Court Opinion

ID: 9769263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:42:15.493421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:24.831297
License: Public Domain

DUNCAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s judgment insofar as it affirms De Los Santos’ conviction. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment on punishment.
The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
During closing arguments, De Los Santos’ counsel made a plea for probation and, near the end of his argument, stated:
Defense Counsel: I think each person has some value in them and each person gives something in this life. In this situation Lucio Delossantos [sic], you know, has not shown to be an evil individual person, not to be shown a horrible *574person. He committed a horrible act as you have found.
It was thus in response to De Los Santos’ closing argument that the prosecutor asked:
Prosecutor: Not evil? Not horrible? What does a person have to do to be evil and horrible? Kill not only Maria How, but that three month old baby.... He is evil. He is horrible.
The prosecutor then went on to review the evidence and, in response to De Los Santos’ plea for a “break”, i.e., probation, stated:
Prosecutor: He already got his break. He only killed one person. "What does he do after that? They go back to the party to party, to brag about it with the rest of them, Jesse and Steve and Goofy and whatever their names are. But they do take Jesse to the hospital. “Oh, yes, let’s take Jesse.”
What about the five people that are there left dying? Any remorse for them? Do we ever hear an “I am sorry. Let me see what I can do. Let me help you”?
At this point, De Los Santos objected. The trial judge sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s last statement, but he denied De Los Santos’ motion for a mistrial. The prosecutor continued:
Prosecutor: Did the Defendant ever stop and say, “Oh, my God. I didn’t mean to do all of this. I am sorry, Roland. I am sorry, Priscilla.”
Defense Counsel: Your Honor—
Prosecutor: He left the scene.
Again, De Los Santos objected and again the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s last statement. The prosecutor continued:
Prosecutor: Ladies and gentlemen, referring to the night of August 8th, 1993, what else does he do? After he makes sure his friend is treated, he sleeps. This evil, horrible person can sleep. He shot four people, he killed a person, and he can sleep.
Finally, the prosecutor stated:
Prosecutor: We need to send these messages. Yesterday’s message was strong and we must continue to send these messages because there is a lot of people out there that are hearing about what you are going to do.
A life for a life. Rehabilitation? Has he shown any remorse?
Once again, De Los Santos’ objection was sustained, and the jury was instructed to disregard the prosecutor’s last statement.
IMPROPER Comments on the Failure to Testify
The Court of Criminal Appeals recently reaffirmed the test for whether closing argument violates a defendant’s right to remain silent:
To violate appellant’s constitutional and statutory rights, the language, viewed from the jury’s perspective, “must be manifestly intended or of such a character that the jury would necessarily and naturally take it as a comment on the accused’s failure to testify. A mere indirect or implied illusion to the accused’s failure to testify does not violate appellant’s rights. A remark that calls attention to the absence of evidence which only the defendant could supply will result in reversal; however, if the language can reasonably be construed to refer to appellant’s failure to produce evidence other than his own testimony, the comment is not improper.
Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 490-91 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). In my view, the prosecutor’s argument in this case passes this test for two reasons.
First, the prosecutor’s argument in this ease, when read in context, plainly refers not to De Los Santos’ failure to testify at trial but to his failure to express remorse to anyone immediately after the shootings.1 See *575Moore v. State, 822 S.W.2d 355, 357-59 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), pet. ref'd, 849 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); see also Davis v. State, 782 S.W.2d 211, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 940, 110 S.Ct. 2193, 109 L.Ed.2d 520 (1990). And there were at least two groups of people who could have so testified — De Los Santos’ victims and his punishment phase witnesses. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor’s argument can reasonably be construed as a comment not on De Los Santos’ failure to testify, but as a comment on the failure of other witnesses to testify that De Los Santos had expressed feelings of remorse outside of the courtroom. Accordingly, in my view, the resolution of this issue is not controlled by Swallow v. State, 829 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex.Crim.App.1992),2 but by McMahon v. State, 582 S.W.2d 786, 791-92 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 238, 62 L.Ed.2d 175 (1979).
In McMahon, the court held that the prosecutor did not improperly comment on the defendant’s failure to testify when he asked the jury: “Have you seen any remorse? Have you seen any remorse on the part of the defendants?” The basis for the court’s holding was that the defendants “were not the only individuals in a position to testify to the presence or absence of remorseful feelings on their part. Twenty-one reputation or character witnesses were called by the defense.” Id. at 792. Accordingly, “the prosecutor’s argument ... could reasonably have been construed not to be a reference to the appellants’ failure to testify but to their failure to show through other witnesses any remorse for their role in the commission of the murder.” Id.; see also Elkins v. State, 647 S.W.2d 663, 667 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (noting that court construed prosecutor’s argument in McMahon as permissible indirect comment); cf. Thomas v. State, 638 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (closing argument referring to failure of defendant’s witnesses to testify regarding defendant’s remorse held not to be comment on defendant’s failure to testify).
So it is here. Several of De Los Santos’ victims testified and, if De Los Santos had expressed remorse to them or those they knew immediately following the shootings, they could have so testified. They were not asked this question and did not otherwise testify as to the remorse issue. Similarly, *576both De Los Santos’ father, with whom De Los Santos lived, and De Los Santos’ sister, with whom De Los Santos corresponded, testified on De Los Santos’ behalf at the punishment phase of the trial. Either could have testified to feelings of remorse expressed by De Los Santos pursuant to Rule 803(3) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 Neither did.
In short, the prosecutor’s arguments can reasonably be construed as comments on the failure of witnesses other than De Los Santos to testify regarding any remorseful feelings expressed by him prior to trial. Under the authority of the test most recently enunciated in Patrick and applied in McMahon, I would overrule De Los Santos’ second point of error and affirm the judgment in its entirety.

. The prosecutor’s comments concerning De Los Santos’ lack of remorse would appear to have been based upon the following excerpts from the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. In the first excerpt, De Los Santos was walking with one of the State’s witnesses when Jesse Del Rio pulled up alongside them in a car.
*575By the Witness: ... So [De Los Santos] told one of the guys, ..., "this is that chick that you killed, right, boyfriend.... That chick that you killed, this is her sister’s boyfriend.” ... And [Del Rio] goes — you know, he told me, he told me face-to-face, he goes, "Well I am sorry, you know. I didn’t know I shot her."
De Los Santos remained silent.
In the second excerpt, the State's witness was testifying as to the people De Los Santos mentioned were involved in the shooting.
By the Witness: ... I have heard — I heard the story from [De Los Santos] but, you know, from everybody else too.
By the State: Because everybody else was bragging about it, right?
By the Witness: I guess.
By the State: The L.A. Boys were bragging about having killed a 21 year old female, right?
By the Witness: Yes.
The court sustained a hearsay objection to the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s question.
As the above excerpts demonstrate, the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding remorse can reasonably be construed as referring to De Los Santos' lack of remorse shortly after the shooting, not his failure to testify at trial. And while the argument could not legitimately refer to the excluded hearsay testimony quoted above, there was no trial objection, and there is no appellate complaint, that the argument was being outside the record.

. In my view, Swallow is distinguishable from this case because there the defendant testified during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, denied the charge of driving while intoxicated, and instead claimed he merely appeared intoxicated because of some cold medication he had taken immediately before entering his car. "This testimony was necessarily inconsistent with either an expression of remorse or an admission of guilt.” Swallow, 829 S.W.2d at 224-25. The jury found the defendant guilty. During the punishment phase, the defendant did not testify but his attorney argued for probation because this “was as minor a DWI as you’re going to have," in part because "the [cold] medication was at least a causative factor in appellant’s arrest.” Id. at 225. In this context, the court held that the prosecutor’s argument "necessarily called the jury’s attention to the fact that, once it had rejected his testimony at the guilt phase, appellant failed to take the stand at punishment and provide that testimony which would have been antithetical to his posture at the guilt stage. Id. at 226.

. I recognize that the Swallow Court stated that contrition evidence, when "offered by witnesses other than the accused himself, is inadmissible." Swallow, 829 S.W.2d at 225 (citing Thomas v. State, 638 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1982)). However, Thomas and other cases holding similarly were decided before the 1986 enactment of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence and, in particular, Rule 803(3), which permits the introduction of hearsay testimony regarding a declar-ant’s state of mind. Compare, e.g., DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224, 233 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (self-serving hearsay of no probative value even though admitted without objection) with Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 803(3).