Court Opinion

ID: 9372763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:20.173633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.345855
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                         MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                       2022 MSPB 36
                             Docket No. DA-0752-17-0304-I-1

                                       George Haas,
                                         Appellant,
                                              v.
                           Department of Homeland Security,
                                          Agency.
                                      November 7, 2022

            Robert Glazer, Houston, Texas, for the appellant.

            Judith M. Ubando, Esquire and Valerie Barnett, Houston, Texas, for the
              agency.

                                          BEFORE

                                Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                 Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                  Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                  OPINION AND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision in this
     appeal, which affirmed his removal. For the reasons discussed below, we DENY
     the petition for review.    We MODIFY the initial decision to apply the proper
     standards for the agency’s charge and the appellant’s equal employment
     opportunity (EEO) reprisal claim, VACATE the administrative judge’s finding
     regarding recurrence of the appellant’s symptoms, and otherwise AFFIRM the
     initial decision.
                                                                                      2

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The following facts, as set forth in the initial decision and the record, are
     undisputed.    Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 36, Initial Decision (ID).
     The appellant was employed as a Customs and Border Protection Officer (CBPO),
     a position that has medical standards. ID at 2; IAF, Tab 8 at 129-38, 148-62. He
     worked at the Port of Houston Airport, processing passengers as they arrived
     from outside the United States. ID at 2; IAF, Tab 8 at 129-38, 148-62. For many
     years, the appellant worked exclusively in the “Primary Inspection” area, which
     involves the initial questioning of passengers and inspection of thei r documents.
     ID at 2, 28 n.11. On May 6, 2015, the agency assigned him to work part of his
     day in “Hard Secondary,” which is the second step in the screening process for
     passengers who require additional questioning. ID at 2-3.
¶3         The appellant objected to working in Hard Secondary, stating, as relevant
     here, that doing so would violate his medical restrictions. ID at 3 -5. He sent an
     email to the agency’s EEO office and one of his managers, asserting that he had a
     disability “which is permanent and limits and servilely [sic] interferes with a
     major life function.”   IAF, Tab 8 at 115-16.     The email quickly came to the
     attention of the Port Director, who instructed the appellant to provide med ical
     documentation about his ability to perform his duties.        Id. at 108-10, 114;
     ID at 4-5. At the same time, the agency revoked the appellant’s authority to carry
     a Government-issued firearm. IAF, Tab 8 at 111-12; ID at 5. When the appellant
     provided documentation reflecting a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, the agency
     deemed it insufficient to determine whether he met the medical requirements of
     his position. IAF, Tab 8 at 98-107; ID at 5-6. Therefore, the agency ordered him
     to attend first a medical fitness-for-duty examination and then a psychiatric
     independent medical evaluation (IME), in August and October 2015, respectively.
     ID at 6-8.
¶4         The IME psychiatrist agreed with the appellant’s diagnosis of bipolar
     disorder and found the appellant was not symptomatic at the time of the
                                                                                        3

     examination. IAF, Tab 8 at 28-29. However, he expressed concern that, when
     symptomatic, the appellant could exhibit “impairment in judgment . . . [and]
     insight, impulsivity, delusions, hallucinations, severe depression with suicidal
     thoughts and impaired cognition.” Id. at 29. The IME psychiatrist stated that, in
     these circumstances, the appellant would be unable to make the “quick decisions
     required in law enforcement situations to protect the lives of self, the public and
     other law enforcement personnel.” Id.
¶5         In December 2015, after receiving the results of the IME, the agency
     concluded that the appellant was unable to perform the essential functions of his
     position, with or without accommodation.        Id. at 14, 16-18, 63-64; ID at 8.
     The agency searched for vacant funded positions over the following months but
     only found ones outside his local commuting area at lower grade levels. ID at 8.
     The agency offered these positions to the appellant, who declined them.          Id.
     In August 2016, the agency offered the appellant the options of resigning,
     applying for retirement, or requesting assistance searching for reassignment to
     another agency, but the appellant failed to respond. Id.
¶6         In October 2016, the Port Director proposed the appellant’s removal for
     inability to perform the essential duties of a CBPO. Id.; IAF, Tab 8 at 4-8. He
     stated that certain limitations on scheduling identified by the IME psychiatrist did
     not affect any essential function of the CBPO position.           IAF, Tab 8 at 5.
     However, he identified other restrictions, such as the appellant’s inability to
     exercise proper judgment, carry a firearm, or protect himself or others in law
     enforcement situations if his bipolar disorder were s ymptomatic, as rendering him
     unable to perform the essential functions of his position. Id. at 5-6.
¶7         The next month, the appellant responded to the proposed removal. ID at 8.
     At that time, the deciding official and the appellant agreed to search once again
     for any vacant positions to which he could be reassigned. Id. In January 2017,
     the agency located such a position, but the appellant rejected it 2 months later.
     ID at 9. Ultimately, in April 2017, the deciding official removed the appellant for
                                                                                        4

     inability to perform the essential functions of his position .     Id.; IAF, Tab 7
     at 27-33.
¶8        The appellant filed the instant appeal, challenging his removal. IAF, Tab 1.
     After developing the record and holding his requested hearing, the administrative
     judge issued an initial decision that affirmed the removal. ID at 1, 35; IAF, Tab 1
     at 2. She found that the agency met its burden of proving the charge. ID at 9 -15.
     She considered whether new medical evidence presented by the appellant showed
     that he had recovered sufficiently to perform his duties, but found that it did not.
     ID at 15-18. She further found that the appellant failed to prove his affirmative
     defenses of disability discrimination, ID at 18-27, reprisal for protected EEO
     activity, ID at 27-29, and harmful procedural error, ID at 29-34.       Finally, the
     administrative judge found that the agency met its burden of proving nexus
     between the appellant’s inability to perform his duties and the efficiency of the
     service and that removal was reasonable. ID at 34-35. The appellant has filed a
     petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed
     a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

                                         ANALYSIS
     Because the appellant’s removal was not based solely on his medical history,
     5 C.F.R. § 339.206 does not set forth the agency’s burden to prove its charge .
¶9        The agency based the appellant’s removal on a charge of “inability to
     perform the essential duties of a [CBPO].”        IAF, Tab 8 at 4.     In the lone
     specification underlying the charge, the agency asserted that the appellant was
     “unable to safely, efficiently or reliably perform the essential duties of a
     [CBPO].”    Id.   The agency explained that the duties of the CBPO position
     included, inter alia, carrying a firearm, performing apprehensions and arrests,
     exercising sound judgment, maintaining mental alertness at all times, and
     functioning under dynamic and stressful conditions in which there are concerns
     for national security and threats of terrorism.    Id. at 6.   The proposal further
                                                                                           5

      explained that medical documentation indicated that his bipolar disorder could
      result in emotional instability and impaired cognition. Id. at 5, 29.
¶10         Though not raised by either party, we modify the initial decision to the
      extent that the administrative judge relied on 5 C.F.R. § 339.206 to analyze the
      agency’s charge.     IAF, Tab 24 at 3; ID at 9; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(e)
      (providing that although the Board normally will consider only issues raised by
      the parties on review, it reserves the authority to consider any issue in an appeal
      before it). We take this opportunity to clarify the proper standard for the removal
      of an employee from a position with medical standards, such as the CBPO, based
      on a current medical condition that impacts his ability to safely and efficiently
      perform the core duties of his position.
¶11         As relevant here, 5 C.F.R. § 339.206 provides that an employee may not be
      removed from a position subject to medical standards “solely on the basis of
      medical history.” 1 The regulation provides an exception only if the condition
      itself is disqualifying, recurrence “is based on reasonable medical judgment,” and
      the position’s duties are such that a recurrence “would pose a significant risk of
      substantial harm to the health and safety of the . . . employee or others that cannot
      be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation or any other agency
      efforts to mitigate risk.” 2 This regulation does not define the meaning of the term

      1
        For the sake of simplicity, this decision will exclusively refer to positions with
      medical standards, but the regulation also applies to positions subject to “physical
      requirements” and those “under medical evaluation programs.” 5 C.F.R. § 339.206.
      2
        Effective March 21, 2017, five months after the agency proposed the appellant’s
      removal but weeks before its effective date, the Office of Personnel Management
      amended 5 C.F.R. § 339.206 as to the degree of risk required. 5 C.F.R. § 339.206
      (indicating an effective date of March 21, 2017); Medical Qualification Determinations,
      82 Fed. Reg. 5340-01, 5346-47, 5352 (Jan. 18, 2017) (Final Rule), 82 Fed. Reg.
      10959-01 (delaying the effective date of the Final Rule to March 21, 2017). The
      previous version required only a “reasonable probability of substantial harm.” 5 C.F.R.
      § 339.206 (2017). Because we find, as discussed below, that the regulation does not
      apply to the agency’s charge here, we need not address whether the changes to the
      regulation apply retroactively.
                                                                                          6

      “medical history.” However, 5 C.F.R. part 339 contains a provision stating that a
      “history of . . . medical condition(s) . . . includ[es] references to findings from
      previous    examinations,      treatment,    and     responses    to      treatment.”
      5 C.F.R. § 339.104(1). This explanation of medical history suggests that such a
      history exists when the employee’s medical records indicate that he was examined
      or treated for the medical condition in question.
¶12        Similarly, the dictionary defines “history” to include “an account of a
      patient’s medical background.”     Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 549
      (10th ed. 2002). Further, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) expressed
      the intent that actions covered by 5 C.F.R. part 339 comply with the
      nondiscrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans
      with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, as amended.            5 C.F.R. § 339.103(a).
      The ADA defines disability to include a “record of . . . an impairment,” as
      distinct from having a current impairment.          42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), (B).
      The ADA’s implementing regulations provide that an individual has a record of
      impairment if he “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental
      or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”
      29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). Given these definitions, we find that a removal is based
      solely on medical history if the only basis for concluding that the employee is
      medically unable to perform the core duties of his position is the fact that his
      medical records reflect that, at some time in the past, he was classified as having,
      was examined for, or was treated for the medical condition or impairment in
      question.
¶13        Contrary to our current finding and beginning with Lassiter v. Department
      of Justice, 60 M.S.P.R. 138, 141-42, 146 (1993), the Board applied 5 C.F.R.
      § 339.206 to all cases in which an appellant who was subject to medical standards
      was removed for medical inability to perform his position .            It applied this
      standard regardless of whether an appellant’s medical history was the sole basis
      for his removal. For example, in Lassiter, the Board recognized that the appellant
                                                                                        7

      had not shown that he had been cured of his delusional paranoid disorder, which
      had been the basis for his removal. 60 M.S.P.R. at 145-46 & n.3. It nonetheless
      found that 5 C.F.R. § 339.206 represented the proper standard for the agency’s
      charge because the appellant occupied a position subject to medical standards.
      60 M.S.P.R. at 141-42. In making this finding, however, the Board failed to cite
      or consider the regulatory requirement that the appellant’s removal be “solely on
      the basis of medical history.” See id.; 5 C.F.R. § 339.206.
¶14        Following Lassiter, the Board continued to apply the same standard to cases
      involving present medical inability to perform. See Sanders v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 144, ¶¶ 2, 11-16, 18-19 (applying the standard
      in 5 C.F.R. § 339.206 when an appellant was removed based on his inability to
      perform his duties due to an existing medical condition, rather than his medical
      history), aff’d per curiam, 625 F. App’x 549 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Brown v.
      Department of the Interior, 121 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶¶ 4, 8 (2014) (applying 5 C.F.R.
      § 339.206 when an appellant was removed based not only on her medical history
      but also on current physical restrictions affecting her ability to perform her job
      duties); Slater v. Department of Homeland Security, 108 M.S.P.R. 419, ¶¶ 6-7,
      13-17 (2008) (finding that 5 C.F.R. § 339.206 applied to the removal of an
      employee due to his current diabetes-related polyneuropathy, which caused his
      inability to perform his duties safely and efficiently without undue risk of harm to
      self or others). These cases continued the error of applying 5 C.F.R. § 339.206 to
      a charge of inability to perform involving current medical conditions.
      We overrule this line of cases to         the extent that the Board applied
      5 C.F.R. § 339.206 to a charge of medical inability when the appellant was
      removed based on his current medical condition or impairment.
¶15        For cases involving a charge of inability to perform that do not fall under
      5 C.F.R. § 339.206, the agency must prove either a nexus between the employee’s
      medical condition and observed deficiencies in his performance or conduct, or a
      high probability, given the nature of the work involved, that his condition may
                                                                                           8

      result in injury to himself or others.       Clemens v. Department of the Army,
      120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5 (2014); Fox v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 529,
      ¶¶ 24-25 (2014). 3 The Board has otherwise described the standard as requiring
      that the agency establish that the appellant’s medical condition prevents h im from
      being able to safely and efficiently perform the core duties of h is position.
      Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5; Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 24.
¶16         The determination of whether the Clemens standard or the standard under
      5 C.F.R. § 339.206 applies may well be outcome determinative in some cases.
      If section 339.206 is applied, an agency must prove that recurrence of the
      condition poses “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety of
      the . . . employee or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable
      accommodation or any other agency efforts to mitigate risk.” Supra ¶ 11 & n.2.
      Here, the parties agree that the appellant has bipolar disorder . E.g., IAF, Tab 7
      at 36-38, Tab 8 at 28, 103. Although the appellant was “asymptomatic” at the
      time of his removal, the parties agree that he had this medical condition when he
      was removed.     E.g., IAF, Tab 7 at 36-38, Tab 8 at 28, 103.        In removing the
      appellant, the agency cited to his bipolar disorder as causing him to be unable to
      carry a weapon or perform other functions related to law enforcement.
      IAF, Tab 8 at 6. If the standard from 5 C.F.R. § 339.206 were applied to the
      instant appeal, the agency would be required to prove that recurrence would pose
      a risk of harm, even though, as discussed below, the appellant’s removal was not

      3
        In both Fox and Clemens, the Board rejected the application of Slater, 108 M.S.P.R.
      419, ¶¶ 6-7, 13-17, and 5 C.F.R. § 339.206 because the employees at issue did not
      occupy positions with medical standards.         Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 4;
      Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 24. But in doing so, those decisions suggested that the
      general standard for inability to perform could not apply to positions with medical
      standards. Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 4; Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 25. Our decision
      in the instant appeal finds otherwise. Therefore, the caveat alluded to in Clemens and
      Fox—that the employee does not occupy a position with medical standards or physi cal
      requirements or that is subject to medical evaluation programs in order for the general
      standard to apply—is no longer operative.
                                                                                         9

      solely based on his medical history of bipolar disorder, but also on his present
      inability to perform his core duties. IAF, Tab 7 at 28, 30-31, Tab 8 at 5-7.
¶17         The appellant argues, in essence, that his removal was based solely on his
      medical history. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-14. For example, the appellant argues
      that because he was “asymptomatic” and his bipolar disorder was in “remission,”
      the agency’s determination that he was medically unable to perform his core
      duties is speculative.   Id. at 10-11, 13-14.   We disagree.     The U.S. Court of
      Appeals for the Federal Circuit has found, and the Board has followed, that when
      “a party is diagnosed with a medical condition that is by its nature ‘permanent or
      progressive’ in severity, it will be assumed to continue to exist after the date
      of diagnosis absent rebuttal evidence of record to the contrary.” Pyles v. Merit
      Systems Protection Board, 45 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see Walker v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 109 M.S.P.R. 158, ¶ 9 (2008).          The National
      Institute of Mental Health explains that bipolar disorder is a lifelong illness
      characterized by “periods of unusually intense emotion, changes in sleep patterns
      and activity levels, and uncharacteristic behaviors,” typically recurring over time.
      National Institute of Mental Health, Bipolar Disorder, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/
      health/topics/bipolar-disorder/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
¶18         Although the appellant may not have exhibited symptoms to the IME
      psychiatrist or his health care providers, one of his health care providers indicated
      that his condition is chronic and that the appellant “is to be monitored for any
      acute decompensation.” IAF, Tab 8 at 103. She further stated that it was not
      possible to predict the likelihood that an individual with bipolar disorder would
      decompensate and that any changes in the appellant’s schedule could cause him to
      decompensate in mood. Id. at 99, 103. Further, the IME psychiatrist testified
      that individuals suffering from bipolar disorder may not realize in advance that
      they have become symptomatic.       IAF, Tab 31, Hearing Compact Disc, Day 1
      (HCD1) (testimony of the IME psychiatrist).
                                                                                      10

¶19        The appellant also asserts that it was unlikely he would become
      symptomatic because he successfully performed in his position for 17 years.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-13. He points to his “successful” performance ratings from
      October 1, 2012, to November 30, 2016, successful completion of training
      throughout his employment with the agency, and receipt of letters of
      commendation and awards. Id. at 15-16; IAF, Tab 28 at 13-16, Tab 30 at 49-84.
      We are not persuaded that this evidence outweighs contrary evidence showing the
      appellant continued to have symptomatic episodes leading up to his April 2017
      removal. In particular, the IME psychiatrist described the appellant’s prognosis
      as “guarded because of his history of worsening symptoms when under stress.”
      IAF, Tab 8 at 28; HCD1 (testimony of the IME psychiatrist).         The appellant
      represented to the IME psychiatrist that he had a serious single car accident in
      2008, after leaving work due to trouble thinking and focusing, as a result of what
      was diagnosed at the time as “work shift disorder.”           IAF, Tab 8 at 24.
      Further, the appellant had what he described as a “relapse” in September 2014.
      IAF, Tab 7 at 96, Tab 8 at 101. According to the appellant’s health care provider,
      he reported to her in January 2015 that “mood reactivity had occurred at work in
      which he cussed a co-worker” and he had asked to start seeing a counselor. IAF,
      Tab 8 at 101.     On forms the appellant submitted in connection with the
      August 2015 IME examination, he indicated that he suffered from episodes of
      depression, periods of anxiety, and sleep disorders. Id. at 38. In sum, at the time
      of his removal, the appellant had a present medical condition that could manifest
      symptoms at any time. Id. at 5.

      We affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved its charge, as
      modified to apply the correct standard.
¶20        Although the administrative judge applied what we have now determined to
      be the incorrect standard to the agency’s charge, remand is unnecessary because
      the record is fully developed on the relevant issues.         See, e.g., Forte v.
      Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 124, ¶ 27 (2016) (deciding an issue on
                                                                                       11

      review, rather than remanding, when the administrative judge applied an incorrect
      standard but the record was fully developed). As noted above, when as here the
      removal is based on a current medical condition, the agency must prove either a
      nexus between the employee’s medical condition and observed deficiencies in his
      performance or conduct, or a high probability, given the nature of the work
      involved, that his condition may result in injury to himself or others.
      Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5; Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶¶ 24-25.           In other
      words, the agency must establish that the appellant’s medical condition prevents
      him from being able to safely and efficiently perform the core duties of his
      position. Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5; Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 24.
¶21        The Board has indicated that the core duties of a position are synonymous
      with the essential functions of a position under the ADA, as amended by the
      Americans With Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 ( ADAAA), i.e., the
      fundamental job duties of the position, not including marginal functions.
      Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 6; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). One of the bases for
      finding that a function is essential is that it is the “reason the position exists.”
      Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 6; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i).
¶22        According to the relevant position description and associated medical
      standards, CBPOs are “frontline” uniformed, weapon-carrying border security
      officers whose “primary function” includes “detect[ing] and prevent[ing]
      terrorists and instruments of terror from entering the United States” and ensuring
      border security. IAF, Tab 8 at 129, 139, 148-50, 156, 162. A CBPO must be
      “prepared mentally and physically to respond to unexpected situations and have
      the functional capacity to defend self and others from threatening situations in
      which the use of deadly force may be necessary.” Id. at 129. They “must be free
      of any organic, structural or functional impairment(s) or existing health
      problem(s) that would be aggravated in response to the work environment and/or
      would affect safe and efficient job performance.” Id. Additionally, they must
      “exercise sound judgment, maintain mental alertness at all times, and function
                                                                                          12

      under dynamic and stressful conditions in which there are time constraints,
      concerns for national security, and threats of terrorism.” Id.
¶23         The agency based its charge on the appellant’s inability to perform these
      functions of his position. IAF, Tab 7 at 30, Tab 8 at 6. The administrative judge
      found that these duties were essential functions of the appellant’s position.
      ID at 9-10, 21. The parties do not dispute this finding. 4 PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 14,
      Tab 3 at 12. Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion
      that the appellant’s duties set forth above are essential, and thus, constitute core
      duties of his position. See Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 6.
¶24         The administrative judge also determined that the agency proved that the
      appellant was medically unable to perform these core duties, thus proving its
      charge. ID at 9-15. She found persuasive the IME psychiatrist’s testimony that
      the appellant was unable to use proper judgment, make quick decisions in law
      enforcement situations, or carry a weapon when symptomatic, as required for his
      position.   ID at 9-15, 21.     We agree with this conclusion and modify her
      reasoning to the extent that she relied on the standard in 5 C.F.R. § 339.206.
      ID at 9-15. In particular, we vacate as unnecessary the administrative judge’s
      conclusion that recurrence of the appellant’s symptoms could not be ruled out.
      ID at 15. Because the appellant’s removal was not based solely on his medical
      history, the agency was required to establish only that his medical condition
      prevented him from being able to safely and efficiently perform the core duties of
      his position. Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5. The appellant’s arguments as to

      4
        In support of its charge, the agency also alleged that the appellant was unable to
      perform Hard Secondary duties. IAF, Tab 8 at 6. The administrative judge found that
      performing Hard Secondary inspections was an essential function of the appellant’s
      position. ID at 15 n.4. She also concluded that he was medically unable to perform
      these duties. ID at 14-15. In light of our finding, below, that the appellant could not
      perform his position’s duties as described herein, we do not address the parties’
      arguments related to whether Hard Secondary inspections were also an essential
      function of his position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-15, Tab 3 at 12.
                                                                                              13

      the likelihood of recurrence are, therefore, misplaced, and we decline to ad dress
      them further. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-14.
¶25         Nevertheless, in determining whether the agency has met its burden, the
      Board will consider whether a reasonable accommodation, short of reassignment,
      exists that would enable the appellant to safely and eff iciently perform his core
      duties.   Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5.         The appellant relies on the current
      version of 5 C.F.R. § 339.206, which requires an agency to consider whether
      reasonable accommodation or other efforts may “eliminate[] or reduce[]” the risk
      of harm an employee poses to self or others, to argue that the agency could have
      reduced or eliminated the risk of recurrence if he were granted certain scheduling
      accommodations. 5 PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10. However, because the agency did not
      remove the appellant solely based on his medical history, it was not required to
      prove that it could not eliminate or reduce the risk of recurrence via
      accommodation. Rather, the agency removed the appellant because he was not
      medically able to perform the core duties of his CBPO position.              IAF, Tab 7
      at 30, Tab 8 at 4-6, 9. We agree with the administrative judge that the agency
      proved that it could not provide a reasonable accommodation that would enable
      the appellant to perform his position’s core duties. ID at 21-22. In making this
      finding, the administrative judge relied on the opinion of the IME psychiatrist
      that the appellant had not been symptom free for sufficient time to be fit for a
      weapons-carrying position. Id. Specifically, the IME psychiatrist explained that,
      in his view, the appellant would need to remain symptom free and stable for
      5 years before he might be fit to carry a weapon. IAF, Tab 8 at 28-30; HCD1
      (testimony of the IME psychiatrist).

      5
        The parties agree that the appellant’s scheduling restrictions did not affect his ability
      to perform the essential functions of his position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10; IAF, Tab 8
      at 5.
                                                                                      14

¶26        To the extent that the appellant questions the administrative judge’s reliance
      on the IME psychiatrist’s opinion, we are not persuaded.         PFR File, Tab 1
      at 11-14. In reaching her conclusions, the administrative judge properly weighed
      the medical evidence.      ID at 12-14; see Brown, 121 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 11
      (recognizing that in assessing the probative weight of medical opinions, the Board
      considers whether the opinion was based on a medical examination and provided
      a reasoned explanation for its findings as distinct from mere conclusory
      assertions, the qualifications of the expert rendering the opinion, and the extent
      and duration of the expert’s familiarity with the treatment of the appellant).
      For example, she considered that the IME psychiatrist met with the appellant for
      more than 4 hours, provided an extensive explanation of his conclusions, had
      relevant experience, and was certified in forensic psychiatry. ID at 12-14; IAF,
      Tab 8 at 20, 28-30. The appellant’s health care providers expressed the belief
      that he was fit for duty. IAF, Tab 7 at 36-38, Tab 8 at 99, 102, Tab 28 at 10-12.
      The administrative judge found the opinions of the appellant’s health care
      providers lacked reasoned explanations. ID at 14. The appellant provides no
      specific argument as to why the administrative judge’s assessment was mistaken,
      and we can discern none.

      The appellant failed to prove his disability discrimination claims.
¶27        The administrative judge denied all of the appellant’s affirmative defenses.
      The appellant’s petition for review focuses on whether the agency could have
      provided him with a reasonable accommodation and whether the agency retaliated
      against him for engaging in protected EEO activity. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-19.
      Accordingly, we focus on these affirmative defenses.        We also examine the
      administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s affirmative defense of disparate
                                                                                           15

      treatment disability discrimination. 6 ID at 18-29. We affirm her findings as to all
      three of these affirmative defenses, as modified.
¶28         The Board adjudicates claims of disability discrimination raised in
      connection with an otherwise appealable action under the substantive standards of
      section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. 7        Pridgen v. Office of Management
      & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 35.         The Rehabilitation Act has incorporated the
      standards of the ADA, as amended by the ADAAA. Id. Therefore, we apply
      those standards here to determine if there has been a Rehabilitation Act violation.
      Id.   In particular, the ADA provides that it is illegal for an employer to
      “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C.
      § 12112(a). A qualified individual with a disability is one who can “perform the
      essential functions of the . . . position that such individual holds or desires” with
      or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). An employer is
      also required to provide reasonable accommodations to an otherwise qualified
      individual with a disability.    42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).      Thus, both a claim of
      disability discrimination based on an individual’s status as disabled and a claim
      based on an agency’s failure to reasonably accommodate that disability require
      that the individual be “qualified.” See Flaherty v. Entergy Nuclear Operations,
      Inc., 946 F.3d 41, 49, 53-56 (1st Cir. 2019) (explaining that a terminated
      employee could not succeed on his status-based and failure to accommodate
      disability discrimination claims when he could not prove he was otherwise

      6
        We decline to disturb the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant failed to
      prove his remaining affirmative defenses. ID at 26 -27, 30-34. We also do not disturb
      her findings that that the appellant’s removal is reasonable and promotes the efficiency
      of the service. ID at 34-35. The parties do not dispute these findings on review.
      7
        Because we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to show
      that any prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the agency’s action, we
      need not resolve the issue of whether the appellant proved that discrimination or
      retaliation was a “but-for” cause of the agency’s decisions. See Pridgen v. Office of
      Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33.
                                                                                  16

qualified for his position); Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169,
1172-73, 1179, 1182-83, 1190-91 (11th Cir. 2019) (remanding a terminated
employee’s disability discrimination claim for the district court to permit a jury to
decide whether the appellant was a qualified individual); Scheidler v. Indiana,
914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019) (reflecting that disability discrimination claims
under both disparate treatment and failure to accommodate theories require proof
that the plaintiff was qualified); Stevens v. Rite Aid Corporation, 851 F.3d 224,
226-31 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming a district court’s dismissal of a discharged
employee’s reasonable accommodation claim because he was not a qualified
individual with a disability); McNab v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R.
661, ¶¶ 6, 8 n.5, 9 (2014) (recognizing that only a qualified individual with a
disability is entitled to relief for his claims of status -based disability
discrimination and denial of reasonable accommodation, but denying his claim on
other grounds); Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶¶ 2, 10-11, 17 (reversing an
administrative judge’s finding that an agency denied reasonable accommodation ,
concluding, as relevant here, that the appellant was not a qualified individual);
Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 34 (concluding that an appellant was not a qualified
individual with a disability and therefore did not prove her claim that the agency
wrongfully denied her reasonable accommodation); Smith v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 101 M.S.P.R. 366, ¶¶ 2-3, 9-11 (2006) (finding that an
administrative judge properly rejected an appellant’s status-based disability
discrimination claim because he was not qualified); Pickens v. Social Security
Administration, 88 M.S.P.R. 525, ¶ 7 (2001) (stating that an appellant alleging
status-based disability discrimination must establish that she is a qualified
individual with a disability); Verla G. v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 0120160990, 2018 WL 1061888, at *1-2 (Feb. 8, 2018) (providing that an
employee alleging disparate treatment disability discrimination must prove, in
pertinent part, that she is a qualified individual with a disability); 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1630.4(a)(1), 1630.9(a)-(b) (reflecting, with exceptions not applicable here,
                                                                                               17

      that “[i]t is unlawful” to discriminate against, or deny reasonable accommodation
      to, a “qualified” individual with a disability). 8
¶29         In the past, the Board has, on occasion, omitted from its discussion of an
      appellant’s burden to prove disability discrimination the requirement that he
      prove he is a qualified individual.          E.g., Thome v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 315, ¶¶ 24-25 (2015) (omitting the qualified individual
      requirement from the discussion of disability discrimination) ; Burton v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R. 115, ¶¶ 14-16 (2009) (omitting the qualified
      individual   requirement      from     the   analysis   of   a    status-based    disability
      discrimination claim); Doe v. U.S. Postal Service, 95 M.S.P.R. 493, ¶¶ 8-10
      (2004) (omitting the qualified individual requirement from the discussion of a
      status-based disability discrimination claim), overruled on other grounds by
      Marcell v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 33, ¶ 7. To the extent
      this has caused confusion, we take this opportunity to clarify that only an
      otherwise qualified individual with a disability is entitled to relief under the ADA
      for   a   claim    of   status-based     discrimination      or   denial   of    reasonable
      accommodation. 9

      8
        The Board generally defers to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
      (EEOC) on issues of substantive discrimination law unless the EEOC’s decision rests
      on civil service law for its support or is so unreasonable that it amounts to a violation of
      civil service law. Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 40.
      9
        Some disability discrimination claims can be resolved without reaching the issue of
      whether an appellant is otherwise qualified. For example, in Thome, 122 M.S.P.R. 315,
      ¶ 25, the Board determined that the appellant did not prove her disability discrimination
      claim because she did not prove she was disabled. The Board did not address whether
      the appellant was qualified. Id. Because an appellant must prove both that she is
      disabled and qualified, the fact she did not prove she was disabled was determinative,
      and a finding on whether she was qualified was not necessary. Similarly, the issue of
      whether an individual is qualified may not be in dispute in every case. See Pridgen,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 38 n.11 (declining to address whether an appellant was a qualified
      individual with a disability because the parties did not dispute that she was).
                                                                                     18

¶30        The administrative judge determined that the appellant was not a qualified
      individual with a disability. ID at 19-24. Regarding reasonable accommodation,
      we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant could not perform his
      position’s core duties.   We also agree that performing these duties was an
      essential function of his position.     While the appellant suggests that his
      performance history supports a finding that he is qualified, we disagree. Our
      conclusion is based on the nature of bipolar disorder, his work-related incidents
      between 2008 and 2015, the appellant’s own representations of his condition, and
      medical opinions offered by both the agency and the appellant. Supra ¶¶ 17-19.
      Finally, the appellant has not identified an alternative position that he desires.
      See Rosario-Fabregas v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶ 18 (2015)
      (indicating that an appellant failed to engage in the interactive process when, as
      relevant here, he did not identify any vacant, funded position to which the agency
      might have reassigned him), aff’d, 833 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, the
      appellant rejected the agency’s offers of reassignment.    IAF, Tab 7 at 34-35,
      42-43, 58-59, Tab 8 at 10. For the foregoing reasons, he cannot prevail on his
      claim of disability discrimination based on either a reasonable accommodation or
      disparate treatment theory.

      The appellant failed to prove his EEO reprisal claim.
¶31        The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that his
      protected EEO activity was a motivating factor in his removal.       ID at 27-29.
      The motivating factor standard applies to claims of reprisal for engaging in
      activity protected under Title VII. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 21-22, 30.
      Specifically, under Title VII, an appellant must show that the prohibited
      consideration was a motivating factor in the personnel action. Id. However, the
      Board recently recognized that a more stringent standard applies in the context of
      retaliation claims arising under the ADA, such that the appellant must prove that
      his prior EEO activity was a “but-for” cause of the retaliation. Id., ¶¶ 43-47. As
      discussed below, we affirm the administrative judge’s factual findings and reach
                                                                                      19

      the same conclusion, while modifying the initial decision to apply the correct
      standard.
¶32         The administrative judge recognized that the appellant engaged in several
      protected activities on various dates between at least August 2014 and
      August 2015. ID at 27-28. Those protected activities included an EEO complaint
      alleging harassment and discrimination involving his disability, IAF, Tab 7 at 96,
      requests for reasonable accommodation, IAF, Tab 8 at 85-86, 99, Tab 28
      at 28, 31, and requests for EEO counseling concerning allegations of disability
      discrimination   and   retaliation   for   requesting   reasonable   accommodation,
      IAF, Tab 8 at 115-16.      These activities are protected under the ADA, not
      Title VII.   See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 44 (recognizing that requesting a
      reasonable accommodation and challenging disability discrimination are activities
      protected by the ADA). Because we agree with the administrative judge that the
      appellant failed to meet the lesser burden of proving his protected activity was a
      motivating factor in his removal, he necessarily failed to meet the more stringent
      “but-for” standard that applies to the appellant’s retaliation claim.
¶33         The administrative judge acknowledged that the officials who proposed and
      decided the appellant’s removal had prior knowledge of at least some of his
      protected activities. ID at 28-29; see, e.g., IAF, Tab 7 at 27-33, Tab 8 at 4-8,
      48-49, 67-69, 108-10, 114-16.        But she ultimately credited their testimony
      denying that the appellant’s protected activity had any effect on their actions.
      ID at 29. On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to
      discuss several matters that weigh against the Port Director’s credibility. 10
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-19.      As we understand his arguments, the appellant is

      10
         Although the appellant generally asserted that the administrative judge erred in
      finding the proposing and deciding officials credible when they denied any improper
      motivation, PFR File, Tab 1 at 16, each accompanying argument pertains only to the
      proposing official, who was the Port Director, id. at 17-19.
                                                                                      20

      implicating two credibility factors:     the contradiction or consistency of this
      witness’s testimony with other evidence and the inherent improbability of his
      version of events. See Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458
      (1987) (recognizing these and other factors that must be considered in analyzing
      the credibility of witness testimony).    The appellant asserts that there is no
      evidence corroborating the Port Director’s testimony that he granted the
      appellant’s request for accommodation; he never adequately explained why he
      initiated the fitness-for-duty examination but not the reasonable accommodation
      process in May 2015; his testimony about who decided to revoke the appellant’s
      authority to carry a weapon was inconsistent with another witness’s testimony;
      and the Port Director could not articulate who informed him that the appellant
      was unable to work in Hard Secondary. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17-18. He also argues
      that the administrative judge did not give sufficient weight to evidence that the
      Port Director’s May 2015 letter requiring him to provide medical documentation
      was prompted by protected activity. Id. at 18. We are not persuaded.
¶34        An administrative judge’s failure to mention all of the evidence of record
      does not mean that she did not consider it in reaching her decision. Mithen v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 489, ¶ 14 (2015), aff’d, 652 F.
      App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Not specifically discussing every evidentiary matt er
      or credibility factor does not mean that an administrative judge failed to consider
      them. Id. Further, the Board must give deference to an administrative judge’s
      credibility determinations when they are based explicitly or implicitly on the
      observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing.       Purifoy v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
      Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, the
      administrative judge implicitly relied on demeanor in finding that the Port
      Director credibly denied that the appellant’s protected activity had any effect on
      his actions.   ID at 29.   The appellant’s arguments do not provide sufficiently
      sound reasons for us to overturn the administrative judge’s credibility findings.
                                                                                           21

      Accordingly, the appellant has failed to prove that his protected activities were a
      motivating factor in his removal, much less a “but-for” cause of his removal. We
      affirm the initial decision, as modified by this Opinion and Order.

                                             ORDER
¶35         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 ( 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).

                                NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 11
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possibl e choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

      11
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        22

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                 23

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).           If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be foun d at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                     24

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 12 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

12
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases wit h the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              25

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.