Court Opinion

ID: 9538237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:33:00.403429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:41.396426
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. It may seem a little unrealistic to say that one could steal his own car, but we have held that conversion of a security right can result in this rather novel situation.1 Ample ancillary evidence justified the jury’s conclusion of guilt and hence we should not disturb it. Consequently, defendant’s contention that there was no mens rea accompanying the commission of larceny because there was no intent permanently to deprive the garage man of possession, seems to be without merit in view’of the Parker case. His own testimony was to the effect that he took the car to sell, and there was nothing shown as to • any intention to return it to the garage owner.
As to his urgence that he thought he had a right to take the car, there is nothing in the record to substantiate it. At no time did he request permission to take it, and his assertion that he thought he had a right to do so, standing alone, did not justify' an instruction that he was not guilty, if he so believed, in the light of other instructions with respect to intent.
The assertion that the court should have instructed as to the defense that accused had no mens rea is unrealistic and flies in the teeth of defendant’s own testimony to the effect that he was denied permission to remove the car when, after counsel said, “you *291were faced with your car being held by the garage, and no money to pay the bill,” he said “That’s right,” but nonetheless, entered the premises at night, after hours, and took the car without permission, without notifying anyone, being picked up several days later for questioning. To have instructed on such theory under such circumstances would have flouted the defendant’s own testimony.