Court Opinion

ID: 9485866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:32:24.42792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:24.702835
License: Public Domain

NIES, Chief Judge,
concurring and dissenting-in-part.
I concur with my colleagues that the subject complaint was timely filed. I dissent from the basis of decision in both the lead and concurring opinions. I do not agree that Rule 6(a) of the Court of Federal Claims may be invoked because “timely filing is not a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction.” This ruling would be contrary to the Supreme Court precedent set forth in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 77 S.Ct. 269, 1 L.Ed.2d 306 (1957); Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 123, 27 L.Ed. 437 *965(1882), and an unbroken line of decisions of the U.S. Court of Claims1 and this court.2
In Irwin, the Supreme Court recognized that tolling principles may apply to a statute of limitations in a suit against the government, but it did not discard the hoary principle that failure to meet a statutory time limit in bringing a suit against the government is a jurisdictional default. The district court in Irwin had dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction by reason of the plaintiffs failure to file within the statutory period. See Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir.1989). The Fifth Circuit affirmed expressly on the ground that “the district court lacked jurisdiction.” Id., 874 F.2d at 1095. And the Supreme Court expressly affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. at 457-58. I do not believe that the Supreme Court inadvertently affirmed a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and really meant to say that the case was dismissed on the merits. Nor do I believe the Supreme Court meant sub silencio to overturn its prior case law, all of which holds that a failure to meet the conditions for a waiver of sovereign immunity, including a time limitation, is a jurisdictional defect. Indeed, this principle is reiterated in Irwin. The Court stated:
Respondent correctly observes that [the statutory time limit] is a condition to its waiver of sovereign immunity....
498 U.S. at 94, 111 S.Ct. at 456. Thus, the Court did not divorce a statute of limitations against the government from part of the jurisdictional requirement of the sovereign’s consent to suit.3
As an initial point, it must be noted that statutory time periods (whether applicable between private litigants or respecting a claim against the government) fall into two categories, one being a jurisdictional limitation on the court itself, the other being only a statute of limitations, i.e., a provision for repose of stale claims which is not jurisdictional between private litigants. See Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1133, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Examples of a jurisdictional time limit would be a statute which provides that all claims of a class or type must be brought by a specified date, Killip v. Office of Personnel Management, 991 F.2d 1564 (Fed.Cir.1993), and 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988), which mandates that no appeal brings an action to an appellate court unless filed within 30 days of entry of the appealed judgment, order or decree. A court may not change a jurisdictional time period because the statute grants the court no power to act over the matter. This type of time period is mandatory and immutable. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315-16, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 2407-08, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988); see also Browder v. Director, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, and cases cited therein, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 *966S.Ct. 556, 560-61, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224, 80 S.Ct. 282, 285, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960) (same regarding criminal appeal); Widdoss v. Secretary of the Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 989 F.2d 1170 (Fed.Cir.1993) (30-day period to request Court of Federal Claims review of special master decision provided in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(l) is jurisdictional).4 In contrast a statute of limitations type of time period, such as the 30 day period for suit under the Civil Rights laws, is extendable under principles of equitable tolling in private litigation, Zipes, 455 U.S. at 398, 102 S.Ct. at 1135, and may, in accordance with recent decisions of the Supreme Court, also be tolled in suits against the government. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95, 111 S.Ct. at 457. See also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 478, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 2029, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986).
In the Irwin ease, the question was whether the 30-day time period allotted for the filing of a discrimination complaint against the government was subject to tolling. The Court first construed the time period as a statute of limitations. However, that did not end its analysis or, ipso facto, eliminate any further question of jurisdiction. Recognizing that the time period was “a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity,” 498 U.S. at 94, 111 S.Ct. at 456, the Supreme Court directed its attention to that separate and distinct jurisdictional issue. Respecting the sovereign’s consent to suit, the Court held that it would be rebuttably presumed that equitable tolling came within the waiver of sovereign immunity for a statute of limitations type of time period unless Congress provided otherwise. 498 U.S. at 95-96, 111 S.Ct. at 457-58. When equitable tolling applies to a statute of limitations, the statutory time period is not “waived” but rather is deemed met. See Crown Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 354, 103 S.Ct. at 2398 (claim timely; period for private suit tolled until class certification denied); see also Torres, 487 U.S. at 315-16, 108 S.Ct. at 2408 (substantial compliance is not the same as waiving requirement). Thus, where such time period is met, albeit in view of tolling, the consent of the sovereign to the suit has been given and the court has jurisdiction. However, if a litigant is untimely, even after applying equitable tolling principles, the Court did not suggest that failure to meet a condition for suit against the Government would no longer be a jurisdictional defect. In Irwin itself, the time limit was not tolled, the filing was untimely, and for that reason, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Meeting the terms for the waiver of sovereign immunity is and remains a jurisdictional requirement in any suit against the government. The Irwin court cited with approval United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 1351, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980), which at that point expressly holds that “the terms of [the sovereign’s] consent to be sued in any court defines that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” (Emphasis added.) Nothing in Irwin discards the principle that a litigant’s failure to satisfy the conditions for suit against the sovereign is a defect relating to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. “Subject matter” jurisdiction is a broad term as used in the Federal Rules, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), and includes not only the fact of being a CDA claim but also the terms and conditions respecting the government’s consent to suit on such claim. Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir.1991); Irving v. United States, 909 F.2d 598, 600 (1st Cir.1990); Dawson v. United States, 894 F.2d 70, 71 (3d Cir.1990); Baird v. United States, 653 F.2d 437, 440 (10th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144, 102 S.Ct. 1004, 71 L.Ed.2d 296 (1982). Sov*967ereign consent is as much a part of “subject matter” jurisdiction as the requirement for a “case or controversy.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S.Ct. 691, 699-700, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). But even if “subject matter” jurisdiction were rejected as the term covering the requirement of consent to suit, semantic preferences cannot convert such consent to a nonjurisdictional requirement.
The difference in holding an issue to be jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional is not a technical quibble. The consequences are far reaching. A court’s lack of jurisdiction over a case may be considered at any time, even for the first time on appeal, and can be raised sua sponte by the court. Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed.Cir.1988). Further, parties cannot overcome the lack of jurisdiction by stipulation, waiver or estoppel. California v. La-Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 113 n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 390, 394 n. 3, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); Amco Constr. Co. v. Mississippi State Bldg. Comm’n, 602 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1979).
A congressionally imposed limitation on the sovereign’s consent to suit is not merely a defense to the merits of a claim. To so hold would make waiver of sovereign immunity itself subject to waiver by reason of action or nonaction of government litigators. However, neither the executive nor the judiciary may exercise the sovereign’s consent to suit. I cannot agree, therefore, to the positions in the accompanying opinions which denigrate this principle. The Constitution does not allow this court to convert the assertion of sovereign immunity into no more than a litigation strategy.
Thus, the Claims Court judge was entirely correct in recognizing that the issue raised in this ease was whether the Claims Court had jurisdiction or not. The lead opinion rests on the authority of the Claims Court to enact rules of procedure. However, a rule of procedure cannot expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Only Congress can set the conditions for waiver of the sovereign’s immunity to suit. However, I believe that Congress has waived sovereign immunity in this case.
Under 41 U.S.C. § 609(a), (the Contract Disputes Act or “CDA”) an action in the Claims Court “shall be filed vpthin twelve months from the date of receipt by the contractor of the decision of the contracting officer concerning the claim.” Under the criteria set out in Zipes, 455 U.S. at 392-9, 102 S.Ct. at 1131-36, this is a statute of limitations type of time limit in my view, which, under Irwin, may be extended in appropriate circumstances in suits against the government. To allow for the filing of a complaint on the next business day, where that twelve month period ends on a non-business day for the court, in my view, amounts to no broadening of the sovereign’s consent to suit. When the choice is between shortening the statutory period because the Claims Court is not prepared to accept filings on nonbusiness days or lengthening it to the next business day, the equitable result dictated by Irwin is in favor of tolling to this extent. Thus, I conclude that Claims.Court Rule 6(a) is in accord with the conditions for waiver of sovereign immunity under the CDA. I do not, however, rely on Rule 6(a) as a basis for my decision. The statute, not the rule, provides the congressional waiver of sovereign immunity.
In sum, statutory time periods on bringing claims may or may not be extendable. Those where the time period defines the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the period may not be extended. Those which are merely statutes of limitations may be extended under appropriate circumstances. This is true whether the claim is against a private citizen or against the government. Where a claim is against a private party, deciding that the time period is a statute of limitations ends any question of jurisdiction based on untimeliness. However, where a statute of limitations applies to a government claim, the jurisdictional question must be refocused. The question becomes whether Congress intended its waiver of sovereign immunity to encompass an extension of the statute of limitations time period on the grounds asserted. Thus, either type of time statute implicates a jurisdictional issue on a government claim but as with nongovernmental claims, only a statute of limitations, not a time limitation affecting the court’s power to act, may be *968extendable. The validity of the distinction between time periods which inform the court’s jurisdiction and those which are merely statutes of limitations is rejected outright in the concurring opinion. However, the reader is referred to Zipes, 455 U.S. at 392-98, 102 S.Ct. at 1131-35, where the Supreme Court devotes a section of its opinion (not merely a sentence) to this distinction between a statute of limitations and a time bar restricting a court’s “subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 396 n. 12, 102 S.Ct. at 1133 n. 12. The concurrence states that “[i]n Irwin the Supreme Court freed us from that unproductive exercise [of distinguishing between types of time limits]; the majority opinion properly eschews this stale debate.” The basis for “eschewing” is that the notion of sovereign immunity is “long outmoded and increasingly archaic.” Under that view the Court of Federal Claims would no longer be necessary. Where as well as when a suit may be brought against the government also rests on the “archaic” principle of sovereign immunity. In any event, as previously discussed, the distinction in the two types of statutory time periods, even if “elusive” or “metaphysical,” is as important in private litigation, such as Zipes, as in litigation against the government. See, e.g., Iacono v. Office of Personnel Management, 974 F.2d 1326 (Fed.Cir.1992) (time for filing for survivor’s annuity cannot be tolled; not a statute of limitations). The distinction cannot be discarded by doing away with sovereign immunity.

. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 681 F.2d 774, 775, 231 Ct.Cl. 52 (1982); Braude v. United States, 585 F.2d 1049, 1051, 218 Ct.Cl. 270 (1978); Mulholland v. United States, 361 F.2d 237, 245, 175 Ct.Cl. 832 (1966); Fattore v. United States, 312 F.2d 797, 800, 160 Ct.Cl. 666 (1963); Riethmiller v. United States, 101 Ct.Cl. 495, 505, 1944 WL 3669 (1944). These are precedential decisions of this court.

. See, e.g., Hart v. United States, 910 F.2d 815, 818-19 (Fed.Cir.1990); Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed.Cir.1988); Jones v. United States, 801 F.2d 1334, 1335 (Fed.Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013, 107 S.Ct. 1887, 95 L.Ed.2d 495 (1987) (all noting that a statute of limitations is jurisdictional in the Claims Court). See also Butler v. Derwinski, 960 F.2d 139 (Fed.Cir.1992) (affirming dismissal by Court of Veterans Appeals for lack of jurisdiction where notice of appeal filed after statutory deadline); Kelley v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378 (Fed.Cir.1987) (appealed judgment of Court of International Trade vacated for lack of jurisdiction due to untimely filing of complaint); Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed.Cir.1986) (Court of International Trade had no jurisdiction because appeal not timely filed). The lead opinion concludes that all pre-Irwin precedent is "suspect.” Irwin reaffirms the jurisdictional nature of untimeliness in suits against the government even while permitting tolling in some circumstances.

.In contrast to the statutory requirement as to the time for filing a CDA suit in the Claims Court, Congress may consent to proceedings against the United States without providing a statutory time limit as a part of the waiver. Time limits in agency proceedings may be set by regulation or merely by contract. In those situations, I agree that the failure to file a claim in accordance with specified time limits is not a jurisdictional defect. See Gunn v. Veterans Admin. Medical Ctr., 892 F.2d 1036, 1038 (Fed.Cir.1990) (labor agreement); Do-Well Mach. Shop Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 637 (Fed.Cir.1989) (contract); Wallace v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 728 F.2d 1456, 1458 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1984) (regulation).

. The author of the lead opinion dissented in Widdoss from the majority decision that the appeal period involved in that case was jurisdictional. Widdoss, 989 F.2d at 1178-79 (Newman, J., dissenting). Similar views are expressed in dicta in Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 978 F.2d 679, 686-689 (Fed.Cir.1992) (Plager, J.). Both rely on Do-Well Machine Shop, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 637, 639-40 (Fed.Cir.1989) as precedent for the proposition that failure to meet a time bar in a suit against the government is not a matter of jurisdiction. Do-Well involved neither a statutory nor a regulatory time period. Under a specific provision in the contract, a contractor agreed to file any claim for termination for convenience with the contracting officer within a year from the date of termination. The court enforced the contract provision and dismissed the case on the merits. However, it hardly needs saying that a contract provision setting such a time period is not jurisdictional.