Court Opinion

ID: 9772116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:07:52.784317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:25.293322
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
On rehearing the appellant again urges his contention that Article 42.12, § 3d, V.A.C.C.P., permitting deferred adjudication, is unconstitutional. He complains that the opinion on original submission held that deferred adjudication was not the type of probation permitted by Article IV, § 11-A of the Texas Constitution, but did not then explain how deferred adjudication was legal since it was not included within “probation” as authorized by said Article IV, § 11-A. He argues that the probation permitted by Article IV, § 11-A, is only “after conviction,” and that deferred adjudication permits probation before conviction and thus the courts have not been authorized to grant such clemency and the Legislature had no constitutional basis for authorizing deferred adjudication. Appellant contends *175that to simply say that deferred adjudication is not the same type of probation as that authorized by Article IV, § 11 — A of the Constitution and Article 42.12, V.A.C.C.P., and therefore there is no violation of the Constitution does not answer the question. We agree that another examination is in order.
Said Article IV, § 11-A, reads:
“The Courts of the State of Texas having original jurisdiction of criminal actions shall have the power, after conviction, to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the defendant upon probation and to reimpose such sentence, under such conditions as the Legislature may prescribe.”
It is clear that such provision provides that “after conviction” the trial court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place a defendant on probation. Burson v. State, 511 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). This is a limited grant by the citizens of the state to the courts to extend clemency. Ex parte Giles, 502 S.W.2d 774 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). This portion of the Constitution is not self-enacting. State v. Klein, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 31, 224 S.W.2d 250 (1949); State ex rel. Smith v. Blackwell, 500 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Article 42.12, V.A.C.C.P., is its enabling act. Ex parte Giles, 502 S.W.2d 774, 784 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). “Probation” is defined by § 2 thereof as follows:
“Sec. 2 * * *
“ Unless the context otherwise requires, the following definitions shall apply to the specified words and phrases as used in this Article:
“b. ‘Probation’ shall mean the release of a convicted defendant by a court under conditions imposed by the court for a specified period during which the imposition of the sentence is suspended.”
(Emphasis added.)
Article 42.12, § 3d(a), (b) and (c) provides:
“(a) When in its opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served, the court may, after receiving a plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere, hearing the evidence, and finding that it substantiates the defendant’s guilt, defer further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt, and place the defendant on probation on reasonable terms and conditions as the court may require and for a period as the court may prescribe not to exceed 10 years. However, upon written motion of the defendant requesting final adjudication filed within 30 days after entering such plea and the deferment of adjudication, the court shall proceed to final adjudication as in all other cases.
“(b) On violation of a condition of probation imposed under Subsection (a) of this section, the defendant may be arrested and detained as provided in Section 8 of this Article. The defendant is entitled to a hearing limited to the determination by the court of whether it proceeds with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge. No appeal may be taken from this determination. After an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of probation, and defendant’s appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.
“(c) On expiration of a probationary period imposed under Subsection (a) of this section, if the court has not proceeded to adjudication of guilt, the court shall dismiss the proceedings against the defendant and discharge him. The court may dismiss the proceedings and discharge the defendant prior to the expiration of the term of probation if in its opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served. A dismissal and discharge under this section may not be deemed a conviction for the purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law for conviction of an offense, except that upon conviction of a subsequent offense, the fact that the defendant had previously received probation shall be admissible before the court or jury to be considered on the issue of penalty.”
The deferred adjudication authorized by statute provides for “probation” before con*176viction and is not “probation” within the meaning of the limited grant of clemency to the court by the people in Article IV, § 11-A of the State Constitution as noted by the opinion on original submission.
Is there, however, some other basis by which the Legislature would have been authorized to provide for deferred adjudication, even though it was incorporated in Article 42.12, V.A.C.C.P., the enabling act for Article IV, § 11-A of the Constitution which deals with a different type of probation?
Article III, § 1 of the State Constitution delegates to the Legislature law-making authority including the right to define crimes and fix penalties therefor.
In Baker v. State, 70 Tex.Cr.R. 618, 158 S.W. 998 (1913), this court upheld the second version of the former Suspended Sentence Act holding that said Article III, § 1, did not conflict with the Governor’s constitutional pardoning power in that it did not relieve from punishment “after conviction” as that term is used in the Constitution, but provided that in certain types of cases no punishment should be imposed unless the individual should once again violate the law. Baker held that defining crimes and fixing penalties was a legislative function and the Legislature was authorized to provide in certain cases that no punishment, under certain conditions, should be imposed.
We conclude that deferred adjudication is a constitutional form of “probation” under the terms of Article III, § 1 of the State Constitution, even though statutorily it is neatly tucked in Article 42.12, V.A.C.C.P., the enabling act for Article IV, § 11-A of the State Constitution, which provides for a different type of probation. After reconsideration, we still overrule appellant’s contention.
Appellant also contends the court erred in assessing ten years’ imprisonment after adjudication of guilt when it had assessed five years’ “probation” under Article 42.12, § 3d, V.A.C.C.P., at the time of the deferred adjudication. He contends such action violated the due process rule of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). The opinion on original submission disposed of this contention by citing Walker v. State, 557 S.W.2d 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), where the same contention was raised. In Walker, the ante was raised from eight years’ “probation” under said Article 42.12, § 3d, supra, to eleven years’ confinement in the Department of Corrections. There we said that Pearce did not apply as Walker was not being punished for what he had a legal right to do.
Appellant McNew urges that deferred adjudication was neatly tucked into the provisions of Article 42.12, supra, and that the Legislature never intended the ante to be raised after revocation and that “probation” under the deferred adjudication of guilt should be treated like other probation cases. He argues that the other “probation” found in the same statute limits the grant thereof to cases where the punishment has been assessed at ten (10) years or less, and that upon revocation of probation the statute authorizes a possible reduction in punishment, in the discretion of the court, but never an increase in punishment. He claims the same rules should apply to revocation or probation in deferred adjudication cases. Appellant vigorously contends that our construction of the statute will put an end to deferred adjudication the same as if we had declared the portion of the statute unconstitutional as attorneys will not permit defendants to plead guilty as a result of a plea bargain involving deferred adjudication. He argues that a defendant could be placed on deferred adjudication for the minimum term fixed as penalty for the offense charged and that after revocation of probation and adjudication of guilt the punishment could be assessed at the maximum term fixed as penalty for the offense charged. This permits the trial court to up the ante taking into consideration the offense or conduct made the basis of the revocation. He contends the Legislature never intended any such result.
As earlier observed, deferred adjudication is not the type of probation contemplated by Article IV, § 11-A of the State Constitu*177tion, although the provisions for deferred adjudication are found in Article 42.12, V.A. C.C.P. § 3d of Article 42.12, supra, sets out the procedure for deferred adjudication. It contains only one express reference to other sections of the statute, that being § 8. And it expressly states in § 3d(b): “... After an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting or probation, and defendant’s appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear the procedure provided for deferred adjudication is different from the other type or types of probation provided by the statute, and it is clear the Legislature intended that after adjudication of guilt following deferred adjudication the assessment of punishment shall be as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred. We appreciate and understand appellant’s concerns, but any procedural changes are for the Legislature to consider, not this court.
Appellant’s contention is overruled.
While it would be far better practice for the trial court to admonish a defendant as to the consequences of deferred adjudication, we have held that Article 26.-13, V.A.C.C.P., does not require such admonishment. Shields v. State, 608 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Long before the advent of deferred adjudication, we have held that Article 26.13, supra, did not require the court to admonish a defendant as to his right to bail, etc. Wilson v. State, 436 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Cr.App.1968); Brown v. State, 478 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
The appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
ROBERTS and PHILLIPS, JJ., concur in the result.
CLINTON, J., not participating.