Court Opinion

ID: 9691701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 21:00:22.129566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:25.643357
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1020(c) succinctly provides: “Causes of action . . . may be pleaded in the alternative.” The import of this provision, designed to ameliorate the stringent rules of common-law pleading, is well stated in Goodrieh-Amram, Standard Pennsylvania Practice §1020(c)-l, at 144 (1962) : “Alternative pleading has become, since the adoption of the Rules, a common method of averment. It may be used to join two or more defendants when- it is not clear which defendant was responsibly for the loss or to join two or more theories of action when it is not certain which theory is applicable to the facts.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant’s complaint contained four causes of action. The first, after detailing various allegedly negligent acts by Goodrich, claimed that “all of the aforesaid injuries and damages suffered by plaintiff were caused by the carelessness and negligence of the B. F. Goodrich Company.” The second insisted that Gulf Tire was liable to appellant for its negligent acts; the third that Keller was liable for his negligent acts. Only in the fourth count did appellant plead that his injuries were the result of the joint negligence of these three defendants. Appellant, therefore, pleaded four *349causes of action in the alternative. As the majority1 correctly concludes, appellant’s evidence was sufficient to create a question for the jury as to the liability of Goodrich and Gulf Tire yet, because of the majority’s belief that appellant alleged that the accident was a result solely of the combination of the negligence of all three appellees, the majority sustains the nonsuit.
I have read appellant’s complaint with utmost care, have examined the record closely and reviewed the opinion of the court below. I can find absolutely no support for the majority’s view of appellant’s theory of recovery. Although appellant did allege that he was injured as the result of the combined negligence of the three appellees, he also alleged that each was solely liable to him for their individual negligent acts. Assuming arguendo that there was no evidence of Keller’s negligence and that the nonsuit was properly granted as to him, appellant had produced sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of Goodrich and Gulf Tire to escape the nonsuit. To deprive a litigant of a jury trial by a reading of his complaint which would be worthy of a Blackstonian lawyer not only disregards the mandate of our rules but returns this Court to an era long since past.
Furthermore, although I agree with the majority that §400 of the Restatement 2d should be adopted as part of the law of this Commonwealth,2 the majority’s conclusion that an individual who places his brand on the product of another may avoid liability by demonstrating that the purchaser did not specifically rely on this brand is erroneous. The section states that the *350brand-placer “is subject to the same liability as though be were its manufacturer.” It does not state that non-reliance by the purchaser is a defense. Although the policy prompting the adoption of this section is the belief that a purchaser usually relies upon the brand name placed on the goods, there is no indication in the reporter’s notes that nonreliance is a defense. See Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 13 Wisc. 2d 173, 108 N.W. 2d 149 (1961) (suit against manufacturer, brand-placer and mounter of tire.)
I dissent.
Mr. Justice Musmanno and Mr. Justice Q’Bbien join in this dissenting opinion.

The opinion denominated in this opinion as the majority opinion does not in fact represent the views of a majority of this Oourt.

 The majority correctly concludes that Gulf Tire's liability can be predicated upon the fact that it is a seller within the meaning of §402A. Its dissertation on §400 is therefore dictum.