Court Opinion

ID: 9599844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:21:52.872781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:34.513587
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
1. Reluctantly, I agree with the majority as to the need to overrule in part Vester v. Mug A Bug Pest Control, 231 Ga. App. 644 (500 SE2d 406) (1998), because the General Assembly in passing Ga. L. 1997, pp. 916, 919, § 2 (OCGA § 9-11-9.1), included the language when setting the effective date: “shall apply only to actions filed on or after [the effective] date,” which prohibits the. retroactive application of the Act. While the statement as to limitation of retroactivity by the General Assembly of procedural matter was dicta, the Supreme Court in Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 55 (365 SE2d 273) (1988) quoting dicta in Pritchard v. Savannah Street &c. R. Co., 87 Ga. 294, 297-299 (13 SE 493) (1891) did state: “[generally statutes prescribe for the future and that is the construction to be given unless there is a clear contrary intention shown. On the other hand, where a statute governs only procedure of the courts, including the rules of evidence, it is to be . . . retroactive [in] effect absent an express contrary intention. . . . Substantive law is that law which creates rights, duties, and obligations. Procedural law is that which prescribes the methods of enforcement of rights, duties, and obligations.” Accord Barner v. State, 263 Ga. 365, 367 (4) (434 SE2d 484) (1993); Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755 (1) (272 SE2d 709) (1980); Thurman v. Mabry, 221 Ga. 153, 154 (143 SE2d 645) (1965); Logan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 734, 736-737 (b) (442 SE2d 883) (1994); Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301, 302 (2) (259 SE2d 697) (1979); Rider v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 474, 475 (2) (143 SE2d 645) (1965). This was the first time that the General Assembly, in the many times amending the Civil Practice Act, has expressly restricted retroactive application of this procedural act. Thus, absent a clear and unambiguous expression of intent by the General Assembly, as in this amendment, to prohibit the retroactive application of a procedural act or amendment, such procedural act will apply retroactively.
2. While I agree with Division 2 of the majority in its entirety as it applies to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 prior to the effective date of Ga. L. 1997, pp.'916, 919, § 2,1 would point out that the General Assembly intended in the 1997 amendment to prevent such issues, as in this case, being raised later by either motion to dismiss, OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6), or by summary judgment, OCGA § 9-11-56, because the defendant shall raise such defense “by motion to dismiss filed con*668temporaneously with its initial responsive pleading that the plaintiff has failed to file the requisite affidavit.” See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) (as amended). The legislative intent was to prevent the very technical attack made in this case; either the motion to dismiss is made contemporaneously with the responsive pleading or no motion to dismiss can be later filed, because the purpose of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 was to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits being filed by requiring an affidavit which makes out a prima facie case of liability as a condition precedent and which would have been done, notwithstanding that the affidavit is defective but amendable. O-1 Doctors Mem. Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) (378 SE2d 708) (1989); accord Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 184 (1) (442 SE2d 233) (1994); Gadd v. Wilson &c., 262 Ga. 234, 235 (416 SE2d 285) (1992); Housing Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, 259 Ga. 435, 439 (5) (383 SE2d 867) (1989). OCGA § 9-11-9.1 merely imposes a pleading requirement. See Hewett v. Kalish, supra at 184. Thus, after July 1, 1997, such attack on the affidavit must be raised, not at the earliest possible opportunity, but contemporaneous with the responsive pleadings. See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b). Thus, if the expert witness’ deposition is taken and a material issue of fact is raised as to liability through the expert witness’ testimony, then any defect in the affidavit has been cured by the sworn testimony of such expert as to the facts and issues contained in the affidavit and the only method of attack remaining is on the merits of the case by summary judgment. See Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 651-652 (1) (492 SE2d 665) (1997); Hewett v. Kalish, supra at 184-185. A defect in pleading cannot be raised by summary judgment. See Porquez v. Washington, supra at 651-652; Hewett v. Kalish, supra at 184-185. If such procedure is not followed, then OCGA § 9-11-9.1 will be used as a procedural barrier to trial on the merits on technical grounds as to the affidavit alone. There would exist, not a frivolous malpractice suit, but a suit that could withstand summary judgment on the merits; however, discovery may disclose a latent defect in the affidavit, i.e., that no oath was properly administered in the notary’s presence, that the notary’s commission expired, that the lawyer-expert failed to pay bis current bar dues before time of the affidavit, or that some similar amendable defect existed to the affidavit.
3. I concur fully with Division 3 of the majority and the judgment.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this special concurrence.