Court Opinion

ID: 9668565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:18:05.610501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:21.009977
License: Public Domain

Simmons, C. J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with certain statements of the evidence made by the court. That disagreement goes to lack of detail and definiteness in most instances and will not be developed here.
I limit this dissent to two matters. The first is the complete lack of any evidence that the defendant converted or appropriated any gasoline or other property of the elevator company. There is a failure of proof of an essential element of the crime charged. The second is the construction which the court puts upon the 1915 amendment to what is now section 28-538, R. R. S. 1943.
The defendant in this case was the manager of the company’s gas station at Wilber. There were at all *692times four or five other employees of the company who sold and delivered gasoline and other commodities including bulk deliveries to farm customers. They had access to the commodities sold and made deliveries when the defendant was not present. The defendant’s possession of the gasoline of the company and the transaction of its business was not an exclusive possession.
There was a shortage of gasoline. However, every witness for the State, including the auditors, testified that there was no evidence that the company had been deprived of any gasoline or other commodity including a “nickel” by the defendant. There was no evidence of an “appropriation” or “conversion” of the company’s gasoline or other property by the defendant. The company’s president testified that he did not know of any gasoline that defendant had taken wrongfully and a co-employee testified that he had no idea where the missing gasoline went. The State’s case as to- this element of the offense rests solely and exclusively upon the shortage of gasoline. The court points out no- evidence to the contrary.
The court holds: “Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation or conversion of another’s money or property by a person to whom it has been entrusted or into whose hands it has lawfully come by virtue of his employment with the felonious intent to defraud or deprive the owner thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Here the court recognizes two- elements of the offense — appropriation or conversion with felonious intent.
In Chaplin v. Lee, 18 Neb. 440, 25 N. W. 609, we held: “To constitute embezzlement it is essential that the owner should be deprived of the property alleged to be embezzled by an adverse use or holding.”
In McAleer v. State, 46 Neb. 116, 64 N. W. 358, following Chaplin v. Lee, supra, we held: “To constitute embezzlement the owner must be deprived of his property by an actual adverse use or holding.”
*693In Nelson v. State, 86 Neb. 856, 126 N. W. 518, following the above decisions, we held: “* * * failure to pay over or account for money received by defendant as agent would not amount to embezzlement, if his principal was not in fact deprived of the property by a felonious, adverse use or holding. Under the information, actual conversion with felonious intent was essential to a conviction.”
Changing the word “money” to “gasoline” makes the holding directly applicable here.
Following Chaplin v. Lee, supra, we held in State v. Hill, 47 Neb. 456, 66 N. W. 541: “It is essential to the crime of embezzlement that the owner be deprived of the property alleged to have been embezzled, by an adverse use or holding.”
In Colley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 107 Neb. 864, 187 N. W. 98, a civil action for conversion, we' held: “The act alleged to be a conversion must be positive -and tortious.” This decision was followed in Talich v. Marvel, 115 Neb. 255, 212 N. W. 540. Heretofore we have not deviated from these decisions in prosecutions under section 28-538, R. R. S. 1943.
The court points out no evidence of appropriation or conversion, fraudulent or otherwise. There was none.
The court then holds: “Conversion of the property .alleged to have been embezzled to the • personal use of the person charged is. not an essential element of the crime of embezzlement.”
Implicit in this statement is the recognition that conversion is an element of the- offense.- The distinction seems to be in “the personal-use of the person charged.” The distinction is a play on words.- :
Following several of the above decisions in Luther College v. Benson, 126 Neb. 410, 253 N. W. 421, we held: “‘Embezzle’ and-‘convert to his own use’ are synonymous terms.' ‘Conversion to his own use’ would be accomplished by any unauthorized act of dominion or *694ownership exercised by one person over property of another.” The court ignores this definition.
Our decisions are in accord with the rules as stated in the authoritative texts. In 18 Am. Jur., Embezzlement, § 21, p. 581, it is stated: “To constitute the crime of embezzlement there must be a fraudulent conversion or misappropriation of property with felonious intent.” In 29 C. J. S., Embezzlement, § 11, p. 682, it is stated: “To constitute a conversion so as to make out a case of embezzlement, the owner must, be deprived of his property or money by an adverse using or holding; * *
In Underhill’s Criminal Evidence (5th Ed.), Embezzlement, § 576, p. 1418, it is stated: “The gravamen of the crime is the fraudulent intent, coupled with execution.”
In Buckley v. State, 131 Neb. 752, 269 N. W. 892, we held: “The word ‘embezzle’ includes within its import the fraudulent appropriation of the funds of another to one’s own use.”
How then does the court avoid the complete lack of evidence and the affirmative negation of any evidence of conversion or appropriation?
The court goes first to the 1915 amendment to what is now section 28-538, R. R. S. 1943, that being the statute upon which the charge here rests. Throughout, the statute uses the synonymous terms embezzle or convert to his own use.
The 1915, amendment as it now appears provides in part: “The failure, neglect or refusal of such officer, attorney at law, agent, clerk, servant, factor or commission agent, as hereinbefore in this section enumerated to pay, deliver or refund to the proper person, company or copartnership such money, goods or property, entrusted to his or her care or which shall come into his or her possession, upon demand, shall be prima facie proof of intent to embezzle.” § 28-538, R. R. S. 1943.
The italics are mine. The quoted provision goes only to the second element of the offense, to wit, “proof of intent to embezzle.”
*695The element of conversion remains and requires proof. We held in Nelson v. State, supra, that “actual conversion with a felonious intent” was essential to a conviction. The court here recognizes this requirement for it says: “Under this statute, when other elements of the crime of embezzlement have been established, it is not necessary to offer other evidence of intent to embezzle where a proper demand has been made.” (Emphasis supplied.) I shall return to the “proper demand” presently.
Where is the proof of the “other elements of the crime”? The court recites none and there is none.
To avoid that situation the court goes (without citation) to what is now section 28-543, R. R. S. 1943, an act relating to the embezzlement of public money. That act provides in part: “The refusal of any such officer or person, whether in or out of office, to pay any draft, order or warrant which may be drawn upon him by the proper officer, for any public money in his hands, no matter in what capacity the same may have been received or may be held by him, or any refusal by any person or public officer to pay over to his successor any public moneys or securities promptly, on the legal requirement of any authorized officer of the state or county, shall be taken, on the trial of any indictment against such officer or person for embezzlement, as prima facie evidence of such embezzlement.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The difference in the two statutes is patent. In the instance of the statute under which the defendant was charged the Legislature made failure to comply with a proper demand prima facie proof of intent to embezzle. In section 28-543, R. R. S. 1943, the Legislature made a refusal to comply with a proper demand prima facie evidence of embezzlement.
Because in Bolln v. State, 51 Neb. 581, 71 N. W. 444, and Whitney v. State, 53 Neb. 287, 73 N. W. 696, we held the evidence sufficient under section 28-543, R. R. *696S. 1943, the court concludes that a prima facie case of intent to embezzle is sufficient to take this case to the jury in a prosecution under section 28-538, R. R. S. 1943: The court ignores the fact that the “other elements of the crime” have not been established.
There remains the void of evidence of appropriation or conversion by the defendant.
State v. Boatman, 142 Neb. 589, 7 N. W. 2d 159, 144 A. L. R. 585, was a prosecution under what is now section 28-543, R. R. S. 1943. In that case the court referred to the rule of strict construction applicable to all criminal statutes and held that any change in the act was a matter for legislative action and not’ judicial’ interpretation.
So here, if the refusal to comply with a proper demand under section 28-538, R. R. S. 1943, is to be made prima facie evidence 'of embezzlement and not “intent to embezzle,” that is a matter for legislative action and not judicial construction. The Legislature has said in section 28-538, R. R. S. 1943, only that it is prima facie proof of intent to embezzle. It involves only one element of the offense of embezzlement under the statute involved here: -
I now go to the demand which the court says was a “proper demand” under the statute and in and of'itself made-a prima facie case of embezzlement to take the case to the jury.
It was a demand to “refund * * * Approximately 57,000 gallons of gasoline * * * which is at this time missing and not properly- accounted for.” ' ■ ■ >
It was a demand for the “refund” of at least 15100 gállons (and under one version of the State’s evidence, 11,100 gallons) more gasoline thán the State claimed at any - timé was missing and not accounted for.
Was it a “proper demand”? Obviously the company knew it was demanding a refund of more gasoline than was unaccounted for. Obviously every one knew that the defendant could not refund' that gasoline.
*697If the defendant had agreed to the refund, under the court’s construction of the act, he would have been confessing guilt of embezzlement of more than the claimed shortage. If defendant had pointed out the over demand, then under the court’s theory he would have been admitting guilt of embezzlement of some amount. By denying the “refund” he, without more, under the court’s holding established evidence to go to the jury sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. The defendant did not have the chance of a person playing Russian roulette. Here every chamber of the gun was loaded against him.
Were the evidence of intent to embezzle as to these matters fully stated, I think it insufficient to sustain a conviction under the circumstantial evidence rule stated in Larson v. State, 161 Neb. 339, 73 N. W. 2d 388.
But I pass that. Conceding it sufficient to prove intent to embezzle, it does not prove the required element of conversion or appropriation.
In Nelson v. State, supra, an embezzlement case, we held: “* * * an unexecuted purpose to embezzle is not embezzlement * * * actual conversion with a felonious intent was essential to a conviction.”
In Reyes v. State, 151 Neb. 636, 38 N. W. 2d 539, we said: “A conviction should not be based on the weakness of the status of the accused, the embarrassing position in which he finds himself, or the mere fact that some unfavorable circumstances are not satisfactorily explained.”
All that is necessary under this decision to take a case of embezzlement to the jury under section 28-538, R. R. S. 1943, is for the State to submit evidence of a shortage of money or commodities and a “proper demand” to pay, refund, or deliver. Under this decision a manager of a store could be found guilty of embezzlement for shortages in cash from a money till used by other employees; for shrinkage in stored potatoes, if the full measure put in a bin were not accounted for; or flour leaking out *698through a rat hole where he could not prove when the leak began or the amount of leakage.
The State could prove a proper demand and without more a case for the jury is made, and without more a conviction must be sustained. I do not agree.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with directions to dismiss.