Court Opinion

ID: 9645982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:41:35.241682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:33.694555
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the holding of the majority, because the appellant’s summary judgment response sufficiently raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the first date that appellant could have discovered the erroneous nature of the appellees’ biopsy report.
Although the appellant’s response did argue that the “so-called” discovery rule should be applied to her case, that was not the only issue submitted. As the majority opinion points out, the appellant directly challenged the constitutionality of article 4590i, and argued that it violated the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution, article I, section 3, and her. right to equal protection and due process. Considered in its entirety, the response sufficiently alleged that the appellant did not discover, nor could have discovered, that the appel-lees’ pathology report was erroneous until after the limitation period had expired.
The appellant also presented sufficient summary judgment proof to raise a genuine issue of fact on this issue. The appellant testified by deposition that she had not been aware of the erroneous nature of the first biopsy, and had no concern about its accuracy, until January 1985. It was then, when she read an article about a woman who had advanced uterine cancer because her doctor had misread the biopsy and failed to report it, that the appellant first began to worry about the accuracy of the appellees’ report.
The appellant also testified that she did not have any definite information about the erroneous biopsy until March 1985, when she had the biopsy slide re-examined by another pathologist and learned conclusively of the appellees’ erroneous reading. She testified that she had not decided whether to file suit until she talked to her current attorney in April 1985.
Although a factfinder might reasonably decide, as the majority evidently did, that the appellant could have discovered the erroneous diagnosis in September 1984, when she learned of the advanced stage of the disease, the summary judgment record does not compel that conclusion. A reasonable trier of fact could infer from the appellant’s testimony, and the related circumstances, that the appellant could not have discovered the error before the time she did so.
In my opinion, the appellant’s response and deposition testimony raised a genuine *628issue of material fact precluding entry of a summary judgment in favor of the appel-lees. Because that issue is dispositive of the appeal, I do not comment on the other points discussed in the majority opinion.
I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.