Court Opinion

ID: 9786297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:52:41.455615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:43.951357
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that appellant is unable to meet her basic needs under the applicable statutory test and therefore that she was properly committed by the trial court. ORS 426.005(l)(d); ORS 426.130(l)(b)(C). Because I would conclude that the state has not met its rigorous burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that appellant will likely die in the near future if not committed, I respectfully dissent.
Our previous decisions indicate that the test for establishing mental illness under ORS 426.005 and thereafter committing a person to state custody under ORS 426.130 is an extremely stringent one. We have stated that a *84State v. Headings, 140 Or App 421, 426, 914 P2d 1129 (1996) (emphasis added). Moreover, to satisfy the clear and convincing standard,2 the state’s evidence must be of “extraordinary persuasiveness,” State v. DeMartino, 164 Or App 331, 335, 991 P2d 1093 (1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), and it must establish that the truth of the facts asserted is “highly probable,” State v. Nance, 85 Or App 143, 146, 735 P2d 1271 (1987).
*83“finding that a person is unable to provide for her basic needs must be supported l)y clear and convincing evidence that the individual, due to some mental disorder, is unable to obtain some commodity (e.g., food and water) or service (e.g., life-saving medical care) without which [she] cannot sustain life.’ State v. Bunting, 112 Or App 143, 145, 826 P2d 1060 (1992). A person’s ability to care for herself is assessed in the light of existing, as opposed to future or potential, conditions. See State v. Stanley, 117 Or App 327, 330, 843 P2d 1018 (1992). In Bunting, we explained how imminent the threat to life must be: the evidence must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that ‘there is a likelihood that the person probably would not survive in the near future because the person is unable to provide for basic personal needs and is not receiving care necessary for health or safety.’ 112 Or App at 146.”1
*84In order to conclude that the state has made the required showing in this case, the majority dispenses with our prior emphasis on whether an appellant will survive in the near future and draws unwarranted conclusions from meager evidence. The evidence on which the majority relies does not meet the clear and convincing standard.
First of all, I note that the evidence in the record does not establish, with high probability, that appellant’s bipolar disorder is a life-threatening condition. Unmedicated, appellant unquestionably has difficulty functioning and is not easy to get along with. Nonetheless, the record is devoid of evidence suggesting that her difficulties are of such magnitude that they will shortly bring her to the brink of death. Moreover, no expert testified that impending death was the likely result of untreated bipolar disorder.
The majority ignores the fact that we previously held that another appellant’s unmedicated bipolar disorder was not life-threatening in spite of the fact that that appellant had previously attempted suicide while unmedicated. State v. Brungard, 101 Or App 67, 71, 789 P2d 683, on recons 102 Or App 509, 794 P2d 1257 (1990), rev den 311 Or 427 (1991) (“[0]n this record, defendant’s failure to take lithium is not shown to be immediately threatening, even when coupled with irregular sleeping and eating.”) (emphasis in original; citation omitted).3 Here, appellant has no history of suicide *85attempts or other hfe-threatening activities when unmedicated. There simply is no basis to conclude that it is highly probable that appellant will die in the near future from her untreated bipolar disorder.
I now shift my focus to the specific problems that appellant’s failure to take medication has caused. As the majority notes, appellant disabled her furnace as a result of her delusion that noxious substances were emanating from it. Although appellant’s decision to disable her furnace could potentially be harmful, for instance if appellant did not reconnect it during severe winter weather, appellant testified at the hearing that she was able to turn the power for the furnace off and on and that she turned it off only when she left the house. No one (besides appellant) who testified at the hearing had examined the furnace and could explain what state it was in. On the record before us, I would not hold that appellant’s decision to disable her furnace helps the state establish, with high probability, that appellant is unable to meet her basic needs.
Moreover, although I recognize that appellant’s financial situation is problematic, the evidence in that regard is simply too unspecific and too inconclusive to permit a conclusion, based on clear and convincing evidence, that appellant is unable to meet her basis needs. Although the evidence indicates that appellant receives $97 a month from her mother’s estate, no one at the hearing knew whether her other resources, such as the 401K account that she had apparently cashed in and her severance package, were exhausted. Moreover, no direct testimony was elicited from appellant on the issue. When asked about his wife’s finances, appellant’s husband stated that “quite frankly — and I’m not being facetious — I think they’re better than my own.” When asked whether his wife was in danger of losing her home, appellant’s husband responded that “[i]t honestly depends on *86what her resources are.” It is simply impossible reasonably to conclude, based on the above evidence, that appellant’s finances have dipped so low that she is unable to meet her basic needs for shelter and food. The majority errs in using that very inconclusive evidence as the cornerstone of its holding. As we have repeatedly stated, speculative threats to an individual’s well being cannot justify a deprivation of liberty as grave as involuntary mental commitment.4
Finally, I turn to the evidence on appellant’s eating habits. Appellant’s husband testified that there was little food in the house but that appellant claimed to eat at restaurants rather than at home. No evidence controverted appellant’s statement to husband that she eats at restaurants. Moreover, although appellant’s loss of 25 pounds over the course of a year could conceivably be dangerous if certain other facts were also established, the evidence of appellant’s weight loss, standing alone, cannot bear the weight that the majority places on it. Without some specific indication of what appellant weighed before she lost the weight and whether she is currently underweight for her height and bone structure, the evidence of appellant’s weight loss is a non sequitur. In fact, it could well be healthier for her to have lost the weight than to have stayed at her previous weight. We simply cannot tell from the record before us, much less conclude with high probability that appellant is unable to meet her basic need for food. Cf Nance, 85 Or App at 146 (concluding that evidence that the appellant had fallen significantly below her ideal weight at one point during the prior six weeks did not establish that she was unable to meet her basic needs).
Because I would conclude that appellant’s failure to take her medication and the troubling behavior that ensues from that decision are not sufficiently dangerous to allow us to determine, with high probability, that appellant would face a likelihood of death in the near future, I would reverse *87the order of the trial court committing appellant to the custody of the Mental Health and Developmental Services Division. ORS 426.005(l)(d)(B); ORS 426.130(l)(b)(C). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

 The majority apparently takes issue with this test. See 174 Or App at 82. It contends that a person need not be on the brink of death before the state may involuntarily commit her. Although it is true that an appellant need not literally be about to die, our cases emphasize that an appellant must face a likelihood of death in the near future and that that likelihood must be established with high probability before the state can deprive her of her liberty. The majority errs by lowering the standard for this case.

 In Riley Hill General Contractor v. Tandy Corp., 303 Or 390, 397, 737 P2d 595 (1987), the Supreme Court traced the history of the clear and'convincing evidentiary standard and explained that “ ‘clear’ describes the character of unambiguous evidence, whether true or false; ‘convincing’ describes the effect of evidence on an observer.”

 The majority attempts to distinguish Brungard without explaining its basis for doing so. 174 Or App at 82. Clearly the most relevant distinction between this *85case and Brungard is that the appellant in Brungard, who suffered from the same disorder as appellant, had engaged in life-threatening behavior in the past as a result of his failure to take medication, while appellant in this case has not. Thus, in that respect, there is less evidence in this case than there was in Brungard tending to indicate that the failure to take medication could potentially be dangerous. Nonetheless, we held in Brungard that the appellant should not have been committed based on his alleged inability to meet his basic needs. Brungard, 101 Or App at 71.

 See State v. Ayala, 164 Or App 399, 402, 991 P2d 1100 (1999) (the threat must be actual rather than speculative). See also DeMartino, 164 Or App at 337 (“appellant’s inability or unwillingness to make mortgage payments on a home does not indicate a probability that her survival was in question”); Headings, 140 Or App at 426 (the risk of losing one’s house at some point in the future is not sufficient to justify commitment).