Court Opinion

ID: 9642865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:11:10.935544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:53.739400
License: Public Domain

Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice, dissenting. This case should be reversed because the trial court erred (1) in not granting a new trial based upon juror Peggy Joyce Dukes’ untruthful response to a question from the court, and (2) in allowing a witness to give expert testimony as to the speed of one of the vehicles at the time of the accident based upon his reconstruction of the accident. I. On voir dire the trial court asked the j ury panel if any of them had ever been represented by the plaintiff’s lawyer, Michael Easley, or by Easley’s partners, Knox and Baird Kinney. No juror responded. On the motion for a new trial, the proof was undisputed that juror Peggy Joyce Dukes had just recently been represented by the law firm of Kinney, Easley and Kinney. It has long been settled law in Arkansas that a juror who is not candid with the Court is guilty of misconduct which gives rise to ground for a new trial. Zimmerman v. Ashcraft, 268 Ark. 835, 597 S.W.2d 99 (1980); Ark. State Hwy. Comm. v. Young, 241 Ark. 765, 410 S.W.2d 120 (1967); Anderson v. State, 200 Ark. 516, 139 S.W.2d 396 (1940). The majority attempts to justify this sudden departure from our heretofore consistent list of cases by quoting from Hot Springs Street Railway Co. v. Adams, 216 Ark. 506, 226 S.W.2d 354 (1950) which supports a position they are refusing to follow in this case. Actually Hot Springs Street Railway Co. stands for the proposition that even the appearance of juror misconduct will be enough to warrant relief. Moreover, this court just recently reiterated its historic position, now being ignored, in Walton v. State, 279 Ark. 193, 650 S.W.2d 231 (1983) where it was held that an ambiguous question (whether a juror had personal knowledge as opposed to hearsay knowledge about the case) was sufficient to require the juror to volunteer that she had listened to a part of an earlier trial. This court reversed in Walton, holding that the juror had not only been less than candid with the court but had been untruthful. The holding of the majority represents inconsistency, a sharp departure from previous law, and a tendency to decide cases, not on the basis of an articulable standard of law, but on some intangible and unknown impulse. The second point of the majority’s holding is that they are unwilling to take the undisputed testimony before the trial court in arriving at its conclusion. This seems to be contrary to all of our cases requiring the juror to respond and volunteer information merely on the suggestion that a response might be needed. II. Generally, automobile accident reconstruction is not an appropriate subject for expert testimony. As here, the opinion of an expert as to the speed of a vehicle depends on the supposition of too many variables. Further, the experience and mental attitude of the experimenter will substantially vary from that of the actual operator of the accident vehicle. See McCraney v. Kuechenberg, 144 Ind. App. 604, 248 N.E.2d 171 (1969). There is, therefore, too much uncertainty to allow this testimony, particularly in view of the great weight which is ordinarily accorded expert testimony by the jury. Expert testimony in this field of law will make negligence actions involving automobiles a contest between expert witnesses which more likely will be decided for the party most able to afford the expert. In the great majority of the cases, this will give insurance companies an unnecessary but decided advantage. 2 Wigmore, Evidence 3rd Ed. § 563 and McCormick on Evidence 2nd Ed. § 17 pp. 37-41.