Court Opinion

ID: 9535915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:46:32.948757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:23.128639
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s construction of section 21(e) and its decision that Pielet’s automobile shredding operation is not exempt from the permit requirement contained therein. The majority bases its conclusions on a reading of the “evils decried in section 20(aX2)” and on legislative intent. However, as the Illinois Supreme Court has stated, “Legislative intent is to be derived primarily from a consideration of the legislative language itself. ‘There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.’ ” (People ex rel. Scott v. Schwulst Building Center, Inc. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 365, 371, 432 N.E.2d 855.) The language contained in section 21(e) is unambiguous. It excepts any operation whose refuse is “generated by the operator’s own activities.” Here, Pielet is engaged in the business of shredding auto parts and culling valuable components for resale. The refuse, “fluff,” is a by-product of this activity. Because Pielet’s automobile shredding business generates this refuse, his operation falls within the literal meaning of the section 21(e) exemption. A permit should, therefore, not be required. For this reason, I would reverse the order of the Illinois Pollution Control Board.