Court Opinion

ID: 9809418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:12:49.527016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:11.618385
License: Public Domain

Merrimon, C. J.
(concurring): I concur in the order of the Court directing a new trial, but I cannot concur in all that is said in the opinion of the Court.
It is unquestionably true that a railroad corporation has the right to cut through and along its right-of-way and keep in repair such appropriate ditches, culverts and appliances as are necessary to carry off the surface water coming upon the right-of-way to a natural drain or outlet adequate to receive it. But it has not the right, by artificial means, to collect, divert and turn such surface water from its natural flow or condition through such ditches into a natural stream or outlet not of sufficient capacity to receive and carry it off without flooding the lauds along and adjacent to the banks of such stream to such extent as to destroy, or seriously impair its usefulness and value; nor has it the right to collect, divert and turn surface water not on its own land from land adjacent and near to its right-of-way into such stream, and so flood and injure land situate along and near to the stream. As is said in Staton v. Railroad, 109 N. C., 337, “A party must submit to the natural disadvantages and inconveniences incident to his land, unless he can in some lawful way avoid *447or remove and rid himself of them. But he has no right, as a general rule, to rid himself of them by shifting them, by artificial means, to the land of another, when naturally and in the order of things they would not go upon such land or affect it adversely.”
It seems to me that it would be manifestly subversive of common right and justice to allow the owner of land, as of r-ight, to so collect and turn the surfacé water upon, or coming upon it into a stream into which it would not naturally go unless by slow percolation through the soil, and thus overflow, flood and destroy the usefulness and value of the land of others situate along such stream. In such case, the party thus relieving himself of natural disadvantages incident to his own land, would do so by practically enlarging the natural capacity of the stream to the positive injury of other landowners. He would thus supplement — enlarge— the natural stream by destroying the value of the land of others; he would do so as certainly and palpably as he would injure the land of another adjoining his own, if he were to collect all the surface water on his own by artificial means and thrust it in a body upon the adjoining land. The law does not allow and will not tolerate such rank injustice, caused either by direct or indirect means. It will not, however, take notice of the increased flow of the natural stream caused by such diversion of surface water, unkss it is so great as to do substantial injur}' to the lands of persons complaining. The use of a natural stream by those entitled to have it, must be reasonable- — -not so large as to really change its size and do substantial injury to others.
In the present case, “ Devil’s Garden” is not a watercourse; it is a low depression in the surface of the earth, having the shape of a basin ; the water accumulating in it did not flow through “Arden Branch” into “Coburn Swamp,” a stream on which the plaintiff’s land is situate, except so much of it as sometimes overflowed its rim. Its water seems *448to have remained stagnant, except as it escaped mainly by evaporation; it did not go into “ Coburn Swamp,” generally, at all, except, perhaps, to some slight extent, by percolation through the soil. Before the defendant cut its ditches, the water of “Devil’s Garden,” it seems, did not swell the flow of “ Coburn Swamp” to any considerable extent. The case states that the defendant’s ditches, intended to drain its right-of-way, not only drained the latter, but as well turned all the water of “ Devil’s Garden” into “ Coburn Swamp.” The evidence tended to prove that, prior to cutting the defendant’s ditches, the current of the swamp was effectual as a drainage-way ; that afterwards ten times as much water passed down the swamp as before, overflowing the stream and the plaintiff’s land, and doing it substantial injury, which did not happen before the ditches were cut.
The defendant had the right, by means of suitable ditches, to drain its right-of-way, and free it of surface water, into the stream called “ Coburn Swamp,” if the latter was capable of receiving it without doing substantial injury to the plaintiff’s land situate near to and adjoining that stream ; but if that stream was inadequate for such purpose, and the effect of turning the water on the defendant’s right-of-way and of “Devil’s Garden” into it was to cause it to overflow to such an extent as to do the plaintiff’s land substantial injury, as alleged, then the defendant would be liable to him in damages for such injury.
It is said this stream was adequate for such purpose. But this does not appear. It seems that whether it was or was not, was not made a question on the trial. The evidence went to prove that the swamp where the defendant’s road crosses it was two to three hundred yards wide, “ with hills on either side eight or ten feet high,” but it did not appear that the whole swamp made up and constituted the stream — the current of running water. A material question in the case, as it *449appears from the record, is as to the capacity of the stream to receive the water turned into it by the defendant.
The defendant is on no better footing as to the drainage of its right-of-way than a natural person in like case. There is nothing in its charter that .purports to give it greater right or advantages in such respect, nor is there anything in its nature or purposes that entitles it to have them. If its purposes and necessities in the interests of the public require that it shall flood and destroy th.e usefulness of the land of an individual situate at a distance from its right-of-way, it must obtain authority from the Legislature to condemn that land, and pay for it, as it did its right-of-way. It has no right to do injury to a citizen’s land simply because it is a railroad corporation. Private property shall not be taken for public uses, except by the due exercise of the power of eminent domain.
It may turn out that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, but it does not appear from the record before this Court that the defendant is now entitled to judgment, as contended by its counsel.
Per curiam. Error.