Court Opinion

ID: 9392970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 19:00:38.954356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:50.191638
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10390   Document: 87-1    Date Filed: 05/08/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-10390
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       VIRGIL MITCHELL,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       STATE OF ALABAMA DHR,
       SHARON HOLLIES,
       CARMEN BOSCH,
       SHERIFF, BALDWIN COUNTY, ALABAMA,
       WILLIE WALKER, et al.,

                                               Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10390      Document: 87-1     Date Filed: 05/08/2023     Page: 2 of 8

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10390

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00085-KD-MU
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Virgil Mitchell, proceeding pro se, appeals following the dis-
       missal of his civil rights complaint and the denial of his various
       post-judgment filings, which essentially constituted a motion for
       reconsideration. In the district court, Mitchell filed an amended
       complaint and asserted certain claims under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §
       1983 and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
       tions Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, involving efforts to
       compel him to pay child support. The defendants moved to dis-
       miss his suit as untimely and on other grounds. He opposed those
       motions without directly addressing timeliness. A magistrate
       judge then reviewed the case and issued a Report and Recommen-
       dation (“R&R”) concluding that the district court should dispose of
       his suit on that basis. Once again, Mitchell did not directly dispute
       the point, and the district court: (i) granted the defendants’ motion
       and dismissed his suit as untimely; and (ii) denied a post-judgment
       motion by him for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
              On appeal, Mitchell challenges the dismissal, but he still does
       not address the timeliness determination. The appellees, in turn,
       argue that he abandoned the issue. After careful review, we affirm.
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       22-10390                Opinion of the Court                         3

                                         I.
               We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a com-
       plaint for failure to satisfy the statute of limitations. Jackson v.
       Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2007). We also review the
       district court’s interpretation and application of the statute of limi-
       tations de novo. Dotson v. United States, 30 F.4th 1259, 1264 (11th
       Cir. 2022). In examining whether a district court’s dismissal is
       proper, we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and con-
       strue them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bingham v.
       Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). But we review the
       denial of Rule 59(e) motions for reconsideration only for abuse of
       discretion. Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282, 1285
       (11th Cir. 2001). We may affirm the district court’s decision for
       reasons different than those stated by the district court. Turlington
       v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1433 n.9 (11th Cir. 1998).
               Generally, we do not consider arguments not raised in the
       district court. Club Madonna Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 42 F.4th
       1231, 1247 n.4 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Air-
       lines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also Finnegan
       v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 926 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir.
       2019). We’ve cautioned litigants that we “cannot allow [them] to
       argue a different case [on appeal] from the case [they] presented to
       the district court.” Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 769
       (11th Cir. 1998). Similarly, a party may forfeit an argument by wait-
       ing until a post-trial motion, like a motion for reconsideration, to
       raise it. See Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1305 (11th Cir. 2010).
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10390

              Moreover, a party who fails to object to a magistrate judge’s
       findings or recommendations contained in an R&R in accordance
       with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to chal-
       lenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to
       factual and legal conclusions, if the party was informed of the time
       period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to
       object. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1. However, we may review on appeal
       for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. Id.
              In addition, an appellant can abandon an issue by failing to
       challenge it on appeal. See Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1
       (11th Cir. 1994) (applying this rule to a pro se litigant). An appellant
       can also abandon a claim if he presents it only in “passing refer-
       ences” or “in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments
       and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., Co., 739 F.3d
       678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). “[S]imply stating that an issue exists,”
       without providing reasoning and citation to authority, “constitutes
       abandonment of that issue.” Id. (quoting Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
       561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009)).
               In applying these principles, we hold pro se pleadings to a
       less stringent standard and will liberally construe them. Campbell
       v. Air Jam., Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). But we will
       not “serve as de facto counsel for a party [or] rewrite an otherwise
       deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Id. at 1168–69. In
       addition, all litigants in federal court -- pro se or counseled -- are
       required to comply with the applicable procedural rules. See Albra
       v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
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       22-10390               Opinion of the Court                         5

                                        II.
               “All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort ac-
       tions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury
       actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.”
       McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). Although
       Alabama has “more than one statute of limitations for personal in-
       jury actions, the residual personal injury statute of limitations ap-
       plies to all actions brought under § 1983.” Jones v. Preuit &
       Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1482 (11th Cir. 1989). Alabama’s residual
       personal injury statute of limitations is two years. Ala. Code
       § 6-2-38; McNair, 515 F.3d at 1173.
               “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question
       of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wal-
       lace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). The statute of limitations for
       a civil rights action begins to run from the date the cause of action
       accrues, which occurs when “the plaintiff has a complete and pre-
       sent cause of action” and “can file suit and obtain relief.” Id. (quo-
       tations omitted). Under the discovery rule, an action accrues when
       “the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or
       should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard
       for his rights.” Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561–62 (11th Cir. 1996)
       (quotations omitted). A § 1983 cause of action will only accrue
       once the plaintiff knows or should know (1) that he has suffered an
       injury that forms the basis of his action and (2) the identity of the
       person or entity that inflicted the injury. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d
       1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). To analyze this issue, a court must first
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10390

       identify the injuries the plaintiff allegedly suffered and then deter-
       mine when he could have sued for them. Rozar, 85 F.3d at 562.
              The statute of limitations for federal civil RICO actions is
       four years. Lehman v. Lucom, 727 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2013).
       It “begins to run when the injury was or should have been discov-
       ered, regardless of whether or when the injury is discovered to be
       part of a pattern of racketeering.” Id. (quotations omitted).
              A party may, no later than 28 days after entry of a judgment,
       move a district court to alter or amend it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A
       party cannot, however, “use a Rule 59(e) motion to relitigate old
       matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been
       raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill.
       of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, a court
       may only grant a Rule 59(e) motion on the basis of newly discov-
       ered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact. PBT Real Estate,
       LLC v. Town of Palm Beach, 988 F.3d 1274, 1287 (11th Cir. 2021).
       We’ve affirmed the denial of a motion for reconsideration where a
       party “did nothing but ask the district court to reexamine an unfa-
       vorable ruling.” Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327,
       1344 (11th Cir. 2010).
               On the record before us, Mitchell’s appeal fails for several
       procedural and substantive reasons. For starters, he forfeited any
       issue relating to the timeliness of his claims by failing to promptly
       raise the issue in the district court and now on appeal. See Thomas,
       614 F.3d at 1305; 11th Cir. R. 3-1; Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1168; Irwin,
       40 F.3d at 347 n.1. And for the same reason, he abandoned any
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       22-10390                Opinion of the Court                          7

       challenge to the denial of his motion for reconsideration under
       Rule 59(e). Further, to the extent he raises claims and theories of
       relief for the first time that he did not present in the district court,
       we will not consider them. Club Madonna Inc., 42 F.4th at 1247
       n.4; Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1331; Finnegan, 926 F.3d at 1271;
       Irving, 136 F.3d at 769.
               But even if Mitchell implicitly preserved challenges to the
       district court’s dismissal order below and on appeal, we conclude
       that the district court did not err, because: (i) the statute of limita-
       tions period for a § 1983 action in Alabama is two years, Jones, 876
       F.2d at 1482; Ala. Code § 6-2-38; McNair, 515 F.3d at 1173, and (ii)
       the statute of limitations for a federal RICO claim is four years,
       Lehman, 727 F.3d at 1330. Mitchell’s amended complaint, on the
       other hand, only pertained to events in 2014 and 2015, which oc-
       curred well before four years before the initiation of this suit, in
       2021. Moreover, his allegations show that he knew of the alleged
       wrongs committed by the defendants at the time they occurred,
       and thus, he had a “complete and present cause of action” that he
       could have “file[d] suit and obtain[ed] relief” for at the time of the
       alleged wrongs. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; see also Rozar, 85 F.3d
       at 561–62; Chappell, 340 F.3d at 1283.
               Finally, assuming that a challenge to the district court’s de-
       nial of Mitchell’s post-judgment motions was and is preserved, he
       merely used these motions to relitigate already-decided issues, re-
       assert the general premise of his amended complaint, or contest the
       R&R’s general conclusion, so the district court did not abuse its
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10390

       discretion in denying them. Sanderlin, 243 F.3d at 1285; Michael
       Linet, Inc., 408 F.3d at 763; PBT Real Estate, LLC, 988 F.3d at 1287.
             Thus, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
             AFFIRMED.