Court Opinion

ID: 9353093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 21:04:32.071057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:31.841860
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                      COURT OF APPEAL
     J
                                         FIRST CIRCUIT

                                         2022 CA 0626

                           VELOCITY INVESTMENTS, LLC

                                             VERSUS

                                        ADAM PASQUA

                                                  JUDGMENT RENDERED: '        JAN 10 2023

                               Appealed from Ascension Parish Court
                               Parish of Ascension • State of Louisiana
                                      Docket Number 2021- 008

                       The Honorable Erin W. Lanoux, Presiding Judge

           Garth Jonathan Ridge                              COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
           Baton Rouge, Louisiana                            DEFENDANT— Adam Pasqua

           Mary Grace Pollet                                 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEF,
           Adam R. Deniger                                   PLAIN T[ FF-   Velocity Investments,
           Gregory M. Eaton                                  LLC
           Michael L. Lancaster
           Baton Rouge, Louisiana

                     BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND ZANIER, JJ.

UV              c
         Car)
WELCH, J.

       In this matter, the parish court granted summary judgment in favor of a debt

collector for the balance and interest owed on the note of a repossessed motor vehicle

that was disposed of at sheriff's sale. The debtor appealed. For the following reasons,

we reverse.

                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Adam Pasqua purchased a used 2011 Infiniti G37 on November 28, 2014, for

the total cash price of $44,744.24          from North American Automotive Group in

Gonzales, Louisiana. Mr. Pasqua made an initial down payment of $2, 000. 00 and

financed the remaining $ 42, 744. 24       purchase price through a retail installment sale

contract calling for seventy- two (       72) monthly payments of $593. 67 at 20. 95%

interest. The contract granted the creditor -seller a security interest in the vehicle.'

The contract provided:

               3. IF YOU PAY LATE OR BREAK YOUR OTHER
               PROMISES

               c. You may have to pay attorney' s fees and collection
               costs. If we hire an attorney to collect what you owe... .

               d. We may tame the vehicle from you. If you default, we
               may take ( repossess) the vehicle from you after we give
               you any notice and wait the time the law requires.... We
               may only take the vehicle if we do so peacefully and the
               law allows it....

               e. How you can get the vehicle back if we take it. If we
               repossess the vehicle, you may pay to get it back (redeem).
               We will tell you how much to pay to redeem. Your right
               to redeem ends when we sell the vehicle.

               L We will sell the vehicle if you do not get it back. If you
               do not redeem, we will sell the vehicle. We will send you
               a written notice of sale before selling the vehicle.
               We will apply the money from the sale, less allowed
               expenses, to the amount you owe.... If money from the
               sale is not enough to pay the amount you owe, you must
               pay the rest to us. If you do not pay the amount when we

 Specifically, the contract provided: " Security Interest. You are giving a security interest in the
vehicle being purchased."

                                                 2
                ask, we may charge you interest on that amount until you
                pay at the Base Rate shown on the front of this contract.

        North American Automotive Group assigned its rights in Mr.                          Pasqua' s

contract to Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. (" CPS"). After Mr. Pasqua defaulted

on the requisite monthly payments under the contract, CPS repossessed the vehicle

in May 2017, and had it sold at sheriff's sale in July 2017.

        In November 2018, CPS assigned and transferred all its rights, title, and

interest in Mr.      Pasqua' s contract to Velocity Investments,               LLC ("    Velocity").

Velocity filed suit to recover the balance of the contract allegedly totaling

 15, 960. 82, together with 5. 75% interest from the date ofjudgment, and costs. Mr.

Pasqua answered the petition, entering general denials and raising the issue of the

commercial reasonableness of the sale of the repossessed vehicle.'

        Thereafter, Velocity filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that there

was no genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Pasqua owed the $ 15, 960. 82 balance

under the contract. Mr. Pasqua opposed Velocity' s motion, contending that the

default notices allegedly sent to hint, the repossession of the vehicle, and the sale of

the vehicle did not comply with the Uniform Commercial Code ("                   UCC").

       Following a hearing held on December 14, 2021,                   the parish court granted

Velocity' s motion for summary judgment. The parish court signed a judgment in

accordance with its ruling on December 22, 2021, in favor of Velocity and against

Mr. Pasqua in the amount of $15, 960. 82, together with 5. 75% interest from the date

of judgment,' plus all costs of the proceedings. Mr. Pasqua now appeals!

I Mr. Pasqua admitted only his domicile; he denied every other allegation in the petition " for lack
of sufficient information to justify a belief therein."

3 Although prayed for by Velocity in its petition, the parish court erred in awarding judicial interest
at the rate of 5. 75% from the date of judgment. The judicial interest rate for 2021. was 3. 5%. See
La. R. S. 13. 4202( B); see also Louisiana Bar Journal, " 2021 Judicial Interest Rate is 3. 5%,"
December 2020/ January 2021, Vol. 68, No. 4, p. 282.

4 Mr. Pasqua timely filed a motion for a devolutive appeal on January 5, 2022. The parish court
signed an order of appeal on January 20, 2022, notice of which was transmitted by the Clerk of
Court to the parties on January 26, 2022.

                                                    3
                                  SUMMARY JUDGMENT

       Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria

that govern the trial court' s consideration of whether summary judgment is

appropriate. In re Succession of Beard, 2013- 1717 ( La. App.                  1st Cir. 616114), 147

So. 3d 753, 759- 60. That is, after an opportunity for adequate discovery, summary

judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents

show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)( 3).

       The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment rests with the

mover—    here, Velocity. La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1).        If the mover will not bear the

burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for

summary judgment, the mover' s burden on the motion does not require him to negate

all essential elements of the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense. Rather, the

mover must point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more

elements essential to the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense.'              The burden is on

the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. La. C. C.P. art. 966( D)( 1).    If the non- moving party fails to do so, there is no

genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be granted. Murphy v.

Savannah, 2018- 0991 ( La. 5/ 8/ 19), 282 So. 3d 1034, 1038.

       In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court' s role is not to evaluate

the weight of the evidence or to make a credibility determination, but instead to

determine whether or not there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Hines v.

Garrett, 2004- 0806 (La. 6/ 25/ 04), 876 So. 2d 764, 765 (per curiam). A genuine issue

s As the plaintiff, Velocity bears the burden of proof at trial to establish a prima facie case of a
debt owed to it by Mr. Pasqua. Once a prima facie case has been established by the plaintiff by a
preponderance of the evidence, the burden shifts to the defendant, here, Mr. Pasqua. See Dupre v.
Joe' s Riverside Seafood, Inc.,   578 So. 2d 158, 163 ( La. App. I"   Cir. 1991).

                                                  4
is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree. However, if reasonable persons

could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary

judgment is appropriate. Hines, 876 So.2d at 765- 66; Marks v. Schultz, 2020- 0197

 La. App.      I"   Cir. 12/ 10/ 20), 316 So. 3d 534, 538. Material facts are those that

potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect the litigant' s success, or determine the

outcome of a legal dispute. Jenkins v. Hernandez, 2019-0874 ( La. App.                              1st Cir.

613120), 305 So. 3d 365, 371, writ denied, 2020- 00835 ( La. 10/ 20120), 303 So. 3d

315. In other words, a fact is "         material"       when its existence or nonexistence is

essential to the plaintiff' s cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery.

Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp.,              Inc., 93- 2512 ( La. 715194), 639 So. 2d 730,

751. Any doubt as to a dispute regarding an issue of material fact must be resolved

against granting the motion and in favor of a trial on the merits. Id. Because it is the

applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in

dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the

case. Shoemake v. Scott, 2019- 1261 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 8/ 3/ 20), 310 So. 3d 191, 193-

94.

                                 LAW AND DISCUSSION

       In support of its motion for summary judgment, Velocity submitted6 its

original   petition;   Mr. Pasqua' s answer; Mr. Pasqua' s admissions; Mr. Pasqua" s

6 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966( A)(4) provides that "[ tjhe only documents that
may be filed in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories,     certified     medical   records,   written   stipulations,   and

admissions."   Also attached to Velocity' s motion were: request for admission of fact; note
interrogatories; surrender interrogatories; request for genuineness of documents and request for
production of documents; Mr. Pasqua' s response to requests for genuineness and production of
documents; and an October 7, 2020 letter from Velocity to Mr. Pasqua notifying him that Velocity
had received his account for collection. The above -listed documents do not fall into any category
of documents listed in La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(4); however, those documents were not objected to.
Thus, under La. C.C. P. art. 966( D)( 2),           shall consider any documents to which no
                                            this court "

objection is made"     to determine, de novo, if any evidentiary value should be given to the
documents. See Pottinger v. Price, 2019- 0183 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 10/ 23119), 289 So. 3d 1047, 1053.
Pursuant to La. C. C. P. arts. 1441, 1466- 67, and 1457- 59, we find that the request for admission of
fact, the interrogatories, and requests for and response to production of documents have evidentiary
value in conjunction with the corresponding responsive evidence, i.e., Mr, Pasqua' s admissions,
answers to the interrogatories, and produced documents. However, the October 7, 2020 letter is an
unsworn and unverified document because it was not attached to an affidavit or otherwise

                                                   5
answers     to "   note"   interrogatories;     Mr.     Pasqua' s       answers   to "     surrender"

interrogatories; and the affidavit of Alia Shaalan,                 a   compliance       associate   of

Velocity' s legal network, along with several attachments, including the sale and

assignment of certain accounts from CPS to Velocity; CPS' s affidavit of sale of

account to Velocity; the November 28, 2014 retail installment sale contract; North

American Automotive Group' s assignment of Mr. Pasqua' s contract to CPS; Mr.

Pasqua' s credit statement application; Velocity' s pre -possession notice; Velocity' s

notice of plan to sell vehicle; sheriff s sale bill of sale; and an account spreadsheet.

                                     Velocity' s Affidavit

       In his first, second, and fifth assignments of error, Mr. Pasqua argues that the

parish court erred by granting summary judgment because the evidence submitted

by Velocity in support of its motion was not properly authenticated, specifically the

attachments to Ms. Shaalan' s affidavit. Mr. Pasqua further argues that the evidence

attached to Ms. Shaalan' s affidavit was not admissible under the business records

exception to the hearsay rule. Mr. Pasqua also contends that Ms. Shaalan' s affidavit

does not comply with La. R.S. 13: 3733( D).

       Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 967( A) provides, in pertinent part:

 Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set

forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively

that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."                    Personal

knowledge encompasses only those facts that the affiant saw, heard, or perceived

with his own senses. See Berard v. L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace,

authenticated. A document that is not an affidavit or sworn to in any way, or is not certified or
attached to an affidavit, has no evidentiary value on a motion for summary judgment. Therefore,
in meeting the burden of proof, unsworn or unverified documents, such as the October 7, 2020
letter, annexed to motions for summary judgment are not self -proving and will not be considered;
attaching such documents to a motion for summary judgment does not transform such documents
into competent summary judgment evidence. See Bunge N. Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Corn. & Indus.
   Louisiana Dep' t of Econ. Dev., 2007- 1746 ( La. App. I" Cir. 5/ 2/ 0$), 991 So. 2d 511, 527, writ
denied, 2008- 1594 ( La. 11/ 21108), 996 So. 2d 1106.

                                                 no
LLC, 2009- 1202 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 2/ 12/ 10), 35 So. 3d 334, 349, writ denied, 2010-

0715 ( La. 6/ 4/ 10),   38 So.3d 302. An affirmative showing of competency cannot be

established without a predicate showing of personal knowledge. Otherwise, personal

knowledge may be based on hearsay or other incompetent evidence. Unifund CCR

Partners v. Perkins, 2012- 1851 ( La. App.      1st Cir. 9/ 25113), 134 So. 3d 626, 631- 32.

       With regard to business records, the following are not excluded by the hearsay

rule of La. C. E. art. 803( 6), even though the declarant is available as a witness:

               Records of regularly conducted business activity. A
               memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
               form, including but not limited to that which is stored by
               the use of an optical disk imaging system, of acts, events,
               conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the
              time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
              knowledge, if made and kept in the course of a regularly
              conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
              practice of that business activity to make and to keep the
               memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as

               shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
              witness, unless the source of information or the method or
               circumstances      of   preparation     indicate    lack    of

              trustworthiness. This exception is inapplicable unless the
              recorded information was furnished to the business either
              by a person who was routinely acting for the business in
              reporting the information or in circumstances under which
              the statement would not be excluded by the hearsay rule.

       Louisiana jurisprudence has held that the wording of La. C. E. art. 803( 6) does

not preclude the introduction of incorporated business records originally generated

by another business, if properly authenticated and determined to be trustworthy by

the trial court. See Burdette v. Drushell, 2001- 2494 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 12/ 20/ 02),

837 So.2d 54, 62- 63, writ denied, 2003- 0682 ( La. 5/ 16/ 03), 843 So.2d 1132. A party

who seeks to submit written hearsay evidence pursuant to La. C. E. art. 803( 6) must

authenticate it by a qualified witness. The witness laying the foundation for

admissibility of the business records does not have to be the preparer of the records.

Finch v. ATCNancom Management Services Ltd. Partnership, 2009- 483 ( La.

App. 5" Cir. 01/ 26/ 10), 33 So. 3d 215, 220. A qualified witness only needs to be

                                            7
familiar with the record-keeping system of the entity whose business records are

sought to be introduced. Id. at 220.

      Louisiana Revised Statutes 13: 3733 provides, in pertinent part:

               A. Any business may cause any or all records kept by such
               business in regular course of its operation to be recorded,
               copied,    or   reproduced         by    any   electronic
                                                                            imaging,
               photographic,        photostatic    or    miniature     photographic

               process    which      correctly,   accurately,    and    permanently
               copies,reproduces or forms a medium for copying or
               reproducing the original record on a film or other durable
               material... .

               B.   Any      such
                                      electronically      imaged,      photographic,

               photostatic     or      miniature        photographic       copy    or

               reproduction shall be deemed to be an original record for
               all purposes and shall be treated as an original record in all
               courts or administrative agencies for the purpose of its
               admissibility in evidence....

Section 3733( D) additionally provides that a copy or reproduction shall be deemed

an original or authentic copy of the original record or document when certified with

a certificate reading " substantially" as follows. " I,                do hereby certify that this

document is a true and correct copy of the original thereof, consisting of                page( s),

being a reproduction thereof from the records on file with the undersigned, in

accordance with Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 13, Section 3733."

      Ms. Shaalan, by way of affidavit, states that she is employed as a compliance

associate with Velocity' s legal network, the servicer of "defendant' s account"                on

behalf of Velocity. Ms. Shaalan states that she is " familiar and well            acquainted" with

Mr. Pasqua' s account and "         is duly qualified and authorized to make this affidavit

based upon personal knowledge and business records of [Velocity] as well as the

account information supplied to [         Velocity]." Ms. Shaalan specifically states that

Velocity is the holder of credit issued through CPS, which shows a total balance on

the auto loan account of Adam Pasqua in the amount of $15, 960. 82, subject to a

credit of $.00, as of October 15, 2020. She certified that all documents attached to

her affidavit are correct originals or true and correct copies of the originals, being

                                                   K
reproductions from the records on file with Velocity in accordance with La. R.S.

13: 3733.

       Based on the applicable law, we conclude that Ms. Shaalan' s affidavit meets

the personal knowledge requirements of La. C. C. P.          art.   967( A). The affidavit

contains facts and information setting forth the basis of Ms.          Shaalan' s personal

knowledge and competency to testify to the matters stated. The affidavit identifies

her position of employment with Velocity and shows that she has personal

knowledge regarding Velocity' s business records. The affidavit discloses the records

that were seen and reviewed by Ms. Shaalan with respect to Mr. Pasqua' s account.

The affidavit also indicates that the documents in question are attached to it. Ms.

Shaalan' s affidavit certified that the business records complied with La. R. S.

13: 3733. Because neither Ms. Shaalan' s affidavit nor the documents attached to it

provide any indication of a lack of trustworthiness, we find that the documents as a

whole sufficiently authenticate Velocity' s claims.

      As it concerns La. C. E. art. 803( 6)'   s business records hearsay exception, Ms.

Shaalan' s affidavit establishes that she is a qualified witness. Where business records

are concerned, La. C. C. P. art. 967 is satisfied when the affiant is qualified to identify

the business records as such. Where the affiant is familiar with the account and

business records,   it is not necessary for the affiant to show that she personally

prepared the business records or that she had direct, independent, first-hand

knowledge of their contents. Durand v. Graham, 2019- 1312 ( La. App. 1St Cir.

6/ 12/ 20), 306 So. 3d 437, 442.

       Finally, while Ms. Shaalan' s affidavit does not contain the exact language

provided for by La.      R.S.   13: 3733( D), we nonetheless find that the affidavit

 substantially" certifies that the documents are true and original copies as required

                                               9
by the statute. Accordingly, we find that these assignments of error are without

merit.'

                           Disposition of Collateral After Default

          In his third and fourth assignments of error, Mr. Pasqua argues that Velocity

failed to prove that the sale of his repossessed vehicle was " commercially

reasonable."    Mr. Pasqua specifically argues that he did not receive the proper notices

required under Louisiana' s commercial law.

          In 1990, Louisiana adopted its own version of Article 9 of the UCC with the

enactment of Louisiana UCC Chapter 9 (" LA UCC -9"), found at La. R.S. 10: 9- 101,

et seq. The LA UCC -9 creates and regulates security interests, which is an " interest

in personal property or fixtures, created by contract, which secures payment or

performance      of an    obligation."     La. R.S.      10: 1- 201( b)( 35). Under LA UCC -9,            a

security interest in favor of a secured parry attaches to collateral ( i.e.,               the movable

subject to the security interest)' at the moment that the security interest is enforceable

against the debtor. La. R.S. 10: 9- 203.

          LA UCC -9 does allow self-help repossession in cases expressly provided by

other law. See La. R.S.            10: 9- 609( a)( 4).   In   1992,   our Legislature enacted the

Additional Default Remedies Act ( Louisiana' s Self H
                                                    - elp Law),                     permitting certain

categories of creditors limited self-help repossession rights under strictly regulated

procedures. See La. R. S. 6: 965- 967. The remedies available under this law are in

addition to all other remedies available to enforce nonpossessory security interests.

See La. R.S. 6: 965( B), 6: 966( E). The statute can be used only to repossess "                   motor

vehicles"     and "   motorcycles"       as defined in La. R.S.            32: 1252.     See   La.    R. S.

7 We pretermit discussion of Mr. Pasqua' s final assignment of error (No. 6). In our de novo review
of Velocity' s motion for summary judgment, we only considered the documents admissible under
                           Accordingly, the only affidavit ( and attachments) that we considered
La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(4).
was the one filed in conjunction with Velocity' s motion for summary judgment.
s La. R.S. 10: 9- 102( a)( 12) ("` Collateral' means the property subject to a security interest ....")

                                                    10
6: 965( C)( 2).   Louisiana' s Self H
                                    - elp Law permits the repossession of motor vehicles

upon default by the debtor without judicial process to enforce a security interest. The

process is outlined in La. R.S. 6: 966, in pertinent part, as follows:

                  A. (2) Prior to the use of the procedures set forth in this
                  Chapter, a secured party shall send notice to all debtors in
                  writing at the last known address of the debtors, of the
                  right of the secured party to take possession of the
                  collateral without further notice upon. default as defined in
                  R. S. 6: 965( C).    Such notice shall include the debtor' s
                  name, last known address, and description of the collateral
                  and the following in at least twelve -point type:
                   Louisiana law permits repossession of motor vehicles
                  upon default without further notice or judicial process."

                   3) After obtaining possession of the collateral, the secured
                  party may dispose of it in any manner permitted by
                  Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Law, R.S.
                  10: 9- 101   et
                                    seq.by resort to available judicial
                                           or

                  procedures, and may cause the collateral to be retitled....
                  B.    Unless otherwise agreed,        a secured party has,        on

                  default, the right to take possession of the collateral. In

                  taking possession, a secured party may proceed without
                  judicial process if this can be done without a breach of the
                  peace or may proceed by other remedies available by law.

                  E.    The secured party shall have and retain all of the
                  possessory and enforcement rights provided under
                  Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws, R. S. 10: 9-
                  101 et seq., including the right to recover a deficiency
                  or     any   other    costs    associated     with   the    seizure

                  proceeding provided for in this Chapter. [                 Emphasis
                  added.]

       As set forth in La. R.S. 6: 966( A)(3),          the secured party may dispose of the

repossessed collateral in any manner permitted by LA UCC -9. The disposition of

collateral after default is governed by La. R.S. 10: 9- 610, in part, as follows:

                   a)   Disposition after default. After default,         a   secured

                  party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of any
                  or all of the collateral in its present condition or following
                  any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.

                   b) Commercially reasonable disposition. Every aspect
                  of a  disposition of collateral, including the method,
                  manner,      time,    place,   and    other    terms,      must   be

                  commercially reasonable. If commercially reasonable, a
                  secured party may dispose of collateral by public or

                                                   11
               private proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or
               parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms. A
                disclaimer or modification of warranties in a secured
               party' s    disposition      of    collateral     is    commercially
                reasonable. 11l

       A secured party that intends to dispose of collateral under La. R.S. 10:9- 610

shall send a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition to the debtor. La.

R.S.   10: 9- 61I( b).   To comply with the "           reasonable    authenticated     notification"

requirement of La. R.S. 10: 9- 611( b), the contents of a notification must include the

following information— as set forth generally in La. R. S. 10: 9- 613( 1)—

                A) describes the debtor and the secured party;
                B) describes the collateral that is the subject of the
                    intended disposition;
                C) states the method of intended disposition;
                D) states that the debtor is entitled to an accounting of the
                   unpaid indebtedness and states the charge, if any, for
                    an accounting; and
                E) states the time and place of a public disposition or the
                    time after which any other disposition is to be made.

   and as set forth more specifically for consumer goods in La. R.S. 10: 9- 614( l)—

                A) the information specified in R.S. 10: 9- 613( 1);
                B) a description of any liability for a deficiency of the
                    person to which the notification is sent;
                C) a telephone number from which the amount that must
                    be paid to the secured party to redeem the collateral
                    under R.S. 10: 9- 623 is available; and

4 While the term " commercially reasonable manner" is not defined, LA UCC -9 gives some
guidance as to dispositions that satisfy the commercially reasonable requirement. Neighbors
Federal Credit Union v, Anderson, 2015- 1020 ( La. App. I" Cir. 613/ 16), 196 So. 3d 727, 730.
 Good faith" is defined in La. R. S. 10: 1- 201( 20) as " honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." Additionally, La. R. S. 10: 9- 627 provides that a
disposition is made in a commercially reasonable manner if any of the following applies: the
disposition is made in the usual manner on any recognized market; the disposition is made at the
price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition; or the disposition is made
otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of
property that was the subject of the disposition. La. R.S. 10: 9- 627( b). The case law suggests that
the obligation of the secured party to act in a commercially reasonable manner generally means
that the secured party must use his best efforts to see that the highest possible price is received for
the collateral. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Melancon, 95- 1221 ( La. App.       3rd Cir. 6119196), 677
So. 2d 145, 150 ( chin    William D. Hawkland, Hawkland'.s Handbook on Chapter 9 Louisiana
Commercial Law ( 1990),    at Chapter 5, pp. 16- 17). However, the fact that a secured party might
have obtained a greater amount of proceeds by proceeding with a collection, enforcement,
disposition, or acceptance at a different time or in a different method is not, of itself, sufficient to
preclude the secured party from establishing that the enforcement action it chose was made in a
commercially reasonable manner. La. R.S. 10: 9- 627( a).

                                                   12
                  D) a telephone number or mailing address from which
                     additional information concerning the disposition and
                         the obligation secured is available.

See also UCC Comment ( 2) to La. R. S. 10: 9- 613 and 10: 9- 614.

        After disposing of collateral, the proceeds of the disposition are applied first

to the expenses of disposition, second to the obligation secured by the security

interest that is being enforced, and third, in the specified circumstances, to interests

that are subordinate to that security interest. La. R.S. 10: 9- 615( a). After making the

payments and applications required under La. R.S. 10: 9- 615( a), the obligor is liable

for any deficiency. La. R.S. 10: 9- 615( d)( 2).

        Following a disposition in a consumer -goods transaction10 in which the debtor

is liable for a deficiency, the secured party must send to the debtor a written

 explanation"        since the amount of the deficiency is unknown until after the

disposition of the collateral."           See La. R. S. 10: 9- 616( b)( 1).   As defined in La. R.S.

10: 9- 616( a):

                  1) "   Explanation" means a writing that:
                  A) states the amount of the surplus or deficiency;
                  B) provides        an     explanation       in   accordance       with

                         Subsection ( c) of how the secured party calculated the
                         surplus or deficiency;
                  C) states, if applicable, that future debits, credits, charges,
                         including additional credit service charges or interest,
                         rebates, and expenses may affect the amount of the
                         surplus or deficiency; and
                  D) provides a telephone number or mailing address from
                         which    additional       information       concerning       the

                         transaction is available.

to A motor vehicle is a " consumer good" as defined in LA UCC -9. See La. R.S. 10: 9- 109( 1);         La.
R. S. 10: 9- 102( 1)( a); La. R. S. 10: 9- 102( 4)( d); and La. R. S. 10: 9- 105( 1)( h). See also L. David
Cromwell, " Consumer goods,"        Chapter 3. Louisiana UCC Terminology and Types of Collateral,
111. Types of UCC Collateral, Loti[ S1ANA PRACTICE; SECURED TRANSACTIONS §              3: 34 ( 2022- 2023
ed.).

11 See L. David Cromwell, " Disposition of collateral after default— Li ability for deficiency and
entitlement to surplus --    Explanation of calculation in consumer -goods transactions," Chapter 10.
Default Remedies, IV. Non -Judicial Remedies under Louisiana UCC Chapter 9, LOUISIANA
PRAC'T'ICE SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 10: 75 ( 2022- 2023 ed.).

                                                      13
       Louisiana Revised Statutes 10: 9- 616( c)           states that to comply with La. R.S.

10: 9- 616( a)( 1)( B),      an " explanation"   must provide the following information in the

following order:

                 1)   the aggregate amount of obligations secured by the
                security interest under which the disposition was made,
               and, if the amount reflects a rebate of unearned interest or
                credit service charge, an indication of that fact, calculated
               as of a specified date:

                A) if the secured party takes or receives possession of the
                   collateral after default, not more than thirty-five days
                      before the secured party takes or receives possession;
                      or

                B) if the secured party takes or receives possession of the
                      collateral before default or does not take possession of
                      the collateral, not more than thirty- five days before the
                      disposition;
                2) the amount of proceeds of the disposition;
                3) the aggregate amount of the obligations after deducting
                      the amount of proceeds;

                4) the amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types of
                   expenses, including expenses of retaking, holding,

                   preparing for disposition, processing, and disposing of
                   the collateral, and attorney' s fees secured by the

                   collateral which are known to the secured party and
                      relate to the current disposition;
                 5) the amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types of
                    credits, including rebates of interest or credit service
                      charges, to which the obligor is known to be entitled
                      and which are not reflected in the amount in Paragraph
                       1);    and

                 6) the amount of the surplus or deficiency.

       Our de novo review of the evidence submitted by Velocity in support of its

motion for summary judgment reveals no disputes as to the following facts: the

signed and dated November 28, 2014 retail installment sale contract identifies Mr.

Pasqua as the buyer and North American Automotive Group as the creditor -seller.

The contract includes the date of the loan, the amount financed, the credit terms of

the loan, and the security agreement. The evidence further identifies Mr. Pasqua as

the debtor; North American Automotive Group as the original creditor, which then

assigned its rights to CPS; and Velocity as the current holder of Mr. Pasqua' s debt.

The evidence shows that Velocity sent Mr. Pasqua a pre -repossession notice in

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compliance with La. R.S. 6: 966( A)( 2) and a pre -disposition notice in compliance

with La. R.S. 10: 9- 611( b), La. R.S. 10: 9- 613( 1),      and La. R. S. 10: 9- 614( 1).   The

evidence further shows that the vehicle was sold at sheriff' s sale for $ 8, 900. 00.

        The evidence reveals, however, genuine issues of material fact as to the stated

amount allegedly owed by Mr. Pasqua. The evidence further reveals genuine issues

of material fact as to whether Velocity breached its duty to provide Mr. Pasqua a

written explanation of the amount of the deficiency and the basis upon which the

deficiency was calculated. Velocity presented no evidence showing it provided Mr.

Pasqua with a written "       explanation"
                                               of how Velocity calculated the alleged

deficiency amount of $15, 960. 82, as mandated by La. R.S. 10: 9- 616. While Ms.

Shaalan' s affidavit indicates that " the total balance on the account" in the amount of

 15, 960. 82 is due, there is no explanation of that amount, nor any indication of

whether that is the deficiency owed by Mr. Pasqua following disposition of the

vehicle. Based on our de novo review, we conclude that Velocity failed to satisfy its

initial burden, meaning that the burden of proof never shifted to Mr. Pasqua. 12

Therefore, we find that the parish court erred in granting summary judgment in favor

of Velocity.

                                          DECREE

        We reverse the parish court' s December 22, 2021 judgment, in favor of

Velocity Investments, LLC and against Adam Pasqua in the amount of $15, 960. 82,

together with 5. 75% interest from the date of judgment, 13 plus all costs of the

proceedings. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Velocity Investments, LLC.

        REVERSED.

12 Mr. Pasqua sufficiently pled Velocity' s non- compliance with the provisions of LA UCC -9 " in
connection  with"   Velocity' s motion for summary judgment. See La. R. S. 10: 9- 626( a)( 1).
Therefore, Velocity had the burden of proving compliance with LA UCC -9 pursuant to La. R.S.
10: 9- 626.

  See FN 3, supra.

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