Court Opinion

ID: 9548995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:11:43.611726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:43.248531
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I believe that the proper interpretation of article IV, section 6, of the Alaska Constitution 1 is that an appointment to a judicial office occurs on the date that the governor informs the new judge of his or her designation to hold office. Accordingly, I agree with this court’s conclusion that Judge Johnstone was constitutionally required to run for retention in the 1982 election, which was the first general election held more than three years after Johnstone’s appointment on October 8, 1979.
AS 15.35.070 requires judges to file a declaration of candidacy “not less than 90 days” before the election at which they seek retention. Johnstone did not file his declaration until approximately thirty days before the date of the 1982 election. As a result of this late filing, the judicial council was unable to evaluate him and “provide to the public information about the judge and ... a recommendation regarding retention or rejection,” as required by AS 22.10.150. In turn, the judicial council was unable to provide this information to the lieutenant governor’s office for inclusion in the election pamphlet distributed to voters, as required by AS 15.58.050.
The majority of this court concludes that, under the particular facts of this case, it is appropriate to “excuse” compliance with these statutes. I disagree. I believe that once this court decides that Johnstone was constitutionally required to run for retention in 1982, and further decides not to “waive” this requirement by giving our interpretation of article IV, section 6, prospective application only, it has no choice but to hold that Johnstone’s office was forfeited by reason of his noncompliance with the election laws. See Alaska Const, art. IV, § 7.2 The election laws were promulgated by the legislature because the legislature determined, in the exercise of its sound judgment, that they are necessary. I do not believe this court has presented any legitimate reasons for “excusing” compliance with them.
I. INELIGIBILITY TO RUN IN 1982
This court has consistently held in the past that pre-election filing deadlines im*547posed by statute are mandatory, rather than directive. State v. Marshall, 633 P.2d 227, 235 (Alaska 1981); Silides v. Thomas, 559 P.2d 80, 86-87 (Alaska 1977).3 In today’s opinion, these authorities are apparently overlooked.
We held in Silides v. Thomas, 559 P.2d at 86, that if it is legally impossible to comply with a statute imposing a filing deadline, or if the statute creates significant confusion as to what conduct is required of the candidate, then substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient. In that case, the lieutenant governor had rejected Silides’ declaration of candidacy for the house of representatives because Silides had not filed his financial disclosure statement within the time prescribed by statute. Although the statute required Silides to file his declaration in Anchorage on June 1, we held that the statute would be sufficiently complied with if Silides merely placed his declaration in the mail to Anchorage on June 1. On remand, however, the superior court found that Silides had not placed his declaration in the mail until June 2. Accordingly, it affirmed the lieutenant governor’s rejection of Silides’ declaration because the additional delay of just one day precluded a finding of substantial compliance. 559 P.2d at 82, 85-86.
It is arguable that Johnstone’s failure to file a declaration of candidacy within the time period prescribed by AS 15.35.070 was the result of significant confusion as to whether he was required to run for retention in 1982. Even so, however, it cannot be said that Johnstone substantially complied with the statute. AS 15.35.070 requires a candidate to file his declaration more than ninety days before the election. Johnstone did not file his declaration until approximately thirty days before the election. This sixty-day tardiness, amounting to two-thirds of the time period at issue, cannot be construed as substantial compliance.
We indicated in State v. Marshall that the sanction of forfeiture of office may not be applicable when violations of the election laws are “technical, trivial, or insubstantial, or could not have affected the election.” 633 P.2d at 235. It is apparent, however, that Johnstone’s violation of AS 15.35.070 was not merely technical, trivial, or insubstantial; furthermore, it could very well have affected the election.
As a result of Johnstone’s late filing, the judicial council was unable to perform the evaluation of him required by AS 22.10.050. The council was also unable to provide the voters with any information in the election pamphlet about Johnstone, or make a recommendation as to whether he should be retained or not. When voters are given less information about a candidate than contemplated by the election laws because of a violation of one of those laws, the violation is considered highly prejudicial and presumed to have affected the election. See State v. Marshall, 633 P.2d at 235-36, Carr v. Thomas, 586 P.2d 622, 626 (Alaska 1978).
Accordingly, I believe that Johnstone’s failure to file his declaration of candidacy until after it was impossible for the judicial council to conduct its evaluation made him ineligible to run in the 1982 election. Unless Johnstone is excused from running in that election, I believe the only proper course is to declare his office forfeited and now vacant.
II. PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF DECISION
This court’s resolution of the case is to require Johnstone to run in the 1982 election, while excusing compliance with AS 15.35.070 and AS 22.10.050. In my opinion, this is the worst possible result. If the court wishes to avoid declaring Johnstone’s office forfeited, I believe the only way to do so is to give prospective application to our interpretation of article IV, section 6, of the constitution. This would permit Johnstone to participate in the 1984 election, while ensuring compliance with the statutory mandates.
*548The rationale ultimately stated by the court for requiring Johnstone to run in the 1982 election and excusing compliance with the relevant statutes is that “[sjelection of 1984 as the appropriate year would result in the suspension of the operation of a constitutional mandate, and a denial of the voters’ opportunity to retain or reject Judge Johnstone at the precise time prescribed by the constitution.” 669 P.2d at 546. The court itself, however, has adequately addressed the latter of these concerns in its opinion. It states that permitting John-stone to run in 1984 would not “contravene the intent underlying article IV, section 6.” Id. at 545. The court specifically notes that “[n]o matter how it is construed, article IV, section 6 can operate in the particular ease to authorize a first term for a superior court judge of anywhere from three to five years.” Id. at 545 (footnote omitted). Having thus disposed of this very issue, the court can hardly give much weight to the “denial of the voters’ opportunity to retain or reject Judge Johnstone at the precise time prescribed by the constitution.” This is particularly so when, until the court rendered its decision in this case, it was unclear what the “precise time prescribed by the constitution” is for a judge to run for retention following his or her “appointment” — the court states that our interpretation of article IV, section 6, is “an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.” Id. at 544. I therefore do not believe that this rationale supports the court’s conclusion.
The other rationale stated for the court’s conclusion is its professed concern that selecting 1984 as the year for Johnstone to run for retention would “result in the suspension of the operation of a constitutional mandate.” Id. at 546. The specific constitutional mandate, however, is as follows: “Each ... superior court judge shall, in the manner provided by law, be subject to approval or rejection on a nonpartisan ballot at the first general election held more than three years after his appointment.” Alaska Const, art. IV, § 6 (emphasis added). Thus, not only does the constitution require a judge to run for retention “at the first general election held more than three years after his appointment,” but it also requires the judge to run for retention “in the manner provided by law.” The election laws clearly require a judge to file his or her declaration of candidacy more than ninety days before the election; they further require the judicial council to evaluate the candidate and provide information about the candidate, which is to be included in the voter’s pamphlet that is published in accordance with AS 15.58.010.
In its opinion, the court fails to explain why it has chosen to elevate one clause of article IV, section 6, over another. Requiring Johnstone to run in 1982, while excusing compliance with the election laws, results “in the suspension of the operation of a constitutional mandate” that Johnstone run for retention in the manner provided by law. By what force of logic is it more important that Johnstone run in 1982, as opposed to 1984, than that the voters have the opportunity to receive from the judicial council information about Johnstone’s qualifications before they exercise their franchise, when both are required by the constitution? As the court notes, it is possible for any judge to be in office nearly five years before he or she is required to run for retention. I therefore do not perceive any prejudice resulting from permitting John-stone to run in 1984. I believe, however, that the prejudice resulting from requiring Johnstone to run in 1982 without the voters receiving necessary information about his qualifications is significant and obvious.
It seems to me that the analysis used by the court supports giving prospective application to our interpretation of article IV, section 6, much more than it supports excusing compliance with the election laws. The court relies upon the test enunciated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56, 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 306 (1971), which is indeed the proper test to use when determining whether or not to apply a decision prospectively. In accordance with this test, I believe the court could make a strong argument that our interpre*549tation of article IV, section 6, should only be given prospective application: the proper interpretation of this constitutional provision is “an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed,” Chevron, id. at 106, 92 S.Ct. at 355, 30 L.Ed.2d at 306; retrospective application of our interpretation would not particularly further the purpose and effect of the provision, id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 356, 30 L.Ed.2d at 306; and finally, retrospective application of our interpretation would arguably produce substantial inequity by causing the forfeiture of Johnstone’s office because of his failure to comply with the election laws.4 Id. Accordingly, the circumstances of this case may well justify giving only prospective application to our interpretation of article IV, section 6. As I have repeatedly indicated, this would enable Johnstone to run for retention in 1984, at which time he would be able to comply with the election laws.
Finally, I believe it is necessary to comment upon the court’s holding that it may apply the same analysis used to determine whether its decision should be given prospective application to determine instead whether it should excuse the “residual, secondary effects of the decision.” 669 P.2d at 543. The court states:
[W]here a new decision has been rendered on an issue of constitutional law, and where the effect of that decision is to place a litigant in violation of related statutory provisions, application of those statutes may be waived if circumstances exist which would otherwise justify a purely prospective ruling regarding the constitutional issue.
Id. at 543. This reasoning is not supported by citation to any authority, presumably because there is none. Although there may be circumstances under which this approach would yield a just result, it is fraught with peril. It may be that prospective application of a particular decision is justified, while excusing compliance with related statutory provisions is not.
I believe this case presents a perfect example of the problem. In my opinion, the court may be justified in giving prospective application to our interpretation of article IV, section 6. I do not believe, however, that the court is justified in retrospectively applying that interpretation, but excusing compliance with the election laws. The analysis appropriate when determining whether or not to apply a decision regarding a constitutional issue prospectively simply does not address or consider the consequences of waiving the requirements of related statutory provisions. In this case, the court analyzes the facts as it would do if it were considering whether to apply our constitutional ruling prospectively or not. It somehow decides, based on this analysis, that compliance with the election laws may be waived. At no point are the purposes of those election laws addressed, or are the effects of waiving compliance considered. It seems obvious to me that the court simply cannot analyze one issue only to use that analysis to resolve a completely different issue, which was never specifically considered.
III. CONCLUSION
I agree with the court that the proper interpretation of article IV, section 6, is that a superior court judge must run for retention at the first general election held more than three years after he or she is designated by the governor to hold the office. I therefore agree with the court that Johnstone was constitutionally required to run for retention in the 1982 election. I disagree, however, with the court’s conclusion that compliance with the election laws may be waived.
Once,the court decides that Johnstone must run in 1982,1 believe the only conclu*550sion the court can reach is that Johnstone’s office is forfeited and now vacant because he did not file his declaration of candidacy within the time prescribed by AS 15.35.070. If the court wishes to avoid this result, the only analytically sound means by which to do so is to give prospective application to our constitutional interpretation. Using this approach, the court could hold that its decision does not apply to Johnstone. John-stone accordingly could run for retention in 1984, instead of 1982, at which time compliance with the statutory mandates would be possible.

. Article IV, section 6, of the Alaska Constitution provides in relevant part as follows: “Each ... superior court judge shall, in the manner provided by law, be subject to approval or rejection on a nonpartisan ballot at the first general election held more than three years after his appointment.”

. Article IV, section 7, of the Alaska Constitution provides as follows: “Vacancy. The office of any supreme court justice or superior court judge becomes vacant ninety days after the election at which he is rejected by a majority of those voting on the question, or for which he fails to file his declaration of candidacy to succeed himself.”

. Statutory deadlines for the filing of post-election reports and documents, however, may be directive, rather than mandatory. See State v. Marshall, 633 P.2d 227, 234-35 (Alaska 1981).

. Unlike the situation that would exist if John-stone had lost at a retention election, see AS 22.10.150, if Johnstone’s office were declared forfeited because of his failure to comply with the election laws in 1982, he could nonetheless be appointed immediately to a new office as a superior court judge. Thus, the prejudice sustained by Johnstone if he were “ousted,” as the court terms it, may not be as great as assumed.