Court Opinion

ID: 9379043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 15:05:02.60647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:36.115746
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13326

 CHURCH OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF WAYLAND & others1 vs. MARILYN J.
           HEINRICH & others2 (and a companion case3).

         Middlesex.     December 5, 2022. - March 14, 2023.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Church. Cemetery.     Contract, Church, Construction of contract.
     Common Law.

     Civil action commenced in the Middlesex Division of the
Probate and Family Court Department on August 29, 2017.

     The case was heard by Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr., J., sitting
under statutory authority, on motions for summary judgment.

     1 The Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts and Saint
Philopateer Mercurius & Saint Mina Coptic Orthodox Church, Inc.

     2 John Doe Heinrich No. 1, John Doe Heinrich No. 2, Mary
Wilson, John Doe Wilson, John Doe Hodgins, Christopher Woodcock,
John Doe Woodcock No. 1, John Doe Woodcock No. 2, Carolyn J.
Kiradjieff, John Doe Jobes No. 1, John Doe Jobes No. 2, Mary Ann
Montague, John Doe Turner No. 1, John Doe Turner No. 2, Judy
Mosedale, John Doe Mosedale No. 1, John Doe Mosedale No. 2,
Stephanie P. Edwards, John Doe Edwards No. 1, and John Doe
Edwards No. 2.

     3 Mary J. Wilson & others   vs.   Church of the Holy Spirit of
Wayland & others.
                                                                     2

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
June 28, 2019.

     A motion to dismiss was heard by Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr.,
J.

     After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

     William F. Gramer (Nicholas K. Holmes also present) for
Marilyn J. Heinrich & others.
     Jennifer Grace Miller for Church of the Holy Spirit of
Wayland & another.
     Audrey Y. Botros for Saint Philopateer Mercurius & Saint
Mina Coptic Orthodox Church, Inc.

     LOWY, J.   This case concerns the scope of rights conveyed

by a set of burial certificates, as sold by a church to its

parishioners.    After dwindling membership compelled the Church

of the Holy Spirit of Wayland (Church of the Holy Spirit, or

church) to close and sell its property, do the certificates

permit the church to disinter and relocate the cremated remains

buried on that property despite the objections of the decedents'

families?

     Although we acknowledge the sensitive -- even sacred --

nature of the subject matter of this dispute, we conclude that

the burial certificates' unambiguous language permits the

disinterment and that no common-law right held by the families

prevents it.    We therefore affirm.

     Background.   The material facts are undisputed.   The Church

of the Holy Spirit was established in 1961 as a parish of the
                                                                     3

Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts.   In the late 1960s, the

church set aside a portion of its land for use as a "Memorial

Garden," also referred to as a "Churchyard."   Parishioners could

arrange for cremated remains (cremains) to be interred in the

Churchyard by purchasing a certificate from the church.       Between

1969 and 2008, a number of such certificates were sold.       The

one-page certificates each granted the purchaser a right to one

or more interments that were "subject to the regulations of the

Churchyard now or hereafter in force."

    The referenced regulations were wide ranging.      They

covered, among other things, the Churchyard's operations and

layout, groundskeeping restrictions, permitted styles of

memorial plaques, and procedures for interment.    The regulations

also contemplated disinterment of cremains, specifying that

disinterment was forbidden "without the consent of [the Church

of the Holy Spirit]."   And, consistent with the certificates,

the regulations further provided that they were subject to "be

amended or revised from time to time" by the church.

    Beginning in 2000, the church's membership began to wane.

As the years passed, its financial difficulties mounted, and in

March of 2015, the congregation concluded that it was "unable to

function as a viable church" and voted to close.    The church

subsequently entered into negotiations with St. Mark Coptic

Orthodox Church of Boston (St. Mark) for sale of its property,
                                                                     4

including the Churchyard.     Although St. Mark agreed to meet the

asking price, it objected to taking ownership of the Churchyard

as it was, largely because the Coptic Church's religious beliefs

do not permit cremation.     The church ultimately agreed to

disinter and relocate the cremains as a condition of the sale.4

St. Mark took the deed to the Wayland property in 2016, and

shortly thereafter it resold the property and assigned its

rights under the purchase and sale agreement to Saint

Philopateer Mercurius & Saint Mina Coptic Orthodox Church, Inc.

(St. Philopateer).   For the same religious reasons, St.

Philopateer shared St. Mark's objections to the cremains

remaining on the property.

     At the time of the sale of the land to St. Mark, the

cremains of at least forty-nine individuals were interred in the

Churchyard.   The church contacted the families of the deceased

and requested their consent for relocation and reinterment of

the cremains, to be undertaken at the church's expense.

Although most consented, family members representing the

cremains of twelve individuals (hereinafter, families) did not.5

     4 The purchase and sale agreement memorializing that term
further specified that the church's obligation to remove the
cremains would survive the sale's closing.

     5 The next of kin for certain interred individuals could not
be located.
                                                                    5

    At an impasse, the church subsequently amended the

Churchyard regulations.   The newly enacted provisions

specifically authorized the church to shutter the Churchyard and

relocate the cremains:

    "If the Church of the Holy Spirit ceases operations or
    ceases operations at the property where the Churchyard
    Memorial Garden is located, then the Vestry or Executive
    Committee, as the case may be, may cause the Churchyard
    Memorial Garden to be discontinued or moved to an alternate
    location, and/or cause all cremated remains located in the
    Churchyard Memorial Garden to be disinterred and relocated
    to one or more other locations within the Diocese of
    Massachusetts or returned to the families of the cremains."

    The church and St. Philopateer then filed a complaint in

the Probate and Family Court seeking a declaration that the

regulations, as amended, permitted removal of the cremains.

Certain members of the families who had objected to the proposed

disinterment asserted counterclaims for breach of contract,

tortious interference with contractual relations, and violations

of G. L. c. 93A.   As those counterclaims lay beyond the court's

jurisdiction, they were dismissed and refiled in the Superior

Court, with an additional claim for violation of the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing.   The presiding Superior Court judge

was then specially assigned to sit as a Probate and Family Court

judge so that the two related actions could be consolidated.

    Upon cross motions for summary judgment in the Probate and

Family Court case, the judge entered judgment dismissing the

families' claims and declaring that the church had the right to
                                                                     6

disinter and relocate the cremains in the Churchyard.6    The judge

reasoned that the regulations entitled the church to close the

Churchyard, thereby extinguishing any common-law rights the

families may have in the burial plots, which could exist only

"so long as the place continues as a burial ground."     Trefry v.

Younger, 226 Mass. 5, 9 (1917).     The families filed a timely

appeal, and in a published opinion, the Appeals Court reversed.

See Church of the Holy Spirit of Wayland v. Heinrich, 101 Mass.

App. Ct. 32, 53 (2022).     We granted the church's petition for

further appellate review.

     Discussion.   "Summary judgment is appropriate where there

is no material issue of fact in dispute and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.     Our review of a

decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo" (quotation

and citation omitted).    Le Fort Enters., Inc. v. Lantern 18,

LLC, 491 Mass. 144, 148–149 (2023).

     1.   The certificates.   The rights and responsibilities of

the parties are governed by the language of the certificates,

which are indisputably contracts.    See McAndrew v. Quirk, 329

Mass. 423, 425 (1952) (burial rights are "subject to whatever

conditions were contained in the instrument [granting the]

interest in the lot"); Green v. Danahy, 223 Mass. 1, 4 (1916)

     6 The judge also granted a parallel motion to dismiss the
claims in the Superior Court case.
                                                                    7

(applying contract principles to dispute over obligations under

burial certificate).   "When the words of a contract are clear,

they must be construed in their usual and ordinary sense

. . . ."   General Convention of the New Jerusalem in the U.S. of

Am., Inc. v. MacKenzie, 449 Mass. 832, 835 (2007).   Such

language, "plainly and intelligibly stated[,] . . . is the best

possible evidence of the intent and meaning of those who are

bound by the contract, and of those who are to receive the

benefit of it."   Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27, 31 (1814).

     The certificates are exceedingly straightforward.     They

grant "right[s] of . . . interments" and state that any such

right conveyed is subject to regulation by the church.7

Importantly, they further provide that the church may amend the

regulations after the contract is executed, a right that is

reiterated in the regulations themselves.   Such terms are not

unique in burial contracts.   See McAndrew, 329 Mass. at 425;

     7 The certificates and regulations lack any language
associated with property rights or covenants that run with the
land. Compare Trefry, 226 Mass. at 8 (burial rights conveyed
"under seal and in the form of a grant" and "run to the grantee
'and his heirs forever'"). Cf. Feeley v. Andrews, 191 Mass.
313, 315-316 (1906) (burial easement "can be created only by
grant under seal"). Although the regulations contain a
reference to "perpetual care," that term is explicitly defined
as "simple maintenance of the Churchyard, keeping individual
lots and the Memorial Grounds free of fallen branches and trees,
trimming of trees when necessary, and maintaining a path through
the Churchyard." This language evinces no intent to convey a
permanent property right.
                                                                      8

Green, 223 Mass. at 4 (certificate for burial in Catholic

cemetery stated right was "subject always to the following

regulations, or such others as may be from time to time

prescribed").

    Neither the certificates nor the regulations themselves

place any limits on the nature and extent of permissible

regulation of the Churchyard, and accordingly, the regulations

reach a wide range of matters related to the Churchyard,

including disinterment.     Not only do the regulations contemplate

disinterment, but by requiring the church's consent to disinter,

they do so in a manner that makes clear that the church

exercises control over the prospect.     Further, the certificates

put no constraints on the church's ability to amend the

regulations as it sees fit.

    In sum, there is nothing in the plain language of the

certificates and attendant regulations that prohibits

disinterment by the church.     It was permitted under the

certificates to regulate the Churchyard and amend the

regulations, and it did so.     Its planned course of action

pursuant to the amended regulations therefore is, as a simple

matter of contract law, permissible.     See Green, 223 Mass. at 4

(applying contract law to conclude that, where party to burial

certificate committed breach of contract, disinterment was

permitted).     Cf. Feeley v. Andrews, 191 Mass. 313, 316–317
                                                                     9

(1906) (licensee could not maintain action for damages over

disinterred remains).

    2.   Burial law.     The families respond that the church's

contractual authority under the certificates and regulations are

circumscribed by our common law.    They urge us to recognize that

certain trust-like property rights are held by all families of

those interred, rights that the church may not regulate out of

existence by contract.

    Although entanglement with State action prevents it from

being squarely on point, Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1

(1871), is nevertheless our most apposite case.    Sohier

concerned the plan of Trinity Church (Trinity) to sell its land

in Boston and relocate to a new location in the city.     Id. at

16-17.   The prevailing law at the time compelled Trinity to

obtain legislative authorization for the sale.    Id. at 17.

    Under Trinity's buildings were dozens of tombs, and the

"representatives" of four of those tombs -- presumably family

members of the deceased -- brought suit to enjoin the sale and

prevent disinterment of the tombs' remains.    Id. at 2, 6-9.

Resolution of the matter required us to consider both the extent

of the power available to Trinity, as authorized by the

Legislature, and the nature of the rights held by the

plaintiffs.   As to Trinity, we concluded that authorization of

the sale and removal of the remains was constitutional under the
                                                                    10

Legislature's police powers, given that the Legislature had

determined that leaving the remains in place would be a danger

to public health.   Id. at 21-22.   As to the families, we noted

that burial rights are "peculiar . . . and are not very

dissimilar to rights in pews," that is, "qualified and

usufructuary right[s], being a right to occupy under certain

restrictions."   Id. at 20-21.

     Weighing those qualified rights against the Legislature's

empowerment of Trinity to consummate the sale, we concluded that

Trinity was "justified in removing the bodies and remains

interred under their church."8   Id. at 22.   We further observed

that there were many such situations where the need of a church

to close and sell its property would permit, or even require,

any remains on that property to be relocated:

     "There are other causes which are obviously sufficient to
     authorize the removal of bodies and tombs placed under a
     church. The edifice may be consumed by fire, or otherwise
     destroyed; or it may decay; or the place may become
     unsuitable for such a building; or for various other
     reasons it may be proper to abandon or sell it. And in
     such cases it would be improper to leave the tombs and the
     remains deposited in them; obvious propriety would require

     8 In so concluding, we cited with approval several cases
from other jurisdictions that authorized disinterment under
similar circumstances. See Sohier, 109 Mass. at 21-22, citing,
e.g., Windt v. German Reformed Church, 4 Sand. Ch. 471 (N.Y.
1847) ("it was held that the sepulture of friends and relatives
in a cemetery belonging to a religious society confers no right
or title upon the survivors, and they cannot prevent a sale of
such cemetery by the corporation and the removal of the interred
remains, when such removal is in all respects conducted
according to law").
                                                                  11

    that the remains should be removed to some suitable place;
    and . . . the owners of the tombs and the friends of the
    deceased have no title to the lands, but only an interest
    in the structures and in their proper use . . . ."9

Id. at 22-23.

    While we realize that there is no State action or

authorization by the Legislature here, the same principles

discussed in Sohier apply.   Sohier does address the nature of

the rights of decedents' families, and whatever common-law

property rights the families have here can be no more extensive

than those analyzed there.   Applying Sohier's principles, we

conclude that the failing membership and financial unviability

of the Church of the Holy Spirit -- both facts that are

undisputed on the summary judgment record -- make it "proper to

. . . sell" the church's land and permit it to relocate the

cremains as a necessary condition of that sale.   Id. at 23.

    This conclusion is further supported by our cases regarding

pew rights, which, as Sohier pointed out, are analogues to

burial rights.   Pew owners are holders of "qualified, subsidiary

and dependent" rights, and our law has consistently held that if

a church closes "not wantonly or unreasonably or with intent to

    9  Presumably because of takings concerns, in this paragraph
we also noted that, in relocating the remains, "the public
authorities do not violate [the plaintiffs'] rights of property,
if proper provision is made for compensation or substitution."
As the Church of the Holy Spirit is a private actor, no similar
issue arises here.
                                                                   12

injure the pew holders . . . , the pew owner is without remedy."

Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Soc'y v. Bowdoin Sq. Baptist

Soc'y, 212 Mass. 198, 200–201 (1912) (collecting cases).

Indeed, we have held this to be true in cases of church closure

due to failing membership:

     "Now as every member of a religious society may at any time
     dissolve his membership at his pleasure, it may often
     happen that the members of a religious society may withdraw
     therefrom in such numbers as to disable the society to
     maintain public worship; and when a religious society or
     parish is thus disabled, it is clear that the pewholders
     would have no cause of complaint if the society or parish
     should abandon their meetinghouse, and wholly cease to
     occupy it as a place of public worship."

Fassett v. First Parish in Boylston, 19 Pick. 361, 363 (1837).

     Review of our limited cases addressing burial rights

reveals no common-law rights of the kind asserted by the

families.10   Given this lack of Massachusetts authority, the

families urge us to adopt the reasoning of Hines v. State, 126

Tenn. 1 (1911).   In Hines, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined

     10 The next closest case we can identify is Messina v.
LaRosa, 337 Mass. 438 (1958), where a decedent's second wife
scrubbed the deceased first wife's dates of birth and death off
of the family tombstone and relocated it to a new plot for her
own use. Id. at 440. The second wife changed the dates on the
tombstone, and not the name, because -- improbably -- both women
were named Josephine LaRosa. Id. at 438-440. We acknowledged
that the first wife's sister had standing to sue for restoration
of the tombstone based on the sensational facts of the case,
tellingly disclaiming reliance on any generally applicable
common-law rights: "This [holding] is not an application of any
rule of property law, but is a recognition of principles of
ethics, propriety, and common decency which equity is peculiarly
qualified to enforce." Id. at 442.
                                                                   13

the rights of family members in a family burial plot on land

that had passed from family ownership to strangers.    It held

that the family had the right to access and maintain the plot,

proclaiming the existence of trust-like rights:

     "When land has been definitely appropriated to burial
     purposes, it cannot be conveyed or devised as other
     property, so as to interfere with the use and purposes to
     which it has been devoted. When once dedicated to burial
     purposes, and interments have there been made, the then
     owner holds the title to some extent in trust for the
     benefit of those entitled to burial in it, and the heir at
     law, devisee, or vendee takes the property subject to this
     trust."

Id. at 4-5.

     Even if we were to put aside that the certificate and

regulations control, and Sohier's teaching that no common-law

rights preclude disinterment here, we would still think that

Hines is a poor fit for the case at bar.11   The land at issue

there was a small family burial plot, those interred there were

buried when an individual in the family was its fee owner, and

the context of the discussion was a criminal prosecution.    The

dispute was not between a church and parishioners over burial in

a churchyard, and there was no governing contract or

     11Hines was considered by the Appeals Court in Sanford v.
Vinal, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 476 (1990), on facts that were much
more similar than those of this case. The Sanford court never
reached the issue whether Massachusetts should adopt Hines,
however, because the family burial plot in question had been so
long abandoned that it could not be located. See id. at 486-
487.
                                                                   14

certificate, nor any regulations authorized by such a contract.

Moreover, Hines no longer even governs burial ground closures

and disinterment in its home State, having been superseded by

statute.12   See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 46-4-101 et seq. (establishing

statutory scheme for closing burial grounds and relocating

remains).

     We see no need to adopt Hines here, where we may

comfortably decide the case by applying Massachusetts law.

Nowhere does our law forbid the Church of the Holy Spirit from

disinterring the cremains in the Churchyard.   Rather, the

closest analogues in our case law provide that this is the type

of situation where relocation of the cremains is proper.13   See

Sohier, 109 Mass. at 22-23.

     12In a concurrence in an earlier case, Chief Justice John
Shields, the author of Hines, opined that burial grounds'
"sacred character" rendered them "forever withdrawn from all the
incidents to which other real estate may be liable," including
eminent domain. See Memphis State Line R.R. v. Forest Hill
Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn. 400, 422 (1906). Chief Justice Shields
was buried in a family plot on his estate in 1934, and just a
few years after his passing, his remains were disinterred and
relocated when the Tennessee Valley Authority built the Cherokee
Dam and flooded the area. See Paine, Cemetery Law: Moving
Chief Justice Shields, 49 Tenn. B.J. 35 (Sept. 2013).

     13In light of this conclusion, we also reject the families'
argument that the church's amendment of the Churchyard
regulations violated the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Cf. T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 456
Mass. 562, 573 (2010).
                                                                  15

     In other circumstances, a different result might obtain.

As with past disputes over burial rights, future disputes will

turn on the particulars of each case, including the language of

the instrument granting the rights, see Feeley, 191 Mass. at

316–317 (documents in evidence established, at best, revocable

license to be buried); the relationship between the parties, see

G. L. c. 114, § 32 (establishing statutory right to burial "in

any burial lot or tomb of which [one's] spouse was seized at any

time during marriage"); the status of the burial ground, see

Sohier, 109 Mass. at 21-23; and any other relevant equitable

considerations, see Messina v. LaRosa, 337 Mass. 438, 442

(1958).   On the particulars of the case before us, summary

judgment was properly granted.14

     Conclusion.   Although we resolve this case by applying

long-standing legal principles, we, of course, recognize the

human element involved.   We also reiterate that in other

circumstances a different result might obtain.   Disinterring the

remains of one's ancestors will forever be a sensitive,

difficult prospect.   To repeat our words from Antoniewicz v. Del

Prete, 340 Mass. 742, 743 (1960):

     14As we decide the case on nonconstitutional grounds, we
need not consider the argument that a declaration that the
cremains may stay in place would violate the church's or St.
Philopateer's constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion.
                                                                  16

    "The court is fully aware that a decent respect for the
    memory of those who have been buried requires that there be
    no disturbance of the remains of one deceased unless the
    law as applied to the particular circumstances compels such
    a conclusion. Here, with considerable reluctance, that
    conclusion seems necessary to the court."

    The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.15

                                   So ordered.

    15 The Superior Court's declaration included certain
deadlines for compliance. Should the parties believe that the
terms of the declaration require modification owing to the
interval between its initial entry and entry of the rescript
from this court, they may move for modification in the Superior
Court.