Court Opinion

ID: 9703698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:05:26.824688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:51.277373
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NASH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent, having concluded that imposition of the ultimate sanction of entry of a default judgment for failure to fully comply with a discovery order was an abuse of discretion. The production of a large number of varied business and personal records was requested, and it appears that defendant’s counsel did work with plaintiffs’ attorney and furnished most of the material and responded to interrogatories. When defendant sought to disqualify plaintiffs’ attorney for a perceived conflict of interest, plaintiffs’ counsel complained that defendant’s attorney was delaying discovery and had refused to turn over certain documents as he was going to seek the disqualification of plaintiffs’ attorney. The trial court ordered production within seven days and also indicated it would partially disqualify plaintiffs’ attorney and gave plaintiffs 21 days to substitute attorneys. Before expiration of the 21-day period, plaintiffs again petitioned to compel defendant to produce further documents. At a hearing held several days later, the court found that discovery was still incomplete and struck defendant’s answer and counterclaim and entered a default judgment for plaintiffs. Two weeks later the court ruled on defendant’s motion to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel and denied it. In my view certain lesser sanctions were clearly warranted in this case, but not that which was imposed. The entry of a default judgment for failure to comply with discovery is to be used only as a last resort (Stevens v. International Farm Systems, Inc. (1978), 56 Illv. App. 3d 717), and is only proper where the actions of a party show a deliberate, contumacious, or unwarranted disregard for the court’s authority. (Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Chicago Black Improvement Association (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 1096.) Supreme Court Rule 219(d) (87 Ill. 2d R. 219(d)) provides for the discretionary application of just sanctions for discovery violations with a view to require the completion of discovery and a trial on the merits; the goal of such sanctions is to complete discovery rather than punish. Jaffe v. Fogelson (1985), 137 Ill. App. 961, 964. There are cases in which the final sanction imposed here would be proper, but this isn’t one of them.