Court Opinion

ID: 9926937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 22:03:57.249897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:32.229270
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                 2024 IL App (4th) 230280-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                  FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                  January 25, 2024
                                          NO. 4-23-0280
not precedent except in the                                                     Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                               4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                  IN THE APPELLATE COURT                          Court, IL

                                           OF ILLINOIS

                                       FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )      Appeal from the
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                )      Circuit Court of
           v.                                                 )      McLean County
AMANDA RUTH PETERSEN,                                         )      No. 21CF436
           Defendant-Appellant.                               )
                                                              )      Honorable
                                                              )      John Casey Costigan,
                                                              )      Judge Presiding.

                PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
                Justices Cavanagh and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding (1) the
             introduction into evidence of defendant’s sexual orientation as bisexual was
             irrelevant to whether she sexually abused her stepdaughter and (2) based on the
             closeness of the case, the error was not harmless.

¶2              In April 2021, the State charged defendant, Amanda Ruth Petersen, with (1) two

counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(b) (West 2020)), alleging

defendant or one whose conduct for which she was legally responsible committed an act of

sexual conduct with a family member, her 14-year-old stepdaughter, N.N., (2) two counts of

aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(f) (West 2020)), alleging defendant or

one whose conduct for which she was legally responsible, who was 17 years of age or older,

committed an act of sexual conduct with N.N., who was at least 13 years of age but under 18

years of age, when defendant held a position of trust, authority, or supervision in relation to
N.N., and (3) three counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a) (3) (West 2020))

based on alleged sexual penetration.

¶3             During trial, the trial court overruled defendant’s objection to a portion of a

video-recorded police interview in which defendant stated she was bisexual. The court found

defendant’s sexual orientation was relevant to whether defendant would commit the crime

against a female victim. The jury found defendant guilty of the criminal sexual abuse charges

and not guilty of the criminal sexual assault charges. Defendant moved for a judgment of

acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, arguing, in part, it was error under the

Second District case of People v. Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, to allow the jury to hear

evidence she was bisexual. The court denied the motion.

¶4             At sentencing, the trial court stated defendant’s position of trust over N.N. was a

very “aggravating factor”. The court sentenced defendant to the maximum extended term of 14

years in prison on the counts involving criminal sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust,

authority, or supervision in relation to N.N. and merged the remaining counts. 720 ILCS 5/11-

1.60(f) (West 2020); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2020).

¶5             On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it (1) allowed the jury to

hear evidence of her sexual orientation and (2) considered a factor inherent in the offense in

aggravation at sentencing.

¶6             We determine (1) the introduction into evidence of defendant’s sexual orientation

as bisexual was irrelevant to whether she sexually abused her stepdaughter and (2) the error was

not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶7                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶8                                            A. Trial

                                                -2-
¶9             Defendant was arrested on April 15, 2021, in connection with allegations she and

her husband, Justin N., sexually abused Justin’s daughter, N.N., on December 4, 2020, at a

Quality Inn in Bloomington, Illinois. In December 2022, a jury trial was held.

¶ 10           Before opening arguments, the trial court instructed the jury it must not be biased

against any person because of his or her race, ethnicity, national ancestry, religion, gender,

sexual orientation, age, disability, or socioeconomic status. The parties did not mention

defendant’s sexual orientation during opening statements.

¶ 11           At the beginning of the trial, the State played a recording of a call N.N. placed

from her cell phone to 911 on December 4, 2020. In the call, N.N. sounded out of breath. She

said defendant and Justin tried to rape her in a room at the Quality Inn and she was running away

from the hotel. During the call, defendant took the phone and identified herself as N.N.’s

stepmother. Defendant told the operator N.N. was making a big deal out of nothing, nothing

happened, and N.N. was just acting out. Defendant stated she had been giving N.N. a back

massage, and N.N. was not getting her way about wanting to go somewhere and stormed out of

the room. Defendant said she chased after N.N. to try to get her to come back inside.

¶ 12           Clayton Arnold, a lieutenant with the Bloomington Police Department, testified

officers were dispatched at approximately 2 a.m. on the morning of December 4, 2020, based on

N.N.’s report of a sexual assault. When Arnold arrived near the scene of the hotel, he observed

N.N. sitting on the ground crying and speaking with Bloomington Police Officer Hector

Melchor.

¶ 13           Arnold identified a video recording from Melchor’s body camera. In the video,

N.N. was crying, and Melchor stated he could see she was “highly upset.” N.N. told Melchor

Justin and defendant were giving her a back massage, and defendant started pulling her pants

                                                -3-
down. She said both started touching her as she lay on her back with a stuffed animal over her

face. She also said Justin tried to rape her. When defendant and Justin briefly stopped, N.N.

took the opportunity to get her clothes on, grab her phone, run out the door, and call 911. She

said she left without her shoes because she had to get away as soon as possible and defendant

was chasing her. N.N. told Melchor she was 14 and took the medications Geodon and Lexapro.

¶ 14           Arnold testified he went to the Quality Inn to talk to Justin. Justin seemed

fidgety, his demeanor was odd, and his speech was difficult to understand. Thus, Arnold

believed Justin was under the influence of something. Justin’s demeanor also did not change

when he was informed of the allegations, which was out of the ordinary.

¶ 15           Arnold spoke to defendant, who admitted giving N.N. a back rub and touching her

back, arms, legs, and feet. Defendant said N.N. had earlier wanted to go visit a boy, who was

later identified at trial as A.D., and was upset when told no. Defendant said when N.N. did not

get her way, she would have an outburst of bad behavior.

¶ 16           Arnold identified a video recording taken from his body camera inside the hotel

after defendant and N.N. returned to the scene. In the video, Arnold asked N.N. what other

options they had for the night and asked if N.N. wanted to talk to Justin. Defendant said N.N.

should return to the room, lie down, and go to sleep. N.N., crying, said, “[H]e touched me.”

When defendant said they had just been giving N.N. a back rub, N.N. forcefully said, “[T]hat’s

not what that was, you don’t give back rubs right there.”

¶ 17           Arnold testified arrangements were made for N.N. to stay with her older sister

that night. Having heard allegations regarding both Justin and defendant, Arnold sought to have

N.N. interviewed by the Children’s Advocacy Center, see if she would agree to a

                                               -4-
sexual-assault-collection kit, and sought to contact the Illinois Department of Children and

Family Services to make sure they were okay with N.N. being placed with her sister.

¶ 18           Alyssa N., N.N.’s older sister, testified she went to the hotel, picked up N.N., and

took her to the hospital to undergo a sexual-assault kit. Alyssa described N.N. as upset and “kind

of like she was in shock.” The parties stipulated to lab results from the testing. The

sexual-assault-kit test was negative, except that DNA from Justin N. could not be excluded from

a profile obtained from swabbing N.N.’s underwear. N.N.’s toxicology screen was negative for

drugs and alcohol.

¶ 19           A.D. testified he had been dating N.N. on December 4, 2020, and they did not

have any plans to meet on that night. He said N.N. would not normally come over without them

having plans. He further testified he lived about a 20-minute car ride away and it was too far to

walk or bike there from Bloomington.

¶ 20           N.N. testified she had not lived with Justin since she was 11 years old, but she

occasionally spent the night with him and defendant. At the time of the trial, N.N. was living

with her brother. In December 2020, N.N. lived with Alyssa, and she was planning to move to

Tennessee to be with her mother.

¶ 21           N.N. testified she was undergoing mental-health treatment, and, in December

2020, she had diagnoses of major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. She was

later diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In December 2020, N.N. was taking

Lexapro and Geodon daily. She occasionally missed a dose, but she only felt the effects if she

missed them for a significant period of time. N.N. testified she was able to tell the difference

between fantasy and reality on December 4, 2020, and there had never been a time when she

could not tell the difference between fantasy and reality.

                                                -5-
¶ 22           N.N. testified she had plans on December 3, 2020, to spend an overnight at the

hotel with Justin and defendant as a going away party before she moved to Tennessee. She did

not have plans to go anywhere else that night. Justin and defendant picked her up, and they spent

time together hanging out, joking around, customizing clothing for a doll, and playing with her

cat. They originally planned to swim in the hotel pool, but it was closed. Defendant and Justin

purchased a bra and underwear she could wear for swimming, which N.N. tried on at the hotel

while defendant was in the bathroom with her.

¶ 23           N.N. testified defendant tried to get her to drink some alcohol, but N.N. did not

like it and just had a sip. N.N. said the group also had marijuana at the hotel, and all three of

them smoked it. N.N. testified she lay down to go to sleep around 11 p.m. wearing a hoodie,

sweatpants, bra, and underwear. Justin and defendant were massaging and scratching N.N.’s

back, which was something they normally did to help her calm down. At some point, defendant

went to McDonald’s to get a drink. N.N. testified Justin then rubbed her back further down and

lifted her pants a bit, trying to touch her butt. N.N. pulled her pants back up and went to sleep.

N.N. woke up when defendant returned to the hotel room. Defendant gave N.N. a drink, but it

tasted like alcohol, so N.N. did not have more than a sip. Defendant tried to pressure N.N. into

drinking it, but N.N. refused and tried to go back to sleep.

¶ 24           N.N. testified Justin and defendant resumed rubbing her back, which N.N. said

“was pretty typical.” Defendant told N.N. to roll onto her back so defendant could rub her belly,

and N.N. complied. N.N. had her eyes closed and a stuffed animal over her face, which was also

normal for her. However, defendant then started moving her hands under N.N.’s bra and shirt

and rubbed her breasts. N.N. said she did not react. N.N. testified defendant then removed her

bra and hoodie, put her hands in N.N.’s pants and under her underwear, and touched the inside

                                                -6-
and outside of N.N.’s vagina, with her fingers moving in and out. N.N. initially felt only

defendant’s hands, but she then heard Justin walk over and, with her underwear pulled down, he

started touching her vagina with his mouth and tongue. She knew it was Justin because she

could feel his beard. Both Justin and defendant then walked away. N.N. testified she then

realized what was happening and was able to react.

¶ 25           N.N. testified she was in a “complete state of panic,” got up, put on her clothes,

grabbed her phone and keycard, and ran out of the hotel and down the street. While she was

running, N.N. called 911 and heard defendant calling her name and chasing her.

¶ 26           On cross-examination, N.N. denied a symptom of her mental-health conditions

was difficulty telling reality from fantasy. N.N. admitted she had some hallucinations and

delusions, such as seeing colors on a wall, but she said she could always distinguish what was

real and what was not. She likened her “delusions” to anxiety, where she would worry about

unrealistic things or be mistrustful of people. N.N. said she still had symptoms even with

medication but agreed the medication “took a little bit of the edge off.”

¶ 27           The defense introduced N.N.’s medical records, including records from April 20,

2020, which included a scale rating her “extremely severe” for peculiar fantasies, indicating she

was often absorbed in elaborate fantasies and had a difficult time distinguishing reality from

fantasy. She also had an “extremely severe” rating for the delusions category, indicating she

mistrusted or was suspicious of everyone or everything and could not distinguish reality from

fantasy. She further had an “extremely severe” rating for hallucinations, indicating she

constantly experienced auditory hallucinations in the form of commanding voices and visual

hallucinations. Her depression diagnosis was described as recurrent major depressive disorder

                                               -7-
with psychotic features. N.N. said that diagnosis was not what she was told, but she

acknowledged it was what was written in her records.

¶ 28           On redirect examination, N.N. denied hearing commanding voices but admitted

she previously told her sister there were a few people living inside her. N.N. also admitted that,

on December 4, 2020, she had missed one dose of her medication and possibly had missed two

days. She said she had heightened anxiety and was a bit paranoid before going to the hotel that

day. N.N. acknowledged she did not tell the hospital that night about smoking marijuana and

had mentioned being offered alcohol only one time. N.N. told the hospital employees her hoodie

was removed during the incident and testified on cross-examination it was possible her bra was

not actually removed but was instead pushed up.

¶ 29           N.N. testified the “extremely severe” ratings in her medical records were made by

psychiatric evaluators. They were not her own subjective ratings, and she did not report to

psychiatric evaluators having difficulty distinguishing fantasy from reality. She said she tended

to get lost in thought and had delusions, such as wondering whether a cheeseburger that seemed

different was tainted. N.N. said that was different from knowing there was something in the

McDonald’s drink on December 4, 2020, because with the burger, she knew there was not really

anything wrong with it. She admitted hearing voices but said they were conversational rather

than commanding. She also acknowledged having visual hallucinations of seeing spots of color

on the wall but knew those were not real. N.N. stated none of her mental-health issues altered

her sense of reality. When asked if it was possible parts of her memory were imagined, she

stated, “I just really don’t see how that would have happened,” and, “It never happened at any

point in my life before that I had experienced something that day that wasn’t real.”

                                               -8-
¶ 30           Curt Maas, a detective with the Bloomington Police Department, testified he

obtained surveillance-camera video from the hotel and identified an exhibit of the video. He also

conducted interviews with Justin and defendant, who initially seemed hesitant to do so.

¶ 31           Excerpts of the surveillance video showed defendant leaving the hotel to buy a

drink from McDonalds, N.N. running out of the hotel with defendant chasing her, and N.N. and

defendant running outside the hotel down the street.

¶ 32           When the State sought to admit Maas’s video interview of defendant, defense

counsel objected, stating he had never been given a redacted version and was under the

impression the State would not be using the video at trial. The trial court gave defense counsel a

chance to preview the proposed exhibit. After viewing the video, defense counsel objected to the

jury hearing defendant’s statement in the video identifying herself as bisexual. Counsel argued

the reference to her sexuality should be redacted and was overly prejudicial. Counsel further

stated:

               “I think it is inappropriate to equate sexual orientation with sexual decency. They

               are saying that because she is bi-sexual, it is likely that she is attracted to minors

               who are young adolescent, or even pre-pubescent. I don’t see that. I think that is

               crossing a different line. There has been no propensity motion, nothing like that.”

The State argued the reference was relevant but did not specifically name a purpose for the

reference, such as to show intent, motive, or lack of mistake. Instead, the State told the court,

“She is charged and accused of committing sexual crimes on a female with a male present.

Whether or not she is a bi-sexual is relevant as to whether or not she would commit these

crimes.” The court overruled the objection, finding the material relevant, stating, “The Court

                                                -9-
agrees with the State, including this potentially could have happened based upon the answer that

was given.” The court did not specifically discuss whether the evidence was overly prejudicial.

¶ 33            Maas testified defendant was cooperative, gave a voluntary statement, and

submitted to genetic testing. In the interview, defendant denied any inappropriate sexual contact

occurred. Defendant told Maas N.N. was very disappointed when they found out the hotel pool

was closed and N.N. remained in “a funk” that night. Defendant said N.N. normally loved

having her back scratched, so defendant began massaging and scratching N.N.’s back, head,

shoulders, arms, and sides. Justin also participated in massaging N.N.’s feet and back. Early in

the interview, defendant stated N.N. was wearing a T-shirt and “regular jeans.”

¶ 34            According to defendant, around 1:30 a.m., N.N. asked if they could go

somewhere else, such as to see A.D. in another town. Defendant told her it was too late to go

out, and N.N. started getting “major attitude” and began acting out, which she had done in the

past. Defendant described other incidents where N.N. did not get her way and had run away and

invented stories about someone hurting her. Defendant said it was not unusual for N.N. to run

out the door and “make a big dramatic scene.” When Maas suggested the “whole thing” was

perhaps because defendant told N.N. they were not going to go see A.D., defendant agreed that

was the case.

¶ 35            Defendant stated she drank a vanilla vodka cocktail that night, and Justin had a

vodka cocktail and beer. Defendant also put vodka in her sweet tea that she bought at

McDonald’s and might have had a shot of vodka. She denied giving alcohol to N.N. or having

marijuana.

¶ 36            In the middle of the interview, Maas told defendant he was going to ask some

questions or have a candid conversation about sexual orientation or body parts. He then asked

                                               - 10 -
defendant her sexual orientation, and defendant stated she was bisexual. There was a redaction

or change in camera angle before defendant’s answer and a redaction right after, which

potentially made the question and answer stand out because of the change in the video before

defendant’s answer and the pause after that section of the video.

¶ 37           Approximately a minute and a half later in the video, defendant stated she had

massaged the side of N.N.’s torso and may have accidentally touched the side of N.N.’s breast.

Defendant said that was when N.N. jumped up, put on her hoodie, and ran out the door. She

later agreed that was the “triggering event” that made N.N. run out of the room. However,

defendant also repeated she thought N.N. made the whole thing up because she was mad about

not getting to go see A.D.

¶ 38           Maas asked defendant to describe N.N.’s clothes, and defendant said N.N. was

wearing a black halter top or sports bra, boy shorts, and black sweatpants. Defendant said she

massaged under the band of N.N.’s bra, which had been irritating N.N.’s skin, but she did not

otherwise place her hand under the bra. With N.N.’s permission, she had also rolled down

N.N.’s waistband to massage her lower back and belly, but she did not move her hand into

N.N.’s underwear or touch her vagina.

¶ 39           Defendant testified she previously saw N.N. on a regular basis and was often

involved in taking her to doctor’s appointments and making sure she took her medications.

Defendant said when N.N. did not take her medications, she would get frustrated easily and

exhibit extreme anxiety and paranoia. According to defendant, when they arrived at the hotel

that evening, N.N. was acting fearful and paranoid. Defendant said N.N. normally took

medications both morning and night and that she knew N.N. did not take her night medication at

                                              - 11 -
the hotel because no pills were sent with them. Defendant did not mention N.N.’s paranoia in

her video interview because she was not asked about it.

¶ 40           Defendant testified N.N. had forgotten to pack a bra and underwear, and Justin

went back in the house to retrieve those. Defendant said she chased N.N. when she ran from the

hotel because she was worried about her safety. Defendant acknowledged she had prior

convictions for forgery and theft and stated she had taken responsibility for her actions in those

cases and pleaded guilty to both.

¶ 41           Officer Melchor testified he briefly glanced at the hotel room on December 4,

2020, and saw no drugs or signs of a struggle. When Melchor spoke with N.N. around 2 a.m.,

she indicated the last time she took her medication was on December 2, 2020. In a video clip

from his body camera, another officer asked Melchor if N.N.’s allegations were increasingly

getting worse, and Melchor responded “yes.” The parties stipulated Bloomington Police Officer

J. Freeman would testify that, when he arrived at the scene, an adult was waving an arm in the

air, and upon locating them, defendant appeared to be leaning over N.N. rubbing her upper back.

¶ 42           Neither party mentioned defendant’s sexual orientation in closing arguments,

although defense counsel reminded the jury it must not be biased in favor or against any person

because of his or her race, ethnicity, national ancestry, religion, gender, sexual orientation, age,

disability, or socioeconomic status. Although there was evidence suggesting defendant may

have accidentally touched the side of N.N.’s breasts, defendant did not specifically raise

inadvertent touching as a defense. Instead, defendant focused primarily on the theory N.N.

lacked credibility because of her mental-health issues.

¶ 43           The trial court instructed the jury, “Neither sympathy nor prejudice should

influence you. You should not be influenced by any person’s race, ethnicity, national ancestry,

                                                - 12 -
religion, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, or socioeconomic status.” The trial court also

gave the jury the following instruction:

                       “We all have feelings, assumptions, perceptions, fears, and stereotypes

               about others. Some biases we are aware of and others we might not fully be

               aware of which is why they are called implicit biases or unconscious biases.

                       Our biases often affect how we act favorably or unfavorably towards

               someone. Bias can also affect our thoughts, how we remember, what we see and

               hear, whom we believe or disbelieve, and how we make important decisions.

                       As jurors you are being asked to make very important decisions in this

               case. You must resist jumping to conclusions based upon personal likes or

               dislikes. You must not let bias, prejudice, or public opinion influence your

               decision.”

¶ 44           The jury found defendant guilty of all four counts of aggravated criminal sexual

abuse and not guilty of the three counts of criminal sexual assault. Defense counsel moved for a

judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, arguing, in part, it was error

under Stowe to allow the jury to hear evidence defendant was bisexual. In response, the State

again argued defendant’s bisexuality made it more probable that she would commit sexual acts

on N.N., who was also female. The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 45                                       B. Sentencing

¶ 46           On February 21, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The presentence

investigation report showed defendant had numerous prior nonviolent felony convictions. At the

time of the offense, she was on probation for manufacture or delivery of a narcotic. She also had

                                               - 13 -
multiple felony convictions for forgery, retail theft, and theft. Her longest previous prison

sentence was four years.

¶ 47           Defendant had four children with her previous husband, whom she described as

sexually, physically, emotionally, and mentally abusive. Her children lived with her parents in

Bloomington. Defendant described her relationship with her children as strained, which she

attributed to her struggle with addiction and being in and out of prison. Two of her children

received disability benefits, one for bipolar disorder and the other for autism.

¶ 48           Defendant reported having been sexually abused for many years by two different

male relatives when she was a child. She suffered from a number of mental-health issues and

had attempted suicide multiple times. Her most recent diagnoses included bipolar disorder,

depression, PTSD, substance use disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Defendant had a

long history of abusing alcohol and underwent drug treatment from 2008 to 2009 and in 2013.

She had been prematurely discharged from drug court probation after being arrested for theft and

sentenced to incarceration. Just before her arrest in 2021, defendant used cannabis, cocaine,

crack, and methamphetamine.

¶ 49           While awaiting trial, defendant participated in alcohol and drug treatment

programs and a “Job Partnership.” Defendant declined to make an in-court statement in

allocution, but she provided a written statement in which she characterized her arrest as a rescue

from drugs and from herself. She wrote she had spent her time in jail participating in programs,

working on self-improvement with her counselor, consistently taking her medications, and

working on healing the sexual and physical trauma of her past. Defendant expressed regret for

things she did in the midst of her addiction and acknowledged her behavior had adversely

affected her loved ones. However, she maintained her innocence of the charges. Defendant

                                               - 14 -
provided letters of support from her parents, individuals in jail who viewed her as a friend and

mentor, and from the director of a bible-study correspondence course.

¶ 50           In mitigation, defense counsel argued the jury’s split verdicts showed uncertainty

about what actually transpired, and defendant’s statement to the detective about possibly

accidentally touching N.N.’s breast showed she did not contemplate that her conduct would

threaten serious physical harm. Defense counsel argued defendant cooperated in the

investigation and had no violent criminal history, including no allegations of domestic violence,

and she had children who would be negatively impacted by her incarceration.

¶ 51           The State presented victim impact statements from N.N. and her mother

describing the emotional trauma caused by the abuse. The State argued defendant blamed her

addiction to drugs or alcohol for her actions, making them aggravating factors. The State also

argued in aggravation the trial evidence showed defendant was in a position of trust and

authority, in that she was N.N.’s stepmother, was entrusted with N.N.’s care and supervision for

periods of time, helped N.N. adhere to her medication schedule, and was involved in taking N.N.

to and from appointments. The State sought consecutive sentences and extended-term

sentencing based on defendant’s criminal record.

¶ 52           The trial court stated it considered the totality of circumstances, including the

relevant statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, the victim impact statements, the letters

of support, the role of defendant’s substance-abuse and mental-health issues, the proactive steps

she took in jail, and the trauma she suffered in childhood. The court considered in aggravation

that defendant’s conduct caused significant harm to N.N. based on N.N.’s trial testimony and the

victim impact statements. The court also considered defendant’s criminal history, describing it

as nonviolent but extensive. The court also noted defendant had previously been given

                                               - 15 -
opportunities at probation and was on probation at the time of the offenses. The court further

considered the role of deterrence. Finally, the court considered in aggravation defendant’s

position of trust relative to N.N., stating:

                “And the court is likewise looking at position of trust over the victim in this case.

                You were in a position of trust. This was a young lady who trusted you to do the

                right thing for her and that trust was violated in the worst possible way. And that

                is very aggravating to the court.”

Defense counsel did not object.

¶ 53            The trial court, applying the totality of the circumstances, sentenced defendant to

concurrent extended terms of 14 years in prison on each of the two counts of aggravated criminal

sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust, authority, or supervision. The court merged the

remaining counts. Defense counsel did not file a motion to reconsider the sentence.

¶ 54            This appeal followed.

¶ 55                                           II. ANALYSIS

¶ 56            On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it (1) allowed the jury to

hear evidence of her sexual orientation and (2) considered a factor inherent in the offense in

aggravation at sentencing, resulting in a double enhancement.

¶ 57            Defendant first contends the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence

she was bisexual. In particular, relying on Stowe, defendant argues her sexual orientation was

not relevant and was unduly prejudicial. She then argues the error was not harmless.

¶ 58                                           A. Relevance

                                                  - 16 -
¶ 59           “All relevant evidence is admissible (Ill. R. Evid. 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)), but the

State bears the burden of demonstrating the admissibility of evidence it offers.” Stowe, 2022 IL

App (2d) 210296, ¶ 50. “[E]vidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.’ ” (Emphases omitted.) Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d)

210296, ¶ 50 (quoting Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)).

¶ 60           “Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues.” Stowe,

2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 51 (quoting Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)). Evidence is unduly

prejudicial when it casts a negative light on the defendant for reasons having nothing to do with

the case on trial or invites the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an

emotional one, such as sympathy, hatred, contempt, or horror. Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296,

¶ 51; People v. Romanowski, 2016 IL App (1st) 142360, ¶ 30, 61 N.E.3d 999.

¶ 61           The trial court’s admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 51. A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is

arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 51.

¶ 62           In Stowe, the defendant was charged with criminal sexual abuse and aggravated

criminal sexual abuse based on allegations he sexually abused a 14-year-old autistic boy who

was a resident of a care facility where the defendant worked. Before trial, the court granted the

State’s motion in limine to introduce evidence of two images found on the defendant’s cell phone

of an adult nude man with an erection. The State argued the images were relevant to establish

the defendant’s intent to commit the alleged conduct for sexual gratification or arousal and to

disprove any claim his conduct was accidental or inadvertent. At the hearing on the motion the

                                               - 17 -
State argued the images were evidence of defendant’s sexual proclivities and relevant to prove

intent, motive, and lack of mistake. The court granted the motion, stating, “It’s in regard to a

proclivity, essentially is what it amounts to.” Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 10. The court

also noted there was some prejudice involved but not enough to overcome the relevancy of the

images.

¶ 63           At trial, the evidence was largely based on the testimony of a supervisor at the

care facility, who briefly saw the defendant masturbating the boy when she opened a bathroom

door to ask the defendant for a key that she needed. The defendant denied the allegations. He

testified he was helping the boy change after the boy had soiled himself. The defendant testified

the boy began to masturbate while defendant was assisting him, and the defendant noticed a

mark on the boy’s penis. The defendant said he tried to get a look at the mark when the

supervisor opened the door. The defendant testified he was a married heterosexual and was not

attracted to men. Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 39. During closing arguments, the State

told the jury the images were relevant because defendant was accused of sexually abusing

another male and he had images of a nude man with an erection on his phone. The State told the

jury, “[D]oes this make it more or less likely that he was masturbating a child? It doesn’t hurt.

Right?” Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 44. The trial court did not give a limiting

instruction specifically regarding the evidence.

¶ 64           On appeal, the Second District reversed. Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 84.

First, the court found evidence of sexual orientation was not relevant to the determination of

whether the defendant was sexually attracted to children. In particular, the court held the images

“were, at best, probative of sexual attraction to a class of adults, and the State offered no

evidence to support the further inference that sexual attraction to that class of adults is probative

                                                - 18 -
of sexual attraction to children of any kind.” Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 60. The court

also took issue with the State’s use of the evidence in closing argument, finding the argument

could be read as directly equating same-sex attraction to men with a propensity to sexually abuse

children when such an assertion was otherwise unsupported by any evidence in the record.

Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 61.

¶ 65           The court distinguished cases involving evidence a defendant had sexual

attraction to children. Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶¶ 59-60. The court also distinguished

People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 824 N.E.2d 191, 197-98 (2005), a case not involving issues of

sexual orientation and in which our supreme court explained that other-acts evidence was

permissible to rebut a defense theory the defendant was “ ‘the kind of person that touches

people’ ” and that, “ ‘even if there was contact with the victims, it was merely incidental contact

and not for sexual arousal.’ ” Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 64 (quoting Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d

at 138, 824 N.E.2d at 197-98). There, our supreme court explained, “ ‘defense counsel raised

motive, intent and the possibility that any of the complained-of touching was inadvertent in such

a way that the jury could acquit defendant even if it believed that he actually touched the

victims’ breasts.’ ” Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 64 (quoting Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d at138,

824 N.E.2d at 198). In Stowe, however, the defendant did not claim he touched the boy

inadvertently and denied touching the boy’s penis altogether. The court then stated, “While the

State was obligated to prove that defendant’s touching was for sexual arousal or gratification,

evidence that defendant had photos of two adult males was not relevant under the facts of the

case to prove this proposition.” Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 64.

                                               - 19 -
¶ 66           The Stowe court relied in part on cases from other jurisdictions to support its

holding the evidence was irrelevant. See Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 65 (citing cases).

One of those cases is also particularly applicable here.

¶ 67           In People v. Garcia, 229 Cal. App. 4th 302, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (2014), the

female defendant was charged with sexually abusing a girl she babysat. The trial court limited

the prosecution’s ability to elicit testimony the defendant was a lesbian. However, during trial,

the prosecution repeatedly attempted to bring the defendant’s sexual orientation to light, and the

court denied the defendant’s motions for a mistrial. The prosecution then specifically told the

jury in closing arguments the defendant was sexually attracted to women. The court instructed

the jury arguments were not evidence and instructed the jurors they were not to let bias,

including bias based on sexual orientation, influence their decision. The jury found the

defendant guilty, and she appealed. Garcia, 229 Cal. App. 4th at 310, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

237-38.

¶ 68           On appeal, the California Court of Appeals held the defendant’s sexual orientation

had “no logical bearing” on the determination whether she was guilty of sexually abusing a child.

Garcia, 229 Cal. App. 4th at 311, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 238. In particular, the court rejected

arguments that the defendant’s sexual orientation was relevant to prove intent or motive. The

court noted the prosecution essentially told the jury the reason the defendant victimized the child

was because she was gay. The court then stated, “We have grown beyond that notion. ‘[T]he

modern understanding of pedophilia is that it exists wholly independently from homosexuality.

The existence or absence of one neither establishes nor disproves the other.’ ” Garcia, 229 Cal.

App. 4th at 313, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 240 (quoting State v. Crotts, 104 Ohio St. 3d 432, 820

N.E.2d 302, 306 (2004)). The court further stated, “[A] defendant’s sexual attraction to adults of

                                               - 20 -
the same sex has nothing to do with whether they are sexually attracted to children of the same

sex.” (Emphasis omitted.) Garcia, 229 Cal. App. 4th at 313, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 240. The

court additionally stated:

               “[W]e do not believe the evidence of appellant’s sexual orientation was relevant

               to her prosecution. Period. Whether designed to show appellant’s intent, motive

               or why she would select [the child] as a victim, the evidence, standing alone,

               simply did not hold up in terms of facilitating the jury’s understanding of the case

               or ‘having any tendency in reason’ to prove a disputed fact of consequence to the

               determination of the action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Garcia, 229

               Cal. App. 4th at 314, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241.

¶ 69           The majority of courts in other jurisdictions have likewise held a person’s sexual

orientation is irrelevant to the issue of whether that person would sexually abuse a child. See

Crotts, 104 Ohio St. 3d at 434-35, 820 N.E.2d at 306; State v. Bates, 507 N.W.2d 847, 852

(Minn. App. 1993); State v. Ellis, 820 S.W.2d 699, 702 (Missouri App. 1991); United States v.

Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 478 (9th Cir. 1988). However, two cases hold otherwise, but with no

meaningful substantive analysis. State v. Davis, 1 Neb. App. 502, 513, 500 N.W.2d 852, 858-59

(1993) (stating bisexuality was relevant to show motive in a crime committed by a male on a

male); Williams v. State, 204 Ga. App. 878, 879, 420 S.E.2d 781, 782-83 (1992) (stating the

defendant’s bisexuality was relevant to prove “intent, motive, plan, scheme and bent of mind”).

¶ 70           Here, applying Stowe and the majority of cases from other jurisdictions, without

evidence connecting defendant’s sexual orientation to a sexual interest in children, her sexual

orientation was irrelevant. The burden was on the State to establish the relevancy of the

evidence, but the State provided nothing indicating defendant’s bisexuality extended to anyone

                                              - 21 -
other than adults. Further, the State never articulated any relevant use of the evidence other than

the assumption a bisexual person would be more likely to commit a sex crime on a child of the

same sex. For example, the State never suggested the evidence was relevant under Wilson to

show absence of mistake. Even in its brief on appeal, the State does not articulate a specific

relevant use of the evidence other than to state “[a]n offender’s bisexuality is relevant where the

victim was the subject of a homosexual act.” The State then cites the Nebraska and Georgia

cases holding such evidence is relevant to show intent, motive, or other similar factors. But as

previously noted, those cases are in the minority and contain little to no substantive analysis.

¶ 71           The State also attempts to distinguish Stowe and Garcia on their facts. For

example, Stowe involved physical evidence consisting of photographs, and both cases involved

the use of the evidence in closing arguments. But the factual distinctions of those cases do not

change the application of the overall holding of those cases that, without more, evidence of

sexual orientation toward adults is irrelevant to whether an adult would sexually abuse a child.

In that regard, the State also suggests Stowe be limited to cases involving prepubescent children.

However, the victim in Stowe was not prepubescent. He was 14, the same age as N.N. here.

¶ 72           We find Stowe well-reasoned and applicable. Accordingly, under the

circumstances of this case, evidence defendant was bisexual was irrelevant, and the trial court

erred in allowing it. We further note, while we need not decide the matter, the court did not

make any findings regarding the possibility the evidence was more prejudicial than probative,

which would be problematic even if we were to find the evidence relevant. The next issue then

is whether the error was harmless.

¶ 73                                     B. Harmless Error

                                               - 22 -
¶ 74           Defendant argues the error was not harmless. Meanwhile, the State contends it

was harmless because the evidence consisted of a single mention of bisexuality, and the trial

court gave limiting instructions.

¶ 75           Where, as here, “the defendant has made a timely objection and properly

preserved an error for review, the reviewing court conducts a harmless-error analysis in which

the State has the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill.

2d 478, 495, 922 N.E.2d 344, 355 (2009). “An evidentiary error is harmless if there is no

reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted the defendant without the error.” Stowe,

2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 68. When considering whether an error was harmless, this court

“may (1) focus on the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction;

(2) examine the other properly admitted evidence to determine whether it overwhelmingly

supports the conviction; or (3) determine whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely

cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence.” In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 43, 902

N.E.2d 600, 617 (2008).

¶ 76           In Stowe, the appellate court found the error was not harmless. Stowe, 2022 IL

App (2d) 210296, ¶ 80. The court noted the evidence against the defendant was not

overwhelming and boiled down to a credibility contest between the supervisor and the defendant.

The court further noted the jury was not provided a limiting instruction as to the purpose for

which it could consider the photos. Thus, the court could not say there was no reasonable

probability the jury would have acquitted defendant without the error. Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d)

210296, ¶ 80; see Ellis, 820 S.W.2d at 703 (finding error not harmless when the case was

dependent on credibility determinations).

                                               - 23 -
¶ 77           Courts have also rejected the argument a limiting instruction cures the error. For

example, in Gillespie, the Ninth Circuit noted “[e]vidence of homosexuality is extremely

prejudicial.” Gillespie, 852 F.2d at 479. The court there found “unconvincing” the prosecution’s

argument admission of evidence of homosexuality was harmless because the trial court gave a

limiting instruction. Gillespie, 852 F.2d at 479. There, the case centered around the defendant’s

denial of eyewitness testimony. The court found the verdict probably depended on the jury’s

assessment of the credibility and character of the defendant and the witness. Under those

circumstances, the court held a curative instruction to the jury was not sufficient to obviate the

prejudice. Gillespie, 852 F.2d at 479.

¶ 78           Likewise, the Garcia court found the error was not harmless, but under

circumstances different from the instant case. Initially the court noted, had the issue of the

defendant’s sexual orientation been “left alone” after the initial reference, the court would have

likely affirmed the conviction. Garcia, 229 Cal. App. 4th at 312, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 239.

However, based on the cumulative exposure to the issue, the court found the defendant had been

denied a fair trial. The court acknowledged prejudice against homosexuals was “not as

antithetical to a fair trial as it once was,” but it also noted evidence and argument regarding the

defendant’s sexual orientation was still inflammatory. Garcia, 229 Cal. App. 4th at 315, 177

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241-42. The court then addressed the instruction on bias, stating:

               “To guard against the possibility that some of the jurors might harbor bias toward

               gays, the trial court admonished the jury on the point. [Citation]. We presume

               the jury followed this instruction in deciding the case. [Citation]. But that

               instruction only went so far. It did not, as the Attorney General maintains, tell the

               jurors to disregard the issue of appellant’s sexual orientation altogether. And as it

                                                - 24 -
               turned out, that issue was kept alive by a confluence of factors.” Garcia, 229 Cal.

               App. 4th at 315, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 242.

¶ 79           The Garcia court found notable the prosecution, as a prominent component of its

closing argument, wrongly told the jury the defendant’s sexual orientation was relevant. The

court found it was quite possible the closing argument confirmed preconceived notions the jury

might have about the case. Thus, although it was not true, jurors may have suspected any

woman who sexually abused a girl would have to be a lesbian or at least bisexual. Thus, given

the emphasis on the issue in closing, the court found the error was not harmless. Garcia, 229

Cal. App. 4th at 317-18, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 243-44. In comparison, an error in the admission of

evidence of a defendant’s sexual orientation has been found harmless when there was substantial

evidence supporting the conviction. See Bates, 507 N.W.2d at 852.

¶ 80           Here, while we recognize the evidence was not as pervasive as it was in Stowe or

Garcia, and it consisted of only a single instance, the State has not met its burden of persuasion

to show the error was harmless. First, although the evidence consisted of a single question and

answer in defendant’s police interview, its topic was potentially inflammatory, and a camera

angle change and redaction in the video particularly drew attention to it. In general, we do not

conclude it is something the jury would easily overlook or disregard.

¶ 81           Next, as in Stowe, this was a close case, with the outcome depending on a

credibility contest between defendant and N.N. While defendant exhibited inconsistencies in her

interview and testimony that could undermine her credibility, N.N.’s credibility was also highly

questionable based on her mental-health struggles. For example, eight months before the

charged offenses, medical professionals rated N.N. as “extremely severe” for peculiar fantasies,

indicating she was often absorbed in elaborate fantasies and had a difficult time distinguishing

                                               - 25 -
reality from fantasy. N.N. admitted that, as of December 4, 2020, she had not taken her

medication for one or two days, and she was feeling paranoid before going to the hotel. Melchor

had also remarked N.N.’s allegations were increasingly getting worse as time went on. Given

the closeness of the case, defendant’s irrelevant statement that she was bisexual could have

reasonably tipped the scale in favor of her conviction. The evidence was also not cumulative of

other evidence at trial. Thus, when we (1) focus on the error to determine whether it might have

contributed to the conviction, (2) examine the other properly admitted evidence to determine

whether it overwhelmingly supported the conviction, and (3) determine whether the improperly

admitted evidence was merely cumulative or duplicated properly admitted evidence, we

determine the error was not harmless.

¶ 82           We also reject the State’s argument the limiting instruction was curative. The

trial court admonished the jury it was to not allow bias based on sexual orientation to influence

its decision. The State, however, has wholly failed to address the more nuanced argument

defendant raises, which is, independent of any bias, the jury, in the absence of a limiting

instruction, was free to consider the evidence for an improper purpose. As illustrated in Garcia,

the instruction given did not tell the jurors to disregard the issue of appellant’s sexual orientation

altogether. As the court noted in Garcia, although it was not true, jurors may have suspected any

woman who sexually abused a girl would have to be a lesbian or at least bisexual. Thus, it is

possible, while the jurors were not influenced by a general bias against defendant’s bisexuality,

they still wrongly believed defendant’s sexual orientation made it more likely she would commit

the crime when the victim was female. As previously discussed, the evidence was not relevant

for that purpose, and the court’s limiting instruction, which merely discussed bias in general, did

not tell the jury it could not consider the evidence in that manner. Given the closeness of the

                                                - 26 -
case, which amounted to a credibility contest, the jury’s improperly drawing such an inference

would be prejudicial to defendant. Under the circumstances of this case, a curative limiting

instruction would have to tell the jury to disregard the evidence altogether.

¶ 83           Overall, in such a close case, the State has not convinced us there is no reasonable

probability the jury would have acquitted defendant without the error. See Stowe, 2022 IL App

(2d) 210296, ¶ 80. However, although we find the trial court erred in allowing the evidence of

defendant’s sexual orientation and the error was not harmless, we note defendant does not argue

double jeopardy precludes retrial. We also find the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Thus, defendant may be retried. See Stowe, 2022 IL App (2d) 210296, ¶ 82.

¶ 84           Because we reverse defendant’s convictions, we need not discuss her argument

she was subjected to an improper double enhancement when the trial court considered the fact

she was in a position of authority, trust, or supervision over N.N. as both an element of the

offenses and as a factor in aggravation. However, we note the court specifically found “very

aggravating” defendant’s position of trust, which was an element of the counts the court

sentenced her on. On appeal, both parties discussed the effect of statutory changes and

principles of statutory interpretation to address whether the legislature clearly intended to

enhance the penalty for aggravated sexual abuse of child based on the element of a position of

trust inherent in the crime. Although we express no view on the issue, if defendant is retried and

convicted, the court should consider the double-enhancement question before applying

defendant’s position of trust as a factor in aggravation at sentencing.

¶ 85                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 86           For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new

trial.

                                               - 27 -
¶ 87   Reversed and remanded.

                                - 28 -