Court Opinion

ID: 9644132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:48:31.756582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:19.077750
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
concurring.
A teacher and head football coach with a losing record was fired by the Tolar Independent School District. He brought suit against the District for breach of contract and for an alleged violation of his civil rights. After lengthy litigation, the District recognized that it mistakenly failed to give him timely notice and a hearing before he was fired. After settling the breach of contract suit, the coach decided to litigate the tort action. The trial court found “zero” damages on the tort action and rendered judgment in favor of the District. The court of appeals affirmed. Today the Court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and the nine year saga of the wannabe coach continues.
I agree with the Court that under the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, Tex.Ed. Code §§ 21.201-.211, teachers, as opposed to coaches, have a property interest warranting due process protection; however, this “contorts” 1 case presents a host of problems. The primary problem pertains to alleged damages. Under the facts of this case, when do the contract damages end and when do the tort damages begin? If the trial court had found some damages on the tort action, can the school district apply the amount of damages already paid from the breach of contract action as a *421credit? 2 The answers to these questions await resolution some other day. However, one thing is certain — neither the legislature nor this Court intended or presently intends to vest coaches with a property interest in coaching.
I.
The procedural and factual background of this case is complicated. Gary Grounds was employed by the Tolar Independent School District as a teacher and the varsity head football coach pursuant to an employment contract dated April 5, 1983. After a losing season in which his team won only two of ten games, he was notified by the District on February 28, 1984 that it would not renew his employment contract for the 1984-85 school year.
On March 5, 1984, Grounds requested a hearing on the District’s proposed nonre-newal of his employment contract. The next day the District declined to provide such a hearing on the basis that he was a probationary employee. Grounds then appealed the District’s decision to the Commissioner of Education. The Commissioner determined on May 14, 1984 that Grounds was not a probationary employee, and as such, he was entitled to a hearing. The Commissioner concluded that the District’s failure to provide Grounds with a hearing made its decision not to renew the contract invalid. The effect of the Commissioner’s ruling was to reinstate Grounds’ employment contract for 1984-85. At the time of the Commissioner’s decision, Grounds was still employed by the District as a teacher and coach. Thus, he had not lost any wages.
After the Commissioner’s decision, Grounds was offered employment as a teacher only, rather than as a teacher/coach, for the 1984-85 school year. This offer was made pursuant to the language of the employment contract which allowed the District to reassign Grounds.3 Although not required to do so, the District gave Grounds reasons in writing for his “reassignment” on June 7, 1984, and provided a hearing for him before the school board on June 12, 1984. Grounds declined the offer for continued employment as a teacher. He appealed his reassignment to the Commissioner of Education. In the meantime, on June 11, 1984, the District filed a declaratory judgment action in Hood County district court seeking a declaration that Grounds was not entitled to be a teacher/coach and that he had no entitlement to continue employment after the expiration of the 1984-85 contract. The trial court granted a declaratory judgment in favor of the District, and the court of appeals affirmed. 694 S.W.2d 241. On April 2, 1986, we reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and dismissed the action, holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain such a collateral attack on the Commissioner’s order. Grounds v. Tolar Ind. Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.1986).
On October 17, 1988, the Commissioner of Education ruled that the District did not have the right to reassign Grounds for the 1984-85 school year. The Commissioner determined that the District had to employ Grounds in the “same professional capacity” due to its failure to properly follow the procedural requirements of the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act by failing to afford Grounds a hearing after informing him of the proposed nonrenewal on February 28, 1984. The Commissioner noted that a school district generally has the right to reassign an employee, but the District lost this right for the 1984-85 school year by failing to grant Grounds the initial hearing he was entitled to receive.
Grounds then filed this suit against the Tolar Independent School District in district court alleging breach of contract and violation of his due process rights. The parties settled the contract claims with the District paying Grounds $28,000 for the 1984-85 employment contract plus $31,500 *422in attorney’s fees. The case then proceeded to a bench trial, based on Grounds’ claim that the failure of the District to provide a hearing upon nonrenewal constituted a violation of his due process rights which entitled him to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The trial court granted a “directed verdict” 4 in favor of the District, holding that while the District did deny Grounds his due process rights by failing to give him a hearing regarding the nonrenewal of his employment contract, Grounds suffered no damages as a result of this violation. The court of appeals affirmed on an alternative basis, stating that Grounds’ due process rights were not violated because he did not possess a property interest in employment with the District. 827 S.W.2d 10. Today the Court reverses the determination of the court of appeals that Grounds did not possess a property interest in his employment with the District. 856 S.W.2d at 417.
II.
There are significant distinctions between a directed verdict in a jury case and a motion for judgment in a non-jury case. A directed verdict can only be granted because the evidence is legally insufficient; it cannot be granted when the trial court determines that the plaintiff’s evidence is factually insufficient to support a judgment. White v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 651 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex.1983). However, because the trial court is the arbiter of both factual issues and legal issues in a non-jury trial, a motion for judgment can be granted based either on the legal insufficiency or the factual insufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. See Qantel Business St/s., Inc. v. Custom Controls Co., 761 S.W.2d 302, 304-05 (Tex.1988).
Even though the trial court in this case granted a “directed verdict” motion, the trial judge made a determination that Grounds had not proved that he incurred damages as a result of the failure of the District to accord him a timely hearing and notice. At the end of the hearing on the motion for judgment, the trial eourt said:
I’m going to grant defendant’s motion for directed verdict ... I am unable to find any damages that were incurred by the plaintiff in this cause, even if there wasn’t due process. I can’t find any damages that grew out of the alleged lack of due process ...
Grounds requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that:
16. Defendant’s failure to provide a hearing for Plaintiff following its decision to nonrenew his contract in February of 1984 constitutes a denial of due process under the Term Contract Nonre-newal Act.
17. Defendant’s denial of due process to Plaintiff was based on a good faith reliance upon advice of counsel retained by Defendant.
18. Plaintiff suffered no damages from the time he was notified of Defendant’s intention to nonrenew his contract for the school year 1984-85 until his appeal was granted by the Commissioner of Education on May 14, 1984.
20. Plaintiff suffered no damages as a result of Defendant’s breach of Plaintiff’s employment contract by the attempted reassignment of his duties.
21. Even if Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the “reassignment,” such damages would be contractual in nature and the Settlement Agreement signed by the parties would dispose of any claim for such damages.5
*423III.
Grounds alleged that he suffered damages in the amount of $75,000.00 because the District failed to afford him a hearing in connection with the February 28, 1984 nonrenewal letter. He claims that he suffered mental anguish because he was no longer able to continue his lifetime dream of being a coach; because he was questioned as to why he was fired; and because his family was uncertain as to where they would move.6 However, none of these alleged damages flow from the failure of the District to provide Grounds a procedural due process hearing in March of 1984; all of his claimed damages are directly related to the District’s decision not to allow him to coach for them in the future. The District possessed the right not to renew his employment contract if they followed proper procedures. Since the proper procedures were not followed, the District violated Grounds’ civil rights, but this violation did not cause any damages to Grounds which were distinguishable from the decision not to renew his contract.
As the trial court determined in its findings of fact, Grounds suffered no damages from February 28, 1984, when the District sent him the nonrenewal notice, until his appeal was granted by the Commissioner of Education on May 14 because he was still employed as a teacher/coach for the District. He then was accorded full due process in the June 1984 reassignment proceedings where he was offered a teaching position without coaching duties. Grounds’ alleged damages all relate to his inability to coach rather than his inability to teach; thus, all of his claimed damages flow from the reassignment decision rather than from the nonrenewal decision. He only alleges a failure of the District to afford him his due process rights in connection with its failure to grant him a hearing concerning the non-renewal notice, but he presented no evidence of damages flowing from this procedural due process violation.
However, according to a recent United States Supreme Court case, the trial court may have erred in one aspect of its findings. In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573-74, 121 L.Ed.2d 494, 504 (1992), the Supreme Court stated that a court is obligated to award nominal damages when a plaintiff establishes a procedural due process violation but cannot prove actual injury. Thus, although the trial court was correct in its finding that Grounds suffered no actual damages, nominal damages should have been awarded to Grounds in order to compensate for the violation of his procedural due process rights. On remand, therefore, Grounds should be allowed a nominal damage recovery for this constitutional violation.
The court of appeals on remand must also consider Grounds’ claim for attorney’s fees. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the trial court may award in its discretion reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in an action brought under section 1983. In Farrar, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party under section 1988. Id. However, the Court also held that “[wjhen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 575, 121 L.Ed.2d at 506 (citations omitted). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award attorney's fees to Grounds when at most Grounds is only entitled to a nominal damage award.
IY.
The final issue I would like to address is the scope of the property interest for a *424teacher/coach such as Gary Grounds. While this Court today correctly decides that a teacher possesses a property interest in employment under the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, Tex.Ed.Code §§ 21.201-.211, the Court does not state, and it could not state, that an individual has a property interest in being a coach rather than just being a teacher. In other words, a school district does not have to afford procedural due process rights to reassign a teacher/coach to only teaching duties. The provisions of the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, which today we conclude grants a property interest in employment for a teacher, applies only to the complete nonre-newal of an employment contract rather than the mere reassignment of an employee under the contract.
Thus, there is no violation of due process when a coach is reassigned without a hearing. To hold otherwise would be absurd. High school athletics, and especially high school football, is taken very seriously in this state; many areas of the state take great pride in their high school football programs. One author stated:
Native Texans, and even transplants from Oklahoma and Arkansas who enjoy watching a good running back, take their high school football seriously. Just drop by the Palace Drug Store in Brownwood or any small town barber shop on a Saturday morning during football season and listen to the conversation. You’ll be treated to a replay of Friday’s game, a bit of local history on a similar touchdown run 10 or 20 years ago and absolutely nothing about the latest world crisis or the fate of the Cowboys and Oilers.
Bill McMuRRAy, Texas High School Football xiii (1985).
Although there might be great pride in this state in the Dallas Cowboys winning the Super Bowl and/or great disappointment in the improbable loss of the Houston Oilers to the Buffalo Bills in the playoffs, the fact remains that, for a great number of Texans, high school football is king. Another author described Texans’ commitment to high school football in this manner:
[The local high school boosters] are not simply football fans, after all, but community leaders, men who regard the support of high school football as a civic obligation, one more immediate than charity and more profound than voting, something on the order of civil defense.7
Geoff Winningham, Rites of Fall 8 (1979).
In my opinion, school boards have the unqualified right to hire, fire or reassign coaches. If Grounds had been reassigned in 1984 for his 2-8 record as a head football coach rather than nonrenewed, then no procedural due process violation would have occurred and this case would not have bounced between the Commissioner of Education and the courts of this state for the last nine years.
In conclusion, in my opinion, the trial court did not err in its factual and legal determinations in this case. However, nominal damages, such as $1.00, should have been awarded under Farrar,8 It is unfortunate that this case must continue, but our procedural rules mandate a remand to the court of appeals.

. See Southwestern Bell v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex.1991) (Gonzalez, J., concurring).

. Is this a "single injury" case? The "one satisfaction rule” limits an injured party to a single satisfaction for one injury. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.1991).

. The contract contained a clause which stated that an "employee is subject to assignment and reassignment at any time during the contract term.”

. Technically, the use of the term "directed verdict" in a bench trial is incorrect because there is no jury to direct. In this situation, the correct procedure is for the defendant, at the close of the plaintiffs evidence, to make a "motion for judgment." See McDaniel v. Carruth, 637 S.W.2d 498, 503 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).

. If the trial court had found that damages on the tort were existent, but minimal, such a factual finding could be properly challenged on appeal by claiming that the finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Justice Raul A. Gonzalez & Rob Gilbreath, Appellate Review of a Jury’s Finding of “Zero Damages," 54 Tex.B.J. 418 (May 1991). *423This is not the case here. Here, the trial court found that the record contained absolutely no evidence of damages and reasonable minds cannot differ on the matter. This case falls within "zone 1" and can be disposed of by the court "as a matter of law.” See William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at "No Evidence” and "InsufficientEvidence,"69 TexX.Rev. 515 (1991).

. However, it is interesting to note that Grounds testified that he has never sought another coaching job. It is common for coaches that are fired by one district to be hired by other districts and work their way up to head coach.

. I wish that this same enthusiasm and passion would be shown for academics, but this is another matter.

. The trial court’s failure to award nominal damages in this case is easily understandable, however, since such damages were not specifically requested by Grounds and the case was tried before the Supreme Court issued the Far-rar decision.