Court Opinion

ID: 9407367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 17:08:35.423043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:37.211937
License: Public Domain

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 1         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

 2   Filing Date: July 6, 2023

 3   No. S-1-SC-39217

 4   STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

 5         Plaintiff-Appellant,

 6   v.

 7   LEISHA HENDERSON,

 8         Defendant-Appellee.

 9   APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
10   Britt M. Baca-Miller, District Judge

11   Hector H. Baldereas, Attorney General
12   Meryl Francolini, Assistant Attorney General
13   Santa Fe, NM

14   for Appellant

15   Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
16   Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender
17   MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender
18   Santa Fe, NM

19   for Appellee

20                     DISPOSITIONAL ORDER OF REVERSAL

21   PER CURIAM.
 1   {1}   WHEREAS, this matter came before the Court upon the State’s appeal of the

 2   district court’s partial grant of Defendant’s amended petition for writ of habeas

 3   corpus, see Rule 5-802(N)(1) NMRA (“[I]f the writ [of habeas corpus] is granted,

 4   the state may appeal as of right under the Rules of Appellate Procedure.”);

 5   {2}   WHEREAS, Defendant was indicted by a grand jury on charges of first degree

 6   child abuse (causing great bodily harm) contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(D),

 7   (E) (2009), first degree kidnapping (inflicting physical injury) contrary to NMSA

 8   1978, Section 30-4-1(2003), aggravated battery contrary to NMSA 1978, Section

 9   30-3-5(A), (C) (1969), and aggravated assault contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-

10   3-2(A) (1963), arising from an attack on her eight-year-old son;

11   {3}   WHEREAS, Defendant entered into a plea and disposition agreement in

12   which she agreed to plead no contest to (1) second degree kidnapping, (2) third

13   degree intentional child abuse (not resulting in death or great bodily harm), and (3)

14   second degree attempt to commit intentional child abuse (resulting in great bodily

15   harm);

16   {4}   WHEREAS, Defendant was sentenced to a term of twenty-one years, of which

17   nine years were suspended;

18   {5}   WHEREAS, Defendant subsequently filed an amended petition for writ of

19   habeas corpus asserting as grounds for relief, (1) “[i]neffective assistance of

                                              2
 1   counsel,” (2) “[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to support the plea agreement and

 2   resulting sentence, where the charge of kidnapping was based on incidental restraint

 3   . . . in violation of the holding of State v. Trujillo, 2012-NMCA-112, 289 P.3d 238,”

 4   or in the alternative, violation of the prohibition on double jeopardy arising from the

 5   kidnapping and child abuse convictions, and (3) “[r]acial disproportionality in the

 6   grand jury proceedings”;

 7   {6}   WHEREAS, the district court ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held on

 8   Defendant’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus;

 9   {7}   WHEREAS, the district court limited the evidentiary hearing to submissions

10   on the issue of whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel as a

11   result of trial counsel’s decision to pursue an involuntary intoxication defense and/or

12   trial counsel’s failure to contest specific intent with respect to the charge of

13   intentional child abuse;

14   {8}   WHEREAS, the district court partially granted Defendant’s amended petition

15   for writ of habeas corpus on the alternative ground that “trial counsel provided

16   deficient performance in failing to challenge the kidnapping charge [pursuant to

17   State v. Trujillo, 2012-NMCA-112] and in advising [Defendant] to plea[d] to [the]

18   charge”;

19   {9}   WHEREAS, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising

                                               3
 1   upon a plea agreement, Defendant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance

 2   was deficient and that defendant suffered prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s

 3   deficient performance, see State v. Hunter, 2006-NMSC-043, ¶ 12, 140 N.M. 406,

 4   143 P.3d 168;

 5   {10}   WHEREAS, to establish deficient performance arising from trial counsel’s

 6   failure to challenge the charge of kidnapping pursuant to State v. Trujillo, 2012-

 7   NMCA-112, Defendant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance fell

 8   below that of a reasonably competent attorney, see Patterson v. LeMaster, 2001-

 9   NMSC-013, ¶ 17, 130 N.M. 179, 21 P.3d 1032, overruled on other grounds by State

10   v. Martinez, 2021-NMSC-002, ¶ 16, 478 P.3d 880;

11   {11}   WHEREAS, to establish prejudice arising from trial counsel’s deficient

12   performance, Defendant must demonstrate that, but for trial counsel’s performance,

13   there is a reasonable probability that she would have gone to trial instead of pleading

14   no contest to the charges, see Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 18;

15   {12}   WHEREAS, by limiting the evidentiary hearing, the district court did not

16   afford the parties an opportunity to submit evidence on whether trial counsel in fact

17   advised Defendant of the possibility that she could challenge the charge of

18   kidnapping pursuant to State v. Trujillo, 2012-NMCA-112, or, if counsel did not so

19   advise Defendant, whether trial counsel failed to identify the issue, made a strategic

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 1   decision not to challenge the charge of kidnapping, or determined that a challenge

 2   pursuant to Trujillo would not have been successful, see Lytle v. Jordan, 2001-

 3   NMSC-016, ¶ 26, 130 N.M. 198, 22 P.3d 666 (“A prima facie case for ineffective

 4   assistance of counsel is not made if there is a plausible, rational strategy or tactic to

 5   explain the counsel’s conduct.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));

 6   State v. Reece, 1968-NMSC-080, ¶ 7, 79 N.M. 142, 441 P.2d 40 (stating that, where

 7   claims for relief made by a habeas petitioner depend upon occurrences outside the

 8   record, the district court errs by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve

 9   them);

10   {13}   WHEREAS, by limiting the evidentiary hearing, the district court did not

11   afford the parties an opportunity to submit evidence on the issue of whether trial

12   counsel’s failure to challenge the charge of kidnapping prejudiced Defendant, see

13   Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 29 (“Because courts are reluctant to rely solely on

14   the self-serving statements of defendants, which are often made after they have been

15   convicted and sentenced, a defendant is generally required to adduce additional

16   evidence to prove that there is a reasonable probability that [the defendant] would

17   have gone to trial.”);

18   {14}   WHEREAS, the district court’s oral ruling limiting the evidentiary hearing

19   failed to indicate a sufficient basis for such limitation, see Rule 5-802(H)(4); Miller

                                                5
 1   v. Tafoya, 2003-NMSC-025, ¶ 13, 134 N.M. 335, 76 P.3d 1092;

 2   {15}   WHEREAS, the district court’s order partially granting Defendant’s amended

 3   petition for writ of habeas corpus does not adequately identify the basis of the court’s

 4   determinations that (1) trial counsel provided deficient performance in failing to

 5   challenge the charge of kidnapping and (2) Defendant suffered prejudice as a result

 6   of trial counsel’s deficient performance;

 7   {16}   WHEREAS, this Court having considered the briefs and being otherwise fully

 8   informed on the issues and applicable law;

 9   {17}   WHEREAS, this Court has chosen to exercise its discretion under Rule 12-

10   405(B) to dispose of this case by nonprecedential order;

11   {18}   NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the district court’s order partially

12   granting Defendant’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and that

13   this matter is remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on all issues

14   raised in Defendant’s amended petition requiring the submission of evidence or

15   testimony for their proper resolution.

16   {19}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

17
18                                    C. SHANNON BACON, Chief Justice

                                                 6
1
2   MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

3
4   DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice

5
6   JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

7
8   BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice

           7