Court Opinion

ID: 9950559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 15:02:14.478182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:24.869681
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-7007     Document: 010111015790   Date Filed: 03/14/2024   Page: 1
                                                                             FILED
                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     March 14, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                         Clerk of Court
  JAMES RICKY EZELL, III,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                       No. 23-7007
                                               (D.C. No. 6:19-CV-00302-JFH-JAR)
  DAMON HININGER, CEO of Core Civic;                       (E.D. Okla.)
  JAMES YATES, Warden, Davis
  Correctional Facility; DEPUTY WARDEN
  GENTRY; (FNU) PEREZ, Deputy
  Warden, Davis Correctional Facility;
  TERRY UNDERWOOD, Grievance
  Coordinator, Davis Correctional Facility;
  JESSICA PATTERSON, Law Library
  Supervisor, Davis Correctional Facility;
  TIFFANY ADE, Echo Maximum Unit
  Manager, Davis Correctional Facility;
  S. PFAFF; CARLA HOOVER, a/k/a Carl
  Hoover; SCOTT CROW, Interim Director,
  Oklahoma Department of Corrections;
  MARK KNUTSON, Designee, Oklahoma
  Department of Corrections; DAVID A.
  CINCOTTA, General Counsel, Oklahoma
  Department of Corrections; JASON
  BRYANT, Warden, Joseph Harp
  Correctional Center; R. HODGSON,
  Captain, James Crabtree Correctional
  Center; LT. AUSTIN PARKS, Lt., James
  Crabtree Correctional Center; SERGEANT
  WALKER, Correctional Officer, James
  Crabtree Correctional Center; JAMES
  NALL, Captain, James Crabtree
  Correctional Center; MS. PIRECE,
  Correctional Officer; MR. VANCE;
  MR. BULLOCK, Correctional Officer;
  MR. KEYS; MR. ADKINS, Correctional
  Officer; ANDREW SMITH,
Appellate Case: 23-7007    Document: 010111015790          Date Filed: 03/14/2024     Page: 2

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, EID, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       James Ricky Ezell III is confined in the Oklahoma Department of Corrections

 (ODOC). He filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against ODOC officials (the ODOC

 defendants) and employees of a privately owned facility that houses ODOC inmates

 (the Core Civic defendants). The district court dismissed some claims and granted

 summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims. We affirm.

                                             I.

       Mr. Ezell’s filings are difficult to follow, and our first task is to identify the

 issues properly before us. Because Mr. Ezell represents himself, we construe his

 filings liberally. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840

 (10th Cir. 2005). But we can go only so far. We may not take on an advocate’s role

 by searching the record and crafting arguments. See id. Even pro se litigants must

 give us more than generalized assertions of error. See id. at 840–41. Like all

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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 litigants, they must provide their contentions and the reasons for them, with citations

 to the legal authority and the parts of the record supporting the contentions. See id.

 Falling short of this standard will waive an issue. See id. at 841.

       Mr. Ezell has waived any challenge to the district court’s decision to dismiss

 several claims against the ODOC defendants for failure to state a claim. See

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed claims against ODOC

 defendants alleging violations of the First Amendment (access to courts), the Sixth

 Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Ezell’s briefs present no coherent

 challenge to the dismissal of these claims.

       Mr. Ezell has also waived any challenge against summary judgment for the

 Core Civic defendants. He never responded to their motion for summary judgment in

 district court. And so we would review any challenge to the district court’s granting

 the motion only for plain error. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123,

 1130 (10th Cir. 2011). Because Mr. Ezell does not argue for plain-error review, he

 has waived any argument against summary judgment for the Core Civic defendants.

 See id. at 1130–31.

       Mr. Ezell makes various allegations of error that are too perfunctory to warrant

 review. In single-sentence assertions without any citations, for example, he suggests

 the district court erred when it denied his motions to appoint counsel and his request

 for a preliminary injunction. See Opening Br. at 11. This insufficient briefing

 amounts to waiver. See Garrett, 425 F.3d at 841.

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       Mr. Ezell has waived one final argument. He argues that the district court

 should not have granted summary judgment without allowing him to obtain

 additional evidence through discovery. But if he needed more discovery to respond

 to a motion for summary judgment, then he should have filed an affidavit saying so.

 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). By failing to file an affidavit under Rule 56(d), he waived

 any argument that we should set aside summary judgment for insufficient discovery.

 See Campfield v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 532 F.3d 1111, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008).

                                           II.

       We now turn to the two issues Mr. Ezell has properly presented: Did the

 district court err when it granted summary judgment to ODOC defendants on

 Mr. Ezell’s claims that they violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment

 (excessive force) and the First Amendment (retaliation)?

       We review the summary judgment rulings de novo, viewing the evidence in

 the light most favorable to Mr. Ezell and drawing any reasonable inferences in his

 favor. See Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 952 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2020). Courts

 will grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute over any material fact

 and “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

 If no reasonable juror could return a verdict for the nonmovant, then there is no need

 for a trial, and summary judgment is proper. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

 477 U.S. 242, 255–56 (1986).

       The material facts (described favorably to Mr. Ezell) are straightforward. One

 day Mr. Ezell stuck his arm through the food slot in his cell door. He refused orders

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 to remove it, and then refused orders to stick his other arm through the slot so that

 prison officials could handcuff him. He demanded that the officials obtain a video

 camera, presumably to record their interaction with him. The officials decided to

 handcuff the arm Mr. Ezell had put through the food slot to the handle on the outside

 of the cell door. As they tried to secure his arm, they twisted and bent it. At some

 point, Mr. Ezell used a cup to throw urine and feces on the officials. The officials

 sprayed him with pepper spray.

       Before this conflict, officials at Mr. Ezell’s facility had recommended that he

 be transferred to a medium-security facility. After the conflict, however, officials

 recommended he be transferred to maximum-security housing, citing his failure to

 comply with security directives and his violent history.

       Mr. Ezell argues that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

 using excessive force during the conflict near his cell door. And he argues that his

 transfer to maximum-security housing amounted to retaliation for his threatening to

 file grievances and a lawsuit over the officials’ conduct during the conflict.

                                            A.

       An excessive-force claim has two elements: (1) an objective element requiring

 that the alleged wrongdoing be harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation;

 and (2) a subjective element requiring the plaintiff to show that the officials acted

 with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 936

 (10th Cir. 2018). An official’s state of mind is sufficiently culpable “if he uses force

 maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, rather than in a

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 good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Id. (internal quotation marks

 omitted).

       The district court correctly granted summary judgment to the ODOC

 defendants on the excessive-force claim. No reasonable juror could conclude that

 prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind during their conflict

 with Mr. Ezell. They acted with a legitimate purpose—getting Mr. Ezell under

 control after he refused to comply with orders and threw human waste on them. And

 they used a level of force proportionate to their legitimate purpose.

                                             B.

       A First Amendment retaliation claim has three elements: (1) the plaintiff

 engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) the defendant caused an injury to

 the plaintiff that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage

 in that activity; and (3) responding to the plaintiff’s protected activity was a

 substantial motive for the defendant’s action. Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196,

 1203 (10th Cir. 2007).

       The district court correctly granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim

 too. No reasonable juror could find that Mr. Ezell’s threats to file grievances and a

 lawsuit substantially motivated the recommendation that he be placed in

 maximum-security housing.1 After all, Mr. Ezell cites no evidence showing that the

       1
         In addition to pursuing his claim that officials retaliated against him in
 changing their housing recommendation, Mr. Ezell suggests that an ODOC official
 named Jesse Barker retaliated against him by giving an affidavit to the local district
 attorney (leading to a criminal charge for throwing human waste on an ODOC
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 officials who made the housing recommendation even knew about his threats to file

 grievances and a lawsuit. At bottom, Mr. Ezell relies on the temporal proximity

 between his threats and the change to his housing recommendation (these events

 occurred on the same day). But temporal proximity alone cannot prove a retaliatory

 motive. See VDARE Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 11 F.4th 1151, 1174 (10th Cir.

 2021). That is especially true here because Mr. Ezell’s behavior gave officials a

 legitimate reason to reconsider the appropriate level of security for him.

                                           III.

       The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Joel M. Carson III
                                             Circuit Judge

 official). See Opening Br. at 3. But although Mr. Ezell mentioned Mr. Barker in his
 complaint, he did not name him as a defendant, we see no indication that Mr. Barker
 was served, and he is not a party to this appeal. And so we do not consider the
 argument about his conduct.

                                            7