Court Opinion

ID: 9700455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:29:55.825901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:33.276101
License: Public Domain

Brickley, C.J.
(concurring). While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Judge Giddings should not *519be disqualified from hearing the underlying suit, I write separately because the conflict between the majority and the dissent over whether the Governor is a “party” to this suit threatens to overwhelm thoughtful resolution of the actual issue in this case— whether the conduct of the Governor and Judge Giddings requires Judge Giddings’ disqualification from the Cain litigation.
The Court’s struggle to define the Governor’s relationship to the suit is understandable. The relationship between a governor and a department is difficult to define because it is unique. On the one hand, the State Constitution vests in the Governor broad powers over the departments of state. See, e.g., Const 1963, art 5, §§ 2, 3 and 8. On the other hand, we do not expect the Governor, as a practical matter, to be responsible for the day-to-day operations of the departments, including most litigation. This particular relationship renders any attempt to decide whether the Governor is a “party” to litigation between a department and a third party a frustrating and divisive task at best.
At worst, this attempt distracts this Court’s attention from the disqualification issue. The court rule disqualifies a judge from hearing the underlying litigation when the “judge cannot impartially hear a case . . . .” MCR 2.003(B). By focusing on subsection (B)(1) of the court rule, the majority and the dissent ignore the broader mandate of the court rule in favor of an example of when a “judge cannot impartially hear a case.”1 I would not restrain disqualifica*520tion to situations that happen to be accurately reflected in an example. Instead, I would disqualify this judge if I determined, with reference to the examples, that this judge could not in fact impartially hear a case.
Under the facts before this Court, I agree with the majority that Judge Giddings can impartially hear the Cain litigation. The facts show that Judge Giddings aided a plaintiff in propria persona by recommending substantive additions to plaintiffs show cause motion — in chambers in the presence of opposing counsel. Such an action is consistent with the judge’s separate power to “properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity . . . .” Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(8).
Additionally, in the present case Judge Giddings could have filed the show cause order himself. See MCR 3.606 and MCL 600.1701(g); MSA 27A. 1701(g). Where the judge could have filed the show cause order, I find nothing improper in the judge’s decision to aid a plaintiff in propria persona to accomplish the same objective. Either under the facts as stated by the plaintiffs or under the facts propounded by defendants, nothing regarding Judge Giddings’ conduct in camera, standing on its own, suggests that Judge Giddings cannot in fact impartially hear the Cain litigation.
I reach the same conclusion when viewing the proceedings in camera in light of Judge Giddings’ June 2 and 30, 1994, media contact orders. Without com-*521meriting on whether the orders were a mistake of law, I recognize that, even if the orders did exceed Judge Giddings’ authority, he made a legal mistake. The remedy for a legal mistake is the appellate process, not a motion to disqualify.
If anything, viewing the proceedings in camera in the context of the media contact orders emphasizes the propriety of these proceedings. Because Judge Giddings acted under the assumption that the Governor violated a court order, filing a motion to show cause is not out of the ordinary. The facts simply do not suggest that Judge Giddings cannot impartially hear the Cain litigation.
I also agree that the facts of this case do not harmonize with those situations that require due process disqualification. I agree with the majority’s interpretation of due process case law. I agree that the citations of United States Supreme Court cases in this Court’s Crampton decision frame the discussion of whether a particular fact situation rises to the level of a due process issue. Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347; 235 NW2d 352 (1975).
However, I do not agree with the majority’s application of the due process case law to these facts. As in my analysis of the Court Rule, I would not base a ruling on a “yes or no” analysis of whether the Governor was a “party” to the suit. Instead, I would prefer to recognize that the Governor was, in some manner, connected to this suit. The task in ruling on a motion to disqualify is to decide whether that connection was close enough, and if the conduct was outrageous enough, that the situation suggests that the probability of actual bias is great enough to counsel in favor of disqualification.
*522However, even assuming the Governor’s connection to the Department of Corrections was close enough, and that the Governor’s conduct was outrageous enough, the Due Process Clause does not require disqualification in this circumstance. To make this point, I will review the second and the third situations listed in Crampton.
The second situation listed in Crampton requires disqualification if the judge “ ‘has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him.’ ” Id. at 351. This Court explained this statement by discussing the United States Supreme Court case of Mayberry v Pennsylvania, 400 US 455; 91 S Ct 499; 27 L Ed 2d 532 (1971). Crampton, 395 Mich 352. Mayberry holds that, when a judge has been such a target, the judge should be disqualified from hearing postjudgment contempt proceedings. Mayberry does not disqualify a judge from continuing to hear the underlying case, the case during which the judge was targeted. Mayberry, 400 US 465-466. See also Taylor v Hayes, 418 US 488, 501-503; 94 S Ct 2697; 41 L Ed 2d 897 (1974). Because all the parties agree that Judge Giddings would not preside over a contempt hearing against the Governor, I cannot conclude that Cramp-ton's second situation compels Judge Giddings’ disqualification from the underlying Cain litigation.
The third situation listed in Crampton requires disqualification if the judge is “ ‘enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner ....’” Crampton, 395 Mich 351 (bracketing in the original). Crampton explained this statement by discussing the United States Supreme Court’s case of Johnson v Mississippi, 403 US 212; 91 S Ct 1778; 29 L Ed 2d 423 (1971). In Johnson, the judge was disqualified from *523adjudicating a courtroom observer to be in contempt for actions occurring in the judge’s courtroom because the judge had just been a losing defendant in a separate civil rights suit involving the same observer. 403 US 215-216. Therefore, I interpret the third Cram/pton situation as disqualifying a judge when the judge is enmeshed in other matters, separate from the underlying litigation, involving a petitioner. Otherwise, a party in a case could disqualify a judge simply by attacking the judge in the context of the underlying litigation until the judge became enmeshed in the situation created by the attacks.
Applying this interpretation of Crampton to the present facts, I conclude that Judge Giddings was not enmeshed in other matters, separate from the underlying litigation, involving the Governor. All the challenged activity on the part of the Governor and on the part of Judge Giddings took place during, and concerned, the underlying Cain litigation.
In conclusion, the majority’s and the dissent’s debate over whether the Governor was a party to this litigation obscures the essential issue. Under the court rule, the essential issue is whether the judge can impartially hear the case. Nothing in the facts before the Court suggests that Judge Giddings cannot. Under the Due Process Clause, the essential issue is whether “experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge ... is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Crampton, 395 Mich 351, quoting Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35, 47; 95 S Ct 1456; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975). Nothing about these facts leads me to conclude that there is sufficient appearance of bias to recommend disqualification. *524Therefore, I agree with the result reached by the majority.
Levin, Cavanagh, and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Brickley, C.J.

 I recognize that the parties have phrased this issue in terms of subsection (B)(1), but I see no compelling reason to similarly limit our discus*520sion of the underlying motion to disqualify, especially when such a limitation confuses the underlying issue.