Court Opinion

ID: 9777692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:19:57.931702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:59.518846
License: Public Domain

TAFT, Justice,
dissenting on overruling of en banc consideration.
I respectfully dissent from the reasoning and disposition of point of error one regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove ownership of the property with respect to the conviction for criminal trespass. I suggest two errors in the standard of review utilized by the Panel: (1) it makes no difference to sufficiency review that the State alleged ownership with unnecessary particularity because of Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); and (2) the Panel did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, making every reasonable inference to sustain it.
The Panel opinion relies on Langston v. State, 855 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) for the proposition that the State has the burden of proving an unnecessarily specific allegation. One of the cases quoted in the portion of Langston cited in the Panel opinion is Boozer v. State, 717 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Boozer was expressly overruled in Malik. Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 239.
Language in Langston v. State, 812 S.W.2d 406 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991), affd, 855 S.W.2d at 722, that the State could not prove ownership in a criminal trespass case by merely showing a greater right to possession than the defendant, was rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeals in dicta in Langston, 855 S.W.2d at 721-22 n. 7. The same language was expressly rejected in Arnold v. State, 867 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex.Crim. App.1993). This significantly lowered the burden of proof that this Court had required of the State in criminal trespass cases where the State had alleged ownership with unnecessary particularity. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 764 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.).
The error more critical to the result, however, is not viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. This is contrary to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), which is cited in the Panel opinion. Not cited, however, is any opinion standing for the proposition that reasonable inferences are to be made in favor of the verdict. See Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
Eugene Campbell testified that he had acquired the property behind rest area number four. The uncontroverted evidence showed the offense took place some 25-30 feet beyond the fence behind rest area number four. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, and making every inference in the verdict’s favor, the jury’s implicit finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was on Campbell’s property is rational.
Indeed, to show the deficiency of the State’s proof the Panel opinion emphasizes matters not shown by the evidence: (1) title; (2) where Campbell’s property began behind the rest area; and (3) ownership of the fence itself. The Panel opinion points to no evidence introduced by appellant which contested Campbell’s ownership of the property beyond the fence behind rest area number four. There was no evidence that anyone else owned any land behind rest area number four. Based on the evidence in the record, *776the only rational conclusion that could have been reached regarding the ownership of the property behind rest area number four is that Eugene Campbell owned it.
Because of these two errors concerning the proper standard of review, which led to the wrong result in the appeal from the conviction for criminal trespass and could lead to wrong results in other cases, I respectfully dissent from the Panel decision and to the full court’s denial of en banc consideration.