Court Opinion

ID: 9840160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 14:07:07.086034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:24.723582
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 8, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals

                                  NO. 2022-CA-1093-MR

CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER POPE                                         APPELLANT

                     APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                   HONORABLE TERESA WHITAKER, JUDGE
                            ACTION NO. 18-CR-00152

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, ECKERLE, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Christopher Alexander Pope (Pope), appeals the

denial of his post-conviction, RCr1 11.42 motion. Finding no error, we affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
                                 BACKGROUND

             A jury convicted Pope of trafficking in a controlled substance (heroin)

in the first degree in Lincoln County, Kentucky, and he pled guilty to being a first-

degree, persistent felony offender. The Trial Court sentenced him to a jury-

recommended, 20-year sentence of imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Kentucky

Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, describing the facts as follows:

                    Pope was indicted by a Lincoln County grand jury
             for trafficking in a controlled substance and being a first-
             degree PFO. The charges stemmed from Pope selling
             heroin to a confidential informant during a controlled
             buy. The controlled buy was arranged by deputies from
             the Boyle County Sheriff’s Department who apparently
             anticipated that it would occur in Boyle County.
             However, when the buy was set in motion Pope told the
             confidential informant that he would not make the sale in
             Boyle County. Instead Pope instructed the informant to
             meet him at a fast-food restaurant in adjoining Lincoln
             County. The Boyle County deputies followed the
             informant to that location and surveilled the drug
             transaction. Notably, the deputies received prior verbal
             approval from the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Department
             for their investigative activities in Lincoln County.

                    Pope communicated with the confidential
             informant via Snapchat. At one point, Pope instructed
             the informant to leave his vehicle unlocked when he went
             into the restaurant. When the informant met with Pope
             inside the restaurant, Pope told him that the heroin had
             already been placed in the glove compartment of his
             vehicle. The informant then paid Pope and returned to
             Boyle County.

                   The Boyle County deputies later testified that they
             surveilled the entire transaction. One officer observed

                                         -2-
             Pope arrive, approach the passenger door of the
             informant’s vehicle, and then enter the restaurant where
             he had a discussion with the informant. Afterward, the
             officers met the confidential informant in Boyle County
             where he gave them the purchased heroin.

                     Following the Lincoln County grand jury’s
             indictment of Pope, a Boyle County officer arrested him
             in Boyle County. As noted, a Lincoln County jury found
             pope guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance, first
             degree and, following his guilty plea to the charge of
             PFO I, recommended a sentence of twenty years. The
             trial court sentenced Pope accordingly and entered
             judgment.

Pope v. Commonwealth, 629 S.W.3d 5, 7 (Ky. 2021).

             Pope then filed a post-conviction motion pursuant to RCr 11.42. Pope

raised numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel both at his trial and

on appeal. He requested an evidentiary hearing. After reviewing responsive

pleadings, the Lincoln Circuit Court denied the request for an evidentiary hearing

and denied Pope’s request for post-conviction relief. Pope timely appealed.

                                       ANALYSIS

             Pope raises multiple issues relating both to his trial counsel and his

appellate counsel. We begin our analysis with the standard of review before

addressing his allegations of error.

   I.     Standard of Review.

             Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under the

standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80

                                          -3-
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and as adopted in Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37

(Ky. 1985). Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Ky. 2016). The

Strickland test for ineffective assistance is a two-prong test: counsel’s

performance was deficient; and the deficient performance prejudiced a defendant.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Deficient performance is proven

when “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment [to the United States

Constitution].” Id. An Appellate Court reviews counsel’s performance under an

objective standard of reasonableness and “indulge[s] a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance[.]” Id. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. “We must analyze counsel’s overall

performance and the totality of circumstances therein in order to determine if the

challenged conduct can overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s

performance was reasonable.” McGorman, 489 S.W.3d at 736 (citation omitted).

             Under the prejudice prong, “A defendant is prejudiced by counsel’s

deficient performance when the ‘errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable.’” Commonwealth v. Searight, 423

S.W.3d 226, 230 (Ky. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). To prove prejudice, there must be a showing of a reasonable probability of

a different outcome had counsel’s unprofessional errors not occurred. Searight,

                                         -4-
423 S.W.3d at 230. “This reasonable probability is a probability ‘sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,

104 S. Ct. at 2067).

             Both prongs must be met for relief to be afforded. Searight, 423

S.W.3d at 231. Thus, a defendant must show both deficient performance of counsel

and prejudice.

             A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel “premised upon

appellate counsel’s alleged failure to raise a particular issue on direct appeal [is]

cognizable in Kentucky.” Commonwealth v. Pollini, 437 S.W.3d 144, 147 (Ky.

2014) (citing Hollon v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d 431 (Ky. 2010)). To succeed

on such a claim, a defendant must show that “counsel’s performance was deficient,

overcoming a strong presumption that appellate counsel’s choice of issues to

present to the appellate court was a reasonable exercise of appellate strategy.”

Hollon, 334 S.W.3d at 436. “The omitted issue must be ‘clearly stronger’ than

those presented for the presumption of effective assistance to be overcome.”

Pollini, 437 S.W.3d at 149. A defendant must also show that there was resulting

prejudice, which “requires a showing that absent counsel’s deficient performance

there is a reasonable probability that the appeal would have succeeded.” Hollon,

334 S.W.3d at 437.

                                          -5-
             When a Trial Court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on an RCr

11.42 motion, “appellate review is limited to ‘whether the motion on its face states

grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would

invalidate the conviction.’” Haley v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Ky.

App. 2019) (quoting Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967)).

“A hearing is required if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively

resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the record.”

Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001) (citing Stanford v.

Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049,

114 S. Ct. 703, 126 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1994); and Lewis, 411 S.W.2d at 322). See also

RCr 11.42(5).

             We review de novo a lower court’s ruling on counsel’s performance

and potential deficiencies. Pollini, 437 S.W.3d at 149 (citing Brown v.

Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490, 500 (Ky. 2008)). Accordingly, no deference to

the Trial Court is afforded.

   II.    Alleged, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Pretrial Motions
          and Direct Appeal

             We first address Pope’s arguments that his trial counsel and appellate

counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Both claims relate to a pretrial motion to

suppress evidence or alternatively to dismiss the indictment. We review both

                                          -6-
together as our analysis and the underlying substantive law are similar, though

through different lenses.

                 Regarding the pretrial motion, Pope’s trial counsel claimed that the

Boyle County Sheriff’s Deputies did not have authority to arrest in Lincoln

County; thus, he contended that they exceeded their authority under KRS2

431.007(1)3 by conducting an investigation in Lincoln County. The resulting

evidence obtained during the investigation in Lincoln County, trial counsel

claimed, should be suppressed. Pope admits that the issues raised in the pretrial

motion were denied by the Trial Court, whose decision was ultimately affirmed by

the Kentucky Supreme Court, albeit for different reasons. Pope claims his counsel

erroneously cited to and argued KRS 431.007 to claim Boyle County Sheriff’s

Deputies had no authority to investigate drug activity in Lincoln County. Pope

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
    That Section delineates the arrest powers of peace officers as such:

                 A peace officer certified pursuant to KRS 15.380 to 15.404, who is
                 directly employed as a police officer by a Kentucky city, county,
                 or urban-county government and whose department meets the
                 requirements of KRS 15.440 and a sheriff, or deputy sheriff who
                 has been certified pursuant to KRS 15.380 to 15.404, who is
                 officially requested by a law enforcement agency in another county
                 in Kentucky to assist in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
                 requesting agency shall possess, while responding to and for the
                 duration of the matter for which the request was made, the same
                 powers of arrest in the requesting county as he possesses in the
                 county in which he is a police officer.

                                                  -7-
now claims his counsel should have cited to Churchwell v. Commonwealth, 843

S.W.2d 336 (Ky. App. 1992), a case finding that a park ranger was operating

outside of his jurisdictional authority when conducting an investigatory stop

multiple miles outside of his jurisdictional parameters.

               The Commonwealth ostensibly concedes trial counsel’s performance

“was deficient in making an argument without legal basis prior to trial. Trial

counsel took a chance and made a novel argument.” Appellee’s Brief at 7.

Nonetheless, the Commonwealth notes that Pope’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim cannot succeed because he has failed to show any resulting

prejudice. We agree for reasons shown below.4

               Additionally, Pope argues that his appellate counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to raise a winning argument on appeal. His

argument follows two lines. First, Pope claims that his counsel should have raised

Churchwell on appeal. Second, Pope claims his counsel erroneously waited until a

petition for rehearing to argue that Fisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.W.3d 329 (Ky.

App. 2016), and KRS 65.240 applied to his suppression issue.

4
 While we do not need to decide whether counsel’s performance was deficient, we would be
hard-pressed to conclude the filing of the motion in this case constituted deficient performance,
as counsel routinely push legal and/or factual boundaries when zealously advocating for clients.

                                               -8-
                 Regarding both trial and appellate counsel’s performance, we find no

deficiency with failing to cite to and argue Churchwell. That case concerned a

park ranger stopping a vehicle some four miles outside of his jurisdictional

authority granted by KRS 148.056.5 843 S.W.2d at 339. The park ranger was not

in hot pursuit, nor were there any exigent circumstances. Id. at 339-40.

Accordingly, having no authority to conduct an investigatory stop, the evidence

subsequently seized was fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. at 340.

                 No such issues arise here. As the Kentucky Supreme Court held on

Pope’s direct appeal, the Boyle County Sheriff’s Deputies were acting under

authority granted pursuant to KRS 218A.240(1). Pope, 629 S.W.3d at 9-12 (“their

investigatory activity fits squarely within the language of KRS 218A.240(1)”).

5
    That statute provides:

                 (1) The commissioner of parks, in his discretion, may employ and commission
                     park rangers as the commissioner deems necessary to secure the parks and
                     property of the Department of Parks and to maintain law and order and such
                     employees, when so commissioned, shall have all of the powers of peace
                     officers and shall have on all parks property and on public highways
                     transversing such property in all parts of the state the same powers with
                     respect to criminal matters and enforcement of the laws relating thereto as
                     sheriffs, constables granted peace officer powers, and police officers in their
                     respective jurisdictions, and shall possess all the immunities and matters of
                     defense now available or hereafter made available to sheriffs and police
                     officers in any suit brought against them in consequence of acts done in the
                     course of their employment.

      (Emphasis added.)

                                                  -9-
Churchwell is wholly inapplicable, and Pope suffered no prejudice by his trial

counsel not citing to it.

              Moreover, Pope has failed to present even a claim that any prejudice

resulted from his trial counsel’s performance. Pope summarily states in his brief,

“Appellant suffered prejudice due to these inexcusable errors which adversely

effected his defense in the pretrial phase.”6 This summary conclusion does not

constitute an argument, nor does it make any causal connection to the prejudice

discussed in Strickland. Our case law is legion with pretrial suppression motions

that failed both at trial and on appeal, and we will not hold that pressing ultimately

losing claims at trial and on appeal constitutes de facto prejudice. Likewise, we

cannot discern any prejudice, even under Strickland, that resulted from counsel’s

failed motion to suppress and/or dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The motion did

not require Pope to disclose any information that could be used against him at trial;

the Commonwealth did not gain any advantage through the motion; and the result

of losing the motion only placed Pope in the exact same position he would have

been in had he not made the motion at all.

              Additionally, we find neither deficient performance nor prejudice

resulted from appellate counsel’s performance. To prevail on an ineffective

6
 This quote is from the Appellant’s Brief. Pope omitted page numbers in his brief; thus we
provide no pinpoint citation.

                                             -10-
assistance of appellate counsel claim, a defendant must first show deficient

performance by demonstrating that counsel omitted an issue, and the “omitted

issue must be ‘clearly stronger’ than those presented for the presumption of

effective assistance to be overcome.” Pollini, 437 S.W.3d at 148-49 (citing Hollon

v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d 431 (Ky. 2010)). Second, a defendant must show

prejudice, “which . . . requires a showing that absent counsel’s deficient

performance there is a reasonable probability that the appeal would have

succeeded.” Pollini, 437 S.W.3d at 149 (quoting Hollon, 334 S.W.3d at 437).

             Pope does not succeed on either prong. On the first prong, even if his

appellate counsel did not cite to Churchwell, counsel nonetheless raised the

jurisdictional argument, and the Kentucky Supreme Court fully considered the

same and rejected it. Had counsel cited to Churchwell, the outcome in the instant

case would have been the same given that the Boyle County Sheriff’s Deputies had

statutory authority to conduct their investigation in Lincoln County. On the second

prong, there is no reasonable probability that citing to Churchwell would have

changed the outcome, as that case was wholly inapplicable to the instant case.

             Likewise, to the extent Pope is arguing that his appellate counsel was

ineffective by raising Fisher, 506 S.W.3d 329, and KRS 65.240 for the first time in

his petition for rehearing, we find that Pope still fails to demonstrate ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel. There was nothing improper about raising those

                                         -11-
claims in a petition for rehearing, as Pope’s appellate counsel was arguing that the

not-yet-final, to-be-published opinion would lead to a misleading application of the

law under the instant facts, which is an argument that the Supreme Court could

rightly consider. Indeed, it might have been ineffective assistance not to raise the

issue. Mitchell v. Hadl, 816 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky. 1991) (“When the facts reveal a

fundamental basis for decision not presented by the parties, it is our duty to

address the issue to avoid a misleading application of the law.”) (emphasis added).

             Likewise, there was no resulting prejudice. The Kentucky Supreme

Court considered and rejected Pope’s claims by denying the petition for rehearing.

Indeed, given that the Boyle County Sheriff’s Deputies had jurisdictional authority

pursuant to KRS 218A.240(1), neither Fisher nor KRS 65.240 would operate to

limit that authority. Accordingly, Pope has not shown ineffective assistance of

counsel with either his trial counsel or his appellate counsel on this issue, and the

Trial Court properly denied his motion.

   III.   Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Plea Negotiations

             Pope next alleges that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance

that prejudiced him during plea negotiations. Specifically, Pope claims that his

counsel should have advised him that he could have pursued a conditional plea

offer. Pope notes that the Commonwealth offered a plea package that included a

recommendation of imprisonment for nine years, dismissal of the PFO charge, and

                                          -12-
parole eligibility at 50% of time served. However, the offer was only valid if Pope

entered an unconditional guilty plea. Pope claims that his counsel advised him to

reject the offer due to an ultimately mistaken belief that the suppression and

jurisdictional issue was strong on appeal. Pope claims that his counsel never

advised him that he could enter a conditional plea, locking in a lower sentence than

he obtained at trial, while awaiting the outcome of his suppression and

jurisdictional claim on appeal. Pope claims his counsel should have provided that

advice.

             The Commonwealth responds that Pope was not captain of his own

ship on the conditional plea offer. A conditional plea requires the approval of both

the Commonwealth and the Trial Court. RCr 8.09. It is noteworthy that no

conditional plea offer was made in the instant case. The Commonwealth further

replied below that it would not have made a conditional plea offer with the same

terms as the unconditional plea offer. If it had extended a conditional plea offer,

the Commonwealth would not have dismissed the persistent felony offender

charge. The Trial Court rejected Pope’s claim, noting that at best Pope would have

received an increased penalty, and that it was “mere speculation” as to whether the

Trial Court would have accepted a conditional plea at all.

             We find no error with the Trial Court’s conclusion. Pope claims that

he would have entered a conditional plea pursuant to the same terms as the

                                        -13-
unconditional plea, which included dismissal of the persistent felony offender

charge. But that offer was never on the table. “The process of arriving at a guilty

plea requires give and take between the Commonwealth and the defendant, and at

some point, an agreement may be reached.” Commonwealth v. Corey, 826 S.W.2d

319, 320-21 (Ky. 1992). In other words, Pope had no inchoate ability to create a

conditional plea offer. And the Trial Court might not have accepted such an offer

even if Pope had the ability to operate unilaterally.

             The record thus refutes Pope’s allegation of ineffective assistance of

counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Court on this point.

   IV.    Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Discovery

             Pope next claims that he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel as

it relates to certain, photographic evidence of Snapchat messages that were

introduced at trial and as it relates to the chain of custody of the drugs that were

seized. Regarding the Snapchat messages, the confidential informant took pictures

of the Snapchat messages he was sending and receiving with Pope during the drug

buy process. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth turned over copies of those photos

that were less than clear. After the trial began, the Commonwealth received clearer

photos and disclosed them to Pope’s counsel, who immediately moved to dismiss

the case for prosecutorial misconduct. Counsel also noted that the clearer photos

now showed one additional word, which indicated that Pope told the confidential

                                         -14-
informant to leave the car “unlock[ed].” Pope’s counsel alternatively requested a

multiple-day continuance. The Trial Court granted less than an hour continuance

and overruled the motion to dismiss, finding no prosecutorial misconduct and

opining that counsel should have requested clearer copies during the discovery

process.

             Regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this issue, the

Trial Court rejected any resulting prejudice under Strickland, noting that the

clearer photos in no way “gutted his defense” or “prevented him from making an

informed decision as to trial strategy.” On appeal, Pope continues to make

summary and conclusory allegations that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s

allegedly deficient performance on this issue.

             Having reviewed the record, we find no error with the Trial Court’s

ruling on this issue. Counsel effectively and defensively utilized the Snapchat

messages by pointing out that they do not contain any request to purchase drugs.

Counsel also challenged the confidential informant’s veracity on the witness stand,

noting that he was being paid and was a convicted felon. Counsel also highlighted

the confidential informant’s inability to recall all of the events. Moreover, even if

the clearer version shows the word “unlock,” Pope cannot show the manner in

which that additional word thwarted his defense. Strickland requires a defendant

to show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

                                         -15-
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Koteras v. Commonwealth,

589 S.W.3d 534, 541 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068). That standard was not met here. If counsel knew about the word “unlock”

before trial, he would have exploited the same weaknesses in the Commonwealth’s

evidence that he did at the trial, and those arguments have repeatedly proven

unsuccessful.

             Pope also claims his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance

of counsel because he did not, pre-trial, interview the lab technician who received

and tested the drugs. Pope insinuates that had his counsel performed such an

interview, he would have had a better argument that there was some problem with

the chain of custody of the drugs. Again, this summary argument without

elaboration demonstrates neither deficient performance nor prejudice under

Strickland, and the Trial Court was correct to reject the same.

   V.    Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Cross-Examination

             Pope next argues that his counsel’s cross-examination of Deputy

Abbott constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Pope claims his

counsel should have questioned Deputy Abbott’s inconsistencies about his

surveillance of the drug transfer and Deputy Abbott’s inconsistencies about his

search of the confidential informant’s vehicle before, during, and after the

transaction. Pope claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not

                                        -16-
“punch holes” in the evidence showing that the confidential informant might have

acquired the heroin from another source either before, during, or after the meeting

with Pope.

             We have reviewed the trial and agree with the Trial Court that

counsel’s performance did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. At the

trial, counsel questioned the confidential informant and Deputy Abbott about

inconsistencies and gaps in the testimony, recordings, and Snapchat messages.

Specifically, evidence was introduced that Deputy Abbott may have only searched

the confidential informant’s person, not his vehicle, and Deputy Abbott did not

always have eyes on the confidential informant or his vehicle. The confidential

informant stopped at a gas station to get Gatorade and cigarettes, and Pope’s

counsel highlighted this fact on cross-examination of Deputy Abbott, who admitted

that he has informed confidential informants not to make such stops. Counsel also

succeeded in having Deputy Abbott concede that confidential informants “have a

mind of their own,” and that it is possible that someone other than the defendant

could have gotten into the car during a pit stop.

             Under Strickland, Pope must show that trial counsel’s performance

was deficient, and that that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different absent that deficiency. Koteras, 589 S.W.3d

at 541. Here, Pope’s counsel’s questioning succeeded in exposing the weaknesses

                                          -17-
in the Commonwealth’s case. It cannot be said that there is a reasonable

probability in a different outcome. Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Court’s order

on this issue.

   VI.    Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Penalty Phase

             Pope next alleges that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance

during the penalty phase when counsel “recommended” that Pope testify. Pope

had not testified during the guilt phase of his trial, but after the jury convicted him

of the underlying offense, Pope entered a guilty plea to being a first-degree

persistent felony offender and proceeded to the penalty phase of his trial. At the

presentation of evidence during the Truth-In-Sentencing phase, the Commonwealth

first read into the record all of Pope’s prior convictions, including five felonies and

three misdemeanors, most of which were drug related.

             Pope then elected to testify, attempting to mitigate his actions by

explaining his drug addiction. The Commonwealth, on cross-examination, asked if

Pope was aware of the deadly danger of fentanyl, which laced the heroin he had

just been convicted of trafficking. The Commonwealth further asked if Pope had

been incarcerated previously for trafficking in drugs and for possessing a gun

while being a convicted felon. On the latter question, Pope disclaimed possession

of the firearm, though he admitted to pleading guilty to the charge. The

Commonwealth followed up with additional questions regarding the firearm

                                          -18-
possession charge, as Pope had previously pled guilty to charges relating to the

same. During closing, Pope’s argument that he should get some credit for pleading

guilty to the first-degree persistent felony offender charge was rebuffed in part by

the Commonwealth’s argument that Pope would not really take ownership of his

past gun crime.

              During jury deliberations, the jury asked to return to the courtroom

and review the list of prior convictions. The Trial Court had the list re-read to the

jury in open court. The jury then deliberated more and returned with a

recommendation of the maximum penalty.

              Pope claims his counsel’s performance was deficient by

recommending that he testify about his drug addiction. Pope claims his attorney

misadvised him that the Commonwealth could only read his convictions into the

record, not question him about them. Pope claims his attorney should have

introduced evidence of Pope’s drug addiction through Pope’s grandfather or

girlfriend.

              As there was no evidentiary hearing, we will assume it true that

Pope’s counsel recommended that Pope testify and misadvised Pope regarding the

scope of the Commonwealth’s questions. Pope claims this alleged deficiency

resulted in prejudice because he received the maximum sentence.

                                         -19-
             The Trial Court found no ineffective assistance on this issue. It noted

that there was no evidence to conclude that the sole reason he received the

maximum sentence was Pope’s testimony. It further noted that had Pope’s

grandfather or girlfriend testified, the Commonwealth would have cross-examined

these witnesses in such a way as to highlight the same conclusion: Pope is a repeat

drug trafficker in inherently dangerous drugs who deserves the maximum penalty.

The Trial Court thus believed the argument was speculative at best and rejected it.

We agree.

             “Mere speculation as to how other counsel might have performed

either better or differently without any indication of what favorable facts would

have resulted is not sufficient [to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.]”

Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Ky. 2003), overruled on other

grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). Here, Pope

speculates that his counsel might have performed better by calling a different

witness to testify about his drug addictions. But as the Trial Court noted, the

Commonwealth would have cross-examined those witnesses to attain the same

conclusion. Likewise, the jury would have heard the list of all the prior

convictions regardless of whether Pope testified. The jury was not clearly

inflamed as a result of Pope’s testimony, as it spent time in deliberations and even

asked the Trial Court if it could return to the courtroom to re-examine Pope’s prior

                                         -20-
convictions. Moreover, and importantly, Pope points to no favorable facts that

would have changed the result. Accordingly, it is purely speculative that any

prejudice resulted. We affirm the Trial Court’s order on this issue.

   VII. Cumulative Error

             Finally, Pope argues that if we hold that none of the aforementioned

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel meets the test under Strickland that

we should hold that the cumulative effect of all of the allegations constitutes the

requisite ineffective assistance of counsel. We do not agree. Cumulative error

may apply when the “individual errors were themselves substantial, bordering, at

least, on the prejudicial.” Commonwealth v. Harbin, 602 S.W.3d 166, 174 (Ky.

App. 2019) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010)).

The evidence against Pope was overwhelming and none of the individual

allegations of error was either substantial or bordering on prejudicial.

Accordingly, there was no cumulative error constituting prejudice.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Pope raises multiple allegations of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel and appellate counsel. We have reviewed them all and find none warrant

relief pursuant to Strickland’s standards for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Trial Court’s order denying relief.

                                         -21-
          ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Louis W. Rom              Daniel Cameron
Lexington, Kentucky       Attorney General of Kentucky

                          Kristin L. Conder
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                        -22-