Court Opinion

ID: 9474334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:54:32.643773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:01.661050
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
When Keith Gayle last came before this court over six years ago, he was found, incorrectly in my opinion, not to have exhausted his state remedies. Gayle v. Le-Fevre, 613 F.2d 21 (2d Cir.1980). The panel there held, with reliance on Johnson v. Metz, 609 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir.1979), that “considerations of ‘federalism ... as a basis for the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies [are] particularly cogent in cases such as this where the conduct of the state trial judge is at issue.’ ” 613 F.2d at 23 (quoting Johnson, 609 F.2d at 1055). Having exhausted his state remedies so as to take into account those “considerations of ‘federalism’ ” and here on the merits at long last, Gayle is still haunted by “principles of comity and federalism” which are said by the majority today to “warrant our respectful attention.” I had thought that those principles had been fully taken into consideration, if not well served, by the six years’ delay in this court’s getting to the merits of the case, especially since the foundation stone on which Gayle’s return to the state courts rested, Johnson v. Metz (and, implicitly, Gayle’s own case), had been overruled by this court sitting en banc *814in Daye v. Attorney General, 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir.1982). Denial of a fair trial, whether by a trial judge’s demonstrated bias, excessive intrusiveness, and unmistakable partisanship or by a mob-dominated atmosphere was, after all, a denial of due process of law cognizable in habeas corpus, as I thought it had been since Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543 (1923). Yet the “[principles of fundamental fairness” which represent, in the majority’s opinion, “the constitutional litmus test we must apply” still are counterbalanced by “principles of comity and federalism.” Today’s opinion makes our power to use the writ of habeas corpus to guarantee the due process right to a fair trial border on the ceremonial.
The question before the court is whether Keith Gayle had a fair trial. Jamaican in background, an illegal alien, Gayle’s cross-examination by an overbearing prosecutor who was all too chummy with the trial judge takes the nice line of inquiring about Rastafarians without a shred of evidence that Gayle was a Rastafarian, associated with Rastafarians, or even knew Rastafari-ans. Gayle, asked what they are by the prosecutor — over an overruled objection— replies that they are “some Jamaicans.... I see them on the street. I know they’re Jamaicans.” The trial judge whose conduct the majority finds not to have deprived Gayle of a fair trial intervenes to ask Gayle, “What are they, animals?”
Even the printed page cannot take away from the biting and devastating effect such a question would have coming from a trial judge, especially when it is followed by the prosecutor’s asking, “Are they assassins?,” and his overt implication in a highly improper question — absent underlying proof —“Didn’t you come to this country to kill Dennis Nunes.”1 In overruling the defense objection to this question and denying a motion for a mistrial, the trial judge forgot a little piece of basic law that goes to fundamental fairness — that a question asked on cross-examination that, without foundation, assumes facts in controversy or not in evidence is improper. 3 J. Wig-more, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 780 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). The erroneously permitted line of cross-examination and the judge’s remark were exacerbated in argument by the language the prosecutor used in asking the jury to consider how Gayle would behave outside the courtroom: “Would he be the animal, the cool, sly animal that can saddle [sic] up to a man, put his arm around the shoulder and discharge a bullet into his gut ... ?”
I will restate what I said in my original dissent in capsulating the facts:
The prosecution’s entire case rested on the following: the testimony of two eyewitnesses, Gayle’s flight when apprehended, and his supposed oral confession to Detective Bankhead immediately after the apprehension. The defendant took the stand, gave an alibi, but produced no witnesses. One of the eyewitnesses (Jones) [had] denied in his first statement that he was even at the party where the homicide took place, admitted on cross-examination that he had had five drinks of 150-proof Jamaican rum before he arrived at the party, and had bad eyesight in one eye. The other prosecution eyewitness (Foster) claimed that he did not discuss the case with anyone, including his cousin, Jones, until a couple of weeks before the trial, more than two and a half years after the killing. Tr. 401-03. Gayle’s running upon apprehension was possibly explicable by the fact that he was an illegal alien and the apprehending detectives were in plain clothes. The detective’s testimony as to a practically unsolicited, unwritten, un-witnessed confession, coupled with no inquiry as to motive, seems suspect on its face. The trial totally turned on credibility. The one piece of evidence that might have substantiated the eyewitnesses’ version of the killing by demonstrating powder burns — the decedent Nune’s [sic] clothing — was not produced even *815though one would assume it was kept as evidence. In such a case, the judge’s role assumed great importance.
613 F.2d at 25. I hold to the view that “the state court trial judge was all over this case like a tent.” Id. I refer to the examples from the trial transcript cited or quoted in my previous dissent, id. at 25-27, and add a few illustrations here:
1. The judge’s frequent interference [here defense counsel is cross-examining one of the investigating police officers who arrived at the scene]:
Mr Galian: I would like to have that marked for identification, your Honor.
The Court: All right, the patrolman’s memorandum book marked for identification.
(Memorandum book marked Defendant’s Exhibit A for identification.)
Q. Now, Patrolman O’Malley, would you look at that memorandum book at that page that is now marked for identification, and tell us, is there anything, any reference in that as to any — the names of any witnesses who were at the scene when you arrived?
The Court: As to what?
Mr. Galian: As to the names of any witnesses who were at the scene.
The Court: Just one minute, now. Did you testify you took the names of witnesses?
The Witness: No, sir, I didn’t.
Mr. Rosenbaum, In fact, he testified nobody would tell him anything.
The Court: That’s right.
Mr. Galian: I’m merely asking—
The Court: Did you write names of witnesses in that book?
The Witness: No, sir, I did not.
The Court: Did you have any witnesses—
The Witness: No, sir, I did not.
The Court: —whose names were to be written anywhere?
The Witness: No, sir, I did not.
Mr. Galian: That is the information I would like to have, your Honor.
The Court: You want him to testify to that again? Say it again, please.
Mr. Galian: That was the information I wanted.
The Court: Did you get the names of any witnesses?
The Witness: No, sir.
The Court: And the people told you, the people who were standing around said they knew nothing about it?
The Witness: That’s correct, sir, no one knew anything.
The Court: Yes, go ahead.
2. The judge’s disparate treatment of defense and prosecution counsel. The first example involves defense counsel cross-examining the detective who had apprehended Gayle, and who claimed another detective had read Gayle his Miranda rights, but who testified that “to us it’s a joke with the advisement of the rights ... on the street, right on the spur of the moment.”
Q. Well, now, is it your opinion, Officer, now, that the reading of the rights to an apprehended—
The Court: Do you want to finish that?
Q. —to a person who has been apprehended on the street is a foolhardy gesture?
Mr. Rosenbaum: Objection.
The Court: Now, do you want to press for an answer to that question?
Mr. Galian: Yes, I do.
The Court: The district attorney’s objection is sustained. We couldn’t care less in this courtroom about the detective’s opinion or yours or mine or the district attorney’s. It is the law, Mr. Galian, that a suspect or a defendant be advised of his rights under the law, and the police officer indicated that he had his own idea of the circumstances under which this has to be done, but he said he complied. The defendant was advised of his rights. What his opinion is of it, we are not concerned with that at all.
Mr. Galian: Your Honor—
*816The Court: The objection is sustained.
Mr. Galian: Your Honor—
The Court: No, no, counselor, excuse me, sir, I have ruled.
Next question, please.
The Court: Mr. Galian, forgive me, please. The rules of the Appellate Division—
Mr. Galian: May I approach the bench?
The Court: Excuse me, sir. The Appellate Division rules require that when the Court makes a ruling, that ruling is not to be argued by counsel. I would not like to violate the rules of the Appellate Division of this court. I have made a ruling. If I want argument, Mr. Galian, I will ask for argument.
Now, I made a simple ruling upon a simple objection. I made my ruling. I will have no argument on it.
Mr. Galian: May we approach the bench on it, your Honor?
The Court: All right, come up.
(Discussion at the bench off the record among Court and counsel.)
The Court: Now, counselor, if I thought that you were going to approach the bench to argue my ruling, I would have ordered you to proceed. Now, please proceed, counselor. I have made a ruling.
Mr. Galian: Your Honor, I don’t recall the answer—
The Court: Mr. Galian, forgive me again, we are not concerned—
Mr. Galian: I am asking now—
The Court: Mr. Galian, don’t interrupt me. I do not want argument on my ruling. This police officer was asked about his opinion of the law. We are not concerned with it. Now, Mr. Galian, you are pacing up—
Mr. Galian: Your Honor—
The Court: Please, sir. Mr. Galian, now, do not interrupt me. I was about to say you are pacing the floor. I want to speak in a well-modulated tone of voice, and that’s what I am doing. I implore you, Mr. Galian, do not argue my ruling. That means, please do not argue my ruling. I have ruled.
Next question, sir.
Mr. Galian: I was merely going to make a request that the previous answer be read. I don’t recall it, your Honor.
The Court: There was no previous answer, because I sustained the objection.
Mr. Galian: The last answer that was not objected to, your Honor.
The Court: All right, what was the question before counsel asked about the witness’s opinion of the so-called Miranda rule? What was the question?
This is as opposed to the treatment of prosecution counsel just after eyewitness Jones testified on cross-examination to having about five drinks of 150-proof Jamaican rum during the day Nunes’ homicide took place:
Q. Did you have anything to drink—
Mr. Rosenbaum: Your Honor, I object to counsel—
The Court: Don’t do that.
Mr. Rosenbaum: If he wants to neigh, we have zoos.
The Court: Don’t make any comments. Were you intoxicated?
The Witness: No, sir. I drove my car there.
The Court: Go ahead.
Or again during the same cross-examination:
Q. And did they take a statement from you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In front of a court reporter?
A. Yes.
Mr. Galian: May I have a copy of that statement?
Mr. Rosenbaum: Judge, can we recess until Thursday and put an end to my patience? I don’t know about yours.
*817Mr. Galian: I object to the remarks of the district attorney.
The Court: Yes. Excuse me, sir.
We will recess until Thursday morning, ten o’clock, five minutes before ten. Where’s our clerk?
Or, during cross-examination of eyewitness Foster, when counsel was seeking to establish the rather incredible fact that Foster and Jones rode together back and forth to the police station without ever talking about the shooting:
Q. Now, while you were in the car that morning, did you and David discuss the shooting at all?
A. No.
Q. You didn’t say anything at all about the shooting?
A. Just w[ha]t time we’re going to the precinct.
Q. And nothing else was spoken between the two of you regarding the shooting?
A. No.
Q. So that on the way to the precinct from the shooting and on the way home after having been questioned, neither you nor David Jones uttered a word between you regarding the shooting?
Mr. Rosenbaum: That is objected to. For the third time he asked the same questions.
The Court: Yes, objection is sustained. The witness said they didn’t discuss it.
Q. All right. Well, can I ask you what you did talk about?
A. Talked about women.
Q. Women?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did you talk about—
The Court: That is always a very interesting subject.
3. The judge leapt to the aid of the prosecution witnesses time and again, e.g., the cross-examination of Jones, who had originally given the police a different version of the facts from what he testified to on direct:
A. The facts that I told the police on the 2nd is different from the other one I told the Detective Bankhead, also the grand jury.
Q. I see. And the facts that you told Assistant D.A. Paul Zsufa differ from the facts that you told the jury and the Court last Monday, is that not true?
The Court: That’s what he said.
Mr. Galian: I beg your pardon?
The Court: That’s what he said. The first statement you made was right after the shooting, you went to the station house—
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: —and you were there questioned by Assistant District Attorney Zsufa?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: You made a statement?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: The questions read to you and the answers, you said you were asked those questions and made those answers, but that those answers were not true?
The Witness: That’s correct.
The Court: The next day, or on a Sunday, after that, Detective Bank-head spoke to you?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: And then you made a statement to Detective Bankhead?
The Witness: That’s correct.
The Court: He talked to you and you answered his questions?
The Witness: That’s correct.
The Court: Those answers which you gave to Detective Bankhead, were different from those you gave the Assistant District Attorney?
The Witness: The answers I gave to Detective Bankhead was the truth.
The Court: Was the truth?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: That was the second questioning?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right, go ahead.
*8184. This contrasts with the judge’s examination of Gayle himself:
Q. Did you go on any other day in January to Coney Island with Beverly Allen?
A. No.
The Court: Did you go swimming on that day [January 3] with Beverly? The Witness: No.
The Court: Just—
Q. Where did you go?
The Court: I’m sorry, go ahead.
Q. Where did you go in Coney Island? A. Beverly’s home.
Q. Sir?
A. To Beverly’s house.
Q. Where was that located?
The Court: She lived in Coney Island?
The Witness: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: Whereabouts?
The Witness: I don’t know where she live in Coney Island, but I know she live in Coney Island.
The Court: “I don’t know whether she lives in Coney Island”—
The Witness: I don’t know where. The Court: Oh, “where.”
The Witness: I don’t know where. The Court: All right, what street, do you know?
The Witness: No, she took me there. The Court: What station did you get off at?
The Witness: I don’t remember the name of the station.
The Court: What line did you take, what subway line?
The Witness: We take the No. 2 train at Nostrand Avenue.
The Court: No. 2 what?
The Witness: The No. 2 train at Nostrand Avenue.
The Court: No. 2 train?
The Witness: At Nostrand Avenue.
The Court: Nostrand near where?
The Witness: Nostrand and Eastern Parkway.
The Court: And that took you to Coney Island?
The Witness: We changed.
The Court: Where?
The Witness: I think it’s Atlantic Avenue we changed to another train. I don’t remember the name of the train we take.
The Court: You went to Atlantic Avenue?
5. Gratuitously the judge talked down to the defense:
[Direct examination of the eyewitness Jones]
Mr. Galian: Objection, your Honor.
The Court: On what grounds, sir?
Mr. Galian: They are leading questions.
The Court: Is that a leading question? You are objecting on the ground he is leading?
Mr. Galian: Yes.
The Court: Mr. Galian, a leading question is one which suggests the answer.
Mr. Galian: Your Honor—
The Court: Excuse me, Mr. Galian, please don't adopt an air of despair. I am overruling your objection. I always give my reasons why so that someone reviewing might understand why I do what I do.
A leading question is a question which suggests the answer. A question as, for instance, “On that day you went to such and such a place, did you not?” that would be leading. But the question, “Did you go there?” calls for a yes or no answer. The interrogator doesn’t know what the answer will be. This is not leading nor is it suggesting; therefore it is not leading.
He wants to know if he was there. The witness may say yes and he may say no.
Let’s hear what the answer is.
Your objection is overruled.
Or, during redirect examination of the same witness:
*819Q. Detective Bankhead asked you why you told Mr. Zsufa that you were not at the party, is that correct?
A. Yeah, I was outside in my car.
Mr. Galian: Your Honor, I object to the form of these questions.
The Court: The objection is overruled.
Q. And what was your answer?
The Court: Just a minute. Mr. Gali-an, this is an adversary proceeding, you understand that. Now, you have a right to cross-examine. But when you develop a line of testimony which had not been gone into in direct examination, and you have a right to, the district attorney has a right in redirect to question a witness with reference to the circumstances surrounding the new line of investigation developed by you, and I must give the district attorney an opportunity to go into these matters.
Mr. Galian: I didn’t object to his entering into the line of questioning. I was objecting to the form of the questions as being leading.
The Court: The objection is overruled. In cross-examination and to some extent in redirect examination, in the Court’s discretion, there may be permitted certain leading questions. But the Court will exercise its discretion when it appears to the Court that the interests of justice do not or should not countenance leading questions.
His questions particularly were not leading. He asked the witness, “Did Detective Bankhead say anything about why you, or ask you why you told a different story?”
Mr. Galian: I am talking about the last question.
The Court: The answer to that could be yes or no. That isn’t suggestive.
Or again, on Gayle’s cross-examination:
Q. [by the Assistant District Attorney] Do you always tell lies?
Mr. Galian: Objection, your Honor.
The Court: The objection is overruled.
Q. Do you always tell lies when you’re in — have problems?
Mr. Galian: I object to the form of the question.
A. No.
The Court: Mr. Galian, I beg you to please, if you want to argue with the Court, you can stand up and do that, but don’t argue with the Court. I have made my ruling, Mr. Galian. This is cross-examination.
Go ahead.
Or later in Gayle’s redirect:
Q. Now, you made a telephone call to — withdrawn.
Did you make a telephone call to Canada during the last two, three years?
The Court: Mr. Galian, I’m just wondering what has all this to do with the case on trial.
Mr. Galian: I’m not too sure, your Honor.
The Court: Well, if you’re not too sure—
Mr. Galian: But Mr. Rosenbaum asked the questions on cross-examination, and I want to bring out—
The Court: What question was asked on cross-examination with reference to Canada?
Mr. Galian: I believe there was—
The Court: When he went to Canada—
Mr. Galian: Whether or not he had made telephone calls to Canada.
The Court: All right, Go ahead. Of course, evidently it was not connected with anything, and therefore it can’t even be considered by the jury.
Now, you are spending a great deal of time or evidently you intend to, on redirect on the meaning of a call to Canada.
Mr. Galian: That’s true, your Hon- or.
The Court: Which in the first instance has nothing to do with that.
Mr. Galian: If I was sure it had no prejudicial meaning, I would—
*820The Court: Mr. Galian, I will tell the jury now, if the district attorney asked whether or not he made a telephone] call to Canada and if the witness said yes or no, without anything further, it doesn’t mean a single, solitary thing. It serves no purpose unless — unless it were connected in some way with the issues in this case.
Mr. Rosenbaum: Well, your Honor, I don’t want to argue with the Court’s ruling, but as your Honor will, I’m sure, charge the jury that any questions asked by the People on cross-examination relate to the determination by the jurors as to the credibility of the defendant and as to his powers or recollection of specific dates and times.
The Court: Well, on the question of ability to recall, yes; that would be receivable, that would be competent, that would be proper, but for no other purpose.
Mr. Galian: I understand, but the importance of his recollection would also be further fo[r]tified by his being able to relate the purpose for which he made that telephone call.
The Court: Except if the purpose is irrelevant and immaterial, I won’t permit it.
The witness said he remembered a telephone call to Canada.
Mr. Galian: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: All right.
This dissent could go on. There are innumerable other examples running throughout the transcript. In my view Gayle did not have a fair trial as a result of the excessive, biased intrusion of the trial judge. I would still grant the writ if the State did not afford Gayle a new trial.

. Despite its lack of foundation, the prosecution relied on the "assassination" theory of this case, using the word in both opening and closing statements.