Court Opinion

ID: 9794722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:10:22.067709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:18.805730
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.
dissenting: In my judgment the trial court’s refusal to require the state to produce the K. B. I. report was clearly erroneous. As I view the situation, the effect of denying the defendant access to a document under the state’s control which contained statements previously made by Nelson concerning the very matters as to which he had testified, was to deprive the defendant of the fair and impartial trial to which an accused is entitled under our laws and which this court has so consistently and zealously guarded.
The principle enunciated in Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657, 77 S. Ct. 1007, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1103, is a most salutary one, with deep and substantial roots in the legal experience of many jurisdictions. The compelling weight of authority is in accord with the Jencks case, some even antedating that federal decision. The prevailing rule is well stated in State v. Hunt, 25 N. J. 514, 138 A. 2d 1:
“. . . Since the county prosecutor’s primary function is not to convict but to see that justice is done (State v. Orecchio, supra, 16 N. J. at page 140) he, as well as the defense counsel, should readily welcome the wholesome principle which we now approve for the administration of j'ustice in our State, that where it appears that a State’s witness has made prior notes or statements relating to the subj'ect matter of the direct testimony which he has given, the defense is entitled to inspect and use on cross-examination the prior notes or statements if they are or can be made available. And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency (Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf.” (pp. 530, 531.)
*521In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), §2224, the rule is similarly expressed:
“It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they are otherwise privileged.” (p. 209.)
See also People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422; People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P. 2d 1; The People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d 84, 142 N. E. 2d 1; People v. Dellabonda, 265 Mich. 486, 251 N. W. 594; State v. Guagliardo, 146 La. 949, 84 So. 216.
The rule is subject to the qualification that the document sought by the defendant must reasonably be available. The condition of availability was fully met in this case for the state admits in its brief that the report was in the possession of James S. Kline, the K. B. I. agent who prepared it, at the very time he, Kline, was testifying.
The matter of identification was crucial in this case. The circumstantial evidence, as pointed out by defense counsel, was weak at best. Neither the gun nor the sweater were ever identified as having actually been used in the robbery. Nor was it possible to identify the watches as those which had been stolen. The same may be said of the three rolls of dimes found in defendant’s car. In my judgment, none of the circumstantial evidence, taken singly or together, was of compelling quality or substantial probative effect. Under such circumstances the language of the court in The People v. Moses, supra, is apropos:
“. . . In this case, identification of the accused was crucial. There is no suggestion that the public interest could be prejudiced by divulging these records, and no other ground of privilege is apparent. Where it appears that there is evidence in the possession and control of the prosecution favorable to the defendant, ‘a right sense of justice demands that it should be available, unless there are strong reasons otherwise.’ People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140. We hold, therefore, that it was error to refuse to turn over the records in question.” (p. 89.)
The prejudicial effect of refusing to allow the defendant to inspect the report and use it on cross-examination becomes the more apparent when one considers these circumstances surrounding Nelson’s identification of the defendant: that Nelson had but approximately eight seconds to see the robber’s face; that while Nelson testified he did not know that he saw a picture of the defendant before making his identification, he could have, and he supposed they (the police) asked him “if there was any chance this could look like the man who *522held me up” and “I said it was”; and finally, that there was credible testimony, although contradicted, that the defendant was dressed differently at the line-up from the other men.
The county attorney calls attention to the fact that the defense attorney had seen the report, had made notes from it and did not request it prior to trial. The observation is entirely extraneous to the issue presented. Not only did defense counsel contend that his contact with the report was brief and inadequate, but it was essential that he have the report itself, or a copy thereof, if his cross-examination of Nelson as to prior statements was to be effective. This was well expressed in Jencks v. United States, supra, where the court said:
“Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer knows the value for impeaching purposes of statements of the witness recording the events before time dulls treacherous memory. Flat contradiction between the witness’ testimony and the version of the events given in his reports is not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of testing the credibility of a witness’ trial testimony.” (p. 667.)
Nor is it important that Kline, the K. B. I. agent, was not asked to produce the report while testifying as a state’s witness. The court had twice refused to compel the state to produce the document and the defendant could hardly expect to fare better a third time. Moreover, the report was needed for use in cross-examining Nelson, not Kline.
I am not impressed with the suggestion that the defendant was not entitled to have the report produced because he failed to subpoena it into court. The defendant was not required to anticipate that Nelson would even be called as a witness, or, if called, that his testimony would contradict his former statements.
The issue involved here is one of serious import. It strikes at the heart of what is encompassed in a fair trial. A trial is not a test of wits; it is a quest for truth. Particularly must this be so where a man’s liberty is at stake. This was well put in Centoamore v. State, 105 Neb. 452, 181 N. W. 182, where the court said:
“Criminal proceedings are instituted with the object, not alone of securing convictions, but of getting as near to the truth as possible on the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused. . . .” (p. 455.)
For the reasons herein expressed, I must respectfully dissent.
Price and Schroeder, JT., join in the foregoing dissent.