Court Opinion

ID: 9711811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:39:42.075297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.637293
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the circuit court that the Department failed to provide Lyon with complete and timely discovery. The Department was not provided that discovery to disclose, and when it received the discovery, the discovery was provided. I disagree with the majority’s opinion that the Department violated Lyon’s right to due process. While the entire appeal process took about eight months to complete, the delay was not unreasonable due to inadvertent delays and Lyon’s agreement to continue. A time period of 104 days or 3.5 months elapsed from the time that Lyon’s appeal rights accrued to the time that the hearing commenced. However, it was only 63 days from the time that Lyon filed his appeal request until the first day of the hearing, and 46 days from the hearing request until the hearing began. These periods are much shorter than those found unconstitutional in Stull, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 334-35, 606 N.E.2d at 792 (347 days), or Cavarretta, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 26-27, 660 N.E.2d at 257 (299 days), and well within the period found acceptable in S.W, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 680-81, 658 N.E.2d at 1308 (180 days). The Director issued his final decision on March 23, 2001, 246 days or a little over 8 months after the appeal process began. Again, this was a period found acceptable by the S.W court (S.W, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 680-81, 658 N.E.2d at 1307-08); and it was significantly shorter than the period that was found unconstitutional in Stull, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 334-35, 606 N.E.2d at 792 (456 days), or Cavarretta, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 26, 660 N.E.2d at 257 (598 days). For these reasons, I would reverse the circuit court.