Court Opinion

ID: 9734724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:44:19.400045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:50.825485
License: Public Domain

Horney, J.,
filed the following concurring opinion, in which Bruñe, C. J., concurred.
The majority hold that the purported nomination of Francis J. Valle (Valle) as the Democratic candidate for State’s Attorney of Baltimore City was invalid because the nomination of a candidate to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Saul A. Harris should have been made by the state-wide State Central Committee instead of by the city-wide committee. All of the members of the Court agree that the selection of Valle as the nominee was invalid, but, to us, the nomination of a candidate to fill the vacancy was a function of the City Committee.
*601There is no question that a State’s Attorney is a State officer, but he is elected by the qualified voters in the political subdivision of which he is a resident, and should he die, resign or be removed during his term of office, his successor would be appointed by the judges of the court having jurisdiction of criminal cases in the political subdivision in which he was serving. It would seem therefore that a State’s Attorney, even though he be a State officer in one sense, is, nevertheless a county or city officer (as the case may be) in that he is the prosecuting officer for the State of Maryland only in the political subdivision in which he is elected or appointed. Thus, it seems to us, that the nomination of a candidate to fill the vacancy in that office should have been made by the City Committee.
Code (1957), Art. 33, § 74 (b),1 stipulates that a vacancy caused by the death of a nominee for any state or judicial office or a candidate for either house of Congress shall be filled by the State Committee of the political party of which the deceased nominee was a member. But § 75 provides that a local vacancy (in the event of the death of a nominee) shall be filled by the local committees of a county or the legislative districts of Baltimore City. And, although it is not specifically applicable to the situation presented by this case, the provisions of § 56 (c), at least to us, indicate that the State Committee should fill a vacancy only when such vacancy pertains to an officer to be elected by the voters of more than one political subdivision.
The words of § 56 (c) relied on by the majority as supporting their interpretation of §§ 74 and 75 seem to us to have a directly opposite effect. Under the provisions of § 56 (c), the state-wide committee is impowered to fill a vacancy due to the lack of a candidate at the primary election “for any officer elected by the voters of more than one county or Baltimore City”; and “in all other instances the vacancy shall be filled by the State central committee of the political subdivision.” The phrase “elected by the voters of more than one county or Balti*602more City” seems to us to be simply and clearly an elliptical or compressed form of expression meaning “by the voters of more than one county or of more than Baltimore City.” The italicized words are, we think, implicit. Without them, the result is indeed strange — the state-wide committee must make a nomination upon which only the voters of Baltimore City may cast their ballots.
Section 75 dealing with local nominations starts off with a general provision. It follows this with a careful provision recognizing the difference which exists in practice between county committees and city-wide committees. In the city, the three members of the city-wide committee from each of the six districts constitute a political committee for the district. We know of no parallel situation in any of the counties. No reason is apparent to us why the General Assembly should have deemed the state-wide committee to be the appropriate nominating body for an office filled only by the voters of Baltimore City, when it clearly did not do so — in fact it did the exact opposite — in the case of offices to be filled by the voters of one county. We do not think the language of either § 56 (c) or of §§ 74 and 75 is properly susceptible of a construction which would bring about so anomalous a result. As reflecting on the general plan for differentiation between offices to be filled by the voters of only one, or of more than one political subdivision, § 55 seems relevant. This specifies the places for filing certificates of candidacy. In general, candidates for offices to be filled by the voters of the entire State or “of any division of a greater extent than one county” 2 file certificates with the Secretary of State (subsection (a) of § 55), and for all other nominations certificates are to “be filed with the supervisors of elections of the respective counties or of Baltimore City, *603wherein the offices are to be filled by the voters” (subsection (c) of § 55). Here, the reference to Baltimore City seems to us no more necessary or significant than in § 56 (c). We also observe that it is not separately referred to in § 55 (a), which obviously deals with the opposite side of the same coin dealt with in § 55 (c).
There are six legislative districts in Baltimore City. Each district, apparently in accordance with usage, has a local central committee or governing body composed of three members, and each member of each district committee — except when a committee is required to vote as a unit at a state-wide committee meeting — is entitled to cast one vote at a district meeting or a city-wide meeting. See § 82 (b). When meeting as a City Committee the total membership is eighteen.
The record discloses that at the first meeting (on August 13) and at the second meeting (on August 15) only ten persons purporting to be members were present, and, of these at least one member was not eligible to serve as a party officer. One of the members of the third district committee, Anthony E. Gallagher, an alleged felon who had not been pardoned, was removed from the registration list of qualified voters before the date of the first meeting and, although he had been duly notified of such removal, he neither protested the removal nor sought to be reinstated and was subsequently removed as a committeeman. Quite possibly one other ineligible purported member was present at each meeting.3 Thus, even if it is assumed that the notice of the meetings of the City Committee were adequate, the nomination of Valle had no effect because there was not a lawful quorum at either the first or second meeting.
We think it necessary to discuss only the situation of Anthony E. Gallagher. He had been removed in July from the registration list of qualified voters upon a ground based on *604Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution of Maryland. See also §§ 19, 44 and 186 (of Art. 33 of the Code). The removal of his name was effected pursuant to § 44 (a). It is our opinion that when he ceased to be a registered voter (if not when he registered improperly), he ceased to be affiliated with the Democratic Party within the meaning of the election laws (see § 60), and hence he was ineligible to serve or to vote as a committee member on August 13th or 15th; and therefore could not be counted for the purpose of constituting a quorum at either of the meetings held on those dates.
The general rule with respect to a public official is that eligibility to hold office is of a continuing nature and must exist not only at the commencement of the term but during the occupancy of the office. Some of the courts of other states hold that the date of election or appointment is the time to test eligibility to hold office. But most of the courts hold that even though a candidate is qualified at the time of his election this is not sufficient to entitle him to qualify and continue to hold office, if, at the commencement of the term, or during the continuance of the incumbency, he ceases to be qualified. See 42 Am. Jur., Public Officers, § 41. And see 88 A.L.R. 812, 828, Part IV, and the cases cited, particularly Jeffries v. Rowe, 63 Ind. 592 (1878); State ex rel. Johnston v. Donworth, 105 S. W. 1055 (Mo. App. 1907); State ex rel. Fugina v. Pierce, 209 N. W. 693 (Wis. 1926); and State ex rel. Coe v. Harrison, 114 So. 905 (Ala. 1927). In the Coe case, in which a councilman after induction into office failed to pay the state poll tax and therefore ceased to be a qualified elector, it was held that he had vacated the office. Cf. Lilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 269-72, 148 Atl. 434 (1930), where it was held that under the provisions of the Baltimore City Charter prohibiting the appointment as a member of the City Service Commission one “holding any public office,” a member of that commission ceased to be qualified for membership if during his term he accepted appointment to another public office.
While it has been held (Usilton v. Bramble, 117 Md. 10, 82 Atl. 661 (1911)), that a member of a political committee is not a public officer, it seems to us that the rules relating to eligibility to hold a public office are just as applicable — indeed *605even more so — to a party official as to a public official. Furthermore, if, instead of analogizing a party official to a public official, he is analogized to a director of a corporation, a director who is disqualified from voting at a board meeting cannot be counted for the purpose of making a quorum. Hagerstown Furniture Co. v. Baker, 158 Md. 574, 149 Atl. 556 (1930). See also 19 C.J.S., Corporations, § 749c. In the absence of a contrary provision in a governing instrument (such as a statute, the charter or a by-law), a majority of the entire authorized number of members of a board of directors, regardless of any vacancies or disqualifications, is necessary to constitute a quorum. Hagerstown Furniture Co. v. Baker, 158 Md. at 585; 2 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, (Rev. Vol. 1954), § 421, pp. 276-78; and half of the directors is not a quorum. 2 Fletcher, op. cit. supra, § 419, p. 273.
We are further of the opinion that the doctrine of de facto officers is not applicable here. That doctrine “has been characterized as ‘one of those legal makeshifts by which unlawful or irregular corporate and public acts are legalized for certain purposes on the score of necessity.’ ” 2 Fletcher, op. cit. supra, § 372, p. 198, citing Mortgage Land Investment Co. v. McMains, 215 N. W. 192 (Minn. 1927). In Richards v. Farmers & Mechanics’ Institute, 26 Atl. 210 (Pa. St. 1893), the court said: “In the case of public corporations the reasons for holding the acts of de facto officers binding on the corporations they represent are doubtless stronger than in the case of private corporations, but, to some extent at least, they are the same in both, differing only in degree.” 2 Fletcher, op. cit. supra, § 372, p. 199, adds: “For the most part the rule applies only to protect third parties dealing with such officers.”
The doctrine of de facto officers is, of course, well established in this State. See Reed v. President (and Town Commissioners) of North Fast, 226 Md. 229, 172 A. 2d 536 (1961), and cases therein cited. See also Hetrich v. Co. Commissioners (of Anne Arundel County), 222 Md. 304, 159 A. 2d 642 (1960), and Kimble v. Bender, 173 Md. 608, 196 Atl. 409 (1938). The Maryland cases recognize the practical public necessities and the considerations of fairness as regards the rights of third parties upon which the doctrine rests. We find *606nothing in the present case which would call for a conclusion that the rights of the public are involved or that Valle had in some way been misled by appearances into taking some action which constituted a detriment to him. In our opinion, the essential element for the invocation of the doctrine, so far as Valle was concerned, is basically estoppel (see 2 Fletcher, op. cit. supra, § 430, p. 297) and that was lacking in this case.
We are accordingly of the opinion that Valle was not validly nominated and for that reason concur in the result reached by the majority.

. All references to code sections throughout this opinion are to Article 33 (Elections) of the 1957 Code.

. All candidates for Congress, regardless of the composition of their districts, must file certificates with the Secretary of State. Specific provisions are also made with regard to candidates for judicial office. These conform to the general pattern. Thus, a candidate for the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City or for the Court of Appeals from the sixth appellate judicial circuit (Baltimore City) would file his certificate with the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City.

. Domenick DiPietro, another person alleged to have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime, attended the first meeting as a member of the first district committee, but was not at the second meeting. And Franklin L. Waldt, who, though he resided in the third district, had been elected as a member of the second district committee.