Court Opinion

ID: 9500061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 18:10:08.579669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:00:33.466635
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00609-CV

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

TIANIKWA HAYWOOD,                                                       Appellant,

                                             v.

NO BULL INVESTMENTS, LLC,                                                 Appellee.

              On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
                         of Ellis County, Texas.

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

      In this eviction dispute, appellant Tianikwa Haywood, proceeding pro se, appeals

from a final judgment granting appellee No Bull Investments, LLC (No Bull) immediate

possession of certain real property occupied by Haywood. By eight overlapping issues,

Haywood chiefly argues that the judgment is “void” because she “is the lawful owner of
the property,” there is no contractual relationship between herself and No Bull, and she

did not “give anyone authority to sell her land.” Because there is no evidence of a landlord-

tenant relationship between the parties, we conclude that the justice court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over this case. Consequently, we set aside the judgment as void and

dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.1

                                          I.      BACKGROUND

        On or about September 14, 2018, Haywood purchased real property commonly

known as 3222 Burgundy Lane, Midlothian, TX 76065. As part of that transaction,

Haywood allegedly granted a deed of trust in favor of her mortgagee DHI Mortgage

Company LTD. Several years later, after her loan was purportedly sold to Pennymac Loan

Services, LLC, Haywood allegedly defaulted on her mortgage, and her new mortgagee

instituted non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. 2 On September 6, 2022, No Bull

purchased the subject property at a foreclosure sale with a winning bid of $323,000.

        The following day, No Bull sent Haywood written notice to vacate the property

within thirty days. The notice was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, and

regular mail. On October 7, 2022, No Bull filed a forcible detainer action against Haywood

in the local justice court. Using a form petition provided by the justice court, No Bull

selected “Other lease violations” as the grounds for the eviction, alleging that Haywood

“breached the terms of the lease (other than by failing to pay rent) as follows: Home was

        1 This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco by order of

the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Accordingly, we “must decide the case in
accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if [our] decision
otherwise would have been inconsistent with the precedent of the transferor court.” TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
        2 We use words like “allegedly” and “purportedly” to describe the transactional history of the subject

property because we are inferring these facts from the limited record before us.
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purchased at foreclosure sale, occupant failed to vacate.”

       In response to the eviction suit, Haywood filed a plea to the jurisdiction, claiming

she was entitled to possession of the property as its rightful owner. Haywood also filed a

copy of a federal lawsuit she had filed against her original mortgagee and others alleging

wrongful foreclosure, fraud, civil rights violations, and deceptive trade practices, among

other claims.3 The justice court did not rule on the plea to the jurisdiction.

       A bench trial was held on October 24, 2022. No Bull offered copies of several

documents to prove its entitlement to immediate possession: a Foreclosure Sale Deed

identifying No Bull as the purchaser of the property; a Notice to Vacate from No Bull to

Haywood demanding that she vacate the property within thirty days; and a printout of the

United States Postal Service’s tracking information showing an individual at the property

accepted delivery of the notice on September 8, 2022. No Bull did not, however, produce

a copy of the deed of trust purportedly executed by Haywood in favor of the original

mortgagee. That same day, the justice court granted No Bull a judgment of possession,

and Haywood perfected an appeal to the county court at law.

       On November 18, 2022, Haywood filed a motion to stay the eviction suit in the

county court and attached a copy of her federal complaint. The court did not rule on the

motion, and a bench trial was conducted on November 30, 2022. No Bull moved to admit

copies of the same documents it relied on in the justice court. Haywood said she had no

objection to the documents, and the court admitted them into evidence.

       Pamela Scott, one of No Bull’s owners, testified that No Bull purchased the

       3 That case is currently pending in the United States District Court, Northern District of Texas,

Dallas Division under cause number 3:22-cv-02174.
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property at a foreclosure sale and then sent written notice to Haywood to vacate the

premises. She further testified that Haywood had not paid rent to No Bull since the

company purchased the property and that despite the notice to vacate, Haywood

continued to occupy the property. On cross-examination, Scott acknowledged that there

is no contractual relationship between No Bull and Haywood. On redirect examination,

Scott confirmed that No Bull is not affiliated with Haywood’s mortgage company.

        Haywood called Paul Celestine as a witness. 4 Celestine testified that he had

investigated the circumstances of the foreclosure and concluded that Haywood’s

mortgage company and others had committed fraud against Haywood. Celestine did not

offer any details to support his conclusion. Celestine also explained that Haywood, with

his assistance, had filed a lawsuit in federal district court against her mortgage company

and others challenging the foreclosure. He asked that the eviction suit be stayed until the

conclusion of that suit. Haywood also testified. Like Celestine, she confirmed that a

federal lawsuit had been filed and asked the trial court to delay its ruling until that case

concluded.

        During closing arguments, No Bull pointed out that no court had issued a stay in

the eviction suit and argued that Haywood’s suit for wrongful foreclosure did not prevent

No Bull from pursuing its right to immediate possession of the property. The county court

entered a judgment of possession for No Bull, and this appeal ensued.

        4 Celestine attempted to represent Haywood at the hearing, and No Bull objected that Celestine

could not appear in a representative capacity because he was not a party to the suit or a licensed attorney.
Under questioning from the county court, Celestine acknowledged as much, and the county court sustained
No Bull’s objection. Consequently, Haywood represented herself at the hearing. Haywood has challenged
the county court’s ruling on appeal; however, given our disposition, we do not reach the merits of this issue.
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                                    II.     JURISDICTION

       A trial court’s authority to adjudicate a matter “is never presumed and cannot be

waived.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993).

“Appellate courts are duty-bound to examine issues of subject matter jurisdiction and may

do so sua sponte.” Allison Publ’ns, LLC v. Doe, 654 S.W.3d 210, 219 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2022, pet. denied). “Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question

of law.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

       An appellate court’s jurisdiction is coextensive with the court from which the appeal

is taken. Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2003, pet. denied). “If the trial court lacked jurisdiction, then the appellate court only has

jurisdiction to set the judgment aside and dismiss the cause.” Id. The plaintiff bears the

burden of pleading facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444. “When we review subject matter

jurisdiction sua sponte, this Court construes the pleading party’s allegations in his favor,

and where necessary, we examine the entire record to ascertain whether there is any

evidence establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Ward, 115 S.W.3d at 269.

       Jurisdiction over a forcible detainer action is vested in the justice court of the

precinct where the property is located and, on appeal, to county courts for a trial de novo.

See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a). “The appellate jurisdiction of a statutory county

court is confined to the jurisdictional limits of the justice court, and the county court has

no jurisdiction over an appeal unless the justice court had jurisdiction.” Ward, 115 S.W.3d

at 269. A justice court is expressly prohibited from determining or adjudicating title to land.

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TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(b). “Thus, neither a justice court, nor a county court on

appeal, has jurisdiction to determine the issues of title to real property in a forcible detainer

suit.” Ward, 115 S.W.3d at 269.

       “When there are issues concerning both title and possession, the issues may be

litigated in separate proceedings in different courts with appropriate jurisdiction.”

Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Yet, “when a forcible detainer action presents a genuine issue of title

so intertwined with the issue of possession that a trial court would be required to

determine title before awarding possession, then a justice court lacks jurisdiction to

resolve the matter.” Id.

                                   III.    APPLICABLE LAW

       “The sole focus of a forcible-detainer action is the right to immediate possession

of real property.” Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 478 (Tex. 2017). To

establish a superior right to immediate possession, No Bull had the burden to prove (1) No

Bull owns the property, (2) Haywood is a tenant at sufferance, (3) No Bull gave proper

notice to Haywood to vacate the premises, and (4) Haywood refused to vacate the

premises. See id.

       But “[w]ithout a landlord-tenant relationship, a justice court cannot determine the

issue of immediate possession without first determining who has title to the property.”

Goodman-Delaney v. Grantham, 484 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2015, no pet.). Stated differently, “[o]ne indication that a justice court (and county court

on appeal) is called on to adjudicate title to real estate in a forcible detainer case—and,

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thus, exceed its jurisdiction—is when a landlord tenant relationship is lacking.” Aguilar v.

Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.).

                                     IV.    ANALYSIS

       Here, No Bull alleged that it could maintain the eviction action because the trustee

purportedly conveyed title to No Bull through the Foreclosure Sale Deed and Haywood

refused to vacate the property. See Fin & Feather Club v. Leander, 415 S.W.3d 548, 557

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (“[A] conveyance is effective and title is

conveyed when an executed deed has been delivered to the grantee.”). Haywood,

though, has consistently maintained that the trustee had no authority to convey the

property to No Bull because the foreclosure was wrongful for various reasons. See Tanya

L. McCabe Tr. v. Ranger Energy LLC, 531 S.W.3d 783, 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (“A trustee’s power to sell property must be exercised in strict

compliance with the deed of trust, and a ‘foreclosure sale purchaser obtains only that title

which the trustee has authority to convey.’” (quoting Conversion Props., L.L.C. v. Kessler,

994 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. denied))); see also Fin. Freedom Sr.

Funding Corp. v. Horrocks, 294 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009,

no pet.) (“[A] deed of trust creates only a lien on property and does not constitute a

conveyance of the property.”). It remains to be seen whether her claims have merit, and

we express no opinion on the matter.

       Nevertheless, it was incumbent upon No Bull to demonstrate that the justice court

could adjudicate immediate possession without wading into title issues. See Yarbrough,

455 S.W.3d at 280. In other words, to confine the subject matter of the case to only the

                                             7
right of possession, No Bull needed to establish a landlord-tenant relationship between

the parties. See Goodman-Delaney, 484 S.W.3d at 174; Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d at 733. When

a forcible detainer suit is premised on a default under a deed of trust or contract for deed,

the right to possession may be independently determined if the document speaks to

possessory rights upon default, but in the absence of such language, the right to

possession cannot be determined without passing on the issue of title. See Reynoso v.

Dibs US, Inc., 541 S.W.3d 331, 337 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“If

the deed of trust contains a provision that in the event of a foreclosure sale, the grantor

in the deed of trust will become a tenant at sufferance, then the trial court can resolve

possession without resort to title.”); Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d at 735 (concluding that the justice

court did not have jurisdiction over forcible detainer suit because the contract for deed

between the parties “did not provide for a landlord-tenant relationship in the event of

default”); Ward, 115 S.W.3d at 271 (same); cf. Leal v. ASAS, Ltd., No. 13-10-00629-CV,

2011 WL 3366363, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 4, 2011, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (distinguishing Aguilar and finding the justice court did have jurisdiction

because the contract for deed granted the seller the right “to take possession of the

property” if the buyer defaulted).

       Here, the evidence No Bull produced referred to a publicly available deed of trust,

but the deed was never produced. Without it, the justice court was left to speculate about

the contents of the deed and whether it created an independent right to possession upon

Haywood’s alleged default. See Reynoso, 541 S.W.3d at 337; cf. Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d at

735; Ward, 115 S.W.3d at 271. Because No Bull failed to demonstrate that Haywood

                                             8
became a tenant at sufferance upon her alleged default, the justice court lacked

jurisdiction to consider the case. See Goodman-Delaney, 484 S.W.3d at 174; Aguilar, 72

S.W.3d at 733.

                                   V.     CONCLUSION

       Without reaching the merits of the appeal, we set aside the judgment of possession

and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

                                                             GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                                             Justice

Delivered and filed on the
3rd day of August, 2023.

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