Court Opinion

ID: 9609097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:22:29.96847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:48.969645
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. The result reached by the majority imposes an improper judicial limitation upon S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-40 (1985 & Supp.1999) and the Full Commission. This decision threatens the right and duty of the Commission to factually analyze and apply the statute.
The procedural posture of this case reveals a decision by the Single Commissioner, affirmed in toto by the Full Commis*114sion, and validated by the Circuit Court. The only issue in this case is the interpretation and application of S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-40 (1985 & Supp.1999):
“Average weekly wages” means the earnings of the injured employee in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury during the period of fifty-two weeks immediately preceding the date of the injury....
When for exceptional reasons the foregoing would be unfair, either to the employer or employee, such other method of computing average weekly wages may be resorted to as will most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury. (Emphasis added).
This statute squarely places upon the Commission the authority to determine if “exceptional circumstances” exist justifying a deviation.
The cases of Boles v. Una Water Dist., 291 S.C. 282, 353 S.E.2d 286 (1987); Foreman v. Jackson Minit Mkts., Inc., 265 S.C. 164, 217 S.E.2d 214 (1975); McCummings v. Anderson Theatre Co., 225 S.C. 187, 81 S.E.2d 348 (1954); and Booth v. Midland Trane Heating & Air Cond., 298 S.C. 251, 379 S.E.2d 730 (Ct.App.1989), are cited by the majority. Consistently, the holding in all the cases is that the Full Commission’s factual determination of deviation due to “exceptional circumstances” is a matter left to the sound discretion of the Commission under the statute.
The majority invades the province of the Workers’ Compensation Commission by injecting an appellate court formula. The formula devised by the majority eviscerates the language of the statute. I disagree with the mathematical recipe approved by the majority. There is no fairness in the judicial windfall bestowed upon Wal-Mart. The majority emphasizes the temporal status of the Osteen employment. Such reliance skews the mathematical calculation and renders the statute nonefficacious.
Here, the Commission has exercised sound discretion in deciding the factual issue of deviation. I believe it is error to conclude as a matter of law that the Commission incorrectly computed the employee’s wages. I would affirm the order of the Circuit Court.