Court Opinion

ID: 9863825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:54:47.484211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:21.066371
License: Public Domain

KAUFMAN, P. J.
I dissent.
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s motion under Code of Civil Procedure, section 473, to set aside a default judgment.
Appellant commenced this action to quiet title on May 11, 1953. On August 18, 1953, respondent answered, denying the allegations of the complaint and as a defense alleged that a certain action was res judicata of appellant’s rights. In addition, respondent filed a cross-complaint, alleging that the respondent was the owner of the property and praying that respondent’s title be quieted. The answer and cross-complaint were served on appellant’s attorney on August 17, 1953. On September 10, 1953, 24 days after the service of the answer and cross-complaint on appellant’s attorney, after hearing respondent’s proof, the trial court entered the default of the appellant for failure to answer the cross-complaint, and granted respondent a decree quieting title. Appellant’s motion to set aside the default was not filed until June 15, 1956. This motion was denied on July 23, 1956.
Appellant asserts that there was an abuse of discretion in denying the motion because she had no notice of the answer and cross-complaint and was not required to answer thereto, and that the judgment was therefore void.
The applicable portion of Code of Civil Procedure, section 473, is: “The court may, upon such terms as may be just, relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Application for such relief must be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and must be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after such judgment, order or proceeding was taken.
“. . . The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or *851orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.”
The granting or denying of a motion to vacate a default rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. (Baratti v. Baratti, 109 Cal.App.2d 917 [242 P.2d 22]; Shearman v. Jorgensen, 106 Cal. 483 [39 P. 863].) Although appellate courts are reluctant to disturb the order of the trial court, denials of relief must be more carefully scrutinized than orders granting relief. (Brill v. Fox, 211 Cal. 739 [297 P. 25].) The burden of showing that there are grounds for setting the default aside is on the moving party.
Appellant’s brief and the augmented record indicate that the answer and cross-complaint were served on appellant’s counsel by mail, a form of service which is proper and authorized by Code of Civil Procedure, section 465, and gave appellant notice thereof under Code of Civil Procedure, sections 442, 1012, 1013. The record also contains letters exchanged between appellant’s and respondent’s counsel which clearly indicate that appellant had notice of respondent’s intention to bring the matter to trial, thus vitiating appellant’s contention that the default should be set aside on grounds of fraud.
Appellant’s motion here was made more than two years after the entry of the default, after the expiration of the six-month period allowed in the statute set forth above. Such a motion is governed by the rules applicable to collateral attack and, in the absence of extrinsic fraud or mistake, the judgment cannot be set aside unless it is void on its face. (Borenstein v. Borenstein, 20 Cal.2d 379 [125 P.2d 465]; City of Salinas v. Luke Kow Lee, 217 Cal. 252 [18 P.2d 335].) Appellant relies chiefly on Brooks v. White, 22 Cal.App. 719 [136 P. 500], In that case, however, the answer denied plaintiff’s ownership of the property and affirmatively alleged that the defendant was the owner of the property in question, and the cross-complaint alleged that the defendant owned the property and requested that her title be quieted. In this case, the answer consisted of a denial of the allegations of the complaint and the pleas of res judicata. The issue of respondent’s title was raised only by the cross-complaint, and is therefore not a repetitious and unnecessary pleading. In an action to quiet title where the defendant does not set up ownership and title, by answer and counterclaim, a cross-complaint is proper. (Myers v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.App.*8522d 925 [172 P.2d 84] ; Crofton v. Young, 48 Cal.App.2d 452 [119 P.2d 1003].) The negligence or carelessness of a party or his attorney is not ground for collateral attack on a final judgment. (Greenwood v. Greenwood, 112 Cal.App. 691 [297 P. 589].)
I am here in agreement with the following statement from the memorandum opinion of the trial court: “It is well established that a cross-complaint commences an independent cross-action and must be answered (or demurred to) just as a complaint. Hence, although the default statutes refer only to a complaint, they are applied to the failure to answer or demur to a. cross-complaint. (Within, California Procedure, vol. 2, p. 1694; Ross v. San Diego Glazed C.P. Co., 50 Cal. App. 170 [194 P. 1059].) ” Appellant’s motion was properly denied.
Appellant contends that there is not a final judgment in this action. The appeal here is from the order denying motion to set the judgment aside, not from the judgment.
The judgment disposes of every issue in the case, including any and all rights appellant may have had in the property. That sufficiently satisfies the rule that there may be only one final judgment in an action.
“Under California procedure there is ordinarily one final judgment in an action. A cross-complaint is not considered sufficiently independent to allow a separate final judgment to be entered upon it unless the judgment or order on the cross-complaint may be considered final as to some of the parties.” (Sjoberg v. Hastorf, 33 Cal.2d 116 [199 P.2d 668].)
In this case the judgment finally settles the rights of all the parties in the action to the property involved. It is, therefore, a final judgment.
In view of the foregoing the order of the trial court finds ample support in the record.
I would affirm the order.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 4, 1957. Kaufman, P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 30, 1957.