Court Opinion

ID: 9800399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 08:14:32.052591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:39.250228
License: Public Domain

GOODMAN, J.,
specially concurring.
T1 I concur, but wish to write separately to emphasize the larger problem alluded to in the majority opinion: that the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, 22 0.S.2011, §§ 1 through 19 (Act), reflects a hodgepodge attempt by the Legislature to address a growing problem. This author is of the opinion that the Act has been repeatedly amended to address problems created by the Act itself.1 In the case under review, much is made of the defined-term "harassment" as a distinct basis for a protective order, which by definition can only be sought by a victim against a family or household member or one involved in a dating relationship. See 22 0.S.2011, *695§ 60.1(8). The Legislature subsequently uses the term "harassment" to define the term "stalking," which carries with it no requirement for a victim to prove a family, household, or dating relationship. See 22 0.S$.2011, § 60.1(2). Thus, unnecessary ambiguity is introduced into an otherwise straightforward statute, requiring further analysis as to whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to relief under the Act for stalking because there was no proof of these aforementioned relationships.
{2 Nevertheless, I agree the trial court was correct in its conclusions. Title 22 0.8. 2011, § 60.1(2) provides two definitions of "stalking." The first was addressed in the majority opinion. "Stalking" is further defined in § 60.1(2) as:
[ Stalking also means a course of conduct composed of a series of two or more separate acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose or unconsented contact with a person that is initiated or continued without the consent of the individual or in disregard of the expressed desire of the individual that the contact be avoided or discontinued. Un-consented contact or course of conduct includes, but is not limited to:
a. following or appearing within the sight of that individual;
b. approaching or confronting that individual in a public place or on private property;
c. appearing at the workplace or residence of that individual;
d. entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by that individual;
e. contacting that individual by telephone;
f. sending mail or electronic communications to that individual; or
g. placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased or occupied by that individual.
13 Upon my review of the record and applicable law, I find sufficient evidence to support a finding of stalking under § 60.1(2)'s "alternate" definition. I therefore concur with the majority opinion.

. For instance, this Court issued Spielmann v. Hayes, 2000 OK CIV APP 44, 3 P.3d 711, in which we held a teacher had standing under the Act to obtain a protective order against a student for harassment. That opinion was issued at a time in which the Act did not require a family or personal relationship to exist between the parties. Because of amendments to the Act, were the same facts in Spielmann before this Court today, the teacher would have no standing to prosecute a claim of harassment, though she might have a claim for stalking.