Court Opinion

ID: 9890013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 21:03:45.16914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:57.179750
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/11/23 In re Jordan M. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

In re JORDAN M., a Person                                   B323565
Coming Under the Juvenile                                   (Los Angeles County Super.
Court Law.                                                  Ct. No. 20CCJP05218C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Appellant,

         v.

TIERRA M.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Pete R. Navarro, Juvenile Court Referee. Appeal and
cross-appeal dismissed.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
                   __________________________

      Tierra M. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring six-month-
old Jordan M. a dependent of the court under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (j). Mother contends
there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s
finding that Mother’s failure to protect Jordan’s older half-
brothers, 12-year-old Tyler W. and 11-year-old Tyrin W., from
sexual abuse placed Jordan at substantial risk of harm.
      The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) cross-appeals from the juvenile
court’s order dismissing the same factual allegations made under
section 300, former subdivision (b)(1).2 The Department argues
Mother’s unresolved mental health issues, poor decision-making,

1     Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2     The Legislature amended Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, effective January 1, 2023, in part by revising
subdivision (b)(1) to specify in separate subparagraphs ways in
which a child may come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court due to the failure or inability of the child’s parent or
guardian to adequately supervise or care for the child.

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and non-cooperation with the Department create an ongoing risk
of harm to Jordan.
      While the appeals were pending, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction over Jordan, granting Mother sole legal
and physical custody. Because we cannot grant effective relief to
Mother, we dismiss her appeal as moot. We also find the
Department’s cross-appeal is moot.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Juvenile Court Proceedings as to Tyler and Tyrin
      On September 29, 2020 the Department received a referral
alleging sexual abuse and general neglect of Tyler and Tyrin.
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Special Victims
Bureau previously received a cybercrime tip that a video
depicting two children engaging in sexual acts had been uploaded
on May 25, 2020 to a YouTube account. The video depicted two
boys, approximately eight to 10 years old, engaging in oral and
anal intercourse with each other. The YouTube account was
registered to Mother. In an interview on September 29, Mother
identified the boys in the video as her sons and stated she
learned of the video on the day it was posted after receiving
notice from a maternal aunt and from YouTube. Mother stated
she told the boys what they had done was wrong, blocked content
on their electronic devices, and required them to sleep in separate
rooms. However, Tyrin told the social worker the brothers still
sometimes slept in the same bedroom. Tyrin also reported that
at the time they made the video, Mother was at work; Tyler said
Mother was in her room or out getting groceries. In a subsequent
interview, Tyrin said that Mother would leave them alone at

                                3
home all day when she had to work, including overnight, and that
sometimes the boys would have nothing to eat all day.
       On September 30, 2020 Tyler and Tyrin were removed from
Mother. Tyler was placed on a section 5585 hold3 because he
expressed thoughts of self-harm. A few weeks later Tyrin was
also placed on a section 5585 hold. Further, Tyrin demonstrated
behavioral issues in his placement, including angry outbursts
and breaking and throwing items.
       On October 2, 2020 the Department filed a petition under
section 300, former subdivision (b)(1), alleging Mother failed to
provide Tyler and Tyrin with appropriate parental care and
supervision because the boys engaged in oral and anal sex with
each other; they recorded their behavior and uploaded the video
to YouTube; and Mother knew of the video and failed to protect
the children by continuing to allow them to sleep in the same
room. In addition, Mother left the boys home alone without adult
supervision and care on multiple occasions in September 2020,
failed to provide the boys with necessary therapeutic counseling
following the incident, and failed to ensure Tyler took prescribed
psychotropic medication. Tyler had been hospitalized due to self-
harming ideation, and Mother suffered mental and emotional
problems and failed to seek mental health treatment. The
petition alleged Mother’s conduct placed the boys at risk of

3      The Children’s Civil Commitment and Mental Health
Treatment Act of 1988 (§ 5585 et seq.) provides for a 72-hour
evaluation and treatment in an evaluation facility of a minor who
“as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself
or herself, or gravely disabled and authorization for voluntary
treatment is not available.” (§ 5585.50, subd. (a).)

                                  4
serious physical harm. On October 7, 2020 the juvenile court
detained the boys from Mother.
       At the December 14, 2020 jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations (including
an amended allegation as to Mother’s mental and emotional
problems). The court declared Tyler and Tyrin dependents of the
court and removed them from Mother’s custody. The court
ordered Mother to participate in a parenting program for children
with behavioral challenges, sex abuse awareness counseling, and
individual counseling to address case issues. Mother was also
ordered to participate in mental health counseling, including a
psychiatric evaluation. The court granted Mother monitored
visits.4
       Mother later reported she had participated in child sexual
abuse awareness classes and completed a parenting program.
Mother had nine individual counseling sessions, but she
terminated individual therapy because she felt it was not helping
her. Tyler’s caregiver reported she had to terminate Mother’s
monitored telephone calls with Tyler on two occasions because
Mother argued with Tyler and spoke negatively about Gregory
(Tyler and Tyrin’s father), and Tyler’s demeanor was negatively
impacted when engaged with Mother. Tyrin, who was in a
separate placement, continued to have serious behavioral
problems, and he was hospitalized on section 5585 holds in
March and May 2021 after attempting self-harm and exhibiting

4     Tyler and Tyrin’s father, Gregory W., did not appear at the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, although he was later
granted family reunification services and visitation with Tyler
and Tyrin.

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assaultive behaviors. At the January 20, 2022 review hearing,
the juvenile court placed Tyler in the home of Gregory and
granted Mother unmonitored visits, as long as Tyrin was not
present at the same time.

B.     The Juvenile Court Proceedings as to Jordan
       In March 2022 Jordan was born. On March 29 the
Department received a referral alleging general neglect by
Mother. On March 31 the social worker visited Mother’s home,
but there was no answer at the door. The social worker reached
Mother by telephone, explaining the Department had received a
referral and needed to meet with Mother and Jordan, but Mother
responded, “‘I’m in the middle of something’” and ended the call.
The Department was unable to reach Mother for several months
thereafter. From April to June social workers visited the home at
least six times, called Mother at least seven times (leaving
detailed messages), and sent Mother certified letters and emails;
Mother never responded. After Jordan was born, Mother also
stopped communicating with the Department regarding Tyler’s
and Tyrin’s cases.
       Gregory reported he had no contact with Mother during
this period, and it appeared Mother was trying to visit Tyler and
Tyrin without informing the Department. Tyrin’s caregiver
reported that on one occasion Mother picked Tyrin up from school
when she did not have a scheduled visit. On another occasion,
Mother flagged down Tyrin’s school bus to visit him.
       On July 1, 2022 the Department filed a petition under
section 300, former subdivision (b)(1) and subdivision (j),
asserting the identical allegations under both subdivisions that
Mother placed Jordan at substantial risk of physical harm

                               6
because she failed to protect Tyler and Tyrin from sexual activity;
she left Tyler and Tyrin at home without adult supervision and
care, and failed to provide Tylor and Tyrin with the necessary
care for their mental and emotional problems. In addition,
Mother suffered from mental and emotional problems, including
depression, that endangered the children, and she failed to
participate in consistent medical treatment. On July 5 the
juvenile court ordered Jordan detained from Mother and issued a
protective custody warrant for Jordan and an arrest warrant for
Mother.5
      Mother voluntarily appeared in the juvenile court on
August 5, 2022, and the court recalled the warrants. Mother
reported she had been diagnosed with postpartum depression,
attention deficit disorder, and adjustment order. Jordan
sustained a head injury during birth and had been recently
referred to a physical therapist and neurologist. The juvenile
court found Mother’s voluntary appearance in court indicated she
was willing to cooperate with the court on a case plan, and, over
the Department’s objection, the court ordered Jordan released to
Mother.
      In the August 15, 2022 last minute information for the
court, the Department reported Mother was not working and was
Jordan’s primary caregiver, with assistance from the maternal
grandmother and aunt. Mother told the Department she had

5     On July 19, 2022 the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction
over Tyler, effective August 5, and released him to Gregory,
granting Mother monitored visitation. On the same day the court
terminated Mother’s reunification services for Tyrin, finding
Mother was in partial compliance with her case plan.

                                7
previously been receiving mental health services. However, she
was unable to provide contact information for any mental health
providers. Mother identified Jordan’s father as a truck driver
named Paul S., but he did not want to be involved in the
dependency matter. Mother failed to explain why she refused to
allow the Department access to Jordan for four months.
       At the August 16, 2022 jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile
court received the parties’ exhibits, including documentation from
Mother showing she had received mental health services in the
past two years and had been prescribed an antidepressant, and
the court took notice of the sustained findings and orders
regarding Tyler and Tyrin. The Department conceded Jordan
was “somewhat differently situated” from Tyler and Tyrin but
argued Mother’s mental and emotional problems “continue to
exist and that her lack of supervision has put the older two
siblings at serious risk of harm and do continue to present a risk
to this newborn.” The court sustained all counts of the petition
under section 300, subdivision (j), as pleaded. The court found
the counts “relate to neglectful supervision that relate to failure
of the Mother in the siblings’ case. . . . [T]he kids are still
experiencing trauma from that.” The court dismissed the
identical allegations under former subdivision (b). The court
noted it had not removed Jordan from Mother because he was a
baby and there was “information that this child was being taken
care of properly.” The court continued the disposition hearing to
await due diligence concerning Paul’s parentage.
       Following the jurisdiction hearing, Mother reported she
had enrolled in mental health services, and Mother’s new
psychiatrist increased her antidepressant medicine. However,

                                8
the Department’s still could not verify Mother’s current mental
health services.
       At the September 13, 2022 disposition hearing, the juvenile
court declared Jordan a dependent of the court under section 300
and ordered that Mother would retain physical custody under
Department supervision. The court found, “If Mother keeps her
mental health needs in check, if she complies with her
psychotropic medication plan, then that goes far to ensure that
this a successful home of parent order. And I am aware of the
Mother’s history and the court struggled at the detention hearing
with its order of releasing the child. But the court is of the
opinion that that the child would be the one suffering in not being
able to bond with the Mother.” Mother was ordered to participate
in mental health treatment, including compliance with her
psychotropic meditation plan, individual counseling, and a family
preservation program.
       Mother timely appealed, and the Department cross-
appealed.6

6      Mother also appealed from the juvenile court’s orders
terminating jurisdiction over Tyler and terminating Mother’s
reunification services as to Tyrin. Although Mother lists these
orders in her opening brief, she does not present any argument as
to why the court erred in issuing the orders, thereby abandoning
or forfeiting any challenge to the orders. (See Tiernan v. Trustees
of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn.
4 [issue not raised on appeal “deemed waived”]; Doe v.
McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 653 [“An appellant
abandons an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief.”];
Swain v. LaserAway Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th

                                9
          On March 14, 2023, after Mother filed her opening brief on
appeal, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Jordan at
the six-month review hearing, releasing Jordan to Mother. The
court’s minute order states “those conditions which would justify
the initial assumption of jurisdiction under WIC section 300 no
longer exist and are not likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn
. . . .”7

                           DISCUSSION

A.    Termination of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction over Jordan
      Moots Mother’s Appeal
      Mother’s appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings as to Jordan
and the disposition order based on those findings. As discussed,
however, while Mother’s appeal was pending, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction over Jordan and released him to Mother
with no further orders.8 Mother’s appeal is now moot.

59, 72 [“‘“‘Issues not raised in an appellant's brief are [forfeited]
or abandoned.’”’”].)
7     On July 18, 2023 we granted the Department’s motion for
judicial notice of the March 14, 2023 minute order.
8      Mother addressed the March 14, 2023 order terminating
jurisdiction in her reply brief, arguing it did not moot her appeal.
In its October 3, 2023 supplemental letter brief the Department
argues Mother’s appeal is now moot, and if we dismiss Mother’s
appeal on this basis, the Department’s cross-appeal would also be
rendered moot or nonjusticiable.

                                  10
       “A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) “A case becomes moot when events
‘“render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in
favor of plaintiff, to grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.”’
[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be
met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm.
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (Id. at p. 276.)
       The parents in D.P. appealed the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction finding that their infant son was at substantial risk
of suffering serious physical harm from alleged physical abuse,
but while their appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction over the child without issuing any orders that
continued to impact the parents. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 272.) The Supreme Court concluded with respect to the
father’s petition for review that the impacts of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction findings were too speculative, and therefore, the
father’s challenge was moot. (Id. at p. 282.) The court explained
that “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible
impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.] It
follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the plaintiff must
first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change in
legal status. Although a jurisdictional finding that a parent
engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally stigmatizing,
complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal.
The stigma must be paired with some effect on the plaintiff’s

                                  11
legal status that is capable of being redressed by a favorable
court decision.” (Id. at p. 277.) The court provided as examples
of non-moot challenges to jurisdiction findings cases in which a
jurisdiction finding affects parental custody rights, limits a
parent’s contact with his or her child, or results in a disposition
order that continues to adversely affect a parent. (Id. at pp. 277-
278.)
       In reversing the Court of Appeal’s order dismissing the
appeal as moot, however, the D.P. court emphasized that “[e]ven
when a case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent
discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) The Supreme Court explained that
reviewing courts will generally exercise their discretion when the
case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to
recur, there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the
parties, or a material question remains for the court to
determine. (Ibid.) The court also identified additional factors
reviewing courts may evaluate when considering whether to
exercise their discretion to decide a moot case, including whether
a challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current or future
dependency proceedings, and the nature of the allegations
against the parent (with more egregious findings showing a
parent’s greater interest in challenging the findings). (Id. at
pp. 285-286.) In addition, courts may consider why the appeal
became moot; for example, principles of fairness may favor
discretionary review of cases rendered moot “by the prompt
compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent
challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (Id. at p. 286.)
Further, “[i]t would perversely incentivize noncompliance if
mootness doctrine resulted in the availability of appeals from

                                12
jurisdictional findings only for parents who are less compliant or
for whom the court has issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)
       In her reply brief, Mother concedes the termination of
jurisdiction over Jordan and his release to Mother without any
orders that continue to impact Mother render her appeal moot.
However, Mother urges us to exercise our discretion to consider
her appeal because of the “particularly pernicious or
stigmatizing” nature of the sustained allegations concerning
Mother’s failure to protect Tyler and Tyrin’s from sexual abuse.
(See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 285-286 [“The exercise of
discretionary review may also be informed by whether the
jurisdictional finding is based on particularly pernicious or
stigmatizing conduct.”].) Mother relies on In re M.W. (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452, in which the Court of Appeal
exercised its discretion to review (and then reversed) a
jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (d), that the
mother failed to protect her children from a substantial risk of
sexual abuse by the father, even though the mother did not
challenge the court’s exercise of jurisdiction based on the
mother’s abuse of alcohol and pain medication, reasoning a
sexual-abuse finding is “pernicious” and “carries a particular
stigma.”
       Although the jurisdiction finding that Mother failed to
protect Tyler and Tyrin from sexual activity can fairly be
considered stigmatizing, in contrast to In re M.W., the juvenile
court here made the identical jurisdiction findings with respect to
the two boys, which are now final. Thus, regardless of our ruling
in this case, the findings as to Tyler and Tyrin will remain in the
record. In adjudicating Jordan’s petition in 2022, the juvenile
court made no additional findings that would unduly stigmatize

                                13
Mother; to the contrary, the court found Mother could retain
physical custody of Jordan because the evidence showed she had
been providing proper care to him.
      Mother argues discretionary review is also warranted
because she promptly complied with her case plan and, as
discussed in D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 286, it would create a
perverse incentive if Mother’s compliance resulted in forfeiture of
her ability to challenge the adverse jurisdiction findings.9 While
we commend Mother for her compliance, this factor alone does
not justify reaching the merits of this appeal. (See ibid. [“no
single factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should
exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal”].) Because the
jurisdiction findings as to Tyler and Tyrin formed the principal
basis for jurisdiction over Jordan, Mother’s current appeal does
not raise any issues that are likely to impact Mother or pose a
recurring question of public interest. (Id. at p. 282.)

B.    Dismissal of Mother’s Appeal Renders the Cross-appeal
      Moot
      The Department contends in its cross-appeal that the
juvenile court erred by dismissing the allegations with respect to
Jordan under section 300, former subdivision (b)(1). As the
Department now concedes, the cross-appeal is also moot.

9     The record does not include any post-appeal status reports
that would reflect Mother’s compliance with her case plan.
However, given the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction
at the six-month review hearing, we assume Mother complied
with her case plan at least within the first six months.

                                14
       The Supreme Court explained in D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pages 283 to 284, “where there are multiple findings against one
parent[,] the validity of one finding may render moot the parent’s
attempt to challenge the others.” (See In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
766, 773 [“‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds
for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency
court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile
court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the
statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the
petition is supported by substantial evidence.’”].)
       Our dismissal of Mother’s appeal as moot operates as an
affirmance of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings under
section 300, subdivision (j), and the disposition order declaring
Jordan a dependent of the court. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 285 [“dismissal of an appeal for mootness operates as an
affirmance of the underlying judgment or order”]; In re Jasmon
O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 413 [“Normally the involuntary dismissal
of an appeal leaves the judgment intact.”].) Because the juvenile
court had jurisdiction over Jordan under section 300,
subdivision (j), we cannot provide the Department effective relief
regardless of whether the court properly dismissed the identical
allegations under section 300, former subdivision (b)(1). And, as
with Mother’s challenges, we see no reason to exercise our
discretion to consider the Department’s cross-appeal.

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                        DISPOSITION

     Mother’s appeal and the Department’s cross-appeal are
dismissed as moot.

                                       FEUER, J.
We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

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