Court Opinion

ID: 9407971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 00:00:28.050624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.998861
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40225     Document: 00516815506         Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/10/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                           FILED
                                                                   July 10, 2023
                                 No. 22-40225
                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                           Clerk

   Young Conservatives of Texas Foundation,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Neal Smatresk, President of the University of North Texas; Shannon
   Goodman, Vice President for Enrollment of the University of North Texas,

                                          Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:20-CV-973
                  ______________________________

   Before Smith, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge:
          States often charge their residents one price for public college and
   charge those who live elsewhere much more. Texas allows illegal aliens who
   satisfy residency requirements to pay that in-state, lower tuition. A Texas
   university student group of out-of-state students sued officials at the
   University of North Texas, arguing that Texas’ tuition scheme violated
   federal law. The district court agreed and barred the university from charging
   out-of-state tuition. We now REVERSE the judgment and VACATE the
   injunction.
Case: 22-40225       Document: 00516815506           Page: 2      Date Filed: 07/10/2023

                                      No. 22-40225

                                             I
          The facts here are undisputed. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal
   Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. See Pub. L. No. 104-
   208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). That act, among other things,
   restricts states’ authority to grant certain postsecondary education benefits
   to illegal aliens unless other conditions are met. It directs that “an alien who
   is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of
   residence within a State . . . for any postsecondary education benefit unless a
   citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit . . . without
   regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident.” 8 U.S.C. §
   1623(a).
          Meanwhile, Texas charges students who satisfy certain residency
   requirements lower tuition than it charges to nonresident students. See Tex.
   Educ. Code §§ 54.051(c)–(d), 54.052. So long as they satisfy the statute’s
   residency requirements, illegal aliens are eligible for Texas resident tuition.
   Out-of-state, nonresident American citizens are not. Currently, Texas
   resident tuition is pegged at $50 per semester credit hour. See Tex. Educ.
   Code § 54.051(c). Nonresident tuition instead totals $458 per semester
   credit hour.
          Enter this lawsuit. The Young Conservatives of Texas Foundation
   (YCT) is a student group at the University of North Texas (UNT)
   comprising many nonresident members. YCT’s “core organizational
   purpose is to advance conservative values” through a variety of actions. It
   has also “repeatedly opposed the disparate treatment of aliens who are not
   lawfully present in the United States and United States citizens from other
   states with regard to tuition.”
          That latter goal collided with UNT’s tuition scheme. UNT, through
   its President, Neal Smatresk, and its Vice President for Enrollment, Shannon

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                                          No. 22-40225

   Goodman, (the appellants here), charge illegal aliens who satisfied Texas’
   residency requirements resident tuition, and charge U.S. citizens who failed
   to meet those requirements nonresident tuition. YCT, believing this
   disparity unlawful and harmful to its members, sued in state court for
   injunctive and declaratory relief. Though it expressly disclaimed any
   challenge to what UNT charges to illegal aliens, it argued that the UNT
   officials improperly charged its members out-of-state tuition per § 54.051(d),
   which YCT believed was preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a).
          Sometime after removal, the parties cross-motioned for summary
   judgment and the district court sided with YCT. It found that YCT had
   associational standing to challenge § 54.051(d); that though UNT itself was
   not a proper defendant under Ex parte Young, Smatresk and Goodman were1;
   that § 54.051(d) is both expressly and impliedly preempted by § 1623(a); and
   that YCT was entitled to a permanent injunction barring the UNT officials
   from enforcing § 54.051(d). The court then declared § 54.051(d) preempted
   and thus violative of the Constitution. It enjoined the UNT officials from
   enforcing “the tuition rates prescribed by Section 54.051(d) of the Texas
   Education Code against United States citizens at the University of North
   Texas.” The UNT officials now appeal.
                                               II
          We review a grant (or denial) of summary judgment de novo.
   Davidson v. Fairchild Controls Corp., 882 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2018). A
   “court should grant summary judgment when ‘there is no genuine dispute as
   to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
   law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “We also review de novo the
   district court’s ruling on standing[.]” See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.
          _____________________
          1
              The UNT officials do not challenge this conclusion.

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   Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 37 F.4th 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 2022). And finally, we
   review a grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. Scott v.
   Schedler, 826 F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
                                          A
          First, we must decide whether YCT has standing to challenge
   § 54.051(d). We conclude they do.
          To establish standing, YCT must demonstrate (1) an “injury in fact”
   that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”; (2) is fairly
   traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) is likely to be redressed by a
   favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). But
   even if YCT has suffered no injury, it “may have standing to assert the claims
   of its members[.]” Tex. Ent. Ass’n. v. Hegar, 10 F.4th 495, 504 (5th Cir. 2021)
   (citation omitted). To have associational standing, YCT must demonstrate
   that its members would have standing to sue in their own right, that the
   interests it seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and that neither the
   claim nor the requested relief requires its members to participate in the
   lawsuit. Id. (citation omitted). It need only show that just one of its members
   would have standing. See Hunt v. Wash. St. Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S.
   333, 342 (1977).
          The court below found that YCT’s out-of-state members would have
   standing; that the suit was germane to YCT’s interests of education reform
   and the treatment of illegal aliens; and that the suit did not require the
   involvement of YCT’s members. As for YCT’s members themselves, the
   court found that they were injured by paying nine times more than in-state
   residents; that their injury was traceable to the UNT officials’ enforcing §
   54.051(d); and that an injunction stopping such enforcement would redress

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   the injury. On appeal, the UNT officials question only whether YCT’s
   members have standing.2
           First, the UNT officials argue that YCT’s members are not injured.
   YCT and the district court’s theory of injury here is straightforward: in-state
   residents pay an amount for college; enforcement of § 54.051(d) improperly
   charges out-of-state citizens a far higher amount; and that far-higher amount
   is an economic injury sufficient for standing.
           In analyzing standing, we assume that YCT is correct on the merits
   such that § 54.051(d) is preempted by § 1623(a). See, e.g., Texas v. EEOC, 933
   F.3d 433, 447 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We assume, for purposes of the standing
   analysis, that Texas is correct on the merits of its claim that the Guidance
   was promulgated in violation of the APA.”). It’s also the case that an
   economic injury is the “quintessential injury upon which to base standing.”
   Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 586 (5th Cir. 2006). And to
   confer standing, such injury “need not measure more than an identifiable
   trifle.” OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 612 (5th Cir. 2017)
   (quotations and citation omitted).
           UNT argues first that any “injury” the students sustained was of their
   own making: out of all possible postsecondary options across the country, the
   students chose to buy—at an open, disclosed price—an out-of-state
   education where they are asked to pay more. In the UNT officials’ framing,
   the university offered a bargain—out-of-state tuition in exchange for a college
   education—which students accepted and got the benefit of.

           _____________________
           2
             Though the UNT officials do not challenge the other components of standing, we
   must nevertheless satisfy ourselves that they have been met. See Cleartrac, LLC v. Lanrick
   Contractors, LLC, 53 F.4th 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2022). We conclude they have. Whether U.S.
   citizens (or illegal aliens) are eligible for benefits is clearly germane to YCT’s mission, and
   YCT’s members need not be involved in the pure legal question presented here.

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          Indeed, “standing cannot be conferred by a self-inflicted injury.”
   Zimmerman v. City of Austin, 881 F.3d 378, 389 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation
   omitted); see also Nat’l Fam. Plan. & Reprod. Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzales,
   468 F.3d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We have consistently held that self-
   inflicted harm doesn’t satisfy the basic requirements for standing. Such harm
   does not amount to an ‘injury’ cognizable under Article III.”). But, at base,
   the students are handing over money that, in the absence of Texas’
   presumed-unlawful statute, they would happily retain. Cf. Maya v. Centex
   Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[P]laintiffs spent money that,
   absent defendants’ actions, they would not have spent. . . . This is a
   quintessential injury-in-fact.”). Just because they agreed to do so does not
   mean they are not, in fact, harmed by the 900% higher price UNT supposedly
   lacks power to impose. See also 13A Charles A. Wright & Arthur
   R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.5 (3d ed. 2008
   & Supp. 2022) (“Standing is not defeated merely because the plaintiff has in
   some sense contributed to his own injury. . . . Standing is defeated only if it is
   concluded that the injury is so completely due to the plaintiff’s own fault as to
   break the causal chain.” (emphasis added)); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n
   of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 373, 377 n.14 (1978) (standing to challenge nonresident
   pricing for hunting licenses).
          “Causation and redressability then flow naturally from th[at] injury.”
   Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 779 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir.
   2015); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62 (explaining that when the plaintiff
   “is himself an object of the action . . . at issue,” “there is ordinarily little
   question that the action . . . has caused him injury, and that a judgment
   preventing . . . the action will redress it”). The harm is directly traceable to
   the UNT officials’ wrongfully enforcing § 54.051(d). That section sets out-
   of-state tuition for these students (making them the statute’s indirect object),
   which is then implemented and enforced by the UNT officials here. See Tex.

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   Educ. Code § 54.051(d). That enforcement causes the students’ harm and
   will continue to do so as more payments are collected. That’s enough to
   establish traceability. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“[T]he injury has to be fairly
   traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.” (cleaned up)).
          The UNT officials offer thin arguments in response. They insist that
   any duty to pay out-of-state tuition does not lie in a failure to properly apply
   § 1623(a), but instead comes from Texas’ legislative choice to charge that
   tuition. They’re right in that, but the argument misunderstands YCT’s
   claim. YCT agrees that it’s Texas’ legislative choice to charge their members
   out-of-state tuition that caused their harm—but the entire point is that that
   legislative choice is preempted by § 1623(a) and is thus void. That must be
   assumed as true at this stage, and so we disagree with the UNT officials’
   arguments to the contrary.
          The future harm is also redressable by favorable action here. If the
   UNT officials may no longer enforce § 54.051(d), then they may no longer
   calculate and charge out-of-state tuition. That erases the students’ future
   harm. The UNT officials’ responses again miss the mark. They claim that an
   order enjoining § 54.051(d) cannot make these students suddenly eligible for
   in-state tuition, which the officials believe to be the injury. But that
   misunderstands YCT’s injury and, in turn, its desired remedy. YCT is not
   asking us to make its members categorically eligible for in-state tuition.
   Rather, YCT is asking us to stop UNT officials from charging an improper
   or unlawful price. The officials muddy the two.
          In response, the officials insist that they only charge rates set by
   statute and the district court lacks any power to force Texas to change its
   statutes. But as YCT notes, that misunderstands redressability. While it’s
   true that no “provision in the Constitution permits a court to dictate to
   legislative bodies . . . what laws . . . they must promulgate,” Mi Familia Vota

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   v. Abbott, 977 F.3d 461, 469 (5th Cir. 2020), we need not do so here. As the
   officials themselves explain, “[u]nder state law, a public university cannot
   assess a charge unless authorized by law, giving UNT no choice but to assess
   to out-of-state U.S. citizens the only tuition rate that was not enjoined: the in-
   state tuition rate.” That’s exactly the fix that would—and so far, did—redress
   the students’ injury. Preventing application of the unlawful rate imposed by
   § 54.051(d) is sufficient redress to establish standing.
          Thus, YCT’s members have an injury in fact, traceable to the
   complained-of acts of the defendants, which is likely redressable by favorable
   action by this court. They therefore have standing. Because those members’
   participation here is not needed, and because this suit is germane to YCT’s
   purpose, YCT also has standing to challenge § 54.051(d).
                                           B
          Next, we must decide whether the specific provision that YCT has
   chosen to challenge is preempted by federal law. We conclude it is not, even
   if other, unchallenged provisions in Texas’ scheme may be.
          Thanks to the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, state laws that
   conflict with federal law are without effect. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.,
   505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). Federal law can preempt state law when (1)
   Congress expressly commands it so; (2) the state law and federal law actually
   conflict; or (3) Congress “so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make
   reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
   supplement it.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “In determining
   whether a state law or regulation is preempted, Congress’s intent is the
   ultimate touchstone.” Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. City of Palestine, 41 F.4th 696,
   704 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotations and citation omitted). Finding Congress’s
   intent requires “examin[ing] the explicit statutory language and the structure

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   and purpose of the statute.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,
   138 (1990).
          The district court first found that § 1623(a) expressly preempted
   § 54.051(d). Then, in the alternative, the district court found that § 1623(a)
   and § 54.051(d) conflicted to such a degree that following them both was
   impossible. The UNT officials disagree on both fronts.
                                           1
          A federal statute expressly preempts a state law when Congress
   “adopts express language defining the existence and scope of pre-emption.”
   Est. of Miranda v. Navistar, Inc., 23 F.4th 500, 504 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation
   omitted). And when the statute contains an express preemption clause, the
   court does not indulge “any presumption against pre-emption but instead
   focus[es] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the
   best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal.
   Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016) (quotations and citation omitted).
   “Evidence of pre-emptive purpose is sought in the text and structure of the
   statute at issue, and in the first instance we focus on the plain wording of the
   clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-
   emptive intent.” United Motorcoach Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Austin, 851 F.3d 489,
   492 (5th Cir. 2017) (alterations adopted) (quotations and citation omitted).
          Section 1623(a) contains an express preemption clause. It directs that
   “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” an illegal alien “shall not be
   eligible on the basis of residence within a State . . . for any postsecondary
   education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible
   for such a benefit . . . without regard to whether the citizen or national is such
   a resident.” 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a). To reach its conclusion, the district court
   framed the statute a different way. In § 1623(a) the district court found a
   “simple rule: If a State makes an unlawfully present alien eligible for a

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   postsecondary education benefit on the basis of state residency, it must make
   a United States citizen eligible for the same benefit regardless of whether the
   citizen is such a resident.” Thus, said the court, Congress meant to
   “invalidate state laws that deny United States citizens eligibility for a
   postsecondary education benefit . . . based on residency if unlawfully present
   aliens are eligible for that benefit based on residence within the State.”
   Because § 54.051(d) does exactly that (by charging nonresident tuition), it
   was found expressly preempted.
          The UNT officials balk at the court’s rewording. Rather than merely
   make the statute easier to read, they say, the court instead “converted
   Section 1623’s ‘unless’ clause—a condition precedent to granting a benefit
   to aliens—into an affirmative obligation to give citizens benefits granted to
   aliens.” This led the court to require states to grant benefits to citizens if they
   grant those benefits to illegal aliens. Per the UNT officials, this improperly
   rewrites Congress’s prohibitory statute and falsely implicates § 54.051(d).
          We agree. Start with the text. Section 1623(a) commands that an
   illegal alien “shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State . . .
   for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the
   United States is eligible for such a benefit . . . without regard to whether the
   citizen or national is such a resident.” 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (emphasis added).
   A preliminary question is what is meant by the chameleon “shall.” See Words
   of Authority, Bryan Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal
   Usage (3d ed. 2011) (explaining that “shall can bear five to eight senses
   even in a single document”). Typically, shall is meant to impose a duty (e.g.,
   you shall file your taxes by April 15). But when followed by not, shall often
   instead means may (i.e., you shall not means you may not). See id. (“The
   word shall gives permission (as opposed to a duty), and shall not denies
   permission (i.e., it means ‘may not’)”—Garner laments the “pervasive
   problem” of shall/may misuse); see also Shall, Black’s Law

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   Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (explaining that shall can mean may,
   especially when paired with a negative word like not or no).
          That latter reading of “shall not” is the better understanding here: it
   denies permission. Otherwise, § 1623 would impose a duty on illegal aliens to
   not be eligible for benefits if citizens are not. That outcome wouldn’t make
   sense. Instead—with “shall not” given proper effect—the statute simply
   requires that all U.S. citizens be eligible for a benefit, without regard to
   residency, before any alien be able to receive the same benefit (based on
   residency). Hence the title, “Limitation on eligibility for preferential
   treatment of aliens not lawfully present on basis of residence for higher
   education benefits.” In doing so, it merely targets offending laws.
          That brings us to the district court’s rewrite. The district court’s new
   “rule” says, in essence, “that if a state says illegal aliens are eligible, it shall
   say that U.S. citizens are eligible.” This is wrong in several ways. First, unlike
   the statute, the district court imposes a duty—i.e., it uses the wrong
   definition of shall. Unlike the statute as written, which is entirely prohibitory
   and limits what can properly be done, the court’s rule demands action.
   Second, it moves shall to the wrong side of the sentence. Rather than using
   the statute’s proper “if A, then B” form (“if immigrants shall be eligible,
   U.S. citizens are”), the court has it backwards (“if immigrants are eligible,
   U.S. citizens shall be”). Third, it changes the object of the statute’s
   regulation. Now, rather than declaring a limitation on illegal alien eligibility
   itself, the court’s rule regulates states directly. In short, the district court
   applied an entirely different rule than the one Congress passed.
          So, going instead with the proper reading of § 1623(a), the statute
   expressly preempts state rules that grant illegal aliens benefits when U.S.
   citizens haven’t received the same. No matter what a state says, if a state did
   not make U.S. citizens eligible, illegal aliens cannot be eligible. But, to be

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   clear, § 1623(a) doesn’t impose any duty to grant the same benefits to U.S.
   citizens. Cf. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Section 1623
   does not provide that ‘No nonresident citizen shall be denied a benefit’
   afforded to an illegal alien, but rather imposes a limit on the authority of
   postsecondary educational institutions.”). Its sole focus is on improper
   benefits for illegal aliens.
          Section 54.051(d)—the one and only section challenged here—does
   not grant those benefits. It does nothing more than set the tuition price for
   nonresident students, citizens or not. It takes no stance on whether illegal
   aliens are eligible for a cheaper price.3 Section 1623(a) has nothing to say
   about a rule like that. Therefore, § 54.051(d) is not expressly preempted by
   § 1623(a).
                                               2
          The district court, relying again on its erroneous reading, also found
   that § 54.051(d) conflicted with § 1623(a) to such degree that it was impliedly
   preempted. It is not.
          Unlike express preemption, conflict preemption begins with the
   presumption “that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Maryland
   v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (citation omitted). Such preemption
   exists when “compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or
   where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
   execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Oneok, Inc. v.
   Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 377 (2015) (quotations and citation omitted).
          Per the district court, it’s impossible to both (1) to charge out-of-state
   U.S. citizens the nonresident tuition rate (as § 54.051(d) requires of

          _____________________
          3
              Which we here assume is a postsecondary benefit.

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   universities) and also (1) to charge out-of-state U.S. citizens the resident
   price (as, thought the court, was required by § 1623(a) since illegal aliens
   could earn resident tuition). Unsurprisingly, then, the district court found §
   54.051(d) preempted.
          But again, § 1623(a) does not require what the district court insists it
   does. The court and YCT have it backwards: the problem with Texas’ system
   relevant to § 1623(a) is that it grants illegal aliens in-state benefits, not that it
   denies those benefits to U.S. citizens. Section 1623(a) does not restrict the
   latter, and burdens Texas with no duty related to U.S. citizens. That
   § 54.051(d) calculates and imposes a nonresident tuition rate (for U.S.
   citizens, foreign nationals, and immigrants alike) has nothing to do with
   § 1623(a)’s mandate that illegal aliens are ineligible for in-state benefits
   unless U.S. citizens are. Thus, even though a different, unchallenged portion
   of Texas’ scheme seems to conflict with § 1623(a), it is entirely possible to
   follow both § 1623(a) and § 54.051(d) at the same time.
          YCT’s arguments generally track the district court’s reasoning and
   are wrong for the same reasons. But one warrants addressing. YCT contends
   that § 1623(a) requires that universities either make illegal aliens eligible for
   in-state tuition, or they can charge U.S. citizens out-of-state tuition. They
   cannot do both. And, says YCT, § 1623(a) is “wholly agnostic on how
   universities choose to comply with its terms.” Id. That is not correct. While
   it’s true that § 1623(a) disallows alien eligibility if paired with citizen
   ineligibility, the statute makes clear that if a state tries both, the former must
   give. The statute does not grant a choice—illegal aliens simply are not eligible
   if citizens aren’t.
          Further still, though the district court didn’t address the question,
   § 54.051(d) does not hamper Congress’s § 1623(a) objectives. To start,
   declaring a statute enough of an obstacle for implied preemption is “a matter

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   of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and
   identifying its purpose and intended effects[.]” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
   Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). As luck would have it, Congress made
   explicit its aims for the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
   Responsibility Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1601. They include promoting immigrant
   self-sufficiency, reducing immigrant reliance on public assistance, and
   ensuring that public benefits aren’t incentives to enter illegally. Id. The
   strictures of § 54.051(d) are silent on those objectives. Section 54.051(d) only
   imposes nonresident tuition for those who do not qualify for Texas residency
   (alien or citizen alike). It does not offer a public benefit to illegal aliens, and
   thus cannot affect that class’s self-sufficiency, their reliance on public
   services, or their incentives to come to America. Unlike Texas’ rule allowing
   illegal aliens to qualify for resident tuition (which implicates every IIRIRA
   objective, often in the negative), § 54.051(d) speaks only to the price that
   nonresidents pay. Congress’s objectives are not thwarted by that higher
   price.
            Since § 54.051(d) neither conflicts with, nor harms the objectives of,
   § 1623(a), the latter does not impliedly preempt it. The district court was
   wrong to find otherwise.
                                           C
            With that conclusion in mind, we turn next to whether the district
   court abused its discretion in permanently enjoining the university officials
   from enforcing § 54.051(d). We conclude it did.
            The court reviews a grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of
   discretion. Scott, 826 F.3d at 211. A district court “abuses its discretion if (1)
   relies on clearly erroneous factual findings when deciding to grant or deny
   the permanent injunction (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law when
   deciding to grant or deny the permanent injunction, or (3) misapplies the

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Case: 22-40225     Document: 00516815506            Page: 15   Date Filed: 07/10/2023

                                     No. 22-40225

   factual or legal conclusions when fashioning its injunctive relief.” Peaches
   Ent. Corp. v. Ent. Repertoire Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995).
          Because the district court awarded a permanent injunction by relying
   on its erroneous preemption analysis, it abused its discretion.
                                         III
          There may be valid preemption challenges to Texas’ scheme here. But
   this is not one of them. The district court’s judgment is REVERSED, and
   its permanent injunction is VACATED.

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