Court Opinion

ID: 9586957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:16:51.574548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:57.458289
License: Public Domain

ALMA WILSON, Justice,
dissenting:
The opinion of the majority presupposes that that portion of 63 O.S. 1981 § 984 which purports to grant a special right of “indemnity” to owners and operators of high voltage lines is constitutional.1 It is not.
The relevant portion states:
“... [I]f such violation [i.e. coming within six (6) feet of any high voltage overhead electrical line or conductor] results in physical or electrical contact with any overhead high voltage line or conductor, the person, firm, corporation, or association violating the provisions of this act, shall be liable to the owner or operator of such high voltage line or conductor for all damage to such facilities and for all liability incurred by such owner or operator as a result of any such accidental contact. [Emphasis mine.]
The above portion of 63 O.S. 1981 § 984, on its face, violates the Constitution of this State at Okla. Const., Art. 23, § 6. Any action which is granted through an unconstitutional act of the legislative branch is void and without effect from its inception. It is wholly void, and in legal contemplation is as inoperative as if it had never been passed. State v. Board of County Commissioners of Creek County, 188 Okl. 184, 107 P.2d 542 (1940).
The above portion of 63 O.S. 1981 § 984 purports to prescribe that any person coming within six (6) feet of any electrical line or conductor assumes the risk as a matter of law for all liability incurred by an owner or operator as a result of physical contact. This legislative prescription is plainly in derogation of Article 23, Section 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution:
“The defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of the risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.”
Thus, such owners and operators cannot constitutionally be relieved of the legal burden to defensively prove, as a matter of fact, whether or not an injured/electrocuted person (or his principle) truly assumed the risk of liability for physical contact with high voltage lines or conductors. Our State Constitution at Article 23, Section 6, supra, prohibits the legislative preclusion of assumption of the risk as anything other than a question of fact. It cannot be summarily deemed a matter of law. In this respect, the challenged portion of 63 O.S. 1981, § 984 is patently unconstitutional on its face, for it dictates, as a matter of law, that any person coming within six (6) feet of an overhead high voltage line or conductor assumes the risk of liability to the owner or operator (and therefore assumes the risk of physical injury or electrocution) regardless of the particular facts and circumstances or the operator/owner’s own negligence.
I would hold the heretofore quoted portion of 63 O.S. 1981, § 984 unconstitutional, and therefore without effect.

. Lack of due process claims are an exception to the general rule that issues not presented to a trial court will not be considered on appeal. W.O. Pettit v. American National Bank of Austin, 649 P.2d 525 (Okla.1982). In the present case, the statutory preclusion of the factual determination of assumption of risk (a jury question) is tantamount to a denial of due process. Moreover, the Supreme Court may review a matter not presented in the lower court if a question of public policy or public interest is involved. In re Initiative Petition No. 10 of Oklahoma City, 186 Okl. 497, 98 P.2d 896 (1940). Questions affecting a substantial right may be considered by an appellate court of review. Stem v. Adams, 30 Okl. 101, 118 P. 382 (Okla.1911).