Court Opinion

ID: 9589229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:42:38.682263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:01.366319
License: Public Domain

BROWNING, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the holding of the Court that there was sufficient evidence of primary neg*859ligence to take the case to the jury. I also agree that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable upon the facts presented by this record. The elimination of the last clear chance doctrine, however, in my opinion, clearly establishes a situation wherein the decedent was negligent as a matter of law; that his negligence continued to the moment of the collision between the automobile and the train; and contributed proximately to the injury which caused decedent’s death.
The evidence of the plaintiff shows that the automobile in which the deceased was riding approached the crossing at a time when no train was visible in either direction and that the automobile stalled between the rails of the first, or west bound, track, and remained there for a period of 28 to 30 seconds. The time was approximately 11:00 A. M., and the day was clear. To the east, the occupants of this automobile had a clear view of the railway for a distance of at least 1,652 feet. The deceased was sitting in the front seat of the automobile nearest the door. The deceased was a man of mature years who had lived for a long time in McDowell County, through which the main line of the Norfolk & Western Railway Company runs. The decedent should have known that the automobile in which he was seated was upon a track of that railroad, frequently used by its trains. It became his duty, in the exercise of reasonable safety, to look and listen effectively for the purpose of ascertaining whether a train was approaching. If he had done so, there was nothing to prevent his seeing the approaching train. He could have provided for his own safety by the simple process of opening the door of the automobile and stepping a few feet to safety. The failure of the decedent to take these simple steps for his safety is not the conduct of a person of ordinary prudence under like circumstances, and, in my opinion, constitutes negligence, barring recovery by the plaintiff.
One may not wantonly project himself into a dangerous situation, no matter how serious the derelictions of the other party. The law ordinarily charges a person of unimpaired vision with seeing an object which, if he had *860used his senses in the nature of things, he must have seen. The duty to maintain a lookout involves not only the physical act of looking, but also a reasonably prudent reaction to whatever might be seen. One will not be heard to say that he looked but did not see, when' a situation is open and obvious.
I would affirm the action of the trial court in directing the jury to return a verdict for the defendants.