Court Opinion

ID: 9884503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:59:58.86446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:39.129743
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE WARD, dissenting: In recent years a number of jurisdictions have abandoned, in whole or in part, the tripartite classification of entrants upon land in terms of their status which the common law used in determining tort liability. (See Annots., 32 A.L.R.3d 508 (1970), 25 A.L.R.2d 598 (1952); Note, Tort Liability of Owners and Possessors of Land — A Single Standard of Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances Towards Invitees and Licensees, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 194 (1979).) I nevertheless agree with the majority that to abolish the common law doctrine of premises liability in its entirety would not be warranted in this case. Such a course would eliminate many rules, such as those governing trespassers, which are not relevant here. I do not believe, however, that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The complaint does not state in what respect the stairway was defective, nor does it state whether the defendant’s fault lay in a failure to correct the defect or only to warn the plaintiff of its existence. The paucity of factual allegations makes it impossible for the court to determine whether the plaintiff might indeed be entitled to recovery as a licensee under existing doctrine, and, if he is not, to formulate a standard of liability which would be meaningful. The complaint does allege, nevertheless, that the plaintiff was present in the defendant’s residence at the defendant’s express invitation, and the question is thus before us whether the plaintiff is entitled to less protection than would be due were the purpose of his visit a matter of business concern to the defendant. I do not think that such a distinction should be drawn. The difference between the duty owed to a licensee and to an invitee has been recognized in this State at least as early as Pauckner v. Wakem (1907), 231 Ill. 276. The concept that a social guest is not, in the legal sense, an invitee, however, stems only from a decision of the appellate court in Biggs v. Bear (1943), 320 Ill. App. 597. The court based its decision in that case upon two Massachusetts decisions, Plummer v. Dill (1892), 156 Mass. 426, 31 N.E. 128, and Comeau v. Comeau (1934), 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588, which in turn had their origin in the English case of Southcote v. Stanley (1856), 1 H. & N. 247, 25 L.J. Ex. (n.s.) 339, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195. Of the latter it is perhaps sufficient to say that the rationale put forward by the court strikes a reader of today as unpersuasive. Exclusion of a social guest from the class of invitees has been based by some courts on the proposition that even in a commercial setting the basis for imposing a higher duty toward invitees is the actual or potential economic benefit to the operator of the establishment. (See Prosser, Torts sec. 61, at 386-87 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573, 603-05 (1942).) As Prosser notes, however, a majority of courts now base liability on the theory that a landowner who encourages others to enter in order to further some purpose of his own impliedly represents “that reasonable care has been exercised to make the place safe for those who come for that purpose.” Prosser, Torts sec. 61, at 388 (4th ed. 1971). On this theory there would be no reason to withhold protection from a guest invited to residential premises simply because the invitation was not made for a business purpose. See Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski (1975), 70 Wis. 2d 836, 845-46, 236 N.W.2d 1,5. I would hold that the standard of care owed to a social guest shall be the same as that owed to a business visitor. GOLDENHERSH, C.J., and MORAN, J., join in this dissent.