Court Opinion

ID: 9378851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 19:02:30.343141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:10.710909
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/23 Nash v. Aprea CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

THOMAS NASH et al.,                                         B319309

     Plaintiffs and                                         (Los Angeles County
Respondents,                                                Super. Ct. No. 21STCV28570)

         v.

NINON APREA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Armen Tamzarian, Judge. Affirmed.
     Sigelman Law Corp and Paul Sigelman for Defendant and
Appellant.
     Linzer Law Group and Kenneth A. Linzer for Plaintiffs and
Respondents Thomas Nash and Bo Kyung O’Connor.

                               _________________________
      Ninon Aprea appeals from the default judgment entered in
favor of Thomas Nash and Bo Kyung O’Connor and from the trial
court’s orders denying her motion to vacate the default judgment
and her motion for reconsideration. Nash and O’Connor sued
Aprea for breach of contract and bad faith retention of a security
deposit in connection with their six-month rental of Aprea’s
residential property on North Martel Avenue in Los Angeles
(Martel property). The summons and complaint were served by
substituted service on a man at the Martel property who
identified himself as Aprea’s roommate, with a copy mailed to the
same address. After Aprea failed to file an answer, the clerk
entered a default, and the trial court later entered a default
judgment for $59,191.
      On appeal, Aprea contends the default judgment is void
because the summons and complaint were not properly served
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure1 section 415.20,
subdivision (b), because the Martel property was not Aprea’s
dwelling house or usual place of abode, and the parties’ lease
agreement provided for notices to be delivered to a commercial
mailbox facility. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Complaint
       On August 3, 2021 Nash and O’Connor filed a complaint
against Aprea alleging causes of action for breach of written
contract, breach of oral contract, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and bad faith retention of a security

1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.

                                 2
deposit in violation of Civil Code section 1950.5.2 The complaint
alleged that on August 10, 2020 Nash and O’Connor entered into
a written residential lease agreement (lease) with Aprea to rent
the Martel property for the following six months for $8,000 per
month, payable as an advance lump sum of $48,000, plus a
$16,000 security deposit. On the same day Nash and O’Connor
paid $64,000 to Aprea. During their tenancy, Nash and O’Connor
discovered mold in a guest house that was part of the leased
premises, and in January 2021 their real estate agent and
Aprea’s real estate agent reached an agreement for Aprea to
return $8,000 of the rent payment as a mold credit. Nash and
O’Connor performed their obligations under the lease, but after
they vacated the premises in February 2021, Aprea did not pay
the mold credit, return the security deposit, or identify claimed
deductions from the deposit. The prayer for relief sought
compensatory damages of at least $24,000, statutory damages
under Civil Code section 1950.5 for twice the amount of the
$16,000 security deposit, prejudgment interest, and attorneys’
fees and costs.

2      Civil Code section 1950.5 governs landlord and tenant
obligations with respect to security deposits for rentals of
residential property. Section 1950.5, subdivision (g)(1), provides
in relevant part, “No later than 21 calendar days after the tenant
has vacated the premises . . . the landlord shall furnish the
tenant . . . a copy of an itemized statement indicating the basis
for, and the amount of, any security received and the disposition
of the security, and shall return any remaining portion of the
security to the tenant.” Subdivision (l) provides that the
landlord’s bad faith retention of a security deposit in violation of
the provision may subject the landlord to statutory damages (in
addition to actual damages) of up to twice the amount of the
security deposit.

                                 3
       The complaint attached the lease as an exhibit. The lease
utilized a form published by the California Association of
Realtors and reflected that Aprea was the owner of the Martel
property and the landlord. Paragraph 32 of the lease, entitled
“Notice,” stated that “[n]otices may be served at the following
address or at any other location subsequently designated,” and
listed 8033 Sunset Blvd., Suite 966 in Los Angeles (Sunset
Boulevard address) for Aprea as the landlord, and the Martel
property for Nash and O’Connor as the tenants.
       The complaint also attached a demand letter dated
June 25, 2021 signed by Nash and O’Connor’s lawyer, Kenneth
Linzer, alleging a violation of Civil Code section 1950.5,
subdivision (l), and demanding payment of the $16,000 security
deposit and $8,000 mold credit. The demand letter was
addressed to Aprea at the Martel property address and to an
email address incorporating Aprea’s name. A July 29, 2021 email
from Linzer (through his legal assistant) directed to Aprea at the
same email address, also attached to the complaint, stated that
Aprea had failed to respond to the demand letter and advised
Aprea that Nash and O’Connor would be filing the attached draft
complaint if Aprea did not respond by August 2, 2021.

B.    Proof of Service and Entry of Default and Default Judgment
      On September 2, 2021 Nash and O’Connor filed an
amended proof of service of the summons and complaint by
substituted service at the Martel property.3 The proof of service
was signed by Robert Brooks, a registered process server working

3     The register of actions reflects that the original proof of
service by substituted service was filed August 17, 2021, but it is
not in the record on appeal.

                                 4
for Nationwide Legal, LLC. It stated that on the morning of
August 9, 2021 Brooks served Aprea in her individual capacity by
leaving the summons with “Abdulla Binsaeed—Roommate.” The
proof of service included a declaration of diligence in which
Brooks attested he made three attempts to serve the summons on
Aprea at the Martel property: on August 6, 2021 Brooks
“[k]nocked on the door, which was answered by the individual[]
we are looking for[’s] roommate who stated she was not at home
at this time and try again at another time”; on August 7, Brooks
“[k]nocked on the door loudly several times with no answer and
no activity heard inside the home”; and on August 9 he made
substituted service “by serving: Abdulla Binsaeed—Roommate,
Middle Eastern Male 36-40 181-200 Lbs Brown 5’7-6’0 Brown.”
Brooks also signed a proof of service by mail attesting that on
April 9, 2021 he mailed the summons to Aprea at the Martel
property address.
       On September 22, 2021 Nash and O’Connor filed a request
for entry of default, which the clerk entered the same day. Nash
and O’Connor subsequently submitted a request for entry of
default judgment in the amount of $59,191, comprised of $56,000
in damages, $1,533 in prejudgment interest, $1,000 in attorneys’
fees, and $658 in costs. In his supporting declaration, Linzer
stated the $56,000 in damages included $8,000 for the rent credit,
$16,000 for the security deposit, and $32,000 in statutory
damages under section 1950.5, subdivision (l). Linzer’s
declaration attached the complaint, the attachments to the
complaint (including the lease, demand letter, and email with the
draft complaint), the proofs of substituted service and service by
mail, and documents supporting Nash and O’Connor’s request for
attorneys’ fees and costs.

                                5
     On November 10, 2021 the trial court entered a default
judgment against Aprea in the amount of $59,191.

C.     Aprea’s Motion To Vacate the Default Judgment
       On November 29, 2021 Aprea, represented by attorney
Paul Sigelman, filed a motion to vacate entry of default and
default judgment (motion to vacate). Aprea argued service of the
summons at the Martel property was ineffective because
substituted service was not made at her “‘dwelling house’” or
“‘usual place of abode,’” as required under section 415.20,
subdivision (b). Aprea asserted (supported by copies of text
messages attached to her declaration) that when the parties
negotiated the lease, Nash and O’Connor’s real estate agent, Tori
Barnao, sent a text message to Aprea’s real estate agent, Gersh
Gershunoff, asking, “‘[D]oes [Aprea] have an address she wants
to use? [¶] I like to put something [in] case any notice needs to
be delivered.’” Gershunoff responded with the Sunset Boulevard
address. Yet, according to Aprea, Nash and O’Connor “ignored
the agreed place for service and instead proceeded by substituted
service at the very location they themselves had rented, by
handing the summons and complaint to the new tenant at that
location, representing to the Court that it could be a
‘roommate’ . . . .” Further, Nash and O’Connor “knew full-well it
was the one place [Aprea] did not live, did not reside, and did not
have a place of business” because it was the property they rented
at the address the lease provided for notices to Nash and
O’Connor, not Aprea.
       In Aprea’s supporting declaration dated November 29,
2021, she stated the Sunset Boulevard address “is the address at
which I reside and from where the lease was entered by myself.”

                                 6
Aprea averred that Barnao told Nash and O’Connor the Martel
property was used as a rental property, and therefore, when
Nash and O’Connor claimed to have left the summons with a
“roommate” at the Martel property, they knew the man was not a
roommate, but a new tenant who was then occupying the
property. Aprea’s declaration attached a letter dated October 22,
2021 from Sigelman to Linzer stating that Sigelman had met that
day with Aprea, “who received an email from your office
pertaining to a default in the above case,” and Sigelman would be
representing Aprea in the dispute. Sigelman asserted in his
letter that he had downloaded the case file from the superior
court, and Brooks’s statement in his service declaration that
Binsaeed was Aprea’s roommate was clearly a misrepresentation
because Aprea lived at the Sunset Boulevard address. Further,
Binsaeed was “not related in any manner, is a stranger to the
case, never said that he was a roommate, and has no actual or
apparent authority to accept substituted service on her behalf.”
Although Sigelman’s letter was attached to Aprea’s declaration,
he did not submit a declaration, and the motion to vacate did not
attach any evidence disputing that Binsaeed spoke to Brooks,
received the summons, and told Brooks he was Aprea’s
roommate.
       In their opposition, Nash and O’Connor argued Aprea did
not seek relief from the default judgment based on citation to a
specific statutory scheme; Aprea did not provide sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption under Evidence Code
section 647 that Brooks’s sworn statement he served Aprea’s
roommate was true; and Aprea never asserted she did not receive
actual notice of the complaint (noting Aprea received notice of
Nash and O’Connor’s complaint by email before it was filed).

                               7
Further, the Martel property was the proper place for substituted
service because the notice provision of the lease did not displace
section 415.20’s service requirements, authorizing substituted
service by “‘leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the
person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of
business, or usual mailing address[.]’” Moreover, contrary to
Aprea’s contention, the Sunset Boulevard address could not have
been Aprea’s “‘dwelling house’” or “usual place of abode” because
it was a UPS commercial mailbox location.
      Linzer submitted a supporting declaration presenting
evidence the Martel property was Aprea’s usual place of
residence. Linzer stated Barnao told Nash and O’Connor the
Martel property was Aprea’s residence. Further, Linzer spoke
with the manager of the UPS store at the Sunset Boulevard
address, who stated there were no residences at that address;
rather, suite 966 consisted only of commercial mailboxes. Linzer
attached a May 2017 email from Aprea to a Los Angeles City
Councilmember in connection with proposed legislation
restricting short-term rentals, in which Aprea stated she owned
the Martel property “for years” and it “is not a vacation rental,
but part of the home I live in.” Linzer also attached a December
2021 credit report identifying Aprea as the owner of the Martel
property and no other real property.4 He also submitted copies of
current listings for both the main house and guest house from an
online home-sharing service that identified Aprea as the “host.”

4      The credit report also identified the Sunset Boulevard
address as being associated with Aprea, but it lists eight
“[c]urrent [c]ommercial [p]hones” for that address, including the
UPS store.

                                8
Aprea did not file evidentiary objections or a reply in support of
her motion to vacate.
       After a hearing, on January 7, 2022 the trial court denied
Aprea’s motion to vacate. In its final ruling, the court found
Aprea cited only the law of substituted service and provided no
authority for relief from entry of default or default judgment.
The court considered and rejected three legal theories for relief
from a default judgment. First, Aprea was not entitled to relief
under section 473, subdivision (b), because she did not attempt to
show the default was taken due to her or Sigelman’s mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Second, Aprea was
not entitled to relief under section 473.5, subdivision (a), because
she did not show she lacked actual notice in time to defend the
action, and no evidence supported her assertion that Binsaeed
had no relation to Aprea and was not her roommate. The court
found to the contrary that Aprea “had actual notice in time to
defend the action, either through Binsaeed or via some method.”
Third, the default and default judgment were not void and
subject to vacatur under section 473, subdivision (d), or thecourt’s
equitable power because there was no defect apparent in the
judgment roll. Instead, “any defect hinges on accepting
defendant’s evidence . . . that substituted service was invalid
because the [Martel property] is not defendant’s “‘dwelling house,
usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing
address.’ . . . Just because [Aprea] did not live there when
plaintiffs rented it does not mean she did not live there at the
time of substituted service.” The court also considered Nash and
O’Connor’s evidence showing Aprea could not reside at the
Sunset Boulevard address because it was a commercial mailbox
location and evidence she had lived at the Martel property

                                 9
address, including her 2017 correspondence with the City
Councilmember. The court found by a preponderance of the
evidence service was proper at the Martel address and Aprea had
actual notice in time to defend the action.

D.     Aprea’s Motion for Reconsideration
       On January 19, 2022 Aprea filed a motion for
reconsideration, or in the alternative, a renewed motion to vacate
the default judgment under the trial court’s equitable powers.
Aprea argued she was entitled to relief from the default because
she lacked actual notice in time to defend the action (§ 473.5) and
due to the mistake and neglect of her attorney (§ 473, subd. (b)).
       Aprea averred in her supporting declaration that she
owned the Martel property but had not resided or transacted
business there for five years. Nash and O’Connor knew Aprea
did not live at the property because she was not present during
their tenancy and Aprea had told their realtor (Barnao) on
multiple occasions that she had been renting a home in Benedict
Canyon for the last several years. Aprea did not know Binsaeed,
who stayed at the Martel property for 10 days in August 2021
through the online home-sharing service, but she understood he
was a businessman living in the Middle East who did not speak
any English. Aprea had been travelling outside California and
did not go to the Martel property until October 10, 2021, when
she made an inspection of the house and found an envelope
containing the summons and complaint on the front porch.
Although “[a] lawsuit may have been threatened,” it was not until
October 10, 2021, after the default was entered, that Aprea
became aware that someone had attempted service. Aprea stated
she had no knowledge of the proof of service until after she

                                10
retained Sigelman and read the documents he downloaded from
the court website. Further, it was not until January 7, 2022, at
the hearing on her motion to vacate, that Aprea learned Brooks
stated in his declaration of diligence that Binsaeed told Brooks he
was Aprea’s roommate and she was not home. At that point
Aprea realized Brooks’s statement must be false because
Binsaeed spoke no English. Aprea then obtained Binsaeed’s
telephone number through the online home-sharing service, and
Binsaeed agreed to sign a declaration prepared by Sigelman, with
Binsaeed’s input.
      Binsaeed’s declaration stated in English he was a resident
of Saudi Arabia, and during his stay at the Martel property he
did not believe he was handed “any papers, by anyone coming to
the home . . . .” He did not recall “any conversation with anyone
wherein I said that Ninon Aprea was my roommate or that she
lived at the house where I was staying.” Binsaeed declared he
did not speak English and used a computer translation
application to translate the declaration.
      Sigelman averred in his declaration that Aprea had a valid
defense to the action and he was responsible for multiple
instances of inadvertence. Specifically, after he was retained by
Aprea, he downloaded the proof of service but failed to tell Aprea
that Brooks claimed in his declaration of diligence that he had
spoken with Binsaeed, which would have alerted Aprea to the
fact Brooks’s declaration was not credible because Binsaeed
spoke no English. Also, due to an oversight of his assistant
during the year-end holidays, Sigelman did not realize Nash and
O’Connor had filed an opposition to Aprea’s motion to vacate,

                                11
which he thought was unopposed.5 Because of an acute infection
following a recent knee surgery, Sigelman asked another
attorney to appear at the hearing on the motion to vacate, and
Sigelman only learned after it was “too late” the arguments made
in the opposition. Had Sigelman attended the hearing, he would
have “answered the Court’s questions posed by its ruling” and
“would have conferred with [Aprea] as to the claimed
conversation of Mr. Brooks.”
      In their opposition, Nash and O’Connor argued Aprea was
not entitled to relief under section 1008 because she failed to
introduce new or different facts that were not available at the
time of the motion to vacate. Her assertion she lacked actual
notice of the action, even if credible, could have been asserted in
the original motion. Further, after Aprea learned of the action
and that service was made during Binsaeed’s stay at the Martel
property, she could have attempted at that time to contact
Binsaeed (in October 2021), before she filed her motion to vacate
(on November 29, 2021). Moreover, Aprea’s assertion Brooks
could not have had a conversation with Binsaeed was not credible
because Brooks knew how to spell Binsaeed’s last name correctly.
Finally, Aprea was not entitled to relief under section 473,
subdivision (b), based on Sigelman’s mistake or inadvertence
because Aprea provided no evidence that the default was caused
by Sigelman.

5     Sigelman’s assistant submitted a declaration stating she
overlooked an email notification on December 23, 2021 that
papers (the opposition) had been electronically served in the
action, and she was out of the office until January 3, 2022.
Sigelman later asked her whether they had received anything in
the action, but she said no.

                                12
      Nash and O’Connor filed evidentiary objections, including
that the Binsaeed declaration was inadmissible in its entirety
under Evidence Code section 7536 because it was translated into
English using a translation software, not a qualified translator
under oath. Nash and O’Connor also objected to large portions of
the Aprea declaration for lack of foundation, speculation, and
hearsay.
      In reply, Aprea filed a supplemental declaration in English
signed by Binsaeed, as well as an Arabic version also signed by
Binsaeed. Hany Farag, a certified translator, submitted a
declaration stating that Sigelman read Binsaeed’s February 28,
2022 declaration out loud to Farag, which Farag translated
sentence by sentence for Binsaeed, and Binsaeed confirmed in
Arabic the statements were his. The translator wrote out the
declaration in Arabic with an English translation for Binsaeed to
sign.
      After a hearing, on March 7, 2022 the trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration. The court sustained Nash and
O’Connor’s objections to Aprea’s and Binsaeed’s declarations.7
The court found Aprea made no attempt to show why she could
not have previously presented the facts supporting her

6     Evidence Code section 753, subdivision (a), provides that
“[w]hen the written characters in a writing offered in evidence
are incapable of being deciphered or understood directly, a
translator who can decipher the characters or understand the
language shall be sworn to decipher or translate the writing.”
7     The trial court held Binsaeed’s initial declaration was
inadmissible because Binsaeed testified he did not speak English
and Aprea failed to lay a proper foundation for Binsaeed’s
assertion the statement was accurately translated. The court did
not address Binsaeed’s reply declaration.

                                13
reconsideration motion. Sigelman’s declaration concerning his
inadvertence did not provide a basis for relief under section 473,
subdivision (b), because “the errors he asserts could not have
caused the default or default judgment themselves. His errors
relate to the motion for relief from default . . . . A mistake after
the default judgment could not have caused the default
judgment.”
      Aprea timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

A.     The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Aprea’s Motion To
       Vacate
       1.     Relief from void judgments and standard of review
       If a court “lack[s] fundamental authority over the subject
matter, question presented, or party, . . . its judgment [is] void.”
(In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 56; accord, First
American Title Insurance Co. v. Banerjee (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th
37, 42 (First American) [“‘A default judgment is void if the trial
court lacked jurisdiction over the parties.’”].) “A default
judgment entered against a defendant who was not served in the
manner prescribed by statute is void.” (First American, at p. 42;
see Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
1434, 1442 (Ramos) [default and default judgment void for lack of
proper service on corporate agent]; Carr v. Kamins (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 929, 933 [default judgment void for ineffective
service by publication].)
       Section 473, subdivision (d), provides a trial court “may, on
motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside
any void judgment or order.” Under section 473, subdivision (d),

                                 14
a trial court may set aside a default judgment that is valid on its
face but void as a matter of law due to improper service. (First
American, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 42; Ellard v. Conway
(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.) However, where a motion to
vacate a default or default judgment is made more than six
months after entry of the judgment, the judgment may only be
set aside if the judgment is void on its face. (Kremerman v. White
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 369 (Kremerman); Ramos, supra,
223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440; Dill v. Berquist Construction Co.
(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441.) “‘“A judgment or order is said
to be void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an
inspection of the judgment-roll.”’” (Ramos, at p. 1440; accord,
Dill, at p. 1441.) “When a judgment by default has been entered,
the judgment roll is limited to the summons, proof of service of
the summons, complaint, request for entry of default, copy of the
judgment, notice of any ruling overruling a demurrer interposed
by the defendant and proof of service thereof, and, if service was
by publication, affidavit for publication and order directing it.”
(Ramos, at p. 1440, citing § 670, subd. (a).)
       We review the trial court’s determination whether a
judgment is void on its face under section 473, subdivision (d), de
novo. (Kremerman, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 369; Pittman v.
Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020;
Ramos, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440 [“Because any defect in
service must appear on the face of the judgment roll as delimited
by the documents specified in section 670, subdivision (a), our
review of a trial court’s order finding such a facial defect is of
necessity de novo.”].) However, where the trial court considers
disputed evidence in deciding whether to set aside a void
judgment under section 473, subdivision (d), we review the

                                15
decision for an abuse of discretion. (First American, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 42; Ramos, at p. 1440-1441.) A trial court
abuses its discretion if its ruling “exceeded the bounds of reason.”
(Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249
[applying abuse of discretion standard in reviewing trial court’s
grant of motion to vacate judgment for lack of personal
jurisdiction based on extrinsic evidence]; accord, Grados v. Shiau
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1049.) If a ruling turns on a
disputed issue of fact, we will not disturb the trial court’s express
and implied factual determinations if supported by substantial
evidence. (Strathvale Holdings, at p. 1250; First American, at
p. 42 [“we defer to factual findings on disputed evidence so long
as those findings are supported by substantial evidence.”)
       In reviewing a ruling on a request to set aside a default
judgment, we are mindful of the public policy favoring a trial on
the merits. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975,
978, 981-982 [granting equitable relief from default judgment
where defendants’ failure to pay entirety of filing fee for answer
was based on incorrect information from clerk’s office].) “Because
the law favors disposing of cases on their merits, ‘any doubts in
applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party
seeking relief from default [citations]. Therefore, a trial court
order denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order
permitting trial on the merits.’” (Rappleyea, at p. 980; accord,
McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 413.)

      2.    Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
            substituted service at the Martel property was valid
     Aprea contends on appeal the trial court erred in denying
her motion to vacate because she was not properly served by

                                 16
substitute service given the lack of diligence, and further, she did
not live at the Martel property address.8 As discussed, the trial
court found the judgment roll did not support Aprea’s argument
she was not properly served, and the evidence submitted by Nash
and O’Conner showed Aprea lived at the Martel property
address, not the Sunset Boulevard address. Substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s findings.

8      Aprea does not directly address the grounds (or code
sections) for relief from the default and default judgment.
However, her central contention is the judgment is void because
service of the summons and complaint at the Martel property was
defective. We review Aprea’s contention in the context of
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying her
motion under section 473, subdivision (d). Aprea also challenges
the default judgment on the same ground, and accordingly, our
analysis of whether Aprea was properly served applies to her
appeal from the default judgment as well. We address Aprea’s
contention the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief
from the default judgment under section 473, subdivision (b), in
our discussion of Aprea’s motion for reconsideration. Aprea does
not contend the trial court erred in denying relief under
section 473.5, subdivision (a), after finding she had actual notice
of the action.
       As to service of the summons, Aprea did not argue in the
trial court or in her appellate briefing that three attempts at
service did not constitute diligence, instead asserting the
attempts were made at the wrong address. Aprea likewise does
not contend Linzer acted improperly in entering her default
without contacting her to let her know he would enter a default if
she did not respond to the complaint. Although we are troubled
by the lack of any effort by Linzer to contact Aprea before
entering her default, Aprea has forfeited any challenge on this
basis.

                                17
        Section 415.20, subdivision (b), provides that if a copy of
the summons and complaint “cannot with reasonable diligence be
personally delivered to the person served,” service may be made
by leaving a copy “at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of
abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address . . . in
the presence of a competent member of the household or a person
apparently in charge of [the defendant’s] office, place of business,
or usual mailing address,” and thereafter mailing a copy to the
same address. The filing of a proof of service that complies with
the statutory requirements creates a rebuttable presumption that
service was proper. (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th
1193, 1205; Dill v. Berquist Construction Co., supra,
24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1441-1442; see Evid. Code § 647 [the return
of a registered process server “establishes a presumption,
affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in
the return”].)
        “‘The terms “dwelling house” and “usual place of abode”
take their meaning from the Federal Rules.’” (Zirbes v. Stratton
(1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1417, quoting Judicial Council of
Cal., com., reprinted at 14 West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1972 ed.)
foll. § 415.20, p. 554 [substituted service at defendant’s mother’s
house was ineffective because defendant had “established a
separate legal household where she resided with her children
which was a matter of public record” and declared she “neither
resided at her mother’s residence nor received mail there”].)
Federal courts construing the provision for substituted service at
a person’s “dwelling or usual place of abode”9 have found that a

9     Rule 4(e)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(28 U.S.C.) authorizes service by “leaving a copy [of the summons
and complaint] at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of

                                18
“person can have more than one dwelling house or usual place of
abode” (Stars’ Desert Inn Hotel & Country Club, Inc. v. Hwang
(9th Cir. 1997) 105 F.3d 521, 524), but each residence must bear
“sufficient indicia of permanence” to be valid. (National
Development Co. v. Triad Holding Corp. (2d Cir. 1991) 930 F.2d
253, 258 [although defendant resided in apartment for only
34 days in the previous year, there was “sufficient indicia of
permanence” where defendant had remodeled and furnished the
apartment to suit his lifestyle]; see Asmodus, Inc. v. Junbiao Ou
(C.D.Cal., Feb 3, 2017, No. EDCV162511), 2017 WL 5592914, at
p. *7 [investment property qualified as defendant’s “dwelling
house or usual place of abode” where there was evidence he
resided there “sporadically” throughout the year].)
       The “reasonable diligence” requirement of section 415.20,
subdivision (b), means “an individual may be served by substitute
service only after a good faith effort at personal service has first
been made . . . . Two or three attempts to personally serve a
defendant at a proper place ordinarily qualifies as ‘“reasonable
diligence.”’” (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 383, 389; accord, Rodriguez v. Cho (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.) Moreover, “‘[s]ervice must be made
upon a person whose “relationship with the person to be served
makes it more likely than not that they will deliver process to the
named party.”’” (Hearn v. Howard, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1203 [substituted service effective where plaintiff served
defendant by substituted service on post office box rental store
clerk at address listed by attorney defendant as her business
address on her letterhead and on State Bar website].)

abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides
there. . . .”

                                19
       The documents in the judgment roll supported the trial
court’s finding the Martel property was Aprea’s “dwelling house”
or “usual place of abode.”10 The lease reflects Aprea owned the
Martel property (which Nash and O’Connor alleged in the
complaint was a “residential dwelling”), and Aprea leased the
dwelling for six months to Nash and O’Connor. The lawsuit was
filed several months after the Nash and O’Connor’s tenancy
concluded. Brooks, a registered process server, declared that on
his first service attempt at the Martel property on August 6,
2021, Aprea’s “roommate” answered the door and stated Aprea
“was not at home at this time and [he should] try again at
another time.”11 On the second attempt, Brooks knocked on the
door loudly, but there was no answer, and he could not hear any
activity in the home. On the third attempt on August 9, 2021,

10     Although Aprea’s motion was filed within six months of
entry of the default judgment, the trial court considered the
documents in the judgment roll first, then the extrinsic evidence
submitted by the parties. We likewise consider the evidence in
this order.
11     In her opening brief, Aprea describes Brooks’s declaration
as a “hearsay conversation” with Binsaeed. Aprea did not object
on hearsay grounds, and the objection is forfeited. (Evid. Code,
§ 353, subd. (a) [“A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor
shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by
reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless: [¶] (a)
There appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or
to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to
make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion.”];
People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 142; Duronslet v.
Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 725 [the failure to object to
the admission of hearsay documents in the trial court forfeits the
issue on appeal].)

                                20
Brooks served the roommate (Binsaeed), recording the
roommate’s name and physical description. Brooks’s declaration
on its face supports the court’s finding that Aprea was living at
the Martel property given Brooks’s attestation that Binsaeed was
Aprea’s “roommate”12 and Brooks should try again later,
suggesting Aprea could reasonably be expected to be there at a
later time. (See First American, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 43
[concluding substitute service was proper based in part on fact
the person who accepted service identified himself to process
server as “coresident” of defendant].)
       Aprea contends the documents in the judgment roll do not
establish the Martel property was her “dwelling house” or “usual
place or abode” because the lease provided that “[n]otices may be
served” to Aprea at the Sunset Boulevard address. We are not
persuaded. First, the lease, in stating that notices must be
served at the Sunset Boulevard address, does not bar service by
other methods. Second, the lease does not define “notices,” let
alone specify that notices encompass legal service of a court
summons (for which the Code of Civil Procedure specifies the
proper method for service of process). Third, it is a reasonable
inference the parties understood the notice provision to
contemplate notices given only during the tenancy, given that the

12    Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a roommate as “one of
two or more persons sharing the same room or living quarters.”
(Merriam-Webster’s Online Dict. (2022)  [as of March 14, 2023].) The
Cambridge Dictionary defines a roommate, in American usage, as
“a person who you share an apartment or house with.”
(Cambridge English Dict. Online
 [as of March 14, 2023].”)

                               21
parties agreed that notices to Nash and O’Connor could be sent to
the Martel property.
       Aprea argues further the notice provision in the lease
shows that the Sunset Boulevard address is Aprea’s “usual
mailing address,” and a commercial mailbox facility is required to
accept substituted service on behalf of its mailbox customers.
(See Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.5, subds. (c) & (d)(1) [“commercial
mail receiving agency” providing private mailbox receiving
service must obtain customer’s authorization to act as agent for
service of process, accept service, and timely provide served
documents to the customer].) However, there is no evidence the
Sunset Boulevard address is a commercial mailbox or that the
location is a commercial mail receiving agency. And even if it
were reasonable to infer from the notice provision that the Sunset
Boulevard address was Aprea’s “usual mailing address” or her
“business address,” it does not follow that service at her “dwelling
house” or “usual place of abode” at the Martel property was not
also effective.
       Kremerman, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pages 372 to 373,
relied on by Aprea, does not support her position. In Kremerman,
the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to serve the defendant at
her residential address multiple times, then filed a proof of
service by substituted service on an employee of a commercial
mailbox facility where the defendant maintained a private
mailbox, and then obtained a default judgment. (Id. at pp. 364-
365.) In reversing the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s
motion to vacate the default judgment, the Court of Appeal
observed that section 415.20, subdivision (c), provides that
substituted service at a commercial mailbox is effective only “‘if
the only address reasonably known for the person . . . is a private

                                22
mailbox obtained through a commercial mail receiving agency.’”
(Kremerman, at p. 373.) Because it was undisputed that the
defendant had another address (her home address on a document
attached to the complaint), substituted service was not valid.
(Ibid.)
       For the first time in her reply brief, Aprea argues service
was defective because Brooks checked the box on the proof of
substituted service for “business” rather than “home,”13 and on
his declaration of diligence he indicated the Martel property was
a “business” location. Aprea failed to raise this argument in the
trial court or in her opening brief, and it is forfeited. (See People
v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9, [“the claim is omitted
from the opening brief and thus waived”]; Quiles v. Parent (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013 [“‘Failure to raise specific challenges
in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.’”].) Although, as
pointed out by Aprea’s counsel at oral argument, a challenge to
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, Aprea has not provided
any authority for the proposition an error on a proof of service
prevents a court from exercising jurisdiction over a defendant if

13    On the proof of service form approved by the Judicial
Council for mandatory use (Form POS-010) there is a box for
substituted service, where Brooks entered the details of the
service, including the date, time, Binsaeed’s name, physical
description, and the description of Binsaeed as Aprea’s
“roommate.” Below that Brooks checked the first box for
“business,” which states service was on “a person at least
18 years of age apparently in charge at the office or usual place of
business of the person to be served.” Brooks did not check the
second box for “home,” which states service was on “a competent
member of the household (at least 18 years of age) at the dwelling
house or usual place of abode of the party.”

                                 23
there is sufficient evidence the defendant was properly served
with the summons. The facts entered by Brooks on the proof of
service, including service on Aprea’s “roommate,” along with the
lease and complaint showing Aprea owned the property, provide
substantial evidence Aprea was served at her “dwelling house” or
“usual place of abode.”
       Moreover, in addition to the judgment roll evidence, Nash
and O’Connor submitted evidence that in 2017 Aprea stated to
her local government representative in connection with a
proposed ordinance regulating home sharing rentals that she
lived at the Martel property and wanted to operate it as a short-
term rental while occupying it. As of December 2021, Aprea
listed both the house and its guest unit on a home-sharing
website. Aprea’s credit report showed she owned the Martel
property and did not own other real property. And Linzer’s
declaration stated the Sunset Boulevard address was a
commercial mailbox address, which, as the trial court found, was
more credible than Aprea’s assertion in her declaration that the
Sunset Boulevard address “is the address at which I reside and
from where the lease was entered by myself.”
       Aprea responds, as she did in the trial court, that Nash and
O’Connor knew Aprea did not reside at the Martel property in
light of the notice provision in the lease, and further, Aprea was
not present during their tenancy. Thus, she argues, any service
attempts at the Martel property address instead of the Sunset
Boulevard address were not reasonably diligent. But the fact
Nash and O’Connor rented Aprea’s furnished home for their
exclusive use for six months does not show that Aprea did not live

                                24
in the residence after the lease expired.14 Aprea also argues
Brooks’s declaration was not credible because Binsaeed was not
her roommate. But in her motion to vacate she relied for this
assertion only on Sigelman’s letter to Linzer stating Binsaeed
was not related to Aprea, he did not say he was a roommate, and
he had no actual or apparent authority to accept substituted
service on her behalf. Aprea did not deny in her declaration that
she knew Binsaeed or that he was a roommate, and she did not
submit any other evidence refuting Brooks’s declaration.
Therefore, Aprea has failed to rebut the presumption that the
facts in Brooks’s declaration of diligence are true (Evid. Code
§ 647), and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in crediting
the proof of service and Nash and O’Connor’s evidence over
Aprea’s minimal showing.

B.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
      Aprea’s Motion for Reconsideration
      Aprea contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her motion for reconsideration, which requested the
court set aside the default and default judgment under
section 473, subdivision (b), based on her attorney’s mistake and
inadvertence. She argues Sigelman’s failure to carefully review
the service documents prevented her from earlier seeking a
declaration from Binsaeed, who attested he spoke no English and

14    The parties dispute whether Barnao told Nash and
O’Connor the Martel property was Aprea’s residence. Linzer in
his declaration stated Barnao did; Aprea stated the contrary in
her declaration. And Barnao did not file a declaration. The trial
court did not make factual findings as to what Barnao said, and
we do not consider these hearsay statements in our review.

                                 25
had no recollection of receiving papers or telling anyone he was
Aprea’s roommate. The court did not abuse its discretion.
       Section 1008, subdivision (a), provides that a party may
make a motion to reconsider a prior order “based upon new or
different facts, circumstances, or law.” “‘A party seeking
reconsideration also must provide a satisfactory explanation for
the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time.’” (Yolo
County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Myers (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 42, 50; accord, Torres v. Design Group Facility
Solutions, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 239, 243.) “[T]he moving
party’s burden is the same as that of a party seeking new trial on
the ground of ‘newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.’” (Baldwin
v. Home Savings of America (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1198
(Italics omitted).) We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. (Torres, at p. 243;
Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1339.)
       Section 473, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part, “The
court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party . . .
from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken
against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.”15 To qualify for discretionary

15     Section 473, subdivision (b), also provides for mandatory
relief from a default and default judgment based on the mistake
or inadvertence of a party’s attorney: “[T]he court shall,
whenever an application for relief is made no more than six
months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is
accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or
her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1)
resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client,

                                 26
relief under section 473, subdivision (b), “the party seeking relief
must show (1) a proper ground for relief, and (2) ‘the party has
raised that ground in a procedurally proper manner, within any
applicable time limits.’” (Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
(2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 229; accord, Huh v. Wang (2007)
158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1419.) The trial court has discretion to
grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b), “based on its
evaluation of the nature of the mistake or error alleged and the
justification proffered for the conduct that occurred.” (Austin v.
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918,
928.)
       As discussed, the trial court denied Aprea’s motion for
reconsideration based on its finding Aprea failed to provide a
reason why she did not discover the evidence offered in support of
her reconsideration motion prior to filing her motion to vacate.
Clearly Aprea’s new declaration—including statements she had
not lived at the Martel property for five years, she was renting a

and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2)
resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or
her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was
not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or neglect.” However, mandatory relief is not available
where counsel was retained after the entry of default. (See
Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 910-911 [“for
mandatory relief to apply the court must also satisfy itself that
the default (i.e., the failure to respond) was in fact caused by
attorney mistake or neglect,” which cannot occur where “it is
undisputed that [the attorney] was not hired until after the
defendants’ default was taken”].) Aprea contends she first
learned a lawsuit had been filed when she hired Sigelman in
October 2021, one month after the clerk had entered the default
on September 22.

                                27
home in Benedict Canyon during Nash and O’Connor’s tenancy,
and she was travelling during the summer of 2021 and did not
inspect the property until October 10, 2021—could have been
presented in her November 29, 2021 motion to vacate. (See Yolo
County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Myers, supra,
248 Cal.App.4th at p. 50 [trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying child support obligor’s motion for reconsideration of
denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment where obligor’s
exhibits included letters addressed to him at a different location
from the one at which the summons was served, and all but one
of the letters were dated before the motion to vacate].) Moreover,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Binsaeed’s
declaration for lack of foundation in light of the fact Binsaeed
spoke no English, yet Sigelman drafted the declaration in English
with unspecified input from Binsaeed using a translation
software.
       Aprea does not dispute Binsaeed’s declaration in English
was defective; rather, she argues the trial court ignored his reply
declaration in Arabic. Although the court’s written ruling does
not discuss the Arabic declaration, it was well within the court’s
discretion to exclude the later declaration as untimely reply
evidence to which Nash and O’Connor had no opportunity to
respond. (See Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522,
1537-1538 [“‘[T]he inclusion of additional evidentiary matter with
the reply should only be allowed in the exceptional case”]; cf.
Alliant Ins. Services, Inc. v. Gaddy (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1292,
1308 [“the trial court had discretion whether to accept new
evidence with the reply papers” so long as the other party had an
opportunity to respond].) Moreover, Aprea has not provided a
reporter’s transcript of the hearing (or settled statement) to show

                                28
whether there was any discussion at the hearing of the
supplemental Binsaeed declaration or a request by Aprea for the
court to consider the late evidence. The trial court may well have
found Aprea had failed to show why she could not have obtained
a proper Binsaeed declaration earlier given the minimal showing
made by Aprea in her supporting declaration that she “had no
idea how to find Mr. Binsaeed.”

                         DISPOSITION

      The default judgment and the orders denying Aprea’s
motions to set aside the default judgment and for reconsideration
are affirmed. Nash and O’Connor are to recover their costs on
appeal.

                                          FEUER, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             SEGAL, J.

                                29