Court Opinion

ID: 9548424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:03:14.139774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:55.428712
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J.
I concur with the majority that in the present case the trial court abused its discretion in not granting plaintiffs relief under Government Code section 946.6.1 I write separately, however, to emphasize that, in my *282view, a reviewing court may not find an abuse of discretion merely because the reviewing court itself would find that uncontradicted evidence established an adequate cause for relief.
Early on, this court explained what was meant by the concept of legal discretion; “The discretion intended ... is not a capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion, guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles. It is ... to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice .... [I]ts exercise is limited to doubtful cases, where an impartial mind hesitates.” (Bailey v. Taaffe (1866) 29 Cal. 422, 424.) Hence, it has been long established that an abuse of discretion occurs only when the court’s decision “exceeds the bounds of reason” or “contravenes” the uncontradicted evidence. (State Farm etc. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 432 [304 P.2d 13]; Baypoint Mortgage Corp. v. Crest Premium Real Estate etc. Trust (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 818, 824 [214 Cal.Rptr. 531].)
The majority, however, states that “where uncontradicted evidence or affidavits of the petitioner establish adequate cause for relief, denial of relief constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (Ante, p. 276.) Thus, as I understand it, if the reviewing court determines that the uncontradicted evidence establishes adequate cause for relief, then the trial court’s denial of relief is an abuse of discretion even if the evidence is reasonably susceptible of a different interpretation leading to the conclusion that adequate cause was not established.
The majority’s formulation improperly erodes the discretion which has been traditionally the province of the trial court. (See Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 239-242 [211 Cal.Rptr. 416, 695 P.2d 713] [dis. opn. by Lucas, J.].) As one appellate court correctly observed, “[T]he discretion to be exercised is that of the trial court, not that of the reviewing court. Thus, even if the reviewing court might have ruled otherwise in the first instance, the trial court’s order will yet not be reversed unless, as a matter of law, it is not supported by the record. [Citation.]” (Martin v. *283Johnson (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 595, 604 [151 Cal.Rptr. 816]; see Estate of Parker (1921) 186 Cal. 671, 672-673 [200 P. 620].) Obviously, even uncontradicted evidence may be susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. Simply because, in the judgment of the reviewing court, the record establishes adequate cause for relief does not necessarily mean that the trial court’s denial of such relief was erroneous. Rather, only when the trial court’s decision “contravenes” the uncontradicted evidence, i.e., where the uncontradicted evidence is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, may the reviewing court find an abuse of discretion.
I recognize the important policy favoring trial on the merits, and believe that this interest is a proper factor for a reviewing court to consider in deciding whether the trial court exercised its discretion “in conformity with the spirit of the law.” I do not believe, however, that an exercise of this discretion should be reversed simply because the reviewing court disagrees with the trial court’s adequate cause determination. The trial court’s exercise of discretion should be reversed on appeal only when in light of the evidence and applicable legal principles it appears unreasonable.
Panelli, J., concurred.

I disagree, however, with the majority’s suggestion that the State Board of Control (Board) acted improperly here, or that the lack of “prompt notification” by the Board of an erroneous filing is a factor weighing in favor of granting a claimant relief under Government Code section 946.6. (See ante, p. 278, fn. 6.) Under the Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.) the Board has 45 days after presentation in which to act on a claim. (Id., § 912.4, subd. (a).) If the Board fails to act, the claim is deemed denied as a matter of law on the last day of this period. (Id., subd. (c).) While written notice of such a rejection must be provided to the claimant (id., § 913), no time limit is prescribed in which the Board must act. (See Edgington v. County of San Diego (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 39, 45 [173 Cal.Rptr. 225]; Cal. Law Revision Com. com., West’s Ann. Gov. Code, § 945.6, p. 597.) Rather, the notification requirement serves to trigger the applicable statute of limitations period *282within which a claimant may file suit against the public entity, namely, “not later than six months after the date [of] such notice” (id., § 945.6, subd. (a)(1)), or if no notice is given, “within two years from the accrual of the cause of action” (id., subd. (a)(2)).
Hence a claim for relief under Government Code section 946.6 may not be premised on or supported by the mere failure of the Board to give “prompt” notification. Moreover, in the present case, the Board’s 45-day period in which to consider plaintiffs’ claim did not expire until after plaintiffs’ 100-day filing period had run. Clearly, the Board’s conduct here should not be considered a factor weighing in favor of granting plaintiffs relief from their untimely filing.