Court Opinion

ID: 9528833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:44:28.163851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:22.856152
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
dissenting: I am, respectfully, unable to agree with the opinion held by the majority of the court.
This action in quo warranto is brought by a landowner contesting the validity of seven Kansas City annexation ordinances, four of which are admittedly invalid. It is agreed that plaintiff has an interest adverse to the three ordinances which the city claims are legal.
The pertinent statute, K. S. A. 60-1203, is not set out in the court’s opinion. It reads:
“Where the action is brought by a person claiming an interest in an office, franchise or corporation, or claiming an interest adverse to a resolution, ordinance, franchise, gift or grant, which is the subject of the action, it shall be prosecuted in the name and under the direction of such person, otherwise it shall be prosecuted in the name of the state by the attorney general or county attorney. . . .”
These provisions seem as clear and unambiguous as the English language affords. In my judgment, the statute should be construed to mean exactly what it says. Not a single word is obscure in meaning, nor is the phraseology complex.
It is the general rule that words in common use are to be given their natural and usual meaning (Pfleiderer v. Brooks, 122 Kan. 647, 253 Pac. 549). Concomitantly, where the language of a statute is definite, clear and unambiguous, there is nothing left for interpretation (Taylor v. S. H. Kress & Co., 136 Kan. 155, 12 P. 2d 808).
Should there be the least lingering doubt that this statute permits *619a person to challenge, in his name, a city ordinance adversely affecting his interest (as the statute expressly provides), that doubt should be completely dispelled by the amendment to the former law (G. S. 1949, 60-1603) by which the words “ordinance” and “resolution” were added to the statute.
Under the former statute, which provided that where an action was brought by a person claiming an interest adverse to a franchise, gift or grant it was to be prosecuted in that person’s name, this court consistently denied the right of an individual to bring an action questioning the validity of a city ordinance. The many cases cited in the court’s opinion are to such effect, but all were decided under the old statute. By legislative action, that statute was amended and it now authorizes a person to bring an action where his asserted interest is adverse to a “resolution” or “ordinance” as well as adverse to a “franchise, gift or grant.”
It is a cardinal rule of construction that where an existing statute is amended by legislative enactment, a change in the law as it was must have been intended. This court has adhered to that sound principle to the present time, our most recent expression being found in Curless v. Board of Johnson County Commissioners, 197 Kan. 580, 419 P. 2d 876. In Curless, we said:
“But when the legislature revises a prior existing law it will be presumed that the legislature intended to make some change in the law as it existed prior to the amendment. In the case of State, ex rel v. Richardson, 174 Kan. 382, 256 P. 2d 135, at page 386, this court said:
“ ‘We will presume that the legislature in revising the mentioned statute intended to make some change in the existing law and we will, therefore, give effect to the amendment. A change in phraselogy or a deleting of a phrase of the original act raises a presumption that the change of meaning was also intended.’
“Any other construction would mean the legislature accomplished nothing by its revision. We must assume that a revision of a prior law was intended to supply some want and to fill some deficiency in existing legislation. (City of Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan. 236; Brown v. Illinois Bankers Life Assur. Co., 144 Kan. 670, 63 P. 2d 165; State, ex rel v. Richardson, supra.)” (p. 587.)
In discussing the meaning, purpose and effect of the change effected in the old statute by the 1963 amendment, Judge Gard in his Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, annotated, says on pages 673 and 674:
“Heretofore there has been no doubt that an attack on the validity of a city’s attempt to extend its boundaries could be made only by the state through *620the county attorney or the attorney general, no matter how personal rights might be affected by the imposition of additional tax burdens or otherwise. . . .
“By changing the order of arrangement of the language this section seems to emphasize the right of private persons to maintain quo warranto to protect their personal interests as of primary importance, without limiting the power of the state to resort to the remedy where the matter is strictly of public concern or where private persons fail to act. No bar is placed on the right of the state to intervene in the interest of the general public, but the exclusive right of the attorney general to control and dismiss the proceedings is apparently curtailed.
“The former statute recognized the right of private persons to bring the action where there was a claim of interest in a franchise, gift or grant or an interest adverse thereto. The new section adds the words ‘resolution, ordinance,’ so that if a private party can show an interest adverse to a ‘resolution, ordinance, franchise, gift or grant’ the action can be maintained by him. The apparent purpose of adding ‘ordinance’ and ‘resolution’ was to modify the principle of exclusive control by the attorney general over the regularity of municipal proceedings.
“It is still necessary in any event that a private person be able to show that he has a special and peculiar interest and right (or that there has been an invasion of right ) not enjoyed or suffered by the public generally. In this respect the test of his right to bring the action is now on the same ground as in injunction or mandamus. . . . Applying the principles applicable to the other remedies mentioned it would seem that now if the illegal annexation of property to a municipality were shown to impose additional tax burdens on the property annexed, those persons affected should at least have their day in court either through their own action or through representation by the county attorney or attorney general.”
This discussion suggests the dilemma in which an individual could find himself under the old statute, and under the new as well, in view of the majority opinion herein. Where an illegal annexation would result in additional taxes on property in the area annexed, an individual owner’s remedy would depend entirely on the willingness of the attorney general or the county attorney to prosecute an action challenging the annexation ordinance in the name of the state. This court has also held, in State, ex rel., v. City of Kansas City, 186 Kan. 190, 350 P. 2d 37, that the attorney general has an absolute right to dismiss such an action where he has superseded the county attorney on whose relation the action was originally brought. If both county attorney and attorney general refused in the first instance to prosecute an action, or if either moved to dismiss an action after it had once been instituted, the aggrieved owner would be left without relief.
By way of illustration, let us suppose that a city, in violation of *621K. S. A. 12-502a, presumes to annex, by ordinance, 160 acres of unplatted land over the protest of the owner, where the land is not circumscribed by platted territory taken into the city, and is not improved property receiving city benefits and protection. In such event, the landowner would undoubtedly be subjected to a tax burden not suffered by the public generally and he should be entitled to his day in court. Yet, under the court’s interpretation of the amended statute, the afflicted owner would have no redress whatever should the attorney general and county attorney refuse to act in his behalf. In my opinion, the purpose of the 1963 amendment was to guard against such an unacceptable hiatus in the law.
In its brief, as amicus curiae, the League of Kansas Municipalities points out that under the provisions of K. S. A. 12-502c the attorney general or the county attorney is limited to one year in bringing an action challenging the validity of an annexation ordinance, while an individual is not subject to that limitation. I recognize the validity of the complaint, but believe the discrepancy may easily be remedied by the legislature. It is a matter which should be corrected by legislative action rather than by judicial misconstruction.
I would proceed to consider this appeal on its merits.
Schroeder, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.