Court Opinion

ID: 9727243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:27:31.19964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:35.425500
License: Public Domain

LONG, J.,
dissenting.
Robert Morton, a 25 year old man with no prior criminal record, emotional problems and an extremely limited intellectual capacity, was befriended by a sophisticated career criminal named Alonzo *288Bryant. In Bryant’s thrall, Morton agreed to participate in a gas station robbery in which Michael Eck was stabbed to death. The jury, nearly unanimously, concluded that but for Bryant, Morton would never have been involved in the crime. Despite that, Morton was sentenced to death and Bryant to life. Because of my abiding belief that the sentence imposed on Morton was not only disproportionate to that of Bryant, the mastermind of the crime, but also to the sentences imposed on other defendants with similar characteristics who committed factually similar murders, I dissent.
I.
In State v. Feaster, decided today, I expressed my general reservations about our system of proportionality review. 165 N.J. 388, 443, 757 A.2d 266 (2000) (Long, J., dissenting). Rather than repeat those points, I incorporate them here and add an additional concern about the Court’s handling of the problem of intra-case disproportionality.
The Court holds that this case presents no such disproportionality although Bryant, the career criminal who devised the robbery-murder, was sentenced to life and Morton, a follower with no prior criminal involvement, was sentenced to die. Ten jurors in Morton’s case determined that he would not have committed, or participated in, the murder but for Bryant’s lead. The jury apparently concluded that Bryant was more culpable than Morton.
However, Bryant’s jury was deadlocked regarding whether he committed the murder by his own conduct; accordingly, he was not death-eligible. Despite that ineligibility, the court that presided over both trials specifically concluded that Bryant had indeed stabbed the victim. In my view, Bryant’s life sentence renders Morton’s death sentence disproportionate. “Where a more culpable co-defendant receives a life sentence, a sentence of death should not be imposed on the less culpable defendant.” Ray v. State, 755 So.2d 604, 611 (Fla.2000) (reversing death sentence because more culpable co-defendant received life sentence); accord Hazen v. State, 700 So.2d 1207, 1214 (Fla.1997) (same); see *289also State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182, 1198 (1985) (holding less culpable co-defendant’s death sentence disproportionate even though more culpable co-defendant also received death sentence); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 250-52, 662 A.2d 442 (1995) (DiFrisco III) (O’Hern, J., dissenting) (arguing death sentence disproportionate because State did not prosecute co-defendant).
Upholding Morton’s death sentence in the face of Bryant’s life sentence violates our principle that we “treat like cases alike.” State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 220, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992) (Marshall II) (citing H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 155 (1961)). Indeed, sentencing Morton to death while sentencing Bryant, the substantially more culpable co-defendant, to life in prison is arbitrary and cannot be upheld. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 883 (1976) (noting death penalty cannot be imposed arbitrarily); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 190, 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (holding New Jersey Constitution provides heightened protection from arbitrariness and inconsistency in capital sentencing). Unless justified by substantial differences in mitigating evidence, which is not the case here, if a co-defendant who instigated and planned a murder receives a life sentence, the defendant who followed the co-defendant’s lead cannot be sentenced to death consonant with the notion of proportionality. The Court has omitted consideration of those very basic principles in rejecting Morton’s intra-case disproportionality claim.
II.
A. Salient Factors
Robert Morton’s own case is included in the salient factor statistics. For the reasons discussed in Feaster, supra, 165 N.J. at 458, 757 A.2d 266 (Long, J., dissenting), Morton’s death sentence should not confirm its own propriety. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 263, 613 A.2d 1059 (Handler, J., dissenting). Equally troubling is the fact that one of the death sentenced F-2 cases included in Morton’s category is that of Richard Feaster whose *290case the Court decided today. It is incomprehensible to me that the Court can use Feaster’s sentence to justify Morton’s and Morton’s to justify Feaster’s.
Excluding Morton’s own case under the salient-factors test, thirteen percent of death-eligible cases in the F-2 category resulted in the death penalty, compared to eleven percent overall. Excluding both Feaster and Morton, as I believe we should, the death sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases in the F-2 subcategory is only about ten percent, and the death sentencing rate for those proceeding to the penalty phase is only nineteen percent.
Given that no death sentence other than Morton’s has been fully upheld (except Feaster’s which the Court upholds today), we cannot conclude from the salient-factors test that there is a “societal consensus” that the death penalty is an appropriate penalty for F-2 defendants. See State v. Cooper, 159 N.J. 55, 72, 731 A.2d 1000 (1999) (Cooper II).
III.
Comparative Culpability
A. Defendant’s Culpability
1.
As I indicated in Feaster, supra, 165 N.J. at 447-48, 757 A.2d 266 (Long, J. dissenting), we should not engage in an abstract discussion of a defendant’s “deathworthiness” based on subjective moral reasoning rather than comparative analysis. That said, I believe certain aspects of the Court’s discussion of Morton’s culpability are misleading and inappropriate. Throughout its discussion, the Court emphasizes that Morton committed murder to escape detection for the robbery. That emphasis is misplaced. I understand the aggravating nature of the “escape detection” factor in a ease in which an eyewitness to a crime is killed to silence him, or in a case where the defendant returns, on a separate occasion, to eliminate the victim as a witness against him. Howev*291er, a defendant who kills a victim because she resists is no less culpable than a defendant who kills the same victim to escape detection.
Furthermore, the escape detection aggravating factor is so commonplace in robbery-murder capital cases that placing substantial weight on the presence of the factor as indicative of high culpability cannot be justified.
Although this aggravating factor (e(4)(f)) is considered to increase defendant’s moral blameworthiness, its widespread, almost universal application, regardless of the lack of evidence presented to establish it in various cases, destroys its efficacy as an appropriate aggravating factor. Its unbounded, amoebic application is inherently expansive, making it impossible to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants adequately to allow for meaningful distinctions regarding defendants’ blameworthiness.
[State V. Harvey, 159 N.J. 277, 386, 731 A.2d 1121 (1999) (Harvey III) (Handler, J., dissenting).]
Accord State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 427-28, 724 A.2d 129 (1999) (Loftin II) (Handler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 897, 120 S.Ct. 229, 145 L.Ed.2d 193 (1999). Indeed, the Court acknowledges that the “escape detection” motive is typical in felony-murder cases. Ante at 249-50, 757 A.2d at 192. In view of its prevalence in robbery-murder cases, the Court’s emphasis on defendant’s motive is distracting and troubling.
2.
Although it acknowledges that Morton did not engineer the crime, the Court does not consider his culpability diminished by his peripheral role. Ante at 252, 757 A.2d at 193. I disagree with that conclusion. Ten jurors found as mitigating that, “Robert Morton would not have committed the offenses for which he has been convicted were it not for Alonzo Bryant.” Similarly, ten jurors found as mitigating that, “Robert Morton would not have participated in these offenses were it not for Alonzo Bryant.” Those findings demonstrate that the jury believed Bryant was the catalyst for the crimes defendant committed.
*292A defendant’s role in planning the murder is one of the components by which we measure his deathworthiness. See, e.g., Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 309, 731 A.2d 1121. Indeed, in both Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 90, 731 A.2d 1000, and State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 75, 651 A.2d 949 (1994) (Martini II), the Court considered the defendant’s culpability to be enhanced because of his sole responsibility in planning the crimes he committed. A necessary corollary to that legal proposition is that a defendant whose role in planning the crimes is peripheral has diminished culpability. Thus, the Court’s refusal to discount Morton’s culpability is logically insupportable and contrary to this Court’s precedent.
Moreover, it is fundamentally unfair to use a defendant’s primary role in planning the crimes to aggravate his culpability, but not allow a defendant’s secondary role to mitigate his culpability. That sort of one-way ratchet has no place in capital jurisprudence, in which defendants are entitled to enhanced, rather than diminished, procedural protections. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399, 113 S.Ct. 853, 860, 122 L.Ed.2d 203, 216 (1993) (“In capital cases, we have required additional protections because of the nature of the penalty at stake.”).
The Court’s reliance on Morton’s willingness to participate in the crimes to support its finding of high moral blameworthiness is unfounded. See ante at 252, 757 A.2d at 193. Morton’s very death-eligibility is premised on his participation in the robbery-murder of Eck. Because voluntary participation in a crime is a universally applicable descriptor, it is useless as a comparative factor.
Finally, the Court concludes that Morton’s “culpability in planning the murder should not be diminished because of the presence of a co-defendant.” Ante at 252, 757 A.2d at 193. That statement disregards one crucial fact: Bryant’s role cannot be defined as mere “presence.” As the jury found, the crimes would have never occurred absent Bryant’s participation. Bryant alone contrived the robbery and murder of Eck. Bryant’s role in planning the *293murder is unique among F-2 co-defendants and curtails Morton’s culpability.
3.
The Court also improperly discounts the mitigating value of defendant’s borderline intellectual functioning. In several proportionality reviews, the Court has found comparison case defendants’ borderline intelligence mitigating. See State v. Harris, 165 N.J. 303, 339, 757 A.2d 221 (2000) (Harris II); State v. Chew, 159 N.J. 183, 217, 731 A.2d 1070 (Chew II), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 593, 145 L.Ed.2d 493 (1999); Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 95-96, 100, 112, 731 A.2d 1000; Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 340, 724 A.2d 129. The Court even found someone’s “cultural retardation” to mitigate, although that defendant was not mentally retarded. See Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 318, 731 A.2d 1121; id. at 408 n. 25, 731 A.2d 1121 (Handler, J., dissenting) (discussing Herman Williams). Like Herman Williams, Morton is not mentally retarded but suffers from intellectual and emotional deficiencies that mitigate his moral blameworthiness. Morton’s limited intellect is particularly relevant here because of his corresponding susceptibility to Bryant’s leadership.
4.
One of the recurring problems we face in proportionality review is that of inconsistent coding of factors from case to case. In re Proportionality Review Project, 165 N.J. 206, 219, 757 A.2d 168 (2000) (Proportionality Review II). Sometimes it is caused by statutory changes or AOC policy, and sometimes by our own missteps. Such a misstep occurred in Harvey III, where we expanded the non-decedent victim factor and made it applicable to every ease in which the victim was “a unique person” with “a web of familial relations” — in other words, to every single murder case. 159 N.J. at 313, 731 A.2d 1121 (cited at ante at 252, 757 A.2d at 193). What murder case does not involve a victim who was “a unique person”? How many decedents do not have “a web of familial relations”? A comparison factor that covers every con*294ceivable comparison case without distinguishing the culpability of any defendant has no utility and mars the integrity of precedent-seeking review. Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 386, 731 A.2d 1121. The Court has cited that factor in this case. Given our significant responsibility in this endeavor, that was wrong. The universal non-decedent factor should be eliminated from future cases.
5.
The Court’s abstract labeling of Morton’s victimization and character also fails to hold up under scrutiny. The Court characterizes the victimization in this case as “exceptional.” Ante at 252, 757 A.2d at 193. To be sure, Eck suffered unimaginable pain at the hands of Morton and Bryant. We do not know who inflicted the worst of the blows, but they are startling to any observer. The kind of pain suffered by Eck, however, is not unusual among murder victims. Of the thirty-one comparison cases under review, many victims suffered from excrutiatingly painful gunshot wounds and some were subject to horrific beatings. Wheeler’s victim, like Eck, for example, was stabbed over ten times, while Hightower’s victim was shot repeatedly as she tried to drag her wounded body off the ground. Simmons’s victim was also stabbed and scalded with steaming hot water. Eck was terribly victimized, but highlighting his great pain and blood loss is not helpful if it is not done in a comparative manner.
With respect to Morton’s character, his failure to show remorse or take responsibility for his actions are typical among similarly situated defendants and do not set Morton apart as particularly culpable. What is atypical about Morton is his lack of a criminal record. Unlike many F-2 defendants, Morton’s crime was an aberration and the evidence suggests that he would not have deviated from his normally law-abiding life were it not for Bryant. The Court attempts to downplay the mitigating effect of Morton’s lack of prior criminal history, but its effort is flawed in two respects. First, it is inequitable to conclude that a defendant is highly culpable based on a significant criminal history, see, e.g., *295Harris II, supra, 165 N.J. at 334-35, 757 A.2d 221, yet fail to downgrade the culpability of a defendant with no criminal history. Second, the Court points to the perceived threat felt by Morton’s attorneys as evidence of unrelated acts of violence demonstrating bad character. Ante at 250, 254, 757 A.2d at 192, 194. That information was not before the jury and is not properly considered by us. Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 76, 651 A.2d 949 (refusing to consider, in analysis of defendant’s culpability, evidence jury did not hear). Moreover, the grounds for that dispute are beyond the knowledge of anyone outside that attorney-client relationship and conjecturing about Morton’s attorneys’ perception of a threat can only insert more unreliability into proportionality review.
In sum, there is no place in proportionality review for an analysis of Morton’s culpability separate and apart from precedent-seeking review. It serves only to prejudice precedent-seeking review and open the process to too many of our own subjective moral valuations. It would better serve the Court to begin our comparative culpability review with actual comparisons.
B. Comparison Cases
Our duty in this portion of proportionality review is to ensure that Morton has not been “singled out unfairly for capital punishment.” Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 88, 731 A.2d 1000 (quoting Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 47, 651 A.2d 949); accord Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 210, 731 A.2d 1070. Considering both Morton’s crime and his character, it is our responsibility to determine whether the comparison cases in which a life sentence was imposed render his death sentence disproportionate. It is not our responsibility, and not even within our power, to determine whether Morton’s death sentence was deserved on a moral level. Our inquiry should avoid that question at all costs, because it is all too tempting to determine proportionality based on the ugly facts of a particular crime.
*296Neither of the cases in Morton’s comparison group that resulted in a death sentence is a good bench mark against which his sentence can be measured for disproportion. Hightower, who asked to be put to death, has had his death sentences reversed because of constitutional flaws. Feaster’s sentence is clearly disproportionate and cannot be used to justify Morton’s. Feaster, supra, 165 N.J. at 467, 757 A.2d 266 (Long, J., dissenting). Of the comparison cases that proceeded to a penalty trial, the majority resulted in life sentences; there is nothing obvious about Morton’s case that explains why he was sentenced to death. Roger Hoyte’s culpability was extraordinary. In three separate incidents over a period of two and one half weeks, Hoyte murdered three taxicab drivers, each of whom he and his co-defendants robbed. One of the victims who survived the initial gunshot inflicted on him died after Hoyte shot him two more times and then stabbed him. The Court concedes that those crimes were heinous, but strains to conclude that Hoyte’s life sentences do not support Morton’s disproportionality claim. See ante at 259, 757 A.2d at 197. I disagree.
Surely, a jury could find that a defendant who murdered three victims is highly culpable, indeed more so than a defendant who murders one victim. See Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 408, 731 A.2d 1121 (Handler, J., dissenting); Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 272, 731 A.2d 1070 (Handler, J., dissenting); Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 100, 651 A.2d 949 (Handler, J., dissenting). The mitigating evidence in Hoyte’s case cannot overcome the presumption that he, as a multiple murderer, is more culpable than Morton. As noted, Hoyte’s motive of completing the robberies is not less culpable than Morton’s motive of escaping detection. Hoyte’s clean criminal record mirrors Morton’s lack of a prior criminal history. Although Hoyte abused heroin, cocaine, or marijuana, he never alleged that he was intoxicated while he committed the crimes. Mere drug addiction does not substantially diminish deathworthiness. See DiFnsco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 204, 662 A.2d 442 (finding defendant highly blameworthy despite drug abuse). Indeed, drug abuse does not reduce a defendant’s *297culpability at all unless a connection between the addiction and the crime can be shown. See Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 93, 731 A.2d 1000 (noting connection between drug addiction and homicide in comparison cases). Hoyte’s cooperation with the police, his remorse, and his age may reduce his culpability, but those mitigating factors do not offset the fact that he killed three people.
David Russo also is extremely culpable in comparison with Morton. In a gas station, he announced a “stick-up,” ordered three victims to lie on the floor, put a gun to their heads, and shot them. He killed one victim and caused another severe brain damage. Not surprisingly, the jury found the (4)(b) (grave risk of death to others) aggravating factor. The victimization in Russo’s case greatly exceeds the victimization in Morton’s case. Russo’s depression, intoxication, and good jailhouse behavior do not render him less culpable than Morton, yet Russo received a life sentence.
Charles Williams, another defendant who shot multiple victims, is substantially more culpable than Morton. He forced three McDonald’s employees to lie down at gunpoint while he stole money. He shot two of them in the head and shot at the third employee, who escaped unharmed. One of the victims died from the head wound while another sustained severe brain damage that permanently disabled him. The tremendous victimization in that case is matched by Williams’s extraordinarily culpable character. He committed a plethora of prior offenses and was in prison for all but ninety-three days of his adult life. In other proportionality reviews, the Court has placed tremendous weight on a defendant’s extensive prior record when deeming him highly deathworthy. See Harris II, supra, 165 N.J. at 326, 757 A.2d 221; Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 314, 318, 731 A.2d 1121; Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 213, 731 A.2d 1070. Likewise, the Court has found a defendant’s lack of a prior record to be a meaningful distinction justifying disparate sentences. See, e.g., Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 318, 731 A.2d 1121. Williams’s long criminal record, when contrasted against Morton’s law-abiding history, magnifies Williams’s relative culpability. Undoubtedly, the abuse Williams *298suffered in his childhood is horrendous. However, in previous proportionality reviews, the Court has shown little sympathy for defendants who suffered similar abuse. See, e.g., Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 90, 731 A.2d 1000. Viewed side by side, there is no objective way to rationalize the life sentence in Williams’s case and the death sentence in Morton’s.
Abdel Jaber Saleh was plainly more culpable than Morton and his life sentence provides powerful evidence of the disproportionality of Morton’s death sentence. Saleh strangled his victim, hit him over the head with a crowbar, bound and gagged him with a metal chain, and set him on fire while he was still alive. Saleh subsequently stole 5000 videocassettes he had agreed to purchase from the victim. After fleeing to Los Angeles, Saleh told police that he had seen two Latino men burn somebody to death. The Court acknowledges that the degree of victimization in Saleh’s case was “formidable.” Ante at 259, 757 A.2d at 197. Although Saleh was three years younger than Morton at the time of their respective murders, and Saleh’s jury found that his family would suffer emotional and psychological harm if he were executed, the victimization in Saleh’s case exceeds that in any other case by a large degree.
Rafael Slaughter’s life sentence suggests the disproportionality of Morton’s death sentence because of the remarkable similarity between the cases. Slaughter confronted a fast-food restaurant employee behind the restaurant, put a gun to his head, forced him to go inside the restaurant to the safe, and shot him twice in the back after he was unable to give Slaughter the combination to the safe. The victim remained conscious for twelve minutes before bleeding to death. While toting his gun, Slaughter also ordered two other restaurant employees to lie on the ground. The Court concludes that because Slaughter was three years younger than Morton, was not motivated by a desire to avoid apprehension, and because his victim died more quickly than Eck, his life sentence is justifiable. Ante at 261, 757 A.2d at 198. I disagree. Slaughter’s victim and Eck both suffered tremendously before dying; the fact *299that Eck survived for an additional hour cannot rationally support disparate sentences. As discussed above, Slaughter’s motive (completing the robbery) is not less culpable than Morton’s motive of escaping detection. Last, although Slaughter’s relative youth mitigates his culpability, it does not offset the increased victimization in his case. Accordingly, Slaughter’s life sentence suggests that Morton’s death sentence is disproportionate.
Three cases that never even made it to a jury also illustrate the disproportionality of Morton’s sentence. Ronald Wheeler pled guilty to felony murder for assaulting the office manager where he worked, stabbing her to death after she, refused to give him his Christmas bonus, then stealing her pocketbook and some petty cash. Because of the nature of the stabbing, the AOC narrative concludes that Wheeler intended to torture the victim in addition to killing her. I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the victimization in Wheeler’s case is similar to the victimization in Morton’s case. See ante at 259, 757 A.2d at 197. However, I disagree that Wheeler’s motive was benign when he barged into the victim’s office. Wheeler’s possession of a knife and his violent reaction to the victim’s refusal to give him the bonus suggests that the robbery was premeditated. Even if Morton’s crime was more premeditated than Wheeler’s, Wheeler’s role in planning his crime renders him as culpable as Morton. In either case, Wheeler’s sentence of forty years in prison, with a possibility of parole after thirty years, is indicative of the disproportionality of Morton’s death sentence.
When robbing a gas station, Harold Rodriguez shot the owner and a customer. The owner recovered from his injuries after two and a half weeks of hospitalization, but the customer died. While that murder was under investigation, Rodriguez shot a woman in another robbery. Although Rodriguez said he used heroin and cocaine on a daily basis, he did not claim to be intoxicated at the time of the crime. Accordingly, the Court’s reliance on the presence of the (5)(d) factor, see ante at 266, 757 A.2d at 201, is *300flawed. I concur with the Court’s finding that Rodriguez’s bout with AIDS is mitigating. Ibid. However, the aggravation in Rodriguez’s ease nevertheless renders him more culpable than Morton. Rodriguez was able to enter into a plea bargain for a term of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after thirty years, in exchange for pleading guilty to murder, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, two counts of robbery, unlawful possession of a weapon, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.
The Court acknowledges that Corey Washington, another similarly situated defendant who was permitted to enter a plea to avoid the death penalty,'appears as culpable as Morton. Ante at 261, 757 A.2d at 198. Although Washington was six years younger than Morton at the time of his offense, he had at least as significant a role in planning the crime as his co-defendants. Washington and his co-defendants made the victim and his sixty-eight-year-old co-worker lie on the floor while the perpetrators removed money from a safe. Presumably, the victim and his coworker feared for their lives during that period. Their fears were realized when Washington fatally shot the victim and a co-defendant shot the co-worker. Thus, I agree with the Court that Morton is not more culpable than Washington. Ante at 262, 757 A.2d at 199. Morton’s death sentence, as contrasted with Washington’s sentence of thirty years imprisonment, suggests dispro-portionality.
In sum, I find that Roger Hoyte, David Russo, Abdel Jaber Saleh, Rafael Slaughter, Ronald Wheeler, Charles Williams, Harold Rodriguez, and Corey Washington are all at least as culpable or more culpable than Morton. Yet, those eight comparison perpetrators have received sentences of life imprisonment or less, while Morton was singled out for the death penalty.
I recognize that “[disparity alone does not demonstrate dispro-portionality,” State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 386, 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), and that proportionality review “is not intended to ensure that one killer’s sentence is identical to all other similarly *301categorized killers,” Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 319, 731 A.2d 1121. Rather, “[proportionality review seeks to determine whether a particular death sentence is aberrational.” In re Proportionality Review, 161 N.J. 71, 76, 735 A.2d 528 (1999) (Proportionality Review I) (quoting Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 352, 645 A.2d 685). Although, like Justice Handler, I disagree with the meaning the Court has ascribed to the notion of “aberration” (i.e., extreme disproportion), id. at 104-05, 735 A.2d 528 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), even accepting its vision of that term in this case, in which Morton is as culpable or less culpable than eight life-sentenced defendants in his comparison group, I believe he has demonstrated that his death sentence is disproportionate.
The other cases in defendant’s comparison group neither support nor detract from Morton’s showing of disproportionality. Some present less victimization than Morton’s but involve a defendant who acted alone or as the dominant participant with other co-defendants. It is, of course, difficult to compare the mitigating evidence in the comparison cases with Morton because of how little we know about Morton’s background and character. He was uncooperative with the lawyers who, in turn, failed to present a single witness to persuade the jury to spare Morton’s life. Nonetheless, what we do know about Morton mitigates his culpability relative to other defendants with more sophisticated intellects and more opportunity to direct the actions around them. Carl Culley, for example, was younger and caused less suffering than Morton; he was an alleged victim of sexual abuse. However, Culley planned a robbery alone and had committed two prior offenses and therefore does not detract from Morton’s disproportionality claim.
Despite Tim Harris’s youth and the lower victimization in the murder he committed, his lengthy juvenile record, failure to finish high school, inability to hold a steady job, and role as at least an equal planner of a robbery-murder make him as culpable as Morton. The same may be said about Donald Loftin, whose *302murder of a chambermaid involved less victimization than Morton’s, but who planned his entire offense alone.
Frederick Simmons committed an offense involving a level of victimization similar to Morton. In the midst of a robbery, Simmons beat, stabbed, and stomped a man to death at a bar, and kicked another man in the head. Simmons was thirty-five years old and unemployed when he committed the crimes, and apparently had an equal role to that of his co-defendant in planning the crime. Aside from Simmons’s depression and personality disorders, there are several similarities between Morton and Simmons, as the Court notes. Ante at 260, 757 A.2d at 198. Although the Court emphasizes Simmons’s intoxication to justify the disparity between Simmons and Morton, ante at 260, 757 A.2d at 198, that distinction is belied by the jury’s rejection of the (5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factor. Due to their intoxication, John Dow-nie, Craig Hart, Anthony Inman, and Khalif James appear less culpable than Morton. Nevertheless, the presence of four less culpable life-sentenced cases in Morton’s comparison group does not preclude a finding of disproportionality. A defendant should not have to be the least culpable person in his comparison group in order for his death sentence to be considered an aberration.
IV.
In a pool of fifteen cases that both the State and Morton consider to be ripe for comparison, the presence of seven life-sentenced cases in which the perpetrator is at least as culpable as the death-sentenced defendant suffice to show that Morton’s death sentence is aberrational.1 We have often emphasized that proportionality review guarantees that a defendant has not been “singled out unfairly for capital punishment.” Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 210, 731 A.2d 1070 (internal quotations omitted). When a defen*303dant receives a death sentence, but most similarly situated defendants receive life sentences, he has been singled out unfairly for death.
Under the Court’s proportionality standard, an occasional sentencing disparity is permissible. However, the case comparisons here offer example after example of the disparity between Morton and other similarly situated defendants who escaped death. Therefore, Morton has demonstrated that his death sentence is aberrant and, thus, disproportionate.
Accordingly, I dissent.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices O’HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN and LaVECCHIA — 5.
To vacate and for remandment — Justice LONG — 1.

 There are only seven because the State disagreed with the inclusion of Rodriguez in the comparison.