Court Opinion

ID: 9833319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:37:11.051477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:01.584984
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
It is not at all clear to our minds that it is necessary to say more than what we directly and by necessary implication said in 'our original opinion, but appellant’s counsel have presented such an extended motion for rehearing, and argue it with such earnestness, that it may not be amiss to make the effort to amplify somewhat.
[8, 9] It is urged that special charge No. 8, for the refusal of which we reversed the judgment in this' case, required a general finding of the jury — was on the weight of the evidence; that, inasmuch as no special issue of fact required a finding as to whether the crossing was extraordinarily dangerous, we must presume that the court found from the evidence this issue in favor of the appel-lee ; and that the charge was indefinite, confusing, and misleading. There propositions are supported by numerous authorities, which have been subjected to as careful an examination as we have been able to give them, but which we think distinguishable from the case here. They very generally announce the rule that in cases submitted upon special issues it is improper to give an instruction requiring a general verdict. This court so held as early as December 1, 1906, over 15 years ago, in the cases of Bridgeport Coal Co. v. Wise County Coal Co., 44 Tex. Civ. App. 369, 99 S. W. 409, and Moore v. Pierson (Tex. Civ. App.) 93 S. W. 1007, and the rule has more than once been followed by this court since, so that, in writing our •original opinion, we did. not overlook the general rule stated. The most recent authoritative statement of the rules to be observed with reference to special instructions in eases submitted upon special issues is the case of T. & N. O. Ry. Co. v. Harrington (Tex. Com. App.) 235 S. W. 188, by the Commission of Appeals, and approved by the Supreme Court. But that case, as it seems to us, is very clearly distinguishable from the present one. That was a suit by Harrington for damages resulting from personal injuries received at a street crossing, wherein the defendant, among other things, pleaded contributory negligence, and among other issues submitted issues Nos. 6, 7, and 8. Issue No. 6 required an answer to the inquiry of whether the deceased, Claude Harrington, “did any act or failed to do any act that contributed to the injury causing his death.” Issue No. 7 required an answer to the inquiry of whether any act or omission of deceased Claude Harrington which immediately preceded the injury that resulted in his death amounted to negligence on his part, as that term had been defined in the charge. Issue No. 8 required a finding on the inquiry of whether such a.ct or omission on the part of said Claude Harrington was the proximate cause of the injuries received by him.
The special charges contained in that case were two, reading as follows:
“(1) You are- instructed that if you believe from the evidence that said Claude Harrington approached said crossing on the occasion of his death without looking or listening for the approach of a train, and you further believe from the evidence that by looking or listening he would have seen or heard sdid train in time to have prevented his injury and death, and ■ you further believe that a man of ordinary prudence would, under the .same or similar *353circumstances, have looked or listened for the approach of a train, then you are instructed to answer questions Nos. 6, 7 and 8, ‘Yes,’ and this would be true even though you may believe from the evidence that there were no whistles or other signals given to announce the approach of the train, and that the train was being operated in a negligent manner.
“(2) You are instructed that,' if you believe from' the evidence that the view of the crossing and the approaching train were either wholly or partially obstructed, and you further believe that the deceased did not reduce the speed of his automobile to 6 miles an hour or less at a point not nearer than 30 feet from said track, and that such failure was the proximate cause of his death, you will answer questions Nos. 6, 7, and 8 ‘Yes,’ and this would'be true even though you believe from the evidence that no signals were given announcing the approach of the train, and that the train, was being otherwise operated in a negligent manner.”
An analysis of the ^opinion, we think, will show that the Commission held that the issue of proximate cause was one for the jury, and that the special charges took that issue away from the jury, and this, we think, is evident when special issues 6, 7, and 8 are examined with the special charges requested. For, as argued by the court in that case, even though the jury should find in answer to questions 6 and 7 that Harrington did some act that contributed to his injury, and that such act was negligent, nevertheless, in order for such finding to require a verdict for the defendant, it was necessary for the jury to go further and find whether such negligence .was the proximate cause of his injury. As we construe the opinion, this was the essential ground of the Commission’s holding. It is true there is in discussing the charges some general language used that, if misapplied, could perhaps be construed as condemning the charge we now have under consideration, but by such language we do not understand that it was the purpose of the Commission to condemn proper definitions and explanations in cases submitted on special issues. We have never understood it to be improper in a case submitted upon speciál issues for the court to define the terms “negligence,” “contributory negligence,” “burden of proof,” etc. That was done in the Harrington Case, as well as in the case herg, and no objection appears to have been taken.
The statute (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St.) article 1984a, among other things specifically declares that:
“In submitting special issues the court shall submit such explanations and definitions of legal terms as shall be necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and render a verdict on such issues.”
In M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Evans, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 68, 41 S. W. 81, writ refused, it was held by this court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Tarleton, that it was not error for the court to define the term “acquiesce,” as used in the lower court’s charge.
In Salado College v. Davis, 47 Tex. 131, in an action for unlawfully overflowing the lands of plaintiff, it was held that it was the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the word “overflow.”
In G. H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. De Castillo (Tex. Civ. App.) 83 S. W. 25, it was held error to refuse an instruction defining “contributory negligence.”
In a recent case by this court (Norton v. Houston [Tex. Civ. App.] 235 S. W. 963), in which a will was contested on the ground, among other things, of undue influence, we held that the court committed reversible error in failing to explain what was meant by “undue influence,” even though in that case no special instruction on the subject was requested.
In Davis v. Hardwick, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 94 S. W. 359, it was held that it was error for the court to fail to explain “what would amount to conversion.” In disposing of the question, we said:
“We conclude that, under the peculiar facts of this case, the charge as a whole presented a misleading view, and that the specific objections above named are well taken. A failure of the court to define terms used in his charge will not ordinarily require a reversal. But this is not a rule of universal application. The duty of the court is to ‘so frame the charge as to distinctly separate the questions of law from the questions of fact’ and ‘instruct the jury as to the law arising on the facts.’ Rev. St. 1895, art. 1317. In cases where terms embody conclusions of law and when, as we think is ’the case here, a failure to explain or properly apply terms used in a charge is calculated to mislead a jury, or to induce a verdict predicated upon a misunderstanding of the proper application to be' given to such terms, the court will reverse. Harrison v. Houston (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 S. W. 647.”
What we said in the case last cited has, we think, application to the one now under consideration.
One of the specific acts of negligence, alleged in the plaintiff’s petition was:
“Plaintiff further alleges that defendant negligently and carelessly failed to keep a watchman at said crossing as it in duty bound was required to do.”
And in the fifth clause of the charge the jury were plainly instructed that, if they should find that the servants in charge of the train “failed to exercise such ordinary care in ■ either. or any of the particulars charged in the plaintiff’s petition, then you should answer special issue No. 1 in the affirmative,” special issue No. 1 reading, as set out in our original opinion:
“Were the defendant’s agents and servants guilty of negligence in the operation of the train, or the condition of the crossing where the accident occurred.”
*354The condition of the crossing, as alleged, consisted of the fact that several strings of cars had been switched and left on each side of the crossing, and the further fact that no watchman had been placed at said point. The conclusion seems almost irresistible that under the charge the jury could, and very probably did, consider the failure of the defendant to have a watchman at the crossing negligent, under the circumstances, and, if so, they could very readily have answered issue No. 1 in the affirmative, regardless of their findings upon any other issue of negligence alleged or submitted. Under such circumstances, as we originally stated, we think it was the defendant’s right to have the law relating to that subject explained. For it is undoubtedly true that the duty of the railroad company to maintain a watchman at crossings does not apply except where the circumstances surrounding the same are such as to make such crossings “extra hazardous or extra dangerous.”
In addition to the authorities cited in our original opinion in support of this 'proposision, see, also, M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Magee, 92 Tex. 616, 50 S. W. 1013; M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Hurdle (Tex. Civ. App.) 142 S. W. 992; Central Tex. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Gibson (Tex. Civ. App.) 83 S. W. 862; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Bratcher, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 10, 118 S. W. 1091.
[10,11] We do not think it can be said that the requested chargé required a general finding for the defendant within the meaning of those decisions which condemn such charges in cases submitted on special issues. Thereunder the mind of the jury would have been directed first to ascertain whether or not, under all the circumstances, the crossing was extraordinarily dangerous or hazardous, and, if so, whether the defendant was negligent under all the circumstances, in failing to have a watchman at that time and place. • Should the jury fail to find that the crossing was extrahazardous, then, under a proper charge, they could understand that the duty of the railroad company to station a watchman there had not arisen, and therefore, that as to that issue, the answer should be in the negative. The requested charge was no more general than was the charge of the court to the effect that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to establish negligence in the particular charged, and that a failure to so do would entitle the defendant to a verdict on that issue. And so, too, is the charge that the burden of proof was upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence, and in event of a failure to so do, their verdict should be in favor of the plaintiff on that issue. Under the special instruction, the jury could have found in favor of the defendant on the issue of negligence in respect to maintaining a watchman, and yet further found for the plaintiff upon other isr sues • of negligence which would have fully supported the' judgment. So, as stated, we do not think the special charge required a verdict for the defendant within the meaning of cases cited in behalf of appellee. Nor do we see that the special charge is objectionable in any other particular upon which it is assailed. It is insisted and urged that the evidence authorized the submission of the issue. This may possibly be true, but it does not follow that the special charge should have not been given. Nor do we think the appellant is entitled to the rule that, in the absence of a specific verdict, and in the absence of a request for the submission of the specific issue, it will be presumed that the court found in such way as to support the judgment. While there does not appear to have been a request for a specific submission of the issue of negligence in the failure to provide a watchman, the issue nevertheless was so submitted, as we have already seen, as to undoubtedly permit the jury to find negligence in this respect. Moreover, there is no allegation in the petition that the crossing was extra dangerous or hazardous. Nor does the petition set forth any state of facts which so shows, in the absence of which it might be said that the court erred in submitting the issue in any formv Without further discussion, we think the appellee’s motion for rehearing must be overruled.