Court Opinion

ID: 9449783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:22:23.325204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:58.717520
License: Public Domain

FOLEY, Senior District Judge
(dissenting).
One of the questions presented by the appeal was, “Were Exhibits 10, 11, 12, and 13 properly admitted over the objection of hearsay?” In support of their position the majority states
“There was neither error nor prejudice in admitting Exhibits 10, 11, 12, and 13. They were objected to as hearsay and the court heard considerable argument, not all of which is reported in the transcript, before overruling the objection. In its memorandum on denial of Sica’s motion for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, the trial court said:
“ ‘Where, however, it is relevant and material to a case that a statement was in fact made or that a conversation or discussion had in fact been held and no effort is made to use the statement or conversation as proof of the truth of the matter asserted, such evidence is not barred by the rule excluding hearsay evidence.’ ”
After a discussion as to the views of the Trial Court in admitting Exhibit 10, the majority’s opinion continues:
“It would have been proper for Sica’s counsel to ask the court to instruct the jury as to the purpose for which these documents were deemed admissible and to caution them that Exhibit 10 was not evidence of the truth of the statements that it contained. The court, however, was not obliged to give such an instruction unless asked to do so. The law wisely places upon counsel the duty to request it.”
Then the Court’s opinion goes on to say:
“It is not an answer to the foregoing to say that the trial court did not indicate to counsel why he was admitting the exhibits over the objection that they were hearsay. The trial court is not required to explain each of its rulings to counsel. Counsel, too, are supposed to know the law applicable to the case they are trying. We do not presume error; we require the appellant to demonstrate it. The record indicates that there was more than one unreported argument about the matter, and we would be going a long way to presume that in the course of this discussion the reasons why these documents should be admitted were not stated by government counsel and by the trial court.”
The record does not disclose that defendant or his counsel were at any time informed during the course of the trial that Exhibit 10 was to be admitted for the purpose only of establishing that Vaughn’s statements were made, and not for the purpose of determining whether or not the statements, or any of them, were true or false; and counsel were not informed that Exhibits 11, 12, and 13 were admitted for a limited purpose, or purposes, only. Therefore counsel had no occasion to request the Court to instruct the jury that the admission of any of the Exhibits 10, 11, 12, and 13 was for limited purposes. Counsel cannot be said to have waived the point by failure to so request.
The majority contends that:
“Furthermore, even if we are in error as to the admissibility of the documents and as to the duty of counsel to request a limiting instruction, we can find no prejudice.”
The question of whether there was prejudice cannot be so lightly disposed of.
In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 761, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1246, 90 L.Ed. 1557, Mr. Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Supreme Court, had the following to say:
“The ‘hearsay’ rule is often grossly artificial. Again in a different *838context it may be the very essence of justice, keeping out gossip, rumor, unfounded report, second, third, or further hand stories.”
Then on p. 762 of 328 U.S., on pp. 1246-1247 of 66 S.Ct., 90 L.Ed. 1557:
“The statute in terms makes no distinction between civil and criminal causes. [Sec. 269 of the Judicial Code, as amended (28 U.S.C. § 391) — now 28 U.S.C.Civ.Proc.R. 59, 61; 18 U.S.C.Cr.Proc.R. 33, 52], But this does not mean that the same criteria shall always be applied regardless of this difference. * * * Nor does § 269 mean that an error in receiving or excluding evidence has identical effects, for purposes of applying its policy, regardless of whether the evidence in other respects is evenly balanced or one-sided. Errors of this sort in criminal causes conceivably may be altogether harmless in the face of other clear evidence, although the same error might turn scales otherwise level, as constantly appears in the application of the policy of § 269 to questions of the admission of cumulative evidence. So it is with errors in instructions to the jury. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra, [310 U.S. 150] at 239, 241 [60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129].
“Some aids to right judgment may be stated more safely in negative than in affirmative form. Thus, it is not the appellate court's function to determine guilt or innocence. Weiler v. United States, supra [323 U.S. 606], at 611 [65 S.Ct. 548, 89 L.Ed. 495]; Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 613-614 [66 S. Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350]. Nor is it to speculate upon probable reconviction and decide according to how the speculation comes out. Appellate judges cannot escape such impressions. But they may not make them sole criteria for reversal or affirmance. Those judgments are exclusively for the jury, given always the necessary minimum evidence legally sufficient to sustain the conviction unaffected by the error. Weiler v. United States, supra; Bollenbach v. United States, supra.
“But this does not mean that the appellate court can escape altogether taking account of the outcome. To weigh the error’s effect against the entire setting of the record without relation to the verdict or judgment would be almost to work in a vacuum. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra [310 U.S.], at 239, 242 [60 S.Ct. at 851, 853, 84 L.Ed. 1129.] In criminal causes that outcome is conviction. This is different, or may be, from guilt in fact. It is guilt in law, established by the judgment of laymen. And the question is, not were they right in their judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. IT IS RATHER WHAT EFFECT THE ERROR HAD OR REASONABLY MAY BE TAKEN TO HAVE HAD UPON THE JURY’S DECISION. THE CRUCIAL THING IS THE IMPACT OF THE THING DONE WRONG ON THE MINDS OF OTHER MEN, NOT ON ONE’S OWN, IN THE TOTAL SETTING. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra [310 U.S.], at 239, 242 [60 S.Ct. at 851, 853, 84 L.Ed. 1129] ; Bollenbach v. United States, supra [326 U.S.] 614 [66 S.Ct. 406, 90 L.Ed. 350]. [Emphasis added.]
“THIS MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF WHAT THE ERROR MEANT TO THEM, NOT SINGLED OUT AND STANDING ALONE, BUT IN RELATION TO ALL ELSE THAT HAPPENED. AND ONE MUST JUDGE OTHERS’ REACTIONS NOT BY HIS OWN, BUT WITH ALLOWANCE FOR HOW OTHERS MIGHT REACT AND NOT BE REGARDED GENERALLY AS ACTING WITHOUT REASON. THIS IS THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE, BUT ONE EASY TO IGNORE WHEN THE SENSE *839OF GUILT COMES STRONGLY FROM THE RECORD.” [Emphasis added.]
As stated by the Trial Judge during the course of the trial (Rep.Tr. 167), this is a very close case, and it cannot be assumed that the statements contained in any of the Exhibits 10 to 13, inclusive, did not have substantial influence upon the jury in arriving at a verdict of guilty. The jury was not informed during the course of the trial, or by means of an instruction, that any of the Exhibits 10 to 13, inclusive, were admitted for limited purposes. It is therefore impossible for this Court to say to what extent any of these exhibits influenced the jury in returning its verdict of guilty; and we have no way of knowing to what extent, if at all, the jury’s belief or disbelief in the truth of any of the statements contained in any of said exhibits influenced its verdict.
We cannot assume that the Trial Court, in the course of unreported discussions between Court and counsel, informed defendant and counsel that any of the Exhibits 10 to 13. inclusive, were admitted for a limited purpose, or purposes, only, and not for the purpose of determining whether or not the statements, or any of them, contained in any or all of said exhibits were true or false.
True, we cannot presume error. Likewise, in the absence of a record showing that the Trial Court, in overruling the hearsay objection, admitted any of these exhibits for some limited purpose, or purposes, we cannot assume that in any unrecorded statements of the Judge he informed counsel that he was admitting these exhibits, or any of them, for a limited purpose, or purposes.
The recorded proceedings on their face show error, viz., the admission of hearsay evidence over the general objection that they were hearsay. The absence in the record of anything showing that the Court admitted any of these exhibits for limited purposes results in the record as it now stands disclosing error. The objection here was a general one, viz., that the exhibits were hearsay or contained hearsay matter. Cf. Brown v. United States, 9 Cir., 314 F.2d 293 (1963). In that case the record did not, on its face, show error. There the Court remanded for a hearing by the Trial Court to determine whether or not in the unreported argument of counsel error was committed.
All proceedings in criminal cases must be recorded verbatim by shorthand or by mechanical means. 28 U.S.C.A. § 753(b). In Brown v. United States, supra, 314 F.2d at p. 295, failure to record closing arguments of counsel in violation of statutory command did not require reversal and new trial but merely vacation of judgment and remand for hearing to determine whether defendant was prejudiced by failure to record, where defendant had suggested no error that may have occurred in prosecutor’s summation. In a footnote 314 F.2d on p. 295, this Court stated:
“Appellant’s argument would be without merit if presented in a collateral attack upon his conviction. Although the requirement of Section 753(b) (1) that ‘all’ proceedings in open court in criminal cases be recorded is mandatory (Stephens v. United States, 289 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir., 1961)), we would think failure to record counsel’s summation, without more, though error, ‘is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure’ (Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962)), and failure to record counsel’s summation therefore would not, of itself, require the granting of collateral relief. However, if a denial of appellant’s rights in some other respect were alleged, the absence of a record might be a significant factor in determining whether in all the circumstances there had been a denial of fundamental fairness. United *840States v. Taylor, 303 F.2d 165, 169 (4th Cir., 1962).”
In the Brown ease it was not alleged that there was error or impropriety in the argument of counsel and that therefore, failure to record counsel’s summation would not of itself require the granting of a reversal. Here it is obvious that hearsay evidence was erroneously admitted and that the record fails to show that the admission of this hearsay was for any limited purpose.
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United States, supra (328 U.S. at 764, 66 S.Ct. at 1247-1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557), we cannot say that:
“If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress. Bruno v. United States, supra [308 U.S. 287], at 294 [60 S.Ct. 198, 84 L.Ed. 257]. BUT IF ONE CANNOT SAY, WITH FAIR ASSURANCE, AFTER PONDERING ALL THAT HAPPENED WITHOUT STRIPPING THE ERRONEOUS ACTION FROM THE WHOLE, THAT THE JUDGMENT WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY SWAYED BY THE ERROR, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE THAT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS WERE NOT AFFECTED. THE INQUIRY CANNOT BE MERELY WHETHER THERE WAS ENOUGH TO SUPPORT THE RESULT, APART FROM THE PHASE AFFECTED BY THE ERROR. IT IS RATHER, EVEN SO, WHETHER THE ERROR ITSELF HAD SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE. IF SO, OR IF ONE IS LEFT IN GRAVE DOUBT, THE CONVICTION CANNOT STAND.” [Emphasis added.]
As said in that case, the crucial thing is the impact of any of these exhibits on the minds of the jurors. In the absence of a limiting instruction, it is likely, and it would bé natural for a juror to consider whether the statements contained in Exhibit 10 were true or false. All that appears in the record is that the objection on the ground of hearsay was overruled. Under the circumstances here, counsel was not obliged nor was it counsel’s duty to ask the Court for a limiting instruction.
The Government suggests that Exhibits 11, 12, and 13 were without the ambit of the hearsay rule and were business records. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 111—114, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645, is to the contrary.
This conviction should not stand. I would reverse.