Court Opinion

ID: 9965094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 17:09:54.992401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:42.028362
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40643

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHANTELLE CHAVEZ,

      Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COLFAX COUNTY
Melissa A. Kennelly, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Leland M. Churan, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

The Law Office of Ryan J. Villa
Richelle Anderson
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

IVES, Judge.

{1}  The State appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant Shantelle
Chavez’s motion to dismiss for violating her speedy trial rights. Unpersuaded, we affirm.

DISCUSSION
{2}    To determine whether a speedy trial violation has occurred, we consider the four
factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972): “(1) the length of delay in
bringing the case to trial, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of
the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.”
State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 5, 366 P.3d 1121. “We weigh these factors
according to the unique circumstances of each case in light of the [s]tate and the
defendant’s conduct and the harm to the defendant from the delay.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Even though the district court explicitly assigned
a weight to just one of the four factors—weighing the length of the delay heavily against
the State—this does not prevent us from reaching the merits of the State’s appeal
because “we review the weighing and the balancing of the Barker factors de novo.”
State v. Collier, 2013-NMSC-015, ¶ 39, 301 P.3d 370 (text only) (citation omitted).
Further, we review factual findings for substantial evidence, State v. Flores, 2015-
NMCA-081, ¶ 4, 355 P.3d 81, affording them “substantial deference” and reversing
them “only for clear error.” State v. Gurule, ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 20, ___ P.3d ___ (S-1-
SC-37879, Dec. 7, 2023) (text only) (citation omitted). We consider each factor in turn.

I.     The Length of Delay Weighs Heavily for Defendant

{3}     The first Barker factor functions “both [as] the threshold question in the speedy
trial analysis and [as] a factor to be weighed with the other three Barker factors.” State
v. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 12, 406 P.3d 505. As the threshold question, the length of
delay that triggers a speedy trial inquiry depends on the case’s complexity: at least
twelve months for a simple case, fifteen months for an intermediate case, and eighteen
months for a complex case. State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 2, 146 N.M. 499, 212
P.3d 387. When weighing delay as a factor, “[a]s the delay lengthens, it weighs
increasingly in favor of the accused.” Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 14.

{4}    The district court found that the delay spanned twenty-five months and that the
case was simple. On appeal, the State challenges both findings. We conclude that the
delay was improperly calculated, but we are not persuaded that the district court erred
as to the case’s complexity. The court determined that the delay spanned from
Defendant’s arrest on June 25, 2020, to the hearing on her motion to dismiss held July
18, 2022. This was in error because speedy trial rights do not attach to a defendant
facing felony charges—as is the situation here—until the State files an indictment or
information against the accused. See State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 12, 135 N.M.
279, 87 P.3d 1061. In this case, the State filed its criminal information on July 21, 2020,
a month after Defendant’s arrest, making the delay twenty-four months, not twenty-five.
As to the case’s complexity, the State argues that, because it planned to use scientific
evidence, we “could find” this to be an intermediate case. This is an unavailing attack on
the finding made by the district court. See In re Ernesto M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039, ¶ 15,
121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318 (recognizing that, under substantial evidence review, we
do not ask “whether the trial court could have reached a different conclusion”). The
State has not rebutted the presumption that the district court was correct. See Corona v.
Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 26, 329 P.3d 701.
{5}    We therefore conclude that because the total length of delay was twenty-four
months—twice the threshold length for a simple case—a speedy trial analysis is
necessary, see Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 2, and we weigh the twenty-four-month
delay heavily against the State. See State v. Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶ 9, 343 P.3d
199 (weighing a twenty-four-month delay in a simple case heavily against the state).

II.    The Reason for the Delay Weighs Slightly for Defendant

{6}     Under the second Barker factor, we evaluate the reasons for each period of
delay, determine if either party is responsible for it and, if so, assign weight to it. Delay
caused by the defendant is generally weighed against the defendant. See State v.
Deans, 2019-NMCA-015, ¶ 18, 435 P.3d 1280. Delay caused by the state falls into one
of three categories: “(1) deliberate or intentional delay; (2) negligent or administrative
delay; and (3) delay for which there is a valid reason,” and each generally carries a
different weight. State v. Suskiewich, 2016-NMCA-004, ¶ 9, 363 P.3d 1247 (text only)
(citation omitted). Deliberate or intentional delay weighs heavily against the state. Id.
Negligent or administrative delay weighs against the state, and “the weight increases
with the delay’s ‘protractedness.’” State v. Radler, 2019-NMCA-052, ¶ 19, 448 P.3d 613
(quoting Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 26, 30) And “a valid reason, such as a missing
witness, . . . justif[ies] appropriate delay.” State v. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 25,
283 P.3d 272 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{7}    Here, the district court did not divide the delay into discernable periods, but on
appeal the parties agree to three different intervals: July 21, 2020, to February 22, 2021;
February 22, 2021, to May 2, 2022; and May 2, 2022, to July 18, 2022. In addition, the
court found the entire delay was due to various factors that overburdened the court’s
docket. On appeal, the State argues that this finding is not supported by substantial
evidence. We address each period in turn.

A.     July 21, 2020, to February 22, 2021 (Seven Months)

{8}   The parties agree that the case proceeded normally for the first seven months.
Both parties filed their witness lists early on; on September 1, 2020, the State requested
a scheduling order and filed various routine discovery motions and notices; and on
September 15, 2020, the court issued a scheduling order, setting trial for February 22,
2021.

{9}    Given that we see nothing in the record that supports the finding that this period
was delayed by the court’s docket, we believe the case proceeded at an ordinary pace
and assign it neutral weight. See State v. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, ¶ 27, 145 N.M
242, 195 P.3d 1254 (weighing a period neutrally where “the case moved toward trial
with customary promptness”), abrogated on other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038,
¶¶ 47-48.

B.     February 22, 2021, to May 2, 2022 (Fourteen-and-a-Half Months)
{10} The State did little to push the case forward during this period. Its only activity
was to amend its notice of intent to call witnesses to include the name of a lab analyst.
The district court rescheduled the trial eleven times sua sponte, providing no reason for
any continuance.

{11} We defer to the court’s finding that this period of delay was due to an
overburdened docket. See Gurule, ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 20. The court pointed to a
combination of causes. It found its docket was backlogged because, even though the
suspension of jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic did not delay this specific case,
it had delayed high priority cases. In addition, “a spike in filings” from the district
attorney’s office combined with staff turnover at that office and a “dearth of case
screening and management” created a trial docket that could not be “reasonably”
managed. On appeal, the State argues that the delay was exclusively related to the
COVID-19 pandemic. The State relies on language in several of the court’s early
continuances, which state that there may not be a docket call for the case “[d]ue to time
limits and issues regarding COVID-19.” It also cites various Supreme Court orders—not
in the record—which either suspended jury trials (whose periods of suspension predate
all of the scheduled trials in this case) or recognized that the pandemic generally
caused a backlog of cases. None of these demonstrate that the delay was exclusively
related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The State has not established that the district court
erred, and we therefore presume that the court was correct. See Corona, 2014-NMCA-
071, ¶ 26.

{12} We determine that this delay is administrative, and because it lasted a few
months beyond the threshold period for a simple case, we weigh it slightly against the
State. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 29-30 (categorizing a “congested docket[]” as
an administrative delay and weighing it slightly against the state because the delay was
“only slightly beyond the threshold to trigger the speedy trial inquiry”).

C.     May 2, 2022, to July 18, 2022 (Two-and-a-Half Months)

{13} Eventually, the trial was set for the end of May 2022 with a docket call on May 2,
2022. At the docket call, Defendant’s counsel was not prepared for trial, so the court
continued the case to late August. On May 30, 2022, Defendant’s counsel moved to
dismiss the case for speedy trial violations. The court heard the motion on July 18, 2022
and dismissed the case on August 2, 2022. We will not defer to the court’s finding that
this two-and-a-half-month period was caused by the court’s overburdened docket
because there is no evidence in the record to support its finding. See Flores, 2015-
NMCA-081, ¶ 4.

{14} Instead, we attribute this period to Defendant because her counsel was
unprepared for trial and thus initiated the subsequent delay. Generally, “delays caused
by defense counsel are attributable to the defendant.” Deans, 2019-NMCA-015, ¶ 18.
There is a very limited exception in which we do not attribute the delay to the defendant
if the “defendant suffers extreme prejudice and is effectively blameless in the delay.” Id.
Defendant urges us to apply this exception because the delay was “solely attributable to
negligence of” her counsel, who failed to communicate with her and the delay “in no
way benefit[ted]” her. We decline to do so because this “narrow” exception applies only
in situations similar to those in Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, the case in which our Supreme
Court adopted the test. See State v. Pate, 2023-NMCA-088, ¶¶ 10-12, 538 P.3d 450.
The facts of Defendant’s case are not similar to the facts in Serros. The two-and-a-half-
month delay here is not comparable to the four-and-a-half-year delay in Serros, 2016-
NMSC-008, ¶¶ 6-7, and, unlike the defendant in Serros, Defendant was not in custody.
We therefore apply the general rule and attribute defense counsel’s actions to
Defendant.

D.     Weighing the Periods of Delay

{15} Of the twenty-four months of total delay in this case, seven weigh neutrally,
fourteen and a half weigh slightly against the State, and two and a half weigh against
Defendant. Because the period of delay attributable to the State outweighs the others,
we conclude that overall this factor weighs slightly against the State.

III.   Defendant’s Assertion of Speedy Trial Rights Weighs Slightly for Defendant

{16} Under the third Barker factor, we analyze Defendant’s assertions of her speedy
trial right, assessing both “the timing of the . . . assertion and the manner in which the
right was asserted.” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 32. “[W]e accord weight to the
frequency and force of the defendant’s objections to the delay and analyze the
defendant’s actions with regard to the delay.” State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 19,
387 P.3d 230 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{17} Defendant adequately asserted her right by making two pro forma demands and
by moving to dismiss for violations of her speedy trial rights. Although each pro forma
demand is enough to assert the right, we assign Defendant’s pro forma demands little
weight. See Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 41. We also believe Defendant’s motion merits
slight weight considering that the case was continued four weeks earlier because her
counsel was unprepared for trial. Cf. Deans, 2019-NMCA-015, ¶ 22 (giving an assertion
slight weight because it was “diluted” when weeks after the defendant’s speedy trial
assertion, he asked for additional time to consider a plea offer).

{18} The State argues that this factor weighs against Defendant because her delay
shows that she did not “truly want[] a speedy trial.” We disagree. The State relies on
State v. Steinmetz, in which the defendant’s multiple speedy trial demands did not
weigh in the defendant’s favor because they “simultaneously operat[ed] in a dilatory
manner” for a year and a half. 2014-NMCA-070, ¶ 61-62, 327 P.3d 1145. We think the
facts of this case are distinguishable because Defendant operated in a dilatory manner
for two-and-a-half months, unlike the year and a half of “gamesmanship” in Steinmetz.
See id. ¶ 61-62. As such, the State has not carried its burden of establishing that the
district court was incorrect. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 26. We therefore conclude that
Defendant adequately asserted her right with her two pro forma demands and her
motion to dismiss, and that overall this factor weighs slightly in her favor. See Ochoa,
2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 41.

IV.    The State Has Not Established That the District Court Erred by Finding
       Particularized Prejudice

{19} The final Barker factor is the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay,
considering the three interests that the speedy trial right was designed to protect:
“preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern of the
accused, and limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Ochoa, 2017-
NMSC-031, ¶ 48. “The [d]efendant must make a particularized showing of prejudice to
demonstrate a violation of any of the three interests.” Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 21.
In this demonstration, because “some degree of oppression and anxiety is inherent for
every defendant who is awaiting trial,” a defendant must show that their “anxiety is
undue.” State v. Parrish, 2011-NMCA-033, ¶ 32, 149 N.M. 506, 252 P.3d 730.

{20} Here, the district court found seven types of particularized prejudice based on
Defendant’s testimony: (1) Defendant’s anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) were exacerbated by the delay; (2) Defendant was unable to find “meaningful
employment” and had to live with her parents because of the pending felony; (3)
Defendant had to live close to Raton, New Mexico rather than in Denver, Colorado
where she would be close to her daughter and would have had better job opportunities;
(4) Defendant never met her second attorney and had no communication with him; (5)
Defendant updated herself on the case by looking it up online on a weekly basis; (6)
Defendant repeatedly showed up to the Raton courthouse for trial only for it to be
rescheduled; and (7) Defendant put her life on hold waiting to resolve the case. Here,
because we conclude the court did not err in its first finding regarding Defendant’s
anxiety and PTSD—a finding that suffices to establish particularized prejudice on its
own, see State v. Montoya, 2015-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 31-32, 348 P.3d 1057—we need not
address the arguments regarding the other six findings.

{21} The State exclusively relies on State v. Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, 327 P.3d
1129, to argue that because Defendant did not substantiate the degree to which the
delay affected her anxiety or PTSD with testimony or medical records, she failed to
show it was undue. Although it is true that the defendant in Vigil-Giron provided medical
records to corroborate the testimony regarding their anxiety, we are not persuaded that
the case created a requirement that a defendant must corroborate their testimony with
medical evidence. Id. ¶ 54. On the contrary, precedent recognizes that a defendant may
demonstrate particularized prejudice by presenting documentary evidence or testimony.
See Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 39 (“[T]he claimed showing of prejudice came in
the form of allegations of counsel, . . . [which] are not generally considered evidence.
[The d]efendant should have offered some actual evidence in the form of affidavits,
testimony, or documentation in support of the allegations.”); Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶
20 (concluding the defendant did not show particularized prejudice without providing
“testimony or documentary evidence”).
{22} In this case, the district court’s finding was based on Defendant’s testimony that
she experienced undue anxiety and PTSD. Defendant testified that the charges she
faced worsened her anxiety and PTSD “more than [she]’d like.” She described her
anxiety as “really bad” and explained that she struggled to find a job due to a
combination of her anxiety, PTSD, and the pending charges. In addition, her anxiety
and PTSD were unnecessarily prolonged by the fourteen-and-a-half-month delay
attributed to the State because the court had an overloaded trial docket and the State
made no effort to move the case toward trial. See Montoya, 2015-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 25, 32
(stating that the “presumption of prejudice intensifies the longer that the delay extends
beyond the presumptive threshold” and concluding a fourteen-month delay attributed to
the state in an intermediate case “unnecessarily prolonged” defendant’s harm). District
courts are “in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and determine
the severity of the hardships and anxiety suffered by [d]efendant[s],” id. ¶ 32, and here
the district court accepted Defendant’s testimony. We therefore defer to the district
court. See Gurule, ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 20.

{23} Based on the arguments presented by the State and the evidence of prejudice in
this case, we are not persuaded that the district court erred by concluding that
Defendant showed particularized prejudice. We therefore weigh this factor slightly to
moderately against the State. See Montoya, 2015-NMCA-056, ¶ 32.

V.     The Weighing of Factors Supports a Speedy Trial Violation

{24} Because all four of the Barker factors weigh in favor of Defendant, we agree with
the district court’s conclusion that Defendant was deprived of her right to a speedy trial.
See id. ¶ 33 (finding a speedy trial violation because no factor weighed for the state);
Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 69 (same); see also State v. Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044,
¶ 38, 148 N.M. 253, 233 P.3d 782 (finding a speedy trial violation when every factor
weighed for the defendant even though none weighed heavily).

CONCLUSION

{25}   We affirm.

{26}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

WE CONCUR:

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge