Court Opinion

ID: 9893577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 19:03:27.754849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:34.032809
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/27/23 Perry v. Mesa CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        DIVISION TWO

 JAMES L. PERRY,                                                  B322063
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                  (Los Angeles County
           v.                                                     Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  19STCV33686)
 FRANCISCO MARIO MESA, as
 Administrator, etc.,
           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Steven J. Kleifield, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Michael S. Goergen and Michael S. Goergen
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez; Trester, Daniel Herbert,
Steven J. Renick and Kirsten A. Brown for Defendant and
Respondent.

                __________________________________________
       Defendant Francisco Mario Mesa (Mesa), the successor
administrator of the Estate of Kendra Zimmerman (estate),
successfully sought relief from the default and default judgment
that resulted from the mistake or inexcusable neglect of the
attorney for the prior estate administrator. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 473, subd. (b).)1 On appeal, plaintiff James L. Perry (Perry)
contends Mesa failed to provide a sufficient showing to support
mandatory relief under the statute. We disagree and affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       According to Perry, Kendra Zimmerman allegedly
contracted with him in 2014 to finance his production of a movie.
She died intestate in November 2017, before paying Perry her
purportedly agreed-upon $ 300,000 investment. Mesa was her
surviving spouse.
       What followed were concurrent and related probate and
civil actions.
A.     Probate Action
       (Super. Ct. L.A. County No. 18STPB00048)
       On January 3, 2018, a probate action was filed to
administer the estate. Later that year, Perry filed a $310,424.51
creditor’s claim plus legal fees, which was ultimately deemed
denied under Probate Code section 9256.
       In August 2019, Cara L. Harris (Harris) was appointed the
estate administrator, and letters were issued the following
month. By December of that year, Harris was unable to continue
as estate administrator. She filed notice of resignation on

     1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

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January 6, 2020, “effective immediately.” Thereafter, Mesa
petitioned to succeed Harris. Perry objected.
       On October 29, 2020, the probate court held a hearing on
Mesa’s petition and overruled Perry’s objections. The court
appointed Mesa as the successor estate administrator but ruled
Harris’s resignation was not effective “until new letters have
issued.” Harris was present at the hearing. In November 2020,
Mesa was appointed the successor estate administrator, and
letters were issued the following month.
B.     Civil Action
       (Super. Ct. L.A. County No. 19STCV33686)
       In September 2019, Perry filed a verified complaint in
propria persona for breach of contract and related causes of
action. The complaint named Mesa, individually, the estate, and
Does 1 through 20 as defendants.2
       Mesa answered the complaint as an individual defendant.
In November 2019, Perry personally served Harris, as the estate
administrator on behalf of the estate. Harris did not respond to
the complaint.
       On January 21, 2020, Perry, now represented by counsel,
filed a fictious name amendment to substitute Harris, the estate
administrator, for the estate in the complaint. In March 2020,
Perry again personally served Harris as the estate administrator
on behalf of the estate. (On March 3, 2020, Perry filed an
amended proof of service that Harris had been served as

     2 Contrary to Perry’s assertion in his opening brief, Harris
was not initially named in the complaint as a defendant either
individually or as the estate administrator.

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defendant estate administrator.) Harris failed to respond to the
complaint.
      On April 13, 2020, an order of default was entered against
defendant Harris as the estate administrator.
      Perry dismissed the complaint against the Doe defendants
and later against Mesa as an individual defendant. Perry then
requested a court judgment in his civil action, notice of which was
mailed to Harris.
      On March 9, 2021, Mesa answered the verified complaint
as the estate administrator. On Perry’s motion, the trial court
struck Mesa’s answer, noting Mesa was not the estate
administrator when the default order was entered. The court
then ordered Mesa substituted for the former estate
administrator, Harris.
      On December 16, 2021, Perry’s civil action proceeded to a
default prove-up hearing, and he obtained a judgment of
$499,877.76 against Mesa as the estate administrator.
C.    Motion and Hearing To Set Aside the Default and
      Default Judgment
      On May 4, 2022, Mesa moved to set aside the default and
default judgment as (1) caused by the mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, and/or neglect of Harris’s counsel, and/or (2) void.
(§ 473, subds. (b) & (d).)
      In support of his motion, Mesa submitted the May 2, 2022
declaration of Attorney Romelia Dede Soto, who had represented
Harris in the probate proceedings. The declaration set forth
what Soto advised Harris after learning Harris was no longer
able to serve as the estate administrator: Soto told Harris that
she could resign as the estate administrator, and her resignation
would be “effective immediately” upon filing with the court. That

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meant Harris “would no longer have any obligation to perform
any duties as the estate’s administrator, other than to file an
accounting with the court.” At Harris’s request, Soto filed the
notice of resignation on January 6, 2020.
       Soto stated that in March 2020, she learned Harris had
received a summons and complaint in a pending civil action
(Super. Ct. L.A. County No. 19STCV33686). The summons
indicated the complaint was purportedly being served on Harris
in her capacity as the estate administrator. Soto told Harris the
“purported service was void and of no effect.” Soto also advised
because Harris had resigned as the estate administrator, she “no
longer represented the estate in any capacity.” Thus, Harris “not
only . . . ha[d] no obligation to respond to the complaint, she had
no power to do so[.]” Soto concluded “no answer or other pleading
should be filed by or on behalf of [Harris] in response to the
purported service on her of the complaint in the civil action.”
       Soto gave Harris the same legal advice in April 2020, when
Harris received a request for entry of default in the same civil
action. Soto testified the decision to forego answering the
complaint and moving to set aside the default “were made by me,
in my capacity as counsel for [Harris].” Soto testified if she were
mistaken in understanding that Harris’s notice of resignation
was immediately effective for all purposes, then “it was this
mistake by me that caused the default of [Harris] to be entered
and for no action to be taken by [Harris] to set aside that entry of
default.”
       As pertinent here, in opposing Mesa’s motion, Perry
challenged the credibility of Soto’s declaration of fault. Perry
relied on two documents, Soto’s billing record and an earlier
declaration by Soto, to argue Soto’s declaration of fault was

                                 5
untrustworthy and should be stricken. Perry contended Soto’s
billing record clearly showed Soto’s declaration of fault
exaggerated the extent of her work to represent Harris. Soto’s
earlier declaration, introduced by Perry, was intended to support
Harris’s efforts to resign as the estate administrator. It was
apparently never filed with the court. Perry contended this
earlier declaration contradicted Soto’s declaration of fault
because it implicated Harris as being partly to blame for failing
to respond to the complaint.
       Following the hearing on May 26, 2022, the trial court
granted mandatory relief under section 473, subdivision (b). The
court found (1) Mesa’s motion “is timely filed”; and (2) Mesa
“convincingly argues that [Soto’s] declaration is trustworthy and
should not be stricken.” The court explained: “[Perry’s]
argument [is] that ‘no prudent attorney would advise their [sic]
client to just ignore legal process, and to allow a default judgment
to be entered.’ That is the point—[Soto] admits to not acting as a
prudent attorney, and was responsible for the entry of default as
a result.” The court also found the billing record and earlier
declaration that Perry introduced in attacking Soto’s credibility
were “not inconsistent” with Soto’s declaration of fault.
       The trial court ordered the April 13, 2020 default and the
December 16, 2021 default judgment vacated. Thereafter, Mesa
answered the verified complaint as the estate administrator.
       Perry timely appealed from the orders.
                            DISCUSSION
A.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       “Section 473, subdivision (b), authorizes the trial court to
relieve a party from a default judgment entered because of the
party’s or his or her attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

                                 6
neglect. The section provides for both mandatory and
discretionary relief.” (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 393, 399.) Mandatory relief is available “whenever
an application for relief is made no more than six months after
entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an
attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or neglect . . . , unless the court finds that
the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (§ 473, subd. (b).)
       If the requirements for applying the mandatory relief
provision exist, the trial court does not have discretion to refuse
relief. (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 603, 612.)
       “Whether section 473, subdivision (b)’s requirements have
been satisfied in any given case is a question we review for
substantial evidence where the evidence is disputed and de novo
where it is undisputed.” (Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v.
Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 437.) Thus, where, as
here, applicability of the mandatory relief provision turns on
disputed facts, the trial court’s decision is reviewed for
substantial evidence. (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at p. 399.)
B.     Substantial Evidence Supported Mandatory Relief
       Perry’s appeal primarily resurrects his challenges to Soto’s
credibility. He again points to Soto’s billing record and earlier
declaration as reasons the trial court should have discounted her
declaration of fault. However, any attempts to discredit Soto’s
testimony at this stage are futile. “The trial court’s ruling
concluding there were grounds for section 473, subdivision (b),
relief implies it believed counsel’s explanation. Credibility is an

                                  7
issue for the fact finder, and we do not reweigh evidence or
reassess the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] . . . [W]e defer to
the trial court’s implied finding of credibility and reject [the
plaintiff’s] apparent attempt to encourage us to make a different
credibility determination.” (Gee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 477, 492; accord, Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 907, 915 [trial court’s finding regarding credibility
“ ‘ “is conclusive on appeal” ’ ”].)
        Here, the trial court expressly made a credibility
determination. The court found Soto’s declaration of fault was
“trustworthy,” and the billing record and earlier declaration were
“not inconsistent” with that testimony. As such, the declaration
provided sufficient evidence to support the application of the
mandatory relief provision. Soto attested the default and default
judgment were entered because she erroneously advised that
Harris need not respond to the civil complaint and request for
entry of default. The trial court found the entry of the default
judgment was in fact caused by Soto’s mistake in failing to act as
a “prudent attorney” in this case.
        Without a citation to the record, Perry contends he objected
to Soto’s declaration of fault as lacking personal knowledge under
Evidence Code section 702. However, our review of the record,
which consists of the clerk’s transcript, reveals no such objection.
“The failure to raise a specific objection to the admission of
evidence results in forfeiture of appellate review.” (People v.
Nelson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 698, 711.) In any event, Perry’s
contention is without merit. Soto’s declaration established her
personal knowledge of the subject matter of her testimony—that
she gave erroneous legal advice to Harris in the probate action

                                  8
that led directly to the entry of a default and default judgment in
the civil action.3
      Finally, Perry contends the trial court erred in setting aside
the default and default judgment without a declaration of fault
from Mesa’s attorney. Perry urges that Mesa and his attorney
should have been compelled to state why Mesa “chose to do
nothing” until the default judgment was entered. Perry argues
that following the default order, Mesa should have acted to
protect the estate by petitioning to be appointed as special
administrator, among other things, to prevent the entry of the
default judgment.
      Perry has forfeited this argument, having failed to raise it
before the trial court. (See, e.g., Brown v. Boren (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 1303, 1316 [litigant may not assert a new theory on
appeal].) More importantly, however, it has no bearing on
whether the section 473, subdivision (b) motion was properly
granted, which it was in this case.

      3 Soto’s averment that, “If called to do so, I could and would
competently testify to the following from my personal
knowledge,” clearly demonstrated her personal knowledge.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The orders are affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on
appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           KWAN, J.*
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

      CHAVEZ, J.

      * Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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