Court Opinion

ID: 9466648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:21:46.815162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:50.743026
License: Public Domain

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
My analysis of this case begins with the indictment, which was returned March 22, 1979. After describing Jesse R. Hare’s position in the Internal Revenue Service and the official acts he performed, the indictment charges:
A. . . .
8. On or about May 29,1970 . Hare received a thing of value . a loan of $11,000 with favorable interest and payment provisions ... at the direction of [the taxpayer],
B. From on or about March 1974 through . . . January 1975 on a continuing basis . . . Hare . did . . . receive . . . something of value for himself, that is: favorable interest and payment provisions on the $11,000 loan described in Paragraph 8 . because of his official acts performed and to be performed by . Hare.
I have no doubt that the indictment charged that Hare persisted in a continuing course of conduct from March, 1974, through January, 1975.1 It fairly apprised him that he was charged with receiving something of value — the use of $11,000 at a favorable interest rate — during the specified period of time.
The critical issue is whether 18 U.S.C. § 201(g), which Hare is charged with violating, describes a continuing offense. This statute provides:
Whoever, being a public official, . directly or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him . shall be [punished].
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 860, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970), explains that a statute should not be construed as defining a continuing offense “unless the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such *1088that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as & continuing one.
Section 201(g) satisfies the test prescribed in Toussie. Its text explicitly punishes not only the initial agreement to receive anything of value, but also the receipt of anything of value for the performance of an official act. This is the construction placed on a similar statute by United States v. Driggs, 125 F. 520 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.1903), the only case apart from those dealing with conspiracies,2 that I have found which applies the statute of limitations to the acceptance of a bribe by a public official. Driggs dealt with a congressman who agreed to accept a bribe payable in installments. The receipt of each installment was charged in a separate indictment. Overruling demurrers to the indictments, the court ruled:
In point of time, as each payment was made an offense under the statute was committed, and so far as such payments were made within three years before the indictments were found the indictments may be based thereon. 125 F. at 524.
The loan agreement required Hare to repay the principal in full, so its true economic benefit to him was the use of the money at a favorable interest rate. This economic benefit constituted the continuing receipt of something of value which the statute was enacted to punish. The statutory phrase “anything of value” should not be restricted to the making of the loan in 1970. It is broad enough to encompass the actual economic benefit of the loan.
Because Hare enjoyed the use of the money at a favorable rate from March, 1974, through January, 1975, he received something of value within the meaning of § 201(g) during these years. I believe that his prosecution was not barred by the five-year statute of limitations. I would vacate the order of dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings.

. The applicable statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3282, is five years. Consequently, Hare could only be prosecuted for an offense that occurred after March 22, 1974.

. See, e. g., United States v. Seuss, 474 F.2d 385 (1st Cir.1973); United States v. Garmatz, 445 F.Supp. 54 (D.Md.1977).