Court Opinion

ID: 9847462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:00:13.024897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:13.963714
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting. I disagree with the majority in this case, for I am of the opinion that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to enter a temporary injunction in favor of the appellants.
The record in this case shows that the subdivision lots owned by the parties to this case were subject to recorded restrictive covenants which provided: "No lot shall be used except for residential purposes, nor shall said lot nor any part thereof ever be used or occupied for trade or business of any kind whatsoever, ...”
The recorded restrictive covenants further provided as follows: "Enforcement shall be by proceedings at law or in equity by Northside Packing Company, Inc., its successors or assigns, or any person owning a lot in said subdivision which is subject to the same restrictions or conditions in respect to which the default is made, against any persons violating or attempting to violate any covenant either to restrain violation or to recover damages.”
The record shows that R. H. Curry, Jr., made an application for a building permit to the City of Albany on *195June 29,1972, to "remodel house and make beauty shop” for a total construction cost of two thousand ($2,000) dollars. The record does not disclose when or if this building permit was granted by the City of Albany. Mr. Curry testified that the remodeling work was started a few days before they moved out of the house on July 3.
Mr. Purvis, one of the appellants, testified that when he learned the appellees’ property was being converted for commercial purposes that he talked with Mr. Owens, the real estate agent who had been connected with the subdivision since its inception, about stopping the conversion. His testimony was: "I talked with him (Mr. Owens) a half a dozen times or more and he was supposed to have handled this thing and he didn’t do anything.” According to the record the conversations with Mr. Owens would have had to have taken place sometime between June 29, 1972 and July 31, 1972, the day the complaint for injunction was filed in court.
Mrs. Davies, one of the appellants, testified that she thought Mr. Owens, the real estate agent connected with the subdivision, was doing something about stopping the conversion of the house to a commercial use. She testified that she thought that Mr. Owens was handling it and doing something about it — "He had led us to believe that he had a lawyer that was checking into it.”
The record then shows that the appellants employed a lawyer, that the complaint was verified on July 28,1972, and that the complaint was filed on July 31,1972, seeking to enjoin the violation of the recorded restrictive covenant.
It is therefore very clear to me from this record that the remodeling permit was only applied for on June 29,1972, and the action for injunction to stop the violation was filed on July 31, 1972. Under such circumstances the appellants were not dilatory in their efforts and, in my opinion, were not guilty of laches so as to prevent equitable relief by injunction to enforce a restrictive *196covenant limiting the use of a subdivision lot.
By virtue of the chronology of events leading to the prompt action of the appellants in bringing their complaint for injunction, I am of the opinion that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing a temporary injunction. To my mind the evidence demanded that relief in favor of appellants.
I would reverse the judgment.
I respectfully dissent.