Court Opinion

ID: 9794344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:04:21.530152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:14:39.585841
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Doyle
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I shall briefly set forth the reasons in support of my disagreement.
The theory upon which this defendant was accused of the crimes of murder and robbery was that he admittedly became a party to an unlawful alliance with his co-defendants looking to the commission of burglaries. The Sides brothers were equipped with burglary tools, masks, coveralls and guns, and although the defendant claims that he was never a willing participant in any robbery, this contention is hard to reconcile with his other activities. The parties went to Lyons, Colorado, and made a preliminary investigation looking to such burglary. Later the defendant separated from the Sides brothers and they removed the equipment from his car. If the defendant had at that stage departed from the scene there would be real substance to his contention that he broke off his relationship with the co-defendants. He did not do this. He remained in the general area and furnished the transportation away from the area of the crime after the Sides brothers had parked the stolen car in a side road. He could, of course, maintain that his post-robbery meeting with the Sides brothers was coincidence. However, this was a question of fact. Furthermore, at the scene of the killing there is disputed evidence as to whether he was a willing participant in that transaction. Unquestionably the jury had some doubt as to whether he had in good faith withdrawn from the events leading to the killing, since they found him not guilty of that charge. This result itself would indicate that there was no inherent prejudice against this defendant, and indi*324cates that he thereby received, a concession or break which renders the present result substantially just.
I.
It is apparent from the facts that a fabric of evidence existed to support the people’s theory that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of the robbery and his contention that he intended at most to commit a burglary and that he did not consent to the perpetration of a robbery is not valid because it is fundamental that the common purpose need not be to commit the particular crime which is ultimately committed in order to render one guilty as an accessory before the fact. If the principals committed a crime and the related crime is a natural or probable consequence of the unlawful association, the defendant is responsible under the law as an accessory before the fact as defined in our statutes, C.R.S. ’53, 40-1-12, C.J.S. 155, sec. 87, Criminal Law. See State v. Kelly, 243 N.C. 177, 90 S.E. (2d) 241; People v. Hobbs, 400 Ill. 143, 79 N.E. (2d) 202. Cf. Mulligan v. People, 68 Colo. 17, 189 Pac. 5.
II.
With respect to the failure to instruct on the defendant’s theory of the case, I submit that the court committed no error in this regard. The tendered instruction which purports to set forth the defendant’s theory is as follows:
“You are instructed that to convict Vernon Johnson of either the crime of robbery or murder, every element of the crime of robbery must be proved against him beyond a reasonable doubt, including the element of intent to rob, and if you find that Vernon Johnson formed no intent to rob the Hideout Bar at Lyons, Colorado, then you must find Vernon Johnson not guilty of robbery and not guilty of murder.”
The above could not have been given because it required the defendant Johnson to have entertained a specific intent to rob and, as noted above, this was not necessary. It was sufficient for the jury to find beyond *325a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a party to the unlawful transaction having for its purpose the commission of a burglary. Unquestionably Johnson was originally a party to this purpose and there is evidence from which the jury could be satisfied that he continued to be a part of the unlawful scheme and that he did not repudiate it, even after discovering that a robbery rather than a burglary occurred. The only instruction embodying the defendant’s theory of the case that the court could have given consistent with fundamental principles of criminal law was one which would have instructed the jury to acquit the defendant if it found that he had withdrawn and had repudiated the unlawful enterprise prior to the robbery, or if it entertained a reasonable doubt as to such withdrawal. No such instruction was tendered and no duty rested upon the court to so instruct on its own motion. It is to be noted also that the record does not contain testimony reflecting the exact intent of the defendant. Consequently, I do not agree that the failure of the court to tailor an instruction embodying such a theory was indicated.
III.
A study of the court’s instructions reveals that the law with respect to principals and accessories was fully expounded. The majority criticizes Instruction No. 11 which defined an accessory before the fact and also went ahead and defined accessory during the fact. However, it was quite clear in requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant at bar “stood by and aided, abetted or assisted in the perpetration of the robbery.” The clarity of the instruction, notwithstanding the inadvertent inclusion by the court of accessory during the fact can only be appreciated by a study of the instruction as a whole. It reads:
“You are instructed that an accessory is he or she who stands by and aids, abets, or assists, or who, not being present aiding, abetting, or assisting, hath advised and encouraged the perpetration of the crime. He or she *326who thus aids, abets, or assists, advises or encourages, shall be deemed and considered as principal and punished accordingly. An accessory during the fact is a person who stands by, without interfering or giving such help as he may in his power to prevent a criminal offense from being committed. In this case, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that either Revilo Robert Sides or Vernon Sides was the principal perpetrator of the robbery of the Hideout cafe-tavern at Lyons, Colorado, and if you should further find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Vernon Lincoln Johnson, stood by and aided, abetted, or assisted in the perpetration of such offense, then and in either case, the defendant, Vernon Lincoln Johnson, would be deemed and considered as a principal in said robbery.”
A fair reading of the above instructions could lead to only one conclusion and that is that the definition of accessory during the fact is surplusage. The defendant was not present during the robbery, hence could not have stood by without interfering to prevent the commission of the crime, and the jury obviously discarded any thought of his being an accessory during the fact as defined in the instruction, and starting with the words “in this case” unquestionably required the jury to find that Johnson aided and abetted the robbery.
• The case of Stewart v. People, 83 Colo. 289, 264 Pac. 720, condemned a somewhat similar instruction as being confusing, but in the Stewart case the jury was told that if it believed “beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evidence in this case, that the defendant was an accessory, as above defined, * * * ” Notwithstanding the confusion, the Court held that the instruction, although erroneous, was not prejudicial. The significant language is quoted on p. 294 of 83 Colo.:
“Instruction No. 3, so far as it relates to an accessory during the fact, is erroneous. But, in view of the facts disclosed by the record, that part of' the instruction *327could not have misled the jury. That the defendant was guilty of the offenses with which he was charged, was proven by conclusive evidence. The defendant offered no evidence to contradict it, or that even tended to contradict it, in any particular. It is not every error in an instruction that requires a reversal. C.L. sec. 7103. No other verdict could have been rendered by a jury having a due regard for its oath. The substantial rights of the defendant were not prejudiced. No reversible error was committed in giving the instruction.”
A fortiori Instruction No. 11 was not prejudicial since it was not an erroneous instruction. The defendant in this case as in the Stewart case “offered” no evidence to contradict it, and I am satisfied that no prejudicial error was committed by the trial court. My reaction from reading the record is that the accused received an excellent defense and a fair and impartial trial and that the judgment should be affirmed.