Court Opinion

ID: 9556836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 20:05:13.39858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:01.106868
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/18/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                         B322752

       Plaintiff and Respondent,    Santa Clara County
                                    Super. Ct. No. F1765160
       v.

THE NORTH RIVER
INSURANCE COMPANY,

       Defendant and Appellant;

BAD BOYS BAIL BONDS,

       Real Party in Interest and
       Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County, My-Le Jacqueline Duong, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
      Jefferson T. Stamp for Appellants.
      James R. Williams, County Counsel, Christopher A.
Capozzi and Sterling S. Larnerd, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________
       After tracking down a fugitive, North River Insurance
Company and its bail agent (collectively, North River) asked for
its bail money back. The court said no: the prosecution had not
decided whether to extradite the fugitive from Mexico. North
River sought a continuance, to give the prosecution enough time
to decide. The court refused that as well. Because prosecutors
would not decide, and because prosecutors would not agree to a
delay to allow themselves to decide, North River had to forfeit its
bail money, said the trial court. We reverse. Section citations
are to the Penal Code.
                                   I
       The prosecution filed a complaint alleging Geovanni
Quijadas Silva committed a lewd act on a child. North River
posted a $100,000 bond to release Silva.
       Silva did not appear for a hearing on February 22, 2018.
When he went missing, the trial court forfeited his bond and
mailed notice of the forfeiture on February 26, 2018. The
forfeiture would become final in 180 days (plus five days for
mailing), on August 30, 2018, unless the bail company could
prompt Silva to come to court or had caught him by then.
       North River began hunting for Silva. At its request, the
court granted two extensions for a total of 180 days. March 20,
2019, was the final day of this new interval. On that day, North
River said it had found and secured Silva in Mexico and so moved
to vacate the forfeiture and to exonerate its bond.
       North River’s exoneration motion—its motion to get its
money back—was under section 1305, subdivision (d) or (g). In
the alternative, it moved to toll time under section 1305,
subdivision (e) or (h).

                                 2
       North River’s motion included a declaration by an
investigator who said he found Silva in Mexico on March 15,
2019. The investigator detained Silva in the presence of a
Mexican law enforcement officer, who identified Silva. The
motion had other exhibits, including Silva’s Mexican
identification card and fingerprints, photos of Silva and the
investigator, and statements from the officer and Silva.
       North River moved for a continuance. The prosecution did
not oppose this motion, and the court continued the matter on
April 26, 2019. We grant North River’s uncontested request to
augment the record to include the court’s minutes for this
continuance.
       On June 8, 2019, the prosecution filed a brief opposing the
motion to vacate the forfeiture. In other words, the prosecution
did not want the court to return North River’s money. The
prosecution’s logic was that the prosecutors could not make an
extradition decision within the appearance period—which is to
say by March 20, 2019. The prosecution also refused to decline to
extradite within that period. On the issue of extradition, then,
the prosecution would not say yes and it would not say no. Its
decision was not to decide.
       The prosecution noted North River served the motion on
the last day of the appearance period and, moreover, served it on
an inconvenient office—an office where the prosecutor of record
and the prosecutor who handled contested bail motions did not
work. The prosecution did acknowledge the district attorney’s
office stamped the motion “Received” on March 20, 2019, and the
individual prosecutor knew about the contested bail motion “at
some point” before April 12, 2019. The prosecution nonetheless
insisted it had yet to make an extradition decision. The

                                3
prosecution also said, without explanation, the fingerprints were
unusable.
       In reply, North River said the prosecution violated due
process by not deciding about extradition and by not saying
whether it would agree to tolling. North River alternatively
argued the court should toll time under section 1305,
subdivision (h) or should grant a continuance under section 1305,
subdivision (j).
       On June 28, 2019, the court denied North River’s motion.
It found the matter was untimely because the prosecution had
not made a decision about extradition by the end of the
appearance period, March 20, 2019, and no statutory provisions
required the prosecution to make a decision by then. The court
also denied the alternate requests to toll the forfeiture period or
to continue the matter. The court did not require the prosecution
to make an extradition decision. It did not make findings about
the fingerprints or about the sufficiency of North River’s
detention of Silva.
       On July 10, 2019, the court entered a judgment of $100,000
against North River, which appealed.
                                 II
       The law required the court either to insist that the
prosecution make an extradition decision or to grant the
continuance so the prosecution had time to decide.

                                 4
                                    A
       We independently review the trial court’s interpretation of
statutes. (County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty & Surety,
Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309, 314.)
       We review some bail basics. We italicize the many times
the bail statute expressly directs courts to seek justice, and later
we return to explain the relevance of these words to our analysis.
       When someone on bail fails to appear, the trial court
declares the bail bond forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a).) The bail
company then has an appearance period either to produce the
defendant or to show other circumstances requiring the court to
set aside the forfeiture. (Id., subd. (c).) This law authorizes the
court to act upon “terms that are just.” (Id., subd. (c)(1) & (c)(2),
italics added.) The appearance period lasts 180 days (plus five
days for mailing) from when the court mails the notice of
forfeiture. (Id., subd. (b).) If the bail company shows good cause,
the court may extend this period for up to 180 days from the date
of the order granting the extension. (§ 1305.4.) If the defendant
appears during the appearance period, the court must vacate the
forfeiture and exonerate the bond. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1).) When a
defendant is in custody beyond the jurisdiction of the court and
prosecutors decide not to seek extradition, the court shall vacate
the forfeiture and exonerate the bond on terms that are just. (Id.
subd. (f).) If the court does not set aside the forfeiture by the end
of the appearance period, it must enter summary judgment
against the bail company. (§ 1306, subd. (a).)
       There is a flight exception. If the defendant flees
California, subdivision (g) of section 1305 gives bail companies a
potential out. Subdivision (g) provides: “In all cases of forfeiture
where a defendant is not in custody and is beyond the jurisdiction

                                 5
of the state, is temporarily detained, by the bail agent, in the
presence of a local law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction in
which the defendant is located, and is positively identified by that
law enforcement officer as the wanted defendant in an affidavit
signed under penalty of perjury, and the prosecuting agency
elects not to seek extradition after being informed of the location
of the defendant, the court shall vacate the forfeiture and
exonerate the bond on terms that are just and do not exceed the
terms imposed in similar situations with respect to other forms of
pretrial release.” (§ 1305, subd. (g), italics added.)
       In cases arising under section 1305, subdivision (g), the
court may toll the appearance period under subdivision (h). To
do so, the bail agent and the prosecution must agree it will take
more time to return the defendant to the court’s jurisdiction, and
the prosecution must agree to tolling. (Id., subd. (h).)
       Subdivision (j) of section 1305 allows the court to hear a
motion after the appearance period expires. It states, “A motion
filed in a timely manner within the 180-day period may be heard
within 30 days of the expiration of the 180-day period. The court
may extend the 30-day period upon a showing of good cause.”
(§ 1305, subd. (j).)
       When construing this statute, our job is to effectuate its
purpose. (E.g., Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th
128, 135 (Apple).) “The dominant mode of statutory
interpretation over the past century has been one premised on
the view that legislation is a purposive act, and judges should
construe statutes to execute that legislative purpose. This
approach finds lineage in the sixteenth-century English decision
Heydon’s Case, which summons judges to interpret statutes in a
way ‘as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy.’ ”

                                 6
(Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014) p. 31, italics added.) Our
polestar is devotion to the statute’s purpose. (Apple, supra, at p.
135.)
                                    B
       We hold the trial court either had to ask the prosecution to
announce its extradition decision or had to grant North River’s
request to continue the appearance period to give the prosecution
enough time to make its decision. This interpretation is the
reasonable construction of a statute that has the explicit purpose
of achieving justice.
       The prosecution contends section 1305, subdivision (g)
applies only if it decides not to extradite the defendant within the
appearance period. The text of that subdivision, however, says
nothing about a deadline for the prosecution to make its decision.
       A rule of statutory construction governs. We generally
construe bail statutes strictly and in favor of the bail company to
avoid bail forfeiture. (People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins.
Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 301, 308.) It would be an “improper
windfall for the County” if it could enjoy the fruits of the bail
company’s costly posse and yet also reap the benefit of the
forfeited bond. (Ibid.) We construe the statute to avoid this
result, which could create a perverse incentive for prosecutors to
avoid making timely extradition decisions.
       In addition to this rule of construction, the statutory text
establishes the Legislature wanted courts to engineer “just”
arrangements with bail companies. Section 1305 repeats this
direction four times. Requiring the prosecution to make a timely
extradition decision advances the cause of justice.
       The purpose of bail and bail forfeiture is to ensure
defendants come to court and obey court rulings. (See People v.

                                 7
Wilcox (1960) 53 Cal.2d 651, 656–657 (Wilcox).) Bail rules,
including appearance periods, give bail companies predictable
deadlines for what can be a challenging and expensive hunt.
They must find fugitives and file section 1305, subdivision (g)
motions within that period. North River did that. There is no
reason to require the prosecution’s decision, a decision completely
beyond the bail company’s control, to fall within the period. “In
matters of this kind there should be no element of revenue to the
state nor punishment of the surety.” (Wilcox, supra, 53 Cal.2d at
p. 657.)
      The prosecution’s interpretation of the statute creates
unpredictability by arrogating to prosecutors unsupervised
control. How long will prosecutors take to decide about
extradition? Are two weeks enough? (Cf. People v. Tingcungco
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 249, 252–253 [prosecutor described the
“lengthy and complicated steps that must be taken before
deciding whether to extradite a fugitive located in a foreign
country” and stated the decision “usually took two weeks”]
(Tingcungco).) Here, the prosecution had about 77 days between
when it had notice of the contested bail motion and the hearing.
That is about 11 weeks. The prosecution has declined to quantify
the duration it prefers. Increasing the uncertainty of when, and
whether, a bail company will get paid cannot sharpen its
incentive to pursue fugitives.
      We hold the prosecution may make its decision during a
section 1305, subdivision (j) continuance.
      The prosecution cites People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 638, which is unlike this case for several reasons. In
Ranger, the trial court denied a request for an extension of the
appearance period, the bail company found the defendant after

                                 8
the appearance period had ended, and the bail company did not
meet the requirements of subdivision (g) because it detained the
defendant without the presence of local law enforcement. (Id. at
pp. 642–643, 650.)
       Ranger did say the bail company must establish the “facts”
of section 1305, subdivision (g) motions before the appearance
period expires, even if the court continues the hearing. (Ranger,
supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 649–650 [referring to former subd.
(i), now subd. (j)].) To the extent Ranger holds the prosecution’s
extradition decision is one of these “facts,” we respectfully
disagree. The bail company must detain the fugitive within the
appearance period. This duration sensibly marks the bail
company’s deadline. But there is no good reason the
prosecution’s extradition decision—which only the prosecutors
control—must fall within this period.
       Ranger’s analysis relied on People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 75, which used the words “facts occurring after”
the appearance period to refer to a bail agent’s act of telling
police about a defendant’s location and the defendant’s arrest in
California on a bail warrant. (Id. at p. 82.) We agree with
Seneca that an extension of the hearing does not give the bail
company extra time to find the defendant. The defendant’s
location is a “fact” the bail company must know before the
appearance period ends. The prosecution’s decision, however, is
not such a “fact.”
       Our interpretation fits the broader bail contract structure.
Where the bail company has complied with its obligations,
government prosecutors should not be able to use their own
indecision to allow the government to keep bail money. The bond
is a contract between the bail company and the government.

                                 9
Section 1305 governs that contract. (See People v. Far West Ins.
Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 791, 797–798 [reversing forfeiture
where the bail company reasonably met its obligations under the
bond contract and the government’s conduct prevented return of
fugitive defendant]; People v. Rolley (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 639,
642 [vacating forfeiture where bail company did everything it
contracted to do, but government impeded defendant’s return].)
The bail company performed its end of the bargain. The trial
court vitiated the bargain by allowing the government to escape
all obligations simply by proclaiming irresolution.
       Our interpretation is consistent with section 1305,
subdivision (h). That subdivision allows the parties to stipulate
to tolling the 180-day period to file a motion to vacate and allows
the court to order the requested tolling. This is a way to get the
vacatur ball rolling without the bail company filing a subdivision
(g) motion. Subdivision (h) does not govern what should happen
after such a bail company files a timely subdivision (g) motion
and the prosecuting agency has not agreed to tolling.
       We do not follow Tingcungco, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th 249.
In that case, a defendant failed to appear, and the court ordered
the bail forfeited. (Id. at p. 252.) Three days before the
appearance period expired, the bail company told the prosecution
it found the defendant in Mexico and asked the court to toll the
appearance period. The court denied the request. (Ibid.) The
bail company appealed and argued the court should read section
1305, subdivisions (g) and (h) to allow tolling while the
prosecution makes its extradition decision.
       The Court of Appeal interpreted section 1305, subdivisions
(g) and (h) to require the bail company to find the defendant “far
enough in advance of the end of the 180-day appearance period to

                                10
allow the prosecutor to decide whether or not to extradite.”
(Tingcungco, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 258.)
       The Tingcungco reasoning relied heavily on a failed
amendment. (Tingcungco, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 255–
258.) That is, the Legislature considered an amendment in 2012
that would have required tolling of the appearance period
pending prosecutors’ extradition decisions and would have
exonerated bonds if the prosecution did not decide within a
reasonable time. (Id. at p. 255.) Instead of enacting that
amendment, the Legislature passed an amendment with the
substance of what is now section 1305, subdivision (h).
(Tingcungco, at pp. 255–256.) That subdivision allows tolling
after the prosecution has decided to extradite and it agrees it
needs more time to do so. The Court of Appeal concluded, based
on the legislative history, it would be untenable to interpret the
statute to require the court to extend the appearance period
under subdivisions (g) or (h). (Id. at p. 258.)
       Tingcungco does not control for two reasons. First, it
neither involved nor discussed section 1305, subdivision (j).
       Second, the Supreme Court has cautioned against
interpreting legislative history as Tingcungco did. “In most cases
there are a number of possible reasons why the Legislature might
have failed to enact a proposed provision. One reason might have
been, of course, that the Legislature rejected the proposal on its
merits. But the Legislature might equally well have been
motivated instead by considerations unrelated to the merits, not
the least of which is that it might have believed the provision
unnecessary because the law already so provided . . . . Indeed,
when as here a provision is dropped from a bill during the
enactment process, the cause may not even be a legislative

                               11
decision at all; it may simply be that its proponents decided to
withdraw the provision on tactical grounds.” (Arnett v. Dal Cielo
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 28.) This reasoning applies to the failure to
amend an existing statute. (Id. at p. 29.) Unpassed amendments
have little value as evidence of legislative intent. (Ibid.)
       Following Arnett v. Dal Cielo, we give little weight to the
unpassed amendment upon which much of the Tingcungco
opinion relied. Perhaps everyone thought the amendment was a
good idea but new priorities eclipsed the issue. Perhaps everyone
disliked only part of the amendment and cut it all. There are
infinite other possibilities. Drawing an inference from inaction
can be misleading, for inaction, like silence, is often ambiguous.
       The failure of a different proposed amendment to section
1305 demonstrates the variety of reasons why bills may die. In
2008, the Legislature passed a bill that would have amended
section 1305, subdivision (g) to give the prosecution 60 days to
decide to seek extradition. (Assem. Bill No. 1133 (2007-2008 Reg.
Sess.) § 1.) The Governor returned the bill unsigned due to a
“historic delay” in passing the state budget that “forced” him to
consider only the “highest priority” bills. (Governor’s veto
message to Assem. on Assem. Bill No. 1133 (Sept. 26, 2008) 6
Assem. J. (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) p. 7336.)
       An idea—one that many thought was a good idea—just got
lost in the shuffle. That does not mean the good idea was bad.
       Courts generally do not interfere with prosecutorial
decisions. (See People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 369, 380–381 [courts “have consistently read
subdivision (g) of section 1305 as leaving the timetable and
criteria for deciding whether to extradite squarely in the hands of
the prosecuting agency”].)

                                12
       It does not interfere with prosecutorial discretion to give
prosecutors time for them to make a decision.
       The reasonable reading of the statute does require the
prosecutor to make some extradition decision before the court
forfeits the bail. What will that decision be? That is entirely up
to prosecutors. The trial court should have asked for the
prosecution’s decision or should have continued the hearing until
the prosecution made its decision.
                           DISPOSITION
       We reverse the judgment, award costs to the appellants,
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

                                          WILEY, J.

I concur:

            STRATTON, P. J.

            GRIMES, J.

                                13