Court Opinion

ID: 9713624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:18:56.863204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.651063
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
In reversing defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, the majority of the court departs from the traditional “probability” standard for determining whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial, adopts the Larrison “possibility” rule and applies the rule in circumstances where it has never before been applied by any state or federal court. I disagree with the ultimate decision to reverse defendant’s conviction and the manner in which the majority arrives at its decision. The majority fails to explain why the traditional rule is inadequate in these circumstances, why it chooses to follow the Larrison rule or why the application of the Larrison rule is justified where the testimony at issue is merely erroneous rather than deliberately false. I believe that the time-honored probability standard, which has always been adhered to in Minnesota before this case, should be followed, and, for this reason, I dissent.
Under the traditional standard for determining whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial, the threshold inquiry *593is whether the new evidence could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence before defendant’s trial. During the subsequent trial of defendant’s wife, it was found that the original identification of a fingerprint as defendant’s was erroneous. I have grave doubt whether the discovery that the original identification was incorrect is new evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.1 Nevertheless, I base my dissent on the ground that defendant has failed to satisfy the final inquiry under the traditional standard.
A new trial may be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence under the traditional Minnesota standard only where the new evidence is such as will probably produce a different result on retrial. Martin v. State, 295 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn.1980); State v. Klotter, 274 Minn. 58, 64, 142 N.W.2d 568, 572 (1966); State v. Weis, 186 Minn. 342, 344, 243 N.W. 135, 135-36 (1932). As this court has stated:
One of the controlling inquiries in determining whether a new trial should be granted on [the ground of newly discovered evidence] is whether the new evidence, if produced, will be likely to change the result; and unless it has a substantial tendency towards showing the innocence of defendants, a new trial should not be granted.
State v. Nelson, 91 Minn. 143, 155, 97 N.W. 652, 657 (1903).
Respected courts in other jurisdictions have held that it is “not sufficient for [the defendant] to bring in new evidence from which a jury could find him not guilty — it must be evidence which persuades the judge that a jury would find him not guilty.” Lombardo v. State, 172 Conn. 385, 391, 374 A.2d 1065, 1068 (1977). Accord Commonwealth v. Markham, - Mass.App. -, 411 N.E.2d 494, 496 (1980). Other courts have similarly instructed that “the test to be employed is not simply whether another jury might bring in a different verdict, but whether the new evidence is so material that it ought to produce a different result than the verdict reached.” State v. Miles, 402 So.2d 644, 649 (La.1981). Accord State v. Terroni, 270 A.2d 75, 78 (Me.1970). Justice Benjamin Cardozo, then judge of the New York Court of Appeals, considered this problem in a case where the newly discovered evidence concerned state witnesses who had recanted their trial testimony. Concurring in the judgment of the court denying a new trial, he stated that the trial court, when presented with the new trial motion, should not abandon the search for truth and turn it over to a jury. He said:
That would have been an easy avenue of escape from a solemn responsibility, but I cannot satisfy myself that along that avenue lay the path of duty. I think it was the duty of the trial judge to try the facts, and determine as best he could where the likelihood of truth lay. * * * He was not at liberty to shift upon the shoulders of another jury his own responsibility.
People v. Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, 180, 112 N.E. 733, 739 (1916) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
The fundamental issue concerns whether a new trial should be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence where expert witnesses for both the state and the defense mistakenly identified a fingerprint as being defendant’s.2 The resolution of that issue *594turns on the strength of the state’s other evidence. O’Bryan v. State, 300 So.2d 323 (Fla.App.1974), provides an apt analogy to this case. In O’Bryan the defendant was charged with murder. At trial the state introduced evidence that the defendant had type “A” blood, that the decedent had type “0” blood, that blood samples taken from fingernail scrapings of the decedent’s hands revealed the presence of both type “0” and type “A” blood, and that tests made on bloodstains on the tip of a vaginal swab used on the decedent revealed the presence of both type “0” and type “A” blood. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. After trial, it was found that the defendant had type “0” blood. The court found there was no lack of due diligence by the defense counsel in failing to discover this evidence. Nevertheless, the court denied the motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The court said that in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, it could not conclude that the newly discovered evidence— the erroneous identification of physical evidence directly linking the defendant to the crime — was such as would probably change the result if a new trial were granted.
The overwhelming likelihood of truth in this case is that defendant was properly found guilty of first-degree murder. The fingerprint on the envelope containing the gold coin is not, as the majority asserts, “the only circumstantial evidence tending to establish that [defendant] was in Duluth on the date of the murders.” (Supra at 587). The state’s handwriting expert testified that the handwriting on the envelope was that of defendant. As the majority notes, this court must take the view most favorable to the state and must assume that the jury believed the state’s witness and disbelieved any contrary evidence. (Supra at 586). Beyond this physical evidence placing defendant in Duluth at the time of the murder, there was a significant amount of other incriminating evidence against defendant. Defendant had an undisputably strong motive for murdering Elisabeth Congdon; witnesses positively identified defendant as the man who was in a gift shop at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport the morning of the murder; the gold coin in the envelope addressed to defendant in defendant’s handwriting was taken from Elisabeth Congdon’s bedroom; and jewelry missing from Elisabeth Cong-don’s body was found in defendant’s hotel room. Still other evidence further implicated defendant: hair and blood found near the dead bodies were similar to defendant’s hair and blood type; the day after the murder defendant had cuts on his face and a swollen hand; the day after the murder defendant opened a safe deposit box and placed in it a document signed by his wife in which she conveyed to defendant all of the money due her from a trust upon the death of Elisabeth Congdon; and a wicker basket similar to one missing from Elisabeth Congdon’s bedroom was found in de*595fendant’s hotel room. In the face of this staggering array of evidence, I am unable to conclude that a jury in a new trial probably would, much less ought, find defendant not guilty.
The majority’s sole basis for reversing defendant’s conviction is the erroneous fingerprint identification by the state expert. For this reason, the majority’s reference to the alibi testimony of Candice Byers is curious. Ms. Byers, who did not testify at defendant’s trial, stated at Marjorie Caldwell’s trial that she saw defendant in a Colorado hotel at about 10 p. m. on June 26, 1977, the night the murders were committed in Duluth. However, on July 1, 1977, Ms. Byers told the Colorado police that she did not recall seeing defendant on June 26, and on July 9 she gave the police a written statement to the same effect. Moreover, following oral argument in this case, the state submitted affidavits and a handwritten statement by Ms. Byers stating that she had testified untruthfully at Marjorie Caldwell’s trial. Under these circumstances, and in light of the other evidence which the majority concedes is sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction (supra at 592), I find it implausible to believe that Ms. Byer’s testimony is sufficiently material to meet the traditional probability test for newly discovered evidence. The majority’s ambiguous assertion that her testimony “could” be material enough to meet this test (supra at 588) is makeweight, and belies the actual ground upon which the conviction is being reversed.
The majority expresses no disagreement with the conclusion that defendant’s conviction should not be reversed under the probability standard on the basis of the erroneous fingerprint evidence but determines that it should be reversed under the Larri-son possibility standard. I disagree with the application of this less stringent standard for the following reasons:
First, there are no cogent reasons for discarding our time-tested probability standard. Neither federal nor state constitutional law requires the possibility standard;3 no Minnesota statute mandates it; and Minnesota common law has always adhered to the probability standard.4 Due regard *596for the binding force of our past decisions does not require a blind adherence to precedent but it does impose an obligation to forthrightly explain departures from our common law. The majority inexplicably treats the case as one of first impression and fails to explain why the traditional probability standard is inadequate for determining whether the discovery of erroneous testimony warrants a new trial.5
Second, the Larrison rule has severe deficiencies. As one court reasons:
[The Larrison] test, if literally applied, should require reversal in cases of perjury with respect to even minor matters, especially in light of the standard jury instruction that upon finding that a witness had deliberately proffered false testimony in part, the jury may disregard his entire testimony. Thus, once it is shown that a material witness had intentionally lied with respect to any matter, it is difficult to deny that the jury, had it known of the lie, “might” have acquitted. We recognize that those who have professed adherence to the Larrison test do not appear to share our concern over the problems arising from its speculative nature. Indeed, notwithstanding the looseness of the test, most courts have not hesitated to deny new trials in cases where they have purported to apply it. However, rather than adopt the Larrison test and violate it in application, we believe, for the reasons indicated, that the time-honored “probability” standard is the more appropriate one for determining whether perjury calls for a new trial. In addition to its other virtues the rule enables a court to act forthrightly in making its determination.
United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819, 97 S.Ct. 66, 50 L.Ed.2d 80 (1976) (footnote omitted). Another court, noting that the Larrison rule creates an arbitrary distinction between perjured testimony and other new evidence, states:
One may always ask how courts can be certain that new evidence would not create a reasonable doubt in the mind of at least one juror. Yet, we have always required a showing that the new evidence would “probably” result in an acquittal upon a new trial. We are not convinced that all cases involving some perjured testimony necessarily require new trials. Yet, as the court in United States v. Stofsky * * * observed, this is exactly where the logic of such cases as Larrison * * * leads.
United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942, 100 S.Ct. 1337, 63 L.Ed.2d 775 (1980).
The majority posits two reasons for treating false testimony differently from other newly discovered evidence. The majority first argues that a higher standard of mate*597riality is necessary in the case of ordinary newly discovered evidence “because this new evidence has not been tried. The trial court is thus required to anticipate the effect on a second trial of evidence of unknown reliability.” (Supra at 585). The majority further argues that a lesser standard of materiality is appropriate for false testimony because “the court has already been able to make a determination that the testimony actually was false; thus the matter of credibility, as it concerns a second trial, is less important.” (Supra at 585).
This first argument confuses reliability with materiality and, in any event, fails to justify the use of different standards of materiality. It is not true that, in the case of false testimony, the court has already made a determination that the testimony was actually false. The determination that ordinary newly discovered evidence is reliable, or that testimony presented at the first trial is false, is made at the same time— during the post-trial proceedings. Thus, ordinary newly discovered evidence and the discovery that testimony is false may not be legitimately distinguished on the basis of their inherent reliability, as the majority appears to suggest.
I assume that the majority is attempting to articulate a distinction grounded on the trial court’s ability to determine the materiality of the evidence. Apparently, the majority is asserting that a trial court is better able to judge the impact that the absence of certain testimony will have at a second trial, than to judge the impact the addition of new material will have at a second trial. Even granting the validity of such an assertion, it does not support the use of different standards of materiality based on the source of the evidence. Indeed, common sense dictates that a lower standard should apply, if at all, when the trial court is less certain about the materiality of the evidence, i.e., when ordinary newly discovered evidence is at issue.
The majority’s other argument, based on United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1945), rev’d on other grounds, 327 U.S. 106, 66 S.Ct. 464, 90 L.Ed. 562 (1946), is that, while most new trial motions concern the probable effect of newly discovered evidence on a future trial, new trial motions based upon perjury concern the probable effect of the perjured testimony on the first trial. The court in United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d at 844, responded to this argument as follows:
We cannot see any practical difference in this distinction. * * * [Johnson] does not suggest any effective difference between perjured testimony and other new evidence, and we can conceive of none. The focus of the inquiry is on what difference the evidence would have made to the trial, regardless of its source.
Third, the majority is applying the Larri-son rule in circumstances where it has never before been applied by any state or federal court. The Larrison rule has been applied to perjured or deliberately false testimony but never to merely mistaken or erroneous testimony, much less to the good faith albeit mistaken interpretation of physical evidence by an expert.6
*598The state’s expert erroneously identified a fingerprint as defendant’s. There is no indication that the expert intentionally falsified his testimony. However, false testimony under the Larrison rule means “deliberately false or ‘false swearing.’ ” United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 989-90 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851, 92 S.Ct. 87, 30 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). See United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1944), rev’d on other grounds, 327 U.S. 106, 66 S.Ct. 464, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946). In United States v. Munchak, 338 F.Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 460 F.2d 1407 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915, 93 S.Ct. 236, 34 L.Ed.2d 177 (1972), the court discussed this precise issue, reasoning:
The determination of this issue- — whether [the government witness’] answer was erroneous but inadvertent, or intentional and perjurious — gives direction to the standard to be applied in the motion for a new trial. * * *
******
* * * The standard of materiality which must be satisfied to obtain a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence varies with the circumstances under which the defendant was deprived of knowledge of the existence of such evidence. Here, since there was no perjury, and since there is no charge of pros-ecutorial misconduct, nor any support for such a charge with respect to these tests, the defendant must show that knowledge and use of them “would probably produce a different verdict.”
Id. at 1289-91 (footnotes omitted).
The majority does not dispute that the Larrison rule has never before been applied in the context of merely erroneous testimony, but states that “we do not believe that the witness’ state of mind necessarily should be the factor that determines whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial.” (Supra at 587). This language obfuscates the real issue, which is whether the witness’ state of mind should be the factor that determines the proper standard to be applied in the motion for a new trial. The probability standard has always been applied in Minnesota cases where it was discovered after trial that a state witness had erroneously testified. See, e.g., State v. Meldahl, 310 Minn. 136, 245 N.W.2d 252 (1976); State v. Warren, 252 Minn. 261, 89 N.W.2d 702 (1958). In any event, the ramifications of the majority’s reasoning are limitless. If there is no distinction between perjured testimony and merely erroneous testimony, why treat any new evidence in a different manner? Why not completely abandon the probability standard and apply the Larrison rule for all new evidence? If the witness’ state of mind is an illegitimate or irrelevant factor in determining entitlement to a new trial (or in determining the standard to be applied in the new trial motion), certainly the source of the evidence is an illegitimate or irrelevant factor for the same reasons. The majority leaves us with no principled basis for distinguishing in future cases between perjured or erroneous testimony, which it now proposes are to be treated identically, and all other new evidence for the purpose of determining whether such evidence warrants a new trial.
Finally, even if the Larrison rule is the governing standard under these circumstances, defendant’s conviction should not be reversed. Under the Larrison rule, an admission of false testimony does not warrant a new trial, if, eliminating such evidence, there is still other evidence sufficient to support the judgment. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87; State v. Compiano, 261 Iowa 509, 518, 154 N.W.2d 845, 850 (1967). See 4 F. Wharton, Criminal Procedure § 601 at 189 (C. Torcía 12th ed. 1976); 58 Am.Jur.2d New Trial § 175 at 391 (1971); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1454k at 189 (1961). The majority concedes that there is sufficient *599evidence to sustain defendant’s conviction. {Supra at 592). Defendant’s conviction should therefore be affirmed.

. Because the newly discovered evidence concerns physical evidence to which defendant had access before trial, I doubt whether he exercised due diligence. See Farmer v. State, 491 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). In Farmer the defendant, convicted of forgery, sought a new trial based on the post-trial discovery by a handwriting expert that the signature on' the forged instrument was not defendant’s. The court found this did not constitute newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial because of a lack of due diligence. Because I find the other ground for this dissent to be more compelling, I do not express an opinion on the question whether defendant exercised due diligence by retaining an expert who may not have performed in a competent manner.

. Defendant’s fingerprint expert had access to the original fingerprint and the photographic enlargement of the original fingerprint. Although the record is unclear, this expert apparently followed one of two procedures:
*594(a) He relied exclusively on the original fingerprint and, like the state’s expert witness, made an erroneous identification. That is, it may be that the original print had not deteriorated to the point where defendant’s expert thought it could not be the basis for an accurate identification. Under these circumstances, the expert would have come to the same erroneous conclusion even if he had access to the photographic negative; or
(b) He was aware of the deterioration and relied exclusively on the enlargement in making his erroneous identification. Under these circumstances, it is inexplicable why the expert would not have informed defendant’s attorney that he could not make an accurate identification due to the deterioration of the original print and the possible distortion of the enlargement. We do not know why he would not have requested the negative if he was not able to make an accurate identification based on the original print. Common sense dictates that the enlargement could only be produced from a negative.
Thus, it appears that the defense expert had sufficient information either to make an accurate identification or to conclude that no accurate identification could be made. The fact of deterioration, although the reason the mistaken identification was later discovered by a defense expert in the subsequent trial of defendant’s wife, only serves to obfuscate the issue raised by this case. This issue would be no different if -no deterioration had occurred or if the defense had access to the negative before the trial and the defense expert still made an erroneous identification.

. The majority opinion states that the use of the fingerprint evidence denied appellant his right to a fair trial (supra at 586, 592) and cites State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 73 N.W.2d 192 (1955), for the proposition that a conviction may be reversed if a defendant’s right to a fair trial is denied even if there is cogent evidence to support the conviction. (Supra at 592.) In Reardon, the court reversed a conviction on state and federal due process grounds.
Despite this language in the majority opinion and the citation to Reardon, the majority is not reversing defendant’s conviction on due process grounds. (Supra at 586 n.9.) Indeed, the general rule is that a state defendant’s federal constitutional rights are violated only where he is convicted upon false or perjured testimony and the state knowingly or intentionally used such testimony. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burnett v. Ill., 619 F.2d 668, 674 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 880, 101 S.Ct. 229, 66 L.Ed.2d 104 (1980); Burks v. Egeler, 512 F.2d 221, 226-29 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 297, 46 L.Ed.2d 270 (1975); Lister v. McLeod, 240 F.2d 16, 17 (10th Cir. 1957). The majority finds no misconduct on the part of the prosecutor concerning the fingerprint evidence, and therefore there is no federal constitutional law violation. Also, defendant has never asserted, and the majority does not intimate, that the state constitution provides greater due process safeguards under these circumstances than the federal constitution mandates; therefore there is also no state constitutional law violation.

. This court has traditionally followed the “probability” test for determining whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 295 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn.1980); State v. Klotter, 274 Minn. 58, 64, 142 N.W.2d 568, 572 (1966); State v. Weis, 186 Minn. 342, 344, 243 N.W. 135, 135-36 (1932).
This case concerns a state expert who erroneously identified a fingerprint as defendant’s; there are no grounds for believing that the expert deliberately lied. In past Minnesota cases where it was discovered after the trial that a key prosecution witness mistakenly or erroneously testified, this court has followed the “probability” rule. See, e.g., State v. Meldahl, 310 Minn. 136, 245 N.W.2d 252 (1976); State v. Warren, 252 Minn. 261, 89 N.W.2d 702 (1958).
In State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 253 N.W.2d 378 (1977), and Whelan v. State, 298 Minn. 545, 214 N.W.2d 344 (1974), a variation of the Larri-son rule was applied in the case of recanted testimony solely to support the proposition that, as a preliminary matter, the court must be reasonably convinced that the witness has in*596deed recanted. In both cases the court was not so convinced and thus the question whether the probability test or the possibility test was appropriate was not at issue and was not expressly considered. Indeed, State v. Klotter, 274 Minn. 58, 142 N.W.2d 568 (1966), which follows the “probability” test, is cited in both cases as authority for the variation of the Larrison rule.

. The majority’s decision to grant a new trial based in part on the court’s supervisory power (supra at 586 n.9) is unnecessary and inappropriate. It is unnecessary because the court has already based its decision on the Larrison rule. It is inappropriate because this court’s supervisory power is properly invoked only where the procedures followed in reaching the adjudication below are amenable to improvement. Cf. State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356, 365 n.17 (Minn.1980) (preliminary probable cause hearing for person subjected to prehear-ing confinement in mental institution authorized pursuant to court’s inherent supervisory powers); Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn.1979) (counsel for indigent defendants in paternity adjudications mandated pursuant to court’s supervisory power when complainant is represented by county attorney). In this case, experts for both the state and the defense erroneously tested physical evidence. There are no procedures which can be implemented to prevent the recurrence of this type of problem in future cases, and thus the asserted exercise of the court’s supervisory power in this context is inappropriate. The majority utilizes the court’s supervisory power not to create new procedural safeguards but rather to implement their notion of the proper substantive law. The court has never used this power in this manner before.

. The majority’s claim, that the Larrison court relied on a statement in Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527, 48 S.Ct. 20, 72 L.Ed. 408 (1927), concerning mistaken testimony (supra at 586), is disingenuous. In Martin the defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that a state witness had confessed to perjury. The Martin court’s comment concerning mistaken testimony was mere dictum. Ledet v. United States, 297 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1962). In Larrison the defendant sought a new trial based on the alleged perjury of a state witness. The Larrison court did not rely on the Martin dictum concerning mistaken testimony; rather, the court cited Martin only for the proposition that courts should not necessarily deny new trial motions “when the perjured testimony is merely cumulative.” Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir. 1928) (emphasis added). The proper standard for determining new trial motions based on mistaken rather than perjured testimony was simply not at issue either in Larrison or Martin.
The majority’s citation of two cases as direct support for the Martin dictum concerning mistaken testimony is curious. In La Fever, inc. v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 571 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1978), a plaintiff in a civil case sought a new trial based on the asserted perjury of a witness. In United States v. McBride, 463 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027, 93 S.Ct. 475, *59834 L.Ed.2d 320 (1972), a criminal defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that a material government witness had admitted to perjury. Thus, none of the four cases cited by the majority to support the proposition that a lesser standard of materiality is appropriate where the witness’ testimony is merely erroneous involved a new trial motion based on merely erroneous testimony.