Court Opinion

ID: 9384815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 06:07:06.506538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.445688
License: Public Domain

CONDITIONALLY GRANT and Opinion Filed March 31, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-23-00298-CV
                          IN RE ONCOR ELECTRIC
                           DELIVERY COMPANY,
                                LLC, Relator

          Original Proceeding from the 191st Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-01615

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before Justices Molberg, Goldstein, and Breedlove
                           Opinion by Justice Goldstein
      Before the Court is relator Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC’s March

29, 2023, petition for writ of mandamus wherein relator challenges the trial court’s

March 28, 2023, pretrial order granting real party in interest James Stacey Taylor’s

motion to increase the expense reimbursement for jurors in this action to $250 per

day. We requested a response from real party in interest Taylor, which was timely

filed on March 30, 2023. We conditionally grant Oncor’s petition for writ of

mandamus.
                                      Background

      In the underlying case, Taylor sued Oncor for personal injuries he sustained

after coming into contact with high voltage lines. The case is set for trial on April

3, 2023. On January 19, 2023, Taylor filed a motion to increase juror pay proposing

that the parties raise the standard juror pay by agreement and each pay 50% of the

additional cost. In the event Oncor opposed the motion, Taylor stated his willingness

to pay 100% of the additional cost.

      On February 6, 2023, Oncor filed its opposition to Taylor’s motion arguing

the motion was prohibited by government code section 61.001(d). At a hearing on

the motion on March 17, 2023, the trial court orally granted the motion and increased

the jurors’ expense reimbursement to $250 per day with Taylor “paying 100% of the

increase over the normal $40 per day.” On March 28, 2023, the trial court signed a

written order to the same effect. This original proceeding followed.

                                   Applicable Law

      Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy requiring the relator to show that (1)

the trial court has clearly abused its discretion, and (2) there is no adequate appellate

remedy. In re Copart, Inc., 619 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)

(citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig.

proceeding)). “A failure by the trial court to apply the law correctly constitutes an

abuse of discretion.” In re BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. 2008)

(orig. proceeding).

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      Section 61.001 of the Texas Government Code governs the “reimbursement

of expenses of jurors and prospective jurors” and provides that the commissioners

court of the county “shall determine the daily amount of reimbursement” to jurors.

TEX. GOV’T. CODE § 61.001(b).         Only one exception exists concerning that

arrangement. The exception provides that:

      In a specific case, the presiding judge, with the agreement of the parties
      involved or their attorneys, may increase the daily amount of
      reimbursement for a person who reports for jury service in that case.
      The difference between the usual daily amount of reimbursement and
      the daily amount of reimbursement for a person who reports for jury
      service in a specific case shall be paid, in equal amounts, by the parties
      involved in the case.”

Id. § 61.001(d).

                                     Discussion

      Section 61.001(d) of the government code provides that juror reimbursement

may be increased but only with the agreement of the parties, and any increase must

be paid in equal amounts by the parties involved in the case. See id. Here, Oncor

opposed the increase in juror reimbursement; nevertheless, the trial court entered an

order increasing juror reimbursement and ordering Taylor to pay 100% of the

increased amount. Because the trial court’s order thus violated section 61.001(d) in

two respects, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in entering its March

28, 2023, order. See id.; In re BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d at 845.

      The trial court’s order averred that “the county’s system for jury

reimbursement encompasses accounting as promulgated by the County Auditor with

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funds disbursed through County Fund 125,” stating the “plan and timing of

distribution has been completed” and thereafter ordered in pertinent part:

        The County Treasurer and District Clerk shall process the check
        distributions from the County’s Jury Fund according to the plan and
        Plaintiff shall promptly reimburse the County for the differential.1

There is a dearth of authority that permits the County Treasurer and District

Clerk to process distributions from the County Jury Fund that are in excess of

the amounts authorized to be reimbursed from the County Jury Fund. See

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 61.001(a), (b). We have found no authority and the

parties have cited none providing for the reimbursement of monies expended

from a specific county fund in excess of the authorized distribution, apart from

subsection (d). See id. § 61.001(d)

        Parties who want jurors to be paid more than the amount the

commissioners court has set in accordance with section 61.001(a) and (c) are

bound by the statute. See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-97-009 (1997). The only

authorization necessitates the parties’ agreement. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §

61.001(d). It is undisputed there is no agreement. We are unpersuaded by the

trial court’s consideration of unspecified “authority, including the inherent

and implied power of the Court” that is contrary to the express statutory

language mandating an agreement to increase the daily amount of

    1
       We note that there is no record of “the plan and timing of distribution [that] has been completed,” but
that is not relevant to our analysis here.
                                                    –4–
reimbursement for a juror that requires payment in equal amounts by the

parties involved.

         We are equally unpersuaded by the authority relied upon by Taylor in

his response relative to the implied and inherent authority of a trial court:

Steenbergen v. Ford Motor Co., 814 S.W.2d 755, 762 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1992, writ denied) and cases cited therein. Taylor fails to appreciate the

position of jurors as officers of the court2 with particularized responsibility in

our judicial system, preserving and protecting the right of trial by jury

guaranteed by the Texas Constitution.            Tex. Const. art. I, § 15.   “The

Legislature shall provide by law for the compensation of all officers, servants,

agents and public contractors, not provided for in this Constitution . . . .” Tex.

Const. art. III, § 44. Because section 61.001 is the only delegation of authority

from the Legislature regarding juror compensation, we conclude there is no

inherent or implied authority for the trial court to act outside the provisions of

section 61.001.

         The trial court has abused her discretion by failing to apply Section

61.001 correctly. There is no adequate remedy at law as we perceive no legal

remedy to rectify the court ordered unauthorized distributions by the County

Treasurer and District Clerk in excess of the approved reimbursements, with

   2
       See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-97-009 (1997).

                                               –5–
concomitant payments made to the jurors in the absence of the statutorily

mandated agreement of the parties. Therefore, the issue before us “eludes

answer by appeal,” and mandamus is an appropriate remedy. See In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 138.

                                     Conclusion

      After reviewing Oncor’s petition, Taylor’s response, and the record before us,

we conditionally grant Oncor’s petition for writ of mandamus. We order the trial

court to issue prior to empaneling the jury a written ruling vacating its March 28,

2023 “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Increase Juror Pay.” We further order

the trial court to file with this Court, within the time for compliance with the Court’s

opinion and order of this date, a certified copy of its order or orders evidencing such

compliance. Should the trial court fail to comply with this order, the writ will issue.

                                            /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
                                            BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
                                            JUSTICE

230298F.P05

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