Court Opinion

ID: 9851197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:08:47.001117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:51.110306
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). We agree that although the sentences for possession and sale of heroin would run concurrently, Stewart may not be "doubly punished” by convicting him of both offenses and that therefore one of the convictions must be vacated.
We do not agree that the conviction for sale should be affirmed and the conviction for possession vacated.
The judge’s instructions were subject to the interpretation that the jury could only acquit of both offenses and could not convict of one and acquit of the other. The jury may have convicted Stewart of both offenses under the impression that in order to render a guilty verdict at all it must convict of both offenses.
The jury’s verdict constitutes a finding that Stewart was at least guilty of possession and therefore we may properly affirm his conviction of the lesser offense. We would vacate the conviction for sale and affirm the conviction for possession.
I
In concluding his instructions to the jury the judge said:
"All right, members of the jury, there are three possible verdicts in this case.
"You may find the defendant guilty of sale of narcotics;
"You may find the defendant guilty of possession of narcotics;
*556"And you may find the defendant not guilty.” (Emphasis supplied.)
There was a "fourth”1 possible verdict not explicitly stated by the judge: not guilty of one offense and guilty of the other.
The jury, composed of persons not trained in the lexicon of the law, may have understood the judge’s instruction, "you may find the defendant not guilty,” to mean that any judgment of acquittal would be an acquittal of both offenses and therefore if there was to be any conviction at all it must be of both offenses. The jury may not have understood that it had a choice of finding Stewart not guilty of one offense and guilty of the other.
While the jury was not instructed that "they had to find the defendant guilty of both counts in order to find him guilty at all” (emphasis in original), and therefore this case is distinguishable from Martin2 (where the judge instructed the jury that it could not bring in a verdict of guilty on one count and not guilty on another), the failure of the judge in this case to instruct the jury that it could bring in a verdict of guilty on one count and not guilty on the other may, as in Martin, have left it with a misapprehension regarding the possible verdicts.
While there was no objection to the instruction in the instant case, as in Martin "the responsibility for a properly conducted trial rests on all the participants, including the prosecuting attorney and trial judge”.3
*557The jury’s verdict did not and could not indicate that all the jurors were free of misapprehension.4
II
Since the jury was not properly instructed, we may not properly affirm the conviction of the greater offense and vacate the conviction of the lesser offense.5
Since the jury, even if under a misapprehension concerning the possible verdicts, by its verdict found that Stewart was at least guilty of possession,6 there would be no prejudice to him in allowing the conviction for the lesser offense to stand. Stewart’s conviction of the greater offense, sale of narcotics, should be vacated and the conviction of possession affirmed with an option in the prosecutor, if he is persuaded that the ends of justice *558would be better served by retrial for sale, to have both convictions vacated and a new trial on both charges7 before a properly instructed jury.
III
Since we would reverse the conviction for sale, we do not reach the question of the constitutionality of a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for conviction of sale of a narcotic substance.
The statute prescribing that punishment has been amended to eliminate the mandatory minimum sentence.8 If the prosecutor were to elect to have both convictions vacated and to have Stewart retried on both charges,9 the constitutional question would not again arise.
We would vacate the conviction of sale and affirm the conviction of possession of heroin, with an option in the prosecutor to have a new trial on both charges.10
Kavanagh, C. J., concurred with Levin, J.

 Actually there were only three possible verdicts, but not the three adverted to by the judge. As set forth in People v Martin, 398 Mich 303; 247 NW2d 303 (1976), and the majority opinion in the instant case, although both the sale and possession charges may be submitted to a jury, it may not convict of both offenses.

 People v Martin, supra.

 Id, p 312.

 When the jury returned the following occurred:
"The Clerk: Members of the jury, have you agreed upon a verdict?
"Juror No. 4: We have.
"The Clerk: And, if so, who shall speak for you? And what is your verdict?
"Juror No. 4: We'find the defendant guilty as charged.
"The Clerk: Members of the jury, do you say upon your oaths that you find the defendant Howard Stewart guilty as charged, so say you, Mr. Foreman; so say you all, members of the jury?
"Mr. Weiswasser: May the people have a specification as to the counts, your Honor?
"The Court: Counts?
"Mr. Weiswasser: I understand there were two counts.
"The Court: That’s right. All right. Do you find him guilty of count 1 and count 2?
"Juror No. 4: Right.
"The Court: All right. All right, the court thanks you for your verdict, and you are excused until tomorrow morning at 9 a.m.; you will report to the jury assembly room.
"Wait. Just before you leave. Do you want the jury polled?
"Mr. Townsend: No, your Honor, that won’t be necessary.”

 People v Martin, supra, p 313.

 The verdict of guilty of possession was an explicit finding of possession; the verdict of guilty of sale was, on the facts of this case, an implicit finding of possession.

 As stated in Martin and in the majority opinion in this case, although both charges may be submitted to the jury, it must be instructed that it can only convict of one offense.

 1971 PA 196, § 41; MCLA 335.341; MSA 18.1070(41).

" * * * If, before the effective date of this act, a person has committed an offense similar to an offense set out in chapter 4 but has not been sentenced as of that date, the sentencing judge shall not impose a sentence in excess of the penalty described in chapter 4 for the similar offense.” 1971 PA 196, §61; MCLA 335.361; MSA 18.1070(61).

 See fn 7, supra.