Court Opinion

ID: 9469105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:32:14.097303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:13.465672
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join in the per curiam opinion. However, with respect to the use of the concurrent sentence doctrine,1 I do so reluctantly and only because the defendant did not oppose the government’s suggestion that it be applied.2 I believe that some explanation of the reasons for my reluctance is required.
Since Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), the law with respect to the concurrent sentence doctrine has been in a state of confusion. In Benton, the Court held that the doctrine does not constitute a jurisdictional bar to review. Id. at 791, 89 S.Ct. at 2060. However, the Court said that “[t]he concurrent sentence doctrine has been widely, if somewhat haphazardly, applied in this Court’s decisions,” and that those decisions provide no “satisfactory explanation” for the existence of the doctrine. Id. at 789, 89 S.Ct. at 2059.3 While the Court remarked, without deciding, that the doctrine “may have some continuing validity as a rule of judicial convenience,” id. at 791, 89 S.Ct. at 2060, its statement that “ ‘most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences,’ ” id. at 790, 89 S.Ct. at 2060, quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1898, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), seriously undermined the utility of the doctrine and resulted in a growing reluctance to invoke it.4
Some circuits are growing more inclined to review the merits of a conviction rather than to utilize the concurrent sentence doctrine.5 This practice serves to protect the *1060rights of the defendant but frequently results in a waste of judicial resources and adversely affects the rights of other litigants by needlessly contributing to the delay in processing other cases. However, as the Second Circuit has said, the continued use of the concurrent sentence doctrine results in a similar waste of judicial resources (with the same adverse effect upon others) in view of the need to carefully analyze the “collateral consequences” issue on a case by case basis. United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952, 960 (2d Cir. 1980).6
The number of cases which circuit judges are required to consider and dispose of annually is staggering. This is true throughout the country. In our circuit each active circuit judge considers and participates in the disposition of approximately 270 cases per year.7 This means more than one case per working day. Many of the cases are complex and require thorough opinions. Some are comparatively uncomplicated and may be disposed of by reasoned memoranda dispositions. All, however, are of importance to the litigants and require thorough and careful consideration and review. It is difficult to understand how the judicial function can be performed properly with the rate of dispositions we are compelled to maintain. Nevertheless, it is essential that appeals be resolved as promptly as possible; unnecessary delay works a hardship on the litigants and society. Given these facts, we must be willing to consider the use of rules or techniques designed to avoid the waste of judicial resources while fully protecting the rights of all parties and society.
The concurrent sentence doctrine is one of those techniques. However, as the Second Circuit noted, if applied with the required degree of care, it does not result in any significant saving of judicial resources. There is also a serious question whether it adequately protects the rights of defendants. The doctrine is premised on our belief that when we fail to review a conviction under that doctrine we are not adversely affecting the defendant. We cloak our conclusion in the term “no adverse collateral legal consequences,”8 a term which-does not necessarily answer the question whether the defendant in fact suffers adverse consequences from our failure to review his case.
There is a troublesome aspect to the premise which underlies our use of the concurrent sentence doctrine. If it is truly of no consequence to the defendant that his conviction on an additional offense stands, why is it of consequence to the government that the conviction be affirmed? If the conviction is of no significance whatsoever, what is our purpose in upholding it? On the other hand, if the conviction has any significance at all, it would seem that the defendant has a right to have it reviewed on appeal. Assuming that there are no *1061particular consequences flowing from a conviction which for reasons of judicial convenience we decline to review, I would think it more consistent with the concept that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty to vacate the conviction than to affirm an individual’s guilt without affording him his right to appeal.
In my opinion, the continued use of the concurrent sentence doctrine can be justified, if at all, only if (1) there is a particular identifiable governmental interest in preserving the additional convictions, (2) the additional convictions in fact have no effect on the defendant, and (3) the governmental interest outweighs the disservice to our system of justice which results from courts saying, in effect: a conviction stands because we are too busy to decide whether the finding of guilt was lawful or unlawful. While I am not here concluding that the concurrent sentence doctrine should be totally abandoned, I suggest that two serious problems with its continued use are apparent: One, it is far from clear that the defendant who is denied review of his con-. viction is not adversely affected,9 and two, the courts have not thus far sufficiently identified the particular governmental interest that would justify the use of the doctrine. If that particular governmental interest were carefully explained and analyzed, we might better understand what the actual consequences for the defendant are, and we might be able to determine more easily whether the doctrine is in fact consistent with our basic concept of justice.
The District of Columbia Circuit has adopted an approach which may avoid some of these troublesome questions and best serve all of the interests involved. In United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604 (D.C.Cir. 1970), the court said that rather than affirm a conviction under the concurrent sentence doctrine, it would vacate the conviction but permit the government to seek reinstatement if and when it became of practical significance. Id. at 606 & n.8. The District of Columbia Circuit has employed the Hooper approach with regularity.10 This approach has been applied in other circuits, including ours, on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., United States v. Morisse, 660 F.2d 132, 137 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Fishbein, 446 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019, 92 S.Ct. 683, 30 L.Ed.2d 667 (1972).11
I see much to commend the Hooper approach and might have been inclined to follow it here, had Barker suggested that we do so and had the government had the opportunity to brief the issue. While I *1062believe that in our circuit we are presently free to adopt whatever approach to the concurrent sentence doctrine a particular case seems to warrant, I do not think that so haphazard a policy is desirable. I believe that when a proper case arises we should carefully consider the question of the Hooper rule and the concurrent sentence doctrine and, after thorough argument by interested parties, decide what we believe the proper procedure to be and follow it uniformly.12
AFFIRMED.

. In United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 2407, 60 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1979), we described the doctrine as follows:
[T]he appellate court, as a matter of discretion, may decline to review a conviction under one count if a conviction under another count is affirmed and the sentence runs concurrently and no adverse collateral legal consequences for the appellant result from the additional conviction.
Id. at 887.

. Barker did not discuss the applicability of the concurrent sentence doctrine in his opening brief. In its responsive brief, the government addressed on the merits each of the issues Barker raised, but suggested, in a brief footnote, that we invoke the concurrent sentence doctrine and summarily affirm on Count Four. Barker did not file a reply brief. Oral argument was waived at Barker’s request.

. For a discussion of the development of the concurrent sentence doctrine prior to Benton, see Note, The Federal Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, 70 Colum.L.Rev. 1099, 1100-04 (1970).

. Nonetheless, in a decision subsequent to Benton, the Supreme Court summarily invoked the concurrent sentence doctrine. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 848 n.16, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 2364 n.16, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973). See also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 469 n.4, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2742 n.4, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976).

. The Second Circuit has observed in several cases that, in that circuit, “utilization of the concurrent sentence doctrine is now the exception rather than the rule.” United States v. *1060Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 361 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Wishart, 582 F.2d 236, 242 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 987, 99 S.Ct. 582, 58 L.Ed.2d 660 (1978). See also Close v. United States, 450 F.2d 152, 155 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1068, 92 S.Ct. 1513, 31 L.Ed.2d 799 (1972); United States v. Jones, 533 F.2d 1387, 1390 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 964, 97 S.Ct. 2919, 53 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1977); Gentry v. United States, 533 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 269, 34 L.Ed.2d 220 (1972); United States v. Kilpatrick, 458 F.2d 864, 867-68 (7th Cir. 1972). But see United States v. McLeod, 493 F.2d 1186, 1189 n.1 (7th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of the concurrent sentence doctrine in the federal courts in the aftermath of Benton, see Note, The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine After Benton v. Maryland, 7 U.C.L.A.—Alaska L.Rev. 282 (1978).

. In Vargas, the court canvassed the various collateral consequences that might flow from the affirmance of an unreviewed conviction and observed that its “specific analysis demonstrates how much uncertainty and judicial time and effort are involved in any review of the risk of collateral consequences, ... judicial time and effort that reduce any ‘convenience’ flowing from the doctrine.” 615 F.2d at 960.

. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics for Twelve Month Period Ended September 30, 1981, Table Bl, at A-3; Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1981 Annual Report of the Director, Table 8, at 51.

. See supra note 1.

. See discussion in Vargas, 615 F.2d at 959-60.

. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 659 F.2d 163, 167-68 (D.C.Cir. 1981); United States v. Durant, 648 F.2d 747, 752 (D.C.Cir.1981); United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Harris, 627 F.2d 474, 477 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 961, 101 S.Ct. 375, 66 L.Ed.2d 229 (1980); United States v. Peters, 587 F.2d 1267, 1277 (D.C.Cir. 1978); United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1367 (D.C.Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976); United States v. Gower, 503 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1074); United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1158 (D.C.Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 190 (1974); United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1209, 1212 (D.C.Cir. 1972); United States v. Bobbitt, 450 F.2d 685, 693-94 (D.C.Cir. 1971).

. Our approach to the concurrent sentence doctrine has been less than uniform. When invoking the doctrine in some cases, we have made a specific finding with regard to the absence of collateral consequences. See, e.g., United States v. Lipps, 659 F.2d 960, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Young Buffalo, 591 F.2d 506, 512-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 950, 99 S.Ct. 2178, 60 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1979); United States v. Diaz-Alvarado, 587 F.2d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 927, 99 S.Ct. 1261, 59 L.Ed.2d 482 (1979); United States v. Walls, 577 F.2d 690, 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893, 99 S.Ct. 251, 58 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978); United States v. Moore, 452 F.2d 576, 577 (9th Cir. 1971). In another line of cases, we have invoked the rule mechanically, without reference to or apparent determination of the existence of collateral consequences. See, e.g., United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 992 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 578, 66 L.Ed.2d 476 (1980); United States v. Jabara, 618 F.2d 1319, 1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987, 100 S.Ct. 2973, 64 L.Ed.2d 845 (1980); United States v. Thomas, 586 F.2d 123, 131 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006, 99 S.Ct. 621, 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978).

. The Fifth Circuit recently granted an en banc hearing to consider its policy with regard to use of the concurrent sentence doctrine. United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956, 100 S.Ct. 2928, 64 L.Ed.2d 815 (1980). The majority decided, however, that the case before it “is no longer a vehicle for consideration of the policies underlying the concurrent sentence doctrine.” Id. at 889. In a concurrence and dissent, several members of the Fifth Circuit expressed vigorous disagreement with the majority’s failure to resolve the question, emphasized the “widespread haphazard” application of the doctrine, explained the necessity for arriving at a uniform policy within the circuit, noted that development of such a policy was “an appropriate role for the en banc Court,” and urged that “careful consideration” be given to the adoption of the Hooper rule. Id. at 891-96.