Court Opinion

ID: 9546420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:29:09.837143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:25.034553
License: Public Domain

HOLMAN, J.,
specially concurring.
The effect of the majority opinion is to abandon the rule laid down in State v. Casson, 223 Or 421, 354 P2d 815 (1960), and State v. Feebler et al, 200 Or 321, 265 P2d 1081 (1954). In these cases, the statute was construed to intend to prohibit only those acts which, as a matter of law, could clearly tend to produce delinquency. It was evident that only those acts would be proscribed which were commonly recognized by everyone as tending to have such effect. As a prac*29tical matter it is impossible to describe with exact particularity all conduct sought to be prohibited. It is my opinion that the statute, thus construed, does not constitute a trap to the unwary or undiscriminating citizen because of the vagueness with which the prohibited conduct is described. “Void-for-vagueness” in criminal law context is the legal terminology which is used when courts believe that the forces of government can exercise too great leeway in choosing whom and for what it may prosecute and convict. See Amsterdam, Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 Pa L Rev 67 (1960). It is my belief that, considering the manner in which the statute has been construed, there is no such danger here. I would not hold the statute unconstitutional for vagueness.
However, applying the rule of Casson and Peebler I would reach the same result as the majority because I believe, as a matter of law, that the acts of an exhibitionist, under the circumstances here, would not tend to cause delinquency in a child, distasteful as such actions may be. The defendant should have been prosecuted under the statute which prohibits the specific acts he performed.
The majority opinion, because it concerns itself with only that portion of the language of the challenged statute which was used in the present indictment, leaves the impression that the balance of the statute may be constitutional. If the challenged portion of the statute is unconstitutional because of the extent to which it allows the various instrumentalities of government the discretion to determine what conduct is prohibited by it, the balance of the statute is equally defective. The statute prohibits: (1) acts which encourage, cause or contribute to existing de*30linquency; (2) endeavoring by threats, commands or-persuasion to induce any. act or course of conduct which would cause delinquency; and (3) acts which manifestly tend to cause delinquency. None of the three classes defines with any greater particularity than the other the acts which are sought to be prohibited. The forces of government are equally at large in deciding the kind of conduct which caused, would cause or tends to cause delinquency. The legislature should be aware of the full import of the majority opinion.
Sloan and Denecke, JJ., join in this specially concurring opinion.