Court Opinion

ID: 9425489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:14:52.572646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:55.913839
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
I
The dispute in this labor case does not involve hourly wages, pension benefits, or the like. It involves the life and death of the workers in the most dangerous occupation in America.1 The history of the coal miner is a history of fatal catastrophes, which have prompted special protective legislation.2 Nor was the mine involved here an exception. It is classified by the United States Bureau of Mines as “especially hazardous,” triggering special inspection procedures to insure the safety of the men who work it. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, § 103 (i), 83 Stat. 750, 30 U. S. C. § 813 (i). Congress has received testimony about safety problems at this mine in which the workers, a year before this dispute, complained of the supervisors’ negligence in safety matters, particularly their practice of “not testing for gas.” 3 At those hearings Senator Harrison Williams, the principal author of the 1969 mine safety act, commented that the enforcement performance of the United States Bureau of Mines was “outrageous . . . just plain unbelievable.”4
*389It was in the context of this history that the workers discovered that three of their foremen had negligently failed to check and record the airflow in the mine before the daylight shift began, as was their duty. Instead they made false entries in their log books. As a result, they had not discovered that the airflow in the mine was 11,000 cubic feet per minute rather than the normal 28,000. Reduced airflow can result in a buildup of methane gas, creating conditions for accidental explosions resulting from the operation of normal mining equipment. The workers walked off the job and refused to return unless the foremen were removed. The majority passes off the workers’ concern here as only “a generalized doubt in the competence and integrity of company supervisors” as if there were only unfounded fears about a few men in an operation with an exemplary safety record. Yet the foremen in question pleaded nolo contendere to state charges of falsifying the records involved in this incident, and their admitted misfeasance is precisely the kind of reckless disregard for thé miners’ safety which permeates the history of this industry.
In response to this history, the union obtained, in the collective-bargaining agreement in force during this incident, a provision for a union “mine safety committee” with the authority to present the mine operator with a binding “recommendation” that all workers be removed from an unsafe mine area. The agreement provides no recourse for the operator in disagreement with the committee’s determinations, although he may subsequently seek removal from the committee of members he believes to have acted arbitrarily. Yet it is clear from this provision that the union reserved to itself the authority to determine that a mine be closed because of safety hazards. Although there is an explicit provision that a dispute over whether a committee member should be removed is arbitrable, there is no such provision for arbitration *390if the mine operator disagrees with the committee’s recommendation. The inescapable inference, absent any contrary presumption, is that this question is not subject to arbitration.5 And in what clearly appears to be a buttress to the union’s authority in this matter, all no-strike provisions from prior contracts were explicitly excluded from the agreement in question here, which contains no such commitment on the part of the union.
This is the contractual context in which the employer brought this action, under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185, to compel arbitration of the safety dispute and enjoin the work stoppage. It is, of course, clearly established that because of congressional policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes, a general arbitration provision, as found in the agreement here in question, is broadly construed. Steelworkers trilogy (United Steelworkers of America v. *391American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593). This policy is grounded, as the majority points out, in the expression of policy by the Labor Management Relations Act. And once a dispute is determined to be arbitrable, there is an implied agreement by the union not to strike, Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, which is enforceable by a federal court injunction under the principles enunciated in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, because of the close relationship between the duty to arbitrate and the duty not to strike. Lucas Flour, supra, at 104-106; Boys Markets, supra, at 247-249.
Yet this whole scheme, grounded as it is on congressional expression of policy, must allow for any congres-sionally indicated exceptions to that policy. In a § 301 suit the federal courts are to apply federal law “which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.” Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456. Although the “presumption of arbitrability” might be sufficient in the ordinary case to overcome the contrary implications in the collective-bargaining agreement involved here, I find that presumption seriously weakened in the area of safety disputes by § 502 of the Labor Management- Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 143, which expressly shields walk-offs by workers concerned for their safety: That section reads in part: “[N]or shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike under this chapter.” Although there is nothing in the legislative history of this section to shed light on its purpose, the words of the section are themselves fairly clear. They recognize in the law what is in any case an unavoidable principle of *392human behavior: self preservation. As Judge Hastie said for the majority in the Court of Appeals: “Men are not wont to submit matters of life or death to arbitration . . . 466 F. 2d 1157, 1160.
This is an area involving “the penumbra of express statutory mandates” to be solved “by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy.” Lincoln Mills, supra, at 457. Although there is a general policy favoring arbitration, I do not find that Congress intended to extend that policy here. Application of the “presumption of arbi-trability” is not inevitable in every labor dispute. But miners’ determination to act to protect their own safety is as inevitable in labor disputes as elsewhere. Absent any presumption, I cannot find that the dispute here was arbitrable or that the union was under any duty not to strike. It follows then, as the Court of Appeals found, that there was no wrong to remedy.
II
Congress in 1969 set up pervasive administrative controls over working and environmental conditions with the coal mines,6 83 Stat. 742. The need for a more effective regulatory scheme was described in H. R. Rep. No. 91-563. The 1969 Act states in its findings and purpose that “the first priority and concern of all in the coal mining industry must be the health and safety of *393its most precious resource — the miner.” § 2 (a), 30 U. S. C. § 801 (a). Ease of investigating mines was insured. The Act provides that when a representative of the miners believes that a violation of a mandatory standard exists and an imminent danger exists, the right of immediate inspection is given the Federal Government. § 103 (g), 30 U. S. C. § 813 (g). The Secretary of the Interior may make a spot investigation of a mine for five working days when he believes hazardous conditions exist. § 103 (i), 30 U. S. C. §813 (i). Once a hazardous condition is found the Secretary can order that all miners be evacuated from the area and prohibited from entering it. § 104 (a), 30 U. S. C. § 814 (a). The Secretary can abate mining in incipient or potential mining areas, § 105, 30 U. S. C. § 815; and his orders are within limits subject to judicial review by the miners as well as by the operators. § 106, 30 U. S. C. § 816.
Detailed ventilating requirements are placed in the Act, § 303, 30 U. S. C. § 863; and examinations of each mine must be made. within “three hours immediately preceding the beginning of any shift.” § 303 (d) (1), 30 U. S. C. § 863 (d)(1). Examinations for hazardous conditions must be made at least once a week, § 303 (f), 30 U. S. C. § 863 (f); and weekly investigations of ventilating conditions must be made and various monitors which detect dangerous gases must be installed, § 303 (1), 30 U. S. C. § 863 (l). The regulatory scheme covers the subject matter in minute detail.
Penalties run against operators of mines and also against miners who violate in specified ways “mandatory safety standards.” Compensation of miners laid off by closed mines is provided, § 110 (a), 30 U. S. C. § 820 (a); and miners are protected against discharge or other discrimination by protests they have made against the operations by testimony they have given. § 110 (b), 30 U. S. C. §820 (b).
*394Title IV of the Act treats disability payments and payments for the death of miners. It bolsters state workmen's compensation laws and makes the owners liable, through self-insurance or through liability insurance, where an adequate state law does not exist, § 423, 30 U. S. C. § 933. State laws inconsistent with the federal act are suspended; but state laws which provide more stringent standards or controls survive, § 506, 30 U. S. C. § 955.
A close reading of this Act convinces me that it must displace all agreements to arbitrate safety conditions. It is in that respect a more extreme case than U. S. Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U. S. 351, where we held that a federal statute giving seamen a specific judicial remedy was not displaced by arbitration. When it comes to health, safety of life, or determination of environmental conditions within the mines, Congress has pre-empted the field. An arbiter is no part of the paraphernalia described in the Act. An arbiter seeks a compromise, an adjustment, an accommodation. There is no mandate in arbitration to apply a specific law. Those named in the present Act who construe, apply, and formulate the law are the Secretary and the courts.
Moreover, arbitration awards might compromise administration of the 1969 Act. Rulings of arbiters might not jibe with rulings of the Secretary. Rulings of the arbiters might even color claims for compensation or damages by negativing the very basis of liability either in workmen's compensation Acts or in state lawsuits for damages.
Hence, though I disagree with the way in which the Court reads this particular arbitration clause, I conclude that even though the collective-bargaining agreement is read to authorize arbitration, the 1969 Act precludes it. The 1969 Act specifies the arms of the law which handle these matters of safety of mines. Congress has given arbiters no share of the power.

 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Injury Rates by Industry, 1970, pp. 3, 6 (Report No. 406, 1972).

 S. Rep. No. 91-411, pp. 3-6; H. R. Rep. No. 91-563, pp. 1-3.

 Hearings on Health and Safety in the Coal Mines before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 27, 351 (1970).

 Id., at 191.

 This inference is strengthened by the agreement’s provisions for arbitration if the operator objected to recommendations by federal coal mine inspectors. § (b) (2) of the agreement. There would obviously be no need for this special arbitration provision if the parties felt that safety questions could be handled through the regular arbitration machinery.
Indeed the provision in question here has a long history supporting this construction. The 1946 agreement, known as the Krug-Lewis agreement, and arising from President Truman’s seizure of the mines in 1946, United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258, expressly permitted union safety committees to initiate safety stoppages, although the Federal Coal Mines Administrator (Capt. N. H. Collisson), was given authority to halt such a stoppage. At hearings following the Centralia mine disaster, resulting in the death of 111 miners, Secretary of the Interior Krug testified that the meaning of the provision “was to give the mine safety committee complete authority to get the men out of the mine, if they felt the mine was unsafe . . . .” Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 98 before a Special Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Lands, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 312. The predecessor to the current provision appeared in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1947, which deleted Collisson’s authority to override the miners.

 The hazards of various working conditions to the health of workers have been of great concern to Congress, its latest Act being the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, which in terms does not exclude employees who are in the coal-mining business. The Act looks toward increasing the quality of the environment in which employees work and of improving-the workmen’s compensation system under which they are protected. See Brodeur, Casualties of the Workplace, New Yorker, Nov. 19, 1973, p. 87, for an account of the industrial-medical complex that works .to keep plants profitable to the owners and dangerous to the workers.