Court Opinion

ID: 9704510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:37:46.578211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.142667
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the trial court’s decision to deny injunctive relief was an abuse of discretion. The majority bases this conclusion upon its finding that the circuit court’s finding that defendants’ use of their property was consistent with the restrictive covenants was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Initially, I note that many of the cases which discuss the standard of review when dealing with injunctive relief are imprecise in the application of the abuse of discretion and manifest weight of the evidence standards. Millard, cited by the majority, holds that the trial court is vested with discretion to grant or deny injunctive relief, that the role of the reviewing court is to determine whether the trial court’s findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and that those findings should be set aside only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Continental Cablevision, also cited by the majority, holds that the test of whether the trial court abused its discretion is whether its decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Steel City National Bank (1992), 234 Ill. App. 3d 48, 599 N.E.2d 1283, the court held that because the trial court’s decision on whether to grant injunctive relief should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, the reviewing court’s role was limited to determining whether the trial court’s decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Other cases use similar language when setting forth the standard of review. (See Lyle R. Jager Agency, Inc. v. Steward (1993), 253 Ill. App. 3d 631, 625 N.E.2d 397; In re Marriage of Joerger (1991), 221 Ill. App. 3d 400, 581 N.E.2d 1219; Bryant v. Village of Sherman (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 583, 561 N.E.2d 1320; Jones v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 793, 469 N.E.2d 393.) The two standards are not the same, however, and the particular standard to be applied depends upon the procedural posture of the case. Under the abuse of discretion standard the question is whether the lower court acted arbitrarily or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law. (Graber v. Badegian (1993), 242 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 611 N.E.2d 1291.) The manifest weight of the evidence standard requires the reviewing court to review all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and will reverse the lower court only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the fact finder’s finding is palpably erroneous and wholly unwarranted. (Tedrowe v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 438, 511 N.E.2d 798.) More deference is shown the lower court under the abuse of discretion standard than the manifest weight standard. Whether the abuse of discretion standard or the manifest weight standard applies depends upon whether the issue of the injunction results in the determination of the merits of the case. The application of the abuse of discretion standard is predicated on the theory that a preliminary injunction is not a final adjudication on the merits. (Witter v. Buchanan (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 273, 476 N.E.2d 1123.) Where the issuance of a preliminary order effectively decides the merits of the case, however, a reviewing court should consider whether the trial court’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence and whether the court erred legally. Hess v. Clarcor, Inc. (1992), 237 Ill. App. 3d 434, 603 N.E.2d 1262. In the present case the parties agreed and stipulated to the court’s consideration of plaintiffs’ request for both a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction, and it was the permanent injunction the court denied. This was a final adjudication on the merits, and therefore the manifest weight of the evidence standard is applicable. I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The restrictive covenants seek to preserve the residential character of the neighborhood but also permit residents to do professional work out of their home. Whether the work defendants are doing in their home results in such disruption as to destroy the residential nature of the neighborhood is a question of fact. Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendants, the prevailing party, I do not believe that it can be said that a conclusion opposite to that drawn by the trial court is clearly apparent, and therefore the court’s conclusion was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.