Court Opinion

ID: 9899210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 15:08:24.339851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:18.981445
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1838-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

EXAMPLIAR EXANTUS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted October 25, 2023 – Decided November 16, 2023

                   Before Judges Vernoia and Walcott-Henderson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 16-01-0281.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Christopher W. Hsieh, Designated Counsel,
                   on the brief).

                   Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E.
                   Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
                   Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Exampliar Exantus appeals from an order denying his post-

conviction relief (PCR) petition without an evidentiary hearing. 1 Based on our

review of the record and the arguments of the parties, we are convinced the PCR

court correctly rejected defendant's claims his trial counsel was ineffective by

failing to properly investigate a diminished capacity defense and discuss the

defense with defendant, and by failing to investigate a purported hate-speech

audio recording and introduce the recording as evidence.       The PCR court

correctly denied defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing because he

did not present competent evidence establishing a prima facie ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. We therefore affirm.

                                       I.

      A grand jury charged defendant with eight counts of fourth-degree bias

intimidation. N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a). More particularly, the indictment charged

that on eight different days between August 2013 and May 2015, defendant

1
   The indictment charging defendant with the crimes that resulted in the
convictions from which he seeks PCR, and the judgment of conviction entered
following his convictions at trial, identify defendant as "Exampliar Exandus."
In his PCR petition, defendant identifies himself as "Exampliare Exandus," and
in defendant's brief on appeal, his counsel states, "[t]he correct spelling of
defendant's first name is 'Exampliare.'" We refer to defendant by the name set
forth in the indictment and judgment of conviction because there is no record
defendant ever sought an amendment of either to correct any alleged misspelling
of his first name.
                                                                          A-1838-21
                                       2
knowingly, and with the purpose to intimidate, made and directed various

degrading comments to a seventeen-year-old neighbor because of the juvenile's

"race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation or ethnicity." The

indictment charged that on the eight dates, defendant directed numerous vile

homophobic, Hispanophobic, and threatening statements to the juvenile in

violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a).

      As detailed by the PCR court in its thorough and detailed opinion denying

defendant's petition, and as confirmed by our review of the record, during the

pre-indictment phase of the proceedings against defendant, the trial court

entered an order directing defendant's evaluation by a qualified psychiatrist or

licensed psychologist due to concerns about his fitness to proceed to trial.

Defendant initially refused to participate in the court-ordered examination. He

later participated and the psychologist who performed the examination

diagnosed defendant with an unspecified personality disorder and determined

defendant was competent to stand trial.

      Defendant later provided timely notice of his intent to assert a diminished

capacity defense at trial in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:4-3(a) and Rule 3:12-

1, but he did not appear for a psychological evaluation, and he informed his

counsel he did not want to pursue a diminished capacity defense.

                                                                           A-1838-21
                                          3
      At defendant's trial, the State presented an August 12, 2013 video

recording made by the juvenile's mother. On the recording, defendant, who

resided in an apartment next to the juvenile and his mother's home, is heard

repeatedly shouting homophobic, Hispanophobic, and threatening statements.

Five days later, officers appeared at the scene and heard a male voice in

defendant's apartment yelling homophobic and Hispanophobic epithets, and they

saw defendant yelling from his apartment window and then retreat after he saw

them.2

      The juvenile testified at trial he made a recording of defendant calling him

homophobic epithets from defendant's window, which was only a few feet from

the juvenile's own.   The State presented evidence defendant yelled similar

comments at the juvenile on two dates in August 2013, five dates in April 2015,

and one date in May 2015.

      The jury convicted defendant of four counts of fourth-degree bias

intimidation, and the court imposed an aggregate sixty-day custodial sentence

as a condition of three-year's probation. We affirmed defendant's convictions

on his direct appeal, State v. Exantus, No. A-1400-17 (App. Div. Aug. 25, 2020)

2
  The record is known to the parties and includes the statements and epithets the
evidence established defendant directed against the juvenile. It is therefore
unnecessary that we repeat them here.
                                                                            A-1838-21
                                        4
(slip op. at 12), and the Supreme Court later denied defendant's petition for

certification, State v. Exantus, 244 N.J. 563 (2020).

      Defendant timely filed a sworn, pro se PCR petition. Defendant attached

to the petition unsworn letters from him to the Office of the Public Defender

making various allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel during its

representation of defendant at trial and on his direct appeal.

      Following the assignment of counsel on the PCR petition, defendant filed

a supplemental certification. In his certification, defendant claimed the Office

of the Public Defender "has not been committed to a society based on equality

for all citizens irrespective of ethnic origin or religion."      Defendant also

confusingly asserted trial and PCR counsel had an "impertinent disposition to

assert [an] intellectual disability in [defendant], while dismissing his complaint

against [the] hate speech of 'Haitian Fuck.'" Defendant further asserted his "trial

was a fraud" and that "a cabal had developed to insult the intelligence of anyone

complaining against the flagrant utterances," and "[t]he arrant hate speech,

antipathy, and outright stupidity in the matter is having the intended [e]ffect, of

losing case after case, the trial and appeal."

      Defendant also claimed trial counsel refused "to represent to the court the

defense" he "had outlined for them," and counsel's briefs to the court "are

                                                                             A-1838-21
                                         5
unequivocal proof of sabotage of [defendant's] legal position."        Defendant

asserted trial counsel failed to subpoena any witnesses on his behalf, and omitted

evidence "of [the] complaint against the sexually charged 'Haitian Fuck'

expressions."

      He also claimed his PCR counsel "was unresponsive to [his] entreaties"

and "pursued the same failed strategy" as trial counsel. Defendant asserted trial

and PCR counsel "kept trying to assert that [he] had mental problems in [him]

because of the complaints and so [he] had no defense for being upset at the

opposing party in the trial court."

      Following argument on defendant's petition, the PCR court issued a

detailed written opinion supporting its denial of the requested relief. As noted,

the court explained defendant had been evaluated by a licensed psychologist

prior to trial and determined to be competent to stand trial, and, although

defendant's trial counsel had filed a notice of a diminished capacity defense,

defendant did not appear for a psychological exam scheduled for the purpose of

developing evidence in support of the defense, and defendant advised his

counsel he did not wish to pursue the defense.

      After summarizing the evidence presented at trial, the court addressed

defendant's legal arguments in support of his PCR petition. Pertinent here, the

                                                                            A-1838-21
                                        6
court explained that defendant asserted trial counsel was ineffective by

attempting to assert a diminished capacity defense at trial without his consent.3

The court rejected defendant's claim, finding it was undermined by the record.

More particularly, the court explained that during various pretrial proceedings ,

trial counsel raised the potential diminished capacity defense and sought

defendant's consent to assert it, but defendant refused to provide his consent.

Thus, the court determined defendant's claim his counsel attempted to assert a

diminished capacity defense at trial without defendant's consent was "without

merit."

      The PCR court also addressed defendant's claim trial counsel was

ineffective by failing to present evidence that "hate speech" had been directed

3
   Defendant presented the PCR court with various claims about the alleged
ineffectiveness of his counsel and other grounds supporting his request for relief
from his convictions. The claims included the following: trial counsel failed to
follow defendant's instructions; trial counsel failed to present evidence of hate
speech against defendant; trial counsel attempted to present a diminished
capacity defense without defendant's consent; there were violations of
defendant's right to exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963); and the Office of the Public Defender is part of a "cabal" that "sides with
homosexuals." The PCR court addressed and rejected each of the claims. On
appeal, defendant focuses his arguments on trial counsel's handling of the
putative diminished capacity defense and alleged failure to present evidence
concerning hate speech directed against defendant. We therefore limit our
discussion to those issues. See generally Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP v. N.J.
Dept. of Law & Pub. Safety, 421 N.J. Super. 489, 496 n.5 (App. Div. 2011)
(explaining issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned).
                                                                             A-1838-21
                                        7
against defendant. Defendant asserted counsel failed to present at trial an audio

recording which showed he had been called a "Haitian Fuck." He claimed the

recording would have established he was the victim of hate speech and that the

statements he was alleged to have made against the juvenile were in response to

the statements that had been made against him.

      The PCR court rejected the claim, finding no evidence that the purported

hate speech on the recording was made by the juvenile victim of the crimes

charged against defendant. The court noted the trial evidence established the

juvenile did not know defendant and had never spoken to him.                Indeed,

defendant testified at trial he had never spoken to the juvenile prior to the August

2013 incidents, and admitted he did not know the identity of the individual who

made the statements on the recording.

      The PCR court also noted that the recording defendant claims includes the

hate speech was "inaudible and incomprehensible." Trial counsel represented

to the court that she could not "hear" the recordings defendant had provided to

her and defendant had not identified the alleged speakers whose statements were

recorded or the dates the putative statements were made.

      The court further found that statements, including the alleged hate speech

directed at defendant by individuals other than the juvenile victim, were not

                                                                              A-1838-21
                                         8
relevant to the disposition of the charges against defendant "and did not justify

defendant's conduct towards the victim." The court reasoned that a defense of

justification based on the statements of others directed against defendant was

"not legally nor factually supported" by the record presented.

      The court concluded counsel was not ineffective by failing to present as

evidence an audio recording that was neither audible nor relevant. The court

further explained that even if the recording had been presented, it would not

have changed the trial's outcome because of the "overwhelming, corroborated

evidence against defendant" supporting his conviction of the four offenses.

      The court entered an order denying defendant's PCR petition without an

evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.

      Defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration:

            POINT I

            THE POST-CONVICTION [RELIEF] COURT
            ERRED IN DENYING PETITION FOR [PCR]
            WITHOUT    AFFORDING    DEFENDANT    AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS
            HIS CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
            TRIAL COUNSEL.

            A. Trial Counsel's Failure to Properly Investigate
            Diminished Capacity Defense and Failure to Properly
            Discuss Defenses with Defendant.

                                                                           A-1838-21
                                       9
            B. Trial Counsel's Failure to Properly Investigate Hate
            Speech Audio Recording and Introduce Such Evidence
            at Trial.

            POINT II

            ALTERNATIVELY, THIS PANEL MUST REVERSE
            THE DENIAL OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
            AND REMAND FOR A NEW PROCEEDING
            BECAUSE PCR COUNSEL FAILED TO MEET THE
            STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT SET
            FORTH IN RUE AND WEBSTER.

                                      II.

      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed

questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. Where, as here, the PCR court has not

conducted an evidentiary hearing, we may "conduct a de novo review" of the

court's "factual findings and legal conclusions." Id. at 421; see also State v.

Lawrence, 463 N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020).

      In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the Court

established a two-part standard, later adopted under the New Jersey Constitution

by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), to determine

whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

Under the standard's first prong, a petitioner must show counsel's performance

was deficient by demonstrating counsel's handling of the matter "fell below an

                                                                          A-1838-21
                                      10
objective standard of reasonableness" and that "counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [to] the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

      Under the "'second, and far more difficult prong of the'" Strickland

standard, State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose,

129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)

(citations omitted) (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S. at 687). To establish prejudice,

"'[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.'" Gideon, 244 N.J. at 550-51 (alteration in original)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Proof of prejudice under Strickland's

second prong "is an exacting standard." Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193

N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). A defendant seeking PCR "must affirmatively prove

prejudice" to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

      To prevail on a PCR petition, a defendant must establish both prongs of

the Strickland standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Nash, 212 N.J. at 542. A

                                                                            A-1838-21
                                       11
failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard requires the denial of a

PCR petition founded on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 700. "With respect to both prongs of the Strickland test, a defendant

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR bears the burden of proving

his or her right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Gaitan,

209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citations omitted).

      Defendant first claims the court erred by denying his PCR petition because

the evidence established trial counsel failed to properly investigate a diminished

capacity defense and discuss the defense with him. More particularly, defendant

asserts that although trial counsel provided notice of a diminished capacity

defense prior to trial, she did not investigate the grounds for the defense by

failing to confer with, or retain, an expert and by failing to have an expert

evaluate defendant. Defendant further claims that as a result of those purported

failures, the trial court excluded from evidence "anything pertaining [ to

defendant's] psychiatric evaluation, mental hospitalization, or prior mental

[health] history."

      "[W]hen a petitioner claims his trial counsel inadequately investigated a

case, he must assert facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported

by affidavits or certifications based on the personal knowledge of the affiant or

                                                                             A-1838-21
                                       12
the person making the certification." State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 353 (2013)

(quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999)).

Defendant's claim that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the putative

diminished capacity defense is untethered to any competent evidence

establishing what an investigation would have revealed. He fails to point to any

competent evidence presented to the PCR court establishing that a prop er

investigation of the diminished capacity defense would have yielded evidence

establishing the defense. See Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.

      Instead, defendant provides only bald assertions and the arguments of his

counsel on appeal that an investigation would have yielded competent evidence

supporting the defense.     Defendant's conclusory assertions and arguments

simply do not satisfy defendant's burden of presenting competent evidence

supporting his claim trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate the

putative diminished capacity defense. Ibid.; see also Baldyga v. Oldman, 261

N.J. Super. 259, 265 (App. Div. 1993) (explaining "unsworn statement[s] of

counsel in briefs and oral arguments" do not constitute competent evidence

supporting findings of fact under Rule 1:6-6).

      For that reason alone, defendant's request for PCR based on his counsel's

alleged failure to investigate a diminished capacity defense fails. Most simply

                                                                            A-1838-21
                                       13
stated, defendant failed to present competent evidence establishing an

entitlement to relief under both prongs of the Strickland standard. Defendant

did not sustain his burden of establishing counsel's performance was deficient

under Strickland's first prong because he failed to present any evidence that an

investigation would have yielded evidence establishing a meritorious

diminished capacity defense. See, e.g., State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625

(1990) ("The failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel.").

      Similarly, defendant did not sustain his burden under Strickland's

prejudice prong because he failed to present any competent evidence to establish

that had counsel investigated the diminished capacity defense, there is a

reasonable probability the investigation would have yielded evidence such that

the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Because defendant failed to sustain his burden under both prongs of the

Strickland standard, we affirm the PCR court's rejection of the claim. See

Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 350.

      We reject defendant's claim the court erred by rejecting his claim trial

counsel was ineffective by failing to fully investigate the audio recording of the

alleged hate speech directed against defendant for the same reasons.

                                                                            A-1838-21
                                        14
Defendant's primary claim is that counsel erred by failing to have the "recording

evaluated by an audio engineer or suitable expert specializing in such measures."

In his brief on appeal, defendant further asserts, without citation to or support

in any competent record evidence, that "[h]ad such measures been taken, the

audio recording would have been enhanced to improve its audibility."

      Defendant's arguments before the PCR court and on appeal in support of

his claim concerning the audio recording consist of nothing more than bald

assertions which, as a matter of well-established law, do not sustain his burden

under the Strickland standard. Porter, 216 N.J. at 355 (quoting Cummings, 321

N.J. Super. at 170). Stated differently, although defendant argues trial counsel's

performance was deficient due to a purported failure to fully investigate the

audibility of the recording, he presents no competent evidence as to what "an

investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications

based on the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the

certification." 4 Id. at 353 (quoting Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170). As a

4
   Defendant concedes this point. Defendant acknowledges that to satisfy
Strickland's prejudice prong on his claim trial counsel was ineffective by failing
to investigate the audibility of the recordings of the alleged hate speech, "it was
necessary . . . to independently investigate the recordings to resolve the
inaudibility issue and to show that they would have supported the defense."
(Emphasis added).
                                                                             A-1838-21
                                       15
result, and as correctly determined by the PCR court, defendant failed to sustain

his burden under both prongs of the Strickland standard on this claim as well.

      Defendant also argues he is entitled to a remand for a hearing on whether

PCR counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate defendant's other claims

and determine whether additional claims should have been asserted on

defendant's behalf. Defendant argues that in PCR counsel's written submissions

to the PCR court:     he should have elaborated on the arguments made in

defendant's pro se submissions; he erred by solely relying on the written

submissions at oral argument on the petition; and he failed to investigate,

through consultation with an expert, the audibility of the audio recordings that

allegedly included hate speech against defendant. We consider the arguments

in turn.

      We reject defendant's argument PCR counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to include in his submissions to the court an elaboration on

the arguments and issues defendant asserted and identified in his pro se

submissions. Rule 3:22-6(d) provides:

            Assigned counsel may not seek to withdraw on the
            ground of lack of merit of the petition. Counsel should
            advance all of the legitimate arguments requested by
            the defendant that the record will support. If defendant
            insists upon the assertion of any grounds for relief that
            counsel deems to be without merit, counsel shall list

                                                                            A-1838-21
                                       16
            such claims in the petition or amended petition or
            incorporate them by reference.

      In State v. Webster, the Court explained PCR counsel's obligation:

            [C]ounsel should advance all of the legitimate
            arguments that the record will support. If after
            investigation counsel can formulate no fair legal
            argument in support of a particular claim raised by
            defendant, no argument need be made on that point.
            Stated differently, the brief must advance the
            arguments that can be made in support of the petition
            and include defendant's remaining claims, either by
            listing them or incorporating them by reference so that
            the judge may consider them. That procedure, which
            will serve to preserve defendant's contentions for
            federal exhaustion purposes, is all that is required.

            [187 N.J. 254, 257-58 (2006) (citation omitted).]

      Here, PCR counsel complied with the prescribed procedure. In his brief

to the PCR court, counsel included a separate point expressly incorporating all

the issues and argument's set forth in defendant's pro se submission s. And, at

oral argument on the PCR petition, the court noted its consideration of

defendant's submissions, and PCR counsel expressed his reliance on the written

submissions identified by the court, as well as a "supplementary letter"

defendant had submitted on his own behalf.

      Relying on the Court's decisions in Webster and State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1

(2002), defendant contends we should remand for a hearing on his claim PCR

                                                                           A-1838-21
                                     17
counsel was ineffective by failing to elaborate on defendant's pro se arguments.

In Webster, however, the Court remanded for a hearing on the defendant's claim

PCR counsel was ineffective because it was not clear if the PCR court had

considered the defendant's pro se arguments where PCR counsel's brief had not

referred to defendant's arguments and the PCR judge had not commented on

them. 187 N.J. at 258. As we have explained, that is not the case here.

      Defendant's reliance on the Court's decision in Rue is similarly misplaced.

In Rue, the Court remanded for a rehearing on the defendant's claim PCR

counsel was ineffective because counsel had "abandon[ed] any notion of

partisan representation by countering every one of [the defendant's] claims and

characterizing the entire [PCR] petition as meritless." 175 N.J. at 19. Again,

there are no similar facts extant here. To the contrary, the record establishes

PCR counsel expressly proffered defendant's pro se arguments to the court as

required under Rule 3:22-6(d) and counsel neither countered defendant's claims

nor suggested they lacked merit. We therefore discern no basis under the

holdings in Webster or Rue to remand defendant's claim PCR counsel failed to

adequately present defendant's arguments before the PCR court. Cf. State v.

Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 626-27 (App. Div. 2023) (explaining "[t]he

                                                                           A-1838-21
                                      18
remedy for counsel's failure to meet the requirements imposed by Rule 3:22-

6(d) is a new PCR proceeding").

      We also reject defendant's argument PCR counsel was ineffective by

relying on his and defendant's written submissions at the hearing before the PCR

court. As the Court explained in Rue, counsel is not ineffective by failing to

offer oral argument in addition to those arguments set forth in a party's brief to

the court because, "as in any case in which a brief is filed, counsel may choose

to stand on it at the hearing and is not required to further engage in expository

argument." 175 N.J. at 19.

      Based on the record presented, we are unable to determine the merits of

defendant's final claim—that PCR counsel was ineffective by failing to

investigate the audibility of the recordings and present evidence during the PCR

proceeding that trial counsel's failure to investigate the audibility of the

recordings constituted deficient performance under Strickland's first prong and

prejudiced defendant at trial under Strickland's second prong.         The claim

requires consideration of facts outside the record presented to the PCR court and

is supported solely by the arguments of defendant's present PCR counsel. See

Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. at 627 (noting "resolution of claims against PCR

counsel generally involves matters outside the record" and, "under most

                                                                            A-1838-21
                                       19
circumstances, they are better suited for a PCR petition"). As a result, we cannot

correctly consider or decide the claim's merits and leave defendant to file a

separate petition in accordance with Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(C) claiming ineffective

assistance of the counsel that represented him "on the first . . . application for"

PCR. Ibid.; see also State v. Armour, 446 N.J. Super. 295, 317 (App. Div. 2016).

      To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining

arguments, we have concluded they are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

                                                                             A-1838-21
                                       20