Court Opinion

ID: 4075339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-30 05:58:37.589149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:32:31.420963
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                                                   03-15-00340-CV
                                                                                                           7912210
                                                                                        THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                                   AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                                                             11/19/2015 4:16:59 PM
                                                                                                 JEFFREY D. KYLE
                                                                                                            CLERK
                         CAUSE	
  NO.	
  03-­‐15-­‐00340-­‐CV	
  
                                            	
  
                         IN	
  THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
  	
             FILED IN
                                                                        3rd COURT OF APPEALS
                                       FOR	
  THE	
  	
                      AUSTIN, TEXAS
                     THIRD	
  JUDICIAL	
  DISTRICT	
  OF	
  TEXAS	
     11/19/2015 4:16:59 PM
                                 AUSTIN,	
  TEXAS	
                         JEFFREY D. KYLE
                                                                                 Clerk
__________________________________________________________________                               	
  
                               ____
                                         	
  
               CHRISTOPHER	
  JAROSZEWICZ,	
  APPELLANT	
  
                                         	
  
                                    VS.	
  
                                         	
  
           TEXAS	
  DEPARTMENT	
  OF	
  PUBLIC	
  SAFETY,	
  APPELLEE	
  
__________________________________________________________________
                                             	
                                                  	
  
        ON	
  APPEAL	
  FROM	
  THE	
  COUNTY	
  COURT	
  AT	
  LAW	
  NO.	
  TWO	
  
                           TRAVIS	
  COUNTY,	
  TEXAS	
  
                    TRIAL	
  COURT	
  NO.	
  C-­‐1-­‐CV-­‐15-­‐001468	
  
                                             	
                                                  	
  
                               APPELLANT’S	
  BRIEF	
  
         _________________________________________________________________	
  
	
  
	
     	
   	
   	
        	
    	
           	
     KEVIN	
  FINE	
  
	
     	
   	
   	
        	
    	
           	
     State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  00790682	
  
	
     	
   	
   	
        	
    	
           	
     P.O.	
  	
  Box	
  312	
  
	
     	
   	
   	
        	
    	
           	
     Boerne,	
  Texas	
  78006	
  
	
     	
   	
   	
        	
    	
           	
     830-­‐542-­‐2230/Boerne	
  
	
     	
   	
   	
        	
    	
           	
     512-­‐593-­‐1383/Austin	
  
	
     	
   	
   	
        	
    	
           	
     713-­‐299-­‐1923/Houston	
  (cell)	
  
	
     	
   	
   	
        	
    	
           	
     888-­‐803-­‐8721/efax	
  
	
     	
   	
   	
        	
    	
           	
     kfine@kevinfinelaw.com	
  
	
  
	
     	
   	
   	
        	
    	
           	
     ATTORNEY	
  FOR	
  APPELLANT	
  
ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  IS	
  WAIVED	
  
	
  
	
  
                  IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

Christopher Jaroszewicz                       Appellant

Tex. Dep’t Pub. Safety                        Appellee

Kevin Fine                                    Appellant’s
P.O. Box 312                                  Counsel
Boerne, Texas 78006

Kevin Givens                                  Appellee’s
P.O. Box 15327                                Counsel
Austin, Texas 78761

Wendy L. Harvel                               Administrative
                                              Law Judge

Honorable Eric M. Shepperd                    Trial Court Judge

	
                              i	
  
                                     TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identification of the Parties.............................................................................. i

Table of Contents............................................................................................ ii

List of Authorities .......................................................................................... iii

Procedural History .......................................................................................... 1

Summary of the Arguments ............................................................................ 1

ISSUE ONE
     WHETHER ERROR WAS PRESERVED .......................................... 2

ISSUE TWO
     WHETHER THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP
     APPELLANT FOR SPEEDING? ........................................................ 6

         Standard of Review .............................................................................. 6

         ISSUE TWO(a)
              Whether Evidence of Appellant’s Speed, as Determined by
              Radar, was Admissible? ............................................................. 8

         ISSUE TWO (b)
               Whether a Non-testifying Officer’s Written Legal
         Conclusion, that Appellant was Driving at a High Rate of
         Speed, without more, is Sufficient to Establish Reasonable
         Suspicion? .......................................................................................... 11

PRAYER ...................................................................................................... 14

APPENDIX
    1. Administrative Decision                                   23
    2. Court Order                                               24
    3. Tex. Gov. Code § 2001.174                                 25
    4. Tex. Transp. Code § 524.043                               26
    5. Tex. Transp. Code § 724.042                               27
    6. Tex. Transp. Code § 724.047                               29

	
                                                      ii	
  
                                       TABLE	
  OF	
  AUTHORITIES	
  

CASES
Crook v. State, 2013 WL 6164058 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.]
  November 21, 2013).................................................................................. 14
Curran v. State, 2011 WL 446191 (Tex. App. – Amarillo February 8, 2011)
  ................................................................................................................... 14
Deramus v. State, 2011 WL 582667 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth February 17,
  2011) ......................................................................................................... 13
Dillard v. State, 550 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ............................. 12
Heredia v. State, 2007 WL 1704952 (Tex. App. – El Paso June 14, 2007) . 13
Hill v. State, 641 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) .............................. 2, 6
Icke v. State, 26 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet)
  ................................................................................................................... 13
Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ........................ 2, 6, 8
Loesch v. State, 958 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ............... 5, 11
Maysonet v. State, 91 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d)
  ............................................................................................................... 9, 10
Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999); .......... 7
Nielsen v. State, 102 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 2003 ____) ....... 13
Ochoa v. State, 994 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App. – El Paso 1999, no pet.); .......... 9
Samuel v. State, 688 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), ............................ 3
Simpson v. State, 2008 WL 4367960 (Tex. App. – Amarillo September 25,
  2008 ........................................................................................................... 13
Smith v. State, 1998 WL 46736 (Tex. App. – Dallas February 6, 1998) ...... 13
Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex. 2006).......... 8
Tex. Dep’t Pub. Safety v. Naraez, 2014 WL 5410758 (Tex. App. – Corpus
  Christi October 23, 2014) .......................................................................... 14
Tex. Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d
446, 452 (Tex. 1984) ................................................................................... 7
Thomas v. State, 2007 WL 1404425 (Tex. App. – El Paso June 11, 2007) . 13
Thomas v. State, 408 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). ................... 6
Will. v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). ........... 5, 11
Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) .................. 2

STATUTES
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 38.23 ........................................................................ 3
TEX. GOV'T CODE § 2001.174 ......................................................................... 7

	
                                                        iii	
  
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 524.043 ....................................................................... 7
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 724.042 ....................................................................... 5
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 724.047 ....................................................................... 7

	
                                               iv	
  
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE THIRD COURT OF

APPEALS:

           COMES NOW, Christopher Jaroszewicz, Appellant in the above-

styled and numbered cause, and files this his Appellant’s brief and, with

respect thereto, would show the Court the following:

                                       I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

           Appellant	
  was	
  arrested	
  for	
  DWI	
  on	
  October	
  11,	
  2014.	
  CR	
  at	
  42.	
  	
  He	
  

refused	
   to	
   give	
   a	
   sample	
   of	
   his	
   breath	
   or	
   blood.	
   CR	
   43.	
   	
   Appellant	
   timely	
  

requested	
   an	
   ALR	
   hearing,	
   pursuant	
   to	
   Chapter	
   724	
   of	
   the	
   Texas	
  

Transportation	
  Code,	
  which	
  was	
  held	
  February	
  2,	
  2015.	
  CR	
  at	
  33.	
  	
  The	
  

ALJ	
  ruled	
  against	
  Appellant	
  and	
  authorized	
  the	
  Department	
  to	
  suspend	
  

Appellant’s	
  driver’s	
  license.	
  CR	
  at	
  16.	
  	
  On	
  February	
  19,	
  2015,	
  Appellant	
  

timely	
  appealed	
  to	
  the	
  civil	
  County	
  Court	
  at	
  Law	
  No.	
  Two,	
  Travis	
  County,	
  

Texas.	
  CR	
  at	
  4.	
  	
  On	
  April	
  30,	
  2015,	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  took	
  up	
  the	
  matter	
  of	
  

Appellant’s	
  appeal.	
  RR	
  at	
  1.	
  	
  Following	
  the	
  hearing,	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  upheld	
  

the	
  ALJ	
  decision	
  to	
  authorize	
  the	
  suspension	
  of	
  Appellant’s	
  license.	
  	
  This	
  

appeal	
  followed.	
  

                                 II.	
  	
  SUMMARY	
  OF	
  THE	
  ARGUMENTS	
  

	
         The	
  arresting	
  officer	
  did	
  not	
  testify	
  at	
  the	
  ALR	
  hearing.	
  	
  The	
  only	
  

evidence	
   offered	
   to	
   establish	
   reasonable	
   suspicion	
   that	
   Appellant	
   was	
  

	
                                                               1	
  
speeding	
   was	
   a	
   two-­‐sentence	
   conclusion	
   that	
   Appellant	
   was	
   observed	
  

speeding	
  and	
  such	
  speeding	
  was	
  confirmed	
  by	
  radar.	
  	
  However,	
  neither	
  

statement	
  should	
  have	
  been	
  allowed	
  in	
  evidence	
  but	
  should	
  have	
  been	
  

excluded.	
   	
   First,	
   the	
   Department	
   offered	
   no	
   evidence	
   to	
   establish	
   the	
  

second	
  or	
  third	
  prongs	
  of	
  Kelly	
  v.	
  State	
  infra.	
  	
  As	
  such	
  the	
  radar	
  evidence	
  

was	
  not	
  admissible	
  and	
  should	
  have	
  been	
  excluded.	
  	
  Second,	
  the	
  officer’s	
  

written,	
   conclusory	
   statement	
   that	
   Appellant	
   was	
   traveling	
   at	
   a	
   high	
  

rate	
   of	
   speed	
   falls	
   short	
   of	
   demonstrating	
   specific	
   articulable	
   facts	
  

coupled	
   with	
   logical	
   inferences	
   from	
   those	
   facts	
   that	
   there	
   was	
  

reasonable	
   suspicion	
   to	
   justify	
   the	
   traffic	
   stop	
   for	
   speeding.	
   	
   This	
  

evidence,	
  too,	
  should	
  have	
  been	
  excluded.	
  

                                III.	
  	
  ISSUE	
  ONE	
  
                    WHETHER	
  ERROR	
  WAS	
  PRESERVED?	
  
                                               	
  
          Appellant first addresses the Department’s contention that his

objection to the evidence was insufficient. In Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d
515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized

that:

          A number of exceptions to the general rule that a party cannot
          complain on appeal to the overruling of a general objection or
          an imprecise specific objection have been created . . . Thus,
          where the correct ground of exclusion was obvious to the judge
          and opposing counsel, no waiver results from a general or
          imprecise objection. [Emphasis in original.]

	
                                                         2	
  
       In Hill v. State, 641 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), the Court of

Criminal Appeals stated that a “catchall” objection “may have left

something to be desired from the standpoint of clarity,” was nevertheless

sufficient to apprise the court of the nature and basis of the defendant’s

objection. Id. at 544. In Hill the defendant made a general objection to the

admissibility of his post arrest silence after being subjected to a vigilante

arrest at gunpoint.   The Court of Criminal Appeals held that such an

objection, under the facts and circumstances of that case was sufficient to

apprise the trial court that his objection to evidence of his post-vigilante

arrest silence was based on TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 38.23.

       Likewise, in Samuel v. State, 688 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Crim. App.

1985), the defendant’s objection was more of an afterthought. Counsel,

following an objection to a question as leading, stated “I’ll object to

statements made after [defendant] was under arrest.” The Court of Criminal

Appeals held that this was a sufficient objection, under the facts and

circumstances of that case, to preserve error for violating TEX. CODE CRIM.

P. art. 38.22.

       The sole issue in the present case has always been the sufficiency of

the evidence to establish reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. It

was the first of five issues to be determined by the administrative law judge

	
                                   3	
  
(ALJ) and the only contested issue at the administrative license revocation

(ALR) hearing. See CR at 16.1 Appellant always maintained, in one form or

another, that the only evidence concerning reasonable suspicion was not

admissible and, therefore, reasonable suspicion could not be established.

                  Counsel objected to the reasonable suspicion evidence as follows:

                  Your Honor, we would object to . . . part of the DIC-23 wherein
                  the officer states . . . his ability to determine an excessive rate
                  of speed and also wherein he states that he used radar to
                  determine the actual speed.

CR at 33-34. It is important to note that these arguments are made everyday

in ALR hearings. Counsel for the Department said as much to the trial court

judge on the initial appeal. See RR at 14. That certainly demonstrates that

counsel’s objection was not new or novel to the ALJ or the Departments

ALR prosecutor.

                  Additionally, at the time the objection was made, the ALJ was holding

Department’s Exhibit 1 in her hands. CR at 33, 42. The officer did not

testify at the ALR hearing and, thus, the sum total of evidence offered to

establish reasonable suspicion was Department’s Exhibit 1, the DIC-23. The

exhibit contained a two sentences purporting to establish reasonable

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  CR	
  denotes	
  Clerk’s	
  Record	
  followed	
  by	
  the	
  page	
  number.	
  	
  RR	
  will	
  denote	
  the	
  

Reporter’s	
  Record	
  followed	
  by	
  the	
  page	
  number.	
  
2	
  This	
  issue	
  is	
  divided	
  into	
  two	
  parts:	
  (1)	
  whether	
  evidence	
  of	
  Appellant’s	
  speed	
  as	
  

determined	
  by	
  radar	
  was	
  admissible?;	
  and	
  (2)	
  whether	
  a	
  non-­‐testifying	
  officer’s	
  
written	
  legal	
  conclusion,	
  that	
  Appellant	
  was	
  driving	
  at	
  a	
  high	
  rate	
  of	
  speed,	
  without	
  
	
                                                                                                             4	
  
suspicion. The officer, who was the affiant, stated “Your affiant observed a

black 2013 Dodge truck . . . pass WB on W. 6th at a high rate of speed for the

30 mph zone. Your affiant measured the speed at 45 mph using Doppler

radar.” CR at 42. As a result, there were only two means of establishing

reasonable suspicion before the ALJ – observation of speed and use of radar.

Counsel objected to the admissibility of both and, hence, the sufficiency of

evidence to establish reasonable suspicion. Within the confines of an ALR

hearing, where reasonable suspicion is a, if not the, seminal issue anytime a

breath or blood test refusal is involved, such an objection is neither new, nor

novel. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 724.042.

       To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must have specific

articulable facts, which, based on his experience and personal knowledge,

and coupled with the logical inferences from those facts would warrant the

intrusion on the person detained. These facts must amount to more than a

mere hunch or suspicion. Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1981).       The determination of the presence of reasonable

suspicion is a factual one and is made and reviewed by considering the

totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. Loesch v. State, 958
S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In other words, in terms of a

traffic stop, there must be some factual basis to conduct the stop.

	
                                     5	
  
                  In an ALR setting, where speeding is the legal basis for a traffic stop,

objections to this evidence are limited to the sufficiency of the factual basis

for the officer’s opinion concerning his observations of speed and to an

analysis, under Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), of

the admissibility of radar evidence used to detect the speed of a vehicle.

There are no other objections.

                  As has been said, “so long as it appears from an appellate record that

[the court and the opposing counsel understood the objection], it should not

matter to the appellate court whether the objecting party used a particular

‘form of words’—or any particular words at all, if meaning is adequately

conveyed by context.” Thomas v. State, 408 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013). Under the facts and circumstances of the case at bar, counsel’s

objections were sufficient to apprise the ALJ and the Department’s

prosecutor of the nature and basis of counsel’s objections. See Hill supra.

                                                IV. ISSUE TWO
                                     WHETHER THERE WAS REASONABLE
                                     SUSPICION TO STOP APPELLANT FOR
                                     SPEEDING?2

                                                                              A. Standard of Review

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2	
  This	
  issue	
  is	
  divided	
  into	
  two	
  parts:	
  (1)	
  whether	
  evidence	
  of	
  Appellant’s	
  speed	
  as	
  

determined	
  by	
  radar	
  was	
  admissible?;	
  and	
  (2)	
  whether	
  a	
  non-­‐testifying	
  officer’s	
  
written	
  legal	
  conclusion,	
  that	
  Appellant	
  was	
  driving	
  at	
  a	
  high	
  rate	
  of	
  speed,	
  without	
  
more,	
  is	
  sufficient	
  to	
  establish	
  reasonable	
  suspicion?	
  

	
                                                                                                             6	
  
“[Reviewing] courts review administrative license suspension decisions

under the substantial evidence standard.” Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub.

Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999); see TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 724.047

(“Chapter 524 governs an appeal from an action of the department,

following an administrative hearing under this chapter, in suspending or

denying the issuance of a license.”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 524.043

(establishing rules for appeal but not defining scope of review). Courts

presume the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and the

complaining party has the burden to prove otherwise. Tex. Health Facilities

Comm'n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984). In

contested cases, if more than a scintilla of evidence supports the

administrative findings, a reviewing court will affirm those findings; “[i]n

fact, an administrative decision may be sustained even if the evidence

preponderates against it.” Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131.              Under the

Administrative Procedure Act, reviewing courts may not substitute their

judgment for

       the judgment of the state agency on the weight of the evidence
       on questions committed to agency discretion but . . . (2) shall
       reverse or remand the case for further proceedings if substantial
       rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
       administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions
       are: . . . (E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence
       considering the reliable and probative evidence in the record as
       a whole. . . .

	
                                    7	
  
TEX. GOV'T CODE § 2001.174. A court of appeals will review the county

civil court at law's substantial evidence review of the administrative ruling

de novo. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex.

2006) (noting that ALJ's findings of fact are entitled to deference but that

“whether there is substantial evidence to support an administrative decision

is a question of law” and as such, neither the civil county court at law’s nor

the ALJ’s determination of an issue is entitled to deference on appeal).

                           B. ISSUE TWO(a)
             Whether Evidence of Appellant’s Speed, as
             Determined by Radar, was Admissible?

       In the present case, the arresting officer did not testify. CR 33-34.

The only evidence offered to establish reasonable suspicion was the DIC-23,

which incorporated an arrest warrant affidavit. CR at 41-42. Concerning the

use of Doppler radar to determine Appellant’s speed, the only evidence

offered was a conclusory statement that “Your affiant measured the speed at

45 mph using Doppler radar.”

       The proponent of evidence based on a scientific theory must show, by

clear and convincing evidence, that the evidence is (1) reliable and (2)

relevant to assist the fact finder in fulfilling its duty. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at

572. To be reliable, evidence derived from a scientific theory must satisfy

three criteria: (1) the underlying scientific theory much be valid; (2) the

	
                                    8	
  
technique applying the theory must be valid; and (3) the technique must

have been properly applied on the occasion in question. Id. at 573. This test

applies to the admissibility of radar evidence. See Ochoa v. State, 994
S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App. – El Paso 1999, no pet.); and Maysonet v. State, 91
S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d).

       In Ochoa, the El Paso court, contrary to most other courts of appeal,

held that all three Kelly criteria had to be met before the radar evidence in

that case could be admitted. Ochoa, 994 S.W.3d at 285. The officer testified

in Ochoa, but was unable to establish the first Kelly prong. That is to say,

the officer could not establish the validity of the underlying scientific theory

of the radar device. Id. Notably, the court held that the officer established

prongs two and three of Kelly by testifying that he had been certified to use

the hand-held radar; that he had calibrated and tested the radar instrument

the day he stopped Ochoa; and that he was able to confirm that radar guns

emit a microwave which strikes an object and returns to the gun and thus

calculates the speed of the object. Id. The El Paso court went on to hold that

admission of the radar evidence was harmless because there was other

evidence in the record to establish the defendant was speeding. Specifically,

the officer testified, without objection from Ochoa, that he observed the

defendant driving at a high rate of speed. Because there was no objection,

	
                                     9	
  
there was nothing preserved for review as concerned the officer’s stated

observation. Id.

       In Maysonet, the Texarkana court held that radar detection is a well-

established scientific theory and, thus, no evidence is required to establish

the first prong of Kelly. Maysonet, 91 S.W.3d at 371. That is to say, the

court of appeals held that the scientific validity of radar detection has been

established as a matter of law. Id. The officer is that case testified that he

had used radar equipment since for three years and had calibrated and tested

the radar unit a day before he stopped Maysonet for speeding. Id. at 370. He

also testified that the gun itself calculates the speed of the object based on a

signal that reflects back to the gun after bouncing off the object. Id. The

court, therefore, held that the radar evidence was admissible against

Maysonet. However, the court of appeals also stated:

       Our holding today, how ever, does not mean radar evidence
       must not undergo rigorous scrutiny under both the second and
       third prongs of the Kelly test, only that the underlying scientific
       theory of radar is valid. The State must still establish that the
       officers applied a valid technique and that it was correctly
       applied on the particular occasion in question.

Id. at 371.

       In both Ochoa and Maysonet, the courts of appeal had before them a

record containing the testimony of the arresting officers. In each case, the

officer was able to establish the second and third prongs of Kelly. In the

	
                                     10	
  
present case, however, the officer did not testify.                           The only evidence

concerning the radar device offered at the ALR hearing was one sentence

from the DIC-23 – “Your affiant measured the speed at 45 mph using

Doppler radar.” CR at 42. There was no evidence offered to show the

officer’s knowledge and experience of the radar unit, how it operated,

whether he calibrated the unit, or even knew how to calibrate it, whether he

tested the unit, or even knew how to test it, or how long he had been using

radar to detect speed, if ever.                In the absence of such evidence, the

Department wholly failed to establish prongs two or three of Kelly and the

radar evidence should have been excluded.

                                        C. ISSUE TWO(b)
             Whether	
   a	
   Non-­‐testifying	
   Officer’s	
   Written	
  
             Legal	
  Conclusion,	
  that	
  Appellant	
  was	
  Driving	
  at	
  
             a	
  High	
  Rate	
  of	
  Speed,	
  without	
  more,	
  is	
  Sufficient	
  
             to	
  Establish	
  Reasonable	
  Suspicion?	
  

       Once again, in order to establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must

have specific articulable facts, which, based on his experience and personal

knowledge, and coupled with the logical inferences from those facts would

warrant the intrusion on the person detained. These facts must amount to

more than a mere hunch or suspicion. Williams, 621 S.W.2d at 612. The

determination of the presence of reasonable suspicion is a factual one and is

made and reviewed by considering the totality of the circumstances at the

	
                                               11	
  
time of the stop. Loesch, at 832. In other words, in terms of a traffic stop,

there must be some factual basis to conduct the stop.

       In the present case, the officer did testify at the ALR hearing. The

only evidence offered that Appellant was speeding was a two sentence

written statement of the arresting officer. For purposes of this issue, there

was one sentence in the DIC-23 wherein the officer wrote “Your affiant

observed [Appellant] pass WB on W. 6th St. at a high rate of speed.” CR at

42.    The record is void of any factual basis for determining whether

Appellant was traveling at a high rate of speed. There were no specific

articulable facts stated in the DIC-23. Neither was there any demonstration

of the officer’s knowledge and experience in making such a determination.

The conclusory statement amounts to nothing more than a mere hunch or

suspicion.

       The Department cites several cases where testimony from the

arresting officer, that they observed the defendant traveling at a high rate of

speed, was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. In each of these

cases, however, the officer actually testified.     Every case cited by the

Department has some factual basis to conclude the defendant was speeding.

The cases recite specific articulable facts, which, coupled with logical

inferences from those facts, give rise to reasonable suspicion to justify a

	
                                    12	
  
traffic stop. See Dillard v. State, 550 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Crim. App.

1977)(officer testified he turned around and pursued the vehicle); Icke v.

State, 26 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet)(officer

testified he saw vehicle driving ahead of other cars on the roadway); Nielsen

v. State, 102 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 2003 ____)(officer

testified vehicle was speeding in the turn lane passing other vehicles); Smith

v. State, 1998 WL 46736 (Tex. App. – Dallas February 6, 1998)(not

designated for publication)(Officer testified he heard an engine racing then

observed the vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed); Heredia v. State,

2007 WL 1704952 (Tex. App. – El Paso June 14, 2007)(not designated for

publication)(officer testified he observed vehicle overtaking other vehicles

and that he paced the vehicle to determine its speed); Thomas v. State, 2007
WL 1404425 (Tex. App. – El Paso June 11, 2007)(not designated for

publication)(officer testified he was able to visually estimate the vehicle’s

speed at 60 mph in a 55 mph zone); Simpson v. State, 2008 WL 4367960

(Tex. App. – Amarillo September 25, 2008)(not designated for

publication)(officer testified that he visually estimated the vehicle was

traveling at 70 mph in a 60 mph zone); Deramus v. State, 2011 WL 582667

(Tex. App. – Fort Worth February 17, 2011)(not designated for

publication)(officer testified as to his vast experience in determining the

	
                                   13	
  
speed of vehicles and that he hear a loud engine noise that was coming from

the subject vehicle); Curran v. State, 2011 WL 446191 (Tex. App. –

Amarillo February 8, 2011)(not designated for publication)(officer testified

driver admitted to the officer he was speeding); Crook v. State, 2013 WL
6164058 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.] November 21, 2013)(not

designated for publication)(officer testified he observed vehicle traveling

faster than other cars on the roadway); Tex. Dep’t Pub. Safety v. Naraez,

2014 WL 5410758 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi October 23, 2014)(not

designated for publication)(officer testified the vehicle appeared to be

traveling faster than the posted 30 mph speed limit).

       Not a single case cited above in analogous to the case at bar. As

previously stated, here the officer did not testify and the only evidence

offered to establish reasonable suspicion that Appellant was speeding, as

concerns this issue, was an unsupported written statement that Appellant

passed the officer’s location at a high rate of speed. There is no indication in

the record of the officer’s knowledge and experience or facts or inferences

drawn from facts that amount to specific articulable facts to establish the

necessary reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. Therefore, this

evidence, too, should not have been admitted.

	
                                    14	
  
                                          PRAYER

       WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays this

court reverse the ALJ’s finding and the trial court’s finding and render a

decision that the Department is not authorized to suspend Appellant’s

driver’s license and order the Department to take all measures to reinstate

Appellant’s driver’s license forthwith.

	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     RESPECTFULLY	
  SUBMITTED,	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     __/s/	
  Kevin	
  Fine_______________	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     KEVIN	
  FINE	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  00790682	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     P.O.	
  	
  Box	
  312	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     Boerne,	
  Texas	
  78006	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     830-­‐542-­‐2230/Boerne	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     512-­‐593-­‐1383/Austin	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     713-­‐299-­‐1923/Houston	
  (cell)	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     888-­‐803-­‐8721/efax	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     kfine@kevinfinelaw.com	
  
	
  
	
     	
     	
     	
     	
     	
         	
     ATTORNEY	
  FOR	
  APPELLANT	
  
	
  
                                              	
  
                                              	
  
                                              	
  
                                              	
  
                                              	
  
                                              	
  
                                              	
  
                                              	
  
                                              	
  
                                              	
  

	
                                          15	
  
                                                  	
  
                                                  	
  
                                                  	
  
                                                  	
  
                                                  	
  
                                                  	
  
                                                  	
  
                                       CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  SERVICE	
  
	
  
	
       I	
  hereby	
  certify	
  that	
  a	
  true	
  and	
  correct	
  copy	
  of	
  the	
  above	
  motion	
  
was	
   provided	
   to	
   the	
   Dep’t	
   of	
   Public	
   Safety,	
   via	
   efiling	
   to	
   Kevin	
   Givens,	
  
Kevin.Givens@dps.texas.gov,	
  on	
  this	
  the	
  16th	
  day	
  of	
  November,	
  2015.	
  
	
  
	
       	
       	
         	
       	
            	
     	
        ___/s/	
  Kevin	
  Fine_____________	
  
	
       	
       	
         	
       	
            	
     	
        KEVIN	
  FINE	
  
	
  
                                                           	
  
                                                           	
  
                                  CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  COMPLIANCE	
  

	
        I	
  hereby	
  certify,	
  pursuant	
  to	
  Tex.	
  R.	
  App.	
  P.	
  9.4(i)(3),	
  that	
  this	
  brief	
  
contains	
  3915	
  words	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  MS	
  Word	
  program,	
  excluding	
  the	
  
title	
  page.	
  	
  	
  
	
        SIGNED	
  this	
  16th	
  day	
  of	
  November,	
  2015.	
  
	
  
	
        	
               	
   	
    	
         	
     	
           ___/s/Kevin	
  Fine_______________	
  
	
        	
               	
   	
    	
         	
     	
           Kevin	
  Fine	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
                                                         16	
  
	
  
	
  
                                  APPENDIX	
  
                                       	
  
       1.   Administrative Decision              23
       2.   Court Order                          24
       3.   Tex. Gov. Code § 2001.174            25
       4.   Tex. Transp. Code § 524.043          26
       5.   Tex. Transp. Code § 724.042          27
       6.   Tex. Transp. Code § 724.047          29

	
                                    17	
  
02/03/2015 08:15 FAX      5124754994                                                                  ©001/002

                                       DOCKET NO. 2014-12-51051
                                                                                                                 \S
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OFPUBLIC SAFETY                     §              BEFORE THE STATE OFFICE
                                                     §
                     v-                              §                              OF
                                                     §
CHRISTOPHER JAROSZEWICZ                              §             ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
                                   ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

       On February 2, 2015, a hearing was held. Having heard and considered the evidence, the
       Administrative Law Judge finds that the State Office ofAdministrative Hearings has jurisdiction
       over this cause and further finds the facts below were proven by apreponderance of the evidence:
                                            FINP^GS OF FACT

       1) On October 11, 2014, reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant existed, in that the Defendant
           drove 45 miles per hour in a 30miles-per-hour zone.

       2) On the same date, probable cause to arrest the Defendant existedbecausehehadthe strong odor
           of an alcoholic beverage on hisbreath. He exhibited six clues ontheHGN test. He refused to
           perform thewalk and turn and onelegstand tests.

       3) Defendant was placed under arrest and was properly asked to submit aspecimen ofbreath or
          blood.

       4) After being requested to submit a specimen ofbreath orblood, Defendant refused.

       5) Defendant has had one or more alcohol ordrug related enforcement contacts during theten yeais
           preceding the date of Defendant's arrest as isindicated onDefendant's driving record;

                                          CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

       Based on the foregoing, the Judge concludes the Department proved the issues set out in Tex.
       Transp. Code § 524.035 or724.042 and that Defendant's license is subject to a suspension for 2
       yearspursuant to Tex. Transp. Code § 724.035.
       In accordance with the above findings and conclusions, the Judge hereby enters the following order
                                                   ORDER

       The Department is authorized to suspend or deny Defendant's driving privileges for the period
       indicated above.
       15?2(5?iSidni5Sy«" appCtded ^asuant t0 Tex- Transp. Code. §524.04J and 1Tex. Admin. Code §§
              Signed February 2,2015.

                                             WENDYgJL. HARVEJ
                                             ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
                                             STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

                                                                                                                 1
                                 CAUSE NO. C-l-CV-15-001468
      CHRISTOPHER JAROSZEWICZ,                  §              IN THE COUNTY COURT
      Appellant,
                                                §
                                                §
                                                §
      vs.
                                                §             AT LAW NUMBER TWO
                                                §
                                                §
      TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF                       §
      PUBLIC SAFETY,
      Appellee.
                                                              TRAVISCOUNTY, TEXAS
                                            ORDER

            ON the 30* day of April, 2015, the Court heard Appellant Christopher
     Jaroszewicz's Petition for Appellate Review of adecision rendered by the State
                                                                                            -CD

     Office of Administrative Hearings ("SOAH") suspending his license for two (2)          I*
                                                                                            -O

     years.                                                                                ~.<7>

              The Court, having considered the Petition, Answer, SOAH administrative      = o
                                                                                          :o

                                                                                          !•*»•
                                                                                          • o>
                                                                                          :CO
     record on appeal, and argument of counsel, is of the opinion that the decision of
     SOAH is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
              IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
     decision of SOAH to suspend Appellant's license for two (2) years is affirmed.
     All other requested relief not expressly granted in this order is denied.
              SIGNED on this the 5th day of May, 2015.
                   «/3
                   <

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                                                                                         w&
                                         Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174
   This document is current through the 2015 regular session, 84th Legislature, Chapters: 3-11, 13-20, 22-29, 31-32,
34-46, 48, 51, 53-62, 63, 66-68, 70-81, 83, 85-96, 98-99, 101-102, 104-105, 107-112, 114, 116-130, 132-134, 136-141,
  143-149, 151-156, 158-159, 161, 165-172, 174, 176, 178-180, 182, 184, 186-200, 202-207, 209-224, 227, 229-234,
   236-241, 244-248, 251-252, 254-255, 257-261, 263-268, 270-287, 289-295, 297-300, 302-311, 314, 316-322, 325,
327-328, 333, 335-354, 356-357, 360-363, 365-367, 369-373, 375-381, 383-393, 395-400, 402-407, 409-414, 416-421,
423-424, 426-428, 430-434, 436, 439-447, 449-456, 458-464, 466-468, 472-479, 482-487, 489-495, 498-500, 502-504,
507-514, 516-526, 528-531, 533-540, 542-548, 550-553, 555-556, 558-560, 563-568, 570, 572-576, 578-584, 586-590,
592-596, 600-601, 605-611, 613-614, 616-622, 624, 626, 628-629, 631-632, 634-646, 648, 650-662, 664-665, 669-671,
     673-683, 685-686, 688-696, 698, 700-702, 704-705, 709, 711, 714-715, 717-718, 720, 722-728, 730-733, 735,
     737-742, 744, 746-751, 753-764, 767, 769, 771-774, 776, 778-786, 788-796, 798-811, 813-820, 822, 824-825,
827-835, 839-840, 842-844, 848-853, 856-859, 861-865, 867-869, 871, 874-876, 879-884, 886-887, 889-895, 897-907,
  909, 913-914, 916-923, 926-928, 930, 933, 936-937, 939, 941-943, 947, 951-954, 956, 958-961, 963-965, 967-978,
 980-983, 988, 990-991, 994-999, 1001, 1003, 1005-1008, 1010, 1012-1022, 1024-1030, 1033-1036, 1038-1043, 1045,
      1047, 1049-1050, 1052, 1057-1064, 1066, 1069, 1071-1072, 1077-1078, 1081-1087, 1090-1093, 1095-1103,
 1105-1107, 1110-1116, 1118-1125, 1127-1130, 1132-1137, 1140, 1142-1147, 1149, 1151-1152, 1154-1156, 1159-1160,
1162-1167, 1169, 1171-1172, 1174-1177, 1180-1181, 1184-1190, 1192, 1194-1201, 1204-1205, 1207-1210, 1212-1213,
   1216, 1218, 1220-1221, 1223-1224, 1226-1235, 1237-1241, 1245-1250, 1253-1254, 1256, 1258-1260, 1263-1267,
                                             1269-1270, 1274-1275, 1277

Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis® > Government Code > Title 10 General Government
 > Subtitle A Administrative Procedure and Practice > Chapter 2001 Administrative Procedure >
Subchapter G Contested Cases: Judicial Review

Sec. 2001.174. Review Under Substantial Evidence Rule or Undefined Scope of
Review.
  If the law authorizes review of a decision in a contested case under the substantial evidence rule or if the law does not
  define the scope of judicial review, a court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the state agency on the
  weight of the evidence on questions committed to agency discretion but:
       (1) may affirm the agency decision in whole or in part; and
       (2)   shall reverse or remand the case for further proceedings if substantial rights of the appellant have been
             prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
             (A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;
             (B) in excess of the agency’s statutory authority;
             (C) made through unlawful procedure;
             (D) affected by other error of law;
             (E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and probative evidence in the
                 record as a whole; or
             (F)    arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
                   discretion.

History

Enacted by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 268 (S.B. 248), § 1, effective September 1, 1993.

Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis®
                                          Tex. Transp. Code § 524.043
   This document is current through the 2015 regular session, 84th Legislature, Chapters: 3-11, 13-20, 22-29, 31-32,
34-46, 48, 51, 53-62, 63, 66-68, 70-81, 83, 85-96, 98-99, 101-102, 104-105, 107-112, 114, 116-130, 132-134, 136-141,
  143-149, 151-156, 158-159, 161, 165-172, 174, 176, 178-180, 182, 184, 186-200, 202-207, 209-224, 227, 229-234,
   236-241, 244-248, 251-252, 254-255, 257-261, 263-268, 270-287, 289-295, 297-300, 302-311, 314, 316-322, 325,
327-328, 333, 335-354, 356-357, 360-363, 365-367, 369-373, 375-381, 383-393, 395-400, 402-407, 409-414, 416-421,
423-424, 426-428, 430-434, 436, 439-447, 449-456, 458-464, 466-468, 472-479, 482-487, 489-495, 498-500, 502-504,
507-514, 516-526, 528-531, 533-540, 542-548, 550-553, 555-556, 558-560, 563-568, 570, 572-576, 578-584, 586-590,
592-596, 600-601, 605-611, 613-614, 616-622, 624, 626, 628-629, 631-632, 634-646, 648, 650-662, 664-665, 669-671,
     673-683, 685-686, 688-696, 698, 700-702, 704-705, 709, 711, 714-715, 717-718, 720, 722-728, 730-733, 735,
     737-742, 744, 746-751, 753-764, 767, 769, 771-774, 776, 778-786, 788-796, 798-811, 813-820, 822, 824-825,
827-835, 839-840, 842-844, 848-853, 856-859, 861-865, 867-869, 871, 874-876, 879-884, 886-887, 889-895, 897-907,
  909, 913-914, 916-923, 926-928, 930, 933, 936-937, 939, 941-943, 947, 951-954, 956, 958-961, 963-965, 967-978,
 980-983, 988, 990-991, 994-999, 1001, 1003, 1005-1008, 1010, 1012-1022, 1024-1030, 1033-1036, 1038-1043, 1045,
      1047, 1049-1050, 1052, 1057-1064, 1066, 1069, 1071-1072, 1077-1078, 1081-1087, 1090-1093, 1095-1103,
 1105-1107, 1110-1116, 1118-1125, 1127-1130, 1132-1137, 1140, 1142-1147, 1149, 1151-1152, 1154-1156, 1159-1160,
1162-1167, 1169, 1171-1172, 1174-1177, 1180-1181, 1184-1190, 1192, 1194-1201, 1204-1205, 1207-1210, 1212-1213,
   1216, 1218, 1220-1221, 1223-1224, 1226-1235, 1237-1241, 1245-1250, 1253-1254, 1256, 1258-1260, 1263-1267,
                                             1269-1270, 1274-1275, 1277

Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis® > Transportation Code > Title 7 Vehicles and Traffic
 > Subtitle B Driver’s Licenses and Personal Identification Cards > Chapter 524 Administrative
Suspension of Driver’s License for Failure to Pass Test for Intoxication > Subchapter D Hearing and
Appeal

Sec. 524.043. Review; Additional Evidence.
   (a)    Review on appeal is on the record certified by the State Office of Administrative Hearings with no additional
         testimony.
   (b)    On appeal, a party may apply to the court to present additional evidence. If the court is satisfied that the additional
         evidence is material and that there were good reasons for the failure to present it in the proceeding before the
         administrative law judge, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken before an administrative law
         judge on conditions determined by the court.
   (c)   There is no right to a jury trial in an appeal under this section.
   (d)     An administrative law judge may change a finding or decision as to whether the person had an alcohol
         concentration of a level specified in Section 49.01, Penal Code, or whether a minor had any detectable amount of
         alcohol in the minor’s system because of the additional evidence and shall file the additional evidence and any
         changes, new findings, or decisions with the reviewing court.
   (e)   A remand under this section does not stay the suspension of a driver’s license.

History

Enacted by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165 (S.B. 971), § 1, effective September 1, 1995; am. Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch.
1013 (S.B. 35), § 29, effective September 1, 1997.

Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis®
Copyright © 2015 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
                                          Tex. Transp. Code § 724.042
   This document is current through the 2015 regular session, 84th Legislature, Chapters: 3-11, 13-20, 22-29, 31-32,
34-46, 48, 51, 53-62, 63, 66-68, 70-81, 83, 85-96, 98-99, 101-102, 104-105, 107-112, 114, 116-130, 132-134, 136-141,
  143-149, 151-156, 158-159, 161, 165-172, 174, 176, 178-180, 182, 184, 186-200, 202-207, 209-224, 227, 229-234,
   236-241, 244-248, 251-252, 254-255, 257-261, 263-268, 270-287, 289-295, 297-300, 302-311, 314, 316-322, 325,
327-328, 333, 335-354, 356-357, 360-363, 365-367, 369-373, 375-381, 383-393, 395-400, 402-407, 409-414, 416-421,
423-424, 426-428, 430-434, 436, 439-447, 449-456, 458-464, 466-468, 472-479, 482-487, 489-495, 498-500, 502-504,
507-514, 516-526, 528-531, 533-540, 542-548, 550-553, 555-556, 558-560, 563-568, 570, 572-576, 578-584, 586-590,
592-596, 600-601, 605-611, 613-614, 616-622, 624, 626, 628-629, 631-632, 634-646, 648, 650-662, 664-665, 669-671,
     673-683, 685-686, 688-696, 698, 700-702, 704-705, 709, 711, 714-715, 717-718, 720, 722-728, 730-733, 735,
     737-742, 744, 746-751, 753-764, 767, 769, 771-774, 776, 778-786, 788-796, 798-811, 813-820, 822, 824-825,
827-835, 839-840, 842-844, 848-853, 856-859, 861-865, 867-869, 871, 874-876, 879-884, 886-887, 889-895, 897-907,
  909, 913-914, 916-923, 926-928, 930, 933, 936-937, 939, 941-943, 947, 951-954, 956, 958-961, 963-965, 967-978,
 980-983, 988, 990-991, 994-999, 1001, 1003, 1005-1008, 1010, 1012-1022, 1024-1030, 1033-1036, 1038-1043, 1045,
      1047, 1049-1050, 1052, 1057-1064, 1066, 1069, 1071-1072, 1077-1078, 1081-1087, 1090-1093, 1095-1103,
 1105-1107, 1110-1116, 1118-1125, 1127-1130, 1132-1137, 1140, 1142-1147, 1149, 1151-1152, 1154-1156, 1159-1160,
1162-1167, 1169, 1171-1172, 1174-1177, 1180-1181, 1184-1190, 1192, 1194-1201, 1204-1205, 1207-1210, 1212-1213,
   1216, 1218, 1220-1221, 1223-1224, 1226-1235, 1237-1241, 1245-1250, 1253-1254, 1256, 1258-1260, 1263-1267,
                                             1269-1270, 1274-1275, 1277

Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis® > Transportation Code > Title 7 Vehicles and Traffic
 > Subtitle J Miscellaneous Provisions > Chapter 724 Implied Consent > Subchapter D Hearing

Sec. 724.042. Issues at Hearing.
   The issues at a hearing under this subchapter are whether:
        (1) reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the person;
        (2) probable cause existed to believe that the person was:
             (A) operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; or
             (B) operating a watercraft powered with an engine having a manufacturer’s rating of 50 horsepower or above
                 while intoxicated;
        (3) the person was placed under arrest by the officer and was requested to submit to the taking of a specimen;
            and
        (4) the person refused to submit to the taking of a specimen on request of the officer.

History

Enacted by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165 (S.B. 971), § 1, effective September 1, 1995; am. Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch.
444 (H.B. 63), § 12, effective September 1, 2001.

Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis®
Copyright © 2015 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
                                                Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174

Copyright © 2015 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.

                                                                             Page 2 of 2
                                          Tex. Transp. Code § 724.047
   This document is current through the 2015 regular session, 84th Legislature, Chapters: 3-11, 13-20, 22-29, 31-32,
34-46, 48, 51, 53-62, 63, 66-68, 70-81, 83, 85-96, 98-99, 101-102, 104-105, 107-112, 114, 116-130, 132-134, 136-141,
  143-149, 151-156, 158-159, 161, 165-172, 174, 176, 178-180, 182, 184, 186-200, 202-207, 209-224, 227, 229-234,
   236-241, 244-248, 251-252, 254-255, 257-261, 263-268, 270-287, 289-295, 297-300, 302-311, 314, 316-322, 325,
327-328, 333, 335-354, 356-357, 360-363, 365-367, 369-373, 375-381, 383-393, 395-400, 402-407, 409-414, 416-421,
423-424, 426-428, 430-434, 436, 439-447, 449-456, 458-464, 466-468, 472-479, 482-487, 489-495, 498-500, 502-504,
507-514, 516-526, 528-531, 533-540, 542-548, 550-553, 555-556, 558-560, 563-568, 570, 572-576, 578-584, 586-590,
592-596, 600-601, 605-611, 613-614, 616-622, 624, 626, 628-629, 631-632, 634-646, 648, 650-662, 664-665, 669-671,
     673-683, 685-686, 688-696, 698, 700-702, 704-705, 709, 711, 714-715, 717-718, 720, 722-728, 730-733, 735,
     737-742, 744, 746-751, 753-764, 767, 769, 771-774, 776, 778-786, 788-796, 798-811, 813-820, 822, 824-825,
827-835, 839-840, 842-844, 848-853, 856-859, 861-865, 867-869, 871, 874-876, 879-884, 886-887, 889-895, 897-907,
  909, 913-914, 916-923, 926-928, 930, 933, 936-937, 939, 941-943, 947, 951-954, 956, 958-961, 963-965, 967-978,
 980-983, 988, 990-991, 994-999, 1001, 1003, 1005-1008, 1010, 1012-1022, 1024-1030, 1033-1036, 1038-1043, 1045,
      1047, 1049-1050, 1052, 1057-1064, 1066, 1069, 1071-1072, 1077-1078, 1081-1087, 1090-1093, 1095-1103,
 1105-1107, 1110-1116, 1118-1125, 1127-1130, 1132-1137, 1140, 1142-1147, 1149, 1151-1152, 1154-1156, 1159-1160,
1162-1167, 1169, 1171-1172, 1174-1177, 1180-1181, 1184-1190, 1192, 1194-1201, 1204-1205, 1207-1210, 1212-1213,
   1216, 1218, 1220-1221, 1223-1224, 1226-1235, 1237-1241, 1245-1250, 1253-1254, 1256, 1258-1260, 1263-1267,
                                             1269-1270, 1274-1275, 1277

Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis® > Transportation Code > Title 7 Vehicles and Traffic
 > Subtitle J Miscellaneous Provisions > Chapter 724 Implied Consent > Subchapter D Hearing

Sec. 724.047. Appeal.
   Chapter 524 governs an appeal from an action of the department, following an administrative hearing under this chapter,
   in suspending or denying the issuance of a license.

History

Enacted by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165 (S.B. 971), § 1, effective September 1, 1995.

Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis®
Copyright © 2015 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.