Court Opinion

ID: 9881012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 14:06:56.196331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:20.418448
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 22, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals

                                  NO. 2022-CA-0945-MR

CHRISTOPHER HILL                                                  APPELLANT

                    APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                   HONORABLE ANNIE O’CONNELL, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 08-CR-002027-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                            APPELLEE

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Christopher Hill appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

order which denied his motion seeking relief pursuant to CR1 60.02. After

reviewing the facts and the law, we affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
                                           I. BACKGROUND

                On June 26, 2008, Hill and two other individuals were in a vehicle

when it was stopped by officers working for the Louisville Metro Police

Department. At some point during the traffic stop, the officers discovered that

these three individuals were on their way to meet with a narcotics dealer, they

intended to rob the dealer, and they had brought along a handgun for that purpose.

Further inquiries revealed that Hill was a convicted felon. As a result of this

incident, the Jefferson County grand jury indicted Hill on one count of criminal

conspiracy to first-degree robbery2 and possession of a handgun by a convicted

felon.3

                Following his indictment, Hill entered plea negotiations with the

Commonwealth. In exchange for Hill’s guilty plea, the Commonwealth agreed to

amend his charges to one count of facilitation to first-degree robbery4 and one

count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,5 with a recommended

concurrent sentence of two years served with the Department of Corrections. The

2
  Criminal conspiracy to first-degree robbery is classified under these facts as a Class C felony.
See Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 515.020(2) and KRS 506.040(2)(c).
3
    KRS 527.040, a Class C felony.
4
    KRS 506.080(2)(a), a Class D felony.
5
   KRS 527.040. By amending the offense from possession of a handgun to possession of a
firearm, the Commonwealth reduced this charge to a Class D felony.

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Commonwealth also agreed to take no stance on shock probation.6 Hill agreed to

these terms. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and subsequently entered

a written judgment of conviction and sentence conforming to its terms on

September 9, 2008. Several months later, Hill filed a motion with the trial court

requesting shock probation. Noting Hill’s lack of a significant criminal record, the

trial court granted this motion on March 27, 2009. Hill was released from prison

and placed on supervised probation for the next five years.

               The record reflects no further activity in this case for nearly thirteen

years before arriving at the current matter on appeal. On March 23, 2022, Hill

filed a motion pursuant to CR 60.02 to vacate his conviction for criminal

facilitation to first-degree robbery. Hill’s argument is somewhat rambling and

discursive. He argues that the conviction pursuant to his guilty plea is illegal and

void because facilitation could not be a lesser included offense to conspiracy as

charged in his indictment; facilitation requires the defendant’s absence of intent to

promote or commit the crime, as well as a completed criminal offense. In contrast,

Hill contends that his indictment charged him with conspiracy, which requires an

intent to commit the crime, and the robbery in this case was never completed. He

6
  “Subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 439 and Chapters 500 to 534, any Circuit Court
may, upon motion of the defendant made not earlier than thirty (30) days nor later than one
hundred eighty (180) days after the defendant has been incarcerated in a county jail following his
conviction and sentencing pending delivery to the institution to which he has been sentenced, or
delivered to the keeper of the institution to which he has been sentenced, suspend the further
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation upon terms the court
determines. . . .” KRS 439.265(1).

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also asserts that, in accepting this plea, the trial court infringed on the prerogative

of the General Assembly to define criminal offenses, violating the strong

separation of powers outlined in the Kentucky Constitution. In sum, Hill argues

that, because he pleaded guilty to an offense he could not have committed under

the facts of his indictment, CR 60.02 was the appropriate vehicle to challenge what

he viewed as an illegal conviction and sentence.

             The trial court considered the motion and denied it in a brief opinion

and order entered on June 30, 2022. As grounds, the trial court found Hill’s

motion alleges judicial error, and “CR 60.02 is not available to correct a judicial

error[,]” quoting Winstead v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 479, 488 (Ky. 2010).

Further, the trial court found that Hill’s arguments went to the sufficiency of the

evidence against him, and such arguments are excluded by the entry of Hill’s

voluntary guilty plea. Hill subsequently moved the trial court under CR 59.05 to

alter or amend its judgment, which the trial court denied by its written order

entered on September 9, 2022. This appeal followed.

                                       II. ANALYSIS

             “We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion for an abuse of

discretion.” Diaz v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Ky. App. 2015) (citing

Partin v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W.3d 639, 640 (Ky. App. 2010)). “The test for

abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,

                                           -4-
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v.

English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). “The burden of proof in a CR 60.02

proceeding falls squarely on the movant to affirmatively allege facts which, if true,

justify vacating the judgment and further allege special circumstances that justify

CR 60.02 relief.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Ky. 2014)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]e will affirm the lower

court’s decision unless there is a showing of some ‘flagrant miscarriage of

justice.’” Id. at 886 (quoting Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky.

1983)).

             “[T]he general rule in this state is that an unconditional guilty plea

waives all defenses except that the indictment does not charge a public offense.”

Jackson v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.3d 11, 15 (Ky. 2012). Hill’s essential

argument is not that his indictment did not charge a public offense, but rather that

his indictment, with the facts alleged therein, was inconsistent with the charges to

which he pleaded guilty. We begin by agreeing with the trial court’s primary basis

for denying relief, which is that CR 60.02 is not an appropriate mechanism for the

correction of a judicial error. In Winstead, the Kentucky Supreme Court explained

that “CR 60.02 is a codification of the ancient common law writ of coram nobis[,

and it] did not expand the scope of the writ of coram nobis.” 327 S.W.3d at 487

(citations omitted). Additionally, the Supreme Court pointed out that “the writ of

                                         -5-
coram nobis ‘was aimed at correcting factual errors, not legal errors. . . .’” Id. at

488 (quoting Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 161 (Ky. 2009)). On

this basis, the Supreme Court reaffirmed precedent holding that CR 60.02 was not

available to correct judicial errors. Id. Even if we were to assume that the trial

court committed error in accepting Hill’s guilty plea based on the grounds Hill

describes, the error was judicial and may not be corrected here.

                Furthermore, as in Winstead, we note here that Hill’s motion for relief

is inappropriate because he could have raised his issue previously.7 “[R]elief under

CR 60.02 is available only to resolve issues that could not have been raised at trial,

on direct appeal, or by a motion for relief under RCr 11.42.” Id. at 487 (internal

quotation marks and footnote omitted); see also Sanders v. Commonwealth, 339

S.W.3d 427, 437 (Ky. 2011) (quoting Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856) (“[CR 60.02] is

not intended as merely an additional opportunity to raise claims which could and

should have been raised in prior proceedings, but, rather, ‘is for relief that is not

available by direct appeal and not available under RCr[8] 11.42.’”). Hill’s signed

guilty plea form includes the following provision:

                (3) I have reviewed a copy of the indictment and told my
                attorney all the facts known to me concerning my

7
  Although the trial court did not consider this reasoning in its order, “it is well-settled that an
appellate court may affirm a lower court for any reason supported by the record.” McCloud v.
Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d 780, 786 (Ky. 2009).
8
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                                 -6-
              charges. I believe he / she is fully informed about my
              case. We have fully discussed, and I understand, the
              charges and any possible defenses to them.

(Record (R.) at 14.) Hill either knew, or should have known, about any possible

issue with his indictment at the time he entered his guilty plea. He also could have

raised this issue in a timely RCr 11.42 motion, but he chose not to do so. “CR

60.02 . . . may be utilized only in extraordinary situations when relief is not

available on direct appeal or under RCr 11.42.” Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 884 (citing

McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997)).

              Nonetheless, Hill attempts to argue that this is a sentencing error, and

our precedents hold that a void and unlawful sentence may be corrected at any time

through a CR 60.02 motion, citing Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284 (Ky.

2018). Hill pays particular attention to the parts of Phon which explain how an

illegal sentence violates the prerogatives of the General Assembly to determine the

appropriate punishments for criminal violations. Id. at 303 (citing Jones v.

Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 295, 299 (Ky. 2010)). However, Phon also states that

an attack on an illegal sentence is not the same as an attack on the underlying

conviction:

              [T]here is a fine distinction between a plea for relief from
              a conviction and relief through remedy of a sentence. In
              a Kansas Supreme Court case, the Court clarified that
              correction of an illegal sentence is distinct and separate
              from a collateral attack on a conviction. State v. Davis,
              283 Kan. 767, 156 P.3d 665, 667 (2007) (quoting State v.

                                          -7-
              Nash, 281 Kan. 600, 133 P.3d 836 (2006)). Thus, even if
              CR 60.02 may not apply to judicial errors in attacking a
              conviction, this is separate and distinct. It is a limited
              attack on the illegality of a sentence and the remedy is
              not reversal of a conviction, but correction of a sentence.

Id. at 305.

              This latter portion of Phon is particularly applicable here, as Hill’s

argument is not grounded in the sentence he received, but rather that he was

improperly convicted by pleading to an offense which was not consistent with his

indictment. However, we have multiple procedural rules stating that errors relating

to a defendant’s indictment do not result in the reversal of a conviction. RCr

6.10(3) reads, in part, that “error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground

for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the

error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his or her prejudice.” RCr 6.12

states, “[a]n indictment, information, complaint or citation shall not be deemed

invalid, nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceedings thereon be stayed,

arrested or in any manner affected by reason of a defect or imperfection that does

not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.” RCr

8.18 requires a defendant to raise alleged defects in an indictment before trial or it

is considered to be waived. Moreover, even though the Kentucky Constitution

guarantees an individual’s “absolute procedural due process right to be prosecuted

by indictment[,]” this “is a personal privilege that may be waived.” Malone v.

                                          -8-
Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 180, 183 (Ky. 2000). Based on these considerations, if

there was error regarding the inconsistency between Hill’s indictment and the

charges to which he pleaded guilty, he waived it when he entered his guilty plea

over thirteen years ago.

             Finally, it is important to remember that an overarching principle of

CR 60.02 is toward the correction of errors resulting in a “flagrant miscarriage of

justice.” Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886. Hill was initially charged with conspiracy to

commit first-degree robbery and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon –

both Class C felonies. If convicted on both counts, he could have faced up to

twenty years in prison. Instead, Hill took a favorable plea of two years and barely

served any of it, as he was granted shock probation after a few months. We cannot

discern how Hill suffered any miscarriage of justice based on the facts of this case.

                                   III. CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

order denying relief pursuant to CR 60.02.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -9-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

J. Vincent Aprile II     Daniel Cameron
Louisville, Kentucky     Attorney General of Kentucky

                         Melissa A. Pile
                         Assistant Attorney General
                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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