Court Opinion

ID: 9705437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:06:12.984879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:11.303268
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. The majority today stice, practice of the past and decides this case on an asserted procedural defect. Based on this analysis, it refuses to address the legal issue raised in this case. I am convinced that the trial judge effectively ruled on the issue at hand. For that reason, I would decide the legal point of whether a hearing on a new-trial motion is a contested matter for purposes of determining proper venue. The fact that the trial court effectively ruled on the appellant’s venue objection is clear oil the face of the record. The appellant objected to the proceeding going forward in Faulkner County, because the trial had taken place in Searcy County. Following the venue objection, the trial judge said, “All righty,” and proceeded to hear the new-trial motion where he was — in Faulkner County. According to the majority, there was no ruling on the appellant’s objection to the hearing taking place in Faulkner County. I ask the rhetorical question: What could be more of a ruling than proceeding with the hearing in Faulkner County when that was the basis for the objection? Holding that no ruling was made under these circumstances elevates the importance of uttering one word — “denied” — to dizzying heights. Over the past decade, a trend has been established in this court to eliminate procedural pitfalls that resulted in no decision on the merits of a case. Those pitfalls were frustrating to both the bench and bar. See, e.g., Leon Fiolmes, Pitfalls of the Appellate Practice; Avoiding the Serbonian Bog, Arkansas Lawyer (Summer 2000). Some of the more obvious examples have been corrected: (1) the elimination of an absolute affirmance for abstract deficiencies (Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(b)); (2) providing that a notice of appeal filed before entry of judgment would be considered filed' the day after that entry (Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 4(a)); (3) providing that a notice of appeal filed before an order disposing of posttrial motions shall also be deemed filed the day after the entry of that order (Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 4(b)(2)); (4) providing that in a criminal trial, a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence will be deemed denied when the trial proceeded ahead (Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c)). With respect to the precise issue confronting this court today, we decided an analogous case in 1994 in a unanimous opinion where we held that instructing a jury with a contested instruction was an effective ruling on the objection. We said: However, counsel objected to the agency instruction, stating correcdy why it should not be given. The trial court then proceeded to give the errant instruction. The giving of the instruction effectively became the ruling and we can see no sound reason why more should be required. McMahan v. Berry, 319 Ark. 88, 94, 890 S.W.2d 242, 246 (1994). In the McMahan case, as in the case before us, the issue was whether the action of the trial court in proceeding with the trial constituted a ruling. This court held that it did, even though the trial judge had not uttered the word, “Denied.” A majority of the court now holds that the McMahan case was an aberration, and that we should, in effect, pretend the case is not there. In holding as it does, the majority wants to retrench and decide cases based on an outmoded procedural pitfall. The majority cites two post-McMahan decisions in support of the uncontroverted rule that we will not decide issues raised on motion or objection when the trial court has not ruled. See Hodges v. Huckabee, 338 Ark. 454, 995 S.W.2d 341 (1999); Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 327 Ark. 407, 939 S.W.2d 280 (1997). That rule is not the issue in this case. The issue here, as in McMahan, is whether the judge effectively ruled on the venue motion by his actions in beginning the trial. It is obvious that he did.1  I would hear this case on the merits, and, for that reason, I respectfully dissent. Hannah, joins.   The majority opinion contains one paragraph about lack of specificity in the appellant’s venue objection. Specificity of the objection was not raised or contested by the parties before the trial court or in this appeal. The sole contention is the question of whether a ruling was obtained from the circuit judge.