Court Opinion

ID: 9796302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:54:49.068655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:50.030219
License: Public Domain

NEHRING, Justice,
dissenting:
1387 I respectfully dissent. I believe the difference in value between section 16 and the property that STTLA was to receive from Garfield County is so great that it violated the clear and unequivocal constitutional and statutory proscription against transferring public property for less than fair market value. NPCA argues, persuasively in my view, that the Board erred because the remand in NPCA I was not limited to directing that an unbiased appraisal be obtained for the section 16 lands, but that it also mandated review of the relative value of the lands exchanged. NPCA's reasoning for this interpretation of our mandate on remand turns on its view that an unbiased appraisal was merely the means to achieve the end of ensuring that an accurate value for both parcels was ascertained, resulting thereby in a lawful, fair exchange. NPCA also argues that the remand for a new appraisal did not preclude a subsequent challenge to the equality of the exchange based on information found in the appraisal. In support of this position, NPCA points to language in NPCA I stating that the Board is subject to a broad duty to "act according to applicable law." 869 P.2d 909, 921 n. 9 (Utah 1998). NPCA points out that the law requires the county to receive fair market value for the property it gave up in the exchange. See Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, 995 P.2d 1237; Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Salt Lake County Att'y, 1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899; Mun. Bldg. Auth. of Iron County v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 *1202(Utah 1985); Sears v. Ogden City, 572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977).
€38 The mandate rule "dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that case." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Utah 1995). In proceedings on remand, an "unwavering fidelity to the letter and spirit of the mandate" is required. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 34, ¶5, 98 P.3d 409. This does not mean, however, that the remand "elevates all of the statements in the . opinion to the status of a holding, thereby binding [the STTLA board] to what would otherwise be properly deemed dicta." Id. ¶6.
{39 Our starting point for determining the letter and the spirit of the NPCA I remand is the text of the case itself, The NPCA I conclusion states:
We remand this case to the Division for a determination of whether the appraised values of section 16 and the Garfield County lands offered in exchange represent the full value of those lands.
The stay presently in effect will continue until the Division makes the requisite determinations that the value of the land exchanged for section 16 is adequate under its trust obligations.
NPCA I, 869 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added).
40 This articulation of our mandate centers on the obligation to lawfully determine value of the properties. The appraisal is an instrument in the service of the quest for value.
{41 The first paragraph of the NPCA I conclusion clearly speaks to appraisals of both section 16 and the Garfield County land. It also indicates that the purpose of the appraisal should be to determine the full value of the lands. In order to determine the full value of the lands, an accurate appraisal is required. Although we did not address the merits of NPCA's request for declaratory action on this issue in NPCA 1, we did acknowledge that "NPCA had a legal interest for the purpose of a declaratory ruling in determining whether the Division was using correct appraisal procedures with respect to trust lands." Id. at 916. The requirement that the appraisal use correct appraisal standards is logically included within the direction to determine "whether the appraised values of section 16 and the Garfield County lands offered in exchange represent the full value of those lands." Id. at 923. Procuring an appraisal by an unbiased appraiser does nothing to contribute to the goal of determining the real value of the lands if the appraisal is materially flawed. The majority grounds its ratification of SIT-LA's conduct on the conclusion that the SIT-LA board had no jurisdiction to oversee the Garfield County side of the land exchange. SITLA's duties were limited to "actions of SITLA and its director." Although the majority does not speak directly to the question of the seope of our remand in NPCA I, it would be fair to infer that our remand mandate cannot be interpreted to confer jurisdiction on SITLA which has not been conferred by statute.
142 NPCA urges us to interpret our remand instructions to extend beyond an examination of the adequacy of the appraisal and to encompass an examination of whether the exchange was fair to Garfield County. The NPCA argument that we should evaluate whether the exchange was fair to both parties is based on language in a footnote responding to an argument made in a concurring opinion. The concurrence pointed out that although "the state's duties to the school system are important, they cannot and do not override every other obligation" and that "[al ... trustee must manage trust property in accordance with the law, and a trustee's duty to obey the law is higher than his or her duty to the beneficiaries." NPCA I, 869 P.2d at 923 & n. 1 (Durham, J., concurring in the result). The majority responded, agreeing in part. It stated that "trustees have a duty to act according to applicable law." Id. at 921 n. 9. NPCA relies on this phrase to support its argument that, with an unbiased appraisal in hand, we should now examine the results *1203of that appraisal to determine whether the exchange was lawful. It argues that an examination of the exchange demonstrates that it was unfair to the county and therefore unlawful.
143 In the portion of NPCA I discussing the duty of the trustee to obtain reliable appraisals, we pointed out that the problem with allowing the buyer to obtain the appraisal is that it gives the buyer "the opportunity to shop for favorable appraisals" and "leave[s] the trust subject to sharp dealing on the part of the purchaser." Id. at 922. Although the section on appraiser bias was concerned primarily with the potential injury to the trust and our analysis elsewhere in NPCA I focused primarily on whether non-economic factors should be given preference over the goal of maximizing trust income, we did acknowledge that part of our inquiry in the case was "whether the Division properly administered the school land trust." Id. at 916. Additionally, we noted that "[clourts generally have broader powers in trust cases in making certain that trusts are properly administered" in holding that NPCA had a limited right of intervention on the issue of whether "the Division breached its trust duty by not securing appraisals for both section 16 and Garfield County's land from appraisers either retained or employed by the Division." Id. at 922 & n. 11.
144 Determining SITLA's treatment of noneconomic factors and its use of a biased appraisal were constituent elements of the larger issue of whether SITLA properly administered the trust when making the land exchange. Just because we decided those two elements, however, does not necessarily preclude other errors of trust administration from being raised once a valid appraisal is obtained. Because lawfulness of the trust administration was a concern in NPCA I and an unequal exchange could potentially be unlawful, the seope of the remand alone does not preclude us from considering NPCA's argument.
1 45 Chief Justice DURHAM concurs in Justice NEHRING's dissenting opinion.