Court Opinion

ID: 9677498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:53:45.894681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:56.330160
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in reversing the trial court’s order vacating the protective order in toto. The trial court went too far in abolishing the protective order and in ordering the wholesale declassification of all documents. However, the majority goes too far in finding that the plaintiffs acted in bad faith in moving to vacate the protective order. There is no predicate for such a gratuitous finding, and, indeed, the terms of the order *66prohibiting dissemination of the documents outside this or related litigation was open to variation by the terms of the order itself. Self categorization by the defendant was not intended to forever consign to secrecy the documents produced. A mechanism for judicial overview was provided and most appropriate.
Two aspects of the flexibility of the arrangement require comment. First of all, documents produced by Upjohn before February 5, 1990, were not protected by the order. Their dissemination was not restricted. Secondly, even documents protected and bearing the designation contemplated by the order could be copied or disseminated unless application was made to the trial court in opposition thereto and an order obtained to that effect. The penultimate paragraph of the order of February 21, 1990, is set forth here in its entirety to evidence what I consider to be the understanding of the parties that some documents would flag a compelling reason for disclosure and publication of such was contemplated.
12. After the discovery cut-off in this case has expired, any party desiring to disseminate confidential documents in any manner not specifically authorized by this protective order, is required to notify the other party at least 15 days before any anticipated dissemination of documents. Such notification shall be in writing and shall include a detailed listing or description of all documents which the notifying party intends to disseminate and also identify the persons or entities to whom the documents will be disseminated. If the parties cannot stipulate to the proposed dissemination of documents, the party opposing dissemination has the burden to make application within 15 days from receipt of such notice to the Court for an order enjoining the dissemination of all or part of the subject documents, upon a reasonable showing why such documents should not be disseminated *67as proposed. No documents shall be disseminated under the procedure set forth in this paragraph without the stipulation of the parties or approval by the Court.
Not only was plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the protective order procedurally proper and contemplated by the order itself, respectable authority exists that the trial court retains ultimate discretion to modify or even to abolish a protective order. See Krause v Rhodes, 671 F2d 212, 219 (CA 6, 1982).
Finally, I don’t see any parade of horrors that would necessarily follow the declassification of protective orders in drug cases, complex or otherwise. The only quarrel I have is with the trial court’s wholesale declassification of the voluminous material here without reviewing the documents or providing an orderly procedural method for the evaluation of arguments regarding whether the documents in question are entitled to continuing protection. Because the majority prevails here, I do not feel compelled to provide or outline any such mechanism in this dissent. I can see where the trial court would be horrified at the prospect of reviewing 25,000 documents item by item, but the problem is not irresistible.
While I join in reversal, I would order it to be without prejudice. I believe the trial court had it well within its authority and discretion to declassify any or all of the documents upon appropriate findings, or if based upon appropriate review or analysis, by a delegated authority. Furthermore, if on remand plaintiffs move to vacate the protective order, and if defendant asserts entitlement to continued protection pursuant to MCR 2.302(C)(8), the trial court should examine the challenged documents in camera, or make some other appropriate mechanism for screening them, and develop a record adequate for appellate review.