Court Opinion

ID: 9522601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:29:23.25314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:17.429550
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting: “A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A(1), at 218 (1965).) (Ward v. K mart Corp. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 132, 149, 554 N.E.2d 223, 231.) There is no question in the case at bar that plaintiff knew of the presence of the throw rug in defendants’ home and appreciated that it sometimes became rolled or rumpled up and could cause one to trip. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she visited defendants’ home every day for many months; that she always used the back-porch door; that the throw rug was always present on the floor of the back porch; and that she had stumbled over the rug on previous occasions. A possessor of land should anticipate harm to an invitee despite the invitee’s knowledge, or the obviousness, of the condition on the land, “where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A, Comment/, at 220 (1965).) (Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 149-50, 554 N.E.2d at 231.) There is no evidence in the instant case that defendants had any reason to expect that an invitee’s attention might be distracted as he or she was exiting the house through the back porch such that he or she would not discover the throw rug on the floor, or would forget having earlier encountered the throw rug on the floor, or would fail to protect himself against the throw rug on the floor. This is not a situation where the invitee might be distracted and fail to discover, or forget, a condition because he or she is carrying bulky items or merchandise which obstructs his or her view (see Ward v. K mart Corp. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 132, 554 N.E.2d 223) or because he or she is performing a distracting task on the land (see Shaffer v. Mays (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 779, 489 N.E.2d 35) or because he or she is distracted by the possibility of some other danger on the land. See Deibert v. Bauer Brothers Construction Co. (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 430, 566 N.E.2d 239. I conclude that defendants could not reasonably have been expected to foresee that plaintiff would become distracted and fail to discover, or remember, the throw rug on the floor of the porch, which she had previously encountered on numerous occasions. There was no reason to believe that plaintiff would be carrying bundles or packages which might obstruct her vision or distract her and make her forget the presence and danger of the rug on the floor, or that she would be engaged in some activity while using the porch to exit the house such as would distract her and make her forget the presence and danger of the throw rug or that she would be performing a distracting task which required her to turn her attention elsewhere. A possessor of land cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate injuries which would ordinarily only result if the invitee were negligent. (Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 152, 554 N.E.2d at 232.) A possessor of land need not anticipate injuries which result from an invitee’s mere inattentiveness to a known and obvious condition rather than a distraction of the invitee’s attention. There is nothing in the instant case to lead defendants to reasonably anticipate or foresee that an invitee’s attention might be distracted from the known and obvious throw mg on the floor. Defendants had no reason to anticipate that plaintiff would trip over the throw rag other than as a result of her own negligence. A rag throw rag is a commonly used household item and defendants were using it in the customary and ordinary manner. A possessor of land is not required to protect against the perpetual possibility that an invitee will hurt himself or herself under plain, ordinary conditions. (Bonamie v. Welsh (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 349, 350, 420 N.E.2d 243, 244.) Under the facts of this case, the presence of the throw rug on the porch floor did not create an unreasonably dangerous condition, and defendants had no duty to protect plaintiff from the throw rag, the presence and danger of which she was well aware. Accordingly, I conclude that defendants’ duty to exercise reasonable care toward plaintiff did not extend to the risk that plaintiff would trip over the known and obvious throw rag and fall into and through the glass-paneled storm door while exiting defendants’ residence. I would affirm the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants.