Court Opinion

ID: 9402953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-19 18:00:29.758605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.653259
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50406     Document: 00516791307         Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/19/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                                                         June 19, 2023
                                  No. 21-50406
                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Alvaro Castillo, Jr.,

                                                         Defendant—Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:19-CR-780-1

   Before Jones, Southwick, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:
          The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the American people
   “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
   unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Today we
   address what searches are reasonable and unreasonable at the intersection of
   two established lines of Fourth Amendment precedent—when the
   government searches a cell phone at the border.
          On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long held that “searches
   made at the border . . . are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they
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   occur at the border,” “pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign
   to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing
   into this country.” United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
          But on the other hand, the Court has also made clear that searches of
   modern devices like cell phones can be unusually intrusive. After all, “[c]ell
   phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects
   that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
   393 (2014). Depending on the extent of the search, the government could
   theoretically access virtually every aspect about one’s life based on a single
   handheld device.
          Our circuit has not yet articulated the standard that governs cell phone
   searches at the border. In some circuits, the governing standard depends on
   the extent of the search—whether the government is conducting merely a
   manual search of what is immediately available on the device, or a more
   intrusive forensic search. The circuits are divided over whether reasonable
   suspicion is required for a forensic search of a cell phone at the border. But
   every circuit to have addressed the issue has agreed that no individualized
   suspicion is required for the government to undertake a manual border search
   of a cell phone.
          We see no reason to depart from the consensus of the circuits. And
   adopting that consensus is all we need to do to decide this appeal. We
   accordingly affirm.
                                         I.
          The parties jointly stipulated to the facts that govern this appeal.
   Defendant Alvaro Castillo and two others crossed the international bridge to
   Presidio, Texas, in a recreational vehicle (RV) that was towing a passenger
   car behind it, at around midnight. Upon reaching the port of entry into the
   United States, the RV was sent to secondary inspection—as is standard

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   operating procedure when it comes to vehicles of that size entering the
   country at that time of night. Defendant and his companions told border
   agents that they had nothing to declare.
          During the search of the RV, an officer found a .357 revolver taped
   between two frying pans that had been wrapped in packing foam and taped
   inside the oven. The officer also found ammunition for a .357 inside a
   pressure cooker that had been taped shut, as well as evidence of marijuana
   inside of luggage.
          Defendant was placed in a holding cell. He admitted to owning the
   contraband. He also provided the passcode to unlock his cell phone to a
   Homeland Security Investigations special agent.
          The agent manually scrolled through various apps. As a result, he
   found what he believed to be child pornography in the photo section of
   Defendant’s phone.
          Based on those initial findings, various agents conducted a more
   intrusive forensic search of the phone. They also conducted both manual and
   forensic searches of other electronic devices in Defendant’s possession.
   Those efforts produced additional child pornography images.
          Defendant was subsequently indicted on six charges involving child
   pornography. He subsequently moved to suppress the evidence obtained
   from the search of his devices. After a hearing, the district court refused to
   suppress the child pornography. Defendant was found guilty on all six counts
   and sentenced to 720 months imprisonment and a life term of supervised
   release. He filed a timely notice of appeal.
          A district court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress are
   reviewed for clear error, and the court’s ultimate conclusions on whether the
   Fourth Amendment was violated are reviewed de novo. United States v.

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   Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2010). The evidence is reviewed in the
   light most favorable to the prevailing party unless that view is inconsistent
   with the court’s findings or is clearly erroneous in light of the evidence as a
   whole. Id.
                                         II.
          The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
   secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
   searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
   “[W]arrantless searches are typically unreasonable where a search is
   undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal
   wrongdoing.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018)
   (quotation omitted). “In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only
   if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley, 573
   U.S. at 382.
          The border search exception is a “longstanding, historically
   recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general principle that a
   warrant be obtained” for a search. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 621. “[T]he border-
   search exception allows officers to conduct ‘routine inspections and searches
   of individuals or conveyances seeking to cross . . . borders’ without any
   particularized suspicion of wrongdoing.” United States v. Aguilar, 973 F.3d 445,
   449 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619) (emphasis added).
   Moreover, even “[s]o-called ‘nonroutine’ searches need only reasonable
   suspicion, not the higher threshold of probable cause.” United States v.
   Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2018). “For border searches both
   routine and not, no case has required a warrant.” Id.
          The “scope of a search conducted under an exception to the warrant
   requirement must be commensurate with its purposes.” Arizona v. Gant, 556
   U.S. 332, 339 (2009). The border search exception reflects “the long-

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   standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining
   persons and property crossing into this country.” Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616.
   “The Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons
   and effects is at its zenith at the international border” and has been
   recognized “since the beginning of our Government.” United States v.
   Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004). “Historically such broad
   powers have been necessary to prevent smuggling and to prevent prohibited
   articles from entry.” Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619.
          Accordingly, courts have allowed a variety of border searches without
   requiring either a warrant or reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Flores–Montano,
   541 U.S. at 155 (“the Government’s authority to conduct suspicionless
   inspections at the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble, and
   reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank”); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 (“custom
   officials could search, without probable cause and without a warrant,
   envelopes carried by an entering traveler, whether in his luggage or on his
   person,” and “no different constitutional standard should apply simply
   because the envelopes were mailed, not carried”); United States v.
   Chaplinski, 579 F.2d 373, 374 (5th Cir. 1978) (“At the border, customs agents
   need not have a reasonable or articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
   involved to stop one who has traveled from a foreign point, examine his or
   her visa, and search luggage and personal effects for contraband.”).
          To be sure, modern cell phones are fundamentally distinct from other
   personal items. As the Supreme Court observed in Riley, “many of these
   devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be
   used as telephones.”      573 U.S. at 393.       “One of the most notable
   distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense storage
   capacity.” Id. “Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by
   physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow
   intrusion on privacy.” Id. But today, “the possible intrusion on privacy is

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   not physically limited in the same way when it comes to cell phones.” Id. at
   394. Accordingly, government searches of such devices have the potential to
   be uniquely intrusive.
          The extent of the privacy intrusion, however, will depend on the
   methodology employed by the government agent. “Basic border searches . . .
   require an officer to manually traverse the contents of the traveler’s
   electronic device, limiting in practice the quantity of information available
   during a basic search.” Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 2021).
   “And a basic border search does not allow government officials to view
   deleted or encrypted files.” Id. at 19. See also id. at 18–19 (“The CBP Policy
   only allows searches of data resident on the device.”).
          Accordingly, when it comes to manual cell phone searches at the
   border, our sister circuits have uniformly held that Riley does not require
   either a warrant or reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Xiang, 67
   F.4th 895, 900 (8th Cir. 2023) (“No Circuit has held that the government
   must obtain a warrant to conduct a routine border search of electronic
   devices.”); Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2021) (“We . . .
   agree with the holdings of the Ninth and Eleventh circuits that basic border
   searches are routine searches and need not be supported by reasonable
   suspicion.”); United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2019)
   (“manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without
   individualized suspicion”).
          Our sister circuits have differed only as to whether reasonable
   suspicion is required for a more intrusive forensic search of a cell phone at
   the border. Compare, e.g., United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th
   Cir. 2018) (“the Fourth Amendment does not require any suspicion [even]
   for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border”), with Cano, 934
   F.3d at 1016 (“we hold that manual searches of cell phones at the border are

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   reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic
   examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion”).
             All we need to decide this case, however, is to adopt the consensus
   view of our sister circuits and hold that the government can conduct manual
   cell phone searches at the border without individualized suspicion. After all,
   the manual cell phone search here produced evidence of child pornography.
   So if that search was valid, then it’s hard to see how that would not justify the
   subsequent forensic searches for additional evidence of child pornography.
   And Castillo does not appear to claim otherwise. He argues that the
   government violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting the manual as
   well as forensic searches. But he does not claim that the forensic search was
   invalid even if we find the manual search valid.
             We see no reason to disagree with our sister circuits. Accordingly, we
   hold that no reasonable suspicion is necessary to conduct the sort of routine
   manual cell phone search at the border that occurred here. We therefore
   affirm.

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