Court Opinion

ID: 9375280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 08:09:55.771057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:57.354308
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________

           No. 02-22-00143-CR
      ___________________________

ISAAC ANTHONY CASTRELLON, Appellant

                     V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS

     On Appeal from 396th District Court
           Tarrant County, Texas
         Trial Court No. 1589127D

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Isaac Anthony Castrellon appeals his sentences of ten years’

imprisonment1 for the offenses of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury,

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and accident involving serious bodily injury.

We will affirm.

                                    I. Background

       In June 2019, Castrellon was indicted for (1) second-degree felony aggravated

assault causing serious bodily injury (Count 1), (2) second-degree felony aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon (Count 2), and (3) third-degree felony accident involving

serious bodily injury (Count 3). The indictment also contained a separate deadly-

weapon-finding-notice paragraph.2

       In July 2021, the State offered Castrellon a plea bargain whereby he would

receive six years’ incarceration in exchange for a guilty plea. However, Castrellon

rejected the State’s offer.

       In January 2022, after being admonished by the trial court, Castrellon pleaded

guilty 3 to all three offenses and “true” to the indictment’s deadly weapon allegation.

       1
        As detailed below, these sentences are to run concurrently.
       2
        This paragraph indicates that a “DEADLY WEAPON, NAMELY: A
MOTOR VEHICLE” was used during the commission of or immediate flight from
the offenses.
       3
        Castrellon entered an “open plea”—that is, a guilty plea without the benefit of
a plea agreement.

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Although Count 3 is a third-degree felony with a punishment range of two to ten

years and a fine not to exceed $10,000, the written admonishment form listed the

punishment range for all three offenses as two to 20 years in prison and a fine not to

exceed $10,000 (the punishment range applicable to second-degree felonies).

Nevertheless, Castrellon signed the admonishment form, which contained a written

waiver including acknowledgments that, among other things, Castrellon fully

understood the trial court’s admonishments and had no questions; he was aware of

the consequences of his plea; and his plea was knowingly, freely, and voluntarily

entered. The trial court acknowledged that the admonishments had been given, that

Castrellon’s plea was intelligently, freely, and voluntarily entered, and that the court

was accepting Castrellon’s guilty plea.

      In July 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. After receiving the

presentence investigation report and hearing from Castrellon’s three witnesses, the

trial court sentenced Castrellon to ten years’ imprisonment on each count, with the

sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.

                                    II. Discussion

      On appeal, Castrellon raises two points. First, he asserts that his guilty plea was

involuntary because he was admonished for a second-degree felony punishment range

for all three offenses but the third count with which he was charged—accident

involving serious bodily injury—is actually a third-degree felony. Second, he contends

that the deadly weapon findings in the trial court’s judgments should be stricken

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because they are not sufficiently specific and do not match the allegations in the

indictment.

A.    Point One: The Trial Court’s Incorrect Admonishment Did Not Render
      Castrellon’s Guilty Plea Involuntary
      In his first point, Castrellon argues that the trial court’s failure to properly

admonish him of the correct punishment range for Count 3 rendered his decision to

enter a guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. This argument lacks merit.

      Under Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a trial court

must admonish a defendant of the punishment range attached to the offense before

accepting the defendant’s guilty plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(1).

The purpose of Article 26.13 is to ensure that only constitutionally valid pleas—those

that are both knowing and voluntary—are entered by defendants and accepted by trial

courts. Meyers v. State, 623 S.W.2d 397, 402–03 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981)

(citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970)). An admonishment

that substantially complies with Article 26.13 is sufficient and establishes a prima facie

case that the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 26.13(c); Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

      The Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed us that when the record reflects

that the trial court incorrectly admonished a defendant regarding the punishment

range but assessed punishment within both the actual and misstated ranges, the

admonishment substantially complies with Article 26.13. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197;

                                            4
see Lemmons v. State, 133 S.W.3d 751, 757 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d).

The burden then shifts to the defendant to affirmatively show that he was not aware

of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed, such that the plea

was rendered involuntary. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197 (interpreting Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c)); Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 757. In other words, once

substantial compliance is shown, “[a] defendant may still raise the claim that his plea

was not voluntary; however, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he

did not fully understand the consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm.”

Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197.

      Here, the trial court substantially complied with Article 26.13(a)(1) because it

assessed Castrellon’s punishment within the actual and misstated ranges.4

See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197. Thus, to prevail on his first point, Castrellon must

affirmatively show that, despite the trial court’s substantial compliance, he was not

aware of the consequences of his plea as it related to the correct punishment range for

his offenses and was misled or harmed by the court’s admonishment. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c); Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 759. Castrellon has not met

this burden.

      4
       As noted above, the admonishment form incorrectly stated the punishment
range as two to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine not to exceed $10,000—the range
for second degree felonies—whereas the actual punishment range for Count 3—a
third degree felony—was two to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine not to exceed
$10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33–12.34. Thus, the trial court’s sentence of
ten years’ imprisonment falls within both the actual and misstated ranges.

                                          5
      In Martinez, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that because “[t]he only

support in the record for appellant’s contention that his plea was involuntary [was] the

incorrect admonishment form,” the appellant had not sustained his burden to show

the involuntariness of his plea. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197. The same is true here.

Like the appellant in Martinez, Castrellon points to nothing in the appellate record

except the incorrect admonishment form to indicate that he was actually harmed or

misled in making his determination to enter a guilty plea. See id. Instead, he relies

solely on the error in the admonishment form to show that his plea was involuntary.

Accordingly, Castrellon has not satisfied his burden. See id.

      We overrule Castrellon’s first point.

B.    Point Two: The Deadly Weapon Findings in the Judgments Need Not
      Be Stricken
      In his second point, Castrellon argues that the deadly weapon findings in the

trial court’s judgments should be stricken because they are not sufficiently specific and

do not accurately reflect the deadly weapon allegations in the indictment. Specifically,

Castrellon asserts that the recitation under the “Findings on Deadly Weapon” section

of each judgment of “Yes, not a firearm” constitutes an inaccurate, non-specific

deadly weapon finding. This argument is meritless.

      If a defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of or

the immediate flight from a felony offense, a deadly weapon finding may be entered

on the judgment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 42.01, § 1(21), 42A.054(b)–(c). A

                                              6
deadly weapon finding must be specific and separate from the charged offense.

Ex parte Brooks, 722 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Thus, “the judgment

must contain something more than, for example, the mere ‘recitation of the offense in

the judgment with the words ‘deadly weapon,’ or ‘firearm used,’ or other similar

phrases added to the offense for which the defendant is convicted.’” Cobb v. State, 95

S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (quoting Brooks, 722

S.W.2d at 142). But a trial court’s utilization of standard deadly weapon findings in

pre-printed judgment forms may satisfy the requirements of specificity and

separateness. See id. (holding that the standard Harris County affirmative deadly

weapon finding—“Affirmative finding: deadly weapon: yes (circled)”—satisfied the

requirements of separateness and specificity); Polanco v. State, 914 S.W.2d 269, 272

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, pet ref’d) (holding pre-printed, fill-in-the-blank

judgment containing “a pre-printed item: FINDING USE OF DEADLY

WEAPON” next to which was typed “Affirmative Finding” satisfied the requirements

of separateness and specificity). And a deadly weapon finding need not indicate the

specific type of deadly weapon found unless it was a firearm. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 42A.054(d); Hooks v. State, 860 S.W.2d 110, 114 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App.

1993) (interpreting former Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (repealed

2017)).

      Here, the trial court’s judgments indicated its deadly weapon finding in two

separate places.   As noted above, the first page of each judgment contained a

                                          7
recitation of “Yes, not a firearm” under the section labeled “Findings on Deadly

Weapon.” In addition, each judgment’s second page contained a section for “special

findings” under which the trial court noted “DEADLY WEAPON FINDING

NOTICE – TRUE.” These affirmative deadly weapon findings are specific and

separate from the charged offense and therefore satisfy the requirements of articles

42.01 and 42A.054 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. arts. 42.01, § 1(21), 42A.054(b)–(c); Brooks, 722 S.W.2d at 142.

      Castrellon suggests that the deadly weapon findings were inadequate because

they did not specifically identify the type of deadly weapon reflected in the

indictment—a motor vehicle.       But because the deadly weapon associated with

Castrellon’s offense was not a firearm, the judgment need not specify that the deadly

weapon was a motor vehicle. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.054(d); Hooks,

860 S.W.2d at 114 n.7.

      We overrule Castrellon’s second point.

                                   III. Conclusion

      Having overruled both of Castrellon’s points, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                                      /s/ Bonnie Sudderth
                                                      Bonnie Sudderth
                                                      Chief Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 23, 2023

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