Court Opinion

ID: 9444257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 20:05:00.558291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.574027
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 230029-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                          NOTICE
 Decision filed 08/03/23. The
                                                                               This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be      NOS. 5-23-0029, 5-23-0030, 5-23-0031,
                                                                               Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                               not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                 5-23-0032 cons.                  limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                               under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                                 IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

In re C.J., N.B., N.B., and J.S., Minors  )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois,     )     Jackson County.
                                          )
        Petitioner-Appellee,              )     Nos. 20-JA-26, 20-JA-27,
                                          )             20-JA-28, 20-JA-29
v.                                        )
                                          )
Sade J.,                                  )     Honorable
                                          )     Ella L. Travelstead,
        Respondent-Appellant).            )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court.
         Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Welch concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1       Held: The trial court’s finding that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate
               respondent’s parental rights is reversed where the court failed to address the
               statutory factors and its sole finding in the written order was unsupported by the
               evidence presented at the hearing.

¶2       Respondent, Sade J., appeals the trial court’s finding that it was in the best interest of the

children to terminate her parental rights. In the alternative, Sade argues that her trial counsel was

ineffective. For the following reasons, we reverse.

                                                    1
¶3                                   BACKGROUND

¶4     On July 29, 2020, the State filed four petitions for adjudication of wardship alleging that

Sade’s children, N.B. (born October 6, 2017), N.B. (born August 1, 2016), J.S. (born January 14,

2015), and C.J. (born February 14, 2009), were neglected. The petitions alleged Sade exhibited

“untreated mental illness symptoms” that prevented her from effectively caring for the children.

¶5     A shelter-care hearing was held on July 30, 2020. Rebecca Mills, an Illinois Department

of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigator, testified that on July 28, 2020, she

responded to a report claiming Sade’s mental health was declining. The informant stated Sade

knocked holes in the dwelling’s walls with a hammer, burned a mattress on her front lawn, and

broke the dwelling’s windows.

¶6     When Ms. Mills arrived at the house, she intended to implement a safety plan, rather than

take the children into protective custody. However, Sade was “erratic, screaming, yelling, stating

that there were people trying to kill her, people had been breaking into the house, she couldn’t

sleep, [and] she had to protect her children because she’d seen people trying to stab her in the

back.” The investigator stated, “it was nonstop the entire time I was there.”

¶7     Ms. Mills contacted her supervisor to call the police, and another caseworker arrived to

assist in taking the children into protective custody. Ms. Mills did not think Sade could adequately

supervise her children due to her mental health issues. She testified to a previous investigation in

which “the children were outside in the vehicle playing [and] set the car on fire.” Ms. Mills stated

that DCFS wanted the children to remain in protective custody until Sade could address her mental

health issues. She opined this could be a long-term issue given Sade’s denials of mental health

issues. On cross-examination, Ms. Mills explained that the children were taken into custody

because Sade would not calm down. She stated Sade became more erratic, as “the hallucinations,

                                                 2
the paranoia [was] more apparent the longer I was there.” The circuit court found an immediate

and urgent necessity to remove the children from Sade’s care and placed the children into DCFS’s

care and custody.

¶8     An adjudicatory hearing was held on September 9, 2020. At that time, Sade stipulated that

investigator Mills’s testimony would be similar to that provided during the shelter-care hearing.

The court found the children neglected and continued DCFS’s custody of the children.

¶9     Sade’s service plan was filed on October 1, 2020. The plan called for Sade to cooperate

with Lutheran Social Services of Illinois (LSSI)1 and inform the agency of any changes in her

address, phone number, household composition, or employment. The plan also required Sade to

complete parenting classes, obtain suitable housing, obtain a mental health assessment, and comply

with all recommendations stemming from the mental health assessment.

¶ 10   On October 5, 2020, LSSI filed its dispositional report for the period from July 2020 to

October 5, 2020. The report revealed that upon inspection of Sade’s home, there were no

appliances. There was an air mattress in Sade’s room and a lawn chair in the living room. The

report stated that Sade advised the caseworker that she would refuse to take mental health

medication even if recommended for her services. Visitation was scheduled for one hour once a

week. Sade attended the first three visits but missed the next three because she was out of town.

The report noted Sade had no working telephone that would allow for supervised telephone visits

with the children. When Sade attended the in-person visitations, she was attentive, active, and

revealed a bond with her children. She also understood her children’s needs by providing asthma

medication for one of the children, along with food and clothing.

       1
           LSSI was a subcontractor of DCFS in this matter.
                                                    3
¶ 11   The dispositional hearing was held on October 7, 2020. Due to difficulties in filing the

dispositional report, the supervisor, Mallory Bollinger, testified as to the contents of the report.

The main issue continued to be Sade’s mental health. Ms. Bollinger testified that Sade had not

visited the children in about four weeks and only had sporadic contact with her caseworker. Sade

had a counselor at Centerstone, and they were doing telehealth. The children were doing well in

foster care and Sade was working on obtaining housing. Following Ms. Bollinger’s testimony, the

court found the children neglected, the service plan was appropriate, and it was in the best interest

of the minors to remain outside the home. Custody of the minor children remained with DCFS.

¶ 12   Following the court’s ruling, Sade’s counsel asked the court if a psychological evaluation

was needed. The court deferred to Ms. Bollinger who stated she believed respondent’s diagnoses

were schizophrenia and bipolar and the “main thing would be for her to participate in mental health

treatment, to be seen by a counselor.” Ms. Bollinger also stated:

       “At this point, I mean, I’m not sure that maybe counseling is enough. I think there’s

       probably some more intensive treatment that needs to happen, which [Sade] isn’t

       very open to right now so that’s definitely something to explore. *** It’s been

       reported that she’s been out of town for a week. So[,] we haven’t had much chance

       to have contact with her.”

¶ 13   Sade advised the court that she had “been going through Cornerstone.” She also indicated

that she has been taking all of her steps without any help or assistance from family or the

caseworkers. She disagreed with the court’s finding that her children should have been removed

because when she was contacting the agency for assistance, no one would help her. She did not

feel “that was okay.” She further disagreed with the counselor’s opinion that she “needed

something further than Centerstone.” The court admonished Sade that she needed to cooperate

                                                 4
with LSSI and participate in those mental health services. Thereafter, Sade requested, no less than

eight times, that LSSI be removed from the case because they would not help her, and she believed

the agency was failing her. She further indicated that the prior caseworker “did not just leave

Lutheran Social Services,” insinuating that the caseworker was fired. The court admonished Sade

to cooperate with LSSI or she risked losing her children. Sade stated, “You all already did that

anyway. You’ve already even took my kids from me.” The court explained that the children could

be returned if she corrected the conditions. Thereafter, Sade advised the court that her children

were not getting daycare and did not have winter coats. The court expressed its understanding and

set the case for a permanency hearing on February 3, 2021.

¶ 14   On January 25, 2021, the DCFS permanency hearing report was filed. The report indicated

Sade had not participated in a parenting program and there were “large portions of this reporting

period when LSSI did not have a current address or phone number” for her. The report indicated

Sade became “agitated” when mental health was addressed, and Sade continued to state she did

not need mental health treatment. The report stated Sade had not participated in services to correct

the conditions that brought her children into care and was not consistent in attending visitation.

¶ 15   At the permanency hearing, the court asked the caseworker for a brief overview. With

regard to Sade, the caseworker advised the court that Sade “has not complied with services and

has not participated in any of them.” Sade disagreed stating, “I have been compliant with my

service plan” and had done everything except the parenting class. She stated that she had reached

out to Centerstone and her counselors, but a lot of the workers no longer worked in those positions.

She also reached out to the supervisor to determine how she was not complying with the service

plan. The court advised Sade to contact her attorney and the caseworker. Sade’s attorney advised

the court that Sade had taken steps to begin the parenting program and stated there was confusion,

                                                 5
but it was clarified. Counsel further indicated Sade was still in counseling and was willing to

continue counseling, however, one of the counselors moved or relocated which delayed things.

Sade did understand and was willing to undergo those services. The court admonished Sade to

continue to participate in her services.

¶ 16   Permanency reports were filed on March 24, 2021, and September 13, 2021. Both reports

stated Sade was noncompliant with the mental health services. The March report also stated Sade

missed the majority of her visits with the children. The September report indicated that Sade was

being evicted and jeopardizing the children’s current placement with public accusations of abuse

against the foster parents. The September report recommended the case proceed to legal screening.

Following a status hearing on November 16, 2021, the court docket entry stated, “Mom not fully

cooperating—needs new releases to determine whether she is completing mental health counseling

& parenting classes.” The entry further ordered a “psych eval” for Sade.

¶ 17   On November 12, 2021, LSSI submitted its status report to the court. The report indicated

that since the September hearing, Sade stopped doing in-person visits with her children and was

using Zoom. During those visits, Sade hinted that she was in Minnesota and would not provide the

agency with her location. The report stated Sade was online shopping during visitation and the

children did not appear attentive. The report further stated that Sade talked negatively about people,

towns, and the agency during the November 3, 2021, visitation. When Sade did not stop, the

agency warned her that the visit would end if she could not be “positive.” Sade responded with an

insulting response and the agency immediately terminated the visit. When Sade failed to confirm

the next week’s visit, she was denied visitation. The report stated Sade indicated she would not

comply with services and would refuse her psychological assessment once it was scheduled. On

                                                  6
September 28, 2021, Centerstone issued a report indicating Sade was not consistently attending

counseling and was not making progress when she did attend.

¶ 18   At the November 16, 2021, hearing, Sade refused to provide her location to the court. The

caseworker confirmed that the case was proceeding to legal screening. The court admonished Sade

to comply with the service plan or risk termination of her parental rights. The case was set for

hearing on March 22, 2022.

¶ 19   The agency permanency report was filed on March 9, 2022. The report indicated Sade

completed parenting courses at Centerstone but was noncompliant with counseling. Sade was

referred for a psychological assessment, but it was denied by the DCFS clinician who reviewed

the request due to Sade’s lack of involvement in services. Sade continued to maintain that she did

not need help for mental health or have mental health issues. After being advised that the agency

would be reporting her as not having made satisfactory progress, Sade sent the agency a profane

email. Sade continued to refuse to disclose her current location although some of her family

members thought she was living in a shelter in Carbondale.

¶ 20   At the March 22, 2022, hearing, Ms. Bollinger advised the court that Sade often missed

visitation. Sade was living at the “Warming Center” in Carbondale. Ms. Bollinger acknowledged

that Sade completed a mental health assessment, and was recommended for individual counseling,

“but then they dropped the counseling portion for nonattendance. She’ll have to get going again.”

The court admonished Sade of the need to complete mental health services, to which she

responded, “I never needed mental health from the beginning.”

¶ 21   The June 15, 2022, report described Sade as noncompliant with treatment and mentally

unstable, continuing to refuse services, and sending threatening or degrading emails to the agency.

Visitations continued to take place via Zoom, and there were several instances where Sade did not

                                                7
join in the call and would then email the caseworker cussing at her, calling her names, threatening

her, and stating she was not provided the correct link to join. Sade requested in-person visits, but

they were denied by the agency because they did not believe it would be in the children’s best

interests. The report stated that Sade obtained housing but had not completed her services. She had

contacted Centerstone and was put on a waiting list.

¶ 22   At the June 28, 2022, hearing, Sade stated that she had not received a copy of the

permanency report and, upon request from the court, provided the court with her current address.

The court then provided Sade with information in the report. The court asked the caseworker if

there were any updates from the report. The caseworker advised that Sade had not completed any

of her services, her emails to the agency were “belligerent, filled with profanity, [and] threatening

in nature,” and Sade failed to participate in visitation. Sade disputed the caseworker’s statements.

The caseworker’s supervisor advised the court that the case would proceed to legal screening the

following day and they would recommend a goal change thereafter. The guardian ad litem (GAL)

agreed with the goal change. The GAL also stated that the oldest child no longer wanted to visit

with Sade and was indicating that he wanted and needed permanency. Sade’s counsel disagreed

with a goal change prior to legal screening. The trial court found no reasonable effort by Sade and

admonished her to cooperate with and complete the service plan or she risked termination of her

parental rights. Thereafter, Sade requested a different judge, preferably a black judge. She also

requested a black attorney and, again, for LSSI to be removed from the case. Sade’s requests were

denied. Sade was advised that her attorney could file any motions regarding the judge’s removal.

¶ 23   On July 12, 2022, LSSI filed a status report indicating that Sade continued to send

inappropriate emails and acted inappropriately with the children’s caregivers. She had housing but

was noncompliant with other service goals. The case passed legal screening, a goal change to

                                                 8
“substitute care pending termination” was requested, and the children were doing well. Following

a permanency hearing on July 26, 2022, the trial court issued a docket entry noting Sade’s attempt

to reengage with counseling but further noted Sade “refused to re-enroll with psych and take

recommended mental health medication, critical decision made to discontinue visitations last week

because of harassment and threatening nature of emails.” The court found no reasonable effort by

Sade. On July 28, 2022, Sade filed a pro se motion requesting a substitution of judge. The trial

court denied the motion on August 9, 2022, because the motion was not filed by Sade’s counsel.

¶ 24   On October 27, 2022, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights for each

child. The petitions alleged that Sade failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,

or responsibility as to the minor children pursuant to section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750

ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)) and failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the

minor children for the nine-month period from January 1, 2022, to September 30, 2022, pursuant

to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)).

¶ 25   The petitions proceeded to hearing on January 10, 2023. The State called Ms. Bollinger

who testified that she evaluated the service plan four or five times since July 31, 2020. Each time,

Sade was rated unsatisfactory. Ms. Bollinger opined that Sade frequently lived out of state and the

agency had no way to contact her. When the agency did have contact with her, “it was just a

barrage of emails with obscenities and phone calls and voicemails and ‘Give me my kids back.’ ”

The video visits were “not very successful” because Sade “was usually agitated.” Although visits

were offered weekly, Sade participated in less than five between November 2021 and July 2022

when LSSI suspended the visits. Ms. Bollinger confirmed that Sade’s mental health was the

agency’s chief concern. She was not participating in the recommended psychiatric services. From

January 2022 through the end of September 2022, she did not participate in any mental health

                                                 9
services. During that time, Sade continued to demonstrate the same mental issues as before. On

cross-examination, Ms. Bollinger testified that Sade was discharged for unsuccessfully completing

mental health services at Centerstone. She reengaged in March 2021, attended one session, and

then dropped out. Ms. Bollinger conceded that she had not recently contacted Centerstone to

determine Sade’s status at the facility and was unsure when they last checked with the facility.

¶ 26   Sade testified that she had been going to counseling “back and forth.” She stated she

performed a psychological evaluation, had it updated, told her caseworker several times that she

was enrolled in services and provided the requisite consent forms that would allow the agency to

receive that information. She disagreed that reunification was ever a true goal, stating that

beginning at the first meeting the agency was asking her to sign her rights over. She testified that

when she was sent back for another psychological evaluation the facility told her that she had

already done one and she should not have to do another. She testified that she gave this information

to LSSI several times. She eventually redid the psychological evaluation in May, gave the agency

her address, and asked if LSSI would come do a home safety check.

¶ 27   Sade testified that the place she obtained to live was large enough to hold her and the four

children, but the agency refused to do a safety check. They told her that her children were well

taken care of, and she was not going to get her children back. Thereafter, she let the place go. With

regard to visitation, Sade testified about her inability to log in and stated that when she was able

to log on, not all of the children were there. She stated she had no problems getting to or attending

in-person visitation. Sade further testified that she left the state to obtain medical treatment and

when she returned the agency would not assist her in finding housing.

¶ 28   After all the parties declined the opportunity to provide closing argument, the court found

Sade was an unfit parent, having failed to make reasonable progress towards the return of the

                                                 10
children for any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect. The court also found

Sade failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the children’s

welfare.

¶ 29   Thereafter, the case proceeded immediately to a best interest hearing. The State declined

the opportunity to present any witnesses or evidence. The GAL called Ms. Bollinger who initially

testified regarding the children’s fathers never visiting the children or expressing any interest in

the children. As to Sade, Ms. Bollinger testified that C.J. indicated a few times that he did not want

to attend visits with his mother. She stated this was due to the children waiting for Sade to appear

during the Zoom visitations. She stated the children resided in stable, loving homes throughout the

case. Sade interjected stating, “No. Them ain’t loving homes. They are hurtful homes.” The court

admonished Sade about interrupting. Sade again stated, “Them ain’t loving homes. They are

hurtful homes.” Ms. Bollinger stated the children were currently placed in appropriate, loving, and

stable homes. She stated the children were not in the same home but had contact with each other

at least four hours a month. Sade interrupted stating, “No, they do not.” Ms. Bollinger stated one

of the foster mothers had the brothers for a sleep over so occasionally the children would see each

other more than four hours a month.

¶ 30   Ms. Bollinger testified that she did not personally go to the foster homes monthly, but a

staff member did. She believed the children were all well cared for, happy, and loved. Sade

interrupted again stating, “They done trash my kids. They’ve got my kids in rags, looking like

bums.” Ms. Bollinger testified that it was her professional opinion, based on her knowledge of the

record and contacts with the parties involved, that all parental rights should be terminated. Sade

stated, “Fuck on here. She don’t even have a right over nobody kids trashy ass.” The court directed

Sade to refrain from using profane language in court. Sade replied, “You about to sit up there and

                                                 11
take my rights and—” The court admonished Sade to stop. After the court determined that no other

witnesses were being called, the court asked the parties if anyone wished to provide argument. All

of the parties declined.

¶ 31   Thereafter, the court stated, “Based upon the testimony of the Court, the Court finds by the

preponderance of the evidence it is in the best interests of the minor that all parental rights and

residual parental rights flowing to and through *** Sade ***, with respect to the minor children

*** be hereinafter terminated.” Sade repeatedly asked what she was supposed to do without her

kids. The court stated, “I need to tell you—” but Sade interrupted saying, “No. Don’t say shit to

me. What am I supposed to do without my kids? That’s all I ever had was my kids.” The court

advised Sade that she had the right to appeal. Sade interrupted saying, “I am. I hate you all. I hate

white people.” The court stated, “That’s all you need to say, that you know you have the rights to

appeal.” Sade replied, “Rights? Bitch, you took my rights from my kids.” Sade left the courtroom,

and the court stated the minors would be placed in the care of DCFS and changed the goal to

adoption. Written orders for each child were filed on January 18, 2023, finding that Sade “had not

had the best interest of the minor, *** in mind for several years” and terminated Sade’s parental

rights. Sade timely appealed and this court consolidated the appeals.

¶ 32                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 33   Prior to discussing the merits of this case, we address the timeliness of our decision. This

case was designated as “accelerated” pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1,

2018) due to it involving a matter affecting the best interest of a child. Rule 311(a)(5) requires this

court to issue “its decision within 150 days after filing the notice of appeal” unless good cause is

shown. Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). In this case, our disposition was due on June 20,

2023. Sade’s appellate counsel initially filed an Anders motion (see Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

                                                  12
738 (1967)) and supporting brief requesting withdrawal as appointed counsel finding no

meritorious issue for review. Upon review of respondent’s pleadings, as well as the record, this

court determined that Sade’s counsel failed to address an issue and provided counsel with the

opportunity to either supplement the Anders supporting brief or brief the issue as one of merit.

Counsel chose the latter and we extended the original briefing deadline to allow the State to file a

responsive brief, which it did. “We cannot properly review a case and render our decision until we

are fully briefed on the issues and the arguments of the parties.” In re Chance H., 2019 IL App

(1st) 180053, ¶ 35. This case was not ready for disposition until after the 150 days expired.

Accordingly, we find good cause for issuing our decision after the 150-day time limit.

¶ 34   Turning to the merits, Sade raises two issues. She contends the trial court’s finding that it

was in the best interest of the children to terminate her parental rights was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. In the alternative, she contends her trial counsel was ineffective.

¶ 35   To terminate a party’s parental rights, a circuit court must make two separate and distinct

findings: that the State has proven (1) that the parents are “unfit persons” within the meaning of

section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)) and (2) that it is in the children’s

best interests to terminate that party’s parental rights. In re M.H., 2015 IL App (4th) 150397, ¶ 20

(citing 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2014)). Our courts have recognized that parental rights and

responsibilities are of deep importance and should not be terminated lightly. In re C.P., 191 Ill.

App. 3d 237, 244 (1989). As such, the State must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence,

that a parent is unfit under one of the grounds set forth in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750

ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d 883, 889 (2004). “If the court makes

a finding of unfitness, the court then considers whether it is in the best interests of the child that

                                                 13
parental rights be terminated.” In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2002). In this case, no argument

regarding Sade’s fitness was raised, and therefore, we move to the second stage.

¶ 36    At the best interests hearing “the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child

relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d

347, 364 (2004). To make the best interest determination, the trial court must consider 10 statutory

factors. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020). These factors include (1) the physical safety and

welfare of the child, (2) the development of the child’s identity, (3) the child’s background and

ties, (4) the child’s sense of attachments, (5) the child’s wishes, (6) the child’s community ties,

(7) the child’s need for permanence, (8) the uniqueness of every family and child, (9) the risks

attendant to entering and being in substitute care, and (10) the preferences of the people available

to care for the child. Id. “The court may also consider the nature and length of the child’s

relationship with his present caretaker and the effect that a change in placement would have upon

his or her emotional and psychological well-being.” In re Ca. B., 2019 IL App (1st) 181024, ¶ 30.

¶ 37    The court’s best interest determination is not required to “contain an explicit reference to

each of these factors.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. We will only overturn

a court’s best interest determination if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Tiffany

M., 353 Ill. App. 3d at 892. “A decision will be found to be against the manifest weight of the

evidence in cases ‘where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings are

unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based upon any of the evidence.’ ” In re Shru. R., 2014 IL App

(4th) 140275, ¶ 24 (quoting In re Tasha L.-I., 383 Ill. App. 3d 45, 52 (2008)).

¶ 38    On appeal, Sade argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proof because it presented

no evidence at the best interest hearing. Sade further argues that there is no evidence the trial court

considered the statutory factors in reaching the conclusion to terminate Sade’s parental rights. In

                                                   14
response, the State contends that the GAL’s procurement of testimony was sufficient to replace

the State’s failure to present any evidence itself, stating the issue of who presents the evidence was

irrelevant. The State’s response further contends it was unnecessary for the trial court to address

any of the statutory factors when rendering its decision and argues that even if it was error for the

trial court to fail to address the factors, this court is not bound by the trial court’s findings and can

affirm based on any evidence in in the record.

¶ 39    It is the State’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is in a child’s

best interest to terminate parental rights. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366. While it matters not from

whom the evidence is elicited, we find it incredulous that the State failed to produce any evidence

or present any argument at the best interest hearing. Despite such failure, we note the GAL

attempted to obtain evidence, via testimony from the caseworker, to serve as a basis for the court

to determine whether termination of Sade’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children.

The testimony obtained, however, was paltry and generic at best.

¶ 40    Here, despite there being four children at issue, the testimony only addressed one child

specifically, and that testimony merely revealed that C.J. did not want to participate in visitation

with Sade due to difficulties stemming from the Zoom visitation. No testimony regarding the other

three children’s desire to spend time, even if only by Zoom, with Sade was presented. The children

were 5, 6, 8, and 13 years old at the time of the hearing. Despite their ages, no testimony was

provided, and no evidence was submitted, regarding the medical conditions, developmental

concerns, schooling, adjustment to new communities, the children’s attachments, wishes and long-

term goals, or their adjustment to being in foster care.

¶ 41    Equally lacking was any evidence specifically addressing any of the foster homes. Contrary

to the State’s argument, there was no testimony revealing when each child was placed in the current

                                                   15
foster home. Further there was no evidence submitted addressing the stability of the foster parents,

the number of other children in the foster homes, the relationships between the children and the

parties residing in the foster homes, or even information regarding the willingness of any of the

foster parents to continue in their current roles. While the caseworker answered affirmatively when

asked whether the children were in stable, loving homes, no supportive details or information was

elicited. Further, the evidence failed to show any benefit to the children by terminating Sade’s

parental rights. See In re M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1118 (2002) (“As no benefits were shown

to be gained by the termination, the only result was to deprive T.R. of an already established

relationship with her mother *** who loved her child and was only prevented from a more hands-

on relationship by her mental disability.”). Here, all four children were of sufficient age to develop

a relationship with Sade, and no evidence regarding the status of the mother-child bond was

presented.

¶ 42    The State, citing In re Ca. B., 2019 IL App (1st) 181024, ¶ 31, and In re Davon H., 2015

IL App (1st) 150926, ¶ 78, argues that we need not rely on any basis cited by the trial court and

invites us to affirm the decision on any basis in the record. We decline to accept the State’s

invitation. While we are well aware that this court is not required to rely on any basis provided by

the trial court, we could not here even if we wanted because no basis was provided.

¶ 43    Despite the legislature providing 10 statutory factors for consideration by the trial court

and case law providing additional factors, the trial court failed to address any factor or provide any

basis for its finding that termination of Sade’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children.

In fact, the trial court did not even mention the statutory factors or state that it considered them

when issuing its ruling.

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¶ 44      The State also contends the GAL-acquired testimony is sufficient to address 3 of the 10

statutory factors. We disagree and find the record insufficient to make a determination on the issue.

While no single factor is dispositive (In re S.K.B., 2015 IL App (1st) 151249, ¶ 48), we find the

testimony lacking as to every factor given the lack of specificity provided for any child or foster

family.

¶ 45      The trial court ultimately decided that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate

Sade’s parental rights. The State claims “it would be folly to speculate that the trial court was

somehow unaware of its obligation to consider the statutory requirements.” We place little merit

in the State’s argument considering its own failure to provide evidence or argument at the hearing.

The court cannot make findings involving the statutory factors without evidence. Here, while no

findings were made in the court’s oral proclamation, the court’s only finding in the written order

stated that Sade *** had not had the best interest of the minors *** in mind for several years.”

However, no testimony or evidence supporting that statement was provided at the best interest

hearing. As the record provides no basis for us to determine the propriety of the trial court’s

ultimate decision, we cannot affirm the decision.

¶ 46      The State also argues that if this court were to find that the lack of factual findings inhibited

our review, we should remand the case to the trial court to make those findings, instead of reversing

the trial court’s order. We again disagree. As noted throughout this decision, there is a complete

lack of evidence on which the decision was issued. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order

finding it was in the best interest of the children to terminate Sade’s parental rights and remand

the case to the trial court for new hearing on the children’s best interests. 2

          2
         Although we note a similar lack of evidence submitted and argument presented by Sade’s counsel
at the best interest hearing, in light of our holding regarding the best interest factor, we find it unnecessary
to address Sade’s alternative argument.
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¶ 47                                 CONCLUSION

¶ 48   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order finding it was in the best

interest of the children to terminate Sade’s parental rights.

¶ 49   Reversed and remanded.

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