Court Opinion

ID: 9535325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:48:04.588634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:13.193322
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting)—This appeal poses the problem of the proper construction of the will of W. Montelius Price. The trial court found the will to be unambiguous and construed it to exclude appellants from taking under it.
W. Montelius Price and his wife, Anna, executed mutual wills in April of 1957. Anna died on February 6, 1962, and W. Montelius Price died on January 26, 1964. Five children had been born of the Price’s marriage. The eldest son died childless in 1933. The other four children are named in the second article of W. Montelius Price’s will, which reads as follows:
I hereby declare that I have four surviving children, Elizabeth Price Morgan, Howard M. [S.] Price, Henry S. Price, and Frederick M. Price, and no other child or children of any deceased child.
Howard Price was killed in an accident on April 24, 1961. The appellants and nominal parties are Howard’s eldest child and his widow. Howard’s widow is acting as guardian ad litem for the four youngest of their five children. Reference to the appellants herein shall mean the five children of Howard Price who are the real parties in interest. The respondent is the executor, Frederick, representing himself, Elizabeth, and Henry.
The fourth article of W. Montelius Price’s will reads as follows:
In the event that my said wife should predecease me, then I give, devise and bequeath my entire estate, consisting of all my property, real, personal or mixed, wheresoever situated, to my four children equally, taking into consideration all advancements made heretofore or hereafter to any of them, to be distributed as follows:
*891[Subsections 1 and 2 make specific bequests to the two bachelor sons, Frederick and Henry, of $10,000 each, and give Frederick an option to purchase the testator’s business.]
3. All of the rest and residue of my said estate to my then surviving children, equally, to be distributed to them as hereinafter set forth, after expenses of administration and taxes.
It should be noted that, in the fourth article of his will, Montelius first left his entire estate “to my four children equally,” and then, in describing how the estate was to be distributed, left the residue, after two specific bequests, “to my then surviving children, equally . . .” If the second direction is followed literally, appellants take nothing since Howard was not a “then surviving” child at the time Montelius died. If the first direction, i.e., “to my four children equally,” is followed literally, then appellants take under the provisions of RCW 11.12.110, since that statute provides that the descendants of a testator’s deceased child shall take their deceased parent’s share. Since the will clearly admits of two interpretations, it may properly be termed ambiguous. In re Estate of Torando, 38 Wn.2d 642, 228 P.2d 142 (1951).
The will being ambiguous on the question of the disposition of the residue, it becomes necessary to resolve the ambiguity by attempting to determine the intent of the testator. If the testator’s intent, scheme, or plan can be determined within the four corners of the will, the court is not at liberty to go beyond the instrument. In re Estate of Shaw, 69 Wn.2d 238, 417 P.2d 942 (1966); In re Estate of Johnson, 46 Wn.2d 308, 280 P.2d 1034 (1955).
Generally speaking, this court has said many times that a provision of a will should be construed in light of the entire instrument. Stated a bit differently, it is said that courts should endeavor to give effect to every part of the will, and should make a reasonable effort to reconcile two seemingly *892inconsistent provisions. In re Estate of Thomas, 17 Wn.2d 674, 136 P.2d 1017, 147 A.L.R. 598 (1943); In re Estate of MacAdams, 45 Wn.2d 527, 276 P.2d 729 (1954).
In the case of In re Estate of Levas, 33 Wn.2d 530, 535-36, 206 P.2d 482 (1949), this court made the following statement:
Several of the important applicable rules of construction are: (a) each part of the will is construed in connection with the other parts, and effect is given to all if possible; (b) a will is presumed to speak as of the time of the testator’s death; (c) the testator’s intention is to be determined as of the time of execution of the will; (d) words used in a will are understood in their ordinary sense if there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent; (e) where there is room for construction, that meaning will be adopted which favors those who would inherit under the intestate laws; (f) wills should be construed to uphold rather than defeat devises and bequests.
(Citing many cases.) I think two of the quoted rules of construction are particularly pertinent here.
In the first place, it is definitely relevant that the testator’s intention is to be determined as of the time of execution of the will. At that time, as noted above, the second article of the will lists and specifically names four children, as follows:
I hereby declare that I have four surviving children, Elizabeth Price Morgan, Howard M. [S.] Price, Henry S. Price, and Frederick M. Price, and no other child or children of any deceased child.
It seems reasonable to conclude that by this enumeration, listing and specifically naming four children, Montelius intended to provide- a meaningful definition of' the phrase “surviving children,” which definition then becomes operative, although somewhat inexactly, in conjunction with the phrase “my then surviving children.”
. In the second place, this interpretation is supported by application of the other pertinent rule of construction quoted, in In re Estate of Levas, viz., that where there is room.for construction, .that meaning will he adopted which favors those who would inherit under the intestate laws. *893This state’s laws relative to the distribution of real and personal property upon death intestate provide that the issue of an intestate’s deceased child take by right of representation. See RCW 11.04.020(5) and RCW 11.04.030(3). Thus, by adopting the construction of the will which gives the residue of the estate to “my four surviving children,” Howard would be included, and now, by virtue of RCW 11.12.110, appellants. I would strongly favor adopting an interpretation of the will which is harmonious with the laws of inheritance. See In re Estate of Tipp, 54 Wn.2d 585, 343 P.2d 566 (1959); In re Estate of Lambell, 200 Wash. 220, 93 P.2d 352 (1939). I note and emphasize further that there is nothing in the text of the will other than the single use of the word “then” which indicates an intent to make the question of whether or not appellants are to participate in their grandfather’s estate turn on whether their father survived their grandfather. I would thus conclude that the testator intended appellants to take under the present circumstances, and therefore that such a construction of the will should be adopted.
I think the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with the views' expressed herein; consequently, I cannot agree with and must dissent regarding the majority’s disposition.
Hunter, C. J., and Neill, J., concur with Finley, J.