Court Opinion

ID: 9466954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:33:53.677492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:04.192923
License: Public Domain

LARSON, Senior District Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the sentiments expressed in the majority opinion and I appreciate the frustration felt by the majority at the continued inexcusable violations of defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights by federal prosecutors. I cannot agree, however, that a new trial is necessary or proper.
As I understand the traditional test by which alleged comments on the failure to testify are judged, it requires an examination into whether the language used was intended to be a comment on a failure to testify, or could be taken by the jury to be such a comment. In addition, the harmless error rule is applied to determine if any real prejudice accrued to the defendant.
Almost every case in this Circuit on this issue has dealt with language to the effect that the government’s evidence was “unrefuted” or “uncontradicted.” Such comments are particularly egregious not only because they direct the jury’s attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, but also because they serve to buttress the credibility of the government witness who gave the “uncontradicted” testimony. While the comment here may have drawn the jury’s attention to Pizarro’s failure to testify, as the government concedes, it is not likely that the language used implied that the government witnesses must therefore be telling the truth or that the government’s evidence is so overwhelming that it could not be challenged.
In addition, it does not appear to me that this was an intentional comment on a failure to testify. I believe the prosecutor, as he explained, meant to indicate that Mr. Pizarro had been the man behind the scenes. Certainly that fits with the facts of the case. The prosecutor was apparently so flustered by his own mis-statement that he repeated it. The prosecutor’s lack of bad faith is shown by his immediate apology not only to the Court and jury, but also to the defendant and his counsel. Furthermore, there is no claim of other aggravating improper argument by the prosecutor, as there often was in past cases. It is difficult to understand how punishment of an unintentional remark by the prosecutor here, which is essentially the effect of the majority decision to grant a new trial, will prevent future unintentional improper comments.
Any prejudice here was vitiated by the immediate curative instruction from the district court, which twice told the jury of defendant’s right not to testify, and informed the jury that it was wrong for the prosecutor to make the remark. A few minutes later, final instructions were given, including one on the defendant’s right to remain silent and not testify, and the jury’s obligation not to draw negative inferences from that silence. This final instruction was requested by the defendant before any improper statement occurred. Mr. Pizarro’s counsel, in his closing argument, which was before the prosecutor made the improper comment, told the jury of his client’s right not to testify. The defendant, as is his right as a matter of trial strategy, was therefore the party to first call this issue to the jury’s attention. Of course, as the Court has previously recognized, the jurors are always aware of a defendant’s failure to testify, and perhaps the best that can be hoped is that after proper instruction they will not draw negative inferences from that failure. See United States v. Wright, 309 F.2d 735, 739 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 929, 83 S.Ct. 873, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963).
There is little doubt in my mind that the defendants were properly convicted. I *115would be extremely reluctant to allow these defendants back on the street to pursue their former business pending a new trial, whose outcome may be different.
The Judges of the Seventh Circuit are certainly more familiar with this problem than I, and probably more aware of the steps necessary to correct it. Nonetheless, I cannot agree that a new trial is warranted here, and I would suggest that if the majority opinion is meant to herald a new approach, it be applied only to cases tried after the date of the opinion. See United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 882 (1st Cir. 1971).