Court Opinion

ID: 9667920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:57:48.291206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:14.283289
License: Public Domain

RICKHOFF, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority and the dissent that the Olivos waived their premise defect claim, thereby making the topic of control a non-issue. The majority, however, reintroduces the problem of control when it holds that a simple negligence submission is supported by the Olivos’ allegations. If that is possible, then, after a complete review of the record, I agree with Chief Justice Chapa’s concurrence in our original opinion of August 10, 1994.1 What follows are now my words but once his and are the reasons for finding that no evidence supports a deemed finding of control.
In Lawson-Avila Construction) Inc. v. Stoutamire, 791 S.W.2d 584, 588-91 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied), this court stressed the importance of determining whether the general contractor or property owner/occupier retains control over the independent contractor in a manner that imposes a duty of care. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c (1965). The contract between the general contractor defendant and its independent contractors in Lawson-Avila contained several explicit provisions outlining the control retained by the general contractor. 791 S.W.2d at 589. In contrast, the contract between Williams and Diamond M explicitly states:
Operator [Williams] shall have no direction or control of Contractor [Diamond M] or its employees and agents except in the results to be obtained. The work contemplated herein shall meet the approval of Operator and be subject to the general right of inspection herein provided for Operator to secure the satisfactory completion thereof.
The actual performance and superintendence of all work hereunder shall be by Contractor, but Operator or its representatives shall have unlimited access to the premises to determine whether work is being performed by Contractor in accordance with all of the provisions of this Agreement.
(emphasis added). The above paragraphs clearly specify the parties’ intent to leave control over the drilling job to Diamond M. The general right retained by Williams to inspect job performance is not sufficient to trigger the duty explained in comment c of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414.
In assessing actual control exercised by Williams, the evidence indicates that, although Graham was present at the jobsite, his role was limited to monitoring progress, surveying drilling operations, and completing daily reports. The fact situation in Lawson-Avila contrasted significantly; the general contractor supervised various subcontractors on the premises, enforced federal regulations, and was ultimately responsible for the overall performance of the job. 791 S.W.2d at 590-91.
The majority, now joined by Chief Justice Chapa, recognizes a type of control that is unrelated to the thread protector, its location on the ground, and the employer’s discretion in running the project. Section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts creates liability for an owner/occupier who causes an injury by his failure to exercise his control of “any part of the work” with reasonable care. The agent’s control over one aspect of the job, in this case what was happening below ground, did not make the owner liable for negligence in an unrelated part of the pro*336ject, what was left on the ground. Thus, control over drug testing is not related to this accident; nor are the contract provisions for daywork, tools, drilling fluid, and surveys.
Upon a careful reading of the record, I find there is no evidence to support the deemed finding of control. I would reverse and render.

. The panel opinion of August 10, 1994 was withdrawn on June 7, 1995 by the panel’s opinion on appellees’ motion for rehearing. In turn. that opinion is withdrawn by today’s opinion on appellees' motion for rehearing en banc.