Court Opinion

ID: 9523875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:47:57.707543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:25.152660
License: Public Domain

Grant, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I recognize the existence of the law set out in the majority opinion concerning the ever-increasing extension of the meaning of search warrants by referring to the affidavit of the officer seeking the warrant, and the growing reliance on the “good faith” of the officer, rather than on the words actually signed by an impartial magistrate authorizing an invasion of an individual’s rights. I believe, however, that we should go no further than absolutely necessary in approving the extension of the invasions of constitutionally protected privacy. To do otherwise is to handle constitutional rights too cavalierly.
*136The affidavit herein states that the contraband property sought is
concealed or kept in, on, or about the following described place or person, to wit: in a 1980 tan to beige Buick Regal, 2 door automobile, lie. # Neb. 70-L871, whose owner is Jeff Klineberg [sic]; that said property is under the control or custody of Jeff Klineberg [sic], 709 East 22nd Street South Sioux City, Nebraska; and is located at his residence.
(Emphasis supplied.) The officer has sworn that the contraband is located in two different places: in a described car and in a described residence.
The issuing magistrate signed a search warrant, which included the following authorization: “You are therefore commanded, with the necessary and proper assistance, to search the following described place or person, to-wit: Jeff Klineberg [sic], 709 East 22nd Street South Sioux City, Nebraska, which is located at his residence.”
The majority opinion lifts the prosecuting authorities up by their own bootstraps to determine the meaning of the search warrant by relying on the understanding of those who served the warrant, not by relying on the language within the four corners of the warrant itself. The magistrate was confronted with conflicting factual allegations that must be deciphered. After being told by sworn affidavit that the contraband was located both in defendant’s car and in defendant’s residence, the magistrate authorized the search of defendant himself, and included the unnecessary words “which is located at his residence.” The trial judge, and the majority in this court, find it necessary to determine that “which” must mean “which vehicle.” I submit it is just as accurate to say that “which” refers to “which property” (which the officer has sworn is “located at his [defendant’s] residence”). Constitutional rights should not hang by such a grammatical thread.
The majority, without giving weight to what the magistrate signed, tells us that because the officers believe they could search the defendant’s car, they may so search. I fear the logical followup to this case is to require that officers seeking a search warrant need only allege any number of facts in the affidavit *137and then ignore the specific authorization given to them by an impartial magistrate, and do what the officers want to do. It seems we are relieving the magistrate from intelligently issuing search warrants and reducing the function of the magistrate to a ministerial office.
If officers submitting an affidavit are entitled to rely in every case on all the terms of the affidavit, rather than the terms of the search warrant, such officers are entitled to assume they have far more power than the issuing magistrate and that the magistrate would not dare to issue a lesser warrant and thus limit the authority the officers seek.
If the warrant had been examined and served as written, and assuming no marijuana was found on defendant’s person (a fact we do not know from the record), there would be time to process a warrant authorizing the search of the residence or the car in further search for the contraband.
I see no need, in this case, to conclude that the county attorney and the issuing magistrate had no idea what they were doing in preparing and signing documents seeking and authorizing invasion of a person’s privacy. If the county attorney did not know what he was seeking where, I see no need to aid him in confusing the magistrate.
I believe the evidence seized under the warrant in question should have been suppressed and that, without such evidence, defendant’s guilt has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. I would reverse and dismiss.
Caporale, J., joins in this dissent.