Court Opinion

ID: 9896548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 17:11:45.905348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:07.557919
License: Public Domain

J-A16030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 KYON DANE MCDONALD                       :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 218 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 4, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0004040-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                          NOVEMBER 13, 2023

      Appellant, Kyon Dane McDonald, appeals from the judgment of sentence

of 60 to 120 months’ incarceration, imposed after a jury convicted him of

voluntary manslaughter. Appellant’s trial took place slightly more than three

years after charges were initiated, and his primary claim on appeal is that the

trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to the

rule-based right to a speedy trial. He separately contends that the court erred

by permitting the Commonwealth’s expert witness to review video surveillance

frame-by-frame. After careful review, we affirm.

      On September 27, 2018, a citizen called 911 at 2:26 a.m. to report a

shooting at Robbie Nick’s Sports Bar in Luzerne County. The victim, Tierees

Owens, was admitted to a hospital at 3:02 a.m., and pronounced dead a few

minutes later. The bar’s owner, Robbie Nicoletti, Jr., told the police that one

of his employees called him slightly before 2:30 a.m. to report a disturbance
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involving several people outside. Nicoletti, who was at another bar a short

distance away, walked back to his establishment.       There, he met Owens,

whom he knew, and escorted him from the altercation.         However, Owens

broke off and ran back towards the disturbance. Nicoletti heard a gunshot

and saw Appellant fire multiple additional shots.

      Nicoletti related the above to investigators and provided access to his

surveillance system, which showed Appellant inside the bar at 1:43 a.m. The

video shows Appellant obtaining a gun from one of the bar’s bouncers. The

outside surveillance cameras show an altercation, and Appellant firing a

handgun multiple times at Owens. The video shows Appellant securing the

gun in his waistband and leaving.       Appellant later admitted during an

interrogation that he separated the magazine from the firearm and discarded

both in a wooded area.

      Pennsylvania State Troopers were called to assist, and they recovered

seven nine-millimeter casings from the scene. Two projectiles were recovered

from the pavement while the remaining five were found in Owens’ body during

an autopsy. Appellant was arrested the next day and charged with one count

of criminal homicide.

      At trial, the Commonwealth sought a conviction for first-degree murder,

arguing that Appellant intentionally killed Owens while Appellant argued self-

defense.   Appellant testified that, while inside the bar, Owens touched

Appellant’s wife and Appellant told him to leave her alone. Additionally, Owens

was with two other men who participated in fights that evening and generally

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caused issues that evening. Appellant testified that Owens and his friends

threatened to shoot up the bar and that, while outside the bar, Owens

displayed a gun and repeatedly threatened to kill Appellant.

      Appellant was ultimately convicted of voluntary manslaughter and

sentenced on January 4, 2022, as previously stated. He filed a timely notice

of appeal and complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court thereafter

filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.   Herein, Appellant states two issues for our

review:
      I. Whether the trial [court] erred by not dismissing this case
      pursuant to Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
      Procedure    (and   the   Pennsylvania  and    United   States
      Constitutions)?

      II. Whether the trial court erred by admitting and permitting use
      of [a] frame-by-frame[,] slowed down video?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

      “In general, a trial court’s denial of a Rule 600 motion is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion; however, it is subject to plenary review when ‘the

dispositive question implicates legal issues.’” Commonwealth v. Lear, 290

A.3d 709, 718 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Harth, 252

A.3d 600, 614 n.13 (Pa. 2021)). The basic principle of Rule 600 is that a full

calendar year is sufficient time for the Commonwealth to prepare the case and

bring the defendant to trial. See generally Commonwealth v. Mills, 162

A.3d 323, 324 (Pa. 2017) (holding that “time attributable to the normal

progression of a case simply is not ‘delay’ for purposes of Rule 600”). We use

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the phrase “mechanical run date” to define “the date by which the trial must

commence pursuant to the time limitations set forth in Rule 600.” Harth, 252

A.3d at 607 n.7. The mechanical run date is calculated by adding 365 days

to the date on which the criminal complaint was filed. Hence, the mechanical

run date in this case was September 27, 2019.

      When, as here, the mechanical run date has been exceeded, the

defendant may seek dismissal under Rule 600. To determine whether Rule

600 is violated, our precedents formerly discussed adjustments of the

mechanical run date by designating periods of time as either “excludable” or

“excusable delay.” Commonwealth v. Malone, 294 A.3d 1247, 1248 (Pa.

Super. 2023).    The former category applied to delays attributable to the

defendant or his attorneys. Those periods of time would automatically extend

the run date without any analysis of the Commonwealth’s due diligence. See

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 489 A.2d 853, 859 (Pa. Super. 1985) (explaining

that for delays “granted at the request of the defense … the Commonwealth

is not required to exercise due diligence in order to toll” the rule-based right

to a speedy trial). Excusable time described periods of delay either caused by

the Commonwealth or by circumstances outside of its control.             If the

Commonwealth caused the delay, then those periods of time were chargeable

to the Commonwealth unless it acted with due diligence. In cases of judicial

delay, such as postponement of the trial due to court unavailability, the

Commonwealth must prove that it acted with due diligence.          See Harth,

supra (concluding that Commonwealth’s failure to fulfill its discovery

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obligations constituted lack of due diligence; trial court unavailability for trial

irrelevant).

      We have since abandoned those labels, as the “new Rule 600 eliminated

the distinction between these two buckets of removable calculable time.

Under its new verbiage, ‘periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings

caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise

due diligence’ forms the basis of what is known as ‘includable time.’”

Commonwealth v. Wiggins, 248 A.3d 1285, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1)). All other periods of delay are excluded from the Rule

600 calculation. Id.

      We now examine the specific periods of delay. The criminal complaint

was filed on September 27, 2018, and the preliminary hearing was scheduled

for October 10, 2018. That hearing was continued at Appellant’s request to

November 16, 2018, and he was held for trial on the single count of criminal

homicide. Appellant was scheduled for formal arraignment on December 11,

2018, which was postponed at Appellant’s request to December 21, 2018, for

him to obtain counsel. On that date, Appellant was formally arraigned, and

trial was set for October 14, 2019. The Honorable Tina Gartley was assigned

to the case and set a deadline of August 2, 2019, for all pretrial motions.

Neither party filed motions by that date. For ease of discussion, the following

table lists the foregoing events and their corresponding Rule 600 implications.

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                                                          Rule 600    Includable
     Event         Start date    End date    # of days    deadline      time?    Reason

    Awaiting
   preliminary                                                                  Ordinary
     hearing       9/27/2018    10/10/2018      13       9/27/2019       Yes    progression

  Preliminary
    hearing                                                                     Appellant
 postponement      10/10/2018   11/16/2018      37       11/3/2019       No     request

    Awaiting                                                                    Appellant
  arraignment      11/16/2018   12/11/2018      25       11/28/2019      No     request

                                                                                Ordinary
  Awaiting trial   12/11/2018   10/14/2019     307       11/28/2019      Yes    progression

       Using the “includable” time concept, as of the November 28, 2019 trial

date, the Commonwealth had used 320 days of the one-year period.

Presuming for the moment that the Commonwealth was prepared to go to trial

as scheduled on October 14, 2019, then the question becomes who bears

responsibility for the subsequent delays. If none of that time is includable in

the Rule 600 calculation, then Appellant’s Rule 600 rights were not violated.

For the following reasons, we conclude that all periods of time following the

initial trial listing are not included in the Rule 600 calculation.

       We first turn to why the trial was postponed from October 14, 2019. On

August 6, 2019, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus nunc pro

tunc, noting within that the Commonwealth did not object to the untimely

nature of the motion. Petition, 8/6/19, at 1 ¶ 3 (unnumbered). Appellant

alleged that the Commonwealth presented inadequate evidence to proceed on

any type of homicide charge and requested dismissal. He further requested

“that this [c]ourt stay the deadlines, including other pre-trial motions, in this

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matter until the rest of this hearing. With all time to run against the defendant

for Rule 600 purposes.” Id. at unnumbered 5, ¶ 25.

      Appellant also filed, on September 13, 2019, a request to postpone the

case as he “believes that more discovery is outstanding and will be filing a

supplemental discovery request.” Motion to Continue Trial, 9/13/19 (single

page). The trial court did not explicitly rule on this motion, perhaps due to

the pending pre-trial writ of habeas corpus motion, which was litigated on

October 10, 2019. On December 31, 2019, the trial court granted partial relief

by precluding the Commonwealth from proceeding on a second-degree

murder charge. The trial court then issued an order on February 13, 2020,

scheduling a status conference for February 21, 2020. At that conference, the

trial court noted “there’s nothing pending right now” and asked the parties if

they intended to schedule a trial date. N.T., 2/21/20, at 2. Appellant then

discussed retaining an expert:
      [APPELLANT]: … There might be some motions in limine. We are
      speaking with an expert witness right now. We’re going through
      that process with him. It’s extensive discovery. He’s gotten it.
      We’re going to have him review it. We’re preparing that now to
      give to him. He hasn’t it [sic] yet.

      But [co-counsel] and I have a trial in April. We believe it’s going
      to be at the end of April going into May.

                                     ***

      THE COURT: All right. And so I don’t know where your run date
      is at, but you said you’re still involved in some discovery. What
      are we looking at the most plausible time to list this? Does
      Counsel have anything you are agreeable to time-wise?

      [APPELLANT]: We were thinking June. Does that --

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      [THE COMMONWEALTH]: June I think would be reasonable. The
      only thing I would say is given the statements made by Counsel
      today, the Commonwealth would make an oral motion for
      reciprocal discovery of any expert reports that would be generated
      in this matter.

      THE COURT: So will they be done – seeing that it’s already March,
      will the Commonwealth have that in a timely fashion for the
      reciprocal discovery if we’re looking…

      [APPELLANT]: Well, we don’t have a report yet; so I can’t -- the
      day we get it, we’ll provide it. I can’t tell you for sure when that
      will be.

      THE COURT: Do you anticipate, like, a month, two months?

      [APPELLANT]: Probably longer.         Probably two months is more
      realistic.

Id. at 2-4. The parties and the trial court discussed the court’s calendar and

agreed to set the trial for July 6, 2020.

      We conclude that the period from October 14, 2019, to the rescheduled

date of July 6, 2020, is delay attributable to Appellant and is therefore not

included in the Rule 600 calculation. Beginning with the motion for a writ of

habeas corpus, “the mere filing of a pretrial motion by a defendant does not

automatically render him unavailable. Rather, a defendant is only unavailable

for trial if a delay in the commencement of trial is caused by the filing of the

pretrial motion.”   Commonwealth v. Hill, 736 A.2d 578, 587 (Pa. 1999)

(footnote omitted).   If litigation delays the trial, the Commonwealth must

demonstrate that it exercised due diligence in opposing or responding to the

motion. Id.

      We need not discuss the Commonwealth’s diligence in responding to the

motion. While the petition for a writ of habeas corpus presumably could have

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been decided prior to the scheduled trial date, Appellant specifically sought a

postponement of trial before the trial court responded to his petition seeking

dismissal of all charges.1       This postponement request is delay caused by

Appellant and is therefore solely attributable to him.

       “[I]n assessing any period of delay under Rule 600, it is critical to

ascertain the cause of such delay. Stated in the most general terms, when

the Commonwealth causes delay, the Rule 600 clock continues to tick; when

the defendant causes delay, the clock stops.” Commonwealth v. Barbour,

189 A.3d 944, 958 (Pa. 2018) (emphasis in original). Appellant caused the

delay by requesting a postponement to develop pre-trial motions and consult

with expert witnesses. See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 180 A.3d 368,

370 (Pa. Super. 2018) (concluding that defense postponements were not

included in the Rule 600 calculation); Commonwealth v. Watson, 140 A.3d

696, 699 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“[Watson] fails to develop any argument, let

alone one substantiated by authority, to advance the theory that the

Commonwealth may be held accountable for delay caused by defense

continuances.     Our jurisprudence has suggested the opposite.”).    Notably,
____________________________________________

1 Appellant briefly suggests that "the time between August 6, 2019[,] and
December 31, 2019[,]” should be included in the Rule 600 calculation, on the
basis that the motion for a writ of habeas corpus was partially successful.
Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant argues that the motion was “necessary only
because the Commonwealth insisted on keeping” a potential charge of second-
degree murder. Id. We disagree. Aside from the fact that Appellant does
not develop any argument on this point, Appellant sought complete dismissal.
Moreover, the Commonwealth’s decision to proceed on a general homicide
charge does not mean that the Commonwealth intended to pursue a second-
degree murder conviction at trial.

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there is no representation that the discovery requests were due to the

Commonwealth’s failure to fulfill its mandatory discovery obligations.         In

Commonwealth v. Andrews, 213 A.3d 1004 (Pa. Super. 2019), “before the

defense requested the continuance at issue, discovery was complete and ...

trial had been scheduled for May 18, 2015.”          Id. at 1013.    The defense

“requested additional discovery on May 15, 2015, which required the

postponement of the trial’s commencement.” Id. We held that the delay was

attributable to the defense.        The same point applies here.    Discovery was

complete and Appellant’s desire to file additional motions and/or retain an

expert caused the postponement.

       Briefly, we note that, while Appellant requested the postponement, the

parties did not promptly select a new date.          Arguably, the period from

December 31, 2019, when the trial court granted partial relief on Appellant’s

motion, through February 21, 2020, when the trial court held a status

conference hearing, should be included in the Rule 600 calculation. As the

trial court stated at the conference, nothing was scheduled after the court

decided Appellant’s pre-trial petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This is a

period of 52 days, and Appellant would prevail as adding this total to the 320

days already included exceeds one year.2

____________________________________________

2 We express no opinion on whether the fact that Appellant sought a
postponement in September affects the calculation of the Mills “normal case
progression” test.

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      It would have been preferable for the Commonwealth to request that

the court schedule the case for trial following resolution of the motion, and it

is not clear why almost two full months elapsed between deciding the habeas

corpus motion and scheduling a new trial date. Notwithstanding, the record

establishes that Appellant was not prepared to proceed to trial.       Appellant

specifically stated in his September motion to postpone the first trial date that

more time was needed:
      2. [Appellant] file[d] a Writ of Habeas Corpus and has a hearing
      on this matter on September 19, 2019.

      3. Following the hearing, [Appellant] believes that more discovery
      is outstanding and will be filing a supplemental discovery request.

      4. [Appellant] would respectfully request a continuance in this
      matter with a pending Habeas before this [c]ourt and more
      discovery to commence following the hearing.

      5. [The Commonwealth] concurs in this motion to continue.

Motion to Continue Trial, 9/13/19, at unnumbered 1.

      Thus, while it would have behooved the Commonwealth to ensure that

a trial date was selected in conjunction with the pre-trial habeas hearing or

shortly after the motion was decided, Appellant had yet to file the motions

referenced in his request for a postponement. Appellant asked the court for

a continuance “and more discovery” to follow the hearing. As far as the record

indicates, Appellant and the Commonwealth were informally addressing those

issues. Therefore, the period from the day Appellant’s writ of habeas corpus

was decided through the rescheduled July 6, 2020 trial date is attributable to

Appellant.

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         We now turn to the postponement of the July 6, 2020 trial date, which

was prompted by judicial orders regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. On March

16, 2020, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an order authorizing

president judges to suspend Rule 600.         See In re Gen. Statewide Jud.

Emergency, 228 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2020).           Luzerne County President Judge

Michael T. Vough issued several orders pursuant to this authority, as discussed

infra.

         We conclude that the period from July 6, 2020 through the rescheduled

November 16, 2020 trial date is excluded from the Rule 600 calculation due

to court unavailability. In Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743 (Pa. Super.

2022), appeal denied, 292 A.3d 839 (Pa. 2023), we held that the period of

delay due to an unambiguous suspension of Rule 600 during the COVID-19

emergency is not included in the Rule 600 calculation, and we do not consider

the Commonwealth’s due diligence obligations during those closures.        The

pertinent order in Carl provided, “in relevant part, that ‘[d]uring the

emergency, the following shall apply: ... (3) Suspend statewide rules

pertaining to the rule-based right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial.’”

Id. at 747 (quoting order).     Conversely, in Commonwealth v. Lear, 290

A.3d 709 (Pa. Super. 2023), appeal granted in part, 2023 WL 6416182 (Pa.

2023), this Court remanded for a hearing on the Commonwealth’s exercise of

due diligence during a time in which the courts were unavailable for trial due

to COVID-19, because the relevant emergency order did not suspend Rule 600

and merely stated that the delay “shall be considered a court postponement

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and shall constitute excludable time” for Rule 600 purpose.          Id. at 720

(quoting order).

       The orders contained in the record here likewise do not unambiguously

suspend Rule 600 due to COVID-19 for the entire at-issue timeframe from

July 6, 2020 through November 16, 2020.            The first order “suspends the

operation of Rule … 600 during the time period of the judicial emergency

concluding April 14, 2020 unless extended by further [o]rder of [c]ourt.”

Order, 3/17/20 (unnumbered).            On April 2, 2020, President Judge Vough

extended that order through April 30, 2020. On May 29, 2020, an order was

issued stating that Rule 600 “is suspended until September 14, 2020 subject

to any intervening orders.”         Order, 5/29/20.3   The order unambiguously

suspends Rule 600 from March 17, 2020, through April 30, 2020, and then

from May 29, 2020 through September 14, 2020. Because there is a gap from

April 30, 2020 through May 29, 2020, we will assume for purposes of our

disposition that the holding in Lear applies. For ease of disposition, we will

defer discussion of the Commonwealth’s due diligence until after a review of

all the delays.

       In any event, at minimum, the courtrooms were unavailable for any jury

trials. The order directed that “[a]ll jury trials are hereby postponed pending

further Order of the [c]ourt.” Order, 3/17/20, at unnumbered 2 (emphasis

____________________________________________

3 These are the only orders included in the record. It is not clear what other
orders, if any, were issued to address the gap between April 30, 2020 and
May 29, 2020.

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added). The impossibility of holding a jury trial due to COVID-19 constitutes

a judicial delay outside of the Commonwealth’s control. As we have previously

observed, “[i]t certainly would not serve the dual purpose of Rule 600 if a

defendant could demand a jury trial (as is their constitutional right) during a

time when it is impossible for the Commonwealth to conduct a jury trial, and

determine that the resulting delay was not excusable under the Rule.”

Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810, 824 (Pa. Super. 2023).

      Next, we discuss the postponement of the November 16, 2020 trial date.

Trials were initially set to resume in Luzerne County in September of 2020.

On November 23, 2020, the president judge ordered a second closure,

specifying that “only civil and criminal proceedings which directly impact the

health, safety, security, welfare or incarceration of an individual shall be held

as would normally be scheduled. All other proceedings shall be postponed to

a later date.” Order, 11/23/20, at unnumbered 1. This order was effective

through January 4, 2021; an order issued December 28, 2020, extended the

order through February 26, 2021.

      Briefly, we note that the November 16, 2020 trial theoretically could

have taken place if jury trials had resumed, as the second emergency order

was issued one week later. Appellant, however, requested a postponement.

The trial court was not idle following the March 17, 2020 emergency order,

and the record establishes that the parties worked with an eye towards

commencing trial upon expiration of the original emergency in September. A

conference was held on May 5, 2020, which resulted in the November 16,

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2020 date. The trial court entered an order on August 26, 2020, scheduling

a conference for September 4, 2020. Additionally, on September 9, 2020,

Judge Gartley recused, and the case was reassigned to the Honorable David

W. Lupas.4

       On November 2, 2020, Judge Lupas issued an order rescheduling the

status conference for December 7, 2020, thus postponing the November 16

trial date. While the order itself does not indicate that Appellant requested

this postponement, the trial court’s opinion states that it was at his request.

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 10/4/22, at 8 (“[Appellant] successfully sought

to reschedule the November 2, 2020 status conference and it became clear

that his trial was not going to occur on November 16, 2020.”). We treat this

as a factual finding that is supported by the record.        Because Appellant

requested that his trial be postponed, those delays are attributable to him.

       This leads to the selection of a new trial date after jury trials resumed

in late February of 2021.           For the same reasons discussed supra, the

subsequent rescheduling of the trial due to the second emergency COVID-19

order constitutes judicial delay which is not included in the Rule 600

calculation. As the trial court’s opinion states, following the expiration of the

second emergency order, “the [c]ourt began the task of recalendaring all the

cases that had been continued due to the various state and county COVID[-
____________________________________________

4 Appellant argues that the delay caused by recusal should be included in the

Rule 600 calculation, as the recusal was apparently due to the assignment of
an assistant district attorney. Appellant does not develop this argument, and
we will not consider it.

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19] emergency orders issued from the inception of the crisis in March of 2020.”

Id. at 10. There is no suggestion that the trial court was required to prioritize

Appellant’s case to the exclusion of others, each of which may have had their

own Rule 600 issues. Accordingly, the postponements due to COVID-19 are

not included in the Rule 600 calculation.

      The foregoing addresses all periods of delay up through the first listing

after the COVID-19 closures ended. The final period of delay involves the

postponements through the actual trial in October of 2021.

      Judge Lupas held a status conference on April 12, 2021.               At this

juncture, Appellant’s comments regarding an expert witness at the February

21, 2020 status conference become relevant. Recall that Appellant requested

a postponement in September of 2019 for an expert witness to review the

material.    The Commonwealth then made an oral motion for reciprocal

discovery.   The trial court did not rule on the Commonwealth’s motion as

Appellant volunteered to supply the report.           See N.T., 2/21/20, at 4

(Appellant’s counsel stating, “Well, we don’t have a report yet; so I can’t --

the day we get it, we’ll provide it. I can’t tell you for sure when that will be.”).

      Appellant decided not to supply the report. At the April 12, 2021 status

conference, the Commonwealth informed the court that the parties had been

informally discussing the issue.      The Commonwealth stated, “[Appellant’s

counsel] did indeed receive that report, but they are of the opinion that they

do not have to provide it to the Commonwealth.”             N.T., 4/12/21, at 2.

Appellant replied that the expert report was not yet finalized but confirmed

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that he no longer intended to provide the Commonwealth with the report.

Appellant explained that, per his interpretation of Rule of Criminal Procedure

573, the Commonwealth was entitled to his expert report only if Appellant had

requested expert reports from the Commonwealth. Appellant did not request

expert reports in his discovery motions, and he thus argued that he did not

have to provide the report.

      The Commonwealth responded that, “up until I would say four days ago

when I spoke to [Appellant’s counsel,] everyone was under the assumption

that it would be provided so we could get our own expert.”            Id. at 7.

Appellant’s counsel stated, “I was wrong on the Rule. I was wrong.” Id. at

8.   The Commonwealth then orally requested that the trial judge compel

disclosure of the expert report. The court overruled Appellant’s objection and

ordered him to supply the report by June 15, 2021. Appellant’s trial was set

for July 26, 2021.

      Appellant failed to timely send the report, as established at a status

conference held on July 6, 2021. Appellant stated at this conference that he

had sent the expert report to the Commonwealth on June 30, 2021, and the

Commonwealth stated that it “need[ed] additional time to hire an expert to

review their expert report.”   N.T., 7/6/21, at 2.    Appellant objected to a

continuance, stating that he was prepared to try the case. Appellant argued

that the Commonwealth had sufficient time to consult an expert before trial.

The trial court stated that because the report has “just been disclosed and

provided basically on the eve of the trial date, I don’t see any alternative but

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to continue the trial date because of that.” Id. at 4. The trial court moved

the trial date to October 25, 2021.

        Appellant asked that the time be counted against the Commonwealth.

The trial court denied this request, stating that the time would count against

Appellant due to “the lateness and the provision of the report, which required

the [c]ourt to order its disclosure, [at that is what was] causing the delay.”

Id. at 4-5. The Commonwealth also stated that, depending on its review of

Appellant’s report and consultation with an expert, it may file motions to

exclude and/or challenge the admissibility of the evidence. The trial court

stated that it would order another status conference in about a month.

        That conference, the final one in this case, took place on August 6, 2021,

and the Commonwealth informed the court that it was conferring with a

possible expert. Additionally, the Commonwealth requested to postpone the

case for the affiant to teach a class for the Pennsylvania State Police. The trial

court denied that request, stating that the court had homicide trials scheduled

for September and October, which “is why I chose October for this one, not to

mention all of the other criminal trial weeks that we have with other trials that

are scheduled.” N.T., 8/6/21, at 5. Jury selection commenced October 22,

2021.

        We conclude that all delays following the expiration of the second COVID

order are not included in this Rule 600 calculation.       Appellant’s argument

concerning this block of time is that the trial court erred in ordering Appellant

to disclose his expert report, which led to the postponements. Initially, we

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note that Appellant does not separately challenge the trial court’s order to

disclose the report, instead addressing the validity of that order within his Rule

600 argument. In short, Appellant offers that the Commonwealth, despite

prevailing in its motion to compel disclosure, should have this time counted

against it.

      We will accept arguendo that we may review the discovery order in

conjunction with the Rule 600 argument, especially because the discovery

order itself is arguably moot in that Appellant did not end up calling his expert

witness.      See Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 549 (Pa. 2022)

(deeming moot a claim that trial court erred by ordering capital defendant to

turn over a mitigation specialist’s report because the defendant did not call

the witness).     Presently, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion in granting the Commonwealth’s discovery motion, and, in turn,

delaying the trial for Appellant to comply with that request.

      We conclude that the trial court did not err in counting the time against

Appellant. As the Rule 600 determination is based on the discovery issue, we

first begin with the relevant provisions of Rule 573:

      (C) Disclosure by the Defendant.

      (1) In all court cases, if the Commonwealth files a motion for
      pretrial discovery, upon a showing of materiality to the
      preparation of the Commonwealth’s case and that the request is
      reasonable, the court may order the defendant, subject to the
      defendant’s rights against compulsory self-incrimination, to allow
      the attorney for the Commonwealth to inspect and copy or
      photograph any of the following requested items:

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        (a) results or reports of physical or mental examinations,
        and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection
        with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the
        possession or control of the defendant, that the defendant
        intends to introduce as evidence in chief, or were prepared
        by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial,
        when results or reports relate to the testimony of that
        witness, provided the defendant has requested and received
        discovery under paragraph (B)(1)(e); and

        (b) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses whom the
        defendant intends to call in its case-in-chief, provided that
        the defendant has previously requested and received
        discovery under paragraph (B)(2)(a)(i).

     (2) If an expert whom the defendant intends to call in any
     proceeding has not prepared a report of examination or tests, the
     court, upon motion, may order that the expert prepare and the
     defendant disclose a report stating the subject matter on which
     the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts to
     which the expert is expected to testify; and a summary of the
     expert’s opinions and the grounds for each opinion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573.

     Appellant’s textual argument is straightforward: per Rule 573(C)(1)(a)

the Commonwealth may seek, inter alia, expert reports so long as the

defendant has requested and received discovery under Rule 573(B)(1)(e),

which requires the Commonwealth to disclose, upon request, expert opinions

within the control of the Commonwealth.     Appellant did not request those

materials. Additionally, Rule 573(C)(2), while providing an independent basis

for disclosure upon the Commonwealth’s request, refers to an expert who has

not prepared a report, and here the expert was in the process of preparing

one. Accordingly, Appellant argues that there was no textual basis to order

discovery.

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       However, a case from our Supreme Court has held that, even in the

absence of reciprocal discovery, the trial court does not per se abuse its

discretion in ordering the defense to turn over expert reports to the

Commonwealth. In Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 595 A.2d 28 (Pa. 1991),

Faulkner filed a motion to retain psychiatric experts, which was granted.

However, he refused to meet with the Commonwealth’s psychiatrist. As a

result, “the trial court required [Faulkner] to reduce the opinions of the experts

to writings and provide them to the court and the prosecutor.” Id. at 35. On

appeal, Faulker alleged “that it was error for the court to order [him] to turn

over to the prosecution the experts’ reports before trial, without requiring the

prosecution to engage in reciprocal discovery.”            Id. at 37.   The Court

disagreed, explaining:
       For two reasons, this argument fails. First, [Faulkner] refused to
       be examined by the prosecution’s psychiatric expert prior to trial.
       As such, the prosecution did not have any reciprocal discovery to
       turn over to the appellant. Second, Rule 305(C)(2)[5] of the
       Pa.R.Crim.P. provides that:

          [I]f the Commonwealth files a motion for pretrial discovery,
          the court may order the defendant … to allow the …
          Commonwealth to inspect and copy … upon a showing of
          materiality to the preparation of the Commonwealth’s case
          and that the request is reasonable: (a) results or reports of
          physical or mental examinations … which the defendant
          intends to introduce as evidence in chief, or which were
          prepared by a witness who the defendant intends to call at
          the trial….

____________________________________________

5 The Rule has since been renumbered.              The quoted text is substantively
similar to the current text.

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       [Faulkner] has made no argument establishing that the trial judge
       abused his discretion in ordering him to turn over the pretrial
       reports of his expert witnesses. Rather, given the facts of this
       case, the trial judge’s rulings were reasonable.             See,
       Commonwealth v. Logan, … 549 A.2d 531 ([Pa.] 1988). … In
       the instant case, [Faulkner] refused to submit to a psychiatric
       examination and the prosecutor had a much stronger need to
       know the substance of the psychiatric experts[’] testimony.

Id. (emphasis in original).

       Both reasons also apply here. As in Faulker, the Commonwealth did

not possess any expert reports concerning the justifiable use of self-defense.

In most cases, the subject of a defense expert report will be addressing an

issue already raised by the Commonwealth, e.g., a competing DNA expert.

The Commonwealth did not initially intend to call an expert witness on the

justifiable use of force in its case-in-chief and thus had no reciprocal obligation

to fulfill.   The Faulkner Court effectively read the rule to mean that the

reciprocal discovery condition applies only when the Commonwealth has its

own report to provide.

       Next, the Commonwealth requested discovery on the grounds that it

needed to know what Appellant’s expert would say so that it could consult

with its own expert witnesses.      Thus, as in Faulker, the Commonwealth

claimed a need to know what that testimony would entail. We conclude that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in crediting the Commonwealth’s

reason for wanting the report.       Appellant’s expert was in the process of

finishing a report and Appellant indicated that the expert may testify at trial.

The court’s discovery order not only permitted the Commonwealth to consider

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its options in terms of retaining its own expert, but it also ensured that the

Commonwealth would be able to raise objections if the expert’s testimony

exceeded the scope of his review. Cf. Commonwealth v. Roles, 116 A.3d

122, 131–32 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Although there are no rules of procedure in

criminal cases precisely governing expert reports, it cannot be asserted that

either the Commonwealth or a defendant has carte blanche to allow an expert

to testify beyond the information contained in his or her report.       To hold

otherwise would eviscerate the requirement that reports be disclosed.”). In

this regard, we find that the intersection of this discovery ruling with the Rule

600 issue implicates the dual purpose of Rule 600.

      Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the
      protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the
      protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right
      to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given
      to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both
      to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating
      it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not
      designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith
      prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc).

      In this context, we conclude that the “effective prosecution of criminal

cases” includes consideration of the Commonwealth’s need to review the

material.     Permitting Appellant to call the expert without affording the

Commonwealth the opportunity to explore the issue would hamper the

Commonwealth’s ability to present its case on behalf of the citizens it

represents.    We do not diminish the effect of delaying the case further,

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especially where the matter had been postponed due to COVID-19.              Still,

Appellant’s role in causing delay cannot be overlooked. He had already agreed

to provide the report on an informal basis, and the Commonwealth was

entitled to rely on that representation.      Appellant later determined that he

should not have agreed to supply the report, and then claimed that trial should

proceed solely because he was ready. His change of heart was not conveyed

to the Commonwealth or the trial court until close to trial. At that point, the

Commonwealth understandably sought disclosure, as its own trial preparation

was premised on the understanding with Appellant’s attorneys that the report

would be provided.

      In concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring

Appellant to furnish the report, it follows that the trial court did not err in

attributing the delays to Appellant.     Accordingly, the combination of the

COVID-related closures, and the subsequent delays in commencing trial, are

all excluded from the Rule 600 calculation.

      We now address the Commonwealth’s due diligence obligations. While

many of the delays are attributable to Appellant, the COVID-19 closures

present a different consideration.      Per Lear, we will assume that the

emergency orders did not unambiguously suspend Rule 600 during the entire

period of the judicial emergency.     Thus, these closures qualify as judicial

delay, but the Commonwealth must show that it acted with due diligence. We

conclude that it did.

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      The decision in Harth, supra, establishes that the fortuity of a court

postponement cannot benefit the Commonwealth.               Consider the following

example. The Commonwealth has listed a case for trial one day before the

expiration of the mechanical run date, and none of the time is attributable to

the defendant. Assume that the Commonwealth is utterly unprepared for trial,

has failed to provide discovery, and did not subpoena any of its witnesses.

The Commonwealth prepares a postponement form, hoping that the

defendant will simply neglect to file a motion to dismiss when the case is

relisted for trial.    The trial court, however, suddenly declares that the

courtroom is unavailable, forcing a postponement.             Prior to Harth, the

prosecution has been saved by sheer luck. Harth changes that. The Court

adopted   Justice     Wecht’s   concurring   opinion   in   Mills,   supra,   which

summarized the point as follows:
      “Judicial delay” is not a mechanism or totem that exempts the
      Commonwealth from its obligations under the Rule. It may be
      invoked only after the Commonwealth has demonstrated that it is
      ready, able, and willing to proceed with the case against the
      defendant. Otherwise, the due diligence component of Rule 600
      would have little, if any, meaningful import.

Mills, 162 A.3d at 326–27 (Wecht, J., concurring). The Harth Court adopted

this view, and thus the Commonwealth must exercise due diligence

throughout the entire case.

      This is not a Harth situation. In that case, the prosecution had failed

to provide discovery throughout the case. “The Commonwealth provided no

explanation with respect to its failure to disclose discovery throughout the life

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of the case or, more specifically, regarding its failure to provide the defense

with the 15 new exhibits which triggered [Harth]’s second Rule 600 motion on

the morning of trial.”   Harth, 252 A.3d at 606.      Both Harth and Justice

Wecht’s concurrence in Mills focus on whether the Commonwealth was

otherwise prepared to go to trial if the delays had not occurred. Appellant

cites to no comparable inability of the Commonwealth to proceed to trial as

scheduled but for the postponements, and the record establishes that the

unavailability of the courtrooms due to COVID-19 closures had no bearing on

the Commonwealth’s readiness for trial.

      In arguing to the contrary, Appellant focuses on the fact that the

Commonwealth called an expert witness in its case-in-chief but did not consult

with that expert until long after the Rule 600 period would have expired. Thus,

the argument goes, the Commonwealth failed to act with due diligence

because the prosecution could have spoken to an expert well before that time.

      We are not persuaded by this argument. The salient point in time, in

our view, is the first trial listing in October of 2019. If the Commonwealth had

been prepared to go to trial at that date, then it acted with due diligence. As

stated in Harth, the Commonwealth’s due diligence obligation is to be ready

for trial within one year:
      We do not suggest that the Commonwealth must be prepared to
      proceed to trial the moment that a criminal case is initiated;
      rather, the Commonwealth must utilize that year to prepare itself
      for trial, as is required under Rule 600(A). We have not altered
      that timeline, but, instead, seek merely to ensure that the
      Commonwealth does not summarily rely upon the judiciary as an

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      excuse to forego preparation for pending criminal           cases,
      consistent with the language and purpose of Rule 600.

Id. at 618 n.15.

      The Commonwealth utilized the first 365 days to get ready for trial and

nothing indicates that the Commonwealth was unprepared to go to trial on the

first trial listing, which was postponed at Appellant’s request. All subsequent

postponements were solely attributable to Appellant or were due to COVID-

19. The fact that the Commonwealth ended up using additional evidence that

it could not have presented if trial had occurred as originally scheduled does

not mean that it was unprepared to go to trial at an earlier point in time. It

simply means that, had the trial proceeded as scheduled, the Commonwealth

would not have presented whatever additional evidence it uncovered in the

interim.   Appellant does not explain why the Commonwealth should be

precluded from conducting additional investigations during periods of delay

that it did not cause.

      Furthermore, Appellant’s argument ignores his own representations to

the Commonwealth that he would supply the prosecution with his expert

report. The Commonwealth may well have decided that consulting an expert

was not warranted until it read the material Appellant was ordered to disclose.

“Due diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not

require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the

Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.”         Commonwealth v.

Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010). Under the specific facts of this

case, where Appellant agreed on-the-record to provide his expert report to

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the Commonwealth, we agree with the trial court that “the Commonwealth

acted with due diligence to bring [Appellant] to trial throughout the lifetime of

this case.” TCO at 4. The trial court therefore did not err in denying the Rule

600 claim.6

       Appellant’s second issue addresses the introduction of exhibits during

the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness on the use of force,

Corporal Kevin Selverian.         Corporal Selverian testified that he used the

software program Input-Ace to examine the video surveillance. That software,

among other things, allows the viewer to “examine [video] frame-by-frame

for a particular detail associated with the events we’re looking at.”      N.T.,

10/27/21, at 733. The Commonwealth then asked the witness to narrate his

frame-by-frame review of the video surveillance by referencing exhibits the

expert had prepared.

       Appellant objected, stating that those exhibits “ha[ve] not been

provided” in discovery.       Id. at 734.      The Commonwealth argued that the

exhibits were demonstrative in nature and “not different than if I had this

witness mark a photo that’s already been provided” in discovery. Id. at 735.

The Commonwealth stated that the exhibits were based on the underlying

____________________________________________

6  Appellant also argues that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). As the trial court
noted, Appellant did not make any constitutional claim in his motion to
dismiss, and his constitutional arguments are thus waived.               See
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 421 A.2d 240, 245 n.7 (Pa. Super. 1980)
(finding a constitutional speedy trial claim waived due to Stokes’ failure to
raise it at trial court level).

                                          - 28 -
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video surveillance, which were disclosed in discovery. Appellant responded

that the exhibits were not demonstrative because “the video was put in a

specialized program to break it down[.]” Id. Appellant stated that he did not

object to playing the surveillance videos, but rather “to the frame by frame by

frame, which I haven’t been provided.” Id. at 736. The trial court stated,

“Whatever objection is being made is overruled. It’s the same exhibit that’s

already been entered.” Id.

      “Generally, evidence is admissible if it is relevant and competent. This

basic rule is equally applicable to the admission of photographs, as well as

other types of demonstrative evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 414

A.2d 1381, 1386 (Pa. 1980).      Appellant’s substantive argument relies on

Kopytin v. Aschinger, 947 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. 2008), and the portion of

Kopytin approvingly quoting the Commonwealth Court’s opinion in Robert

Hawthorne, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Stone), 460 A.2d 911 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983).

We conclude that these precedents are not on point.

      Both cases involve the introduction of videotapes to show that a person

was not disabled.    In Kopytin, the plaintiff sought medical expenses for

injuries suffered during an automobile accident. The defense introduced 16

minutes of surveillance footage, which showed the plaintiff carrying heavy

bags of groceries. Kopytin, 947 A.2d at 742. The plaintiff argued that the

evidence should not have been introduced because, inter alia, “the edited

version of the tape was misleading, and … it was produced one day before

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trial,” which did not permit sufficient time “to prepare a cross-examination as

to the differences between the edited and unedited versions.” Id. at 748.

      We agreed that the excerpted video was potentially misleading,

approvingly quoting Hawthorne. In that case, the videotape in question was

introduced to establish that an individual was not disabled. The videotape

showed the person “doing housework, yardwork and indicating that the

claimant was capable of moving his head from side to side. The claimant then

admitted that he had engaged in most of the activities depicted on these films,

but he insisted that he remains disabled.” Hawthorne, 460 A.2d at 911–12.

The Commonwealth Court remarked, “we have recognized that a short

sequence of film taken after a lengthy period of surveillance often can distort

the true nature of an individual’s injury, and is thus of questionable value as

evidence.” Id. at 912 (citation omitted).

      It appears from the opinions in both decisions that the full video was

not otherwise admitted, only the edited portions.        That selective editing

created the misleading impression. That is a significant distinction from this

case, as Appellant had access to all surveillance videos and indeed relied on

those videos to support his self-defense claim. The expert’s testimony did not

rely on a substantive edit or modification of the underlying surveillance videos.

This is not a case where the expert used forensic tools to “clean up” audio

recordings to make certain conversations less garbled or used software to

digitally enhance video. In such a case, we would agree that the modified

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material would have to be disclosed to the defense to properly prepare for

trial.

         That distinction aside, Appellant has waived any argument that a frame-

by-frame presentation is misleading.               Appellant’s argument at trial had

nothing to do with the admission of the evidence in terms of relevance and

more with whether the material should have been disclosed in discovery. On

appeal, Appellant submits that the trial court erred in failing to balance the

probative value of the material against the prejudicial value, as the video

“made it appear as if [Appellant], during each 1/15 of a second, made choices

or could have made different choices.”                Appellant’s Brief at 66.   The

Commonwealth responds on the merits, and, alternatively, that any error in

the admission of the exhibits was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.7

____________________________________________

7 Appellant has filed an application to strike the Commonwealth’s brief.
Appellant elected to proceed under Pa.R.A.P. 2154(b) (dealing with large
records), thus deferring preparation of the reproduced record until after the
briefs have been served. Per Pa.R.A.P. 2187(b)(3), the parties were required
to serve each other with advance briefs. Appellant’s application to strike noted
that the Commonwealth’s advance brief materially differed from the brief filed
with this Court, and requested that we strike the Commonwealth’s brief.

       In its reply, the Commonwealth concedes that its final brief added
approximately 10 pages to the advance brief sent to Appellant.          The
Commonwealth explains that the attorney who filed the advance brief left the
office before the final brief was filed, and the current Assistant District
Attorney explained that the added material developed a harmless error
argument which had been omitted by the former attorney. We do not address
the Commonwealth’s harmless error argument and deny the application to
strike.

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       We conclude that Appellant has waived any claim that the frame-by-

frame presentation was misleading. “[A] theory of error different from that

presented to the trial jurist is waived on appeal, even if both theories support

the same basic allegation of error which gives rise to the claim for relief.”

Tong-Summerford v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 190 A.3d 631, 649 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellant’s objection

at trial, as quoted supra, did not suggest to the trial court that the frame-by-

frame analysis was misleading in the manner now argued on appeal. See

N.T., 10/29/21, at 736 (“If they’re using it, I should have been provided it.

That’s basic discovery.”).8 His objection was limited to the Commonwealth’s

failure to alert him ahead of time of its intention to have the expert review the

video frame-by-frame.9 We thus conclude that Appellant did not preserve a

claim that the frame-by-frame analysis was so misleading that the evidence

should have been excluded on that basis.10

____________________________________________

8 Appellant also argues that the evidence was not authenticated.       This claim
has been waived as Appellant did not cite authentication as a basis to exclude
the exhibits. Moreover, it is difficult to see how Appellant could argue that the
underlying videos are not authentic as Appellant likewise relied on the videos
to support his self-defense claim.

9 The jury requested to see the frame-by-frame analysis during deliberations.

Appellant did argue at that point that the jury should not be shown the exhibits
because the frame-by-frame breakdown was misleading and more prejudicial
than probative, but that objection came far too late to preserve the issue for
appeal.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/2023

____________________________________________

10 In Commonwealth v. Hindi, 631 A.2d 1341 (Pa. Super. 1993), the trial
court denied a defendant’s request to slow down a video. We stated:
       In a sense, all slow motion and freeze frame video distorts reality.
       It distorts it in the same way that magnification of a photograph
       distorts reality.      Such distortion may enhance the jury’s
       understanding or it may do the opposite. It is the function of the
       trial court, as was done in this case, to view the evidence in
       camera. If the judge concludes that the jury’s understanding will
       be enhanced and that the slow motion or freeze frame is more
       probative than prejudicial, then the judge should admit the
       evidence. Of primary relevance is the purpose for which the party
       offers a slow motion or freeze frame version of a videotape.

Id. at 1345.

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