Court Opinion

ID: 9561789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:16:23.747171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:27.583967
License: Public Domain

Justice Meyer
dissenting.
A brief recitation of particular facts from the forecast of the evidence is necessary to an understanding of this dissenting opinion. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Wanda Jean Morrison purchased a pair of high-heeled shoes from defendant Sears’ store in Winston-Salem in the spring of 1981 and that while wearing these *305shoes for the second time on April 2, 1981, the heel of the left shoe buckled causing plaintiff to fall and receive injuries. Plaintiffs allege that the left heel gave way because the material of which it was made was of inadequate strength and quality due to defective design and construction. Plaintiffs’ asserted claims against Sears for breach of implied warranty are the only claims before us.
Through their pleadings and extensive discovery, the parties have established the following: Sears purchased the shoes in question from Colby Footwear, Inc. The heel in question, which plaintiffs contend “buckled under,” and sole of the shoe was a separate unit which Colby purchased from York Heel of Maine, Inc. which manufactured the heel.
Colby Footwear, Inc. is in the business of manufacturing women’s shoes. Colby requested York Heel to make this particular type of heel so Colby could use it in manufacturing shoes of the type in question. Colby provided York Heel with the design specifications and specified the materials it wanted the heels made of. York Heel then produced some models of the heels for Colby and Colby approved them. York Heel then made the molds for the heels which were paid for and owned by Colby. Colby controlled the manufacturing process in terms of the type of heel, the type of materials and the type of structure.
After the heel and sole unit was completed Colby attached the leather upper portion of the shoe to the heel and sole unit. During Colby’s manufacturing process the shoes were inspected at various steps. The completed shoes were sent to Sears’ warehouse in Garland, Texas.
All shoes offered for retail sale by Sears are delivered to Sears in individual boxes which are contained in shipping cases. After receipt of such cases, the individual boxes containing each pair of shoes are removed from the cases and placed in inventory where they remain until requested by and shown to a customer. If the customer does not buy the shoes they are returned to the individual boxes which are returned to inventory until requested by another customer. Shoes are handled carefully at all times before they are sold to a customer to prevent damage from occurring, and any shoes which appear to be damaged are removed from inventory and not sold. Sears does not remove shoes from *306boxes to inspect them upon receipt from the manufacturer, and in its retail sales stores, are not equipped to conduct inspections of shoes other than inspections for damage which is readily observable by any person who may look at the shoes.
As stated in plaintiffs’ Complaint, the shoes in question looked to be of excellent quality at the time of sale in 1981. Even three years later in 1984 there was no visible defect in the shoes in question. N.C.G.S. § 99B-2(a) provides in pertinent part:
No product liability action, . . . shall be commenced . . . against any seller when the product was acquired and sold by the seller . . . under circumstances in which the seller was afforded no reasonable opportunity to inspect the product in such a manner that would have or should have, in the exercise of reasonable care, revealed the existence of the condition complained of, unless the seller damaged or mishandled the product while in his possession. . . .
(Other provisions of the statute apparently not pertinent here relate to the exclusion from the operation of the statute of actions for breach of express warranty, and to actions for breach of implied warranty against a seller only when the manufacturer is not subject to the jurisdiction of our state courts or is insolvent.) Otherwise stated, the statute clearly provides that actions based on the theory of implied warranty may not be brought against “any seller when the product was acquired and sold by the seller . . . under circumstances in which the seller was afforded no reasonable opportunity to inspect the product in a manner which would have ... in the exercise of reasonable care revealed the existence of the condition complained of, unless the seller damaged . . . the product while in his possession.”
The rule stated in this statute is essentially the common law rule applicable to negligence claims that a retailer has no duty to test or inspect a product for latent conditions or defects. *307(Emphasis added.) 2 Frumer and Friendman, Products Liability Sec. 18.08(l)(a) (1979). In cases like this one where the retail seller does not manufacture the product, he may assume that the manufacturer has done his duty in properly constructing the article and in not placing upon the market a commodity which is defective and likely to inflict injury. See Cockerham v. Ward, 44 N.C. App. 615, 262 S.E. 2d 651, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 195, 269 S.E. 2d 622 (1980) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Davis, 141 Ga. App. 495, 223 S.E. 2d 825 (1977)). The law does not require a retailer to send shoes it acquires for sale to the public to a testing laboratory to be tested for latent defects. It is clear from the forecast of the evidence in this case that no inspection short of one by an expert with sophisticated scientific equipment would have disclosed the alleged latent defect in the design, composition and construction of the shoe heel in question.
*306(A) retailer who purchases from a reputable manufacturer and sells the product under circumstances where he is a mere conduit of the product is under no affirmative duty to inspect or test for a latent defect, and, therefore, liability cannot be based on a failure to inspect or test in order to discover such defect and warn against it.
*307The uncontradicted evidence in this case shows that Sears is not equipped to conduct this type of inspection in its retail stores. Plaintiffs obtained an affidavit from B. Everett Gray of St. Louis, Missouri which states he has personal knowledge that Sears has testing laboratories which are suitable for the testing of footwear. Apparently the majority believes that because Sears allegedly has such testing laboratories, presumably somewhere in the United States, it had a “reasonable opportunity to inspect” the shoes in a manner that would have, or should have, revealed the alleged defect. I do not subscribe to any such belief.
Even if I agreed that Sears had a duty to inspect for latent defects, and I most assuredly do not, I find it beyond the pall of reason to hold that, because Sears had laboratories at some undisclosed location capable of testing footwear, a jury question is presented as to Sears’ “reasonable opportunity to inspect” pursuant to our statute.
The trial court properly granted Sears’ motion for summary judgment. I vote to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.