Court Opinion

ID: 9518331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:50:05.362412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:30.519176
License: Public Domain

Finan, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion in which Hammond, C. J., and Masbuky, J., concurred.
I am unable to agree with the majority of this Court because, in my opinion, the lower court erroneously substituted its judgment for that of the Public Service Commission.
The evidence presented before the Commission was both exhaustive and detailed, as the opinion of this Court clearly indicates, and the members of the Commission took advantage of these hearings to closely question the witnesses, observe their demeanor and weigh both the relevancy, credibility and objectivity of their testimony. The evidence propounded by the railroads attested to the high degree of reliability and increased safety record produced by the Automatic Block Signal System, with wffiich the Brotherhood in large measure agreed. Witnesses for the railroad were of the belief that the continuance of flagging and other manual devices did not add to the protection of trains, and in fact contributed to unsafe practices insofar as train engineers would not rely as much on automatic signals if they expected the added precaution of a flagman would provide sufficient warning.
Opposed to this evidence were the testimony and exhibits of the Brotherhood, which recognized the efficiency of the Automatic Block Signal System, but indicated that it was not infallible, and on numerous occasions had failed to properly warn approaching trains of obstructions on the track ahead. In addition, it produced evidence of many curved stretches of track in Maryland which posed a threat to engineers in that, even if they were traveling a block under restricted conditions, they would be unable to see far enough ahead to determine the location of trains and to stop in time. In such cases, a flagman could walk *606far enough behind the lead train to provide a warning and drop torpedoes and fusees along the track to warn approaching equipment. There was also testimony that the use of a flagman alleviated hazardous conditions encountered at night in mountainous terrain when trains must proceed at an exceptionally slow speed while descending steep grades. In general, the Brotherhood argued that the flagman was the added safety feature providing protection in the event of failure of the Automatic Block Signal System.
After seven days of hearings, the Commission issued its Order, which stated in part:
“It is our opinion that the flagging of the following vehicles in automatic block territory has a definite safety value. While we agree that the electronic equipment used by the railroad is excellent and the evidence of failure minimal, the fact remains that failure can and does occur. Human error is even more likely to occur. We believe from all the evidence that there are times governed by weather and the terrain when a failure to provide adequate flagging of following vehicles could be characterized as negligence per se. We are not impressed with the strongly urged argument on the part of the Companies that the requirement for adequate flagging creates a condition of divided responsibility and therefore is less safe than no flagging at all.”
This Order was set aside by Judge Harris in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City on the basis that the Brotherhood did not meet the required standard of proof.
An order of the Public Service Commission will not be set aside on appeal unless, inter alia, “such order is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Md. Code Ann., Art. 78 § 97 (1965 Repl. Vol.). Although the terms “substantial evidence” and “record as a whole” appear unambiguous, their application to precise sets of facts has frequently resulted in confusing and indefinite guidelines for courts to follow. In an early attempt at breathing substance into the “substantial evidence” test, Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456 (1951), recognized the problem while interpreting the scope of review section of the Taft-Hartley Act, now 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) :
*607“Congress has merely made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board’s view.
Since the precise way in which courts interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any form of words, new formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not likely to be more helpful than the old. There are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment. The difficulty is that we cannot escape, in relation to this problem, the use of undefined defining terms.” 340 U. S. at 488, 489.
Justice Frankfurter’s statement underlines the difficulty of clearly articulating the extent of review, without creating further semantic confusion over “substantial evidence.” However, when he endeavored to clear the water by paraphrasing the standard of judicial review he perhaps unintentionally created a few waves which have yet to settle.
“The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” 340 U. S. at 488.
It should be noticed that the majority opinion in the instant case virtually adopts the language employed by Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera, supra, 248 Md. at 601, 238 A. 2d at 528. Further, the majority opinion quotes Judge Hammond (now Chief Judge) in Board v. Oak Hill Farms, 232 Md. 274, 282, 192 A. 2d 761, 766 (1963), that the Supreme Court’s use of the term weight in Universal Camera “emphasizes the observation that there is a thin line between a test based on substantial evidence and one based on weight of evidence.” It is my belief that the court below crossed that thin line, and, rather than determine whether the total record permitted the findings reached by the Commission, indulged in the non-judicial activity of weighing the evidence.
*608It is understandable that the language of Universal Camera would lead some courts into the trap of confusing “substantial evidence” with “weight of the evidence.” Professor Jaffe, to whom reference was made in the majority opinion, recognized that some jurists would get caught when he said:
“But no doubt the ‘whole record’ test may with certain judges become a ‘weight of evidence’ test. There are a number of reasons for this. First it may be misunderstood. The test teaches us that the probability of an inference, the logical evidentiary support of an inference, is determined not by any one bit of evidence but by the whole record. And in the opinion in Universal Camera the Court says: ‘The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.’ Thus if the value or ‘weight’ of the evidence in support of an inference must be assayed in order to determine its substantiality, it is understandable that some judges may feel that they are called upon to ‘weigh the evidence.’ The judge must, therefore, be vigilantly aware of what he is doing and stop short of such an exercise of power. Once he had determined that there is a reasonable probability of the fact found by the agency he is functus officio. It matters not that the whole record would support a contrary inference or that in the opinion of the court the contrary inference is more probable or even much more probable. The court may not weigh the worth of competing inferences. In the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter a court may not ‘displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo! ” Jaffe, Judicial Review. Question of Fact, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1020, 1028 (1956).
Judge Harris’s memorandum opinion reveals that, although he understood that the court’s power of review was limited to finding “substantial evidence on the record considered as a *609whole,” he nevertheless indulged in the weighing of the evidence. For example, in discussing the interpretation placed upon the I.C.C. railroad accident reports submitted by the Brotherhood, the lower court stated:
“* * *, nor do they show convincingly that the absence of such rear-end flagging would increase the number of rear-end collisions. Certainly there is no preponderance of evidence to that effect. In fact, there is some undisputed evidence of some improved safety by Pennsylvania since the change of the rule.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Further on, the opinion states :
“After a careful consideration of all the evidence, however, it is the opinion of this Court that the evidence produced by the Brotherhood, as the Complainant before the Commission, did not meet the required burden of proof. A close scrutiny of the record indicates that the preponderance of evidence, on the contrary, shows * * (Emphasis supplied.)
The lower court apparently was of the impression that the Brotherhood held the burden of producing sufficient evidence to convince the Commission (and the Court) that the elimination of flagmen’s duties would have a damaging effect on the safety of railroading. The fact is that the accident reports did indicate situations where the presence of a flagman would have presented accidents, and tlie lower court exceeded its power of review when it determined that the reports did not carry sufficient weight to “convince” the Commission. Misapplication of the court’s power of review is also evident from its conclusions that the railroads were able to rebut the Brotherhood’s argument by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The law is settled that the reviewing court may not base its decision on the manner in which the scales tip.
Chief Judge Hammond in the recent case of State Insurance Commissioner v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 236 A. 2d 282, 291 (1967) stated the corn*610mon denominator that must apply to any valid test of judicial review:
“Whichever of the recognized tests the court uses— substantiality of the evidence on the record as a whole, clearly erroneous, fairly debatable or against the weight or preponderance of the evidence on the entire record —its appraisal or evaluation must be of the agency’s fact-finding results and not an independent original estimate of or decision on the evidence. The required process is difficult to precisely articulate but it is plain that it requires restrained and disciplined judicial judgment so as not to interfere with the agency’s factual conclusions under any of the tests, all of which are similar. There are differences but they are slight and under any of the standards the judicial review essentially should be limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. This need not and must not be either judicial fact-finding or a substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.)
See also Baltimore Tank Lines v. Public Service Commission, 215 Md. 125, 137 A. 2d 187 (1955); Howard Sports Daily v. Weller, 179 Md. 355, 18 A. 2d 210 (1941) ; Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 89 (1944).
It is therefore immaterial that this Court viewing all of the evidence may have reached a different conclusion than that of the Commission, or hearing the matter de novo may have arrived at a contrary result; that is not the test. The question is, viewing the record as a whole was there substantial evidence of rational probative force to support the Commission’s finding? In my opinion the evidence presented by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, considered in context with the record as a whole, constitutes such evidence.
I would reverse the order of the lower court. Chief Judge Hammond and Judge Marbury have authorized me to say that they concur in this dissent.