Court Opinion

ID: 9446422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:53:44.054064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:38.413751
License: Public Domain

*595HASTIE, Circuit Judge,
with whom STALEY, Circuit Judge, joins (concurring).
Judge STALEY and I concur because we think the denial of the present petition is a correct result. At the same time, the refusal of the majority to reach a final decision at this time on the important issue this petition raises seems to us to be a mistake.
We understand the majority opinion to say that in extraordinary enough circumstances it might be proper for this court to use mandamus or prohibition to prevent a district judge from arbitrarily or scandalously disregarding his plain duty to disqualify himself from hearing a case under Section 144 of Title 28 of the United States Code, but that such circumstances do not appear in this case. Accordingly, relief is denied at this time in this special proceeding. However, the majority choose to leave open the question whether the trial judge’s action was wrong enough to require on future appeal a reversal of any conviction that may now ensue. It is this postponement of ultimate decision on the charge of disqualification with which we disagree.
The very special, challenging and often sensational charge of partiality in the administration of justice which is initiated by a formal affidavit of prejudice against a judge should receive final adjudication at first opportunity, if only in the interest of public confidence in the courts. Moreover, a trial is not likely to proceed in a very satisfactory way if an unsettled claim of judicial bias is an ever present source of tension and irritation. Only a final ruling on the matter by a disinterested higher court before trial can dispel this unwholesome aura. Thus, if an appellate court refuses, when properly petitioned, to prevent a disqualified judge from trying a case, or to say that the challenged judge is not disqualified, this postponement of decision hurts the administration of justice, even though the court reserves the right to pass upon the matter after trial. Such considerations far outweigh the objections to piecemeal appeals which ordinarily militate against deciding on mandamus an issue which can be reviewed after trial. Another normal objection to mandamus, its character as a challenge addressed to the judge himself, has no force here because the affidavit of prejudice has already challenged the judge in the most personal way imaginable.
For these reasons, we would decide now whether the affidavit of prejudice in this case is sufficient to disqualify Judge Murphy. In our view it is plainly insufficient. Under the statute a sufficient affidavit must charge that the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice against” the party seeking his disqualification. We think Congress used “bias or prejudice” in the conventional sense of enmity or hostility. Here the very opposite is charged. The accused avers that there is a history of friendship and a sense of community between himself and the judge, as well as some sense of obligation running from the judge to him. The sole complaint is that the judge may overcompensate for his inclination toward the accused by leaning backward. The teachings of psychology are invoked to show that this danger exists. But we simply are not persuaded that such possible psychological overcompensation for an inclination favorable to a party is the “personal bias or prejudice against him” with reference to which Congress has legislated. Therefore, we would sustain on its merits Judge Murphy’s ruling that no such affidavit as Section 144 requires has been filed against him.
This does not mean that the trial judge cannot or should not in all of the circumstances of this case, including the understandable indignation and irritation disclosed by his opinion on the question of disqualification, consider whether, however free of bias he may feel, the also important appearance of complete impartiality in the administration of justice would not best be maintained by his stepping aside. Judges from time to time elect not to try cases, which they are sure they can try fairly and objec*596tively, because of their concern to avoid any substantial doubt which circumstances beyond their control may create in the public mind about the impartiality of their administration of justice in the matters at hand. But this consideration must be left to the discretion and sensitive perception of each trial judge in the circumstances of each case. It cannot effectively be controlled by appellate rulings. Certainly it does not involve any mandatory disqualification under Section 144.