Court Opinion

ID: 9752871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:40:55.338555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:47:21.102133
License: Public Domain

*488FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits the procedure which was utilized in the trial of this case.
The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), though interpreting the federal Constitution, is instructive in analyzing the issue under the Pennsylvania Constitution as well, and suggests that the latter would also permit the use of closed-circuit television. In addition, there are flaws in the majority’s analysis of Pennsylvania precedents permitting the admission of out-of-court statements under exceptions to the hearsay rule. Such exceptions demonstrate that a defendant’s right to an in-court, face-to-face confrontation with his accusers is not absolute despite the Pennsylvania Constitution’s use of the words “face to face.” The societal need for using closed-circuit television during some trials is evident, and has been recognized by the legislature as the public policy of this Commonwealth. I fear that the decision of the majority is a virtual license for any miscreant to abuse very young children who, predictably, will be unable to accuse the criminal to his face. A craven sex offender who limits his depredations to the very young may thereby escape the reach of the criminal law. Such a repugnant result is, I believe, unnecessary under our Constitution.
In analytical terms, I believe the confrontation clauses in the federal and state Constitutions are identical, and that both permit use of closed-circuit television procedures. The United States Supreme Court opinion in Maryland v. Craig, supra, is helpful in this case and the rationale is equally pertinent to an analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The federal Supreme Court stated in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), that the federal Constitution, like Pennsylvania’s Constitution, guarantees a face-to-face confrontation, though the federal Constitution does not include the words “face to face.” Without abandoning that interpretation, the Court in Maryland *489v. Craig held that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute, but will in some circumstances give way to more imperative ends. In this respect, the state and federal Constitutions are indistinguishable.
The majority criticizes the Superior Court for using a balancing test, stating that the Pennsylvania Constitution “clearly, emphatically and unambiguously requires a ‘face to face’ confrontation,” but inconsistently concedes, as it must, that “no right is absolute” and that “the right to confront a accuser is not without exception.” The obvious exceptions are the admission of hearsay testimony under a variety of exceptions to the rule against hearsay; however, the majority incorrectly concludes that all such exceptions under Pennsylvania law involve prior testimony under oath in a judicial proceeding in the presence of the defendant where the defendant had been able to face and cross-examine his accuser. In fact, this Court has recognized the admissibility of dying declarations, excited utterances, and statements of co-conspirators as exceptions to the rule against hearsay even when there has been no prior opportunity for cross-examination and where the prior statements were not made under oath. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pinkins, 514 Pa. 418, 425-28, 525 A.2d 1189, 1192-93 (1987) (statements of co-conspirators admissible, under what is apparently the most frequently used exception to the hearsay rule); Commonwealthy v. Cooley, 465 Pa. 35, 40-42, 348 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1975) (hearsay statements admissible under the res gestae exception for spontaneous or excited utterance); Commonwealth v. Speller, 445 Pa. 32, 34-35, 282 A.2d 26, 28 (1971) (hearsay statement admissible as a dying declaration). None of the foregoing examples involves statements made in court or under oath or under circumstances allowing an opportunity for cross-examination.
But even if the majority were correct in concluding that the Pennsylvania Constitution only permits exceptions to the literal “face-to-face” requirement when the right of cross-examination is untrammeled, such a conclusion would *490not act to vitiate the procedure employed during appellant’s trial. His ability to cross-examine the victim was completely unimpaired. Thus it can be said that the essence of the right of confrontation was protected.
The procedure employed in appellant’s trial, like that in the Maryland case, preserved all essential elements of confrontation which the Constitution seeks to protect. The procedure required the witness to be competent to testify and to testify under oath, the defendant retained full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination, and the judge, jury, and defendant were able to view the demeanor and body of the witness as she testified. This assured that the testimony was “both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony.” Maryland v. Craig, — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 3166, 111 L.Ed.2d at 682. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 523 Pa. 577, 593, 568 A.2d 600, 608 (1989) (“The exceptions to the hearsay rule are premised upon circumstances surrounding the making of the utterances which would assure the reliability of the contents.”) In view of these considerations, to distinguish between the federal and state Constitutions is sophistic.
Finally, the statute which now permits the television procedure employed in appellant’s trial1 clearly evinces the *491judgment of the legislature that public policy considerations mandate this minor limitation on the right to have a literal “face-to-face” confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution. Without elaborating, we refer to the facts recounted by the federal Supreme Court in Coy v. Iowa, supra. The now well-documented, widespread incidence of perverted adults preying upon defenseless children has caused a need to provide realistic protection for the children in our society. Between 1976 and 1985 there was a threefold increase in reported child abuse, so that in 1985, nationwide, almost two million cases were reported. “The prosecution of these child sex-abuse cases poses substantial difficulties because of the emotional trauma frequently suffered by child witnesses who must testify about the sexual assaults they suffered.” Id., 487 U.S. at 1031, 108 S.Ct. at 2808, 101 L.Ed.2d at 873-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This situation has led to a statement of public policy by our general assembly that children who are material witnesses to or victims of crimes need “additional consideration and different treatment from that of adults” and “additional rights and protections during their involvement with the criminal justice system.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5981. I wholeheartedly agree with the legislature that it is a matter of important public policy for the state, as parens patriae, to protect such children who, due to their youth, labor under a disability when called upon to testify regarding sexual abuse. I regard this policy to be sufficiently imperative to justify the procedure used during appellant’s trial, despite the Constitution’s guarantee of face-to-face confrontation with his accusers. As I observed earlier, the opposite interpretation leads to de facto license of sexual abuse of the very youngest children, who are obviously most in need of protection.
*492For these reasons, I dissent, and would affirm the order of the Superior Court upholding appellant’s judgment of sentence.
NIX, C.J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Although 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985(a) was enacted subsequent to the trial of this case, it appears to permit the procedure which was utilized during the trial. The statute provides:
§ 5985. Testimony by closed-circuit television
(a) Closed-circuit television. — The child victim or material witness, through his parent or guardian, or, where applicable, the child’s advocate or the attorney for the Commonwealth may move, for good cause shown, that the testimony of a child be taken in a room other than the courtroom and televised by closed-circuit equipment to be viewed by the court and the finder of fact in the proceeding. Only the attorneys for the defendant and for the Commonwealth, the court reporter, the judge, persons necessary to operate the equipment and any person whose presence would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child, including persons designated under section 5983 (relating to rights and services), may be present in the room with the child during his testimony. The court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the child in person but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or *491see the defendant. The court shall make certain that the defendant and defense counsel have adequate opportunity to communicate for the purposes of providing an effective defense. Examination and cross-examination of the child shall proceed in the same manner as permitted at trial.