Court Opinion

ID: 9776755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:43:58.076859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:42.294547
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority in this cause on the following grounds: Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Crimi*199nal Procedure does prohibit oral confessions except in certain stated circumstances. The testimony used in this case as set out in the majority opinion cannot and does not constitute “a confession” or even an inculpatory statement in regard to the crime alleged.
However, this Court, over; the many years as presented by the majority opinion, has followed a primrose path in regard to these matters and has declared that any statement made while under arrest which was not in writing which did not lead to the fruits of the crime or to the weapon used to commit the crime was prohibited under said Article.
Fully realizing that the Legislature of Texas has had notice that this Court has so interpreted this statute over many years and has not seen fit to make a change in the same, I nevertheless dissent because calling a statement a confession when, in truth and in fact, it is simply a statement and not a confession to any crime is not reasonable nor rational.
I realize the hesitancy of the majority to overrule some 70 to 80 years of law in this regard, but feel that we must realistically approach the problem.1 Further, this Court should let a jury decide whether or not perjury has been committed. The ruling by the majority does not let the jury have that function. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed. 1 (1971), decided this in regard to Miranda warnings. It is equally compelling that we do the same.
Therefore, I would affirm the judgment in said cause and hold that the court did not err in admitting the statement made in a conversation between husband and wife while under arrest which did not amount to a confession.
ODOM, J., joins in this opinion.

.Where this Court recognizes a genuine need for change, the overruling of a long line of cases becomes only a secondary consideration. See Olson v. State, 484 S.W.26 756 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).