Court Opinion

ID: 9902786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:23:35.834261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:58.948688
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case Nos. 5D21-2908
                                 5D22-1693
                  LT Case No. 2008-11708-FMCI
                   (Consolidated for disposition)
                  _____________________________

DONALD CHARLES BAUERLE, JR.,
                                                    CORRECTED PAGE: 1
     Appellant/Cross-Appellee,                      CORRECTIONS ARE
                                                    UNDERLINED IN RED
     v.                                             MAILED: 10-13-2023
                                                    BY: SW
CATHERINE JEAN BAUERLE,
CODISCO, INC., A FLORIDA
CORPORATION, CODISCO
INTERNATIONAL INC., A FLORIDA
CORPORATION, COASTLINE
INTERNATIONAL, INC., A FLORIDA
CORPORATION, ET AL.,

     Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Sandra C. Upchurch, Judge.

Tracy S. Carlin and Steven L. Brannock,
of Brannock Berman & Seider, Tampa,
and Sheila M. Ennis, of Sheila M. Ennis, P.A.,
Edgewater, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Richard F. Hussey, of Richard F. Hussey,
P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Catherine Jean Bauerle.

No Appearance for Remaining Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
                          August 25, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     Before us are appeals and cross-appeals by Donald Charles
Bauerle, Jr. (“Former Husband”) and Catherine Jean Bauerle
(“Former Wife”) from two post-dissolution orders.* The first is a
Final Order on Former Wife’s Third Amended Motion for Contempt
or to Compel Enforcement of Marital Settlement Agreement and for
Attorney’s Fees and Other Relief. The second is an Amended Final
Order Regarding Attorney Fees and Costs. We reverse insofar as
the trial court ordered Former Husband to transfer the marina
property described in the Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”)
to Codisco, Inc., a family-owned company, pursuant to a bankruptcy
court’s order. We also reverse the trial court’s finding that Former
Wife was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees as the prevailing
party. In all other respects, we affirm without further discussion.

      Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[a] judgment on the
merits rendered in a former suit between the same parties or their
privies, upon the same cause of action, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusive not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but as to every
other matter which might with propriety have been litigated and
determined in that action.” Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So.
2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Kimbrell v. Paige, 448 So. 2d 1009,
1012 (Fla. 1984)). “[A] judgment on the merits will thus bar ‘a
subsequent action between the same parties on the same cause of
action.’” Id. (quoting Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla.
1956)). The principle of res judicata applies not only to subsequent
independent proceedings, but to all collateral proceedings in the
same action. Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980, 982 (Fla. 3d DCA
2004); Utterback v. Starkey, 669 So. 2d 304, 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
“[F]or the doctrine of res judicata to apply, several conditions must

    * We have sua sponte consolidated the appeals and cross-
appeals in both cases for purposes of this opinion.

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exist, which include: ‘identity of the thing sued for; identity of the
cause of action; identity of [the] parties; and identity of the quality
in the person for or against whom the claim is made.’” Dadeland
Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d 1216, 1235
(Fla. 2006) (quoting Albrecht v. State, 444 So. 2d 8, 12 (Fla. 1984)).
A trial court’s ruling concerning the application of res judicata is
reviewed de novo. Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1259
(Fla. 2006); Bryan v. Fernald, 211 So. 3d 333, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA
2017); Aronowitz v. Home Diagnostics, Inc., 174 So. 3d 1062, 1065
(Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Crews v. Strother, 209 So. 3d 595, 596 (Fla.
1st DCA 2014).

      Here, Former Husband claims that the trial court erred in
ordering him to transfer the marina property described in the MSA
to Codisco pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s order. Specifically,
he asserts that res judicata barred Former Wife from relitigating
the marina transfer issue because she relinquished her right to
have the marina transferred to Codisco when she executed the
MSA, which was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution
of marriage.

     The MSA expressly provided that the marina property would
remain in a family trust and that the value of the marina property
would be considered when determining the value of Former Wife’s
stock under the MSA’s buyout provision. The MSA further provided
that it superseded any prior agreements between the parties. When
the court incorporated the MSA into its final judgment, this
constituted an adjudication on the merits of Former Wife’s claim
seeking transfer of the marina property.

       To the extent that the trial court concluded that res judicata
did not apply because Former Husband concealed the bankruptcy
court’s order during the dissolution proceedings, Former Husband
could not have concealed the order because it was a document from
a public proceeding in which Former Wife was a participant. That
is, Former Husband could not conceal an order appearing on the
public docket that was available to Former Wife and her lawyers at
all times. Because res judicata barred Former Wife from
relitigating her claim seeking to enforce the transfer provision of
the bankruptcy order, the trial court erred in ordering Former
Husband to transfer the marina property to Codisco.

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       As to the prevailing party attorney fee issues, we find that
this litigation ended in a tie with each party prevailing in part and
losing in part on the significant issues. Or, stated differently,
compelling circumstances support the conclusion that there was no
prevailing party in this case. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Tr., for
SASCO 2007-MLN1 Tr. v. Moccia, 258 So. 3d 469, 471 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2018) (concluding that the litigation ended in a proverbial tie
with each party prevailing in part and losing in part where the
borrowers were successful in having the bank’s foreclosure action
involuntarily dismissed, but the bank was also successful in having
the deed agreement enforced against the borrowers); Ruffa v.
Saftpay, Inc., 163 So. 3d 711, 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (holding that
it was completely reasonable to determine that neither party
should recover fees where the plaintiff brought two separate breach
of contract claims, albeit under one cause of action, and prevailed
completely on one of those claims while the defendant prevailed
completely on the other); Merchs. Bonding Co. (Mut.) v. City of
Melbourne, 832 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (“This is a
classic case where two parties fought to a draw; no one won and no
one lost. The trial court found Continental breached its contract by
failing to get written change orders, but it also found the City was
‘wrong’ in destroying and replacing Continental’s sewer system,
after using it for one and one-half years, when it was not necessary
to do so.”); see also Circuitronix, LLC v. Kapoor, No. 15-CV-61446,
2019 WL 2245572, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2019) (declining to
award prevailing party attorney’s fees where the stalemate
resulting from the parties’ competing cross-motions to enforce a
settlement agreement provided a compelling reason to find that
neither party prevailed); Dear v. Q Club Hotel, LLC, No. 15-CV-
60474, 2017 WL 5665359, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017) (concluding
that neither side was a prevailing party where each party won and
lost on significant issues).

      Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s order
requiring Former Husband to transfer the marina property to
Codisco. In addition, we reverse the trial court’s award of prevailing
party attorney’s fees to Former Wife. On remand, the trial court is
directed to deny fees to both parties insofar as the litigation
essentially ended in a tie. In all other respects, we affirm.

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      AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

WALLIS, JAY, and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

     Not final until disposition of any timely and
     authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
     9.331.
                _____________________________

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