Court Opinion

ID: 9694865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:57:43.782515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:05.882849
License: Public Domain

STEELE, Chief Justice
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that we review the motion judge’s decision to admit Grenier’s proffered experts for abuse of discretion.1 I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion because I believe that *543the motion judge abused his discretion by admitting Grenier’s experts’ opinions.
The majority and I differ on the significance of the motion judge’s gatekeeping role under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 The majority concludes that the motion judge may conclude that an expert’s opinion is reliable testimony after assessing only whether the proffered expert is qualified in a recognized field in which he intends to testify, and that his work product has been peer reviewed. The majority concludes that if the motion judge is so satisfied, then the expert’s opinion is reliable and may be admitted.
After a four day Daubert hearing in this case, the motion judge concluded that the “plaintiffs’ medical and scientific evidence ... is sufficiently reliable to pass through the Daubert filter, and that the proper manner by which to challenge the plaintiffs’ theories, and to expose their weaknesses, is through vigorous cross examination of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.”3 The majority agrees with the motion judge that vigorous cross examination of an expert’s methodology underlying his opinion will allow the jury to ferret out the truth of disputed opinions proffered by opposing experts.
I disagree. The motion judge’s gatek-eeping role does not end when he rules that the proffered expert is qualified to testify in a particular field. An expert may be qualified in a field and his work may have been commented on by other experts, but that alone does not demonstrate that a sound, verifiable methodology underlies an opinion in a particular case. The motion judge must also assess the methodology supporting the proffered expert’s opinion to assure that the opinion is verifiable and therefore reliable. I conclude that the motion judge abused his discretion by allowing the jury to hear expert opinion testimony before completing the Daubert analysis and without sufficient factual support for the proposition that the expert derived his view from a validated, reliable methodology.
DISCUSSION
A. Experts Must Provide Reliable Testimony that Focuses on the Facts of the Case
Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and permits the presentation of “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge” if it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”4 To be admissible, “(1) the testimony [must be] based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony [must be] the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness [must have] applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”5 Because D.R.E. 702 is substantially similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, we chose, in M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau,6 to follow the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of F.R.E. 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.7 In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court held that F.R.E. 702 requires trial judges to *544“ensure that any an all scientific testimony ... is not only relevant, but reliable.”8
To fulfill the role of gatekeeper, the trial judge must determine whether:
(1) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill experience, training or education;
(2) the evidence is relevant and reliable; 9
(3) the expert’s opinion is based upon information reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field;
(4) the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and
(5) the expert testimony will not create unfair prejudice or confuse or mislead the jury.10
As the gatekeeper, a trial judge must determine “whether an expert’s testimony ‘has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.’ ”11 Just because an expert is qualified in a field does not automatically make his opinion reliable.12 Expert testimony “must be supported by appropriate validation — i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known,” and all “inference[s] or assertion[s] must be derived by the scientific method.”13 Scientific knowledge requires more than unsupported speculation.14 The trial judge must determine whether the expert, though qualified in his field, can produce a sufficiently informed opinion that is testable and “verifiable on the issue to be determined at trial.”15 Only after the trial judge determines that the expert proffers a “relevant, reliable, validated, and, therefore, trustworthy” opinion, can the expert offer his opinion to the jury and be cross examined on the basis for his opinion.16 When considering whether a proffered expert presents a reliable opinion, trial judges must focus on the “ ‘principles and methodology’ used in formulating an expert’s testimony, not on the expert’s resultant conclusions.”17
Though an expert’s conclusion need not be consistent, the expert must have applied his principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.18 The Daubert Court provided a nonexhaustive list of factors for trial judges to consider in determining whether scientific testimony is sufficiently reliable:
(1) whether a theory or technique can or has been tested;
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication;
*545(3) whether a technique had a high known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling its operation; and
(4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community.19
Ordinarily, scientific testing is a key consideration for a trial judge in determining reliability because testing a hypothesis separates science from other fields of human inquiry.20 Whether the hypothesis has been published in a peer reviewed journal “will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.”21 The known rate of error and whether the scientific community accepts the hypothesis can also have some bearing on reliability.22
In this case, I believe the motion judge abused his discretion when he permitted Drs. Lemen and Dodson to offer concluso-ry opinions without providing the principles and methodology testing the opinions that would suggest that those opinions were reliable. After finding that the experts were qualified to testify in their field, the motion judge should have evaluated their proffered testimony to ensure that it had good grounds in reliable scientific methodology.23 Drs. Lemen and Dodson merely opined that it was possible that fibers from friction products could cause disease because verified science has established that fibers from nonfriction products cause disease — a classic ipse dixit.
Grenier’s experts did not offer evidence to satisfy Daubert’s first reliability indicator of whether the principle or methodology underlying the opinion can or has been tested.24 Dr. Lemen did not provide any testable principles or methodology to support his assumption, yet, the motion judge permitted his opinion testimony. Drs. Le-men and Dodson conceded that they could not prove that fibers from friction products caused disease, but they speculated that those fibers could because there was no evidence to suggest otherwise. The motion judge, therefore, had no proposition other than the negative on which he could rely to consider whether the experts’ opinions have been or even could be tested in order to find those opinions reliable.25
Though Grenier’s experts purportedly relied on peer review studies, another Daubert reliability indicator,26 those studies did not test his experts’ actual hypothesis: whether asbestos fibers from friction products could cause disease. Dr. Lemen relied on studies from Drs. Langer and McCaughley and reports from the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization to conclude that friction products can release unaltered chrysotile fibers, however, those studies did not allow him to conclude that those unaltered fibers did cause cancer. He relied on Bradford Hill studies to conclude that exposure to general chrysotile fibers cause disease. When he applied the Bradford Hill consid*546erations, he did not account for fibers being altered by friction. Yet, he then opined that fibers from friction products could cause disease because there was no evidence suggesting that the fibers were different that the fibers from nonfriction products. Dr. Lemen also relied on an Australian Tumor registry to conclude that there was an “exceptionally high risk” of disease among automobile mechanics; however, he noted that the studies had significant shortcomings and were equivocal. According to Dr. Lemen himself, none of the studies demonstrated a positive association between friction products and mesothelioma.27 Those studies applied no validating methodology to verify whether chrysotile fibers from friction products cause disease in automobile workers.28
Similarly, Dr. Dodson concluded through his own research and peer review studies that friction products may release chryso-tile fibers as well as inert fibers. He opined that chrysotile fibers from nonfriction products cause disease. He assumed that chrysotile fibers from friction products could cause disease on the sole proposition that there was no evidence contradicting his hypothesis. Dr. Dodson did not consider the surface charge or surface chemistry of the friction fibers when he assumed that friction fibers would have the same toxicity as nonfriction fibers. Yet, both Drs. Lemen and Dodson acknowledged that surface characteristics affect the toxicity of fibers. Despite that ac-knowledgement and the absence of any independent validating testing of their own, neither Dr. Lemen nor Dr. Dodson provided peer review studies to bolster the reliability of their hypothesis that fibers subjected to friction cause disease.29 This flaw in Grenier’s experts’ opinions is critical. Peer review studies that do not apply to the facts of the case do not provide a testable, verifiable hypothesis.30 They can hardly, under these circumstances, validate non existent studies by the testifying experts.
No other listed Daubert reliability indicators were present. The experts did not profess that they had a technique with a high known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling its operation.31 Both the experts and the motion judge conceded that the theory that friction products cause disease was a speculative hypothesis that had yet to be proved. The experts did not offer a theory or technique which enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community that could validate their hypothesis.32
In his Report on Remand, the motion judge assumed that the lack of evidence discounting Drs. Lemen’s and Dodson’s speculation fortified their speculation.33 This approach incorrectly shifts the focus *547from an examination of what the experts offer to support their opinion to the absence of information to discredit those views. The motion judge should have excluded the experts because they did not provide a reliable methodology (either their own or another) to support their conclusion. Without a testable methodology to support their conclusion, their respective opinions were conclusory or merely speculative.
B. The Burden of Proof Rests on the Party Proffering the Expert
The motion judge compounded the error of admitting Grenier’s experts by placing a burden on Ford to disprove Grenier’s experts’ opinions’ admissibility. The party proffering an expert bears the burden of establishing that the expert’s opinions are admissible by a preponderance of the evidence.34 As stated, part of proffering an expert is establishing that the expert can support his conclusion with reliable, verifiable science.35 The motion judge erred by putting the onus on Ford to counter Grenier’s experts at the Daubert hearing rather than assume that Grenier’s experts could only offer an expert opinion after establishing at the Daribert hearing that their conclusions were based on sound, reliable, verifiable scientific bases. In effect, the ruling emasculated the concept of a gate keeper’s role.
Because I disagree that Grenier’s expert’s testimony satisfied Daubert, I conclude that the motion judge abused his discretion when he allowed Drs. Dodson and Lemen to offer opinion testimony. Dr. Lemen was Grenier’s sole causation expert. Admitting his unreliable opinion testimony constituted reversible error.

. M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del.1999) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)).

. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

. In re Asbestos Litig., 911 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Del.Super.2006).

. D.R.E. 702.

. Id.

. 737 A.2d at 521-22.

. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

. Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

. Id. at 590-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

. Bowen v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 906 A.2d 787, 795 (Del.2006) (citing Tolson v. State, 900 A.2d 639, 645 (Del.2006); Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1227 (Del.2004)).

. Id. at 794.

. Eskin, 842 A.2d at 1228; see Goodridge v. Hyster Co., 845 A.2d 498, 503 (Del.2004).

. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786; see D.R.E. 702 (expert testimony requires reliable principles and methods that are applied to the facts of the case).

. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

. Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1228 (Del.2004); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (whether a theory or technique will assist the trier of fact as scientific knowledge will often rely on whether it can and has been tested).

. Potter v. Blackburn, 850 A.2d 294, 299 (Del.2004) (quoting Mason v. Rizzi, 2004 WL 439690, at *4 (Del.)).

. Bowen v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 906 A.2d 787, 794 (Del.2006) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786).

. D.R.E. 702.

. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

. Id. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

. Id. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

. Id.

. D.R.E. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (trial judge can consider whether a method can or has been tested for reliability).

. Id.

. See id. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (trial judge can consider peer review studies for reliability).

. General Motors v. Greiner, C.A. No. 05C-11-257, at * 14 (Del.2009) (Remanding Appeal).

. D.R.E. 702; Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1228 (Del.2004).

. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (trial judge can consider peer review studies for reliability).

. D.R.E. 702; Eskin, 842 A.2d at 1228; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (whether a theory or technique will assist the trier of fact as scientific knowledge will often rely on whether it can and has been tested).

. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (trial judge can consider a known rate of error for reliability).

. See id. (trial judge can consider general acceptance for reliability).

. In re Asbestos Litig., C.A. No. 05C-11-257, 2009 WL 1034487, at *5-5, 8, 9-10 (Del.Super.2009) (Report on Remand).

. Bowen v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 906 A.2d 787, 795 (Del.2006) (citations omitted).

. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786; Bowen, 906 A.2d at 794; Eskin, 842 A.2d at 1228.