Court Opinion

ID: 9570435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:23:11.930228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:51.885208
License: Public Domain

LINN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the court because I concur that it is supported by our precedent. I write separately to emphasize, as I have before, my belief that our engraft-ing of a separate written description requirement onto section 112, paragraph 1 is misguided. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1325-27 (Fed.Cir.2004) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 987-89 (Fed.Cir.2002) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). As I observed in University of Rochester, section 112, paragraph 1 requires no more of the specification than a disclosure that is sufficient to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention:
Section 112 of Title 35 of the United States Code requires a written description of the invention, but the measure of the sufficiency of that written description in meeting the conditions of patent-ability in paragraph 1 of that statute depends solely on whether it enables any person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains to make and use the claimed invention and sets forth the best mode of carrying out the invention. The question presented by 35 U.S.C. *1381§ 112, paragraph 1, is not, “Does the written description disclose what the invention is?” The question is, “Does the written description describe the invention recited in the claims — themselves part of the specification — in terms that are sufficient to enable one of skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention and practice the best mode contemplated by the inventor?” That is the mandate of the statute and is all our precedent demanded prior to Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed.Cir.1997).
375 F.3d at 1325.
As both this court and the Supreme Court have recognized, the claims — not the specification — define the invention. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339, 81 S.Ct. 599, 5 L.Ed.2d 592 (1961) (“[T]he claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant.”); see also Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (“Consistent with its scope definition and notice functions, the claim requirement presupposes that a patent applicant defines his invention in the claims, not in the specification. After all, the claims, not the specification, provide the measure of the patentee’s right to exclude.”). The court’s invention of a separate written description requirement has “create[d] confusion as to where the public and the courts should look to determine the scope of the paten-tee’s right to exclude,” University of Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1326, causing uncertainty “in how inventions are protected, in how the [Patent & Trademark Office] discharges its responsibilities, and in how business is conducted in emerging fields of law,” id. at 1327.
Aside from these general observations, I note that the written description requirement does separate mischief in this case. Because the court relies upon this requirement to reverse the district court, it does not reach the important enablement issue raised by Lilly. As the majority opinion observes, the claims-in-suit broadly claim any method for reducing NF-kB activity in cells, including both known and unknown methods. We have long held that in order to survive the enablement requirement, the specification “must describe the manner and process of making and using the invention so as to enable a person of skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the invention without undue experimentation.” LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed.Cir.2005) (emphasis added); see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed.Cir.2005). To my knowledge, however, we have not specifically addressed this requirement in relation to the type of claims at issue here— that is, claims written broadly enough to cover any method for achieving a particular result. It may be, as Lilly argues, that such a claim can never be valid, since the specification cannot enable unknown methods. Cf. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed.Cir.1983) (rejecting “single means” claim, as such claims “cover[] every conceivable means for achieving the stated result”). This is an important issue that we have left unresolved. It is an issue that we would have been compelled to reach had the case been decided on enablement grounds, a basis found in section 112, instead of on written description grounds, a separate basis not justified under' that section or any other provision of the Patent Act.