Court Opinion

ID: 9593956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:25:53.789111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:51.449735
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in parí). I dissent from part in of the lead opinion for the reasons stated by Chief Justice Mallett. I concur with the result of part n, but offer the following analysis of the issues:
Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint indicates that, in the Headlee base year of 1978-79, MCL 400.117a; MSA 16.490(27a) provided that the state would reimburse fifty percent of the actual expenditures from the county child care fund, but that after the 1980 amendment the state reimbursement was capped at fifty percent of budgeted, not actual, expenditures and that the state required an unrealistically low budgeted amount. While this situation almost certainly would result in underfunding and a violation of § 29, the facts pleaded do not directly make out a cause of action under § 29.
Const 1963, art 9, § 29 provides, in pertinent part:
The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of units of Local Government by state law ....
*170To plead a cause of action under this part of § 29, a plaintiff must plead facts showing (1) that there is a continuing state mandate, (2) that the state actually funded the mandated activity at a certain proportion1 of necessary costs in the base year of 1978-79, and (3) that the state funding of necessary costs has dipped below that proportion in a succeeding year.2
Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint and some of their arguments before this Court suggest that they believe that pleading a decrease in the funding requirement of § 117a established, per se, a violation of art 9, § 29. This is not so. Defendants may not have complied with their statutory commitment to fund fifty percent of the expenditures in 1978-79, and actual funding may have been below that level.3 The obligation that is imposed on the state by the Maintenance-of-Support Clause of § 29 begins with whatever level of support was in place when Headlee was adopted.
While I would reject any implication that plaintiffs have pleaded a violation per se of § 29, the factual allegation of reduction in statutoiy level of funding creates a sufficient inference of actual reduction in funding that I proceed on the basis that plaintiffs have alleged actual reduction in state funding.
The remaining issue, for purposes of deciding whether plaintiffs alleged a cause of action, focuses *171on the state-mandated activity. Article 9, § 29 applies to “the state financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of units of Local Government by state law.” The state funding in question supports expenditures from the county child care funds. MCL 400.117a(4); MSA 16.490(27a)(4). Use of that fund is directed by MCL 400.117c(2); MSA 16.490(27c)(2):
The child care fund shall be used for the costs of providing foster care for children under sections 18c and 117a and under the jurisdiction of the probate court ....
Section 18c, MCL 400.18c; MSA 16.418(3), covers foster care “financed by a county department of social welfare . . . .” One of the state-mandated duties of that department is “under the jurisdiction of the probate court to provide supervision and foster care as provided by court order . . . .” MCL 400.55(h); MSA 16.455(h). Section 117a, referred to above, is MCL 400.117a; MSA 16.490(27a), which creates a juvenile justice funding system, including child care funds, for financing juvenile justice services. Subsection 117a(l) defines a juvenile justice service as
a service, exclusive of judicial functions, provided by a county for juveniles who are within, or are likely to come within, the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the probate court under section 2 of chapter XIIA of Act No. 288 of the Public Acts of 1939, as amended, being section 712A.2 of the Michigan Compiled Laws .... A service includes . . . foster care ....
To complete the picture, MCL 712A.25; MSA 27.3178(598.25) provides:
*172Expenses incurred in carrying out this chapter, except as may otherwise be specifically provided by law, shall be paid upon the order of the judge of probate by the county treasurer from the general fund of the county.
Thus, state law mandates that the county provide and pay for foster care for those children determined to be in need of foster care by the probate court. This is the state-mandated activity in question.
At times, plaintiffs refer to the state-mandated duty as maintaining the child care fund. This is an imprecise shorthand. The duty is maintaining and funding the county foster care system.
Defendants argue that the state aid goes to the county child care fund and that maintaining the fund is not mandated. Rather, counties only have to maintain the fund as a condition of receiving state aid. Defendants argue that the counties do not have to accept state aid, so they do not have to maintain the fund. This mischaracterizes the mandated duty. The duty is operation and funding of foster care. As long as the activity is mandated by state law and the state contributed financial aid in the Headlee base year, the state has a duty to continue its proportionate support. See Durant v Michigan, 456 Mich 175, 198; 566 NW2d 272 (1997).
Similarly, I find unpersuasive the state’s argument that county foster care is not a mandated activity because it is a court requirement. The Headlee implementing act exempts certain mandates from reimbursement. “[C]ourt requirements” are exempted. MCL 21.234(5)(c); MSA 5.3194(604)(5)(c). A “[c]ourt requirement” is defined as:
*173[A] new activity or service or an increase in the level of activity or service beyond that required by existing law which is required of a local unit of government in order to comply with a final state or federal court order arising from the interpretation of the constitution of the United States, the state constitution of 1963, an existing law, or a federal statute, rule, or regulation. [MCL 21.232(3); MSA 5.3194(602) (3). ]
The definition is intended to apply, inter alia, to a judicial ruling that increases a local financial burden beyond that required by a statute when Headlee was enacted.
By ordering foster care services, the probate court does not extend the local duties of a county through a judicial ruling. Under subsection 55(h) the county was already required to provide foster care to as many children as the court designated. Through its orders, the court merely identifies the children in need of foster care and places them in the custody of the county. Therefore, the probate court’s order is not “an increase in the level of activity or service beyond that required by . . . state law” for purposes of MCL 21.232(3); MSA 5.3194(602)(3) (emphasis added).4
After correctly determining that foster care was a state-mandated service, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs had not pleaded a cause of action because the requirements of a budgeting process resulted in a prima facie reasonable estimate of what costs were necessary. Because the statute maintained fifty percent support of those expenditures, the Court affirmed the Court of Claims grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants.
*174Plaintiffs argue that the Court of Appeals erred because there are issues of fact concerning whether defendants have not maintained the required level of funding.
I agree with plaintiffs. As noted above, the factual premise for a cause of action under § 29 is a decrease in the actual proportion of funding of the necessary costs of an activity mandated by state law. Plaintiffs allege that the budget amounts do not reflect actual necessary costs. Plaintiffs may make such a showing on remand.
I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals5 for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Riley, J., concurred with Weaver, J.

 The actual proportion would not have to be pleaded, but could be established through discovery or proof at trial.

 By using the past tense, I do not mean to imply that an action seeking declaratory judgment would be premature before underfunding has occurred, as long as there is an actual controversy.

 It is by no means uncommon for a succeeding Legislature to decline to appropriate funds at a level promised by a statute adopted by a prior Legislature. There is normally no legally enforceable obligation to do so.

 Defendants also raise an argument claiming an exception to § 29 for de minimis costs. The issue has played no role in the decisions below.

 At the Court of Appeals, the parties shall file briefs regarding whether the Court of Claims has subject-matter jurisdiction over an action under Const 1963, art 9, § 29. If the Court of Appeals determines that the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals shall assume original jurisdiction over the case.