Court Opinion

ID: 9850690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:01:39.837156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:41.694815
License: Public Domain

Peterson, Justice
(dissenting).
The jury, by special verdict, found that defendants violated Minn. St. 179.11(7)1 and 179.422 by picketing and other acts directed against plaintiffs, who are self-employed persons without employees, for the purpose of coercing them, or one of them, to join the defendant union. The court seems to hold that the acts of defendants were unlawful because contrary both to basic statutory policy and judicially declared public policy.
The conduct of defendants does not, in my opinion, violate either of the cited statutes. The purpose of defendants was, I agree, clearly contrary to the literal language of § 179.11(7), for the proscription against compelling “any person” to join a labor organization against his will is obviously broad enough to include self-employed persons. The manner for the accomplishment of such unlawful purpose, however, was not by *352unlawful interference with person, immediate family, or physical property of plaintiffs, nor by assault or unlawful threat against them — that is, conduct different from peaceful picketing. On the other hand, the manner by which defendants undertook to achieve their purpose was of the coercive character proscribed by § 179.42 — yet its purpose was not proscribed by that section, for the section plainly relates only to the unlawful coercion or inducement of employees. I would hold as a matter of law, therefore, that the statutes are on their face inapplicable to the facts of this case.
I concede that it is within the judicial power of this court to declare such activities unlawful as contrary to public policy. The trial court instructed the jury:
“* * * An objective may be declared contrary to public policy or unlawful by either the legislature or by the Supreme Court of the state. Although the public policy of the state may be found in its constitution, statutes, and court decisions, really its establishment is primarily for the lawmakers, the legislature.”
The court’s instructions additionally contained a reading of the provisions of §§ 179.11(7) and 179.42.1 think it highly doubtful, in this context, that the jury based its verdict on considerations of public policy other than the statutes. Because Minnesota has rather comprehensive labor relations statutes, I think the court itself should defer to legislative action 3 and not add to the body of labor law by judicial decision.

 Minn. St. 179.11(7), which is part of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act, provides: “It shall be an unfair labor practice:
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“(7) For any employee, labor organization, or officer, agent, or member thereof, to compel or attempt to compel any person to join or to refrain from joining any labor organization or any strike against his will by any threatened or actual unlawful interference with his person, immediate family, or physical property, or to assault or unlawfully threaten any such person while in pursuit of lawful employment.”

 Section 179.42, which is § 3 of L. 1947, c. 486, relating to secondary boycotts and other coercive practices, provides: “It is an unlawful act and an unfair labor practice for any person or organization to combine with another, to cause loss or injury to an employer * * * or to induce, or to attempt to induce, another to withhold patronage or other business intercourse, for the purpose of inducing or coercing such employer to persuade or otherwise encourage * * * his employees to join * * * any labor union * * * or for the purpose of coercing such employer’s employees to join * * * any labor union or organization.”

 It is, of course, competent for the legislature to proscribe conduct of the kind involved in this case. Section 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor Management Relations Act prohibits labor organizations from engaging in such concerted activity where an objective of such activity is “forcing or requiring any employers or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization.” 61 Stat. 141, as amended, 29 USCA, § 158(b) (4). In my view, the omission of such express provision in the state labor relations act itself represents a contrary determination of state public policy.