Court Opinion

ID: 9912797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 00:02:22.095972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:45.022180
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Haro CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B328638

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. SA106587)
           v.

 IVAN HARO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lauren Weis Birnstein, Judge. Affirmed.
      Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    ________________________
       While out walking their dog, Harold H.1 and his young son
encountered defendant Ivan Haro. Haro was muttering
incoherently, called Harold and his son “demons,” and then
brutally attacked Harold with a heavy-duty rake and later with
hedge clippers.
       At trial, Haro claimed he acted in self-defense because
Harold had first brandished a knife. To demonstrate Haro was
not acting in self-defense, the prosecutor asked Haro whether,
when the police arrived and Haro was no longer in alleged
danger, Haro refused to surrender and instead stood on top of a
truck telling the police, “I’ll fucking obliterate you,” and “You’re
so fucking weak, and I’m going to obliterate you, fool. If you ever
fuck with me and my fucking people again, that is the truth, fool,
because you are so disobedient.” Haro did not deny doing so. The
jury rejected Haro’s self-defense claim and convicted him of two
counts of assault with a deadly weapon—one based upon his use
of the metal rake and the other based upon his later use of the
hedge clippers—along with other crimes.
       On appeal, Haro argues the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of Haro’s standoff with the police and his profane
statements that he would “obliterate” them because, under
Evidence Code section 352, such evidence was more prejudicial
than probative. He further argues we should strike one of the

      1 Because he is a victim in a criminal proceeding, we use
Harold’s first name and last initial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.90(b)(4).)

                                 2
two assault convictions pursuant to Penal Code2 section 954
because his attack constituted one continuing assault.
       We conclude Haro forfeited his evidentiary argument
because he failed to object on the basis of Evidence Code section
352 or otherwise request the trial court balance the prejudicial
effect of the evidence against its admitted probative value. We
further conclude substantial evidence supported that Haro
completed two crimes of assault and, thus, section 954 does not
require that we strike one of the assault convictions. We
therefore affirm.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    The Information
      An information filed July 20, 2022, alleged Haro committed
an assault with a deadly weapon, “to wit, a metal rake” (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1); count 1), another assault with deadly weapon, “to
wit, hedge clippers” (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), criminal threats
(§ 422, subd. (a); count 3), and second degree robbery (§ 211;
count 4). The information further alleged Haro had a prior strike
conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and several
factors in aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)).
B.    The Prosecution’s Trial Evidence
      On May 31, 2022, at about 8:00 p.m., Harold and his six-
year-old son were walking their dog in their neighborhood when
they encountered Haro. Harold had no weapon with him. Haro
appeared disheveled, was swinging a metal chain, and told
Harold’s son, “Run before you die.” Harold put his son behind

        2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

                                  3
him and attempted “to defuse the situation.” Haro “went into . . .
[a] maniacal state,” at times muttering incoherently, called
Harold and his son “demons,” and said, “You white
motherfucker,” “I’m going to fucking kill you.” Harold told his
son to run away, which his son did.
      Harold retreated, but Haro followed him. Haro said he was
going to follow Harold home and kill Harold, his family, and his
dog. Harold called 911 as he walked backwards from Haro. Haro
retrieved a heavy-duty rake from a gardener’s truck and began
chasing Harold. Harold fell at least twice while trying to evade
Haro, and Haro hit him multiple times on the back and forearms
with the rake. Haro also knocked Harold’s phone out of his hand
and kept it, putting it in Haro’s own pocket.
      While hitting Harold with the rake, Haro partially broke its
wooden handle. Haro then fully broke the handle across his knee
and stabbed Harold in the back with it. Haro grabbed another
flimsier rake out of another truck and continued to give chase.
Haro hit Harold with the flimsier rake, which did not “do much,”
and Haro dropped the flimsier rake.
      Harold ran to a neighbor standing outside, who closed his
front door and refused to help. In the meantime, Haro took hedge
clippers from a gardener’s truck. He opened and closed the
clippers and told Harold, “I’m going to fucking kill you and cut
your dick off.” Harold, feeling he had “to fight for [his] life,”
retrieved a shovel from a gardener’s truck and used it to “duel”
Haro. The shovel broke Haro’s clippers, which fell to the ground.
Haro picked up both blades and resumed pursuit. Haro threw
one of the blades at Harold, which cut Harold’s hand, causing
him to drop the shovel. Haro also stabbed Harold in his back and

                                4
torso with the clippers. Haro then picked up the shovel and hit
Harold multiple times with it.
      Harold’s next-door neighbor observed Haro chuckling and
muttering as he chased and hit Harold, and Harold screaming for
help. Unlike the prior neighbor, this individual intervened and
got Harold to safety inside the neighbor’s house. As a result of
the attack, Harold had lacerations “all over” his body, and his
hands were “severely damaged.”
C.     Haro’s Trial Evidence
       The defense argued Haro attacked Harold in self-defense.
       Haro testified that he grew up on the same street where
the attack occurred and that his godfather still lived there as of
May 31, 2022. On that day, Haro was walking down the street,
swinging a small chain. Harold, who was walking in the opposite
direction, pulled out a knife. Haro got scared and retrieved a
rake to defend himself. He swung the rake to get Harold to “back
off,” but Harold “charg[ed]” at Haro. Haro hit Harold on his arm
with the rake and was able to knock the knife out of Harold’s
hand. Haro also testified he “said some things that were mean”
because he was “mad that somebody had the nerve to pull a knife
on [him].”
       Haro picked up Harold’s phone because he thought it was
his. After Harold retrieved a shovel, he and Haro continued to
fight. Haro picked up gardening shears to scare Harold and get
him to back off, but Harold “just kept wanting to fight.”
       On cross-examination, Haro testified that he walked
towards a park to get away from Harold. When asked whether
he had a 40-minute standoff with police once they arrived, Haro
responded, “I don’t know if it was 40 minutes or what.” The
prosecutor asked, “During that standoff, you stood up on cars in

                                5
the parking lot[,] correct?” Defense counsel objected on the basis
of relevance. After the court asked for an offer of proof at sidebar,
the prosecutor explained that Haro had “testified that he was in
fear for his safety and he was running away from [Harold]. I
think it’s relevant as to his behavior when help comes as to what
he does.” The trial court stated, “ I think it’s relevant.” Defense
counsel argued, “I think at a certain point it becomes improper
character evidence to show there were threats in conformity with
the threats that were previously alleged.” The court responded,
“I don’t think that’s what [the prosecutor is] asking about now.”
The trial court refused defense counsel’s request for a “continuing
objection” and told counsel, “You can make an objection to each
question if you think something is irrelevant.”
       Following the sidebar, Haro testified he got onto a truck.
He acknowledged that he had been angry, and said, “I’ll fucking
obliterate you. I’ll obliterate you.” He did not deny that he also
said, “You’re so fucking weak, and I’m going to obliterate you,
fool. If you ever fuck with me and my fucking people again, that
is the truth, fool, because you are so disobedient.” Haro testified
he “was just saying that,” and that it was not directed to the
police.
D.    Closing Arguments
      During closing argument, the prosecutor explained to the
jury that there were two charges for assault with a deadly
weapon because Haro used two weapons—the rake and the hedge
clippers—and there had been a break between Haro’s use of these
weapons at the time Harold had unsuccessfully pleaded with a
neighbor for help. The prosecutor did not mention Haro’s
standoff or statements to the police during closing argument.

                                 6
      Defense counsel argued Haro acted in self-defense. Like
the prosecutor, defense counsel did not mention Haro’s standoff
or statements to the police during closing argument.
E.    Verdict and Sentencing
      The jury convicted Haro of both counts of assault with a
deadly weapon (counts 1 and 2) and criminal threats (count 3).
The jury acquitted Haro of second degree robbery (count 4) but
found him guilty of the lesser included charge of petty theft
(§ 484, subd. (a)).
      In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the
allegation that Haro had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)). It also found true three factors in
aggravation, including that Haro engaged in violent conduct that
indicated a serious danger to society, that Haro’s prior
convictions as an adult and sustained petitions in juvenile
proceedings were numerous or of increasing seriousness, and that
Haro served a prior prison or jail term under section 1170,
subdivision (h). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b).) The trial
court sentenced Haro to state prison for eight years (the upper
term of four years, doubled due to the prior strike) on count 1.
The court stayed the sentences on counts 2 and 3 pursuant to
section 654 and ran the sentence on count 4 concurrently. With
respect to the second assault, the court found “there was only one
intent, an intent to assault. However, he used different weapons.
It was charged differently. But there was only a single intent,
and that’s why . . . section 654 is . . . appropriate.”

                                7
                         DISCUSSION
A.    The Admission of Evidence Concerning Haro’s
      Interaction with the Police Does Not Merit Reversal
      Haro argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
his standoff with police and the statements made during that
standoff. He contends this evidence should have been excluded
under Evidence Code section 352 because the prejudice from that
evidence outweighed its probative value. The Attorney General
argues Haro forfeited this argument by failing to raise this
objection at trial.
      We may not reverse a judgment based on an alleged error
in admitting evidence unless “ ‘an objection to or a motion to
exclude or to strike the evidence . . . was timely made and so
stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or
motion.’ ” (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 130, quoting
Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Haro acknowledges he did not make
a specific Evidence Code section 352 objection, but contends he
preserved the argument because his counsel objected to the
evidence based on relevance and as improper character evidence,
“which encompassed the issue of balancing prejudice versus
relevance pursuant to Evidence Code[ ] section 352.”
      We do not agree. Haro’s objections based on relevancy or
improper character evidence did not alert the court that it should
conduct an Evidence Code section 352 balancing. (See People v.
Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 138 [objections based on relevance
or foundation “were insufficient to preserve for appeal the claim
that the trial court should have excluded the evidence under
[Evid. Code, §] 352”]; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044,
1130 [relevancy objection did not preserve for review claim under

                                8
Evid. Code, § 352].) Accordingly, Haro has forfeited his Evidence
Code section 352 argument.
       We likewise reject Haro’s assertion that we should excuse
the failure to object because any such objection would have been
futile. In admitting the testimony, the trial court found only that
the evidence was relevant. An Evidence Code section 352
objection, if made, would have then required the court to weigh
that relevancy against any undue prejudice. (See People v.
Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 138.) While the court did not
permit defense counsel to have a continuing relevancy objection,
it invited counsel to make an objection each time she believed it
was proper to do so. No further objection was made.
       Even if we were to excuse this forfeiture, Haro has not
demonstrated that Evidence Code section 352 barred evidence of
his actions once police arrived. That section permits the
exclusion of “evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create
substantial danger of undue prejudice.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Haro does not deny evidence of his interaction with the police
immediately after he assaulted Harold had probative value but
claims its admission created substantial danger of undue
prejudice because the evidence was inflammatory and constituted
improper character or propensity evidence under Evidence Code
section 1101.
       This claim is meritless. Haro’s testimony on cross-
examination that he stood on a car for 40 minutes and told police
that he would obliterate them was not marginally relevant but
material to disproving his claim of self-defense. A victim of an
attack ordinarily would not act in such a manner once the
authorities arrived and the danger from the alleged aggressor

                                 9
had ceased. (Cf. People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 283
[“Evidence of a defendant’s resistance to arrest, like evidence of
flight, is admissible as evidence of the defendant’s consciousness
of guilt”].) Nor did Evidence Code section 1101 prohibit
admission of this evidence. Subdivision (b) of Evidence Code
section 1101 permits the admission of evidence of wrongdoing
when it is “relevant to prove some fact . . . other than [the
defendant’s] disposition to commit such an act.” As just noted,
the evidence at issue was relevant to impeach Haro’s claim of
self-defense.
       Of course, relevant evidence may still be excluded under
Evidence Code section 352 “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create
substantial danger of undue prejudice.” (Ibid.; see also People v.
Hendrix (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 216, 246 [evidence relevant
under Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b) still subject to Evid. Code,
§ 352 balancing].) But the testimony of Haro’s interaction with
the police was not inflammatory or unduly prejudicial. Taken in
context, it was relatively benign compared to Haro’s threats to
maim and kill Harold and Haro’s vicious follow-through on those
threats. Evidence about Haro’s attack on Harold consumed the
majority of the time at trial. The questions concerning Haro’s
stand-off with the police were few and brief and targeted at
Haro’s claim of self-defense. Thus, if Haro had objected, Evidence
Code section 352 did not require exclusion of this evidence.
B.     The Jury Properly Convicted Haro of Two Counts of
       Assault with a Deadly Weapon
       Citing section 954, Haro claims the jury could convict him
of only one assault count. He did not make this argument to the
trial court, and generally “only those claims properly raised and

                               10
preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.” (People v.
Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) However, Haro frames this
argument as one of insufficient evidence, an argument not subject
to forfeiture. (See People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 262
[the defendant forfeits a sufficiency-of-evidence argument only by
failing to file a timely notice of appeal].) We therefore consider it.
            Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       “Section 954 . . . concerns the propriety of multiple
convictions, not multiple punishments, which are governed by
section 654.” (People v. Gonzalez (2014) 60 Cal.4th 533, 537.)
Section 954 provides in part that “[a]n accusatory pleading may
charge two or more different offenses connected together in their
commission, or different statements of the same offense . . . under
separate counts” and “the defendant may be convicted of any
number of the offenses charged.” Thus, our Supreme Court has
held that “ ‘the same act can support multiple charges and
multiple convictions.’ ” (People v. Aguayo (2022) 13 Cal.5th 974,
979, quoting People v. Gonzalez, supra, at p. 537; see People v.
Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 97 [“Unless one offense is
necessarily included in the other [citation], multiple convictions
can be based upon a single criminal act or an indivisible course of
criminal conduct (§ 954)”].)
       The propriety of multiple convictions pursuant to the same
statute depends on whether each conviction reflects a completed
criminal act, as determined by the statutory elements of that
crime. (See People v. Kirvin (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1519
[affirming multiple convictions for attempts to dissuade a witness
pursuant to § 136.1]; People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th
1467, 1474 [affirming multiple convictions for corporal injury
upon a cohabitant pursuant to § 273.5].) Multiple convictions

                                 11
may be proper “even if the crimes are part of the same impulse,
intention or plan.” (People v. Kirvin, supra, at p. 1518; see People
v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 62 [“Under section 954, a
separate conviction is permissible for each completed charged
offense, even if the defendant had the same intent and objective
in committing multiple crimes and even if the defendant
committed the crimes at or near the same time”], review granted
Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)
      Although prior California courts prohibited multiple
convictions for a series of related crimes unless they were
separated by “ ‘a pause . . . sufficient to give [the] defendant a
reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his conduct’ ” (In re
William S. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 313, 317), the Supreme Court
rejected this view in People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321.
There, the defendant claimed his three digital penetrations of the
same victim (each lasting a few seconds) during a continuous
sexual assault of approximately seven to 10 minutes constituted
a single offense. The court disagreed; it explained that given the
history and language of the applicable statute (§ 289), the
defendant completed a new and separate offense with each new
and separate penetration, “however slight.” (People v. Harrison,
supra, at pp. 326, 329.) Following Harrison, courts have found
the relevant analysis to be “dictated solely by the statutory
language and the temporal threshold for establishing guilt, i.e.,
when the offense is complete for purposes of prosecution.” (People
v. Washington (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 568, 578.) Courts have not
limited Harrison’s analysis to sexual offenses. (See, e.g., People
v. Ashbey (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 373, 383 [arson]; People v.
Johnson, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1473-1474 [corporal

                                12
injury upon a cohabitant]; People v. Washington, supra, at p. 578
[burglary].)
      “The issue of whether multiple convictions are proper is . . .
reviewed de novo, as it turns on the interpretation of section
954.” (People v. Villegas (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 642, 646.) As
usual, however, we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting each conviction for substantial evidence.
(People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 671.)
            Analysis
       Section 245, subdivision (a)(1), criminalizes “an assault
upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument
other than a firearm.” “An assault is an unlawful attempt,
coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the
person of another.” (§ 240.) “Where the assault is committed
with a deadly weapon, or with force likely to produce great bodily
injury, the . . . assault is complete upon the attempted use of the
force.” (People v. Yeats (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 874, 878; see People
v. Chance (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1164, 1170 [“ ‘An assault occurs
whenever “ ‘[t]he next movement would, at least to all
appearance, complete the battery.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Italics
omitted.)]; People v. White (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 881, 885 [“The
trier of fact may look to the completed battery to determine
whether the defendant committed an assault or assault with a
deadly weapon”].) An assault is complete even if it does not
result in actual injury to the victim. (See People v. Chance,
supra, at p. 1174.)
       Here, substantial evidence supports two convictions for
assault. First, there was substantial evidence that Haro
committed a completed assault with the first rake. Haro struck
Harold with the rake several times and stabbed him with the

                                 13
broken rake handle, thus committing a battery. (See People v.
White, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 885.) There was then a pause
as Haro abandoned a second and flimsier rake and Harold
unsuccessfully pleaded with a neighbor for help. Although an
interlude between the two assaults may not be necessary to
conclude multiple convictions are proper (see People v. Harrison,
supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 334), the fact one occurred here helps
emphasize the separateness of the two assaults.
       There was also substantial evidence that a second assault
was completed when, after the break in the attack, Haro grabbed
the hedge clippers and again pursued Harold. Haro opened and
closed the clippers while threatening to kill and maim Harold.
Haro also threw one of the blades at Harold, cutting Harold’s
hand and again committing a battery.
       Citing People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632 and Aguayo,
Haro argues section 954 “ ‘does not permit multiple convictions
for a different statement of the same offense when it is based on
the same act or course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Vidana, supra, at
p. 650.) However, Vidana and Aguayo are inapposite as they
both concerned “ ‘ “dual convictions for the same offense based on
alternate legal theories.” ’ ” (People v. Aguayo, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 982; see People v. Vidana, supra, at p. 650.) Specifically, in
Vidana, the Supreme Court held a defendant could not be
convicted of both larceny (§ 484, subd. (a)) and embezzlement
(§ 503) for the same conduct of skimming cash because those
statutes defined the same offense. (People v. Vidana, supra, at
pp. 649, 650.) In Aguayo, the Supreme Court concluded a
defendant could not be convicted of both assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and assault upon the person of
another by any means of force likely to produce great bodily

                                14
injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) based upon the same conduct. (People
v. Aguayo, supra, at pp. 979, 981.) The court held the Legislature
intended both of these assault provisions to be different
statements of the same offense. (Id. at p. 988.)
       In Aguayo, the Supreme Court separately held the Court of
Appeal erred in affirming the two assault convictions on the basis
that the defendant hit the victim with two weapons: a bike lock
and chain as well as a ceramic pot. (People v. Aguayo, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 981.) The Supreme Court observed that the jury did
not make separate findings of fact with respect to each weapon
because they were not “asked to do so by way of the prosecution’s
argument, a unanimity instruction, or the like.” (Id. at p. 994.)
The charging allegations and verdict form did not specify the act
of force necessary to support a section 245, subdivision (a)(4)
count. (People v. Aguayo, supra, at p. 994.) Nor did the jury
instructions identify which act supported each count. (Ibid.)
Aguayo concluded “there is a reasonable probability that the jury
viewed the two charged assault offenses as based on the same act
or course of conduct. Thus, the Court of Appeal erred by
determining for itself that defendant’s ‘convictions are based on
multiple acts—hitting [the victim] with the bicycle chain and
lock, and hitting him with the ceramic pot.’ ” (Id. at p. 996.) The
Supreme Court also declined the Attorney General’s invitation to
determine whether the record supported two separate acts
because, “It is axiomatic that criminal defendants are
constitutionally entitled to ‘ “a jury determination that [they are]
guilty of every element of the crime with which [they are]
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 995.)
       Haro’s case does not suffer from the same deficiencies. The
information, jury instructions, and verdict forms each listed two

                                15
separate counts, the first of which expressly referred to the rake
and the second of which expressly referred to the hedge clippers.
During closing argument, the prosecutor explained there were
two charges for assault with a deadly weapon because Haro used
two weapons and there had been a pause between Haro’s use of
these weapons. Further, the trial court instructed the jury, “If
you are able to reach a unanimous decision on only one or only
some of the charges, fill in those verdict forms only . . . .” The
jury filled in both assault verdict forms, indicting it found the
prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, each element
necessary to convict Haro of assault using the rake and a
separate assault in using the hedge clippers. Because the record
lacks any basis upon which to conclude that the jury here
conflated Haro’s attacks with the rake and hedge clippers in
returning guilty verdicts thereupon, Aguayo does not compel
reversal of one of the two assault convictions.
       Haro also relies on several other inapposite cases to assert
one of his assault convictions cannot stand because he engaged in
one continuing assault despite using different weapons. Haro
cites People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, which held that
section 654 prohibits the imposition of three consecutive one-year
enhancements for the use of deadly weapons (two pairs of scissors
and a knife) to a single count for attempted murder. (People v.
Wong, supra, at p. 978.) Wong does not aid Haro because his
appeal does not concern the imposition of multiple punishments
or section 654. The question instead is whether under section
954, Haro may be convicted of more than one assault. In that
regard, unlike Wong, a unifying “impulse, intention or plan” does
not render multiple convictions improper. (See People v. Kirvin,
supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1518.)

                                16
       Haro also cites People v. Oppenheimer (1909) 156 Cal. 733
and People Mitchell (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 204 for the proposition
that multiple blows delivered during a single episode, even if
carried out with different instrumentalities, cannot give rise to
multiple assault convictions. But both Oppenheimer and Mitchell
predate People v. Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d 321, which
established that the proper analysis requires consideration of
whether the charged crime was complete. (Id. at p. 329.) Indeed,
following Harrison, the Court of Appeal in People v. Johnson,
supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1467 rejected an argument similar to
Haro’s, and held “that where multiple applications of physical
force result in separate injuries, the perpetrator has completed
multiple violations of section 273.5.” (Id. at p. 1477.) Thus, Haro
has failed to demonstrate that Oppenheimer and Mitchell compel
reversal or that pursuant to section 954, he could only be
convicted of a single assault.
                          DISPOSITION
      We affirm the judgment.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                          WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.                   BENDIX, Acting P.J.

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