Court Opinion

ID: 9849425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:39:57.855038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:23.739822
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I am keenly aware of the importance accorded a verdict returned by a jury, as well as the standard to be applied on appellate review. However, it is also the role of this court to review the sufficiency of the evidence when it is called to question on appeal. In performing this function, I reach a different result as to both counts upon which appellants were convicted. Therefore, I dissent to the majority opinion affirming these convictions.
Based upon the following facts, I believe the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law under the equal access doctrine. The *628Barneses operate a used car business in Ranger, Georgia, on the site of which are located the office, the Barneses’ personal residence (a double-wide trailer) and a number of other trailers where various relatives, employees and other people live. On the afternoon of May 18, 1984 some ten law enforcement officers and a dog trained to sniff out drugs arrived in five vehicles to execute a search warrant. Some of the officers searched the car lot office while others searched the Barneses’ trailer home. In the office a bottle of Preludin prescribed to one employee was seized from her person and a bottle of Darvon prescribed to another employee was taken from her desk drawer. Mrs. Barnes was outside the residence trailer and upon sighting the search party’s arrival ran towards the double-wide trailer shouting what sounded to some of the officers like “Raid!” Inside they found three people: Rita Fay Cronan, who was just getting out of the shower, Jennifer Silvers and her young son.
During the search of the residence trailer the officers discovered a plastic zip-loc baggie in Ms. Cronan’s purse in the bathroom off the master bedroom where she had been taking a shower. It contained three ounces of marijuana, which formed the basis of both Counts 2 and 4 (conspiracy to distribute and felony possession). Ms. Cronan testified under a grant of immunity that the marijuana was hers, that she had bought it the day before and brought it into the house trailer in her pocketbook where it remained. Also found in the master bathroom were a set of scales, some boxes of plastic zip-loc baggies and a container of lactose,1 upon which the Count 3 cocaine possession was based. A state crime lab expert testified that the jar of lactose contained a quantity of cocaine equivalent to less than one part per million, an infinitesimal amount roughly equal to “one mouthful of food that a person would eat in ... a lifetime.” Inside an ornamental wood stove in the living room of the house trailer were found several plastic bags containing a residue of marijuana totaling in the aggregate 2.7 grams (less than 1/10 of an ounce). In a closet a four-year-old prescription bottle of atarax (hive medicine) labelled for Rita Fay Cronan was found.
Other testimony from numerous witnesses showed that Tony Barnes was not present anywhere on the premises on the day of the search; that Jimmy Lou Barnes was outside at the time the police arrived; that Rita Fay Cronan lived in the Barneses’ house trailer about 40 percent of the time; that for many years a large number of employees and friends and relatives were allowed to sleep in the spare bedroom and regularly use the kitchen and bath facilities; that every*629body who worked for the used car business had unlimited access to the house trailer and was in and out every day; that Cathy Sue Dixon had done housecleaning for the Barneses for two and a half years and had never seen any marijuana; that none of these witnesses had ever smoked marijuana in the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Barnes, or seen them smoke marijuana; that their house trailer was always open and available for all employees to come and go for whatever purposes they needed, whether or not the Barneses were present; and that a metal cash box was kept in the trailer for paying employees in cash and that at least two others aside from appellants had access to it.
“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-4-6. The proved facts in this case did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the 2.7 grams of marijuana found in the wood stove in the Barneses’ living room, which they were convicted of possessing, might have actually belonged to any of the many other people shown to have had equal access to the trailer.
“ ‘A connection can be made between a defendant and contraband found in his presence by evidence which shows that the contraband was discovered on premises occupied and controlled by the defendant with no right of equal access and control in others. [Cit.] Such occupation and control may be inferred when the accused is the owner or tenant of the premises upon which the illicit drugs are discovered. [Cit.]’ [Cit.] Under the ‘equal access’ rule, however, the inference of constructive possession which attaches to an owner or lessee of certain premises is rebuttable by an affirmative showing that persons other than the defendant owner or lessee had equal access to the premises where the contraband was found. [Cits.] Where it is affirmatively shown that others had equal access or opportunity to commit the crime, the mere discovery of contraband on the defendant’s premises is insufficient to support a conviction. [Cits.]” Shreve v. State, 172 Ga. App. 190, 191 (322 SE2d 362) (1984). Since Tony Barnes was not present at the time of the search, ‘[h]is constructive knowledge cannot be predicated on the fact that drugs were found in a household of which he is the head, where others, who were not members of his household, live in the same house. [Cit.]” Moreland v. State, 133 Ga. App. 723, 724 (212 SE2d 866) (1975). Accord Smith v. State, 156 Ga. App. 102 (1) (273 SE2d 918) (1980); McCann v. State, 137 Ga. App. 445 (1) (224 SE2d 99) (1976). Under such an affirmative showing of equal access, both appellants’ convictions of possessing marijuana must be reversed.
Although the second enumeration of error is not addressed by the majority, review of the issue raised therein is warranted, especially since it presents a question of first impression in Georgia. OCGA § *63016-13-42 (a) (5) provides: “It is unlawful for any person . . . [kjnowingly to keep or maintain any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling, building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other structure or place which is resorted to by persons using controlled substances in violation of this article for the purpose of using these substances, or which is used for keeping or selling them in violation of this article.” (Emphasis supplied.) The State argues that the presence of the scales, the boxes of plastic bags and the used bags found in the wood stove containing marijuana residue constitute a sufficient showing for the jury to conclude that appellants knowingly allowed marijuana to be kept in their residence for use, storage or packaging by themselves or other persons in violation of this statute. Appellants contend that this legislation was intended to deal with the maintenance of a house which was repeatedly or continuously used to “stash” drugs or as a place where drugs were sold and that the single instance in which a misdemeanor amount of marijuana was found in their trailer does not constitute such a repeated or continuous offense. Further, appellants argue that the legislation was not intended to convert a misdemeanor offense into a felony solely because it occurred inside rather than outside a structure. This is a question of first impression in Georgia.
Study of other jurisdictions with statutes similar to OCGA § 16-13-42 (a) (5) indicates that a number require that repeated or recurrent use of the private dwelling in the prohibited manner be established to sustain a conviction under the statute. That is, a single isolated instance of the unlawful activity is insufficient. See, e.g., Baldwin v. State, 468 A2d 394, 397 (Md. App. 1983); State v. Welch, 441 A2d 539, 542 (R.I. 1982); State v. Bulhoes, 430 A2d 1274 (1) (R.I. 1981); State v. Reis, 430 A2d 749, 752 n. 7 (R.I. 1981). Cf. People v. Clay, 78 Cal. Rptr. 56, 60 (Cal. App. 1969). While for the most part these statutes and the cases construing them rely upon a theory of nuisance to invoke the requirement of repeated or recurrent use, I am persuaded that conviction under OCGA § 16-13-42 (a) (5) also requires a showing of more than one instance of the proscribed activity. I base this conclusion upon my examination of other Georgia statutes which prohibit maintaining or keeping a dwelling or other place for the purpose of various specified criminal activities. OCGA § 16-6-10 prohibits keeping a place of prostitution and OCGA § 16-11-44 makes it a criminal violation to maintain a disorderly house. Both appear to require evidence of more than a single instance of the criminal conduct to support a conviction. See generally Brewer v. State, 129 Ga. App. 118 (1) (199 SE2d 109) (1973); Snead v. State, 127 Ga. App. 12 (1) (192 SE2d 415) (1972); Birdwell v. State, 112 Ga. App. 836 (1, 2) (146 SE2d 374) (1965); Martin v. State, 62 Ga. App. 902 (10 SE2d 254) (1940). Keeping a gambling place is proscribed by OCGA § 16-12-23 (a). Such has been analogized to maintaining a public nuisance *631(Gullatt v. State, 169 Ga. 538 (3) (150 SE 825) (1929)) which requires more than proof of a single instance of gaming. See White v. State, 115 Ga. 570, 571 (41 SE 986) (1902). But see McGahee v. State, 133 Ga. App. 964 (1) (213 SE2d 91) (1975), which makes no mention of multiple instances.
Decided July 16, 1985
Rehearing denied July 31, 1985
Austin E. Catts, Donald F. Samuel, J. Britten Miller, Jr., for appellants.
Darrell E. Wilson, District Attorney, Mickey R. Thacker, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I believe that conviction of violating OCGA § 16-13-42 (a) (5) requires presentation of evidence of recurrent or repeated use of the dwelling in the specified criminal manner, at least more than a single isolated incident. Such evidence was not produced in this case. Moreover, from my research I find the majority of cases require the prosecution to show that the defendant owner had control of the premises at the time the offense was committed. All appear to require proof of knowledge of the use of the dwelling in the prohibited manner. See Annot. 54 ALR3d 1297 (1973) and cases cited therein; 28 CJS, Drugs & Narcotics Supp., § 153 and cases cited therein. OCGA § 16-13-42 (a) (5) explicitly requires knowledge that the dwelling is being used for the specified criminal conduct. While either a showing of repeated or recurrent use of the house or knowledge coupled with acquiescence would be sufficient for conviction, the evidence presented in the instant case falls far short of this standard. In light of the fact that the very small amount of marijuana found was not in an area in the exclusive control of appellants and could have been possessed by any one of a dozen or more persons with unrestricted access to the trailer, as well as the absence of evidence to show that appellants had any knowledge of its existence, the equal access rule not only bars a conviction on the possession charge but also precludes a finding that they were maintaining a house for the use, sale or keeping of illegal drugs as contemplated by the statute. Consequently, the convictions under both counts of the indictment cannot stand. I would reverse appellants’ convictions on both counts.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Judge Sognier and Judge Benham join in this dissent.

 Contrary to the majority opinion, my review of the trial transcript has revealed that Ms. Cronan did not disclaim or admit ownership of these articles. She was simply not questioned in this regard.