Court Opinion

ID: 9481986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:37:10.699255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:42.021518
License: Public Domain

POSNER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
A felon, forbidden by law to possess a gun, places a loaded pistol in the waistband of his trousers. Thus accoutered, he goes for a taxi ride in Chicago. The cab driver sees the gun, summons the police, and the felon is arrested. He is later convicted in an Illinois state court of unlawful use of a gun. The question is whether his offense “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.2(1). If the answer is “yes,” the punishment for the felon’s later, federal offense must be enhanced. The district judge answered “yes,” and under our precedents, as this court acknowledges, we can reverse only if *443her answer was clearly erroneous. United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915, 919 (7th Cir.1990). The court assumes that the district judge was right to examine the conduct of the defendant, rather than just the elements of the crime, in deciding whether this provision of the Guidelines has been satisfied. That is the circuit rule, all right, id. at 918, and it is defensible when we are dealing with so amorphous an offense as unlawful use of a weapon. But we should recognize that it has been cast into doubt by Taylor v. United States, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), and that the circuits are divided over it. See United States v. Cornelius, 931 F.2d 490, 492-93 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. John, 936 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Dunn, 935 F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (9th Cir.1991). It requires the district court in effect to retry the earlier offense, which can entail a considerable burden on the court as well as an inquiry fraught with uncertainty because of the passage of time.
Having decided (unlike us) to take the categorical approach and thus not look at the facts of the previous offense, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that a felon’s mere possession of a gun is, without more, a crime of violence. United States v. O’Neal, 910 F.2d 663, 667 (9th Cir.1990). At the other extreme is the Third Circuit’s dictum that the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon is not a crime of violence unless the gun is fired. United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 304 (3d Cir.1989). The first position could be thought to ignore the “serious” in “serious risk of personal injury,” the second the difference between risk and actuality.
My brethren treat our case as one of mere possession, and since we do not follow the Ninth Circuit’s categorical approach, the result is a reversal of the sentence. But this is not a case of mere possession, for two reasons. First and indisputably, Chappie was carrying the gun on his person, and this is different from and more dangerous than just keeping it in one’s home. Second, the gun quite possibly was in public view. The cabbie, after all, saw it. It was thrust into Chappie’s waistband, so the handle must have protruded. Maybe — though there is no evidence of this — he was wearing a jacket that concealed the handle, but, if so, it couldn’t have concealed it very well, since the cab driver saw it. I have trouble imagining a more provocative act than a felon’s carrying a loaded gun in public view while traveling on public transportation in a crowded city. He is flaunting his defiance of the law. A quarrel with the taxi driver, a jostle by the crowd, a gesture of fear or anger by an onlooker alarmed or indignant at such a display — any of these incidents might have occurred and led to the gun’s being fired and killing or wounding someone.
How likely was this to happen? As a statistical matter, not very; but then even in a stickup the likelihood of the victim’s being shot is small. The felon-in-possession laws are premised on a belief that a felon is so much more likely to use a gun for an evil purpose than other people are that he should be punished for bare possession. The Ninth Circuit may be wrong to infer from that premise that bare possession imports a serious potential risk of physical injury, but there is more here, and whether it is enough to change the color of legal litmus is an issue in the first instance for the district judge. If we are to adhere to this circuit’s approach of case-by-case assessment and if the concept of clear error is to be taken seriously, we could not reverse the decision whichever way the district judge decided.
I have assumed that Chappie’s gun was visible to the world. Maybe it was not and only by a fluke did the cabbie see it. If that is crucial — which my colleagues must think it is since they say they would affirm if Chappie had been “openly displaying a weapon” — and if, as they are minded to do, we adhere to the circuit’s approach of looking at the facts of the particular case rather than trying to classify every crime as one of violence or not simply on the basis of the statutory elements of the crime, then we should remand for a determination of the gun’s visibility. We should not assume that the gun was concealed when, so far as appears, it was not.
Maybe it should not matter whether the gun was concealed or displayed. A con*444cealed weapon, unless carried by a peace officer or by a private citizen authorized to do so for purposes of self-defense, is sinister; carried by a felon on his rounds (rather than just kept at home), it could well be thought to create the serious potential risk of which the Guidelines speak. Display, one might think, would make a difference only if the gun was being pointed, brandished, or otherwise displayed in a threatening manner; it is from such display that a readiness actually to fire the gun and therefore a dangerous probability that it will be fired is inferred; peacefully holstered, as it were, the gun might seem more boast than threat. If pressed I would uphold the district court's decision even if I thought the gun had been effectively if not totally concealed, but the case is easier if it was displayed. Granted that a felon who carries a gun with him while traveling in a crowded city is a public menace even if the gun is concealed, its public display may not only contain an element of provocation but also import a greater willingness to fire the gun other than in lawful self-defense; both elements enhance the menace.
We should either affirm outright on the strength of the clear-error doctrine or remand to enable an arguably crucial fact to be ascertained.