Court Opinion

ID: 9952587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 13:09:41.336335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:18.513676
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Stenson, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-995.]

                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.

                         SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-995
                    CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. STENSON.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
       may be cited as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Stenson, Slip Opinion No.
                                    2024-Ohio-995.]
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—One-
        year suspension with six months conditionally stayed.
   (No. 2023-0041—Submitted February 6, 2024—Decided March 20, 2024.)
   ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
                                 Court, No. 2022-047.
                                 __________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Respondent, David Edmund Stenson, of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney
Registration No. 0042671, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989.
        {¶ 2} On June 4, 2014, this court imposed a conditionally stayed six-month
suspension on Stenson’s license to practice law for his failure to abide by a client’s
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which
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those objectives were to be pursued and for his neglect of another client’s legal
matter. Dayton Bar Assn. v. Stenson, 139 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-2339, 12
N.E.3d 1182, ¶ 10, 14, 20.
       {¶ 3} In a December 2022 complaint, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association,
alleged that Stenson neglected a single client’s legal matter, failed to reasonably
communicate with the client, and failed to inform the client that he did not maintain
professional-liability insurance. In January 2023, relator certified to this court that
Stenson had failed to file an answer to the complaint, and we ordered Stenson to
show cause why an interim default suspension should not be imposed and the
corresponding disciplinary order should not be entered against him. After Stenson
filed a timely response to our show-cause order and a motion for leave to file an
answer to relator’s complaint, we remanded the matter to the board for further
proceedings, 169 Ohio St.3d 1453, 2023-Ohio-660, 204 N.E.2d 557.
       {¶ 4} In September 2023, relator amended its complaint to allege additional
rule violations and to add a second count alleging similar misconduct regarding
another client. The parties submitted stipulations of fact and misconduct, including
ten exhibits, and the matter proceeded to a hearing before a three-member panel of
the Board of Professional Conduct. At the conclusion of the evidence and on
relator’s motion, the panel unanimously dismissed three alleged rule violations.
The panel issued a report finding that Stenson committed the remaining charged
misconduct, with the exception of one alleged violation under the second count,
which it unanimously dismissed.         The panel recommended that Stenson be
suspended from the practice of law for one year with six months stayed. The panel
also recommended that certain conditions be placed on Stenson’s reinstatement to
the practice of law and that he be required to serve a one-year period of monitored
probation.

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        {¶ 5} The board adopted the panel’s report and recommendation, and the
parties have jointly waived objections. After a thorough review of the record, we
adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and the recommended sanction.
                                  MISCONDUCT
                            Count I—The Grim Matter
        {¶ 6} In May 2020, Shaunice Grim retained Stenson to assist her in
administering the estate of her deceased mother. She paid Stenson a retainer of
$1,500 using an electronic-payment application that deposited the payment directly
into one of two operating accounts maintained by Stenson. At his disciplinary
hearing, Stenson admitted that he had not maintained a separate record for each
client for whom he held funds. In addition, Stenson stipulated that he did not
maintain professional-liability insurance during the time he represented Grim.
Although he testified that his staff provided Grim with a fee agreement that would
have included a notice to that effect, neither he nor Grim have been able to locate a
signed copy of that agreement.
        {¶ 7} Stenson filed an application to administer Grim’s mother’s estate in
the Hamilton County Probate Court on May 27, 2020. Because Stenson did not file
the appropriate bond with that application, the letters appointing Grim as
administrator of the estate were not timely issued. Consequently, the probate court
set an August 2020 hearing “for entry or dismissal” of the case. Ten days after that
hearing, Stenson filed a fiduciary’s bond and Grim was appointed as fiduciary of
the estate.
        {¶ 8} Beginning in December 2020, the probate court issued multiple
delinquency notices and orders—including orders for Stenson and Grim to appear
in court and for extensions of time to file—regarding the overdue estate inventory
and certificate of fee agreement. Those orders culminated with a body-attachment
order, served by the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, compelling Stenson to
appear on March 31, 2021, and show cause why he should not be held in contempt

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of court. Following the issuance of that body-attachment order and before the
scheduled hearing, Stenson filed a certificate of fee agreement and estate inventory
in the probate court.
       {¶ 9} In the interim, the probate court issued a notice that the estate’s final
account was overdue. The court later issued a citation ordering Stenson and Grim
to appear in court on May 12, 2021, regarding the overdue account, and Stenson
subsequently obtained an extension of time to file the final account on or before
September 21, 2021. Stenson did not meet that deadline, and he did not comply
with a subsequent citation ordering him to appear and show cause for his failure to
file the account. The court continued the filing deadline for the account twice more
before Stenson was permitted to withdraw as counsel in January 2022. Grim
retained new counsel to complete the administration of the estate, and on May 13,
2022—nearly two years after the estate was opened—the court approved the final
account.
       {¶ 10} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing
evidence that Stenson’s conduct in the Grim matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3
(requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with a
client’s reasonable requests for information), 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform a
client if the lawyer does not maintain professional-liability insurance and to obtain
a signed acknowledgment of that notice from the client), and 1.15 (requiring a
lawyer to hold the property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account,
separately from the lawyer’s own property, to maintain a copy of any fee agreement
with each client, and to maintain a record for each client on whose behalf funds are
held that sets forth the name of the client and the date, amount, and source of all
funds received on behalf of such client). We adopt these findings of misconduct
and note that based on the parenthetical descriptions of the rules offered in the
amended complaint, the parties’ stipulations, and the board’s report, the

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                                January Term, 2024

parenthetical description of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15 found by the board shows that the
violation is a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a).
                          Count II—The Russell Matter
       {¶ 11} Around late September or early October 2020, Arnesta Russell
talked to Stenson about injuries she suffered in a fall at a Macy’s department store
in August 2020. Approximately one week after that discussion, Russell met with
Stenson at his office to discuss her claim. At that time, Stenson instructed Russell
to contact him when she completed her course of physical therapy. Stenson did not
maintain professional-liability insurance during the time he represented Russell and
could not produce a written notice signed by Russell advising her of that fact.
       {¶ 12} In October 2020, Stenson sent a letter to inform Macy’s that he
represented Russell in relation to her claim against the company. Stenson had
minimal contact with Russell until she completed her course of physical therapy in
August 2021. In September 2021, Stenson informed Russell that he had received
an offer to settle her claim for $2,500, and Russell rejected the offer.
       {¶ 13} The following May, Stenson sent Russell a letter asking her to send
him $335 for the fee to file a lawsuit on her behalf against Macy’s. Russell
informed Stenson that she would need some time to gather the money. Although
Russell delivered a $250 check to Stenson in September 2022, Stenson did not
attempt to file a lawsuit until December 2022 and January 2023. However, his
online filings were rejected because the credit-card number he entered to pay the
filing fee was invalid.     In his testimony before the hearing panel, Stenson
acknowledged that it was not until after those filings were rejected that he realized
that the statute of limitations had elapsed on Russell’s claim.
       {¶ 14} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing
evidence that Stenson’s conduct in the Russell matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3,
1.4(c), and 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with a client about
the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished), 1.4(a)(3)

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(requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter), and 1.4(a)(4). We adopt these findings of misconduct. And although the
parties stipulated that Stenson’s conduct also violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15, the board
unanimously dismissed the alleged violation of that rule, citing the insufficiency of
the evidence supporting that alleged violation.
                                    SANCTION
       {¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.
       {¶ 16} The parties have stipulated that Stenson’s prior discipline and
multiple offenses are aggravating factors in this case. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1)
and (4). The board adopted those stipulations and also noted that Stenson’s
misconduct in this case is substantially similar to his misconduct in his previous
disciplinary case. That fact weighs in favor of a more severe sanction because the
prior sanction failed to serve the desired deterrent effect. See, e.g., Lorain Cty. Bar
Assn. v. Nelson, 168 Ohio St.3d 596, 2022-Ohio-1288, 200 N.E.3d 1039, ¶ 36. The
board further found the aggravating factor of harm to the victim because Stenson’s
lack of diligence harmed Russell, whose personal-injury claim is now barred by the
statute of limitations. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(8). The board also found that
Stenson refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. See Gov.Bar
R. V(13)(B)(7). Specifically, the board noted that Stenson attempted to blame his
clients for his misconduct by claiming that they had failed to return their signed fee
agreements to him. In addition, the board found that Stenson’s waiting until the
morning of his disciplinary hearing to refund the payments made by Grim and
Russell constituted an aggravating factor. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(9).
       {¶ 17} As for mitigating factors, the parties stipulated and the board agreed
that Stenson did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive. See Gov.Bar R.

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                                January Term, 2024

V(13)(C)(2). The board noted that Stenson offered no evidence of his character or
reputation. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(5). And while he testified about the stress he
experienced following the deaths of several family members, Stenson provided no
evidence that he had been diagnosed with any disorder that would qualify as a
mitigating factor under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).
       {¶ 18} Relator recommended that Stenson be suspended from the practice
of law for one year with six months stayed on conditions that would require him to
complete six hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) focused on law-office
management, serve a period of monitored probation, and participate in counseling
through the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”). Stenson requested a
fully stayed one-year suspension with the conditions recommended by relator.
Although neither party provided any caselaw to support its position, the board
considered three cases that support the imposition of an actual suspension from the
practice of law—namely, Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabol, 118 Ohio St.3d 65, 2008-
Ohio-1594, 886 N.E.2d 191; Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Weir, 156 Ohio St.3d 566,
2019-Ohio-2151, 130 N.E.3d 275; and Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 127
Ohio St.3d 97, 2010-Ohio-4832, 936 N.E.2d 938.
       {¶ 19} After voluntarily dismissing a client’s personal-injury case with the
client’s consent, Sabol realized that he had improperly calendared—and missed—
the deadline to refile the action. He immediately told his client to consult another
lawyer about the potential legal-malpractice claim. Sabol at ¶ 3-4. Sabol had failed
to inform the client that he did not carry professional-liability insurance during his
representation. He agreed, however, to settle the client’s malpractice claim and
paid the agreed amount in full. Id. at ¶ 5. Although Sabol cooperated in the
disciplinary proceeding and made full restitution to his client by resolving the
malpractice claim, he had prior discipline—he was publicly reprimanded more than
ten years earlier for dismissing the personal-injury claims of two clients without
their consent. Id. at ¶ 9. Citing that disciplinary history, we concluded that Sabol’s

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misconduct warranted a stricter sanction than a fully stayed suspension and
suspended him from the practice of law for six months. Id. at ¶ 9-10.
       {¶ 20} Weir neglected two client matters and failed to provide competent
representation to one of his clients. Weir at ¶ 7, 18-19. He also failed to reasonably
communicate with one of those clients, failed to promptly deliver that client’s
settlement funds to her, failed to notify her that he did not carry professional-
liability insurance, and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary
investigation. Id. at ¶ 5-9. For aggravating factors, Weir had a prior attorney-
registration suspension and committed multiple offenses. Id. at ¶ 21. Weir also
failed to make restitution to a client for a financial loss occasioned by his neglect.
Id. at ¶ 23. As in this case, the sole mitigating factor in Weir was the fact that Weir
did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive. See id. at ¶ 22. We suspended Weir
from the practice of law for one year with six months stayed on the conditions that
he commit no further misconduct, make restitution to his client, complete a CLE
course on law-office management, and submit to an assessment conducted by
OLAP and comply with all treatment recommendations arising from that
assessment. Id. at ¶ 28.
       {¶ 21} Johnson neglected two unrelated legal matters by, among other
things, failing to participate in the discovery process and failing to respond to
dispositive motions. Johnson, 127 Ohio St.3d 97, 2010-Ohio-4832, 936 N.E.2d
938, at ¶ 3-4. In one of those matters, Johnson’s failures resulted in a default
judgment of more than $330,000 being entered against her clients. Id. at ¶ 3.
Johnson’s failure to prosecute the second matter resulted in the dismissal of the
client’s complaint without prejudice. Id. at ¶ 4. Johnson’s subsequent failure to
notify that client of the deadline for refiling the case after her withdrawal as counsel
resulted in the client’s claims being time-barred. Id.
       {¶ 22} Aggravating factors in Johnson included a history of prior discipline
for similar offenses and Johnson’s admitted failure to notify her clients that she did

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                                January Term, 2024

not maintain professional-liability insurance. Id. at ¶ 7 and fn. 2. We also found
as aggravating factors a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses. Id. at
¶ 18. In mitigation, we found that Johnson had not acted with a selfish motive and
that in contrast to Stenson, she cooperated in the disciplinary process. See id. at
¶ 8. As in this case, we declined to consider Johnson’s generalized stress arising
from family and other personal matters as a mitigating factor. See id. at ¶ 8, 11-15.
We suspended Johnson from the practice of law for one year with six months stayed
on the conditions that she commit no further misconduct, submit to a mental-health
assessment conducted by OLAP, enter into an OLAP contract, and comply with all
of OLAP’s treatment recommendations. Id. at ¶ 23.
       {¶ 23} The board acknowledged the similarities between the misconduct at
issue in Sabol, Weir, and Johnson and the misconduct at issue in this case. It found
that Stenson’s prior discipline for similar offenses, his refusal to acknowledge his
wrongdoing, and his attempts to deflect blame to his clients suggested that an actual
suspension from the practice of law is necessary to protect the public. The board
therefore recommends that Stenson be suspended from the practice of law for one
year with six months stayed. In addition, the board recommends that Stenson’s
reinstatement to the practice of law be conditioned on the submission of proof that
he has (1) completed a minimum of six hours of CLE focused on law-office
management, in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, (2) completed a
client-trust-account training program offered by disciplinary counsel or a bar
association that maintains a certified-grievance committee, (3) submitted to an
assessment conducted by OLAP, and (4) complied with any treatment
recommendations arising from that assessment.             Furthermore, the board
recommends that upon reinstatement to the practice of law, Stenson be required to
serve a one-year period of monitored probation focused primarily on law-office
management and compliance with client-trust-account regulations.

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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

        {¶ 24} In this case, Stenson disregarded a statute of limitations in the
Russell matter and multiple filing deadlines and court orders in the Grim matter.
He failed to reasonably communicate with his clients, failed to notify them that he
did not carry professional-liability insurance, failed to deposit an unearned fee into
his client trust account, and failed to maintain required records regarding that
account. Although he stipulated to multiple rule violations, he has failed to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct and has instead attempted to
blame his clients and his own difficult family circumstances for his failures. In
light of these facts and their similarity to the facts of Sabol, Weir, and Johnson, we
agree that a partially stayed one-year suspension with the reinstatement conditions
recommended by the board is the appropriate sanction for the misconduct at issue
in this case.
                                  CONCLUSION
        {¶ 25} Accordingly, David Edmund Stenson is hereby suspended from the
practice of law in Ohio for one year with six months stayed on the condition that
he engage in no further misconduct. If Stenson fails to comply with the condition
of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will be required to serve the full one-year
suspension.
        {¶ 26} In addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(24), Stenson’s
reinstatement to the practice of law shall be conditioned on the submission of proof
that he has (1) completed a minimum of six hours of CLE focused on law-office
management, in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, (2) completed a
client-trust-account training program offered by disciplinary counsel or a bar
association that maintains a certified-grievance committee, (3) submitted to an
assessment conducted by OLAP, and (4) complied with any treatment
recommendations arising from that assessment. Further, upon reinstatement to the
practice of law, Stenson shall serve a one-year period of monitored probation in
accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21) to be focused primarily on law-office

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                               January Term, 2024

management and compliance with client-trust-account regulations. Costs are taxed
to Stenson.
                                                          Judgment accordingly.
        KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS,
JJ., concur.
        BRUNNER, J., not participating.
                               _________________
        Maria C. Palermo, Bar Counsel, for relator.
        Bieser, Greer & Landis, L.L.P., and David P. Williamson, for respondent.
                               _________________

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