Court Opinion

ID: 9719192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:45:36.144197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:05.100427
License: Public Domain

FOLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. It is my view that the search warrant should be sustained and the evidence admitted at the trial. In State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 (Minn.1985), the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), in sustaining a search warrant. The supreme court said:
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Supreme Court ruled that the presence of probable cause should be determined under a “totality óf the circumstances” test:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a ’ particular place.
Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be “paid great deference by reviewing courts” and a reviewing court should not review that determination de novo. The fourth amendment requires only that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for * * * concluding] that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Id. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331, quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit under the totality of the circumstances test, courts must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation. Even if each component is judged unsubstantial, the components viewed together may reveal in the informant’s tip “an internal coherence that [gives] weight to the whole.” Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 734, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2089, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984). Furthermore, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be “largely determined by the preference to be accorded warrants.” Id., quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).
Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268.
This court has rather consistently followed the “totality of the circumstances” test set out in Wiley and following Gates. As recently as October 3, 1989 in State v. Reese, 446 N.W.2d 173 (Minn.Ct.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 1989), this court said:
The reviewing court “must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation.” The warrant must be upheld as long as there is “an internal coherence that [gives] weight to the whole.” Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268, quot*230ing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 734, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2089, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984).
Id. at 177.
Here, the affidavit of the sheriff contains the following information:
The CRI told Sheriff Schultz that the CRI had seen some “crack”, meaning cocaine, at the McCloskey residence within the last week. Sheriff Schultz inquired of the CRI how the CRI knew that the substance was in fact “crack” or cocaine. The CRI responded that the substance was in chunk form, was light colored, somewhat whitish, and was approximately 2½ inches in diameter. The CRI further stated that Jeffrey McClos-key was talking about the substance and talked in terms of it being coke. Your Affiant is aware that the description provided by the CRI accurately describes the type of cocaine which has been discovered in recent times in the area, being in raw chunk form.
The CRI further stated that it had purchased marijuana from Jeffrey McCloskey, but stated that the CRI was upset with McCloskey because the CRI had reason to believe that McCloskey was selling controlled substances to juveniles. While the CRI agreed to assist Sheriff Schultz in his investigation, the CRI was very concerned about the safety of the CRI, and declined to provide identification. The CRI stated that it would return to the sheriffs department the next day to further assist Sheriff Schultz in his investigation of this matter.
One day later, the CRI again came to the Isanti County Sheriffs Department, and met with Sheriff Schultz. When Sheriff Schultz requested to have the CRI show him where the McCloskey residence was, the CRI agreed, and rode with Sheriff Schultz to the vicinity of the McCloskey residence, commenting on the way there that the residence had a detached garage. Upon arriving, Sheriff Schultz saw a small residence down a long driveway a distance south of the Isanti hardware store, which did in fact have a detached garage. The CRI also gave Sheriff Schultz the telephone number which was used to contact McClos-key of 444-9456.
In his investigation, Sheriff Schultz looked up the name of Jeffrey McClos-key, and found that McCloskey did live in Isanti, and had a telephone number in the local directory of 444-9456. Sheriff Schultz also learned that the Isanti County Assessor’s Office showed that Jeffrey and Robin McCloskey owned a house in the City of Isanti at Route 4, Box 1-A. The house described by the CRI met the description of the house owned by Jeffrey and Robin McCloskey contained in the records of the Isanti County Assessor’s Office. The CRI further related to Sheriff Schultz that McCloskey had a number of guns, including a shotgun and a long rifle. The CRI stated that McCloskey sometimes carried a seven inch blade in his boot. The CRI further related that McCloskey had a large iguana in his house, which weighed several dozen pounds.
Your Affiant then checked on police sources regarding any illegal activities on the part of Jeffrey McCloskey. The Isanti County Sheriff’s Department contact card showed a DWI arrest in 1982, a probation violation warrant in 1983, a Ramsey County warrant in 1986 for expired plates, and a 1986 Hennepin County warrant for speeding. The traffic record showed McCloskey to be suspended several times for unpaid fines, a no insurance conviction, a DWI, and several speeds. The criminal history showed a 1975 arrest by the St. Paul Police Department for criminal damage to property, for which the disposition was unknown. The record also showed a 1977 arrest by the St. Paul Police Department for vehicle theft, which matter was not prosecuted.
Your Affiant has reason to credit the information which the CRI provided to your Affiant because the information provided included information against the CRI's penal interest, the information contained self verifying detail, your Affi-ant was able to verify certain elements of the information provided, and the CRI *231provided a valid reason for disclosing the information to law enforcement authorities, namely, concern over the distribution of controlled substances to juveniles.
Since the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a reviewing court should not make a de novo determination, it is my view “that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for * * * concluding] that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.’ ” Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331). Applying the rule that each component of the affidavit should not be reviewed in isolation but viewed together, the tips of the informant provided “ ‘an internal coherence that [gives] weight to the whole.’ ” Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268 (quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 734, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2089, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984)). Even if this case could be considered a doubtful or marginal one, that resolution should be determined by the preference to be accorded search warrants, and the search warrant sustained.
The fact that the informant is referred to in a number of places as “CRI,” meaning confidential reliable informant, should not defeat the validity of the search warrant when it is viewed in its entirety, and the information reported by the informant that led to the discovery of the evidence was accurate. The majority seems to make much of the point that because it was the first time the informant was reporting information to the sheriff, the sheriff should not have referred to the person as CRI. Based upon the information furnished to the sheriff, he could reasonably rely on the tips provided and the neutral magistrate could properly issue a search warrant. So far as I understand the record, identifying the informant as CRI was never raised in the lower court, and whether the informant was a man or woman hardly seems necessary to support the affidavit because the information relied upon was proved accurate.
In any event, it may be an appropriate time for the Minnesota Supreme Court to consider adopting the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). We have a situation where the sheriff conducted a search under the authority of a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, and this normally establishes that the law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search. In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 3427, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21), the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search acted in objective reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that is subsequently determined to lack probable cause.
It seems to me that the majority strikes down the search warrant because the components of the warrant were considered in isolation rather than as a whole. But even if under the totality of the circumstances test the warrant lacks probable cause, the good faith exception should be applied and the exclusionary rule be held inapplicable. I would sustain the search warrant.