Court Opinion

ID: 9650312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:29:17.387281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:19.873381
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment and join the Court’s opinion except with respect to section V.C. Although I agree with the Court’s determination that the trial court did not commit error in declining to inform the jury during the guilt phase of the potential sentence to be imposed in the event defendant was convicted of felony murder, the basis for my conclusion differs from the primary reasoning advanced by the Court. In my view, the fact that Mejia concerned a “Gerald mental-state determination” not implicated by the case before us, see ante at 375-377, 700 A.2d at 330-331, is not dispositive. Rather, to the extent that State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 485-86, 662 A.2d 308 (1995), and State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 514-17, 651 A.2d 19 (1994), are understood to require that trial courts in capital cases must inform juries during the guilt phase of the specific sentences to which the defendant is subject on any noncapital homicide charges, the Court no longer should adhere to that aspect of Mejia and Brown.
The prevailing and longstanding rule in federal and state courts is that neither the judge nor counsel should inform the jury of the potential sentencing consequences of a guilty verdict. See Martin A. Kolter, Reappraising the Jury’s Role as Finder of Fact, 20 Ga.L.Rev. 123, 139-41 (1985); Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 Colum. L.Rev. 1232, 1242-47 (1995). In Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 114 S.Ct. 2419, 129 L.Ed.2d 459 (1994), the United States Supreme Court elaborated on the basis *408for that general rule in the context of a defendant’s request that a trial court inform the jury that the defendant would be involuntarily committed to a mental institution if he were to be acquitted of the charged offense by reason of insanity:
It is well established that when a jury has no sentencing function, it should be admonished to “reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed.” The principle that juries are not to consider the consequences of their verdicts is a reflection of the basic division of labor in our legal system between judge and jury. The jury’s function is to find the facts and to decide whether, on those facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The judge, by contrast, imposes sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived at a guilty verdict. Information regarding the consequences of a verdict is therefore irrelevant to the jury’s task. Moreover, providing jurors sentencing information invites them to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts them from their factfinding responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion.
[Id. at 579, 114 S.Ct. at 2424, 129 L.Ed.2d at 466-67 (citations and footnote omitted).]
In State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 618 A.2d 316 (1993), this Court endorsed the view that a jury should not be presented with information that would distract jurors from the proper discharge of their function:
The trial court must endeavor to prevent the jury from considering evidence or information that would unduly prejudice either the State or the defense with respect to the central responsibility of the jury: determining criminal culpability. When instructing the jury, the judicial obligation is to ensure “impartial deliberations upon the guilt of a criminal defendant based solely upon the evidence in accordance with proper and adequate instructions.”
The core of the jury’s duty is to determine criminal culpability, not punishment. Except in capital eases, we do not allow trial courts to inform jurors of the availability or severity of the punishments consequent to the various offenses before them.
[Id. at 61, 618 A.2d 316 (citations omitted).]
See also State v. Pereira, 202 N.J.Super. 434, 439, 495 A.2d 431 (App.Div.1985) (emphasizing that “the practice of informing a jury during the charge as to the punishment that may be anticipated in the event of conviction is not to be commended. It is the function of the jury to adjudge guilt and for the court to pronounce sentence” (citations omitted)).
Federal courts consistently adhere to the principle that sentencing information should not be communicated to jurors. See, e.g., *409United States v. Stanberry, 963 F.2d 1323, 1326 (10th Cir.1992) (“It is axiomatic that the facts relevant to guilt or innocence are for a jury to decide and that the facts relevant to sentencing are for the sentencing court to decide.”); United States v. Broxton, 926 F.2d 1180, 1183 (D.C.Cir.) (holding that “the jury is not to consider the potential punishment which could result from a conviction.”), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911, 111 S.Ct. 1118, 113 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991); United States v. McDonald, 935 F.2d 1212, 1222 (11th Cir.1991) (noting that it is part of Eleventh Circuit’s pattern jury instruction to advise that question of punishment should not be considered by jury in deciding case); United States v. Patrick, 494 F.2d 1150, 1153 (D.C.Cir.1974) (holding that jury’s sole function is to assess guilt or innocence, whereas sentencing decisions are within exclusive province of court); United States v. Davidson, 367 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir.1966) (same); Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir.1962) (same); McClanahan v. United States, 292 F.2d 630, 634 (5th Cir.) (declining to find error in jury charge instructing jury not to concern itself with penalty in event that defendant is found guilty), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913, 82 S.Ct. 193, 7 L.Ed.2d 130 (1961).
State courts generally adhere to the same principle. See, e.g., People v. Holt, 37 Cal.3d 436, 208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 559, 690 P.2d 1207, 1219 (Cal.1984) (“A defendant’s possible punishment is not a proper matter for jury consideration.”); People v. Lake, 61 Ill.App.3d 428, 18 Ill.Dec. 900, 903, 378 N.E.2d 364, 367 (1978) (“The jury is the trier of fact and has no duty, authority, or responsibility as to the sentence which may, or may not, be imposed.”); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 396 Mass. 108, 483 N.E.2d 822, 825-26 (1985) (reiterating Massachusetts’ longstanding policy that judges may not place issue of punishment before finder of fact); Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116, 364 N.E.2d 1264, 1270-71 (1977) (noting that advising juries of sentencing and parole matters invites result-oriented verdicts); People v. Cipollone, 106 A.D.2d 458, 482 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (1984) (“It is axiomatic that punishment is within the sole province of the court and may *410not be considered by the jury, either out of sympathy for the defendant or for retribution purposes against the defendant”).
Prior to our decisions in Brown, supra, and Mejia, supra, our capital punishment jurisprudence had emphasized a trial court’s responsibility in the penalty phase of a capital case to inform the jury of its responsibility in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty, to apprise the jury of the practical effect of a life sentence, and to inform the jury about a defendant’s prior sentences in order “to preclude speculation about a defendant’s release from distorting a jury’s decision to impose life or death.” State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 601-02, 610 A.2d 814 (1992) (Bey III), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995). Reflecting federal precedent concerning sentencing information that should be furnished to capital-case jurors in the penalty phase, see Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161—69, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2192-96, 129 L.Ed.2d 133, 141-46 (1994), we concluded in State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993) (Martini I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 699, 136 L.Ed.2d 621 (1997), that in the penalty phase of a capital case
when defense counsel or the jury requests instructions on the potential sentences a defendant will receive for convictions arising from the same trial as his capital-murder conviction, such information should be provided by the trial court. The jurors should be informed of the sentencing options available to the judge, and that the determination of sentence had not yet been made. In addition, the trial court should explain that the sentence may or may not run consecutively to that for murder, but that the determination is left to the court. Finally, the court should inform the jury that defendant’s possible sentence for the other convictions should not influence its determination regarding the appropriateness of a death sentence on the murder count. Such instructions will assist in dispelling confusion on the part of the jury and will help to safeguard against improper sentencing determinations.
[Id. at 313, 619 A.2d 1208.]
Although the Brown and Mejia opinions were the first to raise the issue of providing sentencing information to the jury in the guilt phase, that question was not the focus of the Brown or Mejia appeals. In both Brown and Mejia the Court considered and resolved the question whether the jury in the guilt phase should have been afforded the option of returning a nonunanimous ver*411diet. In Brown, supra, we held that the jury should have been instructed that a nonunanimous verdict was acceptable on the question whether defendant had committed the murders by his own conduct. 138 N.J. at 516-18, 651 A.2d 19. In Mejia, supra, we held that the jury should have been informed in the guilt phase that a nonunanimous verdict was acceptable on the question whether the defendant had committed homicide with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury that resulted in death. 141 N.J. at 486-90, 662 A.2d 308. In neither appeal did the defendant brief or argue the question whether the guilt-phase jury had to be instructed on the specific sentences to which the defendant was exposed for the charged noncapital homicides. Hence, my belief is that the Court may not adequately have perceived the significance and the implications of that narrow but consequential issue.
Among the important distinctions between noncapital and capital prosecutions is that juries in capital cases are informed in the guilt phase that a conviction of purposeful-or-knowing murder results in the defendant being eligible for a death sentence. See State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 536, 662 A.2d 333 (1995); Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 485, 662 A.2d 308; Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 514, 651 A.2d 19. A jury so informed legitimately may be concerned about the potential sentence for the noncapital homicide counts of the indictment. In my view, trial courts should address forthrightly the unique concerns of capital-case guilt-phase jurors who are informed that a defendant convicted of purposeful-or-knowing murder is death-eligible, but uninformed about the potential sentences for noncapital homicide charges. I deem it inappropriate for trial courts to provide specific sentencing information in the guilt phase. Even in a capital case, during the guilt phase the jury should not be distracted from its function by specific sentencing information about noncapital homicide charges that could intrude on the jury’s deliberative responsibility to return verdicts on the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charged crimes, as well as to determine death-eligibility.
*412Nevertheless, as the Court’s opinion indicates, (ante at 378-379, 700 A.2d at 331-332), trial courts candidly should inform the guilt-phase jury that those noncapital homicide charges relate to extremely serious offenses, convictions for which result in appropriately severe prison sentences. The jury should be admonished that it should not concern itself with the comparative severity of the sentences for the various charged offenses, and that its responsibility is solely to determine whether the prosecution has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s guilt of the charged offenses. The court also should inform the jury that in the event of the necessity of a penalty-phase proceeding, the jury would be informed during the penalty phase of the prison sentences to which the defendant would be subject in the event the death penalty was not imposed.
Defendant also contends that the prejudice caused by the trial court’s failure to inform the jury during the guilt phase of his sentencing exposure for felony murder was exacerbated because the trial court expressly informed the jury that in the event of a conviction of purposeful-or-knowing murder the minimum sentence would be thirty years to life. Because the trial court declined' to inform the jury of defendant’s sentencing exposure for felony murder, that court obviously should not have informed the jury concerning the minimum sentence for purposeful-or-knowing murder. Nevertheless, I regard the error as harmless. As the majority opinion observes, ante at 370, 700 A.2d at 327, “defense counsel, as a matter of trial strategy, conceded that defendant was guilty of felony murder.” Moreover, during the voir dire potential jurors were informed that if defendant were convicted of kidnapping and sexual assault his sentence would include a twenty-five year period of parole ineligibility. In State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 586 A.2d 85 (1991) (Marshall I), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993), we considered the trial court’s explanation of mitigating factors during voir dire in rejecting defendant’s claim that the court’s explanation of the nature and function of mitigating factors in the penalty phase was inadequate, and observed that “the prejudicial effect of an omitted instruction *413must be evaluated ‘in light of the totality of the circumstances— including all the instructions to the jury, [and] the arguments of counsel....'" Id. at 145, 586 A.2d 85 (quoting Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 2090, 60 L.Ed.2d 640, 643 (1979)). On this record, there can be little doubt that the jury deliberating in the guilt phase was aware that if it convicted defendant of felony murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault he would be subject to a prison sentence that was substantial and comparable to the noncapital sentence for purposeful-or-knowing murder.
In view of my conclusion that the Court no longer should adhere to those aspects of Brown, supra, and Mejia, supra, that suggest the necessity that the guilt-phase jury be informed of a defendant’s specific sentencing exposure for charged noncapital homicide offenses, I concur in the judgment of the Court and join the Court’s opinion except with respect to section V.C.