Court Opinion

ID: 9379828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 16:07:09.474027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:06.337476
License: Public Domain

J-A23044-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: I.M.R., AN ALLEGED                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    INCAPACITATED PERSON                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: WILLIAM CARDWELL                :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 728 MDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Decree Entered April 8, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Orphans’ Court at
                               No(s): 2021-281

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                              FILED: MARCH 16, 2023

        William Cardwell appeals from the April 8, 2022 decree adjudicating

I.M.R. to be a totally incapacitated person and appointing Huntingdon-

Bedford-Fulton Area Agency on Aging (the Agency”) as the permanent plenary

guardian of the person and estate of I.M.R. We remand for the preparation

of a supplemental orphans’ court opinion explaining the reasons for its

adjudication or specifying where in the record such reasons may be found.

        I.M.R. was born in November 1938.             In 2014, I.M.R. displayed

symptoms of cognitive decline and memory loss that would eventually be

diagnosed as vascular dementia, a progressive condition which impairs her

ability to function independently. Immediately prior to September 2021, she

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*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A23044-22

resided with her adult son, Appellant, who exercised power of attorney on her

behalf. The agency became involved with the family on September 13, 2021,

after a stranger discovered I.M.R. wandering alone, unable to state her name,

and indicating that she did not want to live with her son. N.T., 12/20/21, at

24.   Appellant refused to cooperate fully with the Agency’s subsequent

investigation of the incident. Id. at 25-27.

      On December 6, 2021, the Agency sought and received the appointment

of an emergency plenary guardian of both the person and estate of I.M.R.

Thereafter, on December 15, 2021, the Agency filed a petition to adjudicate

incapacity and to appoint a permanent plenary guardian for the person and

estate of I.M.R.    The petition alleged that I.M.R. needed daily care and

supervision to ensure her safety, and it averred that no alternative to the

appointment of a guardian had been considered.

      Following four non-consecutive evidentiary hearings, the orphans’ court

entered    the   above-described   decree   adjudging    I.M.R.   to   be   totally

incapacitated and appointing the Agency as the permanent plenary guardian

of both the person and estate of I.M.R.        Appellant timely filed a notice of

appeal, and the orphans’ court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) order directing him

to file and serve a Rule 1925(b) statement within twenty-one days of the

order.    Appellant failed to file the statement within the allotted period.

Instead, he filed the statement five days late. Then, without leave of court,

he filed an amended statement two weeks later. Finding all the issues to be

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waived, the orphans’ court declined to address the merits of any of the issues

presented.

     Appellant’s brief reiterates six of the issues that he included in his

untimely Rule 1925(b) statement:

     1. Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion or make an error of
     law when it granted the Huntingdon- Bedford- Fulton Area Agency
     on Aging’s motion for access to records without giving [I.M.R.] or
     William Cardwell an opportunity to respond?

     2. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion or make an error
     of law when it granted emergency guardianship without a hearing
     when there was no adequate proof of an actual emergency?

     3. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion or make an error
     of law when it prohibited Shaun O’Toole, Esq., [I.M.R.’s] previous
     attorney, from representing [her] . . . in this matter?

     4. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion or make an error
     of law when it failed to appoint William Cardwell as guardian of
     [I.M.R.’s] person despite no Area Agency on Aging observ[ations]
     inside their home; only one caretaker witness who observed
     William Cardwell and [I.M.R.] together inside the home over a
     span of a few months; and [evidence that I.M.R.] walk[ed] away
     from the home on one brief occasion three months before the
     guardianship petition was filed?

     5. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion or make an error
     of law when it failed to appoint William Cardwell as guardian of
     [I.M.R.’s] estate in light of four witnesses and the estate planning
     documents presented clearly stating [I.M.R.’s] desired intention
     for William Cardwell to inherit everything from her and the ability
     to make gifts to himself?

     6. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion or make an error
     of law when it voided the deed signed by William Cardwell in light
     of the fact that the Area Agency on Aging never requested that

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       William Cardwell be removed as power of attorney of [I.M.R.] and
       the court did not remove him prior to signing the deed?[1]

Appellant’s brief at 4-6 (cleaned up) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       At the outset, we consider whether Appellant has waived his claims by

failing to comply with Rule 1925(b). Generally, an appellant’s failure to timely

comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) will result in waiver of the issues raised on

appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement

and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4)

are waived.”).

       There is no dispute that Appellant filed an untimely Rule 1925(b)

statement.      Pursuant to the orphans’ court’s Rule 1925(b) order, the

statement was required to be filed with the clerk of the orphans’ court and

served upon the orphans’ court judge by May 26, 2022, twenty-one days after

the entry of the order. Appellant filed the statement on May 31, 2022, five

days late.     It is unclear when, if ever, Appellant served the Rule 1925

statement upon the orphans’ court judge.

       Nevertheless, before this Court may find waiver under Rule 1925(b), we

must determine whether the orphans’ court’s Rule 1925(b) order complied

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1In a separate order, the orphans’ court invalidated a March 18, 2022 transfer
of land stating that “if there was a valid power of attorney, the alleged agent
has failed to act in good faith and failed to act loyally for the principal’s
benefit.” Orphans’ Court Order, 4/7/22. As Appellant failed to appeal that
order, this Court will not address it or the propriety of the deed referenced in
Appellant’s statement of questions presented.

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strictly with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3). See e.g., Rahn v.

Consol. Rail Corp., 254 A.3d 738, 745-46 (Pa.Super. 2021). In the case at

bar, the orphans’ court’s order stated:

              AND NOW, this 5th day of May, 2022, having filed a Notice
       of Appeal in the above-captioned matter, [Appellant] is directed
       to file of record a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal
       within twenty-one (21) days from this date. Said Statement shall
       be filled of record with the Clerk of the Orphans’ Court and served
       on this Court and opposing counsel. Any issue not properly raised
       shall be deemed waived.

Order, 5/5/22. Significantly, the orphans’ court neglected to “specify . . . both

the place the appellant can serve the Statement in person and the address to

which the appellant can mail the Statement.” See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii).2

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2   Rule 1925(b)(3) provides:

       Contents of order. The judge’s order directing the filing and
       service of a Statement shall specify:

       (i) the number of days after the date of entry of the judge's order
       within which the appellant must file and serve the Statement;

       (ii) that the Statement shall be filed of record;

       (iii) that the Statement shall be served on the judge pursuant to
       paragraph (b)(1) and both the place the appellant can serve
       the Statement in person and the address to which the
       appellant can mail the Statement. In addition, the judge may
       provide an email, facsimile, or other alternative means for the
       appellant to serve the Statement on the judge; and

       (iv) that any issue not properly included in the Statement timely
       filed and served pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be deemed
       waived.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3) (emphasis added) (effective October 1, 2019).

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      Our decision in Rahn is instructive.      In declining to find waiver in a

similar, but admittedly different situation that involved the failure to

simultaneously serve upon the trial court a timely-filed Rule 1925(b)

statement, we first observed that “in determining whether an appellant has

waived his issues on appeal based on non-compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, it

is the trial court’s order that triggers an appellant’s obligation . . . therefore,

we look first to the language of that order.” Id. at 746-47 (quoting In re

Estate of Boyle, 77 A.3d 674, 676 (Pa.Super.2013)).               Thereafter, we

reasoned that the failure to serve a Rule 1925(b) statement on the trial court

did not warrant waiver because the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order neglected

to identify the address to serve the statement on the trial court judge. Id. at

747 (“[T]he trial judge failed to follow the express requirement of the

amended Rule 1925(b) to provide [the appellant] with specific information on

how to serve his 1925(b) statement. . . . In light of these defects in the order,

we decline to quash the appeal.”).

      Instantly, the orphans’ court order, like the order in Rahn, did not

conform with Rule 1925(b)(3)(iii)’s requirement to identify “the address to

which the appellant can mail the Statement.” Hence, Appellant’s failure to file

a timely Rule 1925(b) concise statement is not grounds to find waiver

pursuant to Rule 1925(b)(4)(vii).

      While Rahn involved a slightly different situation concerning improper

service of a timely filed statement, this is a difference without distinction, and

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the rule expressed in Rahn requiring a non-defective Rule 1925(b) order

applies in the present case. Our perspective is buttressed by the Note to Rule

1925, which emphasizes that Subparagraph (b)(3) “specifies what the judge

must advise appellants when ordering a Statement.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925, Note

(emphasis added). Instantly, the court was required to, inter alia, identify

both the location to serve the statement in person and the address to mail it.

It provided neither. To excuse the orphans’ court’s omission in support of

finding waiver in this case would be inequitable. See Boyle v. Main Line

Health, Inc., 272 A.3d 466 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-precedential decision at

11 n.8) (explaining, “Where the trial court’s order is inconsistent with the

requirements of Rule 1925(b)(3)(iii), we hold that the waiver provisions of

subsection (b)(4)(vii) do not apply.    It would be fundamentally unfair to

require appellants to strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 1925, but

not require the same diligence from the trial court requesting a Rule 1925(b)

statement.”).

      As the orphans’ court’s Rule 1925(b) order is facially deficient, we

conclude that Appellant’s failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement did not

render his claims waived on appeal. However, rather than attempt to address

the merits of the six issues that are both asserted in Appellant’s May 31, 2022

Rule 1925(b) statement and raised on appeal without the orphans’ court’s

explanation of its reasons for fashioning the guardianship order, we direct the

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orphans’ court to draft a supplemental opinion that outlines the reasons for

its order or specifies where in the record such reasons may be found.3

       Accordingly, we remand this case to the Court of Common Pleas of

Huntingdon County for issuance of an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

The orphans’ court shall file its Rule 1925(a) opinion within thirty days of

receipt of the certified record.

       Remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction retained.

       Judge McCaffery joins this Memorandum.

       P.J.E. Stevens files a Dissenting Statement.

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3   In addition to finding all of Appellant’s issues waived pursuant to Rule
1925(b), the orphans’ court provided the alternate rationale that “the
extensive record in this matter speaks for itself and establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt that [I.M.R.] is both incapacitated and in need of an
independent guardian of her person and estate (i.e., an entity person other
than [Appellant.]”). Orphans’ Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 5/27/22, at 2.
Contrary to the orphans’ court’s assertion, the general reference to the
certified record is an inadequate explanation of the reasons for its order and
fails to address Appellant’s specific contentions. At a minimum, Rule 1925(a)
requires that the court “specify where in the record where such reasons may
be found.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

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