Court Opinion

ID: 9954951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 15:00:29.427537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:07.362406
License: Public Domain

22-2811
   United States v. Wofford

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                          SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
   City of New York, on the 27th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.

   PRESENT:

              DENNIS JACOBS,
              PIERRE N. LEVAL,
              RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
                    Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                              Appellee,

                              v.                                   No. 22-2811

   WILLIE WOFFORD,

                    Defendant-Appellant.
   _____________________________________
For Defendant-Appellant:                       Jay S. Ovsiovitch, Assistant Federal
                                               Public Defender, Federal Public
                                               Defender’s Office, Rochester, NY.

For Appellee:                                  Monica J. Richards, Assistant United
                                               States Attorney, for Trini E. Ross,
                                               United States Attorney for the
                                               Western District of New York,
                                               Buffalo, NY.

      Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western

District of New York (Elizabeth A. Wolford, Chief Judge).

      UPON       DUE     CONSIDERATION,            IT   IS   HEREBY       ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the October 17, 2022 order of the district court

is AFFIRMED.

      Willie Wofford appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion

for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on

appeal.

      On June 22, 2021, Wofford pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with

intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm

and ammunition by an unlawful drug user, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).

The district court thereafter sentenced Wofford to an aggregate term of seventy-

two months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised release. In

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June 2022, Wofford, proceeding pro se, moved for compassionate release under the

First Step Act of 2018. 1 Under that statute, a district court may, in its discretion,

grant a motion for a sentence reduction if, “after considering the [applicable]

factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a),” the court finds that “extraordinary and

compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As our

caselaw has made clear, a district court may deny a motion for compassionate

release if it determines that a defendant has failed to make the requisite showing

that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist or that the section 3553(a) factors

do not warrant a sentence reduction. See United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 73 (2d

Cir. 2021).

      On October 17, 2022, the district court denied Wofford’s motion, concluding

that he failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons and that, even

if he had, the section 3553(a) factors did not warrant a sentence reduction.

Specifically, the district court concluded that – although Wofford’s “medical

conditions present[ed] a risk factor for severe illness or death from COVID-19” –

he failed to establish that extraordinary and compelling reasons justified his

release because the facility where he was incarcerated “appear[ed] to have the

1Although Wofford proceeded pro se below, he is represented by counsel on appeal.   See Doc.
No. 5.

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virus under control,” and because he refused to be vaccinated against the virus

without offering any “sound reason for [his] refusal.” App’x at 107. The district

court further concluded that the section 3553(a) factors did not support a sentence

reduction in light of “the underlying nature of [his] conviction,” “his criminal

history,” and the court’s assessment that he “present[ed] a significant risk of

danger to the community.” Id. at 108. This appeal followed.

      “We review the denial of a motion for compassionate release for abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2021). “[A] district

court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the

law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision

that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v.

Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      On appeal, Wofford argues only that the district court abused its discretion

in concluding that he failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for

a sentence reduction. But as the government notes, Wofford does not advance

any argument that the district court erred in its consideration of the section 3553(a)

factors. Wofford has therefore forfeited any challenge to that determination. See

Phoenix Light SF Ltd. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 66 F.4th 365, 372 (2d Cir. 2023) (“Issues

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not sufficiently argued in the appellate briefs are considered forfeited and

normally will not be addressed on appeal.” (alterations and internal quotation

marks omitted)).

      Because “a district court’s reasonable evaluation of the [s]ection 3553(a)

factors is an . . . independent basis for denial of compassionate release,” United

States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted),

and a sufficient basis upon which we can affirm, we decline to disturb the district

court’s denial of Wofford’s motion. See Keitt, 21 F.4th at 73 (holding that “[w]hen

a district court denies a defendant’s motion under [section] 3582(c)(1)(A) in sole

reliance on the applicable [section] 3553(a) sentencing factors, it need not

determine whether the defendant has shown extraordinary and compelling

reasons that might (in other circumstances) justify a sentence reduction”).

      But even if we were to review the district court’s section 3553(a) analysis on

the merits, we see no abuse of discretion. Here, the district court reasonably

determined that the “underlying nature” of Wofford’s offense, his “criminal

history,” the “significant risk” he posed to the public, and his continued

engagement in criminal activity after arrest counseled against a sentence reduction

in this case. App’x at 108; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)–(C). And, to

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the extent Wofford believes that the district court placed undue emphasis on

certain factors and failed to adequately consider others, we have repeatedly made

clear that “[m]ere disagreement with how the district court balanced the [section]

3553(a) factors . . . is not a sufficient ground for finding an abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he

weight . . . afforded [to] any [section] 3553(a) factor is a matter firmly committed

to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

      We have considered Wofford’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

                                         FOR THE COURT:
                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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