Court Opinion

ID: 9732244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:12:41.806937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:25.221883
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RATHJE, dissenting: I agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion in parts I and III. I disagree, however, with the majority’s analysis in part II. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. The majority cites to section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and identifies three factors that are relevant to the conflict of laws issue. 193 Ill. 2d at 569. One relevant factor is ignored by the majority— “the protection of justified expectations.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2)(d), at 10 (1971). The balancing of this factor along with the three mentioned by the majority requires this court to apply Missouri’s substantive law on the issue of the distribution of attorney fees. The first factor addressed by the majority is “ ‘the basic policies underlying the particular field of law.’ ” 193 Ill. 2d at 569, quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 6(2)(e), at 10 (1971). The majority begins by discussing the policy behind the common fund doctrine and then states that, because Illinois uses the common fund doctrine in wrongful death cases and Missouri does not, Illinois law should apply. In other words, the majority designates the Illinois common fund doctrine as the “particular field of law” and concludes that the policies underlying the Illinois law more clearly fulfill the policies of the “particular field of law.” The majority’s circular logic mischaracterizes the issue. The appropriate question under this factor is which state’s law better serves the policies underlying the distribution of attorney fees. This question is a much closer one than the majority claims. On one hand, as the majority correctly points out, the Illinois common fund doctrine prevents attorneys who did not participate as fully in the litigation from being unjustly enriched in the dispensation of attorney fees. 193 Ill. 2d at 569. On the other hand, as the majority fails to point out, under Missouri law, each litigant has the freedom to choose which attorney collects the fees associated with the litigant’s claim. Both states’ laws demonstrate clear policies that relate to the basic policies of attorney fee distribution — fairness and client choice of attorney. Second, the majority addresses “ ‘the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue.’ ” 193 Ill. 2d at 568-69, quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2), at 10 (1971). Again assuming that the particular field of law is the common fund doctrine, the majority argues that the statute creates unjust results and that therefore the factor “disfavors the application of Missouri law.” 193 Ill. 2d at 570. The majority fails to even discuss the relevant interests of Missouri in the discussion of this factor. Missouri has a substantial interest in this case. The cause of action arose in Missouri, and some of the most relevant work on the action was done there. In fact, Chapman would not even have a separate cause of action for the disbursement of attorney fees if this case had not been filed in Missouri. See 193 Ill. 2d at 567. As discussed above, Missouri also has a clear policy which, while different than the Illinois policy, does not offend it. This factor weighs in favor of Missouri. The third factor addressed is the “ ‘relevant policies of the forum.’ ” 193 Ill. 2d at 570, quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2)(b), at 10 (1971). This factor is discussed throughout this section of the majority opinion. The majority is correct that Illinois law would apply the common fund doctrine and that the policy underlying that law is against unjust enrichment. This does not mean, however, that a state that does not apply the common fund doctrine has a policy for unjust enrichment. Rather, the Missouri legislators have determined that the policy of attorney choice is more important to their state than the policy against unjust enrichment. Illinois has an obvious policy against unjust enrichment, and, although the Missouri policy does not offend the Illinois policy, the Missouri law clearly does. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of Illinois. A fourth factor that the majority does not consider is “ ‘the protection of justified expectations.’ ” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2)(d), at 10 (1971). This factor is explained in the comments to the Restatement (Second) as follows: “This is an important value in all fields of law, including choice of law. Generally speaking, it would be unfair and improper to hold a person liable under the local law of one state when he had justifiably molded his conduct to conform to the requirements of another state.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2)(g), Comments, at 15 (1971). In this case, the underlying action arose in Missouri, and, most importantly, Chapman filed this action in Missouri. He is presumed to know how attorney fees are disbursed in wrongful death actions in Missouri. The attorney clearly should have expected Missouri law to apply, as should all of the parties. The only person who might have any claim to expect Illinois to govern attorney fees is Karen, because her relationship with Chapman was initiated in Illinois. Karen, however, is not a party to this action, and the attorney fees for her portion of the settlement are not at issue. The Kitzmans, by contrast, had no relationship with Chapman until he filed the wrongful death action in Missouri. The Kitzmans contracted with their attorney, who agreed to be paid one-third of any recovery in excess of $100,000. This contract clearly demonstrates that they expected Missouri law to apply, and the fact that Chapman filed the lawsuit in Missouri renders their expectation justified. Consequently, this factor overwhelmingly favors the application of Missouri law. Under these four factors, Missouri law applies. As a result, the common fund doctrine is not applicable. I would therefore reverse the appellate court as to this issue.