Court Opinion

ID: 9531593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:13:17.241165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:31.896150
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Judge
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I conclude that the trial court erred by enforcing the terms of the parties' October 2001 Agreement beyond the date of the first dissolution action and that the trial court's findings and conclusions fail to explain its unequal division of assets.
As for the enforcement of the parties' Agreement, I find this case distinguishable from Flansburg v. Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d 430 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied, upon which the majority relies, and from Pond v. Pond, 700 N.E.2d 1130, 1132 (Ind.1998) referred to by the parties in their briefs. In the case before us, the trial court correctly labeled the Agreement signed by Husband as a separation agreement, rather than a reconciliation agreement as denominated by the majority. At the time the Agreement was executed, the parties were living apart, apparently intended to continue doing so, and did in fact do so. Eight days after the date of the Agreement, the parties filed a stipulation continuing the dissolution proceedings indefinitely. The majority correctly determined there was consideration for the Agreement, namely the continuance of the dissolution proceedings. Seven and a half months later, however, the trial court entered an order finding that the parties, through counsel, reported reconciliation, certainly a different status than separation, and the case was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
I believe at that point the legal efficacy of the Agreement was extinguished, as *21there was a judicial determination that the parties had reconciled. At that point, if Wife desired to perpetuate the terms of the Agreement, it was incumbent upon her to make its enforcement an issue with the trial court prior to the dismissal of the first dissolution action, or to execute a new agreement with new consideration. Failing to do so, Wife waived enforcement in May 2002. Given the judicial determination of reconciliation, the lack of consideration, and waiver, I would reverse the trial court's enforcement of the Agreement.
Furthermore, I note that, although Finding No. 36 correctly sets out the terms of the Agreement, Conclusion No. 11 provides that the Agreement was a "separation agreement" and lists the terms of the Agreement as follows:
a. Husband shall pay Wife $2,000.00 per month.
b. The parties shall sell the Ridgewood Drive residence and purchase a new residence for the Wife. The Husband shall have a 1% interest in the new residence.
The parties shall split the net proceeds of the sale of the Ridgewood Drive marital home in excess of the amount needed to purchase the La-Grange Street residence.
Husband shall pay car insurance on Wife's vehicle.
Husband shall carry health and vision insurance for the Wife through his employer.
Husband shall pay one-half of the real estate taxes for the residential real estate as they become due.
Appellant's Appendix at 34. However, the actual terms of the Agreement were only that Husband would pay $2,000.00 per month to Wife, that Husband would pay one-half of the property taxes on Wife's residence, and that Husband would pay the "Petsburgh bill." Wife's Exhibit 10; Appellant's Appendix at 48. Consequently, Conclusion No. 11 is clearly erroneous.
Additionally, Conclusion No. 12 provides that the obligations of the Agreement "remain in effect until the date of dissolution." Appellant's Appendix at 34. The terms of the Agreement, however, conflict with the trial court's October 2006 provisional order. The provisional order required Husband to pay $1,200.00 to Wife each month, while the Agreement, if still in effect, required Husband to pay $2,000.00 to Wife each month. In ordering that the terms of the Agreement remained in effect until the date of dissolution, the trial court without authority ignored its own provisional order.
Distinguishing this case from Flansburg, supra, I note that in Flansburg, both parties signed an agreement during dissolution proceedings, reconciled, and dismissed the dissolution proceedings. The Flons-burg agreement contained an acknowl-edgement by the wife that she was seeking reconciliation and was entering into the agreement with that goal in mind. The Court of Appeals applied the law applicable to antenuptials/prenuptials and upheld the agreement as a reconciliation agreement.
A few years later, the Indiana Supreme Court decided Pond, supra. In Pond, the husband filed for a legal separation, and the parties thereafter signed an agreement dealing with the division of their assets, which agreement was clearly not intended to cover the parties' situation if they reconciled. The wife then filed a dissolution action. The Supreme Court said that the agreement was not a reconciliation agreement but rather a postnuptial agreement within the ambit of IC 31-1-11.5-10 (now IC 31-15-2-17) and effectively a dissolution settlement agreement. The Court noted that the focus of the agreement was *22the division of the parties' property and that the parties had divided and distributed their property between themselves according to the terms of the agreement. The Court also noted that the agreement provided no indication that reconciliation would constitute any part of the consideration for the agreement, and held that it was not a reconciliation agreement and should not be treated as an antenuptial agreement as in Flansburg. The Court, citing IC 31-1-11.5-10 (now IC 31-15-2-17), noted further that the agreement's substance was directed at the amicable resolution of "disputes that have arisen or may arise ... attendant upon the dissolution of their marriage" Id. at 1135, and upheld the agreement's terms. Again, these facts are clearly distinguishable from those before us.
Finally, I conclude that the trial court failed to explain its deviation from the statutory presumption of an equal division of marital property. "Following the legislative adoption of the equal division presumption, we placed the requirement upon trial courts, when effecting an unequal division of marital property, to state the reasons based on the evidence which establish that an equal division is not just and reasonable." Hoskins v. Hoskins, 611 N.E.2d 178, 180 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (citing In re Marriage of Davidson, 540 N.E.2d 641 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), reh'g denied, trans. denied). However, express trial court findings will not be required for "insubstantial deviations from precise mathematical equality." Kirkman v. Kirkman, 555 N.E.2d 1293, 1294 (Ind.1990).
Here, in Conclusion No. 17, the trial court determined that the parties' intent was that Wife would have a 99% interest in the LaGrange Street house, for which there is certainly a basis in the record. However, this is not justification for an unequal division of the total of the parties' assets. Rather, the conclusion explains only the division of this particular asset. I believe that the findings and conclusions therefore fail to support the unequal division of assets and would remand for an equal division or for the trial court to make a finding as to why it is deviating from an equal division.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.