Court Opinion

ID: 9751388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:23:34.394209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:44.457050
License: Public Domain

NEBEKER, Associate Judge
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent from what I view to be an anachronistic overtechnical construction and an incomplete reading of our notice of appeal rule. This is not a late notice of appeal case where considerations of policy respecting timeliness and finality are controlling. We hold today that the notice of appeal was filed too early to be effective. I had thought that our jurisprudence had come too far on this point to deprive a convicted defendant of his single avenue of direct review. See Belton v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 81, 259 F.2d 811 (1958) ; Blunt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 266, 244 F.2d 355 (1957). Indeed, D.C.App.R. 4 II(b)(1) followed literally Fed.R.App.P. 4(b) in its liberalization of the strictness of the former rule, Rule 37. See Robinson v. United States, 361 U.S. 220, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960). I respectfully submit that it is an unhealthy course to avoid direct review of a conviction when no good purpose is served and thus leave a defendant and the conviction to the hazards of collateral attack.1
I also submit that Rule 4 11(b)(1) should be liberally construed in favor of permitting appeals in criminal cases particularly when the accused seeks review. Blunt v. United States, supra. I suggest that no good purpose is served by our holding because neither the courts in their administration nor the government is prejudiced by viewing the early notice of appeal as valid for purposes of reviewing the subsequent judgment. The majority misconceives the problem, which is of its making, when it views the notice of appeal by looking backward. Judge Fickling says that “the appeal was taken from the trial court’s adjudication of contempt” (at 505). He then builds an unassailable case for finality of judgment as a prerequisite to ordinary appeal (at 505). The flaw in this reasoning is that the notice of appeal should, and I believe must, be viewed as an early expression of a desire to appeal from the judgment when it becomes final. It surely cannot reasonably be viewed as an appeal from an interlocutory order (e. g., Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 82 *508S.Ct. 654, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962)) without waiting for finality to set in.
In my view, any meaningful and proper reading of the second sentence of Rule 4 11(b)(1) would permit a valid, though premature, notice of appeal to be filed after an adjudication of contempt. After all, such ruling, like a verdict, is a “decision”. My colleagues simply view that provision as going no farther than making valid a premature notice of appeal filed after sentencing but before formal entry of judgment. They fail completely to make a case against viewing a notice of appeal after verdict differently. Indeed, the majority acknowledges Lemke v. United States, 346 U.S. 325 at 326, 74 S.Ct. 1, 98 L.Ed. 3 (1953) (see majority opinion, note 2), but chooses to ignore its plain holding. In Lemke, the Court said:
The notice of appeal filed on March 11 was, however, still on file on March 14 and gave full notice after that date, as well as before, of the sentence and judgment which petitioner challenged. We think the irregularity is governed by Rule 52(a) which reads “Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” [Emphasis supplied.]
Surely, West’s notice of appeal gave the same notice as did Lemke’s.
Irrespective of the majority’s desire to follow the Third Circuit,2 I respectfully submit that under our ruling in M. A. P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 (1971), Belton v. United States, supra, is controlling law in this jurisdiction. We are bound to follow the holding here that
[t]he fact that the notice of appeal was received by the clerk after the verdict and before entry of judgment thereon is an irregularity which does not affect substantial rights and should be disregarded. . . . [Belton v. United States, supra, 104 U.S.App.D.C. at 84, 259 F.2d at 814.]
See also Lemke v. United States, supra, and D.C.Code 1973, § 11-721 (e), which commands us to “give judgment . without regard to . defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” The majority says that the subsequent 1966 amendment to the Federal Rule “further weaken[s] any precedential value” of Belton v. United States, supra. That can hardly be since that amendment liberalized the former strict rule consistent with the holding in Belton and certainly not in an effort to restrict its effect. I would review the merits of the appeal directly and not in a backhanded fashion.

. In this context I note this is not an isolated case; two others just like it pend — Adgerson v. United States, D.C.App. No. 9013, and Henson v. United States, D.C.App. Nos. 9249 and 9480.

. See also United States v. Kokin, 365 F.2d 595, 596 (3d Cir. 1966), a decision that was not overruled by United States v. Mathews, 462 F.2d 182 (3d Cir. 1972), wherein the court held that the filing of a premature notice of appeal need not prevent an appellate court from considering and deciding such an appeal on its merits.