Court Opinion

ID: 9828426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:21:44.998271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:47.996250
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING.
It is insisted by appellant that as this court found as a fact that the deeds from Tippin to Mrs. Cummings were made in consideration, among other things, in contemplation' of their marriage, the court should hold the deed to be binding, as such is a sufficient consideration. Tippin died without the marriage being consummated, though the evidence fails to show that the engagement had been broken off before his. death, unless the fact that he brought suit to cancel the deeds can be-considered as such. What force an agreement made in contemplation of marriage will have when the marriage was not consummated, we will not attempt to decide. All the authorities that have been cited and to-which we have had access treat of questions arising upon antenuptial agreements after the consummation of the marriage. Our disposition. of the case was not based upon the fact that the contemplated marriage was never consummated, but upon the fact that one of the undertakings of Mrs. Cummings, which formed a part of the consideration, was never-complied with. In addition to her promise to marry, she was to secure-the erection of a house on the land to be occupied as a home by them after their marriage. This seems to us an important consideration to* Tippin, as it made provision for him for a home which he was unable himself to otherwise provide. It was not error to admit paroi testimony to show what the contract was between the parties. The deeds did not show the undertaking upon the part of Mrs. Cummings.. The consideration expressed in the grant was “$5 cash and other considerations.” Of what “other considerations” consisted does not appear, nor is there any provision as to what the obligation of Mrs. Cummings was. It is well settled in this State that where an instrument fails upon its face-to show the whole contract between the parties, parol evidence is admissible to prove what the real contract was. Gibson v. Fifer, 21 Texas, 260; Taylor v. Merrill, 64 Texas, 494; Johnson v. Elmen, 24 Texas Civ, App., 43; Womack v. Wamble, 7 Texas Civ. App., 273. Where the-instrument upon its face fails to show the entire agreement, it is not-necessary to allege fraud, accident, or mistake in order to permit paroi evidence as to the real contract. It is only necessary to allege fraud, accident, or mistake where the instrument upon its face shows the entire-contract in order to allow paroi evidence to vary or contradict the terms-of the contract as expressed in the instrument. Taylor v. Merrill, 64 Texas, 494. The evidence shows that Mrs. Cummings breached her *558contract in part at least, and, in our opinion, under the evidence it would be inequitable for her to hold the land.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.

Overruled.

ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF FACT.
Acting on the motion of appellant for additional conclusions of fact, we find:
1. That M. T. Tippin solicited Mrs. Cummings to procure a divorce from her husband that she might marry Tippin, to which she was not averse.
2. The evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of the jury to the effect that said conveyance was not made by Tippin in contemplation of insolvency, and we so find.
3. The evidence fails to show that the engagement of Mrs. Cummings and Tippin to intermarry was ever broken off till his death.
4. Tippin executed the conveyance in consideration of the promise of Mrs. Cummings to marry him and to procure the building of a house on the land for them to live in after marriage. While the evidence fails to show that any specific time was agreed upon for the erection of the house, we think it a fair deduction from the evidence that it was to be erected within a reasonable time that it might be used by them upon their marriage.
We do not deem it necessary to make further findings on the matters embraced in the motion.
Writ of error refused.