Court Opinion

ID: 9907861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 15:06:46.356722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:17:21.585189
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0358-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAMES JACKSON,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted November 28, 2023 – Decided December 7, 2023

                   Before Judges Natali and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 09-09-2607
                   and 09-09-2608.

                   James Jackson, appellant pro se.

                   Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat,
                   Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant James Jackson appeals from a June 22, 2022 order denying his

motion to reduce or modify his sentence. We affirm.

      The facts giving rise to defendant's convictions and sentence are detailed

in our prior decision affirming his convictions, State v. Jackson, No. A-005002-

10 (App. Div. April 3, 2013), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 8 (2013). We therefore

summarize only those facts pertinent to this appeal and as necessary to place our

opinion in context.

      In a five-count indictment, defendant was charged with second-degree

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:5–2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12–

1(b)(1) (count one); second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1(b)(1)

(count two); first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5–1 and N.J.S.A.

2C:11–3(a)(1) or (2) (count three); second-degree possession of a handgun

without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(b) (count four); and second-degree

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4(a) (count

five). Following a jury trial, defendant was acquitted of count one, but he was

convicted of the remaining counts.     In a second trial, based on a separate

indictment, the same jury convicted defendant of second-degree possession of a

handgun by a prohibited person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–7(b). Defendant was twenty-

five years old when he committed these offenses.

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      At sentencing on January 18, 2011, the court identified three aggravating

factors: the risk defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(3);

the extent of defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the

offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(6); and the need to deter defendant and others

from violating the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(9). The court found no mitigating

factors.

      After merging count two into count three, the court sentenced defendant

to a twenty-year prison term, with an eighty-five percent period of parole

ineligibility under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43–7.2. The court

imposed a consecutive ten-year term with five years of parole ineligibility for

the certain persons not to have weapons offense and concurrent sentences for

the other charges, which included a violation of probation charge resulting in

an aggregate thirty-year term of imprisonment with a twenty-two-year period of

parole ineligibility. Defendant was twenty-six years old at the time of his

sentencing.

      We affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded for the court to provide

an explanation for the reasons it imposed consecutive sentences, and to merge

count three into count five. See Jackson, No. A-5002-10 slip op. at 10-11. The

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Supreme Court subsequently denied certification. State v. Jackson, 216 N.J. 8

(2013).

      On remand, the court merged the counts consistent with our instructions.

The court entered an amended judgment of conviction on July 1, 2013, and

sentenced defendant with respect to the certain persons offense to eight years.

The court also confirmed its earlier decision to impose consecutive sentences,

resulting in an aggregate custodial term, subject to other conditions as detailed

in the amended judgment of conviction, of twenty-eight years. As the court

explained:

             The [c]ourt finds by clear and convincing evidence that
             the aggravating factors substantially outweighs the
             non-existent mitigating factors.

             The [c]ourt also finds that the consecutive sentence is
             warranted as this [c]ourt does subscribe to the notion in
             [State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643 (1985)] that there
             can be no free crimes in a system for which the
             punishment shall fit the crime and the crimes, and their
             objectives contained in [the first indictment] were
             predominately independent from the crime and
             objective, contained in [the second indictment]. The
             [a]ttempted [m]urder conviction in Count 3 of [the first
             indictment] where defendant shot the victim in the
             head, was a crime committed against a particular
             individual, as opposed to the conviction in [the second
             indictment], [p]ossession of a weapon by a convicted
             felon, which was a general crime that endangered the
             general public at large.

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            In addition, these crimes were committed while the
            defendant was on probation, thereby showing an utter
            disregard for the criminal justice system.

            The [c]ourt is mindful of [State v. Miller], 108 [N.J.]
            112, 122 (1987) and will therefore not sentence the
            defendant to the maximum term for each offence in the
            two [i]ndictments.

      Defendant thereafter challenged only his sentence, and on October 27,

2014, following oral argument on our Excessive Sentencing Calendar, we

affirmed. The Supreme Court again denied certification. State v. Jackson, 221

N.J. 286 (2015).

      Defendant sought post-conviction relief (PCR), which the PCR court

denied, a decision we affirmed. State v. Jackson, No. A-2491-14 (App. Div.

Aug. 26, 2016). Defendant filed a second PCR application which the PCR court

again denied in a March 12, 2018 order. It does not appear from the record

defendant ever appealed from that order.

      On November 10, 2021, defendant filed an application to reduce his

sentence, relying on Rule 3:21-10(b)(4). Defendant also requested the court

conduct a de novo review of the aggravating and mitigating factors relied upon

by the sentencing court under State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012).

Defendant specifically argued he was entitled to resentencing based on the

retroactive application of newly enacted mitigating factor fourteen, see N.J.S.A.

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2C:44-1(b)(14), as he was under the age of twenty-six at the time the crimes to

which he was found guilty were committed.

      The court rejected defendant's application in a June 2, 2022 order, and in

doing so, relied on the Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Lane, 251

N.J. 84 (2022), which held mitigating factor fourteen was to be applied

prospectively only after the amendment's October 19, 2020 effective date. As

defendant was sentenced in 2011, and again in 2013, the court denied

defendant's motion.

      This appeal followed in which defendant raises the following point:

            [DEFENDANT'S] MOTION FOR A REDUCTION OF
            SENTENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY
            THE SENTENCING COURT BECAUSE OF
            CONFLICTS WITH BINDING PRECEDENTS OF
            HIGHER   COURTS     AND   BECAUSE    THE
            INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE A REDUCTION
            OF [DEFENDANT'S] EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

      Defendant primarily contends, as he did before the court, he should be

resentenced for the court to consider youth mitigating factor fourteen. He argues

the court erred in concluding that factor applied prospectively only, and further

maintains mitigating factor fourteen is particularly applicable to his

circumstances as he was under twenty-six years old at the time of the offenses

and was "under the influence of a much older individual during the time of his

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youth." He also contends it remains within the court's discretion "to amend and

reduce" his sentence "to a lesser or concurrent sentence."

      Defendant also argues the "court improperly balanced the aggravating and

mitigating factors and failed to apply the analysis mandated by our Supreme

Court in State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 63 (2014)." He specifically maintains

the court erred in applying aggravating factor nine as there remains no need to

deter him from violating the law and that aggravating factor has no value under

his present circumstances. On this point, he notes since his sentencing he has

positively changed his life having "completed many institutional programing to

improve himself as a productive member in society" and "has always maintained

his innocence and firmly assert that he did not commit the crimes which he was

wrongfully convicted."

      We have considered all of defendant's arguments and determine they are

of insufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2). We provide the following brief comments to amplify our decision.

      First, we reject, as did the court, defendant's argument that his sentence

should be in any way modified or reduced based on youth mitigating factor

fourteen. As noted, in Lane, our Supreme Court held that mitigating factor

fourteen does not apply retroactively. 251 N.J. at 87, 96. The Court specifically

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found no indication in the statutory language "that mitigating factor fourteen

applies to defendants sentenced prior to the provision's effective date." The

Court explained the "Legislature's use of the language 'take effect immediately'

when it adopted N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14)" and found "no suggestion in N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(b)(14)—let alone the clear, strong and imperative declaration that our

law demands for the presumption of prospective effect to be overcome—that the

Legislature intended otherwise." Ibid.

      We are satisfied Lane is dispositive of defendant's arguments. Defendant

was sentenced well before the effective date of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14), as he

was initially sentenced in 2011, and again in 2013.

      The Lane court, noted, however, that mitigating factor fourteen is to be

applied "not only to defendants sentenced for the first time on or after October

19, 2020, but also to defendants resentenced on or after that date for r easons

unrelated to mitigating factor fourteen." Id. at 97 n.3. As the State correctly

points out, however, no independent basis exists to resentence defendant anew.

      First, defendant failed to raise many of the arguments before the court that

he raises in his merits briefs, and we could decline to consider his arguments for

that reason alone. See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234, 300

(1973) ("our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not

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properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation

is available 'unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the

trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'" (quoting Reynolds Offset

Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959))). Neither

exception applies here.

      Second, to the extent defendant challenges his convictions on the merits,

we simply note we considered and rejected all of his arguments in our earlier

opinion. See Jackson, No. A-5002-10. In that appeal, defendant did not contend

the verdict at trial was against the weight of the evidence and in affirming we

noted, based on the evidence presented at trial and defendant's claim he was not

involved in the shooting, there was no rational basis for the jury to find

defendant acted only as an accomplice. As such, we found the trial court did

not commit plain error by failing to give the jury an accomplice liability

instruction. See Jackson, No. A-5002-10, slip op. at 9-10.

      Additionally, in defendant's PCR appeal we considered defendant's

collateral attacks on his conviction under the two-part test established in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and found them unavailing.

See Jackson, No. A-2491-14. Indeed, we noted the witnesses who testified

before the PCR court did not support defendant's purported alibi, and one

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witness placed defendant at the scene. See id. at slip. op 11-12. The PCR court

also denied defendant's second PCR application.         We also considered and

rejected defendant's challenges to his amended sentence and note, as detailed in

its July 1, 2013 amended JOC, the court clearly considered the fairness of

defendant's overall sentence consistent with the principles later outlined in State

v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021).

      Affirmed.

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