Court Opinion

ID: 9750611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:11:05.834658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:14.103308
License: Public Domain

DIXON W. HOLMAN, Justice (Retired),
dissenting opinion on remand.
Because the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montejo and the court of criminal appeals’ decision in Hughen stand for the proposition that the “Mi-rand,a-Ed,wards regime” does not apply to “non interrogative types of interaction between the defendant and the State,” and because that is the type of interaction that I believe occurred in this case, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that Pecina invoked his Fifth Amendment rights when he requested the appointment of counsel while being arraigned. See Montejo v. Louisiana, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2091, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009) (reasoning that the Miranda-Edwards line of cases is not necessarily invoked during a preliminary hearing); Hughen v. State, 297 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (reasoning that the Fifth Amendment bar on police-initiated interrogation is applicable only “in the context of custodial interrogation”). But more than that, the majority’s holding today basically re-imports Mirandar-Edwards protections into an “arraignment or similar proceeding,” effectively reviving Jackson — a holding that I disagree with and feel obliged to address. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 635, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1411, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (holding that if police initiate interrogation after defendant’s as*272sertion, at arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid), overruled by Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2091.
It is apparent to me that Montejo and Hughen changed the legal landscape concerning what police are free to do after a defendant is appointed counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2091; Hughen, 297 S.W.3d at 335. Under Jackson, once a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights had attached during an arraignment, police were forbidden from initiating interrogation. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 635, 106 S.Ct. at 1411. This is so because Jackson represented a “wholesale importation of the Edwards rule into the Sixth Amendment.” Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2086 (citing Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 175, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 1342, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001)). Under Edwards, once a defendant invokes his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to police-initiated interrogation after being again advised of his rights. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. As the majority points out, Edwards is still in full effect. But after Montejo, the Miranda-Edwards regime of cases does not apply in the context of an arraignment or preliminary hearing any longer. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2091. The Montejo court specifically expressed that “[w]hat matters for Miranda and Edwards is what happens when the defendant is approached for interrogation, and (if he consents) what happens during the interrogation — not what happened at any preliminary hearing. ” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, now that the Montejo court has overruled Jackson, neither a defendant’s request for counsel at arraignment or similar proceeding nor appointment of counsel by a court gives rise to a presumption that any subsequent waiver by a defendant to police-initiated interrogation is invalid. Id. The Hughen court recognized this by stating that “[ajfter Montejo, the Sixth Amendment does not bar police-initiated interrogation of an accused who has previously asserted his right to counsel.” Hughen, 297 S.W.3d at 335.
In this case, pursuant to articles 15.17 and 26.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, police brought a magistrate to the hospital for the purpose of arraigning Pecina. This was nothing more than a “preliminary hearing.” Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2091. Indeed, the court of criminal appeals in Hughen referred to this procedure as an “initial appearance.” Hughen, 297 S.W.3d at 332. Therefore, whatever occurred at that preliminary hearing did not even implicate Edwards because Pecina had not yet been approached for interrogation nor had he ever unambiguously expressed his desire to deal with the police only through his attorney. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2091. I believe that the majority’s Fifth Amendment analysis is unnecessary, especially considering that this court expressly held in our first opinion that Peci-na had never invoked his right to counsel. Pecina v. State, No. 2-05-00456-CR, 2007 WL 1299263, at *7 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, May 3, 2007) (not designated for publication) (“Pecina I ”).
The court of criminal appeals overruled this court’s initial opinion because we had failed to apply Jackson — a purely Sixth Amendment issue. Pecina v. State, 268 S.W.3d 564, 569 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (“Pecina II”). The majority’s holding in this present judicial orbit of Pecina’s case hangs in part upon the court of criminal appeals’ statement in its remand that “[j]ust as in Edwards, the State showed only that [Pecina] responded to further police-initiated questioning.” Majority op. at 265 (citing Pecina II, 268 S.W.3d at *273568). That statement by the court of criminal appeals should not be interpreted to mean anything other than if Jackson was still good law, then the imported rule of Edwards would have prevented police from initiating interrogation after Pecina had been arraigned. Jackson, however, no longer applies; thus, the court of criminal appeals’ use of Edwards-based language is equally inapplicable. In fact, the Hughen court acknowledged that, after Montejo, Edwards no longer prevents police from questioning an accused who has previously asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Hughen, 297 S.W.3d at 335.
The majority seems to suggest that the Hughen court impliedly alluded that it would have decided that case differently had Hughen preserved a Fifth Amendment claim. Majority op. at 264. I do not read the Hughen court as hinting that a Fifth Amendment claim would have fared any better than Hughen’s Sixth Amendment claim. I read just the contrary. In dicta, because Hughen is a purely Sixth Amendment case, the Hughen court stated that invocation of a person’s Fifth Amendment right requires a specific type of State and defendant interaction: “the Fifth Amendment does bar police-initiated interrogation of an accused who, in the context of custodial interrogation, has previously asserted his right to counsel during such interrogation, unless the accused’s counsel is actually present.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, after an arraignment or similar proceeding, police are free to initiate interrogation of an accused who has “previously asserted his right to counsel” during that preliminary hearing. Id. And if the accused then asserts his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, interrogation must cease. Id. at 335, n. 5. If the only distinguishable difference between Hu-ghen’s case (or other cases like his) and this case is that Pecina was savvy enough to preserve his Fifth Amendment claim for our review, then all police are really free to do is cross their fingers and hope that once they approach a defendant after arraignment and the defendant voluntarily submits to an interrogation, he only contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.
The majority takes issue with my reasoning on this point, contending that somehow my position is making a “mockery of Miranda." Majority op. at 267. As the majority puts it, if my point is correct, “the police need only take a magistrate with them to conduct any custodial interrogation ... and then they may ignore with impunity any attempt by the defendant to request appointment of counsel from the magistrate.” Majority op. at 267.
First and foremost, my rebut to this stance by the majority is that I do not have such a harsh view of our law enforcement. I read the record in this case as demonstrating that the officers were doing everything that they could to inform Peci-na of his rights. They complied with the mandates of article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by taking a magistrate to him, and before they questioned him, they twice read to him his Miranda rights. Pecina II, 268 S.W.3d at 567. To expect any more of law enforcement would invite the very evil that the Montejo court was concerned with in overruling Jackson — deterring “law enforcement officers from even trying to obtain voluntary confessions.” Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2091. In fact, it speaks heavily to the voluntary nature of Pecina’s statement that he had been warned numerous times concerning his rights to have counsel present when the officers interviewed him, and yet he still chose to confess to his crime.
Furthermore, Miranda cannot be mocked if it is not at issue. As the court *274of criminal appeals noted in its remand, Judge Maddock testified that Pecina “did not indicate that he wanted counsel present before he talked to the detectives.” Pecina II, 268 S.W.3d at 565. Despite this important fact, the majority summarily concludes that Pecina invoked his right to have counsel present with him during interrogation.
In an attempt to transform Pecina’s request for the appointment of counsel into an invocation of counsel for Miranda purposes, the majority insists that Judge Maddock’s question — after Pecina had requested the appointment of counsel — concerning whether he still wanted to talk to the officers was an action “on behalf of the officers in initiating the interrogation.” Majority op. at 267. The majority even ascribes its view to the court of criminal appeals. What the court of criminal appeals actually held was that Judge Mad-dock’s involvement in this case marked “the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Pecina II, 268 S.W.3d at 568 (emphasis added). That statement says nothing to whether Pecina was being subjected to custodial interrogation when Judge Mad-dock asked her question. See Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (reasoning that actions that normally attend an arrest and custody, such as informing a defendant of his Miranda rights, do not necessarily constitute a custodial interrogation); see also Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2091 (stating that the Supreme Court has never held that a suspect can invoke Miranda rights in a context other than custodial interrogation).
But even if Judge Maddock’s question to Pecina whether he wanted to speak to the detectives was part of a conspired interrogation between Judge Maddock and the officers, the majority’s position is still fatally flawed because Pecina never indicated that he wanted counsel present during interrogation. Pecina II, 268 S.W.3d at 565 (“[Judge Maddock] said that [Pecina] did not indicate that he wanted counsel present before he talked to the detectives.”). The majority completely ignores firmly established law that in order to invoke counsel for Miranda purposes, a suspect’s desire to have counsel present during questioning must be unequivocal and unambiguous; otherwise, police officers are not even required to seek clarification, much less halt their interrogation. See State v. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (reasoning that a clear invocation of the right to counsel is an objective inquiry whereby a suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a clear invocation of the right to counsel present during interrogation)(citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)); see also Dalton v. State, 248 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex.App.-Austin, 2008 pet. ref'd), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 555, 175 L.Ed.2d 386 (2009) (reasoning that a suspect’s statement to officers must be a direct and unequivocal assertion of the right to have counsel present during interrogation before officers are required to halt any further questioning).
What the majority does today is effectively revive Jackson and hold that any defendant who is arraigned pursuant to articles 15.17 and 26.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure can never be approached by police and asked whether the defendant wants to voluntarily confess to the crime for which he stands accused. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 635, 106 S.Ct. at 1411. This holding is contrary to both Montejo and Hughen. See Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2091; Hughen, 297 S.W.3d at 335.
*275The majority applies the Mirandar-Ed-wards regime to this preliminary hearing whereby Pecina affirmatively stated that he wanted a court-appointed attorney. The majority builds its premise on the notion that the “Court in Montejo assures us that the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick regime is ‘not in doubt.’ ” Majority op. at 265 (citing Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2090). I agree that the Miranda-Edwards regime is not in doubt. But there is a distinction between whether that regime is in doubt and whether it applies to a certain set of facts. As the Montejo court stated, although the Mirandar-Edwards regime is not in doubt, those protections are “narrower than Jackson.” Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2090.
The majority treats the Montejo decision as a simple exercise in eliminating redundant case law and as if Jackson and the Miranda-Edwards regime provided the same exact protections. While it is true that the Montejo court reasoned that an individual’s rights were adequately protected by the Miranda-Edwards regime, the Supreme Court had far more negative things to say about Jackson than that it was simply superfluous or redundant to the Miranda-Edwards regime. The Montejo court was concerned that Jackson was thwarting “society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.” Id. at 2089 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425-426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1144, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). The Montejo court reasoned that at best, Jackson was simply adding a protection already existing by way of the Miranda-Edwards regime, but at its worst, Jackson was operating to eliminate “confession[s] given by the free choice of suspects who have received proper advice of their Miranda rights but waived them nonetheless.” Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2089. The iniquity of this paradigm is that without voluntary confessions, “crimes go unsolved and criminals unpunished [and] these are not negligible costs.” Id. at 2090 (citing Cobb, 532 U.S. at 175, 121 S.Ct. at 1335 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Not only did Jackson result in the exclusion of voluntary confessions, thereby “letting guilty and possibly dangerous criminals go free,” but it also “deter[ed] law enforcement officers from even trying to obtain voluntary confessions.” Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2086. Voluntary confessions, as the Montejo court pointed out, are “not an evil, but an unmitigated good.” Id. at 2090 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2212, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991)).
There is no better example than Peei-na’s case to show why the Montejo court overruled Jackson. Pecina is a “guilty and possibly dangerous criminal” who fatally stabbed his very own wife over fifty times. He acknowledged to the magistrate at his arraignment that he was willing to talk to the police and he later admitted to the police, voluntarily, that he had argued with his wife about her wanting to leave him; that he had become angry; that he had cut her; and that no one else was present but the two of them when he had done so. Without this voluntary confession, this heinous crime could have possibly gone unsolved and Pecina could have gone unpunished. That is not a negligible cost, considering that Pecina never indicated that he did not wish to speak to police when they approached him for interrogation.
Yet again, the majority takes issue with my position in this regard. The majority casts my position as a simple equation: Pecina is guilty; thus, he should be punished. Majority op. at 268. That of course is not my position and the majority fails to address my point in its entirety. It is not simply that Pecina is guilty; rather, he is a guilty criminal who voluntarily *276confessed to his crime. As the Montejo court stated, eliminating voluntary confessions obtained without coercion and deterring law enforcement from even trying to obtain them “are not negligible costs.” Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2090.
What the majority ultimately has done is apply the Miranda-Edwards regime to this case based on what Pecina said at his arraignment. To be sure, the Montejo court was not concerned with what “statements [were] made at [a] preliminary hearing.” Id. at 2091. That is because, as the Montejo court stated, they “have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than ‘custodial interrogation’. ...” Id. (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182, n. 3, 111 S.Ct. at 2212, n. 3).
I would hold that when Pecina acknowledged that he wanted court-appointed counsel as the magistrate arraigned him at the hospital he had not invoked his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda-Edwards, the police were entitled to approach him for interrogation, and he made a voluntary statement that was properly admitted by the trial court. Therefore, I dissent.