Court Opinion

ID: 9578442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:45:20.863231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:47.341998
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the lower court.
The complaint alleges several specifications of carelessness and recklessness op the part of the defendant. In order to create a jury issue the plaintiff needs to submit evidence as to only one specification. Specifications (a), (b) and a portion of (f) are as follows:
*296“(a) In. prescribing or ordering the electric heating pad for the Plaintiff knowing full well that the Plaintiff was in an unconscious or only partially conscious condition and was not capable of doing anything to pro.tect herself from a severe burn most likely to result therefrom.
“(b) In prescribing or ordering the electric heating pad to be placed under or on the Plaintiff in her unconscious or only partially conscious condition without prescribing any conditions or limitations whatever in its use by the nurses.
“(f) After ordering and/or prescribing the various potent drugs and/or medicines which resulted in the Plaintiff being rendered unconscious or only partially conscious, in o.rdering and/or prescribing the unrestricted and unlimited use of the electric heating pad . . .”
When the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference it becomes the duty of the trial judge and of this Court to let the jury decide the issues. In my view there is clearly evidence from which the jury might reasonably conclude that Dr. Pearson failed to use due care by failing to more specifically instruct the nurses relative to the use of the heating pad.
I agree with the majority opinion wherein it held that there was evidence warranting the conclusion that the injury was a burn caused or precipitated by the heating pad, and agree that there was evidence warranting the conclusion that Mrs. Burke was not able to care for herself and that her ability to care for herself was impaired by sedation from the seven drugs. I cannot agree that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole of the evidence is that Dr. Pearson fully discharged his duty to his patient and was not at least negligent.
When a trial Judge directs a verdict, in effect he says to the jury: “Reasonable men cannot disagree about the facts in this case; the jury’s judgment is not needed; you must deny the plaintiff recovery.” Simply stated, the facts in this *297case just do not warrant such action on the part of the judge. In the determination of negligence, one must take into consideration all o,f the circumstances. One of the considerations was the knowledge Dr. Pearson had relative to the condition of his patient before she entered the hospital and the condition he created by directing the use of the seven drugs. He testified that he had treated Mrs. Burke for several years for chronic back disease and that she was hospitalized to determine whether the organic causes of her back injury had become worse or not. He stated that if they were not worse, “ . . . then we planned to transfer her to a psychiatric hospital for treatment of her agitation and depression.” In actuality he committed her to the State Mental Hospital in Columbia three or four months later.
Dr. Pearson knew or should have known better than any o.ther person the true condition of Mrs. Burke, and the effects of the combination of drugs he was administering. A doctor is duty bound to give to the nurses and others instructions necessary to ensure the safety of his patient.
“Failure of a physician o,r surgeon to give the patient or his family or attendants all necessary and proper instructions as to the care and attention to be given to the patient and the cautions to be observed is negligence which will render him liable for resulting injury” 70 C. J. S. Physicians and Surgeons § 48h (1951).
“What are reasonable care, skill, and diligence depends largely on the circumstances of the particular case and on the duty to be performed, the degree requisite being in proportion to the nature of the case. Thus it has been held that reasonable care must be proportionate to the risks and dangers to be apprehended and guarded against in the particular case and to the importance and delicacy of the undertaking, and that such care and attention must be given as are required by the exigencies of the case.” 70 C. J. S. Physicians and Surgeons § 45 (1951).
■ The instruction “heating pad to back” may have been sufficient for unsedated patients with no mental difficulty. Appar*298ently the nurses did for this patient what nurses would normally do for a patient sensitive to pain because the doctor gave instructions normally given for a patient sensitive to pain. Such instructions were obviously insufficient. The heating pad burned the patient. The general instructions printed on the hospital heating pad can be of little comfort to the doctor in this case. Such instructions were general and fo,r normal use. It cannot be said as a matter of law that no other instructions were required under the facts here developed.
Nor do I think that medical testimony was required to prove negligence. The case involved evidence which a jury could evaluate independent of medical testimony, or at least with the aid of medical testimony. To say, as did the medical witnesses, that the giving of instructions “heating pad to back” is standard procedure overlooks the heart of the issue. The patient was not a standard case. Her ailments and condition were such as to require special instructions. At least the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference on this point and the jury should have been permitted to say which inference was more plausible.
The other exceptions challenging the introduction of evidence and the instructions of the judge to the jury are without merit. v
I would affirm the judgment of the lower court.