Court Opinion

ID: 9452588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:45:20.515038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:16.618700
License: Public Domain

REGISTER, District Judge
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent. Because of the nature of the issue involved in this case and the scope of the majority opinion, I desire to express my views in some detail.
As the statute involved and the charging portion of the indictment are quoted, and the essential facts are fairly stated in the majority opinion, they will not be here repeated.
*370■ While, in general, the language of the statute is clear and precise, certain words included therein have been subject to judicial interpretation. The offense defined is composed of specific elements. In United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2 Cir. 1962), cert. den. 370 U.S. 939, 82 S.Ct. 1586, 8 L.Ed.2d 808, rehearing den. 374 U.S. 858, 83 S.Ct. 1860, 10 L.Ed. 2d 1083, referring to appellants’ contention that Section 10.01 was not applicable to the conduct for which they were convicted, the court stated, at page 454:
“Analysis of the Section reveals no ambiguity. The elements of the offense are 1) a statement, 2) falsity, 3) that the false statement be made ‘knowingly and wilfully,’ and 4) that the false statement he made in a ‘matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.’ (Citation.)”
It should be noted that the current weight of authority is that “materiality” of the statement is also an essential element of the offense, and that this is the law of this circuit. Brethauer v. United States, 333 F.2d 302, 306 (8 Cir. 1964).
In many of the cases referred to by the majority the critical issue (or one of the critical issues) involved the interpretation of the term “statement” as used in the statute. An excellent review of these cases and the applicable law is found in Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5 Cir. 1962). The statement made by the appellant herein is not merely a negative response to a question put by a government agency, or an “exculpatory no”; it is a positive statement made to agents of the F.B.I. for the purpose of initiating a federal prosecution against Lt. Maxey under the Civil Eights laws of the United States. It is clear that the appellant’s statement in this cáse is within the meaning of the term “statement” as used in Section 1001.
For purposes of this appeal, it has also been established that appellant’s statement is false and was made “knowingly and willfully” although, as is pointed out by the majority, there is some evidence in the record to the contrary. This was a question for the jury, and was determined adversely to the appellant. The most recent pronouncement of this court concerning the applicable rule, of which I am aware, may be found in Anderson v. United States, 369 F.2d 11 (8 Cir. December 2, 1966) and is therein stated as follows:
“The general rule must again be recognized that all evidence is to be viewed in a light most favorable to the government as the prevailing party and all reasonable inferences must similarly be resolved in its favor. (Citations.)”
The Court in Bryson v. United States, 238 F.2d 657 (9 Cir. 1956), cert. den. 355 U.S. 817, 78 S.Ct. 20, 2 L.Ed.2d 34, rehearing den. 355 U.S. 879, 78 S.Ct. 138, 2 L.Ed.2d 110, at page 662 stated:
“The weight of the evidence, including all factors of credibility which do not render the testimony incredible as a matter of law is beyond the scope of appellate review of jury verdicts.”
Also see: Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 742 (9 Cir. 1962).
This court in Brethauer, supra, 333 F. 2d at page 306, held that “ * * * an essential element of the offense of making a false, fictitious or fraudulent statement proscribed by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, is that such statement relates to a ‘material fact’.” Materiality of the alleged false statement was charged in the indictment in this case, and was an issue determined by the court. United States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523, 529 (4 Cir. 1963), cert. den. 375 U.S. 953, 84 S.Ct. 444, 11 L.Ed.2d 313; United States v. Parker, 244 F.2d 943, 950 (7 Cir. 1957), cert. den. 355 U.S. 836, 78 S.Ct. 61, 2 L.Ed.2d 48. The trial court, recognizing this principle, specifically instructed the jury concerning the materiality of appellant’s statement.
And in Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d 245, 246 (8 Cir. 1963) this court said:
“In determining whether a false statement is material, the test is whether it ‘has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in *371making a determination required to be be made.’ (Citations.)”
This statement was subsequently approved in Brethauer, supra. Also see: Freidus v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 223 F.2d 598, 601 (1955), and Brandow v. United States, 268 F.2d 559, 564-565 (9 Cir. 1959). Tested by this criteria, it appears that the “materiality” of the allegedly false statement is beyond question; no exception was taken to the trial court’s instruction concerning this matter.
We are in agreement that the F.B.I. is an “agency” of the United States government. For a detailed history of the creation and purpose of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and for the proposition that it is within the definition of “agency” within the meaning of the statute, see United States v. Stark, 131 F.Supp. 190, 194 (D.C.Md.1955).
From the foregoing it is obvious that all of the essential elements of the statute are established in the instant case unless the “jurisdiction” of the F.B.I. to investigate crimes against the United States is not the “jurisdiction” envisioned by Section 1001. This must be determined by the interpretation placed on the word “jurisdiction”, and the test by which we are bound is the Congressional intent.
Whether a matter is “within the jurisdiction” of a department or agency of the government, within the meaning of the statute is a question of law for determination by the court. The interpretation of that phrase must be made in the light of the legislative intent as it has been disclosed by the Acts of Congress. Terry v. United States, 131 F.2d 40, 44 (8 Cir. 1942); Pitts v. United States, 263 F.2d 353 (9 Cir. 1959), cert. den. 360 U.S. 935, 79 S.Ct. 1457, 3 L.Ed.2d 1547, rehearing den. 361 U.S. 857, 80 S.Ct. 47, 4 L.Ed.2d 97; and Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118, 123 (10 Cir. 1961), cert. den. 365 U.S. 878, 81 S.Ct. 1028, 6 L.Ed.2d 190.
While It is my understanding that there is no substantial disagreement concerning the interpretation of “statements” or “matter” or “department or agency” (as those terms are used in the statute), and their applicability to the facts herein present, I think it should clearly appear that a reversal must rest solely upon the interpretation of the word “jurisdiction”, and believe that significance should be attached to the very broad interpretation uniformly placed upon those other words by the Courts and the reasoning of those courts in arriving at their conclusions — reasoning involving consideration and application of the same general principles here required for ascertaining congressional purpose and intent.
The majority refer to the legislative history of the statute and the circumstances under which the 1934 Amendment was passed and state:
“Obviously, the immediate and primary purpose in amending the old ‘fraudulent claims’ statute was to curtail the flow of false information to the newly created regulative agencies. Though the statute was drafted in broad inclusive terms, presumably due to the numerous agencies and the wide variety of information needed, there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended this statute to have application substantially beyond the purposes for which it was created.”
However, all courts do not agree with this conclusion. In McCue, supra, it was established that the defendants had voluntarily appeared before Treasury agents who were conducting an investigation concerning their income tax returns and, in the course of such examination, knowingly and willfully made certain false statements. On appeal, the defendants contended that Section 1001 was not applicable to the conduct for which they had been convicted. After stating the elements of the offense as hereinbefore quoted, the court said (301 F.2d, pp. 454, 455):
“The legislative history does not suggest that the purpose of the amendment was in any way intended to be confined to the specific situations *372which were mentioned. The very broad language of the amendment suggests that these situations were merely cited as examples of the kind of conduct which the statute was designed to prohibit. And the quite different character of the two examples which were given may also be taken as representing the broad application intended for the statute.
‘A greater variety of false statements were meant to be included. There is no indication in either the committee reports or in the congressional debates that the scope of the statute was to be in any way restricted.’ United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 507, 75 S.Ct. 504, 507, 99 L.Ed. 594 (1955).
“The main thrust of appellant’s argument with respect to Section 1001 is that the Section is intended to protect the processes of government from interference and obstruction and not to require ‘the citizen to speak truthfully to police officers.’
******
“The great weight of judicial authority supports the applicability of Section 1001 to the circumstances of the present case. The recent cases in which the Supreme Court has concerned itself with the Section contain no suggestion of confining the effect of the statute to any smaller area than that encompassed by its own broad language. On the contrary there are indications that the Court rejects any theory of narrow applicability.”
The conclusion of the majority with respect to the purpose and scope of the statute, I believe, is much more limited and restricted than that stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Gilliland et al., 312 U.S. 86, 61 S.Ct. 518, 522, 85 L.Ed. 598 (1941). In that case, at page 93, the Court stated that the apparent congressional intent in enacting what is now Section 1001 was to “ * * * protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described.” This expression of congressional purpose has been adopted and restated on many subsequent occasions by various courts. See: United States v. Van Valkenburg, 157 F.Supp. 599, 600 (D.C.Alaska 1958); Cohen v. United States, 201 F.2d 386, 392 (9 Cir. 1953), cert. den. 345 U.S. 951, 73 S.Ct. 864, 97 L.Ed. 1374; Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 171 (10 Cir. 1955); Pitts, supra, 263 F.2d p. 358; Gonzales, supra, p. 123; Ogden, supra, 303 F.2d p. 742; and Paternostro, supra, 311 F.2d p. 302.
Not only are all of the essential terms used in the statute common, well-understood words, but they are general and broad in meaning, and have been uniformly so interpreted by the courts, consistent with the congressional purpose as pronounced in Gilliland. Concerning the term “statement”, there is no distinction between those made in writing and those made orally, United States v. Beacon Brass Co., Inc., et al., 344 U.S. 43, 73 S.Ct. 77, 97 L.Ed. 61 (1952) and McCue, supra, and cases therein cited, and includes both those made under oath, McCue, supra, and those which are unsworn, Knowles, supra. “Statements” are not limited to those required to be made by law or regulation, Neely v. United States, 300 F.2d 67, 93 A.L.R.2d 718 (9 Cir. 1962), cert. den. 369 U.S. 864, 82 S.Ct. 1030, 8 L.Ed.2d 84, and include those made to investigating officers, De Casaus v. United States, 250 F.2d 150 (9 Cir. 1957), cert. den. 356 U.S. 949, 78 S.Ct. 914, 2 L.Ed.2d 243. The language of the statute contains no restrictions concerning the person to whom the false statement need be made; in fact, the “statement” may come within the purview of the statute even though made to an individual not an agent or employee of the federal government. See: Pitts, supra; United States v. Giarraputo, 140 F.Supp. 831 (E.D.N.Y.1956); and Ebeling et al. v. United States, 248 F.2d 429, 434 (8 Cir. 1957), cert, den., Emerling v. U. S., 355 U.S. 907, 78 S.Ct. 334, 2 L.Ed.2d 261. The “statements” need not have been relied upon by the “agency”, and their purpose need not have *373been accomplished. Brandow, supra; and Blake, supra.
With reference to the term “department” or “agency” within the meaning of Section 1001, the Supreme Court in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 75 S.Ct. 504, 508, 99 L.Ed. 594 (1955), stated, at page 509:
“The development, scope and purpose of the section shows that ‘department,’ as used in this context, was meant to describe the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government.”
The only definitive limitation appearing in the statute is that the “matter” be “within the jurisdiction of” any department or agency of the United States.
The foregoing discussion illustrates, in my view, the very wide area and comprehensive circumstances to which the courts have held Section 1001 applicable, considering its legislative history, broad and unambiguous language, and its purpose as expressed in Gilliland.
The majority states that to interpret the statute as argued by the government would result in an absurdity, in that the penalty for its violation would be more severe than that for perjury. A similar argument was advanced in Gilliland. In that case it was argued that the penalty prescribed in Section 35 of the Criminal Code (which was amended by the 1934 Act) was greater than that fixed by a later Act — that of 1935 — and that this variance was significant in its construction and application. The Court, in rejecting this contention, stated (312 U.S., p. 95, 61 S.Ct. p. 523):
“The matter of penalties lay within the discretion of Congress. Section 35 covered a variety of offenses and the penalties prescribed were maximum . penalties which gave a range for judicial sentences according to the circumstances and gravity of particular violations.”
In this connection, also see United States v. Beacon Brass Co., Inc., supra.
The majority is of the opinion that the effect of an interpretation such as that argued for by the government would be to invest in law enforcement officials a formidable and dangerous power, and that “If the Congress wanted unsworn statements to investigative officials to serve as the basis for severe criminal punishment, we think it would have said so in clear, direct and positive terms.” Nevertheless, the statements constituting the basis for the prosecutions and resulting convictions in many of the cited cases were “unsworn statements to investigative officials.” See, by way of illustration: Cohen, Knowles and Neely, supra, wherein the unsworn statements were made to Internal Revenue agents engaged in investigations into tax matters. The prosecution in De Casaus, supra, was predicated upon the making of a false statement (oral and unsworn) to a special agent of the Commodity Credit Corporation during the course of an official investigation.
It is of interest to note that some investigative officers are empowered to administer oaths, but that the agents of the F.B.I. have no such authority except in certain specified areas. Title 5, U.S.C.A., Section 93. Internal Revenue agents have been so authorized by the provisions of Title 26, U.S.C.A. Section 7602.
After concluding that the statute must be construed in a limited sense, the majority determines the issue presented here (i. e., the limits of the statute as applied to the facts) by what is, in my view, an exceedingly narrow and restricted sense of the term “jurisdiction” as used in the Act. Conceding that “(^’Jurisdiction is a word of many meanings”, the accepted definition is then quoted from Gonzales — “Jurisdiction means the right to say and the power to act” — and the majority then approves the reasoning of the court in Stark, supra, to the effect that: “In like manner the important functions of the Department of Justice with respect to criminal offenses against the United States is the power to investigate and initiate prosecutions, but not the power to decide whether a criminal offense has been committed.” It is interesting to note that the writer of the *374opinion in Gonzales is the same Judge who authored United States v. Levin, 133 F.Supp. 88 (D.C.Col.1953), in which the majority finds strong support. A careful reading of Levin, however, justifies, in my opinion, an understanding that the very basis and foundation of that opinion was the author’s conviction that, to be within the purview of the statute, the “statement” had to be one given under a legal obligation to make or give the requested information. In fact, in Levin, at page 89, the author states: “No decision has been found which holds that the failure to tell the truth to an agent or representative of a department or agency of the United States by a person under no legal obligation to speak, is a violation of Section 1001.” Subsequently, the courts have overwhelmingly rejected this position and specifically held .that such failure does constitute a violation of the statute. See: Cohen, Knowles and Neely, supra.
In support of this restrictive definition, which would so drastically limit the otherwise broad, general and inclusive language of the Act, reliance is placed upon the “total view of the case law”, and the reluctance of courts to go beyond four specified areas into which the vast majority of the cases involving Section 1001 have been placed. I agree with the categorization of the cases cited, insofar as the factual situations are concerned, but in my view the prudent and reasonable conclusion to draw is that these are the areas in which (human nature being what it is) the proscribed false statements would normally arise. I am not persuaded that such categorization logically supports the conclusion that the factual situation in this case is excluded from the purview of the statute.
In support of the majority’s view that the courts generally have been reluctant to extend the reach of the statute beyond the four areas enumerated, three cases (Patemostro and Stark, supra, and United States v. Davey, 155 F.Supp. 175 (S.D. N.Y.1957)) are referred to as cases which “ * * * based their decisions upon the fact that the F.B.I. initiated the investigation and the information received was merely in reply to direct questions.”, and that “Such information was not considered to be a ‘statement’ as set forth in the statute.” It is then stated that a fourth case Levin, supra, “ * * * flatly refused to apply Sec. 1001 to voluntary statements given to the F.B.I. during the investigation of a crime.” As previously shown, we are not here presented with any problem concerning the actual existence of a “statement.” In Levin the false statement upon which the indictment was based consisted of an oral statement, not made under oath, to an F.B.I. agent during the course of an investigation. Without belaboring the point I point out that the court in the later case of Brandow, supra, stated, at 268 F.2d, page 564:
“United States v. Levin, * * * differs from the instant case, because there no sworn statement was involved. But see Marzani v. United States, supra. Regardless of any alleged factual differences, however, we decline to follow the reasoning of United States v. Levin, supra, or United States v. Stark, D.C.D.Md.1955, 131 F.Supp. 190, neither of which is binding on this Court. In reaching this conclusion, we prefer the reasoning of the later case of United States v. Van Valkenburg, D.C. D.Alaska 1958, 157 F.Supp. 599, as well as our earlier decisions herein cited, and our recent opinion of Pitts v. United States, 9 Cir., 1959, 263 F.2d 353.” (Emphasis added.)
In United States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y.1959), the defendant was charged with a violation of Section 1001, and the false statement involved was “a negative exculpatory denial of a suspected source of income”, made orally and under oath to a Special Agent of the Intelligence Division, Internal Revenue Service, during the course of the latter’s investigation. The court therein concluded that the oral statement made by defendant did not constitute a “statement” within the meaning of the statute, but such conclusion was based upon the expressed premise that the false denials *375did not in any way pervert the investigative functions of the Internal Revenue Service — a premise advanced, in principle, by the majority here.
The court in Philippe clearly considered its conclusion and reasoning to be consistent with and in accord with Levin, as it stated, at page 584:
“There is persuasive authority supporting the conclusion we here reach. * * * United States v. Levin, * * *»
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in which the district court in Philippe is located, in United States v. McCue, supra, commented:
“The only case to which we have been cited which supports a contrary result is United States v. Philippe, 173 F.Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y.1959). We reject the reasoning and the result in that decision.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I do not believe it can be seriously questioned but that, if the statute “be construed according to its literal and natural import" (Gilliland, supra), the acts of the appellant in this case constitute a clear violation of the statute involved. In Van Valkenburg, supra, the facts closely parallel those here. In that case the defendant made a positive effort to have a third person charged with a federal crime and for that purpose affirmatively stated to an Assistant United States Attorney that the person accused had stolen certain cheeks and cashed them by means of a forgery. The court, in overruling defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, held that
“Such governmental action (that sought by the defendant) is clearly within the jurisdiction of the office of the United States Attorney.” (157 F.Supp., page 602)
The majority holds that the only “matters” within the purview of the statute are those concerning which the department or agency involved has “power to adjudicate rights, establish binding regulations, compel the action or finally dispose of the problem giving rise to the inquiry.” This precise, definitive and unqualified pronouncement constitutes an absolute, inflexible criterion or test, by which the question of the applicability of this statute to any factual situation may be readily resolved. This conclusion is consistent with portions of the reasoning in Levin and Stark, but which reasoning was not necessary for the ultimate determination of those cases. In my view such explicit and exclusive rule is vulnerable because its sole basic thesis and justification is the proposition that Congress intended to use the word “jurisdiction” in this restrictive sense. Had this actually been the intent of Congress, its purpose could readily have been accomplished by inserting an appropriate descriptive or limiting clause. I am not persuaded that Congress, intending only to enlarge the area embraced by the then existing law so as to accomplish the purpose stated by the majority, would by the 1934 Amendment expressly enlarge the scope thereof, use therein the word “any” with reference to the statements, matters, departments or agencies involved and then, in order to effectuate the intended purpose of the law use the word “jurisdiction” in the restrictive sense as interpreted by the majority, well knowing that the applicability of the law within the intended area would ultimately depend upon judicial interpretation. I cannot ascribe to Congress the intent to use one word “of many meanings” in such a strict and narrow sense as would necessarily restrict and limit the clear and all-inclusive character of all the other essential words of the statute. Nor can I believe that, in this manner, Congress intentionally excepted, for all practical purposes, such an important governmental agency from the plain meaning of “any department or agency."
One readily perceptible and important effect necessarily resulting from the rigid criterion expounded by the majority is to exclude from the purview of Section 1001 all statements in any and all matters strictly criminal in character, irrespective of the governmental agency or department involved. This conclusion is in accord with that portion of the ex*376pressed reasoning found in Stark, supra, which is quoted with approval by the majority as being “sound and applicable”, as follows:
“In like manner the important functions of the Department of Justice with respect to criminal offenses against the United States is the power to investigate and initiate prosecutions, but not the power to decide whether a criminal offense has been committed.”
Thus, it necessarily follows that all statements in matters purely criminal in nature are excluded from the purview of the statute, for the final disposition thereof is by action of the trial court or jury. Should the returning of an indictment by a grand jury be construed as “compel(ling) the action” or satisfaction of this requirement, I point out that it is clear that a federal grand jury is not a “department or agency” within the meaning of the statute. Title 18, U.S. C.A. Section 6; United States v. Allen, 193 F.Supp. 954 (S.D.Cal.1961).
An examination of the case law reveals, in my view, a continuing tendency to progressively liberalize the interpretation of all of the words of the statute, as evidenced in part by subsequent rejection of portions of the reasoning found in Levin and Stark. There appears to me to be running as a common thread throughout most of the cited cases a clearly discernible emphasis placed upon the broad purpose of the statute as outlined in Gilliland; the broad, general and unfettered character of the language of the statute; the indication that the Supreme Court “rejects any theory of narrow applicability,” and that the “Section contain(s) no suggestion of confining the effect of the statute to afty smaller area than that encompassed by its own broad language.” McCue, supra. It would seem reasonable that these guiding principles are also applicable (by inference, at least) to an interpretation of “jurisdiction”, for it would appear that a narrow and restrictive understanding thereof could only be effected by a sharply different approach to the statute and in the attitude toward and understanding of the purpose thereof. For cases cited in support of the proposition that “[t]he term ‘jurisdiction’ is not used in the Act in a technical sense.”, see, Ogden, supra (303 F.2d, n. 73, p. 743).
It may be that our conflicting views are based in part upon divergent concepts of public policy and the application of a yardstick fashioned thereby. The majority frankly states that the “important social policy” of maintaining “an open line of communication between the general public and law enforcement agencies” influenced the ultimate decision, and states reasons why an interpretation of the statute contrary to that expressed would violate such policy. Again, I foresee no such adverse reaction or effect. I see no more reason why an individual, acting innocently and in good faith, would be any more reluctant to voluntarily give information to an agent of the F.B.I., well knowing of the existence of a law that provides a severe penalty for the knowing and intentional giving of false information to such agency, than would a witness be reluctant to testify, under oath, to facts which he believes to be true, well knowing of the perjury statute. Nor do I see any more probability that such construction would tend to discourage the voluntary giving of information in good faith, than knowledge of the existence of Section 1001 would have the effect of discouraging the making of proper and legitimate statements in matters within the jurisdiction of the departments and agencies conceded to be within the purview of that statute. I see no sound reason in principle, based on public policy or otherwise, why the statute should be construed as being applicable to “statements” made to investigative officers of agencies or departments which have the power to “finally dispose” of the matter in inquiry, but not applicaable to statements of like character made to investigative officers of the F.B.I. or of any other agency or department which does not have such power of final disposition. The fact is, false statements made in matters peculiarly within the “investigative jurisdiction” and author*377ized governmental function of the Department of Justice may be exceedingly vicious and potentially dangerous and harmful to others, especially in matters relating to the protection and enforcement of important constitutional rights of private citizens. Such statements may relate to matters involving the safety and protection of important officers in one of the three branches of our government, and conceivably might have a direct and important bearing on our national security. Any such statements would necessarily initiate expensive and time-consuming proceedings by government agents and the substantial exercise by them of their authorized official functions — matters of much more public concern, in my opinion, than a relatively innocuous false civil claim for monetary benefit or personal privilege. In any ■event, policy wisdom is primarily for the •consideration of the makers, rather than fhe interpreters, of the law, and we are here seeking to ascertain the congressional intent.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the investigative agency or arm of the Department of Justice, and is charged with investigating and detecting violations of the laws of the United States and collecting evidence in cases where the United States is or may be a party in interest, excepting those matters specifically assigned by Congress to other federal investigating agencies. This responsibility and duty has been judicially characterized as “investigating authority” and “primary investigative jurisdiction.” 'One of the most important duties and responsibilities of the Department of Justice is the protection, preservation and ■enforcement of the constitutional rights of citizens under the Civil Rights Act. In the performance of those duties the Department of Justice must, and does, necessarily rely upon its investigative agency for the proper, efficient and unperverted exercise of its authorized responsibility. It is my opinion that the ■voluntary, knowing and willful giving by a person of material, false statements •concerning alleged violations of his civil rights by a state law enforcement officer, for the purpose of inducing reliance and action thereon, and thus instigating and causing an investigation as the basis for a subsequent prosecution of the person accused, necessarily perverts the authority and function of that agency. The false statement in this case related to a matter concerning which the F.B.I. had the sole responsibility to investigate — a fact undoubtedly known to the Appellant, who voluntarily and intentionally placed this information before that agency— which information was given for the conceded purpose of inducing that agency to rely thereon and did in fact cause that agency to act to the full extent of its authorized governmental function and purpose, thereby interfering with and perverting its normal activities.
I believe the statute is applicable to the specific factual situation in this case, and would therefore affirm.