Court Opinion

ID: 9377036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 18:00:58.813336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:11.460910
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-1020     Document: 010110821933   Date Filed: 03/06/2023   Page: 1
                                                                             FILED
                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                     PUBLISH                             Tenth Circuit

                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    March 6, 2023
                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                             FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  THE HIGH LONESOME RANCH,
  LLC,

         Plaintiff / Counterclaim
         Defendant - Appellant,

  v.                                                     No. 21-1020

  THE BOARD OF COUNTY
  COMMISSIONERS FOR THE
  COUNTY OF GARFIELD,

         Defendant / Counterclaimant /
         Cross-Claimant - Appellee,

  and

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
  through its agency, the Bureau of Land
  Management, a division of the United
  States Department of Interior,

         Defendant / Cross-Claim
         Defendant - Appellee.

  ------------------------------

  PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION;
  COLORADO FARM BUREAU; NEW
  MEXICO HABITAT CONSERVATION
  INITIATIVE; ROCKY MOUNTAIN
  FARMERS UNION; THE PROPERTY
  AND ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH
  CENTER; UTAH FARMERS UNION;
  WESTERN LANDOWNERS
  ALLIANCE; COLORADO
Appellate Case: 21-1020    Document: 010110821933   Date Filed: 03/06/2023   Page: 2

  COUNTIES, INC.,

        Amici Curiae.
                          _________________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the District of Colorado
                     (D.C. No. 1:17-CV-01260-RBJ-GPG)
                      _________________________________

 Frederick R. Yarger (Ryan W. Cooke with him on the briefs), of Wheeler Trigg
 O’Donnell LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

 Geoffrey P. Anderson of Anderson Notarianni McMahon LLC, Denver,
 Colorado (Joshua D. McMahon of Anderson Notarianni McMahon LLC,
 Denver, Colorado, and Tari L. Williams of Garfield County Attorney’s Office,
 Glenwood Springs, Colorado, with him on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.

 Jeffrey W. McCoy of Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California, and
 Glenn E. Roper of Pacific Legal Foundation, Highlands Ranch, Colorado, filed
 an amicus brief for Pacific Legal Foundation and Colorado Farm Bureau.

 Christopher O. Murray, Julian R. Ellis, Jr., and Sean S. Cuff of Brownstein
 Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus brief for Western
 Landowners Alliance, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, Utah Farmers Center,
 and New Mexico Habitat Conservation Initiative.

 Andrew D. Ringel of Hall & Evans LLC, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus
 brief for Colorado Counties, Inc.
                      _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, EBEL, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
                 _________________________________

 PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
                    _________________________________

       We must resolve whether Garfield County, Colorado, has a right-of-way

 over two dirt roads within the county—North Dry Fork Road and Middle Dry

 Fork Road. The two roads run east to west across the property owned by the

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 High Lonesome Ranch, a conservation and livestock ranch offering hunting and

 outdoor-recreation services.

       For years, the Ranch restricted access to the roads by locking a gate. But

 in 2015, during a county meeting, the Garfield County Commission directed the

 Ranch to remove the locked gate after concluding that the two disputed roads

 were subject to public rights-of-way. The Ranch refused and filed a

 declaratory-judgment action in Colorado state court opposing the County’s

 position. At first, the County asked the state court to dismiss the case for

 failure to name the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) as a party. But

 rather than dismissing, the state court ordered the Ranch to join the United

 States (BLM) as a necessary party, and the Ranch did so. The United States

 promptly removed the case to federal district court. In October 2020, after a

 five-day bench trial, the district court ruled that the entire lengths of the two

 disputed roads were subject to public rights-of-way. In doing so, the court

 relied on Colorado adverse-use law and Revised Statute 2477 (“R.S. 2477”). 1

       On appeal—and for the first time—the Ranch contends that various

 procedural shortcomings deprived the district court of subject-matter

       1
         In 1866, Congress passed an open-ended grant of “the right of way for
 the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses.”
 S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (SUWA), 425 F.3d 735, 739
 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253,
 codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932, repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management
 Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793). This statute is
 often called R.S. 2477. See id. (discussing history of R.S. 2477).
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 jurisdiction. It also challenges the district court’s rights-of-way rulings. If it

 loses on those issues, the Ranch requests that we remand for more precise

 determinations of the County’s rights-of-way. Exercising jurisdiction under

 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s adverse-use ruling, but we

 reverse its R.S. 2477 ruling and remand for the court to reconsider that ruling

 under recent circuit authority governing acceptance of R.S. 2477 rights. We

 also remand for the district court to determine the locations and widths of the

 rights-of-way by survey.

                                  BACKGROUND

 I.    Factual Background

       A.     The Disputed Roads

       North Dry Fork Road “runs east to west from [De Beque], Colorado, to

 the top of a ridgeline [above the] North Dry Fork Valley.” High Lonesome

 Ranch, LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 508 F. Supp. 3d 801, 809 (D. Colo. 2020).

 As North Dry Fork Road (also called Dry Fork Road) heads west from De

 Beque, it splits into South Dry Fork Road and North Dry Fork Road (also

 known as County Road 200). See id. at 810. County Road 200 veers northwest

 from this split until it reaches a locked gate on the Ranch’s property. See id. At

 this point, the road again becomes known as North Dry Fork Road. See id. It

 continues west until it forks again into North and Middle Dry Fork Roads. Id.

 The parties call this intersection “the Y.” Id. Middle Dry Fork Road then runs

 southwest, and North Dry Fork Road continues northwest, then west, then

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 southwest, to the top of the ridgeline. See id. at 809–10. Only Middle Dry Fork

 Road and the portion of North Dry Fork Road west of the gate are disputed. 2

 See id. Though North and Middle Dry Fork Roads mostly lie on the Ranch’s

 property, some scattered segments traverse BLM land. See id. at 810–11, 830;

 Opening Br. 6–8. Dry Fork Road, South Dry Fork Road, and County Road 200

 aren’t at issue.

       To help visualize the area, here is a map of the two disputed roads from

 the district court’s opinion:

 High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 811. The white parcels are the

 Ranch’s, and the yellow parcels are BLM’s. The hand-drawn “X” visible in

 Section 27, Township 7 South, Range 99 West is the gate.

       2
        Our opinion often refers to the disputed roads as “the roads” for
 simplicity. The opening brief ’s map labels the segment of North Dry Fork Road
 between the gate and the Y “Dry Fork Road.” Opening Br. 7. Rather than
 muddying the labels, we’ll stick with calling this segment North Dry Fork
 Road, as the district court did.
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       Until August 1882, the Dry Fork area—in which the Ranch is situated—

 was part of the Ute Indian Reservation. Id. at 813. But President Chester A.

 Arthur terminated the reservation then, making the lands available for public

 purchase and homesteading. Id. In 1885, the U.S. General Land Office

 (“GLO”)—BLM’s predecessor—surveyed the Dry Fork area. Id. Eli M. Ashley

 and Henry Simons separately surveyed the area on the government’s behalf, id.,

 and their surveys were approved by the U.S. Surveyor General. The surveys

 show a trail along Middle Dry Fork Road. Id. But the surveys do not show

 North Dry Fork Road. Id.

       In 1891, the federal government began issuing land patents in the Dry

 Fork area. Id. Throughout the early 1900s, the government continued issuing

 cash-entry patents and patents under the Homestead Act of 1862, the Mining

 Act of 1872, the Desert Land Act of 1877, and the Timber and Stone Act of

 1878. Id.

       Today, the Ranch owns nearly all the land and roadways along Middle

 and North Dry Fork Roads. Id. at 812. BLM manages between 50,000 and

 90,000 acres of public land surrounding the Ranch’s property. Id. Though the

 public can access the federal lands without using the Dry Fork Roads, that

 access is considerably more challenging. Id.

       B.     The Purchase of the High Lonesome Ranch

       In the 1990s and early 2000s, Paul Vahldiek purchased large tracts of

 land in the Dry Fork area. Id. at 812, 826. The High Lonesome Ranch LLC now

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 owns these lands. Id. at 812. Vahldiek is the founder and sole proprietor of the

 LLC and chairs its board of directors. Id. Vahldiek owns 63% of a 50% interest

 in the Ranch. Id. Today, the Ranch is run as a high-end recreation operation that

 offers hunting, fly-fishing, hiking, biking, and horseback riding. Id. It also

 offers luxury accommodations and meals. Id. And it engages in conservation

 efforts such as “improved grazing practices, regenerative agriculture, [and]

 non-interference with wildlife corridors,” among other “positive land

 stewardship” strategies. Id.

       The Ranch was formed from three separate land purchases: (1) the

 Hitchburn Property, (2) the Broadhead Property, and (3) the McKay Fork Ranch

 Property. Id. at 812, 826. In 1994, Vahldiek’s company bought the Hitchburn

 Property. Id. at 826. A year later, his company purchased the Broadhead

 Property. Id. Before purchasing Broadhead, Vahldiek visited the area and saw

 that North Dry Fork Road traversed the property and that a locked gate blocked

 access about a mile east of the current gate. Id.; Appellant’s App. vol. 3,

 at A546. Vahldiek had his attorneys investigate the title issues on the roadways.

 High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 826.

       As part of buying Broadhead, Vahldiek had from December 22, 1994, to

 January 10, 1995, in which to obtain a title commitment and until January 16,

 1995 (the closing date) to raise possible title issues. Appellant’s App. vol. 3,

 at A578–79 (“Q. And then you had five days to make an objection [to title],

 correct? A. I believe so, yes.”). Vahldiek raised no objections. Id. at 579 (“Q.

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 And you didn’t make any objections to the title, did you? A. I think after

 conferring with counsel I don’t recall that we did.”). He similarly opted against

 having an inspection contingency (i.e., the right to rescind the purchase

 contract based on a future inspection). Id. at A580 (“Q. Okay. So you waived

 your right to inspect the property and call off the deal if you didn’t like what

 the inspection showed, right? A. That would be, I think, a fair statement.”).

       In 2003, Vahldiek’s company bought the McKay Fork Ranch (formerly

 known as the Beach Ranch). High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 826.

 Marketing materials for the McKay Fork Ranch stated that “County Road 220”

 ran from De Beque to the eastern boundary of the Ranch, at which point a

 private road continued eight miles across the Ranch. Id. Based on that

 information, Vahldiek concluded that the road crossing the property was

 private. Id.

       C.       The Present Dispute

       The Ranch states that the County first claimed an R.S. 2477 right-of-way

 over North and Middle Dry Fork Roads in December 2015. The County based

 its right-of-way claim on alleged public use of the roads beginning in the

 1880s. The County Commission met in December 2015 and directed the Ranch

 to unlock its gate and allow motorized traffic over the roads west of the gate.

 High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 830–31.

       As we understand it, the Ranch at first agreed to the County’s request.

 The County tells us that the parties met and discussed installing fencing, cattle

                                          8
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 guards, and no-trespassing signs along the roads. In a March 2016 meeting, the

 parties identified where these items would be placed. But after the County

 began obtaining bids for the work, this litigation began.

 II.   Procedural Background

       In April 2016, the Ranch sued the County in Colorado state court for a

 “declaration that the Road is not public.” Appellant’s App. vol. 1, at A34–35. It

 sought “a declaration that no member of the public has any right to use, possess

 or travel upon the Road.” 3 Id. It also sought preliminary and permanent

 injunctions barring the County from requiring it to remove its gate.

       The County moved to dismiss the case based on the Ranch’s failure to

 name the United States as a defendant. But rather than dismiss the case, the

 state court ordered the Ranch to join the United States as a necessary party to

 the suit, reasoning that the United States had an interest in the litigation

 because the road accessed BLM land. After the Ranch amended its complaint to

 include the United States as a defendant, the County filed its answer and four

 counterclaims seeking (1) a declaration that the roads are public under R.S.

       3
          The parties’ briefing and the record sometimes loosely use the terms
 “owns” and “public roads.” See, e.g., Opening Br. 16 (“These two claims, the
 district court held, made the roads ‘public in their entirety.’”); see also Resp.
 Br. 3 (“These Roads are public because they have existed since approximately
 1884.”). To avoid any confusion, we now simply note that “[a] right of way is
 not tantamount to fee simple ownership of a defined parcel of territory. Rather,
 it is an entitlement to use certain land in a particular way.” SUWA, 425 F.3d
 at 747; Barnard v. Gaumer, 361 P.2d 778, 780 (Colo. 1961) (“An easement does
 not carry any title to the land over which it is exercised and the easement does
 not work a dispossession of the landowner.”).
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  2477 and section 43-2-201(1)(e) of the Colorado Revised Statutes; (2) a

  declaration that the roads are public by dedication; 4 (3) a declaration that the

  roads are public by adverse use; 5 and (4) preliminary and permanent injunctions

  preventing the Ranch from blocking access to the roads. 6

        BLM removed the case to federal court under the federal-officer removal

  statute. See Appellant’s App. vol. 1, at A26 (“Removal of this action is proper

  under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which authorizes the removal of any ‘civil

  action’ commenced in state court against, inter alia, the ‘United States or any

  agency thereof.’”). Throughout the district-court proceedings, the Ranch never

  requested remand or challenged federal subject-matter jurisdiction. After

  discovery, and after the district court denied the parties’ cross-motions for

        4
          The Second Counterclaim alleges that a petition submitted on August 6,
  1928, by five area landowners and five other area residents made the road
  public through common-law dedication.
        5
          The Third Counterclaim alleges that the roads became public under the
  public-prescriptive-use statute, section 43-2-201(1)(c) of the Colorado Revised
  Statutes.
        6
         The County later identified another legal theory in support: that the
  roads were public under section 43-1-202 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. See
  Appellant’s App. vol. 1, at A229–30; Appellant’s App. vol. 2, at A326, A343,
  A396. Section 43-1-202 provides that “[a]ll roads and highways which are, on
  May 4, 1921, by law open to public traffic shall be public highways within the
  meaning of this part 2.”
                                          10
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  summary judgment, the case proceeded to a bench trial in October 2020. High

  Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 809. 7

        The bench trial lasted five days. Id. Despite remaining a party, the United

  States didn’t participate; its attorneys attended the trial, but they “just . . . s[a]t

  there and watch[ed].” Appellant’s App. vol. 3, at A635. After the trial, the

  parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on

  the trial record and the parties’ filings, the district court ruled for the County on

  two of its claims: R.S. 2477 and adverse use under Colorado law. 8 High

  Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 831–40. The district court held that

  between these two modes of establishing rights-of-way, the roads were “public

  in their entirety.” Id. at 846.

        For most portions of the disputed roads, the district court ruled that

  public use between 1905 and 1917 established R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in the

  Dry Fork Valley. Id. at 834. The district court determined that the County had

  established R.S. 2477 rights-of-way “along most of North and Middle Dry Fork

        7
          Before trial, The High Lonesome Ranch LLC became the named
  plaintiff after the original plaintiffs, #22 Enterprises LLC and #20 Enterprises
  LLC, merged into their parent entity.
        8
          R.S. 2477 allows the creation of public rights-of-way over public land.
  Kane County v. United States, 772 F.3d 1205, 1219 (10th Cir. 2014) (“R.S.
  2477 rights-of-way can only be established over public lands not reserved for
  public uses.” (cleaned up)). So for any sought rights-of-way not in existence
  while the land was part of the public domain, the claimants must rely on
  Colorado adverse-use law.
                                            11
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  Roads running westward.” Id. 9 And the court found that the rights-of-way

  sufficiently tracked the roads as they exist today, and “the deviations in these

  roads throughout their over one-hundred-year existence are minor and the

  obvious result of natural changes in the landscape and the changing needs of

  settlers along the roads as they extended.” Id. at 836. Yet the court

  acknowledged that “gaps” existed in the R.S. 2477 segments where the

  privately owned land in the early 1900s preceded the County’s claimed R.S.

  2477 rights-of-way. Id. at 834–35. Even so, it ruled that the County had shown

  adverse use of these gaps. Id. at 840 (“The part of North Dry Fork Road created

  by public prescriptive use runs through all of the ‘gaps’ in the R.S. 2477 right-

  of-way . . . .”). So the district court concluded that the gaps didn’t matter

  because “the entirety of Middle Dry Fork Road, and North Dry Fork Road from

  the current locked gate location to the Y [where Middle Dry Fork Road

  branches off], became public by 1949 through adverse use.” Id. 10

        9
          The district court reached the same conclusion under the County’s
  theory based on section 43-1-202 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. High
  Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 842–43 (“Here, the only law that could
  have rendered North and Middle Dry Fork Roads public by 1921 is R.S. 2477. I
  conclude that these roads were also public on May 4, 1921 under § 43-1-202 to
  the extent that R.S. 2477 rights-of-way had been created by that date . . . .”
  (footnote omitted)).

         Finding “no clear evidence of intent to dedicate [the land] by any
        10

  landowner,” the court ruled against the County on its Second Counterclaim,
  common-law dedication. High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 840–42.
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        During trial, the Ranch also argued that even if the County established its

  claimed rights-of-way, it had abandoned them. If it had abandoned them, the

  roads would have reverted to a private status. Id. at 843 (citations omitted). The

  district court agreed that a “presumption of abandonment” applied because the

  County had treated the roads as private for decades. Id. at 843–44. But it found

  no abandonment because the Ranch hadn’t shown that the County had intended

  to abandon the rights-of-way. Id. at 844–46.

        To arrive at its legal conclusions, the district court made many factual

  findings about the history and extent of public use of the roads. It based its

  findings on (1) government records, (2) community life, and (3) commercial

  activity. We provide some of the district court’s extensive findings below.

        Government Records

        Land Patents in the Late 1800s. The land on which the roads now lie

  became public in 1882, when President Arthur terminated the Ute Indian

  Reservation. Id. at 813. Nine years later, the United States began issuing cash-

  entry patents and homestead patents. Id. Cash-entry patents “required the buyer

  to pay cash for the land in exchange for the patent.” Id. Homestead-entry

  patents required patentees to live on the property for at least five years,

  cultivate crops, and improve the land. Id. at 813–14. The government issued

  patents from 1891 to 1940. Id. The patent documents show that Peter Becker

  and Clifford Young lived on their land and used the roads to access their

  properties. Id. at 814, 822. Clifford Young’s property passed to Lew Young in
                                          13
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  July 1940, and Becker’s property passed to Lew Young in March 1941. Id.

  at 822. Lew Young’s daughter Dixie grew up on their ranch. Id. She later wrote

  a book about her childhood that included a 1928 picture showing her there at

  about age six or seven. Id. Dixie recalled seeing hunters there each year and

  going with family to De Beque for supplies. Id.

        Tax Records. From 1892 to the 1940s the County tax assessor drove these

  roads to learn about the properties. See id. at 815. He recorded details,

  including land ownership, livestock, and personal possessions. Id.

        Surveys. In 1884 and 1885, the GLO surveyed the Dry Fork area. Id.

  at 813. The surveys showed an Indian trail along part of the same route as the

  current roads, with the entire trail being immediately adjacent to the north side

  of Dry Fork Creek. Id. at 813, 833. Between 1925 and 1926, the GLO

  resurveyed the Dry Fork area. Id. at 816. These resurveys identify nearly all of

  North and Middle Dry Fork Roads. Id. The resurveys also reference an

  abandoned sawmill, three cabins, a house, a telephone line, and fencing along

  the roads. Id.

        U.S. Census Records. Census records from the 1930s documented

  families living in the Dry Fork area. Id. at 823. They included “the Johns,

  Walkers, Masters, Barrows, Galyeans, and Sissoms.” Id. But it wasn’t clear to

  the district court where in the Dry Fork area these residents lived based on the

  Census data. Id.

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        1928–1929 County Petition. In August 1928, area landowners petitioned

  Garfield County to establish the roads as public and maintain them. Id. at 820.

  The County appointed a group of road viewers to create a report on the

  practicality of creating public roads. Id. Despite at first concluding that

  creating public roads would be impractical, the County reversed its position on

  September 5, 1929, and declared North Dry Fork Road a public road from its

  intersection with South Dry Fork Road west to the Y. Id. at 820, 837. That same

  month, the County surveyor mapped the road and gave notice of a public

  hearing to be held on September 17. Id. at 820. In a resolution, the Commission

  stated that the roads were public and had been used “for public travel, without

  interruption or objection . . . for more than twenty consecutive years . . . in fact

  for about forty consecutive years.” Id. at 821. The district court found that the

  1929 resolution supported the adverse-use finding because it showed that the

  roads were used overtly by the public, that private landowners had notice of the

  roads’ public status, and that they didn’t object within the statutory period. Id.

  at 837–39.

        Community Life

        Post Office. Historically, the only post office near the present Ranch was

  in De Beque. Id. at 816. And to get there, residents had to travel on the Dry

  Fork roads. See id. From this, the district court logically concluded that these

  residents must have used the roads. Id.

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        Books Detailing Settlers’ Lives and School Records. The district court

  found that books from the 1920s “provide ample evidence that the roads were

  used frequently during this period.” See id. at 816–17. The court also found that

  some children likely walked on the roads as the most direct route to the Dry

  Fork Schoolhouse. Id. at 822–23.

        Commercial Activity

        Oil-Shale Mining. The district court reviewed records of oil-shale-mining

  activities that would have required use of the roads. Id. at 817–18. The district

  court logically concluded that “the Oil Shale Mining Company used these roads

  to bring equipment to build the [oil shale] retort, cookhouse, tramway, and

  bunkhouse and that their laborers used the roads to travel to and from the mines

  throughout this period.” Id. at 819.

        Sawmills. The district court reviewed records from the late 1930s and

  early 1940s showing that people had operated a sawmill in the North Dry Fork

  Canyon and transported logs on the roads to De Beque. See id. at 823.

        Cattle Ranching. The district court heard testimony from members of the

  Beach family about their use of the roads. Id. at 824. In 1959, the Beach family

  purchased some land from Lew Young and maintained cattle operations in

  North and Middle Dry Fork Canyons. Id. Mr. Beach lived at their property

  every summer between 1959 and 1971. Id. The Beaches trucked their calves

  along North Dry Fork Road, and the family drove on the roads weekly to De

  Beque for groceries. Id. Mr. Beach described unlocked gates along the roads for
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  cattle control. Id. He testified that “[m]embers of the public who traveled on

  the roads past these gates typically asked for permission,” but they were likely

  being “polite.” Id. All in all, the Beach family “accessed the property via [one

  of the] Dry Fork Road[s].” Id. at 824–25.

                                     ⁎     ⁎      ⁎

        Based on the presented evidence, the district court held that the roads

  were public and not abandoned. Id. at 846. It ordered the Ranch “to remove all

  gates along [the roads], along with any padlocks, chains, or other locking

  devices, and to remove signage indicating or suggesting that the road is private

  or that members of the public may not access and use it.” Id. The Ranch’s

  appeal followed. 11

                                    DISCUSSION

        On appeal, the Ranch raises six challenges: (1) that the district court

  lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) that the district court erred in applying

  Colorado adverse-use law; (3) that the Colorado Court of Appeals previously

  adjudicated the same roads as being private in Enerwest, Inc. v. Dyco Petroleum

  Corp.; (4) that the district court misapplied R.S. 2477; (5) that the district court

  failed to adequately describe the location and width of the County’s rights-of-

        11
           The United States also appealed, but it dismissed its appeal two months
  later. Then, in June 2021, the United States filed a notice of nonparticipation
  and characterized the dispute as between only the County and the Ranch.
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  way; and (6) that the district court misapplied the Colorado presumption of

  abandonment. We address these arguments in turn.

  I.    Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

        On three bases, the Ranch contends for the first time on appeal that the

  district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. First, it argues that in bringing

  Quiet Title Act (“QTA”) crossclaims against BLM, the County failed to satisfy

  the QTA’s jurisdictional prerequisites for waiver of the United States’ sovereign

  immunity. Second, it argues that the County brought those crossclaims after the

  QTA’s statute of limitations expired. Third, it challenges removal jurisdiction

  under a doctrine called derivative jurisdiction. Our review is de novo. Leathers

  v. Leathers, 856 F.3d 729, 749 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

        A.     QTA Sovereign-Immunity Waiver

        The United States is immune from suit unless Congress has expressly

  waived its sovereign immunity. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. &

  Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 280 (1983) (citations omitted). Congress did just that

  in the QTA. Id. As the “exclusive means by which adverse claimants [can]

  challenge the United States’ title to real property,” id. at 286, the QTA permits

  plaintiffs to sue the United States “to adjudicate a disputed title to real property

  in which the United States claims an interest,” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a).

        Why is the QTA relevant here? Early in the litigation, the state trial court

  ordered the Ranch to join the United States as a necessary party because the

  roads “provide[d] access to” BLM land. Appellant’s App. vol. 1, at A68. After
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  the Ranch amended its complaint to add the United States as a defendant, the

  County filed its answer and asserted counterclaims against the Ranch and the

  United States for a declaration that the disputed roads were “public roads.” Id.

  at A77–87; High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 809 (“The county then

  asserted counterclaims against the Ranch and the BLM asking the court to

  declare that the roads are public.” (emphasis added)). 12 After being joined, the

  United States promptly removed the case to federal court under § 1442, the

  federal-officer removal statute. In its notice of removal, the United States

  construed the County’s crossclaims as not only affecting the portions of the

  roads on the Ranch’s land, but also targeting the roads on interspersed BLM

  land. Id. at A26 (“The portions of road that the County seeks to have declared

  public include roadways that cross BLM land and connect with roads owned

  and controlled by BLM.”). The United States then cited the QTA and federal

  courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over those claims. It later answered the Ranch’s

  complaint and the County’s crossclaims.

        Though the County didn’t specify that its crossclaims were QTA claims,

  we “‘focus on the relief . . . request[ed],’ rather than on the party’s

  characterization of the claim.” Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians v. Utah,

  428 F.3d 966, 975 (10th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

        12
           Though not styled as such, the County’s allegations against the United
  States are crossclaims. Cross-Claim, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)
  (“[a] claim asserted between codefendants”).
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  Because the County sought an R.S. 2477 right-of-way over BLM land, which

  can be accomplished only under the QTA, we construe the County’s crossclaims

  as QTA claims. That’s certainly how the parties and the district court

  interpreted them.

        Confirming that the QTA is implicated here, we turn to the Ranch’s

  jurisdictional argument. From the QTA’s text, we have imposed two

  requirements for federal jurisdiction: (1) the United States must “claim[] an

  interest” in the property, and (2) the property’s title must be “disputed.” Kane

  County, 772 F.3d at 1210–11. The Ranch argues that the County failed to make

  these showings, meaning that the United States’ sovereign immunity bars the

  County’s crossclaims.

        We note that the Ranch contests the second element while all but

  conceding the first. This comes as no surprise. After all, BLM owns some of the

  land across which North and Middle Dry Fork Roads lie—it obviously “claims

  an interest” in its own land. We thus focus on the second element, which we

  outlined in Kane County. To satisfy that element, “a plaintiff need not show the

  United States took direct action to close or deny access to a road—indirect

  action or assertions that actually conflict with a plaintiff ’s title will suffice.”

  Id. at 1212. It’s also enough for the plaintiff to show that the United States has

  “previously disputed a plaintiff ’s title” even if it “does not do so presently.” Id.

  (citation omitted). But “actions of the United States that merely produce some

  ambiguity regarding a plaintiff ’s title” do not meet the standard. Id.

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        The Ranch highlights the United States’ inconsistent stances during this

  litigation. It correctly notes that BLM has vacillated between opposing the

  crossclaims, supporting them, or taking no position at all. At best, the Ranch

  argues, these actions are ambiguous and defeat jurisdiction. In response, the

  County points to BLM’s notice of removal and crossclaim answer to show that

  BLM disputed the County’s R.S. 2477 right. We agree with the County. In its

  notice of removal, BLM contended that the County wanted public access over

  the roadways that crossed BLM land. Appellant’s App. vol. 1, at A25–26. BLM

  also characterized the crossclaims as QTA claims, strongly implying that it was

  disputing the County’s R.S. 2477 right across BLM’s stretches of the roads. See

  id. at A26. And in its crossclaim answer, BLM admitted that it had not “vacated

  or abandoned the Roads.” Id. at A82; Appellee’s Suppl. App. vol. 1, at SA9.

        Further, BLM asked the court to deny “[t]he relief requested by the

  County . . . to the extent that the County’s [cross]claim fails to state a claim

  against BLM upon which relief can be granted.” Appellee’s Suppl. App. vol. 1,

  at SA11. Though it may have later changed course, BLM’s litigation posture at

  the outset qualifies as “indirect action[s] or assertions that actually conflict

  with [the County’s] title.” Kane County, 772 F.3d at 1212. We conclude that the

  QTA’s jurisdictional requirements were satisfied and discern no sovereign-

  immunity problem.

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        B.     Statute of Limitations

        The Ranch next argues that “assuming the BLM does claim an interest in

  the roads, the County cannot satisfy the [QTA’s] [twelve-year] statute of

  limitations.” Opening Br. 33; 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). The limitations period

  under the QTA commences when the United States claims to have “exclusive

  control of a road.” Kane County, 772 F.3d at 1215 (cleaned up). But the

  limitations period doesn’t begin until the United States “provide[s] a county or

  state with sufficient notice of the United States’ claim of a right to exclude the

  public.” Id. at 1216 (internal citation and quotations omitted). That never

  happened here. The Ranch’s only argument is that “[t]he limitations period has

  an ‘exceedingly light’ trigger, requiring only reasonable awareness that the

  Government claims some interest in the property.” See Reply Br. 13 (citing

  Kane County, 772 F.3d at 1210–11, 1215). The Ranch doesn’t explain what

  gave (or would have ever given) the County the needed reasonable awareness

  here. We thus reject the statute-of-limitations challenge.

        C.     Derivative-Jurisdiction Doctrine

        The Ranch’s final argument concerns the derivative-jurisdiction doctrine,

  which generally provides that federal courts lack jurisdiction if the state court

  lacked jurisdiction before removal. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R.

  Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). As the Supreme Court phrased it a century ago,

  “[i]f the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties, the

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  federal court acquires none, although it might in a like suit originally brought

  there have had jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted).

        This doctrine has been “heavily criticized” for its inefficiencies. 14C

  Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Joan E. Steinman &

  Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3721.1 (rev. 4th ed. 2018)

  (collecting cases). To promote sound judicial administration, Congress in 1986

  abolished the concept of derivative jurisdiction for cases removed under the

  general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Judicial Improvements Act of 1985,

  Pub. L. No. 99-336, § 3, 100 Stat. 633, 637 (1986) (current version at 28 U.S.C.

  § 1441(f)). And Congress did so again in 2002 using similar language in

  § 1441(f). Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-

  273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1827 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f)). But for no

  clear reason, the 2002 amendment limited its abolition of derivative jurisdiction

  to cases removed under § 1441, not those removed under other sections like

  § 1442, the federal-officer removal statute. See id.

        BLM chose to remove under § 1442, so the derivative-jurisdiction

  doctrine applies. Federal district courts have “exclusive original jurisdiction”

  over QTA claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f). This means that the County’s QTA

  crossclaims must have originally been brought in federal court; removal wasn’t

  an option. See id.; California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 68 (1979) (concluding

  that the QTA “assure[s] that . . . jurisdiction was not conferred upon the courts

  of any State”). Because the state trial court never had jurisdiction over these

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  crossclaims, upon the United States’ § 1442 removal, “the federal court

  acquire[d] none.” Lambert Run Coal Co., 258 U.S. at 382.

        But the Ranch never raised this jurisdictional flag before the district

  court. Though parties can attack subject-matter jurisdiction even after a final

  judgment, Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434–35

  (2011) (citation omitted), many courts have held that derivative jurisdiction is a

  procedural bar and doesn’t concern Article III subject-matter jurisdiction, see

  Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Gilbert, 656 F. App’x 45, 52–53 (6th Cir.

  2016) (Sutton, J., concurring) (collecting cases from the First, Third, Fifth,

  Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits). If derivative jurisdiction is only a

  procedural bar, it is waivable. Rodas v. Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610, 623 (7th Cir.

  2011).

        The view of derivative jurisdiction as a procedural bar comes from the

  Supreme Court’s decision in Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S.

  699 (1972). There, the Supreme Court dealt with a case that had been

  improperly removed and then tried to judgment on the merits without objection.

  Id. at 700–02. The Court held that a party waives its right to later litigate the

  propriety of removal jurisdiction if it fails to raise the issue at removal. Id.

  at 702–03; see also Rodas, 656 F.3d at 619 (noting that derivative jurisdiction

  “is best understood as a procedural bar” to exercising subject-matter

  jurisdiction rather than “an essential ingredient to federal subject matter

  jurisdiction”).

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        The seminal derivative-jurisdiction case among the circuits is Rodas. In

  Rodas, a plaintiff sued a community-health center, a hospital, and three

  physicians in Illinois state court for negligently managing her childbirth.

  656 F.3d at 612–13. Because the defendants received federal funds, the United

  States could substitute itself as a defendant, and the claims would be governed

  by the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. After some procedural tumult, the plaintiff

  sued the United States directly. Id. at 614. The United States then removed the

  case under § 1442, and the case progressed to judgment for the physicians. Id.

  The plaintiff appealed, but after the district court entered judgment, the United

  States moved to dismiss under the derivative-jurisdiction doctrine, which the

  district court denied. Id. On appeal, the United States raised derivative

  jurisdiction again. Id. at 615.

        After determining that removal under § 1442 was proper and that the

  derivative-jurisdiction doctrine applied, the Seventh Circuit turned to evaluate

  how to treat derivative jurisdiction. Id. at 619. It discussed Grubbs, Caterpillar

  Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996), and Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group,

  541 U.S. 567 (2004), and ultimately rejected the United States’ position that

  derivative jurisdiction created a latent subject-matter-jurisdiction defect. Id.

  at 619–22. First, the court distinguished removal jurisdiction from subject-

  matter jurisdiction and held that removal jurisdiction isn’t jurisdictional but is a

  “means of bringing cases within federal courts’ original jurisdiction.” Id.

  at 622–23 (quoting 14B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H.

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  Cooper & Joan E. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3721 (4th ed.

  2009)). Second, it noted that derivative jurisdiction relates to removal

  jurisdiction. Id. at 623 (listing cases). Third, the court analyzed early

  derivative-jurisdiction caselaw and noted that the doctrine was treated flexibly.

  Id. at 623–24. Fourth, it categorized derivative jurisdiction as being “rooted in

  the idea that there is no case at all,” rather than in the court’s power to hear a

  case. Id. at 624. From this, the Seventh Circuit concluded that despite “its

  perhaps improvident name,” derivative jurisdiction is a procedural bar and is

  thus waivable. Id. at 625. Under Grubbs and Caterpillar, the test is whether

  “the district court would have had jurisdiction over a hypothetical complaint

  filed at the time it entered the judgment now under review.” Id. Because the

  district court would have had jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act

  had the case been originally filed in federal court, “the fact that the state court

  lacked jurisdiction over the case when it was removed ha[d] no significance.”

  See id.

        The Ranch asks us to disregard Rodas as incompatible with the

  “jurisdictional character of sovereign immunity.” Reply Br. 11. Yet the Ranch

  fails to appreciate that Rodas itself involved sovereign immunity (related to the

  Federal Tort Claims Act) and still managed to harmonize the cases that the

  Ranch cites. Rodas, 656 F.3d at 616, 619–21. The Ranch also insists that Rodas

  conflicts with Crow v. Wyoming Timber Products Co., 424 F.2d 93, 96 (10th

  Cir. 1970). But Crow didn’t involve waiver. And Crow predated Grubbs, which

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  clarified that after a final district-court judgment the propriety of removal isn’t

  an issue—instead, all that matters is the existence of original district-court

  jurisdiction. Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 702 (“Longstanding decisions of this Court

  make clear . . . that where after removal a case is tried on the merits without

  objection and the federal court enters judgment, the issue in subsequent

  proceedings on appeal is not whether the case was properly removed, but

  whether the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction of the

  case had it been filed in that court.”). 13

        Had the County originally brought its QTA crossclaims in a federal-court

  case, the district court would have had original jurisdiction under the QTA, so

  the crossclaims meet Grubbs’s test. See § 1346(f). As Wright and Miller

  remarked, Rodas presents the “better view” of derivative jurisdiction.

  14 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Helen

  Hershkoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3655 (4th ed. 2015). We agree

  with Rodas and join the six circuits that hold that derivative-jurisdiction issues

  are waivable. Because the Ranch never challenged the district court’s

        13
           The Ranch argues that Grupo Dataflux requires that in cases involving
  derivative jurisdiction, federal courts cannot assert subject-matter jurisdiction
  without it. But Grupo Dataflux concerned diversity jurisdiction. The parties
  weren’t diverse when the case was filed but became so by judgment because in
  the interval a party’s citizenship changed. The Supreme Court held that under
  the “time-of-filing rule,” subject-matter jurisdiction must exist when a case is
  filed. 541 U.S. at 570–71. Grupo Dataflux says nothing about whether the
  derivative-jurisdiction doctrine is a subject-matter-jurisdiction issue or a
  procedural defect.
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  jurisdiction under the derivative-jurisdiction doctrine until this appeal, it has

  waived the argument.

                                     ⁎     ⁎      ⁎

        Though removal here was improper, the Ranch waived its protest by

  waiting until this appeal to broach the subject. With the district court’s subject-

  matter jurisdiction verified, we turn to the merits of the Ranch’s appeal.

  II.   Public Prescriptive Use Under Colorado Law

        The district court held that “the county has proven the roads are public by

  public prescriptive use” between 1929 and 1949 under section 43-2-201(1)(c)

  of the Colorado Revised Statutes. 14 High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d

  at 837–38. The Ranch argues that the district court’s finding of public adverse

  use is erroneous and “contravene[s] constitutional principles.” Opening Br. 35.

  We review the challenge to the district court’s factual finding of adverse use for

  clear error. Obeslo v. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 6 F.4th 1135, 1148

        14
          Section 43-2-201(1) provides the legal standard for creating public
  highways over private lands in Colorado. The statute declares these to be
  “public highways”:

        (c) All roads over private lands that have been used adversely
        without interruption or objection on the part of the owners of such
        lands for twenty consecutive years;
        ...
        (e) All roads over the public domain, whether agricultural or
        mineral.
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  (10th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). 15 We review the constitutional question de

  novo. See United States v. Muhtorov, 20 F.4th 558, 630 (10th Cir. 2021)

  (citation omitted), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 246 (2022).

        A.    Adverse-Use Finding

        Under section 43-2-201(1)(c) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, “[a]ll

  roads over private lands that have been used adversely without interruption or

  objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty consecutive years”

  are considered public highways. There are three elements to public prescriptive

  use: “(1) members of the public must have used the road under a claim of right

  and in a manner adverse to the landowner’s property interest; (2) the public

  must have used the road without interruption for the statutory period of twenty

  years; and (3) the landowner must have had actual or implied knowledge of the

  public’s use of the road and made no objection to such use.” Bd. of Cnty.

  Comm’rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 980 (Colo. 1984) (citations omitted).

        The district court applied the standard for showing public prescriptive

  use under section 43-2-201(1)(c) and found substantial evidence of public

  adverse use during the statutory period. High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d

        15
           The Ranch seeks de novo review because it is challenging legal
  conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact that “primarily” involve
  “consideration of legal principles.” Opening Br. 35 (citing Roberts v. Printup,
  595 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010)). We read the Ranch’s opening brief as
  challenging the district court’s fact-findings by recharacterizing the strength of
  the evidence on which the court relied. We are therefore bound to apply the
  clear-error standard of review.
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  at 836–39. It was persuaded that the County’s 1929 petition process showed

  that the public had used the roads for well over twenty years before 1929. Id.

  at 837–38. It explained that the 1929 resolution identified the entire length of

  Middle Dry Fork Road and much of North Dry Fork Road and notified property

  owners in the area to attend a county meeting if they wanted to object to the

  roads being public. Id. at 837. And because the 1929 resolution was “filed with

  the County Clerk and Recorder,” the district court concluded that “[l]andowners

  thus knew about the road, and there is no evidence they objected to it.” Id.

        It also relied on abundant evidence that the public used the roads after

  the 1929 petition. Id. The district court found that the roads were used by

  patentees and their families. See, e.g., id. at 837–38 (“In 1933 Peter Becker

  entered his patented parcel on Middle Dry Fork and began proving up. He used

  the road to reach his land through 1940 when he received his patent and until

  1941 when he sold to Lew Young. During the 1940s Lew Young’s family used

  the road to access their properties along both North and Middle Dry Fork Roads

  until they sold to the Beaches in 1959. They drove their car to and from [De

  Beque] and hosted hunters each year. At no point did the Court hear evidence

  that a landowner blocked any part of either road between 1929 and 1949.”). The

  district court also found evidence of significant commercial activity. See id.

  at 837 (“Middle Dry Fork Road was in use from 1916 when the Oil Shale

  Mining Company began its operations. Mining claimants did yearly assessment

  work on claims in 1929 and 1930, using the road to access them.”).

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        Based on all the evidence before it, the district court ultimately

  concluded that the roads “were continuously traveled for more than twenty

  years,” which “trigger[ed] the adverse-use presumption.” Id. at 838. But the

  court then held that adverse use existed even without the presumption because

  there were no recorded easements and no evidence of landowners objecting to

  the roads being public in county meetings. Id. (“Neither party found any record

  of easements among landowners to cross one another’s land. No landowners or

  other interested parties objected to the road petition at the 1917 county

  meeting. The Court never heard evidence that any landowner subsequently

  objected to the public’s use or tried to prevent others from traveling the roads

  between 1929 and 1949.”). For those reasons, the court found adverse public

  use. Id. at 837–39.

        The Ranch argues that the district court’s adverse-use analysis conflates

  the requirements for creating a private easement with the requirements of

  creating a public highway. It contends that the district court relied on evidence

  of “obviously intermittent and permissive uses.” Opening Br. 41. But arguing

  that the evidence supports a finding of permissive use doesn’t make the district

  court’s adverse-use findings clearly erroneous. The Ranch doesn’t fully explain

  how the district court improperly weighed the public-use evidence. It also fails

  to point us to any cases reversing as clearly erroneous similar findings by

  district courts. See Maralex Res., Inc. v. Chamberlain, 320 P.3d 399, 404 (Colo.

  App. 2014) (“Whether use is adverse or permissive is a question of fact, and, as

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  such, is within the province of the fact finder.” (citation omitted)). The

  “sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, along with the

  inferences and conclusions to be drawn from such evidence, are all within the

  province of the trial court.” Id. at 405–06. We thus reject the Ranch’s argument.

        The Ranch also argues that “the district court applied a ‘presumption of

  adversity,’” Opening Br. 42, because it concluded that North and Middle Dry

  Fork Roads “were continuously traveled for more than twenty years,” id.

  (quoting High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 838). The Ranch argues that

  applying this presumption was legal error because it “improperly placed the

  burden on the Ranch to disprove adversity.” Id. at 41. But as discussed, the

  presumption of adversity wasn’t necessary to the district court’s finding. The

  district court said that “[e]ven without that presumption, the evidence before

  the Court proved that use of the roads was adverse.” High Lonesome Ranch,

  508 F. Supp. 3d at 838. In any event, we reject the Ranch’s argument because it

  misapprehends Colorado law. In Maralex Resources, the Colorado Court of

  Appeals noted that courts may presume adversity if there is non-permissive use

  of land for the statutory period. 320 P.3d at 404 (citing Brown v. Faatz,

  197 P.3d 245, 250 (Colo. App. 2008)). So the district court didn’t err even if the

  presumption of adversity were necessary to its finding of adverse public use. 16

        16
           The Ranch also argues that the district court should have considered
  historical evidence of gates on the roads by prior landowners as showing only
  permissive use, not adverse use. See Opening Br. 44 (citing McIntyre v. Bd. of

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         B.    Constitutional Taking

         The Ranch also argues that the district court’s adverse-use finding

  “contravenes constitutional protections against uncompensated takings.”

  Opening Br. 45. But the Ranch never develops a constitutional-takings

  argument. Reply Br. 15 n.9 (“[T]he Ranch does not assert [a takings argument]

  . . . [It] argues [only] that adverse use is constrained by constitutional

  principles.”). It cites Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 679–80

  (1979), for the proposition that the Supreme Court has cautioned “that right-of-

  way doctrines cannot ‘upset settled expectations to accommodate some ill-

  defined power to construct public thoroughfares without compensation.’” Reply

  Br. 15. The Ranch doesn’t tell us what to do with such a proposition even if we

  agreed with it. Because it’s unclear what relief the Ranch wants from our court,

  we decline to consider the Ranch’s argument.

  III.   The Enerwest Decision

         The Ranch contends that in a 1986 decision, the Colorado Court of

  Appeals determined that North Dry Fork Road was private. See Opening Br.

  9–10 (citing Enerwest, Inc. v. Dyco Petrol. Corp., 716 P.2d 1130 (Colo. App.

  1986)). In that case, Enerwest had purchased property that carried an easement

  to Dyco Petroleum Corporation. Id. at 1131. The easement gave Dyco the right

  Cnty. Comm’rs, 86 P.3d 402, 412 (Colo. 2004)). As the district court concluded,
  “opening the gates and going through, without ever seeking permission,
  actually suggests adverse use.” High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 838.
                                           33
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  to use North Dry Fork Road up to the Y. Opening Br. Addendum D, at 153.

  Enerwest sued to prevent Dyco from using the road. Enerwest, 716 P.2d

  at 1131. Along with defending the easement, Dyco had also argued during trial

  that the road on the land was a public highway. Id. at 1132. But the trial court

  held that Dyco’s use of the roads had been permissive rather than adverse. Id.

  The court of appeals agreed, concluding that “[t]he trial court’s determination

  that the road in question had not become a public highway will not be disturbed

  on review” because there was “ample evidence” that any use was permissive,

  not adverse. Id. (citation omitted).

        The Ranch asks us to give Enerwest preclusive effect against the County.

  But the County was not a party in Enerwest. On that basis, the district court

  declined to bind the County to the decision. High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F.

  Supp. 3d at 844–45 (“Normally it is the duty of the litigants or the court to join

  an indispensable party.” (citing Bittle v. CAM–Colo., LLC, 318 P.3d 65, 69–70

  (Colo. App. 2012))). The district court didn’t err.

  IV.   R.S. 2477

        The Ranch argues that the district court lessened the County’s burden to

  show that the public had accepted an R.S. 2477 right-of-way over the roads by

  “long-continued use” and “held the County to no significant burden.” Opening

  Br. 46. The County responds that the Ranch is simply challenging the court’s

  permissible use of circumstantial evidence to prove public use. We agree with

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  the Ranch that the district court’s articulated R.S. 2477 standard was too

  lenient.

        To establish an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, a party must show (1) a right-of-

  way over the public domain and (2) the public’s acceptance of it by use. See

  Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane County, 632 F.3d 1162, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2011) (en

  banc). The district court correctly noted that “federal law governs the

  interpretation of R.S. 2477, but that in determining what is required for

  acceptance of a right of way under the statute, federal law ‘borrows’ from long-

  established principles of state law, to the extent that state law provides

  convenient and appropriate principles for effectuating congressional intent.”

  High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 831 (quoting SUWA, 425 F.3d

  at 768). But “to the extent state law is borrowed in the course of interpreting

  R.S. 2477, it must be in service of federal policy or functions[] and cannot

  derogate from the evident purposes of the federal statute.” SUWA, 425 F.3d

  at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted).

        In identifying the R.S. 2477 standard for acceptance, the district court

  recited the standard in Brown v. Jolley, 387 P.2d 278, 281 (Colo. 1963) (in

  department). High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 832. There, a three-

  justice panel for the Colorado Supreme Court declared that such acceptance

  “results from ‘use by those for whom it was necessary or convenient’” and

  suffices even “if the use be by only one.” Brown, 387 P.2d at 281. Yet in the

  district court and on appeal, the parties failed to cite our later decision in San

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  Juan County v. United States, 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014). There, we rejected

  Utah’s and San Juan County’s argument that acceptance required “no particular

  frequency of use,” only public use “as often as the public finds convenient or

  necessary during the ten-year period.” Id. at 797. We held that such a lenient

  standard departed from Congress’s intent under R.S. 2477 in establishing a

  public thoroughfare. Id. Instead, we required an acceptance standard under

  which “[t]he intensity of public use remains a pertinent component.” Id. at 799.

        On this point, the district court did not cite or apply San Juan County.

  Instead, it merely applied Colorado’s acceptance standard from Brown without

  addressing whether Brown “derogate[s] from the evident purposes of [R.S.

  2477].” SUWA, 425 F.3d at 763. Brown contravenes congressional intent for the

  same reason we noted in San Juan County: The acceptance standard is too

  lenient. In divining congressional intent, we have turned to R.S. 2477’s phrase

  “for the construction of highways.” San Juan County, 754 F.3d at 799. A

  public-use standard requiring only that the use be “as often as the public finds

  convenient or necessary” departs from this R.S. 2477 phrase and thus from

  Congress’s intent in enacting that statute. See id. As in San Juan County,

  adopting Brown as the applicable standard risks a right-of-way “spring[ing]

  into being at the most infrequent use of a path by a member of the public.” Id.

        Because the district court applied an acceptance standard out of step with

  San Juan County, we must reverse. Though we recognize that “it is difficult to

  crystallize in a verbal formula the precise level of use necessary for acceptance

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  of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way,” id., on remand, the district court should apply to

  the trial evidence an acceptance standard that accords with our guidance in San

  Juan County.

  V.    Scope of Rights-of-Way

        The Ranch argues that the district court didn’t sufficiently adjudicate the

  location and width of the roads. It insists that the roads be confined to a single

  and definite path. It points out that “for miles approaching the ‘Y,’ the roads sit

  in open range.” Reply Br. 24. And the Ranch says that the roads vary by over

  half a mile from the historically traced routes on which the district court relied.

  This imprecision, the Ranch believes, requires us to vacate the district court’s

  order and remand for a re-adjudication of the roads’ precise locations. We

  review this argument for clear error because it challenges the district court’s

  factual findings. Obeslo, 6 F.4th at 1148 (citation omitted).

        The parties dispute the effect of Weisiger v. Harbour, 62 P.3d 1069, 1071

  (Colo. App. 2002), on this issue. That case holds that minor deviations from

  historical routes will not defeat a claim of public use. See id. The Ranch argues

  that a half-mile change in the roads’ route is not a minor deviation. It points out

  that Weisiger relied on cases treating deviations of 100 feet or less as minor—

  not deviations up to a half-mile. The Ranch is correct on this point, but it

  ignores another key statement from Weisiger: A deviation in the path of a

  prescriptive easement doesn’t defeat a public-use claim when the deviation is

  caused by actions over which the claimant had no control. Id. at 1072 (citations

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  omitted). The Ranch doesn’t contend that the County or its agents changed the

  historic route of the roads. In fact, the district court relied on evidence that the

  route changes largely came from natural washouts: “I have already found that

  the deviations in these roads throughout their over one-hundred-year existence

  are minor and the obvious result of natural changes in the landscape and the

  changing needs of settlers along the roads as they extended.” High Lonesome

  Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 836. The County argues that the Ranch itself changed

  the roads’ locations for its own convenience. The Ranch doesn’t dispute this in

  its reply.

         The district judge visited the disputed area and toured the roads. He

  drove along North and Middle Dry Fork Roads. He saw that these roads

  traveled through narrow canyons. Based on these observations and two

  historical surveys, the district court determined the location of the rights-of-

  way after a weeklong trial that included reviewing documents and testimony

  about the roads over the last century. See High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp.

  3d at 840. Given the extensive effort invested in analyzing the evidence and

  confirming the descriptive testimony, we have no basis to declare the district

  court’s adjudication of the rights-of-way to be clearly erroneous.

         But we agree with the Ranch that the precise locations and widths of the

  rights-of-way aren’t clear from the district court’s opinion. To clarify the

  parties’ rights and obligations, the district court should order a formal survey to

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  establish the dimensions of the rights-of-way. It may allocate costs as it sees

  fit.

  VI.    Presumption of Abandonment

         Under the presumption-of-abandonment principle, public property is

  considered abandoned if a party provides evidence of nonuse and intent to

  abandon the property. See Koenig v. Gaines, 440 P.2d 155, 157–58 (Colo. 1968)

  (in department). The Ranch argues that the district court misapplied the law in

  its abandonment analysis. 17 It summarizes the district-court opinion as finding

  that (1) the County abandoned the roads but that (2) the presumption was

  overcome “without contrary evidence.” Opening Br. 56. The Ranch insists that

  this “is not how presumptions work.” Id. And it declares that “[o]nce the

  ‘presumption of abandonment’ is triggered, the party resisting abandonment has

  the ‘duty of overcoming it.’” Id. (quoting Monte Vista Bank & Tr. Co. v.

  Savage, 225 P. 219, 220 (Colo. 1924)).

         In fact, the district court correctly articulated the two elements of

  abandonment: “(1) intent to abandon and (2) nonuse.” High Lonesome Ranch,

  508 F. Supp. 3d at 843 (citing Koenig, 440 P.2d at 157–58). It then held that

  “[t]his forty-plus year period of non-use creates a presumption of abandonment.

         17
           The County argues that a presumption of abandonment does not exist
  under Colorado law. The district court found that such a presumption does
  exist, and we agree. See, e.g., In re Protest of McKenna, 346 P.3d 35, 42 (Colo.
  2015) (“The common law has long defined abandonment as nonuse coupled
  with the owner’s intent to relinquish his appropriation.” (citing Arnold v. Roup,
  157 P. 206, 209 (Colo. 1916))).
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  But this presumption can be, and indeed is, overcome.” Id. at 844. Though the

  Ranch argues that this statement misapplies the presumption, it takes the

  court’s statement out of context. The district court explained that though the

  Ranch could show nonuse of the roads under Koenig, that was just one

  necessary element to show abandonment. Id. at 843–44. The other necessary

  element is intent. Koenig, 440 P.2d at 157. And the district court stated that

  “[t]he Court finds that the Ranch fails to prove the first element of

  abandonment, intent.” High Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 844 (emphases

  added). It then rejected the evidence that the Ranch believes shows an intent to

  abandon—such as the County’s failure to maintain the roads, failure to

  complain about the locked gates on the road, and failure to “identify the roads

  as public on maps.” Id.

        A fair reading of the district court’s opinion shows that it didn’t shift the

  burden of proof or misapply the abandonment presumption. To the contrary, the

  district court explained why the Ranch failed to show that the County intended

  to abandon the public nature of the roads: “The Court finds that the Ranch has

  carried its burden on the second element, nonuse. . . . The Court finds that the

  Ranch fails to prove the first element of abandonment, intent.” Id. The district

  court found that this meant that the Ranch failed to prove abandonment. See id.

  at 844–45 (“Without more I will not assume the county believed the roads were

  private merely because the Ranch asks me to.”). Because the Ranch’s argument

  mischaracterizes the district court’s opinion, it fails.

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        Even if the Ranch were correct that the County introduced no evidence to

  excuse its nonuse, and even if we looked past the Ranch’s failure to show that

  the County intended to abandon the roads, we would still affirm. The district

  court correctly cited Koenig as providing the relevant standard to prove

  abandonment under Colorado law and applied the case by its terms. Id.

  at 843–45. So abandonment is a factual question. Accord United States v.

  Austin, 66 F.3d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[A]bandonment of property is a

  factual finding . . . .” (citation omitted)). The district court weighed the

  evidence and found that the roads weren’t abandoned as a matter of fact. High

  Lonesome Ranch, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 846. The Ranch points to no clear error in

  the district court’s identification of the relevant evidence or how it weighed

  that evidence in finding that the roads weren’t abandoned.

                                   CONCLUSION

        For those reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s adverse-use ruling but

  REVERSE its R.S. 2477 ruling and remand for the court to reconsider that

  ruling under the San Juan County standard. 18 We also remand for the district

  court to determine the locations and widths of the rights-of-way by survey.

        18
           On remand, the district court need reanalyze only the R.S. 2477 claim
  for the portion of North Dry Fork Road west of the Y.
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