Court Opinion

ID: 9819288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:21:49.655333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.741013
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion ignores the clear language of a curative instruction given by a trial judge exercising his discretion, and the record comes to us without any basis for concluding that the judge’s discretion was abused. The majority concedes that a trial court has discretion in determining which issues are raised by the evidence in a case. Tucker v. Illinois Power Co., 232 Ill. App. 3d 15, 597 N.E.2d 220 (1992). The majority indicates that plaintiff, James E. Bielicke, argues, and a review of the record clearly shows, that a defense witness injected evidence concerning the issue of whether safety-appliance requirements applied during the repair of cars, as in the instant situation. The trial court agreed with plaintiff that defendant, Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, should not be allowed to imply "that Bielicke was wrong in attempting to make repairs without first assuring that the cars were equipped with proper safety appliances.” 291 Ill. App. 3d at 692. Accordingly, the trial court gave instruction No. 24, which reads as follows: "At the time of the occurrence, there was in force a federal statute known as the Safety Appliance Act [(45 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 1986))]. That Act imposes upon the railroad the absolute duty to have all cars which it hauls or permits to be hauled or used on its line equipped with secure and adequate grab irons or handholds at the ends and sides of each car. This statute does not apply to a carman such as the plaintiff who is working in a secured, Blue Flag, Rip track.” (Emphasis added.) The problems with the majority’s position arise at this point because the majority’s analysis misconstrues the clear language of this instruction. Paragraph 1 of instruction No. 24 references the statute dealing with safety appliances, the Safety Appliance Act. The majority concentrates on this as error. The second paragraph, however, does not "compound the problem” but rather cures what the trial judge perceived as a problem in defendant’s injection of the issue of safety appliances. No language could be clearer than "[t]his statute does not apply to a carman such as the plaintiff who is working in a secured, Blue Flag, Rip track.” This language is crystal clear in indicating that the Safety Appliance Act does not apply to plaintiff, and contrary to the majority’s position, the language does not imply that plaintiff was not subject to defendant’s safety rules. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.