Court Opinion

ID: 9430766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:32.095866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:26.031495
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, and consider it an important step toward ending the confusion that has resulted from applying Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965), on a case-by-case basis. I concluded in 1977 that the Court would be well advised to adopt Justice Harlan’s view as to the retroactive application of our decisions both with respect to cases pending at the time on direct appeal and with respect to cases pending on habeas corpus petitions. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 246 (1977) (concurring in judgment). The Harlan view is stated in Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675 (1971) (opinion concurring in judgment in Mackey and dissenting from judgment in Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646 (1971)); and Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 256 (1969) (dissenting opinion). I was persuaded by Justice Harlan’s reasoning then, and have followed it since. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, supra; Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 459, 460 (1979) (concurring in judgment); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323, 337 (1980) (con*329curring in judgment); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 651 (1984) (concurring in judgment).
As the cases we decide today involve only the retroactivity of decisions pending on direct review, it was not necessary for the Court to express an opinion with respect to habeas corpus petitions. As I read the Court’s opinion, this question is carefully left open until it is squarely presented. It is to be hoped that the Court then will adopt the Harlan view of retroactivity in cases seeking relief on habeas petitions. See Mackey v. United States, supra, at 681-695. Under that view, habeas petitions generally should be judged according to the constitutional standards existing at the time of conviction.