Court Opinion

ID: 9402695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 16:09:08.083656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:30.408159
License: Public Domain

J-A09035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 L.J.G.                                    :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
               v.                          :
                                           :
                                           :
 E.B.                                      :
                                           :
                     Appellant             :    No. 1261 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered August 12, 2022,
                in the Court of Common Pleas of Union County,
                        Civil Division at No(s): 17-0702.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                          FILED: JUNE 16, 2023

        E.B. (Mother) appeals the order entered by the Union County Court of

Common Pleas, which awarded L.J.G. (Father) primary physical custody of the

parties’ five-year-old son, A.G., (the Child). Under the prior arrangement, the

Child divided a substantial amount of time between Mother’s residence in

Pennsylvania and Father’s residence in Florida.        The parties filed cross-

modification petitions to establish their respective residence as the location

where the Child would begin primary school. On appeal, Mother argues inter

alia that the trial court erred when it failed to consider the relocation factors

enumerated in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h).          After review, we affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

        The record discloses an acrimonious and litigious history, which we

abbreviate as follows.    The parties are former spouses who separated in
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November 2017, five months after the Child’s birth. Custody litigation began

at that time; the parties were Pennsylvania residents. In February 2018, the

parties agreed to a shared custody arrangement. By the end of 2018, Mother

sought primary custody; soon thereafter, Father sought to relocate with the

Child to Florida, where he accepted a new job. In July 2019, the court denied

Father’s relocation petition, but awarded Father the ability to exercise 10 days

of custody per month in Florida, and another 5 days of custody in

Pennsylvania.

      Father appealed, but the parties settled before the appeal was decided.

The February 2020 settlement effectively granted Mother primary physical

custody, but it allowed Father to exercise all his partial custody in Florida.

Specifically, Father could exercise 15 consecutive days of custody every other

month; on the off months, Father could exercise 8 days of custody.

      The instant custody action began in January 2021 when Father filed a

modification petition for primary custody. In March 2021, Mother filed her

own modification petition, wherein she requested that her primary custody

time be increased.     With the Child approaching school age, the parties

recognized the current arrangement was untenable, and that the Child would

have to spend significantly more time at one location so he could start school.

      Although a final custody hearing was scheduled, the parties’ docket

remained highly active. Relevant to this appeal is the court’s December 3,

2021 interim order, which granted Father custody for 15 days per month

indefinitely – as opposed to the 15-day/8-day monthly rotating schedule.

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Thus, in effect, Father obtained an interim award of shared custody pending

the final resolution of the parties’ cross modification petitions.

      The trial court ultimately held the final custody hearing on August 1 and

2, 2022. On August 5, the court indicated it would grant Father’s petition for

primary physical custody and then delineated its reasons for the award from

the bench. See N.T. (Day 3), at 1-13. Critically, the trial court only analyzed

the factors associated with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), but not the relocation

factors listed in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h). The court issued its formal order on

August 11, 2022, docketed August 12, 2023.

      Mother timely filed this appeal. She presents 11 issues for our review,

which we re-order for ease of disposition:

            1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an
               error of law by failing to consider the relevant
               relocation factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h)
               under the catchall provision of 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
               5328(a)(16)?

            2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an
               error of law in failing to analyze the relevant relocation
               factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h) and in
               failing to issue any analysis, written or oral, of the
               relevant relocation factors in rendering its custody
               decision?

            3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an
               error of law by failing to take testimony on the
               relocation factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h)?

            4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an
               error of law by denying Mother’s motion for
               compulsory non-suit?

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            5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an
               error of law in stating that the burden of proof for the
               non-suit was equal?

            6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an
               error of law in entering its December 3, 2021 interim
               custody order without a hearing in violation of
               Mother’s constitutional right to procedural due
               process?

            7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an
               error of law in issuing an order which delegates
               responsibility for setting the times and lengths of
               telephone and electronic communications to a
               parenting coordinator when the court declined to
               appoint a parenting coordinator in this matter?

            8. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an
               error of law in conferring a presumption in favor of
               Father’s relocation to Florida in its analysis of [23
               Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(4),(11)].

            9. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an
               error of law in its analysis of [23 Pa.C.S.A. §
               5328(a)(1), (4), (8), (9), (12), (13), (15)] by
               disregarding evidence favorable to Mother and
               unfavorable to Father and affording more weight to
               evidence favorable to Father?

            10. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to
               consider the financial circumstances of the parties in
               obligating Mother to be responsible for all of the
               expenses related to exercising her physical custody of
               the Child in Florida?

            11. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit
               an error of law in issuing an order which declared
               Florida as the home state of the Child once Florida
               became the Child’s primary residence?

Mother’s Brief at 5-7.

      A. Consideration of the Relocation Factors

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      In this section, we address contemporaneously Mother’s first, second,

and third appellate issues. Mother essentially asks whether the trial court

erred by failing to apply the relocation factors set forth in Section 5337(h) of

the Child Custody Act. To answer this question, we abide by the following

scope and standard of review:

         The interpretation and application of a statute is a question
         of law that compels plenary review to determine whether
         the trial court committed an error of law. As with all
         questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo
         and the appellate scope of review is plenary.

E.C.S. v. M.C.S., 256 A.3d 449, 454 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

      We begin by observing the relevant law governing this case. The Child

Custody Act contains two sets of factors the trial court must consider,

depending on the type of action. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(1)-(16); see

also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h).     Section 5328(a) provides: “In ordering any

form of custody, the court shall determine the best interest of the child by

considering all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors

which affect the safety of the child, including [factors 1 through 16.]” Id. We

have held the court must conduct a Section 5328(a) analysis when a party

seeks to modify the type of custody award. See A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818,

824 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5338 (“Modification of

existing order.”); and see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a) (“Award of custody.”).

Separately, Section 5337(h) enumerates ten factors a court must consider in

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determining whether to grant a proposed relocation (again giving weighted

consideration to those factors which affect safety).

       This case does not involve “relocation,” per se. When the Legislature

enacted Section 5337 to address relocation, it anticipated there would be a

“relocating party” and a “non-relocating party.” D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467,

472 (Pa. Super. 2014).     In D.K., this Court concluded that the relocation

provisions set forth in Section 5337 do not apply when neither party is moving.

D.K., 102 A.3d at 472-74. There, neither parent sought to relocate from their

home; rather, the mother sought primary custody and that the children move

from Father’s home in Pennsylvania to her home in North Carolina. Technically

speaking then, D.K. was not a relocation case.

       However, we concluded that in such a situation – where neither parent

is seeking to relocate, and only the children would be moving to a significantly

distant location – trial courts “should still consider the relevant factors of

Section 5337(h) in their Section 5328(a) best interest analysis.” Id. at 477-

478.   The catchall provision of Section 5328(a)(16)(“any other relevant

factor”) requires the court to consider the relevant circumstances unique to

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any given case. In this sort of case, the Section 5337(h) factors are per se

relevant to the Section 5328(a) best interest analysis.1,   2

       We reached our decision in D.K. knowing full well that some Section

5337(h) factors are duplicative of the Section 5328(a) factors, either directly

or implicitly. D.K., 102 A.3d at 477. However, Section 5337(h) contains three

factors which are unique:

          [I]n any custody determination where neither parent is
          moving, but the children stand to move to a significantly
          distant location, the trial court would still need to consider
          the age, developmental stage, needs of the child and the
          likely impact the child's change of residence will have on the
          child's physical, educational and emotional development (23
____________________________________________

1 In D.K., we reached this holding by relying on Clapper v. Harvey, 716 A.2d
1271 (Pa. Super. 1998), a case that predated the enactment of the current
iteration of the Child Custody Act. Clapper involved a mother in Florida
seeking custody of her child who lived with father in Pennsylvania. We ruled
that the best interest custody analysis required consideration of the “Gruber
factors,” which were the forebearers to the codified relocation factors in
Section 5337(h). See D.K., 102 A.3d at 475-476 (citing Clapper v. Harvey,
716 A.2d at 1272-73); see also Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super.
1990). In D.K., we applied the same logic to the current iteration of the Child
Custody Act to hold that a proper best interests analysis under Section
5328(a) requires the consideration of the relocation factors under Section
5337(h, even though the matter is not, technically speaking, a relocation
matter.

2  Apart from the relocation context, this Court has held that Section
5328(a)(16) has incorporated custody factors that predated the current
iteration of the Child Custody Act. For instance, in S.T. v. R.W., 192 A.3d
1155, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2018), we concluded that Section 5328(a)(16)
mandates the consideration of the “Etter factors,” which are criteria to
determine whether an incarcerated parent should be awarded supervised
physical custody. See also Etter v. Rose, 684 A.2d 1092, 1093 (Pa. Super.
1996).

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         Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h)(2)), the feasibility of preserving the
         relationship between the other parent and the child (23
         Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h)(3)), and whether the change in the
         child's residence will enhance the general quality of life for
         the child (23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h)(7)). Even though these
         three factors are not directly or implicitly encompassed in
         Section 5328(a), they are clearly relevant to the decision of
         what is in the child's best interest when contemplating a
         move of significant distance to the other parent's home, and
         are therefore necessarily part of the trial court's analysis
         pursuant to Section 5328(a)(16) which requires a trial court
         to consider “any other relevant factor” in making a custody
         determination. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(16).

Id.

      Returning to the instant matter, the trial court did not incorporate the

Section 5337(h) factors into its best interest analysis under Section

5328(a)(16).    Nevertheless, the trial court and Father maintain that the

instant case is factually distinguishable from D.K. The trial court reasoned

that because both parents shared custody, the Child was as much a Florida

resident as he was a Pennsylvania resident. Thus, the trial court found D.K.

inapposite. See T.C.O. at 8. Father adds that, unlike the children in D.K.,

the subject Child had two established residences.      “Thus, not only did the

residences of the parties not change, the residence of the Child did not change

with the trial court’s custody determination.    Rather the trial court merely

established the location from which the Child would attend primary school,

and it did so after a full and complete analysis of all evidence impacting the

Child’s best interests […].” See Father’s Brief at 24-25.

      We recognize that this case is atypical, insofar as the Child regularly

traveled between the parties’ respective homes, spent significant time at each,

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and he had done so for years. By contrast, the more common application of

D.K. usually involves a child who had spent little, if any, time at the

petitioner’s home.

      Notwithstanding the factual distinction, we conclude that the holding in

D.K. still applies.   First, we disagree with Father and the trial court that,

because the parties shared custody, the Child was not “moving” from

Pennsylvania to Florida. When the litigation began five years ago, the parties

shared   custody,     but     they   exercised     custody   almost    exclusively    in

Pennsylvania. Then, by virtue of the February 2020 settlement agreement,

Father exercised significant periods of custody in Florida. Even so, Mother

retained her primary physical custody status, because the Child still primarily

lived with her in Pennsylvania.          Only during the pendency of the current

litigation, did the court temporarily award Father shared custody, in Florida.

Although Father regularly exercised significant partial custody in Florida, the

Child’s primary residence was always Pennsylvania.

      Moreover, the         definition   of what    constitutes a     “move”   is    not

determinative here.     Instead, the effect of the geographical change is the

concern. The geographical change, in the unique context of this case, is that

the Child will stay in one location for the nine months of the school year; he

will, for the first time, put down roots in one location; and he will not be

returning to the other parent’s home as frequently. It is not the newness of

“the significantly distant location” that triggers consideration of the Section

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5337(h) factors; rather, it is the drastic impact that the geographical change

will have on the Child’s life and the custody schedule.

       Father presents a secondary argument that only serves to buttress our

point. Father maintains that “it is obvious the trial court, in fact, considered

all relevant evidence, including that which touched upon the relocation factors,

in rendering its decision.” See Father’s Brief at 22-23. In other words, Father

argues that even if the trial court did not formally analyze the Section 5337(h)

factors, the court substantively addressed the very considerations that Section

5337(h) stands for in its delineation of its findings under Section 5328(a).

       We might be inclined to agree with Father’s argument, but that is not

what occurred here. We recognize that the trial court has considerable leeway

when it comes to the delineation of its reasons for the award under Section

5323(d).3     However, upon our review of the trial court’s delineation, it is

apparent that the court did not address the Section 5337(h) factors, either

formally or in spirit. See N.T. (Day 3) at 1-9. For instance, consider the

court’s delineation of Section 5328(a)(11) (the proximity of the residences of

the parties). While this delineation is thorough, it demonstrates not only that

____________________________________________

3 See D.Q. v. K.K., 241 A.3d 1112, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“In expressing
the reasons for its decision, ‘there is no required amount of detail for the trial
court’s explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors are
considered and that the custody decision is based on those considerations.’”);
see also M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“It is within
the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to determine which factors are
the most salient and critical in each particular case.”); but see C.A.J. v.
D.S.M., 136 A.3d 504, 510 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding error “where the trial
court listed the Section 5328(a) factors but failed to apply them.”).

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the court overlooked the relocation nature of this case, but also why the

additional Section 5537(h) considerations are vital.

      The court stated:

         Factor 11 is the proximity of the residences of the party. By
         agreement, the Child has been dividing his time between
         both communities since 2019. This court does not weigh
         this factor in favor of either party. And both parties have
         indicated that they are unable to fully enmesh or
         immerse the Child in their respective community due
         to the distances and the current custody schedule. I
         think it’s the one thing that everybody agreed [upon, that]
         it’s difficult to have the Child and it’s not the Child’s best
         interest to be equally divided in two such – two communities
         that are at such a great distance away from each of his
         parents, notwithstanding the flights that the Child has had
         to endure.

N.T. (Day 3) at 7 (emphasis added).

      In this excerpt, the trial court alludes to, but does not resolve, the three

relevant Section 5337(h) factors that D.K. requires the court to address in

this type of case:

               •     whether the change in the child's residence will
                     enhance the general quality of life for the child,

               •     the feasibility of preserving the relationship
                     between the other parent and the child, and

               •     the age, developmental stage, needs of the child
                     and the likely impact the child's change of
                     residence will have on the child's physical,
                     educational and emotional development.

D.K., 102 A.3d at 477 (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h)(7); (3); (2)).

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      The trial court noted that the parties have been unable to fully immerse

the Child in their respective communities. The court must decide then, into

which community immersion is in the Child’s best interests. Which of the two

communities would have the most positive impact on the Child’s quality of

life? How feasible would be the preservation of the relationship with the other

parent, if the Child lived long-term in either Florida or Pennsylvania?     And

given the Child’s age, developmental stage, and needs, which community will

have the most positive impact on his educational and emotional development.

See id. This is not to say that the other Section 5337(h) factors are irrelevant,

nor do we suggest that any of the factors, either in Section 5337(h) or Section

5328(a), are subordinate to Section 5337(h)(2), (3) and (7). We merely hold

that the trial court’s custody analysis is incomplete.

      Father would have us deduce how the trial court might rule on these

factors based upon the court’s other findings. If we were to guess, we might

guess right. But to fill in the gaps in the trial court’s analysis would be to

make our own findings, in the first instance. That is simply not the function

of an appellate court.     Although we are not bound by the trial court’s

deductions or inferences, “our role does not include making independent

factual determinations.” D.K., 102 A.3d at 478. We are sympathetic to the

toil that the parties, their counsel, and multiple trial judges have already

invested. As the trial court was keen to observe, the effect of its decision is

life-altering. See N.T. (Day 3) at 3.   For that very reason, we must ensure

appropriate consideration of every criterion that the law mandates. The

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parents’ right to due process demands nothing less; the Child deserves

nothing less.

       Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the trial court erred when it

failed to consider the non-duplicative Section 5337(h) factors as part of its

Section 5328(a) analysis.        Mother’s first and second appellate issues have

merit. However, the remedy for this error is not, as Mother suggests, a new

hearing before a different trial judge.            The remedy is a remand for

supplemental opinion and order specifically addressing the missing Section

5337(h) factors. See, e.g., C.A.J. v. D.S.M., 136 A.3d 504, (Pa. Super.

2016).4

       B. Burdens of proof

       In this part of our discussion, we address contemporaneously Mother’s

fourth and fifth appellate issues. The crux of these claims is that the trial

court misapplied the law concerning burdens of proof. Specifically, Mother

argues that the court erred for not treating Father’s petition as a request for

relocation, but instead concluded that both parties shared the burden equally.

____________________________________________

4 As a housekeeping matter, we briefly address Mother’s allegation that the
trial court erred for failing to take testimony regarding the Section 5337(h)
factors. Mother does not allege that the trial court made an evidentiary ruling
excluding testimony relevant to Section 5337(h). Rather, Mother largely
restates that the court erred by failing to consider those factors. Having
addressed that claim in full, we clarify that Mother warrants no further relief
on this point. Mother’s third appellate issue is without merit.

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See generally Mother’s Brief at 19-23. These claims present questions of

law, and thus our standard of review remains de novo.

        As noted above, Section 5337 anticipates that one party seeks to

relocate; when neither party seeks relocation the provisions of Section 5337

generally do not apply. D.K., 102 A.3d at 472-74. The exception, of course,

is Section 5337(h). Id. As D.K. made clear, this case is technically not a

relocation matter. Thus, the trial court was correct when it did not impose on

the parties the burden of proof for relocation cases, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(i).5

        Instead, the trial court applied the correct burden concerning the

parties’ cross-modification petitions.         In a dispute between parents, each

parent shares the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

an award of custody would serve the best interests of the child. Graves v.

Graves, 265 A.3d 688, 698 (Pa. Super. 2021) (emphasis added). In turn,

the best interests of the child shall be determined by the Section 5328(a)

factors. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5328 (“Factors to Consider when Awarding

____________________________________________

5   Section 5337(i) provides:

           (1)   The party proposing the relocation has the burden of
                 establishing that the relocation will serve the best
                 interest of the child as shown under the factors set
                 forth in subsection (h).

           (2)   Each party has the burden of establishing the integrity
                 of that party’s motives in either seeking the relocation
                 or seeking to prevent the relocation.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(i).

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Custody”), 5338 (“Modification of Existing Order”). And in this case, per D.K.,

supra, Section 5328(a)(16) requires the consideration of the Section 5337(h)

factors.

       Here, both parties sought modification.           Both recognized that

continuation of their pre-existing custody arrangement was impossible, and

thus an outright denial of their petitions, in favor of the status quo, was not

an option for the trial court. Each had the burden to prove that their request

was in the Child’s best interest.6 Mother’s fourth and fifth appellate issues

merit no relief.

       C. Due Process implications of the December 3, 2021 interim

       order

       In her sixth appellate issue, Mother argues the trial court violated her

right to due process.7       Specifically, Mother contends that her right to due

process was infringed when the court issued an interim order on December 3,

2021 without a hearing, which increased Father’s custody from partial to
____________________________________________

6 Mother’s underlying contention has less to do with the burden of proof, and
more to do with her belief that Father obtained a backdoor relocation. We
understand the basis for this belief. Father’s request for relocation was denied
in 2019. And yet, in 2022, Father obtained a primary custody award, in
Florida, without going through the complete relocation process set forth in
Section 5337. However, once Father moved to Florida, he could no longer be
a “relocating parent.” Because his residence was unchanged when he sought
custody modification in 2021, Section 5337 was largely inapplicable, except
as we have already discussed above.

7 We note that claims concerning due process violations are also questions of
law, and thus our standard of review remains de novo. See S.T., 192 A.3d at
1160.

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shared pending final resolution of the cross-modification petitions. Because

the interim order was entered by the previous, since-retired trial judge, the

current trial judge could not speak to reasons behind the interim order, except

to say that the interim order did not alter the existing custody arrangement’s

“essential structure.” See T.C.O. at 14. Father also argues that the “essential

structure” of the parties’ shared custody remained undisturbed. See Father’s

Brief at 37-38 (emphasis added).

      We do not agree with the trial judge’s or Father’s characterization with

the interim order. Prior to the interim order, Mother had “primary physical

custody” and Father had “partial physical custody.” After the interim order,

the parties had “shared physical custody.”       The terms “partial physical

custody,” “shared physical custody,” and “primary physical custody” are terms

of art, demarcating separate types of awards. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a);

see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322 (“Definitions”). The facts of this case indicate

that when the court issued an interim order, the court effectively changed the

award of custody without a hearing.

      Notably, the trial judge could not explain why the prior judge entered

the interim order without a hearing. Without that explanation, we cannot say

definitively whether the order violated Mother’s right to due process.

However, even if we agreed with Mother that the interim order violated her

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right to due process, we cannot grant relief. See E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451

(Pa. Super. 2019).8 As such, Mother’s sixth appellate issue is moot.

____________________________________________

8E.B. is instructive both as to whether a due process violation occurred, and
why this Court cannot grant Mother relief.

In E.B., we concluded that the trial court erred when it sua sponte changed
the parties’ custody arrangement from primary-partial physical custody to
shared custody pending the final custody hearing. Although the court had
authority to act sua sponte under Pa.R.C.P. 1915.13 (“Special Relief”), the
court violated the respondent-father’s right to due process for three reasons.
First, the parties had no notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard; second
“there was no emergency or apparent urgent need to preserve the well-being
of the child.” Id. at 465. Third, the parties’ custody arrangement was already
subject to a formal consent order; it was not the case that the parties were
recently separated and in need of an interim order commemorating the status
quo. Id. at 466.

However, we explained that although the trial court erred, no relief could be
provided:

          [T]he relief that [the appellant-father] seeks is impossible
          to achieve. [The appellant-father] asks us to vacate the
          interim order, effectively re-setting the clock back to [two
          years prior]. This is tantamount to “unringing the bell” and
          rewinding the past two years of the child’s life as if they
          never happened.

Id. at 466-67 (citing Plowman v. Plowman, 597 A.2d at 701, 707 (Pa.
Super.1991)).

The instant case resembles E.B. A key difference is that the record in this
case does not reveal why the trial court issued the December 3, 2021 interim
order. Thus, we cannot determine whether the interim order was a proper
use of the court’s special relief powers or whether the interim order violated
Mother’s due process. But even if a violation occurred, we similarly would be
unable to grant Mother relief. As we explained in E.B. and in Plowman, this
Court cannot “unring the bell” or rewind the last two years.

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      D. Typographical error

      As a final housekeeping measure, we address Mother’s seventh

appellate issue, which concerns the appointment of a parenting coordinator.

The trial court acknowledged in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that the reference to

the parenting coordinator in the August 11, 2022 custody order was a

typographical error and that it should be stricken. On appeal, Mother merely

brings our attention to the error so that we direct the trial court to strike the

erroneous provision. We posit that the trial court already had jurisdiction to

correct this typographical error, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1), but lest

there be any confusion, we grant the trial court this authority.

      Conclusion

      In sum, we conclude the trial court erred when it failed to consider the

Section 5337(h) factors as part of its Section 5328(a) analysis. However, the

trial court imposed the correct burden of proof on the parties. The question

of the December 3, 2021 interim order violated Mother’s right to due process

is moot. Finally, the trial court is authorized to strike the typographical error

concerning the parenting coordinator.     Mother’s remaining appellate issues

concern either the substantive custody analysis, or the effects thereof. As the

trial court’s custody analysis is incomplete, we do not rule on those issues.

      We remand for the trial court to supplement its best interest analysis

with consideration of the Section 5337(h) factors. No additional evidentiary

proceedings are necessary. Within thirty (30) days of the date the record is

remitted, the trial court shall enter a new custody order; the trial court shall

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delineate its reasons for the award in accordance with Section 5323(d). Either

party may then appeal within 30 days of the trial court’s order.9       In the

meantime, the custody order of August 11, 2022 shall remain in effect, but as

a temporary order.

       Order converted to temporary order. Jurisdiction Relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 06/16/2023

____________________________________________

9 We clarify that Mother’s eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh appellate issues,
as re-ordered in this memorandum, are preserved. If Mother decides to
appeal the trial court’s new custody order, and desires to be heard on these
issues, Mother is directed to re-raise those issues.

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