Court Opinion

ID: 9897946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:16.982452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:49.336628
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 EZEQUIEL APOLO-ALBINO,
                                                     No. 83552-1-I
                Respondent,
                                                     DIVISION ONE
                v.
                                                     PUBLISHED OPINION
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,

                Petitioner.

       BIRK, J. — This appeal asks what showing a claimant must make to

overcome a motion to dismiss under section .040 of the wrongly convicted persons

act (Act), chapter 4.100 RCW, where the parties dispute whether the claimant’s

former conviction was vacated “on the basis of significant new exculpatory

information.”   RCW 4.100.040(1)(c)(ii).       We conclude section .040 requires a

claimant to meet a burden of production to adduce evidence sufficient for a

reasonable trier of fact to find the elements of a claim under the Act by clear and

convincing evidence. Because Apolo-Albino meets this burden, we affirm the

superior court’s denial of the State’s section .040 motion and remand for further

proceedings.

                                           I

       In 2009, Apolo-Albino was convicted of two counts of child molestation. The

State presented testimony from Apolo-Albino’s children, B.G. and D.G., that he

had molested them. Apolo-Albino maintained his innocence. In April 2015, the
No. 83552-1-I/2

Indeterminate Sentence Review Board released Apolo-Albino on an Immigration

and Customs Enforcement detainer.

       In September 2015, a referrer reported to Child Protective Services (CPS)

that D.G. had reported that a foster parent had coerced her into testifying against

her father, and that Apolo-Albino did not sexually abuse her. CPS investigated the

allegation the foster parent had committed abuse by manipulating D.G.’s and

B.G.’s testimony, and concluded the allegation was “FOUNDED,” stating, “It

appears that [the foster parent] coerced and emotionally manipulated [D.G. and

B.G.] into testifying against their father and putting him in jail for more than 6 years.”

A special prosecutor investigated, but the prosecutor opined the recantations were

not credible.

       Apolo-Albino filed a CrR 7.8(b)(2) motion for relief from judgment and a new

trial based on newly discovered evidence. Apolo-Albino included over 500 pages

of documents, including recantations of the witnesses and the CPS investigation

report. The State filed a separate motion to vacate Apolo-Albino’s convictions

under CrR 7.8(b)(5) (“[a]ny other reason justifying relief”), and to dismiss the

charges under CrR 8.3(a) (dismissal by the prosecution). The State’s motion

argued the recantations were not reliable, but stated,

       [T]here seems to be little to be gained from re-litigating this eight-
       year-old case when the defendant has served his prison sentence,
       the abuse was limited to over the clothes sexual touching and the
       victims have recanted and now claim that no molestation occurred.
              Given these circumstances, the State . . . moves to dismiss
       this case with prejudice.

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No. 83552-1-I/3

Apolo-Albino’s attorney responded to the State’s motion and proposed order with

a one-line e-mail stating, “We have no objection to the court signing this order.”

The superior court entered an order stating in relevant part, “[T]he State’s motion

to dismiss with prejudice is granted for the reasons stated therein.”

       In September 2019, Apolo-Albino filed a claim under the Act. The State

made a statutorily described motion to dismiss the claim for failure to establish by

documentary evidence that the convictions were vacated “on the basis of

significant new exculpatory information.” RCW 4.100.040(1)(c)(ii). The superior

court denied the State’s motion. The superior court applied a “but for” test, stating,

“ ‘[B]ut for’ the new evidence put forth in the defense’s Motion for a New Trial, the

prosecutor would not have brought a motion to dismiss ‘in the interests of justice.’ ”

The State sought and this court granted discretionary review.1

                                           II

       Before we can decide whether the evidence is sufficient to meet RCW

4.100.040(1)(c)(ii), it is necessary to determine the standard according to which

       1 In seeking discretionary review, the State argued among other things the

trial court erred by adopting a “ ‘but for’ ” causation standard under the Act. On
review, amicus curiae, The Innocence Network, citing Mackay v. Acorn Custom
Cabinetry, Inc., 127 Wn.2d 302, 310, 898 P.2d 284 (1995), argues “ ‘[T]he
‘substantial factor’ test” appropriately implements the statute.
        The State moved to strike in part Apolo-Albino’s answer to the amicus
curiae brief of The Innocence Network, arguing Apolo-Albino did not argue
“substantial factor” causation in the trial court and may not argue it for the first time
on review in answer to an amicus brief. See Cummins v. Lewis County, 156 Wn.2d
844, 850-51, 133 P.3d 458 (2006) (the court will not review arguments first raised
in a reply brief on appeal). The State alternatively asks that we consider its reply
on this issue set forth in its motion. We deny the State’s motion to strike but we
grant its alternative motion. We conclude it is unnecessary to adopt either the “but
for” or “substantial factor” standard under the Act.

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No. 83552-1-I/4

we evaluate the evidence in a motion to dismiss under section .040 of the Act.

Apolo-Albino argues in part that the court’s role, at the section .040 motion to

dismiss stage, is to ask “if a trier of fact could find” the elements of a claim are met.

We agree.

       The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. Dep’t of

Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). “The court’s

fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent, and if

the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that

plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. at 9-10. This requires

“examination of the statute in which the provision at issue is found, as well as

related statutes or other provisions of the same act in which the provision is found.”

Id. at 10, 11-12. The meaning of section .040 of the Act is informed by examination

of section .060.

       The Act lists six elements a claimant must establish to recover a judgment.

RCW 4.100.060(1)(a)-(e); Larson v. State, 194 Wn. App. 722, 732-33, 375 P.3d

1096 (2016). At a trial on the merits, section .060 requires the claimant establish

these elements “by clear and convincing evidence.” RCW 4.100.060(1). Section

.060 provides for consideration of certain factors in exercising “discretion regarding

the weight and admissibility of evidence.”        RCW 4.100.060(3).       Section .060

contemplates that claims under the Act may be tried to a jury. RCW 4.100.060(5).

Thus, at trial under section .060, the element that a claimant’s conviction was

vacated on the basis of significant new exculpatory information, like the other

elements, must be established to a specified standard of proof (clear and

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No. 83552-1-I/5

convincing evidence), and potentially by a jury trial. This indicates the Act views

the six elements as questions of fact.

       Section .040 requires the claimant to meet the same six elements, and

additionally a statute of limitations. RCW 4.100.040(1)-(2). While section .060

describes proof of the elements as being necessary to obtain a favorable

judgment, section .040 describes its requirements as the preconditions “to file an

actionable claim.” RCW 4.100.040(1), .060(1). Section .040 lacks any standard

of proof. While lacking any specified weight the evidence must carry, section .040

requires the first four elements, including the one at issue here, be “establish[ed]

by documentary evidence.” RCW 4.100.040(1). For the last two elements, under

section .040 the claimant need only “state facts in sufficient detail for the finder of

fact to determine” them.      RCW 4.100.040(2).        The claimant or a personal

representative must verify the claim. RCW 4.100.040(4). Under section .040, the

court or the attorney general may make a motion to “dismiss” the claim. RCW

4.100.040(6)(a). If the court dismisses the claim, it must give reasons in written

findings of fact and conclusions of law. RCW 4.100.040(6)(b). The Act directs that

review of a dismissal is de novo. RCW 4.100.050.

       Section .040 requires only a showing that a claim is “actionable.” RCW

4.100.040(1). That a claim be “actionable” is a lower threshold than certainty that

a claim will succeed. Section .040’s requirement, for two of the elements, that the

claimant merely “state facts” in sufficient detail in a verified claim, suggests the

inquiry at the .040 stage is whether the claim is supported by facts that would

support recovery if a trier of fact believes them at a trial on the merits. RCW

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No. 83552-1-I/6

4.100.040(2). And de novo appellate review implies that section .040 is concerned

with a burden of production, because, unlike an ultimate burden of persuasion,

whether a claimant has met a burden of production is generally determined as a

matter of law. Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 192 Wn.2d 403, 412, 430 P.3d 229

(2018) (sufficiency of evidence to survive summary judgment); Hill v. BCTI Income

Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 181-82, 186-87, 23 P.3d 440 (2001) (sufficiency of

evidence to support verdict), abrogated on other grounds by Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util.

Dist. No. 1, 189 Wn.2d 516, 529-32, 404 P.3d 464 (2017); State v. Arbogast, 199

Wn.2d 356, 366-67, 506 P.3d 1238 (2022) (sufficiency of evidence to submit

entrapment defense to jury).

       The text and structure of the Act, and the contrasting requirements of

sections .040 and .060, indicate section .040 is concerned with the existence of

evidence sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find for the claimant at trial.2 We hold

RCW 4.100.040 establishes a burden of production, and the claimant meets this

burden if the claimant adduces evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to

find the elements of RCW 4.100.060(1) by clear and convincing evidence at trial.

                                           III

       The State argues the evidence is nevertheless insufficient for Apolo-Albino

to meet the section .040 burden by documentary evidence that his conviction was

       2  We acknowledge some language potentially suggesting a different
conclusion. Section .040 requires a claimant to “establish” the first four elements,
and granting a motion to dismiss (but not denying one) requires “findings of fact”
explaining the reasons for dismissal. RCW 4.100.040(1), (6)(b). These
inconclusive signals do not overcome the indications that section .040 focuses on
the existence of evidence, not its weight.

                                           6
No. 83552-1-I/7

vacated on the basis of significant new exculpatory information. The State argues

the court should not look past the face of the vacatur order, and the recantations

in this case should not be viewed as exculpatory. We disagree.

                                           A

       The State argues a conclusion the vacatur was on the basis of significant

new exculpatory information is foreclosed, because the court adopted the

reasoning stated in the prosecutor’s motion and the prosecutor believed the

recantations were not reliable. The State argues the vacatur of Apolo-Albino’s

conviction was based on an “ ‘other reason’ ” under CrR 7.8(b)(5), not “newly

discovered evidence” under CrR 7.8(b)(2).          But the State acknowledges the

prosecutor “referenced the recantations as one of three circumstances that led him

to conclude that little would be gained by an evidentiary hearing.” As a result, the

court’s order granting the State’s motion to dismiss “for the reasons stated therein”

relied on the recantations for at least part of the basis for the dismissal. In addition,

our decision in Larson has already indicated that it is appropriate, at a trial on the

merits under section .060, to consider in addition to the reasoning stated on the

face of a dismissal the background facts supporting it.

       In Larson, the court had vacated the criminal convictions of the claimants

because of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the State had thereafter

dismissed the charges based on insufficient evidence. 194 Wn. App. at 731. This

court held the trial court erred in finding the claimants had not proven their

convictions were vacated based on significant new exculpatory information. Id. at

738. The reason for the finding of ineffective assistance was that defense counsel

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No. 83552-1-I/8

at the criminal trial had neglected to present available exculpatory alibi evidence.

Id. at 737. As a result, though the vacatur referred only to ineffective assistance

of counsel, “the existence of significant new exculpatory information was the sole

basis for the criminal court’s decision to vacate the convictions.” Id. at 738. Under

Larson, a trier of fact under section .060 of the Act may consider the background

circumstances leading to a vacatur, beyond the face of the order.

       This interpretation ensures the Act is available to those who can prove they

are actually innocent but lack a particularized acknowledgement of innocence

under the Criminal Rules. Such an acknowledgement may be lacking for multiple

reasons.    Quoting Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Unindicted Co-Ejaculator and

Necrophilia: Addressing Prosecutors' Logic-Defying Responses to Exculpatory

DNA Results, amicus curiae Washington Innocence Project points to reported

instances of reluctance by authorities to acknowledge an erroneous criminal

judgment even in the face of compelling evidence of innocence. 105 J. CRIM. L. &

CRIMINOLOGY 853, 855 (2015) (documenting instances in which authorities sought

to “explain away” exculpatory evidence or resort to “outlandish and insidious

theories” against innocent suspects). The Act provides an avenue for claimants to

establish actual innocence independent of institutional or other limitations of the

criminal process to recognize an erroneous conviction.

                                          B

       The State argues that the recantation evidence in this case is not “significant

new exculpatory information,” and therefore cannot support Apolo-Albino’s claim

under the Act. Generally, to obtain a new trial in a criminal case based on new

                                          8
No. 83552-1-I/9

evidence, the defendant must show among other things that the new evidence is

material and would likely change the outcome at trial. State v. Williams, 96 Wn.2d

215, 222-23, 634 P.2d 868 (1981). When the new evidence is a recantation, this

inquiry focuses on whether the recantation is reliable. State v. Macon, 128 Wn.2d

784, 804, 911 P.2d 1004 (1996). Macon held a trial court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing a new trial when it concluded at a hearing that a recantation

was not reliable and so not material and not likely to change the outcome of the

case. Id. at 803. The court said recantations are inherently suspect and said

reliability must be determined in advance of the ruling on a new trial. Id. at 804.

The State says the criminal court here never ordered a new trial, so never ruled

the Macon standard was met, and so the vacatur cannot have been on the basis

of significant new exculpatory information.

       The State’s argument is undercut by Larson’s holding that “significant new

exculpatory information” under the Act is broader in scope than “newly discovered

evidence” under the Criminal Rules. 194 Wn. App. at at 733-35. In Larson, the

criminal court had refused relief for newly discovered evidence, because the

neglected alibi evidence had been available at the time of the criminal trial. Id. at

730, 733. This court interpreted the Act to permit claimants to rely on new evidence

which merely had not been presented at the criminal trial. Id. at 736. Beyond this,

the Act contemplates the ultimate question of innocence will be decided at a trial

on the merits under section .060. Neither the absence of a particular proceeding

in the criminal case, nor Macon, prevents Apolo-Albino from attempting to establish

by clear and convincing evidence at a trial on the merits under section .060 that

                                         9
No. 83552-1-I/10

his convictions were vacated on the basis of significant new exculpatory

information.

       The determinative question is whether Apolo-Albino can point to

documentary evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find by clear and

convincing evidence he has established the disputed element of his claim under

the Act. A CPS investigator documented that D.G. “disclosed that when she was

in [the ] foster home she was made to lie and say that her biological father sexually

abused her.” The report stated B.G. disclosed “that [the foster parent] told her

what to say about her father, that he touched her inappropriately.” In an interview

with prosecutors, D.G. explained, “she was crying and didn’t want to send her dad

to jail, but didn’t feel comfortable telling the truth because she didn’t want to get

hurt by [the foster parent]. [D.G.] said that [the foster parent] threatened her before

court that if she didn’t do ‘that’ she would hurt her.” Another parent present for

some of the original statements by D.G. and B.G. later reported, “ ‘My feeling is

that the kids were coached’ ” and described at least one other incident in which

D.G.’s and B.G.’s foster parent encouraged another child to make an accusation

of molestation. These and other statements led the CPS investigator to conclude

the foster parent manipulated D.G. and B.G. into testifying against their father.

       The State has argued D.G.’s and B.G.’s new statements are nevertheless

not reliable, arguing some aspects are “demonstrably incorrect or false.” The State

pointed out D.G.’s and B.G.’s new statements describe abuse of other children,

which those children deny. The State pointed to present motives by at least D.G.

both to portray her father in a better light than was true and to retaliate against her

                                          10
No. 83552-1-I/11

former foster parent based on more recent events. However, when the criminal

court vacated Apolo-Albino’s convictions, in addition to these arguments by the

State, that court was presented with the above-summarized recantations together

with the State’s own reliance on them as part of its motion to dismiss. Under the

Act, whether the vacatur was on the basis of significant new exculpatory

information is a question of fact, and there is documentary evidence sufficient for

a rational trier of fact to find in favor of Apolo-Albino on this issue by clear and

convincing evidence.

      We affirm the order denying the State’s section .040 motion for the reasons

stated in this opinion and remand for further proceedings.

WE CONCUR:

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