Court Opinion

ID: 9391614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 19:00:53.907261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.640827
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 22-1359

  IN THE MATTER OF G&J FISHERIES, INC. AS OWNER OF F/V GEORGES
    BANKS, PLAINTIFF, FOR EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION OF
                           LIABILITY,

                      G&J FISHERIES, INC.,
         as Owner of F/V Georges Banks, O.N. 10925237,

                      Plaintiff, Appellee,

                               v.

                          EDUINO COSTA,

                      Claimant, Appellant,

              ELIZABETH & NIKI FISHING CORPORATION,

                            Claimant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

        [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                   Kayatta, Lynch, and Howard,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Marnix E. Weber, with whom Michael Brian Flynn, Kathleen A.
Reagan, and Flynn Wirkus Young PC were on brief, for appellant.
     Olaf Aprans, with whom Farrell Smith O'Connell Aarsheim
Aprans LLP was on brief, for appellee.
May 2, 2023
             LYNCH, Circuit Judge.          When Appellant Eduino Costa, a

commercial fisherman who alleged he was injured while serving on

a vessel owned by Appellee G&J Fisheries, Inc. ("G&J"), failed to

file a claim as required under Supplemental Rule F of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, G&J moved for entry of default judgment.

The district court allowed G&J's motion and denied Costa's request

for leave to file a late claim.          In re G&J Fisheries, Inc. (In re

G&J I), 570 F. Supp. 3d 8, 11-12 (D. Mass. 2021).               The district

court thereafter entered a judgment of exoneration for G&J.               In re

G&J Fisheries, Inc. (In re G&J II), 598 F. Supp. 3d 18, 22 (D. Mass.

2022).      Our review of these orders is for abuse of discretion.

Costa has not met his burden to show such abuse.             We affirm.

                                       I.

             Costa worked as a deckhand aboard the commercial fishing

vessel F/V GEORGES BANKS, owned and operated by G&J, during a

scallop fishing trip that started on or about June 9, 2017.               Costa

did   not   file   any   claim   of   injury   in   the   thirty-five   months

following that voyage.

             Three years later, on June 12, 2020, Costa sued G&J in

Massachusetts Superior Court, alleging that he had been injured on

or about June 15, 2017, on the F/V GEORGES BANKS and that G&J was

liable for unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence, 46 U.S.C.

§ 30104, and seeking maintenance and cure.            Costa alleged that he

"worked at least six trips as a deckhand" aboard G&J's vessel "in

                                      - 3 -
2016 and for some time in 2017."            Costa's state court complaint

also named as defendant Elizabeth & Niki Fishing Corporation

("E&N"), owner of the commercial fishing vessel F/V ELIZABETH &

NIKI, on which Costa allegedly worked as a deckhand for over thirty

years.     Costa alleged that on multiple occasions aboard the F/V

GEORGES BANKS and the F/V ELIZABETH & NIKI, he "was required to

perform    .    .   .   extremely   dangerous    [tasks]"   and     "unsafely

ordered . . . to perform work which was beyond his physical and

medical capacity to perform."

            After receiving written notice of Costa's state court

action, G&J filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the

District       of   Massachusetts   on   September   16,    2020,     seeking

"exoneration from liability for any and all injuries, damages, and

losses of any kind arising from the voyage ending on or about

June 16, 2017, including personal injuries allegedly sustained by

Costa," "pursuant to 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12 . . . and Supplemental

Admiralty Rule F of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."1               See

46 U.S.C. § 30529(a) (formerly 46 U.S.C. § 30511(a)) (providing

that a vessel owner can "bring a civil action in a district court

of the United States for limitation of liability" after receiving

"written notice of a claim").

     1    On January 6, 2021, E&N also filed such a complaint in
federal district court seeking "exoneration from, or limitation
of, any liability [it] may face by reason of Mr. Costa's alleged
injury" aboard the F/V GEORGES BANKS.

                                    - 4 -
         The Supreme Court has described the exoneration-from-

liability process as follows:

         The district court secures the value of the
         vessel or owner's interest, marshals claims,
         and enjoins the prosecution of other actions
         with respect to the claims.         In these
         proceedings, the court, sitting without a
         jury, adjudicates the claims.      The court
         determines whether the vessel owner is liable
         and whether the owner may limit liability.
         The court then determines the validity of the
         claims,   and   if  liability   is   limited,
         distributes the limited fund among the
         claimants.

Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 448 (2001)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F).    When such a federal court

exoneration action is filed, Rules F(4)-(5) of the Supplemental

Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure set forth clear requirements for notice and for

potential claimants to file claims in the district court by a

certain date:

         [T]he [district] court shall issue a notice to
         all persons asserting claims with respect to
         which   the   complaint    seeks    limitation,
         admonishing them to file their respective
         claims with the clerk of the court and to serve
         on the attorneys for the plaintiff a copy
         thereof on or before a date to be named in the
         notice. . . . For cause shown, the court may
         enlarge the time within which claims may be
         filed.

Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(4) (emphasis added).       There is no

dispute that such notice was provided here.

                                - 5 -
             Supplemental Rule F(5) specifies when a claim must be

filed and the claim's contents and differentiates between a "claim"

and an "answer":

             Claims shall be filed and served on or before
             the date specified in the notice provided for
             in subdivision (4) of this rule. Each claim
             shall specify the facts upon which the
             claimant relies in support of the claim, the
             items thereof, and the dates on which the same
             accrued.   If a claimant desires to contest
             either the right to exoneration from or the
             right to limitation of liability the claimant
             shall file and serve an answer to the
             complaint unless the claim has included an
             answer.

Id. F(5) (emphasis added).        The Rule, by its terms, sets certain

requirements for every claim.

             In response to G&J's exoneration complaint, the district

court issued an order on October 13, 2020, enjoining "any and all

lawsuits, causes of action, and claims against Plaintiffs and their

property   arising   from   the   Incident"   pursuant   to   Supplemental

Rule F(3).     The order further directed the issuance of notice

pursuant to Supplemental Rule F(4) and required that any claimants

must "file their respective claims . . . on or before November 18,

2020 or be defaulted."      The formal notice issued two days later.

It reiterated that "[a]ll persons having claims for injuries,

losses, or damages must file a Claim, as provided by Supplemental

Rule F(4)" and that "[a]ny Claimant desiring to contest [G&J's]

right to exoneration from or right to limitation of liability must

                                   - 6 -
also file an answer to the Limitation Complaint, as required by

Supplemental Rule F(5)."2

          Costa   responded    to   the   exoneration   action   on

November 17, 2020.     He filed only an answer to G&J's complaint.

He did not, by his own admission, "file a pleading specifically

entitled a 'claim.'"     Nor did he attach to his federal filing a

copy of his state court complaint.        Costa and G&J commenced

discovery.3

          Nearly eight months later, Costa still had not filed a

claim nor, in G&J's view, had he adequately responded to discovery.

On July 8, 2021, G&J filed a motion for entry of default as to all

persons who failed to file claims by the November 18 deadline.

The next day, E&N filed a claim and answer, albeit late.         On

July 22, 2021, Costa filed a "limited opposition" to entry of

default, in which he argued that default should not be entered

     2    The district court's first notice contained a November 4
deadline for the filing of claims, contrary to the court's order,
which set a deadline of November 18. The court issued a second
notice on October 21, changing the deadline to November 18,
consistent with the court's order.

     3    After Costa's counsel did not agree to an April 2021
date for Costa's deposition, the parties agreed that Costa would
be deposed on July 7, 2021. Costa, his counsel, G&J's counsel,
E&N's counsel, an interpreter, and a court reporter met in Costa's
counsel's New Bedford office for the deposition on that date. But
Costa's counsel refused to produce Costa for deposition, citing a
need to consolidate Costa's case with the E&N exoneration action,
so that Costa would only be deposed once.

                                - 7 -
because   his   state   court   complaint   was   referenced   in   G&J's

exoneration complaint and his answer.

           On July 27, 2021, G&J filed a reply in support of its

motion for entry of default.4    G&J argued that Costa was in default

because he had never filed a claim in district court, as required

by Supplemental Rule F(5), and because neither Costa's answer nor

his state court complaint counted as a claim under the "plain

terms" of that Rule.     G&J contended that, by failing to properly

file a claim, Costa avoided Supplemental Rule F's requirements.5

           G&J further argued that the court should not grant Costa

     4    G&J attached nine exhibits to its filings below: (1) a
page from Costa's counsel's website describing the firm's
expertise in maritime litigation; (2) claims under Supplemental
Rule F(5) that Costa's firm timely filed in other limitation
actions; (3) Costa's answers to G&J's first set of interrogatories;
(4) the two notices        of Costa's deposition       and related
correspondence; (5) a statement on the record regarding the
attempted July 7 deposition of Costa; (6) Costa's medical records
from a visit dated July 19, 2017, in which the physician's
assistant noted that Costa "present[ed] . . . with a 1 year history
of severe back pain . . . not related to accident or injury"; (7)
the complaint against G&J and E&N that Costa filed in state court;
(8) further correspondence regarding the July 7 deposition; and
(9) Costa's supplemental answers to G&J's first set of
interrogatories.

     5    Costa made the following allegations in his state court
complaint: that, on or about June 15, 2017, he "sustained a severe
and painful traumatic injury" aboard the F/V GEORGES BANKS when
the vessel's captain "ordered [him] . . . to go to the wheelhouse
to man the helm and finish cutting scallops"; that when he stepped
on the main stairwell's first step, "while carrying the heavy
basket full of scallops in an unsafe, awkward and ergonomically
unsafe posture," he heard his lower back "pop" and felt "immediate
intense [back] pain"; and that he then "fell face forward on to
the stairwell constructed of diamond plate steel."

                                  - 8 -
leave to file a late claim because Costa's failure to timely file

was not due to excusable neglect.           Rather, G&J alleged, Costa's

"failure to file a claim was and is [a] deliberate" gambit "to

leave his options open to craft a fictitious claim ad hoc after

obtaining discovery."    In support of this assertion, G&J cited

Costa's decision not to submit to a deposition and Costa's unsigned

and   "conclusory"   answers   to    interrogatories.      Further,    G&J

appended Costa's medical records, which showed that Costa had

degenerative back problems well before the date of the accident on

or about June 15, 2017, and that as of July 19, 2017 (the date of

the medical examination), those problems were "not related to

accident or injury."     G&J also noted that "Costa's counsel is

experienced in maritime cases and knows he is required to file a

claim under Supplemental Admiralty Rule F(5)."

           On July 30, 2021, Costa filed a sur-reply arguing that

he "properly preserved his Claim by defending and filing an Answer

as a Claimant and properly described as his affirmative defense

that the negligence of [G&J] was the cause of his injury."            Costa

also requested "leave to file a late claim to preserve his rights"

if the district court "f[ound] that this [a]ffirmative [d]efense

lacks sufficient specificity under the circumstances."

           On August 4, 2021, G&J responded to Costa's sur-reply,

emphasizing that "Costa's bare and conclusory affirmative defenses

[did] not pass as a claim"; that "Costa [did] nothing to explain

                                    - 9 -
how he ha[d] failed to file a claim at this eleventh hour"; that

Costa    "appear[ed]   to    suggest    that     engaging    [in]     discovery

excuse[d]" him from filing a claim; and that Costa, "despite ample

opportunity and warning, ha[d] failed to demonstrate a meritorious

claim through evidence or affidavit that would warrant declining

entry of default against him."

            In a memorandum and order issued November 5, 2021, the

district court held that Costa's answer did not amount to a claim

under Supplemental Rule F and denied Costa leave to file a late

claim.   See In re G&J I, 570 F. Supp. 3d at 11-12.             The district

court noted that it "[was] unaware of any caselaw construing an

answer as a claim under Rule F to save a claimant from default

judgment and Costa cites none."         Id. at 11.        The district court

also emphasized that Costa referred to his own pleadings "as an

answer, an answer and pleadings, or pleadings" -- not a claim.

Id.

            The   district   court     applied      our   excusable     neglect

standard,   which   requires    analysis       of   the   "totality     of   the

circumstances," including such factors as "(1) the explanation for

the delay, (2) whether the non-movant will be prejudiced and

(3) whether the party requesting relief acted in good faith."                Id.

(first citing Nansamba v. N. Shore Med. Ctr., Inc., 727 F.3d 33,

38-39 (1st Cir. 2013); and then citing Rivera-Velázquez v. Hartford

Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2014)).

                                  - 10 -
The district court stated that under this standard, "'[a]t a bare

minimum' the party seeking to alter the judgment 'must offer a

convincing explanation as to why the neglect was excusable.'"             Id.

(quoting Nansamba, 727 F.3d at 39).        The district court concluded

that Costa "provided no such explanation" as to why the neglect

was   excusable;   that    Costa's    argument    "[was]    impossible     to

reconcile with the plain language of Rule F, as well as clear

precedent    requiring    claimants   to   file   claims,    rather      than

answers"; and that Costa's counsel's failure "to admit to this

oversight . . . undermine[d] his good faith."         Id. at 11-12.       The

district court noted that Costa was represented by counsel who

were "experienced practitioners who recently filed claims in other

limitation proceedings governed by Rule F."            Id. at 11.         The

district court granted G&J's motion for entry of default.6                Id.

at 12.

            G&J then moved the district court to enter final judgment

pursuant to its November 5, 2021 ruling. Costa filed an opposition

      6   Costa then filed an interlocutory appeal and moved to
stay the district court proceedings while this appeal was pending.
The district court found that the interlocutory appeal provided no
basis for a stay of the action because (1) Costa made "no effort
to meet [his] burden" and (2) the court was "skeptical that he
would be able to do so if he tried." In re G&J II, 598 F. Supp.
3d at 21. Costa voluntarily dismissed his interlocutory appeal
after this court issued a show cause order on June 9, 2022,
directing Costa to either voluntarily dismiss the interlocutory
appeal or show cause why it should not be dismissed as being
duplicative of his subsequent appeal.

                                 - 11 -
to G&J's motion again seeking permission to file a late claim but

failing to attach one.

          The district court entered final judgment for G&J on

April 14, 2022.    In re G&J II, 598 F. Supp. 3d at 22.    Costa filed

a timely appeal.

                                 II.

          We review for abuse of discretion the district court's

denial of permission to file late claims in an exoneration action.

See Lloyd's Leasing Ltd. v. Bates, 902 F.2d 368, 371 (5th Cir.

1990); Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Blue Stack Towing Co., 313 F.2d

359, 363 (5th Cir. 1963).   To prevail, the appellant must meet the

"heavy burden" of showing an abuse of discretion.         Thibeault v.

Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 242-43 (1st Cir. 1992).          Abuse of

discretion is found in only the "rare[st]" of instances.          Tex.

Gulf Sulphur Co., 313 F.2d at 363.      "[A]n appellate court must

defer to the lower court's 'sound judgment,' so long as its

decision falls within its 'wide discretion,' and is not 'manifestly

erroneous.'"   United States v. Tsarnaev, 142 S. Ct. 1024, 1040

(2022) (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. Abel,

469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984); then quoting id.; and then quoting Gen.

Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997)).     Here, while the

district court could have reached a different result, the result

                               - 12 -
it reached was within its wide discretion and was not manifestly

erroneous.

          District courts applying Supplemental Rule F(4) have

"discretion 'to allow . . . late claims'" for cause shown.    In re

Urbelis, No. 15-cv-12358, 2018 WL 701350, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 2,

2018) (quoting Golnoy Barge Co. v. M/T SHINOUSSA, 980 F.2d 349,

351 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)).   For cause, district courts may

extend the time to file a claim under Supplemental Rule F: "[S]o

long as the limitation proceeding is pending and undetermined, and

the rights of the parties are not adversely affected, the court

will freely grant permission to file late claims . . . upon a

showing of the reasons therefor."    Lloyd's Leasing Ltd., 902 F.2d

at 371 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Tex. Gulf

Sulphur Co., 313 F.2d at 362); see also Schoenbaum, Admiralty and

Maritime Law § 15.6 n.18 (6th ed. 2022 update).7

          This court has not previously addressed the issue of

abuse of discretion in a district court's denial of permission to

file a late claim under Supplemental Rule F(4).8

     7    "[R]elief from a tardy claim is not a matter of right.
It depends upon an equitable showing." Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 313
F.2d at 363.

     8    We note that federal appellate courts have rarely found
abuse of discretion. Such abuse has been found in situations not
like this one, such as when the notice was not published in the
claimant's geographical area.    See, e.g., Sagastume v. Lampsis
Navigation Ltd., 579 F.2d 222, 224 (2nd Cir. 1978); Jappinen v.
Can. S.S. Lines, Ltd., 417 F.2d 189, 190–91 (6th Cir. 1969); see

                             - 13 -
          If a claimant "fail[s] to offer any evidence to support

their reasons for filing their claims after the notice date," then

a district court does not abuse its discretion in "refus[ing] to

permit the [filing of] late claims."        In re River City Towing

Servs., Inc., 420 F.3d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2005).               Costa has

provided no such evidence.

                               III.

          Costa argues that (1) "his answer and the other pleadings

taken [in context] should have been construed as a claim for

purposes of Rule F(5)";9 and (2) under Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. and

"basic principles of admiralty law," the district court "should

have granted Costa permission to file his claim late."         We address

each argument in turn and hold that, on the particular facts of

this case and arguments presented by Costa, the district court did

not abuse its discretion.

          A. Costa's Answer and Other Pleadings Are Not a Claim
          Under Supplemental Rule F(5)

          The   text   of    Supplemental     Rule      F(5)     clearly

also Lloyd's Leasing Ltd., 902 F.2d at 371 (discussing these
cases).

          One circuit has commented that the "cause" required by
Supplemental Rule F(4) "is minimal; an explanation rather than a
justification for the delay will suffice." Alter Barge Line, Inc.
v. Consol. Grain & Barge Co., 272 F.3d 396, 397 (7th Cir. 2001)
(per curiam).

     9    Costa does not make    clear   what   other    pleadings    he
contends amount to a claim.

                              - 14 -
differentiates between a claim and an answer.             A claim "shall

specify the facts upon which the claimant relies in support of the

claim, the items thereof, and the dates on which the same accrued."

Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(5).          Under the Rule, an answer is

clearly different from a claim and serves a different purpose.         An

answer may be filed "[i]f a claimant desires to contest either the

right to exoneration from or the right to limitation of liability."

Id.   A claim can be accompanied by an answer, but an answer alone

is not a claim.    See id.     Supplemental Rule F(5) makes clear that

Costa's answer is not a claim.        Like the district court, we are

unaware of any caselaw construing an answer like Costa's as a claim

under Supplemental Rule F to save a claimant from default judgment.

See In re G&J I, 570 F. Supp. 3d at 11; see also In re Tappan Zee

Constructors,     LLC,   No.   17-cv-00168,   2018   WL    1183711,   *2-3

(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018) (refraining from construing answer as claim

under Rule F); In re Carnival Corp., No. 05-cv-21633, 2006 WL

8432012, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2006) (rejecting claimant's

argument that "the state court complaint, attached to her motion

to dismiss, can be construed as her claim").              Costa relies on

White v. Sabatino, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (D. Haw. 2006), to argue

that his answer should be construed as a claim.             But White is

easily distinguishable.        In White, the district court found the

claimant satisfied Supplemental Rule F's requirements where the

plaintiff had filed a complaint in a separate action, filed an

                                  - 15 -
answer in the limitation action, and then the two cases were

consolidated.   The court reasoned that the "[c]omplaint, [a]nswer,

and consolidation of the two cases [were] sufficient to satisfy

the aim of Rule F(5)."   Id. at 1180.   Thus, in White, unlike here,

the cases were consolidated, such that the claimant's complaint

was part of the same action as the limitation proceeding.

           Further, the differentiation between a claim and an

answer in Supplemental Rule F(5) is consistent with other admiralty

rules. Under Supplemental Rule C(6), "a person who asserts a right

of possession or any ownership interest in the property that is

the subject of [an in rem] action must file a verified statement

of right or interest," and such person "must serve an answer within

21 days after filing the statement of interest or right."   Fed. R.

Civ. P. Supp. R. C(6)(a).     The filing of this statement "is a

prerequisite to the right to file an answer and defend on the

merits."   United States v. One Dairy Farm, 918 F.2d 310, 311 (1st

Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Fourteen (14) Handguns, 524

F. Supp. 395, 397 (S.D. Tex. 1981)) (discussing earlier version of

the Rule).   The same logic applies to Supplemental Rule F(5): a

potential claimant lacks standing to file an answer in a limitation

proceeding if they have not properly filed a claim in district

court.   See Am. River Transp. Co. v. United States, 728 F.3d 839,

844 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that government lacked standing to

                              - 16 -
move to dismiss limitation proceeding because it failed to first

file a claim under Supplemental Rule F(5)).

          The district court reasonably concluded that Costa's

answer did not specify the facts as required by Supplemental

Rule F(5).10   His answer only references the civil suit he filed

in Bristol County Superior Court without any further detail; admits

that "he was injured aboard the F/V GEORGES BANKS on a voyage that

ended on or about June 16, 2017," and that he "was on the F/V

GEORGES BANKS on a scalloping voyage on June 15, 2017"; and raises

affirmative defenses, including that G&J "failed to exercise due

care, including the failures to properly inspect, maintain and

equip the F/V GEORGES BANKS Vessel."

          In response to a vessel owner's limitation action, a

claimant cannot merely point to their state court complaint to

satisfy Supplemental Rule F(5)'s claim requirement.      See In re

Carnival Corp., 2006 WL 8432012, at *2.    Surely the drafters of

Supplemental Rule F, knowing that a state court complaint could

     10   This case is unlike United States v. 1 Street A-1, 885
F.2d 994 (1st Cir. 1989). In 1 Street A-1, this court construed
a timely filed verified answer containing all the information
required of a claim to have fulfilled the function of a claim under
an earlier version of Supplemental Rule C(6).      See id. at 999-
1000. Costa's citation to this case only in his reply brief is
insufficient to avoid waiver of the argument. And even if this
argument were not waived, it does not help Costa because his answer
did not contain all the information required of a claim under
Supplemental Rule F(5).     Costa's answer, for example, did not
"specify the facts upon which" he relied in support of his claim,
as Supplemental Rule F(5) requires.

                              - 17 -
provide notice to a vessel owner to file a federal action for

limitation of liability, would have explicitly provided that a

state court complaint could substitute for the claim provision if

they so intended.      But Supplemental Rule F(5) does not make any

exception to the requirement that a claim be filed in federal court

in   a   limitation   action,   even   where   there    is   a   state    court

complaint.    Costa could have filed a proper claim in response to

the district court's notice, but he chose not to do so.                  It was

insufficient to merely refer the federal court to a case pending

on a state court docket.        Such an argument, if accepted, would

lead to obvious inefficiencies and burdens on the federal courts,

which Supplemental Rule F(5) was meant to avoid.

            B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
            Denying Costa Leave to File a Late Claim

            Costa argues that the district court applied the wrong

legal standard in evaluating his motion for leave to file a late

claim under Supplemental Rule F(4).            He takes issue with the

district court's conclusion that "[c]ase law suggests that Rule F,

like Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(1), sets a standard of 'excusable

neglect' in allowing a late claim."        In re G&J I, 570 F. Supp. 3d

at 11.     Costa also argues that the district court "fail[ed] to

fully assess all of the relevant factors."             We disagree on both

points.     There was no error in the use of the excusable neglect

standard.    See In re Urbelis, 2018 WL 701350, at *5 n.5 (noting

                                  - 18 -
that "[t]he case law suggests" that an excusable neglect standard

applies); see also Nansamba, 727 F.3d at 38-39; Rivera-Velázquez,

750 F.3d at 4.        Though Supplemental Rule F(4) does not use the

term "excusable neglect,"          cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), the

standard for a district court to grant the filing of late claims

"upon   a   showing   of    the   reasons     therefor"   under   the   Rule   is

effectively one of excusable neglect, Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 313

F.2d at 362.      Like a showing of excusable neglect under Rule

60(b)(1), "a showing of the reasons therefor," id., under Rule

F(4)    encompasses     a    showing     of    "inadvertence,     mistake,     or

carelessness, as well as [] intervening circumstances beyond the

party's control," Nansamba, 727 F.3d at 38 (alteration in original)

(quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship,

507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993)).             The district court did assess the

record.     Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

finding there was not excusable neglect.

            As the district court found, Costa "careless[ly]" made

no attempt to remedy his failure to file a claim for a "full year

since his initial filling."         In re G&J I, 570 F. Supp. 3d at 12.

Instead, he asserted that there was no failure on his part at all,

and that he "believed that his rights were sufficiently protected

under" his answer.          Id. at 11.        The district court found that

argument "impossible to reconcile with the plain language of Rule

                                     - 19 -
F."11        Id.     Costa's argument that the district court's entry of

default against him is inconsistent with the Jones Act's purpose

of providing liberal recovery for injured seamen is unavailing.

The Jones Act does not exempt Costa or any other seaman from

complying          with   Supplemental   Rule     F's    requirements   for   timely

filing a claim in a limitation action.

                   The district court did not abuse its discretion in

finding that Costa's counsel "failed to present a convincing excuse

for [their] error," particularly because they "were experienced

practitioners" in maritime litigation.                  Id.   In the district court

and in state court, Costa was represented by counsel who specialize

in maritime law and thus should be familiar with Supplemental Rule

F(5)'s requirement that a claim -- not just an answer -- be filed

in a limitation action.           In limitation actions contemporaneous to

this one, Costa's counsel timely filed claims under Supplemental

Rule F(5).           See id.   For example, one of Costa's attorneys filed

a claim against G&J on behalf of a different personal injury

claimant in another case pending before the same district court

roughly three weeks before the claim in this case was due.                    And at

oral argument, Costa's counsel acknowledged that "our office has

        11Further, as E&N filed its own late claim immediately
after G&J moved for default, Costa was reminded of the need to
file a claim and nonetheless took no steps in the ensuing four
months to file a claim before the district court ruled on G&J's
motion.

                                         - 20 -
filed claims in exoneration actions."            Costa's representation by

counsel   experienced     in   maritime       litigation      makes    especially

troubling his failure to submit any evidence explaining why he

failed to timely file claims.         Cf. In re River City Towing Servs.,

Inc., 420 F.3d at 388.

            Further, Costa's approach clearly harms the efficient

administration of admiralty rules by the federal courts, and G&J

has argued it has harmed its defense of the case.                      The courts

"ha[ve]     a   'strong   institutional       interest     in    ensuring    that

litigants honor court orders' so that [the courts] may efficiently

administer [their] docket[s]." United States v. 2008 33' Contender

Model Tournament Vessel, 990 F.3d 725, 727 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting

Tower Ventures, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 296 F.3d 43, 47 (1st

Cir.   2002)).      The   failure    to   file   a    claim     as    required   by

Supplemental Rule F also caused delay, which G&J argues harmed its

defense of the case as memories of events became stale.                 And Costa

has    consistently   failed    to     commit    to    specific       information

underlying his alleged injury.            G&J argues that Costa "seeks to

take advantage of faded memories, missing witnesses and massaged

evidence," thereby disrupting G&J's ability to adequately defend

the case.

            We affirm.

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