Court Opinion

ID: 9497308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:47:52.473112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:06.688880
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that Mr. Snyder’s complaint states a claim for a constitutional violation of his right to access to the courts and that Mr. Nolen is not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim, I respectfully dissent.
I
A.
Recent Supreme Court guidance, not available to my colleague in the district *295court at the time of his decision, sets forth criteria that a court must consider in determining whether a plaintiff has set forth a viable claim of right to access to the courts. Specifically, in Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002), the Supreme Court had occasion to delineate with more precision than in its earlier cases the requirements for stating a viable cause of action for deprivation of the right of access to the courts. In Christopher, the widow of a murdered Guatemalan citizen brought a Bivens action in which she alleged, among other things, that certain federal officials had concealed and covered up information regarding her husband’s kidnapping, torture and death. She further alleged that this concealment had denied her the right of access to the courts. The complaint, brought after the husband’s death, alleged that the official deception had denied the plaintiff access to the courts “by leaving her without information, or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband’s life.” Id. at 405, 122 S.Ct. 2179. The Supreme Court held that the complaint did not state an actionable claim for denial of access to the courts for two reasons: (1) the complaint failed “to identify an underlying cause of action for relief that the plaintiff would have raised had it not been for the deception alleged,” and (2) the plaintiff failed “to seek any relief presently available for denial of access to courts that would be unavailable otherwise.” Id. at 405-06, 122 S.Ct. 2179.
Noting that its decisions have grounded the right of access to the courts in the Article TV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment, and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id. at 415 n. 12, 122 S.Ct. 2179, the Court further observed that access-to-courts claims fall into two categories. One type seeks to eliminate “systemic official action [that] frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and filing suits at the present time.” Id. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 2179. The Court explained that, in cases of this sort, “[t]he opportunity has not been lost for all time, [] but only in the short term; the object of the denial-of-access suit, and the justification for recognizing that claim, is to place the plaintiff in a position to pursue a separate claim for relief once the frustrating condition has been removed.” Id. The second type aims to compensate a plaintiff for wrongful official conduct that has caused the plaintiff to lose a litigation opportunity. See id. at 413-14, 122 S.Ct. 2179. “The official acts claimed to have denied access may allegedly have caused the loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, the loss of an opportunity to sue, or the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.” Id. at 414 122 S.Ct. 2179 (internal citations omitted). The Court explained that “[t]hese cases do not look forward to a class of future litigation, but backward to a time when specific litigation ended poorly, or could not have commenced, or could have produced a remedy subsequently unobtainable. The ultimate object of these sorts of access claims, then, is not the judgment in a further lawsuit, but simply the judgment in the access claim itself, in providing relief obtainable in no other suit in the future.” Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
In either case, “the very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide some effective vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong.” Id. at 414-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179. The Court made clear that, in all cases, the constitutional right of access to the courts “is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court,” and thus, “the underlying cause of action, *296whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” Id. at 415, 122 S.Ct. 2179. The Court also made clear that, when the access claim looks backward to a lost litigation opportunity, “the complaint must identify a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.” Id. The Court reasoned that there is “no point in spending time and money to establish the facts constituting denial of access when a plaintiff would end up just as well off after litigating a simpler case without the denial-of-access element.” Id.
Applying these standards to the facts in Christopher, the Court determined that the plaintiffs complaint “did not come even close to stating a constitutional claim for denial of access upon which relief could be granted.” Id. at 418, 122 S.Ct. 2179. First, “the complaint failed to identify the underlying cause of action that the alleged deception had compromised, going no further than the protean allegation that the State Department and NSC defendants’ ‘false and deceptive information and concealment foreclosed Plaintiff from effectively seeking adequate legal redress.’ ” Id. The complaint left the court and the defendants “to guess at the unstated cause of action supposed to have been lost, and at the remedy being sought independently of relief that might be available on the 24 other counts set out in the complaint.” Id. Second, even if the court of appeals accepted the plaintiffs allegation during oral argument that she “would have brought an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress as one wrong for which she could have sought the injunctive relief that might have saved her husband’s life,” id. at 419, 122 S.Ct. 2179, the plaintiff “could not satisfy the requirement that a back-ward-looking denial-of-access claim provide a remedy that could not be obtained on an existing claim,” id. at 420-21, 122 S.Ct. 2179. The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs complaint presently included a claim for intentional emotional distress and that she could seek damages based on this cause of action. See id. at 421, 122 S.Ct. 2179. The Court recognized that the plaintiff could not “obtain in any present tort action the order she would have sought before her husband’s death, the order that might have saved her husband’s life.” Id. However, the Court pointed out that “neither can she obtain any such order on her access claim, which therefore cannot recompense [the plaintiff] for the unique loss she claims as a consequence of her inability to bring an intentional-infliction action earlier.” Id. at 421-22, 122 S.Ct. 2179. Because “the access claim [could not] address any injury she has suffered in a way the presently surviving intentional-infliction claims cannot,” the plaintiff was “not entitled to maintain the access claim as a substitute, backward-looking action.” Id. at 422, 122 S.Ct. 2179.
In sum, in order to state a claim for backward-looking denial of access under Christopher,- a party must identify in the complaint: (1) a nonfrivolous, underlying claim, (2) the official acts frustrating the litigation, and (3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit. See id. at 415, 122 S.Ct. 2179; see also Neaves v. City of San Diego, 70 Fed.Appx. 428, 2003 WL 21500201, at *1 (9th Cir. June 27, 2003).
B.
1. Underlying claim
With these principles in mind, I turn to the facts of the case at hand. In Christopher, the Court made clear that, in a backward-looking access case such as this one, *297the complaint must state the underlying claim in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the same degree as if the underlying claim was being pursued independently. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 417, 122 S.Ct. 2179. In short, the complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim.” Id. at 418, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Christopher thus requires that the underlying cause of action “must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.” Id. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179. The statement also must be sufficiently specific to ensure that the district court can ascertain that the claim is not frivolous and that the “the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.” Id.
Upon examination of the complaint, I believe that Mr. Snyder has met this requirement of Christopher. In his second amended complaint, Mr. Snyder alleged that he had attempted to file a petition for dissolution of marriage and a temporary restraining order to prevent his wife “from illegally dissipating his assets, all being covered by a fully executed prenuptial agreement.” R.22. Mr. Snyder further alleged that he “had attached the proper filing fee” and that “there was no constitutionally permissible reason for defendant Nolen to refuse to file plaintiffs case.” Id. Furthermore, Mr. Snyder attached to his second amended complaint the pleadings that he had attempted to file in the state court. In these documents, Mr. Snyder alleged that his wife was “guilty of extreme and repeated mental cruelty in that she refuses to speak or correspond with [him], and had refused to send money to [him] despite his $350/month mortgage payments,” that his wife was “in sole possession of all the property to which [he] claim[ed] as his pursuant to the referenced prenuptial agreement,” that he had “revoked a Power of Attorney given to [his wife], but [she] retain[ed] the document purporting to give her power of attorney over [his] affairs,” that his wife had “indicated to [his] friends that she would sell some of [his property], despite agreements not to sell anything without prior authorization from [Snyder],” and that he would “suffer irreparable injury if such temporary restraining order is not granted.” Id. These allegations, which properly are considered part of Mr. Snyder’s complaint,1 are certainly sufficient to identify the underlying claim in which access to the state court allegedly was denied.
2. Official acts
The second requirement articulated in Christopher is also met in the present case. Mr. Snyder’s complaint clearly alleges the official acts that frustrated the underlying litigation. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Mr. Nolen removed Mr. Snyder’s pleadings from the court’s docket and returned them to Mr. Snyder with a note attached that stated that “[b]e-cause there is a child involved in this case, you must go thru [sic] an attorney for a divorce.” R.22. The complaint further alleges that “[t]here existed no written nor official policy that a similarly situated person as the plaintiff had to have an attorney to file a dissolution action when a child was involved,” and that Mr. Nolen had re*298moved Mr. Snyder’s pleadings from the court’s docket “without consulting any judge [or] state attorney as to the propriety of his actions in denying plaintiffs access to court.” Id.
3. Remedy available
Finally, Christopher requires that we consider whether Mr. Snyder’s complaint identifies, at the level of specificity required by Rule 8(a), see Christopher, 536 U.S. at 417-18, 122 S.Ct. 2179, a remedy that may be awarded as recompense in a denial-of-access case that would not be available in any other future litigation.
This requirement of Christopher requires that a court ascertain whether the plaintiff can maintain any other action against the defendant who caused the deprivation alleged in the underlying cause of action. If such a cause of action exists and if the plaintiff can bring such a cause of action to achieve the remedy sought in the underlying cause of action, there is no remedy unique to a right-of-aceess claim. In Christopher, for example, the plaintiff was unable to describe any relief that she could get through the maintenance of a right-of-access claim that she could not get from her still viable causes of action against the original defendants. Here, Mr. Snyder must demonstrate that he can obtain a remedy in this denial-of-access claim that he could not receive through the maintenance of another cause of action against his former wife.
a. Distinction between Christopher and Parratt v. Taylor
This requirement, although superficially similar to the paradigm employed in the procedural due process context, see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc), is analytically quite distinct. Indeed, the Court in Christopher understandably makes no allusion to these due process cases. Parratt and its progeny stand for the proposition that a random and unauthorized deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of procedural due process so long as the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss. The paradigm is based on the premise that a denial of due process does not take place unless and until there has been the denial of an adequate state remedy against the individual who has caused the deprivation. By contrast, the paradigm employed by the Supreme Court in the denial-of-access context of Christopher asks not whether there is an alternate remedy against the individual who has denied access to the court, but whether there remains, despite the denial of access, a viable alternative remedy against the alleged wrongdoer identified in the original suit.
This distinction is quite compatible with the well-established case law before Christopher, a jurisprudence that the Supreme Court quite appropriately left undisturbed in Christopher. Specifically noting that it had surveyed the jurisprudence of the lower courts dealing with the right of access to the courts, see Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 2179, the Justices left undisturbed the significant body of circuit case law that had held that the paradigm of Parratt is not applicable to actions alleging a denial of the right of access to courts.2 *299This reading of Christopher is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s overall ap*300proach in Christopher. In Christopher, the plaintiff had several claims pending against the defendants for direct harm (including intentional infliction of emotional distress) in addition to her denial-of-access claim. The plaintiffs denial-of-access claim was not premised on the loss of an opportunity to sue, but rather, on “the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.” Id. at 414, 122 S.Ct. 2179. Although the plaintiff could not “obtain in any present tort action the order she would have sought before her husband’s death, the order that might have saved her husband’s life,” neither could she “obtain any such order on her access claim.” Id. at 421, 122 S.Ct. 2179. Thus, any relief the plaintiff could obtain on her access claim, she also could obtain on the counts for direct harm currently pending against the defendants in the district court.
b. Remedy available to Mr. Snyder
I believe that Mr. Snyder, acting pro se, and without the guidance of Christopher, which was rendered long after the district court ruled, has met, albeit minimally, the requirement that he show that the remedy he seeks in this denial-of-access case is not available to him in a lawsuit against his former wife. In this respect it must be recalled that, in his initial complaint in state court, Mr. Snyder sought immediate injunctive relief against his then-wife on the ground that she was in sole possession of his assets, had a power of attorney and, unless stopped by a judicial order, would dissipate those assets. Despite the laconic nature of his pro se complaint, Mr. Snyder did state in his brief in opposition to Mr. Nolen’s motion to dismiss that a writ of mandamus “would not have been effective as plaintiffs former wife is believed to have liquidated and dissipated assets at the time plaintiff attempted to obtain the requested relief and she left the jurisdiction of Saline County within a few months thereafter.” R.27. This court has held that “facts alleged in a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss (indeed, even facts alleged for the first time on appeal) as well as factual allegations contained in other court filings of a pro se plaintiff may be considered when evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint so long as they are consistent with the allegations of the complaint.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1367 n. 2 (7th Cir.1997).3 I believe that these allegations, when read as we must read pro se submissions, adequately set forth Mr. Snyder’s allegations that Mr. Nolen’s actions deprived him of a time-sensitive opportunity to secure his assets before they were dissipated by his former wife. In short, Mr. Snyder has alleged that, because he was unsuccessful in obtaining immediate judicial control of his property because of Mr. Nolen’s actions, he has suffered an injury that only can be remedied completely by a denial-of-access action against Mr. Nolen. At this stage of the proceedings, the court must accept this allegation.4
*301C.
1. Causation requirement
Having explored the requirements of Christopher, there remains one more issue that we must confront with respect to the adequacy of the allegation of a denial of access to the courts. As we have noted earlier, the case law requires that a plaintiff establish that he actually was injured by the activity that constituted the denial of access. Here, Mr. Snyder will have to demonstrate at some point in the litigation that the alleged harm was caused by the alleged action of Mr. Nolen rather than as a result of his own failure to seek immediate redress from Mr. Nolen’s decision through a petition for writ of mandamus to the state trial court. Our case law makes clear that the imposition of an exhaustion requirement on a fundamental right such as the constitutional right of access to the courts is not permissible. See Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Illinois, 852 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir.1988) (“[I]f substantive constitutional rights are violated, the constitutionally recognized deprivation is complete at the time of the action, irrespective of the procedures available before or after the deprivation.” (internal quotations omitted)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a showing of “actual injury” is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a cause of action for denial of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).
In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that an inmate claiming denial of access to the courts “cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. at 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174. Instead, the inmate “must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id. Expounding upon the type of injury that would satisfy this requirement, the Court stated: “He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a complaint.” Id.
Following Lewis, this court stated in Tarpley v. Allen County, 312 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir.2002), that no violation of the right of access to the courts occurs “in the absence of actual injury, by which [the Supreme Court] means the hindrance of efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim.” Applying this standard, the court went on to hold that “[w]hile the jail’s lack of resources might have posed a theoretical problem, ... without evidence that the defendants prevented him from pursuing a nonfrivolous legal action, he cannot show that his constitutional right was violated.” Id. Similarly, in May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir.2000), we stated that, in order to prove a violation of the right of access to the courts, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that state action hindered his or her efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim and that consequently the plaintiff suffered some actual concrete injury.” *302Applying this standard, the court held that the plaintiffs allegation that he “has been detained longer than would otherwise be necessary if he could go to court” was “sufficient to state an access to the courts claim.” Id. Although these cases fall within the first category of denial-of-access cases as Christopher describes them, see Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-14, 122 S.Ct. 2179, this fundamental requirement that the plaintiff show that he was harmed by the actions of the defendant endures.
2. Application
Mr. Nolen’s alleged act of removing Mr. Snyder’s pleadings from the court’s docket clearly hindered Mr. Snyder’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. It is not clear, however, that Mr. Nolen’s act was sufficient to cause Mr. Snyder “actual injury.” Illinois provides its litigants with a specific remedy through a writ of mandamus to address situations such as the one that Mr. Snyder allegedly faced when Mr. Nolen withdrew his papers without the court’s permission. See 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 25/11. Although Mr. Snyder makes no reference to this remedy in his second amended complaint, he did state in his brief in opposition to Mr. Nolen’s motion to dismiss that a writ of mandamus “would not have been effective as plaintiffs former wife is believed to have liquidated and dissipated assets at the time plaintiff attempted to obtain the requested relief and she left the jurisdiction of Saline County within a few months thereafter.” R.27. As noted earlier, facts alleged in a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss may be considered in assessing the adequacy of the complaint. Thus, I believe that Mr. Snyder’s complaint alleges, albeit minimally, that it was Mr. Nolen’s action that deprived Mr. Snyder of the opportunity to obtain viable relief from the state court. Needless to say, an allegation is hardly proof, but at this stage of the proceedings, the pleading is adequate to avoid dismissal.
II
Because I believe that at least at the pleading stage, the operative version of the complaint states adequately the deprivation of the federal constitutional right of access to the courts, I also would reach the question of qualified immunity — whether the law was sufficiently clear, at a meaningful level of generality, that the alleged actions of Mr. Nolen amounted to a deprivation of Mr. Snyder’s right of access to the courts. As of 1996, it was clearly established by Supreme Court precedent that the First Amendment right to petition the government includes the right to file civil actions that have a reasonable basis in law or fact. Also, lower court cases, including John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.1992), and Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.1986), made clear that this right extended to prisoners, and there was no reason to believe otherwise. There is certainly no more direct way to interfere with a plaintiffs access to the courts than to refuse to file his pleadings or to remove them from the docket once filed.
Conclusion
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes."); Thompson v. Illinois Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.2002) (stating that the complaint includes any exhibits attached thereto); Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir.1988) (same); Moran v. London Records, Ltd., 827 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir.1987) (same); English v. Local Union No. 46, 654 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir.1981) (same).

. Several circuits have held that Parratt "is irrelevant when the plaintiff has alleged a violation of some substantive constitutional proscription.” Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir.1984) (refusing to extend Parratt’s exhaustion of state remedies requirement to a substantive due process claim premised on a violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Illinois, 852 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir.1988) *299("[I]f substantive constitutional rights are violated, the constitutionally recognized deprivation is complete at the time of the action, irrespective of the procedures available before or after the deprivation.” (internal quotations omitted)); Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir.1987) ("Intentional substantive violations of constitutional rights are not subject to the rule of Parratt.”); Pruitt v. City of Montgomery, 771 F.2d 1475, 1484 n. 19 (11th Cir.1985) ("[I]t is clear that the rationale of Hudson [v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984),] and Parratt does not apply to alleged violations of substantive constitutional rights, such as the Fourth Amendment rights implicated here.”).
Parratt has been limited to the area of procedural due process. The case law of this court admits to but one exception to this rule. In order to not eviscerate the holding of Parratt, we have held that "[w]hen a plaintiff brings a substantive due process claim predicated on the deprivation of a state-created property interest, she must show that the state violated some other substantive constitutional right or that state law remedies are inadequate.” Veterans Legal Def. Fund v. Schwartz, 330 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir.2003); see also Gable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 541 (7th Cir.2002); New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1480 (7th Cir.1990); Kauth, 852 F.2d at 958. In these cases, it is sound to impose the additional requirement because the substantive right "comes not from the Constitution, but from state law.” Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 718 (5th Cir.1987).
Indeed, many circuits squarely have held that Parratt does not apply to claims for denial of access to the courts. See Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir.1992) ("Where, as in the case at hand, a prisoner’s complaint alleges the taking of legal property that results in the denial of his access to the courts, the Parratt/Hudson analysis cannot, and does not, apply.”); Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewr Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1428 n. 10 (8th Cir.1986) ("Since the Harrisons have alleged a violation of a substantive constitutional right independent of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause simpliciter, the existence of an adequate state remedy under the Parratt analysis is irrelevant.”); Simmons v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 185 (1st Cir.1986) ("That Simmons’ legal property was taken does not convert this case to a procedural due process/deprivation of property claim. It is decisive that the harm complained of is not simply the taking of property, protected by the due process clause, but the taking of legal property resulting in denial of access to the courts, protected as a substantive, constitutional right. And the Parratt analysis does not apply where the alleged violation concerns a substantive, fundamental right.” (internal citation omitted)); Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that Parratt does not apply to a claim for intentional denial of access to the courts). The only opinion that is directly to the contrary is a concurring opinion from the Sixth Circuit. In Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259 (6th Cir.1997), the plaintiff alleged that the defendants denied her access to the courts by concealing certain evidence relating to her husband’s death. The court held that the plaintiff’s failure to make some attempt to gain access to the courts prevented her recovery. See id. at 1264. The court reasoned that "[a] plaintiff cannot merely guess that a state court remedy will be ineffective because of a defendant's actions. Rather, the plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant's actions actually rendered any available state court remedy ineffective.” Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Merritt criticized the court for failing to make clear that the rationale of Parratt applies with equal force to right-of-access claims. He reasoned:
The standard for a "right-of-access-to-the-courts” claim, whether treated under the First Amendment as part of the right "to petition the government for a redress of grievances” or as a procedural due process claim, should require that the plaintiff allege and prove that the state’s judicial process does not provide fair procedures to remedy the wrong alleged. Proof of the lack of adequate state remedies is required by Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), and Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.1983), in procedural due process cases and should be required in judicial access cases. It seems elementary that the federal right of access to the courts is not abridged when the state courts remain just as open to provide a remedy as the federal courts.
Id. at 1265 (Merritt, J., concurring).

. See also Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 718 n. 8 (7th Cir.1995) (”[W]e may, when reviewing 12(b)(6) dismissals, consider new factual allegations raised for the first time on appeal provided they are consistent with the complaint.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Swafford v. Mandrell, 969 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir.1992) ("[T]he court should consider allegations contained in the other court filings of a pro se plaintiff, such as those in Swofford’s Objections to the Report and. Recommendation of the magistrate judge.”).

. The burden of proving the inadequacy of other relief falls on Mr. Snyder. If the parties were to discover, either through the deposition of Mr. Snyder’s former wife and/or a subpoena duces tecum served upon her pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, that she has not "dissipated” Mr. Snyder’s assets, or that she retains sufficient assets to compensate Mr. Snyder for his loss, then Mr. *301Snyder would be able to secure adequate relief through other means. In that event, the evidence would not substantiate Mr. Snyder's allegation that he has suffered an injury which can be remedied only through a denial-of-access action, and Mr. Nolen would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Indeed, although in my opinion not susceptible to dismissal, this matter may well be susceptible to resolution at summary judgment.