Court Opinion

ID: 9881334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-30 21:00:31.02143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:20.962999
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4508

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        REGINALD EARL WILLIAMS, JR.,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Greenville. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (4:20-cr-00102-M-1)

        Submitted: August 29, 2023                                  Decided: September 29, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Jennifer C. Leisten, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A.
        Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Reginald Earl Williams, Jr., pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm,

        in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924. The district court sentenced Williams to 84

        months’ imprisonment and imposed, in relevant part, a special condition of supervised

        release requiring him to submit to warrantless searches. On appeal, Williams argues that

        this special condition is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to

        explain its reasons for imposing the condition. He also asserts that the warrantless search

        condition is substantively unreasonable because it intrudes on his constitutional rights and

        conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3) and the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy statements.

        We affirm.

               “We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an

        abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of whether the sentence is inside, just outside, or

        significantly outside the Guidelines range.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th

        Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). We first evaluate the sentence for significant procedural error,

        such as improperly calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range, inadequately considering

        the § 3553(a) factors, or insufficiently explaining the chosen sentence. Id. If the sentence

        is procedurally reasonable, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the

        sentence, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Provance,

        944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019).

               To preserve a challenge to a proposed condition of supervised release, objections

        “must be made with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the

        true ground for the objection.” United States v. Elbaz, 52 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2022)

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        (internal quotation marks omitted), petition for cert. filed, No. 22-1055 (U.S. May 1, 2023).

        We conclude that Williams’ request for a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines

        range was not sufficiently specific to preserve a challenge to the proposed special condition

        of supervised release; our review is therefore for plain error. Id. at 611-12. “To establish

        plain error, [Williams] must show that an error occurred, that it was plain, and that it

        affected his substantial rights.” United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670, 674 (4th Cir.

        2020). Williams must also show that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or

        public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “District courts have broad latitude to impose discretionary conditions of supervised

        release.” United States v. Boyd, 5 F.4th 550, 557 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). A district court may impose any discretionary condition so long as it “is

        reasonably related to the statutory sentencing factors referenced in 18 U.S.C.

        § 3583(d)(1).” United States v. Douglas, 850 F.3d 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). The condition must “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty

        than is reasonably necessary” to satisfy these factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2), and be

        “consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,”

        18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3). A district court must explain why a discretionary condition is

        warranted under § 3583(d). Boyd, 5 F.4th at 557. However, “[t]he degree of explanation

        required—the appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write,

        what to say—varies with the complexity of a given case.” Id. (cleaned up). At bottom, the

        district court must provide “enough of an explanation to satisfy us that it has considered

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        the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal

        decision-making authority.” Id. at 559 (cleaned up).

               Williams has not demonstrated plain error. The district court explained why it was

        imposing the conditions of release, tying them to the statutory requirements, the nature of

        the instant offense, and Williams’ history of drug use. Furthermore, although Williams

        asserts that the search condition impermissibly infringes on his constitutional rights, it is

        well established “that the conditional liberty to which those under supervised release are

        subject entails the surrender of certain constitutional rights.” United States v. Ward, 770

        F.3d 1090, 1099 (4th Cir. 2014). Notably, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “a

        condition of release can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable

        expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not

        offend the Fourth Amendment.”         Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006).

        Moreover, the discretionary supervision conditions are consistent with the requirements of

        18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). See United States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512, 520-21 (7th Cir. 2016)

        (noting that special conditions recommended in the Guidelines for one offense “may

        otherwise be appropriate in [other] cases” (internal quotation marks omitted)).          We

        conclude the imposition of the search condition was procedurally and substantively

        reasonable.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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