Court Opinion

ID: 9554359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 18:11:31.886742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:17.248060
License: Public Domain

J-S19004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  DELAINE ANDREWS                              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  BERNICE AND TIMOTHY BARNES                   :   No. 1046 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered June 27, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s):
                            2019 CV 8624-DJ

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                          FILED AUGUST 08, 2023

       Appellant, Delaine Andrews, appeals pro se from the trial court’s June

27, 2022 order that, inter alia, found that she did not qualify for in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) status, and dismissed her appeal from an arbitration award.

We affirm.

       The trial court provided the following summary of this matter:
       The instant case arises from a landlord[/]tenant dispute initially
       filed before the Honorable Magisterial District Judge Paul T. Zozos,
       MDJ 12-2-05. At Docket No. MJ-12205-CV-0000061-2019[,] Ms.
       Andrews named [Appellees, Bernice and Timothy Barnes,] as
       defendants.[1]     At Docket No. MJ-12205-CV-0000083-2019,
       [Appellees] named Ms. Andrews as a defendant. After hearing the
       cases together, Judge Zozos entered judgment in favor of
       [Appellees] and against Ms. Andrews in the amount of
       $4,150.00[.]

       Ms. Andrews appealed the magisterial district judgment to the trial
       court. Ms. Andrews filed a Complaint[,] which alleged Breach of
       Contract, Sewer and Trash Rents, Tenant Damages and
____________________________________________

1 By way of background, Ms. Andrews was Appellees’ landlord.
J-S19004-23

     Recoverable Litigation Costs Pursuant to the Terms of the Lease.
     (Delaine Andrews v. Timothy Barnes and Bernice Barnes,
     Docket No. 2019 CV 8624). She did not seek [IFP] status in
     connection with [her] appeal from the magisterial district
     judgment.

     [Appellees] filed a Complaint against Ms. Andrews asserting
     Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, Breach of Lease,
     Violation of the Landlord Tenant Act, and Violation of the
     Consumer Protection Law…. (Bernice Barnes and Timothy
     Barnes v. Delaine Andrews, Docket No. 2019 CV 8628 DJ).

     The parties engaged in a complex series of cross-preliminary
     objections.1
        1 We refrain from reciting the history of the preliminary
        objections because they are not controlling to the issue sub
        judice.

     On January 19, 2021, [Appellees] filed Motions to Consolidate
     Dockets at Docket No. 2019 CV 8624 and 2019 CV 8628. Ms.
     Andrews filed no opposition at either docket. Accordingly, on May
     3, 2021, we ordered that the captions be consolidated at Docket
     No. 2019 CV 8624 and that no further filings be docketed to
     Docket No. 2019 CV 8628 DJ.

     The cases proceeded to arbitration. By Report and Award of
     Arbitrators dated September 8, 2021, filed September 10, 2021,
     the arbitration panel found in favor of Ms. Andrew[s] in the
     amount of $1,117.92[,] and in favor of [Appellees] in the amount
     of $2,525.00, which constituted a new award to [Appellees] of
     $1,407.08.

     On September 30, 2021, Ms. Andrews filed a Petition to Proceed
     [IFP], which she verified, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (Crime of
     Unsworn Falsification to Authorities). In the attached affidavit in
     support of her petition, Ms. Andrews stated that she was, because
     of her financial condition, unable to pay the fees and costs
     associated with this case and was unable to obtain funds from
     anyone, including family and friends.        The Affidavit further
     represented that she was, at the time, unemployed and owned
     real estate valued at $40,000. Based upon … Ms. Andrews[’s]
     verified statements, the court granted Ms. Andrews [IFP] status
     by Order filed September 30, 2021. On the same date, Ms.
     Andrews filed a Notice of Appeal from [the] Award of Board of
     Arbitrators which stated that application had been made to

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       proceed IFP. (Notice of Appeal from Board of Arbitrators, Docket
       No. 2019 CV 8624-DJ, September 30, 2021).[2]

       On November 22, 2021, [Appellees] filed a Motion to Strike Appeal
       in which they asserted that[,] although Ms. Andrews stated in her
       Petition to Proceed [IFP] that she owned real estate valued at
       $40,000, public records reflect that she owns seven properties
       with a total value in excess of $40,000.[3, 4] [Appellees] asserted
       that Ms. Andrews falsely reported the value of the real estate and
       that without IFP status, she would have been required to pay $400
       to appeal the Report and Award of Arbitrators as arbitrators’
       compensation. [Appellees] asserted that Ms. Andrews’[s] appeal
       was therefore invalid and should be stricken.

       On December 9, 2021, Ms. Andrews filed a Motion to
       Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice [Appellees’] Motion to Strike Appeal.
       On the same date, Ms. Andrews filed an Answer/Reply in
       Opposition to Strike Appeal. [She also filed a Reply/Reply Brief in
       Opposition to Motion to Strike Appeal.]

       We conducted argument on February 22, 2022, on [Appellees’]
       Motion to Strike Appeal. In support of their argument, counsel for
       [Appellees] presented exhibits regarding seven properties which
       [Appellees] asserted Ms. Andrews owned at the time she filed the
       [petition for] IFP.[5]   We granted [Appellees’] leave to file
       documents following the argument which would reflect the status
       of payment of property taxes on those properties. We denied Ms.
       Andrews’[s] Motion to Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice [Appellees’]
       Motion to Strike Appeal.

       On February 25, 2022, [Appellees] filed of record Property Taxes
       of Plaintiff Delaine Andrews for Dauphin County.

____________________________________________

2 Ms. Andrews only filed this appeal at Docket No. 2019 CV 8624-DJ.

3 Of the seven properties, Appellees asserted that Ms. Andrews owned four of

them outright. N.T., 2/22/22, at 3.

4 The docket reflects that no activity occurred between the court’s September

30, 2021 order granting Ms. Andrews leave to proceed IFP, and Appellees’
November 22, 2021 motion to strike.

5 The trial court also permitted Ms. Andrews to submit exhibits.

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     On March 10, 2022, we ordered as follows:

       The [c]ourt having reviewed the documents of [Appellees]
       and of [Ms.] Andrews submitted at oral argument held [on]
       February 22, 2022, on the respective parties’ motions, and
       the supplemental exhibits regarding [Ms.] Andrews’[s]
       property taxes submitted by [Appellees], the court finds
       that inquiry into the issue of whether [Ms.] Andrews was
       entitled to proceed [IFP] requires an evidentiary hearing.
       See, e.g., Kovalev v. Step[ansky, 240 A.3d 955 (Pa.
       Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum)].

       [Ms.] Andrews filed a Petition to Proceed [IFP] on
       September 29, 2019[,] pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904
       (Crime of Unsworn Falsification to Authorities). Accordingly,
       inasmuch as [Ms.] Andrews will have the opportunity to
       present testimony under oath regarding said Petition, [Ms.]
       Andrews is hereby apprised of the right to seek
       representation related to presentation of testimony during
       such hearing, which will be held on April 29, 2022[,] at 9:15
       … a.m., in Courtroom No. 1, Fifth Floor, Dauphin County
       Courthouse.

       [Ms.] Andrews shall bear the burden of proof as to whether
       the September 29, 2019[] Petition to Proceed [IFP] was true
       and correct[,] and whether she is a party without financial
       resources to pay the costs of litigation pursuant to
       Pa.R.C[iv].P. 240(b).

     We convened for the April 29, 2022[] hearing. Counsel for
     [Appellees] appeared. Ms. Andrews did not appear. [Appellees],
     by their counsel, asserted that the February 25, 2022[] filing,
     Property Taxes of Plaintiff Delaine Andrews, demonstrates that
     Ms. Andrews owns seven properties having a total value of
     $384,000. The documents further reflected that Ms. Andrews paid
     property taxes in 2021[,] which totaled $3,112.07. We issued our
     ruling in open court on [Appellees’] Motion to Strike Appeal and
     stated the reasons therefore.

     On June 27, 2022, we filed the following written [o]rder:

       Upon hearings conducted February 22, 2022, and April 29,
       2022, we found the testimony of [Appellees] to be credible.

       We found non-credible the testimony of [Ms.] Andrews that
       she had little income and qualified for [IFP] status. [Ms.]

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          Andrews failed to appear at the April 29, 2022[] hearing set
          for the purpose of taking additional testimony regarding
          [Ms.] Andrews’[s] evidence in support of her claim for [IFP]
          status.

          We find that she does not qualify for [IFP] status and did
          not so qualify at the time she appealed the September 8,
          2021[] arbitration award of $1,407.08 in favor of
          [Appellees].

          The September 8, 2021[] arbitration award of $1,407.08 in
          favor of [Appellees] is AFFIRMED and [Ms.] Andrews’[s]
          appeal of that award is DISMISSED.

       Ms. Andrews filed the instant appeal.[6] On September 2, 2022,
       Ms. Andrews filed a Motion to Correct (Material Omissions) (sic)
       Lower Court Record[,] to which [Appellees] filed an Answer. By
       our Order of October 3, 2022, we granted in part and denied in
       part the Motion. We granted the Motion to the extent that we
       supplemented the record with documents which Ms. Andrews
       handed to the [c]ourt at the February 22, 2022[] proceeding. We
       did not rely upon those documents as they lacked evidentiary
       foundation.

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 11/4/22, at 1-5 (some internal citations omitted;

emphasis and capitalization in original).

       The trial court later issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion. In its opinion, it

referenced Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240(j)(1), which states that,
       [i]f, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or
       proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition
       for leave to proceed [IFP], the court prior to acting upon the
       petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the
       allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the action,
       proceeding or appeal is frivolous.

____________________________________________

6 The trial court did not order Ms. Andrews to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and she did not do
so.

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Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1). The trial court went on to recognize that Rule 240(j)(1)

allows for dismissal for untrue statements before an action proceeds. TCO at

8. Nevertheless, it stated that it did not “read Rule 240(j)(1) to preclude us

from considering a claim of false representation raised during the pendency

of the action.”   Id.   It reasoned that ignoring such claims “would be

tantamount to knowingly allowing a case to proceed having been commenced

based upon false statements without sanction.” Id.

      Presently, on appeal, Ms. Andrews raises eight questions for our review,

which we set forth verbatim:
      1.Error of Law as a matter of law : Did the trial court Error
      in its actions in the action detailed in theJune 27, 2022
      court Order and who’s actions and decisions were a
      misapplication of law and that were an error of law. More
      specifically it was an error of law for the trial court judge
      to “act” (to undermine) on an approved IFP (in forma
      pauperis) application after it was approved by the courts.

      2.Did the trial court have authority to “act on” the
      September 30, 2022 IFP approval order after 30 days had
      lapsed after the entry of the order?.

      3.Did the trial court Erred as a matter of law : Once
      Appellant Andrews petition for IFP had been approved did
      the trial court have authorization under the law to hold a
      IFP evidentiary hearing on the same identical IFP
      application and subsequently determine that Appellant was
      not entitled to IFP status when the court had approved
      Appellant IFP status at the time of filing Appellant
      Arbitration appeal

      4.Did the court Error as a matter of law regarding the “denial
      IFP” remedy provisions in 240 ( C) 1 (ii) If the Appellate Court
      finds that the trial court had authorization under the law to
      hold an IFP evidentiary hearing and subsequently
      determine that Appellant was not entitled to IFP status. then
      the trial court erred in their remedy in invalidating Andrews

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       appeal and dismissing Appellant arbitration appeal and the
       remedy was manifestly abusive and contrary to the law .

       5.Did the court Error as a matter of law regarding the “denial
       IFP” remedy provisions in 240( C) 1 (ii) If the Appellate Court
       finds that the trial court had authorization under the law to
       hold an IFP evidentiary hearing and subsequently
       determine that Appellant was not entitled to IFP status. then
       the trial court erred in their remedy in invalidating Andrews
       appeal and dismissing Appellant arbitration appeal and the
       remedy was manifestly abusive and contrary to the law .

       6.Did the Trial Court Erred as a matter of law in that the
       Evidence of Record does not reflect that in anyway was
       Appellant Andrews untruthful on her IFP application The
       trial court was manifestly unreasonable and abused
       discretion because the evidence that the trial court relied
       on wholly does not support that Andrews had the ability to
       pay the Arbitration filing fee in September 2021 .

       7 .Did the trial Court demonstrate bias, and ill will
       prejudicing Appellant thus violating Constitutional rights?

       8.Did the trial Court Error when they failed to grant
       Appellant Andrews unopposed Motion to Strike Barnes
       Motion to Strike causing prejudice in this case?

Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 2-3.7

                                      First Issue
____________________________________________

7 Ms. Andrews’s brief fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).    See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are
questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive
type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein,
followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed
pertinent.”). Although she raises eight issues in her Statement of Questions
Involved, she does not divide the Argument section of brief into eight
corresponding parts. See Donaldson v. Davidson Bros., Inc., 144 A.3d 93,
99 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2016) (determining that the appellant failed to comply with
Rule 2119(a) where the appellant’s brief did not “present and develop eight
arguments in support of the eight questions raised”). While we admonish Ms.
Andrews for failing to follow Rule 2119(a), her noncompliance does not
prevent our review. We will therefore overlook her violation of Rule 2119(a)
and address the issues she raises in her Statement of Questions Involved.

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      In Ms. Andrews’s first issue, she argues that the trial court erred in

acting on her IFP petition after it had already been approved by another judge.

She says “[n]either the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure or Pennsylvania

statutory law provide authorization for the Honorable Judge Cherry (another

trial court judge) to make a new finding on a previously granted IFP [petition]

dated September 30, 2021 by the Honorable Judge McNally (another trial

court judge)….” Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 7.

      No relief is due. “Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”             Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

Problematically, Ms. Andrews does not indicate where she raised this claim

before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (“Where under the applicable

law an issue is not reviewable on appeal unless raised or preserved below, the

argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith or in a footnote

thereto, either a specific cross-reference to the page or pages of the statement

of the case which set forth the information relating thereto as required by

Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), or substantially the same information.”); Commonwealth

v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 502 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[I]t is not the

responsibility of this Court to scour the record to prove that an appellant has

raised an issue before the trial court, thereby preserving it for appellate

review.”) (citations omitted).

      Further, our own review of the record does not indicate that Ms. Andrews

raised this issue below.   To review, Appellees filed a motion to strike Ms.

Andrews’s appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240. See

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Motion to Strike Appeal, 11/22/21, at 1 (specifically citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(b),

(j)(1)); id. at ¶ 14 (“Since [Ms.] Andrews falsely reported her value in real

estate in the IFP petition and she is able to pay the costs of litigation, this

appeal was granted pursuant to an invalid IFP.”). Ms. Andrews then filed a

Motion to Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice Appellees’ Motion to Strike Appeal.

Therein, she asserted that Appellees’ motion to strike appeal was procedurally

defective because they erroneously mailed the motion to the wrong P.O. Box.

In addition, she baldly claimed that Appellees untimely filed their motion to

strike, but she set forth no authority or legal analysis in support of that

assertion. Notably, she did not complain that the trial court could not act on

her IFP petition after another judge had already granted it.

      In addition, Ms. Andrews filed an Answer/Reply in Opposition to Motion

to Strike Appeal. In that filing, she again did not raise that the trial court

could not act on her IFP petition after it had already been granted.

      She also submitted a Reply/Reply Brief in Opposition to Motion to Strike

Appeal. In this reply, she reiterated her argument that the motion to strike

was procedurally defective because it had been sent to the wrong P.O. box,

and again claimed that Appellees’ motion to strike was untimely without

providing any authority or legal analysis in support.          She additionally

maintained that she had insufficient funds at the time she filed her petition to

proceed IFP, and that her estimate of the value of her real estate took into

consideration the repairs the properties need. Finally, without any elaboration

or supporting legal authority, she claimed that striking her appeal is unduly

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prejudicial as it puts her out of court, and she stated that her appeal should

not be deemed invalid because she completed the petition to proceed IFP

truthfully, to the best of her ability, and in compliance with the relevant rule.

Amidst these arguments, she did not raise that the trial court could not now

act on her petition after it had already been granted.

      Last, our review of the transcript from the February 22, 2022 oral

argument does not reveal that Ms. Andrews brought up this specific issue

there either. Further, she did not raise it at the April 29, 2022 hearing because

she did not attend that proceeding. As such, this issue is waived.

                                 Second Issue

      In Ms. Andrews’s second issue, she contends that the trial court did not

have the authority to act on the September 30, 2021 IFP approval order after

30 days had lapsed after the entry of the order. Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 8-9.

Citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, she says that the trial court may only modify a

previous order within 30 days after its entry, and after that 30-day period, the

trial court’s jurisdiction is divested. Id.

      Though Ms. Andrews did not raise this issue below, we will address it

since it ostensibly raises an issue of jurisdiction. See Borough of Media v.

County of Delaware, 82 A.3d 509, 512 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (“Section 5505

of the Judicial Code authorizes a court, upon notice to the parties, to modify

or rescind an order within 30 days of its issuance. This 30–day limitation is

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jurisdictional and cannot be waived by the parties.”) (cleaned up).8 Section

5505 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a

court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30

days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court,

if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505.

Importantly, “Section 5505 applies only to final orders.” Manufacturers and

Traders Trust Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology, SC, 108 A.3d 913, 917

n.3 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court’s September

30, 2021 order granting Ms. Andrews IFP status was not a final order.

Therefore, the 30-day time limit of Section 5505 did not apply to it, and Ms.

Andrews’s argument fails.

                                        Third Issue

       In   Ms.   Andrews’s     third    issue,     she   argues   that   “[n]either   the

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure or Pennsylvania statutory law provide

authorization for a trial court judge to hold an evidentiary hearing on the same

identical IFP petition once the courts have approved an IFP application.” Ms.

Andrews’s Brief at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, Ms. Andrews

does not point us to where she raised this claim below.                   See Pa.R.A.P.

2119(e), supra; Baker, supra. Further, our own review of the record does

____________________________________________

8“Although decisions by the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this
Court, they may be persuasive.” Cresci Const. Services, Inc. v. Martin,
64 A.3d 254, 256 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

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not show that she presented it to the trial court. Accordingly, it is waived.

See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), supra.

                          Fourth and Fifth Issues

      Ms. Andrews’s fourth and fifth issues duplicate each other and,

therefore, we address them together. Ms. Andrews complains that the trial

court should not have dismissed her appeal, but instead permitted her to pay

the filing fee. Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 2-3, 10. We deem this argument waived

on multiple grounds. First, she does not point us to where she specifically

raised this argument below. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e), supra; Baker, supra.

Second, our own review of the record does not show that she specifically

raised it below.   See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), supra.        Third, she sets forth no

developed argument that the trial court should have permitted her to pay the

filing fee rather than dismissing her action. See Commonwealth v. Hardy,

918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“This Court will not act as counsel and

will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects

in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may

dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.”) (citations

omitted). Thus, for all these reasons, it is waived.

                                 Sixth Issue

      In Ms. Andrews’s sixth issue, she claims that the trial court erred and/or

abused its discretion in concluding that she was untruthful on her IFP

application.   See Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 10.    She asserts that she offered

evidence to substantiate her indebtedness and the poor condition of her

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properties. Id. at 11. She challenges the assertion that her seven properties

have a value of $384,000, which she says was nothing more than a ‘Zestimate’

from Zillow. See id. at 12. She also says that the fact that she paid property

taxes on the properties in March of 2021 does not mean that she could pay

the $400 filing fee to appeal the arbitration award six months later in

September of 2021.      Id. at 12-13.    Moreover, she claims that her self-

employment income only amounts to $500-800/month, as her income was

severely impacted by the Covid-19 crisis. Id. at 13.

      We discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

determination that Ms. Andrews was untruthful on her IFP petition. Initially,

Ms. Andrews failed to appear at the April 29, 2022 hearing, which was

scheduled for the specific purpose of taking additional evidence regarding her

IFP status, including her testimony. TCO at 5, 7-8. To the extent Ms. Andrews

argues that she offered evidence at the February 22, 2022 proceeding of her

indebtedness and the conditions of her properties, the trial court reasonably

explained that it did not rely on such evidence as it lacked an evidentiary

foundation. Id. at 5. Instead, the trial court weighed the evidence presented

by Appellees, specifically that Ms. Andrews owned seven properties and was

in good standing on her tax bills for them, which led it to the conclusion that

Ms. Andrews provided false information on her IFP petition. Id. at 4-5, 7-8.

Given the record before it, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred or

abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion.

                               Seventh Issue

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      In Ms. Andrews’s seventh issue, she argues that the trial court

demonstrated bias and ill-will toward her, thus violating her constitutional

rights. Most of her argument on this issue, however, rehashes the evidence

before the trial court and argues that it did not support that she could pay the

filing fee in September of 2021. See Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 11-13. Because

this argument fits better with her Sixth Issue, we incorporated her assertions

into our consideration of her Sixth Issue. Therefore, to the extent she argues

in her Seventh Issue that the evidence did not support that she could pay the

filing fee, we reject this argument for the reasons set forth in her Sixth Issue,

supra. Further, to the extent she argues that the trial court demonstrated

bias and ill-will toward her, violating her constitutional rights, we deem this

claim waived for lack of development. See Hardy, supra.

                                    Eighth Issue

      Finally, in Ms. Andrews’s eighth issue, she advances that the trial court

erred when it failed to grant her unopposed Motion to Strike/Dismiss with

Prejudice Appellees’ Motion to Strike Appeal. She claims that the trial court

never ruled on this motion. Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 13.

      The record belies this argument. At the February 22, 2022 proceeding,

the trial court denied her motion.      N.T., 2/22/22, at 20 (“Based on the

evidence that was presented here[,] your motion is denied. … The reason for

my decision is there is a great amount of evidence which may call into question

whether or not such conduct was performed by [Ms. Andrews]. The [c]ourt

isn’t ready to render a verdict, but certainly there was not evidence presented

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by [Ms. Andrews] to show that this motion to strike should be denied and

stricken.”).

        Further, we are unpersuaded that the trial court erred in denying the

motion.    We reiterate that, in her Motion to Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice

Appellees’ Motion to Strike Appeal, Ms. Andrews presented two arguments.

First, she claimed that Appellees’ motion to strike her appeal was procedurally

defective because they erroneously mailed the motion to the wrong P.O. Box.

However, she admitted at the February 22, 2022 proceeding that she received

the motion in time for her to file a response. Id. at 21-22. Thus, we are

unconvinced by her argument that relief is due on this basis.

        Second, Ms. Andrews baldly advanced that Appellees’ motion to strike

was untimely. However, she provided no authority or legal analysis to support

this claim. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying her

motion on this basis either. Further, to the extent she raises a legal theory to

support her assertion of untimeliness on appeal, we deem such an argument

waived. See Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 630 n.8 (Pa.

1999) (finding issue waived where the appellant raised a legal theory for the

first time on appeal to the Superior Court). Thus, all of Ms. Andrews’s issues

fail.

        Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 08/08/2023

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