Court Opinion

ID: 9405706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 23:03:18.039215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:23.829716
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/28/23
                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                              A165968
 v.
 DALLAS BROOKS ACHANE,                        (Humboldt County Super. Ct. Nos.
           Defendant and Appellant.           CR2102494, CR2001294, CR1905885)

       After finding Dallas Brooks Achane violated probation, the trial court
ordered him to serve a sentence that previously had been imposed with
execution of sentence suspended. The sentence included an upper term.
Achane contends he is entitled to resentencing under legislation enacted after
the initial imposition of sentence that limits trial courts’ discretion to impose
an upper term sentence and, in certain circumstances, creates a presumption
in favor of a lower term sentence. As we will explain, Achane forfeited his
claims by failing to assert them in the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm.
                                  BACKGROUND
       The facts underlying Achane’s offenses are not relevant to the issues on
appeal and need not be recited. In January 2020, Achane pleaded guilty to a
charge of willfully inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant
(Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))1 in case No. CR1905885 (case 1). On
February 4, 2020, the trial court sentenced him to an upper term sentence of

       1    Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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four years, and then suspended execution of sentence and placed Achane on
probation.
      On August 6, 2020, in case No. CR2001294 (case 2), Achane pleaded
guilty to one count of stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a)) and admitted violating
probation in case 1. On August 24, 2020, the trial court suspended
imposition of sentence and placed Achane on probation.
      On August 31, 2021, in case No. CR2102494 (case 3), Achane pleaded
guilty to a charge of obstructing an executive officer (§ 69). On October 21,
2021, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed Achane on
probation, and found his guilty plea was an admission that he violated
probation in cases 1 and 2.
      On March 11, 2022, the probation department filed petitions to revoke
probation in all three cases. The petitions alleged that on March 9, 2022,
Achane carried a loaded firearm in public (§ 25850, subd. (a)), carried a
concealed firearm on his person (§ 25400, subd. (a)(2)), unlawfully possessed
a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (b)), unlawfully possessed ammunition (§ 30305,
subd. (a)), purchased, sold, possessed or transferred an unmarked firearm
(§ 23920), resisted arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) and possessed a controlled
substance while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1,
subd. (a)).
      These new charges were tried to a jury in case No. CR2200716. On
July 15, 2022, the trial court declared a mistrial after the jury deadlocked,
then on the basis of the evidence presented at trial found Achane violated
probation and revoked probation in cases 1, 2 and 3.
      On July 28, 2022, the sentencing hearing was held in Achane’s absence
after he told the court he did not wish to remain in the courtroom. The court
acknowledged that the probation department recommended reinstating

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probation but stated a tentative decision to order Achane to serve a prison
term of five years and four months. The court stated its reasons: Achane had
sustained three violations of probation since the 2020 case; the probation
report characterized his performance on probation as “poor” and reflected
that he had not shown “any evidence of making positive lifestyle changes,” he
had not completed his court-ordered batterer’s intervention program, he
continued to “use and abuse methamphetamine,” he had “only reported
sporadically” to the probation department and he absconded prior to
completing an inpatient treatment program; and on March 3, 2022, the court
had found Achane in possession of a firearm after he had sustained seven
prior felony convictions. Defense counsel urged the court to follow the
probation department’s recommendation, stated her understanding that
Achane would seek to enroll in an inpatient treatment program and noted the
probation report’s statement that Achane had been “going through serious
family issues.” The prosecutor expressed puzzlement at the probation
department’s recommendation given its report on Achane’s poor performance
and argued he had done nothing to change his “criminalistic lifestyle” despite
being given multiple opportunities.
      The court followed its tentative decision and ordered Achane to serve
the previously suspended four-year aggravated term in case 1 and
consecutive eight-month, one-third middle terms in cases 2 and 3, for the
total of five years and four months.
          Achane filed a timely notice of appeal on August 17, 2022.

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                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I.
                                  Background
      As noted, in February 2020, the trial court sentenced Achane to an
upper term sentence of four years and then suspended execution of sentence
and placed him on probation. At that time, section 1170, subdivision (b),
gave trial courts broad discretion to decide which of the three terms specified
for an offense would best serve the interests of justice. (See former § 1170,
subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2020, ch. 29, § 14.)
      Subsequently, effective January 1, 2022, section 1170 was amended in
several respects, two of which are relevant to this case. First, Senate Bill
No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) made the middle term of imprisonment the
presumptive sentence. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2), as amended by Stats. 2021,
ch. 731, § 1.3.) Under the amended statute, “[a] trial court may impose an
upper term sentence only where there are aggravating circumstances in the
crime and the defendant has either stipulated to the facts underlying those
circumstances or they have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)–(2).)” (People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500.)
The sentencing court may also rely on certified records of conviction without
having to submit the prior convictions to the jury. (Ibid.; § 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
      Second, Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) created a
presumption in favor of the lower term where specified circumstances were
“contributing factor[s] in the commission of the offense,” unless the trial court
finds that “the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5.) One of
the specified circumstances is that the defendant “has experienced

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psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
      Under the principles of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada),
because these amendments made ameliorative changes to the law, they apply
retroactively to all cases that were not final as of their effective date,
January 1, 2022. (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299,
308; People v. Flores (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039.) Achane argues the
sentence he was ordered to serve on July 28, 2022, violates section 1170, as
amended, in that the upper term sentence imposed for his conviction under
section 273.5 was not based on any aggravating factor that he admitted, a
jury or judge found true beyond a reasonable doubt or was shown by a
certified record of a prior conviction. (§ 1170, subds. (b)(1), (2), (3).) He also
argues the record shows he suffered trauma triggering the presumption
favoring a lower term sentence. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) He contends that
he is entitled to resentencing for retroactive application of the amendments
because his case was not final when they became effective. (People v.
Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 (Esquivel).)
                                        II.
                  Achane Is Not Entitled to Resentencing.
      The parties agree that this case was not final at the time the trial court
ordered into effect the sentence imposed in 2020. (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 673.) Esquivel held that a case in which “a defendant is placed on
probation with execution of an imposed state prison sentence suspended is
not yet final” for purposes of retroactive application of an ameliorative
sentencing law “if the defendant may still timely obtain direct review of an
order revoking probation and causing the state prison sentence to take
effect.” (Ibid.) In Esquivel, the defendant initially received a sentence that

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included one-year enhancements for prior prison terms and was placed on
probation with execution of sentence suspended. (Ibid.) He subsequently
violated probation and the previously imposed sentence was ordered into
effect. (Ibid.) While his appeal from that order was pending, a statutory
amendment became effective under which his priors were not subject to the
one-year enhancement. (Ibid.) Esquivel held the ameliorative amendment
applied retroactively. (Esquivel, at p. 680.)
      The present case is like Esquivel in that Achane, too, was initially
placed on probation with execution of an imposed sentence suspended and
subsequently ordered to serve the previously imposed sentence upon
revocation of probation. Unlike the situation in Esquivel, however, the
statutory amendments Achane seeks to apply retroactively had already been
in effect for almost seven months by the time he was ordered to serve the
prison sentence imposed in 2020. Achane could have asked the trial court at
the sentencing hearing on July 28, 2022, to apply the section 1170
amendments retroactively to the 2020 upper term sentence, but he did not do
so. The People argue this means Achane’s retroactivity argument is
misplaced; Achane is not entitled to resentencing because he forfeited his
objection to the sentence imposed in 2020.
      Achane argues the issue is cognizable on appeal because objection
would have been futile (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237), since a
court ordering into effect a sentence previously imposed with execution
suspended has no authority to order a lesser sentence (People v. Bolian (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1420-1421). Further, Achane argues the forfeiture
doctrine does not apply because he is challenging the upper term sentence as
unauthorized and unauthorized sentences are not subject to forfeiture.

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(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) Neither of these points is
persuasive.
      A. The Unauthorized Sentence Exception to the Forfeiture
         Doctrine Is Inapplicable.
      “[A] sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’ where it could not lawfully be
imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.” (People v. Scott,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.) The California Supreme Court in In re G.C.
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130, explained the rationale for “this ‘narrow’
category of nonforfeitable error”: “The appellate court may intervene in the
first instance because these errors ‘present[ ] “pure questions of law”
[citation], and [are] “ ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues
presented by the record at sentencing” ’ and without ‘remanding for further
findings.’ [Citation.] The rule exists because correction of sentencing error
that is evident from the record and needing no redetermination of facts does
not significantly impact the state’s interest in finality of judgments.
[Citation.] ‘In such circumstances, an individual’s interest in obtaining
judicial review of an allegedly illegal sentence cannot be ignored.’ [Citation.]”
      The claimed error in the present case does not fit either the definition
of an unauthorized sentence or the rationale for this exception to the
forfeiture rule. Under the amended section 1170, subdivision (b), an upper
term may be imposed if based on an aggravating circumstance admitted by
the defendant, found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact or a
certified record of a prior conviction. When the amendment is applied
retroactively to a case in which the upper term is not supported by one or
more aggravating factors established by this standard, the remedy is a
remand for resentencing. Although the previously imposed upper term
cannot stand, the trial court on remand can again impose the upper term if at
least one aggravating factor is properly established by admission, finding

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beyond a reasonable doubt or certified record of conviction and the trial court
exercises its discretion in accordance with section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).
(See People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 468 [remand for exercise of
discretion under amended § 1170; absent stipulation by defendant, People
may elect to prove aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt or accept
resentencing on current record].) Thus, the upper term is not a sentence that
“could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular
case.” (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.) Nor does the error present
a pure question of law that can be corrected “ ‘ “independent of any factual
issues presented by the record at sentencing” ’ and without ‘remanding for
further findings.’ ” ’ ” (In re G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1130.)
      The situation is no different regarding Achane’s claim that he is
entitled to have the trial court consider applying the presumption in favor of
a lower term sentence under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). This provision
applies if one of the enumerated circumstances “was a contributing factor in
the commission of the offense”—here, that the defendant “has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence”—and the court does not find
aggravating circumstances outweigh “the mitigating circumstances that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.”
(Ibid.) A trial court’s decision whether to apply this provision thus depends
on both factual determinations and the exercise of discretion. A sentence
imposed without consideration of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), is not one
that “could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular
case” (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354) and does not present a
question of law that can be corrected “ ‘ “independent of any factual issues
presented by the record at sentencing” ’ and without ‘remanding for further

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findings.’ ” ’ ” (In re G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1130.) Again, the remedy for
a sentence imposed without consideration of this provision is remand for
resentencing. (People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 242.)
      Achane cannot escape the consequences of his failure to object by
relying on the unauthorized sentence exception to the forfeiture doctrine.

      B. Achane Has Not Demonstrated Objection Would Have Been
         Futile.
      “Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise
an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly
unsupported by substantive law then in existence.” (People v. Welch, supra,
5 Cal.4th at p. 237.) Achane contends it would have been pointless for him to
challenge the upper term imposed in 2020 when his probation was revoked
because the trial court ordering the previously imposed sentence into effect
had no authority to alter the original sentence. (People v. Bolian, supra,
231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1420-1421.) He relies on the generally applicable rule
that “[w]hen a trial court revokes and declines to reinstate probation after
having imposed sentence but suspended its execution during the period of
probation, the court ‘must order that exact sentence into effect.’ ” (In re
Renfrow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1253, quoting People v. Howard (1997)
16 Cal.4th 1081, 1088 (Howard); § 1203.2, subd. (c).)
      Achane fails to appreciate that Esquivel, the authority he relies on in
arguing his case is not final for purposes of retroactivity of the section 1170
amendments, negates his futility argument. As in Esquivel, “[t]he question
in this case arises because ameliorative legislation took effect after the initial
time for defendant to challenge his [original] sentence had elapsed, but before
the conclusion of his appeal from the [subsequent] decision ordering that
sentence into effect.” (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 676.) Esquivel held
the defendant was entitled to retroactive application of the ameliorative

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legislation because “a case in which a defendant is placed on probation with
execution of an imposed state prison sentence suspended is not yet final for
[the] purpose [of Estrada retroactivity] if the defendant may still timely
obtain direct review of an order revoking probation and causing the state
prison sentence to take effect.” (Id. at p. 673.)
      The Esquivel court made only brief mention of the rule that a court
ordering into effect a sentence previously imposed with execution suspended
lacks authority to order anything other than that exact sentence: “True,
there are some constraints on a trial court’s ordinary discretion to modify
suspended execution sentences. (See Howard, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1081.) But
those constraints are statutory, and in any event, defendants entitled to the
benefit of ameliorative legislation may be able to obtain relief by other
procedural means. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 895.)” (Esquivel,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 679.) These comments reference the distinction
discussed in Esquivel between finality of a judgment of conviction, which
underlies the usual rule that a previously imposed sentence cannot be
altered,2 and “finality of the ‘ “case[ ]” ’ or ‘ “prosecution[ ][,]” ’ ” which is the
determinative factor for Estrada retroactivity. (Id. at p. 678, quoting People

      2  As Howard explained, “[w]hen the trial court suspends imposition of
sentence, no judgment is then pending against the probationer, who is subject
only to the terms and conditions of the probation.” (Howard, supra,
16 Cal.4th at p. 1087.) “The probation order is considered to be a final
judgment only for the ‘limited purpose of taking an appeal therefrom’ ” and,
on revocation of probation, the court may “ ‘pronounce judgment for any time
within the longest period for which the person might have been sentenced.’ ”
(Ibid.) In contrast, “where a sentence has actually been imposed but its
execution suspended, ‘The revocation of the suspension of execution of the
judgment brings the former judgment into full force and effect . . . .’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)

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v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46.)3 In short, the principles underlying the
presumption of retroactive application of ameliorative legislation overcome
the usual rule that a previously imposed execution suspended sentence
cannot be later modified when probation is revoked.4
      Achane makes no attempt to explain his insistence that the trial court
lacked authority to modify the previously imposed execution suspended
sentence in the face of Esquivel’s holding that ameliorative legislation applies
retroactively to suspended execution sentences as long as the defendant “may
still timely obtain direct review of an order revoking probation and causing
the state prison sentence to take effect.” (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 673.) As far as we can tell, the only distinction between Achane’s situation
and the one addressed in Esquivel is that the ameliorative legislation here

      3The Esquivel court noted, “[w]hether the imposition of defendant’s
suspended execution sentence gave rise to a final judgment for purposes of
appealability says little about whether the criminal prosecution or proceeding
had concluded—and, thus, says little about whether the matter is “final” for
purposes of Estrada. (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 679.)
      4  By contrast, the usual rule applies for subsequently enacted
legislation that was intended to have only prospective effect. People v. Scott
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, involved the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of
2011, which provided that certain felony offenders would serve their
sentences in county jail, or partly in county jail and partly under mandatory
supervision, rather than in prison. (Scott, at pp. 1418-1419.) Scott held that
the Realignment Act did not apply to defendants who had sentences imposed
with execution suspended prior to the legislation’s effective date, then after
the effective date had probation revoked and were ordered to serve the
previously imposed sentences. (Scott, at p. 1419.) The Realignment Act
specified that it was to be applied “prospectively to any person sentenced on
or after” its effective date. Scott held that a defendant “is ‘sentenced’ when a
judgment imposing punishment is pronounced even if execution of the
sentence is then suspended” and, under Howard, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1081, the
sentence ordered on revocation of probation must be exactly the one
previously imposed. (Scott, at pp. 1423-1424.)

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became effective before the revocation proceedings while in Esquivel the new
legislation went into effect during the pendency of the defendant’s appeal
from the revocation orders. That distinction—while critical with respect to
when each defendant could raise the issue—is irrelevant with regard to the
trial court’s authority. Esquivel’s holding that the defendant was entitled to
retroactive application of the new legislation necessarily confirms that trial
courts have authority to act in accordance with Estrada’s presumption of
retroactivity when ameliorative legislation becomes effective after imposition
of the suspended execution sentence and prior to probation revocation
proceedings.
      Achane’s probation was revoked and his previously imposed sentence
ordered into effect over a year after Esquivel was decided and almost seven
months after the section 1170 amendments became effective. Esquivel
offered direct, controlling authority for Achane to argue the trial court should
apply the section 1170 amendments retroactively to his previously imposed
sentence notwithstanding the usual limitation on its authority to modify a
suspended execution sentence. Achane offers no persuasive reason why the
usual forfeiture rules should not apply to his failure to raise his retroactivity
argument in the trial court when he could and should have done so.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

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                                         STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

MILLER, J.

MARKMAN, J. *

People v. Achane (A165968)

     * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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Trial Court:Humboldt County Superior Court

Trial Judge:     Hon. John T. Feeney

Counsel:

Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Katie Stowe and
Claudia H. Amaral, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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