Court Opinion

ID: 9402550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 00:01:07.013825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:00.662652
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10280         Document: 00516789191             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/15/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 22-10280
                                     Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                     ____________                                  June 15, 2023
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
   Rodney Adam Hurdsman,                                                               Clerk

                                                                    Petitioner—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
   Correctional Institutions Division,

                                                Respondent—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 4:21-CV-427
                      ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          A jury found Rodney Adam Hurdsman, Texas prisoner # 02170782,
   guilty of theft of property valued at between $20,000 and $100,000 and, after
   finding the enhancement paragraphs alleging Hurdsman had prior
   convictions were true, sentenced him to 75 years of imprisonment. His
   conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the Texas Court of Criminal
         _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10280      Document: 00516789191           Page: 2    Date Filed: 06/15/2023

                                     No. 22-10280

   Appeals (TCCA) refused his petition for discretionary review. Hurdsman
   then unsuccessfully sought state habeas relief.
          Through counsel, Hurdsman filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.
   Relevant here, he argued that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective during the
   plea-bargaining process because he did not advise the State that Hurdsman
   accepted the State’s plea offer of 18 months of imprisonment and (2) he was
   denied counsel altogether during critical stages of the proceedings when
   retained attorneys withdrew from representation without giving notice to
   Hurdsman. He also requested an evidentiary hearing. The district court
   rejected his arguments on their merits and denied a certificate of appealability
   (COA). This court granted a COA on the two issues presented.
          When a district court denies a federal habeas petition that is governed
   by § 2254(d), “this Court reviews the district court’s findings of fact for clear
   error and its conclusions of law de novo, ‘applying the same standard of
   review to the state court’s decision as the district court.’” Anaya v. Lumpkin,
   976 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Robertson v. Cain, 324 F.3d 297,
   301 (5th Cir. 2003)).
          Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
   a state court’s adjudication of an issue on the merits is entitled to deference.
   See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). Accordingly, relief under
   § 2254 shall not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of a claim on
   the merits “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
   clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
   United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
   determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
   proceeding.” § 2254(d)(1), (2).
          Hurdsman first argues that his original trial counsel rendered
   ineffective assistance by failing to convey his acceptance of the State’s plea

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                                    No. 22-10280

   offer of 18 months imprisonment. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of
   counsel claim, an applicant must show “that counsel’s performance was
   deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To show prejudice under
   Strickland, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for
   counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.
   at 694. In deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the reviewing
   court need not address both prongs of Strickland but may dispose of such a
   claim based solely on a petitioner’s failure to meet either prong of the test.
   United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893 (5th Cir. 1999).
          The state habeas court’s rejection of this claim on the basis that the
   State made no 18-month offer and that Hurdsman suffered no prejudice was
   neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland nor based
   on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Put differently, given the
   record, the state court’s conclusion was not “so lacking in justification that
   there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond
   any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
          Next, Hurdsman claims that he was denied counsel altogether
   through critical stages of the pretrial proceedings when his retained attorneys
   were permitted to withdraw from representation without notification in
   October 2014. Over the next three years, Hurdsman remained in other
   jurisdictions facing unrelated charges. Eventually, in July 2017, he was
   returned to Texas to face the charge of theft of property. He avers that this
   three-year period is critical because when his attorneys abandoned him
   without notice, vital investigation, protection of trial rights, and negotiation
   were effectively halted.
          Under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), prejudice is
   presumed in a very narrow spectrum of cases where the circumstances

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                                     No. 22-10280

   leading to counsel’s ineffectiveness are so egregious that the defendant was,
   in effect, denied any meaningful assistance, see Jackson v. Johnson, 150 F.3d
   520, 525 (5th Cir. 1998), such as where the defendant was completely denied
   counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, see United States v. Griffin, 324
   F.3d 330, 363 (5th Cir. 2003). Hurdsman has failed to demonstrate that the
   state habeas court’s rejection of this argument was contrary to or an
   unreasonable application of Cronic. Thus, the district court did not err in
   rejecting this claim. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
          Lastly, Hurdsman argues that the district court erred in denying his
   motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding a recorded telephone
   conversation he avers supports his claim that the State offered an 18-month
   plea deal. However, even if the recorded call supports Hurdsman’s claim of
   deficient performance, the state court’s conclusion he suffered no prejudice
   is not unreasonable. Thus, we need not reach this issue.
          Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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