Court Opinion

ID: 9864482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 13:19:56.941384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:06.852326
License: Public Domain

THE COURT.
In their petition for a rehearing appellants reargue the question of the right of a husband to recover for the pecuniary loss suffered by his wife by reason of the death of their minor child. Section 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother, may maintain an action for the injury or death of a minor child, and a guardian for the injury or death of his ward, when such injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. ...” Section 377 provides: ‘‘When the death of a person not being a minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death. ...” These sections appear in title III of part II under the heading ‘‘Parties to Civil Actions.” The various sections under this title relate primarily, though not exclusively, to matters of procedure, as indicated by the heading. Section 11 of the Practice Act was identical in language with the foregoing provisions of section 376 which *273are not italicized. (Stats. 1851, p. 52.) In Kramer v. Market St. R. R. Co., 25 Cal. 435, it is said: “The eleventh section of the Practice Act . . . does not create a right of action where none existed before, but merely designates the persons by whom an action, for the causes therein mentioned, which then existed or might thereafter be created by statute, should be brought.” There, was no right of recovery at common law for the wrongful death of a person. The first substantive law in this state imposing a liability upon a person for wrongfully causing the death of another and giving a cause of action for damages therefor was enacted in 1862. Section 1 thereof provided: “Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default, is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the corporation which, would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.” (Stats. 1862, p. 447.) In adopting the codes in 1872, section 11 of the Practice Act was re-enacted verbatim as section 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 377 was enacted in the language quoted herein, except that the italicized words were not included. In 1874 the italicized words appearing in both sections were added thereto. In Benjamin v. Eldridge, 50 Cal. 612, it is said that sections 376 and 377 are substantially a re-enactment of the statute of 1862 and that, under the provisions of section 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, they must be construed as continuations of that statute, and not as new enactments. In Bond v. United Railroads, 159 Cal. 270, 281 [Ann. Cas. 1912C, 50, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 687, 113 Pac. 366, 370], after pointing out the peculiar provisions of section 376, it is said: “These anomalies show that section 376 was not carefully or skillfully drawn and suggest that caution is necessary in its construction and application.” The statute of 1862 has never been expressly repealed. Much of the uncertainty pointed out in the Bond ease would be overcome by holding that the statute of 1862 still constitutes the substantive law relative to the subject under discussion, except as repealed *274by necessary implication, and that sections 376 and 377, in so far as they relate to parties plaintiff, were intended to affect the procedure merely. It is not necessary, however, •to so hold in order to affirm the judgment. An examination of the provisions of section 376, viewed in the light of the history of legislation upon the subject matter embraced therein, discloses a legislative intent to give the marital community a right of action for the death by wrongful act of a minor child. What is recovered in such a case is community property and therefore the husband, who has control of the community property, is authorized to maintain the action. If the community is destroyed by the death or desertion of the husband, then the wife may sue. In Simoneau v. Pacific Electric Ry., 159 Cal. 494, 508 [115 Pac. 320, 327], in considering a case arising under section 377, it is said: “It is- not intended that the amount recovered shall be divided into integral or proportional parts. The persons entitled do not take as heirs or by succession, but as beneficiaries of the statute; ‘the statute being framed upon the theory that the heirs will always constitute the family of the deceased.’ ” In Robinson v. Western States Gas etc. Co., 184 Cal. 401, 410 [194 Pac. 39, 43], after quoting the'foregoing language of the Simoneau case, it is said: “The verdict should have been given for a lump sum to all the plaintiffs, including, of course, the damages to each of them.”  It may be said, with equal reason, that section 376, in so far as it authorizes the husband to maintain an action for the death of a minor child, is framed upon the theory of the continuance of the marital community and that the husband is the representative thereof for the purpose of maintaining the action. There was no necessity of joining the wife as a party plaintiff. “A person expressly authorized by statute, may sue without joining with him the persons for whose benefit the action is prosecuted.” (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 369.)
The petition is denied.
A petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on May 19, 1924.