Court Opinion

ID: 9379495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 19:04:14.190217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.951688
License: Public Domain

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                                                              Electronically Filed
                                                              Supreme Court
                                                              SCOT-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                              15-MAR-2023
                                                              08:04 AM
                                                              Dkt. 131 OP

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

                            ---o0o---
________________________________________________________________

  IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF KUULEI HIGASHI KANAHELE AND
AHIENA KANAHELE, INDIVIDUALS, FOR A DECLARATORY ORDER CONCERNING
     THE INVALID CLASSIFICATION OF THE DE FACTO AND IMPROPER
INDUSTRIAL USE PRECINCT ON APPROXIMATELY 525 ACRES OF STATE LAND
 USE CONSERVATION DISTRICT LANDS LOCATED IN MAUNA KEA AND HILO,
     COUNTY OF HAWAII, TAX MAP KEY NO.: 4-4-015:0090 (POR.)
________________________________________________________________

                            SCOT-XX-XXXXXXX

                APPEAL FROM THE LAND USE COMMISSION
               (DOCKET NO. DR-19-67 (Agency Appeal))

                             MARCH 15, 2023

                RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, J.,
     CIRCUIT JUDGE CATALDO, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY,
    AND WILSON, J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM McKENNA, J., JOINS

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

          This is another case in the series of proceedings

challenging the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope

(TMT).   However, unlike prior proceedings that only sought to
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prevent the TMT from being built, Appellants Kuʻulei Higashi

Kanahele and Ahiena Kanahele (collectively, the Kanaheles) seek

to use the Land Use Commission’s (the Commission or LUC)

districting authority in a way that could compel the removal of

all astronomy facilities located within the Astronomy Precinct

by petitioning the Commission for declaratory relief.

           On November 29, 2019, the Commission issued a written

Order Denying Petition for Declaratory Order (LUC Order).              The

Commission explained that it lacked jurisdiction (1) to use the

declaratory ruling procedure to undermine decisions already

made, and (2) to regulate land uses in the Astronomy Precinct

because the legislature granted such authority to the Department

of Land and Natural Resources (the Department or DLNR).

           The following day, the Kanaheles appealed to this

court.   The Kanaheles seek to use the Commission’s declaratory

ruling authority (1) to challenge past decisions that astronomy

facilities are permissible within conservation districts and

(2) to contravene the Department’s power to regulate

conservation district uses.       Contrary to the Kanaheles’ claim

that the Commission may restrict land uses through Hawaiʻi

Revised Statutes (HRS) § 205-2(e),1 the statute merely identifies

1    HRS § 205-2 (2017) provides in relevant part:

                 (a) There shall be four major land use districts in
           which all lands in the State shall be placed: urban, rural,
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       agricultural, and conservation. The land use commission
       shall group contiguous land areas suitable for inclusion in
       one of these four major districts. The commission shall
       set standards for determining the boundaries of each
       district, provided that:

             (1) In the establishment of boundaries of urban
                 districts those lands that are now in urban use
                 and a sufficient reserve area for foreseeable
                 urban growth shall be included;

             (2) In the establishment of boundaries for rural
                 districts, areas of land composed primarily of
                 small farms mixed with very low density
                 residential lots, which may be shown by a minimum
                 density of not more than one house per one-half
                 acre and a minimum lot size of not less than one-
                 half acre shall be included, except as herein
                 provided;

             (3) In the establishment of the boundaries of
                 agricultural districts the greatest possible
                 protection shall be given to those lands with a
                 high capacity for intensive cultivation; and

             (4) In the establishment of the boundaries of
                 conservation districts, the “forest and water
                 reserve zones” provided in Act 234, section 2,
                 Session Laws of Hawaii 1957, are renamed
                 “conservation districts” and, effective as of July
                 11, 1961, the boundaries of the forest and water
                 reserve zones theretofore established pursuant to
                 Act 234, section 2, Session Laws of Hawaii 1957,
                 shall constitute the boundaries of the
                 conservation districts; provided that thereafter
                 the power to determine the boundaries of the
                 conservation districts shall be in the commission.

       In establishing the boundaries of the districts in each
       county, the commission shall give consideration to the
       master plan or general plan of the county.

             (b) Urban districts shall include activities or uses
       as provided by ordinances or regulations of the county
       within which the urban district is situated.
             In addition, urban districts shall include geothermal
       resources exploration and geothermal resources development,
       as defined under section 182-1, as permissible uses.

             . . . .

             (e) Conservation districts shall include areas
       necessary for protecting watersheds and water sources;
       preserving scenic and historic areas; providing park lands,
       wilderness, and beach reserves; conserving indigenous or
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uses that are permitted within conservation districts.               The

statute does not authorize the Commission to exclude or enforce

certain land uses within conservation districts.

                               I.    BACKGROUND

A.     The Mauna Kea Observatories

             In January 1964, Gerard Kuiper began investigating

Mauna Kea as a possible observatory site.            David Leverington, A

History of Astronomy: From 1890 to the Present 276 (2012).                 That

same year, the University of Hawaiʻi (UH) and the University of

Arizona entered into an agreement to build a test telescope and

dome on Mauna Kea.       Id.   An access road was built in May 1964,

and the Mauna Kea Observatory was dedicated on July 20, 1964.

Id.    By 1970, UH completed a second telescope on Mauna Kea.               Id.

By 2008, thirteen telescopes had been constructed in the

Astronomy Precinct.        Mauna Kea Comprehensive Management Plan 93-

94 (Apr. 2009).

             endemic plants, fish, and wildlife, including those which
             are threatened or endangered; preventing floods and soil
             erosion; forestry; open space areas whose existing
             openness, natural condition, or present state of use, if
             retained, would enhance the present or potential value of
             abutting or surrounding communities, or would maintain or
             enhance the conservation of natural or scenic resources;
             areas of value for recreational purposes; other related
             activities; and other permitted uses not detrimental to a
             multiple use conservation concept. Conservation districts
             shall also include areas for geothermal resources
             exploration and geothermal resources development, as
             defined under section 182-1.

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B.    Hawaiʻi Land Use Laws

            Hawaiʻi’s land use laws developed almost in parallel to

the growth in astronomy on Mauna Kea.           In 1961, the State

adopted a statewide land use law.           1961 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 187,

at 299-305.     As a part of this law, the legislature established

the Commission with significant powers.           1961 Haw. Sess. Laws

Act 187, § 2 at 300.       The legislature authorized the Commission

to “group contiguous land areas suitable for one of . . . three

major uses into a district and designate it as an urban

district, agricultural district or conservation district, as the

case may be.”     1961 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 187, § 3 at 300.

            Notably, the legislature mandated that “the boundaries

of the forest and water reserve zones theretofore established

pursuant to Act 234, SLH 1957, shall constitute the [initial]

boundaries of the conservation districts, provided, that

thereafter the power to determine the boundaries of the

conservation districts shall be in the commission.”             1961 Haw.

Sess. Laws Act 187, § 3 at 300.            Moreover, the legislature

granted the Commission power to amend district boundaries, and

even required the Commission to review district boundaries every

five years.     1961 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 187, §§ 6, 12 at 301-03.

            However, the legislature declined to provide the

Commission with powers to regulate land uses within the

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conservation districts.       1961 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 187, § 3 at

300 (“Zoning powers within conservation districts shall be

exercised by the [board of commissioners of agriculture and

forestry] to which is assigned the responsibility of

administering the provisions of Act 234, SLH 1957.”); see also

1957 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 234, § 2 at 254-56.

            In 1963, the legislature recognized a “demonstrated

. . . need for clarifying the provisions of . . . Act 187 . . .

with reference to the division of authority between the land use

commission and the counties,” and therefore amended the land use

laws.     1963 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 205, § 1 at 315.         As a part of

this effort, the legislature created a fourth district category

— rural — and articulated:

            Conservation districts shall include areas necessary for
            protecting watersheds and water sources; preserving scenic
            areas: [sic] providing park lands, wilderness and beach
            reserves; conserving endemic plants, fish, and wildlife;
            preventing floods and soil erosion; forestry; and other
            related activities; and other permitted uses not
            detrimental to a multiple use conservation concept.

1963 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 205, § 2 at 316-17.           The legislature

also transferred governing authority over the conservation

districts to the Department.        1963 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 205, § 2

at 318.    The legislature further provided that “[t]he

appropriate . . . agency charged with the administration of

. . . zoning laws shall enforce . . . the use classification

districts adopted by the commission and shall report to the

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commission all violations thereof.”         1963 Haw. Sess. Laws Act

205, § 2 at 320.     However, the legislature retained the

requirement that the Commission review district classifications

every five years.     1963 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 205, § 2 at 320.

           In 1975, the legislature repealed its mandate that the

Commission regularly review the district boundaries, but

expressly provided that the Commission still had authority to

petition itself to redistrict district boundaries.            1975 Haw.

Sess. Laws Act 193, §§ 5-6 at 443 (“Any department or agency of

the State including the land use commission . . . may petition

the land use commission for a change in the boundary of a

district.”) (emphasis added), 445 (repealing the mandatory five-

year review).

           In 1985, the legislature re-enacted the mandatory

five-year district boundary review requirement, but transferred

the authority to periodically review and initiate district

boundary amendment proceedings to the Department of Planning and

Economic Development.      1985 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 230, § 2 at 417.2

The legislature subsequently transferred the authority to the

2     At the same time, the legislature amended HRS § 205-4 to delete the
phrase “including the land use commission” from its articulation that “[a]ny
department or agency of the State . . . may petition the land use commission
for a change in the boundary of a district.” 1985 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 230,
§ 4 at 418. Thus, it appears that the legislature intended to strip the
Commission of its authority to amend district boundaries sua sponte.

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Office of State Planning in 1988.           1988 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 352,

§ 3 at 679.     The Office of State Planning – now the Office of

Planning and Sustainable Development (the Planning Office) –

retains the authority to review the districts to this day.               See

HRS § 205-18 (Supp. 2021).3

C.    Astronomy Precinct Districting

            The Commission issued its first state land use

district boundary maps in 1964.            See Land Use Comm’n, SLU

District Boundary Maps, https://luc.hawaii.gov/maps/land-use-

district-boundary-maps/.        The Commission issued its second state

land use district boundary maps in 1974.            Id.   The Commission

did not change the Astronomy Precinct from a conservation

district in either of these processes.

            The Planning Office subsequently completed a state

land use district boundary review in 1992.            See Off. of State

Planning, State Land Use District Boundary Review Hawaii (1992),

http://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/op/lud/20210500%20Boundary%20Revie

w/1992HawaiiStateLandUseDistrictBoundaryReview.pdf (1992

Boundary Review).      The Planning Office recognized that “[t]he

University of Hawaii’s Master Plan for the Mauna Kea Science

3     In 2021, the legislature amended HRS § 205-18 to authorize, rather than
require, the Planning Office to conduct district boundary reviews.
Currently, HRS § 205-18 reads: “The office of planning and sustainable
development may undertake a review of the classification and districting of
all lands in the State.” HRS § 205-18 (Supp. 2021) (emphasis added).

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Reserve calls for 13 telescopes by the year 2000.”             Id. at 23.

However, the Planning Office did not call for the Astronomy

Precinct to be redistricted from a conservation district to an

urban district.4      Id. at 121-27.

D.    Prior Proceedings Related to the TMT

            Planning for the TMT began prior to 2010.           Matter of

Conservation Dist. Use Application HA 3568, 143 Hawaiʻi 379, 386,

431 P.3d 752, 759 (2018) (Mauna Kea II); see also Mauna Kea

Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land and Nat. Res., 136 Hawaiʻi 376, 381,

363 P.3d 224, 229 (2015) (Mauna Kea I).           On September 2, 2010,

UH submitted a Conservation District Use Application to the

Department.     Mauna Kea II, 143 Hawaiʻi at 387, 431 P.3d at 760.

In 2013, the Department granted a conservation district use

permit (2013 CDUP) before holding a contested case hearing.               Id.

This court vacated the 2013 CDUP and remanded for the Department

to hold a contested case hearing.          Id.; see also Mauna Kea I,

136 Hawaiʻi at 399, 363 P.3d at 247.

            Between October 2016 and March 2017, a Department-

appointed hearing officer conducted a contested case hearing

4     Most recently, the Planning Office completed another state land use
district boundary review on January 28, 2022. Off. of Planning and
Sustainable Development, State Land Use Review of Districts (Jan. 28, 2022),
http://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/op/lud/20220128%20State%20Boundary%20Review-
Final/SLUReviewofDistricts1-28-22Final3.pdf (2022 Boundary Review). The
Planning Office did not recommend that the Astronomy Precinct be redistricted
from a conservation district to an urban district. Id. at 125-38, 35.

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over forty-four days.       Mauna Kea II, 143 Hawaiʻi at 387, 431 P.3d

at 760.     Kuʻulei Kanahele was among the witnesses who testified

in opposition to the Department issuing a conservation district

use permit (CDUP) for the TMT.

             On September 27, 2017, the Department issued its

decision and order (DLNR Decision) authorizing the issuance of a

conservation district use permit for the construction of the

TMT.   Mauna Kea II, 143 Hawaiʻi at 384, 387, 431 P.3d at 757,

760.   The DLNR Decision was appealed to this court.            Id.

             On October 30, 2018, this court affirmed the DLNR

Decision.     Mauna Kea II, 143 Hawaiʻi at 409, 431 P.3d at 782.

E.     The Kanaheles’ Petition

             On September 3, 2019, the Kanaheles filed the

underlying petition with the Commission.           In the petition, the

Kanaheles asked the Commission to “issue declaratory orders

stating:”

                   (1) current industrial research facility uses in the
             [Astronomy Precinct5] are appropriate within the urban
             district as prescribed by HRS § 205-2(b) and not the
             conservation district;

                   (2) further industrial uses proposed for the
             [Astronomy Precinct] must comply with HRS chapter 205 and
             Commission procedures for obtaining a district boundary
             amendment to reclassify conservation lands into the urban
             district; and,

5     The Kanaheles refer to the 525-acre area in which the Mauna Kea
observatories are located as a “de facto industrial precinct.” Because this
court has identified the area as an “Astronomy Precinct” in prior decisions,
this opinion continues to use that terminology. See Mauna Kea II, 143 Hawaiʻi
at 385, 431 P.3d at 758; Mauna Kea I, 136 Hawaiʻi at 381, 363 P.3d at 229.
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                  (3) even if a single scientific laboratory or other
            research facility may be appropriate within non-urban
            districts, the successive, individual approval of thirteen
            scientific laboratories, other research facilities, and
            associated offices, parking lots, and utilities, within the
            [Astronomy Precinct] constitutes urban uses inconsistent
            with conservation district uses and/or detrimental to a
            multiple use conservation concept for which a district
            boundary amendment must be obtained.

            On October 24 and 25, 2019, the Commission held a

hearing on the Kanaheles’ petition.         The Commission heard

testimony from twenty-three witnesses; a representative of West

Maui Preservation Association and Na Papaʻi Wawae ʻUlaʻula; and

the Kanaheles; and heard a statement from the Kanaheles’

attorney.

            The Kanaheles acknowledged that part of the purpose of

their petition was to oppose the construction of the TMT.             The

Kanaheles also indicated that they were not asking the

Commission to reclassify the Astronomy Precinct from a

conservation district to an urban district, but rather to give

the Kanaheles “the opportunity to say we don’t want rezoning”

that already occurred through the construction of the astronomy

facilities.

            The Kanaheles’ attorney argued that the Commission’s

authority to issue the requested declarations arose from HRS

§ 205-2(e).    Specifically, the Kanaheles’ attorney reasoned that

the Commission could use its “exclusive authority to determine

the districts” and noted that the astronomy facilities “don’t

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fit any –– industrial structures don’t fit any of the

descriptions of conservation lands, including permitted uses

that are not detrimental to a multiple use conservation

concept.”    Thus, the Kanaheles’ attorney explained that the

Kanaheles were

            asking [the Commission] just to interpret 205 and say the
            concentration of industrial research facilities on Mauna
            Kea are appropriate uses or are appropriate within the
            urban district or in an urban district as prescribed by
            205-2 and not the conservation district. Further
            industrial uses must comply with boundary amendment
            procedures to reclassify those lands into the urban
            district.

The Kanaheles’ attorney noted that the Kanaheles’ petition was

“not seeking enforcement of anything except for [HRS chapter]

205.”

            When asked about the practical result of the

Kanaheles’ petition, the Kanaheles’ attorney acknowledged that

“in order to keep things as they are,” “the legal effect of [the

Kanaheles’] petition is to . . . force the State of Hawaiʻi or

whoever might be considered the landowner of the land on which

the telescopes sit to have to file a request for a [district]

boundary amendment.”      In the event the district boundary

amendment request is denied, the astronomy facilities “would

either have to come down, or they would reapply and try to find

another way to mitigate it better.”

            The Commission voted to deny the Kanaheles’ petition

five to two.
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           On November 29, 2019, the Commission issued its

written LUC Order.     As relevant here, the Commission cited to

Citizens Against Reckless Development v. Zoning Board of Appeals

of Honolulu, 114 Hawaiʻi 184, 196-97, 159 P.3d 143, 155-56 (2007)

(CARD) and determined “that the declaratory ruling procedure

could not be invoked by the Petitioner’s [sic] in this matter.”

The Commission recognized that the Department has authority to

govern conservation districts under HRS § 205-5(a).6            The

6    HRS § 205-5 (2017) provides:

                 (a) Except as herein provided, the powers granted to
           counties under section 46-4 shall govern the zoning within
           the districts, other than in conservation districts.
           Conservation districts shall be governed by the department
           of land and natural resources pursuant to chapter 183C.

                 (b) Within agricultural districts, uses compatible to
           the activities described in section 205-2 as determined by
           the commission shall be permitted; provided that accessory
           agricultural uses and services described in sections 205-
           2 and 205-4.5 may be further defined by each county by
           zoning ordinance. Each county shall adopt ordinances
           setting forth procedures and requirements, including
           provisions for enforcement, penalties, and administrative
           oversight, for the review and permitting of agricultural
           tourism uses and activities as an accessory use on a
           working farm, or farming operation as defined in section
           165-2. Ordinances shall include but not be limited to:

                 (1) Requirements for access to a farm, including road
                     width, road surface, and parking;

                 (2) Requirements and restrictions for accessory
                     facilities connected with the farming operation,
                     including gift shops and restaurants;

                 (3) Activities that may be offered by the farming
                     operation for visitors;

                 (4) Days and hours of operation; and

                 (5) Automatic termination of the accessory use upon
                      the cessation of the farming operation.
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       Each county may require an environmental assessment under
       chapter 343 as a condition to any agricultural tourism use
       and activity. Other uses may be allowed by special permits
       issued pursuant to this chapter. The minimum lot size in
       agricultural districts shall be determined by each county
       by zoning ordinance, subdivision ordinance, or other lawful
       means; provided that the minimum lot size for any
       agricultural use shall not be less than one acre, except as
       provided herein. If the county finds that unreasonable
       economic hardship to the owner or lessee of land cannot
       otherwise be prevented or where land utilization is
       improved, the county may allow lot sizes of less than the
       minimum lot size as specified by law for lots created by a
       consolidation of existing lots within an agricultural
       district and the resubdivision thereof; provided that the
       consolidation and resubdivision do not result in an
       increase in the number of lots over the number existing
       prior to consolidation; and provided further that in no
       event shall a lot which is equal to or exceeds the minimum
       lot size of one acre be less than that minimum after the
       consolidation and resubdivision action. The county may
       also allow lot sizes of less than the minimum lot size as
       specified by law for lots created or used for plantation
       community subdivisions as defined in section 205-
       4.5(a)(12), for public, private, and quasi-public utility
       purposes, and for lots resulting from the subdivision of
       abandoned roadways and railroad easements.

             (c) Unless authorized by special permit issued
       pursuant to this chapter, only the following uses shall be
       permitted within rural districts:

             (1) Low density residential uses;

             (2) Agricultural uses;

             (3) Golf courses, golf driving ranges, and golf-
                 related facilities;

             (4) Public, quasi-public, and public utility
                 facilities; and

             (5) Geothermal resources exploration and geothermal
                 resources development, as defined under section
                 182-1.

                 In addition, the minimum lot size for any low
             density residential use shall be one-half acre and
             there shall be but one dwelling house per one-half
             acre, except as provided for in section 205-2.

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Commission also recognized that the legislature delegated

authority to enforce uses within conservation districts to the

Department.

            The Commission consequently concluded:

            20. Based on the information provided by Petitioners, the
                Commission concludes that the Petition involves lands
                that are currently classified within the State Land Use
                Conservation District.

            21. Based on the information provided by Petitioners, the
                Commission concludes that it lacks authority under HRS
                Chapter 205 to require a landowner to petition for
                reclassification.

            22. Based on the information provided by Petitioners, the
                Commission concludes that pursuant to HRS §§ 205-5(a),
                205-15, and HRS §§ 183C-3 and 183C-6(a), it is the
                Department of Land and Natural Resources and not the
                Commission, [sic] that is statutorily authorized to
                determine, permit, and enforce land uses within the
                State Conservation District.

            23. The Commission concludes that the plain language of HRS
                § 205-5(a) makes clear that governance over the State
                Conservation District is under the authority of the
                DLNR pursuant to HRS § 183C. Therefore, the Commission
                lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must deny the
                Petition.

The Commission summarized the reasons for its denial of the

Kanaheles’ petition: “[t]he Petitioner[s] ha[ve] requested a

ruling on a statutory provision not administered by the

Commission and a matter that is not otherwise within the

jurisdiction of the Commission.”

F.    The Kanaheles’ Appeal

            The following day, the Kanaheles filed a notice of

appeal before this court.        This court granted intervenor status

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to TMT International Observatory LLC (TIO) and UH over the

Kanaheles’ objections.

          The parties’ arguments and relevant procedural

background are detailed as necessary in the Discussion section

below.   The Commission, TIO, and UH contend that this court

lacks jurisdiction over the Kanaheles’ merits claims, and that

the LUC Order was correctly decided.        Meanwhile, the Kanaheles

contend this court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal and

raise four points of error, with multiple sub-arguments in each.

The Kanaheles’ overarching points of error are:

                (1) The LUC clearly erred, arbitrarily, and
          incorrectly concluded, [sic] the Kanaheles “requested a
          ruling on a statutory provision not administered by the
          [LUC] and a matter that is not otherwise within the
          jurisdiction of the [LUC].”

                (2) Finding of fact (FOF) ¶22, which is a legal
          conclusion in substance, constituted clear error and is
          incorrect as a legal conclusion. FOF ¶22 provides: “Based
          on the Petition, [the Kanaheles’] arguments and responses
          to questions by the Commissioners, and the testimony of the
          Petitioners, Petitioner’s [sic] seek a declaratory order
          from the Commission requiring that a district boundary
          amendment be obtained for the Property.”

                (3) The LUC incorrectly concludes:

                     The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court has considered and
                     ruled on permitting and jurisdictional issues
                     regarding Mauna Kea [sic] in Mauna Kea Anaina Hou
                     v. Bd. Of Land & Nat. Res., 136 Hawaii 376, 363
                     P.3d 224 (2015) [Mauna Kea I] and Matter of
                     Conservation District Use Application HA-3568 for
                     the Thirty Meter Telescope, 143 Hawaii 379, 431
                     P.3d 752 (2018) [Mauna Kea I] [sic].

          The Kanaheles’ [sic] rebutted this position through their
          filings and oral statements.

                (4) Under FOF ¶26, “the [LUC] further concludes that
          the declaratory procedure could not be invoked by the
          Petitioner in this matter. . .” FOF ¶26, which is a legal
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            conclusion in substance, constitutes clear error and is an
            incorrect legal conclusion. The Kanaheles pointed out that
            CARD did not apply because they were “not seeking review of
            BLNR’s decision because BLNR never had the authority to
            redistrict lands and didn’t make a decision on that issue.”

(Underscored [sic] notations in the Kanaheles’ Opening Brief)

(citations omitted).

                         II.   STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A.    Jurisdiction

            “The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law

that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard.

Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at

any stage of a cause of action.”           Lingle v. Haw. Gov’t Emps.

Ass’n, AFSCME, Local 152, 107 Hawaiʻi 178, 182, 111 P.3d 587, 591

(2005) (quoting Amantiad v. Odum, 90 Hawaiʻi 152, 158-59, 977

P.2d 160, 166-67 (1999)).

B.    Statutory Interpretation

            “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law

which this court reviews de novo.”          Keep the N. Shore Country v.

Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 150 Hawaiʻi 486, 506 P.3d 150 (2022)

(citing State v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawai‘i 227, 231, 160 P.3d 703,

707 (2007)).

C.    Administrative Agency Appeals

            This court’s review of administrative agency decisions

is governed by HRS § 91-14(g).         The statute provides:

                  Upon review of the record, the court may affirm the
            decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions
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            for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the
            decision and order if the substantial rights of the
            petitioners may have been prejudiced because the
            administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders
            are:

                  (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory
                      provisions;

                  (2) In excess of the statutory authority or
                      jurisdiction of the agency;

                  (3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

                  (4) Affected by other error of law;

                  (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
                      probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
                      record; or

                  (6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by
                      abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
                      exercise of discretion.

HRS § 91-14(g) (Supp. 2016).        “[U]nder HRS § 91-14(g),

conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2),

and (4); questions regarding procedural defects under subsection

(3); findings of fact under subsection (5); and an agency’s

exercise of discretion under subsection (6).”            Paul’s Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Befitel, 104 Hawaiʻi 412, 416, 91 P.3d 494, 498

(2004) (brackets in original) (quoting In re Hawaiian Elec. Co.,

81 Hawaiʻi 459, 465, 918 P.2d 561, 567 (1996)).

                              III. DISCUSSION

A.    This Court Has Jurisdiction over the Kanaheles’ Appeal.

         The Commission, TIO, and UH argue that this court lacks

jurisdiction to hear the Kanaheles’ direct appeal of the LUC

Order.    The Commission and TIO contend that because the

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Kanaheles’ petition was not a contested case, this court does

not possess jurisdiction under HRS § 205-19(a) (2017 and Supp.

2019), which only authorizes this court to directly review a

final decision or order of contested cases under HRS chapter

205.

          In contrast, the Kanaheles argue that this court has

jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to HRS §§ 205-

19(a), 91-8 (2012), and 91-14(b) (Supp. 2016), given this

court’s statutory interpretation of HRS §§ 91-8 and 91-14 in

Lingle, 107 Hawaiʻi 178, 111 P.3d 587.        The Kanaheles posit that

Lingle held that HRS §§ 91-8 and 91-14 are to be “read

together,” making declaratory and contested case orders share

the same status for purposes of judicial review.           See id. at

185-86, 111 P.3d at 594-95.      Therefore, because HRS § 205-19

authorizes this court to directly review orders from contested

cases, HRS § 205-19 also authorizes this court to directly

review orders granting or denying declaratory order petitions,

given the shared status of declaratory and contested case

orders.

          The Kanaheles are correct that this court possesses

jurisdiction to hear their appeal.

          “The right to appeal is purely statutory and exists only

when jurisdiction is given by some constitutional or statutory

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provision.”    Id. at 184, 111 P.3d at 593.        The statutes

pertinent to this court’s jurisdiction over the Kanaheles’

appeal are HRS §§ 91-8, 91-14, and 205-19.

        HRS § 91-14 authorizes judicial review of a final

decision or order in a contested case.7         However, the LUC Order

denying declaratory relief did not result from a contested case,

as the Kanaheles acknowledged.        A contested case is “a

proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of

7    HRS § 91-14 (2012 and Supp. 2016) provides in relevant part:

                 (a) Any person aggrieved by a final decision and
           order in a contested case or by a preliminary ruling of the
           nature that deferral of review pending entry of a
           subsequent final decision would deprive appellant of
           adequate relief is entitled to judicial review thereof
           under this chapter; but nothing in this section shall be
           deemed to prevent resort to other means of review, redress,
           relief, or trial de novo, including the right of trial by
           jury, provided by law. Notwithstanding any other provision
           of this chapter to the contrary, for the purposes of this
           section, the term “person aggrieved” shall include an
           agency that is a party to a contested case proceeding
           before that agency or another agency.

                 (b) Except as otherwise provided herein, proceedings
           for review shall be instituted in the circuit court or, if
           applicable, the environmental court, within thirty days
           after the preliminary ruling or within thirty days after
           service of the certified copy of the final decision and
           order of the agency pursuant to rule of court, except where
           a statute provides for a direct appeal to the supreme court
           or the intermediate appellate court, subject to chapter
           602. In such cases, the appeal shall be treated in the
           same manner as an appeal from the circuit court to the
           supreme court or the intermediate appellate court,
           including payment of the fee prescribed by section 607-
           5 for filing the notice of appeal (except in cases appealed
           under sections 11-51 and 40-91). The court in its
           discretion may permit other interested persons to
           intervene.

                 . . . .

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specific parties are required by law to be determined after an

opportunity for agency hearing.”          HRS § 91-1 (Supp. 2017).

           If the statute or rule governing the activity in question
           does not mandate a hearing prior to the administrative
           agency’s decision-making, the actions of the administrative
           agency are not “required by law” and do not amount to “a
           final decision or order in a contested case” from which a
           direct appeal . . . is possible.

Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 76 Hawaiʻi 128, 134, 870 P.2d

1272, 1278 (1994).      “Stated differently, discretionary hearings

are not contested cases because they are not required by law.”

Lingle, 107 Hawaiʻi at 184, 111 P.3d at 593.          The Commission’s

hearing on the Kanaheles’ petition was purely discretionary: a

hearing was not required by administrative rule, statute or

constitution.8    The Commission’s discretionary hearing did not

8     Under HRS § 91-8, “[e]ach agency shall adopt rules prescribing . . .
the procedure for . . . consideration” of petitions for declaratory rulings.
The Commission’s rules provide:

                 Consideration of petition for declaratory order. (a) The
           commission, within ninety days after submission of a petition for
           declaratory order, shall:
                 (1) Deny the petitioner where:
                      (A) The question is speculative or purely
                           hypothetical and does not involve an
                           existing situation or one which may
                           reasonably be expected to occur in the near
                           future; or
                      (B) The petitioner’s interest is not of the type
                           which confers sufficient standing to
                           maintain an action in a court of law; or
                      (C) The issuance of the declaratory order may
                           adversely affect the interest of the State,
                           the commission, or any of the officers or
                           employees in any litigation which is pending
                           or may be reasonably be [sic] expected to
                           arise; or
                      (D) The petitioner requests a ruling on a
                           statutory provision not administered by the
                           commission or the matter is not otherwise
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transform the LUC Order into a contested case decision.              See id.

As such, the Kanaheles were not parties to a contested case

hearing and their petition could not be reviewed directly as a

contested case order under HRS § 91-14.

         However, HRS §§ 91-8, 91-14, and 205-19 together provide

for this court’s review of the Kanaheles’ appeal of the LUC

Order, even though the LUC Order was not part of a contested

case.   HRS § 91-8 establishes the framework for declaratory

rulings by agencies, and provides that “[o]rders disposing of

petitions [for declaratory rulings] shall have the same status

as other agency orders.”       This court interpreted the “same

                           within the jurisdiction of the commission;
                           or
                  (2) Issue a declaratory order on the matters
                      contained in the petition; or
                  (3) Set the petition for hearing before the
                      commission or a hearings officer in accordance
                      with this subchapter. The procedures set forth
                      in subchapter 7 shall be applicable.

Hawaiʻi Administrative Rules (HAR) § 15-15-100(a) (2019).   Relatedly, HAR
§ 15-15-103 (2019) provides:

                  Declaratory orders; request for hearing. The
            commission may, but shall not be required to, conduct a
            hearing on a petition for declaratory order. Any
            petitioner or party in interest who desires a hearing on a
            petition for a declaratory order shall set forth in detail
            in the request the reasons why the matters alleged in the
            petition, together with supporting affidavits or other
            written briefs or memoranda of legal authorities, will not
            permit the fair and expeditious disposition of the
            petition, and to the extent that the request for a hearing
            is dependent upon factual assertion, shall accompany the
            request by affidavit establishing those facts.

(Emphasis added.) Based on this language, the Commission was not required to
hold a hearing to resolve the Kanaheles’ petition.
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status” language of HRS § 91-8 and held that orders disposing of

petitions for declaratory rulings, like orders in contested

cases, are subject to judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14.

Lingle, 107 Hawaiʻi at 185-86, 111 P.3d at 594-95.            Therefore, we

held that a Hawai‘i Labor Relation Board order denying the

petitioner for declaratory relief was subject to review by the

circuit court, even though the decision did not result from a

contested case.     Id. at 185, 111 P.3d at 595.

        Subsequently, in 2016 the legislature amended HRS § 91-

14(b) to provide for direct review by the supreme court or the

intermediate appellate court when provided by statute.             2016

Haw. Sess. Laws Act 48, § 5 at 77.9         Now HRS § 91-14(b) provides

that “proceedings for review shall be instituted in the circuit

court . . . except where a statute provides for a direct appeal

to the supreme court or the intermediate appellate court[.]”                 In

the same 2016 Act, the legislature enacted HRS § 205-19,

regarding contested cases arising under HRS chapter 205.             2016

Haw. Sess. Laws Act 48 § 3, at 76-77.         HRS § 205-19 provides:

“any contested case under this chapter shall be appealed from a

final decision and order or a preliminary ruling that is of the

nature defined by section 91-14(a) upon the record directly to

9     The legislature repealed and reenacted HRS § 91-14(b) without any
changes to the language on July 1, 2019. See 2016 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 48,
§ 14 at 82; 2019 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 213, at 637.
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the supreme court for final decision.”           This court must presume

the legislature was aware of Lingle when it passed Act 48 in

2016.    See Peer News LLC v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 138 Hawaiʻi

53, 69, 376 P.3d 1, 17 (2016) (“The legislature is presumed to

know the law when it enacts statutes, including this court’s

decisions, and agency interpretations.”) (citations omitted).

Therefore, this court’s interpretation in Lingle of HRS §§ 91-8

and 91-14 that declaratory orders have the “same status” for

judicial review as orders in contested cases applies to HRS

§ 205-19.     See Lingle, 107 Hawaiʻi at 185-86, 111 P.3d at 594-95.

Thus, pursuant to HRS §§ 91-8, 91-14 and 205-19, this court has

jurisdiction to directly review the Kanaheles’ appeal.

B.    The Commission Correctly Determined That It Lacked
      Jurisdiction over the Kanaheles’ Petition.

            Before turning to the merits of the Kanaheles’

petition and appeal, some clarification regarding the Kanaheles’

requested relief is necessary.         Again, the Kanaheles seek three

declaratory orders stating:

                  (1) current industrial research facility uses in the
            [Astronomy Precinct] are appropriate within the urban
            district as prescribed by HRS § 205-2(b) and not the
            conservation district;

                  (2) further industrial uses proposed for the
            [Astronomy Precinct] must comply with HRS chapter 205 and
            Commission procedures for obtaining a district boundary
            amendment to reclassify conservation lands into the urban
            district; and,

                  (3) even if a single scientific laboratory or other
            research facility may be appropriate within non-urban
            districts, the successive, individual approval of thirteen
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            scientific laboratories, other research facilities, and
            associated offices, parking lots, and utilities, within the
            [Astronomy Precinct] constitutes urban uses inconsistent
            with conservation district uses and/or detrimental to a
            multiple use conservation concept for which a district
            boundary amendment must be obtained.

            The Kanaheles are not asking the Commission to issue a

district boundary amendment to convert the Astronomy Precinct

from a conservation district to an urban district.             In fact, the

Kanaheles made clear that they would oppose any district

boundary amendment petition seeking such a reclassification.10

            Instead, the Kanaheles are asking the Commission to

determine what constitutes prohibited uses of conservation

district lands via an interpretation of HRS § 205-2(e).                As the

Kanaheles’ counsel explained:

            We’re asking you just to interpret 205 and say the
            concentration of industrial research facilities on Mauna
            Kea are appropriate uses or are appropriate within the
            urban district or in an urban district as prescribed by
            205-2 and not the conservation district. Further
            industrial uses must comply with boundary amendment
            procedures to reclassify those lands into the urban
            district.

            The Kanaheles sought this determination as a method

for the Commission to enforce its prior districting of the

Astronomy Precinct as a conservation district.11            At the October

10    In the declarations attached to the Kanaheles’ petition before the
Commission, Kuʻulei Kanahele and Ahiena Kanahele both stated: “I would
participate to strongly oppose a proposed boundary amendment to reclassify
conservation district lands at the Maunakea [sic] summit into the Urban
district.”

11    The dissent posits that the Commission possesses authority to consider
the cumulative impacts of conservation district use permits (CDUPs) and
determine whether the Astronomy Precinct is more appropriately classified as
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25, 2019 hearing on the Kanaheles’ petition before the

Commission, the Kanaheles’ attorney stated: “We’re not seeking

enforcement of anything except for [HRS chapter] 205.”12              The

Kanaheles’ counsel acknowledged that “the legal effect of [the

Kanaheles’] petition is to . . . force the State of Hawaiʻi or

whoever might be considered the landowner of the land on which

the telescopes sit to have to file a request for a [district]

boundary amendment.”       The Kanaheles’ counsel stated that in the

event that a district boundary amendment petition is denied, the

astronomy facilities “would either have to come down, or they

would reapply and try to find another way to mitigate it

better.”

an urban rather than conservation district. The dissent cites to Lanihau
Properties, LLC., No. A00-730, (Hawaiʻi Land Use Comm’n, 2003) in order to
demonstrate this point. However, this argument is unavailing. In Lanihau
Properties, a party with a property interest entitled to seek
reclassification requested redistricting in order to develop a business park.
Id. at 2, 7. In contrast, the Kanaheles explicitly stated that they are not
seeking to reclassify lands. Rather, the Kanaheles are asking the Commission
to determine what constitutes prohibited uses on conservation district land,
and therefore to enforce the conservation district classification. The
Commission does not have the authority to enforce uses on conservation
district lands. See infra Section B(3)(a). As such, the dissent’s arguments
in this regard are inapposite.

12    In the Kanaheles’ Reply to TIO’s Answering Brief, the Kanaheles argued
HRS § 205-2(e) describes “uses of land that the LUC properly considers in
determining and enforcing conservation district use boundaries.” (Emphasis
added.)

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            Moreover, as the Kanaheles acknowledged, the Kanaheles

would use the district boundary amendment proceedings to protest

the development of the Astronomy Precinct.13

            In short, the Kanaheles requested the three

declaratory rulings to enforce the Commission’s classification

of the Astronomy Precinct as a conservation district and to

protest the ongoing development of the Astronomy Precinct.

      1.    The Commission correctly determined that the Kanaheles
            sought a declaratory order requiring a district
            boundary amendment for the Astronomy Precinct.

            The Kanaheles dispute the Commission’s finding that

“[b]ased on the Petition, [the Kanaheles’] arguments and

responses to questions by the Commissioners, and the testimony

of the Petitioners, Petitioner’s [sic] seek a declaratory order

from the Commission requiring that a district boundary amendment

be obtained for the Property.”         The Kanaheles contend they only

“sought declaratory orders and not an order that a boundary

amendment be obtained for the property,” and the requested

declaratory orders would not compel UH to seek a district

boundary amendment because UH would have the option to remove

the astronomy facilities.

13    During the October 25, 2019 hearing before the Commission, Kuʻulei
Kanahele stated: “we are asking for that district boundary amendment so we
have the opportunity to protest.”
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          However, the plain language of the Kanaheles’ petition

requested a declaratory order that explicitly required a

district boundary amendment.      The Kanaheles’ third requested

declaratory order would state that the current uses of the

Astronomy Precinct “constitute[] urban uses inconsistent with

conservation district uses and/or detrimental to a multiple use

conservation concept for which a district boundary amendment

must be obtained.”     (Emphasis added.)

          Consistent with the language of the third requested

declaratory order, the Kanaheles consistently represented the

requested declaratory relief would require a district boundary

amendment to the Commission.      At the October 25, 2019 hearing

before the Commission, the Kanaheles admitted that “the legal

effect of [the Kanaheles’] petition is to . . . force the State

of Hawaiʻi or whoever might be considered the landowner of the

land on which the telescopes sit to have to file a request for a

boundary amendment.”     The Kanaheles further explained that such

a declaratory order by the Commission would create an

enforcement requirement because, “by virtue of saying that those

uses are outside or supposed to be in the urban district, that

in itself, because the agencies are expected to comply, . . .

would put them in a situation where, yes, they would have to do

a [district] boundary amendment.”        (Emphasis added.)      The

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Kanaheles also represented that a district boundary amendment

must be filed and granted or else the astronomy facilities

“would . . . have to come down.”

          Because the plain language of the Kanaheles’ third

requested declaratory order and their representations to the

Commission make clear that the Kanaheles requested a declaratory

order requiring a district boundary amendment, the Commission

did not err by concluding the Kanaheles sought a declaratory

order requiring a district boundary amendment be obtained.

          Furthermore, the Kanaheles’ distinction that UH could

simply remove the astronomy facilities is one without a

difference.   According to the Kanaheles, they did not seek a

declaratory order requiring that a district boundary amendment

be obtained because the Commission would only issue a

declaratory ruling that a district boundary amendment must be

obtained to continue existing uses “inconsistent with

conservation district concepts.”         Either way, the requested

declaratory order would require a district boundary amendment,

at which point UH would have two avenues to comply with the

Commission’s determination: (1) UH could “voluntarily” request a

district boundary amendment or (2) UH could comply through

“removal of the industrial uses from the conservation district,”

as the Kanaheles explained.      The fact two avenues exist through

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which compliance with the requested declaratory order is

possible is irrelevant to the substance of the requested

declaratory order.    The Kanaheles’ requested declaratory relief

would require a district boundary amendment in order for the

astronomy facilities to continue operating.

    2.    The Commission correctly determined that it lacked
          jurisdiction to issue the requested declaratory
          orders.

          The Kanaheles also argue “the LUC reversibly erred by

ruling it lacked jurisdiction to issue declaratory orders on a

matter not within its jurisdiction.”        The Kanaheles argue that

the Commission’s ruling: (a) “is inconsistent with the LUC’s own

conclusion that it holds jurisdiction to issue the requested

declaratory order”; (b) is invalid because it purports to alter

and restrict HRS chapter 205; (c) is premised on incorrect legal

conclusions; and (d) is premised on clear error.

          a.    The Commission possesses jurisdiction to
                determine the boundaries of its jurisdiction.

          The Kanaheles first challenge the Commission’s

conclusion that:

          The Commission has jurisdiction to issue this declaratory
          order. HRS § 91-8, as implemented by the Commission’s
          administrative rules, HAR [Hawaiʻi Administrative Rules]
          §§ 15-15-98 through 15-15-104.1, authorize the Commission
          to issue a declaratory order “as to the applicability of
          any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the
          commission to a specific factual situation.” The
          Commission’s statutes, the applicability of which are put
          at issue in this Petition, are those sections of HRS
          Chapter 205 that govern the authority to reclassify land
          and to govern the permitted uses on State Conservation
          District Lands.
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According to the Kanaheles, “LUC concedes it has jurisdiction to

issue ‘this declaratory order’ and the Petition ‘put at issue’

the LUC’s statutes and rules,” so therefore the Commission’s

“ruling that the Kanaheles requested a ruling on matters not

administered or within the jurisdiction of the LUC must be

incorrect.”

          The Kanaheles misconstrue the Commission’s conclusion.

The first sentence of the conclusion is: “The Commission has

jurisdiction to issue this declaratory order” — i.e., the

Commission has jurisdiction to enter a declaratory order

concluding that it lacks jurisdiction.         (Emphasis added.)      This

follows the axiom that a decision-making body always has

authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction.           See, e.g.,

State v. Brandimart, 68 Haw. 495, 497, 720 P.2d 1009, 1010

(1986) (“A court always has jurisdiction to determine whether it

has jurisdiction over a particular case.”).          If the decision-

making body concludes it lacks jurisdiction, it may issue a

decision stating as much.      See id.    The only prohibition is that

the decision-making body “may not be able to maintain

jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the merits of the

case.”   Id.

          Moreover, although it is true that the Commission has

the authority to issue “a declaratory order as to the

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applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order

of [LUC],” HRS § 91-8,14 this authority is not available when,

for example, “[t]here is no longer a question of how the

relevant laws . . . ‘apply.’”         CARD, 114 Hawaiʻi at 156, 159 P.3d

at 197.    As discussed below, such is the case here.           See infra

Section B(3).      Consequently, the declaratory ruling procedure is

not available for determining the applicability of HRS chapter

205.    See CARD, 114 Hawaiʻi at 156, 159 P.3d at 197.

             b.    The Commission’s ruling does not purport to alter
                   or restrict HRS chapter 205.

             The Kanaheles next challenge the LUC Order by

contending that the Commission improperly “attempt[ed] to

modify, alter, or restrict the scope of HRS chapter 205.”               The

Kanaheles emphasize that HRS § 205-2 grants the Commission

jurisdiction over “all land,” including “over the classification

or reclassification of certain conservation district lands.”

             But the fact that HRS §§ 205-2(a)(4) and 205-4

authorize the Commission to reclassify conservation district

14     HRS § 91-8 provides:

                   Any interested person may petition an agency for a
             declaratory order as to the applicability of any statutory
             provision or of any rule or order of the agency. Each
             agency shall adopt rules prescribing the form of the
             petitions and the procedure for their submission,
             consideration, and prompt disposition. Orders disposing of
             petitions in such cases shall have the same status as other
             agency orders.

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lands does not mean that the Commission can use its

classification authority to enforce land uses within the

Astronomy Precinct.        Rather, the legislature vested such

enforcement authority in the Department through HRS § 205-5(a).

See HRS § 205-5(a) (“Conservation districts shall be governed by

the department of land and natural resources pursuant to chapter

183C.”); HRS § 183C-3(7) (2011) (“The board and department

shall . . . [e]stablish and enforce land use regulations on

conservation district lands . . . .”).            Had the legislature

intended to grant the Commission any authority over the

governance of conservation district lands, it could have done

so.    See, e.g., HRS § 205-5(b)-(c); HRS § 205-6(d) (2017).              It

did not.     See generally HRS chapter 205.         Insofar as this court

“must read statutory language in the context of the entire

statute,” it is the Kanaheles who cabin the scope of HRS chapter

205 by disregarding the powers granted to the Department through

HRS § 205-5(a).       See Gray v. Admin. Dir. of the Ct., 84 Hawaiʻi

138, 148, 931 P.2d 580, 590 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting

State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawaiʻi 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (1995)).

             c.    The Commission’s ruling is not premised on
                   incorrect legal conclusions.

             The Kanaheles also challenge the LUC Order for

creating “a false equivalence between DLNR’s governance of the

conservation district and the LUC’s jurisdiction to classify and

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reclassify lands.”    But it was the Kanaheles who articulated

that equivalence by asking the Commission to use its

classification power to determine what constitutes prohibited

uses within the Astronomy Precinct and, in turn, to enforce the

prior conservation district classification.

          Under these circumstances, the LUC Order does not

indicate that the Department’s granting of successive

conservation district use permits precluded the Commission from

reclassifying the Astronomy Precinct.        Rather, the LUC Order

simply recognized that the legislature delegated the authority

to control land uses within conservation districts — and

therefore the Astronomy Precinct — to the Department.            Insofar

as the legislature did not authorize the Commission to determine

what constitutes prohibited uses of conservation district lands,

the Commission’s use of its classification authority to govern

the Astronomy Precinct would create the epitome of an

administrative act “in excess of the statutory authority or

jurisdiction of the agency.”      See HRS § 91-14(g)(2); supra

Section B(2)(b); infra Section (B)(3)(a).

          d.    The Commission’s ruling is not premised on clear
                error.

          The Kanaheles further challenge the LUC Order because

the Commission denied the Kanaheles’ petition on the basis that

“[t]he petitioner has requested a ruling on a statutory

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provision not administered by the Commission . . . .”            According

to the Kanaheles, the requested declaratory rulings would only

implicate HRS chapter 205 because “HRS chapter 205 puts the LUC

in charge of amending land use district boundaries and DLNR does

not have that power.”     Again, however, the Kanaheles are not

asking the Commission to reclassify the Astronomy Precinct from

a conservation district to a different district.           Instead, the

Kanaheles are asking the Commission to determine what

constitutes prohibited land uses within a conservation district

and to thereby enforce the Astronomy Precinct’s conservation

district designation.     Insofar as the legislature delegated the

authority to govern conservation district land uses to the

Department under HRS § 205-5(a) and HRS chapter 183C, the

Commission did not err in concluding that the Kanaheles

“requested a ruling on a statutory provision not administered by

the Commission.”

    3.    The Commission correctly interpreted CARD as
          precluding the Kanaheles’ petition.

          Lastly, the Kanaheles argue that the Commission

improperly “interpreted CARD to require denial of the Kanaheles’

petition on the basis that [the Department] had already rendered

a decision on the matter.”      The Kanaheles insist that their

petition does not run afoul of CARD because (a) it does not

constitute an attempt to evade a prior decision; and (b) CARD

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arose in a distinguishable procedural posture.           The Kanaheles

also contend that the Commission’s application of CARD “would

cause an absurd situation in which any county or state agency

decision concerning any land would foreclose the LUC’s power to

reclassify that land or a larger area within which that land was

located.”    This point of error is meritless.

            a.   The Commission lacks jurisdiction to issue a
                 declaratory order to review the Department’s
                 already-made decisions.

            Pursuant to HRS § 91-8:

                  Declaratory rulings by agencies. Any interested
            person may petition an agency for a declaratory order as to
            the applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule
            or order of the agency. Each agency shall adopt rules
            proscribing the form of the petitions and the procedure for
            their submission, consideration, and prompt disposition.
            Orders disposing of petitions in such cases shall have the
            same status as other agency orders.

            This court discussed the boundaries of agencies’

declaratory ruling authority in CARD, 114 Hawaiʻi 184, 159 P.3d

143.   We explained:

                  As both the title (“Declaratory rulings by agencies”)
            and the pertinent text (“a declaratory order as to the
            applicability [of a statute, agency rule, or order]”) make
            clear, the declaratory ruling procedure of HRS § 91-8 is
            meant to provide a means of seeking a determination of
            whether and in what way some statute, agency rule, or order
            applies to the factual situation raised by an interested
            person. It was not intended to allow review of concrete
            agency decisions for which other means of review are
            available. Reading HRS § 91-8 in a common sense fashion,
            and bearing in mind the plain meaning of the term
            “applicability,” it cannot seriously be maintained that the
            procedure was intended to review already-made agency
            decisions. For such decisions, . . . the agency has
            already spoken as to the “applicability” of the relevant
            law to the factual circumstances at hand — implicitly or
            explicitly it has found the relevant legal requirements to

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            be met. There is no longer a question of how the relevant
            laws . . . “apply.”
                  Use of the declaratory ruling procedural device only
            makes sense where the applicability of relevant law is
            unknown, either because the agency has not yet acted upon
            particular factual circumstances, or for some other reason
            the applicability of some provisions of law have not been
            brought into consideration.

Id. at 196-97, 159 P.3d at 155-56.

            In this case, the Department has already spoken to the

applicability of the laws implicated by the Kanaheles’ petition.

Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Department has

determined that the astronomy facilities constitute permissible

uses within the Astronomy Precinct.

            According to the Kanaheles, CARD “prohibits using

declaratory petitions to review specific decisions made by the

same agency from which declaratory orders were requested.”

Using this framework, the Kanaheles argue that their “petition

could not constitute an attempt to evade a prior decision by the

LUC or any other agency because no other agency has the

authority to render declaratory rulings on the classification of

lands into districts and the redistricting of lands.”

            As a preliminary matter, the Kanaheles’ focus on the

Commission’s reclassification powers is irrelevant.            Again, the

Kanaheles are not asking the Commission to reclassify the

Astronomy Precinct from a conservation district into an urban

district.    The Kanaheles want a declaration that the astronomy

facilities are not permitted land uses within a conservation
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district.    As such, the Kanaheles’ discussion of the

Commission’s authority to amend district boundaries and

reclassify lands is not relevant to their request for a

declaration on permitted uses within conservation districts.

            Additionally, the Kanaheles’ initial claim that CARD

prohibits review of decisions “made by the same agency from

which declaratory orders were requested” finds no footing in

CARD.   CARD’s key holding to this case is that HRS § 91-8 does

not allow for review of already-made decisions because, in such

scenarios, “[t]here is no longer a question of how the relevant

laws . . . ‘apply.’”     114 Hawaiʻi at 197, 159 P.3d at 156.         In

other words, the declaratory ruling procedure is no longer

available when a decision-making body with authority to address

the question at issue provides an answer.         See id.    Such is the

case here.

            “An administrative agency can only wield powers

expressly or implicitly granted to it by statute.”           Morgan v.

Planning Dep’t, Cnty. of Kauaʻi, 104 Hawaiʻi 173, 184, 86 P.3d

982, 993 (2004) (quoting TIG Ins. Co. v. Kauhane, 101 Hawaiʻi

311, 327, 67 P.3d 810, 826 (App. 2003)).         The legislature did

not grant the Commission any authority to restrict conservation

district land uses; the legislature delegated that power to the

Department.   Pursuant to HRS § 205-5(a), “[c]onservation

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districts shall be governed by the department of land and

natural resources pursuant to chapter 183C.”          Under HRS § 183C-3

(2011), the Department shall:

          (1) Maintain an accurate inventory of lands classified
              within the state conservation district by the state
              land use commission, pursuant to chapter 205;

          (2) Identify and appropriately zone those lands classified
              within the conservation district;

          (3) Adopt rules, in compliance with chapter 91 which shall
              have the force and effect of law;

          (4) Set, charge, and collect reasonable fees in an amount
              sufficient to defray the cost of processing
              applications for zoning, use, and subdivision of
              conservation lands;

          (5) Establish categories of uses or activities on
              conservation lands, including allowable uses or
              activities for which no permit shall be required;

          (6) Establish restrictions, requirements, and conditions
              consistent with the standards set forth in this chapter
              on the use of conservation lands; and

          (7) Establish and enforce land use regulations on
              conservation district lands including the collection of
              fines for violations of land use and terms and
              conditions of permits issued by the department.

(Emphasis added.)

          In contrast, under HRS § 205-2,

                (a) There shall be four major land use districts in
          which all lands in the State shall be placed: urban, rural,
          agricultural, and conservation. The land use commission
          shall group contiguous land areas suitable for inclusion in
          one of these four major districts. The commission shall
          set standards for determining the boundaries of each
          district, provided that:

                . . . .

                (1) In the establishment of the boundaries of
                    conservation districts, the “forest and water
                    reserve zones” provided in Act 234, section 2,
                    Session Laws of Hawaii 1957, are renamed
                    “conservation districts” and, effective as of
                    July 11, 1961, the boundaries of the forest and
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                     water reserve zones theretofore established
                     pursuant to Act 234, section 2, Session Laws of
                     Hawaii 1957, shall constitute the boundaries of
                     the conservation districts; provided that
                     thereafter the power to determine the boundaries
                     of the conservation districts shall be in the
                     commission.

                . . . .

                (e) Conservation districts shall include areas
          necessary for protecting watersheds and water sources;
          preserving scenic and historic areas; providing park lands,
          wilderness, and beach reserves; conserving indigenous or
          endemic plants, fish, and wildlife, including those which
          are threatened or endangered; preventing floods and soil
          erosion; forestry; open space areas whose existing
          openness, natural condition, or present state of use, if
          retained, would enhance the present or potential value of
          abutting or surrounding communities, or would maintain or
          enhance the conservation of natural or scenic resources;
          areas of value for recreational purposes; other related
          activities; and other permitted uses not detrimental to a
          multiple use conservation concept. Conservation districts
          shall also include areas for geothermal resources
          exploration and geothermal resources development, as
          defined under section 182-1.

(Emphasis added.)

          Reading these statutes in conjunction with one

another, it is evident that the Commission lacks authority to

prohibit land uses within the conservation districts.            Under

HRS § 205-2(a), the Commission “determine[s] the boundaries of

the conservation districts.”      (Emphasis added.)      HRS § 205-2(e)

identifies, in turn, areas and uses that “[c]onservation

districts shall include[.]”      While this language indicates what

may be included within conservation districts, it does not grant

the Commission authority to use the conservation district

classification to exclude certain land uses from the

conservation district boundaries.        Had the legislature wished to
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grant the Commission such power, it could have done so as it did

with the agricultural and rural districts.         For instance, the

legislature dictates that “[w]ithin the agricultural district,

all lands . . . shall be restricted to the following permitted

uses.”   HRS § 205-4.5(a) (2017).        The legislature similarly

mandates that “[u]nless authorized by special permit issued

pursuant to this chapter, only the following uses shall be

permitted within rural districts.”        HRS § 205-5(c).     In these

two cases, if an unauthorized land use is included within either

the agricultural or rural district, either the governing county

must terminate the use under HRS § 205-12 (2017) or the

Commission could reclassify the land.         At no point does HRS

§ 205-2(e) contain any of the limiting language used in HRS

§§ 205-4.5 or 205-5(c).     Nor does HRS § 205-2(e) identify any

areas or land uses that the Commission may not include within

conservation district boundaries.        As such, HRS § 205-2(e) does

not provide any basis by which the Commission can exclude land

uses within the Astronomy Precinct, or be required to reclassify

the Astronomy Precinct because such land uses are present.

          Moreover, HRS chapter 183C and HRS § 205-5(a)

establish that the Commission lacks authority to enforce land

use restrictions within the conservation district boundaries.

This is because HRS § 183C-3(7) authorizes the Department to

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enforce conservation district land use restrictions.              See also

HRS § 205-12 (“The appropriate officer or agency charged with

the administration of county zoning laws shall enforce within

each county the use classification districts adopted by the land

use commission”) (emphasis added).

            Insofar as (1) it is the Department’s responsibility

to identify permissible land uses within a conservation district

and (2) the Department has determined that the astronomy

facilities constitute permissible conservation district land

uses, the Kanaheles may not use the declaratory ruling procedure

to seek review of the Department’s prior determinations.              See

CARD, 114 Hawaiʻi at 196-97, 159 P.3d at 155-56.            At this point,

“[t]here is no longer a question of how the relevant laws . . .

‘apply.’”     Id.   The Commission is consequently barred from

issuing any of the requested declaratory orders.             See id.15

15    The Planning Office’s state land use district boundary reviews also
align with the Department’s determination. Pursuant to HRS § 205-18, “[t]he
office of planning and sustainable development may undertake a review of the
classification and districting of all lands in the State” and “may initiate
state land use boundary amendments which it deems appropriate to conform to
these plans [the Hawaii state plan, county general plans, and county
development and community plans].” The Planning Office completed its first
state land use district boundary review in 1992. See 1992 Boundary Review.
At that time, the Planning Office was aware that UH intended to construct
thirteen telescopes within the Astronomy Precinct by 2000. 1992 Boundary
Review at 23. These thirteen telescopes constitute the current uses the
Kanaheles identify in requested declaratory orders one and three. The
Planning Office did not recommend reclassifying the Astronomy Precinct from a
conservation district into a different district at that time. 1992 Boundary
Review at 121-27 (discussing recommended amendments). To the extent the
Planning Office could have pointed to the thirteen telescopes and their
associated facilities as a reason to reclassify the Astronomy Precinct, it
did not. See id. Further, the 2022 Boundary Review was conducted long after
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            b.   The Kanaheles’ contention that they sought the
                 Commission’s interpretation of HRS chapter 205
                 rather than an enforcement order is irrelevant in
                 light of CARD.

            Because the Commission is barred from issuing any of

the requested declaratory orders, the Kanaheles’ contention that

they merely “sought the LUC’s interpretation of HRS chapter 205

and implementing rules concerning certain uses of conservation

lands and not an enforcement order assessing penalties or

imposing injunctive relief for actual uses in violation of

statutory requirements” is irrelevant.          Because the sought

declaratory orders would review the Department’s prior

determinations, the Commission is barred from issuing the

orders.    See CARD, 114 Hawaiʻi at 196-97, 159 P.3d at 155-56.

            c.   CARD’s procedural posture is irrelevant.

            The Kanaheles point out that “the procedural posture”

of the present case and CARD “are entirely distinct.”             However,

the Kanaheles do not provide any explanation as to why this

matters.    Given that the Kanaheles do not articulate how or why

the “entirely distinct” procedural postures must lead to

different results, CARD’s procedural posture appears irrelevant.

UH proposed the TMT and did not recommend reclassification of the Astronomy
Precinct. Under these circumstances, the Planning Office appears to have
implicitly adopted the Department’s determination that the current industrial
research facility uses within the Astronomy Precinct are appropriate within
the conservation district, and - contrary to the Kanaheles’ third requested
declaratory order - are uses consistent “with conservation district uses” and
not “detrimental to a multiple use conservation concept.”
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          d.    The LUC Order does not create an absurd result.

          Finally, the Kanaheles protest that the Commission’s

interpretation of CARD would preclude the Commission from ever

reclassifying land after a county or the Department has made a

decision concerning such land.       The LUC Order has no such

consequence.

          Given that the Kanaheles did not ask the Commission to

reclassify the Astronomy Precinct, the Commission did not

conclude that it was precluded from ever reclassifying the

Astronomy Precinct.     Rather, the crux of the Commission’s

decision was that it lacked authority to prohibit land uses

within conservation districts.       The Commission thereby

determined that it lacked jurisdiction to exercise its

declaratory ruling authority.

    4.    The Commission correctly interpreted Mauna Kea I and
          Mauna Kea II.

          The Kanaheles also argue that the “LUC incorrectly

interpreted Mauna Kea I and Mauna Kea II” by concluding:

          The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court has considered and ruled on
          permitting and jurisdictional issues regarding Mauna Kea in
          [sic] Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. Of Land & Nat. Res., 136
          Hawaii 376, 363 P.3d 224 (2015) and Matter of Conservation
          District Use Application HA-3568 for the Thirty Meter
          Telescope, 143 Hawaii 379, 431 P.3d 752 (2018).

According to the Kanaheles, the Commission’s conclusion was

erroneous because “[n]either Mauna Kea I nor Mauna Kea II passed

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on the matter of the LUC’s jurisdiction to classify or

reclassify lands within the conservation district.”

             However, the Commission’s conclusion did not claim

that either Mauna Kea I or Mauna Kea II passed on the

Commission’s jurisdiction.         The LUC Order simply stated that

“[t]he Hawaiʻi Supreme Court has considered and ruled on

permitting and jurisdiction issues regarding Mauna Kea[.]”                The

Commission therefore did not misinterpret Mauna Kea I or Mauna

Kea II.     Rather, the Kanaheles misread the LUC Order.

                               IV.   CONCLUSION

             This court’s role is to interpret the statutory scheme

as enacted by the legislature.          The dissent contends this

opinion “eliminat[ed] . . . the Commission’s jurisdiction over

conservation land bearing CDUPs granted by the Department.”                Not

so.    This court has faithfully interpreted the relevant statutes

and concluded the statutory scheme does not permit the

Commission to enforce uses within a conservation district.                This

court did not, and indeed has no authority to, rewrite an

existing statute.       Rather, “[o]ur function is to interpret the

statute [or statutory scheme] as it exists, not to indulge in

judicial legislation in the guise of statutory construction.”

Territory of Hawaii v. Shinohara, 42 Haw. 29, 34 (Haw. Terr.

1957).     While the dissent appears to question the efficacy of

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the statutory scheme to protect conservation district land, it

is the legislature’s role, not ours, to amend existing law.             See

McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Haw. 29, 39 469 P.2d 177, 182 (1970)

(Kobayashi, J., dissenting); Yates v. United States, 574 U.S.

528, 570 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“If judges disagree

with Congress's choice, we are perfectly entitled to say so — in

lectures, in law review articles, and even in dicta.            But we are

not entitled to replace the statute Congress enacted with an

alternative of our own design.”).

          For the foregoing reasons, the Kanaheles’ points of

error lack merit, and the LUC Order is affirmed.

Lance D. Collins                         /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
and Bianca Isaki
for Appellants                           /s/ Paula A. Nakayama

                                         /s/ Lisa W. Cataldo
Miranda C. Steed (Patricia
Ohara and Lori N. Tanigawa
on the brief) for Appellee
Land Use Commission, State of
Hawaiʻi

Jesse K. Souki and
Joseph F. Kotowski, III,
(Gary Y. Takeuchi also on the
brief) for Intervenor-Appellee
University of Hawaiʻi

Ross T. Shinyama and
J. Douglas Ing (Brian Kang
and Summer H. Kaiawe also on
the brief) for Intervenor-Appellee
TMT International Observatory LLC

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