Court Opinion

ID: 9430683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:20.402812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:25.772134
License: Public Domain

Justice Rehnquist,
with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
Today, in Firefighters v. Cleveland, post, p. 501 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), I express my belief that § 706(g) forbids a court to order racial preferences that effectively displace nonminorities except to minority individuals who have been the actual victims of a particular employer’s racial discrimination. Although the pervasiveness of the racial discrimination practiced by a particular union or employer is likely to increase the number of victims who are entitled to a remedy under the Act, § 706(g) does not allow us to go further than that and sanction the granting of relief to those who were not victims at the expense of innocent nonminority workers injured by racial preferences. I explain that both the language and the legislative history of § 706(g) clearly support this reading of § 706(g), and that this Court stated as much just two Terms ago in Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984). Because of this, I would not reach the equal protection question, see ante, at 479-481 (opinion of Brennan, J.), ante, at 484-489 (opinion of Powell, J.), but would rely solely on § 706(g) to reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment approving the order of class-based relief for petitioners’ past discrimination.