Court Opinion

ID: 9942644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:10:55.202743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:22.668555
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  WILLIS EDWARD ENGLERT                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 146 MDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 19, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-14-CR-0000604-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                FILED: FEBRUARY 21, 2024

       I join with my learned colleagues on the merits of both issues and concur

in the result. I write separately, however, to correct what I believe is a

confusing statement about the preservation requirements for double jeopardy

claims.

       I agree with the majority that Appellant did not have to object to the

failure of the first trial judge to enter a verdict on the summary offense to

preserve a double jeopardy claim with respect to retrial on that charge. Maj.

Dec. 7-8. I disagree, however, that Appellant had no obligation to otherwise

preserve his double jeopardy claim before the second trial court.

       In 1977, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an appellant had

waived his double jeopardy claim that a sua sponte declaration of mistrial
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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barred retrial when he “failed to plead double jeopardy prior to his second

trial.” Commonwealth v. Peters, 373 A.2d 1055, 1057 (Pa. 1977). The

Court distinguished between remaining silent at the time the sua sponte

mistrial declaration was made and “the failure to raise the issue prior to

commencement of the second trial.” Id. The first was not a waiver of the

claim, but the second was. Id. Here, the trial court declared a mistrial because

of a hung jury and failed to enter a verdict on the summary offense. This is

akin to a sua sponte declaration of mistrial in that jeopardy attached, but due

to a court order (or failure to enter an order) a verdict was not reached.

Peters therefore controls and Appellant had to preserve in the trial court his

double jeopardy claim that a second trial was barred.1

       However, the Majority holds that “[d]ouble jeopardy claims implicate

the legality of sentence and therefore are not subject to waiver” and cites to

Commonwealth v. Andrews, 768 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. 2001). A correct

statement of the law would be that some double jeopardy claims implicate

the legality of sentence and so are not subject to waiver, but not all double

jeopardy claims. As a general matter, there are two broad categories of double

jeopardy claims: those that seek to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same

offense; and those that seek to bar multiple punishments on a single offense.
____________________________________________

1 Appellant was not acquitted of the summary offense. A rule of non-
waivability might apply where the first trial had ended in an acquittal. See
Commonwealth v. Beck, 464 A.2d 316, 318 (Pa. 1983) (“The doctrine of
waiver has no application … where the appellant was previously acquitted of
the charge against him[;] The issue of former acquittal is similar to the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction”).

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A claim that sentencing on a conviction was barred by double jeopardy would

implicate the legality of sentence imposed on that conviction. Id. In contrast,

the claim here is that a second prosecution was barred.

       The Andrews opinion demonstrates this distinction. The category of

double jeopardy claim that the Court stated were unwaivable were those that

asserted the prohibition against multiple punishments:

       The double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishment for the
       same offense serves to “prevent the sentencing court from prescribing
       greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Missouri v. Hunter,
       459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). As a
       result, such challenges have been treated as implicating the legality of
       the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 512 Pa. 349, 355,
       516 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1986) (plurality opinion).

Andrews, 768 A.2d at 313. In other words, a double jeopardy bar to

sentencing implicates the legality of a sentence on a given conviction because

it limits what sentence may be imposed. A challenge to the propriety of the

conviction or prosecution does not limit the trial court’s sentencing discretion.2
____________________________________________

2 In Andrews, the Supreme Court held that the specific claim before it –
whether Andrews could be sentenced on multiple conspiracies arising from the
same criminal incident – was not properly treated as a legality of sentence
claim at all. Rather, it was properly a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence for multiple conspiracies, which in the future would have to be first
presented to the finder of fact. Andrews, 768 A.2d at 314 (“we agree with
the Commonwealth that the issue is more properly presented as a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence, with the facts being reviewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner” … “the present issue concerns proof of
separate offenses, neither of which is a constituent of the other”). In short,
the type of double jeopardy claim addressed in Andrews challenged the
propriety of multiple convictions of conspiracy and possessory offenses, not
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made this distinction explicit

under waiver principles. In Commonwealth v. Hill, 238 A.3d 399 (Pa. 2020),

the Court ruled that a double jeopardy challenge to a sentence imposed was

non-waivable and could be raised for the first time in a Petition for Allowance

of Appeal, but that a double jeopardy claim to the underlying conviction was

waivable and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. At issue in the

Court’s ruling was Hill’s conviction for two counts of DUI – general impairment

arising from a single incident of DUI, where each conviction was linked to a

different sentencing provision. Id. at 402-403. It applied the “current state of

the law” and held, “pursuant to [Commonwealth v.] Spruill,” 80 A.3d 453

(Pa. 2013) that Hill “waived any complaint he has concerning his second DUI

conviction as he failed to preserve that issue below, but that his challenge to

his second sentence for DUI implicates the legality of his sentence, rendering

that part of his claim non-waivable.” Hill, 238 A.3d at 408. More specifically,

the Court held that because Hill argued that “the trial court sentenced and,

therefore, punished him twice for the same DUI offense” it “implicated the

legality of sentence, rendering the issue non-waivable.” Id. at 409.

____________________________________________

the legality of the sentence that could be imposed on each proper conviction.
The Supreme Court reviewed the claim not because it implicated the legality
of sentence, but because “existing precedent supported the manner in which
Andrews raised the claim,” and the Commonwealth did not argue waiver. Id.
at 314-315.

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      Appellant’s challenge is to a second prosecution for the summary

offense. As such it is more akin to a claim of trial error than it is to a claim

that a sentence is illegal. Double jeopardy claims concerning multiple

prosecutions must be preserved in most instances. See Commonwealth v.

Gilman, 401 A.2d 335, 338 (Pa. 1979) (appellant waived claim that retrial

ordered by appellate court constituted double jeopardy “because there was no

motion to dismiss prior to the retrial”); Commonwealth v. Dawson, 87 A.3d

825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“claims based on the Double Jeopardy clauses

are waiv[a]ble in some circumstances;” holding that the appellant’s

compulsory joinder and double jeopardy claims were waived by obtaining

severance). See also Commonwealth v. Thorton, 791 A.2d 1190, 1192

(Pa. Super. 2002) (the appellant waived his double jeopardy argument by

failing to include it in his Rule 1925(b) statement).

      Appellant was therefore obligated to object to a second trial on the

summary offense before the trial court. Ideally, this should have been done

prior to the commencement of the second trial, which Appellant did not do.

Nonetheless, he did raise the double jeopardy claim in his Supplemental Post

Sentence Motion and requested that the summary conviction be vacated.

Appellant’s Supplemental Post Sentence Motion, ¶¶ 3-6 (filed Dec. 1, 2022).

Therefore, the claim was raised in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(1)(b),

and the trial court denied both the post sentence motion and supplemental

motion by written order filed on December 28, 2022. As a result, Appellant’s

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double jeopardy claim is ripe for review on appeal because it was raised before

the trial court.3

       I agree with the majority that the second prosecution for the summary

offense was barred. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 109(4) (barring prosecution for violation

of the same provision of a statute based upon the same facts as a former

prosecution where “[t]he former prosecution was improperly terminated after

the first witness was sworn but before a verdict”). As the Majority explains,

the first trial court was obligated to enter some verdict on the summary

offense when it directed a mistrial on the charges that went to the jury.

Appellant’s conviction of the summary offense of driving with a suspended

license, therefore, should be vacated.

____________________________________________

3There remains a question of whether a double jeopardy challenge to a second

prosecution for the same offense must be raised prior to the start of, or entry
of a verdict at, the second trial. Under the circumstances presented, where
Appellant would not be eligible to seek PCRA relief on this claim because he
was only sentenced to pay a fine for his summary offense, Commonwealth
v. Reigel, 75 A.3d 1284, 1288-89 (Pa. Super. 2013), we should not readily
require precise timing in raising this claim where it was in fact raised before
the trial court in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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