Court Opinion

ID: 7873825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-08 20:58:36.247023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:31:19.937968
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Justice
(concurring specially).
I fully agree with the majority opinion but feel that a better understanding of the background and operation of § 14(b) comes from these excerpts from the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 102-03, 105, 84 S.Ct. 219, 221-22, 223, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963).
In light of the wording of § 14(b) and this legislative history, we conclude that Congress in 1947 did not deprive the States of any and all power to enforce their laws restricting the execution and enforcement of union-security agreements. Since it is plain that Congress left the States free to legislate in that field, we can only assume that it intended to leave unaffected the power to enforce those laws. Otherwise, the reservation which Senator Taft felt to be so critical would become empty and largely meaningless.
. . . Yet even if the union-security agreement clears all federal hurdles, the States by reason of § 14(b) have the final say and may outlaw it. There is thus conflict between state and federal law; but it is a conflict sanctioned by Congress with directions to give the right of way to state laws barring the execution and enforcement of union-security agreements. It is argued that if there is a violation of a state union-security law authorized by § 14(b), it is a federal unfair labor practice and that the federal remedy is the exclusive one. It is urged that that course is necessary if uniformity is to be achieved. But § 14(b) gives the States power to outlaw even a union-security agreement that passes muster by federal standards. Where Congress gives state policy that degree of overriding authority, we are reluctant to conclude that it is nonetheless enforceable by the federal agency in Washington.

As a result of § 14(b), there will arise a wide variety of situations presenting problems of the accommodation of state and federal jurisdiction in the union-security field. As noted, Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Board, supra,1 upheld the right of a State to reinstate with back pay an employee discharged in violation of a state union-security law. On the other hand, picketing in order to get an employer to execute an agreement to hire all-union labor in violation of a state union-security statute lies exclusively in the federal domain (Local Union 429 v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 [77 S.Ct. 1056, 1 L.Ed.2d 1133] and Local No. 438 v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 [83 S.Ct. 531, 9 L.Ed.2d 514]), because state power, recognized by § 14(b), begins only with actual negotiation and execution of the type of agreement described by § 14(b). Absent such an agreement, conduct arguably an unfair labor practice would be a matter for the National Labor Relations Board under Garmon. (Emphasis in original, footnote added.)
Accordingly the bottom line is whether appellant can sustain with proof the allegation, contained in paragraph III of his complaint, that there is a union-security agreement.

. Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691 (1949).