Court Opinion

ID: 9770028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:13:31.270461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:32.403819
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Shelby Lynn Clingan                            :
                                               :
                      v.                       :    No. 231 C.D. 2021
                                               :    Submitted: September 16, 2022
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                  :
Department of Transportation,                  :
Bureau of Driver Licensing,                    :
                         Appellant             :

BEFORE:       HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
              HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
              HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                                    FILED: August 29, 2023

       The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation
(Department), Bureau of Driver Licensing (Bureau) appeals from the February 17,
2021 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County (common pleas). The
Order sustained the statutory appeal of Shelby Lynn Clingan (Licensee) and vacated
the Bureau’s one-year suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege. Licensee’s
operating privilege was suspended pursuant to Section 3804(e)(2)(i) of the Vehicle
Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(2)(i),1 based on her August 20, 2020 conviction for

       1
         Section 3804(e)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code states: “Suspension under paragraph (1) shall
be in accordance with the following: (i) Except as provided for in subparagraph (iii), 12 months
for an ungraded misdemeanor or misdemeanor of the second degree under this chapter.” 75
Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(2)(i).
violating Section 3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).2 At issue
is whether Licensee’s prior successful completion of an Accelerated Rehabilitative
Disposition (ARD) program after being cited for driving under the influence (DUI),
was a “prior offense” for purposes of a one-year suspension, and whether Licensee’s
negotiated plea agreement binds the Bureau. Upon thorough review, we reverse the
Order of common pleas and direct the Bureau to reinstate the one-year suspension
of Licensee’s operating privilege.

I.     BACKGROUND
       On June 14, 2017, Licensee was accepted into an Accelerated Rehabilitative
Disposition (ARD) program after being cited for DUI in violation of Section 3802(c)
of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c) (relating to DUI of alcohol or controlled
substances – highest rate of alcohol),3 on September 2, 2016. (Reproduced Record
(R.R.) at 46a.) In accordance with Section 3807(d) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 3807(d) (relating to ARD – mandatory suspension of operating privileges),
Licensee’s operating privilege was suspended for a period of 60 days. (Id. at 43a.)
Her operating privilege was restored on September 25, 2017. (Id. at 42a.)

       2
          Section 3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code provides: “An individual may not drive, operate
or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of
alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual
physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).
        3
          Section 3802(c) of the Vehicle Code states:

       An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
       movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the
       alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is 0.16% or higher within
       two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control
       of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c).

                                                  2
       Licensee was charged on March 26, 2020, with DUI pursuant to Section
3802(b), 75 Pa.C.S. §3802(b). On August 20, 2020, consistent with a negotiated
plea to an ungraded misdemeanor offense, Licensee was convicted of DUI in
violation     of   Section      3802(a)(1)      of    the    Vehicle      Code,     75     Pa.C.S.
§ 3802(a)(1)(relating to general impairment). (Id. at 40a-41a.) Upon receipt of the
report of Licensee’s conviction, the Bureau, by official notice with a mail date of
September 2, 2020, imposed a one-year suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege
effective October 7, 2020, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(2)(i). (Id. at 36a.)
       On September 9, 2020, Licensee filed a statutory appeal of the suspension of
her operating privilege with common pleas. (Id. at 9a-10a.) On February 17, 2021,
common pleas held a de novo hearing, at which the Bureau offered into evidence
Bureau’s Exhibit No. 1,4 which was admitted without objection, and both parties
presented argument. (Id. at 23a-33a.) The Bureau argued that Commonwealth v.
Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020), overruled by Commonwealth v. Moroz,
284 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), is inapplicable to license suspension
appeals because Chichkin deals with criminal proceedings and license suspension
appeals are not criminal proceedings. (Id. at 27a-28a.) Licensee argued, based on
Chichkin, that ARD does not count as a prior offense. (Id. at 26a.) Licensee also
argued that because of her prior ARD acceptance, Licensee pled guilty to a first
offense DUI, which carries no suspension, rather than a second offense. (Id. at 29a-
30a.) On the same day, common pleas issued its Order sustaining Licensee’s appeal
from the suspension of her operating privilege. (Id. at 52a.)

       4
           Bureau’s Exhibit No. 1 consisted of certified copies of the September 2, 2020 notice of
suspension; report of conviction of the Fayette County Clerk of Courts; the earlier restoration; the
earlier license suspension; the report of the Clerk of Courts of the ARD; and Licensee’s driving
record.

                                                 3
      On March 8, 2021, the Bureau filed a notice of appeal to the Commonwealth
Court. (Id. at 1a.) Common pleas directed the Bureau to file a Concise Statement
of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(b), which it did. (Id. at 59a, 61a-62a.) On March 25, 2021, common
pleas issued a Statement in Lieu of Opinion stating that common pleas relied on the
February 17, 2021 Order and that no further opinion would be issued. (Id. at 65a.)
The Statement in Lieu of Opinion also attached a September 4, 2020 memorandum
opinion and order from the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, which
common pleas “relied upon and referenced in” sustaining Licensee’s appeal. (Id. at
65a-69a.) That memorandum opinion held, based on Chichkin, that prior acceptance
of ARD cannot be used as a prior conviction for license suspension purposes. (Id.
at 67a-68a.)

II.   PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
      On appeal, the Bureau argues

      [common pleas] erred as a matter of law in holding that [Licensee’s]
      acceptance of [ARD] on June 14, 2017, for violating 75 Pa.C.S.
      § 3802(c) on September 2, 2016, was not a “prior offense” in
      accordance with 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806 of her conviction on August 20,
      2020, of violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) as an ungraded misdemeanor
      on February 16, 2020.

(Bureau’s Br. at 10.) The Bureau asserts Chichkin only precludes use of ARD as a
prior conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes in a criminal DUI case. (Id.
at 15-16, 25.) Based on this argument, the Bureau states “Chichkin has no impact
upon the sections of the Vehicle Code . . . that treat acceptance of ARD as a ‘fact’
for purposes of the [Bureau’s] implementation of civil provisions of the Vehicle

                                         4
Code, including suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege.” (Id. at 23-24
(emphasis in original).)
       Licensee argues common pleas correctly held that Licensee’s conviction was
a first offense that carried no license suspension. (Licensee’s Br. at 8.) Licensee
argues this is the case because, under Chichkin, ARD can no longer be used as a
prior offense. (Id. at 8, 10.) Alternatively, Licensee argues common pleas’ Order
should be affirmed because she entered into a plea agreement specifically to avoid a
statutory license suspension and mandatory jail time, and she “deserves to receive
the benefit of her” negotiated plea agreement with the Commonwealth. (Id. at 11-
12.)
       In response to Licensee’s alternative argument, the Bureau asserts it is not
bound by a plea agreement Licensee entered into with the District Attorney of
Fayette County (District Attorney). (Bureau’s Reply Br. at 4-8.) The Bureau argues
this is because the Commonwealth in a criminal proceeding is not the same party as
the Bureau in a civil proceeding, and, thus, the Bureau is not bound by the results of
the negotiations in the former proceedings. (Id. at 5-6.)

III.   DISCUSSION
       The Bureau asserts that Chichkin is not applicable to civil license suspensions
and only precludes the use of ARD as a prior conviction for sentencing enhancement
purposes in a criminal DUI case. (Bureau’s Br. at 15-16, 25.) Under the current
state of the law, we agree. Chichkin was overruled by an en banc panel of the
Superior Court in Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233, which held that “the portion of Section
3806(a), which equates prior acceptance of ARD to a prior conviction for purposes
of imposing a Section 3804 mandatory minimum sentence, passes constitutional

                                          5
muster.”        While the defendant in Moroz is challenging the Superior Court’s
overruling Chichkin in his appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,5 until the
Supreme Court holds otherwise, Moroz remains the law on the issue. In addition to
Chichkin being overruled, this Court held in Ferguson v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 267 A.3d 628, 632 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)
(en banc), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 280 A.3d 859 (Pa. 2022), that
Chichkin is inapplicable to these cases, and Section 3806(a) is valid for the purpose
of civil license suspensions. The Court held that license suspensions are civil
penalties which are imposed separately from criminal sentencing “over which the
criminal judge had no control and for which he had no responsibility.” Id. The
Supreme Court granted an appeal in Ferguson; however, that en banc opinion
remains binding precedent in this Court. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
3103(b), Pa.R.A.P. 3103(b).6 Based on this precedent, common pleas erred in
applying Chichkin to a civil license suspension case because prior ARD acceptance
can be used to establish a prior offense for license suspension purposes.
         In response to Licensee’s alternative argument relating to her plea agreement,
the Bureau asserts it is not bound by a plea agreement Licensee entered into with the
District Attorney. (Bureau’s Reply Br. at 4-7.) We must agree as, for over 30 years,
this Court has held that mandatory civil penalties, such as the suspension of
Licensee’s operating privilege under the Vehicle Code, “are not subject to the terms
of a plea agreement arising from related criminal charges.” Dep’t of Transp., Bureau
of Driver Licensing v. Lefever, 533 A.2d 501, 503 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). Accordingly,

         5
             See Petition for Allowance of Appeal at 21, Commonwealth v. Moroz (Pa., No. 520 MAL
2022).
         6
         Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 3103(b), an en banc decision of
this Court is binding on any subsequent panel. Pa.R.A.P. 3103(b).

                                                 6
the Bureau was not bound by a sentencing order that did not impose a license
suspension. Boals v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 1266 C.D. 2020, filed Oct. 20, 2022), slip op. at 16.7 “[R]egardless of whether
a plea agreement existed in the underlying criminal proceedings, it has no effect on
the [Bureau’s] duty under the relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code to impose the
instant license suspension.” Stair v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing,
911 A.2d 1014, 1018 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Therefore, the Bureau is not bound by
Licensee’s plea agreement.

IV.   CONCLUSION
      Based on the aforementioned precedent, common pleas committed an error of
law when it applied the reasoning of Chichkin to hold that prior acceptance of ARD
cannot be used to establish a prior offense for the purposes of Licensee’s suspension.
Furthermore, the Bureau is not bound by Licensee’s plea agreement. Accordingly,
we reverse common pleas’ Order and direct the Bureau to reinstate the one-year
suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege.

                                         __________________________________________
                                         RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

      7
         Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126(b), Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), and
Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a), an
unreported opinion of this Court, while not binding, may be cited for its persuasive value.

                                            7
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Shelby Lynn Clingan                      :
                                         :
                   v.                    :   No. 231 C.D. 2021
                                         :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,            :
Department of Transportation,            :
Bureau of Driver Licensing,              :
                         Appellant       :

                                     ORDER

      NOW, August 29, 2023, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette
County, dated February 17, 2021, is REVERSED, and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing is directed
to reinstate the one-year suspension of Shelby Lynn Clingan’s operating privilege.

                                      __________________________________________
                                      RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge