Court Opinion

ID: 9627303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:41:59.93094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:32.845925
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion that there was either no evidence to establish whether the Hospital should have had a t-PA protocol in 1998 and whether the lack of such a protocol might have prevented its use for Mr. Reed, or insufficient evidence to at least create a fact issue, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. I disagree with the majority’s determination that the trial court’s decision to exclude two of the appellants’ experts on the appropriate standard of care for a hospital regarding t-PA was not an abuse of discretion.
In its opinion the majority acknowledges this own court’s opinion in LaCroix as our guide in determining what duties a hospital may have directly to a patient. Denton Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. LaCroix, 947 S.W.2d 941, 950 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied). In that opinion, we held that a hospital has a duty to use reasonable care in formulating the policies and procedures that govern a hospital’s medical staff and *416nonphysician personnel. Id. To determine whether a hospital has deviated from its duty, we must determine whether a hospital deviated from the standard of care to a degree that constitutes negligence. Id. <cWhile the standard of administrative care at a hospital may be established by lay testimony, expert testimony is required when the underlying issue involves the performance of medical procedures.” Id. at 950-51.
In the LaCroix case, medical expert testimony of the very type excluded by this trial court was admitted. There, however, it was the hospital’s failure to follow its own policies and procedures as opposed to failing to even have a policy or procedure, as is the case here. Maj. Op. at 413. This distinction is of no significance. Testimony was clear that there were only two requirements for providing t-PA as a potential treatment: a functioning CT scanner and the medicine itself. This hospital had both. The appellants’ two experts, who were sufficiently qualified to testify as to causation, were, by definition, then qualified to testify to appropriate hospital policy: if there is no hospital policy in place to accommodate (or even prevent) a medical doctor from acting in conformity with the current medical standard of care, surely the patient has presented enough evidence to show that the hospital standard of care has not been met. Interestingly, the majority accuses the appellants of failing to provide hospital expert testimony regarding the medical standard of care, and failing to provide medical expert testimony for opinions on hospital policies. Maj. Op. at 412, 418. Therefore, I would conclude and hold that the appellants’ experts should not have been struck as to standard of care, and the trial court should not have granted the no-evidence motion for summary judgment and resulting final summary judgment.
For these reasons, I believe the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for trial.