Court Opinion

ID: 9396652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 15:00:38.742363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.628717
License: Public Domain

20-3227
   Baez-Duran v. Garland
                                                                            BIA
                                                                       Ruehle, IJ
                                                                    A095 421 281
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
   New York, on the 23rd day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

   PRESENT:
            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                     Chief Judge,
            STEVEN J. MENASHI,
            EUNICE C. LEE,
                     Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   JOSE RAMON BAEZ-DURAN,
            Petitioner,

                     v.                                   20-3227
                                                          NAC
   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
            Respondent.
   _____________________________________

   FOR PETITIONER:                    Reuben S. Kerben, Kew Gardens,
                                      NY.

   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy
                                      Assistant Attorney General; Kohsei
                           Ugumori, Senior Litigation
                           Counsel; Nehal H. Kamani, Trial
                           Attorney, Office of Immigration
                           Litigation, United States
                           Department of Justice, Washington,
                           DC.

    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DISMISSED.

    Petitioner Jose Ramon Baez-Duran, a native and citizen

of the Dominican Republic, seeks review of an August 26, 2020

decision of the BIA affirming an October 7, 2019 decision of

an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his second motion to

reopen.     In re Jose Ramon Baez-Duran, No. A 095 421 281

(B.I.A. Aug. 26, 2020), aff’g No. A 095 421 281 (Immigr. Ct.

Buffalo Oct. 7, 2019).    We assume the parties’ familiarity

with the underlying facts and procedural history.

    We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

the BIA.    See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d

Cir. 2005).

    Baez-Duran seeks review of his second motion to rescind

or reopen, filed 17 years after being ordered removed in

absentia.     He does not allege that he meets the statutory

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requirements of a motion to rescind or reopen.              See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(b)(5)(C), (c)(7).        He instead invokes the agency’s

regulatory authority to reopen sua sponte despite the time

and    number     limitations   on   his    motion.     See      8    C.F.R.

§§ 1003.2(a), 1000.23(b)(1) (versions in effect until January

15, 2021).      However, the agency’s exercise of that authority

is    “entirely    discretionary”    and    not   subject   to       judicial

review.    Li Chen v. Garland, 43 F.4th 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2022)

(quotation marks omitted).

      There is one exception to the limit on our jurisdiction:

“[W]here the Agency may have declined to exercise its sua

sponte authority because it misperceived the legal background

and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily

fail, remand to the Agency for reconsideration in view of the

correct law is appropriate.”             Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d

466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Li Chen, 43 F.4th at 253.

However, there was no such misperception here.                As the BIA

found, Baez-Duran did not explain his failure to appear at

his initial removal proceedings, he did not claim lack of

notice or dispute his removability, his motion was untimely,

and his application to adjust status did not provide a

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statutory basis to reopen.      He does not allege error in the

agency’s conclusions about his eligibility for adjustment of

status   or   waivers.    Moreover,           contrary   to   Baez-Duran’s

assertions,    the   agency   did       not    misperceive    the   law   in

concluding that hardship generally is not a sufficient basis

for sua sponte reopening.       See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t

of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The BIA

exercises its sua sponte authority sparingly, treating it not

as a general remedy for any hardships created by enforcement

of the time and number limits in the motions regulations, but

as an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional

situations.” (quotation marks omitted)).

    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DISMISSED.    All pending motions and applications are DENIED

and stays VACATED.

                                FOR THE COURT:
                                Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                Clerk of Court

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