Court Opinion

ID: 9552929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:19:22.569434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:23.412430
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting. This court now decrees that the trial courts of this state give special instructions cautioning the jurors on the inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony. This stacks the deck in favor of the criminal and against the prosecution. The court in its instructions now must discount the weight of eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness testimony should be explained, considered, and evaluated the same as any other testimony, by cross-examination and persuasive argument of defense counsel. Defense counsel can deal realistically with any shortcomings of such evidence, whether it be eyewitness identification of a defendant or circumstantial evidence. The jurors should be allowed to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the *401evidence. The judge should not stress the weight or the shortcomings of any particular relevant evidence.
The effect of the requirement under syllabus ¶ 1 is to place on the shoulders of the trial judge the difficult task of determining when “eyewitness identification is a critical part of the prosecution’s case and there is a serious question about the reliability of the identification.” What yardstick can be used for this determination? Evidence should not be considered critical to the prosecution’s case if there is sufficient other relevant evidence to support a conviction.
In the present case at the preliminary hearing there were three eyewitnesses who identified the defendant as the criminal who held the handgun. The defendant was not wearing a mask when he robbed the restaurant. One of the eyewitnesses was in the hospital at the time of the trial. Her presence could not be procured and the trial was completed without her. The inadvertent reference at trial to her identification of defendant may not have been admissible. However, it was objected to and the court immediately struck the statement and directed the jury to disregard the reference. At most this was harmless error.
There was some question as to the admissibility of proffered testimony of this witness, Tammie Moss. The testimony was given at the preliminary hearing. The testimony was under oath, in open court, and was subjected to cross-examination by defendant’s counsel. It was proffered and a showing was made that Tammie Moss was admitted to a hospital for dental surgery the morning of the trial. She was unavailable as a witness. Her transcribed testimony at the preliminary hearing should have been admitted by the trial judge. K.S.A. 60-460(c)(2).
Even though this testimony was not allowed at the trial, the owner of the restaurant, an eyewitness, did identify the defendant at the trial as one of the persons who committed the crime. A similar eyewitness identification of the defendant was made by the accomplice McGuire. Under the facts here the prosecution’s case was based, not on one, but on three eyewitnesses, although only two of these eyewitnesses were available and permitted to testify at the trial.
Add to their testimony the circumstantial evidence. It consisted of a money bag which was found on the premises where defendant lived. The bag contained definite proof that it was taken from the restaurant during this robbery. In addition to the money bag *402and the eyewitness identifications, we have the testimony of McGuire, the accomplice, who testified that he and Warren planned and carried out the robbery, and divided the ill-gotten gains in Warren’s living quarters. It would appear that this is substantial evidence of another sort linking defendant with the robbery, yet the majority finds a serious question on the reliability of the identification of the defendant. In this case even under the rule stated in paragraph one of the syllabus no cautionary instruction should be required.
After considering the facts of this case, the court still holds a cautionary instruction on the reliability of eyewitness identification was necessary. If this be true the cautionary instruction must be given in any case where an eyewitness identifies the defendant.
Paragraph one of the syllabus in this case is misleading for it does not fit the facts of this case. In relating the facts upon which the court applies this rule, the court has evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and weighed the evidence in such a manner as to justify application of the new rule. The testimony of Miller and McGuire is disparaged. This court characterizes the issue of defendant’s identification as being “hotly contested.” This can be said in most contested cases. The presence of the money sack in the living quarters of the defendant is explained by pointing to McGuire’s previous presence in those quarters and by mentioning the various criminal charges previously filed against him. McGuire’s testimony that defendant took the sack when the money was divided is discounted and the testimony of the defendant Warren, that he never knew the sack was in his living quarters, is accepted as believable. The court in this manner has examined the trial evidence and determined credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence to justify application of the rule it hands down. The jury determined credibility and weight of the evidence and convicted the defendant. The verdict should be allowed to stand.
The following instruction was given at the trial and was sufficient:
“It is for you to determine the weight and credit to be given the testimony of each witness. You have a right to use that knowledge and experience which you possess in common with men in general in considering the testimony of each witness. You also may take the following factors into consideration when weighing a witness’s testimony:
*403“a) The witness’s ability and opportunity to observe and know the things about which he had testified;
“b) The clarity and accuracy of the witness’s memory;
“c) The witness’s manner and conduct while testifying;
“d) Any interest the witness may have in the result of the trial; and
“e) The reasonableness of the witness’s testimony when considered in light of all the evidence in the case; and
“f) Any bias, interest, prejudice or motive the witness may have.
“If you find that any witness has willfully testified falsely concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust the testimony of that witness in other matters, and you may reject all or part of the testimony of that witness, or you may give it such weight as you think it deserves. You should not reject any testimony without cause.”
This instruction is clear. It is logically arranged and covers any possible weaknesses which might be attributed to the eyewitness identification testimony, as well as any other evidence in the case. In disapproving this general instruction given by the trial court the court merely explains its disapproval by saying the instruction did not focus sufficiently on the dangers of eyewitness testimony. This is a dangerous basis for such a requirement. There are many cases which say the court’s instructions should not call attention to or give special emphasis to particular witnesses or evidence. See discussion in State v. Wilkins, 215 Kan. 145, 152, 154, 155, 523 P.2d 728 (1974).
It is not for a court to determine credibility and weight to be given — that is for the jury. State v. Dorsey, 224 Kan. 152, Syl. ¶ 4, 578 P.2d 261 (1978).
In conclusion I note that recently there has been a movement in the courts to discredit an eyewitness who identifies the criminal. This court now joins this movement and adopts the erroneous premise that such testimony is inherently unreliable. All types of testimony and evidence have, at times, proven to be unreliable. In the past we have withheld the stamp of either approval or disapproval on any category or type of relevant evidence. Evidence such as confessions, accomplice testimony, testimony of expert witnesses and circumstantial evidence may be subject to human error and even human perjury. However, once the court determines evidence to be relevant and admissible, it should then be left to the jury as to which witness should be believed and what weight should be given to that testimony.
I would affirm this case rather than use it as a vehicle for adopting the rule set out in syllabus ¶ 1.
McFarland, J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.