Court Opinion

ID: 9397295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 21:01:37.393708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:23.252132
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28           Filed: 03/31/2022   Pg: 1 of 20

                                                                         FILED: March 31, 2022

                                              UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-1280
                                       (1:21-cv-00296-CMH-JFA)

        COALITION FOR TJ,

                     Plaintiff – Appellee,

        v.

        FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

                     Defendant – Appellant,

        and

        SCOTT BRABAND, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Fairfax
        County School Board,

                     Defendant.

                                                 ORDER

              The Court grants appellant’s motion for a stay pending appeal. Appellant has

        satisfied the applicable legal requirements for a stay pending appeal, see Nken v. Holder,

        556 U.S. 418 (2009), and thus may proceed with its use of the challenged admissions plan.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280     Doc: 28           Filed: 03/31/2022     Pg: 2 of 20

              Entered at the direction of Judge Heytens with the concurrence of Judge King. Judge

        Rushing voted to deny the motion.

              Judge Heytens filed a concurring opinion. Judge Rushing filed a dissenting opinion.

                                                  For the Court

                                                  /s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

                                                     2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28          Filed: 03/31/2022     Pg: 3 of 20

        TOBY HEYTENS, Circuit Judge, concurring:

               I agree with the decision to grant a stay pending appeal. The issues in this case are

        materially different from those currently before the Supreme Court in Students for Fair

        Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College (No. 20-1199), and Students

        for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina (No. 21-707). There, the question

        is whether—and if so when—universities may use race conscious policies in admissions.

        Here, in contrast, it is undisputed that the challenged admissions policy is race neutral—

        indeed, evaluators are not told the race or even the name of any given applicant. And, under

        existing precedent, such policies are not constitutionally suspect unless a plaintiff can

        demonstrate (in addition to “actual discriminatory impact”) that the challenged policy was

        adopted “with discriminatory intent.” North Carolina State Conf. of the NAACP v.

        Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir. 2020); see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241

        (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,

        265 (1977).

               In my view, appellant Fairfax County School Board is likely to succeed in its appeal.

        I have grave doubts about the district court’s conclusions regarding both disparate impact

        and discriminatory purpose, as well as its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of

        a plaintiff that would bear the burden of proof on those issues at trial. See Celotex Corp. v.

        Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986) (discussing how the burden of proof impacts

        summary judgment analysis). The other stay factors also weigh in the Board’s favor, in no

        small part because of the significant logistical difficulties and time constraints associated

        with creating a new admissions policy and making thousands of admissions decisions for

                                                      3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280        Doc: 28        Filed: 03/31/2022      Pg: 4 of 20

        the class of 2026 under that new policy after the application process was complete and just

        as decisions were about to go out under the current one.

        I.     Background

               This case involves an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a high school admissions

        policy. Located in Fairfax County, Virginia, Thomas Jefferson High School for Science &

        Technology (TJ) offers advanced academic opportunities for students in the surrounding

        area. Plaintiff Coalition for TJ is an organization of parents and community members.

               Because the district court’s analysis depends heavily on the change from TJ’s

        former admissions policy to its current one, I begin by describing the former policy. Before

        December 2020, applicants were required to reside in one of five participating school

        divisions, be enrolled in 8th grade, have a minimum 3.0 GPA, be enrolled in or have

        completed Algebra I, and pay a $100 application fee. A-99. 1 Students meeting those criteria

        were administered three standardized tests. Id. Students who achieved a certain minimum

        percentile ranking on the standardized tests and maintained a 3.0 GPA were then

        administered another exam that included three writing prompts and a problem-solving

        essay and asked to submit two teacher recommendations. Id. Students who made it through

        all the required steps were selected for admission based on a holistic review of their

        application materials. A-99–100.

               During the summer of 2020, statistics revealed that the number of Black students

        admitted to TJ’s incoming class was too small to be reported. A-213. A state level task

               1
                   This refers to the appendix filed with the Board’s stay motion, CA4 ECF 8-2.

                                                      4
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28          Filed: 03/31/2022     Pg: 5 of 20

        force on diversity, equity, and inclusion was convened to examine barriers to access at

        Virginia’s Governor’s Schools, including TJ. A-118, 214. Throughout the fall, the Board

        considered various changes to TJ’s admissions policy.

               In December 2020, the Board adopted the admissions policy challenged here by a

        vote of 10-1-1. A-217. Under that policy, prospective students must still reside in one of

        five participating school divisions, be enrolled in 8th grade, and be enrolled in or have

        completed Algebra I. A-100. Unlike the former policy, the minimum GPA has been raised

        (from 3.0 to 3.5) and students are required to have taken certain specified honors courses.

        Id. Eligible students are then evaluated holistically on their GPA, answers to essay

        questions, and experience factors: whether the applicant qualifies for free or reduced-price

        meals, is an English language learner, has an Individualized Education Plan, or attends a

        historically underrepresented middle school. A-212. Evaluators are not told the race,

        ethnicity, gender, or even names of applicants. A-100–01.

               The current policy guarantees each participating public middle school a number of

        seats equivalent to 1.5% of that school’s 8th grade class. A-212. Those slots are offered to

        the highest evaluated applicants from each middle school, with the remaining applicants

        competing for about 100 unallocated seats. Id.

               The class of 2025 (who started at TJ this past fall) is the first cohort admitted under

        the new admissions process. A-101. In the policy’s first year, 3,470 students applied and

        550 received offers. Id. Just under half of applicants (48.59%) self-identified as Asian

        American and well over half of offers (54.36%) went to such students. A-102. Over the

                                                      5
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280       Doc: 28          Filed: 03/31/2022       Pg: 6 of 20

        previous five years, Asian American students had accounted for at least 65% of offers

        made. A-212, 222.

               The Coalition sued the Board in March 2021. The Coalition twice moved for a

        preliminary injunction, but the district court denied both motions. D. Ct. ECF 50, 73. On

        February 25, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment to the Coalition,

        concluding the current policy triggered and failed strict scrutiny because it has a disparate

        impact on Asian American applicants and the Board acted with the purpose of

        disadvantaging such applicants. A-209–39. The same day, the district court enjoined use

        of the challenged admissions policy—including for the class of 2026, for whom the

        admissions cycle is currently ongoing. D. Ct. ECF 144. On March 11, the district court

        denied a stay pending appeal. D. Ct. ECF 150; see Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1)(a).

        II.    Stay factors

               I agree the Board is entitled to a stay pending appeal under the traditional Nken

        standard. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). That is, the Board “has made a

        strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits,” that it “will be irreparably

        injured absent a stay,” that “issuance of the stay will [not] substantially injure the other

        parties interested in the proceeding,” and that a stay is in “the public interest.” Id. (quotation

        marks omitted).

               A.      Likelihood of success on the merits

               In my view, the district court’s reasoning on the merits of the Coalition’s Equal

        Protection Clause claim is questionable in multiple respects.

                                                        6
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280       Doc: 28         Filed: 03/31/2022      Pg: 7 of 20

               1.     I think the district court’s disparate impact analysis is likely flawed because

        it relies on the wrong comparator. The court’s conclusion that the new admissions policy

        has a disparate impact on Asian American applicants appears to have rested almost

        exclusively on a comparison between the percentage of Asian American applicants offered

        admission under the current policy and the percentage of such applicants offered admission

        under the former one, i.e., that “the number and proportion of Asian American students

        offered admission to TJ fell following the challenged changes.” A-222.

               The district court never explained, however, why the percentage of Asian American

        applicants offered enrollment under the prior policy is the proper baseline for comparison.

        The only case the district court cited in support of its statement that a “simple before-and-

        after comparison” is the proper method for assessing disparate impact, A-223—North

        Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 231 (4th Cir. 2016)—

        simply does not say that. To the contrary, in addressing whether certain voting procedures

        disproportionately burdened African Americans, McCrory specifically rejected an

        election-to-election comparison of voter turnout to assess disparate impact. Id. at 232–33.

        Nor am I aware of any other authority for the proposition that current government policy

        creates a floor against which all future policies will be judged, a principle that would, if

        adopted, make it exceedingly difficult for government actors to change existing policies

        that have a real (albeit unintentional) racially disparate impact.

               To me, the more obviously relevant comparator for determining whether this race

        neutral admissions policy has an outsized impact on a particular racial group is the

        percentage of applicants versus the percentage of offers. Such a metric targets more directly

                                                      7
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28          Filed: 03/31/2022     Pg: 8 of 20

        the core question for assessing disparate impact: whether members of one group have,

        proportionally, more difficulty securing admission than others. And, by that metric, there

        does not seem to be any disparate impact whatsoever. Indeed, during the one previous year

        under the challenged policy, Asian American applicants made up a higher percentage of

        students offered a spot at TJ (54.36%) than of total applicants (48.69%). A-102.

               The district court also suggested that the policy’s allocation of 1.5% of seats for the

        highest evaluated applicants from each public middle school and the preference for

        students from underrepresented middle schools disparately impacts Asian American

        applicants. A-223–24. The problem is that conclusion is barely reasoned and is not

        supported by a single citation to the record. To be sure, the Coalition’s brief opposing a

        stay includes its own citations in support of the district court’s conclusions. CA4 ECF 17

        at 15. But the Board’s stay motion argues that the record shows just the opposite—that

        Asian American students are not differently situated from any other students when it comes

        to the 1.5% allocation or the preference for underrepresented middle schools, so those parts

        of the admissions policy do not disparately impact Asian American applicants at all. CA4

        ECF 8-1 at 12–13. At the very least, the record reveals a likely dispute of fact on this

        question that would preclude summary judgment in favor of the Coalition.

               2.     I also am skeptical of the district court’s conclusion that there is no genuine

        issue of material fact implicated by its conclusion that the Board adopted the current

        admissions policy for a constitutionally impermissible purpose. A-235–36. The centerpiece

        of the district court’s analysis on this point is its statement that “the Board’s policy was

                                                      8
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280       Doc: 28         Filed: 03/31/2022      Pg: 9 of 20

        designed to increase Black and Hispanic enrollment, which would, by necessity, decrease

        the representation of Asian-Americans at TJ.” Id. (emphasis added).

               That approach seems flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in

        Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Feeney

        involved a constitutional challenge to a Massachusetts statute mandating a categorical

        employment preference for qualified veterans over qualified non-veterans. 442 U.S. at 259.

        Even though “over 98% of the veterans in Massachusetts were male,” id. at 270—and even

        though no one claimed that those who crafted and decided to maintain the law were

        unaware of that fact—the Supreme Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny. In

        language directly relevant to this case, the Court specifically held that “awareness of

        consequences” is not enough to show discriminatory intent and that a plaintiff challenging

        a facially neutral policy must show that a decisionmaker acted “at least in part ‘because

        of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” 442 U.S. at 279

        (emphasis added).

               Nor does the fact that the current policy may have been adopted, at least in part,

        with the expectation that it would “increase Black and Hispanic enrollment” change this

        analysis. A-235–36. Under Feeney, the question is whether the decisionmaker acted “at

        least in part because of [a race neutral policy’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group,”

        442 U.S. at 279 (quotation marks and emphasis added), and the Coalition has never claimed

        that the challenged policy was motivated by or has any sort of adverse effect on Black or

        Hispanic applicants. This aspect of Feeney’s holding operates as a critical limitation on the

                                                      9
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28         Filed: 03/31/2022      Pg: 10 of 20

        potential to lodge constitutional challenges to facially neutral laws of all stripes, which

        often are passed with the aim of winning favor with a particular constituency.

               The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that it is constitutionally permissible to

        seek to increase racial (and other) diversity through race neutral means. Indeed, it has

        required public officials to consider such measures before turning to race conscious

        alternatives. See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 312, 315 (2013)

        (stating that universities must consider whether “workable race-neutral alternatives would

        produce the educational benefits of diversity” before considering race and remanding for

        further consideration of whether the university had done so); see also Texas Dep’t of Hous.

        and Community Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 545 (2015)

        (local housing authorities may “choose to foster diversity” with race neutral tools); City of

        Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989) (governments may “increase

        the opportunities available to minority business” through measures such as altered “bidding

        procedures” that do not “classify[] individuals on the basis of race”). Under the district

        court’s analysis, it is difficult to see why policies such as Texas’s famous Top Ten Percent

        Law—which “grants automatic admission to any public state college . . . to all students in

        the top 10% of their class at high schools in Texas,” Fisher, 570 U.S. at 305, and was

        plainly intended at least in part to ensure that Texas’s public universities retained some

        measure of racial diversity after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d

        932 (5th Cir. 1996)—would not have triggered strict scrutiny. Given these decades of

        guidance, it would be quite the judicial bait-and-switch to hold that such race neutral

        efforts—much less, the race blind policy at issue here—are also subject to strict scrutiny.

                                                     10
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280       Doc: 28         Filed: 03/31/2022    Pg: 11 of 20

               I am no more persuaded by the Coalition’s argument that the challenged policy was

        motivated by impermissible “racial balancing,” CA4 ECF 17 at 13, a term the Supreme

        Court has defined as striving for “some specified percentage of a particular group merely

        because of its race or ethnic origin.” Fisher, 570 U.S. at 311 (quotation marks omitted).

        The race neutral policy challenged here includes no racial quotas or targets. And the

        Coalition appears to have identified no evidence that TJ’s current race neutral policy is

        intended to achieve a certain percentage of Black, Hispanic, or Asian American students—

        much less such overwhelming evidence as to warrant summary judgment in favor of the

        party that would bear the burden of proof at trial. 2

               The district court’s extensive reliance on alleged procedural irregularities in the

        Board’s adoption of the challenged admissions policy also strikes me as unpersuasive,

        especially for purposes of granting summary judgment to the Coalition. The district court

        acknowledged that the Board’s actions did not violate any state law or procedural rules, A-

        227, and, under Arlington Heights, procedural irregularities are not themselves proof of

        discriminatory intent, 429 U.S. at 267. Instead, “[d]epartures from the normal procedural

        sequence” are relevant to the extent they “afford evidence that improper purposes are

        playing a role.” Id. Here, the evidence the district court identified and certain statements

        highlighted by the Coalition, see CA4 ECF 17 at 17, tend to show what is not only obvious

               2
                 The Coalition points to a presentation and various text messages between Board
        members discussing how certain proposed policies might reduce Asian American
        representation at TJ. CA4 ECF 17 at 6–8. As the Board explains, however, both the
        presentation and the messages were about different potential policies that the Board
        rejected. CA4 ECF 19 at 6–7 & n.4.

                                                      11
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28          Filed: 03/31/2022     Pg: 12 of 20

        but, as discussed above, perfectly permissible under existing law—that the Board felt

        compelled to address TJ’s longstanding lack of diversity. Such evidence is hardly an

        appropriate basis for concluding—much less as a matter of law—that a race neutral policy

        was enacted with a constitutionally impermissible intent.

               B.     Irreparable harm absent a stay

               The Board has also shown that it will suffer irreparable harm without a stay.

        Preventing elected representatives from carrying out “a duly enacted” policy always

        “constitutes irreparable harm.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts,

        C.J., in chambers). Moreover, there are currently 2,540 students awaiting their TJ

        admissions decisions, which are supposed to be released “no later than April” 2022. A-

        246; A-283. The Board persuasively argues that there is no way for it simply to revert to

        the previous admissions policy. None of the current applicants was required to take the

        formerly mandated standardized tests, two-thirds of which are no longer commercially

        available. CA4 ECF 8-1 at 18; A-246. The Coalition insists that the Board should have

        approached competing vendors in anticipation of identifying replacement tests at some

        point last year or whipped up a fully formed backup plan even as it was defending its

        chosen policy in litigation, see CA4 ECF 17 at 20, 23, but that strikes me as completely

        unrealistic: It took the Board three months to adopt the challenged policy in the first place,

        A228–32, and the district court thought even that was “rushed,” A-232. 3

               3
                The Coalition also argues the Board should have been on notice of the need for a
        backup policy because the district court suggested in September 2021 that it could “try this
        case in January and get a decision,” which would be “plenty of time to get corrected
        (Continued)

                                                     12
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28          Filed: 03/31/2022     Pg: 13 of 20

               I also am persuaded that requiring the Board to design a new admissions policy and

        then solicit and review applications under a new process, all on a highly compressed

        timetable and with little opportunity for community input or outreach, would irreparably

        damage its credibility and reputation in the community and irreparably harm TJ’s ability

        to compete for students, many of whom apply to other selective schools with late spring

        enrollment deadlines. See CA4 ECF 8-1 at 20. It is no mere “administrative inconvenience”

        the district court’s order mandates, CA4 ECF 17 at 23, but a gigantic undertaking. Such a

        significant outlay of public resources goes far beyond requiring private citizens to initiate

        routine administrative processes, see, e.g., Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 235 (4th

        Cir. 2017), and constitutes a “genuinely extraordinary situation” justifying interim

        equitable relief, Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 92 n.68 (1974). 4

               C.     Effect on the Coalition and the public interest

               The Coalition does not represent a class or putative class of applicants; rather, it is

        a group of interested parents and community members. Based on the record, it appears the

        Coalition has identified only two children of its members who are even eligible for

        whatever needs to be corrected.” CA4 ECF 17 at 9. But the district court did not reach a
        decision in January—instead, it granted summary judgment during the last week of
        February and did not deny the Board’s motion to stay until mid-March.
               4
                 The Coalition suggests the Board could simply excise the two aspects of the current
        plan that the Coalition finds most objectionable. CA4 ECF 17 at 22. But if the Coalition is
        right that the current plan was adopted with discriminatory intent, it is not clear how these
        surgical alterations would remedy the constitutional problem. And, regardless, the
        Coalition offers zero analysis of how the current plan would function without those
        components.

                                                     13
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280        Doc: 28        Filed: 03/31/2022     Pg: 14 of 20

        admission to TJ this year, and those children may yet be admitted. See A-106; A-210; CA4

        ECF 8-1 at 21. For that reason, it appears that the impact of a stay on the Coalition, if any,

        would be significantly less severe than the lack of a stay would be on the Board. See Nken,

        556 U.S. at 435 (balance of the harms “assess[es] the harm to the opposing party”

        (emphasis added)).

               Likewise—even factoring in potential harms to similarly situated Asian American

        students whose parents are neither Coalition members nor otherwise parties—I think the

        public interest favors a stay given the timing and logistical constraints associated with

        scrapping the current admissions policy and creating a new one so close to the end of the

        current admissions cycle. If the district court’s order is not stayed, thousands of students

        and their families will be thrown into disarray for the next several months. By contrast,

        undisputed data presented to the district court show that a higher percentage of Asian

        American students were admitted than applied even under the current plan. Taking all this

        into account, it seems the more prudent course is to allow the current admissions cycle to

        proceed according to settled expectations and require a change, if any, beginning with the

        next class.

                                                     14
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280       Doc: 28        Filed: 03/31/2022      Pg: 15 of 20

        RUSHING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

               In the fall of 2020, the Fairfax County School Board changed the admissions policy

        for Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology (TJ), a magnet school in

        Alexandria, Virginia. A group of parents and community members, including Asian-

        American parents with children who have applied to TJ or intend to do so, sued the Board,

        alleging that the Board acted with discriminatory intent when it changed the admissions

        policy to disfavor Asian-American students. After discovery, both parties moved for

        summary judgment on the undisputed factual record. The district court concluded that the

        Board acted with discriminatory intent and, on February 25, 2022, enjoined the Board from

        further use of the revised admissions policy.

               The Board now seeks a stay of the district court’s order pending appeal so that it

        can use the prohibited policy to make admissions decisions for the incoming class. Because

        the Board has not made the showing necessary to warrant the “extraordinary relief” of a

        stay, I would deny the motion. Williams v. Zbaraz, 442 U.S. 1309, 1316 (1979) (Stevens,

        J., in chambers).

               One of the “most critical” factors in deciding a stay motion is “whether the applicant

        will be irreparably injured absent a stay.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board claims that the district court’s order will

        require it to expend significant time and energy to design and implement a new policy, that

        it will have to delay admissions decisions until after the original April deadline, and that

        hurriedly changing the policy at this stage will injure its reputation and public confidence

        in the school. But “‘[m]ere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and

                                                     15
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28         Filed: 03/31/2022      Pg: 16 of 20

        energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay are not enough.’” Di Biase v. SPX

        Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90

        (1974)); see also A Helping Hand, LLC v. Balt. Cnty., 355 Fed. App. 773, 776 (4th Cir.

        2009) (holding that being forced to relocate business was not irreparable harm because

        “time and energy expended,” “injury to reputation,” and “loss of profits” are not irreparable

        (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the Board acknowledges, it can move the April

        deadline—as it did last year due to this same litigation—and still field a superlative class

        of students. While designing and implementing a new admissions policy on a short

        timeline may be inconvenient, it is not irreparable. Nor is it unforeseen; since at least

        September of 2021, the Board has been on notice that it should be prepared with a new

        policy in the event of an adverse decision. And the Board offers no support for its

        speculation that complying with a court order to modify the admissions policy will

        irreparably harm its reputation.

               Another important factor—“whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure

        the other parties interested in the proceeding”—counsels against granting a stay here.

        Nken, 556 U.S. 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found that the

        current admissions policy violates the Equal Protection rights of Asian-American students.

        The violation of constitutional rights “‘for even minimal periods of time[] unquestionably

        constitutes irreparable harm.’” Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 2

        F.4th 330, 346 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d

        1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009)); see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality

        opinion). The Board disagrees with the district court’s ruling, but we need not (and do not)

                                                     16
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280       Doc: 28        Filed: 03/31/2022     Pg: 17 of 20

        yet decide whether the Board will ultimately prevail; that question will be answered later

        in this appeal, which we have expedited in recognition of the importance of a timely

        decision to both parties. Rather, the question before us now is whether the Board has made

        a sufficiently “strong showing” of likely success on the merits in view of the risk that, by

        granting a stay, we would perpetuate the denial of Asian Americans’ constitutional rights.

        Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). In my view, the Board has not

        yet carried its burden.

               When motivated by discrimination, facially neutral policies like TJ’s admissions

        plan “are just as abhorrent, and just as unconstitutional, as [policies] that expressly

        discriminate on the basis of race.” N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204,

        220 (4th Cir. 2016); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–374 (1886) (prohibiting

        discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral laws). A “[c]hallenger[] need not show that

        discriminatory purpose was the sole or even a primary motive” behind the policy, “just that

        it was a motivating factor.” McCrory, 831 F.3d at 220 (internal quotation marks and

        alterations omitted). This means that, under current law, a facially neutral policy may be

        constitutional in one context but unconstitutional in another, depending on whether it was

        motivated in part by impermissible racial intent.

               Here, following the Supreme Court’s directive in Arlington Heights, the district

        court undertook the “sensitive inquiry” into all “circumstantial and direct evidence” of the

        Board’s intent in adopting TJ’s current admissions policy. Vill. of Arlington Heights v.

        Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). The court considered the historical

        background, the sequence of events leading to the new policy, departures from normal

                                                    17
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28         Filed: 03/31/2022      Pg: 18 of 20

        procedures in enacting the policy, the disproportionate impact of the policy, and relevant

        administrative history, including official and private statements by Board members,

        meeting minutes, and reports. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 220. Based on the undisputed

        evidence before it, the district court found that the Board pursued the policy change “at

        least in part ‘because of,’ and not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects” upon Asian

        Americans. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Specifically, the

        court determined that the Board acted with an impermissible racial purpose when it sought

        to decrease enrollment of “overrepresented” Asian-American students at TJ to better

        “reflect the racial composition” of the surrounding area. As the court explained, Board

        member discussions were permeated with racial balancing, as were its stated aims and its

        use of racial data to model proposed outcomes.

               The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that racial balancing for its own sake

        is unconstitutional. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 311 (2013); Parents

        Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729–730 (2007); Grutter

        v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). Racial balancing is no less pernicious if, instead

        of using a facial quota, the government uses a facially neutral proxy motivated by

        discriminatory intent. And while the Supreme Court has endorsed certain race-based

        motivations—specifically to remedy past intentional discrimination or, in higher

        education, to obtain the benefits of diversity—neither motivation is at issue here.

               The Board particularly disagrees with the district court’s evaluation of the policy’s

        disparate impact on Asian Americans. It suffices at this stage to observe that, under our

        precedent, when a plaintiff contends a law is motivated by discriminatory intent, proof of

                                                     18
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28          Filed: 03/31/2022     Pg: 19 of 20

        disproportionate impact is but one factor to consider “in the totality of the circumstances”;

        it is not “the sole touchstone” of the claim. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 231 (internal quotation

        marks omitted). The district court found that, under the new policy, Asian-American

        enrollment dropped 19 percentage points from the previous year and decreased from a

        historical average of 71% over class years 2020–2024 to 54% in class year 2025. Although

        “such an onerous showing” is not required in every case, id. at 232, and a year-over-year

        comparison may be influenced by other variables, it is nevertheless probative. The Board

        has not yet made a “strong showing” of likely success on the merits sufficient to counter

        the risk that our premature action will, as the district court concluded, violate the

        constitutional rights of Asian-American students. This is especially true given the absence

        of irreparable harm to the Board.

               Finally, the “public interest” likewise disfavors a stay. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434

        (internal quotation marks omitted).     The Board urges us to consider the current TJ

        applicants who are awaiting a decision for the upcoming school year. While it would be

        frustrating to receive an admissions decision later than expected, or to be asked for

        additional admissions materials at this point in the process, these harms simply do not

        outweigh the infringement of constitutional rights. And everyone—even temporarily

        frustrated applicants and their families—ultimately benefits from a public-school

        admissions process not tainted by unconstitutional discrimination. See Legend Night Club

        v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[U]pholding constitutional rights is in the

        public interest.”); Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albermarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 261

        (4th Cir. 2003) (same).

                                                     19
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1280      Doc: 28      Filed: 03/31/2022   Pg: 20 of 20

              I respectfully dissent.

                                                20