Court Opinion

ID: 9556109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 06:09:35.605515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:30.436135
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed August 14, 2023

                                    S  In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00462-CR

                        TREVOR RUSSELL, Appellant
                                   V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F-2175838-T

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
               Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Miskel
                        Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
      In four issues, appellant Trevor Russell challenges his conviction for

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Russell alleges the trial court erred by

failing (1) to include an application paragraph regarding self-defense in the jury

charge and (2) to instruct the jury the State bore the burden of disproving his claim

of self-defense. Russell also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object (3) to the omission of the self-defense application paragraph in the jury charge

and (4) to the absence of an instruction the State bore the burden of disproving

Russell’s self-defense claim. We affirm the judgment.
                                  BACKGROUND

      Russell was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for

shooting Vernon Woodward. Woodward testified he initially considered Russell a

friend and would work on his car for him. He stated the men had a disagreement

over what Woodward believed was a money-related issue. Woodward met Russell

at Lucky’s Food Mart, a neighborhood hangout, on May 12, 2021, to try to resolve

their issue. Woodward said he tried to talk to Russell, but Russell took a posture

showing he wanted to fight Woodward. When he realized Russell did not want to

discuss the issue, Woodward walked away from him and returned to his vehicle. As

Woodward was walking, he stated he heard someone call out his name and say “look

out.” Woodward turned and saw Russell running towards him. As he approached,

Russell pulled out a firearm and shot Woodward in the leg. Woodward fell to the

ground and Russell shot him eight additional times. Woodward stated he could not

do anything to stop the shooting but just “h[eld] my hands up.” Woodward had no

type of weapon on him when Russell shot him. Woodward testified he did have a

pellet gun in his vehicle but never pulled it out of his car.

      Russell testified in his own defense explaining Woodward did some body

work on Russell’s vehicle. Russell felt Woodward did not properly repair the vehicle

and confronted Woodward when the two were at Lucky’s Food Mart. Russell stated

the two had a verbal altercation and Woodward told him, “I’m not going to fight you

                                          –2–
. . . I’m going to shoot you.” Russell believed Woodward had a rifle in his vehicle

and stated Woodward had intent. Russell also testified he believed another man who

worked at Lucky’s named Mark, was about to give Woodward a gun. On cross-

examination, Russell stated he had a pellet gun and shot Woodward with the pellet

gun. He explained he intended to beat Woodward to his weapon. When asked about

the surveillance video, Russell admitted it showed him running towards Woodward

and Woodward’s hands were extended into the air.

      The trial court included a self-defense instruction in the abstract portion of the

jury charge but it was not included in the application portion. After requesting a self-

defense instruction, Russell did not object to the jury charge. The jury convicted

Russell of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to forty years’

imprisonment. This appeal followed.

                                     ANALYSIS

      In four issues, which we reorganized, Russell alleges the trial court erred by

failing (1) to include an application paragraph regarding self-defense in the jury

charge and (2) to instruct the jury the State bore the burden of disproving his claim

of self-defense. Additionally, he argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object (3) to the omission of the self-defense application paragraph in the jury

charge and (4) to the absence of an instruction the State bore the burden of disproving

Russell’s self-defense claim.

                                          –3–
I.    Jury Charge Error

      The purpose of the trial court’s jury charge is to instruct the jurors on the law

applicable to the case. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14. The charge is the

instrument with which the jury convicts; therefore, it must be an accurate statement

of the law and set out the essential elements of the offense. Fields v. State, ––

S.W.3d––, ––, No. 01-20-00280-CR, 2022 WL 3268525, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 11, 2022, pet. ref’d). A jury charge that improperly states

the law or the elements of an offense is erroneous. Id.

      All alleged jury-charge error must be considered on appellate review

regardless of preservation in the trial court. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Appellate review of purported error in a jury charge

involves a two-step process. Id. First, we determine whether the jury instructions are

erroneous. Id. Second, if error occurred, an appellate court must analyze the error

for harm. Id. The issue of error preservation is not relevant until harm is assessed

because the degree of harm required for reversal depends on whether error was

preserved or not. Id.

      The failure to preserve jury-charge error is not a bar to appellate review but

rather establishes the degree of harm necessary for reversal. Warner v. State, 245

S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Neither the State nor the appellant bears

the burden on appeal to prove harm. Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex.

                                         –4–
Crim. App. 2013). Harm is assessed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the

evidence, including contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence, the

parties’ arguments, and all other relevant information in the record. Alcoser v. State,

663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 777

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

      If the “defendant never presents a proposed jury instruction (or fails to object

to the lack of one), any potential error in the charge is reviewed only for ‘egregious

harm’ under Almanza.” Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008) (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op.

on reh’g)). When an “appellant d[oes] not object to the charge, the error does not

result in reversal ‘unless it was so egregious and created such harm that appellant

was denied a fair trial.’” Warner, 245 S.W.3d at 461 (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d

at 171). “Errors that result in egregious harm are those that affect the ‘very basis of

the case,’ ‘deprive the defendant of a valuable right,’ or ‘vitally affect a defensive

theory.’” Id. at 461–62 (quoting Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1996)). To establish egregious harm, the “appellant must have suffered actual,

rather than theoretical, harm.” Id. at 461.

      A proper jury charge consists of an abstract of the law and the application

paragraphs. Smith v. State, No. 01-22-00471-CR, 2023 WL 4239875, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2023, no pet.). The abstract paragraphs serve as

a glossary to help the jury understand concepts and terms used in the application

                                          –5–
paragraphs of the charge. Id. The application paragraphs then apply the “pertinent

penal law, abstract definitions, and general legal principles to the particular facts and

the indictment allegations.” Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012).

      A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when a defensive issue is

raised by the evidence, “whether that evidence is strong or weak, unimpeached or

contradicted, and regardless of what the trial court may think about the credibility of

the defense.” Gamino v. State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The

defendant bears the burden of production with respect to a defense, and the issue of

the existence of a defense is not submitted to the jury unless evidence is admitted

supporting the defense. Barnes v. State, No. 05-22-00013-CR, 2023 WL 3964007,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 13, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). To merit a self-defense instruction, an appellant must have adduced

some evidence of his state of mind at the time he used the force at issue. Barnes,

2023 WL 3964007, at *3; Vega v. State, No. 05-16-00882-CR, 2017 WL 1245423,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 5, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication).

      Russell’s jury charge contained the following:

      Application Paragraph

           Now, considering all the law contained in the Court’s charge, if
      you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the
      Defendant, Trevor Russell, on or about the 19th day of May, 2021, in

                                          –6–
the County of Dallas and said State, did unlawfully then and there
intentionally or knowingly or recklessly cause bodily injury to Vernon
Woodward, by shooting Vernon Woodward with a firearm, and said
defendant did use and exhibit a deadly weapon to wit; a firearm, during
the commission of the assault, then you will find the defendant guilty
of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

      If you believe the defendant is not guilty of any offense, or have
reasonable doubt thereof, then you will acquit the defendant and say by
your verdict “not guilty.”

Self-Defense

‘Reasonable belief’ means a belief that would be held by an ordinary
and prudent person in the same circumstances as the defendant.

A person is justified in using force against another when and to the
degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to
protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful
force.

The use of force against another is not justified in response to verbal
provocation alone.

The use of force against another is not justified if the actor provoked
the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless:

      (A) the actor abandons the encounter, or clearly communicates
       to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot
       safely abandon the encounter; and

      (B) the other nevertheless continues or attempts to use
      unlawful force against the actor.

A person is justified in using deadly force against another:

      (1) if the actor would be justified in using force against
      another; and

                                  –7–
             (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the
             deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against
             the other’s use of unlawful deadly force.

      A person who has the right to be present at the location where the deadly
      force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the deadly
      force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the
      deadly force is used is not required to retreat before using deadly force.

      Russell requested a self-defense instruction but did not object to the jury

charge as it was written. However, the jury charge contains error because the

requested instruction was only contained in the section titled “Self-Defense” without

being included in the application portion of the jury charge. Since Russell did not

object to the jury charge as written, the factors must show he suffered egregious

harm by the jury charge. We look to the following factors to determine if Russell

suffered egregious harm: the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including

contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence, the parties’ arguments,

and all other relevant information in the record. Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165.

      In looking at the jury charge as a whole, we “ask whether anything in the

balance of the jury charge either exacerbated or ameliorated th[e] error.” French v.

State, 563 S.W.3d 228, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The jury charge contained a

section which defined the terms necessary to the charge, an application paragraph, a

section on self-defense, and general evidentiary instructions which also explained

the State’s burden in criminal cases. There was no explanation in the application

paragraph regarding what should occur if the jury found Russell acted in self-

                                         –8–
defense. This does weigh slightly in favor of egregious harm. However, the

explanation of the self-defense doctrine immediately followed the application

paragraph. We could assume the jury would read the two sections together, and if it

had believed Russell’s self-defense claim, would have found him not guilty of the

charged offense. Russell’s testimony did not support a valid self-defense claim, the

jury did not believe he acted in self-defense, and the “presumption is dependent on

the evidence that was adduced at trial.” Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 435–36

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

      The state of the evidence presented at trial also did not support Russell’s

theory of self-defense. To be entitled to a self-defense instruction, Russell must have

believed deadly force was immediately necessary. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.32.

Although Russell testified and stated he felt Woodward threatened him, the evidence

does not support this assessment. Woodward testified he was not armed, and no one

was bringing him a firearm to shoot at Russell. The surveillance video admitted into

evidence supports Woodward’s testimony. It shows as Woodward walks away,

Russell approached and shot him. Russell continued to shoot Woodward as he laid

on the ground with his empty hands raised. Because Russell’s claim of self-defense

is not supported by the record, the inclusion of the self-defense section in the jury

charge was harmless and weighs against a finding of egregious harm. See Villarreal,

453 S.W.3d at 439.

                                         –9–
      In their arguments to the jury, both sides discussed self-defense and its

applicability to this offense. The State argued Russell acted intentionally in shooting

Woodward and explained how his story of what occurred was not plausible based

on the evidence presented. Russell, on the other hand, reiterated the evidence he

believed was applicable to a self-defense justification. The fact both sides argued

according to their beliefs regarding the applicability of self-defense weighs against

a finding of egregious harm.

      Other relevant information in the record shows the trial court explained to the

jury it was the State’s burden to prove Russell was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

and Russell did not have any burden in the case at all. The trial court also told the

jury it could send out notes if there were any questions or clarification needed

regarding the jury charge. No notes were sent out during jury deliberations. See

Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (no showing of

egregious harm when there were no jury notes contained in the record showing

confusion). The lack of additional information showing harm weighs against a

finding of egregious harm.

      Russell has not made a showing he was egregiously harmed because based on

the evidence in the record, he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. See

Villarreal, 453 S.W.3d at 436. After considering the four factors necessary to

establish egregious harm, we find Russell has failed to show he was actually harmed

                                        –10–
by the omission of self-defense in the application paragraph of the jury charge. His

first issue is overruled.

         In his second issue, Russell also claims the trial court erred by failing to

include penal code section 2.03(d) in the jury charge. Section 2.03(d) states “if the

issue of the existence of a defense is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge that

a reasonable doubt on the issue requires that the defendant be acquitted.” TEX. PENAL

CODE § 2.03(d). Russell’s jury charge stated, “In all criminal cases, the burden of

proof is on the State. All persons are presumed to be innocent, and no person may

be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.”

       In Goodson v. State, as in this case, the charge (1) instructed the jury the

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was on the State and (2) contained

instructions on the presumption of innocence. See No. 05-15-00143-CR, 2017 WL

1360193, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 12, 2017). Accordingly, (1) “when the charge is

viewed as a whole, it placed the burden on the State to show beyond a reasonable

doubt that appellant was not acting in self-defense” and (2) therefore, “[n]o error is

shown.” Luck v. State, 588 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (rejecting

appellant's complaint the jury charge “was erroneous in that it did not inform the

jury that the State had to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt the issue of self-

defense”); see also Gonzalez v. State, No. 05–13–00630–CR, 2014 WL 3736208, at

*13–14 Tex. App.–Dallas July 14, 2014, no pet.) (not designated for publication)

                                         –11–
(concluding “the trial court did not err by submitting the jury charge without

including an instruction that the State was required to disprove the issue of self-

defense beyond a reasonable doubt,” where charge met requirements of Luck and

penal code section 2.03(d)) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, Russell did not

suffer harm because he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction and was not

egregiously harmed by the jury charge as written. We overrule his second issue.

II.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      In his third and fourth issue, Russell argues his trial counsel was ineffective.

He states “no competent lawyer would have failed to object to the omission of the

application paragraph for self-defense” or “the omission of the reasonable doubt

instruction for self-defense.”

      A successful ineffective assistance claim depends on (1) deficient

performance and (2) prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

In determining whether counsel’s representation was deficient, we indulge a strong

presumption counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional

assistance, including the possibility counsel’s actions were strategic. Id. at 689. We

focus on the totality of the representation afforded and not on individual alleged

errors. Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We consider

the adequacy of assistance as viewed at the time of trial, not in hindsight. Robertson

v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We may not second-guess

counsel’s strategic decisions and defense counsel’s trial strategy cannot be

                                        –12–
considered ineffective assistance of counsel simply because another attorney would

have used a different strategy. Herrera v. State, No. 05-19-00021-CR, 2020 WL

4435309, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).

      To defeat the presumption of reasonable representation, an allegation of

ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record and the record must

affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Prine v. State, 537 S.W.3d

113, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2001). A silent record provides no explanation for counsel’s actions and will

not overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. Rylander v. State,

101 S.W.3d 107, 110–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808,

812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Moreover, “trial counsel should ordinarily be afforded

an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective.”

Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 111. Where trial counsel is not given an opportunity to

explain his actions, counsel should only be found ineffective if counsel’s conduct

was “so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Id. at 117

(quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).

      Russell claims his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not object to

the omission of self-defense in the application paragraph of the jury charge and penal

code section 2.03(d). In his motion for new trial, he failed to raise either of these

allegations against his trial counsel; therefore, trial counsel had not been given an

                                        –13–
opportunity to respond to such claims. See Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2002).

       However, we previously determined Russell was not entitled to a self-defense

instruction based on the evidence presented at trial. Trial counsel did request a self-

defense instruction, which was included in the jury charge under the “Self-Defense”

section. Russell’s testimony did not establish Woodward threatened him with deadly

force at any time before Russell shot Woodward multiple times. His belief he was

entitled to exercise self-defense was unfounded and implausible. Although the

evidence did not support Russell’s belief in self-defense, trial counsel did pursue

Russell’s defensive theory throughout the trial in his questioning of witnesses,

argument to the jury, and request for the instruction. Russell has not shown how trial

counsel’s actions were deficient based on the evidence presented. We overrule his

third issue.

       Russell also alleges trial counsel was ineffective by not requesting the

inclusion of penal code section 2.03(d). However, as addressed above, the jury

charge included an explanation regarding the State’s burden of proof and how

Russell was presumed innocent unless all the elements of the offense were proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. Trial counsel’s lack of request of the specific language

of section 2.03(d) was not deficient when the appropriate language was contained in

the jury charge. We overrule Russell’s fourth issue.

                                        –14–
                                  CONCLUSION

      Based on the evidence presented in this record, we find Russell was not

egregiously harmed by the jury charge as presented and his trial counsel was not

ineffective. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                           /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
                                           ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
                                           JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
220543F.U05

                                        –15–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

TREVOR RUSSELL, Appellant                     On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial
                                              District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00462-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. F-2175838-T.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Kipness. Justices Reichek and Miskel
                                              participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 14th day of August 2023.

                                       –16–