Court Opinion

ID: 9770575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:10:30.901356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:18.591830
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
MORRISON, Judge.
We shall attempt to discuss the questions raised by able counsel in his argument.
Appellant complains that the allegation in the indictment, “thereby causing said truck to strike the body” of the deceased, was not supported by the evidence. From the testimony of the witness Jones, who arrived upon the scene shortly after the wreck occurred, we find the following:
“* * * and under this vehicle was the body of a man, which we later identified as Fritz Strube; he was dead when I arrived; his head was under the back part of the wrecker and his feet stuck from under the wrecker in this position.”
From the testimony of Reverend Sweet, who was present when the deceased was killed, we find the following:
“Mr. Strube was around to the rear of his wrecker, making those adjustments of the front of my automobile * * *. After that, this car hit the front end of the wrecker and spun off down the highway * * *. After the accident had occurred * * * I could see Mr. Strube underneath the wrecker * *
This, we think, clearly established the allegations in the indictment.
*486Appellant complains that we did not discuss the failure of the trial court to grant his requested charge No. 4, as follows:
“You are further charged, however, that even though you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was intoxicated and under the influence of intoxicating liquor as those terms have been defined, when his automobile collided with the wrecker under the control of Fritz Strube, but if you find and believe that under the same or similar circumstances a reasonably prudent person who was not intoxicated could not have avoided the collision, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will find the defendant ‘not guilty’.
“In this connection you are further charged that a person is not required to anticipate those violations of automobile traffic laws which he does not know of or which a reasonably prudent person similarly situated would not reasonably anticipate.”
The original opinion set forth the charge on causal connection as given by the court and held that it properly presented the issue.
We have been cited no criminal cases, and know of none, which require the giving of paragraph No. 2 of the requested charge above.
Appellant says we were in error in permitting proof by the witness Jones of the two bottles of whiskey found in his automobile. His contention now is that he has no complaint about proof as to the bottle of whiskey on which the seal had never been broken, since he admitted that he was carrying such a bottle. But he does complain of proof as to the finding of a practically empty bottle, since he denied having any such bottle in his car.
In our original opinion, we held that no error was shown by bill of exception No. 15 to the testimony of the witness Jones, •because there appears in the record the same testimony from other witnesses, to which no objection was made. In this connection, reference is made to the testimony of the witness Leon Powell as follows:
“I saw some whiskey in the car * * *. One bottle was intact and one broken.”
No objection appears to have been made to this testimony.
*487The rule is well established, as will be seen from the cases cited in Texas Digest, Crim. Law 1169(2) that “Erroneous admission of evidence is not ground for reversal, if the fact testified to be proved by other evidence not objected to.”
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this cause originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.