Court Opinion

ID: 9710772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:17:24.822644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:59.883291
License: Public Domain

Marbury, C. J.,
delivered the following dissenting opinion, in which Henderson, J., concurred.
One of the important questions in this case is whether the speed of appellant’s train was a proximate cause of the accident. The testimony most favorable to the ap*575pellees as to the speed is that of the witness Wright, who said it was going from 35 to 40 miles per hour. The town ordinance limited the speed to 20 miles per hour. When the engineer rounded the curve which was the first point at which he could see the Tasker car on the track, he was 312 feet away. At 20 miles an hour, the testimony showed that the average stopping distance would be 610 feet, so that had the train been going at the rate of speed allowed by the ordinance, it could not have stopped in time to avoid hitting the car.
On this point, the trial court instructed the jury that the mere violation of an ordinance regarding speed was not in itself negligence, but it might be considered in the determining whether such negligent operation at a greater speed than was reasonable under the circumstances was the proximate cause of the injury. The court then said: “In referring to proximate cause I mean this — if you decide that the speed was excessive under the circumstances but that the accident would have occurred, and that Mrs. Wright would have been injured, even if the train had been operating at a reasonable speed, then you may find that excessive speed was not the proximate cause of the injury to Mrs. Wright but that she was injured solely because of the position of the Tasker automobile in a place of danger.” Appellant specially excepted to the court’s instruction because it failed to instruct the jury that speed, under the evidence in this case, was not the proximate cause of the accident. It seems to me that the appellant was right in this respect and that the jury should have been so instructed.
In the case of Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. State, 188 Md. 646, 53 A. 2d 562, there were two questions of negligence, one involving the conduct of a switching operation where no flagman was left at the crossing when it was temporarily cleared by the switching train, and the other the speed of a northbound train on the adjacent track, which struck the truck in which the plaintiff’s decedent was riding. As in the instant case, the driver *576of the truck was negligent in proceeding across the track. The railroad company in that case asked the court to instruct the jury that there was no legally sufficient evidence from which the jury might find negligence in the operation of the train which struck the truck. We said that while there was legally sufficient evidence of negligence in the failure to provide additional warning at the crossing, we found no legally sufficient evidence of negligence in the operation of the northbound train, and the defendant was entitled to have this issue withdrawn from the consideration of the jury. The contention was that the speed of the northbound train was excessive. We said that speed in itself was not negligence per se, and that at the time the truck entered the tracks, the northbound train was too close to be stopped short of the crossing. '
In the case of Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Rodeheaver, 197 Md. 632, 81 Atl. 2d 63, we held that the speed of the train had no causal relation to Mr. Rodeheaver’s death, and reversed the judgment against the- railroad, because the trial court did not so instruct the jury. There the same contention as here was made by the railroad, namely that had the train been traveling at the legal speed of 20 miles per hour, it could not have been stopped in time to avoid the accident. We agreed with that point of view, and the majority opinion in the instant case cites the Rodeheaver case as authority for the statement that “had Tasker been the plaintiff, the speed of the train could not have been a proximate cause of the damage to his automobile.”
The damage to Mrs. Wright was caused by the impact between the train and the automobile, which caused the automobile to strike her. If the speed of the train was not a proximate cause of the impact between it and the automobile, then the only way by which it could have become a proximate cause of the impact between the automobile and Mrs. Wright was that the force engendered by the speed caused the automobile to strike her. That is the theory on which the case was submitted *577to the jury, and the theory adopted by the majority opinion.
It is suggested in support of that theory that had the train been proceeding at a speed not exceeding 20 miles per hour, the Tasker car would not have been driven into the appellee and she would have escaped injury. It is just as possible to think that had the train been going 60 or 70 miles an hour, it would have driven the automobile forward instead of turning it, so that it would not have struck the appellee. All of this is pure speculation and conjecture. No one can tell what would happen to an automobile hit by a train going 20 miles an hour, and the jury should not be permitted to guess or give its own version of what it might think would have happened under such circumstances. The evidence does not disclose any basis for a holding that the legal speed on the part of the train would have avoided the accident to Mrs. Wright, and, therefore, it does not give the court any basis for submitting to the jury the decision whether the speed of the train was the proximate cause of the accident. The whole idea is merely a theory and an assumption which has no foundation in any testimony, or in any proper inference from any testimony. Such a question should not have been submitted to the jury under the evidence in this case. The judgments should be reversed and the cases remanded for a new trial on this ground.
Judge Henderson authorizes me to say that he agrees with the views herein expressed.