Court Opinion

ID: 9548007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:56:17.52356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:22.130637
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting):
Statutes enacted by the legislative authority of cities in discharging the responsibilities of government are entitled to the same presumptions of validity as other leg*830islation; and should not be stricken down by judicial intervention unless they are clearly invalid.1 It is true that the powers of cities must be found in the statutes granting those powers. But it is also true that it is impossible to spell out in the generality of statutes all of the details necessary to carry on the responsibilities of government; and that cities have those powers expressly granted and those necessarily implied to carry on such responsibilities.2
In regard to the problem here involved, the important general grant of power to the city is that which is necessary to preserve the health, safety and good order of the city and its inhabitants.3 The power referred to in the main opinion, of prohibiting the sale or furnishing of drugs to minors,4 is a lesser and incidental one. It certainly should not be subject to question that the general grant referred to above includes authority to regulate and/or prohibit the possession or use of narcotic drugs; and this should be true wherever found, whether on one’s person, home, or wherever such drugs may be.
The ordinance under attack is designed to prohibit anyone from “knowingly and intentionally” permitting others to possess or use drugs in violation of the law in any “building, room, tenement, vehicle” etc. In my judgment it is properly fashioned and can be sensibly applied to prohibit a person from knowingly aiding, assisting, or encouraging others in the commission of the offense of possessing or concealing such interdicted drugs.5
I concede that, if the ordinance in some way should transcend the state statute regulating the same subject, one accused of its violation might claim the benefit of any lesser penalty provided by the statute. But the fact that there is a state statute with a similar prohibition, does not deprive the city of its duly-granted authority. With due deference to the contrary opinion of my colleagues, I can see no reason whatsoever in law or logic for the statement that the city has “no power or authority to copy the statute.” The measure of authority that it does have is exactly that: to prohibit acts which may also be prohibited by statute; and it may freely do so insofar as its ordinance does not transcend nor run contrary to the state law. This indisputable principle was clearly stated in Salt Lake City v. Allred:
It is ... . well-established . that the city has the right to legislate on the same subject as a state statute where either the general police power or express grant of authority is conferred upon the municipalities.6 [Citing numerous cases.]
I would affirm the judgment.
HALL, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, J.

. See Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633; State Water Pollution Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 247, 311 P.2d 370.

. Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537 (1942); Butt v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 550 P.2d 202 (1976).

. U.C.A.1953, 10-8-84, cited in footnote 3 of main opinion; and see Butt v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra note 2.

. U.C.A.1953, 10-8-47, cited in footnote 2 of main opinion.

. See Sec. 76-2-202, U.C.A.1953 which states: “Every person, who encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.” This section re-enacts in substance former Sec. 76-1-44, U.C.A.1953.

. 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434, 436 (1968) and cases cited therein.