Court Opinion

ID: 9890686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 23:03:11.438802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:34.784420
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 P. v. Reese CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                         B323148

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. BA230274)
           v.

  CLARENCE REESE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Conditionally
reversed and remanded.
      Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Yun K. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
      In 2005, a jury convicted Clarence Reese of various crimes
committed when he was 16 years old. He now appeals from an
order denying his motion to transfer this matter to juvenile court.
The People concede, and we agree, that the trial court erred in
denying the transfer motion.
                         BACKGROUND
       In 2002, then 16-year old Reese and Juan Saucedo tried to
carjack Vuthipong Sanguansukdikosol. Reese or Saucedo shot
Sanguansukdikosol, killing him. Reese later told a detective that
Saucedo was the shooter.1
       Reese was prosecuted for Sanguansukdikosol’s murder in
adult criminal court under a felony murder theory. A jury found
him guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code,2 § 187, subd. (a)),
attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a)), and first degree
burglary (§ 459). (People v. Reese, supra, B186147.) The jury also
found true special circumstance allegations that the murder was
committed while Reese was engaged in the commission of
attempted carjacking and burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(L),
(G).) The trial court sentenced Reese on the murder count to 25
years to life in prison. This Division affirmed Reese’s judgment of
conviction. (People v. Reese, supra, B186147.)
       In 2019, Reese petitioned for resentencing under then
recently enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, which limited accomplice
liability for murder and added section 1172.6.3 The trial court

1
      We derive the background from People v. Reese (Mar. 2,
2007, B186147) [nonpub. opn.].
2
      All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
3
      Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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denied that petition, and this Division affirmed that order on
appeal. (People v. Reese (Apr. 30, 2021, B301473 [nonpub. opn.].)
       In 2021, Reese petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. We
granted the requested relief, vacated the special circumstances
finding, remanded to the trial court for consideration of a new
resentencing petition, and directed the trial court, upon the filing
of a new petition, to vacate Reese’s murder conviction and to
resentence him on the attempted carjacking and burglary counts.
(In re Reese (Apr. 28, 2022, B312440) [nonpub. opn.].)
       On remand, Reese filed a new petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, and the trial court scheduled a hearing on
the petition. Reese also filed a motion to transfer the case to
juvenile court under Proposition 57. The trial court denied the
transfer motion, saying that even if it had authority or discretion
to send the case to juvenile court, it would not exercise it. The
trial court then resentenced Reese to a total term of 3 years 10
months, time served.
                          DISCUSSION
      Reese contends that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to transfer the matter to the juvenile court. The People
concede the error, and, as we now explain, we agree.
      In 2016, California voters enacted Proposition 57, a
measure requiring criminal charges against minors to be filed in
juvenile court. (See generally People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th
152, 158–159 (Padilla); People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4
Cal.5th 299, 303.) Under Proposition 57, certain categories of
minors can still be tried in adult criminal court but only after a
juvenile court holds a transfer hearing to consider factors such as
the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior
delinquent history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated.

                                 3
(Lara, at p. 305.) The law applies retroactively to cases in which
the judgment was not final when the proposition went into effect.
(Id. at p. 309.)
       Cases not final when Proposition 57 went into effect include
ones where the defendant was sentenced in adult criminal court
before the initiative’s passage, that sentence was vacated, and
the defendant is being resentenced after the initiative’s passage.
(Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 158.) The 16-year old defendant
in Padilla had been convicted of murder in adult criminal court
and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. (Id. at
p. 159.) After that judgment was final, he sought resentencing
via a habeas petition based on new United States Supreme Court
authority holding unconstitutional mandatory life without the
possibility of parole sentences for juveniles. The trial court
vacated Padilla’s sentence but reimposed the same sentence.
Padilla appealed, and the Court of Appeal vacated the second
sentence and remanded for resentencing. (Ibid.) Weeks later,
Proposition 57 was enacted. On remand, the trial court did not
hold a transfer hearing and reimposed the same sentence.
       Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at page 168, held that the
defendant was entitled to a transfer hearing because, for the
purposes of retroactivity, his conviction was not final. The court
found no meaningful distinction between a conviction that has
been vacated after becoming final and one that has never become
final at all (i.e., review on direct appeal has not concluded).
(Ibid.; see also People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 996–
1000.) Thus, nonfinal judgments include ones where
“resentencing that occurs after a defendant’s original sentence is
vacated in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Padilla, at p. 163.)

                                4
       That is the scenario here. Reese was sentenced in 2005,
before Proposition 57’s enactment in 2016. In 2021, we granted
his petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacated the special
circumstances finding, and remanded to the trial court for
consideration of a new resentencing petition with the direction to
vacate Reese’s murder conviction and to resentence him on the
attempted carjacking and burglary counts. (In re Reese, supra,
B312440.) As Reese’s judgment was therefore not final, the trial
court should have conducted a transfer hearing.
       And although the People do not argue that remand is
unnecessary based on statements the trial court made suggesting
it would not have, in any event, sent the matter to juvenile court,
we would reject any such argument. First, the trial court clearly
did not think it had authority to hold a transfer hearing. Second,
it did not consider the factors necessary to determine Reese’s
unsuitability for rehabilitation under the juvenile court system.
(See generally Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)

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                         DISPOSITION
       The order is conditionally reversed and remanded with the
direction to the trial court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing.
If, after the hearing, the trial court determines it would have
transferred Reese to adult criminal court, then his sentence shall
be reinstated. If the trial court determines it would not have
transferred Reese to adult court, then the trial court must treat
the conviction as a juvenile adjudication.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                         LAVIN, J.

                         EGERTON, J.

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