Court Opinion

ID: 9912330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 06:05:25.433409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:36.050260
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                   revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     December 21, 2023
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 363257
                                                                     Genesee Circuit Court
RENO KENYATTE JOHNSON,                                               LC No. 17-041948-FC

                 Defendant-Appellant.

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals as of right his convictions by jury trial of two counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(f), and one count of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(f).1 The trial court sentenced defendant, as a third-
offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to prison terms of 168 months to 40 years, each, for the
CSC-I convictions, to be served consecutively, and 10 to 30 years for the CSC-II conviction, to be
served concurrently with the CSC-I sentences. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm
defendant’s convictions but remand for resentencing.

                       I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting then-15-year-old SR during a weekend trip
to a three-bedroom cabin in June 2017. SR went there with her friend, TM, and TM’s mother and
stepfather, Angela and Michael. Defendant’s wife, Kimberly, is Angela’s cousin. For one night,
defendant and his wife joined the group at the cabin. The adults slept in two of the bedrooms, and
TM slept in the third. SR was supposed to stay in the room with TM that night, but ended up
falling asleep on a couch in the common area.

1
    The jury acquitted defendant of an additional count of CSC-II.

                                                 -1-
        SR testified defendant woke her up during the early morning hours asking to see her
breasts, which she refused. She testified that, defendant then grabbed her breasts, forced her to
touch his penis, and performed oral sex on her. Defendant stopped and left when he heard a noise,
but then returned and again performed oral sex on SR. When defendant left the room again, SR
went into TM’s bedroom and told her what happened. TM’s mother and stepfather were then
advised what happened and confronted defendant. SR was taken to the police station and was
subsequently examined by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner at a hospital. A sample collected
from SR’s breast area contained DNA matching defendant’s DNA profile. Defendant gave a
statement to the police in which he initially denied any inappropriate activity with SR. Defendant
later admitted he placed his mouth on SR’s breasts, but denied engaging in oral sex.

        The prosecutor originally charged defendant with CSC-I and CSC-II under alternative
theories that he engaged in sexual penetration and sexual contact (1) with a victim between the
ages of 13 and 16, while in a position of authority over the victim, or (2) under circumstances
involving the commission of another felony, the felony being unlawful imprisonment. MCL
750.520b(1)(b)(iii) or (c); MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(iii) or (c). On the day before trial, the trial court
allowed the prosecutor to amend the information to instead proceed solely under the theory that
defendant committed the CSC-I and CSC-II by using force or coercion to accomplish the sexual
penetration and contact, causing personal injury to SR in the form of mental anguish. MCL
750.520b(1)(f); MCL 750.520c(1)(f).

        The jury found defendant guilty of the two charged CSC-I counts and the CSC-II count
alleging he touched SR’s breasts, but acquitted defendant of the CSC-II count alleging he forced
SR to touch his penis. Defendant now appeals.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

         Defendant asserts that several errors occurred in the trial court proceedings. He contends
that: (1) his due-process rights were violated by the late amendment of the information; (2) his
due-process rights were violated when the trial court permitted the hearsay testimony of the nurse
about what the victim said; (3) the prosecutor violated his due-process rights by evoking sympathy
for the victim for having to relive the events because of defendant’s exercise of his right to a jury
trial, and by vouching for the victim’s veracity; (4) the trial court improperly assessed Offense
Variable (OV) 13, and the proper assessment changed the guidelines range for his sentence,
mandating resentencing; (5) the trial court failed to justify its imposition of consecutive sentences
for the CSC-I counts; and (6) the trial court violated defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Throughout
many of these arguments, defendant also argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object or otherwise act in his best interest. While we disagree defendant’s rights were violated by
the late amendment of the information, the prosecutor’s remarks to the jury, or the delay in bringing
defendant to trial, and disagree with defendant’s argument about the admissibility of the nurse’s
testimony, we agree the trial court improperly assessed OV 13 and failed to justify its imposition
of consecutive sentences for the CSC-I counts.

                                                 -2-
                         A. AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION

       Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to amend the
information the day before trial. We disagree.2

        The information originally charged defendant with CSC-I and CSC-II under alternative
theories that he engaged in sexual penetration and sexual contact (1) with a victim between the
ages of 13 and 16, while in a position of authority over the victim, or (2) under circumstances
involving the commission of another felony, the felony being unlawful imprisonment, contrary to
MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(iii) or (c); MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(iii) or (c). The day before trial, the trial
court permitted the prosecutor to amend the information, replacing these theories with the single
theory that defendant engaged in sexual penetration and sexual contact by using force or coercion
and caused personal injury, contrary to MCL 750.520b(1)(f) and MCL 750.520c(1)(f).

        Under MCR 6.112(H): “The court before, during, or after trial may permit the prosecutor
to amend the information or the notice of intent to seek enhanced sentence unless the proposed
amendment would unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant. On motion, the court must strike
unnecessary allegations from the information.” An information may be amended at any time
before, during, or after trial to cure any defect, imperfection, or omission in form or substance,
including a variance between the information and proofs, so long as the defendant was not
prejudiced by the amendment and the amendment does not charge a new crime. People v Goecke,
457 Mich 442, 459-460; 579 NW2d 868 (1998); People v Higuera, 244 Mich App 429, 446; 625
NW2d 444 (2001). See also MCL 767.76.

        The prosecutor provided defendant with notice of his intent to amend the information
before trial commenced and defendant was afforded the opportunity to address the amendment
before trial. The amendment did not charge any new crimes, it only altered the theory on which
the prosecutor intended to rely to establish the aggravating factors necessary to prove the offenses
of CSC-I and CSC-II. Further, one of the original charged theories was that defendant used a
position of authority to “coerce the victim to submit,” MCL 750.520(1)(b)(iii); MCL
750.520c(1)(b)(iii), and the proposed amendment likewise required the prosecutor to prove that
“force or coercion” was used to accomplish the sexual penetration and sexual contact. MCL
750.520(1)(f); MCL 750.520c(1)(f). Whether the sexual acts were accomplished by force or
coercion was also a focus of the evidence throughout the case and was explored at the preliminary
examination. Thus, defendant cannot claim unfair surprise with respect to the “force or coercion”
element of the amended theory.

        However, the amendment also introduced a theory that defendant was guilty of CSC-I and
CSC-II because he caused personal injury to the victim. “Personal injury” is defined as “bodily
injury, disfigurement, mental anguish, chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of
a sexual or reproductive organ.” MCL 750.520a(n). The prosecutor’s theory at trial was that

2
  “This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion
to amend an information.” People v Spencer, 320 Mich App 692, 697; 909 NW2d 17 (2017). A
trial court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes. Id.

                                                -3-
defendant caused personal injury to SR in the form of mental anguish. At the hearing on the
prosecutor’s motion to amend, in the context of exploring the personal injury issue, the trial court
inquired whether the prosecutor intended to offer any evidence that had not already been disclosed,
noting it did not intend to allow any such evidence. The prosecutor clarified he did not intend to
offer any new evidence.

        Defendant argues that this case is similar to People v Willett, 110 Mich App 337, 342-344;
313 NW2d 117 (1981), which also involved a CSC-I case in which the trial court allowed the
prosecutor to amend the information in a manner similar to the amendment in this case. First, we
note that we are not bound by Willett, because it was decided before November 1, 1990. MCR
7.215(J)(1). Regardless, Willett is distinguishable from this case. In Willett, the prosecutor waited
until after the close of proofs to change its theory of the case from one involving criminal sexual
conduct during the commission of another felony to one involving the use of force or coercion and
causing personal injury. In Willett, the personal injury element was largely ignored by both parties
during trial. This Court determined the amendment “after the close of proofs served to prejudice
the defendant by denying him the opportunity to present evidence to disprove the element of
personal injury to the victim.” Id. at 344. Unlike the defendant in Willett, in this case, defendant
had notice of the amendment before trial, and thus had an opportunity to defend against the
amended theory. Although defendant argues the late notice prejudiced his ability to produce
evidence to defend against the new theory concerning mental anguish, he does not identify any
evidence he would have produced had he been aware of the amendment earlier.

       Although it would have been preferable if the prosecutor had moved to amend the
information earlier, MCR 6.112(H) permits amendment even during or after trial. The trial court
properly observed that the amendment did not allege a new offense or change the possible penalty
for a conviction, and clarified that the prosecutor did not intend to offer any new evidence in
support of the amendment. Therefore, defendant has not shown he was unfairly surprised or
prejudiced by the amendment, and so the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the
amendment.

                                            B. HEARSAY

       Next, defendant argues that reversal is required because the nurse testified regarding
statements made by SR when she was examined on the day of the charged offenses. Defendant
argues SR’s statements to the nurse were inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.3

        Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
MRE 801(c); People v Dendel (On Second Remand), 289 Mich App 445, 452; 797 NW2d 645
(2010). Hearsay is not admissible unless it falls under one of the exceptions in the Michigan Rules

3
  Defendant concedes this issue is unpreserved because there was no objection to this evidence at
trial. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67 (2001); MRE 103(a)(1). We review
an unpreserved claim of evidentiary error for plain error (i.e., an error that is clear or obvious) that
affects a defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).

                                                   -4-
of Evidence. MRE 802. In admitting the statement, the trial court relied on MRE 803(4), which
provides that the following statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even when the
declarant is available as a witness:

              Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in
       connection with treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
       symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or
       external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and
       treatment.

        In People v Mahone, 294 Mich App 208, 214-215; 816 NW2d 436 (2011), this Court held
that the statements made by the victim to a nurse performing a sexual assault examination were
generally admissible under MRE 803(4), explaining:

               Statements made for the purpose of medical treatment are admissible
       pursuant to MRE 803(4) if they were reasonably necessary for diagnosis and
       treatment and if the declarant had a self-interested motivation to be truthful in order
       to receive proper medical care. This is true irrespective of whether the declarant
       sustained any immediately apparent physical injury. People v Garland, 286 Mich
       App 1, 8-10; 777 NW2d 732 (2009). Particularly in cases of sexual assault, in
       which the injuries might be latent, such as contracting sexually transmitted diseases
       or psychological in nature, and thus not necessarily physically manifested at all, a
       victim’s complete history and a recitation of the totality of the circumstances of the
       assault are properly considered to be statements made for medical treatment. Id. at
       9-10; People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 282-283; 545 NW2d 18 (1996).
       Thus, statements the victim made to the nurse were all properly admissible pursuant
       to MRE 803(4).

To the degree the prosecution cites Mahone for the claim that any and all statements by a victim
of sexual assault victim to a nurse during a sexual assault examination are automatically
admissible, we disagree. The question requires consideration of the nature of the statement and
the context in which it was made. In Mahone, the actual statements to the nurse are not described,
so it is unclear what “statements made to the nurse” were at issue.4

       We therefore apply the test set forth by the Supreme Court in People v Meeboer, 439 Mich
310, 322; 484 NW2d 621 (1992), which explained:

       In order to be admitted under MRE 803(4), a statement must be made for purposes
       of medical treatment or diagnosis in connection with treatment, and must describe
       medical history, past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or

4
  Similarly, in Garland, upon which Mahone relied, the content of the statements to the nurse are
not described. And, in People v McElhaney, the other case relied on by Mahone, the Court did
not hold that all such statements necessarily fall within MRE 803(4). Rather, it recognized that
the issue was to be decided on a case-by-case basis and applied the test defined in Meeboer to
determine whether the statements fell within the exception.

                                                -5-
       general character of the cause or external source of the injury. Traditionally, further
       supporting rationale for MRE 803(4) are the existence of (1) the self-interested
       motivation to speak the truth to treating physicians in order to receive proper
       medical care, and (2) the reasonable necessity of the statement to the diagnosis and
       treatment of the patient. The trustworthiness of a child’s statement can be
       sufficiently established to support the application of the medical treatment
       exception. Furthermore, we find that the identification of the assailant is necessary
       to adequate medical diagnosis and treatment.

The victim in this case was 15 years old, and thus “there was a rebuttable presumption that she
understood the need to tell the truth to the nurse.” Garland, 286 Mich App at 9.

        We also disagree with defendant’s argument that SR’s statements to the nurse were not
admissible under MRE 803(4) because the information SR provided was not reasonably necessary
for medical diagnosis or treatment. The nurse was examining SR with regard to an alleged sexual
assault, and, as explained in the cases just cited, a sexual assault can involve many different types
of harm. Further, the nurse explained that the information was important to direct her examination
and know what to look for and focus on. In addition, knowing the circumstances and nature of the
assault, including the identity of the perpetrator, may be necessary for the medical provider to
assure the safety of the patient. See Meeboer, 439 Mich at 322 (“the identification of the assailant
is necessary to adequate medical diagnosis and treatment.”). Lastly, the fact that the examination
may have been conducted in part to collect evidence of a sexual assault is not dispositive. People
v Duenaz, 306 Mich App 85, 96; 854 NW2d 531 (2014). Accordingly, because SR’s statements
to the nurse fall within the scope of MRE 803(4), they were not inadmissible hearsay.

       We also reject defendant’s related argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to this evidence. Because SR’s statements to the nurse were admissible under MRE
803(4), any objection by counsel would have been futile. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to
make a futile objection. People v Johnson, 315 Mich App 163, 195; 889 NW2d 513 (2016); People
v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).

                             C. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

       Defendant next argues that a new trial is required because the prosecutor made improper
statements during closing argument. We disagree.5

5
 Because there was no objection to the challenged remarks at trial, these claims are unpreserved.
People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 234-235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). An unpreserved claim of
prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 275; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). This Court will reverse
“only when a plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 275-276.
This Court “will not find error requiring reversal if the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s
comments could have been cured by a timely instruction.” People v Williams, 265 Mich App 68,
71; 692 NW2d 722 (2005), aff’d 475 Mich 101 (2006).

                                                -6-
       Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the challenged
conduct must be reviewed in context. McElhaney, 215 Mich App at 283. The test for prosecutorial
misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266-
267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).

          “A prosecutor may not make a statement of fact to the jury that is unsupported by
evidence, but she is free to argue the evidence and any reasonable inferences that may arise from
the evidence.” People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 450; 669 NW2d 818 (2003); see also
Bahoda, 448 Mich at 282. Although prosecutors must refrain from making prejudicial remarks,
they are permitted to use “hard language” when the evidence supports it and are not required to
phrase their arguments in the blandest of terms. Bahoda, 448 Mich at 282; People v Ullah, 216
Mich App 669, 678; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). But, a prosecutor commits misconduct by
“abandon[ing] his or her responsibility to seek justice” and by making improper remarks that “so
infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”
People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 62; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (citations omitted).

        Defendant first argues the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to sympathize with the
victim. He further claims that the prosecutor disparaged his exercise of his constitutional right to
a jury trial by suggesting that he forced SR to attend trial. Defendant relies on the following
emphasized portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument:

                These are the elements for counts 1 and 2, that the Defendant engaged in a
       sexual act that involved the following, the touching of [SR’s genital] opening with
       the Defendant’s mouth or tongue. You heard evidence consistent with that and
       nothing to contradict that. That the Defendant caused personal injury to [SR] as it
       relates to the specific things you could think about when it comes to personal injury,
       was the victim—was [SR] upset, crying, or hysterical during or after the event?
       The witnesses who were there all say she was. Did she need psychological
       treatment? She hadn’t sought it until she got a subpoena for this and realized she
       hadn’t worked through the trauma that the Defendant caused her. Did it interfere
       with her ability to lead a normal life? She testified as to it affecting her relationships
       at school, she was angry at school. Was she afraid that someone else would be hurt
       or killed? You remember her testimony when the Defendant was looming and she
       stated she was afraid as she disclosed, she didn’t know what he would do as he was
       there in the room and it was obvious that she was letting people know what he did
       to her. Did she feel angry of [sic] humiliated? She testified that she did. Did she
       need medication for anxiety, insomnia, or other symptoms? She testified she had
       to take melatonin to sleep after this. Did the emotional effects of the incident last
       a long time? Define long, it’s been five years and she’s still experiencing them and
       you saw that. Did she feel scared [about] the possibility of being attacked again?
       She did not know what he was going to do when he was in that room with her and
       it was obvious that she was disclosing. Ladies and gentlemen, those are some of
       the things you may think about when you decide whether or not [SR] suffered
       mental anguish but I would argue that all of those things show that she did, in fact,
       suffer mental anguish and that was her personal injury as a result of this assault.
       [Emphasis added.]

                                                  -7-
It is improper for the prosecutor to appeal to the jury to sympathize with the victim. People v
Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 591; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). It is also generally inappropriate for a
prosecutor to ask jurors to place themselves in the role of the complainant when arriving at a
verdict. People v Buckey, 133 Mich App 158, 167; 348 NW2d 53 (1984), rev’d on other grounds
424 Mich 1 (1985).

       Viewed in context, the challenged comments did not involve a direct plea to the jury to
sympathize or identify with the victim or even encourage the jury to suspend their judgment and
decide the case based on their sympathy for the victim. People v Hoffman, 205 Mich App 1, 21;
518 NW2d 817 (1994). The prosecutor’s remarks about the emotional trauma SR experienced and
her need for psychological treatment were made in the context of addressing the personal injury
element of the charged offenses. The prosecutor’s remarks were directed at the evidence
introduced at trial, which the prosecutor argued “show that she did, in fact, suffer mental anguish
and that was her personal injury as a result of this assault.”

        The record also does not support defendant’s claim that the prosecutor disparaged his
exercise of his right to a jury trial. Defendant relies on Burns v Gammon, 260 F3d 892, 896 (CA
8, 2001), in which the prosecutor asked the jury to consider that the defendant, “by exercising his
constitutional right to a jury trial and to confront witnesses, forced the victim to attend trial, take
the stand and relive the attack.” The Burns court held it was improper for the prosecutor to use
the defendant’s exercise of his fundamental constitutional guarantees against him. Id. In this case,
the prosecutor did not comment on defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to a jury trial
and to confront witnesses. The prosecutor’s reference to the subpoena was made only in the
context of explaining, consistent with the factual evidence, why SR began to relive the trauma
caused by the assault, which was relevant to the personal injury element of the charged offenses.
The prosecutor did not accuse defendant of causing trauma to SR by exercising his right to a jury
trial. Accordingly, defendant has not demonstrated that the prosecutor’s arguments were improper.

        Defendant similarly argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for SR’s credibility in
the following emphasized portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument:

                Ladies and gentlemen, I’ll argue that you have all the reasons to believe
       [SR]. She was under oath here. She understood her oath and was incentivized to
       tell the truth. She said she would, that’s what she agreed to. Very importantly, she
       had no incentive to lie. She didn’t know the Defendant. She didn’t have anything
       to gain by upsetting this family vacation, not even her family, her friend’s family,
       at 3:00 in the morning with these very specific allegations of oral sex being forced
       on her, not once but twice, and that the Defendant had kissed or sucked her breasts.
       Why those specific allegations if she had made this up? Her testimony is
       corroborated by the medical evidence, the contemporaneous [sic], within hours of
       her assault, she tells the nurse exactly what the Defendant did to her. . . . [Emphasis
       added.]

Defendant also challenges the following emphasized portions of the prosecutor’s rebuttal
argument:

                                                 -8-
                 Ladies and gentlemen, [SR] not only had no incentive to make this up, not
         only did she have no incentive to lie, she had every incentive to tell the truth to keep
         herself safe. Swabbing the hands, arguing that the nurse—that’s not in evidence,
         the nurse did not say, of course, I would have swabbed that hand, it’s not there, and
         that’s what the defense has to rely on, that’s all they can do, that’s all they do when
         there’s DNA on a 15 year old child’s breasts, the Defendant’s DNA. . . . Ladies
         and gentlemen, all of the testimony points to the Defendant having done what [SR]
         said he did, the DNA, his own statement, you’ll note that at the end he doesn’t want
         to continue the statement so Detective Sergeant Scott says, okay, we’re done,
         immediately, it was a voluntary statement, he told you what he did. Ladies and
         gentlemen, [SR] had no incentive to lie. She had every incentive to tell the truth.
         Consider what’s in evidence. There’s no reason to reach or run down rabbit holes
         because what’s in evidence proves each element as he is charged beyond a
         reasonable doubt and it’s not reasonable to think otherwise. Hold the Defendant
         responsible for what he did to that 15 year old [sic] child, find him guilty as charged.
         [Emphasis added.]

        It is improper for prosecutors to express their personal knowledge or belief regarding the
credibility of a witness or to vouch for a witness’s credibility by suggesting that he or she has some
special knowledge about the witness’s truthfulness. People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 456;
812 NW2d 37 (2011); People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 455; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). But
that did not occur in this case. It was not improper for the prosecutor to argue why he believed the
evidence at trial demonstrated SR was credible. Indeed, the jury was tasked with determining the
credibility of the witnesses and the trial court instructed it that, in determining whether to believe
a witness, it may consider, among other factors, whether, “[i]n general, does the witness have any
special reason to tell the truth, or any special reason to lie?” Thus, it was not misconduct for the
prosecutor to argue his position that there were reasons, grounded in the evidence, for why SR had
the incentive to tell the truth and that there was no evidence of any incentive to lie.

        Finally, because the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper, defendant’s related claim
that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the remarks cannot succeed. Counsel was
not required to make a futile objection. Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201.

                                    D. OFFENSE VARIABLE 13

       Defendant argues the trial court erred when it assessed 25 points for OV 13. We agree, but
conclude that defendant should have been scored five points for OV 12.6

6
    In People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013), the Supreme Court explained:

             Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court’s factual
             determinations are reviewed for clear error and must be supported
             by a preponderance of the evidence. Whether the facts, as found,
             are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute,

                                                   -9-
        At sentencing, the prosecutor argued OV 13 should be assessed at 25 points because the
offense involved a pattern of three or more crimes against a person. MCL 777.43(1)(c). The
prosecutor agreed the trial court could not count one of the CSC-I convictions to assess OV 13
because it was used to assess OV 11, but argued that it could count defendant’s other two
convictions in this case, for the other CSC-I and the CSC-II, and asserted the evidence at trial
demonstrated defendant committed another uncharged crime against a person, either assault with
intent to commit criminal sexual penetration, MCL 750.520g(1), or assault with intent to commit
CSC-II, MCL 750.520g(2). The trial court agreed with the prosecutor’s argument, although it did
not identify which uncharged crime it believed defendant committed.

        We agree that for purposes of scoring the guidelines, the “sentencing offense” is the first
of the two counts of CSC-I, while the second CSC-I conviction and the CSC-II conviction are not.
The second CSC-I conviction was utilized to assess OV 11 and therefore cannot be used to assess
OV 12 or OV 13. OV 12 addresses “contemporaneous felonious criminal acts,” MCL 777.42, and
while the sentencing offense may not be assessed, the CSC-II conviction must be, as it occurred
within 24 hours of the sentencing offense. Accordingly, defendant should have been assessed 5
points for the CSC-II conviction. A felony assessed for OV 11 or OV 12 may not be counted for
purposes of OV 13. MCL 777.42(2)(c). Therefore, the only conviction for which defendant may
be assessed in OV 13 is the CSC-I that constitutes the sentencing offense.

        The prosecutor maintains that defendant could nevertheless be assessed under OV 13
because, in addition to the offenses for which he was tried and convicted, he also committed both
assault with intent to commit CSC-I and assault with intent to commit CSC-II, which should be
counted for purposes of OV 13. We disagree.

        The elements of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual penetration “are simply (1)
an assault, and (2) an intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration.” People v Nickens, 470
Mich 622, 627; 685 NW2d 657 (2004). The elements of assault with intent to commit criminal
sexual contact are “an assault, involving the use of force or coercion, with the specific intent to
touch the victim’s genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock, breast, or clothing covering those areas,
for the purpose of sexual arousal or sexual gratification.” People v Evans, 173 Mich App 631,
634; 434 NW2d 452 (1988).

        In Nickens, 470 Mich at 629, the Supreme Court held that assault with intent to commit
CSC involving sexual penetration is a necessarily included lesser offense of CSC-I involving the
use of force and coercion and causing personal injury. The Court rejected the notion that CSC-I
and assault with intent to commit criminal sexual penetration based on the same conduct are
distinct offenses. Id. at 631. Given the analysis in Nickens, it logically follows that CSC-II

            i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory
            interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo. [footnotes
            omitted.]

A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. People v Miller, 482 Mich 540, 544; 759 NW2d 850
(2008).

                                                 -10-
involving the use of force and coercion and causing personal injury and assault with intent to
commit CSC-II cannot be considered distinct offenses when arising from the same conduct.

       The record at trial does not establish any conduct not necessary to defendant’s convictions
of CSC-I and CSC-II that would establish a separate and distinct offense of assault with intent to
commit either criminal sexual penetration or CSC-II. On appeal, the prosecutor offers the
following explanation in support of his argument that the testimony at trial established defendant
committed the separate crime of assault with intent to commit either criminal sexual conduct
involving penetration or CSC-II:

                The testimony of the victim was that she was asleep in a common room on
       the couch when Defendant touched her breasts after she told him she was 15 years
       old and did not want him to, Defendant forcibly kissed her, forced her legs open to
       “put his tongue to my clit”, forced her to touch his penis and “jerk him”, forced her
       shorts down and again used his tongue to penetrate her, and then seemed to hear a
       noise that caused him to go back to his room where his wife was sleeping. This
       made her feel scared and like she was having a panic attack. Assault with intent to
       commit criminal sexual conduct involving penetration in the first or second degree
       is a felony. MCL 750.520g.

        Contrary to what the prosecutor argues, defendant’s touching of SR’s breasts was the
conduct that formed the basis for defendant’s CSC-II conviction. Defendant was also charged
with a second count of CSC-II for forcing SR to touch his penis, but defendant was acquitted of
that count. Therefore, under Beck, 504 Mich at 609-610, that conduct may not be considered. The
other conduct described in the prosecutor’s explanation is defendant’s act of forcibly kissing SR
on her mouth, but such kissing is not conduct encompassed within the definition of “sexual
contact,” which is defined as:

       [T]he intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional
       touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s
       intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for
       the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in a
       sexual manner[.] [MCL 750.520a(q).]

Therefore, we disagree with the prosecutor’s argument that the trial court’s assessment of OV 13
may be upheld on the basis that defendant committed assault with intent to commit criminal sexual
conduct.7

7
 At sentencing, the prosecutor also suggested that the uncharged offense of accosting a child for
immoral purposes, MCL 750.145a, could be counted for purposes of OV 13. However, the
prosecutor has not made this argument on appeal, and so it is deemed to be abandoned. See, e.g.,
People v McMiller, 202 Mich App 82, 83 n 1; 507 NW2d 812 (1993). In any event, even if that
uncharged offense were to be counted along with the sentencing offense, it would not result in “3
or more crimes against a person.” MCL 777.43.

                                                -11-
       In sum, we conclude that OV 13 should have been scored at zero and that OV 12 should
have been scored at 5 points. This results in a 20 point reduction in defendant’s OV points from
70 to 50 which in turn places him in grid III-E rather than grid IV-E and reduces his guideline
range (as a third habitual offender) from 135-337 months to 126-315 months. Because the
guidelines range has changed, remand for resentencing is required. People v Francisco, 474 Mich
82, 90-91; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).

                               E. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING

        Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by ordering that his sentences for CSC-I be
served consecutively. Because we are vacating and remanding for resentencing, we are not
required to address this issue and do not. However, we note, cogent arguments were made both in
opposition to and in support of consecutive sentencing. We note, on remand, if consecutive
sentences are imposed, the trial court should make specific findings as to why consecutive
sentences should be imposed, as well as why the sentences selected are individually proportionate,
and not general observations. See People v Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649, 665-666; 897 NW2d 195
(2016).

                                        F. SPEEDY TRIAL

        Lastly, in a pro se brief, filed pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2004-
6, Standard 4, defendant argues the excessive delay between his arrest in 2017 and his trial in 2022
violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise this issue in a motion to dismiss. We disagree.8

        A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the federal and state
constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. See also MCL 768.1; MCR 6.004(A).
The right to a speedy trial requires that the trial commence within a reasonable time under all of
the circumstances, which can vary widely from case to case. People v Spalding, 17 Mich App 73,
75-76; 169 NW2d 163 (1969). “The time for judging whether the right to a speedy trial has been

8
  “A defendant must make a formal demand on the record to preserve a speedy trial issue for
appeal.” People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 111; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). Although defendant
orally asserted his right to a speedy trial at a hearing on November 18, 2019, the prosecutor
challenged that request because it was not made in writing, and the trial court declined to
consider the request and advised defendant he could file an appropriate motion. Because
defendant never subsequently asserted his right to a speedy trial in an appropriate motion, he did
not properly preserve this issue. People v Duncan, 373 Mich 650, 656; 130 NW2d 385 (1964).
Indeed, defendant concedes on appeal that this issue was not properly preserved in the trial court.
        Because this issue is unpreserved, it is reviewed for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, and
an error affects substantial rights if it affects the outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 763.
Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an
actually innocent defendant, or the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 763-764.

                                                 -12-
violated runs from the date of the defendant’s arrest.” People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 261; 716
NW2d 208 (2006). A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is not violated after a fixed number of
days. Id. Rather, a court is required to balance the following factors: “(1) the length of delay, (2)
the reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the
defendant.” Id. at 261-262. “Following a delay of eighteen months or more, prejudice is
presumed, and the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that there was no injury.” Id. at 262.
When the delay amounts to less than 18 months, the defendant must prove that he has suffered
prejudice. People v Rivera, 301 Mich App 188, 193; 835 NW2d 464 (2013).

        The first factor considers the length of the delay, which, in this case, was significant. The
total delay was just a few months short of five years after defendant’s arrest. Because the length
of the delay was well beyond 18 months, prejudice is presumed and the burden is on the prosecutor
to prove that defendant was not prejudiced by the delay. Williams, 475 Mich at 262.

        Turning to the second factor, reasons for the delay, docket congestion was responsible for
some of the delay before March 2020. “Although delays inherent in the court system, e.g., docket
congestion, ‘are technically attributable to the prosecution, they are given a neutral tint and are
assigned only minimal weight in determining whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial.’ ”
People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 460; 564 NW2d 158 (1997). Some of the delay was also
attributable to difficulties obtaining records of other bad acts evidence regarding defendant’s prior
sexual assault, which the prosecutor intended to use to support a motion to introduce evidence of
defendant’s prior sexual assault at the trial in this case. However, defendant was not prejudiced
by this delay because the trial court ultimately denied the prosecutor’s motion to introduce this
evidence at trial. The trial court confirmed in February 2020 that the parties were ready for trial
and intended to schedule a trial date shortly thereafter, but, unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic
erupted in March 2020, and the delay thereafter was attributable to court shutdowns, the
suspension of jury trials, and a pandemic-driven trial backlog.

        In March 2020, the Governor declared a state of emergency because of the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic, and the Supreme Court, in response, issued Administrative Order No. 2020-
1, effective immediately, and adopted emergency procedures in the state’s court facilities. See
505 Mich xcix. Effective March 18, 2020, the Supreme Court imposed limits on trial court
proceedings, limiting access to courtrooms to no more than 10 persons. Administrative Order
No. 2020-2, 505 Mich cii. Additionally, beginning April 23, 2020, the Supreme Court delayed all
jury trials until June 22, 2020, or until further order of the Court. See Administrative Order
No. 2020-10, 505 Mich cxxxix.

       In United States v Smith, 494 F Supp 3d 772, 783 (ED CA, 2020),9 the federal district court
considered how delay attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic should be considered when

9
 We recognize that cases from sister states or lower federal courts are not binding. People v
Fomby, 300 Mich App 46, 50 n 1; 831 NW2d 887 (2013); People v Campbell, 289 Mich App
533, 535; 798 NW2d 514 (2010). However, because this issue has not yet been resolved in our
courts, we turn to other courts for guidance.

                                                -13-
evaluating a speedy-trial claim, and explained that such delay should not be attributed to either the
defendant or the government, stating:

       The Court finds the delay to be neither attributable to the Government nor Smith.
       Instead, the Court’s decision to take responsible, emergency health measures to
       limit the spread of COVID-19 is responsible for the delay. The Court’s inability to
       safely conduct a jury trial is a good-faith and reasonable justification for the delay.
       One that does not weigh against the Government.

         While this Court has not yet addressed in a published decision how delays related to the
COVID-19 pandemic should be considered when evaluating a speedy-trial claim, it has held that
delays caused by the pandemic should not be held against the government in the related context of
evaluating whether dismissal is required under the statutory 180-day rule, MCL 780.131. See
People v Witkoski, 341 Mich App 54, 57-58, 62-64; 988 NW2d 790 (2022). The COVID-19
pandemic not only prevented defendant’s trial from proceeding in early 2020, but the resulting
court shutdowns and suspensions of jury trials created a backlog of cases for the courts. Unlike
many defendants, defendant was out on bond for most of the time he awaited trial, and when jury
trials resumed, priority was given to trying the pending cases of incarcerated defendants. We agree
with Smith that the delay caused by the pandemic is not attributable to the prosecutor.

       Under the third factor, we recognize that while defendant did orally assert his right to a
speedy trial at a hearing in November 2019, he did not thereafter formally assert this right in an
appropriate motion as directed by the trial court.

        Finally, under the fourth factor, the record does not establish that defendant was prejudiced
by the delay. There are two types of prejudice: prejudice to the person and prejudice to the defense.
Williams, 475 Mich at 264. Prejudice to the “person would take the form of oppressive pretrial
incarceration leading to anxiety and concern.” People v Collins, 388 Mich 680, 694; 202 NW2d
769 (1972). However, “[e]very incarceration results in a degree of prejudice to the person.” Id.
Prejudice to the defense is the more serious concern when assessing the harm caused by a delay,
and a defendant might be able to withstand a longer delay if the impact is personal only. Williams,
475 Mich at 264. Prejudice to the defense might take the form of key witnesses no longer being
available. Collins, 388 Mich at 694.

        With regard to prejudice to his person, defendant seems to rely solely on the length of time
he awaited trial, which he asserts led to anxiety and concern about his future. A defendant’s
anxiety while awaiting trial is an appropriate factor to consider, but is insufficient, standing alone,
to establish a violation of the right to a speedy trial. Gilmore, 222 Mich App at 462. Although the
pending charges understandably may have caused defendant to experience some stress and anxiety
while awaiting trial, see Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 532-533; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101
(1972), defendant was out on bond for all but approximately 30 days while he awaited trial, so the
personal prejudice was minimized. The more significant form of prejudice is when a delay impacts
a defendant’s ability to defend against charges. In this case, however, defendant has not identified
any witnesses or evidence that were lost or otherwise demonstrated that the delay impacted his
defense. Accordingly, defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the delay.

                                                 -14-
        In sum, although the delay in bringing defendant to trial was substantial, the record shows
that much of the delay before March 2020 was attributable to docket congestion, which is given
only minimal weight, and to difficulties obtaining records for an issue that ultimately was decided
in defendant’s favor. The delay after March 2020 was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic,
which should not be held against the prosecutor. Although defendant did orally assert his right to
a speedy trial at a hearing in November 2019, he never raised the issue in an appropriate motion
as directed by the trial court. Further, because defendant was out on bond during nearly all of the
period of delay, any prejudice to his person was minimal, and there is no indication that the delay
prejudiced defendant’s ability to defend against the charges. Balancing all of the relevant factors,
defendant has not established a violation of his right to a speedy trial.

        Because we conclude defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated, defendant’s
related claim that defense counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue in a motion to dismiss
also cannot succeed. People v Leffew, 508 Mich 625, 637; 975 NW2d 896 (2022).

                                       III. CONCLUSION

        We affirm defendant’s convictions. However, because correction of the guidelines scoring
changes defendant’s guidelines range, we remand for resentencing. Additionally, to the extent the
trial court wishes to impose consecutive sentences for the CSC-I counts, it must provide
particularized reasons for so doing on the record. We retain jurisdiction.

                                                             /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                             /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
                                                             /s/ Christopher P. Yates

                                               -15-
                              Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

                                                ORDER
                                                                               James Robert Redford
 People of MI v Reno Kenyatte Johnson                                            Presiding Judge

 Docket No.     363257                                                         Douglas B. Shapiro

 LC No.         17-041948-FC                                                   Christopher P. Yates
                                                                                 Judges

               Pursuant to the opinion issued concurrently with this order, this case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court. We retain jurisdiction.

                Proceedings on remand in this matter shall commence within 28 days of the Clerk’s
certification of this order, and they shall be given priority on remand until they are concluded. As stated
in the accompanying opinion, remand shall be limited to resentencing.

               The parties shall promptly file with this Court a copy of all papers filed on remand. Within
seven days after entry, appellant shall file with this Court copies of all orders entered on remand.

               The transcript of all proceedings on remand shall be prepared and filed within 21 days after
completion of the proceedings.

                                                           _______________________________
                                                            Presiding Judge

                                 December 21, 2023