Court Opinion

ID: 9829404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:17:05.833791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:00.820690
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants have filed a motion for rehearing, in which they urge that we were in error in holding that the trial court did not err in giving a peremptory instruction for defendants, and in refusing to admit certain testimony of J. W. Jerard and Sherwood Gowan, and in holding, in effect, that a legal fraud was not perpetuated by the defendants in ordering the election upon the petition-drawn as it was, etc. We have carefully considered the motion, and believe that it should be overruled.
•[5] We are further of the opinion that a question of fraud, either by those concerned in drawing and circulating the petition, or by the members of the commissioners’ court, cannot be raised by way of a collateral attack, as is attempted in this case, and any question of fraud, in order to merit consideration, must have been raised by a contest of the election, or by somé other direct attack. Article 637 of the Civil Statutes, providing for the creation of these districts, makes the district when so established a body corporate. When the creation of such a district is authorized by statute, and it has been so organized by color of such authority, its corporate existence and the rights thereunder of the trustees or county commissioner^ cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding. In Coffman v. Goree Independent School District, 141 S. W. 132, writ of error refused, this court, speaking through Chief Justice Conner, said:
“We are of the opinion that the demurrers were properly sustained. The objections to the incorporation of the independent school district and to the right of appellee trustees to exercise their functions as such therein are not available in this action. True, as pointed out upon submission, our Supreme Court in the case of Parks v. West, 102 Tex. 11, 111 S. W. 726, sustained an attack of like character upon the Mertens independent school district, but in that case it was held that because of a limitation in the Constitution there was no- legislative authority for the construction and incorporation, of an independent school district such as that there under consideration. The incorporation, therefore, was absolutely void, and as such subject to attack in any action in which the right of a citizen was involved, but not so in the ease we have under consideration. It is not contended, nor does the record give room for a contention, that there was not full legis*207lative authority for the formation and incorporation of the Goree independent school district and for the election of school' trustees. The complaints made are, at most, but mere irregularities in the manner of creating the incorporated district and in the election of trustees by virtue of laws undoubtedly giving full authority for such incorporation’ andi elections. Such irregularities, therefore, do not of themselves render the several elections and incorporation complained of entirely void. In such cases said Chief Justice Gaines for the Supreme Court in the case of El Paso v. Ruckman, 92 Tex. 89, 46 S. W. 26: ‘The rule is well established that when the creation of a public corporation, municipal or quasi municipal, is authorized by, statute and a corporation has been organized under the color of such authority, its corporate existence cannot be inquired into by ,the courts in a collateral proceeding. The validity of the incorporation can only be determined in a suit brought for that purpose in the name of the state or by some individual under the authority of the state, who has a special interest which is affected by the existence of the corporation.’ ”
To the same effect are Davis v. Parks (Tex. Civ. App.) 157 S. W. 449, 454, writ refused, and cases cited; Cochran v. Kennon (Tex. Civ. App.) 161 S. W. 67, 69; Robertson v. Haynes, 190 S. W. 735, 736, by this court, speaking through Justice Dunklin; Dye v. Brewer, 119 Miss. 359, 80 South. 762.
Therefore, irrespective of other reasons, we conclude that appellants’ motion for rehearing should be overruled on the ground that this is a collateral attack on the validity of a quasi municipal corporation, organized under color of statutory authority.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.