Court Opinion

ID: 9365318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-23 19:00:35.30752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:44.769148
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 23 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CAPISTRANO UNIFIED SCHOOL                       No.    22-55295
DISTRICT, a local education agency,
                                                D.C. No.
                Plaintiff-Appellee,             8:18-cv-01896-JVS-DFM

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
S.W.; C.W., on behalf of their minor child,
B.W.,

                Defendants-Appellants.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted January 23, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: BENNETT and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,*** District
Judge.

      S.W. and C.W. on behalf of their minor child, B.W., (collectively, B.W.)

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the
District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
appeal from the district court’s order regarding attorneys’ fees, in which the district

court awarded only a portion of their requested fees incurred during an action under

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.

      We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review an award of

attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115,

1118 (9th Cir. 2000). We review a district court’s determination of prevailing party

status de novo. La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake

Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010). For the following reasons, we affirm.1

      1. The district court did not apply the wrong legal standard in determining the

proper fee award. Attorneys’ fees awarded under the IDEA “are governed by the

standards set forth by the Supreme Court in [Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424

(1983)] and its progeny.” Aguirre v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2006).

      “In Hensley, the Supreme Court set out a two-pronged approach for

determining the amount of fees to be awarded when a plaintiff prevails on only some

of his claims for relief or achieves ‘limited success.’” Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 912 F.3d 1147, 1172 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (citing Sorenson v.

Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001)). “First, we ask, ‘did the plaintiff fail to

1
 We GRANT B.W.’s motion for judicial notice of the administrative law judge’s
decision below (Dkt. No. 14). See Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. Sierra Pac.
Power Co., 295 F.3d 918, 924 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002).

                                          2                                    22-55295
prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded?’” Id.

(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).        “Second, we ask whether ‘the plaintiff

achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory

basis for making a fee award?’” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).

       The district court used that two-pronged approach and did not, as B.W. claims,

simply count the issues won without consideration of success as a whole. First, it

evaluated the relatedness of the six issues addressed in the litigation, concluding that

Issue Four—the sole issue on which B.W. prevailed in the litigation—is related to

Issues Three and Five but is unrelated to Issues One, Two, and Six. Second, it

explained that, even if the unrelated issues relate to Issue Four, the significance of

the relief obtained by Issue Four is not proportional to the hours expended on the

litigation. That is precisely the inquiry that Hensley requires.

       2. Applying Hensley, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding

that Issues One, Two, and Six are unrelated to Issue Four. “The test for relatedness

of claims is not precise.” Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1141 (9th

Cir. 1986). But the inquiry largely “rests on whether the ‘related claims involve a

common core of facts or are based on related legal theories,’” with “the focus . . . on

whether the claims arose out of a common course of conduct.” Ibrahim, 912 F.3d

at 1172 (quoting Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis

in original)).

                                           3                                    22-55295
      Here, Issue Four relates to Issues Three and Five, because they all involve the

questions about the same Individualized Education Program (IEP) developed for

B.W.’s first-grade year. By contrast, Issues One, Two, and Six involve a different

IEP for kindergarten and Capistrano’s failure to provide an IEP for second grade.

These issues thus address “a course of conduct entirely distinct and separate from

the course of conduct that gave rise to the injury on which the relief granted is

premised.” Thorne, 802 F.2d at 1141 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The

district court was “well within its discretion” in finding that these “several

unsuccessful claims are unrelated to [B.W.’s] lone successful claim” concerning

Issue Four. Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir.

1995).2

      3. The district court also did not err in concluding that B.W. did not prevail

on appeal. Generally, “[f]ees may be awarded for work performed in successfully

defending an award.” Stewart v. Gates, 987 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1993). But

as the district court explained, B.W. lost “all the substantive issues on appeal” and,

though she retained an order of reimbursement for occupational services, she did so

2
  Having affirmed the district court’s relatedness finding, we need not reach its
alternative finding that “even if the Court deemed Issue Four to be related to Issues
One, Two, and Six . . . the significance of the relief obtained by Issue Four is not
proportional to the hours expended on the litigation.” See Sorenson v. Mink, 239
F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Hours expended on unrelated, unsuccessful claims
should not be included in an award of fees.”).

                                          4                                   22-55295
in large part because of a waived argument on appeal on the part of Capistrano.

Moreover, we reversed the award of reimbursement for tuition and services for

second grade, see Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. S.W., Nos. 20-55961, 20-55987,

2021 WL 6196698, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2021), which constituted a significant

reduction of relief, Corder v. Gates, 104 F.3d 247, 250 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The net

result of the various appeals was a reduced award for plaintiffs. Accordingly,

plaintiffs were not the prevailing parties on appeal.”). It cannot be said that B.W.

successfully defended her award on appeal.

      AFFIRMED.

                                         5                                   22-55295