Court Opinion

ID: 9374192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 17:03:33.190324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:45.538693
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-0061
                            Filed February 22, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RICHARD ALAN MANCINI JR.,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Tod Deck (guilty

plea), Jeffrey Poulson, Tod Deck, and Zachary Hindman (sentencing), Judges.

      Richard Mancini appeals following his guilty plea to third-degree theft.

AFFIRMED.

      Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Mullins, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                          2

AHLERS, Judge.

       Richard Mancini pleaded guilty to third-degree theft. The court entered a

deferred judgment and placed Mancini on supervised probation for two years.

Mancini did not register for probation as required. As a result, upon application of

the State, the court found Mancini violated the terms of his probation, revoked his

deferred judgment, and entered judgment and sentence. Mancini appeals.

       First, Mancini challenges the guilty plea proceedings. He claims error

because the plea agreement was not included in or with the plea documents, as

required by our rules of criminal procedure. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(c) (“The

terms of any plea agreement shall be disclosed of record as provided in

rule 2.10(2).”). Mancini’s contention runs into the obstacle that challenges to the

plea proceedings must be raised by filing a motion in arrest of judgment.1 See

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a) (“A defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a

guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the

defendant’s right to assert such challenge on appeal.”). There is an exception to

this rule when the defendant is not adequately informed of the necessity of filing a

motion in arrest of judgment. State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 153 (Iowa 2021).

Mancini does not meet this exception because his guilty plea included the following

acknowledgment:

                I know that any challenges to the plea of guilty, based on
       alleged defects in the plea proceedings, must be raised in a [m]otion
       in [a]rrest of [j]udgment and that failure to raise such challenges shall
       preclude the right to assert them on appeal. I hereby waive my right
       to file a [m]otion in [a]rrest of [j]udgment.

1A defendant must also establish good cause to appeal from a guilty plea. Iowa
Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2021).
                                          3

This sufficiently informed Mancini that he was required to challenge the plea

proceedings via a motion in arrest of judgment. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d

98, 108 (Iowa 2020) (requiring substantial compliance with the rules regarding

informing a defendant of the necessity to file a motion in arrest of judgment to

challenge a guilty plea). But Mancini never filed a motion in arrest of judgment. In

fact, he waived such right in his written guilty plea. As a result, he cannot challenge

the plea proceedings on appeal, so we do not reach the merits of his claim. See

State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109–10 (Iowa 2021) (holding a defendant who

is properly advised of the obligation to file a motion in arrest of judgment to

challenge defects in the plea proceeding and fails to do so cannot establish good

cause to appeal).

       Next, Mancini argues the district court erred by revoking his deferred

judgment because the State did not establish his violation of the terms of his

probation was willful.2 The State points out that Mancini raises his willfulness

argument for the first time on appeal. Because the district court never had the

opportunity to address this argument, it is not preserved for our review. See State

v. Manna, 534 N.W.2d 642, 644 (Iowa 1995) (“Our preservation rule requires that

issues must be presented and passed upon by the district court before they can

be raised and decided on appeal.”). Accordingly, we do not address it.

       Finally, Mancini claims the district court failed to comply with Iowa Rule of

2A defendant has good cause to appeal following a guilty plea when the defendant
challenges an “order revoking [a] deferred judgment and entering a judgment of
conviction and sentence.” State v. Thompson, 951 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2020).
                                           4

Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(a) when it entered judgment and sentence.3

Rule 2.23(3)(a) provides:

              When the defendant appears for judgment, the defendant
       must be informed by the court or the clerk under its direction, of the
       nature of the indictment, the defendant’s plea, and the verdict, if any
       thereon, and be asked whether the defendant has any legal cause
       to show why judgment should not be pronounced against the
       defendant.

We require district courts to substantially comply with this rule. See Jackson-

Douglass, 970 N.W.2d at 258. Mancini questions whether the court complied with

the rule by adequately noting on the record the nature of the indictment, Mancini’s

plea, and the verdict.4 The State directs us to the following statement of the court

at sentencing:

       Then it is the judgment of the court that the defendant stands
       convicted and is guilty of the crime of theft in the third degree, an
       aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code [s]ection 714.1
       and 714.2(3) as set forth in [the] trial information that was filed in this
       case.
              In considering what sentence to impose, the court did
       consider all of the information before it including the evidence
       submitted today, the defendant’s prior admissions, the victim impact
       statement, and the positions of the parties.

We agree with the State that this statement by the district court substantially

complied with rule 2.23(3)(a).

       AFFIRMED.

3 Because Mancini challenges the sentencing proceedings after he pleaded guilty
and not the guilty plea itself, he has good cause to appeal. See State v. Jackson-
Douglass, 970 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 2022).
4 We note Mancini also asks this court to “analyze this claim pursuant to the

relevant provisions of both the Iowa and United States Constitutions.” But he does
not develop any constitutional claims for our review, so we do not address them.