Court Opinion

ID: 9807599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:10:53.374024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:10.674055
License: Public Domain

Clark:, C. J.,
concurring in the dissenting opinion of AlleN, J. When the train was moving rear-foremost into the siding, that is, backing into it, it was the duty of the engineer to look out of the cab window in the direction in which the train was moving. If he did not do so, and thereby failed to hear the outcries or see the struggles of the deceased brakeman in trying to save himself, it was clearly negligence. The engineer was in charge of the train, and it was his duty to keep supervision over it. It is true that the engineer testifies, in his own behalf, that he did keep a lookout by leaning out of the window and looking in the direction in which the train was moving. But he may have been mistaken as to this”. The nonsuit takes for granted that his statement was true; but if the statement had been submitted to the jury there was evidence from which they might have found the contrary. The fact that people standing some distance off heard the agonized scream of the victim, while the engineer, little more than a car length away, says that he did not, would indicate that he was not leaning out the cab window. Besides, how far the head and hands of a man in the position of the deceased should have been seen by one *423leaning out of the cab window, which would put the engineer considerably beyond the edge of the ties, was a matter for the jury. These and other potent circumstances mentioned in the able dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Allen, which need not be repeated here, would seem to make it clear that this case should have been submitted to the jury.
The old landmark was, that if there is “any evidence beyond a scintilla” a party was entitled to have the case submitted to a jury, as guaranteed by the Constitution. The departure was made in Wittkowsky v. Wasson, 71 N. C., 451, in which Judge Bynum filed his admirable dissenting opinion which is a classic. From that day to this, the power of the judges to take cases from the jury has been steadily extended, till now it can almost be said that trial judges are tempted to think it is not incumbent upon them to give the plaintiff, especially in negligence cases, the right to a trial by jury unless the judge is of an opinion that the evidence will “reasonably” justify a verdict for the plaintiff. That is, the judge puts himself in the place of the juiy. The distinguished counsel of the plaintiff in this case recalled to our attention that Alfred the Great is said by some writers to have hung forty-four judges for denying this right to trial by jury. The. incident is doubtless mythical, for trial by jury was not known till many centuries later, if we take the best authorities. But if the tendency to cut short trials by depriving parties of the right to have controversies settled by jury is not very much restricted it will inevitably result in legislation that will deprive judges of that power, and probably go much further than it should. We have instances before us of such results.
At common law, the judges were not forbidden to express an opinion upon the facts. In fact, this right was very useful in practice as an aid to the jury, and the judges still possess such power in the Federal courts and in many of our sister States as well as in England. But by reason of some excuse, as it was thought, in this State the judges were absolutely deprived of that power by the Act of 1796, now Eev., 535, with the result that the slightest expression of an opinion on the facts, by a judge in the course of a trial, however impartial or help*424ful it might be to the jury, is now ground for a new trial. Again, it was the right of the judges to prescribe the number and length of the speeches of counsel, as it still is in the Federal courts and in most of the State courts and in England. But by reason of what was thought to be an abuse of this power by the judges it was absolutely taken away by statute, with a great increase of the length of trials and expense to the public. Rev., 216, has somewhat restored the former power of the judges in this respect, but not to the full extent.
By reason of the holding of this Court in Owens v. R. R., 88 N. C., 502, that the burden was upon the plaintiff to negative contributory negligence [Ruffin, J., dissenting), the General Assembly promptly passed the Act of 1887, now Rev., 483, which requires that the defense of contributory negligence “shall be set up in the answer and proved on the trial.” In Neal v. R. R., 126 N. C., 634, this Court by a bare majority decided that the judge could hold as a matter of law, upon the demurrer to the evidence of the plaintiff, that contributory negligence was proven. "Without repeating what was said in the dissenting opinions in that and subsequent cases, it is sufficient to say that the doctrine of Neal v. R. R. has been extended until in the opinion of many good lawyers the beneficial intent of the Legislature in enacting Rev., 483, has been largely denied to the plaintiff in many cases.
The extent to which the courts are assuming, on motions for nonsuit, to judge of the “sufficiency of the evidence,” and, as to the defense of contributory negligence, the tendency to hold as a matter of law that the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence, notwithstanding the statute put that burden upon the defendant and clearly meant that whether it was “proven” or not was a fact to be determined by the jury, are to be deplored.
Without questioning in the slightest degree the right of the majority of the Court to express their own views, I deem it my duty, as well as my right, to dissent earnestly against this claim of power on the part of the. Court. Men conscious of their own rectitude are especially prone to believe their own judgment correct, and judges are no exception. But under our *425Constitution parties to litigation bare a right to have jurors and not judges pass upon the evidence, however slight, when beyond a mere scintilla. They can challenge jurors who are to pass upon the facts, but cannot except to a judge who feels competent to pass upon the facts in holding that the evidence is not sufficient to justify a verdict for the plaintiff.
In the late decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case that Court assumed to write into an act of Congress the word “reasonable,” as Mr. Justice Harlan so clearly pointed out in his dissenting opinion. The majority of that Court were doubtless sincere, but they attributed to their own intelligence, powers which under the Constitution were vested in Congress. They doubtless believed that the Court had “the last say.” But the Constitution, from which they derive their powers, Art. Ill, sec. 2, clause 2, gives that Court jurisdiction, “with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make.” The courts have not even the “last say” in respect to the Executive, for when Chief Justice Marshall rendered a decision which the President deemed unsound he declined to obey it, and the decision has never been executed to this day.
Not concurring in the views of the majority of the Court, it is not improper to call attention to some of the instances in which, in this State, the Legislature has dissented from this tendency in the courts to substitute their own judgment as to the extent of their powers by terming it a matter of law. In some instances the Legislature has probably gone too far in the opposite direction, as was perhaps a natural consequence.