Court Opinion

ID: 9401028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 19:10:24.518194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.133802
License: Public Domain

[Cite as CAK Ventures, L.L.C. v. 1690 Timber Lake, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-1926.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                   DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 CAK VENTURES, LLC, ET AL.,                            JUDGES:
                                                       Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
         Appellant’s-Cross Appellees                   Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                                       Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
 -vs-
                                                       Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052
 1690 TIMBER LAKE, LLC

         Appellee-Cross Appellant                      OPINION

 and

 FRANK HOOK, ET AL.,

           Appellees

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                             Appeal from the Delaware County Court
                                                       of Common Pleas, Case No. 20 CVH 02-
                                                       0121

 JUDGMENT:                                             Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                               June 9, 2023

 APPEARANCES:

 For Appellees                                         For Appellant Patti Gilcrest

 GEOFFREY J. MOUL                                      JOSEPH C. PICKENS
 Murray Murphy Moul + Basil, LLP                       Isaac Wiles & Burkholder, LLC
 1114 Dublin Road                                      2 Miranova Place, Suite #700
 Columbus, Ohio 43215                                  Columbus, Ohio 43215

 For Appellants Patti Gilcrest and
 Yogesh Khandelwal

 SCOTT G. OXLEY
 Scott G. Oxley Co., LPA
 325 N. Main Street, Suite #204
 Springboro, Ohio 45066
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                     2

Hoffman, P.J.
       {¶1}   Defendants-appellants/cross-appellees Yogesh and Leena Khandelwal,

and Patti Gilcrest (“the Khandelwals” and “Gilcrest,” individually; “Appellants,” collectively)

appeal the May 24, 2022 Judgment Entry entered by the Delaware County Court of

Common Pleas, which granted, in part, and denied, in part, their motion for summary

judgment; and granted, in part, and denied, in part, the motion for summary judgment

filed by plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant 1690 Timber Lake LLC (“1690 Timber Lake”),

third-party defendants Timber Lake-Liberty LLC (“Timber Lake-Liberty”) and Frank Hook.

1690 Timber Lake has filed a conditional cross- appeal from the same judgment entry.

                            STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

                               The Lake and the Lake Restrictions

       {¶2}   Timber Lake (“the Lake”), which is located in Liberty Township, Delaware

County, Ohio, was formed by the installation of the Timber Lake Liberty Dam (“the Dam”)

in the 1950s. In the 1970s, the land around the Lake was subdivided and homes were

built thereon. A document entitled “Lake Restrictions” was created in 1976, and recorded

in the chain of title for each subdivided lot. The Lake Restrictions govern the use of the

Lake and grant “Shoreline and lake owners, their families and guest * * * full and exclusive

rights to freely use all water area of Timber Lake in such manner as not to interfere with

use by other lake front owners.”

       {¶3}   The Lake Restrictions further provide:

              No underwater property line shall be defined or structure erected in

       such a way as to limit use of water except within forty feet of owners

       shoreline. All other regulations, rules, improvements and control of every
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                               3

      sort, pertaining to the lake and its’ improvements, not in conflict with the

      above, shall be exclusively the responsibility of the Timber Lake Water

      Council, consisting only of shoreline and water owners and the owner of the

      dam embankment whether or not a shoreline or water owner.

             Each member of the Timber Lake Water Council shall be equal in

      authority and responsibility except on items requiring monetary expenditure

      based on shoreline footage owned, in which case any owner of 300 feet or

      more of shoreline shall have two votes. No assessment shall be made

      based on amount or proportion of water area owned.

      {¶4}   In the past, Shoreline Owners voluntarily paid what they could afford to pay

for sediment clean up, algae treatment, and other lake-related maintenance. The prior

owner of the property which is now owned by 1690 Timber Lake assumed the majority of

these costs. Some Shoreline Owners never paid for lake maintenance. The Water

Council never conducted regular meetings and did not operate like a homeowners’

association. The Water Council never imposed mandatory assessments or annual fees

on the Shoreline Owners.

                            Ownership of 1690 Timber Lake Drive

      {¶5}   The property at 1690 Timber Lake Drive was originally purchased by Timber

Lake-Liberty on June 19, 2009. On October 26, 2011, Timber Lake-Liberty transferred

its interest to the Judith D. Hook Revocable Trust, dated December 15, 1998, as amended

and restated (“the Hook Trust”). On October 18, 2018, the Hook Trust transferred the
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                 4

property to 1690 Timber Lake. The sole member of 1690 Timber Lake is the Hook Trust.

Judith Hook served as the trustee until her death in November, 2021.

       {¶6}   1690 Timber Lake owns the property along the southern side of the Lake.

Until 2010, the 1690 Timber Lake property was two parcels, which were separately

owned. In late 2009, an affiliate of 1690 Timber Lake purchased the part of the property

which included the upstream portion of the Dam. On October 21, 2010, through a series

of transactions involving affiliates of 1690 Timber Lake, the part of the property which

included the downstream portion of the Dam was purchased.             This transaction is

discussed in more detail, infra. The two parcels were combined and are now owned by

1690 Timber Lake.      1690 Timber Lake is a Shoreline Owner and the sole Dam

Embankment Owner.

                             Ownership of 1678 Timber Lake Drive

       {¶7}   On October 21, 2010, Vicki Logan, as trustee of the Vicki G. Logan

Revocable Trust (“Logan”), sold the downstream lower dam property located at 1678

Timber Lake Drive to 1678 Timber Lake, LLC (“1678 Timber Lake”). The sole managing

member of 1678 Timber Lake is the Hook Trust. 1678 Timber Lake transferred the 1678

Timber Lake Drive property to Timber Lake-Liberty on October 26, 2011. On the same

day, Timber Lake-Liberty transferred the 1678 Timber Lake Drive property to the Hook

Trust, which unified the said property with the property at 1690 Timber Lake Drive, forming

a single parcel. On October 4, 2018, the Hook Trust transferred the combined property

of 1678 Timber Lake Drive and 1690 Timber Lake Drive to 1690 Timber Lake.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                5

               Inspections of the Dam by Ohio Department of Natural Resources

      {¶8}   In 2009, after learning of the existence of the Dam, the Ohio Department of

Natural Resources (“ODNR”) conducted the first inspection of the Dam. In 2009 and

2011, ODNR sent letters to 1690 Timber Lake setting forth its findings and advising of the

deficiencies found with the Dam.         In early 2011, 1690 Timber Lake made several

alterations to the property around the Dam, including the installation of a culvert in the

spillway, construction of a driveway over the culvert, erection of a fence across the Dam,

placement of metal stakes upstream from the drain inlet, and creation of an artificial

waterfall near the new driveway.

      {¶9}   In 2014, ODNR again inspected the Dam and issued a Notice of Violation.

ODNR sent the inspection report to 1690 Timber Lake, requiring 1690 Timber Lake to

complete the required remedial work to bring the Dam into compliance. ODNR conducted

another inspection in 2016. In 2018 and 2019, ODNR issued Chief’s Orders, again

requiring 1690 Timber Lake to bring the Dam into compliance with state law. The 2019

Chief’s Order was an agreed order between ODNR and 1690 Timber Lake, approving an

emergency action plan for remediating the deficiencies in the Dam, which ODNR

identified during the 2014 inspection.

      {¶10} In December, 2019, and January, 2020, 1690 Timber Lake asked the

Shoreline Owners to pay a share of the cost of either remediating the Dam or removing it

and draining the Lake.    Removal of the Dam was the less expensive option.           The

Shoreline Owners refused to pay any portion of the cost of remediation of the Dam or

removal of the Dam. The Dam remains non-compliant with state law and with the Chief’s

Orders.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                              6

                                             Procedural History

        {¶11} On February 28, 2020, 1690 Timber Lake filed a complaint for declaratory

judgment, seeking a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties under the Lake

Restrictions, and naming CAK Ventures (“CAK”); Kimberly L. Costanzo, Trustee of the

Michael G. Fleniken Testamentary Trust, effective date March 1, 2016;1 Patti Gilcrest;

Gregory and Janet Bates (“Bates”); and Kip and Amy Meyers (“Meyers”) (collectively, “the

Shoreline Owners”) as defendants. Specifically, 1690 Timber Lake sought a declaration

the Shoreline Owners did not have a right to require 1690 Timber Lake to maintain the

Dam or, alternatively, the Lake Restrictions required the Shoreline Owners to contribute

to the maintenance of the Dam. On April 8, 2020, 1690 Timber Lake filed a separate

complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration of the rights and obligations of

1690 Timber Lake and Yogesh and Leena Khandelwal (the Khandelwals”) under the Lake

Restrictions (Delaware County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 20 CV H 04 0177). Via

Judgment Entry filed April 29, 2020, the trial court consolidated the two cases.

        {¶12} On or about September 29-20, 2020, Frank Hook, on behalf of 1690 Timber

Lake, drained the Lake by approximately eight feet from its normal level. On October 9,

2020, the Shoreline Owners filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction. Via Judgment Entry filed October 9, 2020, the trial court granted the Shoreline

Owners’ motion for temporary restraining order. The trial court conducted a hearing on

the preliminary injunction on November 4, 2020. Via Judgment Entry filed November 6,

2020, the trial court granted the Shoreline Owners’ request for preliminary injunction and

1Norbert D. Gorman filed an answer as the Successor Trustee of the Michael G. Fleniken Testamentary
Trust, effective date March 1, 2016. 1690 Timber Lake subsequently filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal
of Gorman.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                   7

enjoined 1690 Timber Lake from draining the Lake, breaching the Dam, or “taking any

other action that would alter the lake, the dam, or the surrounding topography so as to

remove water from or lower the level of the lake any further.”          November 6, 2020

Judgment Entry at p. 4.

       {¶13} On February 23, 2021, the Shoreline Owners filed a counterclaim and third-

party complaint against 1690 Timber Lake, Judith Hook, Frank Hook, Logan, and Timber

Lake-Liberty. The Shoreline Owners claimed 1690 Timber Lake and Judith Hook violated

the Lake Restrictions by taking the unilateral action of installing metal stakes and draining

the Lake without the approval of the Water Council, and such actions detrimentally

impacted the Lake. The Shoreline Owners further alleged 1690 Timber Lake trespassed

on their common-law property rights, and 1690 Timber Lake, Judith Hook, Frank Hook,

and Logan trespassed on their littoral rights.         The Shoreline Owners also sought a

declaration Frank Hook, the Hook Trust, 1690 Timber Lake, and Timber Lake-Liberty

were alter-egos, and 1690 Timber Lake, Timber Lake-Liberty, and Frank Hook waived

their rights to contribution for maintenance costs for the Dam by draining the Lake and

acting outside the authority of the Water Council. Additionally, the Shoreline Owners

sought a declaration 1690 Timber Lake’s deed was invalid as Logan sold the 1678 Timber

Lake Drive property to 1678 Timber Lake, which the Shoreline Owners maintain did not

exist as a legal entity at the time of the transfer.

       {¶14} On March 1, 2021, 1690 Timber Lake and Timber Lake-Liberty filed a

motion to dismiss the Shoreline Owners’ counterclaim and third-party complaint, and

1690 Timber Lake filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Shoreline Owners

filed memorandum contra the motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                 8

on March 30, 2021. The Shoreline Owners also filed a notice of partial dismissal of Logan

on the same day. On April 30, 2021, 1690 Timber Lake filed a supplemental complaint,

seeking damages under its claimed right of contribution for maintenance expenses

relative to the Dam incurred during the pendency of the case. Via Judgment Entry filed

August 2, 2021, the trial court denied 1690 Timber Lake and Timber Lake-Liberty’s joint

motion to dismiss and 1690 Timber Lake’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

       {¶15} On February 28, 2022, the Shoreline Owners filed a motion for summary

judgment on all of 1690 Timber Lake’s claims against them and on their counterclaims

and third-party claims against 1690 Timber Lake. Also, on February 28, 2022, 1690

Timber Lake, Timber Lake-Liberty, and Frank Hook moved for partial summary judgment,

asking the trial court to declare the basic legal obligations owed by the Shoreline Owners.

1690 Timber Lake also moved for summary judgment on the Shoreline Owners’

affirmative defenses of waiver, laches, and estoppel as well as their claims against Frank

Hook. In addition, 1690 Timber Lake sought summary judgment and a declaration that

its deed to the property at 1678 Timber Lake Drive is valid.

       {¶16} Via Judgment Entry filed May 24, 2022, the trial court granted, in part, and

denied, in part, the Shoreline Owners’ motion for summary judgment; and granted, in part,

and denied, in part, 1690 Timber Lake, Timber Lake-Liberty, and Frank Hook’s motion for

partial summary judgment. The trial court found the Lake Restrictions did not require the

permanence of the Lake and 1690 Timber Lake could drain the Lake without violating the

Lake Restrictions. The trial court also found the Water Council did not have exclusive

control over the Dam and the Lake Restrictions did not require the Shoreline Owners to

contribute to the maintenance of the Dam. The trial court determined, because the Lake
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                              9

Restrictions did not govern the Dam, 1690 Timber Lake’s claim for contribution failed as

a matter of law.

       {¶17} It is from this judgment entry, Appellants appeal, raising the following

assignments of error:

              I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING

       TO RECOGNIZE THAT APPELLANTS HAVE THE BENEFIT OF

       RECIPROCAL EASEMENTS THAT EACH SHORELINE OWNER ENJOYS

       OVER THE PROPERTY OF THE OTHER SHORELINE OWNERS THAT

       REQUIRE TIMBER LAKE TO BE MAINTAINED IN PERMANENCE.

              II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT

       FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE TIMBER LAKE SHOULD BE

       CONSIDERED LEGALLY PERMANENT AND ITS WATER LEGALLY

       PROTECTED.

              III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN

       HOLDING THAT THE LAKE RESTRICTIONS GRANT NO RIGHT

       AGAINST INTERFERENCE BY APPELLEE WITH TIMBER LAKE.

              IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY

       HOLDING THAT: (1) APPELLEE MAY BREACH THE TIMBER LAKE DAM,

       AND (2) IN ORDER TO PREVENT A BREACH, THE SHORELINE

       OWNERS MUST PAY FOR REMEDIATION.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                             10

             V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE

      CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FLOODING IN NOVEMBER 2017 WHEN THE

      JUDITH HOOK TRUST OWNED THE TIMBER LAKE DAM.

             VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FRANK HOOK

      BEARS NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR DRAINING TIMBER LAKE.

      {¶18} 1960 Timber Lake has filed a conditional cross-appeal, raising the following

cross-assignments of error:

             I. IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN

      IT HELD THAT THE PRESCRIPTIVE RECIPROCAL EASEMENT DOES

      NOT INCLUDE A SERVIENT DAM OWNER’S OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR

      THE DAM, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD ALSO BE REVERSED

      BECAUSE IT ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE HOLDING IN PETER V.

      CASWELL.

             II. IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND

      SHOULD HAVE FOUND THE LAKE RESTRICTIONS OR SOME OTHER

      SOURCE GRANTS EACH SHORELINE OWNER THE RIGHT TO

      COMPEL A REPAIR OF THE DAM (RATHER THAN REPAIR IT

      THEMSELVES), THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED TO THE EXTENT IT

      HELD THAT “TIMBER LAKE’S CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTIONS FAILS AS

      A MATTER OF LAW.”
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                    11

                                    Standard of Review

       {¶19} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the unique

opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v.

The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). As such, this

Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77

Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

       {¶20} Civ.R. 56 provides summary judgment may be granted only after the trial

court determines: 1) no genuine issues as to any material fact remain to be litigated; 2)

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 3) it appears from the

evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and viewing such

evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary

judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,

50 Ohio St.2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

       {¶21} It is well established the party seeking summary judgment bears the burden

of demonstrating no issues of material fact exist for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting

summary judgment is delineated in Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 at 293, 662 N.E.2d

264 (1996): “* * * a party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving

party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis

for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the nonmoving party's

claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by

making a conclusory assertion the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                    12

Rather, the moving party must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the type

listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates the nonmoving party has no

evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its

initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. However, if the moving

party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden

outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial

and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary *149 judgment, if appropriate, shall

be entered against the nonmoving party.” The record on summary judgment must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Williams v. First United Church

of Christ, 37 Ohio St.2d 150, 309 N.E.2d 924 (1974).

                                               I, II, III

       {¶22} Because Appellants’ first, second, and third assignments of error are

interrelated, we shall address them together. In their first assignment of error, Appellants

assert the trial court erred in failing to recognize the benefit of the reciprocal easements

they and each Shoreline Owner enjoy over the property of other Shoreline Owners,

requiring the Lake be maintained in permanence. In their second assignment of error,

Appellants contend the trial court erred in failing to recognize the Lake as legally

permanent and its water legally protected. In their third assignment of error, Appellants

submit the trial court erred in holding the Lake Restrictions grant no right against

interference by 1690 Timber Lake with the Lake.

       {¶23} In their Brief to this Court, Appellants argued:
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                               13

            [A]s Shoreline Owners, [they] have the right to insist that [1690

     Timber Lake] (also a Shoreline Owner) maintain the water of Timber Lake

     over its portion of the Timber Lake reservoir to maintain Timber Lake at its

     established quasi-natural level. As such reciprocal easements exist as a

     matter of law, they are not subject to on-going reciprocal cost or contribution

     to maintain them.

            Accordingly, all of the Shoreline Owners have a right to insist that

     their neighbor Shoreline Owners refrain from taking any action inconsistent

     with the responsibility to maintain water of an amount over their portion of

     the Timber Lake reservoir to maintain the established water level.

            **

            [The trial court’s] conclusion [no dam-created lake is permanent]

     seems untenable as the Lake Restrictions reinforce such legal

     permanence, affirmatively granting water surface rights.           The Lake

     Restrictions further reinforce the permanence and availability of the lake

     and the attendant lake water surface rights * * * Accordingly, the Lake

     Restrictions contain an affirmatively deeded grant of rights to the lake’s

     water surface, expressing the permanent nature of the lake. The Lake

     Restrictions further affirmatively disavow recognition of any underwater

     property line, establishing the permanent nature of the lake over those

     property lines, as against any interference by any Shoreline Owner.

            Brief of Appellants at 17-19. (Emphasis in original).
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                 14

         {¶24} In its May 24, 2022 Judgment Entry, the trial court concluded:

                While the Lake Restrictions are enforceable and binding on 1690

         Timber Lake and [the Shoreline Owners], nothing in those restrictions

         require the Lake to be permanently maintained as a water feature, and

         nothing in those restrictions requires [the Shoreline Owners] to contribute

         to the costs of repairing the Dam.

                Id. at p. 11.

         {¶25} After analyzing the law applicable to restrictive covenants, the trial court

found:

                [The Shoreline Owners] contend that the surface rights granted to

         them in the first paragraph of the Lake Restrictions require the permanence

         of the Lake. * * * The Lake Restrictions mandate that a Shoreline Owner

         cannot “interfere” with the rights of other Shoreline Owners to use the

         surface of the Lake. I must consider whether 1690 Timber Lake can take

         action involving the Dam that would drain the Lake without running afoul of

         the Lake Restrictions or whether that action would “interfere” with [the

         Shoreline Owners’] surface rights.

                The Lake Restrictions unambiguously confer an easement upon all

         Shoreline Owners for the use of the undivided surface of the Lake and

         prohibit Shoreline Owners from interfering with the use of the surface of the
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                  15

      Lake by others. The Lake Restrictions do not, however, guarantee that

      there will always be a lake to use. Any number of events could result in the

      lowering the level of the Lake or the complete destruction of the Lake, many

      of which are outside the control of the parties. * * *

              Further, the use of the word “interfere” in the first paragraph refers to

      interfering with the “use” of the “water area.” It is a stretch to contend that

      1690 Timber Lake would interfere with the Shoreline Owners’ use of the

      water area of the Lake by breaching the Dam, which lies exclusively on

      1690 Timber Lake’s property. In any event, even were I to conclude that

      the term “interfere” is ambiguous as used in the first paragraph of the Lake

      Restrictions, that provision would be unenforceable as a restriction on 1690

      Timber Lake’s use of its property because ambiguous restrictive covenants

      are given the meaning that promotes free and unrestricted use of the land.

      I conclude, therefore, that nothing in the Lake Restrictions requires 1690

      Timber Lake to maintain the Dam to ensure the permanent existence of the

      Lake.

              Id. at 13-14.

      {¶26} While we may disagree with the trial court’s conclusion “[i]t is a stretch to

contend that 1690 Timber Lake would interfere with the Shoreline Owners’ use of the

[then-existing] water area of the Lake by breaching the Dam, which lies exclusively on

1690 Timber Lake’s property,” we agree with the trial court’s finding the term “interfere”

is ambiguous. In context, the use of the term “interfere” implies a volitional act by the
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                 16

Dam Owner, 1690 Timber Lake. Here, repair of the dam resulting in lowering or draining

of the Lake are necessitated by the Chief’s Orders issued by ODNR, not by 1690 Timber

Lake’s own doing. Arguably, it is the state of Ohio which has interfered with the Shoreline

Owners' or Dam Owner's use of the Lake. Such state action was not contemplated by

either the Shoreline Owners or the Dam Owner at the time the Lake Restrictions were

created or the responsibilities of the Water Council were determined.

       {¶27} In any event, we agree with the trial court’s analysis of the impact of the

ambiguity associated with the use of the term “interfere” in the Lake Restrictions. We

conclude, as did the trial court, nothing in the Lake Restrictions required 1690 Timber

Lake to maintain the Dam to ensure the permanent nature of the Lake.

       {¶28} Appellants’ first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled.

                                                IV

       {¶29} In their fourth assignment of error, Appellants submit the trial court erred in

finding 1690 Timber Lake may breach the Dam, and in finding the Shoreline Owners

“must pay for remediation” in order to prevent a breach. Appellants further assert the

prescriptive easement granted by the trial court is inequitable.

       {¶30} Specifically, Appellants maintain, as Shoreline Owners, they hold an

irrevocable easement in the lake, and 1690 Timber Lake, as the Dam owner, should

repair, not breach, the Dam as breaching the Dam will adversely impact the Shoreline

Owners. In support of their position, Appellants rely upon two cases decided under

Georgia law: Forsyth County v. Martin, 279 Ga. 215, 610 S.E.2d 512 (2005); and Bishop

Eddie Long Ministries, Inc. v. Dillard, 272 Ga. App. 894, 613 S.E.2d 673 (2005). We find

these cases to be factually distinguishable.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                              17

      {¶31} In Forsyth County v. Martin, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the

property interests of lakefront property owners in relation to an earthen dam, which had

been built to create a 21-acre lake as part of the residential community. Id. at 215. The

developer constructed residential homesites bordering the lake, which were sold pursuant

to a recorded plat depicting the lake area. Id. Forsyth County was directed to determine

whether it would breach or repair the dam due to concerns the dam was in danger of

complete failure. Id. at 215-216. The lakefront property owners filed an action against

Forsyth County, seeking a declaration Forsyth County owned the dam; therefore, was

responsible for its maintenance and repair. Id. at 216.

      {¶32} In affirming the trial court's directed verdict against Forsyth County, the

Supreme Court of Georgia determined the lakefront property owners acquired an

irrevocable easement in the lake. Id. at 217. The Court reasoned the property owners

purchased their lots according to a recorded subdivision plat which showed the lake area,

and the property owners paid more for their lakefront lots, thereby acquiring an

irrevocable easement in the lake. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded “[t]he

homeowners’ interest in the lake limited the legal ability of the County, as owner of the

dam ... to breach the dam.” Id.

      {¶33} In Bishop Eddie Long Ministries, Inc. v. Dillard, 272 Ga. App. 894, 613

S.E.2d 673 (2005), upper riparian landowners brought a nuisance and trespass action

against lower riparian landowner regarding a dam-created lake which the lower riparian

landowner drained. Id. at 894. The property on which the dam sat was owned by the lower

riparian landowner.   Id.   The lower riparian landowner counterclaimed for trespass,

conversion, and nuisance.     Id.   The trial court found, inter alia, the upper riparian
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                              18

landowners had an irrevocable easement to the lake; therefore, could maintain both

trespass and nuisance claims against the lower riparian landowner. Id. at 897. Both the

upper and lower riparian landowners appealed. Id. at 894.

      {¶34} The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the easement rights of property

owners in relation to the lake. Id. In analyzing the easement rights of the parties, the

Georgia Court of Appeals applied common grantor method principles and concluded

because the purchaser (one of the upper riparian landowners) bought his property from

the lake owner (the lower riparian landowner) pursuant to a recorded plat which depicted

the lake, the purchaser acquired an irrevocable easement in the lake. Id. at 898 .

      {¶35} In both of these cases, the property owners acquired irrevocable easements

in the respective lakes because they purchased their properties pursuant to recorded

plats which depicted the lakes. Appellant herein did not advance such a legal theory in

the trial court. In their motion for summary judgment, Appellants and the other Shoreline

Owners argued an implied easement arose from the Lake Restrictions. A party appealing

a summary judgment ruling cannot advance new theories or raise new issues in order to

secure reversal on appeal. Whitson v. One Stop Rental Tool & Party, 12th Dist. Preble

No. CA2016–03–004, 2017-Ohio-418, 84 N.E.3d 84, ¶ 17. Accordingly, we need not

determine whether Appellants acquired irrevocable easements.

      {¶36} Within this assignment of error, Appellants also argue the prescriptive

easement granted by the trial court is inequitable. Appellants submit 1690 Timber Lake

will benefit from the continued existence of the Lake if Appellants and the Shoreline

Owners exercise their prescriptive easement to remediate the Dam “at no cost to [1690

Timber Lake.” Brief of Appellants at 23. Appellants and the Shoreline Owners have
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                 19

insisted throughout the course of this litigation 1690 Timber Lake alone should bear the

cost of maintaining the Dam at no cost to Appellants and the other Shoreline Owners.

Appellants did not present this alternative argument to the trial court; therefore, has

waived on appeal. The Strip Delaware, LLC v. Landry's Restaurants, Inc., 5th Dist. Stark

No. 2010CA00316, 2011-Ohio-4075, 2011 WL 3587455, ¶ 41.

      {¶37} Appellants’ fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                                            V

      {¶38} In their fifth assignment of error, Appellants maintain the trial court erred in

failing to address their cause of action for damages caused by flooding in November,

2017, when the Hook Trust owned the Dam.

      {¶39} “A ruling on a motion for summary judgment need not state the findings of

fact or conclusions of law.” Funk v. Handcock, 26 Ohio App.3d 107, 108, 498 N.E.2d 490

(1985). See, also, Civ. Rule 52, which states: “Findings of fact and conclusions of law

required by this rule and by ... are unnecessary upon all other motions including those

pursuant to Rule 12, Rule 55 and Rule 56.” Id. at para. 3 (Emphasis added). Indeed, a

“trial court need not enunciate any definitive statement concerning the court's rationale

for ruling on a motion for summary judgment but need only issue ‘a clear and concise

pronouncement of the judgment’ and ‘a sufficient pronouncement of its decision upon

which to review the issues raised by appellants’ appeal.’ ” State ex rel. Ames v. Pokorny,

11th Dist. Portage No. 2022-P-0007, 2022-Ohio-1102, ¶ 3, quoting Rogoff v. King, 91

Ohio App.3d 438, 449, 632 N.E.2d 977 (8th Dist.1993).

      {¶40} In 1690 Timber Lake, Timber Lake-Liberty, and Frank Hook’s motion for

partial summary judgment, Frank Hook asserted, “Summary judgment should be granted
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                   20

as to Frank Hook. Otherwise, Mr. Hook needs to know . . . for what specific act or acts

he is alleged to be responsible and for which the Shoreline Neighbors can proceed in

front of a jury on.   Motion for Summary Judgment at 19.           Frank Hook specifically

challenged Gilcrest’s claim for damages resulting from a 2017 flood, arguing, “Patty

Gilcrest seeks approximately $6,000 for damages for repair to a dock and steps. There

is no evidence as to how that was or could have been caused or prevented by Frank

Hook.” Id.

       {¶41} In its May 24, 2022 Judgment Entry, the trial court found, “Frank Hook is

entitled to summary judgment on all claims against him because he is not the alter ego of

1690 Timber Lake and because he is not otherwise personally liable.”              Id. at p.22

(Emphasis added). While the trial court did not specifically enunciate its rationale for

finding in favor of Frank Hook on Appellants’ cause of action for flooding, the trial court

did address the claim.

       {¶42} Appellants’ fifth assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 VI

       {¶43} In their final assignment of error, Appellants posit the trial court erred in

finding Frank Hook bore no responsibility for draining the Lake because they “were unable

to demonstrate facts sufficient to ‘pierce the corporate veil.’” Brief of Appellants at p. 24.

Appellants explain Frank Hook was not an officer, director, or shareholder of 1690 Timber

Lake; therefore, he “cannot insulate himself from liability simply by claiming his actions

were done for someone else” and “is not free of personal liability.” Id. at p. 25.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                                  21

       {¶44} In its May 24, 2022 Judgment Entry, the trial court conducted a thorough

analysis in determining Frank Hook was not the alter ego of 1690 Timber Lake and did

not bear any personal liability. The trial court stated, in pertinent part:

              An individual owner, shareholder, director, or officer is not liable for

       the debts of a legal entity, including an LLC. * * * The “corporate veil” may

       be pierced in “rare exceptions” where: (1) control over the entity is so

       complete that the entity has no separate mind, will, or existence; (2) the

       person exercised control over the entity to commit fraud, an illegal act, or a

       similarly unlawful act; and (3) injury resulted from the person’s control. * * *

       The second prong requires more than an unjust or inequitable action and

       instead requires proof of an egregious wrong, such as illegal conduct. * * *

              Mr. Hook did not do anything that would destroy the legal separation

       between himself and 1690 Timber Lake as a separate legal entity. Mr. Hook

       is not even a member or manager of 1690 Timber Lake. * * * The Hook

       Trust is the sole member and manager of 1690 Timber Lake, Timber Lake-

       Liberty, and 1678 Timber Lake. * * * Judith Hook, as the then-trustee of the

       Hook Trust, made all decisions concerning the Dam until her death in

       November 2021. * * *

              * * Defendants do not have any evidence, and do not even contend,

       that Mr. Hook acted outside the scope of his authority as an agent of 1690

       Timber Lake and the authority delegated to him by its member, Judith Hook,

       as trustee of the Hook Trust.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                            22

            **

            Defendants further allege that Mr. Hook stated in December 2019

     that he had Mr. Bates’s proxy to vote to drain the Lake and that this

     untruthful claim supports piercing the corporate veil. Even if this alleged

     misstatement rose to the level of fraud for purposes of piercing the

     corporate veil, however, Defendants cannot show that they were injured as

     a result. Defendants did not vote to contribute to the repair costs of the

     Dam and did not vote to drain the Lake in reliance on the false claim that

     the Bateses were in agreement with Mr. Hook.           Rather, Defendants

     continued to dispute 1690 Timber Lake’s right to contribution and continued

     to demand that 1690 Timber Lake remediate the Dam at its sole cost. Any

     attempt to pierce the corporate veil based on this alleged misrepresentation

     fails as a matter of law.

            **

            Simply put, Mr. Hook’s alleged actions, even if assumed to be true,

     do not establish he was the alter ego of 1690 Timber Lake.

            **

            There is no evidence before me that Mr. Hook did anything regarding

     the Lake or the Dam that could support a claim against him personally. * *

     * Mr. Hook testified about the scope of his authority as an agent of 1690

     Timber Lake. * * * Mr. Hook had authority to call and attend meetings on

     1690 Timber Lake’s behalf, deal with contractors, and order work to be

     done. * * * Any actions he took in meeting with others or working with
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 06 0052                                               23

      contractors was done on behalf of 1690 Timber Lake, and Judith Hook

      made or approved each of those decisions. * * * Mr. Hook denied having

      any authority on behalf of 1690 Timber Lake to file a lawsuit or make

      decisions regarding alterations to its real property.

             Id. at 23- 28. (Citations omitted. Emphasis in original).

      {¶45} Upon review of the entire record in this matter, we agree with the trial court

and find Frank Hook did not bear personal liability for any decisions regarding 1690

Timber Lake property.

      {¶46} Appellants’ sixth assignment of error is overruled.

      {¶47} Having overruled Appellants' assignments of error, 1690 Timber Lake's

conditional cross-appeal is rendered moot. The judgment of the Delaware County Court

of Common Pleas is affirmed

By: Hoffman, P.J.
Baldwin, J. and
King, J. concur