Court Opinion

ID: 9552005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:03:22.573182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:22.638752
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting).
For the following reasons I dissent.
Article 8, Section 9, Utah State Constitution, provides that the decisions of the district court on appeals to it from justices of the peace shall be final, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute. Ordinances fall within this provision as well. The Constitution attaches no condition to the right to take an appeal, from the judgment of a district court, of a matter originating in a justice’s court, which involves the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance. The Constitution does not say that the constitutional issue must first be raised in the court below. It *516simply, and forthrightly provides jurisdiction for this court to consider the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance, when it appears that such is involved.
That such can be done for the first time on appeal would appear clear from the oath of office given by members of this court upon accession to the bench. We swear to support, obey, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the constitution of this state. We do not swear to support, obey, and defend the Constitution, only if the constitutional issue is raised in the court below. That this should be the law is apparent from the oath we give, and from the fact that if an ordinance offends the Constitution, or is invalid for other reasons it is no law; and no conviction can stand under it. In my view the framers of our Constitution understood that and stated it very plainly in the section referred to above.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of a court to mete out punishment under a statute depends upon the validity of that statute. If •the statute is not valid, because of constitutional imperfection, a court has no jurisdiction to pronounce punishment under it. Furthermore, a party cannot confer jurisdiction on a court to act in a manner which is constitutionally impermissible. Yet, what is said in the main opinion is that, given an unconstitutional statute, a party can confer jurisdiction on a court to act under it, by not raising the issue prior to appeal. In such a way do we subvert the Constitution we have sworn to uphold.
The right to raise a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal is not new. In the matter of In Re Clark’s Estate,1 the constitutional question was neither suggested, briefed, or argued in the case prior to its submission for decision. Given these facts, the court said:
If an act of the Legislature is repugnant to the Constitution, the courts have the power, and it is their duty, so to declare. [Citations omitted.] We have held that while a constitutional question should be raised at the earliest opportunity, it may be raised for the first time in this court, unless waived, if that be possible. [Citations omitted.]
The court goes on to quote from Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 179, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), wherein Chief Justice Marshall said:
From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature. Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support! . . . Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States, .if that constitution forms no rule for his government? If it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him. If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime. [It will be remembered that in that case the court raised the constitutional issue sua sponte.]
The Montana court went on to say that if it declined to decide the constitutional question it would be avoiding the performance of a duty; and if the act in question were in fact unconstitutional and the court declined to so declare, such an act would be a violation of the oath of office.
In Schwartz v. People,2 another case passing on the constitutionality of a statute, raised for the first time on appeal, said:
The validity of the local option law seems not to have been directly chal*517lenged or passed upon in the court below, as being obnoxious to any provision of our state Constitution. ... If the law upon which the prosecution is based is unconstitutional, then it is no law and there can be no offense for the supposed violation of its terms. Whenever that question is presented and urged, although it be for the first time in a court of review, if it clearly appears, upon the face of the undisputed record, to be fairly involved, manifestly it commands and deserves the consideration and judgment of the court. Especially is this so in a criminal case where the very foundation of the cause rests upon the validity of the statute, and in which alone is found the power and authority of the court to act at all, else there might appear the anomaly of a person being found guilty of an offense under, and paying the penalty for violation of, despite a protest on this ground, the provision of a pretended law which in fact had and has no valid existence and is not a law. The facts are agreed, the statute law upon which the case is founded is before the court, and if it appears upon its face, when read and considered in connection with the organic law of the state, to contravene the latter, it is too clear to require argument that at least no judgment of conviction based on such law should be affirmed, leaving that question undetermined, although not directly urged in or decided by the trial court.
As can be seen, the rule requiring defenses based on constitutional grounds be first asserted in the lower court is not always strictly applied. Particularly is this so where the constitutional question arises “in cases involving the deprivation of life or liberty.” 3
This court has heretofore addressed itself to a situation, similar to the one here on appeal, where the constitutional issue was first raised on appeal. In the matter of In Re Woodward,4 Mr. Chief Justice Henriod in giving the opinion of the court said:
There may be some doubt as to whether we should review the two points on appeal having to do with the sections mentioned, supra, since they were raised on appeal for the first time. If what we say in this opinion would jeopardize the liberty of appellant . . . there would be authority for raising a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal.
What this court says in the main opinion certainly jeopardizes the liberty of appellant. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail.
The main and concurring opinions confuse trial tactics not objected to, at the trial level, with the constitutionality of the whole proceeding.
The attempt to try a matter anew, for the first time on appeal, by advancing a different theory, or by attacking an instruction not objected to at the trial, is by no stretch of the imagination concomitant with a constitutional. issue. The former may not affect the legality of the proceeding; the latter certainly does. The constitution is not subject to the proceedings, the trial tactics, if you will. The proceedings are subject to the constitution.
As in Schwarts (ibid), the ordinance before us appears on its face to raise two issues within the concept of due process.5 Is it void for vagueness, because it provides no proper standards for determination of its violation? Does it run counter *518to Christiansen v. Harris,6 wherein we said:
That no party can be affected by such action, until his legal rights have been the subject of an inquiry by a person or body authorized by law to determine such rights, of which inquiry the party has due notice, and at which he had an opportunity to be heard and to give evidence as to his rights or defenses.
Here the ordinance consigns a person to the status of a law-breaker after he refuses to remove weeds and other vaguely described objects, after having been given notice from the Director of the Board of Health — no hearing is provided.
With such vague standards governing the exercise of the discretion of the Director of the Board of Health, the subject ordinance would appear to permit and encourage an arbitrary enforcement of the law.7
We should entertain the issue and all cases in conflict herewith should be overruled.

. 105 Mont. 401, 74 P.2d 401, 406, 114 A.L.R. 496 (1937).

. 46 Colo. 239, 104 P. 92 (1909).

. 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, Section 574.

. 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110 (1963).

.Article 1, Section 7, Constitution of Utah; Amendment 14; Sec. 1, Constitution of the United States.

. 109 Utah 1, 7, 163 P.2d 314 (1945).

. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972).