Court Opinion

ID: 6427385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 12:05:08.13968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:52:03.056885
License: Public Domain

Holmes, C. J.
This is an action for the price of one hundred and seventy-four pairs of shoes, and the question raised by the *143defendants’ exceptions is whether there was any evidence, at the trial, of a purchase by the defendants. The plaintiffs contend, that the defendants waived their exceptions by presenting and arguing a motion for a new trial upon the ground, among others, of the proposition of law on which their exceptions are based, they not having filed their exceptions until afterwards. The plaintiffs excepted to a ruling that the defendants had not waived their rights. The judge did not require the defendants to waive their exceptions as a condition of entertaining their motion so far as it went on the same ground, and there is nothing to show that his ruling on this preliminary point was not entirely right. Anthony v. Travis, 148 Mass. 53, 57.
The evidence of the sale was this. The shoes had been sent to the defendants on the understanding that a bargain had been made. It turned out that the parties disagreed, and if any contract had been made it was repudiated by them both. Then, on September 11, 1899, the plaintiffs wrote to the defendants that they had written to their agent, Young, to inform the defendants that the latter might keep the goods “ at the price you offer if you send us net spot cash at once. If you cannot send us cash draft by return mail, please return the goods to us immediately via Wabash & Fitchburg Railroad, otherwise they will go through New York City and it would take three or four weeks to get them.” On September 15, the defendants enclosed a draft for the price less four per cent, which they said was the proposition made by Young. On September 18 the plaintiffs replied, returning the draft, saying that there was no deduction of four per cent, and adding, “ if not satisfactory please return the goods at once by freight via Wabash & Fitchburg Railroad.” This letter was received by the defendants on or before September 20, but the plaintiffs heard nothing more until October 25, when they were notified by the railroad company that the goods were in Boston.
It should be added that when the goods were sent to the defendants they were in good condition, new, fresh and well packed, and that when the plaintiffs opened the returned cases their contents were more or less defaced and some pairs of shoes were gone. It fairly might be inferred that the cases had been opened and the contents tumbled about by the defendants, al*144though whether before or after the plaintiffs’ final offer perhaps would be little more than a guess.
Both parties invoke Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co. 158 Mass. 194, the defendants for the suggestion on p. 197 that a stranger by sending goods to another cannot impose a duty of notification upon him at the risk of finding himself a purchaser against his own will. We are of opinion that this proposition gives the defendants no help. The parties were not strangers to each other. The goods had not been foisted upon the defendants, but were in their custody presumably by their previous assent; at all events by their assent implied by their later conduct. The relations between the parties were so far similar to those in the case cited, that if the plaintiffs’ offer had been simply to let the defendants have the shoes at the price named, with an alternative request to send them back at once, as in their letters, the decision would have applied, and a silent retention of the shoes for an unreasonable time would have been an acceptance of the plaintiffs’ terms, or, at least would have warranted a finding that it was. See also Bohn Manuf. Co. v. Sawyer, 169 Mass. 477.
The defendants seek to escape the effect of the foregoing principle, if held applicable, on the ground of the terms offered by the plaintiffs. They say that those terms made it impossible to accept the plaintiffs’ offer, or to give the plaintiffs any reasonable ground for understanding that their offer was accepted, otherwise than by promptly forwarding the cash. They say that whatever other liabilities they may have incurred they could not have purported to accept an offer to sell for cash on the spot by simply keeping the goods. But this argument appears to us to take one half of the plaintiffs’ proposition with excessive nicety, and to ignore the alternative. Probably the offer could have been accepted and the bargain have been made complete before sending on the cash. At all events we must not forget the alternative, which was the immediate return of the goods.
The evidence warranted a finding that the defendants did not return the goods • immediately or within a reasonable time, although subject to a duty in regard to them. The case does not stand as a simple offer to sell for cash received in silence, but as an alternative offer and demand to and upon one who was sub*145ject to a duty to return the goods, allowing him either to buy for cash or to return the shoes at once, followed by a failure on his part to do anything. Under such circumstances a jury would be warranted in finding that a neglect of the duty to return imported an acceptance of the alternative offer to sell, although coupled with a failure to show that promptness on which the plaintiffs had a right to insist if they saw fit, but which they also were at liberty to waive.

Exceptions overruled.