Court Opinion

ID: 9535962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:52:06.576575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:24.053380
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the careful and complete discussion of the law applicable to the right of self-representation set forth in the main opinion. I disagree with Judge Greenwood only insofar as she would order a new trial at this juncture. I believe remand for further consideration by the trial court is in order. Given Judge Greenwood’s preference for this disposition over the affir-mance urged by Judge Jackson, such a remand is the order of this court.
I confess that I view defendant’s appeal with considerable skepticism. While I am perhaps guilty of the same paternalism which infected the trial court, it is clear to me that defendant was in better hands with appointed counsel than if he had set about to defend himself, the proverbial stranger in a strange land — all the more so because his defense of choice promised to focus on a bizarre, paranoid theory of conspiracy *638rather than anything pertinent to the substantive charges he faced.
But of more concern to me is the posture in which defendant’s claim comes to us. He proceeded to trial with his self-representation issue still lurking, and thus with a “ready issue for appeal if the result at trial prove[d] displeasing.” West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1314 n. 2 (Utah App.1991). Such a “two bites at the apple” strategy is not favored. See, e.g., id.; State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah App.1991). I believe if defendant was seriously concerned about the trial court’s precluding him from representing himself, he would have said so in a petition for interlocutory appeal or for writ of mandamus. To instead see how his trial came out before raising his concern with the appellate court smacks of opportunism — opportunism which works a particular hardship on the victim in this case, who may well be required to endure a second trial even though defendant will have even less hope of acquittal handling his own defense than he had when his defense was entrusted to competent counsel.1
All of that having been said, defendant has, as a technical matter, preserved the issue for appeal.2 I agree that on the first two occasions when the trial court denied defendant’s motion the incorrect legal standard was used. On the third occasion, the correct legal standard was articulated, but the court’s findings are inadequate to establish that the standard of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel was not satisfied. Given the concerns I have expressed in the preceding paragraph, together with the established practice of giving a trial court whose findings are inadequate the opportunity to more fully enlighten us, I would not order a new trial other than as a last resort. On the contrary, I would remand with instructions to the trial court to reconsider its decision in light of this court’s opinion. If upon doing so the trial court concludes it erred, it can grant a new trial.3 If it believes its decision was sound, then it should have the opportunity to enter more complete and detailed findings in support of that decision. With the benefit of those findings, we can then decide whether the trial court acted correctly. Without such findings, I am not prepared to say a new trial is necessary.

.Contrary to the characterization of my concern in note 9 of the main opinion, I am not suspicious about defendant’s initial motive in moving the trial court for permission to proceed without counsel. I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of his position. I question only his motive, having lost those motions, in not seeking the pretrial assistance of this court in securing his proclaimed objective. He could have petitioned for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. He could have petitioned for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. He could have sought a writ of mandamus. He did neither. I am concerned that, on the advice of zealous counsel, he seized upon the opportunity to proceed to trial with the assistance of counsel saving this argument, and the prospect of reversal of any conviction and a new trial, for appeal.

. This case suggests that consideration should be given to amending the pertinent rules and statutes to require that any appeal from the denial of a motion for self-representation be taken immediately or be foreclosed.

. Of course, defendant would not get a second trial with counsel’s assistance. Any grant of a new trial should be conditioned on defendant representing himself. In any such new trial, his prior waiver of the right to a jury trial stands.