Court Opinion

ID: 9884312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:52:13.03392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.613890
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE WARD, dissenting: As I read it, the majority opinion leaves meaningless the constitution’s provision for a “prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.” I consider that the intendment underlying the second paragraph of section 7 of article I was to provide a person accused of crime, but without his having been indicted, with a right to a prompt preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause exists to hold him to await the action of the grand jury. Provision for this hearing would, among other purposes, serve to avoid having an accused held in custody or, less grievously, under bond without a judicial hearing, for an indefinite time, only to have a grand jury later conclude that there was not adequate evidence to indict. Assuring this prompt hearing would be of particular importance in counties where grand juries are only intermittently in session and where weeks may elapse before the evidence against an accused is presented to the grand jury for its decision as to whether it is sufficient for an indictment. It is clear to me from the language of the paragraph that if the “initial charge” against an accused has not been brought by indictment, that “No person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary unless *** the person has been given a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.” That this was intended by the paragraph is confirmed by materials of the constitutional convention. The constitutional commentary to section 7 of article I (Helman and Whalen, Constitutional Commentary, S.H.A. Const. of 1970, art. I, sec. 7, p. 372) says, in part: “In cases where the prosecutor obtains a grand jury indictment prior to the defendant being taken into custody, there is no constitutional requirement for a preliminary hearing because the issue of probable cause will have been determined by the grand jury in deciding to indict. These cases are probably the exception. Usually, the ‘initial charge’ is made by an arresting officer rather than a grand jury. In such cases the person would be entitled to a ‘prompt preliminary hearing’ unless it is understandingly waived.” Too, as originally reported to the convention by the Bill of Rights Committee as proposal 23, the preliminary hearing provision read: “No person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary without a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.” (6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Report, 76-77 [hereinafter cited as Proceedings].) In the report attached to the proposal, the Bill of Rights Committee described what would be the effect of the proposal: “In a great majority of instances involving prosecution by indictment, the preliminary hearing will precede action by the grand jury. In those comparatively infrequent instances where a grand jury has indicted a defendant before he is arrested, this new provision will require that a preliminary hearing be held after the indictment has been returned. *** If the judge finds an absence of probable cause, then he should quash the indictment and discharge the defendant. *** While it may seem anomalous to have a judge examining probable cause after the grand jury has indicted, this procedure is required to prevent prosecution without a public showing of probable cause.” The proposal, with its design for a preliminary hearing after indictment and possible judicial invalidation of the grand jury’s action, was not acceptable to the convention, and it was amended to read substantially as it now appears in the second paragraph of section 7 of article I. The amendment was offered by Delegate John Parkhurst and it read: “Proposal to amend section 23 by adding the following words, ‘unless the initial charge has been brought by an indictment of a grand jury’ before the words ‘No person [shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary without a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause].” (3 Proceedings 1467.) Prior to the taking of the vote on the Parkhurst amendment, Delegate William Jaskula proposed a change to the amendment which would have substituted “unless a true bill has been voted by the grand jury” for “unless the initial charge has been brought by *** a grand jury.” (3 Proceedings 1469.) Opposing the proposed change, Delegate Bernard Weisberg observed: “That would mean that a preliminary hearing right could be easily defeated whenever a prosecutor chose to do so by simply postponing a preliminary hearing until he obtains a grand jury indictment, and then points to the section and says there is no right to preliminary hearing in view of the ‘unless’ clause.” (3 Proceedings 1469.) Delegate Parkhurst agreed with Weisberg and proposal 23, as amended by Parkhurst, was thereafter adopted by the convention. The Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission then gave the paragraph its final form. The revision, with deletions and additions indicated, appears in 7 Proceedings 2514: “Unless — the—initial—charge—has—been brought by-indictment of- a-grand -jury; No person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary 'Without- unless either the initial charge has been brought by indictment of a grand jury or the person has been given 1 a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.” The majority says: “Nor would an interpretation [of the second paragraph of section 7] make sense which required the dismissal of the present indictment and the discharge of the defendant, to be followed by his reindictment and rearrest upon a new indictment.” But I would observe that such an interpretation would establish that an accused has the right to a preliminary hearing when the prosecution is initiated other than by indictment and it would insure the future recognition of that right.  Footnote 1 to the Committee’s report (7 Proceedings 2600) observes: “This change makes it clear that a person must either be charged initially by grand jury indictment or given a prompt preliminary hearing before being held to answer for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary. (Article I, Section 7.)”