Court Opinion

ID: 9760178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:42:12.211768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:08.831589
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
(dissenting).
*134Under the statute law of this state, Sec. 3, Art. 1008a, Vernon’s C.C.P., the Governor of this state can grant a-request for and issue his warrant of extradition only when the demand' is accompanied by a copy of the indictment, . information, or affidavit made before a magistrate which substantially charges the person sought to be extradited “with having committed a crime under the law of that [demanding] state.”
The relators — appellants, here — are not under indictment nor are. they proceeded against by information supported by affidavit.
The extradition is sought upon a complaint filed against appellants in the State of California. A warrant of arrest, was issued thereon.
Here is the charging part of that complaint:
“C. A. Cooper being duly sworn says: That the crime of violation of Section 211 of the Penal Code (robbery) a felony has been committed by the above named defendants as follows;
“That said defendants * * * did wilfully and unlawfully rob SAFEWAY STORES, INC., located at 9185 Magnolia Avenue, in Arlington, California, of lawful money of the United States.”
Such complaint - fails to charge the appellants with having committed a crime under the laws of the State of California, because the crime of robbery can not be effected or committed against a corporation, which in this case was alleged to have been committed against “Safeway Stores, Inc.”
The ■ law of the State of California' under Sec. 211 of the Penal Code of that state, which the appellants are charged with violating, is set out in the application of the district attorney to the Governor of the State of California, and reads as follows:
“Sec. 211. ‘Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in. the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.’ ”
It is apparent that from that statute an assault is an essential element of the crime of robbery in that-state. Such is the construction placed thereon as late as 1958, in the case of People v. Blue, Cal. App., 326 P. 2d 183.
*135A corporation is not a person. A corporation, as such, can not be subject to an assault or putting in fear. It necessarily follows, therefore, that a corporation can not be subject to robbery. • ■ , . .
An agent, servant, or employee who is in possession of the property of the corporation may be assaulted and robbed of personal property of the corporation, but in such cases the robbery is of the person having possession of the property.
In this state, robbery' can be committed only by assault upon or violence to or putting in fear the person robbed.
There appears no material difference in the offense of robbery in this state and the State of California.
A corporation not being the subject of or within the statute denouncing the crime of robbery in the State of California, the complaint so charging failed to substantially charge a crime in that state. • •
The judgment remanding appellants to the custody of the arresting officer for extradition should be reversed and the appellants discharged.
I dissent.