Court Opinion

ID: 9770570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:10:25.164252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:18.580443
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Justice
(concurring).
Plaintiffs, when approached 'by defendant’s agent, stated among other things that their principal concern in having ■house insulated was the elimination of rats, mice, bugs and insects, whereupon the agent verbally guaranteed that the system to be installed would absolutely eradicate all such rodents and pests and definitely prevent their return to the premises. In reliance on such representations, they say, the contract was signed and installation completed; and the trial court has established the falsity of such statements inducing contract and payment of consideration.
The writing does not cover any warranties of any kind; hence the principle invoked in Distributors Inv. Co. v. Patton, 130 Tex. 449, 110 S.W.2d 47, does not apply. However it does include the proviso : “It is understood that the entire contract is contained in this agreement and that no verbal or otherwise understanding shall -be binding on the contractor”; which recital, it is argued, conclusively estops the house-owner from maintaining this tort action seeking damages because of *1018fraud in inducement of the written contract.
Aforesaid verbal guarantee was not inconsistent with the contract, and the court could reasonably have concluded that such was the inducing cause of its execution. In consequence, the principles reflected in the following decisions would appear to be controlling: “It is competent to prove fraud in a contract, although it be reduced to writing and is silent on the subject to which the fraudulent representations referred.” Ranger v. Hearne, 41 Tex. 258, syl. 2. “Contracts, though reduced to writing, are avoided when induced by material promises, never intended to be kept, not because one is allowed to vary his written contract, but because real assent is essential to a binding contract. Using Elliott's phrasing: ‘If one is induced to go through the form of making a contract because of some fraud or misrepresentation made by the other party or his agent, relative to a material element of the agreement, such that, if he had known the truth, he would not have given his assent, the contract may be avoided by him. There can be no real assent when it is induced by fraud.’ 1 Elliott on Contracts, § 70.” Edward Thompson Co. v. Sawyers, 111 Tex. 374, 234 S.W. 873, 874. “ * * * an action of deceit lies, although the false representations were not embodied in, or their subject matter covered by, the writing containing all the terms of the contract, * * *. In an action for deceit inducing the execution of a contract, the parties’ rights are not controlled by the terms of the contract, and an attempt by a contract to restrict the remedy of a party for fraud of the other party which induced the making of the contract is ineffectual.” 37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 64, pp. 353, 354. “The rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written contract does not prevent the use of extrinsic evidence to attack its validity by showing fraud in its inception, notwithstanding the written contract provides that ‘no conditions, representations, or agreements other than these’ contained therein could be considered. Bankers’ Trust Co. v. Calhoun, Tex.Civ.App., 1919, 209 S.W. 826, error refused. Bankers Trust Co. v. James, Tex.Civ.App., 1919, 209 S.W. 830, error refused.” 16 Texas Digest, Complete, <®=:5434(8). “Where fraud induces execution and delivery of release, the release is voidable even though it contains statement that no representations induced its making and that no promises not expressed therein were made, and the party signing release read it and knew its contents.” Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Presley, 137 Tex. 232, 152 S.W.2d 1105, syl. 2. “Fraudulent statements by plaintiff’s agent, if made to induce defendant to enter into written contract for purchase of property, were not merged in contract and papers executed in closing deal, so as to preclude defendant from recovering on counterclaim based on those statements.” Horwitz v. Schaper, Mo.App., 119 S.W.2d 474, syl. 4.
I concur in the foregoing order setting aside our original judgment of reversal and affirming the judgment under review.