Court Opinion

ID: 9666642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:23:35.450316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:38.130132
License: Public Domain

WHITE, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In Alack v. Vic Tanny, Int’l, we held that attempts to avoid responsibility for one’s future negligent acts by use of contractual releases are disfavored on public policy grounds.1 Although Alack did not hold such releases void in all cases, it required those seeking to enforce them — as with other “extraordinary methods of shifting ... risk” — to meet an “‘exacting standard’” in order to succeed.2 The clause at issue in this case was not conspicuous as Alack requires. I would affirm.
In Alack we held that “the best policy is to follow our previous decisions and those of other states that require clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and conspicuous language” in releases from future negligence.3 These devices are disfavored because “[o]ur traditional notions of justice are so fault-based that most people might not expect such a relationship to be altered....” 4 “There must be no doubt that a reasonable person agreeing to an exculpatory clause actually understands *849what future claims he or she is waiving.”5 This Court has never before held that parties are conclusively presumed to have read and understood every term of a contract — no matter how inconspicuous or unexpected. In fact the opposite has been the case. Both this Court and the legislature have sought to protect parties from potentially abusive terms by requiring that certain contract terms be conspicuous. In their disfavored but occasionally allowed status, releases from future negligence are like waivers of implied warranties. The Uniform Commercial Code allows the implied warranty of merchantability to be disclaimed only when the disclaimer specifically mentions “merchantability” and is conspicuous.6 Under common law principles, this Court has established a similar standard to govern attempts to disclaim the implied warranty of habitability.7 While recognizing that “the right of the parties to make their own bargain as to economic risk” was a valid concern, the Court held that “the burden of demonstrating the fact of such a bargain ... remains great.”8 “By this approach, boilerplate clauses, however worded, are rendered ineffective, thereby affording the consumer the desired protection without denying enforcement of what is in fact the intention of both parties.”9 “[0]ne seeking the benefit of such a disclaimer must not only show a conspicuous provision which fully discloses the consequences of its inclusion but also that such was in fact the agreement reached.”10 “The heavy burden thus placed upon the [defendant] is completely justified, for by his assertion of the disclaimer he is seeking to show that the [plaintiff] has relinquished protection afforded him by public policy.”11 In order to interpose this exculpatory clause as a defense, Paragon bears the burden of showing that it is conspicuous, which it has not done.
Even if the Court is to reverse its previous policy and place the burden on Ms. Warren to prove that the term at issue was inconspicuous, remand will serve no purpose since this question is entirely one of law. Conspicuousness is a well-recognized concept in commercial law. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, “A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it”; whether a term is conspicuous is a legal question.12 Methods for making a provision conspicuous include, but aré not limited to, rendering language in all capital letters, in larger type, or in other contrasting type or color.13 The clause at issue here cannot be said to be conspicuous. The relevant provision was the twentieth paragraph of thirty-three in Ms. Warren’s lease. It was located on the bottom of the second full, legal-sized page of single-spaced type between paragraphs entitled “Destruction or Condemnation of Leased Premises” and “Lease Subordination.” While it is true that all terms of a contract are important and, obviously, not all of them can be emphasized, the holding of Alack is that a release from liability for negligent conduct is so far outside the customary expectations of a consumer that it must be specially highlighted in order to be enforced against him or her. When it sought to emphasize a particular point, the lease had no trouble doing so. Certain terms related to the amount of rent, the security deposit, and to pets are rendered entirely in capital letters. In fact, the issue of pets is so crucial that it is dealt with in a separate “Pet Responsibility Addendum” that, apparently, must be executed even if no pet is to reside in the apartment. The exculpatory language in this contract was not *850sufficiently conspicuous to alert a reasonable consumer of the extraordinary nature of the rights relinquished. Thus, the clause was inconspicuous as a matter of law and the trial court did not err in refusing to enforce it as violating public policy. The contract is before us. The only disputed question is one of law. Remanding the case for a full retrial merely to require the plaintiff to plead that the clause is inconspicuous is the height of artificial technicality.
Although I concur in part VI of the principal opinion, I respectfully dissent from the remainder. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. banc 1996).

. Id. (quoting Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1979)).

. Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337.

. Id.

. Id. at 337-38.

. Section 400.2-316(2), RSMo 1994.

. Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. banc 1978).

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id. n. 4.

. Section 400.1-201(10), RSMo 1994. While the U.C.C. does not govern this contract, other courts examining the question of the conspicuousness of exculpatory clauses have adopted the U.C.C. definition as authoritative. See, e.g., Dresser Indus. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 509-511 (Tex.1993).

. Section 400.1-201(10), RSMo 1994.