Court Opinion

ID: 9736871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:08:47.911837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:55.074314
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: Although neither party has raised the issue, this court has an obligation to consider, sua sponte, its jurisdiction over the present appeal. See, e.g., People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1999). Because I conclude that we do not have jurisdiction under Trent v. Winningham, 172 Ill. 2d 420 (1996), and Hearne v. Illinois State Board of Education, 185 Ill. 2d 443 (1999), I respectfully dissent. In Trent, the plaintiff, Barbara Trent, sought retroactive child support from the father of her child under section 14(b) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/14(b) (West 1992)). The trial court denied Trent’s claim for support, holding that she was not entitled to the support, that the claim was time-barred and, in the alternative, that section 14(b) was unconstitutional. Trent, 172 Ill. 2d at 422. Trent appealed to this court, asserting that a direct appeal was appropriate under Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)) because section 14(b) had been held unconstitutional. This court did not reach the merits of Trent’s claim for support. Instead, after examining our jurisdiction sua sponte, we concluded that the circuit court’s constitutional ruling could not serve as a basis for direct review under Rule 302(a) because the circuit court had also denied the plaintiff relief on alternative, nonconstitutional grounds. In so holding, we noted that when a judgment of the circuit court is based upon a finding that legislation is unconstitutional, Rule 302(a) mandates the parties to bypass the normal appellate process and proceed directly to this court. We explained that this direct review process becomes problematic when the judgment of the circuit court contains alternative, non-constitutional grounds, as this court is then compelled to consider issues it might otherwise decline to address “in deference to our appellate court where the issues would have been reviewable as a matter of right.” Trent, 172 Ill. 2d at 426. We also noted that when a circuit court holds legislation unconstitutional, the stability of the legal system is undermined. We admonished courts “not to compromise that stability in the first place by declaring legislation unconstitutional when the particular case does not require it,” i.e., when alternative, nonconstitutional grounds can resolve the case. Trent, 172 Ill. 2d at 425. Because the circuit court in Trent had denied plaintiff relief on two, nonconstitutional grounds, the constitutional holding was not necessary for the resolution of the case. Based on the concerns noted above, we concluded that Rule 302(a) jurisdiction was improper. Trent, 172 Ill. 2d at 426. We vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded the cause to the circuit court with instructions to enter a new, modified order, without the holding that section 14(b) was unconstitutional. Trent, 172 Ill. 2d at 427. Our decision in Trent was reaffirmed in Hearne. In Hearne, a Chicago schoolteacher who had been dismissed by the board of education filed suit in the circuit court contesting his dismissal. Upon administrative review, the circuit court set aside the dismissal, finding that the weight of the evidence supported reinstatement. Hearne, 185 Ill. 2d at 451. However, the court also held a portion of the Illinois School Code unconstitutional and ordered the teacher reinstated on this alternative basis as well. Hearne, 185 Ill. 2d at 451-52. The school board filed a motion to reconsider in which it argued that, under Trent, the circuit court should not have reached the constitutional claim. Hearne, 185 Ill. 2d at 452. The circuit court denied the motion, stating that it was appropriate to reach the constitutional question in order to correct a “fundamentally unfair” process created by the legislation and to relieve other courts from the burden of having to interpret a “vague and ambiguous statute.” Hearne, 185 111. 2d at 452. Based on the finding of unconstitutionality, direct appeal was sought in this court under Rule 302(a). Applying our holding in Trent, we concluded that the circuit court’s constitutional ruling did not provide a proper basis for direct review. We expressly rejected the circuit court’s rationale for reaching the constitutional issue, noting that the circuit court’s constitutional ruling granted the teacher “additional and alternative relief’ which was “not necessary to resolve plaintiffs claim for administrative review.” Hearne, 185 Ill. 2d at 456. As in Trent, we remanded the cause to the circuit court with instructions to vacate its order. We further instructed the circuit court to reenter a modified order which excluded the holding that a portion of the School Code was unconstitutional. Hearne, 185 Ill. 2d at 457. See also McLean v. Department of Revenue, 184 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1998) (the rationale of Trent did not apply where the finding of statutory unconstitutionality was not an alternative basis for granting or denying relief). The present case is controlled by Trent and Hearne. Here, the circuit court granted complete relief to Vuagniaux on several nonconstitutional grounds. The circuit court held that the decision of the Department had to be set aside because, among other reasons, the appointment of Dr. Pope to replace Dr. Cook on the Medical Disciplinary Board was not authorized by the Medical Practice Act (225 ILCS 60/7 (West 1998)), the Department’s administrative complaint was defective, and the Department had failed to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. However, the circuit court also held, in the alternative, that the decision of the Department had to be set aside because sections 22(A)(13) and (A)(26) of the Medical Practice Act (225 ILCS 60/22(A)(13), (A)(26) (West 1998)) were unconstitutionally vague and violated Vuagniaux’s right to engage in “free commercial and educational speech,” and because section 7 of the Medical Practice Act (225 ILCS 60/7 (West 1998)), which sets forth the composition of the Medical Disciplinary Board, violated Vuagniaux’s rights to due process and equal protection. As in Hearne, the circuit court in this case granted Vuagniaux “alternative relief’ (Hearne, 185 Ill. 2d at 456) based on its holdings that provisions of the Medical Practice Act were unconstitutional, even though none of these holdings were necessary for the circuit court’s disposition of the case. Accordingly, under Hearne and Trent, the proper resolution of this case is to vacate the circuit court’s order and to remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions to enter a new order which excludes the holdings of unconstitutionality. See Hearne, 185 Ill. 2d at 457; Trent, 172 Ill. 2d at 427. I believe that Hearne and Trent are relevant to the present case. Because the majority does not acknowledge either decision or explain why the principles set forth in those decisions are inapplicable, I respectfully dissent. JUSTICES FREEMAN and CARMAN join in this dissent.