Court Opinion

ID: 9723881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:37:19.414146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:53.026817
License: Public Domain

Doctoroff, C.J.
(concurring). Although I agree with the majority that, under the facts of this case, defendants adequately protected their right to a jury trial with respect to the issue of damages, I write separately because I believe it is both unnecessary and imprudent to extend the rule of law cited beyond the facts of this case.
The majority concludes that our Supreme Court’s decision in Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573; 321 NW2d 653 (1982), stands for the proposition that a default judgment does not constitute a waiver of the right to a jury trial. See ante, pp 246, 247. While I agree that Wood provides persuasive precedent for the conclusion reached in this case, I think the majority overstates the holding by concluding that Wood offers support for the broader conclusion that a defendant need do nothing to preserve a jury trial once the plaintiff demands a jury. See ante, p 247. The majority overlooks the important fact that in Wood, the defendant filed a jury demand of its own before the default. See Wood, supra, p 576. In fact, the Court made reference to the demand in concluding that daiie had preserved its right to a jury trial independent of the plaintiffs demand. Id., p 582.
The Court in Wood carefully limited its holding when it stated:
We need not decide in this case whether a defaulting party who has failed to properly invoke *249its right to a jury trial may do so on the issue of damages after a default has been entered.
We hold only that a defaulting party who has properly invoked his right to jury trial retains that right if a hearing is held to determine the amount of recovery. [Id. at 583-584; emphasis added.]
I do not believe it is necessary to decide, as a matter of law, that a defendant may rely upon the jury demand of an opposing party (or any other party for that matter) without taking some affirmative action indicating that the defendant wishes to have a jury trial. Rather, under the circumstances of this case, I believe that defendants have sufficiently preserved their right to a jury trial regarding the issue of damages by filing the "Reliance on Plaintiffs’ Jury Demand.”
The majority also places substantial reliance upon the court rule governing withdrawal of a jury demand. MCR 2.508(D)(3). However, we are not faced with a withdrawal in this case. More to the point is MCR 2.508(B)(1), which states that a party may demand a jury by filing a "written demand” within the time prescribed. I would conclude that defendants’ filing of the "Reliance on Plaintiffs’ Jury Demand” was tantamount to a written jury demand and that the defendants thereby adequately preserved their right to a jury trial with regard to the issue of damages. I further believe that the majority’s interpretation of the court rule renders MCR 2.508(D)(1) meaningless. That section states:
A party who fails to file a demand or pay the jury fee as required by this rule waives trial by jury.
The rule does not make an exception for those *250situations where a party presumes to rely upon another’s demand, but fails to file a demand of its own or take any affirmative action to otherwise preserve the right to a jury trial.
I believe it is unnecessary for the majority to go beyond the facts at issue here. Rather, as did our Supreme Court in Wood, supra, I would limit the holding to the facts of this case.