Court Opinion

ID: 9892216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-21 06:11:18.107891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:19:57.069590
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed October 19, 2023

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                                 No. 11-22-00204-CV
                                     __________

                     VINCENT P. RASCON, Appellant
                                          V.
                        THERESA HANSEN, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 318th District Court
                             Midland County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. FM-56,937

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
     Appellant, Vincent P. Rascon, appeals the trial court’s judgment clarifying and
enforcing certain aspects of the property division in the parties’ final decree of
divorce. In two issues, Rascon asserts that (1) the voluntary-payment rule released
him from his obligation to make further payments to Appellee, Theresa Hansen,
under the terms of the decree; and (2) the trial court erred when it imposed additional
payment obligations on Rascon, which resulted in an improper modification to the
terms of the final decree. We affirm.
                                     I. Factual Background
       The parties’ Agreed Final Decree of Divorce (the decree) was signed by the
trial court on March 20, 2014. Hansen testified that the decree was a pro se final
decree. 1 The decree awarded Hansen a residence in Midland (the residence) as her
sole and separate property. The decree further required Rascon to pay $2,600 a
month to the mortgage-holder of the residence until the principal balance of the
mortgage was reduced to $200,000. In this regard, the decree recites the following:
               IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that the husband, VINCENT
        P. RASCON, shall pay, as a part of the division of the estate of the
        parties, and shall indemnify and hold the wife and her property
        harmless from any failure to so discharge, these items:
               H-1. The balance due, including principal, interest, tax, and
        insurance escrow, on the promissory note executed by VINCENT P.
        RASCON, in the original principal sum of $354,600.00, dated July 26,
        2012, payable to Franklin American (formerly LRS Financial Services)
        in the monthly amount of $2,600.00 and secured by deed of trust on the
        900 Bedford Dr., Midland, Texas real property awarded in this decree
        to the wife, which is recorded at volume _, page _, Deed of Trust
        Records of Midland County, Texas, until the outstanding principal
        balance on such promissory note is reduced to $200,000.00, at which
        time, husband shall notify wife of completion of his obligation to pay
        the monthly mortgage payment on the Bedford real property and
        husband’s obligation to pay such monthly mortgage shall cease and
        wife shall be solely responsible for payment on such outstanding
        mortgage on the residence until such note is paid in full or the real
        property is sold or refinanced and the mortgage is extinguished.

        1
         Although Appellee is not pro se on appeal, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as
licensed attorneys and require them to be familiar with and comply with all applicable laws and rules of
procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Aaron v. Fisher, 645
S.W.3d 299, 312 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.).

                                                   2
Under the language of the decree, Hansen became responsible for the remaining
mortgage balance once it was reduced to the threshold amount agreed to by the
parties—$200,000.
      Hansen decided to sell the residence in August 2020, before the mortgage’s
principal balance had been reduced to $200,000. Hansen testified that she believed
the decree did not address the potential sale of the residence prior to the reduction of
the mortgage balance; therefore, she contacted Rascon to discuss his mortgage
obligation. Hansen e-mailed Rascon on August 11, 2020, to inform him that she
was listing the residence for sale, and that there was a “remaining balance of
approximately $95,000” that he was obligated to pay on the mortgage. In this same
e-mail exchange, Hansen proposed to Rascon that (1) she could pay off the entire
mortgage balance and in return he would agree to pay his monthly payment of $2,600
to her until his obligation under the decree was satisfied, or (2) he could secure a
separate loan for his share of the remaining mortgage balance and Hansen would
only pay for her share of the mortgage obligation under the decree. Rascon
responded to Hansen’s e-mail and stated: “Ok. Let me know what the balance will
be at the time of [the] sale. We will figure it out once we have a figure.” In
accordance with their communications, Hansen subsequently listed the residence for
sale on August 14 and notified Rascon on September 15 that the sale of the residence
was set to close on October 2.
      On September 28, Rascon e-mailed Hansen to inquire about the status of the
sale. Rascon also asked Hansen to send him the loan balance before the residence
closed and to prepare a five-year amortization payment schedule that would confirm
Rascon’s continuing obligation to pay off the portion of the loan that he was
responsible for. Hansen closed the sale of the residence on October 2.

                                           3
      Three days later, Hansen sent Rascon the amortization schedule—fifty-eight
monthly payments of $1,800 and a final, fifty-ninth payment of $1,843. The
amortization schedule did not include definitive payment dates; rather, it only
indicated the month upon which each payment was due. The total amount to be paid
by Rascon in the amortization schedule was $106,243. This amount included
Rascon’s share of the mortgage balance in excess of $200,000, as well as Hansen’s
ad valorem tax refund, which Rascon had retained. Rascon’s first payment was due
and scheduled to be paid in November 2020.
      Rascon responded to the amortization schedule in an e-mail to Hansen asking
her “how many checks [she] had left” so that she could make payments to herself on
his behalf. When she answered that she did not “have any checks left,” Rascon
responded that he would send Hansen his first check in November. In other words,
Rascon further acknowledged his obligation to continue making mortgage payments
after the residence was sold when he informed Hansen that he would send her the
first payment in November 2020. Hansen did not hear back from Rascon after this
e-mail exchange, nor did Rascon make any payments toward the mortgage as
described in the decree or amortization schedule.
      On November 16, Hansen sent a formal notice to Rascon regarding his
mortgage payment obligations under the decree. In the notice, Hansen stated that
she intended to rescind the amortization agreement and seek an enforcement of the
decree if Rascon did not respond to the notice within ten days. Rascon did not
respond, and Hansen rescinded the amortization agreement. Hansen then filed a
motion to clarify and enforce the decree. After a hearing, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Hansen for $106,243 in damages, $7,946.39 in accrued
prejudgment interest, and $10,000 in attorney’s fees. Pursuant to Rascon’s request,
the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and found that

                                         4
(1) Rascon was required to pay Hansen for the mortgage payments on the residence
in excess of $200,000 as recited in the decree, (2) Rascon had wrongfully retained
the ad valorem tax refund that Hansen sought, and (3) the recovery of reasonable
and necessary attorney’s fees in favor of Hansen was mandatory. This appeal
followed.
                              II. Standards of Review
      We review a trial court’s ruling on a post-divorce motion for clarification or
enforcement of a final divorce decree under an abuse of discretion standard.
Moore v. Moore, 568 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, no pet.); see
also Woody v. Woody, 429 S.W.3d 792, 797 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
no pet.); Morales v. Rice, 388 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.).
A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary and unreasonable
manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Moore, 568 S.W.3d
at 729 (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42
(Tex. 1985)).
      In family law cases, the abuse-of-discretion standard overlaps with the
traditional sufficiency standards; therefore, legal and factual insufficiency are not
independent grounds of reversible error, but instead are relevant factors in our
assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Moore, 568 S.W.3d at
729 (citing Sink v. Sink, 364 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.));
see Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
      To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider
whether the trial court (1) had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its
discretion and (2) erred in its exercise of that discretion. In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d
91, 95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). The applicable sufficiency review comes
into play under the first prong. Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex.

                                          5
App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied).        We then determine whether, based on the
evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Id. A trial court does not abuse
its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative nature to
support its decision. Id.
      When a legal sufficiency challenge is raised, we must determine whether the
evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict
under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). In
evaluating a legal sufficiency challenge, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and credit evidence that supports the finding if a reasonable
factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder
could not. Id. at 821–22. A legal sufficiency or “no evidence” challenge will be
sustained if the party suffering the adverse decision at trial shows one of the
following: (1) the complete absence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of
law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact;
(3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or
(4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. Id. at 810
(citing Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of
Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 362–63 (1960)). When a party attacks the legal
sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which that party had the burden of
proof, the party must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence conclusively
establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chem.
Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001).
      To analyze a factual sufficiency challenge, we must examine all the evidence
in the record—both supporting and contrary to the trial court’s judgment—and
reverse only if (1) the evidence in support of the finding is so weak as to be clearly
wrong and unjust or (2) the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance

                                           6
of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Id. at 242; Ortiz v.
Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629,
635 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951).
      In any sufficiency review, the factfinder is the sole judge of witness credibility
and evidentiary weight. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819. We do not substitute our
judgment for that of the factfinder. Pace v. Pace, 160 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (citing F.D.I.C. v. F. & A Equip. Leasing, 854 S.W.2d 681,
684–85 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ)). Further, the factfinder may choose to
believe some, all, or none of a witness’s testimony. See Glenn v. Glenn, 659 S.W.3d
212, 219 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied).
                                    III. Analysis
      Rascon contends on appeal that (1) Hansen is not entitled to receive
reimbursement for voluntary payments made by her on the mortgage for the
residence after the divorce was granted, and (2) the trial court erred when it imposed
additional payment obligations on Rascon in excess of his original obligations under
the decree, which he alleges resulted in an improper substantive change to the terms
of the decree. We will first address the voluntary-payment rule issue.
      A. Voluntary Payments
      In Rascon’s first issue, he argues that the voluntary-payment rule bars Hansen
from receiving reimbursement for payments that she made to reduce the mortgage
balance. We conclude that the voluntary-payment rule does not apply here.
      The voluntary-payment rule is a common law principle in which “money
voluntarily paid on a claim of right, with full knowledge of all the facts, in the
absence of fraud, duress, or compulsion, cannot be recovered back merely because
the party at the time of payment was ignorant of or mistook the law as to his
liability.” Pennell v. United Ins. Co., 243 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. 1951) (quoting 40

                                           7
AM. JUR. § 205 (1942)) (emphasis added). Courts have occasionally applied the
voluntary-payment rule as a defense to claims of unjust enrichment in disputes
between private parties, due to public policy concerns regarding protecting the
finality of payments. See e.g., BMG Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Peake, 178 S.W.3d 763,
768–69 (Tex. 2005). In its application, the voluntary-payment rule requires a finding
that a person voluntarily acted with “full knowledge of all the facts.” Id. at 772.
      Rascon cites to Tyler v. Tyler and Runcie v. Runcie to support his argument.
See Tyler v. Tyler, 742 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ
denied); Runcie v. Runcie, 407 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1966, writ ref’d
n.r.e.). In Tyler, a divorce decree divided shares of stock equally between former
spouses and provided that the ex-husband was required to pay the balance of a
promissory note when it became due approximately three-years later. Tyler, 742
S.W.2d at 741–42. So that she could have access to the stocks, the ex-wife sold her
portion of the stock because she “needed some money,” and the balance owed on
the note was satisfied before it was due. Id. at 742–43. The ex-wife later sued the
ex-husband for reimbursement of the note payment made by her, and the trial court
awarded her the amount that she had paid on the note in its enforcement order. Id.
at 741–42. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and held
that the ex-wife was not entitled to reimbursement because she had voluntarily made
the payment on the note with full knowledge of all the facts and without fraud,
deception, duress, or coercion. Id. at 743.
      In Runcie, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement where the
ex-husband was to assume the indebtedness owed on certain life insurance policies.
Runcie, 407 S.W.2d at 862. After the agreement was executed, the parties endorsed
a series of checks for payments to be made on the insurance policies. Id. The ex-
wife then sought reimbursement for the payments she made. Id. Because the ex-

                                          8
wife did not plead or prove that her payments were the result of fraud, deception,
duress, or coercion, the Seventh Court of Appeals held that she was not entitled to
reimbursement since the payments were made by her voluntarily and with full
knowledge of all the facts. Id. at 863.
      Tyler and Runcie are distinguishable from the circumstances before us. Tyler
concerned a premature note payment by the ex-wife on the ex-husband’s assumed
debt, where the decree included a definitive date for when the remaining debt was
to be paid by the ex-husband. Tyler, 742 S.W.2d at 742. The court in Tyler
concluded that there was no evidence that the ex-wife made the note payment to
protect her shares of stock; instead, she made the payment—with full knowledge of
the facts—because she “needed some money.” Id. at 743. Thus, the court applied
the voluntary-payment rule in favor of the ex-husband to prevent the ex-wife’s unjust
enrichment. Id. Like in Tyler, Runcie concerned voluntary payments made by the
ex-wife—with full knowledge of the facts—towards a debt assumed by the ex-
husband. Runcie, 407 S.W.2d at 863.
      An agreed property division that is incorporated into a final divorce decree is
treated as a contract and governed by the rules of construction applicable to ordinary
contracts, not by the law of judgments. Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex.
1986); McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984); Gates v.
Gates, No. 11-18-00139-CV, 2020 WL 3635241, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland
June 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Our primary concern in interpreting a contract
is to ascertain the intent of the parties. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. 2011). We construe the decree as a
whole to harmonize and give effect to all of its terms. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d
391, 393 (Tex. 1983).

                                          9
      If, when read as a whole, the divorce decree’s terms are unambiguous, we
must give effect to the trial court’s order in light of the literal language used. In re
C.P.Y., 364 S.W.3d 411, 413 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). However, if the
terms of the decree in dispute are ambiguous, we must interpret the decree by
reviewing the decree as a whole and the record. Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899,
901 (Tex. 2009) (citing Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2003)). A
decree is ambiguous if its meaning is uncertain or is reasonably susceptible to more
than one interpretation. See Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393. Whether a divorce decree
is ambiguous is a question of law that we review de novo. See id. at 394; see also
Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 901–02. If an ambiguity exists, contract law provides that the
property settlement agreement may be reformed to correct the parties’ mutual
mistake or to reflect the true intent of the parties. Allen, 717 S.W.2d at 313. As
such, a clarification proceeding may be used to reform a property settlement
agreement that is incorporated into an agreed final decree of divorce. See id.; Gates,
2020 WL 3635241, at *3.
      We conclude that the decree is ambiguous as to how Rascon’s financial
obligations could be affected if the residence was sold before the mortgage balance
was reduced to $200,000.2 Because of this ambiguity, Hansen reached out to Rascon
to clarify how he would comply with his payment obligations under the decree if she
sold the residence before the mortgage balance reached the $200,000 threshold—
she offered him an interest-free payment option to pay his share of the mortgage
under terms of the decree. Rascon did not object to or deny his mortgage payment
obligations under these proposed circumstances; instead, he informed Hansen as to
how he preferred to pay his share of the mortgage. As such, Hansen could have

      2
       We further discuss the ambiguity of the decree in the following section of this opinion.

                                                  10
reasonably interpreted Rascon’s communications and representations as an
agreement that he would continue to be responsible for, and continue to pay in
accordance with the decree, the remaining balance that he owed on the mortgage at
that time.
      Here, the voluntary-payment rule does not apply because Hansen did not
make her payment on the mortgage with “full knowledge of the facts.” Hansen
proactively reached out to Rascon, before listing the residence for sale, to clarify
their mortgage obligations under the decree, rather than acting independently to
make payments for her own benefit or doing so intentionally in contravention of the
decree’s express language. E-mail correspondence between the parties showed that
Rascon understood that he was obligated to continue making payments under the
decree, and Hansen testified that she relied on Rascon’s communications and
representations when she sold the residence and made payments on the mortgage.
Hansen further testified that she would not have listed the residence for sale if she
did not believe that the parties had an agreement for Rascon to continue making
payments against the mortgage.
      Further, there is no policy argument that can be made to support the
application of the voluntary-payment rule in this case. The decree states that Rascon
would be responsible for the mortgage payments on the residence until the loan
balance was reduced to $200,000. The trial court’s judgment does not change this
obligation—Rascon is still only responsible for his portion of the mortgage debt as
stated in the decree. Consequently, Hansen was not unjustly enriched because she
received nothing beyond what was awarded to her in the decree’s original division
of property.
      A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to analyze or apply the law
correctly. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011) (citing Walker v. Packer, 827

                                         11
S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)). As discussed above, Hansen did not make the
mortgage payment with full knowledge of the facts; therefore, the voluntary-
payment rule does not apply. Because the voluntary-payment rule is inapplicable,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted relief to Hansen.
Accordingly, Rascon’s first issue on appeal is overruled.
      B. Clarification of the Decree
      In his second issue, Rascon contends that the trial court’s ruling was an
improper modification of the decree under Section 9.007 of the Texas Family Code.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007 (West 2020). We first review the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s order.
      Rascon argues that the trial court’s clarification order is not supported by
legally or factually sufficient evidence. We disagree. In his brief, Rascon does not
argue that there is an absence of any traditional legal sufficiency element—whether
there is an absence of a vital fact, there is only a mere scintilla of evidence supporting
a fact, or the evidence conclusively established the opposite of a vital fact. City of
Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810. Rather, Rascon’s argument on appeal is that the trial
court acted beyond its authority under Section 9.007(a) when it ordered a substantive
change to the property division as recited in the decree.
      The decree imposed an obligation on Rascon to reduce the mortgage balance,
although the terms of the decree were ambiguous as to each parties’ obligation
should the residence be sold before the agreed upon mortgage reduction was
achieved. Because the decree was ambiguous as to these terms, the trial court was
permitted to clarify the decree’s provisions. In interpretating an ambiguity in the
decree, the trial court could consider the language of the decree, the record, and the
parties’ subsequent actions. Wilde v. Murchie, 949 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1997)
(per curiam). The parties testified to their multiple communications where they each

                                           12
appeared to acknowledge their obligations under the decree. Hansen then relied on
these communications when she sold the residence and paid the mortgage.
Considering all the evidence, the trial court’s clarification order neither deviated
from the original obligations imposed in the decree nor did it impose additional
obligations upon Rascon—the order is consistent with the decree’s language and the
parties’ communications and is supported by legally sufficient evidence. City of
Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827.
      We also conclude that the trial court’s order is supported by factually
sufficient evidence. Although the decree does not contemplate or address the
circumstances of the sale of the residence before the mortgage reduction threshold
was achieved, the evidence in the record indicates that Rascon understood that he
had an obligation under the decree to continue to make payments to Hansen until the
mortgage balance reached $200,000, even after Hansen listed the residence for sale.
As we have said and detailed above, the evidence, Hansen’s testimony, and the e-
mail communications between the parties further corroborate this understanding.
Considering the record as a whole, we cannot say that the trial court’s order is against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, clearly wrong, or manifestly
unjust. Ortiz, 917 S.W.2d at 772.
      Rascon’s argument on appeal is that the trial court acted beyond the authority
granted to it under Section 9.007(a) when it ordered what Rascon alleges is a
substantive change to the property division as recited in the decree. A trial court that
renders a divorce decree generally retains the power to enforce or clarify the property
division that is made or approved in the decree. FAM. §§ 9.002, 9.006(a), 9.008. In
the enforcement of a decree, trial courts may clarify or specify the decree’s property
division to assist in the implementation of its order, but a trial court cannot “amend,
modify, alter, or change the division of property” to affect the substantive division

                                          13
of property as set out in the original decree. FAM. §§ 9.007(a), (b), 9.008; DeGroot v.
DeGroot, 260 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). However, the
trial court may enter a clarifying order to enforce compliance with the original
division of property. FAM. § 9.008(b).
      We have concluded that the decree is ambiguous as to the parties’ mortgage
payment obligations should the residence be sold prior to Rascon reducing the loan
balance to $200,000. Because the language of the decree did not contemplate or
address the potential circumstances if the residence was sold, and the parties’
testimony indicated they had different interpretations of the decree’s language and
their respective obligations, the decree was reasonably susceptible to more than one
meaning. Therefore, the decree contained an ambiguity which the trial court was
permitted to clarify in a subsequent order. See Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393. As we
have said, courts are permitted to clarify ambiguities that exist within a decree.
Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 901. Moreover, the parties’ subsequent actions may also be
relevant to the construction of ambiguous judgments. Id. (citing Lone Star Cement
Corp. v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Tex. 1971)). Here, we conclude that the trial
court’s order does not constitute a modification of the decree’s original property
division; rather, it is a proper clarification of the property division as recited in the
decree.
      The parties agreed to the terms of, and signed, the decree which described the
division of their marital property. On its face, Rascon had the obligation under the
decree to make monthly payments in the amount of $2,600 until the mortgage
balance on the residence was reduced to $200,000—Hansen would then be
responsible for satisfying the remaining mortgage balance. Hansen testified that she
believed the decree was unclear as to the parties’ mortgage obligations if she sold
the residence prior to the reduction of the mortgage balance. She also testified that

                                           14
she understood that the decree obligated both parties to share the mortgage payments
in the divorce, and therefore Rascon continued to be responsible for the payments if
she sold the residence. When Hansen reached out to the Rascon to address his
payment obligations, he accepted her interpretation of the parties’ obligations and
responded affirmatively to her communications, thereby corroborating Hansen’s
initial interpretation of the decree. To the contrary, Rascon testified that he believed
the decree did not require him to make mortgage payments if the residence was
prematurely sold—before the mortgage balance reached the $200,000 threshold.
      Rascon cites Tyler and Everett v. Everett in support of his argument that the
trial court made an improper substantive change to the decree in its enforcement
ruling. See Tyler, 742 S.W.2d at 743; Everett v. Everett, 421 S.W.3d 918, 919 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.). The court in Tyler concluded that, because the
voluntary-payment rule applied to the ex-wife’s payments on the note that the ex-
husband owed and was responsible for, the trial court’s order was an improper
modification because it imposed a “substantive change” to the detriment of the ex-
husband in the form of an obligation to pay where no such obligation had previously
existed. Tyler, 742 S.W.2d at 743 (citing McGehee v. Epley, 661 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.
1983)). In Everett, a divorce decree obligated the ex-husband to pay ad valorem
taxes on the ex-wife’s residence for thirty-six months, or until the ex-wife either
resided with a member of the opposite sex or remarried. Everett, 421 S.W.3d at 919.
The decree further stated that if the ex-wife was unable or unwilling to secure
financing to purchase the property, then the residence would be listed for sale. Id.
The trial court ordered that the residence should be sold and ordered the ex-husband
to pay the ex-wife a prorated portion of the taxes due on the residence as a form of
spousal support. Id. The Eighth Court of Appeals held that converting a debt into
spousal maintenance was not a clarification, and thus the trial court’s order was an

                                          15
impermissible substantive change to the property division as described in the decree.
Id. at 921.
        Again, the cases cited by Rascon on this issue are distinguishable from the
case before us. Under the terms of the decree, the parties’ obligations were
defined—Rascon was responsible for paying down the mortgage to $200,000, and
Hansen was responsible for the remaining mortgage payments after the reduction
threshold had been met. Unlike in Everett, the decree here did not provide any other
criteria or qualifications that would relieve Rascon of his financial responsibilities.
Everett, 421 S.W.3d at 919. Similarly, the decree did not contain an explicit timeline
or due date for when the final payment should be made, as were the circumstances
in Everett and Tyler. Id.; Tyler, 742 S.W.2d at 743. Rather, the decree detailed an
open-ended obligation for Rascon to pay his share of the mortgage. Here, the trial
court’s order did not deviate from the obligations that were originally imposed in the
decree—Rascon was only responsible for his share of the payments on the mortgage
in excess of $200,000. 3 Thus, the trial court’s order was not a modification of the
decree as Rascon suggests.
        Additionally, Rascon argues in the alternative that the trial court should not
award attorney’s fees in a clarification proceeding. An award of attorney’s fees is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Tomsu v. Tomsu, 381 S.W.3d 715, 719 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2012, no pet.); McKnight v. Trogdon-McKnight, 132 S.W.3d 126,
132 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).                          Contrary to Rascon’s
contention, a trial court may award reasonable attorney’s fees in a post-divorce

        3
         The trial court found that Rascon received, deposited, and wrongfully retained the ad valorem tax
refund and included the amount of the refund in the judgment that it rendered against Rascon. The trial
court determined that the tax refund was Hansen’s sole and separate property and was part of the residence
that was awarded to her in the decree. As such, the enforcement of this provision was not a modification
of the decree.

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enforcement or clarification action. See FAM. § 9.014; Messier v. Messier, 458
S.W.3d 155, 165 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).             Because
attorney’s fees may be awarded in this instance, and because the parties stipulated
to the reasonableness of the fees, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees to Hansen.
      We conclude that the trial court’s order is supported by legally and factually
sufficient evidence, and that its order constituted a proper clarification, not an
improper modification, of the property division as recited in the decree.
Accordingly, we overrule Rascon’s second issue on appeal.
                              IV. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                              W. STACY TROTTER
                                              JUSTICE

October 19, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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