Court Opinion

ID: 9694588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:48:02.880567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:03.731174
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
concurring.
The majority’s historical analysis in this case is doubtful on two grounds. First, this Court, in a case of relatively *533recent vintage, held that a jury trial is not required in all forfeiture proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Bowers, 304 Pa. 253, 155 A. 605 (1931).
The Court in Bowers was addressing the issue of forfeiture used in illegal alcohol distribution. The case is analogous to the case at bar in that the statute there was also directed towards the seizure of non-contraband items based on their alleged relationship to the contraband itself. Under the then extant forfeiture statute no jury trial was prescribed. The Court in addressing the question ruled thusly:
“A jury trial can only be demanded where there is a disputed question of fact. The court is not required to award a jury trial in cases where there is no dispute of fact and it would be obliged to decide the case against the claimant, as a matter of law, on his petition.”
Id., 304 Pa. at 259, 155 A. at 608 (emphasis added). Thus, this Court has already ruled that a forfeiture proceeding can go forward without a jury, and the majority’s historical analysis is not sufficiently compelling to convince me that a jury trial is constitutionally required in all cases, especially since such a conclusion necessarily requires an overruling of longstanding precedent in this area.
The effect of the Court’s decision in Bowers is that in those cases where there has been prior adjudication of facts, as would be the case where there has been a conviction, no forfeiture jury need be impaneled. Thus, if the majority means by its decision today that one convicted of using a thing or place to make, sell, transport, or store illegal drugs, is nonetheless entitled to a jury trial on whether that thing or place stands forfeit, I vigorously dissent. In such a case the verdict of the jury (or judge sitting as fact finder) in the criminal trial leaves no facts in dispute.
Second, the majority has taken a romantic leap from the case of Wilcox v. Henry, 1 Dall. 69, 1 L.Ed. 41 (1782), arguing that because a jury trial was held there, that a jury trial was in fact required to be so held. The majority cites *534no historical evidence in support of this conclusion and I am unwilling to accept the majority’s assumption that merely because a jury trial was once held it must follow that a jury-trial was mandated in all forfeiture proceedings.
If the majority confined their ruling to those cases where third persons claimed a lack of knowledge that property owned by them was illegally used by one convicted while using the thing or place, I would agree. Likewise, I would agree when the prosecution seeks to pursue property beyond those instruments actually used to facilitate the crime upon which the conviction was founded: for it does not always follow that all that one owns has been obtained by illegal activity, and such facts not in evidence in the criminal trial are not therefore resolved. Thus, a jury trial would be appropriate.
I note that in this case the appellants were not previously convicted of a crime. Therefore, there has not been a prior adjudication of facts. As such I concur in the result in the present case to award the appellants a jury trial.