Court Opinion

ID: 9531235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:08:55.874955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:22.721187
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
Martin, J.
— I do. not agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion in this case.
It has always been my understanding of the law that an Appellate tribunal should look to the record, if need be, to see if justice has been done in the case up for review. It is very obvious from the record in this case that justice was not done to the parties in the lower court and, in my opinion, there is reversible error in the record.
In the case of L. S. Ayres & Company v. Hicks (1942), 220 Ind. 86, at 99, 40 N. E. 2d 334, the court said:
“The practice rule to the effect that alleged errors, not specifically pointed out in the appellant’s brief, will be treated as waived was not intended to circumscribe the reviewing tribunal. The purpose of the rule is to relieve the court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case and to place that responsibility on the party asserting error. It will not be carried so far as to require the court to close its eyes to that which is apparent. To do so would not infrequently place us in the unhappy situation of lending tacit approval to an instruction palpably bad on its face, and this could only result in confusing the law and misleading the profession.”
In the case of White v. White (1935), 208 Ind. 314, at 317, 194 N. E. 355, 196 N. E. 95, we find the following language:
*198“The rule forbidding the discussion of points not originally suggested by appellant is made for the • protection of the court and only operates to excuse the court from considering questions that are not shown to have any material bearing upon the rights of the parties. Notwithstanding the failure of counsel to present the question, the court may consider and decide a question presented by the record, and may go outside the briefs of counsel for reasons upon which to base the decision in order to do justice to the parties.”
In the case of Fairbanks v. Warrum (1913), 56 Ind. App. 337, 104 N. E. 983, 104 N. E. 1141, the court said :
“By repeated decisions it has been established as the policy of the Supreme Court and also of this court that the record will not be searched for purposes of reversal. Here, however, said paragraph of complaint is properly copied into appellants’ brief, and is before us. An examination of said ■ paragraph is necessary to a comprehension of the case. Having examined it we are not required to ignore its infirmities, although a knowledge thereof so acquired might drive us to a reversal.
“. . . the Supreme Court under circumstances similar to those presented here, said, in Big Creek Stone Co. v. Seward (1896), 144 Ind. 205, 210, 42 N. E. 464, 43 N. E. 5: ‘If the court were limited to the arguments and reasoning of counsel in its decision of cases, to the exclusion of its own observations, many cases would lead us far from what we understand to be the true object of the court.’ ”
In the case of Martin, Sr. v. Martin et ux. (1881), 74 Ind. 207, at 210, the court said:
“If there are points in a record which counsel do not suggest, and we do not perceive them, there are numerous decisions that we will not consider such points on a petition for a rehearing, but there is no rule which permits us to ignore what we do see. We read the briefs of counsel, but, as the *199appeal is tried by the record, we examine that ' too.”
■ I believe that a good faith effort has been made in the briefing of this case and it should be decided upon the record and the merits of the case, instead of being decided upon mere technicalities, for I strongly feel that justice has not been done to the parties.
Note. — Reported in 108 N. E. 2d 201.