Court Opinion

ID: 9681271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:47:09.774053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:32.965548
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Wilson,
joined by Justices Smedley and Gar-wood, dissenting.
We respectfully dissent because this case should be rendered for the defendant and not remanded. As a matter of law the bursting of the air hose was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
The facts on proximate cause are uncontroverted. The bursting of an air hose released the air pressure in the brake system and automatically applied the brakes. This stopped the train and made necessary the replacemement of the defective hose by a new hose. Plaintiff was attempting to remove the defective hose when he got rust and dirt in his eye.
We are of the opinion that an injury sustained while repairing a piece of machinery is not proximately caused by the defect in the machinery making necessary the repairs. Such a defect is in law a remote cause. No one would contend that the defective hose could be the proximate cause in the case at bar if this car had been hauled into a shop to make the repairs and, while working on it in the shop, plaintiff had gotten dirt and rust in his eye. What is the difference in making repairs out on the track? The majority rely upon the Goneau case, (1) but that case is authority for the exact contrary of the proposition announced by the majority. In that case the defect was in a coupler and the plaintiff was injured while in the act of coup*354ling cars and while trying to make the coupler perform as a coupler. The court specifically points out that he was not repairing the coupler, and, as we construe that opinion, the court would have held that had he been repairing the coupler there would have been no proximate cause. The court said:
“Nor can it be said that Goneau was engaged in doing repair work. He was not a repair man, but a brakeman, and was not repairing the carrier iron, but attempting to move it into place to support the coupler, so that the coupling could be made and the train proceed. * * *.”
In the case at bar the plaintiff was not injured while either setting or releasing the brakes nor was he injured by the stopping or starting of the train. In the Goneau case the plaintiff was not repairing the "coupler but was actively engaged in effecting a couple at the very time he was injured. In the case at bar plaintiff was repairing the brakes so that they would perform when applied. See Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S. Ct. 275, 93 L. Ed. 208; Reetz v. Chicago & E. Ry., 46 F. 2d. 50.
The “force” of the broken hose (as the word force is used in the literature of proximate cause) was expended and came to rest when the train stopped. Beale, The Proximate Consequence of an Act, 33 Harvard Law Review, 633. This is not a continuing and unbroken succession of events so linked together as to make a natural entity of action. Milwaukee & St. P. Railroad v. Kellog, 94 U.S. 469, F.C. 7664, 24 L. Ed. 256. When the train stopped and the crew got out and contemplated the situation, one entity of action ended. When they decided to repair the hose, another started. The bursting of the hose becomes, after the train stopped and as to future events, a condition or circumstance and not a proximate cause(2) Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239, 44 S. Ct. 64, 68 L. Ed. 284; Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Sears, Tex. Com. App., 210 S.W. 684; Collins v. Pecos & N.T. Ry. Co., 110 Texas 577, 212 S.W. 477; Texas & N.O. Ry. Co. v. Rooks, Tex. Com. App., 293 S.W. 554; Paris & G.N. Ry. Co. v. Stafford, Tex. Com. App., 53 S.W. 2d. 1019; *355Phoenix Refining Co. v. Tips, 125 Texas 69, 81 S.W. 2d. 60; Thompson v. Erisman, 157 S.W. 2d. 439, approved on this point, 140 Texas 361, 167 S. W. 2d. 731; Atchison v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 143 Texas 466, 186 S. W. 2d. 228.
This situation is clearly distinguishable from such a case as Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ballew, Tex. Com. App., 66 S. W. 2d. 659, where the unauthorized emergency application of the air brakes by a passenger put such a strain on the train that a coupling device broke and split the train. The plaintiff fell between the split sections of the train. There the emergency application of the brakes by a passenger and the defective coupling device joined as concurrent proximate cause. Neither does this case fall within that line of cases where plaintiff’s action following a defect in a safety device is a normal response to the stimulus of apprehended danger. Here plaintiff’s action was the routine performance of a routine duty. Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 79 F. Supp. 365, reversed on the question of negligence but approved on the question of proximate cause including a normal response to the stimulus of apprehended danger in 174 F. 2d. 486. This was in turn reversed and the trial court affirmed on the question of negligence but both courts below were approved on the question of proximate cause. 339 U. S. 96, 70 S. Ct. 509, 94 L. Ed. 683.
A cause of action for violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act should not be mixed with a cause of action for negligence. Both are properly brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Because the liability of the railroad under the Safety Appliance Act is absolute if the defective appliance is the proximate cause of the injuries there is no problem of negligence involved. While a cause of action for a defective safety appliance may be joined and litigated in the same suit with a cause of action for negligence, the two should be kept separate and be separately submitted to the jury. It added only confusion for the plaintiff to offer unnecessary proof that the bursting of the hose was due to negligence, O’Donnell v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 70 Sup. Ct. Rep. 200, 94 L. Ed. 187, and it adds more confusion for this court to hold that the plaintiff can recover for damages caused by a separate act of alleged negligence upon a cause of action for violation of the Safety Appliance Act. This gap cannot be bridged by the element of foreseeability in the definition of proximate cause. The scope of the absolute duty to maintain the required braking system is limited to injuries sustained in and at the time of a failure of *356the braking system to operate properly. There is no duty to have a braking system which will never need repair. The scope of the duty cannot be expanded by a resort to the element of foreseeability in our definition of proximate cause.
The majority holds that there was a jury issue on proximate cause because “the Federal cases hold that this matter of causation must be submitted to the jury unless there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the jury’s finding,” and “under the decisions of the Federal courts, we are powerless to set aside such findings, and to hold, as a matter of law, that there was no acusation.” With this we cannot agree. Since the scope of the duty is established as a matter of law and since the uncontroverted facts on causation establish that the injury did not fall within the scope of the duty, there was nothing under our Texas practice to submit to a jury on causation. International & G.N. Ry Co. v. Hawthorne, 131 Texas 622, 116 S.W. 2d 1056. We recognize that in construing this Federal statute the Federal definition of proximate cause must prevail. But under the Federal cases defining proximate cause there was no proximate cause as a matter of law. Therefore, no weight should be given to a jury verdict to the contrary. Our own Texas Constitution and law should determine our judge*jury relationship and not the philosophy of a present majority of the United States Supreme Court.
This same controversy over the function of a jury and the effect to be given a jury finding on a question of law is reflected in the recent judicial writings of the United States Supreme Court. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 69 Sup. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed. 497; James, Functions of Judge amd Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 Yale Law Review 667; Enlargement of the Jury's Function in FELA Cases, 44 Illinois Law Review 854. The view that a jury trial consists of a jury working under the direction and control of a judge is the traditional and sounder view. In our Justice of the Peace court practice our Constitution provides that both the law and the facts should be submitted to the jury. Although it is frequently unsatisfactory to a lawyer, the advocates in a justi 3 court customarily bring their law books and argue both sta ites and cases to the jury. In a jury trial in a district court P5- a case such as the one at bar, the lawyers in their argument would necessarily be confined to the definition of proximate cStise contained in the court’s charge-. Thus they will not have the freedom they have in a justice court when forced to argue a Mw question to a jury. Where there is *357no conflict in the evidence and no question of credibility, the argument to the jury can only become an effort by each side to show the jury how the court’s definition of proximate cause should be applied to the pleadings and a set of uncontroverted facts. Traditionally in Texas this has been considered a law argument for the judge. This is the better practice and is in accord with our concept of the constitutional function of a judge conducting a jury trial. The jury finding on proximate cause under Texas procedure should be given no weight or effect at all.
Leaving aside now the consideration of the bursting of the hose and the Safety Appliance Act, plaintiff’s allegation that the railroad was negligent in having dirt and rust on the connection should be considered under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A., 51-59). Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. Ry. Co., 338 U. S. 430, 70 S. Ct. 226, 94 L. Ed. 236.
This poses a problem in standard of conduct. “The standard to test the question of negligence vel non, is the common experience of mankind * * Southern Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Texas 587. The standard must be reasonable and possible. Paris & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Staffard, supra. Where the standard is that required in the care and maintenance of machinery, it must be within the possibility of achievement by a reasonably prudent defendant within the technological development prevailing in the particular industry at the particular time. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Levi, 59 Texas 674; Trinity & B. V. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, Tex. Com. App., 208 S. W. 912; Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Amason, Tex. Com. App., 276 S. W. 162.
The substance falling into plaintiff’s eye was rust and dirt or “foreign matter,” meaning foreign to the human eye. The pleading, a fair sample of the proof, and the special issues on the point are set out in the footnote below. (3)
*358It would be impossible to operate a freight train and prevent dirt and particles “foreign” to the human eye from collecting upon the connections on the underside of a freight car. The law of negligence does not attempt to compensate for every risk and every danger, Worthington v. Wade, 82 Texas 26, 17 S. W. 520, but only those which prudence would elimate. This is not assumed risk as the majority assert, but is inherent in the definition of duty. The Federal statute on assumed risk relied on by the majority should not change the definition of duty, but should apply only after a duty has been established. The duty is to be prudent, and all risks which do not fall within the test of prudence are simply risks which are not covered by the concept of negligence. In the course of a day’s work dirt and rust could be knocked off of almost any part of a freight train and might fall into the eye of a member of a crew. Whenever a standard of conduct is unreasonable and impossible, this court should hold no negligence as a matter of law.
The Court of Civil Appeals placed their decision on Griswold v. Gardner, 155 F. 2d 333. On authority of Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 366 U. S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed 497, and Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry., supra, we should hold that the statute involved and the decisions construing it do not impose upon a railroad the absolute liability of an insurer. It is not a workmen’s compensation act. In the opinion of the writer the enactment of a workmen’s compensation law for railroad employees is a desirable legislative objective. However desir*359able, this result should not be achieved in the courts by destroying the concept of negligence and proximate cause. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Carter v. Railway, supra.
We should hold that as a matter of law in the year 1949 the failure of a railroad to keep the air hose connections on a freight car free and clear of rust, dirt and particles foreign to a human eye is not negligence. The time may come when such a standard of cleanliness would not be an unreasonable requirement.
This case should be reversed and rendered for the defendant.
Opinion delivered June 25, 1952.
Rehearing overruled July 23, 1952.

 Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company v. Ernest J. Goneau, 269 U.S. 406, 46 S. Ct. 129, 70 L. Ed. 336.

 For a lively controversy over causation, see the following articles: Keeton, Negligence, Duty and Causation in Texas, 16 Texas Law Review 1, Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 14 Southern California Law Review 1, 115, 416; 15 Southern California Law Review, 187, 304, 427; 16 Southern California Law Review 1, 61, 275; Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 Texas Law Review 471, 621, 755; Wilson, Some Thoughts About Negligence, 20 Oklahoma Law Review 275; Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 Minnesota Law Review, 185.

 Plaintiff plead:
“* * * large quantities of rust and other foreign matter fell from the rusty connection of said hose and lodged in your plaintiff’s left eye. * * * and as a result of the rust and other foreign matters and substance falling from said hose connection into your plaintiff’s left eye, your plaintiff has lost the sight of said eye and is totally blind in same. * *

Plaintiff Evans testified:

“Q. As you were beating on it, did anything happen to you? A. My eye got full of rust and dirt.” * * * “Q. The only force you had was the dirt dropping that six or eight inches ? A. I don’t know how hard it hit, it fell in there. Q. Did you have your eye directly under it? A. I would say I was, yes, sir. Q. Were you *358looking up at it, straight up? I think I was.” * * * “Q. When Mrs. Evans put the eye drops in, did she get anything out of your eye? A. She got lots of stuff out. Q. Did you see any of it? A. Yes, I looked at it; it looked like dirt and rust.”
Plaintiff’s wife Mrs. Evans testified:
“Q. When he arrived at home, did you do anything with reference to his eye? A. Well, I boiled some water and washed it out. Q. Was that his left eye? A. Yes, and I got some dirt, rust or something — I didn’t have no way to analyze it. Q. You didn’t analyze it to see whether it was dirt or rust? A. No, sir, I couldn’t say as to that. Q. Was it little fine particles like dust would be or larger particles like rust? A. It looked like a pretty good lot to be in an eye. Q. It looked a little larger than small particles of dust? A. Yes” * * * “Q. On the 24th, when he returned and you warmed the water and washed his eye and rubbed it with Kleenex, that is when you got the rust and dirt out of his eye? A. Yes, sir. Q. What was the appearance of his eye then? A. It was red, like any eye is when you get something in there and it is scratching the eye.” * * * “Q. Mrs. Evans, when you wiped this stuff out of his eye, you didn’t know whether it was dirt, rust or what it was, did you? A. No, I didn’t have no way to analyze it.”
Dr. Johnson (the first doctor to examine plaintiff after the occurrence') testified:
“Q. What kind of examination did you make? A. I made a compítete examination and didn’t find any foreign body in his eye. Q. You found nothing in his eye? A. No. Q. Did you find any evidence there had been anything in his eye?
*359A. No scar or irregularity in the cornea.”
There was no medical testimony that foreign matter was removed from the interior of the eyeball.
The special issues submitted to the jury are:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company, permitted rust to collect upon the connection which connected the air hose to the car? Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Answer: Yes.”
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence ■ that permitting rust to collect upon the connection which connected the air hose to the car, if you have so found, was negligence ? Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Answer: Yes.”