Court Opinion

ID: 9395649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 15:11:51.233618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:10.258362
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

David Harris and Steven Thompson,          :
                        Appellants         :
                                           :
                 v.                        :   No. 169 C.D. 2022
                                           :   ARGUED: March 6, 2023
SEPTA Police Detective Daniel              :
Burgmann, SEPTA Police Detective           :
Stewart, SEPTA Police Detective            :
Bacon, and SEPTA Police Detective          :
Bryan McCauley                             :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
             HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER                                     FILED: May 18, 2023

             In this intentional tort case, Appellants David Harris and Steven
Thompson appeal from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
denying their post-trial motion, and granting in part and denying in part the post-trial
motions of Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) Police
Detectives Daniel Burgmann, Robert Stewart, Edward Bacon, and Bryan McCauley
(collectively, Detectives). Specifically, Appellants take issue with the portions of
the trial court orders granting Detectives’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV) with respect to Appellant Harris’s claims, and granting Detectives
Burgmann, Bacon, and McCauley’s motion for a new trial with respect Appellant
Thompson’s claims. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
                                    Background
             While the parties profess different versions of the underlying events,
the gist of the matter, as asserted by Appellants as verdict winners, is as follows. On
July 24, 2017, a man, later identified as Sorrell Groves, assaulted a SEPTA police
officer at the Angora train station in Philadelphia. SEPTA police were able to use
nearby security camera footage to identify a black Chevy S-10 pick-up truck as Mr.
Groves’ “getaway” vehicle. SEPTA police subsequently issued a “Be On the Look
Out” (BOLO) for a truck fitting this description and increased patrols in the area.
             Two days later, on July 26, 2017, Detectives Bacon and Stewart
identified a truck purportedly resembling the vehicle from the BOLO – specifically,
a black Chevy S-10 – parked across the street from 5811 Cobbs Creek Parkway,
Philadelphia. Appellant Thompson owns the house located at this address, which is
in close proximity to the Angora train station. After staking out the truck for several
hours, Detectives Bacon and Stewart observed an individual, later identified as
Appellant Harris, leave the house at 5811 Cobbs Creek Parkway, walk across the
street, and approach and access the passenger side of the truck. At that point,
Detectives Burgmann and McCauley, as well as numerous officers from SEPTA’s
Special Operations Response Team (SORT), arrived at the scene to assist.
             After Appellant Harris opened the passenger side door of his truck,
numerous officers ran up to him with their firearms drawn, jumped on his back,
removed him from the vehicle, and handcuffed him. Detectives subsequently
searched the portion of the truck that was within Appellant Harris’s wingspan and
purportedly found crack cocaine and a collapsible baton. While Appellant Harris
admits to possessing the baton he has, at all times, denied there were drugs in his
vehicle. He was subsequently arrested, taken to the police station and charged with,

                                          2
among other things, possession with intent to distribute, simple possession, and
prohibited offensive weapons, for which he spent approximately 48 hours in police
custody until Appellant Thompson was able to post his bail. Appellant Harris
suffered injuries to his wrists as well as emotional injuries and distress due to
Detectives’ actions. Of particular note, in April 2018, following a stipulated trial,
Appellant Harris was found not guilty as to all charges stemming from this incident.
              After Appellant Harris’s arrest, Detectives and SEPTA SORT Sergeant
James Zuggi broke into Appellant Thompson’s house without a warrant or consent,
with their firearms drawn and in full SORT gear. Appellant Thompson, who was
approximately 50 years old at the time and disabled, was thrown to the ground and
held at gun-point, and an officer knelt on his back. Appellant Thompson and Richard
Jenkins, an acquaintance who was there to assist him with remodeling, were both
placed in zip-tie restraints and forcibly removed from the house. Numerous officers
then searched Appellant Thompson’s home, causing damage to doors, floors, and a
large safe, and purportedly stealing various items including cash and an expensive
watch. Appellant Thompson and Mr. Jenkins remained outside, in restraints until
the search of the house was completed. In addition to emotional injury and distress,
Appellant Thompson suffered physical injury to his hands and shoulder from having
his hands zip-tied behind his back, and Detectives’ actions reaggravated injuries he
suffered in a previous accident.
              No charges were ever filed against Appellant Thompson. Further,
Detectives admit that neither of the Appellants were ever considered a suspect in the
Angora train station assault. The actual suspect, Mr. Groves, turned himself in to
police on the afternoon of July 26, 2017, just a few hours after the above events
transpired.

                                         3
               On October 22, 2018, Appellants filed a civil action asserting claims of
assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment against each of the Detectives.
Appellant Harris also stated a separate claim for malicious prosecution, and
Appellant Thompson asserted additional claims for trespass and conversion.
Following discovery, Detectives filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis
of sovereign immunity which was denied by Judge Charles Cunningham, III, via
order without an accompanying opinion. The matter then proceeded to a jury trial
over which the Honorable Judge Lori A. Dumas presided.1
                        Trial Testimony on Behalf of Appellants
               During trial, Appellant Harris testified that he was at Appellant
Thompson’s home on the day in question in order to assist him with remodeling.
(Reproduced Record “R.R.” at 441a.)2 He left the house to get his work boots from
his vehicle and as he opened the passenger door he noticed something out of the
corner of his eye. (Id. at 441a-42a.) Appellant Harris turned around and “saw a big
gun, [and] a black uniform,” noting “I was scared. I thought I was about to get
killed.” (Id. at 442a.) Appellant Harris was thrown into the truck, tackled or
“jumped on,” and handcuffed. (Id. at 442a-43a.) A large number of officers then
converged on the scene, swarmed into a circle surrounding him, and began asking
him questions and harassing him. (Id. at 442a.) The officers told Appellant Harris
that he looked like Mr. Groves and made statements such as “[y]ou’re the guy,” and
“give me something, name, [sic] address or you’re going to jail.” (Id.) Appellant

    1
      After the jury trial in this matter concluded, but before a determination could be issued on
the parties’ post-trial motions, Judge Dumas was elevated to her position on this Court. Given
these facts, Judge Dumas is recused and did not participate in this Court’s decision on this matter.

    2
      Appellants’ Reproduced Record is not paginated with a lowercase “a” following the
numbers, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. (Rule) 2173. This Opinion will cite to the Reproduced Record as
provided by Rule 2173.

                                                 4
Harris complained to the officers that his handcuffs were too tight, but rather than
loosen them, the officers continued to tug on them during questioning, especially
when he said something they did not like. (Id. at 442a, 444a.) The officers asked
where Appellant Harris came from, and he pointed them to Appellant Thompson’s
home. (Id. at 442a.)
             Appellant Harris repeatedly testified that all four Detectives were
involved in his arrest, that they all physically touched him that day, and that there
were “a lot of guns” pointed at him. (R.R. at 442a, 444a, 448a, 547a.) He believes
Detective McCauley was the officer who actually handcuffed him, noting that both
Detective McCauley and another officer were short “with very long beards[.]” (Id.
at 442a, 444a, 547a.) A supervisor took Appellant Harris to the police station where
Detectives McCauley and Burgmann processed him on the criminal charges. (Id.)
Both Detectives were also involved in his later criminal proceedings. (Id. at 547a.)
             Notably, Appellant Harris denied that the vehicle he was driving at the
time resembled the truck from the BOLO. (R.R. at 443a-44a, 460a.) He described
his vehicle as “[a] 2001 Chevy S[-]10 Blazer, color black,” registered to his mother
in New Jersey, with a New Jersey inspection sticker on the front and yellow New
Jersey license plates on the front and back of the vehicle. (Id. at 441a, 444a.) In
addition, the molding on the back bumper of his vehicle was “flipped up,” and while
the windows of his car had only “factory tint,” the windows on the vehicle from the
BOLO were heavily tinted, to the point that you could not see inside the vehicle.
(Id. at 444a, 456a.)
             Appellant Harris stated that he was scared during this incident as he
thought he was about to die, and that he has been paranoid ever since. (Id. at 442a,
447a-48a.) When this incident occurred he was trying to gain sole custody of his

                                         5
young daughter and he was afraid the pending drug charges would damage his
custody case. (Id. at 445a, 447a.) As for physical pain and suffering, he had pain
and numbness in his wrists and hands for several months after the arrest, and he
specifically identified Detective McCauley as one of the officers who tugged on his
handcuffs in order to inflict more pain during his questioning. (Id. at 444a-45a,
447a.) Detectives’ actions also aggravated injuries to Appellant Harris’s back and
shoulder that he suffered in a previous car accident, and interfered with his ability to
work. (Id. at 447a.) Further, Detectives confiscated his cell phone and impounded
his vehicle, and when he finally got his vehicle back it was “stripped” with the
dashboard and panels ripped off. (Id. at 445a-46a.)
             Appellant Thompson testified that at the time of the incident he was in
the process of digging out his basement, and Appellant Harris and Mr. Jenkins were
there to help with the renovations. (R.R. at 414a.) Appellant Harris left the house
to get his work boots from his vehicle and never returned. (Id.) Appellant Thompson
heard what he thought was someone trying to open his screen door, and then he heard
his door “pop” and at least seven or eight officers rushed into his home with guns
drawn. (Id. at 415a, 421a, 440a, 546a.) Some of the officers ran up the stairs, others
ran to the back of the house, and two officers put him on the floor, putting a knee on
his back and zip-tying him. (Id. at 415a, 545a.) Appellant Thompson explained that
he has preexisting injuries as a result of being crushed by a tractor trailer in 2007,
and due to his disability he is not able to put his arms behind his back. (Id. at 415a.)
He was trying not to resist, but the officers forced him to the floor and later lifted
him up by his arms to take him outside. (Id.) He described the officers as wearing
all black with bulletproof vests, patches, and helmets, in “riot gear” with their
firearms drawn. (Id. at 415a, 421a, 546a.) He was kept zip-tied outside his home

                                           6
for the duration of the search, which was approximately 45 minutes to an hour. (Id.
at 425a, 426a, 427a.) Appellant Thompson repeatedly stated that no one asked him
for consent to search his home prior to entering and he never gave consent. (Id. at
415a, 421a, 426a, 440a, 545a.) Rather, after he was restrained and taken outside an
officer asked if he had consent to enter the home, to which Appellant Thompson
responded “You’re already in my home. Why would you ask for permission now?”
(Id. at 415a.)
             Appellant Thompson was not able to specifically identify which
officers handcuffed him or brought him outside, noting they were dressed alike and
the incident happened very fast. (R.R. at 421a.) However, he repeatedly identified
each of the four Detectives as having been inside his house that day. (Id. at 421a-
25a, 440a, 545a.) In particular, he remembered Detectives Bacon and Stewart being
inside with their guns drawn, Detective Stewart guarding his stairwell, and two of
the officers having long beards. (Id. at 425a, 440a, 545a.) At least one of the officers
made derogatory comments to Appellant Thompson, questioning how he had such
nice things and using offensive language. (Id. at 425a.)
             Appellant Thompson testified at length as to the damage done to his
property and the items that were taken. (R.R. at 416a-21a, 423a.) He also stated
that after the incident he was angry and felt violated, that he has lingering emotional
effects including anxiety, and that he feels targeted and does not feel safe in his own
home. (Id. at 425a, 426a-27a.) He sought help from a psychiatrist for these
conditions but the provider did not accept his insurance and he could not afford the
fees out-of-pocket. (Id. at 426a-27a.) The incident and Appellant Thompson’s
resulting emotional state caused strain in his relationship with Syrita Wood, his long-
term live-in girlfriend, to the point that they separated six months to a year later. (Id.

                                            7
at 428a.) Appellant Thompson also incurred costs from retaining a criminal defense
lawyer for Appellant Harris and posting his bail. (Id. at 427a.)
             The testimony of Mr. Jenkins and Ms. Wood is consistent with that of
Appellant Thompson. In particular, Mr. Jenkins stated that multiple officers came
into the house with guns drawn and zip-tied both himself and Appellant Thompson.
(R.R. at 462a-64a.) He emphasized that Appellant Thompson did not give the
officers prior permission to enter his home. (Id. at 462a-63a.) Afterwards, the house
was “a total wreck,” with a huge crack in the glass door and couches flipped upside-
down. (Id. at 463a.) While Ms. Wood was not present when the incident occurred,
when she came home from work that day the storm door would not open, the door
to the porch was cracked, the safe was open, the floor was scraped, and things were
“in disarray.” (Id. at 466a-67a.) She further noted that Appellant Thompson became
very disgruntled and depressed after these events, and this played a major part in
their relationship ending. (Id. at 467a.)
             Two of Appellant Thompson’s neighbors, Peter House and Terrence
Arthur, also testified. Mr. House saw Appellant Harris walking to his truck when
several officers wearing black came up to him with their guns drawn, told him to get
out of the truck, and then searched both Appellant Harris and his vehicle. (R.R. at
470a.) After that, the officers went up to Appellant Thompson’s house where they
first knocked and then went inside. (Id.) Mr. House specified that Appellant
Thompson was still inside the house when the officers went in and he did not see
Appellant Thompson come to the door to speak to the officers. (Id. at 470a-71a.)
Mr. Arthur lives behind Appellant Thompson and was standing at his kitchen
window when he saw four or five SEPTA officers in the alleyway trying to open the
fence to Appellant Thompson’s backyard. (Id. at 472a-73a.) The officers had hand

                                            8
guns on them and two had their guns drawn. (Id. at 473a.) Several days later, Mr.
Arthur mentioned to Appellant Thompson that he saw SEPTA officers break his
fence when they tried to get into his yard. (Id. at 472a.) Appellant Thompson
informed Mr. Arthur that the officers also broke his front door. (Id.)
                        Trial Testimony on Behalf of Detectives3
               Detective Bacon, who at the time was also a medic for SEPTA’s
criminal investigation division, testified that he and Detective Stewart were staking
out a truck similar to the vehicle in the BOLO when they saw Appellant Harris exit
a home on Cobbs Creek Parkway and approach the truck. (R.R. at 476a, 483a-87a.)
He and Detective Stewart approached Appellant Harris and identified themselves as
police officers. (Id. at 476a, 487a, 489a.) Detective Bacon admitted to having his
gun drawn very briefly during the encounter with Appellant Harris, but claims he
quickly re-holstered as he was in a bad tactical position. (Id. at 476a-77a, 488a.) He
does not know who actually handcuffed Appellant Harris or at what specific point
the handcuffs were applied, just that Detective Stewart kept him within the passenger
doorway until backup officers arrived. (Id. at 477a-78a, 488a-89a.) Detective Bacon
identified those backup officers as Detectives Burgmann and McCauley, noting that
he did not see either Detective specifically touch or apply handcuffs to Appellant
Harris. (Id. at 478a, 488a.)
               Once the backup officers arrived, Detective Bacon turned his attention
to a “commotion” behind him. (R.R. at 478a, 488a-89a.) He turned around and saw
Appellant Thompson and several uniformed officers talking in front of the house.
Detective Bacon did not see zip ties on Appellant Thompson at any time and he did

    3
       While we include Detectives’ narrative in order to illustrate the entire testimony presented
to the jury, we ultimately conclude that the Honorable Judge Joshua Roberts (Successor Judge)
erred in not viewing the disputed evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winners.

                                                9
not see Mr. Jenkins. (Id. at 489a-90a.) As the assigned medic, Detective Bacon
entered Appellant Thompson’s house with approximately six SEPTA SORT officers
to look for Mr. Groves. (Id. at 490a-91a.) Detective Bacon knew there was no
warrant to enter the home and testified that Appellant Thompson consented to the
search. (Id. at 479a, 489a-91a.) Detective Bacon did not participate in the actual
search of the home but merely stood in the living room in case he was needed as a
medic. (Id. at 490a-91a.) The SORT officers were inside the home for less than five
minutes. Detective Bacon did not see officers take any items from the home or
damage any property, and he himself did not take or damage anything. (Id. at 480a,
490a-92a.) After the search was completed, he rejoined Detective Stewart and by
that time Detectives Burgmann and McCauley were gone from the scene. (Id. at
492a-93a.) Detective Bacon did not participate in or attend Appellant Harris’s
criminal proceedings and he never returned to Appellant Thompson’s home. (Id. at
479a.)
             Detective Stewart testified that he and Detective Bacon were doing a
grid search in the general area of the Angora station. (R.R. at 499a, 503a.) They
spotted a vehicle matching the truck from the BOLO parked on Cobbs Creek
Parkway, so they found a parking spot with a direct view of the truck and staked it
out for several hours. (Id. at 499a, 503a-04a.) When he saw Appellant Harris
approach the truck, Detective Stewart exited his vehicle, ran across the street behind
Appellant Harris, and announced that he was police. (Id. at 499a, 502a, 504a.)
Detective Stewart then put his hand on Appellant Harris’s back and instructed him
to show his hands for safety reasons since Appellant Harris was reaching across the
vehicle. (Id. at 499a, 504a.) Appellant Harris complied and Detective Stewart then
removed him from the vehicle. (Id.) One of the officers patted Appellant Harris

                                         10
down for weapons and handcuffed him, and then Detective Stewart escorted him to
a nearby park bench. (Id. at 499a-500a, 504a.) Detective Stewart repeatedly stated
that he did not search Appellant Harris’s person or his truck, did not handcuff him
or place him under arrest, did not transport him to the station, and did not participate
in any criminal proceedings. (Id. at 501a, 504a-05a.) Detective Stewart did explain
to Appellant Harris that he was being stopped because a SEPTA officer had been
assaulted at the Angora station and they believe the suspect made a getaway in a
black Chevy S-10, similar to his truck. (Id. at 502a, 504a.)
             After escorting Appellant Harris to the park bench, Detective Stewart
went across the street to Appellant Thompson’s house. (R.R. at 502a, 504a.) He
had a brief conversation with Appellant Thompson on his front landing, wherein
Appellant Thompson stated that he did home repairs. (Id. at 504a-05a.) Appellant
Thompson was not handcuffed or restrained in any way and he was free to leave the
area. (Id. at 505a.) While Detective Stewart did not see SORT officers enter the
home, he did see them exit within just a few minutes. (Id.) Detective Stewart
repeatedly testified that he never entered Appellant Thompson’s home. (Id. at 502a-
03a, 505a.) After the SORT officers exited the home, Detectives Stewart and Bacon
left the scene and returned to headquarters. (Id. at 505a.)
             Detective Burgmann testified that in July 2017, he and Detective
McCauley were working in plainclothes undercover and that they both probably had
beards. (R.R. at 511a-12a, 516a, 519a.) While they were assigned to SEPTA’s
Special Investigations Unit, they were not specifically investigating the assault on
the SEPTA officer. (Id. at 519a.) As soon as they reported for work on the day in
question, they were alerted that other officers had located a vehicle matching the
description in the BOLO and were directed to assist. (Id. at 512a-13a, 519a.) The

                                          11
two then drove an unmarked car to the area and parked in a nearby gas station
parking lot to await further instructions. (Id. at 513a, 520a.)
             At some point they were alerted that an individual was approaching the
suspect truck so Detectives Burgmann and McCauley drove to the area and parked
alongside the vehicle, facing the other direction. (R.R. at 513a, 520a.) When they
arrived, Appellant Harris was leaning into the vehicle from the passenger side with
Detective Stewart directly behind him. (Id.) Neither Detective Burgmann nor
Detective McCauley had their guns drawn when they got out of the vehicle, and
Detective Burgmann never drew his weapon during the incident. (Id. at 513a-14a,
521a.) While there was no actual physical struggle with Appellant Harris he also
was not complying with officers’ directions to show his hands, and one hand
remained underneath him for several seconds. (Id. at 513a-15a, 521a.) Eventually
officers were able to remove Appellant Harris and escort him away from the vehicle,
but he was not under arrest at that point. (Id. at 521a-22a.) Detective Burgmann
stated that Detective Stewart never “jumped on” Appellant Harris’s back. (Id. at
522a-23a, 528a.)
             Once Detective Burgmann saw there was nothing in Appellant Harris’s
hands and he was removed from the area, Detective Burgmann went around the front
of the truck to the passenger door and immediately searched the area within
Appellant Harris’s wingspan for weapons so as to ensure everyone’s safety at the
scene. (R.R. at 514a, 518a, 521a-23a.) Detective Burgmann located a collapsible
baton as well as a black bag containing crack cocaine, purportedly packaged for sale.
(Id. at 514a, 522a-23a, 525a.) The search of the vehicle took only a minute or two,
after which it was determined that Appellant Harris would be arrested and charged
for the drugs and weapon. (Id. at 523a-24a.) Prior to this, Detective Burgmann did

                                          12
not see anyone handcuff Appellant Harris or use any force against him other than
removing him from the vehicle. (Id. at 524a.) He and Detective McCauley then left
the scene and returned to headquarters to complete the paperwork and process
Appellant Harris’s arrest. (Id. at 515a, 524a.) Detective Burgmann claimed he never
touched or had his hands on Appellant Harris, and that he never interacted with,
touched, or spoke to Appellant Thompson or entered his home. (Id. at 516a, 524a,
527a). Detective Burgmann was not a supervisor at the time and did not direct
anyone to conduct any activity at the scene. (Id. at 524a.) A search warrant was
subsequently obtained for Appellant Harris’s truck and Detective Burgmann
conducted that search, but maintains he did not look in or open any interior
compartments and the truck was not damaged during the search. (Id. at 526a-27a.)
             Detective McCauley’s testimony is consistent with that of his partner,
Detective Burgmann.      Detective McCauley could not recall who handcuffed
Appellant Harris, but believed it was either himself or Detective Stewart. (R.R. at
532a-33a, 537a.) He escorted Appellant Harris over to the park bench where he and
Detective Stewart remained until the drugs were found and the decision was made
to bring criminal charges against Appellant Harris. (Id. at 532a, 537a, 538a.)
Detective McCauley denied drawing his firearm at any point that day and did not
see any other officers with their weapons drawn. (Id. at 537a-38a.) Detective
McCauley had a very brief interaction with Appellant Thompson when he saw
Appellant Thompson walking down the middle of the street and directed him to
move for his own safety. (Id. at 533a, 539a.) Other than this, he had no contact with
Appellant Thompson that day, claiming he was not involved in the search of his
home and never entered his home. (Id. at 533a, 541a.) Detective McCauley
completed some of the paperwork involved in Appellant Harris’s arrest and testified

                                         13
at a subsequent suppression hearing. (Id. at 534a, 540a-41a.) Within a few days of
the incident, Detective McCauley returned to Appellant Thompson’s house to
provide information on where and how Appellant Harris could retrieve his truck.
(Id. at 541a-42a.)
             Also testifying on behalf of Detectives was Lieutenant Zuggi,
commander of SEPTA’s SORT unit. At the time of this incident, he was a SORT
Sergeant and it was his unit that cleared Appellant Thompson’s house in its search
for Mr. Groves. (R.R. at 557a.) Lieutenant Zuggi specifically testified that he
ordered his SORT officers not to enter the property until he arrived and, to his
knowledge, no search of the house occurred prior to his arrival. (Id. at 558a.)
Captain Reynolds was already at the scene when he arrived and told Lieutenant
Zuggi that Appellant Thompson had consented to the search. (Id. at 558a-59a.)
Lieutenant Zuggi then spoke directly to Appellant Thompson, explaining that they
were looking for the suspect in the train station assault and that they were not
searching for anything else. (Id. at 559a-60a.) Lieutenant Zuggi testified that
Appellant Thompson gave him consent to search and that absent consent his officers
would not have entered the house without obtaining a warrant. (Id. at 560a.)
             Lieutenant Zuggi also stated that Detectives McCauley, Burgmann, and
Stewart never entered Appellant Thompson’s home, and Detective Bacon only did
so to observe as the assigned medic. (R.R. at 561a.) Lieutenant Zuggi entered the
house immediately after his team to supervise the search and the team cleared the
house quickly, within less than five minutes. (Id. at 560a.) The officers did not
forcibly enter the home, he did not see any damage or hear any reports of damage to
the property, and he does not believe there were any civilians inside when they
entered. (Id. at 560a-61a.) Lieutenant Zuggi further stated that Appellant Thompson

                                        14
was outside prior to the officers entering his home and he was not restrained in any
way. (Id. at 559a, 561a.)
               Several other SEPTA officers also testified on behalf of Detectives.
Officer Harry Newell and Officer Brian Zenszer, both of whom were part of the
SORT team that entered Appellant Thompson’s house that day, testified that no one
caused any damage to the property and no one was restrained. Officers Newell and
Zenszer further stated that they specifically heard Appellant Thompson give
Lieutenant Zuggi permission to search his home.4
                          Jury Verdict and Post-Trial Motions
               The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellants, awarding them
compensatory damages of $290,000 and punitive damages of $305,000, for a total
of $595,000. More specifically,

           - As to Appellant Harris, the jury found Detective
             Burgmann liable on all claims (assault, battery, false
             arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution).

           - As to Appellant Thompson, the jury found Detective
             Burgmann liable on the claims of assault, battery, false
             imprisonment, trespass, and conversion, and not liable on
             the claim of false arrest.

           - As to Appellant Harris, the jury found Detective Stewart
             liable on the claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
             and malicious prosecution, and not liable on the claim of
             false arrest.

    4
       Detectives moved for a directed verdict both at the end of Appellants’ case in chief, and at
the close of all testimony. Detectives specifically argued that no reasonable jury could determine
any of them acted outside the course and scope of their duties as police officers. In addition, they
maintained that punitive damages should not be part of the case since Appellants had not raised
the issue other than in their complaint and no evidence was presented to support such claims. Both
motions were denied in their entirety. (See R.R. at 556a, 602a.)

                                                15
         - The jury found Detective Stewart acted within the scope
           of his police duties at all times when interacting with
           Appellant Thompson and, therefore, he was entitled to
           sovereign immunity on all of Appellant Thompson’s
           claims.

         - As to Appellant Harris, the jury found Detective Bacon
           liable on the claims of assault, false arrest, false
           imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and not liable
           on the claim of battery.

         - As to Appellant Thompson, the jury found Detective
           Bacon liable on the claims of assault, battery, false
           imprisonment, trespass, and conversion, and not liable on
           the claim of false arrest.

         - As to Appellant Harris, the jury found Detective
           McCauley liable on all claims.

         - As to Appellant Thompson, the jury found Detective
           McCauley liable on the claims of assault, battery, false
           imprisonment, trespass, and conversion, and not liable on
           the claim of false arrest.

(See R.R. at 712a-25a.)
             Subsequently, Detectives lodged objections with respect to sovereign
immunity and punitive damages, noting they may raise additional objections in their
post-trial motions. (R.R. at 648a.) Detectives then filed both a motion for JNOV
and a motion for new trial asserting, among other things, that the verdict was
inconsistent and that they were entitled to sovereign immunity on all claims because
their actions fell within the scope of their employment. (R.R. at 995a-1036a.)
             As previously indicated, Judge Dumas was elevated to her position on
this Court after the jury trial concluded. Therefore, oral argument on the post-trial
motions was heard by the Honorable Judge Joshua Roberts (Successor Judge) on
February 4, 2022, and the orders at issue in this appeal were entered on February 16

                                         16
and 17, 2022, without an accompanying opinion.            Those orders (1) denied
Appellants’ post-trial motion; (2) granted Detectives’ motion for JNOV with respect
to Appellant Harris; (3) denied Detectives Burgmann, Bacon, and McCauley’s
motion for JNOV with respect to Appellant Thompson; (4) denied Detectives’
motion for a new trial with respect to Appellant Harris; and (5) granted Detectives
Burgmann, Bacon, and McCauley’s motion for a new trial with respect to Appellant
Thompson. (R.R. at 1153a-61a.) The trial court orders left undisturbed the jury’s
verdicts (1) in favor of Detective Stewart and against Appellant Thompson on all
claims (as Appellant Thompson did not move for JNOV or a new trial on his claims
against Detective Stewart); and (2) in favor of Detectives Burgmann, Bacon, and
McCauley on Appellant Thompson’s false arrest claims. (Id.)
             Successor Judge subsequently issued a lengthy opinion pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on June 24, 2022. (R.R. at 1182a-1208a.) Therein, Successor
Judge explained that he granted Detectives’ JNOV motion with respect to Appellant
Harris because Detectives were entitled to sovereign immunity on all of his claims.
Citing Justice v. Lombardo, 208 A.3d 1057 (Pa. 2019), Successor Judge found that
there were no disputed facts showing the conduct of any of the Detectives was
outside the scope of their duties as police officers. He noted that applying handcuffs
is an ordinary, expected part of a detention and that Appellant Harris failed to offer
any medical evidence of injury, relying instead on his own subjective claims that the
handcuffs were too tight and caused him pain and discomfort. As such, Successor
Judge held that the conduct of Detectives in detaining and handcuffing Appellant
Harris was objectively reasonable.
             Regarding the motion for new trial, Successor Judge determined that
the jury’s verdict with respect to Detectives’ actions towards Appellant Thompson

                                         17
“has no possible reasonable explanation.” (R.R. at 1203a.) He stressed that while
the jury found only Detective Stewart was entitled to sovereign immunity, there was
an absence of any facts distinguishing his conduct from that of the other three
Detectives. He further noted that Appellant Thompson’s testimony regarding the
search of his home and how he was treated was “vague and nonspecific,” as he was
unable to point to any particular actions taken by any of the individual Detectives,
including identifying who physically restrained him or took him outside. (R.R. at
1204a.) Successor Judge indicated that while he was not relying upon Detectives’
testimony in his ruling, their statements “cast[] serious doubt on [Appellant]
Thompson’s overall ability to recollect the actions and placement of specific officers
in his house.” (R.R. at 1205a.) The fact that the jury found none of the other three
Detectives liable on Appellant Thompson’s claim of false arrest, but found them
liable for assault and battery, merely compounded the inconsistency. As such,
Successor Judge granted the motion for a new trial based upon an inconsistent
verdict. The appeal to this Court followed.
                                            Issues
              Appellants essentially present three issues on appeal:5 (1) whether
Successor Judge lacked jurisdiction to rule on the parties’ post-trial motions and
reverse a previous ruling by another judge in this matter; (2) whether Successor
Judge abused his discretion by entering JNOV on all claims as to Appellant Harris;
and (3) whether Successor Judge abused his discretion by ordering a new trial as to
Appellant Thompson’s claims because there is no inconsistency in the verdict.
Subsumed within these three main issues is Appellants’ assertion that Successor
Judge erred by not viewing the evidence in light of, and construing all disputed facts

    5
       Appellants’ brief lists 14 separate questions presented. We have reframed and reorganized
their issues on appeal for clarity and ease of analysis.

                                              18
and inferences in favor of, Appellants as verdict winners – in other words, by
improperly relying on the narrative advanced by Detectives. For all of these reasons,
Appellants argue that the jury’s verdict should be reinstated.
                                         Discussion
                             Coordinate Jurisdiction Rule
              In the first two questions presented in their brief, Appellants assert that
Successor Judge “lacked jurisdiction” to rule on the parties’ post-trial motions – in
other words, that his decision is barred by the coordinate jurisdiction rule. As
Detectives point out, however, Appellants failed to raise this issue at the trial court
level after learning that the case had been transferred to another jurist. More
specifically, Appellants did not assert such an objection in any of their post-trial
briefs or by separate motion, and they failed to object during oral argument when
Successor Judge specifically addressed the coordinate jurisdiction rule. A party
cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal and, therefore, it appears that this
issue has been waived. See McGuire on behalf of Neidig v. City of Pittsburgh, 250
A.3d 516, 526 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (noting party “must comply with the general rule
to raise an issue at the earliest opportunity”) (citations and quotation omitted), aff’d,
285 A.3d 887 (Pa. 2022); Keffer v. Bob Nolan’s Auto Serv., Inc., 59 A.3d 621, 630
(Pa. Super. 2012) (party’s coordinate jurisdiction rule issue waived when first raised
in post-trial motion).6
              Even if Appellants properly preserved this issue for appeal, we hold
that the coordinate jurisdiction rule is not implicated here. Generally speaking,
“under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in
the same case should not overrule each other[’s] decisions.” Rellick-Smith v. Rellick,

    6
     Although not binding, Superior Court decisions are persuasive authority in this Court. See
Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

                                              19
261 A.3d 506, 513 (Pa. 2021) (quotation omitted). Our Supreme Court has further
explained that

            [w]hen determining whether the coordinate jurisdiction
            rule applies, the court is not guided by whether an opinion
            was issued in support of the initial ruling. Goldey v. Tr[s.]
            of the Univ. of Pa., [] 675 A.2d 264, 267 ([Pa. ]1996).
            Instead, this Court looks to where the rulings occurred in
            the context of the procedural posture of the case. As this
            Court has explained:

                   Where the motions differ in kind, as
                   preliminary objections differ from motions
                   for judgment on the pleadings, which differ
                   from motions for summary judgment, a judge
                   ruling on a later motion is not precluded from
                   granting relief although another judge has
                   denied an earlier motion. However, a later
                   motion should not be entertained or granted
                   when a motion of the same kind has
                   previously been denied, unless intervening
                   changes in the facts or the law clearly warrant
                   a new look at the question.

            [Id.] Thus, in order to determine whether the coordinate
            jurisdiction rule applies [], we must look to the procedural
            posture where the trial judge and the post-trial judge made
            their respective rulings.

Riccio v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 705 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa. 1997).
            With respect to the procedural posture of this case, Appellants stress
that both Judge Cunningham and Judge Dumas previously ruled on the issue of
sovereign immunity through their respective decisions denying Detectives’ motions
for summary judgment and a directed verdict. However, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure 227.1 specifically allows for a judge considering the parties’ post-trial
motions to order a new trial or grant JNOV. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1; see also Riccio,

                                         20
705 A.2d at 425. As the Supreme Court determined in Riccio, “the fact that a
different judge considered the post-trial motions in this case does not affect a party’s
ability to seek post-trial relief since . . . [Pa.R.Civ.P.] 227.2[7] allows for the
substitution of a judge on behalf of an unavailable trial judge, thereby placing the
substituted judge in the same position as the trial judge.” 705 A.2d at 425 (footnote
added). The Riccio Court further explained that

                 because the post-trial motion process is distinct
                 procedurally from that of rendering a verdict following a
                 non-jury trial and because the considerations of the judge
                 are different at each procedural stage (rendering a verdict
                 at the conclusion of trial versus correcting mistakes made
                 during the earlier trial process), we hold that the
                 coordinate jurisdiction rule does not apply to bar a
                 substituted judge hearing post-trial motions from
                 correcting a mistake made by the trial judge during the
                 trial process. To hold otherwise and not allow a judge
                 deciding post-trial motions to overrule legal errors made
                 during the trial process (whether made by the reviewing
                 judge or another judge who presided over the trial) would
                 render the post-trial motion rules meaningless and the
                 post-trial motion process would become nothing more
                 than an exercise in futility.

Id. at 425-26.

    7
        Rule 227.2 provides, in pertinent part:

                 All post-trial motions and other post-trial matters shall be heard and
                 decided by the trial judge unless the trial judge orders that the matter
                 be heard by a court en banc of which the trial judge shall be a
                 member. If the trial judge for any reason cannot hear the matter,
                 another judge shall be designated to act.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.2 (emphasis added). Appellants’ interpretation of Rule 227.2 as requiring that
post-trial motions be heard en banc when the initial trial judge becomes unavailable is not
supported by the plain language of the rule and lacks merit.

                                                   21
             The instant matter is similar to that of Riccio as both involve post-trial
motions which were decided by a different judge due to the unavailability of the
initial trial judge.   Moreover, both cases pertain to rulings made at varying
procedural junctures. Here, the ruling on Detectives’ motion for summary judgment
was obviously issued prior to the commencement of trial, based solely on the pretrial
record, and both previous rulings were issued before the jury rendered its verdict.
Under these circumstances, we reject Appellants’ argument that the coordinate
jurisdiction rule barred Successor Judge’s decision on the post-trial motions. See
Riccio; see also Hunter v. City of Phila., 80 A.3d 533, 537 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)
(holding coordinate jurisdiction rule not violated because motions for summary
judgment and for nonsuit are not motions of the same kind).
                            Detectives’ JNOV Motion
             Appellants next argue that Successor Judge abused his discretion by
granting Detectives’ motion for JNOV when he did not see any of the testimony or
evidence first-hand, but instead ruled on a “cold” record, essentially usurping the
role of the jury and reversing its determinations as to sovereign immunity. They
further maintain that Successor Judge erred in stating there were no material facts in
dispute as to Appellant Harris’s claims and, instead, viewing the facts and making
inferences against Appellants, contrary to established precedent.
             There are two bases upon which a court may enter JNOV, the first of
which

             is where a movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
             law because, upon reviewing the record and deciding all
             factual inferences adverse to the movant, the law
             nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. Moure[ v.
             Raeuchis], 604 A.2d [1003,] 1007 [(Pa. 1992)]. The
             second is where “the evidence was such that no two
             reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should

                                         22
                have been rendered in favor of the movant.” Id.[] In such
                a case, the court reviews the evidentiary record and
                concludes based on the evidence that a verdict for the
                movant was beyond peradventure. [Id.]

Justice, 208 A.3d at 1069. Of particular import herein, when “reviewing the lower
court’s decision, we must read the record in the light most favorable to the verdict
winner and afford him the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Menkowitz v.
Peerless Publ’ns, Inc., 211 A.3d 797, 804 (Pa. 2019). “JNOV is an extreme remedy”
which “may not be employed to invade the province of the jury.” Rohm & Haas Co.
v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 732 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. Super. 1999). Rather, “JNOV should
only be entered in a clear case with any doubts resolved in favor of the verdict
winner.” Menkowitz, 211 A.3d at 804.8
                Here, Successor Judge explained that he granted Detectives’ motion for
JNOV because “there were no disputed facts showing the conduct of any [Detective]
was outside the scope of their duties as police officers” and, therefore, they “are
entitled to sovereign immunity as a matter of law[.]” (R.R. at 1198a, 1196a.) We
disagree.
                Pursuant to article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,9 the
General Assembly has declared that “the Commonwealth, and its officials and

   8
       In Menkowitz, 211 A.3d at 804, our Supreme Court further explained that

                [a]n appellate court will reverse the trial court’s decision to grant or
                deny JNOV only when it finds an abuse of discretion or an error of
                law. An abuse of discretion does not result from a mere error of
                judgment. An abuse of discretion exists where the law is overridden
                or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable
                or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the
                evidence or the record.

   9
       Pa. Const. art. I, § 11.

                                                   23
employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign
immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General
Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. It is well
established that “SEPTA is a Commonwealth agency for purposes of sovereign
immunity,” and that this sovereign immunity extends to intentional tort claims.
Ioven v. Nestel, 150 A.3d 571, 573 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016); see also Justice, 208 A.3d
at 1066. Given these principles, Detectives, as employees of SEPTA, “are entitled
to the protections of sovereign immunity for conduct within the scope of their duties,
subject only to certain exceptions not applicable here.” Justice, 208 A.3d at 1067.
As explained during the jury charge, and outlined on the verdict forms, judgment
could only be entered against Detectives in this matter if they were acting outside
the scope of their employment during their encounters with Appellants on the day in
question.
             In Justice, our Supreme Court adopted for purposes of sovereign
immunity the definition of “scope of employment” provided by the Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 228(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1958) (Restatement).

             Section 228 of the Restatement provides:

             (1) Conduct of [an employee] is within the scope of
             employment if, but only if:

                   (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;

                   (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time
             and space limits;

                    (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
             serve the [employer;] and

                                         24
                     (d) if force is intentionally used by the [employee]
               against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the
               [employer].

               [Id.] On the other hand, an employee’s conduct “is not
               within the scope of employment if it is different in kind
               from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or
               space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the
               master.” Id., § 228(2).

Justice, 208 A.3d at 1067. As the Justice Court further explained, “whether a
particular act of an employee is within the scope of his employment is ordinarily a
question of fact for the jury[,]” and “the only exception to this well-established rule
is where neither the facts nor the inferences to be drawn from them are in dispute.”
Id. at 1068.
               After closely examining the record in this matter, including the
extensive and detailed testimony of the parties, we simply cannot agree with
Successor Judge’s conclusion that “[t]he circumstances leading to [Appellant]
Harris’s arrest are, in all material ways, undisputed.” (R.R. at 1195a.) Moreover, it
appears that with respect to the issue of sovereign immunity and whether Detectives
were acting within the scope of their employment, Successor Judge erred by
adopting the version of events advanced by Detectives, rather than Appellants as
verdict winners. See Menkowitz.
               As recounted above, Appellant Harris testified that numerous officers
approached him, with their firearms drawn, and proceeded to jump on his back and
handcuff him.       The officers swarmed around him, shouting questions and
accusations and pulling on his handcuffs, inflicting pain. Mr. House’s testimony
corroborates this account, as he stated that numerous officers approached Appellant
Harris with their guns drawn. Appellant Harris also adamantly denied having any

                                            25
drugs in his truck and he was ultimately found not guilty of all criminal charges.10
In addition, he disputed Detectives’ assertion that his vehicle resembled that in the
BOLO, pointing out several differences between the two vehicles and calling into
question the propriety of the initial stop.             Finally, Appellant Harris explicitly
identified each of the Detectives as having taken part in his arrest and having
physically put their hands on him that day. Many of these facts are either absent
from or downplayed in Successor Judge’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, which is
contrary to our mandate to view the record in the light most favorable to Appellants
as verdict winners. While Detectives denied Appellants’ version of events at trial,
this merely reinforces our determination that Successor Judge improperly invaded
the province of the jury since motions for JNOV are only appropriate “where neither
the facts nor the inferences to be drawn from them are in dispute.” Justice, 208 A.3d
at 1068; id. at 1073 (“When the evidence is disputed, these determinations [as to
scope of employment] are for the jury.”).
               Simply put, whether the officers acted within the scope of their
authority is a highly fact-specific determination, subject to the jury’s wide authority
to find facts and judge witnesses’ credibility. See, e.g., McMichael v. McMichael,
241 A.3d 582, 590 (Pa. 2020) (“it is the province of the jury to assess the worth of
all testimony presented, and the jury is free to believe all, some, or none of the

    10
        Detectives take issue with Appellants’ argument throughout their brief to this Court that the
drugs were “planted” in Appellant Harris’s vehicle, noting that Judge Dumas granted Detectives’
motion in limine in this regard and precluded any reference or statement by Appellants’ counsel
at trial that Detectives “planted” the drugs. (See Original Record at 627.) However, the only
logical inference from Appellant Harris’s testimony that he did not have drugs in his vehicle and
his subsequent acquittal is that the drugs ended up there by some improper means. Given the
deference we are required to afford Appellants as verdict winners – with respect to both the facts
and any inferences therefrom – we find it was not inappropriate for Appellants to include this
argument in their brief.

                                                26
witness testimony presented at trial”). Here, “the scope of employment inquiry was
properly put to the jury” and because its determinations were “reasonably inferable
from the facts,” Successor Judge erred in disturbing the verdict as to Appellant
Harris’s claims. Justice, 208 A.3d at 1060.
                       Detectives’ Motion for a New Trial
            Appellants further argue that Successor Judge erred in ordering a new
trial in relation to Appellant Thompson’s claims because “[t]here are no
inconsistencies in the [v]erdict and any perceived inconsistency can be easily
explained without the extreme . . . measures taken by” Successor Judge. Appellants’
Br. at 27. They maintain that Successor Judge really conducted a weight of the
evidence evaluation under the guise of an inconsistent verdict, and that he erred by
viewing the facts and making conclusions in favor of Detectives. Again, we agree.
            It is true that “where a verdict is inconsistent, a new trial is imperative.”
Thompson v. Iannuzzi, 169 A.2d 777, 779 (Pa. 1961). Yet this is tempered by the
principle that “consistency will be presumed unless there is no reasonable theory to
support the jury’s verdict.” Beyrand v. Kelly, 253 A.2d 269, 270 (Pa. 1969)
(emphasis added); see also McDermott v. Biddle, 674 A.2d 665, 667 (Pa. 1996)
(noting same). Moreover, “[a] new trial should be granted only where the verdict is
so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice [and not] where the
evidence is conflicting [or] where the trial judge would have reached a different
conclusion on the same facts.” Davis v. Mullen, 773 A.2d 764, 766 (Pa. 2001). As
with a motion for JNOV, in ruling on a motion for new trial, the evidence must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Dep’t of Gen. Servs. v. U.S.
Min. Prod. Co., 927 A.2d 717, 726 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), aff’d, 956 A.2d 967 (Pa.
2008).

                                          27
             In the instant matter, Successor Judge indicated that his finding of
inconsistency was based, in part, on the fact that the jury only afforded sovereign
immunity to one of the four Detectives, namely Detective Stewart. As Successor
Judge further expounded: “The jury did not find any of the other D[etectives] were
immune from liability, despite the absence of any facts distinguishing the conduct
of Detective Stewart from the other three D[etectives.]” (R.R. at 1203a.) This
conclusion, however, overlooks the fact that Detective Stewart testified he never
entered Appellant Thompson’s house on the day in question. If the jury believed
this statement, as it must have, this necessarily would mean that Detective Stewart
did not participate in Appellant Thompson’s detention or the search of his home, the
actions which form the basis of his claims. As fact finder, the jury was free to believe
Detective Stewart’s testimony in this regard, even if it discounted his testimony in
other respects, including his recitation of the events surrounding Appellant Harris’s
arrest. See Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 927 A.2d at 726 (noting “credibility determinations
are within the sole province of the jury” and “a jury may believe all, part[,] or none
of the evidence presented”); McMichael, 241 A.3d at 590 (same). Such a credibility
determination would account for the jury’s finding that Detective Stewart was
entitled to sovereign immunity on Appellant Thompson’s claims and, therefore, we
discern no inconsistency in this regard.
             Successor Judge further opined that the verdict was inconsistent
because the jury found none of the Detectives liable on Appellant Thompson’s false
arrest claim, but did find them liable on his claims for assault and battery. Again,
there is no patent inconsistency here as the elements of these intentional torts are not
coextensive. “Assault is an intentional attempt by force to do an injury to the person
of another, and a battery is committed whenever the violence menaced in an assault

                                           28
is actually done, though in ever so small a degree, upon the person.” Renk v. City of
Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) [quoting Cohen v. Lit Brothers, 70 A.2d
419, 421 (Pa. Super. 1950)]. In contrast, false arrest is defined as “(1) the detention
of another person (2) that is unlawful.” Alleyne v. Pirrone, 180 A.3d 524, 543 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2018) (quotation omitted). The jury, as trier of fact, was free to determine
that Detectives’ actions constituted an assault and battery upon Appellant
Thompson, but not an unlawful detention. In short, the jury’s verdict appears to be
a product of their specific credibility determinations and is within the realm of
reason. While Successor Judge might have reached a different conclusion on the
same facts, he also issued his decision based upon a “cold” record, unaided “by an
on-the-scene evaluation of the evidence.” Armbruster v. Horowitz, 813 A.2d 698,
703 (Pa. 2002). We therefore hold that it was error to vacate the jury’s verdicts and
order a new trial as to Appellant Thompson’s claims.11
                                           Conclusion
                 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court orders to the extent
they grant Detectives’ post-trial motions and remand the record with directions to
record the jury verdicts.

                                              _____________________________________
                                              BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                              President Judge Emerita

Judge Dumas did not participate on the decision for this case.

    11
         Given our disposition, we need not reach Appellants’ remaining issues.

                                                29
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

David Harris and Steven Thompson,          :
                        Appellants         :
                                           :
                v.                         :   No. 169 C.D. 2022
                                           :
SEPTA Police Detective Daniel              :
Burgmann, SEPTA Police Detective           :
Stewart, SEPTA Police Detective            :
Bacon, and SEPTA Police Detective          :
Bryan McCauley                             :

                                    ORDER

            AND NOW, this 18th day of May, 2023, the orders of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter are hereby
REVERSED insofar as they granted Appellees’ post-trial motions. This matter is
remanded with directions to record the jury verdicts.
            Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                         _____________________________________
                                         BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                         President Judge Emerita