Court Opinion

ID: 9362928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:09:09.321268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.545786
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                 Court of Appeals

                    NO. 2022-CA-0100-MR

GEORGE ANTHONY SLAUGHTER,
AS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND OF
HIS MINOR CHILD GEORGE
ALBERT SLAUGHTER; AND
TABATHA LAND, AS MOTHER
AND NEXT FRIEND OF HER MINOR
CHILD GEORGE ALBERT
SLAUGHTER                                          APPELLANTS

           APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 20-CI-02822

KEITH A. SLAUGHTER, AS AN
INDIVIDUAL AND AS SUCCESSOR
TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE
TRUST AGREEMENT OF GEORGE
A. SLAUGHTER                                         APPELLEE

                         OPINION
                        AFFIRMING

                       ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MAZE,1 AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: George Anthony Slaughter and Tabatha Land, parents and

next friends of George Albert Slaughter, appeal the Fayette Circuit Court’s opinion

and order granting summary judgment to Keith A. Slaughter, in the parents’ action

to recover alleged trust fund proceeds on behalf of their minor son. We affirm.

                George A. Slaughter (George) was the father of George Anthony

Slaughter (Tony), who is the father (with Tabatha Land) of George Albert

Slaughter (Junior). George worked for the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet until

he became disabled in the early 2000s. George was one of nine siblings. In 2010,

George contacted attorney John D. Meyers, Jr., requesting assistance with estate

planning. George expressed his desire to make Junior (born in 2004, and who

suffers from autism, cerebral palsy, and other challenges) the beneficiary of

George’s estate. Meyers drafted several testamentary documents, including: a

“pour over” type will, with George’s brother Keith Slaughter named as executor,

where the remainder of the probate assets would pass to the trust; a trust document,

with Junior as the beneficiary, whereby George was the trustee during his lifetime

and Keith the successor trustee, with Frances Jordan (a niece) as alternate

successor trustee; and a financial power of attorney naming Keith as the attorney in

fact and with Frances again as alternate. Meyers stated that he had no further

1
    Judge Irv Maze concurred in this Opinion prior to his retirement from the Court of Appeals.

                                                -2-
conversations with George about his estate after the documents were prepared and

signed.

                In 2015, George opened eight payable upon death (POD) accounts

with the Commonwealth Credit Union. Each of these accounts listed Keith as the

sole beneficiary. Keith was also the sole beneficiary listed on George’s Kentucky

Public Employees deferred compensation account. The latter designation was

made in 2008.2

                In June 2016, George died from injuries sustained in a motor vehicle

accident. George’s will was admitted to probate. In November 2016, Keith was

appointed executor of George’s estate. The probate assets at the time of George’s

death consisted of some insurance proceeds,3 rental property in Lexington, and

some personal property. According to the terms of the will, after payment of debts

and expenses, the remainder of George’s assets were to go to Junior’s trust. The

POD accounts and deferred compensation accounts were considered non-probate

items and passed directly to Keith.

                In September 2020, Tony and Tabatha, on behalf of Junior, brought

suit against Keith in his individual and trustee capacities. The gist of Junior’s

2
    Frances Jordan was listed as contingent beneficiary on this document.
3
  The record indicates that these proceeds were from a wrongful death claim stemming from the
automobile accident, reduced by a medical subrogation claim related to George’s care prior to
his death.

                                                -3-
complaint was that George intended Junior to inherit everything he owned, and that

Keith’s designation as beneficiary of the POD and deferred compensation accounts

was meant only insofar as Keith was named successor trustee of the trust created

for Junior.

                In October 2021, after discovery was completed, Keith moved for

summary judgment. Junior answered and filed a motion for summary judgment of

his own. A hearing on the competing motions was held on December 14, 2021,

and the circuit court entered its order denying Junior’s motion and granting Keith’s

motion for summary judgment two weeks later. Junior timely appealed.

                We begin by stating the standard of review, recently summarized in

Lawson v. Smith, 652 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Ky. App. 2022):

                       The standard of review upon appeal of an order
                granting summary judgment is “whether the trial court
                correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to
                any material fact and that the moving party was entitled
                to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916
                S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996) (citing CR[4] 56.03).
                Upon a motion for summary judgment, all facts and
                inferences in the record are viewed in a light most
                favorable to the non-moving party and “all doubts are to
                be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
                Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Thus,
                a summary judgment looks only to questions of law, and
                we review a trial court’s decision to grant summary
                judgment de novo. Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777,
                781 (Ky. App. 2016); see also Blackstone Mining Co. v.
                Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Ky. 2010), as

4
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           -4-
                 modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 23, 2011). However,
                 “[a] party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot
                 rely on the hope that the trier of fact” would simply
                 “disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but
                 must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a
                 properly supported motion for summary judgment.”
                 Ryan v. Fast Lane, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 787, 790 (Ky. App.
                 2012) (citing Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 481).

With these standards in mind, we turn to Junior’s appeal.

                 Junior first argues that Keith was never intended by George to inherit

the lion’s share of George’s assets. To support this argument, Junior references

depositions and affidavits of family members and acquaintances that attest to the

fact that it was George’s wish for Junior’s trust to be the recipient of George’s

accumulated wealth. There was also parol evidence regarding Keith’s financial

soundness5 compared to Junior’s multiple physical challenges which will make it

significantly more difficult to achieve financial independence when he reaches

majority.

                 However, the POD accounts are contractual in nature and are not

considered part of the probate estate. Instead, they are governed by Kentucky

Revised Statute (KRS) 391.300(10), namely, ‘“P.O.D. account’ means an account

payable on request to one (1) person during lifetime and on his death to one (1) or

more P.O.D. payees, or to one (1) or more persons during their lifetimes and on the

5
    Keith is an electrical engineer with a master’s degree.

                                                  -5-
death of all of them to one (1) or more P.O.D. payees[.]” And KRS 391.300(11)

states, “‘P.O.D. payee’ means a person designated on a P.O.D. account as one to

whom the account is payable on request after the death of one (1) or more

persons[.]” The circuit court concluded, pursuant to these two statutory sections,

as well as the fact that the POD instruments themselves contained no ambiguities,

that “[e]xtrinsic evidence cannot be admitted to vary the terms of a written

instrument[,]” and “[t]he intention of parties . . . must be gathered from the four

corners of that instrument.” Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Ky.

2000) (citations omitted). The credit union PODs name Keith as beneficiary, not

as trustee of Junior’s trust, but as an individual. The PODs were established after

George signed the will and trust documents. It was thus incumbent upon George to

designate Keith in his capacity as successor trustee in order for the PODs’ assets to

be payable, upon George’s death, to Junior’s trust. But the PODs make no mention

of the trust and only list Keith as beneficiary in his individual capacity.

             A similar analysis applies to the Kentucky Public Employees deferred

compensation funds, which was established prior to the will’s existence. Had

George intended to amend Keith’s capacity as beneficiary from individual to

trustee, he was required to do so after 2010 and before his death. Neither the will

nor the trust reference the deferred compensation account and vice versa. As the

circuit court stated, “the Retirement Account is a contract between the Decedent

                                          -6-
and the Kentucky Public Employees’ Deferred Compensation Authority, and its

beneficiary designation form is a part of the contract.” Again, applying contract

law, the four corners of the document dictate that extrinsic evidence cannot be used

to alter its terms. Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d at 178. We find no error in the circuit

court’s determination that Keith was the intended beneficiary of those accounts.

               We likewise are not persuaded by Junior’s argument that the circuit

court erred by failing to apply the doctrines of the “polar star rule” or “testatorial

absolutism.” Neither is applicable under the facts of this case. The contracts are

unambiguous, and George’s mental capacity was not at issue. We find no error in

that regard.

               Junior’s final argument is that George’s true intent, by designating

Keith as successor trustee, was that all assets naming Keith as beneficiary, both

prior to and after George established Junior’s trust, be made to Keith solely as

trustee, rather than in his individual capacity. In support of this assertion, Junior

points to the following language in Article 3 of the trust document: “After my

death the trust property, including any property payable to the Trustee as a result of

my death, shall be disposed of as provided in this Article.” Junior urges that the

circuit court erred in ignoring this language.

               We decline to address this issue other than again to state that all

documents before us – testamentary and otherwise – are unambiguous and should

                                           -7-
be discerned on the contents within their four corners. All cases cited by Junior

can be distinguished from the situation within the Slaughter family.

             The circuit court was correct in determining that there were no

genuine issues of material fact and that Keith Slaughter was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Lawson, 652 S.W.3d at 645.

             The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Douglas T. Hawkins                        Escum L. Moore, III
Lexington, Kentucky                       Lexington, Kentucky

                                          John D. Meyers, Jr.
                                          Lexington, Kentucky

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