Court Opinion

ID: 9874391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 22:07:13.926862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:17.035835
License: Public Domain

09/26/2023

                                          DA 21-0323
                                                                                          Case Number: DA 21-0323

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                          2023 MT 181

STATE OF MONTANA,

               Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

RANDY VAUGHN SNEED,

               Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DC-19-52C
                       Honorable John C. Brown, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Carolyn M. Gibadlo, Assistant Appellate
                       Defender, Missoula, Montana

                For Appellee:

                       Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Bree Gee, Assistant Attorney
                       General, Helena, Montana

                       Audrey S. Cromwell, Gallatin County Attorney, Bradley D. Bowen, Deputy
                       County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana

                                                   Submitted on Briefs: June 14, 2023

                                                               Decided: September 26, 2023

Filed:

                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1    Randy Sneed (Sneed) appeals from the May 7, 2021 Sentencing Order issued by the

Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Montana. The District Court sentenced Sneed based

on three counts: strangulation of a partner or family member, a felony, in violation of

§ 45-5-215(1),(a), MCA; partner or family member assault, a misdemeanor, in violation of

§ 45-5-206(1),(a), MCA; and endangering the welfare of a child, a misdemeanor, in

violation of § 45-5-622(1), MCA.

¶2    We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

      1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it permitted Dr. Kuehl to testify
      about the legal and medical definitions of strangulation?

      2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it allowed Officer Clark to testify
      that Sneed was charged with a felony and detained in the “high-risk, violent crimes
      pod?”

      3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to play
      Sneed’s statements in Exhibit 22?

      4. Did the District Court’s evidentiary rulings create cumulative error?

      5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused to address Sneed’s
      concerns regarding Juror R.?

                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3    On January 11, 2019, Sneed got into a fight with his partner, Kateland Stephens

(Stephens). Sneed was lying on the bed with their sleeping, ten-month old daughter, IS.

Stephens tried to leave with IS, but Sneed refused to let them. As Stephens attempted to

exit the bedroom while holding IS, Sneed blocked her by grabbing onto her throat and

pushing her to the bed.

                                             2
¶4    Stephens left after that, leaving IS with Sneed, and called the police. Stephens

reported to police that Sneed poked her in the eye and grabbed her by the throat, pinning

her down and putting all his weight on her.

¶5    Officer Clark responded to Stephens’s call. He met with Stephens at a gas station

and examined her injuries. He took pictures of what appeared to be redness on Stephens’s

neck and puffiness in her left eye. Afterwards, Officer Clark went to Sneed’s house to

investigate further. Sneed admitted he grabbed Stephens by the throat. However, Sneed

claims he guided Stephens by the throat down to the bed so that he could take IS away

from her. Consequently, Officer Clark arrested Sneed for felony strangulation of a partner

or family member.

¶6    The District Court held a jury trial during which the State presented multiple pieces

of evidence now at issue on appeal. The evidence includes expert witness testimony,

Officer Clark’s testimony, and a recording from an Order of Protection Hearing.

Additionally, one Juror, Juror R., was checking his phone and dozing off during the trial.

The District Court refused to admonish the jury member at Sneed’s request. The jury

convicted Sneed of count one: strangulation of a partner; count two: assault of a partner;

and count three: child endangerment. The District Court sentenced Sneed to a five-year

DOC commitment with three years suspended for count one; 12 months with 11 months,

21 days suspended for count two; and 6 months, all suspended for count three. Sneed

appeals.

¶7    We affirm.

                                              3
                                STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8     Trial courts have broad discretion to determine the relevance and admissibility of

evidence. State v. Passmore, 2010 MT 34, ¶ 51, 355 Mont. 187, 207, 225 P.3d 1229, 1245.

Thus, this Court generally reviews evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

Passmore, ¶ 51. “A court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without the employment

of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial

injustice.” Passmore, ¶ 51.

¶9     “The trial court is in the best position to observe the jurors and to decide the potential

for prejudice when allegations of juror misconduct are raised; therefore, the trial court has

significant latitude when ruling on these matters, and its determination is given

considerable weight by this Court. This Court will defer to that determination absent a

showing of prejudice.” State v. Rennaker, 2007 MT 10, ¶ 29, 335 Mont. 274, 150 P.3d 960

(internal citations omitted).

                                       DISCUSSION

¶10    1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it permitted Dr. Kuehl to testify
       about the legal and medical definitions of strangulation?

¶11    During trial, Dr. Tiffany Kuehl (Dr. Kuehl) testified as an expert witness, on behalf

of the State. Dr. Kuehl explained the difference between choking and strangulation:

       [State] So in the context of being a medical professional, could you define
       the term “choking”?

       [Dr. Kuehl] Choking is obstruction of the airway, usually by some object
       that’s inside the airway. Like I choked on some food, that type of thing.

       [State] In the context of being a medical professional, could you define
       “strangulation”?

                                               4
       [Dr. Kuehl] Strangulation is an injury that occurs through mechanical,
       external compression of the neck to the point of an alteration in level of
       consciousness through impairment of breathing or circulation.

       [State] It’s complicated. What does that mean?

       [Dr. Kuehl] It means that it’s an injury that is occurring usually through
       application of force to the outside of the neck to obstruct or block the blood
       flow to the brain or block the flow of air into the lungs.

       [State] If strangulation is defined as purposely or knowingly impeding the
       normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by applying
       pressure on the throat or neck of the person, how does that compare with your
       understanding of that term from a medical perspective?

       [Dr. Kuehl] It’s nearly identical. I think it’s consistent.

Although Sneed now takes issue with Dr. Kuehl’s answer that the definitions are “nearly

identical,” he did not immediately object to this line of questioning.

¶12    However, later in the examination, Sneed objected when the State asked:

       [State] If strangulation is defined as purposely or knowingly impeding the
       normal breathing or circulation of the blood of a person by applying pressure
       on the throat or neck of the person, how hard does a person have to apply
       pressure to the throat or neck of another person to impede their normal
       breathing and circulation?

       [Dr. Kuehl] Four pounds of pressure.

       [State] Twelve or four?

       [Dr. Kuehl] Four pounds.

       [State] And that would be for the initial carotid artery; is that correct?

       [Dr. Kuehl] That would be to occlude the jugular vein.

       [State] If a person is asked how did you stop her and the response is “I
       grabbed her by the throat,” how is that statement “I grabbed her by the throat”
       consistent with strangulation as we defined it?

                                              5
       [Defense] Objection, Your Honor. Facts not on the record.

       [District Court] Overruled.

       [Defense] Also calls for speculation, Your Honor.

       [District Court] Also overruled.

       [Dr. Kuehl] So grabbing the neck implies that a physical force of
       compression has been applied to the neck. In terms of whether that would
       impede the blood flow, it would meet the definition of strangulation if the
       victim had symptoms of impairment of consciousness in any way.

¶13    Sneed argues Dr. Kuehl made an improper legal conclusion that the facts of this

case meet the criteria for strangulation. The State argues Dr. Kuehl’s testimony was

appropriate as she did not testify about whether Sneed had the requisite mental state to

commit the crime, and her testimony was based on hypothetical questions.

¶14    We review a district court’s admission of expert testimony to determine if there was

an abuse of discretion. Sharbono v. Cole, 2015 MT 257, ¶ 10, 381 Mont. 13, 15, 355 P.3d

782, 785. Further, even if testimony on an ultimate issue of fact may implicate legal issues,

expert testimony is admissible if it does not reach a legal conclusion or apply the law to

the facts. Comm’r of Political Practices for Mont. v. Wittich, 2017 MT 210, ¶ 41,

388 Mont. 347, 360, 400 P.3d 735, 745. It is the jury’s job, not the witness’s, to apply the

law to the facts of the case. Wittich, ¶ 41.

¶15    Here, the State posed hypothetical questions to Dr. Kuehl to clarify her medical

definition of strangulation versus choking, and by asking her “[i]f a person is asked how

did you stop her and the response is ‘I grabbed her by the throat,’ how is that statement ‘I

grabbed her by the throat’ consistent with strangulation as we defined it?” Dr. Kuehl

                                               6
responded by describing the signs and symptoms of strangulation based on the hypothetical

scenario the State gave. She did not apply the law to the facts of this case. Furthermore,

Dr. Kuehl never reached a conclusion that Sneed committed the crime. Nor did she attest

to whether Sneed had the requisite mental state to commit the crime. The jury was still

tasked with determining whether Stephens experienced symptoms of strangulation and

whether Sneed acted purposely or knowingly. Accordingly, the District Court did not

abuse its discretion regarding Dr. Kuehl’s testimony.

¶16   2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it allowed Officer Clark to testify
      that Sneed was charged with a felony and detained in the “high-risk, violent crimes
      pod?”

¶17   During trial, the State called Officer Clark to testify. The State questioned Officer

Clark about Intelmate—the system that monitors all inmate phone calls. The State asked

Officer Clark about factors he used to verify calls, including inmate ID numbers, phone

numbers that were called, and the phone from which the inmate called. Specifically, the

State asked:

      [State] Okay. And you were able to review the records and they tell you which
      phone number was called, correct?

      [Officer Clark] Yes.

      [State] And they tell you which phone in the detention center makes the call,
      correct?

      [Officer Clark] Yes, from which pod.

      [State] And it would be E Pod in this case. What’s E Pod?

      [Officer Clark] That’s a high-risk, violent crimes pod.

      [Defense] Objection. Move to strike, Your Honor.

                                             7
¶18    The District Court overruled Sneed’s objection and motion to strike. Sneed did not

offer a reason for the objection, nor did the District Court offer a rationale for its overruling.

Sneed now argues the District Court abused its discretion when it admitted Officer Clark’s

statement related to the “high-risk, violent crimes pod” because it was irrelevant and

unfairly prejudicial because it diluted his presumption of innocence and encouraged the

jury to prejudge him. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more or less

probable than it would be without the evidence. Mont. R. Evid. 401. Based on the context

of the questioning, it is clear the State was asking foundational questions to establish a

basis for Officer Clark’s knowledge of Sneed’s phone call with his mother.

¶19    The State asked Officer Clark what E Pod was and he answered. In doing so, Officer

Clark made no assertions as to Sneed’s guilt. In addition to asking Officer Clark what

E Pod was, the State also asked him whether he could tell which phone was called from,

what number was called, and which inmate made the call. Answers to these questions

establish the foundation for the phone call the District Court subsequently admitted into

evidence. Officer Clark’s response to these questions show how well-informed Officer

Clark is with the technology that logs inmate calls and with the phone call in question.

While we agree the specific population make-up of pod E was not necessary or relevant to

establish Officer Clark’s familiarity and knowledge of the jail phone-log system and was

prejudicial, on the record before us we cannot find its admission was reversible error.

                                                8
¶20    This Court has a two-step analysis to determine whether an error is harmless. State

v. Buckles, 2018 MT 150, ¶ 17, 391 Mont. 511, 517, 420 P.3d 511, 516-17. First, the Court

must determine whether the error was structural error or trial error. Buckles, ¶ 18.

Structural error impacts the framework of the entire trial, whereas trial error occurs during

the presentation of the case to the jury. Buckles, ¶ 18. Here, the admission of Officer

Clark’s testimony was trial error. Thus, reversal for structural error is not supported.

¶21    The second step of the harmless error analysis is to determine if the error was

harmless. Buckles, ¶ 18. “If the tainted evidence was admitted to prove an element of the

offense, then the State must direct us to admissible evidence that proves the same facts as

the tainted evidence and demonstrate that the quality of the tainted evidence was such that

there was no reasonable possibility it might have contributed to the conviction.” Buckles,

¶ 18. The testimony as to the E pod population was very brief, the context within which it

was made—establishing foundation for Officer Clark’s knowledge of the jail phone-log

system—did not emphasize its prejudicial nature, and no further emphasis or elaboration

of it was made during trial or upon closing. Further, given the significant amount of other

evidence supporting Sneed’s guilt, including his own admission that he grabbed Stephens’s

throat, we cannot conclude Officer Clark’s brief statement as to the make-up of E Pod

contributed to Sneed’s conviction. As such, any error in its admission was harmless.

¶22    3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to play
       Sneed’s statements contained in Exhibit 22?

¶23    During trial, the State offered Exhibit 22 into evidence. Exhibit 22 is a recording,

in a separate legal cause, of an Order of Protection (OOP) hearing concerning Stephens’s

                                              9
request for a restraining order against Sneed. The State played various portions of the

hearing while examining Stephens. In the recording, Sneed talked about his relationship

struggles with Stephens.    Sneed said he found messages between Stephens and her

ex-boyfriend where she admitted she did not love Sneed anymore. Sneed talked about how

angry he became and that he told Stephens to move out of their house that day. He also

mentioned how he had not seen their daughter, IS, in over 20 days. He did not know where

they were living or how IS was getting diapers.

¶24   Sneed argues the statements in Exhibit 22 were irrelevant, and even if they were

relevant, they suggest to the jury that he is guilty of the crime charged. The State argues

Sneed’s testimony at the OOP hearing was relevant to show he was angry with Stephens

and unable to handle her leaving with IS the day he allegedly strangled Stephens. The

State claims the statements from Exhibit 22 are admissible as an admission of a

party-opponent and to show Sneed’s motive and state of mind.

¶25   We agree with the State. An admission by a party-opponent is not hearsay and may

be offered against him. Mont. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Here, Sneed is the party-opponent. He

made the statements under oath in the OOP hearing. The State offered those statements

against Sneed in the trial below. Exhibit 22 is relevant because it tends to show Sneed

more probably than not had motive to strangle Stephens. In Exhibit 22, Sneed talks about

how angry he was when Stephens left and how desperate he was to get her to come back.

Add to that the messages Sneed found between Stephens and her ex-boyfriend, and a

possible motive becomes clear. Thus, the statements made by Sneed contained in Exhibit

                                            10
22 which the State presented are admissible and the District Court did not abuse its

discretion in this regard.

¶26      4. Did the District Court’s evidentiary rulings create cumulative error?

¶27      Sneed argues that if the above three issues do not demonstrate reversible errors on

their own, then together they prejudiced Sneed’s right to a fair trial. The cumulative error

doctrine states that when prejudice results from the cumulative effect of two or more

individually harmless errors that, when combined, have the same prejudicial effect as a

single reversible error, the sum is basis for reversal. State v. Cunningham, 2018 MT 56,

¶ 32, 390 Mont. 408, 421, 414 P.3d 289, 298. To warrant reversal, the defendant must

establish prejudice because merely alleging error is not sufficient. Cunningham, ¶ 32.

¶28      Here, we conclude only one harmless error—admission of Officer Clark’s testimony

as to the population make of E Pod. As such, Sneed has failed to demonstrate cumulative

error.

¶29      5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused to address Sneed’s
         concerns regarding Juror R.?

¶30      The State argues that Sneed did not object when the judge refused to admonish Juror

R. for being on his phone, and therefore, we should not consider it on appeal. On the

contrary, Sneed argues that his oral request was akin to a motion, therefore, he preserved

the issue for appeal. We conclude that an oral request to the district court to admonish the

jury is sufficient to raise the issue at the trial level and preserve it for appeal. The District

Court, in essence, overruled the request by stating it would not admonish the jurors.

Accordingly, we address the issue on appeal.

                                               11
¶31       During trial, Sneed asked the court to admonish the jury for using their phones in

the courtroom. After a recess, and prior to the jury returning to the courtroom, the defense

stated:

          [Defense] Your Honor, it sounds like at least one of the jurors has been checking
          his phone. I believe that they were admonished beforehand, but I just wondered if
          the Court would either re-admonish or perhaps colle[c]t their cell phones.

          [District Court] So what the rule is, Mr. Rutzke, is that they can’t use their phone
          to communicate about the trial. We don’t take their phones away from them during
          the trial. When they’re deliberating, though, we take the phones away from
          them . . . . Once they deliberate, we take their phones away from them. So one of
          jurors is just out, probably the guy on the corner, the contractor guy?

          [Defense] Yeah.

          [District Court] Probably checking his phone, I bet.

          [Defense] Yeah.

          [District Court] Yeah. So, Mr. Rutzke, you know what, I’m not going to admonish
          him about that because I don’t care if he’s looking at it a little bit because he’s—
          frankly, I would rather have him looking at his phone than dozing off because he’s
          been sleeping some because I’ve been watching, but I’m not going to say anything
          to him, but I will tell you, Mr. Rutzke, though, they can’t talk about the trial and
          when they’re deliberating they won’t have their phones, okay?

          [Defense] Thank you, Your Honor.

¶32       Both the state and federal constitutions protect an individual’s right to a fair and

impartial jury. Mont. Const. art. II, § 24; U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Sneed now asserts

Juror R. was on his phone and falling asleep during the trial. For that reason, Sneed claims

he was prejudiced and is entitled to a new trial.

¶33       We have previously noted, “[t]he trial court is in the best position to observe the

jurors and to decide the potential for prejudice when allegations of juror misconduct are

                                               12
raised; therefore, the trial court has significant latitude when ruling on these matters, and

its determination is given considerable weight by this Court. This Court will defer to that

determination absent a showing of prejudice.” Rennaker, ¶ 10.

¶34    Although Sneed requested the court re-admonish the jurors to refrain from using

their phones, Sneed has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced or deprived of a fair and

impartial trial in this regard. Sneed’s counsel, in making his request for re-admonishment,

did not note the depth or breadth of any problem, did not identify any particular juror or

conduct by a juror or jurors that was so prejudicial it warranted a new trial, did not ask for

a new trial, did not make further offer of proof but merely thanked the court when it advised

it had been monitoring jurors and was not going to re-admonish jurors or collect their cell

phones. While it appears from the record that Juror R. may have checked his phone or

dozed off, it also is apparent from the record that the District Court was attentively

monitoring Juror R.’s behaviors along with those of the rest of the jury. The record

provides no indication of a juror issue other than the conversation noted above. We decline

to speculate as to how frequently Juror R. was on his phone, whether he actually fell asleep,

or whether he experienced any distraction of significance. Thus, on the record before us

and our determination that the trial court is in the best position to observe the jurors and to

decide the potential for prejudice when allegations of juror misconduct are raised, we

cannot determine Sneed’s right to a fair trial was prejudiced by juror misconduct and we

find no error in this regard.

                                              13
                                    CONCLUSION

¶35    Other than a harmless error involving a brief statement of the make-up of the

population of E Pod at the jail, Sneed has failed to establish the other errors he asserts—

that the District Court erred in permitting the testimony to which Sneed objected of

Dr. Kuehl, in admitting Sneed’s statements made in a separate legal proceeding, or in

assuring no prejudicial juror misconduct occurred. Affirmed.

                                                 /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JIM RICE

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