Court Opinion

ID: 9906267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 16:00:54.18666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:12.732881
License: Public Domain

21-2636
     Harris v. United States

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                       SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1                 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 3   New York, on the 1st day of December, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               GUIDO CALABRESI,
 7               MICHAEL H. PARK,
 8               STEVEN J. MENASHI,
 9                     Circuit Judges.
10   _____________________________________
11
12   Thomas Harris,
13
14                              Petitioner-Appellant,
15
16                      v.                                                    21-2636
17
18   United States of America,
19
20                     Respondent-Appellee.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT:                          DARRELL FIELDS, Of Counsel, Federal
24                                                      Defenders of New York, Inc. Appeals
25                                                      Bureau, New York, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE:                           MICHAEL W. GIBALDI, (David C. James, on
28                                                      the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys
29                                                      for Breon Peace, United States Attorney for
30                                                      the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn,
31                                                      NY.
32
 1          Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New

 2   York (Block, J.).

 3          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 4   DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 5          On January 25, 2013, Appellant Thomas Harris pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit

 6   Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and using, carrying, possessing, and

 7   brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.

 8   § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).   His plea agreement contained an appeal and collateral-attack waiver under

 9   which Harris “agree[d] not to file an appeal or otherwise challenge, by petition pursuant to 28

10   U.S.C. § 2255 or any other provision, the conviction or sentence in the event that the Court imposes

11   a term of imprisonment of 272 months or below.”       App’x at A28. The district court sentenced

12   Harris to 168 months’ imprisonment. Now, Harris brings a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition seeking to

13   vacate his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), arguing that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act

14   robbery is not a crime of violence following this Court’s decision in United States v. Barrett, 937

15   F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019), abrogated on other grounds by Lora v. United States, 599 U.S. 453

16   (2023), and so cannot support a § 924(c) conviction.      He claims that he did not knowingly and

17   voluntarily waive his right to challenge the constitutionality of his conviction and that at any rate

18   a collateral-attack waiver cannot bar such a challenge.   The district court denied Harris’s petition

19   but did not determine whether the collateral-attack waiver applies.

20          We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the

21   case, and the issues on appeal.

                                                      2
 1   I.        The Validity of the Collateral-Attack Waiver

 2             We review an unpreserved challenge to a collateral-attack waiver for plain error. See

 3   United States v. Cook, 722 F.3d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 2013).

 4             Harris knowingly and voluntarily entered into his plea agreement, including the collateral-

 5   attack waiver.     At his plea hearing, Harris acknowledged that he had fully reviewed his plea

 6   agreement and agreed to everything in it before signing.       The district court also asked Harris if

 7   he had any questions about the agreement before proceeding to the allocution.       Harris argues that

 8   he understood that he maintained the right to challenge the constitutionality of his conviction

 9   because the court informed him that, “the only appellate rights you would have an exception to,

10   would be any constitutional rights violated or anything fundamental or basic, then you can appeal

11   that.”    App’x at A55.     But “[u]nder the plain error standard . . . [Harris] can only benefit from

12   the district court’s allegedly erroneous description of the waiver[] if [he] can show that there was

13   ‘a reasonable probability that, but for the error, [he] would not have entered the plea.’” Cook v.

14   United States, 84 F.4th 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Lloyd, 901 F.3d 111, 119

15   (2d Cir. 2018)).      Harris has made no such showing.        “Nothing in the record suggests that

16   [Harris] w[as] affirmatively misled by the colloqu[y], or that [his] decision[] to plead guilty turned

17   on the district court’s description of the written waiver terms.”    Id. (citation omitted).   Nothing

18   in the district court’s statement “inject[ed] ambiguity into the plea agreement’s otherwise clear

19   terms.”     Id. at 123.   Harris has thus failed to show that his plea was involuntary or unknowingly

20   made.

21

22

                                                        3
1    II.    Whether the Collateral-Attack Waiver Applies Here

 2          “We review de novo whether a plea agreement’s collateral-attack waiver precludes a

 3   motion to vacate a conviction.” Id. at 121-22.

 4          This Court’s recent decision in Cook forecloses Harris’s argument that his valid collateral-

 5   attack waiver does not apply.   There, we held that a collateral-attack waiver barred an essentially

 6   identical challenge to the petitioners’ convictions. Id. at 124-25.   For the same reasons, Harris’s

 7   collateral-attack waiver bars his present challenge.

 8          We have considered all of Harris’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

 9   For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

10                                                 FOR THE COURT:
11                                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
12
13

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