Court Opinion

ID: 9644410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:55:16.273433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:48.852716
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, concurring. I concur with the majority completely as to the opinion as it relates to appellant, David Burl Taylor. I concur with the result as to the Daiggers but wish to state my reasons in slightly different terms. First, the majority properly cites and interprets the Rules, of Crim. Proc., Rule 12.4(a) and (b), for convenience to the reader is set out as follows: (a) If, at the time of the arrest, the accused is in a vehicle or in the immediate vicinity of a vehicle of which he is in apparent control, and if the circumstances of the arrest justify a reasonable belief on the part of the arresting officer that the vehicle contains things which are connected with the offense for which the arrest is made, the arresting officer may search the vehicle for such things and seize any things subject to seizure and discovered in the course of the search. (b) The search of a vehicle pursuant to this rule shall only be made contemporaneously with the arrest or as soon thereafter as is reasonably practicable. Daigger was in apparent control of the vehicle. The officers had reasonable belief that the vehicle contained things connected with the offense for which the arrest was made. The officers had paid for the LSD with marked bills, and they were in sight of the Daiggers until the arrest. The purse was in the passenger compartment of the vehicle in plain view of the arresting officers, and the search was made contemporaneously with the arrest. These facts fit squarely into the plain wording of the above rule. In Sanders v. State, 262 Ark. 595, 559 S.W.2d 704 (1977) aff'd 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979), the suitcase searched was found in the trunk of the vehicle after the vehicle was parked. I believe both this Court and the United States Supreme Court held such a search was not a “vehicle exception” search. We recently reached the same result in Moore v. State, 268 Ark. 191, 594 S.W.2d 245 (1980), wherein we held a shaving kit located in a hidden place, which took about 20 minutes to locate, was not a search within the “automobile exception.” In Moore the vehicle had been secured, and the accused was handcuffed. and was in another vehicle at the time of the search. There were no exigent circumstances in either Sanders or Moore. In the present case, the officers had concrete facts to base their belief that this vehicle contained not only the marked money but also additional LSD. The present case is similar to the fact situation in Sumlin v. State, 266 Ark. 709, 587 S.W.2d 571 (1979), in which there was a very dangerous fact situation confronting the officers. Also, the purse was in the passenger compartment of the vehicle in plain view of the officers. It appears to me when the search of an automobile is contemporaneous with the arrest and the arresting officers have facts upon which to reasonably believe things connected with the offense are contained in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, the officers are authorized to look into the vehicle. If the things which they have probable cause, based upon facts known to them, to believe are in the vehicle are seen by them, the search is reasonable. However, when the vehicle is secured or the container to be searched is within the exclusive control of the arresting authorities and there are no exigent circumstances and no danger of harm to anyone or loss of the items sought, a warrant is required. If this reasoning is applied, I do not see any conflict between Sanders, supra, Moore, supra, and the case before us. For the above reasons I concur with the majority opinion.