Court Opinion

ID: 9535319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:47:58.062694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:13.076663
License: Public Domain

On Petition For Rehearing
Kendall, P. J.
In appellants’ petition for rehearing, he alleges that this court in its original opinion failed to give a decision as to whether the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.
This proposition was considered and decided in the original opinion under the appellants’ assignment of errors.
However, to avoid doubt, the court now directs the appellants’ attention to the court’s general finding number three where the court found that the testatrix probably intended at some future time to execute a new will and that the markings on the will, if they were made by decedent, were so made for the purpose of indicating that if and when a new will was executed that she would then make some changes. This finding was based upon the theory known and recognized in this state as dependent relative revocation.
“The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is functionally a rule of interpretation of intention. It has behind it a general acceptance in the English cases and a rather wide and respectful acceptance in principle in the United States. The rule seeks to avoid intestacy where a will has once been duly executed and the acts of the testator in relation to *694its revocation seem conditional or equivocal.” In re Macomber’s Will (1949), 274 App. Div. 724, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 308.
This doctrine is recognized in Indiana in the case of Roberts v. Fisher (1952), 230 Ind. 667, 676; 105 N. E. 2d, 595, 599 (cited in original opinion) in which the court said:
“. . . The destruction of a will without the intent to revoke would not work a revocation. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is recognized under our statutes.”
The appellants rely upon the case of Roberts v. Fisher, supra, to substantiate their contention that this doctrine is not applicable to the evidence of the instant case; however, in the Roberts case, supra, it concerned a mutilated copy of a will found in the home of the testatrix with devises and bequests stricken out and the signature of the testatrix and witnesses stricken out and the court said that it was in such condition that it would of itself be presumptive of revocation, and the court held that in view of the evidence there adduced that it established that the testatrix had destroyed her will with the intention to revoke it unconditionally and not conditioned on the making of a new will. We do not have those facts in the instant case.
Considering the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom most favorable to the appellee, this court cannot say that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, notwithstanding the fact that it is generally held that this doctrine should be applied cautiously. In all fairness, the acts of the decedent may be said to be both conditional and equivocal. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.
*695Note: Reported in 118 N. E. 2d 386. Rehearing denied 119 N. E. 2d 437.