Court Opinion

ID: 9559328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:26:47.143483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:43.934651
License: Public Domain

Grady, J.
The question presented on this appeal is whether employees of respondent were entitled to holiday pay under the terms of the contract between their union and employer. The trial court decided adversely to their claims.
The respondent was engaged in the business of manufacturing work clothing. Its principal customer was the J. C. Penney Company. The employees were members of the *413United Garment Workers of America, Local 17 of Seattle. The union had a written contract with respondent, the material parts of which, in so far as this controversy is concerned, are as follows:
“ . . . The following shall be recognized as legal holidays: New Year’s Day, . . . Christmas Day. . . .
“All employees are to be paid for six holidays as follows: New Year’s Day . . . and Christmas Day. ... In order to be eligible .for pay for a holiday an employee must work the last working day before and the first working day after a holiday, provided the manufacturer has work available for their particular job or operation. ...”
The contract also contained vacation provisions, one of them being as follows:
“At the vacation period of each employer, every employee then in the employ of the employer shall receive one week’s vacation with pay; provided, however, that employees with five or more years of continuous employment shall receive two weeks’ vacation with pay.”
In November, 1949, respondent was informed by Penney Company that no further purchases of its manufactured goods would be made. The loss of this customer affected respondent’s business to the extent of about 70%. No orders for goods from other customers were on hand and the business future was uncertain. It became necessary that respondent reduce its payroll. At that time, respondent had 108 persons in its employ. Respondent conferred over the telephone with Carrie McDowell, the business representative and financial secretary of the union. The representative was informed that respondent intended to terminate the employment of all of its employees because it had no orders in view. A request was made that some of the employees be retained. In response to the request, eighteen of the employees were kept on the payroll. Others were given termination slips under dates from December 1st to December 9th. The slips read as follows:
“Your employment with Farwest Garments, Inc., will terminate as of December-.
“Should conditions at a later date improve we will gladly consider you for reemployment. It is suggested you check *414with your local Unemployment Compensation office as to your rights. Farwest Garments, Inc.”
Some employees were given notices reading as follows:
“You are being laid off temporarily and we are advising the Unemployment Office accordingly. You will receive holiday pay for Christmas and New Years.”
In January, 1950, an order was secured from Penney Company, and this, with other orders, enabled respondent during that month and February to re-employ nearly all of those in whose behalf this action was brought.
A number of the employees who received termination slips believed they became entitled to holiday pay for either Christmas or New Year’s Day, or both, and assigned their claims to appellant, who instituted this action.
The appellant contends (1) that because the employees who received termination notices worked the last and first days for which there was available work they were protected in their holiday pay under the contract; (2) that respondent issued termination notices because of an expected shutdown of its manufacturing plant, but when it re-employed the employees and they worked the last day before and the first day after the period of termination respondent became liable for holiday pay; and (3) that inasmuch as respondent gave the complaining employees vacations a few months later pursuant to the vacation clause in the contract, there was a waiver of any claimed right to deny holiday pay.
We are unable to adopt the theory advanced by appellant, because in order to do so it would be necessary to place an incorrect construction upon the contract. The document was carefully prepared so as to attain definite objectives. It is plain and free from ambiguity. When it became necessary for the respondent to reduce its working force, it exercised its right to terminate the employment of those employees represented by appellant. They were not employees of respondent on the days preceding and following the holidays. The holiday pay benefits given by the union contract with these employees were automatically ended *415when employment terminated. They would not again come into being until there was a re-employment, and then only prospectively. There is nothing in the record to indicate bad faith on the part of respondent or that it voluntarily created a situation that made the employees ineligible for holiday pay. The loss of business and the uncertainty of relief therefrom afforded legal justification for the discharge of employees.
We find no place for the application of the doctrine of waiver. The appellant makes the assertion in her brief that “respondent’s payment of vacations constitutes a waiver with respect to its alleged right to deny holiday pay” and cites authority to the effect that a waiver is the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. The act of respondent in giving those they re-employed the vacation pay provided for in the contract had no relation to the right to deny holiday pay to those whose employment had been terminated. We fail to see what known right was voluntarily relinquished or abandoned. Respondent asserted and executed both its right to discharge employees and to give vacation pay to those re-employed when vacation time arrived.
At conference the suggestion was made that this court was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal for the reason that the amount in controversy did not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars. A majority of the members of the court were of the opinion that the same question was presented and decided in National Ass’n of Creditors v. Grassley, 159 Wash. 185, 292 Pac. 416. They were also of the opinion that case was correctly decided and should not be overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
Schwellenbach, C. J., Hill, Hamley, Finley, and Olson, JJ., concur.