Court Opinion

ID: 9760855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:19:51.067548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:18.123149
License: Public Domain

*1366BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority on this court conclude that the Superior Court justice erred in granting Maurice Lerner’s petition for postconviction relief because the revocation of Lerner’s parole-eligible status is not a violation of the ex post facto clause or the due-process clause. After careful consideration of the record and the relevant law, I agree with the trial justice’s conclusion that the revocation violated the ex post facto clause and, therefore, I respectfully dissent. In view of my position regarding the ex post facto claim and the fact that adoption of this position would be dispositive of the case, it is unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the parties.7
Both the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions contain provisions prohibiting ex post facto laws, and each clause is virtually identical to the other. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10; R.I. Const., art. I, § 12. In Calder v. Ball, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), the United States Supreme Court enumerated four types of laws that the ex post facto clause prohibits, including:
“3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.”
I believe that the action of the State Parole Board revoking Lerner’s parole-eligible status falls within this category of prohibited acts.
Although our parole-eligibility provisions are contained in a different title from the statute making certain conduct a crime and providing the term of imprisonment for that crime, they are still considered part 6f “the law annexed to the crime” because parole eligibility is effectively determined at the time of sentencing based on the length of the sentence. See Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 658, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 2535, 41 L.Ed.2d 383, 389 (1974); Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 579 F.2d 238, 265 (3rd Cir.1978). Additionally, although the pertinent statutory provision regarding parole of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment, § 13-8-13, was enacted in 1970 and the alleged crime occurred in 1969, the 1970 version does constitute “the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Lerner was sentenced in 1970 when the amended version of § 13-8-13 was enacted. Subsection 2 of that statute provided:
“This act shall take effect upon its passage and all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.”
Therefore, this was effectively the only provision in effect at the time of the commission of the crime and the time of sentencing.8
Furthermore, a recent United States Supreme Court case, Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 41 L.Ed.2d 383 (1974), indicates that the Court would consider a revocation of parole eligibility a “punishment” within the terms of the third category of prohibited acts enumerated in Calder v. Bull. In Warden v. Marrero the Court considered whether a statutory no-parole provision for convicted drug offenders, which was repealed after the petitioner’s sentencing, was an element of a defendant’s “punishment” for purposes of a savings clause. In discussing this issue, the *1367Court noted the following two reasons, among others, for concluding that ineligibility for parole is an element of a defendant’s punishment:
“First, only an unusual prisoner could be expected to think that he was not suffering a penalty when he was denied eligibility for parole. See United States v. Ross, 464 F.2d 376, 379 (CA2 1972); United States v. DeSimone, 468 F.2d 1196, 1199 (CA2 1972). * * * Second, a repealer of parole eligibility previously available to imprisoned offenders would clearly present the serious question under the ex post facto clause of art. I, § 9, cl. 3, of the Constitution, of whether it imposed a ‘greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the ... offense,’ Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325 [25 S.Ct. 264, 265, 49 L.Ed. 494] (1905) (emphasis added). See Love v. Fitzharris, 460 F.2d 382 (CA9 1972); cf. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 [57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182] (1937); Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 491-92 [11 S.Ct. 143, 146, 34 L.Ed. 734] (1890); Calder v. Bull [3 U.S. 386, 390], 3 Dall. 386, 390 [1 L.Ed. 648] (1798); United States ex rel. Umbenhowar v. McDonnell, 11 F.Supp. 1014 (N.D.Ill.1934).” 417 U.S. at 662-63, 94 S.Ct. at 2538, 41 L.Ed.2d at 392.
I would conclude from these comments that a revocation of parole-eligibility status after it has been granted to a prisoner inflicts a greater punishment on such a prisoner.
The point of disagreement between myself and the other members of the court is the resolution of the issue of whether the alteration in the parole board’s policy regarding the application of § 13-8-13 which resulted in the revocation of Lerner’s eligibility for parole is a “law” within the meaning of the ex post facto clause.
In Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 33 S.Ct. 220, 57 L.Ed. 458 (1913), the Court, in discussing the type of action that the ex post facto clause prohibits, stated:
“The prohibition is aimed at the legislative power of the State, and not at the decisions of its courts, or the acts of administrative or executive boards or officers, or the doings of corporations or individuals.” Id. at 162, 33 S.Ct. at 222-23, 57 L.Ed. at 463.
The Ross Court, however, qualified this statement by declaring:
“But whilst thus uniformly holding that the provision is directed against legislative, but not judicial, acts, this court with like uniformity has regarded it as reaching every form in which the legislative power of a State is exerted, whether it be a constitution, a constitutional amendment, an enactment of the legislature, a by-law or ordinance of a municipal corporation, or a regulation or order of some other instrumentality of the State exercising delegated legislative authority.” Id. at 162-63, 33 S.Ct. at 223, 57 L.Ed. at 463-64.
A person imprisoned by a court is turned over to an administrative agency, the parole board, for execution of his sentence. As this court stated in State v. Fazzano, 96 R.I. 472, 478, 194 A.2d 680, 684 (1963), in considering a separation-of-powers question:
“Courts have no power to determine the penological system; this is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Legislature.”
The Legislature exercised that power in enacting title 13, chapter 8, which provides for the creation of the parole board, enumerates its functions, and sets out guidelines for the performance of those functions. See G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) §§ 13-8-1 to 13-8-29. In § 13-8-8 the Legislature granted the parole board the authority to exercise control over a prisoner’s sentence pursuant to the statutory guidelines. Section 13-8-8 states:
“Whenever a person convicted of any offense shall be sentenced to be imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions for a period of more than six (6) months, his such sentence shall be subject to the control of the parole board as hereinafter provided.”
This statute delegates the authority to the parole board to administer the parole sys*1368tem pursuant to the subsequent provisions which set forth the minimum requirements for parole eligibility for sentences of different types and duration. See §§ 13-8-9 to 13-8-13. In performing this function, the parole board sets a date for parole eligibility of a particular prisoner relying on the terms of the relevant statute as understood by the board.9
In Lerner’s case, the parole board assumed control over his sentence when he began serving his term. At that point, the parole board made a determination of when Lerner would be eligible for parole pursuant to § 13-8-13, which specifically provides for the “Parole of life prisoners and prisoners with lengthy sentences.” Section 13-8-13, prior to its amendment in 1981, which had only prospective effect, stated:
“In case of a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for life, such permit may be issued at any time after such prisoner has served not less than ten (10) years imprisonment * * 10
The statute contains no limitations restricting its applicability to prisoners “serving” life sentences — it is clearly applicable to prisoners “sentenced to life imprisonment.” There is no distinction made in this section, or elsewhere in this chapter, between a prisoner’s receiving one life sentence or several life sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. Consequently, the parole board adopted the position that under § 13-8-13 any prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for life, regardless of how many sentences were imposed or whether they were to be served concurrently or consecutively, would be eligible for parole after serving ten years.
This interpretation was consistently applied to Lerner’s case from at least August 1976 until approximately October 1979. In 1976, at the specific request of the director of the State Department of Corrections, both the chief legal counsel to the department and the Attorney General approved this interpretation as applied to Lerner. Based upon the understanding that he would be eligible for parole in ten years, Lerner was brought before the classification board in 1976 after serving seven years and sent to the minimum security section of the ACI. After serving eight years, Lerner was granted furloughs approximately once a month.11 In March 1979 Lerner was considered eligible for parole and went before the parole board for the first time.12 Parole was denied, and he was returned to the minimum-security facility. He was brought before the board again in September 1979, and the board again denied him parole.
In October 1979, because of an assistant attorney general’s questioning of Lerner’s status as parole-eligible, the chairman of the parole board again requested confirmation of the practice that had been in effect for several years from the new administration in the Attorney General’s office. The Attorney General’s response was that the parole board’s practice was erroneous and that the intent of the language in § 13-8-13 was that a prisoner sentenced to consecu*1369tive life sentences must serve not less than ten years on each life sentence imposed before becoming eligible for parole. As a result of this reversal in policy, Lerner was returned to the maximum security facility and denied all furlough privileges. This change in practice regarding the application of § 13-8-13, which resulted in the revocation of Lerner’s parole-eligible status, after consistently adhering to a different practice for at least three years, clearly violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
I believe Lerner is correct in relying on the case of Love v. Fitzharris, 460 F.2d 382 (9th Cir.1972), because the facts are virtually identical. The minor distinctions made by the majority do not affect the thrust of the reasoning of the case or its applicability to Lerner’s situation.
The Love case involved the interpretation of the relationship between a general penal-code provision regarding parole eligibility of consecutively sentenced prisoners and a mandatory minimum-imprisonment requirement for the particular offense committed. After informing Love of his parole-eligibility date under one provision, the Department of Corrections revised its policy regarding the relationship between these provisions, which resulted in Love’s being required to serve a longer period of imprisonment before becoming eligible for parole. In affirming the granting of Love’s petition for habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
“Absent a court pronouncement on the matter, the interpretation of the relationship between the statutes placed upon them by the administrative agency charged with their enforcement has the force and effect of law. * * * A new administrative interpretation which subjects the prisoner already sentenced to more severe punishment has the same effect as a new statute lengthening his present term * * * each ‘alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage’ * * * and each is prohibited by the Constitution.” Id. at 385.
The parole board was charged by the Legislature with the enforcement and application of the parole-eligibility provisions to sentences within its control under § 13-8-8. There was no existing court pronouncement on the intended meaning of § 13-8-13 when the parole board initially applied it to Lerner’s case. The parole board followed its policy of construing the statute to require that a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment must serve ten years before becoming eligible for parole, regardless of how many sentences were imposed or how they were to be served.13 Subsequently, as a result of consultation with the new Attorney General during the latter part of 1979, the parole board revised its policy regarding parole eligibility of prisoners sentenced to consecutive life terms. There was still no court pronouncement regarding the meaning and application of § 13-8-13.14 Therefore, the original practice of the parole board and the subsequent change in policy had the force and effect of law. The change in the parole board’s policy resulted in the revocation of Lerner’s existing parole-eligible status and required that he serve a longer period of imprisonment before being considered parole-eligible again, thereby inflicting a more severe punishment.15 I would therefore hold that this action of the parole board violates the ex post facto clause of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions.

. Notwithstanding the fact that my dissenting opinion addresses only the ex post facto issue, I continue to adhere to the position I espoused in my dissent in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, R.I., 421 A.2d 535 (1980), that is, that the intent of the Legislature in enacting § 13-8-13 in 1970 was to allow prisoners incarcerated under lengthy sentences or sentenced to imprisonment for life to be eligible for parole after having served ten years, regardless of how many sentences are imposed or the fact that they are to -be served consecutively-

. After the 1970 amendment, the parole board applied this statute to all prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment, regardless of when those sentences were imposed, on the basis that this was the only statute in effect. The chief legal counsel of the Department of Corrections and the Department of the Attorney General (at least through 1978) both concurred in this interpretation.

. Neither the parole board nor the Legislature is empowered to mandate a particular construction or interpretation of a statute as legally binding. The construction and interpretation of statutes is an exclusive function of the judiciary. See Rhode Island Const., amend. 12, §§ 1 and 2.

. This version of the statute took effect in 1970 and repealed all prior inconsistent provisions. Previously, the statute provided that a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment must serve not less than twenty years before becoming eligible for parole. See P.L. 1960, ch. 115, § 1.

. Lemer’s testimony in the United States District Court before Judge Boyle indicated that there was a “system” set up for lifers. They would be eligible for parole after ten years, eligible for transfer to the minimum security facility after seven years, and eligible for furloughs after eight years. These time periods were allegedly based on all lifers’ presumed parole-eligibility dates ten years from the date of incarceration.

. The date in March 1979 was arrived at by calculating ten years from the time of Lemer’s pretrial incarceration in August 1969 minus a few months credit for his participation in the blood-donor program.

. This policy was approved by the chief legal counsel for the Department of Corrections and the Attorney General.

. After the parole board changed its practice as a result of the advice of the new Attorney General, the Governor requested an advisory opinion from this court regarding the application of § 13-8-13 to prisoners sentenced to two consecutive life terms. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, R.I., 421 A.2d 535 (1980). It is well established, however, that an advisory opinion by this court is not binding. See, e.g., Opinion to the Governor, 109 R.I. 289, 291, 284 A.2d 295, 296 (1971).

.It must be emphasized that Lerner only seeks to retain his status as eligible for parole. He is not asserting any right to release on parole.