Court Opinion

ID: 9522079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:17:35.166651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:16.244587
License: Public Domain

Reiber, C.J.,
¶ 21. dissenting. I respectfully dissent. In dicta, the majority acknowledges the ALJ’s use of a “foreseeable” standard under 21 V.S.A. § 1344(a)(1)(B) to determine the “consequences” of *214an employee’s conduct under the simple-misconduct provision. Foreseeability is not a word used in the statute, and, in employing the language, neither the ALJ nor the majority make clear whether it is an objective or subjective standard. This limited interpretation adds confusion and will leave employers struggling with ambiguity under this Act when trying to interpret the majority’s decision under the remaining portion of the statute presented by this appeal, § 1344(a)(2)(B).
¶ 22. The majority also follows the Board and ALJ’s lead under the statute and creates what in effect is a presumption against a finding of gross misconduct under § 1344, a standard that is not there. Without sufficient analysis, the majority affirms a Board conclusion that claimant’s off-duty, off-premises criminal conduct is not directly related to the employee’s work performance and not connected to his work.
¶ 23. The result appears to create a bright-line rule that says any off-duty, off-premises act is not likely gross misconduct. I do not read the gross-misconduct section so broadly.
¶24. The Board concluded that claimant’s past work performance here was “generally acceptable” but it went no further with findings or analysis regarding the impact of claimant’s off-premises criminal conduct on his job performance in furtherance of his employer’s ability to maintain a proper therapeutic relationship with its patients, including their safety and security. The Board merely noted that the conduct was off-site and off-duty, and that there were no reports of similar conduct by claimant with patients or staff. Such a conclusion falls short of addressing employer’s concerns acknowledged in the law, and effectively rewrites the statute.
¶ 25. In the proceedings before the Board and the ALJ, employer introduced evidence on the impact of claimant’s particular misconduct on his work performance. Employer noted the special nature of its relationship with patients; it referenced claimant’s unfettered access to a range of patients, some in compromised states; it introduced evidence of its requirement before hiring that all employees provide ongoing consent to background checks; and it emphasized the nature of the crimes committed by claimant on a stranger. But, in response, the Board failed to address the “directly related to the employee’s work performance” component of the statute, merely noting that the criminal act occurred off-site and off-duty. In affirming the *215Board’s conclusion of no gross misconduct on these facts the majority goes too far in applying the principle of deference to Board decisions.
¶ 26. Furthermore, the cases cited by the majority, Przekaza v. Department of Employment Security, 136 Vt. 355, 392 A.2d 421 (1978), and Chamberlin v. Department of Employment Security, 136 Vt. 571, 396 A.2d 140 (1978), are inapposite insofar as they are not gross-misconduct cases and do little to inform consideration of the work-performance relationship question raised by employer here: when is an employee’s off-site, off-duty conduct “directly related to the employee’s work performance”?
¶,27. For this reason, I would reverse and remand for further findings and analysis of the issue raised by FAHC’s appeal, the question of the work-performance relationship, and for this reason dissent.