Court Opinion

ID: 9457464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:22:25.986521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:21.508181
License: Public Domain

ROBB, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
The waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court was so obviously correct that extended discussion of that matter is unnecessary; but I cannot agree that a defendant convicted of first degree murder in the District of Columbia may be sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act.
The provisions of the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010 and 5017, enacted in 1950, are inconsistent with the provisions of D.C.Code § 22-2404, enacted in 1962. The District of Columbia statute provides that the punishment of murder in the first degree shall be death unless the jury by unanimous vote recommends life imprisonment. If the jury having found a defendant guilty of first degree murder is unable to agree as to punishment, the statute directs that the court “shall impose either a sentence of death by electrocution or life imprisonment” (emphasis supplied). The statute then provides that: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person convicted of first degree murder and upon whom a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed shall be eligible for parole only after the expiration of twenty years from the date he commences to serve his sentence” (emphasis supplied). The Youth Corrections Act on the other hand authorizes the court, among other things, to suspend the imposition of sentence and place a youth offender on probation. Furthermore, the Act (18 U.S.C. § 5017 (a) and (b)) authorizes the Youth Correction Division at any time to release a committed youth offender conditionally under supervision, and to discharge him unconditionally at the expiration of one year from the date of conditional release.
I cannot believe that Congress ever intended or contemplated that a person con*1097victed of first degree murder in the District of Columbia might be placed on probation or discharged unconditionally after serving only a year or so of his sentence. As I read the District of Columbia statute it explicitly directs the court, depending on the action of the jury, to impose one of two sentences — either death or life imprisonment, without parole for twenty years. I think the meaning and intent of Congress are plain and that the specific District of Columbia statute must prevail over the earlier and general provisions of the Youth Corrections Act.
The appellant notes that in section 4 of P.L. 85-752, Act of August 25, 1956, 72 Stat. 845, 846, 18 U.S.C. § 4209, Congress provided that the Youth Corrections Act applied to young adult offenders between the ages of 22 and 26, but also provided in section 7 of P.L. 85-752 that it did not apply to any offense for which there was a mandatory penalty. See 18 U.S.C. § 4209 ff. The appellant argues that the failure of Congress to include a similar exception in the statute relating to youth offenders indicates that Congress intended the Youth Corrections Act to apply to all youth offenders, including those convicted of first degree murder in the District of Columbia. The argument does not withstand analysis.
In the first place, the provisions of section 4, P.L. 85-752, relating to young adult offenders, did not apply to a person convicted under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia (See P.L. 85-752, § 6). The District of Columbia first degree murder statute was applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia. Moreover, when the Youth Corrections Act was passed in 1950 and when P.L. 85-752 was passed in 1958 the only penalty for first degree murder in the District of Columbia was death. Since the Youth Corrections Act applied only to offenses punishable by imprisonment, the offense of first degree murder in the District of Columbia, punishable by death, was not within its scope, or relevant to the amendment embodied in P.L. 85-752. Certainly it cannot be said that when it enacted P.L. 85-752 Congress was concerned with the effect of that statute upon the mandatory penalty for first degree murder in the District of Columbia.1
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. It should be noted also that P.L. 85-752 did not deal only with young adult offenders ; on the contrary it dealt broadly with methods of sentencing in the federal courts, providing, among other things, that the federal courts might impose indeterminate sentences. The exception, that the Act did not apply to any offense for which there was provided a mandatory penalty, was not aimed at young adult offenders alone, but related to the entire sentencing scheme provided for the federal courts. These circumstances I think are further indications that Congress was not focusing on youth offenders in the District of Columbia when it did not include them in the exception.