Court Opinion

ID: 9582834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:31:48.10576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:34.893489
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
The court correctly concludes that Hyda-burg waived its claim to sovereign immunity. Although I concur in this result, I write separately because I disagree with the court’s analysis in reaching this conclusion.
It is settled law that when a tribe brings an action in court, the tribe necessarily consents to the court’s jurisdiction to determine the claims brought against the tribe.1 See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). Accordingly, since HCA requested the superior court to order arbitration, HCA necessarily consented to the court’s jurisdiction and waived any claims to sovereign immunity. This consent disposes of the issue of sovereign immunity, making discussion of contractual arbitration provisions, and principles of international law, superfluous.
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the longstanding doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991). Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
A doctrine of Indian tribal immunity was originally enunciated by this Court, and has been reaffirmed in a number of cases. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 [39 S.Ct. 109, 110, 63 L.Ed. 291] (1919); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 [98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106] (1978). Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with such tribal immunity or to limit it. Although Congress has occasionally authorized limited classes of suits against Indian tribes, it has never authorized suits to enforce tax assessments. Instead, Congress has consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. 1451 et seq., and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 88 Stat. 2203, 25 U.S.C. 450 et seq. These Acts reflect Congress’ desire to promote the “goal of Indian self-government, including its ‘overriding goal’ of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 [107 S.Ct. 1083, 1092, 94 L.Ed.2d 244] (1987). Under these circumstances, we are not disposed to modify the long-established principle of tribal sovereign immunity.
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, — U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 910, 112 L.Ed.2d at 1120.
One of the fundamental principles of tribal sovereign immunity is that a tribe’s immunity remains intact unless surrendered in express and unequivocal terms. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). Moreover, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed. Id. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the notion that contractual arbitration provisions suffice to waive tribal immunity. Pan American Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416 *759(9th Cir.1989); see also American Indian Agric. Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 1377-78 (8th Cir.1985); Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 773 (D.C.Cir.1986). In Pan American the court noted that, based on its earlier holding in United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir.1981), two subsequent state court cases have interpreted contractual arbitration provisions as waiving tribal immunity. 884 F.2d at 419 (citing Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors, 658 P.2d 756 (Alaska 1983); Val/Del, Inc. v. Superior Court, 145 Ariz. 558, 703 P.2d 502, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920, 106 S.Ct. 250, 88 L.Ed.2d 257 (1985)). Correcting the misconception that Oregon supported such a result, the court stated: “Our decision in United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir.1981), in no way lessens the fundamental principle that tribal sovereign immunity remains intact unless surrendered in express and unequivocal terms.” Pan American, 884 F.2d at 419. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that its earlier holding in Oregon was not premised on the arbitration clause, but on the tribe’s consent to suit in prior, related litigation. Id. at 420. Moreover, the court stated:
Whether or to what extent this arbitration clause constituted a waiver of the Band’s tribal sovereign immunity turns on the terms of that clause. Santa Clara Pueblo commands that waiver may only be found if the clause unequivocally and expressly indicates the Band’s consent to waive its sovereign immunity.
Id. at 418 (citations omitted). The Pan American court conceded that Oregon’s, finding of waiver probably tests the outer limits of Santa Clara Pueblo’s admonition against implied waivers,” and noted that “several post-Oregon Ninth Circuit cases have reaffirmed the principle that tribal consent to suit must be unequivocally expressed.” Id. at 420.
Further, the court’s reliance on principles of foreign sovereign immunity under principles of international law are, in my view, misplaced. The sovereign powers of Indian nations have long been distinguished from those powers of other sovereign nations. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831). Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations, which exercise all powers of inherent sovereignty not otherwise extinguished by acts of Congress. Id. Chief Justice Marshall observed in Cherokee Nation that “[t]he condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.... [T]he relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else.” Id. at 16. Because of the special relationship requiring the United States to adhere strictly to the trust relationship in its dealings with Indians, there is a strong presumption against waiver by Indian tribes. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). Therefore, the international law doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity favoring waiver is inapplicable in the context of tribal sovereign immunity.
I dissent from the majority’s holding that HCA’s assets may be executed upon because HCA failed to meet its burden of proving that its assets are protected under § 16 of the IRA. The record shows that at the July 20, 1990 hearing, the superior court never reached the issue of whether the assets were the assets of a § 16 or § 17 entity. Such a determination is necessary before execution can be had on the judgment because control over tribal assets is retained in the tribe’s governing body pursuant to § 16, except where that body specifically transfers assets to a § 17 corporation.2
That HCA was involved in a commercial agreement does not overcome the presumption that its assets are exempt from execution unless specifically conveyed or set aside to the § 17 corporation. See S. Unique, Ltd. v. Gila River Pima-Marico-*760pa Indian Community, 674 P.2d 1376, 1382 (Ariz.App.1983) (“The distinction to be made is not between commercial and governmental functions in order to determine the availability of the defense of sovereign immunity.”); see also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat’l. Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 227, 17 L.Ed.2d 143 (1966) (“The fact that the [ ] Tribe was engaged in an enterprise private or commercial in character, rather than governmental, is not material.”). Thus, I believe that in order for execution to be had against the assets of HCA, it must first be shown that such assets were conveyed or assigned to the § 17 corporation.

. This consent does not apply to crossclaims. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 S.Ct. 653, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940). Neither does a tribe waive its sovereign immunity by filing an action for declaratory relief. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991).

. 25 U.S.C. § 476 expressly gives tribes organized under it the right to "prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe.” See abo F. Cohen, Federal Indian Law 326 n. 381 (1982 ed.).