Court Opinion

ID: 9688222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:40:29.111924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:36.633079
License: Public Domain

*181Whitbeck, C.J.
(concurring). I concur with the majority opinion. I write separately to note that Szy-manski v Kmart Corp1 was vacated, albeit on grounds other than the principle for which it was cited (that is, that liability should not be imposed under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine if the activity was not unusual, the risk not unique, and reasonable safeguards against injury could have been provided through well-recognized safety measures). Although this Court adhered to its previous ruling in Szymanski on remand, it did not restate that principle in the remanded case.
In light of Dunn v DAIEE,2 it is not altogether clear to me whether the Syzmanski formulation of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine exception, having been essentially rendered dictum when Szymanski was vacated, was resuscitated when the original decision was adhered to on remand. Although much of Dunn addresses whether a subsequent panel must follow a rule from a case reversed on other grounds under MCR 7.215(1), it also states that when a case is reversed, no rule of law remains.
In any event, the quotation from Szymanski, whether it was binding on the Rasmussen Court or not, became binding on future panels when the Rasmussen panel relied on it for its ruling. It is permissible for an appellate court to find dictum persuasive and decide to follow it.3 Further, the material that the majority opinion quotes from Syzmanski is unques*182tionably an accurate statement of the law. The quoted formulation of the exceptions to the inherently dangerous activity doctrine had its origin not in Szyman-ski but in Funk v General Motors Corp,4 which, while eroded in some respects, remains good law on this point.

 196 Mich App 427, 432; 493 NW2d 460 (1992).

 254 Mich App 256, 260-266; 657 NW2d 153 (2002).

 Taxpayers Of Michigan Against Casinos v Michigan, 254 Mich App 23, 39; 657 NW2d 503 (2002), citing Dykstra v Dep’t of Transportation, 208 Mich App 390, 392; 528 NW2d 754 (1995).

 392 Mich 91, 110-111; 220 NW2d 641 (1974).