Court Opinion

ID: 9890006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 21:03:42.361321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:57.749473
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/11/23 P. v. Schmidt CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096374

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 20FE006835)

           v.

 BRYAN WAYNE SCHMIDT,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Bryan Wayne Schmidt, a former Elk Grove police officer, responded to
a report of a robbery at a retail store. When he arrived, he saw officers already on scene
pointing guns at two suspects lying prone on the ground, one of whom was not
complying with orders to move his hands away from his waist. Defendant quickly
approached the noncompliant suspect from the side and used the heel of his foot to kick
or stomp on the suspect’s head. Defendant then kicked the suspect’s arms out from
underneath him and, with another officer’s assistance, handcuffed him.

                                                             1
       Defendant subsequently was charged with battery resulting in serious bodily injury
(Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)—count one) and assault under color of authority. (Pen.
Code, § 149—count two.) After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged.
       On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred and violated his
constitutional rights by denying his motion in limine “for an exception” to Code of Civil
Procedure section 231.7,1 which makes certain justifications for exercising a peremptory
challenge presumptively invalid; (2) the trial court erred and violated his constitutional
rights by denying his challenge for cause to Juror No. 4 or, alternatively, that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred and violated his constitutional
rights by denying his peremptory challenge against Juror No. 2; and (4) the trial court
erred and violated his constitutional rights by admitting the prosecution’s evidence of his
department’s use-of-force policies and defendant’s violation of them or, alternatively,
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
       We find no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion seeking an
exception to section 231.7, or in the admission of the evidence of police use-of-force
policies. We conclude defendant forfeited the claim regarding the trial court’s denial of
his challenge for cause, and we reject his alternative argument that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. We conclude it is unnecessary to reach the merits of his claim
regarding the denial of his peremptory challenge because, even if the trial court erred,
defendant has failed to establish any resulting prejudice. Accordingly, we will affirm the
judgment.
                      BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE
       A.     Prosecution case-in-chief
       On June 5, 2019, officers from the Elk Grove Police Department responded to a
reported robbery at a retail clothing and beauty store. Before they arrived, the officers

1      Undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                              2
were informed that there were three possible suspects, two of whom were fighting with
loss prevention officers, that one of those suspects had removed his shirt during the fight,
and that a witness had observed gang signs being thrown. Although dispatch indicated
“no weapons,” it was reported that one of the suspects had left the store to possibly
retrieve something from a vehicle before returning to the fight.
       As officers arrived at the scene, two suspects were exiting the store. The officers
drew their firearms and ordered the suspects to lie on the ground in a prone position with
their arms extended, “like an airplane.” At first, one of the suspects—the victim in this
case—did not comply. Eventually, the suspect got into a prone position on the ground,
but he kept his hands near his waistband and refused to comply with the officer’s
commands to extend his arms.
       At this point, defendant, who was an Elk Grove police officer at the time, arrived
at the scene. He pointed his gun and ordered the noncompliant suspect to put his hands
out. The suspect looked up and mumbled something but did not comply with the order to
show his hands. Defendant quickly approached from the side and used the heel of his
foot to kick or stomp the suspect’s head down to the asphalt. The kick appeared to stun
the suspect or momentarily knock him unconscious. Defendant then kicked the suspect’s
arms out from underneath him and, with another officer’s assistance, handcuffed him.2
       After the suspect was handcuffed, defendant went inside the store to check on the
victims of the robbery, and then came back outside and searched the suspect for weapons.
Defendant did not find any weapons.
       After the suspect was arrested, defendant spoke to the other officers about the
incident. Defendant can be heard on camera saying that he told the suspect to show his

2     Most of the encounter was captured on camera and video footage of the incident
was played for the jury.

                                             3
hands, but the suspect was “not listening” and was “kinda, like, smiling–doin’ that smirk.
So, I, bam and I fuckin’ kick his–his head. And I am telling him, put his hands out.”
       At one point, defendant asked the other officers to mute their body cameras. The
audio was muted for about 10 seconds. When the audio resumed, defendant stated, “I
know I kicked him in the head[;] I don’t think I kicked him in the [unintelligible].”
Defendant then turned and said something to the effect of “his hands, . . . he wouldn’t
fuckin’ put ‘em out,” to which another officer responded, “You’re singin’ that song and
dance to the wrong person.”
       The officer who transported the suspect to jail observed a cut on the suspect’s lip,
blood around his mouth, and an abrasion and some swelling in his right cheek area.
While being transported to jail, the suspect vomited multiple times.
       On July 25, 2019, the suspect went to the hospital with complaints of nausea and
worsening headaches. A doctor examined the suspect and determined that he had
subdural hematomas on both sides of his head. The doctor testified that either a punch to
the suspect’s face by loss prevention officers or the kick to his head by defendant could
have caused the hematomas, although, from the video footage, the kick looked to be more
impactful. To treat the injuries, doctors had to perform a bilateral craniotomy, opening
up the suspect’s skull to drain the blood and relieve the pressure on his brain.
       B.     The prosecution’s use-of-force evidence
       Elk Grove Police Lieutenant Daniel Templeton was involved in an internal
investigation of defendant’s use of force. Templeton testified that the Elk Grove Police
Department’s use-of-force policy provides guidelines as to what constitutes a reasonable
use of force. He testified that officers are trained on the policy and guidelines and are
expected to follow them. At the time of the incident, defendant had attended all required
trainings.
       Templeton testified that under departmental policy, an officer may use deadly
force to protect himself or others from what he or she reasonably perceives as an

                                              4
imminent threat of death or great bodily injury. He explained that officers are trained
they do not need to wait to see a gun before using deadly force if the officer reasonably
perceives an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury. Officers are trained to
watch a suspect’s hands and to keep them away from the waistband area because that is
where firearms are commonly kept. A suspect’s refusal to remove hands from the
waistband area is a factor in assessing whether a suspect is an imminent threat. However,
departmental policy provides that, if feasible, officers should give some type of warning
prior to using deadly force.
       Elk Grove Police Lieutenant Michael Press testified as the prosecution’s expert on
use of force and the Elk Grove Police Department’s training, tactics, and procedures
relating to use of force. Press testified that the department’s use-of-force policy is based
on California’s Peace Officer Standards and Training guidelines. He testified that under
the department’s policy, officers can use reasonable force in making an arrest. Press
discussed lethal use of force and explained that a kick or stomp to the head could be
considered a form of lethal force. Press also discussed nonlethal uses of force, such as
pain compliance techniques. Press testified that a kick or stomp to the head is not
considered a pain compliance technique because of the high likelihood of serious bodily
injury or death. Officers are trained that the head should only be targeted where the
resistance level creates a life-or-death situation.
       Press reviewed the video footage and 911 calls from defendant’s encounter with
the suspect. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Press opined that defendant’s
kick or stomp to the head violated the department’s use-of-force policy and guidelines.
Press emphasized that defendant applied a potentially lethal amount of force, causing the
suspect to lose consciousness, even though the suspect had been mostly compliant, was
not attempting to flee, was not exhibiting combative behavior, and was in a
disadvantageous position relative to the officers. Press acknowledged that officers have
to make split second decisions, and that a prone suspect with his hands tucked underneath

                                               5
his body is a significant concern for officers. But he also testified that it is not reasonable
to assume a suspect is armed and poses an imminent threat just because the suspect’s
hand is near his or her waistband.
       C.     Defense case-in-chief
       Defendant testified in his own defense that he decided to kick the suspect in the
head because he believed there was an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury.
Defendant considered him a threat because he was a robbery suspect involved in an
altercation, gang signs were thrown, the suspect’s shirt was removed, and the suspect
refused to show his hands and had a “thousand-yard stare.” As defendant approached the
suspect, he saw that the suspect’s left hand was still in his waistband and observed the
suspect’s right elbow moving, which suggested to defendant that the suspect was going to
pull out a gun. Defendant’s intent was to distract the suspect and move his hands away
from his waistband. Defendant believed that his use of force was consistent with his
training and experience as a police officer.
       Following the incident, and while still at the scene, defendant reported the use of
force to a superior, Sergeant Hancock. Defendant explained that the suspect kept his
hands by his side despite orders to move them. Defendant did not mention that the
suspect’s hands were moving or that he believed him to be armed. But defendant did
testify that, off camera, he had made a firearm gesture with his hand to indicate his belief
that the suspect was armed when informing Hancock about the use of force. Regarding
asking the other officers to mute their body cameras, defendant explained that this was
common practice so officers could “vent” after “everything was done.”
       Officers Coleman and Trudeau, the Elk Grove Police officers who first responded
to the scene, also testified for the defense. Officer Coleman testified that the suspect
caused him to have safety concerns because he appeared agitated, had removed his shirt,
and was being uncooperative. In addition, the suspect kept his hands down to his side,
near his waistband, which is “where people carry guns or weapons.” Further, the suspect

                                               6
was moving in a manner that suggested he might be trying to reach for a weapon. Officer
Trudeau testified that she too was concerned that the suspect was trying to retrieve a
weapon from his pocket.
       Sean McCann, a professor of administration of justice at Napa Valley College,
testified as the defense expert on use of force. He testified that defendant’s action, which
he characterized as a “push-kick,” was an intermediate level of force. He concluded that
it “clearly” fell within the range of reasonable conduct by “industry standards.” He
explained that the most important factor in the instant case was the activity of the
suspect’s hand and “the potential threat that a trained officer would perceive it to be.” He
testified that the suspect’s refusal to move his hands away from his waistband was a key
element that an officer would view as “incredibly, potentially dangerous.”
       Dr. Geoffrey Desmoulin, a biomedical engineering and incident reconstruction
expert, testified that he performed a biomechanical engineering assessment of the
causation of the suspect’s head injuries. In his opinion, the angular velocity of
defendant’s kick was not sufficient by itself to produce a subdural hematoma. He opined
that the suspect’s subdural hematoma could have been caused by the cumulative effect of
multiple impacts suffered on that date.
       D.     Trial verdict and sentencing
       Defendant was charged with battery resulting in serious bodily injury (Pen. Code,
§ 243, subd. (d)—count one) and assault under color of authority. (Pen. Code, § 149—
count two.). The jury found defendant guilty as charged.
       On count one, the trial court imposed but stayed execution of the middle term of
three years, placing defendant on formal probation for a period of two years, with the
condition that defendant serve 364 days at the county jail. On count two, the court
imposed the middle term of two years, but stayed execution of the sentence under section
654. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.

                                             7
                                        DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                        Section 231.7
         Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his in limine motion for an
“exception” to section 231.7, thereby violating his state and federal constitutional rights
to an impartial jury, fair trial, and due process. We disagree.
         A.    Additional background
         Both the state and federal constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges
to remove prospective jurors on the basis of group bias, such as race or ethnicity. (People
v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 383; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89
[90 L.Ed.2d 69, 83]; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277.) Such conduct
violates both the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution and the right to trial
by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I,
section 16 of the California Constitution. (People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184,
1211.)
         The standard for reviewing a Batson/Wheeler motion is well established. The
court must follow a three-step process. (People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 772.)
First, the party objecting to the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie case by
showing facts sufficient to support an inference of discriminatory purpose. Second, if a
prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the opponent to offer a permissible,
nondiscriminatory explanation for the challenge. Third, if a nondiscriminatory
explanation is offered, the trial court must determine whether that explanation is credible,
or whether the strike was in fact motivated by impermissible discrimination. (Ibid.)
         In 2020, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2020, ch. 318, §§1-3), which enacted section 231.7. The statute codifies the
Batson/Wheeler principle prohibiting unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges. For criminal juries selected after January 1, 2022, it provides that a party is

                                              8
prohibited from using a peremptory challenge to remove a juror based on “race, ethnicity,
gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the
perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.” (§ 231.7, subd.
(a); People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943, fn. 1 (Jaime).)
       Section 231.7 changed the rules for evaluating claims of discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges. (Jaime, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 943.) Before section 231.7,
trial courts examined peremptory challenges using the three-step Batson/Wheeler
framework, which required the party objecting to a peremptory challenge to make a
prima facie case of discrimination. (Jaime, supra, at p. 943.) Under section 231.7, this is
no longer required. (Jaime, at p. 943.) Instead, “upon objection,” the party exercising
the peremptory challenge must state the reasons for exercising the challenge. (Ibid.;
§ 231.7, subds. (b), (c).) The court shall then evaluate the reasons given “in light of the
totality of the circumstances.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).) If the court determines “there is a
substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity,
gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or
perceived membership in any of those groups, as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge,” the objection shall be sustained. (Ibid.)
       Additionally, the statute makes certain justifications for exercising a peremptory
challenge presumptively invalid unless the party exercising the challenge can show “by
clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the
rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race [or other prohibited characteristic], and
that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial
in the case.”3 (§ 231.7, subds. (e), (f).) Those presumptively invalid reasons for

3      Certain other justifications, relating to a juror’s behavior, are presumptively
invalid unless the court can independently confirm the alleged behavior occurred and
counsel can explain why that behavior is significant to the case being tried. (§ 231.7,
subd. (g).)

                                               9
excusing a prospective juror include a negative experience with law enforcement, a close
relationship with someone who has been convicted of a crime, and a belief that criminal
laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner.4 (§ 231.7, subd. (e)(1)-(3).)
       Here, defendant moved in limine to be excepted from the presumptions of
invalidity listed in section 231.7. Defendant argued that he intended to “voir dire the jury
panel specifically regarding their biases against law enforcement and the criminal justice
system in order to prevent such explicit and implicit bias against [appellant] and protect
his right to a fair trial.” He also argued that the statutory presumptions were intended to
impose limits on peremptory challenges by the prosecution and that applying the
presumptions to him would violate his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and
an impartial jury. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that the statute applies to
all parties and that it would be “improper and most likely illegal for the court to exempt
the defense from the presumptive prohibitions . . . .” The trial court denied the motion.
       B.     Analysis
       The question we must answer is whether application of section 231.7 to this case
violated defendant’s rights to an impartial jury, fair trial, or due process. Because this is
primarily a legal issue, we apply a de novo standard of review. (People v. Cromer (2001)
24 Cal.4th 889, 894.) We find no constitutional violation.
       Defendant’s argument fails because it rests on two flawed premises: (1) that
section 231.7 precluded him from exercising peremptory challenges against biased jurors,

4      Many of these justifications were accepted as constitutionally permissible under
the Batson/Wheeler standard. (See, e.g., People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 554-555
(Avila) [sibling’s involvement in the criminal justice system was a race-neutral
explanation]; People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 436, 439, 442 [skepticism about
fairness of the criminal justice system, views that the criminal justice system is biased,
and negative experiences with law enforcement recognized as valid grounds for
exclusion]; People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 167, fn. 13 [negative experience
with the justice system is valid, neutral reason]; People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530,
573 [arrest of a juror or close relative is an accepted race-neutral reason].)

                                              10
and (2) as a result, he was forced to accept a biased jury. Nothing in the statute precluded
defendant from exercising peremptory challenges against the jurors. Even if the reasons
for exercising a particular challenge would have involved a presumptively invalid
justification under section 231.7, subdivision (e), that presumption is rebuttable.
Defendant could have overcome the presumption by showing “by clear and convincing
evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a
prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national
origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that
the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in
the case . . . .” (§ 231.7, subds. (e), (f).) Thus, section 231.7 did not preclude defendant
from exercising peremptory challenges.
       Further, to prove the statute violated his constitutional rights, defendant must show
that application of section 231.7 forced him to accept an incompetent juror. Defendant
has made no such showing. Nor can he since if a prospective juror is biased, the
defendant still may excuse the juror for cause. (§ 225, subd. (b)(1).) Accordingly, we
reject defendant’s claim that the trial court’s denial of his section 231.7 motion infringed
his constitutional rights to an impartial jury, fair trial, or due process.
                                                II
                             Challenge For Cause of Juror No. 4
       Defendant next contends that the trial court erred and violated his constitutional
rights to an impartial jury, fair trial, and due process by denying his challenge for cause to
Juror No. 4. We conclude defendant forfeited this contention because he failed to
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove Juror No. 4, failed to exhaust all of his
peremptory challenges, and failed to express his dissatisfaction with the jury as selected.
We also reject defendant’s alternative argument that the failure to exercise a peremptory
challenge against Juror No. 4 constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

                                               11
       A.     Additional background
       During the initial phase of voir dire, Juror No. 4 expressed some concerns about
serving on this case given the “particularly controversial subject,” and stated that he
generally was “less sympathic [sic] towards law enforcement in that situation.” The
judge then asked a series of questions to ascertain whether Juror No. 4 could be fair and
impartial notwithstanding his concerns. Juror No. 4 repeatedly assured the judge that he
was capable of fairly and impartially assessing the facts and evidence in the case.
       The following day, in response to questioning by the defense, Juror No. 4
indicated that his feelings about law enforcement had been affected by media coverage of
incidents involving police officers’ use of force and by the history of policing in the
United States. Juror No. 4 also stated he had attended recent protests against police
violence and brutality and had made charitable contributions to organizations engaged in
social justice work. Juror No. 4 did not believe law enforcement officers more likely
than not abuse their authority. But Juror No. 4 had one prior negative experience with
law enforcement involving a traffic stop that he felt “was not motivated in good faith.”
       When Juror No. 4 was asked by defense counsel if he still believed he could be
fair and impartial in this case, the juror responded: “I certainly will struggle with it. It’s
a hard question to answer. [But] if you’re looking for a yes or no, the answer is yes . . . .”
Similarly, when asked by the prosecution whether he would have any problem finding
defendant not guilty if the prosecution failed to prove its case, the juror said he “would
struggle with that,” but would be able to find defendant not guilty.
       Later, outside the presence of the other prospective jurors, the judge asked Juror
No. 4 whether he could perform his duties fairly and dispassionately, unaffected by his
“very strong beliefs and passions for social justice issues?” The juror answered, “I’ve
been considering the last two days of this conversation. I don’t think I can do it. I don’t
think I would be the right person to do it.” He explained, “[A]fter examining my own
deep, you know, beliefs on certain specific issues, I think that I’m not—it’s really hard to

                                              12
say. I just think that this case, in particular, is difficult for me from . . . a moral
standpoint. To answer your question, I do think that I’m perfectly capable of evaluating
facts and being objective. I just simply think, in this case . . . that would be more difficult
for me and I’m not sure that I can do it.” The following colloquy then occurred:
       “THE COURT: Can you tell me you will do it?
       “[JUROR NO. 4]: Yes.
       “THE COURT: What I mean by that is, can you definitively participate as a juror
in this case, restricting yourself and your process to a complete and full examination of
the facts and the application only of the law to those facts, to determine the issue of the
defendant’s guilt or innocence, keeping out of the equation any personal views or animus
towards law enforcement?
       “[JUROR NO. 4]: Yes.
       “THE COURT: Okay.
       “[JUROR NO. 4]: It will be incredibly hard, I think, the more that I consider the
duration, right, but, yes, the answer to your question, Your Honor, is yes.”
       Defense counsel subsequently moved to excuse Juror No. 4 for cause. The
prosecution opposed, and the trial court denied the challenge. The court reasoned that
although Juror No. 4 said he would “struggle,” he also said that he would, in the end,
comply with his obligation to fairly and impartially evaluate the case.
      Defendant did not use a peremptory challenge on Juror No. 4. Defendant also did
not use all of his peremptory challenges or object to the jury as constituted. Juror No. 4
was seated as a juror.
       B.      Analysis
       Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause to Juror
No. 4. The People counter that this contention has been forfeited on appeal. We agree
with the People.

                                                13
       To preserve a claim of error in the improper denial of a challenge for cause, the
defendant must (1) use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror in question;
(2) exhaust all his peremptory challenges (or justify the failure to do so); and (3) express
dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected. (People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 425.) Defendant failed to satisfy any of these requirements. Therefore, he forfeited his
claim of error with respect to the denial of his challenge for cause.5 (Id. at pp. 424-426.)
      Anticipating forfeiture, defendant argues in the alternative that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to use a peremptory challenge to remove Juror No. 4. We are
unpersuaded.
       To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove
(1) trial counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance
was prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the
result would have been more favorable to the defendant. (People v. Maury (2003)
30 Cal.4th 342, 389.) If the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing on either
component, the claim must fail. (People v. Palmer (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1158.)
       Here, defendant has not established prejudice. Defendant claims that he was
prejudiced because Juror No. 4 was biased. From this, he reasons that it is reasonably
probable replacing Juror No. 4 “with an impartial juror would have resulted in a verdict
more favorable” to defendant. However, the record does not establish that any juror who
served on the jury, including Juror No. 4, was biased.
       Although Juror No. 4 indicated serving as a juror on the case would be “difficult,”
and the juror at times expressed concerns or doubts about his ability to keep his personal

5       Even if the issue were not forfeited, we would deny it on the merits. As discussed
infra, the juror’s statements were, at most, conflicting, and the trial court reasonably
could have concluded the juror would perform his duties fairly and impartially.

                                               14
views towards law enforcement separate, the juror also repeatedly assured the trial court
that he could fairly and impartially decide the case based upon the evidence presented. In
the end, the court directly asked the juror whether he could determine the issue of the
defendant’s guilt or innocence unaffected by any personal views or animus towards law
enforcement, and the juror answered, “Yes.” Thus, the record reflects the juror’s
willingness and ability to put aside his personal views and render an impartial verdict
based on the evidence and instructions. (See People v. Davis (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 115,
120 [an abstract bias will not of itself disqualify a juror if it appears the juror can set it
aside and fairly and impartially decide the case]; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349,
366 [trial court reasonably could determine juror would impartially perform duties
despite expressed prejudice against defendant’s appearance]; People v. Bivert (2011)
52 Cal.4th 96, 115 [record supported finding that juror’s strong pro-death penalty views
would not substantially impair performance of his duties].)
       To the extent the juror’s responses were conflicting or equivocal, we are bound to
defer to the trial court’s determination that the juror would be able to perform his duties
fairly and impartially. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 217; Avila, supra,
38 Cal.4th at pp. 530, 539; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 488; People v.
Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 675; see Alcazar v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 86, 100 [no abuse of discretion in declining to strike juror who
made conflicting statements about ability to keep an open mind].) We afford this
deference out of recognition that the trial judge who observes and speaks with a
prospective juror is in the best position to evaluate the juror’s state of mind. (Avila,
supra, at p. 529.) Nothing in this record convinces us that Juror No. 4 was biased or that
it is reasonably probable a successful challenge against Juror No. 4 would have resulted
in a verdict more favorable to defendant. Accordingly, we find defendant’s ineffective
assistance claim lacking in merit.

                                               15
                                               III
                           Peremptory Challenge of Juror No. 2
       Defendant contends the trial court erred and violated his constitutional rights to an
impartial jury, fair trial, and due process when it erroneously denied his peremptory
challenge of Juror No. 2. We again disagree.
       A.     Additional background
      Juror No. 2 worked as a maintenance supervisor. He previously served as a juror
on an assault and battery case, and previously was convicted in Arizona of possession of
marijuana. He said he knew “a lot” of people who had been arrested and that a family
member was imprisoned after being involved in an incident like this case. The juror did
not express any negative views toward law enforcement, and he consistently and
unequivocally maintained he could be fair and impartial.
       The defense sought to exercise a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 2. The
prosecutor objected on grounds the strike was presumptively invalid under section 231.7.
The prosecutor reasoned: “[Juror No. 2] appears to be of some kind of ethnicity other
than Caucasian. Our victim is the same, in terms of something other than Caucasian.
[Juror No. 2] is also part of the community that has suffered law enforcement
involvement . . . . He indicated he could be fair, holds nothing against law enforcement.
But I think, based on his ethnic background and his background with respect to having
suffered some convictions, I think he does fall within a cognizable group.”
       Defense counsel responded that he did not understand the objection because Juror
No. 2 had not expressed any of the presumptively invalid grounds under section 231.7.
Counsel further explained that his decision to excuse the juror was not based on the
juror’s ethnicity, it was “more based upon trying to get to other jurors” who he believed
would be better suited to serve in the case.

                                               16
       Applying the presumption of invalidity under section 231.7, the trial court
sustained the prosecution’s objection and denied the peremptory challenge. Juror No. 2
was seated as a juror.
       B.     Analysis
       Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his
constitutional rights in denying his peremptory challenge to Juror No. 2. We conclude it
is unnecessary to reach the merits of the claim because, even if the trial court erred,
defendant has failed to establish any resulting prejudice.
       As a preliminary matter, we note that while the erroneous denial of a section 231.7
objection is per se reversible (§ 231.7, subd. (j)), the statute is silent on the proper remedy
when a section 231.7 objection is improperly sustained. Defendant argues that because
of the “critical role” peremptory challenges have in ensuring a defendant’s right to an
impartial jury, the improper denial of a peremptory challenge should be viewed as a
structural error requiring automatic reversal. Case law compels the opposite conclusion.
       Although “ ‘[p]eremptory challenges are intended to promote a fair and impartial
jury, . . . they are not a right of direct constitutional magnitude.’ ” (People v. Westerfield
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 673.) Thus, improper denial of a peremptory challenge is not
structural error and warrants reversal only if the accused can show the error affected his
or her right to a fair and impartial jury. (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 438-
439; accord, People v. Singh (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1331-1332.) This is the same
standard that applies when a court erroneously denies a challenge for cause. (People v.
Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1048; People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 916-918,
920-921.) Here, defendant has made no attempt to show that Juror No. 2 was biased or
otherwise incompetent. Indeed, defendant has not articulated any concerns regarding the
juror’s ability to be fair or impartial. Accordingly, we find any error in denying
defendant’s peremptory challenge of Juror No. 2 harmless.

                                              17
                                             IV
            Evidence of the Elk Grove Police Department’s Use-of-Force Policies
       Defendant contends the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of the Elk
Grove Police Department’s use-of-force policy and guidelines, and defendant’s violation
of them.6 We find no error.
       A.      Additional background
       The rules governing the admission of expert opinion testimony are well settled.
(People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299.) “ ‘[The] decisive consideration in
determining the admissibility of expert opinion evidence is whether the subject of inquiry
is one of such common knowledge that [persons] of ordinary education could reach a
conclusion as intelligently as the witness or whether, on the other hand, the matter is
sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the
trier of fact.’ ” (Carson v. Facilities Development Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830, 844;
Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) “ ‘If the matter in issue is one within the knowledge of
experts only and not within the common knowledge of laymen, it is necessary for the
plaintiff to introduce expert opinion evidence in order to establish a prima facie case.’
[Citation.]” (Allgoewer v. City of Tracy (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 755, 761-762
(Allgoewer).) On the other hand, when the subject of inquiry is one of such common
knowledge that the jury is “ ‘ “just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the
evidence and draw the necessary conclusions, then the need for expert testimony
evaporates.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 762.)
       Defendant was charged in count two with a violation of Penal Code section 149,
which criminalizes a public officer who, under color of authority, assaults or beats any

6      Alternatively, if we find the issue is not cognizable on appeal because defense
counsel failed to renew his objection at trial, defendant asserts he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Because we address his claim on the merits, it is unnecessary to
consider the ineffective assistance claim.

                                             18
person “without lawful necessity”, i.e., with more force than was reasonably necessary
under the circumstances. (People v. Perry (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 444, 467.) In other
words, Penal Code section 149 punishes a use of force that exceeds what is reasonably
required for the accomplishment of a recognized, lawful purpose. (Perry, supra, at
p. 467.) This is “effectively shorthand for the standard applied in cases alleging
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (Ibid.)
       Under the Fourth Amendment, a claim that law enforcement officers used
excessive force is analyzed under an objective reasonableness standard. (Murchison v.
County of Tehama (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 867, 887.) But “ ‘[t]he “reasonableness” of a
particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’ ” (Ibid.; see Pen. Code, § 835a, subds.
(a)(4), (b).) “ ‘ “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in
a particular situation.” ’ [Citation.]” (Murchison, supra, at p. 887.)
       In the instant case, there was a mutual request by both parties to present expert
testimony on police use of force. The trial court granted that request, noting that there
would be no “imbalance” since the jury would hear experts from both sides.
       Defendant, however, filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding the
Elk Grove Police Department’s use-of-force policy and procedures and whether
defendant complied with them. Defendant argued that such evidence should be excluded
because it was irrelevant, improper character evidence, and unduly prejudicial. The
prosecution filed a written opposition.
       The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the prosecution could introduce the
evidence subject to a limiting instruction. The court also prohibited the parties’ experts
from expressing an opinion on the ultimate issue of fact whether defendant used
excessive force in this case.

                                             19
       At trial, after evidence relating to the Elk Grove Police Department’s use-of-force
policy and procedures was introduced, the trial court admonished the jury: “We just
received testimony to the extent that the witness testified that basically a violation of
policy is a violation of the law. That is an incorrect statement. That is an incorrect legal
principle, and I’m striking it from the record, and I’m admonishing each of you to
disregard it. You’re not [to] use that as a standard. You’ll be instructed on the legal
standards that exist in this case, at the conclusion of the case.”
       The trial court then gave the following limiting instruction: “Ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, you’ve just heard testimony regarding the policies and procedures
of the Elk Grove Police Department regarding the use of force by an officer during the
performance of his or her official duties. An officer’s violation of a police department’s
policies on the use of force during the performance of his or her official duties cannot, by
itself, establish that an officer[’s] actions amount to excessive force. It is but one of a
number of factors for consideration on the issue of whether the force used was
excessive.”
       B.     Analysis
       We begin our analysis by emphasizing what is not in dispute: that expert
testimony on the use of force is generally admissible in excessive force cases. This
conclusion flows from our opinion in Allgoewer, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th 755, which
dealt with the admission of expert testimony in a civil excessive force case.
       In Allgoewer, the plaintiff sued a city and two of its police officers for damages
based on an excessive use of force during his arrest. (Allgoewer, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th
at p. 757.) The trial court granted a nonsuit motion on the ground the plaintiff had not
presented any expert testimony to show what force a reasonable officer would have used
under the same or similar circumstances. (Id. at pp. 757, 760.) The question on appeal
was whether the trial court erred in concluding that expert testimony is required to
establish that a particular use of force is objectively unreasonable. (Id. at p. 757.)

                                              20
Reversing the trial court, we concluded that while expert testimony may be admissible in
an excessive force case, there is no per se requirement that a plaintiff present expert
testimony to prove an excessive force claim. (Id. at pp. 763-764.) We explained that
determining whether a particular use of force was excessive is not “so far removed from
the comprehension of a lay jury as to necessitate expert opinion testimony . . . .” (Id. at
p. 765.)
       Nevertheless, our opinion in Allgoewer made clear that necessity is not the
measure for admissibility. (Allgoewer, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 763-764.) Even if a
matter is within a jury’s comprehension, expert testimony may be admitted if it would
“assist” the jury. (Id. at pp. 761, 763; see People v. McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at
pp. 1299-1300.) Just as the facts of each case will dictate whether a use of force was
reasonable, so too the facts “ ‘will determine whether expert testimony would assist the
jury.’ ” (Allgoewer, supra, at p. 763.) Thus, where the force used is “ ‘reduced to its
most primitive form—the bare hands—expert testimony might not be helpful.’ ” (Ibid.)
But where the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct implicates specialized police
training or experience, or the subtleties of police procedure and practice, expert testimony
may assist the jury to understand the evidence and determine the facts in issue. (Id. at
pp. 763, 765; accord, People v. Sibrian (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 127, 135-136 (Sibrian);
People v. Reardon (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 727, 738 (Reardon); see Kopf v. Skyrm
(4th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 374, 378-379.)7
       With this framework in mind, we turn to the question presented here: whether the
trial court erred in allowing the prosecution’s expert to testify on the Elk Grove Police
Department’s use-of-force policy and procedures and whether defendant violated them.

7      To the extent People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140—a case on which
defendant relies—suggests expert testimony regarding police use of force should be
admissible only in cases involving specialized weapons or tools (e.g., guns, dogs, pepper
spray) (id. at pp. 165-166), we decline to follow it.

                                             21
We review the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence under the abuse of discretion
standard (People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 895), and find no abuse of discretion.
       Although it was the jury’s role to determine whether defendant’s use of force was
reasonable, it bears repeating that the test of reasonableness is judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer in the defendant’s position. (Allgoewer, supra,
207 Cal.App.4th at p. 762; Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 397 [104 L.Ed.2d
443, 456].) Unlike private citizens, police officers are trained in specialized techniques
and standards that the jury may not fully understand without expert assistance, such as
threat assessment, principles of proportionate/escalating force, how and when to deploy
lethal force, and tactics to overcome a noncompliant suspect. When such matters are at
issue in a use-of-force case, expert testimony on law enforcement policies and procedures
can assist the jury by providing a framework for evaluating the defendant’s conduct.
(Allgoewer, supra, at p. 765; Sibrian, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 135-136; Reardon,
supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 739-740; see United States v. Brown (11th Cir. 2019)
934 F.3d 1278, 1296.) Such was the case here.
       This was not a simple physical use of force against a handcuffed or restrained
detainee. As the trial court found, the situation was complicated by the suspect’s attitude
and “noncompliance specific to the issue of placing his hands in and around his waist as
he was prone[] . . . on the ground, . . . the potential threat that may have arisen [from]
that,” and determining a proper application of force in response to those facts. Even if
this was not a case in which the handling of some specialized law enforcement tool (e.g.,
a police dog) had to be explained, we agree with the trial court that it was a case where
knowledge of the department’s policy and procedures could help the jury to better
understand the evidence and determine the reasonableness of defendant’s conduct under
the circumstances confronting him.
       We draw support for our conclusion from Sibrian, in which the First Appellate
District, Division One, upheld the introduction of testimony from a prosecution expert on

                                              22
police training and tactics relating to the use of force in a trial for resisting an officer.
(Sibrian, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 129, 133-139.) The trial court allowed the expert
testimony because it “cover[ed] matters beyond the common experience of an ordinary
juror,” such as “ ‘issues of incremental use of violence and the kind of force that can be
used’ ” in response to a noncompliant suspect, as well as the “the potential continued
danger posed by a suspect after he has been wrestled to the ground.” (Id. at pp. 133-134.)
This case is similar.
       We find additional support for our conclusion in Reardon, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th
727, which involved a trial for resisting an officer who repeatedly struck the defendant
with a baton while he was on the ground. (Reardon, supra, at pp. 730-731.) In that case,
we held the trial court was wrong to exclude expert testimony by which defendant sought
to show officers “could have restrained him through lesser means known to them based
on their training and the facts as they reasonably perceived them . . . .” (Id. at p. 739.)
We indicated that was precisely the kind of testimony that Allgoewer indicated could be
useful to a jury’s understanding of the case. (Id. at p. 740; see also Smith v. City of
Hemet (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3d 689, 703, disapproved on other grounds in Lemos v.
County of Sonoma (9th Cir. 2022) 40 F.4th 1002, 1009.) The same is true here.
       Additionally, because the defense had its own use-of-force expert, the trial court
knew the defense would have the opportunity to respond to any points made by the
prosecution’s experts. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the challenged evidence would assist the jury.8
       Even if the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 801, defendant
argues it should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because its

8       The evidence of police guidelines and training also was admissible to assist the
jury in determining whether defendant acted in self-defense. (See People v. Humphrey
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082; CALCRIM No. 3470.)

                                               23
probative value was “substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Defendant contends the evidence should have been excluded because it was confusing
and effectively invited the jury to use the officer’s compliance (or noncompliance) with
local training as a proxy for reasonableness. We are not persuaded.
       The trial court acknowledged the risk that the jury might conflate the question of
whether defendant used excessive force with the question of whether he followed his
police training. To address this concern, the court admonished the jury that a violation of
police department use-of-force policies cannot, by itself, establish excessive force, and
that it is but one of a number of factors for consideration on the issue of whether the force
used was excessive. (See United States v. Brown, supra, 934 F.3d at p. 1296.) We
presume jurors follow the instructions they are given. (People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th
109, 130.) As a result, the court’s instruction effectively eliminated the danger that the
jury would confuse or conflate the issues. (People v. Hendrix (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
216, 247 [a limiting instruction can ameliorate prejudice by eliminating the danger the
jury could consider the evidence for an improper purpose]; People v. Lindberg (2008)
45 Cal.4th 1, 25-26.) On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence.
       For similar reasons, we also reject defendant’s constitutional arguments. This was
not a case where defendant was denied due process or a fair trial.

                                             24
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                /s/     ,
                                           Krause, J.

We concur:

     \s\                 ,
Robie, Acting P. J.

     \s\                 ,
Boulware Eurie, J.

                                      25