Court Opinion

ID: 9543761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:48:59.232847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:08.988557
License: Public Domain

WINDES, Justice
(specially concurring).
I agree with the interpretation placed on section 16-604, A.C.A.1939, by Justice PHELPS, to the effect that its application *136is limited to municipalities which are being served under franchises issued by municipalities, but I cannot agree with the holding that the section as thus construed could not apply to home rule cities operating under a charter, if such cities have granted franchises for the operation of public utilities. The implied basis for holding that the statute has no application to the home rule cities is that it conflicts with the charter provisions of the city “in its (presumably the legislature’s) attempt to place restriction upon the constitutional grant to the city to engage in business”. The majority opinion thus is saying in effect that section 16-604, which, as construed by us, required all municipalities which have granted franchises to public service corporations to pay damages by purchase of the plant of the franchise holder, is unconstitutional for the reason that the legislature has no power to require such payment.
I agree that under the facts in this case the appellant has a right to furnish water to the residents of Blenman Addition in competition with appellee and that any damages resulting therefrom are damnum absque injuria, but this is for the reason that the appellee has no exclusive franchise. It is impossible for me to subscribe, however, to a holding that under a fact situation to which section 16-604 would apply, damages resulting therefrom would be damnum absque injuria. In the event an exclusive franchise were granted by a home rule municipality, both the federal and state constitution would compel just compensation for a breach thereof, and certainly the legislature has power to require such as has been done under section 16-604.
It may well be said that we are not dealing with a fact situation that fits the provision of 16-604. With this I agree. However, when we attempt to announce principles of law concerning the constitutionality or applicability of a' statute that have an impact upon a fact situation contemplated by the statute, we must deal with the facts so contemplated and to which the statute is applicable, and I cannot agree that the statute when applied to such a fact situation is unconstitutional or that a charter provision under such circumstances would prevail over the legislative act