Court Opinion

ID: 9394949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 18:00:23.786535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.448252
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                                                                      MAY 16 2023
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                   MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHUFANG XIE,                                  No. 22-103
                                              Agency No.
            Petitioner,                       A206-585-863
 v.
                                              MEMORANDUM *
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

            Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted May 9, 2023 **
                           San Francisco, California

Before: CHRISTEN and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON, District
Judge. ***

      Shufang Xie, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing her appeal of an

Immigration Judge (IJ) order finding Xie not credible and denying her

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). When, as here, the BIA adopts and affirms

the IJ’s decision pursuant to Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA

1994), we review the IJ’s order as if it were that of the BIA. See Kwong v.

Holder, 671 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2011). We review the denial of asylum and

withholding of removal for substantial evidence. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th

1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021). “Under this standard, we must uphold the agency

determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-

Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

      1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding

and thus its denial of asylum and withholding of removal. To support an

adverse credibility determination, “[t]he [agency] must have a legitimate

articulable basis to question the petitioner’s credibility, and must offer a

specific, cogent reason for any stated disbelief.” Martinez v. Holder, 557 F.3d

1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Valderrama v. INS, 260 F.3d 1083, 1085

(9th Cir. 2001)). “There is no bright-line rule under which some number of

inconsistencies requires sustaining or rejecting an adverse credibility

determination . . . .” Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en

banc). Instead, this court looks to “the totality of the circumstances and all

relevant factors.” Id. (citation, alteration, and quotation marks omitted).

      One potential basis for an adverse credibility ruling is unexplained and

                                         2                                    22-103
substantial similarities between the petitioner’s proffered evidence and evidence

submitted in unrelated proceedings.           “Significant similarities between

statements submitted by applicants in different proceedings can be considered

by an Immigration Judge in making an adverse credibility determination if

certain procedural steps are undertaken to preserve the fairness of the

proceedings.” Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 658, 658 (BIA 2015). Here,

during her merits hearing, Xie received notice of the identified similarities,

including verbatim phrasing and typos, between her declaration and those of

other applicants. Xie then had the opportunity to explain the similarities, and

the IJ ruled based on the totality of the circumstances.

      Contrary to Xie’s assertions, the IJ did not impermissibly rely on

“conjecture” when he compared the English translation of Xie’s declaration,

which she submitted with her original asylum application, with the declarations

from applicants in other proceedings. Xie does not dispute that there were

numerous similarities in phrasing and word choice between her declaration and

those that other applicants submitted.

      Xie argues that similarities between translations are inadequate to support

an adverse credibility finding because words can be translated in different ways.

But the fact that translations of a text may vary in their phrasing arguably makes

it even less likely that translators would coincidentally translate declarations

from different applicants using the same verbatim language and typos.

Moreover, Xie herself affirmed that the first translation of her declaration was

                                         3                                  22-103
“true, correct, and accurate”, and the IJ could thus reasonably decide not to

consider Xie’s second translation. In addition, when given the chance to obtain

evidence from the original translator, Xie was unable to do so. Under the

circumstances, the record does not compel a finding that Xie was credible.

      Xie does not appear to argue that in the absence of credible testimony,

she presented adequate evidence to demonstrate eligibility for asylum or

withholding of removal. Any argument to that effect is thus waived. See

Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2013) (matters not

raised in opening brief are waived). Regardless, substantial evidence supports

the IJ’s decision that Xie did not establish eligibility for asylum or withholding.

The IJ offered valid reasons for discounting Xie’s other evidence, especially in

view of Xie’s past fraud in the visa process.

      2. Before the BIA, Xie did not meaningfully challenge the IJ’s denial of

CAT protection, and the BIA thus found that Xie waived her CAT claim. Xie

does not challenge that determination in her opening brief. The CAT claim is

therefore waived. See Corro-Barragan v. Holder, 718 F.3d 1174, 1177 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2013) (issues not raised in opening brief are waived).

      PETITION DENIED.

                                        4                                    22-103