Court Opinion

ID: 9364879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 16:03:14.533121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:41.063042
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 127712

                                       IN THE
                              SUPREME COURT
                                          OF
                         THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                  (Docket No. 127712)

            AYESHA CHAUDHARY, Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF
                     HUMAN SERVICES et al., Appellants.

                             Opinion filed January 20, 2023.

        JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet, Holder White, and Cunningham
     concurred in the judgment and opinion.

        Justices Rochford and O’Brien took no part in the decision.

                                       OPINION

¶1       In 2019, defendant, the Department of Human Services (Department), initiated
     an investigation of plaintiff, Ayesha Chaudhary, a recipient of the Supplemental
     Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), pursuant to section 12-4.4 of the Illinois
     Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/12-4.4) (West 2018)) and determined that she
     received overpayments in the amount of $21,821. The Department began an
     overpayment collection process pursuant to Title 89, section 165.10(a), of the
     Illinois Administrative Code (Code) (89 Ill. Adm. Code 165.10(a) (2002)).
     Chaudhary challenged the determination by filing an agency appeal, and the
     administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the overpayment determination was
     valid. Chaudhary sought review by the other defendant, Grace B. Hou, the
     Secretary of Human Services (Secretary), who found that there was sufficient
     evidence presented by the Department to establish that the overpayment had
     occurred. Chaudhary filed a writ of certiorari for administrative review in the
     circuit court. The circuit court of Du Page County reversed the Secretary’s final
     administrative decision, finding that the evidence did not support the determination
     of a SNAP overpayment. Defendants filed an appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme
     Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017)), and the appellate court affirmed the
     judgment of the circuit court. See 2021 IL App (2d) 200364. This court allowed
     defendants’ petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
     315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). We also allowed the Shriver Center on Poverty Law, Equip
     For Equality, Land of Lincoln Legal Aid, Legal Aid Chicago, and Legal Council
     For Health Justice to file an amici curiae brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20,
     2010). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the lower courts.

¶2                                  I. BACKGROUND

¶3                    A. Underlying SNAP Overpayment Proceedings

¶4       Chaudhary arrived in the United States from Pakistan in 2007 or 2008. She
     married Jon Mohammad Ramzan while in Pakistan, and they have three children
     together. Ramzan also has a daughter from a different marriage. In 2012,
     Chaudhary divorced Ramzan, and in January 2013, she moved to White Oak Lane
     in West Chicago, Illinois (White Oak address). Chaudhary received SNAP benefits
     for herself and the three children she has with Ramzan. He separately received
     benefits for himself and his daughter. Under separate accounts, Chaudhary and
     Ramzan received SNAP benefits from May 2015 through December 2017 (the
     overpayment period), both listing the White Oak address as their SNAP benefits
     mailing address.

                                            -2-
¶5          In December 2017, Ramzan stopped receiving SNAP benefits at the White Oak
       address when he changed his mailing address to Morton Road in West Chicago,
       Illinois (Morton Road address), which was previously listed as his residence in the
       Department’s records. His address change alerted the Department that he and
       Chaudhary had each been receiving benefits on their separate accounts at the White
       Oak address. The separate payments to Chaudhary’s account (four recipients) and
       Ramzan’s account (two recipients), cumulatively, were more than would have been
       paid if all six recipients had been on one account.

¶6         The Department initiated an investigation and determined that Ramzan lived at
       the White Oak address during the overpayment period from May 2015 through
       December 2017. Based on its investigation, the Department concluded that
       Chaudhary, as the primary account holder at the White Oak address, had received
       overpayments totaling $21,821. The Department then began the overpayment
       collection process pursuant to section 165.10 of the Code (89 Ill. Adm. Code
       165.10(a) (2002)).

¶7         On August 7, 2019, the Department sent Chaudhary a notice of overpayment.
       The notification informed Chaudhary that she had received an overpayment of
       $21,821 in SNAP benefits from May 2015 to December 2017. The notification
       specified that the overpayment “occurred because you and your husband, Jon
       Ramzan, received SNAP benefits on separate cases when you were required to be
       on a case together, and you did not report Jon’s income from social security or
       Ozark Pizza Company.” The notification apprised Chaudhary that she was
       “responsible for repaying the SNAP overpayment.”

¶8         Chaudhary challenged the determination by filing an agency appeal. Chaudhary
       claimed that she and Ramzan had been divorced since 2012 and Ramzan never
       lived with her at the White Oak address. She also maintained that her SNAP account
       had always only included four individuals, herself and her three children.

¶9                                     B. Agency Appeal

¶ 10      Prior to the administrative hearing, there was a prehearing review of the
       Department’s documentary evidence, which was attended by Chaudhary and the
       department’s representative, Ernesto Chairez, a financial recoveries coordinator

                                              -3-
       and a Department employee of 13 years. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.11 (2001) (Pre-
       Hearing Meeting); id. § 14.12 (Review of Case Record). At the review, Chaudhary
       received from the Department a statement of facts and more than 300 pages of
       documents. Chaudhary, in support of her position, submitted a letter stating that
       Ramzan did not live with her and a copy of her divorce decree from 2012. After the
       prehearing meeting, Chairez forwarded Chaudhary’s submissions to the Bureau of
       Collections (BOC), which conducted a further investigation. Chaudhary received
       the results of this subsequent investigation on the morning of the administrative
       hearing, September 30, 2019.

¶ 11        An administrative law judge (ALJ) heard Chaudhary’s appeal via a telephonic
       conference. At the hearing, Chaudhary appeared pro se, and the Department was
       represented by Chairez. Initially, the ALJ told Chaudhary that, as the appellant, she
       had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and that “[t]his simply
       means that you have to prove why you should win and you have to prove it by 51%
       which is more likely than not.” The ALJ further informed Chaudhary that in a case
       like this, where there is so much information, the Department customarily presents
       its case first.

¶ 12       Chairez testified that Chaudhary was the primary account holder on her SNAP
       account and that there were six people in her household during the overpayment
       period. He stated that the White Oak address was the only address the Department
       had for Ramzan, and there were six residents at that address. According to the BOC,
       Ramzan moved out of the White Oak residence as of January 13, 2018.

¶ 13       Chairez then reviewed the Department’s exhibits, which consisted of various
       documents, including an approximately 200-page submission from the Integrated
       Eligibility System (IES) underpayment/overpayment calculator. That submission
       indicated that the overpayment was repeated month to month during the
       overpayment period. Chairez also pointed out that the BOC report from August 2,
       2019, established unreported income for Ramzan.

¶ 14       Chaudhary clarified that she had been divorced from Ramzan since 2012, and
       he had been living elsewhere. After receiving the Department’s notification, she
       contacted Ramzan and was informed that he was using the White Oak address for
       mailing purposes. She stated that her household was “four all the time,” herself and
       her three children, and that she wrote to the Department and informed it of the same.

                                               -4-
¶ 15       Chairez attested that Ramzan had a separate SNAP account where he was the
       head of the household that included his daughter from another marriage. Chairez
       asserted that the Department’s position was that, because Ramzan used the same
       address as Chaudhary, the two separate households should have been one
       household with six members.

¶ 16       Chaudhary interposed that Ramzan’s daughter attended school in another
       district, which showed that he lived in another town. Chairez again stated that all
       of the Department’s documents listed Ramzan as living at the White Oak address.
       Chairez then continued his review of the Department’s exhibits documenting
       Ramzan’s and Chaudhary’s income.

¶ 17       Chairez next addressed numerous documents that purported to establish that
       Ramzan lived with Chaudhary at the White Oak address during the relevant time
       period, including (1) SNAP payments sent to Chaudhary and Ramzan on separate
       accounts at the address from May 2015 to December 2017, (2) post office
       verification of the address as Ramzan’s mailing address as of February 9, 2018,
       (3) state records showing both Chaudhary and Ramzan with vehicles registered to
       the address in 2018, (4) registration of Ramzan’s corporation, Yasmar, Inc., at the
       address with Ramzan and Chaudhary listed as officers filed with the Illinois
       Secretary of State for the year 2019, (5) property records listing Ramzan as owner
       of the White Oak property in 2004 and 2006, and (6) Social Security records
       showing the receipt of benefits for Ramzan’s daughter from a prior marriage, at the
       address.

¶ 18       Chairez then focused on an IES summary page registering the Morton Road
       address as Ramzan’s residence and the White Oak address as his mailing address.
       According to Chairez, this was “weird,” and Chairez asked why he would use the
       White Oak address for mailing. Chaudhary replied that Ramzan had had trouble
       receiving mail at the Morton Road address.

¶ 19      After Chairez concluded presenting the Department’s evidence, the ALJ
       addressed Chaudhary, informing her that now was her chance to ask Chairez any
       questions. Chaudhary was also informed that she could present her argument or
       choose to say nothing.

                                              -5-
¶ 20       Chaudhary affirmed that she and Ramzan had divorced and she had submitted
       her divorce decree establishing that they divorced in 2012. She testified that
       Shakeel, a relative of Ramzan’s, told her about the White Oak residence and she
       started living at White Oak with her three children in 2013. Chaudhary was not sure
       if Ramzan had ever lived there, but he was not living there when she moved in. She
       acknowledged that she was listed as the secretary of Ramzan’s company in 2006.

¶ 21        After receiving the overpayment notice, Chaudhary spoke with Ramzan, and he
       acknowledged that he used the White Oak address as a mailing address. Chaudhary
       stated that she had not been aware of this, explaining that there were other residents
       at the address, living on different floors, one of whom would receive and distribute
       the mail.

¶ 22      Chaudhary continued testifying that she was in her home country, Pakistan, for
       34 years, and she had not lived with Ramzan when she came to the United States.
       She had resided in Glendale Heights prior to moving to the White Oak address in
       2013. She also stated that she occasionally worked on income taxes five to six
       months a year. In closing, Chaudhary asked the Department to reconsider its
       position because the overpayment was a significant amount. At the end of the
       hearing, Chaudhary requested time to submit additional documents showing that
       Ramzan lived elsewhere, and the ALJ held the record open for four days.

¶ 23       Chaudhary supplemented the record with evidence that Ramzan did not live at
       the White Oak address during the overpayment period. She presented a letter from
       Ramzan, which stated that he had moved out of the White Oak address in 2012 and
       had moved with his daughter to the Morton Road address. His letter continued that
       his relative, Shakeel, rented the residence to Chaudhary after he moved out.
       Ramzan explained that, once he moved to the Morton Road address, he had not
       received several documents from the Department and Social Security. After
       contacting the Department regarding the missing letters, he was advised that he
       could provide a different mailing address than his residence. Ramzan then changed
       his mailing address to White Oak.

¶ 24        Ramzan enclosed numerous exhibits listing his residence as Morton Road that
       included the following: (1) a state of Illinois driver’s license issued in August 2013,
       which expired in June 2017; (2) an internal Department record, showing Ramzan
       listed White Oak as a mailing address and Morton Road as his residence address

                                                -6-
       with the Department; (3) a residential lease beginning June 1, 2013, and ending
       May 31, 2015; (4) a residential lease beginning June 1, 2015, and ending August
       31, 2020; (5) a proof-of-residency letter from the Benjamin School District for
       August 13, 2013; (6) an approval letter from Benjamin School District for free meal
       services for the 2015-16 school year; (7) an automobile insurance card effective
       September 3, 2015, through October 19, 2015; (8) a copy of a check from Allstate
       Insurance dated December 17, 2016; (9) electricity bills for service dated between
       2013 and 2016; and (10) a 2017 medical bill from Northwestern Medicine.

¶ 25       Chaudhary also tendered notarized letters from the other tenants, Nizakat Khan
       and Sher Dill Khan. They averred that (1) they resided in the basement at the White
       Oak address, (2) they knew Chaudhary, and (3) Chaudhary resided in the upper
       level with her three children and nobody else. In addition, she submitted a letter
       from Shakeel dated October 2, 2019, acknowledging that he managed the White
       Oak address and that Chaudhary had moved in on January 3, 2013. The record was
       closed on October 4, 2019, after receipt of Chaudhary’s submissions.

¶ 26       Thereafter, the ALJ rendered the following findings of fact based on a
       preponderance of the evidence: (1) Chaudhary had received SNAP benefits from at
       least May 2015 with a total of four people in her assistance unit; (2) she received a
       notice of overpayment from the Department informing her that she had received a
       $21,821 SNAP overpayment, and she was responsible for repaying the same
       because (a) she and her husband had received SNAP benefits in separate cases when
       they were required to be in a case together and (b) she had not reported his income.
       The ALJ upheld the Department’s overpayment determination.

¶ 27       In summary fashion, the ALJ discussed Chaudhary’s testimony without making
       a credibility determination. She reiterated that Chaudhary arrived from Pakistan in
       2007 or 2008, she and Ramzan have children together but never lived together, and
       they were divorced in 2012. Ramzan’s family member helped Chaudhary find her
       current residence, where she has lived since 2013, and she did not know that
       Ramzan had once lived at the White Oak address or that he was using the address
       as his mailing address. There are two men who also live at the address in a separate
       living quarter, and one collects and distributes all the mail. Chaudhary was aware
       that she was added to Ramzan’s corporation in 2006, and to earn extra money,
       during the tax season, she works filing income taxes for individuals. Chaudhary

                                               -7-
       sought agency review by the Secretary.

¶ 28                      C. Secretary’s Final Administrative Decision

¶ 29       Based on the ALJ’s findings, the Secretary issued her final administrative
       decision, determining that the decision to charge Chaudhary with $21,821 in a
       SNAP overpayment was proper. The Secretary relied on documents from the
       Department’s investigation showing the White Oak address as Ramzan’s address,
       including the Secretary of State records listing Ramzan and Chaudhary as officers
       of Yasmar, Inc., a post office address verification, and state vehicle registration
       records, to find that it was more likely than not that both lived there during the
       overpayment period. As a result, the Secretary ruled Ramzan should have been
       included on Chaudhary’s account and his income reported.

¶ 30       The Secretary specifically addressed the fact that the notice of overpayment
       stated that Chaudhary and her husband received SNAP benefits in separate cases
       and Chaudhary had undeclared income from her husband. The Secretary
       acknowledged Chaudhary’s divorce decree, but according to the Secretary,
       although they may no longer be married under the law, that did not overcome the
       evidence that they are members of the same household and that a SNAP
       overpayment occurred.

¶ 31       The Secretary then asserted that Chaudhary’s testimony “lacks credibility.” The
       Secretary noted that “[i]t is highly implausible” that she did not know that Ramzan
       once owned and lived at the White Oak address, “it is unlikely” that others collected
       the mail every day and that she was “clueless” or “completely oblivious” to the fact
       that Ramzan received his mail there, and her testimony that she and Ramzan never
       lived together during their marriage contradicted her written statement that they had
       not lived together “since” their divorce.

¶ 32      The Secretary concluded that the Department had provided sufficient
       documentation and calculations establishing that Ramzan resided at the White Oak
       address and that an overpayment had occurred. The Secretary upheld the
       Department’s decision to charge Chaudhary with a $21,821 SNAP overpayment.

                                               -8-
¶ 33                               D. Circuit Court Decision

¶ 34      Subsequently, Chaudhary filed a common-law writ of certiorari in the circuit
       court seeking review of the Secretary’s final administrative decision. The circuit
       court granted the writ and reversed the Secretary’s final administrative decision.
       The circuit court found that the Department had the burden of proof regarding
       overpayment of SNAP benefits where it is seeking to divest a recipient of
       previously granted benefits.

¶ 35       Further, the court found that the Department had not sustained its burden of
       proof and the evidence did not establish that Ramzan, Chaudhary’s ex-husband,
       resided at the White Oak address. Specifically, the court determined that (1) many
       of the documents produced by the Department were from outside of the
       overpayment period; (2) Chaudhary and Ramzan had been divorced since 2012,
       with the time in issue being between May 2015 and December 2017; and (3) the
       affidavits plus all of the other documentation clearly showed that Ramzan used the
       White Oak address only as a mailing address and did not reside there.

¶ 36                              E. Appellate Court Decision

¶ 37       Defendants filed an appeal of the circuit court’s order. The appellate court
       affirmed, holding that the Department carried the burden of proof to establish a
       SNAP overpayment. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364, ¶ 47.

¶ 38        The court agreed with the parties that the Code was silent regarding allocation
       of the burden of proof in an appeal from a SNAP overpayment determination. Id.
       The appellate court recognized that the Department first initiated the overpayment
       claim, determined the overpayment amount, and then notified Chaudhary of its
       determination. Id. ¶ 48. Based on the above circumstances, the appellate court
       concluded that Chaudhary’s administrative hearing was not an initiation of a new
       action. Id. Rather, her hearing was an appeal of the Department’s overpayment
       determination against her, as was her right under the Code. Id. The court observed
       that its conclusion was consistent with Eastman v. Department of Public Aid, 178
       Ill. App. 3d 993 (1989), which indicated that the burden of proof is with the agency
       because the agency must present some reliable evidence establishing an

                                              -9-
       overpayment for the administrative decision to stand. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364,
       ¶ 52 (citing Eastman, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 994).

¶ 39       According to the appellate court, where the statute is silent regarding the burden
       of proof, the general rule controls that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. The
       court determined that, in this case, the Department is the plaintiff because it initiated
       the action against Chaudhary to recover its overpayment. Id. ¶ 55.

¶ 40       In addressing the evidence, the appellate court held that the Department’s
       decision to charge Chaudhary with an overpayment and the Secretary’s denial of
       her appeal were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 63. The court
       observed that the evidence that the Secretary relied on in reaching her decision was
       largely from outside the overpayment period. Id. ¶ 65.

¶ 41       The appellate court recognized that “the Secretary gave scarcely any
       consideration in her written decision to Chaudhary’s evidence submitted following
       the appeal hearing.” Id. ¶ 68. In the court’s view, there was no reason why the
       Secretary should not have considered this evidence. Id. The appellate court found
       that the failure to discuss the substance of any of Chaudhary’s supplemental
       evidence in reaching a final decision was unreasonable. Id. ¶ 71. In addition, the
       Department’s “evidence did not show that Ramzan consistently used the White Oak
       address, let alone resided there, during the overpayment period.” Id. Accordingly,
       the appellate court held that the opposite conclusion, that Ramzan did not reside at
       the White Oak address, was clearly evident. Id. The appellate court affirmed the
       judgment of the circuit court reversing the Secretary’s final administrative decision.
       Id. ¶ 73. Defendants filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court.

¶ 42                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 43       Defendants argue that the lower courts erred in placing the burden of proof on
       the Department in this administrative hearing addressing a SNAP overpayment
       determination. Defendants acknowledge that the provisions governing the
       Department’s SNAP administrative hearings do not specifically place the burden
       of proof on either party, but they argue for application of the default rule that the
       party who initiates the action carries the burden, and here that is Chaudhary. In
       addition, defendants contend that the Code as a whole, specifically its appeal

                                                - 10 -
       process, implicitly places the burden of proof on Chaudhary. Defendants also
       contend that the burden should rest with the party who has access to relevant
       information and Chaudhary possesses the evidence concerning Ramzan’s
       residence. Defendants posit that placing the burden on Chaudhary does not violate
       her due process rights because she was afforded a fair hearing before a neutral
       tribunal. Defendants argue that the Secretary’s decision was not against the
       manifest weight of the evidence because there was evidence in the record to support
       the finding that Ramzan lived with Chaudhary at the White Oak address during the
       relevant time period. Finally, defendants maintain that the Secretary’s credibility
       determination regarding Chaudhary is due substantial deference and should be
       upheld.

¶ 44       Chaudhary responds that the lower courts properly found the Department
       carries the burden of proof when divesting a recipient of SNAP benefits. Chaudhary
       agrees that the statute is silent as to who carries the burden of proof and the default
       rule applies. According to Chaudhary, it is the Department that initiated the action
       to divest her of a benefit and, therefore, carries the burden of proof. Chaudhary also
       argues that the Code and the relevant provisions regarding the appeal process do
       not implicitly place the burden on a SNAP benefit recipient. Chaudhary maintains
       that the Department is responsible for determining whether an overpayment
       occurred and has superior access to relevant public records to make that
       determination. Chaudhary argues she was not afforded due process, as she was at a
       disadvantage at the hearing because she did not have notice that she bore the burden
       of proof and did not receive prior notice that Ramzan’s alleged residence at the
       White Oak address was the reason for the overpayment determination. Chaudhary
       maintains that the Secretary’s decision was against the manifest weight of the
       evidence because it was unsupported by any competent evidence and that the
       opposite conclusion was clearly evident—Ramzan did not live at White Oak during
       the overpayment period but used it only as a mailing address.

¶ 45                                  A. Standard of Review

¶ 46      The determination of which party bears the burden of proof in the context of an
       administrative proceeding presents a pure question of law that we review de novo.
       1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Healey, 223 Ill. 2d 607, 627 (2006). To ascertain

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       whether the Code implicitly places the burden of proof on the benefit recipient
       requires us to construe the relevant sections of the Code. Statutory construction also
       presents a pure question of law that we review de novo. Robinson v. Village of Sauk
       Village, 2022 IL 127236, ¶ 17.

¶ 47        The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to
       the intention of the legislature. Id. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent
       is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
       Id. A statute is viewed as a whole; therefore words and phrases are construed in
       light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. United States v.
       Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶ 10. A court may consider the reason for the law, the
       problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences
       of construing the statute one way or the other. Id.

¶ 48                                    B. Burden of Proof

¶ 49                  1. Where the Statute Is Silent, the Default Rule That the
                          Party Who Initiated the Action Applies in
                           Administrative Proceedings to Divest a
                                      Recipient’s Benefit

¶ 50       Defendants contend that an agency should not bear the burden of proof where
       the statutes or regulations do not assign the burden of proof to either party.
       Defendants further contend that their internal process to determine whether an
       overpayment has occurred and notification of an overpayment to the recipient is
       not a proceeding that initiates an action. Rather, it is the benefit recipient’s request
       of an appeal that is the affirmative step that starts the action.

¶ 51       Defendants rely on Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005), for the
       proposition that, where the relevant statute does not allocate the burden of proof,
       the default rule is that the party who initiates the action carries the burden.

¶ 52       Defendants contend that Schaffer supports their position that SNAP
       overpayment collection procedures implicitly place the burden on the recipient of
       the benefit, rather than the Department. Defendants point out that in Schaffer the
       United States Supreme Court explained that placing the burden of proof on an

                                                - 12 -
       agency assumes that “every [agency action] is invalid until the [agency]
       demonstrates that it is not.” Id. at 59. The Court rejected this assumption, reasoning
       that “Congress appears to have presumed instead that, if the [agency’s] procedural
       requirements are respected, [individuals] will prevail when they have legitimate
       grievances.” Id. at 60. Thus, the Court determined that the plaintiffs bore the burden
       of persuasion regarding the essential aspects of their claims. Id. at 57.

¶ 53       Defendants maintain that Illinois law follows this default rule, regardless of
       whether the party initiating the administrative appeal seeking relief from the
       agency’s action either (1) first claimed and was denied a benefit or privilege or
       (2) had a government agency revoke or suspend an existing benefit or privilege.
       We disagree.

¶ 54       Defendants’ reliance on Schaffer is misplaced. In Schaffer, the Court explained
       the difference between the burden of persuasion, i.e., which party loses if the
       evidence is closely balanced, and the burden of production, i.e., which party bears
       the obligation to come forward with the evidence at different points in the
       proceeding. Id. The Court explained that its decision governed the burden of
       persuasion. Id. at 56.

¶ 55       The Schaffer Court determined that the case concerned the burden of persuasion
       because the ALJ deemed the evidence in “ ‘equipoise.’ ” Id. at 55. The Court
       explicitly stated that it would “hold no more than we must to resolve the case at
       hand.” Id. at 62. The Court found that the burden of persuasion in an administrative
       hearing challenging an individual education program is properly placed upon the
       party seeking relief, whether that is the parent on behalf of the disabled child or the
       school district. Id. The parties in the case before us are in a different procedural
       posture.

¶ 56       In the case at bar, Chaudhary’s application for benefits had been approved, and
       she had been receiving SNAP benefits for herself and her three children. The
       Department later initiated proceedings to recover alleged overpayments made to
       Chaudhary. The Department, through notification of a change in mailing address
       for Ramzan, became aware that two recipients were using the same mailing address.
       With this information, the Department made the decision to initiate an
       investigation, refer the results to its BOC, and send notification of overpayment to
       Chaudhary. We find that the Department’s mailing of its notice of overpayment to

                                               - 13 -
       Chaudhary on August 7, 2019, and informing her “You Are Responsible For
       Repaying This SNAP Overpayment” is the act by the Department that initiated this
       action. We also agree with the appellate court that the posture of this case—
       divesting an existing recipient of her benefits and the Department never designating
       Chaudhary as the plaintiff—falls within the default rule. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364,
       ¶ 48.

¶ 57      We next address defendants’ reliance on Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520
       (2004), People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326 (1988), and Smoke N Stuff v. City of Chicago,
       2015 IL App (1st) 140936, for the proposition that the party challenging the
       agency’s determinations is the party who bears the burden during the administrative
       proceedings. These cases do not support defendants’ position.

¶ 58       In Arvia, this court placed the burden of proof on a driver contesting a license
       suspension where the suspension was required by statute and the State provided an
       administrative hearing process to challenge the suspension. Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at
       540. This was necessary, as the burden of proof at the administrative hearing was
       provided for by the Code. Id. at 542 (citing 92 Ill. Adm. Code 1001.620 (2003)
       (zero tolerance petitioner carries the burden of proof)). Thus, the suspension
       occurred by operation of law rather than government action. Id.

¶ 59       Similarly, in Orth, a driver was contesting the summary suspension of his
       driver’s license, and the court placed the burden on the driver. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at
       337. This court addressed the legislative intent of the statute providing recission
       only if the motorist took the positive step of making a written request for judicial
       hearing in the circuit court. Id. However, again, the summary suspension occurred
       by operation of law. Id.

¶ 60       Smoke N Stuff involved an administrative appeal to contest a government
       entity’s initial action against a business. Smoke N Stuff, 2015 IL App (1st) 140936,
       ¶ 1. The city suspended a business license due to a tax law violation. Id. The court
       in Smoke N Stuff relied on the general rule that, because the business initiated the
       administrative appeal, it bore the burden of proof at the hearing to restore its license.
       Id. ¶ 15.

¶ 61       The distinguishing factor, as defendants acknowledge, is that the burden was
       assigned by local ordinance where the municipal code provided that the notice

                                                - 14 -
       constituted a prima facie case. See id. Thus, the code clearly indicated that the
       burden was on the party challenging the allegations in the notice.

¶ 62       In addition, the court in Smoke N Stuff, in applying the general rule, relied on
       Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497 (2006) (per
       curiam). Marconi involved a plaintiff police officer who took the initial step of
       applying for pension disability benefits, was denied them by the Board, and then
       appealed the denial. Id. at 500. This court stated specifically in Marconi, “[a]s the
       applicant for disability pension benefits, plaintiff had the burden of proof to
       establish his entitlement to either *** pension.” Id. at 536.

¶ 63       We observe that there is a distinction between a party who appeals a benefit
       denial on application and a party who appeals and challenges an agency’s
       determination to divest the party of a benefit the party already receives. Id. Thus,
       Arvia, Orth, and Smoke N Stuff do not help us determine the party with the burden
       in a case where a party challenges an agency’s determination of an overpayment of
       benefits. Accordingly, we find defendants’ reliance on those cases is misplaced.

¶ 64       We, however, find the reasoning in Petrovic v. Department of Employment
       Security, 2016 IL 118562, to be instructive in the present case. In Petrovic, an
       employee was advised that her employment was terminated because of her
       misconduct. Id. ¶ 5. She filed for unemployment, and the employer filed a protest.
       Id. ¶ 6. The unemployment claims adjuster denied the benefits. Id. ¶ 7. On appeal
       to the board of employment security, the denial was affirmed. Id. ¶ 9. On review by
       the circuit court, the decision was overturned. Id. ¶ 10. The Department of
       Employment Security, the board of review, and the Director of Employment
       Security appealed, and the appellate court reversed the circuit court, reaffirming the
       board of review’s denial. Id. ¶ 11.

¶ 65        The Petrovic court addressed which party carried the burden of proving an
       employee’s disqualification due to misconduct. Id. ¶ 28. This court observed that
       the appellate court has consistently held that the burden of establishing an
       employee’s disqualification rests upon the employer who alleges that the employee
       was discharged for misconduct. Id. (citing cases). The court explained that, while
       it is true that a claimant bears the burden of establishing her initial eligibility for
       unemployment insurance benefits, this does not mean that an employee must prove
       the absence of a disqualifying event. Id. In the court’s view, there was no reason to

                                               - 15 -
       change the well-established rule that an employer who asserts an employee’s
       disqualification for benefits based on misconduct has the burden of proving such
       misconduct. Id.

¶ 66       Similarly, Chaudhary, as a SNAP recipient, having been previously approved
       and awarded SNAP benefits, was not required to prove the absence of an
       overpayment. Rather, the Department, which asserted Chaudhary’s erroneous
       receipt of SNAP benefits in excess of her household maximum, initiated the action
       by notification and was required to carry the burden of proving such overpayment.
       See id..

¶ 67       In support, we also find case law addressing the burden of proof in Social
       Security overpayment determinations instructive. Like SNAP benefit recipients,
       recipients of federal funds from the Social Security Administration are a vulnerable
       populace. In addition, the Social Security Act also does not designate which party
       bears the burden of establishing an overpayment and the amount of the
       overpayment. 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2018).

¶ 68       In Wilkening v. Barnhart, 139 Fed. App’x 715, 715 (7th Cir. 2005), the Social
       Security Administration (Administration) informed Wilkening that the
       Administration had overpaid her disability benefits. Wilkening pursued an
       administrative appeal, which found evidence of the overpayment. Id. at 717. She
       then sought judicial review. Id. The court concluded that the burden of proving the
       existence and amount of an overpayment should rest with the Administration. Id.

¶ 69       In McCarthy v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Cannuni v.
       Schweiker, 740 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 1984), and United States v. Smith, 482 F.2d
       1120, 1124 (8th Cir. 1973)), the court observed that, although the Social Security
       Act does not designate which party bears the burden of establishing the fact and
       amount of overpayments, each circuit to consider the issue has held that the
       Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) has this burden. The court joined
       these circuits and held that the Commissioner bears the burden of proving the fact
       and amount of overpayment. Id.

¶ 70        As set forth above, we find that where the statute is silent the default rule applies
       in administrative proceedings to divest a recipient’s benefit, such that the party
       initiating the action carries the burden. Here, the Department initiated the action by

                                                 - 16 -
       sending Chaudhary a notification of overpayment and informing her that she was
       responsible for repaying the $21,821 SNAP overpayment. Accordingly, we hold
       that the Department carries the burden of proof in overpayment proceedings.

¶ 71                  2. The Code, Including the Appeal Process, Does Not
                      Implicitly Vitiate the Department’s Burden of Proof

¶ 72       Defendants contend that the Code, as a whole, implicitly places the burden of
       proof on Chaudhary to prove the Department’s determination was incorrect. In
       support, defendants primarily rely on the appeal process and its provisions to show
       that Chaudhary carries the burden of proof.

¶ 73        Defendants assert that the Code provisions relating to SNAP overpayment
       collection procedures are in direct contrast to provisions relating to disqualifying a
       recipient from SNAP benefits altogether for an intentional violation. Defendants
       point out that, in a determination of intentional violation, the Department must
       initiate the administrative proceeding pursuant to section 14.300. 89 Ill. Adm. Code
       14.300 (2001). Further, the Code requires the Department to prove by clear and
       convincing evidence that an intentional violation occurred. Id. § 14.340.
       Defendants argue that it is clear that the legislature placed the burden on the
       Department in disqualification hearings but did not show such an intent in the
       SNAP overpayment collection process.

¶ 74        However, we find important distinctions in the Code’s reference to a suspected
       intentional violation of the program requiring the disqualification of a recipient and
       the Department’s overpayment collection process that divests a portion of the
       recipient’s benefits. First, regarding a disqualification due to an intentional
       violation of the program, section 14.300 provides that the Department may refer
       cases of suspected intentional violation for criminal prosecution. Id. § 14.300.
       Second, at a disqualification hearing, disqualification will only occur if there is
       clear and convincing evidence as determined by the hearing officer that the
       household member intentionally violated the program. Id. §§ 14.340, 14.370.
       Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the
       trier of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question, and proof by a
       preponderance of the evidence means that the trier of fact must believe that it is
       more likely than not that the evidence establishes the proposition in question. In re

                                               - 17 -
       Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2010). An evidentiary standard that is greater
       than the preponderance is required to reduce the risk of an erroneous
       disqualification. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 361-62 (2004) (finding that, where the
       interests at stake are substantial, a higher burden than a preponderance is required,
       and in those cases a clear and convincing standard is imposed).

¶ 75       We note that in the determination of an overpayment and subsequent divestment
       of a portion of the benefit there are no possible criminal implications. Further, the
       standard of proof, as the ALJ informed Chaudhary, was the preponderance of the
       evidence rather than the more exacting standard of clear and convincing evidence
       for disqualification. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.340, 14.370 (2001).

¶ 76       It is clear that the legislature was aware of the substantial result of a full
       disqualification from the program and required the heightened burden prior to
       disqualification. Yet we see no intent, either implicitly or explicitly, that the
       legislature intended to place the burden of proof in overpayment proceedings on a
       vulnerable population such as SNAP recipients. See Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶ 10
       (finding that in construing a statute it is proper to consider the reason for the law,
       the problem sought to be remedied, the goals to be achieved, and the consequences
       of construing the statute one way or another). Accordingly, defendants’ arguments
       regarding the relevant provisions of disqualification and divestment of a benefit do
       not support their contention.

¶ 77       We now turn to defendants’ assertion that the appeal provisions of the Code
       also implicitly provide that Chaudhary, as the one who is appealing the
       Department’s determination, carries the burden of proof. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.10
       (2001). Defendants rely on section 14.22(a), which provides that “[t]he appellant
       shall have the opportunity to: (1) [p]resent evidence and witnesses in the appellant’s
       behalf” and “(2) [r]efute testimony or other evidence and cross-examine
       witnesses.” Id. § 14.22(a). In defendants’ view, the fact that section 14.22(a) gives
       the appellant a right to affirmatively present evidence and witnesses and to cross-
       examine witnesses implies that the burden of proof rests with the benefit recipient
       who is appealing the Department’s overpayment determination. Defendants further
       maintain that section 14.60, which provides that the Department may collect an
       overpayment with no prove-up if an appeal does not proceed, also implies that the
       Department does not bear the initial burden of proof. Id. § 14.60.

                                               - 18 -
¶ 78       Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the language in sections 14.22(a) and 14.60
       does not vitiate the Department’s burden of proof. Rather, sections 14.22(a) and
       14.60 define the contours of the appeal process, which is the only opportunity for a
       benefit recipient to challenge the Department’s SNAP overpayment determination.
       Nothing in the language of the statutes indicates or implies that the appeal process
       alleviates the Department’s burden of proof.

¶ 79        In addition, defendants fail to acknowledge that section 165.10 provides
       specifically that “[t]he Illinois Department of Human Services (Department)
       initiates action to recover overpayments.” (Emphasis added.) 89 Ill. Adm. Code
       165.10 (2002). Thus, the plain language of the Code refutes defendants’ contention
       that Chaudhary’s appeal initiated the action and implicitly placed the burden on
       her. See Robinson, 2022 IL 127236, ¶ 17 (finding that the most reliable indicator
       of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and
       ordinary meaning). In fact, this section of the Code, together with the Department’s
       own assertion that the burden falls on the party who initiated the action, confirms
       the burden rests on the Department.

¶ 80       Further, although focusing on different administrative codes, we find Scott v.
       Department of Commerce & Community Affairs, 84 Ill. 2d 42 (1981), to be
       instructive. In Scott, this court held that when the appellant is challenging an agency
       determination to divest a benefit, the burden of proof belongs to the agency. Id. at
       53. The Scott court observed that the Department of Commerce and Community
       Affairs (Department of Commerce) misconceived the purpose and intent of the
       hearing provided by the Housing Authorities Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 67½, ¶ 4)
       and the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 127, ¶ 1010).
       Scott, 84 Ill. 2d at 52. The court noted that the Department of Commerce interpreted
       the relevant “statutory provisions as requiring only that the Department [of
       Commerce] inform the commissioners of the reasons why it proposes their removal;
       the commissioners are then entitled to a hearing at which they bear the burden of
       establishing the absence of cause for their removal.” Id.

¶ 81       The Scott court recognized that the Department of Commerce overlooked
       relevant provisions of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, which impose
       upon the Department of Commerce a greater obligation in contested cases, under
       which the rules of evidence in civil cases would be followed and a party would be

                                               - 19 -
       allowed to conduct cross-examination. Id. at 53. The court determined that implicit
       in the right of cross-examination is the requirement that there be witnesses and
       testimony presented. Id. The court also determined that the application of the rules
       of evidence in civil cases imposes upon the Department of Commerce the
       obligation to establish, in the first instance, a prima facie case. Id. The court
       explained that Illinois courts have uniformly enforced the rule in administrative
       agency cases that the moving party has the burden of proof. Id.

¶ 82       Thus, we reject defendants’ contention that the Code, and specifically the
       appeal process, implicitly placed the burden of proof on Chaudhary. Similarly, as
       in Scott, here, the Code provided for witnesses, testimony, and cross-examination
       and that the Department, in the first instance, initiated the action. Accordingly, we
       find that the Department carried the burden to present a prima facie case of the
       SNAP overpayment determination and maintained that burden throughout the
       appeal process. See id.; 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.23 (2001) (requiring that a hearing be
       conducted in a manner best calculated to conform to substantial justice).

¶ 83                          3. The Department Is the Entity With
                                  Access to Relevant Information

¶ 84       We next address defendants’ argument that, because Chaudhary had access to
       relevant information as to where her ex-husband, Ramzan, lived during the
       overpayment period, the burden of proof was properly placed on her by the ALJ.
       We disagree.

¶ 85       Defendants contend that Chaudhary was in a better position than the
       Department to have information specific to where Ramzan resided. Defendants also
       point out that the regulations provided Chaudhary with prehearing protection that
       included a meeting with a representative to go over the Department’s evidence to
       understand the reasons for its determination. See 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.11, 14.12
       (2001).

¶ 86       We observe, that in the case at bar, the record shows that the notification and
       the prehearing meeting only informed Chaudhary that the Department found that
       she and her “husband” should have been on the same account for SNAP benefits.
       She was not aware that the Department would be relying on evidence regarding her

                                              - 20 -
       and Ramzan’s mailing addresses during the overpayment period. Thus, as far as
       this prehearing protection is concerned, it failed Chaudhary.

¶ 87        In addressing who has access to relevant information, we first note that the
       Department is responsible for determining that an overpayment has occurred and it
       obviously has superior access to the records it used to make this determination. 89
       Ill. Adm. Code 165.10 (2002). To make this determination, the Department has a
       myriad of public resources that include access to the Illinois Department of
       Employment Security, Social Security Administration, United States Department
       of Labor, and Internal Revenue Service records. The Department also has internal
       provisions that allow the Department to conduct a yearly state income tax match,
       where the Department’s records are matched with the Illinois Department of
       Revenue records to obtain possible sources of unreported income. 89 Ill. Adm.
       Code 117.90 (2013). In addition, the Code provides the Department with the ability
       to match its records with new hire information reported by employers to discover
       unreported earned income of persons receiving assistance. 89 Ill. Adm. Code
       117.91 (2020). On the other hand, benefit recipients have no such access to public
       sources of information and, thus, are at an obvious disadvantage.

¶ 88        Second, the Department also has expertise compared to the general SNAP
       population, including Chaudhary, who by nature of the program are those with
       disabilities; who are elderly; or may have limited education, resources, access to
       representation, and English proficiency. See Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities,
       Illinois Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (Apr. 25, 2022), https://www.
       cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/snap_factsheet_illinois.pdf        [https://
       perma.cc/NN6F-H6RE]. As noted by the amici curiae, many SNAP recipients who
       file an appeal are unrepresented at the hearing. See The Justice Gap: The Unmet
       Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans, Legal Services Corp. (Apr. 2022),
       https://justicegap.lsc.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ANX6-WDVE]; Lyz Riley Sanders
       et al., Colo. Ctr. On Law and Policy, Barriers, Errors, & Due Process Denied, at
       16 (Mar. 2022), https://cclponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SNAP-
       Administrative-Hearing-Report-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NSL-4WJQ]. SNAP
       administrative hearings are formal legal proceedings that occur on record and
       involve the submission of evidence, examination and cross-examination of
       witnesses, and opening and closing statements. Moreover, they involve the legal
       framework of federal and state statutes and regulations and policies that govern the

                                              - 21 -
       administrative hearing process. In these proceedings, the Department is represented
       by an appeals coordinator, who has great experience and knowledge of the SNAP
       program rules and of Department policy manual provisions. Indeed, here, Chairez,
       representing the Department, has the title “Executive I” with over 13 years of
       experience, while Chaudhary appeared pro se. This imbalance in representation and
       advantage to the Department supports our determination that the Department is the
       entity with access to relevant information. See 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 190 (Nov.
       2022 Update) (the party with greater expertise and access to relevant information
       should bear the evidentiary burdens of production of evidence and persuasion).

¶ 89       Third, as observed by the appellate court, the Department would not have to
       expand its prehearing procedures. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364, ¶ 54. Under current
       procedures, the Department must first make an overpayment determination before
       there can be any appeal. Id. Thus, at the appeal hearing, it need not necessarily do
       more than present and authenticate the relevant information and evidence from its
       overpayment determination. Id.; see also Petrovic, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 28 (finding
       that placing the burden on the employer, rather than the employee, thus imposes
       the burden of proof on the entity who has access to the relevant evidence); Hooper
       v. Talbot, 343 Ill. 590, 593 (1931) (determining that it is reasonable and just to
       impose the burden of proof on the individual who is in possession of such proof,
       rather than requiring the other party to prove a negative).

¶ 90       Accordingly, we find that, as the Department is the party that initiated the action
       and the party responsible for determining the overpayment, it is the entity with
       access to relevant information. Consequently, we hold that the Department carries
       the burden of proof in SNAP overpayment proceedings. See Petrovic, 2016 IL
       118562, ¶ 28; Scott, 84 Ill. 2d at 53. Finally, to the extent that Smoke N Stuff, 2015
       IL App (1st) 140936, suggests that the burden of proof lies with the recipient
       beneficiary, it is now overruled.

¶ 91      We need not address the parties’ due process concerns. Our holding that the
       burden of proof was with the Department negates the question of whether
       Chaudhary was entitled to notice on that issue. Further, as acknowledged by the
       appellate court, allowing Chaudhary time to supplement the record provided her
       with the opportunity to respond, thus providing a fair hearing on her administrative

                                               - 22 -
       appeal. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364, ¶ 58.

¶ 92                   C. The ALJ’s and the Secretary’s Decisions Were
                         Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

¶ 93       We next address defendants’ assertion that the ALJ’s and the Secretary’s
       decisions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was
       overwhelming evidence in the record to support the finding that Ramzan lived with
       Chaudhary at the White Oak address during the overpayment period. Defendants
       posit that, at the administrative hearing, Chairez authenticated and explained the
       evidence that Ramzan lived at the White Oak address. Defendants contend that the
       evidence sufficiently showed how the Department calculated the SNAP
       overpayment amount, thus establishing that Chaudhary received an overpayment
       and was responsible for repaying $21,821. Defendants further contend that
       Chaudhary’s documentary evidence simply conflicted with the Department’s and
       that the Secretary properly weighed the conflicts in the Department’s favor. We
       disagree.

¶ 94                                 1. Standard of Review

¶ 95       The reviewing court reviews the decision of the administrative agency. Wade
       v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485, 504 (2007). The
       Secretary, as the head of the Department, reviewed the ALJ’s decision and made
       the final decision. See 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.70(a) (2001) (“[f]ollowing the hearing,
       a Final Administrative Decision will be made by the Secretary that either upholds
       or does not uphold the appealed action”). The standard of review depends on the
       issue presented, whether it be one of law, one of fact, or one of law and fact. City
       of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204-05 (1998).
       The Secretary’s decision here turned on a question of fact—whether Ramzan lived
       at the White Oak address at the relevant times such that he should have been
       included in Chaudhary’s SNAP account—and is reviewed under the manifest
       weight of the evidence standard. Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s
       Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 234 Ill. 2d 446, 463 (2009). The Secretary’s
       factual findings are prima facie true and correct and will not be disturbed unless
       they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. An administrative agency

                                              - 23 -
       decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite
       conclusion is clearly evident. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional
       Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).

¶ 96                  2. The Secretary’s Confirmation of the Department’s
                        Overpayment Determination Was Not Supported
                                         by the Record

¶ 97       Defendants contend that there was evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s
       and the Secretary’s finding that Ramzan lived with Chaudhary at the White Oak
       address during the relevant time, from May 2015 through December 2017.
       Defendants contend that this determination was established at the administrative
       hearing, where Chairez authenticated and explained the evidence and by the records
       showing how the Department calculated the overpayment amount. Defendants take
       issue with the fact that Chaudhary produced much of her evidence after the
       administrative hearing when she had gained the benefit of the Department’s
       testimony and evidence and the ALJ’s comments. Furthermore, Chaudhary’s
       documentary evidence conflicted with the Department’s, and it was the Secretary’s
       prerogative to weigh the posthearing submissions and the conflicts in the evidence
       in defendants’ favor. Finally, defendants maintain that, instead of according
       deference to the Secretary’s findings, the circuit court improperly reweighed the
       evidence and the appellate court repeated that mistake by conducting its own
       analysis of the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the Secretary’s.

¶ 98       Although it is true that the Secretary’s decisions should be afforded
       considerable weight, they are not immune from review. The Kouzoukas court noted
       that, “ ‘[e]ven under the manifest weight standard applicable in this instance, the
       deference we afford the administrative agency’s decision is not boundless.’ ”
       Kouzoukas, 234 Ill. 2d at 465 (quoting Wade, 226 Ill. 2d at 507). This court has
       observed that, when reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, we may put
       aside any findings that are clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
       Such is the case here.

¶ 99       Defendants relied on the Department’s evidence allegedly showing Ramzan
       resided at the White Oak address, including SNAP payments to that address to
       Chaudhary and Ramzan on separate accounts from May 2015 to December 2017,

                                              - 24 -
        post office verification of the address as Ramzan’s mailing address dated in 2018,
        state records showing both Chaudhary and Ramzan with vehicles registered there
        in 2018, registration of Yasmar, Inc., with Ramzan and Chaudhary as officers filed
        with the Illinois Secretary of State in 2019, property records showing that Ramzan
        had owned the property in 2004 and 2006, and Social Security records showing the
        receipt of benefits for Ramzan’s child from a prior marriage.

¶ 100        In addressing the Department’s evidence, we find that the post office
        verification contains no evidence of where Ramzan lived during the overpayment
        period. The verification request was a blank form that was sent by the Department
        to the United States postmaster, who completed it on February 9, 2018, and returned
        it to the Department. The verification specified that Mr. Ramzan currently receives
        mail at the White Oak address. It contains no information about where Mr. Ramzan
        received mail at any other time.

¶ 101       The vehicle registrations that the Department relied upon are also from outside
        the overpayment period, as the registrations for the vehicles are dated February 8,
        2018. Further, nothing on the face of the documents indicates the source of the
        information. In fact, Chairez testified, “I don’t even know where they get this
        information because I’m not familiar with the system that has this stuff.”

¶ 102       The Department also submitted documents related to Ramzan’s company,
        Yasmar, Inc., that purported to support a finding that Ramzan resided at the White
        Oak address during the overpayment period. First, Chairez testified that he had
        received those documents from BOC, but they were not otherwise identified.
        Second, the documents were dated 2019 and 2020, outside of the overpayment
        period. Third, they were internally inconsistent, as one contained the White Oak
        address, another contained an address in Bloomingdale, Illinois, and a third
        contained an address in Glendale Heights, Illinois. All that can be gleaned from this
        evidence is that, at some point in time, Ramzan and Chaudhary were listed as
        officers in the corporation and it was registered at the White Oak address.

¶ 103       The Department introduced documents referred to as property records
        apparently showing that Ramzan once owned White Oak. There is nothing in these
        documents that is remotely close to the time frame of the overpayment, as the
        records are from 10 years prior to the overpayment period. Further, nothing on the
        face of the documents indicated their source. Indeed, the ALJ asked “But you’re

                                               - 25 -
        not sure where this document was generated from?” Chairez answered, “That’s
        correct. I don’t see the source.” Here, we find that the Department’s evidence was
        not sufficiently authenticated and does not support the determination that Ramzan
        resided at the White Oak address during the overpayment period.

¶ 104       Next, we observe that the Secretary’s final administrative decision stated that
        the “Department submitted income documents and calculations and an abundance
        of state/government records to show that Adult A (Ramzan) was residing at
        Address A (White Oak) and that an overpayment occurred.” The Secretary did not
        acknowledge or address Chaudhary’s subsequent submissions to the ALJ.

¶ 105       Thus, the record supports the conclusion that the ALJ and the Secretary relied
        solely on evidence the Department submitted, which was from outside the
        overpayment period. The Department maintains that the investigation, including its
        search for evidence, naturally took place after the overpayment period ended.
        Hence, those records were printed or produced on a date after the overpayment
        period but “could still reflect Ramzan’s activity or status during the overpayment
        period.”

¶ 106       However, we find that, no matter when it was obtained, the evidence still needs
        to show that Ramzan resided at the White Oak address during the overpayment
        period. Any inference that might be drawn from evidence outside of the
        overpayment period about where Ramzan lived during the overpayment period was
        unsupported by the evidence in the record.

¶ 107       To compound these errors, the Secretary ignored the Department’s own
        evidence showing that Ramzan did not live with Chaudhary but only used the White
        Oak address for mail. A Department summary page for Ramzan’s account lists
        Morton Road as his residence and White Oak as his mailing address. In fact, the
        Department’s own document established that the Department keeps both a mailing
        address and a residential address, even if the same, for all recipients. In addition,
        the Department’s evidence included a copy of Ramzan’s driver’s license from the
        overpayment period, which listed the Morton Road address.

¶ 108      We note that Chaudhary submitted an abundance of evidence that supported her
        argument that Ramzan did not reside at the White Oak address during the
        overpayment period. The documents included Ramzan’s statement that he resided

                                               - 26 -
        at the Morton Road address, as well as other evidence listing the Morton Road
        address, including a residential lease from 2013-20, a state of Illinois driver’s
        license issued to Ramzan on August 14, 2013, with an expiration date of June 19,
        2017; an approval letter to Ramzan from the Benjamin School District for free meal
        services for his daughter for the 2015-16 school year; copies of envelopes with
        United States postal stamps showing delivery to Ramzan in 2017; and electricity
        bills addressed to Ramzan in 2013 and 2016.

¶ 109       We reject defendants’ argument that Chaudhary’s evidence was entitled to less
        weight because it was submitted after the administrative hearing. The Department’s
        overpayment determination notification stated that the reason for the overpayment
        was that Chaudhary and Ramzan were married, not whether Ramzan was living at
        White Oak. Contrary to its assertion, before the appeal, Chaudhary was not aware
        that the issue was anything other than that Ramzan was listed as her “husband” in
        the Department’s notification. It is not surprising that Chaudhary’s evidence
        revolved around her divorce from Ramzan, thus establishing that they were not
        husband and wife, after 2012. As noted by the appellate court, considering the
        notification described in error that Ramzan was Chaudhary’s husband, it was proper
        for the ALJ to allow Chaudhary to respond to the Department’s evidence and
        arguments by supplementing the record after the hearing. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364,
        ¶ 68. Chairez, representing the Department, did not object.

¶ 110        It is apparent from the record that the Secretary did not consider any of this
        evidence, as established by the Secretary’s written decision. Although the
        Secretary’s final decision is due considerable deference, the failure to discuss the
        substance of Chaudhary’s supplemental evidence was unreasonable, and her
        subsequent decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In addition,
        we note the competent and corroborated evidence that Ramzan lived at the Morton
        Road address. Thus, the appellate court did not reweigh the evidence but, rather,
        properly set aside a decision that was unsupported by any competent evidence,
        meaning that the opposite conclusion was clearly evident. See Abrahamson, 153
        Ill. 2d at 88 (administrative agency decision is against the manifest weight of the
        evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident). We find that the
        evidence is entirely consistent with both Chaudhary’s and Ramzan’s assertions that
        he used the White Oak address only as his mailing address and that he did not reside

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        there between May 2015 and December 2017.

¶ 111                  3. The Secretary’s Credibility Determination Was
                          Unreasonable and Not Supported by the Record

¶ 112       Defendants contend that the Secretary’s determination that Chaudhary’s
        testimony lacked credibility should be affirmed because it was established by the
        record and deserves substantial deference. This contention is without merit, and we
        reject the Secretary’s credibility determination.

¶ 113       The Secretary found that Chaudhary’s testimony “lack[ed] credibility,” noting
        that “[i]t is highly implausible” that she did not know that Ramzan once owned and
        lived at the White Oak address, “it is highly unlikely” that others collected the mail
        every day and that she was “clueless” or “completely oblivious” to the fact that
        Ramzan got his mail there, and her testimony that she and Ramzan never lived
        together during their marriage contradicted her written statement that they had not
        lived together “since” their divorce.

¶ 114       Defendants assert that the ALJ, who heard Chaudhary testify, found that she
        was not credible and that the Secretary agreed with that finding. But the record
        reveals that the ALJ made no credibility finding. Thus, the ALJ did not make a
        specific credibility determination for the Secretary to adopt.

¶ 115       Second, the Secretary’s credibility determinations were based upon immaterial
        discrepancies, such as whether Ramzan had owned and resided at the White Oak
        address prior to 2012, whether Chaudhary and Ramzan had lived together prior to
        2012, and whether someone other than Chaudhary collected and disbursed the mail
        at the White Oak address. The answer to these questions is not relevant to the
        determination of whether Ramzan resided at the White Oak address during the
        overpayment period.

¶ 116       Third, Chaudhary’s testimony was consistent in that she asserted from the
        beginning that she was not married, that she had a household of four individuals,
        and that Ramzan did not live with her but resided elsewhere during the alleged
        overpayment period. Moreover, minor discrepancies in a witness’s testimony are
        not unusual (In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 438 (2009)) and do not destroy the

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        witness’s credibility. See Longanecker v. East Moline School District No. 37, 2020
        IL App (3d) 150890, ¶ 45 (finding an inability to recall minor events that took place
        nearly six months prior to a hearing did not detract from detailed and credible
        testimony about events that occurred that same day).

¶ 117       Again, although the Secretary’s final decision is due considerable deference,
        the credibility determination by the Secretary was based on testimony on
        nonmaterial issues and was not supported by the record. Accordingly, we find that
        the Secretary’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. See
        Kouzoukas, 234 Ill. 2d at 465 (when reviewing an administrative agency’s decision,
        this court may put aside any findings that are clearly against the manifest weight of
        the evidence (citing Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department v. Illinois Human
        Rights Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 125, 142 (2009))).

¶ 118                          D. Defendants’ Challenges to Portions
                                  of the Appellate Court’s Decision

¶ 119       As a final matter, we note that defendants take issue with portions of the
        appellate court’s analysis and argue that they were based on improper
        considerations. We find it unnecessary to address these challenges. Our task is to
        review the judgment of the appellate court, regardless of whether the reasoning it
        employed was correct. Vaughn v. City of Carbondale, 2016 IL 119181, ¶ 44 (citing
        Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 97 (1995)); In re Rita P.,
        2014 IL 115798, ¶ 51. For the reasons set forth above, we find that the appellate
        court made the right decision when it affirmed the circuit court’s reversal of the
        Secretary’s final administrative decision.

¶ 120                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 121        We are mindful that care should be taken to ensure against an erroneous
        deprivation of critical nutritional benefits that jeopardize the health, wellness, and
        stability of low-income state residents. Thus, we find that, where the Department
        initiates an action to divest a SNAP recipient of benefits and the statute is silent as
        to the burden of proof, the default rule applies. Accordingly, we hold that the burden
        of proof lies with the Department in overpayment cases and remains with the

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        Department throughout the appeal process. We find that the Secretary’s final
        administrative decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence because it
        was unsupported by competent evidence and the opposite conclusion was clearly
        evident—that Ramzan did not live at the White Oak address during the
        overpayment period. We also find that the Secretary’s credibility determination was
        against the manifest weight of the evidence. Consequently, we hold that the
        appellate court did not err when it affirmed the circuit court’s judgment reversing
        the Secretary’s final administrative decision.

¶ 122      Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 123      Circuit court judgment affirmed.

¶ 124      Department decision reversed.

¶ 125      JUSTICES ROCHFORD and O’BRIEN took no part in the consideration or
        decision of this case.

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