Court Opinion

ID: 9767624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:22:52.080157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.091811
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
At page 867 of its opinion the Court discusses “the proper standard of review” announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and also excerpts the most familiar passage “explicating this standard.” However, in page 867 the Court interprets that passage so as to present a litany of “dos and don’ts” that so far as I can determine has not appeared in any prior opinion of this Court. For that reason, if no other, the import of that interpretation becomes even more significant.1 Thus this effort to reprise the theme of Jackson v. Virgina.2
Because the Constitution of the United States (as well as of this State) prohibits a criminal conviction except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in Jackson v. Virginia the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim that under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), a federal habe-as court must determine “not whether there was any evidence to support a state-court conviction, but whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of the facts to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 443 U.S., at 312-313, 99 S.Ct., at 2785.3
In addition to the Jackson v. Virginia standard excerpted by Judge White in the *871opinion of the Court here, the Supreme Court explained:
“Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [note omitted] The criterion thus impinges upon ‘jury’ discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.13
Id., at 319, 99 S.Ct., at 2789 (emphasis by Justice Stewart).
By way of demonstrating a need for the new standard and that the “no evidence” rule of Thompson v. Louisville 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960), is “inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt,” the Supreme Court noted an earlier expression of the notion that “a mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a ‘no evidence’ standard,” pointed out that “any evidence that is relevant [under Fed. Rule Evid. 401] could be deemed a ‘modicum,’ [b]ut it could not seriously be argued that such a ‘modicum’ of evidence could by itself rationally support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 443 U.S., at 310-320, 99 S.Ct., at 2789.4
Justice Stevens, contending that the “logic” of In re Winship would require a reviewing court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” 443 U.S., at 334, 99 S.Ct., at 2797 (emphasis by Justice Stevens), points out, “The Court, however, rejects this standard, as well as others that might be consistent with Win-ship,” and gives examples, viz:
“For example, it does not require the reviewing court to view just the evidence most favorable to the prosecution and then to decide whether that evidence convinced it beyond a reasonable doubt, nor whether, based on the entire record, rational triers of fact could be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It seems to me that if ‘logic’ allows this choice [of the standard announced by the majority] after Winship it should also allow the presumption that the Court has rejected — that trial judges and juries will act rationally and honestly in applying the reasonable doubt standard, at least as long as the trial is free of procedural error and the record contains evidence tending to prove each of the elements of the offense.”
Id., at 334-335, 99 S.Ct., at 2797.
This Court reviewed the teachings of Jackson v. Virginia in a series of opinions in the Carlsen line of cases cited ante, at note 2, and learned the same lesson as Justice Stevens. In each we found, inter alia:
“Moreover, scrutiny of the analysis suggested in the motion for rehearing (that the focus of our inquiry should be on ‘any evidence which could rationally support the verdict’) reveals it to be functionally indistinguishable from that specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Jackson, supra, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Carlsen, supra, at 449; Freeman, supra, at 456; Denby, supra, at 464; Wilson, supra, at 472.
In this cause, in support of its discussion in page 867 of its opinion, the Court cites Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S., at 319-320, 99 S.Ct., at 2789-2790; Carlsen, supra, at 448-449; Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Therein lies an inconsistency.
*872Combs v. State, supra, examined the appropriate standard for appellate review in criminal cases. After pointing out that this Court does not have jurisdiction to pass on “weight and preponderance of evidence,” but instead it “views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,” the Court cited a host of cases to that effect, and then quoted a passage directly from Banks v. State, 510 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Combs, at 716.
Banks, supra, of course, was decided before Jackson v. Virginia. At page 595 Justice Cornelius iterated what the cases were then saying about reviewing sufficiency of evidence, viz:
"... In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. In doing so, the verdict will be sustained if there is any evidence which, if believed, shows the guilt of the accused, [citations omitted].”
So Combs thus approved Banks and that “the verdict will be sustained if there is any evidence which, if believed, shows the guilt of the accused.” Indeed, it rephrased the test, viz:
“If there is any evidence that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the trier of facts believes that evidence, we are not in a position to reverse the judgment on sufficiency of the evidence grounds.”
Id., at 716.
I do not pretend to comprehend the meaning of all that the Court says in page 867. But, because Jackson v. Virginia rejected the notion that “any evidence which, if believed, shows the guilt of the accused” is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty, that the Court would cite Combs, and by extension Banks, makes its comments even more puzzling. Surely the Court is not attempting to read the Combs/Banks formulation into the standard of review announced in Jackson v. Virginia several years after Banks and its cited cases were decided, or to indicate that iteration of Banks by Combs in a different context somehow restored vitality to Banks, and makes it applicable today.
Understanding that the Court must have something else in mind, and because I agree that under Jackson v. Virginia any rational trier of fact could have found the requisite element of intent for this offense beyond a reasonable doubt, I join the judgment of the Court.5
DUNCAN, J., joins this opinion.

. While Jackson v. Virginia sets a standard for review by federal habeas courts of sufficiency of evidence in state convictions, this Court has held that same standard applicable for appellate review for evidentiary sufficiency in Texas. Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Opinion on Rehearing, at 449-450); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Opinion on Rehearing, at 456-457); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Opinion on Rehearing at 463-464); Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Opinion on Rehearing, at 471-472).

. Justice Stewart did not write on a clean slate. The genesis of the principal thesis in Jackson v. Virginia is his dissenting opinion in Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111, 97 S.Ct. 1150, 51 L.Ed.2d 566 (1977). His intendment in the majority opinion may also be gleaned from expressed views of Justice Stevens who, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the Jackson v. Virginia judgment.

. Emphasis by Justice Stewart; all other emphasis throughout is supplied by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

 The question whether the evidence is constitutionally sufficient is of course wholly unrelated to the question of how rationally the verdict was actually reached. Just as the standard announced today does not permit a court to make its own subjective determination of guilt or innocence, it does not require scrutiny of the reasoning process actually used by the factfinder — if known, [citation omitted].”

. In note 14, 99 S.Ct., at 2790, Justice Stewart gives examples of "absurdly unjust results” the Thompson v. Louisville rule would produce, one which is that "a defendant against whom there was but one slender bit of evidence would not be denied due process so long as the jury has been properly instructed on the prosecutor’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." See also Freeman v. Zahradnick, supra, 97 S.Ct., at 1152 for similar "bizarre results.”

. If I believed the Houston (14th) Court of Appeals did indeed exercise its constitutional authority under Article V, § 6, I would entertain consideration of the thrust of Judge Teague’s separate opinion. See, e.g., my dissenting opinion in Hill v. State, 719 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).