Court Opinion

ID: 9753242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:05:00.265364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:32.661325
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, President Judge,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 I must respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, while I agree with the Majority that General Accident Insurance *790Co. of America v. Allen, 547 Pa. 693, 692 A.2d 1089 (1997), and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wickett, 563 Pa. 595, 763 A.2d 813 (2000), can be read as appearing to eliminate the normal and time-honored procedural rules involving post-trial practice, particularly in light of the statements made in the Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Saylor in Wickett at 819, I do not conclude they do here.
¶ 2 I hasten to point out that neither General Accident nor Wickett involved a trial. Rather, General Accident dealt with determinations following cross-motions for summary judgment and Wickett with rulings on preliminary objections. Thus I would suggest that, in a case such as this, following trial the normal post-trial practice involved in civil cases has not been eliminated.
¶ 3 I do not believe that the Declaratory Judgment Act requires the elimination of traditional post-trial practice. In the Pennsylvania court system, matters involving the rules of procedure are, by constitution, delegated to the judiciary under Article 5. The procedure set forth which directs the steps necessary for entry of a final judgment has not been, nor could it be, abrogated by statute. Requiring the filing of post-trial motions following trial, does not, in my judgment, impinge on the Declaratory Judgment Act. I believe the procedures following trials in civil actions should be consistent to the greatest extent possible, thus eliminating traps that may prevent issues from being decided on their merits.
¶4 My second reason for dissenting is that, while the Majority directs the overruling of Miller v. Kramer, 424 Pa.Super. 48, 621 A.2d 1033 (1993), a position consistent with its holding, fairness requires we reach the merits of the matter before us. The parties and trial court relied on Miller to dictate the procedure they followed. This reliance was particularly justified because, as explained above, both General Accident and Wickett did not involve appeals following a trial.
¶ 5 Accordingly, it would be appropriate in this instance to reach the merits of the matter before us.