Court Opinion

ID: 9655159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:01:46.190798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:11.574869
License: Public Domain

CADENA, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot join in the affirmance of the judgment in this case.
I can see no justification for dragging in the fact that appellant was the “Grand Dragon in the Ku Klux Klan of Texas.” The majority opinion gratuitously describes this testimony as “impeachment testimony” but chooses to omit explaining what the testimony impeaches.
The evidence in question, consisting of conduct by appellant, cannot be characterized as evidence of conduct which attacks appellant’s credibility. It cannot be seriously contended that holding the office of Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan has any relevance to the question of credibility and is no indicia of untruthfulness or truthfulness. See TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 608.
It is true that appellant made only the most general objection. But to state the specific ground of objection is required only “if the specific ground [is] not apparent from the context; ...” TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 103. It takes no great mental effort to realize why appellant would object to evidence having as its sole purpose the revelation that, at some time in the 1970’s, he held the office of Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan. Such evidence has not the slightest tendency to show that appellant was engaged in the manufacture of a controlled substance. The reason prompting the presentation of such evidence is not difficult to discover. The only explanation is that the prosecutor believed it would increase the possibility of a conviction. It cannot be said that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, because its probative value was zero.
In the application of TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 103(a)(1) the concurring opinion has substi*6tuted the word “objection” for the word “context” so that the rule would read that a specific objection is required only “if the specific ground was not apparent from the objection.” Doing such violence to the meaning of “context” is unjustified.
It would be helpful to apply this theory which changes “context” to “objection” to a case in which law enforcement officials testified that defendant confessed only after his feet were burned and he was forced to witness the torture of his wife and child by officers. If, after such testimony, when the confession was offered in evidence, counsel for appellant merely said, “I object,” would anyone seriously argue that “the specific ground was not apparent from the context”? I am unwilling to attribute such ignorance of the law to our learned trial judges.
In view of the severity of the punishment meted out to a first offender, it takes a determined effort to reach the conclusion that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence did not contribute to the verdict, even if we blithely overlook the incongruous posture assumed by prosecutors who deliberately drag in inadmissible testimony and then insist on appeal that the evidence could not possibly affect the outcome of the trial.