Court Opinion

ID: 9906323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 18:00:59.827801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:15.186145
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 1 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SIONI JOHANA RODRIGUEZ-                         No.    22-26
MARTINEZ,
                                                Agency No. A087-736-061
                Petitioner,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                          Submitted November 14, 2023**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: PARKER,*** BYBEE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Sioni Johana Rodriguez-Martinez (“Rodriguez-Martinez”), a

native and citizen of Honduras, seeks review of a December 6, 2021 Board of

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge
for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the denial of her application for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). Rodriguez-Martinez’s claims are largely based on a fear of

persecution due to her family’s association with the National Party in Honduras

and their perceived or actual opposition to then-President and Liberal Party leader

Manuel Zelaya in 2009. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we

deny the petition.

      On appeal, we review the decisions of both the immigration judge (“IJ”) and

the BIA. Cordoba v. Barr, 962 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 2020). We review

questions of law de novo and the agency’s factual findings and adverse credibility

determinations for substantial evidence. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th

742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022); Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010).1

Denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief are also reviewed for

substantial evidence. Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 2016).

We reverse these determinations only when the evidence not only supports a

contrary conclusion, but compels it. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026,

1031 (9th Cir. 2014).

1
 Unless otherwise noted, internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations are
omitted.

                                         2
      The IJ made an adverse credibility determination, and the BIA affirmed.

The agency pointed to inconsistences in Rodriguez-Martinez’s testimony regarding

when Liberal Party supporters left death threats at her grandmother’s house. In her

declaration, Rodriguez-Martinez mentions only one occasion in which she received

a death threat, stating that after the November 2009 election, men on motorcycles

with Liberal Party flags left flyers threatening to kill those who voted for the

National Party. However, at the hearing, she testified she received a death threat in

June 2009 and that the only time men on motorcycles with Liberal Party flags

came near her grandmother’s house was in June 2009. Yet, she also testified she

received the death threat after the election in November 2009. Her explanation for

the discrepancy was that she must have made a mistake and that it was painful to

remember what she had experienced.2 While this explanation is sympathetic, “an

IJ may rely upon an inconsistency in a crucial date concerning the very event upon

which [a petitioner] predicated his claim for asylum.” Rodriguez-Ramirez v.

Garland, 11 F.4th 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021).

      Further, Rodriguez-Martinez testified that the police refused to write a report

about the June 2009 death threats because their typewriter was broken. However,

2
  In her brief, Rodriguez-Martinez argued that her testimony “clearly indicate[s]
that threats occurred on multiple occasions.” However, not only is this
characterization conclusory, but it does not address the fact that her testimony
contradicted the declaration and was internally inconsistent.

                                          3
in her declaration, she stated the police refused to do so in November 2009. She

also submitted a letter dated October 21, 2010—when she was already in the

United States—from the Municipal Department of Justice of El Negrito, Yoro,

stating she reported a death threat in June 2009. She could not plausibly explain

how the Municipal Department could send such a letter more than a year later if

they did not make a record of the complaint at the time it was made. These and

other inconsistencies support the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Manes

v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 2017).

      Additionally, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s alternative finding that

even if her testimony were accepted, Rodriguez-Martinez did not meet the

evidentiary burden necessary to establish her asylum, withholding of removal, and

CAT claims. “To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to

demonstrate a likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.’” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). For withholding of removal, an applicant

must demonstrate “a clear probability of persecution because of a protected

ground,” which “requires objective evidence that it is more likely than not that the

[noncitizen] will be subject to persecution upon deportation.” Garcia v. Wilkinson,

988 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2021).

                                          4
      First, the IJ’s determination that the written death threats Rodriguez-

Martinez allegedly received did not amount to past persecution, is supported by

substantial evidence. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.

2019) (noting credible death threats “constitute persecution in only a small

category of cases, and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause

significant actual suffering or harm”).

      Second, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Rodriguez-

Martinez does not face a well-founded fear of future persecution based on the two

groups she claimed membership in: (1) women returning to Honduras with

perceived wealth and (2) individuals with actual or imputed opinions opposing the

Zelaya administration.3 The IJ rejected the first proposed group, correctly noting

that this Court rejected a similar proposed group for Mexicans. Ramirez-Munoz v.

Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016). As for the second proposed group,

the IJ found that it was unclear whether Rodriguez-Martinez or her family was

perceived as having strong ties to the National Party. In fact, Rodriguez-Martinez

testified she and her family were refused help because they were not on a National

3
  The IJ described this group as “individuals who are imputed [with a] political
opinion regarding the Zelaya administration, or have an actual political opinion
opposing the Zelaya administration.” However, in the context of her briefing and
the record, it is clear that Rodriguez-Martinez intended for the proposed group to
be narrower and to specifically encompass individuals with actual or imputed
opinions opposing the Zelaya administration.

                                          5
Party political campaign list or otherwise sufficiently involved with the party in

2009. To show persecution on account of a political opinion, an applicant must

demonstrate “that [s]he held (or that h[er] persecutors believed that [s]he held) a

political opinion.” Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 752 (9th Cir.

2021). Rodriguez-Martinez’s own testimony is evidence that she would not be

perceived as holding anti-Zelaya or pro-National Party beliefs and is inconsistent

with her claim that she would be persecuted for holding such beliefs. Id.

      Third, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Rodriguez-

Martinez did not qualify for CAT relief, which requires her to demonstrate that it is

more likely than not she would be tortured if removed to Honduras. 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.16(c)(2). The IJ concluded that two instances of written death threats do not

amount to past torture. That conclusion is consistent with this Court’s holding that

under the CAT, “torture . . . is reserved for extreme cruel and inhuman treatment

that results in severe pain or suffering.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th

696, 706 (9th Cir. 2022). We do not find Rodriguez-Martinez’s other CAT-related

arguments persuasive. For these reasons, we conclude that the agency committed

no error in denying CAT relief.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                          6