, or termination of
th[e] Agreement’ and ‘the determination of the scope or

                                13
applicability of th[e arbitration clause]’ to the arbitrator. Thus,
the parties’ agreements clearly delegated issues involving breach
and default to the arbitrator.” (Id. at p. *1.) Here, the arbitration
agreement does not contain similar language or any other “clear
and unmistakable” evidence of the intent to arbitrate whether a
party has breached the arbitration agreement.
      In sum, we reject employer’s contention that an arbitrator,
rather than the trial court, should have determined whether
employer violated section 1281.97.
2.    Employer has forfeited the argument regarding the
      composition of AAA’s invoice.
       Employer also insists that AAA’s January 18th letter is not
an invoice. It would follow, then, that employer’s obligation to pay
its share of the arbitration fees was not triggered by the January
18th letter and therefore its payment was not untimely under
section 1281.97.
       Notably absent from employer’s argument is any analysis
of the statutory language or, indeed, any legal authority.
Typically, a party advancing a particular statutory
construction—such as the meaning of the undefined term
“invoice” as used in section 1281.97, subdivision (a)(1)—would
draw on some authority in support of their argument. A similar
statute or a dictionary, for example. Employer does none of this
and instead offers the following: “To be an invoice, an invoiced
party must be able to recognize it as such. Otherwise it is just a
letter with a confusing jumble of stock language.” Additionally,
employer urges: “Thus when Section 1281.97 says ‘invoice,’ it
means ‘invoice.’ And it means ‘invoice’ by force of law.” We reject
the argument. (See Meda v. Autozone, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th

                                 14
366, 383 [noting matters not properly raised or that lack
adequate legal discussion will be deemed forfeited].)
      In any event, the January 18th letter is neither confusing
nor unclear. It plainly states, in bold typeface, that employer’s
share of the arbitration fee was required to be paid on or before
February 17, 2022 and it includes a citation to section 1281.97. In
the absence of a statutory directive regarding the composition of
an “invoice,” we decline to read additional requirements into the
statute.
3.    Section 473, subdivision (b), is inapplicable.
       Finally, employer contends that the court erred in denying
its request for relief under section 473, subdivision (b). We
disagree.
      3.1.   Standard of Review
       “Section 473(b) authorizes the trial court to vacate a
dismissal, order, or judgment if it occurred because of the
excusable mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect of a party or
its attorney. The statute ‘contains both mandatory and
discretionary provisions,’ but only the discretionary provision is
at issue. [Citation.] We review the trial court’s discretionary
decision to grant or deny relief under section 473(b) for an abuse
of discretion. [Citation.]” (County of San Bernardino v. Mancini
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1102–1103.)
      3.2.   Legal Principles and Analysis
      Employer argues that it is an “innocent party” because its
counsel inadvertently neglected to pay the arbitration fee in a
timely manner. As such, employer claims, it should not be
required to forfeit its right to arbitrate plaintiff’s disputes.

                                15
Further, employer asserts, in adopting section 1281.97, the
Legislature intended to target those businesses and employers
that acted in bad faith and withheld payment for purposes of
delay—not parties acting in good faith who inadvertently pay
their fee a couple of days after the deadline, as here.
       The appellate courts of this state have uniformly rejected
employer’s suggestion that a trial court faced with a violation of
section 1281.97 or 1281.983 should take into account such
subjective factors. In Espinoza v. Superior Court (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 761, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s
conclusion that a defendant’s late payment of an arbitration
provider’s invoice was “in ‘substantial[ ] compliance’ with the
arbitration agreement and ‘not in material breach,’ because the
delayed payment was due to ‘ “clerical error,” ’ and the delay did
not prejudice plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 775.) The Court of Appeal
concluded that the “language of section 1281.97 is unambiguous.”
(Id. at p. 776.) “Under the plain language of the statute, then, the
triggering event is nothing more than nonpayment of fees within
the 30-day period—the statute specifies no other required
findings, such as whether the nonpayment was deliberate or
inadvertent, or whether the delay prejudiced the nondrafting
party.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that the “plain language
therefore indicates the Legislature intended the statute to be
strictly applied whenever a drafting party failed to pay by the
statutory deadline.” (Ibid.)

3 Section 1281.98 applies to the failure to pay fees during the course of

the arbitration whereas 1281.97 applies to the failure to pay the initial
fee of arbitration.

                                   16
       The Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in
rejecting an FAA preemption challenge to sections 1281.97 and
1281.98. (Gallo v. Wood Ranch USA, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
621.) Although the court’s preemption analysis is not relevant
here, its description of the statute is. The Court of Appeal
explained that “section 1281.97 declares any payment that
exceeds the arbitration provider’s deadline and a statutorily
granted 30-day grace period to be a material breach as a matter
of law.” (Id. at p. 644, italics omitted.) The court further
explained that section 1281.97 “statutorily defines a material
breach as a matter of law to be failure to pay anything less than
the full amount due by the expiration of the statutory grace
period, rather than leaving materiality as an issue of fact for the
trier of fact to determine.” (Gallo, at p. 644.)
       Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc. (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1054, is in accord. There, the court noted that “[t]o
further its stated purpose, the Legislature in enacting sections
1281.97 and 1281.98 chose to neither require nor permit an
inquiry into the reasons for a drafting party’s nonpayment.
[Citation.] It is within the Legislature’s purview to make a civil
remedy available, as a matter of policy, without regard to fault.
[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1074–1075.)
       This Division reached the same conclusion with respect to
the 30-day payment requirement found in section 1281.98. (See
De Leon v. Juanita’s Foods (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 740, 746.)
There, the defendant employer neglected to pay certain fees
required to continue an arbitration with the former employee
plaintiff and the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to
vacate the arbitration order. On appeal, the defendant argued
that the trial court’s hypertechnical reading of section 1281.98

                                17
was erroneous and asserted the court should have considered the
fact that the defendant’s late payment did not result in any delay
in the arbitration proceedings. (De Leon, at p. 752.) We rejected
the argument based on the plain and unambiguous language of
the statute: “Section 1281.98 explicitly defines what occurs when
‘the fees or costs required to continue the arbitration proceeding
are not paid within 30 days after the due date,’ namely, that ‘the
drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement,
is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel the
employee or consumer to proceed with that arbitration as a result
of the material breach.’ (§ 1281.98, subd. (a)(1).) We find nothing
in this language that is ambiguous regarding the requisite
circumstances to determine the existence of a statutorily defined
material breach of an arbitration agreement. To the contrary, the
statute’s language establishes a simple bright-line rule that a
drafting party’s failure to pay outstanding arbitration fees within
30 days after the due date results in its material breach of the
arbitration agreement.” (Id. at pp. 752–753.)
       Turning to employer’s argument, we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying employer’s motion
for relief under section 473, subdivision (b). As the cases we have
cited indicate, section 1281.97 is a mandatory statute. It does not
permit the trial court to consider any circumstances other than
those set forth in the statute, i.e., whether the defendant paid the
required fee within the 30-day deadline. If the payment is late,
the statute operates automatically and the reason for the late
payment is immaterial. Accordingly, the court here was not
permitted to grant employer relief as a result of its counsel’s

                                18
mistake under section 473. Indeed, it would have been an abuse
of discretion for the court to do so.4

                            DISPOSITION

      The order vacating the court’s prior arbitration order is
affirmed. Plaintiff and respondent John Roman shall recover his
costs on appeal.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                           LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

      EDMON, P. J.

      ADAMS, J.

4 We decline to address employer’s argument, asserted for the first

time in its appellant’s reply brief, that plaintiff’s claims are untimely.
(See Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [“[W]e
do not consider points raised for the first time in the reply brief absent
a showing of good cause for the failure to present them earlier.”].)

                                    19