Court Opinion

ID: 9573223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:50:14.561255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:20.819736
License: Public Domain

Hamilton, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. The defendant in this case was convicted by a jury on February 21, 1963, of three counts of forgery, arising out of the utterance of three checks in the amounts of $13, $20, and $23.50. The trial judge on March 4, 1963, sentenced him to concurrently serve 20 years in the penitentiary on each of the three counts, and suspended the execution of such sentence. Defendant was thus placed on probation, subject to the supervision of an officer of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. He thereafter commenced reporting to such an officer. In the latter part of February or the early part of March, 1964, when defendant reported to his then probation officer, he was placed in jail for violation of his probation. On March 26th he was brought before the court for the first timé since the incarceration. At that timé counsel, who *907represented him at the trial, was appointed by the court to represent him. The judge presiding was not the judge who presided over trial or imposed the sentence. The matter was continued for hearing. Counsel, asserting that defendant had not been told how or in what manner he had violated his probation, asked that the prosecuting attorney either file a written motion setting forth the nature of the violation or otherwise advise defendant and/or his counsel of the state’s contentions. This request was denied by the court. The deputy prosecuting attorney tersely asserted that defendant would hear the reasons when the probation officer testified at the hearing. The court also denied a request that the matter be referred for hearing before the sentencing judge or the trial department from which defendant was initially sentenced.
On the appointed day the matter came on for hearing. No written motion for revocation of probation had been served or filed. The probation officer testified to several complaints of misconduct by defendant, which he frankly qualified by stating he considered them of rather minor consequence. He then recommended revocation of defendant’s probation, based upon the fact that the defendant had purchased some items on credit without obtaining permission from the probation office, and had otherwise incurred some indebtedness. From his testimony it could be inferred that defendant was still practicing the art of procuring money and' goods by false pretenses. Limited cross-examination was permitted.
At the conclusion of the probation officer’s testimony, defendant’s counsel asked for a recess or a short continuance to permit him to discuss the testimony with defendant and, if necessary, to further investigate the accusations. This was denied. The court thereupon asked defendant if he had anything to say. The defendant made a short unsworn statement to the effect that he had obtained permission from a former probation officer to make the credit purchases and that he could, if given an opportunity, fully clarify and clear himself of the other complaints. Without further *908adieu, the court revoked the suspended sentence. From this peremptory hearing defendant has appealed.
I fully appreciate that this court has drawn a technical distinction, so far as appellate remedies and some constitutional concepts be concerned, between the status of an offender on probation under a deferred sentence and one on probation under a suspended sentence. See State v. Farmer, 39 Wn.2d 675, 237 P.2d 734 (1951). However, it seems to me, that when it comes to revocation of the probationary status the distinction is purely artificial for the end result is the same, namely, deprivation of liberty.
Accordingly, I would apply the same concepts of fair play and due process to both proceedings.
In State v. Shannon, 60 Wn.2d 883, 888, 376 P.2d 646 (1962), we said:
Fair play, due process, and the intent of our statute, in requiring that a defendant be “brought before the court wherein probation was granted” (RCW 9.95.220), entitle such defendant to be reasonably informed of the allegations of probation violation, and an opportunity to be heard thereupon. [Citing cases.]
In my opinion, the brusque and peremptory proceedings in this case fall considerably short of meeting this standard. Neither defendant nor his counsel were afforded a fair opportunity to be heard upon the allegations of probation violation after they were informed of such allegations.
I would vacate the order of commitment and remand the matter for a proper hearing.
Donworth and Weaver, JJ., concur in the result of the dissent.
August 24, 1966. Petition for rehearing denied.