Court Opinion

ID: 9402734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 18:00:43.028667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.250664
License: Public Domain

Case: 19-11200     Document: 00516789844        Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/16/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                                 FILED
                                                                        June 16, 2023
                                 No. 19-11200                          Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                                 Clerk

   Mark Moody,

                                                          Petitioner—Appellant,

                                     versus

   Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
   Correctional Institutions Division,

                                            Respondent—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:19-CV-298
                  ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, Circuit Judge:
         This appeal calls into play limitations placed on federal habeas review
   by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28
   U.S.C. §§ 2241–66, which promotes numerous objectives—most relevant
   here, finality. The district court denied as untimely Texas state prisoner
   Mark Moody’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. At hand are the two issues
   for which our court granted the controlling certificate of appealability,
   pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c): whether there is a constitutional right to
   counsel in a state postconviction proceeding when it is petitioner’s “first
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   opportunity to raise” an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim; and
   whether the equitable exception to procedural default announced in Martinez
   v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), applies to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.
   AFFIRMED.
                                         I.
          Moody, after waiving his right to appeal in his plea agreement, did not
   file a direct appeal of his 2015 Texas conviction. His 2017 application for
   state postconviction relief from that 2015 sentence was denied in 2018. In
   2019, he filed this § 2254 petition, which was denied as untimely. Moody
   contends the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez, and its extension in
   Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013), excuse his untimeliness.
                                        A.
          Moody pleaded guilty in October 2015 to the Texas offense of driving
   while intoxicated and felony repetition, in violation of Texas Penal Code
   §§ 49.04 (DWI) & 49.09 (enhancement). The indictment included two
   enhancement paragraphs. The first, titled “felony repetition”, stated Moody
   had two prior misdemeanor Texas DWI convictions, in 1994 and 1998. The
   second paragraph, titled “habitual offender notice”, stated he had two prior
   felony Texas DWI convictions, in 1999 (DWI and felony repetition) and 2009
   (same).
          A third DWI conviction is a third-degree felony in Texas. Tex.
   Penal Code § 49.09(b). Third-degree felonies typically carry a 10-year
   maximum sentence. § 12.34. A third-degree felony, however, is punished as
   a second-degree felony, with a 20-year maximum sentence, if defendant has
   at least one prior felony conviction. § 12.42(a) (enhancement); § 12.33
   (sentence). Finally, a third felony conviction—which applies to any felony
   convictions, with exceptions not applicable here, not only felony DWI
   convictions—classifies defendant as a “Habitual Felony Offender” and

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   carries a sentence of either life or “any term of not more than 99 years or less
   than 25 years”. § 12.42(d).
          As part of his guilty plea in October 2015, Moody pleaded true to the
   first enhancement paragraph (two prior misdemeanor DWI convictions); and
   he and the State agreed his offense would be treated as a third-degree felony
   subject to being punished as a second-degree felony pursuant to the
   § 12.42(a) enhancement discussed above, thus facing a maximum sentence
   of 20 years. By doing so, Moody avoided facing the habitual-offender
   enhancement, which he otherwise would have risked because of his two prior
   felonies and, as stated, carries a 25-year minimum with the possibility of life-
   imprisonment. His plea also included, inter alia, an appeal waiver.
          The court on 19 October 2015 accepted his plea and sentenced him to
   20-years’ imprisonment. Consistent with the appeal waiver, he did not file a
   direct appeal.
                                         B.
                                          1.
          Two years and two months after sentencing, Moody on 21 December
   2017 filed a pro se habeas application in Texas state court, claiming the
   following. His 1998 DWI conviction was obtained in violation of his Sixth
   Amendment right to counsel (incorporated through the Fourteenth
   Amendment) because he was never offered appointed counsel or informed of
   his right to counsel, and his waiver of attorney was signed unknowingly,
   rendering it void. Next, his 1998 conviction was used to enhance his 1999
   conviction to a felony, and that 1999 felony conviction, in turn, subjected him
   to the habitual-offender enhancement in his 2015 indictment (the sentence
   for which he was serving). He would not have accepted the 2015 plea offer
   had he not faced the habitual-offender enhancement; and, because his
   unconstitutional 1998 conviction was used as the basis for seeking that

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   enhancement, he was entitled to relief from his current (2015) sentence.
   Finally, he had a right to appointed counsel for his postconviction proceeding
   because it was his first appeal as of right.
           The court adopted the State’s proposed findings and conclusions,
   which included, inter alia, Moody’s failing to provide sufficient evidence and
   authority in support of his claims. It transmitted the petition to the Court of
   Criminal Appeals, recommending denial.
                                               2.
           The Court of Criminal Appeals on 4 April 2018 denied Moody’s
   petition without a written order.
                                               C.
                                               1.
           Nearly a year later, on 18 March 2019, Moody filed the 28 U.S.C.
   § 2254 habeas petition at issue. Proceeding pro se, he claimed—as he had in
   his state proceeding—that his current (2015) sentence was unconstitutional
   because his 1998 conviction was used to obtain his 2015 guilty plea. Relief
   was warranted, he contended, because his appointed counsel was ineffective
   during negotiation of his 2015 plea by failing to contest his unconstitutional
   1998 conviction’s being used as a basis for enhancement. 1

           _____________________
           1
             Regarding the federal habeas petition, we note that, in his state petition, Moody
   did not explicitly raise, nor did the state court seem to construe his challenge as, an IATC
   claim. And, because the district court denied the petition based on untimeliness, as
   discussed further infra, it did not reach whether Moody’s claims were exhausted. See
   § 2254(b)(1) (providing, subject to exceptions, state prisoner must exhaust state remedies
   before seeking federal habeas relief); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)
   (exhaustion requires state prisoner “fairly present his claim in each appropriate state
   court” (citation omitted)). The State reserved the right to raise the exhaustion
   requirement if Moody’s federal petition was deemed timely. See § 2254(b)(3) (“A State

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           In support of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel (IATC) claim,
   Moody alleged that, after sentencing, he contacted his 2015 counsel with
   concerns about the voluntariness of his 1998 guilty plea upon discovering the
   Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)
   (holding convictions obtained in violation of Gideon may not be used “to
   support guilt or enhance punishment”). See generally Gideon v. Wainwright,
   372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding indigent defendants have constitutional right to
   appointed counsel in criminal proceedings). Attached to his petition was
   counsel’s response to a letter Moody had written him on 23 October 2015
   (just days after the 19 October sentencing). Counsel’s response letter, dated
   28 October, had not been included in Moody’s state habeas petition. 2
           In that response letter, counsel stated he had examined (but without
   specifying when) the record of the 1998 conviction and saw Moody signed an
   attorney waiver which appeared to be legitimate. Counsel explained: “[i]f
   there had been no waiver of counsel in the paperwork, then the conviction
   would have been void, and subject to collateral attack”; and, if that had been
   the case, it would have been sound strategy to contest the 2015 indictment by
   challenging the 1998 conviction.
           In that regard, counsel stated the signed waiver imposed on Moody
   the burden of proving it was involuntary; in other words, the conviction was

           _____________________
   shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement” unless it “expressly”
   does so.).
           2
              Assuming Moody’s federal petition was timely and his IATC claim exhausted,
   this presents the issue of whether the district court would be barred from considering this
   letter in examining the merits of his claim. See Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1734
   (2022) (holding “under § 2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an
   evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on
   ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel”). Because we affirm based on
   untimeliness, we need not reach this issue.

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   “not void” but “merely voidable”. Counsel further explained that, for the
   2015 indictment, Moody “did not want” to risk going to trial “[f]or good and
   sensible reasons”. Rather, he “got the best deal that was actually available
   and sensibly avoided the risk of . . . getting a sentence of 25 years or more”.
          The State countered that the petition was barred by AEDPA’s one-
   year statute of limitations, and that the limitations period should not be
   equitably tolled. As referenced supra, it also reserved the right to raise the
   exhaustion requirement if Moody’s petition was deemed timely.               See
   § 2254(b)(3).
          Moody responded his petition was timely because: (1) his state habeas
   proceeding was the “first opportunity” to pursue his IATC claim; therefore,
   that proceeding should be considered his first appeal as of right, for which he
   was guaranteed the right to counsel; and (2) not having been appointed
   counsel in the state habeas proceeding, his time to file his federal habeas
   petition was tolled under the above-cited decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 566
   U.S. 1 (2012) (holding ineffective assistance in initial-review collateral
   proceedings can constitute sufficient cause to excuse procedural default).
   Alternatively, he contended: (1) the one-year AEDPA limitations period did
   not begin to run until the Court of Criminal Appeals denied his state petition
   on 4 April 2018; therefore, his 18 March 2019 filing was timely, see 28 U.S.C.
   § 2244(d) (limitations period); and (2) his 2015 counsel’s “egregious
   misconduct” warranted equitable tolling.
          The district court rejected Moody’s contention that the limitations
   period did not begin to run until his state petition was denied. It concluded
   the one-year period began 18 November 2015 because that was the date the
   time to file a direct appeal expired, therefore the time his conviction became
   “final”. See § 2244(d) (providing limitations period commences from the
   latest of, inter alia, “date on which the judgment became final by the

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   conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
   review”). Accordingly, the court provided that, “absent any tolling”,
   Moody’s time to file expired 17 November 2016, rendering untimely his 18
   March 2019 filing in district court. (Moody does not challenge that final-
   judgment date in our court.)
          Regarding tolling, the court first concluded Moody was ineligible for
   statutory tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(2) (“properly filed” state habeas
   application tolls AEDPA’s limitations period) because the one-year
   limitations period that began on 18 November 2015 (when conviction became
   final) had already expired when he filed his state petition on 21 December
   2017. Second, equitable tolling was not warranted because Moody could
   have discovered the Court’s 1967 Burgett decision “and raised his Gideon
   claim in a timely-filed federal petition”, had he proceeded with reasonable
   diligence. Finally, Martinez was inapplicable because that decision concerns
   cause for excusing procedural default; it does not apply to AEDPA’s
   limitations period.
          Accordingly, the court denied Moody’s petition as untimely. It
   contemporaneously denied a certificate of appealability (COA). Judgment
   was entered on 2 October 2019, and Moody filed a notice of appeal on 29
   October.
                                         2.
          In our court, Moody moved pro se for a COA, reasserting, and
   elaborating on, the contentions he made in district court.
          The requested COA was denied for his equitable-tolling and
   constructive-denial-of-counsel issues. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
   648, 659 (1984) (holding defendant is constructively denied counsel during
   critical stage of criminal proceedings where counsel, inter alia, “fails to
   subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”).

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          On the other hand, a COA was granted for his “Strickland [v.
   Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] IATC claim and the issues of (1) whether
   there is an exception to the constitutional rule that the right to counsel does
   not apply to postconviction proceedings in cases where postconviction
   proceedings are the first opportunity to raise an IATC claim and (2) whether
   Martinez applies to statute-of-limitations issues under AEDPA”. Our court
   also appointed Moody counsel. Because, as discussed infra, his petition is
   untimely, we do not reach Moody’s IATC claim, including the exhaustion
   issue referenced supra.
                                         II.
          Congress intended that AEDPA “further the principles of comity,
   finality, and federalism” and “curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas
   corpus”. Wallace v. Mississippi, 43 F.4th 482, 492 (5th Cir. 2022) (first
   quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000); and then quoting
   Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762, 780 (5th Cir. 1999)). Along that line, our
   review is limited to the issues specified in the COA, which Moody has not
   moved to expand. E.g., Simmons v. Epps, 654 F.3d 526, 535 (5th Cir. 2011);
   Lackey v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 149, 151–52 (5th Cir. 1997).
          In considering the issues allowed by the COA, we review “the district
   court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo”.
   Harrison v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 2007). Under AEDPA,
   a federal court may grant a state prisoner’s habeas petition “if his
   incarceration was the product of a state court adjudication that: ‘(1) resulted
   in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
   clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court . . . ; or
   (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
   the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding’”.

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   Richardson v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 466, 472 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28
   U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
                                          A.
          Moody, relying primarily on Justice Scalia’s dissent in Martinez,
   contends that decision established a limited right to counsel in state
   postconviction proceedings when those proceedings are a prisoner’s first
   opportunity to pursue an IATC claim (sometimes referred to as initial-review
   collateral proceedings).     See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 18–19 (Scalia, J.,
   dissenting) (“[T]he Court, in what it portrays as an admirable exercise of
   judicial restraint, abstains from holding that there is a constitutional right to
   counsel in initial-review state habeas. . . . Instead of taking that radical step,
   the Court holds that, for equitable reasons, in a case such as the one before
   us, failing to provide assistance of counsel, or providing assistance of counsel
   that falls below the Strickland standard, constitutes cause for excusing
   procedural default. The result, of course, is precisely the same”. (emphasis
   omitted)). Moody claims, relying on the earlier-referenced decision in
   Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013), that his state habeas proceeding was
   his first opportunity to pursue his IATC claim. See id. at 428–29 (providing
   Texas law “does not offer most defendants a meaningful opportunity to
   present” an IATC claim). Therefore, Moody contends: he had a right under
   Martinez to appointed counsel for that state habeas proceeding; and, because
   he was not appointed counsel, his untimeliness should be excused.
          The State counters in numerous ways, most notably: Martinez did not
   establish a limited constitutional right to counsel in postconviction
   proceedings; and adopting Moody’s proposed exception would conflict with
   AEDPA’s objective of furthering finality, comity, and federalism.
          Prior to Martinez, the Court long held no constitutional right to
   counsel exists in discretionary appeals or collateral attacks on convictions.

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   E.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007); Coleman v. Thompson,
   501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Ross
   v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488
   (1969). And this court, of course, followed suit. E.g., Matchett v. Dretke, 380
   F.3d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 2004); In re Goff, 250 F.3d 273, 275–76 (5th Cir.
   2001); Irving v. Hargett, 59 F.3d 23, 26 (5th Cir. 1995); Abraham v.
   Wainwright, 407 F.2d 826, 828 (5th Cir. 1969).
          Included in the above-cited examples, the Court in Coleman, around
   20 years before Martinez, considered whether attorney error could constitute
   sufficient cause to excuse procedural default where the attorney failed to
   present a claim in state court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752–55. The procedural-
   default doctrine bars federal courts from reviewing habeas claims which were
   denied by a state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state
   procedural rule. E.g., id. at 729–32, 750. This rule is not jurisdictional, but
   rather rooted in principles of federalism and comity; therefore, a prisoner’s
   defaulted claim may be considered if he shows sufficient cause. Id.
          Coleman held “counsel’s ineffectiveness will constitute cause only if
   it is an independent constitutional violation”. Id. at 755. The Court refused
   to excuse Coleman’s default because a prisoner has no constitutional right to
   an attorney in collateral proceedings; therefore, he bears the risk that
   attorney error will result in procedural default, and there is no independent
   constitutional violation when default occurs. Id. at 752–57.
          In reaching that holding, the Court acknowledged that, for Coleman’s
   proposed showing of cause to prevail, the general rule that there is not a right
   to counsel in collateral proceedings would have to have “an exception . . . in
   those cases where state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can
   present a challenge to his conviction”. Id. at 755. The Court left that
   question open because “one state court [had already] addressed Coleman’s

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   claims”; therefore, he had a prior opportunity to present his challenges, so it
   was enough that he did not have the right to counsel during his collateral
   proceedings. Id.
          This left-open question resurfaced in Martinez. Martinez’ state
   postconviction petition was dismissed according to state procedural rules.
   Martinez, 566 U.S. at 7. He claimed: his “state collateral proceeding was the
   first place to challenge his conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance”;
   therefore, “he had a constitutional right to an effective attorney in the
   collateral proceeding”; and, because his postconviction counsel was
   ineffective, causing his default, he had sufficient cause to excuse that default.
   Id. at 4, 7–8.
          At the outset, the Court noted that, although Martinez framed his
   challenge as “a constitutional one”, the question before it was “more
   narrow”: “whether a federal habeas court may excuse a procedural default
   of an [IATC] claim when the claim was not properly presented in state court
   due to an attorney’s errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding”. Id. at
   5. Later, the Court recognized the question left open in Coleman regarding a
   hypothetical right to counsel in these proceedings, but stated it was “not the
   case” to resolve that question. Id. at 8.
          The Court held: “Where, under state law, [IATC claims] must be
   raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not
   bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of [IATC] if, in
   the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in
   that proceeding was ineffective”. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). It clarified
   numerous times its holding was a narrow, equitable one, applicable only to
   procedural default, and not a constitutional ruling. E.g., id. at 4, 8, 16.
          Soon after that decision, the Court extended the Martinez procedural-
   default exception to criminal systems like Texas’, where state law makes it

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   “virtually impossible” to pursue an IATC claim on direct review (as opposed
   to outright forcing IATC claims to be brought in collateral proceedings
   through procedural rules, as at issue in Martinez). Trevino, 569 U.S. at 423–
   24, 428.
          We agree with the State that Martinez and Trevino had no effect on the
   long-established rule that there is no constitutional right to counsel in
   postconviction proceedings.      The Court has reaffirmed that rule post-
   Martinez. E.g., Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1737 (2022) (“[I]n Coleman,
   we reiterated that counsel’s ineffectiveness will constitute cause only if it is
   an independent constitutional violation, and surmised that a hypothetical
   constitutional right to initial-review postconviction counsel could give rise to
   a corresponding claim for cause. Since then, however, we have repeatedly
   reaffirmed that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state
   postconviction proceedings”. (citations omitted)); Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct.
   738, 749 (2019) (“There is no right to counsel in postconviction proceedings
   . . . .”); Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2068 (2017) (“[W]e have never held
   that the Constitution guarantees a right to counsel” during postconviction
   review.).
          And, other courts, including ours, have rejected that Martinez or
   Trevino established any constitutional rules and have emphasized that the
   narrow exceptions announced in those decisions apply only to excusing
   procedural default under those particular facts. E.g., In re Hensley, 836 F.3d
   504, 507 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Martinez recognized a narrow, equitable exception
   to the procedural default doctrine . . . . That decision did not establish a new
   rule of constitutional law”. (citation omitted)); In re Paredes, 587 F. App’x
   805, 813 (5th Cir. 2014); Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312, 322 n.6 (5th Cir.
   2012) (“Martinez . . . was an equitable ruling that did not establish a new rule
   of constitutional law”. (citation omitted)); see also Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. at 1737
   (“Martinez foreclosed any extension of its holding beyond the narrow

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   exception to procedural default at issue in that case.” (citation omitted));
   Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2065–66 (“Martinez provides no support for extending
   its narrow exception. . . . In all but those limited circumstances, Martinez
   made clear that the rule of Coleman governs”. (citations omitted)); Bluemel
   v. Bigelow, 613 F. App’x 698, 699 (10th Cir. 2015); Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
   of Corr., 742 F.3d 940, 946 (11th Cir. 2014); Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 843
   (9th Cir. 2013); Pagan-San Miguel v. United States, 736 F.3d 44, 45 (1st Cir.
   2013).
            In short, Moody did not have a constitutional right to counsel in his
   state postconviction proceeding. Accordingly, we turn to the second issue
   granted by the COA: whether the Martinez exception extends to AEDPA’s
   limitation period.
                                            B.
            Moody’s position regarding this second issue is unclear. He, as
   discussed supra, contends Martinez established a limited right to counsel in
   initial-review collateral proceedings. He maintains denying him that right is
   an “extreme malfunction” of the criminal justice system which habeas relief
   is designed to remedy. He does not elaborate, however, on whether the
   procedural-default exception announced in Martinez extends to AEDPA’s
   limitations period.
            The State primarily emphasizes the narrowness of Martinez, claiming
   its holding applies only to procedural default, and pointing to other courts
   that have held as much.
            The Court in Martinez “was unusually explicit about the narrowness
   of [its] decision”, and it “foreclosed any extension of its holding beyond the
   narrow exception to procedural default at issue in that case”. Ramirez, 142
   S. Ct. at 1737 (citation omitted).

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          Several circuits have considered this issue and held Martinez
   inapplicable to AEDPA’s limitations period, albeit some in nonprecedential
   opinions. See, e.g., Lombardo v. United States, 860 F.3d 547, 557 (7th Cir.
   2017); Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 630 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United
   States v. Robinson, 762 F. App’x 571, 576–77 (10th Cir. 2019); Taylor v.
   Eppinger, No. 16-4227, 2017 WL 5125666, at *2 (6th Cir. 2 June 2017)
   (unpublished); Bland v. Superintendent Greene SCI, No. 16-3457, 2017 WL
   3897066, at *1 (3d Cir. 5 Jan. 2017) (unpublished).
          We join those circuits. Martinez established a narrow, equitable
   exception to procedural default; it has no applicability to the statutory
   limitations period prescribed by AEDPA.
                                        III.
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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