Court Opinion

ID: 9778146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:33:59.838681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:04.099595
License: Public Domain

VOLLERS, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that a description of property allegedly taken in a robbery with firearms indictment which reads “corporeal personal property” is “fundamentally” defective and therefore properly challenged for the first time by writ of habeas corpus. I disagree.
In American Plant Food Corporation v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 508 S.W.2d 598 (1974) it was pointed out that a defect in the State’s pleading for failure to allege facts sufficient to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense and sufficient to give the defendant notice of what he is charged with would not render an indictment or information void or insufficient to support a conviction, but merely subject it to being vulnerable to an exception as to form under Article 27.09(2) and 21.21(7) C.C.P. It was also noted that unless the deficiency under Article 21.21(7) be in such degree as to utterly fail to charge that an offense against the law was committed by the defendant, then it is objectionable only as to form and not as to substance. That appears to be precisely the issue which is presented here.
In this case the only defect alleged in the pleading is that the description of the property taken in the robbery was “corporeal personal property.” It should be noted that the provisions of Article 1408, Vernon’s Ann.P.C. (1925), in effect at the time of this offense, prohibit the taking from the person or possession of another by violence or threats “any property” with intent to appropriate the same. From an examination of this statute, it is clear that the element of taking property is covered by the allegation of the taking of any property, and the description of the property goes only to notice and sufficiency of the pleading. As pointed out in American Plant Food, supra, this must be raised by a motion to quash the indictment.
The majority relies on Wilson v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 390, 356 S.W.2d 928 (1961) for its determination that the robbery indictment before us which describes the property taken as “corporeal personal property” is “fundamentally” defective. However, that *269case was before this Court on direct appeal and although the opinion does not recite whether such insufficiency was raised at the trial,1 the reason such description was found defective, as stated by this Court, was that “without a further description, the accused was not put on notice as to what he was alleged to have taken . . . 356 S.W.2d 928 at 929. (Emphasis added.)
The majority also relies upon Mankin v. State, 451 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) as authority for its determination here. Notwithstanding the erroneous conclusion in Mankin at page 241 that “Wilson v. State . is directly in point,”2 this Court recited that the insufficiency of “corporeal personal property” as a description in a robbery indictment is that such fails “ . . .to advise the accused with reasonable certainty of the accusation he is called upon to meet at the trial . . . .” 451 S.W.2d 236 at 241. (Emphasis added.)
It should also be noted that insufficient property description of the robbery indictment has also been determined by this Court to be inadequate for the reason that it fails “ . . . to render available in the event of a second prosecution, a plea of once in jeopardy." Byrd v. State, 456 S.W.2d 931 at 932 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). (Emphasis added.)
Mankin v. State, supra, was decided prior to American Plant Food and is in direct contravention of the rule laid down in American Plant Food.3
Failure of the defendant to object by motion to quash as to insufficiencies regarding notice and sufficiency of the pleading as a basis for a plea in jeopardy illustrates that he has found the charge adequate. “He may not wait to see whether the jury will acquit him, and then, upon an adverse verdict, claim for the first time that he had no notice or that the charge will not bar a subsequent conviction. Only if the defect be of such a degree as to charge no offense against the law, and thereby be void, will the exception to the substance be considered for the first time (after trial).” American Plant Food, supra.4
I take no issue with the finding of the majority that the property description contained in the robbery indictment before us is insufficient. The appropriate objection to the property description, as stated in the majority opinion, is the failure to “ . . . advise the accused with reasonable certainty of the accusation he is called to meet at trial. . . .” The majority asserts neither that the indictment before us fails to allege the constituent elements of robbery, nor that it utterly fails to charge that an offense against the law was committed by the petitioner. Yet the majority labels the error “fundamental.” Such a conclusion is in error. The determination of fundamental defect in Mankin, supra, was apparently based on the gratuitous use in Wilson of the description of *270“fundamental” defect to describe the insufficiency of the property description in a robbery indictment. Because a motion to quash was improperly overruled by the trial court in Wilson, the use of the word “fundamental” was not merely gratuitous, it was erroneous.
The erroneous conclusion of Mankin that an indictment such as we have in this case is fundamentally defective is in direct conflict with the conclusion of this Court in American Plant Food, supra. Although American Plant Food in effect overruled Mankin, we should do so specifically here. The allegation of “corporeal personal property” alleges the necessary element in question, to-wit: a taking of property. It merely falls short of a sufficient description where there is a pretrial objection to such a description. This insufficiency was waived by the defendant’s failure to make a pretrial motion to quash. It cannot be said that this indictment charges “no offense against the law” or that it “fails to allege the constituent elements of the offense.” It is therefore not a void indictment. Such an indictment is not subject to collateral attack such as presented in this writ application and I would deny the writ.
DOUGLAS, J., joins.

. A review of the original record on appeal reveals that a proper motion to quash was filed on behalf of Wilson, excepting to the failure of the indictment to describe the property taken with more specificity. The motion to quash was improperly overruled by the trial court, thus this Court correctly reversed on appeal.

. Because the objection to the property description by motion to quash was erroneously overruled by the trial court in Wilson, that case was procedurally inapposite to making the determination of error in Mankin where objection to “corporeal personal property” as a description in the robbery indictment was raised for the first time on amended motion for rehearing. See, n.l, supra.

. “The . . . two requirements that the State’s pleading must allege facts (1), sufficient to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense and (2) sufficient to give the defendant notice of precisely what he is charged with . . . are . . grounds for an exception to the form . . . , and not for an exception to the substance . Clearly any such defect would not render the information void.or insufficient to support a conviction.” 508 S.W.2d 598 at 603. (Emphasis added.)

.It should be noted that in his Original Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus the petitioner recites as reasons for his present first objection to the indictment of this cause that “ . the description must be sufficient to inform the accused of the property in question and to render available in the event of a second prosecution, a plea of once in jeopardy.”