Court Opinion

ID: 9849553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:42:28.835409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:17.601861
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in result).
Initially, I wish to express my disturbance at the decision’s failure to set forth the most cardinal rule of all, that findings of fact and conclusions of law by the post-conviction court must be found to be “clearly erroneous.” Gregory v. State, 325 N.W.2d 297 (S.D.1982).
I believe that post-conviction relief was improperly denied below. The post-conviction court’s conclusion that appellant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to appeal her conviction was not clearly erroneous. She had a right to appeal her conviction under SDCL 23A-32-2. Trial counsel persuaded appellant not to appeal her conviction knowing the defense efforts were below par and would be detailed and revealed in an appellate tribunal. Acting thereupon, she did not appeal. Without question, this advice constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. This advice, I wish to emphasize, was post-trial advice and post-trial reflection by trial counsel. Post-conviction relief should be granted based upon this singular occurrence. Grooms v. State, 320 N.W.2d 149 (S.D.1982).
However, I disapprove of the trial court permitting this young lawyer to go to trial. The trial court was well aware of his terrible health problems. Yet, the trial court set the case for trial. Improvidently, the young lawyer made no motion for a continuance.
Further, I am of the opinion that appellant waived her right to effective assistance of counsel. A defendant can waive the right to effective assistance of counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). I would affirm the post-conviction court’s conclusion that “[appellant] knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made the decision to proceed with the challenged counsel subsequent to the trial judge affirmatively informing her of the potential problems and ramifications.” I cannot hold that this was clearly erroneous.
As the post-conviction court found, appellant was advised of all her constitutional rights. She was advised of her right not to testify. She indicated to the trial judge that she understood her rights and the ramifications of what was about to occur and she was prepared to proceed with the trial.
.Additionally, appellant knew of her young lawyer’s vast medical problems. These included hospitalization before the trial, an accident on the way tó a physical therapy session, a neck and back brace, and pain killers (medicants) right up to trial. Under oath, long after trial, she stated that the young lawyer actually was under heavy medication during the trial. Knowing this, why did she permit her young lawyer to proceed with a jury trial? As the post-conviction court found, she was concerned, yet did nothing to bring her concerns to anyone’s attention. She made no request for a continuance or for time to employ a new lawyer. I also note that trial counsel not only represented the appellant in this trial, but he also represented her in a previous criminal case involving the distribution of controlled substances. See State v. Oien, *787302 N.W.2d 807 (S.D.1981), wherein this appellant received a penitentiary sentence, affirmed on appeal — the penitentiary sentence in this case to be served concurrently therewith. The defense presented in this case was very similar to the defense presented in appellant’s first criminal proceeding. The point is: appellant knew or should have known of the trial capabilities of defense counsel. This is exactly the finding the post-conviction court made per Finding of Fact III. Nevertheless, counsel was ill when he defended this case. There are two affidavits in the post-conviction relief proceedings reflecting appellant’s concern about the ability of her attorney before the jury trial began. One can only speculate why she did not address these concerns to the trial court either prior to or during the jury trial. Although I join my brothers in reversing and awarding a new jury trial because of the advice against taking an appeal, I am convinced that appellant willingly participated in a “high risk defense” and did not complain about her representation until she was found guilty and sentenced to the state penitentiary.
It strikes me that some good judgment and common sense could have averted this expensive trial for the taxpayers, a retrial of this case, and all of the resultant misery and sorrow caused by proceeding with a jury trial, when some understanding would have demanded a continuance until the young lawyer was on his feet to such extent that he could be fully effective. Constitutionally, the system of criminal justice is based upon an- accused securing a fair trial, U.S. Const, art. VI. This appellant did not get a fair trial because she had a lawyer who was defending his client while in physical pain. Defense counsel was in the hospital on August 20-29; he was the victim of a rear-end collision on November 2; he was bedridden from November 2-9; he was on heavy medication from November 10-17. The trial took place on November 17-18.
The State urges in its brief that inasmuch as the trial court concluded that appellant “did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to appeal her conviction to the Supreme Court, that the matter be remanded to the circuit court for resentenc-ing.” SDCL 23A-34-19 suggests that this could be done. I have anguished over this possibility, but am troubled that the record is fraught with errors which precluded appellant’s securing a fair trial. Thus, I would join my colleagues that this ease be retried, rather than the accused simply be resentenced so that the fairness issue arising in this trial would be foreclosed.