Court Opinion

ID: 9426298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:17:29.63725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:00.120201
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Rehnquist,
with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
Petitioners seek $1 million damages from their employer and their union on the grounds that they were wrongfully discharged from their jobs. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents, finding that the issues had been finally decided as to respondent Anchor Motor by the arbitration committee and that petitioners had failed “to show facts comprising bad faith, arbitrariness or perfunctoriness on the part of the Unions.” The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment as to the local Union, holding that the issue of bad faith should not have been summarily decided. However, as to respondent Anchor Motor the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that where, as here, the collective-bargaining agreement provided that arbitra*574tion would be final and binding, the decision of the arbitrator would not be upset, “absent a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, bad faith, dishonesty of purpose, or such gross mistake or inaction as to imply bad faith on the part of the Union or the employer.” 506 F. 2d 1153, 1157 (1974). This Court, assuming arguendo that the Union breached its duty of fair representation for the reasons set forth in the opinion, reverses as to Anchor Motor, holding that the Union’s breach of its duty to its members voided an otherwise valid arbitration decision in favor of the company. I find this result to be anomalous and contrary to the longstanding policy of this Court favoring the finality of arbitration awards.
In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967), this Court held that, where the union has prevented the employee from taking his grievance to arbitration, as provided in the collective-bargaining agreement, he may then turn to the courts for relief. This decision bolstered the consistent policy of this Court of encouraging the parties to settle their differences according to the terms of their collective-bargaining agreement. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, 566 (1960). By subjecting the employer to a damages suit due to the union’s failure to utilize the arbitration process on behalf of the employees, the Vaca decision put pressure on both employers and unions to make full use of the contractual provisions for settling disputes by arbitration.
The decision in this case will have the exact opposite result. Here the Court has cast aside the policy of finality of arbitration decisions and established a new policy of encouraging challenges to arbitration decrees by the losing party on the ground that he was not properly represented.
The majority cites Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F. 2d 179, 180 (CA9 1974), for the proposition that “it *575makes little difference whether the union subverts the arbitration process by refusing to proceed as in Vaca or follows the arbitration trail to the end, but in so doing subverts the arbitration process by failing to fairly represent the employee.” Ante, at 572. To the contrary, I believe that the existence of a final arbitration decision is the crucial difference between this case and Vaca. The duty of “fair representation” discussed in Vaca was the duty of the union to put the case to a fair and neutral arbitrator, a step which the employee could not take by himself. 386 U. S., at 185.
Here the case was presented to a concededly fair and neutral arbitrator but the claim is that that arbitration decision should be vacated because the employee did not receive “fair representation” from the Union in the sense of representation by counsel at a trial. Obviously this stretches Vaca far beyond its original meaning and adopts the novel notion that one may vacate an otherwise valid arbitration award because his “counsel” was ineffective.
As noted, such a principle violates this Court’s policy favoring the finality of arbitration awards. It also has no basis in the statutory provisions respecting arbitration. Section 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act, which is in use in many States, sets forth the grounds for vacating an award. These include awards having been procured by corruption or fraud, and arbitrators’ exceeding their powers or exhibiting evident partiality. The federal statute governing arbitration, 9 U. S. C. §§ 1-14, provides similarly narrow grounds for vacating an award. § 10. Nowhere is any provision made for vacation of an award due to ineffective presentation of the case by a party’s attorney or representative.
The Court’s decision is particularly vexing on the facts of this case. Petitioners had at their own disposal *576all of the information necessary to present their case. If they had felt that the Union had not brought this information fully to the attention of the arbitration committee or that further investigation was necessary they could have so informed the committee. There is no indication that they did so. Rather, they allowed, without protest, the arbitration to proceed to a decision and when that decision was adverse they brought suit against the company and the Union.
Now the employer, which concededly acted in good faith throughout these proceedings, is to be subjected to a damages suit because of the Union’s alleged misconduct. In view of the fact that petitioners have an action for damages against the Union, see Czosek v. O’Mara, 397 U. S. 25 (1970), this additional remedy against the employer seems both undesirable and unnecessary.
For the reasons stated I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.