Court Opinion

ID: 9831888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:27:11.256587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:38.836824
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[5] It is insisted by plaintiff in error that neither intervener’s petition for a cancellation of the lease to plaintiff, Osborn, nor the evidence introduced in support thereof, was sufficient to warrant such a cancellation, in that there was an absence of any showing •that intervener was injured by the fraud practiced upon him by Osborn. The following authorities are cited to support that contention : Lemmon v. Hanley, 28 Tex. 220; Furneaux v. Webb, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 77 S. W. 828, 20 Cyc. 13.
Those authorities announce the general rule that fraud practiced will furnish no ground for relief unless the party defrauded suffered some injury as a" consequence. That rule is usually applicable in suits to recover pecuniary damages by reason of the fraud and that was the character of suits in the cases cited. But that rule is not ordinarily applicable in suits to rescind a contract or to a deed of conveyance. 12 R. O. L. pp. 390, 391, and 392; 1 Black on Rescission and Cancellation, § 112, pp. 314 and 315; Kanaman v. Hubbard, 160 S. W. 304, and authorities there cited; Sargent v. Barnes, 159 S. W. 366; 3 Williston on Contracts, § 1525. According to those authorities, which control this case, it was not necessary for the intervener to plead and prove the amount of damages suffered by reason of the fraud practiced upon him. His suit was not to recover pecuniary damages, but for a cancellation of the lease to Osborn for the fraud practiced. Besides, the price which Osborn agreed to pay for this lease, to wit, $50 per year, in connection with other circumstances in evidence, was proof sufficient to show that it had some value, and a finding to that effect by the trial judge would be presumed, if the same were necessary to support the judgment. Vernon’s Sayles’ Tex. Civ. Stats, art. 1985.
[6] At all events, the lease was a cloud upon intervener’s title, and for that reason alone its cancellation was warranted. Corpus Juris, p. 1189.
Even injunctive relief may be granted against the easting of a mere cloud upon title to real estate. Canales v. Canales, 190 S. W. 842; Stolte v. Karren, 191 S. W. 600; V. S. Tex. Civ. Stats, art. 4643, sub. 3.
The question now presented was urged by plaintiff in error on the original hearing, and hence was not discussed in our original opinion. And it may be at least doubted that it was sufficiently presented in exceptions urged to intervener’s pleadings, or in the briefs filed by plaintiff in error here; but, aside from that suggestion, we have considered it.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.