Court Opinion

ID: 9453058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:01:09.055057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:54.010323
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10525   Document: 44-1    Date Filed: 08/04/2023   Page: 1 of 17

                                                         [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-10525
                         ____________________

        JERRY BAINBRIDGE,
        FAYE BAINBRIDGE,
        GENE BRETOI, et al.,
                                                   Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
        versus
        GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA, et al.,

                                                          Defendants,

        DIRECTOR OF THE FLORIDA DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC
        BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO,

                                                 Defendant-Appellant.
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10525

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 8:99-cv-02681-JDW-AEP
                            ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
                This appeal stems from the State of Florida’s request to clar-
        ify a 17-year-old injunction. Over 20 years ago, a group of Florida
        wine consumers and an out-of-state winery (collectively, the
        “Plaintiffs”) sued the Director of the Florida Division of Alcoholic
        Beverages and Tobacco, alleging that certain provisions of Florida’s
        beverage laws unconstitutionally discriminated against out-of-state
        wineries. After the United States Supreme Court ruled a virtually
        identical statutory scheme unconstitutional, the Division agreed to
        entry of judgment declaring Florida’s direct shipment laws uncon-
        stitutional as applied to out-of-state “wineries.” The Division also
        agreed to an injunction prohibiting it from enforcing its direct ship-
        ment laws “against out-of-state vendors and producers.” Signifi-
        cantly, these last five words were absent from the parties’ proposed
        injunction and were added sua sponte by the district court. No one
        objected to the court’s addition of this language.
                That is, not until 16 years later, when the Division filed a
        motion in district court to “clarify and modify” the injunction. Spe-
        cifically, the Division asked the district court to confirm that the
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        22-10525               Opinion of the Court                        3

        injunction applied only to out-of-state wineries rather than out-of-
        state wine retailers generally. The district court denied the Divi-
        sion’s motion. We affirm.
                              I.     BACKGROUND
               Florida, like many states, strictly regulates the production,
        distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages. The State’s beverage
        laws afforded Florida wineries a unique advantage over their out-
        of-state counterparts. Florida’s statutory scheme allowed in-state
        wineries to sell and deliver wine directly to consumers—without
        going through a distributor or retailer—but prohibited out-of-state
        wineries from doing the same. Compare Fla. Stat. §§ 561.54 and
        561.545 (generally prohibiting the direct delivery of alcoholic bev-
        erages to Florida consumers from out of state), and id. § 561.22(1)
        (generally prohibiting manufacturers from obtaining vendor li-
        censes), with § 561.221(1)(a) (providing an exception for Florida
        wine manufacturers—e.g., wineries—which may obtain vendor li-
        censes to sell directly to consumers).
               Two decades ago, the Plaintiffs challenged Florida’s direct
        shipment prohibition, alleging it violated the “dormant” aspect of
        the United States Constitution’s Commerce Clause by discriminat-
        ing against out-of-state wineries. Among other relief, the Plaintiffs
        sought an injunction prohibiting the Division “from enforcing the
        provisions of the [statute] prohibiting or punishing the delivery of
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                  22-10525

        alcoholic beverages from an out-of-state supplier to an adult Flor-
        ida resident.” Doc. 36 at 7. 1
                While the Plaintiffs’ case was pending, the Supreme Court
        heard a challenge to two virtually identical statutory schemes in
        other states. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). In Granholm,
        the Supreme Court held that state laws that “allow in-state winer-
        ies to sell wine directly to consumers in that State but . . . prohibit
        out-of-state wineries from doing so” violate the Commerce Clause,
        “and that the discrimination is neither authorized nor permitted by
        the Twenty-first Amendment.” Id. at 466.
                After Granholm, the Division agreed to entry of judgment on
        the pleadings. The Plaintiffs filed an agreed motion for judgment
        on the pleadings asking the district court to declare that Florida’s
        beverage laws violated the Commerce Clause “by prohibiting out-
        of-state wine vendors from selling and delivering their products di-
        rectly to Florida residents.” Doc. 188 at 2. In the same motion, the
        Plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin the Division from enforc-
        ing its direct shipment laws to the extent they prohibited “out-of-
        state wineries from selling and delivering wine directly to adult
        Florida residents.” Id.
                With the Division’s agreement, the Plaintiffs submitted to
        the court a proposed order and injunction. The proposed order
        specified that the declaratory judgment was limited to wineries:
        “[i]t is ADJUDGED that Florida Statutes §§ 561.54 and 561.545

        1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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        22-10525               Opinion of the Court                        5

        violate the Commerce Clause to the extent that they discriminate
        against out-of-state wineries by prohibiting them from selling and
        delivering wine directly to customers in Florida when in-state win-
        eries are not so prohibited.” Doc. 189-2 at 2. The parties’ proposed
        injunction, by contrast, included no language limiting the injunc-
        tion to wineries or otherwise specifying the scope of the injunction:
        “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is ENJOINED from
        enforcing Florida Statutes §§ 561.54 and 541.545.” Id. As submitted,
        the proposed injunction would have prohibited the State from en-
        forcing the named statutory provisions altogether.
               The district court granted the parties’ agreed motion for
        judgment on the pleadings and adopted the proposed order and in-
        junction with one modification. The court adopted the parties’ pro-
        posed judgment verbatim, declaring the relevant statutory sections
        unconstitutional “to the extent that they discriminate against out-
        of-state wineries.” Doc. 196 at 2. But, when it came to the injunc-
        tion, the district court sua sponte added five words to the language
        the parties proposed: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant
        is ENJOINED from enforcing Florida Statutes §§ 564.54 and
        561.545 against out-of-state vendors and producers.” Id. (emphasis
        added). Neither party objected to the addition of this language.
                Shortly after the injunction issued, the Florida Senate Com-
        mittee on Regulated Industries published a report advising the
        Florida Senate of the legal status of direct shipment prohibitions on
        wine. Describing the injunction at issue, the report noted that “[i]t
        is not clear whether this injunction permits direct shipment by out-
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10525

        of-state wineries and non-wineries, or whether it was the court’s
        intention to limit the application of the injunction to out-of-state
        wineries.” Fla. Senate Comm. on Regulated Indus., Direct Ship-
        ment of Wine to Florida Consumers, Rep. 2006-146 at 13 (2005).
        According to the report, the Division interpreted the injunction as
        applicable to out-of-state wineries only and continued to enforce
        Florida’s direct shipment prohibition against out-of-state wine re-
        tailers. Id. At the time, the Division did not ask the district court to
        clarify the scope of the injunction.
               This remained the status quo for more than a decade. Then,
        in 2018, the Division changed its position. In response to a petition
        from an out-of-state wine retailer, the agency issued a declaratory
        statement that out-of-state wine retailers were exempt from the
        State’s direct shipment prohibition. See Fla. Stat. § 120.565. Citing
        the injunction, the Division explained that it was prohibited from
        enforcing the State’s direct shipment laws against all out-of-state
        wine retailers—not just out-of-state wineries. 2
               A few years later, the Division sought to restore its original
        interpretation—that the injunction applied only to wineries—but
        was hemmed in by its own declaratory statement to the contrary.

        2 This declaratory statement made headlines in the beverage industry, which
        until that point had evidently understood the injunction to apply only to win-
        eries. See, e.g., Emma Balter, Wine Shipping Watch: Florida Opens Door to Out-of-
        State Retailer Shipping, Wine Spectator, Aug. 19, 2019, https://www.winespec-
        tator.com/articles/wine-shipping-watch-florida-opens-door-to-out-of-state-
        retailer-shipping [https://perma.cc/DAW7-RFSF].
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        22-10525               Opinion of the Court                         7

        So, the Division returned to the district court, seeking to “clarify
        and modify” the injunction. It argued, as it does on appeal, that the
        addition of the phrase “vendors and producers” made the injunc-
        tion ambiguous. Based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a),
        the Division asked the court to modify the injunction to clarify that
        it applied only to out-of-state wineries, not to out-of-state wine re-
        tailers generally. In the alternative, the Division argued that to the
        extent the injunction applied to wine retailers generally, it was void
        under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4) because it ex-
        ceeded the scope of the parties’ agreement.
              The district court denied the Division’s motion on three
        grounds. First, the court explained that Rule 60(a) did not apply be-
        cause the court had intentionally added the phrase “vendors and
        producers” to correct the parties’ omission. Its deliberate use of the
        phrase therefore was not a clerical error or mistake arising from
        oversight or omission eligible for correction under Rule 60(a).
               Second, the court construed the motion as seeking relief un-
        der Rule 60(b)(1), which allows a party to seek relief from a final
        judgment based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
        neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Because a Rule 60(b)(1) motion
        must be filed within a reasonable time and not more than one year
        post judgment, the district court denied the motion as untimely.
        See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
                Third, the district court denied the Division’s request to va-
        cate the injunction under Rule 60(b)(4), which permits relief from
        a final judgment if “the judgment is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).
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        8                        Opinion of the Court              22-10525

        It rejected the Division’s argument that the injunction exceeded
        the scope of the parties’ consent, finding that the injunction accu-
        rately reflected the intent of the parties and the court. Further-
        more, even if the injunction exceeded the scope of the parties’ con-
        sent, the district court concluded, such circumstances would not
        provide a valid basis to vacate the injunction under Rule 60(b)(4).
        The Division timely appealed.
                        II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review the district court’s ruling on a Rule 60(a) motion
        for abuse of discretion. Stansell v. López, 40 F.4th 1308, 1311 (11th
        Cir. 2022). But we review de novo a district court’s determination
        whether a particular motion seeks relief under Rule 60(a)—as op-
        posed to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)—because that “is a question of
        law.” Id. We generally review a district court’s denial of a Rule
        60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260,
        1263 (11th Cir. 2001). Because “the question of the validity of a
        judgment is a legal one,” we review a district court’s ruling on a
        Rule 60(b)(4) motion de novo. Id.
                                 III.   DISCUSSION
               The Division makes two arguments for reversal. First, the
        Division argues that the district court should have construed its
        motion for clarification or modification as a Rule 60(a) motion. It
        reasons that because the requested clarification would bring the in-
        junction in line with the court’s original intent that the injunction
        apply only to wineries, the motion qualified under Rule 60(a). Sec-
        ond, the Division argues that if the injunction prohibits
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        22-10525                Opinion of the Court                         9

        enforcement against out-of-state wine retailers, the injunction is
        void under Rule 60(b)(4) because it exceeded the scope of the par-
        ties’ consent. We reject both arguments.
        A.     The Division’s Motion to Clarify and Modify Is Gov-
               erned by Rule 60(b)(1), not Rule 60(a).
               Rule 60(a) allows a district court to “correct a clerical mis-
        take or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one
        is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record.” Fed. R.
        Civ. P. 60(a). The Division argues that the injunction was intended
        to apply only to wineries and that the district court’s addition of the
        phrase “against out-of-state vendors and producers” rendered the
        injunction ambiguous. Based on this purported ambiguity, the Di-
        vision contends that the injunction does not accurately reflect the
        intent of the parties and the court. Thus, it argues, Rule 60(a) relief
        is appropriate to clarify the scope of the injunction. We disagree.
        The requested modification “was not clerical or ministerial in na-
        ture and therefore not permitted by Rule 60(a).” Stansell, 40 F.4th
        at 1311.
                The Division is correct that Rule 60(a) allows a district court
        to “correct mistakes or oversights that cause the judgment to fail
        to reflect what was intended at the time.” Vaughter v. E. Air Lines,
        Inc., 817 F.2d 685, 689 (11th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks
        omitted). We have cautioned, however, that “a district court is not
        permitted . . . to clarify a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(a) to reflect
        a new and subsequent intent because it perceives its original judg-
        ment to be incorrect.” Weeks v. Jones, 100 F.3d 124, 129 (11th Cir.
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10525

        1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Corrections or altera-
        tions that affect the substantial rights of the parties,” including fac-
        tual and legal mistakes, are beyond the rule’s scope. See Vaughter,
        817 F.2d at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, a mo-
        tion under Rule 60(a) can be used only “to make the judgment
        speak the truth and cannot be used to make it say something other
        than what originally was pronounced.” Stansell, 40 F.4th at 1311
        (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). A Rule
        60(a) motion cannot be used to correct “errors of substantive judg-
        ment.” Weeks, 100 F.3d at 129 (emphasis omitted) (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted).
                Here, the district court’s addition of the phrase “against out-
        of-state vendors and producers” was not a clerical error or a mis-
        take of oversight or omission. Rather, the court deliberately added
        this language to limit the scope of the injunction. The parties’ pro-
        posed order failed to identify the entities against whom enforce-
        ment was enjoined. To correct this omission, the court added the
        phrase at issue. Where, as here, the district court deliberately in-
        cluded language to alter the scope of the judgment and that lan-
        guage accurately reflects the court’s intended ruling, Rule 60(a)
        does not apply.
               Our decision in Vaughter does not change this conclusion.
        817 F.2d 685. That case involved a class action in which current and
        former airline pilots sought reimbursement for payments made to
        an airline’s pension plan. Id. at 686–87. The district court certified
        a class but later granted summary judgment to the airline. Id. at
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        22-10525                Opinion of the Court                          11

        687–88. The district court’s summary judgment order failed to ac-
        curately define the class that was bound by the judgment. Id. at
        689–90. The court defined the class as one maintained under Rule
        23(b)(1) or (2), which was plainly “inconsistent with the prior pro-
        ceedings in the case.” Id. at 689. The district court later amended
        its judgment to conform to the “clear and consistent intention by
        all concerned [that the class] proceed under Rule 23(b)(3).” Id. at
        690–91.
               On appeal, we held that the district court’s modification was
        properly construed as the correction of an oversight under Rule
        60(a) because the amendment “simply clarified the previous under-
        standing and intent of the parties and the court regarding who
        would be bound by the judgment.” Id. at 689. Thus, the district
        court’s intent was the touchstone of our inquiry. See id.; see also
        Stansell, 40 F.4th at 1311; Rivera v. PNS Stores, Inc., 647 F.3d 188, 198
        (5th Cir. 2011) (“Whether a mistake is correctible under Rule 60(a)
        turns on whether the judgment reflects the actual intention of the
        court, not the shared understanding of the parties.”). Here, unlike
        in Vaughter, the district court deliberately added the language at is-
        sue in an exercise of substantive judgment. Modification of that lan-
        guage is thus beyond the scope of Rule 60(a).
              The Division cites out-of-circuit authority to support its ar-
        gument that Rule 60(a) allows the correction of imprecise language
        that obfuscates the district court’s meaning. Yet these cases, like
        our precedents, uniformly recognize that “the scope of a court’s
        authority under Rule 60(a) . . . is circumscribed by the court’s intent
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        12                          Opinion of the Court                        22-10525

        when it issued the order or judgment.” Sartin v. McNair Law Firm
        PA, 756 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Rivera, 647 F.3d at 195
        (“A district court's authority under Rule 60(a) is also limited to
        making corrections that are consistent with the court’s intent at the
        time it entered the judgment.”); Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574,
        1577 (9th Cir. 1987) (“In deciding whether a trial court may alter a
        judgment pursuant to [Rule 60(a)], our circuit focuses on what the
        court originally intended to do.” (emphasis in original)); United States
        v. Griffin, 782 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The Rule does not
        permit alterations of factual and legal decisions deliberately
        made.”).
               Here, the district court expressly determined that the injunc-
        tion the court entered “accurately reflects the intent of the parties
        and [the] Court.” Doc. 212 at 5. A “district court’s interpretation of
        its own prior order is properly accorded deference on appeal when
        that interpretation is reasonable.” Stansell, 40 F.4th at 1311 (altera-
        tions adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “And where the
        judgment as written reflects the intent of the court, Rule 60(a) does
        not permit correction of an error of law.” Id. Although we do not
        rule out a situation where intervening circumstances may render a
        previously clear judgment ambiguous in application, Rule 60(a)
        does not allow a district court to rewrite its decision any time a
        party later contends that the language is ambiguous.3

        3 The Division argues for the first time on appeal that it is entitled to clarifica-
        tion regardless of whether clarification would be permitted under Rule 60(a).
        Because the Division failed to raise this argument in the district court,
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        22-10525                    Opinion of the Court                                13

               Thus, the district court did not err by construing the Divi-
        sion’s motion as made under Rule 60(b)(1), instead of Rule 60(a).
        See Kemp v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1856, 1865 (2022) (explaining
        that Rule 60(b)(1) includes judicial mistakes of law). And because
        Rule 60(b)(1) motions “must be made within a reasonable time”
        and “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order,”
        the district court properly denied the motion as untimely. Fed. R.
        Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
        B.      The Injunction is Not Void under Rule 60(b)(4).
                Alternatively, the Division argues that it is entitled to Rule
        60(b)(4) relief because the injunction exceeded the scope of the par-
        ties’ consent, making it void. But Rule 60(b)(4) relief is limited to
        situations where a judgment was issued without jurisdiction or in
        violation of due process; neither was true here. Because the injunc-
        tion is not void under Rule 60(b)(4), the district court properly de-
        nied the Division’s motion.
               A court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order
        if “the judgment is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). “[A] void judg-
        ment is one so affected by a fundamental infirmity that the infir-
        mity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final. The list
        of such infirmities is exceedingly short; otherwise, Rule 60(b)(4)’s
        exception to finality would swallow the rule.” United Student Aid
        Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010) (citations omitted).

        however, we do not consider it. See Ramirez v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 686
        F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2012) (“It is well-settled that we will generally refuse
        to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.”).
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                        22-10525

        A judgment is not void “simply because it is or may have been er-
        roneous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Instead, Rule
        60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is prem-
        ised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation
        of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to
        be heard.” Id. at 271; see also Oakes v. Horizon Fin., S.A., 259 F.3d
        1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A judgment is ‘void’ under Rule
        60(b)(4) if it was rendered without jurisdiction of the subject matter
        or the parties or in a manner inconsistent with due process of
        law.”).
               Here, the Division does not contend that the injunction was
        issued without jurisdiction or in violation of due process. 4 Instead,
        it argues that the injunction is void because the district court lacked
        the authority to enter an injunction that exceeded the scope of the
        parties’ consent.
                We have indeed explained that a court’s authority to enter a
        consent decree derives from the parties’ consent. See Reynolds v.
        Roberts, 251 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Lacking the consent
        of all the parties, the court obviously lacked the power to enter a
        decree purportedly based on consent, for ‘it is the parties’

        4 Even if the Division’s argument could be characterized as jurisdictional, “it
        is well-settled that a mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction does not support
        relief under Rule 60(b)(4).” Oakes, 259 F.3d at 1319. Rather, Rule 60(b)(4) relief
        is reserved “only for the exceptional case in which the court that rendered
        judgment lacked even an arguable basis for jurisdiction,” which did not occur
        here. See Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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        22-10525               Opinion of the Court                        15

        agreement that serves as the source of the court’s authority to enter
        any judgment at all.’” (quoting Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478
        U.S. 501, 522 (1986))). For example, although “a party normally has
        no standing to appeal a judgment to which he or she consented,”
        there is an exception if the judgment “allegedly deviates from the
        terms of the parties’ agreement.” Reynolds v. Roberts, 202 F.3d 1303,
        1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks
        omitted).
               But this case does not come to us on the Division’s direct
        appeal from the entry of the injunction. We have long emphasized
        that Rule 60(b) strikes a “delicate balance” between the court’s ob-
        ligation to do substantial justice and the “sanctity of final judg-
        ments.” Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir.
        1984). And “Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide a license for litigants to
        sleep on their rights.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 275.
                Although the district court’s sua sponte modification of the
        injunction 17 years ago may have been erroneous, it falls short of
        the “fundamental infirmity” necessary to render a judgment void
        for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4). See id. at 270. The Supreme Court
        rejected a similar argument in Espinosa. There, a bankruptcy court
        failed to comply with statutory requirements before approving a
        debtor’s bankruptcy plan. Id. at 265. The creditor sought to vacate
        the confirmation order under Rule 60(b)(4), arguing that it was
        void because it exceeded the court’s “statutory authority.” Id. at
        273. The Court disagreed, expressly rejecting the creditor’s attempt
        “to expand the universe of judgment defects that support Rule
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10525

        60(b)(4) relief” beyond jurisdictional errors or due process viola-
        tions. Id. Despite the trial court’s legal error, the confirmation or-
        der “remain[ed] enforceable and binding on [the creditor] because
        [it] had notice of the error and failed to object or timely appeal.” Id.
        at 275. Like the legal error in Espinosa, the alleged error here is in-
        sufficient to render the judgment void where the Division had ac-
        tual notice of the alleged error and failed to object or appeal.
               The Division also relies on language from our decision in
        Burke v. Smith that “[a] judgment also is void for Rule 60(b)(4) pur-
        poses if the rendering court was powerless to enter it.” 252 F.3d
        1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001). But Burke does not support extending
        Rule 60(b)(4) relief to the circumstances before us.
                In Burke, we considered whether a district court’s failure to
        comply with certain procedural protections for settling a minor’s
        claim rendered the judgment of dismissal void under Rule 60(b)(4).
        Id. at 1262–63. The district court bound the minor under the settle-
        ment agreement and dismissed the complaint without first con-
        ducting a fairness hearing as required by Alabama law. Id. at 1265.
        When the minor later challenged the dismissal, we held the judg-
        ment void under Rule 60(b)(4). Id. at 1266. Due to the lack of a
        hearing, the error in Burke was akin to a deprivation of due process.
        See SEC v. Novinger, 40 F.4th 297, 306 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding
        that a previous Fifth Circuit decision involving similar circum-
        stances was “best understood as involving a judgment rendered
        void by a due process violation” and thus reconcilable with Espi-
        nosa). By contrast, the Division was afforded a “full and fair
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        22-10525                  Opinion of the Court                              17

        opportunity to litigate, and [its] failure to avail itself of that oppor-
        tunity will not justify Rule 60(b)(4) relief.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 276.
        Given that there was no deprivation of due process here, we cannot
        say that Burke controls.
               Thus, the Division is not entitled to Rule 60(b)(4) relief.
        Even if the district court erred by adding the phrase in question to
        the parties’ proposed injunction, such a legal error does not render
        a judgment void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) where, as here, the
        Division “had notice of the [purported] error and failed to object or
        timely appeal.” See id. at 275.
                                  IV.     CONCLUSION
               For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial
        of the Division’s motion.5
               AFFIRMED.

        5 Given our conclusion that the district court did not err in denying the Divi-
        sion’s Rule 60 motion, we need not address the Plaintiffs’ arguments that the
        Division is estopped from challenging the injunction or has waived its ability
        to do so. Likewise, we do not address the Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the
        impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers
        Association v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019), on the interpretation of the in-
        junction.