Court Opinion

ID: 9697658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:24:25.567152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:34.005385
License: Public Domain

ORIE MELVIN, J.,
dissenting.
¶ 1 I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “the evidence was insufficient to establish that Appellant acted with ‘wrongful intent’ under the peculiar circumstances of this case.” Majority opinion at 1176. The circumstances are not so “peculiar” as the majority believes. It is not unusual for an abuser who is sanctioned by a PFA order to attempt to circumvent the no contact directive of that order by resort to subterfuge or present some pretext in order to contact his victim. What someone who has never been placed in danger by an abusive spouse or paramour would perceive as a threat is different from what the victim of such abuse perceives. It is the contact alone that can be intimidating for it places in the mind of the victim the notion that the abuser will continue to intrude into her life, even after she has sought the protection of the legal system.
¶ 2 Moreover, the majority overlooks the fact that Appellant pleaded guilty to prior violations of the PFA order for having contact with his wife by phone and letter premised upon the same alleged concern for his wife’s health. The trial court was certainly within its discretion in refusing to credit Appellant’s stated reason for initiating contact with Mrs. Haigh. The irony of an abuser suddenly being so overwhelmingly concerned for the health and well-being of his victim that he felt compelled to violate the clear dictate of the PFA order, not once but three times, was not lost on the trial judge. Simply stated, no contact means no contact for any reason. I would find that the facts support the trial court’s decision, and there has been no showing of a plain abuse of discretion.
¶ 3 Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.