Court Opinion

ID: 9388804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 17:07:38.668118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.764189
License: Public Domain

J-A08038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
               v.                           :
                                            :
                                            :
    JAYCIN STILLWAGON                       :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :   No. 871 WDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered July 21, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-26-CR-0000993-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                         FILED: APRIL 21, 2023

        Jaycin Stillwagon (Stillwagon) appeals pro se from the order filed in the

Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County (trial court) denying her motion to

dismiss the criminal charge of interference with custody of children, 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2904(a), based on double jeopardy.1 We affirm.

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This appeal is properly before us. “Pennsylvania law [] traditionally provided
a criminal defendant the right to an immediate appeal from an order denying
a pretrial motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.” Commonwealth
v. Gross, 232 A.3d 819, 830 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (citation omitted);
see also Commonwealth v. Haefner, 373 A.2d 1094, 1095 (Pa. 1977)
(stating that “pretrial orders denying double jeopardy claims are final orders
for purposes of appeal”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(b)(6).

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                                      I.

      We take the relevant factual background and procedural history from

the trial court’s July 21, 2022 opinion and our independent review of the

record.

                                      A.

      Stillwagon and Tyler Stouffer (Stouffer) shared custody of their 13-year-

old daughter (Child) subject to a 2016 custody order that gave Stouffer, the

father, custody of Child every other weekend for four hours. Stouffer filed a

motion for contempt of court because Stillwagon was not complying with the

custody order.2   Having failed to appear at the hearing on the contempt

motion, a bench warrant was issued for Stillwagon’s arrest and the trial court,

by the Honorable Steve P. Leskinen, who was assigned to the custody matter,

entered the following order:

           AND NOW, March 5, 2019, after hearing of which the
      defendant, Jaycin Stillwagon, acknowledges having received

2 Section 5323 of the Domestic Relations Code authorizes a court to sanction
for contempt for failure to comply with a custody order:

      (g) Contempt for noncompliance with any custody order

      (1) A party who willfully fails to comply with any custody order
      may, as prescribed by general rule, be adjudged in contempt.
      Contempt shall be punishable by any one or more of the following:

            (i) Imprisonment for a period of not more than six months.

            (ii) A fine of not more than $500.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(g)(1)(i)-(ii).

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     notice and as to which she has offered no explanation or excuse
     for her failure to attend other than her assertion that she received
     notice late, the Court finds that the defendant knew of the hearing
     no later than Friday, March 1, 2019, and has no valid explanation
     or excuse for her failure to appear. As a result, she is in Contempt
     of Court for her failure to appear this date.

            In addition , the Court finds that she is in Contempt of Court
     for failing to honor the schedule for visits between the child … and
     the child’s court-appointed -counsel and the -child’s court
     appointed guardian ad litem, having missed all three scheduled
     appointments which were scheduled at times she requested
     without providing any explanation or excuse for her failure to
     produce the child.

           In addition, she is in Contempt of Court for failing to allow
     the child to proceed with father on each and every scheduled
     partial custody date since September 2, 2018, a total of twenty-
     seven (27) days and overnights. For all such contempts, the Court
     sentences her to a period of incarceration at the Fayette County
     Prison until she is able to comply with the following purge
     conditions:

              1. After she is detained, the Court will reschedule a
        sanctions hearing as soon as possible, ideally within
        seventy-two (72) hours. The Court will hold the hearing
        with her present. At said hearing, in addition to the
        defendant, Jaycin Stillwagon, the child must also be
        present.

              2. The child is to be provided to guardian ad litem
        and to the child’s court appointed counsel for a meeting at
        their office, at which time the defendant is not to be
        present in the room with the guardian ad litem and counsel
        as it is to be a private meeting between the child, the
        guardian ad litem and counsel for the child.

           The defendant is ORDERED to report to the Fayette County
     Prison forthwith to begin serving the sentence herein imposed.

           In addition, the Court issues a bench warrant for the
     defendant’s immediate arrest and directs that she be incarcerated
     at the Fayette County Prison until the foregoing purge conditions
     can be complied with.

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            At such time that mother is incarcerated, the plaintiff, Tyler
      Stouffer, is permitted to obtain custody of the child to begin
      "makeup" time for the twenty-seven (27) custodial days and
      nights that he has missed.

            Plaintiff will be permitted to make use of a constable or other
      police officer in order to effectuate any transfer and is specifically
      permitted to pick up child at school at the end of school or any
      time during the day insofar as custody has been denied for
      approximately six (6) months without any just cause or excuse.

(Order, 3/05/19).

      Both parties concede the bench warrant was not served and Stillwagon

was never incarcerated. Within 72 hours, on March 7, 2019, after Child met

with the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL), the trial court modified the custody order

by suspending Stillwagon’s legal custody as well as imposing provisions

implementing that suspension. No criminal sanctions, i.e., incarceration or

fines, were imposed for being held in contempt for not abiding by the previous

custody order.

      On March 7, 2019, the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) charged

Stillwagon with a violation of 18 Pa.C.S.§ 2904(a),3 interference with custody

of children, for:

      knowingly or recklessly tak[ing] or entic[ing] … the juvenile
      female (age 13) from the custody of her parent … when THE
      DEFENDANT had no privilege to do so, in violation of Section
      2904(a) of the PA Crimes Code. TO WIT: THE DEFENDANT did

3 This provision defines that offense as “A person commits an offense if he
knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any child under the age of 18 years
from the custody of its parent, guardian or other lawful custodian, when he
has no privilege to do so.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2904(a).

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     violate Court Order No. 2129 of 2007, GD, … from September 2,
     2018 to present, the DEFENDANT has refused to allow the victim
     to participate with the court ordered visitation.

(Police Criminal Complaint, 3/06/19, at 2)4 (Interference Charge).5

                                     B.

     Stillwagon then filed a counseled motion to dismiss the charge on double

jeopardy grounds.   She contended that the criminal charge was barred by

double jeopardy because the Interference Charge sought to punish for the

4 To the extent that Stillwagon complains in her statement of questions
involved that the GAL also improperly recommended that the criminal charges
in this matter be filed, the claim is underdeveloped and we do not find it
persuasive to the issue before us.

5 Before double jeopardy precludes a prosecution, there must have been a
conviction. Recently, Justice Donahoe of our Supreme Court, in a concurring
opinion in Commonwealth v. Coleman, 285 A.3d 599 (Pa. 2022), discussed
what constituted a conviction, stating:

     Over the years, this Court has attributed to the word “convicted”
     and its various permutations (e.g., “conviction”) a “popular” as
     well as a “technical” meaning.       The “popular” meaning of
     “convicted” refers to a guilty verdict. In other instances, this
     Court has applied a “technical” meaning to “convicted,” which has
     been understood as a judgment or sentence upon the finding of
     guilt. In the past, this Court acknowledged that the “technical”
     meaning should be applied except where the statutory language
     demonstrates a contrary intent.

Coleman, 285 A.3d at 615 (citations omitted). Further, before sanctions are
imposed, a determination of whether the contempt is civil or criminal cannot
be made.

We also note that “[a]n order of contempt is final and appealable when the
order contains a present finding of contempt and imposes sanctions.” In re
K.K., 957 A.2d 298, 303 (Pa. Super.2008) (citations omitted).

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same conduct for which the March 5, 2019 order held her in contempt. (See

Motion to Dismiss Criminal Information, 7/23/20, at ¶¶ 8-10).           After the

Commonwealth responded on August 4, 2020, Honorable Thomas S. Ling Sr.,

who was assigned to hear the double jeopardy motion, denied the motion the

same day without a hearing or findings of fact and conclusions of law.

       Stillwagon appealed and the trial court granted counsel’s motion to

withdraw. We then vacated the trial court’s order denying Stillwagon’s motion

to dismiss on procedural grounds. (See Commonwealth v. Stillwagon, 262

A.3d 479 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 10, 2021), unpublished memorandum). We

instructed the trial court, on remand, to: (1) conduct a Grazier6 hearing to

determine if Stillwagon’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent and

voluntary; (2) conduct a hearing on her motion to dismiss based on double

jeopardy pursuant to Rule 587(b);7 and (3) if the court denies the motion to

dismiss, determine if it is frivolous. (See id. at 479).

       On remand, after holding a Grazier hearing, the trial court found that

Stillwagon’s waiver of counsel was intelligent, knowing and voluntary. It also

held a hearing on her motion to dismiss the Interference Charge on double

6   Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998).

7 Rule 587(b) provides, in pertinent part, that a court “shall” hold a hearing
on a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds and “shall enter on the
record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall issue
an order granting or denying the motion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(b)(3). If the
court denies the motion, it must “determine if it is frivolous.” Id. at 587(b)(4).

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jeopardy grounds.        Although finding the double jeopardy claim was not

frivolous, the court found that it lacked merit because the contempt order was

civil and double jeopardy did not apply.       In its supporting memorandum

opinion, the trial court reasoned that:

        The March 5, 2019 contempt order in the civil case No. 2129 of
        2007, G.D., was issued for failure to appear at a custody hearing
        without leave of court. Secondly, there was a finding of contempt
        for failure to comply with the existing custody order. The other
        contempts in the March 5, 2019, civil order dealt with failure to
        have the child meet with appointed counsel and guardian ad litem.
        Neither failure to appear at a hearing or failure to have a child
        meet with a guardian or legal counsel have any relation to 18
        Pa.C.S. 2904(a). The question then remains did the contempt of
        court for failure to comply with the custody order constitute
        criminal punishment. It is noted the bench warrant issued
        directed the Defendant be taken to the county jail, but only until
        a hearing could be scheduled, which, pursuant to the March 5,
        2019, order would be within 72 hours. No fine of any type was
        imposed, in fact, the March 5, 2019, order states the hearing to
        be scheduled would be a sanctions hearing. The entire thrust of
        the Court’s March 5, 2019 order is to obtain compliance with
        existing order and not to impose punishment. The fact the
        Defendant was ordered to be held in jail would appear to be to
        facilitate a hearing, not impose punishment.

(Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/22, at 4-5).

        Stillwagon again filed a timely notice of appeal arguing that the trial

court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the criminal action because the

March 5, 2019 contempt order was not civil but was indirect criminal

contempt, “[t]herefore, the criminal prosecution for the same conduct was

subject to a plea of double jeopardy.”8 (Stillwagon’s Brief, at 43).

8   It is long settled that:

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                                      II.

                                       A.

      “The Double Jeopardy Clause, applicable to the States through the

Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall ‘be subject for the same

offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.’”     Commonwealth v.

Jackson, 10 A.3d 341, 344-35 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing U.S. CONST. amend.

5) (case citation omitted).    “Furthermore, the Double Jeopardy Clause []

protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.

And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”           Id.

(citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Gross, 232 A.3d 819 (Pa. Super.

2020), we stated that for double jeopardy to attach there had to be an earlier

conviction, stating:

            Importantly, “The prohibition of double jeopardy, as it
      relates to subsequent prosecutions, is irrelevant until jeopardy has
      once attached.” Commonwealth v. Arelt, 308 Pa. Super. 236,
      454 A.2d 108, 111 (1982). In the context of a plea deal, jeopardy
      does not attach to crimes, which were dropped as part of a guilty
      plea agreement. Commonwealth v. Tabb, 491 Pa. 372, 376,
      421 A.2d 183, 186 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000, 101 S.
      Ct. 1708, 68 L.Ed.2d 202 (1981) (describing concept of continuing

      An appeal grounded in double jeopardy raises a question of
      constitutional law. This [C]ourt’s scope of review in making a
      determination on a question of law is, as always, plenary. As with
      all questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo.
      To the extent that the factual findings of the trial court impact its
      double jeopardy ruling, we apply a more deferential standard of
      review to those findings.

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 262 A.3d 1283, 1288 (Pa. Super. 2021),
appeal denied, 278 A.3d 853 (Pa. 2022) (brackets and citation omitted).

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        jeopardy but holding that concept does not protect defendant
        against retrial for crimes he pled guilty to, where plea is voided
        on appeal through defendant’s own procurement). By the same
        token, the dismissal of a charge in federal court, as part of a plea
        deal, does not represent a conviction or an acquittal that might
        prevent    a     subsequent    prosecution     in    state    court.
        Commonwealth v. Schmotzer, 831 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super.
        2003), appeal denied, 577 Pa. 695, 845 A.2d 817 (2004).

Gross, 232 A.3d at 835.

        Once a prior conviction was established, the Court applies the

Blockburger9 test, pursuant to which:

              [T]he “same-elements” test of Blockburger has long been
        followed in this Commonwealth and its application requires a
        comparison of the elements of the offenses to determine whether
        each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not.
        When making such a comparison, overlap in proof between the
        two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation.

Jackson, 10 A.2d 341 at 345.

        In conducting that analysis when criminal contempt is involved, “[W]e

must look to the specific offenses at issue in the contempt proceeding and

compare the elements of those offenses with the elements of the subsequently

charged criminal offenses.” Commonwealth v. Yerby, 679 A.2d 217, 221

(Pa. 1996). “If they are the same, or if one is a lesser included offense of the

other, double jeopardy attaches and the subsequent prosecution is barred.”

Id. “The focus, then, is on the offense(s) for which the defendant was actually

held in contempt.” Id.

9   Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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      Unlike civil contempt, which does not implicate double jeopardy, where

a party is found in direct criminal or indirect criminal contempt, double

jeopardy will attach if the Blockburger test is met.               Because the

Commonwealth contends the contempt at issue is civil in nature, we must

determine whether the contempt order was civil or criminal.

                                       B.

      ”Contempt of court may be classified as civil or criminal in nature. The

distinction between the two categories lies in the purpose behind the court’s

finding of contempt. If the dominant purpose of the court is to prospectively

coerce the contemnor into compliance with the court’s directive, the

adjudication is one of civil contempt.      However, if the court’s dominant

purpose is to punish the contemnor for disobedience of the court’s order, the

adjudication is one of criminal contempt.” In the Interest of C.W., 960 A.2d

458, 466 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). If a person is found guilty of

direct or indirect criminal contempt, a subsequent prosecution is barred if the

Blockburger test is met.

      Criminal contempt may be classified as either direct or indirect. “A direct

criminal contempt consists of misconduct of a person in the presence of the

court, or disobedience to or neglect of the lawful process of the court, or

misbehavior so near thereto as to interfere with the immediate business of

the court.”   Fenstamaker v. Fenstamaker, 487 A.2d 11, 14 (Pa. Super.

1985) (citation omitted). “A charge of indirect criminal contempt consists of

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a claim that a violation of an order or decree of court occurred outside the

presence of the court.” Commonwealth v. Ashton, 824 A.2d 1198, 1203

(Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).        “Criminal contempt is a crime

punishable by imprisonment or fine; sentences of imprisonment for contempt

must be imposed according to the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9701.” In

Interest   of   E.O.,   195   A.3d   583,   586   (Pa.   Super.   2018)   (citing

Commonwealth v. Falkenhan, 452 A.2d 750, 757 (Pa. Super. 1982)).

                                      C.

     In this case, the March 5, 2019 order found that Stillwagon was in

contempt for three reasons, making it necessary to examine each one

separately to determine whether they give rise to a claim of double jeopardy.

     First, Stillwagon was held in contempt because she did not appear at

the scheduled court hearing on the contempt motion and the court ordered

her incarcerated until a “sanctions” hearing was held. Her incarceration was

ordered both to punish her for failing to appear and make sure that she

appeared at the “sanctions” hearing. Even though she was never jailed, and

the purpose of this provision is both to punish her and make sure that she

appeared, the dominant purpose is criminal in nature because there was

nothing she could do to purge herself of contempt. Furthermore, because it

took place outside of the presence of the judge, it was indirect criminal

contempt. However, double jeopardy does not attach because incarceration

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for failing to appear for court has no common elements with the Interference

Charge.

      The second reason she was held in contempt was for failing to honor

scheduled visits between Child and Child’s court-appointed counsel and GAL.

No sanctions were imposed in the March 5 or March 7, 2019 orders for that

failure. Moreover, because failure to have a child meet with a GAL or legal

counsel has no common elements with an Interference Charge, which requires

that a person take a child under the age of 18 from the custody of its guardian,

and because none of those individuals were Child’s guardian, it also would not

meet the Blockburger test. Moreover, no criminal sanctions were imposed

for this failure.

      Finally, Stillwagon was found to be in contempt because she failed to

allow Stouffer to have Child on each scheduled partial custody date since

September 2, 2018, a total of twenty-seven (27) days and overnights. Double

jeopardy is implicated because the same conduct that would have to be proved

to make out the Interference Charge was required to be made out to be

convicted of contempt for the above conduct.

      In an unreported decision in Commonwealth v. Thompson, 284 A.3d

932 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 22, 2022), at issue was whether double jeopardy

bars a prosecution for the interference with the custody of children when the

charge is based on the same conduct for which a defendant was convicted of

indirect criminal contempt. In that case, the defendant did not return the

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child to mother at the end of his custody period several times, and based on

noncompliance with the standing orders, the court found him in indirect

criminal contempt and sanctions were imposed. The next day, he was charged

with Interference with Custody of Children, 18 Pa.C.S § 2904. The defendant

challenged the bringing of this charge because the finding of indirect criminal

contempt constituted double jeopardy. We held that double jeopardy attached

because for the Commonwealth to make out a charge under18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2904(a), it would have to prove that the defendant (1) knowingly took a

child under the age of 18 from the custody of its guardian (2) when he had no

privilege to do so, the same conduct required to find the defendant in indirect

criminal contempt. While this case is like Thompson, there is an important

difference: criminal sanctions were imposed in that case, while in this case,

no criminal sanctions were imposed.

      Section   5323    of   the   Domestic   Relations   Code,    23   Pa.C.S.

§ 5323(g)(1)(i)-(ii), authorizes a court to sanction for contempt for failure to

comply with a custody order by imposing a fine or imprisonment. Under the

March 5, 2019 order, Stouffer was given make-up time for the visits missed,

and under the March 7, 2019 order, Stillwagon’s legal custody was suspended.

Those “sanctions” were ordered because the trial court found that they were

in the best interest of Child, and though they may have had an adverse impact

on Stillwagon, they were not criminal sanctions implicating double jeopardy.

While she was held in contempt for conduct required to convict on the

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Interference Charge, because no criminal sanction was imposed, the contempt

was civil in nature and double jeopardy does not attach.

     Accordingly, based on all the foregoing, Stillwagon is not due any relief

on the trial court’s order denying her motion to dismiss based on double

jeopardy.

     Order affirmed.

     Judge Stabile joins the memorandum.

     Judge Sullivan files a concurring memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2023

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