Court Opinion

ID: 9952704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 16:02:06.082818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:43.922927
License: Public Domain

22-6189
     Ruqi v. Garland
                                                                                       BIA
                                                                                  Factor, IJ
                                                                               A208 005 019

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of March, two thousand
 4   twenty-four.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                     RICHARD C. WESLEY,
 8                     GERARD E. LYNCH,
 9                     BETH ROBINSON,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   BAJRAM RUQI,
14           Petitioner,
15
16                     v.                                            22-6189
17                                                                   NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                        Thomas V. Massucci, Esq., New York, NY.
24
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
 2                                       Attorney General; Jennifer R. Khouri, Senior
 3                                       Litigation Counsel; James A. Hurley,
 4                                       Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
 5                                       United States Department of Justice,
 6                                       Washington, DC.

 7         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

 8   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10         Petitioner Bajram Ruqi, a native of the former Yugoslavia and citizen of

11   Kosovo, seeks review of a March 29, 2022 , decision of the BIA affirming an April

12   29, 2019, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for

13   asylum and withholding of removal. 1 In re Bajram Ruqi, No. A 208 005 019 (B.I.A.

14   Mar. 29, 2022), aff’g No. A 208 005 019 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 29, 2019). We

15   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

16         We have reviewed the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions. See Yan Juan Chen v. Holder,

17   658 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2011); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520,

18   522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and

19   questions of law de novo, see Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014), and

20   “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable

     1The BIA found that Ruqi waived his claim for relief under the Convention Against
     Torture, and Ruqi does not challenge that ruling here.
                                              2
 1   adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

 2   § 1252(b)(4)(B).

3          Ruqi alleged that Islamic extremists threatened and assaulted him because

4    of his political beliefs and his work for U.S. troops in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

5    He had the burden to demonstrate past persecution or a fear of future persecution.

 6   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b).     To constitute

 7   persecution, the harm suffered must be “by the government of the country to

 8   which the alien is returnable, or at the hands of an organization or person from

 9   which the government cannot or will not protect the alien.” Aliyev v. Mukasey,

10   549 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). When private actors

11   are alleged to be the source of persecution, the applicant must show that the

12   government is “unable or unwilling to control” the alleged persecutors. Singh v.

13   Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). The applicant

14   “must show that the government [1] condoned the private actions or [2] at least

15   demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims.” Scarlett v. Barr, 957

16   F.3d 316, 331 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). An applicant must “show

17   more than government failure to act on a particular report of an individual crime,

18   or difficulty . . . controlling private behavior.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets

19   omitted).

                                              3
 1         The agency reasonably concluded that Ruqi failed to establish that the

 2   authorities in Kosovo would fail to protect him, and that failure is dispositive of

 3   asylum and withholding of removal. Ruqi testified that he is Muslim, but that

 4   Islamic extremists accused him of betraying the Muslim faith, assaulted him, and

 5   threatened to kill him and burn down his restaurant. Although he once told a

 6   police officer patronizing his restaurant about the threats, he did not make any

 7   official report or inform any authorities about the three assaults in 2012 and 2013.

 8   He asserted that he was targeted, in part, because of his support for the Christian

 9   Democratic Party of Kosovo, but also testified that his party was part of the ruling

10   coalition in Kosovo. Moreover, while he is correct that the country conditions

11   evidence reflects some government corruption, the State Department also reported

12   that numerous police officers were arrested on corruption charges, indicating that

13   the government was attempting to tackle its corruption problem.         And news

14   articles reflect that the government was actively battling Islamic extremism by

15   arresting individuals and shutting down extremist organizations.

16         On this record the agency reasonably concluded that Ruqi did not establish

17   that the authorities in Kosovo were or would be unable or unwilling to protect

18   him. Because he did not officially report the attacks to police, there was no direct

19   evidence that the police would refuse to help him; he had no evidence of similar

                                              4
 1   attacks on other members of his party or of the police refusing to protect other

 2   party members; he testified that the party he supported was part of the coalition

 3   governing Kosovo; country conditions evidence reflected that the government is

 4   battling corruption as well as violence by Islamic fundamentalists in Kosovo; and

 5   Ruqi identified no specific country conditions evidence overlooked by the agency

6    that supports his claim that the government is unwilling or unable to protect him.

7    See Singh, 11 F.4th at 115; Scarlett, 957 F.3d at 331.

 8         Finally, we reject Ruqi’s argument that the IJ imposed an overly stringent

 9   standard for evaluating the government’s willingness to protect him. The case

10   cited by the IJ, which has since been vacated by the agency, did not impose a new,

11   heightened standard. See Scarlett, 957 F.3d at 333 (holding that the “complete

12   helplessness to protect” formulation in Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G.

13   2018) was “well grounded in circuit precedents”).

14         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

15   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

16                                            FOR THE COURT:
17                                            Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
18                                            Clerk of Court

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