Court Opinion

ID: 9851292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:10:01.430842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.063344
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
In this appeal, the trial court issued a letter opinion granting summary judgment. After receipt of this initial decision, counsel for the appellants wrote the trial court expressing shock with the court’s decision. Counsel went on to state that in light of the sworn affidavits of his clients claiming to have discussed the improper endorsement of the CD with Bank’s president, there was sufficient notice given under the requirements of SDCL 57A-4-406(4) so that a genuine, material issue of fact remained for trial.
*588The majority opinion first holds that since Bank had Mrs. Edmundson’s signature on file that Bank is bound by it. There is nothing in SDCL 57A-4-406 which so states. In fact, this statute specifically reads at the onset as follows: “Without regard to care or lack of care of either customer or the bank ...” which certainly does not say that Bank is presumed to have notice of an unauthorized signature on a document whenever Bank has the customer’s signature on file.1 Nor does this section of the code, or for that matter any section referred to by the appellants or the majority opinion, equate notice as being given since a bank has a customer’s signature on file in the bank. If this was the case, there would be no need for the lack of care language in the code. Further, a review of the record reveals that this binding of the Bank by a signature on file was not presented as a basis for resisting the summary judgment motion nor raised as an issue in this appeal. Matters which the trial court has not had an opportunity to consider cannot be raised on appeal. Husky Spray Service, Inc. v. Patzer, 471 N.W.2d 146, 153-54 (S.D.1991). Nor should this court raise new issues when deciding a case.
After the trial court received the letter expressing shock from appellants' counsel, it reconsidered the case. Relying on the precedent of the summary judgment decision of this court in Taggart v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 462 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1990), the trial court reaffirmed its prior ruling. The trial court concluded after reviewing the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits that appellants could not claim a better version of the facts in their affidavit resisting the summary judgment motion than they had testified to during their deposition prior to the filing of the motion.
A review of this record certainly provides a basis for the trial court’s holding. The appellants never gave Bank the required notice of the unauthorized signature, and Bank merely transferred the funds from Edmundson’s CD account to her checking account. What happened to funds thereafter is apparently the basis for this dispute. This court in reviewing a motion for summary judgment adheres to the principle that an affirmance is proper if there exists any basis to affirm the lower court’s holding. Ruple v. Weinaug, 328 N.W.2d 857, 859-60 (S.D.1983). The facts set forth in the majority and this dissent certainly provide that basis.
In her deposition, Lamp stated that she could not place a date on her conversation with Bank’s president but did specifically admit that whenever this discussion took place, she did not discuss the CD or any alleged unauthorized signature on it with Bank’s president. Likewise, Milton Ed-mundson’s deposition testimony does not set forth any notice regarding the CD being given to Bank’s president during any meetings where he was present.
The majority’s reliance on the admission of a mistake does not satisfy the customer’s duty to notify Bank of the unauthorized signature. The admission of an alleged mistake certainly is no more than admitting to “lack of care” which, pursuant to the statute, does not equate to notice. In fact, the sworn deposition testimony of Lamp and Edmundson does not even place a time when the mistake admission was made. On the other hand, when confronted with the motion for summary judgment, Lamp and Edmundson conveniently were able to remember exactly when this discussion took place in order to resist the motion, thereby attempting to create an issue of genuine fact which was not preserved in their sworn deposition testimony.
*589The Lamp and Milton affidavits filed in opposition to Bank’s motion for summary judgment stated that their conversation with Bank’s president occurred on August 1, 1988, within the statutory time frame, and more specifically the topic of the forgery on the CD was discussed. The affidavits clearly conflict with the deposition testimony. The trial court had to resolve this conflict and, in my opinion, did so correctly. I would affirm the trial court. The majority holding awards appellants the proverbial deep pocket to pursue, but the appellants should be required to seek recovery from their sister Braa, which an affirmance would require. By reversing the trial court, Bank has been placed in the position of an insurer for the dispute between the heirs of the estate.

. In 7 Ronald A. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 4-406:15 (3rd ed. 1985), the author discusses the object of SDCL 57A-4-406(4) and states:
The time limitations of UCC § 4 — 406 are a substantive bar that destroy the right to sue the bank, regardless of the theory on which plaintiff brings suit.
The one and three year limitations imposed by UCC § 4-406(4) are not merely statutes of limitations but are rules of substantive law that define the scope of the customer’s remedy and absolutely bar a customer’s claim that is not timely made "without regard to the care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank.”