Court Opinion

ID: 9930941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 21:04:22.560375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:29.080964
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/24 P. v. Jacobs CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B316230

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. NA113062)
           v.

 EDWARD JACOBS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
      Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Michael C. Keller and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
               _________________________________
                         INTRODUCTION
      Edward Jacobs appeals from his judgment of conviction for
count 1, the first degree murder of Guy Alford (Pen. Code,1 § 187,
subd. (a)), and count 2, possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)).
      First, Jacobs argues the trial court erred by failing to
conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24
(Kelly) before admitting DNA evidence that was analyzed using
STRmix, a software program that uses probabilistic genotyping to
aid in the interpretation and evaluation of forensic evidence that
contains a mixture of DNA from multiple contributors. We
conclude the trial court did not err by failing to hold a Kelly
hearing, because the STRmix method of DNA analysis is
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community as held
in People v. Davis (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 694 (Davis).
      Second, Jacobs argues there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s robbery-murder special-circumstance finding.
We disagree as there was evidence Jacobs intended to rob Alford
before the shooting.
      Third, Jacobs argues the trial court erred when it denied
his request to stay his sentence for his conviction in count 2
under section 654, because his possession of the firearm and the
shooting were part of the same indivisible course of conduct.
Again, we disagree as there was sufficient evidence Jacobs
arrived at the scene with the handgun used to shoot Alford, and
there was no evidence that fortuitous circumstances put the
firearm in Jacobs’s hand only at the instant of committing the
murder.

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                2
       Last, Jacobs has requested an independent review of the
trial court’s hearing under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974)
11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
       Finding no error, we affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Prosecution Evidence
       A.     The shooting
       On September 26, 2018, Javontae Sorrells, Darrell Woodall,
Bamm Thompson, Zatrail Greenhill, and Alford drove to a Jack
in the Box on Atlantic Avenue and 52nd Street in Long Beach.
Alford was driving, Thompson was in the front passenger seat,
Greenhill sat in the back seat behind Thompson, Woodall sat in
the back seat behind Alford, and Sorrells sat between Greenhill
and Woodall.
       The following description of the shooting and subsequent
events is based on Alford’s passengers’ testimony and interviews,
as well as footage captured by surveillance cameras in the Jack
in the Box drive-thru and an adjacent business.
       Alford pulls into the drive-thru and stops at the menu so
Alford and his passengers can order. A black car then pulls into
the drive-thru behind Alford. A man wearing a ski mask then
exits the black car, which starts to back out of the drive-thru.
As the man approaches Alford’s driver-side window, two other
individuals exit the black car and walk towards Alford’s car.
When the man who first exited the black car reaches Alford’s
driver-side window, he points a gun into Alford’s car and says
something like “gimme” or “give me the car.” Alford and the man
struggle over the gun, and the man fires four or five shots into
Alford’s car. The man then runs back to the black car and gets in
along with the other two individuals. At the same time, Sorrells,

                               3
Woodall, Thompson, and Greenhill can be seen quickly exiting
Alford’s car and then running in different directions. Alford’s
vehicle then rolls forward slightly and then rolls backwards out of
the drive-thru, striking a parked car.
       After several minutes, Greenhill and Thompson return to
Alford’s car to get their backpacks from the trunk. Thompson
tries to assist Alford, but finds him nonresponsive and not
breathing. Greenhill and Thompson then open the driver-side
door to pull the trunk latch to access the trunk. Greenhill and
Thompson then leave the scene.
       B.    Law Enforcement Investigation
             1.     The crime scene
       Law enforcement responded to the scene. Officers
recovered cartridge casings from the driver-side floorboard and
windowsill, as well as in the front driver seat after Alford’s body
was removed. They also recovered a watch next to the drive-thru
intercom where the shooting took place.
       Officers obtained the surveillance videos from the Jack in
the Box and an adjacent business, which were played for the jury.
       Investigators from the Los Angeles County Department of
Examiner-Coroner’s office determined Alford suffered a fatal
gunshot wound to the left side of his neck, and suffered
additional gunshot wounds to his torso and right leg.
       Firearms evidence showed the cartridge casings were fired
from the same gun.
             2.     DNA evidence
       A forensic specialist processed the crime scene,
photographing the drive-thru and surrounding area, as well as
collecting DNA swabs from the watch found by the intercom,

                                4
Alford’s hands, and the interior panel and exterior of Alford’s
driver-side door.
       A criminalist tested the swabs for DNA. She explained
DNA testing consists of four steps: extraction, quantitation,
amplification, profiling using a genetic analyzer, and
interpretation. Extraction involves purifying the DNA by
separating the DNA from collected cells. Quantitation involves
determining how much DNA is in a particular sample, which is
critical to testing because if there is not enough DNA, the
criminalist will be unable to create a DNA profile for comparison.
Amplification involves making millions of copies of those
locations on the DNA samples that are unique to each individual.
Then, to create a profile for interpretation, the criminalist
separates out the amplified fragments of DNA and enters them
into a genetic analyzer for comparison.
       To assist in the interpretation of the DNA profile, the
criminalist uses STRmix, a software program that helps interpret
a DNA sample that contains a mixture of DNA from multiple
contributors. STRmix uses probabilities to come up with an
expected profile from the observed profile expressed in the form
of a “likelihood ratio.” The likelihood ratio is a statistical
measure of the probability that certain individuals contributed to
a mixed-source DNA sample against the probability that other,
unrelated individuals were the contributors. In other words, it
expresses the weight of the observed profile in two mutually
exclusive hypotheses, i.e., the probability that the evidence
originated from the suspect in the case versus the probability
that the evidence originated from an unknown and unrelated
individual.

                                5
       Here, the criminalist determined the watch found at the
scene had a total of four contributors. Jacobs’s profile was
included in the mixture and most aligned with the 80 percent
contributor. The likelihood ratio of the DNA profile from the
watch was approximately three times 10 to the 30th power more
likely if it originated from Jacobs and three unknown individuals,
than if it originated from four unknown individuals.
       Alford’s left hand fingernails sample had a mixture of four
contributors. Jacobs’s profile was included and most aligned with
the five percent contributor. Alford’s profile was most aligned
with the 84 percent contributor. The likelihood ratio was
“approximately 312 and 93 times more likely” that it originated
from Alford, Jacobs, and two unknown individuals than if it
originated from Alford and three unknown, unrelated
individuals.
       The interior door panel sample had a mixture of four
contributors, including Alford. Jacobs’s profile was included and
most aligned with the 8 percent contributor. Alford’s profile
aligned with the 67 percent contributor. The likelihood ratio was
approximately nine million times more likely if it originated from
Alford, Jacobs, and two unknown individuals than if it originated
from Alford and three unknown, unrelated individuals.
       The exterior door sample had a mixture of four
contributors. Jacobs’s profile was included and aligned with the
20 percent contributor. The likelihood ratio was approximately
4,180 times more likely that it originated from Jacobs and three
unknown individuals than if it originated from four unknown
individuals.

                                6
II.    Defense Evidence
       Defense counsel called Thompson to testify. Thompson said
Alford picked him and the other passengers up approximately an
hour and a half before the shooting. Thompson testified their
plan was to smoke weed, eat, and then go home. They drove to a
Jack in the Box near Thompson’s house and entered the drive-
thru. Thompson said the passengers were taking their time
ordering, and that Thompson was the only person who got his
order out. As he was ordering, Thompson saw a man walk up to
the driver side of the car and put a gun in the car and start
shooting. Thompson saw Alford and the gunman struggle for the
gun before he heard the gunshots. Thompson did not hear the
gunman say anything before shooting. Immediately after the
shooting, Thompson fled, but then returned to Alford’s car
approximately three to four minutes later to check on Alford and
to retrieve his things.
III. Jury Verdict and Sentencing
       The jury found Jacobs guilty of count 1, first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and count 2, possession of firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). It also found true the robbery-murder
special-circumstance and that Jacobs personally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b)–(d)). The jury also found the prior conviction
allegations to be true.
       The trial court sentenced Jacobs to life without the
possibility of parole plus 29 years to life. The court struck the
two five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancements but
denied Jacobs’s request to stay his sentence for count 2 under
section 654.
       Jacobs appealed.

                                7
                            DISCUSSION
I.    The trial court did not err in failing to hold a Kelly
      hearing before admitting the DNA evidence
      interpreted using STRmix
      Jacobs argues the trial court erred when it failed to hold a
Kelly hearing before admitting the prosecution’s DNA evidence.
Jacobs asserts the trial court was required to conduct a Kelly
hearing because the STRmix methodology of DNA analysis was
not generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific
community. We are not persuaded.
      Under Kelly, before evidence based on a novel method of
scientific proof may be admitted at trial, our Supreme Court
requires “ ‘a preliminary showing of general acceptance of the
new technique in the relevant scientific community.’ ” (People v.
Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 831.) A Kelly
hearing “ ‘is intended to prevent lay jurors from being unduly
influenced by procedures which seem scientific and infallible, but
which actually are not.’ ” (People v. Daveggio and Michaud, at
p. 831.)
      When faced with a novel method of scientific proof, the
party seeking to admit the scientific evidence must satisfy “a
three-pronged test to establish the reliability of scientific testing
and its scientific basis to determine its admissibility.” (People v.
Hardy (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 312, 325.) “The first prong requires
proof that the technique is generally accepted as reliable in the
relevant scientific community. [Citation.] The second prong
requires proof that the witness testifying about the technique and
its application is a properly qualified expert on the subject.
[Citation.] The third prong requires proof that the person
performing the test in the particular case used correct scientific

                                 8
procedures.” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 544–545
(Bolden).)
       Proof of a technique’s general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community is “no longer [] necessary once a published
appellate decision ha[s] affirmed a trial court ruling admitting
evidence obtained by that scientific technique, ‘at least until new
evidence is presented reflecting a change in the attitude of the
scientific community.’ ” (Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 545.)
“In other words, ‘case-by-case adjudication as to the “general
acceptance” prong of the Kelly test is not required once the
scientific technique in question has been endorsed in a published
appellate opinion.’ ” (People v. Lazarus (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
734, 783.)
       On appeal, Jacobs only challenges the DNA evidence based
on the first prong of Kelly, requiring proof that the STRmix
method of DNA analysis is generally accepted as reliable in the
relevant scientific community. Jacobs’s argument is without
merit.
       “[N]umerous courts across the country have concluded that
the STRmix method has gained general acceptance within the
relevant scientific community.” (Davis, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 717, citing United States v. Gissantaner (6th Cir. 2021) 990
F.3d 457, 466 [collecting cases].) Most importantly, however,
since Jacobs’s trial, another California appellate court has
endorsed the STRmix method of DNA analysis, finding it satisfies
the first prong of Kelly, which ultimately forecloses Jacobs’s
challenge here. (See People v. Lazarus, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at
p. 783.) In Davis, the court found “the STRmix method has been
subjected to extensive empirical testing and found to be accurate
and reliable by the FBI and numerous forensic laboratories.”

                                9
(Davis, at p. 717.) The court noted that the defendant had not
directed the court to “any published appellate authority holding
that the STRmix method is not generally accepted as a reliable
method of DNA analysis by the relevant scientific community.”
(Id. at p. 717.) Nor could the defendant point “to any evidence or
scientific literature showing that the STRmix method is publicly
opposed as unreliable by scientists significant either in number
or expertise.” (Ibid.)
       Indeed, in Davis, the court rejected the same argument
raised by Jacobs here, that a report issued by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) demonstrated the
STRmix method had failed to gain general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community. (Davis, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 718.) The Davis court stated: “Having reviewed the NIST
draft report and the additional materials submitted by the
Attorney General on the topic, we conclude the NIST Report does
not show that the STRmix method has failed to gain general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Rather, it is
largely a thoughtful discussion of the scientific foundation
underlying the discipline of DNA mixture interpretation, which
seeks to inform future work in the field by documenting and
independently assessing the publicly available empirical evidence
that supports the reliable use of DNA mixture interpretation
methods. [Citation.] The NIST Report does not offer any opinion
as to whether STRmix is a reliable method of DNA mixture
interpretation. Receipt and careful review of this submission
does not alter our conclusion that the STRmix method has indeed
gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community.” (Id. at pp. 718–719.)

                               10
       We find Davis was correctly decided and reach the same
conclusion here—“that the STRmix method of DNA analysis is
generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific
community, such that expert testimony relying on the method
satisfied the first requirement of the Kelly test.” (Davis, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 701.)2
       While Jacobs acknowledges Davis, he argues it is
distinguishable on the facts because Davis involved the testing of
a bloody shoelace rather than an unknown biological source, and
there was additional evidence connecting the defendant to the
crime. We fail to see the significance of these distinctions.
The issue is whether STRmix satisfies the general acceptance
test of Kelly, not what weight should be afforded to that DNA
evidence after it is admitted.
       We also reject Jacobs’s due process argument as it merely
repeats his arguments for excluding the evidence under Kelly.
       Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
failing to hold a Kelly hearing before admitting the DNA evidence
as interpreted by STRmix.
II.    Substantial evidence supports the special-
       circumstance finding
       Jacobs contends the evidence was insufficient to support
the jury’s robbery-murder special-circumstance finding. Jacobs’s
contention is belied by the record.
       “ ‘The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of
evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a
rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a

2    Our Supreme Court denied review in Davis, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th on June 1, 2022.

                                 11
reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People v.
Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) “ ‘Although we must ensure
the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value,
nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury
to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of
the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus,
if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must
accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our
evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.’ ”
(Ibid.)
       To prove the robbery-murder special-circumstance, the
People had to show Jacobs committed an attempted robbery, and
while attempting to commit the robbery, he killed Alford. (See
People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 618–619.) Robbery is
“the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his
will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) “An
attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: a specific
intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done
toward its commission.” (§ 21a.)
       Here, Jacobs argues there was insufficient evidence that he
intended to commit a robbery. Jacobs directs us to the fact that
only Woodall heard the gunman say the operative words of a
robbery, e.g., “give me the car,” while the other passengers heard
nothing. According to Jacobs, Woodall’s testimony standing
alone, is insufficient as a matter of law to prove intent.

                                 12
       We are not persuaded. The testimony of only one witness
can prove any fact. (CALCRIM No. 301; see also People v.
Gammage (1992) 2 Cal.4th 693, 702.) Here, Woodall’s testimony
that the gunman stated “ ‘gimme’ ” or “ ‘give me the car’ ” as he
pointed the gun at Alford was sufficient to establish that Jacobs
intended to commit a robbery.
       Jacobs essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence on
appeal and to disregard Woodall’s testimony. As the reviewing
court, we can neither reweigh evidence nor reevaluate a witness’s
credibility. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890.)
       Accordingly, we find the evidence was sufficient for the jury
to find that Jacobs intended to commit a robbery.
III. The trial court correctly found section 654 did not
       apply
       Jacobs argues the trial court should have stayed his
sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)) under section 654 because possessing the firearm
and Alford’s killing were part of an indivisible course of conduct.
We disagree.
       Section 654, subdivision (a), provides: “An act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case
shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” (Ibid.) Thus, section 654 “ ‘precludes multiple
punishment for a single act or for a course of conduct comprising
indivisible acts.’ ” (People v. Spirlin (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 119,
129.) To determine whether the course of criminal conduct is
indivisible, we look to the intent and objective of the defendant.
(Ibid.) “[I]f all the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the
means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant

                                 13
may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may
be punished only once.” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321,
335.)
       Whether a course of conduct is indivisible for purposes of
section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor.
(People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208.) If all the
offenses are incidental to one objective, the defendant may be
punished for any one of them, but not for more than one. (Id. at
pp. 1208–1209.) On the other hand, if the evidence discloses that
a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives, which were
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the trial
court may impose punishment for independent violations
committed in pursuit of each objective, even though the violations
shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible
course of conduct. (People v. Centers (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 84,
98.) “However, if the defendant harbored ‘multiple or
simultaneous objectives, independent of and not merely
incidental to each other, the defendant may be punished for each
violation committed in pursuit of each objective even though the
violations share common acts or were parts of an otherwise
indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Jones (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143 (Jones).)
       “Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question
of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in
making its determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not be
reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support
them. [Citations.] We review the trial court’s determination in
the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the
existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.” (Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143.)

                                14
       Relying on People v. Kane (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 480, 488
(Kane), Jacobs argues, since he only possessed the weapon
purportedly for the instant crime, the acts of possessing the
weapon, shooting it, and killing Alford were all part of an
indivisible course of conduct.
       In Kane, the defendant and the victim got into an argument
at a bar that “led to fisticuffs.” (Kane, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at
p. 484.) After the fight, the victim decided to leave and went to
his car. (Ibid.) As the victim drove away, the defendant pointed
his gun at the victim and shot at the victim’s car. (Ibid.)
The defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon,
discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and possession of a
firearm by a felon. (Id. at p. 483.) On appeal, the defendant
argued his sentence should have been stayed for discharging a
firearm and possession under section 654. (Kane, at p. 488.)
The People conceded the error, and the appellate court found the
trial court should have stayed the sentence. (Ibid.)
       Since Kane, other courts have come to a different
conclusion and criticized Kane for either failing to address the
issue of prior or subsequent possession of the firearm or simply
reaching the wrong result on the facts. (See People v. Ratcliff
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1412 (Ratcliff); Jones, supra,
103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1145–1147.) Both the Ratcliff and Jones
courts concluded section 654 will only bar a separate punishment
for the possession of the weapon by a felon if the evidence shows
“at most that fortuitous circumstances put the firearm in the
defendant’s hand only at the instant of committing another
offense.” (Ratcliff, at p. 1412; Jones, at pp. 1148–1149.) Given
the Kane court’s lack of analysis, we find the reasoning in Ratcliff
and Jones persuasive and agree with their conclusion that

                                15
multiple punishments are “proper where the evidence shows that
the defendant possessed the firearm before the crime, with an
independent intent.” (Jones, at p. 1144.)
      Here, because the evidence showed Jacobs arrived at the
scene already in possession of the firearm, and there is no
evidence that Jacobs fortuitously came into possession of the
firearm at the time of the shooting, we are satisfied that section
654 does not bar his punishment for his possession of a firearm
by a felon.
IV. Pitchess review
      Jacobs also asked us to independently review the sealed
personnel records of Detectives Oscar Valenzuela and Travis
Harris in connection with his Pitchess motion. Jacobs moved to
compel disclosure of any complaints relating to fabrication of
evidence, dishonesty, writing of false police reports, planting of
evidence and other evidence of misconduct. The trial court
granted Jacobs’s Pitchess motion but found none of the records
were discoverable. After reviewing the reporter’s transcript and
the confidential personnel records, we found no discoverable
materials; therefore, we find no abuse of discretion. (Pitchess v.
Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 535–540; People v. Mooc
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1232; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th
287, 330.)

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                  DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

                                VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

         STRATTON, P. J.

         WILEY, J.

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