Court Opinion

ID: 9541505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:26:05.419448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:01.553179
License: Public Domain

Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Petition . for Rehearing TRAPP, P. J. Upon petition for rehearing, the prosecution urges that this court erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court as to the sentence upon the conviction of burglary with intent to commit rape. It is contended that rape and burglary are distinct substantive offenses, each requiring proof of differing elements, but that chap 38, sec 3-3 (Ill Rev Stats) requires the State to proceed as to each in a single prosecution. It is argued as analogy that had there been separate trials upon the separate counts in one indictment, or trials upon separate indictments, the conviction of the defendant in one trial on a charge of rape would not bar a conviction of the same defendant on a charge of burglary at a separate trial. It is pointed out that in People v. Stingley, 414 Ill 398, 111 NE2d 548, the counts of assault with intent to rape and assault with intent to murder concerned the same act and the same victim; that in People v. Schlenger, 13 Ill2d 63, 147 NE2d 316, the counts for burglary and larceny related to the same amount of money taken from the same person; that in People v. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill2d 257, 189 NE2d 299, the counts charging rape and incest referred to a single act upon the same victim; and that in People v. Mullenhoff, 33 Ill2d 445, 211 NE2d 744, the separate counts concerned the same act upon the same victim. It is contended that here the count for rape and the count for burglary charge distinct substantive offenses which warrant imposition of sentence upon each conviction. We believe that the conclusions reached in the opinion in this case are correct and are sustained upon review of People v. Golson, 32 Ill2d 398, 207 NE2d 68. In that case there was one indictment for the murder of Wilson and a second indictment for the murder of Spizzirri. The defendants were tried separately upon each indictment. Prior to the trial of the first indictment, the motion of defendants to consolidate the trials was denied. Prior to the trial upon the second indictment, the defendants’ plea in bar was denied. The Supreme Court pointed out that the two indictments charged separate and distinct offenses so that the traditional plea of double jeopardy did not apply. It was the conclusion of the court, however, that the defendants were tried twice for identical misconduct, i. e., participation in an illegal venture in which two men were killed and that fundamental fairness to the accused would not permit a second trial in this case. The court said: “To determine, as a matter of legal semantics, that two indictable offenses were committed does not make these multiple trials fair, or vary the fact that defendants were guilty of only one punishable course of conduct.” In accordance with such view, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the second indictment. Accordingly, we adhere to our original opinion and the petition for rehearing is denied.