Court Opinion

ID: 9385589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 15:00:24.63643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.077637
License: Public Domain

20-2331
     Alexis v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                              Straus, IJ
                                                                           A200 444 973

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 7th day of April, two thousand twenty-
 4   three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
 8              ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
 9              RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   GARYL ALEXIS,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                       v.                                      20-2331
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                     Diana R. Blank, New Haven Legal Assistance
 2                                       Association, New Haven, CT.
 3
 4   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 5                                       General; Anthony C. Payne, Assistant
 6                                       Director; Neelam Ihsanullah, Trial Attorney,
 7                                       Office of Immigration Litigation, United
 8                                       States Department of Justice, Washington,
 9                                       DC.
10
11         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

12   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

13   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

14         Petitioner Garyl Alexis, a native and citizen of Haiti, seeks review of a June

15   24, 2020, decision of the BIA affirming an October 10, 2019, decision of an

16   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for deferral of removal under the

17   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Garyl Alexis, No. A200 444 973 (B.I.A.

18   June 24, 2020), aff’g No. A200 444 973 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Oct. 10, 2019). We

19   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

20         We have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of

21   completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.

22   2006). We review questions of law de novo and factual findings for substantial

23   evidence. Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 583 (2d Cir. 2021). “[T]he

                                              2
 1   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

 2   would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”             8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 3   “[S]ubstantial evidence review does not contemplate any judicial reweighing of

 4   evidence. Rather it requires us to ask only whether record evidence compelled a

 5   . . . finding different from that reached by the agency.” Quintanilla-Mejia, 3 F.4th

 6   at 593–94.

 7         A CAT applicant has the burden to show that he would “more likely than

 8   not” be tortured. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17. An applicant for CAT relief must

 9   show that “it is more likely than not” that he will be tortured “by or at the

10   instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other

11   person acting in an official capacity.”       8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1);

12   Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2004). “An alien will never be able

13   to show that he faces a more likely than not chance of torture if one link in the

14   chain cannot be shown to be more likely than not to occur. It is the likelihood of

15   all necessary events coming together that must more likely than not lead to torture,

16   and a chain of events cannot be more likely than its least likely link.” Savchuck v.

17   Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

18   Alexis asserts that because of his specific characteristics (criminal conviction,

                                               3
 1   Americanization, inability to speak Haitian Creole, aunt’s connection to the

 2   Lavalas political movement, and lack of family in Haiti) he is likely (1) to be

 3   detained on arrival and tortured in detention; and (2) to be tortured by vigilante

 4   mobs and law enforcement when not detained. The record does not compel a

 5   conclusion contrary to the agency’s conclusion that Alexis failed to demonstrate

 6   that this torture was more likely than not to occur.

 7         The agency acknowledged that Alexis may face harsh treatment in Haiti,

 8   but reasonably concluded that he did not show that it was more likely than not

 9   that he would be detained or that he would be tortured outside of detention. The

10   Haitian government is notified of the criminal deportees who are being repatriated

11   and their criminal histories, and criminal deportees are to be immediately released

12   if they do not have pending convictions in Haiti. Although the record reflects that

13   the policy is not uniformly applied, it does not establish that criminal deportees

14   are more likely than not to be detained past this initial screening. See Mu-Xing

15   Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 n.20 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring CAT applicant to

16   “establish that there is greater than a fifty percent chance (i.e. that it is ‘more likely

17   than not’) that he will be tortured”). Although Alexis challenges the agency’s

18   reliance on the lack of quantifiable data, he does not present evidence that the

                                                 4
 1   stories of detention he proffers are more than isolated incidents, or other evidence

 2   that he is more likely than not to be detained. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546

 3   F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a petitioner bears the burden of proof, his

 4   failure to adduce evidence can itself constitute the ‘substantial evidence’ necessary

 5   to support the agency’s decision.”). Because Alexis did not demonstrate that he

 6   more likely than not will be detained upon his arrival in Haiti, he necessarily failed

 7   to show that he would more likely than not be tortured while in detention. See

 8   Savchuck, 518 F.3d at 123.

 9         The agency did not otherwise err in finding that Alexis was not more likely

10   than not to be tortured by vigilante mobs or targeted and tortured by law

11   enforcement. The record reflects that because of his Americanization, inability to

12   speak Haitian Creole, and lack of family in Haiti, Alexis will have difficulty finding

13   housing or employment there and may become homeless, which increases the

14   likelihood that he will be identified as a deportee. Alexis argues that he will likely

15   be targeted and tortured because he will eventually come within the ambit of a

16   crime and be falsely accused by a vigilante mob or police officer and subsequently

17   beaten or subjected to harsh treatment rising to the level of torture. However, the

18   fact that crime is prevalent is not sufficient to show that he will more likely than

                                               5
 1   not be tortured. See Mu-Xing Wang, 320 F.3d at 144 n.20. Moreover, although

 2   Alexis gave examples of criminal deportees being falsely accused of crimes and

 3   targeted, he did not present country conditions to suggest those were more than

 4   isolated incidents, or that more than half of criminal deportees suffer such a fate.

 5   Id.; see Savchuck, 518 F.3d at 123; Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.

 6   2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the record . . . , [an applicant’s] fear is

 7   speculative at best.”). Similarly, Alexis did not show that his aunt’s connection to

 8   the Lavalas movement would likely be discovered or, even if discovered, would

 9   likely result in his torture because the record reflects violence against individuals

10   directly engaged in political activity, not violence against people who shared a last

11   name of someone who supported an opposition group. Alexis presented one case

12   of an individual who was targeted for having the same last name as someone

13   connected to a political movement; however, this one incident reflects that the

14   harm is possible, but not likely.

15         Alexis’s remaining arguments fail. The agency did not err in denying CAT

16   relief for some of the same reasons it denied withholding of removal because the

17   agency also applied the standards for CAT relief, and withholding has the same

18   likelihood of harm requirement as the CAT claim. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111,

                                               6
 1   119 (2d Cir. 2010). Alexis’s argument that the agency failed to consider the

 2   interplay of his characteristics or aggregate risk of torture fails. The agency

 3   considered each of the characteristics and stated that it had considered them in the

 4   aggregate, and Alexis does not identify evidence that compels the conclusion that

 5   the agency erred in that assessment. See Quintanilla-Mejia, 3 F.4th at 593–94; Xiao

 6   Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e presume

 7   that [the agency] has taken into account all the evidence before [it], unless the

 8   record compellingly suggests otherwise.”).

 9         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

10   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

11                                          FOR THE COURT:
12                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
13                                          Clerk of Court

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