Court Opinion

ID: 9901382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 18:03:33.635132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.877210
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/21/23 P. v. Dupree CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                        (Placer)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097816

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. 62-180861)

           v.

 JAMES ROBERT DUPREE,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant James Robert Dupree appeals from a judgment of convictions for
possession of drug paraphernalia and being a felon in possession of ammunition. He
challenges a pretrial ruling denying his motion to disclose the identity of a confidential
informant he claims was a material witness regarding defendant’s possession of the
ammunition. He claims the trial court abused its discretion in upholding the
prosecution’s assertion of an evidentiary privilege, thereby refusing to disclose the
informant’s identity. We find no error.

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                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       We need only recount the facts supporting defendant’s convictions as necessary to
provide context for the issues raised on appeal. It suffices to say that Detective Juan De
Luna conducted a traffic stop of defendant. Detective De Luna searched defendant’s car
and found two methamphetamine pipes and a total of 27 boxes of ammunition for an AK-
47 — a semiautomatic or automatic firearm.
       A search of defendant’s phone revealed text messages from “Tomies Patrick”
(Tomies) and a contact known as “Traciy Placerville” (Traciy). The day before the
traffic stop, Traciy sent messages to defendant that referenced boxes, “rounds,” and
$3,300. On the day of the traffic stop, defendant sent Tomies a message that referenced
“26,” which caught Detective De Luna’s attention because Detective De Luna found 26
boxes of ammunition in a bag in defendant’s trunk. These messages also referenced
“wheels,” which Detective De Luna suspected was code for ammunition. Detective De
Luna believed that there was a deal between defendant and Traciy involving the
ammunition.
       Pretrial Proceedings
       At the preliminary hearing, Detective De Luna testified that he conducted the
traffic stop of defendant because, in part, he knew defendant was on probation. Prior to
trial, defendant moved to disclose the identity of a confidential informant, alleging that
based on the prosecutor’s repeated objections pursuant to Evidence Code section 1040,
and requests for an in camera hearing when defense counsel asked Detective De Luna
why he stopped defendant’s car, there was an inference from Detective De Luna’s
preliminary hearing testimony that he also relied on information from a confidential
informant to justify the traffic stop. Defendant argued that if the confidential informant
had knowledge about the ammunition and shared it with Detective De Luna, that
confidential informant was a material witness and defendant was entitled to learn the

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informant’s identity. The prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing that such information
was privileged under Evidence Code sections 1040 and 1041.
       The parties ultimately stipulated that a prima facie basis for an in camera hearing
existed. Defense counsel submitted 13 questions, which the court subsequently asked
during the hearing. After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding that
disclosure of the information related to the traffic stop was against the public interest
because the necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information outweighed the
necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice pursuant to Evidence Code section 1040,
subdivision (b)(2).
       Trial Proceedings
       Following opening statements in the jury trial in this case, the trial court held a
second in camera hearing when defense counsel advised the trial court and prosecutor of
specific questions he intended to ask Detective De Luna, which the prosecutor believed
would prompt the disclosure of privileged information. The trial court again permitted
the defense to submit written questions to be asked of Detective De Luna during the in
camera hearing. Following the in camera hearing, the trial court overruled the
prosecutor’s objections to the proposed questions and ruled that the questions were
permissible.
       A jury subsequently found defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of
ammunition and guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia.1
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in upholding the
prosecution’s assertion of an evidentiary privilege relating to the identity of a confidential
informant. Should we agree the trial court erred in upholding the evidentiary privilege,

1     Penal Code section 30305, subdivision (a)(1) (count one) and Health & Safety
Code section 11364, subdivision (a) (count two), respectively.

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defendant further requests we review the admission of text messages and the denial of his
motion for a new trial. To address defendant’s central claim, the parties assert that we
should review the transcripts of the in camera hearings. We agree this is the correct
procedure. (See People v. Kelly (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 886, 907 (Kelly).)
       The prosecutor asserted two different, but related, evidentiary privileges: the
official information privilege (Evid. Code, § 1040)2 and the confidential informant
privilege (§ 1041). The trial court upheld the privilege against disclosure under section
1040.3 “Under section 1040, a public entity has a privilege to refuse to disclose official
information and to prevent another from disclosing it if disclosure of the information is
against the public interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of
the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure. [Citation.]” (Torres v.
Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 867, 872.) Similarly, “section 1041 permits a
public entity to refuse to disclose the identity of an informer when disclosure ‘is against
the public interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of his
identity that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice . . . .’ ”
(People v. Otte (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1522, 1529-1530, citing § 1041, subd. (a)(2).)
       In reviewing a claim of privilege under sections 1040 or 1041, the procedures are
similar and governed by section 1042. (Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 407, 418 (Electronic Frontier Foundation).) The court
may conduct an in camera hearing outside the presence of the defendant and their

2      Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
3      Section 1041 applies when a confidential informant provides a law enforcement
officer with information about illegal activities. This statute has a privilege provision
similar to section 1040 in that a public entity has a privilege to refuse to disclose the
identity of a person who has furnished information in confidence purporting to disclose a
violation of a law. (People v. Navarro (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 146, 164, citing § 1041,
subd. (a)(2).)

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counsel. (See People v. Bradley (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 607, 620-621, 626; § 1042, subd.
(d).) “At that hearing, the prosecution may offer evidence that discloses the confidential
information to aid the court in determining materiality: that is, ‘ “whether there is a
reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” ’
(Bradley, supra, at p. 621.)” (Kelly, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 906.) During this ex
parte in camera hearing, the petitioner should be given an opportunity to propose
questions to be asked and the proceedings should be recorded, transcribed, and the
transcript should be sealed. (Torres v. Superior Court, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 874.)
       As it relates to the privilege claimed under section 1041, “when an in camera
hearing has been held and the trial court has reasonably concluded, as in the instant case,
that the informant does not have knowledge of facts that would tend to exculpate the
defendant, disclosure of the identity of the informer is prohibited by . . . section 1042,
subdivision (d), since the public entity has invoked the privilege pursuant to section
1041.” (People v. McCarthy (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 547, 555.) We are satisfied the trial
court here complied with section 1042’s procedures. In both of the transcribed ex parte
in camera hearings, Detective De Luna testified under oath, answered the questions
submitted by defense counsel, and provided sufficient testimony to enable us to review
the trial court’s ruling. We thus address only the court’s decision concerning the denial
of disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant, which we review under the abuse
of discretion standard. (See Davis v. Superior Court (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1277,
citing People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 976; see also People v. Bradley, supra,
7 Cal.App.5th at p. 620; Kelly, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 906.)
       “ ‘To establish an abuse of discretion, [a party] must demonstrate that the trial
court’s decision was so erroneous that it “falls outside the bounds of reason.” [Citations.]
A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] An
abuse of discretion will be “established by ‘a showing the trial court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a

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manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 421, quoting People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th
335, 390.)
       We find no abuse of discretion here. We have thoroughly reviewed the transcript
of the in camera hearing held pursuant to defendant’s motion to disclose the identity of
the confidential informant. We first note that the trial court’s general order denying the
motion was based “upon a conclusion that all of the material sought was privileged.”
(Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, 125, overruled on another point in
People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 131.) We conclude the same. We also
conclude that the trial court reasonably found, pursuant to section 1040, subdivision
(b)(2) and section 1041, subdivision (a)(2), that the information sought was against the
public interest because there was a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the
information that outweighed the necessity for its disclosure in the interest of justice.
“Implicit in [an] assessment [of the necessity for preserving the confidentiality] is a
consideration of consequences — i.e., the consequences to the litigant of nondisclosure,
and the consequences to the public of disclosure.” (Shepherd, supra, at p. 126.) Having
reviewed the testimony from the in camera hearing, we believe the trial court’s order
properly reflects such an assessment. There was nothing arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd about the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion to disclose the identity of
the confidential informant. (See Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 421-422 [finding no error in declining to reveal the identity of the confidential
informant under §§ 1040 and 1041 when the trial court’s determination the public interest
against disclosure outweighed the defendant’s interest was not arbitrary or capricious].)
       We have also reviewed the transcript of the second in camera hearing with
Detective De Luna. We conclude the written questions defendant requested be asked of
Detective De Luna were in fact asked of him and that his in camera answers were
consistent with answers given by him during his testimony before the jury.

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       Because defendant’s remaining issues are conditioned upon a contrary conclusion
by this court regarding the prosecutor’s assertion of privilege, we need not address them.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                     /s/
                                                 EARL, P. J.

We concur:

    /s/
ROBIE, J.

    /s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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