Court Opinion

ID: 9588533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:35:22.368514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:42.296544
License: Public Domain

Bell, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from Division (1) (a) and the judgment, because they are squarely in conflict with the opinion of this court in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walker, 251 Ga. 536 (2b) (307 SE2d 914) (1983). In Division 2 (b) of Walker, we concluded that there were two reasons that the covenant in that case overprotected Orkin’s legitimate interest in its customer relationships. The first was that the cov*561enant prohibited former employees from merely accepting overtures from Orkin customers. Id. at 538-539. The second reason was that the covenant prohibited the former employees from working for any Orkin customers in a certain area, including customers with whom they had had no contact while employees of Orkin. Id. at 539. We held that “[bjecause the appellees hold no unfair competitive advantage respecting the customers for whom they did not work, this provision ‘unfairly restricts ordinary competition and provides (Orkin) with greater protection than it needs.’ [Cit.]” Id.
Decided November 26, 1986
Reconsideration denied December 18, 1986.
Orr & Kopecky, Melvin P. Kopecky, McGahee, Benning, Fletcher, Dunaway & Harley, Leonard 0. Fletcher, Jr., C. Thompson Harley, for appellant.
Decker, Cooper & Hallman, Richard P. Decker, Jay Michael Barber, for appellee.
As the majority opinion in the instant case indicates, Orkin has indeed redrafted its employment contracts in an attempt to address the defects identified in the Walker case. This effort is commendable. Orkin has, in fact, successfully addressed the first prong of Division 2 (b) of Walker, in that former employees are prohibited from calling upon customers for the purpose of soliciting or selling, but are not prevented from merely accepting overtures from those customers. However, the contract as redrafted wholly fails to address the second prong of Walker, since former employees are still prohibited from contacting any customers of Orkin within the stated territory, regardless of whether the former employees ever developed any relationships with those customers while working for Orkin. In this respect the covenant is plainly invalid.
I am authorized to state that Justice Smith joins in this dissent.