Court Opinion

ID: 9551855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:00:51.082747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:51.843476
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J.
I dissent. The record in this case contains sufficient facts from which we may reasonably assume that defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional rights when he changed his plea from not guilty to not guilty by reason of insanity, as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709], Although the record may not satisfy the strict requirements of In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449], defendant’s plea was entered prior to our decision in that case and should not be governed by its principles.Upon reviewing Boykin in the light of subsequent decisions by the United States Supreme Court it is apparent that Tahl went substantially further than necessary under the principles announced in Boykin, and that Tahl’s continued vitality derives solely from the doctrine that this court may adopt for California more exacting standards than those minimally required by the federal Constitution. (See In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122, 132, fn. 5.)
In Tahl, we noted two plausible interpretations of Boykin, namely, (1) that it is sufficient that the record contains facts and statements from which we could reasonably assume that defendant was apprised of and *44voluntarily waived his constitutional rights and intelligently pleaded guilty, or (2) that the record must show that each of the three constitutional rights mentioned in Boykin (self-incrimination privilege, confrontation, jury trial) were specifically and expressly enumerated for the benefit of and waved by defendant prior to acceptance of his guilty plea. (See In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122, 130-132.) In Tahl, we were of the view that the second, more strict interpretation of Boykin was the correct one.
The Boykin decision itself contains no express requirement that the record show that defendant was advised of, and waived, each of the constitutional rights mentioned above. Boykin simply held that it was error for the trial court to accept a guilty plea without ascertaining that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily given, and that on appeal the courts cannot presume waiver of these constitutional rights on the basis of a totally silent record. Moreover, cases decided by the United States Supreme Court subsequent to Boykin and Tahl indicate that we misinterpreted Boykin and that, in fact, the former of our two “plausible interpretations” of that case was the one intended by that court.
Thus, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 [25 L.Ed.2d 747, 90 S.Ct. 1463], the court upheld a guilty plea as voluntarily and intelligently given since, as in the instant case, the record disclosed that defendant had been represented and advised by counsel, was aware of the charges against him, and entered his plea without compulsion, threats or promises. Nothing in Brady indicates that the record also showed that defendant was advised of, and expressly waived, the three constitutional rights mentioned in Boykin, or that Boykin required such a showing. In fact, the court impliedly rejected such an interpretation of Boykin, stating “The requirement that a plea of guilty must be intelligent and voluntary to be valid has long been recognized. ... The new element added in Boykin was the requirement that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily. . . .” (P. 747, fn. 4 [25 L.Ed.2d p. 756]; italics added.)
To the same effect is North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 [27 L.Ed.2d 162, 91 S.Ct. 160], wherein defendant sought to vacate his guilty plea on the ground that it was the product of fear and coercion. The court noted that “The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242. . . .” (P. 31 [27 L.Ed.2d p. 168].) Since the record at a postconviction hearing disclosed that defendant was advised by his attorney as to his rights on a plea of guilty and as to the consequences of a guilty plea, the court found no “issue of substance” under Boykin. Again, there was *45no indication in Alford that the specific rights of self-incrimination privilege, confrontation, and jury trial were enumerated for and waived by defendant prior to his plea of guilty.
Brady and Alford thus confirm that in Tahl this court extended Boykin beyond the necessary confines of that opinion. Since Tahl’s additional requirements are not dependent upon Boykin but in fact extend far beyond that case, those requirements should be held inapplicable to guilty pleas entered prior to the date upon which Tahl was decided. (See People v. Gallegos, 4 Cal.3d 242, 247-249 [93 Cal.Rptr. 229, 481 P.2d 237].) To paraphrase Gallegos, not until Tahl could we reasonably expect trial judges to anticipate the necessity of expressly enumerating for a defendant the specific rights which he would waive by entering a plea of guilty.
Judged by Boykin standards, it seems to me that the record in the instant case adequately discloses that defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional rights and changed his plea to not guilty by reason of insanity. As pointed out by the majority, defendant was represented by counsel and “fully discussed” the consequences of a changed plea with counsel, including the fact that such a plea would constitute an admission that he had committed the offenses charged, and would deprive defendant of the presumption of innocence, the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, and the right to a jury trial. The fact that the particular right of confrontation was not expressly mentioned in the record is thus immaterial, for we can reasonably assume that defendant realized that by admitting his guilt and foregoing a trial on that issue, he would "thereby forfeit his opportunity to confront his accusers.
I would affirm the judgments.
Wright, C. J., and McComb, J., concurred.