Court Opinion

ID: 9907465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 16:06:38.091808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:27.542496
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                       No. 23-0076
                                 Filed December 6, 2023

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS SUCCESSOR BY MERGER OF U.S.
BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION ND,
      Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

DON W. LANGMAID, JR., MARILYN L. LANGMAID, DON W. LANGMAID, JR.
and MARILYN LEE LANGMAID REVOCABLE TRUST, KIRK LANGMAID,
THERESA LANGMAID, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC., QUICKEN LOANS, LLC, n/k/a ROCKET MORTGAGE, LLC,
and PARTIES IN POSSESSION,
     Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Stacy Ritchie, Judge.

       U.S. Bank appeals a district court ruling dismissing its petition with prejudice

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

       Donald J. Pavelka Jr. of Locher Pavelka Dostal Braddy & Hammes, LLC,

Council Bluffs, for appellant.

       David J. Hellstern of Sullivan & Ward, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellees

Don W. Langmaid Jr, Marilyn L. Langmaid, Don W. Langmaid Jr. and Marilyn Lee

Langmaid Revocable Trust, Kirk Langmaid, and Theresa Langmaid.

       Scott A. Hall of Carney & Appleby, PLC, Des Moines, for appellee Quicken

Loans, LLC, n/k/a Rocket Mortgage, LLC.

       Considered by Bower, C.J., and Ahlers and Chicchelly, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.

       U.S. Bank appeals a district court ruling dismissing with prejudice its

foreclosure petition against Don Langmaid; Marilyn Langmaid; Don W. Langmaid

and Marilyn Lee Langmaid Revocable Trust; Kirk Langmaid; Theresa Langmaid;

and Quicken Loans, LLC (collectively, the Langmaids), regarding property owned

by Don and Marylin. U.S. Bank contends, because the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction, it could not make a ruling on whether a homestead exemption

exists. U.S. Bank also contests the ruling any future petition is subject to the two-

dismissal rule enumerated in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943. We reverse and

remand with instructions.

I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       In a petition filed in 2019, U.S. Bank sought foreclosure of the Langmaids’

real estate in Jasper County. The parties settled, and the case was voluntarily

dismissed by U.S. Bank.

       At issue here is a petition filed in June 2022 for foreclosure on the same

property, again filed by U.S. Bank. The Langmaids filed a pre-answer motion to

dismiss, claiming the property was agricultural property and therefore subject to

pre-foreclosure farm mediation pursuant to Iowa Code section 654A.6(1)(a)

(2022).

       The district court granted the Langmaids’ motion to dismiss. U.S. Bank

appeals, claiming the court should have dismissed the case without prejudice

rather than with prejudice.
                                           3

II.    Standard of Review

       We review rulings on subject matter jurisdiction for errors at law. Shaefer

v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Iowa 2013).            A court has inherent power to

determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings

before it. Klinge v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Iowa 2006).

III.   Subject Matter Jurisdiction

       Iowa Code section 654A.6(a)(1) reads, “A creditor . . . desiring to initiate a

proceeding to enforce a debt against agricultural property which is real estate

under chapter 654 . . . shall file a request for mediation with the farm mediation

service.” Neither party disputes the district court finding this property is agricultural

property, and U.S. Bank acknowledges they failed to request mediation under the

statute. The only issue before us is whether the district court erred when it

dismissed the petition with prejudice for lack of lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

In deciding to dismiss with prejudice, the district court relied on Iowa Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.943, titled “Voluntary Dismissal,” which reads:

               A party may, without order of court, dismiss that party’s own
       petition . . . at any time up until ten days before the trial is scheduled
       to begin. . . . A dismissal under this rule shall be without prejudice,
       unless otherwise stated; but if made by any party who has previously
       dismissed an action against the same defendant, in any court of any
       state or of the United States, including or based on the same cause,
       unless otherwise ordered by the court, such dismissal shall operate
       as an adjudication against that party on the merits, in the interests of
       justice.

       The district court found it was required to dismiss the petition based on lack

of subject matter jurisdiction:

       [T]his [forty]-acre plat of land described in the legal description is
       agricultural property as defined by [Iowa Code section] 654A.1, and
       [U.S. Bank] has therefore failed to:
                                          4

               a. file a request for farm mediation . . .;
               b. receive a farm mediation release . . . ‘
               c. give [the Langmaids] proper deadlines for a notice to cure .
       . . [and];
               d. give [the Langmaids] a proper deadline for a notice to
       accelerate . . . .
               These errors, specifically regarding the farm mediation
       requirements . . . are jurisdictional prerequisites to a creditor filing
       action, meaning without them, this court is without jurisdiction to hear
       this matter, and this matter must therefore be dismissed.

The district court further found the dismissal should be with prejudice: “Pursuant

to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943 and 1.946, and finding that this Property is

protected as a homestead, and that Plaintiff does not have a signed homestead

exemption in its Mortgage, this matter should therefore be dismissed with

prejudice.”

       We determine the district court acted beyond its power in making the

second part of this ruling. After finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the

district court impermissibly made findings of fact and conclusions on the merits of

the case. See State v. Rutherford, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2023 WL 7237087, at *2

(Iowa 2023) (noting “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any

cause” (citation omitted)). The district court’s conclusion the property is protected

as a homestead was a ruling on the merits.

       The district court’s application of rule 1.943 was incorrect. Since the district

court dismissed U.S. Bank’s petition, it could not consider a voluntary dismissal as

contemplated by rule 1.943. The proper analysis here is found solely in rule 1.946:

“All dismissals not governed by rule 1.943 or not for want of jurisdiction or improper

venue, shall operate as adjudications on the merits unless they specify otherwise.”

(Emphasis added.) It is clear from the plain language of the rule that dismissals
                                          5

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are to be without prejudice, as lack of

jurisdiction is one of only two exceptions to a dismissal constituting a judgment on

the merits.

       The Langmaids argue ACC Holdings, LLC v. Rooney should control. 973

N.W.2d 851, 853–55 (Iowa 2022). In ACC Holdings, after voluntarily dismissing

two previous suits for forcible entry and detainer (FED), a tax deedholder filed a

third complaint on the same grounds. Id. at 852–53. The supreme court found the

second voluntary dismissal was an adjudication on the merits under rule 1.943 and

therefore held the case should be dismissed with prejudice.              Id. at 854.

Specifically, the Langmaids claim the following hypothetical, posed in dicta of the

opinion, should inform our conclusions here:

               Finally, consider a thought experiment. Suppose a district
       court had involuntarily dismissed the second FED action. Would a
       district court have allowed ACC to bring a third FED action based
       merely on the same tax deed and the same continued occupancy?
       We think clearly not. Accordingly, rule 1.943 barred ACC’s third FED
       action, and it was error for the district court to conclude otherwise.

Id. at 855 (footnote omitted). We disagree. ACC Holdings deals with voluntary

dismissals. The Langmaids argue rule 1.943 should apply to the involuntary

dismissal here, but the plain text of rule 1.943 cuts against their claim. In ACC

Holdings, the supreme court refers to involuntary dismissals other than those

specifically set aside in rule 1.943, namely dismissals due to want of jurisdiction or

improper venue.     Therefore, application of the principles espoused in ACC

Holdings would be improper here.
                                       6

      We reverse the district court and remand for dismissal without prejudice in

accordance with this ruling.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.