Court Opinion

ID: 9956186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 14:00:57.649429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:35.005577
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-11279    Document: 90-1     Date Filed: 04/01/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 20-11279
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       CYNTHIA BEYER,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-24285-PAS
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  20-11279

       Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Cynthia Beyer, proceeding with counsel, appeals a judg-
       ment entered in favor of her former employer—Miami-Dade
       County—in an action for employment discrimination based on sex,
       hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the
       Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), and the
       Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1) and (7). On
       appeal, Beyer argues that the district court abused its discretion by
       granting Miami-Dade’s motion in limine under Federal Rule of Ev-
       idence 403 to exclude two types of documents at trial: letters of de-
       termination from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
       sion (EEOC), and decisions from a proceeding before a county
       hearing examiner and two arbitrators.
                                            I.
             Miami-Dade County employed Beyer as a firefighter from
       2004 until 2008. Between June 2006 and May 2007, Beyer received
       nine disciplinary action reports (DARs), which covered a wide
       range of alleged actions: being disrespectful to a patient, failing to
       timely respond to an emergency call, disruptively arguing about
       who drove a firetruck, refusing to leave her supervisor’s office; not
       paying for food from the commissary, and verbally abusing her
       coworkers and supervisors.
           On December 7, 2007, Airport Fire Rescue Chief Levi
       Thomas sent Fire Chief Herminio Lorenzo a letter summarizing
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       20-11279              Opinion of the Court                        3

       the DARs against Beyer and recommending her termination under
       Miami-Dade’s progressive discipline policy. Beyer was terminated,
       effective January 28, 2008.
              Beyer challenged six of her nine DARs through internal
       hearings and arbitration proceedings. Three of those challenges
       are relevant to this appeal: (1) an arbitration opinion and award
       dated September 21, 2008, rescinding her 24-hour suspension for
       DAR #4; (2) an arbitration opinion and award dated July 6, 2009,
       revoking her 48-hour suspension for DAR #5; and (3) a document
       related to a hearing held on June 18, 2008, which resulted in rec-
       ommending dismissal of DAR #8.
               On April 4, 2007, between her eighth and ninth DARs, Beyer
       filed her first Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC alleging sex
       discrimination and retaliation. On July 12, 2010, Beyer received a
       letter of determination from the EEOC regarding this 2007 filing,
       which found “reason to believe that [Title VII] violations have oc-
       curred.” After her termination in 2008, Beyer filed a second Charge
       of Discrimination with the EEOC alleging sex discrimination and
       retaliation. On August 20, 2010, Beyer received a letter of determi-
       nation from the EEOC regarding the 2008 filing, which also found
       “reason to believe that [Title VII] violations have occurred.”
             On November 29, 2011, Beyer filed a federal lawsuit against
       Miami-Dade County alleging sex discrimination and retaliation.
       On October 1, 2012, Miami-Dade County moved for summary
       judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in
       part on February 12, 2019. Miami-Dade received summary
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                   20-11279

       judgment on the retaliatory termination claim and a claim about
       time-barred evaluation. The remaining claims were set for trial.
       Miami-Dade filed a pre-trial motion in limine, seeking in relevant
       part to exclude Beyer’s two EEOC determination letters and three
       arbitration documents. The district court excluded all five docu-
       ments on the grounds that they were unduly prejudicial and would
       mislead the jury or infringe on the jury’s role as factfinder.
               Between February 18, 2020, and March 2, 2020, the district
       court conducted a jury trial. Twenty-seven witnesses appeared at
       trial, and Beyer testified on two days. The jury found for Miami-
       Dade County. The district court entered judgment in favor of the
       county. Beyer timely appealed on April 1, 2020. On appeal, Beyer
       only challenges the exclusion of the two EEOC determination let-
       ters and three arbitration documents under Rule 403.
                                            II.
              “We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
       discretion.” Proctor v. Fluor Enters., Inc., 494 F.3d 1337, 1349 n.7
       (11th Cir. 2007). We will only reverse an evidentiary ruling when
       a party “establish[es] that (1) its claim was adequately preserved;
       (2) the district court abused its discretion in interpreting or apply-
       ing an evidentiary rule; and (3) this error affected a substantial
       right.” Id. at 1349 (quotations omitted). An abuse of discretion oc-
       curs when “the district court has made a clear error of judgment or
       has applied an incorrect legal standard.” Conroy v. Abraham Chevro-
       let-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations
       omitted).
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       20-11279               Opinion of the Court                          5

              A Title VII plaintiff bears “the ultimate burden of persua-
       sion” to show the defendant discriminated against her. Alvarez v.
       Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). Claims
       brought under the FCRA are analyzed under the same legal frame-
       work as claims brought under Title VII. See Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d
       1047, 1054 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012).
              Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the district court “may
       exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially out-
       weighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair preju-
       dice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wast-
       ing time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R.
       Evid. 403. The district court has broad discretion to assess the pro-
       bative value of proffered evidence against other factors counseling
       against admissibility under Rule 403. See Crawford v. ITW Food
       Equip. Grp., LLC, 977 F.3d 1331, 1352 (11th Cir. 2020).
               District courts must exercise “sound discretion” to weigh
       Rule 403 and other factors to “decid[e] whether and what parts of
       EEOC determinations and reports should be admitted.” Barfield v.
       Orange Cnty., 911 F.2d 644, 650 (11th Cir. 1990). While EEOC de-
       termination letters are generally admissible in bench trials, we do
       not “apply the same liberal admissibility rule to determination let-
       ters in jury trials.” Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548,
       1554 (11th Cir. 1995). Admitting an EEOC letter of determination
       “may be much more likely to present the danger of creating unfair
       prejudice in the minds of the jury than in the mind of the trial
       judge, who is well aware of the limits and vagaries of
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  20-11279

       administrative determinations and better able to assign the report
       appropriate weight and no more.” Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651. In such
       circumstances, a district court may properly preclude an EEOC de-
       termination from evidence in a jury trial under Rule 403. Walker,
       53 F.3d at 1554–55.
                                            III.
              Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by pre-
       cluding the admission of the EEOC letters of determinations or the
       three arbitration documents under Rule 403. The district court did
       not commit a clear error of judgment or apply an incorrect legal
       standard. See Conroy, 375 F.3d at 1232.
              First, the district court did not abuse its discretion by decid-
       ing to exclude the two EEOC letters of determination. We have
       recognized the risk that EEOC letters could prejudice jurors, which
       led to our less liberal rule for admitting EEOC letters in jury trials.
       See Walker, 53 F.3d at 1554. Juror confusion contributes to the prej-
       udice presented by EEOC letters, and the district court’s order
       noted fear that the letters would “preclude the jury’s fresh consid-
       eration of the evidence.” Because most of the letters’ underlying
       facts were coming into trial through other channels, the district
       court found “the probative value [] cumulative and insubstantial
       when balanced against the potential harm of misleading the jury.”
       Ultimately, there was no abuse of discretion in finding that the pro-
       bative value of the letters of determination was substantially out-
       weighed by a danger of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury.
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       20-11279                   Opinion of the Court                                  7

               Similarly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
       excluding documents from a county hearing examiner and two ar-
       bitrators under Rule 403. Plaintiffs bear the burden in Title VII and
       FCRA actions. See Alvarez, 619 F.3d at 1264; Holland, 677 F.3d at
       1054 n.1. The arbitration and hearing documents at issue did not
       discuss the standard of proof used in those internal proceedings. In
       its order, the district court noted both “the different standards of
       proof applicable in those proceedings” versus in federal court, and
       the “substantial risk that the jury will uncritically defer to the con-
       clusions rendered in the prior proceedings.” Beyer’s agreement
       “that the text of the arbitration decision should not be admitted
       into evidence” bolstered the district court’s decision. When bal-
       ancing under Rule 403, we find that the district court did not abuse
       its discretion by excluding the arbitration and county hearing doc-
       uments at issue for having little probative value and a high risk of
       prejudice. 1
               AFFIRMED.

       1 Even if the district court had abused its discretion by excluding the five doc-

       uments at issue on appeal, Beyer has not established that their omission im-
       pacted a substantial right. See Proctor v. Fluor Enters., Inc., 494 F.3d 1337, 1349
       (11th Cir. 2007). Beyer only alleges that if the documents had been entered,
       certain “star witnesses for the defense” would not “have dared appear as right-
       eous, sanctimonious witnesses against Beyer during her trial.”