Court Opinion

ID: 9385843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 14:00:38.304114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.507420
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11833    Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 04/10/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11833
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       RODRICK SLACK,
       a.k.a. Rat,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 3:08-cr-00061-LC-EMT-10
USCA11 Case: 22-11833      Document: 20-1       Date Filed: 04/10/2023      Page: 2 of 6

       2                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11833

                             ____________________

       Before GRANT, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Rodrick Slack, a federal prisoner represented by counsel, ap-
       peals the district court’s order granting Slack’s motion for a re-
       duced sentence under section 404 of the First Step Act and 18
       U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). No reversible error has been shown; we af-
       firm.
              In 2008, Slack was convicted of conspiracy to possess with
       intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine and 50
       grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
       §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii), and 846. Slack was subject to a stat-
       utory penalty of 10 years to life imprisonment. Slack’s guidelines
       range was calculated as 360 months to life imprisonment. The sen-
       tencing court imposed a sentence of 444 months’ imprisonment,
       followed by 10 years’ supervised release.
               In 2022, Slack moved for a sentence reduction under the
       First Step Act. Slack argued that a reduced sentence was warranted
       in the light of the reduced statutory penalties for crack-cocaine of-
       fenses, the disparity between his sentence and the sentences of his
       co-defendants, and his good conduct in prison. Slack sought a sen-
       tence of time served.
             The government conceded that Slack was eligible for relief
       under the First Step Act. The government deferred to the district
USCA11 Case: 22-11833      Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 04/10/2023     Page: 3 of 6

       22-11833               Opinion of the Court                         3

       court’s discretion about whether, and to what extent, to reduce
       Slack’s sentence.
               After considering the parties’ pleadings -- and without a
       hearing -- the district court granted in part Slack’s motion for a re-
       duced sentence. The district court first determined that Slack’s of-
       fense constituted a “covered offense” under the First Step Act. The
       district court then determined that “some sentence reduction” was
       appropriate under the circumstances. In particular, the district
       court noted evidence of Slack’s post-conviction rehabilitation, in-
       cluding that Slack had relatively few disciplinary actions, had
       earned his GED, and had taken occupational classes while in
       prison. The district court also explained, however, that it could not
       overlook Slack’s history of violence or that Slack’s underlying of-
       fense involved both a large quantity of drugs and a gun. Based on
       these considerations, the district court reduced Slack’s sentence to
       285 months, followed by 6 years of supervised release.
               On appeal, Slack contends that the district court erred -- and
       violated his rights under the Due Process Clause -- by imposing a
       reduced sentence without first allowing Slack to appear at a hearing
       and to exercise his right of allocution. Slack never requested a hear-
       ing before the district court. Because Slack raises this argument for
       the first time on appeal, we review the argument only for plain er-
       ror. See United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir.
       2017).
              Slack’s argument is foreclosed by our decision in United
       States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir. 2020). In Denson, we
USCA11 Case: 22-11833     Document: 20-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023    Page: 4 of 6

       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-11833

       concluded expressly that “the First Step Act does not require dis-
       trict courts to hold a hearing with the defendant present before rul-
       ing on a defendant’s motion for a reduced sentence under the Act.”
       See 963 F.3d at 1082. We observed that the plain text of the First
       Step Act “does not mention, let alone mandate, a hearing.” Id. at
       1086. We also noted that Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 provides expressly
       that a defendant’s presence is not required at a sentence-reduction
       proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Id. at 1087. Because “the
       right to be present under Rule 43 is at least as broad as the right
       under the Due Process Clause,” we concluded that a defendant has
       no due process right to be present at a section 3582 proceeding. Id.
       at 1087-88.
               After concluding that a defendant has no right to be present
       at a hearing on his First Step Act motion, we addressed separately
       -- and rejected -- the argument in Denson’s case that a sentence re-
       duction under the First Step Act was a “critical stage” requiring a
       hearing under United States v. Brown, 879 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir.
       2018). See id. at 1088-89. We first concluded that the “critical
       stage” framework in Brown (a case involving a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
       motion) was inapplicable to sentence-modification proceedings un-
       der section 3582(c). Id. at 1088-89 (noting language in Brown rec-
       ognizing that a sentence-reduction under 3582(c) did not require a
       defendant’s presence). “Alternatively, and as an independent hold-
       ing,” we also determined that -- even under Brown’s framework --
       a First Step Act motion constituted no “critical stage” in the pro-
       ceedings requiring a defendant’s presence. Id. at 1089.
USCA11 Case: 22-11833      Document: 20-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023     Page: 5 of 6

       22-11833                Opinion of the Court                         5

               In the present case, Slack says that Denson has since been
       abrogated in part by the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion
       v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022). The chief issue in Concep-
       cion was “whether a district court deciding a First Step Act motion
       must, may, or may not consider intervening changes of law or
       fact.” See 142 S. Ct. at 2398. To the extent Concepcion might have
       undermined our thinking in Denson, it appears to have done so
       only for language in Denson about a district court’s authority to
       consider intervening changes in the law when ruling on a First Step
       Act motion. See id. at 2398 n.2 (collecting cases and citing Denson
       as among the circuit court decisions holding that a district court
       “may not consider” intervening changes); Denson, 963 F.3d at 1089
       (stating -- in the alternative and independent portion of the opinion
       applying the Brown framework -- that a district court ruling on a
       First Step Act motion “is not free . . . to reduce the defendant’s sen-
       tence on the covered offense based on changes in the law beyond
       those mandated by sections 2 and 3” of the Fair Sentencing Act).
               We read nothing in Concepcion as touching on a defend-
       ant’s right to be present at or to speak at a hearing on his First Step
       Act motion, let alone establishing plainly that the defendant’s pres-
       ence at a hearing is mandated. Because Concepcion does not con-
       flict directly with our conclusion in Denson that a district court is
       not required to hold a hearing with the defendant present before
       ruling on a First Step Act motion, we remain bound by that prece-
       dent. See United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249, 1265 (11th Cir.
       2021) (“Under our prior precedent rule, ‘a prior panel’s holding is
USCA11 Case: 22-11833      Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 04/10/2023     Page: 6 of 6

       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11833

       binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or
       undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or
       this court sitting en banc.’”); United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246,
       1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (“To constitute an ‘overruling’ for the pur-
       poses of th[e] prior panel precedent rule, the Supreme Court deci-
       sion ‘must be clearly on point’ . . . [and must] actually abrogate or
       directly conflict with, as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of
       the prior panel.”).
               Slack has identified no controlling authority establishing a
       defendant’s right to be present at a hearing or a right to allocution
       during a sentence-modification proceeding under the First Step
       Act. Slack thus cannot show that the district court committed an
       error that was plain when it imposed a reduced sentence without
       first scheduling sua sponte a hearing. See Lange, 862 F.3d at 1296
       (describing a plain error as “an error that is ‘obvious’ and is ‘clear
       under current law’” and explaining that “there can be no plain error
       where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court
       directly resolving it”).
             AFFIRMED.