Court Opinion

ID: 9698602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:55:44.061055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.158374
License: Public Domain

Murphy, J.
(dissenting). Although defendant was charged with four separate crimes, a nolo contendere plea was offered on two of the crimes and accepted by the court because it was represented to the court that defendant had no memory of the events surrounding the charged crimes. Unlike a guilty plea where the defendant must present a factual recitation of the events to permit a trial court to accept the plea, the court in a nolo contendere plea is proscribed from asking the defendant about the alleged crime. MCR 6.101(F)(3)(b). The "factual basis” for the plea referred to in the majority opinion was provided in some manner other than by defendant’s own statement in open court.
The written motion to set aside the nolo contendere plea in this case contains the following:
That your petitioner does not have any memory or recollection of the evening of May 16, 1987, the alleged date of the offense and does not believe that he [is] guilty of the actions for which he is charged.
A testimonial hearing was held and the trial court acknowledged that the testimony of defendant was consistent with the written motion. The trial court, however, denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea because it concluded that the request was frivolous. Basically, the trial court concluded the request to withdraw the plea was frivolous because it was motivated by defendant’s primary concern regarding his sentence. Like the majority opinion, the trial court relied upon People v Paulus, 121 Mich App 445; 328 NW2d 659 (1982), lv den 417 Mich 1025 (1983), reconsideration gtd and remanded on other *503grounds 417 Mich 1100.15 (1983), and People v Camargo, 163 Mich App 581; 415 Mich 211 (1987), as authority for concluding that a motion to withdraw a plea is frivolous if it is based upon concerns regarding a defendant’s pending sentence.
I am unpersuaded by the dicta in Paulus and Camargo which suggests that concerns regarding sentencing make a request to withdraw a plea frivolous. I reach this conclusion after a careful review of People v Bencheck, 360 Mich 430; 104 NW2d 191 (1960), the seminal case on "great liberality” in allowing a defendant to withdraw a plea prior to sentence or trial. In Bencheck, the facts reveal it was only after the defendant was in court and heard what sentence his older brother received, presumably for the same offense, that the defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea. It is clear to me that the Court in Bencheck did not consider the fact that a potential sentence may have been a motivating factor for the defendant’s request to withdraw a plea to constitute frivolity.
The Supreme Court in Bencheck, supra, p 432, stated:
Generally, it is considered that there is no absolute right to withdrawal of a guilty plea. . . . But this Court’s decisions suggest that the trial judge’s discretion be exercised with great liberality when the motion is made prior to sentence or commencement of trial.
The same "great liberality” standard is to be applied whether the request is to withdraw a guilty plea or a nolo contendere plea. See People v Lewandowski, 394 Mich 529; 232 NW2d 173 (1975).
Bencheck and its progeny are founded on the premise that a right to a jury trial is so important that the exercise of that right should not be impeded by belief in the defendant’s guilt:
*504The right we deal with here is the right to a jury trial, and even what may prove a well-founded belief in defendant’s guilt on the part of the trial judge should not impede the exercise of that right. [Bencheck, supra, p 433.]
See Lewandowski, supra; People v Zaleski, 375 Mich 71; 133 NW2d 175 (1965). See also People v Moreno, 411 Mich 859 (1981), People v Matthews, 393 Mich 771 (1974), and People v Malone, 385 Mich 769 (1971).
The majority seems to be influenced by the fact that defendant "offered no alternative explanation of the events which form the factual support for his earlier plea.” As indicated, defendant was alleged to have no memory of the events and did not himself offer a factual basis for his earlier plea. At the motion to withdraw his plea, defendant still claimed to have no memory of the events on the date of the offense. Simply, without memory, how could defendant offer an alternative explanation? I do not believe this is an appropriate burden to place on a defendant who pled nolo contendere because of lack of memory of the events surrounding the alleged crime.
There are arguments that with the new sentencing procedures the "great liberality” rule announced in Bencheck should no longer be the standard applied to a request for the withdrawal of a plea. In fact, the Supreme Court has granted leave in People v Westerfield, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided January 30, 1989 (Docket No. 108820), for the purpose of considering this issue. 432 Mich 919 (1989). Westerñeld, however, was not a case based on a nolo contendere plea.
Nonetheless, until the "great liberality” standard enunciated in Bencheck and its progeny is *505either abandoned or altered by the Supreme Court, stare decisis mandates that this rule is the law and it is to be followed and applied to all presentence requests by a defendant for the withdrawal of a guilty or nolo contendere plea. Unlike the majority, I believe it is inappropriate for this Court to try to anticipate the future holdings of our Supreme Court. See People v Mitchell, 428 Mich 364, 369-370; 408 NW2d 798 (1987). In addition, I take issue with the majority’s statement that "the absolute liberalization of the standard of withdrawal advocated by the dissent is contrary to our prior precedents and at odds with the policy direction established by the Supreme Court.” (Emphasis added.) I remind the majority that the binding precedent applicable to this case is the Supreme Court’s decision in People v Bencheck, supra, not any decision out of this Court attempting to alter that precedent.
Finally, as for the majority’s reference to and reliance on the admittedly inapplicable new rules of criminal procedure and the staff comment, I would simply note that in its order of August 23, 1989, adopting the rules, the Supreme Court stated that "the staff commentary which accompanies these rules was not prepared by the Court and is not intended as a pronouncement on their meaning.” (Emphasis added.)
In my view, Bencheck, Lewandowski and Zaleski, as applied to the facts of this case, require that defendant be allowed to withdraw his nolo contendere plea. I would reverse the lower court’s order and allow defendant to withdraw his plea.