Court Opinion

ID: 9555619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 16:16:12.710784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:10.694385
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 10, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                           ———————————
                              NO. 01-22-00825-CV
                           ———————————
                       CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant
                                        V.
                        JARED WALDHOFF, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 55th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2019-75104

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant, City of Houston (the “City”), challenges the trial court’s judgment

reversing the administrative decision that appellee, Jared Waldhoff, had violated
Houston Airport System (“HAS”)1 Operating Instruction 05-03 Violation 54 (“Rule

54”) and the consequent permanent revocation of Waldhoff’s HAS Security

Identification Direct Access (“SIDA”) badge. In its sole issue, the City contends

that the trial court erred in reversing the administrative decision and reinstating

Waldhoff’s SIDA badge.

      We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm as modified.

                                      Background

      In his original petition, Waldhoff alleged that he was “an airplane mechanic

licensed by the Federal Aviation Administration” and was “employed by Southwest

Airlines” in Houston, Texas “for approximately two and one-half years.” As a

condition of his employment, Waldhoff was “required to hold a [SIDA] badge.”

HAS issued a SIDA badge to Waldhoff at the start of his employment at William P.

Hobby Airport in Houston.

      According to Waldhoff, the SIDA badge gave him permission “to work in the

‘sterile’ area of the [airport] terminal—meaning the areas of the terminal that c[ould]

only be reached by the general public after going through a [Transportation Security

Administration (‘TSA’)] passenger screening checkpoint.”2 SIDA badge holders

1
      HAS is a “City of Houston department responsible for [the] operation of the
      City-owned airports.” HAS Operating Instruction 05-03 ¶ VI(20).
2
      HAS Operating Instructions define “sterile area” as “[a] portion of an airport defined
      in the airport security program that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft
      and to which the access generally is controlled by [the] TSA, or by an aircraft
                                                2
could enter the sterile area of the terminal without going through a TSA passenger

screening checkpoint to use the food court, restaurants, shops, and other services.

But SIDA badge holders who were scheduled to travel on a flight through an HAS

airport were still required to go through a TSA passenger screening checkpoint

before boarding their flight.

      Waldhoff alleged that he “was scheduled to board a flight to Indianapolis,

Indiana” on September 5, 2019 at approximately 8:40 a.m. He had worked a shift

that began the night before at 10:15 p.m. and ended about at 7:28 a.m., about an hour

before his boarding time.

      After Waldhoff “clocked out,” he entered the sterile area of the airport with

his travel bag.   “[J]ust inside” the door he used to enter the sterile area, he

encountered “two TSA checkpoint [officers].” Waldhoff “explained to the TSA

officers that he had just left work and was going to fly to Indianapolis. [The] TSA

[officers] then searched his bag and cleared it.”

      Waldhoff asked the officers if that search “was sufficient for him to board his

flight,” and “[h]e was told that he still needed to proceed” to the central TSA

passenger screening checkpoint. The TSA officers “then allowed him to proceed

through the sterile area of the terminal to go to the central TSA passenger [screening]

      operator under [Code of Federal Regulations Title 49 section 1544] or a foreign air
      carrier under [Code of Federal Regulations Title 49 section 1546], through the
      screening of persons and property.” HAS Operating Instruction 05-02 ¶ IV(B)(38).
                                              3
checkpoint.”    Waldhoff went through the TSA central passenger screening

checkpoint, went to his departure gate for boarding, and took his trip.

      On September 9, 2019, Waldhoff was summoned to an HAS security office,

where “he was issued HAS Notice of Violation 11082” (“NOV 11082”), which

“charg[ed] him with violating [Rule 54].” Rule 54 is violated if

      [a]n airline employee including, but not limited to, [f]light [c]rew,
      [c]abin [c]rew, mechanic or any other employee boarding or attempting
      to board an aircraft as a passenger or any individual not specifically
      designated or acting as an active crew member for the flight that
      accessed the sterile area through an access point other than a TSA
      screening checkpoint.

      On September 13, 2019, a hearing was held on the violation alleged in NOV

11082, and the HAS hearing officer “sustained the violation.” As a result, HAS

revoked Waldhoff’s SIDA badge. Because he no longer had a SIDA badge,

Waldhoff was “terminated from his employment with Southwest Airlines, and [wa]s

permanently prohibited from working at any major airport in the Houston area.”

      Waldhoff brought claims against the City challenging the administrative

decision that he violated Rule 54 and the revocation of his SIDA badge.3 Waldhoff

asserted that his actions on September 5, 2019 did not violate Rule 54 “as a matter

3
      Waldhoff also brought claims against HAS, but as previously noted HAS is a “City
      of Houston department responsible for [the] operation of the City-owned airports.”
      HAS Operating Instruction 05-03 ¶ VI(20); see also Gyves v. City of Houston, Civil
      Action No. H-18-0891, 2018 WL 5621497, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (mem.
      op. and order) (noting plaintiff sued City based on HAS’s conduct).
                                              4
of law.” And he brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on assertions that

HAS had violated his procedural and substantive due process rights afforded by the

United States and Texas Constitutions.

      The City removed Waldhoff’s suit to federal district court, then moved to

dismiss the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted.4 The federal district court granted the motion

as to Waldhoff’s federal constitutional and statutory claims and remanded the case

to the trial court for adjudication of his remaining claim challenging the

administrative decision that he violated Rule 54 and the revocation of his SIDA

badge.5

      Following remand, Waldhoff filed a brief in support of administrative appeal,

requesting that the trial court “overturn HAS’s [hearing officer’s] determination that

he violated a [HAS] policy and reinstate his [SIDA] badge, or in the alternative,

remand the matter for a new trial or hearing.” According to Waldhoff, “HAS’s

undisputed evidence at the hearing established that on September 5, 2019, Waldhoff

went through . . . two TSA [passenger] screening checkpoints before he boarded or

4
      See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (6); see also Waldhoff v. City of Houston, No.
      H-19-4301, 2020 WL 8771688, at *1–3 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2020) (mem. op.).
5
      See Waldhoff, 2020 WL 8771688, at *1–10; see also Waldhoff v. City of Houston,
      838 Fed. Appx. 895, 895–96 (5th Cir. 2021) (affirming federal district court’s
      decision).
                                               5
attempted to board his flight as a passenger.”          Waldhoff pointed out that by

municipal ordinance, the HAS director was required to establish procedures for the

suspension and revocation of SIDA badges “consistent with any applicable laws and

regulations.”6 Once issued, the SIDA badge was subject to revocation only for

“violation of applicable laws and regulations.”7

      In its response, the City asserted, among other things, that HAS’s hearing

officer’s “findings and decisions [we]re supported by substantial evidence.”

      Waldhoff, in his reply, maintained that “[n]o reasonable person could have

reached the finding of . . . [HAS’s] hearing [officer] based on a proper interpretation

and application of Rule 54 and the evidence in the record.” Waldhoff noted that the

City had “admit[ted] that Waldhoff submitted himself to a TSA [passenger]

screening checkpoint immediately upon entering the secure area of the airport, and

that . . . TSA [officers] specifically permitted Waldhoff to walk through the secure

area of the airport to reach the [central TSA passenger screening checkpoint].” He

also pointed out that the TSA, in its own review of Waldhoff’s conduct on September

5, 2019, found that Waldhoff had not “violated any airport safety provision because

he submit[ed] [him]self and [his] property to [the] TSA at the passenger screening

checkpoint before boarding [his] flight.”          (Internal quotations omitted.)   And

6
      Houston, Tex., Code of Ordinances, ch. 9, art. 3, § 9-113(a) (2002).
7
      Id. § 9-113(a)(1).
                                               6
Waldhoff observed that while “Rule 54 prohibit[ed] an airline employee from

boarding or attempting to board an aircraft as a passenger [who] accessed the sterile

area through an access point other than a TSA [passenger] screening checkpoint,”

the only evidence in the record was that Waldhoff “encountered . . . TSA [officers]

and submitted himself to screening by them” upon entry into the sterile area before

he proceeded to the central TSA passenger screening checkpoint for screening.

(Internal quotations omitted.) Because he “did not board or attempt to board his

flight until he went through [the] TSA central passenger screening [checkpoint],”

Waldhoff argued that he did not violate Rule 54.

      At a hearing on Waldhoff’s administrative appeal of HAS’s hearing officer’s

decision, Waldhoff requested that the trial court interpret the meaning of Rule 54,

including determining that a Rule 54 violation “require[d] that a covered person

actually board[] or attempt[] to board an aircraft as a passenger without first going

through a TSA [passenger screening] checkpoint.”          Waldhoff asserted that a

determination that he had violated Rule 54 “require[d] an objective” finding that he

had boarded or attempted to board an aircraft as a passenger before he went through

a TSA passenger screening checkpoint because, as the holder of a SIDA badge, he

“was entitled to go in the airport, go into the security area, the sterile area of the

airport” to use “the bathroom, . . . access shops, . . . and walk throughout the

airport.” Waldhoff also requested that the trial court “apply [its] interpretation of

                                             7
Rule 54 to the undisputed facts” and “determine that . . . Waldhoff [had] not

violate[d] Rule 54 as a matter of law.”

      In its final judgment, the trial court declared:

      Having considered the arguments of counsel, the briefs submitted, and
      the administrative record, the Court concludes that [Waldhoff’s] appeal
      is well-founded and that . . . [HAS’s hearing officer’s] finding that
      [Waldhoff] violated [Rule 54] [wa]s not supported by substantial
      evidence nor [wa]s it free from legal error.

Based on those conclusions, the trial court reversed the administrative decision that

Waldhoff had violated Rule 54 and the permanent revocation of Waldhoff’s SIDA

badge, and it ordered that Waldhoff’s SIDA badge be reinstated, with such

reinstatement retroactive to September 13, 2019.

                          Scope and Standard of Review

      HAS promulgated its Operating Instructions for its enforcement of “various

laws, ordinances, policies, procedures, rules, and regulations.” HAS Operating

Instruction 05-03, ¶ I. As to airport tenants, which include the airlines operating at

each HAS airport, HAS’s Operating Instructions (1) explain HAS’s system for

enforcing compliance with the applicable laws; (2) identify “the persons authorized

to issue” a notice of violation, which is the “charging instrument” used for an

administrative violation; (3) identify the violations; (4) “assign consequences to

such violations”; and (5) “provide a means of providing for due process to those

charged.”   Id.   Among other things, the HAS Operating Instructions address

                                              8
requirements relating to the SIDA badges that all airport workers are required to

obtain and display while working at HAS sites. See generally HAS Operating

Instruction 05-02; see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540, 1542.

      If an airport tenant or its agent contests a notice of violation, a hearing is held

before an appointed hearing panel or hearing officer. HAS Operating Instruction

05-03, ¶ IX. Such hearing is “restricted to the question of whether or not the alleged

violator committed the offense.” Id. ¶ IX(C). The decision of the hearing panel or

hearing officer “is final and non-appealable as to the facts and the sanctions

imposed.” Id. ¶ IX(Z). The HAS Operating Instructions prohibit “any hearing on

any question of law, mitigation, probation or reduction of sanction.” Id. ¶¶ IX(D).

But they allow for “[a]ny challenge as to questions of law” to be “be heard in a civil

court of competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas.” Id.

      In most administrative proceedings, a party dissatisfied with an administrative

final order may appeal the decision by filing suit in a trial court for review under the

substantial-evidence rule. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.174; R.R. Comm’n v.

WBD Oil & Gas Co., 104 S.W.3d 69, 75 (Tex. 2003). Here, though, HAS’s hearing

officer’s findings of fact are final and nonappealable.          See HAS Operating

Instruction 05-03, ¶ IX(Z).

      To the extent that the City’s appeal of the trial court’s ruling encompasses a

question of law, we review that question de novo, although “an agency’s

                                              9
interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to ‘serious

consideration.’” R.R. Comm’n v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water,

336 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2011).

                                      Waiver

      In its sole issue, the City argues that the trial court erred in reversing the

administrative decision and reinstating Waldhoff’s SIDA badge retroactively to

September 13, 2019 because “reliable and probative evidence” before HAS’s

hearing officer supported the conclusion “that some reasonable basis exist[ed] in the

record for [HAS’s hearing officer’s] action.”

      But, as noted above, we may not review the sufficiency of the evidence, and

the City makes no argument to challenge the trial court’s conclusion that HAS’s

hearing officer’s finding that Waldhoff violated Rule 54 was not “free from legal

error.” Generally, an appellant must attack all independent bases or grounds that

fully support a complained-of ruling or judgment. Sosa v. Auto Club Indem. Co.,

No. 01-21-00312-CV, 2022 WL 3722396, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Aug. 30, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.); D & M Marine, Inc. v. Turner, 409 S.W.3d

693, 697 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); see also Fairfield

Indus., Inc. v. EP Energy E&P Co., 531 S.W.3d 234, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (overruling appellant’s issue after concluding that

appellant did not brief argument challenging each independent summary judgment

                                            10
ground).   The reasoning is that if an independent ground fully supports the

complained-of ruling or judgment, but the appellant assigns no error to that

independent ground, then we must accept the validity of that unchallenged

independent ground. Britton v. Tex. Dep’t Crim. Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.). Thus, any error in the grounds challenged

on appeal is harmless because the unchallenged independent ground fully supports

the complained-of ruling or judgment. Id. Because the City fails to challenge the

alternate ground for the trial court’s ruling, we hold that it has waived any error.

      We overrule the City’s sole issue.

                             Modification of Judgment

      We have the authority to modify the trial court’s judgment when the necessary

information is available to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b) (providing appellate

court may modify trial court’s judgment and affirm as modified); Nolden v. Crescent

Health & Rehab. Ctr., No. 01-21-00132-CV, 2022 WL 3970064, at *11 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 1, 2022) (mem. op.); see also Monk v. Pomberg,

263 S.W.3d 199, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

      Here, the trial court’s judgment concludes, in part, that HAS’s hearing

officer’s finding that Waldhoff violated Rule 54 was “not supported by substantial

evidence.” As we have noted, HAS’s Operations Instructions make the hearing

officer’s findings of fact unreviewable, so a substantial-evidence review was not

                                             11
appropriate.   Thus, we modify the trial court’s judgment to omit the phrase

“supported by substantial evidence nor is it,” so that it reads as follows:

      Having considered the arguments of counsel, the briefs submitted, and
      the administrative record, the Court concludes that Jared Waldhoff’s
      appeal is well-founded and that the City of Houston Adjudication
      Hearing Officer’s finding that Jared Waldhoff violated Houston Airport
      System Operating Instruction 05-03 Violation 54 (“Rule 54”) is not free
      from legal error; therefore, the sustaining of charge NOV #11082
      against Jared Waldhoff by the Adjudication Hearing Officer and the
      resultant sanction imposed by the City of Houston are and should be
      REVERSED.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b).

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

                                               Julie Countiss
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.

                                             12