Court Opinion

ID: 9533504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:32:17.666385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:03.977894
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(dissenting):
Once again this court refuses to give proper deference to a trial court’s determination of ultimate fact. See State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 521 (Utah App.1992) (Bench, P.J., concurring). The main opinion ignores what the trial court determined, and boldly concludes that “defendant’s statement and conduct constituted an equivocal invocation of his Miranda rights.”
From the evidence presented, the trial court found that Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he understood his Miranda rights, to which the defendant replied, “Yes.” The trial court concluded that the defendant understood his Miranda rights.
*902The trial court also found that Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he would answer some questions. The defendant stated, “I don’t know.” Trooper Wassmer then said, “You don’t have to answer questions if you don’t want to. It’s up to you.” The defendant nodded his head in an affirmative manner and then unhesitatingly gave an incriminating response to the trooper’s followup questions. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
Our standard of review is set forth in the now famous case of State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Pena held as follows:
A waiver of Miranda rights may be inferred from a defendant’s “actions and words,” and is based on the “totality of the circumstances.” We review the trial court’s legal conclusion of a valid waiver for correctness. However, this standard of review grants a measure of discretion to the trial court because of the variability of the factual settings.
Id. at 940-41 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The main opinion improperly relies on pre-Pena cases to support its less deferential standard of review. See main opinion at note 1.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances of this case, the trial court concluded that the defendant intended to waive his Miranda rights.1 Pena requires that we accord deference to this fact-sensitive conclusion unless we are able to post a fence line that will delineate the trial court’s discretionary pasture. Id. Rather than attempting to post a fence line, however, the main opinion simply decides the question de novo. Under Pena, that is not our prerogative.
I would defer to the trial court’s determination that defendant waived his Miranda rights. Because the trial court found waiver, the main opinion’s discussion about what officers can do in the face of equivocation is rendered both unnecessary and unwarranted.
In any event, any error in admitting defendant’s inculpatory statements was harmless. This appeal is from defendant’s conviction for failure to respond to an officer’s signal to stop. The case involved a high speed chase, which ended when defendant crashed on a freeway off-ramp. There was abundant evidence presented, in the form of Trooper Wassmer’s own testimony, to establish the elements of the offense.
I would affirm defendant’s conviction.

. The "totality of the circumstances” test is a weighing-of-the-evidence determination usually reserved to trial courts. See State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473, 476 (Utah App.1993); State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 484 n. 2 (Utah App.1993) (plurality opinion).