Court Opinion

ID: 9897074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:06:41.600592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:54.185824
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D22-1190
                  LT Case No. 2015-CA-000533
                 _____________________________

STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,

    Appellant,

    v.

CORA MATTHEWS,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Flagler County.
Christopher A. France, Judge.

Warren B. Kwavnick, of The Law Office of Warren B. Kwavnick,
PLLC, Pembroke Pines, and Thomas L. Hunker and Virginia A.
Paxton, of Hunker Paxton Appeals & Trials, Fort Lauderdale, for
Appellant.

Brian J. Lee, of Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

                       November 9, 2023

JAY, J.

     State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State
Farm”) challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion for a new
trial. State Farm’s motion was based on remarks made by counsel
for Cora Matthews during rebuttal closing argument. Because we
hold that counsel’s remarks were not so highly prejudicial and
inflammatory as to deny State Farm’s right to a fair trial, we
affirm the trial court’s ruling.

                                I.

    Ten years ago, Matthews was involved in a car accident with
an uninsured driver in Palm Coast. Matthews was insured by
State Farm, and her policy included uninsured motorist coverage.
Matthews alleged that the accident permanently injured her. State
Farm disputed that allegation. Matthews sued State Farm.

     A week-long jury trial followed. In his opening statement,
counsel for State Farm claimed the evidence would show that
Matthews’ medical providers were financially interested in the
trial’s outcome, and therefore, were unreliable witnesses.
Throughout the trial, State Farm tried to convince the jury of this
alleged fact.

     Mid-trial, the parties disagreed about the admissibility of
certain medical bills. The trial court concluded the bills were
inadmissible. The day before closing arguments, Matthews
withdrew her claim for past medical expenses.

      In his closing argument, counsel for State Farm noted that
Matthews was not pursuing past medical expenses. He went on to
argue that Matthews’ case depended on testimony from financially
self-interested medical witnesses. In making this claim, he averred
that Matthews “should be able to come in here and present you
testimony from doctors that don’t have a dog in the hunt.”

     During his rebuttal closing, counsel for Matthews made the
argument that is now the subject of this single-issue appeal. The
relevant passage of the trial transcript reads:

    [MR. MORAN, for Matthews]: So State Farm’s attorney
    was up here and talked about that there’s this letter of
    protection or this lien with Advantacare, and, therefore,
    they are biased because they have an interest in the
    outcome of the case. How do they have an interest in the

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outcome of the case? They don’t have an interest in the
outcome of the case. Cora Matthews is not making a claim
for the past medical bills in this case. So how could it
conceivably be argued that Dr. Sandborn or anybody from
Advantacare has an interest in the outcome of the case?
Because regardless of what your award is –

MR. GOBEL [for State Farm]: Objection. Improper
argument.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. MORAN: Regardless of what the outcome of the case
is, they have no dog in this fight. Advantacare has no dog
in this fight.

And while we are on this discussion –

MR. GOBEL: May we approach?

(The following discussion was held at sidebar out of the
presence of the Jury:)

MR. GOBEL: Your Honor, we would object. The Plaintiff
didn’t waive past medical bills until yesterday, so up until
yesterday, Advantacare had a lien and they still have a
lien from the proceeds of this case, so because the
Plaintiff waived past medical [expenses] yesterday, they
did have a dog in the fight, at least until yesterday. We
object. That’s misleading. We would request a curative
instruction on that.

MR. MORAN: Your Honor, that’s absolutely not
misleading to the jury. I’m merely pointing out that there
is no claim for past medical bills, so, therefore, there can
be no argument at all that there’s any bias for Dr.
Sandborn or Advantacare.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled. This motion is
denied. Move on.

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     The jury found that Matthews suffered a permanent injury in
the accident. State Farm moved for a new trial. Its motion claimed
that “[i]n one statement, Plaintiff’s counsel effectively eviscerated
[State Farm’s] theme of the entire case,” which was “the bias and
credibility of Plaintiff’s expert medical witnesses.” State Farm
maintained that counsel’s “one tremendously impactful and
misleading statement” about having “no dog in this fight” was
“alone” enough to justify a new trial because it made the jurors
think that State Farm misled them about the alleged financial
interests of Matthews’ witnesses.

    The trial court denied State Farm’s motion. State Farm
contends this was reversible error. We disagree.

                                 II.

      When ruling on a motion for new trial, the trial court has
broad discretion. See Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla.
1959). In “analyzing whether a trial court abused [this] discretion
. . . appellate courts traditionally defer to the superior vantage
point enjoyed by the trial court.” Olsen v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
343 So. 3d 172, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). This means that a trial
court’s ruling on a motion for new trial will not be “lightly . . .
disturbed.” Fla. Coastal Theatres v. Belflower, 32 So. 2d 738, 747
(Fla. 1947) (emphasis added).

    “The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the
evidence and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably
be drawn from th[at] evidence.” Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130,
134 (Fla. 1985). The law affords counsel “wide latitude” in
completing this task. Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1061 (Fla.
2007). Thus, “an attorney is allowed to argue reasonable inferences
from the evidence and to argue [the] credibility of witnesses or any
other relevant issue so long as the argument is based on the
evidence.” Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1254–55 (Fla. 2006).

     Counsel breaches this wide latitude when he makes
arguments designed to “inflame the minds and passions of the
jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response . . .
rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the
applicable law.” Bertolotti, 476 So. 2d at 134; see also Rodriguez v.

                                 4
State, 210 So. 3d 750, 756 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (noting that unfair
prejudice occurs when a lawyer’s improper comments “poison the
minds of the jurors” (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 786 So. 2d 559, 567
(Fla. 2001))). Consistent with this principle, when a motion for new
trial is based on counsel’s allegedly improper closing argument, the
moving party must show that the argument was “so highly
prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the [moving party’s]
right to a fair trial.” Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, 248 So.
3d 212, 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp.,
Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1271 (Fla. 2006)); see also Lazaroff v. Meek,
361 So. 3d 415, 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (providing that “to
warrant the grant of a new trial,” the improper argument’s impact
“must be so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial”).

    Here, State Farm persuasively argues that Matthews’
counsel’s remarks were misleading. Counsel’s response to State
Farm’s objection was that Matthews withdrew her claim for past
medical expenses. However, that withdrawal did not occur until
the day before closing arguments. This means that to whatever
extent any witnesses had a financial bias because of the past
medical expenses, such a bias would not have dissipated until
shortly before closing arguments.

     But State Farm’s position collapses on the next question,
which is whether the “no dog in this fight” argument was “so highly
prejudicial and inflammatory” that it deprived State Farm of a fair
trial. There is no possibility that counsel’s remarks rose to this
level.

     State Farm makes much of its many efforts to portray
Matthews’ witnesses as financially biased. Indeed, State Farm
argues that “[f]rom inception to the end of trial, State Farm
strongly emphasized the financial biases of Plaintiff’s treating
doctors, Dr. Vassilakis, Dr. Sandborn, and Dr. Brown, and
Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Frisk and Dr. Boehme, and questioned the
reliability of the records created by the treating doctors.” It further
contends that it used portions of its closing argument to reiterate
that “the testimonies of Plaintiff’s treating doctors and experts,
along with the records created by the treating doctors[,] were
questionable.” In sum, as State Farm admits, the jurors heard

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“over and over” about the purported financial biases of Matthews’
medical witnesses.

      Despite this week-long assault, State Farm asserts that a
single argument from Matthews’ counsel “destroyed State Farm’s
financial bias theme.” State Farm’s view—which holds that in one
fell swoop, Matthews’ counsel successfully undid everything that
State Farm had been doing for the entire trial—simply gives
Matthews’ counsel too much credit. As Judge Farmer noted in
Cleveland Clinic Florida v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 4th DCA
1996) (Farmer, J., concurring specially), most jurors are not “so
swept away by” counsel’s arguments “that they lose all control of
their faculties and proceed to award verdict or money in spite of
the facts and law.” Instead, there is a presumption that jurors
follow the court’s instructions. See Nolan v. Kalbfleisch, 369 So. 3d
346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).

     Here, counsel for Matthews only referenced Dr. Sandborn and
Advantacare. He said nothing about Matthews’ other experts or
care providers. Thus, the suggestion that counsel’s argument
“obliterated” all of “State Farm’s bias and credibility arguments”
is baseless.

     Equally important, improper comments do not merit a new
trial when they fail the “highly prejudicial and inflammatory” test.
Bakery Assocs., Ltd. v. Rigaud, 906 So. 2d 366, 367 (Fla. 3d DCA
2005). Isolated comments rarely meet this standard. See Grushoff
v. Denny’s, Inc., 693 So. 2d 1068, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
(observing that in general, isolated comments “do not harmfully
infect a case”); see, e.g., Araujo v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 290 So.
3d 936, 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (holding that defense counsel’s
opening statement about the plaintiff’s doctors not getting paid
unless the plaintiff recovered damages at trial was “not so
inflammatory and prejudicial” that it vitiated the fairness of a
four-day trial); Rosario-Paredes v. J.C. Wrecker Serv., 975 So. 2d
1205, 1207–08 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that defense counsel’s
allegation that the plaintiff’s medical experts “do an amazing job
of trying to convince people” of the existence of injuries, which is
why the plaintiff’s law firm hired such doctors “over and over”
through “a network of lawyers and doctors” where “everybody is
making money,” while improper, was “isolated” and “did not rise

                                  6
to the level that deprived” the plaintiff of a fair trial); see also State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Medina, 300 So. 3d 177, 180–81 (Fla.
4th DCA 2020) (holding that an “isolated comment” by a defense
witness about how his views were not based on money, which the
witness suggested was not true of plaintiff’s counsel, was not so
highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the plaintiff a
fair trial).

      These cases stand in contrast to those where a new trial was
required because counsel’s repeated inflammatory comments—
embedded with derogatory themes—sought to induce a jury
verdict on an improper basis. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. Robinson, 216 So. 3d 674, 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (holding that
in a case where the record was “replete with improper arguments
and comments clearly intended to stir the passions of the jury,” a
new trial was needed because plaintiff’s counsel sought to “utterly
vilify” the defendant by characterizing it “as an unrepentant, anti-
military, criminal predator, whom the jury must fight and destroy”
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); Venning v. Roe, 616 So. 2d
604, 604–05 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (holding that defense counsel’s
comments were “highly prejudicial and inflammatory” and
required a new trial in a case where “defense counsel made several
derogatory remarks,” such as that “plaintiff’s medical expert was
‘nothing more than an unqualified doctor who prostitutes
himself,’” and that plaintiff’s lawyer presented “‘a work of fiction’
which he ‘created and orchestrated’ with the assistance of
plaintiff’s medical expert”).

     The remarks in this case plainly fall into the first category
rather than the second. Even if the comments were misleading,
they were isolated amid a lengthy trial and were not designed to
inflame the jurors’ minds or obtain a verdict based on emotion.
Thus, State Farm’s contention that counsel’s remarks “obliterated”
and “completely destroyed” the theme of State Farm’s case—which
State Farm acknowledges it had advanced for over a week—falls
far short.

                                   III.

     On this record, the trial court did not abuse its broad
discretion by denying State Farm’s motion for a new trial, which

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failed to show that Matthews’ counsel’s argument was so highly
prejudicial and inflammatory that it deprived State Farm of its
right to a fair trial. See Lazaroff, 361 So. 3d at 416; Bakery Assocs.,
Ltd., 906 So. 2d at 367.

    AFFIRMED.

BOATWRIGHT and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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