Court Opinion

ID: 9585148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:56:49.130016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:48.348660
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the judgment of affirmance. In my view, defendant was entitled, under this Court’s precedent, to put up evidence of the victim’s pattern of reckless behavior while under the influence of alcohol, as an exception to the general rule that the character of the victim is not legally relevant. It is further my opinion that the erroneous exclusion of this relevant and material evidence mandates reversal of defendant’s convictions for involuntary manslaughter during the commission of the unlawful act of reckless conduct and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, with direction to admit such evidence upon any retrial. Since the majority is unable meaningfully to distinguish, and is unwilling to follow or overrule, the applicable and binding precedent of Carswell v. State, 171 Ga. App. 455, 459 (4) (320 SE2d 249), overruled in part on other grounds, Adcock v. State, 260 Ga. 302 (392 SE2d 886), I respectfully dissent.
In addition to the facts recited by the majority, I note the following: Basic safety instructions about using a nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol include “never point a loaded gun at somebody. Never have your finger in the trigger well unless you intend to shoot. Make sure your weapon’s on safe. Common sense characteristics.” But Henry Ruiz observed some dangerous horseplay with defendant’s weapon. Defendant took the stand and testified it was standard practice that he “kept rounds in the clip [of his weapon], but no *759rounds in the chambert, explaining that for] a semi-automatic, you need a round in the chamber to have it work. It’s like the keys to the car. Without the round in the chamber, it’s not going to [fire].” Defendant “was very positive [there was no round in the chamber, because that is] the way [he] always leaves them. . . .Not unless when he was . . . looking at it, [Henry Ruiz] loaded one in the chamber.” When the gun discharged, “[flirst thing [defendant] asked him [Henry Ruiz] was who loaded it. [Defendant] used the F word. [He] said, who loaded the damn gun. . . .” Immediately preceding the discharge, defendant “had just put the clip back in. . . . He [the victim] was reaching for it. ... I believe he put his hand on the weapon, try to pull it, tried to get it out of my hand to look — to — to grab it. And the gun went off. It just happened so quick. . . .” Defendant agreed it is “dangerous to be drinking and handling a loaded firearm, . . . but if it’s not loaded, [defendant] didn’t see — if you know what you’re doing, no — no threat to it if you know what you’re doing. . . . [E]ither [defendant] or Mr. Ruiz or [the victim] would have had to pull [the] slide back and push it forward to load a round in that chamber.” “If he [Henry Ruiz] don’t . . . know what he’s doing, he could leave a round in that chamber.” Defendant denied he had been negligent when handling the gun himself because “[i]t was unloaded as far as [he was] concerned.”
The jury acquitted defendant of charges of murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), and involuntary manslaughter during the commission of the unlawful act of pointing a pistol at another (Count 3) but found him guilty of involuntary manslaughter during the commission of the unlawful act of reckless conduct (Count 4) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 5).
1. Defendant proffered the testimony of Corporal Ted Hatch of the Savannah Police Department indicating that a number of “officers on the southside were familiar with [the victim] through prior dealings with him [and that] on at least four or five occasions, [Corporal Hatch] found him in the early morning hours,. . . between midnight and about 4:00 A.M., in [his] black wheelchair, out in the road, intoxicated.” The victim was “obstructing traffic [and posed] a danger to traffic and to himself.” Defendant argued this was proof of a pattern of reckless behavior on the part of the victim. The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude this evidence of the victim’s past contact with the police, and this evidentiary ruling is defendant’s second enumeration of error.
(a) “[T]he Georgia rule favors the admission of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value. Any evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or disprove a material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving to elucidate or to throw light upon a material issue or issues is relevant.” *760(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Snelling v. State, 215 Ga. App. 263 (1), 265 (1) (b) (450 SE2d 299). Accord Moss v. State, 206 Ga. App. 310 (1) (425 SE2d 386). Since their inception, the appellate courts of Georgia stand “pledged, by . . . past history, to abolish, to the extent of [their lawful] power, all exclusionary rules which shut out any fact from the Jury which may assist them in the ascertainment of the truth of the issue committed to their trial and decision.” Haynes v. State, 17 Ga. 465, hn. 6 (1854). Accord Williams v. State, 126 Ga. App. 302 (1), 303 (190 SE2d 807). It is well settled that the victim’s character, good or bad, is generally irrelevant and inadmissible in a murder trial. Wiseman v. State, 249 Ga. 559, 561 (6) (292 SE2d 670). “There are several circumstances, however, in which evidence reflecting the victim’s character is [nevertheless] admissible.” Milich, Ga. Rules of Evidence, § 11.5, p. 120 (1995). In my view, evidence that the victim repeatedly engaged in reckless behavior while under the influence of alcohol is logically relevant to prove defendant’s claim that the victim grabbed for defendant’s hand (in order to place the pistol in his own mouth), at which point the weapon discharged. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court in the case sub judice, that any testimony regarding a pattern of habitual reckless behavior should be excluded, I “think evidence of [the victim’s] ‘hazardous habit was relevant to a factual consideration of whether [recklessness] on (his) part contributed [in any way] to (his) death.’ [Cit.]” Carswell v. State, 171 Ga. App. 455, 459 (4), 460, supra. I cannot say it is highly probable that the error in excluding this relevant evidence did not contribute to the jury’s verdicts. Consequently, the judgment of conviction for involuntary manslaughter via reckless conduct (Count 4) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 5) must, in my view, be reversed. Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 (230 SE2d 869); Snelling v. State, 215 Ga. App. 263 (1), 266 (1) (c), 267, supra; Carswell v. State, 171 Ga. App. 455, 459 (4), 460, supra.
(b) “The decisions of the Court of Appeals insofar as not in conflict with those of the Supreme Court shall bind all courts except the Supreme Court as precedents” (Emphasis supplied.) Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. Ill, Ga. Const, of 1983. “[T]he older decisions of this court are binding on this court until reversed or overruled by the Supreme Court or overruled by this court. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) McKibben v. State, 88 Ga. App. 466, 470 (1), 474 (77 SE2d 86). Regrettably, the majority does not acknowledge exceptions to the general evidentiary rule stated, does not attempt to distinguish the applicable and binding precedent of Carswell v. State, 171 Ga. App. 554, 559 (4), supra, nor does it propose to overrule the same.
2. The third enumeration contends the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant’s written request to charge on mistake of fact. I agree.
*761“A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if the act or omission to act constituting the crime was induced by a misapprehension of fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission.” OCGA § 16-3-5. Since defendant was acquitted by the jury of murder, felony murder, and involuntary manslaughter by pointing a gun, the underlying crime supporting the remaining involuntary manslaughter charge is reckless conduct. This is where: “A person . . . causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his apt or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. . . .” OCGA § 16-5-60 (b).
“Mistake of fact is a defense to a crime to the extent that the ignorance of some fact negates the existence of the mental state required to establish a material element of the crime. [Cit.]” Jones v. State, 263 Ga. 835, 837 (2), 839 (439 SE2d 645). In the case sub judice, there is nothing to contradict defendant’s explanation that the semi-automatic pistol would not fire unless and until a round was chambered. Should the jury accept defendant’s testimony that he consciously believed the weapon was not loaded, i.e., no round was chambered (even though a fully loaded clip had been inserted) when he aimed toward or above the victim’s head, that circumstance would be relevant and material to whether defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm constituting a gross deviation from the applicable standard of care. The trial court’s charge on misfortune or accident, OCGA § 16-2-2, does not itself adequately address this possible view of the evidence. In Adcock v. State, 260 Ga. 302, supra, the Supreme Court of Georgia disapproved of holdings in Abelman v. State, 185 Ga. App. 278, 279 (2) (363 SE2d 764) and Carswell v. State, 171 Ga. App. 455, 460 (5), supra, as well as the holding in Adcock v. State, 194 Ga. App. 627 (391 SE2d 438), that when mistake of fact is not the sole defense, as it was not there, it is not error to refuse to charge. Consequently, the refusal to charge mistake of fact can constitute reversible error even when it is not the sole defense. Adcock v. State, 260 Ga. 302, supra. In my view of the case sub judice, a new trial is demanded for the separate reason that the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant’s timely written request to charge the law of mistake of fact.
3. I fully concur with Division 4, holding the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence such as the weapon, shell casing, and bloody towel seized in plain sight from his apartment during a warrantless search immediately after police arrived at the scene and discovered the victim’s body. Delay v. State, 258 Ga. 229, 230 (2) (b) (367 SE2d 806). Nevertheless, because *762of the harmful errors discussed above, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of affirmance.
Decided August 3, 1998
Gregory N. Crawford, for appellant.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Ronald M. Adams, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.