Court Opinion

ID: 9632048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:00:00.287775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:07.079833
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, J.,
specially concurring.
The upshot of the plurality opinion is that all real property, whether developed or occupied or not, is entitled to the same constitutional protection as “houses” under Article I, section 9, because “the well-established right to control entry gives the possessor of the land a privacy interest in it as against anyone with a lesser right to possession.” 87 Or App at 10. There is no doubt that a person has that kind of privacy interest or that Article I, section 9, protects a person’s privacy interest in “houses, papers and effects.” State v. Duffy et al., 135 Or 290, 295 P 953 (1931). The question is whether, given the right to exclude others, the possessor is entitled to the same constitutional protection afforded houses under Article I, section 9, even though a house includes no more than the house itself and its curtilage. State v. Lee, 120 Or 643, 253 P 533 (1927).1 This court may not overrule Lee, as the plurality *12opinion apparently would do, at least impliedly; neither do I think it is necessary to do so in this case in order to extend constitutional protection to objectively manifested privacy interests in land not within the curtilage.
The occupant of a house is presumed to have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in it, “the quintessential domain protected by the constitutional guarantee against warrantless searches.” State v. Louis, 296 Or 57, 60, 672 P2d 708 (1983). It need not be shown that the occupant expected privacy. On the other hand, if the person conducts himself in such a way that his acts may be seen readily without technological enhancement, he sacrifices his protected privacy interest, and an officer’s observation of the conduct does not constitute a search. State v. Louis, supra. I do not understand the plurality to disagree with that proposition.
Our difference lies in resolving a question that is not presented in this case: whether a warrant is necessary before the police may seize contraband that they have observed on land outside the curtilage from a lawful vantage point without technological enhancement. The plurality would say that, although the observation was made without a search, all land is entitled to be treated the same as a house and its curtilage, and therefore a warrant is required in order to seize the obvious contraband. I would hold that, if it is necessary for the officers to trespass on property not within the curtilage in order to observe the activity or contraband in question, there is an unreasonable search and, therefore, any ensuing seizure would be unlawful.
Whether Article I, section 9, extends individual privacy rights beyond “persons, houses, papers and effects” and, if so, on what basis, has not been decided. Defendants argue that we should apply the analysis of Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 88 S Ct 507, 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), although no case in the Supreme Court or in this court has adopted that analysis in considering the protection afforded by Article I, section 9. Neither has any case rejected it.
The most that I can make of the decided cases is that there is no per se exception to Article I, section 9, applicable to areas outside the curtilage — so-called “open fields.” See Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170, 104 S Ct 1735, 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984). Whether the area is protected constitutionally *13depends on the facts of each case: has the defendant’s cognizable privacy interest been invaded by the police. How that privacy interest is determined is an open question. The Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the protection afforded by the Oregon Constitution is in State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206, 729 P2d 524 (1986):
“Article I, section 9, protects privacy and possessory interests. A ‘search’ occurs when a person’s privacy interests are invaded.”
In Owens, the object seized and searched was a transparent container — an “effect” specifically protected by Article I, section 9. Nevertheless, the court stated that not all containers merit the same protection, because some, such as a transparent one, announce their contents; therefore, “no cognizable privacy interest inheres in their contents,” 302 Or at 206, and they may be opened and their contents seized. The court did not elaborate on how it determines whether a person has a “cognizable privacy interest”; however, the apparent reasoning is that one who carries something in a transparent container has manifested no expectation that the contents will be private, because they are in “plain view.”
Prior decisions have dealt briefly with the subject and suggest that the test is whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the thing searched. See State v. Perry, 298 Or 21, 688 P2d 827 (1984); State v. Elkins, 245 Or 279, 422 P2d 250 (1966). In State v. Holt, 291 Or 343, 630 P2d 854 (1981), the court applied the Katz analysis in considering whether the protection of Article I, section 9, extended beyond a physical trespass, although it did so because the defendant had not argued that the analysis should be different than under the Fourth Amendment.
Under Katz, whether a claimed privacy interest deserves constitutional protection depends on whether the person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. If both parts of the test are satisfied, the individual’s privacy interest is protected, even though the place in which his privacy right is asserted is not mentioned specifically in Article I, section 9. Because I believe that both parts of the Katz test present problems as applied to a person’s privacy interest in real property, I perceive no reason to adopt it here. As to the first part — the so-*14called “subjective” expectation — it would seem that the more tolerant the courts or the legislature are of governmental intrusion, the lower the individual’s subjective expectations will be, because the conduct, over time, will become less offensive to us all.2 Accordingly, an objective standard would be preferable. With respect to real property in particular, frequently there are objective indications that privacy is expected. If the property is protected from public view by virtue of its topography or vegetation, there is, without more, an objective manifestation that the place is private, without regard to the person’s subjective expectations. In such a case, one need not build a wall around it or even post “no trespassing” signs to manifest that expectation. As we said in State v. Russo, supra, n 1, there is a “natural exclusionary barrier.” 68 Or App at 764.
On the other hand, if the property’s physical characteristics are such that the area in question may be seen without technological enhancement from a public place, such as a road, no amount of subjective expectation3 that activities in that area will be private will make the area a constitutionally protected one. In that circumstance, the possessor would be in a situation analogous to the defendant in State v. Owens, supra, who carried contraband in a transparent vial (her effect) that announced its contents, thereby making it permissible for the police to seize it and test its contents.
Similarly, the second part of the Katz analysis — whether the expectation of privacy is a reasonable one that society is prepared to honor — is not helpful as applied to a person’s privacy interest in real property. If the lawful *15occupier or owner of the property has a cognizable privacy interest in the area in question, he is entitled to constitutional protection against an unreasonable search. The common law of trespass protects his right to exclude others; in addition, the legislature has made it a crime for one to enter on premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so. See ORS 164.245;4 ORS 164.205(3)(4)(6).5 Accordingly, a search is unreasonable if, in order to observe activities in the area of the property in question without technological enhancement, it is necessary to trespass on the property.
Here, the cultivated area of the Dixson’s property was not visible from any place on the ground where the public, including law enforcement officers, had a right to be. Because the old skid roads that entered the property were not passable in passenger cars, and each of them was cabled off and “No Hunting” signs were posted, there was nothing to indicate to a reasonable person that he could enter without permission. The Dixsons’ nearest neighbor is approximately one-half mile away. Ready access from the Rogge land was prevented by impenetrable brush. The Dixsons, therefore, have a cognizable privacy interest in the area in question that is protected by Article I, section 9.
When the officers entered the Dixsons’ land, they were trespassers invading the Dixsons’ privacy interests and *16were engaged in a search for which they had no warrant and for which there was no exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Owens, supra. One of them recognized that fact in testifying that he had no intention of trespassing on the Dix-son property but entered under the mistaken belief that he was on Rogge’s property. The evidence was seized as a result of an unreasonable search.
Accordingly, albeit for slightly different reasons, I concur in the result reached by the plurality with respect to all three cases.
Richardson and Warren, JJ., join in this special concurrence.

 Other cases recognize the constitutional protection afforded an individual’s house and its curtilage. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 120 Or 643, 253 P 533 (1927); State v. Roles, 75 Or App 63, 705 P2d 227 (1985); State v. Ohling, 70 Or App 249, 688 P2d 1384, rev den 298 Or 334 (1984); State v. Russo, 68 Or App 760, 683 P2d 163 (1984); State v. Stanton, 7 Or App 286, 490 P2d 1274 (1971), overruled in part State v. Walle, 52 Or App 963, 630 P2d 377 (1981); State v. Brown, 1 Or App 322, 461 P2d 836 (1969), rev den (1970).

 As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Oliver v. United States, supra, 466 US at 197 n 21:
“Perhaps the most serious danger in the decision today is that, if the police are permitted routinely to engage in such behavior, it will gradually become less offensive to us all. As Justice Brandeis once observed: ‘Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law....’ Olmstead v. United States, 277 US, 438, 485, 72 L Ed 944, 48 S Ct 564, 66 ALR 376 (dissenting opinion).”

 However, some objective manifestations that privacy is expected may succeed in affording protection, while others may not. For example, a solid wall that is high enough to prevent members of the public from viewing activities on the property would probably be sufficient; however, a fence through which a person may see without technological enhancement would not, even if “no trespassing” signs were posted at regular intervals.

 ORS 164.245 provides:
“(1) A person commits the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises.
“(2) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a Class C misdemeanor.”

 ORS 164.205(3),(4) and (6) provide:
“As used in ORS 164.205 to 164.270, except as the context requires otherwise:
“(3) ‘Enter or remain unlawfully’ means:
“(a) To enter or remain in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public or when the entrant is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so; or
“(b) To fail to leave premises that are open to the public after being lawfully directed to do so by the person in charge.
“(4) ‘Open to the public’ means premises which by their physical nature, function, custom, usage, notice or lack thereof or other circumstances at the time would cause a reasonable person to believe that no permission to enter or remain is required.
<<* * * % *
“(6) ‘Premises’ includes any building and any real property, whether privately or publicly owned.”