Court Opinion

ID: 9749898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:02:43.10669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:57.984964
License: Public Domain

ALEXANDER, J.,
with whom CALKINS, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 12] I respectfully dissent. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that: “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Article 1, section 6 of the Maine Constitution provides essentially the same protection: “The accused shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself or herself.” ME. CONST. art. I, § 6. Today, the Court apparently modifies those centuries old protections to require that a criminal defendant present at least some evidence questioning the voluntariness of a statement or risk losing a favorable ruling on an issue upon which the State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.6 See State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 10, 704 A.2d 387, 390. A defendant may have the responsibility to raise the issue of voluntariness of a statement. See M.R.Crim. P. 12(b)(3) & 41A. That obligation was satisfied when Sawyer filed his motion to suppress. See M.R.Crim. P. 41A(a).
[¶ 13] With the motion to suppress filed, the State “bears the burden of establishing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt” before the statement can be admitted in evidence against the defendant. Coombs, ¶ 10, 704 A.2d at 390. See also State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶¶ 5-8, 748 A.2d 976, 978-79; State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122-23 (Me.1982).
[¶ 14] We require the State to meet this burden as a prerequisite to use of a defendant’s statement at trial, for reasons originally articulated in State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 626 (Me.1972), and confirmed in Caouette and Rees, because:
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects a high priority commitment to the principle that excluded as available to government is any person’s testimonial self-condemnation of crime unless such person has acted ‘voluntarily’ i.e., unless he has “waived’ his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by choosing, freely and knowingly, to provide criminal self-con,-*1178demnation by utterances from, his own lips.
Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶6, 748 A.2d at 978 (quoting Collins, 297 A.2d at 626) (emphasis in original). See also Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1122.
[¶ 15] Any party, civil or criminal, defending against an issue on which the other party has the burden of proof, may rely solely on the evidence presented by the proponent of the issue and then urge, as Sawyer successfully urged here, that the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the proponent’s burden of proof. In supporting the position that the burden of proof is not satisfied, the opponent may rely on facts presented in the hearing, reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, and the trial judge’s discretion to simply disbelieve the proponent’s witness. See In Re Fleming, 431 A.2d 616, 618 (Me.1981). This is so even if the proponent’s testimony “was undisputed.” Id.See also Foss v. Ingeneri, 561 A.2d 498, 499 (Me.1989) (holding that although liability was established by default and plaintiff “may have proved a loss,” jury award of no damages affirmed because plaintiff had burden of proof).
[¶ 16] To have us affirm the trial judge’s finding that the State’s burden of proof has not been met, the defendant need not “present evidence to indicate that his statement was involuntary.” Ante, ¶ 11 n. 5 (Court’s opinion). Rather, to have us reverse the trial judge’s finding, the State must demonstrate to us that a contrary finding — here that the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt — was compelled by the evidence. See Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123-24. See also Estate of Sylvester v. Benjamin, 2001 ME 48, ¶ 9, 767 A.2d 297, 300. A voluntariness finding beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be compelled where it was within the trial judge’s discretion to disbelieve part or all of the testimony of the State’s single witness.
[¶ 17] Although different factfinders could reach a different result, that is not to say that a different result is compelled. Any police interrogation that focuses on particular suspects regarding particular events has the potential for creating a “coercive atmosphere.” State v. Preston, 411 A.2d 402, 406 (Me.1980). When “compulsion of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the confession,” use of the confession “offends due process.” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) (quoted in Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123).
[¶ 18] In the instant case, the trial judge could have disbelieved the officer’s testimony regarding the circumstances of Sawyer’s statement. Alternatively, the trial judge could have determined that the evidence presented by the officer indicated sufficiently coercive circumstances at the time the officer spoke with Sawyer that the voluntariness of Sawyer’s statement could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Certainly, this evidence “does not compel a finding that the defendant was free from ‘compulsion of whatever nature.’ ” Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123-24 (quoting Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860).
[¶ 19] In consideration of a criminal defendant’s rights, the State has an appropriately high standard of proof. At the same time, the scope of our review of the trial judge’s decision is very narrow. See Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d at 389-90. We cannot broaden the scope of review by characterizing the trial judge’s findings as issues of law rather than issues of fact.
[¶ 20] Voluntariness is a question of fact for the trial court. The trial court decides whether the State has proven voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt based on its view of the evidence and the totality of *1179the circumstances, including its capacity to believe and to disbelieve witnesses. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 3, 748 A.2d at 977. It is not our place, as an appellate court limited to deferential review, to usurp the trial court’s role by applying our own totality of the circumstances test and recharacteriz-ing voluntariness as a “legal conclusion” rather than a finding of fact in order to vacate a ruling granting a motion to suppress. We have deferentially reviewed and affirmed voluntariness findings and denials of motions to suppress, even where a fair reading of the record indicated significant coercion. See Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 11, 704 A.2d at 391; State v. Kremen, 2000 ME 117, 754 A.2d 964. Grants of motions to suppress and findings that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof should be accorded the same deferential review.
[¶ 21] If we respect the high standards of proof imposed on the State and if we respect the narrow scope of our review of trial court findings that a proponent’s burden of proof has not been met, the trial judge’s findings that the voluntariness of Sawyer’s statement was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt must be affirmed.
[¶ 22] The question regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support probable cause to arrest presents a different issue. The officer was at the scene, he observed the various individuals involved, and indisputably he heard Sawyer state that he was the operator of the motor vehicle. Probable cause may be based on a wide variety of information, some of which may be inad-missable at trial. While finding against the State on the voluntariness issue, the court made no finding of official misconduct. Because there was no finding of official misconduct incident to the arrest of Sawyer, and considering all the evidence available to the officer at the time, the officer had probable cause, as a matter of law, to believe that Sawyer had operated the vehicle in violation of the law. Thus, I concur in the result as to the Court’s ruling on the suppression of the arrest.
[¶ 23] Accordingly, I would affirm the ruling of the trial court regarding suppression of the statement, but I concur in the result regarding suppression of the arrest.

. To support this proposition, the Court cites State v. Eaton, 577 A.2d 1162, 1167 (Me.1990). Eaton affirmed a trial court finding that a defendant's statement was voluntary. In supporting the result, our opinion noted that the officer’s testimony supported the vol-untariness finding and that the defendant "produced no evidence to the contrary.” Id. That statement, affirming a voluntariness finding, provides absolutely no support for the proposition that a defendant’s failure to present evidence may cause him to lose a favorable ruling that the state has not met its burden of proof on the voluntariness issue.