Court Opinion

ID: 9773872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:01:44.873523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:58.642352
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON PETITION TO BE HEAR
PURYEAR, J.
The defendant has filed a very earnest petition to rehear in which it insists that it should be relieved of the burden of paying interest on $51,250.00 of the amount awarded to complainant, since this amount was tendered to complainant on April 20', 1962, which was less than thirty days after Haun paid the judgment rendered against him by the United States District Court and affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
It is correct, as we stated in our original opinion, that on or about April 20,1962, defendant’s counsel sent Haun *168a draft for $51,250.00, which, was returned by him to the defendant. However, Haun was demanding payment of $91,196.25 plus attorneys * fees and other costs and this demand was well known to defendant at the time it sent such draft to Haun.
The draft sent to him by defendant contained language, on the reverse side thereof, which would make the acceptance and indorsement of such draft a full and complete release of Haun’s entire demand. Therefore, the tender was conditional.
At no time thereafter did the defendant make an unconditional tender of said sum of $51,250.00 and neither did the defendant tender or offer to pay said sum into Court after suit was filed.
Generally speaking, a tender, in order to be effective, must be absolute and unconditional. Vol. 86, C.J.S. Tender sec. 32, pp. 573, 574; Sinard v. Harris, 2 Higgins 486.
In Ingold v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 230 N.C. 142, 52 S.E.2d 366, 8 A.L.R.2d 1439 (1949), the Supreme Court of North Carolina said:
“It is the universal rule that in order to constitute a valid and effectual tender of money admitted to be due, the party who makes it must allege and show that since the refusal to accept the money he has always been ready to pay the same, and must bring the amount of the tender into court. ’ ’
Supra, 52 S.E.2d at p. 370, 8 A.L.R.2d at p. 1444.
Defendant cites Gracy v. Potts, 63 Tenn. 395, in support of its insistence that it was not necessary to tender said sum of $51,250.00 into Court, but that question was *169apparently not raised in that case, because it is not discussed in the opinion.
Also in that case the tender made before suit was unconditional and was made in confederate money in 1862, at which time no objection was made to this currency. The tender was refused because plaintiff was in the army and did not need the money. When suit was brought in 1865 for United States money it would have been idle ceremony to keep the original tender alive by paying confederate currency into Court, because it was worthless. So Gracy v. Potts, supra, is not controlling.
Defendant also cites Tenn. Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cherry Admr. (1963), 213 Tenn. 391, 374 S.W.2d 371, to which we referred in our original opinion.
We stated in our original opinion that the Cherry case was not applicable to the instant case. After reconsidering that case we do not consider the holding therein as supporting the defendant’s insistence that it is not liable for interest.
The holding in Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Holt, (1949), 32 Tenn.App. 559, 223 S.W.2d 203, seems to settle the question of defendant’s liability for interest in this case. The opinion in Holt, supra, applied to three consolidated cases, which involved liability of the defendant, Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Fire Ins. Company to the plaintiffs, Thomas M. Holt and Mrs. E. L. Holt, upon three contracts of fire insurance. One of the questions raised therein was liability of the insurance company for interest. In disposing of that question, this Court, in an opinion by the late Judge Howell, said:
*170‘ ‘ The defendant also insists that it is not liable for interest. It claims a tender before the snit was filed and filed a plea of tender and paid that amount into court with its plea. We find that this tender was not unconditional in that the amount was tendered in full settlement of the liability of the defendants under all the contracts sued upon. This tender was not sufficient to avoid liability for interest. In the case of Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Jordan et al., 28 Tenn.App. 11 on page 29, 184 S.W.2d 721, on page 728, in an opinion by Hickerson, Judge, this Court said:
‘There remains only the question of the allowance of interest. Code, Section 7305 provides: “Demands bearing interest. — All bonds, notes, bills of exchange, and liquidated and settled accounts, signed by the debtor, shall bear interest from the time they become due, unless it is expressed that interest is not to accrue until a specific time therein mentioned.”
‘Under this section courts are compelled to allow interest in all cases which come within its terms. Nickey Bros. v. Lonsdale Mfg. Co., 149 Tenn. 391, 258 S.W. 776. In People’s Bank & Trust Company v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 156 Tenn. 517, 3 S.W.2d 163, 164, our Supreme Court said: “A policy of life insurance falls within this section and bears interest from the time it becomes due and payable. The allowance of interest is imperative. Knights of Pythias v. Allen, 104 Tenn. 623, 58 S.W. 241. Fire insurance policies, accident insurance policies, and other insurance contracts proper would come under this section of the Code.” ’ ”
*171The $51,250.00 was due immediately after Haim paid the judgment and during all of this period of time from April 20,1962, until the present date, the defendant has retained the use of said sum of money, whereas, if it had been paid into Court within a reasonable time after suit was instituted, such sum would have been earning interest, which interest would have been awarded to complainant upon final termination of the litigation.
It is indeed surprising, in these days of high interest rates, that the defendant would complain about paying six percent interest on this sum of money which it has been permitted to retain all of this time.
After carefully considering said petition to rehear, the brief and argument filed in support thereof, and the authorities cited, the petition is respectfully denied.
Shriver, P. J. (M.S.), and Todd, J., concur.