Court Opinion

ID: 9747892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:41:14.061775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:27.996742
License: Public Domain

*1317PREMO, J.
I concur. A juvenile court adjudication does not offend Apprendi and Jones.1 “The California Supreme Court has succinctly explained Apprendi in the following terms: ‘This is what Apprendi teaches us: Except for sentence enhancement provisions that are based on a defendant’s prior conviction, the federal Constitution requires a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of every element of a sentence enhancement that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the “prescribed statutory maximum” punishment for that crime. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1076 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 901].) Jones, which preceded Apprendi, stated: “One basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness [of prior convictions] is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense ... a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.” (Jones, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 249.) “Thus, Jones’ recognition of prior convictions as a constitutionally permissible sentencing factor was rooted in the concept that prior convictions have been, by their very nature, subject to the fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections intended to guarantee the reliability of criminal convictions: fair notice, reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial.” (U.S. v. Tighe (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1187, 1193.)
In this state, the right to a jury trial is guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 16, 29.) However, juveniles do not have this right. (In re Daedler (1924) 194 Cal. 320 [228 P. 467].)2 “[A]s Justice Kennard explained in her dissenting opinion in Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168, 41 P.3d 3] ... ‘The juvenile court system and the adult criminal courts serve fundamentally different goals. The punishment for serious crimes tried in the criminal courts is imprisonment, and “the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.” [Citation.] California Rules of Court, rule 4.410[,] identifies seven objectives in sentencing a criminal defendant. They include punishment, deterrence, isolation, restitution, and uniformity in sentencing, but they do not include goals important in the treatment of juvenile offenders such as maturation, rehabilitation, or preservation of the family....’” (People v. Smith, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1080.) As most recently stated by the Legislature, offending juveniles are brought into the juvenile court system “to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the *1318jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection of the public. When removal of a minor is determined by the juvenile court to be necessary, reunification of the minor with his or her family shall be a primary objective. When the minor is removed from his or her own family, it is the purpose of this chapter to secure for the minor custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his or her parents ....” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a).) Given the desire of the Legislature to maintain the relative informality of the juvenile court and still provide parens patriae influence in seeking the rehabilitation and protection of the minors under its jurisdiction, the separation of the juvenile and adult courts still has a practical purpose.
It is noteworthy that “the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles.” (Schall v. Martin (1984) 467 U.S. 253, 263 [81 L.Ed.2d 207, 104 S.Ct. 2403].) Although on a petition to have a minor declared a ward of the juvenile court minors are as entitled as adults to notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination, double jeopardy, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 543 [29 L.Ed.2d 647, 91 S.Ct. 1976] (McKeiver); People v. Fowler (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 581, 585 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 874]), for the factfinding function, juveniles are entitled to a trial by a superior court judge. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601 et seq.) The majority of juvenile court decisions in this state are still rendered by dedicated and experienced jurists, assisted in the crucible of truth-finding by able prosecutors and defense counsel and their supporting staffs. The juvenile court’s role as parens patriae is fulfilled if at all stages of the proceedings, the juvenile court assures the minor of his or her statutory rights and follows statutory procedures in conducting the hearing. (In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 831 [41 Cal.Rptr. 379].)
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the fairness of such proceedings. It stated: “We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial—or any particular trial—held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury.” (Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 158 [20 L.Ed.2d 491, 88 S.Ct. 1444].) “[A] juvenile constitutionally—and reliably [citation]— can be adjudicated a delinquent without being afforded a jury trial....” (People v. Fowler, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 586, citing McKeiver, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 547.) The California Constitution recognizes the reliability of juryless trials by providing, in the same section that guarantees the right to a jury trial, the right to waive a jury trial. “Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all, ... A jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the *1319defendant and the defendant’s counsel. In a civil cause a jury may be waived by the consent of the parties expressed as prescribed by statute.” (Cal. Const., art. I., § 16.) If juryless trials were so unreliable that adults could not choose to waive a jury, then juveniles would be entitled to the same protections. However, since juryless trials are authorized by the state Constitution and their fairness has been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court (Duncan, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 158), I am satisfied that juvenile adjudications are reliable enough to be used as strikes under the “Three Strikes” law. If sentence enhancement by a nonjury juvenile court adjudication really offended Apprendi and Jones, nonjury adult court adjudications would be suspect as well.

 Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] (Apprendi); Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227 [143 L.Ed.2d 311, 119 S.Ct. 1215] (Jones).

 This holding has been criticized as based on a “mistaken interpretation of historical fact” (In re Javier A. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 913 [954, 206 Cal.Rptr. 386]) and on a rationale that “has eroded completely away.” (People v. Smith, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085 (dis. opn., Johnson, J.).)