Court Opinion

ID: 9373267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:50.313673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.652354
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     TOMMIE G. SAVAGE,                               DOCKET NUMBERS
                  Appellant,                         AT-0752-11-0634-B-1
                                                     AT-1221-12-0591-B-1
                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
                 Agency.                             DATE: October 31, 2022

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Michael D. Kohn, Esquire, Ashley Binetti, Brandon S. Walker and Felipe
             Bohnet-Gomez, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Elizabeth Vavrica, Jacksonville, Florida, for the agency.

           Ryan Andrew Black, Huntsville, Alabama, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
     in which the administrative judge sustained the appellant’s removal, dismissed

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

     her constructive suspension claim, and denied her request for corrective action
     under 5 U.S.C. § 1221.     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the
     appellant’s petition.   We REVERSE the portion of the initial decision that
     dismissed the appellant’s constructive suspension claim, find that the appellant
     suffered a constructive suspension within the Board’s jurisdiction, and
     REVERSE the suspension action. We also REVERSE the portion of the initial
     decision that sustained the charge of absence without leave (AWOL), and
     VACATE the portion of the decision that sustained the removal action.        We
     REMAND the case for further adjudication on the appellant’s whistleblowing
     reprisal claims concerning her removal; her constructive suspension; her
     November 2007 reassignment; and the March 2009 actions denying her requests
     for leave without pay (LWOP), advanced sick leave, and an extension of her
     return-to-work date.

                                    BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed as a Contract Specialist with the U.S. Army
     Engineer and Support Center in Huntsville, Alabama. Savage v. Department of
     the Army, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-11-0634-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF),
     Tab 64, Exhibits (Exs.) A-P, AD. Beginning in late 2006, and continuing into
     2007, the appellant reported what she claimed were illegal and improper
     contracting activities in the Ranges Program, which generally concerns the
     design and implementation of agency training facilities.       I-2 AF, Tab 64,
     Exs. AE, AG.     The appellant’s disclosures were a factor in the initiation of
     several command-directed inquiries, including an internal audit, which largely
     validated the appellant’s legal concerns, as well as an Army Regulation
     (AR) 15-6 investigation, which resulted in a report that identified the appellant
     by name as a source of the allegations of wrongdoing. Id., Exs. AK, EQ.
¶3        In June 2007, the appellant filed a formal equal employment opportunity
     (EEO) complaint, in which she alleged, inter alia, that she had been subjected to
                                                                                         3

     harassment and a hostile work environment because of her race and sex, in
     violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII).
     I-2 AF, Tab 64, Ex. BE. On October 17, 2007, the appellant and the agency
     entered into a negotiated settlement agreement that resolved the June 2007 EEO
     complaint, including “any and all claims, grievances, complaints or appeals,
     whether perfected or not, in this or any other forum . . . relating to any matters
     that occurred prior to the execution of this settlement agreement.” Id., Ex. BE.
     The agreement provided, inter alia, that the appellant would be reassigned “to a
     position comparable with her current grade and salary” with the agency’s Small
     Business Office (SBO) in Huntsville. Id. at 1. Effective November 11, 2007, the
     appellant was reassigned, with no reduction in pay, from her YC -1102-02
     Supervisory Contract Specialist position, to a YA-1102-02 Contract Specialist
     position with the SBO. I-2 AF, Tab 64, Exs. BE, BG.
¶4        On August 4, 2008, the appellant initiated contact with the agency’s EEO
     office, alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment as a
     result of race and sex discrimination and reprisal for her prior EEO activity.
     Savage v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket Nos. AT-0752-11-0634-B-1
     and AT-1221-12-0591-B-1, Remand Appeal File (RAF), Tab 49 at 98.
     At the request of the EEO office, she provided an addendum letter, dated
     August 15, 2008, describing numerous instances of alleged harassment that took
     place following her reassignment to the SBO. Id. at 99-112. She requested,
     among other remedies, that “[h]arassment . . . immediately cease and that I be
     allowed to do my job.” Id. at 112. Her initial contact was later followed by a
     November 4, 2008 formal EEO complaint in which she identified 25 specific
     incidents of alleged harassment. RAF, Tab 44. 2

     2
       The agency ultimately issued a final agency decision, dated December 28, 2010,
     finding that the appellant had not established her discrimination and reprisal claims.
     RAF, Tab 47 at 14-49.
                                                                                    4

¶5       In addition to her EEO activity, the appellant made disclosures, beginning
     in June 2008, concerning what she believed to be a violation of the Federal
     Acquisition Regulations in the failure to utilize Defense Department (DD)
     Form 2579, Small Business Coordination Record, in circumstances involving
     contract modifications.   I-2 AF, Tab 58 at 5-16.    On August 17, 2008, the
     appellant and her new first-level supervisor, Deputy Commander D.B., had a
     heated discussion concerning the DD Form 2579 issue. The appellant asserts
     that this confrontation was “the final straw” that resulted in her again seeking
     psychological counseling. RAF, Tab 48 at 28.
¶6       The following day, August 18, 2008, the appellant visited her treating
     psychologist, Dr. B.M., who recommended an 8-week leave of absence due to
     “intensifying depression, anxiety and work[ ] caused stress.”        Savage v.
     Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-11-0634-I-1, Initial Appeal
     File (IAF), Tab 9, Subtab 4hh. D.B. granted the appellant’s request for leave
     through October 20, 2008. Id., Subtabs 4ff–4gg. Subsequently, on October 18,
     2008, Dr. B.M. recommended that the appellant’s leave of absence be extended
     until December 22, 2008. Id., Subtab 4cc. D.B. initially denied the request, but
     after requesting and receiving additional      documentation from Dr. B.M.,
     he granted the appellant sick leave until December 5, 2008. Id., Subtabs 4z-4cc.
     The appellant later submitted a leave request under the Family and Medical
     Leave Act (FMLA), with a certification from Dr. B.M., and D.B. granted the
     appellant’s request for FMLA leave through March 5, 2009. Id., Subtabs 4w-4x.
¶7       By letter dated March 4, 2009, Dr. B.M. recommended that the appellant’s
     return-to-work date tentatively be changed from March 5, 2009, to May 4, 2009,
     and the appellant requested an additional leave of absence in accordance with
     that recommendation. IAF, Tab 9, Subtabs 4u-4v. D.B. denied the request in
     large part, but approved the appellant’s use of accrued sick leave through noon
     on March 12, 2009. Id., Subtab 4t. On March 11, 2009, the appellant requested
     advanced sick leave through May 4, 2009. Id., Subtab 4s. That same day, D.B.
                                                                                            5

     denied the request, citing the appellant’s “previous inability to return to work
     according to [her] psychologist’s estimates.” Id., Subtab 4r.
¶8         The appellant requested reconsideration and submitted an additional letter
     from Dr. B.M., dated March 13, 2009.            Id., Subtabs 4p-4q.      In that letter,
     Dr. B.M. stated, in part:
            [The appellant] is experiencing severe depression and intensified
            anxiety related to her work environment. [She] has perceived her
            work environment [as] hostile and is overwhelmed with fear and
            anxiety over returning to that environment. Her supervisors have not
            been supportive and she believes that they are personally against her.
     Id., Subtab 4q. Dr. B.M. further opined:
            She has been diagnosed with Acute Stress Disorder (308.3) and
            Major Depression Disorder (296.33). Acute Stress Disorder is the
            effect of being exposed to traumatic event(s) that involves threat to
            self and the person’s response involves intense [helplessness]. [Her]
            work environment has produced these disturbances for her. The
            depression is severe, but without psychotic features.          She is
            experiencing severe anxiety attacks, having headaches, suffering at
            night with nightmares, and her skin has started to break out again.
            She is emotionally unable to function effective[ly] within her current
            work environment.
     Id.   Dr. B.M. again recommended that the appellant’s return-to-work date be
     extended to May 4, 2009, but indicated that this date was “tentative.” Id. D.B.
     again denied the appellant’s request for advanced sick leave, and also denied her
     subsequent request for LWOP.         Id., Subtabs 4m-4o.      On April 3, 2009, D.B.
     informed the appellant that her leave was exhausted and that she therefore would
     be placed in an absence without leave (AWOL) status.             Id., Subtab 4l.    The
     appellant entered AWOL status on April 2, 2009. Id., Subtab 4f. 3

     3
       On April 3, 2009, the appellant filed another formal EEO complaint, in which she
     alleged that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment, based on r eprisal for
     her 2007 and 2008 EEO complaints. IAF, Tab 4. She named D.B. as the discriminating
     official and cited the denial of her request for LWOP, among other alleged retaliatory
     actions. Id. The agency ultimately issued a final agency decision find ing no
     discrimination as to the allegations set forth in her April 3, 2009 complaint. Id.
                                                                                     6

¶9         On May 4, 2009, the appellant reported to work briefly but became
      physically ill and left after approximately 1 hour. IAF, Tab 9, Subtab 4k. In a
      May 6, 2009 letter, Dr. B.M. recounted the incident and recommended
      September 1, 2009, as a new tentative return-to-work date. Id. She reiterated
      her diagnosis of Acute Stress Disorder and Major Depression Disorder, and
      further stated:   “[The appellant’s] work environment has been traumatic.
      Returning to her work place caused a spontaneous recovery of her previous
      symptoms. She is emotionally unable to function effective[ly] in her current
      work environment.” Id. The appellant submitted a copy of the May 6, 2009
      letter to D.B. and requested that her AWOL status be converted to LWOP or
      advanced sick leave. Id., Subtab 4j.
¶10        In response to that request, D.B. issued a letter to Dr. B.M., requesting
      additional information. Id., Subtab 4h. D.B. also requested that the appellant
      meet with a psychologist of his choosing for a second opinion. Id., Subtab 4i.
      Dr. B.M. did not respond to the request for additional information. The agency’s
      consulting psychologist, Dr. J.H., met with the appellant on July 8, 2009, and on
      July 19, 2009, he provided a written assessment based on the interview and his
      review of the records provided by the appellant’s psychologist. Id., Subtab 4g.
      He concluded, in relevant part:
           The present evaluation indicates that [the appellant] suffers a serious
           mental illness. The diagnostic impression was major depression,
           single episode, moderate to severe, with possible psychotic features,
           and anxiety disorder [not otherwise specified] with generalized
           anxiety and panic attack features. . . .
           The seriousness of these conditions suggests that [the appellant] has
           been medically and psychologically unable to work since
           August 2008 because of a mental condition. Poor stress tolerance,
           fatigue, poor emotional control, extreme anxiety, panic attacks,
           agoraphobia, feelings of hopelessness and loss of will or
           determination are the factors that have made her unable to function
           in her role as a Corps of Engineer[s] officer and manager.
           It is unlikely that [the appellant] will be able to return to the
           previous work in the next six to twelve months.          There is
                                                                                           7

              considerable doubt in the mind of the undersigned that she will ever
              return to the currently assigned workplace, but continued treatment
              might be helpful in bringing that about or assisting [her] to the point
              that she could work for the Corps in some other capacity.
      Id., Subtab 4g.
¶11         By notice dated September 14, 2009, D.B. proposed to remove the appellant
      based     on   three   charges:    (1)   AWOL;     (2)    Excessive   Absences;    and
      (3) Unavailability to Report for Duty with No Foreseeable End.           IAF, Tab 9,
      Subtab 4d. The appellant did not provide a response to the deciding official. 4
      By letter dated November 3, 2009, the deciding official notified the appellant of
      his decision to remove her, effective November 6, 2009. Id., Subtab 4b.
¶12         The appellant filed a timely Board appeal of her removal, raising
      affirmative defenses of race and sex discrimination and retaliation for EEO
      activity. IAF, Tab 1. In particular, she alleged that the removal was the ultimate
      result of the agency creating a hostile work environment where she could not
      perform her duties and responsibilities, which in turn led to her extended
      absences. Id. She specifically alleged that the hostile work environment was
      created following the settlement of her June 2007 EEO complaint.             Id.   The
      administrative judge dismissed the appeal without prejudice to permit the
      appellant additional time to file a whistleblowing retaliation complaint with the
      Office of Special Counsel (OSC). IAF, Tab 22, Initial Decision. On October 11,
      2011, the appellant filed a complaint with OSC, alleging that agency officials
      had taken various personnel actions, including her removal, in retaliation for her
      disclosures concerning the Ranges Program.               I-2 AF, Tab 1; Savage v.
      Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-12-0591-W-1, Appeal File
      (W-1 File), Tab 1.

      4
        The appellant’s attorney at the time did address the proposed removal action in an
      October 3, 2009 email to agency counsel. I-2 AF, Tab 64, Ex. DA. However, neither
      the appellant nor her attorney responded to the deciding official, as instructed in the
      proposal notice, and there is no indication in the record that the deciding official
      received a copy of the October 3, 2009 email.
                                                                                        8

¶13        After exhausting her administrative remedy with OSC, the appellant filed a
      timely individual right of action (IRA) appeal and also refiled her removal
      appeal. I-2 AF, Tab 1; W-1 File, Tab 1. The administrative judge joined the two
      appeals for hearing. I-2 AF, Tab 3; W-1 File, Tab 3. In the removal appeal, the
      appellant raised additional affirmative defenses of disability dis crimination and
      retaliation for protected whistleblowing activity. I-2 AF, Tab 55. In the IRA
      appeal, the administrative judge determined that the appellant had established
      jurisdiction concerning the following personnel actions: (1) the November 2007
      reassignment; (2) the December 2007 performance appraisal; (3) the failure to
      confer a monetary award to the appellant following a SBO conference in 2008;
      (4) the December 2008 performance appraisal; (5) the refusal to extend her
      return-to-work date in March 2009; (6) the denial of her advanced sick leave
      request in March 2009; (7) the denial of her LWOP request in March 2009; and
      (8) an alleged constructive suspension based on the creation of a hostile work
      environment that compelled her to be absent from work from mid-August 2008,
      until her removal in November 2009. Id.
¶14        Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued separate initial
      decisions in the IRA and removal appeals. In the IRA appeal, the administrative
      judge determined that the appellant had made protected disclosures concerning
      the Ranges Program, and also had shown that they were a contributing factor in
      all the personnel actions at issue, except for the alleged constructive suspension.
      W-1 File, Tab 6, Initial Decision (W-1 ID) at 6-13. The administrative judge
      noted that the appellant also had alleged a protected disclosure concerning
      DD Form 2579, but found that she had not exhausted her OSC remedy regarding
      that disclosure.   W-1 ID at 8.   The administrative judge then found that the
      agency had shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken
      some of the alleged retaliatory actions absent the appellant’s whistleblowing
      activity, but had failed to meet that burden as to the December 2007 and
      December 2008 performance evaluations, and the failure to provide a monetary
                                                                                      9

      award for the appellant’s participation in a SBO conference. W-1 ID at 13-21.
      Finally, the administrative judge concluded that the appellant had failed to
      establish that she was constructively suspended. W-1 ID at 21-24.
¶15        In the removal appeal, the administrative judge sustained all three charges
      and found that the agency had met its burden of proof regarding nexus and
      penalty. I-2 AF, Tab 71, Initial Decision (I-2 ID) at 4-12. The administrative
      judge further found that the appellant had failed to establish her affirmative
      defenses. I-2 ID at 12-18. Accordingly, the administrative judge sustained the
      removal action. I-2 ID at 18. The appellant petitioned for review of both initial
      decisions.
¶16        On review, the Board joined the appellant’s IRA and removal appeals and
      issued one precedential decision, Savage v. Department of the Army,
      122 M.S.P.R. 612 (2015), overruled in part by Pridgen v. Office of Management
      & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25, in which the Board:          (1) remanded the
      appellant’s constructive suspension claim for review under chapter 75
      procedures; (2) directed the administrative judge to determine whether the
      appellant’s alleged hostile work environment constituted a personnel action for
      purposes of her IRA appeal; (3) directed the administrative judge to determine
      whether the agency established by clear and convincing evidence that its
      decisions concerning the appellant’s leave requests and/or her requested
      return-to-work date in March 2009 would have been the same absent her
      whistleblowing activity; (4) directed the administrative judge to determine
      whether the appellant was constructively suspended during the period for which
      she was charged with AWOL and, if so, reverse the charge; (5) did not s ustain
      the charge of excessive absences; (6) sustained the charge of unavailability for
      duty with no foreseeable end; (7) directed that the administrative judge
      reexamine the appellant’s Title VII claims under a newly articulated standard;
      and (8) directed the administrative judge to consider whether, in light of all
      pertinent record evidence, including the appellant’s disclosure concerning
                                                                                      10

      DD Form 2579, the agency showed by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would have removed the appellant absent her protected disclosures.             See
      generally id. The Board left undisturbed the administrative judge’s finding that
      the appellant was entitled to corrective action for the December 2007 and
      December 2008 performance evaluations and the agency’s failure to provide a
      monetary award for her participation in a SBO conference. The Board also left
      undisturbed the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant did not establish
      her claim of disability discrimination. See generally id.
¶17        On remand, the administrative judge conducted a supplemental hearing and
      issued a new initial decision addressing the issues identified in the Board’s
      order. RAF, Tab 63, Remand Initial Decision (RID). In the chapter 75 appeal,
      the administrative judge determined that:           (1) the appellant was not
      constructively suspended; (2) the charge of AWOL was established; (3) removal
      was a reasonable penalty based on the sustained charges of AWOL and
      unavailability for duty with no foreseeable end; (4) the app ellant failed to
      establish her Title VII claims; (5) the appellant’s removal was “not motivated”
      by the DD Form 2579 disclosure; and (6) the agency proved by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have removed the appellant absent her
      protected disclosures. RID at 9-27. In the IRA appeal, the administrative judge
      determined that:    (1) the appellant was not subjected to a hostile work
      environment that would constitute a personnel action for purposes of the
      Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, as amended (WPA); (2) the agency
      proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reassigned the
      appellant to the YA-1102-02 Contract Specialist position even absent her
      protected disclosures concerning the Ranges program; and (3) the agency proved
      by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same March 2009
      actions concerning extending the appellant’s return-to-work date and her
      requests for advanced sick leave or LWOP, even absent her protected disclosures
      concerning the Ranges program.       RID at 27-32.    Unlike the previous initial
                                                                                    11

      decision in the IRA appeal, the initial decision on remand did not include
      language ordering corrective action concerning the appellant’s 2007 and 2008
      performance evaluations and the agency’s failure to provide a monetary award
      for her participation in the SBO conference. Compare W-1 ID at 25-27, with
      RID at 32.
¶18        On review, the appellant argues that: (1) the agency failed to submit clear
      and convincing evidence concerning her 2007 reassignment; (2) the agency
      violated her right to due process when the deciding official relied on ex parte
      communications to evaluate the Douglas factors; (3) the administrative judge did
      not apply the correct legal standard in analyzing her constructive suspension
      claim; (4) the administrative judge mischaracterized Dr. B.M.’s testimony;
      (5) the agency relied on an unlawful fitness-for-duty examination in taking the
      removal action; and (6) the appellant provided the agency appropriate notice of
      intolerable working conditions. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3 at 30-41.
      The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 6.

                                        ANALYSIS
      MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-11-0634-B-1
           The appellant established that she was constructively suspended.
¶19        Like involuntary resignations, removals, and reductions in pay or grade,
      involuntary leaves of absence may be appealable under chapter 75. Bean v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8 (2013). Although various fact patterns
      may give rise to an appealable constructive suspension, all constructive
      suspension claims have two things in common:        (1) the employee lacked a
      meaningful choice in the matter; and (2) it was the agency’s wrongful actions
      that deprived the employee of that choice. Id., ¶ 11. Thus, to establish Board
      jurisdiction over an alleged constructive suspension based on intolerable working
      conditions, the appellant must show both that a reasonable person would have
      felt compelled to absent herself under the conditions and that the agency was
                                                                                        12

      culpable for those conditions.        Id.; Peoples v. Department of the Navy,
      83 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶¶ 6-9 (1999). The issue of voluntariness is distinct from the
      issue of the agency’s culpability. See Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 12.
¶20         In addressing the issue of voluntariness, the administrative judge considered
      the appellant’s allegations that during calendar year 2008, i.e., after her
      reassignment to the SBO, the following occurred:
                The SBO was not fully staffed;
                She was excluded from meetings pertinent to the SBO;
                Her initial supervisor asked her if her grandmother had any “good
                 slave masters”;
                Her initial supervisor commented that she had “nappy and greasy
                 hair”;
                She had hostile encounters with contracting office personn el;
                She experienced hostility from her supervisors related to pressure
                 from contracting office personnel;
                She was subject to unprecedented job requirements (e.g., same day
                 or expedited reviews regardless of workload);
                D.B. pressured her to develop contract review timelines at the
                 contracting office’s request;
                She was excluded from emails and meetings leading to a decision
                 that DD Form 2579s would no longer be prepared for contract
                 modifications;
                Her comments were omitted from the minutes of meetings on the
                 DD Form 2579 issue;
                  On August 17, 2008 she “confronted” D.B. about “his unlawful
                   directive to halt the [DD Form] 2579 review on contract
                   modifications” and he responded by “screaming” at her .
      RID at 10-11; RAF, Tab 48 at 23-28; Hearing Transcript (HT), May 10, 2016,
      (testimony of the appellant). 5    The administrative judge concluded that the
      incidents in question, taken singly or together, were not of sufficient severity that

      5
        The hearing on remand was conducted on April 27-28 and May 10, 2016. Written
      transcripts are attached to the appellant’s petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.
                                                                                          13

      a reasonable person would have been compelled to stop reporting for duty. RID
      at 11-12. 6
¶21         However, the parties and their respective medical witnesses are in
      agreement that, beginning on August 18, 2008, and continuing through her
      removal, the appellant was medically incapacitated from returning to her
      workplace. IAF, Tab 9, Subtabs 4g, 4q, 4aa. Under these circumstances, we
      must conclude that the appellant’s absences were involuntary.              See Bean,
      120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 13 (rejecting the notion that “working outside medical
      restrictions is somehow a viable option for federal employees”); see also Moore
      v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 84, ¶ 12 (2011) (finding a nonfrivolous
      allegation of an involuntary absence when the appellant’s psychologist stated
      that anxiety caused by her working conditions rendered her u nable to work, and
      subsequently diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress disorder and recommended
      a transfer); Peoples, 83 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 11 (finding nonfrivolous allegations of
      involuntary absences when each appellant asserted that the employer -retained
      counseling service diagnosed that she would suffer emotional injury or harm if
      she returned to work alongside a coworker who engaged i n continuing bizarre
      behavior, and all but one appellant subsequently was advised by her individual
      psychiatrist that her symptoms would worsen and she would suffer injury or
      harm emotionally if she returned to work).           Hence, whether the appellant
      suffered a constructive suspension turns on the element of culpability, i.e.,

      6
        On review, the appellant contends that the administrative judge should have
      considered all 25 incidents listed in her 2008 EEO complaint, as well as an additional
      12 incidents listed in her 2007 EEO complaint, in determining whether her absences
      were involuntary. PFR File, Tab 3 at 35 n.42. It is unnecessary to decide whether the
      appellant is correct on this point because, as discussed below, we find the appellant’s
      absences were involuntary due to her medical incapacitation.
                                                                                          14

      whether her incapacitation and resulting absences are attributable to wrongful
      actions by the agency. See Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 11. 7
¶22         On this issue, the record contains conflicting evidence. Specifically, while
      Dr. B.M. and Dr. J.H. agreed that the appellant’s incapacitation was caused at
      least in part by her stressful working conditions, they differed as to whether her
      condition was caused by an objectively hostile work environment, for which the
      agency might be held culpable, or was the result of other environmental factors
      and the appellant’s own predisposition to anxiety and depression.            Dr. B.M.
      testified that, in her view, the appellant’s hostile work environment was the sole
                                                                   8
      cause of her depression and resulting incapacitation.            HT, May 10, 2016
      (testimony of Dr. B.M.).        In contrast, Dr. J.H. disagreed with Dr. B.M.’s
      assessment that the appellant’s working conditions were a sufficient explanation

      7
        To establish the agency’s culpability, the appellant must show, at minimum, that she
      put the agency on notice of the objectionable working conditions and requested
      assistance or remediation from the agency. Wegener v. Department of the Interior,
      89 M.S.P.R. 644, ¶ 8 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Abbott v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 294 (2014); Peoples, 83 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 8. The required
      notice need not take the form of a request for accommodation under the Rehabilitation
      Act. Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 21. Nonetheless, the agency must be put on notice
      of the specific nature of the conditions and the employee’s inability to cope with them
      before it can be expected to investigate, attempt remediation of the conditions if
      necessary, or to consider finding other duties or positions for the employee pending
      resolution of the complaints. Peoples, 83 M.S.P.R. 217, ¶ 9. Hence, the agency’s
      knowledge of the intolerable working conditions, whether actual or constru ctive, must
      be shown to establish a culpable connection between the objectionable conditions and
      the agency’s duty—if any—to alleviate the conditions. Id. We agree with the
      appellant that she provided the required notice and request for remediation in he r
      August 2008 contact with the agency’s EEO office, in which she described in detail
      numerous incidents of alleged harassment and specifically requested that the agency
      put an end to what she viewed as a hostile work environment. RAF, Tab 49 at 98 -118.
      8
        We agree with the appellant that Dr. B.M.’s testimony on this point was unambiguous,
      notwithstanding her reference to the appellant’s “perception” of a hostile work
      environment. PFR File, Tab 3 at 36-38. Nothing in Dr. B.M.’s testimony or written
      reports suggests that she believed the appellant’s perception was incorrect. Notably,
      Dr. J.H. agreed that Dr. B.M. had “confidently” identified the appellant’s hostile work
      environment as the cause of her psychological ailment. HT, Apr. 27, 2016 (testimony
      of Dr. J.H.).
                                                                                       15

      for her incapacitation, and instead concluded that the appellant already suffered
      from a mental illness that affected her ability to perceive her work environment
      objectively. HT, Apr. 27, 2016 (testimony of Dr. J.H.).
¶23        In assessing the probative weight of medical opinions, the Board considers,
      inter alia, the extent and duration of the expert’s familiarity with the appellant’s
      treatment. Slater v. Department of Homeland Security, 108 M.S.P.R. 419, ¶ 16
      (2008). Here, Dr. B.M. observed the appellant in 75 sessions over 5½ years.
      HT, May 10, 2016 (testimony of Dr. B.M.). Dr. B.M. testified in the remand
      hearing that, based on those sessions, and the tests she administered, she found
      that the appellant was not otherwise disposed toward depression and that, as no
      other factors were apparent, that finding essentially validated the appellant’s
      claim that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. Id. In contrast,
      Dr. J.H. performed only a one-time evaluation of the appellant.                  He
      acknowledged during his testimony that, in conducting that evaluation, he did
      not endeavor to find the cause of the appellant’s condition, as he was not tasked
      to do so.   HT, Apr. 27, 2016 (testimony of Dr. J.H.).       On balance, we find
      Dr. B.M.’s opinion on this point more persuasive. Accordingly, we find that the
      appellant has shown by preponderant evidence that a hostile work environment
      was the primary cause of her medical inability to return to work during the
      period from August 18, 2008, until her removal.
¶24        Because the agency is culpable for subjecting the appellant to the hostile
      work environment that resulted in her incapacitation, we conclude that her
      absence from August 18, 2008, until her removal, constituted a constructive
      suspension within the Board’s jurisdiction. We further find that the suspension
      action cannot be sustained, because it was effected without minimum due
      process, i.e., notice and an opportunity to respond. See Mc Lain v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 82 M.S.P.R. 526, ¶ 10 (1999). Because the suspension action must be
      reversed regardless of the outcome on remand, we order the agency to cancel the
      action and provide appropriate back pay and benefits, if any, for the period from
                                                                                           16

      August 18, 2008, to her removal.             See Martin v. U.S. Postal Service,
      123 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 14 (2016); Mc Lain, 82 M.S.P.R. 526, ¶ 11.

            We do not sustain the charge of AWOL in the removal action.
¶25         As noted above, the agency based its removal action on three charges:
      excessive absences, unavailability for duty with no foreseeable end, and AWOL.
      In our previous remand order, we determined that the agency failed to prove the
      charge of excessive absences, but did establish the charge of unavailability for
      duty with no foreseeable end. Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶¶ 30-34. Concerning
      the charge of AWOL, we noted that finding that the appellant had been
      constructively suspended during the period she was charged AWOL would mean
      that her absences resulted from the agency’s wrongful actions. Id., ¶ 29. In such
      a case, it would have been unreasonable for the agency to deny the appellant’s
      request for leave to cover those absences. Id. Accordingly, we directed that, if
      the administrative judge determined on remand that the appellant was
      constructively suspended during the period for which she was charged AWOL,
      the charge should not be sustained. Id. We have here found, contrary to the
      remand initial decision, that the appellant was constructively suspended.
      Accordingly, we do not sustain the AWOL charge.

            The appellant has not established that the agency violated Title VII, denied
            her due process, or relied on an unlawful psychological examination in
            removing her.
¶26         Concerning the appellant’s affirmative defenses, the administrative judge
      found below that the appellant did not prove her Title VII claims. RID at 19-24.
      In particular, he found that these claims failed because the appellant did not meet
      her initial burden of proving that her race, sex, or protected EEO activity was a
      motivating factor in the agency’s decision to remove her. 9           Id.; see Savage,

      9
        In finding that the appellant failed to show that her race, sex, or protected EEO
      activity was a motivating factor in her removal, the administrative judge addressed
      separately the several kinds of evidence identified in Savage, including direct evidence
                                                                                            17

      122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 41 (holding that a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 is
      established if a prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the contested
      personnel action). We discern no error in that finding, and the appellant does not
      dispute it on review. 10
¶27         For the first time on review, the appellant further contends that the agency
      denied her due process in removing her because the deciding official allegedly
      engaged in ex parte communications concerning the Douglas factors. PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 32-34; see Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed. Cir.
      2011) (holding that “ex parte communications introducing information material
      to the penalty run astray of the due process requirements of notice and an
      opportunity to be heard”). Generally, the Board will not consider an argument
      raised for the first time on petition for review absent a showing that it is based
      on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due
      diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980).
      In any event, the appellant has not identified any ex parte communication that
      was material to the deciding official’s penalty selection. Rather, she alleges that

      and three varieties of indirect evidence. RID at 20-23; see Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612,
      ¶ 42. Subsequent to the remand initial decision, the Board issued Gardner v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647 (2016), clarified by Pridgen v. Office
      of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-24, in which we clarified that, in
      determining whether an appellant has met her initial burden to show that a prohibited
      consideration was a motivating factor, “all evidence belongs in a single pile and must
      be evaluated as a whole.” Id., ¶¶ 29-30 (quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,
      834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016)). Although the administrative judge did not have the
      benefit of Gardner, which might have allowed for a more streamlined analysis, we
      agree with his conclusion that the appellant failed to meet her initial burden of showing
      that her race, sex or protected EEO activity was a motivating factor in her removal.
      10
        Because we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to meet
      her initial burden to prove that race, sex, or retaliation for EEO activity were
      motivating factors in the agency’s decision, we need not resolve the issue of whether
      the appellant proved that discrimination or retaliation was a “b ut-for” cause of the
      agency’s decisions. See Pridgen v. Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33.
                                                                                      18

      the individuals with whom the deciding official conferred failed to communicate
      information concerning her whistleblowing activity. PFR File, Tab 3 at 32 -34.
      If so, it is not apparent how the alleged concealment of this information would
      implicate Ward or otherwise represent a due process violation.       Accordingly,
      while we have found that the appellant was denied due process with respect to
      her constructive suspension, we find that she was not denied due process with
      respect to the removal action.
¶28        The appellant also argues on review that the removal action should be
      reversed because it was based on an allegedly unlawful psychiatric examination.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 38-40.        It appears the appellant made a variation of this
      argument at the conclusion of the hearing on remand, HT, May 10, 2016, at 175,
      but the issue was not within the scope of the Board’s remand order, and it is
      unclear why she could not have raised it at an earlier stage of the proceedings.
      In any event, we are not persuaded by the appellant’s argument, because the
      record does not show that she was ever ordered to undergo a psychiatric
      examination.   Rather, D.B. indicated in his May 29, 2009 letter that he was
      “requesting” that the appellant meet with Dr. J.H., at no cost to her, in order to
      provide the agency with additional information needed to rule on her leave
      request. IAF, Tab 9, Subtab 4i. The Board has held that an agency may offer,
      rather than order, a medical examination, including a psychiatric evaluation, in
      any situation where the agency needs additional medical documentation to make
      an informed management decision.             Doe v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
      Corporation, 117 M.S.P.R. 579, ¶ 27 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 339.302. Accordingly,
      we find no merit to this affirmative defense.

           Remand is necessary to fully adjudicate the appellant’s affirmative defense
           of whistleblowing retaliation.
¶29        Although the appellant failed to establish her other affirmative defenses, we
      find that her affirmative defense of whistleblowing retaliation requires further
      adjudication. First, the administrative judge appears to have erred in finding that
                                                                                             19

      the appellant’s removal was “not motivated by” her disclosure concerning
      DD Form 2579. 11 RID at 24-25. If the administrative judge meant by this that
      the disclosure was not a contributing factor in the appellant’s removal, his
      finding is not consistent with the record, as it is undisputed that the appellant
      made the disclosure directly to D.B., who proposed her removal approximately
      13 to 15 months later.         These facts alone are sufficient to establish the
      contributing factor element under the knowledge/timing test of 5 U.S.C.
      § 1221(e)(1).    See Schnell v. Department of the Army, 114 M.S.P.R. 83, ¶ 22
      (2010) (holding that a personnel action taken within 1 or 2 years of a protected
      disclosure is sufficiently close in time to satisfy the timing prong of the
      knowledge/timing test).      Thus, we find that the appellant has established her
      prima facie case concerning the DD Form 2579 disclosure.
¶30         Furthermore, we find that the administrative judge did not fully analyze the
      issue of whether the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would have removed the appellant absent her protected d isclosures.                    In
      determining if an agency has shown by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would have taken the same personnel action absent whistleblowing, the Board
      will consider the following three factors: the strength of the agency’s evidence
      in support of its action; the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on
      the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision; and any
      evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who are
      otherwise similarly situated. Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d
      1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).        The Board does not view the Carr factors as
      discrete elements, each of which the agency must prove by clear and convincing
      evidence, but rather weighs these factors together to determine whether the

      11
         We find that the appellant had a reasonable belief, correct or not, that the failure of
      the SBO to use DD Form 2579 to record contract modifications was in violation of an
      agency rule, in effect at the time of her disclosure, requiring the use of DD Form 2579
      for all actions over a certain dollar amount. RAF, Tab 59 at 7 -15. Accordingly, we
      conclude that her disclosure was protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i).
                                                                                        20

      evidence is clear and convincing as a whole.      Lu v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (2015). Our reviewing court has further clarified
      that “[e]vidence only clearly and convincingly supports a conclusion when it
      does so in the aggregate considering all the pertinent evidence in the record, and
      despite the evidence that fairly detracts from that conclusion.”        Whitmore v.
      Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see Lu,
      122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 10.
¶31        In the initial decision in the refiled appeal, the administrative judge
      addressed only the first Carr factor, finding in effect that the agency had met its
      burden by virtue of having proven its charges. I-2 ID at 17-18. Accordingly, in
      our previous remand order, we instructed the administrative judge to revisit the
      question of whether the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would have removed the appellant absent her protected disclosures.          Savage,
      122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 52.     In particular, we noted that the full Board had not
      sustained the charge of excessive absences, and that the merits of the AWOL
      charge remained to be decided on remand.         Id.    We further found that the
      administrative judge should consider the question of whether the appellant’s
      incapacitation   and   resulting   absences   were     themselves   a   product   of
      whistleblowing reprisal. Id.; see Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1376. It was not our
      intent however, to suggest that examining these issues would obviate the need to
      conduct a complete Carr factors analysis.
¶32        On remand, the administrative judge determined that the AWOL charge,
      which he had sustained, together with the sustained charge of unavailability for
      duty without foreseeable end, “amply justify removal.” RID at 25. Having so
      found, he concluded that, “given the appellant’s misconduct . . . the agency met
      its high burden of proving it would have removed her absent the protected
      disclosures.” RID at 25. Thus, as in the first initial decision, the admin istrative
      judge erroneously relied solely on the strength of the agency’s reasons, i.e., the
      first Carr factor, in finding that the agency met its burden under the clear and
                                                                                        21

      convincing test. Moreover, the first Carr factor must itself be reassessed, given
      our finding that the agency did not establish the AWOL charge.
¶33         In light of the above, we find that further adjudication, including explicit
      consideration of all three Carr factors, is needed to resolve the question of
      whether the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
      removed the appellant absent her protected disclosures involving the Ranges
      Program and DD Form 2579. We find that the administrative judge is in the best
      position to complete the Carr factors analysis, having heard the live testimony.
      See Shibuya v Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 37 (2013). If, on
      remand, the administrative judge determines that the agency failed to show by
      clear and convincing evidence that it would have removed the appellant absent
      her protected disclosures, he should reverse the action.       If the administrative
      judge finds that the agency did make the required showing, he sho uld make a
      new finding as to whether, based on the single sustained charge, the agency met
      its burden of proof on nexus and penalty.
            As discussed above, the appellant has also alleged that the agency
      constructively suspended her in retaliation for her prot ected disclosures.      The
      administrative judge did not address that claim below, having found the appellant
      was not constructively suspended. However, given our finding that the appellant
      was constructively suspended, it is necessary to determine whether t he appellant’s
      protected disclosures regarding the Ranges Program and DD Form 2579
      disclosure) were a contributing factor in that action and, if so, whether the ag ency
      can show by clear and convincing evidence that the constructive suspension
      would have occurred in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosures. On
      remand, the administrative judge should address these questions, applying the
      same principles discussed above.
                                                                                     22

      MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-12-0591-B-1
           The appellant’s allegations of a hostile work environment establish a
           significant  change    in   working    conditions  under  5    U.S.C.
           § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).
¶34        Under the WPA, a “personnel action” is defined to include, among other
      enumerated actions, “any other significant change in duties, responsibilities, or
      working conditions.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). The legislative history of
      the 1994 amendment to the WPA indicates that “any other significant change in
      duties, responsibilities, or working conditions” should be interpreted broadly, to
      include “any harassment or discrimination that could have a chilling effect on
      whistleblowing or otherwise undermine the merit system and should be
      determined on a case-by-case basis.” 130 Cong. Rec. H11,419, H11,421 (daily
      ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of Rep. McCloskey); see Skarada v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 14; Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 23; Roach v.
      Department of the Army, 82 M.S.P.R. 464, ¶ 24 (1999); Shivaee v. Department of
      the Navy, 74 M.S.P.R. 383, 388 (1997). Accordingly, in our previous remand
      order, we found that the appellant’s claim of a hostile work environment should
      be considered as an alleged personnel action for purposes of her IRA appeal.
      Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 23.
¶35        However, notwithstanding the broad interpretation accorded to the term
      “significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions,” not every
      agency action is a “personnel action” under the WPA. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17,
      ¶ 15; see King v. Department of Health & Human Services , 133 F.3d 1450, 1453
      (Fed. Cir. 1998). Rather, an agency action must have practical consequences for
      the employee to constitute a personnel action. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 15. In
      determining whether an appellant has suffered a “significant change” in his
      duties, responsibilities, or working conditions, the Board must consider the
      alleged agency actions both collectively and individually.        Id., ¶ 16; see
      Holderfield v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 326 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir.
      2003).   A number of agency actions may amount to a covered “significant
                                                                                        23

      change” personnel action collectively, even if they are not covered personnel
      actions individually. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16. To constitute a significant
      change in working conditions, however, a series of minor agency actions must be
      pervasive and occur over an extended period of time. Id. In sum, only agency
      actions that, individually or collectively, have practical and significant effects on
      the overall nature and quality of an employee’s working conditions, duties, or
      responsibilities will be found to constitute a personnel action covered by
      2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).
¶36        Here, the appellant described numerous acts of alleged harassment,
      occurring over an extended period of time, involving staffing issues, perceived
      exclusions from meetings or email discussions, disagreements with contracting
      office personnel and her own supervisors over work policies and procedures, and
      an extremely heavy workload.        RAF, Tab 48 at 23 -28; HT, May 10, 2016
      (testimony of the appellant).     As discussed above, we have found that the
      appellant suffered from a work environment that was the primary cause of her
      incapacitation and resulting absences. Supra ¶ 22. In light of that finding, we
      conclude that the alleged incidents of harassment, considered collectively,
      contributed to a “significant change in working conditions” as defined at
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). Accordingly, on remand, the administrative judge
      should determine whether the appellant’s protected disclosures concerning the
      Ranges Program were a contributing factor in that change in working conditions
      and, if so, whether the agency would have imposed that change in working
      conditions in the absence of those protected disclosures.

           Further adjudication is needed to determine whether the agency proved by
           clear and convincing evidence that it would have reassigned the appellant
           to a nonsupervisory YA-02 Contract Specialist position, and taken the
           March 2009 actions absent her protected disclosures concerning the
           Ranges Program.
¶37        In our previous remand order, we found that further adjudication was
      needed to determine whether the agency met its burden of p roof under the clear
                                                                                      24

      and convincing standard regarding the appellant’s November 11, 2007
      reassignment and the March 2009 actions denying her requests for LWOP,
      advanced sick leave, and an extension of her return-to-work date.        As noted
      above, in determining whether the agency has proven by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken a personnel action absent the appellant’s
      whistleblowing activity, the Board will consider all relevant factors, including
      the following: (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action;
      (2) the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency
      officials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency
      takes similar actions against employees who do no t engage in such protected
      activity, but who are otherwise similarly situated.      Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323.
      Moreover, the Board must consider all the pertinent evidence in the record, and
      must not exclude or ignore countervailing evidence by only looking at t he
      evidence that supports the agency’s position.           See Whitmore, 680 F.3d
      at 1367-70.
¶38        In finding that the agency met its burden as to these actions, the
      administrative judge implicitly considered the first Carr factor, finding that the
      agency acted reasonably in reassigning the appellant to her Contract Specialist
      position at the SBO, and in denying her requests for advanced sick leave, LWOP,
      and/or an extension of her return-to-work date. RID at 29-32. However, as with
      the whistleblowing defense in the removal action, the administrative judge did
      not conduct a full analysis of the Carr factors. RID at 29-31. As noted above,
      the administrative judge is in the best position to correct this oversight, having
      heard the live testimony. See Shibuya, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 37. Accordingly, on
      remand, the administrative judge should conduct a new analysis of the clear and
      convincing test, consistent with Carr and Whitmore, over the November 11, 2007
      reassignment and the March 2009 actions.
                                                                                       25

                                           ORDER
¶39        We remand the case to the Atlanta Regional Office for further adjudication,
      consistent with this Order, regarding the appellant’s claims that (1) her removal
      and constructive suspension were the result of retaliation for her disclosures
      concerning the Ranges Program and Form DD 2579; and (2) the appellant’s
      November 11, 2007 reassignment, the agency’s March 2009 actions, and the
      imposition of a hostile work environment were the result of retaliation for
      protected disclosures concerning the Ranges Program.            Regardless of the
      outcome, the administrative judge should again order corrective action
      concerning the appellant’s 2008 and 2009 performance eval uations and the
      agency’s denying a bonus for participation in the SBO conference.
¶40        Notwithstanding the remand proceedings, we ORDER the agency to cancel
      the appellant’s constructive suspension for the period from August 18, 2008, to
      November 6, 2009. 12 See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730
      (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days
      after the date of this decision.
¶41        We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.

      12
         Given that the appellant was unable to work and was not formally suspended,
      cancellation of the action will presumably involve retroactively placing her in LWOP
      and/or sick leave status for the relevant period.
                                                                                    26

¶42        We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it
      has taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should
      ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶43        No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency
      has not fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and
      results of any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶44        For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
      Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
      made within the 60-day period set forth above.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                   /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
                                                                                               2

NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
   1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
      describing what to do in accordance with decision.
   2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
            collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
   Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the
   type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave
   to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum
Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
       a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
       b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
       c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.