Court Opinion

ID: 9752627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:24:42.469221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:35.168652
License: Public Domain

HOOD, Chief Judge:
Appellant, a nonprofit organization, offered by brochure various trips into America’s wilderness areas. The prospectus contained, on the last page, the application form used by appellees to make their reservations. Above this form, the following language appeared:
In the event of a cancellation, a refund will be made only if the reservation is taken by another applicant. This action is necessary because of the need to contract well in advance for horses, food, and equipment. Whenever possible, an effort will be made by the Society to fill cancelled reservations in order to permit refund.
Appellees submitted their application with a deposit and “several days later” paid the remainder of the trip’s price— $285 per person, or $570 total. Around August 1, 1966, about 20 days before the trip was to commence, appellees notified appellant that they would not take the trip.
The riding trip through Yellowstone National Park was conducted and “packed” by one Glover. Under the terms of its contract with Glover, appellant paid $235 per reservation. Appellant had until August 10, 1966, to notify Glover of “the final number of riders enrolled in the party.”
Appellees did not show up for the trip, and they brought this action to recover the price paid. The trial court, sitting without a jury, held that appellant was under a duty to mitigate damages, that appellant failed to carry out this duty, and that appellees were thus entitled to a return of part of the contract price — $235 per person. We reverse.
 In their brief appellees make the flat statement that they breached their contract. From that premise, by an argument we cannot follow, they conclude they are entitled to recover. It is quite plain that, despite appellees’ assertion to the contrary, they did not breach their contract. The contract was unilateral in the sense that it consisted of a promise on the part of The Wilderness Society supported by an executed consideration, i. e., the payment of the charges by appellees.1 Having made the payment, appellees could not breach the contract. They made no promise to take the trip. Their failure to go on the trip was simply a failure to exercise their right and was not a breach of their contract. Consequently any claim they have must be based on a breach of contract by Wilderness, and there is no evidence of such a breach.2
The contract plainly stated that in the event of cancellation a refund would be made only if the reservation was taken *822by another applicant, and the uncontradict-ed testimony is that appellees’ reservations were not taken by others. If the provision that “[w]henever possible, an effort will be made by the Society to fill can-celled reservations in order to permit refund”, placed an obligation on the Society, there is no evidence that it failed to meet the obligation, and the burden of proving it was on the appellees. The statement by the Society of the reason why refunds could not be made appears to be only an explanation, and does not have the effect of incorporating into the contract between the Society and appellees the contract between the Society and the packer. Appel-lees’ cancellation cannot impose on the Society a legal obligation to take some action on its contract with the outfitter, a contract to which appellees were not parties.
Implicit in appellees’ “theory of recovery” is the doctrine of mitigation of damages, but that doctrine relates to a defense and does not itself give rise to a right of recovery. Indeed, since appellees had not breached their contract, the Society had not been damaged, and had no damages to mitigate. Nor can we find any other “theory” by which we can sustain the holding of the trial court. Like mitigation of damages, any discussion of forfeiture or liquidated damages is completely irrelevant to the present case. For the question of damages does not arise until a right to recovery has first been established. Further, recovery under a theory of restitution, be it unjust enrichment or quantum meruit, is not available to appel-lees, because the return of the cash price for not going on the trip was expressly covered by the contract terms.3
In summary, the case is one where two people paid for a trip which they could have taken, but for reasons purely personal to them decided against it, and sought a refund on grounds not permitted by their agreement. There is no basis for recovery.
Reversed with instructions to enter judgment for appellant.

. See Friedman v. Decatur Corp., 77 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 135 F.2d 812 (1943); Craddock v. Greenhut Constr. Co., 423 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1970).

. Certainly the failure of appellees to take the trip cannot be viewed as a failure by appellant to provide the trip.

. See Leba v. Sills, D.C.Mun.App., 175 A.2d 599 (1961) (quantum meruit); Gebhardt Bros., Inc. v. Brimmel, 31 Wis.2d 581, 143 N.W.2d 479, 481 (1986) (unjust enrichment); Smith v. Stowell, 256 Iowa 165, 125 N.W.2d 795, 800 (1964) (unjust enrichment); Abinet v. Mediavilla, 5 A.D. 679, 169 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (1957) (quantum meruit).