Court Opinion

ID: 9772335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:02.418977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:20.300493
License: Public Domain

J-S16044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRYAN M. TRENTINI                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2471 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 19, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-09-CR-0006187-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 29, 2023

       Bryan M. Trentini (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, following his open guilty

plea on charges of stalking, terroristic threats, theft by unlawful taking,

criminal mischief, loitering and prowling, and harassment.1      The trial court

sentenced Appellant to a term of 30 to 60 months’ incarceration in a state

correctional institution.     On appeal, Appellant claims the court abused its

discretion by imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive and failed to

consider his rehabilitative needs, history, and character.        Based on the

following, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 18 §§ 2709.1(a)(2), 2706(a)(3),              3921(a), 3304(a)(2), 5506, and
2709(a)(3), respectively.
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      Appellant’s convictions stem from an incident on November 22, 2021,

when his on-again/off-again girlfriend (the Victim) reported that Appellant was

trespassing at her residence on Lakeside Drive in Levittown, Bucks County.

See   N.T.,   7/19/22,   at   9.   Appellant   was   under   the   influence   of

methamphetamine at the time of the trespass. See id. at 20.

      At this juncture, it merits mention that Appellant had four previous

domestic assault cases involving the Victim. See N.T., 7/19/22, at 6-7. In

2013, Appellant pled guilty to harassment, a third-degree misdemeanor, and

received one-year probation. See id. at 7. In 2015, Appellant pled guilty to

simple assault and received a sentence of four to 23 months’ incarceration.

See id. In 2018, Appellant again pled guilty to simple assault and received a

sentence of time served to 23 months. See id. In 2019, Appellant pled guilty

to simple assault and received a six-to-23-month sentence. See id. At the

time of his present sentencing proceeding, Appellant also had an open case in

New Jersey for possession with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a

handgun. See id. at 7.

      Leading up to the incident on November 22nd, the Victim reported

several instances of concern involving Appellant. See N.T., 7/19/22, at 9-11.

On November 11, 2021, Appellant and the Victim got into a verbal argument

where Appellant threatened to “choke the life out of” the Victim, after which

she told him not to return to their residence. See id. at 9-10. The Victim

reported that during the following days, Appellant repeatedly called and texted

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her, was at her front door, and drove by her house.          See id. at 10. She

suspected Appellant would “stay in the shed in her backyard [because] food

and a music player were found in that shed.”          See id.    The Victim made

additional reports via email to the police regarding Appellant’s “escalating

concerning contacts.” See id. at 9-10. The Victim indicated Appellant also

accessed her email and changed her passwords. Id. at 10-11. Moreover,

Appellant accused the Victim of having an affair with the “affiant” police

officer2 and threatened to harm that individual. See id. at 11.

       At the time of the November 22nd incident, Appellant was on

“supervision.” See N.T., 7/19/22, at 7. Melanie Webb, a probation and parole

officer, indicated Appellant violated his parole on four prior occasions. See

id. at 12-19. While in custody for current case, Appellant had two misconducts

for: 1) contacting the Victim despite parole and bail conditions of no contact,

and 2) misuse of medication in January of 2022. See id. at 21-22.

       On April 11, 2022, Appellant entered an open guilty plea on charges of

stalking, terroristic threat, theft by unlawful taking, criminal mischief, loitering

and prowling, and harassment. On July 19, 2022, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to a term of 30 to 60 months’ imprisonment for the stalking. The

court imposed no further penalty regarding the remaining five convictions.

____________________________________________

2 A review of the record does not reveal the identity of the affiant officer.

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      Appellant filed a motion to reconsider sentence on July 29, 2022. The

trial court denied his motion without a hearing on August 26, 2022.

      On September 2, 2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.             On

September 29, 2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

within 21 days.    Following an extension of time, Appellant filed concise

statement on October 18, 2022. The trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)

opinion on January 30, 2023.

      Appellant raises one issue on appeal:

      A. Did the trial court err in imposing a sentence that: (a)
      exceeded the sentence guidelines, (b) failed to give adequate
      reasons to justify a sentence in excess of the aggravated range of
      the sentencing guidelines, and (c) failed to take into account
      Appellant’s age, maturity, circumstances of the case, and
      Appellant’s personal circumstances and rehabilitative needs[?]

See Appellant’s Brief at 7 (some capitalization omitted).

      Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

Appellant claims his sentence is manifestly excessive and the trial court

committed an abuse of discretion because it “ignored” evidence concerning

Appellant’s character and rehabilitative needs. Appellant’s Brief at 12. He

points out that he has been sober since November 23, 2021, and has taken

“significant strides to rehabilitate himself during his period of incarceration

prior to sentencing.” Id. at 13. Additionally, he contends the court failed to

consider the fact that he accepted responsibility for his actions and was

committed to his recovery. Id. at 15. Furthermore, Appellant alleges the

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court “did not mention” the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines and did not

“give any indication that the guidelines were even considered.” Id. at 15-16.

Appellant also states “the trial court failed to adequately state its reasons for

deviating” from the guidelines. Id. at 16. Appellant concludes “the trial court

imposed an aggregate sentence that is manifestly excessive and unreasonable

and constitutes too severe a punishment.” Id.

      As mentioned above, the trial court sentenced Appellant for the stalking

offense to a term of 30 to 60 months’ incarceration. He had a prior record

score of two and the offense gravity score for stalking is five.        See N.T.,

4/11/22, at 15. The sentencing guidelines provide the following ranges: (1)

restorative sanctions or probation for the mitigated range; (2) three to 14

months’ incarceration for the standard range; and (3) at least 17 months’

imprisonment for the aggravated range.           Id. at 15-16.    The statutory

maximum     for   stalking,   a   first-degree   misdemeanor,    is   five   years’

incarceration. Id. at 15. Accordingly, Appellant’s sentence fell outside the

sentencing guidelines but did not exceed the statutory maximum.

      There is no automatic right to review of a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of sentencing. Commonwealth v. Bankes, 286 A.3d 1302, 1306

(Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

      Before [this Court may] reach the merits of [a challenge to the
      discretionary aspects of a sentence], we must engage in a four
      part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal [was timely-
      filed]; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether
      Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied
      upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary

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      aspects of sentence [pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)]; and (4)
      whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that
      the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code. [I]f the
      appeal satisfies each of these four requirements, we will then
      proceed to decide the substantive merits of the case.

Id. (citation omitted).

      Appellant has satisfied the first three prongs of this analysis, where he

raised this challenge in a post-sentence motion, filed a timely appeal, and

included in his brief a Rule 2119(f) statement. See Appellant’s Brief at 9-10.

Therefore, we now consider whether Appellant has raised a substantial

question:

      In determining whether a substantial question exists, this Court
      does not examine the merits of whether the sentence is actually
      excessive.    Rather, we look to whether the appellant has
      forwarded a plausible argument that the sentence, when it is
      within the guideline ranges, is           clearly unreasonable.
      Concomitantly, the substantial question determination does not
      require the court to decide the merits of whether the sentence is
      clearly unreasonable.

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

      This Court has previously determined a “contention that the sentencing

court exceeded the recommended range in the [s]entencing [g]uidelines

without an adequate basis raises a substantial question for this Court to

review.” Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Furthermore, a claim that a court imposed an excessive sentence after not

considering mitigating evidence and rehabilitative needs raises a substantial

question. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super.

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2015) (en banc) (stating that an excessive sentence claim, that encompasses

the court’s failure to consider mitigating factors, raises a substantial

question); see also Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super.

2013) (citation omitted) (concluding a challenge that the trial court imposed

a sentence that was “unreasonable and contrary to the fundamental norms of

the Sentencing Code” and did not consider the appellant’s rehabilitative needs

raised a substantial question) (citation omitted).3 We interpret Appellant’s

claims to fall under these types of substantial questions. Therefore, we may

proceed to consider the merits of his argument.

____________________________________________

3 To the extent that Appellant argues the trial court “did not mention” the
sentencing guidelines, this Court previously has determined that kind of
argument does not raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.
Rush, 162 A.3d 530, 543 (Pa. Super. 2017).

       Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously has stated that
“guidelines have no binding effect . . . they are advisory guideposts that are
valuable, may provide an essential starting point, and that must be respected
and considered; they recommend, however, rather than require a particular
sentence.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 964-65 (Pa. 2007).
This Court has previously held that “[w]hen the record demonstrates that the
sentencing court was aware of the guideline ranges and contains no indication
that incorrect guideline ranges were applied or that the court misapplied the
applicable ranges, we will not reverse merely because the specific ranges were
not recited at the sentencing hearing.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d
1, 8 (Pa. Super. 2002).

      Here, the trial court set forth the guideline ranges at Appellant’s April
11, 2022, guilty plea proceeding, and Appellant does not argue that they are
incorrect. See N.T., 4/11/22, at 15-16. Accordingly, we may presume the
court was aware of the specific ranges at issue. Therefore, Appellant’s claim
has no merit.

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      The relevant standard of review is well-settled:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).   “[W]hen imposing sentence, the trial court is granted broad

discretion, as it is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances

before it.” Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020).

      This Court has also stated:

      [W]hen imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider
      the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), that is, the
      protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on
      the victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the
      defendant. . . .

      Furthermore, [a] trial court judge has wide discretion in
      sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and for the
      appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing a
      sentence[.] The sentencing court, however, must also consider
      the sentencing guidelines.

Clemat, 218 A.3d at 960 (citation omitted).          Moreover, the sentencing

guidelines are advisory as they “have no binding effect, create no presumption

in sentencing, and do not predominate over other sentencing factors.”

Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727-28 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

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            When imposing [a] sentence, the trial court is required to
      consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the
      character of the defendant. The trial court should refer to the
      defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics,
      and potential for rehabilitation.

Clemat at 959-60 (citations omitted).

      We are also guided by the following:

            When reviewing a sentence outside of the guideline range,
      the essential question is whether the sentence imposed was
      reasonable. Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 567 (Pa.
      2007). An appellate court must vacate and remand a case where
      it finds that “the sentencing court sentenced outside the
      sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.” 42
      Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3).         In making a reasonableness
      determination, a court should consider four factors:

         (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
         history and characteristics of the defendant.

         (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
         defendant, including any presentence investigation.

         (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

         (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

      42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d). A sentence may be found unreasonable
      if it fails to properly account for these four statutory factors. A
      sentence may also be found unreasonable if the “sentence was
      imposed without express or implicit consideration by the
      sentencing court of the general standards applicable to sentencing
      [as found in Section 9721].” Walls, [926 A.2d at 964].

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190-91 (Pa. Super. 2008). “A

sentencing court, therefore, in carrying out its duty to impose an individualized

sentence, may depart from the guidelines when it properly identifies a

particular factual basis and specific reasons which compelled [it] to deviate

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from the guideline range.” Commonwealth v. Shull, 148 A.3d 820, 836 Pa.

Super. 2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “in every

case where a sentencing court imposes a sentence outside of the sentencing

guidelines, the court must provide in open court a contemporaneous

statement of reasons in support of its sentence.” Shull, 148 A.3d at 835-36.

The court can “meet the requirement of a contemporaneous written statement

by placing its reasons for departure on the record during sentencing.”

Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 383 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted).   Additionally, the on-the-record disclosure requirement does not

require the trial court to make “a detailed, highly technical statement.”

Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 514 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation

omitted).

      A review of the record reveals the following.    At Appellant’s July 19,

2022, sentencing proceeding, there is no indication whether the trial court had

the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) but it merits mention that

this case was Appellant’s fifth appearance before the court system for crimes

committed against the Victim.     Moreover, the Commonwealth did present

several domestic violence investigation (DVI) reports from prior years. See

N.T., 7/19/22, at 5-6.    The Commonwealth also recited Appellant’s prior

criminal history with respect to the Victim and pointed out the following: (1)

he was unsuccessfully discharged from “batterer’s intervention for continuous

issues with either missing or being late for group and admitting to having

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ongoing contact with the [V]ictim[;”], (2) he continued to test positive for

drugs, including multiple times for methamphetamine; and (3) while in

custody for the present crimes, he had two misconducts (one for contacting

the victim and the second for misuse of medication).           Id. at 6-8.     The

Commonwealth further stated: "Your Honor, the [V]ictim . . . lives in fear and

terror of [Appellant]. She feels that she’s only safe from [him] when he’s in

custody, and she . . . is concerned . . . for herself and their shared son[.]” Id.

at 11. In recommending a state sentence, the Commonwealth emphasized

the following:

      We’ve seen it, now this is the fifth time [Appellant] has been in
      front of th[e trial c]ourt or a court in this county for the same type
      of behavior, escalating behavior. . . .

             Your Honor, I think [Appellant] has shown through his
      actions over at least the last nine years that he is unsafe to the
      [V]ictim, he is unsafe to the community, and the only place where
      he seems to do relatively okay is when he’s incarcerated.

Id. at 35-36.

      The trial court also heard from Probation and Parole Officer Webb

regarding Appellant’s history of parole and probation violations.      See N.T.,

7/19/22, at 14-19. Officer Webb did not provide the trial court with a sentence

recommendation but stated the court should determine whether Appellant

receive concurrent or consecutive sentences. See id. at 19.

      Appellant also invoked his right to allocution, admitting his guilt and that

he was under the influence of drugs at the time. See N.T., 7/19/22, at 20.

Appellant explained his reasons for the violations while in custody, stating that

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he had written a letter to the Victim to discuss their child in December 2021,

and the misuse of medication misconduct was for not taking his medication.

See id. at 21-22. Appellant testified that he has made efforts to rehabilitate

himself while incarcerated prior to sentencing, including the completion of six

programs at Bucks County Jail. See id. at 22-23. Appellant also completed

the H.O.P.E. program for drug and alcohol treatment.           See id. at 23.

Appellant stated that after completing the H.O.P.E. program, he became a

leader in the organization and created materials for it. See id. at 24. He

provided the trial court with a letter of recommendation from his program

supervisor and certificates of recognition in personal accountability and

responsibility, good work ethic, and community involvement. See id. He also

participated in a course to address substance abuse and mental health

disorders. See id. Appellant testified that he had been diagnosed with Post-

Traumatic Stress Disorder, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, and

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. See id. Lastly, he expressed remorse for

his actions, and read a letter to the court which highlighted accomplishments

and lessons from the H.O.P.E. program and expressed a commitment to

improving himself. See id. at 26, 28-29.

      At the conclusion of the proceeding, the trial court set forth its reasons

for Appellant’s sentence, stating:

      [Appellant] has been the example of I’m not doing what anybody
      tells me to do. He just has not done anything. He refuses to
      comply with terms of supervision. He refuses to follow the orders
      of the Court when they tell him not to have contact with people or

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     they must – he must do this, and he doesn’t, and he’s refused,
     and that’s why we’re here.

             But we put him in Bucks County, and I appreciate the fact
     that he has completed the H.O.P.E. program which is a significant
     program there. It’s a difficult program to compete. And for the
     first time he has completed it, and I will give him credit for that,
     significant credit. But [Appellant does not] get to do one thing
     right and think that that fixes everything. It just doesn’t.

           I’m proud of [Appellant], and . . . I was going to send [him]
     to a [SCI] for a significant period of time, and I’ve changed my
     mind as to the length of the time, but [Appellant has] burned
     every bridge in Bucks County and Bucks County Adult Probation
     and Parole. [Appellant has] just done that. So I think that it’s
     appropriate for a state sentence, but I’m going to give [Appellant]
     the credit for the H.O.P.E program and the fact that the prison
     considers that [he is] a leader there, that [he has] changed.

N.T., 7/19/22, at 36-38.

     In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court supplemented its

statements at sentencing with the following:

           This sentence does not follow a first-time offense, nor a
     second, third or fourth, but rather a fifth offense with the same
     victim. We considered the conduct, character, criminal history,
     and impact of Appellant’s actions on the community and found
     that Appellant . . . has a lack of respect for authority, as he
     continues to accrue misconducts and violations of his parole.

           Appellant . . . was advised of the maximum penalties and
     the sentencing guidelines during the guilty plea proceeding on
     April 11, 2022. While Appellant was sentenced to the statutory
     maximum on Count III, Stalking — Repeatedly Communicating to
     Cause Fear, no further penalty was given on any of the other
     counts. The sentence imposed falls within the total number of
     months that could have been imposed if each count was sentenced
     in the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines and were to
     run consecutively. If each count was sentenced in the aggravated
     range and ran consecutively, Appellant would be facing [42]
     months, at the minimum. We implicitly understand the benefit of
     a sentence on one count versus multiple; Appellant remains tied

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      to the system, yet this ultimately avoids inconsistency in violations
      and parole.

            Admittedly we did not issue a contemporaneous written
      statement detailing our reasoning for a sentence outside the
      sentencing guidelines, however, one was not necessary under
      Pennsylvania law. As indicated by the Pennsylvania Superior
      Court in Commonwealth v. Feucht, [supra,] the written
      component was satisfied by our express reasoning given on the
      record during sentencing. Appellant . . . has exhausted the
      treatment options available to him in Bucks County. He refused
      to comply with the rules and regulations of probation and parole
      supervision in Bucks County.          He has been unsuccessfully
      discharged from a required treatment program, namely batterer’s
      intervention.    Appellant continues to use drugs while on
      supervision. He has incurred misconducts while in Bucks County
      Correctional Facility for this case for contact with the victim, and
      misuse of medication. . . .

             We felt strongly that it was appropriate to end his
      supervision by Bucks County and begin anew with state
      supervision. Appellant’s completion of the H.O.P.E. program is
      significant but does not absolve Appellant from the behavior he
      has consistently exhibited.

Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8.

      Under our standard of review, we find the trial court did not abuse its

discretion with regard to Appellant’s sentence. Contrary to his arguments, it

is evident from the July 19th sentencing hearing, and the Rule 1925(a) opinion

that the court considered the mitigating evidence, Appellant’s acceptance of

responsibility and his rehabilitative needs, in addition to the required factors

under Section 9721(b). However, the court emphasized the gravity of offense

in relation to impact on the Victim and Appellant’s lack of potential for

rehabilitation based on his numerous encounters with the court system.

Moreover, the court acknowledged its understanding of the sentencing

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guidelines at the April 11th guilty plea proceeding and its Rule 1925(a)

opinion, and articulated a sufficient statement of reasons for the sentence

imposed.     Lastly, to the extent Appellant complains the trial court did not

provide a contemporaneous written statement regarding its reason for a

deviation, the court did “place[ ] its reasons for departure on the record during

sentencing.” Feucht, 955 A.2d at 383.4

       Accordingly, we find Appellant has failed to demonstrate the sentence

imposed was unreasonable and that the trial court “ignored or misapplied the

law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will,

or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.”          Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 826 (Pa. Super. 2015).

       For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary

aspects of his sentence fails.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

4 It merits mention that Appellant did receive the benefit of a “volume
discount” at the time of sentencing where he pled guilty to six crimes but was
sentenced only for one crime.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2023

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