Court Opinion

ID: 9378746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 15:00:45.622598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.728807
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-5037     Document: 010110825224         Date Filed: 03/13/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                         PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          March 13, 2023

                                                                            Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                             Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                            No. 22-5037

  CONNER LEE POLK,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Oklahoma
                          (D.C. No. 4:21-CR-00294-GKF-1)
                        _________________________________

 Andrew M. Casey of Hendrick, Casey, Hutter, PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
 (Shannon M. McMurray of Viridian Legal Services, PLLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him
 on the briefs), for Defendant-Appellant.

 Leena Alam, Assistant United States Attorney (Clinton J. Johnson, United States
 Attorney, Chantelle Dial, Assistant United States Attorney, on the briefs), United States
 Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-
 Appellee.
                         _________________________________

 Before MORITZ, SEYMOUR, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 MORITZ, Circuit Judge.
                     _________________________________

        Conner Lee Polk appeals his four-year prison sentence under the Assimilative

 Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13, for committing a state-law offense on an Indian
Appellate Case: 22-5037    Document: 010110825224        Date Filed: 03/13/2023    Page: 2

 reservation in Oklahoma. Polk argues that the district court should have considered

 imposing a shorter prison term under an Oklahoma statute that permits a departure

 from a mandatory minimum sentence in certain circumstances. Because this state law

 conflicts with federal sentencing policy, the district court properly declined to apply

 it, and we affirm Polk’s sentence.

                                      Background

       In December 2019, Polk crashed his pickup truck into two cars while

 intoxicated, seriously injuring occupants in one of the vehicles. Because this conduct

 occurred on an Indian reservation and Polk is an Indian, a federal prosecution ensued

 under the ACA. As explained in more detail later, the ACA applies to acts committed

 on an Indian reservation that are crimes in the state within which the reservation is

 located—here, Oklahoma—but are not otherwise crimes under federal law. See

 § 13(a). The government charged Polk under the ACA with an Oklahoma DUI

 offense that carries a mandatory prison sentence of at least 4 years and at most 20

 years. See Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-904(B)(1). He eventually pleaded guilty to that

 offense.1

       Despite the mandatory minimum applicable to his offense, Polk at sentencing

 requested a prison term of less than four years. For support, he cited Oklahoma’s

 “safety-valve” law, which allows state-court judges in certain circumstances to

       1
         Polk also pleaded guilty to an ACA offense for involvement in an accident
 that damaged a vehicle, see Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 10-103, for which he received a
 concurrent six-month prison sentence. He does not challenge his conviction or
 sentence for this offense.
                                            2
Appellate Case: 22-5037    Document: 010110825224        Date Filed: 03/13/2023     Page: 3

 impose a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22,

 § 985.1(A). The district court, however, concluded that it could not apply

 Oklahoma’s safety-valve law because that provision conflicts with federal sentencing

 provisions that permit federal courts to depart from statutory mandatory minimums

 only in two limited circumstances, neither of which exists here. See 18 U.S.C.

 § 3553(e)–(f). Given this conflict, the district court sentenced Polk to the four-year

 mandatory minimum prison term.

                                         Analysis

       Polk appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in declining to

 apply Oklahoma’s safety-valve law to consider whether he qualified for a departure

 below the four-year mandatory minimum. That argument hinges on whether the

 district court properly interpreted the ACA, the relevant federal sentencing

 provisions, and Oklahoma’s safety-valve law. We review those legal determinations

 de novo. See United States v. Chapman, 839 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 2016).

       As relevant here, the ACA provides federal jurisdiction over certain criminal

 acts committed on Indian reservations.2 United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250, 253

       2
         By its terms, the ACA applies only to crimes committed on federal
 enclaves—“areas where states have ceded jurisdiction over land within their borders
 to Congress, such as military bases, federal facilities, and national parks and forests.”
 United States v. Harris, 10 F.4th 1005, 1010 (10th Cir. 2021). It applies to crimes on
 Indian reservations by way of 18 U.S.C. § 1152, which extends federal-enclave law
 to Indian country, see United States v. Langford, 641 F.3d 1195, 1197 (10th Cir.
 2011) (explaining that “in conjunction,” ACA and § 1152 “(1) assimilate state
 criminal law into federal law” for acts committed on federal enclaves and “(2) apply
 these assimilated state crimes to acts committed in Indian country”).
                                             3
Appellate Case: 22-5037    Document: 010110825224         Date Filed: 03/13/2023     Page: 4

 (10th Cir. 1989). When such acts occur, they are often prohibited by specific federal

 criminal statutes. For instance, the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a),

 proscribes a list of severe offenses, such as murder and kidnapping, that are federal

 crimes when committed by Indians in Indian country. But sometimes, as is the case

 here, no particular federal statute covers the defendant’s conduct, meaning it would

 not otherwise be a federal crime. United States v. Jones, 921 F.3d 932, 935 (10th Cir.

 2019). In that event, the ACA steps in and generates a federal offense using the laws

 of the state in which the relevant reservation is located. See id. More precisely, it

 allows federal courts to “borrow [the relevant crime] from preexisting state law,”

 thereby creating an applicable federal offense to fill the gap in the U.S. Code. United

 States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1170 (10th Cir. 2013); cf. also United States v.

 Martinez, 1 F.4th 788, 790 (10th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “[t]he assimilated state

 offense becomes a federal offense punishable under federal law”), cert. denied, 142

 S. Ct. 1373 (2022).

       Notably, however, the ACA does not require federal courts to incorporate

 every aspect of state criminal law that may apply to the newly created offense. See

 Christie, 717 F.3d at 1171–72. To the contrary, it requires only that they ensure the

 defendant receives a “like punishment,” § 13(a)—one similar to the punishment he or

 she would receive in state court. See Christie, 717 F.3d at 1171–72 (emphasizing that

 “the ACA requires like punishment, not precisely the same punishment”). Typically,

 this like-punishment standard means that we must apply “any maximum and

 minimum prison terms pr[e]scribed by state law for an assimilated crime.” Id. at

                                             4
Appellate Case: 22-5037    Document: 010110825224         Date Filed: 03/13/2023     Page: 5

 1171. But in imposing a sentence between those mandatory values, federal courts

 need not “duplicate every last nuance of the sentence that would be imposed in state

 court.” Id. at 1172 (quoting Garcia, 893 F.2d at 254). And critically, “federal courts

 must depart from state [sentencing laws] when Congress has expressed a specific and

 contrary penal policy.” Id.; see also United States v. Wood, 386 F.3d 961, 963 (10th

 Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen sentencing defendants for assimilated crimes, federal courts

 have consistently declined to assimilate state sentencing laws if such laws conflict

 with the [United States Sentencing] Guidelines and their underlying policies.”).

       Applying this principle, the district court concluded that it could not sentence

 Polk under the Oklahoma safety-valve law because that law conflicts with federal

 sentencing policy, in particular 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and (f). Polk disputes this

 conclusion, arguing that no such conflict exists and that the district court therefore

 should have incorporated Oklahoma’s safety-valve law and considered imposing a

 prison term of less than four years.

       But Polk does not meaningfully grapple with the district court’s reasons for

 finding a conflict. As the district court explained, under § 3553, federal sentencing

 judges may “depart from a mandatory minimum sentence only in [two] enumerated,

 limited circumstances,” neither of which applies here.3 App. vol. 1, 41; see also

 United States v. C.D., 848 F.3d 1286, 1292 & n.5 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that

       3
         As the district court also noted, the Guidelines similarly permit such
 departures only in the two circumstances outlined in § 3553(e) and (f). See U.S.S.G.
 §§ 5C1.2, 5K1.1.
                                             5
Appellate Case: 22-5037    Document: 010110825224         Date Filed: 03/13/2023       Page: 6

 § 3553 contains the “only two congressionally-authorized exceptions to a mandatory

 minimum sentence” (emphasis added)). Specifically, they may do so only when the

 defendant (1) provides substantial assistance to a criminal investigation or

 prosecution, or (2) is convicted of certain listed drug offenses and satisfies five

 statutory factors. § 3553(e)–(f). Oklahoma’s safety-valve law, on the other hand,

 allows departures from mandatory minimums under a broader set of circumstances.

 See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 985.1(A) (permitting departure for certain qualifying

 offenses when mandatory minimum “is not necessary for the protection of the

 public,” “would result in substantial injustice to the defendant,” or “is not necessary

 for the protection of the public and the defendant . . . has been accepted” to

 alternative court, diversion program, or community sentencing). Thus, as the district

 court concluded, Oklahoma’s safety-valve law conflicts with federal sentencing

 policy because it would allow a prison term below the mandatory minimum in

 circumstances other than those exclusively provided for in § 3553(e) and (f).4

       Polk’s contrary argument does not undermine this straightforward textual

 conclusion. He suggests that the district court erred by basing its conclusion that a

 conflict exists on a determination that the federal safety-valve provision, § 3553(f),

       4
          This direct tension between what state law permits and what federal law
 forbids answers Polk’s assertion, drawn from an analogy to the conflict-preemption
 doctrine, that two laws do not conflict if they merely “overlap” and that a conflict
 instead requires that it be “[im]possible to comply with both” laws. Rep. Br. 6
 (quoting Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 806 (2020)). This impossibility standard
 plainly is met here: Both provisions cannot be given effect because, as mentioned
 above, Oklahoma’s safety-valve law allows departures for reasons that would not
 support a departure under § 3553(e) and (f).
                                             6
Appellate Case: 22-5037     Document: 010110825224         Date Filed: 03/13/2023     Page: 7

 “never references” the ACA specifically. Aplt. Br. 25–26. From that premise, Polk

 then argues that no language in § 3553(f) shows that Congress intended “to exclude

 [the ACA] from [federal] safety[-]valve consideration.” Rep. Br. 3. But this argument

 both misunderstands and fails to refute the district court’s conflict analysis. As

 explained, the district court did not base its conclusion that Oklahoma’s safety-valve

 law conflicts with § 3553 on Congress’s failure to mention the ACA in subsection (f)

 (or subsection (e), for that matter).5 Instead, it based that conclusion on the fact that

 Oklahoma’s safety-valve law would allow departures below the mandatory minimum

 in circumstances beyond those provided for in § 3553(e) and (f). Nothing about

 Polk’s § 3553(f) argument disputes this unambiguous conflict, and this conflict is

 fatal to Polk’s sentencing challenge.6 See Christie, 717 F.3d at 1172.

                                        Conclusion

        In sum, because Oklahoma’s safety-valve law conflicts with federal sentencing

        5
          To the extent that this failure to mention the ACA in the federal safety-valve
 provision has any significance, it suggests that Congress did intend to exclude ACA
 offenses because § 3553(f) specifies that it applies only “in the case of” certain
 enumerated drug offenses. See Navajo Nation v. Dalley, 896 F.3d 1196, 1213 (10th Cir.
 2018) (“[T]he enumeration of certain things in a statute suggests that the legislature had
 no intent of including things not listed or embraced” (quoting Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of
 Okla. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1034 & n.24 (10th Cir. 2003))).
        6
          Because the relevant statutory language is unambiguous, we do not address
 Polk’s arguments about legislative history, statutory purpose, and the rule of lenity
 supporting his position. See In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir.
 2002) (noting that courts must interpret an unambiguous statute “according to its
 plain meaning,” considering legislative history and statutory purpose only “[i]f a
 statute is ambiguous”); United States v. Black, 773 F.3d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 2014)
 (requiring showing of “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute” to apply rule
 of lenity (quoting Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 577 (2009))).
                                              7
Appellate Case: 22-5037    Document: 010110825224       Date Filed: 03/13/2023     Page: 8

 policy—specifically, § 3553(e) and (f)—the district court did not err in declining to

 apply that state law when sentencing Polk. Instead, the district court properly

 incorporated only the state-law mandatory minimum applicable to Polk’s crime,

 thereby providing him with the “like punishment” the ACA requires. § 13(a). Thus,

 we affirm Polk’s sentence.

                                            8