Court Opinion

ID: 9554134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 20:06:24.582001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:06.684114
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/7/23 P. v. Estrada CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B321175

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. KA020112)
           v.

 MAXIMO GONZALES ESTRADA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT:
      Maximo Estrada purports to appeal from a proceeding
pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).
He contends an appeal is authorized under Penal Code1 section
1237, subdivision (b) because his substantial rights were violated
by ineffective assistance of counsel and the superior court’s
failure to provide him with a Spanish language interpreter. We
appointed counsel to represent Estrada on appeal. After

         1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising
no issues and asking this court to independently review the
record and address any arguments raised by appellant in a
supplemental brief in accordance with People v. Delgadillo
(2022)14 Cal.5th 216, 369–370. Appellant filed his own
supplemental brief, in propria persona.
      Having reviewed the record below, we conclude the
superior court made no order affecting appellant’s substantial
rights. Hence, the appeal from the Franklin proceeding on
May 25, 2022, is not from an appealable order under section
1237, subdivision (b), and must be dismissed.
                          BACKGROUND
      On June 20, 1994, appellant was convicted by jury of two
counts of kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b); counts 1 & 2),
two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 3 & 4), two
counts of assault with great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1);
counts 5 & 6), and one count of attempt to burn (§ 455; count 7).
The jury found true the allegation as to each of the seven counts
that appellant personally used a metal rod in the commission of
the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced
appellant to consecutive indeterminate life sentences with the
possibility of parole plus six years on counts 1 and 2. The court
also imposed and stayed sentence on counts 3, 4, 5, and 6, and
imposed a concurrent term of three years on count 7.
      On February 8, 2020, appellant filed a motion for a
Franklin proceeding pursuant to section 1203.01 and In re Cook
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook), in which he sought the opportunity
to gather mitigating evidence regarding his youth-related
characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offenses to be
presented at a future youthful offender parole hearing before the

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California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
regarding appellant’s suitability for parole. Finding that
appellant was 24 years old when he committed the offenses that
resulted in his life sentence, the superior court appointed counsel
to represent appellant and set the matter for a status conference.
      Appellant was present with counsel for the Franklin
proceeding, which took place on May 25, 2022. Through counsel,
appellant provided the court with a psychological assessment
performed by Haig J. Kojian, Ph.D. Dr. Kojian based his
evaluation of appellant on a clinical interview, cognitive tests,
and a personality assessment inventory. After describing
appellant’s childhood, education, and cognitive development,
Dr. Kojian applied the factors outlined in Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460 to recommend that appellant’s particular
issues arising from a difficult and challenging upbringing along
with the Franklin factors be considered as factors in mitigation in
any future parole hearings.
      The court also accepted the following documents for
inclusion in appellant’s mitigation packet to be forwarded to the
CDCR: a letter from the Amity Foundation dated October 10,
2019, verifying appellant’s acceptance into its resident program
in Los Angeles; a document from Circle Tree Ranch, a substance
abuse treatment program;2 and summaries of interviews

      2 The appellant’s opening brief describes this document as
“a letter from Circle Tree Ranch verifying appellant’s acceptance
into it[s] substance abuse treatment program.” However, the
document contained in the record on appeal is not a letter, and it
does not pertain to Estrada at all. Rather, it appears to be an
incomplete printout of a Web site that contains a partial
description of Circle Tree Ranch’s programs.

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conducted by defense investigator Eduardo L. Hernandez. The
People did not stipulate to the authenticity of the documents or
agree with any conclusions stated therein, but did not object to
admission of the documents into the record.
      The superior court accepted the mitigation packet pursuant
to section 3051 and ordered that the original be transmitted to
CDCR forthwith for use at any future parole hearing. At the
conclusion of the proceeding, the court assured appellant that the
Franklin packet would be forwarded to the CDCR immediately.
The court then advised appellant it was ordering that he be
returned to state prison forthwith or at the earliest opportunity.
Finally, the court confirmed with appellant’s counsel that there
was nothing else that appellant wished to include in his
mitigation packet.
      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in which he alleged
the Franklin proceeding was flawed and his due process rights
violated because: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel
based on counsel’s failure to meet with him, interview him, or
explain his rights or what to expect from the proceedings; (2) the
court failed to provide a Spanish language interpreter at the
Franklin proceeding, thereby preventing appellant from
understanding what transpired in his case because he does not
speak or write English; and (3) appellant understood he would be
“going home” at the conclusion of the Franklin proceeding, but
instead was returned to state prison.
                           DISCUSSION
      In his supplemental brief, appellant seeks “resentenc[ing]
as a youth offender” based upon the allegations set forth in his
notice of appeal. He argues that he has already served

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substantial time on his sentence and “deserve[s] another chance
and compassion.”
       Appellant characterizes the Franklin proceeding as a
postjudgment order affecting his substantial rights, which is
appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b). However, the
superior court made just two orders at the Franklin proceeding,
neither of which involved any findings of fact or legal rulings.
Accordingly, these orders did not affect appellant’s substantial
rights and are not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).
       The first order was that the original mitigation packet be
“transmitted to the Department of Corrections forthwith for use
at any future parole hearing on behalf of Mr. Estrada.” The court
did not exclude any evidence from the mitigation packet or
otherwise limit appellant’s ability to gather mitigating evidence
regarding his youth-related characteristics and circumstances at
the time of the offenses. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 284.)
       The goal of a proceeding pursuant to Franklin “is to provide
an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the
juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time
of the offense so that the Board [of Parole Hearings], years later,
may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’
youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether
the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a
serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law.’ ”
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284; Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 449.) However, a Franklin proceeding is not a “hearing,” and
as our Supreme Court has explained, the distinction is important.
“A hearing generally involves definitive issues of law or fact to be
determined with a decision rendered based on that

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determination. [Citations.] A proceeding is a broader term
describing the form or manner of conducting judicial business
before a court. [Citations.] While a judicial officer presides over
a Franklin proceeding and regulates its conduct, the officer is not
called upon to make findings of fact or render any final
determination at the proceeding’s conclusion. Parole
determination[s] are left to the Board [of Parole Hearings].”
(Cook, at p. 449, fn. 3.)
       In ordering that the mitigation packet be transmitted
forthwith to the CDCR, the superior court made no findings of
fact or legal ruling, but simply discharged the court’s ministerial
obligation under Franklin to forward the information gathered to
the CDCR for use in a future parole hearing. The court’s order
therefore did not affect appellant’s substantial rights and was not
appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).
       The second order the superior court made was that
appellant “be sent forthwith back to state prison.” Despite
appellant’s evident misunderstanding of the purpose of a
Franklin proceeding and his mistaken belief that he would be
released at its conclusion, the superior court had no authority not
to return appellant to the custody of the CDCR. The court made
no findings of fact or legal rulings in ordering appellant back to
state prison. Accordingly, the court’s order did not affect
appellant’s substantial rights and was not appealable.
       A Franklin proceeding does not reopen a final judgment or
sentencing, nor does it function as a parole hearing. (People v.
Lizarraga (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 201, 207.) Indeed, it has no
bearing whatsoever on the validity of the judgment or sentence.
(Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 450–451 [“Neither the entitlement
to a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation

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process ‘disturb[s] the finality of state convictions’ ”].) Thus,
despite a defendant’s entitlement to a Franklin proceeding, his or
her original sentence remains in effect. (Franklin, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 278–279, 284; People v. White (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238 [“When a youth offender receives a
Franklin hearing, the offender ‘need not be resentenced’ because
the sentence remains valid”].) In Cook, our Supreme Court held
that a prisoner whose conviction is final may seek Franklin’s
evidence preservation remedy under the authority of section
1203.01, which empowers the superior court, postjudgment, to
“generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant
and the crime to the [CDCR].” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
pp. 446–447.) However, nothing in section 1203.01, Cook, or
Franklin itself confers jurisdiction on a court to revisit the
defendant’s sentence or consider his or her eligibility for parole.
(White, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240.)
      Here, contrary to appellant’s expectations, his original
sentence remained in effect at the conclusion of the Franklin
proceeding. The superior court wholly lacked authority to modify
appellant’s sentence or consider appellant’s eligibility for parole.
Because appellant remained committed to the CDCR, the
superior court’s order that he be returned to the state prison was
nondiscretionary. It did not affect appellant’s substantial rights
and was therefore not appealable under section 1237,
subdivision (b).

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                        DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.     ASHMANN-GERST, J.      HOFFSTADT, J.

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