Court Opinion

ID: 9397583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 17:06:59.865905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:25.946270
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60538        Document: 00516763678             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/25/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                      No. 22-60538                                   FILED
                                                                                 May 25, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar
                                    ____________                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk
   Sandra Hernandez,

                                                                                Petitioner,

                                            versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                              Respondent.
                     ______________________________

                        Petition for Review of an Order of the
                            Board of Immigration Appeals
                              Agency No. A096 175 750
                     ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Sandra Hernandez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
   review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissing her appeal
   from an order of an Immigration Judge denying her 2020 motion to reopen
   and rescind the 2003 in absentia removal order entered against her after she
   failed to appear at the removal hearing. The removal order was mailed to an

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60538      Document: 00516763678          Page: 2    Date Filed: 05/25/2023

                                    No. 22-60538

   attorney who Hernandez alleges was not her counsel, instead of to her
   address. Although she concedes she received notice of the removal hearing, she
   claims the immigration court’s failing to mail her a copy of the removal order
   violated federal law and regulations and her due-process rights under the
   Fifth Amendment.
          Motions to reopen removal proceedings are disfavored; therefore, our
   court “applies a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing
   those motions”. Spagnol-Bastos v. Garland, 19 F.4th 802, 805 (5th Cir. 2021)
   (citation omitted).
          Regarding her statutory eligibility for rescinding, under 8 U.S.C.
   § 1229a(b)(5)(C), an in absentia removal order “may be rescinded only” if:
   (1) petitioner files a motion to reopen within 180 days following the date of
   the order and shows her failure to appear was due to exceptional
   circumstances; or (2) “upon a motion to reopen filed at any time”, if
   petitioner shows she did not receive notice of her removal hearing as required
   by § 1229(a)(1) & (2). § 1229a(b)(5)(C).
          As noted supra, Hernandez concedes she received notice of the
   removal hearing, and she does not contest the adequacy of that notice;
   therefore, the latter basis in the statute is not an applicable exception for
   rescinding her removal order. Further, she presents no explanation for her
   failure to appear at her hearing, thus failing to allege, much less demonstrate,
   inter alia, exceptional circumstances for her absence. The BIA’s
   determination that Hernandez satisfied neither statutory exception under
   § 1229a(b)(5)(C) was neither “capricious” nor “without foundation in the
   evidence”. Spagnol-Bastos, 19 F.4th at 805.
          Her due-process claim requires “an initial showing of substantial
   prejudice” to prevail. Okpala v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 965, 971 (5th Cir. 2018).

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                                     No. 22-60538

   To meet that burden, she must “make a prima facie showing that the alleged
   violation affected the outcome of the proceedings”. Id.
           Hernandez offers two possibilities for showing prejudice. First, she
   generally alleges that her lack of notice of the in absentia order prevented her
   from timely challenging that order on appeal or through motions to
   reconsider or reopen. She, however, offers no grounds which could have
   excused her absence from the removal hearing. Her tentative contention is,
   therefore, insufficient to show substantial prejudice on this point because she
   does not demonstrate how the outcome of her removal proceedings would
   have been different. See id.; United States v. Villanueva-Diaz, 634 F.3d 844,
   852 (5th Cir. 2011) (rejecting proposed showing of prejudice based on
   “speculative inquiry”).
          Second, she contends her lack of notice of the removal order
   prevented her from timely seeking reopening under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)
   in order to readjust her status based on her being the beneficiary of a relative’s
   petition for an immigrant visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (providing alien who
   entered without inspection and who is beneficiary of qualifying petition for
   immigrant visa may apply for adjustment of status). Assuming this issue is
   exhausted and preserved, it is also insufficient, as discussed below, to make
   the requisite prima facie showing of prejudice.
          Federal regulations require that a motion to reopen for the purpose of
   applying for relief from removal “be accompanied by the appropriate
   application for relief and all supporting documentation”.              8 C.F.R.
   § 1003.2(c)(1). Hernandez was not “inspected and admitted or paroled into
   the United States”. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Therefore, “[i]n order to be
   eligible” for adjustment of status under § 1255(i), “it was [Hernandez’]
   burden to demonstrate that the qualifying I-130 petition ‘was properly filed
   with the Attorney General on or before April 30, 2001,’ and that such petition

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                                    No. 22-60538

   was ‘approvable when filed’”. Manjee v. Holder, 544 F. App’x 571, 576–77
   (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(a)(1)(i)(A)).
          As Hernandez avers, the record includes her affidavit and the receipt
   from the agency accepting her Immigrant Petition for Relative (Form I-130),
   both filed with her motion to reopen. The record does not include, however,
   Hernandez’ Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status
   (Form I-485), as noted by the BIA and as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
   Moreover, Hernandez provided no evidence—beyond her affidavit stating
   that she was “eligible” for adjustment of status—showing that the 19 July
   2000 Petition for Relative was “approvable when filed” or “meritorious in
   fact”. See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(a)(1)(i)(A), (a)(3); see also In re Riero, 24 I. &
   N. Dec. 267, 268 (BIA 2007) (“to be ‘approvable when filed’”, petition
   “must have been (1) properly filed, (2) meritorious in fact, and (3) not
   frivolous”). Accordingly, Hernandez fails to show she was substantially
   prejudiced by the claimed improper mailing of the removal order. See
   Okpala, 908 F.3d at 971 (burden on applicant to show substantial prejudice).
          DENIED.

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