Court Opinion

ID: 9387553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 14:10:02.863048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.034654
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Huff, Lorish and Senior Judge Petty

              JAMES WILLIAM WHITTAKER
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1137-22-3                                         PER CURIAM
                                                                                  APRIL 18, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                  FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOTETOURT COUNTY
                                               Joel R. Branscom, Judge

                              (Joseph T. Cockfield, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting
                              on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Susan Hallie Hovey-Murray,
                              Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Appellant, James William Whittaker, challenges the sentence the trial court imposed upon

              the revocation of his previously suspended sentences. Whittaker contends that the trial court abused

              its discretion by imposing a four-year sentence. After examining the briefs and record in this case,

              we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We unanimously hold that oral argument is unnecessary

              because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a).

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     In February 2018, Whittaker pleaded guilty to distributing hydrocodone and distributing

              an imitation controlled substance under the terms of a written plea agreement. The trial court

              sentenced him to five years’ incarceration with all but eight months suspended for the

                        This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
hydrocodone-related conviction and two years’ suspended incarceration for the imitation

substance conviction.1

       In June 2019, the trial court revoked Whittaker’s suspended sentences, resuspending

them on the condition that he complete the Community Corrections Alternative Program

(CCAP). In August 2021, the trial court again revoked Whittaker’s suspended sentences. The

court imposed a 14-day sentence for the hydrocodone-related conviction and resuspended

Whittaker’s entire sentence for the imitation substance conviction. Whittaker returned to

supervised probation on August 5, 2021.

       On April 5, 2022, Whittaker’s probation officer filed a major violation report alleging

that Whittaker had absconded from supervision and detailing the steps the probation officer had

taken to find him.2 Whittaker last contacted the officer by phone over five months earlier on

September 13, 2021, and failed to report for his appointment on September 29, 2021. On

October 7, 2021, the officer left a voicemail instructing Whittaker to call the officer. The officer

visited Whittaker’s listed residence on October 12, 2021, and, finding no one at home, posted a

note on the door directing Whittaker to call the next business day. On a November 23, 2021

return visit, the current resident advised the officer that Whittaker did not live there.

       At his revocation hearing, Whittaker testified that he had been “trying to kick” his drug

addiction for years but “went back to using” after his uncle died. Although he had completed the

       1
          The joint appendix filed in this case does not contain the February 2018 final sentencing
order or the July 2022 revocation order for the distributing an imitation controlled substance
conviction. See Rule 5A:25(c)(2) (requiring that an appendix include “the judgment appealed
from”). We conclude that this error is insignificant, and thus does not preclude us from
addressing the merits of the assignment of error. See Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 520
(2008).
       2
         The major violation report is sealed; to the extent that this opinion mentions facts found
in the major violation report, we unseal only those specific facts because we find them relevant
to the decision in this case. See Chenevert v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 47, 52 n.1 (2020).
The remainder of the major violation report remains sealed. Id.
                                                -2-
“detention” portion of CCAP, which “helped a little bit,” he left the program with no money or

resources. Whittaker stated that he needed a lot of counseling because he “grew up in a drug

addicted family” and experienced trauma. He stated that before his most recent arrest he “started

to get clean” and left the Roanoke area, where “99.9 percent of his problems” were. Notably,

Whittaker acknowledged the trial court’s earlier warning that if he violated the terms of his

probation again, the trial court would impose the entirety of his suspended sentences.

       The Commonwealth acknowledged that Whittaker had completed CCAP but noted that

he since had absconded from supervision twice. In the Commonwealth’s view, Whittaker was

not “someone who we can expect to be successful on probation.” Accordingly, the

Commonwealth asked the trial court to “impose a sentence” and terminate Whittaker’s

supervised probation. Whittaker acknowledged that he had “a lot of time suspended” but asked

the trial court to show mercy and not impose the entirety of his previously suspended time.

       The trial court found that Whittaker violated the terms of his supervised probation and

revoked his suspended sentences. Despite its earlier admonition, the trial court did not impose

the balance of the suspended sentences (6 years, 3 months, and 16 days); the trial court instead

imposed a four-year period of incarceration and terminated Whittaker’s supervised probation.3

Whittaker now appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a

four-year sentence.

       3
         The trial court imposed two-year sentences for both the hydrocodone-related conviction
and the imitation substance conviction, for a total of four years’ incarceration.
                                                -3-
                                              ANALYSIS

          “On appeal, ‘[w]e “view the evidence received at [a] revocation hearing in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, including all reasonable and legitimate

inferences that may properly be drawn from it.”’” Green v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 69, 76

(2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 266, 274 (2018)). “In

revocation appeals, the trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless there

is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Id. (quoting Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529,

535 (2013)). “The evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the

prevailing party below.” Jacobs, 61 Va. App. at 535. This Court will find an abuse of discretion

only when “reasonable jurists could not differ.” Hicks v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 255, 275

(2019).

          Having found good cause to believe that Whittaker had violated the terms of his

supervised probation by absconding from supervision, the trial court was authorized to revoke

Whittaker’s suspended sentences and “impose a sentence in accordance with the provisions of

§ 19.2-306.1.”4 Code § 19.2-306(C). Under Code § 19.2-306.1(C), the trial court was

authorized to “impose whatever sentence might have been originally imposed for a third or

subsequent technical violation.” The trial court also was permitted, but not required, to

resuspend all or part of this sentence. Code § 19.2-306(C).

          Whittaker contends that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to four years

of active incarceration because he did not incur any new charges or convictions, his drug addiction

caused his violations, he completed CCAP, and his discretionary probation violation guidelines

          Although uncontested, the record makes clear that Whittaker’s violation was a “third or
          4

subsequent technical violation”; thus, the provisions of Code § 19.2-306.1(C) did not limit the
trial court’s sentencing discretion.
                                               -4-
range recommended a sentence between three months and one year. He contends that the trial court

wrongly “punish[ed] an addict for continuing to be an addict.”

        Upon review, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Initially, we note that

Whittaker did not request a specific sentence or suggest an alternative punishment; he merely

asked for the trial court’s mercy and grace. Moreover, the record reflects that the trial court

considered Whittaker’s arguments in mitigation, including his drug addiction and his completion

of CCAP. Indeed, the trial court’s recommendation that the Department of Corrections place

Whittaker in its therapeutic program demonstrates that it considered his addiction in fashioning

an appropriate sentence.5 “The statutes dealing with probation and suspension are remedial and

intended to give the trial court valuable tools to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of

probation, suspension of all or part of a sentence, and/or restitution payments.” Howell v.

Commonwealth, 274 Va. 737, 740 (2007). By continuing to disregard completely his probation

obligations, Whittaker demonstrated that he was not amenable to rehabilitation.

        “When coupled with a suspended sentence, probation represents ‘an act of grace on the part

of the Commonwealth to one who has been convicted and sentenced to a term of confinement.’”

Hunter v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 582, 587 (2010) (quoting Price v. Commonwealth, 51

Va. App. 443, 448 (2008)). Whittaker failed to make productive use of the grace the trial court had

extended to him repeatedly. He also failed to heed the trial court’s warning of the consequences

of continuing to disregard his probation obligations. “For probation to have a deterrent effect on

recidivism, real consequences must follow a probationer’s willful violation of the conditions of

        5
         Contrary to Whittaker’s suggestion, the trial court provided a written explanation for
departing from the discretionary probation violation guidelines range—namely that the court had
“advised” Whittaker that he would receive a “substantial portion” of his suspended sentences if
he absconded again.
                                               -5-
probation.” Price, 51 Va. App. at 449. Based on the record before us, we find no abuse of the

trial court’s sentencing discretion.

                                           CONCLUSION

       Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                      Affirmed.

                                              -6-