Court Opinion

ID: 9787204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:12:38.883807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:53.425661
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the court's decision to affirm the judgment against Snyder. In my view, the judgment cannot be upheld for several interrelated reasons.
Because the superior court dismissed Snyder's case without independently reviewing the record, its dismissal cannot properly be affirmed on the theory that it was a summary judgment warranted by Snyder's failure to respond to Post 28's motion for summary judgment. For despite Snyder's failure to respond, "(ilt remain[ed] the duty of the trial court to determine whether the record present[ed] any factual issues which would preclude the entry of summary judgment as a matter of law." 1
Nor can the judgment against Snyder be sustained as a sanction for his discovery violations. Civil Rule 37(b)(8) prohibits a trial court from ordering dispositive discovery sanctions unless it first finds that the violation was willful and that no lesser sanction would be effective.2 Our case law separately commands similar findings3 Here, the trial court failed to comply even minimally with these requirements.
The opinion attempts to avoid these deficiencies by affirming on an alternative theory. Even though the superior court actually dismissed the case on summary judgment and cancelled the trial, the opinion reasons that Snyder's failure to appear for trial could have justified the entry of a default against him; concluding that the trial court plainly would have taken that course if the case had not been dismissed on summary judgment, the opinion treats Snyder's judgment as one entered upon his default.
But even if this assumption were true, that is, even if it were clear that the trial court would have held Snyder in default for miss*1004ing his trial, it would not necessarily follow that the court would have proceeded to enter an ex parte default judgment against him-especially a judgment in the full amount claimed by the Post.
Under Alaska's Civil Rules, a default and a default judgment are two separate creatures and are governed by different requirements.4 Civil Rule 55(a) allows the trial court to enter a default sua sponte. In contrast, Rule 55(c) only allows the court to enter a default judgment upon proper motion. Although the rule allows trial courts to accept ex parte motions for default judgment, it grants them discretion to require that such motions be properly noticed. And if the trial court finds any uncertainty on the issue of damages, the rule authorizes the court to demand further evidence, provides for a hearing, and grants broad discretion to deny entry of a default judgment.5
We have previously emphasized that these procedural protections are necessary because, "in the interests of justice, there must be some degree of assurance that plaintiffs claim is valid and not false or frivolous.6 We have likewise recognized that a trial court's failure to exercise available discretion amounts to an abuse of that discretion.7 Yet here, Post 28's failure to file the requisite motion left the superior court with no occasion to follow the proper procedures for entering a default judgment or to exercise the discretion they would have permitted. The absence of a motion reduced the entry of judgment to a ministerial act: the superior court mechanically entered a final judgment totaling over $187,000 without any independent consideration of the record or the merits of Post 28's claim, as would have been required under Rule 55. Given these cireum-stances, it seems untenable to affirm the superior court's summary judgment ruling-which at most evidenced the court's willing ness to declare a default-by treating it as a discretionary ruling that was never formally requested or actually considered.
Nor can this problem be cured by speculating about what the superior court might have done had the issue been properly raised. As the record now stands, there is good reason to suspect that, if the trial court had actually considered the issue, as a properly filed motion for summary judgment would have required it to do, the court may not have entered a default judgment without demanding additional evidence-at least not a judgment in the full amount claimed. From the verified information in the record it appears that Post 28 based its claim mainly on the allegation that Snyder wrote a series of checks to himself while serving as the Post's financial officer.8 Yet uncontradicted evidence precludes drawing any inference of impropriety from this conduct alone: According to Post 28's own CPA, Owen Freeman, it was "a usual and customary practice" for Post 28's financial officers to pay business expenses from their personal funds and reimburse themselves for their payments. Because verified record evidence fails to establish a prima facie claim for damages, let alone for the full amount claimed by the Post, I see no reasonable basis for predicting that, if the default judgment procedures re*1005quired by Civil Rule 55 had been followed, the superior court would have automatically entered judgment against Snyder for the full amount claimed.
The opinion nonetheless reasons that there was no need for supporting evidence here. Citing Syndoulos Lutheran Church v. A.R.C. Industries, Inc.,9 it maintains that, because Snyder could properly have been held in default, the superior court was authorized to enter a default judgment against him based solely on "the well pleaded allegations" of the Post's complaint. But Syndowlos fails to support this proposition; indeed, it cuts against the propriety of dispensing with a trial on damages in a situation like Snyder's.10
In Syndoulos, the trial court, despite holding the defendant to be in default, actually did conduct a post-default trial on damages; and on appeal, over the plaintiff's objections, we expressly recognized that, despite the default, the defendant had the right to contest the issue of liability at his damages trial by disproving the complaints allegations:
We interpret [Civil Rule 55(c)(1)] as permitting the superior court to question a defendant's lability after a default has been entered against him. If the court determines that in order to enter the judgment it is necessary for the plaintiff to present evidence supporting one or more of the plaintiffs allegations and if the plaintiff is unable to adduce any evidence tending to support the questioned allegations, then a judgment should be entered dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.[11]
Under Syndoulos, then, Snyder should at least have been given an opportunity to defend himself at a trial on damages before a default judgment could be entered against him.
I therefore dissent.

. Am. Rest. Group v. Clark, 889 P.2d 595, 598 (Alaska 1995).

. Alaska R. Civ. P. 37(b)(3) states:
Prior to making an order [for sanctions] under sections (A), (B), or (C) of subparagraph
(b)(2) the court shall consider
(A) the nature of the violation, including the willfulness of the conduct and the materiality of the information that the party failed to disclose;
(B) the prejudice to the opposing party;
(C) the relationship between the information the party failed to disclose and the proposed sanction;
(D) whether a lesser sanction would adequately protect the opposing party and deter other discovery violations; and
(E) other factors deemed appropriate by the court or required by law.
The court shall not make an order that has the effect of establishing or dismissing a claim or defense or determining a central issue in the litigation unless the court finds that the party acted willfully.

. See, eg., Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. The arrows, 846 P.2d 118, 119 (Alaska 1993); Schandelmeier v. Winchester Western, 520 P.2d 70, 74-75 (Alaska 1974).

. See Alaska R. Civ. P. 55(a)-(c).

. See Alaska R. Civ. P. 55(c)(1); Brown v. Lange, 21 P.3d $22, 825 n. 7 (Alaska 2001) ("Although no Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are worded exactly the same as Alaska Civil Rules 55(a)(1) or 55(c)(1), the similarities between the federal and the Alaska schemes make it appropriate for us to look to the federal case law for guidance."); 10A CHartes A. WricHt, Artaur R. Mitcer & Mary Kay KanE, Feprrar Practice anp Procepure § 2685 (3d ed. 2005) ("'When an application is made to the court ... for the entry of a judgment by default, the district judge is required to exercise sound judicial discretion in determining whether the judgment should be entered.").

. Guard v. Benson, 438 P.2d 219, 221 (Alaska 1968).

. Cf. Alaska Cent. for the Env't v. Rue, 95 P.3d 924, 932 (Alaska 2004) ("We have recognized that 'outright refusal to consider the various alternatives available as a matter of discretion ... is a failure to exercise any discretion at all' The commissioner's refusal here to consider any scientific information except taxonomic classification in the 'technical sense' amounted to an abuse of discretion.").

. The only other verified information in the record suggesting misconduct was an allegation that, at some unspecified later time, Snyder was asked to produce receipts to back up these checks but said that he had given them to the Post's accountant-an assertion that Freeman denied in his deposition.

. 662 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1983).

. In any event, given Civil Rule I's provision requiring claims of fraud to be pleaded with particularity, it seems questionable to assume that the conclusory charges in the Post's complaint would qualify as "well pleaded allegations" of fraud establishing a liquidated damages claim for the full amount.

. Syndoulos Lutheran Church, 662 P.2d at 112 (internal citations omitted).