Court Opinion

ID: 9953375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 22:10:32.176392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:46:03.029967
License: Public Domain

03/21/2024

        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                          Assigned on Briefs October 10, 2023

            STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KESEAN DEWAYNE HALL

                Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
                     No. 2019-D-2480 Steve R. Dozier, Judge

                             No. M2022-01176-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Kesean Dewayne Hall, appeals his jury convictions for second degree
murder, attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of
or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and criminal trespass. For these convictions, he
received an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges (1)
the denial of his motion to sever the separate shooting episodes; (2) the sufficiency of the
convicting evidence; (3) the admission of video footage showing the Defendant trespassing
on the housing development’s property; and (4) the admission of “video evidence related
to Crime Scene 3.” He also raises a claim of cumulative error and a challenge to his
sentence. Following our review, we conclude that due to inadequacies in the Defendant’s
appellate brief, all of his issues are waived save sufficiency of the evidence. First, relative
to the sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support
the Defendant’s criminal trespass conviction, and that conviction must be reversed and
dismissed. Next, the evidence’s being sufficient to support the Defendant’s remaining
convictions for second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and employing a
firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, those
convictions are affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

      Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court
               Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; Case Remanded

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER
and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.

Nicholas McGregor and Jay A. Umerley (on appeal and at sentencing and motion for new
trial hearings); and Wesley B. Clark and F. Michie Gibson, Jr. (at trial), Nashville,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Kesean Dewayne Hall.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Caroline Weldon, Assistant Attorney
General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Chandler Harris and J. Wesley
King, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

                      I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       This case involves three separate shootings that occurred inside or near Cheatham
Place housing development in Nashville, Tennessee, during the evening hours of March
16, 2017. Cheatham Place housing development is operated by the Metropolitan
Development and Housing Agency (“MDHA”). The Davidson County grand jury, on July
24, 2017, returned a nine-count indictment against the Defendant and Hollis Eugeno
Harbison, III (case number 2017-C-1586), based upon their alleged participation in these
shootings. The indictment charged them both with first degree premeditated murder of
Keith King (count one); attempted first degree murder of Darius Fite (count two);
employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony
(counts three and four–separate counts for each defendant); aggravated assault of Nicholas
Goodner (count five); reckless endangerment of “individuals in the alley between 841
Garfield and 843 Garfield” (count six); unlawful possession of a weapon (count eight); and
aggravated criminal trespass (count nine). Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-102, -13-
103, -13-202, -14-406, -17-1307, -17-1324. Codefendant Harbison, solely, was charged
with evading arrest (count seven). Id. § 39-16-603.

        Chronologically, the first shooting, involving count six, took place at approximately
7:30 p.m. in an alleyway of the Cheatham Place housing development that ran between
Delta Avenue and Garfield Street. The first incident was captured on MDHA surveillance
cameras, and the defendants can be seen firing handguns in the direction of a group of
individuals near the Garfield Street end of the alleyway. The second shooting, involving
counts one through four, occurred at approximately 8:17 p.m. when the defendants
allegedly shot at a car occupied by Mr. Fite and Mr. King as the car was traveling through
the same MDHA alleyway before turning left onto Garfield Street. Mr. King suffered a
gunshot wound to the back and died as a result of his injuries. Subsequently, in a
photographic lineup, Mr. Fite positively identified codefendant Harbison as one of the
shooters and partially identified the Defendant as the other. The third shooting, involving
count five, took place at approximately 9:02 p.m. on 9th Avenue North in front of Buena
Vista Elementary School, which was about two blocks away from the alleyway where the
first two shootings occurred. This time, the defendants allegedly fired at a group of

                                            -2-
individuals that included Mr. Goodner. The third shooting was also captured on video
from an MDHA surveillance camera that faced the direction of the elementary school.
Codefendant Harbison fled the scene but was captured soon after in possession of a
Springfield XD 9-millimeter handgun.

        The defendants filed a motion to sever the charges into three different groups,
claiming that each set of charges involved a distinct criminal episode. Following a July
26, 2019 hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order granting the defendants’
motion in part by severing the charge of reckless endangerment (count six) from the
remaining counts in the indictment. First, the trial court, analyzing Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 14, determined that all of the offenses were part of the same criminal
transaction such that they were part of a common scheme or plan. However, the trial court
did not find that the evidence of each offense would be admissible in a trial of the others.
Though identity was likely to be an overriding issue in these incidents, the trial court,
analyzing Rule 404(b), determined that count six would be tried alone because identity was
clear in the first incident given the video footage of the shooting and because the probative
value of proof of the second and third incidents in a trial of the first would be outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.

        The court determined that the remaining counts could be tried together because
proof of each incident would each be admissible in a trial of the others and because the
danger of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence of the other
incidents. In making the probative value determination, the trial court noted that the
defendants’ involvement in the third incident would be probative in a trial of the second
incident because shell casings from codefendant Harbison’s weapon were linked to both
scenes and because the recovered video from the third incident showed two individuals
firing handguns in a location close to the second incident approximately forty-five minutes
after that incident. Then, the trial court found that the probative value of proof of the third
incident in a trial of the second was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect because Mr.
Fite’s positive identification of codefendant Harbison and tentative identification of the
Defendant and because the linkage between the shell casings at the scenes of the two
shootings were “highly probative” of the Defendant’s identity. The court further indicated
that proof of the first incident would be admissible in a trial of the second and third
incidents because proof of the codefendants’ involvement in the first incident was relevant
as to the material issue of identity in the second and third incidents and because the proof
established both defendants’ involvement in the first incident by clear and convincing
evidence.

                                             -3-
       On October 21, 2019, a superseding ten-count indictment was issued against both
defendants (case number 2019-D-2480). In this indictment, the defendants were charged
with first degree premeditated murder of Mr. King (count one); first degree felony murder
of Mr. King (count two); attempted first degree murder of Mr. Fite (count three);
employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony
(counts four and five–separate counts for each defendant); aggravated assault of Mr.
Goodner (count six); reckless endangerment of “individuals in the alley between 841
Garfield and 843 Garfield” (count seven); unlawful possession of a weapon (count nine);
and aggravated criminal trespass (count ten). Codefendant Harbison was again separately
charged with evading arrest (count eight). A minute entry from November 6, 2019,
indicates that case number 2017-C-1586 was dismissed at the request of the State.

       Due to subsequent events, the defendants’ cases were served. They were tried
separately.

       Immediately prior to the Defendant’s trial, the State chose to nolle prosequi counts
six and nine, the offenses of aggravated assault of Mr. Goodner and unlawful possession
of a weapon. In accordance with the trial court’s earlier ruling, the reckless endangerment
count was severed. Because the defendants were now being tried separately, count
eight—codefendant Harbison’s evading arrest charge—was not applicable to the
Defendant’s case. Accordingly, the indictment was renumbered before it was read to the
jury, and the following five offenses charged against the Defendant remained: first degree
premeditated murder of Mr. King; first degree felony murder of Mr. King; attempted first
degree murder of Mr. Fite; employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to
commit a dangerous felony; and aggravated criminal trespass.

       At trial, the State adduced the following evidence. At approximately 8:30 p.m. on
March 16, 2017, Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (“MNPD”) Officer Kevin Frei
responded to a “shots fired call” at 1617 Arthur Avenue, the location where Mr. King was
found suffering from a gunshot wound. It was dark outside. By the time Officer Frei had
arrived on the scene, other officers and emergency personnel were already present. He and
two other officers—MNPD Officers Brian Manning and Ashton Hill—were directed to go
to an alleyway inside Cheatham Place, an MDHA public housing development situated in
north Nashville, the location “where they believed the shots originated from.” Officer Frei
confirmed that the Cheatham Place housing development was equipped with surveillance
cameras that were motion-activated.

      These officers proceeded to the entrance of an alleyway inside Cheatham Place near
1592 Delta Avenue; the alleyway “ran in a little C-pattern between” Garfield Street and

                                           -4-
Delta Avenue. Upon investigation, the officers found multiple cartridge casings, both in
the alleyway and on the grass, and they found a shoe “kind of in the middle of alley[.]”
The officers secured the scene by taping off the area and activating their patrol cars’ blue
lights to keep other cars from entering the alleyway. As they waited for “an ID unit” to
arrive, they saw additional gunfire. Officer Frei said he saw what appeared to be “two guns
. . . shooting[] kind of at each other from across the courtyard,” approximately one-hundred
feet from where he stood. Officer Frei retrieved a rifle from his police car and headed
toward the location of the gunfire.

       Officer Manning said that he also saw “two groups of gunfire going towards each
other” from across the courtyard. Officer Hill noticed a set of “muzzle flashes” on 9th
Avenue North next to the Cheatham Place main office building.

       When the gunfire ended, Officer Manning focused on the individual on the left of
the exchange and saw that he was a Black male who was wearing all black, with a “real
thick white stripe” down both pant legs. Officer Hill spotted the individual “walking from
9th down to Delta across the courtyard” and alerted Officer Manning, who relayed the
information over his radio to the other officers in the area. According to Officer Hill, once
police cars turned onto Delta Avenue, the individual started running.

       Officer Frei said that as he “ran up Delta a little bit further” and turned a corner into
one of the alleyways, he observed the individual matching the description “banging on a
door, trying to get into a building.” Officer Frei detained the man, later identified as
codefendant Harbison, on the back steps of 1528 9th Avenue North. Officer Frei said that
he was able to find codefendant Harbison within a minute of receiving Officer Manning’s
description over the radio.

       When Officer Frei searched codefendant Harbison’s person, he found a loaded,
semiautomatic Springfield XD 9-millimeter handgun and two additional magazines, one
of which was empty. Ultimately that evening, codefendant Harbison was charged with
reckless endangerment, aggravated criminal trespass, and “a weapons law violation.”
Officer Frei explained that codefendant Harbison was charged with aggravated criminal
trespass because “[h]e was on MDHA property, armed, and he wasn’t supposed to be there.
He had no residence there. He had no one with him saying he was supposed to be there,
and he also didn’t have a valid carry permit.”

       MNPD Detective Nicholas Kulp learned that there was a gunshot victim at 1617
Arthur Avenue and arrived on the scene at approximately 8:45 p.m. Shortly after 9:00
p.m., Det. Kulp heard “a bunch of” gunshots. Det. Kulp remained at 1617 Arthur Avenue

                                             -5-
while other law enforcement officers went to investigate the gunshots. Though Mr. King
had already been transported to the hospital prior to Det. Kulp’s arrival, Det. Kulp spoke
with the initial responding officers and a couple of witnesses who had been “following the
car” in which Mr. King had been riding and were still present on the scene. Those
witnesses indicated that Mr. Fite was in the car with Mr. King when he was shot, so Det.
Kulp went to speak with Mr. Fite. At 10:12 p.m., Det. Kulp arrived at Mr. Fite’s mother’s
house, which was a couple of miles away from Cheatham Place, and spoke with Mr. Fite
for thirty to forty minutes about the events of that evening.

       Mr. Fite, who was sixteen years old at the time of shooting, provided the following
version of events at trial. Mr. Fite said that on March 16, 2017, his nephew, Mr. King,
called and asked Mr. Fite to bring him a jacket and give him a ride home. Mr. Fite took
his mother’s white four-door Dodge Stratus and drove to Monroe Park, near Cheatham
Place, to transport Mr. King. After Mr. King got inside his car, Mr. Fite turned into an
alleyway that went through Cheatham Place and headed toward “the store.” As they were
coming to the end of the alleyway, Mr. Fite noticed two men on the right side of the
sidewalk, approximately five to ten feet away from his car. According to Mr. Fite, the men
raised their guns and “just start[ed] shooting” at the car. Mr. Fite turned left out of the
alleyway, and as he drove away, Mr. King said, “I’m hit.”

       Mr. Fite indicated that “a couple of minutes after the shooting[,]” he stopped the car
and called 911. Mr. Fite said that Mr. King, at some point, “opened the door and rolled
out” of the car. Mr. Fite tried to help Mr. King, who was having difficulty breathing. Mr.
Fite’s brother arrived on the scene and helped Mr. Fite with Mr. King. Mr. Fite said that
he “rolled [his car] up the street” “trying to get an ambulance[,]” but his car had a flat tire
and the engine had stopped working. Mr. Fite called his father, who picked him up and
took him to his mother’s house.

        The recording of Mr. Fite’s 911 call was played for the jury. At 8:22 p.m., Mr. Fite
informed the operator that his nephew had been shot, emphasized the urgent nature of his
call, and pleaded for an ambulance to arrive quickly.

       According to Mr. Fite, he did not abandon Mr. King by moving to a different
location because there were other individuals on the scene by then who were helping Mr.
King. Mr. Fite said that he did not return to Mr. King because he “was too in shock” and
was unable to see his nephew in that condition. Mr. Fite indicated that prior to his
departure, someone informed him that an ambulance had arrived to help Mr. King.

                                             -6-
       Mr. Fite confirmed that only he and Mr. King were inside the car at the time of the
shooting and that the car did not have any bullet strikes prior to that evening. He said that
neither he nor Mr. King had a weapon that evening and insisted that they were not members
of a gang called the “Rollin[’] 40s.” In addition, Det. Kulp confirmed at trial that Mr. Fite
told him that no one else was inside the car that evening when Mr. Fite and Mr. King were
fired upon.

        From Det. Kulp’s conversation with Mr. Fite at Mr. Fite’s mother’s house, Det.
Kulp was able to determine that Mr. King had been shot inside the Cheatham Place housing
development at the entrance to an alleyway near 841 Garfield Street. Det. Kulp was also
able to ascertain the location of the car being driven by Mr. Fite at the time of the shooting.
Around 11:00 p.m. that evening, the white Dodge Stratus was found parked on the side of
the road near 10th Avenue North with a flat tire and visible bullet holes. According to Det.
Kulp, this spot was “right down the street southbound going under the interstate overpass
from the Arthur location” where Mr. King was found.

        Det. Kulp, knowledgeable of the MDHA surveillance system, began to review video
footage from Cheatham Place. As he watched, Det. Kulp saw numerous frames showing
the defendants inside Cheatham Place. Det. Kulp eventually concluded that there had been
three shootings over the course of one and one-half hours that evening—the first occurring
near where the alleyway met Delta Avenue; the second, the one in which Mr. King was
shot and killed, happening at the other end of that same alleyway where it met Garfield
Street; and the third taking place slightly south of the general area around the alleyway in
front of Buena Vista Elementary School.

        Video related to the first shooting showed the Defendant and codefendant Harbison
walking toward a red Dodge Charger parked on Delta Avenue before walking back and
forth through the alleyway at 6:56 p.m. and 6:59 p.m., respectively. The Defendant wore
a purple shirt, and codefendant Harbison wore a black and white jacket and striped pants.
Codefendant Harbison was sitting on an alleyway post near the courtyard at 7:14 p.m. when
the Defendant emerged and talked with him. At 7:15 p.m., the Defendant appeared as if
he was talking on his cell phone. Three minutes later, the Defendant appeared to make or
receive another phone call. Thereafter, the men walked back through the alleyway toward
the Charger. At 7:20 p.m., codefendant Harbison walked away from the Charger, and the
men appeared to exchange something. As they reentered the alleyway at 7:29 p.m. walking
toward the courtyard, codefendant Harbison appeared to have a pistol in his right hand.

       A car pulled into the alleyway from the Garfield Street entrance and parked toward
that end of the alleyway. An individual appeared to exit the car and run across the

                                             -7-
courtyard. At 7:30 p.m., codefendant Harbison fired his weapon at the person running.
Codefendant Harbison stopped behind a concrete retaining wall and fired at the car parked
at the other end of the alleyway. Around this time, the Defendant appeared on camera
running toward the person in the courtyard. The Defendant also stopped and fired at the
car. By this time, another individual had exited the car and was firing back at the
defendants. At 7:31 p.m., the defendants returned to the Delta Avenue end of the alleyway
before disappearing off camera. A minute later, the defendants reemerged and were
standing on the opposite side of Delta Avenue, and the two appeared to exchange
something. The Defendant went to the red Charger, unlocked the car, and reached inside
the driver’s side door as codefendant Harbison moved quickly back toward the alleyway
entrance and fired another shot. The Defendant ran toward codefendant Harbison, and they
proceeded to reenter the alleyway. At 7:33 p.m., codefendant Harbison fired more shots.
Thereafter, they returned to the Charger and drove off.

        Det. Kulp explained that no camera captured the second shooting that took place at
the end of the alleyway at the Garfield Street entrance and which resulted in Mr. King’s
death. However, Det. Kulp did find footage of the white Dodge Stratus driving through
the alleyway at 8:17 p.m. in the direction of Garfield Street. Det. Kulp indicated that Mr.
Fite’s 911 call was placed shortly thereafter.

       The third shooting took place on 9th Avenue North in front of Buena Vista
Elementary School shortly after 9:00 p.m. and was captured by a camera on the MDHA
main office building. At 9:01 p.m., a group of individuals was walking northbound on 9th
Avenue North in the direction of the school. Once in front of the school, several of the
men crossed to the other side of the street and stopped at a parked blue car; one of the men
got into the driver’s seat of the car and conversed with the other two while the door was
ajar. At that time, the defendants were walking down the sidewalk on 9th Avenue North
on the same side of the street as the blue car. The defendants then stopped behind a sedan
and truck parked on the street, and codefendant Harbison fired toward the car. The driver
of the blue car closed the door and drove off. One of the men ran in the same direction as
the blue car, running up the street and out of sight. The other man ran toward the school,
and he appeared to shoot back as he ran. The Defendant, who was now in front of the
MDHA main office building, returned fire at the man running in front of the school. Det.
Kulp confirmed that this was the gunfire the officers heard while they were already on the
scene investigating the shooting of Mr. Fite and Mr. King.

       Det. Kulp learned that codefendant Harbison had been arrested just after the third
shooting. Photographs of codefendant Harbison taken after his arrest showed that he was
wearing striped pants. While codefendant Harbison was in custody, he called the

                                           -8-
Defendant fourteen times. One call was made at 12:11 a.m. on March 17, 2017, and
another was placed at 3:44 a.m. In the 12:11 a.m. call, codefendant Harbison told the
Defendant that he had been arrested for trespassing because he “wasn’t supposed to be over
there in Cheatham.”

       Around 4:00 a.m. that morning, codefendant Harbison was released from booking.
Det. Kulp, who happened to be in the parking lot at that time, saw the red Dodge Charger
being driven by the Defendant. Det. Kulp recognized the Defendant as the same person he
had seen in the surveillance footage, noting that the Defendant was wearing the same purple
shirt. Before Det. Kulp could speak to him, the Defendant drove away. Det. Kulp was
thereafter able to confirm the Defendant’s identity through obtaining and viewing his
driver’s license records.

       Around the time of codefendant Harbison’s release, MNPD Detective Richard Ford
saw codefendant Harbison exit the booking facility and walk toward Gay Street and take a
right. Det. Ford also saw the red Dodge Charger leave the parking lot and also turn right
on Gay Street. Det. Ford began to follow codefendant Harbison as he was walking and
saw the red sedan driving slowly in front of codefendant Harbison. Both the Charger and
codefendant Harbison then turned right onto 3rd Avenue North. As Det. Ford approached
3rd Avenue North, he saw the Charger, but codefendant Harbison was nowhere to be found.
Det. Ford tried to follow the Charger, but he ultimately lost sight of the car after it sped
over the Jefferson Street bridge. He estimated that the Charger was driving at least eighty
miles per hour at that time. According to Det. Ford, the speed limit on the bridge was forty
miles per hour.

       Det. Kulp met with Mr. Fite again around 6:00 p.m. on March 17, 2017, this time at
Mr. Fite’s father’s house. Det. Kulp had prepared two photographic lineups for Mr. Fite
to view—one containing a photograph of the Defendant, and the other containing a
photograph of codefendant Harbison. When Mr. Fite viewed the lineups, Mr. Fite was able
to positively identify codefendant Harbison as one of the shooters, but he was only “70
percent” sure that the Defendant was the other shooter.

        On March 17, 2017, Dr. Emily Dennison of the Nashville Davidson County Medical
Examiner’s office performed an autopsy of Mr. King’s body. Dr. Dennison determined
that Mr. King’s cause of death was a gunshot wound and that the manner of death was
homicide. Dr. Dennison said that Mr. King had been shot in the back and that the bullet
traveled through his lung and heart before becoming lodged inside his chest. She was able
to collect the projectile from Mr. King’s front left chest cavity, and it was sent for testing.

                                             -9-
        Dr. Dennison notated in the autopsy report that she did not observe any soot or
stippling associated with Mr. King’s wound. At trial, she explained that medical examiners
usually comment in the autopsy report whether soot or stippling were present on a gunshot
wound in an effort to estimate the range of fire. She stated that if both soot and stippling
were absent, as was the case here, then the weapon was fired at an “indeterminant range.”
Dr. Dennison expounded that this meant that the victim and shooter could have been
anywhere between two feet to one hundred feet apart or there could have been an
intermediary target between the two, if they were within two feet of each other, to absorb
the soot and stippling. Dr. Dennison opined that she “wouldn’t be surprised to know that”
the bullet “had passed through something before” entering Mr. King’s body because a
bullet loses momentum when it hits an object and the bullet did not exit Mr. King’s body.
Dr. Dennison stated that she did not know the “quality [of] the ammunition” that killed Mr.
King.

       Dr. Dennison stated that she had no documentation that the MNPD requested a
gunshot residue test in this case, but she noted that such tests were not often requested
anymore. Det. Kulp explained that a gunshot residue test was used to show if someone
had recently fired a weapon. According to Det. Kulp, a gunshot residue test was never
requested for Mr. King’s hands, and no such test was ever performed on Mr. King.

        Lynette Mace with the MNPD Crime Scene Investigation Unit was the lead crime
scene investigator in this case. According to Investigator Mace, the officers collected some
bloodied clothing from the sidewalk at the Arthur Avenue location where Mr. King was
found after being shot. At the second shooting location at the Garfield Street entrance to
the alleyway where Mr. King was shot, twenty cartridge casings were found on or near the
sidewalk. These cartridge casings were all 9-millimeter luger cartridge casings, but they
were produced by four different manufacturers in total. At the elementary school scene,
seventeen 9-millimeter luger cartridge casings and four .40 caliber Smith & Wesson
cartridge casings were recovered. The 9-millimeter casings were found in the street and
on the sidewalk near where the truck and sedan were seen parked in the video and also in
the parking lot of the MDHA main office building. The two casings that were found in the
middle of the road near the blue sedan where the three men from the group had stopped to
converse were .40 caliber cartridge casings, as were the two casings found near the stairs
in front of the school.

       John Terry, also with the MNPD Crime Scene Investigation Unit, assisted in
collection of the evidence at the first shooting scene that took place in the alleyway around
7:30 p.m. Near where the defendants were seen shooting on the video, Investigator Terry
found four 9-millimeter luger cartridge casings to the right side of the alleyway and ten .40

                                           - 10 -
caliber cartridge casings behind a concrete retaining wall and to the left side of the
alleyway. About “a couple hundred yards” away, at the other end of the alleyway, he found
seven .25 caliber cartridge casings near a car parked inside the alleyway in front of the 843
Garfield Street building.

       MNPD Officer Warren Fleak testified that a loaded .40 caliber semi-automatic
Smith & Wesson handgun was found the following day at 3:31 p.m. near the bushes in
front of the elementary school. In addition, MNPD Officer Nicholas Carter testified
regarding the three magazines taken from codefendant Harbison after his arrest. According
to Officer Carter, two of the 9-millimeter magazines were Springfield brand, while the
other was a Glock.

        Forensic Scientist Bridget Chambers with the MNPD Crime Laboratory testified as
an expert in the field of firearms and tool mark identification. Ms. Chambers created a
firearms report summarizing the evidence associated with each shooting scene. She
determined that an unknown 9-millimeter handgun had been fired at all three shooting
locations—it was responsible for four casings at the first scene, eleven casings at the
second, and two at the third. The Springfield 9-millimeter found on codefendant Harbison
was responsible for nine casings discovered at the second shooting and fifteen at the third
scene. The .40 caliber Smith & Wesson found in the bushes in front of the elementary
school was responsible for four casings at the third scene. No weapon was located that
matched either the ten .40 caliber casings or the seven .25 caliber casings found at the scene
of the first shooting.

       Ms. Chambers testified that the bullet removed from Mr. King’s body was sufficient
for comparison analysis. She was able to determine that it was “a .35 caliber [.]38 class
bullet fired in a firearm having six polygonal lands and groves with a right twist.” She
explained that neither .25 caliber nor .40 caliber are in the .38 class family of calibers.
Accordingly, the bullet could not have been fired through either the unidentified .25 caliber
or .40 caliber firearms. Regarding the two recovered firearms, Ms. Chambers was able to
exclude both the Springfield 9-millimeter handgun found on codefendant Harbison and the
.40 caliber Smith & Wesson found in the bushes in front of the elementary school as the
firearm that fired the bullet that killed Mr. King. However, she opined that the bullet
removed from Mr. King’s chest “could have been fired” from the unidentified 9-millimeter
handgun.

      Over a period of several days, MNPD Crime Scene Investigator Charles Linville
processed the white 2000 Dodge Stratus that belonged to Mr. Fite’s mother. He said that
when he first began processing the car, all four of the windows were rolled up. Investigator

                                            - 11 -
Linville said that he observed several strike marks to the back of the car, specifically on its
bumper and trunk, as well as a defect to its rear right taillight. There was also a bullet strike
to both the driver’s side door and the passenger’s side door. Investigator Linville was able
to determine that those bullet strikes were “going left to right” and “backwards to forward
on the vehicle.” Also, he noted that the front passenger’s side tire was “shredded[.]”

       Investigator Linville looked through the window of the front passenger door and
saw a bullet strike to the front passenger seat. It did not appear that the bullet hit the
dashboard. Investigator Linville testified that he placed various trajectory rods into the
bullet strikes in the car “to try to show the path” of the various bullets. Investigator
Linville’s photographs of the various trajectory rods illustrated the bullets’ paths—most of
the rods were red, but the green rod which went through the front passenger’s seat appeared
to represent the fatal bullet. Investigator Linville also testified that these bullet strikes came
from the exterior of the car, meaning they entered the car from the outside.

       Cell phone records confirmed that the Defendant made outgoing calls at 7:15, 7:18,
7:20, and 7:21 p.m. Later, the Defendant made calls at 8:05, 8:26, 8:28, 8:48, and 9:05
p.m. All of these calls were placed in the vicinity of the Cheatham Place housing
development.

        This concluded the State’s proof, and the twenty-seven-year old Defendant testified
on his own behalf. According to the Defendant, he worked as security for a “pipeline” in
South Dakota at the time of the shooting. He indicated that when he was off work, he
would return to Nashville and stay with his girlfriend, Ms. Paris Coleman, who lived in
Cheatham Place. Though the Defendant said that he received mail at her address, he agreed
that his driver’s license did not bear that address.

        The Defendant stated that he was aware of the housing complex’s rules and that he
spoke with the “head maintenance man” about how long he could stay there with his
girlfriend. He was told that he could only stay with his girlfriend for thirteen full days and
that he must be gone by the fourteenth day. During his conversation with the maintenance
man, they also checked to see if he was on MDHA’s “banned list,” and he was not. The
Defendant explained that this list showed “everyone on [MDHA’s] property that ha[d] been
banned.” The Defendant said that he was at Cheatham Place at his girlfriend’s invitation
and that no one from MDHA ever asked him to leave.

       The Defendant introduced a photograph of a handgun carry permit that had been
issued to him on January 27, 2017, when he was twenty-one-years old. The Defendant
confirmed that he regularly carried a 9-millimeter handgun that he kept loaded with

                                              - 12 -
“[h]ollow tip bullets.” According to the Defendant, Cheatham Place was “gang infested,”
particularly by a gang he referred to as the “Rollin’ 40 Crips.” On the evening in question,
while his girlfriend was at work, the armed Defendant was present inside Cheatham Place
with codefendant Harbison, a woman named Crystal, and her two children.

        The Defendant said that evening when he and codefendant Harbison went to take
the trash to the dumpster, a white car swerved and tried to hit them. According to the
Defendant, Mr. Fite was driving the car and Mr. King, Mr. Malik Jones, and Mr. Lorenzo
Butler were passengers, along with another man whom the Defendant did not know. At
that time, the Defendant only knew those individuals by their “tag names.” The Defendant
said that after the car tried to hit them, it slowed down, and the people inside were
“[l]ooking back at [them].” When the Defendant looked in codefendant Harbison’s
direction, he saw codefendant Harbison holding a firearm. The Defendant said that he told
codefendant Harbison to holster his weapon, and he did so.

       The Defendant testified that he and codefendant Harbison were scared, so they
decided to walk in the opposite direction to get away from the white car and its occupants.
He said that he did not want the men to find out where he lived. As they “were walking
into the curved alley,” a man appeared and whistled at them. He could see that the man
was armed. According to the Defendant, he recognized the man as having been the
unknown passenger in the white car, and he could see that the man was armed. He and
codefendant Harbison turned around and walked back down the alleyway.

       The Defendant was shown multiple still photographs taken from the MDHA videos.
From the pictures, he identified Mr. Jones and Mr. Butler, as well as the man that whistled
at them in the alleyway who was wearing a Nike shirt. The Defendant indicated that the
men were following him through the housing development that evening, though he did not
know it at the time. A photograph appeared to reflect Mr. Jones “racking a firearm” at 6:59
p.m. Referencing another photograph, the Defendant said that the man wearing the Nike
shirt walked between him and codefendant Harbison at 7:02 p.m. and yelled “up there” to
the others that he did not “know them n-----s.” According to the Defendant, “a lot more
people [came] down there and talk[ed] to” them, and it was not “a friendly conversation[.]”
These men instructed him and codefendant Harbison “to leave the area.”

        By 7:19 p.m., the Defendant and codefendant Harbison had decided to walk to
Kroger. Shortly thereafter, the Defendant handed codefendant Harbison a car “key fob.”
The Defendant said that as they were walking and turned left on Delta Avenue, Mr. King
shot at them approximately five times. The Defendant said that he did not draw his weapon
but that he noticed that codefendant Harbison had. At the Defendant’s direction,

                                           - 13 -
codefendant Harbison returned fire. The Defendant said that he ran to his Dodge Charger
to seek shelter and that codefendant Harbison fled down the alleyway. The Defendant was
unable to drive away because codefendant Harbison had his car key. Thereafter, the
Defendant heard gunshots coming from the direction near where codefendant Harbison had
run, so he proceeded up the alleyway to check on him. According to the Defendant, it was
at that time when gunfire between the two groups erupted in the alleyway. The Defendant
said that neither he nor codefendant Harbison fired first but that they did return fire.

        The Defendant and codefendant Harbison returned to the Dodge Charger and drove
away. According to the Defendant, they drove a fairly significant distance away from
Cheatham Place to give the group of men inside the alleyway time to leave, so that the
Defendant could return undetected. The Defendant said that they parked the car and headed
back to Cheatham Place on foot, which was about a thirty- to forty-five-minute walk from
their location. They intended to meet the Defendant’s girlfriend at the bus stop when she
returned home from work. As they neared the Garfield Street entrance to the alleyway, the
Defendant saw the same white car that had tried to hit them earlier. According to the
Defendant, both passenger’s side windows were rolled down, and Mr. King yelled “Rollin’
40 Crip” and began shooting at them. The Defendant believed that Mr. King was firing his
revolver less than ten-feet away from them. The Defendant indicated that Mr. Jones was
also inside the white car, sitting in the backseat on the passenger’s side behind Mr. King.
The Defendant admitted that he returned fire with his 9-millimeter handgun, firing only
“hollow point bullets.” As the car pulled away, the Defendant saw a “muzzle flash from
the back seat.” The Defendant denied knowing whether anyone had been shot.

        Relative to the third shooting, the Defendant said he and codefendant Harbison were
walking down 9th Avenue North to meet the Defendant’s girlfriend. According to the
Defendant, his girlfriend was “terrified” from the evening’s events, and she was bringing
him his belongings because he could no longer stay with her. As he and codefendant
Harbison were walking, they encountered “[a] pack of people on the opposite side of the
street.” He said that the group started telling them to leave because this was “their hood
and stuff like that.” However, the Defendant and codefendant Harbison continued walking
to meet the Defendant’s girlfriend. The Defendant recounted that around 9:01 p.m., three
men from the group crossed the street toward a recently parked car. According to the
Defendant, the driver opened the car door and handed one of the other men a firearm. The
Defendant said that neither he nor codefendant Harbison had their weapons drawn at that
time. One of the men next to the car then fired at codefendant Harbison from a “crouched”
position. Codefendant Harbison returned fire. When shots were fired, the car drove away.
One man fled in the same direction as the car, running up the street. The Defendant said
that he attempted to separate himself from codefendant Harbison, but as he did so, the

                                          - 14 -
“crouched” individual, who was now in front of the school, started shooting at the
Defendant. The Defendant, now situated in front of the MDHA main office building, said
that he returned fire only after being shot at first. The Defendant ran the opposite way, and
that was when he and codefendant Harbison lost contact with each other.

       Ultimately, the Defendant stayed with his girlfriend in Cheatham Place that evening.
Thereafter, the Defendant received a telephone call from codefendant Harbison, who
informed the Defendant that he had been arrested and asked the Defendant to post his bond.
The Defendant admitted that he went to the booking facility at 4:00 a.m. and posted
codefendant Harbison’s bond. The Defendant returned to his job in South Dakota the next
day. Though he kept in touch with codefendant Harbison, the Defendant claimed that he
did not learn of Mr. King’s death until he was arrested in May 2018, fourteen months later.
The Defendant believed Mr. Jones shot and killed Mr. King from inside the car. The
Defendant denied being a member of any gang.

        On cross-examination, the Defendant was asked if he was aware of MDHA’s “strict
rules,” and he said that he was. When the Defendant was asked if he knew that he could
not be on the property unless he lived there or was with a person who lived there, he said
“that’s not necessarily true.” The prosecutor asserted, “That is the rule.” The Defendant
then said, “No, sir.” The Defendant explained that his girlfriend had talked with the leasing
office, that she was also told about the thirteen-day rule, and that they complied with this
rule.

        When asked where his Glock 9-millimeter handgun that he carried that evening was
currently located, the Defendant stated that when he left for South Dakota after his
girlfriend made him leave her residence, he left his weapon in a friend’s car. He said that
the friend’s car had since been stolen. The Defendant denied speeding over the Jefferson
Street bridge at eighty miles per hour after picking up codefendant Harbison from jail.

    On redirect, the Defendant persisted that he “didn’t feel like a trespasser” on
MDHA’s property and that he did not think he was trespassing.

       Following the conclusion of proof, the jury convicted the Defendant of second
degree murder of Mr. King as a lesser included offense of first degree premeditated murder;
second degree murder of Mr. King as a lesser included offense of first degree felony
murder; attempted second degree murder of Mr. Fite as a lesser included offense of
attempted first degree murder; employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt
to commit a dangerous felony; and criminal trespass, a lesser included offense of

                                           - 15 -
aggravated criminal trespass. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-210, -14-405, -17-
1324.

        At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the Defendant’s family members—both his
mother, Neekla Hall-Cunningham, and his cousin’s husband, Jacques Jackson—testified
on the Defendant’s behalf. After considering the proof, the trial court imposed sentences
of twenty years at one-hundred percent for the second degree murder convictions, which
were merged; nine years at thirty percent for the attempted second degree murder
conviction; six years at one-hundred percent for the employing a firearm conviction; and
thirty days for the criminal trespass conviction. The trial court ordered all sentences to run
consecutively, except for the criminal trespass sentence which was to be served
concurrently with the second degree murder sentence, resulting in an effective sentence of
thirty-five years’ incarceration.

       The Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which was followed by the filing
of an amended motion for new trial presenting similar issues to those raised in this appeal.
Following the denial of his motion for new trial, the Defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal. The case is now before us for our review.

                                        II.      ANALYSIS

                                   A.         Waiver Principles

       Our supreme court has recently reemphasized that “an appellate court’s authority
‘generally will extend only to those issues presented for review.’” State v. Bristol, 654
S.W.3d 917, 923 (Tenn. 2022) (quoting Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b)); see also Hodge v. Craig,
382 S.W.3d 325, 334-35 (Tenn. 2012). This “principle of party presentation” is a defining
feature of our adversarial justice system. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d at 923 (quoting United States
v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. ---, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020)). It rests on the premise that
the parties “know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and
argument entitling them to relief.” Id. at 923-24 (quoting Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at
1579). “In our adversarial system, the judicial role is not to research or construct a litigant’s
case or arguments for him or her, but rather to serve as arbiters of legal questions presented
and argued by the parties before them[.]” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly,
an appellate court “may decline to consider issues that a party failed to raise properly.” Id.
(quoting State v. Harbison, 539 S.W.3d 149, 165 (Tenn. 2018)).

      Moreover, “an appellate court’s jurisdiction is ‘appellate only.’” Bristol, 654
S.W.3d at 925 (quoting Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 2). “It extends to those issues that have

                                                - 16 -
been formulated and passed upon in some inferior tribunal.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Like
the party-presentation principle, preservation requirements further values fundamental to
our justice system.” Id. Issue preservation principles ordinarily require that the party
should first assert a timely objection during the trial court proceedings identifying a
“specific ground of objection if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.”
See Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 51(b). Subject to certain exceptions in
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(b), “issues are properly raised on appeal . . .
when they have been raised and preserved at trial and . . . when they have been presented
in the manner prescribed by” certain procedural rules regarding appellate briefs. Hodge,
382 S.W.3d at 334 (footnote omitted).

        The Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals set forth rules regarding appellate practice, specifically, the form and contents of
a party’s brief. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) requires an appellant to
include in their appellate brief “[a] statement of the issues presented for review” and an
argument section setting forth “the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require
appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the record
(which may be quoted verbatim) relied on.” In addition, the rules of this court state that
“[i]f a brief does not substantially conform to the requirements of the Tennessee Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the court may order the same stricken and direct the filing, within a
fixed time, of a new brief” and that “[i]ssues which are not supported by argument, citation
to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in this
court.” Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10.

                            B.     Defendant’s Appellate Brief

        In order to determine which of the Defendant’s issues are properly presented on
appeal for our review, it is necessary for us first to examine the Defendant’s brief. The
Defendant begins by presenting only one issue for review in the “Statement of Issue”
section of his brief: “[The] Defendant . . . killed the victim in self-defense and the trial
court used an unsubstantiated trespassing claim as a pretext to introduce evidence against
him. Will this [c]ourt disturb the jury’s guilty verdict on appeal and reweigh the evidence
in favor of [the Defendant]?” Next, in the “Statement of the Case” section, the Defendant
states that he is “challeng[ing] the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions
and the severity of the sentences” on appeal. In support, he relies on (1) Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), for the appellate standard of review for sufficiency of
the evidence claims, and (2) State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 861-62 (Tenn. 2013), as

                                           - 17 -
providing the appellate standard of review for his sentencing allegation. The Defendant
then provides the factual background of the case in his “Statement of the Facts” section.

        The “Argument” section ensues, which the Defendant commences by summarizing
his issues as follows:

              The trial court erred in denying [the Defendant’s] pre-trial Motion to
       Sever and allowing prejudicial evidence relating to the Criminal Trespassing
       allegation. It also erred in denying [the Defendant’s] Motion for New Trial.
       Each error unfairly prejudiced [the Defendant] and tainted the legal process.
       Despite the errors, the facts also show that [the Defendant] did not commit
       any of the charged offenses. Reversal of the convictions and dismissal of all
       charges is the appropriate remedy.

He notes that during the motion for new trial phase, he argued that the guilty verdicts on
all counts were against the weight of the evidence and that, similarly, on appeal, he is
contending that the evidence was insufficient to support those convictions, again citing the
Jackson v. Virginia standard of review. The Defendant then states that he was prejudiced
by the trial court “at each step” in the proceedings: during the pretrial motion to sever, in
the denial of his motion for new trial, and at trial “as the State introduced irrelevant and
prejudicial video evidence of trespassing.” He surmises that the trespassing offense did
not occur as a matter of law, that the jury “grossly misweighed the evidence,” and that he
acted in self-defense.

        Next, the Defendant, in separate sub-sections with headings, addresses the issues of
(1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the separate shooting
episodes; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions; (3) whether
the trial court erred by allowing the State to show video footage of the Defendant
trespassing on MDHA property; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting “video
evidence related to Crime Scene 3”; and (5) whether the effect of these cumulative errors
entitles him to relief.1 Under the cumulative error heading, not as a separate sub-section,
the Defendant raises a sentencing challenge.

        The State responds that all of the Defendant’s issues, except sufficiency of the
evidence, are waived due to his failure to follow the rules for appellate briefs. See Tenn.
R. App. P. 27; Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10. Specifically, the State contends that the
Defendant’s severance, sentencing, and cumulative error claims are waived because he
failed to include these issues in his statement of the issues as required by the rules. As for
       1
           For clarity and ease of review, we have reordered the Defendant’s issues as stated in his brief.

                                                    - 18 -
the Defendant’s evidentiary issues relative to the admission of certain video evidence, the
State notes that the Defendant does not provide any “details about the exhibits and makes
no reference to a page in the record in which these videos were introduced or if he objected
to their introduction” and then submits that the Defendant’s evidentiary issues are waived
because they are not “supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate
references to the record.”

        We agree with the State that the Defendant’s brief does not substantially conform
to the requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We will exercise our
discretion and not order the brief stricken and require the filing of a new brief. See Tenn.
Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(a); see, e.g., State v. Lee, No. W2022-00626-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL
1956964, at *12 (Tenn. Crim App. Feb. 13, 2023) (concluding same), perm. app. denied
(Tenn. June 7, 2023). We will, however, treat issues which are not properly designated as
issues or supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the
record as waived. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b); Lee, 2023 WL 1956964, at *12.

                                  C.      Motion to Sever

        In one sub-section of his argument, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his pretrial motion to sever. First, the Defendant starts by observing that the three
crime scenes in this case were “at different geographic locations, occur[red] at different
times, and ha[d] alleged different actors.” Citing to the “State’s Response to Defendant’s
Motion to Sever Counts” contained in the technical record, the Defendant notes that the
State argued “the scenes [were] linked by the ‘commonalities’ of finding similar bullet
casings at the different scenes.” Next, in support of his assertion of error, the Defendant
contends, “The evidence in this case shows that [the Defendant] did not commit the alleged
criminal trespass, and the State’s case was so weak they dropped the trespassing charge
after playing the prejudicial video before the jury.” The Defendant continues, “The video
was so prejudicial that any and all evidence relating to trespassing tainted the jury as they
considered the allegations against [the Defendant] involving Scene 2 and Scene 3.”

        The State argues the Defendant has waived his severance issue on appeal because it
is not included in the Defendant’s statement of the issues presented for review as required
by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(4). The Defendant does not present this
issue in his “Statement of the Issue” section of his brief. He does, however, refer to the
issue in his summary at the beginning of the “Argument” section of his brief, as well as
providing a separate sub-section and heading dealing with the trial court’s denial of his
motion for severance. Were this the only deficiency in the Defendant’s brief regarding

                                            - 19 -
proper presentation of this issue, we might have chosen to exercise our discretionary
authority and review the issue on the merits.

       However, the Defendant’s brief does not contain an argument setting forth “the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor,
including the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the
authorities and appropriate references to the record[.]” Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7); see also
Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). “An issue may be deemed waived, even when it has been
specifically raised as an issue, when the brief fails to include an argument satisfying the
requirements” of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. Hodge, 382 S.W.3d at 335.
In the Defendant’s brief, there is no citation to the rules governing joinder and severance,
specifically, Rules 8 and 14 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Nor does the
Defendant cite to any caselaw concerning this issue. Moreover, the Defendant’s only
reference to the record in this section is to the State’s response to his pretrial motion to
sever; there are no references to the lengthy severance hearing nor any mention of the
specifics of the trial court’s ruling in its detailed order denying the Defendant’s motion. 2

       What is more, counsel for the Defendant incorrectly states in the brief that the State
“dropped the trespassing charge after playing the prejudicial video before the jury”; the
Defendant was, in fact, convicted of criminal trespass after the charge of aggravated
criminal trespass was submitted to the jury for consideration. Counsel for the Defendant
also submits that “any and all evidence relating to trespassing tainted the jury as they
considered the allegations against [the Defendant] involving Scene 2 and Scene 3[.]” But,
the Defendant has provided neither exhibit numbers nor reference to pages in the record in
which these videos were introduced, something quite necessary given the abundance of
video footage in this case.

        Moreover, defense counsel fails to acknowledge the trial court’s ruling following
the severance hearing admitting the evidence from the scene of the first shooting for
identity purposes and not specifically as it related to provide evidence of trespassing. The
trial court determined that proof of the first incident would be admissible in a trial of the
second and third incidents because proof of the codefendants’ involvement in the first
incident was relevant as to the material issue of identity in the second and third incidents

        2
          There is one reference to the trial court’s order denying the motion to sever that appears in the
“Statement of Facts” section. It generally cites to the first page of the order and is merely support for the
Defendant’s general statement that the trial court denied his motion to sever “the case into three separate
cases.” We emphasize that the Defendant’s argument must contain appropriate references to the record in
support of his contentions requiring appellate relief.

                                                   - 20 -
and because the proof established both defendants’ involvement in the first incident by
clear and convincing evidence.

       An appellate court’s role is not to construct the Defendant’s argument for him, see
Sneed v. Bd. Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010), nor can we allow
the Defendant to distort the record in a way that supports an argument that is otherwise
unpreserved due to a failure to follow our appellate rules. The Defendant has waived
appellate review of the issue.

                                D.       Sufficiency of the Evidence

       The Defendant, in his “Statement of Issue” section, presents the following issue for
review: “[The] Defendant . . . killed the victim in self-defense and the trial court used an
unsubstantiated trespassing claim as a pretext to introduce evidence against him. Will this
[c]ourt disturb the jury’s guilty verdict on appeal and reweigh the evidence in favor of [the
Defendant]?” Next, in the “Statement of the Case” section, the Defendant states that he is
“challeng[ing] the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions” and relies on
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319, for the appellate standard of review for sufficiency of
the evidence claims. At the beginning of the “Argument” section of the Defendant’s brief,
he contends that “the facts also show that [the Defendant] did not commit any of the
charged offenses.” He then notes that during the motion for new trial phase, he argued that
the guilty verdicts on all counts were against the weight of the evidence and that, similarly,
on appeal, he is contending that the evidence was insufficient to support those convictions,
again citing the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review. He concludes that the trespassing
offense did not occur as a matter of law, that the jury “grossly misweighed the evidence,”
and that he acted in self-defense.

       Relative to the particulars of the Defendant’s sufficiency argument, the Defendant,
in four different sub-sections, challenges the evidence supporting his convictions for
second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during
the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. 3 Regarding the second degree
murder convictions, the Defendant submits that “[t]he evidence overwhelming supports a

        3
           Though the Defendant utilizes four different sub-sections to present his sufficiency argument
relative these offenses, which would seemingly correspond to his four different convictions, the Defendant
does not include a separate sub-section devoted to his employment of a firearm conviction. He does include
two sub-sections addressing the sufficiency of the evidence for separate counts of attempted second degree
murder of Mr. Fite; however, the Defendant was not convicted of two counts of attempted second degree
murder, only one. He does refer to the employment of a firearm offense in several places within the various
sub-sections.

                                                  - 21 -
simple alternative theory that exonerates” him: “the evidence indicates that [Mr. King] was
shot from inside the vehicle, rather than from a distance outside of the vehicle as the State
argued.” He notes that the evidence showed that Mr. King “was killed with a regular
bullet”; that the Defendant “exclusively fires hollow point rounds[,] . . . show[ing] that [he]
was not the trigger man”; and that the medical examiner did not testify “as to the probable
distance from which the victim was shot, leaving a murky picture for the jury.” As for
count two, the Defendant states that because he “is not guilty for the [c]ount [one] predicate
felony, he cannot be guilty of [c]ount [two] for felony murder.”

       In this same vein, relative to the attempted second degree murder conviction, the
Defendant states that Mr. Fite pushed Mr. King out of the car and onto the ground and left
him there, rather than to try and get him help, and that Mr. Fite subsequently “dumped the
car” and went home. He further notes that the medical examiner “testified that she could
not conclude what caliber of bullet killed the victim, nor did she have any sort of alleged
murder weapon to compare the bullet.” The Defendant contends that this evidence
“supports the theory that someone in the backseat of Mr. Fite’s car shot the victim from
within the vehicle, which makes it impossible for [the Defendant] to be the perpetrator.”

       The Defendant also submits that he acted in self-defense “when two men shot at
him from Mr. Fite’s car.” In support of his self-defense argument, the Defendant notes that
“the police suppressed investigative techniques that could exonerate” him by failing to
request a gunshot residue test on Mr. King and that the medical examiner was prohibited
from testifying “about whether a [gunshot] residue test could have determined whether
[Mr.] King could have fired, handled, or was near a gun when it was fired upon [the
Defendant] from within the car[.]”

       In his various sub-sections discussing these convictions, the Defendant makes
several citations to the record regarding the testimony presented at trial. As for legal
support, the Defendant, in a footnote, cites to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d);
State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn.
1995); and State v. Dankworth, 919 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). He provides no
specifics as to what Rule 33 states or how it is relevant to his case. Likewise, he does not
provide any pinpoint citations or holdings for these cases or argue their relevance to these
facts.

       As for his criminal trespass conviction, the Defendant, in a fifth sub-section, argues
that he cannot be guilty as a matter of law under Tennessee Code Annotated section
39-14-405 because MDHA never advised him that “he was not welcome in Cheatham Place
or any other [h]ousing [a]uthority property” and that he “properly inferred consent to enter

                                            - 22 -
the property.” The Defendant notes that MDHA is a government entity and that their
“housing complexes are open to the general public for the commercial activity of leasing
rental units.” According to the Defendant, the State did not rebut the inference of consent
at trial. He observes that the State did not provide any evidence that MDHA had posted
“No Trespassing” signs inside the housing development, that MDHA had received any
complaints resulting in charges against the Defendant or codefendant Harbison, or that the
Defendant’s presence substantially interfered with MDHA’s use of the property. The
Defendant also notes that he was at Cheatham Place visiting his girlfriend and cites to his
own testimony at trial that he did not “feel like a trespasser” and that he did not think that
he was trespassing.

       The Defendant’s sufficiency argument is not a model of clarity. He includes
references to improper legal canons by asking this court to reweigh the evidence and by
making assertions that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the jury
“grossly misweighed the evidence.” He also makes a perplexing argument regarding count
two, asserting that he was convicted of felony murder, when he was, in fact, found not
guilty of felony murder, but guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree murder;
there are no predicate felonies to second degree murder as charged to the jury in this case,
see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-210(a)(1), and his two second degree murder
convictions in counts one and two were merged. Nonetheless, we conclude that the
Defendant’s brief adequately complies with the rules of appellate briefing to present the
issue for appellate review. Accordingly, we will proceed to examine whether the
Defendant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence.

                                 1.     Standard of Review

         The United States Constitution prohibits the states from depriving “any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. A
state shall not deprive a criminal defendant of his liberty “except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In determining whether a state has met this
burden following a finding of guilt, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 319. Because a guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with
a presumption of guilt, the defendant has the burden on appeal of illustrating why the
evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914
(Tenn. 1982). If a convicted defendant makes this showing, the finding of guilt shall be
set aside. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).

                                            - 23 -
       “Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given
the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of
fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Appellate courts do not “reweigh
or reevaluate the evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn.
1978)). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony
of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.”
State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). The law provides this deference to the
jury’s verdict because

       [t]he jury and the [t]rial [j]udge saw the witnesses face to face, heard them
       testify, and observed their demeanor on the stand, and were in much better
       position than we are, to determine the weight to be given their testimony.
       The human atmosphere of the trial and the totality of the evidence before the
       court below cannot be reproduced in an appellate court, which sees only the
       written record.

Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tenn. 1963) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Therefore, on appellate review, “the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate
view of the trial evidence and to all reasonable or legitimate inferences which may be
drawn therefrom.” Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835.

2.     Second Degree Murder, Attempted Second Degree Murder, and Employment of a
     Firearm During the Commission of or Attempt to Commit a Dangerous Felony

         The Defendant’s sufficiency argument regarding these four convictions is two-fold:
(1) he contends that someone else shot Mr. King from inside the car; and (2) he submits
that, if he was the shooter, he acted in self-defense. The State argues that the proof at trial
established that the Defendant and codefendant Harbison fired repeatedly at Mr. Fite and
Mr. King as they were riding in their car and that one bullet struck Mr. King, killing him.
As for the Defendant’s claim of self-defense, the State asserts that the jury listened to Mr.
Fite’s account, and by its verdict, chose not to believe that the Defendant acted in
self-defense. Accordingly, the State submits that the evidence was sufficient to support
the Defendant’s convictions.

        Second degree murder is defined as “[a] knowing killing of another.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). Second degree murder is a “result of conduct” offense. State v.
Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tenn. 2000). Accordingly, the appropriate statutory
definition of “knowing” in the context of second degree murder is as follows: “A person

                                            - 24 -
acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the person is aware
that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-
302(b). In other words, “the State is not required to prove that the defendant wished to
cause his victim’s death but only that the defendant knew that his or her actions were
reasonably certain to cause the victim’s death.” State v. Brown, 311 S.W.3d 422, 432
(Tenn. 2010).

       Criminal attempt requires, as relevant here, proof that a person “[a]cts with intent to
complete a course of action or cause a result that would constitute the offense . . . and the
conduct constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-12-101(a)(3). Attempted second degree murder, therefore, requires the State to
prove that the Defendant knew that his actions were reasonably certain to cause the victim’s
death and that he took a substantial step toward doing so.

       To convict the Defendant of employing a firearm during the commission of or
attempt to commit a dangerous felony, the State had to show that the Defendant
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly employed a firearm during the commission of or
attempt to commit a dangerous felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(b); State v.
Duncan, 505 S.W.3d 480, 488 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting State v. Fayne, 505 S.W.3d 362,
369-70 (Tenn. 2014)). Attempt to commit second degree murder is a dangerous felony.
Id. § 39-17-1324(i)(1)(B). The term “employ” means “to make use of.” Fayne, 451
S.W.3d at 370.

                                       a.     Identity

        To summarize the Defendant’s argument in this regard, the Defendant insists that
when “[v]iewed as a whole, the evidence indicates that [Mr. King] was shot from inside
the vehicle, rather than from a distance outside of the vehicle[.]” The Defendant takes
issue with the ballistics testimony, noting that Mr. King was killed with “a regular bullet,”
and that only regular bullets were collected from the scene, but that he exclusively uses
hollow point rounds. He also takes issue with the medical examiner’s testimony, noting
that she did not testify as to the probable distance from which Mr. King was shot, that she
could not conclude what caliber of bullet killed the victim, and that she did not have any
alleged murder weapon with which to compare the bullet. In addition, the Defendant
submits that Mr. Fite’s abandonment of Mr. King and the car and Mr. Fite’s subsequent
flight from the scene is supportive of the Defendant’s theory that someone else shot Mr.
King from inside the car.

                                            - 25 -
       The Defendant’s argument that someone else from inside the car shot and killed Mr.
King amounts to a claim of innocence that the State failed to prove his identity as one of
the perpetrators of Mr. King’s murder. The identity of the perpetrator is an essential
element of any crime. State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v.
Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tenn. 1975)). The State has the burden of proving the
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sneed, 908
S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing White v. State, 533 S.W.2d 735, 744
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)). Identity is a question of fact for the jury’s determination upon
consideration of all competent proof. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 388 (Tenn. 2005).
As with any sufficiency analysis, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence concerning identity contained in the record, as well as all reasonable inferences
which may be drawn from the evidence. See id. (citing State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185,
191 (Tenn. 1992)); see also State v. Miller, 638 S.W.3d 136, 158-59 (Tenn. 2021).

       The Defendant’s characterization of the testimony from various State’s witnesses is
somewhat contorted. For instance, the Defendant criticizes testimony from Dr. Dennison,
the medical examiner, stating that she failed to testify about the probable distance from
which Mr. King was shot, resulting in a “murky picture for the jury.” However, Dr.
Dennison indicated that there was no soot or stippling seen on Mr. King’s body, which
meant that the bullet was fired at an “indeterminant range.” Dr. Dennison explained that
this meant that the victim and shooter could have been anywhere between two feet to one
hundred feet apart. She also allowed that the muzzle could have been within two feet of
Mr. King’s body when fired, so long as there was an intermediary target between the two
to absorb the soot and stippling. Thus, she provided testimony regarding the estimated
range of fire to the best of her ability within the framework of the obtainable information.
The jury, as the sole arbiter of fact, was free to accredit or discount any portion of her
testimony. See State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 658 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003)
(concluding that “the jury’s role as the trier of fact is to determine which portions of the
evidence are illustrative of the truth relative to disputed events”).

        The Defendant further claims that Dr. Dennison was unable to “conclude what
caliber of bullet killed the victim, nor did she have any sort of alleged murder weapon with
which to compare the bullet.” However, Dr. Dennison testified that she recovered a
projectile from the left side of Mr. King’s chest and that it was sent for testing. While
testifying about the range of firing, Dr. Dennison stated that she did not know the “quality
[of] the ammunition” that killed Mr. King. Beyond that, Dr. Dennison was never asked
about the caliber of the projectile recovered from inside Mr. King or whether the projectile
was ever compared with any particular firearm. Importantly, as a medical examiner, Dr.

                                            - 26 -
Dennison’s area of expertise was forensic pathology, and the testimony described by the
Defendant was better suited for someone with training and expertise in ballistics.

        In fact, Bridget Chambers was qualified as an expert in firearm and tool mark
identification and testified regarding the caliber of the bullet removed from Mr. King’s
body and that there was no matching firearm found. She was able to determine that the
bullet was “a .35 caliber [.]38 class bullet fired in a firearm having six polygonal lands and
groves with a right twist.” She explained that the .38 class is a family of calibers which
includes neither .25 caliber nor .40 caliber. Accordingly, she opined that the bullet could
not have been fired through either the unidentified .25 caliber or .40 caliber firearms. She
was also able to compare the bullet with the Springfield 9-millimeter and the .40 caliber
Smith & Wesson handguns submitted for testing and determined that the bullet was not
fired through either of those weapons. She opined that the bullet removed from Mr. King’s
chest “could have been fired” from the unidentified 9-millimeter handgun.

       Moreover, Investigator Linville testified that he observed several strike marks to the
back of the white Dodge Stratus, that the bullet strikes came from the exterior of the car,
and that the bullet strikes were “going left to right” and “backwards to forward on the
vehicle.” Investigator Linville also saw a bullet strike to the front passenger seat but no
corresponding strike to the dashboard. Investigator Linville placed various trajectory rods
into the bullet strikes in the car, including the green rod representing the fatal bullet, and
those photographs were entered into evidence.

       The Defendant also condemns Mr. Fite’s behavior following the shooting and
implies that it indicates a guilty conscience. The jury heard Mr. Fite, who was sixteen
years old at the time shooting, explain his actions following the shooting. They also heard
testimony that Mr. Fite cooperated with authorities in the aftermath of the shooting by
speaking with Det. Kulp on two occasions. It was within the exclusive province of the jury
to determine how to weigh this evidence and what significance to attach to it, if any. See
Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659.

       The Defendant relies on his own testimony as proof of his innocence. He submits
that he “exclusively used hollow point bullets and the recovered bullets were regular.”
None of the witnesses tasked with crime scene investigation were asked about the regular
versus the hollow point nature of the bullets or how that might have related to the cartridge
casings collected. Ms. Chambers was not asked to distinguish between regular and hollow
point ammunition or any distinctive characteristics between the two. The medical
examiner was not asked about how a hollow point bullet might have differently impacted
Mr. King’s injuries. The Defendant’s testimony in this regard, even if it were fully

                                            - 27 -
accredited by the jury, is entirely unsupported by other evidence in the record that would
have allowed the jury to reach his desired conclusion.

       Video evidence from the MDHA cameras placed the Defendant and codefendant
Harbison in the area of the first shooting. Cell phones records confirmed that the Defendant
was using his cell phone at the times associated with his usage as depicted in the video
footage. At approximately 7:30 p.m., the defendants can be seen in the alleyway firing
their weapons at a group of individuals at the end of the alleyway near Garfield Street.
After firing, the Defendant and codefendant Harbison ran in the opposite direction toward
the other end of the alleyway and entered the Defendant’s Dodge Charger parked on Delta
Avenue, and the car is driven away.

        While no camera angle specifically captured the homicide, surveillance video did
show Mr. Fite and Mr. King in a Dodge Stratus at 8:17 p.m. as they crossed over Delta
Avenue and drove through the alleyway headed toward Garfield Street just prior to the
shooting. Mr. Fite testified that he saw two men on the sidewalk to the right-side of the
car as they were coming toward the end of the alleyway and that as they began to turn left
off the alleyway onto Garfield Street, the two men on the sidewalk opened fire on them.
The 911 call by Mr. Fite was placed shortly thereafter.

       At trial, Mr. Fite testified that no one else was inside the Dodge Stratus. Mr. Fite
also told Det. Kulp that no one else was inside the car. The following day, Mr. Fite was
shown photographic lineups and positively identified codefendant Harbison as one of the
shooters and partially identified the Defendant as the other.

       Around 9:00 p.m. that evening, MDHA cameras again captured the defendants on
9th Avenue North. The defendants approached a group of individuals as they were walking
in front of Buena Vista Elementary School. Codefendant Harbison stepped into the street
and opened fire on the group. The Defendant was then seen in front of the MDHA main
office building firing at one of the men as he ran. Codefendant Harbison was apprehended
shortly thereafter still inside Cheatham Place.

       Once in custody, codefendant Harbison phoned the Defendant fourteen times, and
the Defendant posted codefendant Harbison’s bond. Both Det. Ford and Det. Kulp noticed
the Defendant in the parking lot at the time of codefendant Harbison’s release. When
officers began to follow the defendants and watch their movements as the defendants left
the booking facility, the Red Charger being driven by the Defendant, presumably with
codefendant Harbison inside, sped away at high rate of speed.

                                           - 28 -
        The Springfield 9-millimeter handgun found on codefendant Harbison matched
cartridge casings fired at the homicide scene and the scene in front of the elementary
school. There were 9-millimeter cartridge casings found at all three crime scenes that
matched an unidentified 9-millimeter weapon. Upon his arrest, three 9-millimeter
magazines were found in codefendant Harbison’s possession, two Springfield and one
Glock. The Defendant was not apprehended until fourteen months later and claimed he
did not know about Mr. King’s death. When the Defendant was asked about what
happened to the Glock 9-millimeter firearm that he carried at the time of the shootings, the
Defendant claimed that he left it inside a friend’s car and that the car had been subsequently
stolen.

       The jury was able to hear and assess the testimony from the various witnesses at
trial. The jury rejected the Defendant’s theory that Mr. King had been shot by someone
inside the car, as was its prerogative. See Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. From the proof
presented at trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that the Defendant’s identity had been
sufficiently established as one of the shooters who, on March 16, 2017, fired multiple
bullets into the Dodge Stratus occupied by Mr. Fite and Mr. King, ultimately resulting in
Mr. King’s death. A jury could easily conclude that the Defendant was reasonably certain
his actions would result in the deaths of the car’s occupants. See State v. Freeman, 943
S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (finding sufficient evidence that the defendant
acted knowingly when he fired multiple gunshots at a vehicle that he knew was occupied).

                                    b.      Self-defense

       Alternatively, the Defendant argues that the proof supports the conclusion that he
acted in self-defense, thus justifying his use of force. At the time of the offense, Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-11-611(b)(2) (Supp. 2016), which governs claims of
self-defense, provided as follows:

              Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in
       unlawful activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no
       duty to retreat before threatening or using force intended or likely to cause
       death or serious bodily injury, if:

             (A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an imminent
       danger of death or serious bodily injury;

              (B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily
       injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time; and

                                            - 29 -
              (C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.

A defendant’s conduct and mental state must meet an objective standard of reasonableness
for the conduct to be justified under this statutory defense. State v. Bult, 989 S.W.2d 730,
732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Thus, the mere fact that a defendant believes that his conduct
is justified would not suffice to justify his conduct. Id. Reliance on self-defense is not
limited to the exact moment of the assault, but it may be considered in connection with the
entirety of the events leading to the assault. State v. Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1993) (citation omitted). If proven to the satisfaction of the jury, self-defense is a
complete defense to crimes of violence. Id. (citations omitted).

        It is well-established “that whether an individual acted in self-defense is a factual
determination to be made by the jury as the sole trier of fact.” State v. Goode, 956 S.W.2d
521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Ivy, 868 S.W.2d at 727). When self-defense is
fairly raised by the evidence, the State carries the burden of proof to negate the defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-201(a)(3); State v. Benson, 600
S.W.3d 896, 903 (Tenn. 2020) (citation omitted). As such, “in the context of judicial
review of the jury verdict, in order to prevail, the defendant must show that the evidence
relative to justification, such as self-defense, raises, as a matter of law, a reasonable doubt
as to his conduct being criminal.” State v. Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1994).

        The Defendant claims that he “only fired shots after he was first fired upon by
occupants in the car that Mr. Fite was driving[.]” According to Mr. Fite, who was sixteen
at the time of the incident, he and Mr. King, who was eighteen, were driving through the
alleyway when Mr. Fite saw two guys on the sidewalk who “just start[ed] shooting.” Mr.
Fite said it was just the two of them in the car at the time, and neither of them were armed.
Multiple cartridge casings from two different 9-millimeter handguns were found on the
sidewalk in the area where the defendants were seen standing. Officer Linville testified
that when he began processing the Dodge Stratus driven by Mr. Fite, all four of the
windows were rolled up. The weapon found on codefendant Harbison after his arrest fired
nine of the cartridge casings found on the scene of the second shooting; the other,
unidentified 9-millimeter, presumably carried by the Defendant, fired the other eleven
cartridge casings found on the scene.

       While the Defendant claimed that he was scared of various individuals inside
Cheatham Place that evening, the Defendant had several opportunities to seek shelter or
help from law enforcement. Instead, the Defendant chose to remain inside Cheatham Place

                                            - 30 -
and shot at others for over a period of ninety minutes. He fired a semiautomatic
9-millimeter weapon at Mr. Fite and Mr. King eleven times. The Defendant relies on his
own testimony that Mr. King shot at him first with a revolver; however, the jury listened
to Mr. Fite’s account, and by its verdict, chose not to believe that the Defendant acted in
self-defense. See Goode, 956 S.W.2d at 527. The Defendant has failed to show that the
evidence relative to justification raised a reasonable doubt as to his conduct being criminal.
See Clifton, 880 S.W.2d at 743.

       Furthermore, in support of his self-defense argument, the Defendant mentions that
this defense would have been bolstered by the medical examiner’s performance of a
gunshot residue test on Mr. King, but the MNPD never requested one. The Defendant
notes that when he attempted to ask Dr. Dennison on cross-examination if “a residue test
could have determined whether [Mr.] King could have fired, handled, or was near a gun
when it was fired[,]” the State lodged an objection to such testimony; the State’s objection
was sustained by the trial court, and he was prohibited from pursuing this line of
questioning. According to the Defendant, “the trial court’s failure to allow the residue
questions significantly prejudiced” him.

       To further emphasize the defects in the appellate brief prepared on behalf of the
Defendant, we note that the reference to the record cited by the Defendant in support of
this exchange occurred during the cross-examination of Det. Kulp, not the medical
examiner as posited. Det. Kulp testified that a gunshot residue test was used to show if
someone had recently fired a weapon and that none was performed on Mr. King’s hands.
Additionally, Det. Kulp was asked if it would “have been helpful” to perform a gunshot
residue test on Mr. King’s hands to see if he had recently fired a gun, but the State objected,
arguing that no foundation had been laid to establish Det. Kulp’s basis of knowledge.
Though the defense was permitted to ask more questions of Det. Kulp in this regard, the
objection to this specific question was ultimately sustained.

       Most importantly, this an evidentiary issue that is only included within the
Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence argument. It is never delineated as a separate issue
presented for review. And, he does not include any argument or citation to authority
regarding this alleged trial court error. Accordingly, to the extent that this can be viewed
as a separate claim regarding the trial court’s sustaining the objection, it is waived. See
Tenn. R. App. P. 27; Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10.

      For all of these reasons, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the
Defendant’s convictions for second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and

                                            - 31 -
employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.
The Defendant is not entitled to relief.

                                 3.     Criminal Trespass

       In Tennessee, “[a] person commits criminal trespass if the person enters or remains
on property, or any portion of property, without the consent of the owner.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-14-405(a). “Consent may be inferred in the case of property that is used for
commercial activity available to the general public or in the case of other property when
the owner has communicated the owner’s intent that the property be open to the general
public.” Id. It is a defense to prosecution under this section if the person reasonably
believed that they had the owner’s consent to enter or remain on the property, that the
person’s conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner’s use of the property, and
the person left the property upon request. Id. § 39-14-405(b). However, this defense is not
available if the property owner has posted signs “visible at all major points of ingress to
the property . . . and the signs are reasonably likely to come to the attention of a person
entering the property[.]” Id. § 39-14-405(c).

        To summarize the Defendant’s argument, he contends that he properly inferred
consent to enter Cheatham Place and that the State failed to rebut this inference at trial.
Specifically, he notes that the housing complex was open to the general public for the
commercial activity of leasing rental units, that no one advised him he was not welcome
on the property, and that the State did not offer any proof of “No Trespassing” signs posted
on the property. The Defendant also submits that he was on the property visiting his
girlfriend, Ms. Coleman, with whom he stayed intermittently.

        The State responds that the Defendant did not live at Cheatham Place, but was only
visiting his girlfriend, and that Officer Frei explained that the only people who are allowed
to be on MDHA property were the people who lived there. The State further avers that the
Defendant “agreed that he understood the housing development’s rules and regulations
related to guests and acknowledged that guests were not supposed to be in the development
without their host[,]” that the Defendant admitted his girlfriend was not at Cheatham Place
for most of the night in question, and that video surveillance showed the Defendant at
several different locations within Cheatham Place without his girlfriend. The State
concludes that the Defendant was in violation of the development’s rules and, thus, did not
have the housing authority’s consent to enter.

        However, the State mischaracterizes what occurred during Officer Frei’s testimony
at trial. When Officer Frei was asked why he charged codefendant Harbison with

                                           - 32 -
aggravated criminal trespass, he responded, “He was on MDHA property, armed, and he
wasn’t supposed to be there. He had no residence there. He had no one with him saying
he was supposed to be there, and he also didn’t have a valid carry permit.” Officer Frei
was then asked who was “allowed to be on MDHA property[,]” and he said, “The only
people allowed to be on there are people who live there or . . . .” The defense then objected,
arguing that the State had failed to establish a foundation for Officer Frei’s knowledge, and
the trial court inquired of the State if it desired to ask more questions in that regard. Officer
Frei next testified that upon codefendant Harbison’s arrest, he determined that codefendant
Harbison did not live in Cheatham Place. The State did not proceed with any further
questioning of Officer Frei pertaining to trespassing or about Officer Frei’s knowledge of
the rules of Cheatham Place. In the 12:11 a.m. call codefendant Harbison made to the
Defendant after codefendant Harbison had been arrested, he mentioned that he was being
arrested for trespassing because he “wasn’t supposed to be over there in Cheatham.”

       In addition, the State conflates the Defendant’s testimony. The Defendant testified
that when he returned from his work trips to South Dakota, he stayed with his girlfriend
who lived in Cheatham Place at her invitation. The Defendant stated that he was aware of
the housing complex’s rules. He indicated that he had spoken with the “head maintenance
man” about how long he could stay there and that his girlfriend had talked to the leasing
office as well. He was told that he could not stay with his girlfriend any longer than a full
thirteen days, and they complied with this rule. They also checked to see if he was on
MDHA’s “banned list,” and he was not. The Defendant said that no one from MDHA ever
asked him to leave. The Defendant indicated his awareness of MDHA’s “strict rules,” but
he maintained he was still allowed to be on the property. The Defendant persisted that he
“didn’t feel like a trespasser” and that he did not think he was trespassing.

       Here, the jury was charged that for the Defendant to be guilty of criminal trespass,
the State had to prove the following essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

               One, that the defendant knowingly entered or remained on property or
       a portion thereof belonging to someone else; [a]nd two, that the defendant
       did not have the owner’s effective consent to enter or remain. You may infer
       knowledge that the person did not have the owner’s effective consent where
       notice against entering or remaining is given by: One, personal
       communication to the person by the owner or by someone with apparent
       authority to act for the owner; or two, fencing or other enclosure obviously
       designed to exclude intruders; or three, posting reasonably likely to come to
       the attention of intruders.

                                             - 33 -
See 7 Tenn. Prac. Pattern Jury Instr. T.P.I.—CRIMINAL 14.05 (26th ed. 2022). The jury
was also charged with the definition of effective consent:

                 Effective consent means assent in fact, whether express or apparent,
          including assent by one legally authorized to act for another. Consent is not
          effective when: [(a)] induced by deception or coercion; or (b) given by a
          person the defendant knows is not authorized to act as an agent; or (c) given
          by a person who, by reason of youth, mental disease or defect, or
          intoxication, is known by the defendant to be unable to make reasonable
          decisions regarding the subject matter; or (d) given solely to detect the
          commission of an offense.

See id.

       Officer Frei only testified about the details of why codefendant Harbison was
arrested for trespassing. Once the defense objected to the question of whether Officer Frei
knew who was allowed to be on MDHA property, the trial court implicitly sustained the
objection for lack of a foundation. Thereafter, the State never attempted to establish the
foundation of Officer Frei’s basis of knowledge of MDHA’s rules and did not pursue any
further questioning of Officer Frei along those lines. Despite the Defendant’s testifying
that he was aware of MDHA’s “strict rules,” he continued to assert his belief that he was
allowed to be on the property based upon his conversation with the “head maintenance
man” and his girlfriend’s conversation with the leasing office. The State never entered
evidence of any kind regarding the exact nature of MDHA’s rules. Certainly, the
prosecutor’s affirmation at trial of the substance of a specific MDHA rule—“That is the
rule”—was not sufficient. See State v. Roberts, 755 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1988) (citations omitted) (stating that remarks by counsel are not properly considered as
evidence).

       Cheatham Place is a housing complex, commonly open to the public. See State v.
Ash, 12 S.W.3d 800, 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (“Absent evidence to the effect that the
defendant knew that the letter barred him from entering Authority property, i.e., showing
that being placed on the list as ‘served’ reliably means that the person, including the
defendant, has been told the contents of the letter, there is insufficient evidence that the
defendant knew that he did not have the owner’s effective consent to be on the property.”);
cf. State v. Grimes, No. M2001-02385-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1885053, at *3 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2002); State v. Lillard, No. 01C01-9602-CC-00051, 1997 WL 67906,
at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 1997). Therefore, the State was required to prove that
the Defendant lacked consent to be on housing authority property; however, the State failed

                                             - 34 -
to offer any evidence of MDHA’s rules or its lack of consent, such as signage or fencing
or that the Defendant had ever been asked to leave the premises and not return.
Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude that the State failed to prove the elements of
criminal trespass beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ash, 12 S.W.3d at 806. The Defendant’s
conviction for criminal trespass must be reversed and dismissed.

                                   E.     Video Evidence

                          1.     Video of Defendant Trespassing

       In another sub-section, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing
the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant trespassing on MDHA property. Here,
the Defendant submits that the trial court erred because “it was factually impossible for
[the Defendant] to have committed criminal trespassing,” and the jury should not have been
presented with any evidence related to this charge. The Defendant asserts that “the video
of [him] at Cheatham Place on the night of the crime[,]” prejudiced “him on all charges”
because it “tainted the jury’s view of [him] by framing him as a trespasser[.]”

        The Defendant’s one-paragraph allegation is not supported by argument, citation to
authorities, or appropriate references to record. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7); Tenn. Ct.
Crim. App. R. 10(b). The Defendant does not mention any legal principle in this paragraph,
much less cite to a particular rule, statute, or case. Moreover, the Defendant does not refer
to any particular crime scene or cite to any exhibit or page number concerning the evidence
or video to which he is referring. Again, there was an abundance of video footage from
the MDHA surveillance cameras that was admitted at trial. Also, the Defendant never
lodged any specific objection at trial to certain evidence or video of trespassing as being
prejudicial. See Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 51(b); see also State v. Vance,
596 S.W.3d 229, 253 (Tenn. 2020) (stating that the party who wishes to raise an issue on
appeal first has an obligation to preserve that issue by raising a contemporaneous objection
in the trial court).

        Finally, the Defendant’s argument in this regard comingles his sufficiency argument
with an evidentiary issue regarding admission of evidence. Even though the Defendant’s
argument holds true that the State failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to establish
the offense of criminal trespass, such does not retrospectively make all evidence relevant
to the State’s attempt to establish the charged offense inadmissible and require reversal.

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                             2.      Video of “Crime Scene 3”

        The Defendant, in a separate sub-section, contends that the trial court erred by
admitting “video evidence related to Crime Scene 3,” which prejudiced him “for the entire
proceeding.” In this sub-section, the Defendant cites to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403,
arguing that the probative value of the video was outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. He states that the video had no probative value because all of the charges
“relative to scene 3 were ultimately dismissed before jury selection” and that the trial court,
therefore, should have excluded the video under Rule 403. The Defendant continues, “[He]
had consent to be in Cheatham Place and there was no relevant fact in issue for the video
to prove.” According to the Defendant, “the video was merely a pretext to open the door
to other evidence of [his] activities on the night in question.” The Defendant concludes
that because the video implicated him “in unrelated alleged crimes, it had a substantial
danger of unfair prejudice.”

        The Defendant’s argument in this sub-section is similarly flawed as those above.
First, though the Defendant cites to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, he fails to make any
reference to the record in support of his argument. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7).
Moreover, the Defendant never lodged any specific objection at trial to the video evidence
from the third shooting as being prejudicial under Rule 403. See Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1);
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 51(b); see also Vance, 596 S.W.3d at 253. Importantly, an appropriate
legal analysis of admission of evidence implicating a defendant “in unrelated alleged
crimes” would include citation to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404, which deals
specifically with character evidence, a reference not made by the Defendant.

       The trial court, at the motion to sever hearing, addressed the issue of admissibility
of evidence of the third shooting in a trial of the second shooting, though the Defendant
makes no mention of the severance hearing or the trial court’s ruling in this sub-section.
At the motion to sever hearing, the trial court, analyzing Rule 404(b), determined that the
evidence from the third shooting was relevant for identity purposes without specific
differentiation of its relevancy solely for proof of the trespassing charge. The trial court,
noting that identity would be an overriding concern at trial, determined that the defendants’
involvement in the third incident would be probative in a trial of the second incident
because shell casings from codefendant Harbison’s weapon were linked to both scenes and
because the recovered video from the third incident showed two individuals firing
handguns in a location close to the second incident approximately forty-five minutes after
that incident. Then, the trial court found that the probative value of proof of the third
incident in a trial of the second was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect because Mr.
Fite’s positive identification of codefendant Harbison and tentative identification of the

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Defendant and the linkage between the shell casings at the scenes of the two shootings
were “highly probative” of the Defendant’s identity.

       Additionally, we note that in the sub-section above dealing with severance, the
Defendant challenges video evidence from the scene of the first shooting as providing
prejudicial evidence of trespassing; but, quizzically, in the argument for this sub-section,
he similarly challenges video evidence from the third shooting as prejudicial evidence of
trespassing. It is unclear if this merely a scrivener’s error or if there is some distinction to
be drawn between the various arguments relative to the video footage from the two scenes.

      The inconsistencies in and irreconcilable nature of the Defendant’s various
arguments in his appellate brief pertaining to evidence of trespassing are clear. The
Defendant’s evidentiary challenges to the video evidence are waived.

                          F.     Cumulative Error and Sentencing

        In his final sub-section, the Defendant argues that he “was denied a fair trial by the
combination of all the foregoing errors.” In addition, the Defendant, in this same
sub-section, without a separate heading, submits that the trial court erred in sentencing him.
The State correctly notes that the Defendant has failed to raise these issues in the statement
of the issues presented for review, raising them, instead, for the first time in the “Argument”
section of his brief. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(4). Again, were this the only deficiency
in the Defendant’s brief regarding proper presentation of these two issues, we might have
chosen to exercise our discretionary authority and review them on the merits.

                                  1.      Cumulative Error

        Relative to the Defendant’s “combination of errors” argument, the Defendant
restates his various arguments for trial court error, including a claim of insufficient
evidence, and concludes that “the combination of the errors enabled the jury to reach a
verdict against the weight of the evidence.” However, the Defendant has not clearly set
forth the applicable standard for cumulative error relief. He does not ever use the words
cumulative error, include a citation to any authority, or specifically argue how cumulative
error principles entitle him to relief. For these reasons, the issue is waived. See Tenn. R.
App. P. 27(a)(7); Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b); see also State v. Moore, W2001-01664-
CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1732333, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 2002).

      We also observe that, for the reasons stated above, we have waived all of the
Defendant’s issues except one—sufficiency of the evidence. The cumulative error doctrine

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applies when there have been “multiple errors committed in trial proceedings, each of
which in isolation constitutes mere harmless error, but which when aggregated, have a
cumulative effect on the proceedings so great as to require reversal in order to preserve a
defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 76 (Tenn. 2010). To that
end, more than one actual error in the trial court proceedings must exist before the
cumulative error doctrine can apply. Id. at 77. A sufficiency of the evidence claim does
not lend itself to cumulative error relief because it involves no error “committed in trial
proceedings” that impacted the jury’s verdict; rather, it merely challenges whether that
verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore, due to the inadequacies in the
Defendant’s brief, he would be unable to show multiple instances of trial court error
adequate to warrant reversal under the cumulative error doctrine. See State v. Bonner, No.
W2007-02409-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1905420, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2009)
(citation omitted) (observing that “challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence coupled
with the allegation of a single error does not amount to cumulative error”)).

                                      2.     Sentencing

       Relative to the Defendant’s sentencing allegation, in the “Statement of the Case”
section the Defendant asserts that he is challenging the severity of the sentences imposed
and cites to Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 861-62, as providing the appellate standard of review
for his sentencing allegation. In Pollard, the Tennessee Supreme Court expanded its
holding in Bise to trial courts’ decisions regarding consecutive sentencing. 432 S.W.3d at
859.

        In the Defendant’s “Argument” section, he first refers to any sentencing contention
in the sub-section dealing with cumulative error; nowhere in the brief is the Defendant’s
sentencing claim specifically delineated as a stand-alone issue. Regarding his sentencing
error claim, he contends that the trial court misapplied statutory sentencing factors,
“ignored the fact that [the Defendant was] a first-time offender,” and gave little weight to
the Defendant’s “contrite allocution.” The Defendant further avers that the trial court
disregarded sentencing hearing testimony from Ms. Hall-Cunningham and Mr. Jackson,
citing the transcript of the sentencing hearing on the whole. The Defendant concludes that
the trial court’s “[f]ailure to consider these factors is a violation of the Sentencing Act and
shows that [the Defendant’s] sentence is illegal as a matter of law.”

       The Defendant’s one-paragraph allegation in the “Argument” section does not
include any argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to record. See Tenn.
R. App. P. 27(a)(7). The Defendant does not present any specific sentencing argument in
this paragraph, much less cite to a particular rule, statute, or case. As for references to the

                                            - 38 -
record, he cites to the sentencing hearing transcript on the whole without reference to
specific testimony from a witness, argument by either party, or particulars of the trial
court’s ruling. We emphasize that the Defendant’s argument must contain appropriate
references to the record in support of his contentions requiring appellate relief.

       To address the legality of the Defendant’s sentence in this case would require us to
construct the Defendant’s entire sentencing argument for him, which is not our role. See
Bristol, 654 S.W.3d at 923-24. In light of the Defendant’s failure to properly present this
issue for our review, we conclude that he has waived appellate review of his sentencing.
See, e.g., State v. Jackson, No. M2012-00828-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 5675466, at *11
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2013) (concluding same).

                                  III.   CONCLUSION

       Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgments of the trial court
are affirmed with respect to the Defendant’s convictions for second degree murder,
attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of or
attempt to commit a dangerous felony. The Defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass
is reversed and dismissed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of an
amended judgment form reflecting the dismissal.

                                                   ______________________________
                                                   KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE

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