Court Opinion

ID: 9675176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:44:03.147549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:31.934869
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
(concurring). As he did in his dissent/concurrence in State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 58-64, 527 N.W.2d 343, 354-356 (Ct. App. 1994) (Schudson, J. dissenting), the dissenting judge here blurs the distinction between a trial error to which an *829objection is made timely, and a trial error that is raised in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. When a defendant objects timely to a trial error, and that error is not cured by the trial court, our inquiry is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 544 n.11, 370 N.W.2d 222, 232 n.11 (1985); Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d at 51 n.7, 527 N.W.2d at 351 n.7. The State has the burden of proof. Ibid. On the other hand, when a defendant does not object and, as a result, claims that his or her trial counsel was ineffective, our inquiry is whether the trial lawyer's errors "were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In the context of this case, where there was no "trial," the inquiry focusses on whether the trial lawyer's errors "were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair [proceeding], a [proceeding] whose result is reliable." See ibid. As recently restated, the "prejudice" component of Strickland "focusses on the question whether counsel's deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 844, 122 L.Ed.2d 180, 191 (1993). The defendant has the burden to prove "prejudice." Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544 n.11, 370 N.W.2d at 232 n.11.
Contrary to the dissent's contention, "prejudice" under Strickland must be something more than the fact that there was an error at trial or that the defendant did not receive the benefit of a procedural protection. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (A "substantive constitutional claim" and a related ineffective assistance claim " 'have separate identities *830and reflect different constitutional values.' ").1 Simply put, the prejudice-prong of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis is not satisfied unless the defen*831dant can prove that the "proceeding [was] fundamentally unfair." Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844, 122 L.Ed.2d at 191. For the reasons fully' explained in Judge Wedemeyer's opinion for the majority, in which I fully join, Tony M. Smith, the defendant here, has failed to make that showing; Smith has not demonstrated either that the trial court applied improper sentencing standards or that the trial court relied on the prosecutor's inadvertent sentencing recommendation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 ("The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decision maker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision."). All of the cases upon which the dissent relies were cases where the defendant objected to a breach of the plea bargain; the dissent cites no authority for the unique proposition it and the State assert — namely, that a prosecutor's breach of a plea bargain is, ipso facto, "prejudice" under Strickland. We appropriately decline to adopt such a per se rule here.

 Both the Dissent and the State contend that the defendant is entitled to be resentenced because, in the State’s words as adopted by the Dissent, the defendant did not receive "the performance [of the plea bargain] [he] bargained for." Dissent at 833. If this were the test, however, the two-stage methodology for assessing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), would be a dead letter. For example, every defendant is entitled to a plethora of constitutional protections, the denial of which would entitle the defendant to relief if the defendant objects timely. On the other hand, if the defendant claims that he or she did not object timely because of deficient lawyering by his or her trial counsel, the defendant must establish "prejudice" under Strickland. Thus, for example, in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), the defendant in that capital case was sentenced to death because his lawyer ignored the then prevailing rule in the Eighth Circuit that, as stated by Fretwell, "a death sentence is unconstitutional if it is based on an aggravating factor that duplicates an element of the underlying felony." Id., 113 S. Ct. at 841, 122 L.Ed.2d at 187 (citing Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013). Fretwell noted that Fretwell would not have been sentenced to death if his trial counsel had objected during the death-penalty phase to consideration of the aggravating factor. Id., 113 S. Ct. at 842, 122 L.Ed.2d at 188. Nevertheless, Fretwell's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim failed because Collins was subsequently overruled, and, therefore, Fretwell could not prove "prejudice" as required by Strickland. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 843-844, 122 L.Ed.2d at 188-191. In Fretwell, trial counsel’s deficient performance deprived the defendant of application of the then-existing rule enunciated by Collins', here, trial counsel's deficient performance deprived the defendant of the benefit of his plea-bargained deal (silence by the prosecutor). In both cases, however, there was no Strickland "prejudice."