Court Opinion

ID: 9484209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:44:00.234778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:05.235188
License: Public Domain

MAHONEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s affirmance of the district court’s dismissal, on the basis of double jeopardy, of those counts of McCormick’s Vermont indictment that entered into the calculation of the base offense level at his prior Connecticut sentencing. I concur in the majority’s affir-mance of the district court’s refusal to dismiss the remaining counts of McCormick’s Vermont indictment.
The issue presented by this appeal centers on Congressional intent. As the majority states: “If Congress intends to allow the same conduct to be used to enhance a sentence and to serve as the basis for a separate prosecution, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not stand in the way.” The majority concludes, however, that:
In light of the purpose and careful shaping of the Guidelines, we do not believe that Congress or the Guidelines Commission 1 intended to allow a defendant to be prosecuted for conduct already used to enhance his or her offense level. To rule otherwise would undermine the purpose of the Guidelines and introduce additional possibilities for inconsistent sentences. As the Koonce court stated, “[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress would have intended the punishment to be larger if the government chose to proceed with two different proceedings ... than if it chose to consolidate all of the counts in one proceeding.” Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1152.
I agree with the majority, and with Koonce, that the Congressional/Guidelines intent is not to allow “the punishment to be larger if the government chose to proceed with two different proceedings.” The Guidelines specifically address this situation, however, not (as the majority surmises) by an unexpressed but implied bar of a second prosecution, but by directing in U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 that when, in cases such as McCormick’s, the government institutes two criminal proceedings, the resulting term of imprisonment should be the same as would have resulted from a single prosecution.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 provides:

*443
Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an Undischarged Term of Imprisonment

(a) If the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment (including work release, furlough, or escape status) or after sentencing for, but before commencing service of, such term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment.
(b) If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment.
(c) (Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense.
Subsection (b) of § 5G1.3 focuses upon the consideration in the second (Vermont) prosecution of conduct resulting in the initial (Connecticut) sentence, while the majority opinion is directed to the prior consideration of that conduct in the Connecticut prosecution. These are two sides of the same coin, however, for U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) mandates that the base offense level in both proceedings “shall be determined” on the basis of all relevant conduct. The commentary to § 5G1.3 makes clear that whether subsection (b) or (c) is applied, “[ejxcept in the cases in which subsection (a) applies, this guideline is intended to result in an appropriate incremental punishment for the instant offense that most nearly approximates the sentence that would have been imposed had all the sentences been imposed at the same time.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment, (backg’d) (emphasis added). Further, an application note to this Guideline recognizes that a criminal defendant may be “prosecuted ... in two or more federal jurisdictions ... for the same criminal conduct or for different criminal transactions that were part of the same course of conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment, (n. 2).
Thus, it seems clear, § 5G1.3 recognizes and explicitly addresses the sentencing problem posed by successive prosecutions in which an overall course of conduct is segmented into separate criminal charges, but § 1B1.3 requires that the entire relevant conduct nonetheless be addressed in sentencing at both proceedings.2 It does so not by barring successive prosecutions, as the majority surmises, but rather by requiring appropriate adjustment of the sentence in the second prosecution to achieve the same term of imprisonment that would have resulted from a single prosecution. In this case, if the Vermont prosecution resulted in conviction only for crimes that had previously been taken into account as relevant conduct in the Connecticut sentencing, á concurrent Vermont sentence would be required. If the Vermont prosecution produced convictions that did not thus overlap with the Connecticut sentencing, an incremental Vermont sentence would be imposed that, combined with the prior Connecticut sentence, would approximate the sentence that would have been imposed in a single prosecution that resulted in the convictions determined in both the Connecticut and Vermont proceedings.
It is noteworthy that in this case, there is a significant, legitimate prosecutorial motive to charge the Vermont frauds in the Vermont prosecution despite their prior role in the Connecticut sentencing. In view of the venue requirements of the Sixth Amendment *444and Fed.R.Crim.P. 18, it is highly likely that the Connecticut and Vermont frauds could not have been prosecuted in a single criminal proceeding. Further, restitution could not be imposed in the Connecticut prosecution for Vermont frauds not charged there, whether or not considered in establishing the base offense level in the Connecticut sentencing; the same rule would apply, as to Connecticut frauds, in a Vermont prosecution. See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 1981, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990); United States v. Bailey, 975 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 & n. 1 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Young, 932 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir.1991).
Thus, wholly aside from terms of imprisonment, the government may well be motivated to prosecute McCormick in Vermont in order to seek restitution as to the Vermont frauds not prosecuted (and most likely incapable of prosecution) in the initial Connecticut proceeding. A double jeopardy bar to such prosecutions would run counter to the Congressional purpose underlying enactment of the restitution provisions of the federal criminal code. See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 833-36 (11th Cir.1984) (discussing the restitutionary purpose of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579 and 3580, the predecessors of current §§ 3663 and 3664), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117, 105 S.Ct. 2362, 86 L.Ed.2d 262 (1985); see also U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1 and commentary thereto (expressing strong policy favoring restitution).
Further, it should be noted that the imposition of a concurrent or incremental sentence in this case pursuant to § 5G1.3 would not run afoul of Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985). The majority, following Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1153-54, highlights the statement in Ball that “[a] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.” 470 U.S. at 865, 105 S.Ct. at 1673. In Ball, however, the Court determined that Congress had not intended to allow a dual conviction for possession and receipt of a single firearm when both charges were concededly based upon the same conduct. Id. at 864-65, 105 S.Ct. at 1673. Thus, the contravention of Congressional intent that resulted in a double jeopardy violation was not cured by a concurrent sentence. Here, by contrast, a concurrent or incremental sentence, and accordingly the allowance of dual prosecutions that call for them, follows Congressional/Guidelines intent as set forth in § 5G1.3.
Finally, I regard the ruling in this ease as premature. See United States v. Koonce, 885 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir.1989) (issue of multiple punishments not ripe for review at pretrial stage); cf. United States v. Caceda, 990 F.2d 707, 709 (2d Cir.1993) (sentencing court should not consider outcome of possible subsequent prosecutions) (citing United States v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1991)). The haste to rule in this case results in an expansive double jeopardy ruling regarding an issue of multiple punishment better addressed, should it subsequently arise, as a misapplication of § 5G1.3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2), (b)(2) (1988) (authorizing appeals by defendant or government for incorrect application of sentencing guidelines); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 2997, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985) (“ ‘Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconsti-tutional grounds for decision.’ ”) (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 2199, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981)).
In sum, because the majority postulates a Congressional/Guidelines intent that is at odds with the actual provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the district court’s dismissal of counts of the Vermont indictment.

. The majority properly recognizes that in the sentencing area, Congressional intent is reflected in the Sentencing Guidelines. The initial Guidelines were submitted by the United States Sentencing Commission to Congress for its review (including a study by the General Accounting Office) prior to their taking effect. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 235(a)(1)(B)(ii), 98 Stat. 1987, 2031, amended by Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-646, § 35(2), 100 Stat. 3592, 3599. Similarly, amendments to the Guidelines are submitted for Congressional review, and subject to Congressional modification or disapproval, prior to their taking effect. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988).

. Footnote 3 of the majority opinion rejects this analysis, asserting that subsection (b) is "the relevant provision of § 5G1.3,” and that subsection (b) applies only "where a defendant’s offense level in a second prosecution is set taking into account conduct that has already been the subject of a conviction and sentencing.” This analysis ignores the fact that § IB 1.3 requires all relevant conduct to be addressed in both prosecutions, as well as the explanatory commentary to § 5G1.3 that I have cited, which reveals a much broader reach for § 5G1.3 than the majority accords it. By the explicit terms of § 5G1.3, furthermore, assuming arguendo that subsection (b) is inapplicable here, subsection (c) then applies "[i]n any other case” (§ 5G1.3(c), emphasis added) of a defendant subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, including this case.