Court Opinion

ID: 9645594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:29:32.98437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:29.753574
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
In making the statement, “In determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel, we use the standard set forth in Strickland ¶. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),” (My emphasis), and by what else is stated in the opinion, I believe that the majority opinion has implicitly, if not expressly, mandated that in all future cases what was stated and held in Strickland v. Washington, supra, will control whether trial counsel was or was not effective counsel.
In making the above statement, the majority opinion has, in my view, also buried without even a one-gun salute the opinion of Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), which formerly was used to make the determination whether or not, as a matter of State law, trial counsel was effective. Based upon the above statement in the majority opinion, Duffy is now dispatched to Davey Jones’ footlocker, in order to take its place among so many of the other decisions of this Court that have recently been overruled by an aggressive and assertive majority of this Court.
The above, however, is simply just one more example of this Court’s aggressive and assertive majority’s attempts to mimic decisions by the United States Supreme Court. To this Court’s continuing abdication of its duty to act as an independent State judiciary, I respectfully dissent.
By this dissent, however, I do not mean to leave the impression that I agree with *555everything else that is stated in the majority opinion — because I don’t.