Court Opinion

ID: 9587389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:21:36.664885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:43.077576
License: Public Domain

FLETCHER, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
The majority opinion summarily disposes of any error in the admission of motive evidence against Hames as harmless because he was only convicted of felony murder and misuse of a firearm while hunting, neither of which require “motive.” But because improperly admitted evidence has the potential to influence a jury even if such evidence is not necessary to prove the elements of a particular crime, I write separately to examine each of Hames’s enumerations of error on its merits. Because I find that the alleged errors are without merit, I concur in the judgment to affirm his convictions.2
1. The majority opinion improperly limits Stoudemire v. State3 to cases involving insurance. While Stoudemire did involve evidence of insurance that allegedly went to motive, nothing in its rationale suggests that evidence relating to insurance is the only evidence that may be irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Indeed, in Brown v. State,4 a case not involving insurance evidence, this Court relied upon Stoudemire. In Brown, the Court cited Stoudemire for the proposition that “evidence of a defendant’s motive which is not material to his criminal liability is irrelevant and inadmissible.”5 Furthermore, by focusing on the fact that the defendant was convicted of felony murder and not malice murder, the majority perpetuates the erroneous dicta of Stoudemire that confuses motive with intent. Motive is not an element of either malice murder or felony murder,6 yet the prosecution is generally entitled to offer evidence of motive.7
Rather than rely on a universal rule that improper evidence of motive is harmless when a defendant is convicted of felony murder, I *187would reaffirm Brown’s holding that “evidence of a defendant’s motive which is not material to his criminal liability is irrelevant and inadmissible.”81 would also reaffirm Stoudemire’s holding that where the prosecution offers improper motive evidence, the trial court and this Court must consider whether the evidence has “the enormous potential for so infecting and inflaming the trial process that fundamental fairness [could] be easily compromised.”9 Therefore, Hames’s enumerations of error as to the admission of motive evidence require examination on their merits.
2. (a) Hames contends that the writings on his wall used by the State as motive evidence were illegally seized because they were beyond the scope of the search warrant. But items not specifically listed in a search warrant may be seized if in plain view.10 Hames also argues that the admission of these writings improperly placed his character at issue. Motive evidence “is not rendered inadmissible merely by the fact that it incidentally places the defendant’s character in issue.”11 The writings were relevant to the State’s theory that Hames intentionally shot the victim because the victim was not living in accordance with Hames’s religious and moral beliefs. The State had the right to present evidence of motive in its prosecution of Hames for malice murder, and it was up to the jury whether or not to believe the State’s theory.
(b) Hames also contends that the trial court erred in admitting a statement that Hames gave police after the shooting. The trial court held a lengthy hearing to consider the statement and excluded certain portions prior to its introduction into evidence. Even if portions of the admitted statement incidentally put Hames’s character in issue, the statement was relevant to the State’s theory that the shooting was intentional and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.12
(c) Finally Hames contends that the trial court erred in allowing evidence that the victim used marijuana and was a peeping tom. Again, however, the State’s theory was that Hames intentionally shot the victim because he was not living in accordance with Hames’s *188beliefs. This evidence was relevant to the State’s theory of motive and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.
Decided June 7, 2004
Reconsideration denied July 12, 2004.
James E. Millsaps, for appellant.
W. Kendall Wynne, Jr., District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Raina Nadler, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
For the above reasons, I find that the majority opinion reaches the right result but uses the wrong reasoning. The majority opinion should not abandon our warning in Stoudemire that the erroneous admission of “unnecessary” evidence can, in certain circumstances, so inflame a jury as to require a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins in this special concurrence.

 Arguments regarding whether OCGA§ 16-11-108 should he used to support a conviction for felony murder are foreclosed by this Court’s opinion in Chapman v. State, 266 Ga. 356 (467 SE2d 497) (1996).

 261 Ga. 49 (401 SE2d 482) (1991).

 Brown v. State, 270 Ga. 601 (512 SE2d 260) (1999).

 Id. at 602.

 Coates v. State, 255 Ga. 183 (336 SE2d 255) (1985).

 Brown, 270 Ga. at 602.

 Id.

 Stoudemire, 261 Ga. at 50.

 Brannan v. State, 275 Ga. 70, 73 (561 SE2d 414) (2002).

 See, e.g., Fann v. State, 275 Ga. 756, 757-758 (571 SE2d 774) (2002); Whitener v. State, 261 Ga. 567, 568 (407 SE2d 735) (1991) (admission of notebook containing hieroglyphic religious drawings and references to the occult proper because relevant to motive).

 Ritter v. State, 272 Ga. 551, 554 (532 SE2d 692) (2000) (“trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged testimony as the evidence was relevant to [defendant’s] motive . . .”).