Court Opinion

ID: 9725597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:55:32.496917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:16.385707
License: Public Domain

AMDAHL, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of the Ramsey County District Court declaring that both Article XIV of the collective bar*382gaining agreement1 reached between the Department of Public Safety and the Minnesota Highway Patrol Officers Association and the rules of the Department of Personnel are constitutional as they apply to plaintiff Bolin. We reverse.
Plaintiff Bolin has been a member of the State Highway Patrol since 1966. In February 1978, he submitted a written request to the Chief of the State Highway Patrol for an unpaid leave of absence, to extend from August 2, 1978, through August 29, 1978. The purpose of the leave was to enable the plaintiff to run for the office of Sherburne County Sheriff. Patrol Chief Crawford denied the request on the ground that Memo 75-59, issued in 1975 and later encompassed in Minnesota State Patrol Officers Policy Order P077 — 10-030,2 required troopers seeking the position of County Sheriff to resign from the Highway Patrol without prejudice. On March 3,1978, plaintiff filed a written grievance with his district commander, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement reached between the Minnesota Highway Patrol Officers Association and the Department of Personnel. Four days later, plaintiff’s district commander informed the plaintiff that he was unable to resolve the grievance. Plaintiff thén filed a written grievance with Patrol Chief Crawford, again in conformity with the collective bargaining agreement. Thereafter, a hearing was held before an arbitrator, pursuant to Article XVI of that agreement. Before receiving the arbitrator’s decision, plaintiff submitted a second request for an unpaid leave, this one to extend from July 18, 1978, to November 8, 1978. On July 10, 1978, the arbitrator’s decision came down. The arbitrator decided that the agreement was properly construed by the employer to permit a denial of plaintiff’s request for a leave of absence. Plaintiff did not appeal from the arbitrator’s decision at that time. Patrol Chief Crawford then denied plaintiff’s second request for an unpaid leave of absence.
Plaintiff did not resign from the Patrol to actively run for the office of sheriff. An independent group did, however, conduct a write-in campaign on his behalf. He did not win the election, but did garner thirty percent of the vote in the three person race.
A new collective bargaining agreement was reached between the parties in May of 1979. The Association did not seek a change in the leave of absence provision of the agreement. In June 1979, plaintiff sought permission to appeal from the arbitrator’s decision; this request was denied as untimely. Plaintiff then filed a summons and complaint in Ramsey County District Court against the respondents charging that the “resign to run” rule violated his first and fourteenth amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The case was tried before a district court judge who ruled that the leave of absence provision in the collective bargaining agreement was constitutional. That ruling is the subject of this appeal.
The issues presented by this case are whether the “resign to run” rule violates appellant’s first or fourteenth amendment rights and whether appellant has waived his right to raise this constitutional challenge by virtue of his membership in the collective bargaining unit.
1. While the right to run for public office has not been characterized as fundamental, it is an important right protected by the first amendment. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855-56, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); Hickman v. City of *383Dallas, 475 F.Supp. 137, 140 (N.D.Tex.1979). This right, however, is not absolute and may be subject to restriction, especially when government employees are the subject of the restriction. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973). Plaintiff argues that the restriction placed on his right to candidacy by the “resign to run” rule issued by the Chief of the State Patrol violates both his first and fourteenth amendment rights. We address the equal protection challenge first.
To determine whether the “resign to run” rule violates plaintiff’s right to equal protection, “we must examine the character of the classification in question, the importance of the individual interests at stake, and the state interests asserted in support of the classification.” Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183, 99 S.Ct. 983, 989, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979). Application of this test to the rule under review requires that the “resign to run” rule be declared unconstitutional.
The “resign to run” rule establishes at least two classifications. It distinguishes between state troopers running for the office of sheriff and other law enforcement officers running for that position. It also differentiates between troopers running for the office of sheriff and troopers running for other county offices. These groups are similarly situated yet are treated differently. This alone; however, provides an insufficient basis for finding the classification unconstitutional. Examination of the interests affected must also be made.
Restrictions on access to the ballot burden two distinct and fundamental rights, “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.” The freedom to associate as a political party, a right we have recognized as fundamental, has diminished practical value if the party can be kept off the ballot. Access restrictions also implicate the right to vote because, absent recourse to referendums, “voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or parties or both.” By limiting the choices available to voters, the State impairs the voters’ ability to express their political preferences. And for reasons too self-evident to warrant amplification here, we have often reiterated that voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.
When such vital individual rights are at stake, a State must establish that its classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest. * * * However, our previous opinions have also emphasized that “even when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty,” and we have required that States adopt the least drastic means to achieve their ends. This requirement is particularly important where restrictions on access to the ballot are involved.
Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 184-5, 99 S.Ct. at 990-91 (citations omitted).
We find that the state does have a compelling interest in the promotion of harmony and cooperation between the state highway patrol and the office of sheriff. The problem sought to be ameliorated by the “resign to run” rule is the tension or hostility likely to develop if a person employed as a highway patrolman is, at the same time, running for the office of sheriff. It is imperative that the highway patrolmen have a good relationship with the sheriffs in the working area. Highway patrolmen should be able to move in and out of the sheriff’s headquarters in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and respect. Experience teaches that this desirable harmonious relationship is significantly disrupted when the patrolman runs against the sheriff; and it can be anticipated that the stresses and hostilities will survive the election. The state may, therefore, place reasonable restrictions on the right of state troopers to run for the office of sheriff. The restric*384tions placed on this right must, however, be the least restrictive means to achieve the goal. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974).
The “resign to run” policy is not the least restrictive means available to accomplish the state’s goal. To promote the harmony and cooperation between the office of sheriff and state troopers, it is necessary for the state to effect a separation between the state trooper running for the position of sheriff and the state patrol. In this way the state can minimize the potential for tension and hostility by ensuring that the two candidates do not have professional interaction at the time each is campaigning. This separation from service can be accomplished by requiring the trooper to take an unpaid leave of absence rather than requiring him to resign from the patrol.
The “resign to run” rule imposes heavy burdens on the trooper. Although when the trooper resigns under the rule he does so without prejudice, he does lose all seniority accumulated prior to his resignation. Seniority affects a trooper’s ability to select vacation, to bid on transfers, and to request a special assignment. Loss of seniority may also result in his receiving additional overtime assignments. A trooper who is on leave of absence retains his seniority and therefore does not suffer these burdens.
Under the “resign to run” rule, a trooper who resigns may rejoin the force within 1 year of the effective date of his resignation. He must, however, wait for an opening before he can rejoin and there is no guarantee that an opening will occur within the 1-year time limitation. Moreover, the policy requires that when returning to the force the trooper may not be assigned to the post to which he was assigned prior to resignation. Any moving expenses required by the transfer must be borne by the trooper. These burdens do not attend an unpaid leave of absence.
The state has not shown that the additional hardships placed on troopers by the resignation rule are necessary to promote its interest in a cooperative and harmonious relationship between troopers and sheriffs. The dissent advances the state’s position that an unpaid leave of absence does not further the state’s goal in that it makes it less onerous for a trooper to run for the office of sheriff. We are not unmindful of the potential for tension and hostilities to develop as a result of a state trooper’s political challenge to a sheriff. This possibility, no matter how real, does not empower the state to make it as difficult as possible for the trooper to run. We must keep in mind both interests, that of the state and that of the trooper. Requiring the trooper to take an unpaid leave of absence will promote both. It will enable the trooper to run without undue hardships and it will enable the state to effect a separation between the trooper and the state patrol during candidacy.
The dissent’s point that these potential hostilities might survive the election is well taken. However, a sheriff has the authority to request the reassignment of a trooper should the hostilities continue past the election. Therefore, requiring the trooper to take an unpaid leave of absence is the least restrictive means to accomplish the state’s goal. We hold that the “resign to run” rule is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Because we find this rule to be in violation of plaintiff’s fourteenth amendment rights, we need not address his first amendment challenge, other than as it relates to his equal protection challenge as discussed above.
2. The state argues that the appellant has waived his right to complain about the violation of his constitutional rights by virtue of his membership in the collective bargaining unit, which has failed to seek a change in the challenged provision. The state advances this court’s decision in State ex rel. Johnson v. Independent School District No. 810, 260 Minn. 237, 109 N.W.2d 596 (1961), for the proposition that a constitutional right may be waived, except when contrary to public policy. This premise is correct, but of no avail to respondent. This is a case where public policy militates against a finding of waiver for we are not here concerned solely with the rights of *385appellant but with the right of the public to an effective vote as well.
Reversed.

. Article XIV deals with leaves of absence without pay.

. Policy Order P077-10-030 states in pertinent part:
I. Candidacy for Full-Time Elective Office, State Legislature, and County Sheriff Any State Trooper before filing for such office or accepting appointment thereto must resign.
a. Resignation is without prejudice.
b. Resignee is eligible for Rehiring ahead of Trooper Candidate when opening occurs within one year following resignation.
c. Following reappointment, he will be assigned to a station other than the station he was assigned to upon resignation * * *.