Court Opinion

ID: 9914465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-02 13:04:26.043746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:12.372032
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                        No. COA22-377-2

                                      Filed 2 January 2024

Guilford County, No. 19 SP 1132

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF:

B.M.T., a minor.

         On remand from the Supreme Court of North Carolina by Order dated 15

November 2023. Appeal by Petitioners from Order entered 16 September 2021 by

Judge Teresa H. Vincent in Guilford County Superior Court. Originally heard in the

Court of Appeals 1 November 2022 with opinion issued 20 December 2022. Matter of

Adoption of B.M.T., 287 N.C. App. 95, 882 S.E.2d 145 (2022).

         Manning, Fulton, & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for Petitioners-
         Appellants.

         Lindley Law Firm, PLLC, by Kathryn S. Lindley, for Respondent-Appellee.

         HAMPSON, Judge.

                                           Background

         Respondent is the biological father of Layla.1 Petitioners are the prospective

adoptive parents of Layla. Without Respondent’s knowledge or consent, on 13 June

1   A pseudonym used for the minor child designated in the caption as B.M.T.
                                     IN RE: B.M.T.

                                   Opinion of the Court

2019, Layla’s biological mother placed Layla with Petitioners for the purpose of

adoption.   On 20 June 2019, Respondent and Mother executed a Voluntary

Acknowledgement of Paternity with the State of Tennessee.              Subsequently,

Respondent’s name was added to Layla’s birth certificate, and Layla’s surname was

changed to the surname of Respondent. Petitioners filed a Petition to adopt Layla on

27 June 2019. On 16 September 2021, the trial court entered an Order concluding

Respondent’s consent to the minor child’s adoption is required pursuant to N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 48-3-601.

      On 20 December 2022, we issued a unanimous opinion affirming the trial court

and concluding Respondent’s consent to adoption was required before Petitioners

could adopt Layla. Matter of Adoption of B.M.T., 287 N.C. App. 95, 882 S.E.2d 145

(2022). We held Respondent’s consent was required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601

because we agreed with the trial court’s determination that Respondent provided, in

accordance with his financial means, reasonable and consistent payments for the

support of both Layla’s biological mother and Layla to satisfy the requirement of N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II) (2021).

      On 24 January 2023, Petitioners filed a Petition for Discretionary Review in

the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The Supreme Court granted discretionary

review on 4 April 2023. On 15 November 2023, the Supreme Court issued an Order

stating in full: “Reversed for the reasons stated in In re C.H.M., 371 N.C. 22 (2018),

and remanded for consideration of any outstanding issues on appeal.”

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                                     IN RE: B.M.T.

                                   Opinion of the Court

                                       Analysis

      In our prior opinion, we analyzed, applied, and—solely on the facts of this

case—ultimately distinguished In re C.H.M., explaining our reasoning, discussing

related cases, and how we reached our conclusion in this case. Our Supreme Court,

however, provided no explanation for its decision as to why our prior decision should

be reversed, thereby leaving a rather significant question mark in this important area

of law. Nevertheless, we are bound by the Supreme Court’s Order to simply consider

any remaining outstanding issues on appeal.

      Our faithful consideration of the outstanding issues on appeal here reveals an

alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s decision. On appeal to this Court,

Respondent, in his principal Appellee’s Brief, argued the parties’ execution of a

Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity in Tennessee prior to the filing of the North

Carolina adoption petition served as a legitimation under Tennessee law. As such,

Respondent contends Respondent’s consent is required prior to Layla’s adoption

under the separate ground of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3).

      N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3) provides in a direct placement, consent is

required of a man who may or may not be the biological father but who “[b]efore the

filing of the [adoption] petition, has legitimated the minor under the law of any

state[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3) (2021). Here, the trial court found:

          10. The Respondent filed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of
          Paternity in Tennessee on June 20, 2019, before the petition for
          adoption was filed with the Clerk of Superior Court in Guilford

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                                    IN RE: B.M.T.

                                  Opinion of the Court

         County; further that the mother of the child executed the
         document on June 20, 2019 and that both signatures were
         notarized on June 20, 2019.

         11. The Tennessee Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity
         specifically provides that this document allows the legal father
         “the ability to protect your legal rights by having a say in any
         attempted adoption of your child by others”; a certified copy of this
         document dated July 18, 2019, was provided to this Court as
         Respondent’s Exhibit 20; further the Acknowledgment and the
         certified copy were dated prior to Respondent being served with
         the Notice of the Petition for Adoption in this case.

         12. Tennessee was the home state of the minor child and
         Tennessee law clearly provides that once the father has
         voluntarily acknowledged paternity the father’s consent is
         necessary.

      To the extent these are Factual Findings, Petitioners have not challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence to support these Findings, and these Findings are binding

on appeal. In re Schiphof, 192 N.C. App. 696, 700, 666 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2008)

(“Unchallenged findings of fact are presumed correct and are binding on appeal.”).

Moreover, as noted by the trial court, the evidence in the Record quite plainly

supports the Finding Respondent filed a Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity in

Tennessee before the filing of the adoption petition in North Carolina. Respondent’s

Exhibit 20, contained in the Record Supplement, is a certified copy of the Voluntary

Acknowledgement of Paternity from the Tennessee Department of Health with the

notarized signatures of both Respondent and the biological mother dated 20 June

2019. Thus, the trial court’s Factual Findings are supported by evidence in the

Record. See Hanson v. Legasus of N.C., LLC, 205 N.C. App. 296, 299, 695 S.E.2d 499,

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                                         IN RE: B.M.T.

                                       Opinion of the Court

501 (2010).

       In their Reply Brief to this Court, Petitioners contended the Voluntary

Acknowledgement of Paternity is itself insufficient to establish legitimation in

Tennessee and that Tennessee instead requires an Order of Parentage.                       The

Tennessee Court of Appeals has, however, held the opposite:2

           Mother also appears to rely somewhat on Chapter 36 of the
           Tennessee Code, arguing that “[t]here is nothing in the statute
           which establishes the procedure by which parentage is ordered
           which substitutes a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity for
           an Order of Parentage.” Respectfully, we disagree with Mother’s
           interpretation of the applicable Tennessee statutes to the extent
           that she maintains that an order of parentage is the only
           mechanism by which a father may establish parentage and
           acquire standing to sue for custody or visitation. Tennessee Code
           Annotated section 36-2-301 serves as a statement of purpose
           regarding the subsequent statutes regarding paternity and
           legitimation in the Tennessee Code. It expressly states that
           “[t]his chapter provides a single cause of action to establish
           parentage of children other than by adoption . . . or by
           acknowledgment of parentage . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-301.
           Furthermore, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-305(b)(1)
           states that “[a]bsent an agreement or an acknowledgement of
           parentage as prescribed by § 68-3-203(g), § 68-3-302, or § 68-3-
           305(b), a complaint to establish parentage may be filed.” Tenn.
           Code Ann. § 36-2-305(b)(1). These referenced provisions from
           Title 68 are the very provisions pursuant to which a VAP under
           Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-113 is completed. See
           Tenn. Code Ann. 24-7-113(a) (“A voluntary acknowledgment of
           paternity which is completed under § 68-3-203(g), § 68-3-302, or §
           68-3-305(b) or under similar provisions of another state or
           government shall constitute a legal finding of paternity on the
           individual named as the father of the child in the
           acknowledgment[.]”).

2 We quote extensively from the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ opinion as we defer to that Court on

matters of Tennessee law rather than apply our own interpretation.

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                                            IN RE: B.M.T.

                                         Opinion of the Court

           Based on our plain reading of the applicable statutes, it appears
           that the Code provides for multiple ways in which parentage may
           be established rather than the sole option of filing suit to
           specifically establish same. As indicated above, the statement of
           purpose in section 36-2-301 itself notes that parentage may be
           established by ways other than a cause of action to establish
           parentage of children by its inclusion of “other” along with express
           mentions of both adoption and acknowledgment of parentage.
           This language alone indicates that an order establishing
           parentage is not the sole manner in which a father may obtain
           standing to sue for custody and visitation rights.

Baxter v. Rowan, 620 S.W.3d 889, 895-96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020). Indeed, as Baxter

points out, under the Tennessee statute:

           A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity which is completed
           under § 68-3-203(g), § 68-3-302, or § 68-3-305(b) by an unwed
           father or under similar provisions of another state or government
           shall constitute a legal finding of paternity on the individual
           named as the father of the child in the acknowledgment, subject
           to rescission as provided in subsection (c). The acknowledgment,
           unless rescinded pursuant to subsection (c), shall be conclusive of
           that father’s paternity without further order of the court.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-113(a).

       Here, the Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity constitutes a legal finding

of paternity. Moreover, Tennessee statutes provide for a unified process equating

establishing paternity with legitimation.3              Again re-emphasizing the Tennessee

Court of Appeals’ decision in Baxter:

           Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-301 serves as a
           statement of purpose regarding the subsequent statutes
           regarding paternity and legitimation in the Tennessee Code. It

3 Unlike North Carolina.   See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-14(a) (2021).

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                                     IN RE: B.M.T.

                                   Opinion of the Court

          expressly states that “[t]his chapter provides a single cause of
          action to establish parentage of children other than by
          adoption . . . or by acknowledgment of parentage . . .” Tenn. Code
          Ann. § 36-2-301. Furthermore, Tennessee Code Annotated
          section 36-2-305(b)(1) states that “[a]bsent an agreement or an
          acknowledgement of parentage as prescribed by § 68-3-203(g), §
          68-3-302, or § 68-3-305(b), a complaint to establish parentage may
          be filed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-305(b)(1). These referenced
          provisions from Title 68 are the very provisions pursuant to which
          a VAP under Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-113 is
          completed. See Tenn. Code Ann. 24-7-113(a) (“A voluntary
          acknowledgment of paternity which is completed under § 68-3-
          203(g), § 68-3-302, or § 68-3-305(b) or under similar provisions of
          another state or government shall constitute a legal finding of
          paternity on the individual named as the father of the child in the
          acknowledgment[.]”).

Baxter, 620 S.W.3d at 896; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-301 (“This chapter provides a

single cause of action to establish parentage of children other than establishment by

adoption pursuant to chapter 1 of this title, or by acknowledgement of parentage

pursuant to § 68-3-203(g), § 68-3-302 or § 68-3-305(b).”). Under Tennessee law, and

in light of Baxter, the Voluntary Acknowledgement of Parentage entered in this case

constitutes legitimation. This legitimation occurred prior to the filing of the adoption

petition in this case.

       Thus, before the filing of the adoption petition in this case, Respondent

legitimated the minor under the law of Tennessee. Therefore, under N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 48-3-601(2)(b)(3), Respondent’s consent is required prior to Layla’s adoption by

Petitioners. Consequently, on this alternative basis, the trial court did not err in

concluding Respondent’s consent was required in order for Layla to be legally

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                                  IN RE: B.M.T.

                                Opinion of the Court

adopted.

                                  Conclusion

      Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we again affirm the trial court’s 16

September 2021 Order requiring Respondent’s consent prior to the adoption of the

minor child.

      AFFIRMED.

      Chief Judge STROUD concurs.

      Judge STADING concurs in result.

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