Court Opinion

ID: 9951857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 14:08:36.850897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:08.125525
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1728-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ERRICK L. YOUNG,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

                   Argued February 13, 2024 – Decided March 19, 2024

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 14-10-
                   0754.

                   Steven E. Braun, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
                   for appellant (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender,
                   attorney; Steven E. Braun, on the brief).

                   Jeffrey Nicholas Krachun, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
                   the cause for respondent (Jennifer Webb-McRae,
                   Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney; Jeffrey
                   Nicholas Krachun, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Errick Young appeals from the July 13, 2022, Law Division

order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) after a limited

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

                                       I.

      Defendant was charged in an October 1, 2014, Cumberland County

indictment with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 (count one); second-

degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count two);

second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4(a) (count three); second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)

(count four); and fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4)

(count five).

      The PCR judge recounted the underlying facts as follows:

                  On March 22, 2014, [defendant] traveled with his
            cousin . . . to pick up [his cousin's] two young children
            at the home of the children's father, Benjamin
            Broughton, in Commercial Township, Cumberland
            County.       Prior to the scheduled pick-up, Mr.
            Broughton's girlfriend . . . and [defendant's cousin] had
            an argument over the telephone. [Defendant's] cousin
            asked him to accompany her in case something
            happened. [Defendant] chose to take a loaded handgun
            with him.

                   Once at Mr. Broughton's home for the exchange
            of the children, [defendant's cousin] and [Broughton's
            girlfriend] engaged in a physical altercation with the

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                                       2
            children present to witness the fight. [Defendant] and
            Mr. Broughton interjected themselves in the dispute
            and, as could be predicted, engaged in a physical tussle
            as well. . . . [A]n eyewitness saw [defendant] with a
            gun in his hand and saw [defendant] shoot Mr.
            Broughton. Mr. Broughton died from a single gunshot
            wound to the face.

      On the eve of jury selection, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to

count one, as amended to charge first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A.

2C:11-4(a)(1). The plea was an open plea, meaning there was no sentencing

recommendation from the State. 1 However, the State agreed to the amendment

of count one and agreed to move to dismiss the remaining counts of the

indictment at sentencing.

      During the September 27, 2016, plea colloquy, defendant assured the trial

judge, orally and by executing the plea forms, that he was entering the plea

knowingly and voluntarily, without force or coercion and with a full

understanding of the nature of the charge, the State's proofs, the terms of the

agreement, and the consequences of the plea. Defendant also expressed his

satisfaction with the services of his attorney. When the judge asked whether

1
  "An 'open plea' to an indictment neither 'include[s] a recommendation from
the State, nor a prior indication from the court, regarding sentence.'" State v.
Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 625 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting State v. Kates,
426 N.J. Super. 32, 42 n.4 (App. Div. 2012)).
                                                                           A-1728-22
                                       3
defendant had any questions, defendant asked specific questions about jail

credits, parole supervision, and sentencing considerations, all of which the judge

answered. If defendant did not understand something, the judge provided a

comprehensive and detailed explanation at defendant's behest.

      In providing a factual basis for the plea, defendant admitted that on March

22, 2014, in Commercial Township, he discharged a gun during an altercation

with Broughton, fatally shooting Broughton and directly resulting in his death.

Defendant acknowledged that by possessing the gun and discharging it "at close

range" to Broughton, "when it could have been avoided," defendant acted with

recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to human life.        See State v.

Bowens, 108 N.J. 622, 638 (1987) ("For aggravated manslaughter, in order to

demonstrate the defendant's extreme indifference to human life, there must have

been a probability, rather than a possibility, that death would have resulted from

the defendant's actions."), abrogated by State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300 (2013); State

v. Gaines, 377 N.J. Super. 612, 622 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that defendant

firing a gun above a large crowd, killing a person in the crowd, constituted

"circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life").            After

ensuring compliance with Rule 3:9-2, governing the entry of guilty pleas, the

judge accepted defendant's plea.

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                                        4
      On December 23, 2016, the judge sentenced defendant to twenty-two

years in prison, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility in

accordance with the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

Pursuant to Rule 2:9-11, defendant challenged his sentence on the Sentencing

Oral Argument (SOA) calendar, arguing the judge failed to apply certain

mitigating factors. In an order filed June 29, 2017, we affirmed the sentence

because we were "satisfied that the sentence [was] not manifestly excessive or

unduly punitive and [did] not constitute an abuse of discretion."

      In 2019, defendant filed a timely pro se PCR petition, which was

subsequently supplemented by appointed counsel as well as additional

submissions by defendant. Among other things, defendant argued his trial

counsel was ineffective by failing to provide him with all the discovery before

the plea was entered. According to defendant, as a result, his plea was not

voluntary and knowing because he did not fully understand the consequences of his

plea. Defendant also argued his attorney was ineffective because he pressured him

into pleading guilty by "constantly shut[ting him] down when he tried speaking at

the plea hearing," thereby rendering his plea uninformed.       Further, defendant

asserted there was no factual basis for his plea, and urged the PCR judge to modify

his sentence based on his post-incarceration activities.

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                                          5
      Judge Joseph M. Chiarello conducted oral argument on June 17, 2020, and

addressed defendant's PCR claims in an oral decision on the record. First, the

judge rejected defendant's claim that his plea was not voluntary and knowing as

belied by the record. See State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999) ("Solemn

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." (quoting

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977))). The judge explained that

"based on the plea colloquy, [defendant] understood the plea[ and] had enough

time to consider the plea," having entered it on the eve of jury selection.

      The judge elaborated:

            The initial indictment was for first degree murder,
            which would[ have] subjected[] . . . defendant if
            convicted to a term of life imprisonment potentially.
            The plea he took was an open plea to an aggravated
            manslaughter, which would have subjected him under
            the . . . open plea agreement to [a ten] to a [thirty-] year
            sentence. Clearly there was a negotiated plea which
            benefitted defendant, [and] benefitted the State in
            avoiding trial. And I find that . . . defendant . . .
            understood.

      As to defendant's request for a modification of his sentence based on his

post-incarceration activities, the judge stated such an application was "a separate

motion" that "[was] not properly before th[e c]ourt." Regarding defendant's

claim that there was no factual basis for the plea, the judge found the claim was

"procedurally barred" because it "should have been raised in the Appellate

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                                         6
Division." See R. 3:22-4. However, the judge granted defendant a limited

evidentiary hearing solely to address defendant's claim that his attorney failed

to provide him with all the discovery before he entered the plea.

      No order was entered following Judge Chiarello's oral decision. In September

2021, Judge Kevin T. Smith assumed responsibility for the matter and issued an

order on March 11, 2022, nunc pro tunc to June 17, 2020, memorializing Judge

Chiarello's rulings. The order denied without prejudice defendant's "request to

modify his sentence based upon post-sentence rehabilitative efforts while

incarcerated in State Prison," denied defendant's "request to withdraw his plea of

guilty," denied defendant's challenge to his "factual basis," and denied defendant's

claim "that his case should be reopened since he established during his plea colloquy

a reasonable ground for self-defense."

      The order granted an evidentiary hearing, limited to the following questions:

             a. Did plea counsel disclose to [defendant] a copy of
             all discovery in his possession prior to his entry of his
             guilty plea;

             b. If plea counsel did not provide copies of certain
             discovery to [defendant], did he discuss with
             [defendant] that undisclosed discovery and answer all
             of [defendant's] questions regarding same; and

             c. If plea counsel or [defendant] believed that certain
             discovery had not been provided by the State, what
             discovery was deemed missing and was there a decision

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                                         7
            made to pursue obtaining that missing discovery from
            the State or to proceed without the missing discovery.

      On June 28, 2022, Judge Smith conducted an evidentiary hearing.2

Following the evidentiary hearing, the judge issued an order and written opinion

on July 13, 2022, supplementing his oral opinion placed on the record on June

28, 2022, and denying defendant's petition for PCR. At the evidentiary hearing,

after defendant waived his attorney-client privilege, his trial counsel testified.

However, defendant did not testify. Additionally, as the judge pointed out,

defendant neither submitted a sworn certification nor an affidavit in support of

his PCR petition.

      Based on defendant's unsworn submissions, Judge Smith described

defendant's position as follows:

            [Defendant] alleges that [his attorney] did not provide
            him with all the discovery prior to him entering his plea
            of guilty. He argues that had he been given the
            opportunity to review the entirety of the State's
            evidence by way of the discovery, he would have not
            entered into a plea agreement, and he would have gone
            to trial. He contends that [his attorney] came to see him
            on the weekend before trial was to commence and
            rather than review the discovery and discuss strategy
            for the trial, counsel discussed entering a plea.

2
  The judge noted that the hearing was delayed by the impact of the pandemic
on court operations.
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                                        8
      In contrast, after considering trial counsel's testimony, which the judge

found to be "credible," Judge Smith found that "[n]othing in [trial counsel's]

testimony support[ed defendant's] allegations that items were missing from

discovery and that he never discussed the discovery with his attorney."

Critically, Judge Smith described trial counsel's "recollection" as "remarkable,"

stating that counsel "possessed a full command of the facts," "a clear recollection

of the case," and "a general recollection of his meetings with [defendant]." The

judge also noted that counsel had "[thirty-two] years of criminal law experience"

and was privately "retained" by defendant's family to take over from the public

defender who had previously represented defendant.

      The judge elaborated:

                    [Trial counsel] received discovery from both
            [defendant] and from . . . the Assistant Deputy Public
            Defender representing [defendant. Trial counsel]
            reviewed the discovery and found it to be complete. It
            was his opinion that nothing was missing or needed to
            be acquired. [Trial counsel] testified that he discussed
            the discovery with [defendant] on several occasions,
            recalling that he visited [defendant] at the jail six to
            seven times prior to the guilty plea hearing. On each
            occasion he and [defendant] discussed the case and
            topics or issues addressed by the discovery. According
            to [trial counsel, defendant] never complained about the
            discovery being deficient, never asked [trial counsel] to
            obtain any specific item or document as discovery and
            never asked for copies of certain items from the
            discovery. And, as noted . . . , [trial counsel] testified

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                                        9
            that he obtained the discovery from [defendant]
            himself.

      In denying defendant's petition for PCR, the judge found "no grounds" for

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The judge explained:

            [Defendant] has failed to present a prima [facie] . . .
            showing of ineffective assistance. The question was
            raised of whether or not there was something that was
            missing. [Defendant] never presented to this [c]ourt
            what was missing. And through now the testimony of
            [trial counsel,] he reviewed the discovery, found it to
            be complete, did not believe that there [were] any holes
            in it that he needed to explore through pretrial
            litigation, [and] made no further request for discovery
            because again in his judgment it was complete. . . .
            [N]or did [defendant] raise the question that anything
            was missing.

The judge concluded that defendant "failed to show that counsel's performance

was deficient in any way" but instead made "bald assertions which he does not

support with any facts or certifications, and which are wholly unsupported by

the evidence, that being the credible testimony of [trial counsel]." This appeal

followed.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

            POINT I

            DEFENDANT DID NOT PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT
            FACTUAL BASIS TO SUPPORT HIS GUILTY PLEA
            TO AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER BECAUSE
            HE DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT HE HAD

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                                      10
RECKLESSLY    CAUSED    DEATH    UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES MANIFESTING EXTREME
INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE OR THAT AS A
RESULT OF HIS ACTIONS THAT DEATH WAS
PROBABLE (NOT RAISED BELOW).

POINT II

AS PER DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION, HE WAS
NOT SUPPLIED WITH ALL DISCOVERY BY
TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL AND WOULD NOT
HAVE PLED GUILTY IF SUCH HAD BEEN
PROVIDED. THUS, HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION.

POINT III

AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA, HIS
ASSERTION THAT THE GUILTY PLEA FAILED
TO ESTABLISH A FACTUAL BASIS, HIS
ASSERTION THAT THE PLEA COLLOQUY
ESTABLISHED A REASONABLE GROUND FOR
SELF-DEFENSE, THE LACK OF EVIDENCE OF A
WEAPON    ALONG    WITH   THE   FLAWED
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE, THE FAILURE
TO RETAIN AN EXPERT TO DEFINE THE TERM
"RECKLESS," AND THE DENIAL OF RELIEF
BASED        UPON       POST-CONVICTION
ACHIEVEMENTS.

POINT IV

                                           A-1728-22
                  11
            DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT THE SENTENCING
            COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY CONSIDER WHAT
            CONSTITUTES MID-RANGE WHEN IT IMPOSED
            A TWENTY-TWO YEAR SENTENCE (NOT RAISED
            BELOW).

            POINT V

            DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT HE WAS DENIED
            EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY HIS
            ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE AND
            OBJECT TO INTIMIDATION BY THE FAMILY OF
            THE VICTIM WHEN THEY WERE SEATED
            DIRECTLY BEHIND DEFENDANT IN THE
            COURTROOM. HE ALSO ASSERTS THAT HIS
            TRIAL ATTORNEY RESTRICTED HIS ABILITY TO
            ADDRESS THE TRIAL COURT WHEN HE PLED
            GUILTY (NOT RAISED BELOW).

            POINT VI

            THE CASE AUTHORITY WHICH APPLIES TO
            JUVENILE OFFENDERS REGARDING LENGTHY
            SENTENCES SHOULD EQUALLY APPLY IN
            SITUATIONS SUCH AS THE INSTANT MATTER
            WHERE DEFENDANT WAS VERY YOUNG (NOT
            RAISED BELOW).

                                       II.

      We begin by setting out some guideposts that inform our review. "Post-

conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus."

State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J.

451, 459 (1992)). Rule 3:22-2 recognizes five cognizable grounds for PCR,

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                                      12
including a "[s]ubstantial denial in the conviction proceedings of defendant's

[constitutional] rights," R. 3:22-2(a), which encompasses the right to the

effective assistance of counsel. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541-42 (2013).

            "Because post-conviction relief is not a substitute for
            direct appeal and because of the public policy 'to
            promote finality in judicial proceedings,' our rules
            provide various procedural bars." State v. Echols, 199
            N.J. 344, 357 (2009) (citations omitted) (quoting State
            v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 483 (1997)).

                   "[A] petitioner may be barred from relief if the
            petitioner could have raised the issue on direct appeal
            but failed to do so, Rule 3:22-4[, or] the issue was
            previously decided on direct appeal, Rule 3:22-5[.]"
            Ibid. The effect of Rule 3:22-4 is that PCR will be
            precluded if any ground for relief could have been
            raised at trial or on appeal. State v. Afanador, 151 N.J.
            41, 50 (1997).

            [State v. Peoples, 446 N.J. Super. 245, 254-55 (App.
            Div. 2016) (alterations in original).]

      Unlike Rule 3:22-4, Rule 3:22-5 applies "'if the issue raised is identical or

substantially equivalent to that adjudicated previously on direct appeal.'" State

v. Marshall (Marshall IV), 173 N.J. 343, 351 (2002) (quoting State v. Marshall

(Marshall III), 148 N.J. 89, 150 (1997)). These rules incorporate exceptions to

ensure fairness to defendants. In particular, under Rule 3:22-4(a), "[i]f an issue

could not reasonably have been raised in a prior proceeding, if it involves the

infringement of constitutional rights, or if it presents exceptional circumstances

                                                                             A-1728-22
                                       13
involving a showing of fundamental injustice, then the procedural bar will be

lifted." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 584 (1992); see R. 3:22-4(a)(1), (2), and

(3).

       Where an evidentiary hearing is conducted, we "defer to the PCR court's

factual findings, given its opportunity to hear live witness testimony ." State v.

Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021). "In such circumstances, we will uphold the

PCR court's findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the

record" but we will review "de novo" the PCR court's "legal conclusion." Nash,

212 N.J. at 540-41. On the other hand, "[w]e review a judge's decision to deny

a PCR petition without a hearing for abuse of discretion" and, where "'the PCR

court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing, we review its legal and factual

determinations de novo.'" State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div.

2023) (quoting State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020)).

                   The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not
            entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing. State v.
            Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (1999). An
            evidentiary hearing on a PCR petition is required only
            when: (1) the defendant establishes a prima facie case
            in support of PCR; (2) the court determines that there
            are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be
            resolved by review of the existing record; and (3) the
            court determines that an evidentiary hearing is required
            to resolve the claims asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J.
            343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)). "A prima facie
            case is established when a defendant demonstrates 'a

                                                                             A-1728-22
                                       14
            reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the
            facts alleged in the light most favorable to the
            defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Id.
            at 355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)).

            [Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. at 623.]

"If the court perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's

analysis of whether the defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief, . . . then

an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super.

387, 401 (2013) (quoting Marshall III, 148 N.J. at 158); R. 3:22-10(e)(1).

      To establish a prima facie case of IAC,

            a defendant must demonstrate:             (1) "counsel's
            performance was deficient"; and (2) "the deficient
            performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v.
            Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State
            v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland
            two-pronged analysis in New Jersey). "That is, the
            defendant must establish, first, that 'counsel's
            representation fell below an objective standard of
            reasonableness' and, second, that 'there is a reasonable
            probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
            the result of the proceeding would have been
            different.'" State v. Alvarez, 473 N.J. Super. 448, 455
            (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,
            694).

            [Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. at 623-24.]

      To establish the prejudice prong to set aside a guilty plea based on IAC, a

defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

                                                                              A-1728-22
                                        15
counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration

in original) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). To that end, "'a

[defendant] must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain'"

and "insist on going to trial" would have been "'rational under the

circumstances.'" State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011)

(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). That determination

should be "based on evidence, not speculation." Ibid. Ultimately, a defendant

must "establish the right to PCR by a preponderance of the evidence." State v.

O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 370 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Preciose, 129 N.J.

at 459).

      Failure to meet either prong of the two-pronged Strickland/Fritz test

results in the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280

(2012) (citing Echols, 199 N.J. at 358). That said, "courts are permitted leeway

to choose to examine first whether a defendant has been prejudiced, and if not,

to dismiss the claim without determining whether counsel's performance was

constitutionally deficient." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citation

omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

                                                                              A-1728-22
                                        16
      Guided by these principles, we turn to defendant's arguments. Defendant

renews his challenge to his factual basis for aggravated manslaughter, arguing

that, at the very least, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the

merits of his arguments regarding his guilty plea.3 However, we agree with

Judge Chiarello that the claim is procedurally barred by Rule 3:22-4 because it

could have been raised on direct appeal. Moreover, none of the Rule 3:22-4(a)

exceptions justifies lifting the bar. See Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 583-85 (invoking

the Rule 3:22-4 bar to the defendant's PCR claim because, among other reasons,

"[a]ll of the information necessary to raise the claim regarding an insufficient

factual basis for his plea was available to [defendant] when he made his direct

appeal.").

      Equally unavailing is defendant's newly minted challenge to his sentence,

which we affirmed on direct appeal. Based on our affirmance, defendant's

sentencing arguments are barred by both Rule 3:22-4, because it could have been

3
   We decline to address whether defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty
plea because defendant has not expressly argued this issue on appeal. See R.
2:6-2(a)(6) (describing mode of presenting legal argument in appellant's brief);
State v. D.F.W., 468 N.J. Super. 422, 447 (App. Div. 2021) (declining to address
claims where a defendant "did not formally brief them"). As we have explained,
a "cursory discussion [does] not properly present the issue for our consideration
or afford an adequate opportunity for the [opposing party] to respond." Mid-
Atl. Solar Energy Indus. Ass'n v. Christie, 418 N.J. Super. 499, 508 (App. Div.
2011).
                                                                            A-1728-22
                                       17
raised on direct appeal, and Rule 3:22-5, because "'the issue raised is identical

or substantially equivalent to that adjudicated previously on direct appeal. '"

Marshall IV, 173 N.J. at 351 (quoting Marshall III, 148 N.J. at 150); see also

McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 483 ("[A] defendant may not use a petition for post-

conviction relief as an opportunity to relitigate a claim already decided on the

merits.").

      For the first time on appeal, defendant contends that, in light of the fact

that he was only twenty years old when he committed the offense, "should his

sentence go beyond [twenty] years of incarceration, he should be entitled to

argue the applicability of State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 (2022)," because "he

stands in the same position of a juvenile offender whose brain functions were

recognized by the Supreme Court as not being fully developed." In Comer, 249

N.J. at 405, the Court endorsed a procedure allowing for "a review and possible

reduction of a sentence after a juvenile offender has served two decades in

prison."

      Ordinarily, we decline to consider questions or issues not presented to the

trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation was available unless the

matter involves the trial court's jurisdiction or is of great public interest. State

                                                                              A-1728-22
                                        18
v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009). No exception applies here, and, in any event,

the argument is premature and lacks merit.

      Defendant also argues for the first time on appeal that he was "intimidated

by the presence of the victim's family who sat directly behind him as he

attempted to address the court at his plea hearing" and his attorney was

ineffective because he failed to "object[] to the seating arrangement." Again,

we decline to consider the argument because it was not presented to the trial

court. In any event, defendant's contention is belied by the record because the

plea hearing transcript shows that defendant was actively engaged in a colloquy

with the judge, and defendant makes no claim that he communicated any type

of intimidation to his attorney.

      Equally unavailing is defendant's contention that his attorney "restricted

his ability to address the court by cutting him off" at the plea hearing.4 However,

defendant fails to identify exactly what information he was prevented from

conveying to the court. "In order for a claim of [IAC] to entitle a PCR petitioner

to an evidentiary hearing, 'bald assertions' are not enough—rather, the defendant

'"must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard

4
  Notably, during the plea hearing, trial counsel did, in fact, "cut[ defendant]
off" to prevent him from divulging privileged communications.
                                                                             A-1728-22
                                       19
performance."'" State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 311-12 (2014) (quoting Porter,

216 N.J. at 355).

      Finally, defendant reiterates his discovery challenge, arguing his attorney

"deprived [him] of the State's evidence against him," and, as such, defendant did

not "knowingly or intelligently enter into the plea agreement."         Further,

defendant asserts that "if he had been provided with all discovery documents

and the opportunity to review them with trial counsel, he would not have

accepted the open plea." We reject defendant's contention for the reasons stated

in Judge Smith's well-reasoned decisions. As the judge found, based on the

credible testimony of trial counsel, defendant's claims that items were missing

from the discovery or that his attorney failed to discuss the discovery with him

are entirely unsupported by the record and constitute bald assertions that are

insufficient to support a claim for IAC. See ibid.

      To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because

either our disposition makes it unnecessary or the argument is without sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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                                      20