Court Opinion

ID: 9695970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:32:34.060992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:17.696659
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the judgment affirming the murder conviction and death sentence in this case. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s reasoning in Part I of the opinion.
Part I of the opinion addresses the first issue raised by Johnson. He challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion requesting that defense witnesses be per*543mitted to testify regarding Johnson’s “diminished capacity” to commit first degree murder. The majority upholds the trial court’s ruling by citing Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 473 A.2d 903, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984), and Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982), which held that evidence of a criminal defendant’s mental capability, which tends to negate his ability to form the requisite specific intent, is inadmissible during the guilt or innocence phase of a criminal trial. I continue to adhere to the view, expressed by Judge Cole, Judge Davidson and myself in Johnson, 292 Md. at 446-456, 439 A.2d 542, and in Stebbing, 299 Md. at 380-381, 390, 473 A.2d 903, that such evidence is admissible.
In the present case, the record reflects that Johnson’s attorney made a pre-trial motion requesting that he be allowed to present testimony from “doctors on the question of diminished capacity as it relates to the elements of first degree murder.” Counsel merely cited the dissenting opinion in Johnson, supra, 292 Md. at 444, 439 A.2d 542. The trial court, after consideration, denied the motion. Johnson neither renewed his motion at trial, nor made at any time a proffer as to the substance of the testimony which he desired to offer. The record does show, however, that expert testimony was elicited from defense witnesses on direct examination, and from the State’s witnesses on cross examination, concerning all aspects of Johnson’s mental and emotional state. No relevant evidence relating to his mental capability to form the requisite intent was either objected to or precluded from being admitted.
Preliminarily, there is a question as to whether a mere pre-trial motion, with nothing more, would under the circumstances here preserve the point for appeal. Cf., Luce v. United States, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); Funkhouser v. State, 51 Md.App. 16, 440 A.2d 1114, cert. denied, 293 Md. 331 (1982); Ory v. Libersky, 40 Md.App. 151, 389 A.2d 922, cert. denied, 283 Md. 737 (1978).
*544Nevertheless, assuming that the issue can be preserved by a pre-trial motion, it is settled that whenever one is complaining about a trial court’s refusal to admit certain testimony, it is necessary that there be a proffer of what the evidence would have been. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 603, 479 A.2d 1344 (1984); Hooten v. Kenneth B. Mumaw P. & H. Co., 271 Md. 565, 571, 318 A.2d 514 (1974); Keys v. Keys, 251 Md. 247, 250, 247 A.2d 282 (1968). In the present case, at no time either during the making of the pre-trial motion or at trial did Johnson make any proffer, or make any showing on the record, of the nature of the actual testimony which he desired to introduce.
Finally, as previously mentioned, whatever evidence which Johnson may have wished to offer regarding his mental condition appears to have been elicited, without objection or exclusion, during the guilt or innocence phase of the trial.
For the above reasons, I believe that there is no merit to the first issue raised by Johnson.
Judge Cole has authorized me to state that he concurs with the views expressed herein.