Court Opinion

ID: 9905804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:02:51.811243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:53.712292
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13884    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 11/30/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13884
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       KURT BATUCAN SHELDON,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cr-00118-TJC-MCR-1
                          ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                22-13884

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Kurt Batucan Sheldon appeals his 262-month sentence,
       which represents a downward variance from the 840-month guide-
       lines sentence, for producing and distributing child pornography.
       Sheldon contends that the District Court erred in two ways: first,
       by imposing an unreasonable sentence, and second, by violating
       the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
       punishment.
              But Sheldon’s procedural reasonableness argument is fore-
       closed by our established precedent and his substantive reasonable-
       ness claim lacks merit because the District Court duly considered
       the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. As for his Eighth
       Amendment argument, it fails because Sheldon cites no binding
       precedent establishing that a sentence below the guidelines violates
       the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, we affirm.
                                 I. Background
              In late May 2020, a Clay County Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce (CCSO)
       Deputy learned that a 12-year-old minor victim (MV) had ex-
       changed sexually explicit messages, pictures, and videos with an
       adult male. This interaction began when MV posted on social me-
       dia seeking friends and an individual with the username “K t” re-
       sponded. MV told “K t” that she was ﬁfteen and “K t” told her that
       he was twenty-ﬁve to twenty-nine years old. The conversation be-
       came sexual when they began messaging on Snapchat. During
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       22-13884              Opinion of the Court                        3

       their interactions, “K t” persuaded MV to send over ﬁfty explicit
       pictures and videos.
              Federal law enforcement tracked the IP address connected
       to the Snapchat account and found it was assigned to Sheldon’s ad-
       dress in Interlachen, Florida. Law enforcement searched Sheldon’s
       bedroom and found a thumb drive with multiple videos and images
       of child pornography.
              In an interview, Sheldon estimated that he asked at least ten
       girls he knew to be underage to send him sexually explicit images,
       including MV. Sheldon also admitted that he had been viewing
       child pornography for several years, was sexually attracted to chil-
       dren, and masturbated while viewing child pornography. At least
       1,070 images and 210 videos of child pornography were discovered
       on Sheldon’s electronic devices.
              In 2022, Sheldon pleaded guilty to one count of producing
       child pornography and two counts of distribution. At sentencing,
       neither party objected to the presentence investigation report,
       which gave Sheldon a total oﬀense level of forty-three and a crimi-
       nal history category I. The guidelines were capped at the statutory
       maximum of 840 months’ imprisonment.
              The Government recommended a sentencing range of 292
       to 365 months, underscoring Sheldon’s progression from viewing
       to producing child pornography and using social media to groom
       minors. Sheldon sought a downward variance to the ﬁfteen-year
       mandatory minimum. He argued that this was his ﬁrst criminal
       oﬀense, that the sentencing guidelines should carry minimal
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13884

       weight because they were “skewed,” that the Government’s recom-
       mendation amounted to a life sentence, and emphasized his ac-
       ceptance of the nature and circumstances of the oﬀense.
               The District Court acknowledged the gravity of the case, de-
       scribing it as “child pornography of the worst order.” While rec-
       ognizing that mere gratiﬁcation from viewing such material is con-
       cerning, the District Court emphasized that Sheldon took it further
       by grooming MV, escalating from innocent conversations to ex-
       plicit sexual acts. The District Court found that Sheldon’s history
       and characteristics, including his major depressive disorder, were
       not “completely remarkable” and that many with such a disorder
       don’t engage in child pornography. The District Court acknowl-
       edged Sheldon’s forthrightness with law enforcement and genuine
       remorse. Still, it stressed the need for a sentence that reﬂected the
       seriousness of the oﬀense and provided accountability. The Dis-
       trict Court expressed uncertainty about Sheldon’s low risk of recid-
       ivism and underscored the importance of public protection in de-
       termining the sentence. The District Court agreed that the sen-
       tencing guidelines were “not very helpful” here. However, it disa-
       greed that the Government’s recommended sentence was “a life
       sentence.”
              Ultimately, the District Court sentenced Sheldon to 262
       months’ imprisonment followed by a life term of supervised re-
       lease. Sheldon objected to the reasonableness of his sentence and
       now appeals.
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       22-13884               Opinion of the Court                         5

                                  II. Discussion
                                A. Reasonableness
              Sheldon argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasona-
       ble. He says U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2G2.2 (U.S.
       Sent’g Comm’n 2021)—used to calculate his oﬀense level—concen-
       trates all oﬀenders at or near the statutory maximum, which con-
       travenes § 3553’s requirements. He argues we should invalidate
       U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, citing a 2012 Sentencing Commission report re-
       garding the sentencing disparities among nonproduction child por-
       nography defendants. He concedes we rejected this argument in
       United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888 (11th Cir. 2014), but asks us to
       reexamine it.
              We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of
       discretion. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir.
       2010). Reviewing reasonableness is a two-part process that requires
       us to ensure that the District Court did not commit a signiﬁcant
       procedural error and that the sentence is substantively reasonable
       under the totality of the circumstances. Id. The party challenging
       the sentence bears the burden of showing unreasonableness. Id.
               We will hold that a signiﬁcant procedural error has been
       made if a district court calculates the guidelines incorrectly, disre-
       gards the § 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on clearly erroneous
       facts, neglects to explain the sentence, or treats the guidelines as
       mandatory rather than advisory. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
       51 (2007). Or if it treats the guidelines as presumptively reasonable.
       United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 880 (11th Cir. 2011).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-13884

              In Cubero, this Court addressed child pornography cases spe-
       ciﬁcally when it discussed a Sentencing Commission report on the
       deﬁciencies of the child pornography guideline provisions. 754
       F.3d at 900. We held that the report did not aﬀect the validity of
       § 2G2.2 in nonproduction child pornography cases. Id. As Sheldon
       recognizes, this forecloses his § 2G2.2 argument. We are bound by
       the prior panel precedent rule because Cubero has not been over-
       ruled by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc. See
       United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016) (per cu-
       riam). The District Court didn’t treat the guidelines as mandatory
       or presumptively reasonable. It explicitly acknowledged that the
       guidelines were “not very helpful,” which explains its substantial
       downward variance.
               Nor has Sheldon shown his 262-month sentence is substan-
       tively unreasonable. Sheldon argues that the District Court gave
       undue weight to his oﬀense conduct—particularly his admission
       that he had been engaging in the conduct several years before his
       arrest—and not enough weight to his personal history and charac-
       teristics. He asserts that the District Court was too concerned with
       punishing him for his three-year involvement in child pornography.
       He also argues that the District Court failed to give suﬃcient
       weight to his individual history and the nature of the charges
       against him and that the recidivist oﬀender guidelines overrepre-
       sent his criminal history.
             We will not substitute our judgment for that of the sentenc-
       ing court. See United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1257
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       22-13884               Opinion of the Court                          7

       (11th Cir. 2015). The question is whether the District Court’s deci-
       sion was “in the ballpark of permissible outcomes.” Id. (quoting
       United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010)). Likewise,
       a district court’s imposition of a sentence well below the statutory
       maximum penalty indicates reasonableness. United States v. Cro-
       teau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).
              The District Court did not exclusively rely on Sheldon’s
       three-year involvement with child pornography to the exclusion of
       mitigating factors. Instead, it grappled with the gratiﬁcation that
       Sheldon received from viewing child pornography and the escala-
       tion from viewing child pornography to grooming MV to perform
       sexual acts, which the District Court saw as “child pornography of
       the worst order.” It considered the overarching goals of sentenc-
       ing, focusing on the need to provide “accountability” and a public
       protection component—as the court was unconvinced of Shel-
       don’s low risk for recidivism. It balanced these circumstances and
       goals against mitigating factors such as Sheldon’s personal history
       and characteristics, willingness to be forthright, and genuine re-
       morse.
              Although Sheldon had no criminal history, which would oth-
       erwise be a mitigating factor, the District Court found this factor
       was undermined by the facts of his case. The District Court noted
       the aggravating circumstance of grooming a minor, which it
       deemed an “escalation.” The weight given to each factor is left to
       the District Court’s discretion and it did not abuse that discretion
       in deciding that the factors weighed in favor of a variance below
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       8                     Opinion of the Court                22-13884

       the guidelines, but less than the one Sheldon requested. Further,
       Sheldon’s 262-month sentence was a substantial downward vari-
       ance from the 840-month guidelines calculation—another indica-
       tion of reasonableness.
                              C. Eighth Amendment
               Sheldon argues that his sentence violates the Eighth Amend-
       ment. He says that his 262-month sentence is excessive and grossly
       disproportional because he was a ﬁrst-time oﬀender with nonvio-
       lent oﬀenses. An Eighth Amendment challenge raised for the ﬁrst
       time on appeal is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Suarez,
       893 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018). Sheldon did not make his con-
       stitutional arguments to the District Court, so we review them for
       plain error.
               There can be no plain error when the issue is not directly
       resolved by law from the Supreme Court or this Court. United
       States v. Johnson, 981 F.3d 1171, 1191 (11th Cir. 2020). Sheldon has
       identiﬁed no binding precedent under which the Supreme Court or
       this Court has found that a sentence below the guideline range and
       well below the applicable statutory maximum violated the Eighth
       Amendment. Therefore, he cannot show plain error. See Johnson,
       981 F.3d at 1191. The District Court’s judgment is
             AFFIRMED.