Court Opinion

ID: 9543755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:48:55.522379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:07.646203
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK concurring in part and dissenting in part: While I agree with the majority that the trial court was correct in ordering a new trial because of General Motors’ violation of discovery rules, I disagree with the holding that the trial court was correct in ordering a new trial based upon its previous dismissal of the res ipsa loquitur counts. I agree with the defendant that even if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be relied upon in products liability cases, it would not avail the plaintiff in the present case. “The purpose of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning the cause of the injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of defendant. [Citations.] To prevail under a res ipsa loquitur theory, plaintiff must establish: ‘(1) that the occurrence is one that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence and (2) that the defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the injury.’ ” (Saieva v. Budget Rent-A-Car (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 519, 528-29, 591 N.E.2d 507, 513, quoting Dyback v. Weber (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 232, 242.) Under such circumstances, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of due care. (Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49, 207 N.E.2d 305, 307.) WHiere the evidence does not necessarily support an inference that the accident was the result of the defendant’s negligence, the doctrine does not apply. (Rinck v. Palos Hills Consolidated High School District No. 230 (1979), 82 Ill. App. 3d 856, 403 N.E.2d 470.) The record in the present case discloses that the Delvecchio car was over a year old and had been driven more than 14,000 miles. In Wuench v. Ford Motor Co. (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 317, 432 N.E.2d 969, plaintiff filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company alleging that the left rear axle of his car broke off, causing the car to crash and injure plaintiff. Plaintiff sought to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but in upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the res ipsa loquitur count, the court held that plaintiff’s intervening possession of the automobile for almost four months presented a plausible explanation for the accident other than the negligence of defendant and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was therefore inapplicable. Wueneh, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 319-20, 432 N.E.2d at 970-71. In Silverman v. General Motors Corp. (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 593, 425 N.E.2d 1099, plaintiff was involved in a one-car accident in which he was injured and his wife killed. At trial, plaintiff’s theory of the accident was that a defect in the throttle body extension caused it to break off and jam the throttle mechanism in the open position. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff’s principal contention on appeal was that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the res ipsa loquitur count. In affirming the trial court, the court in Silverman found that because the car had been in plaintiff’s possession for 51 days, driven over 2,000 miles, and serviced by several individuals, the record failed to demonstrate defendant’s opportunity to exercise control over the vehicle. The court also noted that the testimony indicated that the decedent must not have been properly attentive to the operation of the vehicle and that plaintiff failed to eliminate the possibility that the decedent may herself have been at least partially responsible for the accident. Silverman, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 600, 425 N.E.2d at 1104-05. As in Wueneh and Silverman, Delvecchio’s intervening possession and use of the automobile exceeding 14,000 miles would defeat any inference of negligence. Furthermore, there is evidence from which it could be inferred that the accident occurred because Delvecchio was at least inattentive to his driving. Delvecchio, who was 70 years old at the time of the accident, had gotten up early that day to go to Peoria. Upon returning, he and his wife left for the wedding reception. He missed the Route 15 exit at first and had to turn around. The distance from the point where he testified the engine stalled to the point of impact was over 900 feet, yet Delvecchio claimed that he was only traveling 10 to 15 miles per hour when the stall occurred. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only where the surrounding circumstances indicate that the injury was not the result of any voluntary act or neglect on the part of the plaintiff. (Lynch v. Precision Machine Shop, Ltd. (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 266, 443 N.E.2d 569.) That is not the case here. The majority seeks to distinguish Wuench based upon the nature of the complained-of failing part and to distinguish Silverman based upon the intervening servicing. Neither the similarity or dissimilarity of the failing part nor the intervening servicing is the relevant issue. The relevant issue is whether there is evidence in the record that overcomes the inference of negligence. In Wuench, it was plaintiff’s intervening possession of the automobile for four months that destroyed the inference of negligence. In Silverman, it was plaintiff's intervening possession of the automobile for 51 days, the fact that it had been serviced by at least three people, and evidence indicating that the decedent was inattentive to her driving that destroyed the inference of negligence. In the present case, as in Silverman, there is evidence which strongly indicates that Delvecchio was inattentive to his driving and that his inattention was the cause of the accident. Furthermore, there is evidence indicating that the engine did not stall but was still running at the time the automobile crashed into the embankment. The evidence does not, therefore, necessarily support an inference that the accident was the result of General Motors’ negligence, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable.