Court Opinion

ID: 9471191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:26:40.178477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:18.272190
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring.
Although I agree with the majority’s result reversing the district court, I write separately because I am troubled by the majority’s characterization of the government’s conduct as constituting a “search” within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In my view, the majority engages in a needless analysis of the consent issue, because there was no “search” or “seizure” in the first place. Thus, I concur in the majority’s result based on my belief that no search or seizure occurred in this case.
In any claim of an unlawful search or seizure under the fourth amendment, the threshold inquiry is whether the government has infringed on any reasonable expectation of privacy of the defendant. If the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or in the item seized, no search or seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment has occurred. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Thus, the question presented is whether a person who tells an employee that he has counterfeit bills for sale, and who gives the employee the key to an apartment with directions to find a counterfeit bill to deliver to a prospective buyer, has a reasonable expectation that the employee will not cooperate with the government by bringing a government agent into the apartment to take the bill. Manifestly, the answer is no.
I can surmise no reason in either logic or policy why a court should label as “reasonable” a person’s expectation that those to whom he divulges his criminal activities will either remain silent or actively take part in those activities. This is especially true in a case like this, in which the person who was told of the illegal activity, Poteat, had not been involved in the activity beforehand. There is certainly a reasonable possibility that one who is told of such activity will decide to tell law enforcement authorities about it and to cooperate with them. Indeed, most criminals recognize this possibility and go to great lengths to conceal their conduct from all except those involved in it. Thus, as a matter of pure common sense, when one engaged in criminal activity tells another about the activity and gives that person the key to an apartment with specific directions to obtain contraband for a prospective buyer, he has no reasonable expectation that that person will not allow a government agent to accompany him to the apartment, enter the apartment, and take the contraband described.
*539Second, as a matter of policy, I can discern no reason why a criminal’s expectation that another will not divulge his criminal activity, and cooperate with the government in the manner described in this case, should be labeled “reasonable.” There is no legitimate public policy in favor of protecting a criminal’s subjective expectation that one who he informs of criminal activity will not cooperate with the government. On the contrary, there is a strong public policy in favor of encouraging cooperation with law enforcement authorities as a means of detecting, preventing, and solving crime. Therefore, the policies at stake are clearly in favor of a rule recognizing that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists when a criminal informs another about his criminal activity and gives that other person a key to an apartment in furtherance of that activity as in the circumstances of this case.
Of course, what should be considered a “reasonable” expectation of privacy in either logic or policy depends on the circumstances of the case. Thus, I stress what this case is not. First, this is not a case in which the area viewed exceeded the area specified in the directions the criminal gave to the informant. Had Agent Bowron searched the entire apartment, after Schus-ter had given Poteat the key to the apartment with instructions to proceed only to a specified area, a different case would be presented. It is at least arguable that Schuster’s expectation that the entire apartment would not be searched is a more reasonable one. Similarly, this is not a case in which a key was given for purely innocent activity. Had Schuster given Poteat the key merely for Poteat to pick up a towel, for example, and had Poteat then inadvertently stumbled across contraband, a different situation would be presented. In the actual case before us, Schuster purposefully implicated Poteat in criminal activity when he told him that he had counterfeit bills available for sale. A person in Po-teat’s position understandably might want to extricate himself from the situation by cooperating with the police. In contrast, it is again at least arguable that one who merely stumbles across contraband will not feel as great a desire to tell the police. Thus, a criminal who gives a key in furtherance of innocent activity may have a more reasonable claim to privacy than Schuster did here. I do not intimate any opinion on the cases hypothesized above other than to say they are distinguishable from the case at bar. On the facts of this case, however, it is clear that Schuster had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
In conclusion, I believe the majority has placed the cart before the horse in concluding that a valid consent was given without first determining whether there was a search or seizure in the first instance. Perhaps the majority errs in failing to recognize that the standard used to determine whether a search has occurred is an objective one — whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or in the item seized. Thus, Schuster’s subjective expectation that Po-teat would not turn out to be a government informant is relevant only insofar as that expectation was reasonable. Indeed, in every case in which one tells another of criminal activity a subjective expectation of privacy exists or else the speaker would not have told the listener about the activity. Katz holds that the fourth amendment protects only reasonable expectations of privacy. As a matter of both logic and policy, Schuster had no reasonable expectation that Poteat would not decide to cooperate with the government in the manner described above. On this basis, I concur in the majority’s result.