Court Opinion

ID: 9754965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:19:47.431423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:00.245832
License: Public Domain

Marquardt, J.:
Jason Lee Martin Brown (Brown) appeals his conviction of domestic battery, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We affirm.
*211On March 30, 2010, Brown and Amanda Packer, his girlfriend, were having a heated verbal argument in their residence. During the course of the exchange, Brown was trying to leave but Packer was standing in front of the door. Eventually, Brown pushed Packer out of the way and Packer fell down onto a couch. She was not injured. The police arrived immediately thereafter. Following a bench trial, Brown was convicted of domestic battery and sentenced to probation. Brown timely appeals.
Brown contends that the facts do not support a conviction for domestic battery. “When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, this court reviews all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the court is convinced that a rational fact finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 800, 217 P.3d 15 (2009).
To the degree that this case implicates the interpretation of a statute, it presents a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. See State v. Arnett, 290 Kan. 41, 47, 223 P.3d 780 (2010). Thus, in such situations, an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court to examine and consider the evidence and to determine what the facts establish as matter of law. Crawford v. Hrabe, 273 Kan. 565, 570, 44 P.3d 442 (2002).
Domestic battery is defined as “intentionally causing physical contact with a family or household member by a family or household member when done in a rude, insulting or angry manner.” K.S.A. 21-3412a(a)(2).
Brown does not dispute that he made intentional physical contact with another household member. However, Brown argues that his actions do not meet the statutory requirement of done in a “rude, insulting or angry manner,” because “Kansas law provides him a justification for his use of force in this situation.”
During the hearing, the court concluded that both Brown and Packer were household members, as contemplated by the statute. The court then found that Brown did intentionally cause physical contact with Packer. Finally, when considering the context and circumstances of the physical contact, the court decided that “in*212tentionally shoving someone in the course of an argument is rude, insulting, or angry contact.”
There was evidence that Brown and Packer were in an extremely heated and angry verbal exchange at the time of the contact. Furthermore, Brown pushed Packer hard enough that she fell down onto a couch. Evidence that Packer was in Brown’s way is irrelevant in determining whether the contact was done in a rude, insulting, or angry manner.
Based on the evidence that the contact was made during an intense argument, a rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the contact was done in a “rude, insulting, or angry” manner and that a domestic battery occurred.
Brown’s main argument is that he was entitled to use force against Packer in order to exit die house and escape the argument. Under K.S.A. 21-3211(a), a person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent it reasonably appears to such person that the use of force is necessary to defend against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force.
Brown claims that when Packer blocked his exit from the house she was using unlawful force, amounting to the crime of criminal restraint. Brown claims that he was provoked to initiate contact at that point because his only alternative “was to remain trapped in the home with Packer, who wanted to continue with the angiy exchange.”
Brown argues that he was subjected to “unlawful force” under K.S.A. 21-3211 by being restrained in his home. Therefore, he was justified in “defending himself’ against that “force” by using force to escape.
Brown makes a creative argument, but diere is no Kansas case law suggesting that the excuse of self-defense applies in diis context. Finding that a defendant was justified in using physical force to escape an angry verbal argument is simply not supported by established law.
Furthermore, a reasonable statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 21-3211(a) rejects Brown’s argument. When interpreting the meaning of a statute, die most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that die intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be as*213certained. Arnett, 290 Kan. at 47. An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings. State v. Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, 914, 219 P.3d 481 (2009).
Evidence that tire self-defense statute was only intended to allow self-defense against physical force can be found by analyzing Kansas cases on self-defense. Kansas courts consistently hold that the self-defense statute is a codification of the common-law right of self-defense. It allows a person to “stand his ground,” and it limits the degree of force which may be used “to repel an attack” to that force which reasonably appears to be necessary for that purpose. State v. Deavers, 252 Kan. 149, 154, 843 P.2d 695 (1992), rev. denied 508 U.S. 978 (1993); State v. Stokes, 215 Kan. 5, 9, 523 P.2d 364 (1974); State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, Syl. ¶ 11, 37 P. 174 (1894). Consistent references to “repelling an attack” create an inference that the defense must be in response to physical force.
In this case, there was no imminent physical force or attack that Brown was forced to defend himself against. If he had not used force, he only would have had to remain in the house and endure a heated verbal argument. An interpretation that allows an individual to commit a battery to avoid being stuck in an argument is counterintuitive to the plain meaning of the statute.
Brown’s final argument is that under State v. Scobee, 242 Kan. 421, 748 P.2d 862 (1988), he had no duty to retreat when being menaced on his own property. In Scobee, two aggressors pursued Scobee to his home. Scobee parked in his driveway and got out of his car. One of the aggressors ran toward Scobee with a clear intent to physically attack him. The other aggressor brandished an iron pipe. Scobee shot and killed the first attacker as he approached. The Kansas Supreme Court held that a defendant who is attacked in his or her own driveway has no duty to retreat. 242 Kan. at 429.
In this case, unlike Scobee, both Brown and Packer were in their own home. Furthermore, Brown was not subject to an imminent physical attack that caused him to choose between retreat and the use of force. This case bears no resemblance to the facts in Scobee, and Brown’s reliance on it is misplaced.
*214Brown argues that K.S.A. 21-3211 “permits use of force when there is no requirement to retreat.” However, this is an incomplete reading of the statute. The statute reads: “Nothing in this section shall require a person to retreat if such person is using force to protect such person.” K.S.A. 21-3211(c). The statute doesn’t automatically permit the use of force when there is no duty to retreat, as Brown suggests. It simply says that there is no duty to retreat during a self-defense situation. The other requirements for a self-defense situation must still be met. Even though a person has no duty to retreat in his or her home, only a reasonable use of force is permitted. As discussed above, Brown’s situation did not implicate the excuse of self-defense.
The district court relied on sufficient evidence when it found Brown guilty of domestic battery. Furthermore, a reasonable interpretation of the Kansas self-defense statute and case law show that the statute does not give Brown justification for his actions.
Affirmed.
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