Court Opinion

ID: 9959688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 15:01:05.82906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:44.856935
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1905    Document: 57    Page: 1    Filed: 04/12/2024

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                   LUV N' CARE, LTD.,
                    Plaintiff-Appellant

                   NOURI E. HAKIM,
                Counter-Defendant-Appellant

                            v.

                  LINDSEY LAURAIN,
                      Defendant

                   EAZY-PZ, LLC,
      Defendant/Counter-Claimant-Cross-Appellant
                ______________________

                   2022-1905, 2022-1970
                  ______________________

    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
 Western District of Louisiana in No. 3:16-cv-00777-TAD-
 JPM, Judge Terry A. Doughty.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: April 12, 2024
                  ______________________

     CAROL WELBORN REISMAN, Liskow & Lewis, New Orle-
 ans, LA, argued for appellants. Also represented by
 GEORGE DENEGRE, JR., MELANIE DEREFINKO, CAREY
 MENASCO; HARTWELL POWELL MORSE, III, Luv n' Care,
 Ltd., Monroe, LA.
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57     Page: 2    Filed: 04/12/2024

 2                                LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

    JENNIFER KROELL FISCHER, Fischer Law Firm, PC,
 Denver, CO, argued for defendant/counter-claimant-cross-
 appellant.
                 ______________________

     Before REYNA, HUGHES, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 STARK, Circuit Judge.
     This appeal arises from a lawsuit between two manu-
 facturers of dining mats for toddlers: Luv n’ care, Ltd. and
 Nouri E. Hakim (collectively, “LNC”), on one side, and
 Lindsey Laurain (“Laurain”) and Eazy-PZ, LLC (collec-
 tively, “EZPZ”), on the other. After years of litigation, a
 judge in the United States District Court for the Western
 District of Louisiana (“Western District”) held a bench
 trial. The trial court then issued an opinion finding that
 LNC failed to prove EZPZ’s U.S. Patent No. 9,462,903 (the
 “’903 patent”) is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct
 but, at the same time, LNC succeeded in proving that EZPZ
 was barred from obtaining relief due to its “unclean hands.”
 Separately, the district court granted LNC’s motion for
 partial summary judgment that the claims of the ’903 pa-
 tent are invalid as obvious. The court also denied LNC’s
 motion to recover its attorney fees and costs.
     Both LNC and EZPZ now appeal. As explained below,
 we (1) affirm the district court’s judgment for LNC on un-
 clean hands; (2) vacate the judgment for EZPZ of no ineq-
 uitable conduct; (3) vacate the grant of partial summary
 judgment of invalidity; and (4) vacate the orders denying
 attorney fees and costs. We remand for further proceed-
 ings consistent with this opinion.
                              I
                              A
      Many parents have experienced the “inconvenience of
 having to clean up after their children’s mealtimes,” espe-
 cially when those meals involve their children “dislodging
Case: 22-1905     Document: 57     Page: 3    Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                                3

 and upturning their plates and bowls to spill foodstuffs and
 beverages everywhere.” ’903 patent at 1:54-58. The ’903
 patent provides a solution to this problem by introducing a
 surface contact self-sealing dining mat integrated with ta-
 bleware, thereby preventing the separation of tableware
 from the dining mat, while also preventing the lateral dis-
 placement and overturning of the dining mat. See id. at
 1:59-64. An exemplary dining mat is depicted in Figure 1
 of the ’903 patent, reproduced below.

      The dining mat features “a planar portion . . . for seal-
 able contact upon an underlying surface, wherein lateral
 displacement . . . is preventable.” Id. at 1:66-2:2. “[A] par-
 tial vacuum” is created “between the planar portion and
 [the] underlying surface when attempts to lift the planar
 portion away from [the] underlying surface are effected.”
 Id. at 2:2-5. This “partial vacuum” “prevents separation of
 the planar portion from the underlying surface except
 when [the] planar portion is first peeled away . . . at an
 outer edge of [the] planar portion.” Id. at 2:5-8. The upper
 surface of the mat “includes a raised perimeter . . . defining
Case: 22-1905      Document: 57   Page: 4     Filed: 04/12/2024

 4                                LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 a concavity [which] is contemplated to include at least one
 receptacle wherein foodstuffs are storable, as desired, for
 ingestion therefrom.” Id. at 2:41-45.
     The ’903 patent contains nine claims. Claims 1, 5, and
 9 are independent claims. Claim 1 recites:
       1. A surface contact self-sealing integrated
       tableware and dining mat comprising a rub-
       berlike planar portion having a raised perim-
       eter delimiting at least one concavity
       surrounding at least one receptacle above an
       upper surface and an entirely suffuse under-
       surface disposed for sealable contact with an
       underlying surface upon which said mat is
       disposed, said sealable contact preventative of
       lateral displacement of the planar portion
       across the underlying surface, wherein said
       sealable contact creates a partial vacuum
       when attempts to separate the undersurface
       from the underlying surface are made except
       at an outer edge of the planar portion,
       whereby removal of the planar portion from
       the underlying surface is effective only by
       peeling the undersurface from the underlying
       surface starting first at the outer edge.
 Id. at 5:17-30.
     Claim 5 recites:
       5. A surface contact self-sealing integrated
       tableware and dining mat comprising:
       a nontoxic polymeric planar portion;
       an outer edge parametrically bounding said
       planar portion;
       an undersurface entirely suffuse upon the
       planar portion, said undersurface disposed to
Case: 22-1905        Document: 57   Page: 5   Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                               5

       sealably contact an underlying surface upon
       which the planar portion is disposed;
       an upper surface; and
       a raised perimeter disposed within the upper
       surface, said raised perimeter defining a con-
       cavity wrought above the upper surface of the
       planar portion to delimit at least one recepta-
       cle upon the planar portion;
       wherein the undersurface sealably contacts
       an underlying surface upon which the planar
       portion is disposed, said undersurface thereby
       preventing lateral displacement of the planar
       portion upon said underlying surface by fric-
       tional engagement therewith and, further,
       creation of a partial vacuum between the un-
       dersurface and the underlying surface when
       attempt is made to remove said planar portion
       away from said underlying surface, whereby
       foodstuffs are positional interior to the at
       least one receptacle, said receptacle thence
       maintained in desired position by action of the
       planar portion contacting said underlying
       surface, and removal of said planar portion
       from said underlying surface is effective only
       when said planar portion is lifted from said
       underlying surface first at the outer edge of
       the planar portion.
 Id. at 5:42-6:14.
     Claim 9 is identical to claim 5 except in two respects.
 First, instead of a “nontoxic polymeric planar portion,”
 claim 9 specifically recites a “silicone planar portion.” Id.
 at 6:29. Second, the final “wherein” clause of claim 9, as
 shown below, has several limitations that are different
 from that of claim 5:
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57       Page: 6   Filed: 04/12/2024

 6                                LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

       wherein the undersurface sealably contacts
       an underlying surface upon which the planar
       portion is disposed, said undersurface thereby
       preventing lateral displacement of the planar
       portion upon said underlying surface by fric-
       tional engagement therewith and, further,
       creation of a partial vacuum between the un-
       dersurface and the underlying surface when
       attempt is made to separate said planar por-
       tion from said underlying surface, whereby
       foodstuffs are selectively positional interior to
       the at least one receptacle, said receptacle
       thence maintained in desired position upon
       the underlying surface by action of the planar
       portion contacting said underlying surface,
       and removal of said planar portion from said
       underlying surface is effective only when said
       planar portion is separated from said under-
       lying surface first at the outer edge of the pla-
       nar portion.
 Id. at 6:41-56 (emphasis added).
                              B
      In June 2016, LNC filed a complaint in the Western
 District against EZPZ, seeking injunctive and monetary re-
 lief due to EZPZ’s alleged “acts of unfair competition.” J.A.
 481. LNC’s claims were brought pursuant to the Lanham
 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and the Louisiana Unfair Trade
 Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“LUTPA”), La.
 Rev. Stat. § 51:1401 et seq. LNC also sought a declaratory
 judgment that EZPZ’s U.S. Design Patent No. D745,327
 (the “’327 design patent”) is invalid, unenforceable, and not
 infringed.
    On October 11, 2016, the United States Patent and
 Trademark Office (“PTO”) issued the ’903 patent to Ms.
 Laurain, who assigned her rights to EZPZ. LNC filed an
 amended complaint, adding to its declaratory judgment
Case: 22-1905     Document: 57     Page: 7    Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                               7

 claim a request that the ’903 patent be declared invalid,
 unenforceable, and not infringed. In November 2016 and
 January 2017, EZPZ filed counterclaims against LNC, in-
 cluding for infringement of the ’327 design patent and the
 ’903 patent, as well as copyright, trademark, and trade
 dress infringement, violation of LUTPA, and unjust enrich-
 ment.
     Following discovery, LNC moved for partial summary
 judgment on the basis that the claims of the ’903 patent are
 invalid. The district court granted LNC’s motion in May
 2020, finding that all claims of the ’903 patent are obvious
 over U.S. Patent Publication No. 2003/0152736 (“Bass”) in
 view of U.S. Patent Publication No. 2008/0245947 (“Webb
 Publication”) and U.S. Patent No. 8,251,340 (“Webb Pa-
 tent”). We will refer to the Webb Publication and Webb
 Patent together as the “Webb Prior Art.”
      Bass discloses “a plate mat for use in restaurants and
 homes,” having “an adhesive backing so it can be securely
 affixed to a table top or tray.” J.A. 1085. Bass also teaches
 an “enclosed space” integrated with “[t]he upper surface of
 the mat.” Id. The Webb Publication discloses a mat “ar-
 ranged to grip a support surface on which the mat portion
 is laid, in use, by formation of at least a partial vacuum
 between the mat portion and the support surface upon de-
 formation of the mat portion.” J.A. 1088. The district court
 did not separately discuss the Webb Patent, observing that
 “[t]he Webb Publication and Webb Patent . . . generally
 share the same specification.” J.A. 8.
     The district court acknowledged that “Bass does not
 disclose or specify a material for its integrated tableware
 and dining mat,” but found it would have been “common
 sense to a person of ordinary skill in the art” to make “the
 integrated tableware and dining mat disclosed in Bass out
 of the rubberlike, nontoxic material disclosed in the Webb
 Publication.” J.A. 16, 19 (internal quotation marks omit-
 ted). The court further found that “the showing of
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 8    Filed: 04/12/2024

 8                                LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 obviousness in this case is compelling and is not called into
 doubt by the evidence of secondary considerations.” J.A.
 27.
      In June 2020, EZPZ moved for reconsideration of the
 district court’s summary judgment ruling. The district
 court denied the motion in October 2020, indicating that
 “[a] [r]uling providing further reasoning will follow in due
 course.” J.A. 2637. Before any such ruling was issued,
 EZPZ requested ex parte reexamination of its ’903 patent
 by the PTO. On August 5, 2021, EZPZ notified the district
 court that it had been advised by the PTO that the agency
 would soon issue an ex parte reexamination certificate con-
 firming the patentability of the ’903 patent’s claims. The
 PTO issued such a certificate on August 23, 2021, but EZPZ
 did not provide it to the district court before or during the
 bench trial that began on August 25, 2021.
     Hence, during the bench trial, the district judge knew
 that a reexamination certificate – reiterating the PTO’s
 view that the claims of the ’903 patent were nonobvious –
 would be forthcoming, but he did not have the certificate in
 his record. The trial, which ultimately ran to eight days,
 concerned only the issues of (i) whether inequitable con-
 duct (which LNC had asserted as both a declaratory judg-
 ment claim and an affirmative defense) had been
 committed in connection with prosecution of the ’903 pa-
 tent, and (ii) whether EZPZ’s conduct during the litigation
 had amounted to unclean hands (which LNC had asserted
 as an affirmative defense).
      On December 21, 2021, the district court issued its
 post-trial opinion. In it, the court held that LNC did not
 meet its burden of proving that the ’903 patent is unen-
 forceable due to inequitable conduct. Specifically, the dis-
 trict court found that although Ms. Laurain and her patent
 agent, Benjamin Williams (“Williams”), made misrepresen-
 tations to the PTO – namely, that the prior art Platinum
 Pets mat did not exhibit self-sealing functionality – that
Case: 22-1905     Document: 57     Page: 9    Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                               9

 misrepresentation was not but-for material to the patenta-
 bility of the ’903 patent, given that the Platinum Pets mat
 itself had been disclosed to the PTO. The district court fur-
 ther found that several other prior art references Ms.
 Laurain and Mr. Williams withheld from the PTO were
 also not material because they were cumulative of the Plat-
 inum Pets mat. Additionally, the court found that Ms.
 Laurain’s and Mr. Williams’ misrepresentation of the Plat-
 inum Pets mat, as well as their submission of declarations
 containing false or misleading information, did not demon-
 strate a specific intent to deceive the PTO.
     Turning to LNC’s unclean hands defense, the district
 court determined that unclean hands barred EZPZ from ob-
 taining relief on its then-remaining counterclaims. In par-
 ticular, the court found that EZPZ engaged in litigation
 misconduct, including by failing to disclose certain patent
 applications during discovery, attempting repeatedly to
 block LNC from obtaining Ms. Laurain’s prior art searches,
 stringing LNC along during settlement negotiations, and
 providing evasive and misleading testimony. The court
 concluded that EZPZ “by deceit and reprehensible conduct
 attempted to gain an unfair advantage” and, thus, “is not
 entitled to the relief it seeks.” J.A. 189-90.
      On the same day it issued its bench trial opinion, the
 district court provided the parties with its follow-up rea-
 soning for having denied EZPZ’s motion for reconsideration
 of its grant of summary judgment of obviousness. In doing
 so, the court observed: “[g]iven that the issues presented at
 the bench trial required a full understanding of the prior
 art and related evidence, the [c]ourt was provided with the
 opportunity to gain a better understanding of this evidence
 as it relates to EZPZ’s motion for reconsideration.” The dis-
 trict court held that the challenged claims were invalid as
 obvious over the combination of Bass and the Webb Prior
 Art – the same grounds on which it had relied in the origi-
 nal summary judgment opinion – and were also obvious
 over a new combination consisting of Bass and the Tommee
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 10     Filed: 04/12/2024

 10                                LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 Tippee mat, the latter of which was described by the court
 as “a commercial embodiment of the Webb Prior Art.” J.A.
 35 n.4.
      After the district court entered judgment, EZPZ moved
 for amendment of the court’s findings of fact, conclusions of
 law, and judgment relating to LNC’s unclean hands de-
 fense. EZPZ argued that the court erred in considering cer-
 tain facts relating to EZPZ’s litigation misconduct and that
 it also lacked the requisite analysis of how EZPZ’s actions
 had a necessary and immediate connection to the relief
 EZPZ was seeking from the court. EZPZ also again sought
 reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment of obvi-
 ousness, this time based on the PTO’s issuance of the ex
 parte reexamination certificate, which EZPZ provided to
 the district court only after the entry of judgment.
     The district court ruled on the motion relating to un-
 clean hands on June 9, 2022, granting it in part and deny-
 ing it in part and then issuing an amended bench trial
 opinion. The court explained that it would, as EZPZ re-
 quested, exclude from consideration certain facts – includ-
 ing those relating to EZPZ’s deposition and trial testimony
 and its conduct during settlement negotiations – in connec-
 tion with its evaluation of LNC’s unclean hands defense.
 In its amended opinion, the court also, for the first time,
 expressly addressed the issue of the necessary and imme-
 diate connection between EZPZ’s unclean hands and the
 relief EZPZ was seeking from the court. Based on its re-
 vised analysis, the court continued to find that unclean
 hands barred EZPZ from obtaining relief on its counter-
 claims.
     On the same day, the district court granted in part and
 denied in part EZPZ’s motion directed to its summary judg-
 ment ruling on obviousness. The court acknowledged that
 the reexamination certificate was “evidence that it did not
 have before it prior to the [o]bviousness [r]uling or in brief-
 ing on reconsideration.” J.A. 197. Still, after reviewing the
Case: 22-1905     Document: 57       Page: 11   Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                                 11

 prosecution history, including the reexamination, the court
 was “not persuaded that it requires or compels altering or
 amending the [c]ourt ruling that the ’903 Patent is invalid.”
 Id. The district court also denied LNC’s motion for attor-
 ney fees and its request for costs.
     The timely appeal and cross-appeal followed. We have
 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                                II
      LNC’s appeal and EZPZ’s cross-appeal together raise a
 multitude of issues. We will address them in the following
 order: (1) EZPZ’s appeal of the determination that the doc-
 trine of unclean hands bars EZPZ from obtaining relief on
 its claims; (2) LNC’s appeal of the court’s conclusion that it
 failed to prove the ’903 patent is unenforceable due to in-
 equitable conduct; (3) EZPZ’s appeal of the grant of sum-
 mary judgment that the claims of the ’903 patent are
 invalid as obvious; and (4) LNC’s appeal of the district
 court’s denial of an award of attorney fees and costs.
                                A
     We begin with EZPZ’s contention that the district court
 erred in finding that the doctrine of unclean hands bars
 EZPZ from obtaining its requested relief. We disagree with
 EZPZ and affirm the district court.
      A court may find unclean hands when the misconduct
 of a party seeking relief “has immediate and necessary re-
 lation to the equity that he seeks in respect of the matter
 in litigation . . . for such violations of conscience as in some
 measure affect the equitable relations between the parties
 in respect of something brought before the court for adjudi-
 cation.” Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290
 U.S. 240, 245 (1933). “We review the district court’s ruling
 [of unclean hands] for abuse of discretion, which means
 that we review factual findings only for clear error.” Gilead
 Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231, 1240 (Fed. Cir.
 2018). We review “the totality of the evidence-supported
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 12    Filed: 04/12/2024

 12                               LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 misconduct [and] not individual elements alone.” Id. We
 may affirm on any grounds that are adequately supported
 by the evidence in the record and are not limited to those
 bases for unclean hands expressly relied on by the district
 court. See Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281 (1957) (“A
 successful party in the District Court may sustain its judg-
 ment on any ground that finds support in the record.”);
 Rexnord Indus., LLC v. Kappos, 705 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed.
 Cir. 2013) (“On judicial review, the correctness of the deci-
 sion appealed from can be defended by the appellee on any
 ground that is supported by the record.”).
     In finding unclean hands, the district court thoroughly
 analyzed EZPZ’s misconduct. For example, the district
 court found that EZPZ failed to disclose to LNC patent ap-
 plications related to the ’903 patent until well after the
 close of fact discovery and dispositive motion practice, and
 in some cases, only when required by court order, all with-
 out any good faith justification for its delay. In particular,
 EZPZ failed to disclose U.S. Patent Application No.
 15/700,403 (the “’403 application”), the prosecution of
 which involved claim construction relevant to a disputed
 claim term also found in the ’903 patent.
     The district court additionally found that EZPZ tried to
 block LNC’s efforts to discover Ms. Laurain’s prior art
 searches by falsely claiming she had conducted no such
 searches and that all responsive documents had been pro-
 duced. It further found that EZPZ witnesses – including
 Ms. Laurain and Jordan Bolton, EZPZ’s former outside
 counsel – repeatedly gave purposefully evasive testimony
 during depositions and at trial. In particular, according to
 the district court, Ms. Laurain repeatedly provided false
 testimony that was directly contradicted by other contem-
 poraneous evidence.
     EZPZ argues on appeal that the record does not sup-
 port the district court’s finding that the misconduct rose to
 the level of “unconscionable acts” or had the requisite
Case: 22-1905     Document: 57      Page: 13    Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                                 13

 nexus to the ’903 patent infringement claims the district
 court dismissed based on unclean hands. We are unper-
 suaded. Instead, we find no clear error in the district
 court’s findings, which fully support its conclusion that
 EZPZ comes to the court with unclean hands.
     The evidence in the record, including what we summa-
 rized just above, supports the district court’s finding that
 EZPZ “by deceit and reprehensible conduct attempted to
 gain an unfair advantage” in seeking the relief it requested
 in the litigation. J.A. 324. The district court did not clearly
 err in finding this conduct to be “offensive to the integrity
 of the [c]ourt,” resulting in the district court’s “loss of con-
 fidence in [EZPZ’s] candor.” J.A. at 323-24.
      Nor do we find clear error in the district court’s deter-
 mination that EZPZ’s misconduct bears an immediate and
 necessary connection to EZPZ’s claims for infringement of
 its ’903 patent. The undisclosed patent applications and
 their prosecution are directly relevant to the development
 of LNC’s litigation strategy. Because EZPZ only provided
 the ’403 application to LNC after the claim construction
 phase of the litigation, EZPZ deprived both LNC and the
 district court of the opportunity to understand the PTO’s
 construction of a claim term that was also of importance to
 this litigation. 1

     1     The claim term is “planar portion,” which appears
 in all claims of the ’903 patent. The district court construed
 it to mean “a part of an area relating to a plane,” which
 largely tracked EZPZ’s proposed construction (“a part that
 includes an area that relates to a plane”). J.A. 655, 659.
 The court rejected LNC’s proposed construction of “plain
 and ordinary meaning of a flat surface. A flat surface is
 one that is not curved.” J.A. 655. During the prosecution
 of the ’403 application, the examiner rejected certain pend-
 ing claims as indefinite. These claims included a limitation
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57     Page: 14    Filed: 04/12/2024

 14                               LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

      EZPZ’s failure to disclose the prior art searches under-
 mined LNC’s ability to press its invalidity and unenforcea-
 bility challenges. There is no clear error in the district
 court’s finding that Ms. Laurain’s prior art searches may
 have supported LNC’s contention that she had located the
 Webb Prior Art and other key references during her initial
 searches, well in advance of filing the application that led
 to the ’903 patent. Likewise, what the district court found
 to be EZPZ witnesses’ evasive and false testimony during
 depositions and at trial further deprived LNC of material
 information for consideration by its experts, for use in con-
 nection with dispositive motion practice, and as part of
 both its declaratory judgment claim and its defense against
 EZPZ’s counterclaims. See generally Gilead, 888 F.3d at
 1244 (holding that “intentional testimonial falsehoods” can
 qualify as misconduct supporting determination of unclean
 hands). In at least all of these ways, the record supports a
 finding of an “immediate and necessary” connection be-
 tween EZPZ’s misconduct and its ’903 patent infringement
 claim, leaving the district court’s finding on this point un-
 tainted by clear error.

 “wherein the planar portion is cambered,” and the exam-
 iner found a contradiction between “planar portion” and
 “cambered.” J.A. 5792 (examiner explaining that “[b]y def-
 inition, [c]ambered means arched slightly or curved up-
 ward in the middle, and planar means lying in a plane, or
 flat”) (emphasis added). Similarly, in rejecting other pend-
 ing claims for indefiniteness, the examiner stated that “the
 undersurface of the planar portion appears to be completely
 flat.” J.A. 5792-93 (emphasis added). It was not clear error
 for the district court to conclude that LNC’s claim construc-
 tion argument may have been strengthened had it been
 provided, as it should have been, with this prosecution his-
 tory of a related application.
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 15     Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                                15

      EZPZ additionally contends that the district court
 failed to find any misconduct bearing a necessary and im-
 mediate connection to its design patent and trade dress
 claims. Hence, in its view, at least these two claims should
 not have been dismissed due to unclean hands. On this
 point, the district court explained:
       [T]here is an “immediate and necessary rela-
       tion” between the unclean hands findings and
       the dismissed claims. EZPZ’s design patent
       and trade dress infringement claims were
       pled at the outset, the subject of LNC’s writ-
       ten discovery, addressed at depositions and
       the subject of motion practice. After five years
       of litigation, EZPZ’s conduct with respect to
       its pursuit of the ’903 Patent infringement
       claim cannot be cordoned off from its conduct
       with respect to its pursuit of its other claims.
       For example, the Court’s finding that EZPZ
       knowingly deprived it of important infor-
       mation during claims construction cuts across
       all claims. The Court’s loss of confidence in a
       party’s candor cannot be overcome with re-
       spect to other theories of recovery.
 J.A. 323 (internal citations omitted). We find no clear error
 in this analysis.
      In sum, the district court did not clearly err in its as-
 sessment that the totality of the evidence demonstrated
 that EZPZ engaged in misconduct rising to the level of un-
 conscionable acts, enhancing EZPZ’s litigation positions
 and undermining those of LNC, creating immediate and
 necessary connections between EZPZ’s misconduct and the
 relief it was seeking from the court. Thus, the district court
 did not abuse its discretion in finding that unclean hands
 barred EZPZ from seeking relief for alleged infringement
 of its ’903 patent, its ’327 design patent, or its trade dress.
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57     Page: 16    Filed: 04/12/2024

 16                               LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 We affirm the district court’s judgment with respect to un-
 clean hands.
                              B
     We turn next to LNC’s appeal from the district court’s
 finding that it failed to prove the ’903 patent is unenforce-
 able due to inequitable conduct.
     Inequitable conduct renders a patent unenforceable
 and is, therefore, an affirmative defense to an allegation of
 patent infringement. To prove inequitable conduct, a party
 must show that the patentee withheld material infor-
 mation from the PTO, and did so with the specific intent to
 deceive the PTO. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
 & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). Both
 requirements must be proven by clear and convincing evi-
 dence. See id. at 1287. Moreover, deceptive intent must be
 the single most reasonable inference based on the evidence.
 See id. at 1290.
      We review the district court’s fact findings as to mate-
 riality and deceptive intent for clear error, see Regeneron
 Pharms., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
 2017), and its ultimate determination of inequitable con-
 duct based on those findings of fact for an abuse of discre-
 tion, see Energy Heating, LLC v. Heat On-The-Fly, LLC,
 889 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
     The district court held that LNC failed to prove inequi-
 table conduct by the requisite burden of proof. We vacate
 this portion of the district court’s holding and remand for
 further proceedings.
                              1
     We first address LNC’s arguments on materiality.
 LNC contends that Ms. Laurain and Mr. Williams misrep-
 resented the self-sealing functionality of the Platinum Pets
 mat to the PTO and that these misrepresentations are per
 se material. As we have previously explained, “in cases of
Case: 22-1905     Document: 57      Page: 17    Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                                 17

 affirmative egregious misconduct,” materiality is estab-
 lished per se, without need to prove its impact on the PTO’s
 patentability determination. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292;
 see also Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d
 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[B]ut-for materiality is the
 standard for evaluating the materiality prong of the [ineq-
 uitable conduct] analysis unless there is affirmative egre-
 gious misconduct.”). We are unable to discern from the
 district court’s trial opinion whether it made findings as to
 affirmative egregious misconduct and per se materiality.
 The district court’s analysis of those issues seems to have
 been embedded with its assessment of deceptive intent. In-
 tent and materiality, however, are separate requirements,
 both of which must be proven to establish inequitable con-
 duct. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. On remand, the
 district court should determine whether Ms. Laurain’s and
 Mr. Williams’ misrepresentation of the self-sealing func-
 tionality of the Platinum Pets mat amounted to affirmative
 egregious misconduct and is, therefore, per se material.
     If the court finds there is no affirmative egregious mis-
 conduct, it must then reassess its prior determination that
 LNC failed to prove the misrepresentations to the Board
 were but-for material. An undisclosed prior art reference
 is but-for material “if the PTO would not have allowed a
 claim had it been aware of” the reference. Id. at 1291. The
 district court appears to have concluded that the Platinum
 Pets mat could not be found but-for material because it
 “was disclosed to” the PTO, and the PTO “had the oppor-
 tunity to consider” it before granting the ’903 patent. J.A.
 268. LNC points out, however, that the district court found
 Ms. Laurain and Mr. Williams “misrepresented the char-
 acteristics of the Platinum Pets [m]at” by describing it
 falsely to the PTO (i.e., as a prior art device that does not
 practice self-sealing) and by withholding a video showing
 that the mat “does in fact self-seal to an underlying sur-
 face.” J.A. 264-67. On remand, in connection with its eval-
 uation of the totality of evidence before it, the district court
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 18    Filed: 04/12/2024

 18                                LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 must evaluate whether the PTO’s patentability decision
 may have differed if Ms. Laurain and Mr. Williams had de-
 scribed the Platinum Pets mat accurately and had dis-
 closed the withheld video to the PTO. See TransWeb, LLC
 v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
 2016) (holding that even disclosed reference may be but-for
 material where patentee mischaracterized it as non-prior
 art).
     LNC argues that the district court also erred in finding
 several other prior art references Ms. Laurain and Mr. Wil-
 liams failed to disclose to the PTO – the Hot Iron holster,
 the CIBO “Stick Anywhere” placemat, the Momo baby skid-
 proof silicone placemat, and the Brinware silicone place-
 mat – were not material because they are cumulative of the
 Platinum Pets mat. A prior art reference that is otherwise
 material “is not but-for material if it is merely cumulative.”
 Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., 25 F.4th 976, 991 (Fed.
 Cir. 2022). “A reference is cumulative when it teaches no
 more than what a reasonable examiner would consider to
 be taught by the prior art already before the PTO.” Regen-
 eron, 864 F.3d at 1350 (internal quotation marks omitted).
     The district court found that each of the prior art ref-
 erences listed by LNC discloses “the surface contact self-
 sealing characteristic.” J.A. 278-79. It also found Ms.
 Laurain and Mr. Williams misrepresented the Platinum
 Pets mat to the PTO as not possessing the self-sealing func-
 tionality. See J.A. 264-68. Because the district court may
 find, on remand, that these undisclosed prior art references
 would have taught more than what a reasonable examiner
 would have considered to have been taught by the misrep-
 resented Platinum Pets mat, we vacate the district court’s
 finding that the Hot Iron holster, the CIBO “Stick Any-
 where” placemat, the Momo baby skid-proof silicone place-
 mat, and the Brinware silicone placemat are not material.
                               2
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57     Page: 19    Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                              19

    LNC next contends that the district court erred in its
 handling of the deceptive intent requirement. LNC first
 argues that the district court failed to consider Ms.
 Laurain’s and Mr. Williams’ “overall conduct,” which in
 LNC’s view “unequivocally established a pattern of deceit.”
 Appellant’s Br. at 34.
     Acts which are not “per se unreasonable when consid-
 ered in isolation” may still demonstrate “repeated attempts
 to avoid playing fair and square with the patent system”
 and, collectively, support a finding of deceptive intent.
 Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1235 (Fed.
 Cir. 2007). When a person having a duty of candor and
 good faith has engaged in serial misconduct during the
 prosecution of the same or related patents, it is not enough
 for a court to consider each individual act of misconduct
 without also considering the collective whole. See Ohio
 Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1351 (Fed.
 Cir. 2013) (concluding “collective weight” of evidence of
 “several misrepresentations . . . made to the PTO” sup-
 ported finding of deceptive intent); Paragon Podiatry Lab’y,
 Inc. v. KLM Lab’ys, Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir.
 1993) (deceptive intent “must generally be inferred from
 the facts and circumstances surrounding the applicant’s
 overall conduct”). Because an intent to deceive the PTO
 can be inferred from a person’s “pattern of lack of candor,”
 a district court must consider the person’s multiple acts of
 misconduct “[i]n the aggregate.” Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc.,
 763 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
      Here, the district court did not apply this legal stand-
 ard and, thereby, abused its discretion. The district court
 considered each of Ms. Laurain’s and Mr. Williams’ indi-
 vidual acts of misconduct in isolation and failed to address
 the collective weight of the evidence regarding each per-
 son’s misconduct as a whole. Hence, we vacate the district
 court’s findings on deceptive intent. On remand, the dis-
 trict court must reevaluate Ms. Laurain’s deceptive intent
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 20     Filed: 04/12/2024

 20                                LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 based on her misconduct in the aggregate, and must do the
 same with respect to Mr. Williams.
     We further agree with LNC that the district court
 wrongly found Ms. Laurain’s and Mr. Williams’ misrepre-
 sentations about the self-sealing functionality of the Plati-
 num Pets mat amounted only to gross negligence, which is
 insufficient to support a finding of deceptive intent. In-
 stead, the district court’s findings that Ms. Laurain and
 Mr. Williams made a conscious choice to misrepresent the
 Platinum Pets mat as lacking the self-sealing functionality
 – despite them having “observed [it] self-sealing to the un-
 derlying surface to some extent,” J.A. 267 – should not have
 been discounted by the district court as merely gross negli-
 gence. Such purposeful omission or misrepresentation of
 key teachings of prior art references may, instead, be indic-
 ative of a specific intent to deceive the PTO. See, e.g., Am.
 Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 768 F.3d 1185, 1190
 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Partial disclosure of material information
 about the prior art to the PTO cannot absolve a patentee of
 intent if the disclosure is intentionally selective.”); Apotex,
 763 F.3d at 1362 (finding deceptive intent where inventor’s
 misrepresentations about disclosed prior art “were factual
 in nature and contrary to the true information [the inven-
 tor] had in his possession”); Semiconductor Energy Lab’y
 Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
 2000) (finding deceptive intent where patentee made “se-
 lective and misleading disclosure” about prior art reference
 by providing PTO with partial translation of reference that
 omitted material disclosure). On remand, the district court
 should analyze whether Ms. Laurain’s and Mr. Williams’
 misrepresentations relating to the Platinum Pets mat, con-
 sidered in aggregate with their other acts of misconduct,
 demonstrate that these individuals intended to deceive the
 PTO.
     LNC further alleges that Ms. Laurain and Mr. Wil-
 liams acted with deceptive intent in submitting declara-
 tions to the PTO purportedly containing false statements
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57       Page: 21    Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                                21

 regarding “advertising,” “marketing,” “branding,” and “pro-
 motional activity,” as well as the impact these actions had
 on product sales. LNC also faults these declarations for
 failing to disclose the financial interests of the declarants.
 The district court analyzed the intent of the declarants
 themselves but did not expressly address Ms. Laurain’s
 and Mr. Williams’ intent, other than broadly concluding
 that the two “did not commit inequitable conduct by sub-
 mitting these declarations to the USPTO.” J.A. 305. On
 remand, the district court must make findings as to Ms.
 Laurain’s and Mr. Williams’ intent with respect to submit-
 ting these declarations, as part of the evaluation of the ev-
 idence regarding each person’s misconduct as a whole. See
 generally Ferring B.V. v. Barr Lab’ys, Inc., 437 F.3d 1181,
 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he question of intent is directed
 to the applicant’s intent, not to the intent of the declarants.
 Thus, that the declarants may have had no intent to de-
 ceive is entirely irrelevant.”).
     Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s finding that
 LNC failed to prove inequitable conduct and we remand for
 further proceedings, including to allow the district court to
 revisit its findings on materiality and deceptive intent, con-
 sistent with this opinion.
                                C
     We turn next to EZPZ’s appeal from the district court’s
 grant of summary judgment that the claims of the ’903 pa-
 tent are invalid due to obviousness. Because genuine dis-
 putes of material fact are evident from the record, we
 vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for further
 proceedings.
     We review a grant of summary judgment in accordance
 with the law of the regional circuit, here the Fifth Circuit.
 See Ineos USA LLC v. Berry Plastics Corp., 783 F.3d 865,
 868 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Fifth Circuit reviews grants of
 summary judgment de novo. See Keelan v. Majesco Soft-
 ware, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 338 (5th Cir. 2005). Summary
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57     Page: 22    Filed: 04/12/2024

 22                               LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute
 of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judg-
 ment as a matter of law. See Johnson v. World All. Fin.
 Corp., 830 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2016). A dispute is gen-
 uine where a reasonable fact finder could find for the non-
 moving party. See id. In assessing whether a dispute is
 genuine the court must “view the evidence and all factual
 inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to
 the party opposing the motion” and must resolve “all rea-
 sonable doubts about the facts . . . in favor of the nonmov-
 ing litigant.” Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., 375 F.3d 358, 360
 (5th Cir. 2004).
     Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying
 facts. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427
 (2007). The underlying facts to be found include: (1) the
 scope and content of the prior art; (2) differences between
 the prior art and the claims at issue; (3) the level of ordi-
 nary skill in the pertinent art; and (4) secondary consider-
 ations such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
 needs, and failure of others. See Graham v. John Deere Co.,
 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). A determination of obviousness
 “requires consideration of all four Graham factors, and it is
 error to reach a conclusion of obviousness until all those
 factors are considered.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
 839 F.3d 1034, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc). “Objective
 indicia of nonobviousness must be considered in every case
 where present.” Id.
                              1
     We agree with EZPZ that the district court impermis-
 sibly made findings of fact regarding the disclosures of the
 Webb Prior Art. Taking the evidence in the light most fa-
 vorable to EZPZ as the nonmoving party, a reasonable fact-
 finder could find – but alternatively, and crucially, could
 also not find – that the Webb Prior Art discloses the self-
 sealing functionality claimed in the ’903 patent. Because
 the record contains sufficient evidence from which a
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 23     Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                                23

 reasonable factfinder could find that this disputed claim el-
 ement is not disclosed by the Webb Prior Art, there is a
 genuine dispute of material fact. It was, thus, error for the
 district court to determine that the challenged claims
 would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the
 art based on the combination of the Webb Prior Art and
 Bass.
      The Webb Prior Art discloses embodiments in which an
 elastomeric deformity of the mat pulls the underside of the
 mat away from the support surface and creates a vacuum
 to maintain the mat in position. This mechanism of oper-
 ation, according to EZPZ, is “mutually exclusive” from the
 self-sealing functionality claimed in the ’903 patent. Ap-
 pellee’s Br. at 54. EZPZ’s contention is supported by the
 testimony of two experts, Michael Henley and John Ken-
 nedy, both of whom opine that the Webb Prior Art does not
 teach self-sealing. See, e.g., J.A. 1731 (Henley: “[T]he Webb
 patent and Tommee Tippee product also fail to disclose the
 surface contact self-sealing attribute [of] the ’903 Patent
 and invention. . . . [I]t is my opinion that the Webb patent
 and the commercialized Tommee Tippee product examples
 both fail to anticipate or render obvious the ’903 Patent
 Claims.”); J.A. 1837 (Kennedy: “Webb does not teach at
 least the recited operations of ‘causing surface contact self-
 sealing upon an underlying surface by placing [the mat
 upon the underlying surface]’ and ‘causing creation of a
 partial vacuum . . . .’”) (brackets in original). In evaluating
 whether LNC is entitled to summary judgment, EZPZ’s ev-
 idence on this material point must be credited. See Ander-
 son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“The
 evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justi-
 fiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”). Doing so,
 it is evident that one of ordinary skill could find that the
 Webb Prior Art does not disclose the self-sealing limitation
 of the claims of the ’903 patent and, hence, could conclude
 that those claims have not been proven obvious.
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 24     Filed: 04/12/2024

 24                                LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

      The district court similarly erred by finding as a fact
 that the Webb Prior Art’s disclosure of “sticky” materials
 means that a person of ordinary skill in the art would nec-
 essarily read those prior art references as teaching self-
 sealing. On this point, too, the record contains sufficient
 evidence, taken in the light most favorable to EZPZ as the
 non-moving party, to support a finding that the Webb Prior
 Art nonetheless does not teach self-sealing. See, e.g., J.A.
 1837 (EZPZ’s expert, Kennedy, opining that Webb Prior
 Art “sticks to the surface only because the plate was origi-
 nally pushed downward onto the suction cup . . . , and the
 suction area . . . was engaged with the table, . . . [which] is
 a fundamentally different method of operation” from that
 of ’903 patent). Whether prior art discloses a claim limita-
 tion is a question of fact, see Fleming v. Cirrus Design
 Corp., 28 F.4th 1214, 1221-22 (Fed. Cir. 2022), and the dis-
 trict court should not have resolved this dispute in favor of
 the moving party, LNC, on summary judgment.
     A reasonable factfinder might also choose to place
 weight on the fact that during the ex parte reexamination
 of the ’903 patent, the PTO considered the Webb Prior Art
 and found it does not teach self-sealing. See J.A. 15975 (ex-
 aminer explaining reasons for patentability as including
 that Webb Prior Art mat “does not self-seal”). The decision
 whether to admit evidence of reexamination at trial is left
 to the discretion of a district court. See generally Callaway
 Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
 2009) (finding district court did not abuse its discretion in
 excluding evidence regarding non-final reexamination de-
 terminations from jury). Nevertheless, where, as here,
 reexamination evidence is offered by a patentee in connec-
 tion with opposing summary judgment of invalidity (or re-
 consideration thereof), and is neither excluded nor deemed
 inadmissible by the district court, it is error to find a lack
 of a genuine dispute of material fact by ignoring,
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 25    Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                               25

 dismissing, or discounting the probative value of the reex-
 amination evidence in the record. 2
      LNC’s arguments for affirmance are unpersuasive. Re-
 lying on Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d
 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984), LNC argues that where prior
 art references are “readily understandable,” the district
 court may construe them without expert testimony and
 may then determine there is no genuine issue of material
 fact as to what they show. Even accepting that this is
 sometimes possible, here the testimony of EZPZ’s experts
 is, as we have explained, in direct conflict with the district
 court’s understanding of the Webb Prior Art. This creates
 a genuine dispute of material fact.
     LNC’s focus on a single sentence in the specification of
 the Webb Prior Art, purportedly mandating that Webb be
 understood as disclosing a self-sealing embodiment, also

     2    LNC’s reliance on Exmark Manufacturing Co. v.
 Briggs & Stratton Power Products Group, LLC, 879 F.3d
 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018), does nothing to alter our conclusion.
 In Exmark, we vacated a grant of summary judgment of no
 invalidity that had been based solely on a reexamination
 certificate confirming patentability. See id. at 1340-44.
 This is consistent with our holding today that, in evaluat-
 ing LNC’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity,
 EZPZ’s reexamination certificate might have been consid-
 ered as evidence of validity – although it is not dispositive
 of whether LNC can prove invalidity by clear and convinc-
 ing evidence. See generally Fromson v. Advance Offset
 Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating
 that district courts are not bound by PTO reexamination
 decisions although they “must consider” such decisions as
 evidence “in determining whether the party asserting in-
 validity has met its statutory burden by clear and convinc-
 ing evidence”).
Case: 22-1905      Document: 57      Page: 26    Filed: 04/12/2024

 26                                 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 lacks merit. 3 LNC’s contention requires us to draw an in-
 ference against EZPZ from the disclosure of the Webb Prior
 Art, which is improper on summary judgment, especially
 in light of contrary evidence in the record. See, e.g., J.A.
 1837.
     Finally, LNC points to what it contends is a contradic-
 tion between the bench trial testimony and the report of
 EZPZ’s expert, Mr. Henley, on the matter of whether the
 Webb Prior Art discloses self-sealing. Compare J.A. 51,
 14575-78 (district court finding Mr. Henley testified that
 Webb “discloses every element recited in independent
 claim 1 [of the ’903 patent] except an integrated tableware
 with a receptacle”) with J.A. 1730-31 (Mr. Henley opining
 Webb also “fail[s] to disclose the surface contact self-seal-
 ing attribute [of] the ’903 Patent and invention”). The
 seeming inconsistency in the views expressed by EZPZ’s ex-
 pert does no more for LNC than show a genuine dispute of
 material fact, making summary judgment unwarranted.
 Moreover, EZPZ’s second expert, Mr. Kennedy, opined that
 the Webb Prior Art does not disclose self-sealing, see J.A.

      3    The sentence reads as follows:
          By creating the small volume 38 which is a
          vacuum or at least a partial vacuum, this
          serves further to hold the mat 10 against the
          surface 12, thereby increasing the efficiency of
          the holding action of the mat 10 upon the sur-
          face 12 and in particular, enhancing the suc-
          tion effect of the concavity 31.
 J.A. 1099 (emphasis added). The district court concluded
 that “further” requires the disclosed embodiment to self-
 seal, as the word “would not be necessary if the mat had
 not already adhered or self-sealed to the underlying surface
 before the small volume 38 was created.” J.A. 59-60.
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57       Page: 27   Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                              27

 1837, and LNC identifies no purportedly contradictory po-
 sition espoused by him.
     In sum, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as
 to whether the Webb Prior Art discloses the seal-sealing
 functionality claimed in the ’903 patent. Such disputes
 must be submitted to the trier of fact, not resolved as a
 matter of law by the trial court on a motion for summary
 judgment.
                                2
      We agree with EZPZ that the district court also im-
 properly resolved genuine disputes of material fact con-
 cerning the Tommee Tippee mat. There is evidence from
 which a reasonable factfinder could find that the Tommee
 Tippee mat is not an embodiment of the Webb Prior Art.
 See, e.g., J.A. 18709 (LNC’s expert opining: “In contrast to
 some of the figures in both the Webb Pub. and Webb patent,
 there is no small concavity or dimple whatsoever on the un-
 dersurface of the Tommee Tippee planar portion.”); J.A.
 14579 (EZPZ’s expert stating there is “a difference between
 what was disclosed in the Webb patent and the Tommee
 Tippee embodiment”). The record also contains evidence of
 multiple versions of the Tommee Tippee mat, and the par-
 ties genuinely dispute whether each version operates in the
 same manner. See J.A. 42-44 (district court referencing
 both blue Tommee Tippee mat, which was “included in the
 market research summary document compiled by Mrs.
 Laurain,” and pink Tommee Tippee mat, which was intro-
 duced by LNC during bench trial). EZPZ’s expert, Mr. Hen-
 ley, testified that the two mats were different, with the
 “pink Tommee Tippee mat” being “better” than the “aqua
 or blue Tommee Tippee mat.” J.A. 14569-70. Further pro-
 ceedings will be required to enable a factfinder to make the
 material factual determinations as to the relationship be-
 tween the Tommee Tippee mat and the Webb Prior Art.
                                3
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 28     Filed: 04/12/2024

 28                                LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

      On remand, more analysis may also be necessary on
 the issue of motivation to combine. Whether a skilled arti-
 san would have been motivated to modify or combine dis-
 closures in the prior art is a question of fact. See Univ. of
 Strathclyde v. Clear-Vu Lighting LLC, 17 F.4th 155, 160
 (Fed. Cir. 2021). On this genuinely disputed point, the dis-
 trict court found only that “it would have been common
 sense to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art
 to make the integrated tableware and dining mat disclosed
 in Bass out of the rubberlike, nontoxic material disclosed
 in the Webb Publication and the Tommee Tippee Mat.”
 J.A. 58-59. “[O]n summary judgment, to invoke ‘common
 sense’ or any other basis for extrapolating from prior art to
 a conclusion of obviousness, a district court must articulate
 its reasoning with sufficient clarity for review.” Perfect
 Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed.
 Cir. 2009); see also Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d
 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (stating that obviousness find-
 ings “grounded in ‘common sense’ must contain explicit and
 clear reasoning providing some rational underpinning why
 common sense compels a finding of obviousness”). The dis-
 trict court has not yet met this obligation, which – depend-
 ing on how it resolves other issues – it may need to confront
 on remand.
                               4
     Factual issues concerning the objective indicia of non-
 obviousness further preclude the grant of summary judg-
 ment. 4 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Teleflex Innovations S.a.r.l.,

      4  We do not agree with EZPZ that the district court
 is required address the objective indicia of non-obviousness
 before analyzing prima facie obviousness. See Adapt
 Pharma Operations Ltd. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 25
 F.4th 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“Although the district
 court’s analysis of the objective indicia in the opinion
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 29    Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                               29

 70 F.4th 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“It is well established
 that copying by a competitor . . . may be evidence that the
 patented invention is nonobvious.”); Merck & Co. v. Teva
 Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
 (“Commercial success is relevant [to nonobviousness] be-
 cause the law presumes an idea would successfully have
 been brought to market sooner, in response to market
 forces, had the idea been obvious to persons skilled in the
 art.”). The district court was required to consider objective
 indicia evidence in the record and to do so in the light most
 favorable to EZPZ, drawing all reasonable inferences in fa-
 vor of EZPZ, as the non-moving party. Instead, the district
 court improperly resolved genuine disputes of material
 fact, including whether a nexus exists between the com-
 mercial success of EZPZ’s product and its patented fea-
 tures. See, e.g., Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes
 Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (va-
 cating summary judgment of obviousness because genuine
 issue of material fact existed as to commercial success
 nexus).
      The record here is one that requires review by a fact-
 finder, to determine which (if any) objective indicia are es-
 tablished, and then to weigh those findings against the
 affirmative evidence of obviousness introduced by LNC.
 For instance, the record contains evidence from which a
 reasonable factfinder might find that: (i) LNC copied
 EZPZ’s technology, see, e.g., J.A. 15966; see also J.A. 15975
 (PTO finding “[i]t is clear that the invention has been cop-
 ied by many other entities”); and (ii) EZPZ’s product, em-
 bodying its patent claims, enjoyed commercial success, see,

 follows its discussion of the prima facie case of obviousness,
 there is nothing inherently wrong with that.”). Our disa-
 greement with EZPZ on this point does not, however, affect
 our conclusion that summary judgment of obviousness
 should not have been granted.
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57     Page: 30    Filed: 04/12/2024

 30                               LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 e.g., J.A. 2365-66, J.A. 15975 (PTO finding “the invention
 itself has le[d] to it[s] commercial success”). See also gen-
 erally J.A. 15975 (PTO concluding during ex parte reexam-
 ination of ’903 patent that “secondary considerations, when
 looked at as a whole, provide sufficient evidence to support
 non-obviousness”). In short, the evidence presented by
 EZPZ creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to
 whether the objective indicia of non-obviousness overcome
 LNC’s prima facie case (assuming it has made out one) of
 obviousness.
      We recognize that in certain circumstances, for exam-
 ple, where inventions represent “no more than the predict-
 able use of prior art elements according to their established
 functions, the secondary considerations” will prove to be
 “inadequate to establish nonobviousness as a matter of
 law.” Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed.
 Cir. 2010) (internal quotations marks omitted). Here, how-
 ever, given the numerous genuine issues of material fact –
 including whether the prior art references disclose essen-
 tial claim elements – it cannot be said on the present record
 that LNC has made out such a strong prima facie case that
 obviousness can be determined as a matter of law, notwith-
 standing the evidence of objective indicia of nonobvious-
 ness. See, e.g., Plantronics, 724 F.3d at 1357 (reversing
 summary judgment of obviousness because evidence per-
 taining to objective considerations raised genuine issues of
 material fact); Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d
 1372, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (vacating summary judg-
 ment of obviousness where, among other things, district
 court failed to properly consider evidence of secondary con-
 siderations); Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.
 v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed.
 Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment of obviousness be-
 cause district court failed to consider objective evidence of
 nonobviousness); Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
 948 F.2d 1264, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (vacating summary
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57       Page: 31   Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                               31

 judgment of obviousness because disputed fact issues ex-
 isted regarding secondary considerations).
     Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s grant of
 summary judgment that the claims of the ’903 patent are
 invalid as obvious and remand this issue for further pro-
 ceedings. 5
                                D
     Finally, we address LNC’s appeal from the district
 court’s denial of its motion for attorney fees under 35
 U.S.C. § 285 and the related denial of its request for costs.
      Pursuant to § 285, a court “in exceptional cases may
 award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”
 This inquiry “requires a two-step analysis. The district
 court must determine whether the case is ‘exceptional;’ if it
 is, then it is within the court’s discretion to award attor-
 neys’ fees to the prevailing party.” J.P. Stevens Co. v. Lex
 Tex Ltd., Inc., 822 F.2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1987). An
 “exceptional” case is “simply one that stands out from oth-
 ers with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s lit-
 igating position (considering both the governing law and
 the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which
 the case was litigated.” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON
 Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554 (2014). The de-
 termination of whether a case is “exceptional” requires the

     5   During argument, EZPZ suggested that a jury trial
 on invalidity would not be necessary if the district court, on
 remand, determines that inequitable conduct renders the
 ’903 patent unenforceable. See Oral Argument 24:50-25:17
 (EZPZ conceding that finding of inequitable conduct would
 be dispositive of entire case). We leave it to the district
 court to decide which issues it wishes to proceed on first
 and what impact the resolution of any remanded issue
 should have on the remainder of the case.
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 32    Filed: 04/12/2024

 32                               LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 consideration of “the totality of the circumstances” on a
 case-by-case basis. Id.
      “We review a district court’s determination of whether
 a litigant is a prevailing party under § 285 de novo, apply-
 ing Federal Circuit law.” Dragon Intell. Prop., LLC v. Dish
 Network LLC, 956 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “We
 review a district court’s exceptional-case determination
 and award of fees under § 285 for abuse of discretion.” In
 re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC, 85 F.4th 1148, 1153 (Fed. Cir.
 2023). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district
 court’s decision commits legal error or is based on a clearly
 erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Raniere v. Mi-
 crosoft Corp., 887 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
     LNC argues that the district court committed legal er-
 ror by failing to declare LNC is the prevailing party. We
 agree.
     For purposes of awarding attorney fees under § 285,
 “there can be only one winner.” Shum v. Intel Corp., 629
 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “[I]n identifying a pre-
 vailing party, we must consider whether the district court’s
 decision effects or rebuffs a plaintiff’s attempt to effect a
 material alteration in the legal relationship between the
 parties.” B.E. Tech., L.L.C. v. Facebook, Inc., 940 F.3d 675,
 679 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
     We agree with LNC that it is the prevailing party.
 LNC brought this case against EZPZ, requesting, among
 other things, a declaratory judgment of non-infringement,
 invalidity, and unenforceability of LNC’s ’903 patent. By
 proving unclean hands – a decision we are affirming today
 – LNC obtained the dismissal with prejudice of EZPZ’s
 then-remaining counterclaims, including its claim for in-
 fringement of the ’903 patent. See Highway Equip. Co. v.
 FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he
 dismissal with prejudice . . . has the necessary judicial im-
 primatur to constitute a judicially sanctioned change in the
 legal relationship of the parties . . . .”). Consequently, LNC
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 33    Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                               33

 successfully achieved a material alteration in its legal re-
 lationship to EZPZ, which no longer has the ability to en-
 force the ’903 patent against LNC’s accused products. See
 United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., 66
 F.4th 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (finding party prevailed
 where opposing party “can never again assert the same pa-
 tents against . . . [the] same accused products”).
     It is true that LNC did not prevail on its LUTPA claims
 and the district court dismissed its Lanham Act claims
 without prejudice. It is further true that we are remanding
 inequitable conduct and obviousness, so it may turn out
 that LNC ultimately fails to prove the ’903 patent is unen-
 forceable and obvious. But a party is not required “to pre-
 vail on all claims in order to qualify as a prevailing party.”
 Shum, 629 F.3d at 1367-68. Furthermore, nothing remain-
 ing in this case could alter the reality that LNC has already
 obtained the material alteration of its relationship with
 EZPZ because, henceforth, EZPZ is barred by its unclean
 hands from obtaining relief from LNC based on its remain-
 ing counterclaims, including for infringement of the ’903
 patent, the ’327 design patent, and trade dress.
     LNC next contends that the district court abused its
 discretion by not deeming this case exceptional. Evaluat-
 ing whether a case is exceptional requires consideration of
 the “totality of the circumstances,” including “the substan-
 tive strength of a party’s litigating position” and the “man-
 ner in which the case was litigated.” Octane Fitness, 572
 U.S. at 554. While the district court is not required to ar-
 ticulate its assessment of every consideration, “it must ac-
 tually assess the totality of the circumstances.”
 AdjustaCam, LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 861 F.3d 1353, 1360
 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
     Because this case is far from over – as explained above,
 we are remanding for further proceedings to determine if
 the claims of the ’903 patent are invalid for obviousness
 and unenforceable due to Ms. Laurain and Mr. Williams
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57      Page: 34     Filed: 04/12/2024

 34                                LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN

 committing inequitable conduct – and it is, accordingly, not
 yet possible to assess the “totality” of circumstances, we re-
 mand for the district court to evaluate whether this case is
 exceptional at its conclusion; and, further, for the district
 court to decide whether to exercise its discretion to award
 attorney fees if it ultimately deems this case exceptional. 6
     We reach the same conclusion with respect to LNC’s
 appeal of the district court’s decision to deny its request to
 recover its costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
 dure 54(d). The Fifth Circuit, whose law governs this issue
 in this case, applies “a strong presumption that the prevail-
 ing party will be awarded costs.” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448
 F.3d 783, 793 (5th Cir. 2006). A district court that denies
 or reduces a cost award to a prevailing party must articu-
 late justifications for so doing. See id. at 794.
     Here, the district court denied LNC’s request for costs
 due to (at least in part) the “close and difficult legal issues
 presented in this case.” J.A. 333. While, as we have said,
 LNC is the prevailing party – and will remain so no matter
 how the remand turns out – the district court should have
 an opportunity to reevaluate the closeness of the case, and
 any other factors it deems pertinent to whether the “strong
 presumption” in favor of awarding costs has been over-
 come, after it resolves the issues we are remanding to it.
     Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order deny-
 ing LNC’s motion for attorney fees and refusing to award

      6  In saying this we do not mean to suggest that dis-
 trict courts lack discretion to decide for themselves
 whether to resolve § 285 motions before or after liability
 issues are appealed. Moreover, because we are vacating
 the finding of no exceptionality, we need not address LNC’s
 contention that the district court failed to apply the correct
 legal standard in assessing whether this is an exceptional
 case.
Case: 22-1905    Document: 57         Page: 35   Filed: 04/12/2024

 LUV N' CARE, LTD. v. LAURAIN                                35

 costs, and remand these matters for further consideration
 consistent with this opinion.
                                III
     We have considered LNC’s and EZPZ’s remaining ar-
 guments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing
 reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment on the doc-
 trine of unclean hands; vacate its judgment on inequitable
 conduct, invalidity, attorney fees and costs; and remand for
 further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
   AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND
                 REMANDED
                            COSTS
 No costs.