Court Opinion

ID: 9583684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:41:06.463561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:34.888823
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority opinion for two reasons: First, I disagree with the majority's holding that the insurance policy covers the liability of the insured partners, as individuals, for every negligent act even though they are acting outside the scope of the partnership at the time the liability is incurred. Secondly, I disagree with the majority's holding that, as a matter of law, the partner was acting within the scope of the partnership at the time of the injury.
I conclude that the policy covers individual partners only for liability incurred while acting in their capacity as partners. I further conclude (1) that the issue the majority sets forth, whether the partner in this case acted in the ordinary course of the partnership at the time of the injury, is a question for the jury, not for the court, and (2) that when parties file reciprocal (sometimes referred to as cross or bilateral) motions for sum*456mary judgment, they do not necessarily waive their right to present their case to the trier of fact. I would remand the case for a jury determination on the issue of whether the partner in this case acted in the ordinary course of the partnership at the time of injury.
The first issue, a question of law properly decided on summary judgment, involves the interpretation of American Family's "businessowners package policy." The policy defines the persons insured under Section II titled "Business Liability and Medical Expense Insurance" as follows: ”[I]f the named insured is designated in the declaration as a partnership or joint venture, the partnership or joint venture so designated and any partner, member or employee thereof but only with respect to his liability as such ..." (emphasis added).
This clause is standard in numerous insurance policies. See Susan J. Miller and Philip Lefebvre, Miller's Standard Insurance Policies Annotated General Liability Forms, Form GLCGL, vol. 1, p. 411 (1988). In Miller's the cited cases interpreting this standard clause in the partnership context illustrate that the clause provides coverage to individual partners only for liability incurred while they are acting in their capacity as partners. See Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York v. Curie, 771 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. App. 1989) (the policy was interpreted as providing coverage to the individual partners only in their capacity as partners); American States Ins. Co., 826 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1987) (the policy was interpreted as covering a partner who was vicariously liable for the acts of an agent of the partnership; the court did not consider whether coverage extended to individual *457partners who were not acting as agents of the partnership).
Neither the majority opinion nor the parties' briefs cite any authority that directly supports the majority's interpretation of the policy. The majority relies on McDonald v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 47 Wis. 2d 235, 177 N.W.2d 101 (1970); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 529 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Pa. 1981); and Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fike, 304 So. 2d 136, 137 (Fla. Dt. Ct. App. 1974). Each of these cases involves coverage of a partner's personal automobile under an automobile insurance policy listing the partnership and its members as insureds.1 The policy language relating to the automobiles at issue in these cases differs from the standard persons insured clause at issue in the case before us. I thus conclude that the cases upon which the majority opinion relies are not pertinent.
Reading the American Family policy from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the insured, Wood v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 148 Wis. 2d 639, 652, 436 N.W.2d 594 (1989), and considering the reasonable expectations of a person buying a "Businessowners' Package Policy" providing "Business Liability and Medical Expense" insurance, I conclude, as did the three judges of the court of appeals, that the American Family businessowners package policy insures individual partners only for liability incurred while acting in their capacity as partners.
*458The next question addressed by the majority is whether the partner in the case at hand was acting in the capacity of a partner at the time of the injury, or as the majority opinion states, whether the partner was acting within the scope of the partnership. If I were in the majority I would not reach this issue. First, as the majority acknowledges, the issue has no relevance for this case because the majority has decided that the policy covers a partner for liability incurred when acting outside the partnership. Second, because the issue of the scope of the partnership is fact specific and this case presents an unusual fact situation, the discussion in the majority opinion will have little relevance for other cases.
Nevertheless, I write because I believe that the majority opinion errs in its discussion of summary judgment on the issue of whether a partner has acted within the scope of the partnership.
Motions for summary judgment and directed verdict have substantially the same function.2 Both are appropriate only when there is no dispute about both the material facts and the factual inferences reasonably drawn from them, or when the material facts are not in dispute and only one reasonable inference or conclusion can be drawn as a matter of law. See Gouger v. Hardtke, 167 Wis. 2d 504, 482 N.W.2d 84 (1992) (while the historical facts were undisputed, the defendant's intent, a fac*459tual inference to be drawn from the undisputed historical facts, was disputed; summary judgment was not appropriate); Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 172, 465 N.W.2d 812 (1991) (Shirley S. Abrahamson, J. dissenting, citing Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1981)) (the reasonable person standard is an issue of "legal fact" for the fact-finder when undisputed material historical facts may be subject to conflicting inferences or conclusions). See also 28 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. sec. 62:548 (1984).
While the parties in this case agree on the historical facts, they disagree about the "legal facts," that is the inferences or conclusions, that may be drawn from the historical facts.3 By moving for summary judgment, each party asked the circuit court to rule that the conclusion it drew about whether the partner was acting in the ordinary course of the partnership was the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn and that therefore the issue need not be submitted to trial.
The parties' disagreement about the inferences to be drawn from the partner's conduct does not involve an interpretation of the policy. The policy incorporates liability according to partnership law. The policy agrees to pay on behalf of the partner all sums he or she is legally obligated to pay as damages in his or her capacity as partner. A dispute about whether a person is liable in his or her capacity as a partner acting within the scope of the partnership is resolved by a fact-finder. See, e.g., Wis. JI — Civil, No. 4035, Servant: Scope of Employment.4
*460I conclude that a court cannot say in this case that, as a matter of law, the partner was acting within or outside the scope of the partnership. As the majority opinion concedes, "a murky line divides partnership-related negligence from nonpartnership-related negligence." Majority op. at 453. In this case a court must conclude that a rational jury could return a verdict in favor of either party. Therefore, I conclude that the summary judgment motions relating to whether the partner was acting within or outside the scope of the partnership business must be denied.
The majority relies on Powalka v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 513, 518-519, 192 N.W.2d 852 (1972). The Powalka court did state that "the reciprocal motions for summary judgment by the defendant and the plaintiff constituted a waiver of any right to jury trial that might have theretofore existed."5 The Powalka court reached the conclusion that a jury was waived in that case because the circuit court had properly determined that the trier of fact could reach only one conclusion from the undisputed historical facts, namely that the insured's conduct arose out of an actual intent to *461defraud. 53 Wis. 2d at 520. Considered within its factual context, Powalka stands for the widely accepted general rule that a party is not deprived of a jury trial when, as a matter of law, ño triable issue exists for the factfinder.
This court has held that a circuit court may deny reciprocal motions for summary judgment on the ground that unresolved issues remain to be determined at trial. If the court determines that unresolved issues remain to be tried, the reciprocal motions for summary judgment do not constitute a waiver of a jury trial. Capitol Sand & Gravel Co. v. Waffenschmidt, 71 Wis. 2d 227, 235-36, 237 N.W.2d 745 (1976).6 Other Wisconsin cases discussing reciprocal motions for summary judgment similarly conclude that summary judgment is appropriate when the only issues presented are questions of law for the court. The court of appeals explained in Stone v. Seeber, 155 Wis. 2d 275, 455 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1990), that cross motions for summary judgment sometimes, but not *462always, imply a stipulation of facts.7 Furthermore, wrote the court of appeals, both parties might erroneously conclude that no factual dispute exists when in reality one does. Determining the existence of a genuine issue of material fact is a question of law for the court, not for the parties. The court may not overlook a factual issue even if the parties stipulate that none exists. See also 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, sec. 2720 at 19 (1983 and 1992 Supp.); 6 Moore's Federal Practice para 56.13 (1992); 28 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. sec. 62:549 (1984).8
*463I believe it is error to read Powalka, as some cases do, to hold that when parties file reciprocal motions for summary judgment, the motions are necessarily equivalent to a stipulation of all factual issues, to a waiver of jury trial, and to an agreement that the case may be disposed of by the circuit court on summary judgment.9
In this case, the parties disagree about the "legal facts" to be inferred from the undisputed historical facts; rational judges have reached different conclusions in this case on the issue of whether the partner was acting within the scope of the partnership. I conclude that a rational jury could return a verdict in favor of either *464party. I would therefore hold that the circuit court erred in deciding this issue on motions for summary judgment.
For the reasons set forth, I would decide, as did the court of appeals, that the American Family policy covered individual partners only for liability incurred in their capacity as partners. I would remand the case to the circuit court for a jury trial on the question of whether the partner was acting within the scope of the partnership at the time of the injury.
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE WILLIAM A. BABLITCH joins part II of this dissent.

 The policies at issue in Nationwide and Ohio Casualty provided coverage for liability arising from the use of an automobile by relatives of a partner. Both courts considered the reference in the policies to relatives of the partner to indicate that the policies covered the partners as individuals apart from the partnership.

 The directed verdict and the summary judgment rest on the same theory: No genuine issue of material fact needs to be resolved by the fact-finder; the moving party is entitled to have a judgment on the merits entered in his or her favor as a matter of law. 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, sec. 2713.1 (1983 and 1992 Supp.); 6 Moore's Federal Practice para. 56.13 (1992).

 For a discussion of historical facts, legal facts and summary judgment, see Daniel P. Collins, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 491 (1988).

 See Alan R. Bromberg and Larry E. Ribstein, Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership sec. 4.07 at 4:80 (vol. 11991), analogizing *460the question whether a partner is acting in the scope of the partnership to the question whether the servant is acting in the scope of employment.

 The Powalka court continued stating "A motion for summary judgment carries with it the explicit assertion that the movant is satisfied that the facts are undisputed and that on those facts he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We pointed out in Wiegand v. Gissalthe .....practical effect of the bilateral summary judgment motions was the equivalent of a stipulation as to the facts.' "
For a discussion of reciprocal motions, see Ziegler Co. Inc. v. Rexnord, 139 Wis. 2d 593, 595, n.1, 407 N.W.2d 593 (1987).
Neither the parties' briefs nor the decisions of the circuit court or court of appeals discuss summary judgment on this issue.

 Concluding that reciprocal motions for summary judgment waive a jury trial would be adopting a rule that has long been rejected in the analogous context of reciprocal motions for a directed verdict.
The common law rule was that when all parties, without reservation, moved the court for a directed verdict, the motions constituted a stipulation to waive jury trial and submit the entire case to the court for decision. This rule was a trap, making it unsafe for a party to move for a directed verdict, and was a useless restriction on the right of trial by jury. John E. Ahrens, Reservation of Right to Go To The Jury Upon Motion for Directed Verdict by All Parties, 31 Marq. L. Rev. 172 (1947).
Section (Rule) 805.14(8), Stats. 1989-90 (formerly sec. 270.26, Stats. 1973), like the federal rules of civil procedure, changed the common law to provide that "a motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdict."

 See also Ziegler Co. Inc. v. Rexnord, 139 Wis. 2d 593, 595, n.1, 407 N.W.2d 593 (1987).
”... the fact that both parties simultaneously are arguing that there is no genuine issue of fact does not establish that a trial is unnecessary thereby empowering the court to enter judgment as it sees fit.... In short, the mere fact that both parties seek summary judgment does not constitute a waiver of a full trial or the right to have the case presented to a jury. There are basically three reasons why cross-motions ... do not necessarily indicate that the case is ripe for . . . entry of judgment. First, the determination whether a genuine issue concerning a material fact exists is itself a question of law that must be decided by the court... Second a party may argue that no issue of fact exists in the hope that his legal theory will be accepted, but at the same time he may maintain that there is a genuine factual dispute in the event his theory is rejected or his opponent's is adopted.... The third reason that cross-motions must be considered separately and should not be interpreted necessarily to mean that judgment should be entered on one of them is that each party, as a movant for summary judgment, bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ..." 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, sec. 2720 at 16-23 (1983).
See also 6 Moore's Federal Practice para 56.13 (1992).

 The Wisconsin summary judgment rule is patterned after Federal Rule 56. See sec. (Rule) 802.08, West's Wis. Stats. Annot., *463vol. 42 A (1977). In interpreting our rules that are patterned after federal rules, this court looks to federal cases and commentary for guidance.

 Several cases quote Powalka without fully analyzing the holding or its application to the facts of the case before the court. See, e.g., Silverton Enterprises, Inc. v. General Casualty Co., 143 Wis. 2d 661, 442 N.W.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1988); Schwochert v. American Family Ins., 139 Wis. 2d 335, 345, 407 N.W.2d 525 (1987); Streiff v. American Family Mutual Ins., 114 Wis. 2d 63, 337 N.W.2d 186 (1983); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. LaFollette, 106 Wis. 2d 162, 164, 316 N.W.2d 129 (Ct. App. 1982); State ex rel. Grand Bazaar v. Milwaukee, 102 Wis. 2d 208, 306 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1981).
For cases that interpret Powalka as I have, see, e.g., Larsen v. Munz, 166 Wis. 2d 751, 756, n.4, 480 N.W.2d 800 (1992); Stone v. Seeber, 155 Wis. 2d 275, 455 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1990); Duhame v. Duhame, 154 Wis. 2d 258, 264, 453 N.W.2d 149 (Ct. App. 1989); Hanson v. Madison Service Corp., 150 Wis. 2d 828, 843, 443 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1989); Ziegler Co., Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987); Capitol Sand and Gravel Co. v. Waffenschmidt, 71 Wis. 2d 227, 237 N.W.2d 745 (1975). See also Wiegand v. Gissal, 28 Wis. 2d 488, 495a, 137 N.W.2d 740 (1965), upon which the Powalka court relied.