Court Opinion

ID: 9585921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:05:10.643427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:16.868557
License: Public Domain

LEESON, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because, as a matter of law, defendants’ conduct did not transgress the bounds of socially tolerable conduct. Assuming, as we must, the truth of all pleaded allegations and any facts that could be introduced as proof, I believe plaintiffs complaint is sufficient (with amendment if necessary) to allow a jury to conclude that defendants’ conduct was socially intolerable. See Lathrope-Olson v. Dept. of Transportation, 128 Or App 405, 408, 876 P2d 345 (1994) (whether conduct is socially intolerable is, for the most part, a fact-specific inquiry).
The majority observes that “when a relationship breaks down, the children of the relationship often become the instruments of the parties’ pursuits to cause each other pain.” 136 Or App at 310. It concludes that the frequency of such conduct means that recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress must fail. According to the majority, statutes aimed at redressing such conduct — such as those relating to visitation, modifying a decree or abuse prevention — are sufficient to displace the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in these circumstances. That view is curious, particularly in the light of this court’s decision in Shay v. Paulson, 131 Or App 270, 273-74, 884 P2d 870 (1994), cited by the majority, that even when conduct amounts to a criminal violation, it is, for purposes of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a fact-specific question whether the conduct is “outrageous in the extreme.” The majority’s reasoning circumscribes the tort, making it inapplicable in the context of marital dissolution, *312regardless of the conduct involved. In effect, it creates a per se rule that all is fair when love turns to war.
This court properly has not permitted the alleged frequency of harassment and taunts based on gender, race or sexual orientation to defeat claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Lathrope-Olson, 128 Or App at 408; Franklin v. PCC, 100 Or App 465, 471, 787 P2d 489 (1990); Whelan v. Albertson’s, Inc., 129 Or App 501, 879 P2d 888 (1994). Neither should we here. A jury should be permitted to determine whether defendants’ conduct exceeded the bounds of socially tolerable conduct under the circumstances alleged in plaintiffs complaint.
I respectfully dissent.