Court Opinion

ID: 9587191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:19:02.687187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:29.161804
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
concurring specially.
I believe that Georgia should recognize a broader informed consent doctrine than that currently set forth in OCGA § 31-9-6.1. However, based on the doctrines of stare decisis and separation of powers, I am compelled to join the majority opinion in overruling Ketchup v. Howard, 247 Ga. App. 54 (543 SE2d 371) (2000), and in reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant case, which erroneously relied upon Ketchup v. Howard.
As explained in Division 1 of the majority opinion, this Court stated in Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, 272 Ga. 296, 298-299 (1) (528 SE2d 777) (2000), that Georgia does not recognize the common law doctrine of informed consent, and that the “Georgia informed consent statute does not impose a general requirement of disclosure upon physicians; rather, it requires physicians to disclose only those factors listed in OCGA § 31-9-6.1 (a). [Cits.]” I dissented in Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, because I believed that the “appeal [was] controlled by the principle that consent which is obtained by a material misrepresentation is invalid, since fraud vitiates all contracts. [Cit.]” Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, supra at 305. Now Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson joined my dissenting opinion, but it of course did not prevail, and instead the majority opinion plainly established that there is no common law doctrine of informed consent in Georgia. Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, supra at 298-299 (1). Although that opinion was not unanimous, it nevertheless became binding precedent on all *486Georgia courts. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI; Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Lawler, 211 Ga. 246, 251 (1) (85 SE2d 1) (1954).
In Ketchup v. Howard, the Court of Appeals failed to follow the clear precedent of Albany Urology Clinic, by erroneously characterizing this Court’s holding as dicta and by improperly finding that Georgia recognizes the common law doctrine of informed consent. Ketchup v. Howard, supra at 65 (5).
“The application of the doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the performance of a well-ordered system of jurisprudence. In most instances, it is of more practical utility to have the law settled and to let it remain so, than to open it up to new constructions, as the personnel of the court may change, even though grave doubt may arise as to the correctness of the interpretation originally given to it. (Cits.)” [Cit.]
Etkind v. Suarez, 271 Ga. 352, 357 (5) (519 SE2d 210) (1999). Because Ketchup v. Howard violated the doctrine of stare decisis by contradicting settled law, it must be overturned.
Moreover, Ketchup v. Howard also violated the equally important principle of separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature. “ ‘The doctrine of separation of powers is an immutable constitutional principle which must be strictly enforced. Under that doctrine, statutory construction belongs to the courts, legislation to the legislature.’ [Cit.]” Mason v. The Home Depot U.S.A., 283 Ga. 271, 276 (3) (658 SE2d 603) (2008). Because the General Assembly has codified the informed consent doctrine, the Court of Appeals had no authority to adopt a different version of informed consent, as it did in Ketchup v. Howard.
Nevertheless, I empathize with Presiding Judge Johnson’s desire that Georgia be brought in line with other states by recognizing a broader informed consent doctrine under which “a medical professional must inform a patient of the material risks of a proposed treatment or procedure which are or should be known and must inform the patient of available alternatives to the proposed treatment or procedure. [Cit.]” Doreika v. Blotner, 292 Ga. App. 850 (1) (666 SE2d 21) (2008). Of course, any such change to the informed consent statute must be made by the legislature, not the courts. Until then, the role of the courts is to construe the law as it exists, and since the Court of Appeals failed to do that in this case, its decision must be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Sears joins in this special concurrence.
*487Decided June 8, 2009.
Owen, Gleaton, Egan, Jones & Sweeney, H. Andrew Owen, Jr., Milton B. Satcher III, Melissa R. Phillips Reading, for appellant.
Warshauer, Poe & Thornton, Lyle G. Warshauer, Steven R. Thornton, for appellee.
Donald J. Palmisano, Jr., Peters & Monyak, Robert P. Monyak, Jeffrey S. Bazinet, McGarahan, Villines & Honis, Aubrey T. Villines, Jr., Heidi A. Honis, J. Marcus Edward Howard, amici curiae.