Court Opinion

ID: 9825808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:05:29.565375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:41.953544
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                             SHAUN WYRICH,

                                Appellant,

                                     v.

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                 Appellee.

                              No. 2D22-1458

                            September 1, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Mary M. Handsel,
Judge.

J. Andrew Crawford of J. Andrew Crawford, P.A., St. Petersburg, for
Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sonia C. Lawson,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

     Shaun Wyrich appeals the sentence rendered on April 7, 2022. Mr.
Wyrich was sentenced to fifteen years in prison with a four-year
minimum mandatory for leaving the scene of a crash involving death
without rendering aid in violation of section 316.027(2)(c), Florida
Statutes (2020). He was also sentenced to time served for driving a
motorcycle without a driver license in violation of section 322.57(1)(g),
Florida Statutes (2020). Because the sentencing judge referenced
uncharged conduct during sentencing and the State failed to prove that
the trial court did not rely upon that uncharged conduct, we reverse and
remand for a new sentencing hearing before a different judge.
                                     I
     On the evening of December 5, 2020, Mr. Wyrich was on his way
home from work, traveling at a high rate of speed on his motorcycle,
when he crossed a solid double line in order to pass another vehicle and
struck a seven-year-old child. The child later died from the sustained
injuries. Mr. Wyrich left the scene but turned himself in to law
enforcement the following day.
     At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Wyrich, who was nineteen at the
time of the incident, entered an open plea of guilty, and requested a
youthful offender downward departure sentence—six months of county
jail followed by five and one-half years of probation during which Mr.
Wyrich would receive mental health treatment. The sentencing judge
heard witness testimony and statement letters from Mr. Wyrich and his
family, as well as from the child victim's family. In support of the
downward departure, Mr. Wyrich's counsel argued that Mr. Wyrich had
voluntarily turned himself in, was remorseful for the pain and suffering
caused, and had turned his life around since the crash.
     A presentence investigation (PSI) was prepared and submitted to
the sentencing judge. The PSI included a prior criminal case in which
Mr. Wyrich received a twenty-four-month probation sentence after
entering a negotiated plea of guilty to two felony drug sales committed on
August 20, 2020. The PSI also included facts related to uncharged
conduct that occurred on the morning before the crash, namely Mr.

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Wyrich's presence at his residence when his roommate returned fire after
another individual fired gunshots into their residence and Mr. Wyrich's
disposal of the roommate's gun used in the incident. Pursuant to the
PSI, Mr. Wyrich's lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal
Punishment Code was 124.8 months in prison, but he could be
sentenced to up to thirty years with a four-year minimum mandatory
sentence if he was not sentenced as a youthful offender. The victim's
mother requested that Mr. Wyrich receive twenty years in state prison
with a four-year minimum mandatory, and the State agreed with the
request.
     In opposing the request for a downward departure, the State
argued that Mr. Wyrich was on pretrial release for the prior drug offenses
referenced in the PSI at the time of the crash. Further, the State
elaborated on the uncharged conduct, stating that this information
should be allowed "so that the [c]ourt has a better understanding of who
this defendant is." Unfamiliar with the uncharged conduct, the
sentencing judge indicated that she would hear from the State regarding
that conduct. Without objection, the State provided the sentencing judge
with a copy of the police report regarding the uncharged shooting
incident. The report alleged that marijuana was found in the residence
and that Mr. Wyrich disposed of the gun involved in the gunfire. The
State also brought up an out-of-court statement from another individual,
who alleged that at the time of the accident Mr. Wyrich was on his way to
dispose of the gun. The State argued that both the uncharged conduct
and the instant case involved the concealment and destruction of
evidence. During the presentation of the State's evidence, the judge was
engaged in the State's presentation of the uncharged conduct,
summarizing and commenting on the evidence. Ultimately, the State

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requested that the court sentence Mr. Wyrich to twenty years'
imprisonment with a four-year minimum mandatory.
     At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court adjudicated
Mr. Wyrich guilty on both counts. Mr. Wyrich was sentenced to time
served for driving a motorcycle without a license, a misdemeanor.
Regarding leaving the scene of a crash involving death without rendering
aid, the court stated: "Although you qualify for the youthful offender
departure, I am choosing not to exercise my discretion. I'm going to
sentence you to 15 years in the Department of Corrections with a four
year minimum mandatory." The court went on to explain:
            All right. Sir, I want to say a couple of things on the
     record. Number one, in this particular case the probable
     cause affidavit in this state and you have entered a plea to it
     that you were driving almost 64 miles an hour in a 30 mile an
     hour residential zone. That you overtook another vehicle on a
     double yellow line. You were on a motorcycle. Obviously, you
     were driving recklessly. There's no other choice about that.
            You hit a small child. You had to know that you hit a
     small child. Unlike an SUV or a car or something like that
     where you might not have seen him. You had to look him in
     the face in the back when you hit him.
            Now, granted I understand that must have weighed on
     you and that's why you turned yourself in. But you had an
     opportunity to stop and assist and I know there was other
     people but you had to know when you hit him that he was a
     little kid. You had to know. I'm not saying you didn't panic.
     But there's times in our life with all the things that were going
     on in your life, you were selling drugs, you were hanging
     around with drug dealers, they're shooting up the car, they
     shooting up the house, you're throwing the gun in the—you
     were living a bad life and I'm glad to know that you've turned
     your life around.
(Emphasis added.)

                                     4
     Mr. Wyrich's counsel concedes that no objection was made to the
uncharged conduct and argues that the error here was fundamental.1
                                     II
     Defendants are afforded no constitutional due process right to
correct unpreserved errors. Smith v. State, 320 So. 3d 20, 27 (Fla. 2021)
(citing Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970)); see also
Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla 4th DCA 2016) (stating that
sentences within statutory limits are generally not subject to appellate
review (quoting Howard v. State, 820 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. 4th DCA
2002))). The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that
"appellate courts should 'exercise . . . discretion under the doctrine of
fundamental error very guardedly.' " Smith, 320 So. 3d at 27 (quoting
Sanford, 237 So. 2d at 137); see also State v. Garcia, 346 So. 3d 581,
585-86 (Fla. 2022) (holding that there was no fundamental error where
sentencing court issued sentence within statutory range after
considering improper evidence). For an unpreserved error to be so
fundamental as to warrant reversal, "the error must be basic to the
judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process."
Hannum v. State, 13 So. 3d 132, 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quoting
Hopkins v. State, 632 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 1994)).
     A subsequent arrest or charge is not a proper factor for the
sentencing judge to consider under Florida's Criminal Punishment Code.
See Norvil v. State, 191 So. 3d 406, 409 (Fla. 2016) (relying upon the
clear definitions in sections 921.231(1)(c) and 921.0021(5), Florida
Statutes (2010), which reference "primary offense" and "prior record" as

     1 In responding to the uncharged conduct, Mr. Wyrich's counsel

did, however, apprise the sentencing judge that Mr. Wyrich was a
"victim" and had not been charged with any crimes for that conduct.

                                     5
required information included in a presentencing investigation report for
consideration by the sentencing judge—and not subsequent arrest or
record).2 "[C]onsideration of an improper factor such as uncharged
offenses goes to the heart of the sentencing process, [and thus] the error
is fundamental." Challis v. State, 157 So. 3d 393, 396-97 (Fla. 2d DCA
2015) (granting petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel where sentencing court speculated that defendant probably
caused ten to twenty deaths from his drug trafficking); see also
Hernandez v. State, 145 So. 3d 902, 904-05 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
(reversing increased sentence where sentencing judge heard information
about impending charges).
      However, the mere fact that a sentencing judge hears improper
information related to uncharged conduct during a sentencing hearing
does not necessarily warrant reversal. See Serrano v. State, 279 So. 3d
296, 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ("While a court's consideration of
constitutionally impermissible factors generally rises to the level of
fundamental error, there must be some indication that the court based
its sentence on an impermissible factor before this Court will reverse."
(citing Barlow v. State, 238 So. 3d 416, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018))). We
recognize that while trial judges may hear improper information from
time to time during sentencing hearings, trial judges must act within the
bounds of the law and neither consider nor act upon that improper
information. Cf. Mercado v. State, 353 So. 3d 1257, 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA
2023) (stating the record reflected "no inkling that the trial court relied
upon impermissible factors"); N.D.W. v. State, 235 So. 3d 1001, 1002

      2 " 'Prior record' means a conviction for a crime committed by the

offender, as an adult or a juvenile, prior to the time of the primary
offense." § 921.0021(5), Fla. Stat. (2022).

                                      6
(Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (reversing juvenile disposition order where trial court
overruled defense counsel's objections to references to pending charges
and sentenced defendant consistent with State's recommendation).
Where the record " 'may reasonably be read to suggest' that a defendant's
sentence was the result, at least in part, of the consideration of
impermissible factors," reversal is required. Love v. State, 235 So. 3d
1037, 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (quoting Mosley v. State, 198 So. 3d 58,
60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)); see also Norvil, 191 So. 3d at 410 (holding that
consideration of a subsequent arrest without conviction at sentencing
results in fundamental error).
                                     III
     On this record, the State bears the burden to show that the
sentencing judge did not rely upon the uncharged conduct. See Love,
235 So. 3d at 1039, 1040 n.1 ("We cannot say that the trial court did not
consider [the uncharged conduct presented by the State] in imposing
sentence."); see also Fernandez v. State, 212 So. 3d 494, 496-97 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2017) (holding that the State failed to carry its burden where
sentencing court specifically referred to the new offense during
sentencing). Here, the State first relies upon Mercado to argue that the
sentencing judge "focused exclusively on the facts of the crime" when
rendering its sentence. We do not find merit in this argument. In
Mercado, as in this case, the State presented evidence of uncharged
incidents; Mr. Mercado allegedly threatened through text messages to
shoot and kill his former partner's father. 353 So. 3d at 1258. Also as in
this case, the State in Mercado advised the sentencing judge that the
investigation into the texts was still ongoing. Id. The similarities
between Mercado and this case end there. Contrary to the facts in
Mercado, the sentencing judge in this case addressed the uncharged

                                     7
conduct when explaining the reason for Mr. Wyrich's sentence.3 And so
the State in this case cannot show that the sentencing judge "focused
exclusively on the facts of the crime" when rendering the sentence.
     The State next argues that the court's reference to the uncharged
conduct during Mr. Wyrich's sentencing was simply a justification for
why the court refused to honor Mr. Wyrich's request for a downward
departure. Cf. Godwin v. State, 160 So. 3d 497, 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)
(holding that trial court may consider remorse when deciding whether to
mitigate sentence); Shelton v. State, 59 So. 3d 248, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA
2011) (holding that trial court permissibly commented on defendant's
lack of remorse to explain why it lacked the ability to mitigate the
sentence). We also reject this argument. Neither the State nor the
sentencing judge questioned Mr. Wyrich's lack of remorse. The State
presented the uncharged conduct, in its own words, "so that the [c]ourt
has a better understanding of who this defendant is." The court
referenced marijuana found in Mr. Wyrich's residence on the day his
roommate returned gunfire after shots were fired into their residence and
also referenced Mr. Wyrich's disposal of the gun involved in the
shooting—leading the sentencing judge to the conclusion that Mr. Wyrich
was "living a bad life." The evidence presented led to the exact result
that the State intended. For these reasons, we hold that the State failed
to carry its burden of proof showing that the fifteen-year sentence here
was not based upon the sentencing judge's consideration of the

     3 The sentencing judge in this case also agreed to hear the evidence

of the uncharged conduct and was engaged when that evidence was
being offered and argued. Our opinion does not rest upon these
additional facts, but we mention them to caution trial courts from
commenting on impermissible sentencing factors, such as uncharged
conduct, if they should be presented—even without objection.

                                     8
uncharged conduct. See Love, 235 So. 3d at 1040 (holding that while
the sentencing judge made no specific mention of the uncharged offenses
presented by the State, the State failed to meet its burden of proof of
showing that the court relied on impermissible factors in imposing the
sentence).
                                     IV
     Accordingly, because the error here was fundamental and because
the State failed to meet its burden of proof that the fifteen-year sentence
was not based upon consideration of the uncharged conduct, we reverse
the fifteen-year sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing before
a different judge. See id.; Fernandez, 212 So. 3d at 497; Gray v. State,
964 So. 2d 884, 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
     Reversed and remanded.

VILLANTI and BLACK, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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