Court Opinion

ID: 9713727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:21:11.745557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:20.104460
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority opinion which holds that Willis was eligible for sentence modification under IND.CODE 85-88-1-17(b), based upon my belief that the sentencing provisions in effect at the time of sentencing are controlling.
The law in this area is very well settled. The majority has correctly set out the general rule that the law in effect when the crime was committed controls sentencing citing, Watford v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 262, 384 N.E.2d 1030; Holsclaw v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 256, 384 N.E.2d 1026; Terrell v. State (1979), 180 Ind.App. 634, 390 N.E.2d 208. However, the majority has failed to set out the exception to the general rule as defined and applied in the above cases-the very exception that Willis has successfully availed himself of in the present case. An exception which, however, is inapplicable in the present case.
The entire well-settled law-including the exception-may be stated as follows. The general rule of sentencing is that the law in effect when the crime was committed is controlling. Terrell, id. An exception to that rule is recognized when the legislature has enacted an ameliorative amendment after the commission of a crime but before the defendant's sentence-ing. Id. The rationale behind limiting the exception to those cases where the law has been changed before the defendant's sentencing is to protect the finality of judgments. Watford, supra. Our supreme court has declined to expand the exception to those cases where a defendant has been sentenced before the effective date of a statute which contains ameliorative provisions. Id.; Holsclaw, supra; Terrell, supra. Our supreme court has held that a defendant in such a situation may not take advantage of the ameliorative provisions absent specific legislative intent for retroactive application. Id.
Willis was sentenced on February 27, 1985, a date before the effective date, June 1, 1985, of the statutory amendment in question, IND.CODE 85-388-1-17(b). I believe the law is clear that a defendant may not take advantage of an ameliorative legislative amendment effective after he is sentenced. Therefore, I dissent.