Court Opinion

ID: 9352542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:25.756654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:41.292036
License: Public Domain

J-S41045-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    THOMAS STEPHEN KEOGH                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 585 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-28-CR-0001882-2019

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                        FILED JANUARY 06, 2023

        Appellant Thomas Stephen Keogh appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County after a

jury convicted Appellant of delivery of a controlled substance, corrupt

organizations, drug delivery resulting in death (“DDRD”), and criminal use of

communication facility. Appellant challenges the sufficiency and weight of the

evidence supporting his DDRD conviction and asserts that the trial court

abused its discretion in imposing his sentence. We affirm.

        Appellant was charged with the aforementioned offenses in connection

with the untimely death of L.S. (“Child”), a three-year-old girl who ingested

methamphetamine and buprenorphine that was in the possession of Child’s

mother, Brittany Higgins and her boyfriend, Brian Phillip Bennett. Appellant

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S41045-22

was accused of acting as the supplier for the drug distribution network that

delivered the methamphetamine that Child accessed before her death.

       Appellant and Bennett proceeded to a joint trial which commenced on

December 8, 2021.1 The trial court set forth the tragic factual background in

this case in great detail in its March 21, 2022 opinion. We will summarize the

relevant facts which were developed over multiple days at the joint trial.

       On Saturday, January 6, 2018, emergency personnel were summoned

to an apartment in Greencastle Borough based on the report of an

“unconscious toddler.” Notes of Testimony (N.T.), Trial, 9/8/21, at 23. When

emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrived, they discovered Child lifeless,

lying on her back on a bed in a bedroom near the kitchen. Id. at 34-35.

       The autopsy of Child’s body was conducted by Dr. Samuel Land, who

found no evidence of significant injury, disease, infection, bacteria, virus, or

organisms that could have been responsible for Child’s death. Id. at 95-119.

Dr. Land sent samples of Child’s blood for toxicological testing, which revealed

Child had methamphetamine (18 nanograms/milliliter) and buprenorphine in

her system (1.2 nanograms/milliliter). Id. at 67-68, 80, 95-97.

       Methamphetamine is a stimulant that is almost always used illegally,

which can elevate blood pressure and temperature, and can lead to seizures

or misfiring of the heart. Id. at 96, 116. Buprenorphine is a semi-synthetic
____________________________________________

1 Higgins entered a nolo contendere plea to third-degree murder and received
a sentence of ten to twenty years’ imprisonment. As discussed infra, several
individuals entered guilty pleas connected to their participation in the corrupt
organization which delivered the methamphetamine that Child ingested.

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opioid used to treat opioid abuse and withdrawal symptoms, similar to

methadone. Id. at 72, 96-97, 99. Buprenorphine is sold as Subutex or

Suboxone in tablets that dissolve under the tongue. Id. at 72, 99.

     Based on his professional training, education, and experience, Dr. Land

concluded with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Child’s cause of

death was mixed substance toxicity of methamphetamine and buprenorphine,

neither of which was prescribed to Child. Id. at 114-117. Dr. Land indicated

that either drug could have been lethal to Child, but stated there was no way

to differentiate which drug ultimately caused her death. Id. at 102.

     When presented with Child’s toxicology reports, Higgins and Bennett

confessed they were high on methamphetamine (“meth”) the night of January

5, 2018 to the morning of January 6, 2018, the time period in which Child

ingested the drugs. Id. at 30-33. Higgins and Bennett regularly used drugs in

the home they shared with Higgins’ two children: L.H., her nine-year old son,

and Child, her three-year old daughter. Id. at 30, 43-46. While Higgins was

prescribed Suboxone and Bennett was prescribed Subutex, the couple would

share both of these drugs. Id. at 50-51, 112-13, 117, 129.

     Higgins testified that she purchased meth on January 5, 2018 from

Rodney (Allen) Mower, who delivered it to their residence at 5:00 p.m. Id. at

32-33, 47-48. Higgins conceded that she and Bennett bought meth to share

together on numerous occasions from Mower and other individuals. Id. at 47,

87-88. As Mower had just received a large amount of meth from his supplier,

Mower cut the meth on their kitchen table to measure it out into individual

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packages. Id. at 69-76. When asked if the action of cutting the meth had left

“teeny tiny particles … on [her] kitchen table at some point that Friday night,”

Higgins admitted it was possible. Id. at 76.

      Higgins did not discover Child had died until the evening of Saturday,

January 6, 2018 when she went into Child’s bedroom at 8 p.m. to wake her

up. Id. at 49. At that point, Higgins had not seen Child for more than 24 hours

since she injected the meth the previous evening and had not checked on her.

Id. When Higgins discovered Child was cold, stiff, and unresponsive, Higgins

used her cell phone to call 9-1-1. Id. at 63.

      After Child’s death, investigators sought to identify and prosecute the

individuals responsible for delivering the meth that Child ingested. Troopers

interviewed Mower, who admitted selling meth to Higgins and Bennett on

January 5, 2018 and also shared details of the meth distribution chain. N.T.,

9/13/21, at 51-52. Mower agreed to pled guilty to DDRD for the death of Child,

was sentenced to four to ten years’ imprisonment, and entered a cooperation

agreement to testify for the Commonwealth. Id. at 46-47.

      At the joint trial, Mower testified that he sold Higgins and Bennett meth

on multiple occasions, including January 5, 2018, when he delivered a quarter

gram of meth to Higgins. Id. at 52, 62. On the times Mower had delivered

meth to Higgins and Bennett, he noticed children around and had observed

Higgins and Bennett using meth in their home. Id. at 53-55.

      Mower received the meth he delivered to Higgins and Bennett on

January 5, 2018 on the same day from Paul (Larry) Crawford. Id. at 71.

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Crawford had been Mower’s source of meth for approximately six months to a

year. Id. at 73. Mower would go to Crawford’s residence once a week to stock

up with a few grams of meth to sell. Id. at 75. Mower indicated that Crawford

also supplied meth to Brittany Baker, Kelly Monn, Dan Schultz, and Michael

Gatrell, who all sold meth to support their own drug habits. Id. at 77-78, 93.

       Mower knew that Crawford obtained his meth from Appellant, a mutual

acquaintance who lived in Connecticut. Id. at 79, 83, 85. Mower had

introduced Crawford to Appellant in State College in 2017, as Crawford “had

funds available” after receiving a settlement. Id. at 81. The men did drugs

together and arranged for Crawford to receive meth from Appellant. Id. at 82.

       After officers arrested Mower, they continued to investigate the meth

supply chain to determine who was responsible for and profited from the drug

sale that led to Child’s death. In addition to Mower, the Commonwealth

presented the testimony of Baker, Monn, and Schultz, all of whom admitted

to selling meth they received from Crawford.2 N.T., 9/9/21, at 178-96; N.T.,

9/10/21, at 61; N.T., 9/13/21, at 156, 161. Baker, Monn, and Schultz testified

____________________________________________

2 All three individuals entered guilty pleas in connection with their roles in the
corrupt organization that delivered the meth which led to Child’s death. Baker
pled guilty to conspiracy (corrupt organizations) and intercepting
communication, served two years’ incarceration, and was on parole at the
time of trial. N.T. 9/9/21, at 170-72. Monn pled guilty to corrupt organizations,
perjury, and disclosing intercepted communications, served a prison sentence,
and was on parole. N.T. 9/10/21, at 45-46. Schultz plead guilty to criminal
use of a communication device and was awaiting sentencing. N.T., 9/13/21,
at 155. The fourth individual who sold drugs for Crawford, Michael Gatrell,
entered a guilty plea and agreed to testify against Appellant, but Gatrell
passed away in June 2021 before the joint trial. N.T., 9/14/21, at 155.

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that Crawford received meth in the mail each week from an individual in

Connecticut or in Florida. N.T., 9/9/21, at 199-201; N.T., 9/10/21, at 68; N.T.,

9/13/21, at 171, 177. The packages would be addressed to Damien Crawford,

Crawford’s dog. N.T., 9/10/21, at 67-69; N.T., 9/13/21, at 177.

       Monn also identified Appellant as Crawford’s meth supplier. N.T.,

9/10/21, at 53, 56-57, 61. In his guilty plea, Monn confirmed he met Appellant

on a trip to State College with Mower and Crawford in 2017 where he learned

that Appellant was a source of meth. Id. at 52-53, 78. Monn recalled that on

one occasion, Crawford arranged for a package of meth from Appellant to be

sent to Monn’s residence. Id. at 61-66. Monn and Schultz testified separately

that Crawford had directed each of them to wire money to “Thomas Keogh” in

an amount of several thousand dollars. Id. at 74, 77; N.T., 9/13/21, at 163.

       During Schultz’s testimony, the Commonwealth introduced items that

police recovered from Crawford’s home, including, but not limited to, drug

paraphernalia and priority mail envelopes addressed to Damien Crawford from

Connecticut and Wellington, Florida. N.T., 9/13/21, at 177, 180.

       The prosecution also offered the testimony of Crawford, who admitted

to leading a meth distribution network in Franklin County in which Mower,

Monn, Gatrell, and Schultz acted as drug runners. N.T., 9/14/21, at 6-7, 25.3

As Crawford supplied meth to his sellers on a regular basis, Crawford indicated
____________________________________________

3 Crawford entered a negotiated guilty plea to corrupt organizations,
conspiracy, and delivery of a controlled substance in which he would receive
a sentence of 5½ to 11 years’ imprisonment. Crawford had not yet been
sentenced at the time of trial. N.T., 9/14/21, at 177, 180.

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the operation steadily grew and became “too much” to handle. Id. at 26-27.

Crawford shared that he “freaked out” when he learned of Child’s death, which

led him to stop selling meth. Id. at 17-20.

      Crawford revealed that Appellant was his meth supplier. Id. at 25, 28-

29. Crawford confirmed that Mower had introduced him to Appellant in State

College in 2017 after which the men established a business relationship in

which Appellant would send Crawford meth to sell. Id. at 27, 55-58. Appellant

would ship meth from Connecticut where he lived, but also shipped meth from

Wellington, Florida. Id. at 32-33, 58-59. Crawford would use the name of his

dog, Damien, on the packages as to not implicate himself. Id. at 42.

      Crawford regularly sent money to Appellant through a wire transfer at

Walmart or directed Monn, Schultz, or Gatrell to do it for him. Id. at 47-48.

When Crawford received packages from Appellant, Crawford put the meth in

a safe in his bathroom. Id. at 50. On one occasion, Crawford had a package

delivered from Appellant to Monn as Crawford was out of town. Id. at 50-51.

      The investigators presented evidence of wire transfers, cell phone

records, and mail delivery records to corroborate Crawford’s testimony

implicating Appellant as his source of meth. Id. at 144-52, 218-31. In

addition, a search of Appellant’s Amazon account revealed purchases of

scales, baggies, a butane torch, butane capsules, eyedropper glass bottles,

tin cases, and vacuum seal bags. Id. at 228-29.

      At conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Appellant on all charges. On

November 10, 2021, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 12

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years, 1 month to 24 years, 2 months’ incarceration.4 Appellant filed timely

post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied on March 16, 2022. This

timely appeal followed.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal:

       1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motions
          for judgment of acquittal, motion in arrest of judgment, and
          motions for a new trial based on the Commonwealth failed [sic]
          to prove a substantial causal relationship between the actions
          of [Appellant] and the death of [Child?]

       2. Whether the aggregate sentence imposed on the offenses was
          manifestly excessive, harsh, and an abuse of discretion[?]

       3. Whether the trial court erred in imposing a sentence in the
          aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines without stating
          proper reasons on the record[?]

Appellant’s Brief, at 5 (renumbered for ease of review).

       In the first two issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency and weight

of the evidence supporting his DDRD conviction. We begin by noting the

difference between sufficiency and weight claims:

       The distinction between a claim challenging the sufficiency of
       evidence and a claim challenging the weight of evidence is critical.
       A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary
       to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient
       evidence to sustain the verdict but claims that “notwithstanding
       all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to
       ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to
       deny justice.” A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence,
       however, asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support at

____________________________________________

4 Bennett was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, delivery of a controlled
substance and related charges. Bennett received an aggregate sentence of 15
to 30 years’ imprisonment. Bennett’s appeal (docketed at 615-616 MDA 2022)
has been resolved in a separate decision.

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       least one material element of the crime for which Appellant has
       been convicted.

Commonwealth v. Arias, __A.3d __, 2022 PA Super 202 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa.Super. 2003)

(citation omitted)).

       When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our

standard of review is as follows:

       In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
       determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
       reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
       most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
       elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d
       133 (Pa.Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the
       evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
       finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.
       2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
       links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
       Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citations

omitted).

       The Crimes Code provides that an individual commits the crime of Drug

Delivery Resulting in Death (DDRD) “if the person intentionally administers,

dispenses, delivers, gives, prescribes, sells or distributes any controlled

substance ... in violation of [35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(14) or (30)], and another

person dies as a result of using the substance.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506(a).5

____________________________________________

5  The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act criminalizes the
delivery of a controlled substance by an individual who is not registered or
licensed to do so. See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

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Methamphetamine is a Schedule II controlled substance. See 35 P.S. § 780-

104(2)(iii)(4).

      In other words, the crime of DDRD “consists of two principal elements:

(i) [i]ntentionally administering, dispensing, delivering, giving, prescribing,

selling or distributing any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled

substance and (ii) death caused by (‘resulting from’) the use of that drug.”

Commonwealth v. Kakhankham, 132 A.3d 986, 991-92 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(some quotation marks omitted).

      As noted above, although the Commonwealth is required to prove that

the defendant acted intentionally with respect to the drug delivery, the

Commonwealth only needs to show the defendant acted recklessly in causing

the death. This Court recently held that:

      [T]he applicable mens rea for the crime of drug delivery resulting
      in death is two-fold. First, the delivery, distribution or sale of the
      contraband must be intentional. Second, the actual death must be
      the reckless result of the actions of the defendant. Id. at 995. As
      such, the crime is an intentional act in providing contraband, with
      a reckless disregard of death from the use of the contraband.

Commonwealth v. Burton, 234 A.3d 824, 830 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citing

Commonwealth v. Carr, 227 A.3d 11, 16-17 (Pa. Super. 2020)).

      Specifically, in this case, Appellant concedes that the Commonwealth

proved that he intentionally delivered meth to Crawford. However, Appellant

argues that there was insufficient evidence that his conduct was a legal cause

of Child’s death.

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      Appellant’s argument has three subparts, which we will address

together. First, Appellant suggests the Commonwealth failed to prove that the

meth Child ingested came from the packages that he sent to Crawford.

Appellant argues that Crawford and Mower obtained meth from other suppliers

and Higgins and Bennett bought drugs from dealers other than Mower.

      Second, Appellant asserts that even if he supplied the meth that Child

ingested, the prosecution failed to establish the exact cause of death since the

autopsy revealed that Child’s cause of death was mixed substance toxicity of

meth and buprenorphine. As such, Appellant claims the prosecution failed to

prove which drug caused Child’s death. Appellant also suggests that Child died

as a result of the neglect and reckless conduct of her guardians, Higgins and

Bennett, in allowing her access to drugs.

      Third, Appellant suggests that it was not foreseeable to Appellant that

his conduct would result in the “death of a 3-year-old child two states away

from his residence after he delivered drugs to Larry Crawford who was the

methamphetamine kingpin of Franklin County.” Appellant’s Brief, at 14.

      In reviewing similar claims, this Court has held that:

      “It is undisputed that the Commonwealth must prove a direct
      causal relationship between the acts of a defendant and the
      victim's death.” Commonwealth v. Long, 425 Pa.Super. 170,
      624 A.2d 200, 203 (1993). “Criminal responsibility is properly
      assessed against one whose conduct was a direct and substantial
      factor producing the death.” Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835
      A.2d 801, 807 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v.
      Nicotra, 425 Pa.Super. 600, 625 A.2d 1259, 1260 (1993)). “This
      is true even though ‘other factors combined with that conduct to
      achieve the result.’” Id. Additionally:

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         In order to impose criminal liability, causation must be direct
         and substantial. Defendants should not be exposed to a loss
         of liberty based on the tort standard which only provides
         that the event giving rise to the injury is a substantial factor.
         Although typically the tort concept refers to only substantial
         and not to direct and substantial as in the criminal context,
         the additional language in the criminal law does not provide
         much guidance. Therefore, criminal causation has come to
         involve a case-by-case social determination; i.e., is it just
         or fair under the facts of the case to expose the defendant
         to criminal sanctions. In other words, was the defendant's
         conduct so directly and substantially linked to the actual
         result as to give rise to imposition of criminal liability or was
         the actual result so remote and attenuated that it would be
         unfair to hold the defendant responsible for it?

      Commonwealth v. Rementer, 410 Pa.Super. 9, 598 A.2d 1300,
      1304–05 (1991). “In seeking to define the requirement that a
      criminal defendant's conduct be a direct factor in the death of
      another, the courts of this Commonwealth have held that ‘so long
      as the defendant's conduct started the chain of causation which
      led to the victim's death, criminal responsibility for the crime of
      homicide may properly be found.’” McCloskey, 835 A.2d at 808
      (citing Nicotra, supra).

                                   ***
      “[I]t has never been the law of this Commonwealth that
      criminal responsibility must be confined to a sole or
      immediate cause of death.” Commonwealth v. Skufca, 457
      Pa. 124, 321 A.2d 889, 894 (1974) (citation omitted). “Criminal
      responsibility is properly assessed against one whose
      conduct was a direct and substantial factor in producing
      the death even though other factors combined with that
      conduct to achieve the result.” Id.

Fabian, 60 A.3d at 152 (emphasis added).

      Our review of the record in this case in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth shows that the prosecution met its burden of proving beyond

a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s conduct was a direct and substantial factor

in causing Child’s death.

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      As Child’s autopsy revealed her cause of death was mixed substance

toxicity of methamphetamine (18 nanograms/milliliter) and buprenorphine in

her system (1.2 nanograms/milliliter), Dr. Land, the forensic pathologist,

could not say with absolute certainty which of the two drugs definitively

caused Child’s death. However, Dr. Land opined that Child’s ingestion of meth

was likely lethal. Dr. Land emphasized that “[m]ethamphetamine is a very,

very, very dangerous drug” with “lethal toxic side effects.” N.T., 9/8/21, at

120-21. Dr. Land testified that in conducting over 10,000 autopsies, he has

observed numerous deaths caused by meth. Id. at 121-22.

      There was sufficient evidence to show Appellant was the source of the

meth that Child accessed shortly before her death. Child’s guardians, Higgins

and Bennett admitted that they purchased meth from Mower (Crawford and

Appellant’s drug runner) on the evening of January 5, 2018, just hours before

Child was found lifeless in her bed.

      Mower agreed that he delivered meth to Higgins’ home on January 5,

2018, which was the same day he received a supply of meth from Crawford.

Despite Appellant’s allegations to the contrary, Crawford, who admitted to his

role in the corrupt organization did not indicate that he received meth from

anyone other than Appellant.

      Higgins and Bennett testified that Mower cut a large amount of

methamphetamine on their kitchen table, an area accessible to Child.

Although Higgins and Bennett claimed Child was behind a baby gate when the

meth was delivered, they admitted that after Child was placed in her bedroom

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that night to go to sleep, Child could leave her bedroom and was not restricted

from entering the kitchen. Higgins and Bennett began to use the meth, put

Child to bed, and did not check on her until the following day. Bennett testified

that there were no other sources of meth in the home other than the amount

he and Higgins purchased from Mower that evening.

      Despite the fact that no individual witnessed Child accessing meth

before her death, the jury was free to consider the circumstantial evidence to

conclude that Child ingested meth that had been delivered by Mower, an

individual who sold meth on behalf of a corrupt organization that Appellant

supplied with illegal drugs.

      To the extent that Appellant suggests that his liability should be limited

as it was not foreseeable that his conduct would cause the death of a three-

year-old, we reject Appellant’s claim that Child’s death was a result so remote

and attenuated that it would be unfair to hold Appellant responsible.

      Rather, Appellant’s conduct started the chain of causation which led to

the victim's death. Appellant supplied meth to Crawford, when neither men

had the license or authorization to do so. Appellant and Crawford’s exchanges

of meth were part of a network that distributed the drug to users throughout

Franklin County to make a profit. The delivery of this dangerous controlled

substance, which is nearly always used in an illegal manner, was made to

admitted drug addicts who were responsible for the care of children. Child

accessed the meth that was delivered by Appellant’s corrupt organization.

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      Reviewing    the   evidence   in   the   light   most   favorable   to   the

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence to allow the jury to infer that Appellant’s reckless conduct caused

Child’s death. Therefore, there is no merit to his sufficiency challenge.

      Second, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for a new trial when his DDRD conviction is against the weight of the evidence.

Our standard of review for challenges to the weight of the evidence is well-

established:

      The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie
      in ensuring that the trial court's decision has record support.
      Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial
      court has acted within the limits of its discretion.

      A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
      the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
      trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
      conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
      would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
      the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
      certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
      or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

      An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a
      weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
      applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
      review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
      of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(citations omitted).

      Appellant combines his bald assertion that his DDRD conviction is

against the weight of the evidence with his sufficiency analysis arguing that

the Commonwealth failed to prove a causal connection between Appellant’s

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conduct and Child’s death. As noted above, we conclude that the

Commonwealth met its burden to prove the necessary elements to sustain the

DDRD conviction.

      While Appellant cites to the correct standard of review for a challenge

to the weight of the evidence, Appellant does not include any separate

discussion to provide factual or legal support to his theory that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying this claim.

      Moreover, our review of the record in this case does not reveal any

evidence that would lead us to believe that the trial court abused its discretion

in concluding that Appellant failed to show that the jury’s verdict resulted in

such an injustice that a new trial was required. See Windslowe, supra. As

such, Appellant’s weight claim must fail.

      Lastly, Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in imposing

a sentence in the aggravated range without stating proper reasons on the

record. In reviewing challenges to the trial court’s sentencing discretion, we

are mindful that:

      Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
      entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. Prior to reaching the
      merits of a discretionary sentencing issue[, w]e conduct a four-
      part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a
      timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether
      the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
      reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3)
      whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
      (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
      appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
      Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

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Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 489 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(quotation marks, some citations, and emphasis omitted).

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a post-sentence motion,

which included a claim that his sentence was excessive. However, Appellant’s

brief does not contain a statement of the reasons relied upon for appeal with

respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).

      It is well-established that:

      [w]hen challenging the discretionary aspects of sentence, an
      appellant must include in his or her brief a separate concise
      statement demonstrating that there is a substantial question as
      to the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing
      Code. If the Commonwealth objects to the appellant's failure to
      comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), the sentencing claim is waived for
      purposes of review.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 149 A.3d 349, 353 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 861 A.2d 304, 308 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(citations omitted)).

      As the Commonwealth has objected to the fact that Appellant’s brief

does not contain a Rule 2119(f) statement, we deem Appellant’s challenges

to the discretionary aspects of his sentence to be waived.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023

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