Court Opinion

ID: 9389963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 16:04:57.263992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:30.682071
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1757
                              Filed April 26, 2023

DANIEL FRED GOLDSBERRY, JR.,
     Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

MICHELLE LYNN BOND,
     Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel A.

Dalrymple, Judge.

      Daniel Goldsberry appeals from a district court ruling granting Michelle

Bond physical care of their two shared children. AFFIRMED.

      Michael J. Lanigan, Waterloo, for appellant.

      John J. Wood and Kate B. Mitchell of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris,

Hoffman & Johnson, P.C., Waterloo, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

       Daniel Goldsberry appeals from a district court ruling granting Michelle

Bond physical care of their two shared children. Finding the district court’s ruling

is in the best interests of the children and not based on any improper

considerations, we affirm.

       I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       This case is about physical care of Daniel and Michelle’s two children (born

2017 and 2019). Daniel and Michelle were romantically involved for about six

years, and their first child was born about one year into the relationship.

       Daniel and Michelle’s relationship began to deteriorate in 2021, and the

“final straw” was in June 2021. On that night, the two went to a comedy club with

Michelle’s sister and other family members. Michelle “blacked out” and collapsed,

and she had to be taken to the hospital. When confronted later that night, Daniel

admitted to Michelle’s family that he gave Michelle “X” or “ecstasy.” A drug test at

the hospital confirmed MDMA (ecstasy) in Michelle’s system. Michelle has been

consistent and adamant that she did not voluntarily take the drug, and her friends

and family testified she is not a drug user. Daniel maintains Michelle knowingly

took the drug, but the district court did not find Daniel’s version of events credible.

Michelle and Daniel separated immediately following the drugging incident and

have not reconciled.

       Both parties work in the car business. Michelle is a finance manager for a

motor group, and Daniel is a finance manager for a different car company. At

various points in the relationship, each parent provided daily care for some time.

Michelle was more consistently the primary earner.          The children’s long-time
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babysitter observed that Michelle was the parent who the children looked to for

help and was responsible for their daily care, and Michelle’s mother has been the

other historical after-school or evening care provider. Both parents work long

hours, and the district court found “[n]either party’s current employment is ideal to

raise two young boys.”

       The district court found both parents capable of raising the children but

Michelle had been a “more stable parent” because of her consistent employment

and housing.     In contrast, “Daniel’s employment and residences have been

irregular.” To the extent that Daniel recently made strides toward being a more

involved parent, the district court noted that his efforts had been made without

consulting Michelle and led to “disruption and confusion in school enrollment and

insurance coverage.” Also, at the same time these positive strides were made,

Daniel was still dragging his feet paying Michelle for expenses incurred under the

temporary shared-care arrangement.

       Michelle testified that the children had been having trouble moving between

the parties’ houses every few days and that the lack of stability was hard on them.

She also reported that the younger child repeated statements Daniel made, such

as “Mommy doesn't love you,” “Mommy’s gross,” or “Mom’s a ho.”               And she

described behavioral problems by the children that, at least in her mind, were

traceable to Daniel.

       Before trial, the parties stipulated to joint legal custody, alternating tax

exemptions, attorney fees, and costs. The district court was tasked with resolving

physical care, visitation, and child support. Following a contested trial, the district
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court placed physical care with Michelle, emphasizing that “additional stability is in

the best interests of the children.” Daniel appeals.

       II.    Standard of Review

       We review child custody orders de novo. McKee v. Dicus, 785 N.W.2d 733,

736 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). We ordinarily “give weight to the factual findings of the

district court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not

bound by them.” Id. When physical care is at issue, our primary consideration is

the best interests of the children. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(o).

       III.   Discussion

       Daniel’s opening brief does not make clear whether he seeks joint physical

care or that physical care be placed with him, but his reply concludes by seeking

“joint placement,” so we assume that is his position. We affirm the district court’s

ruling placing physical care with Michelle and we expressly deny Daniel’s request

for joint physical care. Even if Daniel had requested placing physical care with

him, we would find the children’s best interests are served by placing physical care

with Michelle and affirm the district court.

       “The objective of a physical care determination is to place the children in

the environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally,

and to social maturity.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa

2007). We are guided by the factors in Iowa Code section 598.41(3) (2021) and

In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974), in evaluating

physical care generally. When evaluating joint physical care specifically, we also

consider the following nonexclusive factors:
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       (1) “approximation”—what has been the historical care giving
       arrangement for the child[ren] between the two parties;
       (2) the ability of the spouses to communicate and show mutual
       respect;
       (3) the degree of conflict between the parents; and
       (4) “the degree to which the parents are in general agreement about
       their approach to daily matters.”

In re Marriage of Berning, 745 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (quoting

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 697–99). “Any consideration of joint physical care,

however, must still be based on Iowa’s traditional and statutorily required child

custody standard—the best interest of the child.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 695.

       Guided by case law, we find joint physical care is not appropriate on this

record. First, the district court found that Michelle was the primary historical

caregiver for the children, and we agree. While Daniel participated in parenting,

the credible record evidence shows Michelle was more involved with the children’s

daily care. Second, while Michelle is respectful and able to communicate with

Daniel, the same cannot be said of Daniel with Michelle. At minimum, there is no

evidence of the children repeating harsh words and insults Michelle made about

Daniel, while there is credible evidence of the children repeating insulting language

about Michelle. We are also concerned that Daniel scheduled the children with a

new dentist and made decisions about schooling without consulting Michelle in the

months before trial, and we are troubled that he lacks insight into why this conduct

was problematic, even when it affected insurance coverage.           Third, there is

significant conflict between these parents, and we do not believe Daniel in

particular is capable of the selfless collaboration needed to successfully co-parent

in a joint care arrangement. Fourth, while we see limited disagreement in this

record on general parenting approaches, we find this last factor does not
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overpower the preceding three, and the balance of evidence weighs against joint

physical care.

       Along with the four-factor analysis, we also consider the drugging incident

in June 2021. We accept the district court’s credibility finding that Daniel drugged

Michelle without her consent. The act of drugging a significant other without

consent is, in our view, a form of domestic abuse and a significant factor weighing

against the offending significant other’s claim for joint physical care. Cf. In re

Marriage of Hynick, 727 N.W.2d 575, 579–80 (Iowa 2007) (finding domestic abuse

a “significant factor” in assessing joint physical care because the abuse “reflect[ed]

the ability of the parties to listen to one another and respect one another’s opinions

and feelings”).

       To the extent that Daniel asserts in his appellate brief some kind of “gender

bias” claim, we reject his argument. In our de novo review, we generally agree

with the district court’s fact-findings and see nothing biased (in regard to gender or

any other suspect class) in the court’s analysis of earnings capacity and historical

caregiving. All of the district court’s fact-findings were supported by substantial

evidence and buttressed with credibility findings when irreconcilable conflicts in the

evidence at trial so required. We also observe Daniel agreed under oath that

Michelle is a “good mom” and “provides stability for the children,” which are

essentially the same facts the district court relied on when placing physical care

with Michelle. Daniel’s attacks on the district court do not persuade us of any bias

or improper consideration.

       Last, Michelle seeks appellate attorney fees. Her brief does not ask for a

specific amount of appellate attorney fees, and she has not filed a fee affidavit with
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our court. After considering the relevant factors and exercising our discretion, we

deny Michelle’s request for appellate attorney fees largely because her income is

significantly greater than Daniel's. See In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d

671, 687 (Iowa 2013); In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006).

Costs on appeal are assessed to Daniel.

      AFFIRMED.