Court Opinion

ID: 9790771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:59:20.094905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.482453
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice,
concurring in the result:
I concur in the majority opinion and write only to note that any implication that may arise from the opinion that there is only one analysis to be applied in all Article I, section 24 cases is not correct. It is clear in Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), that a heightened standard of scrutiny applies in cases involving constitutionally protected rights. The point has been made in numerous opinions. See generally Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). In Lee, we stated:
Our holding that the heightened-scrutiny standard governs the manner in which Article I, section 24 is applied when Article I, section 11 rights are implicated is supported by» the rulings of other courts with respect to medical malpractice statutes and the effect of those statutes on the right to recover for negligently inflicted injuries.
867 P.2d at 583. Justice Durham in Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 356 (Utah 1989), stated:
Other courts have applied a heightened standard of equal protection scrutiny to statutes limiting recovery rights in the medical malpractice area. Some courts have characterized their review as one at an intermediate level, and some have referred to it as a “realistic” review under the rational basis standard. Both approaches, however, involve a real and thoughtful examination of legislative purpose and the relationship between the legislation and that purpose. In the present case, the legislature has not only limited recovery, but it has also extended partial governmental immunity to restrict rights which existed at common law. Therefore, I would apply a heightened standard of review under equal protection.
It should be noted that her statements in the above quotation were in connection with Arti-*429ele I, section 24 (the uniform operation of the laws provision), not federal equal protection. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 352. And her due process argument in Condemarin was explicitly based on a standard of heightened scrutiny.
I need not in this opinion outline all the differences that exist between application of the uniform operation of the laws provision in cases involving constitutionally protected interests and cases not involving such interests. The essential point here is that to equate the two would be to rob constitutionally protected interests of the protection the constitution was intended to impart to them.