Court Opinion

ID: 9529898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:16.2199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.036271
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: I dissent from the majority opinion for several reasons. Davis was present in the vehicle, not only as a passenger, but as one who borrowed the car to be driven to meet his girl friend. Section 24 — 1(a)(7) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 24—1(a)(7)) establishes, by way of a statutory presumption, that the presence of any one in the vehicle is prima facie evidence of his possession of a sawed-off shotgun, or other inheritently dangerous weapons enumerated, found in the vehicle. The majority opinion relies upon People v. Cogwell (1st Dist. 1973), 8 Ill. App. 3d 15, 288 N.E.2d 729, and People v. Crowder (1st Dist. 1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 283 N.E.2d 342, both of which I find particularly distinguishable. Both cited cases indicate that a defendant’s mere presence in a car by itself is not sufficient evidence that he knows that the weapon is in the car. In both cases there were no other circumstances than mere presence in the car from which an inference of scienter could arise. The court was concerned in those cases with an issue of constructive possession of shotgun shells without a valid state firearms owner’s identification card in Cogwell and of an ordinary shotgun and loaded pistol in Crowder. Both those violations concerned unlawful use of weapons in violation of section 24 — 1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 24—1(a)(4)). Contrariwise, in the instant case, Davis was charged with possession of an extremely dangerous weapon, to-wit, a sawed-off shotgun in violation of section 24 — 1(a)(7) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 24—1(a)(7)). The weapons enumerated in section 24 — 1(a)(7) are considered contraband per se and are unlawful for the private citizen to possess anywhere at anytime. The list of weapons in section 24 — 1(a)(7) includes any bomb, bombshell, grenade, black powder bomb, or Molotov cocktail, in addition to sawed-off shotguns. In the recent case of People v. Theobald (3d Dist. 1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 897, 900, 356 N.E.2d 1258,1260, we stated in referring to a sawed-off shotgun and a violation of section 24 — 1(a)(7), “such a weapon is so inherently dangerous to human life that it constitutes a hazard to society, and the weapon is contraband per se.” I believe the same sentiment and reason, and compelling logic and concern for public safety, prompted the legislature to enact the statutory presumption provided in section 24 — 1(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 24—1(c)), relied upon here to convict Davis. I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the statutory presumption that Davis possessed the contraband weapon was overcome by the evidence presented. Though such a harsh presumption as the one relied upon must be viewed with caution to protect the constitutional rights of an accused, the circumstances from which the majority opinion concludes that the presumption of possession is overcome are not sufficient to do so. The record establishes that the car in which defendant was riding was borrowed by the defendant and he gave the keys to the driver, Eugene Henley, requesting Henley to drive him to his girl friend’s home. (See People v. Hood (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 526, 276 N.E.2d 310.) The owner of the car testified that the sawed-off shotgun was not in the car when he vacuumed it earlier. The police did observe the defendant and the driver enter the car minutes before they were apprehended, but the observation was made from some distance away while the car was parked in front of a liquor store with many people milling around. It is argued that the police did not observe the defendant or Henley enter the car carrying the sawed-off shotgun. Such an argument does not recognize the strong possibility that the sawed-off shotgun, because of its small size, could have been concealed upon one of the individuals who entered the car. The ability to easily conceal such a weapon, plus its highly dangerous character, is one of the fundamental and compelling reasons why the statutory presumption of possession was enacted into law by the Illinois General Assembly. In People v. Bell (3d Dist. 1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 625,288 N.E.2d 253, the court felt that the easy accessibility of a sawed-off shotgun and a loaded pistol under the passenger’s side of the front seat was sufficient to sustain the convictions of both the front seat passenger and the passenger immediately behind him in the rear seat of possession of a sawed-off shotgun, in violation of the same section 24 — 1(a)(7) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 24—1(a)(7)). I do not believe the present facts so strongly indicate that the shotgun could not possibly be visible as located near the transmission hump under the seat on the driver’s side. Furthermore, the location of the gun made it readily accessible to the defendant. It is worthy of note that in Hood the defendant-driver removed the sawed-off shotgun from under the driver’s seat for the arresting officers by opening the door on the passenger side, and then, while denying knowing there was a firearm in the car, claimed it would not be possible to see the shotgun from the drivers seat. The presumption of possession and its effect on this criminal case is worthy of additional comment. The use of the term prima facie evidence and presumption means that, when one fact is probative of another, the proof the first or basic fact permits the inference that the second fact is also true. In the instant case the proof of the fact that Davis was present in the automobile he borrowed, where the contraband sawed-off shotgun was found, permits the trier of fact to infer, consistent with the statutory presumption, that defendant was in possession of the unlawful weapon. Thus in the absence of competing positive evidence, I believe the jury was permitted but not required to find that the inferred or presumed fact of possession was true beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Commonwealth v. Pauley (1975), _ Mass. _, 331 N.E.2d 901.) The defendant’s evidence was not sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of defendant’s possession. Nor was the evidence inconsistent with circumstances from which the jury could also permissibly infer that defendant’s possession was with scienter. This conclusion is buttressed by the jury’s determination of guilt, which I am obviously reluctant to upset. It is the opinion of this writer that the test of the validity of the criminal statutory presumption has been met, and that the judgment of conviction of unlawful use of weapons in violation of section 24 — 1(a)(7) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 24—1(a)(7)) should be affirmed. Because of the result suggested by this dissent, the constitutionality of the presumption of section 24 — 1(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 24—1(c)) must be considered. The defendant strenuously argues that the statutory presumption involved here is unconstitutional as applied to the facts in this case. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the test of the validity of the criminal presumption of section 24 — 1(c) was the test enunciated in Leary v. United States (1969), 395 U.S. 6, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57, 89 S. Ct. 1532. (People v. Hood (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 526, 276 N.E.2d 310.) In order to satisfy that test it must at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend. Section 24— 1(c) was specifically upheld in opposition to arguments that the paragraph violated traditional due process standards. Although the factual situation in Hood is somewhat distinguishable, the holding that the presumption of section 24 — 1(c) is constitutional is controlling here. In Hood the court focussed its inquiry on whether the proven facts of the case legitimately supported an inference of defendant’s control over the vehicle. In the instant case the evidence presented also legitimately supports both an inference of the passenger-defendant’s control over the vehicle and his knowledge of the weapon’s presence in the vehicle. Defendant asserts that Hood left unanswered the question of whether section 24 — 1(c) can be applied to a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by another. I agree with that interpretation of the case but because of the unique facts in the case showing visibility of the weapon to defendant and his control over the vehicle which he borrowed from a friend, I believe the presumption can be validly applied and that defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.