Court Opinion

ID: 9940117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:12:40.066583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:33.098617
License: Public Domain

J-S46021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MICHAEL BIENERT                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 198 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 6, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-05-CR-0000174-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED: February 13, 2024

       Michael Bienert (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his guilty plea to ten counts of sexual abuse of children,1

based on his possession of child pornography. After review, we affirm.

       On September 12, 2022, Appellant pled guilty to ten counts of sexual

abuse of children, graded as second-degree felonies.        As part of the plea,

Appellant acknowledged possessing ten images of child pornography, which

included depictions of children under the age of 10 or who were prepubescent.

N.T., 9/12/22, at 24.        The parties did not agree on a specific sentence.

Instead, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend concurrent sentences. Id.

at 3-4. The parties also discussed the registration periods Appellant would be

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d).
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subject to under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act

(SORNA), either as a Tier 1 offender or as a sexually violent predator (SVP).2

Id. at 4.

       On the same day of Appellant’s plea, the trial court ordered completion

of a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). The trial court also directed the

Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) to assess whether Appellant

meets the criteria for classification as an SVP. The SOAB subsequently opined

Appellant was not an SVP.           On January 6, 2023, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to concurrent prison terms of 3-10 years, with credit for time served.

The court also notified Appellant of his 15-year sex offender registration and

reporting requirements as a Tier I offender under SORNA.

       Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion to reconsider his sentence,

emphasizing it excessively deviated from the aggravated range of the

sentencing guidelines. Appellant also sought to withdraw his guilty plea and

proceed to trial. Finally, Appellant requested a stay of his SORNA registration

requirements      pending     the    Pennsylvania   Supreme   Court’s   review   of

Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, Chester County No. 1570 CR 2016 (Pa. Com.

Pl. Crim. Div. Chester County, Aug. 23, 2022) (decision following remand from

____________________________________________

2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.

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Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020)).3 After a hearing,4

the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. This timely appeal

followed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant raises the following issues for review:

       I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an
       aggregate aggravated range sentence of three (3) to ten (10)
       years of incarceration in a state prison by failing to appropriately
       take into consideration mitigating factors such as Appellant’s
       advanced age and prior record score of one (1) from an aged
       conviction in 1976, by exhibiting bias, ill will and prejudice that is
       so manifestly excessive and excessively punitive in nature, and by
       imposing a sentence that violates the protections provided against
       cruel punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United
       States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania
       Constitution?

       II. Whether t[he] trial [court] committed err[or] by denying
       Appellant’s request that the application of SORNA requirements
       be stayed pending appellate review of the decision of the
       Honorable Allison Bell Royer in [] Torsilieri?

Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (capitalization altered).

       Appellant first challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence,5 see

id.   at   15-24,   from    which     there    is   no   automatic   right   to   appeal.

____________________________________________

3 Succinctly, Torsilieri challenges the constitutionality of SORNA’s registration

and notification requirements. We discuss Torsilieri further infra.

4 Appellant abandoned his motion to withdraw guilty plea during the post-
sentence hearing. N.T., 2/9/23, at 2.

5 Because the parties did not bargain for a specific sentence when negotiating

Appellant’s guilty plea, Appellant is not precluded from challenging the
discretionary aspects of his sentence on appeal.      Commonwealth v.
Heaster, 171 A.3d 268, 271 (Pa. Super. 2017) (concluding that appellant
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 585 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Instead, an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

       We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
       appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
       and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
       sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
       Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
       Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
       that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
       Sentencing Code.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some

citations omitted).

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved this claim in his post-

sentence motion, and included in his brief a separate Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)

statement. See Appellant’s Brief at 14. Additionally, Appellant’s claim that

the trial court imposed a manifestly excessive sentence, beyond the

sentencing guidelines, and without proper consideration of mitigating factors,

raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d

763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (“[A]n excessive sentence claim—in

conjunction with an assertion that the [trial] court failed to consider mitigating

factors—raises a substantial question.” (citation omitted));            see also

Commonwealth v. Eby, 784 A.2d 204, 206 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“A claim that

____________________________________________

could challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence after entering a
“hybrid” guilty plea, i.e., a plea that negotiated a particular aspect of the
sentence, but did not include a sentencing agreement).

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the sentencing court imposed an unreasonable sentence by sentencing outside

the guidelines presents a ‘substantial question’ for our review.”). We therefore

turn to the merits of Appellant’s claim.

      The standard by which we review a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of sentence is well settled:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Salter, 290 A.3d 741, 748 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

      The Sentencing Code requires the trial court to “follow the general

principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is

consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The trial court

must also consider the sentencing guidelines.            See id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating

that “[w]hen imposing a sentence, the [trial] court is required to consider the

sentence ranges set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines….”).

      “In every case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony … the

court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time

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of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence

imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); see also Commonwealth v. Mouzon,

812 A.2d 617, 620-21 (Pa. 2002) (plurality). In considering these factors,

“the court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal

characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.”       Commonwealth v.

McClendon, 589 A.2d 706, 712 (Pa. Super. 1991) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

      During the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that Appellant’s prior

record score is 1, and the offense gravity score for sexual abuse of children is

7. N.T., 1/6/23, at 19-20. The sentencing guidelines recommend a minimum

sentence of 9-16 months in prison, plus or minus 6 months for aggravating or

mitigating circumstances.    204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a).       Thus, Appellant’s

sentences of 3-10 years in prison are beyond the aggravated range of the

sentencing guidelines.

      A sentencing court may deviate from the sentencing guidelines so long

as it explains its reasons for doing so on the record. See Commonwealth v.

Garcia-Rivera, 938 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2009). “[T]he guidelines have

no binding effect, in that they do not predominate over individualized

sentencing factors….”    Commonwealth v. Holiday, 954 A.2d 6, 11 (Pa.

Super. 2008).    When a court imposes a sentence outside the sentencing

guidelines, we consider whether the sentence is unreasonable. See id.

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      Here, the Commonwealth requested a standard-range sentence. N.T.,

1/6/23, at 20.    However, the Commonwealth also pointed to statements

Appellant made during his PSI interview that “push back against [Appellant]

accepting responsibility to some extent.”       Id. at 21.    Defense counsel

requested a standard- or mitigated-range sentence, citing the possibility that

Appellant would face deportation. Id. at 23; see also id. at 24 (stating that

Appellant was born in Germany but has not lived there since he was a child).

Defense counsel also noted that Appellant was 73 years old, and Appellant’s

only prior offense was several decades old. Id. at 24.

      In imposing a sentence beyond the sentencing guidelines, the trial court

explained as follows:

           I do have the guidelines range of 9 to 16 [months], plus or
      minus 6. When I reviewed the PSI, … the big things that stuck
      out here from the PSI are from the [Appellant’s] version of the
      events.

            ….

              [Appellant’s] version and his statements in the PSI are
      pretty alarming. … So, the main part here I’m not going to read
      all of it. But he states that: … I grew up in Europe. Obviously in
      Germany where sex is not a problem. And is expressed differently
      than it is in America. No one in Europe is in the closet about their
      sexuality. I believe and follow the [Freikörperkultur (FKK)], also
      known[] as the free baldy culture, which is anyone who does not,
      [is] not ashamed of being nude. An example of that is nudist
      beaches where everyone is completely naked … and isn’t ashamed
      to be seen. I found on the Internet pictures from the FKK and all
      countries. I would look up images every couple of weeks. So, it
      wasn’t a daily thing that I was obsessed with.

            Here’s where the statements become very alarming for this
      court. [Appellant] states[,] … the images I would look up were

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      simple pictures that I found on Bin.dot of nudist colonies that were
      only of frontal nudes, nothing crazy.

             Now, the problem is the description of these images being
      nothing crazy is hard for this court to accept because these are
      children under the age of 10 years old. He goes on to say he’s
      not interested in seeing kids on kids which I assume for him to
      mean … performing sexual acts on one another, or adults on kids,
      just frontal nudes of anyone male, female, or child.

             That’s highly problematic here. The next sentence is: I do
      not see anything wrong with this since it was simply on the
      Internet and easy to access. He … goes on to say: I also … don’t
      think I deserve to be in jail because I was a good citizen in America
      and caused no one any harm.

            So the … elephant in the room here is that [Appellant] … is
      convicted now of looking up child pornography of kids less than
      10 years of age is saying in the PSI, he doesn’t think there’s
      anything wrong with it.

            And I have a high degree of concern that [Appellant is] going
      to recidivate. He’s just going to re-offend, and pretty quickly I
      would think.

Id. at 27-30 (some capitalization and paragraph breaks altered; italics

added).

      The trial court acknowledged Appellant’s guilty plea but voiced doubts

about whether Appellant truly accepted responsibility. Id. at 30-31; see also

id. at 31 (“Because even though [Appellant] is saying that he’s sorry this

happened, I think he’s more sorry that he spent time in jail on it.”). Further,

the trial court explained a standard-range sentence would not be appropriate

because “it’s one of the few cases where I have a [d]efendant who is

essentially telling me he’s going to re-offend.” Id. at 32. The court explicitly

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stated its intention to impose a sentence beyond the aggravated range and

reiterated:

      I don’t do that lightly…. I am [deviating from the guidelines]
      today. It is extremely rare where I have a [d]efendant telling me
      in the PSI. Especially, especially with child pornography. He’s
      telling me, one, what I did wasn’t wrong. And he’s giving me [an]
      indication he’s going to do it again.

Id. at 34 (paragraph break omitted).

      The record reveals that the trial court carefully considered the

sentencing guidelines and the general standards articulated in section 9721(b)

of the Sentencing Code.      The trial court also contemplated all relevant

sentencing factors and the information contained in the PSI.              See

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (explaining

that when the trial court has the benefit of a PSI, “we can assume the

sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory

factors.”). Moreover, the court adequately articulated its reasons for imposing

a sentence outside the guidelines. See Garcia-Rivera, 938 A.2d at 780. On

review, we cannot conclude Appellant’s sentence is unreasonable. This claim

merits no relief.

      In his second issue, Appellant asserts the trial court erred by denying

his request to stay application of SORNA’s registration requirements pending

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review in Torsilieri. Appellant’s Brief at

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24.   According to Appellant, “a high[] likelihood exists that SORNA will be

found to be unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.” Id. at 26.

       This Court has summarized the relevant background of Torsilieri as

follows:

       [I]n July of 2018, “the Chester County Court of Common Pleas
       declared Subchapter H of SORNA unconstitutional as violative of
       several provisions of both the United States and Pennsylvania
       Constitutions.” Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 659 Pa. 359, 232
       A.3d 567, 574-75 (2020). The Commonwealth appealed the
       decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See id. However,
       upon the record before it, the Court “was unable to conclude …
       whether the defendant had significantly undermined the validity
       of the legislative findings supporting Revised Subchapter H’s
       registration and notification provisions.” Id. at 585. Therefore,
       the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court “to
       provide both parties an opportunity to develop arguments and
       present additional evidence in determining whether the defendant
       has refuted the relevant legislative findings supporting the
       challenged registration and notification provision of Revised
       Subchapter H.” Id. at 596.

              Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary
       hearing in June of 2021, “at which both parties presented
       conflicting expert   testimony.”       See 97       MAP   2022,
       Commonwealth’s Statement of Jurisdiction, 9/19/22, at 4.
       Thereafter, on August 23, 2022, the trial court entered an order
       once again concluding that Revised Subchapter H of SORNA is
       unconstitutional, and granting the defendant’s supplemental
       motion to bar application of SORNA.        See id. at 1.     The
       Commonwealth timely appealed to the Supreme Court, where the
       case is now pending. See id.

Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810, 836-37 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(footnotes and brackets omitted).6

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6 Our Supreme Court heard argument in Torsilieri in May 2023.              The
Torsilieri Court has not yet rendered its decision.

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      In Faison, the appellant requested that the court stay his sexual

offender registration requirements under SORNA, pending the Supreme

Court’s decision in Torsilieri.    See id. at 836. This Court expressly rejected

the appellant’s claim, stating, “Subchapter H has not been declared

unconstitutional    by   the   Pennsylvania     Supreme    Court,   and   legislative

enactments are presumed to be constitutional.”            Id. at 837 (citation and

quotation marks omitted).         We also observed that compliance with the

registration requirements would not take effect until the appellant was

released from prison—which, in the Faison appellant’s case, would be at least

25 years. Id.      Finally, this Court stated, “Should the Supreme Court declare

Subchapter H unconstitutional in the future, [the a]ppellant may seek relief at

that time.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 617-18

(Pa. 2020) (SORNA claims need not be raised pursuant to the Post Conviction

Relief Act, and thus, are not subject to the Act’s time constraints)); see also

Commonwealth v. Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d 1210, 1218 n.13 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (stating that the appellant’s challenge to SORNA’s registration

requirements could be raised again in the event our Supreme Court declares

Subchapter H unconstitutional).

      Instantly, we apply the reasoning set forth in Faison. We emphasize

the Torsilieri Court did not reach the merits of the underlying constitutional

claims. We discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of

a stay. We reiterate that if our Supreme Court ultimately declares Subchapter

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H unconstitutional in Torsilieri, Appellant may seek relief at that time. See

Faison, 297 A.3d at 837. However, Appellant is not entitled to relief at this

juncture.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 2/13/2024

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