Court Opinion

ID: 9713049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:05:47.107921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.027614
License: Public Domain

P. R. Joslyn, J.
‘(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority would reverse these two felony convictions under the claims that the court improperly instructed the jury in two specific areas. First, the court did not tell the jury that the element of assault must contain the word immediate battery. Second, the court failed to instruct that armed robbery is a specific intent crime and particularly that the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property was not instructed upon. I would concur with the result if these elements were placed at issue before the fact finder, especially since there are standard jury instructions. The record reflects that the question of whether there was an assault was literally taken away from the fact finder without objection. The court while instructing said, "I have advised you that pointing a weapon at someone is putting that person in fear, telling that person that something was going to happen to them. That’s an assault”.
I cannot concur with the majority that the failure to give the specific intent instruction mandates reversal in this case. The proof of a larceny was overwhelming, in fact, so are the proofs as to armed robbery. Further, the defense was that of identity and not diminished capacity. Defendant interposed no objection to the offered instructions, either prior to or after they were given to the jury. The absence of timely objection at trial precludes *78appellate review of claimed error in the absence of manifest injustice. People v Branner, 53 Mich App 541; 220 NW2d 183 (1974), lv den 392 Mich 814 (1974).
The trial court’s failure here to instruct on the elements of larceny as it relates to the specific intent necessary to convict did not constitute manifest injustice and defendant’s failure to object to the jury instructions precludes him from challenging the validity of the instructions on appeal. See People v Petrosky, 286 Mich 397, 401; 282 NW 191 (1938); People v Rabb, 112 Mich App 430, 435; 316 NW2d 446 (1982). In Petrosky, the trial court failed to define larceny any better than was done here. The trial judge indicated that it "was [a] taking with intent to steal and appropriate property to one’s own use”. The Supreme Court held that the instructions were not erroneous where the evidence at trial negated any inference that the articles were taken with the owner’s consent. Here the facts before the jury negated any inference other than that whoever assaulted the victim intended to permanently deprive him of his property.
I would concur with the conclusions reached as to the other issues raised. The claims of the defendant as to the nonproduction of the res gestae witness is without merit and no prejudice occurred in the technical violation of the order of sequestration.
The convictions should be affirmed.