Court Opinion

ID: 9548381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:02:34.559168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:52.514006
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent and in so doing so invite the attention of the bench and bar to an appreciation of the holdings of eleven of twelve cases cited by the majority opinion at pages 103 and 104, 721 P.2d at pages 203 and 204 as representing of the various viewpoints.
The majority there cites twelve cases, some of which supposedly support its position, by introducing them with the following statement:
“On the other hand, opinions holding such exclusionary clauses to be valid most often refer to the inequity of allowing a person who insures one vehicle with an insurance carrier to obtain a ‘free ride’ by thereby obtaining coverage by that same carrier on one, two, or a fleet of vehicles upon which he has paid no premium to the carrier. Some courts upholding the validity of such exclusionary clauses opine that rewarding a plaintiff who himself is operating an uninsured vehicle is contrary to legislative policy. For cases presenting the various viewpoints, see Aetna v. Hurst [2 Cal.App.3d 1067], 83 Cal.Rptr. 156 (Ct.App. 1969); State Farm Mutual v. Robertson [156 Ind.App. 149], 295 N.E.2d 626 (Ct.App.Ind.1973); Bradley v. Mid Century Insurance [78 Mich.App. 67], 259 N.W.2d 378 (Mich.App.1977); Nygaard v. State Farm [301 Minn. 10], 221 N.W.2d 151 (Minn.1974); Lowrey v. State Farm, 285 So.2d 767 (Miss.1974); Herrick v. Liberty Mutual, 274 N.W.2d 147 (Neb.1979); Chavez v. State Farm Mutual [87 N.M. 327], 533 P.2d 100 (N.M.1975); Ady v. West American Insurance Company [69 Ohio St.2d 593], 433 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 1981); Cothren v. Emcasco Insurance, 555 P.2d 1037 (Okla.1976); Bankes v. State Farm Mutual [216 Pa.Super. 162], 264 A.2d 197 (Pa.Super.1970); Federated American Insurance v. Raynes [88 Wash.2d 439], 563 P.2d 815 (Wash.1977); Bell v. State Farm [157 W.Va. 623], 207 S.E.2d 147 (W.Va.1974).”
The fact is, that of the twelve cases cited, only one, the Nebraska case, supports the majority position; and even that case, Herrick v. Liberty Mutual, 202 Neb. 116, 274 N.W.2d 147 (Neb.1979), can be explained as being poorly reasoned.
The Herrick majority ignores the plain language of Nebraska’s Uninsured Motorist Coverage Statute, holding that from its perspective, “[a]n overriding public policy of protecting an owner-operator who inexcusably has no applicable bodily liability coverage is not presently discernible.” Herrick, 274 N.W.2d at 148 (quoting Ship*114ley v. American Standard Insurance Co., 183 Neb. 109, 158 N.W.2d 238 (1968)). In the process, the Herrick majority, like the majority herein, refuses to acknowledge the policy as established in Nebraska’s statute. The two dissenting justices acknowledged that Shipley was “wrongly decided” which view is “supported by an ever-lessening number of states and that any number of states once holding with Nebraska have re-examined their position and reversed themselves, [such as Arizona and Illinois] as we should do.” This Court has an opportunity to avoid the Nebraska Court’s mistake, and we should do so.
Four of the eleven cases which are exemplary of the holdings of the other eleven cases cited by the majority are:
(1) “The exclusion clause here is invalid because it is not the intent of the statute to limit coverage for an insured to a particular location or a particular vehicle. As pointed out by the Louisiana Court of Appeals in construing a statute identical to ours:
‘There is no requirement in the statute that the insured have any relation, at the time of the accident, with any vehicle he owns and that is insured with the insurer. The uninsured motorists protection covers the insured and the family members while riding in uninsured vehicles, while riding in commercial vehicles, while pedestrians or while rocking on the front porch.’ ”
Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100, 103 (1975).
(2) “... We believe the limits-of-liability provision conflicts with the statutory policy of providing uninsured motorist coverage.”
* * * * * *
“We hold that the number of uninsured motorist coverages on which an insured is entitled to rely is determined by the number of premiums paid and not by the number of policies under which the cars are insured. Because the limits-of-liability provision in FAI’s policy purports to limit coverage based on the number of policies issued to an insured and not on the number of premiums paid by the insured, the provision constitutes an invalid attempt by FAI to erode the amount of uninsured motorist coverage to which respondent is entitled. Respondent may combine the two uninsured motorist coverages so as to have $30,000 in uninsured motorist coverage under his policy with FAI.” Federated American Ins. Co. v. Raynes, 88 Wash.2d 439, 563 P.2d 815, 820 (1977).
(3) “Provision of uninsured motorist clause excluding coverage for bodily injury sustained while occupying a highway vehicle owned by the named insured but not listed in the policy was void was contrary to public policy; hence, clause could not be used to deny coverage for injuries sustained by named insured’s stepson, who was a resident of the same household and who was injured while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle, the title to which was either in the stepfather or his mother but which was not listed as an insured vehicle.” Headnote of Cothren v. Emcasco Insurance Co., 555 P.2d 1037 (Okl.1976).
(4) “An uninsured motorist clause in an insurance policy, if such policy conforms to the statute, insures all family members of a named insured’s household without exception whenever bodily injury results from an accident with an uninsured motorist in which the uninsured motorist would be legally liable. Within this required uninsured motorist coverage there are no distinctions with regard to an owned but not insured motor vehicle, as the coverage applies to use or occupancy of ‘a motor vehicle or otherwise.’ ”
“An insurance policy, therefore, which seeks to defeat the purpose of spreading the burden of loss or the benefits of coverage by limiting through exclusions or otherwise, the insurance underwriter’s liability is repugnant to the uninsured motorist statute. In this regard the Court notes with approval the following from Widess. A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Section 29:
‘There seems to be a growing trend of decisions in which the courts have taken the position that such restrictions [exclu*115sionary clauses] upon the coverage are against public policy and therefore void. One case ... elicited the following response which speaks to the question [of exclusionary clauses] generally: ‘Thus, the uninsured motorist coverage was applicable if at the time of sustaining injury ... a named insured was occupying the Ford described in his policy or was on foot or on horseback or while sitting in his rocking chair on his front porch or while occupying a non-owned automobile furnished for his regular use.’ ”
Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 157 W.Va. 623, 207 S.E.2d 147, 149, 150 (1974).
The overwhelming majority of justices and judges throughout this land have decided contrary to the majority herein after analyzing in depth all the considerations which face this court in the instant case. It is entirely possible that “our three” are right and the “rest” are wrong — or is there another possibility?
BISTLINE, J., concurs.