Court Opinion

ID: 9735258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:07:01.567862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:56.354603
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McBRIDE, dissenting: A jury found the defendant, Toijuan Cooksey, guilty of both robbery and vehicular hijacking. The majority has reversed the vehicular hijacking verdict. I respectfully dissent. The majority’s decision to reverse the jury’s vehicular hijacking finding was based upon a determination that the evidence did not establish the motor vehicle was taken from the victim’s immediate presence. Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the immediate presence language of the vehicular hijacking statute requires more than the “presence” required by the robbery statute (compare 720 ILCS 5/18 — 3(a), 18 — 1(a) (West 1996)), I do not agree with the majority’s decision to reverse the jury’s verdict. I believe the jury could reasonably conclude from all the evidence presented that the defendant took the victim’s motor vehicle from her person or her immediate presence. The question of whether or not a vehicular hijacking was established by the evidence presented in this case requires this court to determine if the motor vehicle was taken “from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.” 720 ILCS 5/18 — 3 (West 1996). Because immediate presence has not been defined by either the legislature or this court prior to this case, this court must address what constitutes immediate presence. The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. People v. Liberman, 228 Ill. App. 3d 639, 647, 592 N.E.2d 575 (1992); People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 589 N.E.2d 508 (1992). In determining that intent, a court may consider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason and necessity for the law, .the evil sought to be remedied, and the purposes to be achieved. Liberman, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 647. Examining the legislative history of a statute is an appropriate aid to making such a determination. Liberman, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 647. Although criminal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused, they should not be so strictly construed as to defeat the intent of the legislature. Liberman, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 647; People v. Goldstein, 204 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1044-45, 562 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (1990). It is clear the legislature’s intent was to address the growing problem of the forceful and often armed taking of vehicles. The legislative debates demonstrate this very concern when the statute’s sponsor, Senator Hawkinson, said: “Unfortunately, in our society from time to time a new — new genre of crime comes along. We’re all too familiar with the tragedies around the country of — of car hijacking where someone armed or unarmed attacks a car, and either snatches the driver out ***.” 88th 111. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 15, 1993, at 281. What is unclear, however, is how the language immediate presence should be applied in determining whether this element of the offense has been satisfied. The legislative debates surrounding immediate presence shed little light on this subject. In response to being asked what the definition of immediate presence is, the statute’s sponsor only listed a few specific circumstances of when such an element would and would not be satisfied. For example, the motor vehicle would be in the immediate presence of a victim if that victim was repairing his car, changing a tire, or pumping gas at the gas pump. A motor vehicle would not be in the immediate presence of a victim, however, if the victim’s car was taken while the victim was in a store away from his car. See 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 15, 1983, at 283. We can infer from these comments that immediate presence would be satisfied when the victim was in close proximity to his or her automobile at the time of the taking. We may also infer that the taking is not in the immediate presence of a victim if the victim and the victim’s car are separated by an enclosed structure. The problem however, is whether or not the immediate presence requirement under section 18 — 3 (720 ILCS 5/18 — 3 (West 1996)) can be satisfied where the victim is farther than a few feet from the vehicle but not inside an enclosed structure. In other words, to what extent does the term “immediate” modify the term “presence” under section 18 — 3 (720 ILCS 5/18 — 3 (West 1996)). As pointed out earlier, although the immediate presence language of the vehicular hijacking statute has not been the subject of interpretation in any reported Illinois cases, the “presence” requirement of the robbery statute has. People v. Blake, 144 Ill. 2d 314, 320, 579 N.E.2d 861 (1991). And, given the similarity in the language of the two statutes a review of the cases interpreting the requirement of “presence” under the robbery statute is instructive. People v. Aguilar, 286 Ill. App. 3d 493, 497, 676 N.E.2d 324 (1997). “In Illinois, the test for presence under the robbery and armed robbery statute is satisfied if the property taken was sufficiently within the possession or control of the person so that it can be said that violence or the threat of violence was the means by which the taking was effected.” Blake, 144 Ill. 2d at 320. Under the robbery statute the term “presence” has been interpreted broadly and thus “presence *** may be established if the owner, possessor or custodian of the property is on the premises at the time of the occurrence.” See Blake, 144 Ill. 2d at 320 (property in presence of the victim even when that property is located on the first floor of a house while the victim was on the second floor); People v. Harris, 195 Ill. App. 3d 421, 423, 552 N.E.2d 392 (1990) (property is in the presence of a victim when it is in the possession of or under the control of the victim in such a way, or to such an extent, that violence or fear of violence was the means the robber used to take it; therefore, defendant’s taking of money from a tote bag in an adjoining room from victim satisfied presence); People v. Lee, 222 Ill. App. 3d 436, 442, 584 N.E.2d 185 (1991) (victim’s purse was in her presence where defendant obtained keys from victim and went into another room and unlocked a desk in order to take victim’s purse); People v. Pavic, 104 Ill. App. 3d 436, 432 N.E.2d 1074 (1982) (presence requirement satisfied where defendant took victim’s property from another room following a sexual assault); People v. Carpenter, 95 Ill. App. 3d 722, 726-27, 420 N.E.2d 640 (1981) (property was taken from the presence of a victim even though that victim was in another room at the time of the taking and did not see defendants take anything); People v. Smith, 78 Ill. 2d 298, 303-04, 399 N.E.2d 1289 (1980) (presence requirement of robbery statute met where victims were compelled to give up property due to defendant’s bomb threats by telephone). Given the parallels between the language of the vehicular hijacking statute and the robbery statute, it is my opinion that the vehicular hijacking statute was drafted with the robbery statute in mind. See 88th 111. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 15, 1993, at 283 (Senator Hawkinson stating during the legislative debates that “it’s the same language that we have in terms of robbery”). In fact, section 18 — 1 was amended to reflect that: “A person commits robbery when he or she takes property, except a motor vehicle covered by section 18 — 3 or 18 — 4, from the person or presence of another by the use of force or threatening the imminent use of force.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/18 — 1 (West 1996); 720 ILCS 5/18 — 3, 18 — 4 (West 1996). The taking by force or the threat of force is the “gist” of the offense of robbery. People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 525, 609 N.E.2d 1366 (1992). Therefore, I believe that like the robbery statute, the “gist” of the vehicular hijacking offense is the taking of specific property, a motor vehicle, by force or the threat of force. Moreover, although the taking by force or the threat of force must be from the person or immediate presence of another, the statute does not require the victim to be physically present in the vehicle when the taking occurs. In order to effectuate the purpose of the statute, I would conclude that the immediate presence requirement is satisfied if at the time of the taking the motor vehicle is in close proximity to the victim. I would further conclude that the statutory language does not require the victim to be physically next to the vehicle at the time of the taking, which, in my opinion, is what the majority decision holds. Rather, close proximity is a measure to be determined by the jury as a question of fact. Thus, if immediate presence includes an area in close proximity to the victim, a jury could easily have concluded that the vehicle in this case was taken from the victim’s immediate presence. As the majority points out, it is well settled that in reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the pertinent inquiry is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Williams, 118 Ill. 2d 407, 416, 515 N.E.2d 1230 (1987). A review of the evidence in this case showed the following. The incident giving rise to these charges occurred on Sunday, May 5, 1996. Prior to May 5, 1996, the defendant, Toijuan Cooksey, and the victim, Iramie Lavizzio, had been dating for about six weeks. During that time period, Lavizzio had loaned the defendant her car on several occasions, had loaned him money and on at least one previous occasion, the defendant went with Lavizzio when she made a bank deposit for the J. Riggins clothing store where she worked. On the morning of the incident Lavizzio left the J. Riggins store located at the.River Oaks Mall to make a bank deposit. Her plan immediately after making the deposit was to pick up the defendant to give him a ride. The defendant lived a short distance from the River Oaks Mall and he had called Lavizzio at the store that morning to request a ride. Once Lavizzio was outside the service doors of the mall, a person in a green jogging suit with a scarf around his mouth jumped from behind a garbage can. When this person jumped out in front of her, Lavizzio began running, dropped the bank deposit bag because she was afraid and immediately began yelling for help. Then Lavizzio saw the same person in the green jogging suit pick up the deposit bag. That person chased her, told her to come back and then caught up to her. The offender grabbed Lavizzio, stuck something into her back and demanded her car keys. When she turned and gave her car keys to the assailant she recognized him as Toijuan Cooksey. After she gave the defendant her car keys he pushed her and told her to run. Lavizzio did run immediately into the mall to notify security that she had just been robbed. Another witness, Daniel Shepherd, who. was in the mall parking lot at the time, heard Lavizzio scream and saw the defendant push her. He also saw the defendant run toward a burgundy car. The burgundy car Cooksey ran toward was later identified as belonging to Lavizzio. Shepherd then saw the offender get into the victim’s car, get out briefly to pick something up, get back into the car and speed off. Shepherd said he was about 50 feet from the defendant and Lavizzio when he observed the occurrence. Shepherd also testified that the burgundy car was approximately 25 feet from the location where the defendant accosted Lavizzio. Shepherd said about five seconds elapsed from the time he observed the defendant push Lavizzio until the time the defendant first entered Lavizzio’s car. Shepherd gave a physical description of Cooksey to the police and said the offender was wearing a green hooded jogging suit. He was also able to observe part of the victim’s license plate as the offender drove away. Mr. Shepherd positively identified the defendant as the offender in a lineup a few days later. Lavizzio identified several photographs showing the area where the property was taken. She testified that the top of exhibit IB (which is part of record on appeal) shows where she dropped the store keys and bank deposit bag and that the same photograph shows where her car had been parked before it was taken. Lavizzio said her car was parked in the third or fourth parking space depicted on the right-hand side of the exhibit. Exhibit IB shows where the victim’s vehicle was parked in relation to the mall doors where Lavizzio was first approached by Cooksey. Lavizzio’s testimony also revealed that just one week before this incident, Cooksey went with Lavizzio when she made a bank deposit. On that morning, Lavizzio and the defendant drove her car to the same service doors of the mall. Lavizzio went in the service doors, clocked in, turned on the lights, opened the safe and got the money to make the bank deposit. Cooksey remained in the car near the service entrance at that time. Then both Lavizzio and Cooksey drove in her car to make the bank deposit. After making the deposit, Cooksey dropped Lavizzio off at the same service doors and left in her burgundy car. According to Lavizzio’s testimony, Cooksey had dropped her off and picked her up at the service mall entrance on several occasions before the robbery. The testimony also showed that the victim parted with her car keys only after the defendant demanded them from her and after the defendant thrust something into her back. Lavizzio testified on cross-examination that, immediately before the incident, her car was parked in the area near the service entrance where the defendant first approached her. In addition, according to Shepherd, Lavizzio was within 25 feet of her car when the defendant got in the car. It took only seconds for the defendant to take the car from its location and flee. The evidence also disclosed that the defendant knew her car was present at the mall parking lot because Lavizzio was going to give him a ride after she made the bank deposit. The defendant also knew that she would drive her car to the bank to make the deposit because she had done so on the previous occasion. Under all of these facts the jury could reasonably conclude that the car was taken from her immediate presence because it was in close proximity to her at the time of the taking. The jury could also reasonably conclude the car was taken from her person because she had actual physical control of her keys, and thus control of her car, up until the time she was forced to give up her car keys. Although the majority finds it significant that Lavizzio was not approaching her car at the time of the taking, that she was not physically present in her car at the time of the taking, and that she was not attempting to gain entry to her car at the time of the taking, the language of the statute does not require these actions to establish immediate presence. It seems clear that the purpose of this statute was to deter the forceful taking of motor vehicles from persons in and around their cars, since such situations have proven to be increasingly dangerous. As stated earlier, the language contained in the vehicular hijacking statute is almost identical to the robbery statute but for the immediate presence language. If the intent of the legislature was to limit the offense of vehicular hijacking to situations where the victim was inside the vehicle, approaching the vehicle or attempting to gain entry to the vehicle instead of merely being in close proximity, the legislature could easily have done so with language to that effect. I agree with the majority when it states that “[i]t is neither the duty nor the privilege of a reviewing court to substitute its judgment as to the weight of disputed evidence or the credibility of witnesses for that of the trier of fact who heard the evidence presented and observed the demeanor of the witnesses.” 309 Ill. App. 3d at 846. Consequently, it was the jury’s province to determine whether or not the defendant took the victim’s automobile from her person or immediate presence. Therefore, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it is my opinion that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took Lavizzio’s vehicle from her person or immediate presence as the statute requires. Therefore, I dissent.