Court Opinion

ID: 9889747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 14:07:42.613982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:21.665440
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                     CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                          OCTOBER 11, 2023
                                                                      STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2023 ND 195

Tess Hillestad,                                        Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Payton Small,                                       Defendant and Appellant

                               No. 20230006

Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District,
the Honorable William A. Herauf, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Bahr, Justice.

Rodney E. Pagel, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Christopher E. Rausch, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant.
                              Hillestad v. Small
                                No. 20230006

Bahr, Justice.

[¶1] Payton Small appeals from a judgment awarding Tess Hillestad primary
residential responsibility of the parties’ minor child. We conclude the district
court’s decision awarding primary residential responsibility to Hillestad,
setting a parenting time holiday schedule, and granting Hillestad tie-breaking
authority was not clearly erroneous. We affirm.

                                       I

[¶2] The parties were never married and have one child together. The child
has “significant birth maladies” which require care. Since the child’s birth, the
parties have arranged for the child to spend two weeks with Hillestad and one
week with Small.

[¶3] Hillestad commenced this action in November 2021 requesting the
district court determine primary residential responsibility and other issues.
The court held a bench trial in October 2022.

[¶4] The district court issued its order on residential responsibility in
December 2022. Among other things, the court granted Hillestad primary
residential responsibility, established a holiday schedule, and granted
Hillestad tie-breaking authority for major medical decisions. A judgment was
subsequently entered.

                                       II

[¶5] Small argues the district court was clearly erroneous in awarding
primary residential responsibility to Hillestad.

[¶6] On appeal, “[a] decision on primary residential responsibility is a finding
of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review.” Boldt v. Boldt,
2021 ND 213, ¶ 8, 966 N.W.2d 897. The clearly erroneous standard of review
is well established:

                                       1
      A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous
      view of the law, if no evidence supports it, or if this Court, on the
      entire record, is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake
      has been made. Under the clearly erroneous standard, we do not
      reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of witnesses, and
      we will not retry a custody case or substitute our judgment for a
      district court’s initial primary residential responsibility decision
      merely because we might have reached a different result.

Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Vetter v. Vetter, 2020 ND 40, ¶ 8, 938 N.W.2d 417).

[¶7] When considering primary residential responsibility, the district court
must award primary residential responsibility to the parent who will better
promote the welfare and best interests of the child. Boldt, 2021 ND 213, ¶ 7.
“The court must consider the thirteen best interest factors set out at N.D.C.C.
§ 14-09-06.2(1) when making its determination[.]” Id. The district court is
required to consider all factors but does not need to make a finding on each
factor. Brown v. Brown, 1999 ND 199, ¶ 11, 600 N.W.2d 869. In considering
evidence related to the best interest factors the court is not required “to address
each minute detail presented in the evidence[.]” Law v. Whittet, 2014 ND 69,
¶ 10, 844 N.W.2d 885. However, “the court may not wholly ignore and fail to
acknowledge or explain significant evidence clearly favoring one party.” Id.

                                         A

[¶8] Small argues the district court did not consider his request for equal
residential responsibility.

[¶9] “Whether or not joint custody is in the best interests of a child depends
on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. We have never held there
is a presumption against joint custody.” P.A. v. A.H.O., 2008 ND 194, ¶ 17, 757
N.W.2d 58 (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, “[r]egarding who ‘will
better promote the best interests and welfare of the child,’ there is no
presumption between the father and mother.” Rustad v. Baumgartner, 2018
ND 268, ¶ 6, 920 N.W.2d 465 (quoting N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(1)).

[¶10] The district court acknowledged and considered Small’s request for equal
residential responsibility. In its order, the court explained, “[o]n the first day of

                                         2
trial, [Small] was wanting the Court to order that he have primary residential
responsibility and [Hillestad] would be limited to alternating weekends.” The
court then acknowledged Small’s second request for equal residential
responsibility, stating, “[o]n the second day of trial, [Small] started the day by
announcing that he no longer desired the radical change that he initially
proposed, but now was requesting joint primary residential responsibility.” The
court also considered Small’s request, finding “the proposed plan by [Small] of
one week with [Hillestad] and one week with [Small] is not something that
accommodates the current work schedule of [Small].”

[¶11] The district court was aware of and considered Small’s request for equal
residential responsibility.

                                        B

[¶12] Small argues under best interest factors (a) and (d) the district court
erroneously relied on the role of primary caretaker in reaching its decision.
Best interest factors (a) and (d) are:

      a. The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between
      the parents and child and the ability of each parent to provide the
      child with nurture, love, affection, and guidance.
      ....
      d. The sufficiency and stability of each parent’s home environment,
      the impact of extended family, the length of time the child has lived
      in each parent’s home, and the desirability of maintaining
      continuity in the child’s home and community.

N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(a), (d).

[¶13] “A court’s choice for primary residential responsibility between two fit
parents is a difficult one, and this Court will not retry the case or substitute
its judgment for that of the district court when its decision is supported by the
evidence.” Friesner v. Friesner, 2019 ND 30, ¶ 6, 921 N.W.2d 898. Established
patterns of care and nurture are relevant factors for courts to consider when
determining an award of residential responsibility. Heggen v. Heggen, 452

                                        3
N.W.2d 96, 101 (N.D. 1990). “While this Court has recognized a primary
caretaker enjoys no paramount or presumptive status under the best interests
of the child factors, we have also stated primary caretakers ‘deserve
recognition’ in custody determinations.” Heinle v. Heinle, 2010 ND 5, ¶ 9, 777
N.W.2d 590 (quoting Heggen, at 101).

[¶14] Addressing factor (a), the district court found both parents are able to
provide love and emotional support for their child. The court went on to explain
the child moved with Hillestad whenever she moved and the child lived
wherever she lived. Under factor (d), the court found the child is accustomed
to the schedule the parties have used since the child’s birth. The record
demonstrates Hillestad was the primary caretaker for much of the child’s life.
Although the court considered Hillestad’s role as primary caretaker, the record
does not demonstrate the court used Hillestad’s role as primary caretaker as a
paramount or presumptive status. The court’s consideration of Hillestad’s role
as primary caretaker was not clearly erroneous.

                                       C

[¶15] Small argues the district court improperly considered the parties’ work
schedules under best interest factor (b). Small argues the court’s finding
Hillestad’s schedule was more accommodating to the child was clearly
erroneous and the court’s findings were inconsistent. Best interest factor (b) is
“[t]he ability of each parent to assure that the child receives adequate food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and a safe environment.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-
06.2(1)(b).

[¶16] Under factor (b), the district court considered the parties’ work schedules
along with the medical needs of the child. “[W]here each parent works outside
of the home and where each has the ability and desire to care for their children,
the trial court must necessarily weigh the circumstances on a fine and delicate
scale.” Schmidt v. Schmidt, 2003 ND 55, ¶ 9, 660 N.W.2d 196 (quoting
Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918, 920 (N.D. 1985)). Here, the court
considered the parties’ schedules in the context of the child’s medical needs and
further considered Hillestad works with a childcare provider with whom the

                                       4
child is already familiar. We conclude the court’s findings under factor (b),
including its consideration of the parties’ work schedules, were not clearly
erroneous.

                                        C

[¶17] For the other best interest factors, Small asks this Court to reweigh the
evidence presented at trial. “Under the clearly erroneous standard, we do not
reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of witnesses, and ‘we will not
retry a custody case or substitute our judgment for a district court’s initial
custody decision merely because we might have reached a different result.’”
Wolt v. Wolt, 2010 ND 26, ¶ 7, 778 N.W.2d 786 (quoting Lindberg v. Lindberg,
2009 ND 136, ¶ 4, 770 N.W.2d 252); see Voigt v. Nelson, 2020 ND 113, ¶ 6, 943
N.W.2d 783. On this record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err
when it awarded residential responsibility to Hillestad.

                                      III

[¶18] Small argues the district court erroneously found he asked the court to
order a parenting time holiday schedule consistent with the parties’ interim
order, arguing he never made that request.

[¶19] “This Court reviews the district court’s decision on parenting time under
the clearly erroneous standard.” Eikom v. Eikom, 2022 ND 91, ¶ 7, 974 N.W.2d
387. “In awarding parenting time to the non-custodial parent, the best
interests of the child, rather than the wishes or desires of the parents, are
paramount.” In re N.C.M., 2013 ND 132, ¶ 41, 834 N.W.2d 270 (cleaned up)
(quoting Bertsch v. Bertsch, 2006 ND 31, ¶ 5, 710 N.W.2d 113).

[¶20] Here, the district court stated Small requested the holiday schedule be
consistent with the interim order. The court correctly stated what Small
requested in his post-trial brief. Small specifically requested the court order
“the parties continue to utilize the alternating holiday schedule as set forth in
the Interim Order[.]”

[¶21] Small further argues the district court did not consider his objection to
the parenting plan containing a right of first refusal. The right of first refusal

                                        5
in the judgment states, “In the event either parent is required to work and the
other parent is personally available to take care of the minor child, the non-
working parent shall be given the first opportunity to provide child care.” The
court found the two individuals who have the most right to spend time with
the child are Hillestad and Small. The right of first refusal allows the child to
spend more time with Hillestad and Small. The court’s inclusion of a right of
first refusal in the judgment is not clearly erroneous. See State v. Andres, 2016
ND 90, ¶ 12, 879 N.W.2d 464 (stating the parenting plan is not clearly
erroneous “[b]ecause it has not been shown the current plan harms the child’s
best interests and because the parties may modify the plan through
mediation”).

                                      IV

[¶22] Small argues the district court erred when it awarded Hillestad tie-
breaking authority over major decisions. He argues neither party should have
tie-breaking authority and instead contends the parties should rely on the
opinion of an appropriate expert if the two sides cannot agree.

[¶23] A district court’s determination of final decision-making authority is
analyzed under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Sayler v. Sayler, 2023
ND 156, ¶ 42, 994 N.W.2d 351. “A parenting plan must include a provision
relating to decision[-]making responsibility, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-30(2)(a), and that
responsibility must be allocated in the best interests of the child, N.D.C.C.
§ 14-09-31(2).” Sayler, at ¶ 40 (quoting Dick v. Erman, 2019 ND 54, ¶ 14, 923
N.W.2d 137). “With two parents, there is always a potential for the parties to
reach a point of impasse when it comes to decisions about their child.” Id.
(quoting Dick, at ¶ 15).

[¶24] Addressing decision-making responsibility and the child’s medical needs,
the district court wrote “[t]he parties should try to examine their view and
listen to the experts.” However, the court found Hillestad is more familiar with
the child’s medical needs and, “due to [Hillestad’s] superior knowledge of [the
child’s] medical conditions,” granted Hillestad tie-breaking authority over
major decisions. On this record, we conclude the court did not clearly err when
it awarded final decision-making authority to Hillestad. See Sayler, 2023 ND

                                       6
156, ¶¶ 41-42 (concluding award of final decision-making authority to mother,
“after good faith efforts by the parties to make a joint decision and work with
a qualified third party,” was not clearly erroneous); Dick, 2019 ND 54, ¶ 15
(“Eventually a decision must be made, and we are not left with a definite and
firm conviction a mistake was made regarding the district court’s
determination of decision-making responsibility.”).

                                      V

[¶25] We have considered Small’s remaining arguments and conclude they are
either without merit or are not necessary to our decision. The district court’s
judgment is affirmed.

[¶26] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                                      7