Court Opinion

ID: 9665339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:45:16.959742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:14.808062
License: Public Domain

PRITCHARD, Judge,
dissenting.
The principal issue presented is whether there was probable cause to arrest appellant, without a warrant therefor, for the misdemeanor of possession of marihuana (less than 35 grams), and whether certain bags containing marihuana, and the can containing them, were properly received into evidence, having been seized after the arrest. A jury returned a guilty verdict and appellant was sentenced to 30 days in jail and was fined $500.
The facts are these: In the early morning hours, about 1:30 a.m., of October 13, 1980, Deputy Sheriff Lucas of Cass County was dispatched to 208 East 165th Street in Bel-ton by the Belton police department to inform one Bailey that his car which was left in a school parking lot had caught fire. As he approached the front door of the residence, he looked through a large picture window and saw two subjects, one lying on a couch facing the window, and the other in a chair that was at an angle to the couch. Both subjects were apparently asleep. Lucas saw also a coffee table between the couch and the chair, parallel with the couch, and on the table was a can with its. lid open with what appeared to be a green leafy substance in it. He saw “Several baggies that appeared to contain green leafy substance, what I believed to be marihuana.” Appellant was lying on the couch about 3V2 or 4 feet from the coffee table, and the other person in the chair was about the same distance from the can. Lucas knocked on the door and appellant came to it. Lucas asked him if Bailey was there. He was not, so Lucas gave the message about the car fire to appellant. No attempt to arrest was made at that time.
Shortly after two o’clock Lucas called Detective Harris, who, in turn, called the prosecutor who advised that in his opinion there was probable cause to arrest the owner of the house for possession of marihuana. Harris, Lucas and a Sgt. Wright then returned to the residence. At that time Lucas again looked through the window and *259saw appellant lying on the couch. The other person was not in sight, nor was the can. The officers then went to the front door where Lucas again knocked on the door and appellant opened it and came out on the porch. Lucas advised him that he was under arrest for possession of a controlled substance and read him his constitutional rights from a Miranda warning card. Lucas explained to him that he had seen the can with the green leafy substance in it earlier. Appellant made a comment, “Oh, shit”, and made a motion with his hand which Lucas took to mean that he was to follow him back into the residence, which he and the other two officers did. They followed appellant into the living room area “and he just bent down, got under the end of the couch nearest the door and reached in and got the can and turned around and handed it to me.” The can was then closed, but Lucas looked inside of it and saw several bags of green leafy substance, seeds and baggies. The contents were later analyzed and found to be marihuana, which was introduced into evidence.
Although Lucas testified on direct examination that appellant, on opening the door, came out on the porch, it was developed on his cross-examination that appellant may have had a foot inside the house, but the biggest part of him was out, that he was half in the house and half out of the house.
Whether appellant was a guest or a resident of the house was unknown to any of the officers at the time Lucas placed him under arrest. It appears from the record that appellant’s wife was asleep in the back bedroom and appellant, accompanied by Detective Harris, went back to tell his wife that he was going to jail. At the time the officers entered the living room, the other man was found behind the couch, apparently asleep, and he was then placed under arrest.
Several cases sustain the validity of the arrest and the admissibility of the controlled substance under the facts and circumstances of this case. The first is the very similar case of State v. Wiley, 522 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. banc 1975). There the police received a telephone tip from an unknown informer that defendant and two others had drugs stored in the refrigerator of an apartment rented to Mr. and Mrs. Gary Moore. Some of the informant’s information was verified by a police officer. Two police officers and three sheriff’s deputies then went to the Moore apartment without either an arrest warrant or a search warrant in their possession. Three officers went to the front door and two to the back door. At the front door, an officer knocked and it was opened by a person inside. The officers announced that they were police officers, and one of them told the occupants they were under arrest for the possession of controlled substances and advised them of their rights. Except for Moore, the individuals inside were seated on living room seats and couches. Officer Sto-ver walked through the living room to the kitchen, admitted the officers at the back door, then immediately went to the refrigerator and removed the controlled substances therein. The individuals in the apartment were not searched and no other search of the place was made. As to the legality of the arrest, the court first had this to say, page 287[l-3], “ ‘The lawfulness of the arrest without warrant, in turn, must be based upon probable cause, which exists “where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense had been or is being committed.” ’ [Citing cases].” And, going on at page 287[4-9], “Whether there was probable cause to arrest the appellant along with others in the apartment depends on the information in the officers’ possession prior to the arrest. Of course, all the information in the possession of the officers and all reasonable inferences therefrom are pertinent to determine probable cause. Whether there is justification for probable cause to arrest without warrant must be determined by practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable men act and is not to be determined by hindsight by legal technicians. [Citing case.] The determination of probable cause depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case and no ready ‘litmus *260paper test’ can be applied. Probable cause may be based on hearsay. There is a broad gulf between what is required to prove guilt and the requirement of probable cause. We deal here with controlled substances. In such cases officers may well have to depend on informers, special employees and on their own special experience. [Citing case].” (Italics added.)
Note that in the Wiley case, all of the occupants of the apartment, including Wiley who was a guest, were arrested for possession of the narcotics, prior information as to the presence of the drugs having been given to the police by an unknown informant. The court held that under all of the circumstances there was probable cause to make the arrests. In this case, there was prior knowledge by deputy Lucas that there was marihuana on the coffee table, and it was in his plain view. It was close, about 3 ½ to 4 feet from the two sleeping men, within the easy reach of either of them. Both of these men were arrested for the possession of the marihuana. Although there may not be an inference drawn of possession of a controlled substance, or knowledge and control thereof, where the defendant is not in exclusive control of the premises, Wiley, supra, page 292[22-25], it was said at that same place, “Where the defendant is present on the premises and if there are additional independent factors showing his knowledge and control, then that is sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict.” That same rule must apply to withstand a motion to suppress evidence based upon a claimed lack of probable cause to arrest, as in this case. The additional and independent evidence, as noted, to that of joint control of the premises, is appellant’s close proximity to the marihuana to which he had easy, actual access, and deputy Lucas testified unequivocally that when he saw the tin and its contents he believed it to be marihuana. See State v. Jackson, 576 S.W.2d 756 (Mo.App.1979), where the contention was that the trial court erred in failing to sustain a motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence failed to show that appellant “ ‘was aware of the presence and character of the heroin and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it.’ ” The facts" were that appellant had an apartment where he lived with a girlfriend. She admitted the officers who entered the kitchen where appellant, wearing a bathrobe, was standing about two feet from a table upon which there were items related to the use of drugs and capsules containing heroin. Appellant denied knowledge of the items, but the court said, page 757, “In this case appellant was two feet from a kitchen table upon which in plain view there were several syringes, ten measuring spoons, several empty capsules, and eighteen capsules containing a brown powder later identified by chemical analysis to be heroin. Appellant had actual access to the area where the heroin was found, and most of the items on the table were readily recognizable as drug related.” (Italics added.) The court held the facts “clearly constituted further evidence, other than only joint control of the premises, connecting appellant with the possession of the illegal heroin.” Note also State v. Zimpher, 552 S.W.2d 345 (Mo.App.1977), cited in the Jackson case, where defendant and another were in joint control of premises where a controlled substance was found in a chest of drawers presumably used for the storage of their personal effects, and also in a bedside stand adjacent to the bed where defendant and another in joint control were sleeping (just prior to being placed under arrest). There were two other persons besides defendant in joint control of the premises. The court held that these facts constituted further evidence (other than joint control of the premises) within the rule of State v. Funk, 490 S.W.2d 354 (Mo.App.1973), and said, further, “one such incriminating fact is a defendant’s access to an area in which drugs are found.”
Compare State v. Perry, 499 S.W.2d 473 (Mo.1973), where a caller, identifying himself as a bus driver, reported to the police that he observed the occupants of a blue Volkswagen, license number CFI-587, flourishing a weapon. The bus driver said where he had last seen the automobile, but he did not describe the person flourishing the gun, state his or her sex, or describe the clothing worn by the person. The police found the described vehicle, which was oc*261cupied by two men and a woman, two blocks from where the bus driver reported it to have been. All three were asked to get out of the vehicle and were told they were under arrest for flourishing a deadly weapon. The officers then searched the three and found a pistol in appellant’s purse. She argued on appeal that there was no probable cause for her arrest because no information was given by the tipster as to which person had a weapon. The court rejected that argument, saying at page 476, “ * * * the officers concerned had not only the right but also the duty to arrest the occupants of the Volkswagen in view of the facts in their possession, and that the search, which produced the revolver, was valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.” Compare also State v. Drake, 512 S.W.2d 166 (Mo.App.1974), where a police officer responded to a report of theft and while talking to the woman in her apartment, he observed two men walking down the hall. He recognized one of them as having a police record, arrested him, and while patting him down, found a watch belonging to complainant. The officer then placed the companion under arrest, and thereafter found some of the woman’s property on him. Drake contended that there was no probable cause for arrest, but the court held that his being in the presence of a person known to have a police record, who had some stolen property in his possession, gave the officer sufficient reason that appellant had committed a theft.
The observation of deputy Lucas of marihuana on the coffee table prior to the arrest is sufficient in itself of probable cause for the arrest of appellant and his companion at the time. There is, however, one important fact which surely the trier of the issue of probable cause for the arrest of appellant is not required to ignore. That is that after appellant was arrested, and practically contemporaneous therewith, he went back into the living room and retrieved the tin of marihuana and handed it to Lucas. This fact shows his guilty knowledge of and control over the prohibited substance. The possession of a controlled substance need not be exclusive and may be established circumstantially. State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.2d 337 (Mo.App.1979). See also State v. Barber, 635 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Mo.1982), quoting State v. West, 559 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Mo.App.1977), “Both possession and knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence. If actual possession has not be shown, ‘constructive possession will suffice when other facts buttress an inference of defendant’s knowledge of the presence of a controlled substance.’ ” State v. Wiley, supra, is authority for the finding of appellant’s joint possession of the controlled substance.
Appellant’s other contention is that there was an invalid warrantless arrest of him in his home under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). That case cannot control because the trier of the fact could conclude that there was an entry into the residence by appellant’s consent, and that the arrest was made when he was at least partially outside the door which he had opened.
The judgment herein should be affirmed.
For the foregoing reasons, and under the above cited authority, I dissent from the holding of the principal opinion.