Court Opinion

ID: 9745651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:16:16.085443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:03.775059
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP specially concurring: I concur in the result reached for reasons not considered in either the principal opinion or the dissent, and which I have not found discussed in either the reported cases or the voluminous literature upon the subject of products liability. It is suggested that within the definitions of the statement of products liability, sometimes called manufacturer’s liability, and of the several terms used in such statement, plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case. In Suvada v. White Motor Company, 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182, the court said: “The plaintiffs must prove that their injury or damage resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer’s control.” This is essentially the language of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 2d, par. 402A. Within such statement of the doctrine or rule of strict liability, it is important to note the meaning of the words, “[T]hat the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one” as such is stated in par. 402A of the Restatement. Comment (i) defines and discusses the denotation of the words “unreasonably dangerous” with this sentence: “The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer * * *. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.” (Emphasis supplied.) Section 402A, par. g, described a “defective condition” in the language: “The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which would be unreasonably dangerous to him.” Products liability as a theory of law arising through a latent unexpected hazard of which the user is not aware is stated in the oft-cited Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049, in the language: “To establish the manufacturer’s liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in any design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the Shop-smith unsafe for its intended use.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the reported cases which have extended recovery to non-users or bystanders under the theory of products liability, the factual circumstances reported show that the unreasonably dangerous condition was not, in fact, known to the user or operator. In Elmore v. American Motors, 70 Cal.2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, an almost new car dropped its drive shaft causing it to go out of control and strike bystanders. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the operator was aware of the condition. In Piercefield v. Remington Arms, 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129, a shotgun shell caused the weapon to explode and injure a bystander. It seems reasonable to conclude that the exploding shotgun would not be contemplated by the purchaser of the shell. The opinion in White v. Jeffrey Gallion, Inc., 326 F.Supp. 751, suggests no facts showing that the defective steering valve at issue had been observed to be defective. In fact, the opinion suggests that there was no operator of the ram car concerned. In Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694, an automobile left in “park” gear rolled down a hill and injured another. The allegation of defective manufacture of the transmission was admitted by demurrer and no factual aspects are reported. The opinion in Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305, in its discussion of the “assumption of risk” by a user does not modify, enlarge or diminish the definition of the terms used to state products liability and in particular does not modify the statement of the meaning of the state of being “unreasonably dangerous”. Such opinion actually restates the principles defining products liability and in particular “unreasonably dangerous” in par. 402A in the context of pleading and burden of proof. The record in this case clearly shows that the user of the fork lift was aware that the bundles were loosely strapped and was aware that such condition regularly was to be found, but that such user nevertheless drove the bundles in a blind fashion into a working area known to contain other workmen, as well as equipment and tools. We suggest that products liability is a closely defined concept having as a keystone the definition of an unreasonably dangerous condition, i.e., that there is a latent hazard causing an unexpected mishap during the intended use of the product. It is usually said that the rule as stated in par. 402A of the Restatement does not make the manufacturer an insurer of his product. (Suvada v. White Motor Company, 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182.) We suggest that the rule or doctrine creating liability in a manufacturer is not properly employed to create liability of the manufacturer to a bystander where the user, in fact, acts or uses the product with knowledge of a known or obvious condition, and such acts are negligent or even wilful and wanton in their performance. The manufacturer should not become an insurer of the conduct of the user through the liability imposed because of the sale of his product. Within the definition of product or manufacturers liability, plaintiff has not made a prima facie case.