Court Opinion

ID: 9715462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:06:18.467372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:34.820605
License: Public Domain

R. M. Daniels, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. A motion for summary judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3) is designed to test whether there is factual support for a claim. Although a court must not resolve disputed questions of fact in resolving such a motion, the motion should be granted if, considering the affidavits and the other available evidence, it is impossible for the claim asserted to be supported by evidence at trial. See, for example, Partrich v Muscat, 84 Mich App 724, 730; 270 NW2d 506 (1978). Plaintiffs here rely on theories of waiver and estoppel. In Dahrooge v *604Rochester German Ins Co, 177 Mich 442, 451-452; 143 NW 608 (1913), the Court explained:
"It has been said that a waiver must arise either by express agreement, a new promise to pay, a part payment, or a failure to plead. A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Estoppel is based on some misleading conduct or language of one person which, being relied on, operates to the prejudice of another, and is applied to the wrongdoer by the court in denial of some right, which otherwise might exist, to prevent a fraud.”
On the record presented here, I find it unnecessary to consider the effect of the "anti-waiver” clause of the revolving credit note. Even if the "anti-waiver” clause has no effect whatever, the undisputed facts show that it will be impossible for plaintiffs to produce evidence at trial to establish a prima facie case of waiver or estoppel.
The parties’ revolving credit note contained a provision by which plaintiff company waived any right to notice before defendant bank pursued its remedies for default. The note was due on demand or on June 30, 1981, whichever occurred first. After June 30, however, the bank did not immediately pursue its remedies for default, but instead entered into negotiations with the company. On August 10, the bank gave the company an ultimatum. The bank announced that it would pursue its remedies for default unless the company submitted a refinancing proposal for the loan by August 14. At or near the deadline, the company responded by telling the bank that negotiations were under way for sale of the company to Charles Baughman and that Baughman would arrange refinancing. On September 22, the bank submitted a proposal for refinancing to the company and Baughman. About October 1 or 2, Baughman told both the *605company and the bank that the refinancing proposal was unacceptable, and he broke off the negotiations for the purchase of the company. On October 23, the bank declared the loan to be in default and began to pursue its various remedies.
There is no evidence here to suggest either a voluntary relinquishment of any relevent right by the bank or any misleading conduct or language by the bank on which the company could have relied to its prejudice. Having responded to the bank’s ultimatum of August 10 with what amounted to a request that the bank refrain from pursuing its remedies for default while negotiations with Baughman were in progress, the company had no basis for believing that the bank’s forbearance would continue after those negotiations were broken off. The bank’s acceptance of interest payments from the company is immaterial, because the bank accepted no interest payments after the negotiations were broken off. The factual issues concerning the various notices the bank claims to have sent to the company or its agents are not material. Even if the bank’s conduct during July and early August could have induced the company to believe that, despite the provision of the note, the bank would not pursue its remedies for default without first giving the company notice, the bank’s ultimatum of August 10 provided the company with notice that the bank would pursue its remedies unless its conditions were met. Nothing which occurred subsequent to the ultimatum could have induced the company to believe that further notice would be given. The company had actual knowledge of the breaking off of the negotiations for which the company had induced the bank to refrain from pursuing its remedies. No further notice was required.
*606Although I believe that it is unnecessary to discuss the effect of the "anti-waiver” clause in order to resolve this case, I am constrained to point out the problems with the majority’s discussion of that clause. The majority notes a split of authority in other jurisdictions as to the effect of such a clause, but then suggests that a split of authority on a legal question is a reason for submitting the case to a jury. The majority (1) finds a sharp conflict in the evidence, (2) states that some threshold must exist below which the "anti-waiver” clause is no protection for the bank, (3) does not offer any guidance as to the location of that threshold, (4) finds that the threshold has been exceeded on the facts presented here, and (5) again finds a close question of fact. It is impossible to tell from the majority opinion what principles of law the majority is applying, whether the majority intends that the jury should consider the "anti-waiver” clause, and what instructions should be given to the jury to assist it to resolve this issue.
I would affirm.