Court Opinion

ID: 9555995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:12:08.728248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:52.315447
License: Public Domain

J-A13045-23

                                   2023 PA Super 155

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DANA GANJEH                                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 586 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 30, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0003535-2018

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                    FILED: AUGUST 15, 2023

       Dana Ganjeh appeals from the March 30, 2022 judgment of sentence of

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after a jury found him guilty

of first-degree murder in connection with the bludgeoning death of his female

companion.1 After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The suppression court summarized the relevant findings of fact and

procedural history of this case as follows:

              On or about November 5, 2018, the Luzerne County
              District Attorney filed a criminal information charging
              [Appellant] with criminal homicide.

              The aforementioned criminal information alleged that
              the [Appellant] intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or
              negligently caused the death of Linda Frick on or
              about August 4, 2018.
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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          [Appellant’s] counsel filed pre-trial motions on August
          13, 2019, which alleged that statements made by the
          [Appellant] to law enforcement were obtained in a
          manner contrary to the [Appellant’s] rights and in
          violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States
          Constitution and Article 1, section 9 of the
          Pennsylvania Constitution.

          A hearing on [Appellant’s] motions was conducted
          before the [trial c]ourt and the parties submitted
          briefs.

          On August 4, 2018, Officer Jude Allen was employed
          a patrolman with the Kingston Borough Police
          Department.

          On that same date, Officer Allen and Officer Robert
          Miller, also employed by Kingston Borough Police
          Department were dispatched to investigate a report of
          a deceased person and a suicidal male at 71 Price
          Street, Kingston, Pennsylvania.

          As the officers approached the residence, a male, later
          identified as [Appellant] opened the door and without
          prompting or questioning, handed officer Miller a key
          and stated, “She’s around back in a vehicle.”

          [Appellant] was placed in handcuffs to protect the
          safety of the responding officers and the public.

          Officer Allen asked [Appellant] “What happened?”

          [Appellant] responded that the victim, Linda Frick,
          “wasn’t feeling well, that he was going to take her to
          the hospital and she just died…[.]”

          [Appellant] continued, stating that he was “screwed.”

          At the time [Appellant] was handcuffed, he was not
          yet a suspect in this homicide and in fact officers did
          not even know that a crime had been committed[.]

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              [Appellant] was subsequently interviewed by
              Detective James Noone, and Detective Lieutenant
              John Anthony Of the Kingston Police Department.

              Detective Noone and Detective Lieutenant Anthony,
              hereinafter the investigators, interviewed [Appellant]
              in a meeting room located inside the Kingston Police
              Department which was a large room with tables and
              chairs.

              [Appellant] was allowed to use the bathroom, and was
              provided food and drink and allowed to smoke
              cigarettes.

              The investigators did not threaten, intimidate or
              coerce [Appellant] during the interview.

              Detective Noone asked [Appellant] if he could record
              the interview and [Appellant] declined. Therefore, the
              investigators did not audio or video record the
              interaction.

              Detective Noone read the Constitutional warnings
              pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona[2] to [Appellant]
              from a form document, hereinafter Miranda rights
              waiver.

              [Appellant] then initialed and signed the Miranda
              rights waiver.

              When [Appellant] signed the Miranda rights waiver
              he did not appear to be under the influence of drugs
              or alcohol.

              When [Appellant] signed the Miranda rights waiver
              he did not appear to be in any distress and clearly
              understood said constitutional warnings.

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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              After executing the Miranda rights waiver,
              [Appellant] agreed to and was interviewed by the
              investigators.

              [Appellant] answered some of the investigators[’]
              questions and declined to answer others.

              During the interview [Appellant] indicated that he was
              with the deceased earlier and that she was feeling ill.

              [Appellant] indicated that he and the decedent were
              driving around in the vehicle on the night before and
              at some point he discovered that she was deceased in
              the vehicle.

              The investigators asked [Appellant] about injuries to
              his hands.

              When the investigators inquired about the injuries to
              the decedent, [Appellant] invoked his right to counsel.

              Subsequent to [Appellant’s] request for counsel, the
              investigators ceased their questioning and terminated
              the interview.

Suppression court order and opinion, 4/8/20 at 2-5 (extraneous capitalization,

numeration, and citations omitted).3

       On October 15, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a notice of its intention

to introduce prior bad acts evidence. This evidence concerned (1) Appellant’s

pending criminal case in Wayne County, Pennsylvania involving his alleged

simple assault and strangulation of the victim; and (2) the history of contact

between Appellant and the Kingston Police Department related to his prior

____________________________________________

3 The suppression court’s April 8, 2020 order and opinion does not contain
pagination. For the ease of our discussion, we have assigned each page a
corresponding number.

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domestic abuse of the victim in September 2017, December 2017, and

February 2018. Following a hearing on September 13, 2021, the trial court

determined that this evidence was admissible under Pennsylvania Rule of

Evidence 404(b). Notes of testimony, 9/13/21 at 34.

       On August 13, 2019, Appellant filed two separate pretrial motions to

suppress the statements that he made to police at the Price Street residence

and during his subsequent interview at the Kingston Police Headquarters, on

the basis that his statements were made in violation of his Miranda rights.

The suppression court held a hearing on Appellant’s suppression motions on

October 16, 2019 and ultimately denied said motions on April 8, 2020.

       Following several continuances, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on

September 14, 2021. On September 17, 2021, the jury found Appellant guilty

of first-degree murder.       On March 21, 2022, Appellant filed a post-verdict

motion for a new trial that was denied by the trial court on March 30, 2022.

As noted, the trial court sentenced Appellant that same day to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This timely appeal followed on

April 12, 2022.4

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

              A.     Should [Appellant’s] custodial statements have
                     been suppressed?

____________________________________________

4 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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            B.     Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by
                   admitting testimony about Appellant’s prior bad
                   acts?

            C.     Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by
                   denying [Appellant’s] motions for substitute
                   counsel?

Appellant’s brief at 5.

      Appellant first argues that the suppression court erred in denying his

pretrial motion to suppress the statements that he made to police at the Price

Street residence and during his subsequent interview at the Kingston Police

Headquarters.    Id. at 14.   The crux of Appellant’s argument is that these

statements were made in violation of his Miranda rights.           Id.   For the

following reasons, we disagree.

            [Our] standard of review in addressing a challenge to
            the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
            determining whether the suppression court’s factual
            findings are supported by the record and whether the
            legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
            Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
            suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
            of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
            for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
            in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
            suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
            the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
            findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
            conclusions are erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation

omitted; brackets in original), appeal denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016).

Additionally, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder

to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their

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testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the

evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Byrd,

185 A.3d 1015, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

     It is well settled that when an individual is “both taken into custody and

subjected to interrogation,” that individual is entitled to Miranda warnings.

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 520 (Pa. 2017). Specifically,

our Supreme Court has explained:

           The United States Supreme Court has held that,
           before law enforcement officers question an individual
           who has been in taken into custody or has been
           deprived of his freedom in any significant way, the
           officers must first warn the individual that he has the
           right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
           used against him in a court of law, that he has the
           right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
           cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed.
           However, these special procedural safeguards are
           required only where a suspect is both taken into
           custody and subjected to             interrogation. In
           determining whether a suspect is in custody, two
           discrete inquiries are essential: (1) an examination of
           the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and
           (2) a determination of whether, given those
           circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt
           that he or she was at liberty to terminate the
           interrogation and leave. As noted, a person is in
           custody for Miranda purposes only when he is
           physically denied his freedom of action in any
           significant way or is placed in a situation in which he
           reasonably believes that his freedom of action or
           movement is restricted by the interrogation. ...
           Whether an encounter is deemed “custodial” must be
           determined by examining the totality of the
           circumstances.

Id. at 520-521 (citations omitted).

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      Here, the trial court found “that all of the statements obtained by law

enforcement were obtained in a manner consistent with [Appellant’s] rights

pursuant to the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions and were

admissible at the time of trial.” Trial court opinion, 10/17/22 at 11. Following

our careful of the evidentiary record, we agree with this assessment.

      By way of background to this claim, Appellant’s initial statements were

made to responding officers upon their arrival at the Price Street residence on

the morning of August 4, 2018. The suppression court summarized this

encounter as follows:

            [T]he Commonwealth introduced testimony that
            Officer Jude Allen and Officer Robert Miller of the
            Kingston Borough Police Department were dispatched
            to 71 Price Street, Kingston on the morning of August
            4, 2018, to investigate a 911 call reporting a deceased
            person and a separate 911 call reporting a suicidal
            male. When the officers approached the residence, a
            male, later identified as [Appellant], exited and,
            without prompting of questioning, handed Officer
            Miller a key and stated, “She’s around back in a
            vehicle.” Officer Miller went to investigate, and Officer
            Allen placed [Appellant] in handcuffs, not because he
            was a person of interest in any crime at that point, but
            because he was distraught, and was cuffed for safety
            purposes in light of the report of a suicidal male and
            Officer Miller’s departure from the immediate scene.
            Unaware that a crime had even been committed at
            that point, and attempting to figure out what was
            going on, Officer Allen asked [Appellant] “What
            happened?” Officer Allen explained that in asking this
            question, he was trying to gather information and
            learn with whom he had to make contact and speak
            to, and that he was not attempting to get [Appellant]
            to admit to committing a crime.              [Appellant]
            responded that “she wasn’t feeling well,” and that he

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J-A13045-23

            tried to take her to the hospital, and “she just died.”
            Then [Appellant] said “I’m screwed.”

Trial court opinion, 10/17/22 at 8-9 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

      Upon review, we agree with the suppression court that Appellant was

not subject to custodial interrogation at the time he made these voluntary and

spontaneous statements to police, and thus, they were not obtained in

violation of Appellant’s constitutional rights. This Court has long recognized

that “not every statement made by an individual during a police encounter

amounts to an interrogation. Volunteered or spontaneous utterances by an

individual are admissible even without Miranda warnings.” Interest of N.M.,

222 A.3d 759, 771 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 229

A.3d 562 (Pa. 2020).

      Additionally, the record further supports the trial court’s determination

that all the statements Appellant made during his subsequent interview at the

Kingston Police Headquarters were made after he knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntary waived his Miranda rights, and were thus admissible.

      In addressing such a claim, we are guided by the following principles:

            When a defendant challenges the admission of a
            statement made during a custodial interrogation, the
            Commonwealth bears the burden to prove by a
            preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s
            Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and
            voluntary. We engage in a two-part inquiry:

            First, the relinquishment of the right must have been
            voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free
            and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
            coercion or deception. Second, the waiver must have

                                     -9-
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           been made with a full awareness both of the nature of
           the right being abandoned and the consequences of
           the decision to abandon it. Only if the totality of the
           circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal
           both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
           comprehension may a court properly conclude that
           Miranda rights have been waived.

           An examination of the totality of the circumstances
           includes a consideration of (1) the duration and means
           of an interrogation; (2) the defendant’s physical and
           psychological state; (3) the conditions attendant to
           the detention; (4) the attitude of the interrogator; and
           (5) any and all other factors that could drain a
           person’s ability to withstand suggestion and coercion.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 210 A.3d 1050, 1058 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citations,

internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted), appeal denied, 218 A.3d

1199 (Pa. 2019).

     Here, the record reflects that Appellant was provided Miranda warnings

prior to his interview at the Kingston Police Headquarters and executed a

written Miranda waiver form wherein he acknowledged that he understood

that his rights and was waiving them in agreeing to speak with Detectives

Noone and Anthony. Notes of testimony, 10/16/19 at 28-33. Detective Noone

testified that Appellant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or

alcohol at the time he waived his Miranda rights nor did he appear to be in

any distress. Id. at 29. Detective Noone further testified that at no point

during this interview was Appellant threatened, intimidated, or coerced. Id.

at 28, 35. Appellant was also permitted to eat, drink, use the bathroom, and

smoke during the course of this interview. Id. at 27, 42-43. The trial court

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explicitly credited Detective Noone’s testimony regarding the circumstances

of Appellant’s Miranda waiver. Trial court opinion, 10/17/22 at 11. We are

bound by the court’s credibility determinations, which are supported by the

record. See Byrd, 185 A.3d at 1019. Furthermore, under the totality of these

circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s Miranda waiver

was proper. See trial court opinion, 10/17/22 at 11; see also Smith, 210

A.3d at 1058.

      Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we discern no error on the

part of the suppression court in denying Appellant’s suppression motions.

      Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion admitting

prior bad act evidence, specifically evidence of his pending 2018 criminal case

in Wayne County, Pennsylvania involving the victim; and the history of contact

between Appellant and the Kingston Police Department related to his prior

domestic abuse of the victim in September 2017, December 2017, and

February 2018. Appellant’s brief at 21.

      “[T]he admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial

court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly

abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Fransen, 42 A.3d 1100, 1106

(Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013).

“An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment, but is rather the

overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality,

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as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Belknap, 105 A.3d

7, 10 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 294 (Pa.

2015).

      It is well settled that “evidence of prior crimes is not admissible for the

sole purpose of demonstrating a criminal defendant’s propensity to commit

crimes.” Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1283

(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc); see also Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). Nevertheless,

“[e]vidence may be admissible in certain circumstances where it is relevant

for some other legitimate purpose and not utilized solely to blacken the

defendant’s character.” Id. Specifically, evidence of other crimes or bad acts

may be admissible to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.” Commonwealth v. Hairston,

84 A.3d 657, 665 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 863

(2014); see also Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).          Evidence of this kind may also be

admissible under the res gestae exception, “where such evidence became

part of history of the case and formed part of the natural development of

facts.”     Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 251, (Pa.Super. 2016)

(citation omitted). In criminal matters, “this evidence is admissible only if the

probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.”

Pa.R.E. 402(b)(2).

          Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in holding that evidence of prior incidents of domestic abuse between

                                        - 12 -
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Appellant and victim and Appellant’s pending criminal charges were relevant

and admissible. Here, the evidence established that, since as early as 2017,

Kingston Police Department officers responded to multiple incidents of

domestic abuse by Appellant against the victim. The evidence suggests that

the abuse of the victim continued to escalate until Appellant ultimately

murdered her.      The challenged evidence shows the chain or sequence of

events which formed the history of the case, is part of the natural development

of the case, and demonstrates Appellant’s malice and ill-will toward the victim.

Moreover, the evidence of Appellant’s pending criminal charges for his alleged

April 2018 simple assault and strangulation of the victim was specifically

relevant to demonstrate that Appellant had a clear motive to murder her. See

Ivy, 146 A.3d at 252 (stating that evidence of prior abuse between a

defendant and an abused victim is generally admissible to establish motive,

intent, malice, or ill-will).

      Lastly, we agree with the Commonwealth that the probative value of the

aforementioned evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. “[T]he trial court

is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the

jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand and

form part of the history and natural development of the events and offenses

for which the defendant is charged.” Hairston, 84 A.3d at 666. Here, the

challenged evidence was not so unduly prejudicial that it likely diverted the

jury’s intention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.

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      Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we discern no abuse of

discretion on the part of the trial court in permitting this evidence to be

introduced at trial.

      In his final claim, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motions for substitute counsel. Appellant’s brief at

26. We disagree.

      “A motion for change of counsel by a defendant for whom counsel has

been appointed shall not be granted except for substantial reasons.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 122(C). “To satisfy this standard, a defendant must demonstrate

that he has an irreconcilable difference with counsel that precludes counsel

from representing him.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 756 A.2d 1139, 1150

(Pa. 2000) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 932 (2001). We have

held that a strained relationship with counsel, a difference of opinion in trial

strategy, a lack of confidence in counsel’s ability, or brevity of pretrial

communications do not necessarily establish irreconcilable differences. See

Commonwealth v. Floyd, 937 A.2d 494, 497-498, 500 (Pa.Super. 2007).

Ultimately, “[t]he decision of whether to appoint new counsel lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court.”    Spotz, 756 A.2d at 1150 (citation

omitted).

      Upon review, we find Appellant’s contention that he was denied right

counsel in this matter to be entirely devoid of merit. The record reflects that

on November 4, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se motion while represented by

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Assistant Public Defenders Mark Singer and Michael Kostelaba, requesting new

counsel on account of an “irreconcilable personality conflict and difference of

opinion….”    Motion for Change of Counsel, 11/4/19 at 1.         In response,

Assistant Public Defender Demetrius Fannick entered his appearance on

Appellant’s behalf on October 19, 2020, replacing Attorneys Kostelaba and

Singer.   Following Appellant’s subsequent dissatisfaction with Attorney

Fannick’s representation, the trial court granted Appellant’s November 9, 2021

“Motion for Appointment of Conflict Counsel” and Attorney David Lampman

entered his appearance on November 15, 2021. Accordingly, Appellant’s

request for substitute counsel was twice satisfied in this matter, and his claim

to the contrary warrants no relief.

      For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s March 30, 2022

judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023

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