Court Opinion

ID: 9889817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 17:07:42.146562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:07.928601
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 23-1230
                               Filed October 11, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF M.D.,
Minor Child,

C.D., Father,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joseph L. Tofilon,

District Associate Judge.

       A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his twelve-year-old

son. AFFIRMED.

       Brandy R. Lundy of Lundy Law, PLC, Fort Dodge, for appellant father.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Gregory H. Stoebe, Humboldt, guardian ad litem for minor child.

       Alesha M. Sigmeth Roberts of Sigmeth Roberts Law, PLC, Clarion, attorney

for minor child.

       Considered by Tabor, P.J., Buller, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

       *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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TABOR, Presiding Judge.

       Twelve-year-old M.D. has developmental delays and an individualized

education program (IEP) at school. But his parents have had scarce involvement

with the services he needs to learn and mature. Almost two years after M.D. was

removed from their home, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both

the mother and father.       Only the father, Curtis, appeals.1       He argues that

termination of his parental rights is not in M.D.’s best interests under Iowa Code

section 232.116(2) (2023). Curtis also contends that the court should have applied

the exception to termination in section 232.116(3)(c) given the closeness of the

father-son bond. Finally, he asks for six more months to work toward reunification.

       After our independent examination of the record, we reach the same

conclusion as the juvenile court.2 Curtis has shown “little to no insight into the

special needs of his child, the effort it takes to take care of him, or even the gravity

of these proceedings.” We thus affirm the termination of his parental rights.

       I.     Facts and Prior Proceedings

       M.D. has special needs. When child protection workers with the Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services visited his home in September 2021,

they found him malnourished, lacking proper hygiene, and off his medication

regime. The juvenile court adjudicated him as a child in need of assistance (CINA)

in November 2021. Because of his difficult behaviors, during the first nine months

after removal, he had three placements, including family foster care, fictive kin, and

1 The mother consented to termination of her rights at the hearing.
2 Our review is de novo.
                       In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Iowa 2021). Under that
standard, we give weight to the juvenile court’s factual findings, but they do not
bind us on appeal. Id.
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shelter care. After those were disrupted, M.D. spent over seven months in a

psychiatric medical institution for children,w hich the department acknowledged

was a long time for a child. At the time of the termination hearing, he was in foster

care. But that family had second thoughts about adopting him after a violent

episode when M.D. had to be restrained.

       Curtis has his own mental-health struggles.         He has a diagnosis of

schizophrenia and has been inconsistent with medical management. According to

the department social worker, Curtis also has limited reading skills, making it

difficult for him to follow instructions. He supports himself through supplemental

security income disability payments. Early in the CINA case, Curtis responded to

the department’s offer of services. For instance, in the first year after M.D.’s

removal from home, Curtis visited him thirty-four times. But as the social worker

described it, “then it just stopped.” In the year before the termination hearing,

Curtis had only seen his son twice. At the termination hearing, Curtis did not have

a good explanation for missing so many visits with M.D. But Curtis did testify that

when they had visitation, it went well: “He’s always excited to see me.”

       The juvenile court terminated Curtis’s parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1), paragraphs (b) and (f). He appeals.

       II.    Analysis

       Curtis does not challenge the statutory grounds for terminating his parental

rights. So we need not address that step in the termination process. See In re

P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (describing three-step analysis for termination

cases). The remaining questions are (1) whether termination is in M.D.’s best

interests; (2) whether termination would harm M.D. because of the closeness of
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the parent-child relationship; and (3) whether Curtis could be a safe caregiver if he

had another six months to improve his parenting skills. See id.; see also Iowa

Code § 232.104(2)(b).

       A. Best interests.      In making this determination, we give primary

consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering his long-

term nurturing and growth, and to his physical, mental, and emotional conditions

and needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2); P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40. The Iowa Code

allows us to consider whether a parent’s ability to provide for the needs of the child

is affected by “the parent’s mental capacity or mental condition.” Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2)(a).

       In his petition on appeal, Curtis asserts: “Termination of parental rights is

not in the best interests of this child as it eliminates other options and effectively

makes this child an orphan.”        We disagree and adopt the juvenile court’s

reasoning: “Despite the uncertainty surrounding [M.D.’s] future, it is clear that the

physical, mental and emotional condition and needs of the child cannot be met by

the parents, but have been met and continue to be met by others.” This harsh

reality is underscored by Curtis’s untreated schizophrenia and limited mental

capacity, which hamper his ability to parent a special needs child. See In re B.H.A.,

938 N.W.2d 227, 235 (Iowa 2020) (providing a parent’s mental health is a factor

we consider when it affects his ability to meet the child’s needs).

       B. Closeness of parent-child relationship. When analyzing claims under

Iowa Code section 232.116(3), our supreme court has decided that the burden

shifts to the parent to prove an exception can save the legal relationship. In re

A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475 (Iowa 2018). Curtis invokes the permissive exception
                                          5

under section 232.116(3)(c), claiming that he and M.D. are “bonded to each other.”

The juvenile court rejected this claim, noting that Curtis had not been “an active

participant” in M.D.’s life. The court added: “There is no indication that the child

will suffer any adverse consequences as a result of termination. Indeed, the

termination may lessen the trauma to the child in the future and help him to start

to heal.” After our de novo review of the record, we agree with that assessment.

       C. Six-month extension.      Finally, we turn to Curtis’s request to delay

permanency. A court may deny termination and give a parent more time for

reunification only if the need for removal “will no longer exist at the end of the

additional six-month period.” Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). And not only must the

record show that parent will have surmounted the obstacles to reunification in six

months, but we must consider whether the delay is in M.D.’s best interests. See

W.T., 967 N.W.2d at 323. Like the juvenile court, we find six more months will not

help Curtis achieve what he has failed to do in the past two years. As the court

noted: “He has no insight into the gravity of this case, the needs of his child, or his

own limitations.” Delaying permanency is not in M.D.’s best interests.

       AFFIRMED.