Court Opinion

ID: 9573424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:54:59.23169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:17.378453
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Division 2 and in the judgment. With respect to Division 1, I hold to the special concurrence in Franklin v. Tackett, 209 Ga. App. 448, 450 (433 SE2d 710) (1993).
I agree with the statement made by Presiding Judge, thereafter Justice, Hall in his concurring opinion in Young v. Carter, 121 Ga. App. 191, 193 (173 SE2d 259) (1970), that “[t]he effect of the rule prohibiting reference to liability insurance is . . . nullified by having the trial judge qualify the jury as to the defendant’s liability insurer.” Evidence of insurance is prejudicial because, at the least, it contaminates “the issue of loss with the issues of injury and liability.” Collins v. Davis, 186 Ga. App. 192 (366 SE2d 769) (1988). See also 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 282a (3) (Chadbourn rev. 1979), which is quoted in Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, 261 Ga. 41, 42 (402 SE2d 269) (1991). As stated in Denton, “[s]uch evidence is highly prejudicial and it can influence the entire case, no matter which side attempts to introduce it.”
By qualifying the jury with respect to a specific insurance carrier, it gains knowledge that the carrier is connected to the case, even though during the course of the trial no evidence of that fact is offered. And because the subject is introduced during the process of determining the prospective jurors’ impartiality, they acquire knowledge that their connection to the carrier is important to that question. But it is only made so by the asking of the question in the first place.
*497Decided June 8, 1994.
Crim & Bassler, Nickolai Makarenko, Jr., for appellant.
Jonap & Associates, Arthur C. Nilsen, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews joins in this special concurrence.