Court Opinion

ID: 9407988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 06:06:01.914046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.076416
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

TRACY FLEMMING,                                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     July 6, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 360505
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
THE TOBIN GROUP, LLC,                                                LC No. 21-005545-NO

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: HOOD, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this premises liability action, plaintiff Tracy Flemming appeals as of right the trial
court’s order granting summary disposition to defendant The Tobin Group, LLC. For the reasons
stated in this opinion, we reverse.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

         On or about May 5, 2018, plaintiff, a resident of Canterbury Woods Apartments located
at 571 Tobin Drive in Inkster, allegedly suffered significant injuries after a defective closet door
fell on her. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint alleging that (1) defendant owned, maintained,
and controlled the apartment complex, (2) defendant owed a duty to plaintiff, as a tenant, to
maintain and repair the premises, and (3) despite plaintiff’s written notice regarding a defective
closet door, defendant failed to address the repair request in a timely manner, which resulted in the
closet door striking plaintiff.

        On October 19, 2021, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
(no genuine issue of material fact), even though discovery was not scheduled to end until March
15, 2022, per the trial court’s scheduling order. Defendant asserted that it was entitled to summary
disposition because it did not own, possess, manage or control the apartment complex at any time,
relying on an affidavit from its corporate counsel, Benjamin Tobin, to that effect. The affidavit
further averred that “[u]pon information and belief, the property was owned by Institutional
Building and managed by Group Five Management during the time referenced in the complaint.”

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        In response, plaintiff explained why The Tobin Group, LLC, was named as the defendant
in this case. According to plaintiff, after providing notice of the closet door incident to the
apartment complex’s rental office, she received correspondences from Westfield Insurance
Company. Westfield provided plaintiff a copy of the commercial insurance coverage policy in
effect on the date of plaintiff’s incident that named defendant as the insured. The insurance policy
delineated the “[l]ocation of all premises owned by, rented to or controlled by the named insured”
that were covered by the policy. This list included Canterbury Woods Apartments among many
other apartment complexes. Per the terms of the insurance agreement, defendant also granted the
insurance company the right to make inspections and surveys at any time at the listed properties,
and to subsequently provide defendant with reports on the condition of the properties in addition
to recommended changes. Relying on the insurance policy, plaintiff maintained that there was a
question of fact as to whether defendant owned, managed or controlled the apartment complex and
that further discovery was needed.

         In a reply brief, defendant argued that the insurance policy did not create a material
question of fact whether it owned, possessed or controlled the apartment complex. Defendant
explained that in 2012 it issued a mortgage to Institutional Building Co, LLC, for property that
contained Canterbury Woods Apartments. The mortgage agreement stated that Institutional
Building “shall preserve and maintain the [m]ortgaged [p]roperty in good repair, working order
and condition, excepting ordinary wear and tear, shall replace any [e]quipment which requires
replacement, [and] shall procure all necessary utility services . . . .” The agreement provided that
Institutional Building’s sole member was the Marshall E. Tobin Trust. Defendant also submitted
an affidavit of its manager, Michael Tobin, averring that defendant’s interest in the apartment
complex was limited to the mortgage interest based upon a loan to Institutional Building, and that
defendant has never had an ownership interest or control of the apartment complex. Michael
further averred that “[u]pon information and belief,” that the property was owned by Institutional
Building and managed by Group Five Management Company.1

        Prior to the motion hearing, plaintiff noticed two depositions: one for the person most
knowledgeable of the properties owned, managed or maintained by defendant, and one for the
person most knowledgeable of defendant’s Westfield insurance policy. The motion hearing was
held on February 9, 2022, with still over a month remaining in discovery. Defendant’s counsel
acknowledged that Canterbury Woods Apartments has “a complex—slightly complex ownership
situation,” but indicated that no discovery was needed beyond the affidavits defendant had
provided. After further argument, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary
disposition, finding there was no genuine issue of material fact under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because

1
  We take judicial notice of the fact that in an appeal before this Court, Michael Tobin was
identified as the president of Group Five Management Company; that case also involved
Canterbury Woods Apartments. See Tackett v Group Five Mgt Co, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 8, 2011 (Docket Nos. 296805, 296819); p 6
(reversing a grant of summary disposition to the defendant in a Whistleblower’s Protection Act
case).

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it was clear from the documents provided by defendant that it did not own the apartment complex
and that the ownership issue was dispositive.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

      Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition before discovery
was completed. We agree.2

        “Michigan has a broad discovery policy that permits the discovery of any matter that is not
privileged and that is relevant to the pending case.” Arabo v Mich Gaming Control Bd, 310 Mich
App 370, 398; 872 NW2d 223 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Generally, a motion
for summary disposition is premature if granted before discovery on a disputed issue is complete.
However, summary disposition may nevertheless be appropriate if further discovery does not stand
a reasonable chance of uncovering factual support for the opposing party’s position.” Oliver v
Smith, 269 Mich App 560, 567; 715 NW2d 314 (2006).

        Plaintiff argues that she should have been permitted to conduct further discovery to
determine whether defendant had ownership, possession or control of the apartment complex. As
noted, over a month before the discovery period was set to expire, plaintiff filed two notices of
depositions related to defendant’s insurance policy and the properties owned, managed or
maintained by defendant. This sought discovery was relevant to the ownership of the apartment
complex and whether defendant has exerted possession or control over the complex. Further,
plaintiff had identified independent evidence that there was a dispute over these issues. See
Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 283 Mich App 264,
292; 769 NW2d 234 (2009) (“[A] party opposing summary disposition cannot simply state that
summary disposition is premature without identifying a disputed issue and supporting that issue
with independent evidence.”). Specifically, the insurance policy, which was provided to plaintiff
after she reported the underlying incident to the renter’s office, states that the apartment complex
was “owned by, rented to, or controlled by the named insured[,]” i.e., defendant. This amounts to
an admission by defendant that it is either the owner, lessee or controller of the premises. Further,
per the insurance agreement, defendant granted the insurance company the right to make
inspections and surveys of the property at any time. Defendant’s apparent right to allow access to
the property is indicative of possession and control of the premises. For these reasons, it cannot
be said that there is “no reasonable chance that further discovery will result in factual support for

2
  A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Ormsby v
Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 52; 684 NW2d 320 (2004). When reviewing a motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers the affidavits, depositions, pleadings, admissions, and
other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rose
v Nat’l Auction Group, Inc, 466 Mich 453, 461; 646 NW2d 455 (2002). Summary disposition is
appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving
the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable
minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).

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the nonmoving party.” Randall v Mich High Sch Athletic Ass’n, 334 Mich App 697, 727; 965
NW2d 690 (2020).

        Defendant maintains that summary disposition was appropriate because the affidavits and
mortgage agreement show that defendant merely has a mortgage interest in the property. However,
even assuming that defendant has no ownership of the apartment complex, that is not grounds for
summary disposition in a premises liability case. For a party to be subject to premises liability,
“the party must possess and control the property at issue but not necessarily be its owner.” Finazzo
v Fire Equip Co, 323 Mich App 620, 627; 918 NW2d 200 (2018) (emphasis omitted). See also
Merritt v Nickelson, 407 Mich 544, 552; 287 NW2d 178 (1980) (“Premises liability is conditioned
upon the presence of both possession and control over the land.”). “Ownership alone is not
dispositive,” Oriel v Uni-Rak Sales Co, Inc, 454 Mich 564, 568; 562 NW2d 241 (1997), and the
trial court erred by reaching a contrary conclusion in this case.

       Defendant also argues that it does not have possession or control of the apartment complex.
Defendant has provided two affidavits, one from corporate counsel Benjamin Tobin and one from
manager Michael Tobin, asserting that the apartment complex is owned by Institutional Building
and managed by Group Five Management Company. While the mortgage agreement supports
defendant’s claim regarding Institutional Building, no additional information is known about
Group Five Management Company, whose president, at least at one point, appears to have been
the same Michael Tobin. See Tackett v Group Five Mgt Co, unpublished per curiam opinion of
the Court of Appeals, issued December 8, 2011 (Docket Nos. 296805, 296819); p 6. Moreover,
for the reasons discussed, the insurance policy indicates that defendant has some de facto
possession or control over the premises.

        To be clear, we are not at this time applying the standards governing motions brought under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) or determining whether defendant had sufficient possession and control over
the apartment complex such that it may subjected to premises liability in this case. Rather, we
hold that defendant’s dispositive motion was prematurely decided. Plaintiff was seeking discovery
on disputed issues before the discovery period had expired, and there was independent evidence
supporting plaintiff’s claims. Under these circumstances, the trial court erred by granting summary
disposition before discovery was completed.

        Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

                                                             /s/ Noah P. Hood
                                                             /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
                                                             /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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