Court Opinion

ID: 9660364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:11:24.961041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:17.732351
License: Public Domain

*834LAVORATO, Justice
(dissenting).
The attorney functions in an adversary system based upon the presupposition that the most effective means of determining truth is to present to a judge and jury a clash between proponents of conflicting views. It is essential to the effective functioning of this system that each adversary have, ... “entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.”
Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L.Rev. 1469, 1470 (1965-66) (citation omitted).
An accused dissatisfied with appointed counsel “must show good cause to warrant substitution of counsel, such as a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and the defendant.” Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir.1991). Once the accused makes that showing, the trial court must appoint new counsel. Id.; see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488-91, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1180-82, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 436-38 (1978).
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes a correlative right to representation unimpaired by conflicts of interest or divided loyalties. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271,101 S.Ct. 1097,1103, 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 230 (1981); Lockhart, 923 F.2d at 1320. “Counsel must be willing ‘to advocate fearlessly and effectively5 on behalf of the client.” Lockhart, 923 F.2d at 1320 (quoting United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162, 167-68 (D.C.Cir.1976)). In attorney-client relationships,
[ejonflict of interest and divided loyalty situations can take many forms, and whether an actual conflict exists must be evaluated on the specific facts of each case. In general, a conflict exists when an attorney is placed in a situation conducive to divided loyalties, and can include situations in which the caliber of an attorney’s services “may be substantially diluted.”
Id. (citations omitted); accord Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 439 (5th Cir.1979); see also United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 393 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that conflicts of interest are not limited to cases involving joint representation of co-defendants “but extend[ ] to any situation in which a defendant’s counsel owes conflicting duties to that defendant and some other third person”).
Once the accused raises a seemingly substantial complaint about counsel, the judge must inquire thoroughly into the factual basis of the accused’s dissatisfaction. Lockhart, 923 F.2d at 1320; William W. Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent Counsel — The Trial Judge’s Role, 93 Harv. L.Rev. 633, 652 (1980). “The court must investigate the facts and details of the attorney’s interests to determine whether the attorney in fact suffers from an actual conflict, a potential conflict, or no conflict at all.” United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir.1994). The inquiry must be more than perfunctory; it must be “the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern.” Lockhart, 923 F.2d at 1320. And the inquiry should be on the record. Id. These obligations exist because trial courts have an independent duty to ensure that criminal defendants receive a trial that is fair and that does not contravene the Sixth Amendment. Levy, 25 F.3d at 153.
Once the accused shows sufficient cause for substitution of counsel but is nevertheless forced to trial with the same counsel, prejudice is presumed regardless of whether it was independently shown. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489, 98 S.Ct. at 1181, 55 L.Ed.2d at 437-38; accord Cook, 45 F.3d at 393; Lock-hart, 923 F.2d at 1321, Zuck, 588 F.2d at 439. Reversal is automatic. Id. The presumed prejudice and automatic reversal rules also apply where the accused objects and the trial judge fails to inquire adequately into the possibility of a conflict of interest. Cook, 45 F.3d at 393; Hamilton v. Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1012 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1419 (9th Cir.1986) (finding Sixth Amendment violations require automatic reversal if “trial judge fails either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk is too remote to warrant individual representa*835tion”). There is good reason for assumed prejudice and automatic reversal:
When there is a conflict of interest ... the prejudice may be subtle, even unconscious. It may elude detection on review. A reviewing court deals with a cold record, capable, perhaps, of exposing gross instances of incompetence but often giving no clue to the erosion of zeal which may ensue from divided loyalty. Accordingly, where the conflict is real ... a denial of the right to effective representation exists, without a showing of specific prejudice.
Zuck, 588 F.2d at 439 (quoting Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir.1974)).
Contrary to the majority, I conclude from this record that Atley established good cause to require substitution of counsel. I also conclude the trial court failed to inquire adequately into the possibility of a conflict of interest. Under either conclusion, I think this record demands an automatic reversal without a showing of prejudice.
I. A Showing of Good Cause to Warrant Substitution of Counsel.
A. The employment issue. From the record I think it is abundantly clear that Atley showed an actual conflict of interest and an irreconcilable conflict between his counsel and himself. Proeedurally, Atley objected in sufficient time to apprise the district court of his objection to his counsel. Before trial, Atley filed a motion to remove counsel and for appointment of new counsel premised on two grounds:
On June 1,1995, defendant’s attorney Robert Weinberg informed defendant he had accepted a job with the Scott County Attorney’s Office, William Davis Chief Prosecutor, and informed defendant of ethical problems with his continued representation.
The other ground dealt with Atley’s claim that his lawyer did not handle plea discussions and motions to his satisfaction.
On the same day, Weinberg, Atley’s counsel, filed his motion to withdraw consistent with what Atley had said as to the employment issue:
That the undersigned attorney was confirmed for an appointment in the office of the Scott County Attorney on June 1,1995, said employment to begin on or about June 15,1995.
That said appointment raised an issue of potential conflict with defendant’s interests which were promptly disclosed to defendant pursuant to Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
That the defendant filed a motion for removal of counsel on June 2, 1995, based on the disclosure of potential conflict.
To his credit, Weinberg goes on with the following additional cogent reasons for his withdrawal as counsel:
That Local Rule 3.4 requires counsel’s termination of employment with permission of the court when the client consents to said termination and compliance with DR 2-110, Code of Professional Responsibility, on withdrawal of counsel.
That DR 2-110(B) requires mandatory withdrawal from employment when (2) counsel knows continued employment would violate an ethical rule or (4) counsel is discharged by his client.
That Canon 5 requires counsel to avoid the appearance of conflict with the interest of a client.
That Canon 5 requires counsel to withdraw from representation if the effectiveness of his representation is impaired by the desires of third persons.
That the undersigned attorney believes that the effectiveness of his representation has been irreparably harmed due to the expressed desire of the defendant to remove counsel from the case based on defendant’s concern with a potential conflict of interest.
That the undersigned attorney cannot represent the defendant effectively at trial.
That the defendant has filed a motion for continuance, has waived speedy trial and is entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for trial with new counsel.
Three days later, just before the commencement of the trial, the trial judge held a hearing on these motions. As the majority notes, Weinberg stated additional reasons for *836his motion to withdraw. At this point Weinberg revealed to the court that he had just learned that Atley had filed a complaint with our court. In Weinberg’s mind, the complaint caused such a breach in his relationship with Atley that Weinberg believed he could not be effective and his ineffectiveness would be an impediment to upholding any subsequent conviction.
As the majority further notes, Weinberg was hired to replace Hugh Pries of the Scott County Attorney’s Office. Pries handled a number of the drug eases for the county attorney’s office and had close relationships with the MEG officers, who were to be the main witnesses against Atley. Weinberg revealed all of these facts to Atley.
To the prosecutor’s credit, he concurred in Weinberg’s assessment. Additionally, he advised the court that
[m]ost of the cases and opinions that have dealt with changes of employment by lawyers have opted in favor of the client being given the rights, and not deprived of them, and I think that clearly, in this case, forcing this matter to trial today would be going against the general grain of those opinions.
I am amazed that the majority has closed its eyes to this obvious demonstration of actual conflict. As Holloway pointedly observed:
Additionally, since the decision in Glosser [v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)], most courts have held that an attorney’s request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted. In so holding, the courts have acknowledged and given effect to several interrelated considerations. An “attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial.” Second, defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise the court at once of the problem. Finally, attorneys are officers of the court, and “when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath.” We find these considerations persuasive.
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485, 98 S.Ct. at 1179, 55 L.Ed.2d at 435 (citations omitted). I too find these considerations persuasive here on the question of an actual conflict of interest. Granted, this is not a dual representation case but these considerations, considered persuasive by the Supreme Court, I think apply with equal force to any conflict of interest situation, and particularly here. Who better than the lawyer who has to do battle in court, knows whether, faced with similar glaring conflicts, he or she can be effective? Should a trial judge simply ignore the solemn admissions given in professional statements and believe it knows better than the lawyer? I think not. By allowing the trial court to ignore such admissions, the majority is creating dangerous precedent. The majority should heed Holloway’s advice:
When a considered representation regarding a conflict in clients’ interests comes from an officer of the court, it should be given the weight commensurate with the grave penalties risked for misrepresentation.
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 486 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. at 1179 n. 9, 55 L.Ed.2d at 435 n. 9.
As Zuck makes clear, the employment issue here falls within the parameters of actual conflict. In Zuck, the law firm that served as counsel in the accused’s first-degree murder trial also represented, in an unrelated civil matter, the state prosecutor who tried the accused. The State asserted that no conflict of interest existed because the real party in interest in the accused’s case was the State of Alabama and the prosecutor’s only interest was in achieving justice, not in convicting the accused. Thus, the State argued, the defense attorneys’ representation of the prosecutor presented no conflict with their commitment to defend the accused.
Rejecting this argument, the court said:
The dual representation here created an actual conflict of interest. The prosecutor and defense attorneys here were adversaries for the purpose of this trial. It is sufficient to establish a constitutional viola*837tion that the defense attorneys owed a duty to Zuck to endeavor to refute the prosecutor’s arguments and to impeach his witnesses ... [T]he defense attorneys were subject to the encumbrance that the prosecutor might take umbrage at a vigorous defense of Zuck and dispense with the services of their firm_ Our analysis in conflict of interest cases does not focus on the actual effect of the conflict on a particular defendant’s case. Rather, the basis of these decisions is our belief that the sixth amendment requires that a defendant may not be represented by counsel who might be tempted to dampen the ardor of his defense in order to placate his other client. The fact that a particular lawyer may actually resist that temptation is of no moment. The right to effective assistance of counsel is so vital to a fair trial that courts are compelled to examine every potential infringement of that right with the most exacting scrutiny. Determining whether a particular attorney has yielded to the temptation a conflict presents requires a searching analysis of his performance at trial. A cold, dispassionate appellate transcript simply cannot provide an adequate basis for assessing such a performance, for subtle variations in demeanor and depth of cross-examination cannot be reflected in the pages of a transcript. For this reason, the mere existence of a temptation in the abstract is sufficient to preclude duality of representation. A defense attorney must be free to use all his skills to provide the best possible defense for his client. Despite the noblest of intentions, the defense attorneys here may have been tempted to be less zealous than they should have been in the presentation of Zuck’s case. This possibility is sufficient to constitute an actual conflict of interest as a matter of law.
Zuck, 588 F.2d at 439-40; cf. Cook, 45 F.3d at 393 (holding that accused was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial court ordered defense counsel to advise a prosecution witness of the consequences of failing to testify in accordance with her plea agreement).
The conflict here is more egregious than the conflict in Zuck. Here, as the trial began, defense counsel was actually in the employ of the county attorney’s office, having been hired to begin work shortly after the end of Atley’s trial. In essence, defense counsel was an employee of the very law firm — the county attorney — representing the very party — the State of Iowa — that was opposing Atley in these proceedings. In his own mind, Weinberg was already in a position of divided loyalties. He had a future, perhaps with long-term job security, with the county attorney’s office. Weinberg would be cross-examining the very people — MEG officers — with whom he would be working closely in his own employment. Weinberg was concerned about being able to give his undivided loyalty to Atley, especially if doing so conflicted with his upcoming employment. What greater temptation could force a defense attorney to “dampen the ardor of his defense in order to placate his other client?” The existence of this temptation was enough to preclude Weinberg’s continued representation regardless of the trial judge’s personal opinion. Weinberg knew this. The prosecutor knew this. Only the trial judge was blind to this fact.
In a weak attempt to justify the trial court’s actions, the majority relies heavily on United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414 (7th Cir.1988). This case is easily distinguishable. In Horton, defense counsel was only a finalist, together with three others, under consideration for a United States Attorney position. He was not actually appointed. In addition, Horton pleaded guilty; Atley did not. Horton agreed at the plea that he was satisfied with the representation and advice he received from his counsel and he was not pressured into pleading guilty. The plea agreement was most favorable to Horton. His plea was voluntary and there was a factual basis for it. Horton did not raise the employment issue at the trial court level when he was given a chance to explain the reason for his request for new counsel. When asked why he wanted new counsel, Horton simply offered a “vaguely-voiced” distrust of counsel and was for the most part uncooperative and uncommunicative with the trial court. Nor did Horton raise the employment issue on either a motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea or for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. *838§ 2255. He did so for the first time on appeal. But, most important, unlike the facts here, defense counsel and the prosecutor in Horton did not agree there was a conflict.
B. The complaint issue. Weinberg also brought to the trial court’s attention that Atley had filed in our court a complaint against him. Weinberg was candid with the trial court that the complaint caused such a breach in the attorney-client relationship that he could not be effective. I think the complaint filed by Atley also created an actual conflict of interest.
Once defense counsel learns the client has filed a complaint about the manner of counsel’s representation, counsel acquires a personal interest in the way counsel conducts the defense. Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 136 (D.C.App.1985). As Douglas points out, such a personal interest
is independent of, and in some respects in conflict with, [the accused’s] interest in obtaining a judgment of acquittal. For instance, fearing that [the accused’s complaint] might later be expanded to include claims of ineffective assistance at trial, [defense counsel] would have an inordinate interest in conducting the defense in a manner calculated to minimize any opportunity for post hoc criticisms of [counsel’s] efforts. This could compromise [counsel’s] professional judgment about the best means of defending this particular case; it could encourage the most standard or conservative trial strategy, as well as overcautious tactical decisions and courtroom demeanor. Furthermore, concerns about the impending investigation might impede communications between [the accused and counsel]. [Counsel] might be apprehensive about sharing with [the accused] the reasons behind tactical defense decisions and refrain from disclosing to [the accused] any unexpected problem that arose during the course of trial. [The accused], in turn, might be reluctant to question [counsel’s] trial decisions for fear of further alienating counsel in the midst of trial.
Id. at 136-37; accord Lockhart, 923 F.2d at 1321 (holding that accused’s class action lawsuit that included his defense counsel created actual conflict of interest); Hurt, 543 F.2d at 164-66 (holding that defamation suit against appellate counsel by trial counsel for the accused was a conflict of interest for appellate counsel on remand for evidentiary hearing on ineffectiveness claim).
II. Failure to Inquire.
That brings me to the second reason why there should be an automatic reversal. Once" there is a timely objection and the trial court fails to inquire adequately into the possibility of a conflict of interest, reversal is automatic. Hamilton, 969 F.2d at 1012; Sutton, 794 F.2d at 1419; cf. Wood, 450 U.S. at 272,101 S.Ct. at 1104, 67 L.Ed.2d at 230-31 (holding that mere possibility of a conflict of interest triggers duty to inquire). “The trial court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern.” Lockhart, 923 F.2d at 1320.
Here Atley voiced his objection to Weinberg in his pretrial motion and at the hearing on the motion. As mentioned, Weinberg and the prosecutor agreed there was a conflict. The trial court never asked Atley one question. Rather, the court launched into a lengthy monologue in which the court assumed and expressly stated that Weinberg would do his job professionally and zealously and that the prosecutor and the state’s witnesses would properly do their jobs. As for Atley’s concerns, the court acknowledged it did not give his concerns a “huge amount of weight” because he was on “his third attorney” and the case had been pending for some months. Finally, the court viewed Atley’s concerns as “part of a way to delay the proceedings.”
As Atley points out, the “court’s ‘inquiry’ was a monologue that assumes answers to questions never asked.” Weinberg was not asked if he could put aside his concerns over Atley’s complaint to our court. Considering Weinberg’s pretrial motion and professional statements to the court, I think Weinberg’s answer would have been an unequivocal “no.”
Nor did the court delve into how serious the conflict of the new job might be and how that too might affect Weinberg’s representation of Atley. Weinberg was not asked whether he would cross-examine vigorously *839the very people with whom he would be working closely. Rather, the court simply refused to believe Weinberg’s professional statement that he could not effectively represent Atley because of the several conflicts.
This record is totally devoid of any showing that Atley’s dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern with Weinberg was put at ease.
What the trial court personally perceived about Weinberg was simply not relevant. On this point, one court aptly observed:
Whether or not the court is personally acquainted with the attorney to be associated, or whether or not the attorney enjoys the confidence of the court, are considerations wholly irrelevant to the constitutional issues confronting the trial court. It is the defendant’s confidence which is at stake, not that of the court.
Magee v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 8 Cal.3d 949, 106 Cal.Rptr. 647, 649, 506 P.2d 1023,1025 (1973).
To be sure, trial judges must be wary of defendants who employ complaints about counsel as dilatory tactics or for some other invidious motive. United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 193-94 (3rd Cir.1982). But here, Atley raised his concerns before trial and as soon as Weinberg told him of Weinberg’s new job. Additionally, Atley never wavered in his objections, which were substantive and concurred in not only by his trial counsel but the prosecutor as well. To ascribe to Atley a motive to delay would necessarily mean the trial court was ascribing such a motive to Weinberg and the prosecutor as well. This record falls woefully short of showing that Atley’s objections were merely to delay trial.
There is an old saying among lawyers that “bad facts make bad law.” In its zeal to uphold a conviction based on what it views as overwhelming evidence of guilt, the majority has succeeded in turning on its head an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to effective representation.
In sum, I would reverse and remand for a new trial on two grounds. First, the record is clear that Weinberg had an actual conflict of interest. Such a showing required the trial judge to appoint Atley new counsel.
The court’s failure to do so violated Atley’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The violation mandates a reversal without a showing of prejudice.
Second, the record is also clear that Atley’s objections to Weinberg should have — at the very least — triggered a possibility of a conflict of interest in the mind of the trial court. The court failed to inquire as to the conflict. Instead it required Weinberg to represent Atley notwithstanding Weinberg’s repeatedly voiced concerns about conflicts of interests and possible ethical violations and his reliance on a local rule for withdrawal of counsel. This failure too violated Atley’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and mandates reversal without a showing of prejudice.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.