Court Opinion

ID: 9595130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:35:56.294887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:26.149279
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the majority that the appellant has not presented a prima facie showing of discrimination in the state’s exercise of all of its peremptory strikes against prospective black jurors, in light of the Georgia Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679 (2) (424 SE2d 626) (1993) and other decisions hereinafter cited. In Lewis at 680, the Supreme Court, citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U. S._ (111 SC 1859, 1866, 114 LE2d 395) (1991), held that “ ‘(o)nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.’ ” Notwithstanding the decision in *372Lewis, supra, the Supreme Court in Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 327 (6) (357 SE2d 792) (1987), found that where the state exercised all of its peremptory strikes against blacks, as in the instant case, a prima facie case of discrimination was clearly made. Inasmuch as the question of whether the appellant has completed the record sufficiently to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination is moot, the veritable issue is whether the state’s explanations for its exercise of 100 percent of its peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, were sufficiently racially neutral and related to this case to withstand a Bat-son challenge.
In rebutting prima facie evidence of racial discrimination, the prosecution must explain each peremptory challenge of a black prospective juror. “The burden [is] on the prosecutor to prove that the disproportionate exclusion of black jurors was not the result of the prosecutor’s conscious or unconscious animus against black jurors but was instead mere happenstance.” Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 558, 559 (2) (423 SE2d 245) (1992). “Hence, it is not a sufficient rebuttal simply to offer explanations which do no more than fail to prove the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor acted, consciously or unconsciously, in a racially-discriminatory manner. That he so acted may be inferred by the circumstances establishing the prima facie case. The prosecutor’s explanation must be strong enough to overcome the prima facie case.” Ford, id. at 559. Moreover, the explanations offered must be “the kind of concrete, tangible, race-neutral and neutrally-applied reasons that can overcome the strong prima facie case established by the pattern of strikes and other factors. . . .” Id. at 560.
Although the trial court’s findings are, of course, entitled to great deference, “ ‘ “(r)ubber stamp” approval of all nonracial explanations, no matter how whimsical or fanciful, would cripple Batson’s commitment to “ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.” Batson, 106 SC at 1723.’ [Cit.]” Gamble v. State, supra at 327. Further, explanations by the state as to the striking of black jurors that reflect certain stereotypical attitudes as to particular groups should be given additional scrutiny by the trial judge before they are found acceptable. Tharpe v. State, 262 Ga. 110, 112 (6) (416 SE2d 78) (1992). “ ‘The explanation “need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause,” but it must be “neutral,” “related to the case to be tried,” and a “ ‘clear and reasonably specific,’ explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Bess v. State, 187 Ga. App. 185 (1) (369 SE2d 784) (1988). In Berry v. State, 262 Ga. 614, 615 (2) (422 SE2d 861) (1992), where, as in Weems v. State, 262 Ga. 101, 103 (2) (416 SE2d 84) (1992), the percentage of blacks on the jury exceeded the percentage of blacks on the array, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of whether the prosecution’s *373strikes were racially neutral where the prosecution had used all of its strikes to exclude black jurors. In Weems, supra at 103, the Supreme Court further remanded the case “so that the trial court [could] apply the ‘ “additional scrutiny” ’ aspect of Tharpe in making a finding as to whether the strikes were racially neutral,” even though seven members of the trial jury (58 percent) were black. More recently in Williams v. State, 262 Ga. 732 (426 SE2d 348) (1993), the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial where the state exercised 90 percent of its peremptory strikes against prospective black jurors for reasons which could have equally applied to white jurors.
Although, in this case, the racial composition of the venire and the racial composition of the trial jury portrayed a 50-50 representation of black and white jurors, “nothing in Batson compels [a] court’s conclusion that constitutional guarantees are never abridged if all black jurors but one or two are struck because of their race. On the contrary, Batson restates the principle that * “(a) single invidiously discriminatory governmental act” is not “immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.” ’ [Cits.]” Fleming v. Kemp, 794 F2d 1478, 1483 (5) (11th Cir. 1986). In Fleming the court specifically stated that it “cannot agree that Bat-son may be rendered a priori inapplicable by a prosecutorial game of numbers.” Id. at 1483. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized in Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 79 (4) (365 SE2d 111) (1988), “[djeciding cases through the use of raw numbers carries with it inherent dangers and possibilities of illogical or unjust results. We do not believe the U. S. Supreme Court intended to lead the courts into this kind of hazard. Using numbers as the only criteria under Batson would mean that if the panel of 42 was composed of 42 black persons, a prima facie case becomes automatic.” Id. at 79.
In the instant case, the prosecution used all ten peremptory strikes to exclude prospective black jurors. The strikes that are in question were exercised as follows:
Juror #8, a 20-year-old black male, was excluded because he was unemployed and was not in school, although he was previously eim ployed as a beer truck driver.
Juror #11, a 31-year-old black female, was excluded because she indicated that she did not feel comfortable sitting on the jury, which is disputed by the defendant.
Juror #12, a 73-year-old black female, was excluded because she was unemployed, was last employed at a hotel, and according to the prosecution, demonstrated hearing problems because she answered a question inappropriately and asked the prosecutor to repeat himself.
Juror #20, a 19-year-old black female, was excluded because she held her present job for a short period of time at a local bank, worked for a clothing store for a short period of time, and was previously *374unemployed.
Juror #26, a 63-year-old retired black female, was excluded because she had not been satisfied with the work of police officers in the investigation of burglaries at her home, which indicated that she was predisposed against the state.
Juror #30, a 57-year-old black male, was excluded because he supposedly had both a speech and hearing impediment demonstrated by inappropriate responses to 50 percent of the voir dire questions.
Juror #38, a 19-year-old black male, was excluded because he had been recently hired by Delta, and previously worked with Circuit City a few months earlier, which, according to the prosecutor, indicated an unstable job history.
Alternate #43, a 45-year-old black female registered nurse, was excluded because she appeared hostile and displayed a belligerent attitude.
Alternate #44, a 54-year-old black female was excluded because “she again was unemployed, had been unemployed for about a year prior to that, claims she did private duty nursing but there is nothing in her educational data, that would be eleven years in school, to indicate that any of that was in any way skilled or such which would offset her irregular unsteady unemployment history.”
The defendant does not question the appropriateness of the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory strike against Juror #22, a 65-year-old black male and uncle of Wayne Williams, the individual prosecuted by the Fulton County D.A.’s office and convicted of the murder of two adults, and suspected of the murder of several children in the Atlanta area.
Arguably, the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory strikes against Jurors 11, 26, 30 and 43 were racially neutral and case related exercises. However the prosecution’s exclusion of the remaining jurors based upon their lack of gainful employment is suspect and pretextual because other similarly situated jurors were not likewise excluded. Although the specific racial make-up of the trial jury as well as the race of each potential juror in the venire is not addressed in the record with the exception of the jurors excluded by the prosecution, 20 of the venire who were similarly situated, some of whom are white and were not gainfully employed, were not stricken by the prosecution. Particularly, juror #5, a 61-year-old housewife; juror #18, a 65-year-old homemaker; juror #19, a 42-year-old housewife; juror #25, a 44-year-old homemaker; juror #26, a 63-year-old retired female; juror #35, a 21-year-old male student; juror #36, a 67-year-old unemployed female; juror #41, a 64-year-old housewife; juror #45, a 70-year-old male retiree; juror #46, a 44-year-old housewife; juror #48, a 53-year-old retired female; juror #50, a 19-year-old student; juror #52, a 57-year-old retired male; and juror #53, a 39-year-old housewife. Fur*375thermore, the prosecution failed to exercise any peremptory strikes against six other members of the venire who indicated on the jury biographical data sheet that they were not employed. Here, as in Gamble v. State, supra, and Ford v. State, supra, “many of the explanations offered by the prosecutor could have applied with equal force to white jurors whom the prosecutor declined to strike.” Ford, id. at 559. “A prosecutor’s failure to explain the apparently disparate treatment of similarly situated white and black jurors certainly diminishes the force of his explanation for striking a black juror.” Id. at 560, n. 1. Further the prosecution’s reasons for the exclusion of prospective black jurors from the petit jury were not the kind of concrete, tangible, race-neutral, case related and neutrally applied reasons that can overcome a strong prima facie case established by the pattern of strikes exercised by the state. Ford, id. at 560.
Decided February 22, 1993 —
Reconsideration denied April 2, 1993
Brian E. Steel, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, William C. Akins, Barry I. Mortge, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
In the recent case of Bess v. State, 207 Ga. App. 295 (427 SE2d 813) (1993), this court remanded the matter to the trial court for a hearing on whether the prosecution’s exercise of 100 percent of its strikes against blacks was racially-neutral. However, in Bess, the trial court concluded, without conducting a hearing, that the state had met its burden regarding the neutrality of its exercise of the peremptory strikes based solely on a statistical analysis of the racial composition of the venire and the jury. Unlike Bess, the trial court in the present case held a pre-trial hearing on the Batson motion, at which time the court requested and received an explanation from the state on the exercise of each of its strikes. Whereas remand for a hearing was the proper remedy in Bess, in the instant case, the trial court’s finding that the state did not use its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner should be reversed in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams, and the case remanded for a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Judge Cooper joins in this dissent.