Court Opinion

ID: 9713105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:08:03.035669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.645326
License: Public Domain

Justice EAKIN
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the order in this case is appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313; however, because I believe the order is also appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority’s decision to the contrary.
The majority cites Commonwealth v. Cosnek, 575 Pa. 411, 836 A.2d 871 (2003), for the proposition that the application of Rule 311(d) in the suppression context is limited “to those ‘circumstances provided by law* in which a pretrial ruling results in the suppression, preclusion or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence.” Maj. Op., at 142-44, 882 A.2d at 468 (quoting Cosnek, at 420-22, 836 A.2d at 877). Here, however, we are not concerned with suppression or admission of evidence; the issue is whether the Commonwealth may appeal an *153order which will substantially hamper the Commonwealth’s case by hindering the willingness of its key witness to testify, a defacto suppression of the evidence.
In Cosnek, I dissented, emphasizing Rule 311(d) does not delineate specific types of orders from which the Commonwealth may take an interlocutory appeal as of right; rather, it permits an appeal from any order the Commonwealth certifies will “terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); see Cosnek, at 430, 836 A.2d at 882 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (“Unless the language of the Rule changes, it means what it says: The Commonwealth may appeal an order, not just some types of orders, if it substantially handicaps the prosecution.”). The majority “reject[s] the Commonwealth’s assertion that it should always be permitted to appeal any pretrial order that has the potential to affect its ability to meet its burden of proof.” Maj. Op., at 141-42, 882 A.2d at 467. However, in providing certification pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 904(e), the Commonwealth is not merely asserting its ability to prove its case may be affected; it is certifying, in good faith, that its case will be terminated or substantially handicapped by the trial court’s order.
Here, the Commonwealth has filed the requisite good faith certification. The Commonwealth asserts that if the young victim is forced to undergo a competency examination by the defense’s psychologist, his willingness to testify may be hampered, thus preventing his testimony from ever being heard. This would end, or, at the very least, severely handicap the Commonwealth’s case. There is no reason to disbelieve the Commonwealth’s assertion; indeed, as I noted in Cosnek:
[W]e must be able to rely on the certification as sufficient to safeguard against dilatory use and abuse of the right of appeal. Until experience shows actual abuse by the elected prosecutorial representatives of our counties and our Commonwealth, something certainly not of record in any way, the Rule should be applied as written.

If there is a good faith certificate that a pretrial ruling substantially hampers the case of the party whose one job is 
*154
to seek justice, and the only possible time to appeal is before jeopardy attaches at trial, the appeal should be allowed.

Cosnek, at 430-32, 836 A.2d at 883-84 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (citation omitted; emphasis added).
Thus, given the tender age of the victim, the vital role his testimony plays in this case, and the understandably traumatic effect a probing psychological exam would have on him due to the nature of the crimes to which he was allegedly subjected, I would hold the Commonwealth’s good faith certification is sufficient to warrant an appeal under Rule 311(d).
Accordingly, I dissent from the portion of the majority’s decision which holds the order at issue in this case was not appealable pursuant to Rule 311(d). In all other aspects, I join the majority.