Court Opinion

ID: 9948759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:10:20.782674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:52.004249
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Torres, 2024-Ohio-837.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                             No. 112812
                 v.                               :

ERIC TORRES,                                      :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-22-673002-B

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Carl Mazzone, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                   Eric Torres appeals his conviction for involuntary manslaughter that

is predicated on his 2007 conviction for aggravated assault, which was committed

against Miguel Rivera. For the following reasons, we affirm.
               In 2007, Torres pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault with the state

dismissing the felonious assault and weapons charge. The two men were involved

in an altercation involving Torres’s friend. Torres punched Rivera, causing him to

fall and strike his head. Torres now claims that he was defending his friend when

he punched Rivera. During the 2007 proceedings, the state reserved the right to

pursue further charges should Rivera die as a result of his injuries inflicted by

Torres. See, e.g., State v. Carpenter, 68 Ohio St.3d 59, 623 N.E.2d 66 (1993) (the

state cannot indict a defendant based on the victim later dying of injuries sustained

by the lesser offense, “unless the state expressly reserves the right to file additional

charges on the record at the time of the defendant’s plea.”). Rivera never recovered

from the injuries and died in January 2022.1 Rivera’s death was ruled a homicide as

being directly caused by the blunt-force trauma inflicted by Torres.

               After Rivera’s death, the state pursued murder, involuntary

manslaughter, aggravated assault, and having a weapon while under disability

charges based on the act of punching Rivera. Torres claimed that principles of

double jeopardy and claim preclusion implicated by the 2007 aggravated-assault

conviction precluded everything but the involuntary manslaughter charge.

According to Torres, the state could not pursue additional aggravated assault or

weapons charges based on the underlying conduct because Torres already pleaded

guilty to aggravated assault for that conduct, which included the dismissal of a

      1 The statute of limitations for involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C.

2903.04 is 20 years from the date of the offense. R.C. 2901.13(A)(3)(a).
weapons charge at the time. Further, according to Torres, because he pleaded guilty

to aggravated assault, which includes a mitigating element of serious provocation

bringing about sudden passion demonstrating that he was guilty of the inferior

offense to the murder charge, the state could not prove Torres acted with the

requisite intent to prove murder. The state conceded that the 2007 conviction

precluded all of the charges except for the involuntary manslaughter, which is

predicated on the aggravated-assault conviction. The murder, aggravated assault,

and weapons charges were then dismissed.

               Before trial, the state filed a motion in limine to preclude Torres from

asserting a self-defense claim. The state advanced two theories. In the first, the

state argued that Torres could not collaterally challenge the aggravated assault

predicate offense because he pleaded guilty to that offense in the 2007 proceedings.

The involuntary manslaughter offense in this case only requires proof of the death

being proximately caused by the aggravated assault, the offense that Torres pleaded

guilty to in the previous case. Thus, according to the state, any self-defense claim

was an impermissible attempt to collaterally attack his guilty plea.            In the

alternative, the state claimed that even if Torres could collaterally attack his earlier

conviction, the theory of self-defense was nonetheless inapplicable to the aggravated

assault. The trial court precluded Torres from presenting a claim for self-defense.

               Under R.C. 2903.04(A), “[n]o person shall cause the death of another

* * * as a proximate result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit a

felony.” Torres’s conviction for aggravated assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.12(A),
was a fourth-degree felony and served as the predicate for the involuntary

manslaughter offense. That conviction was final. Thus, the sole issue at trial was

whether Rivera’s death was a proximate result of the aggravated assault to which

Torres already pleaded guilty. At the bench trial, Torres stipulated to the coroner’s

report, including their conclusion as to Rivera’s death being caused by the injuries

he sustained through Torres’s aggravated assault. Based on that stipulation, the trial

court found Torres guilty of involuntary manslaughter and imposed a five-year term

of imprisonment, with credit for both his pretrial detention and the 18 months

served on the aggravated-assault conviction.

               In this appeal, Torres first claims that the trial court erred by

precluding him from asserting a claim of self-defense to the aggravated assault.

               Torres has presented no authority demonstrating that he is permitted

to collaterally attack his aggravated-assault conviction through the subsequent

proceeding. See App.R. 16(A)(7). It is not the role of an appellate court to search for

case authority to support arguments on behalf of one of the parties. See State v.

Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19, citing State

v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 78 (O’Donnell,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d

171, 177 (D.C.Cir.1983). Torres voluntarily pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in

2007 knowing the state reserved the right to pursue charges should Rivera die as a

result of the injuries directly caused by Torres’s aggravated assault. While that tactic

proved successful in mitigating the severity of the charges that could arise upon
Rivera’s death, for it impacted the state’s attempt to indict Torres on murder

charges, it also precludes him from advancing a self-defense claim to collaterally

attack his prior conviction.

               Torres implicitly acknowledged the preclusive impact of his

aggravated-assault conviction. He successfully argued that his conviction precluded

the state from pursuing murder charges because the serious provocation element of

aggravated assault was incompatible with the knowing and purposeful element of

murder. See State v. Soto, 158 Ohio St.3d 44, 2019-Ohio-4430, 139 N.E.3d 889, ¶ 19

(“Separate and apart from the constitutional protections provided by the double-

jeopardy provisions, a plea agreement may bar further charges based on principles

of contract law. The underlying premise is that when a plea rests on a promise made

by the prosecutor, that promise must be fulfilled.”), citing Santobello v. New York,

404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), and State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio

St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853, 854 N.E.2d 150, ¶ 50. He cannot have it both ways:

that the earlier conviction precludes the state from pursuing the greater offenses

based on Rivera’s death, which are incompatible with the offense to which he

pleaded guilty, while at the same time claiming the right to raise a defense that

contradicts the impact of his guilty plea. Based solely on the arguments as presented

by the parties, we find no merit to Torres’s argument.

               But regardless, even if Torres could have collaterally attacked his

prior conviction, self-defense does not apply to aggravated assault.        State v.

Hughkeith, 2023-Ohio-1217, 212 N.E.3d 1147, ¶ 102 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Bouie,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108095, 2019-Ohio-4579, ¶ 47, State v. Betliskey, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 101330, 2015-Ohio-1821, ¶ 24, and State v. Loyed, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 83075, 2004-Ohio-3961, ¶ 14. Torres is attempting to claim that he acted in

self-defense of another person because he feared for her safety based on Rivera’s

conduct. Such a claim is diametrically different from demonstrating a sudden

passion or acting in a sudden fit of rage brought on by serious provocation, the

elements of aggravated assault. Id. Torres pleaded guilty to aggravated assault,

agreeing that he “acted under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of

rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by” Rivera.

R.C. 2903.12(A). This court has concluded that a claim for self-defense cannot arise

when the facts demonstrate that an aggravated assault occurred because being in

fear of another’s harm is not compatible with acting in a sudden fit of rage. State v.

Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95732, 2011-Ohio-4095, ¶ 37, citing State v.

Mack, 82 Ohio St.3d 198, 201, 694 N.E.2d 1328 (1998), State v. Tantarelli, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 94APA11-1618, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2186 (May 23, 1995), and

State v. Thompson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 92AP-1124, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 1198

(Feb. 23, 1993).2

              Torres cites State v. Hurt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110732, 2022-

Ohio-2039, in support of his claim that self-defense and aggravated assault can

coexist within a trial. The panel in Hurt, however, “recognized that aggravated

      2 Torres has not asked this panel to revisit this conclusion. See App.R. 16(A)(7).
assault and voluntary manslaughter are incompatible with a theory of self-defense

because self-defense requires proof of fear while aggravated assault and voluntary

manslaughter require a showing of a sudden passion or rage.” Id. at ¶ 37, citing

Betliskey at ¶ 24, and Loyed at ¶ 14. The black-letter law from Hurt does not depart

from the general case authority cited above. Hurt, more to the point, presents a

unique procedural history, which is inapplicable to the current case.

              In Hurt, the defendant was charged with murder in violation of R.C.

2903.02(A), felony murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), voluntary manslaughter

in violation of R.C. 2903.03(A), felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)

and (2), and domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). Id. at ¶ 1. Thus, the

state directly charged the defendant with both purposeful murder and voluntary

manslaughter, only one of which can be proven at trial (if the facts demonstrate

serious provocation, the jury is precluded from convicting the offender of murder

and if serious provocation is proven, the defendant is precluded from claiming self-

defense under prevailing law). Id. at ¶ 26; see also State v. Amey, 2018-Ohio-4207,

120 N.E.3d 503, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Griffin, 175 Ohio App.3d 325, 2008-

Ohio-702, 886 N.E.2d 921, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), and State v. Duncan, 154 Ohio App.3d

254, 2003-Ohio-4695, 796 N.E.2d 1006, ¶ 29. After concluding the error occurred

in the jury finding the defendant guilty of both murder and voluntary manslaughter,

the panel further concluded that the offender was entitled to claim self-defense in

response to the murder charge and serious provocation for the voluntary

manslaughter charge upon remand for the new trial. Id. Thus, Hurt implicates a
unique procedural history in which the state indicts an offender with both voluntary

manslaughter, carrying the elements of serious provocation and acting under the

influence of sudden passion, while also claiming the offender purposely and

knowingly killed the victim. That convoluted history limits the applicability of Hurt.

               In this case, the sole offense at issue is involuntary manslaughter

with the predicate offense being aggravated assault. That is proven if the state

demonstrates that the victim’s death was proximately caused by the offender’s

commission of any felony. Since Torres pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, the

sole issue for trial in this case was whether Rivera’s death was caused by Torres’s

aggravated assault — an issue that Torres conceded upon stipulating to the contents

of the coroner’s report. Hurt is inapplicable. The first assignment of error is

overruled.

              In the second assignment of error, Torres claims that his conviction

is not based on sufficient evidence because of the terse nature of the trial. We need

not delve deeper here. Torres stipulated to the coroner’s conclusion that Rivera’s

death was caused by the aggravated assault to which Torres pleaded guilty. As

alluded to throughout this opinion, that is sufficient evidence proving involuntary

manslaughter. The second assignment of error is overruled.

              The conviction is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR