Court Opinion

ID: 9385652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 18:03:07.184513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.615870
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/7/23 P. v. Spivey CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C091512

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. Nos. STK-CR-FE-
                                                                                  1990-0005342, SC045763)
           v.

    EDDIE CHARLES SPIVEY,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Eddie Charles Spivey guilty of second degree murder and
assault with a firearm and found true a personal firearm use enhancement attached to
each offense. (People v. Spivey (Sept. 30, 1992, C009499) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2019,
defendant petitioned under Penal Code1 section 1172.62 for resentencing and the trial

1        Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2      Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 as
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the

                                                             1
court issued an order to show cause. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied defendant’s petition finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was an
accomplice to implied malice murder.
       Defendant appeals arguing aiding and abetting an implied malice murder is no
longer a viable theory of murder following Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 1-3) and that, in any event, the jury’s verdicts precluded the
trial court from finding he acted with implied malice. In the alternative, defendant
contends insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that he acted with implied
malice. Further, defendant argues the trial court committed several evidentiary errors or
impermissibly applied the evidence presented. We affirm.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3
       Because there is no material dispute pertaining to the facts of defendant’s offenses,
we summarize the facts as we did on direct review of the judgment and supplement the
factual background with evidence from the record established at the evidentiary hearing
as necessary for discussion of the issues raised by defendant in this appeal.

statute. Although defendant filed his petition under former section 1170.95, we cite the
current section 1172.6 throughout the remainder of this opinion.
3      Defendant notes the reporter’s transcript from his original trial that was admitted
into evidence at his evidentiary hearing was incomplete. His appellate counsel, however,
located a complete reporter’s transcript and augmented the appellate record so that the
complete reporter’s transcript could be considered. On appeal, defendant relies on
portions of the complete reporter’s transcript that do not appear to be included in the
reporter’s transcript admitted at the evidentiary hearing. We do not include facts in our
factual recitation not admitted into evidence at the evidentiary hearing because our
review of the trial court’s ruling is limited by the evidence it had before it and not by
evidence produced later. (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 434, fn. 10; People v.
Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 739.)

                                             2
                                              I
                       Evidence Admitted At Defendant’s Jury Trial
       The shootings occurred in the early morning hours of September 16, 1989. “The
murder victim was 16-year-old Marcus . . . . His twin brother, Marquis, was the assault
victim.” (People v. Spivey, supra, C009499.) A Stockton police officer responding to a
dispatch call went to a home where he spoke with a young male claiming to be 22 years
old and named Charles. “[The young male] had been shot in the upper leg. He said he
had been walking back from the store and did not know the identity of his assailant.
‘Charles’ would not provide any other information. This person was then taken by
paramedics to the county hospital. Returning to his patrol car in order to drive over to the
hospital, [the officer] heard someone yell that a person had been shot outside. Heading
over to the location indicated, the officer saw another young male lying prone on the
sidewalk. When rolled over on his back, the victim bore a marked resemblance to
‘Charles.’ An autopsy showed the homicide victim, Marcus . . . , died of shock and
hemorrhage from two bullet wounds to the chest; there was also a wound to the left
shoulder. The wounds were not consistent with shotgun injuries.
       “At the hospital, ‘Charles’ continued to stonewall. Upon hearing Marcus . . . was
dead, ‘Charles’ admitted to being Marquis . . . , the deceased’s twin brother. He
explained at trial he had not wanted to reveal his real identity because he had an
outstanding juvenile warrant, so he used his older brother’s name.
       “As Marquis eventually made clear at trial, he was standing outdoors in front of a
relative’s house . . . a little after midnight on the night in question when he saw his
brother almost [get] hit by a car . . . . Marcus and the female driver of the car exchanged
angry words. Marcus was standing right by the driver’s window, but at no point did
Marquis see his brother strike her.
       “A short time later, a large adult male and his female companion accosted
Marquis. Marcus had left the area. Marquis did not recognize the woman at first, but he

                                              3
was able to figure out that she had been the driver. He did not know she was the
defendant’s sister . . . . He was also unfamiliar with the man, though later learned his
name was Greg Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell accused Marquis of striking [defendant’s sister].
Ultimately, [defendant’s sister] told her companion that Marquis was not the object of
their search and the couple left.
       “At least in the version he gave at trial, Marquis then went off in search of Marcus,
finding him at a nearby hangout lying in the bed of a pickup truck . . . . Marquis told
Marcus what had happened; Marcus denied hitting the woman. . . . Although Marquis
wanted to get away from Mr. Mitchell, Marcus wanted to return; Marquis went along out
of brotherly concern. [A friend] dropped off the brothers at their relative’s house.
Marquis went inside to talk with the relatives. When he came back out, he found Marcus
had wandered off.
       “Marquis went down to the corner to see if he could find his brother. Walking
back, he was confronted by Mr. Mitchell, the defendant (whom Marquis knew), and . . .
Romano S[.] Mr. Mitchell was holding a handgun; the others were holding shotguns.
Mr. Mitchell put the gun to Marquis’s head and told him to lie down. He then started
asking Marquis where Marcus had gone. When Marquis pled ignorance, Mr. Mitchell
fired the gun into the ground. As Marquis recollected at trial, the gunshot was followed
by a blast from one of the shotguns, hitting the ground near his upper chest; he was then
shot in the leg by Mr. Mitchell. All the while, Mr. Mitchell kept asking for the location
of Marcus and threatening to kill Marquis. Neither the defendant nor [Romano] asked
any questions. Finally, ‘someone’[4] said Marcus was over on an adjoining street. The
three assailants left him, and Marquis made it back into his relatives’ house, who called

4      “According to the defendant, the ‘someone’ was Marquis.”

                                             4
911 for him. A few minutes later, he heard more gunshots. The police arrived about 10
minutes later.
       “Backtracking to pick up events recounted by the defendant [5] and his cronies,[6]
the defendant was drinking at the home of a friend . . . . Present were [Romano] and
[Randy], among others. At some point, the defendant fell asleep in one of the bedrooms
with a friend. Just after midnight, [defendant’s sister] came to the door. (It is unclear
from the record where this fits chronologically in relation to the original incident, her
confrontation of Marquis with Mr. Mitchell, and the assault on Marquis.) She told
[Romano] (who is a cousin [to her and defendant]) that she had been slapped by one of
the twins. She also told him that her boyfriend, Mr. Mitchell, had already gone to look
for the twin. [Romano] went into the bedroom to awaken the defendant and tell him what
had happened. They went outside, where [defendant’s sister] repeated to her brother that
she had been slapped. Both [Romano] and the defendant denied that [defendant’s sister]
acted as an agent provocateur with respect to any retaliation they should take. They
decided on their own to ‘just go and see what happened.’ ‘You know, why he slapped
her.’ The two cousins denied any preexisting animosity between themselves and the

5       “The defendant was interviewed on September 17[, 1989,] after being identified
by Marquis. He initially denied any knowledge, then after his alibi collapsed[,] he
admitted being at the scene, then after being told he was not being truthful[,] he provided
a fuller recount but denied being armed, then he told the officer ‘I’m going to tell you the
truth,’ at which point he admitted having a rifle, then he started over again. The next day
he told the officer he had been armed with a shotgun, not a rifle, and had fired it only
once, up into a tree. His trial testimony . . . also differs in significant respect from these
various statements.”
6       “[Romano] provided no fewer than four different versions of that night’s events
before his final statement was transcribed on September 19[, 1989]. He, too, departed
from these at trial. Randy . . . , whom we shall meet momentarily, had three interviews
with the police and also disavowed the truth of portions of the extrajudicial statements at
trial.”

                                              5
twins, and denied having any intent to shoot or to kill, or even discussing such action; the
defendant testified he just wanted to talk with them -- they were too young to bother
fighting with them.
       “As they were standing outside, [defendant’s sister] departed and [Randy] returned
from a beer run and an unsuccessful attempt to get a key to his mother’s house. He
dropped off his passengers and agreed to take the defendant and [Romano] over to where
the . . . confrontation [between Marcus and defendant’s sister] had taken place, which
happened to be right by his mother’s home. On the way, they stopped at the defendant’s
mother’s home, where the defendant retrieved two shotguns from a shed out back. . . .
[T]he three claimed they did not speak to each other during the entire ride regarding their
objective, even after the defendant had obtained the shotguns. The defendant said they
needed guns for protection, because Marcus was known to carry a gun (although the
defendant admitted that when he had seen Marcus earlier in the evening Marcus had not
had a gun with him).
       “[Randy] parked by his mother’s house. As he headed to her front door, he saw
the defendant and [Romano] pass [defendant’s sister’s] parked car, in which she was
sitting, and head after Mr. Mitchell (who was standing on the corner). At trial, all three
denied there was any plan for meeting up together later on.
       “While [Randy] was waiting for someone to come to his mother’s door, he heard
shots. Turning, he saw Marquis limping toward a house. Someone at last opened the
door, and [Randy] went in. While inside, he heard additional shots. He then departed the
house . . . . As he walked toward his car, he could see the body of Marcus. According to
an inconsistent pretrial statement, as he drove off he saw the defendant and [Romano]
leap over a fence, shotguns in hand, and get into his car, saying ‘let’s go.’ ” (People v.
Spivey, supra, C009499.)
       “Switching to the perspective of the defendant and [Romano] . . . [who]
approached Mr. Mitchell[ while] carrying the shotguns. They denied that [Mr. Mitchell]

                                              6
had beckoned to them in any way or directed them to do anything; they were simply
following after him. They did not say anything to each other. As they approached, Mr.
Mitchell said ‘here comes my brother-in-law’ (presumably indicating the defendant),
pulled out a handgun, and pushed Marquis to the ground.
       “Their detailing of the several shots fired at Marquis differed. [Romano] said Mr.
Mitchell fired into the ground, prompting Marquis to say he was not the one Mr. Mitchell
wanted. Mr. Mitchell fired a total of three times, the second one into the victim’s leg.
[Romano] said he and the defendant each fired their shotguns into the ground away from
Marquis. He wanted to scare Marquis, but [Romano] claimed this was not toward any
particular end. He then followed the defendant toward the corner. In the defendant’s
version, he thought he might have been the first to shoot, aiming at the ground away from
Marquis. He admitted he did this to obtain information, although he himself was not
doing any questioning. He and [Romano] each shot once. Mr. Mitchell then fired into
the ground, at which point Marquis said his brother was over on the adjoining street. The
defendant turned and walked away. He heard one more shot from Mr. Mitchell’s gun,
but he did not look back, so he did not see Mr. Mitchell actually shoot Marquis. . . . Mr.
Mitchell said nothing to either the defendant or [Romano], nor did the cousins speak
between themselves even as they walked toward the corner away from Marquis. They
asserted they had no idea what Mr. Mitchell was intending to do when they walked away
from him.
       “Both the defendant and [Romano] had said (at some point) that they were
walking around the corner to find Marcus, the defendant claiming he simply wanted to
bring Marcus back to speak with his sister but would not have forced Marcus to do so.
[Romano] said they did not see anyone when they walked around the corner; the
defendant (in an earlier statement) said he saw Marcus, who ran off through a back yard.
The defendant (again in the earlier statement) said he then headed back to his original

                                             7
location to cut off Marcus, hearing gunshots as he did so. [Romano] concurred that they
heard shots and then retraced their steps.
       “The defendant consistently denied seeing Mr. Mitchell actually shoot Marcus as
they came around the corner. In his earlier statement, [Romano] said he saw Mr.
Mitchell shoot Marcus, then jump in his car and leave. He also said the defendant had
fired his shotgun in the direction of Marcus after Marcus had hit the ground.
       “On the ultimate issue, [Romano] denied ever wanting to assist with any shooting
or killing, even though he had pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for his
testimony. The defendant said he assumed Mr. Mitchell was there for the same reason he
was, i.e., because [defendant’s sister] got slapped, but he did not know Mr. Mitchell’s
intentions and if he had, he never would have gone over there because he did not want to
assist any shooting or killing. He did not go around the corner in search of Marcus to
help Mr. Mitchell kill him.” (People v. Spivey, supra, C009499.)
       Based on the above evidence, a jury found defendant guilty of second degree
murder and assault with a firearm, and found true that he had personally used a firearm
during the commission of those offenses. (People v. Spivey, supra, C009499.)
                                              II
                  Evidence Admitted At Defendant’s Evidentiary Hearing
       In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing. After issuing an order to show
cause, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. The prosecution introduced into
evidence a portion of the reporter’s transcript from defendant’s trial, transcripts from two
of defendant’s parole suitability hearings, and all the exhibits attached to the
prosecution’s informal response to defendant’s petition, which included our appellate
opinions in defendant’s and Mitchell’s direct appeals of their respective judgments,
selected jury instructions given at defendant’s trial, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal
decision rejecting all of defendant’s claims in a habeas corpus proceeding, and a

                                              8
transcript of Mitchell’s parole suitability hearing. Defendant objected to the admission of
transcripts from the parole suitability hearings.
       At the evidentiary hearing, Mitchell testified on behalf of the prosecution. He said
he was the person who shot Marcus. The prosecution confronted Mitchell about an
affidavit he wrote for defendant in 2014, which defendant attached to his petition in this
matter. Mitchell explained that he prepared the affidavit because he “felt [defendant] was
innocent [of] the crime.” Mitchell explained he had “suggested [defendant] to come
[help him]. [Defendant] was a young man. He was [a] young and still impressionable
young man. The events that took place unfolded without him knowing about it, because
it happened so fast. But I feel that him getting sentenced to a life sentence was unfair to
him, because the only thing he [did] was sho[o]t a shotgun in the air. [¶] And by me
being the perpetrator and using a gun and shooting an individual and killing him, and by
me understanding the severity of what was happening to [defendant], I felt it was
important that I explained to the court that I was the shooter, and that [defendant] had
c[o]me when I asked him to come. He had no idea what was getting ready to unfold,
unravel. And by me being older than him, he was only coming to support me because
somebody assaulted his sister.” At the time of the murder, Mitchell was 33 years old, and
defendant was 23 years old.
       Mitchell testified that, the night of the murder, defendant’s sister, who he had been
dating, told him that someone had slapped her. When Mitchell confronted Marquis about
the slap, Marquis acted as if he had a gun. Other people were around and started
laughing at Mitchell because he was not armed and, as a drug dealer, was expected to be.
In other words, Mitchell had been “caught slipping” due to his lack of gun possession.
Mitchell became enraged because of the laughter and told defendant’s sister to retrieve
his .357 handgun. Mitchell also believed Marcus and Marquis to be gang members and
wanted to confront them with a gun out of safety concerns about slapping defendant’s
sister. Mitchell also told defendant’s sister to get defendant because he “needed to make

                                              9
sure [he] had backup.” The trial court overruled defendant’s hearsay objection to this
testimony but found that Mitchell did not make a statement about needing backup and
that no statement was communicated to defendant.
       Defendant’s sister returned to Mitchell with his .357 handgun, and five to 10
minutes later, defendant arrived with his shotgun. The two found Marquis and Mitchell
shot him in the leg. Defendant shot his shotgun into a tree.
       Mitchell further clarified the events between shooting Marquis and killing Marcus.
He testified that he and defendant’s sister were in defendant’s sister’s car. Mitchell gave
defendant’s sister his gun because he did not want it with him when he got into his own
car. After leaving defendant’s sister’s car and getting into his own car, Marcus ran down
the street and jumped into Mitchell’s car. Marcus told Mitchell that somebody had just
shot his brother and he needed a ride. Mitchell jumped out of the car and asked
defendant’s sister whether Marcus was the person who had slapped her. Defendant’s
sister “had her finger on the outside of the cylinder [of the gun] holding it towards
[Marcus] and [Mitchell] snatched it out of her hand and fired. [Marcus] fell back into the
car. [Mitchell] went to the other side . . . and shot [Marcus] again. Marcus ran down the
street and . . . died.” Mitchell never communicated to defendant that he intended to kill
Marcus.
                                              III
                                  The Trial Court’s Ruling
       The trial court issued an oral ruling after reviewing the petition and related
briefing, the original court file, the jury instructions provided to the jury, the questions
submitted to the court by the jury, the reporter’s transcripts provided by the parties, and
the appellate court opinion. The trial court overruled defendant’s objection to statements
he and Mitchell made during their parole suitability hearings but said the evidence had, in
substance, been admitted at defendant’s original trial and it would have come to the same
conclusion had it excluded the statements.

                                              10
       The trial court began with a discussion of the jury instructions and case law
describing implied malice murder. The trial court then went through the facts of
defendant’s offenses, starting with statements from his parole hearing, in which
defendant admitted to shooting at Marquis and jogging to the scene of Marcus’s murder.
Defendant admitted at his parole hearing the altercation began because the twins had
disrespected his sister.
       The trial court then summarized a ruling made on defendant’s motion for a new
trial. There, the trial court spoke to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
murder verdict. Finding sufficient evidence, the trial court noted that the evidence could
easily establish that defendant acted as a coconspirator or an aider and abettor in causing
great bodily injury or death to Marcus. It found “ ‘that [defendant’s] further pursuit of
Marcus . . . after the completion of the [assault with a firearm] as to Marquis . . . is the act
that held [defendant] into the murder charge. And that his acts were not complete and he
was . . . not found guilty of the murder based on the assault with a firearm on Marquis
and the transaction that happened prior.’ ”
       The trial court disagreed with defendant that “the natural and probable
consequences doctrine was the prosecutor’s only theory of liability for which [defendant]
could have been convicted of murder” and, instead believed the prosecution had a strong
case for implied malice murder based on an aiding and abetting theory. It pointed to
defendant arming himself, watching Mitchell threaten to kill Marquis, and participating
in the shooting of Marquis. The trial court noted that, after this conduct, defendant and
Mitchell worked together in their pursuit of Marcus, such that defendant “either
specifically intended to aid Mitchell in killing Marcus or knew Mitchell intended to shoot
Marcus, an act inherently dangerous to human life where murder is a reasonabl[y]
foreseeable consequence. And the act was a conscious disregard for life by [defendant]
continuing to aid Mr. Mitchell by locating Marcus.”

                                              11
       Accordingly, the trial court ruled the evidence “establish[es] beyond a reasonable
doubt that [defendant] was convicted of second degree murder based on a valid theory.
Specifically that he aided and abetted implied malice murder.” Thus, the trial court
denied defendant’s petition for resentencing.
       Defendant appeals.
                                      DISCUSSION
                                                I
       Aiding And Abetting Implied Malice Murder Is A Viable Theory Of Murder
       Defendant contends that, after the amendments to sections 188 and 189 made by
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), aiding and abetting implied malice murder
is not a valid theory of murder liability because the theory “contravenes the requirement
that direct aiders and abettors harbor a specific intent to commit the charged crime.”
(Boldface omitted.) We disagree.
       Defendant acknowledges that this court in People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
689, held that an implied malice aider and abettor must know that the perpetrator
intended to commit the life-endangering act; intend “to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of the act”; know “the act is dangerous to life”; and act “in conscious
disregard for human life.” (Id. at p. 713, italics omitted.) In Powell, we cited People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850 (Gentile), where our Supreme Court noted that Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine but not second degree murder liability for an aider and abettor who “ ‘knows that
his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for
life.’ ” (Powell, at p. 713.) Defendant asserts that Powell was wrongly decided and is
inconsistent with Gentile (despite the former expressly relying on the latter), which
defendant argues summarized direct liability for implied malice murder not aider and
abettor liability. Not so.

                                             12
       “Murder, whether in the first or second degree, requires malice aforethought.”
(Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 844.) “Malice can be express or implied. It is express
when there is a manifest intent to kill (§ 188, subd. (a)(1)); it is implied if someone kills
with ‘no considerable provocation . . . or when the circumstances attending the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(2)). When a person directly
perpetrates a killing, it is the perpetrator who must possess . . . malice. [Citations.]
Similarly, when a person directly aids and abets a murder, the aider and abettor must
possess malice aforethought.” (Gentile, at p. 844.)
       In Gentile, our Supreme Court explained that a direct aiding and abetting theory of
murder “requires that ‘the aider and abettor . . . know and share the murderous intent of
the actual perpetrator.’ [Citation.] For implied malice, the intent requirement is satisfied
by proof that the actual perpetrator ‘ “knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and . . . acts with conscious disregard for life.” ’ [Citation.] Therefore,
notwithstanding Senate Bill [No.] 1437’s elimination of natural and probable
consequences liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not
expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the
person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with
conscious disregard for life.” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850.)
       As we have explained, “In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of
the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and
abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the
life[-]endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider
and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act,
not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct
aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to
aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.” (People v. Powell, supra,

                                              13
63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713, italics & fns. omitted; accord, People v. Vargas (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 943, 954.)
       Defendant argues that, in eliminating the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated aider and abettor
liability for unintended murders and made the crime of aiding and abetting murder
structurally identical to crimes like attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder,
which both require express malice. We rejected this argument in Glukhoy and upheld
Powell. (People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 590-591, review granted July 27,
2022, S274792 (Glukhoy).)
       In Glukhoy, we said, “[F]or second degree murder based on implied malice, there
is no imputation of malice because, as we have explained, the direct aider and abettor
must have the same mental state as the actual perpetrator of the charged crime: the direct
aider and abettor must act with knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life and
with conscious disregard for human life. Given the mens rea requirements for aiding and
abetting implied malice, not only is malice not ‘imputed’ on this direct aiding and
abetting theory, but liability is not grounded ‘solely’ upon participation in the crime
within the meaning of section 188, subdivision (a)(3) as amended in Senate Bill
[No.] 1437. Liability for murder is grounded upon the requirement that the aider and
abettor personally harbor malice.” (Glukhoy, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 590-591, rev.
granted, italics omitted.)
       We further held that “nothing in Senate Bill [No.] 775 [(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551)] or its legislative history indicates a rejection of our high court’s
observation concerning the availability of direct aiding and abetting implied malice
murder as a theory of accomplice liability, nor is there any legislative history indicating
disagreement with our holding in Powell. If the Legislature intended to abrogate aiding
and abetting implied malice murder, we think it would have expressly done so in Senate

                                              14
Bill [No.] 775.” (Glukhoy, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 591, rev. granted.) Accordingly,
aiding and abetting implied malice murder is a valid theory of murder.
                                              II
           The Trial Court’s Findings Did Not Conflict With The Jury’s Verdict
       Defendant spends much time attempting to convince us to refine the objective
element of the implied malice murder standard for aiders and abettors, i.e., that an aider
and abettor aid the perpetrator’s life-endangering act, to more narrowly define the
conduct that must be aided. Defendant does not argue how the refinement of the
objective element would change the outcome of his case, and instead focuses his analysis
on the jury verdicts’ effect on the trial court’s finding regarding the subjective element of
implied malice murder. Because defendant does not assert a claim of error with his
argument that the objective element of aiding and abetting an implied malice murder
should be refined, we do not address the argument. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [“No
judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause . . . for any error as to any
matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the
evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice”].)
       As to the subjective element, defendant argues the trial court’s finding that he
“ ‘aided and abetted and/or conspired with Gregory Mitchell to hunt down Marcus . . .
and kill him’ ” conflicted with the jury’s finding that defendant did not commit first
degree murder, and thus the trial court’s finding was prohibited by principles of collateral
estoppel. The trial court, however, did not rely on defendant’s specific intent to kill when
finding defendant guilty of second degree murder, it relied on his conscious disregard for
life. Indeed, the trial court ruled that defendant “either specifically intended to aid
Mitchell in killing Marcus or knew Mitchell intended to shoot Marcus, an act inherently
dangerous to human life where murder is a reasonabl[y] foreseeable consequence. And

                                              15
the act was a conscious disregard for life by [defendant] continuing to aid Mr. Mitchell
by locating Marcus.” (Italics added.)
       Still, defendant argues the trial court’s finding incorporating the conscious
disregard standard was precluded because the arguments made by the prosecution at
defendant’s trial and the jury’s questions and verdicts demonstrate the jury rejected
conscious disregard as the basis for murder. Not so. The jury made no explicit finding
that it rejected aiding and abetting an implied malice murder, as opposed to failing to
consider the theory’s applicability entirely. Defendant relies on inferences to conclude
the jury must have based its verdict on the felony-murder rule and rejected implied
malice murder. This, however, is not sufficient to invoke principles of collateral
estoppel. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715-716 [among other things, to
invoke collateral estoppel, the issue “must have been necessarily decided in the former
proceeding”].) There is nothing in the record demonstrating the jury decided defendant
did not commit implied malice murder when rendering its second degree murder verdict.
       Further, it may be true, as defendant argues, that the jury based its second degree
murder verdict on the felony-murder rule. But that was the reason defendant was
afforded an evidentiary hearing to relitigate beyond a reasonable doubt whether he is
guilty of second degree murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a), (d).) After
participating in that hearing, the trial court, which acts as the fact finder (Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 855), concluded defendant was guilty of murder as an accomplice to
implied malice murder. Defendant does not argue the trial court utilized the wrong
burden of proof when making its findings, and thus we find no basis for reversal.
                                              III
                  Sufficient Evidence Supports The Trial Court’s Finding
              That Defendant Was An Accomplice To Implied Malice Murder
       Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that he
committed implied malice murder. Specifically, defendant contends there is insufficient

                                              16
evidence he was subjectively aware his conduct endangered human life and that he acted
with a conscious disregard for life. We disagree.
       We review the trial court’s factfinding on the question of whether a defendant
committed a murder under a valid theory for substantial evidence. (People v. Clements
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) We analyze the record in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s finding and determine if there is sufficient substantial evidence to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1009, 1028; People v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1087.)
       “Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition.
While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve
contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) We will not reverse unless there
is no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial evidence exists to support the trial
court’s decision. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We must “presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The same standard
applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the
[trier of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
       “To be culpable as a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder, the
accomplice ‘must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering
act.’ [Citation.]” (Glukhoy, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 588, rev. granted, italics
omitted.) “ ‘The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and
abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the

                                              17
perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human
life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
       “ ‘Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to constitute aiding and
abetting, nor is the failure to take action to prevent a crime, although these are factors the
jury may consider in assessing a defendant’s criminal responsibility. [Citation.]
Likewise, knowledge of another’s criminal purpose is not sufficient for aiding and
abetting; the defendant must also share that purpose or intend to commit, encourage, or
facilitate the commission of the crime. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Along with presence at
the scene of the crime and failure to prevent it, ‘companionship’ and ‘conduct before and
after the offense,’ including ‘flight,’ are relevant to the [trier of fact]’s determination as to
whether a defendant aided and abetted in the commission of the crime.” (People v. Lara
(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 296, 322.)
       The life-endangering act committed by the perpetrator was Mitchell’s shooting of
Marcus. Defendant aided Mitchell in the commission of that life-endangering act by
helping Mitchell locate Marcus so that Mitchell could confront Marcus about
disrespecting defendant’s sister. Defendant knew Mitchell’s intent was to shoot Marcus
because, as the trial court found, defendant had just seen Mitchell shoot Marquis in an
effort to find Marcus. Further, as the trial court noted, defendant subjectively knew
locating Marcus for Mitchell to confront him was dangerous to human life because
Mitchell’s prior conduct of threating to kill Marquis and shooting Marquis demonstrated
Mitchell’s intentions towards Marcus went beyond a verbal confrontation. Further,
defendant’s efforts to facilitate a confrontation between Mitchell and Marcus while
knowing of Mitchell’s intentions showed defendant consciously disregarded the risk to
Marcus’s life. Through defendant’s conduct, he did not merely know of Mitchell’s
criminal purpose, but assisted Mitchell in carrying out that criminal purpose. Indeed,
defendant helped Mitchell locate Marcus so that Mitchell could shoot him as retribution
for disrespecting defendant’s sister.

                                               18
       Defendant disputes this interpretation of the facts, arguing that the trial evidence
established he did not see Mitchell shoot Marquis. But the evidence was inconsistent on
this point. While defendant testified he did not see Mitchell shoot Marquis, both Romano
and Marquis testified defendant was present when Mitchell shot Marquis. We adopt the
version of the evidence that supports the verdicts, not that which supports defendant’s
version of events. (See People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 314.) Also, defendant
points us to a series of appellate cases concluding the evidence was either sufficient or
insufficient to sustain an implied malice verdict. None of these cases is either controlling
or persuasive. “Reviewing the sufficiency of evidence . . . necessarily calls for analysis
of the unique facts and inferences present in each case, and therefore comparisons
between cases are of little value.” (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 137-138,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.App.5th 390, 421.)
Here, the evidence that defendant acted with conscious disregard for the lives of others is
well supported by the record.
                                             IV
                                Alleged Evidentiary Errors
       Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence transcripts
from his and Mitchell’s parole suitability hearings and Mitchell’s testimony that he
needed defendant for “backup” when locating Marcus and Marquis. We disagree.
       We review the trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
(People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 22-23.) We evaluate the
harmlessness of any error by asking “whether it is reasonably probable the appellant
would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error.” (Conservatorship of K.W.
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1274, 1286.)

                                             19
                                              A
             Admission Of The Transcripts From Defendant’s And Mitchell’s
                   Parole Suitability Hearings, If Error, Was Harmless
       Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the transcripts
from his two parole suitability hearings and from Mitchell’s parole suitability hearing.
He argues the error was prejudicial because the prosecution heavily relied on the
transcripts when arguing its case of murder. We disagree.
       Regardless of whether error occurred, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice.
(See Conservatorship of K.W., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.) As support for its
ruling, the trial court pointed to defendant’s statements during his parole suitability
hearing describing how he and Mitchell confronted Marquis and fired their guns at
Marquis before separately looking for Marcus while armed. As the trial court noted,
these facts were already established by the evidence admitted at trial. The trial court
further noted its ruling would have been the same without considering statements from
defendant’s and Mitchell’s parole suitability hearings. Given the trial court’s limited
reliance on the hearing transcripts and assertion it would have made the same ruling
without considering the transcripts, defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice
necessary for reversal.
                                              B
             The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Admitting Into
         Evidence Mitchell’s Testimony That He Needed Defendant For Backup
       During Mitchell’s testimony, he said he waited for defendant before confronting
Marcus because “[he] needed to make sure [he] had backup.” Mitchell explained he
could rely on defendant because Mitchell’s girlfriend was defendant’s sister and
defendant loved his sister dearly. Further, “back in the day”, “that’s how we got down.
We handled our business . . . we didn’t trust the police because they twist the truth.”
Following objection from defendant, the trial court acknowledged there was no evidence

                                             20
Mitchell communicated to defendant that he was waiting on him for backup to confront
Marcus.
       Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by considering this
testimony as evidence of defendant’s mental state. Specifically, defendant points to the
trial court’s statements during its ruling that “[Mitchell] testified that he had to make sure
‘[he] had backup. And that is how [they] got down.’ [Defendant] was aware that Mr.
Mitchell was armed, that [he] threatened to kill Marquis unless [Marquis] gave up the
location of [Marcus].” Defendant argues the trial court obviously violated its own ruling
and impermissibly attributed Mitchell’s intent to defendant. We disagree.
       During its ruling, the court did not say it believed defendant knew Mitchell was
waiting on him as backup in this particular instance and for the purpose of locating
Marcus. Instead, the trial court’s statements can be fairly read as indicating the
established practice between Mitchell and defendant. This was a permissible inference
from Mitchell’s testimony. Mitchell described his reliance on defendant as something
that typically occurred because that was how they handled their business at that time.
Mitchell could rely on defendant even more so in this instance because the situation
involved defendant’s sister, whom defendant loved. The trial court did not consider
Mitchell to have communicated his thoughts to defendant before confronting Marcus.
Accordingly, there was no evidentiary error.
                                              V
 Defendant Has Not Demonstrated The Trial Court Impermissibly Relied On Our Prior
   Opinion Or Statements Made By The Court During Defendant’s New Trial Motion
       Defendant contends the trial court impermissibly relied on our prior appellate
court opinion and statements made by the judge at the hearing on defendant’s new trial
motion when determining defendant’s guilt. We disagree.
       As it pertains to our prior opinion, defendant cites to the trial court’s statement that
it reviewed the opinion before making its ruling. Defendant also compares the version of

                                              21
section 1172.6 in effect at the time of his evidentiary hearing with the version in effect
now and notes section 1172.6 was amended to clarify that the trial court may consider our
appellate opinion only for the procedural history recited in it. In reply, defendant argues
our opinion contained many credibility determinations the trial court was precluded from
considering under current section 1172.6, and consideration of those credibility findings
was error.
       The problem with defendant’s argument is that he has pointed us to nothing in the
trial court’s ruling indicating it adopted any of the credibility determinations or factual
conclusions contained in the appellate court opinion. Nor does defendant point to any
evidence missing from the trial court’s analysis in favor of the evidence discussed in our
prior opinion. Accordingly, even if the trial court did rely on the appellate court opinion
as an evidentiary source, defendant has failed to demonstrate he was harmed by that
error. (Cf. People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 975-977, 980 [error for the trial
court to summarily deny a petition for resentencing based on an appellate court opinion’s
statement that the defendant delivered a fatal punch because the opinion did not identify
any express finding that the defendant “threw the fatal punch, any uncontroverted
evidence establishing that fact, or any concession by the defendant of its truth”].)
       As it pertains to the trial court’s statements during defendant’s new trial motion,
defendant argues the trial court adopted those statements as its own, instead of making its
own conclusions based on the evidence. While the trial court recited statements made by
the court during defendant’s new trial motion, it also engaged in a thorough analysis of
evidence admitted at defendant’s trial and evidentiary hearing, as well as the law. Read
as a whole, the trial court did not replace its reasoning with the reasoning of the court at
defendant’s new trial motion.

                                             22
                                              VI
                     Defendant Was Not Harmed By The Trial Court’s
                           Failure To Consider His Youthfulness
       Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to consider his youthfulness
when determining whether he acted with conscious disregard for human life. We
disagree.
       We observe that the California case law upon which defendant relies holds that
youth at the time of the offense is a relevant factor in determining whether a defendant is
a major participant in a crime and has acted with reckless indifference to human life. It
does not hold that courts are required to consider youth as a factor in evaluating whether
a direct aider and abettor has acted with a conscious disregard for human life, the relevant
question before us. (See People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 990-992
[addressing whether the 15-year-old defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life]; In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 453-454 [finding insufficient evidence that
16-year-old defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life and recognizing
children are generally less mature and responsible than adults].)
       Even if there were case law supporting defendant’s contention that courts should
consider a defendant’s youthfulness and maturity in evaluating whether a defendant acted
with a conscious disregard for the risks attendant to their conduct, defendant does not
point us to any evidence in the record that indicates his chronological age reflected
immaturity. Our review of the record did not uncover any evidence by experts regarding
brain development; nor did we discover evidence in the record regarding defendant’s
maturity at the time of the crime.
       Defendant’s attorney argued at the resentencing hearing that defendant was 19
years old and “[t]he idea a[] 19-year-old is going to stop a 33-year-old man from doing
something, I think that the trial testimony from [defendant] doesn’t suggest that somehow
not being able to stop it meant that he had the intent, the specific intent, to kill Marcus.”

                                              23
But none of that argument directs us to evidence that defendant’s youth impeded his
ability to appreciate the risks associated with his conduct. There is simply nothing in the
record before us that indicates youth played a factor in Marcus’s murder.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                                 /s/
                                                 ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, J.

/s/
EARL, J.

                                            24