Court Opinion

ID: 9456709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:00:45.900844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:05.036796
License: Public Domain

WISDOM, Circuit Judge
(concurring specially):
I concur in the judgment of the majority. But I think that we should give more aid to the district courts that must apply this statute in the future by discussing the statutory standard for government payment of defense-chosen expert assistance. The question is the meaning of the statutory criterion “necessary to an adequate defense.”
The Report of the Committee to Implement the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 contains a general statement recommending
that the allowances of petitions for investigative services be strictly limited, to the extent possible, to those charges necessary in the strictest sense of the word.
Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 36 F.R.D. 277, 290 (1965). But the minutes of the Committee’s meeting show that this suggestion applies only to investigative services. The committee members distinguished between “Investigative Services” and “Other Services”, which would include psychiatric and other expert services. 36 F.R. D. at 374. And, the minutes show an explicit recognition of the importance to the defendant of independent psychiatric services:
Judge Hastings inquired about a provision in each plan (to be drawn up for district courts) for psychiatric services, pointing out that the statute apparently is intended to give a defendant who is financially unable the same services that any other defendant might secure. The Committee considered the use of a roster of qualified psychiatrists and concluded that the defendant is entitled to the doctor whom he wants. It was suggested, however, that where practical available public facilities should be used.
36 F.R.D. at 374.
The legislative history of the statute does not contain any attempts at defining “necessary to an adequate defense” specifically. But the expressions of purpose are of some help. President Kennedy’s letter transmitting the proposed legislation to the House said that
In the typical criminal case the resources of the government are pitted against those of the individual. To guarantee a fair trial under such circumstances requires that each accused person have ample opportunity to gather evidence and prepare and present his cause. Whenever the lack of money prevents a defendant from securing an experienced lawyer, trained investigator or technical expert, an unjust conviction may follow.
1964 U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative News, at 2993. The focus on an “ample opportunity to * * * prepare and present his cause” and the effort to undo the effect of a defendant’s indigence reflect a purpose to give the impoverished defendant defense aids that he would use if he had adequate means. The Sixth Circuit has concluded that “the Congressional purpose in adopting the statute was to seek to place indigent defendants as nearly as may be on a level of equality with non-indigent defendants.” United States v. Tate, 6 Cir. 1969, 419 F.2d 131.
A liberal reading of the statute is further impelled by constitutional policies. This Court has held that an indigent criminal defendant has a constitutional right to court-appointed experts when his case would be prejudiced by *717their absence. Bradford v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 413 F.2d 467, 474. The criterion relied on by the court was equality between “indigents and those who possess the means to protect their rights.” 413 F.2d at 474, quoting Jacobs v. United States, 4 Cir. 1965, 350 F.2d 571. The right is crucial to the working of the adversary system. It can be founded on the due process requirement of a fair administration of justice in addition to equality of rights for indigent defendants. And it is a right that goes to the very trustworthiness of the criminal justice process. If there were to be any differentiation of solicitude between defendants’ rights based on values of privacy and those based on maintaining the accuracy of judicial decision making, the latter must certainly be favored. See Note, “Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants,.” 47 Minn.L.Rev. 1054 (1963). Our system of law rests on the adversary process. But in criminal cases the process cannot be expected to work unless indigent defendants are provided with reasonably adequate defense aids to offset the Government’s far greater resources and far more extensive prosecutorial aids. The American Bar Association Committee on the Prosecution and Defense Functions recognizes that the proper functioning of the adversary process requires that investigative and expert services be furnished to the indigent defendant. See ABA Project of Minimum Standards, Providing Defense Services § 1.5 and Commentary (1967).
I would read the statute, therefore, as requiring authorization for defense services when the attorney makes a reasonable request in circumstances in which he would independently engage such services if his client had the financial means to support his defenses.1 The trial judge should tend to rely on the judgment of the attorney, who has the primary duty of providing an adequate defense. Such reliance is recommended by the difficulty of requiring the trial judge to take an adversary view of the case. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 1969, 394 U.S. 165, 182, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176, 192. Additionally it avoids forcing the defendant to reveal private information to the court in order to support the request for such services. Further it comes close to putting the indigent defendant in the same position as a non-indigent defendant, where the defense attorney would determine whether to engage the services. There is a limitation contained in the statute. A maximum amount of $300 is authorized for each expert. This explicit limitation reinforces our interpretation of the requirement of necessity. Congress chose an expenditure limit rather than requiring defendants to demonstrate unusual need for defense services.
I do not mean to suggest that the trial court should grant such requests automatically. For instance, the court should not allow a defendant successive authorizations for the same type of services, since this would undermine the expenditure limit contained in the statute. Nor should the trial judge authorize an obviously frivolous expenditure by the defendant. But he should have a healthy respect for the judgment of the defense attorney in making his findings of necessity.

. Two other courts have formulated definitions of the statutory standard. In United States v. Schultz, 8 Cir. July 17, 1970, 431 F.2d 907, the Court said:
While a trial court need not authorize an expenditure under subdivision (e) for a mere “fishing expedition”, it should not withhold its authority when underlying facts reasonably suggest that further exploration may prove beneficial to the accused in the development of a defense to the charge.
And in United States v. Pope, D.C.Neb. 1966, 251 F.Supp. 234, 241, the Court said
It is contemplated by the Act that counsel should be afforded the fullest opportunity to prepare their case. The rule in allowing defense services is that the Judge need only be satisfied that they reasonably appear to be necessary to assist counsel in their preparation, not that the defense would be defective without such testimony.
(emphasis in original.)