Court Opinion

ID: 9578220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:43:03.177642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:17.666883
License: Public Domain

Townsend, J.,
dissenting. The majority opinion holds, among other reasons, that evidence of other transactions is admissible here because, this being a prosecution for burglary, the crime itself makes intent an essential element, and that such evidence is admissible to show the intent. Code § 26-201 defines 'a crime or misdemeanor as follows: “A crime or misdemeanor shall consist in a violation of a public law, in the commission of which there shall be a union or joint operation of act and intent, or-criminal negligence.” It follows, therefore, that as to all crimes and misdemeanors except where criminal negligence *641is involved, intent is an essential element; and to hold that such evidence is always admissible to show intent therefore does away with the general rule that evidence of other crimes is not admissible. On the other hand, it converts what has heretofore been regarded under the law as exceptions into the general rule. It goes one step further. It also leaves no exception to this newly established general rule, which is directly contrary to the holding in Robinson v. State, 62 Ga. App. 355 (7 S. E. 2d, 758), and many other cases.
For other reasons also, the writer feels that proof of other crimes in this case requires its reversal. See the dissent in Hodges v. State, ante, p. 617 (70 S. E. 2d, 48). I am authorized to say that Felton, J., concurs in this dissent.