Court Opinion

ID: 9719120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:42:51.483855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.700214
License: Public Domain

CATHELL, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the findings but dissent as to sanctions. I would disbar the respondent. At each instance when respondent knowingly used client’s funds to pay his personal and business expenses, he was, at the least, misappropriating client’s funds.
The majority uses language that is overly kind in describing the negative balances in respondent’s trust accounts “while the respondent was still holding the $3500.00 for the client, the respondent’s attorney trust account again showed a negative balance.” The point is that respondent was not holding the $3,500.00. It was gone or there would have been no negative balance. In essence, the respondent was willfully misappropriating client’s monies for his own use. In my view, no other logical conclusion can be made from the facts of the case.
*521In Attorney Grievance v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773 A.2d 463, 470 (2001), we recently stated:
“Accordingly, we reiterate once again the position we announced in Kenney.1 Moreover, we expound upon it by holding that, in cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as ‘compelling extenuating circumstances,’ anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental and physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the ‘root cause’ of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the MRPC. Only if the circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment in cases of ... the intentional misappropriation of funds.... ” [Some emphasis added.]
Respondent acknowledges that when he did so, he knew he was using client’s funds for his own personal use. In essence, he proffers because he did not intend to keep it permanently or that he intended to replace the funds, it was not willful. I do not believe that the intention to give something back negates in any degree the willfulness of the taking in the first instance.
If this Court’s opinions are to be recognized as meaningful, respondent should be disbarred. If we do not mean what we have said in Vanderlinde, Kenney, and other cases, we should overrule the cases and say that misappropriation will not result in disbarment. To strain to reach contrary results in similar cases puts into question the credibility of the Court in disciplinary proceedings. Additionally, to treat willful misappropriation cases differently in respect to sanctions, in my view, raises questions among members of the bar in respect to fairness of treatment and, not the least, questions as to *522whether the Court means what it says in its disciplinary opinions.
Judge RAKER joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 664 A.2d 854 (1995).