Court Opinion

ID: 9747784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:35:44.326891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:27.091957
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen :
For almost a century testimony of “tacit admission” was admissible in evidence in the courts of this Commonwealth as proof of an implied acquiescence on the part of the accused in the truth of the charges made against him. See Commonwealth ex rel. Shadd v. Myers, 423 Pa. 82, 85, 223 A. 2d 296, 298 (1966), and cases cited therein.
Despite criticism of this practice from varied sources,1 Pennsylvania continued to adhere to the rule and, stamped with the imprimatur of time, it became a well established evidentiary rubric. The rule had some currency in practically every state jurisdiction,2 as well as in the federal system.3 Previous to 1966 the *593Supreme Court of the United States expressly considered the propriety of the “tacit admission” rule only once and there approved its application. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 56 (1895).
On October 7, 1966, this Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Shadd v. Myers, supra, recognized for the first time that evidentiary use of “tacit admissions” on the part of an accused offended the proscription included in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution against self-incrimination and ruled that the use of such evidence was no longer permissible in criminal trials in this Commonwealth.4 Our ruling in Shadd was directly responsive to a statement by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, n.37 (1966). However, since Shadd involved a collateral attack on a judgment finalized several years previously, we held that the new ruling declaring the evidentiary use of “tacit admissions” impermissible did not apply or affect the validity of the judgment therein.
The instant trial occurred in September, 1964, and the judgment comes before us for review on direct appeal. Hence, the retroactive application of our new ruling as to the use of evidence of “tacit admissions” at trial presents a problem not present in Shadd.
As noted before, our ruling in Shadd proscribing the use of such evidence was prompted by Miranda v. *594Arizona, supra. Upon- further consideration of the problem, it is now my conclusion that the bar to the use of such evidence flowed from the mandate of Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).5 Since Malloy was decided on June 15, 1964, the question therefore-arises: Must all trials subsequent thereto wherein such evidence was admitted be set aside? I conclude not. It. is my view that the date the judgment was finalized is controlling, rather than the date of trial, and if the judgment was finalized before the pronouncement in Miranda v. Arizona on June 13, 1966, then the use of such evidence at trial does not necessarily invalidate the judgment.
The above conclusion is based on an analogy of the kindred decisions of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), and Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that adverse judicial or prosecutorial comment to the jury on an accused’s silence during a state trial violates the proscription against self-incrimination included in the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution. While this ruling was necessarily premised upon the prior ruling in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, nevertheless, in Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra, the court ruled that Griffin did not apply to all cases tried subsequent to Malloy but only to those not “finalized”, in the sense of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), as of the date the decision in Griffin was announced.5 6
*595Tlie relationship between Malloy and Miranda in the realm of “tacit admissions” is closely analogous to the relationship between Malloy and Griffin, in the realm of adverse comment on an accused’s silence at trial. Just as the decisional seed which later bloomed into Griffin is impliedly imbedded in Malloy, so. too is Miranda’s clear proscription of “tacit admission” evidence genealogically connected to Malloy. However, while the proscription against adverse comment on the accused’s silence at trial was implicitly promulgated by Malloy, it was not explicated therein. This was left to Griffin. Likewise, while the proscription against evidentiary use of “tacit admissions” was implicit in Malloy, it was Miranda that first spelled it out. Hence, it logically follows from Tehan that the ruling banning the evidentiary use of “tacit admissions”, first explicated in Miranda, need only be applied to those cases wherein the judgment was not finalized as of the date Miranda was announced.
Since the judgment in the instant case is not final, a new trial is mandatory.
Mr. Justice Jones, Mr. Justice Cohen and Mr. Justice O’Brien join in this opinion.

 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 424, 32 A. 2d 889, 892 (1943) (Maxey, C. J., dissenting) ; see also, Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions, 112 U. Pa. U. Rev. 210 (1963) ; Heller, Admissions by Acquiescence, 15 U. Miami U. Rev. 161 (1960).

 See 31A C.J.S., Evidence §§294-297 (1964).

 See Note, Silence as Incrimination in Federal Courts, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 598 (1956) ; see also, Tucker v. United States, 279 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Dickerson v. United States, 65 F. 2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 665 (1933).

 It is noteworthy that the Pennsylvania Constitutional analogue to the self-inerimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Pa. Const. Art. I, §9) has never been utilized to judicially attack the use of “tacit admissions” in this Commonwealth. A probable reason is that the cases suggest that the Pennsylvania privilege must be claimed in order to be operative. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 350, 90 A. 2d 838 (1952) ; cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Staino v. Cavell, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 274, 286, 217 A. 2d 824, 829 (1966) (Hoffman, J., dissenting).

 The relevant language in Malloy that prompts this conclusion is as follows: “The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement—the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 8.

 See Tehan v. United, States ex rel. Shott, id. at 409, n.3 (especially last paragraph thereof).