Court Opinion

ID: 9684534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:00:01.649702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:56.831289
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Dissenting Justice.
Respectfully, I must dissent. I still firmly believe that Justice Keller was right in his March dissent, when he noted, “because the Kentucky Constitution contains an express separation of powers among the three branches and provides that the Senate itself shall be the sole judge of the qualifications and elections of its members, the Court of Justice, as a whole, lacks jurisdiction in this case.” I joined Justice Keller then and after all the ensuing briefs, discussions and arguments, I remain firmly convinced of the correctness of his position.
The campaign for the 37th Senatorial District seat in Jefferson County began with the filing deadline in January, 2004 and ran through the general election on November 2, 2004. The Appellee, Ms. Virginia L. Woodward, (who admitted in the Jefferson Circuit Court hearing that she had been gathering materials on the Appellant, Ms. Dana Seum Stephenson, for months), chose, however, to wait until the last minute of the last day to file a challenge to Ms. Stephenson’s qualifications in the Jefferson Circuit Court. With this calculated delay, it was assured there would be no possibility for the action to be resolved prior to the election the next morning.
In fact, the polls had closed, with Ms. Stephenson garnering 22, 772 votes to Ms. Woodward’s 21, 750 votes, when Ms. Stephenson was served with notice of the action at 9:30 p.m., on election night, while attending her victory celebration. Consequently, the hearing could not be held until the day after the election, November 3, 2004 at 3:30 p.m.
At the hearing, the court rejected Ms. Stephenson’s motion to postpone the hearing for just a short time, so she might prepare with counsel. Then, after a hearing lasting less than one hour, the Jefferson Circuit Court enjoined the Jefferson County Board of Elections “from certifying the results of the election .... ” In a final decision on November 22, 2004, the court held Ms. Stephenson did not meet the “residency” requirements set out in Ky. Const. Sec. 32 and permanently enjoined the Jefferson County Board of Elections from counting any votes cast for Ms. Stephenson — even though the tally had already been made.
Then, on December 7, 2004, Ms. Stephenson filed an “Election Contest” with the Kentucky State Senate pursuant to the procedures set forth in KRS 120.195 and 120.215. Ms. Woodward countered with this action in the Franklin Circuit Court on December 15, 2004. Then, on January 7, 2005, after three days of hearings by its Election Contest Committee, the Kentucky Senate received and considered the Contest Committee’s reports and recommendations and by a majority vote of the full Senate, rejected the report that recommended seating Ms. Woodward and adopted the report finding Ms. Stephenson did meet the “residency” qualifications of the office and should be seated. Ms. Stephenson was then sworn in and seated as a member of the Kentucky State Senate, representing the 37th Senatorial District in Jefferson County. Thereafter, on Janu*202ary 14, 2005, the Franklin Circuit Court, in this action, granted Ms. Woodward’s motion for a temporary injunction against Ms. Stephenson, prohibiting her from exercising any of her duties as Senator from the 37th District.
Because this Court’s majority opinion has the effect of extending KRS 118.176 “pre-election” proceedings, not only into areas protected by Section 38 of the Kentucky Constitution, but even past the general election deadline, it may be expected that the “calculated late filing” as occurred here, will be replicated many times over in the years to come, at a cost of increased rancor between the political parties, and hundreds of thousands of dollars of additional expenditures for new elections by the various candidates and taxpayers of this state. More importantly, during these “now extended contests,” their constituencies will be without representation in the important functions of government, due to the delays naturally inherent in litigation.
As I write today, we are in late December and during all of this time, Jefferson County has been without the aid of one of its Senators through the making of the budget in 2005 and will, more likely than not, be without one of its Senators during the session in 2006. Thus, only the most partisan constituents of the electorate could have enjoyed this battle.
Section 27 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that, “[t]he powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body ...: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another.” Section 28 of the Kentucky Constitution provides, “no person or collection of persons, being one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.” (Emphasis added). Section 38 of the Kentucky Constitution then provides, “each house of the General Assembly shall judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its members, but a contested election shall be determined in such manner as shall be directed by law.” 1 (Emphasis added). Thus, when dealing with the qualifications, elections and returns of members of the General Assembly, Section 38 authorizes only “contested elections” to be determined according to law — it grants no ground for interference by “pre-election proceedings.”
“Properly speaking, an election cannot be ‘contested’ before it is held and thus ‘an election contest is a post-election proceeding.’ ” Thomas v. Lyons, 586 S.W.2d 711, 715 (Ky.1979). Election contests are regulated by KRS Chapter 120. And as to the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor and members of the General Assembly, such contests are specifically authorized by Ky. Const. Sec. 38 and 90. “Pre-election proceedings” are regulated by KRS Chapter 118 and are not an approved means of determining the “qualifications, elections, and returns” of the members of the General Assembly under Ky. Const. Sec. 38.
KRS 118.176 falls within Chapter 118, titled “Conduct of Elections,” whereas, KRS 120.215 falls within the Chapter appropriately titled “Election Contests.” “What we have in this case is not an election contest, but a pre-election proceeding .... ” Thomas at 715. Moreover, we recognized in Thomas, that when *203KRS 118.176 “runs athwart” of constitutional sections, KRS 118.176 must give way. Thomas at 716.
KRS 118.176, dealing with “pre-election” procedures, provides, in relevant part:
(1) A “bona fide” candidate means one who is seeking nomination in a primary or election in a general election
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(2) The bona fides of any candidate seeking nomination or election in a primary or general election may be questioned by any ... voter entitled to vote for such candidate or by an opposing candidate by summary proceedings consisting of a motion before the Circuit Court .... An action regarding the bona fides of any candidate seeking nomination or election ... may be commenced at any time prior to the general election. The motion shall be tried summarily and without delay- (Emphasis added).
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(4) ... The order of the Circuit Court shall be ... subject to a motion to set aside in the Court of Appeals. The motion shall be heard by the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof ..., except that the motion must be made ... within five (5) days ..., and the order of the Court of Appeals or judge thereof shall be final....
KRS Chapter 120, however, sets out the rules for “Election Contests.” KRS 120.155 sets the stage and provides, in relevant part:
Any candidate for election to any state, county, district or city office (except the office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, member of the General Assembly, ...), ... may contest the election of the successful candidate, by filing a petition in the Circuit Court .... (Emphasis added).
KRS 120.205 points out, in relevant part: When the election of a Governor or Lieutenant Governor is contested, a board for determining the contest shall be formed [from the General Assembly]
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(5) ... The decision of the board shall not be final nor conclusive, but shall be reported to the two (2) houses of the General Assembly, in joint session, for the further action of the General Assembly.
KRS 120.215 then, for members of the General Assembly, provides:
When the election of a member of the General Assembly is contested, the branch to which he belongs shall, within three (3) days after its organization, and in the manner provided in KRS 120.205, select a board of not more than nine (9) nor less than five (5) of its members to determine the contest. Such board shall be governed by the same rules, have the same power, and be subject to the same penalties as a board to determine the contested election of Governor. It shall report its decision to the branch of the General Assembly by which it was appointed, for its further action.
As indicated, the Kentucky Senate met on January 7, 2005 and by a majority vote rejected the Contest Committee’s majority report, which found Ms. Stephenson had not met residency requirements, but then accepted the Committee’s minority report, which concluded Ms. Stephenson had met the residency requirements. It is the disagreement over the constitutional meaning of “residence” under Section 32 of the Kentucky Constitution which has fueled this Court’s invasion of the powers granted the General Assembly under Section 38. *204But the central point, which is more eloquently addressed in Justice Keller’s March dissent and in Justice Roach’s dissenting opinion, is the fact that the founders of our Constitution did not give us (only one of the three branches of the government) the power to interfere with “the qualifications, elections and returns” of our sister branch, the General Assembly.
“Although current policy may differ from that of another time, the intent of the framers of the Constitution and of the people adopting it must be given effect.” City of Ashland v. Calvary Episcopal Church of Ashland, 278 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Ky.1955). Thus, the Constitution continues to mean what it meant when it was adopted. Runyon v. Smith, 308 Ky. 73, 212 S.W.2d 521, 524 (1948). “Courts in construing constitutional provisions will look to the history of the times and the state of existing things to ascertain the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the people adopting it .... ” Shamburger v. Duncan, 253 S.W.2d 388, 390, 391 (Ky.1952); see also Keck v. Manning, 313 Ky. 433, 231 S.W.2d 604, 607 (1950).
A perusal of the official report of the proceedings and debates in the Constitutional Convention, held in Frankfort in September of 1890, offers some insight. Therein, the honorable delegate from Pen-dleton county, Mr. Leslie T. Applegate, pointed out to those assembled:
Because the experience of time has shown that along in 1849 or in 1850, or even going back to 1792, [the words] didn’t mean what the men who used them thought they meant; and while I have the profoundest respect for our courts, yet they have turned their forces upon it, and they have turned the light of reason upon it, and we have found that these expressions are deficient to protect men and their private rights, and for that reason we have enlarged upon the expressions here .... If you can ever use language so plain and specific that the courts will not sometime or another make a change in it, then I would like you to employ it, because this morning I sat down in the library and took down Barbour’s Digest and found that the court has overruled itself more than a hundred times in its history; then if they themselves cannot say what they mean and stick to it, how in the name of heaven can we use any language that will always be construed as we wish it and which they will stick to. Debates, Constitutional Convention 1890 Ky. Vol. I, P. 590, 591.
The honorable Delegate from Todd County, Mr. H.G. Petrie, pointed out:
[I]n thinking about it, it occurred to me that these judges who are giving this satisfactory interpretation of that clause of the Constitution will in a few years pass away from the honored seats they now occupy, and those seats will be filled by other judges. It will be, as it was said by the Delegate from Pendleton, the same court but different judges. Who knows how they may view that section? They may conclude that the interpretation of the present judges is wrong. They may be unable to concur. They may say that the construction given that clause by some of the other judges way back yonder was the correct one; and then we would have the trouble again; so it seems to me if human language can be so arraigned as to express really the thought intended to be conveyed ..., then it ought to be done. Id. at 625. (Emphasis added).
Looking further at the disagreement we have, within its historical context, the seminal case, Taylor v. Beckham, 108 Ky. 278, 56 S.W. 177 (1900), decided only nine years after the adoption of our current Constitu*205tion. Interestingly enough, Sen. William Goebel, a sad focus of the case, was an outspoken convention member in the 1890 convention. In fact, the episode which furnished the basis for Taylor is often referred to as the “Goebel affair.”
The ‘Goebel affair’ was the most disturbing episode in Kentucky’s political history. It left the state’s electorate in a highly embittered frame of mind. The Republicans said, ‘they stole the election,’ and the Democrats answered, ‘they shot our Governor [Goebel].’ It matters little to posterity who fired the shot that killed Senator Goebel; the important fact is that it forced Kentucky into a long period of partisan and factional war which prevented passage of much needed progressive legislation. Thomas D. Clark, A History of Kentucky, p. 442.2
In Taylor, the Republican gubernatorial nominee, W.S. Taylor, received a majority of 2,383 votes over the Democrat nominee, William Goebel. The Republican Lieutenant Governor nominee, John Marshall, had a somewhat larger majority over the Democrat nominee, J.C. Beckham.
The final official count gave Taylor a majority, and this was the signal for Democrats to start challenging votes. It was claimed [Republican] Governor Bradley’s troops had prevented an honest election in Louisville. Most outrageous of all, however, was the fact that by political chicanery or ‘oversight,’ votes of many eastern Kentucky Republican counties were registered upon ‘tissue paper’ ballots, which, it was claimed, were not printed on legal weight paper. This charge, a fine piece of Kentucky political chicanery, was trumped up to throw out the election. Thomas D. Clark, A History of Kentucky, p. 439.
Notwithstanding the political wrangling, on December 12, 1899, Taylor was sworn in as Governor. An Election Contest was then filed by Goebel and Marshall, placing the “election contest” in the Democrat dominated General Assembly, pursuant to Section 90 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Section 90, similar to Section 38, provides, “contested elections for Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall be determined by both houses of the General Assembly, according to such regulations as may be established by law.” The law pursuant to this Section at the time was Ky. St., Sec. 1596(a)(8), which is a predecessor of today’s KRS 120.205. The General Assembly then determined that William Goe-bel was the winner over Taylor for Governor and that J.C. Beckham was the winner for Lieutenant Governor over Marshall. Taylor then filed suit to set aside the actions of the General Assembly. By that time however, Senator Goebel had been shot as he tried to enter the Capitol building. He died from the wound on February 3,1900.
In Taylor, Justice Burnam set out the circumstances of the case our predecessor, then the Kentucky Court of Appeals, was faced with:
The general demurrer ..., admits that ... Williams S. Taylor and John Marshall had received the highest number of *206votes given for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor ...; that at the election, ... the entire election machinery of the state was in the hands of the friends and partisans of contestants [Goebel and Beckham] ...; that the members of the state board of election[s] ... were themselves fellow partisans of contestants; that by the action of the election officers on the day of the election contestees [Taylor and Marshall] were illegally, ... deprived of a large number of votes in the various voting precincts of the state; that, subsequent to the election, contestants had entered into a conspiracy with diverse members of the legislature to nullify this election of the people by the institution of a fraudulent contest before them; that, pursuant to this conspiracy so entered into, the contest boards were selected by a fraudulent device ... that as a result of this trick 10 out of the 11 members selected for the trial of the governor’s contest were partisans of the contestant, ... that at least one member of the board selected to try the contest for the office of Governor had wagered money on the result of the election; that the contest boards, in the trial of the contests had acted throughout in an illegal, tyrannical, and arbitrary manner in the admission and rejection of testimony, and in the whole conduct of the trial; that they did not report to the general assembly any of the testimony which had been taken upon the trial; and that the general assembly, at the time they approved the decisions of the contest boards, did not have a particle of testimony before them, were not familiar with the facts, refused to hear argument, held their alleged meeting at which the contests were determined at a secret place without the knowledge of either contestees, or more than one-third of the entire membership of the general assembly, who were thereby excluded from any participation in the action .... Taylor at 184, 185 (concurring opinion by Justice Burnam).
In fact, Justice Burnam was so thoroughly disgusted with the events, that he went on to state:
It is hard to imagine a more flagrant and partisan disregard of the modes of procedure which should govern a judicial tribunal in the determination of a great and important issue than is made manifest by the facts alleged and relied on by contestees, and admitted by the demurrer filed in this action to be true; and I am firmly convinced, both from these admitted facts and from knowledge of the current history of these transactions, that the general assembly, in the heat of anger, engendered by the intense partisan excitement, which was at that time prevailing, have done two faithful, conscientious, able public servants an irreparable injury in depriving them of the offices to which they were elected by the people of this commonwealth; and a still greater wrong has been done a large majority of the electors of this commonwealth who voted under difficult circumstances to elect these gentlemen to act as their servants in the discharge of the duties of these great offices. Taylor at 185. (Concurring opinion by Burnam, J.). (Emphasis added).
Yet, the court in Taylor, just nine years after the adoption of our current Constitution, with Justice Burnam concurring, recognized the necessary limitations which had been placed on us by the Kentucky Constitution, to-wit:
although it sometimes has been urged at the bar that the court ought to inquire into the motives of the legislature where fraud and corruption were alleged, and annul their action if the allegations were *207established, the argument has in no ease been acceded to by the judiciary, and they have never allowed the inquiry to be entei’ed upon. The reasons are the same here as those which preclude an inquiry into the motives of the governor in the exercise of a discretion vested in him exclusively. He is responsible for his acts in such a case, not to the court, but to the people. Taylor at 180.
The powers of the three departments are not merely equal. They are exclusive in respect to the duties assigned to each. They are absolutely independent of each other. It is now proposed that one of the three powers shall institute an inquiry into the conduct of another department and form an issue to try by what motives the legislators were governed in the enactment of a law. If this may be done, we may also inquire by what motives the executive is induced to approve a bill or withhold his approval, and, in case of withholding it corruptly, by our mandate compel its approval. To institute the proposed inquiry would be a direct attack upon the independence of the legislature, and a usurpation of power subversive of the constitution. Id. We cannot hesitate a moment on this question. We have no such authority, and ought not to have. However far the legislature may depart from the right line of constitutional morality, we have no authority to supervise and correct their act on the mere ground of fraudulent or dishonest motives. We know of no such check upon legislation, and would not desire to see such a one instituted. The remedy for such an evil is in the hands of the people alone, to be worked out by an increased care to elect representatives that are honest and capable. If the judiciary have such authority, then every justice ... is competent to sit in judgment upon every act of legislation which disorderly moralists or knavish or ignorant anarchists may choose to charge as fraudulent. Nay, more, if the question may be raised in a judicial proceeding, the judges and justices ... will be bound to investigate and decide it, and the principal judicial business then might become that of testing, not cases by the standard of the law, but the standard itself by the infinitely various and uncertain judicial notions of morality. Taylor at 181. (Emphasis added).
Public authority and political power must, of necessity, be confided to officers, who, being human, may violate the trust reposed in them. This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely, but it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with faculties to supervise co-ordinate departments, and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. ... That power does not belong to it. Nor can it keep the legislative journal .... It is neither modest nor just for judges thus to impeach the integrity of another department of government, and to claim the judiciary only will be faithful to its obligation. Taylor at 182-183, citing Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514, 1869 WL 3177 (Ind.), 95 Am. Dec. 710 (1869).
The determination of the result of an election is purely a political question, and, if such suits as this may be maintained, the greatest disorder will result in the public business. It has always been the policy of our law to provide a summary process for the settlement of such contests, to the end that public business shall not be interrupted; but, if such a suit as this may be maintained, *208were will such a contest end? To illustrate, section 38 of the state constitution provides: ‘Each house of the general assembly shall judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its members, but a contested election shall be determined in such manner as shall be directed by law.’ Whatever inherit power either house might have had to determine the election of its members if the constitution had been silent, its power under this section is limited to the grant. It will be observed that the phraseology is substantially the same as section 90, relating to contested elections of governor and lieutenant governor. Suppose these suits had been brought by two members of the general assembly, alleging, in effect, the same facts that are alleged in this case, would anybody suppose the judiciary of the state would have the power to go behind the legislative journals, or to supervise the propriety of the legislative action, in determining the election of its members? Taylor at 183-184. (Emphasis added). It is earnestly argued that the general assembly was wrong in its decision of this case, and that it is a very serious matter thus to overthrow the will of the people. Whether the Assembly was right or not in its decision, it is not our province to determine. But a much more important question is involved in the case, which is the integrity of our form of government as founded by our forefathers. If the action of the legislature may be disregarded by the courts, then it is no longer an equal and independent branch of the government within its constitutional jurisdiction, but the courts become the final depository of the supreme power of the sate. Judicial tyranny is no less tyranny because couched in the forms of law. There was a great wisdom in dividing the powers of a republic between three equal and independent sets of officers. One operates as a check upon the other, and no greater blow to the perpetuity of our institutions could be given than to destroy this check. Taylor at 184.
The strictures set out in Taylor are not archaic or ancient; they are as valid today as they were nine years after our Constitution was adopted. “As observed by the legislature, state courts have consistently concluded that a constitutional provision providing that the legislature ‘shall judge’ the qualification, returns and elections of its own members insulates a legislator’s qualification to hold office from judicial review. In other words, a legislative body’s decision to admit or expel a member is almost un-reviewable in the courts. Heller v. The Legislature of the State of Nevada, 120 Nev. 456, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004).
Those of us dissenting are not alone in this view. See Foster v. Harden, 536 So.2d 905, 906 (Miss.1988) (refusing to consider an election contest which questioned whether a state senator satisfied a residency requirement, because: “Section 38 of the [Mississippi] Constitution provides in unambiguous language that each house of the legislature ‘shall judge of the qualifications, return and election of its own members.’ The almost universal constitutional doctrine in the United States and the several states which have constitutions containing this or similar provisions is that: Each legislative body is the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and its action in admitting or expelling a member is not renewable in the courts.”); State ex rel. Turner v. Scott, 269 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1978) (characterizing as a non-justifiable controversy a quo warranto action to remove a Senator who allegedly failed to satisfy the states inhabitancy requirement); Buskey v. *209Amos, 294 Ala. 1, 310 So.2d 468 (1975) (holding that appellate court lost jurisdiction to consider candidate’s residency when the candidate was sworn in to the Alabama Senate); State v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 500-01 (Mo.1970) (declining to consider a quo warranto action to oust a state legislator, stating that no authority existed to contradict the principle that a legislatures power to judge its members qualification is exclusive); Raney v. Stovall; 361 S.W.2d 518 (Ky.1962) (refusing to question the Kentucky Senate’s approval of a deputy sheriff also serving as a Senator); State v. Wheatley, 197 Ark. 997, 125 S.W.2d 101(1939) (refusing to consider whether the state legislator was disqualified from service based on his conviction for an infamous crime); Lessard v. Snell, 155 Ore. 293, 63 P.2d 893 (1937) (declining to question the qualifications of a state senator who had been commissioned as a Notary Public and employed as a County Attorney, the court held: “we apprehend there is no case in the books — certainly none cited — where any court has ever ousted a member of a legislature or directed such a co-ordinate branch of government to accept any person as one of its members.”); State v. Cutts, 53 Mont. 300 163 P. 470 (1917) (declining to consider quo warranto challenge to legislators right to sit in the Montana House of Representatives).
Even Judge Graham of the Franklin Circuit Court, whose decision this Court is upholding (albeit for different reasons), conceded that this is an accurate representation of the law in this regard, “we agree •with Stephenson and Williams that Section 38 does not strictly limit the rights of the Senate to pass upon the qualifications of its members. Although Woodward vehemently disagrees with this proposition Kentucky case law has consistently ruled to that effect.” Woodward v. Stephenson, et al, No. 04-CI-1676, slip op. at 11 (Franklin Cir. Ct. June 1, 2005) (order granting permanent injunction).
It is obvious, that a power must be lodged somewhere to judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the members .... The only possible question on such a subject is, as to the body, in which such a power shall be lodged. If lodged in any other, than the legislative body itself, its independence, its purity ... may be destroyed .... No other body, but itself, could have the same motives to preserve and perpetuate these attributes; no other body can be so perpetually watchful to guard it own rights and privileges from infringement, to purify and vindicate its own character, and to preserve the rights, and sustain the free choice of it own constituents. Accordingly, the power has always been lodged in the legislative body by the uniform practice of England and America. Scheibel v. Pavlak, 282 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn.1979) (quoting Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 416 (Abr. Ed. 1833), cited in Legislation, The Legislators Power to Judge the Qualifications of its Members, Vand. L.Rev. 1410, 1412 (1966)).
Although the majority can cite many cases where elected officials have been denied office after having won the majority of the votes in an election, they cannot cite one case where the courts have ruled against the “qualifications, elections, and returns” of a member of a General Assembly, whose qualifications, election and returns have been accepted by a body of the Assembly, from any jurisdiction that has constitutional provisions comparable to Sections 27, 28 and 38 of the Kentucky Constitution.
What the majority has done, however, is to construct artful logic from which they *210now announce that the General Assembly, by its 2001 Amendment to KRS 118.176, intended to, and did authorize, the courts to intervene in decisions dealing with the “qualifications, elections, and returns” of members of the General Assembly. They do this under the guise of a perceived legislative over-reaction to the August 16, 2000 Court of Appeals decision in Legate v. Stone.3
Legate was the successful candidate for the Democratic nomination for city councilman in Madisonville, Kentucky. The problem was — he was a registered Republican. After the primary election, Rudy Stone, the unsuccessful candidate, filed a challenge to Legate’s qualifications on this basis. The Circuit Court then granted relief and declared the primary nomination vacant In reversing the trial court, and allowing Legate, the Republican, to run as the Democrat nominee, the Court of Appeals relied on our long-standing rule in Noble v. Meagher; 686 S.W.2d 458 (Ky.1985) (involving the qualifications of judges), where we noted, in reference to KRS 118.176, “it is our further holding that challenges to the qualifications of candidates to appear on the ballot must be made before the primary election.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the General Assembly in 2001, amended KRS 118.176 by adding the additional language that “an action regarding the “bona fides” of any candidate seeking nomination or election in a primary or general election may be commenced at any time prior to the general election.”
From a legislative amendment crafted to avoid the strictures of Legate (concerning only a city councilman), the majority of this Court, now concludes, from this history, we believe that it is unquestionable that the General Assembly amended KRS 118.176 in 2001 to effectuate a singular goal: to allow challenges to a candidate’s qualifications after the primary election and at any time prior to the general election. Finding no ambiguity in the plain language of the statute, it is our holding that KRS 118.176 permits a Circuit Court to consider and adjudicate [after election] challenges to a candidate’s bona fides that are commenced prior to the general election. There are no limitations placed on the movant [Ms. Woodward] as to how far in advance of the election the action may be commenced, nor are there limitations placed on the Circuit Court concerning time limitations for adjudication. Here, Woodward commenced her action prior to the general election. That she filed the Motion to Disqualify Stephenson hours before the polls opened is of absolutely no consequence; her action was commenced pri- or to the election and satisfies the simple requirement of the statute.
[Opinion, p. 173].
This logic ignores the fact that in Legate, the challenge was filed after the primary, but in plenty of time to complete the “summary proceeding and appeals” referenced in KRS 118.176, prior to the general election. In fact, the Court of Appeals opinion in Legate was entered on August 16, 2000 and we denied discretionary review on August 24, 2000. Thus, all the General Assembly intended to do with this amendment was to allow its filing after the primary and that’s the extent of their meaning by “may be commenced at any time prior to the General Election.” In no sense, should we have ever presumed *211from this change that the General Assembly meant to let us interfere in their political realm, a realm which has not been violated since 1792 — the date of our first Constitution.
The majority arrives at this logic, notwithstanding the comments of the Representatives concerning this amendment during the session of the House Committee on Elections, Constitutional Amendments and Intergovernmental Affairs, which, in explaining the amendment, acknowledged that, after an election, candidates “are no longer candidates” and therefore cannot be the subject of KRS 118.176 actions.
There is no question but that the majority of this Court, by virtue of their construction of the intention of the legislature in regards to the 2001 amendment, can constitutionally consider and hold that the time within which “pre-election” litigation may endure has been extended in cases such as Legate (a city commissioner) and Meagher (a judge) by the 2001 amendment. As long as they recognize that last minute filings on the last day, with all the consequent disruptions and later expenses (from overturned elections), will be the rule of the future. I could concur in a decision of such tenor. But I cannot concur with a decision that extends KRS 118.176 into constitutionally impermissible areas, such as Ky. Const. Sec. 38.
Never before has this Court hesitated in finding the application of KRS 118.176 to be unconstitutional when it invades constitutionally protected areas. “To the extent that KRS 118.176(4) provides that the action .of the Court of Appeals shall be final [, it] runs athwart Const. Sec. 110(2)(b), which authorizes the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by its rules.” Thomas v. Lyons, 586 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Ky.1979). (Emphasis added). Remember, KRS 118.176(4) expressly limits appeals from the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals and states their orders shall be final. In Thomas, we held that was unconstitutional as intruding into our constitutional powers. Thus, this Court should respect its own precedents and protect the powers of our sister branches of government when their constitutional powers are invaded by KRS 118.176, as we do our own. This is a responsibility we have neglected in this case.
In summary, I acknowledge the validity of the majority’s ruling extending the litigation time pursuant to KRS 118.176 for all contestants, other than the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the members of the General Assembly, who have constitutional protections, which 118.176 cannot penetrate. But I do not recognize that we can invade a sister branch of government’s constitutional power under any guise. Therefore, I believe the acts of the majority of this Court, in this decision, are unconstitutional, as outside the powers granted us. Cf. Taylor. And in doing so, they are as -wrong as was the Senate.
But I must go further. The lengthy existence of this Nation and of all its states is great evidence that our forefathers, who constructed our constitutions, knew how to build a great government, a structure you might say, which would withstand the winds and storms of history. The one secret they knew, and we overlook today, is that they built this government, or structure, on a solid foundation — the people. They recognized the people and relied upon them, to be the fourth player in government, to be more effective, for their own interests, more diligent and timely, than government itself. For these reasons, each of our three branches of government were intentionally hampered in some areas, so that they would all remain equal; so no one branch, could ever become greater than the others, could ever garner *212enough power, to overcome the greatest part of government — the people. This government, or structure, they built, consists of 264 parts, or sections (the Constitution), and when you change one of these sections, you change the whole structure. Maybe just a little today, but that change will grow in time and then someday, you will find, to your dismay, that the whole structure has changed.
And let’s step back and compare the resolution of this issue, the way the founders of our Constitution intended it to be resolved, with the way the court system has resolved it to date. Had this Court followed its own precedent in Taylor, the 37th Senatorial District of Jefferson County would have had a Senator to participate in the budget and other decisions of 2005. It would have a Senator to participate in the budget and legislative decisions to be made in 2006. And in a normal year, that great fourth part of government — the base of government — the people — would have expressed their political voice and vote in November, punishing the party they found at fault and rendering any further discussion of the matter unnecessary.
Yet, in our actions to date, we have upheld two Circuit Court opinions which admit they cannot grant Ms. Woodward’s request to be seated as the Senator for the 37th Judicial district; cannot grant her request to face the President of the Senate, David Williams, or the Senate, to seat Ms. Woodward; and cannot make the Senate call for a special election to fill the seat. If one does not recognize that this means we were not meant to have this power, then I can not point it out any better.
All the Circuit Court order does, is declare Ms. Stephenson to be unqualified and enjoin her from “sitting as the State Senator, from performing any official duties of the office of State Senators; from receiving or accepting any pay for the office of State Senator, and from participating in the affairs of the General Assembly, including, but not limited to, participation of committee meetings, hearing, any votes, as well as, meetings, hearing, and votes of the full body senate.” Thus, by this opinion we have already acknowledged that we have no power to coerce the Kentucky State Senate, if it chooses to ignore this opinion.
Moreover, if the Appellant, Ms. Stephenson, disregards the injunction, then we will again be called upon to decide whether or not the contempt powers of the Courts to enforce an injunction would themselves, be in violation of Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution, which states, “the members of the General Assembly shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or breach or surety of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance of the sessions of their respective houses, and going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either house they shall not be questioned in any other place.” Ky. Const., Sec. 43. “[Legislative] immunity not only applies to speech and debate, but to voting, reporting, and every act and execution of their legislative duties while in either house.” Wiggins v. Stuart, 671 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Ky.App.1984) citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951).
This is the question left for another day. But it still bears out one point. The resolution of this political question would have been resolved much better at the ballot box, rather than in the courtroom. And we are all in this situation because the majority has chosen to condone the calculated late filing of this type of “pre-election proceeding” in a manner that precluded any effective court process until after the election — thus rendering it an “Election Con*213test” and putting it in conflict with Ky. Const. § 38.
Constitutional Convention delegate, Mr. Charles J. Bronston, of Fayette County, noted on the floor at the 1890 convention, that, “we will not submit to the fluctuations of the future. Majorities might arise that would undertake to infringe upon these liberties which we seek to secure and therefore, we will not submit them to the rule of the majority.” What he was alluding to was the fact that the protections built into the Constitution are to be honored by us and our posterity, as they were written, until we properly amend the Constitution, or call a convention to adopt a new one. I admit that it is much easier, simpler, and quicker to amend the Kentucky Constitution by a majority vote of this Court. But that does not make it right. In fact, it is as wrong as what the Senate did.
When all is said and done, few will acknowledge that I stood up for Kentucky and its Constitution, rather than for Ms. Stephenson or Ms. Woodward. But I did.
Having said all I can say in defense of our Constitution, I close in dissent.

. There are no other relevant constitutional sections, other than Section 90, which I will address momentarily.

. Caleb Powers, the then Republican Secretary of State was tried four times for his part in Goebel’s murder, along with Henry Yout-esy, a clerk in his office. Three times Powers was sentenced to life in prison, once to be hanged. Each time his conviction was reversed by our predecessor, the old Court of Appeals. Finally, he was pardoned by Governor Augustus E. Willson. Youtesy, was pardoned by Governor A.O. Stanley. The Powers reversals make interesting reading and may be found in Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735 (Ky.1901); Powers v. Commonwealth, 114 Ky. 237, 70 S.W. 1050 (Ky.1902); Powers v. Commonwealth, 114 Ky. 237, 71 S.W. 494 (Ky.1903) and Powers v. Commonwealth, 139 Ky. 815, 83 S.W. 146 (Ky.1904).

. As noted in the majority opinion, this case was unreported, but may be referenced by its case number 2000-CA-01724-1.