Court Opinion

ID: 8184457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 23:06:44.794085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:40:21.858743
License: Public Domain

Winslow, J.
The exact question presented by the instruction of the court to the jury is whether mental anguish alone, resulting from the negligent nondelivery of a telegram, constitutes an independent basis for damages.
At common law it was well settled that mere injury to the feelings or affections did not constitute an independent basis for the recovery of damages. Cooley, Torts, 271; Wood’s Mayne, Dam. (1st Am. ed.), § 54, note 1. It is true that damages for mental suffering have been generally allowed by the courts in certain classes of cases. These classes are well stated by Coopee, J., in his learned opinion in the case of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, as follows: “ (1) Where, by the merely negligent act of the defendant, physical injury has been sustained; and in this class of cases they are compensatory, and the reason given for their allowance is that the one cannot be separated from the other. (2) In actions for breach of the contract of marriage. (3) In cases of wilful wrong, especially those affecting the liberty, character, reputation, *9personal security, or domestic relations of the injured party.” To this latter class belong the actions of malicious prosecution, slander and libel, and seduction, and they contain an element of malice. Subject to the possible exceptions contained in the second and third of the above classes, it is not believed that there was any case, — certainly no well-considered case, — prior to the year 1881, which held that mental anguish alone constituted a sufficient basis for the recovery of damages. In that year, however, the supreme court of Texas, in So Relle v. W. U. Tel. Co. 55 Tex. 308, decided that mental suffering alone, caused by failure to deliver such a telegram as the one in the present case, was sufficient basis for damages. The principle of this case has been followed Avith some variations by the same court in many cases since that decision, and its reasoning has been substantially adopted by the courts of last resort in the states of Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Alabama, in cases which are cited in the briefs of counsel. On the other hand, the doctrine has been vigorously denied by the highest courts in the states of Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, Kansas and Dakota, and by practically the unanimous current of authority in the federal courts. All of these cases will be preserved in the report of this case, and the citations need not be repeated here.
The question is substantially a new one in this state, and we are at liberty to adopt that rule which best commends itself to reason and justice. It is true that it has been held by this court, in Walsh v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 42 Wis. 32, that in an action upon breach of a contract of carriage damages were not recoverable for mere mental distress; but, as we regard this action as being in the nature of a tort action founded upon a neglect of the duty which the telegraph company owed to the plaintiff to deliver the telegram seasonably, that decision is not controlling in this case.
*10The reasoning in favor of the recovery of such damages is, in brief, that a wrong has been committed by defendant which has resulted in injury to the plaintiff as grievous as any bodily injury could be, and that the plaintiff should have a remedy therefor. On the other hand, the argument is that such a doctrine is an innovation upon long-established and well-understood principles of law; that the difficulty of estimating the proper pecuniary compensation for mental distress is so great, its elements so vague, shadowy, and easily simulated, and the new field of litigation thus opened up so vast, that the courts should not establish such a rule.
Eegarding, as we do, the Texas rule as a clear innovation upon the law as it previously existed, we shall decline to follow it, and shall adopt the other view, namely, that for mental distress alone, in such a case as the present, damages are not recoverable. The subject has been so fully and ably discussed in opinions very recently delivered that no very extended discussion will be attempted here. We refer specially to the opinions in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748; Connell v. W. U. Tel. Co. 116 Mo. 34; Western Union. Tel. Co. v. Wood, 57 Fed. Rep. 471. See, also, Judge Lurton’s dissenting opinion in Wadsworth v. W. U. Tel. Co. 86 Tenn. 695. In the last-named opinion the following very apt remarks are made: “ The reason why an independent action for such damages cannot and ought not to be sustained is found in the remoteness of such damages, and in the metaphysical character of such an injury, considered apart from physical pain. Such injuries are generally more sentimental than substantial. Depending largely on physical and nervous conditions, the suffering of one under precisely the same circumstances would be no test of the suffering of another. Vague and shadowy, there is no possible standard by which such an injury can be justly compensated or even approximately measured. Easily sim*11ulated and impossible to disprove, it falls within all of the objections to speculative damages, which are universally excluded because of their uncertain character.”
Another consideration which is, perhaps, of equal importance consists in the great field for litigation which would be opened by the logical application of such a rule of damages. If a jury must measure the mental suffering occasioned by the failure to deliver this telegram, must they not also measure the vexation and grief arising from a failure to receive an invitation to a ball or a Thanksgiving dinner? Must not the mortification and chagrin caused by the public use of opprobrious language be assuaged by money damages? Must not every wrongful act which causes pain or grief or vexation to another be measured in dollars and cents? Surely, a court should be slow to open so vast a field as this without cogent and overpowering reasons. For ourselves we see no such reasons. We adopt the language of Gantt, P. J., in Connell v. W. U. Tel. Co. 116 Mo. 34: “We prefer to travel yet awhile super anti-cuas vias. If, in the evolution of society and the law, this innovation should be deemed necessary, the legislature can be safely trusted to introduce it, with those limitations and safeguards which will be absolutely necessary, judging from the variety of cases that have sprung up since the promulgation of the Texas case.”
It was argued that under ch. 171, Laws of 1885 (S. & B. Ann. Stats, sec. 1170b), damages for injuries to feelings alone might be recovered. This law provides that • telegraph companies shall be liable for all damages occasioned by failure or negligence of their operators, servants, or employees in receiving, copying, transmitting, or delivering dispatches or messages. We cannot regard this statute as creating, or intended to create, in any way, new elements of damage. Whether its purpose was to obviate the difficulties which were held fatal to a recovery in the case of *12Candee v. W. U. Tel. Co. 34 Wis. 471, or to effect some other object, is not a question which now arises; but it seems clear to us that, had a radical change in the law relating to the kinds of suffering which should furnish a ground of damages been contemplated, the act would have expressed that intention in some unmistakable way. We see nothing in the law to indicate such intention.
Finally, it is said that verdicts for injuries to the feelings alone have been sustained in this court, and the following cases are cited: Wightman v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 73 Wis. 169; Craker v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 36 Wis. 657; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450. Without reviewing these cases in detail, it is sufficient to say that there was in all of them the element of injury or discomfort to the person, resulting either from actual or threatened force, and they cannot be relied upon as precedents for the allowance of damages for mental sufferings alone.
It follows from these views that the instruction excepted to was erroneous.
By the Court.— Judgment reversed, and action remanded for a new trial.