Court Opinion

ID: 9956654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 18:02:04.240251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:44.118314
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/2/24 P. v. Eaves CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B324674
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 2022011755)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Ventura County)

v.

MICHAEL ALLEN EAVES,

     Defendant and Appellant.

         Michael Allen Eaves appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of stalking (Pen. Code,1 § 646.9, subd. (a)) and
making criminal threats (§ 422). The trial court sentenced him to
the middle term of two years on each conviction, staying the
sentence on the latter pursuant to section 654. Eaves contends:
(1) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions, (2) his
criminal threats conviction must be vacated due to instructional
error, and (3) the matter must be remanded for resentencing

         1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
because the court did not consider mitigating circumstances
when it imposed middle-term sentences. We affirm.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       John Raitt and his family have lived next door to Eaves
since 2014. Initially, the Raitts did not have issues with Eaves.
But in 2021, Eaves began to spray a horse path in front of the
Raitt home, causing a safety hazard. Raitt reported the matter to
the homeowners association (HOA), and later confronted Eaves
directly. Eaves said that he could “do whatever the fuck [he]
want[ed].” Raitt explained that Eaves was damaging his
property and that the HOA might blame him for the damage.
Eaves said, “Fuck the HOA. They can go fuck themselves.”
       On another occasion, Eaves leaned over a fence and yelled,
“I’m going to knock on your fucking door and I’m going to fucking
kill everyone in the house.” Raitt hoped Eaves was yelling at
someone on the telephone, and worried for his family’s safety.
       In July, Raitt walked out to his car so he could pick up his
son from a music lesson. As Raitt walked toward the car, Eaves
yelled, “I’m going to fuck you in your fucking ass until you die,
motherfucker.” Raitt asked if Eaves was talking to him. Eaves
replied, “Yeah motherfucker, I’m talking to you. I’m going to fuck
you in your fucking ass until you fucking die.” Raitt asked Eaves
if he had a problem. Eaves said, “Yeah, you motherfucker.
You’re my fucking problem. I’m going to fuck you in your ass
until you die.” Raitt got in his car and drove away.
       After this threat Raitt feared for the safety of his family
members, who were already scared of Eaves due to his prior
actions. Raitt’s fear thereafter became “all consuming”; he
believed Eaves could attack him at any moment. Raitt reported

                                2
the incident to the police and began to avoid Eaves, trying to deal
with him only through the HOA or law enforcement.
       After the July incident, Eaves escalated his threatening
behavior toward Raitt. He sped his truck on the path in front of
Raitt’s home, despite its frequent use by Raitt and his family.
Eaves frequently called Raitt a “fat queer fuck” and threatened to
“fuck [Raitt] in the ass until [he] die[d].” He threw knives and
hatchets at a shipping container in his yard.
       Raitt installed security cameras in August 2021 so he could
record Eaves’s threats. A series of September videos showed
Eaves “flipp[ing] [Raitt] off” and “grabb[ing] his junk.” He
threatened to “kick [Raitt’s] ass” and “beat [his] fucking ass.”
Eaves said he would “cut [Raitt’s] neck off” and would “take
[Raitt’s] phone and shove it up [his] fuckin’ ass.” He also threw
things at Raitt and his car. Raitt called police to report the
incident.
       In another video Eaves called Raitt a “walking dead man.”
In another he said that “[e]very fucking one of you is going to die”
and that Raitt was “a dead motherfucker.” He threatened to put
a pole “through [his] forehead” and something “up [his] ass” and
to cut a hole in Raitt’s door. He hit golf balls into Raitt’s yard
and told him to leave town. Raitt and his family had trouble
sleeping amidst these threats, and discussed whether they should
move.
       Eaves’s threatening behaviors continued into 2022. He
said to Raitt: “I’m gonna to kill you, motherfucker. I’ll fuckin’ kill
you. You little bitch, fuck.” He threatened to “fucking put a
bullet” in Raitt and said that his family’s names would be in the
news when he killed them. He also threatened them with arson.

                                  3
       At trial, Eaves testified that he suffered from posttraumatic
stress disorder because he had been a witness in a murder trial.
His family’s lives were threatened, and they had to be relocated.
As a result, Eaves was in “a very emotional state” when
interacting with Raitt. He lacked the “proper tools to put that
together right away without someone else’s help.”
       Eaves said that a “majority” of Raitt’s videos showed him
“trying to work through [his] own problems.” He was unaware
anyone was listening to him. He felt that his “whole life was
breaking down” after his children stopped talking to him.
       Eaves said he was not directing his insults and threatening
language at Raitt. He admitted that he had gone onto Raitt’s
property with his hose on one occasion, but denied that he ever
engaged in his loud verbal “self-therapy” while there. He also
admitted that he threw axes and knives on his own property. He
did this as a form of anger management, and not to intimidate
the Raitts.
                              DISCUSSION
                        Sufficiency of the evidence
       Eaves contends there was insufficient evidence to support
either of his convictions. Our review is limited to determining
whether substantial evidence—“evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value”—supports the judgment. (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) We view the evidence “in
the light most favorable to the prosecution[,] and presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Conflicts
and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province
of the . . . jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the

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truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.’ ” (Ibid., alterations omitted.) Reversal “ ‘is
unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the
jury’s verdict[s].” (Ibid.)
                              1. Stalking
       Eaves argues his stalking conviction must be vacated
because prosecutors presented insufficient evidence that he was
subjectively aware that the statements he made to Raitt were of a
threatening nature. He bases his argument on the Supreme
Court’s recent rejection of Colorado’s stalking statute. (See
Counterman v. Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66.) In that case, the
defendant “was prosecuted in accordance with an objective
standard.” (Id. at p. 82.) Prosecutors “had to show only that a
reasonable person would understand [the defendant’s]
statements as threats”; they were not required to demonstrate
“any awareness on his part that the statements could be
understood that way.” (Ibid.) That lack of a subjective element
violated the First Amendment. (Counterman, at p. 82.)
       But California’s stalking statute is different. Under
California law, “[a]ny person who willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another
person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place
that person in reasonable fear for [their] safety[] or the safety of
[their] immediate family is guilty of the crime of stalking.”
(§ 646.9, subd. (a), italics added.) Thus, for a threat to be credible
there must be evidence that the defendant harbored “the intent
to place the person that is the target of the threat in reasonable
fear for [their] safety or the safety of [their] family.” (Id., subd.
(g).)

                                  5
       As this definition makes clear, California’s stalking statute
includes the subjective element that was missing in Counterman,
supra, 600 U.S. 66: For his threat to be credible Eaves had to not
only understand that his statements to Raitt could be understood
as threatening; he had to intend that they place Raitt in fear.
(People v. Lopez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 436, 453-454.) The trial
court told the jury as much when it instructed them pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 1301. And jurors found sufficient evidence of this
subjective element. Eaves’s stalking conviction thus does not
violate the First Amendment.
                          2. Criminal threats
       “[N]ot all threats are criminal.” (In re George T. (2004) 33
Cal.4th 620, 630.) Rather, a criminal threats conviction under
section 422 requires proof that: (1) “the defendant ‘willfully
threatened to commit a crime [that] will result in death or great
bodily injury to another person’ ”; (2) “the defendant made the
threat ‘with the specific intent that the statement [was] to be
taken as a threat, even if there [was] no intent of actually
carrying it out’ ”; (3) the threat was, “ ‘on its face and under the
circumstances in which it was made, so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person
threatened[] a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution of the threat’ ”; (4) “the threat actually caused the
person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for [their] own safety or
for [their] immediate family’s safety’ ”; and (5) “the threatened
person’s fear was ‘reasonable’ under the circumstances.” (People
v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228, alterations omitted.)
Eaves argues there was insufficient evidence of the last three of
these elements.

                                 6
       Eaves is incorrect. As to the third element, “ ‘the
determination [of] whether a defendant intended [for their] words
to be taken as a threat, and whether the words were sufficiently
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate[,] and specific [that] they
conveyed to the victim an immediacy of purpose and immediate
prospect of execution of the threat[,] can be based on all the
surrounding circumstances and not just on the words alone.’ ”
(People v. Gaut (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1431.) “ ‘The parties’
history can also be considered as one of the relevant
circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Here, Eaves’s criminal threats conviction was based on the
threats he made to Raitt in September 2021: He threatened to
“beat [Raitt’s] fucking ass,” “cut [Raitt’s] neck off,” and “take
[Raitt’s] phone and shove it up [his] fuckin’ ass.” He made crude
gestures at Raitt and threw rocks at him around the time he
made these threats. And he previously made similar threats
against Raitt, including that he would “fucking kill everyone in
Raitt’s house,” and had been seen throwing knives and axes in
his yard. Given these circumstances and this history, and that
Eaves and Raitt were next-door neighbors, a reasonable jury
could conclude that Eaves’s threats carried an immediate
prospect of execution and violence.
       There was also sufficient evidence that Raitt was in
sustained fear. A person’s fear is “sustained” if it “extends
beyond what is momentary, fleeting, or transitory.” (People v.
Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156.) “The victim’s
knowledge of defendant’s prior conduct is relevant in establishing
that [they were] in a state of sustained fear.” (Ibid.) So are the
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s threats and their

                                7
subsequent actions. (People v. Martinez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th
1212, 1221.)
       Raitt began to worry for his family’s safety in the months
leading up to Eaves’s September 2021 threats. By that time
Eaves had made clear that his problem was with Raitt. That led
Raitt to install a security system and to strive to avoid dealing
directly with Eaves. After the September incident Raitt called
police. He thereafter had difficulty sleeping and discussed with
his family whether they should move. Such circumstances
support the jury’s finding that Raitt’s fear was more than
momentary, fleeting, or transitory.
       Eaves claims that even if Raitt was in sustained fear, his
threats to sodomize Raitt were “too outlandish” for Raitt’s fear to
be deemed reasonable. But Eaves ignores that “no specific crime
must be identified for the jury” to find a victim’s fear reasonable.
(People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 755.) He also ignores
that he additionally threatened to assault and kill Raitt. Given
such circumstances and that Eaves lived next door, the jury could
easily conclude that Raitt’s fear was reasonable. Eaves’s second
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge accordingly fails.
                              Instructional error
       Eaves next contends his criminal threats conviction must
be vacated because the trial court did not instruct the jury on
attempted criminal threats. We review this contention de novo
(People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 295 (Wilson)), and reject
it.
       “ ‘ “ ‘ “It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the
absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general
principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.”
[Citations.] That obligation . . . include[s] giving instructions on

                                 8
lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to
whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present,
but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than
that charged.’ ” ’ ” (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 295,
alterations omitted.) A court thus “ ‘errs if it fails to instruct, sua
sponte, on all theories of a lesser included offense [that] finds
substantial support in the evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) “In deciding
whether evidence is ‘substantial’ in this context, a court
determines only its bare legal sufficiency, not its weight.” (People
v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 177, disapproved on another
ground by People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.)
       Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
Eaves (see People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122,
1137), we conclude the trial court had no obligation to instruct
the jury on attempted criminal threats. Attempted criminal
threats is a lesser included offense of criminal threats. (People v.
Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 514.) “The crime . . .
encompasses situations where a defendant intends to commit a
criminal threat ‘but is thwarted from completing the crime by
some fortuity or unanticipated event.’ ” (Id. at p. 515.) For
example, the defendant’s threat may not convey an immediate
prospect of execution. (Ibid.) Or it may not cause the recipient to
be in sustained fear. (Ibid.)
       There was insufficient evidence that any of those scenarios
occurred here. Eaves’s threats of violence to his next-door
neighbor Raitt had an immediate prospect of execution: He made
them after months of harassing Raitt, around the time he was
throwing things at Raitt and his car, and after Raitt had
observed him throwing knives and axes in his yard. Raitt was in
sustained fear: He called police shortly after Eaves threatened

                                   9
him, couldn’t sleep in the months that followed, and discussed
moving with his family. That fear was reasonable: Eaves had
threatened him with sodomy, assault, death, and arson—threats
that came on the heels of months of similar threats.
       In our view, the evidence indicates that Eaves committed
criminal threats. Instructing the jury on attempted criminal
threats was thus not required. (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 295; see also People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 959 [“it has
long been settled that the trial court need not . . . instruct the
jury on the existence and definition of a lesser and included
offense if the evidence was such that the defendant, if guilty at
all, was guilty of the greater offense”].)
                        Middle-term sentences
       Finally, Eaves contends the matter must be remanded for
resentencing because the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to consider mitigating circumstances. We disagree.
                       1. Relevant proceedings
       At sentencing, the trial court stated it had considered the
probation report, Eaves’s statement in mitigation, prosecutors’
sentencing recommendation, and statements from the victims,
including Raitt. Prosecutors asked the court to sentence Eaves to
two years eight months in prison: the middle term of two years on
the stalking, plus a consecutive eight months (one-third the
middle term) on the criminal threats. Eaves countered that he
was presumptively entitled to low-term sentences due to his
mental health issues.
       The trial court found that Eaves inflicted serious emotional
injury on the Raitts and exhibited no remorse for his actions.
The court also found that Eaves had “flat-out lied” to the jury,
“minimized” his actions, and “deflected” blame; he “did

                                10
everything he could do other than to accept responsibility for
what he did.” The court said it had considered aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and determined Eaves was not entitled
to the low term because there were “sufficient factors in
aggravation that would bump this up to a mid[dle-]term case.”
                            2. Discussion
       If a defendant’s psychological trauma contributed to the
commission of their offense, the trial court shall impose a
low-term sentence unless it “finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that
imposition of the low[] term would be contrary to the interests of
justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) The court followed that
requirement here. It considered the evidence, statements from
the victims, and circumstances in aggravation and mitigation and
concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
circumstances in mitigation such that imposition of the middle
term was appropriate. There was no abuse of discretion.
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.                     YEGAN, J.

                               11
                     Ryan J. Wright, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Peter S. Westacott, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.