Court Opinion

ID: 9705823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:22:40.446131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:02.857466
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,
dissenting. I regret that my views of the instant case compel me to dissent from the opinion of the majority of the Court. My dissenting views are based for the most part upon those sections of the opinion which relate to the effect upon the will by the widow’s election to take under the statutes as against the provisions in the will made for her benefit, as well as the effect upon the estate here involved by the waiver and disclaimer filed by the trustees of the Kimball Public Library on the residue of the estate.
I agree with the majority that a taking against the will by a surviving spouse, as the widow did here, does not operate to render the estate intestate, or destroy the sufficiency of the will in other respects as to the remainder of the property, but what such election does do is to blot out all the provisions of the will for the benefit of the spouse *40who had made the election to take under the statutes. Jones v. Knappen, 63 Vt. 391, 22 Atl. 630, 11 L.R.A. 293.
A testator is presumed to know that a widow’s statutory rights are paramount, and that she may take against the will. Although such presumption hardly need be relied upon when, as here, the testator evidenced his actual knowledge of such statutory rights by providing that the life estate that he bequeathed to her was “in lieu of homestead and statutory rights.” It is also the general rule in most jurisdictions that upon the election of the spouse to take under the statutes the will is construed as if it contained no provision for the surviving spouse and distribution is made as if he or she died. 97 C.J.S. Wills §1289, p. 154-155. In re Diston’s Estate, 257 Pa. 537, 101 Atl. 804, L.R.A. 1918B, 62; Sherman v. Flack, 283 Ill. 457, 119 N.E. 293, 5 A.L.R. 456; In re Kern’s Estate, 296 Pa. 348, 145 Atl. 824, 66 A.L.R. 1342; In re Vance’s Estate, 141 Pa. 201, 21 Atl. 643, 12 L.R.A. 227; In re Dulles Estate, 156 Pa. Super. 405, 41 A.2d 52. And the testator is presumed to know that a widow’s election to take under the statutes is equivalent to her death for the purposes of distribution of his estate. 14 V.S.A. §551 (2) provides that if the surviving spouse elects to take under the statutes, and waives the will of the decedent, “the remainder of such estate shall descend as the whole would if such spouse did not survive.” The opinion of the majority is that this provision, because it is under the subtitle applying to property “not devised or bequeathed” applies only to the taking of intestate property by operation of law. Without contending that this view is incorrect I submit that it is at least an indication of the statutory view of the status of a surviving spouse who elects to take against the will of the deceased matrimonial partner, and which should be considered by this Court in determining the question presented. A less narrow interpretation of the word “descends,” which the majority uses in its strict common-law signification, might be employed if the legislative intent was found to be to apply the statute in cases of both testacy and intestacy. Mitchell v. Blanchard, 72 Vt. 85, 87, 47 Atl. 98.
But laying the statute just quoted to one side, I believe that the same practical result is reached under the holding in Jones v. Knappen, supra. The blotting out of all the provisions of the will in favor of the widow upon her election to take under the statute is in effect treating her in all respects as if she had predeceased her husband, *41'or, stating it another way, it is as if she had no existence as far as interpreting the will is concerned. Every part of the will which has as its purpose the advantage of the widow is erased from it by her act, and is not to be considered in interpreting the remaining provisions.
The will of the testator provided for the specific bequests to Mrs. Carrie Delaney and the United Church in the event only that his wife did not survive him. The obvious intent of the testator was to hold his estate together until the death of his wife so that she might enjoy her life estate from it without diminution of any of its principal. It was to give to her the benefit of the income from all of his property, and even principal, if need be, for her support and enjoyment for the remainder of her life. Because there could be no way of telling how long his widow might survive him, nor what part of both income and principal might be used up during her lifetime, he made no specific bequests to others that he might wish to share his bounty, but only provided that the residue left, after the completion of the life estate, would go to the Library.
The provision that the bequests to Mrs. Delaney and the United Church should go into effect “in the event that my wife does not survive me” was purely for the benefit of the wife in the event that she took the life estate provided for her under the will. It was not for the benefit of the Library. The Library, by the testator’s expressed intention, was to have only the residue remaining (1) after the depletion of the life estate given to the widow, or (2) after the payment of the specific legacies to Mrs. Delaney and the United Church.- Residuary gifts are from their nature ordinarily the lowest in rank; no other can be interfered with for the sake of benefiting them. In re Vance’s Estate, 141 Pa. 201, 21 Atl. 643, 644, 12 L.R.A. 227.
It is my view that the testator may be presumed to have known that if the widow elected to take under the statute she would blot out all provisions in his will for her benefit, so that as far as his will was concerned it would be as if she did not survive him.
In my opinion the bequests to Mrs. Delaney and the United Church should be decreed. I believe it worthy to note that the amount to be distributed in the Copeland estate, after deducting the amount taken by the widow under the statutes, would still leave a residue after such bequests were made.
*42I cannot treat the waiver filed by the trustees of the Kimball Public Library in the probate court on December 17, 1959 in as cursory a manner as have the majority. It was not given by the trustees of the Kimball Public Library to convert a gift of income from Mr. Copeland’s estate to a gift of cash from the same source. The library was to receive nothing from the Copeland estate by reason of the waiver. It is true that upon their approaching Mrs. Copeland relative to their intentions in the matter, she agreed to leave a sum of money to the.library upon her decease, and so provided in her will, but this is not an attempt to modify the distribution of an estate under the will, as in Re Meade’s Estate, 227 Wisc. 311, 277 N.W. 695, 279 N.W. 18, 116 A.L.R. 1127, cited by the majority, for here the library would receive nothing from the Copeland estate by reason of the waiver.
Entitled Release and Waiver, this waiver was not attempted to be withdrawn until August 18, 1960. During the intervening period of seven months the probate court hearing was concluded, findings of fact were made, and a decree of distribution issued by the probate court. Under this decree of distribution (and in part, at least, because of the waiver of the residuary trust by the library) the remainder of the estate was decreed to Charles Merrill and Maude Merrill Worthen, brother and sister of the late Mr. Copeland, who became appellees in the county court proceedings.
The release and waiver was given by the trustees of the Kimball Public Library. Under 22 V.S.Á. §143 (a) such library trustees “have full power to manage such public library, and to receive, control and manage property which shall come into the hands of such town or village by gift, purchase, devise or bequest for the use and benefit of such library.” Under this unlimited grant of power relative to the affairs of the library under their control, the acts of such trustees are the acts of the library. It is the library that is the beneficiary, or cestui que trust, of the residue of the Copeland estate under the' trust set up in the will. The beneficiary of a trust can waive the provisions of a will for his benefit. Bradley v. New Hampshire, 100 N. H. 232, 123 A.2d 148, 151. A valid trust does not exist if the cestui que trust, when informed of it, clearly and unequivocally rejects or renounces its benefits. Such renunciation or disclaimer relates back to the date of the gift with the result that title to 'the property which is the subject matter of the gift does not pass to the beneficiary. 89 *43C.J.S. Trusts, p. 836. Bradley v. New Hampshire, supra. See 1 Scott on Trusts, §36.1. The right to disclaim the benefits of a trust exists in the cestui que trust even though the trust be one for a charitable purpose. See Bowden v. Brown, 200 Mass. 269, 86 N.E. 351; In re Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 613, 131 N.E. 31.
The opinion of the majority does not pass upon the validity of this waiver by the trustees of the library, although in my view this is essential to a proper determination of the question here presented. For if such waiver was a nullity, as the lower court determined, and the majority suggests may be correct, then the validity of the attempted renunciation by the library trustees upon which the majority opinion depends, would not be presented. If the waiver was a null and void act, there would be nothing of legal effect that would have to be rescinded. It therefore seems by passing upon the propriety of the withdrawal of the waiver the majority does not recognize that there was a waiver or renunciation of such legal effect that a withdrawal was necessary to allow the judgment below to be affirmed.
In my view, however, the question of the withdrawal of the waiver is not before this Court. The library trustees who gave the waiver, and then attempted to withdraw it some seven months later, are not parties to this appeal, this, although they are the very ones upon whom the burden rests of showing that a timely and proper withdrawal of the waiver given by them was made. As far as the record before us indicates, the library trustees remained content with the lower court’s dismissal of their attempted withdrawal of their waiver.
The Trustees of Public Funds of the Town of Randolph who seek to uphold the withdrawal and reverse the lower court’s ruling on the matter, are not the beneficiaries under the trust or the cestui que trust under the will. Their only function under the statute, 24 V.S.A. §2431, is the “charge and management of money held by a town in trust.” Until a trust has been established they have no interest in the matter. Here there is no trust in existence. The waiver or disclaimer by the cestui que trust related back to the date of the gift with the effect that the title to the property, which was the subject matter of the gift, never passed, and no trust came into existence in which the Trustees of Public Funds had an appealable interest as administrators of the game.
The document which the trustees of the Kimball Public Library filed with the probate court, Randolph District, on December 17. 1959. *44was entitled a waiver by the signatories to it, and by its express terms “any and every right and claim” against the estate of Copeland is waived. A right once waived cannot be reclaimed. Johnson v. Tuttle, 108 Vt. 291, 187 Atl. 515, 106 A.L.R. 1291.
If the document so filed be considered a renunciation, as the majority have termed it, we are faced with the fact that the probate court made its decree of the residue of the estate in favor of the brother and sister of Mr. Copeland upon such renunciation, then undisputed and in full force and effect. By reason of such decree, based upon this renunciation, the brother and sister of the deceased Copeland became possessed of a legal right which was a triable issue. This right they have defended in both the county court and this Court. The attempted renunciation, at so late a date, is such a reversal of attitude on the part of those who gave the original renunciation as to adversely affect the triable interest of the blood brother and sister and should be prevented. In re Johnston’s Will, 164 Misc. 469, 298 N.Y.S. 957.
In effect, what we have here is a waiver of all rights that he might possess under a will by one of the legatees. Because of this waiver, certain rights are created which did not before exist, and in which rights certain parties now find they have a triable interest. After having gone to the expense and labor of advocating their various interests through several contested court proceedings they are then confronted with a belated second thought on the part of the original waiving legatee to his waiver, and to destroy the very rights which his original action brought into existence. I cannot conceive it to be justice, or within the law, to allow this to be done.
I would sustain the validity of the waiver given by the library trustees which would leave the residue of the Copeland estate to pass under the laws of descent and distribution. It would then become necessary for the Court to pass upon the conflicting claims of the widow and the blood brother and sister, which have been briefed here, to reach a final judgment in this matter.