Court Opinion

ID: 9411069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 18:04:43.235144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.691315
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/25/23 P. v. Head CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085063
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. VCF252277)
                    v.

    ERICK JOEL HEAD,                                                                      OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Antonio A.
Reyes, Judge.
         James Bisnow, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Erin R.
Doering and Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Meehan, J.
       Defendant Erick Joel Head was convicted by a jury of three counts of murder in
2011. In 2022, he petitioned the trial court, pursuant to former section 1170.95 (now
§ 1172.6) of the Penal Code,1 for resentencing. The trial court summarily denied the
petition, without appointing counsel.
       On appeal, defendant argues the trial court prejudicially erred in: (1) failing to
appoint counsel, (2) denying the petition without setting forth intelligible reasons for the
denial on the record, and (3) denying defendant a hearing on his petition. Specifically, he
argues that he filed a facially sufficient petition, and his convictions could have been
proved under a felony-murder theory and therefore do not render him ineligible for relief
as a matter of law. The People respond that any error was harmless because defendant
was the actual killer and was therefore ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We affirm.
                              PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
       On August 25, 2011, the Tulare County District Attorney charged defendant in an
information alleging defendant committed the murders of R.M., G.M., and R.M., Jr.
(§ 187, subd. (a); counts 1–3), three counts of evading an officer causing death
(Veh. Code, § 2800.3; counts 4–6), evading an officer with willful disregard for the
safety of persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 7), and evading an
officer causing injury (Veh. Code, § 2800.3, subd. (a); count 8). As to each count, the
information further alleged that defendant had suffered a prior “strike” conviction within
the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)),
and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). As to counts 1 through 3,

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated. Former section 1170.95 recently was renumbered section 1172.6, with no
change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the current section 1172.6 in this
opinion.
2     We summarize only the procedural history relevant to our review of the order
denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.

                                             2.
the information alleged that the prior strike conviction also qualified as a serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
       On October 28, 2011, the jury found defendant guilty on counts 1 through 7. The
jury reached no verdict on count 8.3
       On December 8, 2011, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
90 years to life plus nine years as follows: on count 7, four years (the middle term); on
count 1, 30 years to life, plus a five-year serious felony conviction enhancement,
consecutive to the term on count 7; on count 2, 30 years to life, consecutive to the term
on count 1; on count 3, 30 years to life, consecutive to the term on count 2; and on
counts 4, 5, and 6, 12 years (the middle term), stayed pursuant to section 654.
       On September 27, 2022, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition seeking
resentencing and requesting appointment of counsel. The form petition alleged, among
other things, that he was charged with an offense that permitted prosecution under a
felony-murder theory and that he could not presently be convicted of murder due to the
changes to sections 188 and 189. He also requested appointment of counsel.
       On the same date, without first appointing counsel, the trial court summarily
denied the petition as follows: “Petition previously denied. No basis for petition,
defendant was convicted by jury trial. Petition denied.” On September 29, 2022, the
deputy clerk memorialized the court’s order in a letter: “Your request has been DENIED.
No basis for petition, was convicted by Jury trial.”
       On October 5, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
                                 FACTUAL SUMMARY
       The following summary is drawn from the probation officer’s report, summarizing
law enforcement officers’ reports.4 The probation officer expressly noted that they “did

3      The record before us does not reflect whether count 8 was dismissed prior to trial.
4      This factual summary is provided only to give context to our decision. We do not
rely on the probation report in deciding this case—it does not constitute evidence

                                             3.
not have access to the jury trial transcripts at the time of preparation of th[e] report.
Consequently, it [was] possible that additional and/or conflicting information was
developed during the course of the trial that would contradict the summary offered.”
Further, there is no indication in the record that the trial court considered the probation
officer’s report in denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.
       In the evening of March 31, 2011, a Tulare County Sheriff’s deputy observed a
white SUV with a trailer driving northbound on the freeway with no lighting. He
attempted to perform a traffic stop as the SUV exited the freeway, but defendant—the
driver of the SUV—continued driving, continuing through two stop signs without
stopping and entering an intersection on a red traffic light. Defendant was driving in
excess of 90 miles per hour upon entering the intersection and the deputy did not see any
brake lights signal on the SUV. The SUV collided with a sedan. Defendant attempted to
flee the scene but was apprehended behind a nearby church. All three occupants of the
sedan were pronounced dead on the scene.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable Law
       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine … to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see § 189, subd. (e); accord, People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708.)

contained in defendant’s record of conviction. (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1015, 1026.)

                                               4.
       Senate Bill 1437 accomplished this task by adding three separate provisions to the
Penal Code. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 (Gentile).) First, to amend
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the bill added section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), which requires a principal to act with malice aforethought before he or
she may be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); accord, Gentile, at pp. 842–843.)
Second, to amend the felony-murder rule, the bill added section 189, subdivision (e):

       “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [qualifying
       felonies] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the
       following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The
       person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
       counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
       killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person
       was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
       indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
       [s]ection 190.2.”5 (§ 189, subd. (e); accord, Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
       p. 842.)
       Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95) to provide a
procedure for those convicted of a qualifying offense “to seek relief under the
two ameliorative provisions above.” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) This
procedure is available to persons convicted of “felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter ….” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       “Section [1172.6] lays out a process” for a person convicted of one of the
aforementioned offenses “to seek vacatur of his or her conviction and resentencing.”
(Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853.) First, an offender must file a petition in the
sentencing court averring that:

5      Additionally, section 189 was amended to allow for felony-murder liability where
the victim is a peace officer. (§ 189, subd. (f); accord, People v. Daniel (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 666, 672.)

                                              5.
       “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner
       that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder,
       murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
       theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
       person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
       probable consequences doctrine[;]

       “(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
       manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
       which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
       murder[; and]

       “(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
       murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective
       January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3); see also § 1172.6,
       subd. (b)(1)(A); accord, People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959–960
       (Lewis).)
       Additionally, the petition shall state “[w]hether the petitioner requests the
appointment of counsel.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
       If a petition fails to contain the required information and the information cannot be
“readily ascertained” by the court, the petition may be denied without prejudice to the
filing of another petition. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(2).) Otherwise, the court must conclude
that the defendant has filed a facially sufficient petition and counsel must be appointed, if
requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966 [“a complying
petition is filed; the court appoints counsel, if requested; the issue is briefed; and then the
court makes [a] prima facie determination” in consideration of the record of conviction].)
       Only after counsel is appointed to represent a defendant who filed a facially
sufficient petition does the trial court determine whether the defendant has made a prima
facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)–(c); accord, Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961–963, 966–967; see People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) In making the prima facie determination, the court may rely on “ ‘the record [of
conviction], including [its] own documents, “contain[ing] facts refuting the allegations
made in the petition ….” ’ ” (Lewis, at pp. 970–971, 972.) However, the prima facie

                                              6.
inquiry is limited and, at this stage of the proceedings, the court “should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 971–972.) If, in light of the record of conviction, defendant’s petition fails as a
matter of law, the trial court may summarily deny it. (Id. at p. 974.)
       If the sentencing court determines the defendant has made a prima facie showing,
the court must issue an order to show cause6 and hold a hearing to determine whether to
vacate the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At this evidentiary hearing,
“the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the petitioner is guilty of murder … under California law as amended by the changes to
[s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       Prejudice is not presumed when a defendant’s facially sufficient petition is denied
prior to appointment of counsel. Instead, a defendant “ ‘whose petition is denied before
an order to show cause issues has the burden of showing “it is reasonably probable that if
[he or she] had been afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not have
been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 974; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.) That is to say, the defendant must show
that he was not ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Lewis, at p. 974.)
II.    Judicial Notice
       This court advised the parties that it was considering taking judicial notice of the
record on defendant’s direct appeal. (People v. Head (July 8, 2013, F064047) [nonpub.
opn.].) Specifically, it directed the parties to the jury instructions related to
second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter located at pages 361 to 363 and 369
to 371 of volume 2 of the reporter’s transcript in case No. F064047; and to the absence in
that record of any jury instructions related to felony murder, natural and probable

6       “If the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall provide a statement
fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)

                                               7.
consequences aider and abettor liability, or other theory under which malice is imputed
based solely on the defendant’s participation in the offense. We afforded the parties an
opportunity to submit briefing on the issue.
       Defendant originally objected on two bases—(1) he did not have access to the
record in his direct appeal and (2) we should not consider the record in case No. F064047
because the trial court did not consider it in the first instance. The People submitted a
letter brief voicing no objection. We provided the parties an electronic copy of the record
in case No. F064047. The People responded a second time, again voicing no objection.
Defendant again objected to judicial notice on the basis that the trial court had not
considered the material.
       We overrule defendant’s objection. In resolving this case, we consider more than
whether the trial court erred. We consider—aside from any error—whether reversal is
required. “ ‘ “[W]e will affirm a judgment correct on any legal basis, even if that basis
was not invoked by the trial court. [Citation.] There can be no prejudicial error from
erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision itself is correct.” ’ ” (Anderson v. Davidson
(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 136, 144.) Where “there is simply no evidence that could support
a favorable finding for [defendant], then any legal error in the court’s reasoning or basis
for its decision quite obviously is harmless.” (In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526, 533–
534, fn. omitted [affirming where remand due to legal error would be pointless because
there were no factual issues to resolve which would result in a decision favorable to the
defendant].) Courts refuse requests for remand where the remedy would be “worse than
pointless: remands would force people to expend resources but sentences would not
change. There would be cost but no benefit.” (People v. Venegas (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
32, 42; see People v. Schaffer (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 500, 506 [pointless to remand
where defendant would be unable to gain any effective relief].)
       In short, if defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, we need not remand
for the trial court to make that determination. In making the prima facie determination of

                                               8.
eligibility for relief under section 1172.6, a trial court may properly consider jury
instructions as they are part of the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 971–972; People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935.) If the jury instructions
rule out the possibility that defendant was prosecuted under a now-invalid theory, he is
not entitled to relief as a matter of law. (Lewis, at p. 974.)
       For that reason, we take judicial notice of the jury instructions contained in the
record on defendant’s direct appeal because they are relevant to the issues at bar. (Evid.
Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subds. (a)–(c).) Specifically, we note that the jury in
defendant’s trial was instructed on second degree implied malice murder and involuntary
manslaughter. The jury was not instructed on felony murder, natural and probable
consequences aider and abettor liability, or other theory under which malice is imputed
based solely on the defendant’s participation in the offense.
III.   Analysis
       Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by (1) summarily denying
his facially sufficient petition rather than appointing counsel, (2) failing to state
“intelligible” reasons for denying his petition, and (3) denying him a hearing on his
petition. (Capitalization omitted.) The People respond only that any error was harmless
because defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We agree with the People.
       Our Supreme Court has resolved any ambiguity regarding whether section 1172.6
requires the appointment of counsel or further briefing immediately upon the filing of a
facially sufficient petition; it does. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961–967.)
Counsel must be appointed if requested, and briefing must proceed, so long as the
petition complies with the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(1) and (2).
(§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3); accord, Lewis, at pp. 962–963, 967.) Here, defendant’s petition
met the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (b). The People agree that defendant
“was entitled to the appointment of counsel and a hearing ….” Defendant filed a form
petition that complied completely with the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision

                                               9.
(b). Appointment of counsel and a full opportunity for briefing were required by
section 1172.6, subdivisions (b)(3) and (c). (See Lewis, at pp. 961–963, 967.) The trial
court erred in disposing of the petition without following these procedures.
       Nevertheless, the People argue that the denial of appointment of counsel and the
other purported errors were not prejudicial (i.e., that defendant’s petition would
appropriately have been denied without an evidentiary hearing). For the proposition that
any error was harmless, the People argue “[defendant] was charged and convicted of
three counts of second degree murder based on a fatal collision in which he was the
driver of the vehicle that caused the collision.” They reason therefore that defendant
“was the actual killer [and] no malice was imputed to him.” Defendant contends that,
based on People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, it is possible that defendant was
convicted of second degree murder based on a felony-murder theory with the Vehicle
Code section 2800.2 offense—evading an officer while driving with reckless disregard
for the safety of others—serving as the predicate felony. However, as described above,
we have taken judicial notice of the jury instructions given at defendant’s trial so we need
not speculate on what theory the jury might have relied upon. The jury was not
instructed on felony murder or any other theory for which malice is imputed based on the
defendant’s participation in the offense. Defendant was found guilty of second degree
implied malice murder. Defendant was not convicted on a theory of second degree
murder which was invalidated by Senate Bill 1437. Accordingly, defendant is ineligible
for relief as a matter of law. Any error in denying defendant’s petition was therefore
harmless.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The order is affirmed.

                                            10.