Court Opinion

ID: 9865314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:31:12.479227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:25.155843
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Moore
dissenting.
Upon exhaustive study and thorough consideration of the petition for rehearing filed in this cause, I have concluded that the majority opinion, in which I originally concurred, is erroneous, and I respectfully dissent from the views therein expressed.
The case of the City and County of Denver v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 67 Colo. 225, 184 Pac. 604, is chiefly relied upon in the majority opinion as being decisive of this cause. The sole issue in that case, and the only question answered by this *248court in that case was stated by Mr. Justice White as follows: “The sole question involved herein is whether the Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction to regulate the rates to be charged by The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company in its local service within the City and County of Denver.” The question was answered in the negative.'That power of regulation was held to belong to the home rule cities. No question was raised in that, case which challenged the method by which a home rule city had attempted to use the regulatory power which the court held to be lodged in the home rule city. The sole question was whether • the power was existent in the Public Utilities Commission.
In the instant case, the question is entirely different. The home rule city of Denver has, by ordinance of the legislative body of the city, attempted an exercise of this regulatory power. The legality of this ordinance is the issue here.
Numerous opinions of this court hold that the validity of an ordinance of a home rule city is determined by the test of inquiring whether the ordinance relates to matters of “municipal or local concern.” We have held that the regulation of public utilities operating within a municipality is a matter of “municipal or local concern.”
Regulation of utilities calls for an exercise of the police power, but any attempted exercise thereof must meet all tests of applicable constitutional provisions which protect against a deprivation of property without due process of law.
By section 18 of the so-called Speer Amendment which is now in effect (section 209, Municipal Code, 1927), it is provided that: “All legislative powers possessed by the city and county of Denver, conferred by Article XX of the constitution of the state of Colorado, or contained in the charter of the city and county of Denver, and otherwise existing by operation of law, except as otherwise provided hy this amendment, shall be *249vested in a board of councilmen to consist of nine members * * Regulation of utilities is universally held to be a legislative function. It follows, therefore, that the city council has plenary, full and complete power to legislate for the city in any matter of local or municipal concern, unless there is a valid limitation placed thereon. We look to see whether the exercise of a particular power by the council of the city is prohibited. If not prohibited, the power exists in the council in all matters of local or municipal concern.
The majority opinion holds, in effect, that the limitation upon the power of the council, which invalidates the ordinance in question, is to be found in the charter provision which appears as section 280, Municipal Code 1927. I consider this section to be void as violative of the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. Unquestionably, if said section 280 had been omitted from the charter, the council would have the power to act in the manner here questioned, because, as above pointed out, the council is expressly given all legislative power, “except as otherwise provided by this amendment.” By the terms of section 280, the regulatory power attempted to be reserved to the people can only be exercised by them in the particular manner therein provided for. The difficulty, as I see it, arises from the manner in which the exercise of the power sought to be reserved, is to be exercised by the people. If, as here, the power reserved to the people can only be exercised by them in a manner which amounts tó a palpable violation of due process of law, then the claimed limitation upon the otherwise plenary power of the council is void. This court should zealously protect the right of the people to initiate laws and refrain from needlessly placing unreasonable restrictions upon the free exercise of that right. But it is equally important that this court should not deny a corporate entity a fundamental constitutional right to due process of law upon the ground that the denial thereof is being *250accomplished by an ordinance initiated by the people. A failure to provide due process of law is no less offensive because it stems from an initiated ordinance.
Wherein does section 280 violate the guarantee of due process of law? It provides, in substance, that the people shall exercise the power to regulate the rates to be charged by public utility companies “in the manner herein provided for initiating an ordiance.” The procedure for rate regulation, thus fixed upon, makes no provision whatever for a hearing of any kind at which the public utility to be regulated is afforded an opportunity to make a showing, or present facts essential to a fair determination of what the rate should be. The rate is fixed, the regulation is determined in the ex parte deliberation of the sponsors of the initiated measure, who presumably are the representatives of the people who sign the petitions. Upon submission of the duly signed petitions to the named authority, the city council must either forthwith adopt the measure without amendment, or refer it to a vote of the people. If adopted, either by vote of the council, or by the people upon the referendum election, the rate which the corporation is permitted to charge as fixed by the measure thus adopted, and all other regulations therein contained, are given the effect of law. At no point in the entire process is any hearing provided the corporation.
If there is any one firmly established concept of “due process of law,” it is that no person or corporation can have their rights adjudicated, or otherwise determined without full opportunity to said person or corporation to be heard. Any proceeding, the purpose of which is the fixing of a price to be charged for a commodity or service, is a proceeding which most certainly involves a property right of the person or corporation supplying the commodity or service. Such person or corporation is protected by the due process clause against any attempt to force upon him a price in the fixing of which he has *251been wholly excluded, and concerning which he is provided no hearing as a matter of absolute right.
It is no answer to the foregoing to assert that if the people should fix a rate that is confiscatory, the utility has the right to go into court, in a new proceeding, and enjoin the enforcement of the rate. To so hold would be to destroy the practical effectiveness of constitutional protection. The Constitution was not intended for use as a key with which to “lock the barn after the horse is stolen,” nor as á lantern with which to seek, in dark places, a restoration of lost property. If the fundamental guarantees of the Constitution are to have practical meaning, they should be given effect to prevent the injury at its inception.
Applying this reasoning to the case at bar, it is most apparent that the only provision which tends to invalidate the ordinance in question is section 280 of the charter. Upon its face, this section fails to provide even the semblance of due process of law. For that reason it is void. A void provision in a city charter creates no limitation on the power of the legislative body of the city.
It is not my purpose unduly to lengthen this dissent with quotations from the decided cases. As justification for my position, however, I direct attention to Graham v. Dye, 308 Ill. 283, 139 N.E. 390, where I find the following: “It was said in Hills v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. 86, if courts set the pernicious example of frittering away, by construction, the plain prohibitions of the constitution, even though the prohibition may not seemingly be of the greatest importance, the constitution would be of little value, for if one provision may be evaded or abrogated there is no security that others may not be.”
Even stronger language was used by this court in Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400, 26 P. (2d) 1051. I quote from the opinion in that case, the following: “We pronounce as the most certain of law that there has never been, and can never be, an emergency confronting the state that will warrant the servants of the Con*252stitution waiving so much as a word of its provisions. Armed men may destroy the government. Military rule, or the rule of the mob, may replace the orderly processes that have been our fortune since sovereignty was granted us by the United States. But no species of reasoning, no ingenuity of construction, no degree of emergency, can persuade us that the Constitution is without potency or dissuade us from performing our duty as its sworn officers.”
While the issue in each of the above cited cases did not involve a question of regulation of public utilities, the necessity for invoking the protection of constitutional guarantees was no more apparent there than attend the case at bar.
The rule which I believe should control disposition of this cause is stated in 12 American Jurisprudence, page 373, section 698: “A public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the reasonableness of the rates fixed for its charges by a rate-fixing commission. The right to a fair and open hearing is one of the rudiments of fair play assured to every litigant by the Federal Constitution as a minimal requirement. There must be due notice and an opportunity to be heard, the procedure must be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial, and the commission must act upon evidence and not arbitrarily. Such procedure is an inexorable safeguard. Moreover, there can be no compromise on the footing of convenience or expediency or because of a natural desire to be rid of harassing delay when such minimum requirements are ignored. Hence, if no hearing is provided for, and no notice or summons to the company required before the commission has found what it is to find, and no opportunity is provided for the company to introduce witnesses before the commission, not even the semblance of due process of law is provided. * * *”
*253While the above quotation and the authorities cited to support the text deal with the rate fixing power of commissions, the same principle is applicable to any rate fixing authority, and “the people” in the exercise of a rate fixing power cannot act to deny due process more readily than any other rate fixing authority.
I concur in the dissent of Mr. Justice Holland, and I am authorized to state that he concurs in the views hereinabove expressed.