Court Opinion

ID: 9431305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:31:56.07043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:27.914519
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia join, dissenting.
In my opinion the Court’s decision is not faithful to the plain language of the statute,1 to the legislative compromise *127that made it possible to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 or to our prior interpretation of the very provision the Court construes today.3 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

 In a deferral State, §706(c) of Title VII, 86 Stat. 104, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(c), provides that “no charge may be filed . . . before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local lavt, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated.” (Emphasis added.) The Court reasons that as used in § 706(c) “termination” might medn a temporary “cessation in time” and thus is sufficiently ambiguous to require deference to the EEOC’s interpretation. Ante, at 115— 116. I doubt that Congress chose the word “terminated” to convey something other than absolute finality, which the majority recognizes is the meaning the word bears “more naturally or more frequently in common usage.” Ante, at 115. The context in which the word “terminate” is used may inform the reader that the termination being referred to is an ending at or for a particular time. This is true of the examples given by the majority. See ibid. In the phrase “terminating work on the job-site knowing that it will resume the next day,” it is the words used after the word “terminating” that convey the promise of future events, not the word “terminating” itself. The context in which “terminate” is used in § 706(c), however, negates the possibility that future activity by the State was contemplated, because Congress provided that state proceedings must have been earlier terminated.
The majority seeks to construe the statute in a manner that preserves an opportunity for a State to reactivate its proceedings upon the conclusion of federal proceedings. Although such an advantage may be prudent, it is not conferred by the statute, and the failure to afford it does not “tur[n] on its head” the purposes of the statute. See ante, at 120. That the statute operates to prevent concurrent jurisdiction over claims filed over 240 days *127after the prohibited practice occurred does not frustrate congressional intent to protect state enforcement efforts. What is being denied is not state, but federal intervention.

 See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 819-822 (1980). Although it is perfectly clear that nothing in the legislative history contains any suggestion that complainants in deferral States were to be allowed to proceed with less diligence than those in nondeferral States (who must file within 180 days), the Court assumes that the entire class of claims filed after 240 days is entitled to specially favored treatment. See ante, at 120-121; Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F. 2d 811, 822-826, 829-830 (CA7 1972).

 In Mohasco, supra, at 821, we stated:
“Congress chose to prohibit the filing of any federal charge until after state proceedings had been completed or until 60 days had passed, whichever came sooner.”