Court Opinion

ID: 9956893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:00:45.569861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:58.018452
License: Public Domain

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                                                        [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                             ____________________

                                   No. 23-10841
                             ____________________

        WILLIAM MARTIN,
        MICHAEL MARTIN,
                                                          Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
        versus
        MIAMI DADE COUNTY,
        a Florida County and Political Subdivision
        of the State of Florida,

                                                                  Defendant,

        MAURICIO DURAN,
        Miami-Dade County Police Oﬃcer
        in his individual and oﬃcial capacity,
        BRIDGET DOYLE,
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        23-10841               Opinion of the Court                         2

        Miami-Dade County Police Oﬃcer
        in her individual and oﬃcial capacity,

                                                      Defendants-Appellants.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-22107-PAS
                            ____________________

        Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        HULL, Circuit Judge:
               Plaintiffs-Appellees Michael and William Martin (the
        “Martins”) filed an amended complaint alleging claims of false
        arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution against
        Defendants-Appellants Officers Mauricio Duran and Bridget Doyle
        (the “Officers”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Officers moved to
        dismiss based on qualified immunity, which the district court
        denied. This is the Officers’ appeal.
                After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we
        (1) affirm the denial of qualified immunity as to the Martins’ false
        arrest and excessive force claims; (2) reverse the denial of qualified
        immunity as to the Martins’ malicious prosecution claims; and
        (3) remand for further proceedings.
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        23-10841                  Opinion of the Court                             3

                          I.      AMENDED COMPLAINT
                At this motion-to-dismiss stage, we accept the facts alleged
        in the amended complaint as true and construe them in the light
        most favorable to the Martins. See Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc., 89
        F.4th 852, 856 (11th Cir. 2023). The amended complaint also refers
        to Oﬃcer Doyle’s body camera video of the incident. As to the
        video, we construe ambiguities in favor of the Martins but accept
        the video’s depiction to the extent it “is clear and obviously
        contradicts the [Martins’] alleged facts.”1 See Baker v. City of
        Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2023); see also Scott v.
        Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007) (stating a court should view the
        facts in the light depicted by the video where it “utterly discredit[s]”
        a party’s version of events). Applying those standards, we recount
        the facts in the light most favorable to the Martins.
        A.     Facts
              Plaintiﬀs Michael and William Martin are brothers. Just
        before 3:00 a.m. on January 10, 2018, the Martins were walking
        from a gym through a parking lot headed to their car in a separate
        parking lot. The incident took place in the ﬁrst parking lot, which
        we refer to as “the parking lot.”
              The Martins were dressed in gym attire—hoodies and
        basketball shorts—and carried backpacks, and Michael carried a
        water bottle. In the parking lot, Oﬃcer Duran approached the

        1 The parties agree this video was incorporated by reference into the amended

        complaint.
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        23-10841                  Opinion of the Court                              4

        Martins as they were walking through the lot to their car. Shortly
        thereafter, Oﬃcer Doyle arrived and activated her body camera
        video (the “video”), which had audio too.
               The video begins with Oﬃcer Doyle walking through an
        alley and arriving in the parking lot where Oﬃcer Duran and the
        Martins are. The video shows (1) no cars in the parking lot, save
        Oﬃcer Duran’s police car with its emergency lights activated,
        (2) the Martins are attempting to walk across the lot toward their
        car and are engaged in no other activity, and (3) Oﬃcer Duran is
        walking closely behind the Martins.2 The arrests occur in the next
        38 seconds of the video.
              The ﬁrst 27 seconds of that 38 seconds of the video show
        Oﬃcer Duran grabbing William’s arm twice and then taking
        Michael down to the ground. Speciﬁcally, as the Martins walk,
        Oﬃcer Duran grabs William’s arm, preventing him from walking
        and crossing the lot. Michael then tells Oﬃcer Duran to “get your
        hands oﬀ of him,” “this is assault,” and “do not touch him.”
        William pulls away from Oﬃcer Duran’s grasp, and the Martins
        continue walking toward their car.
               Oﬃcer Duran then states that the Martins are “in the wrong
        place.” Michael states, “What have I done besides walk to my car?”
        Oﬃcer Duran asks, “Do you have a car here? Where’s your car at?”

        2 At the time Officer Doyle arrives, there is some audio noise but she is not

        close enough at first to the location of Officer Duran and the Martins for the
        audio to clearly capture what was said at her arrival.
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        23-10841               Opinion of the Court                        5

        Michael responds, “That’s my business,” and William responds,
        “I’m walking to it.” Oﬃcer Doyle replies to Michael, “It’s not [your
        business]; it’s ours.”
                Oﬃcer Duran then grabs William’s arm a second time and
        says, “I’m telling you to stop.” At this point, the body camera video
        becomes obscured by Oﬃcer Duran, but Michael can be heard
        saying, “Yo, if you touch him again, that’s assault.” After this
        statement, Oﬃcer Duran performs a take-down maneuver on
        Michael, sweeping out his legs and slamming him into the ground.
        Before the takedown, Oﬃcer Duran had not said or even hinted
        that Michael was under arrest.
              The next 15 seconds of the video show the tasing of
        William. As Oﬃcer Duran pins Michael to the ground, William
        approaches and says, “Get oﬀ my brother,” “you’re assaulting
        him,” and “he didn’t do anything wrong and you know it.” From
        the ground, Oﬃcer Duran instructs Oﬃcer Doyle to tase William,
        which she does.
               As Oﬃcer Duran continues to pin Michael to the ground,
        both brothers state that their car is nearby and they have the keys.
        Oﬃcer Doyle says to Michael, “We asked you to stop walking and
        did you fucking stop? No.” Michael responds, “We don’t have to
        stop.”
              Eventually, additional police oﬃcers respond and the
        brothers are charged with loitering or prowling, battery on a law
        enforcement oﬃcer, and resisting an oﬃcer with violence. At their
        criminal trial, the jury acquitted the Martins.
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        23-10841               Opinion of the Court                        6

        B.    Police Report
               After the Martins’ arrests, the Oﬃcers prepared a police
        report about the incident. The Martins’ amended complaint
        quotes several statements the Oﬃcers wrote in the police report.
        That police report, as quoted in the amended complaint, states
        Oﬃcer Duran (1) watched the Martins to “see their intent” “due to
        the time of night,” (2) approached the Martins because he
        “observed both black males walking slowly looking into the parked
        county vehicle and oﬃcers’ personal cars inside the station parking
        lot,” and (3) “due to their unorthodox behavior and the time of
        night, [] requested additional units to assist in stopping both males
        to question their intentions in the area.”
               The Oﬃcers argue we must accept the statements in the
        police report as true and that they established reasonable suspicion
        for Oﬃcer Duran to stop the Martins by grabbing William’s arm
        twice and then taking down Michael. We disagree. The amended
        complaint did quote the police report’s statements but also alleged
        that the police report was “materially false” and was contradicted
        by Oﬃcer Doyle’s body camera video. Moreover, before Oﬃcer
        Duran’s grabbing of William’s arm twice, the video shows no
        conduct by the Martins other than their walking through the
        parking lot and both saying they were walking to their car. The
        amended complaint also alleged, and the video conﬁrms, that
        Oﬃcer Duran approached the Martins in an empty parking lot
        devoid of cars. The video shows only Oﬃcer Duran’s police car.
        And the amended complaint also contained statements that
        contradict those in the police report, including that the Martins
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        23-10841                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

        were walking casually through the parking lot without cars and
        “were not engaged in any apparent criminal activity, as they were
        walking to their vehicle.”
               Given the amended complaint alleges the police report is
        materially false and the video and amended complaint taken
        together contradict the police report, we cannot consider the police
        report as true for the purposes of this appeal of the motion to
        dismiss. See Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (stating, where a civil rights plaintiﬀ alleges the contents of a police
        report are false, “the contents of the report cannot be considered
        as true for the purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss”).
               Therefore, under the amended complaint’s allegations and
        the video in the light most favorable to the Martins, Oﬃcer Duran
        encountered the Martins, two Black males, at 3:00 a.m. while they
        were walking from a gym across the parking lot to their car and
        engaging in no other conduct. Oﬃcer Duran followed them and
        forcibly grabbed William’s arm twice while William was walking.
        Michael verbally objected twice when Oﬃcer Duran grabbed
        William’s arm. Oﬃcer Duran then slammed Michael into the
        ground. William then verbally objected and was tased by Oﬃcer
        Doyle. With this version of events, we turn to qualiﬁed immunity.3
        See Ounjian, 89 F.4th at 856; Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277-78.

        3 The Officers’ brief relies heavily on the police report’s statement that Officer

        Duran observed “both black males walking slowly looking into the parked
        County vehicle and officer[s’] personal cars inside the station parking lot.” As
        outlined above, the Martins’ amended complaint contradicts that statement,
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        23-10841                  Opinion of the Court                                8

                            II.     QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
               “Qualiﬁed immunity gives government oﬃcials breathing
        room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open
        legal questions.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 243 (2014) (quotation
        marks omitted). If an oﬃcial was acting within his discretionary
        authority, the plaintiﬀ must establish that the oﬃcial is not entitled
        to qualiﬁed immunity by showing the oﬃcial’s conduct (1) violated
        a constitutional right (2) that was clearly established at the time of
        the oﬃcial’s conduct. Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 904 (11th
        Cir. 2011). For a constitutional right to be clearly established,
        “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
        constitutional question confronted by the oﬃcial beyond debate.”
        Plumhoﬀ v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (quotation marks
        omitted).
               It is undisputed that the Oﬃcers were acting within their
        discretionary authority. So we evaluate whether the Martins have
        shown the Oﬃcers’ conduct violated clearly established
        constitutional rights.4

        and the video, which starts at Officer Doyle’s arrival, does not show any cars
        other than Officer Duran’s in the parking lot where the Martins and Officer
        Duran are standing. So that disputed fact is a key issue in the case and for the
        jury to determine.
        4 We review de novo the district court’s denial of qualified immunity at the

        motion-to-dismiss stage. Est. of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 939 (11th
        Cir. 2018).
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        23-10841              Opinion of the Court                        9

                             III.   FALSE ARREST
                “Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a right to
        be free from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’” Skop v. City of
        Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). To conduct a brief
        investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an
        oﬃcer must have “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
        activity is afoot.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir.
        2000) (quotation marks omitted). The question “is not whether
        reasonable suspicion existed in fact, but whether the oﬃcer had
        ‘arguable’ reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop.”
        Id. at 1166.
              In addition, “an arrest is a seizure of the person.” Skop, 485
        F.3d at 1137. “Probable cause to arrest exists when law
        enforcement oﬃcials have facts and circumstances within their
        knowledge suﬃcient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect
        had committed or was committing a crime.” Id. (quotation marks
        omitted). In the qualiﬁed immunity context, an oﬃcer need not
        have actual probable cause; arguable probable cause will suﬃce. Id.
               At the time of the Oﬃcers’ conduct in 2018, it was clearly
        established that a stop made without arguable reasonable suspicion
        and an arrest made without arguable probable cause violate the
        Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1143; Sauls, 206 F.3d at 1166. Under
        the Martins’ version of events, the Oﬃcers lacked both arguable
        reasonable suspicion to stop and arguable probable cause to arrest
        the Martins. In 2018, any reasonable police oﬃcer would know
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        23-10841               Opinion of the Court                         10

        that he or she could not stop and arrest the Martins for merely
        walking through a parking lot at night.
               That Michael verbally objected to Oﬃcer Duran’s grabbing
        William’s arm twice, and that the two Martin brothers walked
        away from Oﬃcer Duran, also do not show arguable reasonable
        suspicion to stop or arguable probable cause to arrest. The
        freedom of individuals to verbally object to police action without
        thereby risking arrest was well established and well known in 2018.
        See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1139. “[W]hen an oﬃcer, without reasonable
        suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the
        individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.
        And any refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the
        minimal level of objective justiﬁcation needed for a detention or
        seizure.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (quotation
        marks and citation omitted). While police oﬃcers enjoy the liberty
        to address questions to other persons in public spaces, the person
        addressed ordinarily “has an equal right to ignore his interrogator
        and walk away.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980)
        (quotation marks omitted).
               The Oﬃcers also argue they obtained probable cause for the
        arrest due to the Martins’ resistance conduct after Oﬃcer Duran
        swept out Michael’s legs and threw him to the ground. But the
        Martins’ post-arrest conduct cannot supply the probable cause
        necessary to initiate the arrest. See Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th
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        23-10841                  Opinion of the Court                               11

        1326, 1333 n.3 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Probable cause is measured at the
        time of the arrest, not at some time before or after.”).5
              The Oﬃcers further argue they had “at least arguable
        probable cause to arrest Michael for assault” because a “reasonable
        oﬃcer could have interpreted Michael saying ‘Yo, if you touch him
        again—’ as a threat.” What Michael actually said—plain as day on
        Oﬃcer Doyle’s body camera video—was “Yo, if you touch him
        again, that’s assault.” Despite our typical deference to police
        oﬃcers’ discretion in fast-paced situations, see Gates v. Khokhar, 884
        F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018), we must, of course, credit the

        5 The Officers suggest Officer Duran had reasonable suspicion to stop the

        Martins merely because they were walking at night, in dark-colored clothing,
        through the parking lot of a closed establishment. The Officers’ cited Eleventh
        Circuit cases, however, involved additional factors not present here. See, e.g.,
        United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting
        Hernandez was found speeding in her car at night in severe weather, gave an
        implausible excuse for speeding, told conflicting accounts of her trip’s length
        and purpose, did not know the trip’s destination, was traveling between two
        main source cities for narcotics, and exhibited abnormal nervousness); United
        States v. Hardy, 806 F. App’x 718, 721-22 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting Hardy wore
        all black clothing at night, was found in a high-crime area near where a 911
        call about a “prowler” had just been made, and gave the officer an “unlikely”
        story for his presence in the area); United States v. Ligon, 2022 WL 2091598, at
        *2-3 (11th Cir. 2022) (noting Ligon was found in black clothing, walking in a
        roadway at night in a high-crime area near where a murder had recently
        occurred, and matched a description of the murder suspect); United States v.
        Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting Briggman was in a parked
        car at 4:00 a.m. in a high-crime area where the nearby commercial
        establishments were closed, wore “suspicious clothing,” and attempted to
        evade police prior to the stop).
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        23-10841                  Opinion of the Court                     12

        Martins’ version of the statement, which is supported by the
        footage, not the Oﬃcers’. No reasonable oﬃcer could construe “if
        you touch him again, that’s assault,” as a threat to do bodily harm
        to the Oﬃcers. Thus, this statement cannot provide arguable
        probable cause to arrest Michael for assault. See Fla. Stat.
        § 784.011(1) (“An ‘assault’ is an intentional, unlawful threat by word
        or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an
        apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a
        well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is
        imminent.”).
               As to William, the Oﬃcers argue they had arguable probable
        cause to arrest him for battery because (1) after the takedown,
        William moved toward Oﬃcer Duran and said, “Get oﬀ my
        brother,” and (2) when Oﬃcer Doyle reached out to grab William,
        William turned around and pushed her. But this push is not alleged
        in the complaint, and it is not visible on the body camera video.
        Given the amended complaint and the body camera video
        together, the Oﬃcers did not have arguable probable cause to arrest
        William for battery. See Fla Stat § 784.03(1)(a) (stating battery
        occurs when one “[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes
        another person against the will of the other”).
              Accordingly, we aﬃrm the denial of qualiﬁed immunity on
        the Martins’ false arrest claims.
                            IV.      EXCESSIVE FORCE
               The Martins alleged two alternative theories for their
        excessive force claims: (1) the Oﬃcers’ use of force was excessive
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        23-10841                   Opinion of the Court                               13

        because they lacked arguable probable suspicion/cause to detain or
        arrest them, so any force at all was excessive; and
        (2) “[a]lternatively,” even if the Oﬃcers’ detention and arrest of the
        Martins was lawful, the force used in eﬀectuating the arrest
        remains excessive. 6
        A.      Artiﬁcial Claim
               The Martins’ ﬁrst theory is an “artiﬁcial” excessive force
        claim—a claim that any force used was excessive because the stop
        and arrest were unlawful. See Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180
        (11th Cir. 2022). It is true that “if a stop or arrest is illegal, then
        there is no basis for any threat or any use of force[.]” Sauls, 206 F.3d
        at 1171 (emphasis added). However, an “artiﬁcial” excessive force
        claim is not a discrete claim and is subsumed within a false arrest
        claim. Id.
               While the Martins’ “artiﬁcial” excessive force claims fail to
        state independent excessive force claims, they remain relevant to
        any subsequent determination of damages on their false arrest
        claims, as they may recover “damages suﬀered because of the use
        of force in eﬀecting the arrest.” See Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155,

        6 It is well-settled that plaintiffs may assert alternative and contradictory

        theories of liability. Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1175 (11th
        Cir. 2014); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2). At oral argument, the Officers suggested
        that the Martins failed to plead alternative theories for their excessive force
        claims. We disagree because the Martins’ pleading was sufficient to satisfy
        Rule 8(d)(2).
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        23-10841                Opinion of the Court                         14

        158 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Motes v. Myers, 810 F.2d 1055, 1060 (11th
        Cir. 1987) (“It is obvious that if the jury ﬁnds the arrest
        unconstitutional, the use of force and the search were
        unconstitutional and they become elements of damages for the
        § 1983 violation.”).
        B.     Genuine Claim
               The Martins’ second theory is a “genuine” excessive force
        claim because it “relates to the manner in which an arrest was
        carried out, independent of whether law enforcement had the
        power to arrest.” See Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1180 (quotation marks
        omitted). When a false arrest claim and a “genuine” excessive force
        claim stem from the same incident, the two claims “must be
        analyzed independently.” Id. at 1181 (quotation marks omitted).
               Taking the amended complaint’s allegations and the video
        in the light most favorable to the Martins, we cannot say that the
        Martins fail to state plausible “genuine” excessive force claims. The
        Oﬃcers’ uses of force—slamming Michael into the ground and
        tasing William—were not “reasonably proportionate to the need
        for that force” given the totality of the circumstances facing the
        Oﬃcers prior to that force. See Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1251
        (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). While the audio does
        capture some verbal objection to Oﬃcer Duran’s conduct, there is
        no clear or obvious physical aggression or resistance shown by
        either Martin brother prior to the Oﬃcers’ use of force. At most,
        the video becomes obscured and unclear at that point, and we must
        construe any ambiguities in the Martins’ favor.
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        23-10841                Opinion of the Court                          15

                Further, it was clearly established at the time of the Oﬃcers’
        conduct that a gratuitous use of force is excessive when a suspect
        is not resisting arrest. See Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1267 (characterizing
        as gratuitous force an oﬃcer slamming a non-resisting suspect’s
        head into the ground); see also Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272,
        1292 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating it is clearly established that using a
        taser “is excessive where the suspect is non-violent and has not
        resisted arrest”).
              Thus, we aﬃrm the denial of qualiﬁed immunity on the
        Martins’ “genuine” excessive force claims.
                       V.     MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
               We ﬁrst distinguish between false arrest and malicious
        prosecution claims and the distinct seizures required for each
        claim. Under the Fourth Amendment, a claim of false arrest
        concerns a seizure without legal process, such as the warrantless
        arrests here. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007) (stating
        false arrest claims cover seizures without legal process); Williams v.
        Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020) (“A claim of false arrest
        or imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment concerns seizures
        without legal process, such as warrantless arrests.”); Sylvester v.
        Fulton Cnty. Jail, 94 F.4th 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2024) (stating “[a]
        ‘false arrest’ claim challenges as constitutionally deﬁcient an
        oﬃcer’s on-the-spot determination of probable cause” without
        legal process).

               In contrast, a claim of malicious prosecution requires a
        seizure pursuant to legal process. See McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. ----,
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        23-10841                Opinion of the Court                         16

        139 S. Ct. 2149, 2157 (2019) (“Looking ﬁrst to the common law, . . .
        malicious prosecution permits damages for conﬁnement imposed
        pursuant to legal process.” (quotation marks omitted)); Nieves v.
        Bartlett, 587 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (2019) (“At common law,
        false imprisonment arose from a detention without legal process,
        whereas malicious prosecution was marked by wrongful institution
        of legal process.” (quotation marks omitted)); Luke v. Gulley, 975
        F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating malicious prosecution “is
        shorthand for a claim of deprivation of liberty pursuant to legal
        process” (quotation marks omitted)); Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158
        (“Malicious prosecution . . . requires a seizure pursuant to legal
        process.” (quotation marks omitted)); Kingsland v. City of Miami,
        382 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating a malicious prosecution
        claim must be based on an unlawful seizure “in relation to the
        prosecution”), abrogated on other grounds by Williams, 965 F.3d at
        1159. Seizures pursuant to legal process may include a
        warrant-based arrest and arrests following arraignment,
        indictment, or a probable cause hearing. Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158;
        see, e.g., Sylvester, 94 F.4th at 1330 (“A ‘malicious prosecution’ claim
        is that an oﬃcer used a constitutionally deﬁcient legal process to
        eﬀectuate an arrest—here, an allegedly defective warrant.”).
               Here, the Martins presented no allegation of an unlawful
        seizure pursuant to legal process, nor are there facts from which
        we can draw a reasonable inference of such a seizure. While the
        Martins argue their warrantless arrests may support their malicious
        prosecution claims, the precedent above shows otherwise. Simply
        put, the Martins’ warrantless arrests were not seizures pursuant to
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        23-10841               Opinion of the Court                         17

        legal process and cannot support their malicious prosecution
        claims. See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158. And the Martins failed to
        allege any subsequent unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process.
               We recognize that the Martins argue, and the district court
        concluded, that this Court’s Kingsland decision was abrogated by
        the Supreme Court in Nieves and this Court in Williams. Nieves and
        Williams, however, did not abrogate Kingsland’s holding about the
        legal process requirement; if anything, they conﬁrmed it, as
        outlined above. Indeed, Williams expressly recognized that a
        warrantless arrest constitutes a seizure without legal process and
        will not support a malicious prosecution claim. Williams, 965 F.3d
        at 1158.
               Williams also carefully explained how Nieves undermined
        Kingsland only to the extent Kingsland turned to modern Florida tort
        law to determine the common law elements of malicious
        prosecution. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1234 (stating that, in addition
        to an unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process, a plaintiﬀ alleging
        malicious prosecution must establish the common law elements of
        malicious prosecution, and turning to modern Florida tort law for
        those common law elements); Williams, 965 F.3d at 1159
        (addressing Kingsland and stating that Nieves “clariﬁed that the
        relevant common-law principles are those that were ‘well settled at
        the time of [section 1983’s] enactment,’” not those developed by
        modern state tort law (quoting Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1726)).
              For completeness, we note that the district court also relied
        on three other decisions to conclude that the Martins’ warrantless
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        23-10841                Opinion of the Court                         18

        arrests could support their malicious prosecution claims: Grider v.
        City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d
        872 (11th Cir. 2003); and Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959 (11th Cir.
        2018). But tellingly, Grider and Wood both concerned malicious
        prosecution claims stemming from warrant-based arrests—i.e.,
        seizures pursuant to legal process. See Grider, 618 F.3d at 1249;
        Wood, 323 F.3d at 876; Williams, 965 F.3d at 1164 (noting Wood
        “considered only [a] seizure[] pursuant to a warrant”). They
        cannot be read as holding that warrantless arrests, i.e. seizures
        without legal process, can support a malicious prosecution claim.
        See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158.
               Additionally, although Manners analyzed a malicious
        prosecution claim stemming from a warrantless arrest, this Court
        ultimately concluded that the claim failed because the oﬃcer had
        probable cause to arrest the plaintiﬀ. Manners, 891 F.3d at 969, 975.
        In any event, the precedent in Wallace, McDonough, Nieves, and
        Kingsland control, not Manners. See also Williams, 965 F.3d at 1159
        (explaining how Manners relied on “the erroneous premise that a
        seizure without legal process . . . could sustain a claim of malicious
        prosecution”).
              We conclude that the district court erred in denying the
        Oﬃcers qualiﬁed immunity on the Martins’ malicious prosecution
        claims because their warrantless arrests were on-the-spot seizures
        and without legal process.
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        23-10841              Opinion of the Court                       19

                              VI.    CONCLUSION
               For the above reasons, we (1) aﬃrm the denial of qualiﬁed
        immunity as to the Martins’ false arrest and excessive force claims,
        (2) reverse the denial of qualiﬁed immunity as to the Martins’
        malicious prosecution claims, and (3) remand for further
        proceedings.
              AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.