Court Opinion

ID: 9898057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:10.070105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:34.421672
License: Public Domain

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                                                                        FILED
                                                                    JANUARY 19, 2023
                                                                In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                               WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                                       DIVISION THREE

       In the Matter of the Parentage of:             )        No. 38668-6-III
                                                      )
        L.T.†                                         )        PUBLISHED OPINION
                                                      )

                PENNELL, J. — Elizabeth Rall petitioned for de facto parentage of her nephew,

       L.T. Although Ms. Rall has been L.T.’s exclusive caretaker for most of his life, the trial

       court dismissed the petition because Ms. Rall had gained custody of L.T. through a

       nonparental custody decree. The trial court reasoned that such orders are meant to be

       temporary; thus, Ms. Rall had not undertaken “permanent” parental responsibilities for

       L.T. as required by statute. RCW 26.26A.440(4)(c).

                We reverse. The de facto parentage statute does not categorically exclude

       nonparental custodians from becoming de facto parents. The statute recognizes that

       an adult who is not a biological or adoptive parent may form a parental bond with a

       child. The existence of such a bond is not negated by a preexisting legal relationship,

               To protect the privacy interests of the minor child, we use their initials
                †

       throughout this opinion. Gen. Order 2018-1 of Division III, In re Changes to Case Title
       (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/
       ?fa=atc.genorders_orddisp&ordnumber=2018_001&div=III
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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

       such as a custody order. Every petitioner for de facto parentage is entitled to thoughtful

       consideration of their petition according to the terms of the de facto parentage statute.

       If the statutory requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence, an order of

       de facto parentage should issue. Because Ms. Rall alleged facts sufficient to justify an

       order of de facto parentage, her petition was entitled to a full adjudication.

                                                 FACTS

              Eleven-year-old L.T. is the biological son of Janice Kirkpatrick. L.T.’s father

       has played no meaningful role in L.T.’s life and has not participated in this litigation.

       Ms. Kirkpatrick has had some involvement with L.T. but it has been limited. When L.T.

       was three years old, Ms. Kirkpatrick’s sister, Elizabeth Rall, assumed all responsibilities

       for L.T.’s care. Ms. Rall’s involvement was prompted by “drug use by both parents,

       neglect and emotional abuse.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 31 (capitalization omitted).

              At some point after L.T. began living with Ms. Rall, Ms. Kirkpatrick came to visit

       L.T. with a male companion. According to Ms. Rall, during this visit Ms. Kirkpatrick and

       her companion “were both visibly high and [Ms. Kirkpatrick] wanted money.” Id. at 70.

       When Ms. Rall told her sister she did not have any money, Ms. Kirkpatrick allegedly

       threatened to take L.T. away. This episode motivated Ms. Rall to seek third-party custody

       of L.T.

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

              In May 2015, Ms. Rall and Ms. Kirkpatrick entered into a mediated settlement

       agreement and parenting plan that placed L.T. in Ms. Rall’s primary custody. In July,

       the superior court awarded third-party custody of L.T. to Ms. Rall and issued a parenting

       plan consistent with the parties’ settlement agreement. 1 Ms. Kirkpatrick did not attend

       the court’s hearing. The parenting plan granted Ms. Kirkpatrick visitation at least twice

       a month in a therapeutic setting. The court’s orders also recognized Ms. Rall was

       entitled to child support and that “[t]he issues of current and back child support owed by”

       Ms. Kirkpatrick and L.T.’s father would be governed by preexisting administrative

       orders. Id. at 27, 37.

              For the next five years, Ms. Kirkpatrick failed to exercise her visitation rights.

       She also did not make child support payments. In fact, according to Ms. Rall,

       Ms. Kirkpatrick did not have any contact with L.T. at all during this period, in person

       or otherwise. Meanwhile, Ms. Rall continued to parent L.T. She allegedly integrated

       him into her immediate family, advocated for him to receive necessary resources at

       school, and facilitated his medical care. During the period in which Ms. Kirkpatrick

              1
                 The court’s custody decree was entered pursuant to the nonparental child custody
       statute, chapter 26.10 RCW. See former RCW 26.10.040 (2000), repealed by LAWS OF
       2020, ch. 312, § 905. This chapter has since been replaced by the minor guardianship
       statute. See RCW 11.130.185-.260.

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

       had no contact, L.T. grew from a toddler into a child on the cusp of middle school.

              In March 2020, Ms. Rall decided she wanted to facilitate communication between

       L.T. and one of his half-siblings. She reached out to counselors to try to arrange visitation

       with Ms. Kirkpatrick. Ms. Kirkpatrick engaged in some visitation with L.T., including

       two overnight stays. According to Ms. Rall, this process was “disastrous.” Id. at 41.

              In April 2021, Ms. Rall filed a petition to be recognized as L.T.’s de facto parent.

       In a declaration supporting her petition, Ms. Rall explained L.T. had been in her exclusive

       care since April 2014 and the two had developed a parent-child relationship. Ms. Rall

       alleged that, during this seven-year period:

          • She was the only person to take L.T. to medical appointments, attend his parent-

              teacher conferences, and enroll him in extracurricular activities. According to

              Ms. Rall, L.T.’s teachers and healthcare providers refer to her as L.T.’s “mom.”

              Id. at 43.

          • Ms. Rall has been the only person to financially support L.T. Although child

              support had been ordered, no support payments had been received from either

              biological parent. Ms. Rall acknowledged she at times had received “non needy”

              TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) benefits as a result of L.T.’s

              residence with her. Id. at 42.

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

          • Ms. Rall had been L.T.’s exclusive source of social guidance, day-to-day care,

              and emotional development. L.T. understands Ms. Rall is not his biological

              mother, but he refers to Ms. Rall as “mom” and recognizes her with cards on

              Mother’s Day. Id. at 43.

          • Ms. Rall and L.T. share a close relationship and enjoy spending time together.

              Ms. Rall has incorporated L.T. into her blended family. Ms. Rall’s older children

              see L.T. as their little brother.

          • Ms. Rall loves L.T. just as much as her other children.

              Ms. Kirkpatrick responded to Ms. Rall’s petition. Ms. Kirkpatrick asked the court

       to deny Ms. Rall’s petition and alleged it was in L.T.’s best interest to reside with her, not

       Ms. Rall. Ms. Kirkpatrick wrote, “[L.T.] knows me as his mother and knows [Ms. Rall] as

       his aunt.” Id. at 55. She further asserted, “I have always understood this parenting

       arrangement to be temporary and have been working hard to get to a point where I would

       be able to parent [L.T.].” Id. In a memorandum of authorities filed with the superior court,

       Ms. Kirkpatrick claimed she had been working to manage her health and had repeatedly

       sought over the years to be involved in L.T.’s life. Ms. Kirkpatrick claimed Ms. Rall does

       not consider L.T. to be one of her children, citing text messages that are not in the record.

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

       Ms. Kirkpatrick claimed she had set up a bedroom for L.T. along with spaces for study

       and play.

              The superior court dismissed Ms. Rall’s petition for de facto parentage. The court

       concluded, based on the pleadings, that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary and

       held that Ms. Rall had “not met the standard for the case to go forward.” Id. at 102.

       The superior court explained its conclusion:

              The petitioner is a third-party custodian. As such, that legal custodial
              arrangement confers “temporary” custody to a third-party—not
              acquiescence by a parent to a full [and] permanent arrangement, nor
              is the child held out to be a “child” of the petitioner.

       Id. Ms. Rall timely appeals.

                                               ANALYSIS

              Washington law recognizes a parent-child bond can be formed outside the

       traditional context of birth or adoption. See In re Parentage & Custody of A.F.J., 161

       Wn. App. 803, 810, 260 P.3d 889 (2011), aff’d, 179 Wn.2d 179, 314 P.3d 373 (2013)

       (describing de facto parentage as a necessary innovation that filled legal interstices).

       An individual who undertakes the role of parenting a child for a significant period of

       time can be recognized as a de facto parent, on equal footing with otherwise legal parents.

       See In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wn.2d 679, 708, 122 P.3d 161 (2005). De facto parents

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

       have legal rights and obligations toward children that can be recognized in court through

       a de facto parentage action.

              The current method in Washington for establishing de facto parentage is set by

       RCW 26.26A.440. 2 This statutory process involves two steps. First, to proceed to a full

       hearing, the petitioner must establish standing by alleging facts sufficient to justify

       success on the merits. See RCW 26.26A.440(3)(c); Walker v. Riley, 19 Wn. App. 2d 592,

       602, 498 P.3d 33 (2021). If standing is satisfied, the petitioner must then prove their

       de facto parentage claim by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 26.26A.440(4).

              A claim of de facto parentage requires proof of seven elements. They are as

       follows:

                  (a) The [petitioner] resided with the child as a regular member of the
              child’s household for a significant period;
                  (b) The [petitioner] engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
                  (c) The [petitioner] undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a
              parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation;
                  (d) The [petitioner] held out the child as the [petitioner]’s child;
                  (e) The [petitioner] established a bonded and dependent relationship
              with the child which is parental in nature;
                  (f) Another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and
              dependent relationship required under (e) of this subsection; and
                  (g) Continuing the relationship between the [petitioner] and the child is
              in the best interest of the child.

              2
               Before enactment of the statute, the requirements were set by common law.
       See L.B., 155 Wn.2d at 707.

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

       Id. To establish standing, a petitioner must allege facts that, if proved, would be sufficient

       to satisfy each element. In re Parentage of L.J.M., 15 Wn. App. 2d 588, 595, 476 P.3d

       636 (2020). After an evidentiary hearing on the merits, the court ultimately decides

       whether the petitioner has proved the seven elements by a preponderance of the evidence

       and should therefore be adjudicated a de facto parent. Id. at 595-96.

              Where, as here, a de facto parentage petition is dismissed for lack of standing,

       our review is de novo. Id. at 596-97.

              On appeal, the parties agree Ms. Rall has alleged sufficient facts to support all

       but one of the seven statutory elements. The only disputed element is the third, 3 which

       requires a petitioner to show they “undertook full and permanent responsibilities . . .

       without expectation of financial compensation.” RCW 26.26A.440(4)(c). Ms. Kirkpatrick

       argues this provision is not satisfied because Ms. Rall undertook only temporary

       responsibilities for L.T. and Ms. Rall undertook her responsibilities with an expectation

       of financial compensation. We disagree with both contentions and address each in turn.

              3
                The trial court’s order appears to have concluded that Ms. Rall also failed to
       satisfy the fourth element. But on appeal, the parties agree that Ms. Rall has sufficiently
       alleged facts indicating she has “held out” L.T. as her child. RCW 26.26A.440(4)(d).
       We agree with the parties. Compare Walker, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 604 (“[H]olding a
       child out as one’s own is to assert a status as a parent or parent-like as opposed to a
       caretaker.”), with CP at 43 (Ms. Rall’s sworn allegation that L.T.’s teachers, speech
       therapist, and doctor “refer[ ] to” her and “know[ ]” her as L.T.’s “mom.”).

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

       Permanence

              At the outset, Ms. Rall’s agreement to take L.T. into her care was undoubtedly

       intended as temporary. Ms. Kirkpatrick was struggling with substance abuse, prompting

       Ms. Rall to seek a third-party custody order that was intended to formalize Ms. Rall’s

       custody of L.T. while Ms. Kirkpatrick worked to achieve stability. See In re Custody

       of Z.C., 191 Wn. App. 674, 693, 366 P.3d 439 (2015). But the initial intent behind

       Ms. Rall’s care for L.T. was not set in stone.

              Over the course of several years, it is apparent Ms. Rall’s relationship with L.T.

       gradually transitioned from a temporary arrangement to a lasting situation. 4 According

       to Ms. Rall’s sworn allegations, Ms. Kirkpatrick declined to exercise her right to court-

       authorized visitation for five years of L.T.’s childhood. By purportedly abandoning L.T.,

       Ms. Kirkpatrick consented to a formation of a parent-like bond between L.T. and his

       custodian, Ms. Rall. See Walker, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 606-07 (analyzing the consent

       element of RCW 26.26A.440(4)(f)). Ms. Rall responded to Ms. Kirkpatrick’s lengthy

       absence by continuing to accept L.T. in her home. In so doing, Ms. Rall tacitly expressed

              4
                We note that in the dependency and termination context, the passage of
       just one year can be sufficient to transform a temporary dependency action, intended
       to foster familial reunification, to one involving termination of parental rights.
       See RCW 13.34.180(1)(e).

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

       an understanding that her relationship with L.T. had transformed from a temporary

       arrangement into something more permanent. Ms. Rall further solidified her intent to

       permanently include L.T. in her life as her son by addressing his medical, academic, and

       extracurricular needs; allowing L.T. to call her “mom” instead of “Aunt Lizzy”; and by

       encouraging her other children to see L.T. as a sibling rather than as a cousin. CP at 43.

              Contrary to the trial court’s reasoning, Ms. Rall’s status as a third-party

       custodian does not prevent her from satisfying the de facto parent criteria. Cf. Walker,

       19 Wn. App. 2d at 606 (rejecting the argument that a biological grandmother could not

       become a de facto parent because of the “temporary status” of the court order granting

       her custody). The de facto parentage statute simply states that a petitioner who meets

       all the required elements “shall” be adjudicated a de facto parent. RCW 26.26A.440(4).

       It does not say “except for third-party custodians.” See Rivas v. Overlake Hosp. Med.

       Ctr., 164 Wn.2d 261, 270, 189 P.3d 753 (2008) (noting that if “the legislature intended”

       a certain meaning “it would have said so”).

              Every petitioner for de facto parentage deserves an individual assessment of

       their case, regardless of any preexisting legal relationship to the child. See A.F.J., 161

       Wn. App. at 815. Many—perhaps most—temporary custodians will not be able to allege

       sufficient facts to establish standing to petition for de facto parentage. But there is no

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

       absolute bar. Cf. A.F.J., 179 Wn.2d at 182 (holding foster parent status is not a bar to

       de facto parentage, but acknowledging foster parents will not be able to meet the criteria

       in most cases). Here, Ms. Rall has alleged sufficient facts to justify a finding that she has

       undertaken permanent parental responsibilities.

       Expectation of financial compensation

              Even an individual who has undertaken permanent parental responsibilities

       will be ineligible for de facto parentage if they did so with “expectation of financial

       compensation.” RCW 26.26A.440(4)(c). Ms. Rall has not been paid any kind of salary

       or wages in exchange for caring for L.T. But Ms. Kirkpatrick argues Ms. Rall flunks this

       requirement because Ms. Rall received a child support order for L.T. and has obtained

       government benefits as a consequence of L.T. living with her.

              Ms. Kirkpatrick’s argument falls short because it conflates receipt of

       compensation with expectation of compensation. Ms. Rall has received some limited

       compensation in the form of government benefits while L.T. has been in her care.

       But this does not mean Ms. Rall undertook the obligation of parenting L.T. with the

       “expectation” of financial compensation. Id.

              In her petition and accompanying declaration, Ms. Rall states she undertook the

       obligation to provide permanent parenting responsibilities for L.T. “without expectation”

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

       of payment. CP at 7, 41. The circumstances of her case corroborate this claim. When

       Ms. Rall first took L.T. into her care, she did so informally because of Ms. Kirkpatrick’s

       battle with addiction. At that point, Ms. Rall did not seek compensation. Nor was she

       acting as a professional childcare provider. See L.B., 155 Wn.2d at 712 (assuaging

       fears that nannies and other similar caregivers would be able to successfully petition

       for de facto parentage). Rather, Ms. Rall’s actions appear to have been motivated by

       love, concern, and a sense of familial obligation. She explains she sought nonparental

       custody after an incident in 2014 caused her to become concerned for L.T.’s welfare.

       Although the nonparental custody decree was accompanied by an award of child support,

       the facts alleged by Ms. Rall do not indicate she sought third-party custody with an

       expectation that she would actually receive child support. To the contrary, Ms. Rall

       claims she has never actually received any child support. This is noteworthy, given

       Ms. Rall apparently could have pursued contempt sanctions due to nonpayment of child

       support. See RCW 26.18.050(1). The only compensation Ms. Rall has received in relation

       to her care for L.T. is the receipt of some TANF benefits. However, there is no reason to

       think Ms. Rall agreed to care for L.T. with the knowledge she would someday receive

       such benefits.

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       No. 38668-6-III
       In re Parentage of L.T.

              Ms. Rall has alleged sufficient facts supporting a finding that she undertook

       parenting responsibilities without an expectation of compensation. It could be that, after

       a hearing on the merits, a fact finder could determine Ms. Rall actually did have an

       expectation of compensation, despite her claims to the contrary. But at this preliminary

       stage, Ms. Rall’s petition is not subject to dismissal on this basis.

                                             CONCLUSION

              Ms. Rall has alleged facts sufficient to establish standing for a de facto parentage

       action. She therefore is entitled to a hearing on the merits. Nothing in our opinion should

       be interpreted to prejudge whether Ms. Rall will ultimately prevail on her de facto

       parentage petition. That is a matter to be decided by the trial court. This matter is reversed

       and remanded for further proceedings. Ms. Kirkpatrick’s request for attorney fees is

       denied.

                                                   _________________________________
                                                   Pennell, J.

       WE CONCUR:

       ______________________________
       Fearing, J.

       ______________________________
       Staab, J.

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