Court Opinion

ID: 9380205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 17:00:53.416169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.582479
License: Public Domain

FILED
                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                              MAR 17 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARTA DE LOS ANGELES MERINO-                     No.   20-70087
DE RAMIREZ; DORA IVETTE
RAMIREZ-MERINO,                                  Agency Nos. A209-900-105
                                                             A209-900-104
              Petitioners,

 v.                                              MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted March 15, 2023**
                                Pasadena, California

Before:      TASHIMA, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
            The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
      Petitioner Marta de Los Angeles Merino-de Ramirez and her minor

daughter,1 natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of a decision of

the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing the appeal of a decision of the

Immigration Judge (“IJ”), who denied their application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

      1.     The agency’s finding that Petitioner failed to establish either past

persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution is supported by substantial

evidence. See Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining

that the agency’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and its factual findings

for substantial evidence). Petitioner described no incidents of harm or threats, but

only her generalized fear of the gang members outside her home and her fear of the

gang members someday having another shootout with the police. Fear of “general

crime and violence” alone typically “is not a basis on which relief will be granted.”

Hernandez-Galand v. Garland, 996 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2021); see also

Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be

      1
              Petitioner’s minor daughter’s claims are derivative of her claims. For
ease of reference, we will refer to the claims as Petitioner’s alone.
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free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang

members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).

      Nor are the vague, unfulfilled threats against Petitioner’s brother sufficient

to establish persecution. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1062 (9th Cir.

2021 (“[W]e have explained that although harm to a petitioner’s close relatives,

friends, or associates may contribute to a successful showing of past persecution, it

must be part of a pattern of persection closely tied to [Petitioner herself].” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)); Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025,

1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that, although “credible ‘death threats alone can

constitute persecution,’ . . . they constitute ‘persecution in only a small category of

cases, and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual

suffering or harm’” (first quoting Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 658 (9th Cir. 2000);

and then quoting Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000)). Petitioner

testified that gang members tried to force her brother to move out of his

neighborhood, but she submitted no other evidence of suffering or harm

      2.     The agency did not err in finding that Petitioner failed to show that

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her proposed social group of women who appear to be single was cognizable.2 See

Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2020) (reviewing de novo whether a

proposed particular social group is cognizable). The country report Petitioner cites

discusses the problem of violence against women but it does not specifically

address the group of women who appear to be single.

      Even if Petitioner’s proposed group were cognizable, she failed to “establish

a nexus between the feared harm and h[er] alleged membership in the proposed

group.” Macedo Templos v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2021). As the

IJ found, Petitioner presented no evidence that gang members targeted her because

she is a woman who appears to be single, and she acknowledged in her application

that she did not know why gang members tried to break into her house and she

speculated that it was to rob her.

      Because Petitioner has failed to establish eligibility for asylum, her claim for

withholding of removal also fails. See Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th

Cir. 2020) (“An applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard for asylum

      2
             Petitioner has waived her claim that her family is a cognizable social
group because her brief addresses only the other proposed group. See
Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
petitioner waived issue by failing to address it in the opening brief). Even if the
claim is not waived, the agency’s findings that Petitioner failed to show that her
family constitutes a distinct social group and to show that any harm was on account
of her membership in her family are supported by substantial evidence.

                                          4
necessarily fails to satisfy the more demanding standard for withholding of

removal, which involves showing by a ‘clear probability’ that the petitioner’s life

or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal.” (citation

omitted)).

      3.     The agency’s finding that Petitioner failed to establish eligibility for

protection under CAT is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner’s citation of

statistics about violence against women in El Salvador does not constitute evidence

that she or her proposed social group, in particular, would be subject to harm

amounting to torture if returned to El Salvador. See Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841

F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating that “generalized evidence” is

“insufficient for protection under CAT”).

      The petition for review is DENIED.

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