Court Opinion

ID: 9477259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:18:33.733614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:46.848093
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. The majority’s approach in this case rests upon an analogy it seeks to draw between the testimony of Detective Holsberry and certain types of real or physical evidence which do not call forth the protections of the Fifth Amendment. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), and related decisions, make clear that the Supreme Court has explicitly sought to prohibit the construction of such an analogy to resolve the issue presented here. A careful examination of the relevant decisions demonstrates that the majority is misguided in its attempt to parse the testimony of Detective Holsberry so as to render him a source of real evidence.
In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment was implicated where the prosecutor in a capital case sought to introduce the psychiatric testimony as to the defendant’s future dangerousness. The State had argued that the Fifth Amendment was irrelevant because the defendant’s communications to the examining psychiatrist were “nontestimonial in nature.” 451 U.S. at 463, 101 S.Ct. at 1873. The State sought support from those decisions which hold that there is no Fifth Amendment violation when evidence acquired from a defendant is “neither related *1447to some communicative act nor used for the testimonial content of what was said.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)). The Court rejected this contention because it was clear that the examining psychiatrist’s testimony could not be “based simply on his observation of respondent.” 451 U.S. at 463, 101 S.Ct. at 1873.
The D.C. Circuit, in an in banc opinion written by then Circuit Judge Scalia, has noted that Smith makes clear that it is improper to equate psychiatric examinations with the types of real or physical evidence with which Schmerber and related cases are concerned. The court explained that in Smith, “the State urged, as the Ninth Circuit had held in [United States v. Handy, 454 F.2d 885 (9th Cir.1971)] that Smith’s communication to the court-appointed psychiatrist were nontestimonial in character and specifically sought support by way of analogy to the Court’s decisions in [Dionisio, Gilbert, Wade, and Schmer-ber]_ The Court dismissed the argument out of hand.” United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1112 (D.C.Cir.1984); see also Gholson v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734, 739 (rejecting argument that testimony resulting from psychiatric examination was “based upon physical, nontestimonial communications”).
Nevertheless, the majority seeks to breathe new life into this argument through its suggestion that Schmerber and Dionisio “hold[] that there is a range of evidence relating to the appearance and demeanor of a defendant and to the physical properties of a defendant’s body that does not implicate the fifth amendment.” Maj. op. at 1443. It is true that the Supreme Court has found that a defendant may be required to submit to a blood test, see Schmerber, participate in a lineup, see Wade, provide handwriting exemplars, see Gilbert, and speak for the purposes of voice identification, see Dionisio. Yet these decisions have nothing to do with the “demeanor” of a defendant about which a witness testifies for the purpose of establishing a foundation for his or her belief that a defendant is sane. Where such “demeanor” testimony is based on an interview which constitutes unlawful interrogation, Smith requires that this testimony be suppressed.
Such was this court’s understanding of Smith in Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 911, 106 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed.2d 245 (1985), where a psychiatrist’s testimony as to the defendant’s sanity and criminal responsibility “went beyond the permissible bounds” insofar as it was based “on the contents of responses by a defendant who had not been given proper warnings....” Id. at 1294, n. 7. We thought it “of no import that [the psychiatrist] did not testify directly as to any specific statements to him by the [defendant].” Id. at 1294 n. 7. Moreover, we found it irrelevant that it was unclear from this testimony whether the defendant had discussed the crime at all. Id. at 1293. The psychiatrist’s testimony in Cape, as noted by the majority, was limited to mentioning “that he had talked with [the defendant] about ‘the details of how [the defendant] came there’ and ‘the details of the difficulty he was in.’ ” Id. at 1293-94. We found that these limited disclosures, coupled with the psychiatrist’s ultimate opinion as to the defendant’s criminal responsibility, compelled a conclusion that this opinion was “based on the substance of disclosures made during a custodial interrogation.” 741 F.2d at 1294.
The majority attempts to distinguish Cape by explaining that “there was no doubt that the contents of Cape’s discussions with the psychiatrist, as opposed to his mere demeanor, influenced the psychiatrists conclusions.” Maj. op. at 1443 (emphasis added). Given the questions which the prosecutor posed to Detective Holsber-ry, it is simply inconceivable that he did not base his testimony on the petitioner’s “communicative acts.” The prosecutor asked Detective Holsberry to draw his responses specifically from the “conversations” be*1448tween the two men and from “what [Jones] was saying.”
The majority’s misapprehension of Smith and its progeny stems from the view that testimony cannot be based on a “testimonial” communication unless it relates the substance of what one has actually said. This is consistent with the majority’s erroneous assertion that the Schmerber line of cases permits the use of certain “demeanor” testimony which results from an unlawful interview. Yet, as noted above, Smith explained that the physical evidence concerned in these cases was admissible because it was “neither related to some communicative act nor used for the testimonial content of what is said.” 451 U.S. at 463, 101 S.Ct. at 1873. The first portion of this disjunctive statement expresses the same thought contained in the rule that testimony must not be “based on” communicative acts or statements made during the course of unlawful interrogation.1
The case in which this court first applied the principles set forth in Smith exposes the nature of the majority’s error. In Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.1981), the prosecution called a clinical psychologist to testify as to the defendant’s future dangerousness. The witness had examined the defendant to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. We described this examination, which had been conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings, as follows:
At the time he conducted the psychological testing of petitioner, Dr. Patterson was unaware of petitioner’s background and the facts surrounding the crime charged against petitioner. The tests Dr. Patterson administered did not elicit any facts regarding the crime, and Dr. Patterson did not interrogate Battie about the murders. Instead, Dr. Patterson based his diagnostic evaluation of petitioner entirely upon the results of the tests given Battie. From his testing of petitioner, Dr. Patterson concluded that petitioner was suffering from a socio-pathic personality disorder....
Id. at 695 (emphasis added). On the basis of these test results, the witness testified that Battie was likely to commit future criminal acts of violence. Id. Noting that Dr. Patterson “based his analysis on petitioner’s answers to the test questions ... and upon ‘the pertinent information that [Battie] produce[d] in relation to the test protocol or test battery,’ ” Id. at 700 n. 18, we rejected the State’s argument that “Dr. Patterson’s tests constituted real rather than testimonial evidence.” Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
We held that Battie “was not simply ‘required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic’ but instead was required ‘to speak his guilt’ by responding to Dr. Patterson’s test questions.” Id. at 700 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 223, 87 S.Ct. at 1930). This was so regardless of the fact that Dr. Patterson did not describe in any way Battie’s responses or statements. The key to the decision in Battie was that the defendant was compelled, through communicative acts, to assist the state in proving elements necessary to support the imposition of a criminal punishment. See 655 F.2d at 700-01. The same reasoning applies here, since the State has availed itself of unlawfully obtained communications to support a guilty verdict.2 This is true re*1449gardless of whether Holsberry described— directly or indirectly — the substance of what Jones said.3
More recent cases in the Fifth Circuit have continued to follow this approach. In Jones v. McCotter, 767 F.2d 101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 947, 106 S.Ct. 345, 88 L.Ed.2d 292 (1985), two psychiatrists who conducted examinations of the defendant testified as to his future dangerousness during the penalty phase of the defendant’s capital trial. The trial judge prohibited the psychiatrists from testifying “(1) as to the contents of any conversation that they had with [the defendant] while he was in custody and (2) any opinions by the psychiatrists based on a conversation regarding the facts of the case against [him].” Id. at 103. The court, applying Smith, found that the introduction of the psychiatrists’ testimony nevertheless violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 103, n. 6 (citing Muniz v. Procunier, 760 F.2d 588 (5th Cir.) (same result), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 934, 106 S.Ct. 267, 88 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985)); see also Gholson, 675 F.2d at 739-42 (same result); White v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 415 (5th Cir.1983) (hypothetical questions directed at examining psychiatrist interfered with defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights because “they reasonably indicated that the psychiatrist’s prognosis ... was influenced by and derived from” examination conducted without Miranda warnings).
The only material distinction between the facts of this case and those presented in the foregoing series of cases is that here the testimony was that of one with no experience in the mental health field. This distinction, however, strengthens the grounds upon which the court should find that Holsberry’s testimony could not have been based solely on his “observations.” To understand why this is so, it is important to consider what psychiatrists do when they conduct an examination.
The products of psychiatric examinations fall along the entire continuum from real to testimonial evidence. On one end of the spectrum are the clearly physical parts of the examination: x-rays; blood and urine tests; and electroencephalograms. Standardized psychological tests, which probe patterns of association, require vocal responses and more active cooperation from the individual examined.
Byers, 740 F.2d at 1148 (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted). Where a psychiatric examination is composed principally of an oral examination, such an interview “falls squarely at the testimonial end of the spectrum.” Id. Yet when the person conducting the examination of a defendant has no training in the interpretation of personality disorders, his views must necessarily be *1450based in large part upon what that person is saying. This will be particularly true of one whose purpose in conducting an interview is to discover the details of a crime. Schmerber, discussing the difficulties which inhere in drawing distinctions between testimonial and nontestimonial communications, addresses this point:
There will be many cases in which such a distinction is not readily drawn. Some tests seemingly directed to obtain “physical evidence,” for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of 'physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment. Such situations call to mind that the protection of the privilege “is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.”
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764, 86 S.Ct. at 1832 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). These concerns are particularly acute in this case for we know Holsberry’s interview4 with Jones was part of a criminal investigation, in which it was the detective’s purpose — indeed it was his duty — to elicit from the defendant information regarding his crimes.5 During the course of his three-hour and ten-minute interview with Jones, it was not until two hours and fifteen minutes had elapsed that Jones began to confess.6 Cf. Gholson, 675 F.2d at 741 (Fifth Amendment violation where psychiatrist’s examination “aimed at procuring evidence by measuring physical behavioral reactions to interrogation”).
The majority’s portrait of Detective Hols-berry is that of a detached, clinical observer.7 Yet “[t]his case does not present the *1451kind of situation [where one has] drawn [a] conclusion from the [defendant’s] manner or deportment, his attention spans or facial expressions.” Gholson, 675 F.2d at 740. “A neutral and detached observation of a person’s physiological characteristics is something altogether different from an examination directed and calculated to subtly extract a defendant’s thoughts.” Id. at 741.
The court ought to follow the lead of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C.Cir.1982), and hold that lay testimony as to a criminal defendant’s sanity is inadmissible when such testimony is the result of an unlawfully conducted interrogation. In Hinckley, FBI agents ignored the defendant’s request for assistance of counsel and interrogated him for one-half hour before providing him with access to an attorney. Id. at 118. The government characterized its interrogation of the defendant as a “ ‘background’ interview.” But the court rejected the notion that the government ought to be able to use “demeanor” testimony which resulted from this interview because the “whole process” was tainted by a Miranda violation. Id. at 125-26.8
Ultimately, the majority finds that it is “too speculative” to conclude that the jury’s attention was drawn to the substance of the conversation between Jones and Holsberry. Maj. op. at 1446. As is explained above, this approach misapprehends the task before the court. The majority should recognize the presence of constitutional error and proceed to determine whether this error was harmless. See Cape, 741 F.2d at 1295 (citing Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.) (admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be harmless error), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860, 101 S.Ct. 161, 66 L.Ed.2d 76 (1980)).
Were it to do so, it could not conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in this case had no effect on the outcome of Jones’s trial. See Cape, 741 F.2d at 1294-95 (harmless error analysis). As the majority notes, “[s]anity was the central issue at trial.” Maj. op. at 1442. Yet the evidence on this question conflicted substantially. The defense called four expert witnesses. The first concluded that Jones was mildly retarded, that he had symptoms of brain damage, and that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. He could not conclude whether petitioner was sane at the time of his offenses, but thought that he was suffering from a major mental illness which impaired his judgment.9 The second of pe*1452titioner’s experts testified that Jones was legally insane at the time of his offenses.10 The third thought he was not sane, but could not make a definitive determination without further testing.11 The fourth agreed that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, but could not conclude that Jones was not sane at the time of his offenses.12 The State’s expert testified that petitioner suffered from chronic schizophrenia and was borderline retarded. Transcript at 419. He was unable to draw a conclusion as to Jones’s sanity13 but in responses to hypothetical questions, he *1453suggested that Jones “knew the nature and consequences of his actions” at the time of the offenses. Transcript at 424. The only other testimony on the question of sanity was that of the two complaining witnesses 14 and that of Holsberry.
Given the unanimous view of the five experts that Jones suffered from serious mental illness, the testimony of a single lay witness may easily have made a difference in the jury’s determination that Jones was legally sane. Indeed, the testimony of police officers is often the key to a prosecution’s attempt to rebut the insanity defense. Such testimony based on a defendant’s statements and conduct arising soon after the commission of a crime may appear particularly persuasive to a jury. “[Mjedical testimony after the fact may be less persuasive ... than immediate on-the-scene observations by lay witnesses.” Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 125.
Under the circumstances presented here, the trial court’s error could not be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court should grant a writ of habeas corpus.15

. Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, communicative acts should not be thought limited to oral statements. As the Supreme Court has explained,
the Fifth Amendment relates only to acts on the part of the person to whom the privilege applies and we use [the words "testimonial" and "communicative"] subject to the same limitations. A nod or headshake is as much a "testimonial” or “communicative" act in this sense as are spoken words.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 n. 5, 86 S.Ct. at 1830 n. 5. Consider the range of acts which, when the result of compulsion, do not implicate the protections of the Fifth Amendment. "[I]t offers no protection against compulsion to submit to finger printing, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture." Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 6, 93 S.Ct. at 767 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764, 86 S.Ct. at 1832). These are the types of acts to which the Court refers when it uses the term "nontestimonial."

. As is explained in Smith, when considering the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination, there is no basis to distinguish between determinations of guilt or innocence and *1449the imposition of a criminal penalty. See 451 U.S. at 462-63, 101 S.Ct. at 1872-73.

. Even if a content-based disclosure were required before the Fifth Amendment could come into play, I would hold that the dialogue between the prosecutor and Detective Holsberry did result in such disclosures. Consider, for example, this exchange, quoted by the majority:
Q. Based upon your observations of him, and based upon your conversations with him, were you able to form an opinion as to whether or not he was aware of the consequences of being arrested?
A. Yes, he was. At the time he was crying.
Maj. op. at 1442. The majority finds that this disclosure was permissible because it did not "refer[] to the substance of Jones’ statement when [Holsberry] told the jury he was crying." Id., at 1445 n. 8. What the majority fails to recognize is that Holsberry testified to a specific testimonial or communicative act. See Schmer-ber, 384 U.S. at 761 n. 5, 86 S.Ct. at 1830 n. 5 (certain acts are “as much ‘testimonial’ or ‘communicative’ ... as are spoken words’’); cf. Gholson, 675 F.2d at 741 (psychiatrist's testimony as to defendant’s silence and lack of remorse violated Fifth Amendment). It is irrelevant that Holsberry did not "testify that Jones was crying because he felt sorry for what he had done.” Maj. op. at 1445 n. 8. One simply cannot discount the possibility that the jury viewed this disclosure as an acknowledgement of Jones’s belief in his own guilt and that, as a result, Jones was compelled to aid the prosecution in rebutting his insanity defense. Cf. Cape, 741 F.2d at 1294 (reference to criminal responsibility based on disclosures made during custodial interrogation conducted without Miranda warnings violates Fifth Amendment); Gholson, 675 F.2d at 740 ("while the ‘content’ of a communication includes what the person says, it also includes, as a matter of necessity, what is not said”) (citing Smith, 451 U.S. at 464, 101 S.Ct. at 1873).

. There can be no question that this interview constituted "custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda. “[Cjustodial interrogation ... mean[s] questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), quoted in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam); United States v. Del Soccorro Castro, 573 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir.1978).

. No criticism of Detective Holsberry is intended in these remarks; there is no indication that he was aware of Jones’s legal incapacity to execute a waiver of his Miranda rights.

. The transcript of the pretrial suppression hearing reflects this fact.
Q. [the prosecution] I understand the interview was broken into two parts. The first time, what was [Jones's] initial response to your questions.
******
A. [Detective Holsberry] [A]t the start of the interview he denied any part of this act. Later he started crying and confessed to the entire act.
Q. Did he give you a logical sequence of events? Did he tell you what had happened, the first thing, the next after, the next A. Yes, he did.
******
CROSS EXAMINATION
******
Q. [the defense] You say he started crying.
A. Yes.
Q. That was about 5:45 in the morning; is that true?
A. Yes.
Q. Right after he started crying, he continued to cry; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. That went on for quite awhile, that he was crying; isn’t that true?
A. Yes.
Q. In fact, it went on for over an hour; isn't that true?
A. It went on during the confession, yes.
Q. While he was giving your [sic] statement as to what allegedly occurred, he was crying throughout that entire time; is that right?
A. Yes.
******
Q. What time was it when you got Mr. Jones in the interrogation room?
A. 3:30 a.m.
Q. What time was it when he made that statement about white women, the second statement, the last one?
A. That would have been at 6:40 a.m.
Transcript at 44-47 (emphasis added); see also Transcript at 43 (Detective Holsberry: “the interview lasted approximately three hours”).

.In this regard, it should be noted that the majority’s statement of the issue in this case, which assumes that Holsberry’s testimony was based exclusively on his “observations,” is simply incomplete. The majority states that Hols-berry had conversations with Jones yet omits *1451that fact in describing the issue. Compare Maj. op. at 1441 with 1445.

. The majority concludes that the conflict with the D.C.Circuit resulting from its decision is not a "square one” because "Hinckley involved the admissibility of a statement made under custodial interrogation after Hinckley had asked for an attorney but without any waiver of the right to speak to an attorney,” whereas "this case involves the admissibility of statements made after a waiver of Miranda rights that was held invalid because it was not intelligently made.” Maj. op. at 1446 n. 9. The conflict is a square one, however, because the majority has explicitly declined to reach the State's argument that this case differs from those in which no warnings are given. Maj. op. at 1444 n. 6. There are, of course, no such distinctions to be made in the context of this case. The State has never challenged the finding that Jones did not know and understand his constitutional rights when he waived them. These statements are no less inadmissible than statements taken without the benefit of Miranda warnings or statements taken from an accused in custody whose efforts to exercise those rights go unheeded.

. This was the relevant exchange between the defense and Dr. Ronald Shellow:
Q. [the defense] Now, let’s talk about [Jones’s] mental condition at the time of the ... offense_
You make a statement in your 1980 report.... Tell me if this is an accurate quote and if this represents your position here today.
"It is impossible for me to say with certainty if at the time of the alleged offense he did know right from wrong or knew the nature and consequences of his acts_’’
******
“I can say that at the time [of the offenses] he was certainly suffering from a severe, major mental illness which grossly affected his judgment.”
Is that an accurate statement?
A. That’s correct.
Q. You are not hedging on that statement here today, are you?
A. No, sir.
Q. That is still your position today?
A. Yes, sir.
Transcript at 332-33.

. The testimony of Lyle Kunz was as follows:
Q. [the defense] Do you know what the definition of legal insanity is here in the State of Florida?
A. [Dr. Kunz] I believe it has to do with the ability to distinguish right and wrong and to adhere to the right.
Q. Basically, what .I just read from your report about knowing right from wrong and the nature and consequences of [Jones’s] acts at the time of the offenses, that is basically your understanding; is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it your opinion that Mr. Jones at the time of the offense knew right from wrong?
A. It’s my opinion that he did not.
Q. That he did not.
A. Yes.
Q. Is it your opinion that at the time of the offenses that he knew the consequences of his acts ...?
A. I think it unlikely that he did.
Q. Unlikely?
A. Yes.
Transcript at 356-57.

. This was Dr. Arthur Stillman’s testimony:
Q. [the defense] Okay. So the history suggests to you that he was insane at the time of the alleged offense, but you cannot say with any reasonable medical certainty without these additional tests.
A. [Dr. Stillman] That is correct. I think one has to corroborate that because we are looking at a multiplicity of factors which require corroboration to come to a firm conclusion.
Q. I will not try to pin you down because I know you cannot, but at [the time of the offenses] you were leaning towards insanity-
A. Yes. It is not — I mean, it is impossible that anybody by coincidence would have three separate diseases just by pure coincidence.
Q. And [Jones] suffers from three separate conditions.
A. Conditions which may be related because of one central factor, and that is brain damage.
Q. And the three conditions are schizophrenia—
A. Schizophrenia-like psychosis.
Q. And the second is?
A. Mental retardation.
Q. And the third?
A. It is organic brain syndrome.
Transcript at 386.

. Dr. Sanford Jacobson testified as follows:
A. [Dr. Jacobson] Well, I thought his symptoms were most consistent with schizophrenia of the paranoid type. Other persons might say schizophrenia, undifferentiated type, but it was schizophrenic disorder; that was the diagnosis that would best describe his clinical picture at the [time of the offenses].
Q. [the defense] You also wrote in your report, ... "It is felt that the defendant presently is unable to assist counsel in his defense and understand the nature of the charges against him." Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You also wrote, "He appears to lack a rational understanding of the charges ..." Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But you were unable to express a definitive opinion about his sanity because he was amnesic about the actual incident. Would that be a fair statement?
A. Well, I would not say that he was amnesic. He told me that all he knew was that he was on his way home from his girlfriend’s, and he was arrested.
Q. He had no actual memory of the incident that he is here in court for; at least he was unable to tell you anything.
A. Well, he claimed or said that he did not remember anything resembling the allegations against him.
Transcript at 400.

. This was the testimony of Dr. Lloyd Miller:
Q. [the prosecution] You are familiar with the legal definition of insanity?
A. [Dr. Miller] I believe so.
Q. Whether you know right from wrong, the nature and consequences of your actions.
A. That is my understanding.
Q. You told us you had an opinion at the time you saw him that he was psychotic, right?
A. It was my opinion at the time that I examined him that he was in a stable enough condition to go to trial....
Q. And you had no opinion as to whether or not he was psychotic, in particular in 1977.
A. That’s right. I said I didn't have substantial material available to me that would allow me to provide an opinion as to his sanity or insanity for offenses of 1977.
Transcript at 420.

. One of the complaining witnesses expressed her opinion that Jones "knew what he was doing” and that he was sane. Transcript at 141— 42. The other complaining witness was "not sure whether [Jones] was sane or insane" but she thought he knew what he was doing and that he knew what he was doing was wrong. Transcript at 191-92.

. The district court also denied the writ on the alternative ground that Jones’s confessions need not have been suppressed. The district court cited Colorado v. Connelly, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Neither the State nor the majority has addressed this alternative ground. It should be noted, however, that Connelly is distinguishable and does not support the district court’s judgment. The principal holding in Connelly is that "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 107 S.Ct. at 522. Here, the trial court found that Jones’s statements to Detective Holsberry were voluntary, but suppressed them because Jones had failed to waive his rights intelligently. The court said,
Grant the motion [for suppression]. I do not think the State met its burden. I think the [statements were] voluntary, but I do not think there is a showing that the defendant knew and understood his Constitutional Rights at the time he made the waiver.
Transcript at 73. The Connelly Court also disagreed with the
Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis of the "vol-untariness” of a Miranda waiver, but it did not retreat from the long-standing rule that a waiver of Miranda rights must be knowingly and intelligently executed. See 107 S.Ct. at 533 (dissenting opinion).