Court Opinion

ID: 9780655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:19:27.763378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:09.841252
License: Public Domain

CARPENETI, Chief Justice,
with whom STOWERS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
The court today upholds the removal of Indian children from their family and, with no notice by the State of critical hearings in the case to the family for over a year, the children's eventual placement with a non-Indian couple. Because the failure to provide notice to the children's family for over a year was a sharp violation of Alaska law, and because the State has not shown that these violations were harmless, I respectfully dissent from today's opinion.
Maddie is the mother of four Indian children; Paula is Maddie's mother and the children's grandmother. In 2006, when Maddie was a victim of domestic violence and struggled with alcohol abuse, the children were removed from her custody and placed with Paula. Although Maddie was able to regain custody of her children once, she relapsed and the children were returned to Paula. Maddie relinquished her parental rights in 2009, believing that Paula would adopt the children.
Alaska law includes strong protections for the rights of grandparents to have notice of hearings involving their grandchildren and to be heard at those hearings. Alaska Statute 47.10.030(d) provides that "the department shall give advance written notice of all court hearings in a child's case to a grandparent." Alaska Statute 47.10.080(f) provides that "the grandparents ... are entitled to notice of a permanency hearing under this subsection and are also entitled to be heard at the hearing." As the children's grandparent, Paula was entitled to notice of all hearings concerning the children and to be heard at those hearings. But in fact there were several hearings concerning the temporary placement of the children and the plans for their permanent placement that took place without any notice to Paula and consequently without her participation.
Paula argues that failing to provide her of notice of these hearings deprived her of the right to due process. "The crux of due process is opportunity to be heard and the right to adequately represent one's interests."1 While conceding that Paula was entitled to notice and the right to be heard with regard to these proceedings, this court ultimately concludes that Paula is entitled to no relief *439because these violations were harmless-that is, she was not prejudiced by the lack of notice or that any prejudice was cured by later hearings for which Paula was given notice. Upon close examination, however, these conclusions are highly problematic. Paula's absence at the earlier hearings initiated a cascading stream of consequences that severely undercut her ability, over a year later (when she was finally notified what was happening), to present her case for placement of her grandchildren with her.
There were two permanency hearings, one in August 2009 and one in July 2010, and a placement hearing, in September 2010, for which Paula did not receive notice. I examine each in turn.
The August 2009 Permanency Hearing
In August of 2009 Paula, having just returned from her trip to Montana to care for her ailing mother, expected that the children would be placed back with her. The State, having given credence to tribal criticisms of Paula coming through Tribal Administrator Dubov, was at that time moving away from Paula as a placement option. A permanency hearing is required by Alaska law2 to insure that children do not drift in foster care3 and thus the August 2009 permanency hearing was extremely important to the direction that the children's case would take.
At the hearing OCS set out both the case against Paula and the case favoring placement with the Dubovs. Several critical points were established at this hearing: First, OCS reported that it had received a report of harm concerning the children "oc-curing] right before [they were} removed from [their] grandmother." Next, it was stated that the parents had relinquished their parental rights and that the permanent goal was adoption for the children. OCS then reported that "the [Dubovs] are doing a *440fine job with the kids." Finally, it was indicated that "grandmother is okay with the plan now."
Had Paula been present at this hearing, she doubtless would have contested every one of these assertions. As to the "removal" of the children, she testified-in November 2010 when she was finally given her right to be heard-that the children were not removed from her in the summer of 2009 but rather she requested temporary respite care while she traveled to Montana to care for her mother. -As to the report of harm, she would have been able to present her response to it. As to Maddie's relinquishment, she would have notified the court that Maddie had relinquished with the expectation that the children would be going to Paula, as was evident from Maddie's attempt to withdraw her relinquishment only 14 days after signing the papers and Paula's testimony. As to the permanent goal of adoption, the suggestion that the Dubovs were doing fine, and that Paula was "okay with the plan," Paula would have been on notice that OCS was firmly moving away from her as the adoptive placement and toward the Dubovs and she would have had the chance to voice her objection to that development.
Today's opinion concludes that Paula's absence at this hearing did not prejudice her because the placement decision would not have changed at this hearing given the concerns raised about Paula's parenting resulting in the loss of her foster care license. But this rationale actually serves to underscore the prejudice she suffered: Charges were raised about her parenting that she knew nothing about for over a year. Paula of course knew about her licensure problem, but believed that she was working with OCS to correct that problem. Then, when Paula was finally given notice and told of her right to appeal OCS decisions, the standing master relied heavily on her absence at the earlier hearing and her failure to seek placement for over a year:
Only when ... placement [with a relative in Montanal was determined not to be in the best interest of the kids ... only then, 14, 15, 16 months after you were told by Lori Wikle and Valerie Nelson in person [that the children would not be returned] when you got back from Montana, only then did you contact Lori and ask to have placement back with you.
But Paula presented evidence that suggests she tried to have the children placed with her when she returned from Montana. She thought she was working with OCS to overcome the problems with her foster care license:
Q. Did you reapply for your foster care license ... ?
A.... I figured I had to work with OCS and find out what was going on and what the process was to even get the children back.
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Q.... [You] didn't ask for placement of the children at that time because you were trying to work with everybody and be cooperative?
A. Well, yeah. Wouldn't that be the first step in trying to regain something?
Thus, at the very time the court was being told that the "grandmother is okay with the plan," Paula was trying to regain custody of the children and was unaware of OCS's plan to place them with the Dubovs. Not only was she unable to voice this to the court, she thought she was on the path towards reunification. Given Paula's continued desire to have the children with her and OCS's continued involvement with Paula, such as encouraging supervised visits and stopping by her house to discuss the children, it is highly problematic to conclude that Paula's absence from this hearing did not prejudice her.
The court's conclusion is problematic for another reason. The court notes that very little changed at the August 2009 permanency hearing because the permanency plan remained adoption. But this ignores the reality that the prior permanency plan was approved in the context of Paula acting as the foster parent, that is, as the putative adoptive parent. At the August 2009 hearing the court found that placement with the Dubovs was in the best interests of the children. The court had thus moved away from adoption by Paula and toward adoption by the Dubovs. Paula was prejudiced by her absence.4
*441The July 2010 Permanency Hearing
The July 2010 permanency hearing was a second opportunity for Paula to indicate to the court that she was interested in caring for the children and to learn the steps necessary for her to do so. That it was an important opportunity lost is evident from the standing master's later reliance on Paula's inaction in ruling against her. As noted 'above, the standing master stated that Paula waited too long to seek placement of the children with her. In addition, at this hearing the court indicated that the local tribe supported placement with the Dubovs, certainly a significant factor influencing the ultimate decision. Accordingly, Paula's absence from this hearing weakened her case and prejudiced her.
Her absence was critical in another way. At this hearing, additional negative information concerning Paula was brought to the attention of the court. Not being present, Paula was unaware of the allegations and unable to defend herself.
The September 2010 Placement Hearing
The placement hearing of September 2010 was held to review OCS's decision to deny placement of the children with a maternal aunt under AS 47.14.100(m). Although the focus of the hearing was on that decision, substantial evidence that Paula was an unsuitable placement was also developed at this hearing. Today's opinion concludes that Paula did not suffer any prejudice from her absence at this hearing because she was able to present evidence at her own placement hearing later. Although Paula was given the opportunity to try to meet the evidence presented at the September 2010 hearing months later in her own placement hearing, it does not follow that Paula suffered no prejudice from her earlier absence.
First, it is questionable whether any of the evidence against Paula would have even surfaced at the September 2010 hearing had Paula been present. It was irrelevant to the nominal purpose of the hearing: consideration of the maternal aunt's placement request. (Indeed, that request had been withdrawn before the hearing even commenced.) Second, Paula was unable immediately to rebut the significant amount of testimony regarding her failure to properly care for the children. Accordingly, the case against Paula that had been building for over a year without her knowledge was locked in for another two months before she had the opportunity to respond. Third, the chance to present contrary testimony months later is a poor substitute for notice and the right to be heard at the principal hearing. The burdens of locating the testimony in the record, listening to it, understanding it in the context in which it was presented live, and responding to it would pose substantial logistical problems for any litigant. These problems are magnified by the reality in rural Alaska that hearings are often held with witnesses, attorneys, parties, and judges in different locations.5 In sum, Paula's presence would have markedly altered her ability to present her case.
Conclusion
I cannot conclude that Paula was not prejudiced by being kept in the dark for over a year about the direction that the case was taking-away from placement with her because of damaging allegations about her and toward placement with the Dubovs-while the impression that Paula did not care about the children's placement grew and the children bonded with their new foster family. In State v. Jacob (Jacob II),6 we stated that *442the "placement of children and the involvement of grandparents in their grandehil-dren's lives are not matters to be taken lightly."7 We have also noted that
notice of proceedings and a meaningful right to be heard are essential to due process, and ... there are situations in which the right to intervene in the late stages of a CINA case will be insufficient to cure the prejudice of the initial due process violation. Timely notice and an opportunity to be heard are especially important in situations involving the placement of children.[8]
Jacob involved the right of grandparents to be notified of proceedings involving their grandchildren. Paula's involvement was not only as a grandparent but also as a foster parent. She should have been given a fair opportunity to defend her performance as a foster mother and to know the State's changing plans regarding placement of her grandchildren-away from adoption by her and toward adoption by the Dubovs.9
We have been troubled many times in recent years by the State's failure to meet its statutory requirements concerning handling of children's cases. For example, in the areas of giving notice to grandparents,10 making active efforts to reunify the Indian family,11 and giving notice of the planned evidentiary showing ultimately to be used to terminate parental rights,12 we have expressed our concerns about the State's performance. Ultimately, however, we have upheld the State's action, concluding that overall the State's efforts were good enough or that despite the failure to comply with the statute there was no prejudice to the losing party. I cannot join in this approach in the case before us.13 I believe that Paula was prejudiced by the State's failure to notify her of three consecutive hearings over the space of fifteen months during which the placement of her grandchildren was effectively being decided; certainly the State has not demonstrated the lack of prejudice.
Given the factual and legal context of this case, including concerns regarding evidence available in the record but not properly admitted14 and the role of Mr. Dubov in convincing OCS to look for a placement other *443than Paula,15 I conclude that the State has not shown that OCS's failure to provide Paula notice of several important hearings did not prejudice her. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from today's opinion. I would hold that Paula's due process rights were violated.16

. D.M. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 995 P.2d 205, 213-14 (Alaska 2000) (quoting Matanuska Maid, Inc. v. State, 620 P.2d 182, 192 (Alaska 1980)).

. CINA Rule 17.2(e), (F), and (i) provide:
(e) Findings. The court shall make written findings, including findings related to
(1) whether the child continues to be a child in need of aid;
(2) whether the child should be returned to the parent or guardian, and when;
(3) whether the child should be placed for adoption or legal guardianship and whether the Department is in compliance with AS 47.10.088(d) relating to the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights;
(4) whether the child should be placed in another planned, permanent living arrangement and what steps are necessary to achieve the new arrangement; and
(5) in the case of a child who has attained age 16, the services needed to assist the child to make the transition from foster care to independent living or adult protective services.
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(f) Additional Findings. In addition to the findings required under subsection (e), the court shall also make written findings related to
(1) whether the Department has made reasonable efforts required under AS 47.10.086 or, in the case of an Indian child, whether the Department has made active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs as required by 25 U.S.C. Sec.1912(d);
(2) whether the parent or guardian has made substantial progress to remedy the parent's or guardian's conduct or conditions in the home that made the child a child in need of aid;
(3) if the permanency plan is for the child to remain in out-of-home care, whether the child's out-of home placement continues to be appropriate and in the best interests of the child; and
(4) whether the Department has made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan that is in effect (whether the plan is reunification, adoption, legal guardianship, placement with a fit and willing relative, or placement in another planned permanent living arrangement).
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(i) Subsequent Review. The court shall hold a hearing to review the permanency plan at least annually until successful implementation of the plan.

. Permanency hearings are crucial complements of the court's oversight of children in OCS custody. "A permanency hearing must be held: (1) within twelve months after the date the child entered foster care as calculated under AS 47.10.088(f); (2) within thirty days after the court determines pursuant to CINA Rule 17.1 that reasonable efforts are not required; or (3) upon application by a party, when good cause is shown." N.A. v. State, 19 P.3d 597, 602 (Alaska 2001) (internal citations omitted). The court must hold review hearings at least annually. AS 47.10.080(l)(5). Under the CINA rules permanency hearings require several important judicial findings that are crucial to the overall direction and development of the child's care. Permanency hearings are held where there are significant changes in the direction of the child's case. For instance, where OCS seeks to discontinue making reasonable efforts to provide family support services, a permanency hearing should be held. Audrey H. v. State, Office of Children's Servs., 188 P.3d 668, 675-76 (Alaska 2008).

. Six months later, at a time when OCS still had not provided Paula proper notice of her rights as *441a grandparent, it sought to further prevent her from contacting the children. After terminating Paula's daycare services and requiring supervised visits, in February 2010 OCS filed and received a temporary protective order preventing Paula from going to the children's school and requiring her to stay 500 feet away from the children. OCS also implemented a no-contact order for Paula and the children's biological mother. Although OCS ultimately did not pursue the protective order, this is another example where Paula was unaware of any rights she may have had to contest OCS decisions. Paula's case for placement of the children was undermined by her absence from the earlier hearing.

. In this case, for example, Paula was in one location; her attorney was in another location; the OCS social worker, the assistant AG, the guardian ad litem, and counsel for the guardian, were in another location; a witness was in another location; the representative of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe was in another location; and the court was in Glennallen.

. 214 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2009).

. Id. at 362.

. Jacob v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., (Jacob I) 177 P.3d 1181, 1185 (Alaska 2008).

. And recently we held that an Indian grandmother's due process rights were violated (or that she suffered prejudicial unfairness) when she had no notice for two years of an issue raised by the State for the first time in final argument at trial. Amber B. v. State of Alaska, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., Arlene B. v. State of Alaska, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., Mem. Op. & J. No. 1418, 2012 WL - (Alaska, April, 16, 2012).

. Jacob I, 177 P.3d at 1186.

. Jon S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 212 P.3d 756, 766 (Alaska 2009) (failure to meet active efforts duty while father was in jail but overall efforts sufficient); Marina B. v. State, Office of Children's Servs., Mem. Op. & J. No. 1327, 2009 WL 225711 *8 (Alaska, Jan. 28, 2009) ("[Wle cannot condone the low level of OCS's efforts after this point."); T.F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 26 P.3d 1089, 1093 (Alaska 2001) ("We in no way condone DFYS's contribution to the delay in paternity testing."); see also A.A. v. State, Dep't of Family & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 262 (Alaska 1999) (noting court "did not condone the State's failure to work out a case plan); A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296, 306 (Alaska 1997) (noting court "troubled by" passivity of State's remedial efforts).

. D.M. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 995 P.2d 205, 210 (Alaska 2000) ("We do not condone the timing of the state's request.").

. Today's opinion mistakenly assumes that the dissent adopts a "last-straw jurisprudence" out of frustration with OCS's previous failures, and somehow ties the results in those cases to this case. That is not correct. The string of troubling cases in the past is cited to emphasize the difference between those cases and this case: In those cases OCS's violations were not determinative of the outcome, while here they are. This is evident from the language used to express this concept: "I cannot join in this approach in the case before us."
The court also notes that Paula has not challenged the master's findings made after the hearing at which she was finally given notice and allowed to be heard. But she is entitled to a reversal on the basis of the claim she has brought.

. A review of the record reveals several documents that supported Paula's positions on various issues, including several OCS emails that confirmed her factual assertions and the home study. But for reasons that are unclear these exhibits were not admitted into evidence in the course of the hearing. Accordingly, under the rule of Moffitt v. Moffitt, I give no weight to those *443exhibits. 749 P.2d 343, 347 n. 4 (Alaska 1988). Nonetheless, it is deeply troubling that while Paula was already sharply behind the curve in presenting evidence to the court, her trial attorney did not take steps to offer exhibits that supported her case. Paula's attorney may have failed to offer these documents because she was unable to fully grasp the weight of the adverse testimony presented at the September hearing, at which Paula and her attorney were not present because Paula was given no notice of the hearing.

. Dubov was the tribal administrator who wrote letters critical of Paula's parenting and who eventually obtained custody of Paula's grandchildren. His position of power may have further exacerbated the prejudice she suffered, because he had access to both the court and OCS and it appears he played a critical role in the decision to remove the children and to suspend Paula's daycare services.-

. I would remand this case to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with the holding that Paula's due process rights were violated. This might include her right to re-open the children's adoption case. (That case is not before us, but both parties have indicated that the adoptions have gone forward.)
Case law from this court and the United States Supreme Court point to such a remedy. Where a lack of notice led to a denial of due process to grandparents, we have held that a tribal court adoption should be overturned three years after it had been approved and new birth certificates issued by the State. Starr v. George, 175 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2008). The United States Supreme Court has taken a similar approach: In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the Court noted that serious violations may warrant changes in placement, even though such changes can cause "considerable pain" and "potential anguish." 490 U.S. 30, 53-54, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989).
I would afford Paula a full best interests hearing were she to challenge the adoptions. At that hearing, in order to place her and the children in as close as possible to the positions they would have occupied had Paula been given notice, I would preclude consideration of evidence of the children's bonding with the Dubovs in the period since Paula was deprived of her rights.
Whether the outcome of such a hearing would be different from the outcome of the earlier hearings at which Paula was not present cannot be known at this time. But it is clear that the earlier hearings involved substantial evidence concerning bonding between the children and the Dubovs.