Court Opinion

ID: 9526075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:11:34.477078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:20.353979
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KARNS, dissenting: The conduct of defendant convinces me that defendant acquiesced in and consented to the declaration of mistrial. The conduct of her counsel in open court, after an off-the-record discussion with the State’s Attorney and after defense counsel stated to the court that “Jon and I ought to talk. It might save the county a lot of money,” evinces consent by conduct, particularly so in the absence of any objection after the lengthy colloquy between counsel and the court. Counsel had objected to the questioning of the juror, Hatton, by the State’s Attorney, who was attempting to establish the necessity or lack of necessity for a mistrial, and declined to examine him. She then waived her speedy-trial rights when the discussion turned to setting the case for retrial. Two months later a motion for substitution of judges was filed. Cases are collected in the annotation at 63 A.L.R.2d 782 (1959), where the courts considered whether failure to object constituted consent which waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy and where conduct of counsel in the presence of the defendant has been held to constitute implied consent. Illustrative is Baker v. State (1972), 15 Md. App. 73, 289 A.2d 348, where counsel for one defendant objected to the court ascertaining precisely what a juror had overheard in argument on a motion. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial, as conduct of counsel made it evident that he wanted a mistrial and had no objection, and under the circumstances it could have been prejudicial to the other defendant to continue the trial with the one defendant removed from the case. The Baker opinion reviews in detail the relevant Supreme Court opinions and concludes that the test, where the court grants a mistrial sua sponte, is whether the court abused its discretion considering the facts present in the particular case. (United States v. Jorn (1971), 400 U.S. 470, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543, 91 S. Ct. 547; Gori v. United States (1961), 367 U.S. 364, 6 L. Ed. 2d 901, 81 S. Ct. 1523.) The factual circumstances in each case are necessarily unique. I consider no abuse of discretion here, even though the trial court, as in Baker should have examined the jurors in detail to determine if in fact any prejudice would have resulted if the trial were to continue. Nor do I find People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 527, 387 N.E.2d 325, and People v. Williams (1984), 130 Ill. App. 3d 11, 473 N.E.2d 536, contrary to the views here expressed.