Court Opinion

ID: 9396840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 20:00:23.163875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:20.287439
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0233n.06

                                           No. 22-1497

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                              FILED
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                            May 23, 2023
                                                                            DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
 SHAID URIEL JUARICO-CERVANTES,
        Petitioner-Appellant,
                                                      ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
 v.                                                   STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
                                                      WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                                                       OPINION
        Respondent-Appellee.

BEFORE: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

       CLAY, Circuit Judge. Petitioner, Shaid Juarico-Cervantes, appeals the district court’s

denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Juarico-Cervantes pleaded guilty to possession of firearms and ammunition by a person “illegally

or unlawfully in the United States” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(5)(A). For

the reasons set forth below, this Court VACATES the district court’s order denying Petitioner’s

§ 2255 motion and REMANDS for an evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion.

                                    I.    BACKGROUND

                                    A. Factual Background

       Shaid Juarico-Cervantes is a Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) recipient.

In 2005, at the age of seven, his parents brought him to live in the United States from Mexico. He

has resided in Michigan since that time. On January 4, 2018, after his home was shot at in a drive-

by shooting, Juarico-Cervantes went to On Target, a firearms dealer in Kalamazoo, Michigan, to

buy a Zastava assault rifle. As part of the purchase process, Juarico-Cervantes was required to
No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

complete background check paperwork. He filled out the background check form, providing his

name, address, and social security number. Because he wrote his social security number in the

section of the form designated for his alien registration number, the background check was

delayed. Even though the background check was delayed, Juarico-Cervantes was allowed to

purchase and take possession of the firearm, less than a week later, on January 10, 2018.

        Two days later, On Target received the results of the background check indicating that

Juarico-Cervantes was prohibited from purchasing a firearm. On Target notified the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives that Juarico-Cervantes already possessed the gun.

Law enforcement agents visited Juarico-Cervantes’ residence the next month to retrieve the gun

he had purchased from On Target. Juarico-Cervantes was cooperative and permitted the agents to

enter the home and retrieve the firearm. When the agents found the firearm, they also noticed

other guns in plain view. The agents secured a search warrant for the residence and located five

other guns, two of which were reported stolen and one which had an obliterated serial number.

                                        B. Procedural History

        In May 2018, Juarico-Cervantes was charged with one count of knowingly making a false

written statement to procure a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), one count of

possessing firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) and § 924(a)(2), and

one count of knowingly possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(k). Juarico-Cervantes initially pleaded not guilty to all three counts, but he later

pleaded guilty to count two of the indictment, in exchange for dismissal of counts one and three.

Juarico-Cervantes did not waive his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement. Although

Juarico-Cervantes’ plea agreement stipulated that he knew that he possessed the firearms listed in

the indictment, it contained no stipulation that he was aware of his status as a person illegally or

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unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the firearms. During the change of plea hearing,

the district court questioned Juarico-Cervantes about the offense in the indictment, and he admitted

that he had entered the United States illegally in 2005, that he had possessed all of the items listed

in count two of the indictment, and that he knew he was not permitted to possess all of the items

listed in the indictment.

        During the sentencing hearing, Juarico-Cervantes’ attorney, Becket Jones, provided

additional context about the facts precipitating count two of the indictment. Jones told the court

that Juarico-Cervantes had not provided any false information in the background check paperwork

and that the ATF found it “very easy” to find Juarico-Cervantes and locate the firearm he had

purchased. Tr. Sentencing Hr’g, R. 50, Page ID #255–57. Jones also noted that Juarico-Cervantes

purchased the gun from a licensed dealer and “believed that he had Second Amendment rights”

even though he “should not have believed that.” Id. at Page ID #257. The court sentenced Juarico-

Cervantes to a term of 63 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. In making

that determination, the district court specifically acknowledged that Juarico-Cervantes might not

have been aware that DACA recipients were not allowed to possess guns. The district court stated:

        His purchase of the firearm obviously was illegal. He was on DACA status while
        he was doing this. Apparently he didn’t check with his lawyer. He should have
        checked with his lawyer to find out whether he was eligible to possess a firearm or
        not. He wasn’t. And accordingly, his purchase, albeit in his own name, indicates
        that he was being rather open about it. He says he did that as a result of a drive-by
        shooting at his house. I have no reason to disbelieve that.

Id. at Page ID # 263–64.

        The court entered judgment on November 2, 2018. Juarico-Cervantes did not appeal his

sentence, and the time for him to file an appeal expired 14 days later. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1).

On June 21, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, holding that 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(a)(2) requires proof that a defendant knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons

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barred from possessing a firearm specified in 18 U.S.C. § 924(g), in that case an alien who is

illegally or unlawfully in the United States. 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019). On July 13, 2020,

Juarico-Cervantes filed a pro se motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

arguing that the court should apply Rehaif retroactively and find that his conviction was no longer

valid. He also made a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his attorney failed

to file an appeal that would have permitted him to raise his Rehaif claim on direct appeal. Juarico-

Cervantes obtained new counsel to assist with the § 2255 petition, and his new attorney filed a

reply which included a request for an evidentiary hearing.

        The district court denied Juarico-Cervantes’ motion, reasoning that his admissions at his

change of plea hearing—that he had entered the United States illegally and knew he was not

permitted to possess the firearms listed in the indictment—were sufficient evidence that he was

fully aware of his status, and that there was consequently no Rehaif violation. In a footnote, the

district court also acknowledged that sufficient evidence existed in the record that “reasonable

jurists could reach the opposite conclusion,” given that Juarico-Cervantes had tried to purchase

one of the firearms legally and his counsel’s statement at sentencing that Juarico-Cervantes thought

he had Second Amendment rights. Order on Mot. to Vacate, R. 53, Page ID #308 n.1.

        The district court also addressed Juarico-Cervantes’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

determining that he could not show he was prejudiced by his attorney’s conduct because he failed

to show that he would have filed a timely appeal. First, the district court reasoned that that the

petition for writ of certiorari in Rehaif was not granted until two months after the expiration of

Juarico-Cervantes’ appeal deadline. Second, the district court determined that Juarico-Cervantes

was not prejudiced by his lawyer’s failure to appeal because he failed to present evidence that he

would not have pleaded guilty even if the district court had instructed him on the mens rea element

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

of his offense. The district court denied Juarico-Cervantes’s request for an evidentiary hearing,

determining that no hearing was necessary because “Petitioner’s arguments are contrary to law.”

Id. at Page ID #314. Petitioner timely appealed the district court’s order denying his motion to

vacate.

                                II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

          When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to vacate pursuant to § 2255, this

Court reviews conclusions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error. Braden v. United

States, 817 F.3d 926, 929 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Hyatt v. United States, 207 F.3d 831, 832 (6th

Cir. 2000)). This Court reviews for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to refuse to hold

an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion. Martin v. United States, 889 F.3d 827, 831 (6th Cir.

2018).     “A court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact,

improperly applies the law, or employs an erroneous legal standard, or when we are firmly

convinced that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.” Id. at 831 (quoting United

States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 378 (6th Cir. 2015)).

                                        III.   ANALYSIS

          On appeal, Juarico-Cervantes requests that we reverse the district court’s order denying his

motion to vacate his conviction and sentence. He argues that: (1) the Supreme Court’s decision

in Rehaif should be applied retroactively to vacate his conviction since the district court failed to

instruct him that knowledge of his status as an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States

was an element of the crime (his “retroactive Rehaif claim”), (2) his attorney provided ineffective

assistance of counsel that caused him not to appeal the judgment in his case, and (3) the district

court should have permitted him an evidentiary hearing on his claims. The government concedes

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

that Rehaif applies retroactively on collateral review,1 and that Petitioner’s counsel acted

deficiently in not consulting with him about the possibility of filing an appeal after he expressed

interest in doing so.

        Ordinarily, where a defendant fails to raise a Rehaif claim on direct appeal, the defendant

procedurally defaults the claim and can only raise the claim on collateral review if he can show

“cause” and “prejudice” for his failure to bring that claim on direct appeal. Bousley v. United

States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). One way of overcoming a procedural default is by bringing an

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim premised on the failure of appellate counsel to

bring the Rehaif claim. Wallace v. United States, 43 F.4th 595, 602 (6th Cir. 2022) (“To prove

cause, prisoners often argue that their attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance . . . .

[A] prisoner who makes the prejudice showing for an ineffective-assistance claim (to establish

‘cause’ for a procedural default) generally satisfies the logically distinct ‘prejudice’ element to

avoid the procedural default.”). Procedural default is an affirmative defense that the government

must raise, or else it is forfeited. See Vanwinkle v. United States, 645 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2011)

(citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 165-66 (1996)).

        Juarico-Cervantes brought both a merits claim that Rehaif should be applied retroactively

to vacate his guilty plea and sentence and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on

        1
           This Circuit, in two unpublished decisions, has determined that Rehaif applies retroactively on
collateral review. See Baker v. United States, 848 F. App’x 188, 189 (6th Cir. 2021); Kelley v. United
States, No. 20-5448, 2021 WL 2373896, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 2021) (“Thus, just
as Bailey and Burrage announced new substantive rules that apply retroactively to cases on collateral
review, so did Rehaif”); see also Wallace v. United States, 43 F.4th 595, 606 (6th Cir. 2022) (implicitly
recognizing that Rehaif applies retroactively by citing Baker decision and noting that the district court in
that case “wrongly held that Rehaif did not apply retroactively”).

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

his counsel’s failure to raise the Rehaif claim on appeal.2 Because the prejudice prong of

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires the same showing as his Rehaif merits

claim, 3 Plaintiff can only succeed with his § 2255 petition if he can show he would not have

pleaded guilty if the court had properly instructed him on the knowledge of status element pursuant

to Rehaif. Accordingly, we will first address Petitioner’s merits claim that a Rehaif violation

occurred. Second, although the government concedes that it has forfeited any argument that

defendant has procedurally defaulted his Rehaif claim,4 we will nonetheless address the sole

remaining question in Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim—whether he would have

pleaded guilty—in case procedural default is later raised.

        2
           In most cases, a defendant raising a standalone ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised
on his counsel’s failure to file an appeal must only demonstrate for the prejudice prong that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would
have timely appealed.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000). This is because standalone
ineffective assistance of counsel claims seeks only to vacate the sentence and permit a direct appeal. See
Johnson v. United States, 146 Fed. App’x 4, 5 (6th Cir. 2005); Rosinski v. United States, 459 F.2d 59, 59
(6th Cir. 1972). In this case, however, Petitioner seeks to vacate his conviction, and is using his ineffective
assistance claim as a means of excusing the procedural default of his Rehaif claim. For these types of
claims, the Petitioner must also show a probability of success on appeal. See Pough v. United States, 442
F.3d 959, 966 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984)).
        3
          To succeed on his retroactive Rehaif claim, Petitioner must satisfy plain error review, which
involves demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if he
had known about Rehaif’s requirement that he know his prohibited status. Wallace v. United States,
43 F.4th 595, 603 (6th Cir. 2022). And, as discussed, when analyzing whether Petitioner in this case was
prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffective assistance, we must also examine the merits of the issue that
defendant’s counsel failed to appeal and decide whether the defendant had a reasonable probability of
prevailing on appeal. Id.
        4
          When the government fails to raise procedural default, as it did here, it forfeits the right to defend
on that ground. Cartwright v. United States, 12 F.4th 572, 580 (6th Cir. 2021). An appeals court may raise
the issue of a defendant’s procedural default, but it is not obligated to do so. See id.; see also Elzy v. United
States, 205 F.3d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 118 S. Ct. 478, 480 (1997)).
We have previously expressed disapproval of a court’s “sua sponte raising of procedural default issues as
a matter of course.” Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 476 (6th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we decline to
consider whether Juarico-Cervantes has procedurally defaulted the merits of his Rehaif claim on collateral
review.

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

        We conclude that the Petitioner has created a factual dispute on the key issues in his case,

meriting an evidentiary hearing on his claims.

        1.   Retroactive Application of Rehaif

        We review Petitioner’s unpreserved Rehaif claim for plain error. See Wallace, 43 F.4th at

603 (reviewing unpreserved Rehaif claim for plain error in a § 2255 petition where defendant’s

appellate attorney did not raise the claim during his direct appeal because the Rehaif certiorari

petition had not yet been granted); Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021) (reviewing

unpreserved Rehaif violation for plain error on direct appeal). A defendant is only eligible for

relief from a plain error where that plain error affects the defendant’s “substantial rights,” meaning

that there must have been a “reasonable probability” that defendant “would have stood trial rather

than plead guilty if the court had informed him of the element.” Wallace, 43 F.4th at 603 (quoting

Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097).

        In § 2255 cases, an evidentiary hearing is typically required “unless the record conclusively

shows that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357

(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999)). The

defendant’s burden for showing entitlement to an evidentiary hearing is “relatively light,”

particularly where there is a factual dispute. Martin, 889 F.3d at 832 (quoting Turner v. United

States, 183 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 1999)). “If a habeas petitioner presents a factual dispute, then

‘the habeas court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of the petitioner’s

claims.’” Pola v. United States, 778 F.3d 525, 532 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Huff v. United

States, 734 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2013)). A district court may only forgo a hearing when a

defendant’s allegations are “contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather

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than statements of fact.” Martin, 889 F.3d at 832 (quoting MacLloyd v. United States, 684 F.

App’x 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2017)).

        In Rehaif, the Supreme Court considered the case of a defendant, Hamid Rehaif, who had

entered the United States on a student visa to attend university. 139 S. Ct. at 2194. Rehaif received

poor grades, was dismissed from the university, and was told his immigration status would be

terminated unless he transferred to another university. Id. After his dismissal, Rehaif visited a

firing range and shot a firearm. Id. The government learned of his visit and charged him with

possessing a firearm as an alien unlawfully in the United States in violation of § 922(g)(5)(A) and

§ 924(a)(2). Id. He stood trial and was found guilty after the trial judge instructed the jury that

the government did not need to prove that Rehaif knew he was illegally in the United States. Id.

The Supreme Court analyzed the statute and determined that the statutory text required application

of the “longstanding presumption, traceable to the common law, that Congress intends to require

a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding ‘each of the statutory elements that

criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.’” Id. at 2195 (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video,

Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)).

        That presumption required the government to prove that the defendant subjectively knew

of his status as an alien illegally in the United States, noting that a “defendant who does not know

that he is an alien ‘illegally or unlawfully in the United States’ does not have the guilty state of

mind that the statute's language and purposes require.” Id. at 2198. The government may prove

knowledge of status through circumstantial evidence. See id. (citing Staples v. United States, 511

U.S. 600, 615 n. 11 (1994)).

        As this Circuit has previously determined, “Rehaif did not graft onto § 922(g) an

ignorance-of-the-law defense by which every defendant could escape conviction if he was unaware

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of this provision of the United States Code.” United States v. Bowens, 938 F.3d 790, 797–98 (6th

Cir. 2019). However, the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse “normally applies where

a defendant has the requisite mental state in respect to the elements of the crime but claims to be

‘unaware of the existence of a statute proscribing his conduct.’” Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2198 (quoting

1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1(a), p. 575 (1986)). This maxim does not

apply “where a defendant ‘has a mistaken impression concerning the legal effect of some collateral

matter and that mistake results in his misunderstanding the full significance of his conduct,’

thereby negating an element of the offense.” Id. (quoting LaFave at p. 575). Here, Juarico-

Cervantes claims he had a “mistaken impression” about the legal effect of a collateral matter—

that DACA status provided him with legal status in the United States and Second Amendment

rights. That mistaken impression likely resulted in his not understanding the “full significance of

his conduct” in attempting to purchase a firearm and thereby negated an essential element of the

firearm offense he was charged with, namely knowledge of his status as one “illegally or

unlawfully in the United States.” Id.

        Petitioner argues that evidence in the record shows that he did not know that he was

illegally or unlawfully in the United States, “demonstrat[ing] he would not have pled guilty to this

offense if he had been instructed about the knowledge-of-status element.” Pet’r’s Br. at 22. The

district court and the government relied on Juarico-Cervantes’ responses to the district court’s

questions during the plea hearing as conclusive evidence that he did know that he was an alien

illegally or unlawfully in the United States. The district court cited the Supreme Court’s decision

in Greer for the proposition that felons face an uphill battle in establishing that they did not know

of their status because “[i]f a person is a felon, he ordinarily knows he is a felon.” Op. and Order,

R. 53, Page ID #314 (citing 141 S. Ct. at 2097). The district court then extended that inference to

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

the Petitioner and reasoned that “Petitioner admitted that he did not enter the country legally” and

then concluded that “if a person enters the United States illegally, as Petitioner did, he ordinarily

knows he is an illegal alien.” Op. and Order, R. 53, Page ID #314. The district court concluded

from this inference that “[t]he record supports the conclusion that Petitioner knew he was an illegal

immigrant, and even if the Court had instructed Petitioner on the mens rea element of his offense,

Petitioner has failed to show that he would not have pled guilty.” Id.

        The district court’s inference that a person who admitted he entered the country unlawfully

automatically knows he is an “illegal alien” is unsupported by evidence in the record. Not only

does this inference ignore the possibility that someone who has entered the country illegally may

nonetheless obtain lawful status after the fact, it also ignores the contemporaneous evidence

available to the district court that Juarico-Cervantes believed that DACA recipients were lawfully

present in the United States and had Second Amendment rights.

        The most convincing fact supporting Juarico-Cervantes’ contention that he was unaware

that he was illegally or unlawfully in the country at the time of his possession of the firearms, and

thus that he would not have pled guilty had he known of the Rehaif knowledge requirement, are

his statements at sentencing that he believed he had Second Amendment rights. Furthermore, at

the time of the offense he provided all his own personal information in his application for a firearm

and did not attempt to obtain the weapon in a surreptitious manner. His behavior strongly implies

that he thought he was behaving in a manner consistent with the law and that his DACA status

conferred him with lawful status and rights akin to those of a citizen.5 And as a DACA recipient,

        5
          For this reason, the district court’s suggestion that Juarico-Cervantes should have “check[ed] with
his lawyer” before purchasing the firearm, Tr. Sentencing Hr’g, R. 50, at Page ID #234–64, is an
unreasonable expectation. People do not tend to “check with [their] lawyer” before doing things that they
believe are lawful.

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

he had been issued a social security number which he used in his application to purchase a firearm.6

Evidence that a defendant was not actually guilty of an offense is, logically, evidence (though not

conclusive evidence) that the defendant would not have pled guilty to that offense. Cf. Humphress

v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Humphress’s assertions of his innocence at

trial and during the magistrate’s evidentiary hearing lend additional support to the district court’s

conclusion that Humphress would not have pled guilty.”). The record therefore presents a factual

dispute on the question of whether Petitioner would have pled guilty.

        In cases such as this one—which turn on a key factual question not settled by the record as

it stands—the proper course is to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Campbell, 686 F.3d at 357–59

(“Because the resolution of this factual issue is pivotal to Campbell’s claim for relief, the district

court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. . . .”); Martin, 889 F.3d at 833 (determining that

petitioner was entitled to a hearing on his petition because he had provided factual allegations

beyond mere assertions of innocence and noting that in this Circuit even a “‘self-serving’ affidavit

is not inherently incredible.”) (quoting Pola, 778 F.3d at 535 (6th Cir. 2015)). The district court

did not find Juarico-Cervantes’ factual allegations “inherently incredible” or “contradicted by the

record” and in fact expressly stated it had no reason to disbelieve him. Indeed, the district court

acknowledged that “reasonable jurists—given Petitioner’s alleged attempt to purchase firearms

legally—could find this Court’s conclusion to be debatable or wrong.” R. 53 at Page ID #309. As

this Circuit has previously noted, “[t]he fact that the petitioner’s allegations may be ‘improbable’

is insufficient to forego a hearing.” MacLloyd, 684 F. App’x at 562 (quoting Machibroda v. United

States, 368 U.S. 487, 492(1962)) (determining that defendant was entitled to evidentiary hearing

        6
          See e.g., Application for a Social Security Card, SSA.gov, https://www.ssa.gov/forms/ss-5.pdf
(noting that to apply for a social security card, an applicant must have “current lawful, work-authorized
immigration status.”)

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

on § 2255 petition). Thus, Petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the question of

whether he would have pled guilty had he known of Rehaif’s knowledge requirement. Valentine

v. United States, 488 F.3d 325, 334 (6th Cir. 2007) (determining that district court abused its

discretion by denying evidentiary hearing on § 2255 motion where defendant presented a factual

narrative of events that was not incredible or contradicted).

        The government makes several other arguments to support its contention that the outcome

of this case would have been the same even had the district court instructed Juarico-Cervantes on

the mens rea element. First, the government argues that Juarico-Cervantes would not have let go

of the bargain he struck in his plea agreement since the government agreed to move for the

dismissal of the remaining two counts in the indictment, citing this Court’s decision in United

States v. Hobbs, 953 F.3d 853 (6th Cir. 2020). According to the government, Juarico-Cervantes,

like Hobbs, benefited from a plea agreement, making it “wholly implausible” that he would have

risked going to trial by forgoing the benefit of that deal. In Hobbs, however, the defendant relied

only on a conclusory assertion that he would not have entered the plea, acknowledging “candidly”

that there was “no contemporaneous evidence suggest[ing] that he would have rejected the plea

deal had the indictment contained the knowledge-of-status element.” Hobbs, 953 F.3d at 857–58.

This is not the case here, where the district court acknowledged contemporaneous evidence in the

record supporting Juarico-Cervantes’ argument that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been

informed of the knowledge of status element.

        Further, it is not clear from the record as it stands with what likelihood the government

would have been able to obtain convictions on either charge the government agreed to dismiss

(especially the charge relating to making a false statement on a federal Firearms Transaction

Record, as it is not clear whether the information provided was false). And it is not clear from the

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record that Petitioner would not have chosen to plead guilty to a different charge (with perhaps a

lesser sentence) than the charge he pled to. These are simply factual issues best suited for review

after an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Werle, 35 F.4th 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The

Government argues that the district court’s summary denial was proper because there is

‘overwhelming’ evidence that Werle knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more

than one year in prison at the time he possessed the firearm, and no rational person in Werle’s

circumstances would have risked forfeiting a three-level Sentencing Guidelines reduction for

acceptance of responsibility by proceeding to trial. We disagree. While some people in Werle’s

circumstances might rationally choose to plead guilty, others might rationally choose to go to trial.

To determine which category Werle falls into, the district court must hold an evidentiary

hearing.”).

        The government also argues that Juarico-Cervantes’ awareness that he was a DACA

recipient is sufficient evidence that he was aware that he was unlawfully or illegally in the United

States, citing this Court’s decisions in United States v. Lopez, 929 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2019) and

United States v. Bernal Berreaza, 789 F. App’x 534 (6th Cir. 2020). In both Lopez7 and Bernal

Berreaza,8 however, this Circuit resolved the substantive legal question of whether DACA status

conferred legal status in the United States, and not the factual question of a defendant’s awareness

that he was unlawfully in the United States. In fact, in Lopez, we remanded to the district court to

consider the petitioner’s argument that he lacked knowledge that he was an alien illegally or

        7
          In Lopez, the Sixth Circuit resolved the question whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) was
unconstitutionally vague in light of questions regarding whether DACA status conferred lawful status to
DACA recipients. The Sixth Circuit determined that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and that
DACA did not confer legal status to recipients.
        8
          In Bernal Berreaza, this Court applied the decision in Lopez to foreclose the defendant’s challenge
to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) on the basis that DACA conferred legal presence in the
United States.

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

unlawfully in the United States. 929 F.3d at 787 (“Whether the government has or may yet

adequately allege that element, however, is an issue we leave to the district court to address in the

first instance on remand”).

        The government adds that the DACA process itself provides notice to applicants that this

form of relief does not confer lawful status, citing to the United States Citizenship and Immigration

Services’ webpage which states that the prohibition on possession of firearms applies to DACA

recipients. That argument is unpersuasive, however, because the record does not establish

whether, at the time of Juarico-Cervantes’ offense, the website contained this notice9 and it was an

open legal question whether DACA recipients were considered unlawfully or illegally in the

United States. Compare United States v. Venegas-Vasquez, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1105 (D. Or.

2019) (dismissing § 922(g)(5) charge against DACA recipient and determining that defendant was

not unlawfully present in the United States) with Lopez, 929 F.3d at 783 (determining that DACA

recipients were unlawfully in the United States and that §922(g)(5) was not unconstitutionally

vague as applied to DACA recipients) and United States v. Arrieta, 862 F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir.

2017) (same).

        Finally, the government raises the question of whether Juarico-Cervantes’ DACA status

was valid at the time he committed the offense. Juarico-Cervantes replies with several exhibits

showing that his DACA status was valid at the time of his offense. This dispute about whether

Juarico-Cervantes even had valid DACA status at the time he committed his offense is also a

factual dispute that should be resolved by the district court during an evidentiary hearing on

remand. All of the evidence that both parties have submitted will be relevant to the ultimate

        9
          Juarico-Cervantes contends, upon information and belief, that the website did not contain this
information at the time of Juarico-Cervantes’ offense. Had the district court held an evidentiary hearing,
Juarico-Cervantes’ attorney may have been able to offer into evidence an internet archive snapshot of the
website to prove this point.

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

question of whether Juarico-Cervantes understood that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United

States. The district court could have properly resolved these factual disputes during an evidentiary

hearing on whether Juarico-Cervantes had the required mental state to sustain his conviction.

        The district court’s conclusion that Juarico-Cervantes was fully aware of his status as an

alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States, such that a hearing on his Rehaif claim was not

necessary, was erroneous because it lacked a sufficient factual basis. Instead of developing a

sufficient factual basis for its conclusion, the district court made an inference that was not

supported by the record and neglected to hold an evidentiary hearing that would have developed a

factual basis for its decision to deny Juarico-Cervantes’ motion. For these reasons, the district

court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s § 2255 petition and his request for an evidentiary

hearing in support of his retroactive Rehaif claim.

        2. Ineffective Assistance Claim10

        Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim requires that he demonstrate (1) a reasonable

probability that he would have appealed had his counsel not acted deficiently, and (2) that he would

not have pled guilty if he had known of Rehaif’s knowledge requirement. As described above,

Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the second question, which is the same question

posed by his retroactive Rehaif claim. Regarding the first question, the district court concluded

that Petitioner had not met his burden, stating that “it is not certain that he would have indeed

timely appealed.” R. 53, Page ID #312. The district court did not conduct an analysis of whether

an evidentiary hearing was warranted, and merely stated generally that “[b]ecause Petitioner’s

arguments are contrary to law, the Court need not hold a hearing on his motion.” Id. at Page ID

        10
           If Petitioner succeeds on his retroactive Rehaif claim, his conviction will be vacated, and his
ineffective assistance claim will be moot. But, if procedural default becomes an issue after remand, the
ineffective assistance claim will regain import. Thus, we address the merits of the ineffective assistance
claim.

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

#314. We disagree with the district court’s standard and its conclusion regarding prejudice and

find that the evidence presented by Petitioner is sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on the

issue of whether he would have appealed.

        Petitioner provided at least some evidence that he would have appealed. Text messages

between Juarico-Cervantes’s mother and Attorney Jones indicate that the sentence received by

Juarico-Cervantes was greater than that which Attorney Jones had advised it would be. After he

was sentenced, Juarico-Cervantes’ mother continued to request that Attorney Jones meet with her

son. Even after Attorney Jones sent a text message indicating his belief that the “chances of an

appeal going thru are slim,” she continued to express a desire on behalf of her son to appeal the

sentence. See Text Messages, R. 51-1, Page ID #292–93. After he failed to confer with her son

about an appeal, Juarico-Cervantes’ mother wrote to Jones: “Once again, you lied to us and you

did not go to see my son . . . I am unhappy because you are the only one who can give us

information about how to follow the process of all this.” Id. at Page ID #293.

        The record does not establish whether Juarico-Cervantes’s mother was acting on behalf of

her son or on her own behalf. 11 Assuming she acted on his behalf, the evidence suggests that

Juarico-Cervantes “promptly expressed a desire to appeal” and might have appealed his sentence

had his attorney met with him to discuss the process, notwithstanding his attorney’s advice that his

chances of succeeding on appeal were low. As the Supreme Court has explained, “where we are

[] asking what an individual defendant would have done, the possibility of even a highly

improbable result may be pertinent to the extent it would have affected his decision making.” See

Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 368, 371 (2017) (determining that defendant had established

        11
           This question is yet another one posed by this case that would likely be illuminated by an
evidentiary hearing.

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No. 22-1497, USA v. Juarico-Cervantes

prejudice from attorney’s error despite lacking a meaningful defense). Furthermore, Attorney

Jones submitted an amended affidavit indicating that he had forgotten about the text messages sent

from Juarico-Cervantes’ mother requesting that he visit her son to discuss filing an appeal.

Accordingly, the district court’s determination that “it is not certain that he would have indeed

timely appealed” is clearly erroneous because it wrongly elevated the standard of proof for

prejudice to a “certainty” requirement, where all that was needed was a reasonable probability

that Juarico-Cervantes would have appealed had his attorney consulted with him about an appeal.

Op. and Order, R. 53, Page ID #312 (emphasis added).

        This evidence is enough to merit a hearing on the question of whether Petitioner would

have appealed if counsel had consulted with him. A “§ 2255 petitioner’s burden ‘for establishing

an entitlement to an evidentiary hearing is relatively light,’” Wright v. United States, 320 F. App’x

421, 427 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2003)), and

may only be avoided where the record “conclusively shows that the petitioner is entitled to no

relief,” Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The text

messages provided by Petitioner create a factual dispute on a key issue, and thus the district court

was required to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve it.

                                        IV.   CONCLUSION

        For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the district court’s order denying Juarico-

Cervantes’ § 2255 petition and REMAND for an evidentiary hearing on two questions:

(1) whether Petitioner would have appealed if not for his counsel’s deficient performance, and

(2) whether Petitioner would have pleaded guilty had he known of Rehaif’s knowledge

requirement.

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