Court Opinion

ID: 9681555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:52:35.296729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.425964
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Associate Justice.
The controversy involves the authority of appellant agency to suspend appellee’s license to drive a motor vehicle pursuant to Art. 6687b, §§ 22, 31, V.A.C.S. The lecord before us is inclusive only of a transcript containing original petition of Cox filed in County Court at Law No. 2, Stay Order of Judge Hart, motion of Cox for judgment on pleadings, and order of the named Court holding void a prior finding of the Corporation Court of the City of Dallas, on which the departmental order of suspension was based. From this judgment and restoration to Cox of his rights and privileges as a motor vehicle operator, the Department of Public Safety has duly perfected appeal' to this Court.
Under provisions of 6687b (Texas Drivers License Law), appellant agency is charged with the responsibility of supervising the safe operation of motor vehicles over the roads and highways of Texas. Various acts and omissions on part of any automobile driver are there detailed, constituting offenses, and giving rise to action by the Director of Public Safety to the end of suspension or revocation of license; section 22(a) headed “Authority of Department to suspend or revoke a license” reading in part: “When under Section 10 of this Act the Director believes the licensee to be incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle, the Director may notify said licensee of such fact and summons him to appear for hearing as" provided hereinafter. Such hearing shall be had not less than ten (10) days after notification to the licensee or operator under any of the provisions of this Section, and upon charges in writing a copy of which shall be given to said operator or licensee not less than ten (10) days before said hearing. For the purpose of hearing such cases jurisdiction is vested in the mayor of the city, or judge of the police court, or a justice of the peace in the county or subdivision thereof where the operator or licensee resides. Such court may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of relative books and papers. It shall be the duty of the court to set the matter for hearing upon ten (10) days written notice to the Department. Upon such hearing, in the event of an affirmative finding by the court, the officer who presides at such hearing shall report the same *663tó the-Department which shall hav'e authority to suspend said license for a period not greater than one (1) year, provided, however, that in the event of such affirmative finding the licensee may appeal to the county court of the county wherein the hearing was held, said appeal to be tried de novo. * * *” Section 31 is also pertinent: “Any person denied a license or whose license has been cancelled or revoked by the Department except where such cancellation or revocation is automatic under the provisions of this Act shall have the right to file a petition within thirty (30) days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the County Court at Law in the county wherein such person shall reside, or if there bé no County Court at Law therein, then in-the county court of said county, and such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty to set the matter for. hearing upon ten (10) days written notice to the Department, and thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case, and to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or is subject to suspension, cancellation or revocation of license under the provisions of this Act. Provided the trial on appeal as herein provided for shall be a trial de novo and the licensee shall have the right of trial by jury and his license shall not be suspended pending the appeal. Provided further, in cases herein provided for suspension of license, the filing of the petition of appeal shall abate said suspension until the trial herein provided for shall have been consummated and final judgment thereon is had.”
In the same connection we glean from the pleading of Cox and aforesaid judgment’ of the County Court at Law No. 2 of Dallas 'County, the following facts: That appellant prior to February 13, 1953, had filed .an action in the “Corporation Court'of Dallas, Texas,” charging Cox -with infraction of section 22(b),' the Corporation Court on that day making “an affirmative finding”; that in consequence the Department on January 28, 1954 had ordered suspension" of the ■driver’s license of Cox for a period of six months from said date; 'Cox duly appealing to the County Court at Law as authorized by section 31; primarily urging invalidity in toto of the depártmental order of suspension, in that section 22(a) fixed initial jurisdiction for suspension of license in the “mayor of the city,, or judge of the police court, or a justice of the peace in the county or subdivision thereof where the operator or licensee resides” (emphasis ours), whereas appellant’s order in question was based on an affirmative"finding of the Corporation Court of Dallas, Texas; a tribunal not designated in section 22(a) as having jurisdiction thereof.
It is our conclusion that appellant’s order of-suspension, based on an affirmative finding of the “Corporation Court of Dallas, Texas”, is void as found by the trial court. “The proceedings of administrative agencies, and the remedies administered thereby, are, of course, wholly, statutory.; and one who seeks to avail himself thereof must comply with the statutory provisions. These provisions are mandatory and exclusive; and conformity thereto in each and every particular is essential to the exercise of jurisdiction by the agency.” 1 Tex.Jur. Supp. 107, sec. 22; American Surety Co. v. Mays, Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W.2d 444, 446. “Administrative authorities are creatures of statute and have only such powers as the statute confers on them. Their powers must be exercised in accordance with the statute bestowing such powers, and they can act only in the mode prescribed by. statute. * * * They cannot rightfully dispense with any of the essential forms of proceedings which Jhe legislature has prescribed for the purpose of investing them with power to act.” 42 Am.Jur. 379, sec. 68. Section 22 of Art. 6687b.requires that actions taken by the Department for suspension or revocation of license shall begin by notice and written charges before the “mayor of the city, of judge of the police court, or justice of the peace”; and while “police court” is not mentioned in Dallas City ordinances, the term is obviously synonymous with “city,” “municipal,” or “corporation court”; 21 C.J.S., Courts, § *664131, p. 198; the judge of that court to constitute one of the administrative officials for the'initial hearing and “affirmative finding” — the prerequisite. of departmental order of suspension — which in turn forms the basis.of the contemplated judicial review. The Dallas Corporation Court on the other hand is .itself a judicial body, with juris-, diction in all criminal cases arising under the ordinances of the particular municipality; Art. 1195, V.A.C.S. And while in section 22(a) the mayor, police judge, and justice of peace are later referred to as a “court,” we do not think the Legislature intended to impose the administrative duties there authorized upon the Corporation Court of Dallas, but rather the-judge thereof is made - such administrative official; Prince v. Garrison, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W. 2d 241; and Judge Hart properly held null and void the departmental hearing and order under review. As already pointed-out, a conformity to statutory requirements is essential to the exercise of jurisdiction by that agency.
The judgment under review is accord-, ingly affirmed.
DIXON, C. J., dissents.