Court Opinion

ID: 9884097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:36:35.676087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:35.488042
License: Public Domain

GILDEA, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority reverses Al-Naseer’s conviction because it concludes that the circumstances proved are consistent with a rational hypothesis of innocence specifically, that “Al-Naseer did not know what he had hit when he left the scene of the accident.” In my view, the only rational hypothesis supported by the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved is that Al-Naseer must have known he was in an accident with another vehicle. I would also reverse the court of appeals’ conclusion that Al-Na-seer’s right to due process was violated.
I.
To establish criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene), the State was required to prove that Al-Naseer knew he was involved in an accident with a person or another vehicle. State v. Al-Naseer (Al-Naseer TV), 734 N.W.2d at 687-88 (Minn. 2007). Because the State relied on circumstantial evidence to prove Al-Naseer’s knowledge, the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved must be consistent with the hypothesis that Al-Naseer knew he was in an accident with a person or another vehicle and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 857 (Minn.2008) (stating that circumstantial evidence is sufficient when all the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt). The defendant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt. Id. at 858. But inconsistencies in the State’s case or possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the circumstances proved make such theories seem unreasonable. Id. Finally, in identifying the circumstances proved, we construe conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. Id.
The circumstances proved in this case are as follows. Around 11:30 p.m. on a warm, clear, and dry summer night, Al-Naseer’s vehicle struck Thomson and the flat tire lying on the shoulder of the road. The impact was loud, jolting, and caused significant damage to Al-Naseer’s vehicle. Thomson’s flat tire caught under Al-Na-seer’s vehicle, gouging the asphalt roadbed and then popping up and rolling onto Highway 10. Debris from the accident *482was scattered along the highway for nearly 125 feet. The impact of Al-Naseer’s vehicle knocked Thomson out of his shoes and threw him against his parked Monte Carlo with such force that his body dented the driver’s side door before coming to rest 25 feet in front of the Monte Carlo. There were no skid marks leading up to or leaving the scene of the accident. Within 150 feet of the impact, however, Al-Naseer had to steer his vehicle back onto the road because he was heading toward the ditch. Al-Naseer’s vehicle no longer had operational headlights and there was a dramatic change in the operation of his vehicle due to a flat right front tire. At that point, the Monte Carlo headlights were illuminated, the trunk was open, Thomson’s body lay 25 feet in front of the Monte Carlo, and Lein-gang was standing near the rear of the Monte Carlo. Although Al-Naseer knew he was in an accident with “something,” as evidenced by the lack of operational headlights, the noticeable change in the operation of his vehicle, and his subsequent statements to police, Al-Naseer drove away without stopping. Finally, as the police approached him, Al-Naseer quickly tried to place his vehicle’s dislodged right headlamp back into its socket.
The majority concedes that these circumstances proved support a reasonable inference consistent with guilt: “Al-Na-seer must have known that he hit Thomson or Thomson’s vehicle.” Nonetheless, the majority reverses Al-Naseer’s conviction, concluding that the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved also support a rational hypothesis of innocence: “Al-Naseer did not know what he had hit when he left the scene of the accident.” In support of its conclusion, the majority contends that one can reasonably infer three significant facts from the circumstances proved. First, that Al-Naseer was asleep or unconscious at the time of the impact. Second, that Al-Naseer awoke without being aware of the loud and jolting collision. Third, that when Al-Naseer discovered on awakening that his visibly damaged vehicle was on the highway shoulder, he guided his vehicle back onto the highway without looking in his rearview mirror and therefore was unaware of what had taken place behind him. In effect, the majority holds that reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved support a rational hypothesis that before, during, and after the accident, Al-Naseer saw and heard nothing.1 I disagree.
The conclusions the majority gleans from the circumstances proved, while theoretically possible, are simply not reasonable. The circumstances proved do not support a reasonable inference that Al-Naseer awoke without being aware of the loud noise caused by the flat tire dragging under his vehicle. It is not reasonable to infer that Al-Naseer remained asleep, impaired, or unconscious until the loud jolting impact and the subsequent sound of the flat tire dragging under his vehicle had fully subsided, but then suddenly awoke just in time to steer his car back onto the *483highway. The circumstances proved likewise do not support a reasonable inference that Al-Naseer did not look in his rearview mirror before leaving the scene of the accident. It is contrary to common sense and reason that a driver, who discovers on awakening that his significantly and visibly damaged vehicle is heading toward the ditch without headlights in the dark, would not reflexively try to identify the object that struck and damaged his vehicle.
In my view, the reasonable inferences that one can draw from the circumstances proved are as follows. Al-Naseer did not see Thomson or the flat tire as he traveled toward Thomson’s vehicle because Al-Na-seer was asleep, impaired, or unconscious at the time of impact. When the loud jolting impact woke Al-Naseer, he heard the sound of the flat tire dragging under his vehicle, he felt a noticeable change in the operation of his vehicle, he observed that his vehicle no longer had headlights, and discovered that his vehicle was traveling on the highway shoulder. Al-Naseer knew his vehicle had just hit something. In an effort to identify the object struck by his vehicle or as he consciously steered his vehicle from the shoulder back onto the highway, Al-Naseer looked in his rearview mirror. The only observable item that could explain the impact was a lone motor vehicle, with illuminated headlights, parked on the shoulder of a rural highway. Cognizant of what he had done, Al-Naseer tried to conceal from police the damage the impact caused to his vehicle by trying to return his headlight to its socket. The only rational hypothesis supported by the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved is that Al-Naseer must have known he was in accident with another vehicle — specifically, Thomson’s vehicle, which was the only object there and which was parked, with illuminated headlights, on the shoulder of the rural highway 150 feet behind Al-Naseer.
The majority concedes that the headlights of Thomson’s vehicle were visible in Al-Naseer’s rearview mirror. Nevertheless, the majority contends that the presence of Thomson’s vehicle was insufficient to inform Al-Naseer that he must have hit another vehicle because the presence of a vehicle on the side of the road did not rule out the possibility that Al-Naseer hit something that was not a person or a vehicle. But the circumstances proved do not reflect the presence of any other object. For example, if the circumstances proved included a damaged road sign, a gaping pothole, or the presence of a wounded animal, I might agree that the presence of Thomson’s vehicle on the side of the road does not rule out the possibility that Al-Naseer hit something that was not a person or a vehicle. But the circumstances proved do not include such facts.2
In the absence of such facts, a conclusion that Al-Naseer did not know what he had hit when he left the scene of the accident simply reflects a theoretical “possibility” that the object struck by Al-Na-seer’s vehicle was not Thomson’s vehicle.3 We do not set aside verdicts based on speculation, even in circumstantial evi*484dence cases. See, e.g., Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858.
The reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved do not support a rational hypothesis that during and after the accident, Al-Naseer saw and heard nothing. Instead, the only rational hypothesis supported by the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved is that Al-Naseer must have known he was in an accident with another vehicle when he left the scene. I therefore would conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Al-Naseer’s conviction for criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene).
II.
Having rejected Al-Naseer’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, I must address his due-process claims. Al-Naseer asserts two due-process claims.4 First, he argues that the State violated his right to due process because the complaint failed to inform him of the mens rea element that he successfully argued for in AlrNaseer IV, 734 N.W.2d at 687 (adopting a mens rea element of knowledge that the defendant was in an accident with a person or another vehicle). Second, he argues that the district court denied him his right to present a defense when it convicted him based on the 2005 court trial record.
The Due Process Clause requires the State to inform the defendant of the “nature and cause” of the accusation. State v. Kendell, 723 N.W.2d 597, 611 (Minn.2006). The “nature and cause” requirement is satisfied if the charging document “con*485tains such descriptions of the offense charged as will enable [a defendant] to make his defense and plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecution for the same crime.” Id. (alteration in original). In my view, that standard is met in this case.
The complaint identified Al-Naseer’s alleged conduct (leaving the scene of the June 2002 accident) and the statute allegedly violated, Minn.Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(7) (2006). The information in the complaint enabled Al-Naseer to assert a lack-of-mens-rea defense based on his interpretation of the statutory language in Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(7). Our adoption of the stricter mens rea requirement that Al-Naseer advocated belies his claim that the complaint failed to provide notice adequate for him to mount a defense. I therefore would conclude that the State did not violate Al-Naseer’s due-process right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Due process also requires that every defendant be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn.1992). Al-Naseer contends that this aspect of his due-process right was also violated. I disagree.
Although the right to present witnesses is constitutionally protected, the accused “must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” Id. at 195 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)). An offer of proof is the procedure that provides an evidentiary basis for a trial court decision regarding the presentation of evidence. State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Minn.2003). If a defendant’s offer of proof is inadequate, the exclusion of evidence does not violate his or her right to present a defense. State v. Persitz, 518 N.W.2d 843, 847-48 (Minn.1994) (rejecting a right-to-present-a-defense claim when the defendant failed to make an adequate offer of proof); see Richards, 495 N.W.2d at 194-95 (same).
In the district court, Al-Naseer simply asserted that had he “known the state was required to prove that he knew there was an accident involving a person or a vehicle, he may have proceeded very differently. He may have chosen a jury trial. He may have elected to testify.” These assertions do not establish an adequate offer of proof. I therefore would conclude that the district court did not deny Al-Naseer his right to present a defense when it convicted him based on the 2005 court trial record.
Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support Al-Naseer’s conviction and the State did not violate Al-Naseer’s right to due process, I would affirm Al-Naseer’s conviction.

. The majority disagrees with my characterization of its holding. The majority asserts that its conclusion that the circumstances proved support a rational hypothesis of innocence rests on the fact that the circumstances proved do not preclude inferences that Al-Naseer did not know what he hit. The majority contends that “the record does not indicate when [Al-Naseer] first knew that he had hit something.” Yet, as the majority concedes, the record demonstrates that when Al-Naseer regained consciousness, his vehicle headlights were not working properly and "the vehicle’s handling had changed dramatically because of the flat tire." Under these circumstances, one cannot reasonably conclude that Al-Naseer did not know, the moment he regained consciousness and steered his dramatically mishandling vehicle back onto the highway, that his vehicle had hit something.

. The majority argues that even if the circumstances proved reflected the presence of a damaged sign, pothole, or injured animal, Al-Naseer still would not have known what he hit because he was asleep or unconscious at the time of the impact. But the issue is not what Al-Naseer knew at the time of the impact. Instead, the issue is what he knew when he drove away from the scene of the accident.

. The majority erroneously asserts that my analysis adds an improper requirement that the defendant provide evidence to support an inference of innocence. I agree that the State bears the burden of proving all the elements of a crime and a prosecutor may not shift that burden of proof to a defendant to prove his innocence. See State v. Gassier, 505 N.W.2d 62, 69 (Minn. 1993). But when the circumstances proved establish guilt, the circumstan*484tial evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction unless the circumstances proved are also consistent with a rational theory of innocence. The well-established rule that a defendant must point to the circumstances proved that he claims are consistent with a rational theory of innocence does not require a defendant to present evidence of his innocence. In Al-Naseer IV, we adopted the person-or-vehicle standard, which requires the State to prove that the "driver must have known that títere was an accident that involved a person or a vehicle.” 734 N.W.2d at 688. Under this standard, the State is not required to prove that Al-Naseer knew exactly what his vehicle hit as long as Al-Naseer knew his vehicle struck an object that must have been a "person or vehicle.” As a matter of logic, the object struck by Al-Naseer’s vehicle must have been a person, another vehicle, or something that was not a person or another vehicle. The majority concedes that the circumstances proved provided Al-Naseer a reasonable basis to know that the object struck by his vehicle was Thomson or Thomson's vehicle. Thus, if the circumstances proved do not also support a reasonable inference that the object struck could have been something that was not a person or another vehicle, Al-Naseer must have known he was involved in an accident with a person or another vehicle. The examples of circumstances proved — which if present in Al-Na-seer's case would support a conclusion other than that Al-Naseer must have known he hit another vehicle — simply illustrate why the circumstances proved in Al-Naseer’s case are not consistent with a rational theory of innocence. While Al-Naseer was not required to present evidence at trial of an impact with a sign, pothole or animal, he was required on appeal to point to the circumstances proved in his case that support a conclusion other than that Al-Naseer must have known he hit another vehicle. Because Al-Naseer failed to identify any circumstances proved that are consistent with a rational theory of innocence, his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim fails.

. The court of appeals concluded that Al-Naseer did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial because he did not know the potential effect of his testimony with respect to the knowledge element. But we have stated that a waiver of the right to a jury trial is knowingly made if the defendant "understands the basic elements of a jury trial,” such as the number of people on the jury, that the defendant can participate in their selection, that the verdict has to be unanimous, and that if the defendant waives this right, the judge alone will decide his or her innocence. State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Minn.1991).