Court Opinion

ID: 9652590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:27:20.016437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:52.637185
License: Public Domain

*417Dissenting Opinion by
Mk. Justice Bell:
This is another example of the axiom: “Hard cases often make bad law”. It seems necessary to add that it is not within the province of a Court, desirable as that would sometimes be, to alter, ignore or rewrite a will (or an Act of the Legislature), or to conjure up an imaginary testamentary intent, in order to make what we are all convinced would be a more equitable and more desirable distribution of a testator’s estate.
Mr. Wright, the testator, died on June 15, 1951, at the age of 82, leaving a Avill dated November 1, 1950, which was duly probated. Mr. Wright never married and left no close relatives. His gross estate amounted to approximately $2,600,000; his net estate for distribution, before payment of Pennsylvania Inheritance taxes, Federal Estate taxes, and Canadian Succession taxes, totaled approximately $2,460,000.
The will, inclusive of dispositive and administrative provisions, contained 60 numbered items and 3 additional items which are not numbered. In the first 55 items he made pecuniary bequests and specific devises totaling approximately $273,000 to a large number of individuals, and bequests of $269,000 to charities and other organizations. In Item 60 testator gave the residue “not hereinbefore bequeathed”, to Presbyterian Hospital and Princeton University, in equal shares as memorials to himself. The residue totaled approximately $1,918,000.
Testator provided inter alia:
“Item 11: — I give and bequeath to Mrs. Emily Kerr TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) in stocks at the market value at the time of my death.”
“Item 26: — I give and bequeath to Rev. L. A. Owens, a Methodist Minister, formerly of Béllefoñte, Pa., the sum of TWO THOUSAND ($2,000.00) Dollars.”
*418“Item 27: — I give and bequeath to the Reedsville Chapel, Clearfield, Pa., the sum of TWO THOUSAND ($2,000.00) Dollars.”
The above mentioned bequests are typical of the 40 bequests made throughout his will with this exception. He also made additional gifts to Miss Ruth S. Spence, his secretary — for example in item 1 the sum of $75,000 absolutely; in item 47 one-half of certain interests in coal lands; in item 48 his shares of stock in a coal-mining company; in item 49 all his coal land in Penn Township, Clearfield County; in item 50 the sum of $2,000; in item 52 his house in Clearfield; in item 53 all his furniture and his automobile. These gifts to Miss Spence totaled $160,008.
Testator then provided: “Item 56: — I give power to my Executors to borrow money to pay any debts or pay any taxes if they decide the time is not right for the selling of my securities, in paying my bequests and debts. The Executors to consult with Mr. Clinton A. Lutkins of New York City on condition and time to sell securities.”
It will be noticed immediately that the will contains no provision that the gifts of pecuniary legacies, or specific legacies, or devises were to be free and clear of Pennsylvania Inheritance tax; nor did it contain any provision imposing said taxes upon the residuary estate; nor was there any provision directing by whom the Pennsylvania and Federal death taxes should be paid.
It is hornbook law that an absolute gift of a pecuniary legacy in a fixed amount of money* ($100, $500, $5,000, $50,000), or a specific legacy* or devise, does *419not show an intent upon the part of the testator to give the legatee the full amount of the bequest or the specific property free of the Pennsylvania Inheritance Tax, or to impose said tax upon the residuary estate.
Every careful lawyer who is even slightly familiar with the law pertaining to wills, knows that if a testator wants to give a legatee the full amount of his pecuniary legacy, or a specific legacy or devise, free and clear of the Pennsylvania Inheritance Tax, he should specifically add such words at the end of each such bequest, or he should specifically cover it in an all-inclusive, clearly expressed tax provision in a subsequent part of the will. Wright’s will did not contain any such provision.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania imposed a flat 10% collateral inheritance tax on each beneficiary, based upon the amount of her, his or its legacy or devise. The total inheritance taxes (after deduction of a 5% discount) amounted to $232,208. The Federal estate tax return was filed by the executors on July 7, 1952, and a Federal estate tax of $118,116 was then paid. The Federal estate tax return was prepared and filed by the executors on the theory that the Pennsylvania Estate Tax Apportionment Act of 1951 (discussed infra) applied to the computation of the tax, and that all the Federal estate tax would be apportioned among and between the non-charitable beneficiaries. This theory was accepted by the Federal authorities.
The Federal estate tax was assessed and paid on the amount of the individual legacies, plus the 10% Pennsylvania Inheritance Taw which was paid on the charitable specific and residuary gifts. This was in accord with Harrison v. Northern Trust Company, 317 U. S. 476, which held (in interpreting Section 807 of the Revenue Act of 1932) that bequests to charities, ewcept *420the State succession, legacy or inheritance taxes levied thereon, were allowable deductions for Federal estate tax purposes. In other words, the Federal estate tax was assessed on the amount of all the individual legacies and bequests, and on the amount or value of the charitable bequests only to the extent of the 10% Pennsylvania inheritance tax levied thereon. .
Two legal questions are raised by these appeals: First, is each legatee and devisee (including the charitable residuary legatees) required to pay the Pennsylvania transfer inheritance tax of 10% on her, his, or its legacy or devise, or is this tax to be paid from the residue; second, are all Federal estate taxes to be apportioned among and borne by the non-eharitable legatees and devisees or are they to be paid out of the residue?
Pennsylvania Transfer Inheritance Tax*
The Pennsylvania Transfer Inheritance Tax Act of June 20, 1919, P.L. 521, 72 PS §2301, as amended, is not, as its name implies, a direct inheritance tax on the transfer of property, but is a tax upon the right of succession or inheritance, or the privilege of receiving property of a decedent at his death, and is payable ultimately** by the legatee or devisee: Shugars v. Chamberlain, 284 Pa. 200, 130 A. 426; Tack’s Estate, 325 Pa. 545, 191 A, 155. However, a testator may always relieve a legatee or devisee from the payment of such tax: Spangenberg Estate, 359 Pa. 353, 59 A. 2d 103; Brown’s Estate, 208 Pa. 161, 57 A. 360; Stadtfeld Estate, 359 Pa. 147, 58 A. 2d 478; Dravo Estate, 388 *421Pa. 551, 131 A. 2d 351; Youngblood’s Estate, 117 Pa. Superior Ct. 550, 178 A. 517.
In Spangenberg Estate, 359 Pa., supra, the Court reiterated the well established rule (page 355) : “. . . an inheritance tax is ultimately payable by the legatee or out of the estate passing to her, unless the will clearly indicates, either expressly or by necessary implication, that the legacy was given free of the tax: Anderson’s Estate, 312 Pa. 180, 167 A. 329; Rettew’s Estate, 142 Pa. Superior Ct. 335, 16 A. 2d 322.”*
The testator’s will contained no pecuniary or specific gift “free and clear of all taxes”, nor any express tax-free clause; hence any relief from.the payment of the Pennsylvania inheritance tax by a legatee (or devisee) must arise clearly, if at all, by plain or necessary implication from the will’s provisions.
In Beisgen Estate, 387 Pa. 425, 128 A. 2d 52, the Court quoting from Cannistra Estate, 384 Pa. 605, 607, 121 A. 2d 157, said (page 432) : . . “The testator’s intention must be ascertained from the language and scheme of his will: fit is not what the Court thinks he might or would have said in the existing circumstances, or even what the Court thinks he meant to say, but what is the meaning of his words’: Britt Estate, 369 Pa. [450, 454, 87 A. 2d 243]”: Sowers Estate, 383 Pa. 566, 119 A. 2d 60.’ ”
*422Since there is no provision in the will which frees the pecuniary or specific legatees from payment of any taxes whatever, we must search for language in the testator’s will which clearly indicates by necessary implication his intent to give each of his 35 individual beneficiaries their bequest free and clear of all taxes?
The testator’s only reference to taxes is in Item 56 of the will which, we repeat, provides as follows: “Item 56: — I give power to my Executors to borrow money to pay any debts or pay any taxes if they decide the time is not right for the selling of my securities, in paying my bequests and debts. The Executors to consult with Mr. Clinton A. Lutkins of New York City on condition and time to sell securities.”
Item 56 merely gave testator’s executors a discretionary power to borrow money for the purpose of paying debts or bequests or taxes. It is worthwhile to note that in the succeeding item (Item 57) the testator gave the executors power to sell assets and to make all necessary transfers. In neither of these items was the testator dealing with the relief, apportionment or allocation of death taxes, oí' directing by whom they should ultimately be paid; rather, he was creating administrative provisions and powers. It is impossible to interpret Item 56 as a clear indication or direction, either expressly or by necessary implication, that all of the Pennsylvania collateral inheritance taxes are to be paid out of the residuary estate, or that his individual legatees and devisees should receive their respective legacies and devises free of tax.
Generally speaking, precedents are rarely controlling in will cases because each will must be interpreted from its four corners, and no will has a twin brother: Newlin Estate, 367 Pa. 527, 80 A. 2d 819. However, Youngblood’s Estate, 117 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, is analogous. In that case the testatrix bequeathed absolutely*423* a specified number of shares of a particular stock of a stated value to various legatees. The Superior Court said (page 555) :
“The only reference to payment of taxes is in the seventh item of the will, which reads: ‘All other property of whatsoever nature is left to my husband, in trust, and I empower and authorize him to sell such stocks as he thinks proper or necessary for the payment of taxes and costs.’ The taxes mentioned therein evidently referred to those the estate would be compelled to pay. The testatrix no doubt knew that there would be certain taxes due from the estate, independent of any that would be payable on the legacies, which the executor would be required to pay.
“In Tallman’s Est., 10 D. & C. 89, the testator gave $1,000 to each of his two sisters. In the sixth item of his will, he provided: ‘I direct that all inheritance taxes upon my estate, both as to life estate and the estate in remainder, shall be paid by my executor in due course.’ The auditing judge awarded the two legacies of $1,000, subject to payment of tax thereon. Upon exceptions filed, Judge Lamorelle . . . sustained the auditing judge’s adjudication.
“We think the will did not impose the payment of the inheritance tax on the residuary estate, and, consequently it is not liable therefor.”
The majority opinion says that Miss Spence was the primary object of testator’s bounty. Although we consider the question to be entirely immaterial in the instant case, we wonder how she can be so denominated when the testator’s bequests and devises to her totaled $160,000., while his bequests and devises to the Pres*424byterian Hospital and to Princeton University each exceeded one million dollars.
It is even more obvious that over 30 individuals who Were given very small pecuniary legacies could not possibly be denominated as the primary object of testator’s bounty, and equally obvious that the primary object theory could not exempt them from inheritance tax.
An analysis of the language of testator’s will demonstrates beyond any doubt that testator failed, either by specific language or by necessary implication, to clearly evidence an intent to give each individual legatee his legacy or devise free of the Pennsylvania inheritance tax. I venture to express the hope and belief that the majority considers this case to be sui generis; otherwise it would repudiate and impliedly overrule a number of decisions of this Court and of the Superior Court, as well as countless decisions of Orphans’ Courts throughout this Commonwealth which have held that an absolute gift of a pecuniary legacy in a fixed amount of money, or a specific legacy or devise does not show an intention to relieve the legatee or devisee of the payment of Pennsylvania inheritance tax.
Federal Estate Tax
The Federal Estate tax is not a legacy or succession tax or a tax on the privilege of receiving the property possessed by a decedent; instead, it is a tax on the (right of) transmission of a decedent’s property, i.e., the statutory net estate of the decedent, which is payable out of the estate as a whole: Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95; Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39; Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327; Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260; Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F. 2d 998. Pri- or to the enactment of the Pennsylvania Estate Tax *425Apportionment Act of July 2, 1937, P. L. 2762, 20 PS 844, and the Estate Tax Apportionment Act of 1951, August 24, 1951, P. L. 1405, 20 PS 881, the Federal estate tax was payable out of and chargeable to the residuary estate, in the absence of a direction by the testator to the contrary: Edwards Estate, 377 Pa., supra.
The Act of 1937 changed the basic rule by providing:
“Whenever it appears upon any accounting or in any appropriate action or proceeding that an executor, . . . has paid an estate tax, levied or assessed under the provisions of the act, ... or under any law hereafter enacted, or under the provisions of any estate tax law of the United States heretofore or hereafter enacted upon or with respect to any property required to be included in the gross estate of a decedent under the provisions of any such law, the amount of the tax so paid, except in a case where a testator otherwise directs in his will, shall be equitably prorated among the persons interested in the estate to whom such property is or may be transferred, or to whom any benefit accrues.”
The Act of August 24, 1951 (except for changes in context which are unrelated to the instant case) substantially reenacts Section 1 of the Act of July 2, 1937, and consequently the interpretation of the 1937 Act is of' considerable importance in properly disposing of the issues here involved.
Harvey Estate, 350 Pa., supra, was concerned with the application of the Act of 1937. In that case the testator’s will provided for (1) pecuniary legacies aggregating $235,000, each “subject to the payment of the Pennsylvania State Inheritance Tax”, (2) specific legacies in which it was provided that the tax thereon was to be paid out of residue, and (3) a residuary *426legacy in trust, the income to be divided by the trustees after deducting taxes and legal expenses. The pecuniary legatees contended that since their legacies were expressly made “subject to the payment of the Pennsylvania State inheritance tax”, they were impliedly relieved from all other tax including the Federal estate tax. The Court rejected this contention, directed an apportionment of the Federal estate tax, and said (pages 56-57) : “. . . Like the Act of 1917, supra, the Act of 1937, supra, expressly supplies a presumption of the testator’s intention and, when read into this will, is the equivalent of an express provision that these pecuniary legacies are subject to federal inheritance [sic] taxes. Unless there is in the terms of the will some provision which is clearly inconsistent* with such construction, and, when the will is construed as a whole, will override it, the will shall be construed in accordance with the presumption provided by the statute.* The appellants contend we should search for the testamentary intent in construing how these taxes shall be paid. With this contention we have no disagreement, but the statute creates a presumption which can only be overcome by clear language. When the statute is applied in this case, requiring each pecuniary legacy to pay its pro rata share of the federal tax, there appears no expression in .the will of any intent by the testator to impose the the full buiden of the federal tax on the residuary legatees in contravention of the statute.”
How clear and strong the language of a testator must be to shift the burden of the tax from an individual legatee in order that charities shall pay their share of the tax — even though all the equities strongly favor the individual legatees — is further exemplified *427by Wahr Estate, 370 Pa. 382, 88 A. 2d 417. In that case, a testatrix directed that her residuary estate “shall be divided into 12 equal shares or parts”, and then gave 6 of such shares to named relatives and 6 to named charities. A majority of this Court* held (1) that the charities were relieved from the payment of the Federal Estate tax and the tax was to be eqquitably prorated between and paid by the individual legatees, and (2) that testatrix had not shown, expressly or by necessary implication, a contrary intent by providing for the division of the residuary estate into “12 equal shares”. In that case, the primary objects of testatrix’s bounty were her named individual residuary legatees, i.e., her named cousin (who was bequeathed 3 of such 12 shares) and 18 relatives (who were bequeathed 3 of such 12 shares). Nevertheless, they were required to pay $4-88,000 in taxes and to receive a small fraction of the l/12th equal share she specifically gave them, while the Charities were allowed to receive their six l/12th equal shares in full and pay no federal taxes. That case — both in testamentary language and in equities — is far stronger in favor of exempting the individual legatees than is the instant case.
How clear and strong the testamentary language must be to show a contrary intent is further evident from Stadtfeld Estate, 359 Pa., supra, where this Court said (page 152) : “We come, then, to the question: Did Judge Stadtfeld ‘otherwise direct in his will’? The act creates a presumption that a testator intends that proration should be made in accordance with its terms unless his will contains a specific pro*428vision, clearly expressed, inconsistent with such presumption, and, to accomplish that result, his language must not be of doubtful import: Harvey Estate, 350 Pa. 53, 56, 57, 38 A. 2d 262, 263. Only in the 18th paragraph of Judge Stadtfeld’s will is there any provision in regard to the payment of taxes; that paragraph provides: H direct that all inheritance, estate, succession or similar duties or taxes which shall become payable in respect to any property or interest passing under my will or any codicil which I may hereafter execute, shall be paid out of the principal of my estate, without diminution of any devises, bequests or legaciesIt would seem too clear for discussion that this provision is wholly silent with regard to estate taxes on property not passing under the will and therefore is not broad enough to cover property which, though not so passing, is subject to the federal estate tax because of its constituting part of the decedent’s gross estate.”
How very strong the language must be, in order to clearly show a contrary intent is further evidenced from Dravo Estate, 388 Pa., supra, which is well summarized in the syllabus: “Where it appeared that testatrix created two inter vivos trusts which provided for certain distributions at her death which were subject to Pennsylvania transfer inheritance taxes; and testatrix’s will provided H direct my Executors to pay all Federal and State taxes, estate, transfer, succession, and any other taxes due on account of my death against any property which may be included as a part of my estate for tax purposes which shall be subject to the provisions of the law of the State of Pennsylvania relating to the payment and apportionment of such taxes; provided, however, that the devises and bequests made by the first six paragraphs immediately preceding shall be free and clear of all such taxes *429and shall be transferred and paid without deduction or liability for contribution’; it was Held, that (1) testatrix did not intend to shift the normal incidence of the transfer inheritance taxes; and (2) the court below had properly held that the Pennsylvania transfer inheritance taxes attributable to the trusts were payable out of the trusts and not out of testatrix’s residuary estate.”*
Finally, if there were any doubt on this point it would be removed by §4(b) (4) of the Apportionment Act of 1951 which covers the exact situation which has arisen in this case. That Act as amended provided, inter alia: “Powers of Testator or Settlor. A testator, settlor, or possessor of any appropriate power of appointment may direct how the estate tax shall be apportioned or allocated or grant a discretionary power to another so to direct.
“Section 4. Method of Apportionment—
“(a) Basis of Apportionment. Apportionment of the estate tax, except as provided in section three, shall be made among the persons interested in property includible in gross estate in the proportion that the value of the interest of each such person bears to the value of the net estate before exemption.
“(b) Treatment of Deductions and Credits. The following principles shall apply with respect to deductions and credits allowable: (1) Deductions Allowed by Federal Revenue Laws in Determining the Value of Decedent’s Net Estate. Any interest for which deduction is allowable under Federal Revenue laws in determining the value of decedent’s net estate, such as property passing to or in trust for a surviving spouse and charitable, public or similar gifts or bequests to *430the extent of the allowed deduction, shall not be included in the computation provided in subsection (a) of section four hereof, and to that extent no apportionment shall be made against such interest, . . .”
“Section 4(b) (4) : Inheritance or Death Tax Effect. To the extent that property passing to or in trust for a surviving spouse or any charitable, public or similar gift or bequest does not constitute an allowable deduction solely by reason of an inheritance tax or other death tax imposed upon and deductible from such property, it shall not be included in the computation provided for in subsection (a) of section four hereof, and to that extent no apportionment shall be made against such property”
The language of this Act clearly and specifically governs Appeals Nos. 254 and 255 adversely to the contentions and claim of Miss Spence, and we have no right to alter or rewrite clear language in order to attain what we believe is a more equitable and just result.*
Miss Spence, the appellee (in Nos. 254 and 255), further contends that the application of Section 4-(b)(4) of the 1951 Act to the instant case would be unconstitutional, because it is retroactive** and therefore deprives her of vested rights without due process. Section 9 of the Act of 1951 provides that the Act shall apply to the apportionment of Federal estate taxes with respect to any estate for which the Federal es*431tate tax return is filed after the date of its enactment, regardless of when the decedent died. In the instant case, the original return for the estate was filed after the effective date of the Act, although the testator died prior to the Act.
A similar contention was made and rejected in Jeffery’s Estate, 333 Pa. 15, 3 A. 2d 393. In that case, the Act of 1937, whose effective date was July 2, 1937, was held to be constitutionally applicable to the estate of a decedent who died on November 10, 1935. See to the same effect Jewell’s Estate, 235 Pa. 119, 83 A. 610; Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U. S. 543; Carpenter v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 58 U. S. 456. See also Anderson’s Estate, 373 Pa. 294, 95 A. 2d 674, where the Act of 1951 was applied to the estate of a decedent who died before its enactment. The Constitutional question raised in the instant case, however, was not raised in Anderson’s Estate.
Miss Spence also argues that §4(b) (4) of the Estate Tax Apportionment Act of 1951, supra, is unconstitutional for the additional reason that it deprives the non-charitable beneficiaries of vested property rights and therefore denies them due process of law in violation of (a) the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and of (b) Article I, §9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. TVe find no merit in this contention.
The law is well settled that beneficiaries of a decedent’s estate (whether by will or descent) have no natural or vested right to receive such property; on the contrary, whatever rights such beneficiaries possess are derived from and governed by statute and consequently the beneficiaries take under and subject to the applicable statutes. Unfortunately, it is established law that a State may validly escheat all of a decedent’s net estate and such action would violate *432neither the United States nor the Pennsylvania Constitutions: Irving Trust Company v. Day, 314 U. S. 556; Tack’s Estate, 325 Pa. 545, 191 A. 155; Kirkpatrick’s Estate, 275 Pa. 271, 119 A. 268; Carpenter v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 58 U. S., supra. See to the same effect: Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490, 494; United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 321; United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 627, 628; Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 137; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 536; Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 193; Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U. S. 36, 48; United States v. Burnison, 339 U. S. 87.
In Irving Trust Company v. Day, 314 U. S., supra, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson, said (page 562) : “Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance. Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.”
In Tack’s Estate, 325 Pa., supra, what this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Steen, said is particularly apposite (pages 548, 549) : “The right to transmit or to receive property by will or through intestacy is not a natural right but a creature of statutory grant. Students of law agree that the State has the right to declare an escheat of all the property of a decedent, and therefore, as the price of allowing a legatee, devisee or heir to inherit, it may appropriate to itself any portion of the property which it chooses to exact. . . .
“. . . The court further said [in Strode v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. 181] that the ‘estate passed into the hands of the executor for administration, and is taxed *433in Ms hands as an estate. The law takes every decedent’s estate into custody, and administers it for the benefit of creditors, legatees, devisees and heirs, and delivers the residue that remains, after discharging all obligations, to the distributees entitled to receive it. One of the legal obligations to which every estate that is to go to collateral kindred is subject, is this 5 per cent duty to the Commonwealth. And it is not until this work of administration is performed, that the right of succession attaches
Carpenter v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 58 U. S., supra, involved the question of the Constitutionality of the first Pennsylvania Inheritance Tax. In upholding the validity of the statute the United States Supreme Court said: “But, until the period for distribution arrives, the law of the decedent’s domicile attaches to the property, .... The rights of the donee are subordinate to the conditions, formalities, and administrative control, prescribed by the state in the interests of its public order, and are only irrevocably established upon its abdication of this control, at the period of distribution. If the state, during this period of administration and control by its tribunals and their appointees, thinks fit to impose a tax upon the property, there is no obstacle in the constitution and laws of the United States to prevent it.* [Citing cases].”
*434In other words, it is clearly settled that testamentary legacies and gifts — even though the latter may constitute what is known in the law as a vested property interest or right — are subordinate during a period broadly referred to as the period of administration, to costs of administration, debts of decedent and death taxes.
It is clear that Miss Spence was deprived of no vested rights and equally clear that she was not deprived of due process.
I would affirm the decree of the Orphans’ Court of Clearfield County as to No. 279, which imposed the •Pennsylvania Inheritance tax on each legatee, and reverse the decree as to Nos. 254 and 255, which held that all of the Federal Estate tax should be borne by the residuary legatees (the charities).

 It does not make any legal difference whether the bequest to named legatees of $10,000 in stocks at the market value at the time of his death, is considered to be a legacy-in the amount of- $10,000 or a specific legacy.

 Under the Act applicable to the case at bar, 2% for lineals and 10% for collaterals.

 By Section 16 of this Act, executors are charged with the duty of collecting and paying the tax.

 See to the same effect: (1) Dravo Estate, 388 Pa. 551, 131 A. 2d 351; Uber’s Estate, 330 Pa. 417, 199 A. 356; Youngblood’s Estate, 117 Pa. Superior Ct. 550, 178 A. 517; and Habecker’s Estate (No. 3), 43 Pa. Superior Ct. 91; — all of which involved the Pennsylvania inheritance tax; (2) Horn Estate, 351 Pa. 131, 40 A. 2d 471; and Anderson’s Estate, 312 Pa., supra—which involved the Pennsylvania inheritance tax and the Federal estate tax; and (3) Edwards Estate, 377 Pa. 606, 105 A. 2d 312; Audenreid Estate, 376 Pa. 31. 101 A. 2d 721; Stadtfeld Estate, 359 Pa. 147, 58 A. 2d 478; and Harvey Estate, 350 Pa. 53, 38 A. 2d 262; all of which involved the Federal estate tax.

 See also: Edwards’ Estate, 56 D. & C. 682, where a pecuniary bequest to testator’s secretary “outright” was held to be subject to the Pennsylvania Inheritance Tax.

 See.also.Btadtfeld Estate; 389 Psupra.

 Justice Bell filed a dissenting opinion in which he pointed out that 12 equal shares meant 12 equal shares and not a small fraction of a l/12th share for each individual and a l/12th' share in-full' for each - charity.

 Justice Bell filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice B. R. Jones joined.

 We note that the provision in Section 4(b) (4) was wisely eliminated in a subsequent amendment, viz., Act of May 10, 1956, P.L. 1599, §1, 20 PS §884.

 We, like many other people, believe that retroactive taxes of every kind and description, are inequitable and unjust, although their validity and constitutionality have often been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States and by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

 The Federal Estate Tax which is a tax on the estate of the decedent, failed to specify who was to bear the burden of the tax. This administrative determination was left by Congress to the States. In Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95, the Court said (page 9S) : “Its legislative history indicates clearly that Congress did not contemplate that the Government would be interested in the distribution of the estate after the tax was paid, and that Congress intended that state law should determine the ultimate thrust of the tax.”