Court Opinion

ID: 9963030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 15:01:08.503477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:15.840850
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13118    Document: 67-1      Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 1 of 16

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13118
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        SEDERICK MAXWELL,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20064-KMM-4
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13118

        Before NEWSOM, ANDERSON, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               After pleading guilty, defendant Sederick Maxwell appeals
        his 100-month sentence for possession of a firearm as a convicted
        felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In 2020, Maxwell and
        four others who were convicted felons appeared in a music video
        holding firearms. At sentencing, the district court, over Maxwell’s
        objection, applied a 4-level increase in his offense level, pursuant to
        U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B), based on the eight firearms displayed in
        the video. Alternatively, the district court stated that it would have
        imposed the same 100-month sentence regardless of the 4-level
        increase.
                On appeal, Maxwell argues that the district court erred by
        applying U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) because he possessed only one
        firearm and his codefendants’ firearms possession was not
        attributable to him as relevant conduct. Maxwell also argues for
        the first time that the government breached the plea agreement by
        requesting a sentence outside the advisory guidelines range
        calculated without the 4-level increase.
               After careful review, we conclude any alleged error in
        increasing Maxwell’s offense level under § 2K1.2(b)(1)(B) was
        harmless and the government did not breach the plea agreement.
        Thus, we affirm Maxwell’s conviction and sentence.
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        21-13118                 Opinion of the Court                            3

                                  I. BACKGROUND
        A.     Offense Conduct
               In August 2020, law enforcement officers observed a music
        video posted on Instagram accounts of several members or
        associates of “the 13th Avenue/Blood Hound Gang,” including
        defendant Maxwell. 1 In the music video, some individuals were
        holding what appeared to be assault-style firearms. Upon
        reviewing the raw footage, the officers were able to identify the
        individuals who were convicted felons and were shown holding
        firearms. An officer also was able to identify positively the make
        and model of eight firearms in the video, all of which were capable
        of accepting a large capacity magazine.
               At the time, Maxwell had, and was aware that he had, two
        prior felony convictions. Maxwell was one of five individuals
        arrested. In a post-arrest statement, Maxwell admitted to law
        enforcement that the firearm he possessed in the music video was
        real.
        B.     Indictment and Guilty Plea
               A grand jury charged Maxwell and his four codefendants
        with one count each of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Maxwell was charged in Count

        1 Prior to sentencing, Maxwell denied that he was an associate or member of

        any gang, but he did not raise that objection at sentencing and he does not
        challenge this fact on appeal.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                21-13118

        Four with possessing a         “Romarm-Cugir/Century          Arms,
        VT/Model: Micro Draco.”
               In May 2021, Maxwell pled guilty pursuant to a written plea
        agreement. In the plea agreement, Maxwell acknowledged that
        the district court would determine the advisory guidelines range
        relying in part on the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) and
        was not bound to impose a sentence within that range. Maxwell
        also agreed that he was aware any estimate of the sentencing range
        by the government was “a prediction, not a promise” and was not
        binding on the government, the probation officer, or the court.
                In exchange for Maxwell’s guilty plea, the government
        agreed to make three recommendations at sentencing: (1) that the
        district court reduce Maxwell’s offense level for acceptance of
        responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, with certain
        conditions; (2) that Maxwell’s relevant conduct was “one firearm
        which was in his possession and charged in Count Four of the
        Indictment”; and (3) that Maxwell’s federal sentence run
        concurrent with any sentences imposed in his state court cases.
        The government reserved the right to inform the district court “of
        all facts pertinent to the sentencing process” and the right,
        “[s]ubject only to the express terms of any agreed-upon sentencing
        recommendations contained in this agreement, . . . to make any
        recommendation as to the quality and quantity of punishment.”
        C.    PSI and Objections
              The PSI assigned Maxwell a base offense level of 26,
        pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1), because his offense involved a
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        21-13118                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

        semiautomatic firearm that could accept a large capacity magazine
        and because he had committed the instant offense after sustaining
        at least two felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a
        controlled substance offense. The PSI added 4 levels under
        § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) because Maxwell’s offense involved eight firearms,
        for an adjusted offense level of 30. 2 The PSI noted that despite the
        parties’ agreement that Maxwell was responsible for only the one
        firearm he possessed, § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B)’s 4-level increase applied.
        The PSI then reduced Maxwell’s offense level by 3 levels under
        U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for acceptance of responsibility, for a
        total offense level of 27.
               The PSI calculated Maxwell’s criminal history category as IV
        based on a total of eight criminal history points. The PSI assigned
        six of those criminal history points to his separate 2011 Florida
        convictions for (1) possession of cocaine and cannabis with intent
        to sell, manufacture, or deliver within 1,000 feet of a childcare
        center or school, and (2) armed robbery with a firearm or deadly
        weapon and attempted felony murder with a deadly weapon or
        aggravated battery. The second set of charges arose out of a
        robbery in which the victim was shot three times and was
        hospitalized. While Maxwell’s drug crimes and his armed
        robbery/attempted felony murder crimes were committed
        months apart, Maxwell received eight-year concurrent sentences in

        2 Under § 2K2.1(b)(1), the district court increases a defendant’s offense level by

        4 levels if the offense involved between 8 and 24 firearms. See U.S.S.G.
        § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B).
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13118

        both cases. The PSI added two criminal history points, pursuant to
        U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), because Maxwell committed the instant
        firearm offense while serving probation for these convictions.
               With a total offense level of 27 and a criminal history
        category of IV, Maxwell’s initial advisory guidelines range was 100
        to 125 months. However, because his statutory maximum term
        was ten years under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), Maxwell’s advisory
        guidelines range became 100 to 120 months.
               Relevant to this appeal, Maxwell objected to the 4-level
        increase under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B). Maxwell argued that he was not
        responsible for eight firearms because his offense involved only the
        firearm he possessed, he was not charged with conspiracy, and his
        relevant conduct did not include other convicted felons’ possession
        of firearms. Maxwell pointed out that there was no evidence he
        knew the other individuals in the music video were convicted
        felons. Maxwell represented that he had discussed the 4-level
        increase with the prosecutor, who “agree[d] with the defense
        objection and w[ould] not submit evidence to support the
        enhancement.”
               The probation officer responded to Maxwell’s objection,
        stating that the district court was not bound by the parties’
        stipulation to one firearm. The probation officer explained that
        relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) included all acts and
        omissions taken in the scope of jointly undertaken criminal
        activity, whether or not charged as a conspiracy. The probation
        officer submitted that Maxwell’s conspiracy and agreement to
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        21-13118               Opinion of the Court                            7

        appear in the music video with his codefendants, all of whom
        “possessed firearms knowing they had all previously been
        convicted of a felony crime,” was the basis for his relevant conduct.
        D.    Sentencing
                At sentencing, the district court overruled Maxwell’s
        objection to the 4-level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B). The
        district court found that the seven other firearms were attributable
        to Maxwell as relevant conduct. The district court expressed,
        however, that if it was wrong on that point, it would still give
        Maxwell the same sentence, stating as follows:
              If I’m wrong, I’m wrong, and the Eleventh Circuit
              will tell me I’m wrong as they have in the past.
                      And I would say that for everybody’s benefit,
              for the sake of judicial resources, that I’ve looked at
              the PSI carefully. I looked at the letters that you sent
              that I got today, I’ve looked at the 3553(a) factors,
              including his criminal history; not only relying on his
              criminal history, but the nature and circumstances of
              the instant offense, the need to promote respect for
              the law, and to provide adequate deterrence. And so
              the sentence that I would give today would be the same
              sentence post-Booker as a reasonable sentence, regardless of
              the calculation of the guidelines with the additional points
              for multiple weapons. So just so that everybody
              understands, that I’m imposing a sentence that I
              believe is correct under the guidelines; but I’m also
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                21-13118

              imposing a sentence in the alternative under
              post-Booker reasonableness standard.
        (Emphasis added.) The district court adopted the PSI’s advisory
        guidelines calculations and found that the advisory guidelines
        range was 100 to 120 months.
               Maxwell requested an 80-month sentence, in the middle of
        the 70- to 87-month range if the 4-level increase had not applied. In
        mitigation, Maxwell stressed that he recently was a victim of a
        drive-by shooting, for which he had undergone several surgeries
        and still suffered medical issues.
               The government requested a 100-month sentence given the
        nature and circumstances of Maxwell’s firearm offense and his
        history and characteristics. The government emphasized that
        when Maxwell possessed the firearm in the music video, he was on
        probation for very serious state offenses, including attempted
        felony murder, armed robbery, and narcotics trafficking and based
        on discussions with the state attorney’s office, Maxwell faced a
        lengthy sentence for his probation violations. In compliance with
        the plea agreement, the government requested that Maxwell’s
        sentence run concurrent with Maxwell’s state court sentences.
               The district court reviewed Maxwell’s criminal history as
        reflected in the PSI, including his prior concurrent eight-year state
        prison sentences and his pending probation violations in state
        court. The government confirmed that because Maxwell’s prior
        state convictions involved a shooting in which someone was
        injured, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in
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        21-13118                Opinion of the Court                          9

        state court for a new law violation. The district court stated that it
        would not run Maxwell’s federal sentence concurrently, explaining
        that Maxwell should not be rewarded for committing another
        offense while on probation. The district court also observed that
        Maxwell’s prior state sentences of eight years were “probably why
        he’s wound up in federal court” and that if those sentences had
        been longer, “we might have nipped this in the bud.”
               The district court stated that it had considered the
        statements of the parties, the PSI which contained the advisory
        guidelines range, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and imposed a
        sentence of 100 months, followed by three years of supervised
        release. Maxwell renewed his objection to the district court’s
        application of § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B)’s 4-level increase in his offense level.
                                  II. DISCUSSION
               On appeal, Maxwell argues that: (1) the district court erred
        in applying the 4-level multiple-firearm increase under
        § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B), and (2) the government breached the plea
        agreement when it recommended a sentence outside 80 to 87
        months, the sentencing range that did not include the 4-level
        increase. We address each issue in turn.
        A.     Multiple Firearm Increase Under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B)
               Maxwell advances the same argument he made at
        sentencing—that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B)’s 4-level increase does
        not apply because his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) offense involved the
        possession of only one firearm, and no evidence was presented at
        his sentencing that his codefendants’ possession of the other seven
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  21-13118

        firearms was relevant conduct as defined in U.S.S.G.
        § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) or (B). In particular, Maxwell contends there was
        no evidence that he aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
        induced, procured, or willfully caused any of the other individuals
        to possess a firearm or to be in the music video or, alternatively, no
        evidence of jointly undertaken criminal activity by him and the
        others in the video.
               The problem for Maxwell is we need not review a purported
        guidelines calculation error if the district court “has already told us
        that it would impose exactly the same sentence, a sentence we
        would be compelled to affirm.” United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1,
        18 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 143 S.
        Ct. 2594 (2023); see also United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1350
        (11th Cir. 2006). Under our precedent, a guidelines calculation
        error is harmless when (1) the district court states that it would
        have imposed the same sentence, even if it had decided the
        guidelines issue in the defendant’s favor, and (2) assuming an error
        occurred and the lower guidelines range applied, the sentence is
        substantively reasonable. Grushko, 50 F.4th at 18; Keene, 470 F.3d
        at 1349.
              Here, the district court, in imposing the 100-month
        sentence, stated on the record that it would have imposed the same
        sentence even if the § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) 4-level enhancement did not
        apply. Further, as explained below, Maxwell’s 100-month
        sentence, even if an upward variance from the 70- to 87-month
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        21-13118               Opinion of the Court                         11

        guidelines range without the 4-level increase, is substantively
        reasonable.
        B.     Substantive Reasonableness
               More specifically, if the district court had sustained
        Maxwell’s objection to the application of § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B)’s 4-level
        increase, Maxwell’s total offense level would have been lowered to
        23, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 70 to 87 months.
        See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table). The district court’s
        sentence of 100 months’ imprisonment would have been a
        13-month upward variance.
               “We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for
        abuse of discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.”
        United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023). The
        party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing that
        it is unreasonable “in light of the entire record, the [18 U.S.C.]
        § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing
        courts.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th
        Cir. 2015). Although in choosing the sentence, the district court
        must consider the § 3553(a) factors, the district court is not required
        to address each factor separately. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d
        1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). Rather, the district court’s
        acknowledgment that it has considered the defendant’s arguments
        and the factors generally will suffice. Id. Moreover, the weight to
        be given each § 3553(a) factor lies within the district court’s sound
        discretion, and the district court may assign great weight to one
        factor over others. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d. at 1254.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  21-13118

                The district court also has wide discretion to impose an
        upward variance based on the § 3553(a) factors. United States v.
        Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022). If the district court
        determines that a variance is warranted, it “must consider the
        extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is
        sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Gall
        v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). While we may consider the
        extent of the variance, we do not require extraordinary
        circumstances to justify a sentence outside the advisory guidelines
        range or presume that such a sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 47;
        see also United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1186-87 (11th Cir. 2010)
        (en banc). “We will vacate a defendant’s sentence as substantively
        unreasonable only if we are left with the definite and firm
        conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
        judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
        that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
        facts of the case.” Oudomsine, 57 F.4th at 1266 (quotation marks
        omitted).
               Given the alternative 70- to 87-month range, the § 3553(a)
        factors, and the totality of the circumstances, Maxwell has not
        shown his 100-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. In
        choosing the 100-month sentence, the district court stated that it
        had considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments,
        carefully reviewed the PSI, and read the letters sent in support of
        Maxwell. The district court explicitly cited as pertinent factors the
        nature and circumstances of Maxwell’s offense, the need to
        promote respect for the law, and the need to provide adequate
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        21-13118               Opinion of the Court                       13

        deterrence. The district court also stated that it had considered
        Maxwell’s criminal history, but clarified that it did not rely solely
        on his criminal history. The district court’s comments during the
        hearing indicate that it was concerned that Maxwell’s prior eight-
        year state sentences had not adequately deterred him from
        committing the instant federal firearm offense.
               Given Maxwell’s prior criminal history, which included
        serious felonies that resulted in gunshot injuries to the victim, the
        fact that Maxwell was undeterred by his previous eight-year state
        sentences, committed the instant offense while still on state
        probation, and, as part of his current federal firearm offense,
        appeared in a music video with members of a gang holding a
        semiautomatic firearm fitted with a large capacity magazine, we
        cannot say a decision to vary upward by 13 months was
        substantively unreasonable. We note, also, that Maxwell’s
        100-month sentence is below the 120-month statutory maximum,
        another indication it is reasonable. See United States v. Dougherty,
        754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2014).
        C.    Breach of Plea Agreement
               Although Maxwell did not raise this issue in the district
        court, on appeal he argues that the government breached the plea
        agreement by requesting a 100-month sentence, above the 70- to
        87-month range Maxwell says the parties contemplated.
               Ordinarily, we review de novo whether the government has
        breached a plea agreement. United States v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311,
        1318 (11th Cir. 2022). Where, as here, a defendant fails to object to
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                   21-13118

        the purported breach before the district court, our review is for
        plain error. Id. Plain error occurs where: (1) there is an error;
        (2) that is plain; (3) it affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and
        (4) it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
        judicial proceedings. Id. at 1319.
                For an error to be plain, it must be “clear or obvious.” United
        States v. Sosa, 782 F.3d 630, 637 (11th Cir. 2015). “In the context of
        plea agreement breaches, the Supreme Court has advised that not
        all breaches will be clear or obvious, such as when the drafting of
        an agreement leaves the scope of the government’s commitments
        open to doubt.” Id. (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted).
               “[T]he government breaches a plea agreement when it fails
        to perform the promises on which the plea was based.” Malone, 51
        F.4th at 1319 (quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether
        the government has breached a plea agreement, we must first
        determine the scope of the government’s promises.” Id. (quotation
        marks omitted, alteration adopted). We look to the plea
        agreement’s plain language, and the “plea agreement’s
        unambiguous meaning controls.” Id. at 1319-21, see also Sosa, 782
        F.3d at 637. “[W]e ask whether the government’s conduct
        conflicted with the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the
        government’s promises when he entered his guilty plea.” Malone,
        51 F.4th at 1319. Our inquiry applies an objective standard, and we
        do not read “the agreement in a hyper-technical or rigidly literal
        manner.” United States v. Hunter, 835 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir.
        2016) (quotation marks omitted).
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        21-13118              Opinion of the Court                     15

              Here, in exchange for Maxwell’s agreement to plead guilty,
        the government promised to recommend that Maxwell’s relevant
        conduct was “the one firearm which was in his possession and
        charged in Count Four of the Indictment,” that Maxwell receive an
        acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, and that his sentence run
        concurrent to his state sentences. None of these promises requires
        the government to recommend a particular sentence, much less
        recommend a sentence within a particular guidelines range.
               Maxwell essentially contends that implicit within the
        government’s promise to recommend only one firearm as relevant
        conduct, was another promise not to ask for a sentence outside the
        advisory guidelines range that would have been calculated using
        only one firearm. But this understanding of the government’s
        promise is not supported by the plea agreement’s plain language
        and is not objectively reasonable.
               In the plea agreement, the government explicitly reserved
        the right to recommend any “quality or quantity of punishment”
        unless it expressly agreed to a sentencing recommendation set
        forth in the agreement. As noted, there was no explicit promise in
        the plea agreement to recommend a particular sentence or a
        particular guidelines range. Further, Maxwell acknowledged in the
        plea agreement that (1) the district court would determine the
        advisory guidelines range, (2) any estimate by the government of
        the probable sentencing range was only a prediction and not a
        promise and was not binding on the government or the district
        court; and (3) that any recommendation made by the government
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        16                    Opinion of the Court                21-13118

        was not binding on the district court. In light of these
        acknowledgments and the government’s express promises in the
        plea agreement, there is no merit to Maxwell’s claims that an
        advisory guidelines range of 70 to 87 months “was agreed to in the
        plea agreement” or that Maxwell reasonably understood that the
        government would recommend a sentence within that range.
               The record shows the government complied with all three
        promises at the sentencing hearing, including its promise about
        relevant conduct. As to the relevant conduct promise in particular,
        the government agreed with Maxwell that his relevant conduct
        was the single firearm he was charged with possessing and declined
        to present evidence supporting the probation officer’s position in
        the PSI that Maxwell’s relevant conduct included the other seven
        firearms seen in the music video. The government did not plainly
        breach the plea agreement when it sought a 100-month sentence,
        at the low end of the advisory guidelines range, as determined by
        the district court.
                               III. CONCLUSION
              For these reasons, we affirm Maxwell’s firearm conviction
        and 100-month sentence.
              AFFIRMED.