Court Opinion

ID: 9860693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:29:44.127552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:29.267820
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Givan, C.J.
I respectively dissent from the majority in this case. I would follow State ex rel. Beaman v. Circuit Court of Pike County, (1951) 229 Ind. 190, 96 N.E.2d 671 and State ex rel. Acker V. Reeves, (1951) 229 Ind. 126, 95 N.E.2d 838 and wholly agree with the general principle of separation of powers set out in those cases.
However I also agree with the respondent court in this case that since the ruling in Beaman and Acker the legislature amended the statute so that the results of a recount are forwarded to the legislature only “for such action as that body may find appropriate.” IC 3-1-27-14.
All of this is clearly set out in the majority opinion. However the majority opinion also states:
“This distinction pointed out by the respondent is not germane to the constitutional issue presented, because the gravamen of the constitutional prohibition is not the binding effect of the court’s action upon the Legislature, but the participation by the court in a process solely reserved by the Constitution to the legislative branch.”
I do not agree with the majority in this regard. A reasonable extension of such philosophy would be that the counting of the votes by the election boards in the initial election would be an invasion of the legislative prerogative and that the various legislative bodies should choose their members either without benefit of election or that all votes cast would be forwarded to them for official counting. I cannot espouse such a principle.
It is obvious that it has always been the legislative intent to consider the vote of the public as the primary requisite for attaining a seat in a legislative body. A recount is merely *301an extension of this voting process and has been provided for by the legislature in an effort to assure the correctness of the vote count. This is in no way an invasion of the legislative prerogative for, as is clearly demonstrated in the majority opinion, neither the original vote nor the recount are absolutely binding on the legislative body. After the results of the voting have been tabulated and certified to the legislature, that body is then constitutionally free to pass upon the qualifications of the persons involved.
It seems that the legislature’s intent is clear that they desire the election boards and courts to function in the manner set out in the statute. I would dissolve the temporary writ of prohibition and would permit the trial court to function under the statute.
Hunter, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 362 N.E.2d 477.