Court Opinion

ID: 9941286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:14:03.808972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:29.159017
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0110-MR

VANESSA BURNS                                                         APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE CHARLES L. CUNNINGHAM, JR., JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 21-CI-005435

BEATRICE AISTROP                                                        APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   REVERSING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: In 2021, Appellee, Beatrice Aistrop, tripped and fell while

walking on a public sidewalk in Louisville, Kentucky. As a result of injuries

sustained, she filed suit in Jefferson Circuit Court seeking damages against the City

of Louisville and Appellant, Vanessa Burns. Ms. Burns is the Director of

Louisville Metro Public Works, which is responsible for solid waste management,

traffic signals, electrical maintenance, road maintenance, road signs and markings,

and engineering. Sidewalks are included in road maintenance.
              The Jefferson County Attorney filed a motion to dismiss the City of

Louisville, and Ms. Burns in her official capacity, based on the doctrine of

sovereign immunity. The court granted the motion. Ms. Burns, in her individual

capacity, filed a motion summary judgment based on her qualified immunity,

which the court denied. The court reasoned in part as follows: “[s]omeone has to

be the individual responsible for keeping sidewalks safe in our community. Burns

seems to be that person.” Ms. Burns appeals to this Court as a matter of right. For

the following reasons, we reverse.1

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

              As an initial matter, we note that the denial of a motion for summary

judgment is generally considered an interlocutory order and is not appealable.

However, an order denying a substantial claim of absolute immunity is

immediately appealable even in the absence of a final order. Breathitt County Bd.

of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Ky. 2009). As a result, we have

jurisdiction to address Ms. Burns’ claim that the circuit court improperly denied

her motion for summary judgment.

1
  The record does not indicate whether notice required by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
411.110 has been satisfied here. To be clear, this issue has not been raised. We note this
provision only to indicate its potential relevancy in future cases. Compare Muhammad v. City of
Louisville, No. 3:05CV-506-H, 2006 WL 3043422, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 18, 2006), with Settle v.
Franconia, No. 2022-CA-0099-MR, 2023 WL 3556331, at *2 (Ky. App. May 19, 2023), review
denied (Dec. 6, 2023).

                                             -2-
                A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” CR2 56.03. “Because no factual issues are involved and only a legal issue is

before the court on the motion for summary judgment, we do not defer to the trial

court and our review is de novo.” Univ. of Louisville v. Sharp, 416 S.W.3d 313,

315 (Ky. App. 2013) (citation omitted). With this standard in mind, we turn to the

substantive law and the facts of the present case.

                                         ANALYSIS

                The sole question on appeal is whether the circuit court properly

denied Ms. Burns’ motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.

Qualified official immunity applies to a negligent act or omission by a public

officer or employee for his or her “(1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those

involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation,

decision, and judgment . . . ; (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the

employee’s authority.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001) (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (1979)). However, qualified immunity

does not extend to the negligent performance of ministerial acts. Id. In Marson v.

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                            -3-
Thomason, 438 S.W.3d 292 (Ky. 2014), the Kentucky Supreme Court observed

that the distinction between ministerial and discretionary duties is often difficult to

discern. Id. at 296.

                     At its most basic, a ministerial act is “one that
             requires only obedience to the orders of others, or when
             the officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and imperative,
             involving merely execution of a specific act arising from
             fixed and designated facts.” [Yanero, 65 S.W.3d] at 522.
             . . . In reality, a ministerial act or function is one that the
             government employee must do “without regard to his or
             her own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of
             the act to be performed.” 63C Am.Jur.2d Public Officers
             and Employees § 318 (updated through Feb. 2014). In
             other words, if the employee has no choice but to do the
             act, it is ministerial.

             On the other hand, a discretionary act is usually
             described as one calling for a “good faith judgment call[]
             made in a legally uncertain environment.” Yanero, 65
             S.W.3d at 522. It is an act “involving the exercise of
             discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation,
             decision, and judgment.” Id. Given the volume of
             litigation on the subject, it is clear that these definitions
             are not a model of clarity. No doubt, this is due to their
             having been written in general, somewhat sweeping
             terms.

Id. at 297. In addition to the aforementioned authority, we find Wales v. Pullen

particularly instructive. 390 S.W.3d 160, 167 (Ky. App. 2012).

             In Wales, Plaintiff sued Ted Pullen, the Director of the Louisville

Metro Department of Public Works at the time, for injuries resulting from the

alleged failure to remove a downed tree that was in the roadway or otherwise warn

                                           -4-
motorists about the tree. Id. at 163. The trial court granted Pullen summary

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed and

explained:

             As the director of public works, Pullen presided over a
             department with eight divisions and nearly 800
             employees. . . . We agree with the trial court that none of
             these duties involve obedience to the orders of others or
             the execution of any specific act, such that they are
             ministerial in nature. Thus, Pullen’s duties were
             discretionary in nature under Yanero. Pullen was entitled
             to qualified immunity[.]

Id. at 167. In contrast, Ms. Aistrop cites to an earlier unpublished decision by this

Court also involving Director Pullen. See Pullen v. Conder, No. 2009-CA-000450-

MR, 2010 WL 4295582, at *3 (Ky. App. Oct. 29, 2010). Therein, the Court

reasoned:

                     In his complaint, Conder alleged that Pullen had a
             duty to maintain the sidewalk. In his answer, Pullen
             denied any such duty. Therefore, at this stage of the
             litigation, the question before the court was: did Pullen
             have a duty to repair defective sidewalks? In his
             affidavit, Pullen stated that he makes decisions regarding
             a number of things, including what “sites requir[e]
             maintenance, remodeling, and repair.” Furthermore,
             Pullen stated that his Department responds to citizen
             complaints about sidewalk defects. Pullen did not state
             that he or the Department can choose not to repair a
             sidewalk. Therefore, Pullen admitted that the
             Department has responsibility for repairing sidewalks, an
             admission confirmed by the Department’s website.
             Because repairing sidewalks is mandatory, doing so is a
             ministerial function of Pullen’s office. How to make
             repairs and, possibly, when to make those repairs, would

                                         -5-
             be discretionary functions of Pullen’s office, but,
             on the record as it currently exists, making repairs
             is ministerial. Just as the coaches in Yanero were
             required to enforce the rule regarding the use of
             batting helmets, the Department and Pullen, as its
             head, are required to maintain sidewalks. Because
             that function is not discretionary but ministerial,
             the trial court correctly denied Pullen’s motion for
             summary judgment on the issue of qualified
             immunity.

Id.

             On balance, the present case is more like Wales than Pullen. Wales is

also the more recent of the two, and is published. And we agree with Ms. Burns

that the record here is more complete than in Pullen, and indicates the

discretionary nature of her executive role. More precisely, her deposition

testimony indicates that no individuals were specifically tasked with proactively

assessing the concrete labyrinth crisscrossing our Commonwealth’s largest Metro

area. However, once a complaint was filed, an assessment of the alleged defect

would be made by those Metro employees or agents possessing the relevant

expertise and skill necessary. The most poorly rated sidewalks would receive

repair priority. There is no indication that Ms. Burns had any connection to the

day-to-day workings of the specific subordinate subdivision tasked with repairing

sidewalks. Therefore, at least in this instance, Ms. Burns’ acts and functions

pertaining to sidewalk repair were discretionary.

                                         -6-
              And of course, the entirety of this system of assessment and repair is

confined by the discretionary fiscal realities facing all of our municipalities – from

our towering towns to our most humble hamlets. Nevertheless, we find Ms. Burns’

final argument unconvincing – that the present action was barred by the Claims

Against Local Governments Act (CALGA), KRS 65.200 et seq. A similar issue

was addressed by this Court in Russell v. City of Owensboro, No. 2012-CA-

002006-MR, 2014 WL 1407238, at *5 (Ky. App. Apr. 11, 2014). Therein, the

Court held:

              the City’s Sidewalk Plan falls squarely within the quasi-
              legislative authority of the City and its decision regarding
              which sidewalks to repair was made in its discretion
              when allocating the City’s resources. Consequently, we
              hold it is exempt from liability under the CALGA.

Unlike the present case, the holding was confined to the defendant, the City of

Owensboro. And the plan at issue, the “Sidewalk Policy and Construction and

Maintenance Plan,” was expressly established “because the City lacks the physical

and financial ability to repair the many miles of sidewalks within the City.” Id. at

*1. No such evidence exists in the present case. Therefore, while the reasoning in

Russell may be sound, it is distinguishable from the present case, is unpublished,

and has not been applied on its merits since its rendition in 2014. Although

instructive, Russell is certainly not dispositive here, and we decline the invitation

to extend it further.

                                          -7-
                               CONCLUSION

           For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

denial of summary judgment.

           COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.

           JONES, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND DOES NOT FILE SEPARATE
OPINION.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                   BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Michael J. O’Connell                    Damon Blake Willis
Jefferson County Attorney               Louisville, Kentucky

Richard Elder
Roy C. Denny
Assistant Jefferson County Attorneys
Louisville, Kentucky

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