Court Opinion

ID: 9699865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:54:16.533716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:58.941747
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
To predicate grandparent visitation on the statutory requirement that “parents have been separated for six months or more” is unsound and injudicious in this case. As Mr. Justice Papadakos notes, separation is “dividing” or “parting company.” Of course, to separate, divide, or part company, there must first be a unit to be divided or separated. As should be obvious, the act of procreation itself, without more, does not amount to a unity or conjunction which makes its illusory termination a “separation.” In family law, as it is in common parlance, “separation” signifies the event of spouses parting company, not merely losing one of a pair of socks, as it were.. An interpretation that separation follows a period of cohabitation sufficient to deem such a significant relationship, seems eminently more reasonable, and is perfectly consistent with the time-honored usage of the term “separation” in the area of domestic relations law and, indeed, common sense.
Furthermore, I see no absurdity in contrasting 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5311 and § 5312. As we have seen, § 5312 justifies grandparent visitation on a separation of six months or more; § 5311 permits grandparent visitation when the child’s parent is deceased. Mr. Justice Papadakos reasons that if the child’s father in this case were deceased rather than wilfully neglectful, the grandmother would qualify for visitation under § 5311, forgetting that visitation under either section must be both reasonable and in the best interest of the child, neither of which is true in this case. The real absurdity, as I see it, is to *49adopt a totally strained interpretation of the word “separation” to accommodate arrant pernicious behavior, as if such aberrant conduct were the norm by which we should construe the statute in question, thereby eviscerating a “long overdue” statute with such laudable ends and objectives.
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the Superior Court.
NIX, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion.