Court Opinion

ID: 9739680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:19:26.39434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:13.427274
License: Public Domain

Wahls, P.J.
(concurring). I largely agree with the majority’s analysis and result, but write separately to express my belief that Hodgson v William Beaumont Hosp, 373 Mich 184; 128 NW2d 542 (1964), did not establish a "new standard” for summary disposition of issues of charitable immunity. Rather, I believe that the Supreme Court’s use of the phrase "conclusively persuasive” in Hodgson is simply another way of stating the principle that a motion for summary disposition (or, as in Hodgson, a motion to dismiss) based on the lack of a material factual dispute should be granted only where a record cannot be developed that would leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. See, e.g., Buczkowski v Allstate Ins Co (On Rehearing), 198 Mich App 276, 278; 502 NW2d 343 (1993); Anderson v Sanders, 14 Mich App 58, 61; 165 NW2d 290 (1968). Hodgson simply follows the rule that judgment on the motion is one of law for the trial court where the facts are undisputed. Because Hodgson did not announce a new standard, the Court cannot be faulted for ignoring the principle that the law in effect at the time of an injury controls the parties’ rights and liabilities. Hodgson simply provides some factors worthy of consideration in deciding whether a hospital is a charitable institution for the purpose of immunity. Hodgson represents a clarification of existing law and is entitled to retroactive application. People v Jahner, 433 Mich 490, 504; 446 NW2d 151 (1989).