Court Opinion

ID: 9829081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:58:22.361508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:57.090251
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The able counsel for appellant with much force insists that the court below and this court erred in holding, in effect, that appellant was liable for the wife’s goods on the theory that appellant was at least a bailee. It is insisted that there is no pleading to support such a recovery, and there is much force, or apparent force, in the contention ; for the gist of plaintiff’s petition is to the effect that the trunk, within which the wife’s apparel was contained, was baggage, and hence that appellant was liable for its loss as such. It is true, as stated, that plaintiff’s .petition does not specifically allege a bailment and a failure on appellant’s part to exercise ordinary care in keeping the goods. The petition does, however, allege in fact that the trunk containing the wife’s apparel was deposited with and remained in the possession of appellant a number of days at Weatherford, and does allege the failure of appellant t.o redeliver the goods, and there is no explanation whatever in behalf of appellant as to the loss. The evidence shows that the trunk was locked and bound with ropes when delivered to appellant at Fort Worth, and thereafter remained in its exclusive possession. Under such circumstances, the burden of proof was on appellant, instead of appellee, to show that the trunk was trifled, if at all, in transit, instead of at Weath-erford. It is to be noted in this connection that the court distinctly submitted the issue of negligence to the jury, and that the issue was found against appellant. While negligence in terms was not alleged, a failure to redeliver was, which, in the absence of explanation, justified an inference of negligence, as we pointed out in our original opinion. See G., H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Fales, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 457, 77 S. W. 234. So that we did not and do not feel quite willing to say that the case was tried below upon a wholly mistaken theory.
But, if it be admitted that it was, we were not and do not feel prepared to say that the judgment is unsupported upon the theory that the wife’s jewelry and wearing apparel constituted baggage, as urged by appellee in his original petition and upon the trial. Upon this theory of the case, there was but one proposition that we thought of serious import. That was the error assigned to the action of the court in refusing to give apellant’s charge embodying the definition of the term “baggage.” We think the court could have properly given the charge, but the question is whether his failure to do so under the circumstances constitutes reversible error. We finally conclude that it did not. The court, in its third issue, distinctly charged the jury not to “allow for any items, if any, which were not for the personal use and conven-*662ienee of the plaintiff or his wife, either for the immediate necessities or ultimate purpose of the journey,” thus excluding from the jury’s consideration every element that enters into the definition of the term “baggage,” except “the character or length of the journey, * * ⅜ £he owner’s station in life, and the habits and uses of the class of travelers to which he belongs.” Appellant’s contention is that the wife’s articles did not constitute baggage, for the reason that she was not a passenger. There is no contention that they would lose that character because of the shortness of the journey, or because of the wife’s station in life, or because of the habits and uses of the class of travelers to which she belongs. We therefore did not think, and do not think, under the court’s charge and the undisputed fact, or the objections made, that the refusal to give the special charge defining “baggage” constitutes reversible error.
The only remaining contention of materiality is that the wife’s goods did not and do not constitute baggage, for the sole reason that she was not a passenger-. But, as indicated in our original opinion, we have been unable to concur in this contention. Assuming that the wife’s apparel is such as to fairly come within the meaning of the term “baggage,” had she been a passenger, as we think may be assumed, it would be going too far to say that they lost that character on the sole ground that it was the husband, instead of the wife, who was the passenger. As it seems to us, it would lead to an unr*easonable conclusion to hold that under the circumstances of the journey, as detailed in the plaintiff’s petition and in the undisputed proof, that the husband, as the agent of the wife, and as a community owner, may not, within the spirit of the law, take his wife’s apparel together with his own, in the same trunk, and thus cover the contents with the mantle of the law’s protection.
We accordingly conclude, for the reasons indicated, that the motion for rehearing should be overruled.