Court Opinion

ID: 9400886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 17:11:13.990207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:48.698710
License: Public Domain

J-S13027-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ORIALIS FIGUEROA-COLON                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2051 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 13, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
                  Criminal Division at CP-48-CR-0000103-2020

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                  FILED JUNE 9, 2023

        Orialis Figueroa-Colon (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault, simple

assault, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct.1 We affirm.

        During the afternoon of July 27, 2019, Easton Police Officer Jonathan

Vidal (Officer Vidal) was dispatched to the 900 block of Ferry Street for a

complaint of loud music at a large street party. N.T., 5/31/22, at 79, 81.

Officer Vidal “attempted to speak to [Appellant] and advise him that I just

needed the music to be turned down.” Id. at 82. Appellant replied, “the noise

ordinance does not pertain to him,” and turned the music up.           Id. at 84.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3), 2701(a)(1), 5104, 5503(a)(1).
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Officer Vidal contacted dispatch for backup, and uniformed Easton Police

Officer Aaron Kinnel (Officer Kinnel) arrived in a marked police car. Id. at 86.

      At trial, Officer Kinnel testified:

      Q [The prosecutor]. Could you hear anything when you got [to the
      scene of the street party]?

      A. As soon as I got out of my vehicle, I started to get [] verbally
      attacked by [Appellant]….

                                       ***

      Q. What was being said to you?

      A. A lot of things. I was being cursed at. I was told to leave, to
      get out of there. … [Appellant’s] girlfriend or wife told me that
      she didn’t like me and that I needed to leave. I told her that … I
      was there … as a backup officer and I wasn’t going to leave the
      scene until we got it resolved.

                                       ***

      Q. Was [Appellant] yelling directly at you?

      A. He was.

      Q. What was he saying? …

      A. [Appellant] was cursing at me. Calling me a pussy. Saying he
      was going to beat my ass, things like that.

                                       ***

      Q. And how many people approximately were in the area?

      A. … I estimated 40 to 50. …

      Q. How would you describe the crowd in general, their demeanor?

      A. Extremely hostile towards [the officers].

                                       ***

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     Q. Did you tell anyone to turn the music down, you personally?

     A. No. So when I got there, I spoke to Officer Vidal. He had told
     me that he tried to get [Appellant] to turn the music down and
     [Appellant or the partygoers] actually turned [the volume] back
     up. When I got there, I think [the volume] was turned back down.
     But [Appellant] was screaming and yelling and then cursing at me
     and trying to get me to fight him [].

N.T., 11/1/21, at 102-06.

     The prosecutor’s questioning of Officer Kinnel continued:

     Q. [] Why didn’t you just leave the area?

     A. So I had warned [Appellant] … numerous times to stop cursing
     and to calm down because there [were] other families … out in
     the area. And … that made [Appellant] more angry, and he
     continued to … yell at me and curse. [In response, Officer Kinnel
     informed Appellant he was] … getting a ticket for disorderly
     conduct.

          And that did not [have] the desired effect…. [Appellant]
     ramped up even more and continued to scream at me. …

                                   ***

     Q. [] Did you tell [Appellant] he was under arrest?

     A. Yes. I said, Orialis, you are under arrest.

                                   ***

     Q. And what happened?

     A. [Appellant] ran.

     Q. Where did he run to?

     A. Up onto his porch and into his house.

                                   ***

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     Q. [] When you saw [Appellant] go towards his house after you
     told him he was being arrested, what happened?

     A. [Appellant] ran from me. And I gave chase to try to arrest
     him. As I did this, [Appellant’s] sister tried to stop me by …
     blocking me.

                                    ***

     Q. Were there other people between that threshold and the steps
     and the porch blocking your access to [Appellant]?

     A. … [Appellant’s] sister[] grabbed my gun, along with a young
     girl [who] grabbed for my gun and my belt area. …

                                    ***

     Q. [] And when you then went up to the porch … [and] got past
     them, what did you do?

     A. [Appellant] was right inside of that main door []. And
     [Appellant’s elderly mother] was trying to block me from being
     able to get into the house. So I went next to her and did the same
     thing that I did to [Appellant’s sister when she attempted to block
     the officers.] I … just moved her out of my way. And that is when
     I tried to grab [Appellant] to effect the arrest.

     Q. And … when you tried to grab [Appellant], were you able to
     [accomplish] the arrest?

     A. No. So I grabbed ahold of one of [Appellant’s] arms and he
     pulled away from me violently.

     Q. And what did you do?

     A. At this point, as I was trying to grab ahold of [Appellant], other
     family members and friends started to attack me from behind and
     on the side.

                                    ***

     Q. What did you feel?

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     A. People … pulled my radio off, at one point. Somebody pulled
     me back out of the house by my hips, by my gun. …

                                   ***

     Q. [] What did [Appellant] do at that point?

     A. [A]s I was trying to grab [Appellant] and arrest him, he [and]
     his family members and friends started pulling on … my radio …
     and my gun[.] I was getting concerned for my safety…. So I took
     my taser out. … [Appellant] was trying to shove me out of the
     house.

           And when I did that, somebody to my right had smacked
     the taser out of my hand.

     Q. Do you know who that was?

     A. No. I do not know.

     Q. And did you ever feel hands on your neck or shoulders?

     A. Yes, [Appellant’s].

     Q. [] And describe that for the jury please.

                                   ***

     A. [Appellant] was actively trying to shove me out of the house.
     And when I was picking up the taser, he was … trying to push me
     out of the house. And … other people were pulling on me. …

                                   ***

     Q. [] When you fired the taser [at Appellant], what happened
     after that?

     A. … I fired it and when it didn’t do what I was hoping it would
     do, [Appellant] charged me and tackled me out of the
     house.

     Q. [] And how did he charge you?

     A. Violently.

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                                          ***

        Q. And what happened when you were shoved out of the house?

        A. I fell down into the … [concrete] porch area….

Id. at 106-18 (emphasis added); see also id. at 118, 120 (Officer Kinnel

testifying that when he fell, his head struck the metal leg of a table, and he

received an electric shock from one of the deployed taser wires).

        The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the aforementioned crimes,

as well as assault of a law enforcement officer (assault/police) and riot.2 The

Commonwealth        withdrew      the   charge   of    assault/police   at   Appellant’s

preliminary hearing.

        The matter proceeded to trial, where Attorney Robert E. Goldman

(defense counsel) represented Appellant.              During jury selection, defense

counsel raised an objection at sidebar, invoking Batson v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 79, 87-89 (1986) (holding prosecution’s challenge to potential jurors

solely on basis of race violated Equal Protection Clause of the United States

Constitution).3 According to defense counsel, “Three [Commonwealth juror]

____________________________________________

2   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702.1(a), 5501(2).

3 Our Supreme Court has explained, “the harm Batson seeks to avoid is not
only a trial where members of the defendant’s own race have been excluded
from the jury on account of their race, but also the harm to the prospective
jurors and the community at large that results when citizens are denied
participation in jury service based upon their race.” Commonwealth v.
Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 44 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).

                                           -6-
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challenges out of seven are Latinos, [and Appellant] is a Latino[.]”         N.T.,

5/31/22, at 42-43.

       The prosecutor informed the trial court that she had “non-discriminatory

reasons” for challenging the three jurors, including that jurors number 12 and

18 had expressed views “negative to police.” N.T., 5/31/22, at 43-45. With

respect to the two jurors, the trial court replied, “we don’t know if [they are]

Hispanic or not.” Id. at 46. However, the trial court disagreed with the

prosecutor as to the third juror (juror number 6), stating “there’s no legitimate

reason. You can’t give a Batson reason….” Id. at 46-47; see also id. at 47

(trial court cautioning the prosecutor: “That’s not good.”). The prosecutor

agreed to defense counsel’s request that juror number 6 be placed “back on

the jury.” Id. at 47. The trial court then asked defense counsel: “So you’re

done with the objection?” Id. at 48. Defense counsel replied, “There’s

satisfaction on the record. Yes, Your Honor.” Id. (emphasis added).

Thereafter, the jury was empaneled and trial began. The jury found Appellant

guilty of the above crimes.4

       On July 13, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 9

– 13 months of incarceration, followed by two years of probation. Appellant

did not file post-sentence motions.            Appellant filed a timely appeal and

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

____________________________________________

4 The trial court entered a directed verdict on the riot charge. N.T., 6/1/22,
at 166-67.

                                           -7-
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      Appellant presents two issues for review:

      1. Did the Trial Court err when it found that the Commonwealth
         presented sufficient evidence to support the charges of
         Aggravated Assault 18 Pa.[C.S.A. §] 2702(a)(3) and Simple
         Assault 18 Pa.[C.S.A. §] 2701(a)(1)?

      2. Did the Trial Court err when it failed to determine Appellant’s
         Batson challenge on two (2) jurors, instead only addressing
         one (1)?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (issues reordered for disposition).

      Appellant first claims his convictions for aggravated assault and simple

assault were not supported by sufficient evidence.           See id. at 18-22.

According to Appellant:

      There was no evidence presented concerning any threats made by
      Appellant to Officer Kinnel, no evidence that Appellant continued
      to pursue Officer Kinnel, nor any evidence that Officer Kinnel had
      to make any attempts to escape Appellant. … The evidence
      presented simply shows trivial contact between Appellant and
      Officer Kinnel that occurred incident to an attempt to arrest.

Id. at 22; see also id. (claiming Appellant’s “conduct was not assaultive or

violent”). Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Wertelet, 696 A.2d 206

(Pa. Super. 1997), asserting it is “factually similar.” Appellant’s Brief at 20-

21.

      When reviewing a sufficiency challenge,

      we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth as verdict winner, giving it the benefit of all
      reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence
      will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes
      each material element of the crime charged and the commission
      thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Any doubt
      about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder
      unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter

                                      -8-
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      of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
      combined circumstances. Additionally, the Commonwealth may
      sustain its burden solely by means of circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lake, 281 A.3d 341, 346 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations

and quotations omitted). “On appeal, this Court evaluates the full record to

determine whether sufficien[t] evidence was presented to support each

element of the crime charged; however, we do not second-guess the jury’s

factual determinations.” Commonwealth v. Risoldi, 238 A.3d 434, 454 (Pa.

Super. 2020). “Finally, the finder of fact, while passing upon the credibility of

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part

or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 A.3d 551, 557 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      The Crimes Code provides that a person commits aggravated assault if

he “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to any

of the officers, agents, employees or other persons enumerated in subsection

(c), in the performance of duty[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3); see also id.

§ 2702(c)(1) (specifying police officers as protected persons). “Bodily injury”

is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” Id. §

2301. This Court has instructed:

      [I]n a prosecution for aggravated assault on an officer, the
      Commonwealth has no obligation to establish that the officer
      actually suffered a bodily injury; rather, the Commonwealth must
      establish only an attempt to inflict bodily injury, and this intent
      may be shown by circumstances which reasonably suggest that
      [an appellant] intended to cause injury.

                                      -9-
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Commonwealth v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497, 502 (Pa. Super. 2013) (emphasis

in original; citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 560 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc)

(same).

     The Crimes Code provides that a person commits simple assault if he

“attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily

injury to another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1); accord Commonwealth v.

Marti, 779 A.2d 1177, 1182-83 (Pa. Super. 2001) (explaining a defendant’s

assault on a police officer may warrant a conviction of simple assault under

Section 2701(a)(1), and a conviction of aggravated assault under Section

2702(a)(3)).

     Instantly, the trial court explained its rejection of Appellant’s sufficiency

challenge:

            [T]he evidentiary record overwhelmingly establishes
     [Appellant’s] guilt [of aggravated assault and simple assault]. …
     Officer Kinnel testified that as he approached [Appellant],
     announcing that [Appellant] was being arrested, [Appellant]
     pushed Officer Kinnel out of the doorway to the apartment
     building, onto the floor of the porch, and then turned to run into
     his apartment on the second floor. The incident was captured on
     cell phone video and clearly depicted [Appellant] pushing Officer
     Kinnel and Officer Kinnel falling out of the doorway onto the porch
     floor.

           [The defense theory at trial,] … to justify [Appellant’s]
     physical contact with Officer Kinnel, [was that Appellant
     purportedly] was trying to aid or respond to [Appellant’s]
     mother[,] who had also fallen onto the porch and was lying behind
     Officer Kinnel. Unfortunately for [Appellant], the video captured
     [Appellant] pushing Officer Kinnel back, then turning and
     running in the opposite direction into the apartment building

                                     - 10 -
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      where [Appellant] then ran up to his second floor apartment.
      Thus, the [defense’s theory] as to [Appellant’s] intent for creating
      contact with Officer Kinnel was contradicted by the video.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/5/22, at 4 (emphasis added).        The record and law

support the trial court’s reasoning.    Thus, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in rejecting Appellant’s sufficiency claim.

      We further disagree with Appellant’s reliance on Wertelet, supra, to

support reversal of his convictions. The defendant in Wertelet kicked the

arresting officer in the shin while resisting arrest. Wertelet, 696 A.2d at 208,

212. We held that this “relatively harmless physical contact” did not constitute

“bodily injury” as defined by the aggravated assault statute. Id. at 210, 212.

However, we did not squarely address in Wertelet whether the defendant

attempted to cause bodily injury to the officer.

      As discussed above, it was the Commonwealth’s burden to establish that

Appellant attempted to inflict bodily injury, and such intent “may be shown

by circumstances which reasonably suggest [Appellant] intended to cause

injury.” Rahman, supra; see also Brown, supra. The evidence in this case

stands in stark contrast to Wertelet.         Appellant (1) threatened to “beat

[Officer Kinnel’s] ass”; (2) ran from Officer Kinnel to prevent him from lawfully

arresting Appellant for disorderly conduct; and (3) shoved Officer Kinnel out

the doorway of Appellant’s home, causing Officer Kinnel to fall on a

concrete porch and hit his head on a metal table leg. See generally

N.T., 11/1/21, at 106-18, supra. This evidence was sufficient to establish

                                     - 11 -
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Appellant’s attempt to inflict bodily injury. Indeed, Appellant injured Officer

Kinnel. Id. at 118-19, 120 (Officer Kinnel stating the taser “wires actually

wrapped up around my neck” (mildly shocking him and causing pain), he “hit

the back of [his] head on … the metal table leg,” and the fall caused the officer

to be “a little” disoriented).

      Finally, Appellant’s decision to flee from police and attempt to hide in

his home supported an inference of his consciousness of guilt.               See

Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 627 (Pa. 2010) (flight and

concealment can constitute circumstantial proof of consciousness of guilt).

Appellant’s first issue lacks merit.

      In his second issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in rejecting

his Batson challenge. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-18. According to Appellant,

      a prima facie case was established, and the prosecution was asked
      by the [trial c]ourt to present a neutral explanation for its use of
      peremptory challenges for three jurors. Said explanations were
      presented. The [c]ourt challenged the prosecution’s neutral
      explanations, and seemingly disavowed said presented reasons,
      but ultimately only truly made a determination on one of the three
      jurors[, i.e., juror number 6,] before asking if placing … juror
      [number] 6 back on the jury would solve the issue. … [T]he trial
      court erred when it failed its duty to determine if Appellant had
      established purposeful discrimination as to all three of the juror
      strikes that were challenged by Appellant, instead only following
      through on the required analysis for one (1) of the three (3)
      challenges.

Id. at 18.

      When reviewing an issue involving a Batson challenge, we examine

“whether the trial court’s legal conclusions are correct and whether its factual

                                       - 12 -
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findings are clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 177 A.3d 963,

970 (Pa. Super. 2018).

     Great deference must be given to the trial court’s finding as to an
     absence of discriminatory intent in peremptory challenges, and
     this finding will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Such
     deference is warranted because the trial court is in the position to
     make credibility determinations when viewing the demeanor of
     the prosecutor exercising the peremptory challenges.

Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 602 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted).

     The evaluation of a Batson challenge involves a three-prong test:

     [F]irst, the [a]ppellant must make a prima facie showing that the
     circumstances give rise to an inference that the prosecutor struck
     one or more prospective jurors on account of race; second, if the
     prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor
     to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror(s) at
     issue; and third, the trial court must then make the ultimate
     determination of whether the defense has carried its burden of
     proving purposeful discrimination.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 510, 529-30 (Pa. 2009) (citing

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97)).     A trial court should consider the “totality of

circumstances” when determining whether the prosecution acted with

discriminatory intent or engaged in purposeful discrimination. Id. at 531-32.

     The Commonwealth counters:

     Appellant utterly failed to present any of the necessary
     information to make the required prima facie showing. [According
     to] Appellant[,] … three stricken jurors had “Hispanic, Latino last
     names” and “[t]hree challenges out of seven are Latinos.” N.T.,
     5/31/22, at 42-43. Appellant never identified the race of the other
     four potential jurors struck by the Commonwealth or the race of
     the jurors struck by the defense, nor did he provide any
     information about the racial composition of the final jury selected.

                                    - 13 -
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     See Trial Court Opinion, 10/5/22, at 2. Because Appellant failed
     to make the required record to satisfy the first [Batson] prong,
     he has failed to properly preserve his claim for appellate review,
     and is not entitled to relief. See [Commonwealth v.] Hackett,
     735 A.2d [688,] 694 [(Pa. 1999)]; Commonwealth v. Jones,
     668 A.2d 491, 518 (Pa. 1995) (finding appellant failed to create
     adequate record to satisfy requirement of establishing prima facie
     Batson case); see also Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d
     1176, 1182 (Pa. 1993) [(overruled on other grounds by
     Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 781 (Pa. 2014)).]

Commonwealth Brief at 11 (footnote omitted).

     Similarly, the trial court explained:

     At the conclusion of the jury selection process, defense counsel
     raised a Batson objection claiming that the Commonwealth had
     made preemptory challenges striking three (3) jurors who had
     apparent Hispanic last names, specifically jurors [number] 6, 12
     and 18. Defense counsel did not make a presentation with regard
     to the total number of Hispanic jurors in the jury pool or the
     composition of the selected jury.

            [The trial court] first requested the District Attorney to
     present her non-discriminatory basis for making her selections.
     In defense of her selections, the District Attorney noted that there
     were Hispanic jurors seated on the jury that she did not strike.
     The District Attorney also stated that jurors number 12 and
     18 were stricken because of answers they provided on the
     juror questionnaire form which indicated they were
     negative towards the police. As far as juror number 6, the
     District Attorney indicated that that selection was random, as she
     had no negative information about the juror; and in fact, the
     District Attorney commented that she believed that juror number
     6 would be a favorable juror for the Commonwealth.

           [The trial court] overruled the Commonwealth[’s]
     preemptory challenge of juror number 6, [and] add[ed] him back
     to the trial jury. No further discussion was presented by counsel[,
     so the trial court] asked defense counsel: “Do I resolve this
     issue if I put [juror] number 6 back on the jury?” Defense
     counsel responded: “I would be satisfied with that.”
     Thereafter, [the trial court] again inquired of defense counsel: “So
     you’re done with the objection?” Defense counsel responded:

                                    - 14 -
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      “There is satisfaction on the record.” The above exchange
      indicated that the objection was resolved to [defense] counsel’s
      satisfaction.

             No post-trial motion was filed. Therefore, this alleged
      Ba[ts]on error was not preserved or resolved in a post-sentence
      motion. Therefore, we believe that the issue is waived on appeal.
      [See Jones, 668 A.2d at 518, supra (holding defendants raising
      Batson claim have the burden of “creat[ing] an adequate record
      at trial” with respect to the matter); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
      (issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).] Further,
      because defense counsel did not respond to or challenge
      the proffer made by the District Attorney that the strikes
      for jurors [number] 12 and 18 were for non-discriminatory
      reasons, [the trial court] cannot delve further into a Batson
      analysis.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/5/22, at 2-3 (emphasis added; some capitalization

altered).

      The record supports the trial court’s analysis. See id.; see also N.T.,

5/31/22, at 43-45, and id. at 46 (trial court stating, “we don’t know if [the

jurors are] Hispanic or not.”). Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the trial court

did not “err[] when it failed its duty to determine if Appellant had established

purposeful discrimination as to all three of the juror strikes.” Appellant’s Brief

at 18. Appellant’s second issue does not merit relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2023

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