Court Opinion

ID: 2963212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:07:36.934255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:39.607461
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          February 17, 1995                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT                                 ____________________        No. 94-1651                               DONOVAN ALBERT KNIGHT, A/K/A PAUL KNIGHT,                                     Petitioner,                                          v.                       IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,                                     Respondent.                                 ____________________                          ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER                         OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS                                 ____________________                                        Before                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________                                 ____________________            Paul Knight on brief pro se.
            ___________            Frank W. Hunger,  Assistant Attorney General, Francesco Isgro  and
            _______________                               _______________        Donald E.  Keener, Office  of Immigration Litigation,  Civil Division,
        _________________        Department of Justice, on brief for respondent.                                  ____________________                                 ____________________

                 Per  Curiam.  The instant pro se petition for review, in
                 ___________            which petitioner seeks  to challenge a decision of  the Board            of Immigration  Appeals upholding his  order of  deportation,            falters on procedural grounds.  In 1992, an Immigration Judge            found that  petitioner, having  been convicted of  two crimes            involving moral  turpitude, was  deportable under 8  U.S.C.              1251(a)(2) and was undeserving  of discretionary relief under            8  U.S.C.   1182(c).  The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld            this  ruling   in  a  decision  dated   September  21,  1993.            Petitioner  failed  to seek  review in  this court  within 90            days, as required  by 8  U.S.C.   1105a(a)(1).   Instead,  in            March  1994,  he filed  a motion  to  reopen with  the Board,            claiming that the decision  had not been delivered to  him in            prison because its mailing label had omitted the alias ("Paul            Knight")  under which he was incarcerated.   The Board denied            the motion to  reopen, and petitioner filed a timely petition            for  review.  In his  appellate brief, he  argues solely that            the Board's September 1993 decision was in error.                  We lack jurisdiction to review the Board's 1993 decision            because  of  petitioner's  failure   to  seek  timely  review            thereof.  See, e.g., Amaral v. INS, 977 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir.
                      ___  ____  ______    ___            1992)   (compliance   with   statutory   filing   period   is            jurisdictional  prerequisite);  Pimental-Romero  v. INS,  952
                                            _______________     ___            F.2d 564,  564 (1st  Cir. 1991)  (same).  As  such, the  only            matter open  for  review  is the  propriety  of  the  Board's                                         -3-

            decision  not to reopen the case.  Petitioner has waived this            issue,  however,  by failing  to  advance  any argument  with            regard  thereto in his appellate brief.  See, e.g., Lareau v.
                                                     ___  ____  ______            Page, 39 F.3d 384, 390 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994); Charles  v. Rice,
            ____                                        _______     ____            28 F.3d 1312, 1320 (1st Cir. 1994).                  We  add  that  the  two  Board  decisions  appear  fully            supportable in any event.  Its conclusion that petitioner was            responsible for any confusion  as to the name under  which he            received mail was well within its discretion.  See, e.g., INS
                                                           ___  ____  ___            v. Doherty, 112 S.  Ct. 719, 725 (1992) (denial  of motion to
               _______            reopen subject to review under abuse of discretion standard).            Its  determination  that  petitioner's  1983  conviction  was            "final"  for  immigration  purposes appears  unexceptionable.            See, e.g.,  Morales-Alvarado v. INS,  655 F.2d 172,  175 (9th
            ___  ____   ________________    ___            Cir. 1981)  (a conviction is  final even  though "subject  to            collateral  attack") (cited in White v. INS, 17 F.3d 475, 479
                                           _____    ___            (1st  Cir. 1994)).   And its  finding that  petitioner's 1977            conviction   was  established   by  clear,   unequivocal  and            convincing evidence appears warranted on the facts presented.                 The petition for review is denied. 
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