Court Opinion

ID: 9910463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 18:03:24.222241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:00.555357
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 231808-U
                                             No. 1-23-1808B
                                     Order filed December 15, 2023
                                                                                      Fourth Division

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
     limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                                 IN THE
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                            FIRST DISTRICT

     THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                       )       Appeal from the Circuit
                                                                )       Court of Cook County.
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 )
                                                                )
            vs.                                                 )       No. 23 CR 6501
                                                                )
     AVANTE ROGERS,                                             )       Honorable
                                                                )       Thomas J. Byrne,
            Defendant-Appellant.                                )       Judge, presiding.

            JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Ocasio III concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

¶1          Held:   The State had the statutory authority to petition to revoke defendant’s previously
                    set monetary bond where its petition was filed in response to defendant’s petition
                    to remove conditions. The circuit court’s order detaining the defendant was not an
                    abuse of discretion where the State met its burden when it proved by clear and
                    convincing evidence that the proof was evident, and the presumption great, that
                    defendant committed arson and that he poses a real and present threat to the safety
                    of an identifiable person or persons.

¶2          Defendant Avante Rogers appeals the circuit court’s order denying pretrial release,

     pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023). Rogers was arrested and

     charged prior to the effective date of Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as
     No. 1-23-1808B

     the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act).1 For the following

     reasons, we affirm.

¶3                                               I. BACKGROUND

¶4           Rogers was charged with one count of the Class 2 forcible felony of arson that damages

     any real or personal property of another worth $150 or more. 720 ILCS 5/20-1(a)(1), (c) (West

     2022). He was ordered held on a $45,000 D bond but was unable to post the requisite $4500 and

     remained in custody.2

¶5           Pursuant to sections 5/110-2 and 5/110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

     (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-2, 110-6.1 (West 2022)), the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial

     release on September 29, 2023, 11 days after the Act became effective. See Rowe v. Raoul, 2023

     IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay of pretrial release provisions and setting an effective date of Sept. 18,

     2023); Pub. Acts 101-652, § 10-255, 102- 1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). The petition alleged that

     Rogers committed an eligible offense as listed in Section 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code in that he

     “is charged with Arson. *** Video shows Defendant breaking car window and placing flaming

     item inside.” The State further asserted that Rogers posed “a real and present threat to the safety

     of any person or persons in the community.” Specifically, the State relayed that:

                      “Defendant poses a real and present threat to the victim’s safety. Defendant had

             been harassing and stalking victim for approximately 7 months since their brief dating

             relationship ended. Victim installed cameras outside her home due to prior incidents of

             stalking. Victim’s car windows had been smashed twice between the time she ended the

             1
               “The Act has also sometimes been referred to in the press as the Pretrial Fairness Act. Neither
     name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or public act.” Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL
     129248, ¶ 4 n. 1.
             2
               While the record does not contain the date of Rogers’s arrest, it does indicate that he was in custody
     on June 30, 2023.

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     No. 1-23-1808B

            dating relationship with defendant and the time of this incident. Defendant made

            post-Miranda admissions to breaking Victim’s car window on the date of this incident.”

¶6          The court conducted a hearing on the petition that same day. Defense counsel noted that

     she had filed a “Petition to Remove the Conditions of Cash Bond for Release,” but the court

     proceeded with the State’s petition first. Defense counsel did not object. The State proceeded by

     proffer, arguing that the proof is evident, or the presumption great that Rogers committed the

     forcible felony of arson in that:

                    “the defendant and the victim had a brief dating relationship that ended in October

            of 2022. So on the date of April 25th of 2023 around 12:30 in the morning, the defendant

            went to the area of the victim’s residence in Chicago, Cook County, Illinois.

                    The victim’s car was parked outside. The defendant *** struck the back window of

            the victim’s car[,] breaking that window.

                    The defendant left and returned with an object that was on fire. He took that object

            and placed it in the car through the broken window, which ignited the interior of the vehicle,

            and set it ablaze. And the defendant left the scene.

                    This was recorded on video cameras that the victim had installed based on previous

            incidents involving the defendant stalking and harassing her in the seven months since the

            relationship ended. The victim’s car windows had been broken on two previous occasions.

                    Additionally, the victim had other incidents of the defendant making unwanted

            behaviors. The defendant was placed under arrest and made a post Miranda statement in

            summary that he admitted breaking the back window of the victim’s vehicle. He did not

            admit to setting the car on fire but did admit to breaking the window.

                                                      3
     No. 1-23-1808B

                     The defendant stated he remained on scene and could hear the sirens and fire trucks.

             He stated he felt momentary satisfaction from the act but nothing permanent, and defendant

             stated that he honestly didn’t think he would get caught.”

     The State further argued that Rogers poses a real and present threat to the victim and indicated

     “there was a pattern of behavior because the defendant would not accept that the relationship was

     over.” The State noted that there was an active order of protection (OP) in place against Rogers

     and that it was Rogers’s first arrest.

¶7           Defense counsel argued the petition should be denied and requested that Rogers—a

     22-year-old high school graduate who worked two jobs prior to his arrest and aspires to become a

     carpenter—instead be released on electronic monitoring (EM). While acknowledging the

     seriousness of arson, defense counsel countered that this incident is probationable and “isn’t like

     an arson of a home where there is [sic] potentially people present. There were no people in the

     area, any risk to the victim o[r] public safety.” Counsel further argued that the video of the incident

     does not show the individual’s face and that there is “actually no evidence that Mr. Rogers is the

     one that set the fire other than speculation of the complaining witness.” The State responded that

     while the offender’s face is not visible on the video, the victim recognized the hoodie the offender

     was wearing and was familiar with Rogers’s body size, appearance, and clothing. It was unclear if

     the OP had been served as of the date of the instant incident, but it was granted based on a previous

     incident where Rogers had damaged both the victim’s car and the victim’s brother’s car, and

     thrown a brick through the window of the victim’s residence.

¶8           The court granted the State’s motion for pretrial detention, finding the proof evident and

     the presumption great that Rogers committed the offense and that he posed a real and present threat

     to the safety of any persons, specifically the victim, but also anyone else who may be involved in

     the victim’s life. The court’s written order detailed: (1) “the proof is evident or the presumption

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       No. 1-23-1808B

       great that the defendant has committed an eligible offense *** Arson”; (2) Rogers poses a real and

       present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, as “defendant had been

       harassing and stalking the C.W., a person defendant had been dating previously, defendant broke

       the window of her car and burnt her car;” and (3) that no less restrictive conditions can mitigate

       the real and present threat because “defendant’s ongoing conduct has not stopped and even

       escalated.” On October 2, 2023 Rogers filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶9                                                II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10          On appeal, Rogers argues the trial court committed plain error when it heard and

       subsequently granted the State’s petition to detain him. Alternatively, Rogers alleges that the

       circuit court erred in finding that the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that he

       committed arson, that he was a threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, and

       that there were no lesser conditions that could mitigate that threat.

¶ 11          The State counters that there was no “plain error” where it properly presented its petition

       simultaneously with Rogers’s petition for pretrial release. The State contends that the trial court

       did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers pretrial release where the State proved by clear and

       convincing evidence that Rogers committed a qualifying offense under the Act, that he posed a

       real and present threat to the safety of the victim (and those surrounding her), and that there are no

       condition or conditions sufficient to mitigate that threat.

¶ 12          In considering this appeal, this court has reviewed the following documents which Rogers

       and the State have submitted under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023): (1)

       Rogers’s notice of appeal pursuant to the Act, (2) the supporting record, (3) Rogers’s supporting

       memorandum, and (4) the State’s response to Rogers’s memorandum.

¶ 13                                     A. State’s Verified Petition

                                                         5
       No. 1-23-1808B

¶ 14          Rogers first argues that the Act does not permit the State to file a petition to deny pretrial

       release where a defendant is unable to meet a previously ordered monetary bond. As the state was

       not permitted to file its petition, Rogers claims the trial court erred by considering and granting

       the State’s petition. The State contends that once a defendant subject to Section 5/110-7.5 of the

       Code exercises their right to a hearing under the Act, the entirety of the Act applies—including

       the State’s ability to file a detention petition. Rogers neither objected to the State’s petition at the

       time the State filed it, nor did he raise the issue in his notice of appeal. Instead, he requests we

       review this issue for plain error.

¶ 15          Under certain circumstances, the plain error doctrine permits review of an otherwise

       forfeited claim of error. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48; People v. Johnson, 238 Ill. 2d 478,

       484 (2010). The doctrine allows this court to address clear and obvious errors that were

       unpreserved at the trial level. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). A defendant must

       show either that (1) “the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the

       scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,” or (2) the “error

       is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the

       judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

       People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 60. A court's misapplication of the law amounts to plain error

       if it affects a defendant's fundamental right to liberty. People v. Smith, 2016 IL App (1st) 140496,

       ¶ 15. The defendant has the burden of persuasion under both prongs of the plain error doctrine.

       People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). The first step in our analysis is to determine whether

       there was any error. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. Absent any clear or obvious error, there can be

       no plain error and the defendant's forfeiture will be honored. People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 602

       (2008); People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121, ¶ 19.

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       No. 1-23-1808B

¶ 16           The issue Rogers raises was recently addressed in People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th)

       230837. See also People v. Gray 2023 IL App (3d) 230435; People v. Eccles, 2023 IL App (4th)

       230840-U. On appeal, the defendant in Jones claimed the Act does not allow the State to file a

       responsive verified detention petition in cases where a defendant remains in custody after having

       been ordered released on the condition of depositing security. 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶¶ 1, 12.

       Similar to this case, Jones filed a motion for pretrial release prior to the State’s filing of its petition

       to deny pretrial release. Id. ¶ 4. The Jones panel held that:

                       “Based on [the] plain language [of 725 ILCS 5/110-6(i)], the Code does not require

               the State to file all its petitions within 21 days of a case’s commencement. Section 110-6(g)

               allows for the increase of pretrial release conditions after a hearing. 725 ILCS 5/110-6(g)

               (West 2022). For defendants arrested and detained before the Act’s effective date who

               remained in detention after being granted pretrial release on the condition that they pay

               monetary bail, a motion to deny pretrial release following the Act’s implementation

               operates as a motion to increase the pretrial release conditions to the furthest extent. The

               Code, as amended by the Act, allows the State to seek to modify pretrial release conditions,

               which includes filing a responding petition where the defendant moves for pretrial release.

               See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(g), (i), 110-6.1(a) (West 2022); see also In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289,

               316, 827 N.E.2d 466, 484 (2005) (finding it is ‘a fundamental requirement of due process

               *** that a respondent be afforded the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in

               a meaningful manner’); LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998) (‘The core of due

               process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.’).” Id. ¶ 17.

¶ 17           The court further found that “the State’s responding petition functions as a motion to

       increase the conditions of pretrial release following the Act’s implementation. See 725 ILCS

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       No. 1-23-1808B

       5/110-6(g) (West 2022). Thus, the State’s petition was not barred by the restrictions contained in

       section 110-6.1(c)(1). See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022).” Id. ¶ 20.

¶ 18           We note, as the panel in Jones did, that there has been a divide in this court’s decisions

       regarding the State’s authority, or lack thereof, to file petitions seeking to deny defendant’s pretrial

       release pursuant to section 5/110-6 of the Code. See People v. Gray, 2023 IL App (3d) 230435

       (Code permits the State to file a responding petition in cases where a defendant was arrested and

       detained prior to the Act’s effective date and remained in detention after monetary bail was set);

       People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807 (State may petition for the denial of pretrial release

       of defendants who were ordered released on bond but were still detained when the Act went into

       effect); People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724 (timing requirements in Section 110-6 of the

       Code are inapplicable to defendants arrested prior to the effective date of the Act who have not

       been released following their arrest); People v Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698 (same); People

       v. Kurzeja, 2023 IL App (3d) 230434 (State is entitled to file a responding petition once a defendant

       elects to have their pretrial conditions reviewed anew); People v. Clark, 2023 IL App (1st) 231770

       (State is prohibited from filing a petition to detain a defendant once the State has previously agreed

       that the trial court should set bail).

¶ 19           We find the reasoning in Jones and Gray persuasive and agree that “the Code permits the

       State to file a responding petition in cases such as the one at issue”—where a defendant was

       arrested and detained prior to the Act’s effective date, remained in detention after monetary bail

       was set, and filed a petition to remove pretrial conditions pursuant to the Act. Jones, 2023 IL App

       (4th) 230837, ¶ 24. See People v. Gray, 2023 IL App (3d) 230435 (finding “the State is permitted

       to file a responding petition in situations such as this where a defendant (1) was arrested and

       detained prior to the implementation of the Act, (2) remained in detention after monetary bail was

       set, and (3) filed a motion seeking to modify pretrial release conditions.”). In the instant case, both

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       No. 1-23-1808B

       Rogers and the State filed petitions pursuant to the Act. The circuit court proceeded on the State’s

       filing first. Despite Rogers’s argument that “the trial court incorrectly ignored Defense counsel’s

       request by instead holding a Section 110-6.1 detention hearing and ordering Rogers detained,” we

       find no error in the court addressing the State’s petition first. See People v. Bradford, 2023 IL App

       (1st) 231785, ¶ 29 (defendant failed to explain why hearings to set pretrial release conditions and

       hearings to deny pretrial release are mutually exclusive and cannot be held in tandem, when

       “efficiency would be best served by proceeding on both matters at the same time.”). As we have

       found the State may file a responding petition, our plain error analysis need go no further. See

       Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 602 (without error, there can be no plain error).

¶ 20                                  B. Trial Court’s Pretrial Release Order

¶ 21           Alternatively, Rogers contends the circuit court erred in finding that the State proved by

       clear and convincing evidence that the presumption is great or the proof is evident that he

       committed arson, that he was a threat to the safety of any identificable person or persons or the

       community, and that there were no lesser conditions that could assure the safety of the victim in

       this case. The State counters that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

       detention was appropriate where it proved by clear and convincing evidence that Rogers

       committed arson, that he poses a threat to the victim’s safety, and that no lesser conditions could

       mitigate that threat.

¶ 22           We initially note that the parties disagree on the appropriate standard of review. Rogers

       contends we should review the circuit court’s decision to determine if it is against the manifest

       weight of the evidence. The State argues the applicable standard is abuse of discretion. We agree

       with the State. Appeals of bail orders under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(c)(1) (eff. Sept. 18,

       2023) have historically been reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Inman,

       2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court’s “ ‘ruling

                                                        9
       No. 1-23-1808B

       is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted

       by the circuit court.’ ” In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 24 (quoting Blum v. Koster,

       235 Ill. 2d 21, 36 (2009)); see People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (3d) 190582, ¶ 8. While Illinois

       Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023) provides a new procedure for these types of

       appeals, “the Act neither mandates nor suggests a different standard of review.” Inman, 2023 IL

       App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11.

¶ 23          “A defendant appealing under Rule 604(h) may claim the State failed to fulfill its burden

       by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1)(iii) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023). However,

       we are not reviewing the State’s evidence anew.” Id. Rather, we review the circuit court’s

       evaluation of that evidence for an abuse of discretion, as “a court’s decisions regarding whether

       the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that release conditions would not protect the

       community is inextricably linked to any decision to grant or deny pretrial release.” People v. Jones,

       2023 IL App (4th) 230837. This court will not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court

       merely because we would have analyzed the appropriate factors differently. Inman, 2023 IL App

       (4th) 230864, ¶ 11.

¶ 24          Pursuant to the Code, “it is presumed that a defendant is entitled to release on personal

       recognizance on the condition that the defendant shall attend all required court proceedings and

       the defendant does not commit any criminal offense, and complies with all terms of pretrial

       release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2022). It is the State’s burden to prove by clear and

       convincing evidence that “no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably

       ensure the appearance of the defendant for later hearings or prevent the defendant from being

       charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2022).

       Upon such a showing, the trial court may order a defendant detained if the defendant is charged

       with a qualifying offense and the circuit court concludes the defendant poses a real and present

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       No. 1-23-1808B

       threat to the safety of any persons or the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1-7) (West 2022). If

       the court finds that detention is not appropriate, it can impose additional conditions as it deems

       necessary. 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) (West 2022).

¶ 25                                          1. Proof of the Offense

¶ 26          Rogers specifically argues that the State’s proffer of the incident “indicates that Rogers

       might have damaged the victim’s car in the instant case, [but] it has alleged no facts that such

       damage rose to the level of arson.” Additionally, Rogers attacks the State’s reliance on the content

       of the video as proof that he committed the acts, where the “State’s entire proffer is based solely

       on the CW’s word [that the individual in the video is Rogers].” 3

¶ 27          Here, the circuit court heard arguments from both parties and determined that the “proof

       [of the offense] is evident and the presumption great” that Rogers committed the arson.

       Specifically, the proffered evidence indicated that a masked individual, in a hoodie, broke the back

       window of the victim’s car. That same individual then returned with an object that was on fire and

       placed it in the car through the broken window, setting the interior ablaze. The incident was

       captured on video, although Rogers is correct that the individual’s face is indiscernible due to the

       offender being masked. However, the State proffered that not only was the victim familiar with

       Rogers and recognized the sweatshirt from the video as one that Rogers frequently wore, but also

       that Rogers made a post-Mirandized statement admitting he was the offender who broke the car

       window. As the State’s proffer indicates, the video shows the same offender both breaking the

       window and setting the car on fire. We cannot say the court’s finding that the State met its burden

       in proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident and the presumption great

       that Rogers committed the offense of arson to be arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable. Inman, 2023

              3
                  CW means complaining witness.

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       No. 1-23-1808B

       IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 10. Nor can we say that no reasonable person would agree with the position

       adopted by the circuit court. Id. Further, as the Act specifically authorizes the State to proceed by

       way of proffer, we reject Roger’s insinuation that the State ought to have presented direct

       testimony from eyewitnesses to support that he is the offender, rather than relying on the victim’s

       statements. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2), (5) (West 2022).

¶ 28                                                 2. Safety

¶ 29          Rogers next argues the State did not prove that Rogers posed a real and present threat to

       the safety of the victim, where the record indicates uncertainty regarding whether the victim’s

       previous OP had been properly served upon Rogers. Specifically, he argues that “[i]f Rogers

       supposedly is such a threat to the CW’s safety, then it is inexplicable why the OP’s service would

       not have been prioritized.” He further contends that the State alleged no facts that Rogers intended

       to cause the victim or anyone else harm, and that “the specific and articulable facts of the case

       demonstrate that Rogers is not a danger to anyone[, b]ecause no one was present when the CW’s

       car was allegedly set on fire, [and] no one was injured.” Lastly, Rogers argues a probational offense

       should not “be considered dangerous enough to warrant pretrial detention.” We find Rogers’s

       arguments unpersuasive.

¶ 30          Rogers is charged with arson, which is a detainable offense under the Act. See 725 ILCS

       5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). Pursuant to the Code, the circuit court must consider the various

       factors listed in sections 5/110-6.1(g) and 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(8) before concluding whether detention

       is appropriate. 725 ILCS 5/110- 6.1(a)(1)-(8), (g) (West 2022). Per the State’s petition and proffer:

       (1) Rogers had a seven-month history of stalking and harassing the victim in this case, (2) there

       was an active OP ordered for the protection of the victim, (3) Rogers broke the back window of

       the victim’s car and set it on fire at 12:30 in the morning, (4) he thereafter remained on the scene

       and heard the sirens and fire trucks, and (5) Rogers further made post-Miranda statements

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       No. 1-23-1808B

       admitting he was the perpetrator who broke the window and stated that he felt momentary

       satisfaction from the act but nothing permanent, and that he honestly did not think he would get

       caught.

¶ 31             On appeal, Rogers offers the same arguments he made before the circuit court. We will not

       reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court. Inman, 2023 IL App

       (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. The circuit court found that based upon the facts of this case and the proffered

       evidence that Rogers had been harassing and stalking the victim, a person he had previously briefly

       dated, Rogers posed a real and present threat to the safety of not only the victim, but those who

       may interject themselves into her life as well. Rogers is correct that the record before the court

       does not indicate whether the prior OP had been properly served upon him at the time of the instant

       offense. Nor does it indicate when the OP was granted. Regardless of this fact, we find his

       argument disingenuous. There are a myriad of reasons why a person might not be immediately

       served with an OP and nothing in the record indicates that the victim did not “prioritize” service,

       nor can Rogers point to support for his conclusion that the lack of immediate service of an OP

       indicates there is no danger to a victim. Further, he cites no support for the proposition that a

       defendant cannot be considered a danger to the safety of others if they commit an offense where

       “no one was injured.” As to Roger’s argument that a probational offense should not “be considered

       dangerous enough to warrant pretrial detention,” we note the circuit court directly addressed this

       contention in its findings, and stated that, “[i]t is a probationable case. It's also a case in which the

       statute of law was detention.” Based on the facts of this case, we cannot say that no reasonable

       person would agree with the court’s finding that Rogers posed a real and present threat. Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 32                                           3. Lesser Conditions

¶ 33             Last, Rogers contends that the State merely presented a conclusory statement that “no

       condition or combination of conditions set forth under the law can mitigate the risk the defendant

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       No. 1-23-1808B

       poses to the victim.” Because the State failed to attach exhibits or documents to support its

       assertion, Rogers claims, it could not have met its burden to prove said assertion. The State argues

       that, given Rogers’s increased and escalating violence, it was not unreasonable for the trial court

       to find that no less restrictive conditions could mitigate the danger Rogers posed. We agree with

       the State.

¶ 34           As detailed above, the evidence proffered at the hearing indicated that Rogers had

       participated in a months-long history of staking and harassing the victim, a woman with whom he

       had a brief relationship. Despite two prior incidences where Rogers had broken the victim’s

       windows (even admitting he was wrong to have done that) and an active OP, Rogers continued to

       escalate his conduct. Contrary to Rogers’s claims, the court did not simply make a conclusory

       statement that no less restrictive conditions would avoid the danger to the safety of the victim and

       others. In its written order detaining Rogers, the court noted that no less restrictive conditions can

       mitigate the real and present threat because “defendant’s ongoing conduct has not stopped and

       even escalated.” We cannot say the court’s findings were unreasonable or arbitrary or that no

       reasonable person would agree with the court.

¶ 35                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36           We find that the State appropriately filed a detention petition despite defendant’s

       previously set monetary bond where its petition was filed after defendant’s petition to remove

       conditions. Following a thorough review of the record on appeal, for the reasons stated, we find

       the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the State met its burden and we therefore affirm

       the trial court’s order detaining Rogers. The mandate in this case shall issue immediately. See

       People v. Gil, 2019 IL App (1st) 192419, ¶ 21.

¶ 37           Affirmed.

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