Court Opinion

ID: 9459335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:18:02.171572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:07.801384
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Sinaeola had physical possession of the goods for a limited period on November 27, 1970. They were loaded on trailer 622 by other employees of the carrier; he hauled them to their assigned destination; and he completed their delivery by helping the consignee unload the trailer. Had he opened a carton,1 caused someone else to place loot on his trailer,2 acquired constructive possession of another truck by kidnapping its driver,3 or departed for an un*312authorized delivery point,4 for the purpose of converting goods to his own use, a statutory theft would certainly have occurred. But the times when, and the places where, Sinacola had possession of the goods described in the indictment were without exception authorized by the shipper, the carrier, and the consignee. However evil his subjective intent, I am therefore persuaded that no theft occurred before the goods were delivered to the consignee.5
Conceivably the confusing evidence relating to the missing shipping documents would support the conclusion that Sinacola “stole” the goods when he drove away from the terminal. I assume conduct, plainly at odds with normal procedure, coupled with an intent to convert, might be a theft within § 659. As the case was argued and submitted, however, the jury was not required to find that any unauthorized overt act was performed by defendant before he completed his delivery of the goods to the consignee.6 In short, the conviction may rest on nothing more than authorized conduct accompanied by wrongful intent. In my opinion this is not enough.

. United States v. Padilla, 374 F.2d 782, 787-788 (2d Cir. 1967) (“[T]he evidence clearly showed that Padilla took physical possession of the slacks, exercised dominion over them to the exclusion of the owner. .. . ”).

. United States v. Belcher, 448 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 1971) (“There was sufficient proof from which the jury could have concluded that defendant wilfully caused the acts to be done by Claffy.”).

. United States v. Fusco, 398 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1968) (When the driver curtailed delivery of the full order at the Hyde Park station and left for Fusco’s place of business, he “took possession for his own purposes at the Hyde Park station.” Presumably the driver’s illegal intent existed from the moment he left the Hammond terminal, but the theft did not occur until he committed an overt act inconsistent with his authorized mission. I do not believe a driver’s possession can be both lawful and unlawful at the same time).

. Helping to unload the trailer would seem to be within Sinacola’s authority to make delivery to the consignee. He had neither the right nor the duty to obtain a signed receipt until that was done.

. The legal question of whether, and if so when, a theft occurred is unusually sophisticated because the consignee was both the owner of the goods and Sinacola’s co-conspirator. Sinacola never did anything to deprive the owner of his right to possession. Nevertheless, in collusion with the owner, Sinacola theoretically could steal the goods from Associated, which was both his employer and the owner’s carrier-bailee. While Sinacola had physical control of the goods, he either held lawful possession on behalf of the carrier or unlawful possession on behalf of his co-conspirator. I do not believe his possession could be both lawful and unlawful at the same time; in my opinion an overt act of “appropriation” inconsistent with his lawful status was required to consummate the theft. The instructions to the jury failed to define this critical factual issue.
The jury was instructed as follows:
“The Government must prove that these sump pumps had been stolen and unlawfully taken from an interstate shipment of freight. With regard to that, merchandise is considered stolen and unlawfully taken, if it has been appropriated from its lawful owner or possessor with the intent to deprive the owner or possessor of the rights and benefits of ownership or possession.
* * * * *
■ “If you find from all of the evidence that the sump pumps involved here were not stolen until or after the time at which Roy Wagner received and accepted the pumps and later denied receiving them, then you cannot convict the defendant of the crime charged.” Tr. 9, 11.
The defendant had requested a more careful instruction:
“Knowing possession of stolen property is dependent upon defendant’s dominion and control over the stolen property, and this dominion and control, to amount to unlawful possession, must be such that it exceeds defendant’s lawful control and custody in the ordinary course of business.” Defendant’s Requested Instruction No. F.
“If you find from all the evidence that the pumps were placed on a trailer driven by the defendant in the normal course of the business of Associated Truck Lines, and delivered to the consignee, Roy Wagner, in the normal course of the business of Associated Truck Lines, then you must find that the pumps were not stolen before or during the time in which the defendant is alleged to have had possession.” Defendant’s Requested Instruction No. J.