Court Opinion

ID: 9693981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:15:31.721729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:53.520946
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
SIMON, Justice.
The plaintiff, Hugh Wimberly Lawson, brought suit against the defendant, Martin *481Timber Company, to recover the value of timber removed by the defendant from the plaintiff’s land. The plaintiff alleged in his petition that the defendant was guilty of moral bad faith in the cutting and removing of the timber from his land, and, accordingly, was liable to him for the converted value of the saw logs without allowances and deductions for the cost and expense of manufacturing the same; and, in the alternative, if the Court should find that the defendant was merely in legal bad faith, that the plaintiff should have judgment for the full manufactured value of the saw logs, less the cost and expense of converting the same into the manufactured product; and, in the further alternative, should the Court find that the defendant was neither in moral nor legal bad faith, then in that event the plaintiff should recover for the stumpage value of the logs cut and removed from his land. In addition the plaintiff also sought damages for the destruction of a fence on his land and for the employment of a cruiser to estimate the amount of timber cut and removed.
For answer the defendant contended that it was the owner of all the timber cut and removed by virtue of a timber deed executed by the plaintiff in its favor.
The lower court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the stumpage value of the timber in the amount of $1,001.97, the sum of $240 for damages to the fences, and for the further sum of $30 for the cost of having the timber estimated with 5% per annum interest from date of judicial demand on all amounts assessed until paid.
The defendant then appealed to this Court and the plaintiff answered the appeal asking for an increase in the award alleging that the defendant was guilty of moral bad faith, and, in the alternative, in legal bad faith. The plaintiff also asked for an increase in the award for damages to the fence and the cost of estimating the timber.
We reversed and set aside that part of the judgment awarding the plaintiff the stumpage value of the timber as well as the cost of estimating it and we amended the judgment to allow the plaintiff judgment against the defendant in the sum of $240 with 5% per annum interest thereon from judicial demand until paid, and ordered all costs of the suit to be borne equally by the plaintiff and the defendant. The case is again before us on rehearing.
The timber contract of purchase executed between the parties is dated October 14, 1948, and the pertinent provisions therein show that the defendant was to have two years to cut and remove the timber from plaintiff’s land. Then follows the proviso: “And in event of high water after this time Martin Timber Company is to get additional one year’s time.” It appears from the record that the greater portion of the timber was cut and removed during the month of July, 1951, or approximately eight months *483after the two-year period of the contract had expired.
It appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff that he consented to the clause in the deed providing that if during the two years’ term of the contract the defendant was unable to remove the timber from the land because of existing high water, that the defendant would have an additional year in which to do so. The words in the clause standing alone are meaningless. But when taken in context with the preceding language of the contract wherein it is stated that the defendant is given two years in which to cut and remove all of said timber, this clause can have but one objective meaning. Undoubtedly the words “after this time” conclusively mean from the date that the contract became effective, that is, October 14, 1948, the date of its execution. It is manifest that, taking the clause as written with the language preceding, it can only mean that if there existed any overflow or high water during the period of two years which would have prevented the cutting and removal of this timber within the stated primary term, then the defendant enjoyed the right of so doing during the period of one additional year, that is, from October 14, 1950, to October 14, 1951. This view is fully supported by defendant’s answer under Article 12 wherein it is alleged: “Defendant shows that he, Floyd McCarty (defendant’s agent), went to see plaintiff regarding the details of the contract for the cutting and removing the timber off of the land and it was agreed by Lawson that Martin Timber Company was to have two years in which to cut and remove the timber, and if at any time after the date of the contract high water prevented them from cutting and removing the timber they were granted an additional one year’s time; that according to this agreement the contract was prepared and presented to him for his signature * * (Italics ours.)
It also appears from the record that plaintiff in his testimony stated that it was mutually agreed that if the defendant was prevented by high water and was unable to remove the timber because of high water during the two-year term of the contract, that he wanted them “to have sufficient time to remove the timber.” Hence it is evident that this was the intention of the parties. This was the conclusion reached by the trial judge.
In our original opinion we treated this evidence and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom as immaterial for the reason that the very wording of the clause granting defendant an additional year within which to remove the timber “in event of high water after this time” is clear and unambiguous, and we could not go beyond it with the view of seeking the intention of the parties.
Upon the reconsideration of this issue it is our opinion that the interpretation and *485construction to be drawn from the language of this clause is not only within the purview of the words used but is the construction which was placed thereon by plaintiff in his testimony and the defendant in its answer given in that regard, supra.
Such timber contracts are most common in the timber areas of our State. These agreements contemplate that a certain fixed time is given the purchaser of timber to remove the same from the land, but when that is rendered impossible as a result of high water conditions or other unforeseen causes, then and in that event the timber purchaser is afforded a gratuitous period of time to enjoy the benefits of his contract. However, the period of high water, that is, whether high water covers an area of land for a week, a month or a year is incidental. The controlling factor is the prevention of exercising the rights granted. Hence, if an anticipated and probable cause prevents the fulfillment of the rights purchased, then it follows that the extended time becomes operative. To say that high water at any time during the two-year period of the contract, whether it covers the land for a day, month or year, is sufficient to extend the contract for an additional one year would do violence to the meaning and tenor of the language used therein.
Therefore, the remaining question before us is, did the defendant have sufficient time during the two-year term of the timber contract to remove the timber from the plaintiff’s land or was it prevented from so doing as a result of high water ?
The record discloses that Black Lake is a source of the annual overflow in that particular area. There is in evidence, introduced by the defendant itself, the testimony of Ernest J. Taylor, the hydraulic engineer with the geological survey, wherein he testified that the channel of Black Lake starts overflowing only when the gauge height measures 6.4 feet. We need not enter into a detailed analysis of his testimony, but the conclusions reached by him reflect that for the two-year period from October 14, 1948, through October 14, 1950, there was a total of 361 days, or approximately one-half of the two-year limit that the gauge level at Black Lake was far below the overflow point of 6.4 feet, and that the area of land surrounding said lake, including plaintiff’s land, was dry and not under water during that period of time.
Furthermore, defendant concedes that there was sufficient time during 1949 in which it could have cut and removed the timber from plaintiff’s land, a condition most conducive to timber operations.
The question arises is how long did it actually take to remove the timber when it was actually removed ? One Jack Crane, an expert timber man, testified that the timber could have been cut and removed from the land in its entirety within a period not ex*487ceeding- three weeks, and that with a good operator would require only half of that time. Furthermore, defendant admits that the actual cutting and removing of the timber in 1951 took no more than four weeks.
It also appears from the record that this timber contract was prepared by one Ellis Martin, the agent of defendant company. It is shown that plaintiff did not participate in its preparation. Hence, it is well recognized that an instrument is to be most strictly construed against the party who prepared it: St. Landry State Bank v. Meyers, 52 La.Ann. 1769, 28 So. 136. See also Ernest A. Carrere’s Sons v. Rumore, La.App., 52 So.2d 57; Muse v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 193 La, 605, 192 So. 72, 125 A.L.R. 1075; and Texas Company v. Crais, La.App., 155 So. 405.
We are unalterably led to conclude, as shown by the record, that the defendant company had a large amount of “short term timber contracts” and because of this dilemma postponed, with a tinge of procrastination, the cutting of plaintiff’s timber and that possibly when the two-year time limit was nearing its end, it was confronted with unseasonable weather, thus forcing it to take refuge under the additional one-year clause of the contract, a right which, under the facts and the law applicable, did not exist. These actions of defendant were not the fault of plaintiff.
For the reasons assigned, it is ordered that the former judgment of this Court be reversed, annulled and set aside; and it is further ordered that the judgment of the district court be reinstated and made the judgment of this Court, defendant to pay all costs of this suit.