Court Opinion

ID: 9781323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:31:08.699837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:34.129540
License: Public Domain

Greene, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully disagree with my colleagues in their conclusion that Douglas Buchanan faded to comply with the requirements of K.S.A. 60-1102 by not verifying his address sufficient for service of process.
Examining the hen statement itself, there is no question that the “address sufficient for service of process of the claimant” is present at least 21 times on the attachments referenced as Exhibit A and “made a part of [the hen] statement.” Jerry and Carol Overley concede as much but argue that Buchanan failed “to include his address on the face of the hen statement” and failed to verify the address as sufficient for service of process. There is no contention that the address shown on the invoices was incorrect or otherwise inadequate for service of process.
*178K.S.A. 60-1102 does not require that the address of the claimant be verified as the majority holds. In fact, the statute provides that the address of the claimant is among those items to be “showing” on the lien statement and that the statement be verified. There is simply no requirement that the address be verified. The statute provides in material part:
“Any person claiming a lien on real property . . . shall file ... a verified statement showing:
(2) the name and address sufficient for service of process of the claimant.”
Even if the statute is construed as requiring verification of the address, its inclusion on an attachment incorporated within the statement was sufficient. Notably, the statement included by reference the address of the claimant sufficient for service of process, and the statement was indeed verified in compliance with the statute. Read in context, the statement showed that Buchanan, who is previously identified as “Claimant,” “did under contract with [Overleys, owner of the property] perform labor and furnish material for the construction of a residence in and upon said property” and “said labor and material and the items thereof, as nearly as practicable, are set forth in the bill of items hereto attached, made a part of this statement and marked Exhibit'A(Emphasis added.) The majority apparently reads the statement as incorporating and verifying only the labor and material provided, but it is clear that what is incorporated and subsequently verified is the entirety of “the bill of items hereto attached” and that said “bill of items” includes the address of the claimant.
I appreciate that strict compliance with the statutory procedures is generally required. See J. Walters Constr. Co. v. Greystone South Partnership, 15 Kan. App. 2d 689, 691, 817 P.2d 201 (1991). With all due respect to my colleagues, however, I believe they have taken “strict compliance” to a level never before required by our case law and beyond. I believe we should recognize that hens for labor and material are codified within our code of civil procedure and subject to its general rule that its provisions “shall be liberally construed and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive *179determination of every action or proceeding.” K.S.A. 60-102. This general entreaty should provide the context for any “strict” compliance requirement; lien statements must be complete in showing the statutory elements and they must be verified, but there is no call for the finespun distinction embraced by the majority.
“The lien statement’s validity must be ascertained from its four comers,” and when an attachment has clearly been incorporated by referenced, its contents deserve scrutiny as part of the statement. See Trane Co. v. Bakkalapulo, 234 Kan. 348, 352, 672 P.2d 586 (1983). I respectfully suggest that our case law has not always been “strict” in such matters, but rather it has been more liberal in construing lien statement requirements than the abstract rale might imply. See, e.g., Star Lumber & Supply Co. v. Capital Constr. Co., 238 Kan. 743, 715 P.2d 11 (1986); Kansas Lumber Company v. Wang, 12 Kan. App. 2d 20, 733 P.2d 1266 (1987); Kopp’s Rug Co. v. Talbot, 5 Kan. App. 2d 565, 620 P.2d 1167 (1980).
I would hold that Buchanan’s lien statement complied with the statute, that the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1103 are inapplicable to this case, and that his action to enforce the lien was timely filed based upon applicable bankruptcy law. For all of these reasons, I would affirm the district court.