Court Opinion

ID: 9756941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:10:36.762001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:33.599390
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority that the trial judge abused his discretion in discharging the twelfth juror.*
In its consideration of whether “manifest necessity” existed for her discharge, the Court properly uses the test expounded long ago by the Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), and followed by this Court, see e. g. Com. v. Stewart, 456 Pa. 447, 317 A.2d 616 (1974) and Pa.R.Cr.P. 1118, 19 P.S. (Special Pamphlet), for determining whether a mistrial was properly declared sua sponte. I, of course, have no quarrel with the standard employed by the Court. My difference with the majority is in the interpretation and application of that standard to the facts of this case.
I
The Court affirms the order of the court of common pleas because in its view, “[i]n examining the circumstances and events surrounding the discharge of the juror, we do not think the necessity for the trial judge’s action is clearly manifest such that the propriety of the *184declaration of the mistrial is free from doubt." Opinion, ante, at 8 (emphases added). If the Court intends to say that the trial judge’s action, in order to come within the Perez rubric, must be free of all doubt, I believe that the Court is interpreting that standard much too narrowly.
In determining guilt, we require only that the fact-finder be convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt” before it may return a verdict of conviction. We do not require certitude beyond all doubt even for that most grave decision. Surely in determining whether a judge abused his discretion in declaring a mistrial we are not to employ a standard higher than that required for ascertaining guilt.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Gori v. U. S., 367 U.S. 364, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 6 L.Ed.2d 901 (1961), stressed the great breadth of the trial judge’s discretion in situations of this sort:
“Where, for reasons deemed compelling by the trial judge, who is best situated intelligently to make such a decision, the ends of substantial justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial, a mistrial may be declared without the defendant’s consent and even over his objection, and he may be retried consistently with the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 368, 81 S.Ct. at 1526, 6 L.Ed.2d at 901.
See also Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 430 (1973). Clearly with such discretion reposing in the trial judge, it was not intended that he be so circumscribed as to be able to act only when free of all doubt. The cases are plain that a court may declare a mistrial if “manifest” necessity exists. The majority today, in my view, would read “manifest” to mean “absolute.” The trial courts’ discretion is thus reduced to virtual nothingness.
*185II
The Court does not, nor could it, question the trial court’s finding that the twelfth juror was “very, very distressed” at the time she was excused from the jury panel. The principal vice, in the Court’s view, in the trial court’s decision to discharge her was the failure “to contact both attorneys involved in the case to ascertain if they had any suggestions.” Id. This fact, to the Court, indicates the absence of any showing that the exercise of the trial judge’s was “tempered by a consideration of Walton’s interest.” Id. While I agree that it would have been preferable for the judge to consult with counsel for the parties at the time the crisis arose, I do not agree that failure to do so justifies the conclusion that the defendant’s interest was lost sight of. ’
The Court’s reason for requiring consultation with counsel is the belief that counsel would have provided the trial judge with possible alternatives to discharge, such as sending a court officer with the juror or lifting the sequestration order. The Court does not hold that the trial court was bound to follow one of these possible alternatives. What apparently is important to the Court is not that one of these alternatives must be followed, but that there be some evidence that they were considered. Indeed, the Court’s opinion concedes that “the same decision might have here been upheld as manifestly necessary had the attempt [to contact counsel and solicit alternatives] been made.” Opinion, ante at 8-9. The Court is thus finding fault not with the trial court’s decision, but his manner of deciding. I question whether this is our proper role, but even if it were, I believe the Court has overlooked a vital part of the record which does provide some evidence that the court considered and rejected possible alternatives.
While it is true that the trial judge did not seek the advice of counsel at the time he discharged the juror in *186question, the record reflects that the trial judge did receive and consider one of the alternatives now suggested in connection with the discharge of one of the jurors excused earlier in the day. The prosecutor, in order to avoid losing a juror who claimed he was needed at home to care for his incapacitated parents, suggested to the court that rather than discharging the juror, he be sent home with a court officer or sheriff to make sure he remained sequestered. The court rejected that alternative: “I am going to excuse him because I want him to concentrate on this case. I do not want to separate the jury. The risks are too great in a situation like that.”
The judge’s remarks indicate to me that his principal concern in discharging that juror (and inferentially the twelfth juror, since the reasons for their discharge were similar) was to insure that the jury which tried the defendant was uninfluenced by outside sources of concern or information. What Mr. Chief Justice Jones stated in Com. v. Stewart, supra is equally applicable here:
“The trial court was insuring that appellant would receive a trial by a fair and impartial jury which would return a verdict based solely on evidence adduced at trial. This is an interest which is to be protected not only for defendants, but also for the public, which has a compelling interest in justice for all. See Gori v. V. S.f 367 U.S. 364, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 6 L.Ed.2d 901 (1961); Thompson v. U. S., 155 U.S. 271, 15 S.Ct. 73, 39 L.Ed. 146 (1894); Simmons v. U. S., 142 U.S. 148, 12 S.Ct. 171, 35 L.Ed. 968 (1891).” 456 Pa. at 453, 317 A.2d at 619 (footnote omitted).
The fact that alternatives to discharge were available does not mean that the trial judge abused his discretion in discharging the juror and aborting the trial. Com. v. Monte, 459 Pa. 495, 329 A.2d 836, 840-41 (1974). The crucial question, to my mind, is whether the trial judge reasonably concluded that the juror could no longer continue as a juror because of her emotional state. He *187alone was best suited to make that determination and I find nothing in the record to indicate he was in error. See Gori v. U. S., supra; see also U. S. v. Holland, 378 F.Supp. 144 (E.D.Pa.1974), affirmed, sub nom. U. S. v. Murphy, 506 F.2d 1053 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, Ehly v. United States, 420 U.S. 994, 95 S.Ct. 1433, 43 L.Ed.2d 676 (1974); Annot., 53 ALR 1062.
I would reverse the order granting appellee habeas corpus relief and remand the case for a new trial.
NIX, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 The court below concluded that the mistrial was declared when that juror was discharged, and allowed to go home, and not on the following morning. This conclusion, which the majority now accepts, is at least subject to some doubt in light of the simple fact that the judge upon ordering the discharge of this one juror did not release all of the others from sequestration at the same time.