Court Opinion

ID: 9916887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 20:03:32.753372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:06.080940
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 230232-U
                                            No. 1-23-0232
                                     Order filed January 10, 2024
                                                                                        Third Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                               IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                          FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )    Appeal from the
                                                               )    Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 )    Boone County.
                                                               )
     v.                                                        )    No. 19 CF 276
                                                               )
 GREGORY P. ROBINSON, JR.,                                     )    Honorable
                                                               )    Ryan A. Swift,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                )    Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1        Held: The evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant constructively possessed
                heroin recovered from the car in which he was a passenger.

¶2        Following a bench trial, defendant Gregory P. Robinson, Jr., was convicted of possession

of a controlled substance (PCS) with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(1)(A) (West 2018))

and sentenced to 13 years and 6 months in prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the State

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed drugs that were recovered from the
No. 1-23-0232

pouch behind the driver’s seat of the car in which he was a passenger. For the reasons that follow,

we reverse. 1

¶3      Defendant’s conviction arose from a traffic stop that occurred on I-90 near Belvidere,

Illinois, on October 13, 2019. Following arrest, defendant was charged by indictment with one

count each of PCS with intent to deliver heroin, PCS of heroin, PCS with intent to deliver cocaine,

and PCS of cocaine. Prior to trial, the State “dismissed” the two cocaine charges because it had

“no lab results to support those charges.” Three witnesses testified at trial: the car’s driver, the

trooper who pulled the car over, and an officer with the local narcotics unit. The trooper’s dashcam

video was also introduced into evidence.

¶4      At trial, Quinton Ashford, defendant’s brother-in-law, explained that he was appearing as

part of a plea deal by which he would plead guilty to a Class 4 PCS charge, testify against

defendant, and receive two years of “410” probation.

¶5      On October 12, 2019, Ashford and defendant, who both lived in Wisconsin, made a plan

to travel to Chicago the next day so that Ashford could briefly visit his aunt and defendant could

visit his brother or a friend. Defendant agreed to pay Ashford $100 and pay for gas and tolls. At

the time, Ashford had owned his car for four or five months. The only people who had been in the

car other than Ashford were his children, whom he drove back and forth to school.

¶6      Ashford testified that he picked defendant up around 8 or 9 a.m. on October 13, 2019. He

drove to Chicago, dropped defendant off on the east side, visited his aunt on the south side, and

then picked defendant up for the return trip to Wisconsin. During the drive back to Wisconsin,

        1
          In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018),
this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.

                                                  -2-
No. 1-23-0232

they were stopped by Illinois State Troopers. Ultimately, the troopers placed Ashford under arrest

and told him they found drugs in the pouch behind the driver’s seat.

¶7     Ashford testified that he did not know anything about the drugs and he had not seen anyone

place anything in the pouch behind the driver’s seat. He agreed that when he let the troopers look

through his cell phone, they “locate[d] one text message concerning marijuana” and that he “had

sent a message to somebody about buying about $30 worth of marijuana.” Ashford also agreed

“there were also two other cell phones *** located in the car.” The phones were admitted into

evidence as People’s Exhibits No. 3 and No. 4. When shown the phones in court, Ashford stated

that they belonged to defendant.

¶8     On cross-examination, Ashford testified that he had a valid Wisconsin driver’s license at

the time of his arrest. He never saw defendant enter or reach into the back seat of the car. When

asked whether, when he picked defendant up on the east side of Chicago, defendant had anything

in his hands, Ashford answered, “Not that I recall.” He also did not see defendant take anything

out of his pockets when he entered the car.

¶9     Ashford stated that when he entered the trooper’s squad car, he was not nervous. He agreed

that he had rubbed his face, but stated that was “[j]ust something that I do.” He acknowledged that

he did not tell the trooper “everything” while in the squad car. When asked whether, after he was

at the station, his story started to change and expand, he answered, “I would guess.” He engaged

in the following exchange with defense counsel:

                “Q. Your testimony here today was that you had no knowledge of the drugs in the

       vehicle; is that correct?

                A. That’s correct.

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No. 1-23-0232

                Q. But you’re going to plead guilty to it?

                A. Because drugs was found in the vehicle.

                Q. In your vehicle.

                A. Yes. It’s my vehicle but there wasn’t no drugs in there before he got in my car

       so it’s my car. I know for a fact what’s in my car.

                Q. Okay.

                A. There was no drugs in my car before [defendant] entered my car.

                Q. Okay. But you never saw him go into the back seat, correct?

                A. Don’t matter. He could have put that back there when I was in the trooper’s car

       talking to the trooper. How easy it [sic] for somebody to slip something in those slots that

       is right there when me and the trooper is back discussing what was the purpose of me being

       in Chicago in the first place.

                Q. Sure.

                A. So, you keep saying my car, my car, yeah, I know it was my car, but, like I said,

       it’s my car. I know what’s in my car. He put that there when I was talking to the trooper

       because before then it wasn’t in there.

                Q. How do you know he put that in there is my question, sir?

                A. How else did it get in there?”

¶ 10   When asked whether it was correct that the text messages on his phone regarding drug

transactions did not say anything about marijuana, Ashford answered, “If you say so,” and stated

that he was not sure, as it had been “so long” since he had seen the messages.

                                                 -4-
No. 1-23-0232

¶ 11   On redirect, Ashford stated that he answered the trooper’s questions honestly, and that,

once at the station, troopers asked “more and different” questions. He reiterated that he was

maintaining his innocence but pleading guilty because he thought it was in his best interest.

¶ 12   Acting master sergeant Greg Melzer, of the Illinois State Police, testified that he was on

patrol on I-90 around 1:29 p.m. on October 13, 2019, when he noticed a car with a Wisconsin

license plate rapidly decrease speed for no apparent reason. In addition, the car twice “needed to

apply its brakes to avoid coming up directly on the rear” of the sports utility vehicle in front of it.

Melzer curbed the car, which was occupied by two men. As Melzer approached the car on foot, he

saw the passenger, whom he identified in court as defendant, shaking and typing a text message

along the lines of, “Tell the kids I love them. We got stopped by the police.”

¶ 13   Melzer asked the driver, whom he learned was Ashford, to join him in his squad car.

Ashford seemed nervous, but he was not hesitant or evasive and answered Melzer’s questions

fairly consistently and without delay. Melzer checked Ashford’s Wisconsin driver’s license.

Believing it was invalid, he returned to Ashford’s car to check defendant’s license. Defendant gave

Melzer an instructional permit, which Melzer did not believe was a valid license, and stated that

he was coming from his aunties’ house in Chicago.

¶ 14   Melzer went back to his squad car and then approached Ashford’s car a third time.

According to Melzer, defendant seemed “exceedingly” nervous and admitted being nervous while

they “spoke about a possible warrant that he had that was not enforceable.” Melzer told defendant

that he was not being arrested based on the warrant.

¶ 15   Believing that neither defendant nor Ashford had a valid license, Melzer arranged to have

the car towed. He then performed a tow inventory of the car while Ashford was in the squad car

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No. 1-23-0232

and defendant stood nearby with another responding trooper. During the search, Melzer noticed a

“bulge” in the pocket on the back of the driver’s seat. He “was able to pull back the pocket and

noted a plastic bag with what appeared to be a controlled substance or a multiple of controlled

substances inside.” Melzer recovered the bag and placed defendant and Ashford in handcuffs,

detaining them for further investigation. In court, he identified a photograph he took of the “pocket

with a bulge inside of it,” which was admitted into evidence as an exhibit.

¶ 16   Later, at a State police squad room, Melzer looked through Ashford’s cell phone. He

located a text message conversation between Ashford and someone named “Josh” that he thought

might be of evidentiary value pertaining to the drugs. Melzer took a photograph of the

conversation, which was admitted into evidence as an exhibit. The photograph depicts a

conversation from October 5, 2019, in which Ashford asked, “What up you good bro?” and Josh

answered, “Yes sir. How much[?]” to which Ashford replied, “30.” Josh’s response, asking about

“sliding,” is partially obscured by glare on the screen, as is the end of Ashford’s reply, which

begins, “Heading your way[.]”

¶ 17   On cross-examination, Melzer testified that Ashford was nervous throughout their

interaction in the squad car, rubbed his head and face, and fidgeted. He issued Ashford a warning

for following too closely and a ticket for driving without a valid license. Melzer explained that he

told defendant about the unenforceable outstanding warrant for his arrest because it was his normal

practice to inform people of such warrants so they can get them “cleared up.”

¶ 18   Melzer stated that when he was following Ashford, he was not able to see much inside the

car due to the slight amount of tint on the windows and the overcast weather conditions. He did

not at any time before or during the stop see defendant make any “furtive movements” or reach

                                                -6-
No. 1-23-0232

into the back seat. Although the recovered items were sent for forensic analysis, Melzer did not

“believe that there was a result as far as the fingerprint analysis went.”

¶ 19   On redirect, Melzer testified that while he and Ashford were in the squad car, he had “no

idea” what defendant was doing in Ashford’s car. He clarified that while he could see defendant’s

head and shoulders, he could not see defendant’s hands or lower body. He also stated that he did

not see Ashford make any furtive movements while he was in the car.

¶ 20   Melzer’s dashcam video of the stop was admitted into evidence as People’s Exhibit No. 9.

The video was not published in open court; the trial court indicated it would watch the video in

camera.

¶ 21   The dashcam video, which is included in the record on appeal and which was viewed by

this court, depicts Melzer following Ashford’s car, curbing it, and approaching the passenger’s

side on foot. Indistinct images of the top of Ashford’s and defendant’s heads can be seen moving

in the car through its rear window. Melzer speaks to Ashford and defendant through the passenger-

side window, informing them that he pulled them over for following the car ahead of them too

closely. He asks Ashford for his license and registration and, after receiving some sort of

document, asks Ashford to join him in the front seat of the squad car. Ashford exits his car at

approximately 03:42 in the video and follows Melzer to the squad car. Melzer and Ashford then

converse in the squad car until about 07:22, when Melzer exits the squad car, explaining that he is

going to find out whether defendant has a valid driver’s license.

¶ 22   Melzer approaches the passenger side of Ashford’s car a second time and asks defendant

for identification. When he asks defendant where he and Melzer were coming from, defendant can

be heard making an “uh” noise before stating something unintelligible. Melzer responds, “His

                                                -7-
No. 1-23-0232

auntie’s house? All right, cool.” They converse until about 08:15, when Melzer says he is going to

check the status of defendant’s license and walks back to his squad car.

¶ 23   Melzer remains in the squad car, speaking with Ashford and a dispatcher, until about 19:52.

During this time, defendant, who is still in the passenger seat of Ashford’s car, appears to move

his head several times. Melzer then exits the squad car, speaks with a responding officer who is

off-screen, and approaches the passenger side of Ashford’s car a third time.

¶ 24   Through the passenger-side window, Melzer informs defendant that he has a warrant from

southern Illinois that is not extraditable and not valid in northern Illinois. He assures defendant

that he is not being taken into custody based on the warrant, asks defendant if he is okay, and states

he is just giving defendant a heads up. Around 21:50, Melzer walks back to his squad car. While

Melzer is in the squad car, defendant again appears to move his head several times. Melzer

eventually receives information from the dispatcher, after which he informs Ashford that neither

he nor defendant has a valid driver’s license.

¶ 25   Around 32:35, Melzer exits the squad car and tells the other responding officer that

Ashford’s car will be inventoried. At 33:50, he approaches the passenger side and asks defendant

to exit the car. The other officer enters the camera’s frame, defendant exits the car, and Melzer

explains to him that neither he nor Ashford has a valid license to drive the car. Defendant consents

to being patted down by Melzer and then defendant and the other officer exit the camera’s frame.

¶ 26   Melzer searches the car for a few minutes. He then walks out of the camera’s frame toward

defendant and tells him he is being handcuffed because there were “illegal substances” in the car.

While off-screen, Melzer gives Ashford similar information. Melzer returns to Ashford’s car and

                                                 -8-
No. 1-23-0232

emerges with a bag, which he takes to the squad car. He then continues to search Ashford’s car.

Eventually, a tow truck arrives and tows Ashford’s car from the scene.

¶ 27   The parties stipulated that the suspect heroin recovered from the car weighed 39.7 grams

and tested positive for the presence of heroin.

¶ 28   Belvidere detective sergeant Chris Washburn, the supervisor of the Belvidere Boone

County Metro Narcotics Unit, was qualified as an expert in drug transactions. Washburn testified

that the quantity of the recovered heroin alone was indicative of intent to deliver. He also explained

that typically, people conducting drug transactions utilize prepaid phones that are not directly

traceable to them. He identified People’s Exhibit No. 4, one of the phones recovered during the

inventory search of Ashford’s car, as a prepaid “dumb phone.” On cross-examination, he agreed

that many, non-drug-related reasons existed for people to possess prepaid phones.

¶ 29   Defendant made a motion for a directed finding, which the trial court denied. Defendant

did not testify or present evidence.

¶ 30   Following closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of PCS with intent to

deliver heroin, as well as PCS of heroin, which it stated merged with the more serious count. In its

written decision, which it read into the record, the trial court stated that it found Ashford’s

testimony at trial to be credible, as well as consistent with his statements and behavior in the

dashcam video. The court found that Ashford’s temperament and tone in the video were “friendly

and cooperative,” and that his level of anxiety did not appear to be any greater than any other

motorist pulled over for a routine traffic offense. The court acknowledged that any time a

codefendant testifies against another codefendant in exchange for a reduction in charges, the

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No. 1-23-0232

testimony should be greeted with suspicion. Nevertheless, the court was “not persuaded that

Ashford’s testimony was not truthful or believable.”

¶ 31   In contrast to Ashford, the court found that defendant “was a bundle of nerves and

equivocation” in the video. In particular, the court observed that when Melzer asked defendant

where he was coming from, defendant hesitated and said “uh” twice before responding. Noting

that it could draw inferences based on the evidence and testimony presented, the court found

defendant constructively possessed the drugs where his level of nervousness and evasiveness was

evident in the video, he was left alone in the car for a great deal of time, he had ample opportunity

to place the drugs in the pouch behind the driver’s seat, and the drugs were found mere feet from

where he was located. Specifically, the court observed that “at the 8 minute and 49 second mark

and the 22 minute and 40 second mark of the video, as Melzer is walking away from the vehicle,

you can see what appears to be the Defendant leaning towards the driver’s seat of the vehicle,”

and explained that those instances were but two examples throughout the video where defendant

was moving, “however slight.”

¶ 32   Defendant filed a posttrial motion, which the trial court denied. The trial court thereafter

sentenced defendant to 13 years and 6 months in prison for PCS with intent to deliver. Defendant

filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 33   On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, arguing that the

State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the recovered drugs.

¶ 34   When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,

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No. 1-23-0232

443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their

testimony, and the resolution of any conflicts in the evidence are within the province of the trier

of fact, and a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on these

matters. People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 131 (1999). Reversal is justified only where the evidence

is “so unsatisfactory, improbable or implausible” that it raises a reasonable doubt as to the

defendant’s guilt (People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989)) or where proof of an element of a

crime is wholly lacking (People v. Sweigart, 2021 IL App (2d) 180543, ¶ 56).

¶ 35   To sustain a conviction for PCS with intent to deliver, the State must prove, inter alia, that

the defendant knew of the presence of the controlled substance, that the controlled substance was

in his immediate possession or control, and that he intended to deliver the controlled substance.

People v. Crane, 2020 IL App (3d) 170386, ¶ 30 (citing People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 407

(1995)). In the instant case, defendant only disputes the element of possession. As such, the

relevant inquiry in this appeal is whether the State proved he possessed the heroin recovered from

Ashford’s car.

¶ 36   Defendant argues that the State failed to prove possession where no one saw him touch the

drugs or reach into the back seat, he did not admit the drugs were his, and there were no fingerprints

or other physical evidence connecting him to the drugs. He points out that Ashford, who owned

and was driving the car in which the drugs were found, pled guilty to possessing the drugs and had

a cell phone that contained text messages about purchasing drugs. In addition, defendant argues

that Ashford, in light of his guilty plea, should be considered an accomplice, and, as such, his

testimony denying ownership of the drugs is inherently suspect and should be scrutinized carefully.

Defendant concludes that his conviction must be reversed where there was nothing connecting him

                                                - 11 -
No. 1-23-0232

to the drugs aside from his mere presence in the car, which he maintains is insufficient as a matter

of law.

¶ 37      The State responds that it proved constructive possession of the drugs where there were

only two people in the car, only defendant and Ashford had access to the car’s inner compartment,

the drugs were found in an area within defendant’s reach, and Ashford and Melzer “provided

testimony *** that could link defendant to the contraband.” The State further asserts that the

dashcam video depicts “defendant leaning towards the driver’s seat and making other movements

while he was alone in the car,” and notes that Ashford, whom the trial court found credible, testified

that no drugs were in his car prior to defendant entering it and that the prepaid phone recovered

from his car belonged to defendant. Finally, the State asserts that defendant’s nervous behaviors

during the stop, including typing a text message to tell his kids he loved them, were indicative of

consciousness of guilt.

¶ 38      Where, as here, a defendant is not found in actual physical possession of contraband, the

State must prove that he had constructive possession. People v. Walker, 2020 IL App (1st) 162305,

¶ 20.2 Constructive possession is almost always proved by circumstantial evidence. Id. To establish

constructive possession, the State is required to prove both that a defendant had knowledge of the

presence of contraband and that he exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where

it was found. Id.

          2
         The doctrine of constructive possession applies collectively to controlled substances and weapons
as “contraband.” People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 19; see also People v. Williams, 98 Ill. App. 3d 844,
847 (1981) (“The doctrine of constructive possession, usually found in narcotics cases[, is] equally
applicable to possession of unlawful weapons”).

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No. 1-23-0232

¶ 39   When there is no direct evidence of knowledge of contraband in a car, reviewing courts

look to four factors, derived from People v. Davis, 50 Ill. App. 3d 163 (1977), and cited in People

v. Bailey, 333 Ill. App. 3d 888 (2002), to determine whether the State presented sufficient

circumstantial evidence from which the defendant’s knowledge may reasonably be inferred.

People v. Hampton, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1033 (2005). The Bailey factors are: (1) the visibility

of the contraband from the defendant’s position in the car; (2) the period of time in which the

defendant had an opportunity to observe the contraband; (3) any gestures by the defendant

indicating an effort to retrieve or hide the contraband; and (4) the size of the contraband. Bailey,

333 Ill. App. 3d at 891-92. The State cannot rely on a defendant’s mere presence to establish

knowledge that a controlled substance is in a vehicle. People v. Horn, 2021 IL App (2d) 190190,

¶ 40; People v. Ingram, 389 Ill. App. 3d 897, 900 (2009). An application of the Bailey factors in

the instant case leads us to conclude that the State failed to present sufficient circumstantial

evidence for a trier of fact to have made a reasonable inference of knowledge of the presence of

the contraband.

¶ 40   As to the first Bailey factor, the bag of drugs was fully concealed in the pocket behind the

driver’s seat when Melzer discovered it. It was not in a location where it would have been in plain

view from defendant’s position in the front passenger seat.

¶ 41   The second Bailey factor, the length of time defendant had to observe the contraband, cuts

somewhat in the State’s favor. Defendant could have observed the “bulge” in the pocket behind

the driver’s seat at any time during the drive from the east side of Chicago to the Belvidere area of

I-90 where Melzer stopped Ashford, as well as during the stop. However, because the bag of drugs

                                               - 13 -
No. 1-23-0232

was completely concealed within the pocket, it was the “bulge,” not the drugs, that was observable.

As such, we do not find this factor conclusive.

¶ 42   Regarding the third factor, Ashford testified that he never saw defendant enter or reach into

the back seat, and Melzer testified that he did not see defendant make any furtive movements or

reach into the back seat. Although the trial court found that the dashcam video depicted defendant

leaning towards the driver’s seat at least twice, it also characterized those movements as “slight.”

We have carefully reviewed the video and, while we agree that it depicts defendant’s head moving,

we cannot say it shows defendant reaching into the back seat or making any furtive movements.

¶ 43   Lastly, the fourth factor, the size of the contraband, does not support an inference that

defendant knew the drugs were present as the bag of drugs was small enough to be completely

concealed inside the driver’s seat pocket.

¶ 44   Having considered the Bailey factors, we conclude that in this case, the State failed to

present sufficient evidence that defendant had knowledge of the presence of the bag of drugs so as

to establish constructive possession. All the State proved in this case was that defendant was

present in the car where the drugs were found from the time he and Ashford left Chicago to the

time Melzer had him step out of the car. As noted above, mere presence in a car where contraband

is found is not enough to establish an inference of knowledge. See, e.g., Horn, 2021 IL App (2d)

190190, ¶ 40. In light of our finding of insufficient evidence of knowledge to establish constructive

possession, we need not consider whether the State proved that defendant exercised immediate

and exclusive control over the area in which the drugs were found.

¶ 45   We briefly note the State’s arguments that defendant was nervous during the stop, that

Ashford identified the prepaid phone found in his car as defendant’s, and that the trial court found

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No. 1-23-0232

Ashford’s testimony credible. None of these circumstances change our analysis. First, while

nervousness is a factor that may weigh in favor of a finding of knowledge, it is not by itself

sufficient to uphold a finding of knowledge. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 266-67 (2001). Here,

the record presents another potential reason for defendant’s nervousness: Melzer testified that

defendant admitted being nervous while they “spoke about a possible warrant that he had that was

not enforceable.”

¶ 46   Second, even accepting, as Washburn testified, that some people involved in drug

transactions possess prepaid phones, and that, as Ashford testified, the prepaid phone found in his

car belonged to defendant, the evidence at trial failed to establish that defendant possessed that

phone in furtherance of a drug transaction. Any conclusion that defendant had knowledge of the

heroin based on his possession of a prepaid phone is speculation. See Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d at 266

(rejecting argument that knowledge of presence of drugs should be imputed to a defendant based

on the presence of two pagers in the truck he was driving). Although a reviewing court must allow

all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution, a reviewing court may not

allow unreasonable or speculative inferences. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (1984);

Crane, 2020 IL App (3d) 170386, ¶ 29.

¶ 47   As for the trial court’s finding that Ashford was credible, we are mindful that under the

reasonable doubt standard, it is not our function to retry defendant or reweigh the evidence. See,

e.g., People v. Radford, 2018 IL App (3d) 140404, ¶ 30. However, “merely because the trier of

fact accepted certain testimony or made certain inferences based on the evidence does not

guarantee the reasonableness of its decision” (People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008)), and the

fact that a judge “did accept testimony does not guarantee it was reasonable to do so”

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No. 1-23-0232

(Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280). As the trial court acknowledged in this case, the testimony of an

accomplice should be viewed with suspicion and accepted only with great caution, especially

where, as here, he was promised leniency. See People v. Zambrano, 2016 IL App (3d) 140178,

¶ 27. Moreover, even accepting Ashford’s testimony, we note that he did not testify he saw

defendant possessing the drugs at any time, or even reaching into the back seat. Rather, Ashford

merely suggested at trial that defendant must have placed the bag of drugs in the pocket behind

the driver’s seat during the stop because “How else did it get in there?” Ashford’s testimony was

speculative and does not support a finding that defendant had knowledge of the presence of the

bag of drugs in the pocket behind the driver’s seat of Ashford’s car.

¶ 48    In summary, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had

knowledge of the presence of the heroin in the car in which he was a passenger. As such, the

evidence was insufficient to establish constructive possession of the drugs, and, because proof of

an element of the crime is wholly lacking, we must reverse defendant’s conviction for PCS with

intent to deliver.

¶ 49    For the reasons explained above, we reverse defendant’s conviction.

¶ 50    Reversed.

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