Court Opinion

ID: 9627077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:33:07.085013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:19.255348
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
Although I am generally in agreement with Justice Johnson’s opinion, I am not *578persuaded to fully concur in Part II, and I dissent from Parts V and VI. I do agree however that case law precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States interpreting the First Amendment guarantees of the United States Constitution requires that the summary judgment entered against plaintiff Irvin Wiemer cannot stand.
Justice Johnson’s opinion mentions “actual malice” without providing the legal definition of the term. At 573, 790 P.2d at 354. This term appears to be a main ingredient in defamation cases, and fearing that there may be some confusion of that term with the better known term “malice,” as used in ordinary civil cases to denote maliciousness, mischievousness, ill will, or harassment, it is in order to favor the readers of our opinions with a definition. In the Anderson case, cited by Justice Johnson, at 574, 790 P.2d at 355, the Supreme Court restated its legal definition of actual malice in this passage:
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), we held that, in a libel suit brought by a public official, the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to show that in publishing the defamatory statement the defendant acted with actual malice — ‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not’ We held further that such actual malice must be shown with ‘convincing clarity.’ Id., at 285-286, 84 S.Ct., at 729.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2508, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis added).
Justice Johnson has correctly concluded that Mr. Wiemer is not a public figure, yet, purporting to rely on Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), he states that Wiemer must prove actual malice in order to recover “presumed or punitive damages.” At 574, 790 P.2d at 355. This would be a correct statement if Wiemer’s action had been tried, Wiemer had been awarded presumed damages, and if Rankin were challenging that award. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) makes that proposition abundantly clear. Equally clear, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979), teaches that the issue of actual malice brings into play the defendant’s state of mind, the resolution of which is not readily subject to being made in summary judgment proceedings where, as an important concern, a defendant’s credibility is not open to assessment by the trier of fact, whereas it would be at trial. This proposition will be further addressed infra. But, at the very outset, contrary to the views of Justice Johnson, Mr. Wiemer was not obliged to prove anything in resisting a motion for summary judgment. It is not seen how any legally trained mind could become convinced that the defendant as a matter of law is entitled to summary judgment, resulting in the removal of presumed or punitive damages from further litigation, on the sole basis that the death of Mrs. Wiemer was a matter of public concern, or that there is not a sufficient showing of actual malice, which is the applicable rule. Definitely this is an issue which guiding case law precedent requires should be presented to a jury for resolution.
The plaintiff’s action in this case is based on the precise language of the Supreme Court’s definition of actual malice, and the allegation is that the defendant published the article either knowing of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether it was or was not false. Justice Johnson has found that the article contained false statements, and the other justices have agreed with this conclusion. Unlike many of the reported cases, such as Gertz, for example, where the defendant was a publisher of American Opinion and the libellous article was not authored by the publisher, but rather by a commissioned contributor, in the case before us the publisher and author are all one and the same, namely Ron Rankin. Under that scenario Mr. Rankin can point only to himself as the person responsible for any false statements, or half-truths, or innuendos which appear in his article. The plaintiff has presented a suffi*579cient showing of either presumable knowledge of falsity, or of reckless disregard, to create a triable issue. The defendant may still be able to maintain at trial that he did not know of the falsity of the statements which he made. But that is not the end of all inquiry. A factual determination which would properly be made at trial is whether or not the article was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard.
The issue of whether the defendant knew of the article’s falsity, or was guilty of reckless disregard, is an inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind. This inquiry is properly made by the jury, and not by trial judges through summary judgment proceedings, and especially, as here, not by appellate judges when reviewing district court grants of summary judgments. At summary judgment proceedings the plaintiff need not prove his case, but only needs to sufficiently establish his entitlement to a jury trial.
The district court’s opinion in the grant of summary judgment did make the statement that “even viewing the evidence most favorably to Mr. Wiemer by giving him the benefit of all proper inferences, there is no evidence that shows with convincing clarity that Ronald Rankin acted with requisite malice in publishing the subject article.” But the district court went on to explain that conclusion:
Most libel cases involving newspapers deal with critical articles directly focusing upon the plaintiff. In our present case, the thrust of the entire article published by Ronald Rankin was to publicly criticize and comment on Glen Walker’s performance in office as the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney. Mr. Wiemer was a person related by marriage to Deborah Wiemer, who met a violent death. This Court was concerned by the ‘ricochet’ effect which Mr. Rankin’s article had upon Irvin Wiemer. No judicial opinions could be found dealing directly with such an unusual circumstance. However, this Court is convinced the malice required to pursue this action must be directed to the plaintiff herein.1
The district court, I fear, had a better grasp of the unusual circumstance than do the justices who constitute a majority. The district court clearly understood that Rankin’s article was directed at Walker, who has not sued Rankin, and that the libelling of Mr. Wiemer was simply a by-product of Rankin’s attack on Mr. Walker. There is no reason to doubt what Mr. Rankin could truthfully say that he bore Mr. Wiemer no ill will. And, of course, on the standard definition of malice, Mr. Rankin could not be accused of prefabrication. However, our concern is with the hereinabove stated definition of the “actual malice” which applies to defamation actions.
The ultimate conclusion of the district court which supplied the basis for the above finding of “no evidence that shows with convincing clarity” was the district court’s view that “as a private figure embroiled in a matter of public concern, Mr. Wiemer bears that burden of proving the alleged defamatory statements were false____ The question involving falsity of the published material is not appropriate for the jury to consider inasmuch as Mr. Wiemer acknowledged its factual truth in his deposition.” R., 216-17.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment is therefore based upon the premise that actual malice could not be proved because Mr. Wiemer could not in the first place establish that any statements false as to him had been “directed” at Wiemer. On the other hand, Part V of Justice Johnson’s opinion restates the district court’s language, “[e]ven viewing the evidence most favorably to Mr. Wiemer by giving him the benefit of all proper inferences, there is no evidence that shows with convincing clarity that Mr. Rankin acted *580with the requisite malice in publishing the subject article,” to which the majority opinion simply adds: “We agree.” At 576, 790 P.2d at 357. Such is hardly a satisfactory appellate court analysis when the appellate court generally places no reliance on the district court’s analysis. If the appellate court did so, it could simply adopt the ratio decidendi of the lower court.
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2680, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979), the United States Supreme Court had before it a defamation case in which the district court and the circuit court had precluded a private plaintiff from pursuing redress in damages alleged to have resulted from a libelous publication. The Supreme Court noted that “the District Court said that in determining whether a plaintiff had made an adequate showing of ‘actual malice,’ summary judgment [for the defendant] might well be the rule rather than the exception.” The United States Supreme Court painstakingly paused in Hutchinson to respond to that assertion by its footnote 9:
Considering the nuances of the issues raised here, we are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called ‘rule.’ The proof of ‘actual malice’ calls a defendant’s state of mind into question, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition. See 10 C. Wright & A. Miller [& M. Kane], Federal Practice and Procedure § 2730, pp. 590-592 (1973). Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979). In the present posture of the case, however, the propriety of dealing with such complex issues by summary judgment is not before us.
Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 120, 99 S.Ct. at 2680 (emphasis added). Wright, Miller & Kane, say much the same:
[Sjummary judgment frequently is denied in contract actions requiring an inquiry into the intentions of the contracting parties, or in antitrust cases in which the intentions or motives of the alleged conspirators are crucial. The good faith or motive of defendant also plays a significant role in cases involving civil rights and discrimination and in patent litigation.
Similarly, cases involving malice necessarily call defendant’s state of mind into question and summary judgment often will be refused when that issue is raised. This is true, for example, in actions for libel and slander, although competing policy considerations there may argue for granting summary judgment.
10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2730, 240-42 (2d ed. 1983) (emphasis added). However, none of the authorities available present a more compelling case than does Mr. Wiemer for placing the witnesses on the stand and letting the jury reach a determination as to the existence of actual malice on the part of the defendant. Where I apparently differ from Justice Johnson is in my reading that we function only so far as to make an independent determination of whether or not there is a genuine triable issue as to defendant’s liability for bringing Mr. Wiemer into the publication. Clearly there is that triable issue. In fact, this almost appears as a matter of law, which I say because of my concern over the invalidity of the majority’s belief that the publication — as to Mr. Wiemer, and as written — was a matter of public concern or interest. Most assuredly, it appears that this is not so, but even if it were a matter of public concern, Mr. Wiemer has made a strong showing of actual malice (reckless disregard) needlessly directed at him by name which should be determined by a jury.
No one should challenge the district court’s specific finding that “... the thrust of the entire article published by Ronald Rankin was to publicly criticize and comment on Glen Walker’s performance in office as the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney.” R., 214. Undoubtedly it was. Mr. Rankin was out to shoot an eagle, but in the process of attempting that accomplishment, he shot down swallows. This statement by the district court brings to the fore another issue which seems to have *581been overlooked in the trial court proceedings, and again in this Court. Until now the defendant has been allowed, and now in this Court the defendant is being accorded, all of the immunity-from-suit rulings which have been granted to “the media,” i.e., publishers of newspapers and broadcasters of radio and television. However, it is highly doubtful whether the defendant’s publication was in fact a newspaper, or whether it was a news letter. On its face, at the least there is an ambiguity. On the first page of the Vox Pop is a clear concession that the Glen Walker article was drafted for publication in the NORTH IDAHO SUNDAY, which is apparently a publication of the Coeur d’Alene Press. The explanation is given that publication of Mr. Rankin’s article in the NORTH IDAHO SUNDAY was killed, and did not take place. Thereafter the article was printed and disseminated by the defendant.2 The publication appears to be a newsletter, and we are not informed by Mr. Rankin in his deposition testimony whether it was not regularly published, and had no subscribers thereto or advertisers therein. It cannot be found in any of the libraries in Boise.3 It is notable that the copy contains no advertising, and no price for it is listed, nor is there any indication therein of whether it is sold locally, or merely given away by mail and free distribution, as per the footnote 4 below.
The Supreme Court has discussed and distinguished private speech from forms of public speech. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986), the United States Supreme Court commented as follows:
The Court most recently considered the constitutional limits on suits for defamation in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985). In sharp contrast to New York Times, Dun & Bradstreet involved not only a private-figure plaintiff, but also speech of purely private concern. 472 U.S., at 751-752, 105 S.Ct., at 2941-2942. A plurality of the Court in Dun & Bradstreet was convinced that, in a case with such a configuration of speech and plaintiff, the showing of actual malice needed to recover punitive damages under either New York Times or Gertz was unnecessary:
In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest [in preserving private reputation] adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages — even absent a showing of “actual malice.” 472 U.S., at 761, 105 S.Ct., at 2946 (opinion of POWELL, J.) (footnote omitted), id., at 774, 105 S.Ct., at 2953 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment).
Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 774, 106 S.Ct. at 1562-1563 (emphasis added).
ít seems more likely than not that bringing Mr. Wiemer into the article was (by any evidence presented in the summary judgment proceedings), not a matter of public concern. Another factor to be cranked into the equation is that defendant had no need to name Irvin Wiemer in his article. The article could have been written, as it was admittedly intended, to assail Mr. Walker’s performance as Kootenai County Prosecutor, including Mr. Walker’s involvement in an unsolved 1980 homicide, without ever mentioning Mr. or Mrs. Wiemer. To mention Mr. Wiemer by name six years after the incident in an article aimed only at Mr. Walker is sufficiently out of the ordinary to strongly raise an inference of reckless indifference to the consequences. Moreover, not fairly stating the supposed case against Mr. Wiemer, as Justice Johnson has pointed out, certainly borders on reckless disregard of whether the case was false or not. Finally, by professing to be *582knowledgeable to the extent of exalting the article’s veracity in terms of “overwhelming and irrefutable” the defendant displays an awareness of the article’s falsity. The overkill in choice of words is not defensible. It does not appear that the death of Mrs. Wiemer six years earlier continued to be a matter of public concern. It very well could have been thrown into the article on Walker only for the bit of sensationalism that it might add.
In the Hutchinson case, 443 U.S. 111, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411, the Supreme Court of the United States dealt with a case where the plaintiff was libelled by the dissemination of a newsletter similar to Mr. Rankin’s newsletter. Reversing both the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals, the High Court held that what Senator Proxmire uttered in the Senate was protected by a specific grant of immunity contained in the Constitution of the United States, but that such immunity did not attach to his newsletters or press releases, none of which were “essential to the deliberations of the Senate.”4 Just as the Supreme Court held in Hutchinson that defendants charged with alleged defamation cannot by their own conduct create their own defense by purportedly making their victim into a public figure, it is equally true that the defendant in this case cannot by his own article make a stale homicide case into a matter of public interest or concern when in actuality it appears that there was, other than for defendant’s article, no showing of any genuine public interest or concern for the previous six years.5 Clearly, then, a triable issue of fact as to Mr. Rankin’s state of mind has been raised, and the issue should be tried and decided.
There are a number of passages in the Supreme Court’s most recent defamation opinion which lend considerable support to Wiemer’s right to lay his case before a jury. First, though, in setting the stage for applying Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989), to Wiemer’s case, it is in order to consider the teaching of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984), “that an appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’ ” Bose, 466 U.S. at 499, 104 S.Ct. at 1958.6 In Bose, the Supreme Court’s con*583cern was with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which states that “[findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.” Said the Court: “It surely does not stretch the language of the Rule to characterize an inquiry into what a person knew at a given point in time as a question of fact.’ ” Bose, 466 U.S. at 498, 104 S.Ct. at 1958. Although concededly in Mr. Wiemer’s case we have no findings as such, yet, we have deposition testimony and we have taped and transcribed police interviews of the various persons, including Wiemer, and we are certainly obliged to give any and all reasonable inferences to Wiemer in making our review. And we, presumably all five of us, are required to independently examine the entire record.
In Harte-Hanks, the first paragraph of the Court’s opinion cited Bose for the proposition that judges in defamation cases have a constitutional duty to “exercise independent judgment whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity.” 491 U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562. In context that statement was not relative to a district court denial of a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff's claim had gone to trial before a jury. The jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff had been defamed by a publication which was in fact false, and that the article in question had been published with actual malice. 109 S.Ct. at 2682.
Our inquiry, however, does not concern a case which has gone to a jury verdict for plaintiff, but rather a case which did not proceed to trial because it was dismissed at summary judgment proceedings. Nevertheless, it clearly appears from a reading of the cases cited herein, that our review of a summary judgment of dismissal requires a review of the same stature as that which we would make were we reviewing a case which had been tried, i.e., an independent review of the entire record in order to ascertain if the plaintiff’s showing precluded the entry of summary judgment of dismissal. Mainly, then, our independent review should be singularly aimed at determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to take his case before a jury and let it decide the question of defendant’s actual malice in causing to be printed and then disseminated the article on Walker which allegedly defamed Mr. Wiemer.
Independent review involves reading, inter alia, the depositions of Irvin Wiemer, Ron Rankin, the deposition of Detective Randy Bohn, the transcript of the taped police interview of Irvin Wiemer by Bohn, and of Debbie Wiemer’s mother and grandmother, a later second interview of Irvin Wiemer, and the report of a polygraphist from Lewiston, Idaho, employed by the Department of Law Enforcement, who concluded that Mr. Wiemer was being truthful in his account of Debbie Wiemer’s death. Much like the scenario in the Harte-Hanks case, where the person most highly involved, Patsy Stephens, was not interviewed by the reporter who would write the article, so in Mr. Wiemer’s case, Ron Rankin printed and disseminated his article without contacting the sheriff, Mr. Walker, Mr. Wiemer, Mr. Stalder (who was Mr. Walker’s investigator), or any other person who might have had information regarding the incident, especially including the polygraphist. Primarily, as Rankin admitted in his deposition, Rankin relied on Detective Bohn’s opinions as the basis for his article. Yet it was Mr. Rankin, not Detective Bohn, who in authoring, printing, and disseminating his article, declared the evidence irrefutable and overwhelming.
As has been seen, Justice Johnson in authoring the opinion for the Court makes much of Mr. Wiemer’s failure to establish that Detective Bohn was not a credible source. That is as pure a case of juxtaposturing as one might encounter. Detective Bohn was a source relied upon by Mr. Rankin. It was Rankin, the defendant, who moved for summary judgment of dismissal; Mr. Wiemer did not move for summary judgment. If Bohn’s credibility and accuracy was an issue, it was up to the defendant to exert it, not up to Wiemer to prove the contrary, and likewise not up to Wiemer to prove that Bohn was not a *584credible witness, or to prove that Rankin was not a credible witness. All that was needed on Wiemer’s part to withstand the defendant’s motion was a sufficient showing that Rankin published his Walker article with reckless disregard for the veracity thereof. At trial the jury would be concerned with the credibility of the defendant, and any witnesses which he produced to give sworn testimony on his behalf, including Bohn. Unless there is a point involved presently beyond my comprehension, it would seem that any attempt on Rankin’s part to testify to what Bohn, or any other of his sources told him, would be rejected on a hearsay objection. This Court has held that conclusory matter in affidavits, hearsay, and other inadmissible evidence, will be disregarded when considering a summary judgment. See Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986) (conclusory affidavit disregarded); Tapper Chevrolet Co. v. Hansen, 95 Idaho 436, 439, 510 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1973) (affidavits in support or opposition to summary judgment must set forth facts admissible into evidence); Openshaw v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 192, 196, 484 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1971) (lay opinion in affidavit disregarded).
The Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks stated that:
Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 [99 S.Ct. 1635, 1640, 60 L.Ed.2d 115] (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 66, 817 F.2d 762, 789 (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 [108 S.Ct. 200, 98 L.Ed.2d 151] (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.
Harte-Hanks, 109 S.Ct. at 2686 (emphasis added). In this case, Mr. Rankin’s own deposition testimony is sufficient to have (in a summary judgment proceeding) demon-strated a reckless state of mind where truth was concerned, in his failure to conduct a thorough review of the available sources of information. Certainly he showed almost total indifference as to whether the article which he wrote and disseminated was, as to Wiemer, inaccurate and untrue. This conduct considerably exceeds assessing the article as “highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers,” assuming that Mr. Rankin is genuinely of the media, and entitled to all of the protection which the United States Supreme Court has provided publishers and broadcasters. Harte-Hanks seemingly makes it clear indeed that the failure of a reporter, again making that assumption, to interview persons highly involved is circumstantial evidence which must be taken into consideration. Paraphrasing the language of Justice Scalia in his separate Harte-Hanks opinion, 109 S.Ct. at 2700: Even if one believed Rankin’s explanation of why he did not listen to the tapes (of Mr. Wiemer, Mr. Walker, the coroner, or the polygraphist) it would still be reasonable to find (and I would find) clear and convincing proof of malice from the utterly inexplicable failure to interview Mr. Wiemer, Mr. Walker, the coroner, the polygraphist, and Mr. Stalder, plus the uncontroverted evidence in the Weimer case.
APPENDIX A
STATE OF IDAHO
SS
COUNTY OF BONNER
I, Dar Cogswell, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I have read an excerpt of the transcribed oral deposition of Morgan Monroe that has been furnished to me by Mr. Bistline.
As I understand Mr. Monroe’s deposition, the first article that appeared in the Sand-point News Bulletin concerning the Talbot Estate was published on Thursday, August 12, 1971; that prior to the second publication on August 19, 1971, Mr. Monroe alleges that he talked to me extensively concerning the Talbot case and that I used the *585phrase which he quoted in the second article as follows:
“This is a puzzling case that has shaken the legal community in this area.”
I have no recollection of making such a comment to Mr. Monroe. I have never represented myself as speaking for the “legal community.” I had no indication of how the legal community felt concerning the Talbot Estate except that I knew that the attorneys who represented Mr. Bandelin felt that no contempt charge had been made against him.
My recollection is further supported by my court minutes and travel expense vouchers which show that I could not have talked to Mr. Monroe between the first publication of the News Bulletin on August 12, 1971, and the second publication on August 19, 1971, for the reason that I was not available in my office in Sandpoint, Idaho, but that I was out of town performing court business as follows:
A. Thursday, July 12, 1971 — Coeur d’Alene, Idaho Judicial Conference— 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
B. Friday, July 13, 1971 — Coeur d’Alene, Idaho Judicial Conference — 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
C. Saturday, July 14, 1971 — Coeur d’Alene, Idaho Judicial Conference— 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
D. Sunday, July 15, 1971 — At home in Sandpoint. I have never had a conversation with Mr. Monroe at my home concerning legal matters.
E. Monday, July 16, 1971 — Coeur d’Alene, Idaho Judicial Conference — 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
F. Tuesday, July 17, 1971 — Wallace, Idaho West vs. West — 7:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
G. Wednesday, July 18, 1971 — Bonners Ferry, Idaho Law Day — 8:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
DATED this 9th day of December, 1974.
/s/ Par Cogswell Dar Cogswell
Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395 (1977), R. 91-2.

. Other than for the final sentence, the trial court’s analysis is supported by the record. In his deposition testimony, Mr. Rankin, on more than one occasion, insisted that the sole purpose of his article was to make Kootenai County citizenry aware of Mr. Walker’s incompetence. Nevertheless, Mr. Rankin could still be found to have acted with actual malice (reckless disregard) regarding Mr. Wiemer’s inclusion in his Walker article.

. This is established by Mr. Rankin’s deposition testimony.

. At his deposition, Mr. Rankin stated that a prior publication of his, Common Sense, was a newsletter. His testimony also established that distribution of Common Sense and Vox Pop, particularly the Walker Article, was by select mail addresses, and also by distribution to supermarket stands where it could be freely picked up.

. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 130, 99 S.Ct. at 2685-86, quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2627, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). Should Mr. Rankin at trial be determined to have defamed Mr. Wiemer, and to have done so by newsletter, as in Hutchinson, then in all likelihood the following observation of the Supreme Court in Hutchinson would apply:
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals considered whether the New York Times standard can apply to an individual defendant rather than to a media defendant. At oral argument, counsel for Hutchinson stated that he had not conceded that the New York Times standard applied____ This Court has never decided the question; our conclusion that Hutchinson is not a public figure makes it unnecessary to do so in this case.
Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 133-34, 99 S.Ct. at 2687, n. 16. Query, even assuming that the 1980 homicide death of Mrs. Wiemer was a matter of public interest when the 1986 article was published, can the New York Times standard apply to an individual defendant rather than to a media defendant, and, was Mr. Wiemer a public figure?

. Mr. Rankin’s deposition testimony demonstrates that he had been a resident of Kootenai County since 1965, but that he had no previous knowledge whatsoever of the death of Mrs. Wiemer. He reportedly received an anonymous telephone call in December of 1986, or January of 1986, wherein the caller said, "I understand that you’re interested in Walker and that — that if you want to see something that is — that will really astound you — words to that effect — you should check on this case in Post Falls.” The caller, according to Mr. Rankin’s deposition, went on to say the case was about Debbie Wiemer, and the caller advised Mr. Rankin to check with the Post Falls police.

. In this regard the circumstances are unlike those present in Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395, cert. denied 434 U.S. 891, 98 S.Ct. 266, 54 L.Ed.2d 177 (1977), a case also cited and relied upon in Justice Johnson’s opinion. In that case the defendant newspaper claimed some of the information repeatedly published in the newspaper came from a highly respected district judge. See Appendix A attached, the district judge’s affidavit which went wholly unmentioned in the court’s opinion — a most shameful display of appellate review.