Court Opinion

ID: 9390271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 14:12:29.563678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:32.745204
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 33

                  SUPREME COURT             OF    WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:               2021AP102

COMPLETE TITLE:         Green Bay Professional Police Association and
                        Andrew Weiss,
                                  Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,
                             v.
                        City of Green Bay,
                                  Defendant-Respondent.

                             REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                             Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 504, 966 N.W.2d 107
                                 PDC No: 2021 WI App 73 - Published

OPINION FILED:          April 27, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:          December 12, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:               Circuit
   COUNTY:              Brown
   JUDGE:               Kendall M. Kelley

JUSTICES:
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET,
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring
opinion. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For        the   plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners,        there    were
briefs       filed      by   Jonathan   Cermele   and   Cermele   Law,    S.C.,
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Jonathan Cermele.

       For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
William E. Fischer, Kyle J. Gulya, and von Briesen & Roper,
S.C., Madison. There was an oral argument by William E. Fischer.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Brendan P. Matthews and
Cermele & Matthews, S.C., Milwaukee, for the Milwaukee Police
Association.

    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips,
Matthew J. Thome, and Attolles Law, S.C., Milwaukee, for the
Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association.

                                2
                                                                             2023 WI 33
                                                                      NOTICE
                                                       This opinion is subject to further
                                                       editing and modification.   The final
                                                       version will appear in the bound
                                                       volume of the official reports.
No.    2021AP102
(L.C. No.       2019CV1248)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                                 :             IN SUPREME COURT

Green Bay Professional Police Association and
Andrew Weiss,
                                                                          FILED
                Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,
                                                                      APR 27, 2023
       v.
                                                                        Sheila T. Reiff
City of Green Bay,                                                   Clerk of Supreme Court

                Defendant-Respondent.

KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET,
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring
opinion. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.

       REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                    Affirmed.

       ¶1       JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.           The Green Bay Police Department

(the Department) disciplined Andrew Weiss for violating several

Department        policies     and   demoted    him    from    his    position      as    a

detective to a patrol officer.             The demotion resulted in Weiss's

loss       of   an   $80      monthly   stipend.        Weiss1       challenged       this

       The Green Bay Professional Police Association brought this
       1

action against the City of Green Bay along with Weiss. As their
arguments are identical and briefed together, we refer only to
Weiss throughout the opinion.
                                                                                       No.     2021AP102

disciplinary          action        in        an    arbitration             proceeding.              The

arbitrator concluded that the Department had cause to take its

chosen       disciplinary          action.               Additionally,            the     arbitrator

concluded that the Department's disciplinary procedures did not

violate Weiss's constitutional due process rights.2                                      The circuit

court3 confirmed the arbitration award, and the court of appeals

affirmed.4          We afford a high level of deference to arbitration

decisions          because    of    the        contractual         nature         of     arbitration

agreements.          Given this deference, the arbitrator did not exceed

his powers, and so we likewise affirm.

                                         I.       BACKGROUND

       ¶2      In    the     fall    of       2017,       Weiss,       a    detective          for   the

Department,         accessed       sensitive            information         via    the       Green   Bay

Electronic Records Program (GERP) regarding two sexual assault

cases that the Department was investigating.                                       Weiss was not

involved in either investigation.                         After obtaining the sensitive

information,          Weiss     used          a     personal       cellphone            to     provide

information         to   a   third       party.           After        launching        an    internal
investigation, the Department issued a formal complaint alleging

that       Weiss    violated       the    following             four    Department           policies:

Media        Relations        (§ 322.4);                Media     Requests             (§ 322.6(a));

Unauthorized Disclosure (§ 320.5.6(a)); and Conduct Unbecoming

       2   See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.

       The Honorable Kendall
       3                                           M.     Kelley       of    the       Brown    County
Circuit Court presided.

       Green Bay Pro. Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay, 2021 WI
       4

App 73, 399 Wis. 2d 504, 966 N.W.2d 107.

                                                    2
                                                              No.     2021AP102

an Officer (§ 320.5.9(n)).         The Department held an investigative

interview with Weiss and gave Weiss the opportunity to address

the allegations.      Weiss admitted both accessing information on

GERP and then using a personal cell phone to relay information

to a friend.

    ¶3     The following month, the Department conducted a second

interview with Weiss and provided him with an amended formal

complaint alleging two additional violations of the Department

policy   regarding    the    use   of   personal     communication    devices

(§§ 701.2 & 701.5(e)).        At that interview, investigators asked

Weiss to turn over his phone logs for the relevant time period.

The investigators allowed Weiss time to discuss the request with

his union and its attorney before meeting for a third time.                 At

the third meeting, Weiss refused to provide the requested phone

records and the investigators gave him a copy of the Department

policy    regarding     cooperation           with   personnel       complaint

investigations (§ 1008.2).

    ¶4     One month later, the Department issued Weiss a final
notice5 informing him that the Department was "considering a

serious level of discipline."               The notice listed four policy

violations:    Media        Relations        (§ 322.4);   Media       Requests

    5  Both the Department and Weiss refer to this notice and
accompanying hearing as the "Loudermill notice" and "Loudermill
hearing" in reference to Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532 (1985), which held that oral or written notice and
opportunity to respond was required prior to the termination of
the subject public employee who could only be terminated for
cause.

                                        3
                                                                               No.      2021AP102

(§ 322.6(a));        Unauthorized           Disclosure           (§ 320.5.6(a));              and

Conduct     Unbecoming        an    Officer       (§ 320.5.9(n)).                 The    notice

referenced Weiss's admission that he accessed case information

on GERP and then provided information to a friend.                                      A final

hearing was held that same day, and Weiss was allowed to address

the allegations.

      ¶5    The    following             month     the        Department        issued        its

disciplinary decision in which it determined that Weiss violated

the following policies: Unauthorized Disclosure (§ 320.5.6(a));

Conduct Unbecoming an Officer (§ 320.5.9(n)); Use of Personal

Communication      Devices         (§§ 701.2      &     701.5(e));       and      Failure      to

Cooperate in an Investigation of Personnel Complaint (§ 1008.2).

As a result of these violations, the Department demoted Weiss

from his position as a detective to a position as a patrol

officer,    resulting     in       the    loss    of     an    $80    per     month     stipend

associated with the detective assignment.

      ¶6    Weiss filed a grievance with the Green Bay Personnel

Committee    which      was   denied.            Weiss    then       sought    arbitration,
arguing that the Department did not have cause to discipline him

and that his due process rights under Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), were violated because he was

ultimately disciplined for three policy violations that were not

included    in    the    Department's            final     notice——Use         of       Personal

Communication      Devices         (§§ 701.2       &     701.5(e))      and       Failure      to

Cooperate in an Investigation of Personnel Complaint (§ 1008.2).

The   arbitrator     determined          that     the    Department         had      cause,   as
required by the collective bargaining agreement, to discipline
                                             4
                                                                      No.   2021AP102

Weiss    by    removing    him   from     his    detective    assignment.        The

arbitrator concluded that the discipline was warranted because

Weiss had violated all referenced Department policies except for

Conduct Unbecoming an Officer.6

     ¶7       The   arbitrator     also    addressed     Weiss's      due   process

argument as follows:

     The reliance Weiss puts in Loudermill is misplaced.
     In Loudermill, the court balanced competing interests
     specific to the discharge of a public employee.   The
     weight accorded to Loudermill varies depending on the
     severity of the disciplinary action taken. Subsequent
     cases have confirmed that a neutral pre-termination
     adjudicator is not required where there is also a
     post-termination administrative procedure. Locurto v.
     Safir, 264 F.3d 154 (2nd Cir. 2001); Schacht v.
     Wisconsin Dept. of Corr., 175 F.3d 497 (7th Cir.
     1999). In the present case, the arbitrator serves as
     the post-disciplinary administrative procedure and
     satisfies due process requirements under Loudermill,
     particularly given that the disciplinary action taken
     was short of discharge.
     ¶8       Weiss   challenged     the       arbitration    award    in   circuit

court, arguing that the award manifestly disregarded the law

with regards to the due process issue under Loudermill.                          The

circuit court denied Weiss's request to vacate the award and

granted       the   City   of    Green     Bay's    request    to     confirm    the

arbitration award.         The court of appeals affirmed.

     6 The arbitrator decided that Weiss's actions did not fit
the behavior historically understood to be conduct unbecoming an
officer, and that the violation of this section was duplicative
of his other violations.

                                           5
                                                                          No.     2021AP102

                                      II.     ANALYSIS

       ¶9         In    determining       whether     an    arbitration         award    is

confirmed or vacated, we independently interpret and apply Wis.

Stat. § 788.10(1) (2021-22).7                  Racine Cnty. v. Int'l Ass'n of

Machinists & Aerospace Workers Dist. 10, AFL-CIO, 2008 WI 70,

¶11, 310 Wis. 2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312.                      The choice to arbitrate,

at its core, is a contract between the parties intended to keep

a dispute out of the court system.                    Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

2006 WI 70, ¶61, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42.                          As such, the

court's role in reviewing an arbitrator's award is generally

limited to ensuring that the parties received the arbitration

process for which they bargained.                     Racine Cnty., 310 Wis. 2d

508,       ¶11.        In   that   light,    Wis.   Stat.    §   788.10(1)       sets    out

specific          circumstances      under    which   the    court   must       vacate   an

arbitration award.                 As relevant here, courts must                vacate an

arbitration award if the "arbitrators exceed[] their powers."

§ 788.10(1)(d).             Arbitrators exceed their powers when: (1) they

demonstrate "perverse misconstruction" or "positive misconduct,"
(2) they manifestly disregard the law, (3) the award is illegal,

or (4) the award violates a strong public policy.                      Racine Cnty.,

310 Wis. 2d 508, ¶11.

       ¶10        We    reverse      an     arbitration      award   as      manifestly

disregarding the law "when the arbitrator[] fail[s] to examine

and apply the relevant law" because parties to arbitration have

       All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
       7

the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.

                                               6
                                                                               No.     2021AP102

"a   legitimate      expectation       that      the      governing      law         [will]   be

followed and applied properly."                    Orlowski v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 WI 21, ¶¶37-38, 339 Wis. 2d 1, 810 N.W.2d

775.       However, we will not reverse an arbitration award for

"mere errors of judgment as to law or fact" on the part of the

arbitrator.        Joint   Sch.      Dist.       No.     10,    City    of    Jefferson        v.

Jefferson Ed. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 117, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977).

       ¶11    Weiss primarily argues that the arbitrator exceeded

his powers because the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law

when he determined that the Department provided adequate notice

to Weiss under Loudermill.8             Weiss bases this claim on the fact

that the Department's final notice did not list three of the

Department     policies    for       which    he       was     ultimately      disciplined,

depriving Weiss of his opportunity to respond.                               Weiss contends

that the failure to include those policies in the final notice

violated the due process requirements set out in Loudermill.

       ¶12    Importantly,      we    need       not     decide       whether        Weiss    was

afforded all the process due to him.                           We need determine only
whether      the   arbitrator     exceeded         his       powers    under     Wis.    Stat.

§ 788.10(1)(d) by manifestly disregarding the law.                              Although it

may be difficult to define exactly what it means to "manifestly

       Weiss also claims that the arbitrator exceeded his powers
       8

under Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d) because the arbitration award
"violates strong public policy" and "conflicts with the
governing law." However, these arguments are almost entirely
duplicative of his argument that the arbitrator manifestly
disregarded Loudermill. Because we conclude that the arbitrator
did not manifestly disregard Loudermill, these additional
arguments also fail.

                                             7
                                                                          No.       2021AP102

disregard the law," we know that this standard does not entitle

arbitration       participants       to     de    novo     court       review        of    an

arbitrator's interpretation of the law.                    See City of Oshkosh v.

Oshkosh Pub. Libr. Clerical and Maint. Emp.: Union Loc. 796-A,

99 Wis. 2d 95, 104, 299 N.W.2d 210 (1980) ("Having agreed to be

bound by the arbitrator's determination, the arbitrator has the

'authority' to err and a mistake of judgment is plainly not

grounds     for   vacating    an     award       under     sec.       298.10(1)(d)."9).

Arbitrators are bound to follow precedent, Racine Cnty., 310

Wis. 2d 508, ¶34, but they are not expected to anticipate how a

court might apply or extend that precedent when faced with novel

arguments    or    fact   scenarios.            Parties    do    not    have    the       same

"legitimate expectation" regarding new applications of the law

that they have in established applications.                          See Orlowski, 339

Wis. 2d 1, ¶38.

    ¶13     Loudermill,       the        precedent    that        Weiss       argues       the

arbitrator    manifestly      disregarded,          provides         guidance       on    what

pre-termination      process        an     employer       must       afford     a    public
employee who can be discharged only for cause.                        470 U.S. at 535.

In Loudermill, the Cleveland Board of Education terminated a

security     guard    after    discovering           he     had       previously          been

convicted of a felony but did not disclose that felony in the

application process.          Id.        The employee was provided no pre-

termination process whatsoever where he could assert his defense

    9  Wisconsin   Stat.   § 298.10(1)(d)                       is     the      identical
predecessor statute to § 788.10(1)(d).

                                            8
                                                                   No.    2021AP102

to the allegations.10           Id.    In holding that some pre-termination

process    was    due,    the    Court    emphasized   that     "[a]n    essential

principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty,

or property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing

appropriate       to    the    nature    of   the   case[,]'"    and     "that    an

individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is

deprived of any significant property interest."                     Id. at 542

(quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,

313 (1950) & Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).

     ¶14    The        Court    emphasized     that    the      "formality       and

procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon

the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the

subsequent proceedings."              Id. at 545 (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S.

at 378).     Recognizing the importance of a person's interest in

retaining employment, the Court held that the following pre-

termination procedures were constitutionally required: (1) "oral

or written notice of the charges" against the employee with "an

explanation of the employer's evidence;" and (2) an opportunity
for the employee to "present his side of the story" either in

person or in writing before the termination decision is made.

Id. at 546.

     10The employee explained in post-termination proceedings
that he thought his conviction was for a misdemeanor rather than
a felony.

                                          9
                                                                           No.     2021AP102

       ¶15    At   the   outset,      we    note    that     the     specific      process

outlined in Loudermill may not govern in this case.11                           Unlike the

public employee in Loudermill, Weiss was not terminated——he was

reassigned      within    the    Department        and    lost      an   $80     per   month

stipend——which implicates a different property interest than the

interest addressed in Loudermill.                  Our focus on Loudermill stems

from    Weiss's    argument,        which   is     limited     to    the      arbitrator's

application of Loudermill.             Consequently, we address whether the

arbitrator's application of Loudermill demonstrates a manifest

disregard of the law.

       ¶16    The arbitrator directly addressed Weiss's Loudermill

arguments by explaining that "the weight accorded to Loudermill

varies      depending    on   the     severity      of   the     disciplinary          action

taken."       Weiss offers no argument for why this statement is

inaccurate, let alone how this statement manifestly disregarded

Loudermill.        At    best,    Weiss's        position      could     be    seen     as    a

request       to    extend       Loudermill's            pre-termination           process

requirements to less serious forms of discipline.                             However, the
arbitrator is not bound to extend Loudermill in this way.

       ¶17    The arbitrator then determined that, in light of his

view    of   Loudermill,        the   process      the    Department          afforded       to

Weiss——which included notice of all of Weiss's alleged policy

violations, opportunities to be heard at four in-person hearings

       See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997)) ("Due
       11

process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands." (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))).

                                            10
                                                                      No.    2021AP102

prior to the Department's disciplinary decision, and opportunity

to bring post-disciplinary review through a Green Bay Personnel

Committee       grievance     and     arbitration——was          constitutionally

adequate.         The   arbitrator      did      not    manifestly          disregard

Loudermill in doing so, and Weiss received the arbitration he

bargained    for.       Thus,    he    is     contractually      bound       by   the

arbitrator's decision.

                              III.    CONCLUSION

    ¶18     The arbitrator did not exceed his powers by manifestly

disregarding the law when he determined that Weiss was afforded

the constitutional process he was due under                     Loudermill.        As

such, Weiss received the arbitration he bargained for, and the

arbitration award was appropriately confirmed.

    By    the    Court.—The     decision    of    the   court    of     appeals    is

affirmed.

                                       11
                                                                    No.     2021AP102.akz

       ¶19    ANNETTE    KINGSLAND     ZIEGLER,      C.J.     (concurring).             I

agree with the majority that no grounds exist in this case for

vacating the arbitrator's decision, and I therefore join the

majority opinion.         I write separately to address the atextual

nature of the "manifest disregard" standard and to request that,

in future cases, parties include the arbitration agreement as a

part of the circuit court record.

       ¶20    Arbitration    agreements        are   not    special.          They    are

contracts just like any other.                As is true with all contracts,

our task in cases concerning arbitration awards is to review the

arbitration agreement and determine whether the parties received

the arbitration they bargained for.                  See Midwest Neurosciences

Assocs., LLC v. Great Lakes Neurosurgical Assocs., LLC, 2018 WI

112, ¶40, 384 Wis. 2d 669, 920 N.W.2d 767 (quoting Joint Sch.

Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 101, 253

N.W.2d 536     (1997))    ("Arbitration        agreements     are      'a    matter    of

contract.'"); Emps. Ins. of Wausau v. Jackson, 190 Wis. 2d 597,
610,    527     N.W.2d 681       (1995)       ("Arbitration       is        essentially

contractual . . . .");          Wis.   Auto    Title    Loans,    Inc.       v.   Jones,

2005 WI App 86, ¶8, 280 Wis. 2d 823, 696 N.W.2d 214 (alteration

in original) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,

500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)) ("The Federal Arbitration Act's purpose

is     'to    reverse     the     longstanding         judicial      hostility         to

arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements

upon the same footing as other contracts.'").                          This task is

                                          1
                                                                         No.   2021AP102.akz

exceedingly difficult when, as here, the agreement containing

the terms for arbitration is absent from the record.

    ¶21     The Wisconsin Arbitration Act ("WAA") helps define the

circumstances where parties did not receive the arbitration they

bargained for by establishing several grounds for vacating an

arbitral award.         These grounds include where "the award was

procured    by    corruption,    fraud       or       undue       means";      "there       was

evident    partiality      or    corruption             on    the        part        of     the

arbitrators"; "the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct"; or,

most relevant here, "the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or

so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite

award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."                                     Wis.

Stat. § 788.10(1).         The parties to this case agree that the

arbitrator exceeded his powers if he "manifestly disregarded the

law," and the majority correctly applies this standard for that

reason.

    ¶22     However, this "manifest disregard" language is wholly

absent    from    the   statutory    text.            The     "manifest         disregard"
standard   instead      originates   from         dicta      in    the    United      States

Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436

(1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v.

Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).                             The Court in

Wilko appears to have simply described how arbitrators might

exceed their powers as defined by a choice-of-law provision in

an arbitration agreement.         After Wilko, the "manifest disregard"

standard    became      seemingly     untethered              from       the     text        of
arbitration      agreements,    taking       on   a    life       of   its     own    as    the

                                         2
                                                                      No.    2021AP102.akz

standard for reviewing essentially all challenges to arbitral

awards    without       regard       to   the    language      in     the     underlying

contract.          Parties    involved     in    requests      to     vacate      arbitral

awards   must       submit    the    arbitration       agreement      to    the    circuit

court so the court may determine the scope of the arbitrator's

powers   and       confirm    whether     applying      the   "manifest       disregard"

standard is appropriate.              Without the arbitration agreement, we

may not be able to determine whether the parties received the

arbitration they bargained for.

         I.    THE "MANIFEST DISREGARD" STANDARD IN WISCONSIN.

    ¶23       In    1931,     the    Legislature       enacted      the     WAA,     "which

attempted     to     invest    the    courts     of   this    state    with       power   to

specifically enforce an agreement to arbitrate future disputes."

Dunphy Boat Corp. v. Wis. Empl. Rels. Bd., 267 Wis. 316, 325, 64

N.W.2d 866         (1954).      Relevant        to    this    case,    the     WAA     also

identified grounds for vacating an arbitral award, and the text

remains identical to this day:

         (1) In either of the following cases the court in
    and for the county wherein the award was made must
    make an order vacating the award upon the application
    of any party to the arbitration:

         (a) Where the award was procured by corruption,
    fraud or undue means;

         (b) Where  there  was   evident  partiality  or
    corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or either
    of them;

         (c) Where   the   arbitrators  were   guilty   of
    misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
    sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
    evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or
    of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
    party have been prejudiced;
                                            3
                                                                   No.    2021AP102.akz

           (d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
      or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final
      and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
      was not made.
§ 2, ch. 274, Laws of 1931 (codified at Wis. Stat. § 788.10).

      ¶24   Conspicuously      absent    from     this   text      is    the    phrase,

"manifest disregard."          Regardless, we have repeatedly described

our review of arbitral awards using the "manifest disregard"

standard without explaining where this standard came from.                            See,

e.g.,     McAdams   v.    Marquette      Univ.,      2018    WI    88,      ¶29,      383

Wis. 2d 358, 914 N.W.2d 708; Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co.,

2013 WI 29, 346 Wis. 2d 450, 828 N.W.2d 812; Orlowski v. State

Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WI 21, 339 Wis. 2d 1, 810 N.W.2d 775;

Sands v. Menard, Inc., 2010 WI 96, ¶48, 328 Wis. 2d 647, 787

N.W.2d 384; Baldwin-Woodville Area Sch. Dist. v. W. Cent. Educ.

Ass'n-Baldwin Woodville Unit, 2009 WI 51, ¶24, 317 Wis. 2d 691,

766 N.W.2d 591; Racine County v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &

Aerospace    Workers     Dist.   10,    AFL-CIO,      2008    WI    70,     ¶11,      310

Wis. 2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312; Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, ¶24

n.8, 268 Wis. 2d 360, 674 N.W.2d 832; Lukowski v. Dankert, 184
Wis. 2d 142,    149,     515   N.W.2d 883      (1994);      City   of     Madison      v.

Madison Pro. Police Officers Ass'n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 586-87, 425

N.W.2d 8 (1988); Nicolet High Sch. Dist. v. Nicolet Educ. Ass'n,

118     Wis. 2d 707,     713   n.3,    348     N.W.2d 175     (1984);          City    of

Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police Ass'n, 97 Wis. 2d 15, 25-26, 292

N.W.2d 841 (1980);        Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs.                   v. Milwaukee

Tchrs' Educ. Ass'n, 93 Wis. 2d 415, 422, 287 N.W.2d 131 (1980);

Glendale     Pro.   Policemen's        Ass'n    v.    City    of        Glendale,      83
Wis. 2d 90, 99 n.2, 264 N.W.2d 594 (1978); Joint Sch. Dist. No.

                                         4
                                                                         No.    2021AP102.akz

10, City of Jefferson v. Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94,

117-18, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977).

    ¶25       The    first   time     we     used       the      "manifest      disregard"

standard was in Scherrer Construction Co. v. Burlington Memorial

Hospital,     64     Wis. 2d 720,      221       N.W.2d 855        (1974).         Scherrer

Construction presented the issue, "What is the scope of judicial

review   of    arbitration         awards?"           Id.   at    725.         Rather   than

examining the language of Wis. Stat. § 788.10 to answer this

question, Scherrer Construction instead reviewed how this court

described the standard for reviewing arbitral awards in previous

cases.        Id.    at   726–28.       We       concluded,        "[T]his      court     has

consistently        held[]   the    scope        of   review     of   such      matters    is

extremely limited," id. at 726, and expressed a general standard

for reviewing arbitral awards:

         These statements are consistent with the views
    expressed in Domke on Commercial Arbitration, the
    leading treatise in the field. The author states that
    to vacate an arbitration award, the court must find
    not merely an error in judgment, but "perverse
    misconstruction or positive misconduct . . . plainly
    established'," "'manifest disregard of the law'," or
    that the award itself "violates public policy," "is
    illegal," or that "the penal laws of the state will be
    violated."
Id. at 729 (footnotes omitted).                   Without clearly explaining how

or whether this standard was based in the language of the WAA,

Scherrer Construction apparently adopted "manifest disregard of

the law" from Domke on Commercial Arbitration as the standard

for reviewing all arbitral awards.                    According to that treatise,

the standard's origin "lies in dicta from the Supreme Court's
decision in Wilko v. Swan."                 Martin Domke et al., 2 Domke on

                                             5
                                                                      No.   2021AP102.akz

Commercial Arbitration § 39:16 (2022).                    In continued search of

how this standard came about, I turn next to federal law.

             II.    THE "MANIFEST DISREGARD" STANDARD'S ORIGIN
                               IN FEDERAL LAW.
      ¶26    In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act

("FAA")      in    order     to     "abolish    the   common      law        rule    that

arbitration agreements were not judicially enforceable."                             Cost

Brothers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 760 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir.

1985); accord Pub. L. No. 68.41, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified

at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16).              The FAA "was specifically aimed at the

historical        problems    of   courts'     refusing    to   honor       contractual

arbitration agreements" and "was intended to make arbitration

agreements specifically enforceable upon the terms established

by the parties."        Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638,

645   (7th    Cir.    1981)       (citation    omitted).        But    the    Act    also

identifies grounds for vacating an arbitrator's decision:

           (1) where the award was procured by corruption,
      fraud, or undue means;

           (2) where   there   was  evident   partiality                        or
      corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;

           (3) where   the   arbitrators  were   guilty   of
      misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
      sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
      evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or
      of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
      party have been prejudiced; or

           (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
      or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final,
      and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
      was not made.

                                          6
                                                                      No.    2021AP102.akz

9 U.S.C. § 10(a).         Apart from its use of the Oxford comma, this

is   the    exact      same    language      as    appears     in     the        Wisconsin

Arbitration Act.        See Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1).

     ¶27        The United States Supreme Court first discussed the

grounds for vacating an arbitral award under the FAA in Wilko v.

Swan.      Wilko involved a customer's suit against a securities

brokerage       firm   under    the    Securities       Act    of     1933,       alleging

fraudulent       inducement.          Wilko,      346   U.S.    at    428–29.          The

securities         brokerage       firm,          "[w]ithout         answering         the

complaint, . . . moved to stay the trial of the action pursuant

to § 3 of the [FAA] until an arbitration in accordance with the

terms of identical margin agreements was had."                      Id. at 429.

     ¶28        Notably, Wilko did not address whether to vacate an

arbitral award at all.           By the time the case reached the Supreme

Court,     no    arbitration     had   yet     taken    place.        The     issue    was

instead whether "an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy

is a 'condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person

acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision'
of the Securities Act which § 146 declares 'void.'"                         Id. at 430.

The Court concluded such an agreement is void, a holding later

overturned       by    Rodriguez      de   Quijas,      490    U.S.       477.       While

discussing how the effectiveness of buyer protections under the

Securities       Act   "is     lessened    in     arbitration        as     compared    to

judicial proceedings," the Court noted the high standard for

vacating an arbitral award:

     Power to vacate an          award is limited. While it may be
     true, as the Court          of Appeals thought, that a failure
     of the arbitrators           to decide in accordance with the
     provisions of the            Securities Act would 'constitute
                                         7
                                                                     No.   2021AP102.akz

      grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10
      of the Federal Arbitration Act,' that failure would
      need to be made clearly to appear.     In unrestricted
      submission, such as the present margin agreements
      envisage, the interpretations of the law by the
      arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not
      subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for
      error in interpretation.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435–37 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

This is where the "manifest disregard" language first appeared.

      ¶29   After the Wilko decision, "manifest disregard" seemed

to   take   on    a   life   of    its   own.      As   the   Supreme       Court   has
observed,    Wilko's      cryptic      language    caused     much    confusion     and

varying approaches to reviewing arbitral awards in the years

since:

      Maybe the term "manifest disregard" was meant to name
      a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred
      to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding
      to them. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
      Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 656 (1985)
      (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Arbitration awards are
      only reviewable for manifest disregard of the law, 9
      U.S.C. §§ 10, 207"); I/S Stavborg v. National Metal
      Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 431 [(2d Cir. 1974)].
      Or, as some courts have thought, "manifest disregard"
      may have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4),
      the   paragraphs    authorizing   vacatur   when   the
      arbitrators were "guilty of misconduct" or "exceeded
      their   powers."     See,  e.g.,   [Kyocera  Corp.  v.
      Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997
      (9th Circ. 2003)].
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585

(2008).     However, the Court has not attempted to clarify the

meaning of "manifest disregard," how it fits into the FAA's

language,    or       whether     it   is   an    extra-statutory          ground   for

vacating arbitral awards.              See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010) ("We do not decide

                                            8
                                                                             No.   2021AP102.akz

whether      'manifest       disregard'          survives       our    decision      in    [Hall

Street Associates, 552 U.S. 576] as an independent ground for

review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for

vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.").

         III.      "MANIFEST DISREGARD" IS LIKELY NOT A UNIVERSAL
                              STANDARD OF REVIEW.
       ¶30    Several aspects of the Wilko opinion indicate that the

United       States       Supreme        Court    might     not       have     intended        for

"manifest disregard" to be a general standard of review for all

arbitral awards.

       ¶31    First, the Court used the phrase "manifest disregard"

in passing as dicta.               The issue was whether the parties agreed

to arbitrate.             There was no arbitral award for the Court to

review,      and     no    need     to    determine       the    permissible         scope     of

review.       Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 480 (4th

Cir.         2012)         ("The           origins          of         modern         manifest

disregard . . . likely              lie    in    dicta    from        the   Supreme    Court's

decision in Wilko . . . .").

       ¶32    Second, none of the authorities cited in Wilko appear

to   support       the    proposition        that     "manifest        disregard"         is   the

general standard for reviewing arbitral awards.                              Wilko collected

several sources cited in footnote 24 in support of the "manifest

disregard" dicta.            Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437 n.24.                          Rather than

recognizing        a     general     standard        of   review,       these      authorities

instead seem to recognize a reviewing court's ability to vacate

an arbitral award in part depends on the scope of submission to

                                                 9
                                                 No.   2021AP102.akz

the arbitrator as stated in the arbitration agreement.1     One of

the cited cases, Kleine v. Catra, most comprehensively explains

how the standard of review stems from the contract language:

    1  See, e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349
(1854) (emphases added) ("If an award is within the submission,
and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a
full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not
set it aside for error, either in law or fact.     In this case,
one of the parties sued the other for debt, who, in his turn,
claimed damages for the manner in which he was sued.         The
submission was broad enough to cover all these demands on either
side."); United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 406, 413-
14 (1874) (stating "the whole controversy was submitted to three
arbitrators" and reviewing the terms of the arbitration
agreement); Tex. & P. Ry. Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 158 F.2d
251, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1946) (discussing authority of the
arbitrators   under   rules   established   by   contract);  The
Hartbridge. N. of Eng. S.S. Co. v. Munson S.S. Line, 62 F.2d 72,
73 (2d Cir. 1932) (emphasis added) (quoting Wilkins v. Allen, 62
N.E. 575, 576 (N.Y. 1902)) ("Where the merits of a controversy
are referred to an arbitrator selected by the parties, his
determination, either as to the law or the facts, is final and
conclusive; and a court will not open an award unless perverse
misconstruction or positive misconduct upon the part of the
arbitrator is plainly established, or there is some provision in
the agreement of submission authorizing it."); Mut. Benefit
Health & Accident Ass'n v. United Cas. Co., 142 F.2d 390, 393
(1st Cir. 1944) ("It is the contention of the Association that
the decision of the arbitrator is not binding on it, because he
did not follow the terms of submission . . . ."); Wesley A.
Sturges, A Treatise on Commercial Arbitrations and Awards § 218
(1930) ("Judicial opinion, as it is expressed in the cases, is
uniformly to the effect that under an unrestricted submission
arbitrators are not required to decide 'according to law.' They
may disregard the 'strict letter of the law.'"); Note, Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 Harv. L. Rev.
681, 685 (1950) (emphasis added) ("[T]he general view, both at
common law and by statute, is that the courts will not review
for its wisdom or soundness the principle selected by the
arbitrator, unless his discretion in making that selection is
limited by the terms of the submission agreement."); Archibald
Cox, The Place of Law in Labor Arbitration, 34 Chi. Bar Rec.
205, 207 (1953) (arguing arbitrators should apply the governing
law as a judge would, but nonetheless recognizing "[t]he power
of arbitrators differs with the breadth of the provision").

                               10
                                                                    No.    2021AP102.akz

      If the parties wish to reserve the law for the
      decision of the court, they may stipulate to that
      effect in the submission; they may restrain or enlarge
      its operation, as they please. If no such reservation
      is made in the submission, the parties are presumed to
      agree, that every thing, both as to law and fact,
      which is necessary to the ultimate decision, is
      included in the authority of the referees.

           Under  a   general  submission,   therefore,  the
      arbitrators have rightfully a power to decide on the
      law and the fact; and an error in either respect ought
      not to be the subject of complaint by either party,
      for it is their own choice to be concluded by the
      judgment of the arbitrators.    Besides, under such a
      general submission, the reasonable rule seems to be,
      that the referees are not bound to award upon the mere
      dry principles of law applicable to the case before
      them.
14    F. Cas.    732,    735    (C.C.D.        Mass.    1841).       Wilko's      cited

authorities     therefore      may   instead      support    the    idea     that   the

standard of review for arbitral awards depends on the contract,

meaning there is no universal standard.

      ¶33     Finally, Wilko itself apparently did not purport to

establish "manifest disregard" as a universal standard.                             The

Court only said the standard for reviewing an arbitral decision

for   legal     error   is     "manifest       disregard"    "[i]n        unrestricted
submissions, such as the present margin agreements envisage."

Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.              Whether the applicable standard is

"manifest disregard" seems instead to depend on the language in

the arbitration agreement.

      ¶34     Unlike    the    record   in       this    case,     Wilko     helpfully

includes the contract language defining the scope of submission

to the arbitrator:

           Any controversy arising between us under this
      contract shall be determined by arbitration pursuant

                                          11
                                                                             No.   2021AP102.akz

      to the Arbitration Law of the State of New York, and
      under the rules of either the Arbitration Committee of
      the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, or
      of the American Arbitration Association, or of the
      Arbitration Committee of the New York Stock Exchange
      or such other Exchange as may have jurisdiction over
      the matter in dispute, as I may elect.             Any
      arbitration hereunder shall be before at least three
      arbitrators.
Id.   at    432       n.15.      This      is    a    choice-of-law        provision,      which

defines which jurisdiction's law the arbitrator is required to

apply.       Based       on    this       reading       of     Wilko,      so   long   as    the

arbitrator        applied        this       law,        the     parties         received     the

arbitration they bargained for.                       However, if the arbitrator did

not apply the law described in the choice-of-law provision——in

other words, manifestly disregarded the law——then the parties

did not receive the arbitration they bargained for.                                 See James

M. Gaitis, Clearing the Air on "Manifest Disregard" and Choice

of Law in Commercial Arbitration: A Reconciliation of Wilko,

Hall Street, and Stolt-Nielsen, 22 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 21, 22

(2011)     ("[T]he        advent      of    the       phrase       manifest     disregard     in

American     case        law     and       commentary         is     an    unfortunate      and

unnecessary adjunct to evaluating the enforceability of choice-

of-law provisions in agreements to arbitrate. . . . [M]anifest

disregard        of    the    law    is     nothing      more       than    a   loosely     used

catchall misnomer that should be forever abandoned in favor of a

simple and clear pronouncement mandating the enforcement, to one

degree      or        another,      of     choice-of-law            provisions       governing

agreements to arbitrate.").

      ¶35    This        formulation            seems    to     fit       neatly    with     the
statutory vacatur standard.                      A reviewing court may vacate an

                                                 12
                                                                            No.   2021AP102.akz

arbitral award "[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers."

Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).                              One must look

to   the    arbitration           agreement          to    discern   the     scope      of     the

arbitrators'           powers.            6    C.J.S.       Arbitration      § 101       (2023)

(footnotes omitted) ("Except to the extent that an arbitrator's

power may derive from a statute mandating arbitration, or a

court      order,       the       scope       of     an    arbitrator's      authority         is

determined        by   the    arbitration            agreement . . . .").              Where    an

arbitrator        fails      to    abide      by    a     choice-of-law     provision,         and

therefore manifestly disregards the law, it may be that the

arbitrator exceeded his powers, and a reviewing court may vacate

the award.2

            IV.     PARTIES MUST INCLUDE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
                                IN THE RECORD.
      ¶36    In certain cases, it may be that "manifest disregard"

is   the    proper      standard      for          reviewing    challenges        to   arbitral

awards.      But whether that is the case may depend on how the

parties     defined       the      arbitrator's            powers    in    the    arbitration

agreement, and a reviewing court likely cannot know the scope of

      2This  explanation   of  "manifest   disregard"  does  not
necessarily run contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Hall
Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
In Hall Street, the Court concluded the grounds for vacatur
under the FAA are exclusive and cannot "be supplemented by
contract." Id. at 578. The arbitration agreement in that case
permitted district court "review for legal error," which the
Court concluded was a supplemental ground for vacatur in
violation of the FAA.    Id. at 578–80.    Though parties cannot
supplement the statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA, they
may be free to define the arbitrator's powers as they wish.

                                                   13
                                                                  No.   2021AP102.akz

the   arbitrator's      powers   without     first    seeing     the    arbitration

agreement.

      ¶37   In the present case, the arbitration agreement appears

absent from the record.          The closest we have in the record is a

provision of the collective bargaining agreement stating, "The

decision    of   the    arbitrator    shall    be     limited    to     the   subject

matter of the grievance.            The arbitrator shall not modify, add

to or delete from the express terms of this Agreement.                               The

arbitrator's     decision     shall     be    final       and   binding."           This

somewhat establishes the scope of the arbitrator's powers, but

it contains no language stating how the arbitrator was to arrive

at a decision.     Such a contract provision does not appear in the

record, and we have no indication as to whether one even exists.

Nonetheless, the parties agree that the arbitrator would have

exceeded his powers if he were to manifestly disregard the law,

and   the   majority     correctly     applies      the    "manifest     disregard"

standard for that reason.

      ¶38   In   future    cases,     however,      parties     must    ensure      the
record contains the contract language establishing the scope of

the   arbitrator's        powers.       Arbitration         agreements        are     no

different from all other contracts.                 Our duty is to read the

contract     language      and      ensure    the     parties      received          the

arbitration they bargained for.              The arbitration agreement may

very well call for us to apply a "manifest disregard" standard——

or it may not.         Either way, fulfilling our duty to enforce the

arbitration agreement as written becomes nearly impossible when
the parties omit it from the record.

                                        14
                                              No.   2021AP102.akz

¶39   For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

                           15
                                                                  No.       2021AP102.rgb

      ¶40    REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.                (concurring).            Although

the majority treats Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,

470 U.S. 532 (1985) as the lodestar in cases involving the due

process     rights    of   public       employees     deprived    of       a   property

interest,    in    this    case    it    isn't.      As   the   arbitrator       noted,

Andrew Weiss's reliance on Loudermill is "misplaced."                           Mathews

v.    Eldridge,      424   U.S. 319       (1976)     governs    the     due     process

analysis but the majority doesn't even mention it.                         Accordingly,

I respectfully concur but do not join the majority opinion.

      ¶41    In Loudermill, a school board terminated a security

guard because he did not disclose in his employment application

that he had been convicted of a felony.                   470 U.S. at 535.        Under

state law, a security guard could be terminated only for cause.

Id.       Accordingly,       the        terminated     security       guard      had   a

constitutionally-protected               property     interest        in       continued

employment under binding precedent.                 Id. at 535–41.

      ¶42    The terminated security guard sued, alleging he was

not given an opportunity to respond to the charge of dishonesty

prior to his termination.           Id. at 536.        He claimed he mistakenly

thought he had been previously convicted of a misdemeanor, not a

felony, and that this mistaken belief should have mitigated his

discipline.       Id. at 535.

      ¶43    The United States Supreme Court held the terminated

security guard stated a due process claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, relying heavily on
its previous decision in Mathews.                  In that case, the Court set

                                            1
                                                                                  No.    2021AP102.rgb

forth a three-factor test to determine the amount of process

due:

       (1) "the private interest                       that    will       be    affected       by    the
           official action";

       (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
           through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
           any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards";
           and

       (3) "the Government's interest, including the function
           involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
           the additional or substitute procedural requirement
           would entail."
Mathews,     424       U.S. at         335    (citing          Goldberg          v.     Kelly,       397

U.S. 254,     263–71       (1970)).           In        Loudermill,            the     Court   merely

applied the Mathews test to a specific set of facts, ultimately

concluding        both    notice        and    a       hearing        were       required      before

termination.           470 U.S. at 546.                  The Court said little about

these   requirements,            probably       because            the     facts       of   the     case

warranted     a    narrow       holding.           It     did       explain,         however,       that

notice may be provided in writing or orally, and a hearing,

while "necessary," "need not be elaborate."                                Id. at 545–46.
       ¶44   The       Court's         application            of     the       Mathews      test      in

Loudermill        provides        no     guidance         as        to     the       test's    proper

application       in     this    case.         Regarding            the     first       factor,      the

"private     interest,"          the    Court      repeatedly            emphasized         that     the

case    involved       termination;           in       this        case,       Weiss    was    merely

demoted.          In     fact,     the       words       "terminated,"               "termination,"

"pretermination,"          and         "post-termination"                 collectively         appear

twenty-nine times in the Loudermill majority opinion.                                       The first
sentence of the opinion states, "we consider what pretermination

                                                   2
                                                                         No.    2021AP102.rgb

process must be accorded a public employee who can be discharged

only    for    cause."        Id.    at   535.          Similarly,       the        concluding

paragraph begins, "[w]e conclude that all the process that is

due    is    provided    by   a     pretermination        opportunity          to    respond,

coupled       with     post-termination          administrative          procedures          as

provided by . . . [state law]."                  Id. at 547–48.          In applying the

first factor, the Court emphasized the gravity of a job loss:

       [T]he   significance of   the  private   interest  in
       retaining employment cannot be gainsaid.      We have
       frequently recognized the severity of depriving a
       person of the means of livelihood.     While a fired
       worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will
       take some time and is likely to be burdened by the
       questionable circumstances under which he left his
       previous job.
Id. at 543 (citations omitted).                    Throughout the opinion, the

Court focused on the significance of losing employment.

       ¶45    The    private      interest        at    stake       in   this        case   is

obviously less than in Loudermill.                     Weiss will lose $80 a month

as a result of his demotion, a small fraction of his salary,

whereas the security guard in Loudermill lost his entire salary.

Additionally,        Weiss    will     not   face       the   less-tangible            burdens

associated      with    termination.         He     will      not   have       to    look   for

employment elsewhere and accordingly will not have to explain to

potential employers why he is no longer working for the Green

Bay Police Department.              The stigma associated with demotion is

substantially less than the stigma associated with termination.

The    decision        to     demote      Weiss        has     a    quantifiably            and

qualitatively smaller effect on his private interest than the

                                             3
                                                                      No.   2021AP102.rgb

decision to fire in Loudermill had on the private interest of

the terminated security guard.

      ¶46    The    Loudermill         Court's      application       of    the     second

factor——"the risk of an erroneous deprivation" and the "probable

value"      of   additional       "procedural         safeguards"——is          similarly

inapplicable in this case.             The Court noted:

      [S]ome opportunity for the employee to present his
      side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in
      reaching an accurate decision.    Dismissals for cause
      will often involve factual disputes.    Even where the
      facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of
      discharge may not be; in such cases, the only
      meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the
      decisionmaker is likely before the termination takes
      effect.
Id. (citations omitted).              The Court stated that a hearing could

be "informal"——the point of the hearing, it explained, is to

"alert[]" the employer "to the existence of disputes about facts

and arguments[.]"           Id. at 543 n.8 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419

U.S. 565, 583–84 (1975)).

      ¶47    With       respect   to    the       second    factor,    this       case   is

distinguishable from Loudermill on multiple grounds.                          Loudermill

involved a classic dispute of fact:                  Did the terminated security

guard    know      he    had   been     convicted          of   a   felony?        Unlike

Loudermill, this case involves no such dispute——Weiss admitted

he gave confidential information to a friend.                       See majority op.,

¶2.

      ¶48    Additionally, Weiss received four in-person hearings

prior to being demoted, while the terminated security guard in
Loudermill alleged he did not receive a pretermination hearing.

See id., ¶17.           Weiss does not dispute he received a hearing.
                                              4
                                                                      No.    2021AP102.rgb

Instead, he argues the final notice did not cite some of the

specific policies he was ultimately disciplined for violating.

See id., ¶11.          The Court in Loudermill did not discuss that

category of due process claim.                     In the particular context of

employment    termination,           the   Court    determined       that    a    "tenured

public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the

charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence,

and an opportunity to present his side of the story."                             470 U.S.

at 546 (citations omitted).

       ¶49   Weiss's      notice      argument       suffers    from        two    further

flaws:       he    focuses      on     the    final       notice,    but     nothing    in

Loudermill suggests notice must be given in a single, formal

document.         Weiss   had   either       oral    or    written   notice       of   each

policy he was alleged to have violated, as the majority notes.

Majority op., ¶17.         Whether a notice even has to cite a specific

policy is questionable.               Cf. Kohlbeck v. Reliance Const. Co.,

2002    WI   App 142,     ¶12    n.3,        256    Wis. 2d 235,      647     N.W.2d 277

("[L]egal     theories       need      not    be     fully    developed,          or   even
expressly identified, at the pleading stage."                       (citing Murray v.

City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI App 62, ¶12 n.6, 252 Wis. 2d 613, 642

N.W.2d 541)).

       ¶50   Lastly, Loudermill's application of the third factor,

"the Government's interest," is immaterial.                    The Court reasoned:

       [A]ffording the employee an opportunity to respond
       prior   to   termination   would    impose    neither   a
       significant administrative     burden nor intolerable
       delays.     Furthermore,   the    employer   shares   the
       employee's   interest   in  avoiding     disruption   and
       erroneous decisions; and until the matter is settled,
       the employer would continue to receive the benefit of
                                              5
                                                                            No.   2021AP102.rgb

       the employee's labors.    It is preferable to keep a
       qualified employee on than to train a new one.       A
       governmental employer also has an interest in keeping
       citizens usefully employed rather than taking the
       possibly erroneous and counterproductive step of
       forcing   its  employees   onto  the   welfare  rolls.
       Finally, in those situations where the employer
       perceives a significant hazard in keeping the employee
       on the job, it can avoid the problem by suspending
       with pay.
470 U.S. at 544–45.             The Court's analysis of the third factor

places    great    weight       on   the     purported         benefit      the    government

receives by retaining a qualified employee pending a hearing.

In this case, the Department held four hearings; it did not lose

the    benefit    of   Weiss's        labor;       and    Weiss       remained      gainfully

employed in a different position.                      Obviously, the government did

not    perceive    any      hazard     in    keeping          Weiss    on    the    job;    the

department only demoted him.

       ¶51    In summary, Weiss has not explained how the arbitrator

erred.       He was afforded a great deal of process, and Loudermill

does not entitle him to more.                 The Court in Mathews even noted,

"[d]ue       process   is    flexible        and       calls     for     such      procedural

protections as the particular situation demands."                                 424 U.S. at
334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).

Despite the fact-intensive nature of the Mathews test, Weiss

latches onto one particular application of that test and asks

this     court    to     take    the       rare        step     of    setting       aside    an

arbitrator's       decision          based        on     that        application.           The

application he cites, Loudermill, does not fit the facts of this

case and therefore provides no guidance; accordingly, Weiss's
argument fails.

                                              6
                                                                         No.   2021AP102.rgb

      ¶52     "[I]t is this court's function to develop and clarify

the     law."        State     ex    rel.      Wis.      Senate    v.    Thompson,      144

Wis. 2d 429,        436,     424    N.W.2d 385        (1988)   (citations        omitted).

Although litigants often treat Loudermill as the benchmark by

which    to     determine     whether    a     disciplined        government      employee

received      due    process,       it   set       the   standard       only   for    cases

involving a terminated government employee.                       The majority should

have taken the opportunity to clarify that Loudermill represents

but one application of Mathews, which governs the analysis of

whether the government satisfied due process in depriving an

individual, including a public employee, of a property interest.

Although the majority reaches the right result, it applies the

wrong case.         I therefore respectfully concur.

                                               7
    No.   2021AP102.rgb

1