Court Opinion

ID: 9376095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 20:02:28.678305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:04.232570
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/1/23 P. v. Simmons CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                        (Lassen)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C094880

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. CH037835)

           v.

 MELVIN JOSEPH SIMMONS,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Melvin Joseph Simmons pled to custodial possession of a weapon for
which he received a one-year consecutive sentence to the prison term defendant was then
serving. On appeal, defendant brings two separate but related claims. First, defendant
complains the record contains substantial evidence of his incompetence to stand trial, and
thus the trial court violated due process by failing to suspend proceedings and conduct a
competency hearing. In light of this alleged failure, defendant requests we reverse the
judgment and remand for a competency hearing. Second, defendant reasons that because
he was incompetent to stand trial, he was also incompetent to represent himself.

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However, defendant does not challenge whether his waiver under Faretta v. California
(1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) was knowing and voluntary or argue for the application of
the heightened state standard for competency to represent oneself. (People v. Johnson
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 530.) Accordingly, the only issue before this court is whether
substantial evidence supports defendant’s allegations of incompetence to stand trial.
       Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, we affirm.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On March 5, 2020, defendant was charged with custodial possession of a weapon
and it was alleged that he had a prior strike. On June 26, 2020, defendant refused to
leave his cell to attend his arraignment and also refused to speak with his attorney. At the
next Zoom hearing, defendant objected to the appointment of counsel and to not having a
public forum. The matter was put over for a Faretta hearing, and defendant was
provided a form Faretta application, which he later filed.
       On September 18, 2020, the trial court heard defendant’s Faretta motion via
Zoom. At the outset of the hearing, defendant objected that the complaint did not utilize
his full name and reiterated his complaint that the proceedings violated his “constitutional
right to an open court in a public forum.” The court then confirmed defendant’s
understanding of his rights, including his right to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses,
to a speedy trial, and to be represented by an attorney and to waive that right. Defendant
was 56 years old, had obtained a GED, and was a certified paralegal (a certification he
received around 2001 as a result of a correspondence course). Defendant informed the
court that he had represented himself one other time and that case ended in a plea
agreement. Defendant confirmed he understood there were disadvantages to representing
himself, and the court enumerated at length the various tasks he would be expected to
perform. Defendant, of his own accord, confirmed he would have access to a legal
runner for filing.

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       The trial court then explained the allegations defendant was facing and his
potential sentencing exposure of up to 48 months for the custodial possession, which
could be doubled because of the prior strike. The court further explained it was
questioning defendant at the hearing in response to defendant’s “nonsensical items” from
his Faretta application. Defendant understood that if his motion was granted, he would
proceed without the assistance of counsel. Defendant “reject[ed]” the court’s advice not
to represent himself and declined the court’s invitation to postpone his self-representation
until after he had at least met with his court-appointed attorney.
       Ultimately, the court found defendant had “the mental acuity in which to represent
[himself] in th[ose] proceedings at th[at] time.” However, the court warned that should
defendant fail to comport himself and abuse the dignity of the court, then the court would
revoke his self-representation. Accordingly, the court granted defendant’s request to
represent himself and released his appointed counsel.
       On December 1, 2020, defendant made numerous filings in defense of his action,
including (1) a motion to dismiss; (2) a document entitled “compulsory counterclaim
actions in quasi rem” (capitalization omitted), alleging misconduct by officers at the
prison, the district attorney, and the special prosecutor; (3) memoranda in support of the
propriety of defendant’s counterclaims under a theory that government agents had acted
in concert and in violation of antitrust laws; and (4) a notice of hearing and memo, which
we understand to request the counterclaim be heard concurrent with his criminal matter.
These motions were continued so the People could be served and afforded an opportunity
to respond. They were ultimately denied, and defendant attempted multiple times to
appeal these rulings during ongoing proceedings but was notified that these notices of
appeal were inoperative.
       On February 4, 2021, defendant refused to exit his cell for his preliminary hearing,
resulting in a one-day continuance and a warning that if defendant failed to cooperate, his
self-representation status could be revoked. Defendant attended court the next day,

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rejected the People’s offer of a four-year sentencing lid, and insisted upon proceeding
with the preliminary hearing. Thereafter, the court conducted the preliminary hearing
and held defendant to answer. During this hearing, defendant cross-examined the
witness. He then explained his defense was that he was “unlawfully” incarcerated and
had been “placed in High Desert to be murdered.” The court encouraged defendant to
speak with the People about possibly resolving the case and reminded him he could
request an attorney. Defendant responded he had the money to hire an attorney if he
elected to do so. At the conclusion of the hearing, defendant filed a motion to disqualify
Judge Tony Mallery for prejudice, which was granted.
          On March 3, 2021, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, supporting memorandum,
and an affidavit asserting error at the preliminary hearing, which was opposed by the
People. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the criminal action without prejudice
because of the People’s failure to file an information within statutory limits following the
preliminary hearing. However, the criminal action was reinstated on March 17, 2021,
after it was discovered that the People had, in fact, timely filed an information.
          At defendant’s arraignment on the information, defendant objected to Judge Mark
Nareau presiding over the proceedings, complaining he had previously filed a complaint
against him. Judge Nareau had not been aware of his complaint, but nonetheless
encouraged defendant to file complaints if he felt he was being treated unfairly. The
court proceeded with the arraignment, and ultimately entered defendant’s plea of not
guilty.
          Defendant refused to consent to a Zoom appearance on April 15, 2021, requiring
the matter be put over so he could appear in person. The hearing on defendant’s motion
to dismiss took place the next day. Defendant argued at length that (1) the court was
acting in excess of its jurisdiction and (2) against prosecution of the case on various
theories of dubious application. The People submitted on the papers, and the trial court
denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.

                                              4
       Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for change of venue and supporting papers,
which the People opposed. At the outset of the venue hearing, the trial court conferred
with defendant’s cousin Greg Rossignoa, who was present in court. Rossignoa expressed
concern that defendant had a “mental thing that’s going on” and that he needed
counseling and to be returned home having already served 36 years on an eight-year-to-
life sentence. In response, the court explained the purpose of the hearing was to hear
defendant’s motion and the appropriate disposition in the case would be for a later
hearing. Defendant concurred, stating, “All due respect, Your Honor, I respect and
appreciate the words and wisdom of my cousin, but this is not the issue.”
       The trial court then denied defendant’s motion, finding (1) it would not issue an
order to remove the matter to federal court and (2) that defendant had not demonstrated a
need to change the venue within the California courts. In response to the court’s inquiry
impliedly suggesting defendant accept assistance from an attorney, defendant stated, “No,
I do not wish to be assisted by an attorney because the attorney works for the State of
California and he represents the interests of the State of California and not my individual
interests and personal liberty.” Defendant objected that he had not yet received discovery
from the People, and the court directed the People to provide an additional copy of the
discovery to defendant. The court noted defendant’s objection to the continuance of the
proceedings.
       Defendant then filed two notices of removal on June 8, 2021, and June 10, 2021.
On June 23, 2021, defendant filed an opposition to the People’s motions in limine. The
next day, defendant filed a motion seeking the removal of handcuffs, shackles, leg irons,
and other restraints, again making arguments of dubious relevance.
       At the June 29, 2021 trial setting conference, the assigned judge overruled
defendant’s objection to his hearing the matter and set the matter for a trial lasting three
to five days to begin on July 19, 2021. On July 6, 2021, defendant filed a motion to
compel discovery and supporting papers.

                                              5
       Thereafter, on July 19, 2021, defendant rejected the People’s offer to settle the
case in exchange for a sentence of four years, and the matter was continued for one day
because of a power outage. On July 20, 2021, defendant agreed to resolve the case by
pleading no contest to custodial possession of a weapon. In exchange, he would receive a
midterm prison sentence of three years and the People would move to dismiss the strike
allegation in the interests of justice. Through operation of resentencing rules, defendant
would ultimately receive a sentence of one year consecutive to other determinate terms
previously imposed, which would be reimposed.
       Defendant refused to complete the plea form and the trial court agreed to take a
verbal plea, proceeding to confirm the information from the plea agreement form orally
on the record. Defendant agreed he had possessed the weapon, although he contested
whether his incarceration was lawful and asserted he had a right to self-defense.
Thereafter, the trial court accepted defendant’s no contest plea and, with defendant’s
consent, immediately imposed sentence in accordance with the plea agreement.
Defendant timely appealed and his certificate of probable cause request was granted.
Appellate briefing in this matter was completed on December 16, 2022.
                                       DISCUSSION
       The sole issue before this court is whether substantial evidence exists from which
the trial court could have determined that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. We
conclude it does not.
       “[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates
due process.” (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378.) “A defendant is
incompetent to stand trial if he or she lacks a ‘ “sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and . . . a rational as well
as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” ’ ” (People v. Rogers (2006)
39 Cal.4th 826, 846-847 (Rogers).)

                                               6
       As the California Supreme Court explained in Rogers, “Both federal due process
and state law require a trial judge to suspend trial proceedings and conduct a competency
hearing whenever the court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that
is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant’s
competence to stand trial. [Citations.] The court’s duty to conduct a competency hearing
may arise at any time prior to judgment. [Citation.] Evidence of incompetence may
emanate from several sources, including the defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior,
and prior mental evaluations.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.)
       “Evidence that merely raises a suspicion that the defendant lacks present sanity or
competence but does not disclose a present inability because of mental illness to
participate rationally in the trial is not deemed ‘substantial’ evidence requiring a
competence hearing.” (People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 358, disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228, fn. 9.) “[A] defendant must
exhibit more than bizarre, paranoid behavior, strange words . . . .” (People v. Ramos
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 508.)
       “A trial court’s decision whether or not to hold a competence hearing is entitled to
deference, because the court has the opportunity to observe the defendant during trial.
[Citations.] The failure to declare a doubt and conduct a hearing when there is substantial
evidence of incompetence, however, requires reversal of the judgment of conviction.”
(Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.)
       Here, defendant’s competency to stand trial was never questioned in the trial court
proceedings. Nonetheless, the trial court’s determination that defendant should be
permitted to represent himself necessarily included this question. (See, e.g., People v.
Walden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 288, 307 [“A two-part inquiry determines whether a defendant
may waive the right to counsel: (1) The defendant must be competent to stand trial, and
(2) the trial court must ‘satisfy itself’ that the waiver of ‘constitutional rights is knowing
and voluntary’ ”].)

                                               7
       At that hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s request to represent himself
after vetting defendant’s understanding of the proceedings and his individual rights.
Relevant to the arguments on appeal, defendant clearly understood he had been charged
with custodial possession of a weapon with a prior strike, even if he disputed whether the
People had correctly identified him in the charging document, objected that the
proceedings conducted via Zoom violated his right to a public forum, and had dubious
theories about how to defend the action. Further, defendant understood the disadvantages
associated with representing himself, had previously represented himself, and possessed a
paralegal certification.
       Thereafter, defendant filed numerous motions with supporting memoranda and
affidavits in defense of the action. It is of no moment that many of these motions, and
defendant’s arguments in support of them at court hearings, were not meritorious.1 A
defendant’s lack of legal knowledge does not equate to substantial evidence of
incompetence. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070 [defendant’s “missteps in
his self-representation” and confusion with courtroom procedures reflects “lack of legal
knowledge, not necessarily mental illness or incompetency”]; see also People v. Butler
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 828 [acknowledging a propria persona defendant may “provide
[himself or herself] with inept representation” without running afoul of Faretta].)
Accordingly, we disagree that defendant’s arguments made in support of these legal
theories constituted substantial evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial or by
extension to represent himself.
       Nor do comments made by defendant’s cousin at the change of venue hearing alter
this determination. Rossignoa advocated for defendant’s release and return home so that
he could participate in counseling after being in prison for 36 years on a sentence of eight

1      Defendant did have some success, for example, successfully disqualifying a judge
for prejudice.

                                             8
years to life. Rossignoa denied defendant had possessed a weapon and stated defendant
was different than he had been and had a “mental thing that’s going on.” These
comments do not present substantial evidence that defendant did not have a rational or
factual understanding of the proceedings against him or an inability to assist legal
counsel. (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 846-847.)
       Finally, we defer to the trial court on these points given that the court had the
opportunity to observe defendant’s behavior in person over the course of the proceedings
and never expressed a doubt regarding his competency. (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at
p. 847.) Accordingly, we deny defendant’s claim that substantial evidence supports he
was incompetent to stand trial and, by extension, his related claim that this incompetence
meant he was also incompetent to represent himself.

                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                  /s/
                                                  ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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