Court Opinion

ID: 9775011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:40:45.360612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:18.998139
License: Public Domain

DORSEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The issue upon which I dissent is whether the trial court in its instructions to the jury adequately applied the law to the specific facts of the case. I would hold that the application portion of the charge was inadequate and reverse. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Appellant challenges the propriety of the initial stop by the arresting officer, contending the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory Terry-type stop.
The facts at issue are straightforward. Appellant Chubb was driving down a city street around 5 a.m. with his lights on. Officer Good approached him in her vehicle from the opposite direction. Officer Good testified that Chubb had his high beam headlights on, and she blinked her headlights from low to high beam as a signal for him to dim his lights. Chubb flashed his headlights back. Officer Good made a U-tum and followed Chubb into a convenience store parking area. Officer Good testified she parked away from Chubb’s car in the parking lot and observed him “stagger” from his car into the store and, shortly thereafter, “stagger” back. When Chubb returned to his car he sat in the front seat with the door open and his feet on the ground. The officer drove her car right behind Chubb’s, blocking his exit, and confronted him, asking for identification.
Chubb disputes Good’s version, maintaining that she did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the initial investigatory stop that occurred when she blocked his car’s passage with hers. Chubb testified that he did not have his high beams on during their initial encounter, but that the officer did, and she flashed her lights at him and he flashed back, not knowing it was a police vehicle with which he was trifling. He further testified that he did not stagger into the convenience store nor did he stagger back, although he admitted wearing cowboy boots with high sloped heels. Chubb testified that Officer Good confronted him when he returned to his car.
The question is whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Chubb was intoxicated while he was driving his car so as to justify her interference with his movement at the convenience store. Although the officer did not explicitly say she relied on Chubb’s particular actions to raise the suspicion that he was intoxicated, she testified to three things he did that would have reasonably raised the suspicion he was intoxicated: that Chubb initially had his lights on high beam; that he staggered to and from the store; and that he sat in his car with the door open with his feet on the ground. Chubb disputed all three actions.
Chubb presented the court with a special requested jury instruction, applying the law to the specific facts of the case. The pertinent part of his requested instruction reads,
“Now, bearing in mind these instructions, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on the occasion in question the defendant, William C. Chubb, did have his bright lights on and did stagger to and from the 7-Eleven store immediately preceding his detention by the police officer involved herein, then such detention of the accused would be legal.” (emphasis added)
The court refused to incorporate Chubb’s version into the final jury charge. The court’s charge, after stating generally the *303offense and certain definitions, continued to instruct the jury in paragraph II that evidence obtained by an officer as a result of an unlawful stop shall not be admissible. The paragraph instructed that an officer is entitled to make an investigatory detention if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that unusual activity is occurring or has occurred, that the person stopped is connected with the activity, and the activity is related to a crime. Paragraph II of the charge then applied the law to the facts at issue:
“Now, bearing in mind that the state has the burden of proof on the issue of reasonable suspicion and if you do not find from the evidence that on the occasion in question the officer had a reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary was or had occurred, that the person detained was connected with such activity, if any, and that there was some indication that the activity, if any, was related to the crime or a criminal offense....”
It is fundamental that the court’s charge must not only state the abstract principles of law applicable to the case, it must also clearly apply the law to the facts of the case. Beggs v. State, 597 S.W.2d 375, 379 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Harris v. State, 522 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). When the charge fails to apply the law to the facts of the case, the error is considered calculated to injure the rights of the defendant, depriving him of a fair and impartial trial. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Harris, 522 S.W.2d at 202. That kind of error goes to the very heart of the case, creating reversible error. Harris, 522 S.W.2d at 202.
The underlying principle is that jurors must be instructed on the circumstances in which they should find the defendant either guilty or innocent. Perez v. State, 537 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). “The court is the only neutral source to which the jury may look for an unbiased application of the facts of the case. An abstract charge does not inform the jury of what facts, if found by it, would constitute proof of the elements of the offense.” Williams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). The question in the instant case is how specifically must the law be applied to the facts in the charge. The majority concludes that, although the requested charge was more specific than that given, the one given was sufficient. I disagree. Nowhere in the charge given are specific facts mentioned, but only conclusions from those facts. The charge of the court at its most concrete inquired whether “some activity out of the ordinary was or had occurred,” whether “the person detained was connected with such activity,” and whether “the activity, if any, was related to the crime or a criminal offense.” None of this in any way assists the jury in determining what particular facts they need to determine if the officer should have stopped the defendant. While the charge given might be sufficient to overcome an analysis on appeal of fundamental or egregious error,1 it fails when a specific objection was made and a suggested charge was submitted.
Specificity in the application of the facts to the law is not a recent requirement of our jurisprudence. It is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury regarding what combination of facts are required to answer the question asked the jury. A general lecture on the principles of law is insufficient. Marshall v. State, 40 Tex. 200, 202-203 (1874); (full quote in Beggs, 597 S.W.2d at 379)). Such a requirement has long been recognized as a difficult one. “The great jurists of England and America have never been able to devise a charge which would be applicable to every case. Indeed, so vain is the task, it has never been essayed.” Atkinson v. State, 20 Tex. 522, 529 (1857). I would hold the charge applied the law to the specific relevant disputed facts inadequately to aid the jury in determining the propriety of the stop by the officer. I would reverse and remand for new trial.

. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim.App.1984).