Court Opinion

ID: 9556820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 18:04:42.860488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:22.281152
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/18/23 In re G.M. CA2/5
See dissenting opinion
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 In re G.M., a Person Coming                                     B326194
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                          Super. Ct.
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                           No. 20CCJP05713)

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 B.M.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hernan D. Vera, Judge. Conditionally reversed
with directions.
      Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
     Mother1 appeals from the November 2, 2022 order
terminating parental rights to her son (minor) under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.2 Mother’s sole contention on
appeal is that the juvenile court erroneously failed to ensure
compliance with the inquiry and notice requirements of the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) and related California statutes (§ 224 et seq.). We
conditionally reverse and remand the matter solely for the court
to ensure the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) complies with ICWA and related
California statutes by asking available maternal relatives about
minor’s possible Indian ancestry.

     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

     The Department filed a petition under section 300,
subdivision (b), based on mother’s failure to provide appropriate

      1 Minor’s alleged father is not a party to the current appeal.

      2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

      3 Because the sole issue on appeal concerns the juvenile
court’s and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Service’s (the Department) compliance with ICWA and
related California law, we limit our recitation of facts to those

                                 2
care to minor, who was three months old, and mother’s excessive
use of prescription medication. At the October 29, 2020 detention
hearing, the court appointed counsel for mother and minor.
Mother’s responses on a parentage questionnaire identified N.S.
as minor’s father, but also indicated that: N.S. was not present
at minor’s birth; he and mother were not married or living
together; and he had not signed the birth certificate; he had not
taken any other steps to acknowledge paternity. Mother did not
have N.S.’s contact information on hand. Based on mother’s
parentage form, the court found N.S. to be an alleged father. The
only phone number mother had for N.S. was a disconnected
number and mother was not in contact with any of N.S.’s family
members. She believed N.S. was homeless. Mother knew N.S.
had Facebook, but had blocked him. The court directed the
Department to notify N.S. through the number provided by
mother, and if that was not possible, to conduct a due diligence
search to locate N.S. and report on its efforts in the next report to
the court. The court also directed an attorney in the courtroom to
reach out to the father through the number mother had provided.
      Mother submitted an ICWA-010 form stating she did not
have any known Indian ancestry, but she asserted in court that
father might have Cherokee ancestry. The court found no reason
to know ICWA was applicable to minor.
      According to the Department’s jurisdiction and disposition
report, minor was placed with maternal grandparents. Maternal
grandmother reported that N.S. left when mother was three
months pregnant with minor, and the grandparents had not seen

relevant to that compliance issue, except as is necessary for
context.

                                 3
or heard from him since. A due diligence report was initiated for
N.S. in February 2021, identifying four potential addresses in
Southern California, and the Department was awaiting
responses.
       A declaration of due diligence prepared in March 2021
summarized the steps taken by the Department to locate and
contact N.S., including searches of several state and federal
databases. The Department had N.S.’s first and last names, date
of birth, and the last four digits of his social security number.
Mailed notices to several possible addresses did not result in any
response; and attempts to locate N.S. based on different phone
numbers obtained during the search were unsuccessful.
       On June 23, 2021, the juvenile court noted that N.S.’s
whereabouts were unknown and the due diligence was complete.
It sustained the allegations of the first amended petition. On
July 29, 2021, the court ordered reunification services for mother,
but denied services to father because he was only an alleged
father. By January 31, 2022, mother’s whereabouts were
unknown. The court terminated mother’s reunification services
and scheduled a hearing under section 366.26.
       An updated declaration of due diligence, prepared in May
2022, summarized additional information about N.S.’s possible
whereabouts and contact information, as well as the
Department’s efforts to notify N.S. of the dependency
proceedings. Two attempts to contact N.S. by e-mail resulted in
no response. On May 31, 2022, the juvenile court found due
diligence for N.S. was complete, and ordered the Department to
provide notice by publication. The court also authorized service
of notice on mother through her attorney. The Department filed
an updated declaration of due diligence in August 2022, with

                                 4
additional addresses ruled out. N.S.’s whereabouts remained
unknown.
      At the section 366.26 hearing on November 2, 2022, the
juvenile court found notice proper as to mother and N.S., and
terminated parental rights over minor. Mother was not present,
but her counsel stated: “On behalf of mother, I will object to
termination of her parental rights; however, I don’t have
direction from her at this time.” Mother filed a notice of appeal
on January 3, 2023.
                          DISCUSSION

Authority to Appeal and Forfeiture

      The Department contends mother’s appeal should be
dismissed because it was not filed at her direction. Mother’s
absence from the section 366.26 hearing and the fact that her
attorney filed the notice of appeal on the last possible day do not
support any reasonable inference that the appeal was
unauthorized. Rather, “the attorney signing a notice of appeal in
a dependency case is impliedly representing to this court that his
or her client has authorized the appeal.” (In re Helen W. (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 71, 79.)
      The Department also seeks dismissal of the appeal because
mother did not object in the trial court to the adequacy of the
Department’s efforts to search for D.S. A parent’s failure to raise
ICWA compliance to the juvenile court’s attention does not waive
the issue on appeal. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 13; In re
B.R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 773, 779.) When one parent has
possible Indian ancestry and the other does not, the non-Indian
parent still has standing to raise the issue of ICWA compliance

                                 5
on appeal. (In re O.C. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1173, 1180, fn. 5.)
The fact that mother did not object to the sufficiency of the
Department’s efforts to locate N.S. does not waive her right to
raise an ICWA challenge.
ICWA Inquiry

      Mother contends on appeal that the Department did not
adequately inquire into the possibility that minor was an Indian
child. Specifically, mother argues the Department’s efforts to
locate N.S. were inadequate, and that the duty of initial inquiry
required the Department to ask maternal grandparents about
possible Indian ancestry. We disagree that ICWA required the
Department to take additional steps to locate N.S., but we agree
that the Department fell short of its obligations under section
224.2, subdivision (b), when it failed to ask maternal
grandparents about possible Indian ancestry.

   A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

       “Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising
concern in the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian
children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child
welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers
of Indian children from their families and tribes through
adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.’ ”
(In re Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 7.) Both ICWA and
California law define an “ ‘Indian child’ ” as a child who is either
a member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian

                                 6
tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subds. (a) & (b); see In re
Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 783.)
       California statutory law incorporates the requirements of
ICWA, and imposes some additional requirements as well. (In re
Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 91; In re Benjamin M. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 741–742.) State law imposes on the
Department a first-step inquiry duty to “interview, among others,
extended family members and others who had an interest in the
child.” (In re H.V. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438; see § 224.2,
subd. (b).) Federal regulations explain that the term “[e]xtended
family member is defined by the law or custom of the Indian
child’s Tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, is a person
who has reached age 18 and who is the Indian child’s
grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2017).) The duty of initial inquiry
includes making a meaningful effort to interview available
relatives. (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 552–553.)
When there is “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved
in a proceeding,” further inquiry is also required. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e); In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 290, fn. 14.) “We
review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s Indian ancestry
for substantial evidence.” (In re H.V., at p. 438.)

   B. No Inquiry Obligation for Alleged Father

      As an alleged father, N.S. does not qualify as a “parent” for
purposes of ICWA. ICWA defines a parent as “ ‘any biological
parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who
has lawfully adopted an Indian child . . . . It does not include the

                                 7
unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or
established.’ ” (In re C.A. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 511, 520.)
“Moreover, because the ICWA does not provide a standard for the
acknowledgment or establishment of paternity, courts have
resolved the issue under state law.” (In re Daniel M. (2003) 110
Cal.App.4th 703, 708.) Thus, in California, an alleged father may
acknowledge or establish paternity through blood testing (Fam.
Code, § 7551) or by voluntarily signing a declaration of paternity
filed with the child’s birth certificate (Fam. Code, § 7571, subd.
(a)). (In re Daniel M., at pp. 708–709.) Section 316.2 provides
additional facts a dependency court may consider in determining
that a man should be considered a “presumed” father, rather
than an alleged father. (See § 316.2, subd. (a) [listing factors
such as man’s cohabitation with child’s mother at the time of
conception or birth, or man’s payment or promises of support
with respect to the child].)
       Because there was no evidence to elevate N.S.’s status
beyond a mere alleged father, the Department did not have an
obligation under ICWA or related California law to locate him to
ask him about mother’s assertion he may have had Cherokee
ancestry. N.S. never appeared in the dependency case and took
no action to prove a biological connection with minor.
       Mother argues that N.S. never had an opportunity to prove
his biological connection to minor, because he did not have notice
of the case. We reject mother’s argument on two grounds. First,
we will not consider arguments made for the first time in a reply
brief. (See People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195,
255 [insufficient to raise issue in reply brief only].) Second, we
reject any argument that ICWA imposes a higher duty than the
due process efforts accorded to any parent under California

                                8
dependency law. (See In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th
181, 188 [“[d]ue process requires that a parent is entitled to
notice that is reasonably calculated to apprise him or her of the
dependency proceedings and afford him or her an opportunity to
object”]; In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569 [father has standing
to raise violation of mother’s due process rights].) Here, there
was substantial evidence of the Department’s efforts to locate
N.S., mother has not asserted a due process violation of father’s
rights, and the juvenile court found that due diligence search
efforts had been made. On these facts, we find no violation of
ICWA’s inquiry obligations.

   C. Initial Inquiry for Maternal Grandparents

       The Department concedes there is no evidence that it asked
maternal grandparents about minor’s possible Indian ancestry.
In making that factual concession, the Department states it does
not oppose an order remanding the case with directions to ask
maternal grandparents about minor’s possible Indian ancestry,
pointing to the goal of expediting permanency for minor.
However, the Department’s brief does not concede legal error,
and cites to In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 500,
review granted (July 26, 2023, S279743) 2023 WL 4777174,
which held that the duty to inquire of extended relatives does not
apply when a minor is detained pursuant to a warrant under
section 340. While both In re Robert F. and In re Ja.O. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 672, review granted (July 26, 2023, S280572) 2023
WL 4772422, may still be cited as persuasive authority, in light
of the Department’s factual concession and the conflicting holding
in In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, at *8, we decline to

                                9
consider the question of whether the method of minor’s detention
impacts the scope of the Department’s inquiry duties. Instead,
we find that the court erred in finding ICWA inapplicable, as the
court proceeded in the absence of any evidence that the
Department asked available extended family members about the
possibility that minor has Indian ancestry. (See, e.g., In re H.V.,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 438 [prejudicial error when
Department fails to discharge its first step duty of inquiry].)

                         DISPOSITION

       The juvenile court’s November 2, 2022 order terminating
parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26 is conditionally reversed and remanded for proceedings
required by this opinion. The court shall order the Department
to make reasonable efforts to interview available extended
relatives, including maternal grandparents, about the possibility
of the minor’s Indian ancestry and to report on the results of the
Department’s investigation. Nothing in this disposition
precludes the court from ordering additional inquiry of others
having an interest in minor. Based on the information reported,
if the court determines that no additional inquiry or notice to
tribes is necessary, the order terminating parental rights is to be
reinstated. If additional inquiry or notice is warranted, the court
shall make all necessary orders to ensure compliance with ICWA
and related California law.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     MOOR, J.

                                10
I concur:

            KIM, J.

                      11
In re G.M.
B326194

BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting

      I would affirm because substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
does not apply. (In re A.C. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 130, 132 (dis.
opn. of Baker, J.); In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984; In
re H.V. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 439 (dis. opn. of Baker, J.).)

                       BAKER, Acting P. J.