Court Opinion

ID: 9555044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 16:08:34.654136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:40:36.741455
License: Public Domain

J-A17003-23

  NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  TROY WHITE                                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SC REHAB AND NURSING CENTER,                 :   No. 2399 EDA 2022
  LLC A/K/A D/B/A SOMERTON                     :
  CENTER AND 650 EDISON AVENUE                 :
  OPERATIONS SOMERTON CENTER                   :
  NURSING AND REHABILITATION CTR               :
  A/K/A D/B/A SOMERTON CENTER                  :
  A/K/A DBA                                    :

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 210101497

BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 10, 2023

       In this premises liability action, Troy White (White) appeals an order of

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) granting

summary judgment in favor of SC Rehab and Nursing Center, LLC a/k/a d/b/a

Somerton Center, et al (Somerton) and dismissing his negligence claim.

White was injured while working in a nursing home operated by Somerton,

which had, in turn, contracted with White’s employer to provide janitorial

services. The trial court found merit in Somerton’s claim that it was immune

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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from liability under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act)

because of its status as White’s “statutory employer” at the time he was

injured. We now affirm on that same ground.

                                          I.

      On the day in question, White was working as a janitor at a nursing

home operated by Somerton. This premises was not owned by Somerton;

rather, Somerton controlled the property pursuant to a lease with another

entity who is not a party in this case.

      While on a break during a shift, White allegedly fell from a toilet seat

that had not been properly fastened, sustaining injuries that required medical

treatment. He subsequently received workers’ compensation benefits from

his direct employer, the janitorial services company, Serene Health Services

(Serene), which had been hired by Somerton.

      White filed suit against Somerton, alleging that his damages resulted

from Somerton’s negligence in maintaining the bathroom where he was

injured.   Somerton filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that

White’s claim must be dismissed because Somerton was his “statutory

employer” under the Act.     Alternatively, Somerton asserted that it should

prevail as a matter of law because White had produced no evidence that it had

actual or constructive knowledge of a defect in the bathroom White was

injured in.

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      The trial court granted summary judgment for Somerton, agreeing with

its contention that the negligence claim against it was barred due to its status

as a statutory employer. Summary judgment was therefore granted in favor

of Somerton and White’s claim was dismissed. The trial court did not address

the issue of notice of the alleged defect.           White filed a motion for

reconsideration and it was denied.

      White timely appealed and the trial court submitted a 1925(a) opinion

giving the reasons why its order granting summary judgment should be

upheld. See 1925(a) Opinion, 3/3/2023, at 7-11. In his brief, White now

argues that the trial court erred because Somerton was not entitled to

immunity under the Act as a statutory employer. Somerton responds that it

qualifies for immunity and that, regardless, this Court should affirm on the

alternative ground that Somerton cannot be liable for White’s injury because

it lacked notice of any defect in the toilet seat that White fell from.

                                       II.

      The central dispute in this appeal concerns the definition of “statutory

employer” under the Act. The trial court dismissed White’s negligence claim

against Somerton based upon its finding that Somerton qualified as White’s

statutory employer, making it immune from liability. White argues that the

trial court erred in making that determination because, as a matter of law,

Somerton was not his statutory employer.

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      On review of an order granting summary judgment, our standard of

review is the same as that applied by the trial court.         See Gerber v.

Piergross, 142 A.3d 854, 858 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also Pa.R.Civ.P.

1035.2. This Court may only reverse the entry of summary judgment if it

finds that the trial court erred in determining that the case presents no

genuine issue of material fact, and that the prevailing party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See Gerber, 142 A.3d at 858. The record must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts

as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against

the moving party. See id. As this inquiry is purely a matter of law, our review

is de novo. See id.

      Liability of an employer under the Act is the exclusive means of remedy

for an injured employee, and an employer who is liable for an employee’s

injury under the Act is otherwise immune from suit. See 77 P.S. § 481. Even

where a party is not a direct or actual employer of an employee, the Act may

still afford immunity in certain circumstances. That is, the Act recognizes that

an “employer” may also refer to a “statutory employer” who is “not a

contractual or [a] common-law one, but is made [an employer] by the [Act].”

Shamis v. Moon, 81 A.3d 962, 969 (Pa. Super. 2013). The Act explains the

obligations of a statutory employer as follows:

      Any employer who permits entry upon premises occupied by him
      or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an
      employe or contractor, for the performance upon such premises
      of a part of such employer’s regular business entrusted to that

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     employe or contractor, shall be liable for the payment of
     compensation to such laborer or assistant unless such hiring
     employe or contractor, if primarily liable for the payment of such
     compensation, has secured payment thereof as provided for in
     this [A]ct[.]

77 P.S. § 462.

     Elsewhere in the Act, it is made clear that a statutory employer has the

same rights and obligations as a contractual or common-law employer:

     An employer who permits the entry upon premises occupied by
     him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an
     employe or contractor, for the performance upon such premises
     of a part of the employer’s regular business entrusted to such
     employe or contractor, shall be liable to such laborer or
     assistant in the same manner and to the same extent as to
     his own employee.

77 P.S. § 52 (emphasis added).

     To clarify the definition of a statutory employer, our Supreme Court has

developed a test consisting of five elements:

     (1) An employer who is under contract with an owner or one in
     the position of an owner.

     (2) Premises occupied by or under the control of such employer.

     (3) A subcontract made by such employer.

     (4) Part of the employer’s regular business entrusted to such
     subcontractor.

     (5) An employee of such subcontractor.

Cranshaw Construction, Inc. v. Wolk, 434 A.2d 756, 757 (Pa. Super.

1981) (quoting Nineteen North, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation

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Appeal Board, 409 A.2d 503, 504 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979)); see also McDonald

v. Levinson Steel Co., 153 A. 424, 426 (Pa. 1930) (same).

     “The classic statutory employer situation is in the construction industry,

where a property owner hires the general contractor, who hires a

subcontractor to do specialized work on the jobsite, and an employee of the

subcontractor is injured in the course of his employment.” Peck v. Delaware

County Bd. Of Prison Inspectors, 814 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 2002). “Under

this test, an entity cannot serve in the dual capacity as ‘owner’ and

‘employer.’” Id. at 190; see also McDonald, 153 A. at 426 (“[A]n owner is

not a statutory employer.”).

     In the present case, White contends that Somerton cannot satisfy the

first of the above elements because it was the “owner” of the nursing home

being operated on the premises. According to White, Somerton’s operation of

the nursing home and status as a business “owner” precludes it from also

being considered an “employer,” thereby also precluding Serenity from being

Somerton’s “subcontractor” for the purposes of the Act.      Accordingly, this

appeal hinges on the definition of “owner” and whether, as White suggests, it

only refers to the owner of the business (or general contractor) operating on

the premises, to the exclusion of the owner of the property being occupied.

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       We find White’s argument unpersuasive because it is inconsistent with

a plain reading of the Act1 and our controlling decisional law. See Dougherty

v. Conduit & Foundation Corp., 674 A.2d 262, 265 (Pa. Super. 1996)

(“These elements [of a statutory employer] have been strictly construed by

our appellate courts.”). It is undisputed that in order to operate its nursing

home business, Somerton leased the premises from the owner of the property.

This contract gave Somerton control of the premises, putting it “in the position

of an owner.”       Neither the Act nor this Court’s definition of a statutory

employer conflate a business owner and a property owner as White suggests.

In fact, our decisional law distinguishes an “owner” from an “employer” in part

by the fact that the employer controls and occupies the premises by virtue of

its contract with the property owner. See Cranshaw, 434 A.2d at 757; see

also Peck, 814 A.2d at 191 (affirming finding that party was not a statutory

employer because of a lack of a contract between the party and the property

owner).

       There is no dispute here that Somerton controls and occupies the

subject premises pursuant to a lease. Somerton therefore satisfied the first

two of the above elements of a statutory employer because its contract put it

____________________________________________

1 Statutes must be construed so as to give effect to all of its provisions, and

when “the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter
of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1921(a)-(b).

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in the position of the owner of the property.        Contrary to White’s claims,

Somerton was not an “owner” for the purposes of the Act due to it being the

owner of a business operating on the premises.          Rather, as an employer,

Somerton subcontracted with a janitorial company, Serene, who hired White

to provide janitorial services.          This made Serene a “subcontractor” of

Somerton, satisfying the third and fourth above elements.

       Finally, White was indisputably an employee of the subcontractor,

Serene, satisfying the fifth and final element, and qualifying Somerton as a

statutory employer of White.

       For these reasons, the trial court did not err in determining that

Somerton qualified as a statutory employer of White as a matter of law.2 We

therefore find no basis to disturb the trial court’s order granting summary

judgment. Having resolved this appeal by finding no merit in White’s claims,

____________________________________________

2 In his brief, White argues that Somerton was not a statutory employer, a

common-law employer or a contractual employer because it did not supervise
or control the manner in which White did his job at the time he was injured.
However, as explained in the trial court’s 1925(a) opinion, Somerton’s
supervision or control over White’s manner of work is irrelevant insofar as its
status as a statutory employer is governed by the elements of the term’s
definition. See e.g., Cranshaw Construction, Inc. v. Wolk, 434 A.2d 756,
757 (Pa. Super. 1981). Somerton indisputably had control over the premises,
satisfying the second element of the statutory employer test, and Somerton
hired Serenity to provide janitorial services at a nursing home it operated,
thereby “entrusting” Serenity with a part of its regular business and satisfying
the fourth element. The degree to which Somerton supervised or directed the
work of Serenity’s staff would only be germane to whether Somerton had
control of the premises, see generally Dougherty v. Conduit &
Foundation Corp., 674 A.2d 262, 265 (Pa. Super. 1996), but that fact is
undisputed here.

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it is unnecessary for this Court to reach the merits of Somerton’s alternative

grounds for affirmance.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/10/2023

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