Court Opinion

ID: 9827115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:11:03.602062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:23.667488
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Strenuous objection is made to our statement that “there is no question of innocent holder to be considered.” We weré inclined to believe and are still of that opinion, that, in the absence of any pleading of mistake, the bank could not be regarded as being in any position with reference to the note other than that of payee, as it áppears to be on the face of the paper. But it makes no difference whether it is to be held an original payee or a purchaser by indorsement, so far as our decision is concerned, since, according to Rigsby’s testimony, the bank was informed, before it bought the note, of Rigs-by’s right of rescission, and, thougtf 'this is disputed by the bank’s officials, an issue of fact was presented that deprived the trial court of the right to peremptorily instruct the jury for the bank on the theory that it was an innocent purchaser of the note.
Appellee charges the appellant with the “suppression of evidence” in the voluntary and intentional destruction of the writing, referred to as the agency contract, and contends that such act precluded appellant from offering any parol evidence to explain any ambiguity in the written contract that was in evidence. In the additional findings above stated, we have referred to what the record shows as to this matter. It does not conclusively appear that tEe plaintiff or his attorney have destroyed the contract referred to. So far as the record shows, no inquiry was made for this contract until appellant was asked about it on cross-examination on the witness stand. It does not appear whether the Burdick Tire & Rubber Company has a duplicate of it. The contract was, according to appellee’s version, collateral to any issue in this case. The trial court did not reject the parol evidence on this account, and evidently did not base his peremptory instruction on these facts. The jury may have imputed no improper motive to the appellant in his failure to produce the contract under the circumstances, and the court would not have been warranted in giving a peremptory instruction on the theory that appellee had destroyed the evidence of the right asserted in this case. As to the rule in such matters, see Hutchison v. Massie (Tex. Civ. App.) 226 S. W. 698, and authorities cited; Jones on Evidence, par. 18, p. 117.
The appellee makes a suggestion in the motion for rehearing that was not presented on original hearing, to wit, that appellant could only have relief by judgment for rescission ; that he was not entitled to such relief in this case because the rescission that might be awarded could only be partial; and further this could not be done without the Burdick Tire & Rubber Company being made a party to the suit. There would be some strength in this position if this were a suit for rescission or if appellant were bound to secure a judgment of court, rescinding the *212contract before it was at an end. But this is not tbe case. If tlie appellant, by contract, was given an option to-rescind, when lie exercised the option and notified the other party of such fact, the contract then was at an end by the agreement of the parties, and it did not require any further consent or acquiescence of the other party. Black on Rescission and Cancellation, par. 512. Now—
“when a contract is rescinded or canceled, whether by consent of the parties or by judgment of court, it is abrogated for all purposes except only in so far as it must be looked to with regard to the restoration of the parties to their former situation, and hence no action can be maintained which is founded upon or grows out of a rescinded contract or which is only sustainable on the theory that such a contract remains in force.” Black on Rescission and Cancellation, par. 704.
The defendant here is in the attitude of resisting the enforcement of an obligation of a contract that has been rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties thereto.
Apjiellee’s counsel has a vision of dire events to follow our decision. He sees himself defeated before a jury in this case; his adversary armed with the judgment of the Texas courts, wresting from his client in Indiana the stock of the Burdick Tire & Rubber Company, and then doubly armed, collecting the $20,000 from the tire and rubber company, “leaving the bank a ragged beggar, outside the temple of justice.” • He has, we think, unduly frightened himself. While in his mood of dejection he “thinks that no lawyer could be found in Texas who would have the hardihood to say that it would or could work out in any other way,” we confidently predict that his ability and learning will find some other way out.
The motions, except in so far as additional statements have been made in the foregoing opinion, are overruled.