Court Opinion

ID: 9588623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:28.897365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:37.244151
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in prohibiting defense counsel from questioning a potential juror concerning whether she would “hold it against him” because he was opposed to a local school bond referendum.
“Although control of voir dire examination is normally within the discretion of the trial court, it has been held that the defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right to have his prospective jurors questioned as to those matters specified in OCGA § 15-12-133. [Cit.] Hence, it (is) reversible error for the trial court to refuse permission to appellant’s counsel to ask such questions of each juror, for such ruling denie(s) appellant a substantial right granted him by statute. (Cits.)” (Punctuation omitted.) Mitchell v. State, 176 Ga. App. 32, 34 (335 SE2d 150) (1985).
Here counsel sought by his question to ascertain whether the juror, an assistant principal of a local school “[held] it against him” because he took a “very public position” against a local school bond referendum issue. Inasmuch as the question related to “[a] fact or [circumstances] indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias which the juror might have respecting . . . counsel,” it was clearly within the purview of OCGA § 15-12-133. “Accordingly, we hold that [the defendant] had a statutory right to ask the question disallowed in the instant case. . . .
“(W)here a defendant in a criminal case has been deprived of his or her rights under OCGA § 15-12-133 ... to examine prospective jurors on voir dire, the burden is on the (S)tate to show that the error was harmless. (Cits.) This holding applies even though the defendant did not exhaust his or her peremptory strikes.” Mitchell at 34. In the case at bar the state argues that the error was harmless because the question was repetitive of an earlier question counsel propounded to all the potential jurors concerning possible prejudice or bias towards him based on his position as a state legislator. The record shows, however, that the disallowed question concerned counsel’s actions on a local community issue and was unrelated to his legislative position.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Although the bases for defendant’s motion for mistrial may not have been stated with absolute or perfect clarity, in addition to stating that the court had embarrassed him in front of the jury, counsel also argued that his voir dire had been improperly restricted. Accordingly, I would reverse defendant’s conviction.
*121Decided March 17, 1989
Rehearing denied March 29, 1989.
Allen & Perry, Roy L. Allen II, Kevin E. Perry, for appellant.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, J. Clayton Culp, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke, Judge Birdsong, and Judge Benham join in this dissent.