Court Opinion

ID: 9958357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 00:06:16.721813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.270294
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                      Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                             STATE OF MINNESOTA
                             IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                   A23-0844

                                 State of Minnesota,
                        by its Commissioner of Transportation,
                                    Respondent,

                                          vs.

                              Richard R. Compart, et al.,
                                 Respondents Below,

                          Compart’s Boar Store, Inc., et al.,
                                    Appellants.

                                Filed April 8, 2024
                              Reversed and remanded
                                  Larson, Judge

                            Nicollet County District Court
                               File No. 52-CV-12-23

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Erik M. Johnson, William Young, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent commissioner)

Stuart T. Alger, Alger Property Law, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants
Compart’s Boar Store, Inc., et al.)

      Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Ede, Judge.

                         NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARSON, Judge

      Following a condemnation proceeding, respondent Minnesota Department of

Transportation (MnDOT) took title to approximately 12 acres of land appellants (the
Comparts) 1 previously owned. The district court appointed three commissioners who held

a hearing to determine damages. The Comparts hired legal counsel and several experts to

represent them at the hearing. Because the commissioners’ final damages determination

was more than 40% greater than MnDOT’s last written offer prior to filing the

condemnation petition, the Comparts moved the district court for “reasonable attorney fees,

litigation expenses, appraisal fees, expert fees, and other related costs.” See Minn. Stat.

§ 117.031(a) (2022). The district court granted the Comparts’ motion in part, but did not

award the full amount of fees, costs, and expenses requested. The Comparts appeal,

arguing the district court abused its discretion in its calculation of appropriate fees, costs,

and expenses. Because the district court abused its discretion when it misapplied the law

as it relates to fees, costs, and expenses, we reverse and remand.

                                           FACTS

       In 2011, MnDOT determined that it needed to acquire approximately 12 acres of

land (parcel 2) from a tract the Comparts owned in order to improve U.S. Highway 14. 2 In

compliance with Minn. Stat. § 117.036 (2022), MnDOT hired an independent appraiser.

On November 18, 2011, consistent with the appraiser’s recommendation, MnDOT sent the

Comparts a letter offering to pay $59,800 in compensation for taking parcel 2. The

Comparts rejected MnDOT’s offer, and MnDOT commenced condemnation proceedings.

1
  For ease of reference, appellants James A. Compart, Diana C. Compart, Dean M.
Compart, Kaye L. Compart, Christian R. Compart, Rochelle R. Compart, and Compart’s
Boar Store, Inc., will be referred to collectively as the Comparts.
2
  Sometimes referred to as Trunk Highway 14.

                                              2
       On April 20, 2012, the district court issued an order granting MnDOT’s

condemnation petition and appointing three commissioners to determine the damages for

the Comparts. In accordance with the “quick-take” procedure, see Minn. Stat. § 117.042

(2022), on May 9, 2012, MnDOT paid the Comparts $59,800 and took title and possession

of parcel 2. At the time of the taking, the property was used exclusively for agriculture,

and its zoning classification was “Agricultural Preservation.”

       A little over a year later, on June 24, 2013, the Comparts hired legal counsel to

represent them in the condemnation proceeding. The Comparts also engaged appraisers to

provide a damages appraisal and two development-planning experts to help prove damages

caused by the taking.

       On April 27, 2017, the Comparts sent MnDOT a letter offering to settle the matter

for $587,000, based largely on parcel 2’s “development potential.” MnDOT responded on

May 16, 2017, counteroffering with $150,000. MnDOT articulated its view that the

Comparts’ experts overvalued the land because parcel 2 was “outside the city limits and it

[would] likely be many years before . . . the development . . . would be likely to occur.”

       Following unsuccessful settlement negotiations, and after several pandemic-related

delays, the commissioners held a hearing on September 22-23, 2021. Prior to the hearing,

the parties exchanged appraisal reports as required by Minn. Stat. § 117.036, subd. 4.

MnDOT provided an updated appraisal report, which valued the damage to the Comparts

at $96,600 as of May 9, 2012. The Comparts provided an appraisal, which valued

condemnation damages at $673,500. Following the hearing, on October 22, 2021, the

                                             3
commissioners made their report, awarding the Comparts $125,000 for parcel 2, and $0 for

reasonable appraisal fees.

       Because the $125,000 final award was more than 40% greater than MnDOT’s last

written offer prior to filing the condemnation petition ($59,800), the Comparts were

entitled to “reasonable attorney fees, litigation expenses, appraisal fees, other experts fees,

and other related costs in addition to other compensation and fees authorized by this

chapter.” See Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a). On July 11, 2022, the Comparts sent MnDOT a

letter demanding $113,992.52 in attorney fees and $24,857.45 in costs, totaling

$138,849.97. MnDOT declined, and the Comparts brought a motion for attorney fees and

costs in the district court.

       After a hearing, the district court issued its order granting the Comparts’ motion in

part, awarding $9,693.75 in attorney fees and $0 in litigation expenses, appraisal fees, other

experts fees, and other related costs. This appeal follows.

                                        DECISION

       The Comparts argue that the district court erred in applying section 117.031(a) when

it awarded $9,693.75 for attorney fees and $0 for litigation expenses, appraisal fees, other

experts fees, and other related costs. We review a district court’s award under section

117.031(a) for an abuse of discretion. County of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700,

710-11 (Minn. 2013). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on

an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Tapper,

993 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2023) (quoting State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736

(Minn. 2020)).

                                              4
                                             I.

       We first address the Comparts’ argument that the district court abused its discretion

when it awarded $9,693.75 in attorney fees. In condemnation proceedings, “[i]f the final

judgment or award for damages . . . is more than 40 percent greater than [MnDOT’s] last

written offer” prior to filing the condemnation petition, as it was in this case, “the court

shall award the owner reasonable attorney fees.” Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a).

       The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the lodestar method to determine reasonable

attorney fees under section 117.031(a). Cameron, 839 N.W.2d at 711. “The lodestar

method first requires a district court to determine the number of hours reasonably expended

on the litigation and multiply that number by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quotations

omitted). The district “court must consider ‘all relevant circumstances’ when evaluating

the reasonableness of the hours expended” and the hourly rate applied. Id. (quoting State

v. Paulson, 188 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Minn. 1971)). But multiplying the reasonable hours

expended by a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. See id. The district court must

then evaluate “the overall reasonableness of the award” and may adjust the award after

“considering such factors as ‘the time and labor required; the nature and difficulty of the

responsibility assumed; the amount involved and the results obtained; the fees customarily

charged for similar legal services; the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel; and

the fee arrangement existing between counsel and the client.’” Id. (quoting Paulson, 188

N.W.2d at 426).

       Here, the district court evaluated “what work performed in this case was

useful/appropriate.” The district court found the Comparts’ valuation theory “was not

                                             5
particularly well-founded,” and therefore it would be inappropriate to reimburse the fees

accrued in pursuing that theory. But to reduce the attorney fees based on this finding, the

district court did not review the Comparts’ attorney’s invoices to eliminate specific hours,

reduce the overall award to account for limited success, or conduct an analysis of the hours

reasonably expended on the litigation that did not pertain to the valuation theory. See, e.g.,

Cameron, 839 N.W.2d at 711. Instead, the district court picked May 16, 2017, the date

MnDOT offered the Comparts $150,000 to settle their claim, as a cutoff, and summarily

decided that all work performed after that date was not reasonably expended. The district

court did so while acknowledging that it would be inappropriate to measure the Comparts’

success against MnDOT’s settlement offer.

       The Comparts argue the district court abused its discretion for three reasons. First,

the Comparts assert the district court improperly relied on settlement discussions in

assessing the validity of their attorney-fees claim, in violation of Minn. R. Evid. 408. 3

Second, the Comparts contend the district court’s use of settlement communications to

limit the attorney-fees award was inconsistent with the lodestar analysis. Third, the

Comparts argue the district court’s conclusion that the Comparts’ valuation theory was not

well-founded is inconsistent with the facts in the record.

       We agree with the Comparts that the district court’s use of MnDOT’s May 16, 2017

settlement offer to limit the attorney-fees award was inconsistent with the lodestar method.

3
 Because we determine the district court did not appropriately apply the lodestar method,
we do not reach the broader issue of whether a district court violates rule 408 when it
considers settlement negotiations when assessing a claim for attorney fees.

                                              6
While the district court agreed with the Comparts that it would be inappropriate to measure

their success against MnDOT’s May 16, 2017 settlement offer, it appears to have done just

that. Without the settlement offer, we can discern no basis to find all hours billed after that

date were unreasonably expended. Specifically, the district court failed to explain its

reason for discounting all hours after May 16, 2017, rather than focusing on the hours spent

pursuing the valuation theory. Thus, the effect of the district court’s order was to penalize

the Comparts for pursuing their right to a hearing to determine damages.

       Here, the record shows the Comparts’ counsel expended time rebutting MnDOT’s

initial $59,800 damages valuation set forth in the 2011 appraisal to good effect, as

evidenced by the commissioners’ $125,000 damages award.                While the Comparts’

competing valuation theory may have lacked merit, 4 it does not necessarily follow that all

attorney time spent after MnDOT’s May 16, 2017 settlement offer was unreasonably

expended. Certainly, the Comparts’ attorney spent time preparing to rebut MnDOT’s

valuation theory, as MnDOT asked the commissioners to value parcel 2 at $96,600 based

on its updated 2021 appraisal. This is precisely why the lodestar method requires a critical

evaluation of the time an attorney spent on the whole litigation. See Cameron, 839 N.W.2d

at 711 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37).

       Because we conclude that the district court did not appropriately apply the lodestar

method when it decided all work performed after MnDOT’s May 16, 2017 settlement offer

4
 Because we reverse and remand for the district court to reevaluate the attorney-fees award
under the lodestar method, we express no opinion on the district court’s findings with
respect to the valuation theory.

                                              7
was not reasonably expended, we reverse the attorney-fees award and remand to the district

court to conduct a new lodestar analysis consistent with this opinion.

                                               II.

       We next address the Comparts’ argument that the district court abused its discretion

when it awarded $0 in litigation costs, fees, and expenses. As described above, under

section 117.031(a), “[i]f the final judgment or award for damages” in a condemnation

proceeding “is more than 40 percent greater than [MnDOT’s] last written offer” prior to

filing the condemnation petition, as it was here, “the court shall award the owner

reasonable . . . litigation expenses, appraisal fees, other experts fees, and other related

costs.” (Emphasis added.)

       To support its $0 award, the district court made one finding: “As to costs, fees and

expenses, the commissioners awarded the Comparts nothing. The Court does not now see

any reason to overrule the commissioners on that point. The Comparts chose not to appeal

the commissioners’ decision.” We conclude that the district court abused its discretion

when it made this determination for two reasons.

       First, Minn. Stat. § 117.085 (2022) authorizes the commissioners to award appraisal

fees, while section 117.031(a) guides the district court’s decision to award “litigation

expenses, appraisal fees, other experts fees, and other related costs.” There are several

important differences between the two sections. To begin, section 117.085 is permissive,

whereas section 117.031(a) is mandatory.             Compare Minn. Stat. § 117.085 (“The

commissioners . . . may in their discretion allow . . . reasonable appraisal fees . . . .”), with

Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a) (“[T]he court shall award the owner reasonable . . . litigation

                                               8
expenses, appraisal fees, other experts fees, and other related costs . . . .”). See generally

Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (“‘May’ is permissive.”), subd. 16 (“‘Shall’ is mandatory.”)

(2022). Further, section 117.085 only provides for the award of appraisal fees, while

section 117.031(a) provides for the award of litigation expenses, other experts fees, and

other related costs in addition to appraisal fees. Finally, the commissioners’ appraisal-fee

award cannot exceed $1,500 or $5,000, depending on the type of property at issue.

Section 117.031(a) places no such limitation on the district court.          It was therefore

improper for the district court to rest its decision solely on the commissioners’ decision not

to award appraisal fees.

       Second, the record shows that at least some of the Comparts’ litigation expenses,

appraisal fees, other experts fees, and other related costs were incurred to rebut MnDOT’s

valuation theory. Yet, the district court failed to analyze the Comparts’ costs, fees, and

expenses to determine which were reasonably incurred. While the district court may have

determined that the Comparts’ valuation theory was without merit, and therefore any

experts fees incurred in presenting that theory were not reasonable, it does not necessarily

follow that all of the Comparts’ “litigation expenses, appraisal fees, other experts fees, and

other related costs” were not reasonably incurred. See Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a) (emphasis

added). Thus, we conclude the district court abused its discretion, and we reverse its

decision to award $0 in “litigation expenses, appraisal fees, other experts fees, and other

related costs.” See id. We remand to the district court for reconsideration of the fee petition

consistent with this opinion.

       Reversed and remanded.

                                              9