Court Opinion

ID: 6421922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 12:00:36.114318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:48.883738
License: Public Domain

Morton, C. J.
It is settled by the uniform course of the decisions in this Commonwealth that a voluntary settlement, fully executed by a person of sound mind, without any mistake, fraud, or undue influence, is binding upon the settler, and cannot be revoked, except so far as a power of revocation has been reserved in the deed. Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 300. Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262, and cases cited.
*50In the case before us, the plaintiff, acting deliberately and under the advice of counsel, executed the deed of settlement, and there is no pretence of any fraud, collusion, or undue influence. The deed contains no power of revocation, and it is clear that the power of revocation was intentionally omitted. As first drafted, the deed created a dry trust in favor of the settler, which probably could have been revoked by her at any time. But if she had retained a power of revocation, it would have defeated one of the principal objects of the settlement, which was to protect her from the threats, or importunities, or influence of her husband, and therefore the deed was altered to its present form. Both parties understood that she was not to have the power to revoke it. It is not, therefore, a case like some of those cited by the plaintiff, where both parties supposed the settlement to be revocable, and the power to revoke was omitted by mistake. See Aylsworth v. Whitcomb, 12 R. I. 298; Garnsey v. Mundy, 9 C. E. Green, 243, and cases cited.
The justice who heard this case has found that no fraud or imposition was practised on her; that the deed was carefully read over to her; that there was no mistake, in the sense that she thought the deed contained any other or different provision than in fact it contained, and no accident, in the sense that anything was omitted which was intended to be put in; and also that the contingency of her surviving her husband was not in her mind or in that of her advisers, and, if it had been, there was no means of determining what the provision, if any, would have been. From these findings, it is clear that there was no mistake, in the sense that she wrongly apprehended the contents of the deed. The most that can be said is, that she did not, at the time she executed the deed, anticipate or have in her mind what would be its legal effect in the contingency of her husband’s dying before her. She did not, at the time, think of this contingency, but this is not a mistake which will justify setting aside a settlement, especially when it is not shown that, if this contingency had been in her mind, she would have made a deed in any respect different. But this was not a purely voluntary settlement. It appears that she was in financial difficulties and in present need of money, and that her brother advanced her, by way of loan, $600, as a part of the transaction, and on the condition *51that she would execute this deed of trust. It seems to have been a family arrangement to save her property for the benefit of her children, and to protect it, not only from the demands of her husband, but possibly from her own improvidence.
It may be that the fact that there was this pecuniary consideration would not prevent a court of equity from setting aside the settlement, upon proof of fraud or concealment, or upon proof of any material misapprehension on her part of facts which, if known and called to her attention, would have led to a settlement of a different character. But it throws some light upon the transaction, and tends to show that her failure to think of the contingency of her husband’s death was immaterial, and that, if she had thought of it, there would have been no change in the provisions of the deed. We are of opinion that the plaintiff does not show sufficient cause for setting aside the settlement, voluntarily and fairly made by her.

Bill dismissed.