Court Opinion

ID: 9915709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-06 18:13:15.07795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:53.765009
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00530-CR

                                   COURT OF APPEALS

                       THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                          CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

            IN RE THE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. LUIS V. SAENZ

                           On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION
  Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina
             Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides1

        Relator the State of Texas ex rel. Luis V. Saenz filed a petition for writ of

mandamus asserting that the trial court has “a ministerial duty to accept or reject the plea

bargain entered into by the State and the juvenile defendant without modification.” This

Court has requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from

the real party in interest, J.A.G., a juvenile.

        1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
       The parties disagree regarding the relevant standard of review for this original

proceeding: relator presented and briefed the issue raised in this original proceeding as

a criminal matter, governed by the code of criminal procedure, in which the trial court

failed to comply with a ministerial duty, and J.A., in contrast, argues that the trial court

acted within its discretion under civil standards of review. Compare In re USAA Gen.

Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (discussing the general

“abuse of discretion” standard), with In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App.

2020) (orig. proceeding) (discussing the “ministerial act” requirement). The parties further

disagree regarding the availability and adequacy of a remedy by appeal.

       A juvenile proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature, see In re L.D.C., 400 S.W.3d 572,

574 (Tex. 2013), and the application of civil or criminal analyses in such cases vary

depending on the circumstances presented. See In re D.I.B., 988 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex.

1999) (generally discussing the civil and criminal rules applicable to juvenile proceedings

and the different approaches taken to probation by the family code and the code of

criminal procedure); In re I.F.M., 525 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2017, no pet.) (“Civil and criminal rules apply at different stages of the same proceeding.”);

see e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.17 (procedure and evidence), 54.03(j) (agreements),

54.034 (limited right to appeal with a plea or stipulation of evidence), 56.01 (right to appeal

by juvenile), 56.03 (right to appeal by state). We need not address this issue here,

however, because in any event, we deny mandamus relief. In short, under the ill-defined

parameters of the plea bargain presented to the trial court, the trial court neither abused

its discretion nor failed to comply with a ministerial duty. Accordingly, we deny the petition

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for writ of mandamus.

                                 GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                 Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
3rd day of January, 2024.

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