Court Opinion

ID: 9519143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:10:17.735995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:49.552648
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER dissenting: In my opinion the admission of evidence tending to show defendant committed a separate offense was error in the present case. The rule is well settled that during prosecution for a particular crime, evidence showing or tending to show the accused committed another crime wholly independent of and unconnected with that for which he is being tried is irrelevant and inadmissible. (I.L.P. Criminal Law, sec. 301.) Such evidence is not considered relevant because it merely tends to show a propensity to commit criminal offenses and is not a basis for an inference that the accused committed the crime in question. (Card, Illinois Evidence Manual, Rule 89.) An equally significant reason for excluding evidence of other offenses is the desirability of excluding collateral issues. A defendant ought not be required to defend himself against charges of a criminal offense for which he is not being tried and for which he may not have been charged. An exception to the exclusionary rule permits admission of other offenses if there is a connection between the other offense and the offense charged or where such evidence tends to prove a material fact in issue. In either case the evidence is deemed to be relevant. Common examples include evidence which shows identity of the person committing the crime, absence of mistake or accident, common design or plan, conspiracy, proximity, motive, intent or knowledge. The reasons for excluding evidence of other unrelated crimes commend a broad application of the exclusionary rule and correspondingly the same reasons warrant a limited application of the exception. The majority suggests that Countrymans testimony regarding the other offense falls within the exception to the exclusionary rule because the evidence tended to prove intent and guilt of defendant. I am unable to see any such tendency. The two offenses appear to be completely independent of one another and no similarity between them is alleged by the State other than the fact that both involved the same building. Evidence tending to show intent to commit a crime on one day should not be used as a basis for inferring that one has an intent to commit a separate crime several days later without some connecting factor linking the two occasions. If such an inference is made, the most that can be said is that defendant has a propensity for committing crime. According to the rule if this is the only purpose for admitting the evidence, it is inadmissible. In Callaghan’s Illinois Evidence, 1973 Supplement, volume 4, section 5.38, it is stated that irrespective of the exceptions to this exclusionary rule, evidence of other criminal activity is not admissible where minor probative value is outweighed by major prejudicial effect. See also People v. Butler, 133 Ill.App.2d 299, 273 N.E.2d 37, and McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, ch. 17, sec. 190 (2d ed. 1972). In determining the probative value of evidence, not only should relevancy of the evidence be considered but also its reliability. The testimony of the State’s witness, Countryman, in the instant case appears weak in both respects. Evidence of a break in and theft of $700 from the Agamy establishment 3 days prior to the crime presently charged was not corroborated. No police record was offered by the State. Also, the fact that probation was recommended in exchange for Countryman’s testimony reduces its reliability. In considering relevancy, again I point out nothing said by Countryman suggests a connection or relationship between the two crimes nor does evidence concerning the other offense have a tendency to prove a material fact in issue in the case at hand. The prejudicial effect of the testimony is obvious. A collateral issue is interjected which detracts the jury’s attention from the real issue. Defendant is required to defend against a crime with which he has not been charged. Oftentimes too much weight is given to such evidence whereby the jury is apt to convict because it believes defendant is an evil person or because defendant is believed to be guilty of some crime even though perhaps not of the specific offense for which he is being tried. The court must not lose sight of the underlying policy of protecting the accused against unfair prejudice. In my opinion even if the evidence presented by Countryman could be considered within an exception to the rule, any possible probative value is greatly outweighed by the prejudicial effect upon the defendant and should not be admitted. I believe the rebanee by the trial court and the majority on People v. Allen, 1 Ill.App.3d 197, 272 N.E.2d 296, is misplaced, not only because the facts are substantially different, but because the Allen case represents a departure in applying the exception to the general prevailing exclusionary rule. In Allen, the defendant was charged with robbery and admitted being on the premises at the time but denied any participation with two others who actively committed the offense. The defendant called one of the admitted participants in the offense as his witness and such witness in his testimony-in-chief indicated the defendant was not a participant in the robbery. On cross-examination it was elicited from the witness that 4 days subsequent to the date of the offense for which the defendant was charged, the witness and the defendant had committed another robbery. Although the court in its opinion indicates that the primary purpose of the evidence of the subsequent offense was to “discredit” the equivocal testimony of the defendant by impeaching the witness’ testimony and indirectly that of the defendant, ordinarily impeachment is limited to proof of conviction of another offense, rather than evidence of the offense itself. While I have no quarrel with the decision of the majority on sufficiency of the evidence for the conviction, I believe admitting the evidence tending to show a separate unconnected offense deprived defendant of a fair trial.