Court Opinion

ID: 9787818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:25:10.474672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:00.896689
License: Public Domain

Judge RUSSEL
dissenting.
In resolving an issue of statutory interpretation, the first, most important, step is to look to the plain language of the statute. People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986). Here, the offense at issue— leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injuries' — contains no culpable mental state:
The driver of any vehicle directly involved in an accident resulting in injury to, serious bodily injury to, or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close to the scene as possible but shall immediately return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until the driver *83has fulfilled the requirements of section 42-4-1603(1).
Section 42-4-1601, C.R.S.2004.
Because this offense is premised solely on the performance of a voluntary act, it is logical to conclude that it is a strict liability offense. See § 18-1-502, C.R.S.2004 (if voluntary conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, the offense is one of strict liability); see also § 18-1-503(1), C.R.S.2004 (when the commission of an offense requires a culpable mental state, that mental state is ordinarily designated by the use of terms such as “intentionally” and “knowingly”).
Unlike the majority, I am not persuaded to reject a plain language approach for any of the reasons urged.
First, I do not think that the mental state of “knowingly” may be inferred pursuant to § 18-1-503(2), C.R.S.2004. In my view, the proscribed conduct — leaving the scene of an accident — does not “necessarily involve” general intent. A driver can leave the scene of an accident without acquiring actual awareness of the fact that he or she was involved in an accident. See § 18-1-105(6), C.R.S.2004 (a pei’son acts “knowingly” with respect to a circumstance when he or she is aware that such circumstance exists).
Second, I do not think that § 42-4-1601 will violate constitutional principles if it is construed as a strict liability offense. The United States Supreme Court has never defined a due process limit on offenses that lack culpable mental states. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260, 72 S.Ct. 240, 248, 96 L.Ed. 288, 299 (1952). And though I do not doubt that such a limit exists, I think § 42-4-1601 rests on the safe side of the line. In my view, the legislature may constitutionally create an offense that carries the exposure of a class 5 felony without requiring proof of a culpable mental state. I note that, in People v. Rostad, 669 P.2d 126 (Colo.1983), the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that the legislature could premise liability for vehicular homicide — currently a class 3 felony under § 18-3-106(l)(b)(l), C.R.S.2004 — on the defendant’s voluntary conduct of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, without requiring a culpable mental state.
Third, I am not persuaded by the fact that other state courts have construed similar statutory language to require knowledge of the accident. Although I would normally find such opinions to be instructive, I cannot credit these opinions when the Colorado Supreme Court has reached the opposite conclusion when construing similar language in a Colorado statute.
In People v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734 (Colo.1985), the Colorado Supreme Court addressed § 42-4-1402 (now codified with amendments at § 42-4-1602(1), C.R.S.2004), which defined the offense of leaving the scene of an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle. The court found that this statute created a strict liability offense that required only the performance of a voluntary act. People v. DeHerrera, supra, 697 P.2d at 741.
When DeHerrera was decided, the pertinent statute defined the offense as follows:
The driver of any vehicle directly involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of section 42-4-1403. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class 2 traffic offense.
Colo. Sess. Laws 1987, ch. 317, § 42-4-1402 at 1516.
I would construe § 42-4-1601 so that it is harmonious with the supreme court’s view of § 42-^4-1402. There are good reasons to do this:
• The statutes address the same subject matter. Both impose identical duties on the highly regulated activity of driving a motor vehicle. Because they are in pari materia, these statutes should be construed together. See Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039, 1043 n. 6 (Colo. *841991) (statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed together in order to gather the legislature’s intent from the whole of the enactments).
• The statutes are similar in their language and structure. The only substantive difference between the offenses is the type of damage or injury that may have occurred during the accident. This difference does not warrant a divergent approach to culpability, for, as the majority concedes, it is immaterial whether the driver knows of any injury.
• Both statutes create criminal offenses. When DeHerrera was decided, leaving the scene of an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle was a class 2 traffic offense, which carried a maximum penalty of 90 days imprisonment and a $300 fine. See Colo. Sess. Laws 1987, ch. 121, § 42-4-1501 at 628.
• Because these statutory offenses are not rooted in common law, they are not subject to an “interpretive presumption” in favor of requiring a mental state. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873, 57 L.Ed.2d 854, 869-70 (1978) (“Morissette can be fairly read as establishing, at least with regard to crimes having their origin in the common law, an interpretative presumption that mens rea is required”); see also People v. Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 422, 593 P.2d 962, 964 (1979) (“offenses which have their bases in common law such as provisions concerning theft must be construed to require a culpable mental state”).
Ultimately, I do not agree that a hit-and-run statute “would make little sense” unless the driver actually knows that he or she was involved in an accident. The purpose of § 42-4-1601 is to create an incentive for drivers “to stop and render immediate and urgent assistance to the injured parties in a motor vehicle accident.” People v. Rickstrew, 775 P.2d 570, 575 (Colo.1989). This underlying purpose is furthered by omitting a mental state requirement because drivers then have an incentive to stop, even when they are uncertain whether they have been in an accident.
Consider, for example, the driver in Weiderspon v. People, 118 Colo. 529, 534, 198 P.2d 301, 303 (1948), who merely “heard a ‘swish’ as his truck and the car of the prosecuting witness met and passed.” Under today’s decision, this driver has good reason not to stop, for ignorance (even willful ignorance) operates in his favor. But construed as written, § 42-4-1601 requires this driver to stop, determine whether there has been an accident, and render aid if necessary.
I acknowledge that the legislature’s decision may be criticized on policy grounds. Any strict liability offense creates the possibility of unjust results. But in making its policy decision, the legislature may anticipate the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion:
Doubtless with many such crimes the legislature is actually aiming at bad people and expects that the prosecuting officials, in the exercise of their broad discretion to prosecute or not to prosecute, will use the statute only against those persons of bad reputation who probably actually did have the hard-to-prove bad mind, letting others go who, from their generally good reputation, probably had no such bad mental state.
W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 3.8, at 243 (2d ed.1986).
And I note that the majority’s decision also may be criticized on policy grounds. If courts are going to add a culpable mental state element to § 42-4-1601, they might do better to reject general intent as the required standard and to use negligence instead. See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 655 P.2d 1313 (Alaska Ct.App.1982) (offense of fishing in closed waters, which contains no explicit mental state element, requires proof that defendant “knew or should have known” that his boat was in closed waters). This would allow prosecution of drivers who did not know, but who should have known under the circumstances, that they were involved in accidents.
But it is not our job to decide what makes the most sense. Our task is to decide whether there is a statutory or constitutional reason to depart from the plain language of the *85legislature’s enactment. I think the answer is no.
For this reason, I respectfully dissent.