Court Opinion

ID: 9554223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 14:00:58.413457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:23.985432
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1376   Document: 20     Page: 1   Filed: 08/08/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                 GEORGE PIECZENIK,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2023-1376
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:22-cv-00111-LAS, Senior Judge Loren A. Smith.
                  ______________________

                 Decided: August 8, 2023
                 ______________________

    GEORGE PIECZENIK, Stockton, NJ, pro se.

     HAYLEY A. DUNN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, GARY LEE HAUSKEN.
                  ______________________

   Before PROST, CLEVENGER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
Case: 23-1376    Document: 20      Page: 2    Filed: 08/08/2023

 2                                            PIECZENIK v. US

      Dr. George Pieczenik brought claims of infringement of
 U.S. Patent No. 5,866,363 (“the ’363 patent”) against the
 United States in the Court of Federal Claims. The Court
 of Federal Claims dismissed Dr. Pieczenik’s complaint,
 concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
 the claims as pleaded. For the reasons outlined below, we
 affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
      Dr. Pieczenik is the owner and sole inventor of the ’363
 patent, titled “method and means for sorting and identify-
 ing biological information.” (capitalization normalized).
 His complaint alleged, among other things, that “[b]egin-
 ning at least as early as 1993, various components
 of . . . the DOD, NIH and the NCI have entered into fund-
 ing agreements, grants, clinical therapy, [and] licensing
 agreements with various pharmaceutical [companies] and
 individuals who have a history of using the technology and
 products described in the ‘363’ [patent] for clinical and re-
 search purposes including . . . development and distribu-
 tion of monoclonal antibodies, phage display libraries,
 recombinant antibodies, recombinant antigens and pep-
 tides.” S.A. 1009. 1 It also alleged that the government had
 “licensed [U.S. Patent No. 7,041,441] to various pharma-
 ceutical companies,” which amounted to “a direct taking of
 the invention first described in [the ’363 patent].” Id. The
 complaint further attached several postings in the Federal
 Register describing various patents and provisional appli-
 cations as “owned by an agency of the U.S. Government
 and . . . available for licensing.” J.A. 1011–13. It alleged
 that the “work” in these postings “takes from” the ’363 pa-
 tent. Id.

     1   S.A. refers to the supplemental appendix submit-
 ted by the government.
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 PIECZENIK v. US                                             3

     In addition to mentioning the Takings Clause and al-
 leging that certain actions described were takings, the com-
 plaint also alleged that it was “an action under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1498(a) . . . for the unlicensed use, manufacture[,] and in-
 fringement by or on behalf of the United States” of the ’363
 patent. S.A. 1008.
     The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject-
 matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Court
 of Federal Claims granted the motion on 12(b)(1) grounds
 while noting that dismissal under 12(b)(6) may have also
 been warranted because the complaint “alleges little more
 than conclusory statements of liability.” S.A. 1005 n.1.
 The court concluded that the complaint cited two jurisdic-
 tional grounds, neither of which were supported: (1) the
 Takings Clause; and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). S.A. 1002 (cit-
 ing complaint at ¶¶ 2, 4).
     As for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act based on the
 Takings Clause, the Court of Federal Claims determined
 that “patent claims against the federal government, or its
 contractors, must be pursued . . . exclusively under 28
 U.S.C. § 1498.” S.A. 1003. Thus, the court concluded that
 the Tucker Act and Takings Clause could not supply juris-
 diction over Dr. Pieczenik’s claims.
     With respect to jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a),
 the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the complaint
 lacked sufficient factual allegations to establish the condi-
 tions of the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity un-
 der 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Specifically, after concluding that
 Dr. Pieczenik’s claim rested only on a theory of use or man-
 ufacture for the government—a conclusion that Dr. Piec-
 zenik does not challenge—the Court of Federal Claims
 determined that there were insufficient allegations either
 of benefit to or authorization by the government.
 S.A. 1004–05. The court therefore dismissed the com-
 plaint.
Case: 23-1376    Document: 20      Page: 4    Filed: 08/08/2023

 4                                            PIECZENIK v. US

    Dr. Pieczenik timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
 under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
                         DISCUSSION
     We review the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of a mo-
 tion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds de novo. Estes
 Exp. Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir.
 2014). Because “[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in
 nature,” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), pre-
 requisites for the government’s waiver of immunity are
 evaluated under 12(b)(1). A plaintiff “bears the burden of
 showing that the United States waived immunity for his
 suit in the Court of Federal Claims.” Booth v. United
 States, 990 F.2d 617, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Blueport
 Co. v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
 We “accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the
 plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in
 favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United
 States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 2
     The Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that it
 lacked Tucker Act jurisdiction over Dr. Pieczenik’s in-
 fringement claims premised on the Takings Clause. As
 this court has explained, “28 U.S.C. § 1498 provides the
 only avenue for a patent owner to bring an action against
 the government for patent infringement.” Golden v. United
 States, 955 F.3d 981, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The Tucker Act
 does not waive sovereign immunity for claims sounding in
 tort and “a patent infringement action ‘is one sounding in
 tort.’” Id. (quoting Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S.
 163, 169 (1894)). Further, there is no support for Dr. Piec-
 zenik’s suggestion that a contractual interest supports

     2   Here, the government did not raise any factual dis-
 putes about the complaint’s allegations in its 12(b)(1) mo-
 tion to dismiss. Cf. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch.
 Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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 PIECZENIK v. US                                           5

 jurisdiction here. See Appellant’s Br. 7–8. The complaint
 does not allege an agreement between Dr. Pieczenik and
 any other party, so Tucker Act jurisdiction based on breach
 of (or interference with) contractual rights is also inapt.
     Next, we also agree that the complaint’s allegations do
 not support jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Section
 1498(a) serves as a limited waiver of the government’s sov-
 ereign immunity “[w]henever an invention described in
 and covered by a patent of the United States is used or
 manufactured by or for the United States without license
 of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture
 the same.” 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). This waiver of immunity
 is also forum specific, allowing only actions brought in the
 Court of Federal Claims. Id. Dr. Pieczenik’s complaint
 was appropriately dismissed because it does not present a
 nonconclusory allegation of use or manufacture of his in-
 vention “for the United States” within the meaning of
 § 1498(a).
      An accused use is “for the United States” where it is
 (1) for the government’s benefit; and (2) authorized or con-
 sented to by the government. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
 States, 534 F.2d 889, 897–98 (Ct. Cl. 1976); see also 28
 U.S.C. § 1498(a). A government contractor’s use is for the
 government’s benefit when undertaken pursuant to a gov-
 ernment contract that provides services the government
 sought. Sevenson Env’t Servs., Inc. v. Shaw Env’t, Inc., 477
 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Even when a third party’s
 use is pursuant to such a contract, it is still not “for the
 United States” unless the government provided authoriza-
 tion and consent specifically for the accused use. Id. at
 1367. Here, the complaint provides a conclusory allegation
 that “[p]ursuant to cooperative agreement and grant docu-
 ments and correspondence described below . . . [govern-
 mental agencies] granted ‘authorization and consent’ to
 various laboratories for all use and manufacture of the
 technologies recited in the ’363 [p]atent in the performance
 of the relevant grants and contracts.” S.A. 1008. The
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 6                                            PIECZENIK v. US

 complaint does not describe those agreements and grants.
 Instead, the complaint generally alleges that “[t]he ’363
 [i]nvention is used in research and clinical treatments” and
 that the government has entered into agreements with en-
 tities that “have a history of using the technology and prod-
 ucts described in the” ’363 patent. S.A. 1009. These
 allegations are plainly insufficient. See Crow Creek Sioux
 Tribe v. United States, 900 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir.
 2018) (holding that facial challenges to subject-matter ju-
 risdiction are subject to the “plausibility” requirement and
 that conclusory statements are not sufficient). Even as-
 suming the government was a beneficiary of one of these
 agreements, there are no factual allegations linking the ac-
 cused use to the alleged agreements. In fact, there are no
 factual allegations linking the accused use to any authori-
 zation and consent by the government, whether pursuant
 to these agreements or otherwise. 3 Since the complaint
 does not contain sufficient factual allegations of an accused
 use “for the United States,” the Court of Federal Claims

     3    Because the complaint here does not provide any
 nonconclusory allegation of authorization we need not ad-
 dress the extent to which that requirement could blend
 with the overall requirements of proving a claim under
 § 1498(a). Cf. Spruill v. MSPB, 978 F.2d 679, 686–88 (Fed.
 Cir. 1992) (discussing confusing “the question of subject
 matter jurisdiction . . . with the question of entitlement to
 relief” where “the facts which establish jurisdiction are in-
 tertwined with the facts which determine the merits of the
 cause”). Further, since this motion to dismiss involved a
 facial attack on the complaint, any procedural concerns re-
 lated to early-stage factual attacks on intertwined merits
 questions are inapplicable here. Cf. CNA v. United States,
 535 F.3d 132, 143 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing different cir-
 cuits’ approaches to this concern).
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 PIECZENIK v. US                                           7

 correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction under
 § 1498(a). 4
                        CONCLUSION
     We have considered Dr. Pieczenik’s remaining argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive. We affirm the Court
 of Federal Claims’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
                        AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.

     4   We decline to reach Dr. Pieczenik’s cursory request
 on appeal that he be “given an opportunity to file an
 amended complaint, if that be necessary,” Appellant’s
 Br. 12, because he did not move for leave to amend or file a
 proposed amended complaint at the Court of Federal
 Claims in the first instance. Cf. Refaei v. United States,
 725 F. App’x 945, 951–52 (Fed. Cir. 2018).