Court Opinion

ID: 9713996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:28:17.71859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.000837
License: Public Domain

*402Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
Appellants suggest, and their amicus strongly advocates, that a prevailing party should not be permitted to file a cross-appeal due to the lack of aggrievement. See Brief for Appellants at 26 n. 11; Brief for Amicus the Pennsylvania Defense Institute at 4-16; accord G. Ronald Darlington, Kevin J. McKeon, Daniel R. Schuckers & Kristen W. Brown, Pennsylvania Appellate Practice § 511.4 (2d ed. Supp.2004).1 A contrary position has emerged in the federal courts, in that several circuit courts of appeals have permitted prevailing parties to file protective, conditional cross-appeals “to insure that any errors against [the cross-appellant’s] interests are reviewed so that if the main appeal results in modification of the judgment his grievances will be determined as well.” Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. v. Love Funding Corp., 496 F.3d 171, 173 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1465 (D.C.Cir.1994)).2 Appellants observe that the current status of Pennsylvania law is uncertain on this point. See Brief for Appellants at 26 n. 11.3
*403In light of the manner in which the present case has been framed for our review, and since the majority does not specifically address the viability of a conditional cross-appeal in Pennsylvania, I reserve my own final conclusions on the matter for a future case. Here, I express only my present inclination toward the position that such cross-appeals generally should not be permitted. It seems to me that, on balance, the collective burden of screening and addressing such cross-appeals may outweigh the benefits from the opportunity for an appellate court to advance the resolution of the litigation in individual cases.4
The parties also discuss the question of whether, where conditional cross-appeals are filed, the cross-appellants must raise all challenges they may wish to pursue with regard to any previous orders of the trial court on pain of waiver. The aggrievement inquiry is obviously a threshold consideration to this question, and therefore, and in light of the majority’s disposition, I also decline to address this issue here. I note only that this waiver question appears to remain an open one, *404at least in the abstract. Thus, it is presently a relevant consideration for practitioners evaluating the option of a cross-appeal.
On the subject of the majority’s treatment of Civil Procedural Rule 1710(d), I agree that Appellants’ actual filing of a specific cross-appeal relative to the class-certification matter substantially undermines Appellees’ arguments.5 I have a modest difference, however, with the majority’s subsequent analysis, which appears to hinge on the proposition that the fact of a previous decision on the merits ceases to exist upon its vacatur on appeal. See Majority Opinion at 399-01, 973 A.2d at 422-23. While this is certainly one way of conceptualizing the rule’s application, I prefer the federal courts’ approach of recognizing the ambiguity of the “decision on the merits” rubric, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 Amendments, and replacing it with language reflecting that the class certification decision is open to alteration or amendment pending a final decision on the merits.6 Accord Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(C). See generally 6A Fed. Proc. L.Ed. § 12:293 (2008) (“District courts are required to reassess their *405class rulings as the case develops and to take cognizance of changed factual situations, and any certification determination may be modified, expanded, subdivided, or vacated in light of subsequent developments in the litigation.”).7
In the present case, regardless of whether a separate notice of appeal was lodged relative to the class certification order, the majority decision of this Court determining that no agency relationship existed between Appellants and Appellees undermined the basis on which class treatment had been permitted. In my view, this fundamental alteration in the prevailing circumstances justified the filing and consideration of a subsequent decertification motion in the common pleas court, with or without a specific cross-appeal to the class-certification order.8 Cf. Majority Opinion at 399-01, 973 A.2d at 422-23.

. Under this position, the initial basis supporting the majority decision (relying upon Appellants' actual filing of a specific cross-appeal in response to Appellees’ waiver argument) would be irrelevant, since the cross-appeal would be non-cognizable in any event in light of Appellants' status as prevailing parties. Moreover, the question of whether Appellants were required to file a cross-appeal, see Majority Opinion at at 398-400, 973 A.2d at 421-22, also could be answered in a summary fashion.

. These courts appear to take prudential considerations into account in assessing reviewability. For example, the Second Circuit has explained:
Whether an issue that is not technically part of a judgment should be addressed at all, and, if so, as a grounds for affirmance or on a cross-appeal, may depend on the specifics of each case. Whether the issue is ripe in the sense that the record is sufficient for an appellate decision and whether a decision at the time would conserve judicial resources by materially advancing the proceeding will also differ from case to case.
Love Funding, 496 F.3d at 175.

. Compare Darlington, et al., Pennsylvania Appellate Practice § 511.4 ("Cross appeals or cross petitions by parties who were not aggrieved, i.e., who prevailed below, have been consistently dismissed in Pennsylvania."), with Saint Thomas Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Wycko, 758 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000) ("We would note ... that, although a party *403receives the relief it sought, albeit on an alternative basis, that fact alone would not preclude the successful party from filing a protective cross appeal on an issue which the lower tribunal decided against it, and a party choosing to proceed in such a manner, i.e., not filing a protective cross appeal, does so at the risk that the issue on which it prevailed below will be reversed.”).

. The Court, however, should consider the scenario in which, but for the disposition challenged by the main appeal, the litigation otherwise would be final. Cf. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 600 Pa. 1, 38-39, 963 A.2d 409, 432 (2009) (overturning a post-conviction court’s award of a new trial, followed by consideration of an issue raised in the petitioner’s cross-appeal from that court's denial of all other claims). In such circumstances, on the one hand, it would seem to be a formulaic exercise to reverse the order subject to the main appeal and return the matter to the common pleas court for an entry of judgment, only to be followed by another appeal. On the other hand, attempting to recognize exceptions to the requirement of present aggrievement may entail unavoidable uncertainties concerning where the line falls between permissible and impermissible cross-appeals. Therefore, adherence to an established routine applying to all cases may be the preferable course.
Certainly, the Court, acting through its rules-committee structure in the first instance, should strive to provide clear direction concerning any new requirements pertaining to cross-appeals, and parties should not be subject to waiver absent such requirements.

. Appellees have consistently and inaccurately represented to the courts that "Block did not in any way seek review of Judge Herron’s Order granting class certification against it.’’ Brief for Appellees at 9. Substantial private and public resources have been expended based upon this erroneous representation, and it has served to substantially compound the tremendous delay amassing in this protracted litigation. In such circumstances, I would admonish that this Court expects better of the attorneys and litigants.

. In my view, it would be untenable to force a court to maintain class treatment if, for example, it became apparent after certification that the class was unmanageable.
Appellees’ position is essentially that, by virtue of a common pleas court having made some unrelated, erroneous decision on the merits, the court should be deprived of its ability to make otherwise appropriate adjustments to class treatment. See Brief for Appellees at 18. The Rules of Civil Procedure, however, are to be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of actions. See Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 126. While Appellees’ position advocating a literal reading of Rule 1710(d) is not specious, I believe sufficient ambiguity is present to justify consideration of the inefficiencies and injustice that may arise if the common pleas courts were to be hamstrung by class certification orders. I also note that courts have tools available to redress abuses of the decertification mechanism.

. In light of the majority’s response, see Majority Opinion, at 400 n. 9, 973 A.2d at 423 n. 9, perhaps I should be clearer. I do not mean to invoke language that is not presently in our rule. Rather, my intent is to point out that our present rule is ambiguous, as noted by the federal advisory committee and various commentators upon their review of the similar language previously used in Federal Rule 23. See, e.g., 6A Fed. Proc., L.Ed. § 12:293 (2008). Indeed, well prior to the amendment to the federal rule, the United States Supreme Court and many other federal courts were reading former Rule 23's “decision on the merits” language as referring to final judgment. See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 2451, 2453 n. 6, 57 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978). I find such an interpretation to be reasonable and consistent with the purposes of the rules and the appropriate administration of class action proceedings.
The 2003 amendments to Federal Rule 23(c)(1)(C) also eliminated the proviso that a class certification "may be conditional” (which also is present in our Rule 1710(d)) to discourage class treatment in instances in which the requirements are not satisfied. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 Amendments. The change also removes any inference from this language that class treatment not denominated as conditional must necessarily be considered permanent. I believe we would also be well advised to consider a similar change to our rules.

. Appellees also argue the common pleas court lacked authority to decertify the class, since the Superior Court had ruled that the confidential relationship issue could be considered on a class-wide basis. See Brief for Appellees at 18-19 n. 11. I differ with Appellees’ premise, however, since the relevant Superior Court decision was explicitly a narrow one tied to the summaiy judgment inquiry. See Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., Ill A.2d 95, 107-08 (Pa.Super.2001). Thus, and because the appropriateness of class treatment may depend on developing *406circumstances, I do not regard the Superior Court's decision as foreclosing further inquiry into the propriety of the certification.