Court Opinion

ID: 9706723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:50:27.731856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:29.177710
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
dissenting.
In Dayap v. Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22 (N.D.1983), I expressed my concern with regard to the unrestricted application of Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, to these mental health appeals. See 331 N.W.2d at 29 (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially). The substance of that special concurrence was the concern as to whether or not the determination that a person is in need of treatment as defined by the statute is a finding of fact. Because the statute requires that the petition be sustained by clear and convincing evidence if the respondent is to be involuntarily committed to a treatment center and there was no dispute as to the facts in that case, I concluded our function on appeal was to determine whether or not the undisputed facts clearly and convincingly indicated the respondent was in need of treatment as a matter of law.
Subsequently, In Interest of Rambousek, 331 N.W.2d 548 (N.D.1983), was decided by this Court, and in another special concurrence I adhered to the position I took in Dayap concerning the unrestricted application of Rule 52(a) and observed that because it seemed probable that there would be a number of appeals pursuant to section 25-03.1-29, NDCC, it was not my intent in the future to express my objection as to the standard of review in those cases in which I concurred with the result reached by the majority. I stated that “in those instances in which I believe the standard expressed by the majority of the court is contrary to the result I would have reached as a result of the application of the standard I advocated in Dayap, I will continue to express my objection.” 331 N.W.2d at 552-53 (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially). In In Interest of Gust, 392 N.W.2d 824 (N.D.1986), I concurred in the result because of the discussion concerning the application of Rule 52(a) to these proceedings.
I dissent because this is a case in which I believe “the standard expressed by the majority of the court is contrary to the result I would have reached as a result of the application of the standard I advocated in Dayap,” i.e., I believe it is our function to *558determine whether or not the facts as found by the trial court clearly and convincingly indicate the respondent is in need of treatment. I cannot agree that the record reveals clear and convincing evidence that M.H. is a person requiring treatment as defined in section 25-03.1-02(1), NDCC. I have no difficulty determining there is clear and convincing evidence to sustain a finding that M.H. is mentally ill and there is adequate evidence to determine that she is in need of treatment in a generic or medical sense. But, to require treatment, the Legislature has required a different standard as set forth in section 25-03.1-02(1) and evidence that M.H. would benefit from treatment in a medical or generic sense is not sufficient. Contrary to the majority opinion, I cannot conclude that evidence that M.H. would “possibly” be a danger to herself, that there would be “substantial” deterioration in her mental health if she was not committed, and that it is “possible” that she would be injured because her illness would affect her everyday living is sufficiently clear and convincing to require treatment under the statute.
I understand that few medical professionals are willing to give unqualified opinions, but, in view of the statutory requirements of section 25-03.1-02(10), NDCC, which requires clear and convincing evidence of a “substantial likelihood of serious risk of harm to that person, others, or property,” the evidence in this case is insufficient to order commitment. I would reverse the decision of the trial court.
LEVINE, J., concurs.