Court Opinion

ID: 9838447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 15:01:34.371357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:33.345184
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13759    Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 09/06/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13759
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       PETER ELIJAH METZLER,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cr-60104-RAR-1
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13759

       Before JILL PRYOR, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Peter Metzler appeals his 120-month sentence for bank rob-
       bery. He argues that the district court improperly enhanced his of-
       fense level by designating him a career offender under U.S.S.G.
       § 4B1.1. Specifically, he argues that his prior Florida conviction for
       attempted strong arm robbery is not a “crime of violence” under
       the Sentencing Guidelines because of the Supreme Court’s decision
       in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), and our decision in
       United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). So
       he says he lacks the required predicate offenses to qualify for the
       career offender enhancement. The government concedes that
       Metzler is right. Because we also agree, we vacate Metzler’s sen-
       tence and remand the case for resentencing without the career of-
       fender enhancement.
                                       I.

              We review the interpretation and application of the Sentenc-
       ing Guidelines de novo. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 at 1272. Likewise, “we
       review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as
       a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States
       v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation
       marks omitted). We are not bound by a party’s concession on a
       question of law. United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1187 (11th Cir.
       2021). So we need not accept the government’s concession of error
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       22-13759                Opinion of the Court                           3

       where the law and record do not support it. United States v. Linville,
       228 F.3d 1330, 1331 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000).
                                       II.

              Under Section 4B1.1(a), a defendant is classified as a career
       offender if: (1) he was at least 18 years old at the time he committed
       the instant offense; (2) the instant offense is a felony that is either a
       “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense”; and (3) he
       had at least 2 prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence
       or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
               A “crime of violence” is any offense under federal or state
       law punishable by at least one-year imprisonment and that satisfies
       either the “elements clause” or the “enumerated crimes clause.” See
       U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a); see also United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 939
       (11th Cir. 2016). An offense satisfies the “elements clause” if it “has
       as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
       force against the person of another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(1). An offense
       satisfies the “enumerated crimes clause” if it is “murder, voluntary
       manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex of-
       fense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession
       of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material
       as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The commentary
       on Section 4B1.2(a) further provides that a “crime of violence” in-
       cludes “the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and at-
       tempting to commit such offenses.” Id. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1.
             We previously held that attempted robbery in Florida is a
       crime of violence under Section 4B1.2(a)’s elements clause and
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13759

       enumerated crimes clause. United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238,
       1246 (11th Cir. 2011). We said attempted robbery satisfies the enu-
       merated crimes clause because robbery in Florida is equivalent to
       the generic form of robbery and the commentary includes attempt-
       ing to commit robbery. Id. at 1241–42. And we said that attempted
       robbery satisfies the elements clause because robbery has as an el-
       ement the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
       against the person of another” and “the commentary explicitly
       states that the attempt to commit a ‘crime of violence’ is itself a
       ‘crime of violence.’” Id. at 1245; § 4B1.2(a)(1).
              We must follow Lockley “unless and until it is overruled or
       undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or
       by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347,
       1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
              The government and Meltzer agree that Lockley has been un-
       dermined to the point of abrogation. Since Lockley, we have held
       that the commentary to Section 4B1.2 cannot expand the text when
       the guideline’s text is not “genuinely ambiguous.” See Dupree, 57
       F.4th at 1274. The Supreme Court also held that a crime is only a
       “crime of violence” under the elements clause of the identically-
       worded Armed Career Criminal Act when the government must
       prove, as an element of its case, “the use, attempted use, or threat-
       ened use of force.” Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2020. Taken together,
       Dupree and Taylor establish that Florida attempted robbery is not a
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       22-13759              Opinion of the Court                        5

       crime of violence under Section 4B1.2(a) and abrogate our contrary
       conclusion in Lockley.
                                     A.

              We will start with the enumerated crimes clause. The enu-
       merated crimes clause lists ten applicable offenses, including rob-
       bery, but does not mention inchoate crimes. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
       The commentary later defines a “crime of violence” as “includ[ing]
       the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to
       commit such offenses.” Id. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1.
              We recently held, sitting en banc, that the enumerated
       crimes clause in the Sentencing Guidelines’ related definition of a
       “controlled substance offense” did not include the inchoate of-
       fenses referenced in the commentary. Dupree, 57 F.4th at 1277. We
       determined that the application note—the same one we relied on
       in Lockley—could not expand the definition of a “controlled sub-
       stance offense” because Section 4B1.2(b) unambiguously excludes
       inchoate offenses. Id. Because the guidelines were not “genuinely
       ambiguous,” we could not consider the application notes. Id. at
       1274 (quoting Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414 (2019)).
              The guidelines provide that “crime of violence means . . .
       murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault,
       a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or un-
       lawful possession of a firearm� described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or
       explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).” U.S.S.G. §
       4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). Like the definition of “controlled sub-
       stance offense,” which we addressed in Dupree, “[t]he definition
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13759

       does not mention conspiracy or attempt or any other inchoate
       crimes.” Dupree, 57 F.4th at 1277. That the enumerated crimes
       clause excludes “inchoate crimes from the definition of what the
       term ‘means’ is a strong indicator that the term does not include
       those offenses.” Dupree, 57 F.4th at 1277. And as we reasoned in
       Dupree, the lack of mention of attempt in the enumerated crimes
       clause “stands in stark contrast” to the neighboring elements
       clause, which covers the “attempted use” of force. Id. Accordingly,
       the enumerated crimes clause unambiguously covers only com-
       pleted offenses. And without ambiguity in the text of the Sentenc-
       ing Guidelines, we are powerless to defer to the Sentencing Com-
       mission’s contrary interpretation of the Guidelines in the commen-
       tary. Id. at 1279.
              In light of Dupree, we must conclude that attempted strong
       arm robbery in Florida is not within the enumerated crimes clause
       because that clause unambiguously refers only to completed of-
       fenses. The commentary on which we relied in Lockley cannot add
       inchoate crimes to the list.
                                     B.

             We next consider whether Florida attempted strong arm
       robbery is a “crime of violence” under the elements clause.
       Whether a person commits a “crime of violence” under the ele-
       ments clause depends on if the government must always prove as
       an element of its case “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
       physical force.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). We held in Lockley that at-
       tempted robbery is a crime of violence under 4B1.2(a) because the
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       22-13759               Opinion of the Court                          7

       commentary provided that an “attempt to commit a ‘crime of vio-
       lence’ is itself a ‘crime of violence.’” 632 F.3d at 1245.
              The government and Metzler contend that our decision in
       Lockley cannot be squared with Dupree and Taylor. We agree.
              As we have already noted, Dupree establishes that (contrary
       to Lockley) we may not rely on the commentary to Rule 4B.1.2(a)
       to add to an otherwise unambiguous statement in the Guidelines.
       Although Dupree concerned an enumerated crimes clause, its hold-
       ing applies just as well to the elements clause. For one, it’s not even
       clear that the applicable commentary applies to the elements clause
       because it applies to “offenses” not elements. But even if the com-
       mentary applied, the elements clause is not ambiguous, so under
       Dupree we cannot defer to the commentary. The elements clause
       says that a crime of violence is a crime that “has as an element the
       use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
       person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). That clause unambigu-
       ously includes only three elements: the use of physical force, at-
       tempted use of physical force, and threatened use of physical force.
       We cannot say that the elements clause contains a “genuine ambi-
       guity.” Dupree, 57 F.4th at 1279.
              Lockley is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s deci-
       sion in Taylor. In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that the ACCA’s
       materially identical elements clause covered only those crimes
       where a conviction necessarily required the government to prove
       the attempted, actual, or threatened use of force. The Court re-
       jected our contrary position in United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13759

       335, 352 (11th Cir. 2018)—which we also expressed in Lockley—that
       an attempt to commit a completed crime of violence is also neces-
       sarily a crime of violence. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2021–22. Instead, the
       Court held that “where a crime may be committed by the threat-
       ened use of force, an attempt to commit that crime—i.e., an attempt
       to threaten—falls outside the elements clause.” Alvarado-Linares v.
       United States, 44 F.4th 1334, 1346 (11th Cir. 2022). Although Taylor
       interpreted ACCA’s elements clause, the Sentencing Guideline’s el-
       ements clause contains materially identical language. Compare 18
       U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). And we have held
       that “decisions about one [clause] apply to the other.” Turner v.
       Warden Coleman FCI, 709 F.3d 1328, 1335 n. 4 (11th Cir. 2013).
               Under the reasoning in Taylor, Florida attempted strong arm
       robbery is not a crime of violence under Rule 4B.1.2(a)’s elements
       clause because it can be accomplished without force, attempted
       force, or the threat of force. Florida strong arm robbery has four
       elements: (1) taking money or property from another; (2) “with in-
       tent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the owner” of it;
       (3) while using “force, violence, assault, or putting [the owner] in
       fear”; and (4) without carrying a weapon. Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1),
       (2)(c). An attempted strong arm robbery occurs when a person “at-
       tempts to commit [the] offense . . . and in such attempt does any
       act toward the commission of [the] offense, but fails in the perpe-
       tration or is intercepted or prevented in the execution thereof.” Fla.
       Stat. § 777.04(1). Thus, in Florida, “[t]he crime of attempted rob-
       bery requires only the formation of an intent to take money or
       property of another and an overt act capable of accomplishing the
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       22-13759               Opinion of the Court                        9

       goal.” Green v. State, 655 So.2d 208, 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
       Indeed, the Florida courts have recognized that “an attempted rob-
       bery [under Florida law] does not necessarily involve the use or
       threat of use of force.” Walters v. State, 790 So. 2d. 483, 485 (Fla.
       Dist. Ct. App. 2001). So while completed robbery may always re-
       quire the government to prove the defendant used, attempted to
       use, or threatened to use force, attempted robbery does not.
                                      III.

               For these reasons, Metzler’s sentence is VACATED and this
       case is REMANDED for resentencing without the career offender
       enhancement.