Court Opinion

ID: 9721956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:13:19.013155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:29.567079
License: Public Domain

STATON, Presiding Judge.
Precision Erecting, Inc. ("Precision") 1 appeals the trial court's denial of its motion to set aside the partial default judgment entered against it, Precision raises the following (restated) issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court erred when it entered a default judgment against Precision.
II. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B).
We affirm.
On January 28, 1998, Todd Wokurka ("Wo-kurka") filed a tort action against Precision and others for personal injuries he sustained in a work-related accident. Wokurka sent a copy of the summons and complaint by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Todd Anson, the registered agent of Precision.2 Although Anson's wife actually signed the return receipts, there is no dispute that An-son received the summons and complaint shortly thereafter.
In early February 1998, Anson telephoned Precision's office in Wisconsin and advised Precision's secretary of the pending lawsuit. Anson did not tell the secretary the name of the person bringing the action or any other specific information about the case. Precision told Anson to forward the papers to Precision, which Anson failed to do. After Precision failed to file an appearance or responsive pleading, Wokurka filed a motion for default judgment against Precision, which was granted on April 20, 1998. Precision filed a motion to vacate the partial default judgment on August 4, 1998. Its motion was denied.
I.
Default Judgment
The grant or denial of a default judgment is within the trial court's discretion. On appeal, we will reverse only if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Siebert Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 332, 340.
Precision contends the trial court erred in entering a default judgment against it because the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Precision due to insufficient service of process. Service of process on a corporation is controlled by Ind. Trial Rule 4.6 which provides in relevant part that:
(A) Persons to Be Served. Service upon an organization may be made as follows:
(1) In the case of a domestic or foreign organization upon an executive officer thereof, or if there is an agent appointed or deemed by law to have been appointed to receive service, then upon such agent.
* * L * * 200
(B) Manner of Service Service under subdivision (A) of this rule shall be made on the proper person in the manner provided by these rules, for service upon individuals.... (Emphasis added).
Ind. Trial Rule 4.1 discusses service upon an individual:
(A) In General. Service may be made upon an individual, or an individual acting in a representative capacity, by:
(1) sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail or other public means by which a written acknowledgment of receipt may be requested and obtained to his residence, place of business or employment with *474return receipt requested and returned showing receipt of the letter;
Precision argues that the provision in T.R. 4.6(B), that service shall be made on the proper person, mandates that the agent sign the return receipt in order for service to be effective.3 Precision's argument is without merit. We find nothing in the trial rules requiring that the individual to whom service of process is mailed be the one who signs the return receipts in order for service to be effective. Rather, the rule requires only that service be sent by certified mail to the proper person, a requirement with which Wokur-ka strictly complied.
In Buck v. P.J.T. (1979), 182 Ind.App. 71, 394 N.E.2d 935, trons. denied, this court affirmed a default judgment where the defendant was served via certified mail and the return receipt was signed by someone else.
Service delivered by United States mail, postage prepaid, as certified mail with a return receipt satisfies the method requirement of due process. No contention is made that the information contained was inadequate or that inadequate time to respond was provided. Since actual delivery to the party is not jurisdictionally nee-essary, Buck's argument that the court failed to acquire personal jurisdiction fails.
Id. 394 N.E.2d at 937. See also LaPalme v. Romero (1993), Ind., 621 N.E.2d 1102, 1105, reh. denied ("A copy of the summons and complaint, sent by registered or certified mail to the party, is adequate service."); Glennar Mercury-Lincoln, Inc. v. Riley (1975), 167 Ind.App. 144, 388 N.E.2d 670, 675, trams. denied ("Literal compliance with Trial Rules 4 through 4.17 means effective service of process.") We conclude that Precision was served and that no error exists.
IL.
Relief from Judgment
Next, Precision argues that the trial court erred when it refused to set aside the partial default judgment on grounds of mistake, surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying relief pursuant to T.R. 60(B)(1) and (8). A trial court's decision regarding whether to set aside a default judgment is given substantial deference on review. Our review is limited to determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Upon a motion for relief from the default judgment pursuant to TR. 60(B), the burden is on the movant to present a sufficient ground for relief. A denial of the motion is presumptively valid and the movant must demonstrate that the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and cireumstances before the court. LaPalme, supra, at 1104.
Precision bases its argument largely on the fact that Anson failed to forward the summons and complaint to Precision. IND. CODE 23-1-~49-7 (1998) requires that each foreign corporation authorized to transact business in Indiana continuously maintain a registered agent in Indiana. IND.CODE 23-1-49-10 (1998) states that "[the registered agent of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in Indiana is the corporation's agent for service of process...." There is no dispute that Anson was designated by Precision as its registered agent, that Wokurka sent the summons and complaint to Anson via certified mail, or that Anson received actual notice thereby. The risk of a breakdown in communication between Precision and Anson is one that should be borne by Precision, not a third-party complainant.
*475Inasmuch as Precision alleges no facts showing a mistake, surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying relief from judgment, we find no abuse of discretion here.
Affirmed.
GARRARD, J., concurs.
FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs in result with opinion.

. The partial default judgment was entered against both Precision Erecting, Inc. and Precision Industrial Contractors, Division of Precision Erecting, Inc. However, the parties now agree that the latter is not a separate and distinct legal entity.

. The record indicates that Anson was listed with the Secretary of State's office as the resident agent without his knowledge or consent.

. In support of its position, Precision cites cases from other jurisdictions in which service of process upon relatives of a corporation's appointed agent was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the corporation. See eg., T.W.I. Investments v. Pacific Aggregates, Inc. (1987), Mo.App., 726 S.W.2d 807; Kirlin v. Daclo, Inc. (1986), Mo. App. 719 S.W.2d 516; Dade Erection Service v. Sims Crane Service, Inc. (1980), Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 379 So.2d 423. We consider these cases to be inapposite to the case at bar in that they involved service via personal delivery, rather than certified mail. This distinction is flustrated by TR. 4.1(A)(2) which states that service upon an individual or agent may be accomplished by "delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally...." (Emphasis added). As noted in the discussion, infra, TR. 4.6(A)(1), allowing for service by registered or certified mail, contains no parallel requirement that the initial reception of the documents be by the individual or agent personally.