Court Opinion

ID: 9411876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 07:09:34.609031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:16.061861
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-22-00115-CR
                              __________________

                 BRADLEY ROBERT KONNING, Appellant

                                        V.

                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

 ________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
                       Jefferson County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. 21-37450
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A grand jury indicted Appellant Bradley Robert Konning (“Konning” or

“Appellant”) for the murder of Lizeth Carpio. Konning pleaded guilty, and Konning

elected to have the jury decide punishment. The trial court submitted the punishment

to the jury and asked the jury to decide whether Konning proved he caused Carpio’s

                                         1
death under the immediate influence of sudden passion. 1 The jury found Konning

failed to prove he acted under the influence of sudden passion, and the jury assessed

      1
         The defendant does not challenge any part of the Jury Charge. In the charge
the trial court submitted to the Jury it included the following excerpts pertaining to
“sudden passion”:

               SPECIFIC LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE
             The Defendant has pleaded guilty to the offense of Murder as
      charged in the indictment. It is now your duty to assess punishment.
      The defendant contends he committed the murder under the immediate
      influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. Before you
      assess punishment, you must determine whether the defendant has
      proved this contention.
             Relevant Statutes
      A defendant convicted of murder may raise the issue of whether he
      caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion
      arising from an adequate cause. This is called the doctrine of “sudden
      passion.”
      ...
             Burden of Proof
             The burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of
      the evidence, that he acted under the influence of sudden passion.
             Definitions
             “Sudden passion” means passion directly caused by and arising
      out of provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the
      person killed, which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not
      solely the result of former provocation.
             “Adequate cause” means cause that would commonly produce a
      degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary
      temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.
             The term “preponderance of the evidence” means the greater
      weight and degree of the credible evidence.
      ...
             Application of Law to Facts
             You must determine whether the defendant has proved, by a
      preponderance of the evidence, that he acted under the immediate
      influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.
                                          2
punishment at seventy-three years of confinement. In five issues, Konning

challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s

finding on sudden passion. We affirm.

             You must all agree on whether the defendant has proved sudden
      passion before you may assess punishment.
             Your resolution of this issue will determine which of the two
      verdict forms you will use.
             If you all agree the defendant has proved sudden passion, use the
      first verdict form, titled “Verdict-Defendant Has Proved Sudden
      Passion.” If you all agree the defendant has not proved sudden passion,
      use the second verdict form, titled “Verdict-Defendant Has Not Proved
      Sudden Passion.”
             If you all agree the defendant has proved, by a preponderance of
      the evidence, that he acted under the influence of sudden passion, you
      are to determine and state in your verdict-
             1. a term of imprisonment for no less than two years and no more
             than twenty years, or
             2. a term of imprisonment for no less than two years and no more
             than twenty years and a fine of no more than $10,000.
             If you all agree the defendant has not proved, by a preponderance
      of the evidence, that he acted under the influence of sudden passion,
      you are to determine and state in your verdict-
             1. a term of imprisonment for no less than five years and no more
             than ninety-nine years or for life, or
             2. a term of imprisonment for no less than five years and no more
             than ninety-nine years or for life and a fine of no more than
             $10,000.
      ...
There were two jury verdict forms given to the Jury and the Jury filled out and signed
the second verdict form, titled “Verdict-Defendant Has Not Proved Sudden
Passion.”
                                          3
                            Evidence Submitted to the Jury

Law Enforcement Testimony About the Incident

      Kory Gerber, a patrol officer for the Beaumont Police Department, testified

that he was dispatched to a home on McFaddin Avenue about 10:27 a.m. on April

29, 2021, for a complaint from “Candy.” 2 Upon arrival, he saw an unoccupied truck

that was parked but running and a woman with blood on her face lying on the ground,

and she appeared to be deceased. Gerber testified that he noticed flowers lying on

the ground and a handgun beside the woman. According to Gerber, the police

became aware of a possible suspect, and they went looking for Konning, and Gerber

also spoke with Konning’s sister “Alva.”

      Brandy Dyson, a crime scene technician with the Beaumont Police

Department, testified that she took photographs at the scene on April 29, 2021. She

identified State’s Exhibits 10 through 76 as photographs of the scene, and she agreed

that some of the photographs depict a camera mounted on a second-story window at

the home. Dyson agreed there was a truck at the home with water or condensation

underneath it, and she took a photograph to show that the truck had been running.

Dyson also agreed that State’s Exhibit 39 shows some legal papers on the front

passenger’s seat of the parked vehicle, Exhibit 40 was signed by Carpio and dated

April 27, 2021, and Dyson stated the papers were what “looks like somebody’s

      2
          We use pseudonyms to refer to witnesses not affiliated with law enforcement.
                                           4
asking for a divorce.” Dyson identified other exhibits as letterhead for the Crime

Victim’s Unit of Lone Star Legal Aid and other exhibits as a document handwritten

by Carpio.

      Dyson agreed that photos of Carpio show significant injuries to her face,

depict a pistol next to her body, and it appears that Carpio has car keys in her hand.

Dyson identified State’s Exhibit 131 as a box containing a pistol, an empty clip, and

a bag with bullets recovered from the McFaddin residence on April 29, 2021. Dyson

also testified that a shell casing was found at the scene.

      Yvette Borrero, a detective sergeant with the Family Violence Unit of the

Beaumont Police Department, testified that she went to the home on McFaddin on

April 29, 2021. She recalled that, upon arrival, she saw Carpio lying on the ground,

flowers on the ground, a pistol lying next to Carpio, a pickup truck with the engine

running, and a Chevy Malibu at the end of the driveway. She agreed there were

papers of interest inside one vehicle, and the papers were admitted as State’s Exhibit

6. According to Borrero, the police noticed cameras mounted on the house, and they

obtained a download from the cameras from Carpio’s phone. Borrero agreed that the

video showed Konning holding flowers and that it also showed Konning rush over

toward Carpio.

      Borrero testified that she recognized Carpio’s name from a pending case and

based on that case and after talking with Konning’s sister, the police spoke with

                                           5
Konning. Borrero recalled that, when Carpio died there were two open domestic

violence cases that involved Konning; in one, Konning was out on bond; in both

cases Carpio was cooperating as a witness. According to Borrero, Konning had been

told not to go to Carpio’s home on McFaddin, and Borrero knew that Carpio had

gone to the District Attorney’s Office asking for a protective order.

      Bruce Minter testified that he is the captain of technology and records for the

Sheriff’s Department, and he oversees electronic systems. He agreed he had been

asked to download Konning’s outgoing phone calls from April 3rd to October 13th

of 2021 that were recorded by the system used at the Jefferson County jail. Minter

identified State’s Exhibit 128 as his “stick drive” containing the recordings of

Konning’s phone calls that Minter downloaded.

      Dr. Selly Rivers, a private forensic pathologist who performs autopsies,

testified that she performed an autopsy of Carpio. Rivers found two gunshot wounds

on Carpio, one to the left side of her head and the other to her right cheek. According

to Rivers, either of the two shots could have been enough to cause Carpio’s death,

and no treatment could have saved her. Rivers determined that the cause of Carpio’s

death was “a gunshot wound [to] [] the head, perforating the left jugular vein, left

carotid artery, the left subclavian vein, the esophagus and cervical vertebral body.”

The doctor concluded that the means and manner of Carpio’s death was homicide.

                                          6
Testimony of Carpio’s Friend

      Carpio’s best friend Candy testified that she had known Carpio for about three

years, and they worked together at an auto parts store. Candy testified that she spoke

with Carpio on April 29, 2021, to make sure she was okay because the previous

night, Carpio had mentioned she was scared and had no electricity at her house.

According to Candy, Carpio told her she felt harassed, threatened, and afraid for her

life for about two weeks, and while Candy was on the phone with Carpio on April

29, Carpio told her to “call the cops, he’s here.” Candy testified that she called

Carpio’s mother to get the address for Carpio’s home, and Candy then called 911.

      Candy identified Carpio and Konning in the video that was admitted as State’s

Exhibit 8—a video about one-and-a-half minutes long—that was published to the

jury. Candy testified that she went to the scene afterwards, and she was also asked

by the police to give a statement. According to Candy, she went to work later that

day, where she saw Konning at the store, but she did not know of any reason for

Konning to be there, and she thought it was possible that Konning had heard Candy’s

voice earlier in the day when she was on the phone with Carpio.

Testimony from a Victims’ Assistance Center Caseworker

      Sheila Jolivet testified that she is a caseworker at the Victims’ Assistance

Center where she has worked with the District Attorney’s Office. Jolivet testified

that Lizeth Carpio contacted her office in April 2021 to try to get a protective order

                                          7
against Konning for herself and her one-year-old daughter, and Carpio had also

contacted the office in 2019 and 2020. Jolivet agreed that she helped Carpio with the

required paperwork, including preparing an affidavit. Jolivet identified State’s

Exhibit 2 as a Protective Order Application with an information sheet. Jolivet

identified State’s Exhibit 5 as containing Carpio’s own words that Jolivet typed out.

According to Jolivet, Carpio asked her to include a statement that “[h]e continued

calling my job making threats that he’s going to kill me.” Jolivet testified that there

was no signature on the documents because Carpio had to leave and get a battery for

her vehicle, which she was selling, but that Carpio had promised she would come

back to sign the papers after the vehicle was sold.

      Jolivet testified that while Carpio was applying for a protective order, she was

receiving phone calls from Konning, and Carpio was “[u]pset, fearful, nervous, [and]

crying.” Jolivet agreed that the information Carpio wrote on her application included

the following allegations about Konning: Konning was then on probation and he had

been convicted of assault on a peace officer and child endangerment; there were

pending charges against Konning for family assault; she and Konning had been

separated for four months and she planned to divorce him; and Konning had pushed

her, grabbed her hair, slapped her, punched her face, strangled her, threatened her

with a weapon, hit her head against a wall or object, and used a car as a weapon.

Carpio wrote on her application “[a]fter plenty [of] episodes, he escalated and told

                                          8
me he wanted to kill me[.]” Carpio also wrote that on April 28, Konning called her

at work and “said he was going to kill [her] and that he didn’t care [about] going to

jail because without [her] he [didn’t] have anything.” Carpio also wrote that on April

28, Konning turned her breakers off at her home, and on April 29, she woke up to

see her tires had been slashed, she could not go anywhere without the fear of him

killing her and her daughter, and she was not safe anywhere. Carpio indicated that

Konning had a long-term pattern of threats and harassment, had threatened to kill

her, and had said, “If I cannot have you, no one can[.]”

Testimony from Dispatcher and Officers About Prior Incidents

      Shelby West testified that she works for 911 dispatch for the police

department, and she received a call on August 22, 2020, about a “rolling

disturbance” involving two vehicles. West identified State’s Exhibit 161 as a thumb

drive containing a recorded phone call to dispatch in which Lizeth Carpio reported

that someone was “chasing and hitting her car.” The exhibit was admitted and

published to the jury. West testified that on several occasions, you could hear Carpio

scream during the 911 call, and that Carpio told her during the 911 call that “he” was

going to kill her.

      Officer Jacob Froman with the Beaumont Police Department testified that on

August 22, 2020, he responded to a report of a “rolling disturbance” or “road rage”

where someone was running into another vehicle. Lizeth Carpio had called in the

                                          9
incident, and she flagged the police down and pointed out the vehicle that was

involved in the incident with her. Froman activated his overhead lights, but the other

vehicle continued to drive, and Froman chased it. Once the vehicle stopped and

Froman approached, he saw a male driver—whom Froman identified as Konning—

and a child in the front passenger seat. Froman recalled that Konning was charged

with evading with a motor vehicle, endangering a child, and aggravated assault with

a deadly weapon. Froman identified Exhibit 160 as a thumb drive of a video from

his vehicle and body camera that night, and the exhibit was admitted and published

to the jury.

       Officer Augustin Palomares with the Beaumont Police Department testified

that he was working patrol on August 22, 2020, and he responded to a reported

“rolling disturbance” with Officer Froman, both officers activated their lights, and

Palomares activated his siren as they chased the suspect who “continued to evade”

until the suspect stopped at a residence. Palomares testified that the driver he pursued

was Konning, and there was a child sitting in the front seat of Konning’s car.

Palomares recalled that Carpio seemed in fear for her life that night. Recordings

from Palomares’s vehicle and body camera were admitted into evidence and

published to the jury.

       Roderick Williams, a patrol officer with the Beaumont Police Department,

testified that on August 4, 2020, he was dispatched to a residence for a report of a

                                          10
man “allegedly planning on breaking windows to a residence.” Once on the scene,

Williams saw Konning come from the back of the house to the front yard, and when

Williams asked Konning to come toward him, Konning refused. When Konning

tried to walk away, Williams grabbed him by the wrist and advised him he was being

detained, and Williams pulled Konning to the ground to place handcuffs on Konning.

Williams recalled that when Carpio arrived, she said, “[h]e’s not supposed to be

here.” Williams testified that he called for backup, and when Officer Hanley arrived,

Konning continued to resist, and Konning hit Hanley in the leg. Video from

Williams’s body camera that day was admitted and published to the jury.

      Officer Stewart Hanley with the Beaumont Police Department testified that

he was dispatched to the disturbance on August 4, 2020, and upon arrival Officer

Williams was already on the scene. Hanley recalled that he saw Officer Williams

“laying on the ground with the suspect wrapped up[,]” and while trying to assist

Williams, Konning struck Hanley’s leg. Hanley was treated for injuries. Video from

Hanley’s body camera was admitted and published to the jury.

      Detective Amber McMichael with the Beaumont Police Department testified

that she also responded to a call of an officer needing assistance on August 4, 2020.

McMichael testified that when she arrived, the other officers had Konning in

handcuffs. McMichael recalled that Carpio was at the scene, and she said that she

and Konning were married, had a small child, and that Konning was upset because

                                         11
she had filed for divorce that day. McMichael thought that Carpio appeared to be in

fear for her own and her daughter’s safety. Video from McMichael’s body camera

was admitted and published to the jury. McMichael agreed the recording depicts

Konning saying he was “going to break all the windows out of the house until

[Carpio] came to the house[.]” She also testified that Carpio told her she had changed

the locks on the house the previous day so Konning could not get inside.

Testimony of Konning’s Family Members

      Konning’s sister “Alva” testified that on the morning of the shooting she asked

her brother (Konning) to go to the store and get some groceries. He drove her Chevy

Malibu. He later came back and put the groceries on the cabinet and gave her the

keys. Later that day, she learned that something had happened when she received

calls from two detectives, and she learned that Carpio had been murdered and her

brother had been arrested. Alva testified that she visited Konning in jail, and he

admitted to shooting Carpio. Alva looked at a still photo from the video of the

incident, and Alva agreed it depicted her brother and Carpio. Alva agreed she had

listened to audio recordings of her telephone calls with Konning while he was in jail,

and she did not appreciate that he tried to blame her and their mother for the crime.

      Alva testified that Carpio called the police on Konning “a lot,” sometimes for

a good reason but sometimes not. Alva testified that she let Konning stay with her

several times after Carpio kicked him out. She agreed there was “constant fighting[]”

                                         12
between Konning and Carpio, Konning told her he went to Carpio’s house that day

to make peace with her, and Konning had admitted he shot Carpio. Alva also agreed

that, at one point, there was a charge against Konning for assaulting Carpio, but

Carpio had signed a non-prosecution affidavit.

      Konning’s mother “Sheila” testified that when Konning was about thirteen

years old, he took her car without her permission, he hit some neighbors’ cars, and

he was placed on probation. She agreed that, while on probation, he got in trouble

for assaulting a school janitor and another time, he was kicked out of school for

assaulting a staff member. Sheila agreed that over the course of Konning’s

relationship with Carpio, Carpio “kicked him out of the house quite a bit[.]”

      Konning’s uncle “Donald” testified as a defense witness. He testified that the

relationship between Konning and Carpio had ups and downs, they fought a lot, and

some of the fights were violent. According to Donald, he knew Carpio had a gun,

and Carpio had shown it to him.

Konning’s Testimony

      Konning testified that he met Carpio in April 2019 when he started working

at an auto parts store where Carpio was a manager, and they started dating. Konning

testified that the two started fighting verbally after a few months of living together.

He admitted lying to Carpio about contacting another woman, and when Carpio got

tired of him lying to her, she started throwing him out of the house. After Carpio

                                          13
became pregnant, the two married in December 2020. The couple first lived on

Pradice Street and later moved to McFaddin Avenue.

      Konning testified that the fights became physical, Carpio pulled a gun on him

once or twice, he did not call the police because Carpio was a felon, and he did not

want her to get arrested for having a gun. He also testified that one time Carpio

threatened him with a butcher knife. He testified that the fights were “[e]very other

week or every other month[,]” and he would stay with his sister when Carpio kicked

him out. He recalled that Carpio had called the police on him more times than he

could count. Konning testified that, after he pleaded guilty to evading arrest and

endangering a child from the August 2020 incident, Carpio bonded him out of jail

even though there was a no-contact provision under his bond.

      State’s Exhibit 8—the video from Carpio’s security camera the day of the

shooting—was played in court, and Konning was questioned as to why he went to

Carpio’s house the day of the shooting. Konning testified that he went to her house

that day with flowers so Carpio would see he was serious about loving her. He knew

there was a protective order in place prohibiting him from contacting Carpio, and he

testified that did not have a gun or knife, nor did he have any intent to harm Carpio.

Konning added that when he got out of his car, he did not know that Carpio had a

gun. But when he saw that she did, he thought: “She hates me. [] [S]he’s gone for

good. She’d rather me be dead.” According to Konning, he panicked, he hurt “so

                                         14
bad[,]” and he had passion in his head. He agreed that he hit Carpio, knocked her

down, and that he killed her because he knew she hated him and that she wanted him

dead. Konning stated he was sorry, and he wished he could “take back the eight

seconds[]” between when he saw the gun until he shot her. Konning testified that

when he shot Carpio, he was not in his right frame of mind nor thinking clearly, and

his heart was broken. According to Konning, after the shooting, he went to his

sister’s house, dropped off her keys, and then went to his aunt and uncle’s house.

Konning agreed he that at some point, confessed to his sister.

      On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

      [Prosecutor]: . . . [Y]ou said you wanted -- your lawyer was asking
      about sudden passion. Is that what you’re claiming you were suffering
      under?

      [Konning]: No.

      [Prosecutor]: All right. You weren’t suffering under sudden passion?

      [Konning]: I wasn’t -- when I mentioned that, it wasn’t about what I
      was suffering from.

      [Prosecutor]: Okay. When you shot and killed Liz Carpio, were you
      operating under the condition of sudden passion?

      [Konning]: Yes, sir.

      [Prosecutor]: All right. Okay. And what sudden passion were you
      offering -- were you working under?

      [Konning]: Do I have to answer that question?

      The Court: You have to answer all questions.
                                         15
      [Konning]: What if I don’t answer his question?

      The Court: Then tell him to -- ask him to repeat it or say you don’t
      understand. Don’t make up an answer.

      [Konning]: I don’t understand.

      [Prosecutor]: Why did you say that you’re operating under sudden
      passion if you don’t know what it is?

      [Konning]: You asked me a question. I told you yes, and then I don’t
      understand the second part of it.

      [Prosecutor]: Okay. All right. What passion were you operating under
      when you killed Lizeth?

      [Konning]: Can you give me examples?

      [Prosecutor]: I didn’t kill Liz. I need you to tell me what you were
      feeling at the time.

      [Konning]: I don’t know how to answer that because I don’t understand
      what answer you’re looking for.

      [Prosecutor]: What emotion were you feeling when you killed Liz?

      [Konning]: Desperate, separate emotion.

      [Prosecutor]: Desperate, sep --

      [Konning]: Depressed.

      [Prosecutor]: Depressed.
            What did she do to provoke this passion to you?

      [Konning]: The gun.

Konning agreed that Carpio pulled a gun, and he agreed his response was to “bull-

rush” her. As the Exhibit 8 video was played, Konning agreed that at one point,
                                        16
Carpio was behind the open door of her vehicle, her hands were down by the door,

and the vehicle’s door was between Konning and Carpio. Konning agreed that, after

the shooting, he dropped the gun and took off running.

      According to Konning, the night before the shooting, he received a video of

Carpio “sleeping with another guy[,]” and he went to the house to turn the power

off. Konning also testified that he assumed the cameras went off when the lights

went off. He testified that he did not want the jury to hear about that because he did

not want to expose the problems they were having and his belief that Carpio was

cheating on him.

      Konning agreed that at some point he had slapped Carpio’s face, hit her head

on the wall by pushing her, rammed his car into hers, and choked her. He denied

strangling her, pulling her hair, and threatening to hit her with a phone.

      During Konning’s testimony on cross-examination, audio recordings of

certain phone calls Konning made while in jail were published to the jury:

      • a call with his sister in which his sister says that he should take
        responsibility, and Konning responds that he is not admitting to
        anything;
      • a call with his sister in which she tells him he should show some
        emotion, that it is all on camera, and he should admit to it if it is true.
        Konning tells his sister he has a girlfriend, that he is innocent, and
        he needs a lawyer, and that when he found out it was his wife who
        was shot, he cried;
      • a call with his uncle in which Konning states that the case went from
        serious to being a joke and “every time I think of it, I laugh”;
      • a call with his aunt and uncle in which Konning states that his sister
        is the reason he was arrested and that she had signed a statement
                                         17
          against him. His aunt says Konning did nothing wrong and it was
          Konning’s sister who shot Carpio, to which Konning replies, “I
          know.” His aunt offers to write a statement for him saying Konning
          was cooking cabbage for her;
      •   a call with his mother in which she repeatedly asks Konning whether
          he did it, and Konning says he did not, that “this is not my character.”
          In court, Konning is questioned about this statement and he agreed
          that “[p]art of that is a lie”;
      •   a call with his aunt in which Konning tells her that the judge is out
          to get him. When questioned about this in court, Konning testified
          that he did not want to tell his aunt that he was scared to go in front
          of the judge;
      •   a call with his uncle in which Konning says they got a video from
          Carpio’s phone and “it’s not pretty”;
      •   a call with his sister in which his sister says he should say that Carpio
          shot at him before and this time was at closer range, that it was a
          “crime of passion” because “everybody knows the girl was cheating
          on you”;
      •   a call with his aunt and uncle in which Konning mentions the video
          and says “it ain’t a pretty sight”;
      •   a call with his sister in which Konning asks her to look up the
          punishment for involuntary manslaughter; and
      •   a call with his uncle in which Konning says that his lawyer was
          going to try to get the charge reduced to a second-degree felony, that
          would get Konning seven years, and that Konning would be out in
          three-and-a-half years.

                                         Issues

      In five issues, Appellant argues that the evidence was legally and factually

insufficient to support the jury’s negative finding on his sudden-passion defense.

Appellant argues that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and the evidence

(Issue One), that the jury’s verdict on sudden passion was against the great weight

and preponderance of the evidence (Issue Two), that the jury’s adverse finding is

                                           18
legally insufficient (Issue Three) and factually insufficient (Issue Four), and that no

rational juror could have found that Appellant did not act under the influence of

sudden passion (Issue Five).

                                 Standard of Review

      In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we

review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine

whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give deference to

the factfinder’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh

the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. If the record contains conflicting inferences, we must

presume that the factfinder resolved such facts in favor of the verdict and defer to

that resolution. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

      The jury as factfinder is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and

credibility of the witnesses, and it may believe all, some, or none of the testimony

presented by the parties. See Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 865 (Tex. Crim. App.

2020) (citing Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018);

Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). The appellate

                                          19
court does not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the evidence, nor

does it substitute its own judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235

S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Direct and circumstantial evidence are

treated equally: ‘Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in

establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient

to establish guilt.’” Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13).

      Although Brooks abolished factual sufficiency review as it applies to criminal

convictions, affirmative defenses or affirmative mitigating issues may be evaluated

for both legal and factual sufficiency. Butcher v. State, 454 S.W.3d 13, 20 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2015). In a legal sufficiency review of an affirmative defense, we first

assay the record for a scintilla of evidence favorable to the factfinder’s finding and

disregard all evidence to the contrary unless a reasonable factfinder could not do so.

Id. (citing See Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 669-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

“The finding of the factfinder rejecting a defendant’s affirmative defense should be

overturned for lack of legal sufficiency only if the appealing party establishes that

the evidence conclusively proves his affirmative defense, and ‘no reasonable

[factfinder] was free to think otherwise.’” Id. at 20.

      In a factual-sufficiency review of a finding rejecting an affirmative defense,

and unlike in a legal sufficiency review, we examine the evidence in a neutral light.

Id. A finding rejecting a defendant’s affirmative defense cannot be overruled unless,

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“after setting out the relevant evidence supporting the verdict, the court clearly states

why the verdict is so much against the great weight of the evidence as to be

manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or clearly biased.” Id. Evidence may be

legally sufficient to support a jury’s determination on a defendant’s affirmative

defense, yet also may be factually insufficient. Petetan v. State, 622 S.W.3d 321,

357 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

      A person commits murder if he (1) “intentionally or knowingly causes the

death of an individual[,]” or (2) “intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits

an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual[.]” Tex.

Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b). Normally, convictions for murder are punishable as

first-degree felonies. Id. § 19.02(c). Sudden passion is a mitigating circumstance

relevant to determining punishment, and if the factfinder returns a verdict in the

defendant’s favor on his claim of sudden passion, the favorable finding reduces the

punishment on the conviction for murder from a felony of the first-degree to a

second-degree felony. Id. § 19.02(d); Beltran v. State, 472 S.W.3d 283, 289 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2015).

      The defendant must prove that he acted under sudden passion by a

preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(d). To prevail on the

defense at trial, the defendant must obtain an affirmative finding that “he caused the

death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate

                                           21
cause.” Id. The Texas Penal Code defines “[a]dequate cause” as a “cause that would

commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of

ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.” Id.

§ 19.02(a)(1). “Sudden passion” is defined as a “passion directly caused by and

arising out of provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the person

killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of

former provocation.” Id. § 19.02(a)(2); Wooten v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013).

                                      Analysis

      We first note that Appellant’s brief does not identify a specific “sudden

passion” that induced him to murder Carpio. Instead, he argues that “[s]imple logic

would dictate that there is no reason to take flowers to the intended victim of a

murder[,]” and that “he reacted in sudden passion to the introduction of the gun by

the deceased into the situation.” According to Appellant “no rational juror could

have concluded that he was not acting under sudden and extreme passion in the

commission of the offense.” Appellant argues that when he went to Carpio’s house

on the day of the shooting, he did not anticipate that he would be confronted with a

firearm that threatened his life 3 and destroyed his hopes of restoring his marriage.

      3
        Appellant did not argue at trial, nor does he argue on appeal, that he acted in
self-defense.
                                           22
       To prevail on a defense of sudden passion, there must be evidence of (1) an

adequate cause (2) that would produce “a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror

in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool

reflection.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(1). Konning did not testify that he

experienced “anger, rage, resentment, or terror” that rendered him incapable of cool

reflection. See id.

       Konning testified that he knew Carpio had a gun, she had pulled the gun on

him previously. Sergeant Borrero testified that the video from Carpio’s security

cameras show that, upon arriving at the McFaddin house and seeing Carpio in the

driveway, Konning “bull-rushed” her. Konning testified that he “knew” Carpio had

a gun because “[w]hy would you have your hand behind your back?” Konning

admitted that he shot Carpio because he realized she hated him, and she wanted him

dead. Konning also admitted that he went to Carpio’s home the day of the shooting

despite a protective order against him, and even though she had refused to answer

his calls. A crime scene technician testified that Carpio was found with her car keys

still in her hand.

       The jury rejected Konning’s mitigating affirmative defense. We conclude that

the record contains more than a scintilla of evidence that Konning did not act under

sudden passion. Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 20. Further, to prevail on his legal

sufficiency challenge, Konning had to establish that the evidence conclusively

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proved his affirmative defense such that “‘no reasonable [jury] was free to think

otherwise.’” Id. He failed to do so.

      The jury, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, could

have decided that Konning’s behavior both before, during, and after the shooting did

not demonstrate that Konning had acted under “sudden passion.” Konning did not

call 911 or otherwise seek assistance after the shooting, but rather he went to his

sister’s house to drop off her car keys and then he went to his aunt and uncle’s house.

In some of the recorded jailhouse phone calls, Konning is heard saying he did not

shoot Carpio. Konning admitted that he lied to his mother several times when she

asked him if he shot Carpio. The jury could have concluded that, in some of the

recorded calls, Konning appeared to have been willing for his sister or mother to

take the blame for Carpio’s death. Konning also agreed that, the day before the

shooting, he turned off the electrical service to Carpio’s home where Carpio lived

on McFaddin, and he stated he thought that would disable the security cameras as

well. He also testified that he did not think the jury was going to hear about that. The

day before the shooting, Carpio told a caseworker that Konning had threatened to

kill Carpio, Konning had turned the breaker off at Carpio’s home so that her security

cameras were not working, the police came to her house and turned the breaker back

on, and the day the shooting occurred, Carpio found her tires had been slashed.

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      The jury also heard evidence that Konning’s relationship with Carpio had

often been violent. During his testimony, Konning admitted to slapping Carpio’s

face, hitting her head on the wall by pushing her, ramming his car into hers, and

choking her. He admitted that he and Carpio fought verbally early in their

relationship, and at some point, their fights started getting physical. The caseworker

testified that Carpio wrote on her application for a protective order that Konning had

pushed her, grabbed her hair, slapped her, punched her, strangled her, threatened her

with a weapon, hit her head against a wall, and used a car as a weapon. Carpio’s

friend Candy testified that Carpio told her she felt harassed, threatened, and afraid

for her life for about two weeks, and while Carpio was on the phone with Candy on

the day of the shooting, Carpio told Candy to call the police because Konning had

arrived. A caseworker at the Victims’ Assistance Center testified that in an

application for a protective order, Carpio alleged that Konning had threatened to kill

Carpio, and she was afraid for her life. A copy of Carpio’s application for the

protective order was found in her vehicle. Multiple police officers testified about a

“rolling disturbance” incident in August 2020 in which Konning was running into

Carpio’s vehicle. Officers also testified about an incident earlier in August 2020

when Carpio called for police assistance because Konning was trying to break the

windows of her house.

                                         25
      Video from the security cameras at Carpio’s home was published to the jury

that shows the shooting. The video is about one-and-a-half minutes long, and it

shows Carpio standing by her vehicle with the driver’s door open when Konning

arrives. Officers testified that Carpio’s vehicle was still running when police arrived

at the scene. We conclude the evidence was legally sufficient for the jury to reject

Konning’s affirmative defense. Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 20.

      In addition, we hold the evidence in the record was also factually sufficient to

support the jury’s verdict and rejecting Konning’s affirmative defense. As stated

above, the evidence showed Konning had made previous threats and engaged in

violent behavior toward Carpio, he shut off her electricity the night before the

incident, and he admitted he thought he had disabled her security cameras. After

having viewed the video from the security camera showing Konning rush toward

Carpio, along with the testimony and other evidence, as sole judges of the weight

and credibility of the evidence, the jurors could have reasonably concluded the

evidence does not support Konning’s argument claiming that his passion arose from

an adequate cause. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(2). For instance, as the

finders of fact, the jurors had the right to reject Konning’s testimony to the effect

that he went to Carpio’s house to give her flowers to show her he was still in love

with her. See Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 865.

                                          26
      In this case there was ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could

have concluded Konning did not meet his burden of proof on his affirmative defense.

See Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 20; Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 669-70. We conclude based

on the record that the jury’s rejection of Konning’s sudden-passion defense is not

manifestly unjust, shocking to the conscience, or clearly biased, and the evidence is

factually sufficient to support the verdict. Because we have concluded the evidence

is both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s rejection of Konning’s

affirmative defense, we overrule Konning’s issues on appeal, and we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                    _________________________
                                                        LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                              Justice

Submitted on April 10, 2023
Opinion Delivered July 26, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Horton, Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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