Court Opinion

ID: 9906710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 23:03:10.220595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:26.019645
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/4/23 P. v. Penaloza CA2/4
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

     IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                       DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B324354

       Plaintiff and Respondent,                              Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. PA003748
       v.

ERIBERTO GUEBARA
PENALOZA,

       Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Walgren, Judge. Affirmed.
      Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Gabriel Bradley,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
  INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In 1997, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Eriberto
Guebara Penaloza of two counts of first degree murder (Pen.
Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and two counts of robbery (§ 211). The
trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms of 25 years to life
on each murder count, plus a 1-year firearm enhancement. The
court stayed sentencing on the robbery counts under section 654.
On direct appeal, a different panel of this court affirmed the
judgment, in case number B116017 (Penaloza I).2
       In 2019, Penaloza filed a petition for recall of and
resentencing on his murder convictions under former section
1170.95.3 After holding an evidentiary hearing under former
section 1170.95, subdivision (d), the trial court denied the
petition, concluding the evidence showed Penaloza had been a
major participant in the robberies underlying his murder
convictions who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
We affirmed the trial court’s order denying relief. (People v.
Penaloza (May 3, 2021, B304714 [nonpub. opn.] (Penaloza II).)4

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2     We take judicial notice of our opinion in that case. (See
Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (a).)
3     Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute.
4     We granted Penaloza’s request for judicial notice of the
appellate record in Penaloza II.

                                  2
      In September 2022, Penaloza filed another petition for
resentencing and requested appointment of counsel.5 Without
appointing counsel, the trial court summarily denied the petition
on res judicata grounds. In making its ruling, the court noted
Penaloza had previously filed a section 1170.95 petition, the trial
court denied that petition, and this court affirmed the trial
court’s order denying the petition. Penaloza timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

   A. The trial court’s res judicata ruling was error

       On appeal, Penaloza argues the trial court prejudicially
erred, and violated his federal due process rights, by summarily
denying his petition on res judicata grounds. In support of this
contention, Penaloza correctly notes that when the trial court
denied his original section 1170.95 petition, it relied in part on
the statement of facts in our opinion in Penaloza I.6 Penaloza also
correctly notes the Legislature has since amended the statute to
prohibit such use of facts contained in prior appellate opinions
(see § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
974, 988), and argues, because of this material change in the
statute, the trial court’s reliance on res judicata in denying relief
was error. The Attorney General agrees the trial court erred by
relying on res judicata to deny relief.
       We agree with the parties. At Penaloza’s evidentiary
hearing under former section 1170.95, the prosecution stated it

5     Penaloza’s new petition referenced section 1170.95
although he filed it after the statute was renumbered to section
1172.6.
6     The opinion in Penaloza I is contained in the appellate
record of Penaloza II.

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was relying on the facts stated in this court’s opinion in Penaloza
I. Because the record clearly demonstrates the prosecution relied
on facts contained in our opinion in Penaloza I at the evidentiary
hearing, we conclude the issue litigated in Penaloza’s former
section 1170.95 proceeding was different from the issue presented
when he filed his second resentencing petition. For this reason,
we agree with the parties that the trial court’s denial of relief on
res judicata grounds was erroneous. (See People v. Barragan
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253 [res judicata applies only if the “issue
raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue
litigated in a prior proceeding”].)

   B. Remand is unwarranted because any error by the
      trial court was harmless
       Although the parties agree that the trial court erred, they
disagree over whether the error was harmless. They also disagree
over which harmless error standard should apply. Whereas the
Attorney General argues the applicable standard is that
articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
(Watson) (i.e., whether Penaloza can show it is reasonably
probable he would have received a more favorable outcome),
Penaloza argues the error should be deemed structural, or
alternatively, should be reviewed under the standard in
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17
L.Ed.2d 705] (Chapman) (placing the burden on the prosecution
to show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
Before analyzing whether the trial court’s error was harmless, we
will first address which harmless error standard applies.
       We conclude the Attorney General is correct that Watson
applies. We reject Penaloza’s assertion that the denial of his
petition under res judicata principles should be reversible per se.

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Implementing that standard would, among other things, be a
waste of judicial resources in cases where the record
demonstrates remand would be futile regardless of the error. We
likewise reject Penaloza’s argument that Chapman should apply.
That standard applies when a defendant’s federal constitutional
rights have been violated. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)
Because section 1172.6 is a state ameliorative statute, the trial
court’s erroneous application of the statute’s requirements
amounted merely to an error of state law, rendering Chapman
inapplicable. Because the trial court’s error was one of state
statutory law, the Attorney General is correct that Watson is the
applicable prejudice standard. (Cf. People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957-958, 973 (Lewis) [erroneous denial of section
1172.6 petition at prima facie stage without appointing counsel is
a purely state law issue reviewed for prejudice under Watson].)
       We now turn to whether the error here was harmless under
Watson. More specifically, the question is whether it is
reasonably probable Penaloza would have obtained a more
favorable outcome at a second evidentiary hearing at which the
facts from this court’s opinion in Penaloza I were excluded. We
conclude the answer is no, and consequently, the error was
harmless. In denying the original section 1170.95 petition, the
trial court did not rely solely on the facts contained in our opinion
in Penaloza I. It also relied on other relevant parts of the record
of conviction introduced into evidence by the parties, including
Penaloza’s admissions as recounted by a detective at Penaloza’s
preliminary hearing.7

7     Section 1172.6 (d)(3) (dealing with the evidentiary hearing
stage of section 1172.6 proceedings) explains: “hearsay evidence
that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to

                                  5
       At the preliminary hearing, Detective Lillian Johnson
testified she advised Penaloza of his constitutional rights and
then spoke with him. When speaking with Detective Johnson,
Penaloza waived his right to remain silent, then made various
admissions about his role in the robbery-murders. Penaloza told
her “his part in this case was to transport the two victims to a
predesignated location in Pacoima where [the victims] were going
to bring the cocaine[,] and a dope rip off was going to take place[ ]
[at which] the cocaine would be stolen from [the victims].”
Penaloza told Johnson the two actual killers were Carlos
Gutierrez and Juan Jose Paniagua. Penaloza also told Johnson
he was aware Paniagua dealt cocaine, and he was apprehensive
about introducing Paniagua to the victims, because he knew
Paniagua would set up drug deals, take the money and drugs,
and sometimes commit murder in order to accomplish these
robberies.
       Despite knowing Paniagua had committed similar robbery-
murders, Penaloza put the victims in contact with Paniagua and
Gutierrez. Penaloza also brought the victims to the location

subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing
as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another
exception to the hearsay rule.” Here, if the case were to be
remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, Penaloza’s admissions
implicating him as a major participant with reckless indifference
to human life would be admissible under various exceptions to
the hearsay rule, just as they were at the prior hearing. (Evid.
Code, § 1230 [hearsay declarations against interest are
admissible]; Evid. Code, § 1220 [hearsay party admissions are
admissible].) At the prior hearing, Penaloza’s counsel explicitly
asked the court to review the preliminary hearing transcript, and
the court took a recess in order to do so before ultimately denying
relief.

                                  6
where they were murdered. Penaloza knew he was bringing the
victims there so Paniagua and Gutierrez could steal their drugs.
When Penaloza was on his way with the victims, he started to
feel bad, thought about telling one of the victims he was going to
be robbed, but then decided not to divulge this information.
Penaloza said he “didn’t know [ ] [the victims] were going to get
killed, but he knew they were going to get robbed.” After the
victims were killed, Penaloza fled the scene with the shooters.
Paniagua gave Penaloza $2,000, told him to go to Mexico, and
told him he would get the rest of his money after they sold the
drugs.8
       Given Penaloza’s admissions, it is not reasonably probable
that a finder of fact would conclude Penaloza was not a major
participant in the robberies or did not act with reckless
indifference to human life.9 For this reason, the trial court’s error
in applying res judicata principles to deny relief, as well as the
court’s error in not appointing counsel and allowing briefing (see
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957 [appointment of counsel and
opportunity for briefing are required under section 1172.6]), were
both harmless.10

8     Paniagua originally offered Penaloza $10,000 for
participating in the robbery. Another participant, Angel Rosalez,
offered Penaloza $5,000.
9     Indeed, in light of the facts contained in the preliminary
hearing transcript, even assuming Chapman applied, we would
find the error harmless under that standard as well.
10    We likewise reject Penaloza’s argument that the trial
court’s summary denial of his petition violated his federal due
process rights. (Cf. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972-973

                                  7
                         DISPOSITION

      The order denying Penaloza’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

MORI, J.

[failure to appoint counsel under section 1172.6 is error under
state statutory law only].)

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