Court Opinion

ID: 9861045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:40:03.507051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:08.927454
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, specially concurring: I specially concur because I wish to distance myself from several statements contained in the majority opinion. First, in reference to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the majority states: “ ‘ “An arrest under a warrant is not privileged unless the person arrested (a) is a person sufficiently named or otherwise described in the warrant and is, or is reasonably believed by the actor to be, the person intended, or (b) although not such person, has knowingly caused the actor to believe him to be so.” ’ Stewart, 243 Ga. at 583, 255 S.E.2d at 702, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §125, at 221 (1965). We adopt the above principle from the Restatement.” 385 Ill. App. 3d at 1009. Thus, the majority sets forth a portion of the Restatement and then adopts the “principle” from that section. What is not clear is which principle the majority has adopted. Is it the principle of privilege set forth in the Restatement? Is it the principle that the defendant has the burden of proof to establish at least one of the two prongs necessary to establish privilege? Is it the principle that the burden of proof has now been shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant? Rather than requiring the plaintiff to prove willful and wanton conduct, is the defendant now required to prove privilege from liability for arresting the wrong individual? In my opinion, there is no need for, nor benefit derived from, citing the Restatement. The issues of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested is probably the perpetrator are eliminated by the issuance of a warrant. The majority’s reference to Georgia law and the incorporation of the Restatement add little but confusion to Illinois’s requirements for proving willful and wanton conduct. Section 1 — 210 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act defines “willful and wanton conduct” as follows: “[A] course of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property. This definition shall apply in any case where a ‘willful and wanton’ exception is incorporated into any immunity under this Act.” 745 ILCS 10/1 — 210 (West 2006). Conspicuously absent from this statutory definition, which the majority acknowledges applies here (see 385 Ill. App. 3d at 1008-09), is any reference to the reasonableness of the conduct. Yet the majority takes the unnecessary step of analyzing the officers’ conduct pursuant to a “reasonableness” standard and concluding that the conduct was “not unreasonable, let alone willful and wanton.” (Emphasis added.) 385 Ill. App. 3d at 1010. The sole issue on appeal is: was the officers’ conduct not willful and wanton as a matter of law? The majority’s statement that the officers’ conduct was not unreasonable is immaterial and gratuitous. What is the value of analyzing the facts under a nonstatutory, lesser standard? Had the majority found that the officers’ conduct was unreasonable, it then still would have to analyze the case under the proper “willful and wanton” standard. The majority uses the term “principle” for what it purports to adopt. The majority uses this language in order to avoid what is readily apparent: this is an attempt to adopt the Restatement. However, there is no reported authority for an inferior court to adopt a Restatement; that prerogative has been left to our supreme court. See In re Marriage of Chrobak, 349 Ill. App. 3d 894, 898 (2004) (“Because the Restatement has not been adopted by our supreme court, it is not the law and merely provides guidance”). The majority does not have the authority to impose the quoted section of the Restatement in contravention of clear Illinois law relating to willful and wanton conduct. An appellate court has the apparent authority to adopt a Restatement “principle.” See Handelsman v. Handelsman, 366 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 1130 (2006). In Handelsman, this court adopted the principle from the Restatement (Third) of Property that, “in general, will substitutes are to be construed according to the rules used to construe wills.” Handelsman, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1130. This, indeed, was the adoption of a “principle”; this court did not adopt any specific Restatement section or analysis, especially one that contradicted existing law by changing the burden of proof and the standard of conduct. Here, the majority does not even cite to Handelsman or any other case for the fig leaf of authority to adopt a “principle.” However, since the majority adopts a “principle” that is in fact not a principle but a two-pronged test set forth in the Restatement, without the authority to do so, such a citation would be nothing more than window dressing anyway. Second, since the majority went to the trouble of reaching the conclusion that “the officers’ conduct was not unreasonable” (385 Ill. App. 3d at 1010), I will address this improper and incorrect conclusion. The officers denied that they were told of the misidentification. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that they did nothing in response to further identify plaintiff beyond looking at the information contained in the warrant. However, for purposes of analysis, the majority adopts plaintiffs contention that he repeatedly told the officers that he was not the party against whom the warrant was issued. I submit that there were several things that the officers could reasonably have done in response to the claim of misidentification. At a minimum, they could have reported plaintiffs claim to the jailers. The jail personnel could have then related the claim to the judge at bond court. Also, the officers could have inquired if there was a photograph or other identifying material that easily could have been compared. Had they done so, they may have received information to cause them to question the arrest. Regardless of whether they should have released him if such information was found, they could have given that information to the jailers so that it could be presented to the judge at bond court. Considering the prevalence of stolen identities in these times, I do not consider it reasonable for an officer to do nothing when he is told that a person taken into custody pursuant to a warrant is not the person against whom the warrant was issued. Accepting the facts as alleged by plaintiff, I do not believe that what the officers did was reasonable. However, the unreasonable conduct here did not rise to the level of willful and wanton conduct. Nevertheless, since what is reasonable is not the touchstone of what constitutes willful and wanton conduct, there is no reason for the majority to address this nonissue. Further, I will not speculate as to whether the officers’ unreasonable behavior rose to the (equally irrelevant) level of negligence. Finally, the majority concludes with the statement, “The fault here, if any, lies with the authority that apparently mistakenly issued a warrant for plaintiff’s arrest, not with the police officers who executed the warrant.” 385 Ill. App. 3d at 1010. I wish to distance myself from this statement. First, I disagree with this gratuitous comment. In my opinion, the accepted facts in this case do not establish fault at all. Second, such a comment does not illuminate, define, or explain the sole issue on appeal: was the officers’ conduct not willful and wanton as a matter of law?