Court Opinion

ID: 9582749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:30:54.184372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:17.450488
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Judge
(concurring):
I concur with the result reached by my colleagues but disagree with the standard of review for reasonable suspicion which they have selected. Although Judge Orme, writing for the panel in State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (Utah App.1991), expressed concern for consistent application of the law as manifested in the doctrine of stare decisis, his opinion here ignores the important concept of stare decisis. Judge Garff’s concurring opinion does likewise. Rather, both prefer to rely upon court of appeals opinions such as State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296 (Utah App.1991); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App.1991), cert. denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), and ignore the rule of law declared by the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied the clearly erroneous standard of review to the issue of reasonable suspicion. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987) (the reviewing court should not overturn the trial court’s determination of reasonable suspicion unless it is clearly erroneous). To date, no supreme court holding subsequent to Mendoza has modified, disavowed, or overruled this standard.
Today’s decision should be controlled
by the important doctrine of stare deci-sis, the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412, 52 S.Ct. 443, 449, 76 *992L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Pursuant to this doctrine, reasonable suspicion is to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review. The principle of stare decisis requires that we “continue the journey until our supreme court chooses to change course.” Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d 1377, 1383 (Utah App.1990) (Jackson, J., concurring), aff'd, 818 P.2d 546 (Utah 1991).