Court Opinion

ID: 9900959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 21:01:53.496644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:23.074792
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HELENE TONIQUE LAURENT MILLER, )
                                    )
                Plaintiff,          )
                                    )
      v.                            )                  Case No. 1:23-cv-02945 (UNA)
                                    )
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., )
                                    )
                Defendants.         )

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Plaintiff, appearing pro se, has filed a complaint, Dkt. 1, and an accompanying

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), Dkt. 2. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s

application for leave to proceed IFP, and for the reasons explained below, it will dismiss this

matter without prejudice.

        Plaintiff, who appears to reside in Chicago, Illinois, sues the United States Departments

of Justice and Labor, a company referred to as “Gamma Team Security,” and Tiffany &

Company, for $40 million in damages arising from alleged employment discrimination. The

complaint’s allegations leave much to be desired. Plaintiff fails to plead any facts whatsoever

implicating the Department of Justice or the Department of Labor. And the allegations raised

against Gamma Team Security and Tiffany & Company are vague, overbroad, and boilerplate, at

best.

        Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch,

656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires complaints

to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . [and] (2)

a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661,

668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the

claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and

determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498

(D.D.C. 1977). As is true here, “[a] confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions

. . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F.

Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up).

       Plaintiff’s complaint falls within this category, failing to provide the Defendants or this

Court with clear notice of her intended claims. Indeed, a claim is facially plausible only when

the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A pleading must provide more than “labels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Simply put, Plaintiff’s intended claims fail to meet the

requisite standard.

       The Court also notes that Plaintiff has failed to establish venue in the District of

Columbia. She has not presented any allegations giving rise to a claim against the named federal

agencies. And although Plaintiff has failed to provide addresses and contact information for the

Defendants, in contravention of D.C. Local Rule 5.1(c)(1), it does not appear that Gamma Team
Security and the relevant Tiffany & Company are located in the District of Columbia. Likewise,

the alleged actions giving rise to this case appear to have occurred exclusively in Illinois.

        Relevant here, Title VII provides that a civil action may be brought:

               in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment
               practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which
               the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and
               administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person
               would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but
               if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may
               be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his
               principal office.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Moreover, there is a clear preference for adjudicating employment

discrimination claims in the judicial district most concerned with the alleged discrimination. See

Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102–03 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Here,

assuming arguendo that plaintiff’s claims are cognizable, they do not belong in this District. See

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

        For the reasons stated above, this case will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s

pending motion for leave to use of a P.O. Box, Dkt. 3, is denied as moot. A separate order

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

       Date: November 17, 2023
                                                               /s/ Ana C. Reyes
                                                               ANA C. REYES
                                                               United States District Judge