Court Opinion

ID: 9769152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:36:10.762288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:56.157689
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
In holding appellant was properly precluded from cross-examining the State’s witness regarding pending federal charges, the majority misstates the holding in Carroll v. *637State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 497-98 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996) (holding cross-examination regarding pending charges against the State’s witness is appropriate to expose a witness’ motivation to testify).1 See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); and, Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). The majority and concurring opinions seriously misconstrue Carroll and disregard the import of federal law which impacts this case. Specifically, I dissent on three grounds.
I.
The majority erroneously holds the trial judge has the discretion to limit cross-examination regarding pending criminal charges. Ante at 635. Nowhere in their opinion does the majority cite any authority for this holding. Case law is clear that a trial judge only has discretion to restrict inappropriate cross-examination. Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 498. See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436-1437, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). This Court defined inappropriate cross-examination as “... cross-examination when a subject is exhausted, or when the cross-examination is designed to annoy, harass, or humiliate, or when the cross-examination might endanger the personal safety of the witness.” Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 498. See also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435 (trial judge has discretion to limit cross-examination to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, and repetitive or marginally relevant interrogation). Conversely, “... the trial judge abuses [his] discretion when he limits appropriate cross-examination.”2 Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 499. This Court expressly provided that the parameters of appropriate cross-examination include questions regarding a State witness’ pending criminal charges:
[t]he scope of appropriate cross-examination is necessarily broad. A defendant is entitled to pursue all avenues of cross-examination reasonably calculated to expose a motive, bias or interest for the witness to testify .... [t]his broad scope [of appropriate cross-examination] necessarily includes cross-examination concerning criminal charges pending against a witness and over which those in need of the witness’ testimony might be empowered to exercise control.3
Id. 916 S.W.2d at 497-98. Additionally, “[t]here exists a long line of federal and state authority holding a pending criminal charge is an appropriate area of cross-examination.” Id. 916 S.W.2d at 499. See e.g., Alford, 282 U.S. at 693, 51 S.Ct. at 220; Davis, 415 U.S. *638at 316-317, 94 S.Ct. at 1110-1111; Collins v. State, 780 S.W.2d 176, 196 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Carmona v. State, 698 S.W.2d 100, 102-103 (Tex. Cr.App.1985); Harris v. State, 642 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (citing Randle v. State, 565 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.Cr.App. Cr.App.1975); Lewis, 815 S.W.2d at 565; and, Miller, 741 S.W.2d 382, 389 (1987). Since cross-examination regarding pending charges is an appropriate area of cross-examination because it exposes a witness’s motive, bias or interest in testifying, it is not subject to the discretion of the trial judge. The majority errs in holding otherwise.
II.
Second, the majority incorrectly concludes: Appellant has not established a causal connection or logical relationship between the pending federal charges and the witness’s testimony at trial. Appellant does not argue, and the record does not demonstrate, why prosecution by the federal government for theft and conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances would tend to show that the witness’ testimony in an unrelated state prosecution for tampering with government documents might be biased ...,
Ante at 634-635; and, in a footnote the majority continues:
“the testimony does not show, for example, the existence of a plea bargain agreement or negotiations, or show the witness’ belief regarding the existence or non-existence of any kind of “deal.” We note, however, that there, are other ways to support the assertion that the witness believed testimony in this case would favorably affect the outcome of pending federal charges. It also fails to establish any connection between the state and federal charges.”
Ante at 635, at fn. 5. This holding is problematic for several reasons.
A.
As to the majority’s first contention, neither this Court, nor the Supreme Court has ever hedged the accused’s right to cross-examine a State’s witness regarding pending charges on a requirement he “... establish some causal connection or logical relationship between the [witness’] pending charges and the witness’ testimony at trial” (Ante at 634). To the contrary, the Supreme Court, in Alford, 282 U.S. at 693, 51 S.Ct. at 220, specifically addressed the issue of whether the witness’ pending charges and the nature of his testimony need to be related, and held:
... Nor is it material ... whether the witness was in custody because of his participation in the transactions for which petitioner was indicted. Even if the witness were charged with some other offense by the prosecuting authorities, petitioner was entitled to show by cross-examination that his [the witness’] testimony was affected by fear or favor growing out of his detention.
Therefore, the majority’s “causal connection” or “rational relationship” requirement is wholly unsupported.4
*639B.
Second, as to the contention the witness’ testimony must “... show ... the existence of a plea bargain agreement or negotiations, or show the witness’ belief regarding the existence or non-existence of any kind of ‘deal,’ ” (Ante at 635, fn. 5), case law is clear that the witness’ motivation, bias or interest in testifying for the State need not be evidenced or proven, only “possible” or “potential.” Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 500.
On the issue of whether a witness’ potential motivation, bias or interest needs to be evidenced or shown by a plea agreement or negotiations, the majority demonstrates their utter misunderstanding of the purpose of cross-examination:
We emphasize that the proponent is not required to establish actual bias. What is required is that the proponent make a showing of the witness’ potential for bias. Naked allegations which do no more than establish the fact that unrelated federal charges are pending do not, in themselves, show potential for bias.
Ante at 634, fn. 4. In fact, there is no requirement the accused make any “showing ” of the [State] witness’ potential for bias before being able to cross-examine that witness regarding his pending charges. In Alford, 282 U.S. at 692, 51 S.Ct. at 219, the Supreme Court explained:
Counsel can often not know in advance what pertinent facts may be elicited on cross-examination. For that reason it is necessarily exploratory; and the rule that the examiner must indicate the purpose of his inquiry does not, in general apply. It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop.
Id. See also, Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110 (“[t]he partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony”). In Carroll, this Court reiterated that the very purpose of erossexamination regarding a witness’ pending charges is to explore whether the witness has potential for bias:
[a]ppellant’s cross-examination was clearly an attempt to demonstrate that Russell [State’s witness] held a possible motive, bias or interest in testifying for the State. Appellant’s inquiry into Russell’s incarceration, his pending charge and possible punishment as a habitual criminal, was appropriate to demonstrate Russell’s potential motive, bias or interest to testify for the State.
See also, Harris v. State, 642 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Therefore, the witness’ potential for bias need not be evidenced by a plea agreement, and the majority’s comment regarding appellant’s lack of a plea bargain disregards what this Court held in Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 500:5
... the existence of such [a plea] agreement is not determinative. What is determinative is whether appellant was allowed to demonstrate any possible bias or interest that [the witness] may hold to testify on the State’s behalf. In other words, it is possible, even absent an agreement, that [the witness] believed his testimony in this case would be of later benefit.
Federal case law also supports the premise there need not be evidence of a plea agreement or “deal” in order for the accused to explore by means of cross-examination the possibility of an agreement. United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938, 945 (5th Cir.1976). In Onori, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
Onori and Bukky contend that the trial court committed reversible error in limiting the defense’s cross-examination into the motivation and bias of the two government witnesses. The Sixth Amendment *640confrontation clause guarantees to a criminal defendant the right to cross-examine a witness against him. This right is especially important with respect to accomplices or other witnesses who may have a substantial reason to cooperate mth the government. Indeed it is so important that the defendant is allowed to “search” for a deal between the government and the witness, even if there is no hard evidence that such a deal exists. What tells, of course, is not the actual existence of a deal but the witness’ belief or disbelief that a deal exists. [Internal citation omitted].
Onori, 535 F.2d at 945. See also, United States v. Mayer, 556 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.1977) (“... a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness about any deals that may have been made or any understandings that may have been reached between the government and one of its witnesses does not hinge on whether in fact any such deals or understandings were effected.”) [Emphasis in original]
C.
Third, the majority is incorrect the State witness’ testimony must first demonstrate or “show ” whether that witness believes or disbelieves there is a “deal,” or even whether he believes or disbelieves his testimony will be of later benefit to him on his own criminal charges. Ante at 635, fn.5. This is so because appellant has a right to explore what the State witness believes or disbelieves in regard to his pending criminal charges in order to expose the witness’ possible motive, bias or interest in testifying. In Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 500, this Court explained:
... it is possible, even absent an agreement, that Russell believed his testimony in this case would be of later benefit. As we held in Spain v. State,
... an effective cross-examination encompasses more than just the opportunity to elicit testimony to establish the existence of certain facts [such as the witness’ belief or disbelief a deal exists]. The cross-examiner should be allowed to expose the limits of the witness’ knowledge of relevant facts, place the witness in his proper setting, and test the credibility of the witness....
Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 500 citing Spain v. State, 585 S.W.2d 705, 710 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). See also, Alford, 282 U.S. at 692, 51 S.Ct. at 219; Saunders v. State, 572 S.W.2d 944, 948-949 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). Importantly, “... the failure to affirmatively establish the fact sought [in this case, whether the witness believed or disbelieved there was a deal] does not prevent the cross-examination from having probative value in regard to the witness’ credibility.” Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 500 citing Spain, 585 S.W.2d at 710. For this reason, appellant was entitled to conduct an exploratory cross-examination regarding the witness’ beliefs as to his pending criminal charges and his testimony on behalf of the State, without first proving whether the witness believed or disbelieved a “deal” existed. The majority fails to provide any support or legal analysis for their conclusion this established rule of law is inapplicable in the instant case.
III.
Lastly, the majority’s holding a State witness’ pending federal charges are not relevant to show that witness’ motivation to testify on behalf of the State in a State prosecution ignores applicable federal law which specifically provides the federal de-fendanVState’s witness with statutory motivation to testify on behalf of the State.
A. The Law
The United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1 provides:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
(a) the appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:
(1) the courts evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered;
*641(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, 18 U.S.C.A. It is well settled that a federal defendant’s “substantial assistance” includes assistance to State and local authorities as well as federal authorities. The commentary following the United States Sentencing Guidelines explains:
[sjentencing guideline allowing downward departure, on motion of government, for defendant who has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person applies to assistance to any governmental authorities, including state and local authorities_
Citing United States v. Love, 985 F.2d 732 (3rd Cir.1993). See also United States v. Lugman, 130 F.3d 113, 114 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1855, 140 L.Ed.2d 1103 (1998)(considering defendant’s assistance to “local authorities in Texas” as potentially qualifying defendant for downward departure under § 5K1.1, but de-eiding defendant’s assistance unsubstantial); United States v. Egan, 966 F.2d 328 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1069, 113 S.Ct. 1021, 122 L.Ed.2d 167 (1993) (assuming, without discussion, U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 applies to assistance to state or loeal authorities as well as federal authorities); United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116, 120-121 (3rd Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 943, 112 S.Ct. 382, 116 L.Ed.2d 333 (1991) (same); United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246 (7th Cir.1990) (same).6
B. Application of Law
Appellant sought to cross-examine the federal defendant/State witness regarding his pending federal charge to expose any possible motive, bias, or interest the witness may have in testifying for the State. The majority holds the federal defendant/State witness has no motive, bias, or interest in testifying for the State because the witness does not have a “vulnerable relationship” with the State.7 Although applicable in Carroll, the “vulnerable relationship” inquiry is not the only means by which a State witness’ motive, bias or interest in testifying can be established.
The State’s witness in the instant case has pending federal charges which do not create a “vulnerable relationship” between the witness and the State. However, § 5K1.1 is the *642nexus which links the witness’ federal charges with his testimony in the State prosecution. Section 5K1.1 provides statutory motive, bias and interest in that it offers a federal defendant/State’s witness the possibility of a lesser sentence on his federal charges in return for his testimony and cooperation with State authorities in the State prosecution. Therefore, § 5K1.1 necessarily produces the same kind of motivation and bias we recognized in Carroll. As long as § 5K1.1 is law, cross-examination regarding a State witness’s pending federal charges will always be “appropriate.”
IV.
The rule of law announced in Carroll, namely that pending criminal charges are an appropriate area for cross-examination to demonstrate any possible motive, bias or interest the State’s witness may have in testifying, is applicable to the instant case because § 5K1.1 of the federal sentencing guidelines creates direct, statutory motivation. The majority opinion not only declines to follow Carroll and ignores this applicable federal law; it creates its own law, without any supporting authority whatsoever. Davis, Alford, and Carroll held a trial judge abuses his discretion if he limits cross-examination regarding a witness’ pending charges because such cross-examination is protected by the Constitution and always “appropriate” to expose the witness’ possible motive, bias or interest. However, the majority opinion holds cross-examination regarding a witness’ pending charges is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Because the majority opinion fails to recognize § 5K1.1 as providing the same statutory motive, bias and interest for a federal defendant/State witness that we recognized in Carroll, completely misconceives this Court’s opinion in Carroll, and creates unprecedented rules of law in opposition to precedent, I dissent.
OVERSTREET, J. joins.

.The majority opinion cites Carroll, not for its rule of law, but for the dicta contained in Judge Meyers’ concurring advisory opinion which states "... should these [pending] charges [of the State’s witness] emanate from another jurisdiction or authority, I would hold that the release of the information to the jury is subject to a discretionary ruling of the trial court under rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence.” Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d at 501 (MEYERS, J. concurring).
Likewise, Judge Mansfield’s concurrence in the instant case, cites only Judge Meyers’ concurrence in Carroll, and not the Court's opinion. Judge Price’s concurrence does not even cite Carroll or its underlying precedent Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), and Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931) at all.
Furthermore, the majority attempts to lessen the import of the rule of law announced in Carroll by stating only "... four judges determined ..." this holding. This is inaccurate. In fact, five judges supported the Carroll holding: Baird, J. authored the opinion of the Court, Clinton, Maloney, and Overstreet, J.J. joined without comment, and Meyers, J. "concurred” with comment, but clearly stated "... I join the opinion of the Court."

. In United States v. Mayer, 556 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.1977), the Fifth Circuit explained the trial court's discretion in limiting the extent of cross-examination, and held:
... while the scope of cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial judge, this discretionary authority to limit cross-examination comes into play only after there has been permitted as a matter of right sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. Because the district court did not allow the defense sufficient inquiry into the motivation of the prosecution’s chief witnesses in testifying, and consequently frustrated Mayer’s attempts to fully exercise his sixth amendment rights, the trial judge never reached the point at which he had the discretion to limit the extent of cross-examination. [Internal citation omitted].

. All emphasis mine unless otherwise indicated.

. For their causal connection/rational relationship argument, the majority miscites McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 618 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997), with the following parenthetical:
(permissible to show serious pending state charges against accomplice witness because such situation might have affected his testimony as a witness for the State; but impermissible to "elicit the accomplice witness' knowledge or lack of knowledge of the difference in parole eligibility minimum time periods” because "it would not have any further shown his vulnerable relationship with the State or his potential motive, bias or interest”).
Ante at 634. McDuff does not hold, or even suggest, that there must be a connection or relationship between the witness’ pending charges and his testimony in order for those charges to be admissible on cross-examination. Rather, McDuff merely explains that appellant was properly permitted to cross-examine the witness on his pending charge pursuant to Carroll. The ultimate holding in McDuff centers on an issue which has no bearing on the instant case, i.e., the issue of that same witness’ knowledge of parole eligibility:
... appellant was able to show that since the accomplice witness had the serious pending charges, he was at least potentially beholden to some extent to the State for the disposition of those charges and that such situation might have affected his testimony as a witness for the State. Allowing him to elicit the accomplice witness’ knowledge or lack of knowledge of the difference in parole eligibility minimum time periods would not have any further shown his vulnerable relationship with the State or his potential motive, bias or interest.
*639McDuff, 939 S.W.2d at 618. When read in its entirety, and put in a relevant context, the holding in McDuff is of no consequence to the instant case.

. Judge Price also ignores what we held in Carroll when he states:
"... there is nothing in the record to show that he (State’s witness) was aware of the guidelines (i 5K1.1) or that he had any type of 'deal’ with the federal prosecutors in charge of his case.” Ante at 634.

. The majority opinion, as well as Judge Price’s concurring opinion addresses our argument that § 5K1.1 provides statutory motivation for a federal defendant/State witness to testify by admitting:
1) the existence of pending federal charges may be relevant to establish bias or motive, as a federal defendant’s 'substantial assistance’ in a state prosecution may result in a downward departure from the United States sentencing guidelines;
(Ante at 634) and,
2) it is possible that the police officer could have possessed a knowledge of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and thus testified against appellant in hopes of a downward departure if sentenced in his federal cases ...
Ante at 636 (PRICE, J. concurring). Even with these written admissions, both opinions conclude § 5K1.1 does not establish motivation, such as this Court recognized in Carroll, in the instant case.
All the same, the opinions in this case evidence that a majority of this Court obviously agrees § 5K1.1 serves to make the State witness’ pending federal charges "relevant” to establish "bias or motive," and/or made the witness testify "in hopes of a downward departure.” Therefore, I fail to see how the majority and concurring opinions can ignore case law from this Court and the United States Supreme Court which mandate appellant be entitled to cross-examine the witness regarding his pending charges to expose potential motive or bias on the part of the defen-danl/testifying witness. Particularly, the majority is wrong to deny appellant the right to cross-examine the State’s witness regarding his pending federal charges in order to expose the potential motive created § 5K1.1 of the United State Sentencing Guidelines which provides the federally charged defendant with a motive to testify for any authority, including the State.

. In Carroll, this Court held Carroll was permitted to cross-examine the State’s witness, who had State charges pending against him, and to expose any possible motive, bias or interest the witness had, and "... to elicit any fact from [the] witness intended to demonstrate that witness’ vulnerable relationship with the State.” Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 500.