Court Opinion

ID: 9596941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:54:24.332892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:40.553253
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for two separate reasons. First, I fail to find in the record where the issue addressed in the majority opinion is the subject of the sole enumeration of error submitted in this case. Moreover, the issue addressed by the majority has not been raised, argued, discussed, or even mentioned in the brief of either party. Nor is a resolution of the issue addressed in the majority opinion necessary to reach the issues actually raised in this appeal. Under these circumstances a question of law is not ripe for appellate decision and should not be addressed by this Court.
Additionally, in my view, the majority opinion’s analysis of the issue addressed is incorrect. While the majority opinion concludes that a statutory amendment has provided a new standard of review to be applied by the appellate division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation when reviewing the evidence admitted before an ALJ, I see no change of substance resulting from the new statutory language.
The new statutory language requires the appellate division to accept the findings of fact of the ALJ “where such findings are supported by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence contained within the records.” See OCGA § 34-9-103 (a) as amended by Ga. L. 1994, p. 887, § 8, effective July 1, 1994. This is not an “any evidence” standard, but requires the appellate division to make a determination not only of the sufficiency of the evidence but also of the weight of the evidence. The burden is the same as that placed on the Board under the old statute. See Saunders v. Bailey, 205 Ga. App. 808, 810 (423 SE2d 688) and Automatic Sprinkler Corp. &c v. Rucker, 87 Ga. App. 375, 384-385 (73 SE2d 609). The provision for acceptance of the findings of fact entered by the ALJ and supported by a preponderance of evidence does nothing more than formalize the Board’s longstanding practice of adopting the findings and conclusions of the ALJ except insofar as they conflict with the determinations of the Board. The appellate division, like the full Board under the old statute, is the final arbiter of the weight of the evidence, thus the ultimate factual findings reached upon review of the award of an ALJ is not altered by the statutory change. I fail to see any error, or harm, in the appellate division’s use of de novo consideration.
The sole enumeration of error submitted in the case sub judice *685raises a question of whether the claimant, who became disabled on two occasions, sustained a new accident or a change of condition upon the occurrence of the second incident. The employer maintains that the appellate division’s finding that the claimant sustained a change of condition rather than a new accident is erroneous as a matter of law. But this contention overlooks competent and credible evidence authorizing the finding of the appellate division. I would affirm the judgment below.
Decided September 8, 1995
Reconsideration denied October 5, 1995.
Shivers, Johnson & Wilson, Benjamin J. Johnson, Edwin G. Russell, Jr., for appellants.
Burdine & Brown, Thomas F. Brown II, Mallard & Wilson, Emmett E. Mallard, Jr., for appellees.
The cases cited in the second footnote of the majority opinion to refute this dissent are easily distinguished. Both of those cases as well as any references to awards based on erroneous legal theories relate to substantive issues of law. But the supposed error of law which the majority would correct is not substantive but procedural, thus more amenable to waiver as by appellant’s failure to raise such an issue in the case sub judice.