Court Opinion

ID: 9662025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:57:29.375426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:35.827457
License: Public Domain

White, C. J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot come to any other conclusion but that the alimony award in this case is grossly excessive and is not harmonious with the present statute creating the “no fault” provisions for the dissolution of a marriage. As the majority opinion points out, both parties are young (around 30 years of age), both are in good health, and both are, or can be, self-supporting. They have no children, and they are both educated, sophisticated, and cultured people. The award of over $100,000 in alimony, in my opinion, is unconscionable. It seems to me that the award in this case is -a sub silentio approval of applying the harsh and punitive considerations present in the traditional picture of a lifetime marriage, with family and children, in many of the cases cited by the court prior to the enactment of the “no fault” divorce law. Even under our old law, there is no evidence to support, on the grounds of fault, an award of the income of earnings of the husband present in this case. It is true that the defendant in this case aided and furnished financial support to the plaintiff during the period of his education. She should be amply compensated for whatever investment and time she contributed in this area. But the new law specifically eliminates the element of fault *579in the enactment of the considerations present in an award of alimony. It completely disregards ■ the new factor placed in the statute, “and the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of any minor children in the custody of such party.” There are no children to interfere with her gainful employment. Despite that fact, this court awards alimony of over $100,000 to the plaintiff.
This issue presented here is very important, because it is abundantly apparent that the court, despite the statute, has determined to follow the traditional philosophy of fault. And if this be so, the plaintiff is entitled to a hearing in which this issue is explained, and if that should happen, we are back where we started from and in violation of the whole philosophy of the new statute.
My views on this matter are supported almost conclusively by the decisions and jurisdictions interpreted almost identically in the following statutes. It should be noted that our statutes were drawn and follow the “no fault” divorce statute of California.
There is no Nebraska case law on this issue under the new statute, and there is no pertinent legislative history. Therefore, other “no fault” divorce jurisdictions will be examined. The jurisdictions examined are only those which have judicial decisions interpreting a no fault divorce statute; these are Florida, Oregon, Iowa, and California.
FLORIDA: F.S.A. § 61.08 (West Pocket Part, 1972) provides: “(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant alimony to either party * * *. The court may consider the adultery of a spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony shall be awarded to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded to such spouse. •
“(2) In determining a proper award of alimony, the *580court may consider any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.”
There appears to be only one Florida appellate decision in point. In Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112 (Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 4th Dist., 1972), the husband received as lump sum alimony his wife’s interest in certain real and personal property. The wife attacked the alimony provisions. The court stated: Alimony’s “* * * basic nature and purpose remains the same as heretofore, i.e., to provide nourishment, sustenance and the necessities of life to a former spouse who has neither the resources nor ability to be self-sustaining.” Therefore, to receive alimony under Florida’s no fault divorce act, the party must show need and the ability of the other party to pay. Since the husband in Lefler could not show that he had need for the alimony, the judgment granting him such alimony was reversed. Inferentially, at least, it seems that except for the statutory adultery provision, Florida courts apply a two-part test of need and ability to determine alimony and ignore misconduct or fault.
OREGON: O.R.S. § 107.036 (Supp., 1971) provides:
“(1) The doctrines of fault and of in pari delicto are abolished in suits for * * * the dissolution of a marriage.
“(2) The court shall not receive evidence of specific acts of misconduct, excepting where child custody is an issue and such evidence is relevant to that issue, or excepting at a hearing when the court finds such evidence necessary to provide irreconcilable differences.”
O.R.S. § 107.105 (Supp., 1971) provides in part:
“(c) For the support of a party, in gross or in installments, or both, such amount of money for such period of time as it may be just and equitable for the other party to contribute. * * * In making such support order, the court shall consider the following matters:
“(A) The duration of the marriage;
*581“ (B) The ages of the parties;
“(C) Their health and conditions;
“(D) Their work experience and earning capacities;
“(E) Their financial conditions, resources and property rights;
“(F) The provisions of the decree relating to custody of the minor children of the parties;
“(G) The ages, health and dependency conditions of the children of the parties, or either of them; and
“(H) Such other matters as the court shall deem relevant.”
In Minovsky v. Minovsky, 500 P. 2d 1234 (Ct. of Appeals, Dept. 1, Ore., 1972), the trial court allowed testimony that the wife had been the only real source of support of the parties’ daughter for a number of years. Husband also contended that the trial court, in allowing the wife $7,500 in lump sum alimony, considered other aspects of fault. The husband appealed the alimony award, contending that fault should not have been allowed into evidence under the Oregon no fault divorce act.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s award of alimony to the wife: “It is justified in view of the parties’ disparate earning abilities and financial conditions, plus the quite unusual circumstance that plaintiff married and brought to this country a wife unprepared by training, or even knowledge of the language, to financially fend for herself. To arrive at this conclusion, a court need not consider at all the previous marriage and the parties’ relative participation in the upbringing of their daughter.” Although the trial court may have considered fault, the appellate court felt that the decision could have been reached considering just the factors enumerated in the statute. Therefore, the trial court had reached a permissible result by perhaps examining impermissible factors. It seems clear that if the fault or guilt of either party had been the only reason for the trial court to have granted alimony, the appellate *582court would not have allowed the decision to stand.
IOWA: I.C.A. § 598.21 (Pocket Part, 1972) provides: “When a dissolution of marriage is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the parties as shall be justified.”
In a series of cases construing this provision, the Iowa Supreme Court arrived at this conclusion: “* * * (W)e determined from the legislative history of chapter 1266 that the intent and purpose of the revised statute was to eliminate the fault concept as a standard for granting dissolution of the marital relationship and held that not only the ‘guilty party’ concept must be eliminated as a factor but evidence of the conduct of the parties insofar a's it tends to place fault for the marriage breakdown on either spouse must also be rejected as a factor in awarding property settlement or an allowance of alimony or support money.” In re Marriage of Tjaden, 199 N. W. 2d 475 (Iowa, 1972), referring to In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N. W. 2d 339 (Iowa, 1972). See, also, In re Marriage of Harrington, 199 N. W. 2d 351 (Iowa, 1972). After examining legislative history and other sources, the Iowa court felt that the overriding purpose of the no fault divorce act was to remove all considerations of fault from the entire divorce proceeding. “In fact, we find no dissent in the sources examined from the proposition that fault is not a factor to be considered in awarding property settlement or an allowance of alimony under the dissolution acts.” In re Marriage of Williams, supra.
CALIFORNIA: Cal. Civil Code, § 4509, provides: “In any pleadings or proceedings for legal separation or dissolution of marriage under this part, * * * evidence of specific acts of .misconduct shall be improper and inadmissible, except where child custody is in issue and such evidence is relevant to that issue, or at the hearing where it is determined by the court to be necessary to establish the existence of irreconcilable differences.”
*583Cal. Civil Code, § 4801, provides: “(a) In any judgment decreeing the dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation of the parties, the court may order a party to pay for the support of the other party any amount, and for such period of time, as the court may deem just and reasonable having regard for the circumstances of the respective parties, including the duration of the marriage, and the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of the children of the parties in the custody of such spouse.”
In re Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295 (4th Dist., Div. Two, 1972), appears to be a leading case interpreting the new California statute. In determining whether a wife’s alimony award was sufficient, the court noted that: “Under the preexisting law an award of spousal support rested in the judicial discretion of the trial court upon consideration of the circumstances of the parties, but one of the circumstances to be considered was the comparative marital fault of the parties.” The court concluded that' “the change effected by Civil Code, section 4801 was the elimination of the consideration of the comparative marital fault of the parties and the ‘concept of granting support to the “innocent” or against the “guilty.” ’ ” Id. Therefore, California also appears to be among the jurisdictions which have eliminated fault or misconduct as a consideration in the granting of alimony.
The four jurisdictions surveyed all appear to disregard fault as a factor in the awarding of alimony. It is contended that “the alimony section is but a part of a total, new scheme of divorce law by which traditional conceptions of marital relationship are undergoing substantial changes, and a court should view the alimony proceeding in this new context.” 34 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 493 (1972). The new context for divorce law under no fault is best summarized in this statement: “When a personal relationship with another under the institution *584of marriage has deteriorated to the point that the parties can no longer live together and provide our society with the sort of stable socio-economic unit on which this country so depends, it is time to call a spade a spade and dissolve it without acrimony, moral judgments or benedictions.” Henderson, Practice and Problems Under Nebraska’s New Divorce Laws, 52 Neb. L. Rev. 1 at p. 23 (1972). Viewed from this perspective, a trial court should consider two broad factors in determining alimony: Social surroundings and the ability to help oneself. 34 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 498. Social surroundings includes the length of the marriage and present health and age. The ability to help oneself includes amount of assets, ability to obtain employment, and the 'size of the income of the supporting spouse. Id. Consideration of these factors would provide sufficient alimony and would also “* * * destroy the 'state of secured indolence known as the ‘alimony drone’ by denying alimony to one who is able to be self-supporting.” Id.
In conclusion, the thrust of Nebraska’s new divorce law isi that all divorce proceedings should be conducted without reference to fault. To allow references to fault or misconduct into evidence under the guise of setting alimony is a mere perversion of the Legislature’s intent. Alimony “* * * should not be allowed as a matter of sympathy to the wife or as a penalty imposed for the misconduct of the husband.” Prosser v. Prosser, 156 Neb. 629, 57 N. W. 2d 173 (1953) (Dictum).
The foundation of the court’s decision is clearly a response and rejection of the fundamental philosophy of the new statute. I think this defendant should be liberally awarded and paid for the monetary investment that she has made to the plaintiff’s education. I do not believe that she acquired over a $100,000 interest in her husband’s earnings in the future.
McCown and Newton, JJ., join in this dissent.