Court Opinion

ID: 9726067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:29:59.749794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:38.786495
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Although I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the defendant’s burglary and intentional murder convictions in this case, I disagree with its conclusions concerning the propriety of the death sentence hearing. Specifically, I am deeply troubled by the majority’s treatment of the trial judge’s summary finding that defendant was eligible for the death penalty. The trial judge here not only failed to follow the procedure established by the legislature in conducting the hearing, but also misstated the law to a pro se defendant. These errors, taken together, cast serious doubt on the integrity of the proceeding which we review today. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion. I Our death penalty statute expressly provides that upon the State’s request, the court "shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth in subsection (b) [eligibility factors] and to consider any aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). The proceeding shall be conducted *** before the court alone if the defendant waives a jury for the separate proceeding.” 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(d)(3) (West 1992). During the hearing, "any information relevant to any of the [eligibility] factors *** may be presented by either the State or the defendant under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. *** The State and the defendant shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing.” 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(e) (West 1992). Finally, the statute further provides that the burden of proof for establishing the existence of the eligibility factors is on the State and "shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt.” 720 ILCS 5/9— 1(f) (West 1992). The transcript of proceedings in this case reveals that the trial judge did not follow these procedures. I quote from the record at length in order to relate in full the extent to which the judge deviated from the statute. As demonstrated by the portion of the transcript quoted below, the eligibility hearing took place immediately after the trial court found defendant guilty as charged in the indictment. "[THE COURT]: There’s really nothing that the court can add to what has already been added by virtue of the totality of the evidence in this case and so, therefore, it now becomes my obligation and responsibility to tell Mr. Jonathan Haynes that he is guilty in the manner and form as charged in the indictment. That is the finding of the court, and judgment will be entered on the finding. Please step up, Mr. Haynes. Mr. Haynes, under the charge that has been placed against you, this is felony murder. A felony murder carries with it a possible sentence of death. And since the court has found you guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment, and since one of the allegations in the indictment was that you committed this first degree murder in the course of the perpetration of another felony, that being burglary, that makes you eligible to have death imposed upon you as a sentence in this case. The law states that under these circumstances, a Defendant having been found guilty under the felony murder count of the indictment has a right to have the determination made as to whether or not death should be imposed by a fact finder, either a jury or by the court. And I now ask you at this time, do you understand what I have just stated? MR. HAYNES: Yes, I do. THE COURT: Do you wish to confer again with [standby counsel] with reference to your rights now as to whether you wish to have a jury hear and make a determination as to what the sentence should be in this case or whether you wish the court to make that determination? Do you wish to — confer with [stand-by] counsel on that issue? MR. HAYNES: No, I do not. THE COURT: What is your desire? Do you wish a jury to hear and make a determination as to the sentence to impose upon you after you have been found guilty of first degree felony murder or do you wish to [szc] court to make that determination? MR. HAYNES: I will let the court decide. THE COURT: I will ask you at this time, therefore, to sign the jury waiver which states that you waive your constitutional right to have a jury determine what your punishment should be in this case, and are willing to submit this issue to a court sitting without a jury. * * * Mr. Haynes, I’m passing to you a document which if you sign it means that you will waive your constitutional right to have a jury hear evidence and determine what the sentence should be in this case after a finding of guilty. I want you to be absolutely clear that you understand what you are signing when you sign this document. Do you understand that? MR. HAYNES: Yes. Yes, I do.” (Emphasis added.) At this point in the proceedings, stand-by counsel requested to have defendant ordered examined for a determination of his fitness to be sentenced. The court denied the request. The following colloquy then occurred: "MR. PAYNTER [Assistant State’s Attorney]: Your Honor, the People at this time would just merely wish to supplement the action the court has taken by filing with the court a motion to conduct a sentence proceeding to determine the imposition of the death penalty. THE COURT: Proceed. MR. PAYNTER: We are prepared to proceed on the eligibility. THE COURT: No, I find him eligible. So we don’t have to have any evidence presented on that issue. I find that the law is such that he is charged with felony murder. He has been found guilty of felony murder. With felony murder, one of the sentences that is possible for a felony murder is the death penalty. So I find him based upon the evidence that has been presented in the trial, that he is eligible to have the death penalty imposed upon him. MR. PAYNTER: The court also takes judicial notice the Defendant is over the age of 18. THE COURT: Yes.” (Emphasis added.) The court then continued the proceeding to the following week, stating that "[tjhere’s been a finding of eligibility for the imposition of the death penalty.” At the beginning of the next court session, the trial judge stated to defendant that "this is the sentence hearing. The State is asking that you be sentenced to death, and under the statute, there is a sentencing hearing required because the Court has found that you are eligible to have the death penalty imposed. Do you still desire and wish to represent yourself in this sentencing hearing?” (Emphasis added.) Defendant responded affirmatively. The following exchange between the assistant State’s Attorney and the trial judge then occurred: "MR. NELSON: Judge, we addressed the eligibility question on Friday. We’d ask you to inquire of the defendant if there was any evidence he wished to offer on that particular issue. THE COURT: No. Doesn’t need to be. I found as a matter of law that he is eligible. So, whatever he says is not going to have any consequence because the law says he’s eligible.” (Emphasis added.) II The majority concludes that the "trial court did, as the defendant here claims, dispense with a hearing on eligibility and make a summary finding of eligibility. This conduct by the trial court was clearly in violation of our death penalty statute.” 174 Ill. 2d at 247. The majority, however, goes on to hold that "at no time *** did the defendant demand a hearing on eligibility, request that he be permitted to present evidence on the issue, or otherwise object to the trial court’s handling of the issue *** and thereby waived this claim of error for review.” 174 Ill. 2d at 248. I find this resolution of defendant’s contentions, on the basis of waiver, disconcerting on two levels. Initially, I cannot fathom how a pro se defendant, having just been found guilty of murder, can be expected to perceive and appreciate the ramifications of the trial judge’s errors with regard to sentencing procedure when, with all respect, the learned trial judge did not. Even if defendant had, the record indicates that the judge would not have been receptive to a challenge. As revealed in the transcript quoted above, the trial judge refused even the prosecutor’s attempts to tailor the hearing to conform with the requirements of the statute. There is no reason to believe that this pro se defendant’s exhortations would have fared any better. Although I generally agree that a pro se defendant must be held to the same standards as an attorney, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the judge before whom a defendant appears without counsel has a duty "to take all steps necessary to insure the fullest protection” of the constitutional right to a fair trial "at every stage of the proceedings.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722, 92 L. Ed. 309, 320, 68 S. Ct. 316, 322 (1948). This protection extends both to the right to counsel and to all "essential rights of the accused.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71, 86 L. Ed. 680, 699, 62 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1942). The transcript in this case demonstrates that the trial judge was less than meticulous in safeguarding defendant’s rights at sentencing. Under my reading of our death penalty statute, a defendant is not under any obligation to "demand” a hearing on eligibility. The statute mandates that the trial court "shall” conduct such a hearing upon the State’s request. See 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(d) (West 1992). The transcript amply illustrates that any objection or request for permission to adduce evidence regarding eligibility on defendant’s part would have been futile: The prosecutor, sensing the gravity of the judge’s actions, specifically requested the judge to inquire of defendant if there was any evidence he wished to offer as to eligibility. The trial judge refused, stating that there "[djoesn’t need to be” because he had already "found that as a matter of law that [defendant was] eligible.” The statute, however, expressly provides that a defendant may present any information relevant to factors regarding eligibility. See 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(e) (West 1992). Thus, the majority’s stated reasons for finding waiver ring hollow when juxtaposed against what was actually said and done at the hearing. It is with these concerns in mind, perhaps, that the majority ultimately concludes that defendant "has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s actions.” 174 Ill. 2d at 248.1 The reason the majority gives for this conclusion is that the evidence of defendant’s eligibility was "overwhelming.” 174 Ill. 2d at 248. That may be so, but the harm caused by the trial judge’s error affected more than mere eligibility. Contrary to the majority’s position, I believe that the trial court’s determination of defendant’s death eligibility, made before the State even filed its motion for a death sentencing hearing, resulted in two distinct problems which mandate reversal. First, the trial judge preempted the State from going forth with its case of death eligibility. Indeed, when the prosecutor attempted to adduce its evidence of eligibility, the trial judge replied, erroneously, that we "don’t have to have any evidence presented on that issue. He has been found guilty of felony murder.” Not only does this statement presuppose that the State wished to proceed on a felony-murder theory of death eligibility, but it evinces the trial judge’s disregard of defendant’s statutory right both to put on evidence and to rebut the information adduced by the State at the eligibility phase of the hearing. In upholding the constitutionality of our death penalty statute, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the statute’s "series of procedural safeguards ensure that the defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to respond to the State’s request for the imposition of the death penalty.” Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 997 (7th Cir. 1990). As a result, that court determined that the sentencing hearing mandated by our statute provides for all the procedure which is due under the fourteenth amendment. Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d at 998. Thus, when a trial judge dispenses with the eligibility hearing, one of the series’ procedural safeguards of due process is lost. More important, the trial judge’s statement demonstrates a disregard of the fact that not all deféndants found guilty of felony murder at trial are ipso facto death eligible at sentencing. A capital sentencing scheme must provide a " ’meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’ ” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 883, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976), quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 392, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (1972) (White, J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the eligibility phase of a death sentence hearing plays a ’’constitutionally necessary” function by ’’circumscrib[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 251, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2743 (1983). This phase of the hearing safeguards against arbitrary and capricious sentencing because it reasonably justifies the narrowing of the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty. Zant, 462 U.S. at 874-77, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 248-49, 103 S. Ct. at 2741-42. In the past, this court, too, has echoed these same concerns by noting that "[ajggravating factors serve as necessary prerequisites without which the death sentence cannot be imposed; they delineate the borderline between those cases in which death is a possible punishment and those in which it cannot be considered.” People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129,145 (1981); see also People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 544 (1992); People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 170 (1991). Thus, the trial judge’s error unnecessarily compromised the constitutionality of the hearing conducted in this case. Ill Despite the trial judge’s failure to adhere to the statute’s procedural requirements and his numerous misstatements of the law throughout these proceedings, the majority holds that the trial court’s admonishments to the defendant "were sufficient to effectuate a valid sentencing jury waiver.” 174 Ill. 2d at 252. I strongly disagree. After the trial judge had found, sua sponte, defendant eligible for the death penalty, he undertook to ascertain if the defendant wished to waive a jury for his hearing. As noted, our death penalty statute grants defendants the right to choose a jury for their death sentencing hearing even when they are convicted at a bench trial. See 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(d) (West 1992). The statute thus contemplates a hearing in which a jury will consider defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty in addition to whether the death penalty should be imposed. Thus, defendant possesses a liberty interest, protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, to have, if he so desires, a jury decide all of the issues relevant to sentencing. See People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 534 (1995). Here, however, the trial judge effectively denied defendant his right to elect to have a jury determine eligibility. Therefore, I cannot join in the majority’s terse conclusion that the "record reveals that the defendant clearly waived a jury for the entire sentencing determination.” (Emphasis added.) 174 Ill. 2d at 252-53. Although defendant may have knowingly given up his right to have a jury elect his fate in the manner erroneously described to him by the trial judge, it cannot be said that he knowingly waived a statutory right which, unbeknownst to him, had already been denied. IV Accordingly, I cannot agree with my colleagues that because there is evidence in the record to support a finding of eligibility, defendant suffered no prejudice from the trial judge’s actions. In the past, this court has required "a high standard of procedural accuracy” in death sentencing hearings in order to ensure that "the penalty is applied in as uniform a manner as possible within the framework of an adversary proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Walker, 91 Ill. 2d 502, 517 (1982). In fact, this court recently, in a unanimous decision, reversed a sentence of death imposed by the same trial judge for actions similar, in part, to those reviewed here today. See People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 163 (1996) (finding error where trial judge immediately proceeded to determine death eligibility after finding defendant guilty of murder). Given the similarity of the complained-of actions in the case at bar, I see no reason for today’s departure from such recent precedent. Where, as here, the trial judge takes it upon himself to declare a defendant death eligible immediately after finding that defendant guilty and prior to the State’s formal request for a death sentencing hearing, the resultant "hearing” loses the appearance of an adversarial proceeding. The manner in which the trial judge rushed to make the eligibility judgment was not only statutorily infirm, but unseemly. His statements regarding the felony-murder eligibility factor reflect an erroneous belief that all defendants convicted of felony murder are eligible for death as a matter of law and no evidence need be heard on the issue. Such a viewpoint certainly does not inspire confidence in the judge’s ability to hear the issue impartially. Although the majority "emphasize[s]” that it "do[es] not condone” the procedure employed by the trial judge (174 Ill. 2d at 250), its ultimate affirmance of the death sentence, in my mind, provides little, if any, incentive against its future commission. As the cases analyzing the constitutionality of our death penalty clearly demonstrate, the procedure established by the General Assembly for conducting a death sentencing hearing is not a mere suggestion to be complied with on an ad hoc basis. In matters of life and death, it is this court’s constitutional, if not moral, obligation to do more than "not condone” the improper actions of the trial judge in this case. We must not hesitate to reverse those actions lest bench and bar assume that the laxity at issue here is, in any way, tolerable or excusable. It simply is not. Therefore, I would vacate defendant’s death sentence and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing which comports with the procedural requirements of the statute. JUSTICES MILLER and McMORROW join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.  It is unclear whether the "prejudice” to which the majority refers relates to our plain error exception to the waiver doctrine (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) or whether it relates to an examination of defendant’s claim on the merits. I would invoke the second prong of the plain error exception in this case (error whose commission denies defendant a fair and impartial trial) and excuse the waiver. See People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576-77 (1980).