Court Opinion

ID: 9945328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:10:48.357857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.634224
License: Public Domain

J-A23014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ANGEL IRIZARRY                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 540 MDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 27, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-36-CR-0001243-2000

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                     FILED: FEBRUARY 27, 2024

       Angel Irizarry appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Lancaster County, denying his petition, titled “Motion for

New Trial Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(2),” filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.1 After review, we

affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The court treated Irizarry’s motion for new trial as his fourth PCRA petition

and addressed it as such. It is well-settled that “any petition filed after the
judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition.”
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also
Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 749 A.2d 502, 503 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(defendant’s “motion to correct illegal sentence” treated as PCRA petition);
Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Pa. Super. 2001) (PCRA
is “exclusive vehicle for obtaining post-conviction collateral relief.”); 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.
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       The PCRA court set out the facts of this case as follows:

       On September 12, 2000, a jury found Irizarry guilty of two counts
       of attempted first-degree murder, five counts of aggravated
       assault, one count of criminal attempt to commit robbery, [one
       count of] criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, and three counts
       of reckless endangerment of another person[.2] The testimony at
       trial established that Irizarry was involved with three other
       individuals in planning and attempting to commit an armed
       robbery of a store in Lancaster City on February 16, 2000, during
       the lunch hour. When the police interrupted their attempted
       robbery, Irizarry pulled out a .223 caliber semi-automatic rifle and
       unloaded 19 of the 30 bullets from his clip, firing directly at a
       Lancaster City police officer and a Lancaster County deputy
       sheriff. The police officer and several bystanders sustained
       injuries. Irizarry was seen by numerous witnesses as he engaged
       in this rampage[] and was caught behind the Lancaster County
       Courthouse still in possession of the rifle.

                                      *        *   *

       On November 6, 2000, Irizarry was sentenced to a total aggregate
       term of imprisonment of 39 years, 3 months to 78 years, 6
       months.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/26/23, at 1-2 (citation omitted). Irizarry did not file

post-sentence motions. This Court affirmed Irizarry’s judgment of sentence

on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Irizarry, 797 A.2d 373 (Pa. Super.

2002) (Table).      Irizarry did not seek allowance of appeal to our Supreme

Court. Thereafter, Irizarry filed three unsuccessful PCRA Petitions in 2007,

2012, and 2018.

       On February 9, 2023, Irizarry, pro se, filed the instant PCRA petition,

contending that on February 10, 2022, he became aware of the address of a
____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2502(a), 2702(a)(1)-(4), 3701(a)(1)(iii), 903.18, and

2705, respectively.

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witness, Milagros Montanez, “who has exculpatory information which proves

that [Irizarry’s] intent . . . was not . . . rooted in malicious intent.” PCRA

Petition, 2/9/23, at ¶ 3. Irizarry stated that Montanez would testify that she

was with Irizarry in the days prior to the attempted robbery, during which she

“repeatedly related a threat, allegedly made by an officer[,] . . . that [police]

were instructed to shoot first[,] ask questions last[.]” Id. at ¶ 4. Irizarry

alleged in his petition that this constituted new, exculpatory evidence. Id. at

¶ 5. The PCRA court subsequently denied Irizarry’s petition, concluding that

Irizarry’s claim did not constitute a newly-discovered fact as contemplated by

the PCRA because Irizarry “would have been aware of any statements the

witness was making to him leading up to the [attempted robbery] and could

have communicated that information to his attorney for further consideration.”

Order, 2/27/23, at n.1. Irizarry filed a notice appeal on April 6, 2023,3 thirty-

eight days after the PCRA court’s order denying his petition, followed by a

court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal.4

____________________________________________

3 Irizarry’s notice of appeal was filed on April 6, 2023, but dated March 31,

2023. Even applying the prisoner mailbox rule, see Commonwealth v.
Jones, 700 A.2d 423 (Pa. 1997), the notice of appeal would have still been
filed beyond thirty days from the PCRA court’s order. See Pa.R.A.P. 903;
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

4 Irizarry’s Rule 1925(b) statement was filed on May 8, 2023, but dated May

2, 2023. Though filed more than twenty-one days beyond the PCRA court’s
order, the PCRA court nevertheless treated it as timely filed pursuant to the
prisoner mailbox rule. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/26/23, at 4 n.6; see also
Thomas v. Elash, 781 A.2d 170, 176 (Pa. Super. 2001).

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      Prior to addressing the merits of Irizarry’s appellate claims, we must

first address the timeliness of Irizarry’s notice of appeal, as it affects this

Court’s jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Pena, 31 A.3d 704, 706 (Pa.

Super. 2011). To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days

after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. See Pa.R.A.P.

903(a). This Court is without authority to extend the thirty-day period unless

there is fraud or a breakdown in the processes of the court. See Pa.R.A.P.

105(b); see also Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 160 (Pa.

Super. 2019).

      In the instant case, because Irizarry’s petition was denied without a

hearing, the PCRA court is required to “advise the defendant by certified mail,

return receipt requested, of the right to appeal from the final order disposing

of the petition and of the time limits within which the appeal must be filed.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4). Under Stansbury, supra, a misstatement of the law or

incorrect instruction concerning the right to appeal in collateral matters under

the PCRA may “amount to a breakdown in court operations such that we may

overlook the defective nature of Appellant’s timely notice of appeal rather than

quash [the appeal].”     Id. at 160.    Here, the PCRA court did not include

language about Irizarry’s right to appeal in its order denying Irizarry’s petition.

Consequently, this omission constitutes a breakdown in court operations, and

we may overlook the defective nature of Irizarry’s notice of appeal.          See

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Stansbury, supra. Therefore, we will consider the appeal to be timely and

address Irizarry’s issues raised on appeal.5

       Irizarry raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Did the PCRA court err in denying appellate relief without an
       evidentiary hearing to establish the length and potential damage
       and prejudice created by the suppression of the interactions of
       police with this specific witness or the prejudice caused by the
       interference which resulted in refusing [Irizarry] [d]ue [p]rocess
       in the adversarial process by denying him the opportunity to
       present this witness[?]

       2. Did the PCRA court err in its interpretation of the evidence
       presented and the legal application as to its significance[?]

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

       The standard of review of an order denying a PCRA petition is whether

that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal

error. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 42 A.3d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012).

The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for

the findings in the certified record. Id.

____________________________________________

5 The PCRA court noted that the appeal was untimely but treated it as a motion

for leave to file the notice of appeal, nunc pro tunc, which the PCRA court
granted. See Order, 4/13/23. While we note that the allowance of appeal,
nunc pro tunc, is within the sound discretion of the trial court, “[t]ime
limitations for taking appeals are strictly construed and cannot be extended
as a matter of grace.” Commonwealth v. Burks, 102 A.3d 497, 500 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “[A]n appeal nunc pro tunc is intended as a
remedy to vindicate the right to an appeal where that right has been lost due
to certain extraordinary circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Stock, 679 A.2d
760, 764 (Pa. 1996). Extraordinary circumstances include instances such as
fraud, ineffectiveness of counsel, or a breakdown in the operations of the
court. See id. at 763-64. Irizarry made no effort to explain his late filing or
argue any extraordinary circumstances in the instant case.

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      Prior to addressing the merits of Irizarry’s appeal, we must determine

whether his PCRA petition was timely filed and, if not, whether he has satisfied

an exception to the PCRA time bar. Any PCRA petition “shall be filed within a

year of the date judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A

judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review,

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking

review.”   Id. at 9545(b)(3).      The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are

jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues

raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht,

994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

      Here, Irizarry’s judgment of sentence became final, for purposes of the

PCRA, on February 21, 2002, when the time expired for Irizarry to file a

petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after this

Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on January 22, 2002.            See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113. Irizarry had one year from that date,

or until February 21, 2003, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1), supra. Consequently, Irizarry’s instant PCRA petition, filed on

February 9, 2023, is patently untimely.

      However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely petition if the

petitioner can explicitly plead and prove one of the three exceptions set forth

at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Those exceptions are as follows:

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       (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
       interference by government officials with the presentation of the
       claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
       or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

       (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
       the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
       of due diligence; or

       (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
       by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
       of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
       has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

Id. Any petition invoking one of these exceptions “shall be filed within one

year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id. at § 9545(b)(2).6

“The PCRA petitioner bears the burden of proving the applicability of one of

the exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017).

       Here, Irizarry invoked the newly-discovered facts exception.7            The

newly-discovered facts exception applies where “the facts upon which the

____________________________________________

6 We observe that section 9545(b)(2) was amended on October 24, 2018,
effective in 60 days (i.e., December 24, 2018), extending the time for filing
from 60 days of the date the claim could have been first presented, to one
year. The amendment applies to claims arising on December 24, 2017, or
thereafter. See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, N. 146, § 3. Instantly, Irizarry
claims the earliest he could have presented this claim was February 10, 2022.
See Defendant’s Brief in Support, 2/9/23, at 2. Irizarry had one year from
that date to file a PCRA petition raising his claim. Therefore, his motion for
new trial/PCRA petition filed on February 9, 2023, if meeting the exception,
would be within the one-year window. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(ii),
(b)(2).

7 Throughout his filings, Irizarry frequently and mistakenly claims he is
invoking the “after-discovered” evidence exception to the PCRA time bar. As
mentioned supra, a claim of newly-discovered facts is an exception to the
PCRA’s one year time bar, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), while an after-
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has “the exception set forth in subsection

(b)(1)(ii) . . . only requires a petitioner to prove that the facts were unknown

to him and that he exercised due diligence in discovering those facts.”

Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).            “Due diligence does not require perfect

vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the party has put forth

reasonable effort to obtain the information upon which a claim is based.” Id.

at 230 (quotation marks omitted).

       Irizarry argues that while he has known of Montanez’s existence for

some time, he has been unable to locate her, despite efforts by Irizarry and

his family.     See Appellant’s Brief, at 16.        Irizarry claims that due to

“intimidation and coercion[,]” Montanez was “forced [] into hiding and

prevented the defense from presenting her testimony[.]” Id. at 15. Irizarry

enumerates the steps taken to locate Montanez, including attempts over social

media and family traveling from Pennsylvania to Florida to attempt to convince

Montanez to come forward. Id. at 16; see also Defendant’s Brief in Support,
____________________________________________

discovered evidence claim is a substantive claim for PCRA relief. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi); see also Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d
618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (reiterating “the newly-discovered facts exception to the
time limitations of the PCRA, as set forth in subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii), is
distinct from the after-discovered evidence basis for relief delineated in 42
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2)”). Nevertheless, this does not impact our ability to
review the claim because Irizarry addresses the requisite factors under the
newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA time bar in his argument.

                                           -8-
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2/9/23, at 2-3 (explaining efforts by Irizarry’s family to locate Montanez and

a seemingly chance encounter whereby Jonathan Irizzary “came across”

Montanez after he was released from SCI Camp Hill and obtained her address).

      Irizarry also claims that Montanez’s “exculpatory information” would

support Irizarry’s lack of intent to commit the crimes for which he was

convicted and show that he was “provoked by the human and legal need for

self-preservation[.]” PCRA Petition, 2/9/23, ¶ 3. As stated supra, Irizarry

suggests that Montanez would testify as to the time she spent with Irizarry

prior to the attempted robbery and the statements she made to him about

alleged threats made by a police officer. Id. at ¶ 4; see also Defendant’s

Brief in Support, 2/9/23, at 3-4.

      The PCRA court found this claim to be insufficient to meet the newly-

discovered facts exception because Irizarry did not show that either the facts

upon which it is predicated were unknown, or that he could not have

ascertained those facts by due diligence. The court explained:

      Since the substance of Montanez’[s] proffered testimony would be
      statements that she made in his presence, it cannot be said that
      the testimony is newly[-]discovered evidence. [Irizarry] claims
      Montanez will testify that “she would tell [Irizarry] that the police
      wanted to kill him and have no desire to bring him in alive.”
      [Defendant’s Brief in Support, 2/9/23, at] 3. This does not
      constitute [newly-discovered] evidence since Irizarry would have
      been aware of any statements made to him leading up to the
      offense, and he could have communicated that information to his
      attorney for further consideration. The only new information
      possibly obtained by Irizarry is Montanez’[s] address, which he
      has not shown that he exercised due diligence in trying to obtain
      previously, as he fails to mention whether he communicated
      Montanez’[s] identity as a potential witness to his attorney prior

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      to trial. Therefore, because the facts upon which Irizarry’s claim
      is predicated were known to him prior to his trial, the deadline to
      bring this claim would have been on February 21, 2002, when the
      judgment became final. As such, Irizarry’s fourth petition is
      untimely.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/26/23, 6-7 (emphasis original).

      After our review of the record, we conclude that the PCRA court’s

determination that Irizarry’s fourth PCRA petition was untimely and does not

meet the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA time bar is supported

by the evidence of record and free of legal error. See Johnston, supra; see

also Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001) (rejecting

attempt to invoke section 9545(b)(1)(ii) because appellant failed to offer

evidence that he exercised due diligence in obtaining facts upon which claim

was based).    As stated, because the alleged newly-discovered fact is a

statement made by Montanez to Irizarry, Irizarry would have known this

information since February of 2000, when the statement was allegedly made.

Moreover, Irizarry’s own arguments include information that his family knew

how to contact Montanez and he fails to explain whether this information was

shared with his attorney prior to or during trial.       Accordingly, because

Irizarry’s PCRA petition was facially untimely and he failed to prove the newly-

discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional time bar, the PCRA court

properly denied him relief.

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     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/27/2024

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