Court Opinion

ID: 9565306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:18:54.18023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:32.212408
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the finding by the majority that the evidence is sufficient to show beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of rape. The only issue as to rape is whether the penetration was by appellant’s sex organ, which is an essential element of the offense of rape. OCGA § 16-6-1. I have scrutinized the record and find no evidence of penetration by appellant’s sex organ. The State has the burden of proving each essential element of an offense beyond reasonable doubt. OCGA § 16-1-5; Phillips v. State, 162 Ga. App. 471 (2) (291 SE2d 776) (1982). An inference cannot relieve the State of this burden, especially where, as here, there is no evidence to support *251such an inference. To infer that penetration by “something” is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the penetration was with appellant’s sex organ is to approve conviction based on evidence insufficient to meet the standard of proof required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560).
Decided June 8, 1987.
George H. Law III, for appellant.
C. Andrew Fuller, District Attorney, Daniel A. Summer, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I do not find the victim’s failure to be explicit in regard to the rape to be based on the fact that she was upset, because immediately after her testimony that she was penetrated “maybe slightly” by “something,” she was very explicit about the offense of aggravated sodomy. Rather, she was not explicit because appellant was behind her, and she could not state what penetrated her. Accordingly, I would reverse appellant’s conviction of rape.
I am authorized to state that Judge Carley joins in this dissent.