Court Opinion

ID: 9739862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:22:26.926857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.359229
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Garrard, J.
While I agree that the court erred in failing to hold a voluntariness hearing regarding Payne’s confession, and further agree with resolution of Issues III, IV and V, my analysis of the entrapment issue differs from that of Judge Staton.
Under the decisions of this state and the majority opinions of the United States Supreme Court, entrapment presents a question to be determined by the trier of fact. It exists when the government, through its agents, engages in a scheme to trap a suspect and entices, lures or induces the accused into committing an offense he would not otherwise have committed. It does not exist where the government agent merely affords the would-be criminal opportunity for his crime. Sorrells v. U.S. (1932), 287 U.S. 435; U.S. v. Russell (1973), 411 U.S. 423; Walker v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 65, 262 N.E.2d 641.
*413Accordingly, under this view, the inquiry is focused upon the subjective intent of the defendant. The problem is one of evidence, not substantive law, i.e., is there sufficient evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact may reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the requisite independent intent?
While such proof may often consist of evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions for the same kind of misconduct, or of prior acts of such misconduct, although no prosecution was had, there is no apparent reason to limit the state’s proof to this kind of predisposition evidence. Circumstantial evidence giving rise to the necessary inference of intent might also be found in such things as the defendant’s possession of such a large quantity of contraband that the purpose of selling might be inferred. Knowledge of prices on the criminal market and of sources of supply; possession of apparatus for manufacture; the manner of the sale itself and the defendant’s readiness to participate; solicitations, assurances or other conduct evincing the defendant’s willingness or desire to engage in future sales; all these circumstances may be germane to the evidentiary issue. If the quantum of legitimate evidence supports the necessary inference of guilt, application of the subjective test would support conviction.
In addition, it should be noted that entrapment is a judicial doctrine which does not rise to constitutional proportions. U.S. v. Russell, supra.
Accordingly, it appears to me that entrapment as defined by the Sorrells majority contains no requirement that the government agents have cause to suspect a defendant before they determine to trap him.
However, in Walker v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 65, 262 N.E.2d 641, our Supreme Court spoke of such a requirement, stating,
“When appellant evoked the defense of entrapment he imposed upon the State the requirement of proving that it had probable cause of suspecting that the appellant was *414engaged in illegal conduct.” 255 Ind. 65, 71, 262 N.E.2d 641, 645.
While I have attempted to characterize this statement as merely intended to reflect the subjective intent test, I cannot do so.
In the first place, the statement in the opinion was made in justification of admitting hearsay evidence of the accused’s predisposition to commit the kind of offense in question. The case was originally tried by the court without a jury. Thus, the court on appeal could have considered the hearsay admission harmless in light of the other evidence produced at trial and the presumption that in a trial by the court, the judge will properly disregard inadmissible evidence. Instead, the court chose to ground its ruling on the probable cause requirement.
Secondly, the evidence clearly established that on the occasion for which he was being tried, as well as on several previous occasions, it was the defendant who solicited the officers to buy, rather than they who solicited him to sell. Under such circumstances, the claim of entrapment in terms of independent intent is so improbable that the court could not have been misled into speaking of probable cause when it meant predisposition to commit the crime.
In this context, one can conclude only that Indiana does impose a separate requirement.
In addition, the court affirmed the probable cause requirement as an alternative ground for reversal in Smith v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 415, 281 N.E.2d 803.
The impact of this requirement must be other than the Sorrells requirement of ascertaining the defendant’s independent intent. Otherwise, as long as the admissible evidence available was sufficient to clearly demonstrate the defendant’s independent desire or willingness to engage in the prohibited conduct, it would simply be immaterial whether or not the *415police had reasonable grounds to suspect him of criminal activity before they provided him an opportunity to commit the offense.
As alluded to by Judge Lybrook in Hauk v. State (1974), 160 Ind. App. 390, 312 N.E.2d 92, the only purpose that may be served by the rule is an examination, not of the accused’s intent, but of the justification for the government to engage in creative activity. See, Sherman v. U.S. (1958), 356 U.S. 369.
While I do not believe such an inquiry is made necessary by the theory of the Sorrells majority,1 we are, of course, bound by our Supreme Court’s determination until it is changed or the consequences of its ruling are clarified.
Furthermore, I agree with the First District in Locklayer v. State (1974), 162 Ind. App. 64, 317 N.E.2d 868, that if, as the Walker court held, hearsay which is inadmissible to establish guilt is admissible to determine the probable cause issue, then it should be determined by the court in the absence of the jury as a question of law.2
Accordingly, as with similar determinations our criminal courts are called upon to make, where a defendant desires to rely upon entrapment as a defense and, additionally, questions whether the government agents possessed the reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal conduct before the transaction for which he is prosecuted took place,3 he may seek a hearing by the court for the purpose of determining the question of law thus presented.
However, in the absence of such an objection or request, either before trial, or when during trial it first appears that government agents engaged in creative activity in order to *416prosecute commission of the offense, the “probable cause” issue should be deemed waived for lack of objection.4 Cf. Tyler v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 419, 236 N.E.2d 815; Johnson v. State (1972), 152 Ind. App. 104, 281 N.E.2d 922.
Thus, I do not agree that the trial court “implicitly” found that probable cause to suspect did exist. Instead, I conclude that because the question was not timely raised by Payne, it was waived.
Note. — Reported at 343 N.E.2d 325.

. A different question might be presented by the nature of the creative activity. See Sherman v. U.S. and Bussell v. U.S., supra.

. Locklayer relied upon Walker in this assertion. However, Walker arose on a trial by the court and the language in the majority opinion does not clearly mandate determination by the court as a question of law. Smith is silent on the point.

. This appears to be the Walker test.

. The state, or the court, might also raise the question during the omnibus hearing-pretrial conference. 1C 1971, 35-4.1-3-1. In the absence of pretrial disposition and the necessity of formally pleading entrapment, “first appearance” occurs when the evidence first establishes that commission of the offense on trial came about as the result of the implementation of a plan by a government agent to trap the accused.