Court Opinion

ID: 9639604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:41:32.128151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:20.365254
License: Public Domain

Henderson, Judge
(concurring in the result).
I think the overruling of the demurrer can be sustained on one or all of the following grounds:
(1) that the agreement is voidable because of the infancy of the appellee, (2) that the agreement is unfair in the light of the confidential relationship, or (3) that the agreement is a fraud upon her marital rights in the light of the circumstances alleged. The opinion of this court glosses over these points and reaches out to rest the decision upon the ground that the agreement on its face is unenforceable and illegal, although the parties are not in pari delicto. I think this holding ignores the plain language of the statute, substitutes the court’s view of public policy for that of the legislature, and decides the case on a point not considered by the chancellor and not argued in this court.
*621The language of Article 16, Section 42 is clear and unambiguous. Its adoption came immediately after the decision in Harrison v. Harrison, 1930, 160 Md. 378, 153 A. 58. It has been widely assumed that it was designed to modify the pre-existing law as laid down by the courts and encourage the settlement of property rights, and rights to alimony or support, by removing the risk that such settlements might be held invalid or a bar to subsequent proceedings for divorce. Cf. 2 Maryland L. R. 363 and 7 Maryland L. R. 150. It was a logical forerunner of the statute that now recognizes mutual consent, without regard to fault, as an independent ground of divorce. Both acts evidence a new and realistic approach to the problem by recognizing that the courts cannot, if they should, compel an unwilling cohabitation, and that collusion to obtain a legal separation is at least preferable to perjury as to the assigned ground or a suppression of the real cause, of which the parties themselves are not always fully aware because of the psychological factors involved. It seems peculiarly unfortunate for this court to revive an archaic doctrine in the teeth of Section 42.
In the late case of Kershaw v. Kershaw, 195 Md. 307, 73 A. 2d 223, we did not cite or construe this section. The parties sold their farm, divided the proceeds, signed mutual releases and went their separate ways, without convincing evidence of regret on either side. We held that under the circumstances, of which the agreement was one, neither party could claim desertion by the other. There was no intimation that the agreement itself was invalid or a bar to further proceedings per se.
In the instant case, if the agreement had been a fair one, made after full disclosure by adult parties, the mere fact that it contemplated, or was conditioned upon, subsequent proceedings for divorce would not, in my opinion, render it void or bar action upon grounds otherwise adequate. I think the decision should have been placed upon the other grounds suggested.