Court Opinion

ID: 9379351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 15:01:26.92014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.101615
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2097   Document: 81     Page: 1   Filed: 03/15/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

    BORUSAN MANNESMANN BORU SANAYI VE
   TICARET A.S., BORUSAN MANNESMANN PIPE
                     U.S. INC.,
                Plaintiffs-Appellants

                            v.

   UNITED STATES, WHEATLAND TUBE, NUCOR
          TUBULAR PRODUCTS INC.,
              Defendants-Appellees
             ______________________

                       2021-2097
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of International
 Trade in No. 1:20-cv-00015-JAR, Senior Judge Jane A. Re-
 stani.
                  ______________________

                Decided: March 15, 2023
                ______________________

     JULIE MENDOZA, Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP,
 Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also
 represented by DONALD CAMERON, JR., MARY HODGINS,
 BRADY MILLS, R. WILL PLANERT, EDWARD JOHN THOMAS,
 III; TIMOTHY MEYER, Duke University School of Law,
 Durham, NC.

     ALAN H. PRICE, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, DC, for
 defendant-appellee Nucor Tubular Products Inc. Also
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 2   BORUSAN MANNESMANN BORU SANAYI VE TICARET A.S.     v. US

 represented by THEODORE PAUL BRACKEMYRE, ROBERT E.
 DEFRANCESCO, III, PAUL A. DEVAMITHRAN.

     ELIZABETH DRAKE, Schagrin Associates, Washington,
 DC, argued for defendant-appellee Wheatland Tube. Also
 represented by NICHOLAS J. BIRCH, CHRISTOPHER
 CLOUTIER, WILLIAM ALFRED FENNELL, LUKE A. MEISNER,
 KELSEY RULE, ROGER BRIAN SCHAGRIN.

      ROBERT R. KIEPURA, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States.
 Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY, FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR.; RACHEL BOGDAN, Of-
 fice of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Com-
 pliance, United States Department of Commerce,
 Washington, DC.
                   ______________________

     Before TARANTO, STOLL, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit
                        Judges.
 TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
     From May 2017 to April 2018, Borusan Mannesmann
 Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. and Borusan Mannesmann
 Pipe U.S. Inc. (collectively, Borusan) imported circular
 welded carbon steel pipes and tubes (carbon steel pipe) that
 were subject to decades-old antidumping duties. Near the
 end of that period in 2018, the President issued Proclama-
 tion 9705, which separately imposed a duty on imported
 steel articles (including Borusan’s carbon steel pipe) under
 § 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862.
 In the annual administrative review of the antidumping
 duties owed on Borusan’s imports for the May 2017–April
 2018 period, the Department of Commerce treated the
 Proclamation 9705 duty as a “United States import dut[y]”
 under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A), a treatment that resulted
 in higher antidumping duties for Borusan’s imports in the
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 BORUSAN MANNESMANN BORU SANAYI VE TICARET A.S.     v. US   3

 review than if Commerce had not so treated the Proclama-
 tion 9705 duty.
      Borusan challenged Commerce’s annual-review deter-
 mination in the Court of International Trade (Trade
 Court), urging that the phrase “United States import du-
 ties” in § 1677a(c)(2)(A) did not encompass any duties im-
 posed under § 232. The Trade Court disagreed and
 affirmed Commerce’s treatment of the Proclamation 9705
 duty. Borusan Mannesmann Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.
 v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1371–76 (Ct. Int’l
 Trade 2021). That ruling is now here on Borusan’s appeal.
 Because Commerce correctly determined that the particu-
 lar § 232 duty imposed by Proclamation 9705 is a “United
 States import dut[y]” under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A), we
 affirm.
                               I
                              A
     Antidumping duties are designed to remedy injury or
 threatened injury to domestic industry from the importa-
 tion of merchandise sold in the United States at a price less
 than the merchandise’s fair value (i.e., dumping). See 19
 U.S.C. § 1673; Thyssenkrupp Steel North America, Inc. v.
 United States, 886 F.3d 1215, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The
 antidumping duty is set to equal the amount by which the
 imported merchandise is sold below its fair value. 19
 U.S.C. § 1673. Importers make appropriate deposits upon
 entering merchandise subject to an antidumping duty, but
 final determinations of the duties owed are generally made
 in annual administrative reviews (if requested) that cover
 imports during the preceding 12 months (the period of re-
 view). Id. § 1675(a)(1); see Thyssenkrupp, 886 F.3d at 1218
 (describing this “retrospective” system).
     Of importance to the present appeal, antidumping du-
 ties depend on the “dumping margin,” 19 U.S.C.
 § 1677(35)(A), which is the difference between “the normal
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 value” and the “export price (or the constructed export
 price) for the merchandise,” id. § 1673. The normal value,
 i.e., the value in the home country, is commonly the price
 at which the merchandise is sold in the exporting country,
 subject to certain adjustments. Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B). On
 the other hand, the “export price” is
     the price at which the subject merchandise is first
     sold (or agreed to be sold) before the date of impor-
     tation by the producer or exporter of the subject
     merchandise outside of the United States to an un-
     affiliated purchaser in the United States or to an
     unaffiliated purchaser for exportation to the
     United States, as adjusted under subsection (c).
 Id. § 1677a(a). A “constructed export price” is similar for
 present purposes. 1 In either case, this price, before it is
 adjusted as next described, can be called the “U.S. price.”
 See United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d
 1351, 1353 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (defining “export price”
 as “the price of the product in the United States”).

     1    A “constructed export price,” also involving a for-
 eign producer’s or exporter’s first sale to an unaffiliated
 purchaser, is used when the location of such a sale is “in
 the United States”—rather than (as with an “export price”)
 “outside of the United States”—according to the definition
 of “construction export price” as
      the price at which the subject merchandise is first
      sold (or agreed to be sold) in the United States be-
      fore or after the date of importation by or for the
      account of the producer or exporter of such mer-
      chandise or by a seller affiliated with the producer
      or exporter, to a purchaser not affiliated with the
      producer or exporter, as adjusted under subsec-
      tions (c) and (d).
 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b).
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     To arrive at the final export or constructed export price,
 adjustments must be made. For example, the U.S. price
 must be “increased by . . . the amount of any countervailing
 duty imposed on the subject merchandise under part I of
 this subtitle [19 U.S.C. §§ 1671–1671h] to offset an export
 subsidy.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C). And, what is key
 here, the U.S. price also must be “reduced by[,] . . . except
 as provided in paragraph (1)(C),” i.e., except for certain
 countervailing duties,
     the amount, if any, included in such price, attribut-
     able to any additional costs, charges, or expenses,
     and United States import duties, which are incident
     to bringing the subject merchandise from the orig-
     inal place of shipment in the exporting country to
     the place of delivery in the United States.
 Id. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). We have described
 these adjustments as designed to produce an “apples with
 apples” comparison between the price at which the mer-
 chandise is sold in the U.S. and the price at which it is sold
 in the home country. Smith-Corona Group v. United
 States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also APEX
 Exports v. United States, 777 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
 2015).
                               B
      Borusan Mannesmann Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.
 produces carbon steel pipe in Turkey and exports it to the
 United States. Borusan Mannesmann Pipe U.S. Inc., a
 United States-based affiliate of Borusan A.S., imports car-
 bon steel pipe into the United States. Borusan’s carbon
 steel pipe has long been subject to antidumping duties, see,
 e.g., Antidumping Duty Order: Welded Carbon Steel Stand-
 ard Pipe and Tube Products from Turkey, 51 Fed. Reg.
 17,784 (May 15, 1986), including the Borusan pipe im-
 ported from May 2017 through April 2018.
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      In March 2018, the President issued a proclamation,
 pursuant to § 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub.
 L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872, 877, codified as amended at 19
 U.S.C. § 1862, that imposed a 25 percent ad valorem tariff
 on imported steel articles, including carbon steel pipe, from
 all countries except Canada and Mexico, entered (or with-
 drawn from a warehouse for consumption) on or after
 March 23, 2018. Proclamation 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625
 (Mar. 15, 2018). The proclamation directed that the duty
 was to be imposed “in addition to any other duties, fees,
 exactions, and charges applicable to such imported steel ar-
 ticles.” Id. clause 2, 83 Fed. Reg. at 11,627. Although the
 President later modified Proclamation 9705, the 25 percent
 duty applied to Borusan’s imports for the last five weeks or
 so of the period from May 1, 2017, through April 30, 2018,
 which was the period of review for the annual administra-
 tive review of antidumping duties initiated by Commerce
 in July 2018. Initiation of Antidumping and Countervail-
 ing Duty Administrative Reviews, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,270 (July
 12, 2018).
     In its final results for that administrative review, Com-
 merce treated the Proclamation 9705 duty as a “United
 States import dut[y]” under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A). Be-
 cause Borusan had built this duty into its U.S. price (rais-
 ing, after imposition of the Proclamation 9705 duty, what
 the U.S. price was before the duty), Commerce subtracted
 the Proclamation 9705 duty from the Borusan U.S. price,
 thereby lowering the export (and constructed export) price
 for Borusan (from what it would be without subtraction)
 and enlarging the gap between the normal value and the
 export (and constructed export) price, i.e., increasing the
 dumping margin that determines the antidumping duty
 owed. Circular Welded Carbon Steel Standard Pipe and
 Tube Products from Turkey: Final Results of Antidumping
 Duty Administrative Review and Final Determination of
 No Shipments; 2017–2018, 85 Fed. Reg. 3616 (Jan. 22,
 2020) (Final Results); see also Circular Welded Carbon
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 Steel Standard Pipe and Tube Products from Turkey:
 Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administra-
 tive Review; 2017–2018, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,893 (Mar. 5, 2020);
 J.A. 1348.
      In a memorandum issued with the Final Results, J.A.
 2368, Commerce analyzed two factors to determine
 whether the Proclamation 9705 duty, imposed under § 232,
 is a “regular” duty, such that, according to Commerce, it
 falls within the meaning of “United States import duties,”
 or a “special duty,” such that it does not. J.A. 2397–400.
 Commerce borrowed the distinction, and factors used to ap-
 ply it, from its determination made years earlier in consid-
 ering a different presidential proclamation, Proclamation
 7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553 (Mar. 7, 2002), that imposed so-
 called “safeguard” (or “§ 201”) duties under different statu-
 tory authority, namely, § 201 et. seq. of the Trade Act of
 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, title II, §§ 201–05, 88 Stat. 1978,
 2011–18 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251–55).
 See Stainless Steel Wire Rod from the Republic of Korea:
 Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
 69 Fed. Reg. 19,153 (Apr. 12, 2004) (SWR Korea); Wheat-
 land Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1359–66
 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming the SWR Korea analysis under
 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Specifically, Commerce analyzed (1)
 whether the Proclamation 9705 duty is remedial and (2)
 whether “double counting” of the duty would result from
 deeming it a United States import duty and therefore sub-
 tracting it from the U.S. price. J.A. 2397–400. Commerce
 did not analyze a third factor identified in the earlier § 201
 proceedings: whether the duty at issue is temporary.
     Commerce determined that Proclamation 9705’s duty
 is not remedial, making it unlike special duties, because
 duties imposed under § 232 “are not focused on remedying
 injury to a domestic industry” but instead on eliminating
 threats to national security. J.A. 2398. Commerce also
 concluded that “antidumping duties and section 232
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 duties” serve “separate and distinct” functions, so “there
 would be no overlap between the two in providing the rem-
 edies sought by each,” and hence no double counting in
 deeming the duty imposed under § 232 a United States im-
 port duty to be subtracted under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A).
 J.A. 2399. Commerce then pointed to Proclamation 9705’s
 statement, which it described as “critical” to its double-
 counting analysis, that the duty is “to be imposed in addi-
 tion to other duties.” J.A. 2400. Finally, Commerce con-
 cluded that the International Trade Commission’s
 placement of the § 232 duty at issue in the “special” duties
 chapter of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule is not sufficient
 to change the above-described conclusion. Id. Because
 Commerce determined in a separate memorandum that
 the Proclamation 9705 duty was in fact included in the U.S.
 price for Borusan before adjustment, J.A. 1348, it sub-
 tracted the duty under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A).
     Borusan challenged the Final Results in the Trade
 Court. It contended, among other things, that all duties
 imposed under § 232, categorically, must be deemed not
 “United States import duties.” Wheatland Tube and Nucor
 Tubular Products, Inc., U.S. domestic producers of carbon
 steel pipe and therefore interested parties, 19 U.S.C.
 § 1677(9)(C), intervened.
     The Trade Court, in its February 17, 2021 opinion,
 agreed with Commerce on the point now at issue here. Bo-
 rusan, 494 F. Supp. 3d at 1373–76. It determined that du-
 ties imposed by the President under § 232 are “remedial in
 a broad sense” but are unlike the presidentially imposed
 safeguard duties (also called “§ 201 duties”) that were at
 issue in SWR Korea and Wheatland. Id. at 1374. Safe-
 guard duties, the Trade Court said, “require[] a finding of
 a particular level of injury or threat of injury,” whereas du-
 ties imposed under § 232 “could be used to promote vital
 nascent industries, not just already established injured in-
 dustries,” in which case “remediation would not be a pri-
 mary goal.” Id. The Trade Court further noted that duties
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 imposed under § 232 are not subject to statutory time lim-
 its, unlike safeguard duties, which are subject to such time
 limits, see 19 U.S.C. § 2253(e), but nevertheless determined
 that duties imposed under section 232 are “not . . . signifi-
 cantly more permanent than safeguard duties.” Borusan,
 494 F. Supp. 3d. at 1374–75. The Trade Court gave a third
 factor—whether inclusion in “United States import duties”
 results in double counting—the greatest weight. Id. at
 1375–76. It explained that “[t]here is a clear statutory in-
 terplay between Section 201 duties and antidumping du-
 ties,” which is not the case for duties imposed under § 232,
 so no double counting results from treating the latter as
 “United States import duties” under 19 U.S.C.
 § 1677a(c)(2)(A) to calculate the dumping margin. Id. at
 1375. The Trade Court finally noted that the parties ac-
 cepted that Borusan’s relevant U.S. prices included the
 Proclamation 9705 duty. Id. at 1376 n.9.
      The Trade Court remanded the matter for Commerce
 to consider other issues immaterial to the present appeal.
 Id. at 1377. Commerce issued final results of redetermina-
 tion on April 19, 2021. The Trade Court, “[h]aving received
 no objections to . . . the Remand Results,” entered final
 judgment “sustain[ing]” them and ordering “liquidat[ion]
 [of the Borusan entries covered by the administrative re-
 view] in accordance with the final court decision in this ac-
 tion, including all appeals.”       J.A. 1 (capitalization
 removed). Borusan timely appealed. 2 We have jurisdiction
 under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
                              II
     “We review the Commerce decisions at issue de novo,
 using the same standard of review applied by the [Trade
 Court] . . . .” Quiedan Co. v. United States, 927 F.3d 1328,

     2   Wheatland and the United States each cross-ap-
 pealed, but those cross-appeals have been dismissed.
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 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). We must sustain
 Commerce’s determinations in antidumping duty proceed-
 ings unless they are “unsupported by substantial evidence
 on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19
 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “For factual determinations,
 substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reason-
 able mind might accept to support a conclusion’ considering
 the record as a whole.” Mid Continent Steel & Wire, Inc. v.
 United States, 941 F.3d 530, 537 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations
 omitted). We evaluate questions of statutory interpreta-
 tion de novo. Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, 4
 F.4th 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
     There is no properly preserved dispute before us about
 Commerce’s determination, J.A. 1348, that the duty im-
 posed by Proclamation 9705 was in fact included in Bo-
 rusan’s U.S. prices. 3 The only issue is whether it was
 permissible for Commerce to treat that duty as a “United
 States import dut[y]” under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) to
 be subtracted from those U.S. prices to arrive at the export
 (and constructed export) price used for calculation of the
 dumping margin. We draw the proclamation-specific con-
 clusion that this treatment was permissible.
                                A
      Before addressing the situation presented here—a spe-
 cific presidential proclamation imposing a duty under

      3  Borusan did not challenge that determination be-
 fore the Trade Court. See Borusan, 494 F. Supp. 3d at 1376
 n.9. Nor did Borusan challenge the determination in this
 court until its reply brief, Reply Br. at 25-27, which was too
 late. See In re Google Technology Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d
 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira,
 Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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 § 232—we recount the decisions of Commerce and of this
 court that addressed the application of 19 U.S.C.
 § 1677a(c)(2)(A) to safeguard duties imposed by a 2002
 presidential proclamation under the distinct § 201 regime.
 Those decisions feature prominently in the Commerce de-
 cision, Trade Court ruling, and parties’ briefing before us.
     Section 201 authorizes the President to take actions
 when an “article is being imported into the United States
 in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of
 serious injury, or the threat thereof, to . . . domestic indus-
 try.” 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (emphasis added to indicate why
 § 201 is commonly described as addressing surges in im-
 ports). Among the wide range of actions authorized is “an
 increase in, or the imposition of, any duty on the imported
 article.” Id. § 2253(a)(3)(A). For purposes of the chapter
 containing § 201 et seq., “[t]he term ‘duty’ includes the rate
 and form of any import duty, including but not limited to
 tariff-rate quotas.” Id. § 2481(1). Congress set certain pre-
 requisites to presidential action, including an identified de-
 termination by the International Trade Commission about
 injury or threatened injury. Id. §§ 2251–54. Presidentially
 proclaimed measures are time-limited, presumptively to
 four years. Id. § 2253(e).
     In 2002, the President issued Proclamation 7529 to im-
 pose duties under § 201 on merchandise that was also sub-
 ject to antidumping duties, e.g., stainless steel wire rod
 from the Republic of Korea, SWR Korea, 69 Fed. Reg. at
 19,153, and carbon steel pipe from Thailand, Certain
 Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand: Final
 Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 69
 Fed. Reg. 61,649 (Oct. 20, 2004). Commerce, in its annual
 administrative reviews addressing those antidumping du-
 ties, had to decide whether the Proclamation 7529 duties
 were “United States import duties.” It concluded that they
 were not, after giving notice and receiving comments on the
 issue. SWR Korea, 69 Fed. Reg. at 19,154–61.
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     Commerce reasoned that there is a distinction between
 “special” duties and “regular” duties, that it had long ex-
 cluded antidumping duties from “United States import du-
 ties,” and that antidumping duties are “special duties.” Id.
 at 19,159 (discussing the Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub. L.
 No. 67-10, title II, §§ 202, 211, 42 Stat. 9, 11–12, 15). Com-
 merce then considered whether the duties at issue, im-
 posed under § 201 by Proclamation 7529, were more like
 special duties, which include at least antidumping duties,
 or regular duties. Id. Much of Commerce’s reasoning ad-
 dressed § 201 generally, but some was specific to Proclama-
 tion 7529. Id. at 19,160.
     Commerce stated that § 201 duties are both remedial
 and temporary, unlike normal duties. Id. at 19,159. Com-
 merce also determined that treating the duties at issue as
 “United States import duties” presented problems of dou-
 ble counting similar to the circularity problems presented
 by treating antidumping duties as “United States import
 duties.” Id. at 19,160. Commerce stated that duties im-
 posed under § 201 and antidumping duties can be interre-
 lated and remedy overlapping harms. Id. 4 Commerce then

      4  For support, Commerce relied on a Senate Commit-
 tee Report related to the Trade Act of 1974 (which enacted
 the § 201 regime), S. Rep. No. 93-1298 at 123 (1974), and
 also the Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) accom-
 panying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), the
 latter stating that, in considering the imposition of
 measures under § 201, “the President will continue the
 practice of taking into account relief provided under other
 provisions of law, such as the antidumping and counter-
 vailing duty laws,” SAA, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, Vol. 1, at
 964 (1994). The SAA “shall be regarded as an authoritative
 expression by the United States concerning the interpreta-
 tion and application of the Uruguay Round Agreements”
 and the URAA. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d).
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 made the proclamation-specific point that there was “abso-
 lutely no indication in [Proclamation 7529] placing 201 du-
 ties on certain imports of steel that the President believed
 that Commerce effectively would increase those duties by
 taking them into account in calculating subsequent dump-
 ing margins.” Id. Commerce reasoned that “any adjust-
 ment for the potential overlap between 201 and
 [antidumping] remedies is to be made by the President in
 setting the level of the 201 duties,” and “[o]nce the Presi-
 dent has struck this balance, it is not Commerce’s place to
 upset that balance.” Id.
     In Wheatland, we approved Commerce’s SWR Korea
 conclusion, affirming its application in the annual admin-
 istration review before us. 495 F.3d at 1359–66. We
 quickly found ambiguity at step one of the Chevron frame-
 work. Id. at 1359–60. We explained that “Congress has
 not defined or explained the meaning or scope of ‘United
 States import duties,”’ id. at 1359, and concluded that
 “Congress has not ‘directly spoken to the precise question
 at issue’”—“whether § 201 safeguard duties are to be con-
 sidered ‘United States import duties’ for purposes of deter-
 mining the [export price] and calculating dumping
 margin,” id. at 1359–60.
     We then determined, at step two of the Chevron frame-
 work, that Commerce’s answer to this precise question was
 reasonable. Among other things, we specifically high-
 lighted the lack of express presidential intent “regarding
 the calculation of antidumping margin” in the particular
 proclamation at issue. Id. at 1364. We quoted and relied
 on Commerce’s explanation that the relationship between
 a particular safeguard duty and antidumping remedies
 was for the President to decide in imposing the former and
 that, in Proclamation 7529, “the balance between § 201
 safeguard duties and antidumping duties had been set by
 the President.” Id. at 1365. We also noted certain procla-
 mation-specific facts as supporting Commerce’s conclusion.
 Id. at 1364–65 (stating that only four of the twenty
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 14   BORUSAN MANNESMANN BORU SANAYI VE TICARET A.S.       v. US

 exporting countries were subject to both antidumping du-
 ties and § 201 safeguard duties).
     Notably, the government emphasized proclamation-
 specific issues in its brief before us in Wheatland. For ex-
 ample, the government suggested that Commerce was in
 the best position to determine whether to deduct the § 201
 duties at issue from the U.S. price because Commerce,
 through the Secretary of Commerce, is subject to the Pres-
 ident’s control. Wheatland, Nos. 2006-1524, -1525, United
 States Opening Br. at 41–42. The government also empha-
 sized the lack of country-specific rates in Proclamation
 7529, which it viewed as indicating that the President did
 not intend for the proclamation’s duties to be imposed in
 addition to antidumping duties. Id. at 42–45.
                               B
                               1
     The reference to “United States import duties” in
 § 1677a(c)(2)(A) is a reference to actually prescribed du-
 ties—not to a mere legal authorization to prescribe duties,
 such as the constitutional grant of power to Congress or a
 statutory grant of authority to the President. The provi-
 sion requires “reducing” a concrete numerical price, the
 U.S. price, by “United States import duties,” to the extent
 those duties are “included in such price” to arrive at a dif-
 ferent concrete numerical price, the “export price” (or “con-
 structed export price”). 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A). There
 is nothing to subtract until a duty is prescribed. If a statute
 merely authorizes a governmental officer or body to impose
 a duty, as § 232 authorizes the President to do, it is the
 particular exercise of the authority that determines—
 based on the character of that exercise—whether the pre-
 scribed duty comes within § 1677a(c)(2)(A).
    Nothing in § 1677a(c)(2)(A) requires the uniform treat-
 ment of all duties prescribed under a particular statutory
 authorization. Nor, more specifically, have we been shown
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 anything in the § 232 framework that requires the uniform
 treatment of all duties imposed by the President under
 § 232. Specifically, although Borusan suggests that we cat-
 egorically conclude that § 232 duties are not United States
 import duties, see Oral Arg. at 43:20–44:19, it has pre-
 sented no persuasive reason to conclude that the relevant
 question—whether a specific duty prescribed by a particu-
 lar presidential action under § 232 constitutes a “United
 States import dut[y]” under § 1677a(c)(2)(A)—must have
 the same answer for all such actions under § 232.
     Section 232 by its terms gives the President discretion
 to determine “the nature and duration of the action”
 needed to “adjust the imports of the article and its deriva-
 tives” to address the national-security threat. 19 U.S.C.
 § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii). Even as to a choice between quotas and
 duties, § 232 gives the President “discretion in determining
 the method to be used to adjust imports.” Federal Energy
 Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 561
 (1976). The President’s discretion is broad enough to en-
 compass the choice of whether a duty is to be imposed on
 top of the amounts of antidumping duties that would be
 due without the duty or, instead, is to partly or wholly sub-
 stitute for such duties. See Transpacific, 4 F.4th at 1324–
 26 (affirming discretion as to action to be taken).
     Thus, we need not make a statute-wide categorical de-
 termination regarding all duties imposed on imports by
 presidential action under § 232. We will focus on the char-
 acter of Proclamation 9705 specifically—the authorized
 governmental action that actually prescribed the duty on
 imports at issue. This proclamation-specific approach is
 consistent with our decision in the § 201 setting in Wheat-
 land, where, as described above, our approval of Com-
 merce’s determination relied in part on specifics of the
 particular proclamation at issue there and on Commerce’s
 own declaration that it is for the President, in the duty-
 creating action under the § 201 regime, to determine the
 duty’s relationship to antidumping duties.          At oral
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 argument before this court, we note, government counsel
 seemingly agreed that Wheatland is “fair[ly] read[]” as “ap-
 proving only the proclamation-specific determination by
 Commerce there, not a necessarily categorical treatment of
 all [§ 201] impositions.” Oral Arg. at 29:28–30:09.
                                2
     Proclamation 9705 makes clear that the duty newly be-
 ing imposed was to add to, and not partly or wholly offset,
 the antidumping duties that would be due without the new
 duty. Proclamation 9705 provides:
      Except as otherwise provided in this proclamation,
      or in notices published pursuant to clause 3 of this
      proclamation, all steel articles imports specified in
      the Annex shall be subject to an additional 25 per-
      cent ad valorem rate of duty with respect to goods
      entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for con-
      sumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight
      time on March 23, 2018. This rate of duty, which
      is in addition to any other duties, fees, exactions,
      and charges applicable to such imported steel arti-
      cles, shall apply to imports of steel articles from all
      countries except Canada and Mexico.
 Proclamation 9705, clause 2, 83 Fed. Reg. at 11,627 (em-
 phasis added). The proclamation imposes a duty on im-
 ports to the United States, which comes within the literal
 language,     “United     States     import     duties,”   of
 § 1677a(c)(2)(A). More particularly, the proclamation de-
 clares that the rate of duty is to be imposed “in addition to
 any other duties.” Id.; see also id. at 11,629, Annex (“All
 anti-dumping, countervailing, or other duties and charges
 applicable to such goods shall continue to be imposed.”).
 The context confirms the evident meaning of this declara-
 tion—that the duty should be charged on top of otherwise-
 determined antidumping duties. The President deter-
 mined that national security was threatened by the unsus-
 tainably low utilization of domestic steel-producing
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 capacity, an underutilization tied to imports of steel, id.
 ¶¶ 5, 8, 11, 83 Fed. Reg. at 11,626–27, notwithstanding
 that antidumping duties had been in place for three dec-
 ades on certain imports covered by the proclamation’s duty.
     We conclude that the only fair reading of Proclamation
 9705 is that, when applied to an article covered by anti-
 dumping duties, the Proclamation 9705 and antidumping
 duties must together result in a full imposition of both du-
 ties. Producing that result requires the antidumping duty
 to be calculated as if the Proclamation 9705 duty did not
 exist—i.e., by subtraction of the Proclamation 9705 duty
 from the U.S. price if the Proclamation 9705 duty is built
 into it. Otherwise, the Proclamation 9705 duty would be
 offset substantially or completely by a reduction in the an-
 tidumping duty itself (through an increase in the U.S. price
 and therefore a decrease in the dumping margin), defeating
 the evident “in addition to” prescription of Proclamation
 9705. See J.A. 2400.
                              3
     This treatment of the duty imposed in Proclamation
 9705 is not inconsistent with Commerce’s long-recognized
 categorical exclusion of antidumping duties themselves
 from classification as “United States import duties.” Anti-
 dumping duties cannot be subtracted in the calculation of
 dumping margins (and hence antidumping duties), because
 doing so would produce a spiraling circularity. See APEX
 Exports, 777 F.3d at 1379 & n.2. It is therefore a necessary
 implication of the antidumping duty statute itself that
 such duties cannot come within § 1677a(c)(2)(A). See
 United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948) (“No rule of
 construction necessitates our acceptance of an interpreta-
 tion resulting in patently absurd consequences.”). There is
 no such circularity problem with recognizing that the Proc-
 lamation 9705 duty on imports is a “United States import
 dut[y].”
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     Commerce similarly treats countervailing duties as
 categorically excluded from “United States import duties.”
 AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 594, 607–08
 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997). But there is no immediately evident
 circularity problem, and we have not addressed whether
 such treatment is proper. Commerce’s practice in this re-
 gard thus does not undermine the conclusion here.
      Commerce’s determination in SWR Korea, involving a
 proclamation that imposed duties under § 201, and our de-
 cision in Wheatland upholding Commerce’s decision, also
 do not preclude our view or Commerce’s decision here.
 Commerce did use some categorical language in SWR Ko-
 rea. 69 Fed. Reg. at 19,161 (“In conclusion, Commerce will
 not deduct 201 duties from U.S. prices in calculating dump-
 ing margins because 201 duties are not ‘United States im-
 port duties’ within the meaning of the statute.”). But,
 importantly, its rationale for excluding the proclamation’s
 duties from “United States import duties” depended ex-
 pressly on the language and nature of the particular proc-
 lamation at issue, Proclamation 7529. Id. at 19,160 (noting
 that “any adjustment for the potential overlap between 201
 and AD remedies is to be made by the President in setting
 the level of the 201 duties” and that Commerce cannot “up-
 set that balance” “[o]nce the President has struck” it); id.
 (highlighting that there was “absolutely no indication in
 [Proclamation 7529] placing 201 duties on certain imports
 of steel that the President believed that Commerce effec-
 tively would increase those duties by taking them into ac-
 count in calculating subsequent dumping margins”).
 Before this court, moreover, the government took pains to
 argue that Commerce’s decision was perfectly consistent
 with Proclamation 7529.           Wheatland, Nos. 2006-
 1524, -1525, United States Opening Br. at 41–42 (arguing
 that the “trial court made the further implausible assump-
 tion that Commerce, a Department of the Executive
 Branch, flouted the President’s intent”). We likewise relied
 on     Commerce’s       proclamation-specific     reasoning,
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 Wheatland, 495 F.3d at 1365, and other aspects of Procla-
 mation 7529, id. at 1364 (discussing the President’s “intent
 regarding the calculation of antidumping margin at the
 time [he] imposed § 201 safeguard duties”); id. at 1364–65
 (discussing the particular “§ 201 safeguard duties” imposed
 in Proclamation 7529).
     In these circumstances, the present matter is properly
 distinguished from the relied-on § 201 decisions at least be-
 cause of the difference in the presidential proclamations at
 issue. As discussed above, Proclamation 9705 requires
 that its duty be treated as a “United States import dut[y]”
 to be subtracted under § 1677a(c)(2)(A). In contrast, there
 was no comparable language in Proclamation 7529, and in
 light of a background recognition concerning potential
 overlap of § 201 duties and antidumping duties, Commerce
 found no implication that the Proclamation 7529 duties im-
 posed should be subtracted so that they would add to, and
 not be substantially or completely offset by, reductions in
 the antidumping duties. In the present matter, as in the
 earlier one, the duty’s treatment under § 1677a(c)(2)(A) is
 effectively determined by the President in exercising the
 broad power to shape the particular duty imposition, as
 Commerce suggested it should be, in a passage in SWR Ko-
 rea that we quoted in Wheatland.
                              C
     The foregoing analysis is enough for us to uphold Com-
 merce’s decision here. We do not decide whether the same
 result could soundly rest on distinctions between § 232 and
 the § 201 regime more generally, and the distinction be-
 tween “normal” and “special” duties, articulated by Com-
 merce and approved by the Trade Court here. That
 approach presents challenges that we may avoid. The
 Commerce decision sufficiently rests on the proclamation-
 specific basis set forth above. See J.A. 2399–400.
     We also do not decide whether our Wheatland conclu-
 sion about ambiguity at Chevron’s step one is subject to
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 question based on intervening developments about, at
 least, the fullness of the statutory analysis required at that
 step. See, e.g., SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348,
 1358 (2018) (stating that “whether Chevron should remain
 is a question we may leave for another day” and concluding
 that Chevron did not apply because “after applying tradi-
 tional tools of interpretation here,” the Court was “left with
 no uncertainty that could warrant deference”); Kisor v.
 Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414–15 (2019) (in case concerning
 Auer deference regarding interpretation of a regulation,
 citing Chevron to clarify the Auer standard as permitting
 deference to an agency interpretation only if “after ex-
 hausting all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction, the reg-
 ulation is genuinely ambiguous” (citation omitted)). The
 best interpretation of the statute, as relevant in this case,
 supports Commerce’s decision, making it unnecessary to
 apply the Chevron framework. See Nicely v. United States,
 23 F.4th 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2022); Chudik v. Hirshfeld,
 987 F.3d 1033, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Further considera-
 tion of Chevron and other issues can await other cases,
 such as one, if it arises, in which Commerce applies its
 broader language in SWR Korea to deny subtraction under
 § 1677a(c)(2)(A) to a § 201-based duty even if the proclama-
 tion imposing it insists that it is to be supplemental to an-
 tidumping duties.
                               III
     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the specific
 duty imposed by the President in Proclamation 9705 was
 properly treated by the President’s subordinate, the Secre-
 tary of Commerce, as a “United States import dut[y]” under
 § 1677a(c)(2)(A). We therefore affirm the judgment of the
 Trade Court.
      The parties shall bear their own costs.
                         AFFIRMED