Court Opinion

ID: 9906068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:07:21.512017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.384833
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion S: 3

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LAWRENCE F. PANIK, AN No. 84679
INDIVIDUAL,

Appellant, f i
FILE
TMM, INC., A NEVADA -
CORPORATION, NOV 38 2023
Respondent. oo Spee -

BY Vy" DEPUTY CLERK

Appeal from a district court order denying an anti-SLAPP
special motion to dismiss. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
Gloria Sturman, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Weide & Miller, Ltd., and F. Christopher Austin, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Lex Tecnica Ltd. and Adam R. Knecht and Vincent J. Garrido, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, C.J., and LEE and BELL,
Jed.

OPINION

By the Court, STIGLICH, C.J.:
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes are intended to protect citizens’
First Amendment rights to petition the government for redress of

grievances and to free speech by limiting the chilling effect of civil actions

Supreme Court
oF

Nevaoa Lie sesz2o
(0) 19478 <B>

that are based on the valid exercise of those rights in connection with an
issue of public concern (SLAPP actions). 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 387, at 1363
(preamble to bill enacting anti-SLAPP statute). To achieve that intended
goal, the statutes allow defendants to file a special motion to dismiss to
obtain an early and expeditious resolution of a meritless claim for relief that
is based on protected activity, as defined in NRS 41.637. NRS 41.650; NRS
41.660.

In this opinion, we clarify that the anti-SLAPP statutes do not
exclude any particular types of claims for relief from their scope because the
focus is on the defendant’s activity, not the form of the plaintiff's claims for
relief. The district court thus erred in concluding that the claims against
appellant Lawrence F. Panik “do not fall within the categories of claims
subject to the [a]nti-SLAPP statute,” without further analysis. And because
we conclude that Panik established by a preponderance of the evidence that
respondent TMM, Inc. (TMMI) brought its claims based upon Panik’s “good
faith communication{s]...in direct connection with an issue of public
concern,” NRS 41.660(1), we reverse the district court's order and remand

with instructions to address prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis.!

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Panik is the president and CEO of nonparty Dimension, Inc. In
2000, Panik and several other nonparties invested in a company, Digital
Focus, Inc. (DFI), to purchase the license to a computer code (the Code).
DFI later transferred its interest in the Code license to nonparty Digital
Focus Media, Inc. (DFMI), Dimension’s predecessor-in-interest. TMMI
purchased DFI and sued Dimension and DFMI in 2013 seeking to establish

‘Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted.

Supreme Court
OF
NEVADA

2

(0) 19474 <B>

its rights to the Code license (the 2013 lawsuit). The district court found
that Dimension owned the rights to the Code license, and this court
affirmed. See TMM, Inc. v. Dimension, Inc., Nos. 72025 & 72779, 2018 WL
6829001 (Nev. Dec. 27, 2018) (Order of Affirmance).

In 2019, Dimension brought the underlying action (the 2019
lawsuit) against TMMI for abuse of process relating to the 2013 iawautt.
During settlement discussions, TMMI discovered that Dimension was in
possession of several Code- derivatives that TMMI contends belong to it:
Settlement discussions ceased, and TMMI filed counterclaims against
Dimension, alleging that Dimension converted the disputed Code
derivatives from TMMI. TMMI later filed a third-party complaint against
Panik, asserting claims for trade libel, misappropriation of trade secrets,
conversion, injunctive relief, abuse of process, and alter ego liability. TMMI
alleged that Panik made statements to “current and prospective [TMMI]
shareholders, directors, [and] officers” that Dimension, not TMMI, owns the
exclusive rights to the Code and its derivatives and that TMMI was
defrauding its shareholders, directors, and officers by claiming it owned the
disputed derivatives. Panik filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss,
arguing that TMMI filed its third-party claims in retaliation for Panik’s
alleged statements concerning the rights to the Code derivatives. Panik
now appeals from the district court’s order denying that motion.

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s “decision to grant or deny an anti-
SLAPP special motion to dismiss de novo.” Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev.
65, 67, 481 P.3d 1222, 1226 (2021). We also review a district court's
interpretation of a statute de novo. Zohar v. Zbiegien, 130 Nev. 733, 737,

334 P.3d 402, 465 (2014). Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes direct the district

SupREME COURT
OF
NEVADA

(0) 1947A <6

court to conduct a two-prong analysis, where it must first “[dJetermine
whether the moving party has established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the claim[s are] based upon a good faith communication in
furtherance of... the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue
of public concern.” NRS 41.660(3)(a). To meet the burden under the first
prong, the defendant must show “that the comments at issue fall into one of
the four categories of protected communications enumerated in NRS
41.637.”2 Stark v. Lackey, 136 Nev. 38, 40, 458 P.3d 342, 345 (2020). Once
the defendant establishes that the communications fall within one of those
categories, they must then demonstrate “that the communication ‘is
truthful or [wa]s made without knowledge of its falsehood.” Jd. (quoting
NRS 41.637). “[I]f the district court finds the defendant has met his or her
burden” under the first prong, “the court must then ‘determine whether the
plaintiff has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of
prevailing on [its] claim[s].” Jd. (quoting NRS 41.660(3)(b)).

The district court erred in its interpretation and application of the anti-
SLAPP statutes

Panik argues that the district court failed to apply the correct
standard under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis when it
summarily concluded that the claims against Panik “do not fall within the

categories of claims subject to the [a]nti-SLAPP statute.” We agree.

2The four categories of protected communications are any
(1) communication “aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral
action”; (2) communication to government or political entities “regarding a
matter reasonably of concern to” that entity; (3) “[w]ritten or oral statement
made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative,
executive or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law;” and (4) “[c]ommunication made in direct connection with an issue of
public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum.” NRS
41.637.

SupREME CouAT
OF
NEVADA

(0) 19970 Be

“When interpreting a statute, we look to its plain language. If
a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we enforce the statute as
written, without resorting to the rules of construction.” Zilverberg, 137 Nev.
at 72, 481 P.3d at 1230 (citation omitted). Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes
provide immunity “from any civil action for claims based upon’ a person's
protected good faith communications. NRS 41.650: see also NRS
41.660(1}(a) (providing that, when “an action is brought against a person
based upon a [protected] good faith communication,” that person “may file
a special motion to dismiss” the action). The statute’s plain language directs
courts to examine the substance of the defendant’s communications, not the
title of the plaintiffs claims for relief. NRS 41.660(3)(a) (“Ifa special motion
to dismiss is filed ..., the court shall... [dJetermine whether the moving
party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is
based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to
petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of
public concern ....”). As the California Supreme Court has explained in
discussing California's similar anti-SLAPP statute, “[t]he...statute’s
definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiffs cause of action but, rather,
the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted hability—-and
whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” Navellier
v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 711 (Cal. 2002).8

NRS 41.660(3)(a) affords the defendant (the moving party) the

opportunity to establish that the plaintiffs claims for relief are based upon

3Given “the similarities between California’s and Nevada’s anti-
SLAPP statutes,” this court has “routinely look[ed] to California courts for
guidance in this area.” Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 11, 432 P.3d 746, 749
(2019).

Supreme Court
OF
NEVADA

(0) 1947A kB

protected good faith communications. That first step in the anti-SLAPP
analysis necessarily looks beyond the form of the plaintiff's claims for relief,
which makes sense given the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statutes’ special-
motion-to-dismiss procedure—to provide a mechanism for the expeditious
resolution of meritless SLAPPs regardless of the form the SLAPP takes. See
NRS 41.660(2) (allowing a defendant 60 days after service of a complaint
based on the defendant's good faith communication in furtherance of
petitioning or speech rights to file a special motion to dismiss). If the focus
were instead on the form of the plaintiffs claims for relief, the plaintiff
would be completely in control of the anti-SLAPP statutes’ application. This
would allow the plaintiff to circumvent the Legislature’s intent to limit the
chilling effect that SLAPPs have on the rights to petition and to speech and
frustrate the quick resolution of meritless SLAPPs. Accordingly,
“fcJonsistent with the broad construction that the anti-SLAPP statute is to
receive, [the statute] may apply to any cause of action.” Thomas R. Burke,
Anti-SLAPP Litigation § 4.1 (2022) (observing that anti-SLAPP protections
have been extended to over 40 different types of claims). Indeed, we have
recognized that anti-SLAPP protections may apply in cases involving a
variety of claims for relief. See, e.g., Ziluerberg, 137 Nev. at 66-69, 481 P.3d
at 1226-28 (defamation per se, conspiracy, and injunctive relief); Abrams v.
Sanson, 136 Nev. 83, 85, 458 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2020) (defamation,
intentional and negligent infliction. of emotional distress, false light,
business disparagement, civil conspiracy, and concert of action); Delucci v.
Songer, 133 Nev. 290, 292, 396 P.38d 826, 828 (2017) (defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
Here, rather than evaluating the statements that are the basis

of TMMI’s third-party claims against Panik, the district court considered

Supreme Gourt
OF
NEVADA

(0) 1947A QED

whether those claims were of the type entitled to anti-SLAPP protections.
Because the statutes do not limit anti-SLAPP protections to only certain
claims for relief, the district court erred when it denied Panik’s motion
based on its finding that “the subject claims do not fall within the categories
of claims subject to the [a]nti-SLAPP statute.”

Panik met his burden under the first prong
Panik further argues that he met his burden under the first

prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Under that prong, Panik was required
to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his statements fell
within one of the four statutorily defined categories of protected speech. See
NRS 41.637. TMMI alleged that Panik made statements to its
shareholders, directors, and officers challenging TMMI’s claim to the Code
derivatives.‘ We agree with Panik that such statements were “made in
direct connection with an issue under consideration by a.. . judicial body,”
NRS 41.637(3), and thus fall within one of the statute’s categories. Indeed,
the statements were directly connected to the ultimate issue in TMMI’s
counterclaims in the 2019 lawsuit, and Panik made those statements to
people with an interest in the litigation—TMMI directors, officers,
shareholders, and potential shareholders. See Patin v. Lee, 134 Nev. 722,
726, 429 P.3d 1248, 1251 (2018) (explaining that for a statement to be
protected under NRS 41.637(8), “the statement must (1) relate to the

4While the parties dispute whether Panik made the challenged
statements, the court “must evaluate the communication as it is alleged in
the plaintiff's complaint and in any of the plaintiffs clarifying declarations.”
Spirtos v. Yemenidjian, 137 Nev. 711, 715-16, 720, 499 P.3d 611, 616-17,
620 (2021) (“[A] moving party’s denial that he or she made the alleged
statements has no relevance... .”).

Supreme Court
OF
Nevapa

7

(0) 19874 Bm

substantive issues in the litigation and (2) be directed to persons having
some interest in the litigation’).

Panik also met his burden to establish that his statements were
“truthful or made without knowledge of [their] falsehood.” NRS 41.637; see
also Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 12, 482 P.3d 746, 749 (2019) (recognizing
this as part of the movant’s burden). In particular, Panik offered the final
judgment from the 2013 lawsuit, which held that Dimension was the sole
owner of the Code license, as well as several addendums to the original Code
license agreement that support his belief that Dimension is the sole owner
of any Code derivatives, including those at dispute in TMMI’s
counterclaims. Panik also provided a declaration stating that he believes
the statements concerning Dimension’s exclusive rights are true. That
evidence, “absent [any] contradictory evidence in the record,” is sufficient to
meet Panik’s burden of showing that the statements were made in good
faith. See Stark, 136 Nev. at 43, 458 P.3d at 347 (holding that “an affidavit
stating that the defendant believed the communications to be truthful . . . is
sufficient to meet [his] burden absent contradictory evidence in the record”).

The district court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating TMMI's
claims under the second prong

Finally, Panik argues that the district court also erred when it
evaluated TMMI’s claims under the second prong because the court applied
the wrong test, finding “that [TMMI’s] claims [were] prompted by TMMI’s
good faith belief in material issues of fact.” We agree.

The language in the district court’s order indicates that the
court treated Panik’s motion as one for summary judgment. Doing so
ignores the statute’s direction that, on the second prong analysis, the court
must “determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated with prima facie

evidence a probability of prevailing on [its] claim[s].” NRS 41.660(3)(b). As

SuPREME Count
OF
NEVADA

(0) 197A oR

8.

explained in Coker, while the previous version of NRS 41.660 “instructed
courts to treat [a] special motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment, ... [i]Jn 2013, the Legislature removed [that] language... and
set forth [the] specific burden-shifting framework” noted above. 135 Nev.
at 10, 432 P.3d at 748.

Because the statute no longer directs district courts to treat a
special motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, the relevant
inquiry is not whether the plaintiff can establish a genuine issue of material
fact, but whether the plaintiff can produce prima facie evidence in support
of its claims. Compare NRCP 56 (directing the district court to “grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact”), with NRS 41.660(3)(b) (requiring the plaintiff to
demonstrate “a probability of prevailing on [its] claim[s]” with prima facie
evidence). In conducting the second prong analysis, the district court must
“review each claim and assess the plaintiffs probability of prevailing,”
which “is determined by comparing the evidence presented with the
elements of the claim.” Zilverberg, 137 Nev. at 70-71, 481 P.3d at 1229. The
district court’s analysis here did not comport with NRS 41.660’s burden-
shifting framework, as it failed to consider whether TMMI produced prima
facie evidence sufficient to demonstrate that its third-party claims against
Panik “have minimal merit.” Jd. at 70, 481 P.3d at 1229; see also Abrams,
136 Nev. at 91, 458 P.3d at 1069 (adopting California’s “minimal merit”

burden under the second prong of the analysis).

CONCLUSION
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes make clear that on prong one of
the analysis, the district court’s focus in evaluating a special motion to
dismiss must be on the defendant’s communications rather than the form

° of the plaintiff's claims. We conclude that Panik has met the burden under
OF
NEVADA

(0) 19470 SED

the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis by demonstrating that the claims
in the complaint are based on “good faith communication{s] ...in direct
connection with an issue of public concern.” NRS 41.660(1). Because Panik
satisfied the burden under the first prong and the district court did not
apply the correct analysis under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP
analysis, we reverse the district court’s order and remand this matter with
instructions for the district court to determine, consistent with NRS
41.660(3)(b), whether TMMI “has demonstrated with prima facie evidence

a probability of prevailing on [its] claim[{s].”°

ATK 9 a 8 , Cd,

Stiglich

We concur:

5Given our disposition, we deny Panik’s request for an award of
attorney fees, costs, and an additional award under NRS 41.670(1), as that
statute only authorizes the court to make such an award after it grants a
special motion to dismiss.

SuPREME GCourT 1 O
OF
NEVADA

(0) 19470 <RBm