Court Opinion

ID: 9703782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:07:34.167691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:51.656442
License: Public Domain

LITTLETON, Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot concur in the opinion of the majority dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction to consider it notwithstanding the Special Jurisdictional Act of February 27, 1942, 56 Stat. 1122. I do not construe the special act as in any way infringing upon the Judicial Department of the Government or upon the proper exercise by the court of its judicial duties. On the contrary, I construe the act as an authorization by the lawmaking Departments of the Government to the court to consider plaintiff’s claims in the light of the waivers by the Legislative and Executive Departments of the Government of limitations, res adjudicata, and certain rights and defenses of the Government, mentioned in Sections 1 and 2 of the act, which the Government, as the defendant in the suit, might otherwise bring forward and successfully insist upon in opposition to the jurisdiction of the court and the right of plaintiff to make and maintain the claims. I do not think Congress intended to go, and I do not find anything in the special jurisdictional act which goes, beyond this. Section 1 of the act is a grant of jurisdiction and authority to hear, determine, and enter judgment notwithstanding certain defenses mentioned therein, including the waivers of defenses which might otherwise be made, as more specifically described in Section 2 of the act. No special significance should be attached to the word "directed” appearing in the first clause of Section 2. Section 1 conferred the jurisdiction and authority to be exercised by the court and section 2 simply described in detail the basis of the liability which the Government, acting through the Legislative and Executive Departments, was willing to assume in the circumstances, and by this section 2 the Government consented to be charged on the basis specified in accordance with such findings and such measurements as the court shall make in accordance with the jurisdiction and authority conferred by section 1.
I think it is clear that Congress by an act approved by the President may do this without in any way interfering with the proper judicial function of the court although the reason of Congress in so doing is purely moral or equitable rather than legal, and, notwithstanding the plaintiff has once lost his case in this court in a suit under the contract. It seems to me that the Sovereign, which acts through its Legislative and Executive branches in respect of the institution of suits against it and through the Judicial branch in the determination and adjudication of claims against it, in such suits, is not exactly in the same situation as a private litigant might be in regard to the matter of assuming a liability, or liabilities, on a specified basis and authorizing and empowering this court to adjudicate and determine such assumed liabilities in a second suit. The provisions of the Special Act of February 27, 1942, now form the legal basis for the adjudication of the claims presented in the petition filed thereunder. Alcock v. United States, 74 Ct.Cl. 308. See, also, Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U.S. 476, 486, 46 S.Ct. 428, 70 L.Ed. 694. I do not think the case of United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 20 L.Ed. 519, is in point here.
For the reason stated I think the court has jurisdiction and authority in the premises and should proceed to hear, determine, and enter judgment under the provisions of the jurisdictional act and upon the record in the case.
JONES, Judge, took no part in the decision of this case.