Court Opinion

ID: 9790788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:59:31.694388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.619619
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. The main opinion errs by concluding, as a matter of law, that criminal prosecution of defendant would violate double jeopardy because defendant has already been subjected to the civil forfeiture provision of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (1994).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[J” Historically, this provision was interpreted to apply in cases where a person’s life was at stake or to “offences which, in former ages, were punishable by dismemberment, and as intending to comprise the crimes denominated in the law, felonies.” People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187, 201 (N.Y.1820). Most courts now accept the notion that, despite the narrow constitutional language, double jeopardy bars multiple criminal prosecutions and punishments for the same criminal offense regardless of the severity of the offense and consequent punishment. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975).
The main opinion, however, goes far beyond what the United States Supreme Court has ever said about double jeopardy and holds that a civil sanction is subject to double jeopardy analysis if it is not solely remedial. The main opinion states that if the civil sanction has any punitive aspects, no matter how minor, double jeopardy applies. The main opinion misreads the Constitution and misapplies the holding of United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989).
In Halper, the Supreme Court expressly held as follows: '
We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already *951has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.
Id. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902 (emphasis added). Therefore, if the civil sanction can be characterized as serving at least some remedial purpose, double jeopardy does not apply. Id.; accord Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1945, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (holding that double jeopardy applies only if “the sanction may not be fairly characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution”).1
In the present case, section 58-37-13 provides for forfeiture, under certain enumerated circumstances, of property used to manufacture or transport controlled substances. This section is at least partially remedial in nature. In State v. 892 South 600 East, Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d 534, 541 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court stated that this section is also “punitive, at least in part.” In so stating, the supreme court recognized that this section serves at least some remedial purpose. Id. (“ ‘forfeiture statutes historically have been understood as serving not simply remedial goals but also those of punishment and deterrence.’ ”) (quoting Austin v. United States, — U.S. -, n. 14, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2803 n. 14, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993)).
Under Halper’s, Fifth Amendment analysis, double jeopardy applies only when the statute in question is solely punitive in nature. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. By contrast, under Eighth Amendment analysis, the Excessive Fines Clause applies if the statute in question is merely partly punitive in nature. Austin, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2806 (holding that “[w]e need not exclude the possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, however, must determine that it can only be explained as serving in part to punish.”) Therefore, the main opinion errs by concluding that double jeopardy applies to civil forfeiture under section 58-37-13. The main opinion compounds this error by importing Eighth Amendment principles into a Fifth Amendment analysis.
The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is the protection available to criminal defendants against unreasonable civil forfeiture. See Austin, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2803 (holding that Excessive Fines Clause applies to forfeitures of property used to manufacture or transport illegal drugs); 392 South 600 East, Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d at 540-41 (same). Under the Eighth Amendment, there is no bright line test for determining when a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. See Id. at 541. Instead, trial courts are granted appropriate discretion to determine, under the specific facts of each case, when a civil forfeiture becomes constitutionally excessive. Id.
Even if the proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment could be fairly imported into a double jeopardy case, the main opinion fails to afford the trial court the necessary discretion to decide the case. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the imprecise task of determining the punitive character of a civil sanction:
We acknowledge that this inquiry will not be an exact pursuit. In our decided cases we have noted that the precise amount of the Government’s damages and costs may prove to be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain.... Similarly, it would be difficult if not impossible in many cases for a court to determine the precise dollar figure at which a civil sanction has accomplished its remedial purpose of making the Government whole, but beyond which the sanction takes on the quality of punishment. In other words, as we have observed ... the process of affixing a sanction that compensates the Government for all its costs inevitably involves an element of rough justice. Our upholding rea*952sonable liquidated damages clauses reflects this unavoidable imprecision. Similarly, we have recognized that in the ordinary ease fixed-penalty-plus-damages provisions can be said to do no more than make Government whole.
Halper, 490 U.S. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. The Court indicated that it would continue to look with favor upon such reasonable liquidated damages clauses and “fixed-penalty-plus-damages” provisions. The Court noted that it was the rare case where a fixed-penalty provision subjects an offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages. Id.
The rule is one of reason: Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as “punishment” in the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government’s damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second punishment.
Id., 490 U.S. at 450, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Because of the imprecise nature of this determination, the Court left individual determinations of when civil sanctions constitute punishment within the sound discretion of the trial court.
We must leave to the trial court the discretion to determine on the basis of such an accounting the size of the civil sanction the Government may receive without crossing the line between remedy and punishment.

Id.

In the present case, the trial court concluded that
the penalty suffered by the defendant in the forfeiture proceeding did not exceed what could reasonably be regarded as the equivalent compensation, for the state[’]s loss, and the penalty is not entirely unrelated to the actual damages suffered. The forfeiture penalty assessed in the forfeiture action was not so disproportionate to the cost of investigating and prosecuting the defendant that it constitutes “punishment” rather than “rough remedial justice.”
The trial court therefore held that the seizure of defendant’s vehicle did not constitute “punishment” in the constitutional sense. This determination by the trial court is entitled to significant deference. See Id., 490 U.S. at 449-50, 109 S.Ct. at 1902.
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the deference due a trial court in cases where the court is called upon to apply facts to the law. In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994), the supreme court held that trial courts are entitled to deference when applying facts to controlling law. Unless the trial court crosses an established legal boundary, we should not upset the court’s determination of whether, under the specific facts of a given case, the value of property seized under section 58-37-13 is so disproportionate to the cost of investigation and prosecution to constitute “punishment.” Id.
The trial court in the instant case did not abuse its discretion in determining that the State’s seizure of defendant’s vehicle did not constitute “punishment.” Therefore, even if double jeopardy applies in this case, the main opinion errs by substituting its judgment for that of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
Section 58-37-13 is not, as a matter of law, solely punitive. The Double Jeopardy Clause therefore should not even come into play. Because the protections of double jeopardy are not available to a defendant under section 58-37-13, a defendant’s redress is limited to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the seizure of defendant’s vehicle was roughly equivalent to the cost of prosecution and therefore was not “punishment” in the constitutional sense.
I would therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the criminal charge brought against him.

. Justice O'Connor, writing separately in Kurth Ranch, echoed the principle of Halper: "Our double jeopardy cases make clear that a civil sanction will be considered punishment to the extent that it serves only the purposes of retribution and deterrence, as opposed to furthering any nonpunitive objective.” Kurth Ranch, - U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1953.