Court Opinion

ID: 9532425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:21:13.152777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:45.584944
License: Public Domain

*105CAMERON, Justice
(concurring).
I' concur with the result reached by Judge Jacobson and Justice Struckmeyer but for different reasons. I agree with Justice Hays that the trial court was in a better position to observe the demeanor of both Mr. Berger, the Chief Deputy County Attorney, and Vernon Mahan, and to factually determine the issue of agency based upon their testimony. However, even were we to find direct agency to exist between the witness and the County Attorney, the notes might be admissible. The trend of the United States Supreme Court, both in denying certiorari in the case of Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616, 88 S.Ct. 2258, 20 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1968) and in the opinion of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), would indicate an enlargement of the permissible usage of illegally obtained but trustworthy evidence as well as a contraction of the rule laid down in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). I believe, however, that other grounds for reversal exist.
Prior to trial the attorney for the defendant moved the court “for an order directing and compelling the prosecution to furnish the defense with any and all information known by it to exist which is or may be favorable to or supporting the defense of insanity.” This motion was granted and the statement in the minutes of the court indicates that the County Attorney and his Deputy were in agreement. The minutes read:
"Statement by Moise Berger, Deputy County Attorney: ‘We realize that this is not only a matter of motion granted by the Court, but we also realize that it is our duty as prosecutors to provide defendant any information on this question as a matter of ethics’.”
The notes in question were in existence at the time this statement was made but were ■ not made available to defendant’s attorney until used by the prosecution on rebuttal. There were other notes that were never •made available to defendant’s attorney. The testimony of the Chief Deputy County Attorney is as follows:
“Q How many notes in all did you see?
“A Four notes.
“Q How many notes did Mr. Mahan see?
“A I don’t have any idea.
"Q Well, he said yesterday 15 to 20, did he not — or Saturday, I believe?
“A I believe he said something about like that. I don’t recall.
“Q What happened to the other sixteen notes?
“A I don’t know. They were not given to me.
“Q Were they given to any other law enforcement officers, as far as you know?
“A I don’t know.
“Q Certainly if they were given to any member of the jail staff, they eventually would have found their way to your office and your file, true?
“A I don’t know.
“Q What did any of the other notes say?
“A You mean of the four that were given to me or the other ten or fifteen?
"Q The other sixteen.
“A I don’t know what the other notes said.
“Q Did you ask Mr. Mahan?
“A No, I don’t remember doing it.
******
“Q As these notes were obtained by Mr. Mahan, whether or not they were destroyed or kept for testimony was solely dependent upon Mr. Mahan’s judgment?
"A Yes, true. It’s hard to be, I don’t know what notes he had.
“Q You had no idea at all what these notes said?
“A That is right.”
It should be noted that whether the defendant actually committed the acts o£ *106which he was accused was never questioned by the defense. The defendant’s sanity was in question, however, and the testimony of Dr. Dupree on surrebuttal is enlightening in this regard:
“Q Doctor, from a psychiatric standpoint, do these notes mean anything at all?
sfc * * * >fe *
“A Well, I think on the one hand, if I may, to pass notes to a fellow prisoner certainly shows poor judgment. This boy is on trial for his life.
It also indicates that he — well, within the framework of judgment he is very unwise as who he picks to trust.
The fear of psychiatry and psychiatrists is, I think, indicative of the boy’s inability to trust me, particularly after I was selected by you to examine this boy. He has been told by you, by his parents, by me, I was appointed to examine him. I did examine him over 12 different times, over a period of months. I have no idea when these were actually written, but I had been in contact with this boy for quite some time, so I think it shows his inability to trust, and subsequently, aid in his own defense adequately. I think it shows extremely poor judgment, in view of the situation, total situation; the fact that he is on trial for his life.”
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
“[Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963).
And this court has recognized that the prosecution has the obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant whether he requests it or not. State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 422 P.2d 125 (1967). Our court has stated:
“It is now, though, an established proposition that disclosure of evidence favorable to an accused is not restricted to ‘discovery’ rights, and that there exists a broad duty on the part of the prosecution to reveal such evidence to the. accused. * * State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 351, 464 P.2d 793, 796 (1970). See also Sec. 2.1, Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice of the- American Bar Association.
Admittedly, where the question is the sanity of the defendant, what evidence is or is not favorable to the defendant is difficult to determine. The notes in this case may not have been on their face favorable to the defendant, but they were certainly material to the question of defendant’s sanity. Were these four notes the only ones .written, I might agree that it was harmless error under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In this case, however, we have not. only the failure of the prosecution to disclose the four notes prior to trial, but also the failure to properly preserve such other notes written by the defendant. Assuming that Mahan was not the County Attorney’s agent and that he was completely on his own as the trial court has held, the prosecution nevertheless relied on the four notes he passed on to the State at the same time making little or no effort to learn of or to preserve the other notes which were being written by the defendant and which it may be suspected, were more favorable to the defendant than the ones introduced into evidence. It is also possible that the other notes explained some of the language in the four notes preserved. A District of Columbia case of Bryant v. United States, D.C.Cir., 439 F.2d 642, 1971, held that the prosecutor must make an “earnest effort” to preserve evidence in a criminal case. Where the question is the sanity of the defendant, any doubts should be resolved in favor of the disclosure, and the prosecution *107should he required not only to make an earnest and good faith effort to preserve all the evidence relating to the defendant’s sanity, particularly the defendant’s own written statements, but, upon proper motion, make it available to the defendant’s attorney prior to trial. It may not be reasonable to rely upon Dr. Dupree’s testimony that the notes were favorable to the defense as to the question of the defendant’s sanity, but the cumulative effect of the failure to disclose coupled with the failure to make an earnest effort to preserve the other notes makes the introduction into evidence of the four notes reversible error. See State v. Von Reeden, 9 Ariz.App. 190, 450 P.2d 702 (1969).
I concur that the matter should be reversed for a new trial.