Court Opinion

ID: 9733605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:11:40.27009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:42.664677
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Judge,
dissenting:
I vehemently dissent from the opinion of the majority. The record amply demonstrates that appellant’s trial was set for the earliest possible court date available and that appellant and his counsel sat idly by while his trial date was set. In essence, appellant agreed to be tried after the 180 day Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act period expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, Article 111(a). Thus, I believe he has waived the present objection.
*390I also believe the majority’s determination that the Commonwealth is at fault for failing to request a “continuance” is erroneous. I find it ludicrous to place such importance on the magic word of “continuance” when, in fact, all the evidence necessary for proper granting of a continuance was before the court at the time it originally scheduled appellant’s trial. Appellant’s trial date was scheduled past the 180 day run-date based on “good cause”, i.e., the earliest trial date available fell after the run-date. The trial court, in setting the date, considered that same evidence it would have if a “continuance” had been requested. Even the majority seems to agree that under the circumstances of this case, delaying appellant’s trial beyond that run-date was not unreasonable. Majority opinion, p. 387. I can find nothing in the Act which requires the Commonwealth to ask for the “continuance” and precludes the court from acting sua sponte to grant any “necessary or reasonable continuance” for “good cause shown”. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, Article 111(a). Instantly, the court picked the first available date for trial and, by implication, granted the necessary continuance until that date. Cf., Commonwealth v. Gonce, 320 Pa.Super. 19, 466 A.2d 1039 (1983) (court may grant continuance when first available court date is beyond run-date).
In sum, I do not believe appellant should be permitted to escape prosecution merely because the word “continuance” was not used when he did, in fact, receive the benefit of the speedy trial protections embodied in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the court below.