Court Opinion

ID: 9854843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:15:15.321741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:28.913035
License: Public Domain

Eelton, Chief Judge,
concurring specially. While I concur with the result reached by the majority, in my opinion the case should be decided on another theory.
A good argument could be advanced in favor of regarding the plaintiff’s decedent child as an invitee, on the grounds that he was on the defendant’s premises with his knowledge and implied consent and, furthermore, that his presence there was beneficial to the defendant as a playmate for his son. Even conceding that the child was a licensee and that the defendant was not liable for the reasons given by the majority, however, I would not say as a matter of law that the defendant’s employee was not guilty of negligence which contributed to the death of the child. “It is the duty of a parent or other person having *544the care, custody, or control of a child to exercise ordinary care for its safety.” (Emphasis supplied.) 67 CJS 749, Parent and Child, § 46. “The fundamental concept in this class of cases [licensees], as in that of trespassers, is of a liability only for wilful or wanton injury; but it is usually wilful or wanton not to exercise ordinary care to prevent injuring a person who is actually known to be, or reasonably is expected to be, within the range of a dangerous act being done.” (Emphasis supplied.) Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Heath, 57 Ga. App. 763, 771 (196 SE (125). I believe the facts alleged, if proved, might authorize a finding that the defendant’s employee was negligent in failing to properly supervise the decedent child, who was under her temporary custody.
“Although there are a few decisions to the contrary, it is established by the decided weight of authority that if the parents of a child intrust it to the temporary custody of another, and the negligence of the custodian contributes to an accident resulting in injury to the child, such negligence is, on principles of agency, imputed to the parents and has the same effect on their right to recover as if they themselves had been guilty of the negligent act. The same principle applies in death actions. The theory upon which negligence is imputed to the parents in this class of cases is that, having been intrusted with the child by them, the custodian becomes their agent, or, according to some courts, stands in loco parentis or in privity with the parents.” 39 AmJur 730, Parent and Child, § 84; 22 AmJur2d 685, Death, § 114; 23 ALR 655, 656, IIa; 2 ALR2d 785; Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369 (3) (20 SE 550, 26 LRA 553, 44 ASR 145); Woodham v. Powell, 61 Ga. App. 760, 761 (2) (7 SE2d 573); Saman v. Seaboard A. L. R. Co., 33 Ga. App. 315, 318 (1) (125 SE 891); Crook v. Foster, 142 Ga. 715, 719 (3) (83 SE 670). The above cases recognize the principle that, the father having the custody, management and control of the minor child (Code Ann. § 49-102; Code § 74-108), the mother’s right of action for the child’s homicide -under Code Ann. § 105-1307 (Ga. L. 1887, pp. 43, 45; Ga. L. 1952, p. 54) is not barred by the negligence of a custodian chosen by the father. In the present case, however, it is not alleged that the *545child’s father was the one who intrusted the child to the defendant’s employee or consented thereto. Construing the petition most strongly against the pleader, it must be assumed either that the father, if living, had lost this parental power by one or more of the means provided in Code § 74-108 or that the plaintiff mother had intrusted the child to the employee herself without the father’s consent, in either of which events the custodian’s negligence would be imputed to her.