Court Opinion

ID: 9653120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:39:10.848881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:56.453368
License: Public Domain

LENROOT, Associate Judge
(dissenting).
I am compelled to dissent from that part of the decision of the majority which treats the issue of division as to claims 62, 63, and 64 as an interlocutory order subject to review by this court, and while I agree with the majority that there was error in requiring a division, I cannot do so upon the grounds stated in the opinion for such conclusion.
I agree that combination claims and a claim for a specific element may be included in one application, and that division is not proper where such specific element is an essen*454tial element in the combination claims; but I cannot agree that claims 62 and 63 are stated ''to' be, or are in fact, essential- elements of claims 21 and 22, as held by the majority. In neither of said claims are the eleménts described in claims 62 and 63 stated generally or specifically, and it is clear that crimping heads responding to the requirements of combination claims 21 and 22 could be used which do not embody the structure claimed in claims 62 and 63. Therefore the elements of said last-named claims are not essential elements of said claims 21 and 22, and, if nothing more were involved, there would be no abuse of. discretion by the tribun-als of the Patent Office in requiring a division. However, claim 21, allowed by the majority, does specifically include an element comprising the essential element of claim 64; in fact, the latter part of claim 21 is almost literally the same as elaim 64.
As to claims 62 and 63, the elements therein described are stated in almost identical language in elaim 18, which elaim the majority finds unpatentable.
Eor these reasons, I agree that there was error by the Board of Appeals affirming the requirement for division as to claims 62, 63, and 64.
'■ The majority opinion, however, seems to treat the requirement for division as an interlocutory order, for it is stated in the opinion, with reference to claims 62, 63, and 64, that “Whether these claims state a patentable subject matter is not now the object of our inquiry”, and again, “Whether the claims are patentable to the appellant, is another matter, and one which, in this ease, we feel should be first determined on its merits, by the Patent Office.”
If the order requiring division is an interlocutory order, the rule is well established that we have no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from it. This rule is so well established that it needs no citation of authority to support it: If the object of our inquiry is not to ascertain whether these claims “state a patentable subject matter,” it must be because the majority regards the order requiring division as interlocutory.
Whether an order requiring division of an application is an interlocutory order ^as considered by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in the case of In re Eraseh, 20 App. D. C. 298, where it was held that it was such an order, from which an appeal would not lie to that court. However, in the case of Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U. S. 543, 24 S. Ct. 416, 48 L. Ed. 555, it was held that a requirement for division of an application constituted a final rejection by the Primary Examiner of the claims there involved, from which an appeal to the Board of Examiners in Chief could be taken. It is proper to observe that in this ease the Supreme Court referred to the case of In re Erasch, supra, but did not disapprove it.
Assuming that we may, for the purpose of establishing our jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, regard the decision of the Board of Appeals and that of the Primary Examiner as a final rejection of claims 62, 63, and 64, then it must follow that the claims are before us f01. action upon their merits, and, if the record before us is sufficient for that purpose, it our duty to pass upon the merits, j think the record is sufficient for that purpose, and that, in fact, the majority opinion does jn effect pass upon the patentability of the subject-matter of claims 62, 63, and 64. Therefore, if this is not an interlocutory ordea-, there is no reason for remanding the ease to the Patent Office for further consideration, as the majority decision requires,
Furthermore, appellant in his brief contends that said claims are patentable, and states his reasons therefor.
It will be observed that, in allowing claim 21, ’the majority does so wholly upon the ground that the feature of' the ring element is not found in any of the references, and the opinion states: “As these seem to be essential parts of the mechanism, no reason appears why appellant should not have this elaim allowed.” Therefore, as this element constitutes the essential part of elaim 64, and as it or its equivalent is not found in any referenee, and this element makes the eombination claim 21 patentable, by the same course °£ reasoning elaim 64 is patentable and should be allowed. While I have some misgiving as to the correctness of the conclusion of the majority as to claim 21, I do feel clear that, upon the reasoning of the majority as to the patentability of elaim 21, elaim 64 should likewise be allowed.
With regard to claims 62 and 63, the structural elements of these claims are specifieally described in elaim 18, disallowed by the majority. With respect to said elaim 18, which is considered in the majority opinion together with certain other claims, the majority state: “As it appears to us, all that appellant has done is to combine elements which were already known to the art,” and again, “having assembled elements already *455known, which do nothing more than perform their formerly known functions, no invention lies in the combination.” (Italics mine.)
If the majority finds all the structural elements described in claim 18 in the references, it must also find the structural elements described in claims 62 and 63 in the references, and therefore said claims -are not patentable.
I see no escape from this conclusion. If the structural elements described in claims 62 and 63 are not found in the references, then of course they cannot be found when the same elements are considered in said claim 18.
I therefore come to the conclusion that claims 62 and 63 should be disallowed; if I be wrong in this conclusion, then clearly the majority is in error in disallowing claim 18.
I do not question, the power of the court to remand a ease to the Patent Office for consideration, where the record before us is insufficient for us to make a final determination of the questions within our jurisdiction arising upon the appeal; and in the case at bar, if the record before us was not sufficient to determine the patentability of claims 62, 63, and 64, I should have no objection to the case being remanded for a further considera^ tion of that question by the tribunals of the Patent Office.
My objection to the remand is that a majority of the court has necessarily passed upon the patentability of these claims in affirming the rejection of claim 18 and reversing the Board of Appeals as to claim 21. As heretofore pointed out, if the decision of the majority is right as toi claim 18, it is necessarily so because claims 62 and 63 are not patentable. In order for the majority to arrive at the conclusion that it did, it necessarily found that the elements of claims 62 and 63 were found in the references; otherwise, the claim should have been allowed. As to claim 2.1, the majority finds this claim allowable solely because of elements found in claim 64, and, if claim 21 is allowable for that reason, it necessarily follows that claim 64 is also allowable.
"While it may bo said that the Patent Office should have opportunity to cite further references as anticipating claim 64, the presumption is that, in passing upon claim 21, it did cite all of the references which were applicable thereto, and, not having cited any that, in the opinion of the majority, included the elements of claim 64, the inference is that there are none such. Furthermore, I would observe that if upon the remand additional references should be cited establishing the anticipation of claim 64, the same references would render unpatentable claim 21, which the majority allows, because claim 21 is allowed by the majority solely upon the ground that the element claimed in claim 64 is not found in the references cited. ■ With respect to claims 62 and 63 there could, of course, be no occasion for citing further references, because the majority agrees with the Patent Office tribunals that the references cited contain all of the) elements found in said claims 62 and 63. Under the majority opinion, if this ease is remanded, the Patent Office must reject claims 62 and 63 because this court has found, in rejecting claim 18, that all of the elements included in said claims 62 and 63 are old in the prior art, and, unless it can find some new references with respect to claim 64, the Patent "Office must allow this claim because this court has found, in allowing claim 21, that the elements of this claim are patentable.