Court Opinion

ID: 9716564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:43:55.376887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:46.866181
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting: For the reasons which follow, I dissent. I do not agree that Lieutenant Acker’s testimony that he had been told by one or two young men whom he believed to be occupants of the automobile in which plaintiffs were riding that “the driver had lost control of the vehicle coming across the railroad tracks” constituted inadmissible hearsay. Instead, I believe that the out-of-court statement was admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent. Lieutenant Acker’s testimony sufficiently established that the statement was made by one or both plaintiffs, or that it was made in the presence of, and acquiesced in by, both plaintiffs. Generally, any statement made by a party or on his behalf which is inconsistent with his position in litigation may be introduced into evidence against him. (In re Application of County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 373, 379, 519 N.E.2d 1010, 1014.) Admissions may also be implied from conduct, as where a party remains silent where there is an opportunity to speak and the circumstances properly and naturally call for the party to speak. (Casey v. Burns (1955), 7 Ill. App. 2d 316, 325, 129 N.E.2d 440, 445.) Thus a party’s silence may be admissible as evidence of admission by that party of the truth of what another has said. Friedland v. Allis Chalmers Co. of Canada (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 511 N.E.2d 1199, 1204. In the instant case, Lieutenant Acker testified that when he arrived on the scene of the accident, defendant and his passenger were being tended by the ambulance attendants. Acker approached the Mustang in which plaintiffs had been passengers. There were three young men at the Mustang. At this point in Acker’s testimony, plaintiffs’ counsel objected and defendant made an offer of proof. Acker testified in offer of proof that the three young men were standing around the Mustang. One of the young men stated that he had been in the back seat of the Mustang when the accident occurred. One or possibly two of the three men stated that the driver of the Mustang lost control of the car as it came across the railroad tracks. Acker testified that all three men indicated by their actions and words that they had been in the Mustang when the accident occurred. All three men were present during the conversation and all heard it. Acker testified that at the time of trial he could not identify any of the three young men and he did not know for sure “who told [him] what out there.” The trial court allowed Acker to testify to his conversation with the three young men over plaintiffs’ objection. Acker testified before the jury that shortly after he arrived at the accident scene he had a conversation with the occupants of the Mustang. One of the men stated he had been in the back seat of the Mustang. One of the men stated that the driver of the Mustang had lost control of the vehicle as it came across the railroad tracks. On cross-examination, Acker stated that he did not know for a fact that the three men had been occupants of the Mustang. I think this evidence is sufficient to show that the statement that the driver of the Mustang lost control of the vehicle as it came across the railroad tracks was made either by, or in the presence of, plaintiffs and that neither plaintiff objected to the statement when it was made. The statement was properly admitted over plaintiffs’ objection as an admission against interest of a party-opponent. I also do not agree with the majority that Lieutenant Acker’s testimony pertaining to the gouge marks in the pavement constituted expert reconstruction testimony. Lieutenant Acker testified regarding photographs he had taken at the accident scene on the night of the accident. One photograph, defendant’s exhibit No. 11, showed the position of defendant’s vehicle on the shoulder of the southbound lane following the accident. Lieutenant Acker identified a black substance on the roadway, as shown in the photograph, as engine-type fluid which begins in defendant’s southbound lane and ends at the engine area of defendant’s vehicle on the southbound shoulder. Lieutenant Acker also pointed out on the photograph an area of scrape marks and gouge marks in the asphalt of the roadway in defendant’s southbound lane. Defendant’s counsel asked Lieutenant Acker what causes gouge marks, and plaintiffs’ counsel objected, arguing that defendant was improperly asking for expert testimony. Plaintiffs’ objection was overruled. Defendant’s counsel asked, “[W]hat causes gouge marks like that in the highway? What does that indicate to you when you see marks in the highway?” Lieutenant Acker responded, “These are caused by the vehicle being forced downward at the point of impact.” Plaintiffs’ counsel objected and moved to strike. The trial court struck “the last portion of his answer” but allowed “the first part” to stand. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded, “I don’t object to the first part, Judge.” Lieutenant Acker went on to explain that gouge marks are made during a vehicular collision when the vehicle is forced downward and sharp and rounded points of the underside of the vehicle dig into the highway. Lieutenant Acker also identified tire skid marks in the photograph which begin in defendant’s southbound lane and end at defendant’s vehicle on the southbound shoulder. I do not believe that this testimony amounts to expert reconstruction testimony. The cause of gouge marks, like the cause of skid marks, is not a subject outside the common knowledge of an average juror. It is not, therefore, properly the subject of expert testimony. (Hernandez v. Power Construction Co. (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 90, 98-99, 382 N.E.2d 1201, 1205.) Lieutenant Acker did not reconstruct the accident in any respect. His reference to point of impact was stricken. He did not testify as to what caused the gouge marks in this particular case. Instead, he simply explained what he meant by the term “gouge marks.” Finally, although the majority found it unnecessary to address the question of whether the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, I think, after reviewing the record, that the jury’s verdict in favor of defendant was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As the majority points out, plaintiffs and defendant had very different versions of how the accident occurred and who was at fault. However, all of the physical evidence presented at trial indicated that defendant’s vehicle did not cross the center line of traffic and that, in fact, defendant’s vehicle was in its own lane of traffic at the time of impact. There was no physical evidence presented to show that defendant’s vehicle had crossed into plaintiffs’ lane of traffic. In any event, all of the evidence was presented to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of defendant. A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or when the finding of the jury appears arbitrary and unsubstantiated by the evidence. (Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co. (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 666, 674, 475 N.E.2d 1383, 1389.) A reviewing court should not overturn a jury’s verdict unless, considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed at trial, the jury’s conclusion is palpably . erroneous and wholly unwarranted. Holmes, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 674, 475 N.E.2d at 1389. After carefully reviewing the record in this case, I do not think that an opposite verdict is clearly apparent. In fact, the jury’s verdict in favor of defendant appears to be well supported by the evidence. It is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion reversing the jury’s verdict and remanding this cause for a new trial.