Court Opinion

ID: 9487184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:10:32.487077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:08.495322
License: Public Domain

KANNE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Because the record indicates that Jackson was only a “money marketing clerk,” and thus not subject to a two-level upward adjustment for abuse of a position of trust, I concur in the analysis of that issue (11(A)).
I write separately, however, to indicate disagreement with those portions of Judge Coffey’s opinion concerning the notice required for upward adjustments (11(B) and part of III). I cannot agree with my colleague’s view that Jackson received inadequate notice that his sentence might be adjusted upward for abuse of a position of trust.
Citing the Supreme Court in Burns v. United States, Judge Coffey offers the view that a defendant must be given the same type of notice for sentence adjustments to Guideline ranges as is required for sentence departures from the Guidelines. I disagree because I believe that the text of the Guidelines provides adequate notice of a district court’s limited sentence adjustment options.
In Burns, the Supreme Court held that “before a district court can depart upward on a ground not identified as a ground for upward departure either in the presentence report or in a prehearing submission by the Government, Rule 32 requires that the district court give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a ruling.” Burns, 501 U.S. 129, 138, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 2187 (1991) (emphasis added). Bums is not controlling in this case, however, because the district court did not depart from the Guideline range, but simply adjusted Jackson’s sentence in conformity with the applicable Guideline range identified in the presentenee report.
Two circuits have reached a position contrary to that of Judge Coffey — a position which I believe correctly resolves the issue. I agree with the First and Eighth Circuits that a lesser degree of notice is required for sentence adjustments than is required for sentence departures. See United States v. Adipietro, 983 F.2d 1468, 1473 (8th Cir.1993) (“While Bums mandates that both parties be given adequate notice before a court departs from the applicable guideline range, Bums does not mandate that adequate notice must be given before a district court addresses an adjustment or enhancement.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d *1113263, 266 (1st Cir.1992) (“We do not read Burns to require special notice where, as here, a court decides that an upward adjustment is warranted based on offense or offender characteristics delineated within the Sentencing Guidelines themselves, at least where the facts relevant to the adjustment are already known to the defendant.”)
In Burns, the Supreme Court based its decision on Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1), which requires that a defendant be given “an opportunity to comment upon the probation officer’s determination and on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence.” According to the Court, given the virtually unlimited grounds for departure under the Guidelines,1 failure to give precise notice of the grounds on which the district court intends to depart would render “meaningless the parties express right ‘to comment upon matters relating to the appropriate sentence.’ ” Burns, 501 U.S. at 135, 111 S.Ct. at 2186 (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1)). The Court stressed that “no one is in a position to guess when or on what grounds a district court might depart, much less to ‘comment’ on such a possibility in a coherent way.” Id.
What Judge Coffey in the case before us does not acknowledge, however, is that sentence adjustments and sentence departures are very different creatures.2 “Departures are sharply circumscribed under the sentencing guidelines and represent a more drastic change in a defendant’s sentence than merely adjusting a sentence without going outside the presumptive sentencing range.” Adipietro, 983 F.2d at 1473. Moreover, unlike the grounds for departure, the grounds for adjustments are limited — “specific and finite.” Canada, 960 F.2d at 266. As such, “an adjustment does not require the parties to try ‘to anticipate and negate every conceivable ground on which the district court might choose to depart on its own initiative.’ ” Id. at 266-267 (quoting Burns, 501 U.S. at 137, 111 S.Ct. at 2187). The Guidelines enable the parties to focus in advance on the limited list of grounds for adjustment and gives them adequate notice that those grounds may be used by the district court in imposing a sentence on the defendant.
Unlike the departure grounds, all of the adjustment grounds relate to the offense charged. Thus, in almost every case, both the defendant and the government should readily be able to ascertain and argue the relevant facts with respect to each of the recognized grounds for adjustment. Of course, abuse of a position of trust is not an unusual aspect of offenses which are banking related. The application note in the commentary to section 3B1.3 excluded “ordinary bank tellers” (and one may presume ordinary bank clerks) from an upward adjustment for abuse of a position of trust. By reading the application note concerning abuse of a position of trust, one charged with a bank related offense could reasonably anticipate that this section might come into play at sentencing. That it did so in this case was not unexpected. It is abundantly clear, in fact, that Jackson’s counsel was well aware of the application note. In response to questioning by the district court during the sentencing hearing, Jackson’s counsel stated “my client just indicated to me that he was a clerk in this bank. He was not a bank official of any sort.” What additional relevant information could have been provided? No continuance for witness preparation was required. Counsel for the defendant succinctly provided the court with information about his client which, as is plainly evident from the application note to section 3B1.3, should have prohibited an upward adjustment for abuse of a position of trust.
Also, I cannot agree with Judge Coffey’s position that “there is no evidence in this record to indicate that the defendant, Jackson, was or should have been aware of the *1114facts relevant to an adjustment for an abuse of a position of trust.” See supra at 1107. The determining issue for a section 3B1.3 adjustment in this case was simply Jackson’s employment status with the bank — and the record shows that the court had been made aware, through the presentence report and comments of defense counsel, that Jackson was not a bank official but merely a clerk earning $14,952.08.3
In most sentencing proceedings, as Judge Coffey recognizes, there is no necessity for calling witnesses. To grant defendants an absolute right to call witnesses at sentencing proceedings would accelerate a drift toward converting those hearings into second trials. Of course, due process does not require that a criminal defendant be afforded an opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses at sentencing. United States v. Giltner, 889 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 840 (11th Cir.1984)). Nor, is a right to call witnesses contemplated by Rule 32(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which governs imposition of sentence. Moreover, as Judge Coffey recognizes, the Guidelines leave the method of resolution of the disputed sentencing factors to the discretion of the district judge. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, comment.
With regard to sentence adjustments, the proper approach is to recognize that “the guidelines themselves provide [adequate] notice to the defendant of the issues about which he may be called upon to comment.” Id. at 267. The Guidelines satisfy the notice requirement under the due process clause and give the defendant a meaningful “opportunity to comment on ... matters relevant to his sentence.” Jackson had adequate notice from the Guidelines of the potential sentence adjustment — and, in fact, acted on that notice by presenting facts which constituted a bar to the upward sentence adjustment.

. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A ("With ... [a few] specific exceptions ... the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case.”)

. Both "adjustments” (U.S.S.G., Chap. 3 — Adjustments) and “departures” (U.S.S.G., Chap. 5, Part K — Departures) are terms of art in the sentencing guideline scheme. “Enhancement” is a term not found in the sentencing -guide lexicon and its use in judicial opinions may have led to confusion between the two distinctly different concepts of “adjustments" and "departures.”

. The evidence in the record discloses the obvious, that Jackson was aware of his own job responsibilities. It was Jackson himself who informed the probation officer during the preparation of the presentence report that he was a "money marketing clerk.” Moreover, as noted above, it was Jackson, through his attorney, who told the court at sentencing that he was only a clerk, not a bank officer.