Court Opinion

ID: 9404827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 14:06:55.976637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:17.623784
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13225

                 COMMONWEALTH   vs.   LAZARO MIRANDA.

        Suffolk.       December 9, 2022. - June 26, 2023.

   Present:   Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ.

Homicide. Evidence, State of mind, Intoxication. Mental
     Impairment. Intoxication. Practice, Criminal, Capital
     case, Instructions to jury, State of mind, New trial,
     Transcript of evidence, Record, Stipulation.

     Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on February 12, 1998.

     The case was tried before Charles T. Spurlock, J., and a
motion for a new trial, filed on July 30, 2012, was heard by
Jeffrey A. Locke, J.

     Brian J. Kelly for the defendant.
     Elisabeth Martino, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

    KAFKER, J.     A jury found the defendant, Lazaro Miranda,

guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme

atrocity or cruelty for the death of twenty-seven year old Lisa

McLester (victim).   She died from multiple chop wounds from a
                                                                   2

machete.   No dispute existed at trial as to the defendant's

actions causing the victim's death.   At issue, however, was the

defendant's state of mind at the time of the murder.   The

defendant appeals from his conviction and from the denial of his

motion for a new trial.

    On direct appeal, the defendant argues that the trial judge

erred by not providing two instructions to the jury regarding

mitigating circumstances despite trial counsel's objections.

The trial judge did not instruct on sudden combat in his

voluntary manslaughter instruction, nor did he specifically

instruct on the defendant's mental impairment and intoxication

in his instruction on murder in the first degree under a theory

of extreme atrocity or cruelty.   He did, however, provide a

general instruction on intoxication and mental impairment

negating knowledge or intent.

    Appealing from the denial of the motion for a new trial,

the defendant argues that the judge who heard that motion

(motion judge) erred in not granting a new trial because the

defendant was unfairly prejudiced by the motion judge's reliance

on a stipulated summary of a missing trial transcript from the

day of trial that included the jury instructions.   Finally, the

defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial or a

reduced conviction to either murder in the second degree or

voluntary manslaughter, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
                                                                       3

    We conclude that the trial judge did not err by omitting

the defendant's requested instructions on sudden combat, but

erred when he failed to instruct on the impact of mental

impairment and intoxication on whether the defendant acted in a

cruel or atrocious manner.      This error created a substantial

likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.       Commonwealth v. Denson,

489 Mass. 138, 144 (2022).      See Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459

Mass. 794, 799 (2011).    We therefore vacate the conviction of

murder in the first degree and remand for further proceedings in

which "the Commonwealth has the option of moving to have the

defendant sentenced on the lesser included offense of murder in

the second degree or of retrying the defendant for murder on the

theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty."       Id. at 800.

    1.   Background.     a.   Facts.   We summarize the facts that

the jury could have found at the defendant's trial, reserving

certain details for our discussion of the legal issues.

    On the evening of December 29, 1997, Anna French was

reading the newspaper in her first-floor unit in an apartment

complex on Seaver Street in Boston.       Between 7 P.M. and 7:15

P.M., she overheard two loud "thumps" coming from a bedroom in

the apartment above hers, where the victim lived with the

defendant and a four year old child.       She heard male and female

voices, including a man yelling repeatedly, "Who are you

fucking?"   She also heard the child crying.
                                                                     4

     Shortly thereafter, French heard the same voices in the

first-floor hallway outside her apartment.   The man said, "I'm

going to kill you.   Bitch, you're not dead yet?    You're still

breathing?"   French also heard a repeated "swoosh sound, like

something was swinging."   She entered the hallway and saw the

defendant, whom she recognized as the man who lived in the

apartment above hers.   Seeing French, the defendant said,

"Bitch, you'd better go back in the house before I kill you,

too," causing her to run back inside her apartment and lock her

door.   She called 911 at 7:45 P.M.   While she waited for police,

she heard someone "running on the stairs" and leaving the

building.

     Boston police arrived at 7:48 P.M and found the victim

unresponsive at the base of the stairs on the first floor.

Blood had pooled in the foyer and at the stairwell and spattered

the walls and stairs.   Emergency personnel transported the

victim to a local hospital, where she was pronounced dead,

having suffered multiple chop wounds to the head, resulting in

several skull fractures, as well as similar wounds to the upper

body.   At the apartment complex, investigators recovered four

pieces of black plastic from the building's foyer and a sheathed

machete from behind a bedroom door in the victim's apartment.

Police did not detect within the apartment any evidence of

blood, a struggle, or the consumption of alcohol.
                                                                       5

    Later that evening, police composed a photographic array

that included the defendant's photograph.     From that array,

French identified the defendant as "the man she saw in the

hallway of the apartment building" earlier in the evening, who

"lived upstairs with" the victim.     Officers began searching for

the defendant at various addresses throughout Boston.     At 12:20

A.M. on December 30, 1997, police apprehended the defendant, who

was walking down Edinboro Street, carrying a sheathed machete

with a broken handle.   Officers recited to him the Miranda

rights both prior to putting him in the back of a police cruiser

and again after securing him in the vehicle.

    At first, the defendant asked the officers, "Is she dead?"

Despite an admonishment not to talk, the defendant declared,

"[S]he shouldn't have been fucking around.     I told her about

fucking around.   I'm deadly."    En route to Boston police

headquarters, the defendant continued to inquire, unprompted,

about the victim's physical condition.     To the officers, the

defendant seemed calm and in good physical condition and did not

appear intoxicated or impaired.

    After arriving at police headquarters, the defendant waived

his Miranda rights, and a homicide sergeant detective

interviewed him, first off tape and then tape recorded.       During

the tape recorded interview, the defendant said that he was

suspicious that the victim had been unfaithful to him.        Although
                                                                     6

he denied arguing with the victim, when asked whether "she

ma[d]e a move for" a machete found in the bedroom, the defendant

responded, "Yes, she did."   When asked "if he was in fear of his

life," he also replied in the affirmative.   Nevertheless, the

defendant "refused to enter into any specificity surrounding the

number of times [the victim] was struck or specificity as to how

she obtained her injuries," but did "tak[e] responsibility for

what occurred" and told the detective that "he should have the

death penalty" for his actions.   At no point did the

interviewing detective have the impression that the defendant

was under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, and he did

not appear intoxicated or impaired while at the police station.

     The Boston police crime laboratory conducted forensic

testing on the machete confiscated from the defendant at the

time of his arrest.   The machete and its sheath tested positive

for human blood.   Forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis

of the blood on the machete blade, and blood from the apartment

complex entryway, matched the victim's DNA profile.1    The pieces

of plastic recovered from the entryway of the apartment building

also matched the broken handle of the machete.   Furthermore,

following an autopsy, the medical examiner determined that the

     1 The director of the crime laboratory testified that the
odds of such a match occurring in randomly selected unrelated
individuals were between one in 5.9 million and one in 190
million.
                                                                      7

victim's injuries were consistent with wounds made by a machete

and that "she died of multiple chop wounds to the head."

    b.   Procedural history.   A grand jury indicted the

defendant on one count of murder in the first degree.      Prior to

trial, the defendant filed a notice of an intent to rely on a

defense of a lack of criminal responsibility or diminished

capacity due to mental disease or defect.   After a trial in

November of 2000, a jury convicted the defendant of murder in

the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.

The judge sentenced the defendant to life in prison without the

possibility of parole, and the defendant timely appealed.      His

appeal stalled for several years, however, pending the filing of

three days of trial court transcripts, one of which was never

recovered.

    In response, in 2012, the defendant filed a motion for a

new trial or, in the alternative, for a hearing pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Harris, 376 Mass. 74 (1978), to address the

missing trial transcript for the appellate record.   After

supervising the Harris reconstruction of the missing trial

transcript, and participating in an evidentiary hearing, the

parties were able to stipulate to facts recreating the substance

of the missing transcript, which included testimony from one of

the defendant's expert psychologist witnesses, the charge

conference, the closing arguments, the jury instructions, and
                                                                     8

the verdict.   Equipped with the reconstructed record, the motion

judge ultimately denied the defendant's motion for a new trial

in 2015.

    The defendant's appeal from that denial was consolidated

with his direct appeal from his conviction.     We requested

supplemental briefing to address the reconstruction of certain

jury instructions given at trial, particularly the general

instruction on intoxication and mental impairment.

    2.     Discussion.   We review "a direct appeal from a

conviction of murder in the first degree along with an appeal

from the denial of a motion for a new trial" together under

G. L. c. 278, § 33E.     Denson, 489 Mass. at 144.   "In so doing,

we review 'preserved issues according to their constitutional or

common-law standard and any unraised, unpreserved, or unargued

errors, and other errors we discover after a comprehensive

review of the entire record, for a substantial likelihood of a

miscarriage of justice.'"    Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Upton,

484 Mass. 155, 160 (2020).

    The defendant argues that the trial judge committed

reversible error by failing to give the jury two instructions on

mitigating circumstances.    He also argues that the motion judge

erred by denying his motion for a new trial and that he is

entitled to a new trial because he is prejudiced on direct

appeal by the reliance on a stipulated summary of a missing
                                                                      9

trial transcript that encompasses the trial judge's errant jury

instructions.    The defendant also asks this court to order a new

trial or reduce the verdict pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.     We

address each issue in turn.

     a.    Jury instructions.   Per the parties' stipulation to the

trial events of November 15, 2000, the trial judge instructed

the jury on murder in the first degree on the theories of

deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, murder

in the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, and self-defense.2

The parties agree that the judge used the model jury

instructions in operation at the time of trial.3

     The defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial

because the trial judge erred by declining to instruct the jury

on voluntary manslaughter under a theory of sudden combat, and

on the combined effects of mental impairment from mental illness

and intoxication negating the intent or knowledge required for

murder in the first degree under a theory of extreme atrocity or

cruelty, which would have warranted a lesser conviction of

murder in the second degree.

     2 The judge also specifically instructed on third prong
malice for murder in the first and second degrees, to which the
defendant objected but was overruled.

     3   Model Jury Instructions on Homicide (1999).
                                                                  10

     i.   Voluntary manslaughter arising from sudden combat.     The

defendant asserts that he was entitled to a jury instruction on

sudden combat because, considering the facts in the light most

favorable to him, the victim reached for the machete in the

bedroom, causing the defendant to fear for his life, given that

"the victim had swung her machete at him on at least one prior

occasion and . . . cut him before."   She then swung this machete

"at him a couple times, but did not touch him with it," before

the defendant grabbed the other machete and chased her

downstairs with it.   After the confrontation that resulted in

her death, he immediately left the building.   The defendant

requested, and then objected to the omission of, the sudden

combat instruction,4 and so we review for prejudicial error,

Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 678 (2019), by

"inquir[ing] whether there is a reasonable possibility that the

error might have contributed to the jury's verdict" (citation

omitted), Commonwealth v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 46 (2019).

     "Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing arising not

from malice, but from . . . sudden [heat of] passion induced by

reasonable provocation, sudden combat, or [the use of] excessive

force in self-defense" (emphasis added; quotation and citation

     4 The defendant's objection to the sudden combat instruction
appears in the stipulation, which we accept as true, thereby
preserving the issue on appeal.
                                                                      11

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Richards, 485 Mass. 896, 918 (2020).

"In deciding whether an instruction is warranted regarding these

mitigating circumstances, the evidence must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the defendant."     Id., citing

Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 443 (2006).       Here, the

trial judge instructed the jury on theories of reasonable

provocation and excessive force in self-defense but not on

sudden combat, which the defendant had requested.5    Having viewed

the evidence "in the light most favorable to the defendant,"

Richards, supra, we conclude that the trial judge did not err by

not giving the sudden combat instruction.

     Consistent with more than one and one-half centuries of our

jurisprudence, sudden combat entails two persons "meet[ing], not

intending to quarrel, and angry words suddenly arise," leading

to "blows . . . on both sides, without much regard to who is the

assailant."   Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 58 (2018),

     5 In their briefs, the parties frequently conflate
reasonable provocation with sudden combat or merge the two into
one instruction ("reasonable provocation by sudden combat") when
they are two separate but related instructions, as we discuss
infra. "Reasonable provocation encompasses a wider range of
circumstances likely to cause an individual to lose self-control
in the heat of passion than does sudden combat. . . . Thus, it
is more accurate to view sudden combat as a form of reasonable
provocation." Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 58 (2018).
See Richards, 485 Mass. at 919-920 (concluding that trial judge
erred in not offering reasonable provocation instruction when
victim stabbed defendant in chest, and thus, not needing to
reach question whether sudden combat instruction was also
required).
                                                                   12

quoting Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 308 (1850).    The

victim making physical contact with the defendant is necessary,

but not sufficient, for a sudden combat instruction.    Howard,

supra at 58-59 & n.7 (2018) (citing several cases).    Even when

the victim attacks or "strike[s] a blow against the defendant,"

however, such contact is not always enough to warrant the

instruction.    Id. at 58, quoting Commonwealth v. Espada, 450

Mass. 687, 697 (2008).

    Regardless of the theory evoked, a voluntary "manslaughter

instruction is not warranted when the defendant 'cooled off' and

'regained a measure of self-control' before attacking the victim

(citation omitted)," Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 136

(2012), or where the defendant and victim are separated for a

few minutes following the provocation "and then the defendant

seeks out the victim (citation omitted)," id. at 136-137.    Both

reasonable provocation and sudden combat instructions require

evidence that

    "raises a reasonable doubt that something happened which
    would have been likely to produce in an ordinary person
    such a state of passion, anger, fear, fright, or nervous
    excitement as would eclipse his capacity for reflection or
    restraint, and that what happened actually did produce such
    a state of mind in the defendant" (quotation and citation
    omitted).

Richards, 485 Mass. at 918 (reasonable provocation).   Accord

Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 (1980) (sudden

combat).
                                                                    13

    First and foremost, the defendant admitted that the victim

struck no blow against him; he had no physical injuries

whatsoever.    Cf. Howard, 479 Mass. at 58-59 & n.7.   Secondly,

although the conflict began in the apartment, the defendant

chased the victim into the common hallway of the apartment

building and downstairs into the foyer, where she was killed,

leaving him ample time to regain a measure of self-control.        See

Richards, 485 Mass. at 919; Barbosa, 463 Mass. at 136.     Indeed,

the victim's machete was found sheathed behind a bedroom door.

We therefore discern no error in rejecting a sudden combat

instruction.

    ii.   Mental impairment and intoxication.    Our evaluation of

the adequacy of the jury instructions on mental impairment and

the effects of the consumption of alcohol is complicated by the

missing transcript, which included testimony from one of the

defendant's key mental health experts, as well as the jury

instructions themselves.    We have at our disposal the joint

stipulation of the parties; the proposed jury instructions

submitted by each party, with annotations, where trial counsel

"checked off" what the trial judge delivered and noted certain

omissions or objections; and transcripts from the 2015

evidentiary hearing and status conference at which appellate

counsel discussed transcript reconstruction efforts with the
                                                                  14

motion judge.   We have also requested, and have been provided,

supplemental briefing.

    Based on this information, we know that the judge relied on

the 1999 model jury instructions, in effect at the time of the

defendant's 2000 trial, when he gave an instruction.   We also

know that the trial judge properly instructed on lack of

criminal responsibility due to mental disease or defect.

Furthermore, in his instruction on murder in the first degree

under a theory of deliberate premeditation, he instructed as

follows:

    "In determining whether the Commonwealth has proven beyond
    a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with deliberate
    premeditation and that he specifically intended to kill
    [the victim], you should consider all the credible evidence
    relevant to deliberate premeditation and intent to kill,
    including any credible evidence of the defendant's alleged
    mental impairment on the day in question" (emphasis added).

There is also no dispute that the judge gave a "general

instruction on intoxication" as it relates to proof of knowledge

and intent.

    What persists are two distinct issues:   first, whether the

judge, when he gave a "general instruction on intoxication," as

framed in the stipulation, also instructed on mental impairment;

and second, whether the judge gave an instruction on mental

impairment and intoxication specific to murder in the first

degree under the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.
                                                                   15

    A.   Supplemental instruction on mental impairment negating

knowledge and intent.   The 1999 model jury instructions provide

for a supplemental instruction regarding mental impairment and

intoxication as it applies to proof of knowledge or intent.

    "Whenever the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's
    intention to do something, you should consider any credible
    evidence of [mental impairment] [the effect on the
    defendant of his consumption of (alcohol) (drugs) (alcohol
    and other drugs)] in determining whether the Commonwealth
    has met its burden of proof. Likewise, whenever the
    Commonwealth must prove the defendant's knowledge of any
    facts or circumstances, you should consider any credible
    evidence of [mental impairment] [the effect on the
    defendant of his consumption of (alcohol) (drugs) (alcohol
    and other drugs)] in determining whether the Commonwealth
    has met its burden of proof."

Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 61-62 (1999).   Based on the

representations of the parties in their principal and

supplemental briefs, and the record before us, we conclude that

the trial judge properly gave the model instruction, employing

the language on "mental impairment" and "the effect on the

defendant of his consumption of alcohol."

    Discussing the general intent instruction, the stipulation

notes:

    "The judge did not use the specific language as noted in
    defense counsel's motion for jury instructions,
    specifically regarding the jury's consideration of any
    credible evidence of mental impairment in conjunction with
    his consumption of alcohol and/or drugs. Defense counsel
    had requested said language and objected when said
    instruction was not given."
                                                                  16

     Based on all this information, the Commonwealth contends

that the judge gave the model instruction, including referencing

both mental impairment and the consumption of alcohol, and only

declined to incorporate the defendant's specific language about

"mental impairment in conjunction with the consumption of

alcohol," which sought to add to the jury's consideration the

effects of the combination of impairment and intoxication.6    The

defendant, although less than clear, has not challenged this

interpretation, but instead focuses on the specific supplemental

instruction on extreme atrocity or cruelty, discussed infra.7   We

     6 The defendant requested the following instruction as
paragraph fifty-four of his proposed jury instructions:

     "Whenever the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's
     intention to do something, you should consider any credible
     evidence of mental impairment, the effect on the defendant
     of his consumption of alcohol, drugs, or alcohol and other
     drugs, as well as his mental impairment in conjunction with
     the consumption of alcohol, drugs[,] or alcohol and drugs,
     in determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden
     of proof. Likewise, whenever the Commonwealth must prove
     the defendant's knowledge of any facts or circumstances,
     you should consider any credible evidence of mental
     impairment, the effect on the defendant of his consumption
     of alcohol, drugs, or alcohol and other drugs in
     determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of
     proof." (Emphasis added.)

This paragraph was not checked off, indicating that it was not
given, and it includes a handwritten annotation about an
objection, which was denied, next to the second sentence of the
proposed instruction, which was underlined.

     7 At oral argument, the defendant clarified his position on
asserting that the judge erred in failing to give a mental
                                                                   17

conclude that the judge gave the general instruction, including

the language on mental impairment, and need not have given the

defendant's requested instruction regarding the combination of

mental impairment and intoxication, as the defendant did not

present evidence on such combined effects.

    "A judge is not required to give jury instructions in the

exact manner requested by the defendant provided that the

requested instruction is adequately covered."   Commonwealth v.

Walker, 466 Mass. 268, 284 (2013).   Because the judge generally

gave the model instructions, and the issue of the defendant's

mental health was front and center at trial, we conclude that

the Commonwealth's reading is supported by the record in the

instant case.   We also conclude that, because the expert

evidence primarily focused on the defendant's mental illness and

did not address the effects of alcohol on the defendant's mental

illness, as specifically requested by the defendant, the

supplemental instruction on mental impairment and intoxication

was sufficient as to general knowledge or intent.

    "To be entitled to an instruction on mental impairment, a

defendant must, at a minimum, introduce evidence that such

impairment existed at the time of the conduct in question."

Commonwealth v. Santiago (No. 2), 485 Mass. 416, 426-427 (2020),

impairment and intoxication instruction to negate extreme
atrocity or cruelty.
                                                                   18

citing Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 680-681 (1980).      As

to evidence of mental impairment, the defendant presented

testimony from two expert witnesses:   a clinical psychologist,

Dr. Stephanie Brody, who conducted four hours of cognitive and

personality testing on him several months prior to trial, but

more than two years after the murder; and a forensic

psychologist, Dr. Ronald Ebert, who examined the defendant on

five separate occasions between May of 1998 and June of 2000.

    Regarding the defendant's cognitive functioning in April of

2000, Dr. Brody determined that he performed "at a borderline

level of intellectual ability," with "significant impairment

. . . in concentrating, highly concrete thought process, and

. . . significant psycho-motor slowing."   She also thought that,

based on indications of disorganized thinking, he may be

suffering from major depression, but, regardless, his cognitive

abilities had been persistently below average on these metrics

that remained stable over time.

    With regard to the defendant's personality profile, Dr.

Brody testified to evidence of "psychotic depression," marked by

"intense [dysphoria], mood shifts," as well as "problems with

concentration" and "managing and coping with intrusive
                                                                    19

thoughts."8   She also noted that the defendant "ha[d] difficulty

controlling the experience of emotion," known as "eruption of

affect," during testing.   Nevertheless, she noted that she had

"no knowledge . . . of how [the defendant] was functioning prior

to" her testing him in April of 2000, or thereafter.    Dr. Brody

also presented no testimony regarding the effects of alcohol on

the defendant's mental illness.    In fact, she testified that she

had "no personal knowledge as to whether the defendant abused

alcohol," including on the night of the victim's death.

     It was Dr. Ebert's opinion that the defendant suffered from

major depression with psychotic features and that such illness

was present at the time of the murder.    As recounted in the

stipulation, he determined that,

     "[a]lthough [the defendant] has not offered significant
     details of his mental state during the incident to his
     examiner, his description (and that of others) of his
     drinking and his depression in the time immediately
     preceding the event raises significant question concerning
     his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of
     the law at the time of the incident due to the existence of
     both a mental disease (depression) and a mental defect
     (effects of alcoholism)" (emphases added).

     8 The defendant's mother also testified that, prior to the
killing, the defendant had problems sleeping and was "hearing
things," and that he seemed "very depressed" to her.
                                                                   20

The defendant also told Dr. Ebert that he had "been drinking

heavily during the day of the killing."9    Dr. Ebert concluded

that the defendant's "psychological state and his intoxication

very likely interfered with the normal functioning of his mind

at that time," including "that his ability to plan and

premeditate his actions would have been severely impaired at

that time."10

     Viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant,

Richards, 485 Mass. at 918, this evidence described the

defendant as suffering from mental disease -- major depression

with psychotic features -- and mental defect -- effects of

alcoholism -- while also drinking alcohol on the night of the

killing but did not address how the defendant's purported

intoxication on that day would have affected his mental disease

or defect.   As given by the trial judge, the model supplemental

instruction on mental impairment and intoxication as to general

knowledge or intent tracked the evidence.    The jury were free to

     9 In further support of the defendant's contention that he
was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the killing,
the defendant called his stepfather and mother as lay witnesses.
They testified that, at around the time of the murder, the
defendant drank alcohol routinely. His stepfather further
testified that, when he saw the defendant after the killing that
same night, the defendant's breath smelled of alcohol.

     10Dr. Ebert believed that the defendant presented signs of
"organic damage secondary to substance abuse" supporting
"evidence of mental illness of psychotic proportions."
                                                                  21

consider mental impairment or intoxication and were not

precluded from considering both.    The trial judge was not,

however, required to instruct on the combined effect as there

was no expert testimony in this regard.    We discern no error.

    B.   Mental impairment and intoxication affecting extreme

atrocity or cruelty.    Per the stipulation, the trial judge

"instructed the jury on murder in the first degree on the

theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or

cruelty," as well as murder in the second degree, using the

model instructions.    Based on the Commonwealth's proposed

instructions for murder in the first degree, all of which were

checked off as having been given, and the parties'

representations in their briefs, the trial judge instructed on

mental impairment as to the defendant acting with deliberate

premeditation:

    "In determining whether the Commonwealth has proven beyond
    a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with deliberate
    premeditation and that he specifically intended to kill
    [the victim], you should consider all the credible evidence
    relevant to deliberate premeditation and intent to kill,
    including any credible evidence of the defendant's alleged
    mental impairment on the day in question" (emphasis added).

The supplemental instructions in effect in 1999 also included

similar language regarding "[Whether the defendant acted in a

cruel or atrocious manner in causing the death of the deceased]"

(emphasis added).     Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 62
                                                                  22

(1999).   This instruction, we conclude, was not given, for the

reasons stated infra.

     Paragraph fifty-five of the defendant's requested

instructions included the relevant language.   Neither party

contends that the trial judge gave this supplemental instruction

regarding whether the defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious

manner, nor is there any indication, in the stipulation or

supplemental briefing, that the defendant objected to the

failure to give this instruction regarding murder in an

extremely cruel or atrocious manner.11

     The defendant argues, in his principal and supplemental

briefs, that the trial judge committed a reversible error by not

instructing the jury on the defendant's alleged mental

impairment and intoxication to negate the intent or knowledge

required for a finding of murder in the first degree under a

theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.   In response to this

argument, the Commonwealth points only to the defendant's

     11Where the stipulation discusses the defendant's
objections to the omission of jury instructions, the stipulation
cites to paragraphs fifty-four, which contains the defendant's
requested language on the combined effects of mental impairment
and alcohol, and fifty-six, which provides: "I reiterate,
whenever the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant intended
to do something, or had knowledge of certain facts or
circumstances, in order to prove the crime, you may consider any
credible evidence of mental impairment, the consumption of
alcohol, drugs or alcohol and drugs in determining whether the
Commonwealth has met its burden of proving the defendant's
intent or knowledge."
                                                                  23

objection, as noted in the stipulation and annotations to his

proposed jury instructions, to the trial judge not instructing

using the language he requested on the combined effects of

mental impairment and intoxication, an issue we addressed supra.

The Commonwealth provides nothing affirmatively suggesting that

the judge gave the instruction.

    We read the record, including the stipulation, and

supplemental briefing as demonstrating that the judge gave a

general instruction on mental impairment and intoxication as to

intent and knowledge, but did not give the defendant's requested

supplemental instruction on mental impairment and intoxication

negating whether he acted in an extremely cruel or atrocious

manner, and that the defendant did not object to the omission of

this supplemental instruction.    Because the defendant did not

object, we review this unpreserved issue "for a substantial

likelihood of a miscarriage of justice" (quotations omitted).

Denson, 489 Mass. at 144, quoting Upton, 484 Mass. at 160.     "For

an error to have created a substantial likelihood of a

miscarriage of justice, it must have been 'likely to have

influenced the jury's conclusion.'"    Upton, supra, quoting

Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480 Mass. 763, 768 (2018).    Accord

Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 799.

    When warranted by the evidence, we have long required a

mental impairment instruction specific to whether the murder was
                                                                   24

committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty -- in addition to, or

apart from, that given generally on intent and knowledge.    See

Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 798 n.3, 799 (explaining distinction).

We have done so even though extreme atrocity or cruelty does not

require a finding of intent separate from the malice

aforethought required for murder, Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389

Mass. 216, 227 (1983), modified by Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485

Mass. 852, 865-866 (2020), because mental impairment also

relates, in this context, to the jury's function in serving as

the "community's conscience," Cunneen, supra at 228, quoting

Gould, 380 Mass. at 685.   To understand this requirement and its

proper application, we must review several cases decided by this

court, beginning with Gould and concluding with Commonwealth v.

Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410 (2014).

    As the court in Gould, 380 Mass. at 685, explained:     "It is

the teaching of our cases that the jurors 'as the repository of

the community's conscience, [must] determine when the mode of

inflicting death is so shocking as to amount to extreme atrocity

or cruelty" (citation omitted).   This is because mental

impairment "bears on personal turpitude, and the law, if it is

to maintain the community's respect, must grade its condemnation

according to the moral turpitude of the offender as the

community evaluates it" (quotation and citation omitted).    Id.

at 686.   More specifically, "if a malicious mind may be
                                                                     25

considered as evidence that a defendant committed a murder with

extreme atrocity or cruelty, then fairness requires that an

impaired mind may also be considered as evidence" on this same

question.   Id. at 684-685.   As they are acting as the conscience

of the community in deciding whether a murder was committed with

extreme atrocity or cruelty, the jury should, therefore, be

instructed to consider evidence of mental impairment on the

specific question of extreme atrocity or cruelty.      Id. at 685-

686.12

     We further clarified this requirement, and the analysis

underlying it, in Cunneen.    We began by explaining that "[w]e

adhere to our view that proof of malice aforethought is the only

requisite mental intent for a conviction of murder in the first

degree based on murder committed with extreme atrocity or

cruelty."   Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227.   Then, after

"delineat[ing] a number of factors which a jury can consider in

deciding whether a murder was committed with extreme atrocity or

cruelty," id.,13 we confirmed that Gould also established that "a

     12 We applied our reasoning on mental impairment in Gould to
the jury's consideration of evidence of the defendant's
intoxication as to extreme atrocity or cruelty in Commonwealth
v. Perry, 385 Mass. 639, 648-649 (1982), S.C., 424 Mass. 1019
(1997).

     13In Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227, we listed the factors as
including "indifference to or taking pleasure in the victim's
suffering, consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim,
                                                                26

defendant's impaired mental capacity is an additional factor

which the jury should consider in determining whether the murder

was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty," id. at 228.    We

again specifically referenced in our reasoning the jury's

responsibility to reflect "the community's conscience, goals,

and norms" in this determination.   Id., quoting Gould, 380 Mass.

at 685.

    We reiterated this reasoning in Commonwealth v. Oliveira,

445 Mass. 837, 846-847 (2006), after our approval of and

recommendation to use the 1999 model jury instructions on

homicide that are at issue in this case.   In so doing, we

extent of physical injuries, number of blows, manner and force
with which delivered, instrument employed, and disproportion
between the means needed to cause death and those employed." We
modified the so-called Cunneen factors in our recent decision,
Castillo, 485 Mass. at 865-866. There, we concluded that, "[t]o
find that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that a defendant caused the death of the deceased with extreme
atrocity or cruelty, future juries must consider the following
three evidentiary factors": "whether the defendant was
indifferent to or took pleasure in the suffering of the
deceased"; "whether the defendant's method or means of killing
the deceased was reasonably likely to substantially increase or
prolong the conscious suffering of the deceased"; and "whether
the means used by the defendant were excessive and out of
proportion to what would be needed to kill a person." Id.

     This clarification, designed to prevent a jury from finding
"extreme atrocity or cruelty based only on the degree of a
victim's suffering," rather than in reference to the "extreme
nature of the defendant's conduct," id. at 865, does not change
our historical analysis of the purpose and need for the mental
impairment instruction for extreme atrocity or cruelty -- to
serve as the conscience of the community, as explained supra.
                                                                     27

explained that the language of the model jury instructions was

"consistent" with Cunneen and its clarification of Gould:

       "[W]hile reduced mental capacity is relevant to the jury's
       exercise of their broad discretion as a reflection of the
       community's conscience, there is no greater mens rea
       required for murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty than
       there is for murder in the second degree, and the crime
       does not require that the defendant be aware that his acts
       were extremely cruel or atrocious."

Id. at 848-849.

       All this sheds light on our somewhat abbreviated discussion

in Rutkowski.     In that case, the defendant, after "present[ing]

expert psychiatric testimony that included," in part, "a review

of her long history of mental illness," Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at

796, and her "diagnoses that included psychotic depression,"

requested an instruction on mental impairment regarding extreme

atrocity or cruelty, id. at 797.     The judge, however,

"instructed on mental impairment only as it related to intent

and knowledge."     Id.   We concluded that this was error.   Id. at

799.

       As explained in Rutkowski, and more clearly in its progeny,

"there is no greater mens rea required for murder by extreme

atrocity or cruelty than there is for murder in the second

degree," Oliveira, 445 Mass. at 848, as "[t]he Commonwealth need

not prove that . . . the defendant intended to inflict

extraordinary pain, or that [he or] she knew that [his or] her

acts were extremely atrocious or cruel" (citation omitted),
                                                                   28

Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 798 n.3.   Therefore, as the court in

Rutkowski held, "It should have been made clear to the jury that

they could consider evidence of mental impairment on the

specific question whether the murder was committed with extreme

atrocity or cruelty."   Id. at 798.   As it was not, and the

"evidence of the defendant's mental impairment [was] significant

and . . . a critical aspect of [the] defense, the failure to

instruct the jury that they could consider evidence of that

impairment on the question of extreme atrocity or cruelty

effectively removed what may have been [the] only viable defense

to the question of extreme atrocity or cruelty."     Id. at 799.

The court, therefore, upheld the verdict, but only as to murder

in the second degree.   Id. at 800.

    We found a similar error in Gonzalez.    There, "the

defendant stabbed his girl friend multiple times" at his

apartment "[i]n the early morning hours of February 15, 2009,"

Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 411, after an evening of steady drinking,

id. at 412, and was convicted of murder in the first degree on a

theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, id. at 411.    The jury

received instructions on "murder in the first degree on the

theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or

cruelty, as well as the lesser included offenses of murder in

the second degree and manslaughter."   Id. at 421.   The judge

also instructed on the impact of intoxication on the defendant's
                                                                    29

intent but "did not instruct the jury that they could consider

any credible evidence of the defendant's consumption of alcohol

in determining whether the defendant committed the killing with

extreme atrocity or cruelty."     Id., citing Rutkowski, 459 Mass.

at 798.     Because of the "strong evidence of the defendant's

intoxication at the time of the killing," Gonzalez, supra at

423, "[t]he absence of such an instruction was error," even

where the jury received the instruction on intent, as "the

judge's instructions . . . would have been understood by the

jury to relate only to the elements of premeditation and malice,

and not to whether the defendant acted with extreme atrocity or

cruelty," id. at 422, citing Rutkowski, supra at 797-799.

    Given this long line of cases, we conclude that, here, the

judge clearly erred in failing to give an instruction on mental

impairment as it related to extreme atrocity or cruelty, see

Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 421-422; Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 797-799,

especially considering the "strong evidence," discussed supra,

of the defendant's mental impairment on the night of the

killing, see Gonzalez, supra at 423.

    "We turn now to whether the error in the jury instructions

created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."

Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 422.     There is no doubt that the victim's

manner of death -- multiple chop wounds from a machete -- is

horrific.    In Gonzalez, the Commonwealth argued "that there was
                                                                   30

no substantial likelihood" of a miscarriage of justice based on

"the number of stab wounds the defendant inflicted on the victim

and her degree of suffering," but we concluded that such an

argument "overlook[ed] the rationale for the jury instruction."

Id.   A proper instruction ensures that the jury's verdict

"reflect[s] the community's conscience in determining what

constitutes an extremely cruel or atrocious killing" (citation

omitted).   Id. at 422-423.   This instruction entitles the jury

to take into account the defendant's significant mental

impairment, even in brutal murders, and adjust their degree of

condemnation based on their consideration of the mental

impairment.   See Gould, 380 Mass. at 686.

      Here, we have another factor to consider.   The jury did not

convict the defendant of murder in the first degree on the

theory of deliberate premeditation where they received a

specific instruction to consider mental impairment, but they did

convict him on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty where

such an instruction was omitted.   Under these circumstances, in

the absence of the required instruction, "we cannot say that 'we

are substantially confident that, if the error had not been

made, the jury verdict would have been the same'" (citation

omitted).   Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 423.   See Rutkowski, 459 Mass.

at 799 ("We cannot say that this error did not likely influence

the jury's verdict").   This error, therefore, created a
                                                                  31

substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.     See

Gonzalez, supra; Rutkowski, supra.

    We turn now to the disposition of the defendant's

conviction of murder in the first degree.   "The distinction

between the two degrees of murder is that murder in the first

degree is a murder committed with deliberate premeditation, or

with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or

attempted commission of a crime punishable with imprisonment for

life," Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 296 n.4 (1992),

whereas murder is "the killing of a human being, with malice

aforethought," G. L. c. 277, § 39.   "Murder which does not

appear to be in the first degree is murder in the second

degree," G. L. c. 265, § 1, meaning murder in the second degree

is a "lesser included offense" of murder in the first degree,

see Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 421; Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 800.

    "Because the error affected only the jury's finding

regarding the element of extreme atrocity or cruelty, and did

not affect the jury's finding regarding the elements of murder

in the second degree," Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 423, "[w]e discern

no error in the jury's verdict as to murder in the second

degree," Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 800.   Similarly, in

Commonwealth v. Perry, 385 Mass. 639, 649 (1982), S.C., 424

Mass. 1019 (1997), we concluded that, while the judge erred in

not instructing the jury on intoxication with respect to extreme
                                                                    32

atrocity or cruelty, "[t]he jury's verdict [still] established

that the defendant was guilty of murder," as "[t]here was ample

evidence to support" it.    Here, apart from failing to instruct

the jury to consider mental impairment for the purpose of

atrocity or cruelty, the judge otherwise properly instructed the

jury on intent and malice, and the other elements of murder in

the second degree, and there was ample evidence to support such

a verdict.

    In such cases, "we have the option of directing a reduction

in the verdict to murder in the second degree rather than

ordering a new trial."     Commonwealth v. Lennon, 399 Mass. 443,

449 (1987).   "We will normally exercise that option where the

Commonwealth has requested . . . that we do so, rather than

grant a new trial at which the Commonwealth might prove murder

in the first degree."    Id. at 450.   Because the Commonwealth has

not made that request in this case, "on remand, the Commonwealth

has the option of moving to have the defendant sentenced on the

lesser included offense of murder in the second degree or of

retrying the defendant for murder on the theory of extreme

atrocity or cruelty."    Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 800.   Accord

Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 423.

    b.   Motion for a new trial.    "'A motion for a new trial is

addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge,' who may

grant a new trial 'if it appears that justice may not have been
                                                                     33

done'" (alteration omitted).     Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 488 Mass.

597, 600 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass.

664, 672 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017).     "We review a

decision on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of

discretion," ascertaining whether the denial "resulted from 'a

clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the

decision such that the decision falls outside the range of

reasonable alternatives.'"     Jacobs, supra, quoting L.L. v.

Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).    "Where a judge

conducts an evidentiary hearing, we 'accept the judge's findings

where they are supported by substantial evidence in the record'"

(alteration omitted).     Jacobs, supra, quoting Commonwealth v.

Velez, 487 Mass. 533, 540 (2021).

    The defendant argues that, if his claims fail on appeal,

then the motion judge committed reversible error by not granting

him a new trial, because the trial transcript was inadequate to

support his appeal and he was "entitled to a per se new trial

where the Commonwealth as responsible for loss of the

transcript."     We address each contention in turn.

    i.   Adequacy of record.     "[A] defendant is entitled to a

record of sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration

of his claims.    However, this does not translate automatically

into a complete verbatim transcript" (quotations and citations

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 577-578
                                                                    34

(2018).   "A new trial will not be granted 'unless the trial

proceedings cannot be reconstructed sufficiently to present the

defendant's claims.'"   Id. at 578, quoting Harris, 376 Mass. at

78.   As we have repeatedly held, "a statement of agreed facts"

as an "alternative method[] of reporting the trial proceedings"

is "constitutionally adequate if [it] bring[s] before the

appellate court an account of the events sufficient to allow it

to evaluate the defendant's contentions."   Imbert, supra,

quoting Harris, supra at 77.

      As in Imbert, 479 Mass. at 579, "the defendant does not

present a specific dispute over [the] contents [of the

reconstruction] relating to any claim of error," other than

claiming that not prevailing here means the stipulation has

failed him.   But this assertion begs the question.   The

defendant conceded at the evidentiary hearing in front of the

motion judge that "the record has been reconstructed adequately

to present the appellate issues," going so far as to say that

the reconstruction efforts were "extremely successful."      From

September of 2005 to March of 2015, appellate counsel worked

diligently to reconstruct the record based on trial records and

notes, as well as a joint conference with trial counsel and the

prosecutor.   We discern no reversible error in the motion

judge's determination that the reconstructed record was adequate

for appeal.
                                                                     35

    ii.     Responsibility for loss of transcript.   The defendant

renews an argument that he made at the evidentiary hearing on

the reconstructed transcript:    that we should extend our ruling

in Harris by requiring a per se new trial where the Commonwealth

is at fault for the missing transcript and that, here, the

Commonwealth includes a court reporter and clerk's office staff.

We decline to do so.

    In Harris, 376 Mass. at 74, "the stenographic notes of the

trial . . . had been stolen from the court reporter's car," and

yet, we did not find that the Commonwealth was at fault for the

missing transcripts.   Similarly, here, one of the court

reporters "left her job with the Commonwealth, without having

transcribed . . . three days of the [d]efendant's trial."     The

trial court's administrative office intended to have this

stenographer's tapes transcribed by a different court reporter,

but "the tapes could not be located."   Four years after these

inquiries, a clerk of the court found two of the three days of

transcripts and shared them with defense appellate counsel.

Based on these facts, we decline to extend Harris in this

instance.

    We do not identify any abuse of discretion by the motion

judge, and so the motion for a new trial was properly denied on

these grounds.
                                                                  36

    c.   Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   We have reviewed the

record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and we discern no

other basis for further relief.

    3.   Conclusion.   For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the

conviction of murder in the first degree and remand for the

Commonwealth to move either for sentencing on a conviction of

murder in the second degree or for a new trial on the theory of

extreme atrocity or cruelty.   We affirm the denial of the

defendant's postconviction motion for a new trial on the grounds

presented.

                                    So ordered.