Court Opinion

ID: 9956890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 13:07:52.450908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.777784
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re L.B., 2024-Ohio-1255.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                           HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 IN RE: L.B.                               :      APPEAL NO. C-230375
                                                  TRIAL NO. 07-4314 X
                                           :

                                           :          O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 3, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith Sauter,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, Margaret Kane, Assistant
Public Defender, and Jessica Moss, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-
Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}    L.B. asked the juvenile court to seal and expunge 20 juvenile-

delinquency adjudications. The juvenile court granted 19 of the applications, but

denied one, citing L.B.’s failure to pay restitution. Because this court has held that a

juvenile’s failure to pay restitution is probative only of that person at 21 years of age

and may not be used as a proxy for deciding whether an applicant is presently

rehabilitated, we reverse the juvenile court’s judgment and remand this cause with

instructions to grant L.B.’s application.

                              I.     Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}    In 2007, 17-year-old L.B. was adjudicated delinquent for attempting to

steal $50 worth of earrings from a Macy’s store (“2007 adjudication”). As part of its

disposition, the juvenile court ordered L.B. to pay $336.25 in restitution to Macy’s

(“restitution order”).

       {¶3}    In 2023, 34-year-old L.B. filed applications under R.C. 2151.356 and

2151.358 to seal and expunge her juvenile records in 20 cases spanning from 2002 to

2007, including the 2007 adjudication. The restitution order remained unpaid. After

a hearing, the magistrate sealed L.B.’s records in 19 cases but, citing her “outstanding

restitution,” denied her application to seal the 2007 adjudication.

       {¶4}    L.B. objected to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that the juvenile

court lost jurisdiction over the restitution order after her 21st birthday. The juvenile

court disagreed, overruled L.G.’s objections, and adopted the magistrate’s decision.

L.B. now appeals.

                               II.    Law and Analysis

       {¶5}    In her sole assignment of error, L.B. challenges the juvenile court’s

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

judgment denying her application to seal and expunge the 2007 adjudication based on

her failure to pay restitution. She argues that she satisfied the statutory requirements

for sealing the 2007 adjudication and that the juvenile court’s decision to deny her

application based on the unpaid restitution contravenes this court’s recent decision in

In re I.J., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220553, 2023-Ohio-2024. The state concedes the

error.

         {¶6}    We review a trial court’s decision on an application for expungement

and sealing for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 9. “We will thus not reverse the trial

court’s judgment unless the court has exercised its discretionary judgment over the

matter in an unwarranted way or committed legal error.” Id.

         {¶7}    While the expungement and sealing of juvenile records is considered a

privilege and not a right, expungement and sealing statutes are remedial and require

liberal construction. Id. at ¶ 8. As a matter of policy, statutes authorizing the

expungement and sealing of a juvenile’s record “ ‘ “promote [the] goals of

rehabilitation and reintegration into society by permitting rehabilitated offenders to

have their records sealed so that they can leave their youthful offenses in the past.” ’ ”

Id., quoting In re C.T., 5th Dist. Licking No. 11 CA 19, 2011-Ohio-4275, ¶ 11, quoting

State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 54; see In

re H.S., 2020-Ohio-4530, 159 N.E.3d 344, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.).

         {¶8}    Relevant here, juvenile records may be sealed if the juvenile court “finds

that the person has been rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree.” R.C. 2151.356(C)(2)(e).

The juvenile sealing statute identifies a nonexhaustive list of statutory factors that a

juvenile court may consider when assessing rehabilitation, including:

         i.   The applicant’s age;

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       ii. The nature of the case;

       iii. The applicant’s cessation or continuation of delinquent, unruly, or

           criminal behavior;

       iv. The applicant’s education and employment history;

       v. Classification or declassification from the juvenile offender registry;

           and

       vi. Any other circumstances related to the applicant’s rehabilitation.

Id.

       {¶9}    In In re I.J., this court reversed the juvenile court’s judgment denying

I.J.’s applications to seal and expunge his juvenile records based on unpaid juvenile

restitution, where the juvenile court had granted I.J.’s applications in the remaining

cases and the juvenile court’s other rehabilitation findings were “not so dissimilar * *

* to warrant [a] different outcome.” In re I.J., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220553, 2023-

Ohio-2024, at ¶ 15. This court considered the relevance of an adult applicant’s unpaid

juvenile restitution, explaining that “a juvenile court may no longer exercise its

jurisdiction over a person once that person reaches the age of 21,” and therefore, an

applicant’s failure to pay restitution in a juvenile case “is probative only of that person

at 21 years old, not whether he or she is rehabilitated at the time of applying for sealing

and expungement.” Id. at ¶ 14.

       {¶10} Months later, this court reaffirmed I.J., holding that a juvenile court errs

“in using unpaid juvenile restitution as a proxy for deciding whether an applicant for

sealing and expungement was presently rehabilitated as an adult.” In re S.S., 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-230075, 2023-Ohio-4197, ¶ 12. In In re S.S., this court discussed

recently passed legislation that addresses unpaid juvenile restitution and enables a

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

procedure for a court to reduce unpaid restitution “to a civil judgment in favor of the

victim prior to the termination of the court’s jurisdiction upon [the child’s] attainment

of twenty-one years of age.” R.C. 2152.203(F). That civil judgment is “enforceable by

a victim * * * until the obligation is satisfied.” Id. In In re S.S., this court construed this

legislation as support for In re I.J.’s treatment of unpaid juvenile restitution. In re S.S.

at ¶ 11. This court explained, “absent such a conversion order breathing new life into

the obligation after the offender turns 21, an unpaid juvenile restitution order is

enforceable by no court.” Id.

       {¶11} In this case, R.C. 2152.203(F) was in effect at the time of L.B.’s sealing-

and-expungement hearing in front of the juvenile court. But the restitution order had

not been reduced to a civil judgment when the juvenile court overruled L.B.’s objection

to the magistrate’s decision.

       {¶12} As the state concedes, this court’s decision in In re I.J. requires reversal

in this case. The juvenile court issued its decision 13 years after it lost jurisdiction over

L.B. and the restitution order terminated. The magistrate explained at the hearing that

L.B. was “eligible on everything but the case for which restitution is owed.”

       {¶13} The record evidences L.B.’s rehabilitation, including her job as a nurse’s

assistant, her providing childcare for her nieces and nephews, and her caring for her

aging father. Because her application would have otherwise been granted, we hold that

the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying L.B.’s application. We sustain L.B.’s

assignment of error and reverse the juvenile court’s judgment.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                 III.       Conclusion

       {¶14} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain L.B.’s assignment of error, reverse

the juvenile court’s judgment, and remand the cause to the juvenile court with

instructions to grant L.B.’s application.

                                                 Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Bergeron and Crouse, JJ., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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