Court Opinion

ID: 9487723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:24:33.54851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:26.839826
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The court today looks at only part of the problem presented to us, and ignores completely the mandatory provisions of the Missouri Title Transfer Statute which provides that: “[i]n the event of a sale or transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle ..., the holder of [the] certificate [of ownership] shall endorse on [the certificate] an assignment ... and deliver [it] to the buyer at the time of the delivery to him of such motor vehicle.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 301.210.1 (Supp.1993). The statute further provides that “the sale of any motor vehicle or trailer registered under the laws of this state, without the assignment of such certificate of ownership, shall be fraudulent and void.” Id. at § 301.210.4 (emphasis added). The transfer of the Buick to the Bernardos without transfer of the certificate of title is thus fraudulent and void. The Buick was not an owned auto under the uninsured motorist policy provisions entitling the Bernardos to such coverage.
The court holds that denying the Bernar-dos coverage is contrary to the public policy of Missouri as expressed in the Uninsured Motorist Statute. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 379.203.1. However, this case also presents an issue involving the public policy of Missouri with respect to the transfer of titles to automobiles. The transfer of title requirement, as embodied in Mo.Rev.Stat. § 301.210, is “an attempt to prevent fraud and deceit in the sale of cars and to hamper traffic in stolen vehicles.” Faygal v. Shelter Insurance Co., 689 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Mo.App.1985). To hold that the public policy behind the Uninsured Motorist Statute requires that coverage be extended to the Bernardos, under the circumstances of this ease, would reward violation of the Missouri Title Transfer Statute.
The sole basis of the court’s opinion is Otto v. Farmers Insurance Co., 558 S.W.2d 713 (Mo.App.1977), a ease which was not cited by either of the parties in their briefs. The court in Otto struck down a policy exclusion. However, the Otto court did hot reach the issue which is determinative in this case. Here we are not determining the validity of a policy exclusion, but rather the validity of the terms which define the covered automobile, and whether the Bernardos are entitled to coverage under those terms.2 In ruling in favor of the Bernardos, the court concluded *276that the Uninsured Motorist Statute requires symmetry between liability and uninsured motorist coverage. Neither the language of the Uninsured Motorist Statute, nor the court’s reasoning in Otto supports such a conclusion.
In Famuliner, 619 S.W.2d 894 (Mo.App.1981) the court rejected an argument similar to the argument now asserted by the Bernardo’s and accepted by the majority. The Famuliner court applied the Uninsured Motorist Statute and concluded that the statute is not violated “unless a policy condition limits uninsured motorist protection as to persons who otherwise qualify as insureds for liability purposes.” Id. at 897. Famuliner claimed that he was entitled to uninsured motorists coverage under his parents’ two automobile policies as a result of a collision while operating the motorcycle that he owned and insured. Id. at 896. In rejecting Famuliner’s claim, the court held that although he was entitled to recover under both his own automobile and motorcycle policy, he could not recover under his parents’ policies because those policies, while providing coverage for relatives resident in the parents’ household, did not provide coverage to relatives who owned motor vehicles. Id. at 897. Similarly, the Northland policy while providing uninsured motorist coverage for vehicles owned by Bernardo, did not provide such coverage for vehicles which Bernardo did not own. The significance of Famuliner is that it recognizes that the Uninsured Motorist Statute does not prohibit the issuance of policies which limit the scope of uninsured motorist coverage.
The policy issued by Northland complied with the mandate of the statute in that it included uninsured motorist coverage. Mo. Rev.Stat. § 379.203.1. Northland’s limitation of the uninsured motorist coverage to owned vehicles merely limits the category of vehicles covered under the policy and not the persons covered by the policy. Under the policy, Bernardo would have been entitled to the uninsured motorist coverage had the certificate of title been transferred to him as required by section 301.210 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, but that was not the case. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 301.210.
In this case, we are confronted with an insurance policy which provides uninsured motorist coverage only for owned vehicles. The Bernardos do not qualify under the terms of the policy. I find no support for the majority’s conclusion that the Uninsured Motorist Statute requires symmetry between liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage. Thus, the court errs in its unnecessarily broad application of the Uninsured Motorist Statute and its complete disregard for the mandatory Title Transfer Statute.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. It is also significant that Otto involved an individual liability insurance policy, and the Bernardo policy was a commercial policy covering an automobile dealership and providing garage keeper's coverage. The policy declarations demonstrate that the uninsured motorist coverage premium was based upon seven automobile license plates, which must have been attached to the auto in order for it to be covered under the policy. The vehicle operated by the Bernardos at the time of the accident was not owned by the dealership and pursuant to § 301.560.7 of Missouri Revised Statutes should not have been operated with a dealership license tag. Mo .Rev. Stat. § 301.560.7 (Supp.1993).
There are substantial differences between insurance needs of individuals and those in the automobile business. The insurance policy in this case was tailored to accommodate a dealership rather than an individual, and therefore the court’s reasoning in Otto does not apply.