Court Opinion

ID: 9470992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:22:49.742556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:13.740804
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
with whom BROWN, CHARLES CLARK, HILL, HENDERSON, HATCHETT, GARWOOD and JOLLY, Circuit Judges, join, specially concurring:
Although I concur in the judgment of the court to reverse and remand count II to the district court to enter judgment for the defendant judges, I would order the entry of that judgment for different reasons. I believe that Davis’ count II claim against the state judges for declaratory and injunc*519tive relief never presented a case or controversy. As the per curiam opinion states, the district court certified a class and granted all the relief Davis requested under count II. In deciding whether Davis was an adequate class representative, the court should have first decided whether Davis’ individual claim for relief against the judges presented a case or controversy. See East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-04, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 1896, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977) (“[Tjhese plaintiffs lacked the qualifications to be hired as line drivers. Thus, they could have suffered no injury as a result of the alleged discriminatory practices [against line drivers], and they were, therefore simply not eligible to represent a class of persons who did allegedly suffer injury.”) (footnote omitted); 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 23.04[2], at 120-27 (2d ed. 1982). Specifically, the court should have determined whether it could have ordered any relief against the Dade County circuit judges that would have been of any benefit to Davis. As Chief Justice Hughes recognized in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937): “[The controversy] must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character .... ” Because the district court’s grant of declaratory or injunctive relief against the judges would have been of no benefit to Davis, I would hold there was no case or controversy between Davis and the judges. Therefore, I would not decide the merits of the purported class claim.
The wrong alleged in count II was that judges had violated the constitutional rights of Davis and other indigent parents and were continuing to violate the constitutional rights of indigent parents by their practice of not appointing counsel in dependency proceedings. The district court could have granted no remedy of benefit to Davis against the judges for the alleged violation in her case, however, because the dependency proceeding involving her child had concluded.1 At that point, any claim Davis may have had against the judge in her case or the other judges assigned to the Juvenile and Family Division for declaratory and injunctive relief was moot. See C & C Products, Inc. v. Messick, 700 F.2d 635, 636 (11th Cir.1983) (if events preclude the grant of effective relief, case is moot). Davis did not allege that she might be a defendant in future dependency proceedings.2 Neither an injunction mandating that the judges appoint counsel to indigent parents in the future nor a declaration that the judges’ practice of denying counsel to indigent parents was unconstitutional would have been of any benefit to Davis because the proceeding involving her child had concluded.3
One might argue that a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the judges’ practice *520would have benefited Davis because it might have cast doubt on the constitutionality of the judgment under which DHRS had custody of her child.4 This argument does not, however, respond to the observation that Davis alleged no case or controversy against the judges because she sought no relief from them. Even if DHRS had been joined as a party defendant in count II of Davis’ complaint,5 the only relief Davis requested or could have obtained for her benefit was the return of her child from DHRS. Davis could have obtained no relief from the judges.6 We should not allow an indirect lawsuit aimed at only one party to be brought against different parties, who are powerless to take any action of benefit to the plaintiff. A case or controversy must exist between the plaintiff and each defendant. See, e.g., Northern Virginia Women's Medical Center v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045, 1049 (4th Cir.1980). Because Davis’ controversy was only with DHRS, we should not consider any possible effect relief entered against the judges might have had on DHRS.
Firmly established case law recognizes that once a proceeding has ended and there is no sufficient allegation that the petitioner may again be involved in a similar proceeding, no case or controversy exists between the petitioner and the judge who had presided over the proceeding. In O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), nineteen named individuals brought a civil rights action, individually and on behalf of a class of citizens of Cairo, Illinois, against, among others, a magistrate and an associate judge of the local county circuit court. The suit alleged that the defendants had engaged in certain unconstitutional practices affecting the individuals and the class, including illegal bond-setting, sentencing, and jury-fee practices. The Court held that petitioners had failed to establish a case or controversy against respondents for equitable relief because it was too speculative whether petitioners would be subject to the alleged illegal practices in the future. The Court held: “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” Id. at 495-96, 94 S.Ct. at 676; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). Although in the case at bar Davis was suffering the continuing adverse effect of being deprived of her child, at the time she brought her suit for declaratory and injunctive relief it was DHRS who was responsible for this circumstance. Davis’ claim for injunctive and declaratory relief against the judges had passed.
In Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, modified, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir.1978), Slavin brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that a state judge and others had conspired to deprive him of due process and equal protection by framing him on state criminal charges. Slavin was convicted of those charges in a trial before the state judge. His conviction was reversed on appeal. Slavin alleged that the judge took certain acts throughout his trial to rig the case against him, including ordering court reporters to alter the transcript of his trial to make it more likely his conviction would be upheld on appeal. He sought a declaratory judgment that the judge had infringed on his constitutional rights by these actions.
*521In dismissing the complaint against the judge, the district court relied in part on the absence of an active controversy between Slavin and the judge. The court of appeals first recognized “that courts will grant declaratory relief only if there is ‘a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality between parties having adverse legal interests.’ ” 574 F.2d at 1264 (quoting Wolfer v. Thaler, 525 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir.1976)). The court then tried to determine the present stage of the state criminal proceedings against Slavin. It recognized that a state jury had convicted Slavin, but that this conviction had been reversed on appeal. It noted that Slavin had been reindicted, but it did not know whether any further proceedings had occurred. The court held:
In this case, whether there is ... a substantial controversy will depend upon Slavin’s current condition. If he has not been retried on the same charges, these defendants may continue to infringe his constitutionally guaranteed rights. If that possibility were proved, the district court is not foreclosed from enjoining the judge and others from continuing their conduct. It may be, however, that Slavin has been retried and found innocent. If that be true, the district court will probably conclude that equitable relief would be inappropriate. If Slavin is presently in prison after having been convicted, whatever controversy may exist would be between Slavin and the state official responsible for continuing his imprisonment. Under those circumstances, there would be no controversy between the judge and Slavin. Because we do not know which of those conditions is true, we remand the claim against Judge Lindsey to the district court for further proceedings.
574 F.2d at 1264 (emphasis added).
The court thus recognized that if the state criminal proceedings had ended in Slavin’s conviction, there would no longer be a controversy between Slavin and the judge. Rather, the controversy would be between Slavin and “the state official responsible for continuing his imprisonment,” i.e., the warden. On petition for rehearing, the court was informed that Slavin had pled guilty to the charges alleged in the second indictment before the same state judge, who sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of two to four years. The court withdrew as moot its prior discussion of the validity of equitable relief against the judge, including the paragraph quoted above. Slavin v. Curry, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir.1978).
In withdrawing as moot that paragraph, however, the court actually reaffirmed the language describing what in fact had occurred: “If Slavin is presently in prison after having been convicted, whatever controversy may exist would be between Slavin and the state official responsible for continuing his imprisonment. Under those circumstances, there would be no controversy between the judge and Slavin.” Because Slavin had been convicted and sentenced, he no longer had any controversy with the judge, and the court's prior discussion of equitable relief against the judge had been rendered moot. Cf. Northern Virginia Women’s Medical Center v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045, 1049 (4th Cir.1980) (holding that action against state judges for declaration that their judgments of acquittal in certain criminal cases were void did not present case or controversy because “[a] declaration on the invalidity of these judgments would have been nothing more than a gratuitous comment without any force or effect.”).
As did O’Shea and Slavin, the case at bar involved a suit for equitable relief against state judges who presided over a proceeding that terminated prior to suit.7 I agree with the reasoning the O’Shea and Slavin opinions illustrate. Once the state proceeding has ended, and there is no allegation that the petitioner may be involved in a similar *522proceeding in the future, a federal declaration or injunction against a state judge serves no purpose. Just as Slavin’s controversy was no longer with the judge, but with the warden, Davis’ controversy was no longer with the judges, but with DHRS. It was DHRS who allegedly was depriving Davis of her constitutional rights by acting pursuant to an unconstitutional decision. Whatever constitutional deprivation may have occurred by the judge rendering the unconstitutional decision or by other judges acting under the same unconstitutional practice was no longer remediable in a suit against the judges. Thus, no controversy existed between Davis and the state judges.
The case-or-controversy problem would have been apparent at an earlier stage of the litigation had the district court recognized that Davis brought two separate lawsuits. These suits were based on two different statutes, brought against two different groups of defendants, claiming two different factual bases in support of relief, and asking for totally different forms of relief. The first suit was based on the habeas corpus statute; it was brought against DHRS, who had custody of the Davis child; it claimed that Davis’ proceeding was rendered fundamentally unfair in violation of the due process clause because Davis was not provided counsel; and it asked for the release of the Davis child. In sharp contrast, the second suit was brought under section 1983; it was brought against the state judges only; it alleged that due process violations occur in so many cases in which indigent parents are not provided counsel that a prophylactic rule requiring the appointment of counsel in all cases is needed; and it sought the broad remedy of declaratory and injunctive relief against the state judges.
Faced with these two separate lawsuits, the district court should have separated them. Different concerns come into play in each suit. The factual basis necessary to support the first suit is narrow: evidence showing a single due process violation. In contrast, the factual basis necessary to support the second suit involves a showing of a pervasive due process violation which occurs in almost every case. Concerns of federalism, comity, and traditional notions of equity obviously play a part in the second suit but do not in the first. The error the district court made was in mistaking Davis’ live case or controversy with DHRS for a live case or controversy with the judges. Had the court separated the two lawsuits as I have described, it would have become obvious to it that Davis had no case or controversy with the judges.
Based on the foregoing reasoning, I concur in the judgment of the court.

. Thus, this is not a case in which one in Davis’ position brought a federal suit for declaratory and injunctive relief during the state dependency proceeding. Presumably, no problem of case or controversy would arise in that context. Other barriers to relief would most likely arise, however, including, most notably, abstention. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979).

. Thus, Davis’ claim did not fall within the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. See C & C Products, Inc. v. Messick, 700 F.2d 635, 637-38 (11th Cir.1983). If count II of Davis’ complaint had presented a live case or controversy against the judges at the time her suit was filed and at the time the class was certified, the fact that Davis’ individual claim might have become moot would not have mooted the case because the interests of the class would still have been live. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398-403, 95 S.Ct. 553, 556-59, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). But this case is distinguishable from Sosna because Davis’ complaint never presented a case or controversy against the judges. Therefore, the district court should not have certified the class. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402, 95 S.Ct. at 559 (“There must ... be a named plaintiff who has [an article III] case or controversy at the time the complaint is filed, and at the time the class action is certified by the District Court pursuant to Rule 23 .... ” (footnote omitted).

. Count II of Davis’ complaint could not have been interpreted to have asked for damages. Furthermore, the judges would have been immune from damages liability. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).

. Such a declaration would not necessarily impugn the constitutionality of the proceeding involving the Davis child. Conceivably, a court could decide that although Davis’ proceeding on the whole satisfied due process, nonetheless the likelihood of due process violations occurring in other cases because of the deprivation of counsel was so great that a prophylactic rule was needed to prevent the withholding of counsel.

. Davis never mentioned DHRS as a party in count II. This does not reflect an oversight on Davis’ part, but rather reflects a recognition of the separate nature of counts I and II.

. It is hard enough to determine what relief Davis sought from the judge who presided over the dependency proceeding involving her child. It is even harder to fathom what relief she sought from the other judges.

. We recognize that in Slavin petitioner sued only one judge, whereas here Davis is suing a number of judges. Slavin did not allege that the judge who presided over his state trial acted in conformity with any judicial practice, whereas Davis does. This distinction is not relevant to our case-or-controversy analysis.