Court Opinion

ID: 9725432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:47:40.636399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:15.232319
License: Public Domain

*51aThe following opinion was filed December 30, 1953:
Currie, J.
(on motion for rehearing). In support of the motion for rehearing made by the plaintiff employer and its insurance carrier, there has been filed a deluge of briefs amici curiae. We, therefore, have had the benefit of those briefs, as well as that of counsel for plaintiffs, in passing on such motion. These briefs have been most ably prepared and we .doubt if there is any aspect of the problem relating to recovery of workmen’s compensation benefits for loss of hearing occasioned by industrial noise that has not been thoroughly explored therein.
Two questions of constitutionality are raised for the first time in these briefs submitted in support of the motion for rehearing. It is contended:
(1) The Industrial Commission engaged in judicial legislation when it construed sec. 102.01 (2), Stats., defining “time of injury.”
(2) Secs. 102.52 and 102.55, Stats., which provide benefits for “schedule” and “relative” disabilities, work an úncon-stitutional denial of due process of law, in so far as they require substantial compensation for fractional losses of hearing, because based upon a conclusive legislative presumption of wage loss.
This court recently held in C. F. Trantow Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1952), 262 Wis. 586, 590, 55 N. W. (2d) 884, that questions of constitutionality of a provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act not previously raised cannot be considered when urged for the first time on appeal. In our opinion in that case we stated:
“The question of the constitutionality of the statute was not timely raised and has not been argued by the attorney general. It was not considered below and is not before us on this appeal. In Baker v. Leenhouts (1950), 257 Wis. 584, 44 N. W. (2d) 544, in accord with the rule that ‘the constitutionality of a statute cannot be raised for the first time in *51ban appellate court of a state or upon a rehearing in a civil case’ (11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, p. 772, sec. 125), we quoted from Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Comm. cited below, which held that (p. 588) :
“ Tt is well settled that constitutional rights, as well as any other personal or property right, may be waived.’
"Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1924), 185 Wis. 127, 132, 200 N. W. 775; Hayes v. Hoffman (1927), 192 Wis. 63, 70, 211 N. W. 271; State v. Retail Gasoline Dealers Asso. (1950), 256 Wis. 537, 41 N. W. (2d) 637. We reserve any ruling on the question of the constitutionality of this statute.”
By the amendment made to sec. 102.52 (17) and (18), Stats., by ch. 328, Laws of 1953, loss of hearing if due to occupational disease is no longer a schedule injury, but if occasioned by accident or sudden trauma it is. Before such amendment there was no distinction made by the legislature between loss of hearing due to industrial noise and that due to trauma so far as the schedule set forth in sec. 102.52 was concerned. The gist of the holding of our original opinion was that the occurring of an impairment covered by the schedule established a compensable disability regardless of actual wage loss and irrespective of whether caused by industrial accident or occupational disease. No sufficiently persuasive argument has been advanced in the briefs on the motion for rehearing to convince us that our former conclusion in this respect was erroneous.
It is again strenuously urged that the enactment of the amendments contained in ch. 328, Laws of 1953, evinces a retroactive legislative intent that there can be no recovery of compensation for loss of hearing without actual wage loss. However, the legislature by a later enactment cannot establish or affect the construction of a former act so as to have the same operate retroactively. Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder (1902), 113 Wis. 516, 530, 89 N. W. 460; 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, p. 330, sec. 337.
*51cCounsel for plaintiffs in their brief in support of the motion for rehearing point out that “thousands” of applications have been or will be filed subsequent to July 1, 1953 (the effective date of the amendments enacted by ch. 328, Laws of 1953), for loss of hearing due to industrial noise in which the impairment of hearing occurred prior to July 1, 1953; and urge that we clarify our former decision as to whether these cases will be governed by the new amendments or under the act as it stood prior thereto.
Sec. 102.03 (4), Stats., provides:
“The right to compensation and the amount thereof shall in all cases be determined in accordance with the provisions of law in effect as of the date of the injury.”
The attorney general points out in behalf of the Industrial Commission that, since “the date of injury” is the last day of work prior to filing the application in these loss-of-hearing cases due to industrial noise where the employee is still employed, therefore, these cases arising under applications filed after July 1, 1953, will be governed by the statutes as amended by ch. 328, Laws of 1953.
We feel compelled to refrain from expressing our views on this point because to do so would be to render an advisory opinion extraneous to the issues presented in the particular case now before this court for review.
By the Court. — Motion for rehearing denied.