Court Opinion

ID: 9690328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:06:50.432492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:55.553562
License: Public Domain

TOM GRAY, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Before we examine the trial court’s jurisdiction, we must examine our own jurisdiction. We have no jurisdiction of this appeal.
The Time Line
January 14, 2005 Summary Judgment on all issues other than pending motions for sanctions
February 8, 2005 Notice of Appealable Order sent by district clerk
February 11, 2005 Latest date by which the appellant received actual notice of signing of judgment. Date the notice of appealable order is suggested to have been received.
*333February 18, 2005 Motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
March 23, 2005 Motion for new trial filed
March 23, 2005 Notice of appeal filed
April 22, 2005 Judgment reiterating January 14, 2005 judgment on merits, and denying one motion for sanctions and granting another motion for sanctions
BACKGROUND FACTS
The only issues left unresolved by the January 14, 2005 judgment were pending motions for sanctions. After determining the merits of the suit by summary judgment, the January 14, 2005 judgment noted the request for sanctions remained pending and then concluded with a Mother Hubbard clause stating “All relief requested in this case and not expressly granted is denied.”
After notice of an appealable order was sent to the parties on February 8, 2005, there was no effort to comply with Rule 306a(4) and (5). Tex.R. Civ. P. 306a(4) and (5).
A motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal has not been filed. Good cause, if any, for filing a late notice of appeal has not been asserted by any party.
Final Judgment
The January 14, 2005 judgment was final because the only issues left unresolved were requests for sanctions. Unresolved motions for sanctions do not keep an otherwise final judgment from being final. Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex.2000). See Mantri v. Bergman, 153 S.W.3d 715, 717 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied); In re Velte, 140 S.W.3d 709, 711-712 (Tex.App.Austin 2004, no pet.); In re J.R., 123 S.W.3d 669, 671 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). The untimely notice of appeal did not invoke our jurisdiction.
Conclusion1
Because we have no jurisdiction of this appeal, the only proper judgment of this Court must be a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Because the majority skips the analysis of our jurisdiction and erroneously reviews the trial court’s jurisdiction and then vacates the trial court’s judgment and remands the case with instructions to “return the ease to the constitutional county court,” I dissent. I also note that the judgment rendered by the majority is not a judgment authorized by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Tex.R.App. P. 43.2. The only judgment the rule authorizes after an appellate court vacates the trial court’s judgment is a dismissal of the case. Tex.R.App. P. 43.2(f). For this reason, if no other, the judgment of the majority is erroneous.

. It appears there were several causes of action of which the county court at law would not have had jurisdiction, whether in a transferred probate matter or if originally filed in a county court at law. The majority fails to explain why the method by which the parties originally found their way into a district courtroom, i.e., by way of transfer as opposed to having originally filed in district court, should matter if the trial court otherwise has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim and personal jurisdiction over the parties. And because this is an issue the parties have not briefed, I decline further analysis of it at this time because it is wholly unnecessary to my analysis of a proper disposition of this appeal.