Court Opinion

ID: 9456699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:00:26.750603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:04.646092
License: Public Domain

*561STEVENS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
This litigation arises out of a collective bargaining agreement which Flair executed in 1964 and which was still in effect when the union filed its complaint in 1968. The union asserts that Flair failed to pay the agreed wages to one employee in 1964, hired nonunion employees in 1965, 1966, and 1967, and generally refused to follow contract procedures for hiring personnel and contributing to a pension fund. The employer defended on the ground that the contract had been abandoned by the union and, therefore, was no longer in effect. The trial court rejected the abandonment defense but held that the union was guilty of laches.
The appropriateness of laches as a defense to a labor dispute involves a consideration of several questions which can best be answered by one who is familiar with the collective bargaining relationship between the parties. Although the trial court stated that the defense of the union’s charges would impose an “extreme burden” on Flair, the record does not answer these questions: Does the area-wide master agreement contemplate that a small employer like Flair shall have the burden of full compliance with its terms? Would routine records ordinarily retained by employers disclose the information on which Flair relies to justify its disregard of its written undertakings? Was the lack of communication between the union and Flair entirely the fault of the union? Even if it was too late in 1968 for the union to question Flair’s breaches in 1964 and 1965, was it also too late to ask a neutral third party to pass judgment on 1966 and 1967 breaches, as well as a continuing refusal to abide by the agreement?
The task of answering questions such as these — determining whether the union’s delay was unreasonable and whether Flair’s defense has been significantly prejudiced by that delay — inevitably involves a consideration of the merits of the underlying dispute between the parties. This task should, therefore, be performed by the arbiter who is also responsible for deciding the merits of the basic controversy.
Considerations affecting the orderly disposition of litigation, as well as a due regard for our national labor policy, persuade me that the defense of laches should be processed like other “procedural” questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 556-559, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898; Local Union No. 51, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Illinois Power Company, 357 F.2d 916, 918-919 (7th Cir. 1966). Separating laches from the merits for trial before a separate tribunal will frequently result in an unnecessary duplication of effort and may commit the disposition of the laches issue to the tribunal which is less qualified to evaluate it fairly in the context of the collective bargaining relationship. Moreover, even in those cases which are promptly terminated by judicial approval of the defense, the price for efficiency will be some loss of union confidence in the fairness of the procedures which are offered as a substitute for collective self-help. Unless arbitration procedures command labor’s respect, less civilized methods of resolving disputes will be employed with greater frequency.
In many collective bargaining agreements the employer has obtained a “no strike” pledge from the union in exchange for a commitment to arbitrate disputes. Unions must honor that bargain. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199. We should compel employers to honor their quid pro quo. I would reverse.