Court Opinion

ID: 9851294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:10:06.551574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.077980
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I find that Williams cannot prove an essential element of her cause of action, namely, that an employee had an opportunity to remove the water or to warn customers of the hazard, I must respectfully dissent.
“ ‘ “In reviewing the overruling of a motion for a directed verdict, the proper standard to be utilized by the appellate court is the any evidence test.” ’ ” Amberley Suite Hotel v. Soto, 214 Ga. App. 72, 73 (446 SE2d 778) (1994) (quoting Re/Max of Ga. v. Real Estate Group on Peachtree, 201 Ga. App. 787, 788 (412 SE2d 543) (1991). Viewed in the light most favorable to Williams, the party opposing the motion, the evidence was as follows.
On February 28, 1992, at approximately 6:50 p.m., Williams slipped and fell as she was entering the ladies’ room in the Food Lion store. Water from an overflowing toilet caused the fall. A store cashier, Ms. Kirkland, was in the rest room when Williams entered. Kirkland testified that she had just come out of one of the stalls when she noticed the water on the floor. Kirkland said that she discovered the water a minute or two before Williams entered and she was leaving the rest room to take care of the problem when Williams opened the door. Kirkland further testified that she tried to warn Williams but Williams slipped and fell before she could do so.
“ ‘ “For [Williams] to recover under a common law negligence theory, there must have been a defective condition on [Food Lion’s] premises, which defect was the cause of [Williams’] fall and of which [Food Lion] had superior knowledge.” ’ ” Froman v. George L. Smith, Ga. World Congress Auth., 197 Ga. App. 338, 339 (398 SE2d 413) (1990).
Williams claims that Food Lion had actual knowledge of the hazard and failed to warn her of the dangerous condition. However, Kirkland’s uncontroverted testimony was that she had discovered the *357water only a minute or two before Williams entered.
Decided December 5, 1995.
Painter, Ratterree & Bart, R. Clay Ratterree, Sarah B. Akins, for appellant.
Jones, Boykin & Associates, Noble L. Boykin, Jr., Charles W. Snyder, for appellee.
“Q. Now, do you recall how long it had been from the time you noticed the water on the floor until the time Mrs. Williams entered the restroom? A. It could have been about a minute. It wasn’t really longer than that. I didn’t really have time to stand there and look at it before she came in.”
“[T]here never has been a rule in this state that liability can be shown by nothing more than the fact that the defendant’s employee was in the immediate area of the hazardous substance. In every case, the rule that states that proposition also requires a finding that the defendant’s employee ‘had an opportunity to discover and remove the hazard,’ . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Mitchell v. Food Giant, 176 Ga. App. 705, 709 (337 SE2d 353) (1985). Accordingly, although Kirkland was aware of the water on the floor, Williams cannot show that she had an opportunity to clean it up or warn anyone of the hazard. Indeed, Kirkland testified that as she was leaving to get someone to clean up the water, Williams opened the door. Further, before Kirkland could stop her, Williams entered and fell. Thus, although Williams has shown that, at the moment of her fall, a Food Lion employee had knowledge of the water on the floor, she cannot show that the employee had an opportunity to remove the water or warn customers of the hazard. Therefore, because Williams failed to establish one of the essential elements of her cause of action, I believe the trial court erred when it overruled Food Lion’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability.