Court Opinion

ID: 9838502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 16:08:32.389943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:36.557510
License: Public Domain

J-A10018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  JAMES MICHAEL HERO                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 2169 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 3, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0003332-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

       Appellant, James Michael Hero, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury

trial convictions for possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug

paraphernalia, and resisting arrest.1 We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.

In September 2020, Sergeant Gregory Huff of the Bethlehem Police

Department commenced an investigation into drug activity occurring at 2291

Silver Creek Road in Hellertown. Subsequent investigation revealed that the

property was occupied by Appellant and his co-defendant, Angela Lorah.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (32) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104, respectively.
J-A10018-23

Sergeant Huff was aware that Appellant and Ms. Lorah had a history of arrests

for drug offenses. Sergeant Huff also participated in a prior investigation of

Appellant, which concluded with Appellant resisting arrest.

      During the week of September 21, 2020, Sergeant Huff utilized a

confidential   informant    (“CI”)   to    conduct   a   controlled   purchase   of

methamphetamine at the property.           (See Application for Search Warrant,

dated 10/3/20, at ¶9). Over a week later, the CI completed a second purchase

of methamphetamine from Ms. Lorah at the property.                     After these

transactions, the CI provided Sergeant Huff with additional information about

the property. Specifically, the CI indicated that the property was surrounded

by “motion-activated surveillance equipment.”            (See N.T. Suppression

Hearing, 10/21/21, at 8). The CI also stated that Ms. Lorah kept “a firearm

on her hip or in the small of her back,” and the CI “was confident that there

were other weapons inside of that home.” (Id. at 7). Further, the CI alerted

Sergeant Huff about “two pit bulls in the residence, one of which was described

as being aggressive.”      (Id. at 8).    Sergeant Huff subsequently conducted

surveillance that confirmed the presence of “numerous cameras in numerous

locations.” (Id. at 10).

      Based upon the controlled purchases, Sergeant Huff applied for a

warrant to search the property. During the predawn hours of October 5, 2020,

police executed the warrant. Due to the presence of the security cameras at

the property, Sergeant Huff decided to use an emergency response team to

                                          -2-
J-A10018-23

execute the warrant.       The team consisted of approximately eighteen

members, as well as “additional personnel including uniformed patrol officers

and EMS paramedics.”       (Id. at 11-12).    Upon arriving at the property,

Sergeant Huff “noticed that the first-floor lights were on,” which was

significant because “that’s the area the drugs were stored.” (Id. at 13). After

the officers announced their identity and purpose, Sergeant Huff estimated

that the team waited “14, 15 seconds” before using a battering ram to breach

the front door. (Id. at 14). The officers entered the residence and found

Appellant and Ms. Lorah in the living room. The officers arrested Appellant,

and the Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging him with various

offenses on March 19, 2021.

        On June 9, 2021, Appellant filed a suppression motion arguing that the

Commonwealth violated the “knock and announce” rule by “violently entering

the home after having given [Appellant and Ms. Lorah] no opportunity to

comply with the announcement….”        (Suppression Motion, filed 6/9/21, at

¶12).    On October 21, 2021, the court conducted a suppression hearing.

During this hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence in the form of

testimony from Sergeant Huff, video footage of the warrant execution, and

photographs of the property. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court made

on-the-record findings of fact and conclusions of law, and it denied the

                                     -3-
J-A10018-23

suppression motion.2 (See N.T. Suppression Hearing at 49-50).

       Appellant proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him of simple

possession, possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest. On August

3, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of eighteen (18)

to sixty (60) months’ imprisonment.            Appellant did not file post-sentence

motions. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on August 18, 2022. On

August 22, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed

his Rule 1925(b) statement on September 7, 2022.

       Appellant now raises the following issue for this Court’s review:

          Whether the court erred by denying Appellant’s pretrial
          motion to suppress all evidence of drugs [and]
          paraphernalia as fruit of the poisonous tree?

(Appellant’s Brief at 5).

       The following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion

to suppress:

          An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a
          challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
          determining whether the suppression court’s factual
          findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
          conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because
          the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court,
          we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth
          and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
          uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
          whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
____________________________________________

2 The court entered a formal order denying the suppression motion on
November 24, 2021.

                                           -4-
J-A10018-23

        supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by
        those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
        conclusions are erroneous.       Where the appeal of the
        determination of the suppression court turns on allegations
        of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are
        not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to
        determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
        to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below
        are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal

denied, 647 Pa. 522, 190 A.3d 580 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa.Super. 2015)).

     On appeal, Appellant argues that the police violated the knock and

announce rule when executing the search warrant, and “there is no evidence

to conclude that the police at time of entry reasonably believed that exigent

circumstances would justify” their noncompliance. (Appellant’s Brief at 9).

Appellant contends that approximately ten seconds elapsed between the

officers’ announcement and their breach of the front door.           Appellant

maintains that “police had no reasonable reason to suspect that [Appellant]

and [Ms. Lorah] would not allow entrance, as [the police] never gave them a

chance to answer the door.” (Id. at 11). Relying on the Commonwealth’s

evidence from the suppression hearing, Appellant reiterates that his residence

was “approximately 2,900 square feet,” and ten seconds was not enough time

for the occupants to open the front door.     (Id.) (citing N.T. Suppression

Hearing at 8).

     Regarding the existence of exigent circumstances, Appellant asserts

                                    -5-
J-A10018-23

that the Commonwealth did not present evidence of movement inside the

residence prior to the breach; thus, there was no reason for the officers to

believe that the occupants knew the officers’ purpose for being there.

Appellant insists that police conducted surveillance of the property before

executing the warrant, and the surveillance did not reveal any hazards that

would have imperiled officer safety. Finally, Appellant emphasizes that the

record is devoid of evidence to justify a belief that the occupants might have

been destroying evidence. Under these circumstances, Appellant concludes

that the police violated the knock and announce rule, and the court erred in

denying his suppression motion. We disagree.

      Our rules of criminal procedure govern manner of entry for law

enforcement seeking to execute a search warrant:

         Rule 207. Manner of Entry Into Premises

            (A) A law enforcement officer executing a search
         warrant shall, before entry, give, or make reasonable effort
         to give, notice of the officer’s identity, authority, and
         purpose to any occupant of the premises specified in the
         warrant, unless exigent circumstances require the officer’s
         immediate forcible entry.

            (B) Such officer shall await a response for a reasonable
         period of time after this announcement of identity,
         authority, and purpose, unless exigent circumstances
         require the officer’s immediate forcible entry.

            (C) If the officer is not admitted after such reasonable
         period, the officer may forcibly enter the premises and may
         use as much physical force to effect entry therein as is
         necessary to execute the search.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 207.

                                    -6-
J-A10018-23

      “The purposes of this requirement, known as the ‘knock and announce

rule,’ are to prevent resistance by an occupant protecting his dwelling, to

prevent violence and physical injury to the police and occupants, to protect an

occupant’s privacy expectation against the unauthorized entry, and to prevent

property damage resulting from forced entry.” Commonwealth v. Goodis,

2023 PA Super 136, *5 (filed July 28, 2023). “Although this rule is frequently

referred to as ‘knock and announce,’ the rule actually imposes no specific

obligation to knock.”    Commonwealth v. Bellamy, 252 A.3d 656, 664

(Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 874 A.2d 667, 671

(Pa.Super. 2005)).      “Nonetheless, the rule requires that police officers

announce their identity, purpose and authority and then wait a reasonable

amount of time for the occupants to respond prior to entering any private

premises.” Id. (internal footnote omitted).

      “When the knock-and-announce rule does apply, it is not easy to

determine precisely what officers must do. How many seconds’ wait are too

few? Our ‘reasonable wait time’ standard … is necessarily vague.” Hudson

v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2163, 165 L.Ed.2d 56, ___

(2006).

          In determining whether the police properly complied with
          the knock and announce rule, a court must consider the
          amount of time the police wait after knocking and
          announcing prior to gaining entry, as well as the
          circumstances observed upon announcement.               See
          Commonwealth v. Parsons, 391 Pa.Super. 273, 570 A.2d
          1328 (1990) (two announcements of presence coupled with
          a 45 second wait prior to entry by officers, where sounds of

                                     -7-
J-A10018-23

        movement were heard inside residence was sufficient to
        satisfy the knock and announce rule); Commonwealth v.
        Burstin, 259 Pa.Super. 584, 393 A.2d 979 (1978) (police
        who waited twenty seconds after knocking and announcing
        during which time they heard television and telephone
        conversations prior to gaining entry was reasonable under
        the knock and announce rule). Cf. Commonwealth v.
        Means, 531 Pa. 504, 614 A.2d 220 (1992) (forcible entry
        after waiting five to ten seconds after knocking and
        announcing was unreasonable); Commonwealth v.
        Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 240 A.2d 795 (1968) (forcible entry
        following twenty seconds of silence after knocking and
        announcing was unreasonable); Commonwealth v.
        Douventzidis, 451 Pa.Super. 280, 679 A.2d 795 (1996)
        (knocking only once and waiting only ten to fifteen seconds
        before entry was unreasonable); Commonwealth v.
        Rudisill, 424 Pa.Super. 313, 622 A.2d 397 (1993)
        (knocking and waiting fifteen seconds prior to entry was
        unreasonable).

Commonwealth v. Dean, 693 A.2d 1360, 1363 (Pa.Super. 1997), appeal

denied, 549 Pa. 724, 702 A.2d 1058 (1997).

     “The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove that the police fully

complied with the knock and announce rule or to prove … exigent

circumstances[.]” Goodis, supra at *6.

        Our Supreme Court has recognized only four exigent
        circumstances:

           1.   the occupants remain silent after repeated
           knocking and announcing;

           2.   the police are virtually certain that the
           occupants of the premises already know their
           purpose;

           3.    the police have reason to believe that an
           announcement prior to entry would imperil their
           safety; [or]

                                   -8-
J-A10018-23

              4.    the police have reason to believe that evidence
              is about to be destroyed.

Bellamy, supra at 665 (Pa.Super. 2021) (internal citations, emphasis, and

footnote omitted).

      “These exceptions to the ‘knock and announce’ rule fulfill the purpose of

the rule in that entry is accomplished with a minimum of danger to officers

and occupants or damage to the premises.” Commonwealth v. Kane, 940

A.2d 483, 490 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 713, 951 A.2d 1161

(2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Morgan, 517 Pa. 93, 97, 534 A.2d 1054,

1056-57 (1987)). “In order to invoke an exception, police must only possess

‘a reasonable suspicion that one of these grounds is present.’” Id. at 489

(quoting Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 589 Pa. 43, 63, 907 A.2d 477, 489

(2006)).    “[T]he [United States Supreme] Court has indicated that ‘[t]his

showing is not high.’”     Sanchez, supra at 63, 907 A.2d at 489 (quoting

Hudson, supra at 590, 126 S.Ct. at 2163, 165 L.Ed.2d at ___).

      Instantly, the court evaluated the Commonwealth’s evidence from the

suppression hearing and issued the following findings of fact and conclusions

of law:

           On the date in question, the officers had obtained a search
           warrant to search [Appellant’s] residence following two
           controlled buys of methamphetamine using a [CI]. The [CI]
           had told the police that one of the residents, Angela Lorah,
           was seen with a gun in the residence in the small of her
           back. The police also had evidence from the [CI] that there
           was an aggressive pit bull on the property, and the officer
           testified that in the past [Appellant] had been known to cook
           methamphetamine and, in a prior case, had resisted arrest

                                       -9-
J-A10018-23

          upon execution of the search warrant.

          On the date in question, the police chose to use the
          emergency response team, which entailed them driving
          slowly down a 50-yard driveway … when it was barely light
          out and there was a surveillance camera noted not only by
          the [CI] who informed the police about it but was observed
          during surveillance, and on the date in question when the
          police went to search the residence the lights were on in the
          residence where the drug activity was known to have
          occurred.

          Based upon all of this, the officers made a decision—well,
          they did announce over the loudspeaker that they had a
          search warrant. There was a relatively small period of time
          before the door was breached after the knock, but in this
          case the officers had exigent circumstances, including fear
          for their safety and also destruction of evidence. So, based
          upon all of that, there was a reasonable suspicion of the
          exigent circumstances which allowed for the breach of the
          residence.

(N.T. Suppression Hearing at 49-50).

       Our review of the record confirms the court’s findings.3               Here, the

Commonwealth’s        evidence     established     that   the   officers   possessed    a

reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances.              See Kane, supra.           We

____________________________________________

3 The record on appeal included the flash drive containing the body camera

footage from three (3) officers who participated in the execution of the search
warrant. This Court reviewed the footage, which confirmed the testimony of
Sergeant Huff. Specifically, the footage revealed that police announced their
presence and waited thirteen (13) seconds before breaching the front door.
(See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1-3, Video 1, at 1:56-2:09). Police entered the
residence and found that the lights were on in the living room, where both
Appellant and Ms. Lorah were present. (See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1-3,
Video 3, at 2:05-2:11).       After the officers entered, one of the dogs
immediately ran into the living room. (Id. at 2:15). Thereafter, Ms. Lorah
offered to assist police with securing the animal. (See Commonwealth’s
Exhibit 1-3, Video 1, at 2:32-2:40).

                                          - 10 -
J-A10018-23

emphasize that: 1) the presence of security cameras gave the officers a

reason to believe that evidence might be destroyed; 2) the CI alerted Sergeant

Huff to the presence of weapons on the property, which could have imperiled

officer safety; 3) the CI indicated that an aggressive pit bull lived on the

property, which created another hazard; and 4) Sergeant Huff knew that

Appellant had resisted arrest in the past, further compromising officer safety.

See Bellamy, supra. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in

denying Appellant’s suppression motion. See Ford, supra. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/06/2023

                                    - 11 -