Court Opinion

ID: 9371773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 20:02:24.26155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:30.096707
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/23 Hill RHF Housing Partners v. City of Los Angeles CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 HILL RHF HOUSING                                              B295181
 PARTNERS, L.P., et al.,
                                                               (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiffs and                                      Super. Ct. No. BS170127)
           Appellants,
                                                               ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
           v.                                                  AND DENYING REHEARING

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,                                  [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

           Defendants and
           Respondents.

 MESA RHF PARTNERS, L.P.,                                      B295315

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BS170352)
           v.

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,

           Defendants and
           Respondents.
THE COURT:
       It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on January 20,
2023, be modified as follows:
1.     At the end of the first full sentence on page 32 (quoting
from Dahms “No assessment [may] . . . exceed[ ] the reasonable
cost of the proportional special benefit conferred on that parcel.”)
add as footnote 3 the following footnote:

      In their petitions for rehearing, petitioners argue that BID
      discounts for nonprofit entities and residential properties
      in the BID underlying Dahms means that the “BID at issue
      in Dahms took the benefits conferred on each parcel into
      much greater consideration than the BIDs at issue on this
      appeal” and urge us to grant rehearing “to consider the
      importance of these distinctions.” In Dahms, the BID
      discounted properties belonging to “nonprofit entities
      (‘religious organizations, clubs, lodges and fraternal
      organizations’)” (not subject to any distinction for property
      use) and—separately—any properties “zoned exclusively
      residential.” (Dahms, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 713.)

      In contrast to the petitioners’ arguments here—that their
      nonprofit status must be accounted for—the argument in
      Dahms was that “the assessments for properties owned by
      nonprofit entities, such as fraternal organizations and
      churches,” violated Proposition 218 because “ ‘[t]he
      assessments are not proportional to the benefits received
      because the assessments are discounted.’ ” (Dahms, supra,
      174 Cal.App.4th at p. 716.) In other words, Dahms argued
      that the BID could not discount based on nonprofit status

                                  2
      under Proposition 218. That is the argument we rejected in
      Dahms. (Ibid.)

      Cases are not authority for arguments that were not
      considered. (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Newsom
      (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 158, 169.) We will not rely on
      Dahms as authority to require a BID to consider a property
      owner’s nonprofit status in a proportionality analysis.

There is no change in judgment.

Appellants’ petition for rehearing is denied.

____________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.           CHANEY, J.            BENDIX, J.

                                  3
Filed 1/20/23 Hill RHF Housing Partners v. City of Los Angeles CA2/1 (unmodified
opinion)
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 HILL RHF HOUSING                                              B295181
 PARTNERS, L.P., et al.,
                                                               (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiffs and                                      Super. Ct. No. BS170127)
           Appellants,

           v.

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,

           Defendants and
           Respondents.

 MESA RHF PARTNERS, L.P.,                                      B295315

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BS170352)
           v.

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,

           Defendants and
           Respondents.
       APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
       Reuben Raucher & Blum, Timothy D. Reuben and Stephen
L. Raucher for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
       Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Beverly A. Cook,
Assistant City Attorney, and Daniel M. Whitley, Deputy City
Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent City of Los Angeles.
       Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono,
Holly O. Whatley, and Pamela K. Graham for Defendants and
Respondents Downtown Center Business Improvement District
Management Corporation and San Pedro Property Owners
Alliance.
                   ____________________________
       “State law provides for the formation of business
improvement districts, or BIDs, through which services,
activities, and improvements may be funded by assessments
imposed on benefitted business or properties. When a BID is
subsidized by assessments upon real property, these levies must
comply with the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, an initiative
measure more commonly known as Proposition 218,” which was
approved by voters on November 5, 1996. (Hill RHF Housing
Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 12 Cal.5th 458, 468
(Hill).)
       The City of Los Angeles created the Downtown Center
Business Improvement District (DCBID) in 1998 and the San
Pedro Historic Waterfront Business Improvement District
(SPBID) in 2007 pursuant to the Property and Business
Improvement District Law of 1994 (the PBID Law). (Sts. & Hy.
Code, § 36600, et seq.) Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. (Hill),
Hill Olive Housing Partners, L.P. (Olive), and Mesa RHF

                               2
Partners, L.P. (Mesa) (collectively petitioners) filed petitions for
writ of mandate in the trial court alleging various causes of
action challenging the 2017 renewal of the two BIDs.
       The petitioners’ challenges fall into three categories of
contentions petitioners make in this court. First, petitioners
argue that the BIDs’ assessments are unconstitutional under
Proposition 218 because they rely on facially unconstitutional
legislative amendments to the PBID Law. Second, petitioners
contend that the BIDs’ assessments are themselves
unconstitutional because the assessments are not based solely on
special benefits, the engineers’ reports upon which the
assessments are based fail to separate general benefits from
special benefits, and the BIDs failed to consider the unique
circumstances of the petitioners’ properties in levying the
assessments. Third, petitioners contend that the engineers’
reports upon which the BIDs based their assessments are legally
insufficient to support the assessments. Because the
assessments are invalid for any one of these reasons, petitioners
contend, they constitute taxes, from which the petitioners are
exempt.
       The trial court rejected the petitioners’ arguments, relying
largely on this court’s opinion in Dahms v. Downtown Pomona
Property & Business Improvement Dist. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
708 (Dahms), and entered judgment for the City on both
petitions. We also disagree with the petitioners, and will affirm
the trial court’s judgments.

                         BACKGROUND
       The Supreme Court recited much of the relevant procedural
and factual background, which we draw on here, in its opinion in
Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th 458.

                                 3
       The petitioners “are nonprofit providers of housing and
services to low-income seniors. Mesa owns real property, known
as Harbor Tower, in San Pedro. Hill owns a property known as
Angelus Plaza and Olive owns another property, Angelus Plaza
North, in downtown Los Angeles. Harbor Tower is within the
boundaries of the [SPBID], and the Angelus Plaza and Angelus
Plaza North properties are within the [DCBID].
       “These two BIDs were created pursuant to the [PBID Law].
The [SPBID] was originally established in [2007]; the [DCBID] in
1998. In 2012, petitioners brought legal challenges against these
BIDs. Those disputes were resolved through settlement
agreements, reached in 2013, in which it was determined that the
City of Los Angeles would reimburse petitioners for their BID
assessment payments.
       “In 2017 [the City of Los Angeles] proposed that the [BIDs]
be renewed for 10-year terms. Each proposal engaged the process
for approving a BID, as set out in the PBID Law, Proposition 218,
and the Proposition 218 Omnibus Implementation Act (Gov.
Code, § 53750 et seq. . . .). As part of this process, the Los
Angeles City Council . . . adopted two ordinances, one for each
BID, expressing an intent to consider the establishment of the
BID. Each of these ordinances adopted and approved a detailed
management district plan and associated engineer’s report for
the relevant BID, provided a general description of the BID’s
boundaries, gave the total projected assessment for the BID over
its 10-year term as well as for its first year, identified the number
of assessed parcels in the proposed BID (804 parcels owned by
270 stakeholders for the [SPBID]; 2,865 parcels owned by 1,710
stakeholders for the [DCBID]), and summarized the
improvements and activities to be undertaken through the BID.

                                 4
For each BID, the appropriate ordinance also announced the
date, time, and place of a public hearing before the City Council
at which, per the ordinances, ‘all interested persons will be
permitted to present written or oral testimony, and the City
Council will consider all objections or protests to the proposed
assessment’ used to fund the BID.” (Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp.
469-470.)
       The petitioners received notices of the public hearings
before the City Council, and their authorized representatives
voted against establishment of the BIDs. (Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th
at p. 470.) “Meanwhile, on the same day as the hearing on the
[SPBID] (which took place three weeks after the hearing on the
[DCBID]), a City of Los Angeles representative advised
petitioners’ counsel that due to differences between the BIDs as
formerly constituted and as renewed, the previously negotiated
2013 settlement agreements—which by their terms applied for so
long as the earlier-established BIDs ‘continue[d] in [their] current
formulation[s]’—were no longer in effect.
       “When all ballots were counted, petitioners were
substantially outvoted; there was no majority protest against
either BID. Shortly after each tabulation, the City Council
adopted an ordinance regarding the relevant BID, announcing in
each instance that the City Council had ‘heard all testimony and
received all evidence concerning the establishment of the District
and desires to establish the District.’ ” (Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
pp. 470-471.)
   A. The SPBID
       According to the engineer’s report supporting the SPBID
renewal, the SBPID “incorporates two dynamic centers: [¶] A)
The revitalized pedestrian oriented Historic Downtown San

                                 5
Pedro [teeming] with unique shops, restaurants, offices,
entertainment venues[,] and mixed use newer developments, and
[¶] B) The international based Port of Los Angeles—a hub of
tourism, culture, commerce and recreation.” The SPBID’s
Management District Plan indicates that SPBID “include[s] a
mix of retail, office, entertainment, light industrial,
manufacturing, . . . parking, residential[,] and government
facilities.” SPBID is divided into three benefit districts, with
some SPBID activities designated for all districts, but others
designated for less than the entire SPBID. As an example,
“Ambassador/Security Services,” described below, “are only
provided within Benefit Zone 1 with none in Benefit Zones 2 or 3.
Zones 2 and 3 are patrolled by the Port of Los Angeles Police
Department.” And “Sidewalk pressure washing,” part of SPBID’s
“Sanitation & Beautification/Capital Improvements,” “is provided
at least 4 times a year in Benefit Zone 1 and only as needed in
Benefit Zones 2 and 3.”1
       SPBID intended to fund services and activities in the three
benefit zones by assessments specific to those benefit zones:
“Assessment funds collected from each benefit zone will only be
spent on services provided within that benefit zone.”
       In addition to district management and administration, the
SPBID was to provide “Visitor, Ambassador, and Security
services[,] [¶] Sanitation, Beautification, & Capital
Improvements such as monument signs, landscaping and other
streetscape improvements[,] [¶] [and] Marketing and Special
Events.” “Visitor & Ambassador/Security Services” includes,

      1 This is not an exhaustive list of the distinctions between
the three zones, rather is included to provide examples of the
differences in services between the three SPBID benefit zones.

                                 6
among other services, shuttle services, visitor kiosks with maps
and brochures, “wayfinding signage, monument signage[,] and
high technology advances to automate and enhance various
Visitor Program elements.” “Ambassador/Security Services uses
uniformed ambassadors that provide security services . . . by
reporting crime to [the Los Angeles Police Department] and the
Port Police Department.” The ambassador services program also
intended to install security cameras and security lighting
throughout the district. Sanitation, beautification/capital
improvements included sidewalk sweeping, sidewalk pressure
washing, illegal dumping pickup, graffiti removal, and “clean up
patrols,” along with landscape watering, tree trimming, and
streetscape improvements as well as capital improvement
beautification projects. According to the Management District
Plan, “[e]xamples of streetscape improvements include street tree
‘twinkle’ lighting, holiday decorations, street furniture, decorative
banners, and utility services.” Finally, “Marketing and Special
Events” included “website development and updates, newsletter
publication, branding and marketing program development,
advertising, public relations activities[,] and special events,” as
well as “business attraction, recruitment[,] and retention.”
“Special events include concerts, festivals, and Los Angeles Fleet
Week events.”
   B. The DCBID
      According to the Management District Plan Summary
drafted to support the DCBID’s 2017 renewal, the DCBID “was
created to include the commercial core of Downtown Los
Angeles.” “The property uses within [DCBID’s] boundaries are a
mix of office, retail, cultural, religious, parking, publicly-owned
transit, publicly-owned library, publicly-owned parks, publicly-

                                 7
owned office building, residential[,] and mixed-use residential.”
The summary noted that the DCBID would contain two different
“benefit zones,” to be assessed at different rates based on “a
different level of services and a different level of benefit” provided
to each zone. Specifically, the summary reported that “Zone Two
will receive a differing level of benefit in the form of a higher
frequency of cleaning and graffiti abatement services than Zone
One. . . . Zone One properties, because of less pedestrian activity,
require less cleaning services in order to maintain a level of
cleanliness consistent with Zone Two and provide a consistent
level of cleanliness throughout the [DCBID].”
       The materials supporting the 2017 DCBID renewal
identified “improvements and activities” that the DCBID would
provide that fell within three identified categories: safety and
cleanliness, marketing and economic development, and BID
management. “CLEAN and SAFE” included, as the title implies,
activities to promote safety and cleanliness. The “Safe Team
Program” was to “provide security services for the individual
assessed parcels located within the [DCBID] in the form of
patrolling bicycle personnel, nighttime vehicle patrol[,] and
downtown ambassadors.” The engineer’s report stated that the
“[t]he special benefit to assessed parcels from these services is
increased commercial activity which directly relates to increases
in lease rates, residential serving businesses[,] and customer
usage.” Safe services were to be provided to both benefit zones at
the same level.
       The report explained that the “Clean Program” began at
the DCBID’s inception in 1998. “Basic cleaning services, such as
trash pickup and removal from the District, landscape service,
equipment expense and management are delivered to” both

                                  8
benefit zones. According to the engineer’s report, “Zone One will
receive approximately 200 additional hours [annually] above the
baseline level of sidewalk sweeping, sidewalk cleaning[,] and
graffiti removal. Zone Two will receive approximately 625
additional hours [annually] above the baseline level of sidewalk
sweeping, sidewalk cleaning[,] and graffiti removal.” Sidewalk
cleaning was to include sweeping and pressure washing. Trash
collection was to include both trash collection and dispatch of
personnel to “collect stolen shopping carts and large bulky items
illegally dumped in” the DCBID. The DCBID undertook to
remove graffiti by “painting, using solvent[,] and pressure
washing,” and made a goal of “remov[ing] all tags within 24 hours
on weekdays.” The Clean Program also included landscape
improvement and street tree trimming.
       The engineer’s report also identified economic development
and marketing programs and projects designed to “communicate
the changes that are taking place in the [DCBID] and to enhance
the positive perception of the [DCBID].” “The special benefit to
District assessed parcels from these services,” the engineer’s
report said, “is increased commercial activity which directly
relates to increases in lease rates and enhanced commerce.”
    C. The BIDs Assessment Methodology
       The BIDs each employed separate methodologies to
calculate special benefits and assessments attributable to
individual parcels. For DCBID, the methodology was the result
of a four-step process. First, the BID undertook to “[d]efin[e] the
proposed activities.” Second, the BID “[d]etermine[ed] which
parcels specially benefit[ted] from the proposed activities.” Third,
the BID “[d]etermin[ed] the amount of special benefit each parcel
receive[d].” And fourth, the BID “[d]etermin[ed] the proportional

                                 9
special benefit a parcel receives in relation to the amount of
special benefit all other parcels in the PBID receive[d].”
       From that four-step process, DCBID arrived at what it
called a Special Benefit Factor, which the engineer’s report
explained in great detail. The report ultimately described the
factor as a function of what it termed “assessable square footage,”
which the reports explained was generally “the total of gross
building square footage and/or when applicable, land square
footage, plus applicable, assessable parking square footage for
each parcel.”
       Finally, the DCBID engineer’s report contained a detailed
benefit analysis. The analysis purported to restate the special
benefits that had already been set forth in greater detail under
headings related to each of the BIDs’ programs and activities.
The analysis then purported to identify with specificity any
general benefit to parcels both inside and outside of each BID and
general benefit to the general public.
       For SPBID, the methodology consisted of seven steps.
First, the engineer’s report selected what it termed a “basic
benefit unit.” Because SPBID services were “property related
services,” “the benefit unit [could be] measured in linear feet of
street frontage or parcel size in square feet or building size in
square feet or any combination of these factors. Factor quantities
for each parcel are then measured or otherwise ascertained.”
And based on the factor quantity, the engineer’s report could then
assign an appropriate number of benefit units to each parcel. At
this stage of the process, the engineer’s report stated, “[s]pecial
circumstances such as unique geography, land uses, development
constraints[,] etc.[,] are carefully reviewed relative to specific
programs and improvements to be funded by the PBID in order to

                                10
determine any levels of different benefit that may apply on a
parcel-by-parcel or categorical basis.”
       After identifying the basic benefit unit, the engineer
quantified the total basic benefit units by identifying the
specially benefited parcels and their assessable benefit units.
That number derived from step two was then used in step three
to calculate benefit units for each property.
       Step four of the SPBID process was to determine the
assessment formula. The formula was identical for zone 1 and
zone 2 assessments, but was different for zone 3 assessments.
Within each zone, the assessment formula was different for
commercial parcels, residential parcels, and parcels the report
termed “land area.” In step five, the SPBID estimated the total
district costs for all of the proposed programs and services. Step
six was to separate general benefits from special benefits and
related costs. Step seven was to calculate what the report termed
the “basic unit cost.” And step eight was to apply the assessment
formula based on the unit costs to the parcels in the district.
    D. This Litigation
       “Petitioners . . . initiated two actions . . . with Mesa
challenging the San Pedro BID and Hill and Olive attacking the
Downtown Center BID. The verified pleadings contain similar
allegations, with each averring that the BID in question violates
Proposition 218. Boiled down, petitioners assert that the
assessments imposed for the BIDs contravene the initiative
because they are premised on an incorrect and inadequately
supported understanding of the ‘special’ versus ‘general’ benefits
that will accrue from each BID’s activities—treating as ‘special’
what petitioners contend are in fact ‘general’ benefits . . .—and
because the assessments imposed on petitioners exceed the

                               11
reasonable cost of the proportional special benefits conferred on
their parcels. Petitioners seek various forms of relief that would
remove any obligation that they pay assessments for the BIDs.”
(Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 471, fn. omitted.)
       The trial court denied both petitions in full on the merits
and entered judgments for the City of Los Angeles and the BIDs.
The petitioners filed timely notices of appeal.
       On appeal, we concluded by opinion issued June 29, 2020,
that the petitioners were obligated to exhaust administrative
remedies before initiating a challenge to the establishment of the
BIDs in a judicial forum. The Supreme Court granted review and
reversed, concluding that “[p]etitioners did not have to articulate
their objections to the BID assessment schemes at the public
hearings before the City Council to subsequently present their
arguments in these proceedings.” (Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp.
491-492.) The Supreme Court then remanded the matter for
further proceedings consistent with its decision. (Id. at p. 492.)
       Consistent with the Supreme Court’s remittitur, we
vacated our earlier opinion. On remand, the parties submitted
supplemental briefs pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
8.200(b).

                           DISCUSSION
   A. Legal Principles
       1. Proposition 218
       Proposition 218, “ ‘approved by voters in 1996, is one of a
series of voter initiatives restricting the ability of state and local
governments to impose taxes and fees.’ ” (Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th
at p. 473.) The proposition, “ ‘known as the “Right to Vote on
Taxes Act,” . . . added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California
Constitution. [Citation.] Article XIII C concerns voter approval

                                  12
for many types of local taxes other than property taxes. Article
XIII D addresses property-based taxes and fees. [¶] Article XIII
D allows only four types of local property taxes: (1) an ad
valorem tax, (2) a special tax, (3) an assessment, and (4) a
property-related fee. (Art. XIII D, § 3, subd. (a).)’ ” (Ibid.)
       “Section 4 of Proposition 218 (art. XIII D, § 4) is specifically
concerned with assessments. Regarding these levies, Proposition
218 ‘was designed to: constrain local governments’ ability to
impose assessments; place extensive requirements on local
governments charging assessments; shift the burden of
demonstrating assessments’ legality to local government; make it
easier for taxpayers to win lawsuits; and limit the methods by
which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without
their consent.’ ” (Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 473, quoting Silicon
Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space
Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 448 (SVTA).)
       “Proposition 218 has both substantive and procedural
ramifications for assessments. Substantively, it ‘restricts
government’s ability to impose assessments in several important
ways. First, it tightens the definition of the two key findings
necessary to support an assessment: special benefit and
proportionality. An assessment can be imposed only for a
“special benefit” conferred on a particular property. (Art. XIII D,
§§ 2, subd. (b), 4, subd. (a).) A special benefit is “a particular and
distinct benefit over and above general benefits conferred on real
property located in the district or to the public at large.” (Art.
XIII D, § 2, subd. (i).) The definition specifically provides that
“[g]eneral enhancement of property value does not constitute
‘special benefit.’ ” (Ibid.) Further, an assessment on any given
parcel must be in proportion to the special benefit conferred on

                                  13
that parcel: “No assessment shall be imposed on any parcel
which exceeds the reasonable cost of the proportional special
benefit conferred on that parcel.” (Art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (a).) . . .
Because only special benefits are assessable, and public
improvements often provide both general benefits to the
community and special benefits to a particular property, the
assessing agency must first “separate the general benefits from
the special benefits conferred on a parcel” and impose the
assessment only for the special benefits. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
        “Procedurally, all assessments captured by Proposition 218
‘shall be supported by a detailed engineer’s report prepared by a
registered,’ state-certified professional engineer. (Art. XIII D, § 4,
subd. (b).)” (Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 474.)
        “ ‘To make it more difficult for an assessment to be
validated in a court proceeding’ [citation], [Proposition 218]
provides that ‘[i]n any legal action contesting the validity of any
assessment, the burden shall be on the agency to demonstrate
that the property or properties in question receive a special
benefit over and above the benefits conferred on the public at
large and that the amount of any contested assessment is
proportional to, and no greater than, the benefits conferred on
the property or properties in question.’ (Art. XIII D, § 4, subd.
(f).)” (Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 475.)
        2. The PBID Law
        “The PBID Law provides a framework for the
establishment and operation of BIDs in this state. The statute
reflects and furthers the Legislature’s view that ‘[i]t is of
particular local benefit to allow business districts to fund
business related improvements, maintenance, and activities
through the levy of assessments upon the businesses or real

                                  14
property that receive benefits from those improvements.’ (Sts. &
Hy. Code, § 36601, subd. (c).) The ‘activities’ contemplated by the
PBID Law include, but are not limited to, the ‘[p]romotion of
public events’ and tourism within a district, ‘[f]urnishing of music
in any public place,’ ‘[m]arketing and economic development,’ and
‘[p]roviding security, sanitation, graffiti removal, street and
sidewalk cleaning, and other municipal services supplemental to
those normally provided by the municipality.’ (Sts. & Hy. Code,
§ 36606, subds. (a), (b), (d), (e).) The ‘improvements’ referenced
by the law include, but again are not limited to, parking facilities,
benches and kiosks, trash receptacles and public restrooms,
lighting and heating facilities, decorations, parks, fountains, and
planting areas. (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 36610.)” (Hill, supra, 12
Cal.5th at pp. 475-476.)
       Relevant to these appeals, the Legislature amended the
PBID Law effective January 1, 2015 to include the following:
“Activities undertaken for the purpose of conferring special
benefits upon property to be assessed inherently produce
incidental or collateral effects that benefit property or persons
not assessed. Therefore, for special benefits to exist as a separate
and distinct category from general benefits, the incidental or
collateral effects of those special benefits are inherently part of
those special benefits. The mere fact that special benefits
produce incidental or collateral effects that benefit property or
persons not assessed does not convert any portion of those special
benefits or their incidental or collateral effects into general
benefits.” (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 36601, subd. (h)(2), added by
Assem. Bill. No. 2618 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) § 1.) The Bill also
added section 36615.5 to the Streets & Highways Code, which
states in full: “ ‘Special benefit’ means, for purposes of a

                                 15
property-based district, a particular and distinct benefit over and
above general benefits conferred on real property located in a
district or to the public at large. Special benefit includes
incidental or collateral effects that arise from the improvements,
maintenance, or activities of property-based districts even if
those incidental or collateral effects benefit property or persons
not assessed. Special benefit excludes general enhancement of
property value.” (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 36615.5, added by Assem.
Bill. No. 2618 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) § 14.)2
       3. Standards of Review
       We “exercise our independent judgment in reviewing
whether assessments that local agencies impose violate”
Proposition 218. (SVTA, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 450.) Likewise,
on a facial challenge to the validity of a statute, “[w]e use our
independent judgment to decide whether the challenged law is

      2 In July 2022, the Legislature passed and the Governor
signed Assembly Bill No. 2890, which amended Streets and
Highways Code sections 36615.5 and 36622, operative January 1,
2023. (Stats. 2022, ch. 129, §§ 1, 2.) Neither party contends that
the amendments have any retroactive effect. And the legislation
contains no language that would indicate retroactive application.
Therefore, we have not reviewed this matter in the context of
Assembly Bill No. 2890. (See Phillips v. St. Mary Regional
Medical Center (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 218, 229 [“Generally,
statutes do not apply retroactively unless the Legislature clearly
indicated otherwise”].) Nevertheless, we note that the legislative
history for Assembly Bill No. 2890 generally indicates that the
purpose of the bill was to modify and clarify the information that
must be in a BID management district plan and to “codify”
Dahms, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 708, and other recent cases.
(E.g., Assem. Com. on Local Gov., Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2890,
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 19, 2022, pp. 2-3.)

                                16
constitutional.” (Perez v. County of Monterey (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 257, 261.)
       We note that “although we use a de novo standard of
review here, we do not transform into a trial court. As a Court of
Appeal, even in exercising our independent judgment, we do not
find it sufficient for an appellant merely to claim the respondent
should not have been successful at trial and then the burden
shifts to the respondent to prove its case in its entirety again.
Instead, the appellant must frame the issues for us, show us
where the superior court erred, and provide us with the proper
citations to the record and case law.” (Morgan v. Imperial
Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 913.)
    B. The Amendments to the PBID Law are not Facially
       Unconstitutional
       Petitioners broadly contend that the 2014 amendments
(effective January 1, 2015) to the PBID Law are an
unconstitutional end-run around the Supreme Court’s opinion in
SVTA, supra, 44 Cal.4th 431. They couch their constitutional
challenge not on the particular application of the statute, but
rather as a facial challenge to the validity of the 2014 statutory
amendments that include collateral effects of a special benefit in
the definition of a special benefit.
       “ ‘A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a
statute or ordinance considers only the text of the measure itself,
not its application to the particular circumstances of an
individual.’ [Citation.] To succeed on a facial challenge, a [party]
must show that the law in question could never be applied in a
constitutional manner; it is not enough to show that the law
would be unconstitutional under some circumstances. [Citation.]
We use our independent judgment to decide whether the

                                17
challenged law is constitutional.” (Perez v. County of Monterey,
supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 261.)
       The petitioners’ argument does not identify a flaw in the
text of the 2014 amendments based on any stated contradiction
with the text of Proposition 218. Rather, the petitioners contend
that the Supreme Court’s opinion in SVTA—describing the
benefits at issue in that case as general benefits—“held” that
“economic enhancements, quality-of-life benefits, and derivative,
indirect benefits do not constitute special benefits.”
       SVTA dealt with the Santa Clara Open-Space Authority,
which included “all Santa Clara County lands except those
already within the boundaries” of another open-space district.
(SVTA, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 437-438.) “The proposed
assessment district included approximately 314,000 parcels and
over 800 square miles containing over 1,000,000 people.” (Id. at
p. 439.) The purpose of the proposed assessment was to fund the
purchase and maintenance “of open space lands for recreation,
conservation, watersheds, easements, and similar purposes.”
(Ibid.) The engineer’s report supporting the establishment of the
district “identified no particular parcels to be acquired and no
particular areas [within the 800 square mile district] to be
prioritized.” (Ibid.)
       The engineer’s report in SVTA listed seven “special
benefits” that the assessment would confer on “all residents and
property owners in the district: (1) enhanced recreational
activities and expanded access to recreational areas; (2)
protection of views, scenery, and other resources; (3) increased
economic activity; (4) expanded employment opportunity; (5)
reduced costs of law enforcement, health care, fire prevention,
and natural disaster response; (6) enhanced quality of life and

                               18
desirability of the area; and (7) improved water quality, pollution
reduction, and flood prevention.” (SVTA, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p.
453.) The Court focused its analysis through the lens of
Proposition 218’s plain language, which it said required that “a
special benefit must affect the assessed property in a way that is
particular and distinct from its effect on other parcels and that
real property in general and the public at large do not share.”
(Id. at p. 452.) The Court then methodically examined each of
the seven special benefits in the context of both the engineer’s
report and the context of the composition of the district, and
concluded that each of the seven were—in the context of the
district at issue—general rather than special benefits. “All the
listed benefits,” the Court said, “are general benefits in this case,
shared by everyone—all 1.2 million people—living within the
district.” (Id. at p. 454, italics added.)
       The benefits at issue in SVTA are the seven benefits that
the engineer’s report in that matter listed. The Supreme Court
was not focused on and did not make any declaration regarding
collateral effects of special benefits that could themselves be
classified as general benefits.
       Moreover, the Court’s opinion in SVTA appears to be based
more on the relationship between the assessed parcels and each
particular benefit than to a categorical determination about
whether a particular benefit could ever pass constitutional
muster under Proposition 218. The Court pointed out that “[i]n a
well-drawn district—limited to only parcels receiving special
benefits from the improvement—every parcel within that district
receives a shared special benefit.” (SVTA, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p.
452, fn. 8, italics added.) The Court said that it did “not believe
that the voters intended to invalidate an assessment district that

                                 19
is narrowly drawn to include only properties directly benefitting
from an improvement. . . . Thus, if an assessment district is
narrowly drawn, the fact that a benefit is conferred throughout
the district does not make it general rather than special. In that
circumstance, the characterization of a benefit may depend on
whether the parcel receives a direct advantage from the
improvement (e.g., proximity to a park) or receives an indirect,
derivative advantage resulting from the overall public benefits of
the improvement (e.g., general enhancement of the district’s
property values).” (Ibid.)
       The Court also found it significant that the assessment
district assumed that benefits would affect people and property
throughout the county-wide district equally, but drew no link
based on proximity to any particular open space that was to be
acquired or maintained. (SVTA, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 454,
455-456.) The report “[did] not even attempt to measure the
benefits that accrue to particular parcels.” (Ibid.)
       It bears repeating that SVTA did not make any statement
about benefits not articulated in the engineer’s report in that
case; it made no determination about benefits that were a
function of other, enumerated benefits. That is what is at issue
here. Consequently, we disagree with the petitioners’ argument
that the Supreme Court’s opinion in SVTA renders
unconstitutional the 2014 amendments to the PBID Law.
       We also note that the petitioners’ argument would leave
Proposition 218 with no discernible application. Were we to
accept petitioners’ assertions, any properly categorized special
benefit that incidentally created any sort of benefit for any other
property or person—that generally raised a district’s property
values, for example—would violate Proposition 218 because it

                                20
would create what the court in Beutz v. County of Riverside
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1537 (Beutz), called a “collateral
general benefit.” (Also Broad Beach Geologic Hazard Abatement
Dist. v. 31506 Victoria Point LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1068,
1086 (Broad Beach).)
       In Town of Tiburon v. Bonander (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th
1057 (Tiburon), the court described the general concept that the
2014 amendments appear to codify. “[T]he prohibition against
basing assessments on general property value enhancements,”
the court said, “does not mean any benefit that enhances property
values is a general benefit. Nearly every assessment that confers
a particular and distinct advantage on a specific parcel will also
enhance the overall value of that property in some respect. Such
an effect does not transform a special benefit into a general
benefit. An increase in property value attributable to a project
that provides a direct advantage to a particular property—
instead of an indirect or derivative benefit—is a specific rather
than a general enhancement in the property value.” (Id. at p.
1079, italics added.)
       We disagree with the petitioners’ contentions and on that
basis reject their constitutional challenge to the PBID Law’s 2014
amendments.
   C. The DCBID and SPBID Assessments
       “[U]nder the plain language of [Proposition 218], a special
benefit must affect the assessed property in a way that is
particular and distinct from its effect on other parcels and that
real property in general and the public at large do not share.”
(SVTA, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 452.)

                               21
       1. The Engineers’ Reports Properly Characterize
          Benefits as Special Benefits
       The petitioners’ second set of contentions center on whether
the benefits identified in the engineers’ reports are special
benefits as Proposition 218 uses that term.
       Hill and Olive contend that the special benefits identified
in the engineer’s report for the DCBID for the Safe Team
Program Services and the Clean Program are actually general
benefits, and not special benefits because the stated benefits
essentially amount to general enhancements of property value.
Mesa makes the same argument with regard to the SPBID’s
Visitor Program, Ambassador Security Services, and Sanitation
and Beautification improvement categories.
       The DCBID’s Safe Team Program is described in the
engineer’s report as specifically providing security services for
assessed parcels “in the form of patrolling bicycle personnel,
nighttime vehicle patrol and downtown ambassadors.” The
program’s objective is to “prevent, deter[,] and report illegal
activities taking place on the streets, sidewalks, storefronts,
parking lots[,] and alleys.” The particular illegal activities the
program is to target are “public urination, indecent exposure,
trespassing, drinking in public, prostitution, illegal panhandling,
illegal vending, and illegal dumping.”
       The DCBID’s Clean Program was intended to provide
sidewalk cleaning, including “[u]niformed, radio equipped
personnel [who] sweep litter, debris[,] and refuse from sidewalks
and gutters,” pressure washing of sidewalks, collecting trash
from sidewalk trash receptacles as needed, collecting stolen
shopping carts and illegally dumped bulky items, graffiti
removal, including a stated effort “to remove all tags within 24

                                22
hours on weekdays,” and landscape improvement and tree
trimming.
       The engineer’s report lists benefits for both programs to
“[r]esidential and mixed-use residential parcels” as “an enhanced
sense of safety, cleanliness[,] and a positive user experience[,]
which in turn enhances the business climate and improves the
business offering and attracts new residents, businesses and
District investment.” Under a separate special benefits analysis,
the report lists a special benefit as “the likelihood of increased
lease rates and tenant occupancy due to the increase of
commercial activity and an increase in customers that follow
from having a safer environment.” “In addition,” the report
states, “each specially benefitted parcel benefits from: increased
security patrol, removing graffiti from their buildings, connecting
the homeless to available resources, reducing the number of trips
and falls by repairing the grout in the sidewalks in front of their
parcel, picking up trash that pedestrians leave behind, and power
washing their sidewalks.” (Italics added.)
       The SPBID describes its Visitor Program as “includ[ing]
shuttle services with multiple shuttle stops, refurbishment
and/or replacement of shuttles, visitor kiosk[s] with maps and
brochures, wayfinding signage, monument signage[,] and high
technology advances to automate and enhance the various Visitor
Program elements. The Visitor Program is designed to attract
visitors and tourists to, and for the special benefit of, individually
assessed parcels in both the Historic Downtown and the
Waterfront areas of the” SPBID. The engineer’s report notes that
the Visitor Program attracts tenants and investors for residential
parcels, and “is designed to increase residential occupancies,
residential rental income[,] and return on investment[ ] for

                                 23
each . . . assessed parcel[ ].” The report also states that the
program “is designed to improve livability for each of the[ ]
assessed residential parcels by,” among other things,
“transporting residents and visitors to other assessed parcels
within the” SPBID. (Italics added.)
         SPBID’s “Ambassador/Security Services uses uniformed
ambassadors that provide security services to each . . . assessed
parcel . . . by reporting crime to LAPD and the Port Police
Department.” According to the engineer’s report, “[t]he presence
helps prevent, deter, and report illegal activities in the” SPBID.
The report states that these services will benefit residential
parcels by “improv[ing] security for each of the[ ] assessed parcels
by reducing and deterring crime . . . .”
         The SPBID “Sanitation Services include sidewalk
sweeping, sidewalk pressure washing, illegal dumping pickup,
graffiti removal and clean up patrols.” “Beautification/Capital
Improvements includes landscape watering, tree trimming,
streetscape improvements and capital improvement projects.”
The program specifically includes palm tree trimming and weekly
landscape watering, holiday decorations and lighting, street
furniture, and decorative banners. Besides “attracting more
tenants and investors” for residential parcels, the report notes
that these projects will also “improve the physical appearance
of . . . assessed residential parcels by providing physical
amenities adjacent to and for the special benefit of each of the[ ]
assessed parcels.”
         In addition to the program-specific benefit descriptions, the
SPBID engineer’s report contains statements of both BID-wide
benefits broken down by property type, and program-by-program
benefits, again detailed by property type. The broader statement

                                 24
of benefits claims that the district’s services “are designed to
improve the cleanliness, security, marketability[,] and livability
of each of the[ ] assessed parcels and residential units on them.
For the[ ] assessed parcels, [SPBID] programs, services[,] and
improvements are designed to improve security and aesthetic
appeal . . . by reducing crime, litter[,] and debris and
professionally marketing the availability of residential units
within the [SPBID] and the array of goods, services[,] and
activities available within the [SPBID] . . . .”
       Each of the programs identified by the petitioners
constitutes a special benefit as Proposition 218, the PBID Law,
and the Supreme Court’s opinion in SVAT guide our
understanding of that term. As an initial matter, the DCBID and
the SPBID, as well as the respective benefit zones in each BID,
appear from the engineers’ reports to have been crafted to
achieve the most impact specifically for assessed properties with
the different levels of benefits provided to each assessed parcel.
Additionally, the fact that the programs are geared specifically to
provide services both to and for the direct benefit of assessed
properties appears to be clear even aside from the benefits
identified in the engineers’ reports. Obvious security patrol
aimed at the properties within the DCBID, for example, makes
those properties safer places to live and work. Graffiti cleaning,
sidewalk scrubbing, and increased trash removal make properties
cleaner and more attractive, and encourage people both to move
to and stay in homes that they might have otherwise left for
cleaner, safer areas.
       Like each of the cleaning, beautification, and security
initiatives, the Visitor Program provides benefits directly to
assessed properties. Two obvious benefits of the Visitor

                                25
Program’s shuttle and information services are reduced traffic
and parking problems at and in front of assessed parcels and
shuttle services in addition to other public transportation options.
       Based on our independent review, we conclude that the
challenged services and the benefits identified in the engineers’
reports are properly characterized as special benefits.
       2. The Engineers’ Reports Adequately Describe
          Benefits from Marketing Initiatives
       Petitioners also challenge both BIDs marketing and events
plans as general benefits rather than special.
       The SPBID engineers’ report identifies activities as
“website development and updates, newsletter publication,
branding and marketing program development, advertising,
public relations activities[,] and special events. The DCBID’s
economic development and marketing plan identified 27 different
activities under two primary categories as “some of the programs
and projects” under marketing and business recruitment and
retention headings. Specific programs included newsletters,
information kiosks, downtown center maps, communications with
property owners, special events, banners, advertising, trade show
marketing, and several programs specifically designed to recruit
new businesses to the DCBID.
       Specific to residential parcels, the DCBID engineer’s report
identified “increased awareness of [DCBID] amenities such as
retail and transit options . . . .” Moreover, to the extent the
DCBID is producing special events and bringing new businesses
to the DCBID, it is creating access to those new businesses. The
SPBID engineer’s report noted that these functions are “designed
to improve the livability of each of the[ ] assessed residential
parcels. In addition, the report notes that the marketing function

                                26
for the SPBID will “professionally market[ ] the availability of
residential units within the [SPBID] and the array of goods,
services[,] and activities available within the District . . . .”
       Finally, we note that the trial court relied heavily on this
Division’s opinion in Dahms, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 708 in
drawing the same conclusions that we have reached regarding
the assessed benefits at issue here. In Dahms, we considered
benefits that the BID management district plan had identified as
special benefits: “(1) security, (2) streetscape maintenance (e.g.,
street sweeping, gutter cleaning, graffiti removal), and (3)
marketing, promotion, and special events.” (Id. at p. 713.) We
concluded that those services were properly characterized as
special benefits: “They are all services over and above those
already provided by the City within the boundaries of the [BID].
And they are particular and distinct benefits to be provided only
to the properties within the [BID], not to the public at large—
they ‘affect the assessed property in a way that is particular and
distinct from [their] effect on other parcels and that real property
in general and the public at large do not share.’ [Citation.] The
services provided by the [BID] are therefore special benefits . . . .”
(Id. at p. 722.)
       The assessed benefits in Dahms are strikingly similar to
the assessed benefits at issue here. The petitioners’ arguments
here have not given us any reason to depart from those
conclusions.
       3. Administration and Management Services for
           Special Benefits are Expressly Constitutionally
           Permitted
       Without citing any authority to support their arguments,
the petitioners contend that the BIDs were required in the

                                 27
engineer’s report to provide a “benefit character analysis” for
management and administration services that were included in
the assessments for special benefits.
        The plain language of Proposition 218 undermines the
petitioners’ argument. California Constitution, article XIII D,
section 4, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he
proportionate special benefit derived by each identified parcel
shall be determined in relationship to the entirety of the capital
cost of a public improvement, the maintenance and operation
expenses of a public improvement, or the cost of the property
related service being provided.” (Italics added.)
        As we read the constitutional text, the administrative cost
of providing a special benefit is not in and of itself a benefit for
which the engineer’s report must account, but is assessable as
part of the maintenance and operation expenses necessary to
provide the special benefit. (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, §§ 2, subd.
(f), 3, subd. (a), par. (4), 4, subd. (a).)
    D. The Engineers’ Reports Are Sufficient to Support the
        BIDs Assessments
        The petitioners each raise three challenges specifically to
the engineer’s reports supporting the BIDs’ renewals. First,
petitioners contend that the engineers’ reports fail to separate
general from special benefits. Second, they contend that the
assessment methodologies are flawed because they failed to
consider the unique circumstances of the petitioners’ properties
as low-income housing. Finally, the petitioners contend that the
reports are not based on “solid, credible evidence,” and therefore
are not legally sufficient to support the BIDs’ renewals.
        Petitioners contend that the engineers’ reports did not
sufficiently separate general from special benefits. Petitioners’

                                28
contention is based largely on the petitioners’ argument that a
general benefit created by a special benefit is itself a separate
general benefit that must be delineated in the engineers’ report.
We do not revisit our conclusion—and the conclusion of the other
courts that have considered the question—that “collateral general
benefits,” as the Beutz and Broad Beach courts called them, or
the “effect[s]” of “assessment[s] that confer[] a particular and
distinct advantage on a specific parcel,” as the Tiburon court
described them, do not transform otherwise properly
characterized special benefits into general benefits or require
further analysis or separate treatment by the assessing agency.
       Because we have rejected that argument, our review of the
engineers’ reports reveals that general benefits and special
benefits are separately accounted for in each BID’s methodology.
       For the SPBID, the engineer’s report details at great length
what the special benefit is of each program to the assessed
properties. As noted earlier, the engineer’s report separated
special benefits into three zones, each to be assessed at a
different level based on the level and frequency of services to be
provided in each zone. The report then further analyzed how
much each service would specifically support each type of
property and applied a “benefit factor” for each property. The
report concluded that the BID renewal was intended to provide
100 percent of its services to specially benefit assessed parcels
inside the BID. Nevertheless, the report concluded that there
would be some general benefit to the public at large and that
there would be indirect general benefits to parcels adjacent to
and outside of the BID boundaries. The report applied different
benefit factors to the benefits to the general public and the
benefits to the 143 parcels (including 123 residentially zoned

                                29
parcels) adjacent to the BID boundaries. After generating a
detailed analysis separating general from special benefits, the
engineer’s report included, for the entire life of the SPBID
renewal, a spreadsheet of costs separated by year and benefit
zone and separated into general and special benefit costs.
       Petitioners’ contention that the engineers’ reports failed to
account for the unique characteristics of their property is equally
unavailing.
       Petitioners contend that the language of Proposition 218
requires a subjective measure of the value of a benefit provided
based on how a particular parcel owner might avail themselves of
particular special benefits. Article XIII D, section 4, subdivision
(a), they quote, says “no assessment shall be imposed on any
parcel which exceeds the reasonable cost of the proportional
special benefit conferred on that parcel.” (Emphasis in
petitioners’ briefs.)
       The subdivision that petitioners quoted from delineates the
two “key findings” required to support a special assessment under
Proposition 218: “special benefit and proportionality.” (SVTA,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 443.) By focusing on the words “on that
parcel” to the exclusion of everything else in Proposition 218, the
petitioners would make Proposition 218’s proportionality
requirement impossible to support in any context.
       We have outlined the engineers’ reports methodology above
that the engineers’ reports each accounted for variations in types
of property, including property uses, differences in services
provided to particular properties based on locations in different
benefit zones, and came to individualized property assessments
based on complex proportionality calculations that accounted for
individual variations on a parcel-by-parcel basis. Petitioners

                                30
identify no authority, and we are aware of none, supporting the
requirement implicit in petitioners’ argument that an engineer’s
report must assess on a parcel-by-parcel basis special benefit
based on the subjective perceived value a property owner places
on any particular special benefit.
       Both the plain language of Proposition 218 and the cases
interpreting it directly contravene the petitioners’ argument.
       Under Proposition 218, a special assessment may not
“exceed[ ] the reasonable cost of the proportional special benefit
conferred on that parcel.” (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (a),
italics added.) The Tiburon court emphasized the distinction the
petitioners’ argument raises: “For the sake of clarity, it must be
emphasized that an assessment is not measured by the precise
amount of special benefits enjoyed by the assessed property.
[Citation.] Instead, an assessment reflects costs allocated
according to relative benefit received. As a general matter, an
assessment represents the entirety of the cost of the improvement
or property-related service, less any amounts attributable to
general benefits (which may not be assessed), allocated to
individual properties in proportion to the relative special benefit
conferred on the property.” (Tiburon, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p.
1081.) “Thus, the ‘reasonable cost of the proportional special
benefit,’ which an assessment may not exceed, simply reflects an
assessed property’s proportionate share of total assessable costs
as measured by relative special benefits.” (Ibid.)
       More directly, the petitioners’ contention regarding the
special nature of their properties are not focused on the statutory
criteria for measuring proportionality of a special benefit. As we
recognized in Dahms, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 716, under
article XIII D, section (4), subdivision (a), the “proportionate

                                 31
special benefit derived by each identified parcel shall be
determined in relationship to the entirety of the capital cost of a
public improvement, the maintenance and operation expenses of a
public improvement, or the cost of the property related service
being provided. No assessment [may] . . . exceed[ ] the reasonable
cost of the proportional special benefit conferred on that parcel.”
(Italics added.) The proportional special benefit to a particular
parcel, then, is not measured by the property owner’s subjective
perception of how the improvement or service benefits the
property, but rather is measured by the cost of the improvement
or service on a proportional basis. (See SVTA, supra, 44 Cal.4th
at p. 443.)
       Finally, relying on Beutz, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th 1516,
petitioners contend that the engineers’ reports are not based on
“solid, credible evidence.” The petitioners’ contentions are based
in large part on the previously-rejected argument that the reports
do not properly identify and account for general benefits that
exist as collateral effects of special benefits.
       Petitioners also contend, however, that because the reports
rely on the engineers’ “experience” to develop and apply
proportionality analyses, that the reports rely on “a guess.” “This
type of ‘expert’ analysis,” the petitioners argue, “would certainly
not be allowed in any courtroom—speculation is inadmissible and
should be disregarded, and does not constitute ‘solid, credible
evidence.’ ”
       Proposition 218 and the PBID Law each require “a detailed
engineer’s report prepared by a registered professional engineer
certified by the State of California” to support assessments. (Sts.
& Hy. Code, § 36622, subd. (l); also Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 4,
subd. (b).) In the context of the PBID Law, Streets and Highways

                                32
Code section 36622 defines—in great detail—what constitutes
“support” for an assessment. The petitioners do not contend that
the engineers’ reports here have failed to include information
required by the PBID Law or Proposition 218.
       The petitioners’ challenges to the sufficiency of the
engineers’ reports resemble evidentiary objections as though
engineers’ reports supporting assessments were subject to
Evidence Code provisions regarding expert testimony, but
provide no authority or argument that would support that
argument or assist us to determine why the reports are
insufficient. Indeed, our review of the reports indicates that they
meet Proposition 218’s requirements and that they are
methodologically appropriate for purposes of calculating
proportional special benefit. The engineers’ reports appear to
strictly comply with Proposition 218 and the PBID Law, and
appear to contain each of the elements Streets and Highways
Code section 36622 requires.
       The petitioners rely heavily on the Beutz case to support
their argument. Beutz, however, does not support the petitioners’
argument because of the differences between both the nature of
the benefits at issue in that case and the content of the engineer’s
report described in the Beutz opinion.
       Beutz dealt with a “Landscape Maintenance District”
containing “6,858 assessable parcels”—all single-family
residences. (Beutz, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526.) Each of
the properties was to be assessed a flat $28 for the first fiscal
year, and the purpose of the assessment was to maintain
landscaping in four public parks. (Ibid.) Similar to the open
space authority at issue in SVTA, the Beutz engineer’s report
based its assessment entirely on the budget of “ongoing costs of

                                33
maintaining the parks’ landscaping.” (Id. at p. 1532.) The report
made no distinction between assessments to properties based on
properties’ distance from the parks or any other measure by
which landscaping the parks might specially benefit a property.
(Id. at pp. 1532, 1534.)
       The court faulted the analysis because, contrary to
Proposition 218’s requirements, the report did not “separat[e] the
general from the special benefits of [the entire] public
improvement project and estimat[e] the quantity of each in
relation to the other . . . .” (Beutz, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p.
1532, original italics.) “Missing from the Report,” the court
explained, “is an analysis of the quantity or extent to which the
general public may reasonably be expected to use or benefit from
the parks in relation to the quantity or extent to which occupants
of Wildomar residential properties, either in the aggregate or
individually, may use or benefit from the parks.” (Id. at p. 1533.)
The court noted that based on the report it was “unable to infer . .
. how often or to what extent persons who live inside and outside
Wildomar may reasonably be expected to use the parks.” (Ibid.)
Even beyond that, the report lacked an analysis of even how or to
what extent the benefits would extend to the assessed properties.
(Ibid.)
       In Broad Beach, the court addressed a district that was
created to abate shoreline erosion on a mile-long stretch of beach
that included 121 parcels by importing “hundreds of thousands of
cubic yards of sand to restore the width of the beach and provide
a protective barrier” for the 121 parcels. (Broad Beach, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 1079.) Although some parcels would receive no
“sand nourishment,” the management district plan “projected
they would benefit from . . . migration of sand placed elsewhere

                                34
on the beach.” (Id. at p. 1080.) Other properties were located
behind a revetment, but “[w]hether properties would be protected
by the revetment was not a factor in the [d]istrict’s methodology.”
(Ibid.) And in spite of the beach being publicly accessible, the
report “concluded the project would not provide substantial
general benefits for purposes of Prop[osition] 218.” (Id. at p.
1081.)
       The metrics absent in Beutz are present in the engineering
reports here. The engineers’ reports at issue here specifically
quantify both the special benefits and general benefits and their
relation to the other. The reports quantify which services are
expected to benefit the general public and to what degree. And
the projects in Beutz—landscaping in four public parks assessed
without regard to how benefits might accrue to any specific
property in the district—and Broad Beach—a public beach again
assessed without regard to how the sand nourishment project
would affect any specific property in the district or members of
the public who would indisputably directly benefit from the
project—are discernibly different from the projects here. The
general benefits in Beutz and Broad Beach are, by those courts’
own account, distinctly different from the collateral general
benefit generated by special benefits in Dahms and in this case.
       Indeed, the Broad Beach court expressly distinguished the
general benefits at issue in Broad Beach and Beutz from the
benefits at issue in Dahms. “In Dahms,” the Broad Beach court
said, “a property and business improvement district imposed a
special assessment to fund certain services, including security
and streetscape maintenance, for properties in a city’s downtown
area. [Citation.] A property owner challenged the assessment on
the ground that the special benefits to the downtown properties

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also produced general benefits (in the form of increased safety for
the general public, for example), but that the district failed to
separate and quantify those general benefits. [Citation.]” (Broad
Beach, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1086.) The Broad Beach court
further explained: “The [Dahms] court explained that the
district’s services ‘themselves constitute[d] special benefits’
provided direction to assessed parcels, and contrasted these
circumstances with those in which putative special benefits ‘were
merely the alleged effects of . . . services directly funded by the
assessments . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) The Broad Beach court noted that
“Dahms’s holding as to collateral general benefits stemming from
the special benefits to assessed properties has not been extended
beyond that limited context.” (Ibid.)
       We do not extend Dahms’s holding here, either. As we have
noted, the services at issue, and the special benefits those
services conferred on the properties at issue, are virtually
identical to the services and special benefits at issue in Dahms.
       In its order regarding Hill’s petition, the trial court
explained that “[t]here is nothing in the record to undermine the
engineer’s opinion. A methodology had to be employed to
determine proportionality; it would be unconstitutional to equally
divide the special services costs by the number of parcels within
the district. The methodology used by the engineer makes sense
in that the size and general character of the property dictates the
proportionate special benefit each parcel will receive.” We view
that rationale as applicable to both of the engineers’ reports.
       Based on our independent review, the methodology
employed by each engineer appears to ensure Proposition 218’s
requirements that “[n]o assessment shall be imposed on any
parcel which exceeds the reasonable cost of the proportional

                                36
special benefit conferred on that parcel.” (Cal. Const., art. XIII D,
§ 4, subd. (a).)
       Because the petitioners have not demonstrated that the
assessments at issue are invalid, they have also not
demonstrated that the assessments constitute a special tax. (See
SVTA, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 442.)

                         DISPOSITION
     The trial court’s judgments are affirmed. Respondents are
awarded their costs on appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                           CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENDIX, J.

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