Court Opinion

ID: 9439924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:58:29.521816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:47.045242
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I write separately because I believe that there was sufficient evidence of causation to allow the issue to go to the jury. However, I concur with the majority’s result because I do not think the police officers’ conduct eon-*54stituted a violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights.
I. Causation
I think the record indicates the existence of a factual issue as to causation, precluding the granting of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the ground of an absence of causation. See Ahern v. O’Donnell, 109 F.3d 809, 811 (1st Cir.1997) (all inferences to be made in favor of party against whom summary judgment sought).
Causation depends upon whether, assuming the police officers violated § 1983 on March 17 by not carrying out the court order directing them to take Francisco into custody for psychiatric examination, there was a sufficient causal connection between the officers’ default and Francisco’s stabbing of a relative two weeks later.
Causation in tort law is generally divided into two concepts: causation in fact, or actual causation, and proximate or legal causation. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts §§ 41-42 (5th ed.1984). The terms for these two concepts are sometimes confused, as are the concepts themselves. Regardless of the terminology, however, there are two questions that must be answered to determine if a defendant’s conduct “caused” a plaintiffs injury. The first question is whether there was in fact some causal relationship between the conduct and the outcome. The Restatement expresses this test as whether the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in producing the harm. Id. The second question is whether the circumstances and causal relationship are such that the law will impose liability on the defendant. Sometimes this is expressed as a foreseeability test, see Keeton, supra, § 42, at 273. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 431(b) (1965) (different terminology).
Regarding the second issue, foreseeability, that prong is plainly satisfied here. A foreseeable result of the police officers’ failure to take Francisco to the psychiatrist for examination, as ordered by the court, was that he would harm someone, since the express basis of the court order was Francisco’s potential dangerousness and likely eligibility for involuntary commitment in a mental health facility. The reason for the ordered psychiatric examination, as Puerto Rico’s statute specifically provides, infra, is to determine whether a person believed to be dangerous is dangerous, and needs to be committed immediately in order to avoid the kind of harm Francisco later caused. While under the preliminary court order in issue Francisco could only be detained for twenty-four hours, the order directed that he be psychiatrically examined during that period and that, within the twenty-four hours, a report of his condition be sent to the judge and proper steps be initiated for his involuntary admittance should that be indicated. Thus the harm that occurred here was clearly a foreseeable result of interrupting the protective process begun by the petition and order.
Since the harm that occurred was foreseeable, the only remaining question is that of actual cause, i.e., whether Francisco’s later assault with a knife was actually linked causally in sufficient degree to the police’s failure to detain Francisco for the ordered psychiatric examination. I believe that on this record a factual issue is raised as to whether the police officers’ failure to comply with the court order to detain Francisco was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the harm from Francisco’s later stabbing of Celso.6
The order the police failed to carry out was issued under a comprehensive statutory scheme for the examination and involuntary commitment to a mental health facility of mentally ill people who are dangerous to themselves or others. In the first step of this process, any person who fears an individual may be psychologically unstable may bring that individual to the attention of a Puerto Rico court. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 6006. This occurred here when a relative, *55Mr. Jorge Rodríguez-Nieves, filed a petition to the Puerto Rico court declaring that Francisco was believed dangerous, having threatened to kill someone with a sharp object such as a machete or a knife. The petition also stated that Francisco had previously been in a recognized mental institution.
The second step spelled out in the Puerto Rico statute is for a judge to decide, preliminarily, whether or not there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the patient is subject to involuntary admission and needs immediate hospitalization to keep him from harming himself, other persons or property.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The judge expressly found such reasonable grounds here and issued a written order that Francisco was to be detained for twenty-four hours and examined by a psychiatrist to determine “if he should be admitted immediately and involuntarily to the psychiatric institution,” as the statute provided. The order directed that an explanatory report be returned to the'judge within the twenty-four hours and a resolution of provisional admittance prepared in the event continued hospitalization was required. It was the court order containing the above provisions that the police allegedly failed to carry out, with the result that Francisco was never examined by a psychiatrist and the necessary steps never taken for his involuntary hospitalization should that have been recommended by the psychiatrist.
If Francisco had been examined, the psychiatrist was under a duty, as the order and Puerto Rico law provide, to report his findings concerning Francisco’s mental condition and potential dangerousness back to the court within twenty-four hours. If the court had then found by clear and convincing evidence, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 6089, that Francisco was “subject to involuntary admission,” the court would have ordered him confined to a mental health facility. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 6090. The statute provides that a person is “subject to involuntary admission” if he is mentally ill and if, because of his illness, he “may reasonably be expected to physically injure himself or any other person, or damage property.” P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 4002(14)(a).
It is important to emphasize that the order here in question did not merely provide for a, twenty-four hour period of detention. Rather it was based on a judge’s finding of reasonable cause to believe that Francisco was a candidate for involuntary admission, i.e. confinement, in a mental health facility. The twenty-four hours’ detention was merely the period within which he was to be evaluated, after which, if the initial finding was confirmed, he would be involuntarily committed for a more extended period. Under Puerto Rico law, a court’s order for involuntary admission is limited, in the first instance, to a term of thirty days, but it can be followed by an additional thirty-day order. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 6094(a). This second thirty-day period may then be supplemented by additional periods of 180 days as long as the patient “continues to be subject to involuntary admission.” P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 6094(b). So in effect, once involuntarily admitted, a person may be forced to remain confined in a mental health facility indefinitely if he remains a danger to himself, others, or to property because of a mental illness.
I believe the evidence here plainly creates a jury issue as to whether Francisco would likely have been confined to a mental health facility for a sufficient period of time to render him unable to stab Celso when he did, had the police complied with the court order to detain him for a psychiatric examination. A jury could find that the police officers’ failure to enforce the order was a “substantial factor” in the ensuing harm.
As noted, there is evidence that Francisco had threatened to kill with a sharp object, such as a machete or a knife, a threat followed by stabbing his brother two weeks later. The record also indicates his prior hospitalization in a mental facility, giving rise to an inference that his behavior stemmed from an underlying mental condition. Even more significantly, the record shows a judicial determination, reciting the consideration of evidence, that “the Court finds a reasonable basis to believe that [Francisco] may be subject to an involuntary admission treatment and hospitalization under the provisions of the Puerto Rico Mental Health Code.” Underlying that determination necessarily *56lay a finding of reasonable grounds to believe that Francisco might harm himself, other persons or property. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 6006.
The above facts more than suffice, in my view, to demonstrate a triable issue over whether, if the defendants had done their duty and brought Francisco to the psychiatrist for examination, the latter would more likely than not have found that Francisco was mentally ill and a danger to himself or to others and recommended committing him involuntarily. Had that recommendation been made, it could also be reasonably inferred that the Puerto Rico court would have implemented it pursuant to the statutory authority described above, and that Francisco, being confined, would not have been able to stab Celso two weeks later. Hence, I believe there is adequate evidence to create a factual issue for later trial over whether the police officers’ default was a “substantial factor” in causing Celso’s stabbing.7
The majority argues that no reasonable jury could find that the police officers’ failure to bring Francisco to the psychiatrist actually caused Celso’s injuries. They point out that two weeks elapsed between the police officers’ failure to detain Francisco and the stabbing. They also insist that it is too speculative, on this record, to know whether Francisco would have been confined or treated so as not to have injured Celso when he did.
The time factor is hardly significant here. Two weeks is not a lengthy interval for present purposes; it is less than the thirty days which the court could have initially ordered him confined had the court determined, after psychiatric examination, that he was dangerous. “[Wjhere it is evident that the influence of the actor’s negligence is still a substantial factor, mere lapse of time, no matter how long, is not sufficient to prevent it from being the legal cause of the other’s harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433(c) cmt. f (1965). The damage from the collapse of a defective bridge is no less caused by the builder’s negligence even though occurring months or years after construction.
As for the argument that it is too speculative whether Francisco would have been confined, I think, for reasons already discussed, that the present record is sufficient to raise a factual issue concerning his likely commitment that makes summary judgment inappropriate. The evidence of Francisco’s mental instability and dangerousness is uncontested making it probable that he would have been committed. The Puerto Rico judge had already found that Francisco was a likely candidate for involuntary commitment — a preliminary finding, to be sure, but indicative of a factual issue in that judge’s mind as to the need to commit him.
There is, in addition, the affidavit of a psychologist which, if accepted, would lend even further support to the probability of his commitment. Unfortunately, as the district court and my colleagues note, the affidavit is poorly drafted. The affidavit says only that it is the psychologist’s “understanding” that Francisco has a serious personality disorder. It does say, however, that the psychologist is “of the opinion that Mr. Francisco Rodriguez-Cirilo’s being temporarily detained on March 17,1994 for the purpose [of] an examination and evaluation of his mental condition ... would have resulted in Francisco Rodriguez-Cirilo’s receipt of timely and effective psychological and/or psychiatric treatment, most likely on an in patient basis over an extended period of time,” (emphasis supplied) and expresses the opinion that such treatment would have prevented Francisco’s later stabbing of Cirilo.
Given, in any case, the other uncontested factual evidence mentioned above plainly indicating Francisco’s abnormality and dangerousness, I cannot doubt that a factual issue *57exists over whether Francisco would have been confined and, if so, rendered unable to have committed the assault in dispute. The very finding by the Puerto Rico court of reasonable grounds to believe that Francisco was subject to involuntary commitment suggests the existence of such a triable issue. The existence of such an issue is the only question at the present stage. We are not now acting as factfinders. Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial. The credible evidence here all shows that Francisco was suffering from mental instability, having been previously hospitalized and having uttered credible threats, later carried out, to stab someone to death. Hence even excluding the affidavit, the record provides a factual basis for a finding that, if detained as ordered for psychiatric examination, Francisco would, more likely than not, have been involuntarily admitted to a mental health facility, thereby preventing the later stabbing. The police officers’ failure to detain Francisco could thus reasonably be found to have been a “substantial factor” in producing Cel-so’s injuries.
II. The Due Process Claim
Despite my disagreement with the majority on causation, I concur in the result because, like the district court, I do not believe that the plaintiffs have stated a violation of the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution.8
Plaintiffs’ due process claim does not rest, of course, on any contention that the police or other agents of the state attacked or physically harmed Celso. This case is not about violence committed by agents of the state. Rather, Plaintiffs’ claim concerns the all too common situation where violence inflicted by a third party might have been prevented had the police or other public officials acted more diligently. But while police default may be found to have caused Celso to lose the protection of a state statutory scheme designed to guard the public against people having Francisco’s potential for violence, this unfortunate failure does not violate the federal constitution. As the Supreme Court wrote:
But nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without “due process of law,” but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1008, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). See also Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir.) (holding that a county was not liable under the Due Process Clause for the death of a woman murdered by a prison inmate while he was on a furlough release, even though the county had reason to know that the victim was in special danger from the murderer), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 270, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986).
Nor does the fact that the police violated the plain order of a Puerto Rico court to detain Francisco and bring him to a psychiatrist for examination change the analysis. Police officers certainly have a duty to obey court orders. But the court did not, in ordering Francisco’s detention, thereby create the sort of “special relationship” between the state and all of Francisco’s potential victims that might make the state liable for any harm that came to them at Francisco’s hands. See generally DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-203, 109 S.Ct. at 1004-07 (discussing the “special relationship” test). Neither did the state render Celso more vulnerable to the danger posed by Francisco. See id. at 201, 109 S.Ct. at 1006. By failing to detain him for examination, the defendants merely failed to reduce a danger — not of the state’s own making — that Francisco’s violent proclivities already created.
The police officers in this case may have acted improperly. Faced with a court order *58to detain Francisco, they should not have substituted their judgment for the court’s and refused to detain him in violation of the court’s order. As discussed above, a jury could reasonably find that their wrongful failure to enforce the court’s order was a substantial factor in causing Celso’s injury by Francisco. Their default might constitute a tort under state law. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965) (stating that one who undertakes to render services to another may be liable for performing negligently). But “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202, 109 S.Ct. at 1006. If the defendants’ conduct here violated the Due Process Clause, then many everyday defaults of police, firefighters, and other public officials around the nation would likewise violate the Constitution on a similar theory. It will be unfortunate, I believe, if, instead of relying on state legislatures and state courts to provide legal means to redress matters of this nature, federal courts transform conduct that is at most tortious into constitutional causes of action.
I would affirm the decision of the district court because the plaintiffs have no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause.

. Although the majority discusses the Restatement 's "substantial factor” test under the rubric of proximate causation, Rodríguez-Cirilo v. García, at 52 (1st Cir.1997), it is perhaps more accurately described as referring to actual causation. See Keeton, supra, § 42, at 278 (“|T]he 1948 revision of the Restatement limited [the] application [of the "substantial factor” test] very definitely to cause in fact alone.”) (citing, inter alia, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (1965)).

. My colleagues' error, as I see it, is in treating causation as a matter for their own determination now rather than recognizing that, on summary judgment, the question is simply whether, viewing everything most favorably to (here) the plaintiffs, the record indicates a disputed issue of fact. I do not see how, for that purpose, one can ignore the finding, similar to a probable cause finding, of a Puerto Rico judge, coupled with undisputed facts strongly indicating that Francisco was both mentally unbalanced and dangerous to others — the criteria for involuntary admission. From these facts a reasonable jury could infer that he would likely have been committed for several weeks or more, thus preventing any attack on Celso.

. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....”