Court Opinion

ID: 9407334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 16:09:58.235161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:37.016898
License: Public Domain

J-S09017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 ESTATE OF RICKY E. HULL,                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 DECEASED                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
                    Appellant              :
                                           :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :   No. 1277 WDA 2022
 MELISSA S. SHOWMAN                        :

           Appeal from the Order Entered September 28, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s):
                            702 of 2022 GD

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                 FILED: JULY 6, 2023

      The Estate of Ricky E. Hull, deceased (the “Estate”), appeals from the

order entered in the civil division of the Fayette County Court of Common

Pleas dismissing all claims in this ejectment action, without prejudice, so that

the claims could instead be raised in the orphans’ court division. The Estate

contends that the orphans’ court division lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

its complaint in ejectment and that the trial court erred in dismissing this claim

instead of transferring the counterclaims raised by Melissa S. Showman

(“Appellee”), one of the decedent’s three daughters, to the orphans’ court

division. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the orphans’ court division

may exercise nonmandatory subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, but

we reverse the dismissal of this action and remand with instructions to transfer
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the proceeding to the orphans’ court division pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 5103(c).

       By way of background, Mr. Hull died testate on April 7, 2021.          The

Register of Wills in Fayette County subsequently issued letters testamentary

to the executrix at docket number 2621-0471 of the orphans’ court division.

The decedent’s assets included, inter alia, over sixteen acres of real estate in

Springfield Township, Fayette County (the “Property”). While the orphans’

court docket remained open, the Estate filed a complaint against Appellee in

the civil division, raising a single count of ejectment asserting that she was

occupying the Property without any right to do so.1

       Appellee filed a response containing new matter, affirmative defenses,

and three counterclaims against the Estate. Therein, she asserted that the

decedent executed a deed transferring a one-third interest in the Property to

her several weeks prior to the decedent’s death, and that the Estate agreed

to allow her to remain on the Property if she installed a septic system.

Appellee also raised the defense that the decedent’s last will and testament

did not fully dispose of the residue of his assets, creating a partial intestacy

that entitled her to an interest in the Property. Finally, Appellee averred that

the executrix of the Estate violated her fiduciary obligations by entering into

an agreement of sale for the Property with a third-party for below its appraised

____________________________________________

1 Notably, the Honorable Judge Joseph M. George, Jr., presided over both the
orphans’ court docket and the complaint filed by the Estate in the civil division.

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value. As such, Appellee requested relief from the trial court in the form of

attorney’s fees arising from defending the ejectment action, and seeking

specific performance of a contract, an accounting, a freeze of the Estate’s

assets, and/or a hearing to determine whether the executrix should be

removed.

       The Estate filed preliminary objections to Appellee’s response seeking,

inter alia, to dismiss her counterclaims due to lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The Estate argued that the civil division had exclusive jurisdiction

over the ejectment action and that Appellee’s counterclaims should be brought

in a separate action within the orphans’ court division. Both parties filed briefs

addressing the Estate’s preliminary objections.

       On September 28, 2022, the trial court sustained the Estate’s

preliminary objection to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Appellee’s

counterclaims.2      Critically, the order dismissed all claims of both parties,

without prejudice, so that they could be raised in the docket of the orphans’

court division relating to the Estate. The trial court also directed that, once

the claims were filed with the orphans’ court division, it would appoint a

master pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. § 751, with the master’s costs to be borne by

the Estate.    The Estate filed a motion to reconsider, and thereafter timely

____________________________________________

2 The order did not address the remaining preliminary objections raised by
the Estate.

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appealed from the order sustaining the preliminary objection while the motion

to reconsider was still pending.

           The Estate and the trial court thereafter complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3

The Estate raises the following inter-related issues on appeal:

      I.     Where the trial court had exclusive jurisdiction of [the Estate’s]
             ejectment action, whether the trial court abused its discretion
             or committed an error of law by sua sponte dismissing that
             action and transferring it to the trial court’s orphans’ court
             division?

     II.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an
             error of law by sua sponte dismissing Appellant’s ejectment
             action and transferring it to the trial court’s orphans’ court
             division to be heard by a master, even though the Appellant
             has the right to try the ejectment action either to a jury or a
             judge sitting without a jury?

    III.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an
             error of law by sua sponte dismissing Appellant’s ejectment
             action and transferring it to the trial court’s orphans’ court
             division to be tried to a master together with all of the
             Appellee’s counterclaims[,] none of which arise from the same
             transaction or occurrence as the ejectment action?

The Estate’s brief at 3-4.4

____________________________________________

3  The trial court entered a statement in lieu of opinion, asserting that the
order appealed from was interlocutory because the claims were preserved to
be raised in the orphans’ court. The court did not address the merits of the
Estate’s claims on appeal.

4 We note with displeasure that the Estate discusses all three of these issues
in a single argument section of its brief, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)
(stating that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are
questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part . . . the
particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       We first address our appellate jurisdiction.5 The Estate asserts that the

order appealed from constitutes a final order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341 or,

alternatively, a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. Both the trial court

and Appellee assert that the order in question is not a final order because it

disposes of no claims, as they were preserved to be raised in the orphans’

court division.

       We agree with the Estate that the order in question constitutes a final

order and is thus appealable.          “It is well settled that questions as to the

appealability of an order go to the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the

order.” Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 974 A.2d 1166, 1171 (Pa.Super.

2009) (citation omitted). Generally, an appeal lies only from a final order,

unless otherwise permitted by statute. See Forrester v. Hanson, 901 A.2d

548, 554 (Pa.Super. 2006). A final order is defined in Rule 341 as one that

“disposes of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). To determine

whether an order is final, this Court “must consider whether the practical

ramification of the order will be to dispose of the case, making review

____________________________________________

authorities as are deemed pertinent”). Counsel for the Estate is cautioned to
comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure in the future.

5   This Court issued a rule to show cause order on November 28, 2022, with
respect to why this appeal should not be quashed as interlocutory. The Estate
filed a response, and this Court discharged the rule without rendering a
determination regarding appealability.

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appropriate.” Friia v. Friia, 780 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa.Super. 2001) (cleaned

up).

       Here, the trial court’s order precludes the Estate and Appellee from

litigating any of their claims in the civil division, and therefore “disposes of all

claims and of all parties” as to that action. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). The case

was dismissed, despite the trial court giving leave for the parties to re-file

their actions in the orphans’ court. Accordingly, the order is final, and we

have jurisdiction to address the merits of the Estate’s claims. 6 See In re

Estate of Cantor, 621 A.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Pa.Super. 1993) (addressing the

merits of an appeal filed from an orphans’ court order dismissing claims

without prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also In re

Caples, 1802 EDA 2020 (Pa.Super. filed August 16, 2021) (non-precedential

decision) (same).

       All three of the Estate’s claims on appeal concern the lower court’s

jurisdiction. Our standard of review for questions involving subject matter

jurisdiction is as follows:

       Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred solely by the
       Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth. The test for whether
       a court has subject matter jurisdiction inquires into the
       competency of the court to determine controversies of the general
       class to which the case presented for consideration belongs. Thus,
       as a pure question of law, the standard of review in determining

____________________________________________

6 In light of our finding that the September 28, 2022 order was a final order,
we do not address the Estate’s alternative argument that the order satisfies
the requirements of a collateral order under Pa.R.A.P. 313.

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      whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is de novo and the
      scope of review is plenary.

Mazur v. Trinity Area Sch. Dist., 961 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 2008) (cleaned up).

      Concerning jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas, 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 931(a) provides that “[e]xcept where exclusive original jurisdiction of an

action or proceeding is by statute or by general rule . . . vested in another

court of this Commonwealth, the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited

original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings[.]” Further, pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S. § 952,

      [t]he divisions of a court of common pleas are administrative units
      composed of those judges of the court responsible for the
      transaction of specified classes of the business of the court. In a
      court of common pleas having two or more divisions each division
      of the court is vested with the full jurisdiction of the whole court,
      but the business of the court may be allocated among the divisions
      of the court by or pursuant to general rules.

Id. Our High Court has also stated that “it is now recognized that the divisions

of the common pleas courts are established essentially for purposes of

administrative convenience, and that each division is vested with the full

jurisdiction of the whole court.” In re Estate of Hall, 535 A.2d 47, 59 (Pa.

1987) (citing § 952).

      Concerning the jurisdiction of an orphans’ court division, § 711 of the

Pennsylvania Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code (“PEF Code”) states that

the orphans’ court shall have mandatory jurisdiction over the following

enumerated matters pertinent to the instant appeal:

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      (1) Decedent’s estates.--The administration and distribution of
      the real and personal property of decedents’ estates and the
      control of the decedent’s burial.

            ....

      (12) Fiduciaries.--The appointment, control, settlement of the
      accounts of, removal and discharge of, and allowance to and
      allocation of compensation among, all fiduciaries of estates and
      trusts, jurisdiction of which is exercised through the orphans’ court
      division, except that the register shall continue to grant letters
      testamentary and of administration to personal representatives as
      heretofore.

            ....

      (13) Specific performance of contracts.--To enforce
      specifically the performance by either party of any agreement
      made by a decedent to purchase or sell real or personal property.

20 Pa.C.S. § 711.

      Additionally, § 712 of the PEF Code explains that the concurrent

jurisdiction of the court of common pleas may be, but is not required to be,

exercised through its orphans’ court division under certain circumstances.

Specifically, § 712 states in relevant part as follows:

      § 712. Nonmandatory exercise of jurisdiction through
      orphans’ court division

            The jurisdiction of the court of common pleas over the
            following may be exercised through either its orphans’ court
            division or other appropriate division:

                         ....

                    (3) Other matters.--The disposition of any case
                    where there are substantial questions concerning
                    matters enumerated in section 711 and also matters
                    not enumerated in that section.

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20 Pa.C.S. § 712. Subsection 712(3) is notable because it provides that the

orphans’ court division may exercise jurisdiction when a controversy

implicates items enumerated in § 711 (such as those involving the

administration of an estate, fiduciaries, and specific performance of a

contract), yet also involves claims that are not enumerated in that section

(such as an ejectment action). Our High Court has held that “§ 712 confers

upon the orphans’ court division broad residual and discretionary jurisdiction

over all matters that are subject to resolution by courts of common pleas

generally.” In re Estate of Hall, supra at 59 (cleaned up).

      In this context, we review a court’s jurisdictional decision for an abuse

of discretion. See R.M. v. J.S., 20 A.3d 496, 500 (Pa.Super. 2011). Our

Supreme Court has explained,

      an abuse of discretion occurs when the court has overridden or
      misapplied the law, when its judgment is manifestly unreasonable,
      or when there is insufficient evidence of record to support the
      court’s findings.    An abuse of discretion requires clear and
      convincing evidence that the trial court misapplied the law or
      failed to follow proper legal procedures.

Id. (cleaned up).

      With this background in mind, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

trial court’s determination that the orphans’ court division may exercise

jurisdiction over both parties’ claims in this litigation. While the civil division

is ordinarily a proper location to resolve the ejectment action, practically all of

Appellee’s counterclaims here fall within the mandatory jurisdiction of the

orphans’ court as provided by the three subsections of § 711 discussed above.

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Specifically, Appellee averred that the decedent transferred to her a one-third

interest in the Property subject to the ejectment action prior to decedent’s

death. She also asserted that she has a partial residual interest in the Estate’s

assets under the decedent’s will, which would include the Property. Both of

these contentions implicate the administration and distributions of the

decedent’s personal and real property under § 711(1).

      Further, Appellee pled that the executrix of the Estate breached her

duties by entering into an agreement of sale for the Property for below market

value and by failing to provide an accounting. As such, Appellee requested

that the lower court freeze the Estate’s assets, order the executrix to prepare

an accounting, and schedule a hearing concerning removal of the executrix.

These demands all relate to the control and removal of a fiduciary pursuant to

§ 711(12).

      Moreover, the new matter raised by Appellee alleged that the Estate

agreed to allow her to remain on the Property if certain conditions were met.

She requested that the lower court enter an order granting specific

performance on that contract. Therefore, this counterclaim invokes § 711(13)

and jurisdiction over specific performance of contracts involving an estate.

      Since the orphans’ court would have mandatory jurisdiction over the

counterclaims raised by Appellee, pursuant to § 712(3), the orphans’ court

would be permitted to exercise nonmandatory jurisdiction over any other

claims, including those not enumerated in § 711.        This would include the

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Estate’s ejectment claim. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that the orphans’ court should exercise jurisdiction over all the

parties’ entangled claims.7

       Indeed, the orphans’ court’s assumption of nonmandatory jurisdiction

would permit it to efficiently resolve the claims related to the decedent’s estate

in a single proceeding, and thus further the purpose of § 712. As the official

comment to § 712 states: “The addition of new paragraph (3) is intended to

avoid multiple actions in different divisions in a case involving two or more

questions, one of which would ordinarily be decided by the orphans’ court

division and the other by the trial or family division.” Hence, the very purpose

of § 712 is to promote judicial economy and prevent parallel, yet related,

proceedings, and accordingly avoid the situation the Estate advocates for

herein.

       Instead of addressing § 712, the Estate challenges the orphans’ court’s

subject matter jurisdiction by highlighting procedural differences between the

civil and orphans’ court divisions. The Estate argues that it is entitled to relief

because the trial court “effectively eviscerated [the Estate’s] right to have the

____________________________________________

7 In its statement in lieu of opinion, the trial court did not expressly indicate
whether jurisdiction of the orphans’ court division would be exercised under
the nonmandatory provision pursuant to § 712(3). Nonetheless, we are
permitted to affirm the trial court on any basis supported by the record. See
In re Amended and Restated Deed of Trust of Margaret M. Holdship
Dated February 26, 1981 fbo Holdship, 288 A.3d 919, 933 n.10 (Pa.Super.
2023).

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[e]jectment [a]ction tried by a jury or a judge of the court of common pleas

according to the rules of civil procedure.” The Estate’s brief at 11.8 Further,

the Estate laments that there is no rule permitting appointment of a master

to hear ejectment actions. Id. at 10. Finally, the Estate asserts that the trial

court erred in permitting the counterclaims to be raised by Appellee pursuant

to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1056 because they did not “arise from

the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as

the original ejectment action.”           Id.      We find the Estate’s arguments

unpersuasive.

       With respect to the Estate’s right to a jury trial and the trial court’s

decision to eventually appoint a master, we note that the trial court stated the

following in its Statement in Lieu of Opinion:

       To the extent that our order conflicts with the right to a jury trial
       for an ejectment action and in the event the moving party would
       request a jury trial rather than proceed under 20 Pa.C.S. § 3311,
____________________________________________

8 The Estate cites, without discussion, the case of Baskin & Sears v. Edward
J. Boyle Co., 483 A.2d 1365 (Pa. 1984). Therein, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the lower court erred when it transferred to the orphans’ court
division a case involving claims of negligent estate planning/administration,
unfair trade practices, malpractice, fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress that arose from transactions between an estate and a
revocable life insurance trust. See id. at 1367. The High Court found that
the issues raised by the plaintiffs were only collaterally related to § 711(1)
and (2) and it was clear the trial division had jurisdiction over all of the claims.
See id. at 1367-38. In the instant case, by contrast, it is clear that some of
the counterclaims directly invoke subjects enumerated in § 711 and therefore
are within the mandatory jurisdiction of the orphans’ court division. Thus, the
Baskin & Sears Court did not address the issue of whether nonmandatory
jurisdiction pursuant to § 712(3) was appropriate in the context of competing
related claims.

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         the court shall afford the moving party a jury trial in orphan’s court
         on the ejectment action and all other claims shall be referred to
         the hearing officer.

Statement in Lieu of Opinion, 11/14/22, at 2 n.1 (cleaned up). Additionally,

pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. § 777(a), a party in interest shall be entitled to a trial

by jury in cases before the orphans’ court “[w]hen a substantial dispute of fact

shall arise concerning the decedent’s title to property, real or personal[.]”

         As we already highlighted, Appellee’s new matter and counterclaims

created a substantial dispute of fact concerning the decedent’s title to the

Property as of the time of his death. Accordingly, between the trial court’s

order and the discretionary rules allowing jury trials in proceedings before the

orphans’ court, the record before us does not support the conclusion that the

Estate will be deprived of its right to a trial by jury in the event of a transfer

to the orphans’ court. Nor would it be required to prosecute its ejectment

action through a master or hearing officer if this matter were transferred to

orphans’ court. As the Estate’s rights are protected, we discern no reversible

error.

         We are likewise unmoved by the Estate’s argument that the trial court

erred in failing to limit or exclude Appellee’s counterclaims pursuant to

Pa.R.C.P. 1056(a).       That rule provides that “[t]he defendant may plead a

counterclaim which arises from the same transaction or occurrence or series

of transactions or occurrences from which the cause of action arose.” Id. The

Estate baldly asserts, without further discussion, that the counterclaims

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asserted by Appellee did not arise from the same transactions or series of

transactions from which the ejectment action arises.         Our review of the

certified record does not support this conclusion.

      Appellee’s counterclaim for specific performance of a contract, relating

to an agreement by the Estate to allow her to remain on the Property,

specifically concerns the Estate’s legal authority to eject her.    It therefore

arises from the series of transactions or occurrences between the Estate and

Appellee   leading   up to   the   ejectment action.      Similarly, Appellee’s

counterclaims requesting legal fees in defending the ejectment action and for

an accounting/removal of the executrix based on her decision to enter into an

agreement of sale below the Property’s appraised value arise from the same

series of transactions or occurrences between the Estate and Appellee. As our

High Court has observed, Rule 1056 does not prevent assertion of

counterclaims that sound in equity. See Goodwin v. Rodriguez, 554 A.2d

6, 8 (Pa. 1989) (discussing prior case law and noting that in a landlord’s

ejectment action, a tenant may raise a counterclaim for breach of the implied

warranty of habitability in a residential lease).

      Furthermore, the Estate cites no authority prohibiting Appellee from

asserting the new matter or the other affirmative defenses raised in the

response, all of which call into question the Estate’s ownership of the Property.

The new matter pled by Appellee raises the “substantial questions” concerning

items enumerated in § 711(1), (12), and (13) and the Estate’s ejectment

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claim. Therefore, this argument fails to overcome the trial court’s conclusion

that the orphans’ court may properly exercise nonmandatory jurisdiction over

this litigation.

      However, that does not end our review. Although we find that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the orphans’ court division

could assume jurisdiction over all claims, the Estate also challenges the trial

court’s decision to dismiss the action instead of transferring both sets of claims

to the orphans’ court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(c). The Estate argues

that it will incur costs unnecessarily by having to re-draft the complaint and

pay additional fees to file and serve the new petition. See Estate’s brief at

13.

      Rule 5103(c) provides as follows:

      (c) Interdivisional transfers.--If an appeal or other matter is
      taken to, brought in, or transferred to a division of a court to which
      such matter is not allocated by law, the court shall not quash such
      appeal or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof
      to the proper division of the court, where the appeal or other
      matter shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee
      division on the date first filed in a court or magisterial district.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5103.

      Upon review, we agree with the Estate that the trial court should have

transferred the proceeding instead of dismissing the claims.          The proper

remedy when a case has been brought in the wrong division of a multi-

divisional common pleas court is not a dismissal, but rather a transfer to the

correct division. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(c). This precept “applies equally to

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dismissal entered with and without prejudice.” In re Estate of Ciuccarelli,

81 A.3d 953, 960 (Pa.Super. 2013). Thereafter, the matter should be treated

as if it was originally filed in the transferred division on the date first filed in a

court or magisterial district.       See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(c).            Under the

circumstances of this case, the trial court erred by dismissing all counts

without prejudice. See In re Estate of Ciuccarelli, supra at 961 (holding

that pursuant to § 5103(c), the trial court erred in dismissing the appellant’s

claims without prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction instead of

transferring them); see also In re Caples, supra (non-precedential decision

at 13) (vacating a lower court’s order dismissing a petition for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and remanding for transfer of the petition pursuant to

§ 5103(c)).

      Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the order dismissing all claims

without prejudice, and remand the case for the entry of an order transferring

the case to the orphans’ court division pursuant to § 5103(c).

      Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/6/2023

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