Court Opinion

ID: 9673991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:21:37.571342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.117049
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
MORRISON, Judge.
Appellant presents a most able brief on motion for rehearing, and this court will attempt to discuss the points raised therein in the order presented.
Appellant first complains of our holding that there was no evidence giving rise to the presumption based upon the use of a deadly weapon in the hands of deceased.
It will be noted that the terms of Art. 1223 provide that the weapon, or means used by the party, gives rise to the presumption. It therefore follows that mere possession of a deadly weapon does not raise the presumption, Cain v. State, 154 Tex. Cr. R. 284, 226 S.W. 640, and Spencer v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 217, 128 S.W. 118. Smith did not testify that he saw a knife in the hands of deceased. The officer who searched deceased testified that he found the knife in his pocket and closed.
Viewing the evidence as we do, the question of the deadly character of the knife passes out of consideration.
*260A proper charge on self-defense was given, which we feel is all that the evidence required.
Appellant next complains of the overruling of his motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is uncertain, vague, and indefinite, because each defendant was found guilty, and the jury assessed “their punishment at 7 years in the penitentiary.”
Our original opinion cites no authority and states that those cited by appellant do not sustain him.
A distinction has existed so far as we can determine since 1896 between joint verdicts in cases involving a monetary fine and those where a period of confinement is assessed as the sole punishment.
In Mootry v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 450, 33 S.W. 877, decided in 1896, the court reviewed the prior decisions and held that a verdict which assessed “their punishment at death” was certain and, therefore, not vague and indefinite.
This seems to have been followed in cases involving punishment by a term of confinement in Polk v. State, 34 S.W. 633, where the jury assessed “their punishment at life imprisonment”; in Davidson v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 495, 50 S.W. 365, wherein the verdict “assessed their punishment at 2 years”; and in Good v. State, 66 S.W. 1099, wherein the verdict assessed “their punishment at 3 years,” and each was held to be certain.
In the discussion found in 42 Texas Jurisprudence, Sec. 367, as well as in some of the decisions of this court, it would appear that the test of the certainty of a joint verdict was whether the case was a felony or a misdemeanor. Only generally is this true since usually the punishment in misdemeanor cases is thought of as being a fine, while felonies usually carry with them punishment of a term of confinement.
A more accurate distinction, which we now point out, would be between cases in which a monetary fine was at least a part of the punishment and those where the punishment was a term of confinement.
The reason for this distinction is that a sum of money is readily divisible, while a term of confinement is not. This hinges *261upon the prime question of determining what was in the minds of the jury.
In addition to what has been said in our original opinion on appellant’s Bill of Exception No. 6, it will now be observed that such bill seeks to complain of two separate and distinct things, and is, therefore, duplicitous and not to be considered, Granado v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. Rep. 519, 228 S.W. 2d 530, and Smithwick v. State, 155 Texas Crim. Rep. 292, 234 S.W. 237.
If the matters set out in appellant’s Bill of Exception No. 3 actually transpired, they would present this court with a serious question. However, the qualification of the trial court states specifically that they did not occur. Appellant having failed to except to the qualification, this court has nothing for review.
In addition to what has been said in our original opinion about appellant’s Bill of Exception No. 7, we here observe that we know of no law authorizing the introduction of articles not shown to have been connected with the crime to be used for the purpose of comparison or for the purpose of conducting an experiment by the jury. Appellant’s authorities do not support him.
Bill of Exception No. 9 complains of the trial court’s refusal to allow appellant to ask his own witness, Carter, a leading question. The bill does not show surprise, that the witness was hostile or reluctant, or that his memory needed refreshing, which are the only exceptions generally recognized by this court. We uniformly have held this to be a question within the discretion of the trial court.
It is further observed that since the bill does not contain the answer which the witness would have given, it presents nothing for review, 4 Texas Jurisprudence, Sec. 219, p. 318.
Bill of Exception No. 10, by its terms, complains that his witness, Carter, was not permitted to reiterate statements made to him about which, according to the bill, he had just finished testifying. The bill does not disclose what the witness would have answered if he had been permitted to do so by the court; therefore, presents nothing for review.
Bills of Exception Nos. 1 and 5 complain that appellant was *262not permitted to examine the confessions of the defendants before announcing ready for trial.
Ón original submission appellant cited this court no authority supporting his position. He now cites U.S. v. Coplon, 185 Fed. 2d 629. That case was reversed, among other reasons, because the defendant Coplon was not permitted to see certain documentary evidence introduced by the government against her. In the case at bar appellant was permitted, as is always done, to examine the confessions before they were introduced as evidence.
We have attempted to write on every point raised by appellant so that he may be assured that this court has given his case, as it does all cases, its very best attention.
Finding no reversible error, the motion for rehearing is overruled.