Court Opinion

ID: 9473305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:25:58.832034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:26.761864
License: Public Domain

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority’s holding that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires the government either to call a co-conspirator declarant or prove his or her unavailability before the coconspirator’s statement is admissible represents an unwarranted extension of Supreme Court precedent. This holding, which reiterates that recently announced in United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812 (3d Cir.1984) (also authored by Judge Higginbotham), will seriously hamper the government’s use of such statements in the numerous conspiracy cases that it brings. While such a result would not justify disagreement with the majority’s holding were it constitutionally compelled, I see no persuasive reason for the majority’s conclusion that it is. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The majority relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), for its conclusion that unavailability must be shown in the circumstances of this case. I believe that reading is overbroad. In the first place, Roberts dealt, not with a coconspirator’s statement, but with a witness’ prior testimony that had been given at a preliminary hearing. Thus the statement, unlike a coconspirator’s statement, was clearly hearsay. In the second place, the Court held that the witness’ unavailability at trial was established, so the language upon which the majority relies is dictum. It is true, of course, that in the course of the decision the Court stated broadly:
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.
The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that “there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.”
Id. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted). However, even taken literally, the language does not purport to impose an unavailability requirement in all cases, since the Court referred to the “usual case”. There is no indication that the Court intended to apply its Confrontation Clause analysis to instances other than those in which unavailability was traditionally required at common law and which are codified in Fed.R.Evid. 804. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2313, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) (prior-trial testimony); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (testimony at preliminary hearing); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1069, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) (dying declaration).
*954The implication of the majority’s reading of Roberts cannot be underestimated. It is important to keep in mind that the Federal Rules of Evidence divide the exceptions to the hearsay rule into two categories— statements that are admissible only if there is a showing that the declarant is unavailable as a witness (enumerated in Fed.R. Evid. 804(b)), and those which are admissible even though the declarant may be available (enumerated in the twenty-four exceptions in Fed.R.Evid. 803, captioned “Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial.”). The inevitable result of the majority’s creation of a per se rule requiring unavailability to be shown as a precondition to the admission of out-of-court statements is to render unconstitutional the premise of Fed.R.Evid. 803 as applied in criminal cases. The Advisory Committee wrote:
The present rule proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available. The theory finds vast support in the many exceptions to the hearsay rule developed by the common law in which unavailability of the declarant is not a relevant factor.
Fed.R.Evid. 803 advisory committee note. In contrast, the Notes to Rule 804 refer to the evolution “[a]t common law [of] the unavailability requirement ... in connection with particular hearsay exceptions ____” Fed.R.Evid. 804 advisory committee note (emphasis added). The majority’s holding eviscerates this distinction, and much of the common law upon which it is based.
The third reason why Roberts does not compel the result the majority reaches is that the Court itself stated:
A demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 [91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213] (1970), for example, the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that it did not require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 2538 n. 7. In Dutton, cited by the Court in Roberts for the proposition that unavailability is not required, the plurality concluded that the introduction of a coconspirator’s statement that was admissible under applicable state law did not violate the Confrontation Clause (which also applies to the states) because there were sufficient indicia of reliability, even though the witness was not shown to be unavailable. Therefore, the approving reference to Dutton by the majority in Roberts casts substantial question on Judge Higginbotham’s reliance on Roberts for precisely the opposite conclusion.
Even if the majority were correct in its conclusion that there must be a showing of unavailability before hearsay statements can be admitted into evidence, which was the only issue before the court in Roberts, the fundamental flaw in the majority’s analysis is its treatment of a coconspirator’s statement as hearsay. The majority fails to give adequate recognition to the fact that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a coconspirator’s statement is not hearsay. “[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence categorize coconspirator statements along with admissions as ‘[statements which are not hearsay’ under Rule 801(d)(2)”. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 344, 78 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983). This view is in accord with the longstanding principle that statements made by a coconspirator, in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, are, like acts committed by a coconspirator, substantively attributable to the other coconspirators as though the statements were their own. See generally, Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, And Hearsay, 12 Hofstra L.Rev. 323, 331-35 (1984); Fed. R.Evid. 801 advisory committee note.
I do not agree with the majority that the “mere” fact that the drafters of the Federal Rules chose to exclude coconspirators’ *955statements from the definition of hearsay is “of no consequence in applying the Confrontation Clause.” The decision by the rulemakers was based on a well-supported understanding of the nature of admissions as evidence. As we pointed out in Ammar, “[T]he rationale for admitting evidence under the rules covering hearsay exceptions is different from that used to admit coconspirator statements.” 714 F.2d at 255. We explained:
Evidence falling within the hearsay exceptions is admissible because of its special trustworthiness. See McCormick, supra, § 262, at 628; 5 Wigmore on Evidence §§ 1420, 1422. Admissions, on the other hand, are not admitted because of confidence in their inherent reliability. They are instead admitted because a party will not be heard to object that s/he is unworthy of credence. As explained by the Advisory Committee, “Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule____”
Id. (citation omitted).
The majority reasons that because in Ammar we held that coconspirators’ statements are subject to a reliability inquiry under the Confrontation Clause, it follows that we must also subject such statements to an unavailability inquiry. That conclusion does not follow ineluctably. While reliability is a core value at issue either directly or in the abstract as to all evidence, the availability of a declarant is not always as important.
The distinction was implicitly recognized in Roberts. There the Court, in explaining its imposition of an unavailability requirement to certain forms of hearsay, referred to its “preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,” 448 U.S. at 63, 100 S.Ct. at 2537, but at the same time recognized that in some cases “the utility of trial confrontation [is] remote.” Id. at 65 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 2538 n. 7. A party’s admissions are among the statements falling within this latter group, since it is well established that a defendant’s earlier statements are admissible, whether or not the defendant chooses to testify. See generally McCormick on Evidence § 145 (1972). Since coeonspiratoi; statements are treated as a category of party admissions, see Rule 801(d)(2), under the theory, albeit a “legal fiction that each conspirator is an agent of the other and that the statements of one can therefore be attributable to all.” Am-mar, 714 F.2d at 255-56, it is logical that they be treated similarly as admissions for this purpose as well.
The same rationale for dispensing with the availability requirement applies to both admissions and coeonspirator statements. As to admissions, once the declarant has become a defendant, there may be a natural incentive to exculpate oneself and retract an earlier adverse admission. Since there was no such incentive when the statement was first made, the law admits it. There is a similarly strong temptation or incentive to retract a coconspirator statement since the declarant’s cohort has now become a defendant and the declarant may also face prosecution. As with a defendant, the tendency to exculpate oneself or one’s coconspirator at trial gives special utility to the admissibility of the earlier statements, even if the declarant may be available to testify. In both instances, the utility of trial confrontation is weaker than the utility of introduction of the earlier statement.
Moreover, a coconspirator’s statement must meet the requirements established in Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) that the statement was made by a coconspirator, during the course of a conspiracy, and in furtherance thereof. These tend to supply even more indicia of reliability than necessary for a defendant’s admission. The reliability requirements built into Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) and the Confrontation Clause will tend to ameliorate any possible untoward effect of admitting coconspirators’ *956statements. Furthermore, if the declarant is available, a defendant can subpoena the declarant after the conclusion of the government’s case, to attempt to shed light on the statement. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96, 91 S.Ct. 210, 223, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). If the declarant is unavailable, the statement would be admissible in any event.
The Confrontation Clause was intended to prevent such gross abuses as trial by affidavit or deposition of principal witnesses. To shift the clause into a means to eliminate longstanding rules of evidence and to fix new ones in constitutional concrete “carries the seeds of great mischief,” as Justice Harlan commented. Id. at 94-OS, 91 S.Ct. at 222-23. The majority’s conclusion increases the number of declarants who must mechanically appear at trial, and thereby complicates and protracts the proceedings.
Even if the majority were correct in its statement of the law, I would dissent from its judgment of reversal. It seems clear to me that introduction of DiPasquale’s statements, even if violative of Caputo’s Confrontation Clause rights, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The statements of DiPasquale at issue here were repetitive of the direct testimony of several witnesses. Anthony Canale testified at length and in considerable detail that on several occasions he purchased methamphetamine from Caputo, sold it, and split the proceeds with Caputo. Most of these transactions also involved coconspirator DiPasquale. See Supp.App. at 24a, 33a-37a, 39a-42a, 45a-46a. Joseph Bocella, a witness cooperating with the prosecution, testified that he met with Canale and Caputo to buy methamphetamine. Supp.App. at 128a-129a. Thus, in the context of all the evidence, the introduction of the statements of DiPasquale would not warrant the reversal ordered by the majority. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 641 (8th Cir.1984).