Court Opinion

ID: 9852523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:32:18.721086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:29.128699
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree on the admissibility of defendant’s pre-arrest statements and that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding.
However, I dissent on the issue regarding defendant’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests.
South Dakota Constitution Article VI, § 9, plainly states: “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself....” (Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 429 (S.D.1984) (Neville II), this Court held that a motorist’s “refusal to submit to a blood test is evidence of a testimonial nature and thus within the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.” *133This Court further held, however, that the refusal was not compelled and thus the refusal was not within the self-incrimination protection.
Two Justices of that Court held the refusal to be “forced,” “coerced,” and “compelled” and thus inadmissible at trial because it was within the protection afforded by the self-incrimination clause. See State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d at 431-33 (Dunn, J., concurring in result; Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). I have not deviated from my writing in Neville II. Nor do I do so now. I read where the majority is now deviating from its writings in Neville I and II and now holds that the refusal to perform tests does not constitute communicative or testimonial evidence.
The refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is evidence of a communicative or testimonial nature which is being compelled by the actions of the State, and thus is within the purview of the individual right against self-incrimination. Upon a police officer’s request to perform field sobriety tests, a motorist is providing the State with evidence that may be used against him at trial. The motorist is compelled to provide direct evidence by performing the field tests or is compelled to provide evidence of a communicative or testimonial nature, by refusing to comply with the officer’s request. A motorist can, of course, submit to the tests, and thereby provide direct evidence that may or may not prove his innocence. No amount of warning, however, can vitiate the compulsion inherent in this Hobson’s choice, and the refusal to submit to field sobriety tests cannot be placed before the jury as evidence to convict. A trumpet of warning should be sounded. We are but a breath away from the conclusion that pre-arrest silence is admissible (citizen stands mute when requested to take test) and therefore incriminatory.
The State Legislature, unlike the blood test, has passed no law requiring field sobriety tests. In a word, there is no such law. This Court now makes such a law. The doctrine of separation of powers, forsooth!
This decision seriously erodes State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976). As I pointed out in my writing in Neville II, this state opted that its highest Court will grant protection to its citizens under the South Dakota Constitution independent from federal interpretation. We chose to not follow a federally oriented interpretation of our constitution. We chose to follow a state-specific interpretation. See 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324 (1982). Our constitution was independently adopted and should be a document of independent force. We, in South Dakota, have a right to independently determine our own constitutional questions; and, if we see fit, to grant a greater protection than required under the federal constitution. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975). The distinction between “evidence” in our state constitution and “testimony” in the federal constitution, is highly relevant.