Court Opinion

ID: 9951353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 20:03:10.495854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:39:35.713073
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                          B328954

         Plaintiff and Respondent,    Los Angeles County
                                      Super. Ct. No. TA155176
         v.

 ALBERT JACKSON,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
      Lauren Noriega, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________
      Around midnight, two officers in a cruiser saw Albert
Jackson alone in a parked car. They pulled alongside, close
enough so Jackson would have to squeeze to get out. One officer
went to Jackson’s side of the car, while the other walked to
Jackson’s passenger side. Both shined flashlights on Jackson.
By boxing in and surrounding Jackson, the officers’ actions
meant a reasonable person in his position would not feel free to
leave.
       The officers explained why they took these steps. Jackson
was wearing a “big bulky jacket” on a “hot” and “humid” night.
He “was seated kind of awkwardly in the driver’s seat.” And
when they approached in the dark and shined flashlights on him,
he looked “uncomfortable and kind of nervous,” “like he was
surprised to see us.”
       The officers’ stated observations did not suggest criminal
activity might be afoot. Jackson’s detention violated the Fourth
Amendment. We suppress the evidence the officers found as a
result of this detention. Statutory citations are to the Penal
Code.
                                  I
       Two officers of the Los Angeles Police Department were
patrolling near Compton. Officer Joseph Chavez was driving east
on 109th Street from San Pedro Street towards Avalon
Boulevard. His passenger and partner was Officer Jebert
Ybanez. Shortly before midnight on July 12, 2021, they noticed a
car parked on the south side of 109th Street between Avalon and
San Pedro. It was an SUV they described variously as a Range
Rover or a Land Rover. Chavez and Ybanez were the two lone
witnesses at the hearing on Jackson’s suppression motion. We
recount their testimony, beginning with Chavez.

                               2
                                  A
      Chavez testified his partner Ybanez told him “there was
someone in the car, so I stopped . . . our police car, pretty much
alongside this Range Rover I am speaking about.”
      “Q: And why did you do that there?
      [Chavez]: There was a male seated kind of awkwardly in
the driver’s seat.
      Q: Can you explain how he was seated awkwardly?
      [Chavez]: For one, he had a big jacket on. It’s, you know,
midsummer; so we thought, kind of odd, like a big bulky jacket
for the temperature. [¶] And then, two, it kind of -- after
illuminating him with the light -- my partner illuminated him --
he kind of -- he looked kind of nervous. He looked kind of like he
was kind of halfway in, halfway out of the driver’s seat.
      Q: Was his leg sticking out of the car?”
      “[Chavez]: I don’t remember about his legs, but I
remember he was kind of seated kind of -- he just looked, like,
kind of, like, uncomfortable and kind of nervous. So I exited . . .
my police car, put it in park, and my partner started talking to
him. . . .”
      “Q: . . . At this point, was he free to leave?
      [Chavez]: Yes.”
      “[Chavez]: When [Ybanez] first started talking to
[Jackson], I was seated in the driver’s seat of our police car.
      Q: Okay. And at what point did you exit the vehicle?
      [Chavez]: I would say a short -- a short moment after,
maybe a couple of seconds.”
      “[Chavez]: I got out of the driver’s seat of our car . . . and
then walked around the trunk of the rear of the defendant’s car
and then walked up to the front passenger side . . . .”

                                  3
       “Q: What criminal activity did you believe sitting
awkwardly suggested?
       [Chavez]: A couple things. I believed, based on my
training and experience and my knowledge of the area, that
specific block; you know, the time of night -- it’s a high-end car,
like, a really nice, I think Range Rover or Land Rover -- one of
these kind of higher-end vehicles, I thought based on just first
initial --
       Q: Based on how he’s sitting is my question.
       [Chavez]: Yes. That the car could have been stolen, the
defendant could be concealing something, he could -- and then
also too -- well, criminal activity, yeah. [¶] I couldn’t -- I couldn’t
see much more past that, but just based upon his seating position
and how nervous he was acting, yeah, that definitely was a
thought in my mind that the car possibly could be stolen or he
could be concealing something on his person, especially in that
jacket. . . .”
       “Q: . . . [H]ow are you able to tell by the way that
somebody’s sitting that they could have stolen a car?
       [Chavez]: Well, I’d be unable to tell if they stole a car based
on how they were sitting. I’m just going off of his -- like, his
position and what I thought when I saw his position.”
       Chavez and Ybanez shined their flashlights on Jackson.
       Chavez became suspicious of Jackson “pretty early on in
this contact.”
                                   B
       Ybanez testified to his perspective. Ybanez saw Jackson in
the parked car.
       “We noticed that [Jackson] was acting a little strange. He
seemed like he was surprised to see us. It was also middle of

                                  4
July. He was wearing a thick jacket, which we found to be
strange at the time.” It was strange because the night was “hot.”
Ybanez did not remember the approximate temperature. That
night also was “humid.”
       Ybanez agreed it “would be a subjective determination if
someone’s acting strange.”
       Ybanez and Chavez got out of their car. Ybanez
approached the driver’s side of Jackson’s car while Chavez went
to the other side.
       Ybanez’s opinion was that they had not detained Jackson
at this point: Jackson was free to leave, and the encounter was
“consensual.”
       “So we got [to making] small talk with him.” After about 10
seconds, Chavez spied a gun, called it out, backup arrived, and
police arrested Jackson.
                                  C
       In her initial motion to suppress, defense counsel argued
that “[w]earing a bulky jacket in 60-something degree weather,
without more, certainly does not [imply] criminal activity is afoot.
This unreasonable inference is [a] textbook example of law
enforcement hunch and conjecture with underpinnings of racial
discrimination.”
       The magistrate denied Jackson’s motion to suppress
without disclosing her reasoning and held Jackson to answer.
       Jackson filed a motion under section 995 to challenge the
holding order from the preliminary hearing.
       In this motion, Jackson’s counsel argued that “African
American men are justified when becoming fearful of white
officers who approach them late at night while they are alone. . . .
As this Motion discusses, the assumption that an African

                                 5
American man in an expensive car is a criminal or that the
vehicle is stolen, based solely on the way he looks and without
any indication of criminal activity, is not in line with the Fourth
Amendment.”
      “A quick historical weather search reveals that the
temperature this night around midnight was low to mid 60’s.
There is no shortage of Angelinos who readily wear jackets when
the weather is within this range. Mr. Jackson’s clothing was not
suspicious to any reasonable individual. It begs the question –
whether the officers would have also suspected a middle-aged
Caucasian woman wearing a thick coat in the same location to
have stolen a vehicle, just as they suspected of Mr. Jackson.”
      “Officer Chavez testified he was immediately suspicious of
Mr. Jackson based on the way he was seated. The officers were
suspicious of an African American man in a high-end vehicle.
The officers’ reflex assumption is that it must be stolen. This
thought was formed in the absence of any facts, whatsoever, to
suggest Mr. Jackson was in a stolen vehicle. Had a Caucasian
female been the driver, the court should consider the likelihood
that the officers would form the same assumption.”
      The prosecution argued the incident was a consensual stop.
The trial court agreed and denied the motion.
      Jackson renewed his motion to suppress. The trial court
denied the motion, finding the claims had already been denied on
the merits in the section 995 motion.
      Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jackson entered a plea of no
contest to a felon-in-possession charge. The trial court sentenced
him to 16 months in state prison. Jackson appealed.

                                 6
                                   II
       The crucial distinction here is between a consensual
encounter and a detention.
                                   A
       Consensual encounters require no justification. Police may
approach people in public and engage them in consensual
conversation and ask if they are willing to answer questions.
Merely walking up to someone in a parked car is not a detention.
Prosecutors may use voluntary answers and the officer’s
observations in criminal prosecutions. (People v. Tacardon (2022)
14 Cal.5th 235, 241 (Tacardon).)
       Detentions require justification. If an officer’s physical
force or show of authority restrains someone’s liberty in some
way, then the officer has seized that person and must justify this
detention. In situations involving a show of authority, police
seize someone if, in view of all of the circumstances, reasonable
people in those shoes would not believe they are free to leave.
(Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 241; Brendlin v. California
(2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254–255 (Brendlin).)
       We consider the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether police actions turn an encounter into a detention.
Courts note factors like the presence of many officers, police
display of weapons, use of sirens or overhead emergency lights,
physically touching the person, the use of a patrol car to block
movement, or the use of language or of a tone of voice implying
compliance with the officer’s request is compelled. We review
facts objectively. Officers’ states of mind are not relevant unless
their overt actions communicate those mental states. The
subjective belief of the person who is the target of police attention
is irrelevant. (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 241–242.)

                                 7
       We defer to the magistrate’s express and implied findings
of fact if supported by substantial evidence. We independently
assess whether the challenged seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment, according to federal constitutional standards.
(Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 242; People v. Souza (1994) 9
Cal.4th 224, 232–233.)
       Police detained Jackson at some point, but the question is
when. If police detained Jackson before Chavez saw the gun in
Jackson’s pocket and absent other information, the detention
would be unjustified. The consequence would be suppression of
evidence that was the fruit of the poisonous tree. (Tacardon,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 242; Nardone v. United States (1939) 308
U.S. 338, 341.)
                                   B
       As a matter of constitutional law, the officers detained
Jackson before spotting the gun. The officers pulled their car
within a few feet of Jackson’s open driver’s side door, leaving only
enough room that, in the officers’ opinion, perhaps he “could have
squeezed out.” Then they surrounded his car in the dark and, at
close range, aimed two flashlights on him. Under these
circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.
(See Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 241; Brendlin, supra, 551
U.S. at pp. 254–255.)
       Pulling the police car so close boxed Jackson in. Perhaps he
“could have squeezed out.” But opening a car door when another
car is close by is a delicate operation if one is to avoid paying for
an expensive trip to the body shop. When the car they might
dent is a police car, reasonable people would not attempt to
squeeze out the door. Banging up the police car would aggravate
a situation reasonable people would want to assuage. The

                                 8
proximity of the car conveyed a message: better to stay in your
car. Whatever the officers’ subjective intent, the objective and
reasonable meaning of this police action was a display of
authority and control.
       The officers showed authority by surrounding Jackson.
       A recent decision applies here. In the next paragraph, we
use brackets to plug Jackson’s name into a lengthy quotation
from that decision to show its correspondence and force.
       Chavez and Ybarra “exited their vehicle, approached . . .
[Jackson] from both sides, and shined their flashlights into
[Jackson’s car] from close range, right at the car door windows.
This was a display of authority that would lead a reasonable
person to believe he is not free to leave or otherwise disregard the
police and go about his business, both because more than one
officer approached and because the officers shined their
flashlights on [Jackson] from opposite angles, effectively
illuminating him on all sides. . . . If the officers wished to signal
that [Jackson] was free to go, the officers could have approached
[Jackson’s car] from the same side of the vehicle and engaged
[Jackson] in casual conversation. The officers instead flanked
[Jackson] and approached from both sides while shining their
flashlights into the vehicle. The officers’ approach is exactly the
kind of coordinated action that an objective person would expect
to witness when being detained. A reasonable person would
conclude that when two officers approach in this manner,
surrounding the individual in the vehicle, he or she is not free to
leave.” (People v. Paul (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 832, 840.)
       There was no car in front of Jackson, so it would have been
possible, physically, for him to drive forward. (See Tacardon,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 247 [finding no detention where

                                  9
defendant’s car was not blocked from driving away].) Once the
officers displayed their authority as they did, however, a
reasonable person would have equated driving forward with
flouting the officers’ show of authority. It is unwise to flout an
officer’s show of authority.
                                   C
       The justifications for this detention were inadequate.
       Officers may conduct an investigatory detention if they
have an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Their suspicions must be supported by specific and articulable
facts that are reasonably consistent with criminal activity. We
examine the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Wells (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.)
       Wearing what someone perceives is a big bulky jacket on
what feels to be a hot humid night does not lead an officer
reasonably to conclude “that criminal activity may be afoot.”
(Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30.) This jacket factor is
unremarkable because a universe of alternative explanations
exists.
       And it is natural for someone to look surprised, nervous,
and uncomfortable when police appear out of the dark, park too
close for easy exit, surround your car, and shine flashlights on
you.
       The prosecution argues Jackson “was also sitting in an
awkward, uncomfortable position, seemingly ‘halfway in, halfway
out’ of the driver’s seat.” This position does not suggest crime.
       Taken together, these three factors are insufficient.
       The prosecution incorrectly argues the evidence at the
suppression hearing showed the officers believed this was a high-

                                10
crime area. This argument is based on the following exchange,
which we quoted above and now repeat.
       “Q: What criminal activity did you believe sitting
awkwardly suggested?
       [Chavez]: A couple things. I believed, based on my
training and experience and my knowledge of the area, that
specific block; you know, the time of night -- it’s a high-end car,
like, a really nice, I think Range Rover or Land Rover -- one of
these kind of higher-end vehicles. I thought based on just first
initial --
       Q: Based on how he’s sitting is my question.
       [Chavez]: Yes. That the car could have been stolen, the
defendant could be concealing something, he could -- and then
also too -- well, criminal activity, yeah. [¶] I couldn’t -- I couldn’t
see much more past that, but just based upon his seating position
and how nervous he was acting, yeah, that definitely was a
thought in my mind that the car possibly could be stolen or he
could be concealing something on his person, especially in that
jacket. . . .”
       “Q: . . . [H]ow are you able to tell by the way that
somebody’s sitting that they could have stolen a car?
       [Chavez]: Well, I’d be unable to tell if they stole a car based
on how they’re sitting. I’m just going off of his -- like, his position
and what I thought when I saw his position.”
       The words “my knowledge of the area, that specific block;
you know, the time of night -- it’s a high-end car, like, a really
nice, I think Range Rover or Land Rover -- one of these kind of
higher-end vehicles” suggest the officer suspected something
based on a “high-end car” parked on “that specific block.” This
was the officer’s response to a question about Jackson’s sitting

                                  11
position. These words, in this context, are not reasonably
interpreted to mean “that specific block” is a high-crime area.
      Collectively, these justifications did not create a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. The detention was invalid. (See
People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 297, 299–301.)
                          DISPOSITION
      We reverse the judgment, vacate the conviction, and
remand the matter. On remand, the trial court shall vacate its
order denying Jackson’s motion to suppress the evidence and
shall enter a new order granting that motion. (People v. Paul,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 841–842.)

                                           WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

                                 12