Court Opinion

ID: 9522232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:20:30.322924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:25.372630
License: Public Domain

Wilkins, J.
(dissenting, with whom Liacos and Abrams, JJ., join). The court rightly says that its “decision . . . may *809have been unforeseeable.” Supra at 808. “[T]he rule that a fetus cannot be the victim of a homicide is the rule in every jurisdiction that has decided the issue, except those in which a different result is dictated by statute” (emphasis supplied). Id. The court further characterizes the conclusion it reaches as “[a]n unpredictable judicial decision.” Id. I think the court is right. I would never have guessed it.
The court asserts that the Legislature intended to adopt the construction of the word “person” used by this court in Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354 (1975), a civil case involving the tort law of the Commonwealth. Nowhere does the court explain why the Legislature should be assumed to have disregarded hundreds of years of the criminal common law nor why this court should ignore the commendable judicial restraint of every other court that has considered the point. See supra at 805-807. Moreover, the development of civil liability for injuries to a fetus is “quite distinguishable” from the criminal law. See Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 513 n.23 (1976) (plurality opinion).
“Criminal statutes must be strictly construed.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 386 Mass. 607, 617 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring). “The result is disturbing. Every jurisdiction which has considered the issue . . . holds to the contrary.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 390 Mass. 797, 811 (1984) (Nolan, J., dissenting, joined by Lynch, J.). The question whether the killing of a viable fetus by reason of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle should be a separate crime is for the Legislature as a matter of wise social policy, and a strong case can be made for appropriate legislation to that effect. “It is clear that the matter in which this court now intrudes is a matter for the Legislature.” Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629,664 (1981) (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting). The court’s extended reliance on its power to construe common law crimes and judge-made mies is beside the point. That power has no place in the construction of an exclusively statutory crime.
If the court truly believed that the Legislature intended to include a viable fetus within the meaning of “person” in the *810motor vehicle homicide statute, it should have made its interpretation applicable to this defendant. How can it justify ignoring such a legislative determination? As it is, the court has prospectively amended the statute. I think that this is an inappropriate “exercise of raw judicial power.” Doe v. Doe, 365 Mass. 556, 565 (1974) (Hennessey, J., dissenting in part), quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410U.S. 179,222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).