Court Opinion

ID: 9732484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:22:56.534057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:28.418733
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s finding of admissibility. The record shows and the Court of Common Pleas found that Appellant and his father were not given an opportunity to consult privately out of the presence of the police after being advised of Appellant’s rights. Without such consultation, the waiver is invalid.
In Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975), we held that a confession must be suppressed if given by a juvenile who has not been given an opportunity to consult with an interested and informed adult before waiving his or her rights. This was a per se rule. In Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218, 465 A.2d 989 (1983), we abandoned the McCutchen rule and held that a juvenile would be presumed incompetent to waive his or her rights without an opportunity to consult with an interested and informed adult but that the validity of a waiver would be determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. The majority would now apply a totality of the circumstances test without the presumption of incompetency. I joined the majority decision in Christmas in order to preserve the modicum of protection that the presumption of incompetency would provide. I now abandon that position and would hold that the McCutchen Rule continues to apply.
If the McCutchen rule applies, the Commonwealth has the burden to establish an effective waiver of the juvenile’s *527rights, and such effective waiver must appear in the record, Commonwealth v. Wade, 485 Pa. 453, 402 A.2d 1360 (1979); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Accord, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Piankhy v. Cuyler, 703 F.2d 728 (3rd Cir., 1983). The adult with whom the juvenile consults must be informed and aware of the juvenile’s rights and be genuinely interested in the juvenile’s welfare, Commonwealth v. Barnes, 482 Pa. 555, 394 A.2d 461 (1978). If the adult is not informed of the juvenile’s rights, the requirements are not met, Commonwealth v. Graver, 473 Pa. 473, 375 A.2d 339 (1977). The purpose of the rule is to balance the disadvantage of the juvenile’s immaturity, Barnes, supra. Juveniles are presumed to require special provisions. That is the policy embodied in the Juvenile Act, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, 42 P.S. § 6301 et seq.
I reject the majority’s holding that Appellant’s waiver should be considered valid because of his experience with the criminal justice system. A suspect who is questioned on various occasions must be rewarned of his or her rights if necessary under the circumstances, Commonwealth v. Dixon, 475 Pa. 365, 380 A.2d 765 (1977). Rewarning may be necessary when there has been a lapse of time, when a suspect is interrogated at a different place from that where the warnings were given or by a different officer than the one who gave the warnings, or when the suspect gives statements that are materially different than those that might have been made at the time of the warnings. We cannot presume that Appellee knew his rights because of previous encounters with the police, especially when we have no knowledge as to when or under what circumstances these encounters occurred or what warnings Appellee was given. Neither were Appellee’s previous police encounters sufficient to meet the requirements of McCutchen. We do not know what, if any, adult consultation Appellee had on those occasions. In any event, I would find that it was necessary for Appellee to consult with an interested and *528informed adult prior to interrogation on the charge involved here. We do not presume that an adult knows his or her rights on the basis of previous encounters with the police. We should not make such a presumption about a juvenile. A juvenile is presumed to be less knowledgeable about these matters than an adult. We established the McCutchen rule with that in mind.
The “totality of circumstances” rule advocated by the majority opinion would add to the burdens of an overworked judicial system by requiring an examination of the circumstances in each case. The majority does not offer readily applicable criteria by which it may be determined when a confession by a juvenile will be admissible without the juvenile having had an opportunity to consult with an interested and informed adult. It would be preferable to retain the McCutchen rule, which provides a definite and easily applicable means of protecting the interests of a juvenile suspect. I would adhere to the previously applied finding of McCutchen that the requirement of consultation with an interested adult in all cases is necessary to protect such interests.
I would reverse the Order of the Superior Court and reinstate the Order of the Court of Common Pleas.