Court Opinion

ID: 9665906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:59:16.774888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.359802
License: Public Domain

Justice LEE
dissenting.
In the original majority opinion, we held that the appellate record did not demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the “certified tax records” presented by appellants, Harris County and Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District (Cypress-Fairbanks). Because I still believe that our original disposition was sound, I would overrule appellants’ motion for rehearing. I note my dissent from the majority opinion substituted on rehearing.
Because neither tax entity tendered the excluded exhibits to the trial court as part of their bill, the actual documents which were offered as exhibits to the trial court are not part of the appellate record. Both tax entities admit that they did not request that the documents be included in their bills of exceptions. Thus, when the court reporter prepared the statement of facts for this case, the excluded exhibits were not included in the record.
The majority holds that even without the excluded documents, we can tell that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to admit the exhibits. To reach this conclusion, the majority relies on the statements made by the attorneys for Cypress-Fairbanks and Harris County, the exhibits admitted by the Tax Master and the documents attached to the county’s brief.1
*274The majority overlooks two well established rules of appellate review. First, the burden is on the appellant to bring forward a sufficient record to show reversible error. Tex.R.App. P. 50(d). Because the excluded documents are not part of our appellate record, the tax entities have failed to carry their burden. See Pope v. Stephenson, 787 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex.1990) (per curiam); Carter v. Steere Tank Lines, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 176, 181-82 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1992, writ denied) (plurality opinion). Second, when we are confronted with an incomplete record on appeal, we are to presume that the omitted portions of the record support the trial court’s ruling. See Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.1987); In the Matter of A.R.A, 898 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995, no writ); Beck & Masten Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 830 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
When reviewing a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence, we will only reverse the if the court abused its discretion. Tex.R. Civ. Evid. 104; North Dallas Diagnostic Ctr. v. Dewberry, 900 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied); Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Puremco Mfg. Co., 854 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex.App.—Waco 1993, writ denied). A party seeking to introduce evidence as an exception to hearsay has the burden of clearly showing that the evidence falls within the exception. Roberts v. Allison, 836 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1992, writ denied). Therefore, the burden was on the tax entities to demonstrate that the public records exception applied to the exhibits.
The public records exception provides:
Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, or (C) factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law; unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Tex.R. Civ. Evid. 803(8). The only foundation required for admission of a document under the public records exception is that the document is authentic and that it falls within one of the three types of matter specified in the rule. Cowan v. State, 840 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). As the trial court overruled the property owners’ authentication objection, the only remaining question for the court to determine was whether the exhibits fell within one of the three types of matter specified in the rule. This determination “may be met by circumstantial evidence from the face of the offered document.” Id.; see also Texas Rules of Evidence Handbook, 30 Houston L.Rev. 897, 990 (2d ed.1993); 2 Texas Practice, Guide to the Texas Rule of Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 803.13 (1993).
The record indicates that the tax entities offered documents that they referred to as “certified delinquent tax statements” which the trial court implicitly found to be authentic by overruling the taxpayers’ authentication objection. However, the record does not indicate whether these documents fall within one of the three categories necessary for the documents to be admissible under the public records exception. See Tex.R. Civ. Evid. 803(8); Cowan, 840 S.W.2d at 437.
Whether the documents were within the exception might have been discernible from the face of the documents. But, without the actual documents which were offered at trial, I believe that we cannot determine if the public records exception applies or hold that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the documents. Accordingly, I would overrule the tax entities two points of error, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. We cannot consider documents which are attached to hriefs, unless they were before the trial court and are part of the appellate record. Allen v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford Connecticut, 892 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ); Mitchison v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th DistJ 1991, writ denied); see also *274Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, writ denied); Kraft v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 743 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1987, writ denied).