Court Opinion

ID: 9384715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 19:02:35.893218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.869314
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/4/23 P. v. Chagolla CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D079231

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. BAF1700629)

 JAMES ANTHONY CHAGOLLA, JR.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Mark Mandio, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded for further
proceedings.
         Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, Paige B. Hazard, Andrew Mestman and Minh U. Le, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      A jury convicted James Anthony Chagolla, Jr., of first degree murder

with the gang-murder special circumstance (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a),
190.2, subd. (a)(22); count 1) and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 2 and 3) based on an incident in which Chagolla
and a co-assailant attacked a father and son, leaving the father stabbed to
death and the son wounded. The jury also found true a gang enhancement
allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) with respect to count 1.
      While Chagolla’s appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), Senate
Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567), Assembly Bill No. 124
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 124), and Assembly Bill No. 518
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 518). Assembly Bill 333 made
substantive revisions to section 186.22 and created section 1109, a new
procedural provision requiring bifurcation of the trial of gang enhancement
charges. Senate Bill 567 and Assembly Bill 124 made ameliorative changes
to the determinate sentencing law (§ 1170, subd. (b)), and Assembly Bill 518
revised section 654 to expand the discretion of sentencing courts with regard
to which sentences to stay and which to execute. Chagolla’s challenges to the
judgment are all based on these new laws.
      We agree with Chagolla that Assembly Bill 333’s revisions to section
186.22 apply retroactively, and so we vacate the jury’s true findings on the
gang-murder special circumstance and gang enhancement allegations.
However, we reject Chagolla’s claim that the failure to bifurcate the trial of
the gang enhancement charges under new section 1109 was error and entitles

1     All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                        2
him to reversal of the entire judgment, because we find any such error to be
harmless. We remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings,
including possible retrial if the People elect to retry the gang-murder special
circumstance or gang enhancement. Current sentencing law, including the
changes implemented by Senate Bill 567, Assembly Bill 124, and Assembly
Bill 518, shall apply at resentencing on remand.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                       I.

                                Trial Evidence2
A.    Prosecution Case
      1.    The Assault and Homicide of Jeremy and Assault of E.C.
      In May 2016, Jeremy C. and his wife, Norma V., moved into a housing

complex (the complex)3 located in Banning along with their newborn
daughter and Norma’s son, 16-year-old E.C. The complex was in an area
claimed by the Eastside Banning Sapos (Sapos) criminal street gang. Two
Sapos members, A.O. and his older cousin Frankie Balderas, lived in the
complex.
      Shortly after they moved in, Jeremy and Norma had their first
encounter with Chagolla, a Sapos member. Chagolla was walking down the
street as Jeremy and Norma were getting out of their car. Chagolla stared at
them “really hard” and said, “Where are you guys from.” When Jeremy and

2    Because Chagolla does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions, our factual summary is abbreviated.

3      The complex was described as a “front house” connected to adjacent
duplexes by a shared driveway. Jeremy, Norma, and their children were
living in the front house.

                                       3
Norma did not respond, Chagolla claimed, “Eastside Banning Sapos.” Norma
and Jeremy went inside their home.
      Later, Norma went outside and saw Chagolla “standing on the corner
[of her house] in the dark.” She asked Chagolla what his problem was, and
told him they were a family that just moved in and did not want any
problems. She told Chagolla she “didn’t feel that he should be disrespecting
[them] like that.” Chagolla asked, “ ‘Well, what’s your husband’s problem?’ ”
Just then Jeremy stepped outside, but Norma told him everything was fine,
and “that was it.”
      The family encountered Chagolla again on June 5, 2016. That day, a
Balderas family reunion was held at a park near the complex. Some of those
in attendance were associated with the Sapos. When the reunion ended, a
small number of attendees gathered outside the complex drinking alcohol and
listening to music. Among them were A.O., Balderas, Richard Garcia
(another cousin of A.O. and a known Sapos member), and Jerry Valdepena (a
Sapos gang member known as “Negro”).
      A fight broke out. And Jeremy and E.C. were assaulted, leaving
Jeremy dead and E.C. wounded. A.O., Norma, and E.C. each saw different
parts of the fight.
             a.       A.O.’s Testimony
      At some point after the post-reunion gathering started, Jason Rhine—
the leader of the Sapos known as “Diablo”—showed up at the complex with
Chagolla and a group of “youngsters.” Chagolla was wearing a white shirt,
while everyone else at the gathering was wearing dark clothing. A.O. knew
Chagolla because in 2007, he and Chagolla had fought with members of a
rival gang and they were both prosecuted as a result. Since 2007, A.O. had
become a father and had distanced himself from the Sapos.

                                         4
      Rhine started a confrontation with Garcia about “something that . . .
had happened between them in the past.” Garcia told Rhine it was a family
gathering and was not the place to be arguing. But Rhine pointed a gun at
Garcia and threatened to shoot him, saying “he didn’t care.” As Rhine
argued, Chagolla watched and stayed quiet. A.O. went inside his house
because “the arguing wasn’t stopping.”
      Around 25 or 30 minutes later, A.O. heard screaming and ran outside
to see what was going on. He did not see the attack and did not see anyone
armed with a knife. He saw Jeremy next to a pool of blood in the middle of

the driveway.4 Someone in a white shirt was standing five feet away from
Jeremy. No one else was near him. A.O. “touch[ed]” the person in the white
shirt “and everybody just started running from there.” The only person
wearing a white shirt that night was Chagolla.
      Jeremy got up and walked to the front door of his house, where he
collapsed. Norma was yelling, the “kid” E.C. had been slashed in the stomach
and was crying. A.O. handed his phone to E.C. but ended up calling the
police himself.
      The police responded to the complex, and A.O. was taken in for
questioning. At first, he told detectives “the tweaker guy” came by the
complex with “a bunch of youngsters” from the Sapos gang, and the “bunch of
youngsters” had attacked Jeremy. Then, he said “[t]he dude with the white
shirt” was one of the assailants. Asked to identify the man in the white shirt
and the “tweaker guy,” A.O. resisted but then identified the man in the white
shirt as Chagolla, and the “tweaker guy” as Diablo (Rhine). A.O. saw

4    One witness explained the driveway of the complex connected the front
house to the duplexes in the rear.

                                      5
Chagolla fighting “for sure”; he had pushed Chagolla off Jeremy. But A.O.
“didn’t really see” Rhine fighting but knew he “was in the mix.” A.O. did not
know why they fought Jeremy, but he “ha[d] a feeling” Jeremy “came out
because it was too loud and said something to these guys . . . [a]nd they said,
nah, f[---] you.”
      At trial, A.O. testified he initially tried to protect Chagolla and Rhine’s
identities because he did not want the Sapos to retaliate and harm him or his
family. A.O. moved away from the area after talking to the police. He failed
to comply with a subpoena to testify at trial because he feared retaliation by
the Sapos. He was arrested and detained as a material witness to compel his
testimony.
              b.    E.C.’s Testimony
      When E.C. and his family got home after a day of shopping, the
neighbors in the back of the complex were having a small party in the
driveway. The family went inside, and E.C. went to his room.
      Later, E.C. heard loud voices outside. When he opened the front door,
he saw Norma and Jeremy talking to Chagolla, who was wearing a white
shirt, and Valdepena, whom he described as a skinny, dark-complected,
Hispanic individual wearing dark clothing. E.C. heard either Chagolla or
Valdepena say, “I don’t like the way that you came at me. This is the
Eastside Banning.” E.C. believed the speaker “felt disrespected.” From their
posture and tone of voice, Chagolla and Valdepena seemed hostile and
aggravated.
      E.C. asked Norma what was going on. She told him to go back inside.
Instead, E.C. stepped outside. As soon as he did, Chagolla punched Jeremy
in the head, causing Jeremy to fall backwards onto the concrete. Jeremy got

                                        6
back up, and Norma and Jeremy started fighting with Chagolla. Norma tried
to get Chagolla off of Jeremy as Jeremy and Chagolla traded blows.
      As Norma and Jeremy fought Chagolla, Valdepena advanced toward
E.C. Valdepena pulled a folding knife out of his pocket as he approached E.C.
The knife was brown with gold plating and was about five inches long. But
as he got close to E.C., Valdepena tripped on the grass and fell on his back.
E.C. jumped on top of Valdepena and “pancake[d]” him to keep Valdepena
from fighting with Jeremy and Norma. At 260 pounds, E.C. outweighed
Valdepena. While E.C. was on top of Valdepena, he could see Norma,
Jeremy, and Chagolla were still fighting. Valdepena was struggling and
punching him. E.C. soon realized he was being cut, and he got up and backed
away from Valdepena. Valdepena stood and stared at E.C. as Jeremy and
Norma continued fighting with Chagolla.
      E.C. went inside to look for a phone but could not find one. When he
came back out, he saw a woman fighting with Norma. Chagolla and
Valdepena were attacking Jeremy with “punching motions.” E.C. did not see
Chagolla or Valdepena holding a knife at this point.
      E.C. went back inside again to look for a phone and did not see the end
of the fight. When he went back outside, Jeremy was cut up, bleeding and
crawling towards the doorway of the house. Chagolla and Valdepena were
gone. A man, later determined to be A.O., who had not participated in the
fight approached and offered to help. A.O. called 911.
            c.    Norma’s Testimony
      After they came home from shopping with their children, Norma and
Jeremy sat on their front porch drinking beer. There were people in the
driveway with beer bottles in their hands. At some point, Norma saw

                                       7
Chagolla emerge from the drivers’ side of a champagne-colored pickup truck
that was parked nearby.
      The party seemed calm at first, but then Norma heard an argument.
She heard someone saying, “Just leave it alone. Don’t do nothing.” From her
vantage point on the porch, Norma could not see who was arguing.
      Norma went inside to check on the children. While inside, she heard
Jeremy talking outside in what she initially thought was a conversation but
then realized it was a confrontation. She heard someone asking Jeremy
where he was from, if he had a problem, and if he wanted to “catch a fade,”
which meant get into a fight.
      Norma opened the door and saw Jeremy standing in the driveway.
There were two people standing in front of him: Chagolla, who was in a
white shirt, and a second, dark-complected, Hispanic individual dressed in
dark-colored clothing and a dark-colored baseball cap who said his name was
“Negro” (Valdepena). Chagolla and Valdepena were both saying things that
were designed to provoke a fight. Norma heard, “ ‘Well, you’re the one
coming to us,’ or ‘you’re the one disrespecting us.’ ” Jeremy “just kept saying
that he didn’t want any problems” and that he “was a working man” who
“wasn’t from nowhere.”
      Norma tried to defend Jeremy by telling the men, “We have a right to
be here. We pay rent.” Valdepena responded, “This is my cousin’s house,”
and both Chagolla and Valdepena claimed, “This is Eastside Banning Sapos.”
Chagolla and Valdepena were getting mad and came towards Jeremy.
      Norma heard E.C. open the door. She turned around and told him to go
inside. When she turned back to face the men, Chagolla and Valdepena had
begun attacking Jeremy and were beating him up. She did not see who
threw the first punch. Norma tried to separate the men from Jeremy and

                                       8
ended up on the ground with Chagolla. She heard Jeremy telling Chagolla,
“Get off my wife.”
      Before Norma could get up, a woman started pulling her by the hair,
and then Norma and the woman started fighting. As she fought with the
woman, Norma saw Valdepena attacking her son E.C. Chagolla continued to
fight with Jeremy and Norma saw their fight move towards the street.
      Norma then saw a third person, a “tall[,] heavyset guy” in a white shirt
and black hat, approach the scene carrying a knife with a wooden handle.
Norma did not see this third person approach or attack Jeremy. But she
believed the third person made a “passing motion” to Chagolla at some point,
as if he were handing the knife to Chagolla. At trial, Norma testified she saw
Chagolla chasing Jeremy down the street and making “slashing motions”
towards Jeremy’s stomach with a wooden-handled or brown-handled knife.
      At some point, Norma realized Jeremy was hurt. She saw him making
his way towards the doorway of their house. Everybody, including Chagolla
and Valdepena, scattered. As they fled, Norma heard Valdepena tell
someone, “I stabbed that fool ten times.” She did not know whether he was
talking about E.C. or Jeremy.
      Before trial, Norma had given different accounts of the attack to law
enforcement. When initially interviewed by detectives, she identified three
suspects: a light-complected Hispanic man who arrived in a champagne-
colored Silverado pickup truck (Chagolla); a second, dark-complected,
Hispanic individual wearing a hat, who called himself “Negro” (Valdepena);
and a third heavyset individual wearing a hat and white shirt and carrying a
wooden-handled knife. During this interview, she said the third heavyset
person was the one who attacked her son. She also said she did not see who

                                      9
stabbed Jeremy, but she saw Chagolla and Valdepena attacking Jeremy, and
she heard Valdepena say, “I stabbed ‘em ten times.”
      In a later interview, Norma again said Jeremy had been attacked by
the man who arrived in the Silverado pickup truck (Chagolla) and the dark-
complected man who called himself “Negro” (Valdepena), but she said E.C.’s
assailant was one of these two people. When asked to describe the clothing of
the man in the pickup truck, she said he had been wearing a white shirt.
      At the preliminary hearing, Norma testified she saw Chagolla chasing
Jeremy in the street, but she did not see any weapons in Chagolla’s hands.
      At trial, Norma testified her memory was better than it was when she
testified at the preliminary hearing. She explained that in preparing to
testify at trial, she had reviewed her prior statements, and they had
refreshed her memory.
      2.    Additional Evidence
      Police responded to the complex within minutes of receiving a call of an
assault or stabbing. When the first officer arrived, Jeremy was unable to
communicate, and he soon fell unconscious.
      Despite medical attempts to save him, Jeremy died from his injuries.
He had sustained stab wounds (puncture injuries greater in depth than
width) and incised wounds (slashing injuries greater in width than depth) to
his right arm, chest, and torso, as well as an incised wound to his face. He
suffered a total of 20 stab and incised wounds. The cause of death was
multiple sharp injuries, and the mechanism of death was internal and
external bleeding. Four stab wounds to the abdomen were the primary
injuries that led to Jeremy’s death. It was not possible to determine whether
Jeremy’s wounds were caused by one knife or more than one knife.

                                      10
      E.C. sustained multiple lacerations to his shoulders and chest,
including a cut on his shoulder that required five or six staples, and a chest
wound that required eight staples.
      The DNA profiles of Chagolla and Valdepena matched DNA found on
beer cans collected from the complex in the aftermath of the assault and
homicide. A latent fingerprint on one of the recovered beer cans matched
that of Rhine.
      Sometime before the homicide, a California Highway Patrol officer had
pulled over Chagolla while he was driving a light-colored Chevy Silverado
pickup truck. After the homicide, officers conducting a welfare check at the
residence of Chagolla’s wife found Chagolla with his light-colored Chevy
pickup truck.
      3.    Gang Evidence
      Investigator B. Smith of the Banning Police Department testified as the
prosecution’s gang expert. During his 10-year tenure with the police
department, Smith had been a detective with the department’s gang
investigation unit and had received specialized training on criminal street
gangs, specifically on gangs that operated in the City of Banning.
      Smith defined “criminal street gang” as a group of three or more
individuals who identify under a common sign or symbol and “commit crimes
to benefit themselves and the gang[.]” Criminal street gangs make money by
selling narcotics, stealing, and committing fraud. Establishing and
protecting turf is important to criminal street gangs, including to ensure
their dominance in areas where they make drug sales. Criminal street gangs
want a reputation “of instilling fear in the general public and showing their
superiority over other rival gangs.” Committing crimes of violence in the
community is one way of developing this reputation.

                                       11
      Gang members “represent” their gang by claiming gang membership
while committing crimes, flashing gang signs, identifying their home turf,
and announcing their gang moniker during the commission of a crime. Gang
members who admit gang membership and openly expose themselves to legal
liability develop a positive reputation within the gang. Gang members who
do not “represent” their gang can develop a reputation for being soft and risk
being assaulted by other gang members.
      Gang members are taught they and their gang should be respected.
Disrespect can include not acknowledging them as the people in control of the
gang’s claimed turf. There had been many instances in which a person who
was not a gang member could be “called out or asked where they’re from” by
members of a criminal street gang. “And just the way you respond, don't
respond, or look at them, or don’t acknowledge them could result in a violent
confrontation.” “[B]acking up your gang” means that “if one of your members
that you’re with . . . gets involved in a confrontation with somebody for
whatever reason it may be . . . , if he gets into a fight, you’re going to get into
the fight with him.” Gang members who back up their gang develop a
positive reputation within the gang. A person who cooperates with the police
can get labeled as a “snitch or rat,” which can result in the person being
attacked or killed.
      Smith opined the Sapos qualified as a criminal street gang within the
meaning of section 186.22. The Sapos was the most active gang in Banning
and had approximately 50 active members. It used common signs and
symbols to identify itself, claimed the City of Banning as its territory, and
had several rival gangs in the area. Smith testified Rhine was the Sapos’s
leader, and that Chagolla, Valdepena, Garcia, and Balderas were all active
Sapos members.

                                        12
      Smith further opined the charged crimes had been committed for the
benefit of the Sapos. The assault occurred at a location where a documented
member of the Sapos was living; there was a gathering that included several
documented members of the Sapos; and a fight broke out between the Sapos
members and a person living at that location. Telling someone to “keep it
down” could be taken as a sign of disrespect by gang members. By yelling out
their gang name, the individuals involved in the assault were “making it
known . . . [that] this area was Eastside Banning Sapos turf” and were
“show[ing] that claim of turf[.]” Smith testified that “due to the issues of
respect, putting in work, and backing your gang,” the individuals involved in
the attack on Jeremy and E.C. committed the crimes in association with
other Sapos gang members and for the benefit of the Sapos.
      Smith further opined that committing crimes listed in section 186.22,
subdivision (e), was one of the primary activities of the Sapos. He testified to
six predicate offenses to demonstrate the Sapos had a pattern of criminal
activity:
      (1)   In 2000, Rhine pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon and
admitted the crime was committed for the benefit of or in association with
“gang members,” based on an incident in which he and another Sapos
member stabbed someone during a fight.
      (2)   In 2007, Chagolla, A.O., and two other Sapos members attacked
two rival gang members, and one of the rival gang members was stabbed.
Chagolla pled guilty to attempted murder and admitted the crime was
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with
members of the Sapos.

                                       13
      (3)      In 2012, Gabriel Herrera, an active Sapos member, pled guilty to
assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury and admitted a prior
strike.
      (4)      In April 2013, Chagolla, Clancy McCafferty, and other Sapos
members were investigated for a walk-up shooting of a house. Each of the
individuals involved admitted to the commission of crimes relating to this
incident. Chagolla pled guilty to discharge of a firearm. McCafferty pled
guilty to assault and admitted the crime was committed “for . . . gang
purposes[.]”
      (5)      In November 2013, McCafferty and another Sapos member
stabbed a Sapos member who was not in good standing with the gang.
McCafferty pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon with a gang
enhancement.
      (6)      A jury found Joseph Lavoie, an active Sapos member, guilty of
robbery.
B.    Defense Case
      The defense called the police officer who arrived first at the scene and
spoke with Norma. Norma told this officer she did not recognize either of the
people who fought with Jeremy and she had not had any problems with them
in the past.
                                        II.
                           Jury Verdict and Sentencing
      In October 2019, a jury convicted Chagolla of first degree murder with
the gang-murder special circumstance (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(22);
count 1) and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1);

                                        14
counts 2 and 3).5 As to count 1, the jury found true Chagolla personally used
a deadly and dangerous weapon (a knife) in the commission of the murder
(§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)) and found true he committed the
murder for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). As to count 2, the jury found true
Chagolla personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (a knife), in the
commission of the assault (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)) and
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Jeremy (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a),

1192.7, subd. (c)(8)).6 In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that
Chagolla had suffered a prior strike conviction.
      In February 2021, the trial court sentenced Chagolla on count 1 to a
term of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the first degree
special circumstance murder, plus an additional year for the deadly weapon

enhancement.7 On count 2, the court imposed a total prison term of 12 years
(consisting of the upper term of four years for the assault, doubled to eight

5     Jeremy was the named victim of the assault charged in count 2; E.C.
was the named victim of the assault charged in count 3.

6     Each of the three counts charged in the operative information included
a gang enhancement allegation pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).
The parties assert that the jury returned not true findings with respect to the
gang enhancement allegations charged in connection with counts 2 and 3. As
we explain in footnote 9, the parties appear to have overlooked a discrepancy
in the verdict forms for these findings.

7      The court did not impose a term for the gang enhancement, explaining
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), was not applicable given the length of
the sentence already imposed on count 1. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1236–1239 [“when the defendant has been convicted of
a felony that already carries a life sentence, there is no specific enhancement
[under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1),] for a term of years”].)

                                        15
years due to the strike prior, plus three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement, and one additional year for the deadly weapon enhancement)
but stayed execution of this term pursuant to section 654. On count 3, the
court imposed a total prison term of eight years (consisting of the upper term
of four years for the assault, doubled due to the strike prior). Chagolla’s total
sentence was nine years plus life without the possibility of parole. He timely
appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I.
  The Jury’s True Findings on the Gang Enhancement Allegation and Gang-
     Murder Special Circumstances Allegation Will Be Vacated in Light of
                            Amended Section 186.22
A.    Assembly Bill 333
      While this appeal was pending, Assembly Bill 333 amended section
186.22 so as to change the substantive requirements for imposing the gang-
crime sentencing enhancement. The revisions to section 186.22 implemented
by Assembly Bill 333 require us to vacate the jury’s gang enhancement
finding under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), as well as its gang-murder
special circumstance finding under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22) (section
190.2(a)(22)).
      “ ‘In 1988, the Legislature enacted the California Street Terrorism
Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP Act; § 186.20 et seq.) to eradicate
“criminal activity by street gangs.” ’ [Citation.] Among other things, the
STEP Act created ‘a sentencing enhancement for a felony committed “for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang”
(. . . § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).’ ” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1205–
1206 (Tran).)

                                        16
      Effective January 1, 2022, “Assembly Bill 333 made the following
changes to the law on gang enhancements: First, it narrowed the definition
of a ‘criminal street gang’ to require that any gang be an ‘ongoing, organized
association or group of three or more persons.’ (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics
added.) Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only
that a gang’s members ‘individually or collectively engage in’ a pattern of
criminal activity in order to constitute a ‘criminal street gang,’ Assembly Bill
333 requires that any such pattern have been ‘collectively engage[d] in’ by
members of the gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.) Third, Assembly
Bill 333 also narrowed the definition of a ‘pattern of criminal activity’ by
requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang
activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged
offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by
two or more gang ‘members,’ as opposed to just ‘persons’; (3) the offenses
commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing
a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged
offense. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (2).) Fourth, Assembly Bill 333 narrowed
what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang,
requiring that any ‘common benefit’ be ‘more than reputational.’ (§ 186.22,
subd. (g).)” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1206.)
      “Finally, Assembly Bill 333 added section 1109, which requires, if
requested by the defendant, a gang enhancement charge to be tried
separately from all other counts that do not otherwise require gang evidence
as an element of the crime. If the proceedings are bifurcated, the truth of the
gang enhancement may be determined only after a trier of fact finds the
defendant guilty of the underlying offense.” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1206.)

                                       17
B.    The Amendments to Section 186.22 Require That the Jury’s True
      Finding on the Count 1 Gang Enhancement Allegation Be Vacated
      Chagolla contends, and the People concede, that Assembly Bill 333’s
amendments to section 186.22 apply retroactively to Chagolla, and require
that we vacate the jury’s true finding on the gang enhancement allegation
attached to count 1. We agree.
      Under the Estrada rule, absent evidence to the contrary, courts
presume statutes that reduce punishment for criminal conduct apply
retroactively to all defendants whose sentences are not final on the statute’s
operative date. (See People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624–626; People v.
Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 742–
745 (Estrada).) In Tran, the California Supreme Court held that by
increasing the threshold for imposition of a gang enhancement pursuant to
section 186.22, Assembly Bill 333 is ameliorative and therefore retroactive
under the Estrada rule. (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1206–1207.)
      The amendments to section 186.22 require reversal of the jury’s gang
enhancement finding on count 1. “When a substantive change occurs in the
elements of an offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper
elements, the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under
the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless ‘it appears beyond a
reasonable doubt’ that the jury verdict would have been the same in the
absence of the error.” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.) The jury was not
instructed in accordance with the elements of the statute as revised. The
prosecution’s evidence failed to meet the requirements of section 186.22 as
newly amended, including that the predicate offenses used to establish the
requisite “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” benefitted the Sapos in a way
that was more than reputational. (See § 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) Given these
deficiencies, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s

                                       18
finding would have been the same in the absence of the error. As a result, we
will vacate the true finding on the count 1 gang enhancement pursuant to
amended section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C).
      As both sides agree, we conclude the People must be given the
opportunity to retry this allegation under the newly amended version of
section 186.22. As another court has explained, “ ‘Because we do not reverse
based on the insufficiency of the evidence required to prove a violation of the
statute as it read at the time of trial, the double jeopardy clause of the
Constitution will not bar a retrial. [Citations.] “ ‘Where, as here, evidence is
not introduced at trial because the law at that time would have rendered it
irrelevant, the remand to prove that element is proper and the reviewing
court does not treat the issue as one of sufficiency of the evidence.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669–670 [prosecution not barred
from retrying defendant on gang enhancement allegations reversed due to
the Assembly Bill 333 amendments to section 186.22]; see People v. Lopez
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 346 [“the gang-related enhancement findings
must be vacated and the matter remanded to give the People the opportunity
to prove the applicability of the enhancements under the amendments to
section 186.22”].) On remand, the prosecution may retry Chagolla on the
count 1 allegation pursuant to the current version of section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1)(C).
C.    The Jury’s Gang-Murder Special Circumstance Finding Will Also Be
      Vacated
      The jury’s true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance
allegation pursuant to section 190.2(a)(22) is also affected by Assembly Bill
333’s amendments to section 186.22. Section 190.2(a)(22) provides that a
defendant shall be subject to death or a term of life without the possibility of
parole if “[t]he defendant intentionally killed the victim while the defendant

                                        19
was an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in
subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, and the murder was carried out to further
the activities of the criminal street gang.” Thus, section 190.2(a)(22)
expressly incorporates the statutory definition of “criminal street gang” set
forth in section 186.22, subdivision (f). Chagolla argues section 190.2(a)(22)
has also been substantively amended by Assembly Bill 333 and requires the
jury’s gang-murder special circumstance must also be vacated.
      The People oppose reversal of the gang-murder special circumstance
finding on constitutional grounds. They argue subdivision (a)(22) was added
to section 190.2 in 2000 as part of Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and
Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998. (People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th
55, 65 (Shabazz).) Subdivision (c) of article II, section 10 of the California
Constitution restricts the Legislature from amending “an initiative statute by
another statute” unless the subsequent statute is “approved by the electors”
or “the initiative statute permits amendment . . . without the electors’
approval.” There is no dispute Assembly Bill 333 did not meet this criterion.
(See People v. Lopez (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1, 18.) Thus, the People contend,
Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22 constitute an
unconstitutional amendment to a voter initiative if applied to section
190.2(a)(22).
      On this question, two courts have reached different conclusions, and
the issue is now before the California Supreme Court. In People v. Rojas
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 542, review granted October 19, 2022, S275835, a
divided panel in the Fifth Appellate District agreed with the Attorney
General and held, “allowing Assembly Bill 333’s changes to section 186.22 to
affect section [190.2(a)(22)] would constitute an impermissible amendment of
Proposition 21.” (Id. at p. 547 (maj. opn. of Poochigian, J.); but see id. at

                                        20
pp. 558–561 (conc. & dis. opn. of Snauffer, J.).) By contrast, the Second
Appellate District has held Assembly Bill 333 did not unconstitutionally
amend section 190.2(a)(22) because it neither prohibited what Proposition 21
authorized, nor authorized what Proposition 21 prohibited. (People v. Lee
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 232, 245, review granted Oct. 19, 2022, S275449 (Lee).)
We agree with Lee and conclude the amendments to section 186.22, if applied
to section 190.2(a)(22), do not constitute an unconstitutional amendment of
Proposition 21.
      “In deciding whether [a] particular [statutory] provision amends [a
voter initiative], we simply need to ask whether it prohibits what the
initiative authorizes, or authorizes what the initiative prohibits.” (People v.
Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 571 (Pearson).) What the
voters intended to authorize or prohibit by the initiative “is a question of
statutory interpretation. When we interpret an initiative, we apply the same
principles governing statutory construction. We first consider the initiative’s
language, giving the words their ordinary meaning and construing this
language in the context of the statute and initiative as a whole. If the
language is not ambiguous, we presume the voters intended the meaning
apparent from that language, and we may not add to the statute or rewrite it
to conform to some assumed intent not apparent from that language. If the
language is ambiguous, courts may consider ballot summaries and
arguments in determining the voters’ intent and understanding of a ballot
measure.” (Ibid.) In short, “ ‘[t]he voters should get what they enacted, not
more and not less.’ ” (Ibid.)
      We are not the first court to examine the voter intent underlying
Proposition 21. The California Supreme Court has “had occasion in past
decisions to review at length the findings and declarations that were set forth

                                       21
as part of [Proposition 21].” (Shabazz, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 65.) As the
Shabazz court explained, “[t]he voters intended to address gang-related crime
generally,” and, as relevant here, “ ‘to punish all gang crime more severely.’ ”
(Ibid., quoting Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 905–908
(Robert L.).) The ballot measure announced: “ ‘Gang-related crimes pose a
unique threat to the public because of gang members’ organization and
solidarity. Gang-related felonies should result in severe penalties.’ ”
(Shabazz, at p. 65, quoting Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) text of
Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (h), p. 119 (Ballot Pamphlet).)
      As part of Proposition 21, voters amended section 186.22 to increase
the sentences for the gang enhancements set forth in subdivisions (b), (c), and
(d), and amended existing section 190.2 to add subdivision (a)(22)—at issue
here—to include gang-related murder in the list of special circumstances
allowing the imposition of death or life without the possibility of parole. (See
Ballot Pamphlet, text of Prop 21, pp. 119, 120, 122; Lee, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 242–244.) Notably, in enacting Proposition 21, the voters
changed only the punishments relating to then-existing laws on gang crimes.
      The amendments to section 186.22 implemented by Assembly Bill 333
do not conflict with the voters’ intent in enacting Proposition 21. In passing
Assembly Bill 333, the Legislature explained proponents of the STEP Act
“claimed the prosecution would be unable to prove an offense was committed
for the benefit of, or in association with, a gang ‘except in the most egregious
cases where a pattern of criminal gang activity was clearly shown.’ ” (Stats
2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (e).) The Legislature determined, however, that the
STEP Act was “continuously expanded through legislative amendments and
court rulings,” leading to “ubiquitous” application. (Ibid.) The Legislature
thus expressed concern that former section 186.22 was, at times, misapplied

                                        22
to “social networks of residents in neighborhoods.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2,
subd. (d)(8).) The Legislature also found “[c]urrent gang enhancement
statutes criminalize entire neighborhoods historically impacted by poverty,
racial inequality, and mass incarceration as they punish people based on
their cultural identity, who they know, and where they live,” in part because
“[t]he social networks of residents in neighborhoods targeted for gang
suppression are often mischaracterized as gangs.” (Id. at subds. (a), (d)(8);
see also id. at subd. (d)(7) [“People frequently receive gang enhancements
based on the conduct of other people whom they have never even met.”].)
      Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22 reverse that course.
The additional requirements set forth in amended section 186.22 ensure the
enhancements are applied to crimes that are truly related to patterns of
criminal gang activity, as opposed to individual crimes committed by persons
merely associated with “social networks of residents in neighborhoods.”
(Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (d)(8).) The amendments do not change the
length of the sentences imposed, nor do they remove gang-related murder
from the list of special circumstances making a qualifying defendant eligible
for death or life without the possibility of parole. They simply ensure the
increased punishments provided in sections 186.22 and 190.2(a)(22) are
applied to the type of criminal conduct the voters intended to address in
Proposition 21; that is, crimes that are directly related to criminal street
gangs and gang activity. In doing so, Assembly Bill 333’s amendments do not
prohibit what Proposition 21 authorized (longer sentences for gang-related
crimes), or authorize anything that Proposition 21 prohibited. (See Pearson,
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.)
      The People concede Assembly Bill 333 did not directly change the
language of section 190.2(a)(22). But they argue that “ ‘where a statute

                                       23
adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute . . . such
provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the
reference and not as subsequently modified.’ ” (Palermo v. Stockton Theatres,
Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 58–59 (Palermo); see also In re Oluwa (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 439, 445 [applying Palermo in the context of a statutory
amendment to a voter initiative]; People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008,
1048–1049 [same].) Based on this rule, known as the Palermo rule, the
People contend that by incorporating the definition of “criminal street gang”
from section 186.22, subdivision (f), into section 190.2(a)(22), the voters
intended to adopt the definition solely as it existed when Proposition 21
passed in 2000.
      We disagree. This rule of statutory construction is not applied
mechanically, rigidly, or in isolation. (See, e.g., In re Jovan B. (1993) 6
Cal.4th 801, 816, fn. 10 [“Several modern decisions have applied the Palermo
rule, but none have done so without regard to other indicia of legislative
intent.”]; Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 241 [Palermo rule is not
mechanically applied].) In Palermo itself, our high court set forth an equally
significant rule: “ ‘[W]here the reference is general instead of specific, such as
a reference to a system or body of laws or to the general law relating to the
subject in hand, the referring statute takes the law or laws referred to not
only in their contemporary form, but also as they may be changed from time
to time.’ ” (Palermo, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 59.) And as the Court has since
explained, “when the statutory words themselves ‘do not make clear whether
[the statute] contemplates only a time-specific incorporation, “the
determining factor will be . . . legislative intent.” ’ ” (People v. Anderson
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 779.)

                                        24
      Like the court in Lee, we conclude “the voters did not contemplate a
time-specific incorporation of the then-current version of section 186.22,
subdivision (f), into the gang-murder special-circumstance statute.” (Lee,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 241.) Nothing in Proposition 21 or the Ballot
Pamphlet suggests the voters intended to limit the Legislature’s ability to
amend the statutory definitions set forth in section 186.22, subdivisions (e) or
(f). Indeed, by acknowledging the newly amended definitions apply
retroactively in other contexts, the People implicitly concede the voters left
the definitions in section 186.22 open to further amendment by the
Legislature. Yet the People claim the voters intended to freeze the same
definitions by incorporating section 186.22, subdivision (f), into section
190.2(a)(22).
      We are not persuaded. As the court in Lee observed when addressing
this issue, “the electorate clearly knew how to express the intent to freeze a
statutory definition.” (Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 243.) In two other
instances, Proposition 21 expressly stated references to existing statutes
were “ ‘to those statutes as they existed on the effective date of this act,
including amendments made to those statutes by this act.’ ” (Ibid., italics
omitted; see also Ballot Pamphlet, supra, text of Prop. 21, §§ 14, 16, pp. 123–
124.) But newly added section 190.2(a)(22) did not similarly incorporate the
definition of criminal street gang in section 186.22, subdivision (f), as it
existed on the effective date of Proposition 21. In short, there is simply no
indication the voters contemplated “a time-specific incorporation of the then-
current version of section 186.22, subdivision (f), into the gang-murder
special-circumstance statute.” (Lee, at p. 241; see also id. at pp. 241–243.) “It
is not our role to rewrite the initiative by inserting language the drafters

                                        25
never included and the voters never considered.” (People v. Superior Court
(Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270, 284 (Gooden).)
      Contrary to the interpretation of Proposition 21 advanced by the
People, the ballot materials evince an intent by the voters to conform, at all
times, the statutory definitions of gang-related crimes across section 186.22
and section 190.2(a)(22). (See Ballot Pamphlet, supra, analysis of Prop. 21 by
Legis. Analyst, pp. 46 [stating, “[t]his measure increases the extra prison
terms for gang-related crimes . . . [and] adds gang-related murder to the list
of ‘special circumstances’ that make offenders eligible for the death penalty”],
47 [stating the proposition “[i]ncreases penalties for gang-related crimes,”
without distinguishing between the felony sentencing enhancements and the
newly added gang-murder special circumstance (italics omitted)]; see also
Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 906 [“As with ballot pamphlet arguments, a
reviewing court may look to a ballot’s legislative analysis to determine voter
intent.”].) In short, “[t]here was no distinction suggesting that what
constitutes a ‘gang-related’ murder was frozen in time for section
[190.2(a)(22)], but what constitutes a ‘gang-related felony’ for section 186.22
was not.” (Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 244.) We agree with the court in
Lee that “the term ‘criminal street gang’ as incorporated in the gang-murder
special-circumstance statute was ‘intended to conform at all times’ and

‘remain permanently parallel’ to section 186.22.” (See id. at p. 245.)8
      The People assert Proposition 21 did not just change the penalty for
gang-related crimes. Rather, “it created the special circumstance provision

8      The People acknowledge this court reached a similar conclusion in
Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pages 288 to 289. We are not persuaded by
their effort to distinguish Gooden as a case involving an initiative that did
not incorporate another statutory definition by reference.

                                       26
where none had previously existed.” This is a distinction without a
difference. In enacting Proposition 21, the voters did not create special
circumstance murder. Rather, as the Ballot Pamphlet explains, the voters
“add[ed] gang-related murder to the list of ‘special circumstances’ that make
offenders eligible for the death penalty.” (Ballot Pamphlet, supra, analysis of
Prop. 21 by Legis. Analyst, p. 46, italics added.) The voters’ intent in doing so
was to increase the penalties for gang-related crimes, including murder.
That intent is not undermined by ensuring the increased penalties of death
and life without the possibility of parole are imposed on persons that commit
a true gang-related murder. (See Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 288.)
      In sum, the intent of the voters in passing Proposition 21 was to
increase penalties for gang-related felonies and murders. By enacting
Assembly Bill 333, the Legislature sought to focus those increased penalties
on crimes that are truly related to patterns of criminal gang activity, the type
that likely animated voters to enact Proposition 21 in the first instance. (See
Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 245 [“in Assembly Bill 333, the Legislature
redefined the term ‘criminal street gang’ so as to truly target the population
of criminals for which an enhanced punishment is warranted”].) Construing
section 190.2(a)(22) in a manner that allows the incorporated statutory
definition of criminal gang activity to evolve concurrently with section 186.22
achieves the goals of both the voters and the Legislature. We therefore
conclude Assembly Bill 333 does not unconstitutionally amend section
190.2(a)(22).
      The retroactive application of Assembly Bill 333 affects not only the
jury’s gang-crime enhancement finding under section 186.22, subdivision
(b)(1)(C), but also its gang-murder special circumstance finding under section
190.2(a)(22). Consequently, we will vacate the jury’s special circumstance

                                       27
finding pursuant to section 190.2(a)(22). On remand, the People shall also be
given the opportunity to retry Chagolla on this allegation. (See Lee, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 245 [vacating the gang-murder special circumstance finding
under section 190.2(a)(22) and remanding to afford the People the
opportunity to retry the allegation].)
D.    Any Error Arising from the Failure to Bifurcate the Trial of the Gang
      Enhancement Allegations Under Newly-Added Section 1109 Was
      Harmless
      In addition to revising section 186.22, Assembly Bill 333 also created
section 1109, a new bifurcation procedure. Section 1109 provides, in relevant
part, “If requested by the defense, a case in which a gang enhancement is
charged under subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 186.22 shall be tried in
separate phases[.]” (§ 1109, subd. (a).) The question of defendant’s guilt of
the underlying offense shall be determined first. (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1).) If the
defendant is found guilty, “there shall be further proceedings to the trier of
fact on the question of the truth of [any] enhancement” under section 186.22,
subdivisions (b) or (d). (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1) and (2).)
      Chagolla contends section 1109 applies retroactively to his case under
Estrada and requires reversal of the entire judgment. He further contends
the failure to bifurcate the trial of the gang enhancement allegations was
either structural error or, if reviewable for prejudice, was prejudicial under
any standard.
      The People respond that Chagolla has forfeited any claim of error
under section 1109 because he failed to move for bifurcation of the gang
enhancement allegations in the trial court. They further assert that even if
Chagolla has not forfeited this challenge, section 1109, unlike other
provisions of Assembly Bill 333, does not apply retroactively because it is a
procedural provision that operates only prospectively. Finally, they argue

                                         28
that even if section 1109 applies retroactively, reversal is not warranted
because the failure to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations in this case
was harmless.
      Appellate courts are currently divided as to whether section 1109
applies retroactively, and this issue is now before the California Supreme
Court. (Compare People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550, 566–567,
review granted July 13, 2022, S274743 [§ 1109 applies retroactively under
Estrada]; People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1128–1131 (Ramos)
[same]; People v. Montano (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 82, 105–108 (Montano)
[same]; with People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 207, review granted
Aug. 17, 2022, S275090 [holding § 1109 is not retroactive]; People v. Ramirez
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 65, review granted Aug. 17, 2022, S275341 [same];
People v. Boukes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 937, 948, review granted Dec. 14,
2022, S277103 [same].) In Tran, the California Supreme Court declined to
resolve this split, finding that any error in failing to bifurcate the trial of the
gang enhancements was harmless. (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1208.) We
take a similar approach here. Even assuming section 1109 applies
retroactively and Chagolla preserved this issue for appeal, we conclude he
was not prejudiced by the failure to bifurcate the trial of the gang
enhancement allegations.
      Chagolla’s claim of structural error was presented for the first time in
his reply brief without a showing of good cause for the delay, and it is
forfeited as a result. (See People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218–1219
[“ ‘[i]t is axiomatic that arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will
not be entertained because of the unfairness to the other party’ ”]; People v.
Gonzalez (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 960, 978 [it is “well established that
arguments may not ordinarily be raised on appeal for the first time in a reply

                                        29
brief”].) Also, his reply brief was filed after the California Supreme Court
issued its decision in Tran. In Tran, our high court rejected the contention
that failure to bifurcate a trial pursuant to section 1109 constitutes
structural error. (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1208.) We adhere to this
holding. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455.)
        In Tran, the Court also rejected the defendant’s claim that the failure
to bifurcate gang enhancement allegations in accordance with section 1109
necessitated review under the heightened Chapman standard. (Chapman v.
California (Chapman) (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [reversal is required under the
federal Constitution unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt].) The Tran court explained, “ ‘[t]he admission of evidence, even if
erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes
the trial fundamentally unfair.’ ” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209.)
Finding no such fundamental unfairness in the use of gang evidence in the
defendant’s trial, the Court applied the Watson standard for reviewing state
law error. (Tran, at p. 1209; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
(Watson) [reversal is required only if the defendant shows it is reasonably
probable a more favorable result would have been reached in the absence of
the error].)
        We similarly conclude the admission of gang evidence did not render
Chagolla’s trial fundamentally unfair, and that the failure to bifurcate the
trial of the gang enhancement allegations was harmless under the Watson
standard. First, we agree with the People that even if the trial had been
bifurcated, the gang evidence would have been independently admissible in a
trial of the remaining offenses to prove the gang-murder special circumstance
allegation. “[N]othing in Assembly Bill 333 limits the introduction of gang

                                        30
evidence in a bifurcated proceeding where the gang evidence is relevant to
the underlying charges.” (Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132; see
People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31 (Chhoun) [“The People are generally
entitled to introduce evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if
it is relevant to the charged offense.”].) As the Montano court recently
explained: “Section 1109 says nothing about the special circumstance
statutes, and its provisions are specific to section 186.22, subdivisions (a), (b),
and (d). Moreover, the procedures required by section 1109 conflict with the
procedures set forth in section 190.1 et seq.” (Montano, supra, 80
Cal.App.5th at p. 109; see § 190.4, subd. (a) [“Whenever special circumstances
. . . are alleged and the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree
murder, the trier of fact shall also make a special finding on the truth of each
alleged special circumstance. [¶] . . . [¶] If the trier of fact finds that any one
or more of the special circumstances . . . as charged is true, there shall be a
separate penalty hearing[.]”].) Thus, “section 1109, as originally enacted by
Assembly Bill 333, does not apply to the determination of special
circumstance allegations under section 190.2(a)(22).” (Montano, at p. 114.)
       Chagolla does not respond to this point in his reply brief. In short,
because the gang evidence was cross-admissible to prove the gang-murder
special circumstance allegation, bifurcation of the gang enhancement
allegations under section 1109 would not materially have affected the scope
of gang evidence presented during the trial of the remaining charges. (See
People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049–1050 (Hernandez) [“[t]o the
extent the evidence supporting the gang enhancement would be admissible at
a trial of guilt, any inference of prejudice would be dispelled”]; People v.
Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 667 [if evidence is cross-admissible, prejudice
is dispelled].)

                                        31
      Additionally, given the facts of the case, “it is likely some, though not
all of the [gang] evidence . . . would have come in at a trial on just the
substantive offenses” (Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132) to prove such
issues as motive and intent, and to explain the circumstances surrounding
the offenses (see ibid.; Evid. Code, §§ 352, 1101, subds. (b), (c); People v.
Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1370 (Olguin) [evidence of defendants’
gang membership and gang activities was “highly relevant to the
prosecution’s theory of how and why [the victim] was killed”]; People v.
Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1096 [introduction of gang evidence proper
“where the defendant himself identifies gang affiliation as a motive”]). Gang
evidence, “ ‘including evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs,
symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—
can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of
applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged
crime.’ ” (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 31, quoting Hernandez, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 1049.) Further, “[e]vidence that a witness is afraid to testify or
fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness and
. . . [a]n explanation of the basis for the witness’s fear is likewise relevant to
[his] credibility[.]” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869, citations
omitted.)
      Chagolla criticizes Hernandez and Olguin as cases of “yesteryear” that
relied on the admissibility of gang-related evidence under Evidence Code
section 1101, analysis he claims is outmoded following Assembly Bill 333.
Although we do not dismiss the concerns underlying Assembly Bill 333, in
enacting Assembly Bill 333, the Legislature did not go so far as to grant
criminal defendants the right to a trial sanitized of all gang-related evidence.
(Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132 [“[N]othing in Assembly Bill 333

                                        32
limits the introduction of gang evidence in a bifurcated proceeding where the
gang evidence is relevant to the underlying charges.”].) The Tran court,
when explaining why the failure to bifurcate a gang enhancement allegation
under section 1109 is not structural error requiring automatic reversal in
every case, observed: “We have held that gang evidence, even if not admitted
to prove a gang enhancement, may still be relevant and admissible to prove
other facts related to a crime. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153,
194.)” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1208; see Williams, at pp. 193–194 [trial
court did not err in admitting gang evidence where relevant to motive and
identity; the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its
prejudicial effect], citing Evid. Code, § 1101.) The Court’s observation
together with its reliance on Williams confirm that gang-related evidence
remains admissible on grounds authorized by Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (b), even after the passage of Assembly Bill 333.
      Chagolla argues the evidence of his guilt of the substantive charges left
room for doubt because of contradictions in witness testimony, primarily on
the subject of his possession of a knife. This argument overlooks that the
prosecution primarily relied on the theory he aided and abetted the assaults
and murder. In this regard, the evidence of Chagolla’s guilt was
overwhelming. (See People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 480 [trial
court’s failure to bifurcate gang enhancement allegations pursuant to section
1109 not prejudicial under Watson where evidence of guilt on underlying
charges was overwhelming].) Three eyewitnesses identified Chagolla as one
of the assailants who participated in all stages of the violent attack that
resulted in Jeremy sustaining 20 knife wounds. E.C. testified without
contradiction that Chagolla started the fight; fought with both Norma and
Jeremy while E.C. “pancaked” the second assailant; and was continuing to

                                       33
attack Jeremy when E.C. returned outside for the first time. A.O. was
consistent in testifying to facts that supported the identification of Chagolla
as the person closest in proximity to Jeremy at the end of the fight. And
notwithstanding prior inconsistent statements, Norma was unvarying at trial
in her claims that Jeremy was attacked by two men, and she consistently
identified Chagolla, the driver of a champagne-colored Silverado pickup
truck, as one of these two assailants. This aspect of her testimony was
corroborated by the evidence Chagolla was stopped while driving a light-
colored Silverado pickup truck, and that such a truck was registered to his
wife and was found with him at the time of his arrest. Norma also testified
without contradiction that when she tried to defend Jeremy, Chagolla
attacked her, supporting the reasonable and uncontested inference Chagolla
perceived anyone who might intervene on Jeremy’s behalf as a foe to be met
with violence.
      In short, the evidence resoundingly supported the identification of
Chagolla as an active, persistent, and unyielding participant in an attack so
grisly and unsparing it left Jeremy eviscerated and lying in a pool of blood in
the complex driveway, and Norma’s teenaged son wounded and bleeding.
Further, it was uncontradicted Chagolla fled to Arizona after the assaults.
(See People v. Singleton (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 492 [“Factors relevant to
a determination of whether defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting
include: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct
before and after the offense.”].) Even without the gang evidence, the evidence
of Chagolla’s guilt as an aider and abettor of the assault and murder of
Jeremy and the assault of E.C. was overwhelming.
      Finally, although two of the predicate crimes introduced to prove a
pattern of criminal gang activity involved Chagolla, they were no more

                                       34
inflammatory than the charged crimes. When the evidence of the predicate
crimes was introduced, the court gave the jury a limiting instruction, which
we presume it followed. (See Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.)
Although the prosecutor relied heavily on the gang evidence, given that this
evidence was admissible in any event, we do not find that this circumstance
compels reversal. Other aspects of the record do not persuade us Chagolla

was prejudiced.9
      In sum, we conclude it is not reasonably probable Chagolla would have
reached a more favorable result in the absence of the asserted error.
(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

9      In this regard, we disagree with Chagolla’s claim that the jury’s
findings on the gang enhancement allegations attached to counts 1, 2, and 3
were irreconcilably inconsistent. This claim relies on the assertion that
whereas the jury returned a true finding on the gang enhancement allegation
attached to count 1, it simultaneously returned not true findings with respect
to the gang enhancement allegations attached to counts 2 and 3. As it turns
out, however, it was the verdict forms, not the jury’s findings, that were
inconsistent. The pre-printed verdict form for the count 1 gang enhancement
allegation stated, in relevant part, that the jury “find[s] that the defendant . .
. did commit [the crime charged in count 1 of the operative information] for
the benefit of . . . a criminal street gang . . . ,” whereas the pre-printed verdict
forms for the counts 2 and 3 gang enhancement allegations stated, in
relevant part, that the jury “find[s] that the defendant . . . did not commit
[the crime charged in count 2/ count 3 of the operative information] for the
benefit of . . . a criminal street gang . . . .” (Italics added.) Although all
parties, including the trial court, interpreted the jury’s “not true” findings on
the counts 2 and 3 gang enhancement allegations as rejections of those
allegations, in fact the findings contained a double negative: in each case, the
jury found it was “not true” that Chagolla “did not commit” the assaults for
the benefit of a criminal street gang. The People failed to notice this
discrepancy and have long since forfeited any challenge they might have
brought to the court’s interpretation of the counts 2 and 3 gang enhancement
findings. In any event, accurately read, the jury’s findings on the counts 1, 2,
and 3 gang enhancement allegations were not irreconcilable.

                                        35
                                        II.
          The Current Versions of Sections 1170 and 654 Shall Apply
                   When Chagolla Is Resentenced on Remand
      In February 2021, when Chagolla was sentenced, section 1170, former
subdivision (b), left it to the sentencing judge’s “sound discretion” to select the
appropriate term within a sentencing triad that “best serves the interests of
justice.” (§ 1170, former subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1001
(Assem. Bill No. 2942) § 1.) In sentencing Chagolla, the trial court selected
upper-term sentences for counts 2 and 3. At the sentencing hearing, the
court discussed several factors it regarded as aggravating and found these
factors warranted imposition of the upper term. Because counts 1 and 2
involved the same victim, Jeremy, the court stayed execution of the 12-year
sentence imposed on count 2 in favor of the life sentence imposed on count 1
pursuant to the then-current version of section 654.
      While this appeal was pending, section 1170 was modified by two pieces
of legislation. The first is Senate Bill 567, which made significant
amendments to the determinate sentencing law under section 1170, former
subdivision (b). (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Effective January 1, 2022, a
“court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a
term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Bifurcation of such jury findings is also
now required. (Ibid.)
      The second is Assembly Bill 124, which, as relevant here, amended the
determinate sentencing law by making the lower term presumptive in certain

                                        36
circumstances, including where the defendant “has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,” or where the defendant was a

youth at the time of the commission of the offense,10 and the defendant’s
youth or trauma “was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A), (B); see § 1016.7, subd. (b) [defining “youth” as “any
person under 26 years of age on the date the offense was committed].) Where
the presumption applies, the court must apply the lower term unless it “finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances
that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
      Section 654 was also recently amended. Effective January 1, 2022,
Assembly Bill 518 modified section 654 to provide in relevant part, “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act
or omission be punished under more than one provision.” (Stats. 2021,
ch. 441, § 1, italics added.) Previously, under section 654, “the sentencing
court was required to impose the sentence that ‘provides for the longest
potential term of imprisonment’ and stay execution of the other term.”
(People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379; People v. Jones (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 37, 45.) “As amended by Assembly Bill 518, . . . section 654 now
provides the trial court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of
either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the
shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence.” (Mani, at p. 379.)

10    Chagolla was 25 years old on June 5, 2016, when the charged offenses
were committed.

                                        37
      Chagolla claims the recent amendments to sections 1170 and 654 are
ameliorative and therefore retroactive under Estrada, requiring us to vacate
his sentence and remand for resentencing. The People agree these
amendments are retroactive, but they oppose resentencing. They argue any
error in failing to apply the current version of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2),
was harmless; that the trial court “implicitly” found imposition of the lower
term on any counts, as authorized by the current version of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), would be contrary to the interests of justice; and that there
is no possibility the court would have exercised the discretion afforded by the
current version of section 654 to stay Chagolla’s indeterminate sentence on
count 1 in favor of the shorter determinate sentence imposed on count 2.
Chagolla opposes these positions.
      Because we are remanding the matter for further proceedings, we need
not resolve the parties’ disputes. Chagolla will have to be resentenced on

remand,11 and the trial court will be required to apply current sentencing
law at the time of resentencing. As a result, Chagolla will have the
opportunity to argue before the sentencing court that he is entitled to the
benefit of the amendments to sections 1170, subdivision (b), and 654.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The jury’s true findings on the gang enhancement pursuant to section
186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) (count 1), and the gang-murder special
circumstance allegation pursuant to section 190.2(a)(22) (count 1) are

11     On remand, “the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every
aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion” that was the basis of the
resentencing hearing. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) The only
restriction is that the new sentence must be no more severe than the original
one. (People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 358–360.)

                                       38
vacated. The matter is remanded to the superior court. On remand, the
People shall have the opportunity to retry the count 1 gang enhancement
allegation and gang-murder special circumstance allegation in conformance
with current law. The court shall then resentence Chagolla in light of the
outcome of those proceedings, and in accordance with the sentencing laws in
effect at the time of resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.

                                                                             DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                                      39