Court Opinion

ID: 9397778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 14:05:34.086412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.088260
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0557-MR

QUEEN DEBORAH CA’MEL                                                 APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 11-CI-007599

LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY
METROPOLITAN (METRO)
GOVERNMENT                                                             APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Appellant Queen Deborah Ca’Mel (“Ca’Mel”) appeals a

directed verdict of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing her discrimination claims

based on race and sex, and a jury verdict dismissing her workplace retaliation

claim. After review, we affirm.
                          I.      FACTUAL BACKGROUND

              In 2009, Ca’Mel, an African American female, was hired as a police

recruit and attended the Louisville Metro Police Department (“LMPD”)1 Academy.

Despite struggling mightily throughout the Academy, she graduated in August

2010 and was sworn in as a probationary officer. The probationary period for an

LMPD officer begins with four training phases and lasts one year.

              Ca’Mel completed the first two phases with Seventh Division. Her

police training officer stated that during that time, she “did not accept criticism

well, that she became defensive when she was critiqued, and she had difficulty

with officer safety, self-awareness, and report writing[.]” Ca’Mel v. Louisville

Metro/Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Gov’t Police Dep’t, No. 2013-CA-001988-MR, 2015

WL 226088, at *2 (Ky. App. Jan. 16, 2015). At her mid-term evaluation, she

failed four of the 15 core competencies and her evaluator (different from her

training officer) stated that her failure was “the culmination of her issues.” Ca’Mel

was assigned a new training officer, repeated the training, and passed the second

mid-term evaluation. She completed the last two training phases and passed her

final evaluation with Seventh Division. In July 2010, she began riding solo with

Seventh Division.

1
 For purposes of this Opinion, we will refer to the Appellee Louisville/Jefferson County
Metropolitan Government as LMPD, the department of government involved.

                                              -2-
             In September 2010, Ca’Mel transferred and began riding solo with

First Division. She struggled with interpersonal relationships within her new

division. In particular, Ca’Mel struggled to interact effectively with Officer

Humphrey, a four-year veteran of First Division at that time. She stated that he

publicly criticized her, mocked her on the radio, and micro-managed her policing.

LMPD contends he was a senior officer attempting to help and advise her.

             Within days of her arrival at her new division, she discovered a penis

drawn on the rear windshield of her personal vehicle while it was parked in the

division’s parking lot. She reported the drawing to her sergeant, and he informed

her that he would address the incident with the platoon to avoid similar incidents.

Additionally, Ca’Mel contends that some of her colleagues refused to back her up

on traffic stops and called her traffic stops “bullshit” over the radio. However,

Ca’Mel did not present evidence of any specific incident where help was

warranted, but not received. Also, someone left an anonymous note in her office

mail slot telling her she needed to know where her beat partners were at lunch;

Ca’Mel took offense to the note. Officer Humphrey later admitted that he left the

note, and LMPD argued that such a note was intended to be helpful and advisory

because “[i]t is important for officers to know where their potential backup is in

case they were to get into a situation requiring additional officers.”

                                          -3-
             Procedurally, she struggled as well. During those first few months

with First Division, fellow officers reported that she breached procedure on at least

four occasions: (1) she did not follow protocol when she requested urgent

assistance in a non-urgent situation, (2) she did not immediately report a cruiser

accident to her supervisor, (3) she drove through a fire scene and over a hose, and

(4) she instructed vehicle owners to await a wrecker in a high-crime area. These

incidents all occurred during her probationary period. The only other incident

relevant here occurred in February 2011, when Ca’Mel arrested a woman without a

valid basis for taking her into custody.

             On January 12, 2011, Ca’Mel submitted a memorandum (“January 12

Memo”) to her chain of command complaining about the penis drawing and her

difficulties with Officer Humphrey. The LMPD ordered the Professional

Standards Unit (“PSU”) to investigate her claims, but the exact start date and end

date of that investigation is unclear from the record.

             Ca’Mel’s probationary period was set to end on January 29, 2011.

However, prior to January 29, the LMPD filed a motion with the Louisville Metro

Police Merit Board (the “Merit Board”) requesting a three-month extension of her

probation, and the Merit Board granted the motion. One month later, on March 4,

LMPD gave Ca’Mel a “probationary dismissal” letter terminating her employment

                                           -4-
effective immediately.2 Ca’Mel appealed her termination to the Merit Board and

won. The Merit Board deemed the extension invalid because the LMPD did not

provide timely written notice to her. As a result, the Police Chief rescinded the

termination letter on March 18.

             On March 25, 2011, Ca’Mel filed a formal complaint with the LMPD

(“March 25 Complaint”). That March 25 Complaint referenced the same

information in her January 12 Memo (i.e., the penis drawing and the hostilities

with Officer Humphrey). PSU completed its investigation and concluded that

Ca’Mel violated procedure for not properly reporting the cruiser accident and

arresting the woman in February on improper charges. In a letter dated May 16,

2011, the Police Chief informed Ca’Mel that LMPD was terminating her

employment due to her poor performance during the Academy, as well as

numerous protocol breaches that occurred during and after her probationary period.

                      II.    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             In November 2011, Ca’Mel filed a lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court

claiming discrimination based on race, discrimination based on sex, and retaliation

pursuant to the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”), as codified in Kentucky

2
 Under the LMPD Collective Bargaining Agreement and Metro Personnel Polices, the LMPD
does not require cause to terminate a probationary employee.

                                          -5-
Revised Statute (“KRS”) Chapter 344.3 Those claims were delayed while the

wheels of the administrative appeals turned slowly over the next eight years.

                 In 2012 – after holding hearings on four separate dates – the Merit

Board upheld Ca’Mel’s second termination. She appealed to the Jefferson Circuit

Court, and, in 2013, that court affirmed the Merit Board’s decision, finding that the

decision was not arbitrary nor in violation of Ca’Mel’s due process. Ca’Mel

appealed to this Court. In 2015, a panel of this Court determined that precedent

supported the Merit Board’s decision to review Ca’Mel’s entire employment

record (including her probationary period), but her Academy performance should

not have been a factor in her termination. Ca’Mel, WL 226088, at *1, *7. This

Court reversed and remanded4 with instructions for the Merit Board to consider

only post-Academy conduct and stated that the Merit Board need not hold another

hearing “because it appears the record was fully developed below.” Id. at *7.

                 On remand, the Merit Board – considering only Ca’Mel’s

employment performance post-Academy – again voted to sustain her termination.

In 2016, she again appealed the Merit Board’s decision to the circuit court and that

court again affirmed. Ca’Mel appealed to this Court and, in 2018, this Court

affirmed the decision to terminate her employment. Ca’Mel v. Louisville/Jefferson

3
    She also made a claim of defamation, which was dismissed by agreed order in 2019.
4
    This Court also addressed procedural and due process challenges that are not relevant here.

                                                 -6-
Cnty. Metro. Gov’t Police Dep’t, No. 2016-CA-001842-MR, 2018 WL 3005925, at

*1, *3 (Ky. App. Jun. 15, 2018).

             Then – with the Merit Board’s decision finalized and the COVID

pandemic delays concluded – the remainder of Ca’Mel’s claims (discrimination

and retaliation) proceeded in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The trial court held a

three-day jury trial in March 2022. At the close of Ca’Mel’s proof, the trial court

granted LMPD’s motion for a directed verdict on the race and sex discrimination

claims. The court submitted her retaliation claim to the jury; and, with a vote of

11-1, the jury voted in favor of the LMPD. Thereafter, the trial court entered a

judgment on the jury verdict and its directed verdict, dismissing her claims in full

(“March 10 Order”). Ca’Mel moved for a new trial, but the trial court denied that

motion in its April 27, 2022 Order (“April 27 Order”). Ca’Mel again appealed.

                                 III.   ANALYSIS

             On appeal, Ca’Mel argues the trial court inappropriately limited her

case-in-chief through admonitions and by refusing to admit relevant evidence. We

do not agree. In fact, the trial court put on a masterclass on civil procedure and

patience throughout the three-day trial.

             There are two orders on appeal. The March 10 Order granted

LMPD’s motion for a directed verdict regarding Ca’Mel’s gender and race

                                           -7-
discrimination claims and dismissed her retaliation claim, consistent with the jury

verdict. The April 27 Order denied Ca’Mel’s motion for a new trial.

             A. Discrimination

             [W]hen presented with a motion for directed verdict, a trial
             court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the
             evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion. As a
             reviewing court, we must ascribe to the evidence all
             reasonable inferences and deductions which support the
             claim of the prevailing party.

                     It is the province of the jury, of course, to weigh the
             evidence, but a directed verdict is appropriate where there
             is no evidence of probative value to support an opposite
             result because the jury may not be permitted to reach a
             verdict upon speculation or conjecture. The judgment of
             the trial court in such matters will only be substituted when
             clearly erroneous. In the end, a trial court should only
             grant a directed verdict when there is a complete absence
             of proof on a material issue or if no disputed issues of fact
             exist upon which reasonable minds could differ.

Toler v. Süd-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276, 285 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

             Here – after Ca’Mel completed her proof – the trial court granted

LMPD’s motion for a directed verdict dismissing the discrimination claims. The

trial court found that Ca’Mel failed to show how her termination was related to her

race or gender. On appeal Ca’Mel repeats her claims that discrimination is

apparent, but we, like the trial court, find no discrimination as a matter of law.

                                          -8-
              It is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire . . . any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the

individual’s race . . . [or] sex . . . .” KRS 344.040(1)(a). Plaintiffs can establish

discrimination by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Norton Healthcare, Inc.

v. Disselkamp, 600 S.W.3d 696, 719 (Ky. 2020) (citing Williams v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Ky. 2005)). Ca’Mel argues she established

discrimination through both direct and circumstantial evidence.

              Ca’Mel argues that direct evidence exists as a result of Officer

Humphrey’s testimony. She argues that Officer Humphrey (also an African

American) used “the words sex, race, gender, black, and white in explaining his

actions toward [Ca’Mel]” and that the use of the words alone were direct evidence

of discrimination. However, he never stated that he acted a certain way toward her

because she was an African American woman. Ca’Mel does not point to any

specific statement by Officer Humphrey (nor anyone else) that conveys bias,

harassment, or discrimination based on race or gender. Additionally, Ca’Mel

makes a confusing argument about possible beliefs in stereotypes existing within

the LMPD,5 but again, she gave no indication how possible stereotypical beliefs

5
  Ca’Mel argues that Officer Humphrey “adopted his Caucasian colleagues’ racial and sexual
stereotyping in acting toward and interacting with [Ca’Mel], and that he influenced LMPD’s
decision to fire [Ca’Mel].”

                                             -9-
affected her, nor the connection of those beliefs to her termination. Direct

“evidence, standing alone, must demonstrate discriminatory motivation.”

Charalambakis v. Asbury Univ., 488 S.W.3d 568, 577 (Ky. 2016) (citation

omitted). “[D]irect evidence of discrimination does not require a factfinder to

draw any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action

was motivated at least in part by prejudice against members of the protected

group.” Id. Here, Ca’Mel presented no direct evidence.

             Lacking direct evidence, we shift our analysis to circumstantial

evidence. Kentucky frequently applies the burden-shifting test established in

McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed.

2d 68 (1973), in cases without direct evidence in order “to allow a victim of

discrimination to establish a case through inferential and circumstantial” evidence.

Norton Healthcare, 600 S.W.3d at 719 (quoting Williams, 184 S.W.3d at 495).

             First, to prevail, Ca’Mel needed to prove a prima face case of

discrimination. A prima facie discrimination action includes proof that a plaintiff:

(1) was a member of a protected group; (2) was subjected to an adverse

employment action; (3) was qualified for the position; and (4) similarly situated

individuals were treated more favorably. The Bd. of Regents of N. Ky. Univ. v.

Weickgenannt, 485 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Ky. 2016) (citation omitted); see also

Williams, 184 S.W.3d at 496 (citation omitted). The crux here is proving that

                                        -10-
similarly situated people were treated more favorably than she was. Weickgenannt,

485 S.W.3d at 306. Ca’Mel argues that the trial court erroneously limited her

argument on that issue, but we do not agree.

              Here, the trial court did not permit her to relitigate previous issues,6

but did allow the admission of evidence as it related to similarly situated people.

To qualify as a similarly situated person, the person

              must have reported to the same supervisor as the plaintiff,
              must have been subject to the same standards governing
              performance evaluation and discipline, and must have
              engaged in conduct similar to the plaintiff’s, without such
              differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would
              distinguish their conduct or the appropriate discipline for
              it.

Mazzella v. RCA Global Commc’ns, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1531, 1547 (S.D.N.Y.

1986).7

6
  The trial court did not allow Ca’Mel to admit into evidence any documents that specifically and
only challenged the legitimacy of LMPD’s reasons for firing Ca’Mel. Such documentation
included Ca’Mel’s high productivity, letters of recommendation, and other material challenging
the reports of her procedural errors. The trial court was correct to exclude these documents
because the legitimacy of LMPD’s reasons for firing her had already been adjudicated. The
doctrine of “issue preclusion bars the parties from relitigating any issue actually litigated and
finally decided in an earlier action.” Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d
459, 465 (Ky. 1998). Additionally, Ca’Mel conflates aspects of her discrimination and
retaliation arguments, but the same rules of evidence and issue preclusion apply to both claims.
None of the avowal exhibits directly refuted the LMPD’s reasons for the firing.
7
 LMPD cites to this federal case. Because KCRA is similar to the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1964, generally, interpretation of the Kentucky statute is consistent with federal case law.
Stewart v. Univ. of Louisville, 65 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Ky. App. 2001) (citation omitted).

                                              -11-
             However, Ca’Mel presented no evidence that she was treated

differently than other similarly situated people. She did not present any evidence

that other officers (in her platoon or otherwise) made the same or similar errors or

omissions, but did not receive adverse employment action, or received lesser

adverse employment action.

             Second, even if she had established a prima facie case, the McDonnell

Douglas test would have then shifted the burden to LMPD to prove it had non-

discriminatory reasons to fire her. Again, LMPD previously established this fact

long before the trial currently on appeal; a 2018 panel of this Court agreed with the

circuit court that the Merit Board relied on legitimate, substantial evidence when it

affirmed Ca’Mel’s termination. Ca’Mel, 2018 WL 3005925, at *3.

             Third, the McDonnell Douglas test would have next shifted the

burden back to Ca’Mel to show that LMPD’s reasons for her termination were a

pretext for discrimination. Commonwealth v. Solly, 253 S.W.3d 537, 541 (Ky.

2008) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800, 93 S. Ct. at 1824-26). Once

again, Ca’Mel did not meet her burden. On appeal she acknowledges that she

needed to prove “that her race or sex were a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in

[LMPD’s] decision to fire her from her job.” However, she did not. The only

tangentially sexual reference was the single instance of a penis drawn on her

vehicle window, but she in no way connected that singular incident to her overall

                                        -12-
treatment or termination. Ca’Mel argues that she faced hostility and enhanced

oversight, especially from Officer Humphrey, but does not give any insight into

how any hostility or oversight was linked to her race or gender. Ca’Mel testified

that she believed that her fellow officers failed to provide her with backup, but she

never reported a single instance of such a failure, nor did she present any evidence

that any alleged failure to provide backup was connected to her race or gender.

             In discrimination cases, “the ultimate question is ‘of discrimination

vel non.’” Norton Healthcare, 600 S.W.3d at 717 (quoting United States Postal

Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1481, 75

L. Ed. 403 (1983)). Although a “pretentious surplusage,” here “discrimination vel

non” reiterates that the overarching issue before us is whether discrimination

occurred or not. Id. at 717 n.55. We think not. Ca’Mel did not present any

evidence – circumstantial or direct – that LMPD discriminated against her due to

her race or gender. The directed verdict was not clearly erroneous.

             B. Retaliation

             During the three-day trial, Ca’Mel presented a claim for retaliation

under KRS 344.280. She argued that she was fired for making her March 25

Complaint that formally reported the penis drawn on her car and her hostile

interactions with Officer Humphrey. After deliberations, the jury returned a

verdict (11-1) in favor of LMPD. The trial court, in its March 10 Order, entered a

                                        -13-
judgment based upon the jury verdict. Subsequently, Ca’Mel moved for a new

trial but was denied. On appeal, she argues that (1) the trial court committed

reversible error by issuing frequent admonitions that inappropriately limited her

theory of the case, and (2) these errors warranted a new trial.

             First, we review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under the abuse of

discretion standard. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575,

577 (Ky. 2000) (citations omitted). The trial court has broad discretion in issuing

admonitions as curative measures. See Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc., 929 S.W.2d

734, 739-40 (Ky. 1996); see also Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441

(Ky. 2003). Here, we find no abuse of discretion because the trial court’s frequent

admonitions were due to failure by counsel for Ca’Mel to follow the trial court’s

instructions. For example, in one instance, the trial court interrupted Ca’Mel’s

closing argument, and – after a bench conference – the trial court issued this

admonition to the jury:

             To the extent that you remember the proof differently than
             [Ca’Mel’s counsel] does, you should rely on your
             recollection of the proof as to whether or not there was an
             investigation into the allegations against Officer
             Humphrey and whether or not there was a finding. There
             is proof in the record on which you may rely, and to the
             extent that’s different than what [Ca’Mel’s counsel]
             remembers, you should rely on what the proof was and
             your recollection of that proof.

                                         -14-
This admonition occurred after her counsel made two misstatements during his

closing statements: one mistake of fact, one of law.

             As to the mistake in fact, counsel for Ca’Mel implied that the LMPD

did not investigate Ca’Mel’s concerns. “If [LMPD] would have addressed

[Ca’Mel’s] complaints there would have been a much greater likelihood that she

could have saved her job.” However, the Police Chief testified that there was a

PSU investigation into Ca’Mel’s complaints, and the investigation’s conclusions

were factored into the Police Chief’s reasoning to terminate her employment. The

trial court’s admonition attempted to clarify counsel’s mischaracterization of the

testimony, and to encourage the jury to rely on their own memory.

             As to the mistake of law, counsel for Ca’Mel misused the legal term

“but for.” Counsel seemed to be making an argument that “but for” LMPD’s

failure to investigate Ca’Mel’s concerns, she would have been able to keep her job.

During the bench conference, the trial court pointed out that this theory was not

legally accurate for the retaliation claim before the jury. The retaliation claim was

based on the allegation that Ca’Mel would not have been fired “but for” the

complaint. The trial court clarified the misstatement of law to counsel but limited

its admonition to the jury to only correct counsel’s misstatement of fact. This

admonition fell within the trial court’s broad discretion.

                                         -15-
               Finally, as to the new trial motion, Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure

(“CR”) 60.20 allows for a new trial under certain circumstances,8 none of which

are present here. We “presume the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial to

be correct and will reverse only upon a finding of clear error.” Jefferson v.

Eggemeyer, 516 S.W.3d 325, 337 (Ky. 2017) (citing Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d

439, 444 (Ky. 2005)). Moreover, “[t]here must be very strong reasons for granting

a new trial, and it must appear with reasonable certainty that injustice or wrong

would result unless the relief be granted and another opportunity allowed to

relitigate the same issues.” Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1952)

(citations omitted). We find no such injustice nor any error by the trial court in

denying the motion for a new trial. In fact, from our review of the record, we find

LMPD’s appellate argument to be a sufficient and accurate summary of this issue.

                      Most important to the retaliation case is when the
               event occurred for which Ca’Mel alleged she was
               retaliated against. Ca’Mel specifically identifies and
               limited her retaliation claim to those events which
               occurred after March 25, 2011, when she sent written
               notice of sexual and racial discrimination to LMPD under
               the advice of counsel. The date is key because the decision
               to terminate Ca’Mel had already occurred on March 4,
               2011. The termination was only rescinded because of a

8
  “On motion a court may . . . relieve a party . . . from its final judgment, order, or proceeding
upon the following grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (b) newly
discovered evidence . . . (c) perjury or falsified evidence; (d) fraud affecting the proceedings,
other than perjury or falsified evidence; (e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (f) any other
reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.” CR 60.02.

                                               -16-
             technical error in providing notice in the proper form to
             Ca’Mel of the extension of her probationary period.

             ...

                    The only adverse employment action taken against
             Ca’Mel after the triggering event was her final
             termination. The reasons for her termination existed prior
             to her March 25, 2011 complaint and were well known to
             [her Police Chief]. LMPD had already actually attempted
             to terminate her. As such, a reasonable jury certainly can
             conclude that her termination was not in retaliation for her
             March 25, 2011 complaint as they had already made it
             clear by no later than March 4, 2011 they intended to fire
             her.

             Simply, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Ca’Mel’s firing

was not in retaliation for her March 25 Complaint, considering she filed the

Complaint after LMPD decided to end her employment on March 4. There is more

than enough evidence in the record to support the supposition that Ca’Mel’s

employment was terminated for cause, not retaliation. We find no error in the trial

court’s denial of a new trial.

                                 IV.   CONCLUSION

             For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit

Court is AFFIRMED.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                        -17-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Philip C. Kimball         Michael J. O’Connell
Louisville, Kentucky      Roy C. Denny
                          Louisville, Kentucky

                        -18-