Court Opinion

ID: 4234119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2018-01-03 20:25:00.782018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:41.878336
License: Public Domain

J-A29010-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                      v.                       :
                                               :
                                               :
GREGORY RAHEEM GIDDINGS                        :
                                               :
                Appellant                      :   No. 3493 EDA 2016

            Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 21, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0015079-2012

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., PLATT*, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                             FILED JANUARY 03, 2018

       Gregory Raheem Giddings appeals from the judgment of sentence,

imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following his

convictions for second-degree murder, burglary, robbery, conspiracy to

commit burglary and robbery, and two counts of Violation of the Uniform

Firearms Act (“VUFA”).1 After careful review, we affirm.

       On September 19, 2014, a jury found Giddings guilty of the foregoing

charges following a trial presided over by the Honorable Rose Marie Defino-

Nastasi.    On January 21, 2015, the trial court sentenced Giddings to life

imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction; he received no

____________________________________________

118 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 903, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106, and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108, respectively.

____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A29010-17

further penalty for the remaining convictions.2        On September 3, 2015,

Giddings filed a timely first pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546, in which he claimed that counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal.   The PCRA court appointed

David Rudenstein, Esquire, as Giddings’ counsel, and on May 22, 2016,

Giddings filed an amended petition asserting that trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance when he failed to file his requested appeal.3 On October

13, 2016, Giddings’ PCRA petition was granted, and his appellate rights were

reinstated nunc pro tunc. Both Giddings and the trial court have complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Giddings raises the following issues:

       1. The evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty as
          the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
          that Giddings engaged in a burglary or robbery and the death
          of the victim did not occur during the course of a felony.

____________________________________________

2 On February 20, 2015, thirty days after Giddings’ sentencing hearing, trial
counsel W. Fred Harrison, Jr., Esquire, filed an untimely post-sentence motion
requesting a new trial. In his motion, Giddings alleged that (1) the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence, and (2) the evidence was insufficient
to support the verdict. Attorney Harrison titled the motion “POST TRIAL
MOTIONS NUNC PRO TUNC,” however, there is no indication in the record that
the trial court granted Giddings leave to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro
tunc. Accordingly, the motion was not entered in the certified docket. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) (“[A] written post-sentence motion shall be filed no
later than 10 days after imposition of sentence.”)

3 Giddings’ amended PCRA petition only sought the following relief: (1) an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Giddings actually requested trial
counsel file an appeal, and (2) restoration of appellate rights nunc pro tunc.
Giddings’ amended petition did not seek restoration of his rights to file a post-
sentence motion. The Commonwealth did not oppose Giddings’ amended
PCRA petition.

                                           -2-
J-A29010-17

      2. The verdict was against the weight of the evidence as the
         evidence only supports that Giddings was present at the scene
         but not that he was committing a felony.

Brief of Appellant, at 6 (reworded for clarity).

Our standard of review in reviewing sufficiency claims is well settled:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
      the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
      in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
      is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
      element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the
      above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
      judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts
      and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
      preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
      defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
      evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
      probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
      circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
      proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
      means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
      the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
      evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder
      of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
      weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
      of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-44 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      Here, the evidence presented at trial supported a finding that Giddings

set the warehouse robbery in motion, after which he fired two shots at the

fleeing victim; thus, he is responsible for the resultant death. See Trial Court

Opinion, 3/22/16, at 8-13.

      Upon review of the parties’ briefs, the record, the relevant law and Judge

Defino-Nastasi’s decision, we find that the trial court’s well-reasoned decision

                                      -3-
J-A29010-17

comprehensively and correctly disposes of Giddings’ sufficiency issue on

appeal.    Accordingly, we affirm in part based on Judge Defino-Nastasi’s

decision. We direct counsel to attach a copy of that opinion in the event of

further proceedings in this matter.

       Giddings next claims that his conviction is against the weight of the

evidence; however, Giddings has waived this claim on appeal. To preserve a

challenge to the weight of the evidence, a defendant must raise the claim

before the trial court in a motion for a new trial: (1) orally, before sentencing;

(2) by written motion, before sentencing; or (3) in a post-sentence motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. An appellate claim raising the weight of the evidence is

therefore a challenge to the trial court’s exercise of discretion in ruling on the

claim in the first instance, and must be preserved below. Commonwealth

v. West, 937 A.2d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2007).

       Instantly, Giddings did not raise a weight claim at any time during trial

or by filing a post-sentence motion pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(a).

Additionally, Giddings did not seek reinstatement of his post-sentence motion

rights in either his pro se PCRA petition or his counseled petition.4 Therefore,
____________________________________________

4 In any event, Giddings’ belated weight claim is meritless. This court’s
“standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is
distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court. Appellate
review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the
underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Mucci, 143 A.3d 399, 410-11 (Pa. Super.
2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 2013).
“In order for an appellant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the

                                           -4-
J-A29010-17

Giddings has waived his weight claim. See Commonwealth v. Washington,

825 A.2d 1264, 1265-66 (Pa. Super. 2003).

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/3/2018

____________________________________________

evidence, ‘the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the
verdict shocks the conscience of the court.’”     Id. at 411, quoting
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Here, the jury believed the Commonwealth’s evidence proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Giddings shot and killed the victim during the
commission of an armed robbery. Trial Court Opinion, 11/22/16, at 13-14. It
is within the province of the jury as fact-finder to resolve all issues of
credibility, resolve conflicts in evidence, make reasonable inferences from the
evidence, believe all, none, or some of the evidence, and ultimately adjudge
defendant guilty. Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 562 (Pa.
Super. 2006). We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding
that the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense
of justice.

                                           -5-
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0035_Opinion
                                                                                                                                                       Circulated 12/18/2017 03:53 PM

                                                  IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA

                                                                    CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION

                                COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                                                                 CP-51-CR-0015079-2012

                                       v.                                                                                    3493 EDA 20 lo

                                GREGORY R. GIDDINGS
                                    (aka Gregory Raheem Giddings)
                                                                                                                                                        FILED
                                                                                OPINION                                                                    MAR 22 20�
                                Rose Marie Defino-Nastasi, J.                                                                                  Criminal Appeals Unit
                                                                                                                                             First Judicial District of PA
                                                                      PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                        On September 19, 2014, the Defendant was found guilty after a jury trial, presided over

                                by the Honorable Rose Marie Defino-Nastasi, of Second Degree Murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502, as

                                a felony of the first degree; Burglary, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502, as a felony of the first degree; Robbery,

                                18 Pa.C.S. § 3701, as a felony of the first degree; Conspiracy to Commit Burglary and Robbery,

                                18 Pa.C.S. § 903, each a felony of the first degree; Violation of the Uniform Firearms Act

                                (VUFA), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106, as a felony of the third degree; and VUFA, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108, as a

                                misdemeanor of the first degree. N.T. 01/19/15 at pp. 145-148.

                                        On January 21, 2015, the Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the second

                                degree murder conviction; and no further penalty for the remaining convictions.

                                        On September 3, 2015, the Defendant filed a timely prose Post-Conviction Relief Act

                                (PCRA) petition, claiming that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal.

                                David Rudenstein, Esq. was appointed PCRA counsel and filed an amended petition requesting

                                Defendant's appellate rights to be reinstated nunc pro tune. On October 13, 2016, Defendant's
                                                                                                                   CP·St-Cll-OOt507!J.20t2 C-011�" v. Ciddmgs, G86 A.3d 272, 275-76 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing Com. v.

                                                                                                                                                                                   9
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                     Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 560 (Pa. Super. 2008), app. denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009)

                     (quoting Com. v. Smith, 956 A.2d 1029, 1035-36 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en bane).

                     "To secure a conviction for second-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that

             the defendant committed a murder while [he] was engaged ... in the perpetration of a felony."

             18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b) (internal quotation marks omitted). "'Perpetration of a felony' is statutorily

             defined in a very broad manner, encompassing, inter alia, '[t]he act of the defendant in engaging

             in ... the commission of, or an attempt to commit, ... robbery ... " Commonwealth v. Miller, 35

             A.3d 1206, 1212 (Pa. 2012) (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d).

                     A person commits robbery if, "in the course of committing a theft, he: (i) inflicts serious

             bodily injury upon another; (ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of

             immediate serious bodily injury; (iii) [or] commits or threatens immediately to commit any

             felony of the first or second degree." 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(l)(i)-(iii). "An act shall be deemed 'in

             the course of committing a theft' if it occurs in an attempt to commit a theft or in flight after the

             attempt or commission." Id. at§ 3701(a)(2). A theft means taking unlawful control of or

             exercising unlawful control over the movable property of another with intent to deprive him

             thereof. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921. It is not necessary that a defendant have successfully completed a

             theft in order to commit robbery. See Com. v. Robinson, 936 A.2d 107, 110 (Pa. Super. 2007).

                     The elements of the offense of burglary are defined as the entry of a building or occupied

             structure thereof, with the intent to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time

             open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter. 18 Pa.C.S. 3502. The specific

             intent required to make out a burglary charge may be found in defendant's words, conduct, or

             from the attendant circumstances together with all reasonable inferences therefrom.

                                                                                                                                                                              10
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               Commonwealth v. Atkins, 232 Pa.Super, 206, 335 A.2d 375 (1975); Commonwealth v. Carroll,

               412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 (1963).

                            A defendant also may be guilty of robbery or burglary as an accomplice or co-conspirator

               as long as the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the criminal act and the

               additional elements of accomplice liability or conspiratorial liability are established. Com. v.

               Mitchell, 135 A.3d 1097, 1102 (Pa. Super.), app. denied, 145 A.3d 725 (Pa. 2016). Conspiracy is

               defined as follows:

                            (a) Definition of conspiracy.-A person is guilty of conspiracy with another

                            person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating

                            its commission he:

                                 (1) Agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them

                                 will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or

                                 solicitation to commit such crime; or

                                 (2) Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission

                                 of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such a crime.                                                                                                                               .!
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ,!

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      .I
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      "n,,
               18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a). Where a conspiracy has multiple criminal objectives, a person is guilty of                                                                                                                        '!
              only one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      p
              continuous conspiratorial relationship. 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(c). Even if the conspirator did not act as                                                                                                                     :I
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          !

              a principal in committing the underlying crime, he is still criminally liable for the actions of his                                                                                                                        '

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      .1
              co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. Com. v. McCall, 911 A.2d 992, 996-97 (Pa.                                                                                                                              '

              Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      '1:
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      :;� .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      .,
                                                                                                                                                                                             II

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                                               It is clear that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the Defendant's

                               conviction for burglary of the Budd plant. The Defendant and his co-conspirators broke into the

                               building and retrieved copper piping from throughout the premises. The evidence established

                               that no permission was given to any of the co-conspirators to enter the premises or to remove any

                               items. The manholes in the factory were taken apart in order to remove the copper piping, after

                               which the pipes were taken elsewhere to be sold.

                                               The evidence at trial showed that, initially, the Defendant and his co-conspirators broke

                               into the Budd plant to steal copper. However, that plan was revised once the Defendant and his

                               co-conspirators determined that the decedent and Kashief Bailey were not going to give them

                               their cut of the proceeds. At that point, the Defend ant decided that he would wait until the

                               decedent and Bailey cut the copper and then take it from them by force with a gun. According to

                               Brittingham, when Brittingham suggested they wait and take what was left behind the Defendant

                               said, "[N]o, fuck that, we wiJl take the whole thing."

                                               The Defendant's own statement placed himself on the ramp shooting the gun. Bailey

                               testified that he saw the Defendant jump in front of his vehicle and point a black handgun at the

                               decedent and start shooting. Brittingham heard the Defendant yell "drop it" or "stop" before the

                               gunshots. Once the Defendant engaged in this action he became the principal actor in the robbery

                               and therefore the second degree murder.

                                               The Defendant claims that he fired only after Bailey attempted to hit him with the vehicle

                               and only at the tires. This is a distinction without a difference under the doctrine of felony

                               murder. There is no requirement of specific intent. The malice for second degree murder is the

                               commission of the underlying robbery. Furthermore, the gunshot wound to the decedent's back

                                                                                                                                            12
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             and the damage to the car belie this assertion. There were two bullet holes on the passenger's

             side and one to the windshield. Since the Defendant set the robbery in motion, he is liable for the

             death regardless. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as

             verdict winner, was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilt.

                                                             · Issue II

                     Defendant argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because the

             Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the charges of murder in the second

             degree, robbery, burglary and conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary.

                     The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to believe all,

             part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses. Com. v. Devine, 26

             A.3d 1139, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2011), app. denied, 42 A.3d 1059 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

             "[A] true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the

             verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed." Com. v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 758

             (Pa. Super. 2014). Accordingly, "[ojne of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a

             new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the

             evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice." Com. v. Clay, 64 A.3d

             1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013). A trial judge should not grant a new trial due to "a mere conflict in the

             testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion."

             Clay, 64 A.3d at I 055. Instead, the trial court must examine whether "notwithstanding all the

             facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal

             weight with all the facts is to deny justice." id c11 1055. Only where the jury verdict "is so

             contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice" should a trial court afford a Defendant

             a new trial. Id

                                                                                                                                                   13
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                          The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact. The jury's verdict in this

                case signifies that it believed the overwhelming direct and circumstantial evidence which proved

                beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant shot and killed the decedent while he was engaged

                in the commission of an armed robbery. The mere conflict in the testimony as to whether the

                Defendant aimed to shoot at the tires of the vehicle to avoid being hit or at the decedent is

                irrelevant to that determination. It is evident that the jury verdict is not so contrary to the

                evidence as to shock one's sense of justice, and therefore, the verdict was not against the weight

                of the evidence.

                                                                                     CONCLUSION

                          Based on the foregoing, the judgment of sentence of the trial court should be affirmed.

                                                                                                                   By the Court:

                                                                                                                   I ose Marie Def'ino-Nastasi, J.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                           14
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                                                      :_             .;;...._.___._ ....         -....   ·-------'-----·�... ·.·   .   '   _.... .....

                Commonwealth v, Gregory R. Giddings
                CP-Sl-CR-0015079-2012
                Opinion

                                                                                 Proof of Service

                I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing Court Order upon the person(s), and in
                the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 114:

                Defendant:                                      Gregory R. Giddings, L W 1024
                                                                SCI Rockview
                                                                1 Rockview Place
                                                                Box A
                                                                Bellefonte, PA 16823

                Type of Service: () Personal (x) First Class Mail () Other, Please Specify:

                Counsel:                                         David Rudenstein, Esq.
                                                                 9411 Evans Street
                                                                 Philadelphia, PA 19115

                Type of Service: () Personal (x) First Class Mail () Other, Please Specify:

                District Attorney:                               Philadelphia District Attorney's Office
                                                                 Widener Bldg.
                                                                 3 South Penn Square
                                                                 Philadelphia, PA 19107

                Type of Service: ( ) Personal ( ) First Class Mail (x) Inter-Office

                Date: 03/22/17
                                                                                                  1,  sq.
                                                                              Law Clerk to the      onorable Rose Marie Defino-Nastasi