Court Opinion

ID: 9536510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:00:55.097445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:35.850939
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Justice,
concurring.
The court correctly concludes that chapter 52, SLA 1986 (“the Act”) violates the Alaska Constitution. I write separately to explain my understanding of the court's holding in part B of the section entitled “The Article VIII Clauses — History and Analysis,” which I join, and because I disagree with the court’s analysis in part A.

Equal Protection

The Act is motivated by a compelling purpose, ensuring that persons who are dependent upon subsistence hunting and fishing have access to wildlife. However, the Act’s geographical classification scheme is only loosely related to that purpose. This is an equal protection case, and an easy one at that.
Article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution provides that “all persons are ... entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law....” We have decided many cases interpreting this provision, most recently, State v. Enserch Alaska Construction, Inc., 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989). The Alaska Constitution has a similar clause specifically concerning natural resources. Article VIII, section 17, the uniform application clause, provides that “[l]aws and regulations governing the use or disposal of natural resources shall apply equally to all persons similarly situated with reference to the subject matter and purpose to be served by the law or regulation.”
When applying the equal protection clause of article I, we determine the impor*13tance of the individual interest affected by the enactment. The importance of the individual interest determines the level of scrutiny we apply to both the state’s interest in the enactment and the nexus between that interest and the enactment. Enserch, 787 P.2d at 631-632; Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-70-(Alaska 1984). Without explicitly acknowledging it, the court’s opinion employs the same analysis under the uniform application clause of article VIII. See supra pp. 10-11. Since the principle of equality underlies both clauses, the use of our equal protection analysis in the uniform application context is proper.
I believe that the individual interest impaired by the Act, access to wildlife for subsistence purposes, is a species of the important right to engage in economic endeavor at issue in Enserch, at 632-633. See also Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1266 (Alaska 1980). The challenged enactment therefore should receive close scrutiny.1 The Act then at least must be closely related to an important state interest. Enserch, at 633.
The state’s interest, ensuring that those who must engage in subsistence hunting and fishing are able to do so, is undoubtedly important. Indeed, I believe it is compelling. However, the Act’s classification scheme for deciding who is entitled to engage in subsistence hunting and fishing and its implementing regulations are not closely related to the purpose of the Act. As the court’s opinion describes, large numbers of residents of areas classified as urban under the Act are dependent upon subsistence hunting and fishing. Conversely, some of the state’s larger cities, where many people are not dependent upon subsistence hunting and fishing, are classified as rural. Supra pp. 4-5. There is only a modest correlation between the set of people who reside in areas designated as rural under the Act and the set of people who are dependent upon subsistence hunting and fishing. The fit between the Act and the state’s interest does not even approach that required to withstand close scrutiny. Therefore, the Act violates the equal protection and uniform application clauses of the Alaska Constitution.
This is not to say that all subsistence preference laws would be unconstitutional. I simply believe that for such a law to pass constitutional muster, it must be closely related to its compelling purpose. A law providing for individual determinations of eligibility would in my view be sufficiently tailored to the state’s interest to withstand a constitutional challenge.

Common Use and Exclusive Right of Fishery

The court’s holding in Part A of the section entitled “The Article VIII Clauses — History and Analysis” is not altogether clear. I agree with the court to the extent that it holds that an intrastate geographical preference for the taking of wildlife violates sections 3 and 15 of article VIII of the Alaska Constitution. I reject any implication that all preferences, especially all subsistence preferences, would violate these sections. I do not believe that the court can find a violation of article VIII, section 17 without a full equal protection analysis. I do not join part A of the court’s opinion, but I concur in its result.2
Section 15 of article VIII provides that “[n]o exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State.” Alaska Const., art. VIII, § 15 (emphasis added). Section 4 of article VIII provides that the use of resources shall be “subject to preferences among beneficial uses.” On the surface, there appears to be some conflict between these provisions. To the greatest *14extent possible, we must interpret the provisions of Article VIII consistent with each other. See Abrams v. State, 534 P.2d 91, 95 (Alaska 1975).
Section 4 clearly authorizes some preferences based upon uses. The court recognized a parallel exception to section 15 in Kenai Peninsula Fisherman’s Cooperative Association, Inc. v. State, 628 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1981), where we wrote that section 15 “was not meant to prohibit differential treatment of such diverse user groups as commercial, sports, and subsistence fishermen.” 628 P.2d at 904. The Act distinguishes subsistence uses from commercial and sport uses in name only. As discussed above, its classification is in fact a fairly arbitrary one based upon residence. It is not the type of classification we have previously held permissible under section 15.
We are left with the question whether geographical preferences are permissible under section 15. For the reasons given in the court’s opinion, see supra pp. 6-8, I believe that reliance upon Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 69 S.Ct. 968, 93 L.Ed. 1231 (1949), which interpreted the federal statute upon which section 15 was based, is appropriate. In Hynes, the Court invalidated regulations prohibiting fishing off the shores of the Karluk Reservation. While I do not believe that Hynes is determinative since it involved an exclusive right to fish in a particular area and not a mere preference, 337 U.S. at 92, 69 S.Ct. at 973, section 15 proscribes “special privilege[s]” as well as exclusive rights. Like the court, I do not read Hynes as being based on the fact that the exclusive right was granted to Natives rather than some other group. Nor do I believe that Hynes can be distinguished by the ability of people to move to rural areas and thus qualify under the Act. See supra pp. 7-8 & n. 12. For these reasons, I agree with the court that geographical preferences for the taking of fish are not permissible under section 15. The Act thus violates section 15. Although section 15 is facially applicable only to fishing, I would have no difficulty finding a corresponding prohibition of geographical hunting preferences in the common use clause of article VIII, section 3. See supra p. 9.

. Enserch, at 633; Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska 1988). It may be that the enactment should receive even greater scrutiny under the uniform application clause; however, the court has not decided that question. Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 498 n. 17 (Alaska 1988).

. ■ I would not, however, reach this question, because I believe that such geographical preferences violate the equal protection and uniform application clauses of the Alaska Constitution.