Court Opinion

ID: 9634500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:15:08.596373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:50.001936
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
Today the majority, without cause and impermissibly acting as a factfinder, ignores the duly entered unappealed probate of decedent’s will by the Philadelphia Register of Wills and finds that there was writing after the signature on the decedent’s handwritten will form. Then, sub silentio, it introduces a new principle of fraud to overturn the decision of the Orphans’ Court Division of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on the basis of the majority’s newly created rule. I must dissent.
Edward A. Gallagher died testate on December 18, 1969. Appellee, Provident National Bank (Provident), administrator c.t.a. of the Gallagher estate, proffered for probate to the Philadelphia Register of Wills both the decedent’s will, which was handwritten on a printed will form, and a proposed “copy fair” of that instrument, prepared by Provident.1 Appellant, Daniel Gallagher, is a beneficiary and legal heir of the decedent.
*69The register of wills issued letters of administration c.t.a. to Provident on September 15, 1972. Provident properly advertised the issuance of the letters on September 26, October 3, and October 10, 1972, in both the Philadelphia Daily News and The Legal Intelligencer. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3162. Thereafter, Provident filed a first and final account and a schedule of proposed distribution in compliance with Sup.Ct.O.C. Rule 6. By letter of November 19, 1974, appellant was given written notice of the December 2, 1974, audit of the account, and of appellant’s interest under Provident’s schedule of proposed distribution. On May 9, 1975, a nisi adjudication was entered by the Orphans’ Court confirming Provident’s account and directing distribution. Appellant filed no objections to Provident’s account or proposed distributions and no exceptions were taken to the May 9, 1975 nisi adjudication. The adjudication became absolute, no appeal was taken, and distribution proceeded in accordance with the court’s decree.
On April 5, 1976, eleven months after the unappealed decree became final, and after distribution, appellant filed a “Petition for Citation to Show Cause Why Audit Should Not be Set Aside and Letters of Administration Revoked.” This petition was viewed by the Orphans’ Court as a petition seeking a rehearing under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3521.2 Appellee responded by filing “Preliminary Objections.” In its opinion *70sur petition and preliminary objections, the Orphans’ Court concluded that the appeal was “a thinly veiled, collateral attack on the probate of the will and copy fair,” and that, as such it was barred by the statute of limitations on appeals from probate. 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 908, 3133(b).3 The Orphans’ Court dismissed appellant’s petition.
A party who has been given proper notice of all prior proceedings is not entitled to a Section 3521 rehearing. Compare Bach Estate, 426 Pa. 350, 231 A.2d 125 (1967) with Stewart Estate, 413 Pa. 190, 196 A.2d 330 (1964). Appellant argues that appellee’s copy of the decedent’s will so misconstrues the handwritten instrument, however, that its proposal for probate by appellee constituted a fraud against appellant from which appellant is entitled to equitable relief. See Estate of Bell, 463 Pa. 109, 343 A.2d 679 (1975); Osterling Estate, 337 Pa. 225, 10 A.2d 17 (1940). The majority, disregarding the time requirements, disagrees with the Philadelphia Register of Wills and affords appellant relief which is, as the Orphans’ Court observed, a collateral attack on the May 9, 1975 probate.
Appellant’s claim of fraud is based on his argument that decedent’s signature on the handwritten instrument appears between the specific pecuniary bequests and the residuary clause and that therefore it could not have been mere error on the copy fair to show decedent’s signature at the end of the instrument.4
“Fraud,” as that term was used in the predecessor to § 3521, has been defined to mean “such fraud as operates to prevent the fiduciary or ‘any person interested’ from taking action within the . . . period to secure review of the account. ... A plaintiff who charges fraud ‘is not *71only chargeable with what he knew but also with what he could have discovered [with] reasonable diligence.’ ” Thorne’s Estate, 344 Pa. 503, 510, 25 A.2d 811, 815-6 (1942). “ ‘Fraud’ consists of any ‘false representation of a matter of fact ... by false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive . . . Baker v. Rangos, 229 Pa.Super. 333, 348, 324 A.2d 498, 505 (1974). See also Hamilton Estate, 351 Pa. 419, 41 A.2d 567 (1945) (respondent’s averment cannot constitute fraud where averment did not hinder or prevent petitioner from obtaining the information about the estate which she was at liberty to seek). Here, where the copy fair and the original will have been matters of public record and available to appellant since the 1972 probate, of which appellant had due notice, there can be no fraud.
Thus, to properly state a claim of fraud, appellant’s petition must allege that in spite of his due diligence appellee’s actions operated to preclude his taking any earlier action. Here, on the contrary, however, appellant admits, as he must, that he had notice of probate and hence that it was available for his inspection and review in 1972, four years prior to the filing of his rehearing petition. The alleged misconstrual of the copy fair was discoverable not only before audit and distribution, but also before the decree of probate became final and before the time for filing an appeal expired. Thus, no act of the appellee in any way hindered appellant from timely raising any claim.
To achieve finality and the timely, orderly and efficient administration of decedent’s estate, our statutory and case law require adherence to the plain, well and long established rules of timeliness. The Court has held:
“It is the affirmative duty of all competent beneficiaries, upon receiving notice of the filing of an account, to make diligent inquiry concerning the fiduciary’s conduct and management of the affairs of the estate. All beneficiaries are chargeable not only with such information as was known to them at the time of the audit but also with *72what they could have discovered by exercising reasonable diligence.”
Mershon Estate, 364 Pa. 549, 551, 73 A.2d 686, 687 (1950). Where, as here, appellant has had timely notice and every opportunity prior to distribution, to inspect the probate record in its entirety, and compare all the relevant documents, and to challenge both the decree of probate and the schedule of proposed distribution at both the trial and appellate levels, appellant’s allegation of fraud cannot be sustained.
On this record there is no basis whatsoever on which to charge the Orphans’ Court with an abuse of its discretion in denying a Section 3521 rehearing on this deficient allegation of “fraud.” I would, contrary to the majority, affirm the decree of the Orphans’ Court.
EAGEN, C. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. It is the statutory duty of the Register of Wills to determine which documents, and portions of documents, constitute a decedent’s testamentary writing. 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901 et seq.; Rockett Will, 348 Pa. 445, 35 A.2d 303 (1944). At argument, this Court was advised that in Philadelphia, it is the procedure of the Register of Wills to direct preparation of a copy of a handwritten testamentary instrument, which copy includes the writing which the Register deems constitutes decedent’s will. Such a copy, adopted by the Register, is probated along with the handwritten instrument and, once admitted to probate, is called a “copy fair.” The Register routinely requests a party offering a handwritten instrument for probate to submit a proposed “copy fair” of that instrument. See generally, Walsh, Copy Fair & The Register of Wills, 36 Temp.L.Q. 311 (1963), Aker, Pennsylvania Probate & Interpretation of Wills § 3.14A. Here, the administrator submitted its proposed “copy fair,” to the Register at the time it offered the handwritten instrument for probate. Appellant had notice and the opportunity to challenge the probate and accounting at the trial and appellate levels, but did not do so until nearly one year after final distribution.

. Section 3521 now provides:
“§ 3521. Rehearing; relief granted
If any party in interest shall, within five years after the final confirmation of any account of a personal representative, file a petition to review any part of the account or of an auditor’s report, or of the adjudication, or of any decree of distribution, setting forth specifically alleged errors therein, the court shall give such relief as equity and justice shall require: Provided, that no such review shall impose liability on the personal representative as to any property which was distributed by him in accordance with a decree of court before the filing of the petition. The court or master considering the petition may include in his adjudication or report findings of fact and of law as to the entire controversy, in pursuance of which a final order may be made.”
1972, June 30, P.L. 508, No. 164, § 2, eff. July 1, 1972. Section 3521 removes a previous statutory bar to a Section 3521 rehearing after distribution of the estate. See, Act of April 18, 1949, P.L. 512, art. VII, § 721.

. Although Section 908 now provides for a one-year period in which one may file a timely appeal from a probate decree, the controlling statute at the time the probate decree was entered in the Gallagher estate, allowed two years for the filing of such an appeal.

. The bulk of decedent’s estate was bequeathed to five hospitals. Appellant received only 1 pound under decedent’s will. Were the charitable gifts declared void, appellant, as a legal heir, would receive a substantially greater portion of decedent’s estate.