Court Opinion

ID: 9655828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:23:12.930432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:22.358491
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(concurring in reversal). I join in Justice Black’s decision that, “until the Supreme Court speaks otherwise, I shall look upon the pertinent requirement of the Sixth Amendment and of our Constitution as being fully consistent with the petty offense exception made by the criminal justice act,” and I hereby register my objection and dissent to the recent August 24, 1966, amendment to Rule 785 of the General Court Rules of 1963 (effective January 1, 1967), requiring appointment of counsel to those charged with misdemeanors upon conviction for which the accused could be jailed for 90 days or more.
*578I disagree with Justice Black’s affirmance and agree with Justice Dethmers’ reversal because defendant has served and is still serving a lengthy prison sentence in addition to a 90-day confinement in jail due to the fact that a recorder’s court judge, without a jury and without defendant being represented by counsel, pronounced judgment that defendant was guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
The record discloses:
(.1) A letter dated January 8, 1965, from the parole board, signed by Frank G-. Buchko, “Re: Alton Mallory, B-101696,” as follows:
“The above named man was paroled on 4-2-64 for a period of two years. He was returned to prison on 7-30-64 and at a parole violation hearing conducted on August 17, he was found automatically guilty of parole violation by reason of a conviction on 5-11-64 for receiving stolen property. He received a term of 90 days at the Detroit house of correction as a result of this conviction.” (Emphasis ours.)
(2) Frank G. Schemanske, judge of the recorder’s court, on January 25, 1965, certified the “concise statement of proceedings and facts in support of the application for leave to appeal,” which statement reads:
“1. On May 11, 1964, Alton Mallory, defendant-appellant, stood charged and was convicted of the criminal offense of receiving and concealing stolen property under the value of $100 in the recorder’s court of the city of Detroit, by the Honorable Frank G. Schemanske, judge of the recorder’s court. Defendant was sentenced to 90 days in the Detroit house of correction, and the said 90 days have been served.
“2. Trial by jury had been waived. Defendant was not represented by counsel at the trial,
*579“3. On or about May 19, 1964, an attorney (on behalf of the defendant) made a motion for a new trial. The motion was withdrawn by the attorney on May 27, 1964, ánd never came on for a hearing. The 15-day period in which to make a motion for new trial in misdemeanor cases (as provided in Rule 26 of the recorder’s court of the city of Detroit) expired on May 26, 1964. .
“4. On September 25, 1964, defendant, in propria persona, made a motion for appointment of appellate counsel and for free transcript for appellate purposes.
“5. On October 29, 1964, defendant’s motion was denied by Judge Schemanske for .the reason ‘that the case is already moot, since the sentence has been served.’ ”
(3) Defendant’s January 27,1965, affidavit (Court of Appeals) pursuant to GCR 1963, 806.3(3) (b), as follows:
“1. That he is the defendant and appellant in these proceedings.
“2. That although a motion for. a new trial was made in the lower court by an attorney on May 19, 1964, said motion was withdrawn by the attorney without the permission of defendant-appellant and never came on for a hearing.
' “3. That he is presently incarcerated in the State Prison of Southern Michigan, at Jackson, Michigan, for violation of parole. An automatic adjudication .of guilt of that offense was made when he was convicted of the instant offense of receiving and concealing stolen property.”
(4) The order of the Court of Appeals, dated March 2, 1965:
“It is ordered that the application for delayed appeal be, and the same is hereby denied, the ques*580tion presented therein being moot, the case of People v. Pyrros, 323 Mich 329 controlling therein.”
Justice Dethmers, considering the question of “mootness,” states:
“After the May 11, 1964, misdemeanor conviction, defendant was found guilty by the parole board of. parole violation and, after service of his 90-day misdemeanor sentence, was remanded to State prison as a parole violator and is still there as provided by law, serving the remainder of his sentence for the 1962 felony conviction. * * *
“Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction automatically brought about a finding by the parole board of parole violation or that, at least, that conviction was an element and factor in the parole violations charged against defendant and considered by the b,oard in mating its finding of parole violation. Accordingly, we consider the above cases cited by the people with respect to mootness inapt. Defendant’s present incarceration may well be considered a consequence, in part at least, of this misdemeanor conviction. More to the point is United States v. Morgan, 346 US 502 (74 S Ct 247; 98 L ed 248), in which the United States Supreme Court said (pp 512, 513) :
“ Although the term has been served, the results of the conviction may persist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties * * * As the power to remedy an invalid sentence exists, * * * respondent is entitled to an opportunity to attempt to show that this conviction was invalid.’ ” (Emphasis ours.)
Justice O’Hara writes:
“I do agree with Mr. Justice Dethmers that the appeal in this case is not dismissible as moot for the reasons he assigns and on the basis of the authority he cites.”
*581I agree with Justices Dethmers and O’Hara.
The parole board rules and our decisions* authorize the board in finding that defendant was “automatically guilty of parole violation by reason of a conviction on 5-11-64 for receiving stolen property.” The board does not have or exercise the right to pass appellate judgment on court decisions.
Defendant does not challenge the board’s action, but asks for appellate review of the May 11, 1964, misdemeanor conviction that automatically placed him behind prison walls for a period that has not expired at the time I write this opinion.
We are confronted with a misdemeanor charge and a felony penalty, and the same reasons that justify a finding that the case is not moot also justify granting defendant’s request to have counsel appointed for appeal.
Repeating the words of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Morgan, supra, defendant “is entitled to an opportunity to attempt to show that this conviction was invalid.”
I agree with Justice Dethmers’ holding for reversal and remand.

 Canfield v. Commissioner of Pardons and Paroles (1937), 280 Mich 305, 309; Jurczyszyn v. Parole Board (1947), 316 Mich 529.