Court Opinion

ID: 9761054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:30:14.814496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:21:03.192196
License: Public Domain

*489GREENE, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
To me, there are at least three reasons why the judgment in this case should be reversed. The first is the very nature of the cause of action itself. Seduction is a common law remedy, whose roots are in ancient times. It was formerly an exclusive action by a father to collect for the loss of services of his daughter who had usually became impregnated by some local swain. In time, the courts came to realize that the loss of services claim was fictional, and permitted the woman to sue in her own name, seeking damages for loss of reputation, embarrassment, etc. See Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed., pp. 885-886 (1971).
In the entire legal history of the state of Missouri, there have only been 20 appellate decisions in seduction cases, starting with Carder v. Forehand, 1 Mo. 704 (1826), in which case $40 in damages was awarded, to Greco v. Anderson, 615 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. App.1980), which acknowledged that the action of seduction is a common law tort bottomed in fraud. Most of these decisions occurred in the 19th century. The time has come to judicially repudiate this ancient doctrine which was artificially created by the courts of Missouri over 150 years ago. The doctrine is sexist, socially unwise, and subject to great abuse, as it provides a fertile field for blackmail, extortion and perjury, since it calls for no proof, according to the majority opinion, other than the allegations of the allegedly deflowered female, plus a pregnancy to justify her claim for damages.
The one-time held notion that women are “the weaker sex” is a myth, as modern women are not easily misled by panting males with sexual propositions. This is especially so when the woman in question is a mature adult. Here, the woman in question was 26 years old and a registered nurse at the time of her second impregnation by Bruner. At trial, she talked learnedly of condoms, IUD’s, foam, withdrawal, and other contraceptive methods. Their sexual encounters, by her own words, lasted from at least November of 1979 until April of 1982, punctuated by Bruner giving her at least $4,000 in the form of 17 checks, stays in hotels and motels throughout the country, and two pregnancies, one ending by voluntary abortion in January of 1981, and the second resulting in the birth of a child in 1982. To say that a seduction action could be maintained under such facts amounts to a perversion of justice. See Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696, 707-708 (Mo.App.1977) for a similar view.
While this court cannot abolish the cause of action by judicial fiat, the Supreme Court of Missouri, which created the doctrine, can. Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary’s, 446 S.W.2d 599-605-6 (Mo. banc 1969); Anderson v. Cahill, 528 S.W.2d 742, 749 (Mo. banc 1975). The doctrine should be abolished, and this case is a proper vehicle to do so.
The second reason why I disagree with the majority opinion is that in Missouri a seduction action is a species of fraud and the evidence to support a judgment in such cases must be clear, cogent, and convincing. Such evidence must show that the defendant knowingly made false representations, including a false promise to marry, for the purpose of seduction, which causes a chaste unmarried woman to consent to sexual intercourse. The evidence must show that the woman had a right to rely on the false promises, that she did rely on them, and, that as a result of such reliance, engaged in sexual intercourse with the defendant. Breece v. Jett, supra, at 707.
The only evidence that shows a promise made by Bruner to Alice was her testimony regarding an implied promise to marry her before the first act of sexual intercourse and promises thereafter, and before her first pregnancy that he “would make an honest woman” out of Alice if she became pregnant. The mere fact that Bruner did not marry her after she became pregnant is not enough, standing alone, to maintain Alice’s burden of proof by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in an actionable fraud cause. Brennaman v. Andes & Roberts Brothers Const. Co., 506 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Mo.App.1973). There would have to be clear, cogent and convincing evidence *490that at the time he promised to marry her, Bruner had no intention of doing so.
While fraud, grounded on a concealed intention not to perform a certain promise, may be inferred from facts and circumstances [Wattach v. Joseph, 420 S.W.2d 289, 294 (Mo.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953, 88 S.Ct. 335, 19 L.Ed.2d 362 (1967) ], in this case there are no such facts and circumstances to justify such a premise. Here, there was not only a complete failure of proof that Bruner did not intend to hon- or his implied promises to marry Alice when he made them, there was evidence, such as buying her an engagement ring and applying for a marriage license, that showed he actually took steps to perform that promise, but later changed his mind.
Under such facts, Alice did not make a submissible case. Dillard v. Earnhart, 457 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Mo.1970); Bauer v. Adams, 550 S.W.2d 850, 853-854 (Mo.App. 1977); Grosser v. Kandel-Iken Builders, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Mo.App.1983). I do not find any actionable fraud and, therefore, no seduction from the facts in this ease. I believe the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying Bruner’s motion for judgment in his favor. Assuming the validity of the seduction doctrine, I would reverse the judgment outright for failure of plaintiff to make a submissible case.
The final reason why the trial court’s judgment should not stand is that, assuming that the tort of seduction should continue to be a viable doctrine in Missouri, and that plaintiff made a submissible case, the evidence submitted as proof of damages, over the standing objection of defendant following the overruling of his motion in limine, was far in excess of that permitted by law.
The tort of seduction allows recovery for loss of chastity. Continuation of sexual relations by the parties after the first such encounter does not cause a continuing tort, or series of torts. While it has been judicially recognized that a woman whose chastity has been compromised can reform, and thereafter be seduced again, such reformation presupposes a termination of the original relationship, and a new inducement in order to allow her to be compromised again. Absent such a reformation, which is not even claimed by plaintiff here, the seduction is complete on the date when the woman’s chastity was originally compromised, which occurred here in November of 1979, if one believes Alice was seduced. Greco v. Anderson, 615 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Mo.App.1980).
Even if Alice was to be permitted to show as damages, as some ancient cases suggest, her first pregnancy and ensuing abortion, there is nothing that I know of that should permit her, after she knew Bruner would not marry her if she became pregnant, to introduce evidence, over objection, of her second pregnancy and subsequent birth of her child, as there is not a scintilla of evidence that she was induced by new false promises to resume her sexual relationship with Bruner. The majority opinion dodges this issue by attempting to split hairs over the fact that since the motion in limine sought to exclude all evidence of sexual contact after the first time, the failure to state in the motion that some of the evidence might be admissible and some not was fatal to defendant’s claim. I find no basis in law for such reasoning.
After being given a free lane and a fast track by the trial court on this issue, plaintiff’s counsel proceeded to make the most of it. In addition to Alice’s testimony concerning the birth of the child and its rejection by Bruner, there was evidence that her lawyer brandished the baby in Bruner’s face in the jury’s presence, demanding that he acknowledge his son. Alice also fondled and played with the baby in the jury’s presence, over objection. In my opinion, what occurred here was a circus, not a trial. I believe the trial court erred in overruling the motion in limine, at least to the extent of allowing evidence of sexual relations after the abortion, the ensuing second pregnancy, and the birth of the child. This error would justify reversal and remand, if I am wrong in my first two reasons given for reversal.
*491For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. I request that this case be transferred to the Supreme Court after opinion for re-examination of existing law, and further, because the majority opinion is in conflict with existing Missouri appellate decisions (Breece v. Jett and Greco v. Anderson, supra) in that those decisions require proof of seduction by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and it is obvious that the majority opinion does not require such proof. Rules 83.01 and 83.02, V.A.M.R.