Court Opinion

ID: 9451493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:18:38.383582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:46.411441
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The release the court holds to bar appellant’s claim against appellee for his allegedly negligent treatment of an injury to appellant’s hip runs in terms not to appellee but to John L. Sarver and Elsie L. Sarver and all others “on account of all injuries, known or unknown, * * * which have resulted or may in the future develop from an accident which occurred on or about' the. 14th *554day of January, 1956 at or near 600 Magarity Road, Falls Church, * * The accident referred to was a fall which injured appellant’s knee. Forecasting Virginia law our court now holds that this release of the Sarvers and others for damages attributed to the knee injury of January 1956 releases appellee of liability for damages charged to his negligent treatment of appellant’s hip injury in July 1957. His treatment of the hip continued according to the complaint until March 21, 1960. I find no basis in Virginia law for this conclusion, even though I assume that the pleadings in appellant’s earlier suit against the Sar-vers in Virginia, resulting in the release, attributed the hip injury itself, though not the negligence of appellee, to the original knee injury. The court relies on the case of Corbett v. Clarke, 187 Va. 222, 46 S.E.2d 327, notwithstanding the Virginia court held in Corbett that damages for the second tort there involved were not barred by release of the first tort-feasor.
In Corbett, the court states the general rule to be that if an injured person uses ordinary care in selecting a physician for treatment of his injury the law regards aggravation of the injury resulting from the negligent act of the physician as part of the immediate and direct damages which naturally flow from the original injury. The court cited a number of cases for the proposition that “A settlement with the' original tort feasor operates as a release of the negligent physician.” The court then states that this rule is based on the theory that the aggravation of the injury by the negligent treatment of the physician is a result that might reasonably have been anticipated. The court adds that this theory embraces the much discussed question of what is proximate cause, and refers approvingly to the discussion of this question in McDonald v. Snelling, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 290. It is there held
* * * that, when a person violates a duty imposed upon him by common law, it is just and reasonable to hold him liable to every person injured whose injury is the natural and probable consequence of his misconduct, if the injury is of a character likely to follow and which, under ordinary circumstances, might reasonably have been anticipated from the wrongful act. “The damage is not too remote if according to the usual experience of mankind the result was to be expected. * * * The test is to be found, not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character, and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence. * * *”1
187 Va. 222, 225, 46 S.E.2d 327, 328.
The Corbett court then states that the concept of proximate cause is recognized and applied in Virginia; that is, negligence carries with it liability for consequences which, in the light of attendant circumstances, could reasonably have been anticipated by a prudent man, but not for casualties which, though possible, were wholly improbable: “One is not charged with foreseeing that which could not be expected to happen.”
In our case the gap between the negligence charged to each of the two tort-feasors is wider than in Corbett. We begin with the tort of January 14, 1956, causing injury to the knee, followed July 14, 1957, by the injury to the hip, followed by the alleged tort in treatment of the hip, the gravamen of the complaint. The chain of events thus consists of three links, first the negligence causing the accident injuring the knee, then the accident injuring the hip, then the alleged *555negligent treatment of the hip continuing for more than two years. There were but two links in Corbett, the negligence of Dentist No. 1, followed by the negligence of Dentist No. 2. It is by no means clear to me from the opinion in Corbett that the Virginia court would hold as a matter of law that if appellant’s hip were negligently treated by appellee over a long period of time subsequent to July 1957 such negligence was a joint tort with the Sarvers’ negligence which caused the injury to the knee in January 1956, even though we attribute the hip accident itself to the knee accident.
There is every reason to believe that in our case the Virginia court would hold that the issue of proximate cause is for a jury to decide.
Ordinarily, negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause are jury questions. It is only when reasonable men may draw but one inference from the facts that they become questions of law for the court to decide.
Alexander v. Moore, 205 Va. 870, 875, 140 S.E.2d 645, 648-649. And see Hanna v. Fletcher, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 316, 231 F.2d 469, 475, 58 A.L.R.2d 847.
There is a simpler and still stronger reason for my disagreement with the majority opinion. Our court now holds that Corbett stands for the proposition that in Virginia, even if the relationship between the two injuries is so close as to be one of proximate cause, nevertheless if the negligence of appellee [Dentist No. 2 in Corbett] was gross rather than ordinary the release of the Sarvers and others here [Dentist No. 1 in Corbett] would not release appellee; that is to say, the majority opinion of our court interprets Corbett to mean that the Virginia court, in reversing the trial court for having released Dentist No. 2, remanded the case to afford plaintiff an opportunity to prove that the negligence of Dentist No. 2 was gross, in which event he was not released of liability by the release of Dentist No. 1.2 Accepting this interpretation of Corbett reversal would seem to be required here as it was in Corbett; for the question whether appellee’s negligence was gross or ordinary should have been left for the jury to decide. It has been held in Virginia that “[i]f a number of negligent acts are so combined that reasonable men may differ as to whether their cumulative effect shows a form of recklessness or a total disregard of all precautions akin to willful and wanton misconduct, it is a question for the jury whether such negligence amounts to gross negligence. [Citations omitted.]” Kennedy v. McElroy, 195 Va. 1078, 1082, 81 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1954). Appellant’s complaint did not use either the term ordinary or gross in describing appellee’s negligence. This is immaterial. The pleading is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under those Rules if the facts alleged and proved could be found by the jury to amount to gross negligence recovery would not be defeated by the omission of the complaint to describe the negligence as gross. Hollander v. Davis, 120 F.2d 131, 132-133 (5th Cir.). And see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80; Francis O. Day Co. v. Shapiro, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 392, 396, 267 F.2d 669, 673. I set forth in an Appendix to this opinion excerpts from appellant’s complaint describing the negligence charged to appellee. If proved, the jury could find gross negligence. That being so, then under the very interpretation of Corbett now adopted by this court, we should reverse and remand, as in Corbett. I accordingly dissent from affirmance.
APPENDIX 1
11. Plaintiff avers that defendant, during and throughout the period that he *556attended plaintiff, negligently and carelessly cared for, treated and diagnosed plaintiff’s injuries and condition; and in said professional care and diagnosis failed to exercise that degree of skill which is ordinarily [2] expected among orthopaedic surgeons and specialists of the said locality; that whatever x-rays that were taken of plaintiff were taken in a negligent manner or negligently analyzed; that defendant continued to negligently diagnose plaintiff’s condition and continued to negligently care for plaintiff until she terminated his care and treatment on or about March 21, 1960, at which time defendant had neither recommended nor administered further treatment to plaintiff for the said non-union of said femur. More particularly, plaintiff species and attributes the following professional neglects by acts or omissions to defendant, to-wit:
(a) Failure to take necessary x-rays to follow progress of plaintiff’s injuries;
(b) Failure to recommend further treatment and corrective procedures after operation on the left hip;
(c) Failure to advise plaintiff of nonunion of left femur;
(d) Failure to advise plaintiff of said suspected non-union;
(e) Failure to diagnose and discover said non-union;
(f) Failure to properly analyze symptoms related by plaintiff and physical evidence of deformity of the left lower extremity;
(g) Failure to diagnose the necrotic condition of the head of said left femur;
(h) Failure to promptly remove the loose Knoles pins from plaintiff’s left thigh;
(i) Failure to recognize the significance of the said loose Knoles pins, viz., a non-union of said left femur;
(j) Failure to communicate the significance of said loose Knoles pins as aforesaid; and
<k) Failure to caution plaintiff and otherwise treat plaintiff so as to eliminate further injury to plaintiff’s left hip.

. The doctrine that one liable for injury due to his own tort should foresee and be held liable for aggravation of the injury by the negligence of the physician called to treat the injury has sufficient difficulties not to be extended, especially to a vase where the negligence charged to the physician extends over a long period of time. The courts should not readily assume that negligent treatment by a physician should reasonably be anticipated to flow from an injury caused by the misconduct of another.

. It is not clear to me that the reversal turned upon whether the negligence of Dentist No. 2 might be found to be gross. Neither party to the present appeal has referred to Corbett in those terms nor briefed the relevance to our case of the question of gross as distinguished from ordinary negligence, the turning point of the majority opinion.

. Excerpts from appellant’s complaint in the District Court.

. The allegation here that appellee did not exercise the skill ordinarily expected is not a description of his negligence as ordinary, but may be read “not even ordinary.”]