Court Opinion

ID: 9887653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 18:03:58.869811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:40.115462
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/6/23 White v. California Department of Forestry CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 MARIBETH MERCADO WHITE,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                     A162967, A162978

 v.                                                                  (Mendocino County
 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF                                            Super. Ct. Nos.
 FORESTRY,                                                         SCTMCVG1769676 &
                                                                   SCTMCVG2074570)
           Defendant and Respondent.

 MARIBETH MERCADO WHITE,
     Plaintiff and Appellant,                                           A165182
 v.
 CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS                                                 (Mendocino County
 COMMISSION et al.,                                                     Super. Ct. No. 21-CV00686)
     Defendants and Respondents.

         This consolidated appeal is from three judgments in lawsuits
(commenced in 2017, 2020, and 2021) by plaintiff and appellant Maribeth
Mercado White. The trial court ruled that most of the causes of action in
these lawsuits are barred under preclusion doctrines (res judicata and
collateral estoppel) given a judgment against White in a 2010 lawsuit and a
2012 writ proceeding. The court dismissed the remainder of the causes of
action for various other reasons. The cases all arise out of White’s dispute
with defendants over her ability to access property she owns by way of an old,
unpaved logging road on state forest land the Department of Forestry and
                                                               1
Fire Protection (CalFire) is in the process of closing. We affirm the
judgments.
                                 BACKGROUND
The 2010 Lawsuit and 2012 Mandamus Proceeding
      In March 2010, White sued the Director of CalFire and the California
Board of Forestry,1 alleging causes of action for quiet title, reformation of
deed, inverse condemnation, and declaratory and injunctive relief.
      White alleged the following “[r]elevant” facts in support of her claims:
      The lawsuit “concern[ed] a forty-acre parcel” bounded on three sides by
the Jackson Demonstration State Forest (the state forest).2 (Boldface
omitted.) The parcel was conveyed by the state to White’s predecessor in
interest in the late 1940’s. “For all known and documented time,” the parcel
was accessed through a road that traverses the state forest land. Forestry
personnel “first became aware” there was no “legal documentation” of any
right of access over the forest land in 1981, when Pacific Telephone asked
about installing an underground telephone cable. The issue of access
“surfaced again” in 1983, when the brother of White’s first and now deceased
husband sought a permit for approval of an illegal structure on the property.
The then forest manager suggested it was an “appropriate time” to “obtain
formal written legal access” and said he would assist White’s predecessor in

      1  She alleged the Board of Forestry is an appointed body under the
auspices of CalFire that develops “general forest policy” and “guidance
policies,” which are implemented by CalFire.
      2  Demonstration state forests, in contrast to the “majority of public
wildlands,” “are public lands that by legislative mandate have a unique and
distinctly different purpose from parks and wilderness areas. Demonstration
State Forests are mandated to conduct research, demonstration, and
education on sustainable forestry practices using active forest management,
including periodic timber harvests.”

                                        2
doing so. “For unknown reasons, the parties did not complete the
transaction.” More than 10 years later, in 1994, the then new forest
manager, “threaten[ed] to permanently close the roadway.” The issue was
not “formally resolved,” but “access was not denied.”
      Some 12 years later, in 2006, White “reopened the discussion as to
formalizing access,” indicating she was “willing to actively engage in a
process that would resolve matters with a formal deeded easement.”
Between November of that year and April 2008, “a number of meetings and
on-site visits” took place to consider alternative access not on the state forest
land, “as that was the preferred resolution for all parties.” However, no
“economically and environmentally feasible alternative routes” were found.
      In June 2008, White sought to involve CalFire’s general counsel. In
August, he “indicated” she did not need to be concerned about access to her
parcel and the issue of an easement was being studied “in light of the Board[
of Forestry’s] policies.”
      In August 2009, White submitted a formal written request to the Board
of Forestry seeking a deeded easement. The Board of Forestry denied the
request in March 2010. The action resulted in White being denied
refinancing and impairment of the marketability of her property.
      White further alleged Board of Forestry policy 0351.8 allows the Board
of Forestry to grant easements and states easements are “ ‘sometimes
necessary to allow adjacent owners access, use[,] and development of their
property.’ ” It also states requests for easements are “ ‘discouraged’ ” but they
“ ‘may be considered when no other routing through non-State forest land is
physically possible or if such other routing presents substantial and
unreasonable difficulties or environmental damage.’ ” It additionally states
“ ‘an effort will be made to formalize by agreement, any prescriptive rights to

                                        3
State forest roads which adjacent owners may have acquired through
uncontested use.’ ”
      Her first cause of action, for quiet title, asserted White and her
predecessors “either own the roadway at issue or have established their right
to an easement . . . based on implication, necessity or prescription, or as a
matter of equity including collateral estoppel.” Her second cause of action
sought reformation of the “original deed” from the state to her predecessor in
interest. Her third cause of action, for inverse condemnation, asserted the
Board of Forestry’s “arbitrary refusal” to grant her a deeded easement
violated its policies and so affected the value of her property “to render it
near worthless and deprived [her] of the ability to sell [it] and even to obtain
loan[s].” Her fourth and fifth causes of action sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, respectively.
      In June 2010, White filed a first amended complaint that added causes
of action for slander of title, breach of contract, interference with prospective
economic advantage, and state and federal due process violations. CalFire
interposed a demurrer, which was sustained without leave to amend as to all
causes of action except for quiet title and declaratory relief.
      White filed a second amended complaint in February 2011. Her
allegations of “[r]elevant” facts essentially remained the same, but she
augmented the allegations of her quiet title claim and added a cause of action
for mandamus relief. (Boldface omitted.)
      As to quiet title, White additionally alleged her right to use the road
was “based on a claim of necessity that is implied from the fact [the state]
was the common owner of plaintiff’s parcel” and the state forest land
surrounding the parcel on three sides, and the state, “as common owner,
intended to convey whatever was necessary for the beneficial use of plaintiff’s

                                        4
parcel.” She further alleged her property is “effectively landlocked in that
alternate access is impossible because access across the only adjoining
private property has been refused,” and even if granted, would not be feasible
because building a road was prohibitively expensive and would result in
“serious environmental damage.” Given the alleged environmental damage,
Board of Forestry policy assertedly directed that the Board of Forestry
“should consider granting a permanent easement.” Her claim was “based
additionally on principles of equity, including equitable estoppel and
promissory estoppel,” and she and her predecessors had “relied to their
detriment on assurances made over the years and up until recently that
defendants would provide a deeded easement.” She further alleged her
predecessors in interest had obtained a prescriptive right to the portion of the
road that had once been on private property that was later conveyed to the
state.
         As to mandamus relief, White alleged the defendants had acted
“arbitrarily and capriciously . . . in their application of state law and [Board
of Forestry] Policy 0351.8 by refusing to grant [her] a deeded easement to her
property.”
         In September 2012, White filed a separate mandamus action against
CalFire and its director. White alleged that the preceding April, the director
had authored a letter denying her request for an easement but stating
CalFire would continue to allow use of the road. At some point, CalFire
offered to enter into a use agreement limited to White and not applicable to
successors-in-interest.
         The following year, in December 2013, the trial court denied her writ
petition, ruling CalFire was under no mandatory duty to grant White an

                                         5
easement and the director had not abused his discretion in refusing to
approve one.
      White’s quiet title and declaratory relief claims in her lawsuit came on
for trial the following month, and in July 2014, the court issued a nine-page
decision, ruling White had failed to establish that any of the three factors
relevant to an “equitable” easement weighed in her favor.3 As White observes
in her briefing in the instant appeal, the trial court found two of the factors—
whether CalFire would suffer irreparable injury and whether denial of an
easement would cause White disproportionate hardship—did not weigh in
her favor given CalFire’s assurance it would not deny White access. “Her
access to the property, so long as she cooperates in protecting the public lands
against various trespasses, is guaranteed.”
      White appealed the adverse judgments in both her lawsuit and
mandamus action. This court affirmed.
      With respect to her quiet title/equitable easement claim, we concluded
the trial court properly ruled White had not established that any of the three
factors required to establish an equitable easement weighed in her favor,

      3   To support an equitable easement, three factors must be present:
First, the easement seeker must use and improve the property innocently—
“ ‘[t]hat is, his or her encroachment must not be willful or negligent.’ ”
(Tashakori v. Lakis (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1009 (Tashakori.) A court
“ “should consider the parties’ conduct to determine who is responsible for the
dispute.’ ” (Ibid.) Second, the easement opponent will not suffer irreparable
harm by its creation. Third, the hardship of denying the easement “ ‘ “must
be greatly disproportionate to the hardship” ’ ” of allowing it. (Ibid.) “Unless
all three prerequisites are established, a court lacks the discretion to grant
an equitable easement.” (Shoen v. Zacarias (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 16, 19.)
Moreover, “courts approach the issue of equitable easements with ‘[a]n
abundance of caution’ [citation], and resolve all doubts against their
issuance.” (Id. at p. 21.)

                                       6
including the first factor pertaining to whether use of the road was “innocent”
and not willful or negligent. In that regard, we stated:
      “[T]he trial court found the Whites did not have ‘a good faith belief,
      based on a diligent investigation, that they had unfettered rights to use
      the roadway.’ Specifically, there was no evidence that anyone in the
      chain of title to plaintiff’s parcel had ever been misled as to the absence
      of a right of access. Importantly, Robert [White] testified at trial that
      he knew the parcel had no recorded access at the time he examined the
      deed, and acknowledged that he had likely discussed this point with his
      brother William [White], plaintiff’s husband. The court imputed
      William’s knowledge to plaintiff, and she does not challenge this aspect
      of the court’s ruling on appeal. The instant case is thus distinguishable
      from Tashakori, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at page 1006, in which the
      easement seekers were reasonably misled into believing they already
      had a recorded easement for use of a neighbor’s driveway. Accordingly,
      that case does not undercut the trial court's findings here.”
      We went on to state that “[w]hile plaintiff’s failure to surmount this
first hurdle is dispositive,” the trial court’s findings as to the relative
hardships to the parties were also supported by substantial evidence.
The 2017 Lawsuit
      Two years after the judgments in the 2010 lawsuit and 2012
mandamus action were affirmed, White filed a new lawsuit against CalFire,
the Board of Forestry, and several individuals, including the then manager of
the state forest.
      Many of the “[r]elevant” facts White alleged were identical to those
alleged in her original and amended complaints in her 2010 lawsuit.
(Boldface omitted.) New allegations included the following:

                                         7
      Her property was once owned by the federal government, which passed
title to the state for use as an educational site, and “there was an implied
condition that access accompany the property so that the property may house
a school” and students could have access. The state “elected not to use the
parcel in this manner,” instead selling it to White’s predecessor-in-interest.
In March 2010, White had filed suit “to obtain a judicial order granting an
easement or similar form of security involving access.” That case was tried,
relief was denied, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in 2015. In August 2017,
the then forest manager notified White that she (the manager) “was
ordering” the road “decommissioned and closed effective October 1, 2017,”
and offered White “a one-year, non-renewable access agreement to defer the
closure for twelve months.” White asked to see the document, but the
manager never provided it, “merely indicat[ing] it was a limited use
agreement that differed from that previously offered” to White during the
prior lawsuit. The manager further told White the new offer would expire
within two weeks if not accepted. White refused the offer because use was
limited to one year.
      White asserted fourteen causes of action: (1) “Breach of Implied Use
Agreement & Promissory Estoppel”; (2) “Equitable Easement or Permanent
Use Agreement”; (3) “Taking of Property (Inverse Condemnation)”;
(4) “Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage”; (5) intentional
“Infliction of Emotional Distress”; (6) “Violation of Substantive Due Process &
Equal Protection”; (7) “Civil Rights Violations”; (8) “Civil Conspiracy”;
(9) “Private Nuisance & Loss of Quiet Enjoyment”; (10) “Defamation”;
(11) “Violation of CEQA and JDSF Management Plan (FEIR)”; (12) “Waste of
Public Funds (Taxpayer Claim)”; (13) “Violation of Public Records Act”; and
(14) “Declaratory Relief.” (Boldface omitted.)

                                        8
      Two years later, in December 2019, White filed a second amended
complaint, adding as defendants the then new forest manager, the deputy
director for resource management for the state forest, and the deputy
attorney general who had been representing the defendants. White also
added the following alleged “[r]elevant” facts:
      In January 2018, the parties “reached an interim settlement
agreement” that “[e]nsured continued access” to the parcel until “at least
September 2018.” (Boldface omitted.) The terms provided CalFire “would
continue to negotiate in good faith an access agreement” and the agreement
“could be extended” beyond September 2018. Negotiations took place during
the late February through April 2019 time frame. It appeared to White’s
attorney that the “access issues had been working out,” and he told the
deputy attorney general handling the case for CalFire that litigation would
be necessary only if “ ‘CDF unilaterally and without cause or notice decided
to bar access.’ ” The deputy attorney general “avoided direct responses,
offering no clue that plans were under way to close the road.” But in fact,
CalFire “staff” had, in February, filed a Notice of Exemption (NOE) under
CEQA to “decommission[]” a number of “unused or abandoned logging roads,”
including the road at issue. Despite knowing White had a “strong interest” in
any such action, she was not given notice of the filing of the NOE. In mid-
June, the new forest manager gave White 60 days’ notice of decommissioning.
      White alleged twelve causes of action: (1) “Breach of Implied Use
Agreement & Promissory Estoppel”; (2) “Equitable Easement or Permanent
Use Agreement”; (3) “Taking of Property (Inverse Condemnation)”;
(4) “Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage”; (5) “Violation of
Substantive Due Process & Equal Protection”; (6) “Civil Rights Violations”;
(7) “Civil Conspiracy”; (8) “Defamation”; (9) “Violation of CEQA and JDSF

                                       9
Management Plan (FEIR)”; (10) “Waste of Public Funds (Taxpayer Claim)”;
(11) “Violation of Public Records Act”; and (12) “Declaratory Relief.”
      Defendants interposed a demurrer seeking the dismissal of all
individually named defendants and dismissal of the third through eleventh
causes of action as against all defendants.
      The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to
the individual defendants on multiple grounds—there were no allegations
these individuals had acted outside the scope of their official capacity, there
were no allegations these individuals owed any duty to White they had not
performed, and there were no allegations these individuals held any right,
title, or interest in the property, or any right to control the disposition
thereof. Further, the deputy attorney general was protected by the litigation
privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47, and the originally named forest
manager no longer worked for CalFire.
      As to CalFire and the Board of Forestry, the court sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend as to all causes of action except the first,
second, and twelfth causes of action on a variety of grounds. Because it had
been adjudged that White had no easement over the access road, she had no
property that had been “taken” for purposes of inverse condemnation. All her
causes of action seeking damages were barred for failure to file a claim in
accordance with the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). Her
substantive due process claim was conclusory and not based on the
termination or revocation of any existing property interest created by an
independent source. She was barred from pursuing civil rights claims
against the state, its agencies, and its officials acting in their official
capacities. She failed to timely request a hearing on her CEQA claim. Her
claim for waste of public funds was speculative and she had failed to exhaust

                                         10
administrative and judicial remedies, including filing a timely petition for
writ of mandate. Her public records claim was moot because the records had
been produced.
      White moved for reconsideration, which in large part was a request for
leave to further amend. The trial court denied the motion both because
White failed to make the showing required by Code of Civil Procedure section
1008 and because her proposed amendments did not cure the deficiencies of
her causes of action.
      CalFire and the Board of Forestry then moved for summary judgment
on White’s remaining claims for “breach of implied use agreement and
promissory estoppel,” “equitable easement or permanent use agreement,” and
declaratory relief on res judicata grounds and the merits.
      The trial court granted the motion, first summarizing the “long and
convoluted history” of White’s effort to establish “a right of access” through
the forest land.4 As to what followed this Court’s affirmance of the judgments
against her in her 2010 lawsuit and 2012 writ proceeding, the trial court
stated:
            “After the Court of Appeal decision, CALFIRE attempted to
      formalize Ms. White’s use of the road through a use agreement.
      CALFIRE sent a letter in June 2017, which was ignored. After
      CALFIRE did not receive a response to that letter, and a private
      equipment operator hired by Ms. White did work on state property
      without any authorization, CALFIRE notified Ms. White of its plan to
      decommission the access road. The parties agreed to a stay of the case

      4  The court expressly granted the defendants’ request for judicial
notice filed on October 1, 2020, and implicitly granted their supplemental
request filed January 19, 2021.

                                       11
      at that time, in order to give Ms. White time to find a buyer. CALFIRE
      proposed a use agreement to one potential buyer. The potential buyer
      decided not to negotiate or enter into the proposed use agreement.
      Until at least mid-September 2020, no other potential buyer has
      approached CALFIRE about access to this property.
            “In 2019, CALFIRE again gave notice that it would decommission
      the road. CALFIRE explained that the road is no longer needed for
      forest management purposes. The Court has issued a preliminary
      injunction, preserving the status quo while the merits of the case are
      resolved.
            “Ms. White has recently filed yet another action, against
      CALFIRE and two neighbors, raising the same issues.”
      The court went on to rule that all three causes of action were barred by
res judicata, concluding the “primary right” that has been at issue in all her
claims is her asserted right of access through the state forest land. It
expressly rejected White’s assertion that a new primary right was at issue
because CalFire had assertedly “change[d]” its position on access and was
now moving to preclude it. All of White’s “claimed harms,” said the court,
“are because she does not have legal access to her property,” and all of the
causes in her first lawsuit also “relate[d] back to the issue of access.” “The
different legal theories now advanced by Ms. White are still based on the
central claim of road access to her property.”
      The court similarly rejected White’s assertion that res judicata was not
a bar because “the facts have materially changed” given CalFire’s
decommissioning of the road. CalFire “never promised it would allow
plaintiff to use the road for all time,” and White, herself, averred in a
declaration she “did not believe any ‘claim that CDF does not intend to

                                       12
prevent my use of the road.’ ” The court also pointed out neither it, nor the
Court of Appeal, had relied on assurances of permanent access by CalFire in
previously rejecting her equitable claim for an easement. Furthermore,
neither White, nor her predecessors, were “mislead” that CalFire would
provide permanent access.
      While the trial court pointed out its res judicata ruling was dispositive
as to the remaining causes of action, it also agreed with defendants’
alternative argument as to the first cause of action—that it was essentially a
contract claim and White had identified no contractual authority in
defendants to enter into the asserted permanent use agreement.5
      White filed a notice of appeal. (Appeal No. A162967.)
The 2020 Lawsuit
      In the meantime, White and her tenant (collectively, White) had filed a
third lawsuit (fourth if you include her prior mandamus proceeding), naming
as defendants CalFire and the individual owners of the two adjacent,
privately held parcels. She largely asserted the same “[r]elevant” facts
alleged in her prior lawsuits, emphasizing there was no feasible means of
access across the two privately owned parcels and both owners had refused to
provide her with access. (Boldface omitted.) She asserted five causes of
action: (1) “Hinrichs-Linthicum action to establish right of access”6 on the
ground her property was “landlocked”; (2) “public and private nuisance” on
the ground that by closing the access road CalFire was creating both a public

      5 The court also denied White’s purported cross-motion for summary
judgment on the ground it was moot and procedurally deficient in numerous
respects.
      6 This cause of action was based on Hinrichs v. Melton (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 516 (Hinrichs) and Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 259 (Linthicum).

                                       13
and private fire and emergency hazard; (3) “intentional & reckless
endangerment to health & safety” on the ground closure of the road created
“an unreasonable risk of physical and psychological harm to” to White and
the “public living in the vicinity”; (4) “good faith improver of property” on the
ground White and her predecessors had made substantial improvements to
the roadway; and (5) declaratory relief. (Capitalization & boldface omitted.)
        White subsequently filed a second amended complaint, largely
reiterating the allegations she had made in her 2017 lawsuit and adding the
California Public Works Board as a defendant.7 She added the following new
“[r]elevant” factual allegations (boldface omitted):
        That after obtaining a preliminary injunction in her 2017 lawsuit, she
began improving her property and seeking new buyers, “confident” CalFire
would grant a road use permit like the one it had offered to her in 2014 and
to a prior prospective buyer in 2018. But “numerous prospective buyers”
either “lost interest” after being told there was no “clear access” right or
“withdrew their purchase offers” when CalFire “refused” to talk with them
about obtaining a right of access. Eventually, White’s tenant expressed a
desire to purchase if CalFire would provide access. While White needs access
to her property, CalFire allegedly offered “no reason for decommissioning” the
road.
        White now asserted eight causes of action: (1) “Hinrichs-Linthicum
action to establish right of access”; (2) “fraudulent or negligent land transfers
and non-disclosure by State of California” on the ground that in acquiring the
surrounding parcels and in selling the parcel at issue, the state had not

        White alleged the Public Works Board oversees the fiscal matters
        7

associated with state construction projects and in 1968 conveyed the state
property over which the road runs to CalFire.

                                        14
provided for access; (3) “quiet title & implied easement/license action” on the
ground White detrimentally relied on “representations and capricious
conduct” by CalFire; (4) “public and private nuisance” on the ground that by
closing the access road CalFire is creating both a public and private nuisance;
(5) “intentional & reckless endangerment to health & safety” on the ground
CalFire’s closure of the road creates an “unreasonable risk of physical and
psychological harm to” to White and the “public living in the vicinity”;
(6) “unlawful public road closure”; (7) “violation of public trust doctrine”; and
(8) declaratory relief. (Capitalization & boldface omitted.)
      CalFire interposed a demurrer as to all causes of action against it on
both res judicata grounds and the merits.
      The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the
ground of res judicata.8 The court essentially repeated the analysis set forth
in its order dismissing her 2017 lawsuit, ruling that only one “primary right”
has been at issue since the outset of litigation—White’s “claim of road access
to her property.” The court again rejected her assertion that the facts had
“materially changed” given CalFire’s decommissioning of the road and
therefore res judicata was not a bar to her latest lawsuit.
      Pursuant to a stipulation that the court would issue a like ruling on the
anticipated demurrer by the Public Works Board, the trial court also
dismissed the only cause of action (the second cause of action) asserted
against the Board.
      White filed a notice of appeal. (Appeal No. 162978.)
The 2021 Lawsuit

      8 It also granted CalFire’s request for judicial notice filed December 24,
2020, and its supplemental request filed January 19, 2021.

                                       15
      Three months after the judgments in favor of CalFire and the Public
Works Board were entered, White filed a fourth lawsuit (fifth if you count the
mandamus proceeding), this time naming as defendants the State Lands
Commission and the Public Works Board.
      White again alleged that in 1946 the state purchased the land
bounding White’s parcel on three sides from a logging company and in 1949,
created the state forest. She further alleged that within the forest lands
there were private landholdings that were accessed by unimproved roads
running across the state property. A “1949 title report” allegedly noted these
roads were “not . . . objectionable” to CalFire and “did not interfere with
operations.” “To accommodate those private landowners,” “CDF” (the
acronym White now used, although we will continue to use CalFire) “offered
free deeded easements” during “the 1980’s and 1990’s,” many of which were
granted and exist at the present time. White also alleged the Board of
Forestry implemented its Policy 0351.8 “to explicitly articulate a grant-of-
easement policy to allow adjacent owners access, use and development of
their parcels.” Such easements were granted even when they were not the
sole means of access. CalFire records allegedly reflected that White’s
“deceased husband and his brother, who then owned the parcel, were offered
such an easement in 1983.” “For unknown reasons, [CalFire] never provided
the Whites an easement similar to that given to others.” Although CalFire
has stated it has no need for and is decommissioning the road, it continues to
refuse to negotiate with White for an easement or road use agreement. Its
refusal has rendered White’s parcel “virtually valueless.”
      White asserted nine causes of action: (1) “fraudulent or negligent land
transfers in violation of state public policy and/or failure to disclose title
defects” on the alleged ground the state had and violated “a common law

                                        16
fiduciary obligation of due diligence to disclose a potential cloud on the title
and to ensure that any visible and known road access across these lands
either be maintained or extinguished”; (2) “deed reformation & specific
performance” on the alleged ground that through fraud or mistake the 1946
deed to White’s predecessor-in-interest failed to express the intent of the
parties to provide access; (3) “Hinrichs-Linthicum equitable action to
establish right of access” on the alleged ground White’s parcel is “landlocked”;
(4) “quiet title & implied easement/license action” on the alleged ground
White and her predecessors-in-interest “detrimentally relied” on
“representations and conduct” by the state personnel of a right to continued
access; (5) “public and private nuisance” on the alleged ground closing the
road will adversely impact fire-fighting capability and restrict access by
emergency vehicles and utility companies; (6) “intentional & reckless
endangerment to health & safety” on the alleged ground closing the road will
create “unreasonable and highly dangerous risk of physical and psychological
harm” to White and the local community; (7) “unlawful public road closure”
on the alleged ground closures must be handled by the State Highway
Commission and there must be compliance with CEQA; (8) declaratory relief;
and (9) “unlawful taking/inverse condemnation” on the alleged ground
White’s and her predecessors-in-interest’s use of the road “created a property
right of access in the nature of an oral license or oral contract” which the
government will “tak[e]” by closing the road.
      The defendants demurred on numerous grounds, summing up the only
factual allegations as to the Lands Commission and the Public Works Board
as follows: “The Complaint’s sole factual allegations against the Commission
are that, in 1946, the Commission transferred a parcel to White’s
predecessor-in-interest . . . and in 1968, it transferred the adjacent access

                                        17
road parcel to the [Public Works] Board.” “The Complaint’s sole factual
allegations against the [Public Works] Board are that, in 1968, the [Public
Works] Board ‘administered conveyance of the parcel over which the disputed
road traverses’ to the State . . . ‘to be part of the [Forest],’ and that in doing so
it allegedly failed to reference the ‘existing disputed road’ or ‘provide explicit
rights of access to a public road.’ ” In short, as to the actual named
defendants, White was complaining about a conveyance by the Commission
that had occurred 75 years ago, and a separate transfer by the Public Works
Board 50 years ago.
      As to the first and second causes of action, defendants maintained
White had not pleaded her claims with sufficient particularity and not
alleged the existence of any legal duty they had breached. As to the third
through seventh causes of action, they were based on alleged conduct by
CalFire and not on any alleged action by the Lands Commission or the Public
Works Board. To the contrary, White’s own allegations established that
during the time frame relevant to these causes of action, neither the
Commission nor the Public Works Board had any interest in either White’s
parcel or the state forest land through which the road passes. The eighth
cause of action for declaratory relief was simply derivative of her other claims
and therefore also failed. Her ninth cause of action for a “taking” also was
not based on any actions by the Commission or the Public Works Board, and
it had already been adjudicated, in any event, that White had no right of
access over the state forest land. The defendants further maintained all the
causes of action as against the Commission and Public Works Board were
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations or laches, and by the doctrine
of res judicata.

                                         18
      The clerk’s transcript contains no written opposition by White and only
a request for judicial notice of a copy of the 1946 conveyance of the parcel to
White’s predecessor-in-interest.
      The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to
amend without specifying the particular ground(s) for doing so.
      White filed a notice of appeal. (Appeal No. A165182.)
                                   DISCUSSION
Causes of Action Based on Asserted Right of Access Through the State
Forest Land
      General Preclusion Principles
      We start with a recap of our Supreme Court’s discussion of the res
judicata doctrine in DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823
(DNK Holdings), in which the high court acknowledged courts have not been
consistent in their utilization of the terms “res judicata” and “collateral
estoppel.” The high court, itself, has “frequently used ‘res judicata’ as an
umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion,”
which it “described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine.”
(Ibid.) However, “[c]laim preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘primary aspect’ ” ’ of res judicata,
acts to bar claims that were, or should have been, advanced in a previous suit
involving the same parties.” (Id. at p. 824.) In contrast, “[i]ssue preclusion,
the ‘ “ ‘secondary aspect’ ” ’ historically called collateral estoppel, describes
the bar on relitigating issues that were argued and decided in the first suit.”
(Ibid.)
      As the Supreme Court explained, “[i]t is important to distinguish these
two types of preclusion because they have different requirements.” (DKN
Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.)

                                         19
      Claim preclusion (or res judicata) “ ‘prevents relitigation of the same
cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity
with them.’ [Citation.] Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves
(1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final
judgment on the merits in the first suit. [Citations.] If claim preclusion is
established, it operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether.” (DKN
Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.) This aspect of the doctrine promotes
judicial economy by preventing claim splitting. It requires all claims based
on the same cause of action, which were or could have been raised, to be
decided in a single suit. (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 73, 92–93, italics added (Kim).)
      Issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) “prohibits the relitigation of
issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises
different causes of action. [Citation.] Under issue preclusion, the prior
judgment conclusively resolves an issue actually litigated and determined in
the first action. [Citation.] There is a limit to the reach of issue preclusion,
however. In accordance with due process, it can be asserted only against a
party to the first lawsuit, or one in privity with a party.” (DKN Holdings,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.) “Issue preclusion differs from claim preclusion
in two ways. First, issue preclusion does not bar entire causes of action.
Instead, it prevents relitigation of previously decided issues. Second, unlike
claim preclusion, issue preclusion can be raised by one who was not a party or
privy in the first suit. [Citation.] ‘Only the party against whom the doctrine
is invoked must be bound by the prior proceeding. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] In
summary, issue preclusion applies (1) after final adjudication (2) of an
identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit

                                        20
and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity
with that party.”9 (DKN Holdings, at pp. 824–825, italics omitted.)
      As we have recited, White has sued a number of defendants in her
lawsuits. However, the judgments at issue in these appeals are those entered
in favor of the state defendants—CalFire, the Board of Forestry, the Public
Works Board, four individual state employees, and the Lands Commission,
all of which are represented by the Attorney General. We have no hesitation
in concluding that these state defendants can invoke the doctrine of claim
preclusion (res judicata) as privies. (See DNK Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 826 [“As applied to questions of preclusion, privity requires the sharing of
‘an identity or community of interest,’ with ‘adequate representation’ of that
interest in the first suit, and circumstances such that the nonparty ‘should
reasonably have expected to be bound’ by the first suit.”]; see also Grande v.
Eisenhower Medical Center (2022) 13 Cal.5th 313, 326.)
      Same Primary Right
      In determining whether the first requirement for claim preclusion (or
res judicata) applies—that the “same cause of action” has been asserted in a
subsequent lawsuit between the same parties (or their privies)—a court must
“discern whether the lawsuits involve the same ‘primary right.’ ” (5th & LA
v. Western Waterproofing Co., Inc. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 781, 788, italics
omitted.)

      9  Thus, the Attorney General is mistaken in stating in his respondents’
brief that “[i]t does not matter if the party asserting the doctrine of res
judicata as a defense was not a party to the original case, so long as the party
against whom res judicata is asserted is the same.” That is correct as to issue
preclusion (i.e., collateral estoppel). It is incorrect as to claim preclusion (i.e.,
res judicata) which bars relitigation of the same claim between the same
parties (and/or their privies). (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 825–
826.)

                                         21
      “ ‘ “The primary right theory is a theory of code pleading that has long
been followed in California. It provides that a ‘cause of action’ is comprised of
a ‘primary right’ of the plaintiff, a corresponding ‘primary duty’ of the
defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that
duty. [Citation.] The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it
is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single
cause of action. [Citation.] . . . [¶] As far as its content is concerned, the
primary right is simply the plaintiff’s right to be free from the particular
injury suffered. [Citation.] It must therefore be distinguished from the legal
theory on which liability for that injury is premised: ‘Even where there are
multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury
gives rise to only one claim for relief.’ [Citation.] The primary right must
also be distinguished from the remedy sought: ‘The violation of one primary
right constitutes a single cause of action, though it may entitle the injured
party to many forms of relief, and the relief is not to be confounded with the
cause of action, one not being determinative of the other.’ ” ’ ” (Colebrook v.
CIT Bank, N.A. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 259, 263 (Colebrook), italics omitted.)
      In short, “[u]nder the ‘primary rights’ theory, a cause of action arises
from the invasion of a primary right. Although different grounds for legal
relief may be asserted under different theories, conduct that violates a single
primary right gives rise to only one cause of action.” (DNK Holdings, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 818, fn. 1.)
      Right of Access
      As we have recited, the trial court identified the “primary right” which
White has sought to vindicate in virtually all of the causes of action in her
2010, 2017, 2020, and 2021 lawsuits as the “right of access” to her property
through the state forest land.

                                         22
      White insists this is not so and that her 2010 lawsuit “[a]ddressed” only
her “right to obtain an easement and not her right to access, itself.”
(Capitalization omitted.) This assertion disregards that a primary right is
not defined by the particular legal theory advanced or ground for relief
sought in the first lawsuit. (DNK Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 818, fn. 1;
Colebrook, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 263.) Rather, a “primary right” is
“ ‘ “simply the plaintiff’s right to be free from the particular injury
suffered.” ’ ” (Colebrook, at p. 263.)
      The injury White has sought to rectify in all her lawsuits, under
innumerable theories, is interference with an asserted right of access to her
property. The doctrine of claim preclusion (res judicata) prohibits her from
advancing these theories seriatim over the course of more than a decade. To
the contrary, White was required to raise in her 2010 lawsuit every theory
that “ ‘could have been’ ” raised to rectify the abridgement of her asserted
right of access. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 92–93.) This embraced, for
example, every species of asserted easement or use agreement (e.g.,
prescriptive easement, equitable easement, easement by necessity, implied
easement, reformation of deed to include a right of access, irrevocable license)
and all assorted claims of injury based on or arising from interference with or
abridgment of her asserted right of access (e.g., inverse condemnation,
nuisance, unlawful public road closure).10 (See Colebrook, supra,

      10  At oral argument, White continued to insist her 2010 lawsuit
concerned only the scope of her permissive use of the road through the state
forest land at that time, and therefore it cannot be fairly said she claimed a
“right of access” across that land. However, as we have recited, in her
original complaint White alleged in her first cause of action, for quiet title,
that she and her predecessors “either own the roadway at issue or have
established their right to an easement . . . based on implication, necessity or
prescription, or as a matter of equity including collateral estoppel.” In her
                                         23
64 Cal.App.5th at p. 264 [“primary right alleged to have been violated” was
plaintiff’s “ownership interest in the property,” and all claims in her fourth
lawsuit, as in her prior lawsuits, were “premised upon” and “flow[ed] from”
asserted interference with that right]; Gillies v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 907, 910, 914 [each of plaintiff’s four lawsuits
challenging efforts to foreclose sought to vindicate same primary right]11.)
      And as to any causes of action not based on the same primary right, the
doctrine of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) bars White from relitigating
all issues tried and decided adversely to her in her 2010 lawsuit.
      Indeed, White’s principal arguments are directed not at the
fundamental requirements of claim and issue preclusion, but rather on the
asserted equities of her case and, specifically, CalFire’s supposed repudiation

second amended complaint, she further alleged as to quiet title, that her right
to use the road was “based on a claim of necessity that is implied from the
fact [the state] was the common owner of plaintiff’s parcel” and the state
forest land surrounding the parcel on three sides, and the state, “as common
owner, intended to convey whatever was necessary for the beneficial use of
plaintiff’s parcel.” She alleged her claim was “based additionally on
principles of equity, including equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel,”
and she and her predecessors had “relied to their detriment on assurances
made over the years and up until recently that defendants would provide a
deeded easement.” She further alleged her predecessors in interest had
obtained a prescriptive right to the portion of the road that had once been on
private property that was later conveyed to the state. Thus, contrary to her
oral argument, White’s 2010 lawsuit did, indeed, involve a claimed right of
access over the forest property and advanced a number of theories to that
end.
      11 At oral argument, White expressed umbrage at the cited cases as
involving vexatious litigants. Neither is an appeal from a vexatious litigant
determination. Rather, both these recent cases discuss what constitutes a
cause of action for purposes of claim and issue preclusion (i.e., res judicata
and collateral estoppel), the exact issue we are addressing here. None of the
older cases White cites in her briefing calls into question either the principles
enunciated in these cases or their application.
                                       24
of years of assurances of access when, in 2017, the then forest manager
notified White the road would be decommissioned12 and, in 2019, CalFire
filed a NOE to proceed with decommissioning. It is clear from White’s
allegations that she and her attorney felt blindsided by the NOE since White
had obtained a preliminary injunction maintaining the status quo and she
and her attorney believed progress was being made towards reaching an
agreement on access.
      As White points out, “[n]either res judicata nor collateral estoppel was
ever ‘ “intended to operate so as to prevent a re-examination of the same
question between the same parties where, in the interval between the first
and second actions, the facts have materially changed or new facts have
occurred which have altered the legal rights or relations of the litigants.” ’ ”
(Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 134, 179–180, quoting Evans v. Celotex Corp. (1987)
194 Cal.App.3d 741, 748.)
      But White has focused only on the “facts have materially changed”
aspect of this exception to preclusion. Even assuming CalFire’s
decommissioning of the road and refusal to further negotiate an access
agreement constituted “materially changed facts” (and we are not suggesting
that is so given the decades’ worth of fits and starts of discussions with no

      12  In January 2017, CalFire adopted an updated “Jackson
Demonstration State Forest Management Plan” which included as an
appendix a “Road Management Plan.” The Forest Management Plan and the
Road Management Plan called for an inventory of the roads within the forest
and the identification of roads that would be “abandoned” (i.e., closed or
decommissioned). These included roads “no longer required for management
and recreation purposes.” “The goal [was] to complete the entire road and
closing inventory within three years.” The updated Forest Management Plan
was certified by the forest manager who told White the road would be
decommissioned.

                                        25
agreement about access), White disregards the additional requirement that
these changed facts would have “ ‘ “altered the legal rights or relations of the
litigants.” ’ ” (Union Pacific Railroad Co., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.)
      That CalFire finally took action to close the road and ceased
discussions with White, did not “alter” her legal rights—or more to the point,
her lack of legal rights—to access her property through the state forest land.
She litigated her asserted right of access in her 2010 lawsuit and lost.
Accordingly, she had no right of access that CalFire could abridge by
decommissioning the road. All White “had” after the conclusion of her 2010
lawsuit and affirmance of the judgment on appeal in 2015, was access at the
largesse of CalFire, revocable at any time.
      White nevertheless persists in asserting CalFire’s earlier assurances of
access were pivotal to the initial judgment against her. As we have recited,
the trial court did take the assurances CalFire had made as of the time of
trial in January 2014 into account in finding White had not established the
second and third requirements to create an equitable easement. But as
defendants point out, the trial court also found White had not established
even the first requirement—“innocence and reasonableness” of her claim of
entitlement to use of the road. In answer to “whether the Whites had a good
faith belief, based on a diligent investigation, that they had unfettered rights
to use the roadway,” the court found “[t]he answer to this question is clearly
no.” As defendants further point out, this court affirmed that specific finding
and observed White’s “failure to surmount this first hurdle is dispositive.”
      Accordingly, CalFire’s assurances as of January 2014 were not the sine
qua non of the judgment in White’s 2010 lawsuit nor of this court’s
affirmance of that judgment in 2015. Furthermore, as the trial court
observed in granting summary judgment in the 2017 lawsuit, there is no

                                       26
evidence CalFire ever promised White she could use the road “for all time.”
Indeed, in closing argument in the January 2014 trial, White’s counsel
argued to the court CalFire had given no assurance of continued access.
      White discounts the significance of the trial court’s finding that she
failed to establish the first requirement for an equitable easement (and this
court’s affirmance of that finding), asserting the law has changed and the
“innocent use doctrine” is now “obsolete & inapplicable” (boldface &
capitalization omitted) and there is now a more vigorous doctrine of easement
by necessity, citing to Hinrichs, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th 516 and Linthicum,
supra, 175 Cal.App.4th 259. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
716–717 [“one well-settled equitable exception to the general rule holds that
preclusion does not apply when there has been a significant change in the
law since the factual findings were rendered that warrants reexamination of
the issue”; the significant change to felony murder made by Banks and Clark
represented “the sort of significant change that has traditionally been
thought to warrant reexamination of an earlier-litigated issue”].)
      The fundamental difficulty with White’s argument is that the
Linthicum and Hinrichs cases do not represent a “significant change in the
law” between the judgment in her 2010 lawsuit, rendered in 2014 and
affirmed on appeal in 2015, and the first of her three subsequent lawsuits
filed in 2017. To the contrary, Linthicum was decided in 2009, before White
filed even her first lawsuit. Moreover, this court discussed Linthicum in its
opinion affirming the judgment against White in that lawsuit.
      Hinrichs was decided in 2017 by the same court that decided
Linthicum. In Linthicum the court had affirmed a judgment imposing an
equitable easement to access “landlocked” property where the owner thereof
had been using a roadway over neighboring property for several decades. In

                                       27
Hinrichs, the court affirmed a judgment finding an easement by necessity
over one parcel and a connecting equitable easement over another parcel
holding, among other things, that a court can grant an equitable easement
“without there being a preexisting use” by the owner seeking the easement.
(Hinrichs, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 519.) In articulating the inquiry
pertinent to an equitable easement, the appellate court did not jettison the
basic elements that must be established for an equitable easement. To the
contrary, citing to its prior decision in Linthicum, the court stated, among
other things, that “[t]he court should consider whether the need for the
easement is the result of the willful act of the party seeking the easement.”
(Id. at p. 522.) Thus, Hinrichs does not reflect any change in the law
pertaining to equitable easements, let alone a significant change. White’s
real complaint is that in Linthicum and Hinrichs the trial courts granted
equitable easements, whereas the trial court here did not. But under no
exception to the preclusion doctrines is that a ground to disregard the finality
and preclusive effect of the trial court’s judgment.13
      White also points out that “[i]n rare circumstances, a final judgment
may be denied claim preclusive effect when to do so would result in manifest
injustice.” (F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 462, 465.) She
insists that would be the result here.

      13  We also note that the equitable easement granted in Hinrichs was
“over a small portion of” an adjoining property that the owners rarely visited
and used for no purpose, and the easement crossed the “ ‘very back’ ” of the
property, which was separated from the rest of the property by a creek bed.
Given these facts, the trial court found the “ ‘ “relative hardship[s]” ’ ”
“ ‘clearly favor[ed]’ ” the owner seeking access. (Hinrichs, supra,
11 Cal.App.5th at p. 522.) Here, there were different facts, and the trial court
reached a different conclusion.

                                         28
      We disagree. White’s 2010 lawsuit was litigated over the course of five
years, and a full trial was held on the issue that undergirds all of her
claims—whether she is entitled to access her property through the state
forest land. The evidence established that White’s predecessors acquired the
parcel knowing there was no written or recorded right of access through the
state property14 and they had multiple opportunities over the succeeding
decades to pursue such a right. For reasons unknown, they never did. White
adduced no evidence the state ever inadvertently, let alone deliberately, led
White’s predecessors to delay or abandon efforts to secure a right of access.
As the trial court stated in its written decision following trial, given CalFire’s
prior offer of an easement, “[t]he Whites . . . cannot fault CALFIRE for their
own lack of diligence” in failing to follow through. Thus, unlike in a case
where the record suggests the plaintiff might succeed if not foreclosed by
claim or issue preclusion, the record here does not hold any such portent.
      Moreover, the relentlessness of White’s litigation argues for application
of the preclusion doctrines. “ ‘A predictable doctrine of res judicata benefits
both the parties and the courts because it “seeks to curtail multiple litigation
causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in
judicial administration.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Judgment,
§ 280, p. 820.)’ ” (Gillies, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 914, quoting Mycogen
Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 897, italics omitted.)
      In sum, the trial court did not err in concluding all her causes of action
against the state defendants based on or seeking to vindicate an asserted

      14 The trial court expressly found there was no “evidence in the record
that anyone in the chain of title was ever misled about there being a right of
access to the parcel.”

                                        29
right of access through the state forest land are barred by claim preclusion
(res judicata).
“Stand Alone” Claims
      White maintains the trial court failed to appreciate that she also
asserted a number of “independent and free-standing claims unrelated to any
primary right theory.” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.)
      CEQA Claim
      White’s ninth cause of action in her seconded amended complaint in her
2017 lawsuit alleged the decommissioning of the road was “undertaken in
violation of CEQA” (as well as several forest management plans) and
“conflict[ed] with defendants’ obligation under its programmatic FEIR . . . to
maintain and expand recreational opportunities and [was] likely to lead to
soil erosion in the vicinity of the road.” She asserted defendants’ “action
[was] designed to force [her] to construct a new access road through and
across two blue-line streams, the result of which would be to endanger the
watercourses and endangered or threated species residing in them or in the
riparian corridor associated with them.”15
      The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action
on multiple grounds: (1) the 35-day statute of limitations for challenging a
NOE had run (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167, subd. (d)); (2) White failed to
timely request a hearing within 90 days of filing her lawsuit as required by
Public Resources Code section 21167.4, subdivision (a); and (3) she “fail[ed] to
allege any non-speculative facts indicating the manner CEQA” was violated.
      White addresses only the first ground—that she failed to timely
challenge the NOE. This precludes her from obtaining relief on appeal.

       Contrary to her claim in her opening brief, White did not allege a
      15

CEQA claim in her 2020 lawsuit.

                                       30
Where the appellant fails to address alternative grounds on which a
judgment is sought and granted, we assume the alternative grounds support
the judgment and must affirm. (Lafferty v. Wells Fargo Bank (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 545, 571–572 (Lafferty); Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 125–126 (Christoff).)16
      Furthermore, the trial court did not err in ruling her CEQA claim,
which was based on CalFire’s decision to decommission the road and the
filing of a NOE to do so, was barred by the 35-day limitations period. This

      16   In Lafferty, for example, the trial court granted summary
adjudication to the defendant on a number of causes of action on numerous
grounds. (Lafferty, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 571–572.) On appeal, the
plaintiffs challenged only the trial court’s evidentiary ground that they had
failed to present any competent evidence raising a triable issue (which flowed
from the sustaining of defense objections to much of the plaintiffs’ evidence).
(Id. at p. 571.) The plaintiffs did not address the separate legal grounds on
which the defendant had moved for, and the court had granted, summary
adjudication. (Ibid.) As the Court of Appeal explained, it had no choice but
to affirm: “Even if we assume the [appellants’] arguments regarding the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings are meritorious, we would nonetheless be
compelled to affirm the order granting summary adjudication. ‘ “A judgment
or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is
silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general
principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine
of reversible error.” ’ (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557,
564. . . .) [¶] Here, the [appellants] have failed to address how the trial court
erred in concluding legal grounds separate from the evidentiary issues
supported summary adjudication. . . . Consequently, we deem the contention
that the trial erred in granting summary adjudication to be forfeited for
failure to present arguments as to the separate grounds for dismissing the
[appellants’] six remaining causes of action.” (Id. at pp. 571–572; see
Christoff, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 125–126 [where appellant failed to
challenge ruling on causation, a separate ground on which the trial court
granted summary judgment, plaintiff forfeited the issue, which, in turn, was
dispositive and sufficed to affirm the judgment].)

                                       31
time period commences when the lead agency files the NOE with the Office of
Planning and Research and it is posted on its Web site. (Pub. Resources
Code, §§ 21108, subd. (b) & (c), 21167, subd. (d); see generally Committee to
Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 607, 631 [“the
filing of the notice of exemption triggers the running of a shortened 35-day
statute of limitations period for the filing of any legal challenge to the
exemption finding. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167, subd. (d); Guidelines,
§§ 15062, subd. (d), 15112, subd. (c)(2).)”].) Here, the NOE was filed on
February 14, 2019, and White first alleged a CEQA claim in her second
amended complaint on July 5, 2019, 141 days later.
      White appears to maintain either that her time to challenge the NOE
did not commence running at the usual time (on posting on the Web site) or
that she was excused from complying with the 35-day limitations period,
because she assertedly was entitled to individual notice under Public
Resources Code section 21167, subdivision (f).
      That statutory provision states that “[i]f a person has made a written
request to the public agency for a copy of the notice specified in [Public
Resources Code] [s]ection 21108 [that is, a NOE] . . . before the date on which
the agency approves or determines to carry out the project,” then the agency
shall mail notice to such person within five days. (Pub. Resources Code,
§ 21167, subd. (f), italics added.) As defendants point out, White did not
allege or make any showing in the trial court that she made a written request
for a copy of the NOE, and she provides no record citation to such in her
briefing on appeal.
      Instead, White refers in her briefs to “prior correspondence” between
her lawyer and CalFire’s general counsel wherein her lawyer assertedly
sought “notice of any changed position as to road access.” The only record

                                        32
citation she provides anywhere in her briefs of such “correspondence” is to a
declaration by her attorney filed in support of temporary or preliminary
injunctive relief, wherein he recounted his efforts to resolve the dispute over
access. This included reciting an e-mail string (he did not provide a copy of
the actual e-mail string) with CalFire’s legal counsel in which he (White’s
attorney) towards the end of the string states, “I won’t waste anyone’s time,
then [pursuing an access agreement]. Provide me please a clear
understanding of what ‘decommissioning’ means to your agency and a rough
time table. I’ll plan out another lawsuit. I assume I may be allowed to serve
you directly?” He added a post-script stating, “I need clarity on your plans so
that litigation may proceed in an orderly fashion and I need to know if an
injunction must be requested immediately (with or without a TRO) and so
that the judge is certain that decommissioning means road closure.” This
asserted e-mail string does not remotely constitute a request under Public
Resources Code section 21167, subdivision (f) for a copy of any NOE
associated with decommissioning the road. Furthermore, subdivision (f) goes
on to state the “date upon which [individual] notice is mailed shall not affect
the time periods specified in subdivisions (b), (c), (d) [the 35-day limitations
period], and (e).” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167, subd. (f).)
      Due Process Claim
      White maintains the trial court also erred in “ignoring” her
“procedural” and “substantive” due process claims.
      As defendants point out, White never advanced a procedural due
process claim in her 2017, 2020, and 2021 lawsuits. Rather, in her second
amended complaint in her 2017 lawsuit, she asserted a cause of action (the
fifth cause of action) for “violation of substantive due process & equal

                                        33
protection.” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) White can hardly fault the
trial court for “ignoring” a claim she never pled or asked leave to allege.
      In any case, in her opening brief, White recognizes that whether there
has been a procedural due process violation entails a two-part inquiry: “(1) is
there a liberty or property interest of which the [person] has been deprived,
and (2) if so, were the procedures followed by the state [in depriving the
person of his or her liberty or property] constitutionally sufficient.” White
“maintains her property interest concerns both ownership of her parcel and
reasonable access to that parcel based on historical use [apparently of the
road] without suffering an arbitrary government landlock.”
      Thus, regardless of the label White might have affixed to her never-
asserted claim, it is another theory to establish or vindicate an asserted right
of access through the state forest land, which she is barred from pursuing by
claim preclusion (res judicata). Even if her newly conceived due process
claim could be said to vindicate a different primary right, the claim is barred
by issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) and, specifically, the court’s ruling in
her 2010 lawsuit affirmed on appeal that she has no species of property
interest in the road through the state forest land.
      White did allege a claim for substantive due process in her second
amended complaint in her 2017 lawsuit, asserting she had a “constitutional
. . . interest at stake arising from her ownership of the involved property and
to be free from the arbitrary exercise of government authority against her.”
She further alleged defendants violated her right to substantive due process
“by applying vague, arbitrary, inconsistent, illogical standards, failing to
abide by their own policies, standards, and representations.” White
maintained defendants’ actions did “not involve discretionary decisions but
[were] based on a punitive and malicious effort grounded in hatred and ill-

                                        34
will, to impose financial harm” on her and to “cause her to surrender her land
to defendants at no cost, while also placing her at risk of harm to herself and
property.” She additionally alleged defendants had violated “their own
mandates” concerning emergencies and wildfire and that “eliminating all
access” violated a variety of statutes and local codes.
      The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action
on two grounds: (1) that White’s allegations were too conclusory; and (2) that
a “ ‘threshold requirement’ ” for stating a substantive due process claim is
“ ‘termination or revocation of an existing property interest in a benefit
created by an independent source, such as state or federal law,’ ” (quoting
Rabkin v. Dean (N.D.Ca. 1994) 856 F. Supp. 543, 549) and White had no such
interest. Thus, as to the second ground, while the trial court did not
expressly state White faced the bar of claim or issue preclusion, that is
clearly the substance of the court’s ruling.
      In her opening brief, White does not address either of the grounds on
which the trial court dismissed her substantive due process claim. For this
reason, alone, she cannot prevail on appeal.17 (See Lafferty, supra,
213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 571–572; Christoff, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 125–
126; see also People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237 (JTH

      17   In her closing brief, White attempted to distinguish Rabkin, stating
it “remain[ed] unclear [to her] how this case has any bearing on the dispute
at hand.” Advancing this argument for the first time in her closing brief was
too little, too late. (See Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 653
(McLaughlin) [appellant’s “discussion of the issue in his reply brief comes too
late”].) In any case, while Rabkin v. Dean (N.D.Cal. 1994) 856 F.Supp. 543
may have involved different facts (specifically a claim that the plaintiff had
been wrongly deprived of a public employment benefit, i.e., of a protected
property interest), the salient point, as the trial court recognized, was the
need for a protectible interest, which the court had already decreed White did
not have.

                                       35
Tax) [“[w]hen a trial court states multiple grounds for its ruling and
appellant addresses only some of them, we need not address appellant’s
arguments because ‘one good reason is sufficient to sustain the order from
which the appeal was taken’ ”].)
      Instead, White urges a new theory—that the “government” can be held
“accountable” “through the state-created danger doctrine,” which she
describes as an “ ‘affirmative duty to protect [that] arises not from the State’s
knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to
help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act
on his own behalf.” She asserts “the principle reasonably extends to
[defendants] arbitrarily cutting off road access to appellant’s land, such that
she and any tenants . . . are rendered susceptible to serious harm or death
because emergency responders would have great difficulty reaching them or
they fleeing [sic] from the property in the event of forest fire or other natural
disaster.” She also urges, apparently as another additional theory, that the
government can be held liable where an “agency acts with deliberate
indifference after recognizing an unreasonable risk, intending to expose a
citizen to such risk without regard to consequences.” By failing to raise these
theories in the trial court, White forfeited them. (See In re Marriage of
Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 695 [we generally do not consider theories
raised for the first time on appeal which could have been, but were not,
presented to the trial court for consideration].)
      Furthermore, these are new theories to establish or vindicate White’s
asserted right of access through the state forest land, which she is barred
from pursuing by claim or issue preclusion.

                                       36
      Nuisance and Public Endangerment
      In her second amended complaint in her 2020 lawsuit, White alleged
causes of action for “public and private nuisance” (fourth cause of action) and
“intentional & reckless endangerment to health & safety” (fifth cause of
action). (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) She maintained CalFire’s
closing of the road would create a “public nuisance” because it “will be
eliminating an important fire access road that could be essential is [sic]
stopping a fire . . . and endangering the [local] community.” The closure
would also “infringe[] on the right of entry of [PG&E]” and depriving PG&E
“create[s] a public nuisance fire hazard.” White asserted closing the road
would also create a “private nuisance” that endangered her and her tenant as
it “is the only means . . . in and out of the parcel for purpose of escape and/or
provision of emergency services involving fire suppression and medical care.”
She further claimed the road closure would “unnecessarily disturb[]” her and
her tenant’s “right to quiet and safe enjoyment and use of the property.”
      White insists her nuisance and endangerment claims “were
independent of any right to access and concerned the ramifications of road
closure and landlocking her parcel,” citing to Public Resources Code section
4171, which states “Any condition endangering public safety by creating a
fire hazard and which exists upon any property which is included within any
state responsibility area is a public nuisance.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 4171.)
      We agree with the trial court, however, that these causes of action are,
at bottom, additional theories advanced by White to establish or vindicate a
right of access through the state forest land, and the preclusion doctrines
apply.
      Furthermore, White has cited no authority supporting her assertion
that closing an old logging road “creat[es] a fire hazard” within the meaning

                                        37
of Public Resources Codes section 4171. This alleged conduct is not close, for
example, to that alleged in Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v.
County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036 (Koll-Irvine), wherein the
plaintiff, an association of owners of commercial properties adjacent to the
county airport, complained the county had approved the construction of
“three 300,000 gallon above-ground fuel storage tanks located in the
northwest quadrant of the airport 500 feet from the edge of the main
runway,” despite “studies done on behalf of the county recognizing the
potential disaster in the event of an aircraft accident.” (Id. at p. 1039.) The
Court of Appeal acknowledged the complained-of conduct could, under the
right circumstances, support a nuisance claim (notably under Civil Code
section 3479, not under Public Resources Code section 4171). (Koll-Irvine, at
p. 1040.)
      The principal issue in Koll-Irvine was whether the plaintiff could, itself,
pursue claims for public and private nuisance. The appellate court concluded
it could not.
      The association could not advance a public nuisance claim because a
private party can do so only “ ‘if it is specially injurious to himself, but not
otherwise.’ ([Civ. Code,] § 3493.) The damage suffered must be different in
kind and not merely in degree from that suffered by other members of the
public.” (Koll-Irvine, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1040.) The court rejected
the plaintiff’s claim that “allegations of mental anguish, risk of higher
insurance premiums, diminished property values and reduced usefulness of
its premises constitute unique damages due to its proximity to the Fuel
Farm.” (Id. at pp. 1040–1041.) These alleged damages, said the court,
applied “to all the homes and businesses in the area of the airport.” (Id. at
p. 1041.) Indeed, the complaint itself alleged “ ‘all members of the public

                                        38
within 1000 to 1500 feet . . . would be killed and those within one and one-
half to three miles would be injured’ if the Fuel Farm exploded.” (Ibid.) The
plaintiff’s “proximity arguably expose[ed] it to a higher degree of these
damages, but not to a different kind altogether.” (Ibid.)
      Nor could the association advance a private nuisance claim—because “a
private nuisance action cannot be maintained for an interference in the use
and enjoyment of land caused solely by the fear of a future injury.” (Koll-
Irvine, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1041–1042.) A plaintiff must “ ‘show an
actual physical invasion or damage to themselves or their properties. . . .
[S]uch things as fear, anxiety, and emotional distress which are not caused
by an interference with a specific private property right and which are
common to the general population will not support a private action for
nuisance.’ ” (Id. at p. 1042.) The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that its
“allegations of diminution in property value, mental anguish due to fear of
increased property insurance, and diminished use of its premises
constitute[d] interference with specific property rights.” (Id. at pp. 1042–
1043.) “[T]hese . . . elements of damage,” said the court, “must be caused by
an interference with a property right,” which the plaintiff could not allege.
(Id. at p. 1043.)
      White faces these same difficulties. While she maintains she alleged
that she and her tenant will suffer damage “different in kind” than other
members of the public, enabling her to advance a public nuisance claim, that
is not the case. She complains, for example, about closure of a “fire access
road that could be essential is [sic] stopping a fire trending east-to-west and
endangering the community living around Mitchell Creek Road.” (Italics
added.) As for White’s claim for private nuisance, it fails both because it is
predicated on “fear of a future injury” (i.e., the theoretical possibility that

                                        39
CalFire’s fire-fighting capability will be hampered by closure of the road) and
because she cannot allege “actual physical invasion or damage to” her
property.
      Public Trust Doctrine
      In her second amended complaint in her 2020 lawsuit, White alleged a
cause of action (the ninth) for “violation of public trust doctrine.”
(Capitalization & boldface omitted.) She asserted CalFire violated this
doctrine by “arbitrarily chos[ing] to close public access to a portion” of the
state forest that is used by the public “for recreational purposes and
environmental preservation of surrounding pygmy forest and soils, in
addition to open space.” She further maintained “[r]ecreational purposes . . .
must be factored into any decision to close access to an existing thoroughfare
within” the state forest.
      We need not, and do not, decide whether this claim is merely another
theory by which White seeks to establish or vindicate an asserted right of
access through the state forest land. CalFire demurred to this cause of action
on the ground White did not, and could not, state a claim for violation of the
public trust doctrine, and we agree.
      “ ‘While the public trust doctrine has evolved primarily around the
rights of the public with respect to tidelands and navigable waters, the
doctrine is not so limited.’ [Citation.] More than ‘ “a set of rules about
tidelands,” ’ or ‘ “a restraint on alienation by the government,” ’ this doctrine
functions ‘ “largely as a public property right of access to certain public trust
natural resources for various public purposes.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus,
the doctrine protects ‘expansive public use of trust property.’ ” (San
Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Com. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 202,
233–234 (San Francisco Baykeeper) quoting Center for Biological Diversity,

                                        40
Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1360 (Center for
Biological Diversity).)
      What constitutes “trust property” generally remains limited to
navigable waterways, submerged lands, and tidelands in trust for the public.
(See generally National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d
419, 433–441, 446; see also Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an
Interpretive Canon (2012) 45 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 693, 723–724 [extending the
public trust doctrine beyond its “current water-based focus” to “dry land
would represent a major expansion in its scope”]; Golden Feather Community
Assn. v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1276, 1284 [public
trust doctrine generally does not extend to nonnavigable waterways].) More
recently, a California court has extended the doctrine to “undomesticated
birds and wildlife,” because they have historically “ ‘been held to belong to no
one and therefore to belong to everyone in common.’ ” (Center for Biological
Diversity, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1361, 1363.)
      White has cited no authority in support of her assertion that the strip
of land in dispute is public trust property. Nor are we aware of any such
authority.

      The range of “public uses,” in contrast, is broad, encompassing not just
navigation, commerce, and fishing, but also the public right to hunt, bathe or
swim. (City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515, 521.) The
concept of a public trust use is also flexible, accommodating changing public
needs. (National Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 434.) For example, an
increasingly important public use is the preservation of trust lands “ ‘in their
natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study,
as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds
and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the

                                       41
area.’ ” (Id. at pp. 434–435; accord, San Francisco Baykeeper, supra,
242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 233–234.) “ ‘Where . . . the propriety of a
governmental reallocation of trust land from one public use to another is
placed in question, the seminal opinion in Illinois Central [Railroad Co. v.
State of Illinois (1892)] 146 U.S. 387, makes clear that courts should “look
with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is
calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to
subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties.” ’ ” (San Francisco
Baykeeper, at p. 234.)
     White did not allege that CalFire subjected any public use to the self-
interest of private parties. Rather, she asserted CalFire changed its own use
of a narrow strip of the state property it manages from use as a recreational
access road to undeveloped forest land. (White also alleged, seemingly at
odds with her allegation that the road was impressed with public trust
recreational use, that she and “her predecessors [had] always maintained the
roadbed and [had] cooperated with [CalFire] in maintaining a security gate,
the key to which [CalFire] freely provided the landowners over the past 60
years.”)
      What is immediately apparent from White’s allegations is that the
“recreational” use she complains was not considered, and the maintenance of
undeveloped forest land to which CalFire has now committed the strip of
property at issue, are both public trust uses, and as evidenced by the case law
are of equal dignity. (See National Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 434–
435.) The two uses are also mutually exclusive—use as an access road
necessarily precludes use as undeveloped forest land. Accordingly, CalFire
had to choose, and was entitled to choose, between these two equally valued
public trust uses. (See Monterey Coastkeeper v. Central Coast Regional Water

                                       42
Quality Control Board (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1, 21 (Monterey Coastkeeper)
[“ ‘selecting one trust use “in preference to . . . [an]other cannot reasonably
said to be an abuse of . . . discretion” ’ ”; “public trust uses are to be protected
wherever feasible”].) Furthermore, despite the alleged importance White
ascribes to recreation, it is, in fact, a use of only “secondary” importance in
managing the state forest. The Forest Management Plan states “[T]he
primary purpose of [the Jackson Demonstration State Forest] is to conduct
innovative demonstrations, experiments, and education in forest
management; that timber production will be the primary land use on [the
forest], and that recreation is recognized as a secondary but compatible land
use on [the forest].”18
      The courts have also recognized that “[t]his inherently discretionary
doctrine generally does not allow for intervention by the courts other than in
the context of judicial review of administrative decisions. ‘ “Intervention by
the courts [through a separate lawsuit under the public trust doctrine], other
than by exercising oversight over the administrative process and ensuring
that proper standards are applied, not only would threaten duplication of
effort and inconsistency of results, but would require courts to perform an
ongoing regulatory role as technology evolves and conditions change.” ’ ”
(Monterey Coastkeeper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 21–22, quoting Citizens
for East Shore Parks v. State Lands Com. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 549, 577.)
      For these reasons, alone, White did not, and cannot, allege a viable
cause of action under the public trust doctrine.
      In addition, there is “no set ‘procedural matrix’ for determining state
compliance with the public trust doctrine.” (San Francisco Baykeeper, supra,

      18  As we have noted, the trial court granted CalFire’s request for
judicial notice of these government documents.

                                         43
242 Cal.App.4th at p. 234.) And in the trial court, CalFire maintained that
its Forest Management Plan (and Road Management Plan set forth therein),
evidence that it did consider recreational uses in the course of preparing
these plans and the ensuing NOE implementing these plans. As we have
recited, the Management Plan does recognize recreation as a “secondary but
compatible land use.” It also states research and demonstration projects
“shall include” “recreation” and “shall be directed to the needs of the general
public” as well as “small forest landowners, timber operators, and the timber
industry,” and that CalFire will “[c]ooperate with the Department of Parks
and Recreation in establishing” on the demonstration forest and an adjacent
woodlands center “forest management demonstration areas that are
compatible with recreation for educational purposes.” It is therefore
apparent CalFire did take into account recreational use in preparing its
Forest Management Plan and Road Management Plan, both of which called
for a survey of existing roads and the closure of roads no longer necessary to
management of the forest land.19
      Civil Rights Claim
      In her second amended complaint in her 2017 lawsuit, White alleged a
cause of action for “civil rights violations” under title 42 United States Code
section 1983 and Civil Code section 52.1. (Capitalization & boldface omitted.)
She asserted defendants had “acted in a discriminatory fashion based on race
and gender” and had interfered with her “constitutional rights by threats,
intimidation and coercion, making unreasonable and irrational demands and
establishing arbitrary rules on her use of [the access road] that are not

      19 It is also abundantly clear from the Forest Management Plan that
the principal use of this demonstration forest has been, and will remain,
research and demonstrations aimed at enhancing forest eco-systems and
habitat, not public recreation.

                                       44
imposed on others” using roads in the state forest or on those “with existing
easements.” She further asserted defendants had conspired to file a NOE
while “hiding their actions” from her and that CalFire’s general counsel had
acted “outside the scope of his official and appropriate duties” in representing
CalFire and, specifically, when conferring with White’s attorney about
dismissing her case. She sought “[e]quitable relief, damages and attorney
fees” in connection with this cause of action.
      The trial court sustained CalFire’s demurrer to this cause of action on
two grounds: (1) she cannot state a federal civil rights claim under title 42
United States Code section 1983 “against state agencies and their employees”
because “[s]uch actors are immune from liability” by “ ‘virtue of the Eleventh
Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity’ ”; and (2) she did not,
and could not, allege that she had filed a government claim for damages, a
prerequisite to suing under Civil Code section 52.1.20
      In her opening brief, White does not address either of these grounds.
Thus, for this reason, alone, she also cannot prevail on appeal on this claim.
(See Lafferty, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 571–572; JTH Tax, Inc., supra,
212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237; Christoff, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 125–126.)
      Furthermore, the trial court correctly ruled that CalFire and its
officials are not subject to a claim for damages under title 42 United States
Code section 1983. But that is not because CalFire and its officials are
“immune” from suit under the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity.

      20  Commonly referred to as the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Civil Code
section 52.1 “makes a person liable for conduct that deprives an individual of
his or her rights ‘secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of’ California through
‘threat, intimidation, or coercion.’ ” (Pierce v. County of Marin (N.D. Cal.
2018) 291 F.Supp.3d 982, 997, quoting Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (a).)

                                       45
Rather, as this court explained at length in Pierce v. San Mateo County
Sheriff's Dept. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 995, 1006–1011 (Pierce), it is because
the state and its officials are, under controlling federal law, not “persons”
subject to suit as that term is used in title 42 United States Code section
1983.21
      In her closing brief, White asserts state officials can be sued for
injunctive relief to end a “ ‘continuing violation of federal law,’ ” citing Ex
Parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123, superseded by statute on another ground as
stated in E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co. (9th Cir. 2010) 610 F.3d 1070,
1085–1086. It is true a state official “is not shielded from liability under
section 1983 where [the plaintiff] is seeking prospective injunctive relief.”
(California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 517, 534, citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491
U.S. 58, 71, fn. 10 [“a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued
for injunctive relief, would be a person under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 because
‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions
against the State,’ ” quoting Kentucky v. Graham (1985) 473 U.S. 159, 167, fn.
14].) However, this is not a claim White ever made in the trial court. To the
contrary, in her opposition to CalFire’s demurrer, she disputed CalFire’s
assertion that she had “ ‘no such property interest,’ ” claiming “ ‘her land’ ”
was “such an interest” and complaining that she had been subjected to “
‘arbitrary’ ” action and not accorded “due process.” Moreover, had she sought
prospective injunctive relief to effectively compel CalFire to grant her an

      21 We further explained in Pierce that the Eleventh Amendment
“recognizes and preserves the states’ common law immunity with respect to
suits brought in the federal courts. The amendment does not, itself, apply to
actions brought in the state courts.” (Pierce, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1013–1014.)

                                        46
easement or use agreement, her claim would then have been another theory
seeking to establish or vindicate a right of access through the forest land,
which would have been barred by preclusion doctrines.
      The trial court also correctly ruled White’s state civil rights claim
under Civil Code section 52.1 failed for lack of prior filing of a government
claim. (See Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 764 [“[t]he
fact that federal civil rights claims under 42 United States Code section 1983
are exempt from the requirements of the Government Claims Act . . .
provides no reason to exempt claims under [Civil Code] sections 51 and 52.1],
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Nevarez v. Forty Niners
Football Co. LLC (N.D.Cal. 2018) 326 F.R.D. 562, 575, fn. 8; Pierce v. County
of Marin, supra, 291 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1000–1001.) In her closing brief, White
asserts “[CalFire] . . . knows that [she] filed multiple claim forms with the
state but chooses not to mention either that or the fact that [title 42 United
States Code] section 1983 actions are not subject to the government claims
act.” However, White supplies no record citation to any such claim form or to
any request that the trial court take judicial notice of any such form and any
action thereon.22
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgments in these consolidated appeals are AFFIRMED.

      22 Given our disposition of the issues, we need not and do not reach any
other arguments advanced by the parties.

                                       47
                                          _________________________
                                          Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P.J.

_________________________
Bowen, J.*

**Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A162967, A162978, A165182, White v. California Department of Forestry

                                     48