Court Opinion

ID: 9388894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-22 00:00:34.841495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:23.374963
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30489        Document: 00516721801             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/21/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                      No. 22-30489                                   April 21, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar
                                    ____________                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                          Clerk
   Chance Dwayne Beroid,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Christopher Lafleur, Jefferson Davis Parish Deputy Sheriff;
   Ferroll Leblanc, Jefferson Davis Parish Deputy Sheriff; Naquan
   Senegal, Jefferson Davis Parish Deputy Sheriff,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:21-CV-516
                     ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         This appeal arises from Chance Dwayne Beroid’s (“Beroid”) suit
   against Officers Christopher LaFleur, Ferroll Leblanc, and Naquan Senegal
   (collectively “the officers”) for allegedly violating his Fourth Amendment

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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   rights. Because Beroid failed to plead facts sufficient to survive a motion to
   dismiss, we AFFIRM.
                                    I.    Background

           According to Beroid’s complaint 1, he alleged that Officers LaFleur,
   Leblanc and Senegal were dispatched to his parents’ house after receiving a
   call from his fiancée about an argument the two were having. After the
   situation settled down, Beroid’s fiancée left, and he remained at his parents’
   house where he intended to stay for the evening. Beroid alleged that the
   officers remained outside for thirty to forty-five minutes before approaching
   the door a second time. Beroid’s mother answered and was asked if he was
   still home. He came to the door and Officer LaFleur ordered him to grab his
   shoes and to come with them because there was a warrant for his arrest. He
   denied the existence of a warrant and refused to go with the officer. He
   retreated further into the house. Beroid alleged that the officers then “barged
   into the house” and attempted to grab him by the shirt. His shirt slipped off
   which prompted him to step a few feet further into the house.
           Beroid alleged that moments after entering the house and without
   warning, Officer LaFleur shot him with a taser which forced him to drop to
   the ground. Once on the ground, Officer LaFleur demanded that Beroid put
   his hands behind his back. Officer Senegal told him that if he did not comply
   with Officer LaFleur’s instruction he would “light [him] up again.” As
   Beroid was handcuffed he explained that the charges underlying the warrant

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           1
            As part of his complaint, Beroid included camera footage taken from the officers’
   body cameras, dashboard camera, and backseat camera. Because the district court’s
   characterization of the video footage is at issue in this case, the facts summarized in this
   section come directly from the complaint. However, we note that there are a number of
   inconsistencies between the facts as alleged in the complaint and the video footage.

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   were dropped and repeatedly asked what the charges were for and from what
   year. Officer LaFleur eventually responded that he did not know the details
   about the charges but that the warrant was confirmed by the Jennings Police
   Department. Beroid was taken to the Sherriff’s Office where he met with
   EMT personnel to be treated for the injuries he sustained during his arrest.
   He alleged that he overheard the officers tell the EMT personnel that he had
   been “fighting” and that he overheard conversation between the officers
   corroborating “a false version of the incident.”
          Beroid sued all three officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
   violations of his Fourth Amendment right “to be secure in his person from
   unreasonable seizure through excessive force” and his “constitutional right
   under the Fourteenth Amendment to bodily integrity and to be free from
   excessive force by law enforcement.” The officers filed a motion to dismiss
   under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted
   the officers’ motion and determined that Beroid failed to show that the
   officers acted unreasonably in their use of force. It also determined that the
   officers were entitled to qualified immunity. This appeal ensued.
                         II.    Standard of Review
          We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.
   Butts v. Aultman, 953 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2020). When reviewing a
   motion to dismiss, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those
   facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Alexander v. City of Round
   Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2017). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint
   must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
   relief that is plausible on its face.” Butts, 953 F.3d at 357 (quoting Masel v.
   Villarreal, 924 F.3d 734, 743 (5th Cir. 2019)). A claim is facially plausible
   “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
   reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

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   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
   550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
                            III.      Discussion
          Beroid presents four issues on appeal. He asks us to decide whether
   the district court erred in: 1) relying on its own characterization of the video
   footage at the pleadings stage; 2) granting the motion to dismiss and
   determining qualified immunity was applicable; 3) determining that the
   complaint failed to set forth a prima facie Fourth Amendment claim and
   otherwise overcome the officers’ qualified immunity claim; and 4) declining
   to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Beroid’s state law claims. We
   address each in turn.
                       A.        Fourth Amendment Claims

          Beroid argues that Officer LaFleur shot him with a taser “without
   warning and without attempting to use de-escalation skills, negotiations, or
   commands.” He adds that Officers Senegal and Leblanc “stood idly by.”
   He contends that this violated his Fourth Amendment rights because “the
   officers acted unreasonably excessively [sic] [.]”
          To advance a successful claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must (1)
   allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
   States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
   person acting under color of state law.” James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d
   365, 373 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d
   871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000)). There is no dispute that the officers acted under
   the color of state law when they effectuated Beroid’s arrest. Beroid’s
   arguments focus on prong two, that the officers violated his clearly

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   established Fourth Amendment “right to be free from excessive force.” 2 To
   prevail on an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, Beroid
   “must establish ‘(1) [an] injury (2) which resulted directly and only from a
   use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was
   clearly unreasonable.’” Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., 948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir.
   2020) (quoting Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 416 (5th Cir. 2007)).
           With respect to the first prong, “although a de minimis injury is not
   cognizable, the extent of injury necessary to satisfy the injury requirement is
   directly related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible
   under the circumstances.” Byrd v. Cornelius, 52 F.4th 265, 274 (5th Cir.
   2022) (quoting Alexander, 854 F.3d at 309) (citations and quotation marks
   omitted). “Any force found to be objectively unreasonable necessarily
   exceeds the de minimis threshold, and, conversely, objectively reasonable
   force will result in de minimis injuries only.” Id. (citation and quotation
   marks omitted).
           Beroid claimed he suffered burn marks on his arm and back from being
   tased as well as anxiety and other psychological injuries and psychiatric
   distress. His injuries are cognizable only if the officers’ use of force was
   unreasonable. See Ratliff, 948 at 287.
           In determining whether the use of force was reasonable, we must
   assess the totality of the circumstances. See Elizondo v. Green, 671 F.3d 506,
   510 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Massey v. Wharton, 477 F. App’x. 256, 262 (5th
   Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (analyzing several important factors including

           _____________________
           2
             See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that “all claims that law
   enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest,
   investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth
   Amendment and its reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due process’
   approach”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

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   “whether he [was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
   flight”) (internal citation omitted). 3 Further, “[t]he reasonableness of a
   particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
   officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham
   v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal citation and quotation marks
   omitted). Thus, not every push or shove violates the Fourth Amendment.
   Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). Instead, “the calculus of
   reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are
   often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are
   tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is
   necessary in a particular situation.” Id at 396–97 (internal citation and
   quotation marks omitted).
           Beroid argues that Officer LaFleur acted unreasonably when he tased
   him because at that point in time he was not aware that he was under arrest
   because officers did not use the precise phrase “you are under arrest” and he
   was not warned that he would be shot with a taser. Our cases involving the
   use of a taser to effectuate an arrest focus on whether the officers faced active
   resistance. See Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Pratt
   v. Harris Cnty., 822 F.3d 174, 182 (5th Cir. 2016)) (“[A] suspect’s active
   resistance to arrest may justify this degree of force.”). For example, in Poole
   v. City of Shreveport, in affirming the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment we determined that the use of a taser during an arrest was

           _____________________
           3
             See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“Because “[t]he test of reasonableness under the
   Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,” Bell v.
   Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), [ ] its proper application requires careful attention to the
   facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
   whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
   whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”) (emphasis
   added).

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   reasonable because the plaintiff verbally and physically resisted arrest. See
   691 F.3d 624, 631–32 (5th Cir. 2012). There, we concluded that the officers
   were entitled to use “some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to”
   effectuate the seizure to execute the arrest warrant including the use of a taser
   if the situation so requires. Id. at 627–28 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
           We also have caselaw emphasizing that reciting “you’re under arrest”
   is not necessary to put a suspect on notice that he is being arrested and
   resistance can be met with reasonable force. In Tucker v. City of Shreveport,
   we reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and determined
   that the level of force that officers used during the plaintiff’s arrest was
   reasonable. 998 F.3d 165, 185 (5th Cir. 2021). We further concluded that
   even though the officers did not utter the words “you are under arrest,”
   lights and sirens coupled with being told to put his hands behind his back
   were enough to put the plaintiff on notice that he was being arrested. We
   determined that by refusing to pull over and then physically and verbally
   resisting arrest, the officers were reasonable in their use of force to take him
   down to the ground to complete the arrest. Id. at 178–79. By contrast, there
   are a number of cases where we have determined excessive force was used
   when officers tased a suspect offering only passive resistance or no resistance
   at all. 4 This is not such a case.
           Mindful that we must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and
   construe those facts in the light most favorable to Beroid, see Alexander, 854

           _____________________
           4
             See e.g., Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2018) (reversing
   dismissal of claims against officer because evidence including video evidence showed that
   the plaintiff was not resisting and was instead complying with officers during arrest
   therefore use of a taser was excessive force); Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 380 (5th
   Cir. 2013); Newman v. Guedry, 730 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding that use of a taser
   was unreasonable because the plaintiff’s behavior did not rise to the level of “active
   resistance”).

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   F. 3d at 303, we hold that Beroid has not pleaded facts establishing excessive
   force. First, he argues that he was never told that he was under arrest, but
   his complaint alleges that Officer LaFleur told him to grab his shoes because
   there was a warrant for his arrest. This was sufficient to put Beroid on notice
   that he was being arrested. See Tucker, 998 F.3d at 185.
          Next, he argues that Officer LaFleur violated his Fourth Amendment
   right when he shot him with a taser without warning even though he “was
   not committing a crime, was unarmed, and was not actively resisting arrest.”
   We disagree. Beroid was on notice that he was being arrested therefore his
   refusal to comply and his subsequent retreat into the house was active
   resistance. As we have repeatedly held, the use of a taser is a reasonable level
   of force when a suspect is resisting arrest. Thus, Officer LaFleur’s use of
   force was reasonable in this situation. See Stone, 993 F.3d at 384; see also
   Buchanan v. Gulfport Police Dep’t, 530 F. App’x 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2013) (per
   curiam) (“[W]here a suspect resists arrest or fails to follow police orders,
   officers [did] not violate his right against excessive force by deploying their
   tasers to subdue him.”).
          Beroid further argues that the district court relied on its own
   characterization of the video footage in reaching its decision to dismiss the
   case. We disagree. But regardless, setting aside the video footage and
   focusing only on the language in the amended complaint, as we have done
   here, we hold that Beroid has failed to establish that there was use of
   excessive force thus his injury was de minimis. See Byrd, 52 F.4th at 274.
          Beroid also argues that Officers Leblanc and Senegal violated his
   constitutional rights when they “stood idly by and otherwise made no
   attempt to use other, less forceful tactics to arrest [him].” However, Officers
   Leblanc and Senegal did not deploy their taser and given that there were no
   constitutional right violations for them to be aware of and protect, they are

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   also not liable under the theory of bystander liability. See Hale v. Townley, 45
   F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding “that [ ] officer[s] who [were] present
   at the scene and [did] not take reasonable measures to protect a suspect from
   another officer’s use of excessive force may be liable under section 1983”).
                        B.      Qualified Immunity

          To determine whether qualified immunity applies, we engage in a
   two-part inquiry “asking: first, whether taken in the light most favorable to
   the party asserting the injury . . . the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct
   violated a constitutional right; and second, whether the right was clearly
   established.” Byrd, 52 F.4th at 271 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
   201 (2001) (quotation marks omitted)). We have repeatedly denied qualified
   immunity “in cases in which ‘officers face verbal resistance but no fleeing
   suspect.’” Tucker, 998 F.3d at 175 (quoting Bone v. Dunnaway, 657 F. App’x
   258, 263 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)). Since Beroid does not contest the
   legality of his arrest, we only focus on the officers’ use of force during his
   arrest. See Poole, 691 F.3d at 629.
          Beroid argues that his complaint demonstrates that the officers
   violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the only reason the motion to
   dismiss was granted was because the district court, adopting the
   recommendation of the magistrate judge, substituted the facts alleged in the
   complaint with its own characterization of the video footage. He argues that
   but for this error, the officers would not be entitled to qualified immunity.
          We are not persuaded by this argument because we have routinely
   held that “on a motion to dismiss, the court is entitled to consider any
   exhibits attached to the complaint, including video evidence.” Hartman v.
   Walker, 685 F. App’x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Tucker, 998 F.3d
   at 170 (determining officers were entitled to qualified immunity “because
   there [was] video and audio recording of the event, [and] we are not required

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   to accept factual allegations that are blatantly contradicted by the record”)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Villarreal v. Wells
   Fargo Bank, N.A., 814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The court may [ ] also
   consider documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss . . . if
   they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to [his]
   claim.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Beroid elected to
   attach video footage to his complaint and directed the court’s attention to
   that footage throughout his complaint but now argues that the district court
   mischaracterized it. We disagree. After reviewing the video footage to
   determine the merits of this argument, we conclude that the district court’s
   characterization of the footage was accurate. The footage does contradict
   Beroid’s claims that he did not resist arrest. Thus, the district court did not
   err in considering this video footage. See Tucker, 998 F.3d at 170.
          Because we have already determined that Beroid has failed to establish
   a constitutional violation, we hold that the district court did not err in
   determining that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity in this case.
   See Byrd, 52 F.4th at 271.
                    C. Denial of Supplemental Jurisdiction

          Because Beroid’s § 1983 claim was properly dismissed and there are
   no other federal claims, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
   discretion by declining extension of supplemental jurisdiction to Beroid’s
   state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may
   decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection
   (a) if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
   original jurisdiction”).
                                IV.   Conclusion
          For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting
   the officers’ motion to dismiss and dismissing Beroid’s suit.

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