Court Opinion

ID: 9943861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 15:01:40.250911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:39.117595
License: Public Domain

[17] We would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The trial justice in limiting compensation to the personal representative of the decedent to pecuniary loss, was, in our opinion, implementing the legislative policy as set forth in G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 12-25-5. That section reads as follows:
 "Nature of the compensation. — The court may render judgment for compensation under this chapter for —
 (a) expenses actually and reasonably incurred as a result of the personal injury or death of the victim;
 (b) pecuniary loss to the dependents of the deceased victim;
(c) pain and suffering of the victim; and
 (d) any other pecuniary loss resulting from the personal injury or death of the victim, the amount of which the court finds upon the evidence to be reasonable and necessary.
 "In determining the amount of the judgment, the court may, in its discretion, take into consideration the rates and amounts payable for injuries and death under other statutes of this state and of the United States, and the amount of revenue in the violent crimes indemnity fund and the number and nature of claims pending against it." (Emphasis added.)
[18] The trial justice concluded that it was the intention of the Legislature to create two classes of beneficiaries. One class would consist of those who were alive and who would be entitled to compensation for all injuries and loss, including pain and suffering. The second group would be the dependents or personal representatives of deceased victims who would be entitled to receive compensation for financial losses, such as funeral and burial expenses and loss of support to defendants but not pain and suffering. In reaching this conclusion, the trial justice considered among other elements "the amount of revenue in the violent crimes indemnity fund and the number and nature of claims pending against it." She deemed that it would be inappropriate to provide a "windfall" to the survivors of the deceased victim for pain and suffering that they had not incurred. In so doing, the fund might be rendered inadequate to compensate an actual living victim for pain and suffering that he or she had actually endured.
[19] In our opinion, the trial justice was correct in her interpretation of the statute and its objectives in the light of the limited funding available. For this reason, we respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the majority. *Page 401