Court Opinion

ID: 9840975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:05:01.269416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:32:05.712640
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/20/23 Balali v. Huntington Reproductive Center Medical Group CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 SHAGHAYEGH BALALI et al.,                                           B324323

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 22STCV15294)
           v.

 HUNTINGTON REPRODUCTIVE
 CENTER MEDICAL GROUP et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gregory Keosian, Judge. Affirmed.
      Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Todd E. Lundell,
Shannon Z. Petersen and Jenna G. Crawford for Defendants and
Appellants.
      Balali & Associates, Shideh N. Balali; Joseph S. Socher,
Esq. and Joseph S. Socher for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
                               _________________________
                       INTRODUCTION
      Huntington Reproductive Center Medical Group (HRC
Fertility) and Wendy Shubin (collectively, Defendants) appeal
from the superior court’s order denying their petition to compel
arbitration of the civil action filed by Shaghayegh Balali and
Sean Bafan (collectively, Plaintiffs). We conclude that the claims
Plaintiffs assert do not fall within the scope of the parties’
arbitration agreement. We therefore affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    Plaintiffs Obtain Fertility Treatment and Sue for
      Alleged Interference with Their Relationship with a
      Gestational Surrogate
      Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges the following. HRC Fertility is
a medical corporation that provides medical treatment in
reproductive medicine. Shubin is a physician’s assistant
employed by HRC Fertility. Beginning in or about April 2019,
Plaintiffs obtained fertility treatment from HRC Fertility.
      At some point in 2019, HRC Fertility advised Plaintiffs that
the only way they could have their own biological child was to use
a gestational surrogate. Plaintiffs secured a gestational
surrogate on their own and paid “substantial amounts” for
testing required by HRC Fertility to have the surrogate
approved. Plaintiffs entered a contract with the surrogate and an
embryo was transferred to the surrogate in or about June 2020.
In mid-2021, Plaintiffs and their surrogate were ready for a
second embryo transfer, and they executed a new contract and
informed HRC Fertility of the contract. In November 2021, after
it conducted various testing on the surrogate, HRC Fertility
transferred an embryo to the surrogate. However, on

                                2
December 13, 2021, HRC Fertility informed Plaintiffs and the
surrogate that the surrogate was miscarrying the embryo.
       On December 20, 2021, the surrogate went to HRC Fertility
for follow-up treatment; Plaintiffs were not present. At that visit,
“Shubin . . . informed the gestational surrogate that . . . HRC
Fertility had two other couples that they would like to connect
[sic] the gestational surrogate because these two other couples
were having trouble with their surrogates not being able to pass
the required testing.” Defendants later connected the surrogate
with one of those couples, and the surrogate terminated her
contract with Plaintiffs. Before the surrogate’s December 20,
2021 visit to HRC Fertility, she and Plaintiffs “had
communicated and agreed to continue with their contractual
relationship for another embryo transfer.”
       On May 9, 2022, Plaintiffs sued Defendants for tortious
interference with contractual relations, negligent interference
with prospective economic relations, and intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, premised on the theory
that Defendants’ actions caused the surrogate to end her
surrogacy relationship with Plaintiffs.
B.     Defendants Move to Compel Arbitration
       On June 29, 2022, Defendants moved to compel arbitration
of Plaintiffs’ claims based on a stand-alone arbitration agreement
the parties had signed on April 9, 2019. The agreement provided,
in relevant part:
       “Article 1
       “It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice
that is as to whether any medical services rendered under this
contract . . . were unnecessary or unauthorized or were
improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be

                                 3
determined by submission to arbitration as provided by
California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process
except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration
proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are
giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute
decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting
the use of arbitration.
       “Article 2
       “Pursuant to this Mutual Binding Arbitration Agreement
(‘Arbitration Agreement’), all disputes, claims or controversies
against HRC Fertility and its agents, employees, owners,
shareholders, officers, directors, partners, and associates, arising
out of the rendering of professional services, as well as the
breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity of
any written agreement pertaining thereto, and including claims
for negligence, battery, wrongful death, lack of informed consent
and loss of consortium, as well as the determination of the scope
or applicability of this Agreement, shall be exclusively
determined by binding arbitration, before the American
Arbitration [sic] pursuant to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) in Los Angeles,
California, and shall be governed in accordance with the laws of
the State of California. Said binding arbitration shall be before a
single arbitrator with at least 20 years’ experience in the field of
medical malpractice. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
       “Article 6
       “This Arbitration Agreement may be revoked by written
notice delivered to HRC [Fertility] within 30 days of signature
and if not revoked will govern all professional services received
by the Partner(s) and all other disputes between the parties. If

                                 4
this Arbitration Agreement is revoked within 30 days of
signature, treatment will be discontinued. Services will be
itemized fee for services and a partial refund, if available, will be
credited to your account. [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
       “Notice: By signing this contract, you are agreeing
to have any issue of Medical Malpractice decided by
neutral arbitration and you are giving up your right to a
jury or court trial. See Article 1 of this contract.”
       In their motion, Defendants contended that Plaintiffs’
claims fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement under
both article 2 and article 6. With respect to the language in
article 2 (requiring arbitration of claims “arising out of the
rendering of professional services”), Defendants argued,
“Plaintiffs’ claims ‘aris[e] out of’ the rendering of professional
services by HRC Fertility to Plaintiffs and their surrogate.”
Based on the language in article 6 (providing that if the
arbitration agreement is not revoked it “will govern all
professional services received by the Partner(s) and all other
disputes between the parties”), Defendants argued that because
Plaintiffs had not revoked the agreement, it applied to “ ‘all
disputes’ ” between the parties, “regardless of whether those
claims arise out of the rendering of professional services.”
Defendants also contended that the agreement was enforceable,
because there was no evidence of duress, fraud or
unconscionability.
       Plaintiffs filed an opposition, in which they argued that the
arbitration agreement did not cover the parties’ dispute and was
instead limited to medical malpractice claims. Plaintiffs argued
that their claims “ha[d] nothing to do with [Defendants’]
medical/professional services as they are not a surrogacy agency

                                  5
and are not in the business of providing services relating to
surrogacy matching.” Plaintiffs also contended in their
opposition that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable
because it was unconscionable in several respects, including that
it was one-sided in that HRC Fertility was not required to
arbitrate any claims it might assert against Plaintiffs, and that
Plaintiffs did not have a meaningful opportunity to negotiate or
opt-out.
      Defendants filed a reply brief which reiterated their
arguments regarding the scope of the arbitration agreement. In
addition, in response to Plaintiffs’ unconscionability arguments,
Defendants contended that the agreement provided Plaintiffs an
opportunity to opt out, that it was “ ‘fully mutual in scope,’ ” and
that any unconscionable terms could be severed from the
agreement.
C.     The Superior Court Denies Defendants’ Motion
       The superior court held a hearing on Defendants’ motion to
compel arbitration on September 27, 2022, and took the matter
under submission after oral argument. On October 6, 2022, the
court issued a written ruling denying the motion. The court
concluded that “no portion of Plaintiffs’ claims fits within the
scope of the arbitration agreement.” With respect to the
language in article 2 about the scope of arbitrable claims, the
court stated, “Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise from the rendering of
professional services, and are not founded upon medical
negligence or associated theories.” Regarding the language in
article 6, the court found, “It is unreasonable to read the ‘all other
disputes’ language, buried in the paragraph governing the
process for rescission, as expanding the scope of the arbitration
agreement . . . .” Thus, the court concluded, “the reasonable

                                  6
interpretation of this ‘all other disputes’ language does not
expand the agreement to include the whole universe of possible
legal claims, but merely refers to the kinds of disputes listed in
[a]rticle 2 of the same agreement, which includes claims related
to professional services before specifically listing other included
claims.” Because it found Plaintiffs’ claims were not subject to
arbitration, the court did not address whether the arbitration
agreement was unconscionable.
       On October 24, 2022, Defendants timely filed a notice of
appeal.
                           DISCUSSION
      Defendants challenge the denial of their motion to compel
arbitration. Code of Civil Procedure1 section 1294, subdivision
(a) provides that “[a]n order dismissing or denying a petition to
compel arbitration” is appealable.
A.     Standard of Review
       In deciding a petition to compel arbitration, “the trial court
sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and
other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at
the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Engalla v.
Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)
       “If the superior court’s decision regarding arbitrability is
based on resolution of disputed facts, we review the decision for
substantial evidence.” (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1158, citing Engineers & Architects
Assn. v. Community Development Dept. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th

      1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

                                  7
644, 653.) “ ‘However, where the trial court’s denial of a petition
to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order
de novo.’ ” (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.) Thus, we review de novo a trial
court’s interpretation of an arbitration agreement which does not
depend on conflicting extrinsic evidence.
       Finally, “[i]t is the ruling, and not the reason for the ruling,
that is reviewed on appeal.” (Muller v. Fresno Community
Hospital & Medical Center (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 887, 906-907.)
B.     The Applicable Legal Principles
       Both parties agree, and we concur, that the California
Arbitration Act (CAA; § 1280 et seq.) governs in this case. Under
the CAA, “[a] written agreement to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid,
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for
the revocation of any contract.” (§ 1281.) “A party who claims
that there is an applicable written arbitration agreement may
petition the superior court for an order compelling the parties to
arbitrate.” (Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 184-185
(Rice), citing § 1281.2.)
       “[T]he Legislature has expressed a ‘strong public policy in
favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means
of dispute resolution.’ ” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3
Cal.4th 1, 9.) Given this policy, “doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues are to be resolved in favor of arbitration.
[Citations.] Therefore, in the absence of indication of contrary
intent, and where the arbitration clause is reasonably susceptible
of such an interpretation, claims . . . will be deemed subject to
arbitration.” (Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh,
Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 323, fn. omitted;

                                   8
accord, Rice, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 185 [holding that an
arbitration provision should be interpreted to require arbitration
“ ‘ “unless it can be said with assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the
asserted dispute” ’ ”].)
       “There is no public policy, however, that favors the
arbitration of disputes the parties did not agree to arbitrate.”
(Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 890.)
Furthermore, the policy favoring arbitration “does not override
ordinary principles of contract interpretation.” (Rice, supra, 248
Cal.App.4th at p. 185.) “ ‘The court should attempt to give effect
to the parties’ intentions, in light of the usual and ordinary
meaning of the contractual language and the circumstances
under which the agreement was made (Civ. Code, §§ 1636, 1644,
1647).’ [Citation.] ‘The whole of a contract is to be taken
together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably
practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.’ (Civ.
Code, § 1641.) ‘ “A court must view the language in light of the
instrument as a whole and not use a ‘disjointed, single-
paragraph, strict construction approach’ [citation].” ’ [Citation.]
An interpretation that leaves part of a contract as surplusage is
to be avoided. [Citation.]” (Rice, supra, at pp. 185-186.)
C.     The Arbitration Agreement Extended Beyond
       Medical Malpractice Claims
       Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement is limited to
medical malpractice claims, which would plainly not include their
claims based on Defendants’ alleged interference with Plaintiffs’
relationship with their surrogate. They rely on the language in
article 1 of the agreement, as well as the language just above the
signature block, which refers specifically to “[m]edical

                                 9
[m]alpractice” disputes. However, as Defendants note, section
1295 requires this specific language to be included in any
arbitration agreement that is intended to cover medical
malpractice claims, and it is well-established that such an
arbitration agreement can also provide for arbitration of other
types of claims. (See Titolo v. Cano (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 310,
319 [“As long as the arbitration agreement includes the language
required by section 1295, as it did here, the parties may broaden
their agreement with additional language”]; Coon v. Nicola (1993)
17 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1232 [“nothing in the wording of [section
1295] states that medical malpractice arbitration agreements
may not also include additional provisions”].)
       The agreement here does include additional language in
article 2 that extends the scope of the requirement to arbitrate
beyond just medical malpractice claims. We turn to that
language now.
D.     The Arbitration of Claims “Arising out of the
       Rendering of Professional Services”
       Defendants argue that arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims is
required under article 2 of the agreement. Article 2 provides, in
relevant part, that “all disputes, claims or controversies against
HRC Fertility and its agents, employees, owners, shareholders,
officers, directors, partners, and associates, arising out of the
rendering of professional services . . . shall be exclusively
determined by binding arbitration.”2

      2 As noted above, article 2 also provides for arbitration of
“all disputes, claims or controversies . . . arising out of . . . the
breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity of
any written agreement pertaining” to the “rendering of

                                   10
       In Rice, this court addressed the scope of an arbitration
clause that provided for arbitration of “ ‘any controversy between
the parties arising out of’ ” operating agreements for companies
the parties had formed. (Rice, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 180,
187.) After surveying both California and Ninth Circuit
decisions, we found that “provisions using only phrases such as
‘arising out of’ or ‘ “arising from” ’ . . . extended only to disputes
relating to the interpretation and performance of the agreement
[citations].” (Id. at p. 189.) We thus concluded, “the parties
intended the arbitration provision to apply to a very limited
range of controversies, not ones merely connected with the
operating agreements or transactions contemplated by those
agreements and certainly not all controversies between them.”
(Id. at p. 190.) We also held that, while the arbitration provision
could potentially apply to tort claims arising from the operating
agreements, “a tort claim based upon violation of an independent
duty or right originating outside of the agreement does not arise

professional services,” “as well as the determination of the scope
or applicability of this Agreement.” Defendants did not argue to
the trial court, nor do they contend on appeal, that Plaintiffs’
claims arise out of “the breach, termination, enforcement,
interpretation or validity” of any agreement between the parties.
Similarly, Defendants did not argue below, nor do they now
contend, that under the clause which provides for arbitration of
“the determination of the scope or applicability of” the arbitration
agreement, the question whether Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the
scope of the arbitration agreement must be decided by an
arbitrator. (See Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc. (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 376, 386-387 [parties may designate the arbitrator
as the one to decide whether a particular dispute is subject to
arbitration].)

                                  11
from the agreement and falls outside the scope of the arbitration
provision.” (Id. at pp. 190-191.)
       Although the arbitration provision in Rice applied to
disputes arising out of operating agreements and this case
involves an arbitration provision that applies to disputes arising
out of “the rendering of professional services,” the conclusions we
reached in Rice regarding the scope of “arising out of” language
apply here with equal force. By requiring arbitration of disputes
“arising out of the rendering of professional services,” the
agreement here extends only to disputes relating to the
performance of the professional services, and does not encompass
tort claims based on duties originating independently from those
professional services or the agreements governing those
professional services. This is consistent with the general
meaning of “arising out of,” which connotes some type of causal
connection. (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) [defining “arise,”
in relevant part, as “[t]o originate; to stem (from)” and “[t]o result
(from)”]; see Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court (2021) 592 U.S. –––, ––– [141 S.Ct. 1017, 1026] [stating
that “ ‘arise out of’ ” “asks about causation” in interpreting rule
extending a state court’s jurisdiction to claims that “ ‘arise out of
or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum’ ”]; Doe v.
Princess Cruise Lines, LTD (11th Cir. 2011) 657 F.3d 1204, 1218
[“ ‘Arising out of’ requires the existence of some direct
relationship between the dispute and the performance of duties
specified by the contract”]; Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Civil Service Employees Ins. Co. (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 26, 32
[“ ‘The phrase “arising out of” is equated with origination, growth
or flow from the event’ ”].)

                                 12
       As alleged by Plaintiffs, Defendants interfered with
Plaintiffs’ relationship with the surrogate during the provision of
professional services, but that is the extent of the connection.
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants “are not a surrogacy agency and
are not in the business of finding and facilitating surrogacy
relationships for their patients,” and Defendants do not dispute
this. Defendants point out that the alleged torts occurred while
Plaintiffs were patients of HRC Fertility, while the surrogate was
present at an HRC Fertility facility, and while HRC Fertility was
providing medical services to the surrogate. However, none of
this is sufficient to establish that the alleged torts “aris[e] out of”
Defendants’ professional services. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ tort
claims do not “aris[e] out of” Defendants’ rendering of
professional services because they are premised on common law
legal duties that are independent of the professional services
rendered by Defendants and the medical relationship between
the parties.3 Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims do not “aris[e] out of the
rendering of professional services” by Defendants, and arbitration
is not required by article 2 of the arbitration agreement.4

      3 Defendants cite several cases in which courts have held
that the arbitration provisions at issue covered plaintiff tort
claims. We agree that the arbitration provision in this case can
cover tort claims; indeed, the provision states that its scope
includes negligence and other tort claims. However, in order for
tort claims to be covered by the arbitration provision, they must
“aris[e] out of the rendering of professional services.” That is not
the case with Plaintiffs’ tort claims.
      4 Titolo v. Cano, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th 310, relied upon by
Defendants, is distinguishable. In that case, the plaintiff sued
her former treating physician for intentional interference with

                                  13
       Defendants cite two cases in support of their argument that
Plaintiffs’ claims “aris[e] out of” Defendants’ rendering of
professional services: EFund Capital Partners v. Pless (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 1311 (EFund) and Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle,
Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 651. Neither case persuades us to
reach a different conclusion. The arbitration clause in EFund
applied to “ ‘[a]ny dispute or other disagreement arising from or
out of’ ” a consulting agreement. (EFund, supra, at p. 1317.) The
court stated, “The Courts of Appeal have construed arbitration
clauses similar to the present provision to broadly encompass tort
claims having their roots in the contractual relationship between
the parties.” (Id. at p. 1323.) However, two of the three cases the
EFund court relied upon involved arbitration agreements with
substantially different, broader language than the agreements at
issue here and in EFund. Specifically, in Berman v. Dean Witter
& Co., Inc. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 999, the agreement provided
that “ ‘[a]ny controversy between [the parties] arising out of or

prospective economic advantage and related torts based on
allegations that the physician told the plaintiff’s disability
insurer that the plaintiff “was not disabled, but was a scam artist
and a fraud,” and disclosed the plaintiff’s medical file to the
insurer. (Id. at p. 313.) The court held that the plaintiff’s claims
fell within the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate “ ‘any
dispute as to medical malpractice,’ ” concluding that
“communications between a physician and his or her patient’s
disability insurer, at the request of the patient, regarding the
diagnosis and/or treatment of the patient by that physician,
constitutes the rendering of medical services.” (Id. at p. 314.)
Nothing in Titolo supports an argument that Defendants’ alleged
tortious communications with Plaintiffs’ surrogate constituted
professional services.

                                14
relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration’ ” (id. at p. 1002, italics added), and in Izzi v. Mesquite
Country Club (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1309, the agreement
required arbitration of actions “ ‘instituted . . . in connection
with’ ” the parties’ agreement (id. at p. 1315). As we observed in
Rice, the difference between “arising out of,” on the one hand, and
“arising out of or related to” or “arising out of or in connection
with,” on the other hand, is material, with arbitration
agreements that include only the “arising out of” language being
“ ‘generally considered to be more limited in scope.’ ” (Rice,
supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 186, citing Cobler v. Stanley, Barber,
Southard, Brown & Associates (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 518, 530.)5
       Furthermore, even if we were to apply the standard
adopted by the EFund court, we would conclude that Plaintiffs’
claims in this case do not have their “roots” in the Defendants’
rendering of professional services or the parties’ medical
relationship, because the only connection is that the alleged torts
occurred in parallel at the same time and place as the

      5 The third case the EFund court relied upon, Coast Plaza
Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83
Cal.App.4th 677, also involved language different from the
language utilized in the agreement at issue here, as it provided,
“ ‘Any problem or dispute arising under this [a]greement and/or
concerning the terms of this [a]greement . . . shall be
arbitrated.’ ” (Id. at p. 681, fn. 2, italics omitted.) The court
concluded that the plaintiff’s claims in that case fell within the
scope of this arbitration provision because they were “clearly
based upon” reimbursement rates set forth in the parties’
agreement (id. at p. 684), and thus “unquestionably have arisen
under the [parties’ a]greement and are inextricably related to its
terms and provisions.” (Id. at p. 685.)

                                  15
professional services. EFund is also distinguishable because the
claims at issue in that case did arise from the agreement at issue.
(EFund, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1325-1326.)
       In Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle, Inc., supra, 237
Cal.App.4th 651, the arbitration provision applied to “ ‘any
controversy or claim between the parties arising out of or relating
to [the parties’ employment agreement] or any alleged breach [of
the agreement], including any issues . . . that th[e] [a]greement or
any part [t]hereof is invalid, illegal, or otherwise voidable or
void.’ ” (Id. at p. 655, italics added.) As noted above, this type of
arbitration provision, which includes the language “arising out of
or relating to,” is materially broader than the arbitration
provision at issue in this case. (Rice, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at
p. 186.) Furthermore, the plaintiff’s claims in Khalatian fell
squarely within the scope of the arbitration clause because he
claimed the parties’ agreement improperly classified him as an
independent contractor. (Khalatian, supra, at p. 659.)
       Finally, we reject Defendants’ argument that arbitration is
required here because of the policy favoring arbitration. As we
have noted, this general policy favoring arbitration does not
mean that a court should compel arbitration where the claims fall
outside the scope of the applicable arbitration agreement. That is
the case here, as Plaintiffs’ tortious interference and related
claims do not “aris[e] out of” Defendants’ “rendering of
professional services,” and are not premised on legal duties
arising from the professional services or the parties’ medical
relationship.

                                 16
E.    Article 6 of the Agreement Does Not Expand the
      Scope of the Arbitration Requirement
      Defendants also contend that arbitration of Plaintiffs’
claims is required under article 6 of the agreement. Article 6
provides, in relevant part: “This Arbitration Agreement may be
revoked by written notice delivered to HRC [Fertility] within 30
days of signature and if not revoked will govern all professional
services received by the Partner(s) and all other disputes between
the parties.” Seizing upon the language “all other disputes
between the parties,” Defendants argue that, in the event the
agreement is not revoked, arbitration is broadly required for “all”
disputes.
      Plaintiffs respond that article 6 “is clearly intended to
govern revocation of the agreement, not define the scope of
coverage.” They argue that Defendants’ interpretation is
“unreasonable” because the term purportedly broadening the
scope of the agreement is essentially hidden in a provision
otherwise unrelated to the scope of the agreement. Plaintiffs also
argue that the reference to “all other disputes” refers back to “the
specific list” in article 2. In addition, Plaintiffs rely on Civil Code
section 1641, which provides: “The whole of a contract is to be
taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably
practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.”6

      6 In their reply brief, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs
have forfeited these arguments because they did not address the
provisions of article 6 in the trial court. We exercise our
discretion to address the legal arguments raised by Plaintiffs
given that our standard of review is de novo, the arguments
present questions of law on undisputed facts, Defendants have

                                  17
      Properly read, the language of article 6 does not expressly
require arbitration of any claims or disputes regardless of their
subject matter. Instead, it provides that the agreement “will
govern” the professional services and any disputes. This
contrasts starkly with the language in article 2, which provides
in express terms that the specified “disputes, claims or
controversies . . . shall be exclusively determined by binding
arbitration.” (Italics added.) We interpret the “will govern”
language in article 6 to mean that, with respect to the
professional services provided by Defendants to Plaintiffs and
any other disputes between the parties, the question whether
arbitration is required is determined under the terms of the
arbitration agreement, and specifically article 2 of the agreement.
      Our conclusion is supported by the rule of construction
which requires us to harmonize all the provisions in an
agreement so as to give effect to every part of the agreement.
Interpreting the “all other disputes” language in article 6 as a
broad arbitration provision would render the language in article
2 as surplusage without any practical force, a result we must
avoid. (Rice, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.)
      Because Plaintiffs’ claims do not fall within the scope of the
parties’ arbitration agreement, the trial court did not err in
denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. Given our
resolution of the arbitrability issue, we need not reach the

fully briefed the issue, and the trial court relied on the arguments
in its ruling. (See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11
Cal.4th 1, 24 [appellate courts have discretion to address a
question of law based on undisputed facts even though issue was
not raised in the trial court].)

                                18
parties’ arguments about whether the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable, and we express no opinion on that issue.
                          DISPOSITION
       We affirm the trial court’s order denying Defendants’
petition to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs are awarded their costs
on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                          WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENDIX, J.

                                19