Court Opinion

ID: 9585196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:57:25.815339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:06.998152
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting. If sound rules of construction would allow this amendment to be divorced and isolated from the Constitution of which it is expressly made a part, as the majority, I believe, has done, then the construction given it when thus standing alone is undoubtedly correct. But such mutilation is contrary to established rules of construction. Sound construction demands that this amendment be construed in pari materia with each and every other provision of the whole Constitution as thus amended. This at once presents the uniformity and classification of property clause of the Constitution [Code Ann. § 2-5403; Const, of 1945) which requires that taxation be uniform upon each class of property, and this amendment should not be construed to exempt any part of the property of a class subjected to tax, unless its terms expressly and positively demand such a construction. Then paragraphs 4 and 5 which follow the classification paragraph (Code Ann. *558§§ 2-5404, 2-5405; Const, of 1945) specify the classes of property that the legislature may exempt, and private property used for private purposes is not included therein, nor does this amendment even purport to amend either by adding thereto. Since the intent is a controlling guide of construction, does not the fact that there is not even an intimation of an intent to amend these sections compel the construction that the intent of this amendment was to be in harmony therewith?
Since Code Ann. § 2-5404, supra, allows exemptions of all institutions of purely public charity, and we held in Smith v. State of Ga., 217 Ga. 94 (121 SE2d 113), that properties there identical in purpose with properties here were public, hence public charity and therefore properly exempt from taxation, I believe it the duty of this court to construe this amendment to refer only to property used for a public purpose, hence public charity, and hence exempt, but that there is neither an express nor implied exemption of private property used for private purposes, and thus harmonize all parts of the Constitution and render this amendment valid. Indeed courts are bound to adopt a construction, if possible, that will render it valid rather than one that invalidates it.
While courts should never be influenced by what may be good or bad for the state, yet judges, as citizens of Georgia, who are aware of conditions in this state, can not overlook the overwhelming need for means of improving the economic conditions of rural Georgia and should be doubly sure that means such as this are irreconcilable with the overworked Fourteenth Amendment before striking them down and thus defeating such worthy efforts. I would hold the amendment valid and affirm the judgment.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Presiding Justice Candler concurs in this dissent.