Court Opinion

ID: 9728056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:56:57.055943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:45.479192
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
I join the majority opinion. I write only to note that our neighboring sister state of New Jersey has already grappled with the issue before us today and has formulated a more powerful analytical test than this Commonwealth’s courts have provided in the Western Pennsylvania—Tate dichotomy.
In Brown v. Davis, 203 N.J.Super. 41, 495 A.2d 900 (1984), New Jersey’s counterpart to our Court had before it a case dealing with the right of public access under New Jersey’s Constitution to private property to demonstrate against abortions. In deciding that the right was not present under the facts before it, the Brown court applied the test laid down by New Jersey’s high court in State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), app. dism. sub nom. Princeton University v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102 S.Ct. 867, 70 L.Ed.2d 855 (1982).
In State v. Schmid, where the defendant sought to distribute political literature on the campus of Princeton University, the court formulated a three prong test to ascertain “... the parameters of the rights of speech and assembly upon privately owned property and the extent to which such property reasonably can be restricted to accomodate” those rights. Id. 84 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d 615. The elements to be considered are “(1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally, its ‘normal’ use, (2) the extent and nature of the public’s invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and public use of the property.” Id. at 563, 423 A.2d 615.
*65The protection of the rights of a private owner is concomitant to the owner’s obligation to honor the rights of others to speak and assemble on his property. In weighing the reasonableness of the owner’s restrictions to access to private property, effect must be given to whether “there exists convenient and feasible alternative means to individuals to engage in substantially the same expres-sional activity.” Schmid at 563, 423 A.2d 615.
Brown, 495 A.2d at 903.
The Schmid analysis makes explicit the factors that are implicit in Western Pennsylvania, Tate and the majority opinion. It is, consequently, a more useful tool. Using it, I come to the same conclusion as the majority.