Court Opinion

ID: 9837046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:06.721152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:20.035028
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(concurring in the result):
Article 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 921, prohibits the crime of larceny of property from its owner. The property alleged to be stolen here was various items purchased with a credit card made available by the Government to military personnel for military duties. Paragraph 46e, Part IV, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984 (1994 and 1995 eds.) provides for enhanced punishment if the items stolen are “military property”. However, failure to satisfy this punishment enhancer in no way *101invalidates a plea of guilty to larceny under Article 121.
In any event, I conclude that appellant admitted that this punishment enhancer existed in his case, i.e., he stole military property. Appellant admitted that he used a credit card issued to him by the United States for the purpose of performing his military duties. He also admitted that the items which he purchased were military property, as a result of the manner in which they were purchased. As this Court said in United States v. Simonds, 20 MJ 279, 280 (1985), “In a general sense, all property purchased with federal funds and owned or held by a service is military property.” I think Simonds is controlling in this case.
In addition, to the extent this is viewed as a guilty plea issue, post-trial speculation concerning the use that may or may not have been made of this property should not be countenanced. I would affirm under United States v. Harrison, 26 MJ 474, 476 (CMA 1988) (post-trial speculation in guilty plea cases will not be countenanced). Appellant admitted that it was military property and provided a factual basis for his admission.