Court Opinion

ID: 9960658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 19:01:55.940805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:43.594334
License: Public Domain

United States Tax Court

                                 T.C. Memo. 2024-44

                               KEITH M. PHILLIPS,
                                   Petitioner

                                            v.

               COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
                           Respondent

                                       —————

Docket No. 37955-21.                                             Filed April 16, 2024.

                                       —————

Percy Squire, for petitioner.

Lisa P. Lafferty, for respondent.

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

       GREAVES, Judge: This deficiency case is before the Court on the
Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS or respondent) Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction on the ground that the petition was not filed within
the time prescribed by section 6213(a). 1 Petitioner objected to this
motion, arguing that the notice of deficiency is invalid because it was
not sent to his last known address. To decide the motion, we must
determine whether respondent complied with the procedure set forth in
Treasury Regulation § 301.6212-2 to update petitioner’s last known
address based on the U.S. Postal Service’s (USPS) National Change of
Address (NCOA) database. We will deny respondent’s motion for the
reasons set forth below. We nevertheless dismiss this case because the
notice of deficiency is invalid.

        1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue

Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (Code), in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are
to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times,
and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

                                   Served 04/16/24
                                         2

[*2]                               Background

       The following facts are based on the parties’ pleadings and motion
papers, including attached declarations and exhibits, and, unless
otherwise stated, are not disputed. Petitioner lived in Ohio when he
petitioned this Court. Petitioner last filed a federal tax return in March
2004 for tax year 2003. On this return, which he filed jointly with his
now ex-wife, petitioner listed his address as 75 Hazeltine Avenue,
Youngstown, Ohio 44506.

       On January 26, 2010, petitioner began serving a prison sentence,
which continued through January 26, 2017. During this time, petitioner
was injured and suffered a permanent loss of nearly all vision in his
right eye. He filed a civil lawsuit against the prison, and in 2014 he
received a $201,011 personal injury settlement. 2 Petitioner did not file
an income tax return for tax year 2014.

       On September 3, 2018, respondent prepared a substitute for
return for 2014 pursuant to section 6020(b), reporting petitioner’s
personal injury settlement as income. Respondent determined an
income tax deficiency of $51,952; an addition to tax under section
6651(a)(1) for failure to timely file of $11,689; an addition to tax under
section 6651(a)(2) for failure to timely pay of $11,689; and an addition
to tax under section 6654 for failure to pay estimated tax of $933.
Respondent sent a notice of deficiency, dated September 24, 2018, to
petitioner at 157 Roslyn Drive, Youngstown, Ohio 44505 (Roslyn
Address).

        Petitioner did not protest the notice of deficiency within 90 days,
and respondent assessed the deficiency along with additions to tax on
February 25, 2019. After receiving no payment, respondent filed a
federal tax lien and issued a notice of filing a federal tax lien, dated
January 23, 2020, to petitioner at the Roslyn Address. Petitioner did
not request a collection due process hearing and failed to pay the
liability. Respondent certified petitioner as an individual owing
seriously delinquent tax debt to the State Department and issued
petitioner CP508C, Notice of Certification of Your Seriously Delinquent
Federal Tax Debt to the State Department, dated May 3, 2021. This
notice was sent to petitioner at 120 North Richview Avenue,
Youngstown, Ohio 44509.

       2 All dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.
                                             3

[*3] In response, petitioner filed a petition with this Court on May 3,
2021, wherein petitioner checked the boxes indicating he sought review
of a notice of deficiency and a notice of certification. 3 Petitioner
contended that the IRS incorrectly determined that the personal injury
settlement he received in 2014 was taxable income.

       On September 2, 2021, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction on the ground that petitioner failed to timely
petition this Court. On November 19, 2021, respondent filed a First
Supplement to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, attaching a
copy of the notice of deficiency and USPS Form 3877, Firm Mailing Book
For Accountable Mail.

       On November 24, 2021, petitioner filed a Response to Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, as Supplemented, stating that he never
lived at the Roslyn Address. On February 8, 2023, respondent filed a
Reply to Response to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, as
Supplemented. Therein, respondent appeared to argue that third-party
reporting related to petitioner’s ex-wife supported changing petitioner’s
last known address to the Roslyn Address.

        On February 8, 2023, petitioner filed a sur-reply in which he
again argued that he never lived at the Roslyn Address but his son, who
shares the same name, could have been living with petitioner’s ex-wife
at that address. We ordered respondent on May 26, 2023, to file a second
supplement to his motion detailing the address shown on petitioner’s
last filed return and how he determined petitioner’s address. On June
23, 2023, respondent filed a Second Supplement to his Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction as Supplemented. For the first time, respondent
asserted that petitioner’s address was updated in accordance with a
notification from the USPS NCOA database (NCOA Notification). To
support this assertion, respondent attached Integrated Data Retrieval
System (IDRS) transcripts of petitioner’s account. 4

        3 On April 13, 2023, this Court ordered all claims relating to the notice of

deficiency severed from claims relating to the notice of certification. On May 22, 2023,
we dismissed the claims relating to the notice of certification for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Claims relating to the notice of certification will not
be addressed in this Opinion.
        4 The IDRS is a computer interface that allows the IRS to retrieve a portion of

the data it possesses regarding each taxpayer’s federal tax obligations and generate
transcripts with respect to such information. See, e.g., Meduty v. Commissioner,
                                        4

[*4] The Court ordered the parties to file additional documents,
including additional information on the NCOA Notification. On
February 1, 2024, respondent filed a response to our order, explaining
the general process respondent follows upon receipt of an NCOA change-
of-address notification. Respondent did not provide any additional
information related specifically to petitioner’s NCOA Notification. On
February 5, 2024, petitioner filed an unsworn declaration under penalty
of perjury under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 in which he represented that he never
lived at the Roslyn Address, it is his belief that his deceased former
spouse lived at the Roslyn Address, and his adult son Keith M. Phillips,
Jr., may have lived at the Roslyn Address with his mother. On February
27, 2024, petitioner filed a First Supplemental Declaration of Keith
Phillips in Support of Petition, asserting the same facts.

      On February 28, 2024, we held a remote hearing on the Motion to
Dismiss. Petitioner testified that he did not submit a USPS change-of-
address request in or around 2010 that requested his address be
changed to the Roslyn Address.

                                  Discussion

I.     Jurisdiction

       The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we may
exercise our jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by Congress. See
§ 7442; Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985).                   We
nevertheless have jurisdiction to determine whether we have
jurisdiction. See Pyo v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 626, 632 (1984); Kluger
v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 309, 314 (1984).              In a case seeking
redetermination of a deficiency, our jurisdiction depends upon the
issuance of a valid notice of deficiency and the timely filing of a petition.
See Rule 13(a), (c); Mulvania v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 65, 67 (1983);
Naftel, 85 T.C. at 530. Section 6213(a) provides: “Within 90 days . . .
after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed . . . ,
the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a
redetermination of the deficiency.” The 90-day period prescribed by
section 6213(a) sets forth a jurisdictional requirement. See Sanders v.
Commissioner, No. 15143-22, 161 T.C., slip op. at 8 (Nov. 2, 2023);
Hallmark Rsch. Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. 126, 166–67
(2022). If the notice of deficiency specifies a last day for filing a petition

No. 32817-21P, 160 T.C., slip op. at 6 n.5 (May 23, 2023); Belton v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2023-13, at *14.
                                             5

[*5] that is later than the 90th day, the deadline to file a petition related
to the notice is extended to the day specified. See § 6213(a); Nutt v.
Commissioner, No. 15959-22, 160 T.C., slip op. at 3 (May 2, 2023).

         Respondent has presented conflicting evidence as to the date of
mailing. The notice of deficiency at issue in this case is dated September
24, 2018. Respondent represents that the notice of deficiency was issued
on September 11, 2018. USPS Form 3877 is dated September 20, 2018.
Finally, USPS Form 3877 bears a date stamp of September 24, 2018.
The date listed on the notice of deficiency as the last day to petition this
Court (i.e., December 24, 2018) is later than the filing deadline based on
respondent’s representation and the USPS Form 3877 date. The
deadline based on the USPS Form 3877 date stamp and the deadline
listed on the notice of deficiency are identical. Therefore, the deadline
to file a petition with this Court was December 24, 2018. See Nutt, 160
T.C., slip op. at 3.

       There is no dispute that petitioner filed his petition after
December 24, 2018. However, petitioner argues that the notice of
deficiency was not properly mailed. Petitioner asserts that he never
lived at the Roslyn Address and that he did not submit a USPS change-
of-address request to treat the Roslyn Address as his mailing address.
We interpret his contention as a challenge to the validity of the notice of
deficiency because the notice of deficiency was not sent to his last known
address. This error would render the notice of deficiency invalid, and
we would lack jurisdiction over this case. 5

       Accordingly, we must dismiss this case as untimely under section
6213(a), unless we agree with petitioner that the notice was not properly
mailed. See Monge, 93 T.C. at 27. If we agree with petitioner, we must
dismiss the case on the basis that the notice of deficiency is invalid. See
id. Regardless of whether petitioner or respondent prevails, we lack
jurisdiction to consider this case on its merits. See McKay v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1063, 1067 (1987), aff’d, 886 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.
1989). However, we have jurisdiction to determine the reason we do not
have jurisdiction. See Shelton v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 193, 194–95
(1974).

       5 Petitioner appears to argue that we should retain jurisdiction over his case if

we determine that the notice of deficiency was not sent to his last known address.
However, if the notice of deficiency is invalid, we lack jurisdiction over petitioner’s case.
See Monge v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 22, 27 (1989).
                                         6

[*6] II.     Last Known Address Determination

       In every deficiency case the Commissioner must have issued the
taxpayer a notice of deficiency. See § 6213(a). “The notice constitutes
the taxpayer’s ticket to the Tax Court, and without it, there could be no
prepayment judicial review of the asserted deficiency.” Mulvania,
81 T.C. at 67. The parties do not dispute that petitioner did not receive
the notice of deficiency until several years after it was mailed to the
Roslyn Address. Rather, respondent asserts that the notice was sent to
petitioner’s “last known address,” which started the clock on petitioner’s
90-day window to file a petition in this Court.

       It is not mandatory that the Commissioner mail a notice of
deficiency to the taxpayer’s last known address; rather, the taxpayer’s
last known address is “a ‘safe harbor’ address to which he could send the
notice.” McKay, 89 T.C. at 1068 (quoting Mulvania, 81 T.C. at 68). But
if respondent takes advantage of this safe harbor, then the notice of
deficiency “shall be sufficient,” and whether the taxpayer actually
receives the notice is immaterial. See Fehrs v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
346, 351 (1975); see also § 6212(a). However, if the Commissioner mails
a notice to an incorrect address but the taxpayer receives actual notice
in sufficient time to file a petition, we have held that the notice is valid
even though improperly addressed. See Dees v. Commissioner, 148 T.C.
1, 8 (2017). As noted above, respondent does not allege that petitioner
had actual notice of the notice of deficiency in time to petition this Court.
Therefore, the dispositive issue in this case is whether the notice of
deficiency was mailed to petitioner’s last known address within the
meaning of section 6212.

       As the Code does not define “last known address,” we frequently
rely upon the definition found in Treasury Regulation § 301.6212-2,
which was promulgated in 2001. 6 Under the regulation, a taxpayer’s
last known address is presumptively the address appearing on the
taxpayer’s most recently filed and properly processed federal tax return.
See id. para. (a). The IRS will update a taxpayer’s last known address
if the taxpayer provides clear and concise notification of a different
address. See id.

      6 Before the promulgation of the regulation, a taxpayer’s last known address

was the “address to which, in light of all the facts and circumstances, the
[Commissioner] reasonably believed the taxpayer wished the notice to be sent.” Looper
v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 690, 696 (1980).
                                          7

[*7] Generally, providing a third party, such as a payor or another
government agency, change-of-address information is not clear and
concise notification of a different address for purposes of determining
the taxpayer’s last known address. See id. para. (b)(1). However, the
regulation provides that the IRS will update a taxpayer’s last known
address to that accumulated and maintained in the NCOA database. 7
See id. subpara. (2)(i). A taxpayer’s last known address will be updated
if the taxpayer’s name and last known address in the IRS records match
the taxpayer’s name and old mailing address contained in the NCOA
database.    See id.     The regulation does not provide additional
information as to the NCOA database nor the matching process.

       To update his address with the USPS, a taxpayer may call the
USPS or submit a USPS Form 3575, Official Mail Forwarding Change
of Address Order, in person or online. USPS policy dictates certain
authorization and validation controls to ensure that a change-of-address
request is submitted by the taxpayer, but the USPS has recognized that
these controls are insufficient. 8 After processing, the USPS accumulates
and maintains change-of-address information in the NCOA database.
See id. subpara. (2). The IRS, as a licensee of the NCOA database,
receives a weekly file from the USPS, containing change-of-address

       7 Before the regulation, our caselaw established that filing a change-of-address

form with the USPS was not clear and concise notification to the IRS of a taxpayer’s
change of address. See Adams v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-365, 1994 WL
397318, at *4, aff’d sub nom. Miller v. Commissioner, 61 F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table decision). For notices issued after the promulgation, we treat a
USPS change-of-address request as clear and concise notification to the IRS of a
taxpayer’s change of address. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the
statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).
       8 The USPS’s verification of an individual’s identity has consistently been the

subject of scrutiny with several reports detailing the lack of sufficient controls to
ensure change-of-address orders are legitimate and authorized by the individual. See
Off. of Inspector Gen., USPS, Audit Report—Identity Theft Potential in the Change of
Address Process 2–3 (2008), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2023-
01/IS-AR-08-016.pdf (explaining that the USPS’s processing of physical change-of-
address forms lacks sufficient safeguards to ensure legitimacy because of widespread
disregard of internal controls, such as processing forms without proper signatures);
Off. of Inspector Gen., USPS, Audit Report—Change of Address Identify Verification
Internal Controls 7–8 (2018), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2023-
01/MS-AR-18-005.pdf (reporting on a lack of identity verification related to hardcopy
change-of-address forms and insufficient verification of online change-of-address
requests).
                                    8

[*8] information. See Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) 3.13.5.22.1
(Jan. 1, 2010). This file is matched against the IRS’s master file with a
“proprietary software.” See id. If the taxpayer’s name and old address
in the IDRS matches that in the NCOA database, the taxpayer’s last
known address is updated in the IDRS to the address in the NCOA
database. See T.D. 8939, 2001-1 C.B. 899, 900 (Jan. 12, 2001);
IRM 3.13.5.22.1.

       The regulation specifies that the taxpayer’s last known address is
the address obtained by the matching process. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6212-2(b)(2). Therefore, if the IRS complies with the procedure set
forth in the regulation—specifically matching a taxpayer’s name and old
address to the NCOA database—the address in the NCOA database is
the taxpayer’s last known address, even if the USPS improperly
processed the change-of-address form.

        The Commissioner often relies upon the last known address safe
harbor to show that a notice of deficiency is valid. In a typical case, the
IRS sends the notice of deficiency to the address listed on a taxpayer’s
most recently processed tax return.              See, e.g., Chapman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-110, at *11–12. A taxpayer will then
argue that he provided adequate notice of a new address to the IRS, and
thus the notice of deficiency was not sent to his last known address. See,
e.g., id. at *12. To establish clear and concise notice, the Court requires
a taxpayer to come forward with evidence documenting that he
submitted the change-of-address form.              See, e.g., Gyorgy v.
Commissioner, 779 F.3d 466, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a taxpayer’s
testimony that he submitted a change-of-address form each time he
moved when he failed to provide documentation); Taylor v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-81, at *6 (rejecting a taxpayer’s
testimony that he submitted a change-of-address form to the USPS
when he failed to produce evidence to corroborate his testimony or
establish a date on which he submitted the form).

       Here the parties’ arguments are the opposite of what is typical for
this issue. Respondent argues that petitioner provided clear and concise
notification of a change of address by sending a change-of-address form
to the USPS, whereas petitioner counters that he neither lived at the
Roslyn Address nor submitted the USPS change-of-address form.
                                    9

[*9] III.   Allocation of Burden of Proof

       Generally, the party invoking this Court’s jurisdiction bears the
burden of demonstrating that it exists. See David Dung Le, M.D., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 268, 270 (2000), aff’d, 22 F. App’x 837 (9th
Cir. 2001). Usually, the application of this principle places the burden
of proof on the taxpayer, who invoked the jurisdiction of the Court. It is
well established that the burden falls upon the taxpayer to keep the IRS
informed of his proper address. See Mollet v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 618,
624–25 (1984), aff’d, 757 F.2d 286 (11th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table
decision); Alta Sierra Vista, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 367, 374
(1974), aff’d, 538 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1976) (unpublished table decision).
In a typical last known address dispute, this means the taxpayer has
the burden to show that he submitted clear and concise notification of a
change of address to the IRS such that his last known address is not
that shown on his last tax return. See Yusko v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.
806, 808 (1987). However, the IRS must use reasonable diligence to
determine a taxpayer’s last known address in accordance with the
applicable regulations. See Gyorgy v. Commissioner, 779 F.3d at 478;
Buffano v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-32, slip op. at 12.

       When faced with unusual facts that run contrary to our
traditional allocation of the burden of proof, we may consider which
party ought to bear the burden of proof. See, e.g., Pietanza v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 729, 736–37 (1989), aff’d, 935 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir.
1991) (unpublished table decision). Here, we are in an unusual situation
where both parties are contesting jurisdiction. Each party has
obligations placed in tension by the argument posture: petitioner has an
obligation to keep respondent informed of his change of address and
respondent must exercise reasonable diligence in complying with the
regulation to determine petitioner’s last known address. Petitioner’s
underlying obligation to keep respondent informed of his change of
address does not indicate which party should bear the burden because
petitioner is arguing that he did not change his address. In contrast,
respondent’s obligation to use reasonable diligence to ensure compliance
with the regulation favors placing the burden of proof on respondent.

       The difficulty in establishing a negative fact and availability of
evidence to one party are factors we may consider in allocating the
burden of proof. See, e.g., Pietanza, 92 T.C. at 736–37; Casqueira v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-428. In Pietanza we found it proper to
place the burden of proof on the IRS to show the existence of a notice of
deficiency and the date of mailing because if the burden was placed on
                                    10

[*10] the taxpayers, they would have to show nonexistence of a notice of
deficiency that they claim to have not received. Pietanza, 92 T.C.
at 376–77; see also Bobbs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-272,
slip op. at 5 (allocating the burden of proof to the IRS when a taxpayer
challenged proper mailing of a notice of deficiency).

       Respondent concedes that he did not send the notice of deficiency
to the address on petitioner’s last tax return, and petitioner contends
that he never sent anything to the USPS or the IRS about changing his
address to the Roslyn Address. Further, respondent has ready access to
the information required to make an affirmative showing that he
properly matched petitioner’s information in the NCOA Notification
with the IDRS. Petitioner, however, does not have access to information
that would allow him to prove either (1) the IRS did not receive an
NCOA Notification or (2) the information on the NCOA Notification
(which petitioner maintains he never submitted) did not match the
information in the IDRS. This asymmetry in access to information
favors placing the burden of proof on respondent to show that he
properly determined petitioner’s last known address when he relied on
the alleged NCOA Notification.

IV.   Analysis Framework

       After we allocate the burden of proof to respondent to show that
he complied with the regulation, the analysis follows a familiar
framework.      The interaction of evidentiary presumptions and
respondent’s burden is best illustrated by the framework routinely used
in collection due process cases.

        First, the Court determines whether the IRS has carried its initial
burden to show that it properly mailed the notice of deficiency to the
taxpayer. See Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610–11 (2000). This
initial burden may be carried with the presumption of official regularity.
See id. Next, the burden of going forward shifts to the taxpayer to rebut
the presumption by demonstrating irregularities in the procedure. See
id. at 611. Finally, if the taxpayer rebuts the presumption, the IRS has
the burden of production to show that the notice was properly mailed.
See Butti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-66, slip op. at 7–8. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims applies an identical three-
step approach to decide whether the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
properly determined a veteran’s last known address. See Crain v.
Principi, 17 Vet. App. 182, 187 (2003); Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App.
62, 65–66 (1992).
                                    11

[*11] We have previously applied a similar framework to a last known
address inquiry in a collection due process case. In Devlin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-145, slip op. at 7, a taxpayer sought to
challenge his underlying liability by claiming that he did not receive
notices of deficiency for some of the years at issue because they were
sent to the wrong address. The Commissioner attempted to invoke the
presumption of proper mailing to show that such a challenge was
precluded. Id. The taxpayer argued that the presumption should not
apply because the notice of deficiency was not sent to his last known
address and there was no evidence connecting him to this address. Id.
The Court determined that the presumption of proper mailing was
inapplicable because of the lack of evidence. Id. at 8. There was then
insufficient evidence to conclude that the taxpayer received the notice of
deficiency. Id.

       Applying this framework to the last known address inquiry, the
focus of the analysis becomes whether respondent properly updated
petitioner’s last known address in his system. Thus, in the first step,
the doctrine of official regularity may apply to respondent’s action of
matching petitioner’s name and old address in the NCOA Notification
to that information in the IDRS. For the second step, petitioner would
need to allege irregularities in this matching process to rebut the
presumption of official regularity. Finally, if petitioner rebuts the
presumption, respondent would bear the burden of proving he properly
updated petitioner’s last known address by competent and persuasive
evidence.

V.    Application

      A.     Respondent’s Initial Burden

        Respondent bears the initial burden to demonstrate that he
properly updated petitioner’s last known address. This initial burden
may be satisfied with the presumption of official regularity, which
presumes that a public officer, absent evidence to the contrary, has
properly discharged his official duties in accordance with proper
procedure. See Mecom v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 374, 388 (1993)
(“[P]ublic officials are presumed to have properly discharged their
official duties.”), aff’d, 40 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table
decision). As the Supreme Court has stated: “Acts done by a public
officer ‘which presuppose the existence of other acts to make them
legally operative, are presumptive proofs of the latter.’” R.H. Stearns Co.
                                   12

[*12] of Bos., Mass. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 63 (1934) (quoting
Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 70 (1827)).

        We have previously analyzed the effect of the presumption of
official regularity on the IRS’s obligation to update the IDRS. In Davis
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-197, at *11, aff’d, 788 F. App’x 618
(10th Cir. 2019), the IRS issued a notice of deficiency to a taxpayer at
the address listed in the IDRS before the processing of the taxpayer’s
most recently filed tax return. In finding that the notice was properly
sent to the taxpayer’s last known address, the Court noted that the
presumption of official regularity applied to the IRS’s maintenance of
the IDRS. Id. at *12 n.10. The Court reasoned that because the IRS did
not update the taxpayer’s address upon processing the return, the
address listed on that return presumptively matched the address in the
IDRS. Id. The taxpayer did not rebut the presumption. Id.

       Here the presumption of official regularity applies to presume
that respondent properly compared the NCOA Notification with
petitioner’s name and old address as recorded in the IDRS. Relying on
the presumption of official regularity, respondent has carried his initial
burden to show that he properly updated petitioner’s last known address
in his system.

      B.     Petitioner’s Burden to Rebut the Presumption

        Because respondent carried his initial burden to show that he
properly updated petitioner’s address through the presumption of
official regularity, petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the
presumption. In collection due process cases in which taxpayers allege
that they submitted a change-of-address form, we have found self-
serving testimony without additional corroborating evidence to be
insufficient to rebut the presumption. See Sego, 114 T.C. at 611; Taylor,
T.C. Memo. 2016-81, at *6. We adopt a similar approach in that
petitioner may rebut the presumption with credible testimony or other
competent evidence alleging irregularities in respondent’s processing of
the NCOA Notification, either because respondent did not receive an
NCOA Notification or the information contained in the NCOA
Notification did not match the information in the IDRS.

      In sworn testimony petitioner asserted that he did not file a
change-of-address form in 2010. Moreover, his responses to the motion
suggest that his son, with the same name, may have been residing at
the Roslyn Address with his mother. Petitioner provided documentation
                                         13

[*13] that he was incarcerated when respondent processed the USPS
change-of-address form. 9 This evidence lends credibility to petitioner’s
argument that he did not submit the USPS change-of-address form.
Thus, this evidence demonstrates irregularity in the matching process:
either respondent did not receive the NCOA Notification or the
information contained in the NCOA Notification matched petitioner’s
son’s account rather than his account. We find that this evidence is
sufficient to rebut the presumption of official regularity and shift the
burden of production back to respondent.

       C.      Respondent’s Burden to Show Proper Update

        Because petitioner carried his burden to rebut the presumption of
official regularity, respondent has the burden of production to show that
he complied with the regulation in updating petitioner’s last known
address. To show compliance with the regulation, respondent has
provided the Court with two transcripts from the IDRS: FINDSD and
IMFOLE transcripts. A FINDSD transcript provides a taxpayer’s name
and address. See IRM 4.71.2.3 (Nov. 12, 2021). An IMFOLE transcript
records account transactions, designated by transaction codes and
document locator numbers. See id.

       The IRS typically introduces IDRS transcripts to show that a
taxpayer has not notified the IRS of a change of address. See Gyorgy v.
Commissioner, 779 F.3d at 477 (holding that a taxpayer did not notify
the IRS of a change of address because it was not reflected in the IDRS);
Davis, T.C. Memo. 2018-197, at *12 n.10. As for proof of affirmative
actions by the IRS, we have previously rejected reliance on IDRS
transcript entries to show the validity of underlying actions. See
Gardner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-67, at *24 (holding that the
IRS did not satisfy its burden of proof to show preparation of a substitute
for return that complied with the requirements of section 6020(b) when
the IRS introduced only a copy of the taxpayer’s account transcript that
showed that a substitute for return was prepared), aff’d, 845 F.3d 971
(9th Cir. 2017).

        9 We recognize that the Treasury Decision issued with the promulgation of the

regulation states that it may take up to two or three weeks for the IRS to process an
NCOA Notification. See T.D. 8939, 2001-1 C.B. at 900. However, respondent has failed
to provide the exact date that he processed the NCOA Notification. The information
we derive from the transcript tends to show that the change-of-address request was
sent after petitioner was incarcerated.
                                   14

[*14] We do not have to reach the question of whether respondent can
generally rely on the IDRS to show evidence of compliance with the last
known address regulation. The transcripts respondent provided contain
no information relating to the process of matching petitioner’s
information to the NCOA Notification in 2010, only the result of such
process. Even if the IDRS may be used as evidence of compliance with
the regulation, the transcripts provided in this case are not competent
and persuasive evidence of respondent’s compliance.

       As discussed above, the transcripts respondent provided show
that the 2010 change of address occurred after petitioner was
incarcerated. This fact supports petitioner’s contention that he did not
submit a change-of-address form to the USPS, and thus any update to
his last known address was the result of respondent’s error in processing
the form. While the transcript shows that respondent processed a
change-of-address form in 2010, the transcripts do not show that
respondent properly processed that form.

       Respondent’s inconsistent explanations for the change of address
further diminish the credibility of the transcripts. In his reply,
respondent appears to argue that third-party reporting regarding
petitioner’s ex-wife supported his decision to update petitioner’s last
known address. Reliance on third-party reporting, excluding the USPS,
to update petitioner’s last known address would violate the regulation.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.6212-2(b)(1). Respondent asserted the new theory
that the change of address was the result of an NCOA Notification in his
second supplement to his motion. Respondent failed to provide an
explanation for this change in position.

       Expanding beyond the 2010 address change, additional
inconsistencies are present on the transcript. For example, the FINDSD
transcript shows that petitioner’s address was updated in 2008.
However, there is no corresponding entry in the IMFOLE transcript.
For all other address changes reflected on the FINDSD transcript, there
are corresponding entries on the IMFOLE transcript.

      The unexplained irregularities on the transcripts cause us to
question their accuracy. Consequently, we do not find that the FINDSD
and IMFOLE transcripts in this case are competent and persuasive
evidence that respondent properly updated petitioner’s last known
address. Respondent provided no additional evidence related to his
compliance with the regulation to update petitioner’s last known
                                          15

[*15] address. Therefore, respondent has not carried his burden to show
compliance with the regulation.

                                    Conclusion

       We conclude that the notice of deficiency is invalid because it was
not sent to petitioner’s last known address. 10 Thus, we lack jurisdiction
in this case. Accordingly, we dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that the notice of deficiency is invalid. We will deny
respondent’s motion and dismiss this case sua sponte.

       To reflect the foregoing,

       An order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction will be entered.

        10 Nothing in this Opinion should be construed as limiting respondent’s ability

to issue petitioner a new notice of deficiency for 2014 that is properly mailed to
petitioner’s last known address.