Court Opinion

ID: 9676742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:31:41.503639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:50.679078
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
Bluebonnet Savings Bank, FSB argues for the first time on its motion for rehearing that Texas trial courts are required to admit otherwise inadmissible hearsay into evidence if it is a document that was acquired by the offering party as part of an Acquisition Agreement with the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Bluebonnet relies on the D’Oench, Duhme doctrine as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 62 S.Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942). Bluebonnet additionally relies on the cases of Stiles v. Resolution Trust Corp., 831 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no writ); Resolution Trust Corp. v. McCrory, 951 F.2d 68, 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 459, 121 L.Ed.2d 368 (1992); Bowen v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir.1990); and Porras v. Petroplex Sav. Ass’n, 903 F.2d 379, 380-81 (5th Cir.1990).
The D’Oench, Duhme doctrine protects purchasers in such an Acquisition Agreement from secret agreements that are not part of the official record of the depository institution. D’Oench, Duhme & Co., 315 U.S. at 461, 62 S.Ct.-at 681, 86 L.Ed. at 964. We have examined all of the cases cited by Bluebonnet and find that none is authority for Bluebonnet’s expansion of the doctrine to the effect that Texas courts must admit the official records of such institutions into evidence, although they are hearsay, without the offering party authenticating the documents as required by TEX.R.CIV. EVID. 803(6).
We further note that Bluebonnet states in its motion for rehearing that the sponsoring witness, Ms. Scott, testified that the document that Bluebonnet sought to introduce was made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of the facts set out therein. It does not give any citation to the record as to where she so testified. In fact, as we noted in the original opinion, she did not so testify and that is the basis for the opinion. If we were in error in stating that she did not so testify, Bluebonnet should give us the citation to the record as to where such testimony is located.
*537We overrule Bluebonnet’s motion for rehearing.