Court Opinion

ID: 9558003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:01:27.797363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:05.014174
License: Public Domain

EUBANK, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. The trial court’s dismissal of the prosecution with prejudice effectively bars the State from prosecuting the appellee for the alleged felony: violation of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor while his operator’s license was revoked (A.R.S. §§ 28-692, 28-692.02). While I agree with the majority that the form of the dismissal is not appealable, the substance of the dismissal is certainly to “quash” the information and bar future prosecution for the offense.
In State v. Garoutte, 95 Ariz. 234, 388 P.2d 809 (1964), our Supreme Court examined the substance of a trial judge’s order of dismissal and treated it as an order quashing the information under A.R.S. § 13-1712(1). The order was therefore ap-pealable. This is exactly what should be done here. The legal effect or substance of the dismissal of the information with prejudice exceeds that of quashing an information. Where the effect of the order is to quash the information it should be appealable pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1712(1).