Court Opinion

ID: 9650960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:57:46.450758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:27.897330
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the result.
The trial court predicated its decision on two grounds: (1) that it was without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought and, (2) that the issues tendered in the instant case were adjudicated by the court in the divorce action, and that the parties were , concluded as to those issues by the judgment in the divorce action under the doctrine of res judicata.
12 Okl.St.Ann. § 1278 provides that when a divorce shall be granted, the court shall make such division between the parties of the real and personal property acquired by the parties jointly during their*marriage as may appear just and reasonable and that • the division of the property may be either in kind or by setting the same apart to one of the parties and requiring the other to ■pay such sum as may be just and proper to effect a fair and just division thereof. The separation agreement involved in the instant case provides for a division between the Schoonovers of the real and personal property acquired by them jointly during their marriage. In the case of Wheeler v. Wheeler, 167 Okl. 598, 32 P.2d 305, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma announced what it stated was the mandatory duty of the divorce court under § 1278, supra, when the husband and wife had entered into a contract for a division of the property acquired by them jointly during their marriage and presented such contract to the divorce court for its sanction. I cannot agree that the duty of the divorce court, as *531laid down in the Wheeler case, is merely to scrutinize the contract and see if it is fair and equitable and, if found to be so, approve it and, -if not, to set it aside and by its decree make a fair and equitable division of the property.
Under 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 977, the Jaw of the case is stated in the syllabi.1 2In the Wheeler case, syllabus 1 by the court reads: “1. When a husband [and] wife enter into an agreement fair and just, free from fraud, coercion, or undue influence, and they present the same for sanction in a court of equity in settlement and disposition of their property rights in the event a divorce is granted to either of the parties, the court in every case should scrutinize such a transáction very closely to ascertain whether the same was fairly entered into and whether or not the same is reasonable, just, and fair to the parties to the agreement. The court, in the exercise of its chancery powers and the mandatory statutory duty, must look beyond the terms of the agreement to ascertain all the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution and consider the relationship' of the parties at the time of the trial, their ages, needs, health, financial conditions, opportunities to provide for themselves, and the part each performed in acquiring and contributing to the joint estate in order that the court may make such a division of the property jointly acquired during their marital relation as may appear just and reasonable.”
I think that syllabus, read in the light of the text of the opinion, means that the divorce court, before approving and confirming an agreement for a division of the property jointly acquired during marriage, should look beyond the agreement, ascertain all the facts and .circumstances surrounding its execution, determine that it was free from fraud, coercion, or undue influence and is reasonable, just, and fair to the parties.
Practical difficulties arise in the application of that part of the doctrine of res judicata, commonly called “conclusiveness of' judgment,”2 to the adjudication in the divorce proceedings.
Whether fraud was practiced upon Mrs. Schoonover as an inducement to her to enter into the separation agreement was not put in issue by the pleadings in the divorce proceeding. It is the general rule that the judgment of a court on an issue not submitted for its decision by the parties is not conclusive in a subsequent proceeding.3 However, it has been held that, where a statute gives a probate court in a proceeding to sell real estate for the payment of decedent’s debts, power to ascertain and settle priorities among lienholders, the judgment of the court is conclusive against a lienholder although his claim was not put in issue by the pleadings.4
Moreover, the record in the instant case failed to show affirmatively that such issue of fraud was decided by the divorce court. The only pertinent finding made by the divorce court with respect to the agreement was that it was “fair, just and equitable,” and was entered into by the parties “upon competent and able advice * * * and should he approved.” The judgment merely confirmed the agreement. A party, setting up a former judgment as an estoppel, has the burden of proving that the particular point or question, as to which he claims the estoppel, was in issue and determined in the former suit.5 Here, Schoonover did not meet that burden.
The jurisdiction of the United States District Court in equity is not coexistent with the jurisdiction of a state court in equity, but is limited to the equity jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the separation of the American Colonies from England.6 Hence, the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant a divorce. Neither did it have jurisdiction to allow alimony, approve and confirm a property settlement in a separation agreement, or make a division of property jointly acquired by the *532husband and wife during marriage, either as an original proceeding in chancery, or as an incident to a divorce.7
But here the separation agreement was not merged in the judgment of the divorce court and the trial court did have jurisdiction, either to enforce the contract or to award damages for a fraud practiced upon Mrs. Schoonover as an inducement to the separation agreement, provided she had acquired, subsequent to the divorce decree, a domicile in a state other than the state of her husband’s domicile and the requisite jurisdictional amount was involved.8
Accordingly, it is my conclusion that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.

 Corbin v. Wilkinson, 175 Okl. 247, 52 P.2d 45, 47.

 See Henderson v. United States Radiator Corp., 10 Cir., 78 F.2d 674, 675.

 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 732, page 223.

 Farmers’ National Bank of Greenville; Ohio v. Green, C.C.S.D., 4 F. 609, 613.

 Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 62 U. S. 582, 584, 16 L.Ed. 226.

 Pierce v. National Bank of Commerce, 8 Cir., 268 F. 487, 496; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 843, page 430.

 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 529, 52 S.Ct. 217, 76 U.Ed. 447.

 Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 62 U.S. 582, 588-600, 16 L.Ed. 226.