Court Opinion

ID: 9770568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:10:17.602234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:18.553285
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. MoFaddin, Justice (Dissenting). The definite question to be considered is clearly stated in the majority opinion in these words: “May the Arkansas Courts entertain a suit1 for injuries to real property situated in another State?” The majority answers the question in the affirmative; and I answer it in the negative. Insofar as Barton’s defense against the Planters Flying Service is concerned, the Arkansas Court has jurisdiction.2 The difficulty arises on Barton’s cross complaint against Reasor-Hill. In that so-called cross complaint, Barton claimed that Reasor-Hill sold to the Planters Flying Service — not to Barton, I stress, — an insecticide that damaged Barton’s cotton crop growing on his lands in Missouri. This complaint of Barton against Reasor-Hill was an entirely new cause of action and was a claim by Barton against Reasor-Hill for damages to a crop growing on lands in Missouri. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bush, 191 Ark. 1085, 89 S. W. 2d 723, 103 A. L. R. 367, we held that damage to a growing crop was a damage to real property, and that an action to recover such damage MUST be brought in the County in which the land is situated.3 That ease clearly holds two points: (1) Damage to growing crops is damage to realty; and (2) an action for damage to realty MUST he brought in the County in which the land is situated. In the present case, the majority concedes the first point, but refuses to follow the second point; and it is in regard to this second point that this dissent is directed. The majority in the present case candidly admits that every American Jurisdiction — save only the State of Minnesota — has followed the holding in the original case of Livingston v. Jefferson (1811) 1 Brock. 203, Fed. Cas. No. 8, 411; yet the majority, in seeing fit to depart from such time honored holding, advances three reasons, which do not seem to me to be sufficient for such a radical departure. In the first place, the majority says that we have ample facilities to determine the land laws of other States in the United States. Here is the wording of the majority-opinion: “In our library, we have the statutes and decisions of every other State, and it seldom takes more than a few hours to find the answer to a particular question.” This statement about the size of the law library seems rather weak, because land actions are tried in lower courts and not in the Supreme Court library. Just because we have a fine law library does not mean that we are prepared to determine the title to lands in Texas,4 Missouri, Vermont, or any other State. But if we have the jurisdiction which the majority claims, then we could determine ejectment actions involving ownership of lands in other States. We might undertake to do this, but the Full Faith and Credit clause of the U. S. Constitution would not require the Sister State to recognize our judgment. See Huntington v. Attrill (1892), 146 U. S. 657, 36 L. Ed. 1123, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224. The example posed by the majority — as to two companion suits, one local and the other transitory — merely emphasizes that the majority still recognizes that there are LOCAL actions; and our Court held, in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bush (supra), that local actions must be brought in the county in which the land is situated. ' Such is the clear wording of our statute (§ 27-601 Ark. Stats.) which localizes an action “For an injury to real property”. Secondly, the majority says that the rule, requiring that an action be brought in the jurisdiction in which the land is situated, is a good rule between Nations, but is not good as between States in the American Union. For answer to this, I say: I have always understood that each of the American States is Sovereign; that the Federal Government is a government of delegated powers; and that all powers not delegated to the Federal Government are retained by the States and the People.5 Surely the majority is not attempting to reduce our American States to the level of mere local administrative units. Yet such, unfortunately, is the natural conclusion to which the majority opinion would carry us, when it concedes one rule for Nations and another for States. Thirdly, the majority says that it does not desire to afford Arkansas Citizens a sanctuary from damage actions by citizens of other States. This is an argument that should be made — if at all — in the Legislative branch of Government, rather than in a judicial opinion. It is for the Legislative Department to determine when and where actions may be prosecuted. The opinion of the majority in the case at bar is therefore judicial legislation, minus only the enacting clause required of legislative determinations. And having briefly noticed the three arguments advanced by the majority for the departure from the holding of the vast array of sister jurisdictions, I desire now to call attention to the Annotation in 42 A. L. R. 196, entitled “Jurisdiction of action at law for damages for tort concerning real property in another state or country ’ \6 That Annotation lists the many, many eases that have considered the question here involved; and each Court — with the sole exception of Minnesota — has seen fit to follow the great weight of authority which has come down to us from the common law. In matters affecting real property particularly, we should leave undisturbed the ancient landmarks.7 The rationale of the various holdings iá stated in this language in the said Annotation: “Generally speaking, actions for injuries to personal property or personal right may be brought wherever the defendant may be found and served, but at common law the courts of one state or country are without jurisdiction in actions that are local in their nature, and relate to subjects within another state or country. 7 R. C. L. 1058, 1059, Secs. ,96, 97. Therefore, in the absence of a statute specifically limiting or enlarging jurisdiction of local courts, the principal question in every case involving matters occurring in another jurisdiction is whether the action is local, or transitory in its nature. According to the generally accepted view, if the principal fact carries with it the idea of some certain place, — -for example, relates to land, — it is local, as the distinction between local and transitory actions exists in the nature of the subject injured, and-not in the means used or the place where the injury took place.” Because of the views herein stated, I respectfully dissent from the majority in the case at bar; and I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Ward concurs in this dissent.   This means an action at law for damages, rather than “a suit”.    The Planters Flying Service brought action against Barton to collect the account for spraying his cotton crop. Barton defended against the action by claiming that the insecticide was not as represented. The Arkansas Court had jurisdiction of this action because it was an action on account and was transitory.    The scholarly opinion of Mr. Justice Baker in that case is worthy of study.    The writer knows by experience that only one skilled in Texas Land Law can successfully handle an action of Trespass to try title in the State of Texas.    See Amendment No. 10 to United States Constitution.    For study, in addition to cases in the above Annotation, see Leflar on Conflict of Laws, Sec. 4, and Sec. 82. See also American Law Institute’s Restatement of Conflict of Laws, § 614, et seq.    Proverbs 22:28, “Remove not the ancient landmark, which thy fathers have set.”