Court Opinion

ID: 9532456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:21:28.868241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:45.939744
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
I cannot agree that the evidence is sufficient on which to predicate a verdict of murder of the first degree under the law of this state. We are not here interpreting or applying the law of Moses—“whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.” (Gen. IX.6.) “And thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.” (Deu. XIX.21.)
We are interpreting and applying the law of California. Under our law every homicide is not murder and every murder is not of the first degree. First degree murder is defined in section 189 of the Penal Code as follows: “All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem, is murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree.”
As correctly stated in the majority opinion the only theory upon which the homicide here could be held to be murder of the first degree is, that it was committed in an attempt to perpetrate burglary or rape. From an examination of the record there appears to be little doubt but that defendant was intoxicated beyond a point where he did not know or appreciate what he was doing. But conceding that the evidence was sufficient to support the implied finding of the jury that he was not intoxicated, I am convinced that the evidence was not sufficient to give rise to an inference that he intended to perpetrate rape on either Mrs. Inglet or Mrs. McDonald. In my opinion the only rational conclusion to be reached from the record in this case is that defendant while in a drunken stupor perpetrated the sordid acts which resulted in the death of Mrs. McDonald. It was a ghastly and terrible crime, unprovoked and unjustified from any point of view, but I am unable to reach the conclusion from the record before us that it falls within the definition of *320murder of the first degree as defined in the above quoted section of the Penal Code. (People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387 [281 P. 609] ; People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72 [207 P.2d 51].)
For the foregoing reasons I would reduce the degree of the crime to that of murder of the second degree.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 8, 1957. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.