Court Opinion

ID: 9547983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:55:39.892913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:19.328562
License: Public Domain

PETERS, J.
I dissent.
In holding that petitioner can be convicted of murder of John H. Smith, the majority repudiate this court’s holdings in People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 779-783 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130], and People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690, 703-705 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365], that robbers cannot be convicted of murder for a killing by a victim unless the robbers commit malicious acts, in addition to the acts constituting the underlying felony, which demonstrate culpability beyond that of other robbers. The majority conveniently ignore the facts of Gilbert and its entire discussion concerning implied malice. They purport to distinguish Washington from the instant case, resulting in the absurd distinction that robbers who point guns at their victims without articulating the obvious threat inherent in such action cannot be convicted of murder for a killing committed by the victims, whereas robbers who point guns at their victims and articulate their threat can be convicted of murder in the same sitúation. To hold, as do the majority, that petitioner can be convicted of murder for acts which constitute a first degree robbery solely because the victims killed one of the robbers is in effect to reinstate the felony-murder rule in cases where the victim resists and kills.
In Washington, two robbers held up a service station. The owner, Carpenter, was in the office, totaling up the receipts and disbursements while an employee was depositing the money in a vault in an adjoining room. Upon hearing someone yell “robbery,” Carpenter opened his desk and took out a revolver. A few moments later one of the robbers, Ball, entered the office and pointed a revolver at Carpenter. Carpenter fired immediately, mortally wounding Ball. Washington, the accomplice, was con*586victed of the murder of Ball. We reversed the murder conviction. We held that the felony-murder doctrine could not be invoked to convict Washington of murder because the killing was not committed by Washington or his accomplice: “When a killing is not committed by a robber or by his accomplice but by his victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to the robber, for the killing is not committed by him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery.” (62 Cal.2d at p. 781.)
We further stated that, apart from the felony-murder rule, a defendant may be guilty of murder on a vicarious liability theory for a killing committed by the victim: “Defendants who initiate gun battles may also be found guilty of murder if their victims resist and kill. Under such circumstances, ‘the defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result in death’ (People v. Thomas, 41 Cal.2d 470, 480 . . . [concurring opinion]), and it is unnecessary to imply malice by invoking the felony-murder doctrine. To invoke the felony-murder doctrine to imply malice in such a case is unnecessary and overlooks the principles of criminal liability that should govern the responsibility of one person for a killing committed by another.” (Id., at p. 782; fn. omitted.)
In Washington the decedent-accomplice pointed a gun directly at the victim. If this court was of the opinion that a defendant in such a situation could properly be convicted of murder for the killing committed by the victim, it would have so stated and would have held that Washington could be so convicted of murder. Instead, it held that'Washington could not be convicted of murder and mentioned only one case where defendants could properly be convicted of murder for a killing committed by the victim:, the case where the defendants initiate the gun battle. Therefore, Washington stands for the proposition that the act of pointing a gun at the victim, unlike the act of initiating a gun battle, is hot an act done “ ‘with wanton disregard for human life,’ ” involving “ ‘a high degree of probability that it will result in death’ ” from which malice can be implied. (See id.)1
*587The Washington rule as to when a defendant may be guilty of murder for a killing committed by the victim was followed in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690. In that case, Gilbert and Weaver used guns to rob a bank, and King drove the getaway car. Gilbert shot and killed a policeman as he and Weaver were leaving the bank. Weaver was shot and killed by another policeman as they fled. King and Gilbert were convicted of first degree murder of both the policeman and Weaver. We reversed the convictions of murder of Weaver, which had been predicated on the felony-murder doctrine, but stated that on retrial the defendants might be found guilty of murder of Weaver if Weaver was killed in response to a shooting initiated by Gilbert: “In People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781-782 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130], we held that since the purpose of the common-law felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit, malice aforethought cannot be imputed under that rule unless a felon commits the killing. We recognized, however, that entirely apart from the felony-murder rule, malice may be established when a defendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing committed by another. Although the evidence in the present case would support a conviction of first degree murder on the ground that Weaver was killed in response to a shooting initiated by Gilbert, the court did not instruct the jury on that ground, but gave an erroneous instruction that defendants could be convicted of murder for that killing without proof of malice and solely on the ground that they committed a robbery that was the proximate cause of their accomplice’s death. This instruction withdrew from the jury the crucial issue of whether the shooting of Weaver was in response to the shooting of Davis or solely to prevent the robbery.” (Id., at pp. 703-704.) -
Thus we recognized that King might be found guilty of murder of Weaver, but only because there was evidéncé that Weaver was killed in response to a shootout initiated by Gilbert. We then set forth the principles of criminal responsibility which had to be satisfied on retrial for King to be convicted of murder for the killing of Weaver: “(1) Proof of malice aforethought. . . . (2) The killing must be attributable to the act of the defendant or his accomplice. . . . (3) Vicarious criminal liability. . . .” (Id., at pp. 704-705; italics deleted.) We discussed the first principle— proof of malice aforethought—as follows: “ ‘Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought.’ (Pen Code, § 187.) Such malice is implied under Penal Code section 188 when the defendant or *588his accomplice 1 “for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves,a high degree of probabihty that it will result in death.” ’ (People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 782 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130], quoting People v. Thomas, 41 Cal.2d 470, 480 [261 P.2d 1] [concurring opinion].) Initiating a gun battle is such an act.” (Id., at p. 704; italics added.)
The majority do not contest the Washington holding that the defendant in that case could not be convicted of murder on a vicarious liability theory. However, they purport to distinguish that case simply by characterizing it as a case “wherein defendant’s accomplice merely pointed a gun at the robbery victim who, without further provocation, shot and killed him. . . .” (Italics added.)
In Washington, a gun was pointed at the victim by a robber appearing suddenly in the victim’s office; in the instant case, a gun was pointed at one of the victims and threatening language was used. The majority are making the incredible statement that because the robber in Washington did not articulate his obvious threat—because, in the majority’s words, he “merely” pointed a gun at the victim—it cannot be said that he committed an act with conscious disregard for life and likely to result in death, whereas if he articulated his threat—as did the robbers in the instant case —his act could be found to have met such criteria.
To me, it is too obvious to dispute that inherent in the brandishing of a gun in a robbery is the conditional threat of the robber that he will use the gun if his demands are not complied with. The fact that the robber makes his threat express does not serve to distinguish Washington. It is unreasonable to assume that, just because the robber in Washington did not articulate his threat, the victim in that case had less reason to fear for his safety orj as the majority assert, less “provocation” for shooting the robber than did the victims in the instant case. It is absurd to suggest that the robber’s acts in Washington were, as a matter of law, not “sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance to support a finding of implied malice,” whereas the robbers’ acts in the instant case could be so considered.
In sum, the articulation of threats does not without more show that the robber’s acts were done “ ‘with wanton disregard for human life,’ ” involving “ ‘a high degree of probability that it will result in death’ ” from which malice can be implied. (See People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 782; People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690, 704.) The difference between an implied and an express threat furnishes no significant basis for discrimination between robbers. To permit additional punishment for a homicide committed by the victim on the basis of the articulation of *589the threats would deter robbery “haphazardly at best.” (See People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781.)
Moreover, the robbers in Gilbert expressly threatened to kill one of the robbery victims and in fact did kill a policeman, but we stated that they could be convicted of murder of Weaver only if it was found that they initiated the shooting which resulted in Weaver’s death. Obviously, if this court in Gilbert was of the opinion that the act of threatening victims at gunpoint—which act was clearly involved in that case—could constitute a “malicious act,” it would have sent the case back for retrial on the charge of Weaver’s murder on that theory as well as on the theory that the shooting of Weaver was in response to shooting initiated by the robbers.
The majority in the instant case conveniently ignore this clear conflict between their opinion and Gilbert. In addition, when citing Gilbert as support for the proposition that petitioner can be convicted of murder on a vicarious liability theory, the majority set forth Gilberts discussion of only two of the three principles of criminal responsibility that must be satisfied for a defendant to be convicted on such a theory—the principle that “[t]he killing must be attributable to the act of the defendant or his accomplice” and the principle of “[v]icarious criminal liability.” (63 Cal. 2d at pp. 704-705; italics deleted.) They completely ignore Gilbert's discussion of the crucial principle of “[p]roof of malice aforethought” (italics deleted), including Gilbert's statement that “[i]nitiating a gun battle is such an act [from which malice can be implied]” and its failure to mention as being malicious the act of threatening victims at gunpoint despite the fact that the latter act was involved in that case.
Not only is the majority’s holding contrary to the holdings and language of Washington and Gilbert, it is also contrary .to the fundamental rationale of those cases—that the culpability of criminal defendants should be determined by their own acts, not by the fortuitous acts of their victims which are beyond the defendants’ control and thus logically irrelevant to the defendants’ culpability. In rejecting the contention that a purpose of the felony-murder rule is to prevent the commission of robberies, this court in Washington reasoned that whether robbers can be convicted of murder should not depend on the uncontrollable responses of their victims. “In every robbery there is a possibility that the victim will resist and kill. The robber has little control over such a killing once the robbery is undertaken as this case demonstrates. To impose an additional penalty for the killing would discriminate between robbers, not on the basis of any difference in their own conduct, but solely on the basis of the response by others that the robber’s conduct happened to induce. An additional penalty for a homicide committed by the victim would deter robbery haphazardly at best. *590To ‘prevent stealing, [the law] would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by lot.’ (Holmes, The Common Law, p. 58.)” (62 Cal.2d at p. 781.)
In the instant case as in Washington, the robbers committed acts constituting a first degree robbery; they committed no additional acts—such as initiating a gun battle—that would reflect a culpability beyond that of any othér first degree robbers and that would justify the additional charge of murder. As Washington stated, “[i]n every robbery there is a possibility that the victim will resist and kill,” and robbers cannot be charged with murder for a killing by a victim unless they commit acts in addition to those constituting a robbery upon which additional acts a murder charge can be based. Any murder instruction in the instant case would be based solely on acts constituting first degree robbery. To convert such acts—i.e., to convert a first degree robbery—into murder solely because the victim killed one of the robbers is in effect to reinstitute the felony-murder doctrine in such a situation—contrary to the basic Washington holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of murder simply because he and his accomplices committed a felony in which a death resulted. In the instant case as in Washington, to impose an additional penalty on the defendant, not because of any independently malicious act (such as initiating a gun battle) by him or his accomplices, but because of the uncontrollable act of the victim who resists and kills is to “deter robbery haphazardly at best.”
In conclusion, the majority have rejected the Washington holding.that robbers can be convicted of murder for a killing by a victim only if the robbers commit malicious acts, in addition to the acts which constitute the underlying felony, which demonstrate culpability beyond that of other robbers. By purporting to distinguish Washington from the instant case, the majority have set forth a new, wholly irrational, rule: if robbers point guns at the victims without articulating the obvious threat inherent in such action they cannot be convicted of' murder for a killing committed by the victims, whereas if they articulate their threat they can be convicted of murder in the same situation. As we have seen, the majority’s purported distinction of Washington makes absolutely no sense. In my opinion, it simply demonstrates a desire on the part of the majority to overrule Washington sub silentio.
People v. Reed, 270 Cal.App.2d 37 [75 Cal.Rptr. 430], is consistent with the views expressed in my dissent. In that case, defendant robbed and then kidnapped a gas station attendant, taking the attendant to an automobile in the station lot; two policemen arrived as defendant and the attendant were walking toward the automobile. As the attendant was seated in the automobile with defendant standing next to him beginning *591to enter the car, the police officers called to defendant to halt and put up his hands; defendant responded by shaking his head in a negative manner and saying something that sounded like “no” and by pointing his gun at the head of the attendant and at one of the officers. The officers fired at defendant a number of times, wounding him and accidentally killing the attendant. The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant’s murder conviction.
Thus Reed involved a hostage-type situation after the robbery. It is like the classic “shield” cases, in that the malice requirement is satisfied by the defendant’s placing the victim in the “line of fire” and then aiming his gun at one of the officers. Placing the victim in this highly dangerous position after the robbery is itself a directly lethal act by the defendant independent of the robbery, from which malice can be implied. (See Morris, The Felon’s Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U.Pa. L.Rev. 50, 54.) In instructing the jury on implied malice, the trial court in Reed followed the precise language of Washington and Gilbert: “ ‘As used in connection with murder, “malice” may be implied when the killing results from an act done by the defendant involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is intentionally done for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life.’ ” (270 Cal.App.2d at p. 44.)
Although I am of the opinion that Brooks v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. App.2d 538 [48 Cal.Rptr. 762], was incorrectly decided under Washington,2 it can be distinguished from Washington and from the instant case. As the Court of Appeal in Brooks noted, the petitioner “plainly saw” the officer carrying a loaded shotgun “with his finger on the trigger.” (Id., at p. 540.) Attempting to wrestle the gun from the officer under such circumstances, and especially during “the throes of a widespread and explosive riot,” clearly involves a higher degree of probability of resulting in death than does an ordinary armed robbery; indeed, causing a gun to discharge by attempting to wrestle it from another is almost tantamount to shooting a gun one’s self. Thus it can be held consistently with Washington that there was some evidence to support a finding of malice in Brooks.
In the instant case, Smith, the decedent-accomplice, pointed his gun at Mr. West, and Daniels said he had a gun and threatened to use it if the victims did not comply with the robbers’ orders; Mrs. West then began to fire on Smith and Daniels. There was no attempt to use anyone as a “shield.” As was the case in Washington—where this court held the “im*592plied malice” theory to be inapplicable—it was the victim who fired the first shot; the shooting of Smith was to prevent the robbery and not in response to any shooting Smith had initiated.
It is absurd to suggest—as does the Attorney General—that to hold that petitioner is not chargeable with murder would be “to condemn the victims for not standing idly and waiting for some further action by the robbers. . . .” I am not “condemning” the victims in any way; I am adhering to the fundamental principle that the culpability of criminal defendants should be determined by their own acts—not by the fortuitous acts of their victims which are beyond the defendants’ control and thus logically irrelevant to the defendants’ culpability.
In sum, the instant case—like Washington—involves a typical first degree robbery situation without any independently malicious act by the robbers. In the instant case, a gun was pointed at one of the victims and threatening language was used; in Washington, a gun was pointed at the victim by a robber appearing suddenly in the victim’s office. For such highly unsocial and unjustifiable conduct, appropriately harsh penalties have been allotted. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 213.) In each case, solely because the victim killed one of the robbers, the prosecutor attempts to charge the defendant with the additional count of murder. As this court stated in Washington, a robber has little control over the response of a victim and to impose an additional penalty when such uncontrollable response results in a death—to discriminate between robbers solely on the basis of the uncontrollable responses of their victims—would deter robbery haphazardly at best.
Since there is a total absence of evidence supporting the necessary element of malice aforethought, the information as to the count charging petitioner with murder of John H. Smith must be held invalid in the instant proceeding for a writ of prohibition. (E.g., Roads v. Superior Court, 275 Cal.App.2d 593, 597 [80 Cal.Rptr. 169], and cases cited.)
I would issue prohibition as to the murder count.
Tobriner, J., concurred.

 It is significant that People v. Thomas, supra, 41 Cal.2d 470, 480 (concurring opinion)—cited in Washington as a case enunciating the “implied malice” doctrine (62 Cal.2d at p. 782)—and the other cases enunciating this doctrine (e.g., People v. , Doyell, 48 Cal. 85, 95; People v. Torres, 94 Cal.App.2d 146, 149-150 [210 P.2d 324]; People v. Semone, 140 Cal.App. 318, 323 [35 P.2d 379]; People v. Hubbard, 64 Cal. App. 27, 37-38 [220 P. 315]; People v. Stein, 23 Cal.App. 108, 114 [137 P. 271]; see Collings, Negligent Murder—Some Stateside Footnotes to Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith (1961) 49 Cal.L.Rev. 254, 281-285, and cases cited) involved defendants who recklessly and with conscious disregard of human life had fired a gun or struck a blow with a deadly weapon directly at the victim or a group of which the victim was a member.
Moreover, People v. Harrison, 176 Cal.App.2d 330 [1 Cal.Rptr. 414]—cited by *587this court in Washington as a case where it was unnecessary to imply malice by invoking the felony-murder doctrine (62 Cal.2d at p. 782, fn. 2)—involved a situation in which the shooting was initiated by one of the defendants.

 Brooks’ petition for hearing to this court was denied. Justices Tobriner and Mosk and I were of the opinion that the petition should have been granted. (Id., at p. 542.)
It should be noted that the Court of Appeal had issued writs of prohibition restraining the prosecution for murder of the other two occupants of Brooks’ car. (Lavine v. Superior Court, 238 Cal.App.2d 540 [48 Cal.Rptr. 8].)