Court Opinion

ID: 9397592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 17:09:56.726412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:26.046129
License: Public Domain

IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                   ASHLEY RENAE PHILLIPS, Petitioner,

                                       v.

                THE HONORABLE ARYEH SCHWARTZ,
     Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
         in and for the County of MARICOPA, Respondent Judge,

              JARROD LEWIS PHILLIPS, Real Party in Interest.

                             No. 1 CA-SA 23-0023
                               FILED 5-25-2023

 Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                            No. FC2022-052081
                 The Honorable Aryeh D. Schwartz, Judge

            JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

                                     COUNSEL

State 48 Law Firm, Scottsdale
By Robert Hendricks, Samantha Brown, Stephen Vincent
Counsel for Petitioner

Goldman Law LLC, Phoenix
By Lundyn J. Garrett
Counsel for Real Party in Interest
                PHILLIPS v. HON. SCHWARTZ/PHILLIPS
                          Opinion of the Court

                                  OPINION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1            In Arizona, a couple desiring a covenant marriage must
comply with specific statutory requirements when entering the marriage,
A.R.S. § 25-901 (declaration and filing requirements), or when seeking
dissolution, A.R.S. § 25-903(1)–(8) (grounds for dissolution include
adultery, commission of a felony, abandonment, abuse, domestic violence,
substance abuse, or living separately for at least two years). If a party filing
for dissolution of a covenant marriage alleges the two-year ground but the
couple has not yet satisfied that condition, the superior court must stay the
action but can still enter temporary orders. See A.R.S. § 25-903(5).

¶2             In this dispute, Ashley Phillips (“Mother”) seeks special
action review of the superior court’s temporary orders and related rulings
in her dissolution of a covenant marriage proceeding. Because the court
exceeded its authority by staying the proceeding until the parties have
satisfied the two-year separation requirement, when Mother had not
alleged the two-year ground, we vacate the stay order to allow the parties
to proceed with litigating the merits of the grounds alleged in Mother’s
petition for dissolution.

                              BACKGROUND

¶3            In 2005, Mother and Jarrod Phillips (“Father”) entered a
covenant marriage under § 25-901. They are the parents of four minor
children. In August 2022, Mother petitioned for dissolution, alleging Father
had been emotionally and physically abusive toward her and the children,
and he “consistently abused alcohol” during the marriage. Mother sought
sole legal decision-making authority, with supervised parenting time for
Father, and asked that all marital assets and obligations be divided
equitably.

¶4           Mother then requested temporary orders to address legal
decision-making, parenting time, child support, and exclusive use of the
marital residence. In October 2022, after hearing testimony from both

                                       2
               PHILLIPS v. HON. SCHWARTZ/PHILLIPS
                         Opinion of the Court

parents and admitting exhibits, the court issued temporary orders,
awarding joint legal decision-making and allocating equal parenting time
based on a “graduated” schedule. The court also confirmed the parties’
stipulation that Mother be awarded temporary exclusive use of the marital
residence.

¶5            Addressing Mother’s allegations, the court acknowledged
there was evidence of a tumultuous marriage but found that she had
exaggerated, or perhaps misrepresented, some facts. The court determined
there was insufficient “evidence of physical, verbal, mental, or emotional
abuse, domestic violence, substance abuse, or parental fitness issues” and
concluded that none of the circumstances in § 25-903 existed. See A.R.S.
§ 25-903(1)–(8) (listing the eight grounds that justify dissolving a covenant
marriage). The court acknowledged, however, that the evidence might not
yet have been “fully developed.” Nonetheless, the court stayed the
proceedings under § 25-903(5), the two-year ground, reasoning that because
it found no other grounds had been proven, the case could only proceed
under this ground, and that a stay was required because the requisite time
had not passed.

¶6            Mother filed motions to set a resolution management
conference and amend her petition. Although it was substantially similar
to the original, the amended petition she sought to file clarified that Mother
was alleging (1) Father “committed domestic violence as defined in section
13-3601 or emotional abuse,” (2) his acts of domestic violence varied from
physical assault to harassment, (3) under § 25-903(7), he habitually abused
substances including alcohol, and (4) his mental health revealed significant
concerns. The court denied both motions, noting the case had been stayed.
The court also reasoned that Mother’s motions suggested she was trying to
circumvent § 25-903(5) by moving forward with the case “despite the
two-year stay.”

¶7             After Mother petitioned for special action, we issued an order
accepting jurisdiction because temporary orders are not appealable, and the
case raises issues of first impression and statewide importance involving
purely legal questions. See Courtney v. Foster ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 235
Ariz. 613, 615, ¶ 4 (App. 2014). We also directed the parties to focus their
remaining briefing on several issues centered around whether the court
erred in deciding the merits of the grounds for dissolution alleged in
Mother’s petition and staying the case under § 25-903(5) as part of a
temporary orders hearing.

                                      3
                PHILLIPS v. HON. SCHWARTZ/PHILLIPS
                          Opinion of the Court

                                 DISCUSSION

¶8            Mother argues the superior court erred in issuing a stay under
§ 25-903(5) and in denying her the opportunity to litigate her case, including
participation in disclosure and discovery. We review de novo the
application and interpretation of statutes. Hustrulid v. Stakebake, 253 Ariz.
569, 574, ¶ 12 (App. 2022). “Our task in statutory construction is to
effectuate the text if it is clear and unambiguous.” BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 19, ¶ 9 (2018). “We seek to harmonize and
attain consistency among related statutory provisions in the context of the
overall statutory scheme.” Gutierrez v. Fox, 242 Ariz. 259, 267, ¶ 28 (App.
2017).

¶9             A covenant marriage cannot be dissolved unless a court finds
at least one of eight statutory grounds for dissolution. A.R.S. § 25-903. The
ground at issue here, § 25-903(5), provides as follows:

       The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously
       without reconciliation for at least two years before the
       petitioner filed for dissolution of marriage. A party may file a
       petition based on this ground by alleging that it is expected that the
       parties will be living separate and apart for the required period. If
       the parties have not been separated for the required period at
       the time of the filing of the petition, the action shall not be
       dismissed for failure to state sufficient grounds and the action
       shall be stayed for the period of time remaining to meet the
       grounds based on separation, except that the court may enter
       and enforce temporary orders pursuant to § 25-315 during the
       time that the action is pending.

(Emphasis added.)

¶10           A party seeking dissolution of a covenant marriage must
include, in a verified petition, “any of the grounds prescribed in § 25-903.”
A.R.S. § 25-314(A). Also, § 25-903(5) unambiguously provides that “[a]
party may file a petition” alleging that ground. Mother alleged several
grounds for dissolution, but she did not allege § 25-903(5), implicitly
indicating that ground was not applicable or appropriate for her petition.
Nor did Mother include any reference to § 25-903(5) or a stay in her request
for temporary orders.         Instead, the issues she raised were legal
decision-making, parenting time, child support, and the use of the marital
residence. Because Mother did not seek dissolution under § 25-903(5), the
superior court erred when it found that none of the circumstances in

                                         4
                PHILLIPS v. HON. SCHWARTZ/PHILLIPS
                          Opinion of the Court

§ 25-903(1)–(8) existed and then issued a stay based on § 25-903(5) even
though Mother had not alleged that ground in her petition.

¶11           Father argues the court did not err because it analyzed
Mother’s evidence and concluded she failed to meet her burden for grounds
(1)–(4) and (6)–(8), leaving ground (5) as the only option to continue the
proceeding. His argument fails because nothing in § 25-903(5) or in the
related statutes suggests a court may consider that ground, or any other
ground, when it is not alleged in a petition for dissolution of a covenant
marriage. See Fenn v. Fenn, 174 Ariz. 84, 87 (App. 1993) (“Every power that
the superior court exercises in a dissolution proceeding must find its source
in the supporting statutory framework.”).

¶12            The court’s decision to stay all proceedings in this dissolution
also conflicts with the limited scope and purpose of temporary orders. See
Gutierrez, 242 Ariz. at 268, ¶ 34 (holding that temporary orders are of a
transitory nature and courts are not required to make specific findings); see
also A.R.S. § 25-316(D)(1) (stating that temporary orders do not prejudice
the rights of the parties that are to be adjudicated at later hearings); Smith
v. Smith, No. 1 CA-CV 20-0159, 2021 WL 1759207, at *4, ¶ 19, n.1 (Ariz. App.
May 4, 2021) (mem. decision) (explaining that “temporary orders are based
on a truncated hearing with little opportunity for discovery” while “final
orders are generally entered after an evidentiary hearing after the
completion of discovery”).

¶13           Topics appropriate for temporary order hearings are outlined
in § 25-316(A) and include interim orders for child support, legal
decision-making, parenting time, use and possession of marital property or
home, spousal maintenance, and attorneys’ fees, and “[o]ther relief deemed
necessary pending final resolution of the issues of the parties.” Because the
scope of temporary orders hearings is narrow, nothing mandates that a
party have evidence ready to prove all grounds alleged in the petition for
dissolution, and certainly not with finality. See A.R.S. § 25-316(D)(2), (4)
(temporary orders may be revoked or modified, and they terminate when
the final decree is entered or when a petition is dismissed). And it is the
parties, rather than the court, that determine the scope of the matters to be
decided at the temporary orders stage based on the relief the parties are
seeking through their pleadings and motions. See A.R.S. § 25-316(A)
(“[E]ither party may move for temporary orders.”). Here, neither party
sought relief in the form of a final ruling on the grounds for dissolution
alleged in Mother’s petition, and Mother did not seek a stay under
§ 25-903(5).

                                      5
                PHILLIPS v. HON. SCHWARTZ/PHILLIPS
                          Opinion of the Court

¶14           Father also argues that Mother is not entitled to another
hearing to prove the grounds in her petition because the temporary orders
hearing encompassed both § 25-403 (legal decision-making) and § 25-903
(grounds for dissolution). Given that Mother’s allegations arose from the
same facts, Father contends the temporary orders hearing gave her an
adequate opportunity to prove her allegations. He notes that Mother had
the chance to present testimony and evidence and conduct
cross-examination. He also asserts the court did not err in denying
Mother’s motion to amend because it did not contain any new factual
allegations. Father’s position fails to acknowledge the truncated procedure
for temporary orders, which may often involve presentation of limited
evidence at relatively brief hearings that occur before the parties have been
able to engage in meaningful discovery. Supra, ¶ 13. Thus, a party seeking
dissolution of a covenant marriage has the right to prove the existence of
the grounds listed in § 25-903 outside the narrow constraints of a temporary
orders hearing.

¶15            While § 25-903 details the grounds for the dissolution of a
covenant marriage, § 25-905 allows a party to petition for temporary orders
at any time throughout the proceedings. Although § 25-903 states that “the
court shall not enter a decree of dissolution” unless it finds at least one of
the grounds in subsections (1)–(8) is proven, there is no requirement that
the court must decide whether any of those grounds alleged in a petition
have been proven at the outset of a proceeding. And because a finding on
at least one ground is necessary for a final decree, the parties are entitled to
engage in the litigation process, including disclosure and discovery, before
a final determination. We see no reason, and Father offers none, why a
covenant marriage should be treated differently than a non-covenant
marriage in allowing the parties to litigate their disputes under applicable
procedural rules. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 1(a) (“These rules govern
procedures in family law cases and all matters arising under Title 25 of the
Arizona Revised Statutes.”).

¶16            Because Mother had not alleged that she was seeking
dissolution of her covenant marriage under subsection (5) in her petition
for dissolution, the court erred by issuing a stay. The court also erred in
attempting to resolve the grounds for dissolution through a temporary
order and by denying Mother’s motion to amend. Accordingly, Mother has
the right to prove the grounds alleged in her amended petition by engaging
in the dissolution process outlined under the pertinent statutes and rules.

                                       6
               PHILLIPS v. HON. SCHWARTZ/PHILLIPS
                         Opinion of the Court

                             CONCLUSION

¶17          We vacate the superior court’s order imposing a stay of the
dissolution proceeding under § 25-903(5) and the portions of the court’s
temporary orders rejecting Mother’s alleged grounds for dissolution. We
deny Father’s request for attorneys’ fees because he cites no supporting
substantive authority. See Zambrano v. M & RC II LLC, 254 Ariz. 53, 66, ¶ 49
(2022) (denying fee request for failure “to state the basis for the request”
under ARCAP 21(a)(2)).

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

                                       7