Court Opinion

ID: 9838700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 16:09:14.232252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:42.894282
License: Public Domain

J-S19011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 RAFAEL SAEZ                               :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 1440 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 6, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-36-CR-0005489-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                   FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2023

      Appellant, Rafael Saez, appeals from the post-conviction court’s

September 6, 2022 order denying his timely-filed petition under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant argues that

his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for not calling a

certain witness to the stand at trial. After careful review, we affirm.

      The PCRA court provided a detailed summary of the facts underlying

Appellant’s convictions, the procedural history of his case, and the basis for

his present claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, as follows:

      On June 27, 2018, following a three-day jury trial, [Appellant] was
      convicted of one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
      with a child less than thirteen years of age, two counts of indecent
      assault of a child less than thirteen years of age, one count of
      attempt to commit indecent assault of a child less than thirteen
      years of age, one count of corruption of a minor, one count of
      unlawful contact with a minor, one count of endangering welfare
      of children, and one count of indecent exposure. The events
      underlying these convictions arose from [Appellant’s] repeated
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     sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter when she was between
     the ages of approximately eight and twelve years of [age].

     The following facts regarding [Appellant’s]       abuse    of     his
     stepdaughter were established at trial:

        In 2013, [Appellant] moved into his girlfriend’s home, where
        she lived with her daughter, J.C., and five sons. J.C. was
        nine years old when she first remembered her “step-dad
        touch[ing her] in a wrong way.” (Trial Testimony [(N.T.
        Trial)], [6/25/18], at 69). At that time her room was on the
        second floor of the house, though two years later[,] she
        moved up to an attic bedroom. During trial, she testified
        that the assaults “started in the middle room, and then …
        came to the attic.” (Id. at 71). [Appellant] groped her
        “chest” and “where [she] use[s] the bathroom” in the room
        on the middle floor, in her attic bedroom, in the kitchen
        while she was cooking, and once in the living room. (Id. at
        71, 75, 79). [Appellant] would approach J.C. during times
        when her mother was not home, when she was “at work or
        out shopping,” after sending the boys outside or upstairs.
        (Id. at 79). He repeatedly came to her attic bedroom when
        she was alone, took off her underwear, forced her to
        masturbate him, engaged in oral intercourse with her, and
        vaginally raped her. (Id. at 72-80). At age thirteen, J.C.
        found the courage to tell her grandmother, Luz Alvarez,
        about the abuse. Ms. Alvarez reported the abuse to the
        police and an investigation began.

     (Trial Court Opinion, [3/22/19], at 1-2).

     Following the trial and verdict, [the court] sentenced [Appellant]
     on October 5, 2018, to an aggregate period of 16 to 32 years[’]
     incarceration. [Appellant] thereafter filed a timely direct appeal
     to the Superior Court. The Superior Court affirmed [Appellant’s]
     judgment of sentence on December 20, 2019.                   [See
     Commonwealth v. Saez, 225 A.3d 169 (Pa. Super. 2019).] On
     January 21, 2020, [Appellant] filed a petition for allowance of
     appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied
     on May 27, 2020. [See Commonwealth v. Saez, 234 A.3d 407
     (Pa. 2020). Appellant] did not seek review by the United States
     Supreme Court.

     On August 18, 2020, [Appellant] filed a pro se [PCRA] petition….
     … Attorney Daniel C. Bardo was appointed to represent
     [Appellant]. Attorney Bardo filed an amended [PCRA] petition …

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     on [Appellant]’s behalf on September 24, 2021. In his amended
     petition, [Appellant] argued that his trial counsel, Daniel
     Straszynski, Esquire, was ineffective for failing to call a witness,
     P.M., during trial. On October 12, 2021, [the court] entered an
     order scheduling a hearing on [Appellant’s petition].

     At the January 24, 2022[] hearing, Attorney Straszynski testified
     that he learned of a potential witness, P.M., during trial
     preparation when the Assistant District Attorney forwarded police
     reports from interviews that detectives had conducted with P.M.
     and her mother. (Notes of Testimony, Post-Conviction Relief Act
     Hearing [(N.T. Hearing], [12/29/21], at 7-8…. After receiving
     information about P.M., Attorney Straszynski sent his own
     investigator to interview both P.M. and her mother. ([Id.] at 8).
     Attorney Straszynski testified that P.M.’s mother made it clear to
     the investigator that she did not want her daughter to be involved
     in the trial and that if Attorney Straszynski did get P.M. involved,
     “it would not be good for [Appellant].” ([Id.]). P.M.’s mother did
     allow the investigator to speak with P.M., who told the investigator
     that she had a conversation with the victim where the victim
     stated that [Appellant] did not do what she had accused him of
     doing—that her accusations were fabricated. ([Id.] at 8-10).

     Attorney Straszynski testified that he ultimately made the decision
     not to call P.M. as a witness at trial. ([Id.] at 11). He explained:

        Prior to trial, I had made the decision not to call [P.M.] as a
        witness, for essentially, two reasons. One is, essentially,
        her family didn’t want her involved and had indicated at
        least twice to our investigator that if we did call her, that it
        would not be good [for Appellant].

        And then, number two, it was relayed to me by [the]
        Assistant District Attorney … that if I did call [P.M.] as a
        witness, she would call [P.M.’s mother] as a witness to offer
        a prior consistent statement about a conversation that she
        had with the victim where the victim told her that
        [Appellant] had been abusing her since she was 8 years
        old[,] a specific conversation that, I think, happened during
        a car ride, if I remember correctly.

     ([Id.] at 11-12). Attorney Straszynski stated that although he
     subpoenaed P.M. and she appeared on the first day of trial, he did
     not want “the jury to hear that [the victim] had made another
     disclosure to a family member, and [he] considered that the jury

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      would consider [P.M.’s] mother’s testimony about that to be more
      credible than the testimony from [P.M.].” ([Id.] at 13).

      Attorney Bardo pushed back against Attorney Straszynski’s
      testimony by referencing a discussion that occurred during an in-
      chambers meeting on the second afternoon of trial, before the
      Commonwealth concluded its case-in-chief but after the victim
      had already testified. During the discussion, Attorney Straszynski
      requested permission to call P.M. for impeachment purposes
      pursuant to [Pa.R.E.] 813(b). Attorney Straszynski acknowledged
      that he had not laid the proper foundation because he had not
      confronted the victim with P.M’s statement while the victim was
      on the stand. ([N.T. Trial], [6/26/18], at 241-42). However,
      Attorney Straszynski sought to call P.M. regardless of his
      “oversight” and “lack of vigilance” during his cross-examination of
      the [v]ictim. ([Id.]). [The court] denied Attorney Straszynski’s
      request. ([Id. at 244]).

      During the PCRA hearing, Attorney Straszynski acknowledged that
      he could have fixed his error by recalling the victim during his own
      case-in-chief. (N.T. [Hearing] at 15-16). Attorney Straszynski
      explained that he chose not to take this step and decided not to
      call P.M. for tactical reasons—he thought it was too risky. ([Id.]
      at 17). Attorney Straszynski testified that in addition to the
      Commonwealth’s threat to call P.M.’s mother during its case-in-
      chief, he feared that if he called P.M., she would be hostile and
      that she might bring up something that she had not disclosed to
      his investigators. ([Id.] at 18).

      Following the PCRA hearing and after considering briefing
      submitted by both [Appellant] and the Commonwealth, [the court]
      ultimately denied [Appellant’s] request for post-conviction relief
      on September 6, 2022. On October 6, 2022, [Appellant] filed a
      notice of appeal to the Superior Court. He filed a [Pa.R.A.P.
      1925(b)] concise statement on October 19, 2022, and the
      Commonwealth responded on October 24, 2022.

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 12/6/22, at 1-5 (footnote and unnecessary

capitalization omitted). The PCRA court filed its opinion on December 6, 2022.

      Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review: “Did the [PCRA] court

err when it denied relief on [Appellant’s] ineffectiveness claim when the record

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showed that trial counsel failed to call a known witness who would have

testified that the victim admitted that she fabricated the allegations against

[Appellant]?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      First, “[t]his Court’s standard of review from the grant or denial of post-

conviction   relief   is   limited   to   examining   whether   the   lower   court’s

determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of

legal error.” Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. 1997)

(citing Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 356 n.4 (Pa. 1995)).

Where, as here, a petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel, our Supreme Court has stated that:

      [A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by
      a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
      resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the
      circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
      determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
      innocence could have taken place.”             Generally, counsel’s
      performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and
      counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing
      by the petitioner. To obtain relief, a petitioner must demonstrate
      that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency
      prejudiced the petitioner. A petitioner establishes prejudice when
      he demonstrates “that there is a reasonable probability that, but
      for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
      would have been different.”        … [A] properly pled claim of
      ineffectiveness posits that: (1) the underlying legal issue has
      arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective
      reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice befell the petitioner
      from counsel’s act or omission.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532-33 (Pa. 2009) (citations

omitted).

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      It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have provided
      effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and
      proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal claim is of
      arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any
      objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s
      interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a
      reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s
      error. The PCRA court may deny an ineffectiveness claim if the
      petitioner’s evidence fails to meet a single one of these prongs.
      Moreover, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating
      counsel’s ineffectiveness.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations

omitted).

      In this case, Appellant argues that Attorney Straszynski was ineffective

for failing to call P.M. to the stand, as P.M. would have testified that the victim

admitted she fabricated the allegations against Appellant.              Appellant

challenges the PCRA court’s conclusion that Attorney Straszynski expressed a

reasonable basis for deciding not to call P.M., and that Appellant failed to

establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s decision. First, in determining that

Attorney Straszynski’s decision not to call P.M. was reasonable, the PCRA court

explained:

      “A failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective assistance of
      counsel[,] for such decision usually involves matters of trial
      strategy.” [Commonwealth v.] Sneed, 4[5] A.3d [1096,] 1109
      [(Pa. 2012).] Attorney Straszynski’s PCRA hearing testimony
      showed that his ultimate decision not to take the steps necessary
      to call P.M. was tactical. Attorney Straszynski explained that
      although he did fail to lay the evidentiary foundation required to
      introduce P.M.’s testimony, he ultimately decided not to take the
      remedial action necessary to call P.M. because he made a strategic
      decision that the jury would consider P.M.’s mother’s testimony to
      be more credible than the testimony from P.M.

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PCO at 8 (unnecessary capitalization and some brackets omitted). Second, in

concluding that Appellant did not demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel’s

decision not to call P.M., the PCRA court reasoned:

      First, [Appellant] failed to call P.M. as a witness at the PCRA
      hearing, making it almost impossible to discern what her actual
      testimony would have been at trial and whether Attorney
      Straszynski’s decision not to call her prejudiced [Appellant].
      Compare Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 812 (Pa.
      Super. 2013) (upholding the PCRA [c]ourt’s decision that counsel
      was ineffective for failure to call a witness where the witness
      testified at the PCRA hearing and directly contradicted testimony
      offered by [an]other witnesses at trial).

      Second, at the PCRA [h]earing, Attorney Straszynski testified that
      P.M.’s mother made it clear that if Attorney Straszynski got P.M,
      involved in the trial, it would not go well for [Appellant]. Attorney
      Straszynski also testified that it was relayed to him by the
      Commonwealth that if he did call P.M. as a witness, the
      Commonwealth would call P.M.’s mother as a witness to offer a
      prior statement about a conversation that she had with the victim.
      In fact, on the morning of June 26, 2018, prior to closing its case-
      in chief, the Commonwealth filed an “Amended Petition to Admit
      Out-of-Court Statements Under the ‘Tender Years Hearsay
      Exception’” in which the Commonwealth sought to introduce the
      statement that the victim allegedly made to P.M.’s mother. The
      Commonwealth outlined the nature of the statement, noting that
      the victim told P.M.’s mother that the abuse started when she was
      eight years old and that the victim was crying at the time she
      made the statement. On the final day of trial, June 27, 2018, [the
      court] noted on the record that [it] had denied the
      Commonwealth’s Petition because [it] had also denied Attorney
      Straszynski’s request to call P.M. under Rule 613(b). ([N.T.] Trial,
      [6/27/18], at 266-67). Thus, if Attorney Straszynski had decided
      to call P.M., the Commonwealth had taken all the procedural steps
      necessary to call P.M.’s mother during its case-in-chief.

Id. at 8-9.

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       We agree with the court’s conclusion that Appellant has failed to

demonstrate he was prejudiced by the omission of P.M.’s testimony.1 We are

unconvinced by Appellant’s argument challenging the court’s decision, in

which he avers:

       The victim’s admission to her friend that she fabricated the
       allegations was credible and valuable to the defense. She told her
       friend that “[Appellant] didn’t do what [I] accused him of doing.
       It was fabricated[.]” N.T. [Hearing] … at 10. The respective
       investigations from both sides confirmed the statement. [Id.] at
       8-10 (the Commonwealth disclosed that the victim made the
       statement and the public defender’s investigator confirmed the
       same). It certainly stands to reason that a victim would confess
       that she fabricated allegations to a friend but not family members,
       the police, or the prosecutor. The admission that the victim
       fabricated the allegations would have bolstered the defense
       argument that the jury should not believe the victim. This would
       have come in addition to the inconsistencies trial counsel had
       already pointed out to the jury. The jury’s verdict is, therefore, in
       question.

       The admission of the victim’s confession that she fabricated the
       allegations would not have hurt [Appellant’s] case. As discussed
       above, the prosecutor had already admitted several consistent
       statements. The threat that [a] witness—or more properly the
       witness’s family—would be less-than cooperative is nothing more
       than the reality of trying criminal cases. It is unrealistic to expect
       that the admission of the victim’s inconsistent statement would
       have left [Appellant] worse off under either of these theories.

       The outcome is in question. The jury would have heard additional
       evidence negatively affecting the victim’s credibility. If the jury
       believed that the victim was lying, the result of the trial would
       likely have been different.

____________________________________________

1 Accordingly, we need not address the court’s determination that counsel also

expressed a reasonable basis for not calling P.M. to the stand. See Franklin,
990 A.2d at 797 (“The PCRA court may deny an ineffectiveness claim if the
petitioner’s evidence fails to meet a single one of these prongs.”).

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Appellant’s Brief at 20-21.

      Initially, Appellant’s argument is wholly premised on an assumption that

P.M.’s testimony would have aligned with her out-of-court statements to

investigators. However, because Appellant failed to call P.M. to the stand at

the PCRA hearing, this assumption is impossible to verify.              As the

Commonwealth points out, Appellant’s

      decision not to call P.M. as a witness at the PCRA hearing is
      particularly noteworthy and telling given [Attorney Straszynski’s]
      testimony that he ultimately decided not to call P.M. as a witness
      at trial because he believed the risks associated with calling her
      outweighed any potential benefit. While trial counsel testified that
      he had no reason to believe P.M.’s testimony concerning that
      conversation would not have been consistent with her prior
      statement, he also noted that P.M.’s mother … had
      warned/threatened him that calling P.M. to testify would not be
      good for [Appellant] and that he was concerned about the
      possibility of P.M.[’s] disclosing something on the stand that she
      had not disclosed to the investigator. Trial counsel’s stated
      concerns are not unfounded[,] as he acknowledged at the PCRA
      hearing that P.M. and her family were close friends with the victim
      and her family and that the investigator for the defense had only
      questioned P.M. about the one specific conversation. As such,
      [Appellant] failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that P.M.
      was willing to testify in favor of the defense[,] and that the
      absence of her testimony was so prejudicial as to have denied
      [Appellant] a fair trial.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 11 (footnotes omitted).

      We agree. Without P.M.’s testimony at the PCRA hearing, we cannot

conclude that she would have testified consistently with her exculpatory, out-

of-court statements. We also cannot be certain that she would not have added

other information that could have been harmful to Appellant’s defense.

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Therefore, Appellant has failed to prove that the absence of P.M.’s testimony

caused him prejudice.

     Alternatively, we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant also

failed to prove prejudice for several additional reasons. The Commonwealth

explains:

     Offering the testimony of P.M. would have opened the door to
     other highly prejudicial evidence. In addition to inviting the prior
     out-of-court statements [the victim made to P.M.’s mother], …
     P.M.’s testimony would have arguably opened the door to
     reconsideration of the order precluding evidence of [Appellant’s]
     2001 adjudication for rape and incest involving his then twelve-
     year-old sister, whom he impregnated. The Commonwealth had
     previously sought to introduce this evidence through the
     testimony of [Appellant’s] sister pursuant to [Pa.R.E.] 404(b)(2),
     arguing that [Appellant’s] prior rape of his sister was strikingly
     similar to the current offenses, highly probative[,] and
     demonstrated a common plan, scheme or design. While the
     Commonwealth was ultimately precluded from doing so, based
     solely on the relative remoteness of the prior offenses, it was
     specifically noted during the proceedings that a Rule 404(b)
     analysis includes consideration of the Commonwealth’s need for
     the evidence, including to rebut attacks on credibility and claims
     of fabrication. See[] Commonwealth v. Luktisch, … 680 A.2d
     877[, 879] (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding that the Commonwealth’s
     need to present prior bad acts testimony increased after victim’s
     credibility was “crippled” at trial).         In fact, the defense
     acknowledged the possibility that the evidence may be
     appropriate rebuttal evidence[,] and the [c]ourt included a
     qualification in its order precluding the evidence, noting that it was
     not precluding “the possible use of such evidence in rebuttal if
     deemed to be relevant.” [Order, 4/25/18, at 1 (single page).]
     Offering the testimony of P.M. would have warranted reopening
     the issue, as was specifically anticipated, and likely would have
     tipped the scale in favor of admitting the evidence to rebut the
     direct attack on the victim’s credibility and charge of fabrication.
     Because P.M.’s testimony could have opened the door to this

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       other[,2] highly prejudicial evidence, [Appellant] did not suffer any
       actual prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s decision to not call
       P.M. to testify.

       Furthermore, given this record, P.M.’s testimony would have been
       unlikely to change the jury’s credibility determinations or the
       outcome of the proceedings.        The jury was presented with
       voluminous testimony and evidence that the victim had made
       prior inconsistent statements. In fact, it was specifically noted
       that during her forensic interviews the victim unequivocally denied
       having touched [Appellant’s] penis[,] despite testifying to doing
       so at trial. The jury also observed the victim during her first
       forensic interview outright deny several of the allegations against
       [Appellant], including [Appellant’s] having touched her with
       anything but his hands[,] and [Appellant’s] having touched her
       under her clothes or on the inside of her vagina. During both …
       the forensic interviews, the jury observed the victim[’s] claiming
       to not know or [be able to] recall details and events that she
       reported to others and/or testified to at trial. Despite being
       presented with these inconsistent statements and prior outright
       denials, the jury found the victim credible and returned a verdict
       of guilt.

       The record also contains overwhelming testimony and evidence
       concerning the victim’s reluctance, and at times outright refusal,
       to disclose the sexual abuse to others. The victim repeatedly
       expressed feeling ashamed, scared[,] and a desire to not have
       people know that she was sexually abuse[d]. She testified that
       she never told any of her friends about the abuse and still had not
       disclosed the extent of it to even her mother. Throughout the
       forensic interviews[,] she can be observed avoiding talking about
       the abuse by denying the abuse occurred, claiming to not know or
       recall things and, at times, simply refusing to respond. Consistent
       with the arguments of the defense at trial, the only disclosures
       the victim ever made, notably with the exception of [P.M.’s
       mother], were to adults that pressured her into disclosing. P.M.’s
       statement that on one occasion the victim had denied that the
       abuse occurred is entirely consistent with and cumulative of other
       testimony and evidence offered at trial and merely demonstrates
____________________________________________

2  Here, the Commonwealth notes that “the [c]ourt permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce, for purposes of showing a common plan or
scheme, evidence that [Appellant] sexually abused his six-year-old biological
daughter.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 18 n.38 (citations to the record omitted).

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      a young child feeling ashamed, scared[,] and reluctant to have
      others, particularly friends/peers, know that she was sexually
      abused by a trusted adult father figure. Given the circumstances
      in this particular case, it is unlikely that P.M.’s testimony would
      have changed the outcome of the proceedings.

Id. at 16-20 (footnotes omitted).

      After thoroughly reviewing the record in this case, we agree with the

Commonwealth’s arguments that Appellant was not prejudiced by the

omission of P.M.’s testimony and, indeed, her testimony could have potentially

harmed his defense by opening the door to other, damaging evidence. Thus,

the PCRA court did not err in concluding that Appellant failed to prove he was

prejudiced by Attorney Straszynski’s decision not to call P.M. at trial.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/07/2023

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