Court Opinion

ID: 9617270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:53:55.67886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:07.608767
License: Public Domain

TRAYNOR, J.
By this action plaintiffs sought to confirm their right to take four inches of water from Grub Ravine during the irrigation season and to enjoin defendants’ interference with that right. Defendants denied plaintiffs’ right to take water, alleged their own prescriptive right to take all the water flowing through their land in Grub Ravine, and prayed that their own right be quieted against the claims of plaintiffs. The trial court entered judgment providing that plaintiffs take nothing by their action, that defendants are the owners of all waters flowing on or upon their land, and that *827defendants’ title to said water be quieted as against the claims of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal.
It is contended on behalf of plaintiffs that they proved rights as riparian owners, that the evidence will not support a judgment that defendants have acquired a prescriptive right to take all the water flowing through defendants’ land in Grub Ravine, and that in any event the judgment affirmatively quieting defendants’ title is erroneous because defendants did not cross-complain. It is contended on behalf of defendants that plaintiffs not only did not properly allege but failed to prove a riparian right, that having failed to prove their own right to take water, plaintiffs may not complain of a judgment confirming defendants’ water right, and that in any event the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment that defendants acquired a prescriptive right to take all the water flowing through their land in Grub Ravine during the irrigation season.
On appeal, counsel for the state Department of Public Works, Division of Water Resources, filed an amicus curiae brief in which they attack the judgment, contending that there is no evidence in this case that defendants complied with the statutory procedures concerning the appropriation of water (Wat. Code, §§ 1200-1801) and that without such compliance no prescriptive right to use water may be acquired in this state. The parties have not raised this issue, however, and the judgment quieting title in defendants prejudices no right of the state of California, for neither it nor the Department of Public Works was a party to this action. (See Wat. Code, § 1052.)

The Judgment is Not Erroneous Because of Defendants’ Failure to Cross-Complain.

If the judgment is otherwise proper, it is not erroneous because of defendants’ failure to cross-complain. Defendants denied plaintiffs’ right to take water, asserted their own water right, and prayed that their right be quieted against plaintiffs’ claims.  In a suit to quiet title, when the defendant denies the plaintiff’s title, asserts his own title, and prays for affirmative relief, the defendant’s title may properly be quieted though his pleading is not technically a cross-complaint. (Talbot v. Gadia, 123 Cal.App.2d 712, 721 [267 P.2d 436] ; Rinker v. McKinley, 65 Cal.App.2d 109, 111 [149 P.2d 859].)

*828
Even if Plaintiffs’ Pleadings Contained Sufficient Allegations to Place Riparian Rights in Issue, Plaintiffs Bid Not Prove a Right to Take Water as Riparians.

One who relies upon a riparian right must plead: (1) the riparian character of his land, (2) the quantity of water or the proportion of the stream to which he claims to be entitled as a riparian owner, and (3) the location of his land with respect to the land of the other party. (Riverside Water Co. v. Gage, 89 Cal. 410, 420-421 [26 P. 889] ; San Luis Water Co. v. Estrada, 117 Cal. 168,182-183 [48 P. 1075] ; Wutchumna Water Co. v. Pogue, 151 Cal. 105, 112 [90 P. 362] ; Montecito Valley Water Co. v. Santa Barbara, 151 Cal. 377, 378 [90 P. 935].) It has been said that the pleader should also allege the quantity of his irrigable riparian land (Wutchumna Water Co. v. Pogue, supra; Montecito Valley Water Co. v. Santa Barbara, supra), but since that fact is important only as evidence of the amount of water to which the riparian owner is reasonably entitled, it is more properly a matter for proof than pleading.
Plaintiffs alleged in their first amended complaint as amended by a pleading entitled “second amended complaint,” that they are the owners of certain described land and of a water right “appurtenant” thereto; that they have been in possession thereof and paid taxes thereon for more than five years; that said water right of four inches has its source in Grub Ravine; that Grub Ravine is a natural watercourse; that the water flowing in Grub Ravine has its source on land above that of defendants and that said water flows from defendants’ land, through intervening land, onto the land of plaintiffs; and that defendants’ land is at an elevation higher than that of plaintiffs.
It is apparent that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the location of their land with respect to the land of defendants. They claim to be owners of land downstream from defendants’ land.  It is also clear that plaintiffs claim the right to take “four inches” of water. Although without further qualification “four inches” is an indefinite quantity of running water, in the absence of a special demurrer for uncertainty, plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the quantity of water that they claim the right to use.
The remaining question is whether plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the riparian character of their land.  The riparian character of land may be pleaded in either of two ways: (1) by alleging the existence of ultimate facts, which if *829proved would establish the land as riparian or (2) by alleging generally that the land is riparian to a stream or natural watercourse.  Although the latter allegation is conclusional, it is sufficient to indicate to the other party the nature of the pleader’s claim and is analogous to the commonly accepted general allegations of ownership and negligence.
In Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal.2d 501, 528-529 [81 P.2d 533], it was held that three things must be proved to establish land as riparian in character: (1) some part of the land must be shown to be contiguous to a stream or natural watercourse; (2) the land for which water is claimed must be shown to be within the watershed of the stream (Bathgate v. Irvine, 126 Cal. 135, 143 [58 P. 442, 77 Am.St.Rep. 158]); (3) the land for which water is claimed must be shown to be part of the smallest tract held under one title in the chain of title leading to the present owner, that is that the land’s riparian status has not been lost by severance (Boehmer v. Big Rock Irr. Dist., 117 Cal. 19 [48 P. 908]). It follows that one who attempts to plead the riparian character of his land by specific allegations must plead the existence of the foregoing facts.  Plaintiffs allege that their land is traversed by a natural watercourse, but their pleadings contain no allegation that any land for which water is claimed is within the watershed of the watercourse, nor is there any allegation touching the matter of severance. It is apparent, therefore, that plaintiffs’ specific allegations are insufficient to place in issue the riparian character of their land.
The question arises whether plaintiffs’ allegation that they own land and a water right “appurtenant” thereto may be construed as a general allegation of the riparian character of plaintiffs’ land. Such an allegation has been held to be indicative of a right by prescription (Morgan v. Walker, 217 Cal. 607, 608 [20 P.2d 660] ; see 26 Cal.Jur. 209, §414), but a riparian water right has also been described as “appurtenant” in recent cases. (See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, 925 [207 P.2d 17].) Even if an allegation of ownership of land contiguous to a natural watercourse and of a water right appurtenant to the land, liberally construed (Code Civ. Proc., §452; see Matteson v. Wagoner, 147 Cal. 739, 742 [82 P. 436] ; Toney v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 108 Cal.App.2d 161, 167 [238 P.2d 645]), would be sufficient to place in issue the riparian character of the plead*830er’s land, plaintiffs did not prove a right to take water as riparians.
Although the riparian character of land may be put in issue by a general allegation, to prove that land is riparian it is necessary, as previously noted, to show that: (1) some part of the land is contiguous to a stream or natural watercourse ; (2) the land for which water is claimed is within the watershed of the stream; and that (3) the land for which water is claimed is part of the smallest tract held under one title in the chain of title leading to the present owner. (Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, supra, 11 Cal.2d 501, 528-529 and cases cited; see Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, 2d ed., vol. 1, pp. 794-795, § 466.) Plaintiffs proved that they are the owners of land through which a natural watercourse runs. They introduced no evidence, however, to show that any of their land for which water is claimed is within the watershed. Furthermore, although they traced their title back to a deed of 1890 by which the owner of some 120 acres conveyed the 4-acre tract that they now own, plaintiffs offered no evidence of the state of the title to this tract prior to 1890.  Plaintiffs proved only one of the three facts it was incumbent upon them to prove, namely, that their land is contiguous to a natural watercourse. Proof of that fact alone does not establish the riparian character of plaintiffs’ land, nor does it entitle plaintiffs to any water as riparian owners. (Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, supra, 11 Cal.2d at 528-529; Riverside Water Co. v. Gage, supra, 89 Cal. at 420-421; San Luis Water Co. v. Estrada, supra, 117 Cal. at 172-173, 182-183; Wutchumna Water Co. v. Pogue, supra, 151 Cal. at 111-112.)

Having Failed to Prove Their Own Right to Take Water, Plaintiffs May Not Complain of a Judgment Confirming Defendants’ Water Right.

In Warden v. Stoll, 210 Cal. 374, 377 [291 P. 835], it was held: “A simple judgment in a quiet title action in favor of the defendant, that is that plaintiff take nothing by his said action and that defendant recover his costs, operates as an estoppel upon the plaintiff and determines title as between the parties and protects the defendant against any claim of the plaintiff as fully as would an affirmative decree in his favor. [Citations.]  The insertion, therefore, in the decree in this action of a provision awarding the respondents affirmative relief against the appellant, while erroneous, does not prejudice the appellant in any of her substantial rights *831and may be regarded as surplusage.” This rule is well settled. (California Bank v. Traeger, 215 Cal. 346, 349-351 [10 P.2d 51] ; Allen v. McGee, 54 Cal.App.2d 476, 485-486 [129 P.2d 143]; Wagner v. Worell, 76 Cal.App.2d 172, 182-183 [172 P.2d 751]; and see generally, White v. Lantz, 126 Cal.App. 693 [14 P.2d 1041] and authorities there cited.) Moreover, it derives additional support from section 581c of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that when a plaintiff fails to prove his case and a judgment of nonsuit is entered against him, the judgment is an adjudication upon the merits unless the court provides to the contrary.
It is fundamental that a party who would quiet his title must prevail, if at all, on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the claims of an adversary. (Helvey v. Sax, 38 Cal.2d 21, 23 [237 P.2d 269].)  The record in this case discloses that plaintiffs failed to prove any right to take water from Grub Ravine, and it was therefore properly adjudged that they take nothing by their action. By that judgment plaintiffs and their successors are forever barred from again asserting against defendants or their successors claims, made or which could have been made, to the water right that is the subject of this action. Plaintiffs are not harmed, therefore, by a judgment confirming defendants’ right to take all the water flowing through their land in Grub Ravine during the irrigation season and may not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support such a judgment. (Allen v. McGee, supra.)
The judgment entered by the trial court, however, is too broad in providing that defendants are the owners of all waters arising on, or flowing on, or upon, their land. The record discloses that the subject of this action was the right to take water from Grub Ravine during the irrigation season. The right to take water during the remainder of the year was not litigated. The judgment is modified, therefore, to limit defendants to the right to use all the water flowing through their land in Grub Ravine during the irrigation season. As so modified the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs shall bear the costs of this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., concurred.