Court Opinion

ID: 2963635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:19.167716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:44.049780
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 94-1893
        No. 94-1895

                          DORIS FREDETTE and PAUL FREDETTE,

                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

             ALLIED VAN LINES, INC., and TRANSIT HOMES OF AMERICA, INC.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

        No. 94-1894

                          DORIS FREDETTE and PAUL FREDETTE,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

              ALLIED VAN LINES, INC., MULLEN BROS., INC. of NORTH ADAMS,
                         and TRANSIT HOMES OF AMERICA, INC.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                 [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    _____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Joseph B.  Bertrand with whom Marie  G. Leary  and Martin Magnuson
            ___________________           _______________      _______________
        McCarthy & Kenney were on briefs for defendant Allied Van  Lines, Inc.
        _________________
        and defendant Mullen Bros., Inc. of North Adams.
            William Gordon Prescott with whom David  W. Murphy, Jr., and Katz,
            _______________________           _____________________      ____
        Lapointe & Murphy,  P.C. were on brief for defendant  Transit Homes of
        ________________________
        America, Inc.
            David R.  Cianflone with whom Cianflone  & Cianflone,  P.C. was on
            ___________________           _____________________________
        briefs for plaintiffs.

                                 ____________________

                                  September 28, 1995
                                 ____________________

                 BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.   We have before us cross-appeals
                         _____________

            in  a case concerning  long-distance moving arrangements that

            went seriously  awry.  The  plaintiffs in the  district court

            were Paul and Doris Fredette; the defendants were Allied  Van

            Lines, Inc., ("Allied"), Mullen Brothers, Inc. of North Adams

            ("Mullen  Brothers")  and  Transit  Homes  of  America,  Inc.

            ("Transit").  The facts, taken in the light most favorable to

            the  jury verdict, Borden v.  Paul Revere Life  Ins. Co., 935
                               ______     __________________________

            F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1991), are as follows.

                 In September 1990, General Electric Company ("GE")  laid

            off Paul Fredette, who was then working as a machinist in its

            Pittsfield, Massachusetts, plant.  GE offered Paul Fredette a

            position  in  its  Hickory,  North  Carolina  plant,  and  he

            accepted.  The Fredettes  contacted defendant Mullen Brothers

            to arrange the move  of their mobile home to  North Carolina.

            Mullen  is  a local  Massachusetts  mover  licensed only  for

            intrastate moves;  for interstate moves  like the Fredettes',

            Mullen acts as an agent for Allied.

                 In  January 1991,  a Mullen  sales  representative, Chad

            Lindburg, came  to the Fredettes' Pittsfield  home to inspect

            and inventory their mobile home and personal belongings.  The

            mobile home was a one-bedroom unit with an attached porch and

            canopy  and  a  detached  shed. The  Fredettes  explained  to

            Lindburg  that they  wanted to move  the home and  all of its

            contents and that  they wanted  to be fully  insured.   After

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                                         -3-

            that  meeting,  the Fredettes  left  for  North Carolina  and

            stayed with relatives  while Paul Fredette began work  at the

            GE plant there.  They also purchased a lot for the home.

                 In  mid-February, the  Fredettes returned and  signed an

            agreement with Lindburg committing  Allied to move the mobile

            home and its  contents at  a cost of  $20,520; the  Fredettes

            handed over  a check,  apparently believing that  this amount

            represented  all  payments required  for  the  move.   Allied

            planned to  transport the  household possessions itself.   It

            subcontracted  the  move of  the mobile  home to  Transit and

            hired  another company to move the porch and shed.  According

            to the contract, the move was to begin on  February 16, 1991,

            with a guaranteed  delivery date no  later than February  25,

            1991.

                 Transit, in turn, hired James Bedford to move the mobile

            home and  he inspected  it on the  day that the  contract was

            signed.  The Fredettes  then returned to North Carolina.   On

            February  21,  1991,  Lindburg  told them  that  Bedford  had

            discovered pre-existing  structural damage after he moved the

            home off its Pittsfield  lot.  Bedford told Transit  that the

            home  was not roadworthy because it was sagging on its axles.

            Transit told Bedford  not to  move the home  and told  Allied

            that  the  home  would  not  be  moved  until  the  Fredettes

            furnished  Transit  with  a  broad liability  release.    The

            Fredettes' personal belongings were placed in storage.

                                         -4-
                                         -4-

                 The Fredettes returned  to Pittsfield, photographed  the

            home  and   hired  their  own  expert,   Stanley  Bator,  who

            determined  that the home could  be safely moved  if a fourth

            axle were added.   The  Fredettes refused to  sign the  broad

            release  demanded by  Transit, but  on March  1, 1991,  Doris

            Fredette  signed a promissory note to Allied for up to $2,500

            to  cover costs of adding an axle.   A fourth axle was added,

            and on March 7, 1991, Bedford moved the home from Pittsfield,

            arriving  in North  Carolina on  March 12.   On  arrival, the

            Fredettes and  an expert they hired  found (and photographed)

            substantial damage to the interior and exterior of the home.

                 Bedford  refused to  place the  mobile home  on the  lot

            until  the   Fredettes  removed   a  fence  and   made  other

            adjustments.  The  Fredettes hired Irvin Finger,  who did the

            required work,  but Bedford still  refused to  move the  home

            onto the lot,  saying that the ground was too hilly and muddy

            to do it safely.   After consulting with Allied  and Transit,

            Bedford left the  mobile home  near the lot  and returned  to

            Massachusetts.   The  Fredettes hired  a local  company which

            promptly placed the home onto the lot for an additional fee.

                 A  week  later,  after  a  number  of  requests  by  the

            Fredettes,  Allied sent a crew  to block and  level the home.

            The contents of the  home and the porch, including  the front

            steps, had  not  yet  arrived.   Apparently  Allied  and  the

            Fredettes were engaged  in a dispute  about the storage  fees

                                         -5-
                                         -5-

            incurred  during  the moving  delay,  and  Allied refused  to

            deliver  the personal  belongings until  the storage  fee was

            paid.  Delivery occurred on April 11, 1991, and the Fredettes

            moved  into  their  home the  next  day,  45  days after  the

            original guaranteed delivery date.

                 While  the  home  was  en route,  Paul  Fredette  became

            depressed  and, as a result, was terminated from his job with

            GE.   His anxiety and depression continued after the move and

            were confirmed by medical testimony at trial.  He returned to

            work  in  May of  1991, but  left  again in  September, again

            because  of  depression.     Doris  Fredette   also  suffered

            emotional distress.  Ultimately,  the Fredettes brought  suit

            in  Massachusetts state  court, alleging  a number  of claims

            against Allied, Transit and Mullen.

                 The  defendants  removed the  suit  to  federal district

            court,  and  ultimately the  parties  went to  trial  on four

            counts:    count  I  alleged  a  violation   of  the  Carmack

            Amendment, 49  U.S.C.    11707; count  II  charged breach  of

            contract;  count IV  alleged  a  violation  of  Massachusetts

            consumer  protection law, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, based on the

            intentional  infliction of  emotional distress;  and count  V

            charged intentional infliction of emotional distress.1

                                
            ____________________

                 1Count III,  a state-law claim for  property damage, was
            dismissed as preempted by the Carmack Amendment.

                                         -6-
                                         -6-

                 Counts I, II and V were tried to a  jury beginning April

            11,  1994; Count  IV, the 93A  claim, was heard  by the court

            afterward.   After the  Fredettes rested, the  district court

            dismissed Mullen as  a party.   On April 14,  1994, the  jury

            found for the Fredettes  and against Allied on the  breach of

            contract  claim and  the claim  of intentional  infliction of

            emotional  distress.  It found  for the Fredettes and against

            Transit on  the  Carmack Amendment  claim  and the  claim  of

            intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress.   The  jury

            awarded   $36,000,  representing   $18,500  on   the  Carmack

            Amendment claim against Transit; $7,500 on the contract claim

            against Allied;  and $5,000 each against  these defendants on

            the emotional distress claim.  The district court then  found

            in favor of Allied and Transit on the Fredettes' 93A claim.

                 Allied  and  Transit   duly  filed  post-trial  motions,

            generally  preserving  the claims  now  made  on appeal,  but

            motions  were denied.  Allied and Transit now appeal from the

            judgments against  them.  The Fredettes cross appeal from the

            rejection  of their  claim  against Mullen  and the  district

            court's denial of their 93A claim.  

                 1.  The Carmack Amendment Claim.  The Carmack Amendment,
                     ___________________________

            49  U.S.C.    11707,  incorporates common  law principles  of

            liability and makes  a common carrier liable  for "the actual

            loss  or   injury  to   the  property"  that   it  transports

            interstate.  Id.    11707(a)(1).  Transit was responsible for
                         ___

                                         -7-
                                         -7-

            the  move  of  the mobile  home,  and  the  jury awarded  the

            Fredettes $18,500  against Transit  for damages to  the home.

            Transit  argues   that  the  Fredettes   failed  to   present

            sufficient  evidence of the damages  to take the  case to the

            jury;   alternatively  it   seeks  remittitur   or,   in  the

            alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages.

                 A  plaintiff  suing  under  the  Carmack  Amendment  may

            recover as damages  only the  "actual loss or  injury to  the

            property," ordinarily  measured  either by  the reduction  in

            market value caused  by the  defendant or  by replacement  or

            repair costs occasioned by the harm.  See, e.g., Oak Hall Cap
                                                  ___  ____  ____________

            & Gown Co., Inc. v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 899 F.2d
            ________________    _______________________________

            291,  296 (4th  Cir. 1990).   There is no  recovery under the

            statute for punitive damages or  for damages unrelated to the

            property at  issue.  Cleveland  v. Beltman  North Amer.  Co.,
                                 _________     __________________________

            Inc., 30 F.3d 373, 379 (2d  Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115  S.
            ____                                    _____ ______

            Ct. 901 (1995).

                 Evidence as to the nature and extent of physical damages

            sustained by the home  move was presented primarily  by Doris

            and   Paul  Fredette  and  by  Irvin  Finger;  Finger  was  a

            contractor  who  had  examined  the home  at  the  Fredettes'

            request  when it arrived in North Carolina and compared it to

            photographs  of   the  home  taken  on   the  Pittsfield  lot

            immediately prior  to the move.   Finger  supplied a  written

            list  of  repair tasks  and  a  proposed  price  of  $10,500.

                                         -8-
                                         -8-

            "Before and after" photographs of the home were also admitted

            into evidence.

                 Although Transit  argues that little  beyond normal wear

            and tear  was demonstrated,  the  jury was  entitled to  find

            otherwise.  The Fredettes described the condition of the home

            before the  move and after,  testifying to the  broken window

            and  door casing,  missing shingles,  soiled rugs,  damage to

            aluminum siding and to  the roof, a broken sink,  and similar

            injuries discovered  when the move was over.  Another witness

            confirmed the existence of damage to the roof and an exterior

            wall.     The  jury   was  also  entitled   to  consider  the

            photographs.  Thus, there was ample proof of injury.

                 What is of more concern is the amount of damages awarded

            by the  jury for injury  to the  mobile home.   Even assuming

            that the jury fully accepted Finger's estimate, the  award of

            $18,500 against  Transit--or $8,350 in excess  of the damages

            estimated  by   him--is  puzzling.     Possibly,  as  Transit

            speculates, the jury included other damages for which Transit

            was not liable (e.g., damage to the porch and shed which were
                            ____

            moved  by another company), although the figures do not quite

            mesh.   But  Transit  has  not  claimed  that  the  jury  was

            misinstructed, so we  have to assume  that the jury  intended

            the award to cover the mobile home itself.

                 That presents the question whether the jury was entitled

            to  take the descriptions and  photographs of the injuries to

                                         -9-
                                         -9-

            the mobile home  and then  value those  injuries more  highly

            than  the  amount assigned  by  the  Fredettes' own  witness.

            Under the  case law, the jury  can depart upward, as  well as

            downward, from the opinion of the expert; and this makes good

            sense  wherever the  jury  could reasonably  have valued  the

            damage without any  expert opinion.2   The jury  could do  so

            for  a broken  window or  dented fender;  a  defective dynamo

            would probably be beyond its ken.

                 The  injuries to the mobile home are in between but much

            closer to the broken window.  The injuries here (e.g., soiled
                                                             ____

            rugs, repainting,  damaged  sidings  and  roof,  broken  door

            frame) were  not especially  exotic in character  and nothing

            prevented  the jurors  from  using their  own experience  and

            common sense  to adjust upward  or downward the  expert's own

            estimate.  The award was certainly very generous, in light of

            Finger's testimony, and a remittitur could have been ordered;

            but it  is hard to  say that  it was irrational  or that  the

            refusal to grant a new trial or remittitur on damages was  an

            abuse of discretion.

                 2.   The  Contract  Claim.   The  Fredettes also  won  a
                      ____________________

            judgment  of $7,500  against  Allied for  breach of  contract

                                
            ____________________

                 2See, e.g., Weber v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co.,
                  ___  ____  _____    __________________________________
            530 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Wis. App.) ("[t]he jury is not bound by an
            expert's estimate of damages"),  review denied, 534 N.W.2d 85
                                             ______ ______
            (Wis. 1995); Birmingham Slag Div. of  Vulcan Materials Co. v.
                         _____________________________________________
            Chandler, 231 So.2d 329,  331 (Ala. Civ. App. 1970)  ("a jury
            ________
            is  not   bound  by  opinion  evidence   of  damages,  though
            undisputed").

                                         -10-
                                         -10-

            based  on Allied's failure to deliver their home and goods by

            the guaranteed delivery date.  Allied contends that the delay

            resulted  from  events  outside  its control  and  sought  an

            instruction on  frustration of  purpose.  The  district court

            declined to give such  an instruction on the ground  that the

            evidence did not support it.

                 A party is entitled to have its legal theories presented

            to  the  jury,  if  legally  correct  and  supported  by  the

            evidence.   Sullivan  v.  National Football  League, 34  F.3d
                        ________      _________________________

            1091,  1106-07 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1252
                                            ____________

            (1995).   The  determination  of whether  there was  evidence

            sufficient to require an instruction  is made by the district

            court in the  first instance, but  is subject to  appropriate

            appellate review.   Id. at  1107-09.  Assuming  arguendo that
                                ___                         ________

            frustration of  purpose is to be determined  by the jury in a

            proper case, see generally E. Farnsworth, Contracts   9.7, at
                         _____________                _________

            722  (2d ed. 1990),  no reasonable jury  could have concluded

            here that the contract's purpose had been frustrated.

                 The doctrine  of frustration  of purpose, recognized  in

            Massachusetts as elsewhere, excuses  a party from contractual

            obligations under certain defined circumstances.  The central

            condition,   but   not  the   only  one,   is  that--although

            "[p]erformance  remains  possible"--"the  expected  value  of

            performance  to the  party  seeking to  be  excused has  been

            destroyed  by [the] fortuitous event.  . . ."   Chase Precast
                                                            _____________

                                         -11-
                                         -11-

            Corp.  v.  Paonessa Co.,  566 N.E.2d  603, 608  (Mass. 1991),
            _____      ____________

            quoting Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1944).  If the
                    _____    ______

            GE plant  in North  Carolina had  burned down,  the Fredettes

            might  have argued  (not necessarily  with success)  that the

            purpose of the agreement had been frustrated.

                 Obviously, the  purpose of the Fredettes'  contract with

            Allied--to  arrange for  a move  of home  and  possessions to

            North Carolina--was not frustrated by need for a fourth axle.

            Allied might  have sought an instruction  on impossibility or
                                                         _____________

            impracticability of  performance, or even  on mutual  mistake
            ________________                              _______________

            relating  to the  immediate fitness  of  the mobile  home for

            transportation.  Compare Farnsworth, supra,    9.3, 9.5, 9.6.
                             _______             _____

            Whether  any of  these sister  doctrines could  properly have

            been invoked is open to dispute;  but the dispute need not be

            resolved because no such instructions were sought.

                 3.  Intentional Infliction  of Emotional Distress.  Both
                     _____________________________________________

            Allied  and  Transit  argue  that the  trial  judge  erred in

            instructing  the jury  about  the elements  of the  emotional

            distress claim.   The trial judge  described the elements  of

            intentional infliction of emotional distress as follows:

                 First, that  the defendants  intended to  cause, or
                 should  have  known that  its  [sic] conduct  would
                 cause  emotional  distress; and,  Second,  that the
                 defendants'  conduct  was  extreme and  outrageous;
                 and, Third,  that  the actions  of  the  defendants
                 caused plaintiffs distress;  and, Fourth, that  the
                 plaintiffs   suffered   emotional  distress.     In
                 determining whether a defendants' [sic] conduct was
                 extreme   and  utterly  outrageous,  you  must  ask
                 yourselves  whether  the  conduct  was  beyond  all

                                         -12-
                                         -12-

                 bounds  of  decency and  utterly  intolerable  in a
                 civilized community.  Liability can't be founded on
                 mere insults, threats, or annoyances.  It should be
                 noted that physical harm to the plaintiffs in [sic]
                 not a required element of this claim.

                 The  district  court's  instructions  are  taken  almost

            verbatim from a recent  decision by the Massachusetts Supreme

            Judicial  Court, Sena  v. Commonwealth,  629 N.E.2d  986, 994
                             ____     ____________

            (Mass.  1994).    In  this  case,  the  defendants  submitted

            proposed instructions that would have required, on the fourth

            element, that the plaintiffs' emotional distress  be "severe"

            and  "of a nature that no reasonable person could be expected
            ___

            to  endure it."   That  language is  taken from  that court's

            watershed decision on the tort  nearly twenty years ago, Agis
                                                                     ____

            v.  Howard  Johnson Co.,  355  N.E.2d 315,  319  (Mass. 1976)
                ___________________

            (quotations omitted).  The district court declined to include

            the "reasonable  person" language,  and an objection  to this

            omission was preserved.3

                 Since Agis, the SJC has all but  ignored the "reasonable
                       ____

            person" language.  Every  time that the court has  decided an

            intentional infliction  claim since Agis, it  has omitted the
                                                ____

            "reasonable   person"  language   and  simply   required  the

                                
            ____________________

                 3The judge apparently intended to use the word "severe,"
            but may  well have failed to  do so.  The  transcript and the
            court's  post-trial memorandum  and  order  are seemingly  in
            conflict.  But  if "severe" was omitted, no  proper objection
            was preserved.

                                         -13-
                                         -13-

            plaintiff to show "severe"  emotional distress.4  This  is so

            even in cases where the severity of the plaintiff's emotional

            distress is at  issue.   See, e.g., Haddad  v. Gonzalez,  576
                                     _________  ______     ________

            N.E.2d 658, 667-68 (Mass. 1991).  Because the district  court

            defined the tort  precisely as the state's  highest court has

            done for more  than a  decade, we  find no  error, much  less

            prejudicial error.

                 Both  Allied  and Transit  also  contend  that they  are

            entitled to  judgment as a  matter of law  or a new  trial on

            this claim.  The  former remedy requires that  "no reasonable

            jury  could have  returned a  verdict  adverse to  the moving

            party."  Havinga  v. Crowley  Towing & Trans.  Co., Inc.,  24
                     _______     ___________________________________

            F.3d 1480,  1483 (1st Cir. 1994),  and we review  de novo the
                                                              _______

            district court's  decision on such a  motion.  Id.   As for a
                                                           ___

            new  trial, this may be  granted if the  district court finds

            that  the jury's verdict is  against the clear  weight of the

            evidence; a refusal to grant a new trial is reviewed only for

            abuse  of discretion.  Phav v. Trueblood, Inc., 915 F.2d 764,
                                   ____    _______________

            766 (1st Cir. 1990).

                 Allied  and Transit  argue that  their conduct,  even if

            wrongful,  was  not  bad  enough to  be  deemed  extreme  and

                                
            ____________________

                 4See, e.g., Bowman  v. Heller, 651  N.E.2d 369, 373  n.6
                  _________  ______     ______
            (Mass. 1995);  Sena, 629 N.E.2d  at 994; Haddad  v. Gonzalez,
                           ____                      ______     ________
            576 N.E.2d 658, 667-68 (Mass. 1991); Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 517
                                                 ________    _______
            N.E.2d  824, 827  (Mass. 1988).   The  court referred  to the
            "reasonable person"  language in  an opinion  about negligent
                                                                _________
            infliction  of emotional  distress in  1982.   See  Payton v.
                                                           ___  ______
            Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (Mass. 1982).
            ___________

                                         -14-
                                         -14-

            outrageous.  In  part, this  argument rests on  an effort  to

            disassociate  themselves from Bedford,  who refused  to place

            the home  on the lot  even after  the Fredettes had  made the

            initial adjustment  Bedford  demanded.    But  the  Fredettes

            presented  evidence  that  Transit  had   ratified  Bedford's

            demands that the North Carolina lot be levelled  further, and

            that Transit  and Allied  had approved Bedford's  decision to

            leave the site with the home still not in place.

                 There  was other  conduct of  which the jury  might have

            disapproved.   Transit took the  lead in seeking  to obtain a

            release from  the Fredettes  that seemingly went  well beyond

            the  danger that occasioned the demand.  Allied waited a week

            before sending  a crew to block  and level the  site once the

            home was moved to  North Carolina, and it waited  three weeks

            more to deliver  the Fredettes'  belongings (including  their

            car,  furniture  and the  steps  to  their  home)  until  the

            Fredettes paid the disputed storage charges.

                   Most  of  the  Massachusetts  cases  cited  to  us  by

            defendants are distinguishable, but  Transit has a  plausible

            argument  that the conduct here  is not much  worse than that

            held insufficient in  Foley v. Polaroid Corp.,  508 N.E.2d 72
                                  _____    ______________

            (Mass.  1987); there,  an employee  acquitted of  assault was

            sidetracked  in his  job and  ostracized by  other employees.

            Still, in  Foley the SJC  thought that  the company's  formal
                       _____

            actions were consistent with "a good faith effort to maintain

                                         -15-
                                         -15-

            Foley's  employment  in a  manner consistent  with Polaroid's

            legitimate  business  concerns," id.  at  82;  and the  court
                                             ___

            apparently  equated   the  harassment  with   "mere  insults,

            indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other

            trivialities" for which recovery  is not permitted under this

            claim.  Id.
                    ___

                 Here,  we think  that  the jury  was entitled,  although

            hardly compelled,  to  find bad  faith;  and the  delays  and

            withholding of  property and services go  somewhat beyond the

            verbal  and  other  minor  abuses  that  Polaroid   employees

            directed against Foley.  Further, given the interplay between

            Allied, Transit  and Bedford, the  jury was entitled  to view

            the conduct as a whole and not as isolated minor  wrongs.  So

            viewed, we think  that the  deference to be  accorded to  the

            jury's judgment on issues of this kind keeps the verdict just

            this side of the dividing line. 

                 4.    The  Fredettes'  93A Claim.    The  Fredettes also
                       __________________________

            claimed   against    the   defendants   for    violation   of

            Massachusetts'  far-reaching  consumer protection  law, Mass.

            Gen.  L. ch. 93A.   That law proscribes  "unfair or deceptive

            acts  or practices in the  conduct of any  trade or commerce"

            and  provides  a  private   right  of  action  for  aggrieved

            individuals.  The 93A  claim was tried to the  district court

            after the  jury verdict on the other counts.  The court found

                                         -16-
                                         -16-

            that no violation  had occurred,  and ruled in  favor of  the

            defendants.  The Fredettes argue that this ruling was error.

                 Although  93A is  phrased  in terms  different than  the

            emotional distress tort, the  analogy is closer than language

            might suggest.  The "unfair or deceptive" label sounds like a

            very  low  threshold,  but   the  Massachusetts  courts  have

            repeatedly held  that 93A  requires conduct that  is immoral,

            unethical  or unscrupulous or  at least  attains "a  level of

            rascality" that  goes  well beyond  ordinary  tough  business

            practice.   Industrial  Gen.  Corp. v.  Sequoia Pacific  Sys.
                        _______________________     _____________________

            Corp.,  44  F.3d 40,  43  (1st  Cir.  1995) (citing  numerous
            _____

            Massachusetts cases).

                 Here, in deciding the  93A claim as the finder  of fact,

            the  district   judge  was  entitled  to   reach  a  judgment

            independent of the jury  on such issues as the  existence and

            extent of deception,  unfairness and bad  faith.  Whether  or

            not  the judge's findings can be squared with the jury's does

            not  matter, so long as the former's findings are not clearly

            erroneous and the latter's  are within the bounds  of reason.

            Wallace  Motor Sales, Inc. v. American Motor Sales Corp., 780
            __________________________    __________________________

            F.2d 1049, 1063-64  (1st Cir. 1985).   Precisely because this

            is a borderline case, we think that the respective  standards

            of review protect both factfinders.

                 The Fredettes  also rely on  a regulation issued  by the

            Massachusetts Attorney General  which provides that  "[i]t is

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            an  unfair and deceptive act or practice: (a) To advertise or

            promise prompt delivery where  delivery is neither prompt nor

            expeditious."  940 C.M.R. 3.15.  But we read this to refer to

            a pattern of conduct,  or at least to an  individual occasion

            in  which  the  promisor  knows  that  it  is  making  untrue

            representations.   Whatever other  criticisms may be  made of

            Allied, nothing suggests that  its original delivery date was

            a representation made in bad faith.

                 The  Fredettes'  other  theory  is  that the  defendants

            behaved unfairly  and deceptively by specifying  a price that

            the Fredettes believed to  be all-inclusive and then imposing

            a  succession of  additional charges  and demands  (e.g., the
                                                                ____

            storage fees, expenses  relating to  the new lot).   But  the

            district judge  as the trier of  fact was entitled to  take a

            more benign  view  and  regard  these extra  demands  as  not

            clearly  beyond  what was  agreed  to  or  as  occasioned  by

            developments that no one had  foreseen.  This view,  although

            not compelled, was not clearly erroneous.

                 5.   The Dismissal  of Mullen.   At  the close of  their
                      _________________________

            brief as  appellants, the Fredettes argue  that Mullen should

            not  have been dismissed as  a defendant at  the close of the

            evidence.   Lindburg, they say,  acted as the  agent for both

            Mullen and Allied; and Mullen is responsible, they argue, for

            the wrongs  they attribute to  Lindburg.   These wrongs  they

            identify as (1) misadvising the Fredettes that their move was

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            "fully covered"  and "fully insured" and  (2) mishandling the

            original inspection and measurements  of the home and thereby

            causing a significant portion of the delay in the move.

                 It  is not clear why  this claimed error  matters to the

            Fredettes since  Allied and  Transit are presumably  solvent,

            and  the Fredettes cannot collect twice  for the same wrongs.

            But in any event  we see little indication that  Lindburg was

            independently culpable: there is no evidence that he told the

            Fredettes anything he had reason to believe to be untrue; and

            the  Fredettes point us to  nothing in the  record that would

            show  that Lindburg knew or should have known that the mobile

            home would sag when removed from its supports.

                 Affirmed.
                 _________

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