Court Opinion

ID: 9851000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:05:37.765829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.822667
License: Public Domain

FERNANDEZ, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur in the trial court’s determination that timely and proper notice to the public entity satisfies the requirements of the new claims statute, A.R.S. § 12-821(A).
The previous state claims statute was intended to give the state notice and an opportunity to investigate its liability, to explore the possibility of settlement, and to assist in the budgeting process. State v. Brooks, 23 Ariz.App. 463, 534 P.2d 271 (1975). Those purposes are implicit in the current statute. In addition to the notice, settlement and fiscal considerations implicit in the statute, the legislature expressly declared Arizona public policy to be “that public entities are liable for acts and omissions of employees in accordance with the statutes and common law of this state.” 1984 Ariz.Sess. Laws, ch. 285, § 1(A) (emphasis added).
A public entity acts through its employees, whose conduct gives rise to potential liability. An injured plaintiff may file suit against the public employee, the public entity employer, or both, but the public entity’s liability for the employee’s conduct is vicarious under the respondeat superior doctrine, which holds a public entity liable for any breach of duty by its employee or agent if committed while the employee is acting within the scope of employment.1 See State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 123 Ariz. 324, 599 P.2d 777 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Gunnison, 127 Ariz. 110, 618 P.2d 604 (1980); Patterson v. City of Phoenix, 103 Ariz. 64, 436 P.2d 613 (1968); Stone v. Arizona *511Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
Looking to the investigatory, settlement and fiscal considerations of the act, the express legislative intent that public entities be liable for the conduct of their employees, the statutory definition of a public employee, A.R.S. § 12-820(1) and (5), and the fact that public entities act only through their agents and employees, I do not believe that the legislature intended § 12-821(A) to require notice of claims to individual public employees as a prerequisite to naming them as defendants in the resulting lawsuit. I would hold that § 12-821(A) requires notice only to the public entity as a prerequisite to bringing suit against the entity and/or its employees for injuries caused by their acts or omissions in the scope of their employment.2 To require notice to the entity of claims against it or its employees arising from their conduct in the scope of employment does not contravene the rule of statutory construction cited by the majority. My interpretation gives full effect to the words “public employee” as the legislature intended. The other states’ statutes cited by the majority require notice to their employees but do so explicitly in unambiguous language. Our statute provides that notice of claims shall be given but does not specify that notice shall be given to the individual employees. I believe the legislature clearly intended that notice must have been given to the public entity as a prerequisite to suit against either the entity or its employees in all claims against either public entities or their employees arising from the conduct of their employees in the scope of employment, whether or not the entity is named as a defendant in the subsequent lawsuit.
The 1984 changes in the claims act indicate a legislative intent to regulate the circumstances in which a claimant can sue a public entity, as well as a public employee acting within the scope of employment. The act grants immunity for employees’ judicial, legislative or discretionary activities. A.R.S. § 12-820.01; see also A.R.S. § 41-621(H). It provides qualified immunity for certain activities involving arrest, probation and parole, licensing, and inspections of property. A.R.S. § 12-820.02. It precludes liability for punitive damages arising from acts of a public employee within the scope of employment. A.R.S. § 12-820.04. Moreover, the state is authorized to defend its employees, A.R.S. § 41-621(K), and to indemnify certain employees, A.R.S. § 41-621(H), under specified circumstances. A settlement of claims against the state is solely within the power of the department of administration, the attorney general and the joint legislative budget committee, and all other agencies and employees are precluded from assuming any such liability or obligation. A.R.S. § 41-621(L). Any and all claims must be directed to the attention of risk management services and, under the regulations promulgated • by Arizona’s department of administration, it is the risk management office which has the authority to deny such claims. A.A.C.R. 2-10-103(D).3
The 1984 act, which limits the liability of public employees under specified circumstances, when combined with the state’s opportunity to either defend or settle claims against employees, shows a state interest in controlling the circumstances under which suit may be brought against public employees. The Maine Supreme Court, in responding to the same question with which we are presented, stated, “[Tjhese regulations ultimately assist the governmental entity itself in attracting and keeping employees well qualified to carry out important functions of government.” *512Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Institute, 535 A.2d 421, 430 (Me.1987).4
The historical purpose for claims statutes, to allow the public entity an opportunity for investigation and settlement prior to litigation, read together with certain entities’ rights to defend and, in some situations, their obligations to indemnify, employees is advanced by requirement of notice to the entity even though the entity is not joined as a defendant in the subsequent lawsuit.
Other states have resolved the question differently.5 In New Jersey, the law provides: “[n]o action shall be brought against a public entity under this act unless the claim upon which it is based shall have been presented in accordance with the procedure set forth in this chapter.” N.J.S.A. 59:8-3. The New Jersey courts have construed that statute to mean that no notice of claim to a public employee is required prior to maintaining any action against the employee. See, e.g., Lutz v. Semcer, 126 N.J.Super. 288, 314 A.2d 86 (1974).6 The Arizona legislature obviously intended to avoid that construction.
Petitioners’ argument that a ruling consistent with my interpretation would result in indirect recoveries from public entities without the benefit of notice is unfounded. If a claimant intends to recover from an entity or a public employee acting in the scope of employment, § 12-821(A) must be followed. The attorney indemnification provisions of § 12-821(A) will apply in the fashion stated by the majority, and a public employee will have a right of indemnification against the claimant’s attorney if the attorney’s failure to file a claim against the entity prior to bringing suit against the employee acting within the scope of employment constitutes inexcusable neglect.
In drafting A.R.S. § 12-821(A) to require notice to public entities of claims against either the entities or their employees, the legislature has insured that Arizona and its political subdivisions will be afforded the opportunity to investigate and explore settlement of all claims which may result in liability to the entity, whether through direct lawsuit or through indemnification, or to the public employees whose conduct within the scope of their public employment gave rise to the claim.

. I note the exceptions provided in A.R.S. § 41-621.

. This interpretation is consistent with the general rule under the law of respondeat superior that a plaintiff may file an action against the employer without naming the individual employees as defendants in order to hold the employer liable for the employees’ negligent acts. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund v. Helme, 153 Ariz. 123, 735 P.2d 445 (App.1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 153 Ariz. 129, 735 P.2d 451 (1987).

. I note a similar provision in the Tucson City Code which authorizes the city manager to settle claims against the city, its officers, appointees and employees and requires any settlement to be conditioned upon a release of the city as well as its employees. Tucson Code § 2-12.

. The Maine notice of claims statute provides: "Notice of claims against any political subdivision or an employee thereof shall be addressed to and filed with one of the persons upon whom a summons and complaint could be served under the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, in a civil action against a political subdivision.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(3)(B). That section also provides: "No claim or action shall be commenced against a governmental entity or employee ... unless the foregoing notice provisions are substantially complied with.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(4).

. See Cal. Government Code § 950 (West 1988) (“claim need not be presented as a prerequisite to the maintenance of an action against a public employee ... for injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his employment").

. As a result, the scenario posed by petitioners has arisen in the New Jersey courts. Referring to the situation as an "anomaly,” Lameiro v. West New York Board of Education, 136 NJ.Super. 585, 347 A.2d 377, 380 (1975), it has been held that when an employee is entitled to indemnification by the public entity, a plaintiff can simply disregard the notice requirements and subsequently recover indirectly from the entity through indemnification. Williams v. Adams, 189 N.J.Super, 196, 459 A.2d 707 (1983). This problem is avoided by construing A.R.S. § 12-821(A) as I have.