Court Opinion

ID: 9839106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 18:04:30.133725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:58.725057
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/11/23 Ruiz v. City of Industry CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  JOSEPH P. RUIZ,                                              B323687

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. 20STCV29058)
           v.

  CITY OF INDUSTRY et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mel Red Recana, Judge. Affirmed.
     Joseph P. Ruiz, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Casso & Sparks, James M. Casso, Matthew M. Gorman,
and Carolin Sahimi for Defendants and Respondents.

                            _________________________
       Plaintiff Joseph P. Ruiz appeals from the dismissal of his
lawsuit against the City of Industry (the City) and
Councilmember Newell Ruggles after the trial court concluded
that he failed to state a claim under the Ralph M. Brown Act (the
Act) (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.).1 We affirm the judgment.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Original Complaint
       Ruiz sued the City and Ruggles (collectively defendants) in
August 2020. He alleged causes of action for (1) “Willful
Misclassification (Labor Code Section 226.8)” and (2) “Wrongful
Termination (Government Code Section 54957).”
       Ruiz alleged, in relevant part, that he was employed by the
City from October 1999 to August 2015. In April 2009, Mayor
Dave Perez sent Ruiz a letter stating he was reducing Ruiz’s
monthly pay from $8,000 to $4,000. The letter indicated the
decrease was due to “budget constraints” occasioned by the
existing “economic crisis.” Ruiz responded by letter to then City
Manager Kevin Radecki, arguing the City had misclassified him
as an independent contractor and threatening litigation. As a
result of Ruiz’s letter, the “Mayor quickly withdrew his letter and
Plaintiff was given more money in monthly salary the following
year.”
       According to Ruiz’s complaint, in July 2012, Radecki
reduced Ruiz’s monthly pay from $11,000 to $4,000 without
placing that action on a meeting agenda for the city council to
decide. Ruiz alleged this violated public policy and section 54957.
In August 2015, “Paul Philips became City Manager and

1    All undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.

                                 2
terminated Plaintiff without cause, reasoning, notice or
authority.”
       Ruiz further alleged that “City of Industry insider Frank
Hill told Plaintiff of a conversation he had with Councilman
Newell Ruggles’ grandmother, Planning Commissioner Andria
Welch and aunt to Mr. Ruggles, Laurie Marshall.” Hill informed
Ruiz that Welch and Marshall were responsible for Ruiz’s
termination. Ruiz alleged Ruggles caused Philips to terminate
him. In August 2018, Ruiz sent an e-mail to the city clerk with
the subject line “Claim for Damages.” The e-mail alleged Ruggles
ordered Philips to fire Ruiz and sought $5 million in damages.
Ruiz then filed a lawsuit “per Government Code Section 945.6”
after “the City Council did not respond within 45 days of the
presentation of the Claim for Damages and therefore it was
deemed rejected.”
       Ruiz sought compensatory and punitive damages in his
prayer for relief.
Demurrer to Original Complaint
       Defendants demurred to Ruiz’s complaint.
       On August 12, 2021, the trial court sustained defendants’
demurrer. As to the first cause of action for “willful
misclassification,” the court concluded there is no private right of
action under Labor Code section 226.8. As to the second cause of
action for wrongful termination, the court concluded
section 54957 provided no basis for Ruiz’s claim. The court
granted Ruiz leave to amend to state a claim under the Act.
Amended Complaint
       In September 2021, Ruiz filed an amended complaint
asserting a single cause of action for “Wrongful Termination per

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Government Code Section 54957(4).”2
       The amended complaint alleged in relevant part that
Radecki’s reduction of Ruiz’s pay in July 2012 was improper
because such action requires public notice on a council agenda.
The complaint asserted Philips also lacked the authority to
terminate Ruiz because his termination required consideration in
an open session under section 54957, subdivision (b)(4). The city
council “was silent” while Radecki altered Ruiz’s contract and
Philips terminated him “without authority.” Ruiz attached as an
exhibit a city council agenda from July 26, 2012, listing as one
item of consideration the termination of a contract with an entity
Ruiz contends was an independent contractor.
       Ruiz also alleged the delayed discovery rule rendered his
lawsuit timely because he filed a claim with the City on August 9
and 11 of 2018, immediately after learning of the “conspiracy”
between Ruggles and Welch to terminate him. Ruiz alleged the
City failed to timely respond to his claim under section 945.6,
thus his lawsuit filed on August 3, 2020 was within the two-year
limitations period.
Demurrer to Amended Complaint
       Defendants demurred to Ruiz’s amended complaint.
Defendants argued: (1) Ruiz’s claim was barred because he failed
to exhaust prerequisites under the Act set forth in sections
54960.1 and 54960.2; (2) the delayed discovery rule did not save
Ruiz’s claim; (3) there is no wrongful termination cause of action
under the Act; (4) Ruiz did not allege any improper action by the
City’s legislative body; (5) Ruiz did not allege any action by

2      Although Ruiz repeatedly referenced section “54957(4)” in
the trial court, it is apparent he intended to cite section 54957,
subdivision (b)(4).

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Ruggles that violated the Act; and (6) Ruiz apparently sought
monetary damages, which are not available under the Act.
       Ruiz opposed defendants’ demurrer, arguing he was not
required to fulfill the prerequisites to filing suit under the Act
because the legislative body did not terminate him; the city
manager did. He further argued Radecki and Philips “usurped
the power of the city council by terminating the agreements” with
Ruiz in violation of section 54957, subdivision (b)(4). Ruiz
contended the delayed discovery rule applied because he did not
learn about the actions by the “rogue city managers” until Hill
informed him in August 2018. Ruiz argued that Ruggles violated
sections 54957.7, subdivision (b), and 54959.
       The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend. The court noted section 54957 permits a legislative body
to hold closed sessions to consider the employment of a public
employee (§ 54957, subd. (b)(1)), and the term “employee”
includes “an officer or an independent contractor who functions
as an officer or an employee but . . . not . . . other independent
contractors.” (Id., subd. (b)(4).) The court reasoned that Ruiz’s
June 2009 letter to Radecki arguing that he was an employee
who had been misclassified as an independent contractor
definitively established that he was an “employee” for purposes of
section 54957, subdivision (b)(1). The legislative body was
therefore entitled to hold a closed session about his dismissal.
       The trial court further concluded that Ruiz “[failed] to show
that he can pursue damages” under section 54957, as the only
damages available are “mandamus, injunction, or declaratory
relief.” (§ 54960, subd. (a).) Ruiz’s amended complaint did not
pray for any of those available remedies. Instead, Ruiz’s claim to
the City indicated he is seeking monetary damages.

                                 5
       Finally, the court concluded that section 54960.2 requires
an individual to submit a cease and desist letter to the legislative
body within nine months of the violation of section 54957 before
bringing an action under that section. In the trial court’s view,
Ruiz’s argument that this prerequisite did not apply because the
legislative body did not terminate him was “completely at odds”
with his claim that the legislative body violated section 54957.
       With respect to Ruggles, the trial court concluded that none
of Ruiz’s allegations showed Ruggles violated any provision of the
Act. The court did not reach the statute of limitations issue.
       Ruiz timely appealed.
                             DISCUSSION
I.     The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining Ruiz’s
       Amended Complaint Without Leave to Amend
       On appeal, Ruiz argues his allegation that the city council
was required to, but did not, consider his termination in an open
and public hearing under section 54957, subdivision (b), was
sufficient to state a cause of action for wrongful termination.
       We independently review a trial court’s order sustaining a
demurrer to determine whether the operative complaint states
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action under any legal
theory. (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v.
Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Lee v.
Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1230.) We accept as true all
material facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint, but
not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Winn
v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 152; Evans
v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) On appeal, we review a
trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. Indeed, “[w]e are not bound
by the trial court’s stated reasons, if any, supporting its

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ruling . . . .” (Mendoza v. Town of Ross (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
625, 631.)
       A.      The Brown Act
       The purpose of the Act is to ensure the public’s right to
attend the meetings of public agencies. (Freedom Newspapers,
Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (1993) 6
Cal.4th 821, 823 (Freedom Newspapers); Epstein v. Hollywood
Entertainment Dist. II Bus. Improvement Dist. (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 862, 868.) To that end, it requires that all “meetings
of the legislative body of a local agency shall be open and public,
and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting of the
legislative body of a local agency,” except as the Act otherwise
provides. (§ 54953, subd. (a); Freedom Newspapers, at p. 823;
Golightly v. Molina (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1512
(Golightly).)
       The Act only applies to a “meeting” of a legislative body
(Golightly, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514), which is defined as
“any congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative
body at the same time and location . . . to hear, discuss,
deliberate, or take action on any item that is within the subject
matter jurisdiction of the legislative body.” (§ 54952.2, subd. (a);
Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services Dist. (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 502, 514.) The Act also prohibits “ ‘a series of private
meetings (known as serial meetings) by which a majority of the
members of a legislative body commit themselves to a
decision . . . or engage in collective deliberation on public
business.’ ” (Page v. MiraCosta Community College Dist. (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 471, 503–504 (Page), quoting 216 Sutter Bay
Associates v. County of Sutter (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 860, 877; see

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§ 54952.2, subd. (b)(1) [statutory provision prohibiting serial
meetings].)
       Section 54960 permits “any interested person” to
“commence an action by mandamus, injunction, or declaratory
relief . . . to determine the applicability of this chapter to past
actions of the legislative body, subject to Section 54960.2 . . . .”
(§ 54960, subd. (a).) Section 54960.2 requires any “interested
person alleging a violation” of the Act to first submit “a cease and
desist letter” to the clerk of the legislative body being accused of
the violation “within nine months of the alleged violation.”
(§ 54960.2, subd. (a)(1), (2).) The legislative body has 30 days to
respond to a cease and desist letter (id., subd. (b)), after which
“the party submitting the cease and desist letter shall commence
the action” within 60 days “or thereafter be barred from
commencing the action.” (Id., subd. (a)(4).)
       B. Ruiz’s operative complaint does not allege a
       violation of the Act
       A plaintiff alleging a violation of the Act must show: (1) the
local legislative body violated one or more of the Act’s provisions;
(2) the legislative body took action in connection with the
violation; (3) a timely demand for the legislative body to cure the
improper action; (4) the legislative body did not cure the action;
and (5) prejudice from the violation of the Act. (Julian Volunteer
Fire Co. Assn. v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Protection Dist. (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 583, 601 (Julian).)
       The Act generally prohibits a legislative body from holding
meetings that are not open to the public. Ruiz asserts defendants
violated this prohibition, yet the amended complaint fails to
allege the occurrence of any “meeting” among a “majority of the
members of a legislative body” in violation of the Act. (§§ 54953,

                                 8
54952.2, subds. (a) & (b)(1).) Ruiz alleges he “was terminated by
city manager Paul Philips in August 2015”; City Manager
Radecki reduced Ruiz’s pay in July 2012; and there was a
“conspiracy to terminate” Ruiz between Ruggles and Welch.
None of these allegations describe a prohibited “meeting.” Nor do
they allege any behavior by Ruggles that would constitute a
violation of the Act. Although the City of Industry City Council is
a “legislative body” subject to the Act (§ 54952, subd. (a); Boyle v.
City of Redondo Beach (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1116), Ruiz
does not allege a majority of its members met in private to
discuss his termination or pay reduction. To the contrary, he
alleges the “City of Industry [City] Council was silent” as Radecki
reduced Ruiz’s pay and Philips terminated his contract “without
authority.” To the extent Ruiz’s claim is premised on Ruggles’s
communication with Welch, it fails because individual
conversations between a member of the city council and another
person fall outside the scope of the Act’s open meeting
requirements. (§ 54952.2, subd. (c)(1) [expressly excluding
“[i]ndividual contacts or conversations between a member of a
legislative body and any other person”]; Page, supra, 180
Cal.App.4th at p. 504.)
       Further, the amended complaint does not allege Ruiz
complied with section 54960.2’s requirement that a prospective
plaintiff submit a cease and desist letter to the legislative body
within nine months after the alleged violation before that
plaintiff may file an action under the Act. Ruiz argues that he
did not need to fulfill that requirement because his pay reduction
and termination were not actions of a legislative body. The trial
court aptly noted that this contention undermines Ruiz’s claim
under the Act, as it concedes the legislative body took no action in

                                 9
connection with any violation of the Act—an element essential to
Ruiz’s claim. (See Julian, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.)
       While Ruiz’s claim could be understood as asserting it was
defendants’ failure to take collective action that violated the Act,
he identifies no provision of the Act that required the city council
to discuss his pay reduction or termination in a meeting. Indeed,
the only provision Ruiz relies upon is the “personnel exception” to
the Act’s open meeting requirement. We agree with the trial
court that this provision does not provide a legal basis for Ruiz’s
claim.
       Under section 54957, subdivision (b)(1), the Act “shall not
be construed to prevent the legislative body of a local agency from
holding closed sessions during a regular or special meeting to
consider the appointment, employment, evaluation of
performance, discipline, or dismissal of a public employee or to
hear complaints or charges brought against the employee by
another person or employee unless the employee requests a
public session.” Subdivision (b)(4) of the same section provides:
“For the purposes of this subdivision, the term ‘employee’ shall
include an officer or an independent contractor who functions as
an officer or an employee but shall not include any elected
official, member of a legislative body or other independent
contractors. This subdivision shall not limit local officials’ ability
to hold closed session meetings pursuant to Sections 1461, 32106,
and 32155 of the Health and Safety Code or Sections 37606 and
37624.3 of the Government Code. Closed sessions held pursuant
to this subdivision shall not include discussion or action on
proposed compensation except for a reduction of compensation
that results from the imposition of discipline.”

                                 10
       Although the statute thus permits certain employment
matters to be considered in closed sessions, section 54957 cannot
be read as independently requiring the legislative body to engage
in “collective decisionmaking” or “collective action” on all
personnel issues. (See Golightly, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1513–1514 [legislative body could delegate administrative
authority; decisionmaking by individual public officials not
subject to Act].) Although Ruiz contends defendants engaged in
improper acts by not conducting a meeting, or by allowing the
city managers to “usurp” the City’s authority, these allegations
are not tethered to any valid legal theory or supported by any
legal authority. Other than section 54957, subdivision (b)(4),
Ruiz has not identified any law he claims defendants violated by
failing to hold a meeting to terminate his employment or
contract. In the absence of any allegation that a meeting took
place within the meaning of the Act, or any legal basis to support
the argument that a meeting was required, the “personnel
exception” to the open meeting requirement is inapplicable.
       Finally, the remedies available for a violation of the Act are
limited to “mandamus, injunction, or declaratory relief.”
(§ 54960.) Ruiz’s amended complaint did not seek any of these
remedies, and it expressly alleged that Ruiz “is not attempting to
nullify” any action. The allegation that Ruiz submitted a “Claim
for Damages” with the City in August 2018 showed he is seeking
monetary damages, which are unavailable under the Act.3

3     Because we conclude his complaint otherwise fails to state
a claim under the Act we need not consider Ruiz’s argument that
the delayed-discovery rule saves his claim from being barred by
the statute of limitations.

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       We further conclude Ruiz’s amended complaint does not
state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy. The policy underlying such a claim “must be supported by
either constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Stevenson v.
Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 890.) Yet the only
statutory provisions the amended complaint cites are those
comprising the Act, and for the reasons discussed above, the
complaint failed to allege a violation of the Act. (See City of
Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1159
[common law cause of action for wrongful discharge cannot be
broader than the statute on which it depends]; accord Dutra v.
Mercy Medical Center Mt. Shasta (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 750,
756 [when statute articulating a public policy includes limitations
in scope or remedy, those limitations also circumscribe common
law wrongful discharge cause of action].)
       Ruiz has not shown any reasonable possibility he could
amend his complaint to state a claim under the Act. (Schifando
v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081 [plaintiff has
burden of proving an amendment would cure defect].) The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

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                          DISPOSITION
       The trial court judgment is affirmed. Defendants to recover
their costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                          ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                        EDMON, P. J.

                        EGERTON, J.

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