Court Opinion

ID: 9962578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 20:13:44.586399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:04.679687
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    LANE R. JUBB                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TIMOTHY M. KOLMAN AND KOLMAN               :
    ELY, P.C. AND JOYDEEP BOSE                 :
                                               :   No. 456 EDA 2023
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: TIMOTHY M. KOLMAN               :
    AND KOLMAN ELY, P.C.                       :

                Appeal from the Order Entered January 18, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                        Civil Division at No: 210100970

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and LANE, J.

CONCURRING STATEMENT BY STABILE, J.:                     FILED APRIL 23, 2024

       Like the majority, I consider this Court’s prior panel decision in Miller

v. St. Luke’s Univ. Health Network, 142 A.3d 884 (Pa. Super. 2016), to be

binding on this panel. Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s memorandum.

I write separately to express my view that Miller was wrongfully decided, and

this Court should revisit that decision through en banc review.

       Miller affirmed the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in a

Dragonetti1 action even though the jury determined that the plaintiff failed to

prove damages. In construing Sections 8151, 8153, and 8154 of the

“Dragonetti Act”, the Miller court held that a plaintiff does not have to prove

damages to prevail on a claim. The Miller Court reasoned that since Section
____________________________________________

1 An action for wrongful use of civil proceedings, known as a “Dragonetti”
action, is codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8151-8354.
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8151 alone provides for the essential elements of a cause of action for

wrongful use of civil proceedings, a showing of damages is not required.

Miller, 142 A.3d at 895-896. I construe the Dragonetti Act still to require

proof of damages in order for a plaintiff to obtain a judgment in his favor. By

holding to the contrary, Miller ran afoul of (1) centuries of common law that

always required a plaintiff to prove special damages to win a judgment for

malicious civil suits, (2) our Supreme Court’s reasoning in McNeil v. Jordan,

894 A.2d 1260 (Pa. 2006), and (3) the text of the Dragonetti Act itself.

       The history of Anglo-American attempts to discourage malicious civil

suits appears to have begun in the seventh century with the laws of Kentish

kings.2,3 Through time, these attempts evolved from a system whereby 1) a

complainant unfortunate enough to lose his cause also lost his tongue, or was

compelled to pay his opponent compensation, to 2) a system whereby a losing

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2 See Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical

Analysis, 88 Yale L.J. 1218, 1221 (1979); John R. Jones, Jr., Liability for
Proceeding with Unfounded Litigation, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 743 (1980).

3 During the fifth century, as the Roman Empire was crumbling throughout
western Europe, waves of barbarian invaders overran Britain’s borders. By
A.D. 410, groups of Angles, Saxons, and Jutes began crossing the North Sea
from Germany and southern Scandinavia to claim land in Britain that had been
abandoned by the Roman army. These tribes succeeded Rome as the
dominant power in central and southern Britain, marking the beginning of
what we now call the Anglo-Saxon Age, which would last for more than 600
years.     See https://www.archaeology.org/issues/89-1305/features/735-
anglo-saxon-pagan-kings-lyminge-kent The “Kingdom of Kent” (470-871 AD)
was a kingdom of Jutes in southeast England and was one of the seven
traditional kingdoms of the so-called Anglo-Saxon heptarchy. See
https://royalfamily.fandom.com/wiki/Kingdom_of_Kent.

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plaintiffs would pay the court a penalty, to 3) a writ of conspiracy whereby

injured defendants could sue those who maliciously brought meritless actions

through straw claimants, to 4) a seventeenth century action on the case for

"manifest vexation" stemming from groundless suits.4               Against this

background, the tort of malicious prosecution came into being as defined

today in Britain and about a third of our states.5

        Under the English Rule, five elements had to be proven: initiation or

continuation of a prior suit, lack of probable cause for the prior action, malice

in instituting or continuing the prior suit, termination of the prior action in

favor of the original defendant, and some form of damage to the original

defendant beyond that normally inflicted by similar litigation.6 A showing of

special damages was required to eliminate the prospect of interminable suits

and countersuits.7 Special damages included interference with the person,

i.e. arrest, commitment under lunacy proceedings, and/or interference with

property.8 For over a century prior to the codification of the Dragonetti Act,

____________________________________________

4 Groundless Litigation, supra n.2, at 1221; Unfounded Litigation, supra n.2,

at 745-746.

5 Id.

6 Id. (citing William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 120 (4th ed.

1971)).

7 Groundless Litigation, supra, at 1221; Unfounded Litigation, supra, at 749.

8 Groundless Litigation, supra n.2, at 1221 n.8; Unfounded Litigation, supra

n.2, at 748-49.

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Pennsylvania, along with approximately 17 other states, followed the "English

rule" which required a plaintiff to prove as damages either an arrest of the

person or seizure of property in order to state a cause of action for malicious

use of civil process. Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc. 389 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super.

1978) (citing Kramer v. Stock, 10 Watts 115 (Pa. 1840)). At the time Garcia

was decided, twenty-three states did not require a seizure of person or

property, and the remaining ten jurisdictions had not decided the issue. Id.

at 608 n.1 (citing O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513,569 P.2d 561 (1977)).

      Close to the time of this Court’s decision in Garcia, the drafters of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts defined the tort of “wrongful use of civil

proceedings.”   See Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965); Restatement

(Second) of Torts, §§ 674-681(B). Section 681 of the Restatement (Second)

significantly expanded the types of damages that the plaintiff could introduce

to prevail in an action for wrongful use of civil proceedings. While a plaintiff

still could prevail by demonstrating special damages, he also could prevail by

demonstrating harm to his reputation by any defamatory matter alleged as

the basis of the proceedings, the expense that he reasonably incurred in

defending himself against the proceedings, any specific pecuniary loss that

resulted from the proceedings, and any emotional distress caused by the

proceedings. In addition, Section 681A of the Restatement (Second) allowed

for recovery of punitive damages in appropriate cases.

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       In 1980, our Legislature enacted the statutory tort of “Wrongful Use of

Civil Proceedings”, a/k/a the “Dragonetti Act”,9 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 8351-8354

(the “Act”), to replace the common-law tort of malicious prosecution. See

Shaffer v. Stewart, 473 A.2d 1017 (Pa. 1984). In a significant break from

case law, the Act expressly eliminated the requirement that a plaintiff prove

special damages in the nature of an arrest of the person or seizure of property

to maintain an action for wrongful use of civil proceedings.             This was

consonant with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 674 (1965), which does

not require these elements of special damages to maintain the action but

requires that a plaintiff still must show either material harm or the violation

of a legal right that is in itself sufficient to support an action for damages in a

suit for wrongful use of civil proceedings. See Restatement (Second) of Torts,

§ 674, Comment (e).

       Nothing in the history of the tort, Pennsylvania’s statute, or in the

Restatement suggest that the tort evolved away from requiring proof of strict

special damages to requiring no proof of damages at all. Nor is there anything

in history to suggest that when the Act was adopted in 1980, Pennsylvania

____________________________________________

9 Nothing in the present statute or the common-law referred to this tort as a

“Dragonetti” action. The name derivation, it seems, was coined in 1980, when
the Legislature, in response to the lobbying efforts of a single aggrieved
litigant, “Joseph Dragonetti”, enacted the present-day statutory tort of
“Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings”, now commonly referred to as the
“Dragonetti Act”. See Villani v. Seibert, 159 A.3d 478, 499-500, n.6 (Pa.
2017) (Donohue, J., dissenting). Mr. Dragonetti sought to abolish the old
English rule within the common-law tort of malicious use of civil process. Id.

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intended to eliminate proof of damages to maintain the action. Instead, all

that history reveals is that a fairer and broader system of compensating a

wrongfully sued person was deemed advisable in the codified law, rather than

the unduly restrictive requirement to show special damages in the nature of

seizing a person or their property under the old English rule. Thus, in Shaffer,

where it was alleged that an attorney filed suit without probable cause and for

an improper purpose (to extort a settlement), we held it was error for the

court to dismiss the matter upon preliminary objections for failure to allege a

seizure of property. A review of appellant’s amended complaint disclosed that

he alleged facts essential to the three elements of a cause of action for

malicious use of process under Section 8531—specifically, the underlying

proceedings terminated favorably to the plaintiff, the defendant caused these

proceedings to be instituted without probable cause, and malice. Id. at 1020-

21. We concluded by commenting that it remained to be seen “[w]hether he

can prove those facts and whether he sustained damage.” Id. at 1021. This

statement signaled our recognition that although the law no longer required

proof of damages in the nature of seizure of a person or property, damages

(now more liberal in scope) still had to be proven in addition to the three

essential elements under Section 8531.

      My analysis of pre-Dragonetti Act common law, and of its influence on

the Dragonetti Act, leads me to the conclusion that Miller is incorrect.      A

plaintiff always had the duty at common law to prove damages to obtain a

judgment for wrongful civil suits. The Dragonetti Act continues to include this

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duty, but in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Act now

augments the categories of provable damages beyond the special damages

required for recovery under common law. The common law underpinnings of

the Dragonetti Act offer no support for Miller’s holding that the plaintiff is not

required to prove damages to win a judgment under the Dragonetti Act. To

the contrary, history reveals that a fairer and broader system of compensating

a wrongfully sued person was deemed advisable instead of the unduly

restrictive requirement of special damages.

      Not only is Miller out of line with the history underlying the Dragonetti

Act, but Miller misconstrues the Dragonetti Act as a matter of statutory

construction.   Miller claims that the Dragonetti Act transforms trial for

wrongful use of civil proceedings into a “bifurcated, two phase action,” in

which the first phase is to determine whether plaintiff has satisfied Section

8351’s elements and the second phase is to determine damages. Id., 142

A.3d at 895. Miller seems to suggest that if plaintiff wins the first phase, he

is entitled to judgment – even if it turns out after the second phase that he is

entitled to zero damages. I respectfully must disagree with this construction

of the Dragonetti Act.

      The four sections of the Dragonetti Act provide as follows:

      § 8351. Wrongful use of civil proceedings.

            (a) Elements of action.--A person who takes part in the
            procurement, initiation or continuation of civil proceedings
            against another is subject to liability to the other for
            wrongful use of civil proceedings:

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              (1) he acts in a grossly negligent manner or without
              probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that
              of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties or
              adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are
              based; and

              (2) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person
              against whom they are brought.

              (b) Arrest or seizure of person or property not
              required.--The arrest or seizure of the person or property
              of the plaintiff shall not be a necessary element for an action
              brought pursuant to this subchapter.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351.

     § 8352. Existence of probable cause.

              A person who takes part in the procurement, initiation or
              continuation of civil proceedings against another has
              probable cause for doing so if he reasonably believes in the
              existence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and
              either:

              (1) reasonably believes that under those facts the claim may
              be valid under the existing or developing law;

              (2) believes to this effect in reliance upon the advice of
              counsel, sought in good faith and given after full disclosure
              of all relevant facts within his knowledge and information;
              or

              (3) believes as an attorney of record, in good faith that his
              procurement, initiation or continuation of a civil cause is not
              intended to merely harass or maliciously injure the opposite
              party.

Id. § 8352.

     § 8353. Damages.

              When the essential elements of an action brought pursuant
              to this subchapter have been established as provided in

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              section 8351 (relating to wrongful use of civil proceedings),
              the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the following:

              (1) The harm normally resulting from any arrest or
              imprisonment, or any dispossession or interference with the
              advantageous use of his land, chattels or other things,
              suffered by him during the course of the proceedings.

              (2) The harm to his reputation by any defamatory matter
              alleged as the basis of the proceedings.

              (3) The expense, including any reasonable attorney fees,
              that he has reasonably incurred in defending himself against
              the proceedings.

              (4) Any specific pecuniary loss that has resulted from the
              proceedings.

              (5) Any emotional       distress   that   is   caused   by   the
              proceedings.

              (6) Punitive damages according to law in appropriate cases.

Id. § 8353.

     § 8354. Burden of proof.

              In an action brought pursuant to this subchapter the plaintiff
              has the burden of proving, when the issue is properly raised,
              that:

              (1) The defendant has procured, initiated or continued the
              civil proceedings against him.

              (2) The proceedings were terminated in his favor.

              (3) The defendant did not have probable cause for his
              action.

              (4) The primary purpose for which the proceedings were
              brought was not that of securing the proper discovery,
              joinder of parties or adjudication of the claim on which the
              proceedings were based.

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              (5) The plaintiff has suffered damages as set forth in section
              8353 (relating to damages).

Id. § 8354.

      These four sections of the Dragonetti Act must be read in pari materia.

See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(a, b) (providing that “[s]tatutes in pari materia shall

be construed together, if possible, as one statute” and that “[s]tatutes ... are

in pari materia when they relate to the same persons or things or to the same

class of persons or things”). Miller concludes that if a plaintiff satisfies

Section 8351, he is entitled to judgment. In order to understand Section

8351, however, we must read it together with Sections 8352-8354, because

all four sections are inextricably interconnected. Section 8351 states that the

plaintiff is subject to liability if he “acts . . . without probable cause.”   42

Pa.C.S.A. § 8351. To understand the meaning of probable cause, we must

consult the definition of probable cause in Section 8352. Furthermore, we do

not know who bears the burden of proving the elements in Section 8351

without consulting Section 8354, which tells us that plaintiff has the burden of

proving the defendant lacked probable cause for his action. Section 8354 also

tells us that plaintiff has the burden of proving “damages as set forth in

Section 8353.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8354. Section 8353, in turn, refers back to

Section 8351 by stating that the plaintiff may recover various items of

damages (including but not limited to special damages) when “the essential

elements of an action brought pursuant to this subchapter have been

established as provided in Section 8351 ...” Moreover, Section 8353’s text,

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“when the essential elements . . . have been established,” implicitly refers

back to Section 8354, because only Section 8354 defines who has the burden

of establishing these elements. Nothing in Sections 8353 or 8354 suggest a

two-part proceeding, that is, one part for proving the elements of Section

8351 and one for proving damages.

      Reading all four provisions of the Act in pari materia leads me to

conclude that the intent of the Dragonetti Act is to have one proceeding, not

the bifurcated proceeding contemplated in Miller, and to provide that the

plaintiff cannot win a judgment without proving damages, as plainly stated in

Section 8354. My construction of the Dragonetti Act is consistent with our

Supreme Court’s reasoning in McNeil that “[i]n establishing entitlement

to relief, a plaintiff under the Dragonetti Act bears the burden of proving: ...

(5) The plaintiff has suffered damages.” McNeil, 894 A.2d at 1274 (emphasis

added). I read this observation to mean that failure to prove damages results

in no relief (no judgment) for the plaintiff. See also Kit v. Mitchell, 771 A.2d

814, 819 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“the Legislature has delineated five factors that

a plaintiff must show to succeed in the action … (5) the plaintiff has suffered

damages”).

      In the present appeal, Appellants request that judgment for zero

damages be vacated and that judgment be entered in their favor. Were we

free not to follow the Miller precedent, I would agree. Where there is a finding

of liability but no damages, the court should enter judgment in favor of the

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defendant. See Kirby v. Carlisle, 116 A.2d 220 (Pa. Super. 1955) (where

minor plaintiff was struck by an automobile, but suffered no injuries for which

damages were awarded, the trial court properly molded the verdict for the

defendant and entered judgment accordingly).

      For the above reasons, while I concur with the Majority’s ultimate

decision, I urge this Court to reconsider Miller through en banc review.

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