Court Opinion

ID: 9939460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 22:02:21.854965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:17.393157
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/24
               CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

               SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                       DIVISION EIGHT

JONI FRASER,                         B324831

   Plaintiff and Appellant,          Los Angeles County
                                     Super. Ct. No. BC724217
       v.

ALI FARVID et al.,

   Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. Gregory W. Alarcon, Judge. Affirmed.

     Cummins & White and Eric M. Khodadian for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

     Mark R. Weiner & Associates and Michael H. Park for
Defendants and Respondents.

                 _____________________________
                             SUMMARY
       Plaintiff Joni Fraser was attacked by two pit bulls who
escaped from a single-family residence their owner, Hebe Crocker
(Ms. Crocker or tenant), leased from Ali Farvid and Lilyana
Amezcua (defendants or landlords). Plaintiff sued Ms. Crocker
and defendants. Plaintiff settled with Ms. Crocker. A jury found
plaintiff proved that defendants had actual knowledge of the
dangerous propensity of Ms. Crocker’s dogs and could have
prevented foreseeable harm to plaintiff. The jury found plaintiff
suffered damages of more than $600,000.
       The trial court granted defendants’ motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), finding no substantial
evidence was produced at trial demonstrating defendants’
knowledge of the dogs’ dangerous propensities.
       Our review of the record confirms the trial court’s ruling
was correct. We therefore affirm the judgment for defendants.
                            THE ISSUE
       We begin by describing the legal principle governing this
case.
       “Under California law, a landlord who does not have actual
knowledge of a tenant’s dog’s vicious nature cannot be held liable
when the dog attacks a third person. . . . Without knowledge of a
dog’s propensities a landlord will not be able to foresee the
animal poses a danger and thus will not have a duty to take
measures to prevent the attack.” (Donchin v. Guerrero (1995)
34 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1838 (Donchin).) This “actual knowledge
rule” can be satisfied “by circumstantial evidence the landlord
must have known about the dog’s dangerousness as well as direct
evidence he actually knew.” (Ibid.)
       Here, we agree with plaintiff there was evidence from
which the jury could have disbelieved defendants’ testimony that
they did not know there were any dogs on the property. But the

                                2
only other evidence plaintiff relies on to establish defendants
actually knew the dogs were dangerous—other than challenges to
defendants’ credibility—was an e-mail from a next-door neighbor
about the state of the property. This e-mail is neither direct nor
circumstantial evidence that defendants knew or must have
known the tenant’s dogs were vicious.
       We quote the entire e-mail in question, sent on May 29,
2017, about 15 months before plaintiff was attacked (the May
2017 e-mail): “Hi Lilyana and Ali – [¶] I hope that you are
getting a nice mini break with the holiday. [¶] Lorne and I
wanted to let you know of your house. We aren’t sure how much
you know. There is a new person living there. It is the same
woman but it seems she may be either subletting or have an
extended guest. [¶] We are not sure about your arrangement
with the tenants. But your lawn and side yard are overgrown. A
family of ferral [sic] cats were living in your side yard. I don’t
know what will happen to the babies as we saw the mom dead in
the driveway of another neighbor yesterday (and what prompted
me to let you know). This is from the side we share. The weeds
on your side are taller than the bushes between our homes. [¶]
On the good end, they are no longer burning left over marijuana
plants and they are so quiet. Even the 2 guard dogs in the back
are quiet. [¶] Hopefully, it’s just the outside and inside is in good
repair. We are not sure if you have a property manager who can
check things out. [¶] We do miss having neighbors that we can
talk to. [¶] Leigh.”
       Plaintiff contends this e-mail “itself constitutes ‘substantial
evidence’ of [defendants’] knowledge that the dogs were
dangerous.” Plaintiff argues the e-mail’s reference to two “guard
dogs,” plus defendants’ “false exculpatory statements” that they
did not know the tenant kept any dogs on the property,

                                  3
“constitutes affirmative evidence of actual knowledge that the
dogs were vicious.”
       Defendants, on the other hand, contend none of this
constitutes evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer
they knew or must have known of the dogs’ vicious nature. We
find the law supports defendants’ position and that, on this
record, the trial court correctly granted JNOV.
                               FACTS
1.     The Background
       On August 14, 2018, while she was walking her dog in the
neighborhood, plaintiff was attacked by Ms. Crocker’s two pit
bulls (the August 2018 attack). The dogs had escaped from
Ms. Crocker’s back patio after someone left the gate unlatched.
The facts about the attack and the severity of plaintiff’s injuries
are not disputed.
       Defendants, a married couple, have owned the subject
property since 2005. They lived there from 2006 until August
2012, when they moved to Orange County. While they lived in
the home, they became friends with their next-door neighbors,
Lorne Platt and Leigh Ramos-Platt. Leigh Ramos-Platt is the
neighbor who sent the May 2017 e-mail; she and defendant
Ms. Amezcua were both doctors, with different specialties, on the
faculty at USC.
       In December 2015, defendants leased the property to
Ms. Crocker for a one-year term, and after that Ms. Crocker
continued to rent the premises on a month-to-month basis. The
lease prohibited subletting without permission and prohibited
dogs without permission.
       About a year after she moved in, Ms. Crocker acquired the
dogs, and after “rehabilitat[ing]” them on a friend’s ranch for six
months, she brought the dogs to the property. She testified they

                                 4
were her emotional support dogs; she did not ask the defendants’
permission; and “never explicitly told them about my dogs.”
      As stated earlier, in May 2017, Ms. Ramos-Platt sent
Ms. Amezcua the e-mail that is at the heart of plaintiff’s case.
Ms. Amezcua replied to the May 2017 e-mail later the same day.
She thanked Ms. Ramos-Platt for “letting us know,” and stated:
“I am ccing Ali [her husband, defendant Mr. Farvid] and hope
maybe Ali and Lorne can talk? Ali is in charge of the property
and all has been ok in respect to payments and when we send our
handyman for repairs. Certainly I am sure we can address the
weed situation . . . and I am not sure how we can figure out the
subletting issues.”
      As mentioned, the attack occurred in August 2018, and in
October 2018, plaintiff filed this lawsuit.
      Defendants did not produce the May 2017 e-mail in
discovery. At her deposition in April 2019, defendant
Ms. Amezcua testified she had no communications from anyone
about dogs on the premises. (At trial, Ms. Amezcua testified that
she gets more than 100 e-mails a day, and that e-mails to her
USC work e-mail account from an outside e-mail account (such as
the May 2017 e-mail) get erased “every 2 years or a year.”
Ms. Ramos-Platt testified she was not aware of any USC policy of
deleting e-mails older than two years; she said she had e-mails
she sent to colleagues as early as 2009.)
      In May 2019, Ms. Ramos-Platt forwarded the May 2017 e-
mail to counsel for plaintiff, in response to a subpoena, saying it
was the only e-mail she had “regarding communication with the
landlords.”
      Ms. Amezcua did not authenticate the May 2017 e-mail
when plaintiff’s counsel asked her to do so in June 2019 (and did
not ask her husband to look for it in his e-mail), but she did
authenticate the e-mail at trial.

                                 5
2.     Trial Testimony
       Defendant Mr. Farvid testified that prior to the attack, he
had no idea the dogs were there, and no one ever told him there
were guard dogs on the property. He testified that if he had seen
any dogs being kept on the property, he “would have brought that
up with Ms. Crocker,” “especially if they were these dogs,”
because that would have been a breach of the lease. When he
was shown the May 2017 e-mail at trial, he said he did not recall
seeing the e-mail before.
       Defendant Ms. Amezcua also answered, “Not that I recall,”
to the question whether, prior to the attack, she knew there were
any dogs on the premises.
       At trial, Ms. Amezcua was questioned about her reference
to a handyman in her reply to the May 2017 e-mail, and about
her interrogatory response, which stated she did not have a
handyman. She again said she did not have a handyman, and
“I’ve not sent a handyman to the property.” Mr. Farvid testified
there was no handyman he sent to the property to perform
repairs while Ms. Crocker was living there. Ms. Ramos-Platt
testified she saw a handyman come to the property “maybe a few
times,” “[b]ut definitely after . . . I sent the email someone did
come by and they cleaned up the yard.”
       Ms. Ramos-Platt testified that after the August 2018
attack, defendant Ms. Amezcua called her. When she returned
the call, Ms. Amezcua told her, “ ‘Remember, I didn’t know that
there were dogs on the property.’ ” At trial, Ms. Ramos-Platt did
not remember whether the conversation was before or after she
(Ms. Ramos-Platt) produced the May 2017 e-mail in May 2019,
but “it probably was after.”
       Ms. Ramos-Platt testified that she talked to Ms. Amezcua
about the dogs one other time, earlier in 2017 before the May
2017 e-mail, after a “Grand Rounds” lecture Ms. Ramos-Platt had

                                6
given at USC. In that conversation about “the house” and “the
kids” and other things, Ms. Ramos-Platt “also mentioned that
[Ms. Crocker] had dogs.” Defendants’ previous tenants had had a
small dog, and Ms. Amezcua asked Ms. Ramos-Platt, “ ‘You mean
a small dog?’ and I had mentioned to her ‘these are not small
dogs.’ ”
       Ms. Ramos-Platt also testified that when she wrote the
May 2017 e-mail, “I was really trying to convey what is going on
next door. It wasn’t to convey that there were aggressive dogs. It
was to convey that there were large dogs there and I’m being
completely honest here.” She also testified that the reason she
called the dogs “guard dogs” was “[b]ecause they are large and
they are pit bulls.” She stated she had never seen the dogs “being
aggressive to any other person,” and had she done so, she would
have called defendants and told them about it.
       Mr. Platt testified that after the May 2017 e-mail, he and
defendant Mr. Farvid had a conversation about Ms. Crocker not
cleaning up after her dogs. Mr. Platt did not specifically recall
Mr. Farvid’s response, but “to the best of my recollection, oh, you
know, I’m concerned and we’ll try to take care of it.” Mr. Farvid
did not seem shocked that there were dogs on his property. The
conversation “was not just the dogs, but, umm, just the yard and
kind of upkeep in general. [¶] We were concerned about both our
own sort of property and just the condition in general how it
might affect us, and then also for them and their property being
just looked after generally.”
       Mr. Farvid also testified that, before the August 2018
attack, he had a conversation with Mr. Platt about Ms. Crocker
not cleaning up after her dogs. Then he immediately repeated
that he did not know about the dogs prior to the attack. He said
the conversation with Mr. Platt was “never a conversation about
the dogs. It was about the cleaning inside the property which

                                 7
include the hedges and the front yard and general trash around
the place.”
       One of the two defendants conducted an annual inspection
of the property in 2016 and 2017, and Mr. Farvid inspected the
property, including the backyard, within the six months before
the August 2018 attack on plaintiff. He said he never saw any
dogs or any evidence of dogs during his inspections. He also did
not recall anyone being there other than Ms. Crocker, and said he
would have raised the issue with Ms. Crocker if he thought other
people were living there.
       Alan Zhang and Bianca Griffin began subletting rooms
from Ms. Crocker in early 2018. Mr. Zhang testified that he was
at home during Mr. Farvid’s 2018 inspection; he walked past
Mr. Farvid while he and Ms. Crocker were inspecting the ceiling;
and Mr. Farvid must have seen him. Mr. Zhang also said he did
not know and had “no memory of the dogs being there on the day
of that inspection.”
       There was also testimony from Susan Murray that in June
2017, the dogs attacked her 20-pound dog while she and her
husband were walking their dogs. Ms. Murray had a puncture
wound on her index and middle fingers inflicted by one of the pit
bulls while she was trying to separate the dogs. However,
Ms. Murray did not report the attack to animal control
authorities. She did not want the dogs to be put down, and she
believed Ms. Crocker would always leash her dogs in the future
and that “it wouldn’t happen again.” She also testified she never
had any communication with either of defendants.
       Ms. Crocker testified the dogs were “there” during
Mr. Farvid’s 2018 inspection. She also testified the dogs had
“free range” in the house, including the backyard, the upstairs
master bedroom, and the living room. She did not recall
Mr. Farvid having seen the dogs during the inspection, since the

                                8
inspection was “just for the ceiling” and “mostly to inspect water
damage.”
       Ms. Crocker continued to live at the property and pay rent
through March 2019. At her deposition, she testified that she
had a conversation with Mr. Farvid about her dogs for the first
time about a month or two after the August 2018 attack. She
told him they were emotional support dogs; that her psychiatrist
confirmed they were emotional support dogs; that Mr. Farvid
“met my dogs and they were very nice”; and Mr. Farvid told her
he was “a dog person” and he let her keep the dogs. Ms. Crocker
also testified that Mr. Farvid “requested that I would move out
because I couldn’t keep the dogs there,” and she “wasn’t ready to
part with the dogs at the time so I decided to just leave . . . .”
3.     The Verdict and the Trial Court’s JNOV Ruling
       As stated at the outset, the jury found (9 to 3) both
defendants had actual knowledge of the dangerous propensity of
the dogs and had the ability to prevent foreseeable harm to
plaintiff. The jury found Ms. Crocker 60 percent responsible, and
each of defendants 20 percent responsible. Plaintiff’s damages
amounted to $604,977.10.
       In its ruling on defendants’ JNOV motion, the trial court
found there was “an absence of any evidence that Defendants
Farvid and Amezcua had actual knowledge that Ms. Crocker’s
dogs were dangerous and vicious prior to the incident involving
Plaintiff.” The court reviewed the evidence, observing (for
example) that: Mr. Platt testified he never informed defendants
the dogs were dangerous, and his main concern was the condition
of the house and yard that might affect property values.
Ms. Ramos-Platt acknowledged she never saw the dogs being
aggressive or vicious and never told either defendant they were
aggressive or vicious. The court described testimony from several
other witnesses, none of whom provided any evidence defendants

                                9
knew or must have known the dogs were dangerous before the
August 2018 attack. (This included testimony from the animal
control officer who investigated the attack and found no prior
incidents involving the dogs.)
       As for the May 2017 e-mail from Ms. Ramos-Platt
mentioning “the 2 guard dogs,” the court stated: “In fact, the
‘guard dog’ comment says nothing to warn anyone about these
dogs’ dangerous propensities but has been used by Plaintiff’s
counsel to suggest that this comment, not remembered by
Ms. Amezcua, is compelling proof that both Mr. Farvid and
Ms. Amezcua had knowledge of the dangerous and vicious
propensities of the two dogs.” The court found the comment
lacked “sufficient substantiality” to support a finding that
defendants knew the dogs had dangerous propensities. The court
concluded:
       “[T]he fact that the words ‘guard dog’ [were] contained in a
lengthy email, albeit in a positive light, constitutes no evidence
that Defendants had knowledge of Ms. Crocker’s dogs’ dangerous
propensities. The colloquial use of the term ‘guard dogs’ was
used by Ms. [Ramos-]Platt in a positive light and not as a
warning, in no way put the Defendant landlords on notice as to
dangerous propensities, as compared to a commercial setting
when guard dogs are likely trained to protect through
intimidation the property they are guarding.”
       The court also rejected plaintiff’s contention that defendant
Mr. Farvid’s allegedly false statements denying knowledge of the
dogs on the premises “equate[d] to knowledge of the vicious
propensities of the dogs.” The court found the precedent on
which plaintiff relied (Donchin, discussed post) was
distinguishable because in that case evidence of the landlord’s
false statement was bolstered by other evidence the landlord
knew of the dogs’ vicious propensities.

                                 10
      The trial court entered judgment for defendants on
October 10, 2022, and this timely appeal followed.
                          DISCUSSION
      “A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be
granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no
substantial evidence in support.” (Sweatman v. Department of
Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68.) The standard of
review on appeal is the same: “whether any substantial
evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—supports the jury’s
conclusion.” (Ibid.)
      As already mentioned, to establish a landlord’s liability, the
plaintiff must present either direct evidence the landlord actually
knew about the dog’s dangerousness or circumstantial evidence
that the landlord must have known. (Donchin, supra,
34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1838; see Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975)
44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514, fn. 4 (Uccello) [“[A]ctual knowledge can
be inferred from the circumstances only if, in the light of the
evidence, such inference is not based on speculation or conjecture.
Only where the circumstances are such that the defendant ‘must
have known’ and not ‘should have known’ will an inference of
actual knowledge be permitted.”].)
      We agree with the trial court that there is neither direct
nor circumstantial evidence that defendants knew or must have
known Ms. Crocker’s dogs were dangerous. We turn to plaintiff’s
specific arguments.
1.    The May 2017 E-mail
      Plaintiff contends the May 2017 e-mail alone constitutes
substantial evidence defendants “were told the dogs were
dangerous, because calling the pit bulls ‘guard dogs’ was the
same thing as calling them ‘vicious’ or ‘dangerous.’ ” Plaintiff

                                11
says guard dogs “are presumed vicious,” citing Portillo v. Aiassa
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135 (Portillo).
       Plaintiff misrepresents Portillo, substituting an ellipsis for
the portion of a direct quotation that shows Portillo has no
application in this case. Plaintiff omits the underlined portion of
this passage: “It is reasonably foreseeable that a guard dog kept
in a business open to the general public will injure someone; the
purpose of such animals is to protect the premises and it is highly
unlikely that they are docile by nature.” (Portillo, supra,
27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135, underscore added.) Portillo goes on to
observe that, had the landlord inspected the liquor store before
renewing the lease (as was his duty as a lessor of property for a
purpose involving admission of the public (id. at p. 1134)), he
would have observed a “Beware of Dog” sign and a newspaper
article posted near the door, discussing the dog’s recent attack on
an attempted robber in the store, and thus learned of the dog’s
dangerous propensities.1 (Portillo, at p. 1135.)

1     Plaintiff also omits pertinent facts in quotations from or
descriptions of Frederickson v. Kepner (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 905,
908-909 (pet store proprietors who kept 75-pound German police
dog tied on commercial premises as a watchdog, where there had
been attempted robberies at a nearby store, “and permitted the
dog to be unfettered only in the evenings and when accompanied
by someone” allowed inference owner knew of dog’s dangerous
nature), and Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at pages 510, 507-508
(reversing nonsuit after opening statement; a reasonable
inference of landlord’s knowledge could be drawn from the
opening statement; facts included several visits by landlord to the
property, and several drives past the residence to visually inspect
the premises, where he observed the large German Shepherd dog;
“Beware of Dog” signs the tenant placed and kept on the fences
throughout the tenancy; meter readers were warned of a “bad

                                 12
       In short, Portillo is inapt. Its holding is that “a landlord
has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the inspection of his
commercial property and to remove a dangerous condition, which
includes a dog, from the premises, if he knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care would have known, the dog was dangerous and
usually present on the premises.” (Portillo, supra,
27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132.) Indeed, Portillo distinguished cases
involving a family pet kept in a single-family residence (id. at
pp. 1136-1137), where the landlord has “ ‘no duty to inspect the
premises for the purpose of discovering the existence of a tenant’s
dangerous animal.’ ” (Id. at p. 1137, italics omitted.) As we have
seen, in such a case the plaintiff is required to establish the
landlord actually knew or must have known the dogs were
dangerous. (Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 514 & fn. 4.)
       Much of the remainder of plaintiff’s argument about the
“guard dog” e-mail as substantial evidence is addressed to two
points: that defendants “knew the guard dogs were pit bulls” and
“knew the pit bulls were large.” Most of the argument consists of
a screed about “common knowledge” that pit bulls “have a
reputation for and are known for their vicious propensity,” along
with references to definitions of pit bulls, dog bite statistics, and
blogs and other websites—without any citation to the record in
this case. Plaintiff states she “is not arguing that all pit bulls are
vicious nor asking that the Court take judicial notice that all pit
bulls are vicious.” But that is exactly what she is doing, and
what this court cannot do.

dog” and to take precautions before entering the premises, and
more). These cases in no way resemble the facts in this record.

                                 13
       In sum, there is no reasonable basis for drawing an
inference from the May 2017 e-mail that defendants knew or
must have known the dogs were dangerous.
2.     False Exculpatory Statements
       Plaintiff contends that defendants’ “false exculpatory
statements” that they were unaware of any dogs being kept on
the property “constitutes evidence that they knew the dogs were
dangerous pursuant to Donchin v. Guerrero.” We do not agree.
       In Donchin, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff “introduced
sufficient evidence casting doubt on the landlord’s credibility to
create a triable issue whether he did know the dogs were
dangerous.” (Donchin, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1835.) The
court concluded the landlord’s “false exculpatory statements
denying any knowledge of the rottweilers’ existence and his
further denial he granted permission for their presence on his
property may be used to infer guilty consciousness as to his
knowledge of the dogs’ viciousness.” (Id. at p. 1839.) Donchin
framed the issue before the court as whether the court “—or a
subsequent fact finder—” could be asked “to disbelieve [the
defendant’s] denial and thereby to believe the opposite, that is, to
find he did possess the requisite knowledge. At this stage, of
course, we only have to ask whether [the plaintiff] has introduced
enough evidence to create a triable issue [the defendant’s] denial
should be disbelieved. If so, summary judgment was
inappropriate.” (Id. at p. 1840.)
       The court explained that the landlord “made the
exculpatory statement as soon as he received the summons and
complaint describing the rottweilers’ attack,” and the landlord
“himself admitted his exculpatory statement to be false by later
filing a response to interrogatories admitting he knew about the
dogs from the rental agreement and from his visits to the

                                 14
property where he claimed he had played with the dogs.”
(Donchin, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1842.) Indeed, the landlord
testified that he enjoyed playing with the dogs when he went to
collect the monthly rent payments. (Id. at p. 1835.) The
landlord’s “false exculpatory statement denying he knew his
tenant had dogs on the leased property is evidence of the falsity
of his later denial he knew the rottweilers had vicious
propensities.” (Id. at p. 1843.) The fact finder could “reasonably
infer [the landlord] falsely denied he knew the dogs were
dangerous from his initial false denial of knowledge they even
existed.” (Ibid.)
       But in Donchin, there was a great deal more evidence than
just false exculpatory statements. The court further concluded
that “[t]he affirmative evidence the landlord was aware of the
dogs’ vicious propensities reinforces the inference he was not
credible in denying knowledge of those propensities.” (Donchin,
supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1843.) The neighbor across the street
declared he was afraid of the rottweilers. He complained to the
tenant, another neighbor and the animal control department.
(Ibid.) According to this neighbor, “the dogs frequently ran loose
around the neighborhood, lunging towards both people and other
dogs. [The neighbor] stated he was so afraid of the dogs he kept a
baseball bat outside his back door as a safety measure.” (Id. at
p. 1836.)
       A UPS courier stated he was afraid of the dogs; he saw
them once a week and every time they would growl, show their
teeth, ram the fence and try to jump over it; they appeared
extremely ferocious. (Donchin, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1843.)
An expert on animal behavior described why it was unlikely the
landlord was unaware of the rottweilers’ vicious propensities;
through the landlord’s visits to the property, and as a relative

                               15
stranger, “ ‘he had undoubtedly witnessed displays of territorial
aggressive behavior in these dogs.’ ” (Id. at p. 1844.)
      Donchin correctly found that on the record before the court,
there were material triable fact issues such that summary
judgment was improvidently granted. But Donchin did not hold
that the landlord’s false exculpatory statement that he did not
know his tenant owned dogs, without any other direct or
circumstantial evidence, was substantial evidence sufficient to
support a verdict that the landlord knew the dogs were vicious.
Donchin must be read and understood in the context in which the
opinion was written—reversal of summary judgment; it is not
precedent for what constitutes substantial evidence to support a
verdict after trial.2
      In this case, there is no evidence at all of defendants’
knowledge of the dogs’ vicious propensities. No one other than
Ms. Crocker and Susan Murray (the person who was bitten in the
June 2017 incident) had any knowledge the dogs were dangerous
before the August 2018 attack, and they told no one. No one,

2      See Ayon v. Esquire Deposition Solutions, LLC (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 487, 498 (“Donchin gave inadequate attention to
the need for a plaintiff to present substantial evidence. The point
of the summary judgment procedure is to test whether the
plaintiff has enough evidence to support a jury verdict.
Substantial evidence, however, is not synonymous
with any evidence. Rather, substantial evidence must be
sufficient to support the essential elements underlying a verdict.
[Citation.] Take the example Donchin invoked about a criminal
defendant lying about an alibi. That evidence may be relevant,
and thus admissible, on the question of the defendant’s guilt, but
it would certainly not be substantial. That is, we would not
uphold a jury verdict if the only evidence tying the defendant to
the crime was a false claim about an alibi.”).

                                16
including Mr. Platt and Ms. Ramos-Platt, ever said anything to
defendants about the dogs being dangerous. Under these
circumstances, the inconsistencies in defendants’ testimony about
their knowledge of any dogs on the property cannot, standing
alone, justify an inference they knew or must have known the
dogs were vicious.
       Plaintiff points to another judge’s January 2020 ruling
denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the
Donchin analysis (and adding that defendants failed to
distinguish that case). Plaintiff also points to the trial court’s
denial of defendants’ motion for nonsuit. (The court stated that
“[w]ithout those two words in the email, ‘guard dogs,’ the court
would grant the motion for nonsuit.”) But plaintiff cites no
authority suggesting the trial court is bound by those rulings,
and we find neither is helpful to our analysis.3
3.     Respondeat Superior Liability
       Finally, plaintiff contends that, even if there was no
substantial evidence of defendants’ knowledge, the trial court
should have denied the JNOV motion “because: 1) substantial
evidence supported [plaintiff’s] responde[a]t superior theory of
liability, which did not require proving prior knowledge of the
dogs’ vicious propensities and 2) by telling Ms. Crocker that she
could keep her dogs, [defendants] ratified Ms. Crocker’s conduct
of keeping vicious dogs on the Premises.” Plaintiff is mistaken.

3      Plaintiff also contends the fact that defendants “did
nothing” after the attack, allowing Ms. Crocker to keep the dogs
until she moved out in the spring of 2019, is “corroborating
evidence” they knew the dogs were dangerous. Events
transpiring after the attack “are irrelevant . . . to the issue of [the
defendant’s] knowledge of the dog’s vicious nature.” (Uccello,
supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 509, fn. 2.)

                                  17
       The jury was instructed on plaintiff’s theory of vicarious
liability—that Ms. Crocker was defendants’ agent or employee
and defendants are therefore responsible for her conduct.
Plaintiff claims there was substantial evidence Ms. Crocker
worked for defendants as their “onsite property manager” and the
August 2018 attack “arose from the course and scope of that
agency/employment.” This evidence is that she sublet rooms in
the house and collected rent from her subtenants, and also that
defendants reduced Ms. Crocker’s rent by $50 a month in
exchange for “maintenance of the outside of the property . . . like
keeping the yard.”
       The cited evidence does not show defendants employed
Ms. Crocker as a “property manager,” and in any event, there is
no evidence Ms. Crocker was acting within the scope of any such
purported employment or agency when plaintiff was harmed.
Moreover, the special verdict form did not ask the jury to make
either of those determinations.
       Nor is there any merit to plaintiff’s claim that defendants
ratified Ms. Crocker’s conduct by allowing her to keep her dogs
after the attack. Indeed, plaintiff does not identify or discuss the
elements of a ratification claim. The trial court correctly
concluded there was no evidence of ratification, and the jury was
not instructed on and made no finding on ratification.
                          DISPOSITION
       The order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and the judgment in favor of defendants are affirmed.
Defendants are to recover costs on appeal.

                              GRIMES, Acting P. J.
      WE CONCUR:
                        WILEY, J.          VIRAMONTES, J.

                                18