Court Opinion

ID: 9656459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:48:35.517021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.462105
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dis*583sent. I do not share the majority’s confidence that the jury did not assume that plaintiff Charles Jackson had received workers’ compensation benefits. Even though no testimony suggesting that coplaintiff Stockman had received such benefits was brought before the jury, the jury apparently assumed that Stockman had received benefits. Consequently, it is illogical to conclude that the jury did not also assume that plaintiff had received workers’ compensation benefits, since defense counsel elicited a specific reference to the plaintiff’s receipt of such benefits.
Both plaintiff’s and coplaintiff’s counsel argued that the line of questioning by defense counsel that produced the reference to workers’ compensation benefits amounted to a deliberate attempt to circumvent an earlier ruling by the trial court denying a request by defense counsel for permission to introduce evidence that the plaintiff had received such benefits.
It is certainly possible (though somewhat unlikely) that the jury did not take into account workers’ compensation benefits in determining the size of plaintiff Charles Jackson’s award, as the majority concludes. It is also possible that the jury did, in fact, deduct their estimate of the benefits plaintiff Charles Jackson was receiving from their estimate of Jackson’s damages. The point is not whether the jury did or did not assume that Charles Jackson was receiving benefits, but that this Court simply cannot tell. If the trial court, after the jury indicated its confusion, had instructed the jury that it was not under any circumstances to take into account possible workers’ compensation benefits in determining the size of the verdict, I would have little difficulty in concluding that the jury had not made such a deduc*584tion. However, this scenario did not occur; instead, the trial court abdicated its responsibility to guide the jury in its deliberations by responding to the jury’s inquiry in the following fashion:
"The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, your foreman evidently sent this note: 'Do we take into consideration Mr. Stockman’s workmen’s compensation and disability that he is receiving?’
"In all frankness, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I can’t answer that question. You are bound by the testimony that you heard from the witness stand and any exhibits that may have been introduced into evidence. I think that is all the information I can give you. It is a field in the grey area. I can’t comment on it, I can’t answer the question. You are bound by the testimony that you heard and any exhibits that may be introduced into evidence. So you may go back to your deliberations and deliberate further.”
The jury may have interpreted this "instruction” to mean that they were supposed to take into account workers’ compensation benefits with respect to both accident victims,1 with respect to one victim but not the other, or with respect to neither. I simply have no way of knowing what the jury did; I can only guess. Hence, reversal is required.
Plaintiffs’ failure to object to the above-quoted instruction does not preclude review of this issue because the instruction did not embody an affirmative position on the issue of workers’ compensation *585benefits. If the trial court had told the jury that they were to take into account such benefits and the plaintiffs had failed to register an objection thereto, they would not be permitted to complain, on appeal, that the instruction was erroneous. However, in this case, the trial court essentially said nothing at all; hence, there was nothing to which plaintiffs could object.
I would also direct the trial court, on remand, to forbid the admission of the physical therapist’s statement that plaintiff Charles Jackson had been uncooperative
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

 The majority explains the disparity between the two awards by emphasizing that the coplaintiff suffered much more serious injuries than the plaintiff. I agree that this provides a rational basis for the disparity between the two awards; however, this argument misses the point. It is entirely possible that the jury deducted workers’ compensation benefits from both awards. If so, both plaintiff and coplaintiff would have received larger awards if the jury had been properly instructed.