Court Opinion

ID: 9505589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:06:59.766534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:37.717846
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR TRANSFER
SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
The Chief of the Evansville Police Department imposed discipline on an officer, who appealed to the City's Police Merit Commission. The officer then sued the Commission, the Chief, and others, seeking to prevent a hearing on the merits of his appeal and challenging the Chief's right to hold office, the lawfulness of the Commission's existence and the validity of an agreement between the City and the Fraternal Order of Police. We hold that these matters may be the subject of review sought after any final decision of the Commission but may not be pursued collaterally through this lawsuit.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant Bradley A. Turner began his service with the Evansville Police Department in January 1995, hired from a list created by the Evansville Police Merit Commission. The current dispute began when Chief of Police Arthur A. Gann issued Turner written reprimands on two occasions in 1997, onee for failing to use reasonable care in the use of a motor vehicle, and again for failing to follow the police department's standard operating procedures.
Chief Gann suspended Turner in early August 1998 for twenty-one days, with pay, for giving false information in a statement to Internal Affairs and in testimony to the Merit Commission regarding a disciplinary action against another officer. Turner filed a notice of appeal with the Merit Commission regarding this suspension.
When Marvin D. Guest replaced Gann as Chief of Police in late August 1998, Chief Guest amended Turner's suspension to be served without pay. Turner appealed this amended suspension to the Merit Commission. In late 1998, Guest suspended Turner two more times, first for failing to follow standard operating procedures and "repeated violations," and later for being absent from roll call and his assigned posts at the time prescribed and for "repeated violations." (R. at 127-28, 130-31.) Turner filed a notice of appeal for each of these suspensions.
All three of Turner's appeals remain pending before the Merit Commission. Before they could be heard, Turner filed a lawsuit challenging the past and present Chiefs' right to office, the ordinance establishing the ' Merit Commission and an agreement between the City and the Fraternal Order of Police.: He asked the court to enjoin the Commission from conducting a disciplinary hearing while his lawsuit proceeded. The court issued such an order, and it still pends.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Among other things, it held the Evansville Police Merit Commission was properly constituted under the relevant statutes and that the Chief of Police was obliged by Article 6, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution to live inside the city limits. Turner v. City of Evansville, 729 N.E.2d 149 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). We grant transfer and vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
It has long been Indiana law that a claimant with an available administrative remedy must pursue that remedy before being allowed access to the courts. City of East Chicago v. Sinclair Refining Co., 232 Ind. 295, 111 N.E.2d 459 (1953). If a party fails to exhaust administrative remedies, the trial court lacks subject matter *862jurisdiction. Town Council of New Harmony v. Parker, 726 N.E.2d 1217 (Ind.2000).1
We recently re-emphasized the value of completing administrative proceedings before resorting to judicial review in State Bd. Of Tax Com'rs v. Montgomery, 730 N.E.2d 680, 684 (Ind.2000)(quoting State v. Sproles, 672 N.E.2d 1353, 1358 (Ind.1996)),
The reasons for requiring a party to seek administrative remedies are well established. Premature litigation may be avoided, an adequate record for judicial review may be compiled, and agencies retain the opportunity and autonomy to correct their own errors. Even if the ground of complaint is the unconstitutionality of the statute, which may be beyond the agency's power to resolve, exhaustion may still be required because 'administrative action may resolve the case on other grounds without confronting broader legal issues.'
(Citation omitted.)
Turner appropriately filed a notice of appeal of each of his suspensions with the Merit Commission, which would go forward but for the restraining order obtained by Turner. This right of appeal from discipline by a Chief is common in Indiana's various statutory schemes. Seq, e.g., Ind.Code Ann. § 36-8-8.5-19(b) (West 1997). A decision by the commission is also subject to judicial review. Ind.Code Ann. § 36-8-8.5-18 (West 1997). Turner's challenges to the Chief's authority, and the Commission's own compliance with relevant statutes may be challenged before the body and subsequently raised in court through the process of judicial review. See, e.g., City of Marion v. Antrobus, 448 N.E.2d 325 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (board whose composition was challenged at officer's disciplinary hearing later held on judicial review to be unlawfully constituted, officer's suspension reversed). To preserve these issues for judicial review, Turner must first present them at the administrative hearing. See Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (plaintiff waived challenge to authority of police chief by failing to make a timely objection at the hearing).
Turner was required to pursue his administrative remedies and may not avoid doing so through this collateral action.2 Consequently, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of Turner's amended complaint.
Conclusion
Having heard the City's motions, the trial court granted summary judgment and also ordered dismissal. It was the latter action that was appropriate. We affirm the dismissal and direct the court to dissolve the injunction preventing the Merit Commission from hearing Turner's appeal.
DICKSON, SULLIVAN, BOEHM, RUCKER, JJ., concur.
BOEHM, J., concurs with opinion, in which DICKSON and RUCKER, JJ., join.

. A party may gain judicial review without satisfying this prerequisite in limited circumstances, such as where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile, or where strict compliance would cause irreparable harm, or where the applicable statute is alleged to be void on its face. Bellamy v. Gillis, 722 N.E.2d 905, 909 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). None of these seem to apply here.

. A proper challenge to an office is made by filing a quo warranto action. Hovanec v. Diaz, 272 Ind. 342, 397 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (1979).