Court Opinion

ID: 9707131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:02:54.065054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:28.324190
License: Public Domain

BELSON, Associate Judge,
concurring in result.
I join in the opinion of the court except for its holding that the erroneous exclusion of evidence of the bad reputation of Sheila Bassil for truth and veracjty was error of constitutional dimension.
I think there is no constitutional right to impeach a government witness by evidence of bad reputation for truth and veracity. The legislature, I submit, could enact a law eliminating reputation impeachment without violating the constitution.1 Therefore, in my view, the trial judge's error was non-constitutional in nature, and our review for harmless error should be under the less stringent formula set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, *71890 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) rather than the test for constitutional error announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed. (1967).2 Cf. Parks v. United States, 451 A.2d 591, 610 n. 37 (D.C.1982) (Kotteakos test applied where trial court excluded cumulative impeachment testimony of defense investigator concerning witness’ identification of defendant).
The majority states, correctly, that by bringing out extrinsic evidence of a witness’ bad reputation, a defendant seeks to do the same thing that he may accomplish by cross-examination, viz., to tarnish the credibility of a government witness. But it does not necessarily follow, as the majority would conclude, that the erroneous exclusion of the extrinsic evidence of the government witness’ reputation for untruthfulness is a Sixth Amendment violation. Such logic would lead to the conclusion that every erroneous exclusion of evidence bearing on the credibility of a government witness is constitutional error, a result that is far-reaching and unsupportable in view of the many forms of credibility impeachment available. See, generally, McCoRmick Evidence, §§ 33-50 (3rd ed. 1984), regarding methods of impeachment. Moreover, in dealing with reputation testimony concerning character for veracity, we are dealing with one of the least reliable methods of credibility impeachment. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477, 480, 69 S.Ct. 213, 219, 220, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948).
I recognize that, in this jurisdiction, when the defendant calls a witness to testify concerning a government witness’ character for truthfulness, the defendant is limited to adducing testimony concerning the government witness’ reputation for truthfulness, rather than adducing testimony that expresses the impeaching witness’ own opinion of the truthfulness of the government witness. Cf. Marcus v. United States, 476 A.2d 1134, 1138 (D.C.1984). As a result, when a trial judge excludes reputation impeachment, the judge effectively excludes any testimony concerning the government witness’ character for truthfulness.
The question is, therefore, whether the Constitution mandates that defendant be enabled to adduce some sort of evidence of a government witness’ character regarding truthfulness, whether it be opinion evidence or reputation evidence. The answer, I think, is in the negative. Evidence of an opposing witness’ character for truthfulness seems quite removed from the core rights protected by the confrontation clause (cross-examination, including the right to impeach by showing bias), see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), and by the compulsory process clause (subpoena power and the right of a defendant to present a defense). See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1922-1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).
There can be no doubt that the Constitution requires that a defendant be given ample means to call into question the credibility of a government witness. However, in light of the existence of other effective, probably superior, methods of credibility impeachment, I submit that it is inappropriate to constitutionalize the defendant’s right to call witnesses to testify concerning a government witness’ character for truthfulness.

. In fact, the Advisory Committee’s 1969 preliminary draft of FED.R.EVID. 608(a) allowed testimony of opinion only, i.e., not reputation, as to the credibility of a witness. 3 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE, ¶ 608[02] (1985).

. Those tests are set forth in the opinion of the majority at footnotes 3 and 4.