Court Opinion

ID: 9697366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:15:00.643245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.069870
License: Public Domain

*374RODOWSKY, Judge.
The issue in this search warrant case is whether there was probable cause to believe that instrumentalities and evidence of a street murder could be found in the residence and/or motor vehicle of the person identified as the murderer. As explained below, we hold that there was probable cause.
Shortly before 11:30 p.m. on Wednesday, September 30, 1992, Alfred Stewart (Stewart) was shot a number of times and killed on a public street in Baltimore City. Over the next two days persons who would not identify themselves telephoned the police stating that the respondent, Gary R. Ward (Ward), had murdered Stewart. Ward was brought to police headquarters for questioning, and his automobile was towed there. Ward was not charged at the time, but the police would not allow Ward to drive his car away because its license tags had expired. Three days after the murder an eyewitness identified Ward in a photographic array as Stewart’s killer. The police then obtained the subject warrant to search Ward’s home and automobile. Seized in the search of the automobile were three .357 “MAG” hollow point cartridges. These were introduced into evidence by the State at Ward’s trial on charges of murder in the first degree and of using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.
That trial was conducted in November 1993. Ward was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion dated November 9, 1994, remanded for the limited purpose of holding a suppression hearing.1 On remand the Circuit Court for Baltimore City conducted a hearing and denied the motion to suppress in September 1995. Ward again appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals reversed in an unreported opinion *375filed January 7, 1997. That court concluded “that the search warrant was invalid because the affidavit lacked information of nexus between the item sought and the place to be searched.” The State moved for reconsideration, contending that the opinion of January 7, 1997, conflicted with the opinion of November 9, 1994. That motion was denied in an unreported opinion filed March 20, 1997, in which the court held “that there was nothing in the warrant documents upon which the officer could have based objectively reasonable reliance that the automobile contained evidence of the crime involved.”
We granted the State’s petition for certiorari. That petition raises only the nexus issue.
Application for the search warrant here involved was made on October 4, 1992, four days after the Stewart murder. The affiant was a detective of the homicide unit of the Baltimore City Police. His thirteen years’ experience included work in the drug enforcement and vice units. The warrant sought was to search “[a] two (2) story row-type dwelling” located at 1634 Darley Avenue in Baltimore City and a 1983 Oldsmobile Cutlass, described by tag number, serial number, and color. Set forth in the margin is the text of the affidavit, excluding those portions describing the places to be searched and the background of the affiant.2
*376United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), directs how the affidavit is to be read by courts reviewing the magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant.
“If the teachings of the Court’s cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants ... must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting.”
Id. at 108, 85 S.Ct. at 746, 13 L.Ed.2d at 689.
I. The Inferences
With the foregoing guidance in mind, we turn to a review of the affidavit in the instant matter. Stewart was shot late on the evening of September 30, 1992, in the 1400 block of Cliftview Avenue in the Eastern District of the Baltimore City Police Department. Inasmuch as the cause of death was multiple' gunshot wounds and his body was found lying between two parked cars, the inference is that Stewart was *377gunned down on the public street. The warrant authorized a search for, inter alia, “Handguns, Ammunition, Personal Papers showing ownership/possession of a firearm.” It is self-evident that the murder weapon was not found at the crime scene.
The fact that the first of the witnesses who telephoned the police would not identify themselves is significant. These witnesses knew Ward by sight and name. There was no information from any caller that the murderer was a person other than Ward. Ward, age twenty to twenty-one, had an arrest record that included two or more handgun “[vjiolations.” All of this information permitted the magistrate to infer that these witnesses were unwilling to identify themselves because they feared Ward. The affidavit described Ward, not in terms but in reasonable inference, as a person to whom a handgun and ammunition are items of utility and value. Consequently, the magistrate could infer a reasonable probability that, between the murder and the application for the warrant, Ward had not disposed of the murder weapon and that Ward would be even less likely to have disposed of the weapon’s less incriminating bullets.
The magistrate further could infer that the weapon was not on Ward’s person when he was brought in for questioning less than forty-eight hours after the murder. As a matter of self-protection the police most certainly would have done a pat-down for weapons when they accosted Ward, and the police were still looking for the murder weapon when they applied for the warrant. Apparently Ward was accosted when he was in or about his automobile, inasmuch as the police towed that automobile to headquarters while Ward was transported to headquarters by other means. Thus, the weapon was not in plain view in Ward’s automobile when the police towed it.
Under the authorities reviewed below, the magistrate had probable cause to believe that the murder weapon and associated evidence of the crime of murdering Stewart could be found in Ward’s home and/or in his automobile, but out of *378view. Because more court decisions deal with residences than with automobiles, we shall review the residence cases first.
II. The Residence
That there was probable cause to find a nexus in the instant matter is supported by Mills v. State, 278 Md. 262, 363 A.2d 491 (1976).
Mills was convicted of kidnapping two women and of raping and robbing one of them. He was arrested on the day following the crimes when he was identified by the rape victim while he was on a public street. The crimes had been effected by threatening the victims with a hunting knife which was not on Mills’s person when he was arrested. The victims were able to give a detailed description of the knife which the police seized under a warrant, issued after Mills’s arrest, for the search of his residence. Mills contended, inter alia, on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals that there was no probable cause for the search. Mills v. State, 28 Md.App. 300, 303, 345 A.2d 127, 129-30 (1975). The opinion by the Court of Special Appeals does not quote from the application for the warrant, but the court upheld the search on the following rationale:
“The remaining question is, therefore, whether the affidavit as presented demonstrated probable cause within its four corners, as required. We think that the law in Maryland is clear in this regard. In Grimm v. State, 6 Md.App. 321, 251 A.2d 230 (1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1001[, 90 S.Ct. 1150, 25 L.Ed.2d 412] (1970) and Reidy v. State, 8 Md.App. 169, 259 A.2d 66 (1969) this Court found no defects in warrants issued to search residences where weapons used in the commission of recent crimes could reasonably be found. Chief Judge Murphy, in Reidy, where the affidavit related that an individual had been shot with a .22 caliber weapon and that there was a witness to the crime who identified the defendant as the perpetrator, observed:
“ *We think that it was reasonable, given the information set out in the application for the warrant, for police to believe that the gun used in the crime could be found in appellant’s house.’ [Citing Grimm.]
*379“We reach the same conclusion concerning the knife and sheath in the instant case and therefore find no error in their admission.”
Id. at 305, 345 A.2d at 130-31.
This Court granted certiorari in Mills and affirmed. The opinion summarized the affidavit which described in detail the offense, the arrest of Mills, the knife, and the place to be searched. The only express facts dealing with the nexus between the knife and Mills’s residence was that Mills, when arrested, was “ ‘not carrying a weapon similar to the one described by’ the two victims.” Mills, 278 Md. at 276, 363 A.2d at 499. We quoted favorably the following passage from United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.1970), a prosecution for theft from the mails:
“ ‘[T]his court and others, albeit usually without discussion, have upheld searches although the nexus between the items to be seized and the place to be searched rested not on direct observation, as in the normal search-and-seizure case, but on the type of crime, the nature of the missing items, the extent of the suspect’s opportunity for concealment, and normal inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to hide stolen property.’ ”
Mills, 278 Md. at 277, 363 A.2d at 499. We concluded that “Mills’ home was a probable place for secreting objects such as a hunting knife and a sheath.” Id. at 280, 363 A.2d at 501.
In Malcolm v. State, 314 Md. 221, 550 A.2d 670 (1988), we parenthetically described Mills as “upholding warrant based on police allegation of a crime, knowledge of the suspect’s address, detailed description of the weapon and absence of weapon on suspect at time of arrest.” Id. at 233, 550 A.2d at 676 (emphasis added). There is no substantial difference between there being no hunting knife on Mills’s person when he was arrested and there being no handgun on Ward when he was brought to police headquarters for questioning one day before the warrant was issued.
A considerable body of authority supports the position taken by this Court in Mills. In each of the cases reviewed or cited *380below, there was probable cause to believe that a crime of violence, involving the use of a weapon, had been committed, that the defendant was the criminal agent, and that the defendant resided at the place to be searched. Thus, we shall focus on the various courts’ rationales as to nexus, to the extent that it might be articulated, between the object to be seized and the defendant’s residence.
The Mills opinion cited a number of earlier cases that sustained warrants, without any express evidence of nexus, where the affidavit contained the factors that we set forth above. These opinions seem to have considered the facts relating to the elements listed above sufficient to satisfy the nexus requirement. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 448 Pa. 128, 291 A.2d 89 (1972); Riddle v. State, 257 Ind. 501, 275 N.E.2d 788 (1971); People v. Alvarado, 255 Cal.App.2d 285, 62 Cal.Rptr. 891 (1967).
Mills and Lucarz were cited with approval in State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985). There the police sought the weapon used in a triple murder. The court relied in part on 1 W.R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.7, at 709 (1978). “ “Where the object of the search is a weapon used in the crime ... the inference that the items are at the offender’s residence is especially compelling, at least in those cases where the perpetrator is unaware that the victim has been able to identify him to the police.’ ” Couture, 482 A.2d at 309 (ellipsis in original).3 In the case now before us Stewart would obviously be unable to identify Ward.
Mills was also cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 449 N.E.2d 1207, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860, 104 S.Ct. 186, 78 L.Ed.2d 165 (1983). The court found “compelling” the inference “that the ammunition, which could not be traced to the robbery and which could be used in a future robbery, was at Cinelli’s residence.” 449 N.E.2d at *3811216. In the instant matter the warrant included ammunition, and ammunition was found in Ward’s car.
Mills applied the reasoning of Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, a case involving the search for the fruits of theft, to the search for a knife. Other courts have similarly relied upon Lucarz as support for the search of a residence for evidence other than fruits of the crime. See United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 372-73 (9th Cir.1976) (search for articles evidencing kidnapping and extortion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099, 97 S.Ct. 1118, 51 L.Ed.2d 546 (1977); State v. Kalai, 56 Haw. 366, 537 P.2d 8, 12-13 (1975) (reasonable to infer that shotgun used in murder would be found at defendant’s residence). See also State v. Poree, 406 So.2d 546, 547-48 (La.1981) (“The items sought—a handgun, clothing, money, and a money bag—are objects which one might expect to find at a person’s residence.”); Bollinger v. State, 556 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Okla.Crim.App.1976) (“[A]t the least, a probability existed that the property sought [that included a revolver used in an assault with intent to kill] was indeed at the residence of the defendant.”).
In United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir.1993), a robbery prosecution, the court reversed a trial court’s ruling suppressing evidence for lack of nexus. The Third Circuit said that the firearms used in the robbery are a type of evidence “likely to be kept in a suspect’s residence.” Id. at 1056. Nevertheless, because of two additional facts, the court concluded that it did not “have to decide whether in every case the fact that a suspect committed a crime involving cash and/or a gun automatically provides a magistrate with enough information to approve a search of a suspect’s home.” Id.4
United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.1975), concerned a prosecution for possession of rifles by a convicted *382felon. That evidence had been observed while FBI agents were executing a search warrant issued in the investigation of a bank robbery in which a handgun had been used. The robbery had occurred on June 22, but the warrant was not obtained until September 17. Although the court recognized that there was “little reason to believe that any of the bank’s money ... would still be in the home,” the same could not be said of the revolver. Id. at 38. The court said that “apart from [the defendant’s] prior felony record possession of the pistol was not unlawful in itself or particularly incriminating. Moreover, people who own pistols generally keep them at home or on their persons.” Id. Steeves was relied upon in State v. Gathercole, 553 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1996), a robbery prosecution, for the proposition that “it is reasonable to believe that guns will be kept on the subject’s person or in his residence.” Id. at 574.
Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860 (5th Cir.1973), reversed the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a federal district court sought by a Louisiana prisoner who had been convicted of a street robbery in which an automatic pistol had been used. The weapon was seen by an informant on April 8, 1972, in the possession of the prisoner, but the warrant had not been applied for until April 17. Id. at 861-62. The Supreme Court of Louisiana sustained Bastida’s conviction, stating simply that “there was a reasonable inference from the affidavit, and probable cause to issue the warrant to search defendant’s house for automatic weapons used in the robbery.” State v. Bastida, 271 So.2d 854, 856 (La.1973). The federal district court concluded that there was probable cause as of April 8 but that the information had become stale. Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d at 863. The Fifth Circuit held that, after the informant had seen the weapons, “[a] very likely place to find them ... would either be on the persons of the assailants or about the premises where they lived.”- Id.
Blount v. State, 511 A.2d 1030 (Del.1986), concerned a murder prosecution in which the handgun used to kill the victim was seized from the defendant’s residence under a *383search warrant. The appellate court sustained the search by applying the following reasoning:
“ ‘Concrete firsthand evidence that the items sought are in the place to be searched is not always required in a search warrant.... The question is whether one would normally expect to find those items at that place.... If so, then that inference will suffice to allow the valid issuance of a search warrant for that place.... We think it clear that [the defendant’s] residence would be a logical place to search for the weapon and clothing used in the crime.’ ”
Id. at 1033 (quoting Hooks v. State, 416 A.2,d 189, 203 (Del. 1980) (ellipses in original)). The court also said that “a reasonable magistrate could have concluded that the proximity of the defendant’s residence to the crime scene could have rendered immediate disposition of the weapon more imprudent than retaining it.” Id. The opinion of the Delaware court does not reflect the distance between the murder site, in a park, and the defendant’s residence.
In Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 641 A.2d 214 (1994), we took judicial notice of certain facts of geography that appeared on standard street maps of the community involved. Id. at 718, 641 A.2d at 219. Standard Baltimore City street maps reflect that Darley Avenue, where Ward resided at No. 1634, is parallel to, and one block away from, Cliftview Avenue, on which the murder occurred in the 1400 block. Under the rationale of the Delaware court in Blount, the warrant-issuing judge in the case before us could have concluded that the weapon had not been disposed of.
The search for evidence, including the gun used in a murder and robbery, was sustained in McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2485, 138 L.Ed.2d 993 (1997), primarily on the basis that it was reasonable to infer that the defendant returned to his residence after the shooting. 477 S.E.2d at 825.
In Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 409 N.E.2d 719 (1980), rev’d on other grounds, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), the police *384searched for the murder weapon and bloody clothing at the defendant’s hotel room. The connection was that the victim had been shot in the head, thus permitting a search for bloodstained clothing. 409 N.E.2d at 727. Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228 (Miss.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S.Ct. 1684, 134 L.Ed.2d 785 (1996), was the appeal from a death sentence for murder committed in the course of a robbery. On the nexus issue the court said: “Cash is the type of loot that criminals seek to hide in secure places like their homes. Similarly, the other items sought, clothing and guns, are also the types of evidence likely to be kept in a suspect’s residence.” Id. at 1239 (citations omitted).
We also note the upholding of the search in United States v. Sleet, 54 F.3d 303 (7th Cir.1995). As probable cause for believing that the defendant had robbed the subject bank, the court relied on information that the defendant had been arrested and charged with robbing another bank, and in both instances the robber had vaulted the counter. Further, the defendant was an African-American male in his mid-20s, approximately five feet six inches tall and weighing 140 pounds, a description that also applied to the robber in the crime under investigation. The nexus evidence was that the robber, upon leaving the bank, ran in the direction of an apartment complex, one-half mile away, where the defendant occupied one of the apartments.
There are, of course, cases which do not agree with the approach of the decisions reviewed above. Illustrative is United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir.1979). The appeal was from a conviction for possession of a firearm by one previously convicted of a felony. The gun had been obtained in a search of the defendant’s residence in the course of a murder investigation. The First Circuit reversed the conviction for the reasons set forth below.
“Common sense tells us that it is unlikely that a murderer would hide in his own home a gun used to shoot someone. If defendant shot Raimondi, as the affidavit states, one of the first things he would do would be to get rid of the gun. The handgun could easily have been disposed of permanent*385ly within a short time after the crime. It is not reasonable to infer that defendant drove from Somerset to Fall River and then casually placed a weapon which had fired more than one bullet into a man on the shelf in his bedroom closet. Ballistics is not only an accurate science, it is also well-known. We have been unable to find any case in which a search warrant was issued for a person’s home on the sole basis that a handgun had been used by that person in the commission of the type of crime where the bullets used could be traced to the gun.”
Id. at 1017 (footnotes omitted).
In 1985 the above case was distinguished by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire on the basis that Charest “was suspected of shooting a known acquaintance in the presence of three witnesses, and he would therefore have expected the police to try to connect him with a gun.” State v. Faragi, 127 N.H. 1, 498 A.2d 723, 727 (1985) (opinion by Souter, J.).
The conflict between the Charest approach and that of the other cases reviewed above was squarely addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031, 109 S.Ct. 841, 102 L.Ed.2d 973 (1989). Virginia police had found an unregistered silencer for a .45 caliber handgun in the search under a warrant of the defendant’s residence during the course of a murder investigation. The Fourth Circuit, speaking through Judge Murnaghan for a panel that included Judge Frank A. Kaufman of the District of Maryland, declined to decide the case on the basis of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The court found the holdings in cases including Bastida v. Henderson and United States v. Steeves, both supra, “to be more persuasive” than Charest and the somewhat similar holding in United States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843 (11th Cir.1982). Anderson, 851 F.2d at 729. The Fourth Circuit concluded:
“It was reasonable for the magistrate to believe that the defendant’s gun and the silencer would be found in his *386residence. Therefore, even though the affidavit contains no facts that the weapons were located in defendant’s trailer, we reject his argument that the warrant was defective.”
Id. (emphasis added).
III. The Car
The same probable cause that supported issuance of the search warrant for 1634 Darley Avenue supported a search warrant for Ward’s nine-year-old Oldsmobile. The handgun and the ammunition for which the police were searching were highly portable and could be under the defendant’s control either at his home or concealed in his automobile. LaFave states: “It is permissible to have a single warrant authorize search of a described place and a described person or of a described place and a described automobile, without regard to whether the person or vehicle is to be found at the place described.” W.R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.5(c), at 535 (3d ed.1996).
People v. Easley, 34 Cal.3d 858, 196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813 (1983), aff'd on reh’g, 46 Cal.3d 712, 250 Cal.Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490 (1988), is on point. In that double-murder capital punishment case the victims had been bound with baling wire and then stabbed with an icepick. A warrant was issued to search for evidence of the crime at four places, the defendant’s residence before the crime, his residence after the crime, the car which he owned before the crime and retained thereafter, and the additional car that he bought after the crime. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that “the authorization to search four different places demonstrates that the affiant did not know where the sought-after property actually was located.” 196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d at 820. Rather, the court said “[tjhere is no logical inconsistency in the conclusion that an affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be in any one of a suspect’s homes or vehicles.” Id.
Particularly noteworthy is the content of the affidavit in Easley. As summarized by the court, the pertinent information in the affidavit was as follows:
*387“A search warrant designating more than one person or place to be searched must contain sufficient probable cause to justify its issuance as to each person or place named therein. The affidavit in question established that defendant had obtained baling wire one day before the killings; that he was in Modesto on the day of the murders; that his fingerprint had been found on a piece of paper which was lying next to one of the victims; and that he had purchased a car and rented an apartment, paying large sums of money in cash, within four days after the homicides. On the basis of this information, the magistrate properly concluded that there was probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime could be found at either of defendant’s residences or in either of his cars.”
Id. (citations omitted).
Searches of four places under a single warrant were also sustained in Williams v. State, 95 Okla.Crim. 131, 240 P.2d 1132 (App.1952). That was a bootlegging case in which the search for intoxicating liquor was authorized at an inn on one side of a major highway, another inn on the other side of that same highway, the residence of the defendant, and the automobile of the defendant. 240 P.2d at 1135. The court was satisfied that the same probable cause applied to all locations inasmuch as they “were being operated by one person, partnership or corporation.” Id. at 1137.
In another capital sentence case, involving the search for a knife and bloodstained clothing that would evidence a rape, federal courts, on habeas corpus review, sustained the issuance of a warrant to search both the defendant’s residence and his automobile. Vessels v. Estelle, 376 F.Supp. 1303 (S.D.Tex. 1973), aff'd without opinion, 494 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 969, 95 S.Ct. 234, 42 L.Ed.2d 185 (1974). The factors that the district court pointed to in the affidavit were “that the assailant’s car was seen in the vicinity of the victim’s house, ... that the assailant left the house with the knife, and that the assailant’s house was a place where implements such as knives would ordinarily be kept.” Id. at 1309. In a supplemental opinion on reconsideration the district court *388would not modify its search and seizure analysis, commenting that “the knife and the clothes which were the subject of the search are likely to remain as continuing articles.” Id. at 1311.
Warrants were issued simultaneously to search two automobiles in Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 983, 85 S.Ct. 695, 13 L.Ed.2d 574 (1965). From one of the vehicles, an Oldsmobile, the FBI had seized a sawed-off shotgun, the possession of which formed the basis for the prosecution in the cited case. The search warrants had been issued in the investigation of a bank robbery after the victim teller had identified Porter as the robber. The warrants sought specifically described items of clothing and a handgun. Id. at 604. The Oldsmobile to be searched was registered in another state under an assumed name. At the same time that the FBI applied for the warrant to search the Oldsmobile, the investigators applied for a warrant to search a Rambler also registered in another state, but in the name of Porter’s purported wife. Porter argued “that the application for this second warrant is an indication that the search of each of the automobiles would be an exploratory search, comparable to a ... ‘general warrant’----” Id. at 605. In response to this argument the court said:
“A warrant to search for three named and described articles, a gun, a cap and a coat is in no sense a general warrant. As to the significance of the fact that two warrants were issued, one for the Oldsmobile and the other for the Rambler, surely the fact that a suspect has two automobiles, or two residences, does not mean that neither one of them can be searched, because the suspect may have concealed the wanted evidence in the other one.”

Id.

There are other cases where warrants have been issued for both the residence and the automobile of the defendant, where the affidavit has indicated that the vehicle may have been used in leaving the scene of the crime, but this latter factor is not said to be the threshold of validity. See, e.g., United States v. *389Morris, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.1981) (robbery); State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis.2d 978, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991) (arson); State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.) (murder), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956, 92 S.Ct. 322, 30 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971).
In the case before us we are informed by the affidavit that Ward was operating his car within forty-eight hours after the murder. Obviously, Ward was not hiding out at home. Inasmuch as his handgun could be considered an item of continuing utility and value to him, the warrant-issuing judge reasonably could have inferred that Ward might be moving the gun and ammunition between his residence and his vehicle, so that there was probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime could be found in Ward’s vehicle.
IV. Preference to Warrants
The instant matter is not a clear cut case and, obviously, it would have been much more helpful had the affidavit contained more detail. The issue of the validity of this search has been examined since 1992 in two separate cases, at three levels of court, with the result that seven judges have concluded that there was probable cause and six judges have concluded that there was not. Seemingly the instant matter is a classic illustration of the “doubtful or marginal cases” referred to by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ventresca, the resolution of which “should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” 380 U.S. at 109, 85 S.Ct. at 746, 13 L.Ed.2d at 689. See also Mills v. State, 278 Md. at 280, 363 A.2d at 501.
For all the foregoing reasons the search warrant in the instant case was valid.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR THE ENTRY OF A JUDGMENT AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE *390COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT, GARY R. WARD.
BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE and WILNER, JJ., dissent.

. The trial court had concluded that no suppression hearing was required in the criminal cause involving the murder of Stewart because the evidence seized that was to be offered in the Stewart murder trial had been the subject of a suppression hearing in a criminal cause against Ward involving a shooting on September 17, 1992. The motion to suppress in that other cause had been denied.

. The affidavit, in substantial part, reads:
"Your affiant does hereby state the following. On 30 September 1992 at 2325 hrs, P/O Bruce Ridley of the Eastern District responded to the 1400 Blk Cliftview Ave for a shooting. Upon his arrival he observed the victim later identified as Alfred [S]tewart, lying in the street between two (2) parked cars, suffering from multiple GSW'S To the body. BFD Medic # 3 responded to the scene and pronounced the victim dead at 2337 Hrs. At 2351 Hrs your affiant arrived on the scene and took charge of the investigation. Several anonymous telephone calls were received in the Homicide office on 1-2 October 1992 in reference to the recent homicide, all the calls indicated that a Gary Ward B/M/20-21 yrs of the 1600 Blk of Darley Ave was responsible for the death of the victim. Gary Ricardo Ward has an arrest record with the Baltimore City Police Department under B of I # 374-587 to include handgun Violations. On 2 October 1992 at approx 2030 hrs Gary Ward was brought into the Homicide office and his 1983 Olds Cutlass, black in color was towed into the headquarters building. Mr. Ward was interviewed but was released due
*376to the lack of any eyewitnesses. Ward’s vehicle was kept at the Police building due to expired Tags. On 3 October 1992 a witness was developed who picked out the photograph of Gary Ward from a photographic line-up card. The witness chose the photograph of B of I # 374-587 and positively identified the suspect as the person responsible for the death of the victim on 30 September 1992.
"The suspect Gary Ward gave the address of 1634 Darley Ave as his home address. The vehicle a 1983 Olds Cutlass Maryland Tag ZWH075 is listed to Mr Ward at the 1634 Darley Ave address. Your affiant prays that a search and seizure warrant be issued for the above listed location and vehicle. Your affiant believes that probable cause exists to believe that there is evidence relating to the crime of Murder being stored at 1634 Darley Ave and the 1983 OLDS Cutlass Maryland Tag # ZWH-075. Therefore, your affiant prays that a search and seizure warrant be issued for the said premise and vehicle.”

. The same position, in identical language, is taken in W.R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.7(d), at 384 (3d ed.1996).

. The additional information was that an informant told the police that a cellular telephone taken in the robbery was at the suspect's residence. Also, because new motorcycles were parked in front of the residence, the court inferred that the defendants "were not too careful about hiding the loot away from their homes.” Jones, 994 F.2d at 1057.