Court Opinion

ID: 9855263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:22:01.392643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:27.025582
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting) — I believe that the one per cent county real estate tax should be imposed upon the dissolution of a corporation where the incorporator has sold his stock to another party who receives land upon the dissolution of the corporation. When these facts occur there has been a “sale” of land within the “ordinary meaning” of that term for a “valuable consideration” under RCW 28.45.010. I do not think that complicated corporation principles should be used to define a “sale” when the statute requires that the term “sale” shall have its “ordinary meaning.”
The rejection of the Kimbell-Diamond rule misses the thrust of the county’s argument. Of course the rule does not strictly apply to a state situation. It is offered only as an analogy. When the court defines the term “sale,” it should not close its eyes to reality. There most assuredly has been a “sale” of real property in this case.
I find little merit to the majority’s argument that “Adoption of the rule would write into Washington law a provision not voiced by the legislature and would make suspect *81every conveyance of real property by a corporate liquidating trustee.” There is no more “writing of law” in the adoption of a realistic approach than there is in holding that there is no “sale” upon dissolution, Deer Park Pine Industry, Inc. v. Stevens Cy., 46 Wn.2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955), and holding that there is a “sale” when land is transferred to a corporation during incorporation. See Christensen v. Skagit Cy. post p. 95, 401 P.2d 335 (1965), and dissent filed therein.
' Furthermore, I see nothing wrong with placing conveyances by liquidating trustees under surveillance by county tax authorities. There has probably been a sale of stock at some time, and thus a sale of the land which should be taxed. The county should assume that there has been a sale of land until the grantee shows that he was the incorporator, thus showing that the real property originally belonged to him. In this manner, there will be a tax on “sales,” and in those cases where there was no transfer of ownership to a third party the burden of proof is placed on the party who can easily negate the assumed sale. For a further elaboration of these points see the dissent in Christensen v. Skagit Cy., supra.
May 28,1965. Petition for rehearing denied.