Court Opinion

ID: 9941242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 13:02:19.707905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:24.979752
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

                            UNNI HASKELL,

                               Appellant,

                                   v.

         PCP GROUP, LLC, a Florida limited liability company,

                                Appellee.

                             No. 2D22-1800

                           February 16, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Pinellas County; Cynthia Newton, Judge.

Kenneth G. Turkel and David A. Hayes of Turkel Cuva Barrios, P.A.,
Tampa; Kristin A. Norse, Robert W. Ritsch, Stuart C. Markman, and
Brandon K. Breslow of Kynes, Markman & Felman, P.A., Tampa, for
Appellant.

Marie A. Borland, Gregory P. Brown, Jacob Z. Coates, and Sean P.
Mullen of Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A., Tampa; Lindsay Patrick-Lopez of
Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O'Neill & Mullis, P.A., Tampa, for
Appellee.

KELLY, Judge.
     Unni Haskell appeals from the summary judgment order that
requires her, as the owner of membership shares (units) in a limited
liability company, PCP Group, LLC, to sell those units to PCP. That order
was based on the trial court's interpretation of a written instrument—
PCP's operating agreement. We review a summary judgment order de
novo. Smith v. Frontier Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 805 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2001). The de novo standard also applies to decisions involving the
interpretation of written instruments. Gillis v. Jackson Shores
Townhomes Ass'n, 351 So. 3d 668, 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).
      [When] . . . the construction of a written instrument and the
      legal effect to be drawn from the instrument is at issue, the
      appellate court is not restricted in its ability to reassess the
      meaning and effect of the instrument, and the appellate court
      may reach a conclusion contrary to the conclusion of the trial
      court.
Smith, 805 So. 2d at 977.

      Before we address the merits of the trial court's interpretation of
PCP's operating agreement, a brief history of how Unni became the owner
of the units is in order. Unni was awarded the units as part of the
equitable distribution scheme when she and John Haskell, her husband
of thirty-nine years, dissolved their marriage. John is PCP's manager
and at the time of dissolution was the owner of several units in PCP. The
judge presiding over the dissolution action determined that John's
ownership interest in PCP should be divided equally, but she also found
that the existence of multiple lawsuits involving PCP made it impossible
to accurately value John's interest so that half of that value could be
awarded to Unni. For that reason, the judge declared that Unni would
"hereafter" be the owner of half of John's units and ordered John to
immediately transfer those units to Unni. The judgment further provided
that should Unni "ever want to divest herself" of the units, John would
have the right of first refusal.
      John appealed from the dissolution judgment; significantly,
however, he did not challenge the portion of the judgment that gave Unni
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ownership of the units and directed that they be immediately transferred
to her. And although PCP was a named party in the dissolution action, it
did not appeal from the dissolution judgment.
     Despite the unchallenged directive that John immediately transfer
half of his units to Unni, John instead sold those same units to another
member of PCP. Unni challenged this sale by moving to enforce the
dissolution judgment. In defense of the sale, John relied on the same
provision of PCP's operating agreement that PCP relies on in this appeal.
The dissolution court rejected John's position, found that the transfer
was invalid, and set aside the sale of Unni's units declaring that Unni
was the owner of the units as stated in the dissolution judgment. John
appealed from that order arguing that under PCP's operating agreement
the sale was proper; however, this court affirmed the trial court's order.
See Haskell v. Haskell, 258 So. 3d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (table
decision).
     This was the situation when PCP instituted the present declaratory
judgment action in another attempt to divest Unni of ownership of the
units awarded to her in the final judgment of dissolution. PCP's
complaint asked the court to declare that its operating agreement
required Unni to sell her shares back to the company—the same
argument John had previously used in the enforcement action to defend
his attempted sale of the units. Specifically, PCP argued that section
9.3.1, titled "Deemed Offers to Sell" ("DOTS"), was controlling and
required Unni to sell her shares.
     Section 9.3 of PCP's operating agreement provides in pertinent part:
          9.3.1 Deemed Offers to Sell. Notwithstanding
     anything in this Agreement to the contrary, a Member shall
     be deemed to have made an Offer to Sell . . . , and the
     Company and the Non-Selling Class A Members shall have

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     the right to purchase . . . , all of such Member's Units upon
     the occurrence of any of the following events (provided,
     however, any Transfer permitted under Section 9.1 of this
     Agreement shall not be a deemed Offer to Sell under this
     Section 9.3), of which such Member . . . must give prompt
     written notice to the Company and the Non-Selling Class A
     Members:
           ....
           (e) Divorce. The attempt by a Member or his or her
     spouse . . . to Transfer any Units . . . pursuant to any court
     order issued or court ordered property settlement agreement
     entered into in connection with, a suit for dissolution of
     marriage, legal separation or any similar status.
PCP contends that because Unni received her units as the result of a
final judgment of dissolution, the DOTS provision was triggered and Unni
must offer to sell her units to PCP.
     PCP's argument is not supported by the plain language of section
9.3.1(e). It is undisputed that Unni is the owner of the units and that
ownership of the units was transferred to her in the final judgment of
dissolution. Under section 9.3.1(e), the DOTS procedure applies when
an owner attempts to transfer units, not after ownership is transferred.
PCP's argument rewrites the operating agreement to impose an obligation
on the transferee of a completed transfer when on its face section 9.3.1(e)
imposes an obligation on a transferor who is attempting a transfer under
one of the listed circumstances.
     Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred when it denied
Unni's motion for summary judgment and entered summary judgment in
favor of PCP. We therefore reverse the summary judgment order and
remand with instructions to enter final summary judgment in favor of
Unni pursuant to her motion for summary judgment.
     Reversed and remanded with instructions.

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ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM J., Concurs.
ATKINSON, J., Concurs in result only.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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