Court Opinion

ID: 9790574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:55:12.720292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.287609
License: Public Domain

JENNINGS, Justice
(dissenting).
Five years ago this Court considered this same case. We then held that, if the plaintiff’s evidence was believed, she had a cause of action for malicious prosecution, Wisniski v. Ong, 84 Ariz. 372, 329 P.2d 1097 (1958). As to some of the elements of her cause of action, that holding meant only that her evidence was sufficient to go to a jury. The element of want of probable cause, however, is a question of law, Sarwark Motor Sales, Inc. v. Woolridge, 88 Ariz. 173, 354 P.2d 34 (1960), and our holding necessarily meant that the evidence viewed most favorably to the plaintiff established want of probable cause as a matter of law.
In the present appeal the plaintiff’s evidence is the same as was before us previously. Here, where a verdict was directed against the plaintiff, as there, where judgment n. o. v. was granted against the plaintiff, we must view that evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In the Matter of the Estate of Mary Emma Stitt, 93 Ariz. 302, 380 P.2d 601 (1963). However, the plaintiff is now told that, although the contention of her opponents five years ago that she failed to show want of probable cause was rejected by us then, and although the fact of her reversed conviction by a magistrate’s court appeared of record at that time, somehow the discredited judgment of the magistrate’s court overrides the previous judgment of this Court on the question of law as to whether want of probable cause was established. This is so, she is told, because “ * * * matters which are errors occurring at a trial, generally subject only to review on direct appeal, even if categorically classified as unfair, are not such corrupt means as permit an attack on the conclusive effect of the judgment of conviction.”
But the plaintiff did undertake a direct appeal of the judgment in the only way provided under our statutes and, in a trial de novo in the superior court, the magistate’s judgment was set aside. It cannot have any “conclusive effect” under the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The reversal wipes out the previous conviction and establishes the innocence of the civil plaintiff:
“If, however, a judgment has been vacated by the trial court or reversed by an appellate court, it is no longer conclusive between thé parties, either as a merger of the original cause of action or as a bar to an action upon the original cause of action; nor is it conclusive by way of collateral estoppel in a subsequent action on a different cause *127of action involving issues litigated in the original action.
“If a different judgment is entered, this judgment is conclusive between the parties. * * * ” Restatement, Judgments § 41, comment d.
In Desmond v. Fawcett, 226 Mass. 100, 115 N.E. 280, L.R.A., 1917D, 408 (1917), a malicious prosecution case, the court said:
“ * * * A conviction below is wiped out by the acquittal on appeal so far as the doctrine of res judicata is concerned. A conviction below followed by acquittal above on which final judgment is entered establishes the innocence not the guilt of the prisoner. Under these circumstances it is not necessary to go [further] and point out (in the first place) that the parties to the criminal prosecution and those to the subsequent action for malicious prosecution are not the same and (in the second place) that the issues tried in the criminal complaint and in the civil action for malicious prosecution are quite different.” 226 Mass, at 105, 115 N.E. at 283.
The only sound and rational basis for the rule that a reversed criminal conviction nevertheless establishes probable cause is this: When a fair and impartial tribunal returns a judgment of conviction it must have had before it evidence which would convince a reasonable man that the accused was guilty. A fortiori, such evidence would show probable cause. Since probable cause does not depend on actual guilt or innocence, but upon objective indications of guilt, a subsequent reversal which establishes the innocence of the accused does not destroy the inference that there was evidence which showed probable cause, Skeffington v. Eylward, 97 Minn. 244, 105 N.W. 638 (1906). This being the true reason for the rule, it follows that any evidence which shows the criminal conviction was based on improper and inflammatory testimony would rebut the presumption that probable cause was shown.
“But suppose the judgment of conviction was procured by perjury or fraud, or by any [other] means which show that the judgment is invalid, unauthorized, and of no efficacy whatever as evidence of probable cause. Could it then be contended that such a judgment has probative value to establish probable cause ? We have no hesitancy in holding that in such a case the probative effect of the judgment is entirely overcome, and that it stands in the case the same as if it had never been rendered. Suppose that the judgment was procured by testimony that was admittedly false and untrue. Should such a judgment in a case of this kind be given effect as proof of probable cause ? Clearly not. And even though the testimony was not given willfully and corruptly so as to make it a case of per*128jury as known to the criminal law, nevertheless its probative effect is just the same. It deceived and misled the court, and caused him to enter a judgment which, for the purpose of evidence in a case of this kind, should have no effect whatever.” Kennedy v. Burbridge, 54 Utah 497, 503, 504, 183 P. 325, 327, 5 A.L.R. 1682 (1919).
In the present case, unfounded remarks by the prosecuting attorney that the plaintiff was a “gang moll” and had an FBI record would have affected the judgment of conviction, as much as and, because of the prestige of the prosecutor as an officer of the state, perhaps more than false testimony given by a witness on the stand. The plaintiff’s offer to prove that these remarks were made was rejected by the trial court in the instant case. Such evidence, if found to be true, would destroy the presumption that the testimony in the criminal trial was sufficient to show probable cause. The evidence was admissible for that purpose.
There is second ground upon which the reversed magistrate’s conviction may be impeached — one which satisfies even the restrictive view of the law held by the majority. Bearing in mind that we must here view the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, we quote from the opinion in the former appeal:
“ * * * If the jurors believed plaintiff’s testimony that she purchased the pills prior to entering the Ong market, then necessarily they must have believed, and impliedly found, that the defendants did not see plaintiff take the pills. Consequently, the inference exists that the subsequent prosecution for theft was maliciously instigated and without probable cause.” Wisniski v. Ong, 84 Ariz. 372, 375, 329 P.2d 1097, 1098 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
We now have the very same evidence before us, and again must necessarily take the view that the defendants did not see the plaintiff take the pills. It follows that the plaintiff’s conviction in the magistrate’s court was obtained through false testimony, by the defendants, who testified that they did observe her take the pills. A conviction obtained by false testimony is not conclusive proof of probable cause, McMahon v. Florio, 147 Conn. 704, 166 A.2d 204 (1960); Boxer v. Slack, 124 W.Va. 149, 19 S.E.2d 606 (1942) ; McElroy v. Catholic Press Co., 254 Ill. 290, 98 N.E. 527 (1912). See Mannisto v. Rainen Furniture Co., 295 S.W.2d 841 (Mo.App.1956) where, in a malicious prosecution action based on a civil suit, the court stated the rule to be that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the original action is conclusive evidence of probable cause unless rebutted by evidence that the judgment was obtained by fraud or other unfair means. The presumption arising from the original judgment was found to be rebutted, because:
*129As we have said before,
“The purpose of disciplining lawyers is the protection of the public, the profession and the administration of justice, and not the punishment of the persons disciplined; * * In re Richey, 76 Ariz. 152, 154, 261 P.2d 673, 674.
The basic argument raised by counsel for Respondent is to the effect that this one infraction by the Respondent was an isolated single instance of unprofessional conduct, and does not fairly indicate that the public needs protection from the Respondent or that the Respondent is not a fit and qualified practitioner of the law. Although the acts of the Respondent were not recurring and could be construed as an isolated single violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the Canons make no reference to the fact that a certain number of infractions or offenses are necessary to merit disciplinary action. Although a recurring number of violations would affect the seriousness of the offense and the severity of the disciplinary action, nevertheless one single act may alone be sufficient to constitute a violation of the Canons and to require disciplinary action to be taken.
We have examined the record and feel disposed to follow the recommendations of the Local Administrative Committee and the Board of Governors, even though their recommendations are not binding upon us. It is our opinion that the ends of justice require that the Respondent, W. Roy Tribble, be publicly reprimanded for his conduct, and it is so ordered.
Note : Justice RENZ L. JENNINGS, having disqualified himself, the Honorable RICHARD ROYLSTON, Judge of the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, was called to sit in his stead and participate in the determination of this matter.