Court Opinion

ID: 9627357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:42:37.573206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:45.052807
License: Public Domain

WATT, Justice,
dissenting, with whom LAVENDER, OPALA and ALMA WILSON, JJ., join.
¶ 1 Through decades of constitutional jurisprudence, this Court has consistently guarded against the State’s attempted use of long-term debt financing. In sanctioning the bond issue before us, the majority’s decision flies in the face of our prior ease law, runs afoul of the plain language of our Constitution, and sounds the death knell to Oklahoma’s constitutional balanced budget provisions. I cannot accede to such a radical departure from our prior precedents, nor can I endorse the demise of this State’s balanced budget. Contrary to the majority’s assertions, these bonds will not be “self-liquidating” and will create a legally binding debt against the State without a vote of the people in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. Furthermore, approval of the current bond *788issue is not mandated by stare decisis. Rather, as demonstrated below, stare decisis requires the opposite result.
¶ 2 In this original action, the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority seeks this Court’s approval for the issuance of $300,-000,000.00 in bonds to fund various construction and improvement projects, including maintenance and repair, on state highways and bridges. The bonds are to be retired over a ten year period through annual payments to the Authority from the Oklahoma Department of Transportation, which will receive the entirety of the repayment funds via annual appropriations from the Oklahoma Legislature.1 Furthermore, the statute authorizing the bond issue, 73 O.S. Supp.1997 § 168.6, was not submitted to the citizens of Oklahoma for their consideration. The objections to the proposed bond issue filed by the various opponents urge that the proposed bonds would create state debt in violation of Article 10, §§ 23 and 25 of the Oklahoma Constitution. I agree.
¶ 3 Title 73 O.S.1991 § 160 confers upon this Court exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the validity of bond issues proposed by the Authority. In passing on such applications, we are to determine whether “the bonds have been properly authorized in accordance with [the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority Act, 73 O.S.1991 § 151 et seq.] and the Constitution of Oklahoma, and [whether] when issued they will constitute valid obligations in accordance with their terms, ...” None of the opponents object to the manner in which the bonds were authorized and I detect no procedural infirmities. However, for the reasons set forth below, I would declare the proposed bond issue unconstitutional.
¶ 4 In construing the constitutionality of a statute, this Court is not authorized to consider the statute’s propriety, desirability, wisdom or its practicality as a working proposition. Those questions are clearly and definitely established as functions of the Legislature. The function of this Court is limited to the determination of the validity of the statute. There is a presumption that the act is constitutional. The Legislature, unless prohibited by the Constitution, has the right to declare fiscal policy, and the question as to the wisdom of the policy is not within the scope of this Court’s authority. We must, therefore, sustain statutes where possible and nullify them only when they are clearly unconstitutional. Application of Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 1960 OK 207, 355 P.2d 1028, 1031.
¶ 5 Article 10, § 23 of the Oklahoma Constitution states in relevant part:
The state shall never create or authorize the creation of any debt or obligation, or fund or pay any deficit, against the state, or any department, institution or agency thereof, regardless of its form or the source of money from which it is to be paid, except as may be provided in this section and in Sections 24 and 25 of Article X of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma ....
Article 10, § 25 provides that no debt may be allowed against the state for some work or project unless the law authorizing the same “shall impose and provide for the collection of a direct annual tax to pay” for it, providing further that no such law shall take effect until approved by the people in a general election.2 The issue in this proceeding is *789whether the State, through the enactment of 73 O.S. Supp.1997 § 168.6, has authorized the creation of a state “debt” in violation of Article 10, §§23 and 25.
¶ 6 In Smith v. State Bd. of Equalization, 1981 OK 57, 630 P.2d 1264, this Court described the purpose underlying § 23. We held:
Article 10, § 23 was adopted by the people in 1941 to provide for budget balancing in this state. There is no room for construction or provision for further inquiry when the Constitution plainly speaks. A constitutional amendment should be construed in consideration of its purpose and be given practical interpretation to carry out the plainly manifested purpose of the people who adopted it. The fiscal responsibility shown by Oklahoma has become an enviable example for the nation. This policy of fiscal restraint and control can only be applauded in a time of monetary crisis. We do not find this constitutional requirement to be unduly burdensome nor to be a vain endeavor. The citizens of this state, as well as the Legislature, have a vested constitutional right to know how much money is available for appropriations to the General Revenue Fund and special funds which are supported by direct taxes, fees, and other revenue.
Id., 1981 OK at ¶ 9, 630 P.2d at 1267 (footnote omitted).
¶7 Also instructive is the following language from Boardman Co. v. Board of Comm’rs of Ellis County, 1929 OK -, 276 P. 474. Although the Court there was referring to § 26 of Article 10, which governs indebtedness of political subdivisions, the Court’s rationale applies equally to § 23:
We hazard the opinion that there can be found in our Constitution no provision couched in clearer or more comprehensive terms than this section. There is not even the possibility of ambiguity or misunderstanding as to what is meant.... What was uppermost in the minds of those who wrote this document, which is our fundamental law? The one purpose was to safeguard the citizens and taxpayers of the state against the ... [mis-] handling of public moneys. That provision is subject to no exigency, pays no heed to convenience, expediency, or emergency. It is safe, sane, unconditional, and, so far as human documents can be regarded, should be held sacred in its observance, interpretation, and enforcement. Once this clear protecting mandate is whittled away, reasoned around, or disregarded, for any cause, the chief guaranty of our orderly municipal progress, whether in state, county, city, town, township, or school district, is threatened.
Id., 276 P. at 477.
¶ 8 With these directives in mind, I first address the majority’s false assertion that stare decisis dictates approval of the proposed bonds. In Application of Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 1960 OK 207, 355 P.2d 1028, this Court addressed the question of whether proposed bonds created a state debt in violation of §§ 23, 24 and 25.3 We noted:
This Court has approved statutes creating “self-liquidating” projects and the bonds issued to construct them as not creating a state debt, where only the revenue therefrom was usable for retirement of the bonds and no recourse was had to the revenue of the state for that purpose. Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 203 Okl. 335, 221 P.2d 795; Application of Board of Regents for Oklahoma Agricultural & Mechanical Colleges, 196 Okla. 622, 167 P.2d 883; Baker v. Carter, 165 Okl. 116, 25 P.2d 747.
Application of Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 355 P.2d at 1031.
¶ 9 This Court approved the bonds at issue in 1960, which were to be issued to purchase state agency office space and which were “to be retired solely from the revenues from the office buildings.” Id. at 1030. Regarding the cases cited above, in Application of Okla. Turnpike Auth., 1950 OK -, 221 *790P.2d 795, the proposed bonds were to be issued for the purpose of building a toll road and were to be retired “solely from the revenues to be derived from the operation of the toll road in question.” 221 P.2d at 804. In both Application of Bd. of Regents for Okla. Agric. & Mech. Colleges, 1946 OK -, 196 Okla. 622, 167 P.2d 888, and Baker v. Carter, 1933 OK -, 165 Okla. 116, 25 P.2d 747, the proposed bond proceeds were to be used to construct dormitory buildings and the bonds were to be retired solely from “rents and fees to be received from the students using the dormitory_” 167 P.2d at 883, 25 P.2d at 753 (exact language used in both opinions). See also Application of Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 1966 OK 6, 410 P.2d 46 (bonds to be used to construct state office buildings and to be retired by rents derived from such projects); Application of Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 1945 OK -, 195 Okla. 641, 161 P.2d 447 (dormitory bonds to be retired through rentals, fees and charges to students using dormitories).
¶ 10 The Authority argues that the present fact situation is analogous to those in the cases cited above. I disagree. The transparent, illusory nature of the proposed transaction in the present case constitutes a major distinction between the proposed bonds at issue here and those previously validated by this Court. The bonds proposed in this case are not self-liquidating; none of the money realized through issuance of the bonds will be used to purchase any property or assets that will generate funds with which the bonds may be retired. Highways dedicated to püb-lic use cannot be leased. They are constructed for the benefit of all citizens who travel upon them. The office buildings, dormitories and toll roads discussed in the cases above were capable of generating funds to retire the bonds issued to create them. Here, the bond proceeds will be used to construct or repair roads and bridges that are dedicated to the public use without any means of re-coupment save annual legislative appropriations from the general revenues of the State. Patches of asphalt and concrete used to repair and maintain public roadways are simply incapable of generating the direct revenues required of a “self-liquidating” bond project. Herein lies the constitutional infirmity of the bond issue proposed here.
' ¶ 11 This Court invalidated a similar proposed bond issue in Boswell v. State, 1937 OK -, 181 Okla. 435, 74 P.2d 940. There, the State Highway Commission also sought to secure bond funds for constructing and repairing state highways and bridges. The statute that authorized the bond issue, which similarly was not presented to the people for consideration, pledged certain tax revenues to retire the bonds. We invalidated the bond issue on the grounds that it created state “debt” in violation- of the constitutional debt limits then found in Article 10, §§ 23-25.
¶ 12 Here, ■ as in Boswell, the bond proceeds are earmarked for projects that will generate no revenues with which the bonds may be retired. Although specific funds have not been pledged toward the retirement of the bonds at issue in this case, the Boswell Court noted that the pledged tax revenues there were nonetheless “part of the general revenues of the state.... ” The appropriations to be used to pay for the bonds in the present case will also flow from this state’s general revenues. See also Excise Bd. of Carter County v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 1931 OK -, 152 Okla. 120, 3 P.2d 1037, and Boardman Co. v. Board of Comm’rs of Ellis County, 1929 OK -, 136 Okla. 85, 276 P. 474 (In both cases this Court declared unconstitutional a county’s attempt to incur indebtedness, beyond the current fiscal year and without a vote of the people, to repair/rebuild public bridges).
¶ 13 The majority also holds that its conclusion is consistent with and dictated by previous- opinions of this Court regarding leases. In Application of Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., supra, 355 P.2d 1028, this Court distinguished between long-term obligations created by leases or contracts from long-term debts created by bonds. The distinction was made in the context of constitutional debt provisions. The Court noted that in a sense, any contract to pay money in the future would create a debt, but that courts generally exclude contracts payable in installments if the consideration is also to be provided in the future. Id., 355 P.2d at 1032-33. A lease has been defined as “a *791contract by which one owning ... property grants to another the right to possess, use and enjoy it for specified period of time in exchange for periodic payment of a stipulated price_” Black’s Law Dictionary, 800 (5th ed.1979). The leases referred to in U.C. Leasing, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bd. of Public Affairs, 1987 OK 43, 737 P.2d 1191, Indiana Nat’l Bank v. State Dept. of Human Serv., 1993 OK 101, 857 P.2d 53, and Halstead v. McHendry, 1977 OK 131, 566 P.2d 134, relied upon by the majority, typified classic installment leases. In each case, the governmental entity made annual payments for the annual use of certain property. The majority’s assertion that “there is no constitutional difference between leasing equipment and leasing roads” misses the point. Public roadways and the repairs made thereto cannot be leased in the conventional sense of that word. The law governing leases is simply inapplicable to the bond proposal at issue here.
¶ 14 In each of the bond cases approved by this Court, bondholders could rely upon some tangible asset for repayment of their investment. In each case, the assets were capable of directly generating the funds that were to serve as the sole source of repayment of the bonds. Although factually and legally incongruous with bond issues, the lease cases discussed above also involved tangible assets that constituted a type of “collateral.” In the event of default by the governmental entity, the lessors in those cases could rely upon the return of their “collateral” which served as the object of the lease. In this context, no tangible asset will be available here. The maintenance and repair projects under consideration here are incapable of producing direct revenues. ■ The bondholders are afforded no property upon which they may rely for repayment of their investments. In the event of default, the asphalt and concrete cannot be repossessed and sold to pay investors. Stare decisis requires rejection of these proposed bonds.
¶15 I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the proposed bonds are self-liquidating because certain taxes and fees placed in the State Transportation Fund have been “earmarked” for the payment of highway bonds. As the majority correctly states, the Legislature has authorized the use of two different state funds for the payment of the bond debt. Subsection 168.6(E) refers to payments from the State Highway Construction and Maintenance Fund, 69 O.S.1991 § 1501, while subsections (G) & (H) refer to payments from the State Transportation Fund, 69 O.S.1991 § 1501.1, Both funds were in existence prior to the present bond issue and both consist of various tax and “other” revenues.
¶ 16 Initially, I find the majority’s “self-liquidating” argument factually untenable. The Legislature has stated its intent in § 168.6(H) “to maintain the funding level of the State Transportation Fund as required in order for the Department of Transportation to fully pay any and all obligations incurred” by virtue of the proposed bond deal. Stated otherwise, the Legislature has vowed not to alter the current revenue make-up of the State Transportation Fund. However, as set forth in note 1, supra., the Legislature has also stated its intent in § 168.6(E) to appropriate to the same fund “sufficient monies to make payments to the Authority for purposes of retiring the debt created pursuant to this section.”
¶ 17 The majority’s theory coupled with these two stated intentions beg the question: If the current funding level of the State Transportation Fund is sufficient to retire the proposed bond debt, why has the Legislature stated its intent to “appropriate” additional monies for that purpose? The answer to this question is that the current funding level of the State Transportation Fund is sufficient only to service the State’s annual roadway needs. The proposed bond issue will create an extraordinary expense that will have to be funded by extraordinary appropriations. If the Fund contained sufficient monies to pay for the bonds, as the majority intimates in its “self-liquidating” argument, this bond issue would never have been proposed.
¶ 18 Second, I find the argument advanced by the majority legally flawed as having already been expressly rejected by this Court in Application of Okla. Educ. Television Auth., 1954 OK -, 272 P.2d 1027. There the Legislature passed a bill *792authorizing the Educational Television Authority to issue revenue bonds for constructing and operating public television facilities. The bonds were to be paid with monies from the Oklahoma Public Building Fund. The enabling legislation in that case was strikingly similar to that in the case at bar: The Authority could sue and be sued and it was designated “an instrumentality of the state,” the Act stated that the proposed bonds “shall never become obligations of the State of Oklahoma,” and it provided “that neither the faith and credit, nor taxing power of the State, or any political subdivision thereof, is pledged to the payment of the principal of or the interest on such bonds.” Id., 272 P.2d at 1028. In both cases the proposed bonds were to be repaid solely from funds accruing to existing permanent funds of the State. In neither case was the bond issue submitted to a vote of the people.
¶ 19 In holding that the proposed bond issue violated Article 10, § 23, we distinguished the case from the previously sanctioned “self-liquidating” bond cases:
Those bond issues or debts [in the self-liquidating bond cases] were not created against existing permanent funds of the state, for regularly recurring use in the interest of the citizens of the state. The money realized by each of those bond issues itself created the construction or facility which in turn produced the income and funds against which the debt was a standing obligation, and the debt specifically could not be collected from any other source, nor paid with any other moneys. But for the creation or construction of the facilities in those cases, the funds against which those debts stood would never have existed. But here we have the creation of a debt against a fund which has always existed as a valuable asset and fund of the state. This fund is not created by the facility here to be constructed, or operated, nor does this facility nor this Authority add anything at all to this permanent fund of the state. If the bonds in this case were to be paid exclusively from revenue earned or received by the facility in the operation authorized by this Act, then the last cited authorities would be in point, and in keeping with such rule the transaction would not create a debt in violation of the quoted section of the Constitution.
Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
¶ 20 Continuing, the Court held:
If [the Public Building Fund] and its proceeds did not exist and therefore was not available for use in behalf of the citizenship of the state, then the state could not have those things now purchased with that fund and its proceeds without using tax money of the state for such purpose. Therefore, while the Public Building Fund is not itself a tax revenue fund of the State, it serves purposes which if they were not served out of that fund, they must necessarily be served out of tax money, or the State must .go without them. Therefore there is no fair analogy between this permanent fund of the State and the special revenue funds or self-liquidating debts involved in each of the foregoing ... eases.
Id. at 1033.
¶ 21 As was true in the above case, there is no fair analogy between the self-liquidating bond cases and the case presently before us. The construction and maintenance projects proposed to be funded by the instant bond issue will produce no income that may be used to retire the debt. Moreover, the State Transportation Fund exists as a valuable asset and fund of the State. It was not created by the projects to be completed here, nor will the projects or the Authority add anything at all to this fund. The Fund “serves purposes which if they were not served out of that fund, they must necessarily be served out of tax money, or the State must go without them.” The proposed bonds are in no sense self-liquidating.
¶ 22 Notwithstanding the above, the Authority contends the proposed bonds would not create state debt within the meaning of our Constitution because both § 168.6 and the bonds themselves contain language disavowing the creation of any such debt.4 How*793ever, as this Court stated in Boswell v. State, 1937 OK -, 181 Okla. 435, 74 P.2d 940, 943:
[A recitation in a statute] that the notes “are not debts or general obligations of the State of Oklahoma,” ... is in no respect conclusive of the matter. The question of whether the bill authorizes a debt of the state contrary to the constitutional provisions is a judicial and not a legislative question.
¶23 The language of both § 168.6 and the proposed bond issue makes clear that the Authority is “obligated” to pay the bondholders principal and interest on the bonds.5 Article 10, § 23 refers to a debt or “obligation.” For purposes of these proceedings, the terms are synonymous. See The American Heritage Dictionary 370 (Second College Ed.1985) (“debt” defined as “[a]n obligation or liability to pay or render something to someone else”). Moreover, § 168.6(E), n. 1 supra, specifically refers to the proposed bond deal as “the debt created pursuant to [§ 168.6].” (emphasis added). See also § 168.6(M), which discusses certain funds that may be used to pay “the annual debt service.” (emphasis added).
¶ 24 Equally clear is that the Authority is a “department, institution or agency” of the State within the meaning of Article 10, § 23. Title 73 O.S. Supp.1997 § 152 specifically provides that the Authority is an “instrumentality of the state” and that the exercise of its powers are “deemed and shall be held to be an essential governmental function of the state.”
¶ 25 Finally, the Authority may be sued in the event of any default. Section 152 states that the Authority “may sue and be sued and plead and be impleaded.” Section 18(h) of the Resolution provides:
All such agreements and covenants entered into by the Authority shall be binding in all respects upon the Authority and its officials, agents and employees, and upon its successors, and all such agreements and covenants shall be enforceable by appropriate action or suit at law or in equity, which may be brought by any holder or holders of Bonds issued hereunder.
¶ 26 Taken together, the above facts lead me to conclude that the proposed bonds would create a debt or obligation against the Authority within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution. Therefore, the Legislature’s authorization of such debt through the enactment of § 168.6 runs afoul of Article 10, §§23 and 25. I am cognizant that the Authority’s liability to repay the bonds is limited to the appropriations specifically pledged for that purpose. 73 O.S. Supp.1997 § 168.6(F). However, that the liability may be limited does not alter the fact that a “debt” has been created against the Authority. See U.C. Leasing, Inc. v. State ex rel. *794Bd. of Public Affairs, 1987 OK 43, 737 P.2d 1191.6
¶ 27 At oral argument, the Authority asserted that the legislation at issue created merely a “moral” obligation on the part of the State to retire the bond debt. Their argument is based upon the previously quoted language of § 168.6 and the proposed bonds which declare that the bonds would never constitute debt of the State. Therefore, they argue, future legislatures would not be “legally” bound to appropriate monies to retire the debt. However, we need not here be concerned with whether the bond issue would create a moral, rather than legal, obligation against the State itself, because the issuance of such bonds would create a legally enforceable debt against an instrumentality of the State: The Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority. Counsel for the Authority admitted as much at oral argument. The creation of such debt against an instrumentality of the State is prohibited by the Oklahoma Constitution to the same extent as is the creation of such debt against the State itself.
¶ 28 As the majority noted, we were informed at oral argument that the proposed bonds will undoubtedly carry an “A+” rating. The reason for such rating is simple: Financiers and investors both know that the State of Oklahoma dare not default on any of its bonded indebtedness. Regardless of whether these proposed bonds are labeled “legal” or “moral,” the economic reality is that the State’s failure to repay bondholders in full would be devastating to Oklahoma’s credit worthiness and cripple our ability to finance any project via future bond issues. Notwithstanding the language to the contrary, these bonds will indeed be backed by the full faith and credit of the State of Oklahoma.
¶ 29 The following language, enunciated by this Court over fifty years ago, applies with equal force and effect today:
[I]t is our solemn duty to determine the intent of the framers of the Constitution and of the people in adopting it with respect to the authority of the Legislature to incur debts which the people must pay. What we have said clearly demonstrates that the interpretation and construction sought to be placed upon these constitutional provisions by the [Authority] could not have been contemplated by the framers of that document, but that the people intended that the government should be operated on a cash, or pay-as-you-go, plan. It is significant to note that in the adoption of the Constitution the people reserved to themselves all power to determine whether or not debts should be incurred, excepting only those debts which might be incurred under the specific provisions of sections 23 and 24, article 10, of the Constitution, and also fixed upon themselves the responsibility for providing the revenue for the payment of such debts.
Boswell, supra, 74 P.2d at 945.
CONCLUSION
¶ 30 The proposed bonds in this case are not self-liquidating and the statute authorizing their issuance, 73 O.S. Supp.1997 § 168.6, was not submitted to the people of Oklahoma for their consideration. The bonds will create debt against the Capitol Improvement Authority, an instrumentality of the State of Oklahoma, to be serviced solely through legislative appropriation from the general revenues of the State while circumventing the vote of the people called for in Article 10, § 25.
¶ 31 My oath of office requires me to support, obey and defend the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, not repeal it. Accordingly, I would hold that the proposed bond issue is in violation of Article 10, §§ 23 and 25 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

. Title 73 O.S. Supp.1997 § 168.6(E) states in relevant part:
It is the intent of the Legislature to appropriate to the Oklahoma Department of Transportation State Transportation Fund sufficient monies to make payments to the Authority for purposes of retiring the debt created pursuant to this section.

. The complete text of § 25 reads as follows:
Except the debts specified in sections twenty-three and twenty-four of this article, no debts shall be hereafter contracted by or on behalf of this State, unless such debt shall be authorized by law for some work or object, to be distinctly specified therein; and such law shall impose and provide for the collection of a direct annual tax to pay, the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal of such debt within twenty-five years from the time of the contracting thereof. No such law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people and have received a majority of all votes cast for and against it at such election. On the final passage of such bill in either House of the Legislature, the question shall be taken by yeas and nays, to be duly *789entered on the journals thereof, and shall be: "Shall this bill pass, and ought the same to receive the sanction of the people?”

. Article 10, § 24 applies only to debts incurred to “repel invasion, suppress insurrection or to defend the State in war; ..."

. Section 168.6(1) states:
The bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this section shall not at any time be *793deemed to constitute a debt of the state or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit of the state or of any such political subdivision.
The proposed bonds would contain the following language:
This Bond is not an indebtedness of the State of Oklahoma, nor shall it be deemed to be an obligation of the State of Oklahoma and neither the faith and credit nor the taxing power of the State of Oklahoma or any political subdivision thereof is pledged or may hereafter be pledged to the payment of the principal of or the interest on this Bond or the series of which it forms a part. This Bond is not a general obligation of the Authority nor a personal obligation of the members of the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, but is a limited obligation payable solely from the revenues specifically pledged to its payment.
Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority September 23, 1997, Resolution, § 8. Section 13 of the Resolution contains virtually identical language.

. The body of § 168.6 refers to the terms "obligated" or "obligations" some 24 different times, including the following excerpt from subsection (F):
The bond indenture or other instrument pursuant to which the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority becomes obligated for the repayment of principal and interest of the proceeds from the sale of obligations....
(emphasis added). See also § 18(g) of the Resolution, which states:
The Authority covenants and agrees ... that it will promptly pay the principal of and interest on every Bond issued under the provisions of this Bond Resolution at the places, on the dates and in the manner provided herein and therein and in said Bonds. The Revenues are hereby pledged to the payment of the Bonds in the manner and to the extent herein specified.

. In U.C. Leasing, we held:
Where a person or entity enters into a valid contract with the proper State officials and a valid appropriation has been made therefor, the State has consented to be sued and has waived it governmental immunity to the extent of its contractual obligations and such contractual obligation may be enforced against the State in an ordinary action at law.
Id., 1997 OK 43 at § 19, 737 P.2d at 1195 (citation omitted).