Court Opinion

ID: 9682675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:19:40.881834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:36.131680
License: Public Domain

In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                         Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                          No. 07-23-00034-CV

       IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF JORDIN HAYES BRIDENTHAL
                 AND WARREN FREDRICK BRIDENTHAL AND
                     IN THE INTEREST OF L.B., A CHILD

                            On Appeal from the 169th District Court
                                       Bell County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 322,883-C, Honorable Cari Starritt-Burnett, Presiding

                                            August 17, 2023
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
                      Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

        This is an appeal of a divorce decree rendered following a September 13, 2022

final hearing.1     Through a single issue, Appellant Jordin Hayes Bridenthal (Mother)

challenges that portion of the decree designating Appellee Warren Fredrick Bridenthal

        1 This appeal was originally filed in the Third Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court by

a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. In the
event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
(Father) as the parent with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the

parties’ son, L.B.2 Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

        Through a single issue, Mother argues the “trial court’s finding of fact and/or

conclusion of law in its final judgment that the note was invalid is legally insufficient.” We

are unclear what “note” Mother is referring to, but we note Mother argues elsewhere the

“custody award to [Father] was legally insufficient.” From what we can discern, Mother is

arguing the trial court abused its discretion designating Father as the parent with the

exclusive right to determine L.B.’s residence because no evidence supports the court’s

exercise of discretion.

        Mother’s appeal primarily tests the evidence supporting two of the trial court’s

findings of fact:

        14. [Mother] interfered with [Father’s] periods of possession to [the child].

        15. It is in the best interest of the child that [Mother] and [Father] be
        appointed joint managing conservators of the children [sic] and that [Father]
        have the right to designate the child’s primary residence.

In cases involving the best interest of the child,3 including questions of conservatorship,

possession, and access, sufficiency of the evidence is not an independent ground of error

but is one factor relevant to the appellate court’s assessment of the trial court’s exercise

of discretion. Fish v. Lebrie, No. 03-09-00387-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9791, at *5–6

        2 The child was age seven at the time of final hearing.

         3 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002. For determining the best interest of a child, courts consider

a variety of factors, including the nine considerations identified by the Supreme Court of Texas in Holley v.
Adams, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (Tex. 1976). Moreover, not all factors apply in every case. Pore v. Ellis,
No. 03-20-00550-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 8853, at *24 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem.
op.).

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(Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). We do not find a trial court abused

its discretion simply because this Court might have decided the issue differently. Zeifman

v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied).                 Rather,

reversing the trial court’s determination of the child’s residency as an abuse of discretion

will only occur if the evidence or law shows the court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or

without reference to guiding principles. In re J.R.D., 169 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2005, pet. denied).

       When conducting this review, we observe that suits affecting the parent-child

relationship are “intensely fact driven” and require courts to balance numerous factors.

Norman v. Martin, No. 03-17-00704-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 2396, at *15–16 (Tex.

App.—Austin Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19

(Tex. 2002)). The trial court is best situated to observe witnesses’ demeanor and other

indicia that cannot be discerned from the appellate record. Billisits v. Billisits, No. 03-21-

00358-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 1193, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 24, 2023, no pet.)

(mem. op.). Accordingly, we will generally defer to the trial court’s decision so long as it

is supported by substantive and probative evidence. Id. at 4–5.

       The only witnesses at final hearing were Mother and Father. At one time, both

lived in Texas, but Mother moved to California while the divorce proceeding was pending.

Father lives in Oklahoma. Father and Mother both have time consuming careers, with

Mother working as a soil technician and Father serving in the military. Both have plans

for L.B.’s care when work requires their absence. Father and Mother each cohabitate

with a partner outside of marriage.

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       Under the temporary orders that were signed during this case, both parties were

ordered to be joint managing conservators, with the child’s primary residence to be

determined by Mother, exclusively, within Bell County, Texas, or Riverside County,

California. Upon proof of a COVID vaccination, the child’s paternal grandmother could

have possession of the child one weekend per month with advance notice to Mother. “No

other COVID restrictions on either party.”

       Several provisions granted Father periods of possession with the child. Relevant

here, the trial court ordered that when the parents lived more than 100 miles apart, Father

would have the right to possession of the child every year during spring break, to begin

when the child was dismissed from school. Moreover, if Father did not give Mother written

notice before April 1, he would have the right to possession of the child during the summer

“for forty-two consecutive days beginning at 6:00 p.m. on June 15 and ending at 6:00 p.m.

on July 27 of that year.” Each parent was permitted to designate “any competent adult to

pick up and return the child, as applicable.”

       Mother testified she “was willing to compromise and do whatever it took because

our kid needs to see his dad.” The record, however, evidences Mother’s inflexibility when

Father attempted to exercise periods of possession. Here are a few examples:

          •   During Christmas 2021, and in contravention of the temporary
              order’s language that no COVID requirements restricted the parties
              (except for permitting the grandmother’s separate periods of
              access), Mother denied Father access to the child because Father
              visited family members who were not vaccinated against COVID-19.
          •   Mere days before the child’s spring break (and the period for Father’s
              period of access to the child), Mother withdrew the child from school
              to begin a move from Texas to California. Mother then denied Father
              access to the child because “it was no longer his Spring Break.”
              Mother agreed with the statement that it was in the child’s best
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              interest to ride across the country with her rather than spending the
              period with Father (who had offered to fly the child to California).
          •   When Father attempted to exercise his summer period of
              possession, Mother would not release the child until after 6:00 p.m.
              on June 15, 2022, because “it’s in the paperwork, the court order.”
              Notwithstanding Despite their residences being several states away,
              Mother refused to allow Father to designate another adult to pick-up
              the child, despite the language in the court order permitting Father to
              do so.
          •   Also regarding Father’s summer period of possession, when it was
              necessary for the child to fly unaccompanied from California, Mother
              alleged the child became so distraught at the airport that “the airline
              would no longer allow him on the plane.” This meant Father’s period
              of possession did not begin per the order. When, at the end of the
              (shorter) possession period, Father took the child to the airport to fly
              unaccompanied to California, Father did not witness the child
              exhibiting the same behaviors Mother said she saw.

       On appeal, Mother’s brief essentially attempts to credit the evidence favorable to

her and to explain away the evidence suggesting she had interfered with Father’s periods

of possession. But we do not sit as a jury; the trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’

credibility. See Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)

(“The trial court is in the best position to observe the demeanor and personalities of the

witnesses and can ‘feel’ the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by

merely reading the record.”).

       Regarding other best-interest factors, Father testified he works 12-hour days, and

plans to remain in the military for another eight and a half years so he can attain twenty

years of service. Father said he is not “deployable” for the next two years, and that he

and his fiancée occupy a three-bedroom home in Elgin, Oklahoma.                  Photographs

admitted into evidence depicted the child’s bedroom at Father’s house.             Testimony

showed the fiancée is a registered nurse, working ten-hour shifts, Monday through

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Thursday; she could care for the child if Father’s military service kept him away overnight.

Alternatively, a friend “up the street” would babysit. Father testified he planned to enroll

the child in childcare, either in Elgin or on the Army post. Although admitting to being an

alcoholic, Father said he had remained sober for 20 months.

         Because some evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to support

the trial court’s decision, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding it is in the child’s

best interest to designate Father as the joint managing conservator with the exclusive

right to determine the child’s primary residence. Mother’s sole issue is overruled.

                                          Conclusion

         Having overruled Mother’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

                                                            Lawrence M. Doss
                                                                Justice

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