Court Opinion

ID: 9611753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:59:58.146417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:16.259172
License: Public Domain

TAFT, Justice,
dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s opinion in all respects but one: I would hold that prejudgment interest assessed under Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (MLIIA) subchapter P1 is subject to the damages cap. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I do so for the following reasons. First, had the Legislature intended for the prejudgment interest provision of subchapter P, added in 1995, to prevail over the then 18-year-old liability limitation of subchap-ter K, it surely would have said so. It did not. Second, the Legislature knew how to *567exempt categories of damages from the cap. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 11.02(b), (c) (expressly exempting expenses of necessary medical, hospital, and custodial care from damages cap and providing cap does not limit Stowers liability). Nonetheless, no express “exemption” for prejudgment interest appears anywhere in the MLIIA. Third, in contrast to the majority’s view, I read the House Bill analysis to show that subchapter P’s purpose was to bar prejudgment interest on future damages, rather to create another exception to subchapter K’s damages cap. See House Comm, on Civil Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 971, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (“Prejudgment interest on future damages are [sic] eliminated. The substitute will bar the award of prejudgment interest on damages which have not occurred at the time of judgement. It will also allow prejudgment interest on past damages to accrue from the date of injury.”).
Fourth, I believe capping prejudgment interest is consistent with Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, in which the appellant argued that, if the MLIIA cap included prejudgment interest, then the cap statute conflicted with the general prejudgment interest statute because both contained mandatory language. 43 Tex. S.Ct. J. at 1151, 1159-60, 34 S.W.3d 887, 890, 900-01 (Tex. Aug. 24, 2000) (designated for publication). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that construing the cap to prevail over the general prejudgment interest statute comported with the liability-limitation scheme that was unique to article 4590i’s “self-contained structure.” Id. at 1160, 34 S.W.3d 887, 901. The Court also reasoned that the more specific statute (the MLIIA cap) should control over the more general one (the general prejudgment interest statute). Id. I recognize that Auld is distinguishable to the extent its holding was based on the MLIIA cap’s being the more specific statute and on the MLIIA’s “self-contained structure.” However, Auld shows that the MLIIA cap exists to limit liability, and it is instructive by analogy because it shows how subchap-ters K and P can be harmonized to effectuate that purpose “to the extent that damages — including prejudgment interest — do not exceed the cap.” See Auld, 43 Tex. S.Ct. J. at 1160, 34 S.W.3d 887, 901.
Finally, and most importantly, I disagree that subchapter P “trumps” sub-chapter K when to do so would undermine the MLIIA’s intended purpose. To quote the majority, “the MLIIA’s purpose ... was to ‘reduce excessive frequency and severity of health care liability claims through reasonable improvements and modifications in the Texas insurance, tort, and medical practice systems,’ thereby making health care and its liability insurance more affordable and available. Limitation of damages was considered an essential part of the goal of reducing medical malpractice premiums by the Legislature and the ‘Keeton Commission,’ whose findings the Legislature adopted in enacting article 4590L” Columbia Hosp., Inc. v. Moore, slip op. at 21 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 22, 2001, no pet. h.) (designated for publication) (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 1.02(a)(l)-(ll), (b)(l)-(© (Vernon Supp.2001); Auld, 43 Tex. S.Ct. J. at 1153-54,1157,1160, 34 S.W.3d 887, 891-93, 897, 900 (repeatedly stating that the MLIIA’s purpose is to limit civil liability for damages). Capping prejudgment interest — regardless of under what statute it is awarded — achieves this purpose.
Accordingly, I would hold the Moore parties may recover prejudgment interest on those damages subject to the MLIIA cap only up to the amount of the cap.

. TexRev.Stat. Ann. art. 4590Í, §§ 16.01 .02 (Vernon Supp.2001).