Court Opinion

ID: 9652992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:36:40.705376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:55.708905
License: Public Domain

GRAHAM, Presiding Judge
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the majority on the rehearing of this case. I shall avoid, as much as possible, a statement of the facts, which have been quite fully and fairly stated in the ma*612jority opinion, except in so far as it may seem necessary to explain my views.
Customs duties were imposed by the collector at San Juan, Puerto Rico, on foreign grown coffee brought into Puerto Rico from the United States, during the months of February, March, and April, 1931, after the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1930, June 17, 1930, 46 Stat. 590. The importer protested against the imposition of the duties, claiming that “all coffee imported into Porto Rico from the United States before May 5, 1931, should be free of duties.” The collector justified his action “under section 319 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Joint Resolution No. 59.”
The matter came before this court on appeal, 71 F.(2d) 469, 472, 22 C. C. P. A. (Customs) —, T. D. 47156. We held that at the time Joint Resolution No. 59 was en-actéd by the Legislature of Puerto Rico, there was no authority of law for the enactment of the same; that the said Legislature was, in fact, prohibited from enacting the same by the Organic Act of Puerto Rico of March 2, 1917, c. 145, 39 Stat. 951; and that said section 319 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USCA § 1319) was not retroactive, but prospective, in its operation. The question of the constitutional right of the Congress to grant such a right to the Legislature of Puerto Rico was reserved; the court disposing of the matter with this statement :
“ * * * Accordingly, the Joint Resolution was void for want of constitutional power to adopt it, and it was not validated by a subsequent amendment to the Organic Act which did not ratify and confirm it, but merely authorized the enactment of such legislation. * * *
“For the reasons herein stated, we are of opinion that the involved duties were unlawfully assessed.”
It will be observed that there was, in our opinion in that case, no intimation of the necessity for any particular' language of confirmation. The only matter decided was that there was no intent of the Congress expressed in said section 319 to the effect that the section was to be retroactive in its operation. The inference may have been properly deduced by the Congress from what we there said, that if it had been apparent that it was the congressional intent to ratify and confirm the collection of said duties by the collector at San Juan, the duties would have been held to be lawfully collected.
This court handed down its decision on June 12, 1934. Action was taken soon thereafter, in both houses of the Congress, to ratify and confirm the collection of the said duties theretofore collected on coffee, in Puerto Rico. On June 15, 1934, Mr. Tyd-ings of Maryland, Chairman of the Senate Committee first hereinafter mentioned, introduced a bill (S. 3799) providing for ratification, which was referred to the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs. Cong. Rec, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. vol. 78, part II, p. 11604.
Simultaneously, Mr. McDuffie of Alabama, Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, introduced a similar bill in the House of Representatives. This bill was numbered H. R. 9946, and was reported to the House with a favorable report on June 16, 1934. Cong. Rec. 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. vol. 78, part II, pp. 12155-57. This bill, quoted in the majority opinion, was enacted and became the law on June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 1017, c. 604 (19 USCA § 1319a). Mr. McDuffie presented the report of his committee, and explained the purpose of the bill. In doing so, he said in part:
“Mr. McDuffie. Mr. Speaker, the act of Congress of 1930, enacted June 15 of that year, provided that the Legislature of Puer-to Rico might impose certain tariff duties on coffee. It so .happened that the Puerto Rican Legislature passed a resolution, no. 59, about 1 month before the approval of the act of Congress, levying a tariff of 10 cents a pound on coffee. That resolution has been held invalid because Congress, at the time of its passage, had not granted authority to pass it.
“Coffee is one of the basic industries of the islands, probably the second largest, and, as the gentleman knows, we have already loaned so much money in Puerto Rico with a view to its rehabilitation that we hope some day to realize something upon. The Customs Court within the last few days, on the'12th of June, held that because the resolution of the island legislature was passed after the act of Congress, it was thereby invalid. In other words, the legislature of the island, after authority was granted, could impose the duty, but its action was not retroactive, and must have the approval of Congress to be effective. It so happened that they levied the tax prior to the time when it was proper for them to "act. The suggestion for this quick emergency action was sent up yesterday, with the request that it have immediate consideration. I am sub*613mitting the letters of the Governor of Puer-to Rico, the Honorable Blanton Winship, and the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture which explain and ask for this legislation.
“I will state to the gentleman the reasons why this bill is necessary. Brazil or other coffee-producing countries can now, without this tariff, dump its cheap coffee into Puerto Rico and there have it mixed with the better grade of coffee, and destroy the market for one of the basic industries of that island. * * *
“Mr. Knutson. The gentleman mentioned the tax on coffee. Was that an import tax?
“Mr. McDuffie. It is an import tax. It is simply for the protection of the coffee producers in Puerto Rico who have formed cooperative associations and who might be unable to compete with cheaper coffee.
“Mr. McFadden. Will the gentleman yield ?
. “Mr. McDuffie. I yield.
“Mr. McFadden. I am heartily in favor of what this bill proposes. I think it is right and proper. Many of the loans that have been made through the Federal Farm Loan system in Puerto Rico have been made to coffee producers. We have been doing all we could to help them develop the coffee industry, and if they have to compete with Brazilian coffee it will destroy the very industry we have been trying to develop.
“Mr. McDuffie. I thank the gentleman for his contribution. He has given you the very meat and purpose of the legislation.”
Accompanying the committee’s report, Mr. McDuffie presented a letter from Hon. Blanton Winship, governor of Puerto Rico, to the Secretary of War, which is as follows:
“June 15, 1934.
“Hon. George H. Dern, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.
"Dear Mr. Secretary: I am enclosing herewith a draft of a bill to ratify Joint Resolution No. 59, of the Puerto Rican Legislature, approved May 5, 1930, imposing a 10-cent import duty on coffee imported into Puerto Rico. The enactment of this bill at the present session of Congress as an emergency matter is necessary to protect a vital portion of the administration’s program for the rehabilitation of Puerto Rican industries.
"The coffee industry is one of the basic industries of Puerto Rico. The 10-cent tax levied by the joint resolution of 1930, which has heretofore been regularly collected, is necessary to protect the industry, particu--larly during the present period of recovery from the effects of the hurricane. The levy-of the tax is in accord with the intention of Congress as evidenced by the enactment of section 319 of the Tariff Act of 1930, enacted June 15, of that year, which specifically authorized the Legislature of Puerto Rico to impose tariff duties upon coffee imported into Puerto Rico, including coffee grown in a foreign country and imported into Puerto Rico from the United States.
“Unfortunately the Puerto Rican act, Joint Resolution No. 59, was enacted and approved by the Governor on May 5, 1930, a month and 12 days before the approval of the act of Congress, and consequently the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has now held, in a decision handed down within the past few days (June 12, 1934), that the act of the Puerto Rican Legislature is invalid and void because at the time it was passed Congress had not yet given that legislature the power to enact such legislation.
“Therefore it is necessary to have the Puerto Rican act ratified. The bill herewith submitted is drawn to follow substantially the language used in the act of Congress of June 5, 1920 (c. 253, 41 Stat. 1025), ratifying an export tax theretofore attempted to be imposed by the Philippine Legislature. That ratifying act was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Rafferty v. Smith, Bell & Co. (257 U. S. 226, 232 [42 S. Ct. 71, 66 L. Ed. 208]).
“The vital necessity for this legislation at the present term of the Congress arises especially from the fact that cooperatives have been formed of the coffee raisers through the Farm Credit Administration for the purpose of extending to them the aid necessary to preserve the industry. This could not be extended if the cheap coffee from Brazil were thrown into the country, thus reducing the price of the Puerto Rican product to a point where little of that could be sold except at the depreciated value on which the Farm Credit Administration would not be trilling to extend the loan.
“I urgently request that you transmit this to the chairman of the appropriate. committees of Congress with the request that the enactment of this legislation be secured at the present session.
“Sincerely yours,
“Blanton Winship,
“Governo'r of Puerto Rico.”
*614Reports and statements upon the floor, made by the Chairman of the Committee, or other member having a measure in charge, may be considered by the court, when the language of a measure is uncertain or when it is sought to ascertain the environment at the time of consideration of a measure. Likewise, the history of the times has always been considered material and relevant. United States v. Stone & Downer Co. et al., 16 Cust. App. 82, 87, T. D. 42732, and cases therein cited.
The hurricane in Puerto Rico, which led to the legislation here involved, occurred September 13, 1928. The amount of coffee exported from Puerto Rico, which at times had arisen as high as 51,000,000 pounds in a year, at once fell off, until in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, the total exports were but 433,901 pounds. 30th Annual Report of the Governor of Porto Rico for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, page 24. 71st Cong. 3rd Sess. H. D. No. 545. The same report (page 84), in a “Comparative statement of foreign coffee imported into Porto Rico,” gives the number of pounds imported in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929, as 5,590,569, and during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, as 9,832,458. At the same time, the imports of coffee into the island from the United States rose from 4,-091,549 pounds during the calendar year 1929, to 11,202,909 pounds in the calendar year of 1930. Monthly Summary of Foreign Commerce of the United States, December, 1930, part II, page 110. These facts are a part of the history of the times, of which we may take judicial notice. The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 372, 6 L. Ed. 111; Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 463, 12 S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226. It thus appears that the major portion of the coffee brought into Puerto Rico during this period came from the United States.
In view of this legislative history and the history of the times, how can there be any doubt concerning the legislative intent as expressed in said ratifying Act of June 18, 1934? The coffee plantations of Puerto Rico had been destroyed and the principal industry of the island was at the mercy of its foreign competitors, It was necessary, according to the congressional view, that the industry be protected by means of an import duty upon foreign coffee. This could not be done by an import duty on coffee brought direct from foreign countries. Coffee, at that time, entered the ports of the United States, not including Puerto Rico, free of duty. , Paragraph 1654, Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USCA § 1201 (1654). From the United States it might enter the ports of Puer-to Rico free of duty, if not prevented from doing sq by said Joint Resolution No. 59, by said paragraph 1654, or section 319 of said Tariff Act of 1930, or later, by said ratifying Act of June 18, 1934. Thus, the protection, to be given, and revenue to be provided for Puerto Rico, would not be given or provided if the said Act of June 18, 1934, is to be construed according to the views of the majority of the court herein.
The said ratifying act was expressly enacted to meet our former decision herein, and to make it certain that the duties already collected might be retained for the use of the government in the stricken island. How it can be believed, or even imagined, that the Congress intended only to ratify the duties collected on the coffee brought into the island directly from foreign countries, while the large and preponderating quantities brought from the United States should be admitted free, is beyond my comprehension. However, the opinion of the majority, and this, as I view it, is the ratio decidendi of the majority, states:
“We have carefully examined the ratifying act and its legislative history, and have found nothing to indicate that the Congress contemplated anything more than the ratification of the joint resolution and the validation of the collection of duties and taxes assessed in accordance with its provisions. * * *
“We are of opinion, therefore, that it was the purpose of the Congress, as evidenced by the ratifying act and its history, to validate the collection of such taxes and duties only as were imposed and collected under and by virtue of the authority of the joint resolution.”
No other position could be taken which would lead to the conclusion reached by the majority, for, if it be once admitted that the congressional intent was to ratify and confirm all ¡duties collected by him, including those here involved, then the ratifying acts must be so construed. The only way to avoid this is to conclude that such was not the legislative intent.
No principle is more firmly established, especially in customs law, than this: The legislative intent is the lodestar of judicial decisions. United States v. Guth Stern & Co., Inc., 21 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 246, T. D. 46777. Rules of interpretation adopted by the courts are adopted for the purpose *615of arriving at such intent. Schwabacher & Co., Inc. v. United States, 22 C. C. P. A. (Customs) —, T. D. 47484; Universal Mercantile Co. v. United States, 18 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 441, T. D. 44698. Grammatical rules must yield if their application would defeat the purpose of the Congress. Nestle’s Food Co., Inc. v. United States, 16 Cust. App. 451, T. D. 43199. The master rule, in the consideration of all statutes, has been to so interpret them as to carry out the legislative intent. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. United States, 19 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 415, T. D. 45578, certiorari denied, 287 U. S. 629, 53 S. Ct. 82, 77 L. Ed. 546. In the last-cited case we construed the words “foreign country” to mean a place, including the high seas, outside the customs jurisdiction of this country. No stronger statement of the rule can be found than that in Hartranft v. Oliver, 125 U. S. 525, 526, 529, 8 S. Ct. 958, 961, 31 L. Ed. 813, where it is said: “ * * * The intent of the legislature is to be followed, even if not strictly within the letter of the statute. He * * ”
Again, in Union National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, 25 L. Ed. 188, the Supreme Court observed: “ * * * The intent, not the letter, of the statute constitutes the law. * * * ”
See, also, Stoeger v. United States, 15 Cust. App. 291, 294, T. D. 42472; United States v. Clay Adams Co., Inc., 20 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 285, 288, T. D. 46078; Holy Trinity Church v. United States, supra; United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U. S. 225, 252, 47 S. Ct. 616, 71 L. Ed. 1013; United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 357, 46 S. Ct. 513, 70 L. Ed. 986; Five Per Cent Cases, 6 Cust. App. 291, 321, T. D. 35508.
Having arrived at the conclusion that there is no legislative intent shown to the effect that all duties collected on coffee were to be ratified and confirmed, including those here involved, the majority then proceeds to a discussion of the meaning of the term “imported,” as it appears in the preamble of the ratifying act and in said Joint Resolution No. 59. Said Joint Resolution No. 59 provides in its preamble that it is the purpose to “Impose an Import Duty on Foreign Coffee Brought Into Porto Rico”; it recites the catastrophe and the necessity of tariff protection; it recites the pending bill which afterward became the Tariff Act of 1930; it then attempted to impose a duty on “all coffee imported into Porto Rico,” (section 1); and, in section 3, provided for an effective date after the Legislature of Puerto Rico was authorized “to impose an import duty on all coffee brought into this Island.” (Italics not quoted.)
At the time of the passage of this resolution, the Legislature of Puerto Rico knew and had in mind the meaning of “import” that was being considered by the Congress in section 319 of the pending bill. That section provided and now provides that “the Legislature of Porto Rico is hereby empowered to impose tariff duties upon coffee imported into Porto Rico, including coffee grown in a foreign country coming into Porto Rico from the United States.” (Italics not quoted.) The Legislature also had in mind said paragraph 1654 of said bill, which free listed “Coffee, except coffee imported into Porto Rico and upon which a duty is imposed under the authority of section 319.” (Italics not quoted.)
The words appearing in said section 319, “including coffee grown in a foreign country coming into Porto Rico from the United States,” are words of inclusion, and broaden and extend the ordinary meaning of the words “imported” or “imports.” Mi-croutsicos v. United States, 2 Cust. App. 342, T. D. 32078; United States v. Nightingale, 5 Cust. App. 79, T. D. 34104. Agreeing, as I do, with the idea expressed by the majority, that Congress might lawfully authorize the imposition of such an import duty on goods coming from the United States, it seems apparent that it did so, and, in doing so, gave a new and special meaning to the words “imports” and “imported,” in transactions involving shipments of foreign coffee from the United States to Puer-to Rico.
Under such circumstances, Joint Resolution No. 59 was enacted. When the ratifying Act of June 18, 1934, was enacted, said paragraph 1654 and section 319 of the Tariff Act of 1930 were the law of the land. To “import,” as regards coffee taken into Puerto Rico, included coffee brought from the United States, and, as I view it, was so intended by the Congress.
There is no hard and fast meaning to be attached to the word “import.” Such meaning varies, according to its use and the legislative intent. Goods, when in bonded warehouse, although in customs custody, are not imported. Five Per Cent Cases, supra, 321. They are not imported until they have passed into the custody and control of the importer, his agent, or consignee, United States v. Cronkhite Co., 9 Cust. App. 129, *616T. D. 37980; the words “import” and “importation” may be used with entirely different meanings, May Co. v. United States, 12 Cust. App. 266, T. D. 40270; they may mean the time of withdrawal for consumption, Casazza & Bro. v. United States, 13 Cust. App. 627, T. D. 41481. The word “import” has various meanings; it may mean to bring goods within the jurisdictional limits of the country, or may be limited to the time such goods enter the commerce of the country. While the word “import” ordinarily means to bring from a foreign country, it may, if the congressional intent indicates this, mean to bring in from a place outside our customs limits. Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, supra. Goods are not imported until the duties are levied and paid. Board of Trustees, etc., v. United States, 20 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 134, T. D. 45773, affirmed m 287 U. S. 596, 53 S. Ct. 315, 77 L. Ed. 520. “Import” means to bring an article into a country from the outside. Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100, 122, 43 S. Ct. 504, 67 L. Ed. 894, 27 A. L. R. 1306.
A statement very relevant to the issues here involved is found in United States v. Field & Co., 14 Cust. App. 406, T. D. 42052. There we said, in part: “Unless it clearly appears that Congress otherwise intended, the word ‘importation’ means the bringing of goods within the jurisdictional limits of the United States with the intention to un-lade them.” (Italics not quoted.)
It follows, therefore, that if it does otherwise appear, the meaning will be given which was intended by the Legislature, and that, I take it, should be the conclusion here.
It is said that the collector did not purport to impose the duties here involved, by virtue of or under the authority of said Joint Resolution No. 59, but under said resolution and said section 319 of the Tariff Act of 1930. It is strange logic to me that because the collector claimed to impose a duty under two separate provisions, therefore he did not do it “under or by authority of such Joint Resolution,” as expressed in the ratifying act. It is obvious that the collector imposed the duties under the authority of said joint resolution, being of the opinion that the ,same had been fully legalized by said section 319. As a matter of law, Joint Resolution No. 59, proceeding from the Legislature of Puerto Rico, was the only source of his authority. He could not levy duties under said section 319. This section only authorized the Legislature to act. His authority must come from the Legislature of Puerto Rico.
It follows that the collector acted under and by authority of said Joint Resolution No. 59. It likewise follows that the “collection of all such taxes and duties made by or under” its authority, were “legalized, ratified, and confirmed as fully to all intents and purposes as if the same had, by prior Act of Congress, been specifically authorized and directed.” Act of June 18, 1934 (19 USCA § 1319a). This, the Congress clearly had the right to do. United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U. S. 370, 390, 27 S. Ct. 742, 51 L. Ed. 1098, 11 Ann. Cas. 688; Rafferty v. Smith, Bell & Co., 257 U. S. 226, 42 S. Ct. 71, 66 L. Ed. 208.
I conclude what I have to say with this brief excerpt from the opinion of the Supreme Court, as expressed by Mr. Justice Woodbury in Marriott v. Brune et al., 9 How. 619, 634, 635, 13 L. Ed. 282:
“ * * * Their design is, of course, to protect the revenue from evasions, and the policy of the courts is the same, when deciding how the laws ought to be executed on these subjects.
“But as Congress wishes to foster an honest and honorable commerce by its laws, no less than obtain revenue, it is neither the true policy nor right of Departments or of courts, nor is it presumed to be their desire, to thwart the views of Congress, or embarrass mercantile business, when not attended by equivocation and fraud, or to throw doubts and difficulties over the liberal course proper to be pursued generally towards the community in any branch of trade.
“Thinking, then, as we do, that making this deduction is not only the legal, but the more reasonable and liberal course, it has our full approbation.”
I admit it is possible to come to the conclusion reached by the majority. However, in doing so, we must adopt a technical and inflexible construction, which leads us to an unintended and unnecessary result. I incline to a more liberal view which would lead to a conclusion in harmony with the expressed congressional intent, and which is entirely in conformity with well-settled rules of judicial construction. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
BLAND, Associate Judge, concurs in this dissent