Court Opinion

ID: 9713127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:08:58.313177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.875211
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, J.
(dissenting).
Appellant was adjudged guilty of driving a vehicle on State Trunk Highway 77 on December 15, 1956, at an unlawful rate of speed and was sentenced to pay a fine of $50. Appellant in his brief contends, first, that the State did not show “that the State Highway Commission actually established a speed zone in the area where appellant was arrested in compliance with Chap. 168 of the 1955 Session Laws by conspicuously posted signs showing the beginning and the ending” thereof, and, second, that if the statute confers authority on the State Highway Commission to establish speed limits on all State Trunk Highways “it is an improper delegation of legislative power and void and unconstitutional”.
The basic standard of conduct that no person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway “at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent” having regard to existing conditions of the highway in the 1955 act has been the rule ever since the enactment of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Act in 1929. Section 4 of that act (Chap. 251, Laws 1929) provided that no person could drive a vehicle upon a *515highway at a speed “greater than is reasonable and proper” having due regard to the traffic, surface, width of the highway and of any conditions then existing. It further provided that subject to this basic standard it was prima facie unlawful for the driver of a motor vehicle to drive in excess of specified speeds. State v. Rossman, 64 S.D. 532, 268 N.W. 702. The words “reasonable and prudent” or words meaning substantially the same have been used in other jurisdictions to define similar offenses. The following is quoted from People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 228 N.W. 723, 731: “In forty-seven states of the Union and in the District of Columbia and Hawaii there are statutes which forbid driving ‘at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard for the width, traffic and use of the highway and in a manner so as to endanger property or the limb of any person.’ In some of the states the words ‘careful and prudent’ are used. In others, words with a like meaning to those quoted are used.” See also State v. Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220, L.R.A.1918B, 945; Siegman v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 48 A.2d 764; State v. Magaha, 182 Md. 122, 32 A.2d 477; People v. Wilson, 78 Cal.App.2d 108, 177 P.2d 567; State v. Coppes, 247 Iowa 1057, 78 N.W.2d 10; State v. Wojahn, 204 Or. 84, 282 P.2d 675; Gallaher v. State, 193 Ind. 629, 141 N.E. 347, 29 A.L.R. 1059.
The provisions granting general authority to the State Highway Commission to establish upon any State Trunk Highway System limited speed zones and giving effect to the maximum speeds therein when the zones are conspicuously posted by signs were first enacted by Chap. 187, Laws 1941 and re-enacted by the 1955 statute. If this language were construed literally and other relevant parts of the statute ignored, there might be some merit in the argument of counsel that the statute confers legislative power upon the State Highway Commission to fix maximum rates of speed. As noted in Concrete Materials Co. v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 70 S.D. 535, 19 N.W.2d 523, a statute must be considered in its entirety. And too, the presumption is always indulged in favor of the validity of an act and that construction will be adopted which *516will sustain an act if the language used will permit the interpretation. State v. Black Hills Transportation Co., 71 S.D. 28, 20 N.W.2d 683. In the light of the legislative history and consideration of the statute in its entirety, the standard by which a violation of the statute is determined is whether or not an accused was driving at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent, having regard to the condition of the highway. When appropriate signs giving notice of permissible speed limits have been conspicuously posted, they are not effective to establish fixed limits, but constitute upon the trial of a person charged with violation of the statute prima facie evidence of the maximum speed that may be reasonably and prudently maintained. It is obvious that the legislature intended to conform other provisions to the basic standard prescribed by the statute and not to authorize in any instance the establishment by the State Highway Commission or local authorities of fixed maximum rates of speed. This construction is consistent with SDC 44.0501 which provides that a complaint shall specify both the speed at which defendant is alleged to have driven and the one that is prima facie lawful at the time and place of the alleged violation.
The 1941 statute fixed maximum limits of 50 and 60 miles per hour. The zoning and posting of sections of a State Trunk Highway within these limitations was consistent and in compliance with the statute. The legislature deemed it proper in 1955 to eliminate these fixed limitations of speed. The basic standard of “reasonable and prudent” conduct under the present statute applies “except as otherwise provided by law”. This exception includes- those vehicles classified as authorized emergency vehicles such as ambulances when responding to emergency calls. Anderson v. Lanning, 74 S.D. 161, 50 N.W.2d 57. Recognizing that it is impractical to legislate specifically concerning different localities and variable traffic conditions, the legislature deemed it advisable to vest the State Highway Commission with authority to establish “limited” speed zones. The word “limited” read in context is synonymous with the word “bounded”. 53 C.J.S. p. 887. The ends of *517each zone by express terms of the statute must be indicated by signs showing the permissible rates of speed therein. The statute was designed to protect the travelling public. When a State Trunk Highway or other highway upon request of local authorities is completely zoned and posted as the statute appears to contemplate, a motorist may then know what speeds are deemed reasonable and prudent under different traffic conditions, and thus avoid subjecting himself to penal provisions. If the State Highway Commission has not the authority to zone and post a highway in such manner, motorists except where particular conditions exist will have no criterion by which to determine at what speeds they may operate their vehicles without violating penal provisions of the statute. Experience has proven, as the court in State v. Mangus, 120 W.Va. 415, 198 S.E.872, observed that motorists all too often are strangely indifferent to the welfare of others. The absence of signs indicating permissible speeds other than those erected because of particular conditions will not minimize such indifference and will tend to hamper the enforcement of statutory regulations respecting the use of public highways. Where a statute is capable of more than one interpretation, it must be read in a sense which harmonizes with the subject matter and general purpose and object of the statute. It must be given that interpretation which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it. Friese v. Gulbrandson, 69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W.2d 438; Busby v. Shafer, 75 S.D. 428, 66 N.W.2d 910.
The violation of the standard of conduct prescribed by Section 44.0303 as amended is made a misdemeanor. SDC Supp. 44.9929 as am. by Chap. 240, Laws 1953. Under the facts disclosed by the record, appellant was driving on State Trunk Highway 77 at a rate of speed in excess of the posted rate of sixty miles per hour which was the prima facie lawful speed at the time and place of the alleged violation. Proof of the establishment of maximum rates of speed by resolution or other official proceedings of the State Highway Commission as appellant seems to contend was not required. When appropriate signs are erected, they are effective as above indicated to give notice of permis*518sible rates of speed. In view of the record and the principles of law applicable, the court below did not in my opinion err in finding defendant guilty of driving at an unlawful rate of speed. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.