Court Opinion

ID: 9927197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:07:10.353325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.795899
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3679-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

         Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

EDWARD M. PLAZA, a/k/a
EDWARD M. PLAZE,
EDDY ARENAS, and
ED ARENAS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted December 6, 2023 – Decided January 26, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Susswein.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Indictment No. 16-09-0623.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (Lauren Bonfiglio, Deputy Attorney
                   General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Edward M. Plaza appeals from a May 13, 2022 Law Division

order entered by Judge Stacey K. Boretz denying his third petition for post -

conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing.            After carefully

reviewing the record in light of the governing legal principles, we affirm

substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Boretz's twenty-four-page written

opinion.

                                         I.

      Defendant was charged by indictment with second-degree reckless

vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a), in connection with a crash that

occurred on May 21, 2016. The collision resulted in the death of defendant's

girlfriend, Valerie Edwards, who was sitting in the front passenger seat.

Defendant also was charged by summons with driving while intoxicated (DWI),

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.

      A jury trial was held in September and October of 2018. Defendant moved

to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of third-degree strict liability

vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3 became effective

on July 21, 2017, more than a year after the fatal crash. Judge Daniel denied the

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defense motion because defendant refused to waive his ex post facto rights. The

trial judge explained:

            The defendant—it's undisputed the defendant … is not
            willing to waive the [E]x [P]ost [F]acto [C]lause. Our
            New Jersey Constitution provides that the legislature
            shall not pass any bill of attained or ex post facto law.
            The U.S. Constitution provides no state shall pass any
            bill of attained or ex post facto law. The language in
            each provision that is in the New Jersey Constitution
            and the U.S. Constitution is practically identical. The
            Court in [State v. Fortin, 198 N.J. 619, 626-27 (2009)]
            indicated that we interpret the state provision as
            providing as at least as much protection as its federal
            counterpart. Now, it's also, as spelled out in Fortin,
            well established that a defendant may waive a
            constitutional right. . . .
                   The State in this case asserts that it's clear from
            the analysis in Fortin that if a defendant wishes to have
            a jury charge with a new law, whether it be a lesser-
            included offense or a related offense, he may do so only
            if he is willing to enter a waiver subjecting himself to
            that law. The State's argument in this case is that
            although it's within defendant's right to waive the
            protections of the [E]x [P]ost [F]acto [C]lause, he has
            indicated he is not willing to do so.

      The following colloquy then occurred to confirm defendant understood

the consequences of his decision not to waive his ex post facto rights:

            ASST. PROSECUTOR: Judge . . . I'd just like one thing
            for the record. I know that the defendant had in the
            course of sort of litigating this motion and prosecuting
            it indicated that he would not be inclined to waive the
            [E]x [P]ost [F]acto [C]lause. But now that Your Honor
            has ruled and made the decision, could we perhaps voir

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                                        3
dire the defendant to make sure that that remains his
intent?

THE COURT: All right . . . sir, do you understand
that—do you understand my decision thus far?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And have you had the
opportunity to speak to your lawyer—

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: —about this choice that you have?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Again, our current law, the
constitution[s] of the State of New Jersey and the
United States of America, prohibits one being charged
with the commission of an offense the prohibited
conduct being part of a law that was enacted after the
alleged commission of the offense. In other words,
you're alleged to have engaged in criminal behavior on
May. . . the 21st?

ASST. PROSECUTOR: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's the 21st, 2016. Therefore, a law was
adopted by—passed by the legislature effective July
1st, 2017. It's called criminal homicide strict liability.
That law was passed after May 21st, 2016. You have
constitutional protections and the New Jersey
Constitution provides that the legislature should not
pass any ex post facto law. Application of this law,
2C:11-53, strict liability, vehicular homicide, if that
were to be applied to you without your consent, without
your waiving the [E]x [P]ost [F]acto [C]lause of the

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                            4
            constitution, that would be in violation of the
            constitution. You have the right to waive certain
            constitutional rights. And based on what your lawyer
            told me . . . you've elected not to waive the [E]x [P]ost
            [F]acto [C]lause as it would apply to you. Do you
            understand all of that?

            DEFENDANT: Yes, that's correct. Yeah, that's correct.

      In addition to this colloquy between defendant and the judge, defendant's

trial counsel confirmed he had explained ex post facto protections to his client:

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I did discuss with my
            client the issue of ex post facto law and [N.J.S.A.
            2C:11-5.3].

            THE COURT: Yes.

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: —and this motion prior to ever
            filing it. At that time I explained to [defendant] what I
            thought the options were, what the potential choice
            could be for the [c]ourt, for him. He has indicated to
            me as late as this past week, Judge, on Friday that if the
            motion were denied . . . that he was not going to waive
            his ex post facto protections. And he told me that he
            understood that the—in response to my questions, that
            he understood that would mean that he would be going
            forward with his trial and the jury then deliberating
            only the charge that was in the indictment.

            THE COURT: Okay. Is what your lawyer just said
            accurate?

            DEFENDANT: Yes.

            THE COURT: Do you need more time to talk to your
            lawyer about this issue now?

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                                        5
             DEFENDANT: No.

      The matter proceeded to trial. Defendant testified on his own behalf,

explaining he was in a relationship with Edwards for approximately twenty

years. He testified he and Edwards had a couple of "cocktails" at their home on

the day on the crash. After drinking, they were going to pick up a prescription

on their way to a BYOB restaurant in Red Bank. Defendant claimed that an

open beer found in the car belonged to Edwards.

      On the way to the restaurant, defendant pulled over so Edwards could call

the pharmacy to check if her prescription had been filled and to touch up her

makeup. When he put his car back into drive, another car came towards him

from the opposite direction and into his lane. Defendant testified, "I put it in

drive . . . a car came in our lane. And [Edwards] grabbed the steering wheel and

that's when airbags came out. As soon as she grabbed it, that's all I remember."

He reiterated, "I was pulled over and just proceeded, and then she grabbed the

steering wheel and then I must have jumped the curb. That's the only thing I

remember."

      The jury returned a guilty verdict on the second-degree vehicular

homicide count. The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact on the non-indictable

charge, also found defendant guilty of DWI. Defendant was sentenced on the

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                                        6
vehicular homicide conviction to eight years in prison subject to the No Early

Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

      In his direct appeal, defendant claimed Judge Daniel erred in denying his

motion to have N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3 charged as a lesser included offense.

Defendant argued there was a rational basis to include the charge and, therefore,

doing so would not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

      We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence in an unpublished

decision, State v. Plaza, No. A-2042-18 (App. Div. Feb. 19, 2021).                We

determined "[a]t the time of defendant's offense, the act of driving while

intoxicated and causing the death of another did not render defendant strictly

liable for that death." Id. at 4. We noted the strict liability statute would have

precluded defendant from presenting his defense—that Edwards contributed to

her own death by "grabbing" the steering wheel.1 Ibid. We further held that

without a waiver by defendant, a conviction on the strict liability statute would

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Ibid. Accordingly, given defendant's refusal

to waive his ex post facto rights, we concluded the trial judge did not err by not

charging the jury on the third-degree strict liability offense. Id. at 4-5.

1
  N.J.S.A. 11-5.3(d) explicitly provides, "[i]t shall not be a defense to a
prosecution under this section that the decedent contributed to [her] own death
by reckless or negligent conduct or operation of a motor vehicle."
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                                         7
       In the summer of 2021, defendant filed two pro se PCR petitions. In a

July 13, 2021 petition, defendant claimed he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel regarding sentencing issues; that the victim grabbed the

steering wheel; and that the victim was taken to the wrong hospital. In his

August 16, 2021 petition, defendant claimed he was denied his right to the

"effective assistance of plea/trial/appellate counsel." Judge Regina Caulfield

denied both petitions because defendant failed to "set forth with specificity the

facts upon which the claim for relief is based, the legal grounds [the] complaint

asserts, and the particular relief sought."

       On October 4, 2021, defendant filed a third PCR petition, again arguing

his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated.

Assigned PCR counsel filed an amended petition and brief arguing defendant's

trial attorney failed to explain the need for defendant to waive his ex post facto

protections in order to have the lesser included offense of third-degree strict

liability vehicular homicide presented to the jury. Defendant claimed he would

have waived his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause if he fully understood the

law.

       Judge Boretz denied defendant's PCR without an evidentiary hearing,

concluding defendant's latest contentions were "belied by both the trial court

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                                         8
record as well as [d]efendant's own sworn testimony at trial." Judge Boretz

determined the record "unequivocally establish[ed] that the [d]efendant

understood he would be required to waive his constitutional protection under the

Ex Post Facto [C]lause in order to submit the strict liability offense to the jur y

and that his refusal to do so was the result of a deliberate and sound trial

strategy." Judge Boretz further found defense counsel "presented a sound trial

strategy that if successful, would have resulted in little to no jail time for

[d]efendant." The judge stated, "it cannot seriously be contended that [d]efense

counsel's representation of the [d]efendant 'made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Six Amendment.'" Judge

Boretz thus concluded defendant "failed to establish that counsel's performance

was deficient or that defense counsel's performance prejudiced the [d]efendant."

      Defendant raises the following contention for our consideration:

            POINT I
            THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN
            EVIDENTIARY    HEARING    BECAUSE    THE
            DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
            CASE OF TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS
            FOR FAILING TO ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN TO
            HIM    THE   NEED     TO   WAIVE     THE
            CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF THE EX
            POST FACTO CLAUSE, IN ORDER FOR THE JURY
            TO BE CHARGED WITH THE LESSER-INCLUDED

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                                        9
            OFFENSE OF THIRD-DEGREE STRICT LIABILITY
            VEHICULAR HOMICIDE.

                                       II.

      We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing

this appeal. PCR serves the same function as a federal writ of habeas corpus.

State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). When petitioning for PCR, a

defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he

or she is entitled to the requested relief. Ibid. The defendant must allege and

articulate specific facts that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which

to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992). "Where, as

here, the PCR court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing, we review its

legal and factual determinations de novo." State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super.

326, 338 (App. Div. 2020); see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540-41 (2013).

      In addressing an ineffective assistance claim, New Jersey courts follow

the two-part test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58

(1987).   "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was

deficient." State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687). Second, the defendant must have been prejudiced by counsel's

deficient performance. Ibid. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

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                                      10
        To meet the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant must show

"that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. Reviewing courts indulge in "a strong presumption that coun sel's

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. . . ."

Id. at 689.

        The second Strickland prong requires the defendant show "that counsel's

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable." Id. at 687. Put differently, counsel's errors must create a

"reasonable probability" that the outcome of the proceedings would have been

different if counsel had not made the errors. Id. at 694. This "is an exacting

standard." Gideon, 244 N.J. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367

(2008)). "Prejudice is not to be presumed," but must be affirmatively proven by

the defendant. Ibid. (citing Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, and Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693).

        Short of obtaining immediate relief, a defendant may show that an

evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with

an ineffective assistance claim. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63. But the mere

raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary

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                                        11
hearing. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). The

PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing only when: "(1) the defendant

establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; (2) the court determines that

there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by review of

the existing record; and (3) the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is

required to resolve the claims asserted." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609,

623 (App. Div. 2023) (citing State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013)). "A

prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates 'a reasonable

likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most

favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Porter, 216

N.J. at 355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)).

      Turning to the substantive legal principles governing this appeal, the

United States and New Jersey Constitutions prohibit the Legislature from

enacting ex post facto laws. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; N.J. Const. art. IV, §

7, ¶ 3; Fortin, 198 N.J. at 626-27. New Jersey's ex post facto jurisprudence

follows the federal jurisprudence. State v. Perez, 220 N.J. 423, 439 (2015)

(citing State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 608 n.8 (2004)). "The Ex Post Facto Clause

was intended to interdict the retroactive application of criminal laws that harm

the accused." Fortin, 178 N.J. at 608. "The drafters of that clause understood

                                                                             A-3679-21
                                        12
that it would be unjust to prosecute a person for a crime . . . that was not on the

books at the time of the commission of the act covered by the subsequent

legislation." Ibid.

      "An ex post facto penal law is defined by 'two critical elements. . . it must

be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment,

and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.'" State v. Natale, 184 N.J.

458, 491 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S.

24, 29 (1981)). For an ex post facto violation to occur, "the statute in question

must either (1) punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was

innocent when done; (2) make more burdensome the punishment for a crime,

after its commission; or (3) deprive a defendant of any defense available

according to the law at the time when the crime was committed." State v.

Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 56 (1996) (citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-

70 (1925)).

                                       III.

      We next apply these general principles to the matter before us. Defendant

contends his refusal to waive his ex post facto rights was not knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary because "trial counsel effectively subverted his

prospective waiver." In support of that contention, defendant states in his PCR

                                                                            A-3679-21
                                       13
certification he "did not understand" he needed to waive his constitutional

protections to have third-degree strict liability vehicle homicide charged to the

jury. He claims his trial counsel "never made clear" or "really explained" that

waiver was "critical to the success" of his motion to charge the jury with the

lesser included offense, and he "can think of no logical reason to pursue the

motion without waiving ex post facto protection." Defendant further contends

he "would have agreed to waive if someone had just said that [he] had to waive

to get the third-degree charge before the jury."

      Defendant maintains "trial counsel's failure to explain the need to waive

the constitutional protections of the Ex Post Facto Clauses, in order for the jury

to be charged with the lesser-included offense of third-degree strict liability

vehicular homicide, constituted a prima facie case of ineffectiveness. . . ."

Furthermore, defendant now claims that if he had waived his constitution al

protections, "counsel's 'trial strategy,' that Ms. Edwards' reckless behavior

caused her death, could have been substituted, albeit belatedly, by applying

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3, the third-degree strict liability statute."

      Defendant asks us to remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing so his

trial counsel can "testify about what he told [defendant] concerning ex post facto

                                                                           A-3679-21
                                        14
protection and the waiver issue." He also wants his "PCR attorney to ask [trial

counsel] to explain what reason [he] gave for declining to waive."

      Defendant acknowledges his colloquy with Judge Daniel about the waiver

issue, but claims "I was too frightened to think clearly when Judge Daniel spoke

to me. I just said, 'Yes.' You are supposed to say yes when a judge speaks to

you. That much I know."

      We are unpersuaded by defendant's arguments. We agree completely with

Judge Boretz that defendant's claims "are belied by both the trial court record as

well as [d]efendant's own sworn testimony at trial." As Judge Boretz aptly

emphasized, "[a] review of the trial record demonstrates that the [waiver] issue

was fully discussed at length with counsel for both sides" with defendant

present. Judge Daniel explained the Ex Post Facto Clause, the protections it

provides defendant, and why a jury charge on N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3 required

defendant's voluntary waiver.     The trial judge noted it was "undisputed"

defendant was "not willing to waive" the Ex Post Facto Clause. Lest there be

any doubt on this score, the trial judge personally addressed defendant to ensure

defendant understood his ex post facto rights and the impact of his decision not

to waive them. Defendant confirmed he had the opportunity to speak with his

attorney, that he understood why the requested jury charge would violate the Ex

                                                                           A-3679-21
                                       15
Post Facto Clause without his waiver, and that he did not need any additional

time to consult further with his attorney.

      We also agree with Judge Boretz's finding that defendant's refusal to

waive his ex post facto protections "was a well thought out and purposeful

strategy to present the jury with an 'all or nothing' approach." As Judge Boretz

explained:

             Defense counsel presented a very sound trial strategy
             that if successful, would have resulted in an acquittal of
             the second-degree charge and only subjected the
             [d]efendant to a municipal offense, which would have
             resulted in little or no jail time. The fact that the jury
             ultimately was persuaded by the State's evidence and
             found [d]efendant guilty does not indicate that defense
             counsel's efforts, and the trial strategy used, fell below
             the standards of professional competency.

      In sum, defendant has not established a prima facie case under either

prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. See Cummings, 321 N.J. at 170. Nor has

defendant established there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be

resolved by a review of the existing record. See Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. at

623. Accordingly, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing much less to

vacate his vehicular homicide conviction.

      Affirmed.

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