Court Opinion

ID: 9715385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:03:43.382672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:34.533929
License: Public Domain

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
(concurring). The parties in this case have raised and argued two separate issues: first, what is the standard of proof of causation in a products liability case based on the claim of a design defect; and, second, which party has the burden of proof of apportioning damages between injuries sustained as a result of the automobile accident itself and the additional injuries sustained as a result of the defective design.
The majority holding correctly states the law in Wisconsin that a plaintiff must prove that the defect was a substantial factor in producing the injury. P. 358, supra. See Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 557-58, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975). In the present case, the jury found, based on substantial evidence, that the defective design of the seats in the Toyota was a substantial factor in producing Sumnicht’s quadriplegia.
By virtue of the wording of the special verdict in this case,1 it is clear that the jury concluded that all of *380damages sustained were caused by the defective seat system. As the majority states:
“The trial court found, and we agree, that it is reasonable to say that the jury reasoned that if the seats had been properly engineered, the respondent would have sustained practically no injuries. Technically, the defective seat system did not ‘enhance’ Sumnicht’s injuries because, but for the defect, there were no injuries to enhance.” P. 366, supra.
Consequently, there are no distinct harms or damages to apportion in this case. This court, therefore, need not address the issue of the burden of proof of apportioning damages in “second collision” cases.2
I write separately to state that, because the facts of this case do not present the issue of the apportionment of damages, the majority opinion’s discussion of the Huddell3 standard of proof of enhanced injuries and of Wisconsin law on the apportionment of damages constitutes dicta unnecessary to the holding.
1 am authorized to state that Justices Shirley S. Abrahamson and William A. Bablitch join in this concurrence.

 Special verdict question two asked:
“Was such defective design a cause of injuries to the plaintiff over and above those injuries which he probably would have sustained as a result of the collision without such defective design?”

 In Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 485-86, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983), this court stated, “when there is a logical basis to allocate damages between two or more incidents and among various parties, courts attempt to do so.” The opinion then cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 443A, which specifies that: “(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where (a) there are distinct harms . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 486. The logical negative inference is that damages cannot be apportioned among causes where there are not separate or distinct harms.

 Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).