Court Opinion

ID: 9486655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:55:06.2791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:50.957613
License: Public Domain

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
in which WALLACE, Chief Judge, joins, concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority’s opinion regarding Count Eight. However, I must respectfully dissent as to Count Six. In my opinion, 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c) does cover Judge Aguilar’s actions. As I see it, the government was required to prove that Judge Aguilar knew that a wiretap had been applied for; that Judge Aguilar intended to obstruct or impede the interception for which the application was designed to obtain authorization; and that Judge Aguilar gave or attempted to give notice of the possible interception.
For purposes of this opinion, I (along with the majority) will take it as a given that Judge Aguilar knew of the wiretap application.1 I also take it that he even knew that a wiretap might well result from that application.2 I further take it that he did not know about the later applications and wiretaps, including the one which was in place when he made his disclosures to Chapman, although the latter assumption is somewhat problematic. He certainly talked and behaved as if he thought a wiretap was in place.
It cannot be doubted that Judge Aguilar conveyed information to Chapman with the intent to impede interception. We need not be concerned with whether he thought that the initial wiretap authorizations were extended or thought something else. We need only take him at his word. He did think that the information disclosed to him meant that Chapman’s conversations were being intercepted by a wiretap.
That leaves only the question of whether Judge Aguilar could have attempted “to give notice of the possible interception.” 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c) (West Supp.1993). The majority reads this to mean that an interception must have been objectively possible at the time the notice was given or at the time that the attempt to give notice was made: I believe that is a strange way to read the statute. To my mind, the statute must be read to mean that a defendant has fulfilled this element upon attempting to warn someone that an interception of that person’s telephone communications is possible. Here the defendant, Judge Aguilar, was correct. Interception was then possible. But that is not the point. The point is that Judge Aguilar’s own wrongdoing was his attempt to give a notice that would interfere with a wiretap. Here- his attempt to interfere could have gone awry for any of a number of reasons. His nephew might not have conveyed his message. The telephone lines could have come down while he was calling a target. The wiretap might not have been in place; indeed, there never was a wiretap on Chapman’s own telephone. Chapman may no longer have been targeted. The authorization itself might not have been granted pending further information. The wiretap might have expired. Etc.
Of course, Judge Aguilar’s concrete action was the notice he gave or attempted to give. That is the only thing that went beyond mental states — knowledge, intent, belief that interception was possible, and belief that interception could be obstructed. When a defendant tries to give notice, we can be sure *1488that we are not punishing thoughts alone. Rather, his wrongdoing becomes manifest, just as it did here. Judge Aguilar matched his actions to his thoughts. He attempted to give notice of the possible interception of Chapman’s conversations.
It seems to me that the statute is clear enough on this point to make resort to legislative history unnecessary. See United States v. Galliano, 977 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1399, 122 L.Ed.2d 772 (1993). But if we do so resort, any doubt, is removed by two salient comments in the brief Senate Report. See S.Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 34 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3588.3 That report indicates an intent to punish conduct which gives notice of the possible interception to someone who was a target. Id. Use of the past tense shows that the person may no longer be a target, so that no interception would remain possible in the objective sense. More importantly, the report states that “[t]he offense also includes an attempt to engage in the offense.” Id. At the very least, Judge Aguilar made that attempt. He did his very best to obstruct any possible interception of Chapman’s telephone conversations.
I am not unaware of the rule of lenity, but it should only be applied'when there is some “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” which cannot be overcome. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 458, 463, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1926, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991). There is no such ambiguity here. Perhaps in saying that I show too much temerity in the face of the majority opinion. However, I cannot find opacity where a straight-forward reading of the statute gives fair warning to the citizen of what is required to violate its terms. I believe that to be the ease here. I do not think one has to try to convert dross into precious metal in order to reach this conclusion; rather, I think that by some exercise of thaumaturgy gone awry, the majority has turned gold into lead. Judge Aguilar “knew” of the application, intended to impede the interception which would flow from that application, and told Chapman that it was possible that his conversations would be intercepted. That is all the government had to prove.
I refrain from discussing the other issues that would have to be wrestled with before actually affirming Judge Aguilar’s conviction, such as the meaning of knowledge. Given the majority opinion, that discussion would encumber the reports without deciding anything.
In sum, I agree with the majority that Judge Aguilar’s conduct cannot lead to a conviction under 18. U.S.C. § 1503, but I believe that it could, and properly did, lead to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c).

. His conversation with Judge Peckham indicates that.

. Indeed, in his conversation with Solomon he said, "Oh yeah the phone's definitely tapped.... Absolutely.”

. The House Report is to the same effect. See H.R.Rep. No. 99-647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 61 (1986).