Court Opinion

ID: 9897257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:20.113617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:24.629952
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Oct 23 2023, 8:45 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas A. Manges                                           Lucy R. Dollens
Manges Law Firm                                            Quarles & Brady LLP
Fort Wayne, Indiana                                        Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                           Kathleen K. Curtis
                                                           Nilan Johnson Lewis
                                                           Minneapolis, MN

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Richard Dolsen, Jr.,                                       October 23, 2023
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CT-945
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Allen Superior
                                                           Court
VeoRide, Inc.,                                             The Honorable Jennifer L.
Appellee-Defendant                                         DeGroote, Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           02D03-2203-CT-103

                                   Opinion by Judge Crone
                                Judges Brown and Felix concur.

Crone, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023                             Page 1 of 11
      Case Summary
[1]   Fort Wayne Fire Department Captain Richard Dolsen, Jr., was injured while

      responding to a fire in a building leased by VeoRide, Inc. Dolsen sued VeoRide

      for negligence. VeoRide moved for summary judgment on the basis that

      Dolsen’s claims were barred by Indiana’s firefighter’s rule, 1 and the trial court

      granted that motion. On appeal, Dolsen argues that the trial court erred. We

      agree, so we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   VeoRide “is a company that rents electric scooters and electric bicycles that are

      powered by lithium batteries.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 59. In 2019, VeoRide

      expressed interest in leasing a building in Fort Wayne from Sweet Real Estate–

      City Center, LLC (Sweet). At that time, the building had no electricity or light

      fixtures, and the only window was on the second floor, which was “sectioned

      off” from the ground floor. Id. at 152. During a walk-through of the building,

      VeoRide regional general manager Benjamin Thomas and Sweet real estate

      broker Tiffany Fries had to use “big flashlights” to be able to see. Id. at 150.

      Thomas asked Sweet to install electricity, light fixtures, and “outlets to charge

      batteries[,]” which was done after VeoRide and Sweet entered into a

      commercial lease agreement in August 2019. Id. at 153. VeoRide used the

      1
          The rule has previously been referred to as the “fireman’s rule.”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023        Page 2 of 11
      building “to store scooters, scooter parts, batteries, battery racks, and battery

      recharging equipment.” Id. at 61.

[3]   On June 11, 2020, one of the batteries ignited and started a fire in the building.

      No VeoRide employees were on the premises at that time. Around 6:00 p.m.,

      Fries received a call from her company’s security chief about the fire, and she

      started driving toward the building. Fries called the fire department and

      VeoRide manager Eric Xayarath, who had already been notified about the fire 2

      and also was en route to the building. Xayarath called Thomas and said that

      “there was a fire” and “the firefighters had been called[.]” Id. at 185. Xayarath

      said “that he would keep [Thomas] posted on kind of next steps what was going

      to go on.” Id.

[4]   Around 6:38 p.m., Dolsen’s unit was dispatched to the fire. Dolsen had never

      been inside the building. He was “equipped with a radio, so any warning sent

      by [Sweet] or [VeoRide] could quickly and easily have been conveyed to

      [him].” Id. at 112. On “many occasions in [his] career, [he had] responded to

      other fires where an owner or tenant at a commercial building [had] warned

      [fire department personnel] about potential dangers inside, including holes in a

      floor.” Id.

      2
       Fries’s deposition suggests that the fire department notified Xayarath about the fire. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2
      at 171.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023                               Page 3 of 11
[5]   Dolsen entered the building through a door, “at which point [he] could not see

      due to lack of light and smoke.” Id. at 112. 3 He “moved around the perimeter of

      the inside of the building … to look for a ventilation opening and electrical

      breaker box by touching and pressing the inside wall to guide [him].” Id. Just

      after he passed a closed door “at the southeast corner of the building, [he]

      extended [his] left arm to press the wall, as [he] had been doing, but contacted

      nothing but air, and fell through an opening in the wall down into what [he]

      later realized was a stairwell.” Id. The wall was composed of bare wooden

      studs, with a gap left by a missing stud. Dolsen “could not see the opening in

      the wall due to the lack of light and the presence of smoke.” Id. Dolsen “fell to

      the bottom of the stairwell” and was injured. Id. Fries and Xayarath arrived at

      the building after the fire was extinguished.

[6]   In March 2022, Dolsen filed a complaint against VeoRide and Sweet, which

      alleged in pertinent part that the fire was caused by “mishandling of the

      batteries[,]” that he should have been warned about the opening in the wall,

      and that “[t]he fault of the Defendants was responsible for causing damages to”

      him. Id. at 34. VeoRide filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that

      Dolsen’s claims were barred by Indiana’s firefighter’s rule. In support of its

      motion, VeoRide designated evidence establishing that its “employees walked

      around and in the area of the absent stud … on a day-to-day basis without any

      3
        VeoRide asserts that “it was only dark in the Building because the lights were inoperable as a result of the
      fire.” Appellee’s Br. at 9 (citing Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 127, 153, 168). The cited pages do not support this
      assertion. The record before us is silent regarding the actual cause of the power outage.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023                                 Page 4 of 11
      injuries occurring[,]” that no employee had “ever fallen through the location of

      the absent stud[,]” and that the wall “was in the same condition on the day of

      the fire as it was on the day VeoRide began occupying the Building on

      September 1, 2019.” Id. at 41. Sweet filed a motion asserting that it was entitled

      to summary judgment because “it had given full possession and control of the

      Building to VeoRide.” Appealed Order at 2. In March 2023, the trial court

      issued an order granting both summary judgment motions, finding that

      Dolsen’s claims were “conclusively barred” by Indiana’s firefighter’s rule. Id. at

      18. Dolsen now appeals that order only as to VeoRide.

      Discussion and Decision
[7]   In reviewing a summary judgment ruling, “we apply the same test as the trial

      court: summary judgment is appropriate only if the designated evidence shows

      there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

      judgment as a matter of law.” Erie Ins. Exch. v. Myron Corp., 212 N.E.3d 174,

      178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing, inter alia, Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). “The moving

      party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of

      material fact as to a determinative issue.” Id. “Our review is limited to those

      facts designated to the trial court, and we construe all facts and reasonable

      inferences drawn from those facts in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. (citing,

      inter alia, Ind. Trial Rule 56(H)). Although “federal practice permits the

      moving party to merely show that the party carrying the burden of proof lacks

      evidence on a necessary element, we impose a more onerous burden: to

      affirmatively ‘negate an opponent’s claim.’” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023      Page 5 of 11
      1003 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644

      N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994)). “Because we review a summary judgment ruling

      de novo, a trial court’s findings and conclusions offer insight into the rationale

      for the court’s judgment and facilitate appellate review but are not binding on

      this court.” Erie Ins., 212 N.E.3d at 178 (italics omitted).

[8]   Dolsen’s claims against VeoRide sound in negligence. “To prevail on a claim of

      negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements: (1) a duty owed by the

      defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) compensable injuries

      proximately caused by the breach.” Shiel Sexton Co. v. Towe, 154 N.E.3d 827,

      832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Whether a duty exists is usually a question of law, but

      sometimes the existence of a duty depends upon underlying facts that require

      resolution by the trier of fact. Yates v. Johnson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 888 N.E.2d

      842, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in

      negligence actions because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and

      are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person.” Severance v. New

      Castle Cmty. Sch. Corp., 75 N.E.3d 541, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

      “This standard is best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id.

      “To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action, the

      defendant must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least

      one of the elements essential to plaintiff’s claim or that the claim is barred by an

      affirmative defense.” Id.

[9]   In its relatively recent restatement of Indiana’s firefighter’s rule, which was

      originally established in 1893, the Indiana Supreme Court explained that the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023        Page 6 of 11
       rule “allows no claim by a professional emergency responder for the negligence

       that creates the emergency to which he or she responds.” Babes Showclub, Jaba,

       Inc. v. Lair, 918 N.E.2d 308, 313-14 (Ind. 2009). Thus, Dolsen has no claim for

       VeoRide’s allegedly negligent handling of the scooter batteries, which allegedly

       started the fire to which he responded.

[10]   That said, pursuant to Babes Showclub, an “emergency responder remains free to

       sue for damages if an injury is caused by negligent or intentional tortious

       conduct separate and apart from the conduct that contributed to the

       emergency.” Id. at 314. “The negligent conduct need not occur after the officer

       arrives on the scene, but must be separate from and independent of the

       negligence that caused the situation necessitating the officer’s presence. Such a

       claim will be subject to the provisions of Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act.” Id.

[11]   Here, Dolsen alleged that VeoRide was also negligent in failing to warn him of

       the danger posed by the gap in the wall next to the stairwell, which he was

       unable to see “due to the lack of light and the presence of smoke.” Appellant’s

       App. Vol. 2 at 112. Clearly, this allegedly negligent conduct is separate from

       and independent of the negligence that caused the situation necessitating

       Dolsen’s presence in VeoRide’s building. “Under Indiana law, the status of a

       person when he or she is injured on the premises of another determines the duty

       owed to that person by the owner of the property.” Henderson v. Reid Hosp.

       Healthcare Servs., 17 N.E.3d 311, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (2015).

       A firefighter is a licensee and therefore “is owed only ‘the duty to refrain from

       willfully or wantonly injuring him or acting in a manner to increase his peril’

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023       Page 7 of 11
       and ‘to warn the licensee of any latent [non-obvious] danger’ of which the

       landowner [or possessor] is aware.” Babes Showclub, 918 N.E.2d at 310 & n.2

       (quoting Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 1991)).

[12]   In its order, the trial court noted that

               VeoRide employees routinely walked by the Wall and Stairwell
               without incurring any injuries. For this reason, it is likely that
               Defendants did not warn Dolsen of the Wall and Stairway
               because Defendants simply did not anticipate them presenting
               any danger to Dolsen; in a normal situation they likely would not
               have presented any danger to Dolsen.

       Appealed Order at 17. But the designated evidence indicates that when Dolsen

       responded to the fire, the building was dark and filled with smoke, and thus the

       gap in the wall and the stairwell, which VeoRide’s employees were aware of,

       were not obvious to him.

[13]   In this situation, we find instructive Section 342 of the Restatement (Second) of

       Torts, which is consistent with Indiana law regarding the duty owed to a

       licensee: 4

               A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused
               to licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if,

               (a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition
               and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm

       4
        Section 342 of the first Restatement of Torts was quoted approvingly by this Court in Wozniczka v. McKean,
       144 Ind. App. 471, 486-87, 247 N.E.2d 215, 223 (1969).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023                             Page 8 of 11
         to such licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or
         realize the danger, and

         (b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe,
         or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved,
         and

         (c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the
         condition and the risk involved.[ 5]

We further find comment h to that section particularly relevant:

         A possessor of land who permits licensees to enter is subject to
         liability for bodily harm caused to them by the dangerous state in
         which he permits a natural or artificial condition to remain, if,
         but only if, he not only knows of the condition but also should
         realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to
         the particular licensee harmed thereby. In determining whether the
         possessor should realize that a known condition involves not only a risk
         but an unreasonable risk, the character of the invitation or permission is
         important. A condition, no matter how dangerous to those who come in
         contact with it, can involve risk to a particular licensee only if he may be
         expected to encounter it in the exercise of his license. Thus, if a possessor
         gives to another a license to come upon the land by day, he may have no
         reason to expect the licensee to enter by night. Therefore he may be under
         no duty to warn the licensee of a condition which would be obvious in
         daylight. So too, a possessor has no reason to expect the licensee’s
         presence at any point other than that within which the license
         gives him the privilege to enter. He is, therefore, under no duty to

5
 “The words ‘the risk’ denote not only the existence of a risk, but also its extent.” Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 342 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1965). “Thus ‘knowledge’ of the risk involved in a particular condition
implies not only that the condition is recognized as dangerous, but also that the chance of harm and the
gravity of the threatened harm are appreciated.” Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023                                Page 9 of 11
               warn licensees of conditions which exist outside of the area
               covered by the license.

       Id. cmt. h (emphasis added).

[14]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that whether VeoRide owed Dolsen a

       duty to warn him of the gap in the wall next to the stairwell depends upon

       underlying facts that require resolution by the trier of fact, including whether

       VeoRide should have realized that the condition involved an unreasonable risk

       of causing physical harm to Dolsen (who did not know or have reason to know

       of the condition and the risk involved), whether VeoRide should have expected

       that Dolsen would not discover or realize the danger, and whether VeoRide had

       reason to expect that Dolsen would encounter the condition in the exercise of

       his license. Assuming arguendo that such a duty existed, we further conclude

       that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether VeoRide’s failure to

       warn Dolsen of the condition and the risk involved was a breach of that duty,

       that is, a failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances pursuant to

       Restatement Section 342(b); among the factors to be considered are whether

       VeoRide had a reasonable opportunity to alert fire department personnel.

       Additional issues of material fact exist regarding whether any breach of a duty

       to warn proximately caused Dolsen’s injuries and the extent to which Dolsen

       might have contributed to his injuries for purposes of the Comparative Fault

       Act. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in

       VeoRide’s favor and remand for further proceedings.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023      Page 10 of 11
[15]   Reversed and remanded.

       Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023   Page 11 of 11