Court Opinion

ID: 9592038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:09:52.877523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:14.334568
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL,
dissenting in a separate opinion.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion, and would reverse the court of appeals’ decision finding the trial court erred in denying Brannon’s motion for a directed verdict on the resisting arrest charge. I would affirm the trial court’s denial of the directed verdict motion.
Section III
The majority holds, “Because the State has failed to put forth any evidence demonstrating that the officers either intended to arrest Brannon or that Brannon submitted to arrest, we find an arrest was not being made when Brannon ran from police.”2 I disagree, and would hold that when the evidence and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the State put forth evidence that the officers intended to arrest Brannon. See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) (recognizing that when reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party).
I agree with the majority that, in addressing the issues in this matter, we are focused on whether an arrest was being made at the time of Brannon’s flight. However, I disagree with their analysis and conclusion. The statute at issue states, “It is unlawful for a person knowingly and willfully ... to resist an arrest being made by one whom the person knows or reasonably should know is a law enforcement officer, whether under process or not.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16-9-320(A) (2003).
An arrest is an ongoing process. State v. Dowd, 306 S.C. 268, 270, 411 S.E.2d 428, 429 (1991). This Court has held that in order to “ ‘constitute an arrest, there must be an actual or *507constructive seizure or detention of the person, performed with the intention to effect an arrest and so understood by the person detained.’ ” State v. Williams, 237 S.C. 252, 257, 116 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1960) (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 161 F.2d 99, 101 (10th Cir.1947)). Williams provided further guidance:
It is not necessary “that there be an application of actual force, or manual touching of the body, or physical restraint which may be visible to the eye, or a formal declaration of arrest; it is sufficient if the person arrested understands that he is in the power of the one arresting and submits in consequence. However, in all cases in which there is no manual touching or seizure or any resistance, the intentions of the parties to the transaction are very important; there must have been intent on the part of one of them to arrest the other, and intent on the part of such other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission was necessary. There can be no arrest where the person sought to be arrested is not conscious of any restraint of his liberty.”
Id. at 257,116 S.E.2d at 860-61 (quoting 4 Am. Jur. Arrest § 2 (1936)); see also 5 Am. Jur. 2D Arrest § 4 (2007) (“Police detention constitutes an ‘arrest’ if a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would understand the situation to be a restraint on freedom of the kind that the law typically associates with a formal arrest.”); 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 1 (2004) (“An arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining the person of another by any act which indicates an intention to take him or her into custody and subject the person arrested to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.”).
Because Brannon was not physically touched or seized, pursuant to Williams the intentions of the parties are important. The question of intent from Brannon’s perspective is obvious. Brannon was breaking into vehicles in the middle of the night. When he was surprised by two uniformed police officers, he ran and tried to avoid arrest. Any reasonable person in Brannon’s position would not have the slightest doubt that the pursuing officers intended to place him in custody. Clearly, Brannon was “conscious of [the] restraint of his liberty.” Williams, 237 S.C. at 257, 116 S.E.2d at 860.
*508Regarding the officers’ intent, the majority holds that the intent of the officers must be evaluated under a subjective standard rather than the objective standard governing probable cause. I disagree and would apply an objective standard. The evidence reveals that a resident called 911 to report a car break-in which the caller was seeing in progress. The 911 operator kept the caller-witness on the line and notified the officers as to the location of the break-in and its progress. As the officers apprehended the suspect, they were receiving a live transmission of the caller-witness’s ongoing observations as relayed by the 911 operator. Based on the information received from the 911 operator, coupled with the officers observations of Brannon next to the Ford Explorer with its door open and inside light on, a reasonably prudent police officer would have cause to believe that Brannon was committing the crime of breaking into a motor vehicle. The majority merely quoted one sentence of Officer Quinn’s testimony when he stated that “[o]ur intention was to approach the subject and find out exactly what he was doing there at the time.” The next sentence out of Officer Quinn’s mouth was, “We believe [sic] he was breaking into a motor vehicle and we placed him under arrest for that charge.” Taking the officers’ testimony as a whole, and construing it in a light most favorable to the State, I would find there was sufficient evidence of intent to arrest Brannon.3
The presence of probable cause to arrest for breaking into a motor vehicle at the time of the initial encounter lies at the core of my view that the process of arrest was underway when the officers caught Brannon in the act. Probable cause is guided by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and an officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,” Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The proper inquiry is an objective one, based on what a reasonable police officer would believe under the same circumstances. Id. at 810-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769. In this case, a reasonable police officer would have probable cause to arrest Brannon at the *509initial encounter. Brannon’s location and conduct exactly matched the witness’s description, as Brannon was standing next to the Ford Explorer with an open door in the deserted parking lot late at night.
In conclusion, I would hold that a person violates section 16-9-320(A) irrespective of the lack of physical contact when: (1) a law enforcement officer, from an objective standpoint, has probable cause to believe a person has committed a crime; (2) the law enforcement officer through words or actions makes known his intent to arrest or otherwise detain the person; (3) the person, from an objective standpoint, recognizes the presence of a law enforcement officer and understands the intent of the officer to arrest him; and (4) the person attempts to avoid the arrest by impeding, hindering, or obstructing the law enforcement officer, by means of fleeing from the officer or some other method of resisting or opposing the arrest. In this case, viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the State, I would find a jury question was presented as to the charge of resisting arrest and would affirm the trial court’s denial of a directed verdict motion.
Sections I & II
I agree with the majority’s holding in Section II of the majority opinion. I also agree with the portion of Section I of the majority opinion that holds Brannon did not need to use the terms “seizure” or “Fourth Amendment” in his motion for a directed verdict. However, because I would analyze Section III of the opinion differently than the majority, it is necessary for me to address the resistance issue in Section I of the majority opinion. In Section I, the majority held that it need not decide whether Brannon’s flight from police amounted to resistance because it found there was no evidence an arrest was being made when Brannon fled from police. Because I would find there is evidence that an arrest was being made, I must also address whether Brannon’s flight from police amounted to resistance.
The State argues the court of appeals disregarded the law of the case doctrine in finding Brannon’s flight from police did not constitute resisting arrest. I agree. In charging the jury, the trial court defined the term “resist” to include “peaceful *510nonviolent indirect obstruction of an arrest.” Brannon failed to object to this charge. As a result, the trial court’s definition of “resist” is the law of the case, and under that definition, Brannon’s act of running from the police qualifies as resisting arrest under section 16-9-320(A). See Mickle v. Blackmon, 255 S.C. 136, 141-42, 177 S.E.2d 548, 549-50 (1970) (recognizing the failure to object to a jury instruction makes the charge the law of the case).
For the aforementioned reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of the directed verdict motion.
Acting Justice JAMES E. MOORE, concurs.

. Brannon did not submit to the arrest because he was running away from the officers. Holding a suspect must submit to an arrest for an arrest to be initiated leads to an absurd result in a resisting arrest charge. The whole point of a resisting arrest charge is that a person is not submitting.

. Even using the majority's subjective standard, I believe that taking Officer Quinn's testimony as a whole and construing it in a light most favorable to the State would provide sufficient evidence of his subjective intent to arrest Brannon.