Court Opinion

ID: 9403897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 19:16:22.84093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:09.548844
License: Public Domain

No. 22-0365 –In re: G.G.                                                            FILED
                                                                                 June 21, 2023
                                                                                released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                            EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                 OF WEST VIRGINIA

BUNN, Justice, concurring:

              I agree with the majority’s determination that G.G.’s best interests require

her continued placement with her foster parents. After having been placed with her foster

family when she was just over one year old and having now resided in their care for

approximately two years, disruption of this placement would likely wreak havoc on the

young child’s life given the significant attachments she has formed with her foster family.

See Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Treadway v. McCoy, 189 W. Va. 210, 429 S.E.2d 492 (1993)

(“The best interests of a child are served by preserving important relationships in that

child’s life.”). Therefore, I concur with the majority’s opinion in this case.

              I write separately to express my frustration with the protracted delays that

have led to G.G.’s long-term placement with her foster family and contributed to the

formation of the bond she now has with them to the exclusion of her right to form a

relationship with her biological relatives. See W. Va. Code § 49-2-126(a)(5) (recognizing

that “[f]oster children and children in a kinship placement are active and participating

members of the child welfare system and have the following rights: . . . The right to be

placed in a kinship placement, when such placement meets the objectives set forth in this

article[.]”). All too often in abuse and neglect cases, bureaucratic delays in the

identification of a child’s relatives and consideration of the appropriateness of placing a

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child in their care result in real life consequences for the children subject to such

proceedings. This case is no exception.

              The Legislature has established definite and fairly rigid time limits to govern

the conduct of abuse and neglect cases, 1 and this Court also recognizes stringent timelines

to guide the resolution of these proceedings. 2 These time limits help ensure that abuse and

neglect cases are given priority and are resolved as expeditiously as possible for the young

lives at stake in such proceedings. Our constant refrain for over three decades is that

“[c]hild abuse and neglect cases must be recognized as being among the highest priority

for the courts’ attention. Unjustified procedural delays wreak havoc on a child’s

development, stability and security.” Syl. pt. 1, in part, In Int. of Carlita B., 185 W. Va.

613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991). Unfortunately, the continued search for a child’s relatives, and

              1
               See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 49-4-111(b) (limiting termination of child’s foster
care arrangement “[w]hen a child has been placed in a foster care arrangement for a period
in excess of eighteen consecutive months”); W. Va. Code § 49-4-602(a)(1) (restricting
period of DHHR’s temporary emergency care of child suspected to be abused or neglected
to ten days); W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(e) (permitting court to grant parents “an
improvement period not to exceed six months”); W. Va. Code § 49-4-605(a)(1) (requiring
DHHR action when “a child has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months”).
              2
                 See, e.g., W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proceed. 27 (directing court
to enter adjudicatory order “within ten (10) days of the conclusion of the hearing”); id. at
R. 32 (establishing timeframes for dispositional hearing); id. at R. 43 (requiring
achievement of child’s permanent placement “within twelve (12) months of the final
disposition order, unless the court specifically finds on the record extraordinary reasons
sufficient to justify the delay”).

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the exhaustive investigative process 3 employed to ensure the relatives are an appropriate

placement for the child, very often causes the child to form deep and immutable

attachments to the foster parents with whom she has been temporarily placed—so much so

that once a relative is finally approved as a suitable caregiver, such relative placement

would no longer serve the child’s best interests. This case is an example of that very

scenario.

              Despite the efforts of G.G.’s relatives to serve as her caregivers during the

underlying abuse and neglect proceeding, it appears that the DHHR 4 first told them that

they had come forward too soon. Later, when the fictive kin placement failed and the

DHHR sought a new placement for G.G., the relatives were not considered—until nearly

three months later when they again initiated contact with the DHHR to seek her custody.

While the relatives timely completed the appropriate paperwork to be considered as an out-

              3
                For example, in this case G.G.’s relatives live in another state; therefore,
the DHHR was required to coordinate with the corresponding agency in the relatives’ home
state to secure their home study and ensure that they would be a safe and appropriate
placement for her. See generally W. Va. Code §§ 49-7-101 to -102 (detailing requirements
for Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children).
              4
                 The Legislature recently reorganized the DHHR into three new
departments: the West Virginia Department of Health, the West Virginia Department of
Human Services, and the West Virginia Department of Health Facilities. See generally
Acts of the W. Va. Legislature, Reg. Sess. 2023, H.B. 2006 (eff. May 23, 2023). While I
refer to the agency involved in this case as the DHHR to maintain consistency with the
underlying abuse and neglect proceeding and the majority’s opinion in this case, I hope
that the new department that will replace the existing DHHR takes heed of the concerns
detailed herein.

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of-state placement for G.G., unexplained delays and breakdowns in communication

resulted in an additional five-month period before the relatives’ home was finally approved

as an appropriate placement. After these delays, the circuit court determined that young

G.G. had formed such a deep bond with her foster family that moving her to another

placement, albeit with her relatives, would be more detrimental to her well-being than

beneficial.

              I understand and appreciate the issues regarding staff retention, inadequate

resources, and other institutional difficulties that may hamper the DHHR’s ability to devote

its full attention to any particular child entrusted to its care during the course of an abuse

and neglect case. See generally State ex rel. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res. v. Bloom,

247 W. Va. 433, 880 S.E.2d 899 (2022). However, where, as here, a child’s biological

relatives initiate contact with the DHHR during a previous abuse and neglect proceeding

concerning the child’s siblings and are effectively rebuffed because they have expressed

interest in receiving placement of the children too early, it does not seem prohibitively

difficult to retain the relatives’ information so that they may be contacted should they be

needed as caregivers in the future—particularly when the Legislature has enacted a series

of statutes specifically addressing the DHHR’s record keeping responsibilities concerning

children who have been entrusted to its care or to whom it has provided services. See

W. Va. Code §§ 49-5-101 to -106. In other words, insofar as the DHHR apparently keeps

records of a child’s siblings, even when the child and her siblings are born across different

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years, it certainly seems possible to also include the child’s known relatives in those records

for ease of reference in any future abuse and neglect proceeding.

              The extensive efforts of the DHHR in striving to protect the children of this

State through the abuse and neglect process do not go unnoticed. See W. Va. Code §§ 49-

2-802(a)-(b) (requiring DHHR to “establish or designate in every county a local child

protective services office” and further directing “[t]he local child protective services office

shall investigate all reports of child abuse or neglect” and “provide protective services to

prevent further abuse or neglect of children and provide for or arrange for and coordinate

and monitor the provision of those services necessary to ensure the safety of children,”

among other enumerated duties (emphasis added)). See also W. Va. Code § 49-1-105

(recognizing purposes of child welfare system generally and corresponding duties of state

agencies to achieve those goals). However, the DHHR should also remain mindful of the

need for timely and prompt action in such proceedings to ensure that children’s rights are

not inadvertently trammeled. As the majority astutely noted, “[r]egardless of who is

responsible for the delay in this case, the child is the unfortunate victim.” W. Va. Dep’t of

Hum. Serv. v. La Rea Ann C.L., 175 W. Va. 330, 337 n.8, 332 S.E.2d 632, 638 n.8 (1985).

This quote aptly describes the various quagmires in the DHHR’s process that shaped the

contours of G.G.’s abuse and neglect proceeding and contributed to her long-term

placement with foster parents instead of enabling her to form a bond with, and be placed

with, her biological relatives who desperately sought her care. I only hope that, in future

abuse and neglect cases, the DHHR will remain vigilant in its continuing efforts to

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safeguard the rights of the children it seeks to protect and that the courts presiding over

those proceedings will remain steadfast in their efforts to ensure that such cases are

resolved as expeditiously as possible. For these reasons, I respectfully concur with the

majority’s opinion in this case.

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