Court Opinion

ID: 9861860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:50:00.143872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:34.632751
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with my colleagues that the trial court erred in ordering Heather Harner, (Mother), to make restitution for attorneys’ fees incurred by John Henry Harner, (Father). I also agree that the trial court failed to make an on-the-record determination of Mother’s ability to comply with the proposed order. This failure, alone, would require that we vacate that portion of the judgment of sentence relating to restitution.
Since I am unable to find any statutory authority for the imposition of an order of restitution to permit a parent to recover alleged expenses billed by private investigators or incurred while traveling, I must dissent.
Since the judgment of sentence brought together an imposition of twelve months’ probation and an order of restitution totalling $14,351.48, and since I would find that none of the restitution is allowable, I would reverse the order of restitution and remand for resentencing.
I firmly believe that the facts of this particular case cannot satisfy the general rule authorizing restitution. I am not surprised, therefore, by my colleagues’ inability to find any cases or statutes in this, or “in at least three other *482major jurisdictions” significantly related to Father’s claim in this case. Where the general rule is clearly inapplicable, I find it inappropriate to seize upon a causation analysis bottomed in “but for”-ness and only casually mentioned by way of footnote dicta in an earlier case.
When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Moreover, all provisions of a penal statute are to be strictly construed. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1).
The relevant statutory provision, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106, provides as follows:
§ 1106. Restitution for injuries to person or property
(a) General rule.—Upon conviction for any crime wherein property has been stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime, or wherein the victim suffered personal injury directly resulting from the crime, the offender may be sentenced to make restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor.
Oi) Definitions.—As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:
“Injury to property.” Loss of real or personal property, including negotiable instruments, or decrease in its value, directly resulting from the crime.
“Restitution.” The return of the property of the victim or payments in cash or the equivalent thereof pursuant to an order of the court.
“Victim.” Any person, except an offender, who suffered injuries to his person or property as a direct result of the crime.
Mother pleaded guilty to two counts of interference with custody of children, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2904. The charges *483stemmed from her having taken her two children, in June 1989, and having returned to her home in Louisiana in violation of an existing Dauphin County custody order. The restitution order here under review included amounts “expended by [Father] for private investigators, trying to locate his children, for legal fees, within Louisiana and Pennsylvania, and for expenses for trips to Louisiana.” Opinion, Honorable Warren G. Morgan, dated and filed June 7,1990.
Under the general rule set forth in Section 1106(a), supra, restitution is authorized only in convictions “wherein property has been stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime.” The majority does not seek to analyze Father’s loss, if any, in terms of describing the “property” claimed to be “stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained.” Rather, the majority asserts that the “value” of Father’s assets “were substantially decreased as a direct result of [Mother’s] abduction of his children.” The majority goes on to conclude, without analysis, that these vague “assets ... would not have been substantially decreased ‘but for’ [Mother’s] action in abducting the children and secreting them in Louisiana.”
The majority’s reliance on the dicta in Commonwealth v. Penrod, 396 Pa.Super. 221, 229 n. 1, 578 A.2d 486, 490 n. 1, (1990) is misplaced. Without reaching the soundness of that dicta, it is quite clear that Penrod involved a demolished car and audiotapes that, under the general rule in § 1106(a), were both tangible, specific “property” and were either “substantially decreased in value” or “stolen”. This, then, would permit an analysis as to whether the decrease in value was “as a direct result of the crime”, where the post-accident criminal conduct of an unknown third party resulted in the tapes being stolen, and whether Gerald N. Penrod was, in fact and in law, the “offender” with respect to the loss of the audiotapes. The Penrod panel utilized a footnote to slip in its dicta regarding the waived restitution issue, without any analysis on the point by the panel. It is impossible, therefore, to tell how that panel concluded that *484Penrod could be made to pay restitution for the acts of an unknown, third party offender.
In the case now before us, we do not even have any identifiable “property” for which restitution may be ordered. The crime here is interference with custody of children. There is not the slightest suggestion that anything other than the parties two children were, at any time, “stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained.” The majority is reduced to describing the imagined “property” as “cash, or property that had to be sold in order to obtain cash.” We know not which. Since there is no “property” involved, I reject the majority’s analysis that finds that a party’s general, nonspecific “assets” may have their value “substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime.”
Any time that money is paid out for services, the assets from which the payment was derived are decreased, regardless of the reason or the cause for the payment. Here, Father elected to use his own resources to secure personal investigative services and to travel to another state in the course of seeking to locate his children. All of these payments were discretionary as well as voluntary. None of them arose as a “direct result” of Mother’s criminal acts. Cf. Commonwealth v. Galloway, 302 Pa.Super. 145, 448 A.2d 568 (1982); Commonwealth v. Mourar, 349 Pa.Super. 583, 504 A.2d 197 (1986) (Dissenting Opinion, Johnson, J.) vacated 517 Pa. 83, 534 A.2d 1050 (1987), order reentering order affirming grant of restitution and remanding for resentencing, No. 3076 Philadelphia 1983, Pa.Super. October 18, 1988.
In Commonwealth v. Cooper, 319 Pa.Super. 351, 466 A.2d 195 (1983), we analyzed the case law in other jurisdictions and determined that “restitution is permissible only as to losses flowing from the conduct for which the defendant has been held criminally accountable.” 319 Pa.Super. at 356, 466 A.2d at 197 (citations omitted, emphasis added). This is based upon the very sound rationale that due process of law is denied when the losses for which restitution has been imposed did not arise from the very *485offense for which the defendant was convicted. This is reflected in the requirement of § 1106(a) that the loss directly result from the crime.
In the case before us, the trial court did not reach a conclusion that the losses awarded to Father had directly resulted from Mother’s having fled Pennsylvania with her two children. Rather, the court merely found that “all of the incurred costs stemmed from the charges.” Opinion, Morgan, J., June 7, 1990, page 1 (emphasis added). In a criminal proceeding, this simply is not enough. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1). Where, as here, no property is endangered and the amounts sought to be deemed “losses” represent nothing more than the aggregate of voluntary cash payments made from unrelated personal assets by a parent in pursuing enforcement of an existing custody order, restitution can not be imposed. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 394 Pa.Super. 299, 575 A.2d 639 (1990).
That portion of the judgment of sentence which purports to impose restitution should be reversed as beyond the scope of § 1106(a). Since the only remaining portion of the sentence involves a two year period of probation, it may well be that the sentencing court believed it was balancing several needs by ordering a significant restitution sum and foregoing incarceration. We cannot tell from this record. Where a case requires a correction of sentence, we may either remand for resentencing or amend the sentence directly. Commonwealth v. Eberts, 282 Pa.Super. 354, 422 A.2d 1154 (1980). Since I believe that no restitution is authorized on this prosecution, I would vacate the sentence, remand the case to the trial court and rely on the good judgment of the sentencing court to amend the sentence upon remand. Commonwealth v. Parrish, 340 Pa.Super. 528, 490 A.2d 905 (1985).
For all of the above reasons, I can concur in only so much of my colleagues’ decision as would deny Father reimbursement for his attorneys’ fees. I must dissent from that portion of the majority opinion as would find authority in 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106 to award restitution for personally incurred *486private investigator fees and voluntarily incurred trip expenses. Such an award flies in the face of the statute governing restitution, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106.