Court Opinion

ID: 9963576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 19:27:25.42714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:52.768166
License: Public Domain

J-A24008-23

                               2024 PA Super 84

 EUGENE SCHRIVER, IV                     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant             :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 LAURA SCHRIVER AND LANGUAGE             :   No. 1896 EDA 2022
 SERVICES ASSOCIATES                     :

                Appeal from the Order Entered July 1, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
                     Civil Division at No: 2021-14959

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY STABILE, J.:                              FILED APRIL 25, 2024

     Appellant, Eugene Schriver, IV, appeals from the July 1, 2022 order

sustaining the preliminary objections of Appellees, Laura Schriver (“Laura”)

and Language Services Associates (“LSA”). We affirm in part, vacate in part,

and remand.

     LSA is a language translation company. Laura is LSA’s president and

CEO, and Appellant, Laura’s son, was LSA’s executive vice-president prior to

his resignation in August of 2009. This appeal arises from the second of two

actions filed by Appellant against Appellees. The first was filed in 2018 (the

“2018 Complaint”). In it, Appellant claimed that he owned 12 shares of LSA

stock, and that LSA had the right, under the parties’ Stock Restriction

Agreement (“SRA”) to purchase those shares upon his “termination” (as

opposed to resignation) from LSA’s employment. In any event, Appellees did
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not move to repurchase the stock until 2011, at which time they claimed the

right under the SRA to repurchase Appellant’s shares for $600,000.00.

Appellant disputed that claim, countering that the SRA permitted Appellees to

repurchase Appellant’s shares upon his termination or not at all. Appellant

also claimed that $600,000.00 was a below-market price for his stock.

       The 2018 Complaint alleges that the parties eventually reached a

settlement of their dispute (the “Settlement Agreement”).1 Exhibit B to the

2018 Complaint is a draft written settlement agreement never signed by

Appellees.    Appellant claims Appellees represented to him that the written

draft substantially sets forth the terms of the parties’ Settlement Agreement.

The   written    draft   contemplated          that   Appellees   would   pay   Appellant

$600,000.00 for six shares of his stock and the greater of $600,000.00 or six

percent of the fair market value of LSA in 2017. 2018 Complaint, at ¶ 22.

Appellant alleged that Appellees partially performed their obligations under

the Settlement Agreement and then breached. Appellant then filed the 2018

Complaint alleging causes of action for breach of the Settlement Agreement,

detrimental reliance, unjust enrichment, and conversion. The civil action on

the 2018 Complaint remained pending as of the filing of this appeal.2

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1  We are cognizant that Appellees contest the existence and validity of a
Settlement Agreement in their defense of the 2018 Complaint. Nothing in this
opinion is intended to express an opinion on that issue.

2 Appellees represent in their brief that discovery is ongoing in that case.
Appellees’ Brief at 4, 8.

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       On July 9, 2021, Appellant filed the instant action (the “2021

Complaint”), alleging counts of fraud, minority shareholder oppression, and

declaratory judgment. These claims, per Appellant’s brief, “involve many of

the   same     background      allegations     that   are   referenced   in   the   2018

Complaint[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 7. But Appellant claims he could not have

known in 2018 of Appellee’s alleged fraudulent scheme, in Appellant’s words,

“fraudulently inducing Appellant into believing that there was an enforceable

Settlement Agreement […] when, in fact, as was discovered during [Laura’s]

deposition, taken in discovery in the litigation of the 2018 Complaint, that

Appellees never had any intention of fully performing their obligations under

the Settlement Agreement[.]”           Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.     For that reason,

Appellant posits that the causes of action in the 2021 Complaint are distinct

from those of the 2018 Complaint and could not have been joined in the 2018

Complaint.

       On August 9, 2021, Appellees filed preliminary objections to the 2021

Complaint, in which they alleged that Appellant waived all the claims in his

2021 Complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d),3 and pursuant to the gist of

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3   Rule 1020(d) provides:

       (d) Failure to Join--Waiver. If a transaction or occurrence gives
       rise to more than one cause of action heretofore asserted in
       assumpsit and trespass, against the same person, including
       causes of action in the alternative, they shall be joined in separate
       counts in the action against any such person. Failure to join a
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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the action doctrine.        Appellant answered the preliminary objections on

September 3, 2021. The parties filed competing briefs, and on June 27, 2022,

the trial court entered an order sustaining Appellees’ preliminary objections

and dismissing Appellant’s 2021 Complaint.        The trial court amended that

order on July 2, 2022. This timely appeal followed.

       In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court reasoned that Appellant’s

minority shareholder oppression and declaratory judgment causes of action

were waived because they sought monetary, rather than equitable, relief.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/22, at 2-3. The court agreed with Appellees that

1020(d) required Appellant in this case to allege all his causes of action in his

2018 Complaint, and that he therefore waived the causes of action in his 2021

Complaint.      The trial court noted that Appellant’s minority shareholder

oppression and declaratory judgment causes of action expressly requested an

award of damages in excess of $50,000.00.4 Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/22,

at 3; 2021 Complaint, Ad Damnum clauses following ¶¶ 95 and 101.5 The

trial therefore reasoned that these two causes of action are not equitable in

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       cause of action as required by this subdivision shall be deemed a
       waiver of that cause of action as against all parties to the action.

Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d).

4 Likewise, the cover page of the 2021 Complaint describes the action as an

intentional tort.

5   The parties refer to these clauses as the ad damnum clauses.

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nature because an adequate remedy exists at law.          Trial Court Opinion,

11/21/22, at 3.

      As to Appellant’s fraud claim, the trial court found it barred by Rule

1020(d) and by the gist of the action doctrine. The trial court reasoned that

Appellant’s fraud claim arises out of Laura’s alleged breach of the Settlement

Agreement.     “[I]f the [Settlement Agreement] is a valid and enforceable

contract […] Appellees’ non-performance, even if based upon an intent never

to perform, constitutes a breach of contract, not fraud.” Trial Court Opinion,

11/21/22, at 5.    The trial court further noted that Appellant used nearly

identical language to assert his 2018 breach of contract claim and his 2021

fraud claim. Id. at 6-7.

      Appellant took this timely appeal from the trial court’s order, presenting

the following questions:

      I.     Whether Appellant’s claims asserted […] for minority
             shareholder oppression and […] declaratory judgment
             constituted equitable claims which were not required to
             have been brought by Appellant pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
             1020(d) in his earlier 2018 Complaint.

      II.    Whether Appellant should have been afforded the
             opportunity to amend Counts II [Minority Shareholder
             Oppression] and III [Declaratory Judgment] of his 2021
             Complaint to clarify any ambiguity that may have existed as
             to the equitable nature of such claims, given that such
             amendments are supposed to be liberally permitted.

      III.   Whether    Appellant’s   claim   for  fraud    (intentional
             misrepresentation) is not barred by the gist of the action
             doctrine where it does not assert an alternative claim for
             Appellees’ failure to perform under the Settlement
             Agreement, but instead asserts that Appellees intentionally

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            “tricked” Appellant into believing that Appellees intended to
            perform on the purported Settlement Agreement when, in
            fact, Appellees never had such an intention.

      IV.   Whether     Appellant’s   claim    for  fraud   (intentional
            misrepresentation) in Count I of Appellant’s 2021 Complaint
            is waived pursuant to either [Pa.R.C.P.] 1020(d) or […]
            1033(a) where Appellant filed his 2021 Complaint asserting
            his new fraud claim that was predicated upon a set of facts
            and circumstances that were not previously known and were
            distinct from those asserted in his 2018 Complaint.

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4.

      On review of an order sustaining preliminary objections, we must

determine whether the averments in the complaint, along with any attached

exhibits and documents, would support recovery if proven.       McNaughton

Prop., LP v. Barr, 981 A.2d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. 2009). We must consider

all the material facts alleged in the complaint, as well as all inferences

reasonably deducible therefrom, as true. Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d

937, 941 (Pa. Super. 2011). Where, as here, an order sustaining preliminary

objections will result in the dismissal of a suit, the trial court may sustain

preliminary objections only if the case is free and clear from doubt. Godlove

v. Humes, 303 A.3d 477, 481 (Pa. super. 2023). We reverse the trial court

only in the event of an error of law or abuse of discretion.    McNaughton

Prop., LP, 981 A.2d at 224. An abuse of discretion may occur, for example,

where the trial court dismisses a case without leave to amend in a case where

an amended complaint would not be futile. Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d 540, 557

(Pa. Super. 2014).

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      We consider Appellant’s first two questions together. Appellant claims

his declaratory judgment and minority shareholder oppression claims were

equitable in nature, and that the trial court erred in finding otherwise. Both

claims, according to Appellant, request from the trial court a legal declaration

that Appellant remains the owner of 12 shares of LSA stock that were his at

the time of his resignation from LSA. Appellant claims the SRA gave Laura

the right to repurchase his LSA stock upon his “termination” but not upon his

“resignation.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. And, in that circumstance, Appellant

was obligated to sell the stock upon Laura’s election to redeem. Appellant

also challenges the timing of Laura’s election to repurchase and cancel

Appellant’s shares of LSA stock, approximately a year and a half after

Appellant’s departure from LSA.     Appellant’s Brief at 15.   Given Appellees’

partial performance and payment under the Settlement Agreement, Appellant

believes a declaration of his continued status as a minority owner of LSA, and

protection of his rights as such, is necessary.

      “[E]quity has jurisdiction only in the absence of full, complete, and

adequate remedy at law.” City of Philadelphia v. Armstrong, 271 A.3d

555 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). Thus, if the trial court is correct that Appellant’s

shareholder oppression and declaratory judgment actions have a full remedy

at law, we must affirm its order as to these counts.       Appellant’s minority

shareholder oppression claim rests on the principle that majority shareholders

have a duty to protect the interests of minority shareholder. See Hill, 85

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A.3d at 550 (noting the “long-recognized principle of Pennsylvania law that

‘majority shareholders have a duty to protect the interests of the

minority.’”) (quoting Ferber v. Am. Lamp Corp., 469 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Pa.

1983) (emphasis added in Hill). Moreover, “[a] claim of oppressive conduct,

like a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, ‘sounds in equity[.]” Ford v. Ford,

878 A.2d 894, 899 (Pa. Super. 2005).6

       Our review of the 2021 Complaint reveals that Count II of the 2021

Complaint (minority shareholder oppression), alleges, among other things,

that Appellees have excluded Appellant from “receiving the true value of

[Appellant’s] LSA stock, including without limitation, [Appellant’s] rights as a

minority shareholder, including actual and de facto shareholder distributions

to which [Appellant] has been entitled but denied.” 2021 Complaint, at ¶ 87.

Appellant    further    alleges    that    Appellants   “have   systematically   and

intentionally frustrated [Appellant’s] reasonable expectations and legal

entitlements as a current minority shareholder of [LSA].” Id. at ¶ 89. At the

conclusion of Count II, Appellant requests financial damages and a court order

for Appellees to acquire his shares of LSA stock at market value. Id. at the

Ad Damnum clause following ¶ 95.               In Count III of the 2021 Complaint

(Declaratory Judgment), Appellant requests a declaration that he remains the

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6  Ford involved the appointment of a custodian, pursuant to 15 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1767(a) in response to the minority shareholders’ claim of oppressive
conduct by the majority shareholder.

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owner of his 12 shares of LSA stock. 2021 Complaint at ¶ 101 and the Ad

Damnum clause following ¶ 101.

       We are cognizant that both ad damnum clauses include a boilerplate

request for damages in an amount greater than $50,000.00. Count II, as

noted just above, seeks an order directing Appellees’ to complete their

acquisition of Appellant’s LSA stock at market value. In essence, Appellant

wants money, and money can be recovered in an action at law. Hence, the

trial court’s finding that these counts do not sound in equity.

       But despite Appellant’s inartful pleading, we conclude that the trial court

erred in dismissing Appellant’s declaratory judgment and minority shareholder

oppression causes of action. Both causes of action sound in equity.7 Both

counts, separately and in tandem, allege harms for which there is no adequate

remedy at law.       Reading the facts alleged in the complaint along with all

reasonable inferences therefrom, as we must under the applicable standard

of review, Appellant claims Appellees acted in disregard of his rights as a

minority shareholder in LSA and seeks a declaration that he remains a minority

shareholder. While Appellant may have sustained financial damages due to

Appellees’ alleged disregard of his minority shareholder status, the 2021

Complaint seeks to establish his continued status as a minority shareholder of

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7  We are aware that the fiduciary duty of majority shareholders has been
construed variously as an action sounding in equity or tort. Linde v. Linde,
220 A.3d 1119, 1147-48 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 236 A.3d 1048
(Pa. 2020). In either case, equitable relief is available. Id. at 1148.

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LSA, to whom the majority shareholders owe a duty. These requests are not

remediable by money damages.             Indeed, the nub of Appellant’s argument

appears to be that he did not contest the Appellees’ repurchase of his 12

shares of LSA stock, in accordance with his obligations under the Settlement

Agreement, so long as Appellees were performing their obligations by making

payments thereunder.          Because Appellees’ payments ceased earlier than

Appellant believes they should have, and because there is an ongoing dispute

as to the validity and terms of the Settlement Agreement, Appellant has

sought a declaration of his continued ownership of 12 shares of LSA.

       Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Counts II and III seek forms

of relief not remediable at law, and further that an amended complaint could

address any confusion in this regard.8             Perhaps, as Appellees argue,

Appellant’s ultimate aim is not equitable relief but the monetary damages he

sought in the 2018 Complaint. And perhaps a final resolution of the litigation

of the 2018 Complaint will obviate the need for further litigation of the case

before us.     In the future, the parties may address these issues with any

appropriate motions.       At the pleadings stage however, we do not believe

dismissal of Appellant’s shareholder oppression and declaratory judgment

causes of action was appropriate, as both claims request some relief for which

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8An ad damnum clause is permitted at any point in the litigation. R.P. Clarke
Personnel, Inc. v. Commonwealth Nat’l Bank, 559 A.2d 560, 566 (Pa.
Super. 1989).

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no adequate remedy is available at law.          Appellant’s request for some

remedies more appropriate to an action at law can be addressed in an

amended complaint.

      It follows from the foregoing that Appellant has not waived his equitable

claims under Rule 1020(d), because that rule applies only to tort and contract

actions: “If a transaction or occurrence gives rise to more than one cause of

action heretofore asserted in assumpsit and trespass, against the same

person, including causes of action in the alternative, they shall be joined in

separate counts[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d)(emphasis added). Our Supreme Court

has recognized that “Rule 1020(d) concerns causes of action sounding in

assumpsit and trespass, not equity.” D’Allesandro v. Wassel, 587 A.2d

724, 726 n.2 (Pa. 1991) (emphasis added). Rule 1020(d) therefore does not

bar the causes of action at Counts II and III of Appellant’s 2021 Complaint

insofar as they seek equitable relief.

      Having disposed of the first two questions presented, we now turn our

attention to the third and fourth, in which Appellant challenges the trial court’s

conclusions that his fraud claim was waived under Rule 1020(d) and/or barred

by the gist of the action doctrine. We begin with Rule 1020(d). As noted

above, Rule 1020(d) requires joinder of trespass and assumpsit actions arising

out of the same occurrence. The 2018 Complaint includes a cause of action

for breach of the Settlement Agreement, and the fraud claim in the 2021

Complaint alleges fraud based on allegedly newfound evidence that Appellees

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never intended to perform their obligations under the Settlement Agreement.

Because the former claim sounds in assumpsit and the latter in trespass, Rule

1020(d) mandated joinder if the two causes of action arose from the same

occurrence.

       This Court considered this issue in Hineline v. Stroudsburg Elec.

Supply Co., Inc., 586 A.2d 455 (Pa. Super. 1991), appeal denied, 598 A.2d

284 (Pa. 1991). This Court first noted that

             Rule 1020(d) is to “be liberally construed to secure the just,
       speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
       proceeding” to which it is applicable. Pa.R.C.P. 126. The purpose
       of Rule 1020(d) is to avoid multiplicity of suits, thereby ensuring
       the prompt disposition of all rights and liabilities of the parties in
       a single suit.

Id. at 456.9 Cases arise out of the same transaction or occurrence “where

they involve ‘a common factual background or common factual or legal

questions.’” Id. (quoting Stokes v. Local Order of Moose Lodge No. 696,

466 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Pa. 1983)). Likewise, the Hineline Court quoted with

approval the following definition of transaction:

               A ‘transaction’ within the statutes as to counterclaims is
       defined as the act of transacting or conducting any business,
       negotiation, management, or proceeding. The word, as used in
       counterclaim statutes, is broad and comprehensive, and is
       construed liberally and according to its natural and ordinary
       signification. In other words, the term is not a technical one and
       must be construed according to the context and approved usage.
       It is broader in meaning than ‘contract’ or ‘tort,’ and it may include
       either or both. It means any act as affecting legal rights or

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9We are cognizant that Rule 1020(d) has been amended since Hineline. The
amendment does not affect Hineline’s applicability to the present case.

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       obligations, and properly embraces an entire occurrence out of
       which a legal right springs or on which a legal obligation is
       predicated, although it has been held that the term is not
       synonymous with ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence.’

Id. at 457 (quoting U.S. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. M. London, Inc., 487 A.2d 385,

393 (Pa. Super. 1985)).

       The plaintiff in Hineline filed suit for wrongful termination after he was

fired for disabling the audio/video surveillance system his company used on

employees.      He filed a separate lawsuit alleging, among other things, a

violation of the Wiretap Act10 and invasion of privacy. The Hineline Court

noted that both complaints involved “identical or substantially the same

factual allegations[.]” Id. at 458. Thus, both cases would involve proof of

the employer’s aural monitoring of its employees and customers and the

plaintiff’s disconnection of the equipment. Pretrial discovery would have been

duplicative and two separate juries would have considered the same evidence

and many of the same legal questions. The Hineline Court concluded, for

these reasons, that both cases arose out of the same occurrence and that Rule

1020(d) barred the latter.        Id. at 459.      This Court rejected the plaintiff’s

argument that the employer’s use of surveillance equipment and the plaintiff’s

subsequent termination for disconnecting it arose from different occurrences.

“But for [the employer’s] use of the illegal equipment, [plaintiff] would not

have a cause of action for wrongful discharge.” Id. “We disagree that the

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10   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5701, et. seq.

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phrase ‘same transaction or occurrence’ within the meaning of Rule 1020(d)

should be so stringently interpreted as to mean a single fact or instantaneous

event, rather than a combination of acts and events giving rise to a right to

judicial relief.” Id.

      A careful review of both of Appellant’s complaints reveals that they

describe the same facts—Appellant’s resignation from LSA, followed by a

dispute as to the terms of Appellees’ repurchase of Appellant’s LSA stock,

followed by the alleged negotiation, partial execution, and breach of the

Settlement Agreement. 2018 Complaint at ¶¶ 7-36, 2021 Complaint at ¶¶ 6-

72. The 2021 Complaint is longer and more detailed because it expounds on

some of the underlying facts, such as by clarifying that Appellant’s 2009

departure from LSA was a resignation, not an involuntary termination. 2021

Complaint at ¶¶ 6-7.    Likewise, the 2021 Complaint includes a detailed

account of the terms of the SRA and Appellees’ alleged failure to comply

therewith in their attempts to repurchase Appellant’s stock. Id. at ¶¶ 9-36,

65-69. The detailed account of the SRA terms was absent from the 2018

Complaint. Likewise, the 2021 Complaint provides a more detailed factual

account of the alleged Settlement Agreement, Appellees’ alleged partial

performance, and the alleged subsequent breach, than did the 2018

Complaint. Compare 2021 Complaint, at ¶¶ 37-64, with 2018 Complaint,

¶¶ 20-36.    Nonetheless, the operative facts are the same, and they were

known to Appellant prior to the filing of the 2018 Complaint.

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      Most significant, for present purposes, is that the 2018 Complaint

alleges that, in 2017, Appellees, after they ceased making payments under

the Settlement Agreement, “claimed to be ‘unaware’ of [the Settlement

Agreement] or any additional payments to be made to [Appellant].” 2018

Complaint, at ¶ 36. Similarly, the 2021 Complaint alleges that,

            “In November of 2017, despite the above Settlement, and
      notwithstanding [Appellees’] partial performance of the specific
      terms of that Settlement which [Appellant] has now learned was
      part of the Fraudulent Scheme, [Appellees] repudiated the
      Settlement and denied any obligation to make a final payment
      to [Appellant] as provided by the Written Settlement Agreement.”

2021 Complaint, at ¶ 64 (emphasis added).        Thus, it is clear from both

complaints that Appellees disputed the existence (and/or terms) of the alleged

Settlement Agreement prior to the filing of the 2018 Complaint. The 2021

Complaint simply recharacterizes Appellees’ pre-existing intent not to comply

with the Settlement Agreement as a “fraudulent scheme,” as seen in ¶ 64 and

elsewhere throughout that document.

      Appellant now argues that he was not aware of Laura’s deception until

her deposition during the litigation of the 2018 Complaint. But the allegations

in both the 2018 and 2021 Complaints belie that claim.        Both complaints

expressly allege that Appellees informed Appellant in 2017 that they did not

intend to do what Appellant believed they had agreed to do under the

Settlement Agreement.

      In Hineline, this Court explained that a “transaction,” within the

meaning of 1020(d), is broader in meaning than either a contract or tort and

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can include both. Further, the term encompasses an entire occurrence out of

which a legal right arises.   Hineline, 586 A.2d 457.     Instantly, the entire

occurrence out of which the 2018 and 2021 Complaints spring is the parties

negotiation, execution, and performance of the Settlement Agreement. And

while Appellant alleges both contract and tort causes of action arising out of

that transaction, Hineline makes clear that a transaction can encompass

both.

        Likewise, Appellant’s 2021 fraud cause of action depends on the same

operative set of facts as the causes of action in the 2018 Complaint. Here, as

in Hineline, discovery will likely be duplicative, and juries would decide the

same or substantially similar legal and factual questions. The instant fraud

cause of action turns on Appellant’s allegation that Appellees entered into the

Settlement Agreement with no intention of performing their obligations. But,

as the trial court noted, Appellees have disputed their assent to the Settlement

Agreement and its terms.        And even if Appellees are unsuccessful in

establishing that no Settlement Agreement existed, their nonperformance of

the Settlement Agreement sounds in breach of contract, not in fraud. Here,

just as in Hineline, the cause of action in the second complaint would never

exist but for the events that led to the first complaint.     Here, just as in

Hineline, the single instantaneous event of Laura’s deposition testimony does

not remove the fraud cause of action from the combination of acts and events

that gave rise to the relief requested in the 2018 Complaint.        For these

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reasons, we conclude that the fraud count arises from the same transaction

or occurrence as the causes of action in the 2018 Complaint, and that

Appellant has waived his fraud claim under Rule 1020(d).

      In summary, we have concluded that the declaratory judgment and

minority shareholder oppression causes of action in the 2021 Complaint sound

in equity and therefore can go forward. The trial court erred in sustaining

Appellees’ preliminary objections to those counts. The fraud cause of action

in the 2021 Complaint is barred under Rule 1020(d).        We affirm the trial

court’s order insofar as it sustained Appellees’ preliminary objection to the

fraud count. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      Order affirmed in part and reversed in part.           Case remanded.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 4/25/2024

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