Court Opinion

ID: 9583113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:56.065146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:15.069530
License: Public Domain

Smith, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe the judgment of the Court of Appeals was correct and should be affirmed. I respectfully dissent.
1. The majority holds that appellee’s “acquiescence” in counsel’s waiver of his right to be present during the cross-examination of his wife was a “knowing” and “voluntary” waiver of Sixth Amendment confrontation rights on the part of appellee. I believe this conclusion is unsupported by the record.
The right of an accused to be present at all stages of his trial has historically been regarded “as being scarcely less important... than the right of trial itself.” Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442, 455 (32 SC 250, 56 LE 500) (1912). In recognition of the traditional status of confrontation rights, this court has steadfastly held that they “are personal to the accused . . .” Byrd v. Rickets, 233 Ga. 779, 780 (213 SE2d 610) (1975). Before waiver of confrontation rights can be found, the state must meet the “appropriately heavy burden” set forth in *251Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (58 SC 1019, 82 LE 1461) (1938) — it must establish “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 236-237 (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) (1973); see also United States v. Tortora, 464 F2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Morotta, 518 F2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975).
As the majority notes, a criminal defendant may impliedly waive the right to be present at trial, even in the absence of a showing that he has been specifically informed of his confrontation rights. However, the circumstances under which such a waiver has been found are exceedingly limited. They have generally demonstrated an open defiance of or indifference to the judicial process on the part of the accused. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U. S. 17 (94 SC 194, 38 LE2d 174) (1973); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 (90 SC 1057, 25 LE2d 353 (1970). Appellee has not been shown to have engaged in.any improper conduct.
The record in this case does not establish that appellee knew he had a right to be present during the cross-examination of his wife.1 There is no indication that the trial court or counsel informed him that he had a right to be present or that appellee had independently learned of this right. While the record shows that appellee acquiesced in counsel’s “request” that “he not remain in the courtroom”2 during his wife’s cross-examination, it does not appear that appellee knew the decision to remain within or leave the courtroom was, legally, his own or that he had any role in the decision that was in fact made. In view of the rule that “courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights” (Illinois v. Allen, supra at 343), it is inconceivable to me that the state has met its burden of establishing “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra at 464).
2. Where an error of constitutional dimension has been committed, the state, in order to establish harmless error, must demonstrate that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. *252Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (87 SC 824, 17 LE2d 705) (1967).
In United States v. Toliver, 541 F2d 958, 964-965 (2d Cir. 1976), the court states: “Although we indicated in United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 908, 89 S.Ct. 1018, 22 L.Ed. 2d 219 (1969), that a defendant’s absence during the empanelling of a jury might be too basic to be treated as harmless, see also United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1973), we did so on the ground that his absence during jury selection might prejudice him in ways impossible to determine on an appellate record, because it would deny him ‘his prerogative to challenge a juror simply on the basis of the “sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks [or] gestures of another. [”]’ 405 F.2d at 244, quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 376, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892). This reasoning might justify a rule that would require automatic reversal when a defendant has been denied his right to participate in the jury selection process. However, it does not support an extension of such a per se rule to all stages of a trial. During the cross-examination of a witness, for instance, a defendant does not exercise any absolute prerogative comparable to a peremptory challenge. He may assist his counsel in preparing the cross-examination and suggest areas to be explored or avoided, but the extent to which his absence may impair his ability to do so is capable of appraisal by a reviewing court. When, for example, the witness’ testimony concerns matters of which the defendant has no knowledge, it strains credulity to think that the absent defendant might have helped to produce a more effective cross-examination if he had been present. While the defendant’s presence during testimony may sometimes serve a psychological function by impressing witnesses with the consequences which may hang upon their testimony, this too may be accomplished by other means as, for instance, by the presence of co-defendants. Finally, when a defendant has been absent during testimony, a trial judge may take corrective measures ... and the effectiveness of these measures is also open to appraisal in most cases.” On the basis of this analysis, the court in Toliver found a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, appellee was absent during the cross-examination of a primary state’s witness who happens to be his wife. Compare United States v. Toliver, supra. The witness provided highly damaging testimony on cross-examination. In view of the nature of her testimony and her close personal relationship to the accused, I cannot find that the Sixth Amendment violation in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore conclude, *253as did the Court of Appeals, that appellee’s conviction should be reversed.

 The Sixth Amendment problem presented by this case could have been avoided if, prior to leaving the courtroom, appellee had been informed of his right to be present throughout the trial of his case.

 This is the language used by the trial court in recounting counsel’s purported waiver of appellee’s right to be present during the cross-examination of his wife. Although appellee was in the courtroom at the time the trial court recounted what had transpired in his absence, the court’s recollection clearly did not provide appellee with sufficient information to make a knowing waiver of his confrontation rights.