Court Opinion

ID: 9798049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:35:59.767083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:37.628124
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
dissenting in part.
In this dissent I argue that the loss of use award is excessive and should be remitted. I also suggest that car rental costs that are not actually incurred should not be used to measure loss of use damages over a long period of time because no reasonable person rents a car at weekly or monthly rates on a long-term basis.
The rule that loss of use damages can be obtained for property that is destroyed or converted is of relatively recent origin. Formerly it was thought that the correct measure of damages simply was the fair market value of the property in question plus prejudgment interest from the date of loss. This was an ongoing controversy as of 1978 when we decided State v. Stanley.1 We did not resolve it for Alaska until Alaska Construction Equipment, Inc. v. Star Trucking, Inc. was decided in 2006.2
Another somewhat less recent rule that is involved here allows reasonable rental value as a measure of loss of use damages even though no substitute property is actually rented. We adopted this approach in Burgess Construction Co. v. Hancock, while recognizing that actually renting a replacement is required in some jurisdictions.3
Combining these two rules means that when a vehicle is tortiously destroyed loss of use damages may be recovered, and the measure of the loss of use can be the reasonable rental cost of renting a substitute vehicle even though no substitute is actually rented. Recognizing that loss of use damages should not go on indefinitely, our rule is that they run only for the time reasonably required to buy a suitable replacement vehicle.4
Buying a replacement vehicle for an eight-year-old Pontiac should not be a time-consuming process. For all but the impecunious *1263the process should be completed in a couple of weeks. One would expect then that the rules discussed here would leave the plaintiff whose vehicle has been destroyed with a realistic measure of recovery that is fair to both the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff would be entitled to the fair market value of the destroyed vehicle plus car rental charges for a week or two.
But complications develop when the plaintiff whose vehicle is destroyed is impecunious and cannot afford to buy a replacement vehicle. If the plaintiff's lack of financial means may be considered, it may be that the time reasonably required to obtain a substitute vehicle extends indefinitely or at least is very lengthy. And if the measure of the loss of use is prevailing car rental charges even though the plaintiff does not actually rent a substitute vehicle (and could not afford to do so) the loss of use recovery can readily become both unrealistic and unfair. No reasonable person rents a passenger vehicle on a long-term basis at retail weekly or monthly rates.
I would resolve this problem by limiting the use of rental charges that are not incurred as a measure of loss of use damages to the period of time that it would take a person of ordinary means to buy a substitute vehicle. Beyond that period, if the impecunious plaintiff incurs actual damages that exceed prejudgment interest-ear pool and public transportation costs, for example-they may be recovered as well. But allowing unineurred rental charges to run on a long-term basis is unrealistic and unreasonable because, as stated, no one reasonably incurs them on a long-term basis.
In the present case I can see no basis for allowing unineurred rental charges for more than a month. Given that the lowest figure for a month's rental was $499 (and choosing the low figure for an eight-year-old car seems right) and that there was no evidence of actually incurred loss of use damages, any figure in excess of that sum for loss of use would be excessive. Accordingly, I would order a remittitur to $499 for the loss of use award.
In all other respects I agree with today's opinion.

. 506 P.2d 1284, 1292 (Alaska 1973).

. 128 P.3d 164, 169 (Alaska 2006).

. 514 P.2d 236, 238 & n. 6 (Alaska 1973); see Nashban Barrel & Container Co. v. G.G. Parsons Trucking Co., 49 Wis.2d 591, 182 N.W.2d 448, 453-54 (1971) (noting that "several courts surprisingly do not require an actual rental" and adopting rule that damages for loss of use when vehicle is not repairable are recoverable during period reasonably required for replacement "in an amount equal to that which was actually expended ... provided such amount was not unreasonable").

. See Star Trucking, 128 P.3d at 169.