Court Opinion

ID: 9894487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 21:00:48.3444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:47.471386
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4673

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        MILTON LEWIS LANE, JR.,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:20-cr-00455-CCE-1)

        Submitted: October 20, 2023                                   Decided: October 31, 2023

        Before THACKER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, First Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
        Greensboro, North Carolina; Michael W. Patrick, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL W.
        PATRICK, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States
        Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Milton Lewis Lane, Jr., pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to possession of

        a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court

        found that Lane was an armed career criminal based in part on his two prior North Carolina

        breaking or entering convictions and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment, the

        mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C.

        § 924(e)(1). Lane raises two challenges to his sentence on appeal: (1) whether the district

        court properly concluded that North Carolina breaking or entering is a violent felony under

        the ACCA; and (2) whether the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights

        by finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he committed the two North Carolina

        breaking or entering offenses on different occasions. We affirm.

               Under the ACCA, a defendant convicted of a § 922(g) offense is subject to an

        enhanced statutory range of 15 years’ to life imprisonment if, as relevant here, he “has

        three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony . . . committed on occasions different

        from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). We review de novo whether a prior conviction

        qualifies as an ACCA predicate. United States v. Ogle, 82 F.4th 272, 274 (4th Cir. 2023).

               In determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as an enumerated ACCA violent

        felony, such as burglary, courts generally must apply the categorical approach,

        “compar[ing] the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s [prior]

        conviction with the elements of the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as commonly

        understood.” Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013); see 18 U.S.C.

        § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). An offense qualifies as a violent felony “only if the statute’s elements

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        are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.” Descamps, 570 U.S.

        at 257. The Supreme Court has defined generic burglary as “an unlawful or unprivileged

        entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.”

        Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).

               Lane argues that his North Carolina breaking or entering convictions do not qualify

        as violent felonies under the ACCA because that offense is broader than generic burglary.

        As Lane acknowledges, however, we held in United States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d 267

        (4th Cir. 2014), that the North Carolina breaking or entering statute, “as interpreted by the

        North Carolina Supreme Court, sweeps no more broadly than the generic elements of

        burglary” and, therefore, qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA. Id. at 272.

        Nevertheless, Lane contends that Mungro is not controlling here because of two

        intervening Supreme Court decisions: United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018), and

        Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016).

               In United States v. Dodge, 963 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2020), we held that Mungro is

        still good law after Stitt and Mathis. Id. at 385. Indeed, we expressly rejected the same

        argument that Lane advances here. Id. at 383-85. Although we recognized that Mungro

        “could be read as being in tension with intervening Supreme Court reasoning,” we held

        that Mungro was still binding, as it was not contradicted by any “directly applicable

        Supreme Court holding.” Id. at 384. Accordingly, Lane’s first challenge to his sentence

        is foreclosed by our precedent.

               Lane’s second challenge to his sentence is likewise foreclosed by our precedent. In

        United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2005), we rejected the argument that

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        the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a jury to find, or a defendant to admit, that the

        defendant committed his prior offenses on different occasions. Id. at 281-87. We recently

        revisited this issue and concluded that Thompson remains good law in light of intervening

        Supreme Court decisions, including Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022). United

        States v. Brown, 67 F.4th 200, 201 (4th Cir. 2023). In any event, we conclude that any

        error was harmless because the proof that Lane committed his North Carolina breaking or

        entering convictions on different occasions “is overwhelming and uncontroverted.” United

        States v. Legins, 34 F.4th 304, 322 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.

        denied, 143 S. Ct. 266 (2022); see Wooden, 595 U.S. at 370 (observing that courts “have

        nearly always treated offenses as occurring on separate occasions if a person committed

        them a day or more apart, or at a significant distance” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Lane’s motion to

        reconsider the order denying him leave to proceed pro se. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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