Court Opinion

ID: 9765651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:12:16.276583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:09.284589
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
dissenting.
This appeal concerns a Montclair State University professor’s commitment to academic freedom, and her good faith belief that a statute enacted by the Legislature did not compel her to issue a grade to a student called to serve in the Gulf War who, on his return, declined to be tested or to write a report covering approximately one month’s ungraded work. Her position was sustained by the University’s Grade Grievance Committee and the Provost. When the student sued seeking injunctive relief and punitive damages, the Attorney General refused to defend the professor. After the suit was settled without any determination adverse to the professor, the Attorney General refused to reimburse her for counsel fees. Although the State’s legal position reflected its belief that the professor defied the Attorney General’s legal advice, the record to the contrary is crystal clear: there never was any direct communication from the Attorney General to the professor, oral or written, informing the professor that she was violating the law. A conversation to that effect between a Deputy Attorney General and the professor’s lawyer took place, but only after the student filed suit. Although the Court’s opinion persis*453tently attempts to mischaracterize the professor as defying the Attorney General’s legal advice, the record to the contrary is uncontested.
I join Justice O’Hern’s cogent, persuasive and, in my view, unanswerable dissenting opinion. I write separately because of my conclusion that the Attorney General’s office disregarded the applicable statutes and abused its discretion when it declined to represent or indemnify the professor who was sued by a student to compel her to issue him a grade and to recover punitive damages for her failure to do so. That the Attorney General’s office would adopt so petty and crabbed an approach to the question of defense or reimbursement of a University professor asserting so defensible a position and motivated .by a respect for academic freedom is disappointing indeed. Accordingly, I find it especially troublesome that the Court has obscured the facts and misapplied the law in its efforts to sustain the unsustainable action of the Attorney General. I believe that the Court’s obligation to preserve the judiciary’s independence from the coordinate branches of government is compromised by its disposition of this appeal.
I
A precise understanding of the facts is critical to an appreciation of the issues posed by this appeal. John Lloyd, a student in Professor Barbara Chasm’s course entitled “Sociology of Rich and Poor Nations” in the fall semester of 1990, received notice during the semester to report to duty to serve in the United States forces in the Gulf War. On October 1, 1990, Lloyd took a quiz and received an A; oh November 1, 1990, Lloyd took the midterm exam and also received a grade of A. He continued to attend class for approximately five weeks before departing for duty on December 4, 1990. Before leaving for the Gulf War he signed an “Incomplete Contract” with Professor Chasin in which he agreed, on his return, to take a test or submit a paper to cover the weeks of class attendance on which he had not yet been tested.
*454While Lloyd was in the service, the Legislature passed L. 1991, c. 167, which in pertinent part provided as follows:
A student who is a member of the New Jersey National Guard or of the Reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, and who is unable to complete a course or courses at a New Jersey institution of higher education because the student is called to active duty in consequence of the current United Nations action in the Persian Gulf known as operation “Desert Shield” or “Desert Storm,” shall be entitled to receive a grade in each course for which the student has completed a minimum of 8 weeks’ attendance and all other academic requirements during that period. The grade shall be based on the work completed up to the time when the student was called to active service.
[Emphasis added.]
On his return from the Gulf War, Lloyd requested that Professor Chasin issue him a grade of A because he believed that he was entitled to receive that grade in accordance with the terms of the foregoing legislation. Professor Chasin disagreed, reading the statute’s requirement that a student’s grade be based on all of “the work completed” prior to departing for military service to mean that a student called to military service would receive a grade based on all material covered until the date of the student’s departure. She suggested that Lloyd take a test or write a paper covering his experiences in the Gulf War in satisfaction of the requirement that he provide additional evidence of his entitlement to a grade. Lloyd refused and when Professor Chasin would not yield, Lloyd filed a grievance with the Grade Grievance Committee of the University faculty.
Before the grievance was heard by the Committee, the University Provost wrote to Professor Chasin, enclosing a copy of the pertinent legislation, and stating:
I believe that you have asked that Mr. Lloyd fulfill the terms of the incomplete contract entered into in December 1990 or, alternatively, you will give him an F. I urge you to read carefully the attached copy of the law____ I appreciate your concerns and understand the position you have taken. But, as employees of the State of New Jersey we have an obligation to obey the laws enacted by the legislature. I hope that you will agree.
Significantly, prior to Lloyd’s appeal to the Grade Grievance Committee, no one from, the Attorney General’s office ever communicated with Professor Chasin concerning whether her inter*455pretation of the statute was consistent with the Attorney General’s interpretation.
While the Grade Grievance Committee hearing was pending, a representative of the Attorney General’s office apparently appeared at an organizational meeting of the Committee and orally communicated the view that Professor Chasin was obligated to issue an A grade to Lloyd. Counsel to the University faculty objected to the Attorney General’s interference with the Committee’s deliberations and advised the Committee that it should reconstitute itself with members who had not been influenced by the Deputy Attorney General’s appearance. Whether the Committee was reconstituted is not revealed by the record, but it is a reasonable assumption that the Committee, in deciding Lloyd’s appeal, did not consider itself bound by the Attorney General’s informally expressed views concerning the statute.
On May 7, 1992, the Grade Grievance Committee sustained Professor Chasin’s refusal to issue Lloyd a grade, based on its “belief that the law is ambiguous and open to several interpretations.” The University Provost sustained the Grade Grievance Committee’s decision and informed Lloyd that his grade in the course would be “incomplete.” After her action was upheld by the Grade Grievance Committee and by the University Provost, Professor Chasin did not issue Lloyd a grade.
Lloyd then filed suit in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Essex County, seeking both injunctive relief and damages against Professor Chasin and the Provost. The injunctive relief requested was that the court compel Professor Chasin and the University to issue Lloyd a grade of A in the course. With respect to the damages' claim, the complaint alleged that Professor Chasin and the Provost had “intentionally and maliciously refused to provide the plaintiff with the grade to which the New Jersey Legislature has entitled him,” and that because of their “intentional, wanton and malicious” refusal Lloyd had been harmed and was entitled to punitive damages.
*456Chasin then requested representation from the Attorney General’s office who, according to the record, had never directly communicated with Professor Chasin, either orally or in writing, prior to Lloyd’s institution of suit. The Attorney General’s office agreed to represent the University and the Provost but declined to represent Professor Chasin. The letter refusing her representation stated as follows:
After review of the factual and legal background from which the above litigation arises, this office has determined that it will not provide legal representation for Professor Chasin pursuant to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act in connection with this matter. This decision is based upon the actions of Professor Chasin with regard to this matter and the Attorney General’s discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A 59U0A-2 to refuse such representation. There is also a serious question as to whether the Attorney General’s representation of Professor Chasin in this matter would constitute a conflict of interest between the State and Professor Chasin. N.J.S.A 59:10A-2(e). In light of this determination, whether Professor Chasin will be entitled, to indemnification by the State will be governed by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 59:10-2.
[Emphasis added.]
Significantly, the section of the Tort Claims Act referred to by the Attorney General’s letter requires indemnification in claims sounding in tort unless the employee was acting outside of the course of employment or had acted because of fraud, malice or wilful misconduct. Accordingly, at the outset of the litigation Chasin rightfully would have assumed that her eventual claim for indemnification for legal expenses would be based on whether she had been found to have committed wilful misconduct, there being no suggestion of fraud or malice in the record.
The lawsuit progressed for approximately two years and eventually was settled in 1994 by a stipulation of dismissal. The tort claims for punitive damages were dismissed and the University agreed to issue Lloyd an administrative grade of A. No admission that Chasin had acted wrongfully was included in the stipulation nor was she required to acquiesce in the issuance of the grade.
Chasin then requested indemnification for her counsel fees of approximately $12,000 and the Attorney General’s office denied her request. She instituted this action. In an affidavit filed in support of the Attorney General’s motion for summary judgment, *457and dated approximately two years after Lloyd’s underlying suit was settled, Deputy Attorney General Grey J. Dimenna certified that after Lloyd had filed suit against Professor Chasin he had informed her counsel that her interpretation of the law was incorrect and that she was required to issue Lloyd a grade. The Court’s reference to Deputy Attorney General Dimenna’s certification is misleading. (“Dimenna alleges that he had several conversations with Chasm’s counsel informing him of her duties under the statute.”) Ante at 435, 732 A.2d at 466. The Court fails to acknowledge that any such conversation occurred after Lloyd had filed suit.
In the Law Division Judge Kirsten granted Chasin’s summary judgment motion, concluding as a matter of law that Professor Chasin had acted in good faith and thereby rejecting any suggestion that her actions constituted wilful misconduct. He also observed that a university professor was not bound by the Attorney General’s interpretation of the law and was free to take action that was inconsistent with the Attorney General’s legal opinion.
The Attorney General’s office appealed to the Appellate Division, setting forth in its Case Information Statement the following basis for reversing the Law Division’s judgment: “A state employee is not entitled to reimbursement of attorneys fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:10-2 or N.J.S.A. 18A:60-4 when the employee is sued because she did not comply with the legal advice of the Attorney General.” (Civil Case Information Statement, at 1 — June 21, 1996)(emphasis added). Not until the filing of briefs in the Appellate Division did the Attorney General’s office assert the legal position adopted by the majority in this appeal, that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1, the Attorney General was not obligated to represent or indemnify a state employee in respect of claims not sounding in tort. Moreover, not until the filing of post-argument briefs with this Court did the Attorney General assert that N.J.S.A. 18A:60-4 had been impliedly repealed by the Tort Claims Act.
*458II
A
Lloyd’s Suit Against Professor Chasin Was A Tort Action For Which Representation And Indemnification Were Mandatmy In The Absence Of Wilful Misconduct
The Court’s opinion ignores this issue and treats Lloyd’s claim against Chasin as if it were a claim solely for equitable relief. The majority apparently has elected to read only allegations one through fifteen of Lloyd’s complaint. An examination of allegations sixteen through eighteen would cause the Court to recognize that Lloyd had alleged tortious, and in fact, intentional wrongdoing on the part of Professor Chasin and the Provost, and sought punitive damages as redress for that wrongdoing. That claim is not equitable. Its essence is tort, and as the Attorney General successfully argued to this Court, N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 mandates that the Attorney General provide a defense concerning that claim.
The majority counters with the observation that Lloyd’s “ancillary request for exemplary damages” does not alter the fundamental nature of his claim. Ante at 431, 732 A.2d at 464. In the context of a claim for representation under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1, that assertion is groundless.
The Court expressly holds in its opinion that the Attorney General’s obligation to defend and indemnify under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 “arises only in the context of civil actions seeking damages for tortious conduct.” Ante at 431, 732 A.2d at 464. Lloyd’s suit was such a civil action. To the extent we are informed about the conduct of that litigation, all we know is that the suit was settled and no damages were paid. That result hardly negates the incontrovertible fact that among the claims asserted against Professor Chasin was a claim sounding in tort and seeking punitive damages.
Because Lloyd sued Professor Chasin and the Provost in tort, then only by contending that Professor Chasm’s actions constituted “wilful misconduct” could the Attorney General successfully *459argue that it had no obligation to defend Lloyd’s suit and. to indemnify Professor Chasin for her legal expenses. Surely, no proof of wilful misconduct exists on this record. The record informs us that at no time prior to the organizational meeting of the Grade Grievance Committee did the Attorney General’s office communicate to anyone its interpretation of the statute. At that meeting Deputy Attorney General Dimenna appeared and apparently informed the Committee that in his view Professor Chasin was obligated to give Lloyd a grade. Deputy Attorney General Dimenna’s certification indicates that the first time he informed Professor Chasm’s counsel of his interpretation of the statute was after Lloyd had filed suit. Because Professor Chasm’s interpretation of the statute was sustained by both the Grade Grievance Committee and the Provost, no one seriously could contend that her actions constituted wilful misconduct.
Moreover, the meaning of the statute was sufficiently debatable to justify a professor’s conclusion that a student’s entitlement to a grade, even under the statute, mandated a demonstration of proficiency concerning the work covered in class prior to the student’s departure for the Gulf War. The statutory language indicating that the grade should be based on “the work completed up to the time when the student was called to active service” is imprecise, and does not clearly resolve the dispute between Lloyd and Professor Chasin.
B

The Attorney General’s Office Should Be Estopped From Asserting That N.J.S.A: 59:10A-2 Does Not Control Professor Chasm’s Right To Reimbursement

In W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Department of Transportation, 116 N.J. 543, 562 A.2d 222 (1989), Justice Handler, writing for the Court, emphasized the principle that government has a special obligation to “turn square comers” and to deal fairly with the public. Id. at 561, 562 A.2d 222. That obligation surely extends to public employees. In Pangbome, we held that the Department of Transportation was estopped from asserting a *460statute of limitations defense that was inconsistent with the actions it took with respect to its review of a contractor’s claim for additional compensation.
That same principle should apply here. The Attorney General’s office, in declining to represent Professor Chasin in 1992, informed her that her right to indemnification would be governed by the statutes that afford representation and indemnification to public employees sued in tort, and the clear implication of the Attorney General’s communication was that the determination of her entitlement to reimbursement would be based on whether her actions constituted wilful misconduct. As noted, there simply is no basis in the record on which to conclude that Professor Chasm’s actions remotely resembled wilful misconduct. Accordingly, the Attorney General’s office should have honored its commitment and reimbursed Professor Chasin for her fees.
C

If The Court Concludes Thai The Suit Against Professor Chasin Did, Not Sound In Tort, And Ignores The Attorney General’s Commitment To Determine Her Right To Reimbursement On The Basis OfN.J.S.A 59:10-$, There Is No Basis In This Record To Justify The Attorney General’s Discretionary Determination To Deny Professor Chasin Representation Or Reimbursement Pursuant To N.J.S.A. 59:10AS

The extent of the discretion reposed in the Attorney General to deny representation or reimbursement of public employees sued on the basis of actions taken in the course of their employment must be informed by the Legislature’s assumption that under ordinary circumstances state employees should not be expected to bear their own legal fees when actions taken in the course of their employment are lawful and proper. In other contexts, the Attorney General’s office has generously accorded state employees the benefit of the doubt in deciding whether allegations of misconduct or other disqualifying activity are sufficient to justify denial of representation. In comparison, to whatever extent Professor Chasin’s conduct may possibly be criticized, her motivation — the preservation of academic freedom — clearly was admirable and *461unselfish. Because Professor Chasin acted in good faith and with a laudable motive, and was never informed that her refusal to issue Lloyd a grade was unlawful, the discretionary decision to deny her indemnification is impossible to justify.
The question whether a discretionary refusal to represent or indemnify Professor Chasin is sustainable might be closer if the Attorney General’s office had informed her of its legal opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the statute prior to Lloyd’s appeal to the Grade Grievance Committee. Indisputably, that was not done. According to the record before us, no written legal opinion concerning this matter was ever rendered by the Attorney General’s office to anyone, and the only indication in the record of the Attorney General’s views concerning the statute is Deputy Attorney General Dimenna’s appearance at the organizational meeting of the Grade Grievance Committee at which he orally conveyed the view that Professor Chasin was required to give Lloyd a grade. As the Appellate Division observed, that communication is a “thin reed” on which to base a conclusion that Professor Chasin acted in bad faith or committed wilful misconduct. The only person that purported to give her legal advice was the Provost, who sent her a copy of the state statute. Subsequently, that same Provost sustained the action of the Grade Grievance Committee that supported Professor Chasm’s position. Professor Chasin scrupulously followed the rules and procedures set down by her university and cannot by any standard be considered to have engaged in wilful misconduct.
D

Professor Chasin Has An Undeniable Right To Indemnification Pursuant To N.J.S. A 18A60-4

Justice O’Hern has dealt forcefully and persuasively with the majority’s unsustainable conclusion that N.J.S.A 18A:60-4 was impliedly repealed in 1972 by the Tort Claims Act. Ante at 447-52, 782 A.2d at 473-76. As Justice O’Hern points out, the test for determining whether a statute has been impliedly repealed is *462whether the repealing statute and the allegedly repealed statute are fatally inconsistent. There is not the remotest suggestion of a fatal inconsistency between these two statutes. The provision in the education law mandating reimbursement of counsel fees incurred by employees of state universities does not even involve the Attorney General’s office. Instead, that statute simply requires reimbursement of legal fees in actions arising out of the employee’s public employment. Under the Tort Claims Act, the burden of representation is borne by the Attorney General, but under the education law no such burden is imposed. Not only are the statutes not fatally inconsistent, they are totally harmonious and could coexist — as they did for approximately twenty-two years— until the education statute was repealed in 1994. That the Court would extend its jurisprudence to accommodate the specious arguments advanced by the Attorney General in support of the implied repeal of N.J.S.A. 18A:60-4 demonstrates that this case is being driven not by facts, not by law, but by a result.
Ill
The simple truth about this case is that someone in the Attorney General’s' office exercised questionable judgment in denying representation and indemnification to Professor Chasin. Assuming incorrectly that Professor Chasin “did not comply with the legal advice of the Attorney General,” a decision apparently was made to test the principle that public employees who defy the Attorney General’s legal advice forfeit their right to representation or indemnification. Neither Justice O’Hern nor I quarrel with that principle, but it simply has no relevance to this appeal. Any advice by the Attorney General’s office to Professor Chasm’s counsel was delivered too late and too informally to constitute a justification for the decision to require her to bear the expense of Lloyd’s suit.
I would hold that as a matter of law Professor Chasin is entitled to indemnification for her legal fees. Accordingly, I would affirm but modify the judgment of the Appellate Division.
*463O’HERN, J., joins in this dissent.
For affirmance and modification — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and • COLEMAN — 5.
For affirmance and remandment — Justices O’HERN and STEIN — 2.