Court Opinion

ID: 9582993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:33:40.451743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:24.905681
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring specially in part.
I dissent to that part of the majority opinion concerning the charge of driving under the influence (DUI). I agree with the result reached in that part of the majority opinion which concerns the charge of driving while the license to do so is suspended (DUS).
In State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 181 (N.D.1985), I suggested in a concurring opinion that statements in the majority opinion may well cast doubt upon the validity of an initial conviction in municipal court when a defendant has not been represented by a lawyer and there is no evidence on the record that the defendant has been advised of and waived his right to counsel without regard to any issue of enhancement of punishment. Although Rule 44, N.D.R.Crim.P., relying on Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), is to the contrary, it appears to me that the logical conclusion of the majority opinion is that Rule 44 is also invalid. Relying upon the majority opinion in Orr that absent a valid waiver of the right to counsel on the record, a resulting uncounseled DUI conviction could not, under Article I, Section 12, North Dakota Constitution, be used to enhance a term of incarceration for a subsequent DUI offense, the majority here concludes that there is nothing that distinguishes this case from Orr. In Orr I did not agree that the issue was of constitutional dimension and I cannot agree with the conclusion reached here in the majority opinion.
The result reached by the majority is, of course, contrary to Rule 32(c)(2), N.D.R. Crim.P., which the majority cites but does not quote. That rule permits the report of the presentence investigation to “contain any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, ...” The previous DUI conviction is, of course, a part of the defendant’s prior criminal record because, as recognized in Orr, it is a valid conviction. There is no doubt that knowledge of the conviction of a similar offense is helpful to the judge in imposing sentence.
I am concerned that the majority opinion is an unnecessary restriction on the discretion of the sentencing judge. Although the majority opinion gives lip service to the fact that the widest possible range of information is permitted in the exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion, this opinion is, of course, limiting. The majority opinion justifies its contrary result on the premise that there are constitutional limitations on what may be relied upon in sentencing. Because, as stated in my special concurrence in Orr, I do not agree that the use of a prior uncounseled conviction rises to the height of a constitutional issue, I do not agree with the majority’s justification of limiting the sentencing judge’s discretion in this instance.
If Cummings had only been charged with, but not convicted of, a previous offense, or charged but not tried prior to sentencing, such matters could be considered by the sentencing judge. Williams v. People of State of New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). Cf. State v. Smith, 238 N.W.2d 662 (N.D.1976) [raising but not deciding the issue]; United States v. Hill, 688 F.2d 18. (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074, 103 S.Ct. 498, 74 L.Ed.2d 638 (1982). To conclude that such information can be permissibly relied upon but that Cummings’s previous uncounseled but valid conviction cannot be relied upon is, at best, inconsistent and can only lead to further restrictions on the discretion of the sentencing judge.
Finally, the opinion notes that the State “conceded it could not show Cummings had waived counsel in his 1983 DUI conviction ...” Here, at least, it appears to me the *474burden should be placed upon Cummings to prove he had not waived counsel before he should be permitted to raise the objection to the use of the prior conviction. Rule 32, N.D.R.Crim.P., provides that the defendant and his counsel may allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report and that the trial court must either make a finding as to the allegation or determine that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing. As noted in Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d, Sec. 526, the only real limitation on the information a judge may consider is that it is error if it can be shown that he relied on information that was in fact not true. I do not believe that it necessarily follows from the majority opinion in Orr that the burden of proof must also be on the State in these proceedings.
Although the majority opinion in this case sees “nothing that distinguishes this case from Orr” they are, of course, different. Orr was concerned with a mandatory sentence for a second offense. We are here concerned with the exercise of a judge’s discretion in sentencing. Although it may be suspiciously fortuitous that a trial judge will inform us that the sole reason for the sentence was a prior, un-counseled conviction of DUI, Section 12.1-32-02(5), N.D.C.C., does require that the sentence be accompanied by a written statement by the court setting forth the reasons for imposing the particular sentence. Nevertheless, the judge was not compelled to sentence more harshly because of the uncounseled conviction, whereas in Orr we determined the judge sentenced under the mandatory sentencing provision for a second offense. I do not believe Orr requires the judge to totally ignore the previous offense in sentencing; rather, because the sentence is discretionary, whereas it was mandatory in Orr, the judge should be able to take into consideration the previous offense and the fact, if it is fact, that the previous offense was un-counseled. The majority opinion removes that discretion from the judge on the premise that such a result is predestined by our State Constitution and by the majority decision in Orr. For the reasons stated above, I cannot agree with that conclusion.
DUS
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion with regard to the DUS charge. I do so on the basis of the ameliorating amendment rationale contained in the majority opinion. I do not concede that Section 12.1-01-01, N.D.C.C., is a saving clause which extended beyond the time that the “new” criminal code took effect, July 1, 1975. See 1973 N.D.Sess.Laws, ch. 116, sec. 42. Title 12.1 was effective on that date. Other statutes enacted subsequent to that time may have been codified as part of Title 12.1 but are not governed by Section 12.1-01-01 which refers only to Title 12.1.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., concurs.