Court Opinion

ID: 9534846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:43:08.527567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:32:50.001589
License: Public Domain

STEADMAN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I cannot agree that the failure to give the District’s requested instruction on last clear chance was harmless.1 That issue was central to the litigation. The written instructions, which were contained in a booklet carried to the jury room, specifically highlighted the last clear chance instruction, with a heading in capital letters. The instruction particularly relied on by the majority, which is Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 7-13 (1981), was contained in another section of boilerplate instructions dealing with automobile cases, and was separated from the last clear chance instruction by standard instruction 6-1 on vicarious liability and standard instructions 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3, which deal with the duties of both the motorist and pedestrian or with the motorist alone.
It has been rightly said that “[t]he application of the doctrine [of last clear chance] has been attended with much confusion.” Pros-ser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 66 at 464 (5th ed. 1984). Its nuances are difficult even for lawyers and judges to grasp. I think this jury was entitled to have an instruction on last clear chance that accurately and completely set forth the applicable law and not be expected to make the implicit and subtle link between clearly separated instructions that the majority assumes it did.2

. I do agree with the majority that the District was not entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of last clear chance.

. On the merits, I simply observe, as the majority notes, that powerful authority exists in support of the District’s position, which I am not convinced is precluded by our prior decisions.