Court Opinion

ID: 9494542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:39:50.729381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:27.645925
License: Public Domain

GRABER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
' I respectfully dissent. The BIA correctly applied current law, as it was obligated to do. The majority attempts unavailingly to distinguish the controlling case, Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir.2001), instead relying heavily on an incomplete reading of Astrero v. INS, 104 F.3d 264, 266 (9th Cir.1996). Moreover, the majority misapplies Guadalupe-Cruz v. INS, 240 F.3d 1209,1210 n. 1 (9th Cir.), amended by 250 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir.2001); and Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 2000).
A. Setting the Stage: The Chronology
Petitioner’s deportation proceedings coincided with dramatic changes in immigration law. To understand how that law applies to him, it is necessary first to set out the events leading up to this appeal and the effective dates of the relevant statutory changes. The Appendix details this chronology in a chart.
On February 23, 1989, Petitioner entered the United States from Peru. On December 4, 1995, less than seven years later, he was served with an “order to show cause,” the INS’s charging document. On April 15, 1996, an initial deportation hearing was held. Petitioner conceded deportability, but applied for a suspension of deportation based on continuous physical presence.
On September 30, 1996, IIRIRA was signed into law. Section 309(a), entitled “In general,” establishes that IIRIRA’s provisions were to become effective “on the first day of the first month beginning more than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act” — that is, April 1, 1997. Astrero, 104 F.3d at 266.
On October 25, 1996, before the effective date of the Act, the IJ in Petitioner’s case correctly applied pre-IIRIRA law and granted Petitioner’s suspension of deportation. In November of 1996, the INS appealed. Also in November of 1996, the INS argued its interpretation of the effec*1278tive date of IIRIRA before this court in Astrero. We decided Astrero on December 30,1996.
On April 1, 1997, in accordance with § 309(a) as construed by Astrero, IIRIRA became effective. At that time, the INS’s appeal of Petitioner’s case remained pending before the BIA. In June of 1997, the INS filed a short memorandum with the BIA stating simply that it rested on its brief, which had been filed on November 20, 1996. On September 30, 1997, as required by § 309(c)(6)(A), the BIA applied IIRIRA’s now-effective stop-time rule, § 240A(d)(l), and held that Petitioner did not meet the seven-year continuous presence requirement.
In November of 1997, Congress enacted the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). It became effective as if originally part of IIRI-RA. Pub.L. 105-100, § 203(f), 111 Stat. 2200 (Nov. 19,1997).
B. Applicable Statutes
Section 240A(d)(l) of IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(l), is known as the stop-time rule. Before the stop-time rule was enacted, aliens could count time spent in appeals to the INS toward their period of “continuous physical presence” in the United States for the purpose of applications to suspend deportation. After the enactment of § 240A(d)(l), continuous physical presence stops accruing upon service of an order to show cause or a notice to appear.
Section 309(a), set forth in the notes to 8 U.S.C. § 1101, articulates the effective date of IIRIRA. Section 309(c), entitled “Transition for certain aliens,” begins by establishing the general rule of IIRIRA’s applicability to “transitional aliens”: “Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection,” the amendments do not apply to aliens in exclusion or deportation who were in proceedings before IIRIRA’s effective date. However, the statute does not stop there.
Section 309(c)(6)(A), a “succeeding provision of ... subsection” 309(c), states:
In general — Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C),[1] paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [section 1229b(d) of this title] (relating to continuous residence or physical presence) shall apply to orders to show cause ... issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act ....
(Emphasis added.) The clear intent of Congress in enacting these statutes and subsequent amendments is that, after April 17, 1997, the stop-time rule in § 240A(d)(l) applies to aliens whose orders to show cause “issued before” that effective date.
C. The majority fails to apply the controlling case.
This case is controlled by Ram. There, we held that the BIA must apply IIRI-RA’s stop-time rules to transitional-rule aliens like Petitioner:
Because the legislative history of NA-CARA resolves any ambiguity in the plain language of IIRIRA section 309(c)(5)(A), we conclude that there is only one reasonable interpretation of this statute. We hold that IIRIRA section 309(c)(5)(A) generally applies the stop-time rule to transitional rule aliens whose deportations were initiated with the service of an [order to show cause] and who seek suspension of deportation.
243 F.3d at 516 (emphasis added).
The Ram family entered the United States on August 22,1987. Id. at 512. On *1279May 17, 1988, they were served with an order to show cause and, later, were found deportable (but granted voluntary departure) by an IJ. They challenged the IJ’s decision before the BIA, which affirmed. Id.
On November 16,1994, the Rams moved to reopen the deportation proceeding to apply for suspension of deportation. Their appeal was then pending before this court. Id. The Rams asserted that they had accrued seven years of physical presence while their deportation proceeding was pending. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, and we remanded the case for reconsideration. Id.
On June 29, 1999, more than two years after IIRIRA became effective, the BIA applied § 240A(d)(l) retroactively. Id. at 512. We affirmed.
In so doing, we carefully construed the statutory text and held that § 309(c)(5)(A) requires application of the stop-time rule to aliens, like the Rams and Petitioner, who were served with orders to show cause before the effective date of IIRIRA. Id. at 513-16. We also described extensive legislative history that supports this conclusion. Id. at 515-16. As initially enacted, § 309(c)(5)(A) stated that the stop-time rule applied to “notices to appear” issued before, on, or after the effective date of IIRIRA. Because the term “notices to appear” in IIRIRA replaced the old term “orders to show cause,” there was confusion as to how the stop-time rule could apply to such non-existent documents issued before the effective date of the Act. Id. at 513, 515. That is, because IIRIRA first introduced the term, there were no “notices to appear” issued before the effective date of IIRIRA. However, NACARA amended § 309(c)(5)(A) retroactively and changed the term to “orders to show cause.” Id. at 515. This change makes the intent of Congress much clearer — § 309(c)(5)(A) expressly applies the stop-time rule of § 240A to charging documents issued before the effective date of IIRIRA.2 Id. at 516.
In so holding, we joined seven other circuits. Sad v. INS, 246 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir.2001); Angel-Ramos v. Reno, 227 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir.2000); Afolayan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir.2000); Rivera-Jimenez v. INS, 214 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir.2000); Gonzalez-Torres v. INS, 213 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir.2000); Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 708 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 857, 121 S.Ct. 140, 148 L.Ed.2d 92 (2000); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1228, 120 S.Ct. 2657, 147 L.Ed.2d 272 (2000). We also approved the BIA’s own interpretation, Nolasco-Tofino, Int. Dec. 3385, 1999 WL 218466 (B.I.A. Apr. 15, 1999) (en banc), to which we owe some deference, Urbina-Mauricio v. INS, 989 F.2d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir.1993).
Although the Rams’ case was in a different procedural posture than is Petitioner’s, the cases are indistinguishable with respect to the application of the stop-time rule. The majority attempts to distinguish Ram on the grounds that it “was not an appeal from a correct ruling by an IJ prior to the effective date” of IIRIRA; that the Rams, rather than the INS, had appealed; and that Petitioner “had completed the seven-year requirement before the IJ *1280ruled and before the effective date of IIRI-RA.” (Maj. op. at 1276-77.) The first ground is beside the point in view of our cases, discussed below in Part E, which require the BIA to apply new law to a pending appeal even if the IJ correctly applied previous law. With respect to the second ground, nothing in IIRIRA or in the logic of Ram suggests that the statute should mean something different depending on which party initiates the appeal. The third ground assumes the answer; the very question before us is whether Petitioner completed the seven-year requirement in accordance with the statute. In Ram we answered that question “no,” because the accrual of relevant time stopped upon the order to show cause.
Like the Rams, Petitioner was served with an order to show cause long before the effective date of IIRIRA. Like the Rams, Petitioner’s case was pending when IIRIRA took effect. Like the Rams, Petitioner had not accrued seven years of continuous physical presence before service of the order to show cause. The same stop-time rule must apply.
D. The majority’s reliance on other precedents is misplaced.
The majority relies on Astrero for its conclusion that, as of June 16, 1997, there was statutory authority to consider Petitioner’s request for suspension of deportation. (Maj. op. at 1276.) As the majority correctly points out (id.), Astrero construed § 309(a) as establishing a six-month waiting period between IIRIRA’s enactment and its effective date. 104 F.3d at 266.
But Astrero also discussed § 309(c)(5)(A). As we said in Astrero, § 309(c)(5)(A) “concerns the retroactivity of the new § 240A once it becomes effective,” id. (emphasis in original), and we warned that, “on and after April 1, 1997, the new requirements may apply retroactively to trigger cutoff dates based on notices to appear issued prior to April 1, 1997,” id. Of course, the date when the INS filed its memorandum in this case, reiterating its legal position — June 16, 1997 — already was after the effective date of April 1, 1997.
When we decided Astrero in December of 1996, the new rules had not yet become effective, so those comments about the future retroactivity of § 309(c)(5)(A) may not have been a holding, as distinct from a cautionary note. Ram, however, picked up that suggestion where Astrero left off.
In the light of Ram, the majority’s reliance on Guadalupe-Cruz and Castillo-Perez is similarly misplaced. Guadalupe-Cruz and Castillo-Perez both specifically state that they do not decide the issue of the stop-time rule’s retroactivity. (“Petitioners also challenge the application of the stop-time rule to their cases, arguing that ... the stop-time rule should not apply to Orders to Show Cause served before IIRIRA was enacted_ Given our holding, we do not reach [this] issue[ ].” Guadalupe-Cruz, 240 F.3d at 1210 n. 1; “[W]e decline to exercise our discretion to consider the BIA’s holding that NACARA’s timing rule is triggered by an order to show cause and should generally apply retroactively.” Castillo-Perez, 212 F.3d at 523.) That issue of retroactivity was decided squarely in Ram.
Moreover, neither case is an exception to the BIA’s obligation to apply current law. In both cases, the BIA applied the then-effective IIRIRA stop-time rule. A-though we reversed in both cases, we did not do so because the BIA’s application of IIRIRA law was in error. Rather, the errors in each case took place at the IJ level.
In Guadalupe-Cruz, we reversed because the IJ had applied the stop-time rule in March of 1997, before the effective date of IIRIRA, in clear violation of Astrero *1281and § 309(a). 240 F.3d at 1211. In Castillo-Perez, we reversed because the petitioner had not received a proper hearing before an IJ as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. 212 F.3d at 527. Due process required that Castillo-Perez be afforded that opportunity. Id. at 528.
E. The BIA was bound to apply current law when it decided this case.
The majority errs further when it carves out an exception to the rule that the BIA must apply the current law as of the date of its decision. Urbina-Mauricio, 989 F.2d at 1088 n. 4. Indeed, “the BIA was required to apply the law existing at the time of its review, even if different from the law applied by the IJ.” Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir.1999) (emphasis added).
As a rationale for carving out an exception, the majority repeatedly asserts that the INS acted improperly when it failed to respond to Petitioner’s citation to Astrero and when it maintained its appeal thereafter. (Maj. op. at 1274-1276.) I disagree.
• When the INS filed its appeal to the BIA, Astrero had not been decided yet, so the taking of the appeal plainly was proper.
• The INS had no obligation to withdraw its appeal after Astrero, either, especially in view of our acknowledgment in that case that § 309(c)(5) would make the stop-time rule retroactive to cases like Petitioner’s. Although the majority does not phrase it this way, what the opinion really means is that the INS had to withdraw its appeal after we decided Astrero. Functionally, that is what the majority is forcing upon the INS: because, in the majority’s view, the appeal became “meritless,” the court will not give effect to the existence of the appeal by requiring the BIA to apply current law as it usually must. In my view, that result usurps the executive-branch function of deciding whether to continue to prosecute an appeal. Nor was the appeal “meritless.” As our decision in Ram made clear, the INS’s position ultimately proved to be correct in all respects.
• Finally, there is no support in the record for a conclusion that the BIA itself acted improperly in not deciding the case sooner. The BIA decided Petitioner’s case within one year of the IJ’s decision, certainly not an extraordinarily long delay.
F. Conclusion
The IJ did not err, and neither did the BIA. Each applied the version of the stop-time rule that was extant when it heard the case. That was precisely Congress’ intent. Accordingly, I would deny the petition, and I dissent from the majority’s contrary holding.
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. Subparagraph (B) concerns cases in which the Attorney General elects to terminate and reinitiate proceedings. Subparagraph (C) exempts certain classes of aliens from the retro-activity of § 309(c)(5)(A). Neither of those provisions affects Petitioner.

. Section 309(c)(5)(A) essentially codified the BIA’s holding in 21 I. & N. Dec. 812, Int. Dec. 3309, 1997 WL 107593 (B.I.A. Feb. 20, 1997) (en banc), which was vacated by former Attorney General Reno. See N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3415, 1999 WL 1390344 (B.I.A. Aug. 20, 1999). That decision was vacated not ■ because it was wrong, but because consistent legislative action was imminent. Immigration Legislation Handbook § 4:23 (West 2000).