Court Opinion

ID: 9740110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:28:19.076939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.356942
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I find that I differ with the majority opinion as it resolves the discovery issue. This case involves a situation in which the undisclosed material evidence is available for examination when the claim that the prosecution has wrongfully failed to disclose it to the defense is being litigated. This situation is thus not one in which the material evidence was lost or destroyed while in the hands of the prosecution. The question of who should bear the burdens at the litigation of a claim that the prosecution has failed to disclose material evidence which the prosecution has lost or destroyed, has not been determined for Indiana by this Court. The question was considered in Johnson v. State (1987), Ind., 507 N.E.2d 980, but left unresolved because the Court was evenly split. The case Birkla v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 37, 323 N.E.2d 645, cited in the majority opinion, is indeed a case involving the destruction of material, There we said:
We therefore hold that when the prosecution determines evidence to be nonma-terial, and further decides not to advise defense counsel of such evidence prior to its destruction, a heavy burden rests upon the prosecution to demonstrate that the destruction of such evidence did not prejudice the defendant.
Id. 323 N.E.2d at 649.
This formulation thus takes care of one facet of the question but not all, and indicates the propriety of relieving the defendant of burdens in this area of the law where destruction of evidence is involved. While I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion on this issue, I point out that when the accused shows that material evidence was in the hands of the prosecution and lost, the question of whether the accused must then go ahead and show prejudice is open in Indiana. In my judgment, when the item is not available for serutiny by the trial court, but is known to have been material, the risk of loss should be borne by the prosecution, not the defendant. The police and prosecutors are after all highly trained specialists in the gathering and retention of evidence and should be expected to carefully retain all material evidence in usable form.
I also have a different view on the application of the marital communications privilege in this case. Woods confessed to his participation in the crime. He testified for the prosecution and against appellant at trial. His testimony was key, and therefore his credibility was crucial. The trial court permitted the marital privilege to be invoked to prevent the disclosure of Woods' confession to his wife describing his participation in the same crime. In my view, the interest in preserving and promoting marital stability is at a low ebb here, while the defendant's interest in showing possible discrepancies between the two descriptions . given by Woods of his and defendant's criminal acts is at maximum flow. In this circumstance, the defendant's basic right to confront and cross-examine is implicated, and in my opinion requires that the marital privilege give way. Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed. 2d 347.
DICKSON, J., concurs.