Court Opinion

ID: 9657383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:24:02.059706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:44.387886
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). To the extent the lead opinion affirms the grant of summary disposition, I concur in the result.
In all other respects, I dissent and would affirm for three reasons:
1. Plaintiffs claim for injuries sustained on November 4, 1986, in the course of his employment as a crewman aboard defendant’s vessel was litigated in federal court. The complaint included a claim for maintenance and cure, and a terse two-paragraph judgment was entered that did not preserve, leave open, exclude, mention, or otherwise refer to any ongoing claim for maintenance and cure.
2. If plaintiff has any claim for maintenance and cure arising out of that cause of action, he should pursue it in federal court because that court ought to interpret its own judgment, not this Court.
3. This case was dismissed on February 4, 1992, in the Wayne Circuit Court and plaintiffs attorney approved that dismissal "as to form and content.” That approval has the effect of a consent judgment and no appeal lies therefrom. Trupski v Kanar, 366 Mich 603, 607; 115 NW2d 408 (1962); Walker v Walker, 155 Mich App 405, 406; 399 NW2d 541 (1986).
The lead opinion states that the second and third points raised in this dissent were not argued by defendant. On the contrary, defendant alleged and urged that because maintenance and cure was pleaded in the federal court action and was not excluded from the judgment in that forum, res judicata bars relitigation. Two judgments were entered in this case. A judgment was entered *162under the seven-day rule on December 9, 1991, dismissing the action with prejudice and without cost to either party, and a second judgment entitled, "Order Setting Aside December 9, 1991 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Disposition and Reentering Order Granting Summary Disposition” followed. The second judgment was dated February 4, 1992, and was endorsed, "approved as to form and content,” signed by Harold Perakis, attorney for the plaintiff, ánd Paul Kettunen, attorney for the defendant. The reason for the second judgment is not explained in the record. The approval by counsel cannot be denied and is not denied. Neither fraud nor mistake has been raised. I think appellate review is barred.
I would affirm.