Court Opinion

ID: 9960809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 13:09:32.954973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:54.362716
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Palmer, 2024-Ohio-1445.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                   FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                             HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                                       :   APPEAL NO. C-230412
                                                          TRIAL NO. 23TRD-1318A
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                             :
                                                             O P I N I O N.
   vs.                                                :

 EDYN PALMER,                                         :

      Defendant-Appellant.                            :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 17, 2024

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsely, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
Victoria Gooder and Danielle Ferris, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for Plaintiff-
Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Krista Gieske, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, JUDGE.

       {¶1}   When one driver hits another and causes damage to a car, the law often

permits an award of restitution. But restitution is not automatic. The offending driver

may request a hearing and has a right to due process that includes the meaningful

opportunity to be heard, both as to the value of damages caused to the car and as to

whether restitution should be awarded at all. What does it mean to have such an

opportunity? Is it enough to simply inspect a computer printout that estimates a car’s

value or a mechanic’s receipt that estimates the costs of needed repairs? Or does due

process require that a driver be able to subpoena a witness to answer questions about

the status of a damaged car when restitution is contested? As we hold today, the

answer to these questions is: “it depends.”

       {¶2}   After entering no-contest pleas and being found guilty of failure to

maintain reasonable control in violation of R.C. 4511.202 and the amended charge of

reckless operation of a vehicle in violation of Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-6,

defendant-appellant Edyn Palmer appeals the judgment of the trial court ordering her

to pay $3,233 in restitution. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s

order as to the amount of restitution and remand the matter to the trial court to hold

an evidentiary hearing on that question.

                         Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶3}   On July 24, 2022, Edyn Palmer lost control of her vehicle and struck the

vehicle of Jamie Adams. After colliding with Adams’s vehicle, Palmer fled the scene

of the accident and failed to provide her driver’s license and insurance information.

As a result, Palmer was charged with failure to maintain reasonable control in

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

violation of R.C. 4511.202, a minor misdemeanor, and leaving the scene of an accident

in violation of R.C. 4549.02, a misdemeanor of the first degree.

         {¶4}   On April 4, 2023, Palmer entered no-contest pleas to the reasonable-

control charge and an amended charge of reckless operation of a vehicle in violation

of Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-6, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. The state

briefly explained the facts of the case on the record, generally describing the accident

without mentioning the specific damage that was caused to Adams’s car. The trial

court found Palmer guilty of both charges.

         {¶5}   The trial court then allowed both sides to present arguments as to the

appropriate sentence. Defense counsel acknowledged that restitution was owed to

Adams, but requested a restitution hearing, along with “reputable” information, to

establish the amount. The state agreed that the case should be set for a restitution

hearing, because Adams had not brought a receipt for the damage to her vehicle to

court.

         {¶6}   The trial court then asked Adams, who was present in the courtroom, if

she had anything she wanted to add. Adams stated, “[W]hen we heard from the

mechanic they pretty much said unless you have a judge tell you to get a receipt we

won’t write you one[.]” When the trial court asked Adams if the vehicle was totaled,

she responded, “[I]t appears they estimated it’s probably about three for the car, and

it would be four for the damages, so they totaled it.” In response, the trial court issued

an order requiring “Ron’s Complete Auto Body,” the name provided by Adams as the

mechanic, to provide a receipt that Adams could present as evidence of the repair

amount for the car.

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

        {¶7}    The trial court also asked defense counsel if the Kelley Blue Book (“Blue

Book”) value of the car would be acceptable, if provided by Adams. Defense counsel

responded, “The concern I have here is, Your Honor, this happened in July, and from

what I understand the prosecuting witness just took the car to a mechanic this week.

* * * So - - I mean, like I said, I have concerns as far as the dollar amount.”

        {¶8}    The matter was continued until May 30, 2023, for a restitution hearing

on the reckless-driving charge. On the reasonable-control charge, the trial court

sentenced Palmer to no fine, and that charge was fully disposed.

        {¶9}    At the May 30th hearing, Adams did not appear. Instead, the state and

defense counsel apprised the court of the status of the restitution evidence. During

the hearing, the prosecutor indicated that Adams had submitted a repair estimate and

a Blue Book printout with an estimated value range. Defense counsel questioned

whether Adams had car insurance and the deductible of that insurance policy, noting

that the police report indicated that Adams had insurance.1 The trial court continued

the matter to July 17, 2023, for further investigation of the insurance matter.

        {¶10} At the July 17, 2023 hearing, defense counsel took issue with the Blue

Book estimated value range because it was for the replacement of the vehicle, and

Palmer reportedly had evidence of Adams recently driving the vehicle. Defense

counsel also took issue with the fact that Adams was not present, although subpoenaed

by defense counsel. The prosecution argued that the repair estimate and Blue Book

printout were sufficient evidence to prove the restitution amount. In response,

defense counsel questioned the authenticity of the estimate, noting the lack of self-

1 If Adams in fact maintained an insurance policy that provided coverage, less a deductible, for
repairs to her vehicle, then precedent indicates the amount of restitution should be set at the
amount of the deductible, not the amount of the damage. See, e.g., State v. Nickens, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 104670, 2017-Ohio-1448.

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

authenticating information.          Importantly, the state agreed that it could not

authenticate the document without a witness present. As a result, the trial court

explained that it was “not ordering restitution based on” the state’s lack of an

authenticating witness and continued the hearing to allow the state to secure Adams’s

testimony.

        {¶11} The final hearing was held on July 31, 2023. Again, Adams was not

present. Through the prosecutor, the state submitted two exhibits as its sole evidence

in support of restitution. As Exhibit 1, the state submitted a Blue Book value range

printout. The exhibit reflected a private-party range of $2,540 to $3,925, with a

private-party value of $3,233. It indicated these values were valid as of April 7, 2023.

It did not otherwise indicate the make, model, age, or condition of the vehicle, the

source of the values, or who created the printout. As Exhibit 2, the state submitted a

damage report from ASA Automative Service Association reflecting a cost of $3,800

to repair the car.2 The report indicated it was for Adams’s 2006 Chevy Impala and

bore a date of April 6, 2023, more than eight months after the July 24, 2022 accident

involving Palmer.

        {¶12} Defense counsel objected to the admission of both pieces of evidence,

but the trial court admitted them over the objection. The prosecution provided no

testimony to authenticate the exhibits and provided no further evidence to support a

restitution amount. In closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Palmer’s

constitutional right to confront Adams had been violated, because Adams had been

subpoenaed and continuously failed to appear. In response, the prosecution argued

2 The record is unclear as to why Adams initially sought a court order for Ron’s Complete Auto Body
for a repair receipt, but the state later submitted a report from ASA Automative Service Association
rather than Ron’s.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

that Palmer no longer maintained a constitutional right to confront Adams because

Palmer pleaded guilty to the underlying traffic offense. No evidence was presented,

and no discussion took place, regarding the insurance question that had been raised

at the July 17th hearing.

       {¶13} Ultimately, the trial court imposed a restitution amount of $3,233,

based entirely on the Blue Book value document submitted as state’s Exhibit 1.

According to the trial court, the exhibit reflected a value range of between $2,549 and

$3,925. The trial court explained that it selected the amount of $3,233, which was

listed as the estimated private-party value rate on the printout, because it was the

lesser of the values, considering that the damage report reflected costs of $3,800. The

trial court also sentenced Palmer to a suspended jail sentence of 30 days, a $200 fine,

one year of probation, and treatment and counseling as recommended by Hamilton

County Probation.

       {¶14} Palmer timely filed this appeal, challenging the restitution order.

                                  Assignments of Error

       {¶15} Palmer raises two assignments of error on appeal. First, Palmer argues

that the trial court deprived her of her right to confrontation under Article 1, Section

10 of the Ohio Constitution. Second, Palmer argues that the trial court erred when it

ordered her to pay $3,233 in restitution in violation of her due-process rights. She

raises two issues under this assignment of error, one factual and one constitutional.

First, Palmer argues that the restitution award was improper because it exceeded the

amount of economic loss suffered by Adams. Second, Palmer argues that the trial

court violated her due-process rights when it ordered her to pay restitution without

allowing her to cross-examine Adams.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶16}     We address Palmer’s second assignment of error first, as it is

dispositive of her appeal.

                                  Economic Loss

       {¶17} “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s award of restitution in a

misdemeanor case for an abuse of discretion.” (Internal citation omitted.) State v.

Miles, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210226, 2021-Ohio-4581, ¶ 5. “[T]he amount of

restitution must be supported by competent, credible evidence from which the court

can discern the amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty. A trial court

abuses its discretion in ordering an amount of restitution that is not supported by such

evidence.” (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) State v. Betley, 2018-

Ohio-2516, 115 N.E.3d 836, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).

       {¶18} R.C. 2929.28 governs financial sanctions. In relevant part, R.C.

2929.28(A)(1) provides that “[t]he amount the court orders as restitution shall not

exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and

proximate result of the commission of the offense,” and that “[t]he court shall

determine the amount of full restitution by a preponderance of the evidence.”

       {¶19} Palmer argues that the evidence presented is not reliable and does not

show a causal connection between the incident and the economic loss Adams suffered.

R.C. 2929.01(L) defines economic loss as “any economic detriment suffered by a

victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of an offense.”

       {¶20} With regard to vehicles, damage may be determined by demonstrating

the reasonable cost to repair the vehicle. State v. Moore, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

220421, 2023-Ohio-3318, ¶ 12. However, where a vehicle has been totally destroyed

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

or where the cost to repair it exceeds its value, the owner’s damages are limited to the

value of the vehicle immediately prior to the accident. Id.

       {¶21} In this case, the record lacks competent, credible evidence as to the

damage Adams’s vehicle suffered as a direct and proximate cause of Palmer’s conduct.

Two fundamental problems exist with the evidence before us. The first problem

relates to the lack of evidence establishing the reasonable cost to repair Adams’s

vehicle from the damage caused by Palmer. While Palmer admitted that restitution

was owed, Palmer did not agree to any particular damage that was caused to Adams’s

vehicle and sought a hearing on this question. No evidence presented, either by way

of Palmer’s guilty plea or by the state at the restitution hearing, connected Palmer’s

conduct to the specific damage to Adams’s car. The second problem relates to the

absence of evidence establishing the value of Adams’s vehicle immediately prior to the

accident.

       {¶22} As a starting point, the traffic citations to which Palmer pleaded guilty

make no mention of the damage caused to Adams’s vehicle and only describe the make

and model of Palmer’s vehicle. During the plea hearing, the only information read into

the record regarding the incident was that Palmer failed to maintain reasonable

control of her vehicle resulting in a crash. As a result, no facts admitted by Palmer

established the make, model, and year of the vehicle that Palmer struck, or details of

what damage was caused as a result. And Adams never appeared at the restitution

hearing to describe the damage to her car, nor did any other witness establish this

critical fact. Without knowing what damage Adams’s car suffered from the accident,

it was not possible for the trial court to assess whether the damage report related to

Palmer’s accident or to some other occurrence.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶23} The absence of this information in the record complicated the trial

court’s ability to ascertain Adams’s economic loss under the standards set out in

Moore, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220421, 2023-Ohio-3318, at ¶ 12. The trial court was

tasked with determining the reasonable cost to repair Adams’s vehicle from the

damage sustained in the accident with Palmer. But absent any evidence as to what

that damage was, the trial court could not impute the $3,800 ASA Automative Service

Association damage report to Palmer. The more than eight-month delay between the

accident and the damage report only further compels this conclusion.

       {¶24} At step two, the trial court concluded that a value less than the estimated

cost of repair was appropriate for Adams’s car. But no evidence in the record

established the value of Adams’s vehicle as of July 2022, immediately before the

accident. Even if we accept the unauthenticated Blue Book printout, it indicates,

“value valid as of 04/07/2023,” a date more than eight months after the accident.

Even worse, the printout does not state the make, model, or year of the vehicle that

was used to generate the estimate. Thus, the Blue Book printout is of little to no utility

in demonstrating the damage Adams suffered as a direct and proximate result of

Palmer’s conduct.

       {¶25} Making matters worse, the trial court provided no explanation as to why

it selected $3,233, the private-party value, from the range of $2,540 to $3,925 as the

value of Adams’s vehicle. There is no evidence in the record that shows that Adams

sold her vehicle to a private party or otherwise connected Adams’s damage to the

private-party figure used by the trial court.

       {¶26} Thus, because the evidence did not show a causal connection between

Palmer’s conduct and the damage to Adams’s vehicle, and because the record lacks

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

competent, credible evidence to establish the amount of restitution under Moore, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-220421, 2023-Ohio-3318, at ¶ 12, we sustain Palmer’s second

assignment of error as to that issue, reverse the trial court’s judgment as to the amount

of restitution, and remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing as to

restitution. But our analysis does not stop there.

                                     Due Process

       {¶27} Palmer’s second assignment of error also raises a constitutional

question as to the requirement of due process at restitution hearings.

       {¶28} This court previously acknowledged that a defendant is entitled to due

process at a restitution hearing in State v. Miles, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210226,

2021-Ohio-4581. As we noted in Miles, “[w]hile the concept of due process may be

flexible and amorphous, at a minimum, procedural due process requires an

opportunity to be heard.” Id. at ¶ 8. Describing what due process means, we indicated

that it must be “meaningful” and entitles a defendant to both cross-examine adverse

witnesses and to present her own evidence. Id. at ¶ 8-9. The failure to provide for

adequate due process in a restitution hearing constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. at

¶ 9.

       {¶29} Tracking Miles, Palmer argues that due process allows her the right to

cross-examine a witness as to the exhibits presented by the state at the restitution

hearing. While she does not explicitly couch her argument as a right to compulsory

process, she in essence argues that she should have a right to compel a victim who

seeks restitution to appear at a restitution hearing.

       {¶30} No Ohio court has squarely addressed this question. However, the

courts of numerous other states have considered whether a defendant has a

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

constitutional due process right to compel a complaining witness to appear and be

cross-examined at a restitution hearing and have resolved this question in the

affirmative. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Franz, Mass. App. No. 06-P-1264, 2008

Unpub. LEXIS 1132 (Jan. 11, 2008) (holding that, although defendant’s right to cross-

examine is not absolute, defendant should have the opportunity to cross-examine at a

restitution hearing, which should be determined based on totality of the

circumstances); Franco v. State, 918 A.2d 1158 (Del.2007) (holding that due process

is violated when a trial court refuses to allow cross-examination where it is relevant to

determining the proper restitution amount); State v. Butcher, Wash.App. No. 75973-

6-I, 2018 Wash.App. LEXIS 1028 (Apr. 30, 2018) (holding that because the restitution

amount was based solely on medical bills and the complaining witness’s statements

that the bill were connected to the incident, cross-examination of complaining witness

was warranted to satisfy due process).

       {¶31} Arizona is one such example. In State v. Quijada, 246 Ariz. 356, 439

P.3d 815 (App.2019), the defendant pled guilty to facilitation to commit trafficking in

stolen property, agreed to pay restitution not to exceed one hundred dollars, and was

sentenced to two years of probation.       Id. at 360.    To establish restitution, the

complaining witness provided three different “unsworn” restitution statements that

listed various items and their value. Id. The first statement reported a financial loss

of $5,530.75, the second statement reported a financial loss of $13,252.25, and the

third statement reported a financial loss of $ 45,320.18. Id.

       {¶32} At the first and second restitution hearings, the complaining witness

appeared to testify, but the matters were continued. Id. at 361. At the third setting,

the complaining witness appeared, but left before testifying due to an illness. Id. At

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the fourth setting, the complaining witness failed to appear and had indicated to the

prosecution that she was unwilling and/or unable to participate. Id. The state argued

that restitution could be awarded on the statements provided, to which defense

counsel objected. Id. Without a hearing, the trial court found that the evidence

supported an economic loss of $39,969.37. Id.

       {¶33} About two years later, the trial court extended the term of the

defendant’s probation because restitution had not been paid in full. Id. at 362. The

defendant then petitioned for postjudgment relief in part based on her inability to

cross-examine the complaining witness. Id. The trial court reaffirmed its finding and

increased the restitution amount to $40,885.42. Id. at 363.

       {¶34} The defendant appealed, arguing that her due-process rights were

violated because she was not given the opportunity to question the complaining

witness. Quijada, 246 Ariz. At 363, 439 P.3d 815. While noting that “[r]estitution is

part of the sentencing process which is ‘not surrounded by the panoply of protections

afforded a defendant at trial,’ the court nevertheless held that due process requires ‘the

opportunity to contest the information on which the restitution award is based,

present relevant evidence, and to be heard.’” Id. at 364. Interpreting due process

contextually, the court noted that a defendant cannot obtain a meaningful opportunity

to be heard without cross-examination when the information necessary to mount a

restitution defense rests solely with the victim. Id. at 365. By denying the defendant

the opportunity to cross-examine the victim, the trial court “effectively cut off the only

avenue by which she could challenge the information on which the court would

determine the amount of restitution.” Id.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶35} The Quijada court acknowledged the burden on a complaining witness

that a rigid rule requiring cross-examination would create. Id. at 366. It cautioned

against converting a defendant’s due-process protections “into tools to subject victims

to unnecessary and potentially injurious court proceedings” and fashioned a rule that

balanced the defendant’s and victim’s competing interests at the restitution stage. Id.

According to that rule, “where events or circumstances call the veracity or accuracy of

evidence concerning restitution into doubt, and the defendant cannot adequately

challenge that evidence without questioning the victim in open court under oath, due

process requires that the defendant be given the opportunity to do so.” Id.

       {¶36} We agree with the reasoning in Quijada. As we observed in Miles, due

process is flexible and focuses on protecting a defendant’s right to be heard. Miles, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-210226, 2021-Ohio-4581, at ¶ 8-9. In many cases, that objective

will be accomplished without the need for cross-examination of the complaining

witness or any particular witness at all. But sometimes a defendant will be unable to

be meaningfully heard in defense of the restitution amount or the requirement to pay

restitution at all without the ability to compel the presence of a witness to question. In

those circumstances, due process requires that the defendant be afforded the

opportunity to compel a witness’s presence through the issuance of a subpoena and to

meaningfully examine or cross-examine the witness at a hearing.

       {¶37} Here, the defense raised significant questions as to the authenticity and

relevance of the state’s restitution evidence. Absent from the record, but relevant to

the trial court’s value determination, was evidence as to the damage sustained to

Adams’s vehicle, its condition before the accident, how that condition may have been

the same or different as of the April 7, 2023 Blue Book printout, and the car

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

information that was input to generate the Blue Book printout. One way for Palmer to

contest these key pieces of information was to question Adams, given that Palmer

would have no other access to evidence about Adams’s car or the state’s exhibits. In

fact, the state appeared to admit as much at the July 17th hearing, when it admitted it

could not authenticate its two exhibits without Adams’s presence. And Palmer may

not have subpoenaed Adams at all had Adams submitted an affidavit along with the

exhibits to explain the missing information.

       {¶38} We therefore hold that due process was not satisfied at the restitution

hearing. We accordingly sustain Palmer’s second assignment of error and remand this

matter to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing that comports with the

contours of due process specific to this case.

       {¶39} Because we have sustained Palmer’s second assignment of error,

Palmer’s first assignment of error is moot, and we decline to address it.

                                         Conclusion

       {¶40} The trial court’s judgment awarding $3,233 in restitution was not

supported by competent, credible evidence and did not comport with the requirements

of due process. We accordingly sustain Palmer’s second assignment of error, reverse

the trial court’s judgment as to the amount of restitution, and remand this cause to the

trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing in accordance with R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) and

this opinion.

                                                 Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

CROUSE, J., CONCURS.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

ZAYAS, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.

ZAYAS, P.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART.

          {¶41} I agree that the restitution amount was not based on competent and

credible evidence because the submitted Blue Book value of the vehicle does not

include sufficient information to identify the vehicle or the condition of the vehicle

used to generate the value. See Moore, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220421, 2023-Ohio-

3318, at ¶ 14 (The Blue Book value was insufficient to establish the fair market value

because it does not “indicate the mileage used to determine the value of [the totaled

vehicle] or that the value was generated based upon any information provided by [the

victim] regarding the condition of his vehicle prior to the accident.”); State v. Kennedy,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25037, 2012-Ohio-5215, ¶ 14-16 (holding the Blue Book

value of the damaged vehicle was not supported by competent and credible evidence

where the victim-impact statement did not indicate the source of the information used

to generate the report). Therefore, a completed Kelley Blue Book Value would be

sufficient to determine the fair market value of the vehicle. See, e.g., Zanesville v.

Quinn, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT207-0033, 2018-Ohio-429, ¶ 22 (Where the repair

estimates exceeded the Kelley Blue Book value, which was admitted as an exhibit, the

trial court did not err in imposing a restitution amount that reflected the Blue Book

value).

          {¶42} With respect to the repair estimate, at the plea hearing, Palmer

requested a receipt from a “reputable mechanic” to establish that $4,000 was the

correct restitution amount. Palmer believed that the amount was significant based on

the photo of the vehicle’s damage. The victim sought and received an order for Ron’s

Complete Auto Body to submit a written estimate. When the estimate was submitted,

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

as the prosecutor explained, the name of the shop that provided the estimate was cut

off from the top of the document.3 According to the estimate, the cost to repair the

victim’s vehicle was $3,800 to replace the left quarter panel and refinish the vehicle.

Providing an estimate that includes the name of the repair shop should cure that

deficiency. See Cleveland v. Figueroa, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111267, 2022-Ohio-

4012, ¶ 11 (explaining that because the rules of evidence do not apply in sentencing

proceedings, “the city was not required to set forth any evidentiary foundation before

presenting the written estimate [that depicted the cost to repair the damages to the

victim’s vehicle] to the trial court for its consideration of the amount of restitution.”);

R.C. 2929.28 (allowing the court to determine the restitution amount based on

information provided by “[t]he victim, victim’s representative, victim’s attorney, if

applicable, the prosecutor or the prosecutor’s designee”).

       {¶43} Because the evidence was insufficient to establish the market value of

the vehicle, I agree that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the

restitution amount. Accordingly, we should sustain the second assignment of error,

reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for a restitution hearing.

       {¶44} I also agree that the first assignment of error, that Palmer was deprived

of her right to confrontation under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, is

moot. “We should avoid reaching a constitutional question when ‘other issues are

apparent in the record which will dispose of the case on its merits.’ ” In re D.S., 152

Ohio St.3d 109, 2017-Ohio-8289, 93 N.E.3d 937, ¶ 7. For this reason, I respectfully

dissent from the majority’s dicta regarding Palmer’s “right to compel a victim who

3 Although the majority claims the repair estimate was submitted by  ASA Automative Service
Association, the bottom of the repair receipt merely acknowledges that the repair shop was a
member of this association.

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                         OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

seeks restitution to appear at a restitution hearing.” The majority appears to squeeze

Palmer’s first assignment of error, the compulsory-process argument, into a due-

process analysis that was not raised or briefed by the parties.4 While this court has

held that the concept of due process includes the right to cross-examine adverse

witnesses, Miles, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210226, 2021-Ohio-4581, at ¶ 9, in this case,

Palmer sought to compel the victim’s testimony.

        {¶45} Palmer wished to question the victim regarding the operability of the

vehicle, alleging that by questioning the victim, “evidence could have been adduced

that the damage sustained by the vehicle was functional rather than disabling.”5

Palmer argued that the replacement value of the vehicle was an improper restitution

amount because the car was still operable, and she had a video showing the victim

driving the car. However, Palmer fails to explain the relevance of the operability of the

vehicle to the economic loss suffered by the victim. Palmer cites no legal authority to

support her contention that the operability of a vehicle is relevant to the computation

of economic loss, and I could find none. “[W]hen the cost to repair the vehicle exceeds

its value, then the owner’s damages are limited to the value of the vehicle immediately

prior to the accident.” Moore, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220421, 2023-Ohio-3318, at

¶ 12. Thus the economic loss is not dependent upon the operability of the vehicle. See

id.

4 The two issues raised in Palmer’s second assignment of error were: “1. Whether the restitution
award was improper because it exceeded the amount of economic loss suffered by Ms. Adams?”
and “2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to discount the amount of restitution when it appears
Ms. Adams’ vehicle was still drivable?” The gist of the argument was that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining restitution based on a generic blue book value and an unreliable repair
estimate.
5 Palmer no longer questioned whether the victim’s insurance covered the loss. During oral
argument, the appellee explained that the victim only had liability insurance on the vehicle, so her
insurance company did not reimburse her for the loss.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶46} Relying on Quijada, an Arizona case, the majority opines that “due

process requires that the defendant be afforded the opportunity to compel a witness’s

presence through the issuance of a subpoena.” But Quijada made it clear that, “We do

not hold today that defendants have an unconditional due-process right to question

any victim who submits evidence or statements to support a restitution claim.”

Quijada, 246 Ariz. at 365, 439 P.3d 815. The Quijada court was justifiably concerned

that an unconditional due-process right could be “converted into tools to subject

victims to unnecessary and potentially injurious court proceedings.” Id. at 366.

Rather, the court held that due-process rights are only triggered when “events or

circumstances call the veracity or accuracy of evidence concerning restitution into

doubt, and the defendant cannot adequately challenge that evidence without

questioning the victim in open court under oath.” Id.

       {¶47} In Quijada, the victim sought restitution for items that were stolen from

her home. Her initial unsworn restitution statement reported a financial loss of

$5,5530.75 for $500 in cash, two pairs of Manolo Blahnik footwear, an iPad, leather

and ostrich phone cases, and the cost of installing and maintaining a home security

system, which was almost one-third of the restitution amount. Id. at 360. No jewelry

was reported stolen. Shortly thereafter, the victim submitted a second unsworn

statement “which totaled $13,252.25, including a tennis bracelet worth ‘about $6,000.’

The updated statement referenced additional items, including several other jewelry

pieces (gold necklace, amethyst and garnet beads, gold bracelet, diamond ring, Rolex

watch), clothes, and electronics.” Id. In a recorded statement to the police, the victim

had previously reported that all of the jewelry stolen, including the tennis bracelet,

contained fake stones, and she did not own a Rolex watch. Id. at 359-360.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶48} Six weeks after the initial statement, the victim provided a third

statement seeking a restitution award in the amount of $45,320.18. Id. This request

included:

       (in addition to the Manolo Blahnik footwear): (1) a tennis bracelet

       valued at $10,800; (2) a gold “goddess bangle” worth $4500; (3) a

       diamond ring valued at $2098; (4) a Tiffany & Co. necklace with a cross

       pendant valued at $2850; (5) a diamond “flower bracelet” valued at

       $1579; (6) a Movado men’s watch valued at $450; (7) a “Bianca ring”

       with a sapphire and diamonds worth $8005; and (8) 16 bracelets with

       “14k gold clasps, beads, garnets, fresh water pearls [and] amethysts,”

       worth $4400. The victim also submitted invoices for a portable scanner,

       phone and tablet cases, an iPad, and certain clothing. To account for the

       value of the jewelry listed in the statement, the victim relied on printouts

       from internet catalogs depicting pieces she believed were similar or the

       “closest [she] could get” to the jewelry she claimed had been stolen.

       Many of the printouts also contained her handwritten annotations

       describing the differences, in her opinion, between the nature and value

       of her pieces of jewelry and the jewelry listed in the printout. In the July

       15 statement, the victim did not claim the missing fake jewelry she

       identified in the police interview.

Id. at 360-361.

       {¶49} Before a scheduled hearing, the state reported that “six pieces of jewelry,

of unknown value, remained in police custody.” Quijada, 246 Ariz. at 362, 439 P.3d

815. At the hearing, the victim’s former husband testified that he had never seen the

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

expensive jewelry and shoes, and that the victim was a “liar.” Id. “He also testified

that he purchased a Tiffany & Co. necklace with a cross pendant for the victim, to

replace one she previously lost, while they were on the vacation when the burglaries

occurred.” Id. Additionally, the prosecutor, who could not subpoena the victim

because her whereabouts were unknown, also expressed “ ‘serious misgivings’ about

the accuracy of the victim’s restitution claim.” Id. “The prosecutor stated he believed

the victim needed to verify her claims to ensure the court had ‘correct’ and ‘true

information.’ ” Id. at 363. The state moved to subpoena the victim, but the trial court

determined a restitution amount without hearing from the victim. Id.

       {¶50} Under these specific facts and circumstances, the court observed that

the inability to question the victim denied Quijada the opportunity to effectively

challenge “the veracity of the victim’s restitution statements.” Id. at 365. “Thus, not

only was the victim the only individual who could explain the discrepancies between

the third restitution statement and her previous statements, she alone could

substantiate the values of what she claimed was missing.” Id.

       {¶51} That is not the situation here.       The victim’s veracity was never

questioned by Palmer. Palmer admitted that she damaged the victim’s car and was

obligated to pay restitution to the victim. As previously discussed, Palmer’s sole

reason to question the victim was to determine whether the car was operable, which

was not relevant to the restitution amount. Moreover, Palmer had taken a video

showing that the car was operable. Palmer could have submitted the video to the court

without questioning the victim.     Thus, the majority’s discussion of Quijada is

inapposite and does not apply to the facts and legal arguments made in this case.

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                         OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

          {¶52} Moreover, the majority’s analysis is nonbinding dicta. Courts have

defined dicta as “statements made by a court in an opinion that are not necessary for

the resolution of the issues.” (Citations omitted.) Gissiner v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-070536, 2008-Ohio-3161, ¶ 15. And “where a case is decided on one

issue, and dicta pertaining to a separate and distinct issue might be found in the

rationale of the case, the court has not decided the matter on the basis of the issue

mentioned in dicta.” Westhoven v. Snyder, 40 Ohio App.2d 91, 94, 318 N.E.2d 167

(1973).

          {¶53} For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

Please note:
          The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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