Court Opinion

ID: 9790351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:52:02.291054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.083258
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Justice,
dissenting.
I regret that I must dissent. A reading of the record in this case indicates that there is a lack of the most basic knowledge of the lawyer-client relationship on the part of the respondent. In addition, his pleadings raise questions about his ability to properly represent his clients. Because respondent’s motives are good, does not mean he need not measure up to the ethical standards of the legal profession. A lawyer must be competent before he is benevolent.
The matter is not difficult. Respondent on 19 July 1984 agreed to represent Abel Lucero-Lima accused of illegal entry, into the United States. Respondent at that time signed and filed a Form G-28 Notice of Entry of Appearance as an attorney or representative. There were no restrictions as to the scope of his representation. At the initial hearing, respondent not only ap*564peared but waived some of Lucero’s rights. Respondent stated:
Your honor, at this time we’d like to make a statement. We would like to concede service of the O.S.C., we would like to waive the readings of rights and explanations as required by law, we’d like to admit the allegations contained in the O.S.C., we will decline to designate a country of deportation at this time.
Respondent also made a motion for an extension of time stating:
Abel Lucero Lima requests this court to extend the time for filing his petition for political asylum to August 6, 1984 from August 3, 1984. The reason for this request is that his attorney was unexpectedly called away on another matter, involving murder, and could not complete the form on time. This is being manifested to the court as the first possible moment after the date the form was due, and said form is being simultaneously submitted.
WHEREFORE, Mr. Lucero requests this court to extend his filing deadline to August 6, 1984.
Later, respondent received a notice of hearing for his client. He made little effort to notify his client. Respondent intentionally did not appear at the hearing. In the absence of both respondent and Lucero, the immigration judge ordered Lucero deported. Lucero’s case was appealed by another attorney and the court remanded for a new hearing because of inadequate representation by the respondent. As a result, the chief immigration judge wrote to the state bar stating:
Your attention is invited to the fact that this case was remanded by the Board for further proceedings before the Immigration Judge because counsel for the respondent, whose name appears above, failed to notify his client of the time and place of a hearing on his asylum application. As a result, neither the alien nor his counsel was present at the hearing. The request for asylum was subsequently denied by the Immigration Judge and the alien’s attorney had deprived his client of the opportunity to be heard.
What followed was a flurry of filings by the respondent, acting as his own attorney. These pleadings raise questions concerning his professionalism. First, he showed a lack of knowledge of the law in insisting Lucero was not his client. Respondent stated in one of his many pleadings:
ARTICLE 11 (COUNT THREE): a) Mr. Lucero was never counsel’s client, b) Mr. Lucero was in a better position as a result of Fr. Myers representation, rather than a worse position. Mr. Lucero gained at least twelve months of freedom from persecution. Counsel did not violate DR 7-101(A)(3). (Prejudice to Client).
For Bar Counsel John G. Ryan to plead to the contrary either manifests gross ignorance of Immigration law and procedures, or constitutes perjury.
Respondent may not have it both ways. Either he represented Lucero or he did not. If he did represent Lucero then Lucero was respondent’s client.
Second, respondent contends that the Hearing Committee was incompetent because the members of the Committee were not immigration specialists stating:
2. This committee has made conclusions of law with respect to immigration law. The chairman of this committee has admitted, on the record, that he knows very little about immigration law. I have practiced immigration law extensively and I have never encountered the other two members of this committee in the practice of immigration law. I therefore make a logical presumption that they, also, know very little about immigration law. ER 1.1 of the lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct, and Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Ethics state that a lawyer and judge must acquire and maintain professional competence in the areas in which they practice. Here the members of the Committee, one by his own admission, do not have the competence required to judge this case. Therefore they are bound to recuse themselves.
Respondent contends that because the commissioners were not versed in immigra*565tion law, they didn’t understand that it is normal for a lawyer not to show up at a regularly scheduled hearing without notice. To support this position, respondent called some expert witnesses and filed an affidavit. Their testimony does not support respondent’s position, but just the opposite, refute his position. For example, the affidavit of Anne Pilsbury filed by respondent stated:
I, ANNE PILSBURY, being duly sworn do depose and say as follows:
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and the State of Maine and before various federal district courts, the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit as well as the U.S. Supreme Court. I have been active in the practice of law since 1975.
2. My background is in general federal civil litigation; however, for the past three and half years I have devoted myself exclusively to providing free legal assistance to Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers because there is a very grave shortage of attorneys and representatives to assist the large numbers of persons from those countries who are facing deportation proceedings.
3. I have appeared before the immigration judges in the New York City district in connection with over 100 individual cases. I am familiar with all areas of the asylum process as it effects Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers. I am also the director of a non-profit organization called Central American Legal Assistance located at 240 Hooper Street in Brooklyn, N.Y. 11211. This office tries to provide free legal representation to any Salvadoran or Guatemalan arrested by the INS and who fears persecution if returned to his or her home country.
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6. Because Father David Myers covers the INS detention center, a service that the private bar has never undertaken to do in any part of the country of which I am aware, he comes in contact with a large number of indigent, unrepresented aliens who need help. We have often had the experience here of representing someone in a bond reduction hearing while they are in detention (during which time they may be served with an Order to Show Cause) and then losing track of them after they are bonded out. Although we make every effort to maintain contact, the difficulty many refugees have finding housing and support often means that they will have to change addresses frequently and we will have to write several letters to locate them.
7. It occasionally happens that despite our best efforts we are not able to locate a client who has received a hearing notice which we are aware of because either someone in the office was the obligor of the bond (and by regulation had to be told of the hearing) or because INS sent us a copy of the hearing notice. When this happens it is my practice and the practice of other experienced attorneys and representatives to inform the court by telephone or letter if there is time that we cannot locate the client but I do not go to court to the hearing without my client. That would serve no useful purpose and given the enormous caseload we carry would greatly prejudice my ability to serve the majority of clients with whom I am in contact.
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(Emphasis added.)
Immigration judge McCarrick testified: Q. Lastly, Judge McCarrick to appear— I’m going to seek your opinion here — if another lawyer handled the bond aspect of a case, actually setting forth, effectuating the bond, and if this was done prior to the date of the hearing set forth — as an example, in Exhibit B-4, the notice of hearing, which I believe is the proper entitlement of this documentation— would a lawyer be ethically required, in your opinion, to have to appear at the hearing set forth there?
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THE WITNESS: I can’t answer that simply yes or no. I’ve got to give you *566some further history. There was a time when attorneys attempted to make limited appearances for bond purposes only, and very often the G-28 would reflect appearance for bond only. As a practical matter, some courts did and some courts did not honor that limited appearance.
I think you’ll find the regulations now provide there are no limited appearances, but again, that’s only subsequent to 1987. In my view, my personal practice prior to 1987 was that if an individual indicated that they were making a limited appearance on the G-28, they were essentially — they essentially stated that they were only coming in for a limited purpose, and as such, in my view I would honor that request.
It is noted that the complaint to the Arizona Bar was made by the chief immigration judge who, it is presumed, “knows something about immigration law.”
Third, in defense of his actions, respondent relies heavily on an unsupported theory of conspiracy. Respondent stated in the pleading:
Let it be clearly stated from the outset that David A. Myers, the respondent, believes this entire action to be brought for the purpose of harassing him because of his devoted service to Central American refugees. It is part of a conspiracy to harass attorneys advocating causes considered undesirable by President Ronald Reagan, Attorney General Edwin Meese III, and Chief Immigration Judge William R. Robie. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Arizona, through the State Bar of Arizona, Disciplinary Commission, has become complicit in the conspiracy.
Counsel for Mr. Robie does not address the substantive issues of Fr. Myers’ Answer: 1) the entire action is nothing but a political ploy on behalf of Mr. Robie to harass and discredit Fr. Myers in his work for Central Americans. 2) the person it is alleged was injured by Fr. Myers, a) is not a party to the complaint, b) was never a client of David Myers, and c) the only legal issues involved are
highly debatable, and should be litigated in the federal court, not the Supreme Court of Arizona Disciplinary Commission. 4) the Board of immigration Appeals found Immigration Judge John T. Zastrow to have erred, not Fr. Myers. 5) the Complaint in this case contains gross misrepresentations of the facts in critical matters, which reflects either manifest incompetence or perjury on the part of Mr. Ryan.
As part of this theory, respondent alleged that the bar counsel’s copy of the letter of complaint by Judge Robie contains a hand-written note. Respondent stated:
His Exhibit L includes a notation, not on the originals, as presented to Respondent. In the upper right quadrant of William R. Robie’s letter of complaint is hand written what appears to be “Screw David Myers VGa 9/9/85.” This accurately states the apparent motivation behind this action.
A careful (or even not so careful) reading of this notation indicates that it reads “screen David Myers.”
Respondent further alleges:
The Respondent has even maintained that the purpose of the action itself is to harass him because of his service to Central American refugees, and thus to occupy his time in his defense of himself in the bar committee, which time would otherwise be spent in helping Central American refugees.
I disagree. I find no evidence of a conspiracy to prevent respondent from representing his clients.
Finally, I must respectfully disagree with the statement in the majority opinion which reads as follows:
[Respondent was not charged with any violation of his obligation to the immigration court. Respondent may not be charged with one violation and then, without opportunity for hearing or presentation of evidence, be disciplined for another ...
Respondent was charged with the following violations of the Code of Professional *567Responsibility, DR-6-101(A)(3), which reads:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
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(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
And DR 7-101(A)(l), and DR 7-101(A)(3) which read:
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objective of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101(B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of his client by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.
(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional relationship, except as required under DR 7-102(B).
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These charges applied to respondent regardless of whether the conduct occurred before the Immigration Court, a state court or any other court, state or federal. There was no confusion for respondent as to what the charges were, as his pleadings indicate. There was no due process violation. In re Riley, cited by the majority does not apply. Riley, supra, was a question concerning an amendment of a complaint after the hearing had started. We stated that allowing amendments is constitutional as long as care is taken to assure that respondent has a reasonable time and an appropriate opportunity to respond to the additional charge. In re Riley, 142 Ariz. 604, 609, 691 P.2d at 695 (1984). In the instant case, the respondent knew of this allegation of failure to properly represent his client (Lucero) and he had ample time to prepare his defense.
I would adopt the recommendation of the Commission.