Court Opinion

ID: 9707941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:25:35.099595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:40.420952
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
It has long been the rule that an information must be sufficiently definite to apprise the accused of the specific nature of the offense with which he is charged. The defendant had the information served upon him and the statute read to hiip. He was thereby apprised *767of the exact act with which he was charged and of the provision of the statute he was alleged to have violated. In addition, he had retained counsel of his own choosing and was undoubtedly fully advised of all the pertinent circumstances and law. Defendant, under these conditions, elected to enter a plea of guilty and entered into a plea bargain with the county attorney whereby the county attorney agreed to and did dismiss another pending charge. Experience with this type of case has demonstrated that after the county attorney has fulfilled his part of the bargain by dismissing additional charges, the defendants all too often feel that they are then in a position to renege on a plea of guilty. Such was obviously the case here. A defendant who voluntarily enters a plea of guilty under circumstances similar to the present one does so knowingly and voluntarily. He is fully aware of the exact acts charged as comprising the crime alleged and his plea of guilty is a direct admission that he did actually perform those acts. For the court to be required to inquire further into the facts pertaining to the offense would be to require a superfluous act and verges on the ridiculous.
White, C. J., joins in this dissent.