Court Opinion

ID: 7817449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:41:16.33636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:38.339019
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, concurring. I concur in the result and essentially agree with the basis for reaching it. I also agree that the record is quite meager, particularly with reference to the key issue. To me the key issue is whether the notes made payable to David Porter were made and accepted with the knowledge or consent of the wife. The rule that the destruction of a tenancy by the entirety is accomplished by the unilateral act of one of the tenants when the other has knowledge thereof and consents thereto is clearly established in. Dickson v. Jonesboro Trust Co., 154 Ark. 155, 242 S. W. 57. This rule was so essential to that decision that the opinion establishes the converse of that rule, i. e., that act of one of the tenants when the other has knowledge edge or consent of the other does not destroy the tenancy as between the parties.1  The inference may be drawn from the majority opinion that fraud, on the part of the tenant withdrawing funds from a joint bank account held as a tenancy by entirety is essential to the retention of any interest by the other tenant after withdrawal. The primary importance of the finding of fraud in Union & Mercantile Bank v. Hudson, 147 Ark. 7, 227 S. W. 1, is that a third party bank was involved. Proof of fraud was essential to impress a trust on funds in his hands. It was alleged that the bank participated in the act of the administrator of the husband in treating the funds deposited in the husband’s name as an asset of his estate, without the knowledge or consent of the wife, even after notice from the wife that she claimed the funds. While the court did say that it was a fraud on her rights for the husband to have deposited the proceeds of a loan on lands held by the entirety without the knowledge or consent of the wife and that his actions constituted him a trustee of her interests, the essence of this statement is the rule in the Dickson case. So, even in the light of the Hudson case, the only real issue is whether Mrs. Porter had knowledge of, or consented to, the transaction as handled. I believe that two statements made in the majority opinion are unwarranted, but I do not consider them to be determinative of the issues. I do not agree that the failure of the executrix to list the note in the inventory of the estate is of no importance. The husband’s executrix, appellant here, admitted that she had seen the deed of trust securing the note before she made the inventory she later filed. Nor do I think that the declaration that the wife had access to the statements of the joint bank account is supported by the evidence. There was a petition by the wife to require the executrix to turn over to her the statements of the joint bank accounts. The basis of -this request was her statement that she was claiming certain of the assets as her own property. Her mere access to the statements of the accounts is not of controlling significance, however. It is entirely plausible to believe that she knew of the loan and of the source of the funds loaned but did not know that the notes were made payable to the husband alone. In spite of the lack of substance in these statements of the majority, I would reverse the case. I think that, when the executrix included this note as an asset in her accounting, the appellees had the burden to establish the title of their decedent (the widow) by a preponderance of the evidence. This accounting was filed several months prior to the death of the widow and the widow herself never questioned this item. Since the asset in question was not listed in the inventory, having first appeared in the final accounting of the executrix, it was permissible for the personal representatives of the widow to file objections to this item. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 62-2808 (Supp. 1967). Upon hearing, there was a presumption that the notes were the property of the husband since they were made payable to him. Landis v. Landis, 343 Pa. 252, 22 A. 2d 908; 11 C.J.S. 91, Bills & Notes, § 659; 12 Am. Jur. 2d 214, Bills & Notes, § 1188. While this presumption alone is sufficient to place the burden of proof on an adverse claimant, appellees also bear the burden of sustaining an objection to the accounting of the personal representative based on a claim of ownership adverse to the estate. In re Kellas Estate, 38 N.Y.S. 2d, 197. This authority seems to be more than slightly persuásive because its result is based, at least in part, upon the New York rule that the adverse claimant has the burden of proof in a probate discovery proceeding. We have also held that in a hearing of a probate discovery proceeding, a widow who asserted an adverse claim to certain notes made payable to her and her husband, of which she had possession but had assigned to him, had the burden to establish her claim to ownership based on invalidity of the assignment. Hartman v. Hartman, 228 Ark. 692, 309 S. W. 2d 737. I consider this decision authority for saying that an adverse claimant in probate court has the burden of proof under the circumstances prevailing here, regardless of the stage of the proceedings at which the question arises. I do not believe that the inferences to be drawn from the meager evidence offered by appellees are sufficient to sustain this burden of proof. On the contrary, inferences to be drawn from the relationship of the parties and other factors hereinabove set out clearly preponderate in this case. Strong inferences against the widow’s executrix may be drawn from the fact that the note was four years old and that Mrs. Porter took no affirmative steps to question the ownership of the note even after the accounting was filed, which was after the court granted her petition to have access to the bank statements. I do not concur in some of the reasons given by the majority for reaching this result, but I would reverse the lower court on this failure to meet the burden of proof.  Clearly the rights of third parties are not involved. If they were, perhaps a different result would be reached.