Court Opinion

ID: 2964147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:21:17.773896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:14.116989
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

        July 5, 1996            [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1960
        No. 95-2018

                             MARC E. WILDER, II, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                              DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
                                    JOHN MARSHALL,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                            Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                           ______________

                                 ____________________

            Marc E. Wilder, II and Russell J. Carey on brief pro se.
            __________________     ________________
            Nancy  Ankers  White,  Special  Assistant  Attorney  General,  and
            ____________________
        Margaret  Melville, Counsel,  Department of  Correction, on  brief for
        __________________
        appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                 Per  Curiam.     Prior  to   its  repeal   in  1994,   a
                 ___________

            Massachusetts  statute providing for  the award  of good-time

            credits to state prisoners specifically withheld such credits

            from  inmates  who  had  been  convicted  of  enumerated  sex

            offenses.   See Mass.  Gen. L., ch.  127,   129.   Plaintiffs
                        ___

            here, a group of prisoners serving sentences for  sex crimes,

            have brought  an action  under 42  U.S.C.   1983  challenging

            this statutory exclusion on various  constitutional grounds.1
                                                                        1

            The  lower court rejected each of their claims at the summary

            judgment stage.  On  the arguendo assumption that plaintiffs'
                                     ________

            contentions are cognizable  in a civil-rights  action (rather

            than a habeas corpus proceeding), we summarily affirm for the

            reasons recited by the magistrate-judge in his June 23,  1995

            report.  We add only the following.

                 Underlying   several  of   plaintiffs'  claims   is  the

            assertion  that their inability  to obtain  good-time credits

            constitutes a separate "punishment" apart from that  incurred

            at sentencing.   This is  mistaken.  The  statutory exclusion

            was enacted in 1965,  see Amado v. Superintendent,  366 Mass.
                                  ___ _____    ______________

            45, 48 (1974) (reviewing  statutory history)--long before any

            of  the plaintiffs  had been  convicted.   Accordingly, their

            ineligibility  for such credits can only be viewed as part of

                                
            ____________________

               1   Of the  more than fifty  plaintiffs who  joined in the
               1
            action  below, only  some fourteen  are participating  in the
            instant appeals.    We  assume  arguendo  that  each  of  the
                                            ________
            appellants has properly invoked this court's jurisdiction.  

                                         -2-

            the punishment  imposed by the sentencing  court after trial.

            Plaintiffs'  assertion that the  exclusion constitutes a bill

            of  attainder fails  for this  reason (among  others).   See,
                                                                     ___

            e.g.,  United  States v.  Brown,  381 U.S.  437,  450 (1965).
            ____   ______________     _____

            Their  additional claim  that the  exclusion  violates double

            jeopardy (a claim which we assume arguendo is properly before
                                              ________

            us) falters on  the same ground.  Even  if the exclusion were

            viewed  as  a cumulative  punishment  for  the same  offense,

            double  jeopardy would  not be  offended.  See,  e.g., United
                                                       ___   ____  ______

            States  v.  Centeno-Torres, 50  F.3d 84,  85 (1st  Cir.) (per
            ______      ______________

            curiam), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 208 (1995).
                     ____________

                 The allegation that the  exclusion violates due  process

            proves  equally unavailing.   Plaintiffs  possess no  liberty

            interest in  receiving good-time credits.   See, e.g., Sandin
                                                        ___  ____  ______

            v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1995); Riddle v. Mondragon,
               ______                                ______    _________

            83  F.3d 1197, 1206-07 (10th  Cir. 1996).   And the statutory

            scheme found violative of substantive due process in Young v.
                                                                 _____

            Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995), a case on
            ______

            which plaintiffs rely, bears no resemblance to the one before

            us.   Finally,  the  contention that  the exclusion  violates

            equal  protection  runs into  a  wall  of caselaw  indicating

            otherwise.   See, e.g., Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1207-08; Artway v.
                         ___  ____  ______                      ______

            Attorney General  of New  Jersey, 81  F.3d 1235,  1267-68 (3d
            ________________________________

            Cir. 1996);  Lustgarden v. Gunter,  966 F.2d  552, 555  (10th
                         __________    ______

                                         -3-

            Cir.), cert. denied, 506  U.S. 1008 (1992); Amado,  366 Mass.
                   ____________                         _____

            at 46-51.

                 Affirmed.  See Loc. R. 27.1.
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