Court Opinion

ID: 9487400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:15:48.459666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:15.116214
License: Public Domain

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in each aspect of this opinion except the majority’s conclusion that “the mere declaration that [Lloyd’s] sentence was improper is enough to pass the minimal threshold of jurisdiction.” I do not believe that this is a correct statement of the law in general, and in this case in particular, I would hold that we lack jurisdiction to review appellant Lloyd’s sentence.
The right of a defendant to appeal a guidelines sentence is set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a) (West 1985 & Supp.1994). It is well-settled in this circuit that our jurisdiction under that statute to review a guidelines sentence is limited to claims that the sentence (1) was imposed in violation of the law, (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines, (3) is outside the applicable guideline range and is unreasonable in light of statutory factors, or (4) is plainly unreasonable and was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline. United States v. Lavoie, 19 F.3d 1102, 1103 (6th Cir.1994).
I would concede that we have jurisdiction to review a sentence labeled “improper” where the defendant provides some substance to that claim which arguably fits within one of the foregoing categories. In United States v. Lively, 20 F.3d 193 (6th Cir.1994), for example, we considered whether the defendant’s challenge to the kind of sentence imposed was reviewable on appeal. We found that, because the defendant argued that the district court, in imposing a sentence of imprisonment rather than home confinement, had failed to consider certain directives contained in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, she was in fact arguing that her sentence was imposed in violation of law. Accordingly, we found the sentence reviewable. Id. at 196-97. But the majority’s holding here that “the mere declaration that the sentence was improper is enough to pass the minimum threshold of jurisdiction” simply negates the requirements of § 3742(a).
Here, the sum total of Lloyd’s attack on his sentence is this:
4- Was your Appellant’s sentence proper under the sentencing guidelines?
Your Appellant was sentenced to a period of incarceration of 292 months based upon the following guideline sentence calculation:
Base offense level 28
Criminal History Category VI
Career Offender adjustment 34
Your Appellant Bobby Lloyd would urge that the sentence as calculated is not proper.
More specifically, Appellant contends that the increase in his offense level from 28 to 34 based upon the Career Offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, was improper and thus his sentence should not have been calculated based upon an offense level of 34 but rather 28.
Brief of Appellant Lloyd, pp. 8-9.
Lloyd has provided no substance whatsoever from which we can determine the basis for our jurisdiction to review his sentence. He does not claim that the district court’s use of the career offender provision was based on erroneous findings of fact. He does not point to any specific legal error in the district court’s use of the career offender provision. Without such a claim of factual or legal error, there is no basis for this court to conclude that Lloyd in fact claims that the *243sentence was imposed in violation of the law or as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines. Similarly, there is no basis for concluding that Lloyd in fact claims that the sentence is outside the applicable guideline range or was imposed for. an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline. In short, Lloyd fails to provide any clue as to why or how the district court’s use of the career offender provisions was “improper.” This claim of error is insufficient to permit appellate review, and I would so hold.