Court Opinion

ID: 9496989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:40:41.937877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:55.950411
License: Public Domain

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
We do not have jurisdiction to consider Soffar’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he failed to raise them in his federal habeas application and because the district court never ruled on them. Further, Soffar’s claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he was interrogated regarding an unrelated sexual assault charge is without merit. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
I
Soffar requests that we consider whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). He argues that his trial counsels were deficient in failing to investigate and bring out inconsistencies between his confession to the murders and Greg Gar*481ner’s account of the offense;1 and were deficient in failing to retain an expert to examine certain ballistics evidence.
Soffar’s federal habeas application raised twenty-four grounds for relief. Eight of those grounds raised StHckland claims: Ground I alleged trial counsels failure to investigate Soffar’s medical history and his personality; Ground II, alleged their failure .to raise a Fifth Amendment challenge to Soffar’s confession; Ground IV, alleged their failure to investigate an unrelated prior act of violent misconduct; and Ground XIX, alleged their failure to object to the court excusing a particular juror. Ground IX, X, XIII, and XIV related solely to the penalty phase of Soffar’s trial and did not refer either to Garner’s statements or the ballistics evidence.2
None of the StHckland claims raised in Soffar’s habeas petition alleged his counsels’ failure to retain a ballistics expert, develop ballistics evidence, or develop evidence with respect to Garner’s statements. As the majority opinion notes, Ground I most closely resembles the claims presently before this Court, but a closer inspection clarifies their incongruence. Ground I presented multiple theories of why Soffar’s trial counsel failed to fully investigate and develop the presented defense that Sof-far’s statements to the police were the product of his mental condition. It alleged counsels failure to investigate and develop: 1) evidence contained in the State’s file; 2) evidence relating to Soffar’s police interrogation; 3) evidence from persons in Soffar’s community relating to his mental state; 4) evidence of Soffar’s organic brain damage; and, 5) its effect on his making incriminating statements. Sof-far argued extensively about his counsels’ failure to investigate and develop evidence of his mental condition, its effect on his willingness to give a false confession, and the fundamental flaws of his confession. He did not argue, however, that his counsels failed to investigate either Garner’s statements or the ballistics evidence.
The majority opinion cites language in Ground I that if construed broadly and read in isolation can be interpreted to have raised the StHckland claims presently before this Court. Other language in Ground I, however, clarifies that Soffar’s only claim in that ground for relief was that his trial counsels’ failed to investigate his mental condition:
“Defense counsel argued to the jury at trial that Max’s statements to the police were the product of his mental condition.” Pet’s App. Habeas Corpus, ¶ 44, at 15 (emphasis added).
“[Djefense counsel unreasonably failed to investigate, develop and present available medical evidence that the specific symptoms of Max’s permanent organic brain damage seriously undermined the reliability of his incriminating statement.” Id. at ¶ 51, at 19 (emphasis added).
“As a result of counsels’ unreasonable failure to investigate, critical and available medical evidence was never developed or presented to the jury supporting counsels’ chosen theory of defense. Counsels’ unreasonable failure to present such medical evidence constituted ineffective assistance.” Id. ¶ 61, at 24 (emphasis added).
“Had counsel undertaken a reasonable investigation, counsel would have *482learned that Max was born with permanent organic brain damage, and that he had acquired, in childhood, additional permanent organic brain damage.” Id. ¶ 63, at 25.
“For example, neuropsychological and neurological examinations and testing on Max confirms the existence of substantial permanent organic brain damage.” Id. ¶ 65, at 25.
“Defense counsel had available to them psychiatric assistance for the preparation and presentation of Max’s defense.” Id. ¶ 74, at 33.
The majority opinion concludes that Ground I was a “general claim for ineffective assistance of counsel” which included the claims for which it granted habeas relief. Even a cursory review of the language in Ground I, however, confirms that, like the seven other Strickland claims raised in Soffar’s habeas petition, it was a specific claim that did not relate to counsels’ failure to investigate either the Garner statements or the ballistics evidence.
The majority opinion further finds that Soffar raised these Strickland claims in Ground III of his federal habeas application as part of his contention under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), that the prosecution failed to turnover “material evidence relevant to the guilt phase of Petitioner’s trial” in violation of his right to “due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”3 In this ground for relief, Soffar does refer to the prosecution’s failure to turnover ballistics evidence. He does not, however, refer either to the need for testimony from a ballistics expert or to the Garner statements. Even if he had made these factual references, he certainly never articulated or even casually referenced the Strickland claims presently before this Court.
Under Brady v. Maryland, “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (emphasis added). The fundamental characteristic of a Brady claim is misbehavior by a prosecutor, and the constitutional right asserted is due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (A “prosecution that withholds evidence ... casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice ....”) (emphasis added). The fundamental characteristic of a Strickland claim is deficient attorney performance, and the constitutional right asserted is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[T]he Court has recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” (internal quotations omitted)). Considering a Brady claim finds fault with a prosecutor under the Fourteenth Amendment and a Strickland claim finds fault with one’s own attorney under the Sixth Amendment these two types of constitutional chal*483lenges to a conviction are not easily confused. It is unlikely that the experienced counsel who drafted Soffar’s federal habe-as application mistook one of these claims for the other. Unlike many petitioners before this Court, Soffar is not proceedings pro se. Rather he is currently represented by very competent counsel from one of the top law firms in the country. Presumably these attorneys can distinguish between errors by a prosecutor under the Fourteenth Amendment and errors by a defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
It is simply not true that Soffar “explicitly and adequately” set forth the grounds of his request for relief under Strickland v. Washington as part of his claim seeking relief under Brady v. Maryland. The majority opinion’s conclusion otherwise’is particularly suspect in this case because Sof-far “explicitly and adequately” outlined Strickland claims in eight separate grounds for relief in his habeas petition. See supra. It would seem odd for him to have hidden his ninth and tenth claims under the misleading heading of a Brady challenge.
Soffar’s failure to raise his Strickland claims as to the ballistics evidence and Garner’s statements in his habeas application is highlighted by the district court’s decision to not rule on them. Despite Soffar raising elements of these claims in Appendix B of his summary judgment brief,4 the district court did not rule on the claims, apparently recognizing that it could not consider claims not raised in the habe-as application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (providing that a petition for habeas corpus be made in a habeas application); cf. United States v. Warden of Philadelphia County Prison, 87 F.Supp. 339, 340 (E.D.Pa.1949) (holding that until application for writ of habeas corpus is made “no suit has been instituted”).
The majority opinion dismisses the district court’s decision to not address these claims as irrelevant because “this fact reflects only that the district court, like the state habeas court, simply considered and rejected Soffar’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without reasons.... ” Although I do not express an opinion as to whether Soffar raised these claims before the state habeas court, or whether they were silently addressed by that body, the idea that the district court failed to address these particular claims in a 127 page opinion5 in which it fully addressed each of Soffar’s twenty-four “other” claims is nothing short of fantastic. I also find it hard. to believe, as the majority opinion suggests, that the state trial and appellate courts as well as the federal district court each engaged in the irresponsible act of ignoring these claims despite Soffar having “clearly” raised them during each stage of this process.
The district court never ruled on the merits of the Strickland claims before us, thus there is no appeal to consider. See Fed R.App. P. 22(a) (providing the right to appeal the district court’s denial of habeas relief). The role of this Court is to review the decisions of the courts below us, it is not to stand as a court of first instance adjudicating new claims at the will of a petitioner’s fancy. See Zimmerman v. Spears, 565 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir.1977) (“[T]he Courts of Appeals are not vested with jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as an original matter.”). That role, to the extent that it exists, is reserved to district courts. The *484majority has confused our separate functions.6
II
The majority opinion does not address Soffar’s Sixth Amendment claim because it finds that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. However, because I do not believe relief can be granted on Sof-far’s phantom Strickland claim, I must address the merits of his contention that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was interrogated by a Harris County detective regarding an unrelated sexual assault charge.
At some point while Houston Police were interrogating Soffar as to the murders at issue in this case, Soffar, without provocation, confessed to the rape of a woman in Harris County. After charging Soffar with the murders at the bowling alley, Houston Police contacted Harris County Sheriffs Detective Bockel and informed him of Soffar’s confession. Detective Bockel contacted the victim in an unresolved rape case, and traveled to Houston to interview Soffar. After advising him of his right to silence and counsel, both of which Soffar waived, Bockel interrogated Soffar. During this interrogation, Soffar gave a written confession admitting to the rape of the woman who later identified him.7
The victim testified at the punishment phase of Soffar’s capital murder trial and identified him as the man who had raped her. Neither Soffar’s written confession presented to Detective Bockel, nor evidence of his oral confession given to Houston Police were presented at the trial. Soffar first argues that the testimony is “extraneous offense” evidence that is the fruit of Detective Bockel’s illegal interrogation of Soffar in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Soffar then claims that because this evidence was improperly admitted during the punishment phase of his capital trial, the death penalty was “improperly imposed” in his case. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (holding that the death penalty is “improperly imposed” if evidence obtained in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights is submitted during the penalty phases of his capital trial). Soffar’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated, therefore, he is not entitled to habeas relief.
As a preliminary matter, the evidence gleaned by police from questioning Soffar about the sexual assault offense, including Soffar’s confession and the victim’s testimony, were admissible in the punishment phase of his capital murder trial, even though he was never formally charged with committing the sexual assault. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 665, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (“Once guilt has been established ... sentencing courts may take into account not only a defendant’s prior convictions, but ... also [his] past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior.”) (internal quotations omitted).
At the time of the questioning, Soffar’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, an offense-specific right, had not yet attached to the uncharged sexual assault offense. *485See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings “whether byway of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment”). As Soffar knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights before being questioned by Detective Bockel about the uncharged sexual assault offense, the police were free to question him, without counsel present, about that offense. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (refusing to extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to uncharged offenses, even if they are “factually related” to the charged offenses); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-79, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (holding that after a defendant’s valid Miranda waiver, despite the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as to another offense, the police are free to question that defendant, without counsel present, about crimes for which he has not yet been formally charged). Therefore, Soffar had no right to counsel with respect to being questioned about the sexual assault.
Soffar’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had, however, attached to the murder charges. He thus argues that the police officers purposefully “circumvented” his right to counsel as to the murder charges by questioning him as to the sexual assault charge for the purpose of soliciting incriminating statements to be used at the punishment phase of his murder trial. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180, 106 S.Ct. 477 (prohibiting the knowing circumvention of a prisoner’s right to counsel).
Under Maine v. Moulton, “incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges, notwithstanding the fact that the police were also investigating other crimes, if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violated the Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel.” Id. Thus, if, during the interrogation, Soffar had made incriminating statements pertaining to his capital murder charges, those statements would have been inadmissible at Soffar’s capital murder trial, if the State knowingly circumvented Soffar’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. at 177, 106 S.Ct. 477 (finding police violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights when it recorded a telephone conversation knowing defendant would discuss “pending charges”).
First, the state habeas court found that during the interrogation Soffar made no incriminating statements pertaining to his pending murder charges. In fact, it found that “the conversation only concerned the sexual assault....” As Soffar made no incriminating statements regarding his murder charge during the interrogation, Moulton, by its own terms, is inapplicable. See id. at 180,106 S.Ct. 477.
Second, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Detective Bockel’s purpose in interviewing Soffar was to solicit incriminating statements to be used at Soffar’s murder trial. The state habeas court found that: 1) Harris County Sheriffs Detective Bockel interrogated Soffar as to the sexual assault; 2) Soffar was advised of his Miranda rights, which he knowingly and intelligently waived and never invoked; 3) Soffar made a written confession to the assault; 4) Detective Bockel’s interrogation was limited to the subject of the alleged sexual assault; and, 5) at the punishment phase of Soffar’s murder trial, the trial judge instructed the jury to consider the evidence of the extraneous sexual assault for the limited purpose of determining punishment.8 It did *486not find that Bockel’s purpose in interrogating Soffar was to circumvent his right to counsel as to the murder charges or to gather information that could be used to prosecute those charges.
Further, the record strongly supports the conclusion that Bockel’s sole purpose in interrogating Soffar was to investigate the unsolved rape. Bockel sought to speak to Soffar only after he was informed that Soffar had already confessed to a rape in Harris County. Before Bockel questioned Soffar, he advised him of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and took Sof-far’s written confession only after Soffar explicitly waived that right. After taking Soffar’s confession, Bockel continued his investigation by bringing the victim down to Houston to identify Soffar in a line-up.9 Bockel was thus deeply engaged in the sexual assault investigation, before, during, and after his interrogation of Soffar.
There is, however, no evidence suggesting that he was in any way involved in the murder investigation. Bockel was not a member of the Houston Police force, much less a member of the team investigating the murders at the bowling alley. Nor is there any evidence in the record suggesting that Houston Police asked Bockel to solicit incriminating statements to be used at Soffar’s murder trial. Soffar’s contention otherwise is nothing but unsubstantiated conjecture.
Nothing in the evidentiary record, or the state habeas findings, suggests that Detective Bockel intended to interrogate Soffar for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to a crime he was not investigating. Rather, it demonstrates that his purpose was to gather information regarding *487an unsolved rape to which Soffar had already confessed to committing. That the evidence Bockel obtained during the interrogation was used during the punishment phases of Soffar’s capital murder trial appears to be nothing more than happenstance. See id. at 176, 106 S.Ct. 477 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever — by luck or happenstance' — 'the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached.”).
Further, the victim’s testimony, to the extent that it is the fruit of Soffar’s rape confession, is the fruit of his confession to Houston Police, not to Detective Bockel. By the time Bockel interrogated Soffar, he had already confessed to the rape. The victime then identified Soffar as the man who raped her, during the punishment phase of Soffar’s capital trial. Her testimony is the fruit of Soffar’s confession to Houston Police, which Soffar does not contend was taken in violation of either his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.
The police did not violate Soffar’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel because he made no incriminating statements “pertaining to [his] pending charges”; because at the time of his interrogation his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached as to the sexual assault charge; because there is no evidence in the record indicating that the purpose of the interrogation was to circumvent his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as to the murder charges; and, because the victim’s testimony was the fruit of his confession to the Houston police, not of his confession during his interrogation by Detective Bockel.
Ill
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand this case to the district court for entry of an order granting Soffar’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and setting aside his conviction and sentence for capital murder.
*488APPENDIX A
•Sbffar?is '.Writte¿:Síatem^ntv/-' '->■ ■#: ■A I"/1-'August 7, lMffÁ'Av j ••■■■%
Latt and I both went inside the bowling alley together.
Latt had a stocking over his head and I had my shirt pulled up over my face.
Latt and I went right in an unlocked front door.
We stayed inside of the bowling alley during the entire time we were there.
As soon as we walked in, Lat grabbed the first guy we saw by the hair (the dude, who according to Soffar, ended up lying farthest from the front door, i.e, Tommy Temple) and made him get down on his knees. The other three people saw this and they walked up to see what was going on.
The girl screamed and kept screaming. Latt kicked her, and he also kicked the second dude (Sims) because he kept looking up.
Latt fired a warning shot, and there were four more shots fired after that. (Latt shot the first two guys from behind, in position 3 and 4, then he threw the gun to me. he made me shoot Gamer from behind, position 1, and I walked around in front of Felsher and he made me shoot her in cheek, position 2)1
,;. v Garner In terview: 'u;fi ;-w-
There was jnst one robber who entered the bowling alley.
The robber wore no disguise and I had an unobstructed view of his face.
Steve Sims unlocked the front door and let in the robber who had been knocking on the door.
It appeared that the robber had told Steve he was having car trouble. He was carrying a water jug that he wanted to fill up, and the robber and Sims went back outside together.
When Sims and the same robber guy came back inside, I walked up from bowling on lanes 25/26 to see what was going on. The robber asked Sims if anyone else was there, and Sims called Temple and Felsher up to the front.
No one, not even the girl, screamed or said anything, and the robber never hit, kicked, or touched anyone.
I think there were four shots total. The same lone robber shot us all, one right after another. Felsher was in position 1, Sims in position 2,1 was in position 3, and Temple was in position 4.
*489APPENDIX A
C Soffar’sWriiten Statement August17,1980 . '
The victims’ positions at the time of the shootings were male, female, male, male. Latt shot Sims first in position 3, then he shot Temple in position 4. Next, I shot Gamer in position 1, and then I shot Felsher when she was in position 2.
I went around and emptied the cash register after the shootings.
Latt emptied the victims’ pockets to get their wallets after the shootings.
Ghrn;er; Iiit6É:tew '»Y oh '
The body positions at the time of the shootings were female, male, male, male. I got up and made a call to mymother, and then the manager called me. I then went back and laid down next to the female, assuming a position closest to door (thus changing the body configuration to male, female, mail, male).
Before the shootings, the robber asked if I could open the register and I said, “I don’t know how,” so the robber made Steve go around behind the counter and empty register while he stayed in front of counter with his gun on us. He then made Steve come back around and lie down. Then the robber shot us all.
The robber asked me for my wallet when I first approached Mm and I told him I didn’t have it. But later, when we were all lying on the ground, the robber made us all empty our pockets and put our wallets above our heads, so I did. Right after we did this, he shot us all.2
*490APPENDIX B
[[Image here]]
*491APPENDIX C
[[Image here]]

. Greg Garner was shot in the head and left for dead on the night of the murders. He survived and gave an accounting of the crime to the police.

. The district court denied Soffar relief on each of these claims.

. Ground III: "The State's withholding of material evidence relevant to the guilt phase of Petitioner’s trial, which if admitted likely would have mandated suppression of Petitioner's written statements, due to the violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and convinced Petitioner's jury that a reasonable doubt existed as to whether Petitioner committed the offense charged, denied Petitioner due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Pet.’s App. Habeas Corpus, at 53.
Soffar specifically complained: "[T]he State failed to disclose to the defense evidence and information which was material to the guilt phase of Max’s trial and which the State was obligated to produce under the trial court's discovery order and the federal Constitution.” Pet.'s App. Habeas Corpus, ¶ 124, at 54.

. There is no mention of them in the body of the brief.

. The state habeas trial court’s opinion is 183 pages.

. Because I find that Soffar’s Strickland claims are not properly before this panel, I do not reach the merits of those claims nor do I consider Texas’s contention that they were not exhausted in state court.

. Soffar was not subsequently charged with the rape, presumably because he was convicted of these murders.

. Specifically the state habeas court found:
1) on August 19, 1980, in the presence of Detective Earl Bockel of the Harris County *486Sheriff's Office, Soffar made a written statement confessing to the sexual assault of [the victim];
2) prior to any alleged interrogation from August 8, 1980 to August 19, 1980, adversarial proceedings against Soffar for the offense of capital murder in the instant case had been initiated; however, no such adversarial proceedings had been initiated against Soffar for the offense of the aggravated sexual assault of [the victim], an extraneous offense introduced into evidence during the punishment phase of Soffar’s trial;
3) during the Jackson v. Denno hearing in the trial in the primary case, Detective Bockel testified that, on August 19, 1980, he gave Soffar Miranda warnings, that Soffar sufficiently understood those warnings, that Soffar specified that he did not want his attorneys present but rather wanted to talk to Detective Bockel only, that the conversation only concerned the sexual assault of [the victim], and that no coercion or threats were made to Soffar to obtain this confession;
4) during the Jackson v. Denno hearing in the instant case, the trial court found that Soffar never invoked his right to counsel, and was repeatedly given Miranda warnings and intelligently waived them under no coercion or improper influence from the police both regarding interrogations covering the primary case, as well as interrogations covering the extraneous offense of the sexual assault of [the victim]; and
5)the trial court instructed the jury to consider the evidence of the extraneous sexual assault of [the victim] for the limited purpose of aiding the jury in answering any questions that might be presented in the punishment charge, and also instructed the jury that, before the jury could consider the testimony of the extraneous offense, the jury must find that Soffar committed the extraneous offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

. Although the victim was unable to conclusively identify Soffar in the live line-up, the use of the line-up further supports the conclusion that Detective Bockel’s purpose in interrogating Soffar was to further the investigation of the sexual assault rather than gather evidence for the punishment phase of the murder trial.

The numbered positions correspond to the victims’ relative proximity to the front door, with position 1 being closest to the front door (i.e,, where Gamer was found), and position 4 being farthest from the door (i.e., where Temple’s body was found).

TMs information was derived from Gamer’s hypnotic interview on August 21,1980.