Court Opinion

ID: 9714511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:39:32.588926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:26.755482
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
dissenting.
The Court bars plaintiffs’ products liability claim on statute of limitations grounds, relying primarily on typed language in a workers’ compensation claim petition that included “asbestos,” as well as “noise” and “chemicals,” among the substances to which decedent’s exposure .allegedly contributed to his work-related disability. The uncontroverted medical evidence in this record reveals that none of the many physicians that had examined dece*559dent ever had associated his pulmonary condition with asbestos exposure, suggesting that the reference to asbestos on the claim petition was gratuitous and without foundation. Nevertheless, exalting literalism over substance, the Court bars plaintiffs’ product liability suit, and in the process diminishes the significance of this Court’s ruling in Vispisiano v. Ashland Chemical Co., 107 N.J. 416, 527 A.2d 66 (1987).
In Vispisiano, this Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendants on statute of limitations grounds because the facts were insufficient to put the plaintiff on notice that exposure to chemicals at work might have caused the injuries that were the subject of his suit. We held that “before a toxic-tort-case plaintiff may be deemed, in a discovery rule context, to have the requisite state of knowledge that would trigger the running of the statute of limitations [plaintiffs] impression of the nature of the injury and of its cause must have some reasonable medical support.” Id. at 437, 527 A.2d 66 (internal quotations omitted). The underlying facts in Vispisiano were adduced at a Lopez hearing, used to determine when a plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the existence of a cause of action. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973).
Plaintiffs will not be afforded that procedural protection because the Court’s opinion concludes that “the record here unquestionably establishes plaintiffs awareness of the essential facts” necessary to find that plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known of their cause of action. Because the products liability complaint was filed on March 24, 1988, the Court holds that the statute of limitations bars plaintiffs’ claim because decedent knew or should have known of the existence of his cause of action when he filed a workers’ compensation petition on January 14, 1986. Although plaintiffs’ attorney did not specifically request a Lopez hearing in response to defendants’ summary judgment motions, this record demonstrates that a Lopez hearing was required to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to establish that the discovery rule should preclude defendants’ statute of limitations defense.
*560I
Kazmierz Lapka began working for Essex Chemical Corporation (Essex Chemical) in 1967. On February 9, 1981, Lapka left work for an extended period due to health problems. After undergoing a chest x-ray on February 13, 1981, he initially was diagnosed with pulmonary emphysema with mild diffuse fibrotic lung changes. Complaining of pain, shortness of breath, and a cough, Lapka was admitted to the Raritan Bay Medical Center on February 21, 1981. In a report dated February 29, 1981, Dr. Francis Urbanski, Essex Chemical’s physician, concluded that Lapka suffered from mild restrictive and moderate large airway obstructive ventilatory impairment with severe small airway obstruction. Urbanski also expressed reservations about Lapka’s return to work as a “hot melt operator.” Lapka was discharged on March 1, 1981, with a final diagnosis of pulmonary fibrosis and emphysema. That diagnosis was based in part on chest x-rays that demonstrated “bilateral apical pleural thickening” and “increased markings within the lungs.” Pulmonary fibrosis is a medical condition involving inflammation and scarring of the lung tissue. Among its known causes are occupational or environmental exposure, vapors, certain drugs, radiation, and infection. Asbestos exposure, although a possible cause of pulmonary fibrosis, is hardly the exclusive cause. Exposure to other chemicals or toxic substances may also cause or contribute to that condition. Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment 306-07 (Lawrence M. Tierney, Jr. et al. eds., 38th ed.1999).
On June 29, 1981, Dr. Thaddeus Balinski, Lapka’s personal physician, completed an Attending Physician’s Supplementary Statement in connection with Lapka’s claim for medical coverage that listed his condition as “emphysema.” On July 7, 1981, the Loss Prevention Manager at Essex Chemical discussed with Dr. Balinski his concern about Lapka returning to his job. Dr. Balinski concurred with Dr. Urbanski’s recommendation that Lapka not return to his previous job, but to a different job “in a less toxic area.” On July 23, 1981, Dr. Urbanski completed a Return *561to Work Evaluation that noted that Lapka had a “long history of smoking at least one pack of cigarettes each day, but ... he stopped smoking on February 9, 1981.” Based on the results of two evaluations and a pulmonary function test, Dr. Urbanski concluded that the “clinical findings indicate that pulmonary emphysema is not present but, rather, the studies illustrate reverseability [sic] of the employee’s ventilatory impairment and demonstrates [sic] that, in the absence of any environmental exposure, values have returned to normal.”
On a Medical-Work History form completed on May 23, 1982, Lapka reported that he had emphysema and shortness of breath after minimal exertion, but did not report any tightness or constriction of the chest or lungs. A Professional Health Services report dated June 16, 1983, contained pulmonary test results that noted Lapka’s “forced vital capacity is normal, indicating no restrictive problem ... but flow rates are depressed, suggesting a possible early stage mild obstructive deficiency.” Another Physical Examination and Evaluation report on Lapka dated August 1, 1983, noted that he was “employable or can continue to work in exposure to chemical or physical stresses” and was “physically able to use personal protective equipment, including respirator.”
On February 13, 1984, Lapka returned to Dr. Balinski for treatment. Dr. Balinski diagnosed emphysema and COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) on the Attending Physician’s Statement Health Insurance Claim used in connection with Lapka’s treatment. In June 1984, Lapka returned to the hospital. Lapka’s admitting and final diagnosis was COPD. That diagnosis was based on a chest x-ray and pulmonary function tests that “showed mild airway obstruction, with small airway disease.”
On June 6, 1985, Dr. Charles Brancato “strongly suggested” that Lapka be put on permanent disability because pulmonary function tests completed earlier in the year revealed a “ ‘moderate to severe airway obstruction’, a marked worsening as compared to the previous tests dated June 12, 1984.” Those January 1985 tests were supervised by Dr. N. Reddy who acknowledged in a *562letter dated January 29,1985, to Essex Chemical that Lapka had a history of COPD and was “not suited for the work in which he is involved with [sic].” The chest x-ray from those tests revealed a number of small calcifications in the lungs that were deemed “compatible with previous granulomatous disease.”
On January 14, 1986, Lapka filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits. The claim form was neatly typed and specific information surrounding Lapka’s injury was provided as follows:
Date of Accident or Dates of Occupational Exposure:
1967 to June 5,1984
Where:
Respondent’s premises
How:
PETITIONER EXPOSED TO ASBESTOS, NOISE AND CHEMICALS
Occupation:
Laborer-Operator
Date Stopped Work:
June 5,1984
Date Returned to Work:
Date Injury Reported to Employer and to Whom:
Respondent had constructive notice
In the next section of the claim form, “DESCRIBE EXTENT AND CHARACTER OF INJURY,” the form noted that “PETITIONER SUSTAINED PULMONARY, AND INTERNAL ORGAN DISABILITY; AS WELL AS BINAURAL LOSS OF HEARING AND BILATERAL EYE DISABILITY.” The petition is signed by Lapka and Paul Franz, an attorney at law.
On March 24, 1986, Lapka was examined by Dr. Malcolm Hermele at the request of Franz and Mintz, Esqs. In his report to Franz and Mintz dated the same day, Hermele noted in Lapka’s Past Medical History that Lapka had a “history of ■ Emphysema and Bronchitis.” Hermele described Lapka’s work environment, specifically referring to twelve different potential work-related sources of his disability, including asbestos, but without attempting to identify the more suspect of those sources:
*563Mr. Lapka was employed by Essex Chemical Corp. from 1967 to May, 1984 as a chemical operator. He was exposed to dust, fumes, dirt, asbestos, carbon monoxide, chemicals used in plastic products, petroleum products, paints, powders, solvents, acetone and extremes in temperature. He was required to do much bending, lifting, standing and manipulation of his hands and feet while on the job. In addition to the physical stress and strain of his job, he was under considerable emotional stress and tension as he competed to get his particular job accomplished.
[ (emphasis added).]
Hermele noted the multiple breathing difficulties that Lapka experienced and concluded that Lapka’s “chest condition is causally related to or exacerbated by the exposure to the above pulmonary noxious agents while employed by Essex Chemical Corp.” (Emphasis added). Hermele also concluded that “[biased upon the history and the physical examination it is my opinion that Kazimierz Lapka has emphysema, restrictive pulmonary disease and small airways disease for which I would estimate a permanent disability of 65% of total.”
On April 7,1987, Lapka was awarded $23,800 based on a 33 and l/3rd% permanent/partial pulmonary disability due to emphysema, restrictive pulmonary disease and small airways disease in an Order Approving Settlement by the Division of Workers’ Compensation. On August 10, 1992, Lapka was awarded an additional $27,200 because his partial/total disability due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with severe emphysema was increased to 50%.
On August 23, 1988, Dr. Matthew H. Smith, at the request of Jane Cantor, Esq., evaluated Lapka for occupational lung disease. For the first time since Lapka’s earliest medical examinations relating to his pulmonary condition, Dr. Smith specifically addressed Lapka’s exposure to asbestos:
[F]rom the beginning of his employment until 1976 [Lapka] mixed a liquid with pigment and asbestos powder in the manufacture of paneling glue. The surrounding equipment and the air around him was heavily laden with asbestos dust and particulate matter, and the patient was never offered a filter mask. He has no other occupational exposures of which he is aware.
With regard to the remainder of his pulmonary symptoms, he was a one pack per day smoker for 15 years quitting in 1952.
*564My impression is that Mr. Lapka does suffer from asbestos related disease. This is manifested by his progressive exertional dyspnea, his history of exposure, and his absence of cardiac or other causes.
On November 2, 1996, Lapka was again admitted to Raritan Bay Medical Center. Lapka’s chart noted that “according to patient & his wife, this pt [patient] has H/O [history of] emphysema & asbestosis & silicosis since ’84.” Other chart notations indicated that “[h]e has h/o COPD for >20 yrs, [with] asbestosis silicosis diagnosed about 12 years ago” and that Lapka “smoked IPPD for 40 yrs. Quit 7 yrs ago. Used to work in chemical plant (?) for 17 yrs. stop in 1984 when was dx [diagnosed] as having asbestosis/silicosis (?).” Lapka died on November 3,1996.
II
A cause of action accrues when a plaintiff “learns, or reasonably should learn, the existence of that state of facts which may equate in law with a cause of action.” Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291, 386 A.2d 1310 (1978) (internal emphasis omitted). Where a plaintiff does not know or have reason to know that he or she has a cause of action, the cause of action will not accrue “until [plaintiff] discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered [the] basis for an actionable claim.” Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 546, 503 A.2d 296 (1986); see also Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 272-73, 300 A.2d 563. “In order to start the statute of limitations [in a complex medical malpractice case], more is required than mere speculation or an uninformed guess ‘without some reasonable medical support’ that there was a causal connection.” Mancuso v. Neckles, 163 N.J. 26, 34, 747 A.2d 255 (2000) (quoting Vispisiano, supra, 107 N.J. at 437, 527 A.2d 66). The discovery rule avoids inequitable results that would flow from a mechanical application of the relevant statute of limitations. O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 491, 416 A.2d 862 (1980); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 449-50, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
The pertinent statute of limitations required the complaint to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrued. N.J.S.A. *5652A:14-2. “[T]he purpose of statutes of limitations is to stimulate litigants to pursue their causes of action diligently.” Vispisiano, supra, 107 N.J. at 426, 527 A.2d 66. Because of the latent characteristics and difficulty in diagnosis associated with a toxic-tort illness, we articulated in Vispisiano the standard that would start the statute of limitations running for a toxic-tort plaintiff:
[B]efore a toxie-tort-case plaintiff may be deemed, in a “discovery rule” context, to have the requisite state of knowledge that would trigger the running of the statute of limitations],] his impression of the nature of the injury and of its cause must have some reasonable medical suppoH [, therefore,] we are convinced that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment. We hasten to add that we do not insist on medical confirmation as such: a physician’s willingness to include chemical poisoning in the differential diagnosis would probably suffice, as would any other reasonably reliable source of information.
[Id. at 437, 527 A.2d 66 (emphasis added).]
Similarly, this matter requires us to examine the record carefully in search of evidence that Lapka knew or should have known that his condition was causally related to asbestos and that that knowledge was based on some reasonable medical support, mindful of the fact that the burden of proof rests with the party claiming the use of the discovery rule. Id. at 432, 527 A.2d 66; Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 276, 300 A.2d 563.
Ill
Lapka did not receive a medical diagnosis that his injuries were causally related to asbestos exposure until Dr. Smith stated that fact in his letter of August 23,1988. Although a medical diagnosis is not required to confirm that Lapka knew or should have known of his condition’s cause, Vispisiano, supra, 107 N.J. at 437, 527 A.2d 66, Lapka had received multiple medical diagnoses that informed him that his injuries were a result of pulmonary fibrosis or emphysema, not asbestosis. During Lapka’s early medical history, he received those different diagnoses as well as medical advice that he could “continue to work in exposure to chemical or physical stresses.” Even in 1985, Lapka’s “worsening” test results were deemed “compatible with previous granulomatous disease.” No medical diagnoses ever mentioned asbestos or asbesto*566sis as a cause of Lapka’s injuries. Because Lapka was never informed that asbestos was the cause of his injuries, Lapka was never given “the impression of the nature of his injury” from any of the doctors that examined him. Therefore, Lapka’s knowledge concerning the accrual of a cause of action cannot definitively be determined by the written documentation in the record.
The earliest date that Lapka may have been put on notice that his injuries were caused by asbestos was March 24,1986, the date of the report produced by Dr. Hermele in support of Lapka’s petition for workers’ compensation benefits. However, even that report’s reference to “asbestos” as one of twelve noxious substances to which Lapka was exposed at work falls far short of the Vispisiano standard of “reasonable medical support.”
As did the Appellate Division, the Court places significant emphasis on Lapka’s workers’ compensation petition in which Lapka sought benefits based on his exposure to “asbestos, noise, and chemicals.” Although the petition conceivably could be considered as some evidence that Lapka may have suspected that asbestos caused his injuries, a more reasonable inference is that Lapka’s attorney’s insertion of asbestos as a possible cause of Lapka’s pulmonary condition was merely an uninformed generalization included in the form to provide possible support for the workers’ compensation claim. We note that Dr. Hermele was retained by Lapka’s counsel to support Lapka’s petition for workers’ compensation benefits and that the Order Approving Settlement issued by the Division of Workers’ Compensation incorporated Hermele’s diagnosis of “emphysema, restrictive pulmonary disease and small airways disease.” In approving the settlement, the Division of Workers’ Compensation did not make a finding that Lapka suffered from asbestosis.
A better rule for determining the date of accrual of knowledge of a toxic-tort plaintiff who has filed a worker’s compensation claim was adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 42-43 (1998). Relying on this Court’s *567decision in Vispisiano, supra, 107 N.J. 416, 527 A.2d 66, the Texas Supreme Court observed:
[Although several courts have adopted [the] position that the filing of a worker’s compensation claim or lawsuit alleging that the plaintiff has an occupational injury begins the statute of limitations running as a matter of law, we believe this rule, while not without some appeal, does not necessarily reflect accurately the plaintiffs knowledge in every case. Rather than demonstrating what a plaintiff actually knows or should have known, an occupational injury claim or suit may be filed by an overly cautious plaintiff merely because of that layperson’s unfounded suspicions or belief that an injury is related to a particular exposure---- This being the case, a latent occupational disease cause of action should not be deemed to accrue absent some objective verification of a causal connection between injury and toxic exposure____ Accordingly, a diligent plaintiffs mere suspicion or subjective belief that a causal connection exists between his exposure and his symptoms is, standing alone, insufficient to establish accrual as a matter of law.
[Childs, 974 S.W.2d at 42-43 (citations omitted).]
Although the Court does not adopt a per se rule that a workers’ compensation petition necessarily triggers the running of the statute of limitations, the claim petition in the context of this record does not support the Court’s conclusion that Lapka knew his occupational exposure to asbestos was the cause of his injuries. The Court’s conclusion simply is inconsistent with the extensive evidence of Lapka’s prior medical evaluations and reports that conspicuously omit any reference whatsoever to asbestos exposure as a cause of Lapka’s pulmonary condition. Cf. Ackler v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 380 Pa.Super. 183, 551 A.2d 291, 292 (1988) (demonstrating that petition alleged “in detail the nature of his illness as asbestosis ... the dates on which his injury occurred, the location, the nature of his occupation, and what he was doing that caused his asbestosis”); Price v. Johns-Manville Corp., 336 Pa.Super. 133, 485 A.2d 466, 467 (1984) (“Mr. Price argued that his disability from asbestosis was total” on appeal to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board); Meeker v. American Torque Rod of Ohio, Inc., 79 Ohio App.3d 514, 607 N.E.2d 874, 876 (1992) (explaining that plaintiff specifically listed the chemicals that caused his injuries).
Finally, Lapka’s November 1996 hospital records do not assist us in determining Lapka’s state of knowledge. Lapka was first specifically informed in 1988 that he suffered from an asbestos related disease. After acquiring that knowledge, Lapka and his *568wife may have assumed that his deteriorating physical condition had been caused by asbestos, and told the attending doctor as much hoping that that information might save Lapka’s life. Lapka died the day after he was admitted to the hospital in 1996. Additionally, although the notations on Lapka’s chart that stated that patient had had a history of emphysema, asbestosis, and silicosis since 1984 and that he had been diagnosed with asbestosis and silicosis twelve years previously may accurately have reflected what the plaintiffs told the attending physician, this record demonstrates unequivocally that the plaintiffs’ recollection was inaccurate because no such diagnosis had ever been made before 1988. Accordingly, the 1996 hospital records provide little assistance in determining when Lapka knew or reasonably should have known that asbestos was a cause of Lapka’s injuries.
IV
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand this matter to the Law Division to conduct a Lopez hearing to determine whether the discovery rule precludes dismissal of the complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds.
Justice O’HERN joins in this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices GARIBALDI, COLEMAN, LONG and VERNIERO — 5.
For reversal and remandment — Justices O’HERN and STEIN — 2.