Court Opinion

ID: 9639252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:09:30.187065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:31.566368
License: Public Domain

Shea, J.
(dissenting). Section 10-186 did not authorize the state board of education to issue to the town of Waterford an order “to furnish . . . transportation [for certain children] . . . until sidewalks and/or crossing guards are provided along Route 1A.” Under this statute, each town is required to furnish, “by transportation or otherwise,” school accommodations so that each child, within specified ages, may attend school as required in § 10-184. Thus, the statute means that each town *251must furnish school accommodations either by transportation or in other ways. Provisions or arrangements for the instruction of children as required in §10-184 are made by the local board of education under the authority of §10-220, a portion of which is set out in a footnote to the majority opinion. In the portion which does not appear, local boards are given additional authority to carry out the obligation to furnish school accommodations in various ways. It is true that under § 10-220 a local board is to “provide for the transportation of children wherever transportation is reasonable and desirable,” but that is only one of the different ways in which school accommodations may be furnished. And so § 10-186, in requiring towns to furnish school accommodations, quite properly provided that these accommodations should be furnished by transportation “or otherwise,” i.e., in any other way legally authorized by the board of education. The school accommodations required under § 10-186 by “transportation or otherwise” do not fall within the narrow orbit indicated by the opinion of the majority.
Before the state board of education can issue an order under § 10-186, it must find that a child is illegally or unreasonably deprived of schooling. On such a finding, it must issue an order to the local board to make arrangements to enable the parent or guardian to comply with the provisions of § 10-184. The state board is not authorized to give specific directions in the order. The reason for this is obvious when we bear in mind that the local board, as previously pointed out, has a choice of various ways of providing school accommodations. The local board is not, and cannot be, limited to transportation alone. As it is expressed in § 10-186, *252the town must furnish school accommodations by transportation “or otherwise.” Accordingly, when the state board has issued an order to the local board under § 10-186, the local board is given as much as a month within which to make suitable provision for the child deprived of schooling. Suitable provision may include transportation or not. In the discretion of the local board, suitable provision may be by any one of the various ways authorized by law. The manner in which the problem is to be solved is for the local board, acting within the scope of its legal powers.
The majority of the court concede that “the state board cannot dictate, as between reasonable alternatives, what the local board shall provide, but the state board can require a reasonable compliance with the general mandate contained in the statutes.” And again, the majority say, “[i]f sidewalks and necessary crossing guards are not provided [as ordered], the local board still has the alternative of providing transportation or of presenting to the state board some other adequate method of dealing with the traffic hazard and seeking a modification of the order.” It is difficult to reconcile these statements with the conclusion reached in the opinion, that the state board of education was empowered by § 10-186 to issue an order which gave specific directions to the town as to the means, methods and details to be followed in providing school accommodations. What practical purpose is served by issuing an order which, although not saying so, still provides the local board with legal alternatives? Of what efficacy is such an order? The simple answers to these questions are found in the language of the statute itself. The power of the state board is limited to the issuance of a general order requiring *253the local board to make arrangements which will enable a parent to comply with the law and send his children to school. So long as the local board provides school accommodations, the state board cannot, and the majority, in effect, so hold, arrogate the right to fix the means or methods by which the local board carries out its legal obligations. The state board exceeded its authority when it ordered the board of education of the town of Waterford to furnish transportation for certain children.
Moreover, the procedure followed in this case did not conform to the statutory requirements. Section 10-186 authorizes the following procedure, in the sequence stated: (1) An appeal to the state board by a parent, guardian or attendance officer aggrieved by the finding of the local board of education; (2) the designation by the chairman of the state board of a member of that board or of the professional staff of the state department of education to hold a public hearing in the town in which the cause of complaint arose; (3) a report to the state board by the member who held the hearing. On November 5, 1958, before this appeal was taken to the state board of education, the chairman of that board had appointed Dr. Powell and five other members of the professional staff of the state department of education as school transportation hearing officers. Dr. Powell carried on correspondence, and was in communication, with the man who had circulated the petition in Waterford. While the appeal from the finding of the local board was addressed to the state board on forms provided for the purpose, those forms were enclosed in a letter addressed to Dr. Powell on January 14, 1959. There is nothing in this record to show when, if ever, the appeal papers officially reached the state board. Dr. *254Powell fixed the time and place for a public hearing on the appeal without specific designation or authority from the chairman of the state board. The evidence shows that he acted on his own initiative, without direction from, or consultation with, any member of the state board. By what magic he, rather than any one of the other persons eligible, under the statute, for designation as a hearing officer, assumed the power to act in this case has not been disclosed or explained. Of the nine members of the state board, notice of the hearing was given to only one, a resident of New London County. After the hearing, Dr. Powell made a digest of the testimony taken and sent a copy to each member of the state board. The indications are that none of them ever read the evidence. Dr. Powell made certain recommendations which, with one slight change, were adopted by the state board. So far as appears in this record, Dr. Powell assumed, without authority, the obligations and responsibilities of the state board in this case. This was contrary to the express direction in § 10-186 that “hearing members may examine witnesses but shall have no other powers vested in the state board of education under this section.” The procedure followed by the state board of education was illegal and should not be approved by this court.
The appeal from the order of the state board of education should have been sustained by the trial court.