Court Opinion

ID: 9514211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:45:40.765325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:13.844405
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 28] Concluding that with probable cause to arrest, the officer was entitled to do a warrantless safety sweep of the trailer home, I respectfully dissent. Additionally, if the sweep had not been permissible, suppression of the evidence would not have been appropriate.
I
[¶ 29] As the majority notes, at ¶¶ 2-3, after receiving a tip from North Dakota Department of Parole and Probation Officer Mike Nason that two marijuana plants were growing in William Gagnon’s residence and were visible through a window, Special Agent Steve Niebuhr parked his vehicle on a public street outside Gagnon’s residence and, using binoculars, observed two marijuana plants in the window of *381Gagnon’s residence. Agent Niebuhr testified at a suppression hearing that he and three other officers conducted a “knock and talk” at Gagnon’s residence after he confirmed Officer Nason’s tip. “Knock and talks” are a legitimate police practice. See State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 116-17 (N.D.1979). Agent Niebuhr testified he twice knocked on the front door of the Gagnon residence and a female from inside the residence twice called for Agent Niebuhr and another officer to “come in” to the residence. Consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). After receiving consent to enter the residence, Agent Niebuhr opened the front door and was met by Tara Yellowbird, who lived at the residence. Although Gagnon and Yellowbird did not initially consent to a search of the residence, Agent Niebuhr had validly entered the residence and had probable cause to arrest them on the basis of his viewing from a public street two marijuana plants in Gagnon’s window.
[¶ 30] Because probable cause to arrest already existed here, this case is unlike State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶¶ 3-4, 685 N.W.2d 120, in which probable cause to arrest was developed through the safety sweep, and we reversed.
[¶ 31] The majority, at ¶ 15, concludes Agent Niebuhr’s walk through Gagnon’s residence was an unreasonable warrantless search. The conclusion is misplaced, however, because incident to a valid arrest, law enforcement officers may conduct a protective sweep to secure the premises to protect the officers’ safety under appropriate circumstances. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984).
[¶ 32] In Buie, the United States Supreme Court held “that as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093.
[¶ 33] Here the record establishes that the safety sweep was of the trailer home in which the officers were present. Reasonably, an attack could have been immediately launched from anywhere within the trailer home.
[¶ 34] The Court in Buie said more was required if officers are going to go beyond “closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” As the Court explained, “Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Id. And Buie did involve going beyond “closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” In Buie, law enforcement swept the first and second floors of the house and the basement. It was in the basement that the incriminating evidence was found. Id. at 328, 110 S.Ct. 1093. Since the sweep went beyond “closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched,” in Buie, reasonable suspicion was required.1
*382[¶ 35] In United States v. Mata, 517 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.2008), the court explained the three variations for “safety personnel sweeps”:
First, incident to an arrest, law enforcement officers may contemporaneously search areas within the arrestee’s immediate control to prevent the destruction of evidence or procurement of a weapon. Second, officers may search areas immediately adjoining the place of arrest, such as closets and other spaces, from which a surprise attack could occur. Probable cause or reasonable suspicion is not necessary for these first two variations. Third, officers may also perform cursory “protective sweeps” of larger areas if they have articulable facts plus rational inferences that allow a reasonable officer to suspect that an individual dangerous to the officers is within the area to be searched.
Mata, 517 F.3d at 285 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The court concluded a “safety sweep” of a separate garage at Mata’s place of business did not meet the criteria, because it was not an area “immediately adjoining the place of arrest, such as closets and other spaces, from which a surprise attack could occur.” Id. at 285-86. But the Fifth Circuit explained that a safety sweep of a proximate smaller area is permissible:
In United States v. Charles, [469 F.3d 402 (5th Cir.2006),] this Court upheld a precautionary search when officers quickly entered a 10' by 25' storage unit in which they found the defendant. The officers approached the storage unit, ordered the defendant outside, and arrested him without a warrant. One officer quickly entered the unit, which contained a car, to check beneath, behind, and inside the car to confirm no other person was hiding. During this brief entrance, the officer noticed in plain view narcotics and a firearm. Charles argued that once he was outside the unit nothing inside was within his immediate control and that the officer lacked artic-ulable facts justifying the sweep. This court concluded that the officers were justified in searching the unit because [Maryland v.] Buie[, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990),] held that police may as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion look in closets and spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be launched.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Our case here is much more in line with Charles, in which the protective sweep was upheld, than with Mata, in which a separate, large building was involved, or Buie, in which three levels of the house were swept.
[¶ 36] As the United States Supreme Court emphasized in Buie, “such a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.” Id. And, again, that is what the record reflects happened in this case.
[¶ 37] It is of no consequence the arrest contemporaneously followed the protective sweep. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980) (holding “[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa,” so long as the fruits of the search were “not necessary to support probable cause to arrest”); *383State v. Overby, 1999 ND 47, ¶ 8, 590 N.W.2d 703. In addition, the majority, at ¶ 10, cites the Segura Court, which stated:
“We hold, therefore, that securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents. We reaffirm at the same time, however, that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless search — such as that invalidated in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-34, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970) — is illegal.”
(Quoting Segura, 468 U.S. at 810, 104 S.Ct. 3380.) The majority uses the quoted Seg-ura language to conclude the Court did not decide whether the security search was illegal, but rather only “considered whether the officers unreasonably seized Segu-ra’s apartment by entering and remaining on the premises while a search warrant was obtained.” The majority then concludes the “proper inquiry here is not whether the walk through was an unreasonable seizure but whether it was an unreasonable search.”
[¶ 38] On the basis of Buie and Segura, Agent Niebuhr’s protective sweep to secure the residence incident to Gagnon’s arrest was not an unreasonable warrant-less search or seizure. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093; Segura, 468 U.S. at 810, 104 S.Ct. 3380. A review of the record establishes there is no testimony showing Agent Niebuhr “searched” the residence or did anything other than secure the residence for the officers’ safety or to prevent the destruction of evidence. Conversely, Agent Niebuhr testified he walked through the residence to ensure that no one else who could cause the officers harm or destroy or remove evidence was in the residence.
[¶ 39] Additionally, even if Agent Niebuhr had testified to having seen marijuana plants inside the residence during his protective sweep, which he did not, the majority erroneously applies the “plain view” doctrine to the facts in this case. The majority concludes, at ¶ 12, the “plain view” doctrine did not apply as an exception to the warrant requirement because Agent Niebuhr observed the marijuana plants standing on a public street outside the residence and “[p]lain view alone ... is never enough to justify the warrantless search or seizure of evidence.” (Quoting State v. Garrett, 1998 ND 173, ¶ 16, 584 N.W.2d 502.) Yellowbird, however, consented to the officers’ entering the residence, thereby placing the officers in a constitutionally protected area. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Because Agent Niebuhr validly conducted a protective sweep incident to Gagnon’s arrest and because he was in a constitutionally protected area on the basis of Yellow-bird’s consent to enter the residence, Agent Niebuhr could have validly seized any evidence of a crime during his walk through the residence. See id. As a result, Agent Niebuhr’s walk through the residence incident to Gagnon’s arrest was not an unreasonable warrantless search.
[¶ 40] Agent Niebuhr’s safety sweep was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
II
[¶ 41] Even if the safety sweep had not been reasonable, the suppression of the evidence would not be appropriate. No evidence was seized in the safety sweep. The officers had already seen the marijuana in the window before the safety sweep. They were going to go to get a search warrant when both occupants signed a consent to search.
*384[¶ 42] As the United States Supreme Court explained in Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988):
The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), and of testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search, Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961). Beyond that, the exclusionary rule also prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection with the unlawful search becomes “so attentuated [sic] as to dissipate the taint,” Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 268, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415-16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
Almost simultaneously with our development of the exclusionary rule, in the first quarter of this century, we also announced what has come to be known as the “independent source” doctrine. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). That doctrine, which has been applied to evidence acquired not only through Fourth Amendment violations but also through Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations, has recently been described as follows:
“[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by 'putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. ... When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).
Murray, 487 U.S. at 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 2529 (emphasis added).
[¶ 43] Under the circumstances of this case, the police obtained no evidence as a result of the sweep. Under the United States Supreme Court criteria, there is nothing properly excludable.
Ill
[¶ 44] I would affirm the district court judgment.
[¶ 45] DALE V. SANDSTROM

. Respectfully, as illustrated by the Fifth Circuit cases discussed in the following paragraph, Justice Kapsner’s concurring opinion misreads Buie and would nullify a key sen*382tence of the United States Supreme Court holding.