Court Opinion

ID: 9749678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:57:29.368151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:55.730355
License: Public Domain

MINTON, C.J.,
CONCURRING:
I concur in result and with most of the reasoning in the majority opinion, but I write separately to highlight a few key points.
First, I wish to make clear that with very few exceptions introduction of a party’s liability insurance coverage is prohibited by Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 411. And I believe that every effort should be made to reveal witness bias without resorting to introducing evidence of a party’s liability insurance coverage. While I wonder if Dr. Butcher’s bias here could have been shown without- resorting to admitting evidence of Dr. Woolum’s liability insurance coverage by the same carrier, I do not believe the trial court’s admission of the evidence was an abuse of discretion under the unique facts of this case.
Despite Dr. Butcher’s statement at trial that he did not believe this particular lawsuit would affect his own insurance premiums, his deposition testimony could reasonably support a contrary conclusion that he perceived a personal financial stake in the outcome of this case. For example, Dr. Butcher recounted how he was forced to flee another state to escape increased insurance premiums; and he described how insurance premiums had recently increased in Kentucky. He further recounted lawsuits that were filed against him and other doctors, frequently describing particular malpractice lawsuits as “nuisance suits.” In particular, the manner in which Dr. Butcher described his personal experiences and expressed opinions could lead to an inference that he generally harbored hostility toward malpractice lawsuits and perceived doctors as being persecuted by exorbitant insurance premiums caused by lawsuits that were almost always frivolous.
Further, I agree with the trial court that the fact that this expert practiced at the same hospital as' Dr. Woolum suggests that this expert might have perceived a personal financial stake in the outcome of this case. It is not clearly beyond the realm of possibility that a malpractice lawsuit filed against a doctor practicing at the same hospital might have a more direct effect on his premiums than other malpractice lawsuits.
Second, I acknowledge Dr. Woolum’s allegation that the ultrasound videotape was presented in such a theatrical manner as to heighten its prejudicial effect. Specifically, he asserts that the ultrasound videotape was played while Ms. Hillman occupied the witness stand and wept openly in full view of the jury. Upon review of the record provided us, I would note that Ms. Hillman is not directly visible on the portion of the trial videotape during which the ultrasound videotape was played. But her attorney can be seen handing her a box of tissues and a few soft sniffles can be heard during the playing of the ultrasound videotape.
Directly after the ultrasound videotape presentation, Ms. Hillman resumed her *295testimony in a composed manner with no emotional outbursts. Having reviewed this portion of the record, I conclude that although the ultrasound videotape was of dubious probative value, any error in its presentation was harmless given the inherent emotional nature of this case, the apparent lack of truly overwrought emotional display, and the fact that other evidence also established that the fetus was known to be viable with no apparent defects at that point.
Although perhaps the better practice might have been to not admit the ultrasound videotape — as the trial judge later admitted with the benefit of hindsight— the effect of the few minutes of unnarrated ultrasound videotape presentation was unlikely to have had a substantial effect on the judgment following a generally well-managed and fair multi-day trial. So any error was harmless. See Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688-89 (Ky.2009), citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). (“A non-constitutional evidentiary error may be deemed harmless, the United States Supreme Court has explained, if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error”). See also Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 61.01; KRE 103.
I concur with the majority that the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court judgment must be affirmed.
ABRAMSON, J., joins.