Court Opinion

ID: 9778962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:28:27.767205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:16.770138
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. I write separately to emphasize the care which our Courts of Appeals must take when analyzing claims, on direct appeal, of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals purported to follow Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) in analyzing appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jackson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Disk] 1996, pet. granted). The Court then pointed out that under Strickland, the appellant must show both that (1) counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness, based on prevailing professional norms; and that (2) but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Jackson, 921 S.W.2d at 811.
The Court also noted that under Strickland there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range *958of reasonable professional assistance. Id. It then stated that “[t]he record before us is devoid of facts that would establish conclusively the validity of the search and seizure in this case” (Id.); that “... the facts were not sufficiently developed to determine whether the officer’s discovery of appellant’s crack pipe was the result of a valid search ...” (Id. at 814); and that “... because neither trial counsel nor the prosecutor developed investigative facts and details of the pat-down search by the arresting officer, this court cannot conclude that the search was valid or invalid” (Id.). However, it then concluded that under the circumstances, appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective. Id.
It is clear, from its conclusion, that the Court of Appeals proceeded to apply the exact opposite presumption from that mandated by Strickland. That is, given the lack of a developed factual record as to the validity of the search and Strickland’s strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable, the only logical conclusion that can be reached, under Strickland, is that appellant has failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective. That the Court reached the opposite conclusion shows that, despite its assertions to the contrary, it did not follow the mandates of Strickland. In the future, our courts should take greater care when applying such clearly established law.