Court Opinion

ID: 9642810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:09:38.742046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:52.649642
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing- and to Modify
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff contends in his motion for rehearing that the Dubinsky brothers never demanded, a trial by ,the judge and therefore cannot raise this question for the first time on appeal. When the original order of reference was made, the defendants, other than Commerce Trust Company, objected thereto because,the reference was not authorized by Section 515.020. -We held in the principal opinion that the reference of counts III and IV was not authorized,, and the reason that such unauthorized reference was prejudicial was because thfe objecting parties were denied a trial of the issues by the judge. In the answer to the amended petition, where count. Ill was first so designated and count IV was. first made a part of the petition, the defendants named in these two counts preserved all “protests and objections heretofore made of record,” one of which,was that there was no authority for the reference. In the motions for new trial it was contended that there was no authority for the reference and that the movants were “entitled to a trial by the court, and not before a referee, of the issues tendered by counts III and IV.” It it also noted that Section 515.010 provides that all or any of the issues of fact in an action may be referred “upon the written consent of the parties”, and that Section 515.020 provides .for reference without written consent in only three situations. *924These two sections provide the only method whereby any issue of fact may be referred. It is not contended that there was any consent in writing to the reference. The defendants named in counts III and IV preserved throughout their objection to the reference on the ground that it was not authorized by Section 515.020, and they did nothing whereby it could be contended that they waived the requirement that the consent be in writing.
Plaintiff also contends for the first time in his motion for rehearing that the authority of a court to refer any suit in equity to a referee is contained in Section 1.010, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. That section provides that “The common law of England and all statutes and acts of parliament made prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, and which are of a general nature, * * * not repugnant to or inconsistent with * * * the constitution of this state, or the statute laws in force for the time being, shall be the rule of action and decision in this state, any custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding, but no act of the general- assembly or law of this state shall be held to be invalid, or limited in its scope or effect by the courts of this state, for the reason that the same may be in derogation of, or in conflict with, such common law, or with such statutes or acts of parliament; but all such acts of the general assembly, or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent and meaning thereof.” Plaintiff ‘cites State ex rel. South Missouri Pine Lumber Company v. Dearing, 180 Mo. 53, 79 S.W. 454. It is there stated that by reason of this statute the circuit courts are invested with the powers of an English Court of Chancery except so far as those powers may have been limited by statute. Other cases hold that these powers can be divested “by express legislative enactment”, State ex rel. and to use of Kenney v. Johnson, 229 Mo.App. 16, 68 S.W.2d 858, 860, by a, legislative act “directly and irreconcilably opposed thereto in terms”, State v. Dalton & Fay, 134 Mo.App. 517, 114 S.W. 1132, 1136, or by “express enactment or by inexorable implication”, Arnett v. Williams, 226 Mo. 109, 125 S.W. 1154, 1157. The principal opinion was based upon the theory that a court of equity at common law did not require or need legislative authority to order a reference to a master in chancery of any issue in a case, but that now the power of a court of equity in Missouri to refer issues to a referee has beep expressly limited by statute to the situations provided for in Chapter .515, notwithstanding the rule at common law, and we adhere to that view. The other matters raised in the motion for rehearing do not require additional comment.
Appellants have filed a motion to modify the opinion, and they urge that their objections to venue should have been sustained. When the original petition was filed objection to venue was made for the reason that the petition did not state a cause of action against Commerce Trust Company and because the petition did not state a joint cause of action against all the defendants. The first objection was disposed of in the principal opinion. In support of the second objection appellants cite State ex rel. Thompson v. Terte, 357 Mo. 229, 207 S.W.2d 487, and State ex rel. C. H. Atkinson Paving Company v. Aronson, 345 Mo. 937, 138 S.W.2d 1. These cases, upon first, reading, appear to support appellant’s position, but in State ex rel. Campbell v. James, Mo.Sup., 263 S.W.2d 402, this court had this exact question before it and held that in order to obtain jurisdiction and venue pursuant to Section 508.010, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., it was not a requirement that a joint cause of action be stated against all defendants. See also State ex rel. Baker v. Goodman, 364 Mo. 1202, 274 S.W.2d 293.
Appellants also point out that we did not rule on the contention that no cause of action was stated in count IV of the *925amended petition pertaining to the- constructive trust. ■ It is recalled that count • IV. first came into existence after the hearing before the referee had been concluded. In view of this unusual procedure all questions other than the validity of the reference ate expressly not ruled so that the normal and usual trial court procedures pertaining to count IV may be followed.
Appellants also suggest that this court re-allocate costs- in the trial court. This is a matter the trial court should pass on originally.
Respondent’s motion-for rehearing or in the alternative to transfer to the court en banc and appellants’ motion to modify are overruled.