Court Opinion

ID: 9907673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 20:02:41.598706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:00.201939
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/6/23 Jose S. v. Payan CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

JOSE S.,                                                  B315071

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                        (Los Angeles County
                                                          Super. Ct. No. 20STPT02798)
         v.

PATRICIA PAYAN,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael R. Powell, Judge. Affirmed.

     Diamond & Associates and David D. Diamond for
Appellant.

         No appearance for Respondent.

                                 _______________________
      Patricia Payan (appellant) challenges an order granting
Jose S.’s (respondent) request for a restraining order. She argues
there was insufficient evidence to support the order and the trial
court erred when examining the parties. We find the order was
properly issued under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act
(Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.)1 (DVPA) and affirm.

                           BACKGROUND
       Appellant and respondent live together with four children,
their biological four year old, and the three older children from
respondent’s previous relationship. Claiming appellant had
engaged in verbal and physical abuse of respondent and the
children, respondent sought a restraining order in a petition filed
on May 11, 2021. That same day, a temporary restraining order
was issued, and appellant was ordered to move out of the family
home.
       During the June 24, 2021 hearing, both parties presented
evidence of the derogatory statements they made to each other,
appellant’s alleged physical abuse of the four-year-old child, and
injuries caused to respondent when appellant hit him with a door
frame segment containing two nails. The trial court issued a
three-year restraining order against appellant. The order also
required her to move out of the residence and to enroll in a 52-
week domestic violence program. After discussions with the
parties, the trial court identified the terms of appellant’s
visitation with the four-year-old child.
       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

1     All further statutory references are to the Family Code.

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                            DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable law and standard of review
       The DVPA provides for the issuance of restraining orders to
enjoin specific acts of abuse, defined under the statute to include
“intentionally or recklessly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause
bodily injury,” and “plac[ing] a person in reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or
to another.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(1), (3).)
       A trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant
a petition for a restraining order under the DVPA. (In re
Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.)
We review such an order for abuse of that discretion. (Burquet v.
Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143.) We also consider
the evidence supporting such an order under the substantial
evidence standard. (Ibid.) Under that standard, we determine
whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted supporting the trial court's
findings. (Ibid.) We must accept as true all evidence supporting
the trial court’s findings and resolve every conflict in favor of the
court’s order. (Ibid.)
II.    Appellant forfeited her challenge due to her one-
       sided presentation of the evidence
       Appellant contends the trial court erred in issuing a
restraining order, arguing she acted in self-defense and was the
victim of violence. “A party who challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a finding must set forth, discuss, and analyze
all the evidence on that point, both favorable and unfavorable.”
(Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 209, 218.) “An appellate court will consider the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a given finding only after a
party tenders such an issue together with a fair summary of the

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evidence bearing on the challenged finding, particularly including
evidence that arguably supports it.” (Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409-410.)
       The presumption is that the record contains evidence to
sustain every finding of fact, and, thus, an appellant who
challenges a finding is required to set forth in the opening brief
all the material evidence on that issue or finding and not merely
evidence favorable to his or her position. (Foreman & Clark Corp.
v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) If they do not, the error is
deemed waived. (Ibid.)
       Here, appellant highlights the evidence that supports her
arguments, e.g., respondent’s derogatory language and her self-
defense. She fails to set forth, discuss, and analyze other evidence
supporting the court’s findings. Notably, she omits discussion of
the following testimony: when respondent refused to let appellant
inside, she broke down the door, seized a segment of the door
frame with two nails that she used to strike and stab respondent.
Appellant also neglects to discuss the trial court’s finding that
she was not credible because she gave conflicting testimony that
“didn’t make any sense.” The result is that appellant’s
presentation is one-sided, inadequate, and warrants the
conclusion she has forfeited any claim concerning the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the restraining order. Despite this, we
address the merits of appellant’s arguments on appeal.
III. Issuance of restraining order was not an abuse of
       discretion
       Appellant argues no grounds existed for the restraining
order, emphasizing she was the victim of the violence and
highlighting the primary incident in 2019. The DVPA is intended
“‘to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse
and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the

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domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons
to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.’” (J.H. v. G.H.
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 633, 640-641; see § 6220.) “Under the
DVPA, a court may issue a protective order ‘“to restrain any
person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic
violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons
involved” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”’”
(In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 115.)
       Here, the parties lived together and experienced a violent
incident involving a broken door frame used as a weapon.
Additionally, evidence was offered to support respondent’s claim
that appellant had injured their four-year-old child. Despite
appellant’s denial of the abuse and self-defense claim, the trial
court found her to lack credibility.
       While the door frame incident took place two years prior to
the June 2021 hearing, “[t]he length of time since the most recent
act of abuse is not, by itself, determinative.” (§ 6301, subd. (c).)
“The court shall consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether to grant or deny a petition for relief.” (Ibid.)
       Further, the DVPA protects against more than just
physical violence and threats. Disturbing the peace or “destroying
the mental or emotional calm” of the other party is considered
abuse under the DVPA. (In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 1483, 1498.) In addition to appellant’s violent acts
during the door frame incident, there was also evidence she had
engaged in child abuse against the four year old in January 2021,
and she disturbed the peace of the household by using derogatory
terms to describe respondent and the children. As the parties
were still living together, a restraining order would ensure a
period of separation sufficient to enable the parties to seek a
resolution of the causes of the violence. It was not an abuse of

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discretion to issue a restraining order to prevent the recurrence
of violence and abuse.
IV. Court did not abuse its discretion by examining
       witnesses
       Appellant contends the trial judge erred by examining the
parties before allowing the attorneys to question them. “A trial
judge may examine witnesses to elicit or clarify testimony
[citations]. Indeed, ‘it is the right and duty of a judge to conduct a
trial in such a manner that the truth will be established in
accordance with the rules of evidence.’ [Citation.] The trial judge,
however, must not become an advocate for either party or under
the gui[s]e of examining witnesses comment on the evidence or
cast aspersions or ridicule on a witness.” (People v. Rigney (1961)
55 Cal.2d 236, 241.)
       Here, the trial judge examined the witnesses to elicit
testimony in an organized fashion. Appellant fails to identify any
instance where the judge acted as an advocate for either party or
used questions to cast aspersions or ridicule either witness. Our
independent review of the record confirms that the judge’s
examination was proper and did not hinder the parties’ ability to
present their cases.

                         DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.

                                            CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.                 HOFFSTADT, J.

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