Court Opinion

ID: 9862143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:02:18.563185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:26.818482
License: Public Domain

BURKE, P. J. dissenting: The executor made out a prima facie case of ownership of the stock certificate by proving that it was registered on its face and on the books of the corporation in the name of the decedent and was not endorsed. Sec. 21 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, (Sec. 436, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959). The burden then rested on the respondent to go forward with the evidence. Wagner v. Wagner, 17 Ill. App. 2d 307, 310, 149 N.E.2d 770. She seeks to meet her burden by proving a gift of the certificate to her by decedent. The burden was on her to prove the gift. In re Estates of Antkowski, 286 Ill. App. 184, 3 N.E.2d 132; People ex rel. Williams v. Wismuth, 2 Ill. App. 2d 109, 117, 118 N.E.2d 881; Storr v. Storr, 329 Ill. App. 537, 543, 69 N.E.2d 916; In re Estate of Wright, 304 Ill. App. 87, 94, 25 N.E.2d 909; In re Estate of Jarmuth, 329 Ill. App. 619, 630, 70 N.E.2d 336. The executor did not have the burden of proving that there was no gift. The respondent cites the case of In re Estate of Maxwell M. Jones, deceased, 274 Ill. App. 616, to avoid her burden of proving the gift. There the stock certificates had been endorsed in blank and were in the possession of the sister of decedent. The only evidence offered by respondent to sustain her burden of proving the alleged gift was her own testimony of what the deceased had said to her. Such total uncorroborated testimony by one who stands to profit from it is of questionable credibility and is almost wholly impossible to refute. For that reason it is generally incompetent under Sec. 2 of the Evidence Act. For practical reasons such testimony may be admitted in the Probate Court in limited circumstances under the provisions of Sec. 185 of the Probate Act. (Sec. 337, Ch. 3, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1959). This section, however, does not impose a duty upon the court to examine the respondent. It gives the court discretion to do so. See Mahoney v. The People, 98 Ill. App. 241; Wagner v. Wagner, 17 Ill. App. 2d 307, 313, 149 N.E.2d 770; Storr v. Storr, 329 Ill. App. 537, 542, 69 N.E.2d 916. The court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the proffered testimony of respondent as to statement made to her by decedent. This was the only testimony offered to prove the alleged gift. There were no other confirming witnesses nor any corroborative letters or documents. Respondent would have, been an interested witness. Furthermore, her offer of proof asserts that decedent handed to her the stock certificates of the Lowell Lumber Company and the Lake Front Realty Company and told her that the stock was hers, but that subsequently lie told her he had decided to leave the Lowell Lumber Company stock to some relatives. This proffered evidence indicates that decedent intended to retain control over the stock during his lifetime, and that therefore it should be disposed of pursuant to his will. The majority opinion, in effect, ignores the discretion of the trial judge to call or not to call the respondent and assumes to exercise that discretion for him.