Court Opinion

ID: 9577897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:39:13.709444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:27.549952
License: Public Domain

Hill, Chief Justice,
dissenting as to Division 2.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) filed a declaration of taking against certain of condemnee’s property. As explained in Dorsey v. Dept. of Transp., 248 Ga. 34, 36 (279 SE2d 707) (1981) the general notion of notice pleading is not applicable to a declaration of taking, for “[t]he petition is not a mere pleading but an instrument which passes title when filed. . . .”
Condemnee filed a counterclaim seeking to quiet title to certain of his property allegedly impacted by a plat filed by DOT in a related condemnation against one of his neighbors. The majority holds, in Division 2, that such a counterclaim will not lie because OCGA § 32-3-1 et seq. establishes a special statutory procedure, and the counterclaim lies outside the bounds of this procedure. I agree that because of the special nature of the declaration of taking, this counterclaim is not compulsory, OCGA § 9-11-13 (a), that is, that it does not “arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” But because OCGA § 9-11-81 provides that the provisions of the Civil Practice Act relating to counterclaims do apply to special statutory proceedings, I would hold that it is a permissive counterclaim. OCGA § 9-11-13 (b). As such, it should have been separated for trial, not dismissed. Therefore, I must dissent to Division 2 and that part of the judgment which affirms the dismissal of the counterclaim.
*63Decided March 4, 1985 —
Rehearing denied March 14, 1985.
Dillard, Greer, Westmoreland & Wilson, George P. Dillard, for appellant.
Joseph E. Cheeley, George J. Hearn III, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Justice Gregory joins in this dissent.