Court Opinion

ID: 9746549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:22:02.909391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:14.058737
License: Public Domain

NIGRO, Justice,
concurring.
While I join the Majority’s opinion in all other respects, I write separately to note my disagreement with the Majority’s conclusion that the statements made by Appellant’s son, Alfred Albrecht, Jr., to Carol and Terry Kuhns, the Albrechts’ neighbors, were not excited utterances.
At Appellant’s trial, Mr. and Mrs. Kuhns testified that on the night before the fire, Alfred Jr., nervous and shaken, came to their house and told them that Appellant was hitting his mother again and threatening to burn the house down. N.T. at 105, 210. In determining that these statements do not qualify as excited utterances, the Majority essentially finds, in the first instance, that the violent argument between the Albrechts was not a sufficiently startling occurrence to render Alfred Jr.’s reflective faculties inoperable at the time he made the declarations to the Kuhns. See Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. 132, 383 A.2d 858 (1978) (to come within excited utterance exception to hearsay rule, statement must be spontaneous declaration by person whose mind has suddenly been made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some shocking occurrence, which is made so near the occurrence as to exclude the likelihood of it having emanated from declarant’s reflective faculties). I disagree. The Majority suggests that since Alfred Jr. had been subjected to numerous violent arguments between his parents in the past, experiencing one more altercation would not sufficiently traumatize him so as to *65render him incapable of reflective thought. Regardless of how many times a child is forced to witness violent arguments between his parents, however, I cannot agree with the Majority that repetition somehow numbs the traumatizing effects such abuse has on a child. Rather, I believe that a child witnessing the physical abuse of his mother can clearly be considered a shocking event for purposes of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 258 Pa.Super. 101, 106, 392 A.2d 704, 706 (1978) (for purposes of excited utterance exception, a child witnessing his mother’s boyfriend strike his sibling is startling occurrence).
Furthermore, the fact that the statements were made to the Kuhns after Alfred Jr. had already sought help at another neighbors’ house does not, in my view, obviate the fact that Alfred Jr. was still suffering from emotional shock at the time he made the statements to the Kuhns. See Commonwealth v. Zukauskas, 501 Pa. 500, 504, 462 A.2d 236, 238 (1983) (since the question is not how long one or when one is seized by an event, but rather whether he was seized at all, time itself is not dispositive of whether statement is excited utterance). The Kuhns testified that Alfred Jr. was nervous and shaken when he rang the doorbell to their home for help and told them that his father was hitting his mother again and threatening to burn down his house. N.T. at 105, 210. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 426 Pa.Super. 496, 503, 627 A.2d 785, 788 (1993) (despite uncertainty about how much time had elapsed between shocking occurrence and utterance, testimony that child was crying and nervous at time he made statement made it clear that child was still suffering from emotional shock of incident at that time). Likewise, I do not believe that the additional fact that Alfred Jr. declined the Kuhns’ invitation to stay overnight after making the challenged statements establishes that the statements were not, under the circumstances of this case, excited utterances. Unlike the Majority, then, I have no difficulty finding that Alfred Jr.’s statements to the Kuhns were declarations made while experiencing overpowering emotion caused by a shocking event and there*66fore, properly admissible pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
Accordingly, I disagree with the Majority that Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Alfred Jr.’s statements as inadmissible hearsay has arguable merit. I would find that Appellant’s claim fails on this ground. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 527 Pa. 118, 122, 588 A.2d 1303, 1305 (1991) (counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once it is determined that underlying claim is not of arguable merit). However, since the Majority ultimately rejects Appellant’s claim on the basis that he was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object to these statements, I agree with the result reached by the Majority on this issue.
Justice CASTILLE joins in the Concurring Opinion.