Court Opinion

ID: 9830118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:53:35.501453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:13.314852
License: Public Domain

On Appellees' Blotion for Rehearing.
The statement in the opinion disposing of the appeal that it appeared from Sperry’s testimony as a witness that he made inquiry before purchasing the land of Glueck, to ascertain by what right appellees had possession of it, is attacked in the motion as unwarranted by anything in the record. The statement was based on testimony of Sperry, which we think justified it, as follows:
“I did examine the record in connection with this piece of property, and in connection with the sale of it to Glueck. In my examination of the record I saw the consideration, the description of the property, the deed and everything. I did see the deed, it was duly executed and recorded, from Frank and Egerzine Bloody. After seeing this deed and after talking to Egerzine I purchased this property and paid my money for it. I did not know at that time what the details of the contract between Frank and Egerzine Bloody and Blr. Glueck were. I never heard of that contract until this suit was filed.”
However, the testimony set out, so far as it was that the inquiry made by Sperry consisted of an examination of the deed records of Lamar county, was modified by other testimony he gave on his cross-examination showing that the information he had about the deed from appellees to Glueck was not obtained from said records, but from the deed itself after it was recorded, and from an abstract of the title including it, which he examined before he purchased the land.
We see no reason why the rule announced in Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex. 315, stated in the opinion disposing of this appeal, did not apply as well where the inquiry by the purchaser extended no farther than an examination of the original deed from the grantor remaining in possession after it was recorded, as when it extended no farther than an examination of the record of that deed. The reasons given for the holding in the case cited apply as strongly to the one state of facts as to the other. Hence, we think the conclusion reached by this court, that it did not appear as a matter of law that Sperry had notice of the fraud practiced by Glueck upon appellees, was not incorrect.
But if we thought otherwise no change would be made in the disposition of the appeal, for further consideration of the record has convinced a majority of the members of the court, that Sperry’p contention that the testimony did not warrant the finding of the jury that he had notice at the time he purchased and paid Glueck for the land “that Glueck had procured the conveyance” from appellees by fraud, should be sustained. The testimony relevant to that issue established^ the jury might have said, that appellees conveyed the land to Glueck January 21, 1922; that the consideration, in part, for the conveyance was a lot in Gary, Ind., and a house to be built thereon by Glueck; that the house had not been built nor the lot in Gary conveyed to appellees April 1, 1922, when Glueck conveyed the Paris property to Sperry, and that Sperry knew it; that another part of the consideration to appellees for the conveyance to Glueck was a right they reserved to continue the occupancy and use of the premises in controversy as their home, until Glueck had complied with his undertaking to build and turn over to them a house as specified on the lot in Gary; that Sperry knew that appellees had reserved such a right at the time he purchased the Paris property from Glueck; and that said Paris property was worth $1,500, whereas Glueck sold it to Sperry .for $400. The 'writer is not satisfied that the testimony referred to did not support said finding. In appellees’ petition, fraud on Glueck’s part was predicated on the charge that he never intended to comply with his undertaking to build a house on the lot, and then convey same to appellees. There was no finding by the jury that Glueck was guilty of fraud as charged, but the judgment involves a finding by the court that he was. It seems to the writer that if Glueck was guilty of such fraud the jury had a right to conclude from the. testimony referred to that Sperry was chargeable with notice of the fact.
The motion is overruled.