Court Opinion

ID: 9518793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:02:11.18223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:19.165253
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Justice.
I respectfully dissent.
Various rules of law are discussed in the majority opinion but it is obvious the decision turns upon one rule applicable to the interpretation of contracts plagued with ambiguous terminology. That rule is, when a court has exhausted all legitimate avenues of approach and ordinary processes of contractual interpretation and yet remains dubious as to the parties’ intended meaning, then it should adopt that meaning which is less favorable in the legal effect to the parties responsible for the words chosen. I do not disagree with this general rule but the facts presented here do not justify its application.
The crucial phraseology upon which a proper disposition of this controversy depends reads: “Exclusive Operations. Except for the Demised Premises no part of Parcel ‘B’ shown on Exhibit ‘A’ shall be leased to any other tenant whose principal business is the operation of a store selling fabric.” Plaintiff contends, and the majority holds, that the phrase absolutely prohibits the sale of any fabric by any store in the shopping center which has entered into a lease agreement with Crossroads subsequent to his lease. I am unable to read this phrase as expressly or impliedly affording such a blanket prohibition.
The majority observes that the phrase “the operation of a store” does not appear in Singer’s lease and asserts this omission imparts some peculiar meaning to that phrase as used in Baron’s lease. Consideration of this omission as bearing on a proper interpretation of Baron’s lease is impermissible as Singer’s lease was admittedly executed eighteen months after Baron’s. The issue here is what may reasonably be interpreted to have been the intent of the parties when Baron’s lease was executed. Such a determination must be based on the language and circumstances surrounding the execution of Baron’s lease, not on the fact a subsequent lease granted to a third party did not contain a phrase which was inserted in Baron’s lease.
In my opinion the language of the Baron lease is sufficiently clear and unambiguous to support defendant’s position without resort to the application of an arbitrary rule of construction. The phrase reads “whose principal business is the operation of a store selling fabric”. The word “principal” should be accorded its commonly understood meaning. The majority deletes the word in holding the restrictive covenant bars Singer from selling any fabric even though such sales may be incidental to its total sales volume. It holds the “principal business” requirement is met when Singer sells fabrics in excess of the nebulous de minimus standard.
I can reach no other conclusion after reading this phrase but that the parties agreed to permit the operation of a store whose principal volume of business does not derive from the sales of fabrics. Having reached this conclusion the focal point of inquiry is whether the sale by Singer of commodities other than fabrics constitutes its principal business. The record is undisputed that Singer’s sale of fabrics did not exceed 17 percent of its business.
I would affirm the judgment and decree of the trial court.
LeGRAND, J., joins in this dissent.