Court Opinion

ID: 9916446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 00:02:23.518516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:27.369109
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/9/24 In re B.P. CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re B.P. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

                                                                  D082281
A.P. et al.,

         Plaintiffs and Respondents,                              (Super. Ct. No. 22AD000446N)

         v.

K.K.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Tilisha Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
         Marisa L.D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Pamela Rae Tripp, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
                                                             I.
         Appellant K.K. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her children, B.P. and S.P. (Children), and
approving their adoption by their stepmother, A.P. (Stepmother). Mother
argues there was insufficient evidence to support she “abandoned” Children
as required by Family Code section 7822. She contends she did not
voluntarily leave Children in the custody of their father, C.P. (Father), but
rather lost custody due to a court order. However, although a court-ordered
deprivation of custody does not itself constitute abandonment, the court
reasonably concluded Mother’s voluntary behavior, including failure to
comply with a court-ordered psychological evaluation and repeated violations
of protective orders, effectively abandoned Children to Father’s care and
custody.
      Mother also claims the evidence does not support she intended to
abandon Children. However, intent to abandon is presumed from Mother’s
undisputed failure to communicate with Children for the statutory period.
Despite being granted supervised phone visitation, Mother never exercised
that right and made only token efforts to obtain a supervisor. To be sure,
Mother’s communications with Father—many of which violated protective
orders against her—indicate she cared for her children. However, these
messages do not support Mother was engaged in reasonable efforts to
reestablish a parental relationship with Children.
      Mother further claims the court erred by concluding that terminating
parental rights was in the best interests of Children. Mother’s arguments in
support of this contention are immaterial, conclusory, or duplicative of her
argument that she did not intend to abandon Children. In sum, we find
Mother’s arguments unpersuasive and conclude the court’s order terminating
Mother’s parental rights was supported by substantial evidence.
      Finally, Mother claims the court violated Welfare and Institutions Code
section 224.2, part of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), by failing to
conduct an initial inquiry into whether Children may be “Indian” children.

                                       2
However, California Rules of Court, rule 5.481 provides the applicable ICWA
inquiry standard for Family Code section 7822 proceedings. (See Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.480(4).) Mother focuses exclusively on the initial inquiry
requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, which are
inapplicable here. She fails to discuss the requirements of California Rules of
Court, rule 5.481 or claim these were not satisfied, thus forfeiting any such
argument. Accordingly, we affirm.
                                       II.
                                       A.
      Mother filed for divorce in 2018, and Mother and Father initially
shared custody of Children. Several months later, Father requested a
restraining order against Mother. According to Father, he had “received
phone calls and text messages [from Mother] incessantly any hour of the day,
night, messages threatening my job, demanding money, [and] referencing
sexual relationships with other men.” Father testified that a few months
after requesting the restraining order, he “voluntarily got rid of it” because he
“wanted to show the court that [he] was willing to work with [Mother] to
coparent and try to make life as normal as possible for the children.”
      In March 2019, the court granted Stepmother a restraining order
against Mother. Stepmother testified she sought the order because Mother
was sending “threatening, derogatory, disgusting texts, phone calls all the
time, day and night, every hour, non-stop.” In September 2019, Mother was
arrested for violating the restraining order, although charges were ultimately
dropped. In May 2020, Mother again violated the March 2019 restraining
order. Stepmother testified Mother came to their home, banging on the door
and yelling through the windows at her. According to Stepmother, Mother
then jumped onto their “balcony and started taking stuff.” Stepmother called

                                       3
law enforcement, and a criminal protective order (CPO) was issued to
Stepmother and S.P., who was also in the home at the time.
      In June 2020, the San Diego Health and Human Services Agency
substantiated an allegation that Mother hit B.P. in the face. In July 2020,
Children began living with their maternal grandmother, but shortly
thereafter were sent to live with their paternal grandmother in New Jersey.
      Initially, Mother called and spoke with Children approximately once a
week. According to Mother, the paternal grandmother stopped taking her
calls after October 2020. According to paternal grandmother, Children
decided they did not want to talk on the phone. She denied preventing
Children from talking to Mother. Mother’s last call with Children occurred in
October 2020.
      In April 2021, Father was granted a CPO against Mother under Penal
Code section 136.2. The order prohibited Mother from contacting Father and
ordered her to stay away from his home, work, and vehicle. Stepmother and
Children were issued a separate CPO, also pursuant to Penal Code
section 136.2. That order prohibited Mother from contacting Children except
for “peaceful contact” for the purposes of “court-ordered visitation” as stated
in family court orders.
      In June 2021, Father was granted sole legal and physical custody of
Children. Mother’s visitation was limited to one, 15-minute, professionally
supervised phone call per week, on Wednesdays at 4:00 p.m., which was to be
recorded. Mother was ordered to complete “a comprehensive psychiatric
evaluation” to determine her “ability to safely and consistently meet the
children’s needs.” The court ordered the evaluator to prepare “a written
report for the Court’s consideration.”

                                         4
      On the morning of July 7, a Wednesday, Father sent Mother a phone
number to use for supervised phone calls and said, “Contact information for
the professional phone supervisor is required prior to any/all calls being
accepted.” Three days later, Mother responded, “I really really want to
respect you, but I truly cannot when you have alienated me from my kids for
almost a year. Then you go and claim it violating an order on YOU when all I
care about is the kids . . . . ¶ You either want this to keep going or you don’t.
¶ Please stop destroying my life based on your incapacity to know your own
emotions.” A few minutes later, she added, “I can’t talk to the kids from 4 to
415 anymore, I’m working, 6 to 615 would better. ¶ Again, I’m not here for
YOU, I’m here to make sure I speak to my children . . . . ¶ Please stop taking
[this messaging platform] as your own personal device to destroy me. Thank
you.” Later that month, Children returned from New Jersey to live with
Father full time.
      In August 2021, Mother pled guilty to misdemeanor child
endangerment and stalking, although the record does not reflect the basis for
these charges. She received three years’ probation and was ordered to
complete a 52-week parenting class. Pursuant to Penal Code
section 1203.097, Father and B.P. received a CPO against Mother barring
any contact other than “peaceful contact” for the purpose of “court-ordered
visitation” in accordance with family court orders issued after the date of the
CPO, August 25, 2021.
      By October 2021, Mother had not had any supervised visits with
Children and had not completed the psychological evaluation ordered by the
court. Nonetheless, at a status hearing before the family court in the custody
case, she requested modification of the court’s recent visitation order, asking
for three unsupervised phone calls and up to 12 hours of supervised visitation

                                        5
per week, proposing her sister as a supervisor. The family court denied the
request and maintained the previous visitation order because, according to
Father, Mother had not completed her psychological evaluation.
      In January 2022, Mother messaged Father a link to a professional
supervisor service and said, “[I] want to start calling the children this week.”
Father testified he has never received any communication from a professional
supervisor.
      Mother otherwise continued to message Father throughout this period
in violation of the CPO, sending Father numerous insults, threats, and
accusations. On occasion, she sent messages meant for Children, including:
“Happy Easter to my babies”; “Please tell my littles I love and miss them. So
much. When you allow me to speak to them, I will gladly pay you whatever
you want.”; and, “[P]lease tell [Children I] love them and miss them. [M]ore
then [sic] they could ever even imagine.”
      In June 2022, Mother sent B.P. flowers and a card. Father refused
delivery.
      In January 2023, Mother was convicted of violating one of the
protective orders. The criminal court entered a new CPO, this time pursuant
to Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), again restricting Mother’s
contact with Father and B.P.
      It is undisputed Mother has not seen Children in person since
July 2020 and has not spoken to them since October 2020.
                                       B.
      In July 2022, Stepmother filed a request to adopt Children and, along
with Father, a Petition for Freedom from Parental Custody and Control
under Family Code section 7822, subdivision (a)(3). Mother opposed the
petition.

                                       6
      The court held a multi-day hearing and heard testimony from Mother,
Father, Stepmother, paternal grandmother, maternal grandmother, a social
worker who had investigated in connection with the petition, a professional
supervisor who had supervised some of Mother’s visits with Children, and
Children’s counsel in the custody proceedings.
      The court found in favor of Stepmother and Father. The court
concluded the statutory period of one year began in June of 2021, when
Father was awarded sole legal and physical custody. The court found Mother
had left Children in the custody of Father, noting her failure to “complete
what had been ordered from the family court hearings . . . to warrant
modification of custody and visitation.” The court found Father’s testimony
“to be more credible than” Mother’s, observing that “aspects of the father’s
testimony [were] corroborated by court orders, corroborated by the
stepmother’s testimony, and corroborated by minor’s counsel, the attorney for
the family law case.”
      The court found Mother had only made token efforts to communicate
with Children, concluding Mother had failed to take reasonable steps to
obtain a suitable supervisor for her visits. The court found it unreasonable
for Mother to expect that messaging Father “would result in contact with the
children after the restraining orders continued to be extended, renewed, or
granted since 2021 at the father’s and stepmother’s request.” The court
observed Mother “continues with the same course of behavior that warranted
restraining orders in the first place,” which the court found “concerning
especially given the fact that the mother indicated that she had completed
anger management . . . [and] had completed kids turn, as well as her
testimony that she is in the process of completing 49 of the 52 child abuse
classes, and that she has engaged in therapy on and off.”

                                       7
      The court also found clear and convincing evidence Mother “had the
requisite intent to abandon the children” for the statutory period, “as
evidenced by her voluntary actions, specifically the failure to comply with the
court-ordered psychological evaluation.”
      Finally, the court found it was in Children’s best interests to permit the
adoption. The court found Stepmother’s testimony credible and found she
“has played a consistent role of mother to the children since she has been
involved in their life on/or about 2019,” noting “the stepmother is the person
the children call mom.” The court found Stepmother “comfortably testified
about the needs of each child as well as about who they are as children, about
the different activities that they are involved in, and about her role in
parenting them,” and she “has shown over the years that she is committed to
providing consistency and stability for the children to help them grow and
thrive.” Accordingly, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights and
approved Stepmother’s adoption of Children.
                                       III.
      Mother makes two principal arguments on appeal. First, she contends
there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings because:
(1) she did not “leave” Children with Father because they were taken from
her pursuant to a court order; (2) the record supports she did not intend to
abandon Children; and (3) termination was not in the best interests of
Children. Separately, Mother claims the court violated Welfare and
Institutions Code section 224.2 by failing to conduct an initial inquiry into
whether Children may be “Indian” children. As we will explain, we find
Mother’s arguments unpersuasive.

                                        8
                                        A.
      Under Family Code section 7822, subdivision (a)(3), a party may file a
petition to terminate parental rights if “[o]ne parent has left the child in the
care and custody of the other parent for a period of one year without any
provision for the child’s support, or without communication from the parent,
with the intent on the part of the parent to abandon the child.” “[F]ailure to
provide support[ ] or failure to communicate is presumptive evidence of the
intent to abandon. If the parent . . . ha[s] made only token efforts to support
or communicate with the child, the court may declare the child abandoned by
the parent . . . .” (Id., subd. (b).) A court ruling on a Family Code
section 7822 petition “[must] consider the wishes of the child, bearing in mind
the age of the child, and [must] act in the best interest of the child.” (Fam.
Code, § 7890.)
      “Although a court must make such findings based on clear and
convincing evidence ([Fam. Code,] § 7821), the sole issue on appeal is whether
substantial evidence supports its conclusions.” (Adoption of A.B. (2016)
2 Cal.App.5th 912, 922–923.) “In determining if substantial evidence exists,
we consider the evidence in a manner that favors the order being challenged.”
(Ibid., citing Guardianship of Wisdom (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 635, 639.) We
have “no power to pass on the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in the
evidence or determine the weight of the evidence.” (In re E.M. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 828, 839.) Rather, “ ‘ “[a]ll conflicts in the evidence must be
resolved in favor of the respondents and all legitimate and reasonable
inferences must be indulged in to uphold the judgment.” ’ ” (Adoption of
Allison C. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1010-1011 (Allison C.).) “ ‘The
appellant has the burden of showing the finding or order is not supported by
substantial evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 1011.)

                                        9
                                        B.
                                        1.
      Mother first claims she cannot have “left” Children in Father’s care and
custody for purposes of Family Code section 7822, subdivision (a)(3), because
Children were taken from her by court order. Mother concedes “[s]ome courts
have held that if after a child is taken against the parent’s wishes and that
parent does not endeavor to secure the child’s return but instead fails to act,
their inaction can ‘convert[ ]’ the earlier taking into a leaving,” but urges this
court to follow other cases she contends hold otherwise. In fact, “[n]umerous
appellate decisions have long agreed that the leaving-with-intent-to-abandon-
the-child requirement of [Family Code] section 7822 can be established by
evidence of a parent’s voluntary inaction after an order granting primary care
and custody to the other parent.” (In re Marriage of Jill & Victor D. (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 491, 504 (Marriage of Jill & Victor D.) [collecting cases].)
The cases Mother cites are not contrary to this long line of authority.
      Mother first cites In re Adoption of Cozza (1912) 163 Cal. 514, 528
(Cozza). Mother however fails to acknowledge Cozza was disapproved by
In re Adoption of Barnett (1960) 54 Cal.2d 370. As explained in In re
Adoption of Barnett, Cozza relied on a “rule of strict construction of our
adoption statutes in favor of the natural parents.” (In re Adoption of Barnett,
supra, at pp. 377–378.) Specifically, Cozza held that in considering a request
to terminate parental rights “[e]very intendment should have been in favor of
the claim of the [biological] mother under the evidence, and if the statute was
open to construction and interpretation should have been construed in
support of the right of the natural parent.” (Cozza, supra, at p. 524.) By
contrast, “[t]he purpose of [Family Code section 7822] is to serve the welfare
and best interest of a child by providing the stability and security of an

                                        10
adoptive home when those conditions are otherwise missing from the child’s
life” (Fam. Code, § 7800), and it is to “be liberally construed to serve and
protect the interests and welfare of the child” (Fam. Code, § 7801). Because
Cozza applied a predecessor statute interpreted under an inapplicable canon,
its value as precedent here is questionable.
      In any event, Cozza is not as categorical as Mother suggests. In Cozza,
Margaret was taken from her mother after her stepfather claimed her sister
Mary had “persistent[ly] refus[ed] to obey ‘the reasonable and proper orders
and directions of her parents or guardians.’ ” (Cozza, supra, 163 Cal. at
p. 518.) The court observed the mother “and her husband are Italians,
having but a limited and imperfect knowledge of the English language and
ignorant of our laws,” and thus credited mother’s professed belief she could
not do anything to get Margaret back before the end of the year. (Id. at
p. 519.) The court nonetheless found that “[s]ince [Margaret was] taken from
her, [the mother] has endeavored, through her personal efforts and those of
her relations, to secure” Margaret’s return. (Id. at p. 529.) Once the end of
the year came, the mother promptly filed an application with the court
seeking to regain custody of Margaret. (Ibid.) The petition to terminate
parental rights was filed in response to the mother’s application. (Id. at
p. 520.) Cozza thus suggests that, even under a strict reading of the statute
favoring biological parents, a parent’s actions after a child is taken from that
parent are relevant—otherwise, the fact the child was taken pursuant to a
judicial order would have ended the analysis.
      Mother next points to In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636. In the course
of resolving a claim of judicial estoppel, the court stated: “A child taken from
a parent by judicial order was not then deemed to have been left in the care
and custody of another within the meaning of the statutory provision relied

                                       11
upon,” citing In re Conrich (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 662, and In re Barton
(1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 584. (In re Lisa R., supra, at p. 646.) In re Conrich
holds that “nonaction of the parents may convert into a leaving (and, the
other elements present, into an abandonment) that which initially could not
be regarded so.” (In re Conrich, supra, at p. 666.) This single, ambiguous
sentence in In re Lisa R. does not support Mother’s broad claim.
      Closer to the mark is In re Jacklyn F. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 747, 755,
in which the court held “that evidence of a failure to communicate or support
for the statutory period of time can[not], in itself, satisfy the separate
statutory requirement that the child be ‘left’ for a prescribed period of time.”
However, it is not only the failure to communicate with Children that the
court here pointed to as evidence that Mother “left” them, but her repeated
violation of protective orders and her failure to obtain a court-ordered
psychological evaluation.
      “Case law consistently focuses on the voluntary nature of a parent’s
abandonment of the parental role rather than on physical desertion by the
parent.” (See In re Amy A. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 63, 69.) Mother lost
custody due to judicial orders, but these orders were issued in response to
Mother’s voluntary behavior. Among these voluntary actions was the
substantiated incident of child abuse against B.P. in 2020, which resulted in
Mother losing physical custody of Children. (Cf. Allison C., supra,
164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1012 [“[F]ather, by his voluntary act of domestic
violence, left [the child] in mother’s care and custody.”].) After custody was
awarded to Father, Mother failed to make any efforts to regain custody and,
as discussed in more detail below, made only token efforts to exercise her
visitation rights. (Cf. In re Jacqueline H. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 808, 816
(“[M]other’s failure to engage in psychological and family counseling, which

                                        12
resulted in termination of visitation rights, and her token efforts to regain
visitation rights indicated an abandonment of the child.”].) Mother has
continued to violate the protective orders in place for years, including as
recently as two months before the hearing in this case. All this evidence
supports the court’s determination that Mother left Children by failing to
take reasonable steps under the circumstances toward reestablishing a
parental relationship.
      Mother criticizes the court’s reliance on her failure to complete the
court-ordered psychological evaluation, claiming it “would not result in any
guaranteed outcome.” However, given the court indicated it was requiring
the evaluation to ensure Mother could be a safe and consistent caretaker,
failing to have an evaluation ensured she would not regain custody. Indeed,
Father’s unrebutted testimony stated that Mother’s request for increased
visitation was denied because she had not completed the evaluation.
      Mother points to her participation in therapy—“[o]n and off” since
2019—and her testimony that she has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder
and regularly takes psychiatrist-prescribed medication. Mother claims this
shows she “was committed to addressing any mental health issues and how
that may affect her ability to effectively parent the children.” Although she
has apparently sought support to better meet her mental health needs,
Mother has also persisted in troubling behavior. The court reasonably found
it “concerning” Mother continued to violate various court orders despite
participating in therapy and other court-mandated programming, including
anger management. Mother’s messages to Father are themselves concerning,
as they often contained angry outbursts—for example, telling Father (a
veteran), “You are asking for a god damn war. You think Iraq was bad?”—
and several messages threatened suicide. Mother has not shown she

                                       13
obviated any mental health concerns and, in any case, does not dispute she
has not satisfied the June 2021 court order requiring an evaluation.
      Mother also claims her request for increased visitation in October 2021
is not the kind of parental inaction that can result in abandonment.
However, it is undisputed Mother never exercised the visitation she had
already been granted and, as discussed below, she has made no genuine
efforts to do so. Moreover, at the time of her request, Mother had not
complied with the family court’s prior order mandating a psychological
evaluation and, in the intervening months, had pled guilty to misdemeanor
child endangerment and stalking. Given her failure to comply with a court-
mandated condition intended to ensure her “ability to safely and consistently
meet the children’s needs,” and her continued criminal behavior, there was
no reason to expect the court would modify its visitation order entered only
four months earlier.

                                      14
                                        2.
      Next, Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support she
intended to abandon Children. She does not dispute the evidence established
she failed to communicate with Children for the statutory period. “[F]ailure
to communicate is presumptive evidence of the intent to abandon.” (Fam.
Code, § 7822, subd. (b).) “When the evidence permits the conclusion of only
token efforts to communicate with the child, ‘Unless the presumption of
abandonment raised by [that] fact has been overcome as a matter of law, the
findings and order of the trial court . . . must be sustained.” (In re B.J.B.
(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1201, 1212.) It was Mother’s burden to rebut this
presumption. (See Marriage of Jill & Victor D., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at
p. 506.) We conclude she has not done so.
      Mother points to her messages to Father as evidence she was
“attempt[ing] to communicate with” Children. As the court found, however,
these were not reasonable attempts because Mother was aware she was only
permitted supervised visitation with Children and her messages to Father
violated court orders.
      Mother specifically highlights her January 2022 message to Father
that included a link to a professional monitoring service. The court
considered this message, sent seven months after the supervised visitation
order, and found it was not a serious attempt to secure a supervisor under
the circumstances. That conclusion is supported by the evidence.
      Minor’s counsel sent Mother a court-created list of professional
supervisors in June 2021. Mother responded, claiming she did not need a list
because she had already contacted a supervisor they had used previously.
Minor’s counsel responded that Mother’s proposed supervisor had “admitted
to leaving [Mother and maternal grandmother] unsupervised with the

                                       15
children when he should have been present at all times,” and therefore
suggested using a different monitor. In response, Mother claimed the
supervisor “did nothing wrong” and said, “I will chose [sic] the supervisor I
deem suitable.”
      However, it does not appear Mother actually attempted to secure the
services of this supervisor in 2021, as she had claimed. The supervisor
testified and the court found him credible. He stated Mother did not contact
him in 2021, but instead had done so in late 2022 or early 2023, well after the
filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. The court found this
statement “compelling, as it goes to the conduct of the mother in not
consistently following through with securing a supervisor for the visits with
the children to maintain the parent bond . . . even after the mother was
provid[ed] a list of supervised visitation monitors and after the concern with
[her proposed supervisor] was shared with her.”
      Similarly, Mother claimed she had contacted another supervisor in
June 2021. She claimed this proposed supervisor had reached out to Father
and she had discussed this person with minor’s counsel. The court did not
credit Mother’s testimony because both minor’s counsel and Father “denied
receiving any information regarding this individual,” and Mother did not call
this supervisor to corroborate her testimony. Indeed, Mother did not present
any corroborating evidence, such as call logs or text messages. The court was
entitled to disregard Mother’s disputed and uncorroborated testimony.
      As to the professional monitoring service she proposed in January
2022, this service was not on the list provided by minor’s counsel but was a
service Mother “had just Googled.” There is no indication Mother ever
contacted this service. She, moreover, conceded her message violated “a
restraining order that prevented [her] from contacting” Father. The record

                                      16
supports Mother made only a half-hearted effort to obtain a supervisor, even
though this was her only legal avenue to communicate with Children. This
supports the court’s conclusion she intended to abandon them.
      Mother also contends she could not have intended to abandon Children
because she offered to pay $500 per month in child support to Father.
Specifically, in July 2021, Mother messaged Father: “I’m not sending
anything over to you, until you end this crusade to end my career. ¶ Can’t
get a dime from me from prison. ¶ I’m willing to send you 500 a month,
that[’]s me working overtime two weekends a month, easily. ¶ However I
can’t do so when you are threatening to put me away for every instance I talk
to you. ¶ The ball is in your court. ¶ That’s 200 bucks more then you sent
me when I had the kids 100%. ¶ Let me know.” There is no evidence Mother
renewed this offer; she did not send support to Father. This apparently
contingent offer of support fairly constitutes a mere “token effort[ ]” to
support Children. (Fam. Code, § 7822, subd. (b).) Furthermore, either failure
to support or failure to communicate with Children provides presumptive
evidence of intent to abandon. (Ibid.) In light of Mother’s undisputed failure
to communicate with Children and other circumstances, a one-time offer of
financial support is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that she intended
to abandon Children for the statutory period.
      Finally, Mother claims, vaguely, that “phone calls, . . . gifts, and letters”
reflect her intent not to abandon Children. Although mother refers to these
“phone calls, . . . gifts, and letters” three times in her opening brief, she does
not provide any record citations, in contravention of California Rules of
Court, rule 8.204, subdivision (a)(1)(C). “This rule applies to matters
referenced at any point in the brief, not just in the statement of facts.”
(Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253.) On reply,

                                        17
the only evidence of “gifts” Mother cites appears to be evidence that she sent
flowers and a card to B.P. in June of 2022. Aside from this, her contentions
are unsupported. In fact, both Children denied receiving gifts or letters from
Mother, and B.P. told a social worker that Mother “ ‘never called when she
was supposed to.’ ” In the context of the record as a whole, Mother sending
flowers to B.P. is not sufficient to establish she did not intend to abandon
Children.
      In sum, Mother has failed to rebut the presumption that her failure to
communicate with Children reflected intent to abandon them for the
statutory period.
                                        3.
      Mother contends adoption is not in Children’s best interests. First, she
claims she “loves [Children] and wants to continue as a mother in their life.”
Mother’s love for Children and stated desire to parent them speak to Mother’s
interests but do little to establish what is in Children’s best interests.
Mother next states, “Adoption by [Stepmother] is not in the children’s best
interests.” Mother fails to make any explanatory argument or cite to any
evidence in support of this contention. This conclusory statement does not
establish the court erred. Finally, Mother claims she “did not intend to
abandon” Children. As we have already determined, however, the record
supports the court’s contrary conclusion. Mother’s contentions are, thus,
unpersuasive.
                                        C.
      Finally, Mother argues the court’s order must be overturned because
Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c)
required the court and Agency to ask available extended family members
whether Children have Indian heritage. However, Welfare and Institutions

                                        18
Code section 224.2 applies to children “for whom a petition under [Welfare
and Institutions Code] Section 300, 601, or 602” has been filed. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 224.2, subd. (a).) This matter undisputedly does not involve a
petition under any of those sections.
      Mother cites Adoption of M.R. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 537, 541, which
held that the court’s failure to make any ICWA findings in connection with a
Family Code section 7822 petition was reversible. In passing, the court
suggested Family Code section 177 incorporates Welfare and Institutions
Code section 224.2 to the Family Code, stating: “The notice and inquiry
requirements of the Welfare and Institutions Code apply to proceedings
under . . . the Family Code (Fam. Code, § 177 [Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 224.2
through 224.6 apply to an Indian child custody proceeding]).” (Ibid.) It
appears Mother relies on this reading of the statute for the proposition that
Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c)
applies to this case. Not so.
      As Adoption of M.R. correctly recites, Family Code section 177 says
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 224.2 through 224.6 apply to an
“Indian child custody proceeding.” (Italics added.) An “ ‘Indian child’ means
any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member
of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is
the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903; Fam.
Code, § 170.) Mother does not contend Children are “Indian children” for
purposes of the statute, and in fact has denied Indian heritage. Father
similarly denied Children were “Indian” children. As such, Welfare and
Institutions Code section 224.2 does not apply to this proceeding.
      ICWA inquiry requirements do apply to proceedings under Family
Code section 7822, as set out in California Rules of Court, rule 5.481. (Cal.

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Rules of Court, rule 5.480, subd. (4).) However, Mother does not dispute the
Rule 5.481 standards were met and thus forfeits any such argument. (See,
e.g., Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 726.) Mother
argues exclusively under the assumption that Welfare and Institutions Code
section 224.2 applies. Because we conclude it does not, Mother has failed to
establish ICWA error.
                                     IV.
      The juvenile court’s findings and orders are affirmed.

                                                               CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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