Court Opinion

ID: 9654787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:50:50.797122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:13.506534
License: Public Domain

SCHRODER, J.,
DISSENTING.
Because I believe that the language of the Code of Judicial Conduct should be applied to the individual judge and the individual business at issue, I respectfully dissent. I take a broader view of the language of Canon 4 D(3), and read it to be permissive in nature.
This case involves the application of the Code of Judicial Conduct (SCR 4.300). The question asked was whether a Kentucky Judge or Justice, consistent with the Code of Judicial Conduct, could serve as a director on the board of directors or on the advisory board of a financial institution. Governing this situation is SCR 4.300, Canon 4, which states: “A judge shall so conduct the judge’s extra-judicial activities as to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations.” Canon 4 D addresses “Financial Activities” and provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A judge shall not engage in financial and business dealings that:
(a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit the judge’s judicial position, or
(b) involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing business relationships with those lawyers or other persons likely to come before the court on which the judge serves.
(2) A judge may, subject to the requirements of this Code, hold and manage investments of the judge and members of the judge’s family, including real estate, and engage in other remunerative activity.
(3) A judge may serve as an officer, director, manager, general partner, advisor or employee of any business entity subject to the following limitations and the other requirements of this Code:
(a) A judge shall not be involved with any business entity
(i) generally held in disrepute in the community, or
(ii) likely to be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, or
(iii) likely to be engaged frequently in adversary proceedings in the court of which the judge is a member or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdic*211tion of the court of which the judge is a member.
(b) A judge involved with any business entity may assist such a business entity in planning fund-raising and may participate in the management and investment of the entity’s funds, but shall not personally participate in the solicitation of funds, the raising of capital or the selling of stock in such a manner as to use or permit the use of the prestige of judicial office for promotion of the business entity.
The question before us was previously presented to the Ethics Committee under the former code and answered in JE-67 and JE-78. In JE-67, the Ethics Committee was asked whether a judge may ethically “serve as a member of an advisory board of a local financial institution.” The Ethics Committee recognized that “[t]he Kentucky Judicial Code of Ethics does not absolutely prohibit judges from serving on the boards of banks.” The Ethics Committee acknowledged that Kentucky has taken a more lenient approach than the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, and “has not chosen to strictly prohibit judges from being involved in certain businesses such as banks.... ”
Nevertheless, the Committee decided that other provisions of the Code prohibited service on this advisory board. Canon 5 F (now Canon 4 G) prohibited judges from giving legal advice, and Canon 5 B(2) and Canon 5 C(l) (now Canon 2 D and Canon 4 D) forbade the judge from allowing the prestige of his or her office to be used to draw more business. The Committee was, therefore, “unable to determine any purpose the judge could serve on an advisory board other than lending his name to enhance the prestige of the institution to enable it to draw more business.” Hence, the Committee advised that “a judge may not serve as a member of [an] Advisory Board of a local financial institution.”
A variation of the question came back to the Ethics Committee when they were asked, “May a district judge serve as director of a local bank?” Responding with JE-78, the Ethics Committee answered a “Qualified yes.” Pointing out that the district judge must be careful not to lend the prestige of his office to advance the interest of the bank, the Ethics Committee advised that a district judge could serve as a bank director because a local bank is not often in district court. The Committee noted that in the event the bank was in district court, the judge would have to disqualify himself. Apparently, the fact that this was not merely an “advisory” board was distinguishing, and the bank had other reasons (other than using the prestige of his office) to want to have the judge on its board of directors.
JE-118 was issued by the Ethics Committee as a result of the Supreme Court’s request that the Ethics Committee review all existing Judicial Ethics Opinions. The purpose of JE-118 was to address “a possible contradiction between” JE-67 and JE-78. Accordingly, the Ethics Committee stated the question as “May a Kentucky Judge or Justice, consistent with the Code of Judicial Conduct, serve as a director on the board of directors or on the advisory board of a financial institution?” The Ethics Committee answered a “Qualified No.”
The Committee recognized that the express language of Canon 4 D(3) seemingly permits such participation in a business, but that the Commentary cautions that such service may be prohibited by other provisions of the Code. In this regard, the Committee looked to Canon 2 D, which provides that “[a] judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others,” and to Canon 4 D(3)(iii) which provides *212that a judge shall not be involved with any business entity “likely to be engaged frequently in adversary proceedings in the court of which the judge is a member or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court of which the judge is a member.”
The Committee identified banks per se as a business to avoid because “banks are engaged in litigation much more frequently than other businesses.” With regard to Canon 2 D, the Committee withdrew the distinction in circuit and district judges it made in JE-78. The Committee was unable to ascertain any purpose to any judge, irrespective of level of judicial service, serving on an advisory board or board of directors, other than to lend the judge’s name to enhance the prestige of the institution to enable it to draw more business. The Committee decided to eliminate even the mere risk. Recognizing, however, “the right of a judge to have and maintain investments”, the Committee carved out an exception that a judge may serve on the board of directors of a banking company in which the judge owns stock.
Movant is currently a circuit judge in the family court division, and he serves on the advisory board of a local bank. Standing is not an issue, nor is any actual conflict alleged between his office as judge and his position with the bank. Movant contends that JE-118 is far too narrow an interpretation of Canon 4 D of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and that such interpretation arbitrarily and unnecessarily restricts the non-judicial activities of judges and justices.
My interpretation of the language of Canon 4 D(3) is that it is permissive in nature and does not except out banks or other financial institutions. The clear wording of Canon 4 D(3) provides: “A judge may serve as an officer, director, manager, general partner, advisor or employee of any business entity subject to the following limitations and the other requirements of this Code.... ” (Emphasis added.) The language is permissive,7 with no distinctions related to the court in which the judge serves, in the type of business, the position held (director or an advisor), nor requirement that the judge own stock in said business to be either a director or advisor. Only after this permissive language does the Canon qualify this permissive language to exclude businesses that are:
(i) generally held in disrepute in the community, or
(ii) likely to be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, or
(iii) likely to be engaged frequently in adversary proceedings in the court of which the judge is a member or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court of which the judge is a member.
Canon 4 D(3)(a).
Here again, the exclusionary language of Canon 4 D(3) does not single out any business per se, nor distinguish between being a director or an advisor. There is no distinction between being an owner or nonowner of stock in the business. Fui’-ther, when an individual is named without the title of “Judge,” I would like to presume the purpose of having the judge serve on an advisory board or board of directors has something to do with his or her knowledge of the subject matter, although it could be shown otherwise and contrary to Canon 2 D. The language of *213the Canons must be applied to the individual business in the community and to the individual judge.
I agree with Movant that this particular business (a bank or financial institution) is not likely to come before this particular judge (a family court judge). Occasional conflicts, if any, can be dealt with through the judge’s disqualification or recusal. To the extent that JE-118 opines otherwise, it conflicts with the clear wording of Canon 4 D. I would vacate JE-118 to that extent.

. See SCR 4.300, Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, pmbl., which provides, in part, "[wjhen 'may' is used, it denotes permissible discretion or, depending on the context, it refers to action that is not covered by specific proscriptions.”