Court Opinion

ID: 9907889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 16:01:36.025142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:59.769547
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2303   Document: 47     Page: 1    Filed: 12/07/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                 WILLIAM B. JOLLEY,
                      Petitioner

                            v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
              DEVELOPMENT,
                  Respondent
            ______________________

                       2022-2303
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. AT-3330-18-0138-B-1.
                 ______________________

                Decided: December 7, 2023
                 ______________________

    WILLIAM B. JOLLEY, Brunswick, GA, pro se.

     MATNEY ELIZABETH ROLFE, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, FRANKLIN E.
 WHITE, JR.
                  ______________________

 Before TARANTO, CHEN, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-2303    Document: 47      Page: 2    Filed: 12/07/2023

 2                                              JOLLEY v. HUD

 PER CURIAM.
     William B. Jolley applied for two positions with the
 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
 (HUD)—each one to serve as a field office director—but
 was not selected for either position. He then sought correc-
 tive action from the Merit Systems Protection Board, as-
 serting that HUD had violated the Veterans Employment
 Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA), 5 U.S.C. § 3300a. The
 Board denied his request. Jolley v. Department of Housing
 and Urban Development, No. AT-3330-18-0138-B-1, 2022
 WL 3578093 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 19, 2022); SAppx. 307–24. 1 On
 Mr. Jolley’s appeal, we affirm the Board’s decision.
                               I
      In February 2017, HUD issued two job-vacancy an-
 nouncements, each announcement addressing the same
 pair of job openings for field office director positions: one
 position in Louisville, Kentucky; the other position in Co-
 lumbia, South Carolina. SAppx. 167, 308. One of the an-
 nouncements (17-HUD-269) identified a merit-promotion
 process, and the other (17-HUD-270-P) identified an open
 competitive-examination process. See SAppx. 185–86,
 196–98, 204; see also Joseph v. Federal Trade Commission,
 505 F.3d 1380, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (describing gov-
 ernment hiring processes). Mr. Jolley, a preference-eligible
 veteran, was interviewed for both positions but was not se-
 lected. SAppx. 205, 308. Ultimately, both positions were
 filled via a merit-promotion process. SAppx. 205.
     In December 2017, Mr. Jolley filed an appeal with the
 Board under 5 U.S.C. § 3330a, alleging that HUD’s deci-
 sion not to hire him for either position violated the VEOA.
 SAppx. 1–10. In January 2018, the assigned administra-
 tive judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

     1 “SAppx.” refers to the supplemental appendix filed
 by HUD in this court with its brief as respondent.
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 JOLLEY v. HUD                                              3

 SAppx. 101–14. Mr. Jolley sought review by the full Board,
 SAppx. 118–27, and in May 2022, the Board reversed the
 dismissal, holding that Mr. Jolley had met the require-
 ments to establish the Board’s jurisdiction to hear his
 VEOA appeal, and remanded the case for adjudication on
 the merits. SAppx. 325–29.
      On August 19, 2022, the administrative judge denied
 Mr. Jolley’s request for corrective action under the VEOA,
 SAppx. 307–24, relying on the written record because there
 were “no genuine issues of material fact in dispute,” SAppx.
 307–08. The administrative judge ruled that Mr. Jolley
 failed to establish a VEOA violation because (1) he did not
 show that HUD violated any statutes or regulations re-
 lated to veterans’ preference and (2) he was allowed to com-
 pete for both positions as required under the merit-
 promotion process. SAppx. 308–16. That ruling became
 the final decision of the Board on September 23, 2022.
 SAppx. 316.
     Mr. Jolley timely filed his appeal on September 29,
 2022, as permitted by 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). We have
 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(b)(1)(A).
                              II
     We will affirm the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) ar-
 bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
 in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
 quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
 (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”            5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(c). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence
 as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
 a conclusion.’” McLaughlin v. Office of Personnel Manage-
 ment, 353 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Matsu-
 shita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927,
 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). “The petitioner [in this court, Mr.
 Jolley] bears the burden of establishing error in the Board’s
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 4                                               JOLLEY v. HUD

 decision.” Harris v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 142
 F.3d 1463, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
     In the present appeal, Mr. Jolley’s arguments fall into
 two classes. First, he asserts that the Board made several
 factual and legal errors related to the merits of his VEOA
 claims. Second, he asserts that the Board committed mis-
 cellaneous procedural errors during the proceedings. We
 address these arguments in turn.
                               A
     We start by considering Mr. Jolley’s challenges related
 to the merits of the Board’s decision. “Federal agencies
 generally use two types of selection to fill vacancies: (1) the
 open ‘competitive examination’ process and (2) the ‘merit
 promotion’ process.’” Joseph, 505 F.3d at 1381. Under the
 competitive-examination process, applicants are given a
 numerical rating and placed on a list of qualified personnel
 for appointment. Id. (citing 5 C.F.R. § 2.1). The three high-
 est-rated applicants are then considered by the appointing
 official, who is generally required to select one of them. Id.
 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3318(a)). Under the VEOA, veterans re-
 ceive special advantages in this process; for example, five
 or ten points are added to their scores, and they are ranked
 ahead of candidates with the same score. Id. at 1381–82
 (first citing 5 U.S.C. § 3309; 5 C.F.R. § 337.101(b); and then
 citing 5 U.S.C. § 3313; 5 C.F.R. § 332.401). Under the
 merit-promotion process, veterans are not entitled to those
 hiring preferences (e.g., veterans’ point preferences). Id. at
 1382. But veterans are guaranteed the opportunity to ap-
 ply and compete. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1)).
     A preference-eligible veteran, which Mr. Jolley undis-
 putedly is, can present either of two types of claims to the
 Board under the VEOA. The first is a claim that an agency
 violated his rights under a statute or regulation that re-
 lates to veterans’ preferences in federal employment. See
 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A). The second is a claim that an
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 JOLLEY v. HUD                                              5

 agency denied him the opportunity to compete for a vacant
 position. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3304(f)(1), 3330a(a)(1)(B).
    Here, Mr. Jolley appears to argue that it was error for
 the Board not to consider the amount of time that elapsed
 between the announcement of a field officer director posi-
 tion in Columbia and the agency’s eventual filling of that
 position. But he has not shown that this elapsed-time
 grievance gives him a VEOA claim of either of the two
 types. As to the first, Mr. Jolley has failed to identify a
 statute or regulation related to hiring timing that is rele-
 vant to veterans’ preference rights. As to the second, Mr.
 Jolley was undeniably given an opportunity to compete. He
 was listed on the Columbia position hiring certificates, see
 SAppx. 208–09, and was interviewed for the position, see
 SAppx. 205. See Joseph, 505 F.3d at 1383–84 (explaining
 that the petitioner was given a full opportunity to compete
 when he was included on the merit-promotion list and in-
 terviewed); Abell v. Department of the Navy, 343 F.3d 1378,
 1383–85 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
      Mr. Jolley next alleges that the Board incorrectly
 stated that vacancy announcement 17-HUD-269, with its
 competitive-examination process, was “for Louisville” and
 that vacancy announcement 17-HUD-270-P, with its merit-
 promotion process, was “for Columbia,” SAppx. 308 n.1,
 309, when in fact both vacancy announcements advertised
 both positions (in the two locations). But Mr. Jolley has not
 shown how the Board’s description produced an error in
 finding no VEOA claim. He has identified no statute or
 regulation that is violated by dual-position announce-
 ments. In a case in which a single position was the subject
 of two announcements, we found no violation and ex-
 plained that, when hiring, an agency has “the discretion to
 fill a vacant position by any authorized method.” Joseph,
 505 F.3d at 1384–85 (citation omitted); see 5 C.F.R.
 § 330.102. Mr. Jolley has not shown a violation on the facts
 he describes: HUD accepted applications for the positions
 under both the competitive-examination and merit-
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 6                                              JOLLEY v. HUD

 promotion processes and ultimately chose to fill both posi-
 tions under the merit-promotion procedure. Mr. Jolley also
 was clearly given an opportunity to compete for both posi-
 tions.
     Relatedly, Mr. Jolley offers no sound criticism of the
 Board’s decision when he points out that HUD did not uti-
 lize category rating in making its hiring decisions. Under
 the merit-promotion process, the process by which both the
 Louisville and Columbia positions were ultimately filled,
 see SAppx. 205, HUD was not required to use category rat-
 ing. Indeed, the VEOA expressly states that the “oppor-
 tunity to compete” provision which applies to the merit-
 promotion process, “shall not be construed to confer an en-
 titlement to veterans’ preference that is not otherwise re-
 quired by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(3) (emphasis added); see
 also Joseph, 505 F.3d at 1383 (“[A]n employee is not enti-
 tled to veterans’ preference in the merit promotion pro-
 cess.” (citation omitted)).
     Mr. Jolley also argues that he has been “adversely af-
 fected by HUD’s non-compliance with 42 U.S.C.
 [§] 3535(p).” Pet’r Inf. Br. at 12–13. The cited subsection
 relates to the reorganization of HUD field offices. The
 Board correctly found it irrelevant to Mr. Jolley’s VEOA
 claim. See SAppx. 309–10.
      Finally, Mr. Jolley appears to argue that the Board “ac-
 cepted argument” about the Uniformed Services Employ-
 ment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)
 and thus should have decided this case on USERRA
 grounds. But Mr. Jolley’s USERRA claims related to these
 field office director positions have never been part of this
 appeal, see SAppx. 6, and indeed have already been ad-
 dressed separately, by the Board and this court, see Jolley
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 JOLLEY v. HUD                                             7

 v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 752 F. App’x 964 (Fed.
 Cir. 2018). 2
                              B
     We now turn to Mr. Jolley’s procedural arguments.
 First, Mr. Jolley argues that the Board erred in deciding
 his appeal without a hearing. We discern no error. A hear-
 ing is unnecessary if there is no genuine issue of fact that
 could alter the outcome. See 5 C.F.R. § 1208.23(b). We
 have recognized this familiar principle in the VEOA con-
 text before. Jones v. Department of Health and Human
 Services, 640 F. App’x 861, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2006). As dis-
 cussed above, Mr. Jolley’s legal arguments are unavailing,
 and he has failed to identify a factual dispute that could
 change the outcome of his case.
     Finally, Mr. Jolley argues that the administrative
 judge who decided his case is “according to the criteria in
 Lucia v. SEC, [138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018),] not constitutionally
 qualified.” Pet’r Inf. Br. at 13. That argument lacks merit.
 We have previously held that the Board’s administrative
 judges are not principal officers under the Appointments
 Clause. McIntosh v. Department of Defense, 53 F.4th 630,
 638–41 (Fed. Cir. 2022). And if the Board’s administrative
 judges are inferior officers, the administrative judge here
 was properly appointed under the Appointments Clause—

    2     For this reason, we also deny Mr. Jolley’s motion
 for reconsideration of our January 25, 2023 order directing
 him to pay the docketing fee or move to proceed in forma
 pauperis (if appropriate). Motion Regarding USERRA Fee
 Waiver, ECF No. 18; see Order, ECF No. 17; Order, ECF
 No. 20. With no USERRA claim here, Mr. Jolley is not en-
 titled to invoke the exemption from the docketing fee appli-
 cable to petitions for review of a Board decision where the
 underlying appeal at the Board involved a claim under
 USERRA. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4323(h), 4324; Fed. Cir. R. 52 note.
Case: 22-2303    Document: 47      Page: 8     Filed: 12/07/2023

 8                                              JOLLEY v. HUD

 by the Board’s quorum as the “head[] of department[].” See
 id. at 641–42. While the Board lacked a quorum between
 January 7, 2017 and March 3, 2022, a reconstituted
 quorum of the Board, which qualifies as a “head[] of depart-
 ment[]” under the Appointments Clause, id. at 641, issued
 an order on March 4, 2022, ratifying prior appointments of
 administrative judges—including the administrative judge
 here. See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board Ratifica-
 tion     Order    (Mar.    4,     2022),    available     at
 https://www.mspb.gov/foia/files/AJ_Ratification_Order_3-
 4-2022.pdf. That ratification order was issued over two
 months before Mr. Jolley’s case was remanded for the ad-
 judication that is the subject of the present appeal. See
 SAppx. 325–26.
                             III
     We have considered Mr. Jolley’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons,
 the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is af-
 firmed.
     The parties shall bear their own costs.
                        AFFIRMED