Court Opinion

ID: 9391540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 16:09:13.711951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.114926
License: Public Domain

J-A15042-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :         PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant             :
                                          :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 STEVEN G. EAKIN                          :    No. 1113 WDA 2021

            Appeal from the Order Entered September 8, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-61-CR-0000647-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                     FILED: MAY 2, 2023

      I respectfully dissent. Upon review, I believe that the learned Majority

misapplied the relevant factors in determining whether a violation of the

Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (“MPJA”) required suppression.       For the

reasons that follow, I conclude that suppression was not an appropriate

remedy for the technical violation of the MPJA in this case and would therefore

reverse the trial court’s suppression order.

      I begin with our standard of review. “When reviewing an order granting

a motion to suppress we are required to determine whether the record

supports the suppression court’s factual findings and whether the legal

conclusions drawn by the suppression court from those findings are accurate.”

Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 969 (Pa.Super. 2008) (cleaned

up). In the case sub judice, the facts largely are not in dispute. Rather, this

case hinges on the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. In that
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regard, “[o]ur scope of review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions

. . . is plenary.” Id. (citations omitted).

       From the outset, I note that I take no issue with the Majority’s

conclusion that Chief Sharp’s extraterritorial conduct at the time of the stop

was not authorized by statute.          As conceded by the Commonwealth, Chief

Sharp’s actions were not authorized by the Intergovernmental Cooperation

Act (“ICA”) because the 2006 Joint Municipal Agreement, which called for Polk

Borough police officers to provide police services for Frenchcreek Township,

had not been adopted by ordinance in Frenchcreek Township, as was required

at that time by the ICA for the agreement to take effect.1 Additionally, the

Commonwealth concedes that Chief Sharp’s actions were not authorized by

the MPJA as they did not fall within one of the six enumerated circumstances.

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1The parties stipulated to the following recitation surrounding the interplay
between Polk Borough and Frenchcreek Township:

       At the time of the traffic stop, which is the subject of this case, it
       occurred in Frenchcreek Township. . . . Chief Sharp observed
       [Eakin] operating the vehicle, which was the basis of his stop when
       he was in . . . Frenchcreek Township. . . . At the time of the stop,
       there was a Joint Municipal Agreement between Polk Borough and
       Frenchcreek Township for police services to be provided by officers
       of Polk in Frenchcreek. Frenchcreek had a resolution to adopt the
       agreement, but no ordinance. Polk had an ordinance as to the
       agreement. So, as of the time of the stop in Frenchcreek
       Township, Frenchcreek had no ordinance adopting the agreement.

N.T. Suppression, 8/27/21, at 68 (capitalization altered). I note the ICA has
since been amended to expressly permit adoption of such an agreement by
ordinance or resolution. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 2305.

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       Chief Sharp’s technical violation of the MPJA, however, does not

automatically compel suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the

traffic stop. See Commonwealth v. Hobel, 275 A.3d 1049, 1058 (Pa.Super.

2022).    In determining the appropriate remedy for an MPJA violation, this

Court employs a case-by-case approach. Id. “The factors to be considered .

. . consist of all the circumstances of the case including the intrusiveness of

the police conduct, the extent of deviation from the letter and spirit of the

MPJA, and the prejudice to the accused.” Id. (cleaned up). This case-by-case

approach permits “this Commonwealth’s courts to tailor a remedy in situations

where police intentionally have overstepped their boundaries while still

affording our courts the flexibility to deny suppression when police have acted

to uphold the rule of law in good faith but are in technical violation of

the MPJA.” Id. (cleaned up). Upon review, I find that the case sub judice is

a textbook example of Chief Sharp acting “to uphold the rule of law in good

faith [while] in technical violation of the MPJA[,]” and therefore the trial court

erred in granting suppression.2 Id.

       My analysis of the first factor is guided by our Supreme Court’s decision

in Commonwealth v. Hlubin, 208 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2019), wherein the High

Court considered the intrusiveness of a sobriety checkpoint.         Rather than

considering the intrusiveness of a checkpoint for an unimpaired driver, the
____________________________________________

2 I note with displeasure that the trial court utterly failed to apply this test,
instead concluding summarily that “[t]he remedy is suppression of the
evidence” based on Chief Sharp not having the authority to stop Eakin. See
Order of Court, 9/8/21, at 2.

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Court concluded that it “must instead measure the level of intrusion of a stop

that results in an arrest, since only in this circumstance does the issue of

possible suppression of evidence arise.” Id. at 1048. In Hlubin, the officer

initially questioned Hlubin for 30-45 seconds and then, based upon that

interaction, “removed Hlubin from her vehicle and took her to a testing area,

where she was subjected to field sobriety testing, blood testing and arrest.”

Id. Our High Court determined that such an interaction “resulted in a high

level of intrusiveness[.]” Id.

       In accordance with Hlubin, I consider the entirety of the encounter from

when Chief Sharp stopped Eakin to when Eakin was arrested to determine the

level of intrusiveness. In that regard, Chief Sharp conducted a traffic stop of

Eakin based upon a traffic violation. Upon observing a martini glass in the

vehicle and realizing that Chief Sharp had a personal relationship with the

driver, he called for another officer to conduct the traffic stop. That officer

arrived and ultimately transported Eakin to a hospital for blood testing and

arrest. Based on Hlubin, I am constrained to agree with the Majority that

this interaction involved a high level of intrusiveness and thus the first factor

favors Eakin. See Majority at 11-12.

       My analysis differs from the Majority as to the second and third factors.

Turning to the second factor, I consider “the extent of deviation from the letter

and spirit of the MPJA[.]” Hobel, supra at 1058. This Court has held that

“the   spirit,   or   purpose    of,   the MPJA is   to   proscribe   investigatory,

extraterritorial forays used to acquire additional evidence where probable

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cause does not yet exist.” Id. (cleaned up). Moreover, the MPJA endeavors

“to promote public safety while maintaining police accountability to local

authority; it is not intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls

benefiting only criminals hidden in their shadows.”       Commonwealth v.

Lehman, 870 A.2d 818, 820 (Pa. 2005) (cleaned up).

       Of relevance, the MPJA permits an officer to act outside his jurisdiction

where he “is on official business and views an offense, or has probable cause

to believe that an offense has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort

to identify himself as a police officer and which offense is a felony,

misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act which presents an immediate

clear and present danger to persons or property.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(5).

       Instantly, at the time of the stop, Chief Sharp was operating pursuant

to a belief that his conduct in Frenchcreek Township was authorized by the

ICA based on the agreement between Polk Borough and Frenchcreek

Township.3      See N.T. Suppression, 8/27/21, at 51 (stating that he had

jurisdiction in Frenchcreek Township). Upon review, I find that he had a good

faith belief that he was in Frenchcreek Township on official business. 4 While
____________________________________________

3 I observe, again, that the 2006 agreement had been adopted by resolution
in Frenchcreek Township at the time of the stop, but not by ordinance as was
required by the ICA at that time. As noted, our legislature amended the ICA
in 2019 expressly to permit adoption by ordinance or resolution. See 53
Pa.C.S. § 2305.

4 While not pursued by the Commonwealth, Chief Sharp testified at the
suppression hearing that he was in Frenchcreek Township while en route to
Utica, a municipality where he stated that he also had jurisdiction. See N.T.
Suppression, 8/27/21, at 51.

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in Frenchcreek Township on what he reasonably believed to be official

business, Chief Sharp observed Eakin driving his vehicle for one-half of a mile

in the wrong direction on a public roadway. Unequivocally, Eakin’s driving

presented “an immediate clear and present danger” to other vehicles on the

roadway.     See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(5); Hobel, supra at 1062-63

(concluding that Hobel’s driving presented “an immediate clear and present

danger” when he swerved back and forth across the road into the oncoming

traffic lane).   Under these circumstances, but for Frenchcreek Township’s

misguided decision to adopt the agreement by resolution instead of ordinance,

Chief Sharp would have been in Frenchcreek Township on official business

when he observed Eakin’s dangerous driving, and therefore his conduct would

have been authorized by the MPJA.

      The Majority finds this factor weighs in favor of Eakin, essentially

positing that the violation of the MPJA “contravenes the MPJA’s policy[.]” See

Majority at 12. I cannot countenance a conclusion that amounts to a self-

fulfilling prophecy. If the second factor favors the accused whenever there is

a violation of the MPJA, then every application of this test would have the

second factor favoring the accused because we only apply it in circumstances

where the police have violated the MPJA.     In fact, such a rigid application

focusing solely on police accountability ignores that the MPJA also endeavors

“to promote public safety while maintaining police accountability to local

authority; it is not intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls

benefiting only criminals hidden in their shadows.” Lehman, supra at 820

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(cleaned up); see also Hlubin, supra at 1048 (observing that our Supreme

Court previously “held that the goals of the MPJA are the promotion of public

safety while maintaining jurisdictional police lines and to expand the powers

of local police to protect the public, where such expansion would not adversely

affect the ultimate goal of maintaining police accountability to local authority”

(cleaned up)). Given the entire letter and spirit of the MPJA, I find that its

objectives were advanced by Chief Sharp’s conduct in this case.          Thus, I

disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that this factor favors Eakin.

      Finally, I consider the prejudice to Eakin. See Hobel, supra at 1058.

This factor requires us to consider “whether the search would not have

otherwise occurred or would not have been as intrusive.” See Hlubin, supra

at 1048 (cleaned up). The Majority concludes that this factor favors Eakin

because there was no evidence that the stop otherwise would have occurred.

While it is unclear whether the search would have otherwise occurred, it is

likely that any other officer pulling over Eakin would have conducted the

search in the same manner as Officer Heller, who was ultimately called to the

scene, transported Eakin for blood testing, and arrested him for drunk driving.

Therefore, even if another officer had conducted the stop, the resulting search

would have been equally intrusive.       Thus, I disagree with the Majority’s

conclusion that the third factor favors Eakin.

      Based on the foregoing, I conclude that in this case “suppression would

not be an appropriate remedy under the MPJA, the legislative intent of which

is to advance public safety and not shield criminal behavior.” Hobel, supra

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at 1064 (citation omitted). Since I would reverse the suppression order and

remand for further proceedings, I respectfully enter this dissent.

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