Court Opinion

ID: 9943462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:00:27.127827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:02.727506
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

FRANCISCO E. PRINCE,                            DOCKET NUMBER
              Appellant,                        CH-0731-18-0192-I-1

             v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL                             DATE: February 22, 2024
  MANAGEMENT,
              Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Eustace A. Prince , Waukegan, Illinois, for the appellant.

      Steve Newman , Esquire, New York, New York, for the appellant.

      Darlene M. Carr , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                          Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                           Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)’s decision to find the
appellant unsuitable for Federal employment, direct his employing agency to
terminate him from his Federal position, cancel his reinstatement eligibilities and
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

other eligibilities, and debar him from Federal employment in covered positions
for a period of 3 years.    On petition for review, the appellant challenges the
administrative   judge’s   decision    to   affirm   OPM’s     negative    suitability
determination, arguing that OPM failed to prove charges 1 and 2.
      Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).              After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
address the appellant’s request to present new argument, supplement the
administrative judge’s discussion of the evidence in support of charge 1, and
VACATE her analysis of the Board’s jurisdiction to review suitability actions
taken against tenured Federal employees, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

We decline to consider the appellant’s new arguments that he raises on review.
      On review, the appellant requests that the Board consider his new
arguments because his attorney representative was unable to submit a closing
brief due to unforeseen “technological” and “computer hardware” problems.
Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 2, 8.        A substantial portion of the
appellant’s arguments are raised below and based on evidence already in the
record; therefore, they are not a basis for granting the petition for review.
                                                                                       3

See Meier v. Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980) (providing
that evidence that is already a part of the record is not new).
      As to the appellant’s new arguments, the Board will not consider an
argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it
is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s
due diligence.    Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271
(1980). He has not made such a showing. Further, the error of his representative
does not excuse his failure to raise his arguments below. The appellant has not
explained the nature of the technological problems or how they prevented his
representative from requesting an extension or submitting his brief before the
initial decision’s issuance, especially considering that the administrative judge
extended the close of the record several times. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7
at 6, Tabs 12, 15, 17; see, e.g., Strickler v. Office of Personnel Management,
51 M.S.P.R. 354, 357 (1991) (declining to consider the agency’s arguments raised
for the first time on review because it failed to sufficiently explain why its
representative was unable to raise those arguments below).            The appellant is
responsible for the errors of his chosen representative . Sofio v. Internal Revenue
Service, 7 M.S.P.R. 667, 670 (1981). Accordingly, we decline to consider the
appellant’s arguments raised for the first time on review. 2

2
  The appellant also appears to raise an affirmative defense of race discrimination.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12. We find that the appellant, who has been represented by both
an attorney and non-attorney, waived or abandoned this claim because he did not raise
any substantive arguments below on this issue in his pleadings; he did not object to the
administrative judge’s order that did not include this affirmative defense as an issue on
appeal, despite being apprised of the consequences of such failure; and he offers no
more substantive argument on this issue on review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12; IAF,
Tab 1 at 37, Tab 7; See Thurman v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 21, ¶¶ 17-18
(setting forth the factors for considering whether the appellant waived or abandoned his
affirmative defense, such as the thoroughness and clarity with which the appellant
raised his affirmative defense, the degree to which the appellant continued to pursue his
affirmative defense in the proceedings below after initially raising it, and whether the
appellant objected to a summary of the issues to be decided that failed to include the
potential affirmative defense when he was specifically afforded an opportunity to object
and the consequences of his failure were made clear).
                                                                                        4

The administrative judge properly sustained charge 1.
      On review, the appellant reasserts that the signed statement he made during
the Navy Exchange (NEX)’s investigation into his misconduct was coerced;
denies that he received or assisted his coworker in receiving unauthorized
discounts; and argues that the agency’s circumstantial evidence, which consisted
of inadmissible hearsay, was insufficient to prove the charge. 3 PFR File, Tab 1
at 6-11. We find these arguments unavailing.
      The Board has found that when an appellant repudiates, under oath, his
unsworn extrajudicial statement made in a custodial situation, due process
requires the agency to submit independent evidence in support of the charge.
Wohlwend v. Department of Health and Human Services , 16 M.S.P.R. 458, 461
(1983); cf. Cole v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 9 (2014)
(finding that an appellant’s unrecanted admissions may suffice as proof of a
charge without additional proof from the agency). Here, however, the appellant
swore under penalty of perjury that he engaged in the misconduct. IAF, Tab 6
at 96. Even so, OPM submitted corroborating evidence in support of the charge.
See Uske v. U.S. Postal Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 544, 549 (1994) (explaining that,
when the agency submits corroborative evidence in support of its charge, the
Board may properly consider an appellant’s unsworn recanted admission,
including whether the recantation is credible or not, as one of the pieces of
evidence against him), aff’d, 56 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
      In addition to the NEX statement, OPM submitted the NEX report prepared
by the Loss Prevention Officer (LPO) assigned to the matter. 4              IAF, Tab 6
3
  The appellant reasserts that NEX violated his constitutional rights, including his First
and Fifth Amendment rights, and “E.E.O. [r]ights” when it interviewed him. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 11; IAF, Tab 1 at 37. Absent further clarification as to the nature of those
claims, we construe the appellant’s argument as a general assertion that his due process
rights were violated.
4
 While some of the evidence in support of charge 1 is hearsay, as the appellant argues,
PFR File, Tab 1 at 8, hearsay evidence is admissible in Board proceedings, and the
assessment of the probative value of such evidence depends on the circumstances of
each case. See Shannon v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶15
                                                                                   5

at 88-96. The report included a printout from NEX’s system reflecting the sale
and the application of the unauthorized discount on the boots and indicated that,
during a separate interview, the appellant’s coworker identified him as a
participant in the discount scheme.      Id. at 92.    Contrary to the appellant’s
argument otherwise, there is no indication his coworker benefited from his
statement implicating the appellant, as he admitted to engaging in the misconduct
and apparently was removed as a result. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8; IAF, Tab 1 at 38.
The record reflects that the appellant made a verbal statement to the NEX Loss
Prevention/Safety Supervisor (LP/S), which the LP/S memorialized in the written
statement that the appellant signed and swore, under penalty of perjury, was
accurate. Id. at 90, 96, 106. Later that day, the appellant confirmed to another
management official, the NEX Softline Divisional Manager, that his statement
was accurate.   Id. at 3.   Although the appellant now denies that he had any
participation in creating the signed statement, the accuracy of the statement, and
engaging in the misconduct, PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-12, he does not contest the two
verbal statements. We therefore find that those verbal statements are credible and
corroborate his signed statement.
      When compared to the consistent statements the appellant made during the
NEX investigation, his subsequent repudiations are not credible. See generally
Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987) (explaining that
an administrative judge may consider a witness’s prior inconsistent statements in
resolving credibility issues).      The appellant did not respond to NEX’s
January 2015 termination action, but rather began denying that he stole from NEX
and challenging the reliability of his NEX statement in submissions to OPM in

(2014) (citing Borninkhof v. Department of Justice, 5 M.S.P.R. 77, 83-87 (1981)).
Less than 1 week after NEX interviewed the appellant and he submitted his signed,
sworn statement, the LPO prepared his report and signed a statement attesting to its
accuracy. IAF, Tab 6 at 89, 97. There is no evidence that the LPO had a motive to lie
or otherwise fabricate his report or statement.
                                                                                      6

2017 and in statements to the Board in this appeal. 5 IAF, Tab 1 at 2, 33-38, Tab 6
at 54, Tab 11 at 10-11. These claims of coercion were inconsistent with each
other and became more elaborate with each telling; therefore, we do not find them
credible. Id. Because the voluntariness of the appellant’s extrajudicial sworn
statement was not seriously at issue and given the corroborating evidence, we
find no due process concerns raised by his statement. Cf. Wohlwend, 16 M.S.P.R.
at 461. Consequently, we discern no error in the administrative judge’s decision
to credit the NEX statement admitting to the misconduct over the appellant’s
subsequent repudiations, and affirm her finding that OPM proved the appellant
engaged in the misconduct as specified in charge 1.

The Board lacks authority          to   review   OPM’s     decision   to   direct   the
appellant’s termination.
      The administrative judge found that the Board could not review the
reasonableness of OPM’s decision to direct the appellant’s separation because he
was not a tenured Federal employee. Initial Decision (ID) at 7-8. Although the
administrative judge was correct in that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review
OPM’s suitability actions taken against the appellant, her reasoning and analysis
was erroneous. We therefore vacate those aspects of the initial decision.
      Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,
Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1086(h), 129 Stat. 726, 1010 (2015), when OPM makes a
suitability determination pursuant to its regulations, the Board does not have the
authority to adjudicate the matter as a chapter 75 adverse action, even if the
appellant is a tenured Federal employee.            Odoh v. Office of Personnel
Management, 2022 MSPB 5, ¶ 16; see 5 U.S.C. § 7512(F). Instead, the Board’s
jurisdiction over a negative suitability determination is limited to that provided
under 5 C.F.R. § 731.501, which does not extend to reviewing or modifying the
ultimate action taken as a result of a suitability determination. Odoh, 2022 MSPB
5
  Although the appellant asserts that he had only 1 day to respond to the termination
letter, he had “three calendar days after receipt of this letter” to respond. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 9; IAF, Tab 6 at 107.
                                                                                      7

5, ¶ 16 (citing Folio v. Department of Homeland Security, 402 F.3d 1350, 1353,
1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
      Nevertheless, the administrative judge’s error is not a basis for granting the
petition for review because she ultimately reached the correct conclusion.
ID at 8; see Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984)
(explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s
substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).
We therefore affirm, as modified, the administrative judge’s finding that the
Board lacks jurisdiction to review the suitability actions taken by OPM.
ID at 7-8.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        8

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the
court within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                  9

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.         See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     10

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant   to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 7   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439
7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              11

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.