Court Opinion

ID: 9629923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:53:07.117909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:26.927568
License: Public Domain

Pee Ctjeiam.
Defendant was found guilty after jury trial on all counts contained in seven separate indictments returned by a Monmouth County Grand Jury. Our attention centers on the charges set forth in two of those indictments and particularly on the problem of whether there should be merger of the convictions obtained thereon.
Indictment No. 1039-71 alleged in one count that on November 8, 1971, defendant possessed heroin with intent to *207distribute it, and in a second count that on the same date defendant did distribute heroin to one Robert McCue, both in violation of N. J. S. A. 24:21-19 (a) (1). A separate indictment, No. 1100-71, charged in the first count that on November 23, 1971, defendant possessed heroin with intent to distribute the same; and, in the second count, that on the same date, and offensive to the provisions of N. J. 8. A. 2A :85-14, he aided and abetted one Bobby Sheard in the distribution of heroin to the same Robert McCue as is mentioned in the previous indictment.
The Appellate Division, in unreported opinions which resolved a number of issues in addition to the merger question, affirmed the judgments of conviction on the possession-with-intent-to-distribute-and-distribution case, holding there was no merger of those offenses; but in the second case that court vacated the conviction for possession with intent to distribute and the sentence imposed thereon, reasoning that that offense merged with the conviction for aiding and abetting in the distribution of heroin. Both the defendant’s petition for certification in No. 1039-71 and the State’s cross-petition for certification in No. 1100-71 were granted, 65 N. J. 578 (1974), limited however to the merger issues. We consolidated the appeals on motion of the defendant.
While these consolidated appeals were pending, the Court heard oral argument in a trilogy of cases posing issues closely related to those now before us, State v. Ruiz, 68 N. J. 54 (1975); State v. Davis, 68 N. J. 69 (1975); and State v. Jester, 68 N. J. 87 (1975). Counsel herein, recognizing the identity of questions presented here with those in the previously argued cases, therefore sought waiver of oral argument in these appeals, which we granted.
To support the charges in Indictment No. 1039-71, possession with intent to distribute and distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, the State relied essentially upon *208testimony of Trooper Robert MeCue, an undercover agent for the Narcotics Bureau of the New Jersey State Police. On November 8, 1971, while in Red Bank, McCue met the defendant whom he had encountered previously, and their conversation turned to drugs. After some preliminary discussion McCue agreed to purchase “one dime” (a $10 bag of heroin). Valentine “took out several glassine bags which were wrapped with a rubber band and pulled one of the bags out of the stack and handed it” to McCue, who paid defendant with a $10 bill. MeCue then returned to the State Police Barracks where the evidence was marked, subsequently analyzed, and determined to be heroin. At trial the defendant denied ever having seen McCue before and denied the possession or sale of any heroin. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on each count. Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 5 to 7 years to run consecutively to those imposed under another indictment.
At the trial on Indictment No. 1100-71, charging defendant in separate counts with possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and aiding and abetting in the distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, Trooper McCue was again the principal witness. He testified that on November 23, 1971 he met with one Bobby Sheard in the Trooper’s undercover automobile. Sheard stated that he could get “dimes” for McCue, who requested one bag.
At this point a white Cadillac driven by defendant pulled up alongside of McOue’s car. In compliance with Sheard’s request McCue gave him a $10 bill, whereupon Sheard alighted from McCue’s car, made his way to the passenger side of the Cadillac and reached through the window into that car. Defendant handed something to Sheard who in turn immediately handed one glassine bag to McCue. Sheard then entered the Cadillac and he and the defendant drove off together. The substance in the glassine bag was later determined to be heroin. Defendant denied any participation in this transaction as did Sheard, even though the *209latter had previously pleaded guilty to the charge of distribution to McCue on this very occasion.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on each count and defendant was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 5 to 7 years to run consecutively to the other sentences already imposed.
II
The Appellate Division opinions were handed down prior to our determinations in the Ruiz-D avis-J ester trilogy. In both of the cases before us the Appellate Division used as its touchstone whether the same packet of heroin was the sole subject matter of each of the counts. We specifically rejected the determinative effect of that fact in State v. Davis, supra, 68 N. J. at 82-83. That case set a two-pronged test for merger cases: first, it must be ascertained whether the legislature has in fact undertaken to create separate offenses; and, if so, it must then be determined whether those separate offenses have been established under the proofs.
A
In State v. Ruiz, supra, we observed that possession with intent to distribute and distribution are “demonstrably distinguishable criminal offenses," 68 N. J. at 58. The first concerns “the transportation and placement of certain drug substances in the stream of illegal commerce," while distribution looks to “the final step in drug trafficking — transfer to someone else." Id. On the analysis employed in State v. Davis, supra, 68 N. J. at 77-80, we concluded that the legislature had intended to make these separate and distinct offenses.
However, we have not had occasion heretofore to scrutinize the relationship of possession with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting in the actual distribution. ■ The same considerations which led to our conclusion regarding the separability of possession with intent to distribute and distribu*210lion are brought to bear on our examination of these offenses. Eirst, the comprehensive legislative effort to combat drug traffic bespeaks an intention to make “each of certain specified components of a transaction or episode leading to and including the distribution of a controlled dangerous substance to be a distinct and separate offense.” State v. Davis, supra, 68 N. J. at 78. Moreover, the core of conduct which each count of this indictment represents is distinct. Evidence of either offense does not prove, nor is it necessary for the proof of, the other. Id. at 83. As already noted, possession with intent to distribute involves the placement of the drug in the stream of illegal commerce. But aiding and abetting focuses on quite different conduct amounting to the providing of something useful or necessary for the commission of a crime by another. See State v. Jacques, 99 N. J. Super. 230 (App. Div.) aff’d., 52 N. J. 481 (1968), cert. den., 395 U. S. 985, 89 S. Ct. 2138, 23 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1969). Eor example, the mere driving of a vehicle which carries contraband to the site of a sale or the giving to a drug dealer the names of potential customers might be sufficient to support a charge of aiding and abetting. Thus, convictions on both counts are not legally inappropriate under the first prong of the Davis test.
B
Having determined that the legislature has created separate offenses, we now proceed to examine whether the proofs demonstrate that separate offenses were in fact established. In State v. Davis, supra, we set out a list of considerations which should be taken account of in this level of analysis:
As a practical matter * * * it may be helpful to employ a certain flexibility of approach to the inquiry of whether separate offenses have been established under the proofs, attended by considerations of “fairness and fulfillment of reasonable expectations in the light of constitutional and common law goals.” State v. Currie, 41 N. J. 531, 539 (1964). Such an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each *211purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed. [Id. at 81.1
In the application of these factors to the case in which this defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute and distribution, we perceive immediately that the essential facts here mirror those in State v. Jester, supra. There, as here, defendant’s possession of the heroin was inferentially for some substantial period of time prior to actual distribution. Jester’s intention to distribute was gleaned from surrounding circumstances. So here Valentine, as did Jester, walked around with heroin on his person andl readily negotiated for the sale of a part of his “goods” to McCue. The actual distribution was in both cases a separate and distinct act. Thus, there is no merger required of the separate counts in Indictment No. 1039-71.
An analysis of the evidence supporting Indictment No. 1100-71 likewise leads to the conclusion that separate offenses were established and the two counts of that indictment do not merge under the circumstances here presented. The possession-with-intent-to-distribute charge was established by proof of Valentine’s actual possession of heroin in his automobile inferentially for some period prior to the actual distribution to Sheard, and his delivery of the one bag of heroin to Sheard. As to the aiding and abetting count, the plentitude of circumstances adduced here supplied more than sufficient basis for the jury’s conclusion that Sheard’s sale of heroin to McCue was accomplished through the intercessions of this defendant. Those circumstances are found in the defendant’s stopping alongside McCue’s car at precisely the right moment; the passing of money from Sheard to defendant in exchange for the bag of heroin; and the fact of Sheard and defendant driving off together immediately upon concluding the transaction. This series of events demonstrates the “separateness” of the aiding and *212abetting offense from the charge of possession with intent to distribute, thus preventing their merger. See State v. Jester, supra, n. 1, 68 N. J. at 91.
Ill
In A-99, involving Indictment No. 1039-71, the judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
In A-100 the judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. The conviction on the first count of Indictment No. 1100-71 charging possession with intent to distribute heroin and the sentence imposed thereon are hereby reinstated.