Court Opinion

ID: 9651376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:17:06.172771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:32.828754
License: Public Domain

ROBINSON, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I readily concur in the Court’s holding to the effect that the defendants should not be awarded attorneys’ fees in connection with either their unsuccessful first motion for summary judgment or their unsuccessful petition for certiorari; in my view, the anti-SLAPP statute should not be construed as authorizing the payment of attorneys’ fees for such unsuccessful quests.
However, I respectfully part company from the majority with respect to its sustaining the Superior Court’s later grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants under the anti-SLAPP statute and its consequent award of attorneys’ fees. As I understand Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and the copious body of jurisprudence relative to the summary judgment mechanism, I do not believe that the hearing justice should have granted summary judgment on the basis of her ruling that defendants’ actions were “not subjectively baseless.” I am firmly convinced that summary judgment is not an appropriate mechanism for resolving controversies that turn on an assessment of the subjective intent of a party — and certainly the issue of subjective baselessness vel non involves a determination of subjective intent.9
*274It is my view that the determination of whether defendants’ actions were subjectively baseless (vel non) should have been grist for the mill of a fact-finder. In my judgment, such a determination is simply not susceptible to summary disposition. It is noteworthy that, in his supplemental memorandum in opposition to defendants’ successful 2003 motion for summary judgment, Karousos explicitly argued that “[t]he gross untimeliness alone of the defendants’ concerted efforts to burden and delay Mr. Karousos from opening his culinary school * * * creates a triable issue regarding the propriety of the defendants’ actions.” (Emphasis added.) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants’ subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a “mere sham.” See G.L. 1956 § 9-33-2.
Numerous issues (including, I submit, the issue of subjective baselessness vel non) are, by their very nature, inherently incapable of being decided by summary judgment. See, e.g., Gliottone v. Ethier, 870 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I.2005) (“[IJssues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.”) (quoting Rogers v. Peabody Coal Co., 342 F.2d 749, 751 (6th Cir.1965)); see generally Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (“We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.”); Schmidt v. McKay, 555 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir.1977); see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (holding that whether the gerrymandering at issue was the product of impermissible racial motivation was a disputed fact and that “it was error in this case for the District Court to resolve the disputed fact of motivation at the summary judgment stage”); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions * * *.”); Santana v. Rainbow Cleaners, Inc., 969 A.2d 653, 658 (R.I.2009); Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 865 (R.I.1997).10
*275It is self-evident to me that the determination of the presence of subjective base-lessness vel non requires the scrutiny of the human heart and mind.11 It has long been held that the summary judgment procedural mechanism- is ordinarily inappropriate for resolving such issues of intent and state of mind. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Farr, 594 A.2d 379, 381 (R.I.1991) (“If a dispute about intent is apparent in the record, then a genuine issue of material fact has been discovered and it may not be decided in a motion for summary judgment.”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Home Insurance Co., 672 F.2d 252, 257 (2d Cir.1982) (“In light of the court’s obligation to draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party, summary judgment is rarely appropriate where the moving party’s state of mind is a material issue.”); Maiorana v. MacDonald, 596 F.2d 1072, 1076-77 (1st Cir.1979) (“We are well aware * * * that cases like this one in which state of mind is at issue do not usually lend themselves to summary judgment.”); Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.1970) (“The court should be cautious in granting a motion for summary judgment when resolution of the disposi-tive issue requires a determination of state of mind.”); Brett T. Reynolds, Comment: Appellate Review of Lanham Act Violations: Is Likelihood of Confusion a Question of Law or Fact?, 38 Southwestern L.J. 743, 772 (1984) (“Summary judgment is usually inappropriate to resolve disputes concerning state of mind and conflicting interpretations of perceived events because state of mind is normally an inference drawn from facts.”).
For the foregoing reasons, it is my opinion that summary judgment was not an appropriate procedural mechanism for evaluating the subjective baselessness component of the anti-SLAPP statute. I would have remanded the ease to the Superior Court for fact-finding with regard to the issue of the defendants’ subjective intent.

. Furthermore, prescinding from the procedural (i.eRule 56 of the Superior Court *274Rules of Civil Procedure) issue, I wish to indicate that I am troubled by the provision in the anti-SLAPP statute that requires the awarding of attorneys' fees to a party whose actions have been found to have been "objectively baseless” (provided only that those actions are also found not to have been subjectively baseless). See G.L. 1956 § 9-33-2. Our law does not usually grant attorneys' fees to a party that has engaged in "objectively baseless” activity. However, I realize that we are faced here with a statutory mandate, and I also realize "[tjhe remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation, but in amendment or repeal." State v. Duggan, 15 R.I. 403, 409, 6 A. 787, 788 (1886).
Anti-SLAPP statutes undoubtedly serve a useful purpose, but it is important that they not improperly thwart the constitutional right of access to the courts. See Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 150 & nn. 10 & 11 (R.I.2008).

. In addition, this Court has on numerous occasions emphasized the drastic nature of the summary judgment mechanism. See, e.g., Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I.2008) ("Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.”) (Internal quotation marks omitted.); DePasquale v. Venus Pizza, Inc., 727 A.2d 683, 685 (R.I.1999) (“This Court has consistently acknowledged that summary judgment is a harsh remedy that must be applied cautiously.”); Sjogren v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 703 A.2d 608, 610 (R.I.1997) ("Summary judgment is an extreme remedy that should be applied cautiously.”).
*275Moreover, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that the “purpose of the summary judgment procedure is issue finding, not issue determination.” Industrial National Bank v. Peloso, 121 R.I. 305, 307, 397 A.2d 1312, 1313 (1979); see also Estate of Giuliano, 949 A.2d at 391; Saltzman v. Atlantic Realty Co., Inc., 434 A.2d 1343, 1345 (R.I.1981).

. One can conceive of a case where subjective baselessness is entirely clear — for example where there is an unambiguous admission by a party to that effect. But this is no such case.