Court Opinion

ID: 9556706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 06:00:26.51254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:48.481850
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     CLIFTON D. LOLLAR,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DA-1221-14-0324-C-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: August 17, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Ashok Bail, Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the appellant.

           Larry Zieff, Esquire, Williston, Vermont, for the agency.

           Michelle M. Murray, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                           ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross
     petition for review of the compliance initial decision, which granted the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     appellant’s petition for enforcement in part. Generally, we grant petitions such as
     these only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous appl ication of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party
     has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross
     petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the cross
     petition for review and AFFIRM the compliance initial decision to find the
     agency in noncompliance as to the appellant’s special act award, and ORDER the
     agency to submit satisfactory evidence of compliance.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant, a GS-14 Supervisory Criminal Investigator, filed an
     individual right of action (IRA) appeal claiming that the agency took several
     personnel actions against him in retaliation for various protected disclosures.
     Lollar v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-14-
     0324-W-1, Initial Appeal File, Tabs 1, 6.            On December 13, 2016, the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision granting corrective action as to
     some of the claimed prohibited personnel practices.        Lollar v. Department of
     Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-14-0324-W-3, Appeal File,
     Tab 35, Initial Decision (ID). Neither party petitioned for review, and the initial
     decision became the Board’s final decision. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.
                                                                                       3

¶3         On May 31, 2017, the appellant filed a petition for enforcement alleging
     that the agency was in noncompliance because it miscalculated the performance
     award it owed him, failed to award him a quality step increase (QSI), and failed
     to pay him a special act award.     Lollar v. Department of Homeland Security,
     MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-14-0324-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab 1 at 7-16.
     The administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision granting the
     appellant’s petition for enforcement in part.     CF, Tab 6, Compliance Initial
     Decision (CID).    She found the agency in compliance as to the performance
     award and the QSI but in noncompliance as to the special act award. CID at 4-7.
     She therefore ordered the agency to calculate and pay the appellant a special act
     award. CID at 7.
¶4         The agency has filed a petition for review, arguing that it should not be
     required to pay the appellant a special act award because this relief was not
     specified in the ordering paragraphs of the merits initial decision.      Lollar v.
     Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-14-0324-C-1,
     Compliance Petition for Review (CPFR) File, Tab 1; ID at 45 -46. The appellant
     has filed a response in opposition, as well as a cross petition for review disputing
     the administrative judge’s findings on the performance award calculation. 2 CPFR
     File, Tab 3.

                                        ANALYSIS
     The agency’s petition for review is denied.
¶5         In her compliance initial decision, the administrative judge found that the
     agency was in noncompliance concerning the special act award. CID at 6-7. She
     found it undisputed that the agency had taken no action to calculate or pay the
     appellant a special act award. CID at 6. Although the agency conte nded that it

     2
       The appellant does not appear to dispute the administrative judge’s finding of
     compliance regarding the QSI.
                                                                                         4

     was not required to do so because the initial decision’s ordering paragraphs
     contained no mention of a special act award, the administrative judge found that
     it was otherwise clear from the initial decision that she had granted corrective
     action in this regard. CID at 6-7. She therefore ordered the agency to calculate
     and pay the appellant a special act award and to provide the appellant evidence of
     its compliance. CID at 7.
¶6         On petition for review, the agency maintains that, under the terms of the
     initial decision, it is not required to pay the appellant a special act award. CPFR
     File, Tab 1.   The agency argues that it is only required to comply with the
     directions in the initial decision under the section captioned “Order.” Id. at 5-6.
     The agency also disputes the administrative judge’s finding that it was “clear”
     that she intended the agency to pay the appellant a special act award. Id. at 7.
     The agency argues that, if this were the administrative judge’s intention, she
     should have included this in the ordering paragraphs of the initial decision
     because “the agency cannot be expected to sift through dicta in the merits [initial
     decision] to discern the [administrative judge ’s] intent.” Id. The agency further
     argues that the appellant is essentially using the petition-for-enforcement process
     to challenge the outcome of the merits proceedings, an approach that the Board
     has rejected in the past.    CPFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5, 7-9; see, e.g., Jones v.
     Department of the Navy, 50 M.S.P.R. 398, 400 (1991). The agency argues, in the
     alternative, that the compliance initial decision’s grant of a special act award be
     invalidated due to vagueness because the administrative judge did not specify an
     amount for the award. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 9.
¶7         For the following reasons, we disagree with the agency. First, to the extent
     that the agency is arguing that the analysis section of an initial decision is dicta,
     we disagree. Although there may be dicta contained in an administrative judge’s
     analysis, those holdings and findings necessary for the administrative judge to
     reach her decision are not.       Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
     (definition of “dictum”). Second, we disagree with the agency that the initial
                                                                                      5

     decision was in any way unclear on this point. Although not under the heading
     “Order,” the initial decision specifically states, “the appellant’s request for
     corrective action with regard to [the special act award] is granted.” ID at 32. We
     fail to see what is unclear about this. Third, the Board will not allow obvious
     omissions in an order to serve as a loophole for parties to avoid the obligations
     imposed by an initial decision. See Shenwick v. Department of State, 90 M.S.P.R.
     192, ¶ 6 n.1 (2001). Initial decisions, like other legal documents, should be read
     and interpreted as a whole. See Webster v. Department of the Army, 911 F.2d
     679, 687-88 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We find that the special act award fell properly
     within the scope of the petition for enforcement and that the petition was not an
     attempt to expand the relief to which the appellant is entitled under the terms of
     that decision.   For these reasons, and in light of the remedial nature of the
     Whistleblower Protection Act and the Board’s broad remedial and enforcement
     authority, see generally, Tram v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 388, ¶ 7
     (2012); Weed v. Social Security Administration, 110 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶ 5 (2009),
     Porter v. Department of the Treasury, 80 M.S.P.R. 606, ¶ 10 (1999), we agree
     with the administrative judge’s finding of noncompliance.
¶8        As for the alleged vagueness of the administrative judge’s order, although
     she did not specify an amount for the special act award, this is not at all unusual
     for a remedial order and in no way renders it invalid. The agency is in possession
     of all the information necessary to calculate the award, and it will do so in good
     faith in accordance with the administrative judge’s instructions. CID at 7. The
     agency’s petition for review is denied.

     The appellant’s cross petition for review is denied.
¶9        In her merits initial decision, the administrative judge found that the
     appellant earned a summary performance rating of “achieved excellence” for
     fiscal year 2012, and that he received a 16-hour time-off performance award. ID
     at 26-28. However, she also found that the appellant had received greater awards
     for the same summary rating in prior years, and that three out of five similarly
                                                                                           6

      situated employees had received greater awards than the appellant in fiscal year
      2012.     ID at 27-28.    The administrative judge found that the appellant was
      entitled to corrective action as to the performance award, and she ordered the
      agency to grant the appellant an additional cash or time -off award for fiscal year
      2012, consistent with applicable policies and regulations, and consistent with the
      awards granted to other employees with the same performance rating.                ID
      at 30, 45.
¶10           In her compliance initial decision, the administrative judge found that the
      agency complied with her order by paying the appellant a $1,000 cash award and
      increasing his time-off award from 16 to 24 hours. 3 CID at 4. She found that this
      performance award was consistent with the awards given to the five comparator
      employees. CID at 4-5. Although the appellant argued that these comparator
      employees were not unit chiefs like he was, the administrative judge found that
      the appellant had not filed a petition for review of the merits initial decision to
      challenge the propriety of the comparators. CID at 4.
¶11           On cross petition for review, the appellant argues that, instead of basing the
      performance award on what the comparator employees received for fiscal year
      2012, the agency should instead have based the performance award on what he
      had received in fiscal year 2010.       CPFR File, Tab 3 at 24.      The appellant’s
      proffered method would result in a cash award of $3,000 and a time-off award of
      40 hours. Id. at 23-24.
¶12           Putting aside the issue of whether the appellant missed his opportunity to
      challenge the identity of the comparators, we find that the method of calculation
      that the administrative judge ordered, and that the agency applied, was more
      appropriate than the method that the appellant now proffers.             Specifically,
      performance awards are heavily dependent on factors specific to the performance

      3
       Because the appellant was no longer employed by the agency, the agency paid him the
      cash equivalent of the increased time-off award. CID at 4.
                                                                                          7

      year in question; these include the funding available for such awards and the
      number of employees among whom these funds must be distributed.                   See
      Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Guidance on
      Awards for Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012, from John Berry, Director, Office of
      Personnel Management (June 10, 2011), https://chcoc.gov/content/guidance-
      awards-fiscal-years-2011-and-2012.      We recognize that, unlike the appellant,
      none of the five comparators were unit chiefs. However, in the absence of any
      evidence to show that this fact would have figured prominently into the
      performance award calculation, we find that the awards that the agency paid to
      the comparators in 2012 provide a better benchmark for relief than the awar d that
      it paid the appellant 2 years earlier. 4    Because the $1,000 cash and 24-hour
      time-off performance awards match those given to the most highly awarded
      comparators, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency is in
      compliance with respect to the appellant’s 2012 performance award. ID at 27;
      CID at 3-5.
¶13         The appellant appears to raise some other matters on cross petition for
      review that do not warrant any action at this time.         To the extent that the
      appellant is requesting sanctions against the agency, CPFR File, Tab 3 at 26, we
      find that sanctions are not appropriate at this time, see generally 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.43. To the extent that the appellant is requesting leave to seek attorney
      fees related to these enforcement proceedings, CPFR File, Tab 3 at 26, he may
      file a motion for attorney fees under the procedures of 5 C.F.R. § 1201.203. The
      appellant’s cross petition for review is denied.

      4
        Under the appellant’s proffered method of calculation, his designation as unit chief
      would have entitled him to approximately double the performance award of other
      otherwise similarly situated GS-14s. We find this to be inherently unlikely.
                                                                                        8

                                           ORDER
¶14        We ORDER the agency to submit to the Clerk of the Board within 60 days
      of the date of this Order satisfactory evidence of compliance. This evidence shall
      adhere to the requirements set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(6)(i), including
      submission of evidence and a narrative statement of compliance. The agency’s
      submission shall demonstrate that it properly calculated the appellant’s special
      act award and that the back pay awarded to the appellant reflects that calculation.
      The agency must serve all parties with copies of its submission.
¶15        The Board will assign a new docket number to this matter, MSPB
      Docket No. DA-1221-14-0324-X-1. All subsequent filings should refer to the
      new docket number set forth above and should be faxed to (202) 653 -7130 or
      mailed to the following address:
                                    Clerk of the Board
                            U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board
                                   1615 M Street, N.W.
                                  Washington, D.C. 20419

      Submissions may also be made by electronic filing at the MSPB’s e-Appeal site
      (https://e-appeal.mspb.gov) in accordance with the Board’s regulation at 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.14.
¶16        The appellant may respond to the agency’s evidence of compliance within
      20 days of the date of service of the agency’s submission.               5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.183(a)(8). If the appellant does not respond to the agency’s evidence of
      compliance, the Board may assume that he is satisfied with the agency’s actions
      and dismiss the petition for enforcement.
¶17        The agency is reminded that if it fails to provide adequate evidence of
      compliance, the responsible agency official and the agency’s rep resentative may
      be required to appear before the General Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection
      Board to show cause why the Board should not impose sanctions for the agency’s
      noncompliance in this case. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c). The Board’s authority to
      impose sanctions includes the authority to order that the responsible agency
                                                                                         9

      official “shall not be entitled to receive payment for service as an employee
      during any period that the order has not been complied with.”             5 U.S.C.
      § 1204(e)(2)(A).
¶18        This Order does not constitute a final order and is therefore not subject to
      judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). Upon the Board’s final resolution of
      the remaining issues in this petition for enforcement, a final order shall be issued
      which shall be subject to judicial review.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                       /s/ for
                                                   Jennifer Everling
                                                   Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.