Court Opinion

ID: 9375508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 22:02:30.159522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:58.605619
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/23 Agardi v. City & County of S.F. CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 JULIANNA AGARDI,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
 v.                                                                      A164169
 CITY AND COUNTY OF
 SAN FRANCISCO,                                                          (San Francisco County
                                                                          Super. Ct. No. CGC-20-588062)
           Defendant and Respondent.

         Plaintiff Julianna Agardi, representing herself in propria persona,
alleges she is entitled to a money judgment as the result of litigation against
defendant City and County of San Francisco (San Francisco) in 2010–2012.
Agardi’s earlier litigation attacked San Francisco’s “Care Not Cash” program,
passed by the voters in 2002 as Proposition N. Agardi claimed she should
receive cash benefits rather than in-kind services.
         The trial court sustained San Francisco’s demurrer to Agardi’s first
amended complaint (FAC) on the merits and without leave to amend. Agardi
appeals, and asks that we “remand the case with instructions to vacate
Appellee’s Judgment and enter a Default Judgment for Plaintiff/Appellant
with the sum to be paid twenty million,” and that we “Issue a Writ of

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Mandate to pay the Judgment from 2010 up to forty five million or put
Appellee into jail until it pays.”
      The trial court correctly identified at least two fatal flaws in Agardi’s
case. First, Agardi lost her 2011 case against San Francisco. (Agardi v. City
and County of San Francisco (Mar. 27, 2012, A132949) [nonpub. opn.]
(Agardi I).) Agardi has no prior judgment to enforce in the new case now
before us. Second, to the extent Agardi may be attempting to renew the
claims in her earlier lawsuit, those claims are barred by claim preclusion
(res judicata).
      Agardi mistakenly argues that she has a judgment in her favor signed
on December 7 and entered on December 10, 2010, which she is now seeking
to enforce. There is no judgment in Agardi I dated December 7 or 10, 2010.
The source of confusion appears to be Agardi’s initial success challenging
San Francisco’s original answer in Agardi I. On December 7, 2010, the trial
court denied Agardi’s motion to strike San Francisco’s answer but granted
her motion for judgment on the pleadings, with leave for San Francisco to
amend as to nine affirmative defenses. San Francisco’s amended answer,
filed January 6, 2011, corrected the problems in its earlier answer. The trial
court granted San Francisco’s subsequent motion for judgment on the
pleadings without leave for Agardi to amend. On June 27, 2011, the trial
court entered judgment in San Francisco’s favor and against Agardi.
      Beyond the problems identified by the trial court in this new case,
which we believe the trial court accurately resolved on demurrer using
appropriate procedures, Agardi filed her appeal 114 days too late. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).) We lack jurisdiction to hear her untimely appeal
and we dismiss it.

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                               BACKGROUND
                                    Agardi I
       In 2010, Agardi filed suit against San Francisco, attacking Proposition
N. Dubbed the “Care Not Cash” program and enacted by the voters in 2002,
Proposition N placed limitations on providing cash-based aid from the
General Assistance program to unhoused residents of San Francisco. (S.F.
Admin. Code, § 20.7-34, formerly § 20.59.3.) Instead, for “[General Aid]
recipients who declared themselves” unhoused, aid would primarily be
provided in the form of “ ‘in-kind benefits for housing, utilities and meals’
rather than cash . . . .” (Ibid.) Agardi argued that she should receive cash as
aid.
       Agardi filed a motion seeking judgment on the pleadings based on
San Francisco’s original answer. The court granted the motion in part,
finding San Francisco’s affirmative defenses insufficiently specific, but
granted leave to amend. San Francisco’s amended answer survived Agardi’s
further attempts to challenge it.
       The Agardi I trial court subsequently granted San Francisco’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. Agardi unsuccessfully
attempted to vacate the order. On June 27, 2011, the trial court entered
judgment that: “(1) Plaintiff Julianna Agardi shall take nothing by her
complaint in this action. (2) Judgment with prejudice shall be entered
forthwith in favor of defendant City and County of San Francisco and against
plaintiff Julianna Agardi. (3) Each party shall bear its own costs.”
       On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment. (Agardi I, supra,
A132949.) The court noted Agardi’s early success in challenging
San Francisco’s answer. The court explained, however, that Agardi appeared
to be treating a December 7, 2010 order as decisively ruling in her favor on

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the merits of the entire dispute. The court noted at some length that the
December 7, 2010 order simply found San Francisco’s original answer to be
inadequate, and that the amended answered filed after the December 7 order
corrected the earlier problems with the pleading.
      The court rejected Agardi’s various procedural challenges to the trial
court’s rulings. On the merits, the court held that “the law forecloses Agardi
from arguing that she must be paid her full benefit in cash. Agardi has also
failed to advance an alternate legal theory that demonstrates that, had she
been given the opportunity to amend her complaint, she could have done so in
a way that would survive a subsequent motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Accordingly, we affirm the court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings without
leave to amend as to the first cause of action,” for “[f]ailure to discharge
mandatory duty” regarding payment of cash benefits to Agardi. The court
also ruled against Agardi on a claim for failure to forward cash benefits to
Agardi’s electronic benefits transfer (EBT) card and a claim for fraud based
on the allegedly deceptive language of Proposition N.
                                    Agardi II
      On December 1, 2020, after the passage of eight and a half years,
Agardi filed a new case against San Francisco. In her FAC, Agardi identified
herself as “Plaintiff” and “Judgment Creditor.” She captioned the FAC “An
action on the Judgment. Enforcing Plaintiff’s Judgment Petition for a Writ of
Mandate/Contempt Gov Code 970 et seq. Consolidation/Severance
Fraud/Deceit/Harassment.” The FAC appears to allege that Agardi obtained
a judgment against San Francisco on December 7, 2010. Agardi refers to
San Francisco as “the losing party.” Agardi accuses various current and
former members of the San Francisco City Attorney’s Office of bias and other
improprieties. The FAC further asks to “sever” the two alleged judgments,

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further asserting that Agardi “won” litigation in federal court in 2014 “to
resolve the case of two judgments.” Agardi alleges that San Francisco is
defrauding her, and seeks a contempt finding and a sentence of
“imprisonment.” She concludes, “The demand in the complaint was twenty
million dollars. Ten years has passed and the judgment earned another
twenty millions in post judgment interests. Plaintiff demands for the fraud
another twenty millions. Altogether the demand is $60.000.000.00/sixty
million dollars.”
      On April 8, 2021, San Francisco filed and served a demurrer on the
basis of claim preclusion and the statute of limitations. Agardi moved to
strike or oppose the demurrer. Agardi argued the demurer cited this court’s
unpublished decision in Agardi I, and asserted that doing so violated rule
8.1115(b) of the California Rules of Court. Agardi also argued that
San Francisco and the courts were ignoring a judgment entered in her favor
on December 10, 2010, and insisted “it is called Judgment for Plaintiff
granted in part and denied in part upon entry will end the litigation and no
jurisdiction for defendant to file its own [Judgment] and prevailing.” She
further attempted to argue about this court’s reasoning in its Agardi I
decision, including with ad hominem attacks on a retired justice.
      The trial court granted San Francisco’s demurrer and denied Agardi
leave to amend. It had entered a tentative ruling, which Agardi did not seek
to contest by providing telephone (or e-mail) notice. The court explained:
“Plaintiff asserts that her FAC is filed ‘with the purpose of enforcing
plaintiff’s judgment’ as to case number CGC-10-500534. [Citation.]
However, in that case, this court granted the City’s judgment on the
pleadings, dismissed the case with prejudice and entered judgment in favor of
the City. The Court of Appeal affirmed this court’s judgment. Contrary to

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Plaintiff’s apparent misimpression, no judgment was ever entered in her
favor. There can be only one final judgment in an action. In the present
FAC, Plaintiff again alleges the City is violating its obligation to pay General
Assistance and is defrauding Plaintiff. [Citation.] The action is barred by
law of the case and/or by res judicata.” The trial court noted that Agardi’s
argument concerning citations to this court’s unpublished decision in
Agardi I was incorrect. Citations to unpublished opinions are permitted
when the unpublished decision “is relevant under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel,” as was true here. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1).)
      The trial court entered judgment on June 10, 2021. San Francisco
served Agardi with the notice of entry of judgment the next day.
      Over four months later, Agardi sought to vacate the judgment. The
trial court denied her motion because Agardi failed to attempt to make a
showing of her “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect”
pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure.1
      On December 3, 2021, Agardi filed a notice of appeal.
                                 DISCUSSION
                             The Appeal Is Untimely
      We dismiss the appeal as untimely. Rule 8.406(a)(1) of the California
Rules of Court gives a party 60 days to file a notice of appeal. Here, the trial
court entered judgment against Agardi on June 10, 2021 and San Francisco
served Agardi with a notice of entry of judgment the very next day. Agardi
did not file a notice of appeal until December 3, 2021, which was 175 days

      1Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise indicated.

                                        6
after service of the notice of entry of judgment—115 days after the 60-day
deadline.
        Agardi’s notice of appeal does not indicate that it is an appeal from the
trial court’s final judgment. Rather, Agardi checked the boxes for an appeal
from an order after judgment under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), and for
an appeal from an order or judgment under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(3)–
(13).
        We construe Agardi’s appeal as one from the June 10, 2021 judgment
for four reasons. First, in her opening brief, Agardi identifies her appeal as
“from a judgment for Appellee on a Demurrer in an enforcement action.”
Second, we are unaware of a basis to appeal under section 904.1, subdivision
(a)(2). That subdivision applies to “an order made after a judgment made
appealable by paragraph (1),” which in turn permits appeal “[f]rom a
judgment, except an interlocutory judgment, other than as provided in
paragraphs (8), (9), and (11), or a judgment of contempt that is made final
and conclusive by Section 1222.” (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1), (2).) Third, we are
unaware of an order by the trial court to which section 904.1, subdivision
(a)(3)–(13) might apply.2 Fourth, Agardi’s arguments on appeal appear to be

        2Section 904.1, subdivision (a)(3)–(13) provide: “An appeal, other than
in a limited civil case, is to the court of appeal. An appeal, other than in a
limited civil case, may be taken from any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶]
(3) From an order granting a motion to quash service of summons or granting
a motion to stay the action on the ground of inconvenient forum, or from a
written order of dismissal under Section 581d following an order granting a
motion to dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum.
[¶] (4) From an order granting a new trial or denying a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. [¶] (5) From an order discharging or refusing to
discharge an attachment or granting a right to attach order. [¶] (6) From an
order granting or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an
injunction. [¶] (7) From an order appointing a receiver. [¶] (8) From an
interlocutory judgment, order, or decree, made or entered in an action to

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directed to the June 10, 2021 final judgment, and not to any subsequent
order.
         Though it is sometimes difficult to discern her arguments, Agardi’s
appeal does not appear to make any arguments concerning the order denying
her motion to set aside the judgment. We note that, by the time Agardi filed
her motion to set aside the judgment in the trial court (on October 26, 2021),
any notice of appeal of the final judgment would have already been untimely
by 77 days.
         Under these circumstances, we must dismiss the appeal. California
Rules of Court, rule 8.104(b) provides that “no court may extend the time to
file a notice of appeal.” If a notice of appeal is filed beyond the statutory
appeal period, “the reviewing court must dismiss the appeal.” Similarly, rule
8.406(c) provides in relevant part, “Except as provided in rule 8.66,” which
applies only in public emergencies, “no court may extend the time to file a
notice of appeal. . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(c).)
         Neither we nor the trial court may “extend or shorten the time for
appeal.” (Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120, 123.) Rather, “if it appears
that the appeal was not taken within the 60-day period, the court has no
discretion but must dismiss the appeal of its own motion even if no objection

redeem real or personal property from a mortgage thereof, or a lien thereon,
determining the right to redeem and directing an accounting. [¶] (9) From an
interlocutory judgment in an action for partition determining the rights and
interests of the respective parties and directing partition to be made.
[¶] (10) From an order made appealable by the Probate Code or the Family
Code. [¶] (11) From an interlocutory judgment directing payment of
monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney for a party if the amount
exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000). [¶] (12) From an order directing
payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney for a party if the
amount exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000). [¶] (13) From an order
granting or denying a special motion to strike under Section 425.16.”

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is made.” (Ibid.) The rule is strict, but “the courts are not arbitrarily
penalizing procedural missteps. Relief may be given for excusable delay in
complying with many provisions in the statutes and rules on appeal, such as
those governing the time within which the record and briefs must be
prepared and filed. These procedural time provisions, however, become
effective after the appeal is taken. The first step, taking of the appeal, is not
merely a procedural one; it vests jurisdiction in the appellate court and
terminates the jurisdiction of the lower court.” (Ibid.)
               The Order Sustaining San Francisco’s Demurrer
      Though we need not address the merits of the appeal, we note that the
appeal appears to be based on an ongoing misunderstanding of what the trial
court in Agardi I ordered back in December 2010. Specifically, Agardi
repeatedly attempts to re-characterize the trial court’s December 7, 2010
order (entered on December 10, 2010) as a final judgment. The December 7
order granted Agardi’s motion for judgment on the pleadings—specifically
San Francisco’s answer—with leave to amend. San Francisco amended its
answer in Agardi I. The trial court and this court ultimately rejected
Agardi’s further attempts to strike or obtain judgment on San Francisco’s
amended answer there.
      This is not the first time that Agardi misconstrued the order on
San Francisco’s original answer in Agardi I as a judgment or order disposing
of her entire case. Agardi made the very same error when she appealed the
trial court’s final judgment in Agardi I. This court noted at the time that
Agardi was misinterpreting the December 7, 2010 order as a binding decision
on the merits of her lawsuit or a final judgment. The court explained that
Agardi’s “argument fails to recognize that the order partially granting her
motion for judgment on the pleadings concerned the deficiencies in the City’s

                                        9
pleading, not the merits of her own pleading. The order did not imply a
finding that Agardi’s complaint stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted; in fact, the order preserved the City’s affirmative defense that the
complaint did not state such a claim and the City had every right to raise the
defense later in the proceedings, which it did. Even less was the [December
7, 2010] order and adjudication on the merits of Agardi’s complaint.”
Further, the court explained, “There are no grounds for Agardi to assert that
simply by being the first to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and
receiving a partial grant to that motion, the City would be foreclosed from
filing its own motion for judgment on the pleadings, and from prevailing on
that motion.”
      Were Agardi’s appeal timely, we would affirm the trial court’s order
sustaining San Francisco’s demurrer without leave to amend for at least
three reasons. First, Agardi’s lawsuit is based on the notion that she is
“enforcing” a December 2010 judgment in Agardi I in her favor. The one and
only final judgment in Agardi I, which our court affirmed on appeal, is a
judgment against Agardi and for San Francisco. She has no judgment to
seek to enforce against San Francisco for any sum, let alone the $45 million
she appears to want to seek via a writ or other order from this court. There is
also no judgment that could possibly trigger holding in contempt and jailing
anyone representing San Francisco.
      Second, Agardi’s FAC is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, also
known as res judicata, to the extent it attempts to re-litigate the challenges
to Proposition N from her 2010 lawsuit. The 2010 complaint in Agardi I
included multiple claims attacking Proposition N, arguing that San Francisco
had a mandatory duty to provide Agardi with cash aid, and arguing that the
proposition was a fraud on the voters. The FAC here attempts to attack

                                       10
Proposition N again, repeating substantially similar arguments to those
raised in the 2010 lawsuit. Again, those resulted in a definitive, final
judgment in San Francisco’s favor.
      The doctrine of claim preclusion bars Agardi from re-litigating her
claims concerning Proposition N and cash aid. A final valid judgment by a
court precludes further litigation between the same parties as to the same
claims that were or could have been litigated in the prior lawsuit.
(Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of Conservation (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1219.) The final judgment in Agardi I, affirmed on the
merits on appeal, thus precludes litigation concerning Agardi’s claims
concerning Proposition N, alleging fraud by San Francisco, and alleging that
San Francisco has a mandatory duty to provide cash aid to her
notwithstanding Proposition N.
      Third, if the appeal were timely, we would reject Agardi’s various
procedural arguments. Agardi makes a number of vituperative attacks on
the trial judge’s character and alleged bias, none of which finds any support
whatsoever in the record. As the Court of Appeal described in In re S.C.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 422, “Disparaging the trial judge is a tactic that
is not taken lightly by a reviewing court. Counsel better make sure he or she
has the facts right before venturing into such dangerous territory because it
is contemptuous for an attorney to make the unsupported assertion that the
judge was ‘act[ing] out of bias toward a party.’ (In re White (2004) 121
Cal.App.4th 1453, 1578.)”
      We also disagree with Agardi’s contention that she was deprived of her
opportunity to be heard via Zoom. Agardi could have appeared on the
demurrer or the motion to set aside the judgment by telephone had she
contacted the trial court to contest either of its tentative rulings. (Super. Ct.

                                       11
S.F. County, Local Rules, rules 8.2(A)(3), 8.3.)3 The record does not reflect
any request to contest or discuss the trial court’s tentative rulings. Nor does
Agardi explain why she did not elect to appear via telephone rather than via
a virtual appearance on the Zoom platform. (Super. Ct. S.F. County, Local
Rules, rule 8.2(A)(3).)
      Finally, we reject Agardi’s argument that San Francisco failed to
provide notice that its demurrer attacked all the claims in the FAC. The
demurrer, and the supporting memorandum of points and authorities,
unambiguously attack Agardi’s complaint as barred by claim preclusion and
by the statute of limitations. There was no ambiguity in San Francisco’s
request for relief.
                                DISPOSITION
      We dismiss the appeal. We decline to award costs, but we caution
Agardi against further attempts to re-litigate the claims that were or could
have been litigated in Agardi I or the issues that were actually and
necessarily litigated in that case.

      3We previously took judicial notice of the Superior Court of San
Francisco County, Local Rules, rules 8.2–8.4.

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                                         _________________________
                                         Markman, J.*

We concur:

_________________________
Richman, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Miller, J.

Agardi v. City and County of San Francisco (A164169)

     * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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