Court Opinion

ID: 9678624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:25:59.463337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:06.282595
License: Public Domain

LIVINGSTON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the disposition of the third and fourth points of error regarding the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress. I do not, however, believe it is necessary to reach the fifth and sixth points of error because the ease is being remanded for a new trial. Although only dicta, I also do not agree with the conclusions reached by the majority on points of error five and six.
In points of error five and six, appellant claims his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and under article I, section 10 of Texas Constitution was denied. The pleadings show that Carl E. Mallory represented appellant. Mr. Mallory conducted the voir dire on behalf of his client and was introduced to the jury as appellant’s attorney. Only on the next day as the trial was about to begin did Mr. Mallory ask to bring in his “partner,” Judge Louis Sturns, as co-counsel. The prosecutor objected stating that had he been aware Judge Sturns would be trying the case, he would have exercised a peremptory challenge against a venireman who admitted knowing Sturns. While the right to employ counsel of one’s own choosing exists, it is not an unlimited, unqualified right. Childress v. State, 794 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd). The appellant’s right to employ counsel must be balanced against the “important considerations relating to the integrity of the judicial process and the fair and orderly administration of justice.” Kozacki v. Knize, 883 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.App. — Waco 1994, orig. proceeding).
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the result and the opinion on points of error three and four only.