Court Opinion

ID: 9515302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:55:38.381451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:27.793834
License: Public Domain

MEIERHENRY, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 12.] I respectfully dissent. The majority points out that this case creates cause for concern. With this, I completely *16agree. It is cause for concern because (1) vehicular homicide is not defined in the statutes as a crime of violence, (2) the legislature did not intend vehicular homicide to be considered a crime of violence, and (3) no specific findings of fact were made .to support its reclassification as a crime of violence. Tellingly, this has been the only time the Department of Corrections has classified vehicular homicide as a crime of violence when determining parole eligibility.

Vehicular Homicide, By Definition, Is Negligent Operation of a Vehicle

[¶ 13.] In order for a vehicle to become a “dangerous weapon,” we have consistently required it to be operated in more than a negligent manner. We have said that an automobile can be considered a dangerous weapon only in those instances where “the use of the automobile [is] of such a nature that death or serious bodily harm [is] a probable result.” State v. Stetter, 513 N.W.2d 87, 92 (S.D.1994) (citing State v. Seidschlaw, 304 N.W.2d 102, 106 (S.D.1981)). See also State v. Barrientos, 444 N.W.2d 374, 377 (S.D.1989); State v. Koester, 519 N.W.2d 322, 325 (S.D.1994).
[¶ 14.] The cases wherein we have approved of a vehicle being considered a dangerous weapon involved either aggravated assault or manslaughter, and the crimes as charged included the specific allegation that the crime was committed with the use of a-dangerous weapon. Consequently, the cases relied upon by the majority are clearly distinguishable because in all of those cases the defendants were specifically charged and convicted of crimes that included use of a dangerous weapon as one of the elements of the crime. In other words, in those cases, the judge or jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime by using the vehicle as a dangerous weapon.
[¶ 15.] In State v. Seidschlaw, a jury convicted the defendant specifically of first-degree manslaughter “ ‘perpetrated: (3) [without a design to effect death, but by means of a dangerous weaponQ’ ” 304 N.W.2d at 105 (citing SDCL 22-16-15) (emphasis added). In State v. Koester, a jury convicted the defendant of the crime of aggravated assault by attempting “ ‘by physical menace with a deadly weapon to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm.’ ” 519 N.W.2d at 324 (citing SDCL 22-18-1.1(5)) (emphasis added). In State v. Barrientos, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault by attempting “ ‘to cause, or knowingly causing], bodily injury to another with a dangerous weapon” 444 N.W.2d at 375 (citing SDCL 22-18-1.1(2)) (emphasis added). See also Stetter, 513 N.W.2d at 91-92 (defendant convicted of first-degree manslaughter for killing by means of a dangerous weapon). Additionally, in each case the defendant was ultimately convicted of a crime that the statute expressly designated as violent. See SDCL 22-1-2(9).
[¶ 16.] In this case, Boehrns pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide. Vehicular homicide by definition involves only negligent operation of a vehicle. Vehicular homicide, as defined by the legislature, is when a person causes the death of another “while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, ... without design to effect death, operates or drives a motor vehicle of any kind in a negligent manner[.]” SDCL 22-16-41 (emphasis added). Bo-ehrns was not adjudicated of using the vehicle in a manner “that death or serious bodily harm was a probable result;” he was adjudicated of driving “in a negligent manner.”
[¶ 17.] Additionally, our prior cases are distinguishable because they did not involve the parole eligibility statute at issue here. Unlike the cases cited to by the *17majority, here the Department and Board (not a judge or jury) had to engage in its own fact finding to determine whether the crime was a. violent offense. The Department or Board would have had to conclude that Boehrns’ use was “of such a nature that death or serious bodily harm was a probable result.” Seidschlaw, 304 N.W.2d at 106. In effect, the Department and Board would be making a post-conviction determination that Boehrns had been more than negligent in the operation of the vehicle and thereby had committed the higher level felony of manslaughter or aggravated assault. This is contrary to our prior cases or statutory directive.

Legislature Did Not Intend to Define Vehicular Homicide as a Violent Crime

[¶ 18.] There was no language in the parole eligibility statutes in effect at the time of this conviction that indicated the legislature intended to give the Department or the Board discretion to enhance a felony from nonviolent to violent after the conviction. The parole eligibility scheme was designed to be mandatory and conclusive, in order that anyone could read thé statute and know just how long the inmate would have to serve.6 In fact, the judge was required to announce the parole eligibility at sentencing. SDCL 23A-27-48. The list of violent crimes for purposes of setting parole eligibility was specific. Vehicular homicide was not listed. The following were listed: “murder, manslaughter, rape, criminal pedophilia, aggravated assault, riot, robbery, burglary in the first or second degree, arson, kidnapping, felony sexual contact as defined in §§ 22-22-7 and 22-22-19.1, felony child abuse as defined in § 26-10-1.” SDCL 22-1-2(9). The majority claims that vehicular homicide can be considered as a violent crime because it falls under the general clause of the statute, which further defined a violent crime as “any other felony in the commission of which the perpetrator used force, or was armed with a dangerous weapon,....” Id.7 Even if this were the case, the statute does not give the Department or the Board authority to look beyond the conviction, judgment and sentence. Here, Boehrns was not convicted of committing the felony “armed with a dangerous weapon.” This cannot be tacked on post-conviction.

Findings of Fact Not in the Record

[¶ 19.] The majority affirms the reclassification because the Board made an independent determination that this was a crime of violence. The Board' entered one conclusory finding that this was a crime of violence. The Board did not make an independent determination that Boehrns drove the vehicle in a manner that death or serious bodily harm was a probable result, as our prior cases require. The only finding by the Board that dealt with the facts of the case was as follows:
Mr. Boehrns was driving drunk on alcohol and marijuana on June 20, 1999 and *18caused a violent collision in which Curtis Abraharason. was thrown through the windshield of his car and killed.
The Board took no testimony or evidence concerning the underlying facts of the accident at the hearing. The main argument presented to the Board was based upon the trial court’s intentions.
[¶ 20.] There is no dispute in this case that the only reason the Department changed its initial classification from nonviolent to violent was because of a letter it received from the prosecuting Deputy State’s Attorney. In the letter, the prosecutor characterized the judge’s comment at sentencing as a “pronounce[ment] that vehicular homicide is a crime of violence.” The Board’s findings indicate that it was relying to a great extent on the trial court’s findings.8 The trial court, however, made no findings. All the trial court did was to inform the defendant at the sentencing hearing of how much time the defendant would have to serve before being eligible for parole, as he was required to do under SDCL 23A-27-48. After imposing the 15 year sentence, the judge told the defendant that the family wanted the judge to impose a sentence of “a term of years without parole;” however, he had no authority to enter such a sentence. The judge then wept on to say, “Mr. Boehrps, I’m going to tell you that because this is. a Class 3 felony and because I believe it would be classified as a violent offense or a crime of violence that you have to serve 50 percent of that sentence, ..., before you can be eligible for parole.” The judge made no further reference to the classification as a crime of violence. He gave no reason for his statement and provided no basis for his belief that it was a crime of violence. Even if the judge believed this case warranted a reclassification, he had no authority under the law to reclassify it. The statute only gives the Department the authority to set a parole eligibility date and it must do so according to the grid laid out by SDCL 24-15A-32. Consequently, the judge’s misstatement at sentencing could not and did not turn the vehicular homicide conviction into a violent crime, nor did it give the Department or Board the authority to reclassify the conviction.
[¶ 21.] The Department has consistently classified vehicular homicide as a nonviolent offense pursuant to statute, except for this one case. The only reason it went against its own procedure was because of a letter from the prosecutor overstating the trial court’s actions. To affirm this process is contrary to law. I would reverse the Board and trial court.

. The amendment in 2002, which specifically limited the phrase "armed with a dangerous weapon” to those crimes the defendant committed while armed with a firearm or stun gun, supports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend that setting the date of eligibility would involve discretion.

. It should be noted that this clause is no longer applicable to the violent crime statute. In 2002, shortly after this case was decided by the Board, the legislature amended the statute by removing the reference to violent crimes as defined at 22-1-2(9) and instead, specifically listed the violent crimes within the statute itself. The amended statute still does not include vehicular homicide as a violent offense. Further, "armed with a dangerous weapon,” was replaced with armed with a firearm,-including a machine gun, short shotgun or a stun gun. SDCL 24-15A-32; SDCL 22-14-12; -13.1. Therefore, under the current law, Boehrns’ crime unquestionably could not be classified as violent.

. The relevant finding of fact states:
In this case, however, when the Department of Corrections was made aware of the sentencing judge's intentions regarding this . being a crime of violence, the initial classification was changed from a Class 3 Nonviolent to a Class 3 Violent category.