Court Opinion

ID: 9462676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:47:00.696132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:42.812063
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
Following issuance of the Court’s prior opinion in these cases, Stephen K. Lester, an Assistant United States Attorney, contacted the F.B.I. agent in charge of this case; Lester informed the agent of the basis of our decision. In an affidavit submitted to this Court, Lester stated on December 10, 1975, he received 146 black and white photographs from the F.B.I.; Lester recognized these photographs as copies of the color photographs which were in the missing Exhibit 71. Nine of the exhibit’s 155 photos had not been copied; writing on the back of the 146 copies did not appear on the originals. Lester concluded his affidavit by stating, “Other than the fact that the attached 146 photographs are not in color, they accurately reflect the contents of Government’s Exhibit 71.”
On December 22, 1975, this Court, by order, permitted supplementation of the record on appeal by the government. The 146 photographs and the Lester affidavit were filed. The Court, on its own motion, ordered a limited rehearing; the rehearing was to concern the issues relating to admissibility of Exhibit 71 and whether the record, as supplemented by the government, is sufficient to permit this Court to determine the relevancy and materiality of the exhibit vis-a-vis its prejudicial effect.
*213The rehearing has been held and it is our conclusion the record as supplemented is sufficient to permit this Court to determine the issue of the alleged unacceptable prejudicial effect of Exhibit 71.1 Thus, a new trial because of the missing exhibit is no longer required. We must, however, determine the issues raised in the original briefs filed in this case and not addressed in our previous opinion.
Appellants raise numerous contentions concerning the admissibility of Exhibit 71. These contentions present questions concerning the sufficiency of foundation evidence, the exhibit’s relevancy, and the weighing of that relevancy, if any, against possible prejudice to appellants from the exhibit’s admission. All three matters are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we can reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Young v. Anderson, 513 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1975) (determination of relevancy); United States v. Willis, 482 F.2d 1034 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den’d, 414 U.S. 1112, 94 S.Ct. 841, 38 L.Ed.2d 738 (weighing of prejudice against relevancy); Gard, Jones on Evidence § 17.-51 at 354 (6th ed. 1972) (sufficiency of foundation evidence). Having viewed the copies of the photographs and considered the record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of Exhibit 71. The purpose of the admission of the photographs in Exhibit 71 was not a purpose which required stringent standards of foundation and authenticity evidence. Many of appellants’ complaints actually go to the weight the jury should give the photographs. To the extent pictures containing none of the appellants or witnesses are included in the exhibit, any error in admitting those would necessarily be harmless. The jury had seen the appellants and the witnesses and could have discerned in which photos these persons were not present. We do not believe these photos were of a nature to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury against the appellants. The relevancy of the exhibit in showing the relationship of the parties (especially as these issues related to the involuntary servitude count) and in countering certain testimony of appellants Harris and Street as to their general unfamiliarity with activities at Mitchell’s Farm would outweigh any passion and prejudice engendered by the pictures. The trial court did not err in admitting Exhibit 71.
Appellants raise numerous contentions concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. In determining these challenges, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to decide if there is sufficient substantial proof, direct and circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, from which a jury might find these appellants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. den’d, 419 U.S. 897, 95 S.Ct. 177, 42 L.Ed.2d 142; United States v. Yates, 470 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1972).
Appellants argue the evidence was insufficient as to the conspiracy count because there was no proof of an agreement among the appellants to violate the laws of the United States. The alleged conspiracy involved violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584, 1952, 2421, 2423 (footnote 1 of the original opinion describes these statutes). The overt acts alleged set forth the basic outline of the scheme, and we set out some of those overt acts to give the factual context of our decision. In the spring of 1972, appellant Harris asked one Cookie Martinez to prostitute herself and turn over all monies she earned to him. In May, 1972, Martinez was taken from Junction City, Kansas, to Kansas City, Missouri, by Harris, one James Logan, and one Alphonso Nephew; Harris, Nephew and Martinez flew from Kansas City, Missouri, to Baltimore, Maryland. Appellant Street met the trio at Baltimore and gave money to Harris and Nephew (allegedly their shares of the earnings from the Mitchell’s Farm enterprise accumulated *214in their absences). Martínez was taken to Mitchell’s Farm and was beaten by Harris. Martinez began prostituting herself at Mitchell’s Farm with all monies being collected by appellant Cline who divided them with Harris, Nephew and Street. Harris and Martinez subsequently traveled to Wichita, Kansas, via Chicago, Illinois, and Martinez performed acts of prostitution in Chicago and Wichita.
Appellants claim a conspiracy was not proven because Harris and Cline did not know each other before Harris arrived in Maryland; consequently, if Harris and Cline conspired they had to conspire through Street. Thus, they argue, there had to be evidence of communication between Street and Harris prior to May, 1972. Appellants admit there was testimony of a phone call from Street to Harris in April, 1972, in which Street invited Harris to visit Maryland. Appellants discount this latter evidence by saying no mention was made during the call of bringing girls to Maryland for prostitution purposes. We reject appellants’ attempts to limit the evidence which the jury could use to determine a conspiracy existed. We have recognized that circumstantial evidence is almost always required to prove an agreement to violate the law. United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1974). The jury had evidence which, if believed, established the acts set forth previously. These acts and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom would have allowed the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants had agreed to violate the law.
Appellants argue Street could not have been found guilty of the Mann Act and Interstate Racketeering Act violations if the conspiracy were not shown. Having determined there was sufficient evidence Street was a co-conspirator, we need not consider this contention.
Appellants attack Harris’ convictions on Counts II, III and V because Cookie Martinez’s testimony is the only evidence the trips specified in those counts were for the purpose of prostitution. The involuntary servitude count against all appellants also is attacked because Cookie Martinez’s testimony regarding torture, confinement and threats is not supported by other evidence and is contradicted by her own acts. Our appellate function does not permit the weighing of conflicting evidence or consideration of witnesses’ credibility. United States v. Buck, 449 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Baker, 444 F.2d 1290 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. den’d, 404 U.S. 885, 92 S.Ct. 222, 30 L.Ed.2d 167. The jury has determined these matters and we cannot say the evidence was insufficient to support its verdict.
Our former opinion is modified as it related to the missing Exhibit 71. Our discussion in that opinion of the warrant issue applies to the Exhibit, as well as to the testimony concerning the pistol and marijuana. Consequently, there is no necessity for setting aside the convictions and remanding for a new trial. The convictions are AFFIRMED.

. We have considered the arguments raised in appellants’ “Motion to Suppress” and find them unconvincing.