Court Opinion

ID: 9403414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 06:09:46.849462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:06.733247
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed June 16, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-21-00847-CR

                         ROBERT DIXON, Appellant
                                   V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F-1620143-K

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before Justices Pedersen, III, Garcia, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Garcia
      A jury convicted appellant of murder and assessed punishment at life in

prison. Appellant now argues the trial court erred: (i) by refusing to admit evidence

of his mental illness during the guilt-innocence phase of trial, (ii) by refusing his

requested jury instruction on insanity, and (iii) by including an incorrect jury

instruction on good conduct time in the punishment charge. Appellant further argues

that the judgment should be modified to accurately reflect his jail time credits, the

amount of costs, and that he pleaded not guilty to the charged offense. In a cross-

point, the State argues the judgment should also be modified to reflect the correct

statute for the charged offense. We modify the judgment and as modified, affirm.
                                           I. Background
         Appellant, who suffers from schizophrenia, shot his father and stepmother in

their home as they slept. He shot his father eight times, and his stepmother twice,

including a shot to the head. According to appellant, “She-God,” a voice in his head,

asked appellant if he would kill his family for her.

         Appellant’s stepmother died immediately, but appellant’s father survived.

When his father called for help, appellant played music on his portable speaker.

When the calls became louder, appellant increased the volume of the music.

         Appellant remained in the home for approximately two hours after shooting

his parents. As his father called for help, appellant used paint and chalk to draw

upside-down crosses and other symbols on both levels of the home and to write the

words “For Her” on the walls.

         When the police arrived in response to appellant’s father’s triggering of an

alarm, appellant answered the door with his hands up. He was arrested at the scene.

         Appellant was interviewed by Detective William McGraw at the police station

and the interview was recorded. During the interview, appellant acknowledged his

understanding that he was there because he “killed his dad and stepmother.” 1 He

described his communication with She-God and said that he planned to kill his

parents for two years. He further described preparing for the crime the day before

the offense.

   1
       At that juncture, appellant was apparently unaware that his father, Robert Dixon, survived.

                                                    –2–
         Appellant also gave a written statement. He said that he shot a full magazine

of a 9mm pistol into his father and stepmother and “after the shooting, [his]

stepmother died instantly, while [his father] screamed in agony for nearly three

hours.” The statement also said, “My father and stepmother were not murdered out

of spite or any other negative emotion; simply For Her.”

         When the interview concluded, appellant was provided a telephone to call his

mother, Mildred Dixon. During that call, appellant told Ms. Dixon he would be

sentenced to death or life in prison for the offense.

         Appellant was charged with murder for the death of his stepmother. Upon

initial evaluation, he was found incompetent to stand trial and was hospitalized for

treatment. After receiving medical treatment, he was reevaluated and found

competent to stand trial.

         Prior to trial, appellant gave notice of his intent to present evidence of insanity.

The court appointed Dr. Lisa Clayton to examine appellant and determine his mental

state at the time of the offense. Dr. Clayton concluded that appellant was actively

psychotic at the time of the offense but did not meet the legal test for insanity because

he understood the consequences of his actions. In a subsequent hearing to determine

the admissibility of Dr. Clayton’s testimony on the issue of insanity during the guilt-

innocence phase of trial, the judge ruled the testimony inadmissible. 2 At the time of

   2
       Dr. Clayton testified during the punishment phase of trial.

                                                    –3–
the ruling, however, the judge also said that the issue would be revisited if the issue

was raised by other evidence at trial.

        The jury found appellant guilty of murder and assessed punishment at life

imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.

                                            II. Analysis
Excluding Mental Illness Testimony
        Appellant’s first issue argues the trial court erred in excluding testimony

concerning his mental illness at the guilt-innocence stage of trial. Specifically,

appellant argues the court erred by excluding Ms. Dixon’s testimony that: (1)

appellant began exhibiting negative behaviors in high school when he was living

with her; (2) she could hear him in his room talking and yelling late at night; (3) she

took him to a psychiatrist for his symptoms of depression, withdrawal and insomnia;

(4) the bottom of the forms the doctor gave her said “schizoid” and something else

that she could not read; (5) she reviewed appellant’s recorded police interview and

it was her opinion “that was not her son”; and (6) she believed her son committed

the offense in this case because he has schizophrenia. According to appellant, the

State opened the door for this testimony through three of its witnesses. 3

        We review the trial court’s exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion.

See Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). As long as a trial

    3
      The trial court did not exclude Ms. Dixon’s testimony in its entirety. After the ruling limiting her
testimony, the defense elected not to present her testimony at all.
                                                  –4–
court’s decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, no abuse of

discretion occurs. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

       Texas law presumes that a criminal defendant intended the natural

consequences of his acts. Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008). Evidence that is relevant to negate that intent, including evidence of a

defendant’s history of mental illness, mental diseases, or defects may be admissible.

Id. at 593–595. But such evidence may still be excluded if it does not meet the

requirements under the evidentiary rules and if it does not truly negate the required

mens rea. Id. at 595–96; see also Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 381 (Tex. 2010)

(mental illness testimony may be relevant for mitigation during the punishment

phase, but “expert testimony that does not directly rebut the culpable mental state

usually may be excluded at the guilt phase.”); Warner v. State, No. 05-22-00155-

CR, 2023 WL 3316745, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 9, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (no error in excluding proffered testimony

because it did not rebut or disprove mens rea).

      During the presentation of its case-in-chief, the State called Officer Brian

Scott-Lee to testify about his response to officers’ request for backup at the crime

scene. Officer Scott-Lee testified that appellant opened the door to the Dixon home

at officers’ request. The prosecutor asked the officer whether he thought a person

who immediately lifted his hands in the air upon seeing an officer at the door seemed

                                        –5–
oblivious to what was happening. Officer Scott-Lee responded that it seemed to him

that such a person understood he was in trouble and was saying, “hey, you got me.”

      The State also elicited testimony from another officer at the scene, Officer

Richard Incremona. Officer Incremona testified that he pulled appellant out of the

house after appellant opened the door, patted appellant down, and handcuffed him.

When asked if appellant was coherent, answered questions, and seemed to know that

Officer Incremona was a police officer, the officer responded affirmatively.

      Appellant’s father, Robert Dixon, testified extensively about his relationship

with appellant and appellant’s relationship with his stepmother. Appellant’s

relationship with his stepmother was good, and appellant was always loving and

accepting towards her.

      Appellant lived with his mother, Ms. Dixon, in Illinois in the years prior to

the offense, but had previously lived with his father in Dallas. Dixon said he did not

notice any significant personality or behavior changes in appellant in the months

prior to the commission of the offense.

      Prior to the offense, appellant attended a family event in Missouri with his

stepmother and Dixon. Dixon said appellant seemed coherent and there was nothing

abnormal or unusual about his conversations with appellant during that time. Dixon

also said that appellant did not seem depressed, sad, or angry.

      Appellant was visiting his stepmother and Dixon in Dallas when he committed

the offense. The evening before he shot his father and stepmother, appellant and his

                                          –6–
father talked and played video games for a couple of hours. Appellant appeared to

be in a good mood, and the things he and his father discussed made sense.

      On cross-examination, Dixon said his ex-wife had called him about changes

in appellant’s behavior, including disrespect towards her, poor performance in

school, and that appellant was no longer playing football. Ms. Dixon also told him

that appellant was not sleeping and was playing video games by himself all night.

Dixon attributed the differences in appellant’s behavior with him and the behavior

his ex-wife described to the fact that there was more structure in his household.

      As cross-examination progressed, defense counsel requested a hearing, and

the jury was removed. Counsel then renewed his request to present mental illness

testimony, and specifically, wanted to question Dixon about whether his ex-wife

sought psychiatric help for appellant. After hearing extensive argument from both

sides, the judge ruled that counsel could question Dixon about whether he knew what

his ex-wife did and if she took appellant to a doctor but could not inquire about a

diagnosis. When the jury returned, Dixon testified that his ex-wife did not tell him

what measures she was taking to address appellant’s behavior, and only told him

that she was taking appellant for speech therapy.

      When the State rested, while the jury was out, defense counsel presented

Detective McGraw’s testimony to the court. In essence, Detective McGraw said he

had concerns about appellant’s mental state because he told the detective that “God”

told him to commit the offense. When the testimony concluded, defense counsel re-

                                        –7–
urged his request to present evidence of appellant’s “diagnosis and scientific and

psychiatric evidence” but did not seek to do so through Detective McGraw. 4 Instead,

counsel proposed to do so through the testimony of Ms. Dixon, which was presented

to the court outside the presence of the jury.

         Ms. Dixon testified that appellant’s demeanor, habits, and grades started to

change at the end of tenth grade; that his grades fell from A’s & B’s to C’s, D’s, and

F’s; that he had been friendly and outgoing, but was no longer interacting with

people outside of the house and was just spending his time in his room. Appellant

used to be particular about how he dressed, but this changed, and he started wearing

a hoodie, shorts, and flip-flops. Appellant was up in the middle of the night, yelling

and talking very loudly. Ms. Dixon assumed he was on the phone; however, she later

learned that there were no incoming or outgoing phone calls during the time he was

yelling at night.

         Ms. Dixon took appellant to a psychiatrist in August 2015 for his depression

and withdrawal, his not sleeping, and all of his other symptoms. The form the

psychiatrist gave her referred him to CBT (Cognitive Behavioral Therapy) and had

something on the bottom about schizoid and something else. She stated that she

discussed these issues with appellant’s father and told him that she needed to get

   4
       The jury did not hear Detective McGraw’s testimony until the punishment phase of trial.

                                                   –8–
appellant help. Dixon responded that she should not take appellant to a psychiatrist

because it would hurt appellant’s chances of joining the Navy.

        Ms. Dixon also testified that she reviewed the detective’s interview with

appellant, and despite what he told the detective, she did not believe that he

understood that his conduct was wrong. She believed that appellant committed the

offense because he has schizophrenia.

        After hearing the testimony and argument from the parties, the trial judge

ruled that Ms. Dixon would be allowed to testify during the guilt phase about the

relationship between appellant and his father, if and to the extent she was aware of

it, subject to the rule against hearsay. But Ms. Dixon would not be allowed to testify

about appellant being up at night talking in his room, his subsequent mental health

diagnosis, her opinions about why she thinks the murder happened, or her opinion

that it was not “her son who did that.” 5

        Both parties acknowledge that Texas does not recognize diminished capacity

as an affirmative defense. See Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005). In fact, insanity is the only recognized defense pertaining to mental

disease, defect, or abnormality. See Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d at 593. Ms. Dixon’s

    5
     In the parties’ arguments to the court, counsel noted that the Rule had not been invoked and Ms.
Dixon had been present in the courtroom for all testimony, including the testimony of Dixon that she
proposed to rebut. The trial court did not indicate whether this factored into her decision about the scope of
permissible testimony.
                                                    –9–
testimony was not offered to prove insanity. 6 And appellant recognizes that evidence

of mental illness that does not negate mens rea is inadmissible. See Mays, 318

S.W.3d at 380. Nonetheless, he maintains that Ms. Dixon’s inadmissible testimony

should have been admitted because the State opened the door for that evidence by

leaving a false impression that invited response. See Haydon v. State, 296 S.W.3d

549, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (evidence that is otherwise inadmissible may

become admissible when a party opens the door to such evidence). We disagree.

        The mens rea for murder is either knowing or intentional. See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 19.02 (b) (1). A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect

to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious

objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN § 6.03(a). “A person acts knowingly . . . when he is aware of the nature of his

conduct . . . [and] his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(b).

None of Ms. Dixon’s proffered testimony negated the mens rea for the charged

offense or showed that appellant’s mental illness prevented him from forming the

requisite intent. Ms. Dixon proposed to testify that appellant’s grooming habits

changed, and he made lower grades in school. He stayed up all night playing video

games and she heard him talking and yelling in his room. She thought he committed

        6
          Defense counsel argued to the court, “Even if we don’t use the insanity defense, we feel like its
relevant for them to have the full picture of all the facts.”

                                                  –10–
the offense because he has schizophrenia. None of this testimony pertains to whether

appellant was capable of knowingly and intentionally killing his stepmother.

Likewise, his mental illness diagnosis does not address his mens rea. See Williams

v. State, 502 S.W.3d 262, 276–277 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.

ref’d) (proffered testimony that defendant was experiencing significant psychotic

symptoms around time of offense and was suffering from depression and post-

traumatic stress disorder did not address defendant’s ability to form the intent to

kill). 7 Because Ms. Dixon’s testimony would not negate the mens rea, it was

inadmissible.

       The testimony the State elicited from officers Scott-Lee and Incremona did

not open the door for Ms. Dixon’s inadmissible testimony. Insanity was potentially

at issue when appellant gave notice of his intent to raise that defense. The court’s

pretrial ruling did not foreclose the defense from seeking to admit insanity evidence

at trial, and there is no indication that the defense had affirmatively abandoned that

potential defense. Evidence about whether appellant appeared coherent the night of

the offense, was able to respond to officer’s questions, and displayed any indication

that he knew his behavior was wrong was relevant to insanity. Ms. Dixon’s

testimony about appellant’s behavior when he lived with her did not respond to the

   7
     There was also some dispute about whether the records Ms. Dixon provided showed that appellant
had been diagnosed with a mental illness.
                                              –11–
officers’ observations about appellant on the night of the offense, so there was no

false impression to rebut.

        Moreover, even if the officer’s testimony opened the door for the admission

of otherwise inadmissible evidence, the trial court still had discretion to exclude the

evidence under Rule 403. See Hayden, 296 S.W.3d at 554. Rule 403 provides that

relevant evidence may be excluded if the trial court determines that its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusing the

issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative

evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. In this instance, the trial court could reasonably

have concluded that testimony about appellant’s unusual behavior and mental illness

would confuse the jury about the ultimate issue—whether appellant knowingly or

intentionally shot his stepmother.

        Ms. Dixon’s testimony was also not admissible to rebut a false impression

created by Dixon’s testimony. Dixon’s testimony about his relationship with

appellant and appellant’s behavior preceding the offense was relevant and

admissible under article 38.36. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36 (a). 8 Ms.

Dixon’s testimony did not address Dixon’s testimony about his relationship with

appellant or appellant’s behavior prior to the offense. Further, Dixon did not deny or

    8
       Article 38.36(a) provides that in a prosecution for murder, the state or defendant “shall be permitted
to offer testimony as to all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and the previous
relationship existing between the accused and the deceased, together with all relevant facts and
circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the offense.” Id.; see
also Garcia v. State, 201 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
                                                   –12–
minimize that appellant displayed different behavior when he was with Ms. Dixon.

He acknowledged during cross-examination that Ms. Dixon raised behavioral

concerns and explained that he attributed the differing observations to the structure

of the two households.

      Significantly, the trial court did not rule that Ms. Dixon could not testify about

the relationship between appellant and his father. To the contrary, the court expressly

ruled that such testimony (which would have been responsive to Dixon’s testimony)

would be allowed. The defense, however, elected not to elicit any testimony from

Ms. Dixon after the court limited the scope of permissible testimony.

      Further, Ms. Dixon’s testimony about appellant’s psychiatric diagnosis would

not rebut Dixon’s testimony because he did not so testify. The trial court specifically

ruled during cross-examination that such an inquiry would not be allowed.

      We reject appellant’s argument that “the answers given by these witnesses . .

. left the false impression that appellant was acting normal, was able to talk, and was

not psychotic.” The issue is not whether appellant was psychotic or acting normally,

but whether he was capable of forming the mens rea for the offense. See Ruffin, 270

S.W.3d at 591.

      Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its

discretion by excluding Ms. Dixon’s proffered testimony. See Palmer v. State, No.

05-14-00671-CR, 2015 WL 6859783, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 9, 2015, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (no error in excluding evidence

                                        –13–
concerning history of mental illness and current stressors because testimony dd not

negate mens rea); Gassaway v. State, No. 05-07-00922-CR, 2009 WL 1547756, at

*3–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 4, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (mental illness evidence did not negate mens rea). We resolve

appellant’s first issue against him.

Insanity Instruction
      In his second issue appellant contends the trial court erred when it failed to

submit a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of insanity. In accordance with

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Appellant filed notice of his intent to raise

an insanity defense at trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46C.051. At a

pretrial hearing, appellant’s expert, Dr. Lisa Clayton, testified that appellant did not

meet the legal definition of insanity because he understood that his actions were

illegal and that he would likely be arrested and sent to prison for his actions. The

State’s expert also conducted a pretrial insanity evaluation and reached the same

conclusion. The trial judge ruled that based on what she had heard thus far, Dr.

Clayton would not be permitted to testify about insanity, but she would revisit the

matter if the issue was raised by other evidence at trial.

      During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, appellant made no attempt to offer

any testimony or other evidence of insanity. He nonetheless requested that insanity

be submitted in the court’s charge. The court denied his request.

                                         –14–
      “[A]ll alleged jury-charge error must be considered on appellate review

regardless of preservation in the trial court.” Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In our review of a jury charge, we first determine whether

error occurred; if no error occurred, our analysis ends. Id. If error occurred, whether

it was preserved then determines the degree of harm required for reversal. Id.; see

Sandoval v. State, No. AP-77,081, 2022 WL 17484313, at *28 (Tex. Crim. App.

2022). Where, as here, appellant raised a timely objection to the jury charge, we

reverse if appellant suffered some harm as a result of the error. See Sakil v. State,

287 S.W.3d 23, 25–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

       A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a defensive issue if the issue is

raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is strong or weak, unimpeached or

contradicted, and regardless of what the trial court may think about the credibility of

the defense. Ferrel v. State, 55 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We review

the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant to determine whether a

defensive issue should have been submitted. Id.

       The affirmative defense of insanity applies if, “at the time of the conduct

charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that

his conduct was wrong.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a). A person may be

suffering from delusions or other mental issues and be denied an insanity defense if

he still understands that his actions are wrong. See Grahm v. State, 556 S.W.2d 941,

949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

                                        –15–
      “In a case tried to a jury, the issue of the defendant’s sanity shall be submitted

to the jury only if the issue is supported by competent evidence.” TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 46C.151(a). If evidence from any source raises the issue of insanity,

the trial court must include an instruction on this defense in the jury charge. Nutter

v. State, 93 S.W.3d 130, 131 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Jones

v. State, No. 05-12-00618-CR, 2013 WL 3717771, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July

12, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Conversely, it is not

proper to charge the jury on insanity if the evidence is insufficient to raise the issue.

Jeffley v. State, 938 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, no pet.).

      The insanity defense focuses on whether the accused understood the nature of

his action and whether he knew he should not do it. Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864,

877–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). In the context of the insanity defense, the word

“wrong” means illegal. Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592. If the accused knows that his

conduct is “illegal” by societal standards, then he understands that his conduct is

wrong. See id.

       Appellant argues that the circumstances of the offense, including the bizarre

crime scene with the writings on the wall and his behavior after he committed the

offense as depicted in the security footage, provided sufficient competent evidence

to submit the insanity defense to the jury. Bizarre or abnormal behavior, however, is

not sufficient to establish legal insanity. See Kelly v. State, 195 S.W.3d 753, 757

(Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d). Similarly, lay witness testimony about nervous

                                         –16–
and unusual behavior and that a defendant does “not seem right in the head,” is

insufficient to raise the insanity defense. Carreon v. State, 08-12-00196-CR, 2014

WL 4243583, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 27, 2014, no pet.) (mem op., not

designated for publication); Pacheco v. State, 757 S.W.2d 729, 736 (Tex. Crim. App.

1988) (evidence that defendant was not himself, was acting abnormally and that he

experienced mental disease or defect insufficient to raise insanity). The

circumstances of the offense and the crime scene do not establish or suggest that

appellant did not understand that his conduct was wrong, particularly in light of his

behavior after the police arrived. See Dashield v. State, 110 S.W.3d 111, 116 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (jury could infer from defendant’s

equivocation that he was debating rectitude of the assault and could therefore

distinguish between right and wrong); Pham v. State, 463 S.W.3d 660, 672 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. ref’d) (evidence sufficient to support jury’s implied

rejection of insanity where evidence suggested defendant could distinguish from

right and wrong).

      Appellant also argues that some of the statements he made during his recorded

interview with Detective McGraw, such as his statement about having a choice to

kill his parents or go into the Navy were not “rational or sane” and supported

submitting insanity to the jury. But Detective McGraw’s testimony that appellant’s

statements were not “rational or sane” was presented outside the presence of the jury

during the guilt-innocence phase, and appellant did not request that McGraw be

                                       –17–
permitted to testify on insanity. Appellant’s recorded interview with McGraw was

not played until the punishment phase. Consequently, McGraw’s testimony and the

recorded interview do not support submission of the insanity issue to the jury.

      Although the evidence may have suggested that appellant suffered from

mental disease or defect, the existence of a mental disease, alone, is not sufficient to

establish legal insanity; rather, the accused must have been mentally ill at the time

of the offense to the point that he did not know his conduct was wrong. Plough v.

State, 725 S.W.2d 494, 500 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.). The experts

for both sides concluded that appellant did not satisfy the legal criteria for insanity.

The evidence concerning the bizarre crime scene and the security footage of

appellant’s behavior after the offense was presented through lay witnesses, and none

of these witnesses offered an opinion on insanity. See Pacheco, 770 S.W.2d at 735.

Therefore, the trial court did not err by not submitting the insanity issue to the jury.

See Nutter, 93 S.W.3d at 132; Horton v. State, No. 12-20-00032-CR, 2021 WL

1916703, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). Appellant’s second issue is overruled.

Good Conduct Instruction

      The trial court provided the jury with a punishment charge that submitted

outdated parole instructions with language concerning good-conduct time. In his

third issue, appellant correctly points out that Article 37.07, Section 4(a) of the Code

of Criminal Procedure no longer refers to good-conduct time. See Act of May 26,

                                         –18–
2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 770, § 2.08, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 2321, 2366–68

(amended 2019) (current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 4(a)).

Instead, the current version of Section 4(a) refers only to parole. See id. The effective

date of the amendment making this change was September 1, 2019, and the

proceedings in this case took place in September 2021.

      In reviewing a jury-charge issue, our first duty is to determine whether the

charge contains error. Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

The State concedes that including the outdated language concerning good-conduct

time is error. Because appellant was sentenced after the 2019 amendment’s effective

date, we hold that there was error in instructing the jury regarding parole law using

Section 4(a)’s pre-amendment language. See Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S.,

ch. 770, § 2.08, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 2321, 2366–68 (amended 2019) (current

version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 4(a)); Jones v. State, No. 10-

19-00350-CR, 2021 WL 4198452, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 15, 2021, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding jury charge on parole was error).

      When we find error in the charge, we next consider whether an objection to

the charge was made, and we analyze the error for harm. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d

437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Trial counsel did not timely object to the

complained–of language in the punishment charge in the present case. Accordingly,

we reverse only if appellant suffered egregious harm as a result of the error. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 33.1.

                                         –19–
      “An egregious harm determination must be based on a finding of actual rather

than theoretical harm.” Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Errors that result in egregious harm are those that affect “the very basis of the case,”

“deprive the accused of a ‘valuable right,’” or “vitally affect [a] defensive theory.”

Id. To determine whether harm was egregious, we consider four factors on a case-

by-case basis: (1) the jury charge as a whole, (2) the state of the evidence, including

contested issues and the weight of probative evidence, (3) the parties’ arguments,

and (4) all other relevant information in the record. Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d

834, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

      We first consider the entire charge to the jury in the punishment phase of the

trial. See Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 840. Although the charge erroneously included

language about good conduct time that was no longer required under article 37.07,

it also instructed jurors that they were “not to consider the extent to which good

conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant.” We

presume the jury followed the instructions given in the charge. See Thrift v. State,

176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Further, the charge correctly

instructed the jury on the matters to be considered in deliberations, the range of

punishment, and the requirement of unanimity.

      We next consider the state of the evidence. Under this factor, we determine

whether the evidence made it more or less likely that the charge error caused

appellant actual harm. Lehman v. State, No. 05-19-01367-CR, 2022 WL 2155061,

                                         –20–
at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 15, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). We must determine “the likelihood that the jury would in fact have

reached a non-unanimous verdict on the facts of this particular case.” Id. (internal

quotation omitted). Here, the state of the evidence supports appellant’s life sentence.

      The defensive theory at the punishment phase was that appellant was

experiencing a psychotic episode due to schizophrenia and he shot his parents

because he heard a voice from “God.” When Detective McGraw interviewed

appellant, he told the detective that “God” needed him to kill his parents. The day

before the shooting, appellant collected all the guns in his father’s house so that his

father could not access a gun. He wrote a note stating that he was taking the lives of

his father and stepmother out of love for “Her” [“God”]. The night before the

murder, appellant was in his parents’ bedroom for two hours as they slept. On the

day of the shooting, appellant test fired his gun to ensure it was working properly.

      Appellant was in his parents’ home the night of the shooting. He waited until

they went to bed, entered their bedroom, and shot them. He shot his stepmother in

the head and in the right forearm. He shot his father eight times—once in the back,

twice in his leg, twice in the shoulder, and three times in his stomach. When

appellant’s father realized he had been shot, he called out for appellant. Appellant

turned music on his portable speaker. When his father yelled again, appellant turned

the music up louder.

                                        –21–
      After shooting his father and stepmother, appellant remained in the house for

approximately two hours before the police arrived. During that time, while his father

cried for help, appellant used chalk and paint to draw several symbols and phrases

in various rooms. On the ground floor, he drew fourteen upside-down crosses and

six hearts in paint and an upside down cross in chalk. The words “For Her” were

written in chalk twenty-three times. On the second floor, there were fifteen upside-

down crosses, two hearts, and nine horizontal lines drawn in paint. The words “For

Her” were written in chalk twenty-four times.

      The defense expert testified that although appellant knew that he would go to

jail as a result of his actions, if he did not have schizophrenia, or if his schizophrenia

had been treated, he would never have committed the offense. Conversely, the

State’s expert testified that despite his schizophrenia, she believed appellant could

have controlled his behavior.

      No evidence regarding possible parole or good conduct time was offered

during the guilt-innocence or the punishment phase of trial. Likewise, there was no

mention of parole or good conduct time during voir dire.

       We conclude the state of the evidence made it less likely that the jury charge

caused appellant actual harm. Consequently, this factor weighs against finding

egregious harm. See id.

      Next, we consider whether any arguments made by the State or appellant

exacerbated or ameliorated error in the charge. Id. at *10. Neither party discussed

                                          –22–
good conduct time in argument or urged the jury to assess a greater or lesser sentence

based on any potential good conduct time credit. See Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355,

367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Indeed, other than the erroneous language in the charge,

there was no mention of parole or good conduct time by anyone at any time. As we

have noted, the charge instructed the jury not to consider the award or forfeit of good

conduct time. Because no arguments exacerbated the error, this factor weighs against

finding egregious harm. See Atkinson v. State, 107 S.W.3d 856, 860 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2003, no pet.).

      Last, we consider any other relevant information, such as whether the jury

sent requests for clarification during deliberations. See Lehman, 2022 WL 2155061,

at *9. After twenty minutes of deliberation during the punishment phase, the jury

sent a note that said, “Does the assignment of life in prison mean the defendant is

not eligible for parole?” The trial court responded, “You have received all the law

in this case. Please continue your deliberations.” The punishment verdict was

returned approximately one hour later.

      As appellant correctly observes, a note from the jury concerning parole or

good conduct time weighs in favor of harm. See Ritchey v. State, No. 11-20-00035-

CR, 2022 WL 3649433, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 25, 2022, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication); Hooper v. State, 255 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref’d). It does not, however, conclude the inquiry. See Igo

                                         –23–
v. State, 210 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (applying egregious harm

standard by weighing all four factors).

      Appellant insists that the jury note suggests the erroneous instruction caused

the jury to assess punishment at life in prison. But we do not consider the existence

of a note in a vacuum. Other facts offer equally plausible explanations for the jury’s

punishment assessment. Although appellant received the maximum possible

sentence, that is unsurprising given the heinous nature of his crime. Moreover, both

the defense expert and the State’s expert testified that it was not safe for appellant to

be in the community because there was no assurance that appellant would continue

to take his medication, that the medication would continue to work, or that appellant

would not have another psychotic episode. Thus, although the jury’s note weighs in

favor of harm, other factors suggest that even if the jury improperly considered

parole, it was not their sole consideration.

      In so concluding, we distinguish this case from our court’s opinion in

Shamburger v. State, 05-20-00108-CR, 2021 WL 2430903, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Dallas June 15, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In

Shamburger, our court concluded that the appellant was egregiously harmed by an

erroneous good conduct instruction. See id. at *8. The Shamburger jury sent a note

inquiring about appellant’s payment of fines “during his parole.” Id. Unlike the

present case, however, in Shamburger, we noted that “from the beginning of the

prosecution, the State raised the issue of the impact of parole on appellant’s

                                          –24–
sentence.” Id. Accordingly, we concluded that “the jury was focused on the way

parole, and, by extension, good conduct time might impact appellant.” Id. There was

no such focus or emphasis here.

      Weighing all the harm factors, we conclude that appellant has not

demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the jury assessed a higher sentence based

on the erroneous instruction and the record does not support a finding of egregious

harm. See Taylor v. State, No. 05-20-00017-CR, 2022 WL 17335689, at *13–14

(Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (concluding erroneous good conduct instruction did not cause egregious

harm); Addison v. State, No. 05-18-01263-CR, 2020 WL 4251068, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Dallas July 24, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(same). Appellant’s third issue is resolved against him.

Modification of the Judgment

      In his fourth, fifth, and sixth issues appellant argues that the judgment should

be modified to (i) accurately reflect his pre-sentence jail time credits, (ii) accurately

reflect the amount of costs authorized to be assessed against appellant, and (iii)

reflect appellant’s “not guilty” plea. The State agrees, and adds in a cross-point, that

the judgment should also be modified to reflect the correct statute for the offense for

which he was convicted.

      We are authorized to reform a judgment to make the record speak the truth

when we have the necessary information to do so. Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26,

                                         –25–
27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The record supports the requested modifications here.

We therefore sustain appellant’s fourth, fifth, and sixth issues and the State’s cross-

point and modify the judgment accordingly.

                                  III. Conclusion

      We resolve appellant’s first three issues against him and sustain his fourth,

fifth, and sixth issues and the State’s cross point. We modify the judgment, and as

modified, affirm.

                                            /Dennise Garcia/
                                            DENNISE GARCIA
                                            JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
210847F.U05

                                        –26–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

ROBERT DIXON, Appellant                        On Appeal from the Criminal District
                                               Court No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-21-00847-CR           V.                Trial Court Cause No. F-1620143-K.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                   Justices Pedersen, III and Kennedy
                                               participating.

      Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows: to reflect that appellant pleaded not guilty to the charged
offense, to delete the $1 jury fee and $25 specialty court fees, to reduce the
courthouse security fee to $5, to reduce the consolidated fee on conviction to $133,
with such modifications and deletions to reflect total costs of $207, to reflect that
appellant was charged and convicted under Penal Code § 19.02(b), and to award
appellant a total of 1940 days pre-sentence jail time credit.

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered June 16, 2023

                                        –27–