Court Opinion

ID: 9952746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 17:01:28.658549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:09.983655
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-4089     Document: 010111019010      Date Filed: 03/20/2024      Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         March 20, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  SHERMAN ALEXANDER LYNCH,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                        No. 23-4089
                                                    (D.C. No. 4:20-CV-00093-DN)
  SEAN D. REYES,                                              (D. Utah)

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Sherman Alexander Lynch, a Utah inmate proceeding pro se, appeals the

 district court’s denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) motion for

 relief from judgment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                   BACKGROUND

       In August 2020, Mr. Lynch filed an initial pleading entitled “Petition for

 Redress Against Utah Attorney General Sean D. Reyes . . . Under the Fourteenth

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-4089    Document: 010111019010        Date Filed: 03/20/2024     Page: 2

 Amendment.” R. vol. I at 5. In it, Mr. Lynch alleged that Mr. Reyes violated his

 constitutional rights by lying throughout Mr. Lynch’s criminal and habeas

 proceedings.

       In November 2021, the district court construed Mr. Lynch’s “Petition for

 Redress” as a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court dismissed the

 complaint with prejudice, reasoning that Mr. Lynch’s civil-rights claims were barred

 by Supreme Court precedent. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)

 (holding that a § 1983 action that would invalidate a plaintiff’s underlying conviction

 is barred unless the conviction has been reversed or invalidated). Alternatively, the

 district court concluded that Mr. Lynch’s allegations did not adequately link

 Mr. Reyes to any alleged civil-rights violation and that Mr. Reyes’ alleged acts

 during court proceedings were covered by prosecutorial immunity.

       The court also determined that Mr. Lynch improperly requested habeas relief

 and instructed that any habeas claims must be made in a separate habeas petition.

 Finally, the court noted that “neither liberal interpretation of [Mr. Lynch]’s claims

 nor opportunity to amend would lead to a different result.” R. vol. III at 317.

 Mr. Lynch did not timely appeal.

       In October 2022, Mr. Lynch moved for relief from judgment under Rule

 60(b)(1) and requested leave to amend his complaint. He argued the district court

 made several mistakes in its November 2021 order dismissing his complaint. The

 district court denied the motion and Mr. Lynch timely appealed.

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Appellate Case: 23-4089    Document: 010111019010        Date Filed: 03/20/2024     Page: 3

                                     DISCUSSION

       A court may “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment,

 order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). “A ‘mistake’ may occur if the district court made a

 substantive mistake of law in its order.” Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1249

 (10th Cir. 2007).

       We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for “an abuse of discretion,

 keeping in mind that Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary and may only be granted in

 exceptional circumstances.” Lebahn v. Owens, 813 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2016)

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “[w]e will not reverse the district

 court’s decision on a Rule 60(b) motion unless that decision is arbitrary, capricious,

 whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

 Mr. Lynch represents himself, so we construe his filings liberally. See Hall v.

 Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

       Mr. Lynch asserted in his motion that the district court made several mistakes

 in its November 2021 order dismissing his complaint. In support, he argued the

 court: (1) improperly construed his Fourteenth Amendment petition as a § 1983

 action, because he did not file his claims under § 1983; (2) misinterpreted his petition

 as an attack on his underlying conviction, as he never requested to have his

 conviction invalidated; (3) mistook his petition for a second habeas petition when he

 was not requesting habeas relief; (4) incorrectly determined that he did not

 adequately link Mr. Reyes to any alleged civil-rights violation, because Mr. Reyes

                                             3
Appellate Case: 23-4089    Document: 010111019010         Date Filed: 03/20/2024    Page: 4

 was the presiding attorney in his habeas proceedings; and (5) mistakenly afforded

 Mr. Reyes prosecutorial immunity because Mr. Reyes was not involved in his

 criminal proceedings.

       The district court determined that Mr. Lynch was not entitled to relief under

 Rule 60(b)(1) and denied the motion. The court first explained that it construed

 Mr. Lynch’s claims under § 1983 because they “were most closely aligned” with a

 “federal civil-rights action” under that provision. R. vol. III at 344. Next, the court

 said that it notified Mr. Lynch “that he could not seek habeas relief in a civil-rights

 case” because his petition noted that he sought “to protect his statutory right to a writ

 of habeas corpus.” Id. at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       The court further explained that, under § 1983, because Mr. Reyes was in a

 supervisory role, and did not personally participate, he could not be affirmatively

 linked to the alleged constitutional violations. The court also rejected Mr. Lynch’s

 prosecutorial immunity argument, noting that his “claims alleged [Mr. Reyes’]

 unconstitutional behavior in pursuing and preserving [his] criminal conviction” and

 concluding that “[t]hese acts inherently involved advocacy in legal proceedings.” Id.

 Finally, the court denied Mr. Lynch’s motion to amend his initial pleading because

 his supporting argument merely repeated arguments that the court had previously

 rejected.

       Mr. Lynch asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

 Rule 60(b) motion. We have explained that “Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary and

 may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.” Lebahn, 813 F.3d at 1306

                                             4
Appellate Case: 23-4089    Document: 010111019010         Date Filed: 03/20/2024     Page: 5

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our precedent also establishes that parties

 seeking relief under Rule 60(b) have a higher hurdle to overcome “because a Rule

 60(b) motion is not a substitute for an appeal.” Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill

 Hodges Trucking Co., 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990). On appeal, Mr. Lynch

 largely repeats the arguments advanced in his motion. He has not demonstrated that

 the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 60(b) motion. We

 therefore affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court.

                                     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Mr. Lynch’s motion to

 appoint an attorney.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Carolyn B. McHugh
                                             Circuit Judge

                                             5