Court Opinion

ID: 9786993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:07:51.951186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.006617
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Professor Wigmore introduces the first edition of his famous treatise on the law of evidence with this passage:
In the Ninth Book of the Analects of the Confucian Sage this saying is recorded: "The Master said: 'There are some persons with whom we may pursue our studies in common, yet we shall find them unable to progress to general principles. Or, if they attain to principles, we shall find them unable to accept a common understanding of them. Or, if they reach this common understanding, we find them unable to use the principles with us in their applications.' "
1 John H. Wigmore, Evidence, at xili (Preface to the First Edition) (2d ed.1923).
Because I am largely in agreement with the majority's articulation of the principles of law governing the admissibility of Bradshaw's statements,1 our differences may appear to be little more than matters of application to individual cireumstances. Were they nothing more than this, having an effect no broader than the unique cireumstances of this case, it would hardly be worth the effort to point them out. I take a moment here, however, because I fear our differences may in fact reflect our lack of any common understanding of the principles governing the use of confessions. Rather than an isolated example of misapplication, the majority's application in this case seems to me to be typical of what I have previously characterized as its hostility or antipathy toward the use of confessions as a tool to solve crimes. See People v. Adkins, 118 P.3d 788, 796 (Colo.2005) (Coats, J., dissenting); see also People v. Wood, 185 P.3d 744, 754 (Colo.2006) (Coats, J., dissenting); People v. Minjares, 81 P.3d 348, 358-59 (Colo.2008) (Coats, J., dissent ing).
Far from being unambiguous, the defendant's "request" for counsel in this instance was a classic example of an equivocal request, expressly conditioned on the strength of the evidence against him, already in the possession of the police. Syntactically, it was even posed in the form of a conditional sentence, the protasis of which specified the condition ("if she's got some other different story") required to trigger the apodosis (then "I'm going to have to talk to an attorney about this"). It was tantamount to saying, "If what I'm telling you contradicts what you have already heard, I'm going to have to talk to an attorney." Apparently unlike the majority, I do not consider a conditional request of this kind to be an unambiguous request, and I would most certainly not require the officer to disclose or confirm for the suspect *461what he has learned from the victim or other witnesses.
The officer's follow-up questions, which the majority finds fatal, were clearly not directed at discovering more information about the alleged crime but only at clarifying the defendant's position concerning further discussion. Although even this precaution was unnecessary in the absence of an initial unambiguous request, as noted by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, it demonstrated a responsible attempt by the officer not to proceed against the defendant's wishes. 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). In no sense could these follow-up questions be mistaken for badgering the suspect or attempting to trick him into continuing to talk without a lawyer. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
As I have noted elsewhere, seg, eg., Adkins, 113 P.3d at 796 (Coats, J., dissenting); Minjares, 81 P.3d at 359 (Coats, J., dissenting), in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court squarely rejected the notion that confessions are in some way undesirable or unworthy evidence. It merely sought to protect suspects in the inherently coercive atmosphere of the stationhouse interrogation by requiring express notification of their rights to silence and the assistance of counsel. Because I believe the majority's open hostility to the use of confessions as a legitimate investigative tool strikes an improper balance between protecting the constitutional rights of defendants and the state's interest in protecting future victims of crime, I respectfully dissent from that portion of its opinion affirming the suppression of Bradshaw's statement.
I concur, however, in its judgment reversing the trial court's suppression of physical evidence.
I am authorized to state that Justice RICE and Justice EID join in this concurrence and dissent.

. I do take exception to the majority's conflation of the "scrupulously honored" test, for measuring compliance with a request to remain silent, see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 LEd.2d 313 (1975), and the Edwards bright-line rule, which is a per se rule proscribing any further interrogation of a person held in custody who has unambiguously invoked his right to counsel, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 LEd.2d 378 (1981); however, I consider the majority's perpetuation of this usage, see, eg., People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 241 (Colo.1999), the result of a mere lack of precision in analysis rather than an attempt to water down the "unambiguous request" essential to any invocation of the bright-line rule. See generally 2 W. La Fave, Criminal Procedure § 6.9(f) (2d ed.1999).