Court Opinion

ID: 9768085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:41:50.346276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:36.520549
License: Public Domain

SANDERS, Judge
(dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent from the holding in the majority opinion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is controlling in this case.
Had the Defendants not gone forward with their proof and shown why the wheel came off and injured the Plaintiff, then the doctrine would have been applicable and there would have been an inference of negligence upon which a jury verdict could have been predicated.
At the conclusion of the Defendants’ proof there could be absolutely no question in the mind of any reasonable man but that the accident occurred as a result of the lug bolts’ shearing off of the wheel. This removed the inference applicable under the doctrine of res ipsa which arose from the unexplained reason for the wheel’s coming off.
At this point the Plaintiff is charged with the burden of showing Defendants were guilty of some act or omission which constituted negligence proximately causing his injury. For instance, did the Defendants know, or in the exercise of ordinary care should they have known, the lug bolts on this wheel were defective to the extent they might shear off and cause injuries to a third party?
The fallacy of the rationale in the majority opinion seems to lie in the fact that it places two inferences of negligence upon the Defendants. The effect of the holding is not only that the inference of negligence existed until there was an explanation of why the wheel came off but, after it was shown that it came off because the lug bolts sheared, there then arose a second *118inference that the Defendants knew, or should have known, they were defective.
In the case of DeGlopper v. Nashville Railway & Light Co., 123 Tenn. 633, 646, 134 S.W. 609, 612, the court said:
“If the act which caused the injury was shown by direct evidence, and all of the circumstances, of the accident were shown in the proof, and if the only reasonable explanation of the accident should give rise to an inference of negligence, then the rule of ‘res ipsa loquitur’ would apply; but there can be no foundation for the application of this maxim where both the act which caused the injury and the negligence of defendant in relation to the act must be inferred from the accident itself. You cannot well say that an act is negligent, unless you know what it is.” (Emphasis ours.)
I cannot agree with the majority that the case of Hudson v. Stepp, 54 Tenn.App. 640, 393 S.W.2d 301 is controlling over the case of Granert v. Bauer, 17 Tenn.App. 370, 67 S.W.2d 748. In the Hudson case the driver testified she did not know why the car left the road. In other words, there was no explanation of what caused the accident. Had it been shown in that case that the automobile left the road because a wheel came off or because the steering mechanism failed, the doctrine of res ipsa would not have been applicable.
I cannot agree that it was dictum when the court said in the case of Sloan v. Nevil, 33 Tenn.App. 100, 110, 229 S.W.2d 350, 355:
“In this case the plaintiff offered no proof of any negligence of the defendant and if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnished an inference of negligence we think this inference disappeared when the defendant explained the cause of the accident as the falling down of the front of the car on the highway.” (Emphasis ours.)
I think what the court said is a proper enunciation of the rule in this jurisdiction and we are cited to no authority in this state to the contrary.
The majority refers to the annotation of 46 A.L.R.2d, 110, as being in point with the case at bar. In that same treatise, at page 111, it says:
“The doctrine does not rest upon established facts. It does not apply where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the injury and all of the facts and circumstances attending upon the occurrence appear.”
I also cannot agree with the majority that the case of Smith v. Fisher, 11 Tenn. App. 273 is not controlling in the case at bar. I can see no distinguishing difference in a brake band’s “snapping” and lug bolts’ shearing off, nor can I see any rational reason for applying the doctrine of res ipsa in the case at bar and rejecting it in the Smith case. The reason for distinguishing the cases seems to lie in the fact that the universal joint was concealed in the Smith case. It is common knowledge, however, that the base of lug bolts, where these were sheared off, is also concealed until the wheel is removed. The proof shows the wheels involved had been removed about 30 days prior to the accident. The majority opinion has the tenor of assuming the lug bolts may have been defective at that time and a negligent inspection failed to reveal it.
I am of the further opinion that the principles enunciated by Chief Justice Green in the case of Memphis Street Ry. Co. v. Stockton, 143 Tenn. 201, 226 S.W. 187, are applicable to the case at bar. This case involved a suit by a student motorman for personal injuries resulting from a defective brake on the streetcar. In addressing himself to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Justice Green said:
“To state it differently, the application of this rule in its primary or distinctive sense rests on common experience, and ‘not at all on the circumstances of the particular case tending of their own force to show that the very accident in question was in fact the result of negligence.’ Note L.R.A.1917E, 9.
“In the first case an artificial presumption of law is employed. The second case *119is really one of circumstantial evidence, although the inference justified by res ipsa loquitur is thrown in along with other facts proven to make out plaintiff’s case.
“As stated before, no facts are proven in this record which tend to show that the street railway company had knowledge of any defect in the brake, nor is any fact proven which tends to show that the street railway company should have in the exercise of ordinary care acquired such knowledge.
“If res ipsa loquitur is to be employed at this angle of the case, it must be in its primary or distinctive sense.
“The question then is: May it be inferred from common experience that the bare failure of this brake to work indicated a defect which was of such a character and had existed for such a length of time as that the master knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of its existence?
“How can we say that the master knew of this defect or ought to have known of it when the character of the defect itself is utterly unknown?
“An air brake is a somewhat complicated apparatus. There may be obvious defects in such machinery and there may be hidden defects therein.
“The master is not usually liable for latent defects. Morris Bros. v. Bowers, 105 Tenn. 59, 58 S.W. 328; Labatt on Master & Servant, vol. 3, p. 2716. Nor is the master liable for defects arising so short a time prior to the accident as not to have been discovered by him in the course of his reasonable inspections. Box Co. v. Gregory, 119 Tenn. 537, 105 S.W. 350; Griffin & Son v. Parker, 129 Tenn. 446, 164 S.W. 1142, L.R.A., 1917F, 497.
“Since we have no intimation of the nature of the defect in this brake, we think it would be a violent assumption for us to say that it was discoverable on reasonable inspection, or that it had existed for such a length of time as that the master should have known of it. The latter notion is really negatived by the proof in the case showing that the car stopped after it left the barn on the morning of the accident to take on a passenger, at which time the brake was almost certainly used, and must have been in working order.
“It may be that rare cases will arise in which res ipsa loquitur can be invoked by way of raising an inference of negligent ignorance against a master in favor of his servant. We are clear, however, that under the circumstances of this case such an inference would not be permissible. We do not think it would be a safe inference in the light of common knowledge or experience.”
In my view, the majority opinion is doing what Justice Green says you cannot do in the first above-quoted paragraph.
Also, let us apply Justice Green’s own words to the case at bar except to substitute defendants for the master and lug bolts for the brake:
“As stated before, no facts are proven in this record which tend to show that the [defendants] had knowledge of any defect in the [lug bolts ], nor is any fact proven which tends to show that the [defendants ] should have in the exercise of ordinary care acquired such knowledge.”
“. . . . The question then is: May it be inferred from common experience that the bare failure of [these lug bolts] indicated a defect which was of such a character and had existed for such a length of time as that the [defendants] knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of its existence?”
“How can we say that the [defendants] knew of this defect or ought to have known of it when the character of the defect itself is utterly unknown?”
Finally, I cannot agree that the rule quoted from Prosser on Torts has any application to the case at bar. Should this quotation be approved in the context of this case, in my view, we would be establishing an extremely dangerous precedent. We would, in effect, be saying, “Any time a third party is injured as the result of a *120mechanical failure of a motor vehicle, the jury may infer negligence on the part of the owner or operator unless he can show due care by overwhelming proof.”
Since the proof shows affirmatively that the accident resulted from the lug bolts’ shearing off and the record is devoid of evidence that the Defendants knew or, through the exercise of ordinary care, should have known they were defective, it was, in my view, error for the Trial Court not to direct a verdict in favor of the Defendants.