Court Opinion

ID: 9849205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:36:08.474858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:06.935452
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s decision insofar as it affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeal. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that “whenever an accomplice, or a witness who might be determined by the jury to be an accomplice, testifies,” the jury must be instructed to examine the testimony “ ‘with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 569 [outlining permanent revisions to CALJIC No. 3.18].) Such an instruction “does little to improve the quest for justice in the trial courts while frequently generating an argument for reversal on appeal. [Citation.]” (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 293 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013] (cone. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).)
As several early decisions of this court correctly recognized, the cautionary instruction the majority requires trial courts to give sua sponte is unnecessary because it “states mere commonplace matter within the general knowledge of the jury.” (Hirshfeld v. Dana (1924) 193 Cal. 142, 160 [223 P. 451]; see also People v. Ruiz (1904) 144 Cal. 251, 253 [77 P. 907]; People v. Wardrip (1903) 141 Cal. 229, 232 [74 P. 744].) The notion that an accomplice may have a motive to lie or to shade his or her testimony is scarcely *579beyond the "comprehension of the average juror. As Presiding Justice' Gardner aptly put it, “[a] juror is not some kind of a dithering nincompoop, brought in from never-never land and exposed to the harsh realities of life for the first time in the jury box.” (People v. Long (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 680, 689 [113 Cal.Rptr. 530].)
In any event, juries are more than adequately apprised of the pitfalls of accomplice testimony by a veritable slew of other standard jury instructions, including both the general witness credibility instructions and the extensive series of instructions given to implement the statutory accomplice corroboration requirement.1 A review of the instructions given to the jury in this case is instructive.
First, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.20, entitled “Believability of Witness,” the jury was instructed:
“Every person who testifies under oath is a witness. You are the sole judges of the believability of a witness and the weight to be given the testimony of each of the witnesses.
“In determining the believability of a witness you may consider anything that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness, including but not limited to any of the following factors:
“The extent of the opportunity or the ability of the witness to see or hear or otherwise become aware of any matter about which the witness has testified;
“The ability of the witness to remember or communicate any matter about which the witness has testified;
“The character and quality of that testimony;
“The demeanor and manner of the witness while testifying;
“The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest or other motive;
*580“Evidence of the existence or nonexistence of any fact testified to by the witness;
“The attitude of the witness toward this action or toward the giving of testimony itself;
“A statement previously made by the witness that is consistent or inconsistent with the testimony of the witness;
“An admission by the witness of untruthfulness;
“The witness’ prior conviction of a felony offense.”
Second, pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.10, entitled “Accomplice—Defined,” the jury was instructed:
“An accomplice is a person who is subject to prosecution for the identical offenses charged in counts one, two, and three against the defendant on trial by reason of aiding and abetting or being a member of a criminal conspiracy.”2
Third, pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.11, entitled “Testimony of Accomplice Must Be Corroborated,” the jury was instructed:
“A defendant cannot be found guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless such testimony is corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect such defendant with the commission of the offense.
“Testimony of an accomplice includes any out of court statement purportedly made by an accomplice received for the purpose of proving what the accomplice stated was true.”
Fourth, pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.12, entitled “Sufficiency of Evidence to Corroborate an Accomplice,” the jury was instructed:
“To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice there must be evidence of some act or fact related to the crime which if believed by itself and without any aid, interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged.
“However, it is not necessary that the evidence of corroboration be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the crime charged or that it *581corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies. In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you must first assume that the testimony of the accomplice has been removed from the case. You must then determine whether there is any remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. If there is not such independent evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, the testimony of the accomplice is not corroborated. If there is such independent evidence which you believe, then the testimony of [the] accomplice is corroborated.”
Fifth, pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.13,,entitled “One Accomplice May Not Corroborate Another,” the jury was instructed:
“The required corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice may not be supplied by the testimony of any or all of his or her accomplices, but must come from other evidence.”
Sixth, pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.14, entitled “Criminal- Intent Necessary to Make One an Accomplice,” the jury was instructed:
“Merely assenting to or aiding or assisting in the commission of a crime without knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and without the intent or purpose of the perpetrator and without the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging or facilitating the crime is not criminal. Thus a person who assents to or aids or assists in the commission of a crime without such knowledge and without such intent or purpose is not an accomplice in the commission of the crime.”
Seventh, and finally, pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.19, entitled “Burden to Prove Corroborating Witness Is an Accomplice,” the jury was instructed:
“You must determine whether the witnesses, Prince W[.], Josh S[.] and Elisha F[.], were accomplices as I defined that term. The defendant has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that Prince W[.], Josh S[.] and Elisha F[.] were accomplices in the crimes charged against the defendant.”3
Apparently subscribing to the notion that nothing succeeds like excess, the majority insists that juries must also be instructed to examine an accomplice’s testimony “ ‘with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence *582in the case.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 569.) Why? If the jury hasn’t figured it out by now, 15 more words will not make a bit of difference.4
Fortunately, I do not share the majority’s dim view of jurors. Rather, I would presume, as we do in virtually every other context, that jurors are “intelligent, capable of understanding instructions and applying them to the facts of the case. [Citation.]” (Conservatorship of Early (1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 253 [197 Cal.Rptr. 539, 673 P.2d 209].) In my view, “by requiring the jury to find some evidence corroborating an accomplice’s testimony, the jury is sufficiently informed of the inherently suspect nature of accomplice testimony.” (State v. Hutchison (Tenn. 1994) 898 S.W.2d 161, 172.) Indeed, “the accomplice corroboration requirement arises out of, or is premised upon, the suspicion and caution with which the law views accomplice testimony [citations].” (People v. Ely (1990) 164 A.D.2d 442 [563 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892].) As this court explained in People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 967 [127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335], “[a]t common law the fact that a witness was an accomplice resulted only in an instruction that his testimony was to be viewed with care, caution, and suspicion unless corroborated in any material matter by independent evidence. [Citations.] The limitation based on the common law distrust of accomplices as now embodied in [Penal Code] section 1111 is much harsher than the common law limitation. Juries are now compelled rather than cautioned to view an accomplice’s testimony with distrust, for while his testimony is always admissible and in some respects competent to establish certain facts [citation], such testimony has been legislatively determined never to be sufficiently trustworthy to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt unless corroborated.”
In other words, when a jury focuses on whether the remaining evidence in a case is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, it is viewing the accomplice’s testimony “ ‘with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 569.) Thus, as other states with accomplice corroboration requirements have recognized, when the full panoply of general witness credibility and accomplice corroboration instructions are given, as they were in this case, the majority’s additional cautionary instruction is simply redundant. (See, e.g., Ladson v. State (1981) 248 Ga. 470 [285 S.E.2d 508, 514]; State v. Reese (Iowa 1981) 301 N.W.2d *583693, 696-698; Blizzard v. State (1976) 30 Md.App. 156 [351 A.2d 443, 449-450], revd. on other grounds in State v. Blizzard (1976) 278 Md. 556 [366 A.2d 1026]; State v. LaJambe (1974) 300 Minn. 539 [219 N.W.2d 917, 919]; People v. Ely, supra, 563 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 891-892; State v. Lind (N.D. 1982) 322 N.W.2d 826, 843; State v. Hutchison, supra, 898 S.W.2d at p. 172.)
Nor is it necessary to “advise jurors of the reasons why accomplice testimony should be viewed skeptically.” (Cone. opn. of Kennard, J., ante, at p. 570; see Blizzard v. State, supra, 351 A.2d at p. 450 [rejecting such a requirement]; State v. LaJambe, supra, 219 N.W.2d at p. 919 [same]; People v. Ely, supra, 563 N.Y.S.2d at p. 892 [same].) I agree that “ ‘an accomplice’s testimony may be strongly influenced by the hope or expectation that the prosecution will reward testimony that supports the prosecution’s case by-granting the accomplice immunity or leniency’ ” (cone. opn. of Kennard, J., ante, at pp. 575-576, italics added), that an accomplice may have an “ ‘interest in minimizing the seriousness of the crime and the significance of the accomplice’s own role in its commission’ ” (id. at p. 576), that “ ‘the accomplice’s participation in the crime may show the accomplice to be an untrustworthy person’ ” (ibid., italics added), and that an accomplice may have a “ ‘particular ability, because of inside knowledge about the details of the crime, to construct plausible falsehoods about it’ ” (ibid.). These permissible inferences “may be fully explored on cross-examination and jury argument.” (State v. Reese, supra, 301 N.W.2d at p. 697.) They are not, however, proper subjects for jury instruction. The facts of this case amply demonstrate why. Here, as in many other cases, much of the accomplice testimony cited by defendant could be construed as “favorable,” “unfavorable,” or both “favorable” and “unfavorable” simultaneously. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 563-564 & fn. 2.) Under these circumstances, an elaborate one-size-fits-all instruction is wholly inappropriate and risks intruding on the fact-finding province of juries.
Nor do I agree that the People are “not challenging the underlying rule requiring that when an accomplice is called as a witness by the prosecution, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury, in the language we approve today.” (Cone. opn. of Baxter, J., ante, at p. 578.) The People devote a substantial portion of their briefing to explaining why the majority’s cautionary instruction is unnecessary, noting that not a single other state with an accomplice corroboration requirement also imposes such a sua sponte instructional obligation on its trial courts. At oral argument, when asked about the possibility of a permanent revision to CALJIC No. 3.18, the People described it as “an absolute last resort” to their “first choice” of “eliminating the sua sponte instruction altogether.” The People specifically *584argued that there is “no reason why the trial court should ever be required as a matter of sua sponte instruction to instruct juries to distrust accomplice testimony.” (Italics added.) Hence, the sua sponte nature of a trial court’s instructional obligation falls well within the scope of the issues briefed and argued by the People.5
In conclusion, while the majority’s permanent revision to CALIIC No. 3.18 is certainly an improvement over the current version of the instruction, in reality, there is no compelling reason to give the instruction at all. Thus, I would no longer require that it be given. Busy trial courts and juries have enough things to worry about. Superfluous jury instructions should not be one of them.

The accomplice corroboration requirement is set forth in Penal Code section 1111, which provides as follows: “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.”

In connection with this instruction, the jury was also given lengthy instructions defining the terms “aiding and abetting” and “criminal conspiracy.” (See CALJIC Nos. 3.01, 6.10.)

In connection with this instruction, the jury was also given an instruction defining the term “preponderance of the evidence.” (See CALJIC No. 2.50.2.)

Ironically, both the majority opinion and the concurring opinion of Justice Kennard rely on former Code of Civil Procedure section 2061, which the Legislature repealed over three decades ago, as a justification for requiring even more cautionary instructions. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 569; cone. opn. of Kennard, J., ante, at p. 573.) Significantly, however, neither opinion feels constrained by the language of the repealed statute in formulating their respective instructions. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 569 [eliminating the word “distrust”]; cone, opn. of Kennard, J., ante, at pp. 575-576 [retaining the word “distrust" but otherwise dramatically expanding on the repealed statutory language].)

Even if the People had not advanced such an argument, we would nonetheless have the inherent power to address it because it is necessary for a proper disposition of the case. (See Philbrook v. Randall (1924) 195 Cal. 95, 104-105 [231 P. 739]; Schubert v. Lowe (1924) 193 Cal. 291, 294 [223 P. 550]; Burns v. Ross (1923) 190 Cal. 269, 275-276 [212 P. 17]; Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 477, 495 [144 Cal.Rptr. 474].) Here, the majority extends a trial court’s sua sponte instructional obligation to a whole new class of cases. (Compare maj. opn., ante, at p. 569 [cautionary instruction must be given sua sponte “whenever an accomplice, or a witness who might be determined by the jury to be an accomplice, testifies”] with People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1314 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221] [cautionary instruction must not be given sua sponte when an accomplice is called by the defendant].) It makes little sense to establish this new rule of law without considering the sua sponte nature of the instructional obligation in the first instance.