Court Opinion

ID: 9702408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:10:40.60346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:37.210781
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
KLEIN, J.:
¶ 1 After reviewing the record, I reach a different conclusion than the majority regarding whether the police possessed a reasonable suspicion sufficient to support the interaction between the State Police and Fuller.
¶ 2 At about midnight, May 11, 2006, Troopers Hoppel (passenger) and Wool (driver) were on patrol in Blossburg Borough when they spotted a blue Chevy S-10 pick-up truck traveling slowly on Gulick Street. Although there was no testimony as to just how fast the pick-up truck was traveling, Trooper Hoppel noted that they closed in on the truck without having to exceed the speed limit themselves. As the Troopers approached the truck, it came to a near stop in the middle of the traffic lane and then pulled off the road without signaling. Although the Troopers recognized that pulling off the road without signaling was a traffic violation, they were more concerned with the odd nature of the behavior of the truck. The Troopers pulled in behind the truck, at least in part, because they wanted to see if there were any problems with the driver.
¶ 3 The facts in this matter are problematic in that as much as anything it appears that the police had mixed motives for initiating contact with Fuller. While the police may not have initiated contact with Fuller solely because of the traffic violation, the facts remain that the police were aware of the infraction, the police cited the infraction in the affidavit of probable cause, the infraction occurred prior to any personal contact with Fuller, the police cited Fuller for the infraction, and the trial court convicted Fuller of the infraction.
¶ 4 I also note that the trial court does not classify the infraction as a pretext. Fuller does not challenge the infraction as a pretext. Although Fuller challenged the infraction at the trial level on a factual basis, he does not challenge the propriety of the conviction before our Court.
¶ 5 The majority notes that Trooper Hoppel denied using the trafile infraction as a reason to pull over behind Fuller truck. Indeed, Trooper Hoppel did testify that the infraction was not the sole reason for investigating. One exchange between defense counsel and Trooper Hoppel is recounted:
Question: And then you and the other Trooper initiated a traffic stop as a result of that Motor Vehicle Code violation *482which occurred in your presence; is that true?
Trooper Hoppel: No, we didn’t pull in behind him because he didn’t use his turn signal; we pulled in behind him because we didn’t know what the situation was, what was going on.
Question: So you—
Trooper Hoppel: We observed the violation, but that’s not why we pulled in behind him.
Question: So two trained Pennsylvania State Troopers on patrol in Bloss-burg at midnight observe a Motor Vehicle Code violation and that’s not the reason you pulled in behind him?
Trooper Hoppel: This specific incident, yeah, that’s not the reason why we pulled in behind him is just because he didn’t use his turn signal. We pulled in behind him, because, like I said, as we approached and he almost came to a stop in the road, we thought that that wasn’t a normal act, that was suspicious—
Question: Okay.
Trooper Hoppel: — and that there might be something going on there, something might be wrong, and that’s why we pulled in behind him.
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/3/06, at 27-28.
¶ 6 In addition to the above quoted evidence, defense counsel stipulated to the evidence in the affidavit of probable cause in lieu of Trooper Hoppel’s direct testimony. Therefore, because the affidavit of probable cause recounts the observed traffic violation prior to the stop, I would accept that traffic violation was at least part of the equation in this matter. This interpretation is supported by the Trooper’s testimony that they did not pull over “just because” of the traffic violation and by the Trooper’s recognition that a traffic violation had been observed. The use of the phrase “just because” indicates that the traffic violation was a factor in deciding to pull over and investigate.
¶ 7 Finally, the trial court actually convicted Fuller of the predicate traffic violation. Fuller was not simply convicted of summary offenses related to the DUI, he was convicted of a traffic violation that took place before the Troopers pulled in behind the pick-up truck and had any contact with Fuller.
¶ 8 I find it very difficult to state that there was no reasonable suspicion to investigate where the defendant has been convicted of a traffic offense that not only provides for a reasonable suspicion, but absolutely demonstrates the existence of probable cause. While I understand the majority’s reluctance to credit this conviction due to the Trooper’s equivocal testimony,3 I believe that we must accept the Trooper’s testimony in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, which includes the affidavit of probable cause listing the traffic violation as well as the Trooper’s statement that they did not pull over “just because” of the traffic violation.4 The testimony of the Trooper, the realization that neither the trial court nor the defense has called the traffic violation a pretext, the fact that the defense is not challenging the validity of the conviction for the traffic offense, and the knowledge that we may affirm a decision if any grounds for affirmance exists, Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435, *483438 n. 5 (1975), leads me to conclude that there was sufficient reasonable suspicion to pull in behind the Fuller and investigate.
¶ 9 At the beginning of this statement I mentioned that the Trooper appeared to have mixed motives for stopping behind Fuller and investigating. I do not believe that ramifications of a “mixed motive” need to be explored in this matter because the matter can be resolved without such discussion. However, since cases such as Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556 (Pa.Super.2004) (acceptable to stop to render aid, subsequent discovery of wrongdoing not suppressed), have been decided and have introduced exceptions to traffic stop law, such “mixed motive” facts may now be seen. The law is somewhat unclear as to what should happen if a police officer has both benign (safety) and suspicious (e.g. possible DUI) reasons for investigating a situation. Future cases may not include a conviction for a traffic violation that provides for probable cause. No one delved into precisely what Trooper Hoppel believed may have been taking place in this matter, so any statement regarding this would seem to be speculation. However, given the factual scenario it is not difficult to see how one could believe that the driver was in some distress or was perhaps lost or simply looking for a house number. Equally, a Trooper might believe that a driver who slows to a near stop in the middle of the road is in some manner impaired.
¶ 10 Slowing to a near stop and pulling off the road might not, in and of itself, provide a reasonable suspicion for investigation. Such behavior is not immediately indicative of either criminal behavior or of some type of distress. But it is odd behavior, to be sure, and it is understandable to see why a police officer would want to find out what, if anything, the problem is. Given the time and place of this incident, I would be blind not to realize that the Troopers must have at least suspected a DUI. However, the evidence also reflects a real issue as to the possibility of a situation where the Troopers may have simply been of some assistance. In a situation such as this where out of the ordinary behavior can signal either benign or criminal conduct I do not believe that the policy of the Commonwealth should be to require the police to ignore the situation all together because any subsequent discovery of criminal activity would not be actionable or to investigate the possibility of helping an individual but then to ignore the subsequent discovery of the criminal because such evidence would only be suppressed.
¶ 11 Thankfully, this potentially thorny issue need not be addressed in this matter. Nonetheless, because I believe the record supports a finding of reasonable suspicion, I would affirm the trial court.

. The testimony seems particularly strange because the Trooper clearly states that there was probable cause to make a traffic stop or to stop and investigate, but the Trooper then partially backs away from that probable cause.

. It bears remembering that the defense stipulated to the affidavit of probable cause during the Trooper’s direct testimony.