Court Opinion

ID: 9474372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:55:42.257443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:02.941434
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent on two grounds. First, I do not agree with the majority’s analysis of the consequences of defendant NHS’ admission that it is a FLSA employer. The majority claims that there is a “distinction between an admission that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, and an admission of facts serving in part to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction,” and that NHS’ admission is a “fact, and the establishment of that fact creates federal subject matter jurisdiction.”
I fail to see how this “distinction” has any bearing on this case. Actually, NHS’ admission that it is a FLSA employer seems more like a legal conclusion than fact. But any “fact-law” distinction is really besides the point. The real issue is whether subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, regardless of whether such jurisdiction is predicated upon factual admissions. Statute and case law make it clear that subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any time. Rule 12(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“(3) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”
*555This Court recently stated in Ambrose v. Welch, 729 F.2d 1084 (6th Circuit 1984):
“The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a nonwaivable defect that may be raised at any time to justify dismissal of a pending action.”
729 F.2d at 1085. Furthermore, defendant cannot be “estopped” from raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction through his previous “factual” admissions. In Rubin v. Buckman, 727 F.2d 71 (3rd Cir.1984), a plaintiff who originally falsely alleged the “fact” of Hong Kong citizenship to establish diversity jurisdiction, was nonetheless able to repudiate such citizenship, thus stripping the court of jurisdiction, in order to escape an adverse judgment. Clearly, if a party with “unclean hands” can challenge subject matter jurisdiction despite its “factual” admissions establishing jurisdiction, NHS, which had no nefarious intent in admitting it was an FLSA employer, can do likewise. In sum, the majority correctly states that the parties may admit facts which confer jurisdiction. However, such a proposition does not negate the equally well-established proposition that subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any time.
Second, I dissent on the ground that the record does not conclusively indicate that NHS was engaged in the requisite activities to make it come under FLSA. The majority cites Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942), as the standard to be employed in determining whether a party has engaged in interstate commerce. Under Filbum, the Court held that even strictly local activities —i.e. a farmer growing wheat for strictly home consumption — can come under the power granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause. ’ If Filburn were the correct standard, then the majority’s analysis would be correct. However, the Supreme Court held long ago in McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 87 L.Ed. 1538 (1943), that the “expansive” Filbum standard should not be employed in FLSA cases:
In the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress did not intend that the regulation of hours and wages should extend to the furthest reaches of federal authority____ The test under this present act, to determine whether an employee is engaged in commerce, is not whether the employee’s activities affect or indirectly relate to interstate commerce but whether they are actually in or so closely related to the movement of the commerce as to be part of it.
319 U.S. at 493, 497, 63 S.Ct. at 1249, 1251.
The jurisdictional “facts” which the majority cites as evidence of interstate commerce were never challenged or discussed below. NHS disputes the factual assertions upon which jurisdiction is premised. Accordingly, I would remand this case for a factual determination as to whether jurisdiction exists.