Court Opinion

ID: 9761251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:36:03.036161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:21.469317
License: Public Domain

O’HERN, J.,
dissenting.
I agree generally with the principles of law stated by the majority. I disagree with their application to the facts of this case. The holding would permit the jury to make a trespasser out of a five year old boy who regularly tagged along when his father went to defendant’s body shop on business, and deny recovery for a severe dog bite because the boy was not “lawfully on ... the property of the owner of the dog.” N.J.S.A. 4:19-16. Because that result is inconsistent with the way that defendant tried the case, with our landowner liability law and with the statute protecting dog bite victims, N.J.S.A. 4:19-16, I must dissent.
I.
Defendant admits that plaintiff Peter regularly came without objection onto his premises with his father, Vito DeRobertis, *161who operated a tow truck. Sometimes he would even sweep the floor and do other chores to help defendant’s employees. He had gone before into both the body shop area and the driveway where the dog was kept, again without objection by defendant.
On June 21, 1977, one of defendant’s employees, McCarthy, had taken Peter with him to the office of a doctor who was to treat McCarthy’s injured hand. When they returned to Randazzo’s, McCarthy dropped Peter off and Peter entered an office inside. He walked through the open door from the office into the body shop to watch an employee paint a car. The dog began to bark and Peter walked through still another open door to the driveway. After petting the dog, he noticed that his shoe was untied. When he bent to tie it, the dog, a German shepherd, bit Peter in the head and, with the child’s head in its mouth, shook its head back and forth.
The bite left Peter without hair for six to eight months. The lacerations from the bite have become permanent scars. Moreover, he suffered recurrent nightmares about being bitten by large dogs. These nightmares haunted Peter intermittently for over a year after the biting.
The jury found Peter’s father 20% negligent and defendant 80% negligent. It awarded Peter a total of $40,000, but the trial judge reduced it to $25,000. Defendant appealed the verdict against him, while plaintiffs contested the remittitur. The Appellate Division upheld the verdict and reinstated the jury’s award.
At trial, plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict but the court denied the motion because there was a factual dispute about whether the dog had bitten or merely pawed Peter.1 Strangely, *162the answer to that question makes a big difference in the law. If the dog bites, the owner pays if the victim is “lawfully on or in a private place.” N.J.S.A. 4:19-16. But if the dog mauls without biting, the statute does not apply. Ante at 152. The court ruled that this was an issue for the jury to resolve. Defendant himself admitted that he tolerated Peter’s presence, so the boy’s status simply was not at issue at trial.
The issue was not whether Peter would recover, but how much and from whom. Randazzo forcefully urged throughout the trial that Peter’s father had been culpably negligent in leaving the boy unattended, and had counterclaimed for contribution from him.2 Thus, that portion of the charge that impli*163cated Peter’s status was “purely incidental.” Skupienski v. Maly, 47 N.J.Super. 409, 412 (App.Div.1957), aff’d, 27 N.J. 240 (1958).
The trial court expressly charged the jury with the statute, reading the statutory language in its entirety. Then it charged concerning the liability of the owner of a dog with vicious propensities. It was in that context that the court said:
It must be noted that the status of the infant plaintiff on the premises, i.e. as a visitor, licensee or in some other capacity, even if tolerated is of no moment insofar as the infant’s possible recovery is concerned.
This is a situation where a person is injured by the actions of the dog with vicious propensities, known to its keeper, while that injured person is on the premises of the keeper of the dog. It is not necessary in order to recover for the injuries to show that he was on the premises either by invitation, by consent or by acquiescence.
Later portions of the charge tend to overlap, but by and large the jury was fully informed of the relevant law.
Moreover, the court made its comments about Peter’s status in the context of a special interrogatory about the dog’s vicious propensities that the parties agreed to submit to the jury. Those remarks can fairly be read to apply only to that question.
*164In justifying the retrial, the majority chides Peter’s counsel for imprecise pleading. I would have thought that “[t]he days when substantial justice must be sacrificed for the sake of blind adherence to strict technicalities long since outmoded have passed in this State and are,, we hope, beyond recall.” State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 501 (1957) (Vanderbilt, C.J.). I therefore believe that defendant received a fair trial “in the light of the charge as a whole and the facts of the case,” see Goss v. Allen, 70 N.J. 442, 448 n. 2 (1976), and that, in view of the way that the case was tried, he suffered no prejudice.
II.
Even were this issue in the case, the undisputed facts show that Peter could not possibly have been classified as a trespasser.
The distinction between invitees, licensees and trespassers was stated in Lordi v. Spiotta, 133 N.J.L. 581, 584 (Sup.Ct.1946) thus: “The first come by invitation, express or implied; the second are those who are not invited but whose presence is suffered; the third are neither invited nor suffered.” [Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 312 (1959)].
Under the relatively more severe standards that obtained in the nineteenth century, see Renz v. Penn Central Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 461-62 (1981), a child who was with his father at the latter’s place of employment with the permission of the employer was not a trespasser but a licensee. Fitzpatrick v. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co., 61 N.J.L. 378 (Sup.Ct.1898) (twelve year old plaintiff brought dinner to father at his place of employment). More recently, this Court observed:
We believe that visiting an employee at his place of employment, where a hazardous activity is not being conducted in the area visited, does not go beyond generally accepted modes of behavior or custom, and in the absence of any prior expression of disapproval by the employer the visitor is not a trespasser but one whose presence is suffered and therefore is lawfully upon the premises. [Snyder, 30 N.J. at 312-13],
In Snyder, plaintiff accompanied a friend to the latter’s place of employment. After being introduced to defendant employer’s foreman, who did not object to his presence, plaintiff “browsed around” and watched other employees while his friend and the foreman loaded cartons onto an elevator. The three of *165them rode the elevator down to the loading platform, where they each picked up a carton to carry to a truck. While doing this, plaintiff stepped in a hole and injured himself. We rejected the trial court’s decision that he was a trespasser as a matter of law, and ruled that “[ujnless on the retrial there is evidence of prohibition, the court should charge that plaintiff was ... a licensee and invitee.” Id. at 314. On these remarkably similar facts, I would hold that Peter was “lawfully on or in a private place” as a matter of law for the purpose of the dog bite statute. N.J.S.A. 4:19-16.
Defendant might have limited the area to which Peter was authorized to go. But he did not do so expressly, and the open doors to the body shop and the driveway represented an implied authorization of Peter’s presence in these areas.3 Under the circumstances of this case, which included Peter’s previous presence on the driveway without objection by defendant, and the open doors on the day of the biting, I would not permit a jury to find that Peter was not lawfully on defendant’s premises. R. 4:40-1.
III.
I also believe that the Court should construe the dog bite statute in light of the infant trespasser rule of Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38 (1952), as the Appellate Division did. As a remedial statute, N.J.S.A. 4:19-16 should receive a liberal construction. Tanga v. Tanga, 94 N.J.Super. 5,
*1667 (App.Div.1967); Gross v. Dunham, 91 N.J.Super. 519, 522 (App.Div.1966).
The infant trespasser rule reflects society’s compelling interest in “the protection of the life and limb of its youth.” Strang, 9 N.J. at 45; 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 27.5 at 1450 (1956). Until today, New Jersey has been in the forefront of protecting infants. E.g., DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159 (1982); Renz, 87 N.J. 437; Hughes, “Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation,” 68 Yale L.J. 633, 642-44 (1959).
Foy v. Dayko, 82 N.J.Super. 8 (App.Div.), certif. den., 41 N.J. 602 (1964), established that the defense of contributory negligence would be applicable even though the dog bite statute imposed strict liability. Comparative negligence, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3, would similarly play an appropriate role today. These concepts reflect a judicial and legislative judgment that a plaintiff’s own conduct should be considered in evaluating his personal injury claim against another.
The concepts of status and fault were historically intertwined. Renz, 87 N.J. at 444. But in Strang and Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., Inc., 11 N.J. 559 (1953), this Court relaxed the formalistic scheme and adopted the infant trespasser rule. The rule recognizes that “trespassing children of tender years ... because of immaturity are wanting in the discretion and judgment essential to their own security.” Strang, 9 N.J. at 45, accord Harris, 11 N.J. at 562-63. This represented “a complete reversal of the established rule” in New Jersey. Note, “The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine — Its Status in New Jersey,” 8 Rutgers L.Rev. 378, 383 (1954).
In Renz, a similarly “dramatic and avulsive change,” 87 N.J. at 458, in the old doctrine of contributory negligence resulted in a new view of the railroad immunity act, N.J.S.A. 48:12-152. This awareness that statutes should be construed in light of developing legal trends, Renz, 87 N.J. at 458, should apply here as well. Therefore, in construing the dog bite statute, we should consider our recognition in Strang and Harris of chil*167dren’s immaturity in their relationship to dangerous conditions on property.
The Renz doctrine plays a salutary role in keeping tort law abreast of the times. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90 (1965). I would apply it here and incorporate the infant trespasser rule into the dog bite statute.
I have nothing against dogs, but dogs bite and children roam. The Legislature has recognized both of these facts of life. As between dog and child, I believe that the Legislature would prefer the child. See N.J.S.A. 4:19-16 (dog bite statute); N.J. S.A. 2C:40-1 (disorderly persons offense to leave unattended certain items or areas attractive to children). Therefore, “it is reasonable to believe that the Legislature itself did not intend that its enactment be insulated from changing circumstances and contemporary social values, especially when these are reflected in its own current legislative actions.” Uricoli v. Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 91 N.J. 62, 77 (1982). A contrary view would retain concepts of property and status that we have long since repudiated. See Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 276-77 (1982). Accordingly, were I to remand as the Court does, I would instruct the jury to consider whether, under the infant trespasser rule, see 2 Restatement, Torts 2d, § 339 at 197 (1965), Peter was lawfully on the premises for the purpose of the dog bite statute.
IV.
Finally, even if the majority is impelled to remand the matter for a new trial, it should limit the retrial to the issues of liability as it has defined them. See Greenberg v. Stanley, 30 N.J. 485, 506-07 (1959); Tabor v. O’Grady, 61 N.J.Super. 446, 453 (App. Div.1960). Although the damage award may be on the high side, it is not unconscionable and should be allowed to stand. Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 596 (1977).
Justice HANDLER joins in this opinion.
*168For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, POLLOCK and GARIBALDI — 5.
For affirmance —Justices HANDLER and O’HERN — 2.

Plaintiffs based their motion on N.J.S.A. 4:19-16, which states:
The owner of any dog which shall bite a person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.
*162For the purpose of this section, a person is lawfully upon the private property of such owner when he is on the property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this state or the laws or postal regulations of the United States, or when he is on such property upon the invitation, express or implied, of the owner thereof.
Plaintiffs’ attorney argued:
I suggest to the Court that there is no doubt in any one’s mind that Peter DeRobertis had an implied invitation based upon all of the testimony in the case to have access to and walk about, whether it be as a five-year-old would, jumping and wandering, or as an adult would by going into a particular area of the premises.
He then proceeded to recite the testimony. The court responded: .... [I]f you’re talking in terms of N.J.S.A. 4:19-16, your application, I would suggest, should be limited to the issue of whether or not a bite occurred.
If [your adversary] agrees with you [that a bite occurred], that might be one thing as to the application of the Statute, but if he disagrees with you, maybe you ought to concentrate just on that testimony which you feel would permit me to make the finding you request, vis-a-vis the Statute and a bite situation.
When defendant’s counsel argued against the motion for directed verdict his only contention was that Peter’s injuries were caused by the dog’s pawing, not biting, him. He did not assert that Peter had not been lawfully on the premises.

In his closing argument, Randazzo’s counsel stated:
This was a sad, unfortunate incident. Everybody here should feel bad for little Pete. He had a bad experience. He was troubled by it for a
*163time. He had a rotten summer as a result of this and everybody knows that and he’s entitled to be compensated fairly, not too little, not too much, whatever you feel is the right amount....
.... [This] never would have happened if Mr. DeRobertis was a reasonable parent and he just wasn’t.
.... This place had so many — there’s no other word to explain it, so many traps, traps for a kid that he has to fall beneath the standard of a reasonable parent in leaving that boy there, in just going off the way he did.
He never argued to the jury that Peter was not lawfully on the premises.
Peter’s counsel noted this in his own closing argument:
What was not said, I think, and I submit is also extremely important and what was not said was that Peter did anything wrong. There is no allegation whatsoever in this case that Peter did anything wrong.
What else was not said was that Peter had no right to be where he was. It was never mentioned one single time in, approximately, 45 minutes or 50 minutes of summation by the prior two counsel, not one single time.
He therefore did not dwell on the issue of Peter’s status either.

Compare Handleman v. Cox, 39 N.J. 95 (1963) (no sign on rear door prohibiting admittance; implied invitation could be found) with State in the Interest of L.R., 112 N.J.Super. 464, 466-67 (App.Div.1970) (high, locked, barbed-wire fence around lot indicated, even without express statement, that one who entered lot was unwanted and would be treated as trespasser). The permitted area includes those parts of the premises that, depending on all the circumstances, it would reasonably be believed that the authorized individual would enter. See, e.g., Giangrasso v. Dean Floor Covering Co., 51 N.J. 80, 83 (1968); Handleman, 39 N.J. at 110-11 (discussing implied invitation).