Court Opinion

ID: 9913885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 22:00:25.703525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:32.834732
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit

No. 22-1121

                          UNITED STATES,

                            Appellee,

                                v.

                          GILBERT PEREZ,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

          [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                       Barron, Chief Judge,
              Howard and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

     Jamesa J. Drake, with whom Drake Law LLC was on brief, for
appellant.
     Brian S. Kleinbord, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.

                        December 28, 2023
          BARRON, Chief Judge.      Gilbert Perez seeks to vacate his

federal drug conviction on the ground that the United States

District Court for the District of Maine wrongly denied his motion

to suppress the fruits of a warrantless search of his backpack.

The District Court rested the denial on our decision in United

States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1975), which upheld a

similar warrantless search under the search-incident-to-arrest

exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution, id. at 609-11.        Because we reject Perez's

contention that intervening decisions of the Supreme Court of the

United States have stripped Eatherton of controlling force, we

affirm the judgment of conviction.

                                    I.

          When   reviewing   the    denial   of   a   motion   to   suppress

evidence, "'we recite the facts as found by the district court,

consistent with record support,' including the testimony from the

motion hearing."   United States v. Tom, 988 F.3d 95, 97 (1st Cir.

2021) (quoting United States v. Soares, 521 F.3d 117, 118 (1st

Cir. 2008) (cleaned up)). Massachusetts State Trooper Jason Conant

was conducting a patrol on the evening of August 30, 2019, when he

saw a pickup truck with Maine license plates stop in a McDonald's

                                   - 2 -
parking lot in Lawrence, Massachusetts.            The driver was later

identified as Perez.

            Perez exited the truck, donned a backpack, and walked

towards a residential area near the parking lot.             Conant became

suspicious of the out-of-state truck, as well as Perez's behavior,

and alerted other state troopers in the area to watch for Perez.

            Minutes after Perez left the parking lot, a second

Massachusetts state trooper, Shawn McIntyre, saw Perez exiting a

taxi on a nearby street.       McIntyre watched Perez start to walk in

the direction of the McDonald's where the truck was parked.

            McIntyre stopped the taxi and saw large quantities of

cash at the feet of the taxi's passenger.          McIntyre then radioed

Conant, informing him of the cash and the suspicion that Perez had

participated in a drug transaction with the taxi's passenger.

            Perez,    still   wearing   the   backpack,   returned   to   the

McDonald's parking lot.       Conant pulled his (unmarked) car into the

parking lot and exited the car.          Roughly simultaneously, Conant

began to yell "state police," and Perez began to run from the

parking lot.    Conant gave chase.

            About twenty yards from the parking lot, Perez tripped

and fell.   Conant caught up to Perez after his fall and pinned him

to the ground.       A third state trooper, Ryan Dolan, pulled up in a

patrol car.

                                   - 3 -
          Conant removed the backpack from Perez as Dolan was

handcuffing Perez's hands behind his back.         Dolan then sat Perez

on the pavement.

          After Perez was handcuffed, Conant placed the backpack

on Dolan's car and opened and searched the backpack.           Perez was

not in reaching distance of the backpack when the search of the

backpack took place.

          Conant discovered fentanyl and cocaine in the backpack.

Perez was then searched and formally arrested.

          Perez was indicted on March 12, 2020, on a federal

drug-related charge.       He moved to suppress the drugs, contending

that the backpack's search violated the Fourth Amendment.1

          The government opposed the motion on the ground that the

search was constitutional under Eatherton.         The government also

argued that, in any event, the search was conducted in good-faith

reliance on Eatherton.      See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229,

232   (2011)    (holding    that   "[police]   searches    conducted   in

objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are

not subject to the exclusionary rule").

          The    District    Court   denied    Perez's    motion   without

reaching the good-faith issue.       See United States v. Perez, Crim.

No. 2:20-CR-39-DBH-01, 2021 WL 2953671 (D. Me. July 14, 2021).

      1Perez challenged several other aspects of his arrest in the
District Court but raises none of those issues on appeal.

                                   - 4 -
The District Court found that "[t]he police had probable cause to

arrest Perez when they handcuffed him," and it "treat[ed] [the

police] as having effectively arrested him then," although the

District Court also found that it was only later that Perez was

"formally" arrested.   Id. at *2.     The District Court separately

found, moreover, that Perez's handcuffing occurred "as" Conan

"ripped the backpack off" of Perez.        Id.   With that factual

predicate in place, the District Court reasoned that the search of

the backpack was lawful because, when there is probable cause for

an arrest, Eatherton allows for the warrantless "search [of] a

container found on a person being arrested," id. at *3, and our

Court had not "'unmistakably' cast Eatherton 'into disrepute,'"

id. at *4 (quoting Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Me., Dep’t of Educ.,

386 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 2004)).

          Perez entered a conditional guilty plea, which preserved

his right to appeal his conviction based on the District Court's

Eatherton-based denial of his motion to suppress.     He then filed

this timely appeal.    We review the District Court's "factual

findings for 'clear error'" and its "legal conclusions . . . de

novo."   United States v. Rodríguez-Pacheco, 948 F.3d 1, 6 (1st

Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 723-

24 (1st Cir. 2011)).

                              - 5 -
                                       II.

             The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable       searches      and    seizures"       by    providing      that

"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."                   U.S. Const.

amend. IV.    Our focus is on the exception to the Fourth Amendment's

warrant requirement for a search incident to an arrest. See United

States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

             Perez does not dispute that the exception covers his

backpack's search if Eatherton remains good law.              He contends only

that   Eatherton    does   not    because      of   either   United    States   v.

Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), or Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332

(2009), or both together.

             Under the law of the circuit doctrine, newly constituted

panels must follow the rulings of preceding panels that are

"directly (or even closely) on point," United States v. Guzman,

419 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2005), "even where the succeeding panel

disagrees with the prior one," United States v. Guerrero, 19 F.4th

547, 552 (1st. Cir 2021).         The doctrine recognizes an exception,

however, when "[a]n existing panel decision [is] undermined by

controlling authority, subsequently announced, such as an opinion

of the Supreme Court, an en banc opinion of the circuit court, or

a statutory overruling," Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d

588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995), or when an "authority that postdates the

                                       - 6 -
original decision, although not directly controlling, nevertheless

offers a sound reason for believing that the former panel, in light

of fresh developments, would change its collective mind," United

States v. Barbosa, 896 F.3d 60, 74 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting

Williams, 45 F.3d at 592).

            The latter exception is very limited, as it applies only

when the new authority "provides a clear and convincing basis" to

conclude    that    the   prior   panel    would    have   changed   its   mind.

Guerrero, 19 F.4th at 552.          For that reason, we have described

cases that trigger this exception as "hen's-teeth-rare."               San Juan

Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2010).

            We    begin   by   reviewing   Eatherton       and   describing   its

rationale.       We then explain why we conclude that Eatherton still

controls.

                                      A.

            The defendant in Eatherton was Gilbert Eatherton.                 519

F.2d. at 605.        A suspected bank robber, he was walking down a

street while carrying a briefcase when agents of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation ("FBI") spotted him.              Id. at 609.

            The FBI agents called for Eatherton to come to their

car, and he did so.        Id.    When he was "close to the vehicle the

agents told him he was under arrest [and] instructed him to drop

the briefcase and [lie] spread eagle on the ground."                    Id.    He

complied with the commands, and the FBI agents "thoroughly frisked"

                                    - 7 -
him, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of their vehicle.

Id.    The FBI agents then picked up the briefcase, opened it, and

found a loaded gun and three brown ski masks, all of which were

later admitted as evidence at trial.     Id.

           Eatherton did not dispute that there was probable cause

to arrest him, and he "concede[d] that the agents could have seized

the briefcase consonant with the [F]ourth [A]mendment."      Id. at

610.   But he argued that the agents "should have obtained a search

warrant before investigating [the briefcase's] contents," and

that, because the agents did not, the search of his briefcase

violated the Fourth Amendment.    Id. He thus argued that the fruits

of the search of the briefcase had to be suppressed because that

search could not be justified merely by the fact of his arrest and

the right to search his person that his arrest entailed.    Id.

           Eatherton relied chiefly on the Supreme Court's decision

in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).      There, the Court

held that the bare fact that an arrest occurred inside a home did

not justify a warrantless search of the entirety of the premises.

Id. at 763. The Court also held that although a warrantless search

of the area of the home within the "immediate control" of the

arrestee was reasonable if justified "by the need to seize weapons

and other things which might be used to assault an officer or

effect an escape" or "by the need to prevent the destruction of

evidence of the crime," these "justifications are absent where a

                                 - 8 -
search is remote in time or place from the arrest."      Id. at 764

(quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).

           Eatherton argued based on Chimel that the briefcase's

search violated the Fourth Amendment because "any urgency to

inspect the interior of the briefcase was completely removed once

he had been subdued and the [brief]case removed from his possession

and beyond his possible reach."    Eatherton, 519 F.2d at 610.   But,

although the Eatherton panel acknowledged that there was "some

logical cogency" to the contention, id., the panel held that the

search of the briefcase's interior was reasonable.

           The Eatherton panel first pointed out that Chimel had

cited "with apparent approval Draper v. United States, in which a

search virtually identical to that at issue [in Eatherton] was

upheld."   Id. (citation omitted).       Draper involved a criminal

defendant who had evidence admitted against him at his trial that

was obtained from the warrantless search of a bag that he was

carrying when he was arrested.    358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959).

           The Eatherton panel next explained that other courts of

appeals "had little apparent difficulty" rejecting Chimel-based

arguments for prohibiting warrantless "searches identical to that

contested" by Eatherton.   519 F.2d at 610.     Notably, in each of

those cases, as in Draper, the warrantlessly-searched container

was similar in size to the briefcase in Eatherton.       See United

States v. Maynard, 439 F.2d 1086, 1087 (9th Cir. 1971) (rejecting

                                 - 9 -
the argument that a warrantless search of a suitcase the defendant

was carrying when arrested was unconstitutional because the search

was "incident to the lawful arrest of its carrier"); United States

v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145, 146-48 (9th Cir. 1971) (relying on Draper

to reject the contention that Chimel governed a warrantless search

of a suitcase carried at the time of arrest); United States ex

rel. Muhammad v. Mancusi, 432 F.2d 1046, 1047-48 (2d Cir. 1970)

(rejecting     as   "frivolous"   a   Chimel-based   challenge   to   the

post-arrest search at a police station of a briefcase in the

"immediate possession" of the defendant at the time of the arrest

when the defendant conceded that the search "would have been proper

if [it] had been conducted at the time [and place] of his arrest").

          The Eatherton panel then addressed three Supreme Court

decisions that post-dated both Chimel and the other circuits'

rulings that had upheld searches like the search of Eatherton's

briefcase: Robinson, 414 U.S. at 218; Gustafson v. Florida, 414

U.S. 260 (1973); and United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).

The Eatherton panel explained that this trio showed that the

Chimel-based challenge could not "be sustained."         Eatherton, 519

F.2d at 610.

          In Robinson, the Court held that the warrantless search

of a "crumpled up cigarette package" found in the "breast pocket

of the heavy coat [the arrestee] was wearing" at the time of his

arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the

                                  - 10 -
arresting   officer    had   neither    "any     subjective   fear   of   the

[arrestee]" or any "susp[icion] that the [arrestee] was armed."

414 U.S. at 222-23, 236.         The Court explained that because the

"custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a

reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment[,]" a search "of

the person" of an arrestee incident to that arrest is per se

reasonable.    Id. at 235.     Robinson thus rejected the contention

that a more limited pat-down -- such as the limited frisk permitted

in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) -- was all that was allowed

for a search incident to the arrest.             See Robinson, 414 U.S. at

235.   And the Court then explained that "[h]aving in the course of

a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, [the

officer who had conducted the search of the arrestee's person] was

entitled to inspect [the package,] and when his inspection revealed

the heroin capsules, he was entitled to seize them as 'fruits,

instrumentalities, or contraband' probative of criminal conduct."

Id. at 236 (quoting Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-55

(1947)).

            Robinson    relied     on      the     rationales    for      the

search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement to

justify the ruling that the warrantless search of the cigarette

package was reasonable.      Those rationales are rooted in a concern

for officer safety, the governmental interest in the preservation

of evidence, and the diminished privacy interest of an arrestee

                                  - 11 -
due to the dominion over their person effected by the arrest

itself.     See   Robinson,    414    U.S.     at     226;    see     also    Riley   v.

California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) ("Robinson regarded any

privacy   interests     retained     by   an   individual           after    arrest   as

significantly diminished by the fact of the arrest itself.").

            In Gustafson, which was decided the same day as Robinson,

the Court went a step further than it had in Robinson.                         It held

that a warrantless search of a cigarette box found in the "front

coat pocket of the coat [the arrestee] was wearing" during a search

of the arrestee's person at the time of his arrest, 414 U.S. at

262, was per se reasonable under Robinson even though the search

of the cigarette box occurred after the arrestee had been placed

"in the back seat of the squad car," id. at 262 n.2, and even

though    there   was   no   "subjective       fear    of     the    [arrestee]"      or

"susp[icion] that the [arrestee] was armed," id. at 266.

            The defendant in Eatherton tried to distinguish Robinson

and Gustafson based on the relatively large size of his briefcase

and the fact that it was not concealed in his pocket but held in

his hand at the time of the arrest.                   But the Eatherton panel

concluded that "[t]he line which [Eatherton] attempts to draw

placing the briefcase beyond the search of his 'person' which

Robinson and Gustafson expressly approve is one requiring gossamer

distinctions."     Eatherton, 519 F.2d at 610.               And Eatherton went on

to state that "[t]here is no indication that the result in those

                                     - 12 -
cases would have been any different had the cigarette packages

been in the defendants' hands rather than in their pockets or if

they had been dropped to the ground in response to [a] police

command." Id. Moreover, Eatherton explained, "[w]hile a briefcase

may be a different order of container than a cigarette box, it is

not easy to rest a principled articulation of the reach of the

[F]ourth [A]mendment upon the distinction."               Id.

           The Eatherton panel also noted that the defendant's

argument was "not unlike" Justice Marshall's in "his dissent to

Gustafson and Robinson."        Id.     The Eatherton panel then cited to

the portion of that dissent that relied on Chimel to dispute the

majority's     decision   to   uphold    the   warrantless       search   of   the

container in that case.        Id. (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 256-58

(Marshall, J., dissenting)).          While the argument advanced in that

portion   of    Justice   Marshall's      dissent    "may       have   analytical

appeal," the Eatherton panel concluded, the view set forth there

"does not presently represent the law."             Id.

           The Eatherton panel wound up its analysis by invoking

Edwards, which was decided the year after Robinson and Gustafson.

The Court held in Edwards that the Fourth Amendment permitted the

warrantless search of clothing that an arrestee was wearing at the

time of his arrest even though the search of the clothing occurred

the day after the arrest and while the arrestee was in jail.

Edwards, 415 U.S. at 808-09.            Edwards reasoned that "the legal

                                      - 13 -
arrest of a person" reduces the arrestee's expectation of privacy

in items "in his immediate possession, including his clothing."

Id. at 805, 808 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. DeLeo,

422 F.2d 487, 493 (1st Cir. 1970)).

             The Eatherton panel observed that the Court in Edwards,

"after noting that the courts of appeals have generally permitted

searches of both 'the person and the property in his immediate

possession,'" stated that "it is difficult to perceive what is

unreasonable about the police examining and holding as evidence

those personal effects of the accused that they already have in

their lawful custody as the result of a lawful arrest." Eatherton,

519 F.2d at 610 (first quoting Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803; then

quoting Edwards, 415 U.S. at 806).       The search in Edwards had been

made   "in    the     station   house   after   an   arrest,"   Eatherton

acknowledged.       But Eatherton explained that there was no reason to

"doubt that [those observations from Edwards] apply equally to

searches in the field immediately incident to the arrest."            Id.

Eatherton thus held that, as the defendant in the case before it

had "conceded the agents properly seized the briefcase as . . .

incident to his arrest . . . any expectation of privacy which he

held with regard to the briefcase was taken out of 'the realm of

protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and

evidence.'"    Id. at 610-11 (quoting Edwards, 415 U.S. at 808-09).

                                   - 14 -
                                        B.

               As this extended review of Eatherton reveals, the panel

in that case did more than determine that the rule set forth in

Robinson, Gustafson, and Edwards rather than the rule set forth in

Chimel controlled the briefcase's search.              The panel also made

clear that it based that determination on the considered judgment

that, for purposes of the rule laid down in Robinson and Gustafson,

a search of a container (at least of the "order" of a briefcase,

see Eatherton, 519 F.2d at 610) in the hands of an arrestee at the

time of the arrest was no different from a search of a container

in the pocket of an arrestee at that time.2            As Eatherton put it,

a "line which [would] plac[e] the briefcase beyond the search of

[the] 'person' which Robinson and Gustafson expressly approve is

one requiring gossamer distinctions."             519 F.2d at 610.    And, to

that       point,   the   Eatherton   panel    explained   that,   although   a

briefcase was of "a different order of container from a cigarette

box," it would not be "easy" to make any such distinction for the

       2We understand Eatherton's statement that "[t]here is no
indication that the result in [Robinson and Gustafson] would have
been any different had the cigarette packages been . . . dropped
to the ground in response to police command," 519 F.2d at 610, to
mean only that the determination of whether an item is "of the
person" of the arrestee or in the arrestee's "area of immediate
control" is unaffected by post-arrest, police-ordered conduct.
After all, at the same time that the FBI agents told Eatherton to
drop the briefcase, they also told him he was under arrest. Id.
at 609.

                                      - 15 -
relevant Fourth Amendment purposes in a "principled" manner.                 Id.

Eatherton then reasoned that, as a result, Edwards required the

conclusion that the briefcase's search was reasonable, given that

Edwards concluded that the search of the personal property found

on the person of the arrestee in that case was reasonable.                   In

that regard, Eatherton concluded based on Edwards that because

"the   agents   properly   seized    the     briefcase   . . .    incident   to

[Eatherton's] arrest. . . . any expectation of privacy which he

held with regard to the briefcase was taken out of 'the realm of

protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and

evidence.'"     Id. at 610-11 (quoting Edwards, 415 U.S. at 808-09).

           Perez   does    not   suggest     that   there   is   any   relevant

difference between his backpack and the briefcase in Eatherton or

that the backpack was not on his back when the District Court found

that he was arrested, notwithstanding that the District Court found

that he was "formally" arrested only thereafter.             He thus accepts

that his appeal lacks merit if Eatherton controls.                     His sole

contention, therefore, is that Eatherton does not control due to

post-Eatherton developments.

                                      C.

           The post-Eatherton developments that Perez has in mind

are two Supreme Court precedents: Chadwick and Gant.              He contends

that, whether separately or together, they undermine (even if they

do not overrule) Eatherton's holding that a briefcase in the hands

                                    - 16 -
of an arrestee at the time of arrest is no different from the

cigarette containers involved in Robinson and Gustafson.                   But we

cannot agree -- even if we account for post-Chadwick and post-Gant

out-of-circuit precedent that is at odds with Eatherton.                  Thus, we

conclude that Eatherton remains binding on us as a panel.3

                                           1.

               We start with Perez's arguments about Chadwick, which

was decided two years after               Eatherton.       Perez contends that

Chadwick       is    a    significant       intervening     precedent     because

Eatherton's rationale depended on the determination that there was

"no indication" that the result in either Robinson or Gustafson

"would have been any different had the cigarette packages been in

the defendants' hands rather than in their pockets or if they had

been       dropped   to   the   ground    in    response   to   police   command."

Eatherton, 519 F.2d at 610.              Yet, Perez asserts, Chadwick shows

that is not so.

       Neither Perez nor the government addresses whether, even if
       3

Eatherton does not control the outcome of this case, it is
controlled by our post-Chadwick ruling in United States v.
Maldonaldo-Espinosa, 968 F.2d 101, 104 (1st Cir. 1992) (rejecting
an argument that the search of a bag "on the table next to [the
handcuffed defendant] and within reach" could be justified only by
an exigency because "government agents, when arresting a person,
may constitutionally search an arrested person's nearby . . . bag,
without a warrant . . . whether or not [the agents] have reason to
fear that the carry-on bag contains a weapon, another threat to
their safety, or destructible evidence"). Because we conclude that
Eatherton controls here, we need not evaluate the search of Perez's
backpack under Maldonaldo-Espinosa.

                                         - 17 -
           The Supreme Court held in Chadwick that the warrantless

search of an arrestee's      "double-locked,    200-pound footlocker"

violated the Fourth Amendment when the search of that container

was conducted beyond "the area from within which [the arrestees]

might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence,"

Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 5 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763), and was

not "justified by any other exigency," id. at 15.         But nothing in

Chadwick   disturbs    either    Robinson's    ruling     upholding    the

warrantless search of a cigarette container in the pocket of an

arrestee at the time of the lawful arrest or Gustafson's ruling

upholding such a search even when it is performed after the

cigarette container has been removed from the arrestee's immediate

area of control.

           In   that   regard,   Chadwick     expressly    states     that,

"[u]nlike searches of the person [under] United States v. Robinson

[and] United States v. Edwards, searches of possessions within an

arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced

expectations of privacy caused by the arrest."            433 U.S. at 16

n.10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).        We do not read that

passage, in expressly reaffirming Robinson and Edwards, to be

silently rejecting the parts of their holdings that blessed the

searches of the personal property in those cases that was found on

the person of the defendants.      Nor do we read that passage, in

reaffirming those two cases without mentioning Gustafson, to be

                                 - 18 -
silently    rejecting      Gustafson's     extension    of   Robinson's    rule

regarding a search of personal property on the person of the

arrestee at the time of the arrest to cover the search of such

property even after that property was no longer in the arrestee's

area of immediate control.

            Moreover, nothing in Chadwick purports to address how to

treat a container that an arrestee has in hand at the time of

arrest relative to a container that an arrestee has in a pocket at

that time.      In fact, Chadwick had no reason to address that

question because the arrestee was not holding the container in

Chadwick.    Nor, for that same reason, did Chadwick have reason to

address whether the arrestee's dropping of such a container in

response to a police command upon arrest would change the calculus.

So, not surprisingly, Chadwick does not purport to address that

scenario either.

            True, Chadwick does state that "[o]nce law enforcement

officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not

immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their

exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the

arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or

destroy evidence, a search of the property is no longer an incident

of the arrest."         433 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).             But the

emphasized    language     shows   that    Chadwick's   "immediate   area    of

control"     rule   does    not    apply   to   "personal    property     . . .

                                     - 19 -
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee," id., and

so merely operates in parallel to the holdings in                           Robinson,

Gustafson, and Edwards.          Thus, because Chadwick does not address

what, if any, personal property carried or worn by the arrestee at

the time of the arrest beyond the cigarette packages in Robinson

and Gustafson and the clothing in Edwards constitutes "personal

property     . . . immediately         associated   with   the      person    of   the

arrestee," Chadwick does not address whether a held briefcase like

the one in Eatherton is to be treated the way that the personal

property in those three cases was.           As a result, Chadwick gives no

"indication that the result in [Robinson and Gustafson] would have

been   any    different    had    the    cigarette     packages      been     in   the

defendants' hands rather than in their pockets or if they had been

dropped to the ground in response to police command."                    Eatherton,

519 F.2d at 610.

             Simply     put,   Eatherton     was    concerned       about     drawing

distinctions     between       types    of   containers       in    an   arrestee's

"immediate     possession,"      Eatherton,      519   F.2d    at    610     (quoting

Edwards, 415 at 803), at the time of arrest -- a problem that is

hardly trivial given the range of containers people may carry

beyond cigarette packages, from holsters to purses to backpacks.

But, as      Chadwick    had no reason to address that line-drawing

problem, it cannot offer any insight into how to resolve that

                                        - 20 -
problem.    We thus do not see how Chadwick undermines Eatherton's

rationale for upholding the search of the briefcase in Eatherton.

                                 2.

           Perez does argue that Gant undermines Eatherton even if

Chadwick does not.   But here, too, we disagree.

           Gant relied on Chimel in holding that courts had wrongly

interpreted New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), to have held

that all personal property in an automobile was categorically

searchable incident to an occupant's arrest.       Gant, 556 U.S. at

348-52.    Perez contends that it follows from Gant that the search

of his backpack is no different from the car search in that case.

           But, Gant, like Chadwick, said nothing about whether the

rule of Robinson (as applied in Gustafson and Edwards) governs a

container that an arrestee is carrying at the time of the arrest

(or that is dropped in response to police command at that time).

Indeed, Gant did not address carried personal property at all,

because it concerned only whether a car may be searched incident

to a lawful arrest of an occupant of the car.       Thus, Gant is no

different from Chadwick in the relevant respect, and so provides

no basis for our concluding that Eatherton has been stripped of

its controlling force.     For, like Chadwick, Gant has literally

nothing to say about where the line should be drawn in searches

                               - 21 -
incident to arrest when it comes to things an arrestee carries at

the time of the arrest.4

                                      D.

               The dissent appears to accept that neither Chadwick nor

Gant       directly   overrules   Eatherton.     The   dissent    nonetheless

contends that we still can be confident that if the panel in

Eatherton knew what we do in consequence of Chadwick and Gant,

that panel would have abandoned its hard line about the difficulty

of drawing hard lines.        As the dissent sees it, the panel in that

event would have "centered its analysis around 'immediate control'

rather than shoehorning the search of a closed container into being

'of the [arrestee's] person.'"             Dissent at 49.   But we see no

"clear and convincing" case for that conclusion.                 Guerrero, 19

F.4th at 552.

               Chadwick does make clear that no per se rule establishes

that "luggage" within the "immediate area of control" of an

       Perez does at points argue that, under Gant, the location
       4

of a container "relative to the arrestee at the time of arrest is
irrelevant" when determining whether the container can be searched
without a warrant, because all such searches should be evaluated
based on the container's location at the time of its search. But,
as Gustafson and Edwards show, the application of Robinson's
categorical rule depends, as to at least some personal property,
on the property's location at the time of the arrest and not at
the time of the search.      And, as we have explained, there is
nothing in Gant that undermines Robinson, Gustafson, or Edwards.
We thus do not see how Perez's time-of-the-search contention,
insofar as it is meant to address all containers, can be reconciled
with Robinson as it was applied in Gustafson and Edwards.

                                    - 22 -
arrestee at the time of the arrest may be warrantlessly searched.

See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n.10.          Thus, Chadwick does prompt the

question of why it would be per se reasonable to search a briefcase

that is held (or dropped upon police command) by an arrestee at

the time of the arrest.

             But Chadwick applied the "immediate control" test to a

container that was not carried by the arrestee at the time of the

arrest.      By contrast, the Eatherton panel was addressing only how

to treat a container that an arrestee was carrying at that time,

so the Eatherton panel did not purport to suggest that the Robinson

rule would apply to nearby containers not carried by the arrestee

at the time of the arrest.        As a result, Chadwick fails to provide

a clear and convincing reason for us to conclude that the Eatherton

panel would have reversed course had it known about Chadwick.

             That is especially so given that Chadwick, in a passage

that   the    dissent     mentions    but   otherwise    ignores,   expressly

distinguishes       searches     of    personal    property     "immediately

associated" with the person of the arrestee (like the personal

property     at   issue   in   Robinson,    Gustafson,   and   Edwards)   from

searches of personal property of the arrestee that is merely within

the "immediate control" of the arrestee.          Id. at 15.    For, because

of that distinction, Chadwick did not address whether principled

lines could be drawn in this context between types of containers

that are carried by the arrestee at the time of arrest -- whether

                                      - 23 -
those types of containers are cigarette packs, wallets, purses,

fanny packs, holsters, or briefcases.                      Yet Eatherton's clearly

expressed concern was that such lines could not be drawn.                              See

Eatherton, 519 F.2d at 610.

              Gant   similarly     offers        no    relevant    insight     into    the

proper way to resolve the line-drawing problem that troubled the

Eatherton      panel.        Because      Gant     addresses      only    searches      of

automobiles, it says nothing about what distinctions might be

tenable when it comes to containers that an arrestee is carrying

at the time of the arrest.

              We thus fail to see how we could be confident that

Chadwick or Gant -- or even the two taken together -- would have

led the Eatherton panel to "center" its analysis of the briefcase

on the "immediate control" question.                   Were the panel to have done

so, it would have been forced to draw the very distinctions between

the   types    of    carried    containers         that    it    concluded     were    too

"gossamer" to make.          Eatherton, 519 F.2d at 610.                But not a word

in either Chadwick or Gant would give the Eatherton panel reason

to    think   that,     contrary     to    the        panel's   initial    assessment,

distinctions of substance as to such containers could be made in

a "principled" manner.          See id.

              Of course, the dissent is right that, in the wake of

Chadwick      and    Gant,   other     circuits         have    drawn    the   kinds   of

distinctions that Eatherton refused to make.                    See United States v.

                                          - 24 -
Knapp, 917 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that the

search of a purse was governed by the Chimel standard because the

purse   "was    not   concealed   under   or     within   [the    defendant's]

clothing" and "was easily capable of separation from her person");

United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 321 (3rd Cir. 2010) ("[A]

search is permissible incident to a suspect's arrest when, under

all the circumstances, there remains a reasonable possibility that

the arrestee could access a weapon or destructible evidence in the

container or area being searched.").         But post-Eatherton precedent

is not uniformly at odds with Eatherton, as even the dissent

acknowledges     in   describing    how     other      circuits   reacted   to

Chadwick -- at least prior to Gant.          See Dissent at 39.

           Indeed, some circuits after Chadwick but before Gant

appeared   to   follow   Eatherton's      lead    in   categorizing   certain

carried items as "of the person."           Two months after Chadwick was

decided, for example, the Fourth Circuit assumed that warrantless

searches of objects carried in an arrestee's hands were permissible

as searches "of the person incidental to an arrest." United States

v. Wyatt, 561 F.2d 1388, 1391 (4th Cir. 1977) (search of a notebook

that arrestee retrieved from his car after being arrested).                 And

four years later, in United States v. Graham, the Seventh Circuit

explained that a "shoulder purse carried by a person at the time

he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the

search of his person."      638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1981).

                                   - 25 -
             Although the question in Graham was whether the purse

was "of the person" for purposes of a search warrant authorizing

a search of the person, and there was no issue of a warrantless

search incident to an arrest, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning

nevertheless aligns neatly with Eatherton's.         As the Seventh

Circuit explained, "[c]ontainers . . . while appended to the body,

are so closely associated with the person that they are identified

with and included within the concept of one's person.           To hold

differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one's

person to a point at which it would have little meaning."           Id.

And almost two decades later, the Eighth Circuit followed the

Seventh Circuit's lead and explained that a purse, for purposes of

the       search-incident-to-arrest   exception,   was     an    object

"immediately associated" with one's person, even though the purse

in that case was also within the arrestee's area of "immediate

control."      Curd v. City Court, 141 F.3d 839, 843-44 (8th Cir.

1998).     Indeed, the Eighth Circuit agreed "with the general view"

of other courts that "concluded that a purse, like a wallet, is an

object 'immediately associated' with the person."        Id. (citations

omitted).5

      5To be sure, four months later, the Eighth Circuit approved
a backpack search because "the search of his person and backpack
was lawful as a search incident to arrest," seemingly
distinguishing "person" from "backpack" and citing a case for the
idea that possessions within "immediate control" can be searched.
United States v. Oakley, 153 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir. 1998).

                                 - 26 -
            Thus, to the extent that post-Chadwick precedents from

sister circuits may shed light on what the Eatherton panel would

have done with the benefit of them, we do not see how the pre-Gant

precedents of that ilk do. Even though some of those post-Chadwick

but   pre-Gant   precedents   adopt    the   dissent's    position,    these

precedents are, as a group, too varied to justify application of

the second exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine.

            The dissent does also cite to post-Gant sister-circuit

cases that extend Gant to non-vehicle contexts.          See, e.g., United

States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191, 193 (4th Cir. 2021) ("Gant applies

beyond the automobile context to the search of a backpack.");

United States v. Knapp, 917 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2019)

("[A]lthough     Gant   specifically    addressed   the    search     of   an

automobile, its principles apply more broadly."); United States v.

Cook, 808 F.3d 1195, 1199 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015) ("We do not read

Gant's holding as limited only to automobile searches because the

Court tethered its rational to the concerns articulated in Chimel,

which involved a search of an arrestee's home."); Shakir, 616 F.3d

at 318 ("[T]he Government contends that the rule of Gant applies

only to vehicle searches.       We do not read Gant so narrowly.").

But these out-of-circuit cases also fail to show what is required

to justify applying the second exception to the law-of-the-circuit

doctrine.

                                 - 27 -
             Even after Gant, the Supreme Court recognized in Riley

v. California that "[l]ower courts applying Robinson and Chimel

. . . have approved searches of a variety of personal items carried

by an arrestee" and cited to a case where the D.C. Circuit upheld

the search of a purse incident to the arrest of its owner.             573

U.S. 373, 392-93 (2014) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Lee,

501   F.2d   890,   892   (D.C.   Cir.   1974)).   And   Riley   repeatedly

described Gant as a case involving automobile searches without in

any way suggesting that Gant had worked a reformation of Robinson's

rule for searches of at least some personal property on the person

of the arrestee at the time of the arrest.           See 573 U.S. at 398

("But Gant relied on 'circumstances unique to the vehicle context'"

(quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343)); id. at 385 ("Gant added . . . an

independent exception for a warrantless search of a vehicle's

passenger compartment . . . . That exception stems not from Chimel

. . . but from 'circumstances unique to the vehicle context.'"

(quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343)).         Thus, the post-Gant cases from

sister circuits do not show in a clear and convincing way that the

Eatherton panel -- with the benefit of Gant -- would have ruled

the same way that those circuits had.

             We note, too, that Riley made its observation about how

other circuits had applied Robinson post-Chadwick while addressing

whether the rule of Robinson extends to the search of the data on

an arrestee's carried cellphone.         Riley, 573 U.S. at 392-93.   Yet,

                                    - 28 -
in doing so, the Court both expressly reaffirmed that Robinson

survived Chadwick as to at least some personal property on the

person of the arrestee at the time of arrest, id. at 384, 394, and

highlighted the fact that Chadwick expressly exempted from its

"immediate control" test "personal property . . . immediately

associated with the person of the arrestee[,]" id. at 384 (first

alteration in original) (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15).

           Finally, although Riley carefully explained that the

officer-safety,     evidence-collection,       and     diminished-privacy

rationales for Robinson's rule did not apply to a cell phone's

data, the Court said nothing in doing so that "clear[ly] and

convincing[ly]"    indicates,    Guerrero,    19     F.4th   at   552,   that

Robinson's rule has no application to a container that is of the

same "order" as a briefcase, Eatherton, 519 F.2d at 610.                 Riley

does   suggest   that,   based   on   those   rationales,     a   200-pound

double-locked storage trunk may fall outside Robinson's rule even

if the arrestee happens to be dragging the trunk along behind him.

See Riley, 573 U.S. at 394.      But Eatherton did not itself suggest

otherwise.   Rather, Eatherton held only that a briefcase that the

arrestee was carrying at the time of the arrest fell within

Robinson's rule because the distinction between such a container

when held in hand and a cigarette package when carried in a pocket

was "gossamer" and because it was "not easy to rest a principled

                                 - 29 -
articulation of the reach of the [F]ourth [A]mendment upon the

distinction."       Eatherton, 519 F.2d at 610.

            We note, too, that Riley's comment about the potential

exclusion of the dragged trunk from Robinson's rule was based on

the   notion      that   "[m]ost      people     cannot   lug     around"     a    trunk

containing "every piece of mail . . . every picture . . . or every

book or article they have read" and on the observation that "nor

would they have any reason to attempt to do so."                    Id. at 393-94.

Yet, of course, most people can carry a briefcase and often have

reason to do so.         Indeed, Perez himself does not argue that Riley

is the case that would have led the Eatherton panel to rule other

than it did, as he contends only that Riley merely excluded digital

content from Robinson's rule.

                                           E.

            We close by addressing what may be our key point of

disagreement with our dissenting colleague -- the proper scope of

the second exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine.                          As we

see   it,   the    whole   point      of   the   doctrine    is    to   ensure      that

individual     panels      of   our    court      do   not   --    in   an    ad     hoc

way -- second-guess prior circuit precedents just because the

panels are convinced that those precedents are wrong.                        Thus, the

determination of whether a prior panel decision binds a future

panel cannot depend on whether there are sound reasons to conclude

that the prior panel got it wrong.                Yet, the post-Eatherton body

                                       - 30 -
of precedent that the dissent invokes shows, in our view, that

there are merely reasons of that sort when it comes to Eatherton,

as that body of caselaw fails to provide "a clear and convincing

basis to believe that the [Eatherton] panel would have decided the

issue differently."       Guerrero, 19 F.4th at 552.

            A comparison of this case with Guerrero -- which is our

most     recent    case   to   find   the   second   exception   to   the

law-of-the-circuit doctrine to be satisfied -- underscores the

point.    In finding the second exception to the doctrine applicable

there, we relied on an unbroken string of intervening Supreme Court

precedents.       Id. at 555-57.   Those precedents, we explained, each

had made sweeping statements that contradicted the very rationale

that the prior panel had relied on in ruling that a warrantless

search had to be subjectively and not just objectively aimed at

addressing an exigency to be lawful.         See id., 19 F.4th at 554.

And while we acknowledged that none of those precedents directly

overruled the prior panel decision, we pointed out that one of

them rejected the application of a subjective test with respect to

a home search, notwithstanding that the prior panel had applied

that test to a search of an automobile.       See id. at 555-56 (citing

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)).         We thus explained that,

given the heightened privacy interests at stake in home searches,

it would be most strange to conclude that the prior panel would

stick with its position that a subjective test had to be used for

                                   - 31 -
a search of a car if that panel had the benefit of the intervening

Supreme Court precedent.     See id. at 557.

          Here, by contrast, the relevant intervening Supreme

Court precedents are Chadwick and Gant -- neither of which even

addresses a search of personal property carried by an arrestee at

the time of the arrest, let alone whether and how to distinguish

between types of such personal property, at least as between

briefcases and cigarette packages.     We thus do not see how we could

reason from either of those precedents to the determination that

there is a clear and convincing basis on which to conclude that

the Eatherton panel would have decided differently with the benefit

of knowing what we now do.    And the fact that sister circuits have

relied on Chadwick and Gant to chart a different course than

Eatherton cannot provide the required clarity, as the second

exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine does not apply just

because several other circuits have chosen not to follow one of

our prior rulings.

          Accordingly,       we     conclude    that,    under    the

law-of-the-circuit doctrine, the en banc process supplies the

proper means for our Court to reconsider Eatherton in light of all

that has transpired in its wake.      Through that process, the Court

as a whole rather than this single panel can examine Eatherton and

the question of whether Eatherton's line-drawing concern justifies

its decision to treat an openly carried container like a briefcase

                                  - 32 -
the way that the Supreme Court treated the cigarette containers in

Robinson and Gustafson and the clothing in Edwards.   And so, until

then, the rule laid down in Eatherton controls this case about the

things we carry, as Perez makes no argument that Eatherton can be

distinguished on the facts.6

                                III.

          For the reasons set out above, the District Court's

judgment of conviction is affirmed.

                   -Dissenting Opinion Follows-

     6 We do recognize that a determination that a Fourth Amendment
precedent of our court remains binding may well bear on whether
the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applies. See
Davis, 564 U.S. at 232 ("[P]olice . . . searches conducted in
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are
not subject to the exclusionary rule.").      But, given the vital
role that the law-of-the-circuit doctrine plays in ensuring the
orderly process of lower court adjudication, that fact provides no
reason for us to be less strict in applying the law-of-the-circuit
doctrine than we have long been.

                               - 33 -
              MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge, dissenting.            I view United

States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1975), differently

than the majority, particularly as to how the exception to the

law-of-the-circuit      doctrine   applies      here.       Further,    applying

modern Supreme Court precedent, I would find that the search of

Perez's backpack violated his Fourth-Amendment rights.                   I would

also find that the good-faith exception is not applicable here.

Accordingly, and for the reasons that follow, I would reverse the

decision of the district court on Perez's motion to suppress and

vacate the judgment of conviction.

                   I. The Law-of-the-Circuit Doctrine

              This appeal arises from the denial of a motion to

suppress the warrantless search of the backpack Perez was wearing

at the time of his arrest.         As the majority notes, that search

should   be    viewed   through   the   scope   of   "the    basic     rule   that

'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior

approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the

Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically established

and well-delineated exceptions.'"         Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,

338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357

(2009)).      One such exception is that of the search incident to

arrest. Id. There are two grounding principles to that exception:

(1) to protect officer safety and (2) to preserve evidence.                   Id.

                                   - 34 -
             The     development     of       this   exception    has    evolved   over

decades of caselaw, both in the Supreme Court and this Circuit.

To that end, as to our prior decisions, we are bound by the

law-of-the-circuit doctrine.              United States v. Barbosa, 896 F.3d

60, 74 (1st Cir. 2018).              However, there are exceptions to that

doctrine, as it is "neither a straightjacket nor an immutable

rule."      Id. (quoting Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. &

Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 2000)).                      One exception is

"when the holding of a previous panel is contradicted by subsequent

controlling authority, such as a decision by the Supreme Court, an

en   banc    decision     of   the    originating        court,     or   a    statutory

overruling."       Id.    Another exception exists "when 'authority that

postdates      the       original     decision,          although       not    directly

controlling, nevertheless offers a sound reason for believing that

the former panel, in light of fresh developments, would change its

collective mind.'"         Id. (quoting Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45

F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995)).

             The majority's opinion rests on a case decided by a panel

of   this    court    nearly   half       a    century    ago:    United      States   v.

Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1975).                         Admittedly, should

Eatherton remain good law, it is controlling here.                         In my view,

however, the second exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine,

delineated above, is applicable under these circumstances.                             In

light of the major developments to the search-incident-to-arrest

                                          - 35 -
exception    postdating   Eatherton,      including       modern     binding      and

persuasive precedent on the propriety of warrantless searches

incident to arrest, I think that the Eatherton panel would have

come to a different conclusion.           To justify this conclusion, an

analysis    of   Eatherton     itself    and     a   brief    history      of     the

developments following Eatherton's publication is necessary.

                                A. Eatherton

            As described in the majority opinion, Eatherton involved

the warrantless search of a briefcase that the arrestee was holding

when first approached by law enforcement.               519 F.2d at 609.        After

the arrestee was frisked and placed in the back of a police

vehicle, the officers searched the briefcase, and the contents

were later admitted at trial.           Id.    The defendant challenged the

search of his briefcase as violative of his Fourth-Amendment

rights.    Id. at 609-10.

            The Eatherton panel noted that the appellant's strongest

support for his Fourth-Amendment challenge laid in Chimel v.

California, 395 U.S. 752 (1962); however, the panel recognized

that Chimel cited with approval to Draper v. United States, 358

U.S. 307 (1959), a case involving a "virtually identical" search

to the one at issue in Eatherton.         519 F.2d at 610.         The Eatherton

panel then cited to a number of cases from our sister circuits

that,     applying   Chimel,    upheld        similar     searches    of    closed

containers carried by the arrestee. 519 F.2d at 610 (citing United

                                   - 36 -
States v. Maynard, 439 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.

Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974

(1971); United States ex rel. Muhammad v. Mancusi, 432 F.2d 1046

(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 911 (1971)).                Lastly, the

Eatherton    panel    noted   that    the     Supreme   Court's    then-recent

decisions in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);

Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); and United States v.

Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), offered further guidance on the

Fourth-Amendment issue.       519 F.2d at 610.

            Relying on this case law, the Eatherton panel determined

that differentiating between the cigarette packages in Robinson

and Gustafson and the briefcase in Eatherton "requir[ed] gossamer

distinctions."       Id. at 610.     The panel further held that "[w]hile

a briefcase may be a different order of container from a cigarette

box, it is not easy to rest a principled articulation of the reach

of the [F]ourth [A]mendment upon the distinction."                Id.   Relying

on Edwards, the Eatherton panel emphasized that once the briefcase

was "properly seized" as "incident to [the defendant's] arrest"

any expectation of privacy the defendant held was diminished.              Id.

at 610-11.

                                B. Chadwick

            After Eatherton, the Supreme Court decided United States

v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).          In Chadwick, the Court examined

the search of a 200-pound footlocker stowed in the trunk of the

                                     - 37 -
defendant's car at the time of arrest.           433 U.S. at 3-4.       Officers

subsequently seized the footlocker, transported it to a federal

building, and then, an hour and a half later and without a warrant,

searched the footlocker.       Id. at 4.      The officers had no reason to

believe     the   footlocker    held    inherently       dangerous     items   or

contained evidence that could lose value over time. Id. Examining

the nature of the footlocker, the Court noted that "[l]uggage

contents are not open to public view . . . nor is luggage subject

to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing

basis."    Id. at 13.   "[L]uggage is [also] intended as a repository

of personal effects."     Id.

            Chadwick    reiterated     that     "[t]he     potential     dangers

lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items

within the 'immediate control' area reasonable without requiring

the arresting officer to calculate the probability that weapons or

destructible evidence may be involved."            433 U.S. at 14-15.          But

Chadwick    importantly   clarified     that    "warrantless     searches       of

luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot

be justified as incident to that arrest either if the search is

remote in time or place from the arrest . . . or no exigency

exists."     Id. at 15 (cleaned up).          Finally, the Chadwick Court

concluded    that   "[o]nce    law   enforcement     officers   have     reduced

luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with

the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there

                                     - 38 -
is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the

property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that

property is no longer an incident of the arrest."        Id.   Put another

way, "when no exigency is shown to support the need for an

immediate search, the Warrant Clause places the line at the point

where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive

dominion of police authority."      Id.

                      C. Cases Postdating Chadwick

             After Chadwick, several of our sister circuits addressed

situations involving items that an arrestee was holding or carrying

at the time of arrest and questioned the breadth of Chadwick,

reaching mixed results.       See United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537,

543   (4th    Cir.   1996)   (finding   that,   after   Chadwick,   "[t]he

determinative question appears to be whether the time and distance

between elimination of the danger and performance of the search

were reasonable" and holding that "when a container is within the

immediate control of a suspect at the beginning of an encounter

with law enforcement officers; and when the officers search the

container at the scene of the arrest; the Fourth Amendment does

not prohibit a reasonable delay . . . between the elimination of

danger and the search"); see also United States v. Garcia, 605

F.2d 349, 356-57 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting the "less than uniform"

application of Chadwick across the circuits).

                                  - 39 -
            In United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236 (6th Cir.

1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979), the            Sixth Circuit

examined a briefcase seized from the person at the time of arrest.

That court, examining Chadwick, noted that "the primary [F]ourth

[A]mendment interest [is] in the privacy of the contents of [a

container], not in the simple possession of the receptacle."          Id.

at 249. Therefore, the defendant had an increased privacy interest

in the briefcase, like the footlocker in Chadwick, the "very

purpose [for which] is to transport papers and other items of an

inherently personal, private nature."       Id. (internal quotations

omitted).     Ultimately, the Calandrella court found that under

Chadwick, "once the agents had seized the item and reduced it to

their exclusive control there was no further danger that the

defendant     would   secure   therefrom   either   a   weapon   or   an

instrumentality of escape, or would destroy evidence contained in

the briefcase."       Id. at 249, 251-52 (expressly overturning its

prior line of cases upholding searches of suitcases "even after

the item has been seized and the suspect subdued" and citing to

courts that had made similar decisions prior to Chadwick, including

Eatherton).

            Several other circuits also recognized the applicability

of Chadwick to cases involving carried containers.          See United

States v. Berry, 571 F.2d 2, 3 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that "until

Chadwick, there was no reason for law enforcement officials to

                                 - 40 -
believe that attache cases were not among those personal effects

which, under [Robinson], could be seized as part of a 'full search

of the person' incident to a lawful arrest, and which, under

[Edwards], could be searched several hours after the suspect had

been taken into custody"); see also United States v. Stewart, 595

F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that if Chadwick was

applicable, "it would require suppression of the contents of the

attache case"); United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 273 (3d Cir.

2002) (examining the search of a "school bag" under the immediate

control analysis and citing Chadwick's rationale).

                                D. Gant

           Later, in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), the Court

revisited the search-incident-to-arrest exception.     The Court once

again emphasized that the limitation on that exception "ensures

that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with

its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any

evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal

or destroy."    Id. at 339.    Relying on the principles articulated

in Chimel, the Court reiterated that "[i]f there is no possibility

that an arrestee could reach into [an] area that law enforcement

officers   seek      to   search,   both   justifications   for   the

search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does

not apply."    Id.

                                - 41 -
                          E. Cases Postdating Gant

              The   decision     in   Gant   has   been    instrumental     in   the

understanding and application of the Fourth Amendment and the

search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.                After Gant, circuit courts

applied that precedent and the immediate control analysis to

containers outside of the vehicle context.                 See United States v.

Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S.

1116 (2010) (examining the search of a gym bag under the "narrowed"

scope    of   the   search-incident-to-arrest            doctrine   under      Gant);

United   States     v.   Cook,    808   F.3d     1195,    1199   (9th   Cir.   2015)

(applying the immediate control analysis to a backpack); United

States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191, 193 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that

"Gant applies beyond the automobile context to the search of a

backpack"); United States v. Knapp, 917 F.3d 1161, 1168-70 (10th

Cir. 2019) (considering whether the search of an arrestee's purse

was justified under Chimel and Gant); see also United States v.

Hill, 818 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying immediate control

analysis to bag); United States v. Matthews, 532 Fed. Appx. 211,

217-19 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that the search of a backpack could

not be justified under the immediate control analysis of the

search-incident-to-arrest doctrine); cf. United States v. Perdoma,

621 F.3d 745, 750-51 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 992

(2011) (upholding the warrantless search of a "small bag" where

"the search of the bag occurred in close proximity to where [the

                                        - 42 -
arrestee] was restrained" and the arrestee had already run from

officers once; but holding that a closer application of Gant was

not necessary under the circumstances).        Many of these cases are

instructive as to how Gant must be applied to cases involving

carried containers.

          In   Shakir,   the   Third    Circuit    was   faced    with     the

warrantless search of a gym bag initially held by an arrestee.

616 F.3d at 316.    The defendant there argued that the search of

his bag was in violation of his Fourth-Amendment rights because he

was already handcuffed at the time of the search and could not

have accessed the bag.    Id. at 317.      In response, the government

cited several cases upholding searches conducted while an arrestee

was handcuffed.    Id.   However, the Third Circuit noted that the

government relied solely on pre-Gant cases.        Id. at 318.    The court

emphasized "Gant as refocusing [its] attention on a suspect's

ability (or inability) to access weapons or destroy evidence at

the time a search incident to arrest is conducted."              Id.     Thus,

the Shakir court was "left to consider, under Gant and other

relevant precedents, whether [the defendant] retained sufficient

potential access to his bag to justify a warrantless search."              Id.

at 319.

          In   considering     that    question,   our   sister        circuit

"underst[ood] Gant to stand for the proposition that police cannot

search a location or item when there is no reasonable possibility

                                 - 43 -
that the suspect might access it."           Id. at 320.      In accordance

with that principle, it held that "a search is permissible incident

to a suspect's arrest when, under all the circumstances, there

remains a reasonable possibility that the arrestee could access a

weapon or destructible evidence in the container or area being

searched."   Id. at 321.    Applying this legal standard to the facts

there, the Third Circuit concluded that the search was justified

because there was a "sufficient possibility" that the arrestee

could have gained access to the bag.          Id.     The court found this

even though the arrestee was handcuffed because the bag was at his

feet, he was in a public area surrounded by approximately twenty

bystanders, and there was at least one suspected confederate in

the area.    Id. at 316, 321.

            The   Ninth   Circuit    confronted     similar   questions   in

assessing the validity of a warrantless backpack search in Cook.

808 F.3d at 1199-1200.     There, the arrestee was wearing a backpack

at the time the officers approached him.          Id. at 1197.    While the

arrestee was handcuffed on the ground, but within one to two

minutes of his arrest, officers picked up the arrestee's backpack,

which was right next to the arrestee, and conducted a twenty- or

thirty-second cursory search.         Id.    The officers then took the

arrestee to a more secluded area several blocks away and performed

a more thorough search of the backpack.             Id.   The arrestee only

challenged the validity of the first cursory search of his backpack

                                    - 44 -
immediately following his arrest.       Id. at 1198.       Relying on Gant,

our sister circuit found that "[t]he brief and limited nature of

the [initial] search, its immediacy to the time of arrest, and the

location of the backpack ensured that the search was 'commensurate

with   its     purposes    of   protecting     arresting        officers   and

safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that [the

arrestee] might conceal or destroy.'"         Id. at 1200 (quoting Gant,

556 U.S. at 339).

             In Davis, the Fourth Circuit examined the history of the

search-incident-to-arrest       exception    and   how   Gant    altered   its

understanding of that exception.       997 F.3d at 195-200.         The Davis

court found that Gant's first holding, "that police can 'search a

vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the

arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger

compartment at the time of the search'" -- a holding derived from

Chimel -- applies outside of the automobile context.               Id. at 197

(quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).

             After establishing Gant's applicability outside of the

automobile search context, the Fourth Circuit analyzed whether the

warrantless search of a backpack was permissible under Gant.               Id.

at 198.   In Davis, the arrestee fled from officers while carrying

his backpack but ultimately became bogged down in a swamp with

knee-high water.     Id.   An officer drew his weapon and ordered the

arrestee out of the swamp.      Id.   The arrestee complied and dropped

                                  - 45 -
his backpack on the ground; he then laid down and was handcuffed.

Id.    Two other officers arrived at the scene, and the officers

searched the backpack that was not within the arrestee's reaching

distance.     Id.

             The Fourth Circuit then held that the warrantless search

of the backpack was unlawful, reasoning that there was "no doubt

that [the arrestee] was secured and not within reaching distance

of his backpack when [the officer] unzipped and searched it."                   Id.

At    the   time    of   the    search,    the   arrestee   was   face   down   and

handcuffed, he was outnumbered by officers three to one, and the

events had occurred in a residential area with no other people

present; the court thus had "no difficulty" in determining that

the arrestee was secured.            Id.   The court also emphasized that the

arrestee was not within reaching distance of the backpack at the

time of the search.            Id.

             F. The Impact of Modern Authority on Eatherton

             In examining the above cases carefully, I agree with the

majority that we do not have a Supreme Court opinion that is

"directly on point contradicting our precedent" in Eatherton.

United States v. Wurie, 867 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2017).                 However,

I remain convinced that the "less common exception" to the law-

of-the-circuit       doctrine        forecloses    our   present    reliance     on

Eatherton.         The    authorities      discussed     above,    "although    not

directly controlling, offer[] a sound reason for believing that

                                        - 46 -
the [Eatherton] panel would change its collective mind."    Id.   "A

Supreme Court opinion need not be directly on point to undermine

one of our opinions."    United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252,

258 (1st Cir. 2011).    Further, a decision of the Supreme Court

"can extend through its logic beyond the specific facts of its

case."   Id. (quoting Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29,

38 (2010)).

          Unlike the district court, who must apply our "precedent

unless it has unmistakably been cast into disrepute by supervening

authority," the exceptions to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine

provide us with "modest" flexibility in the application of our own

precedents.   Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Me. Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d

344, 349 (1st Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Carson as

next friend of O.C. v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767 (2022).     The majority

decision stresses that the second exception to the law-of-the-

circuit doctrine "cannot depend on whether there are sound reasons

to conclude that the prior panel got it wrong."   However, the scope

of the exception applied here is not based on whether I believe

there are sound reasons to conclude that the Eatherton panel was

wrong, but rather whether there are sound reasons for believing

that the Eatherton panel would have changed its collective mind.

And this "sound reason" standard has been reiterated by this court.

See e.g., Lewis, 963 F.3d at 23; United States v. López, 890 F.3d

332, 340 (1st Cir. 2018); Wurie, 867 F.3d at 34.

                              - 47 -
          Given that scope, in my view, had the Eatherton panel

had the benefit of both Chadwick and Gant, that panel would have

changed its collective mind as to its interpretation of the

search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.         As our sister circuits have

concluded,   Chadwick   and,    perhaps     even    more   so,    Gant    have

unquestionably     altered        our       understanding         of      the

search-incident-to-arrest      doctrine    and     "provide   a   clear   and

convincing basis" to determine that the Eatherton panel too would

have come to a different conclusion on the issue.             See Guerrero,

19 F.4th at 552.

          Chadwick made a nuanced distinction between the reduced

expectation of privacy an arrestee has of their person as compared

to possessions within their immediate control at the time of

arrest.   433 U.S. at 16 n.10.      Further, Chadwick's analysis did

not hinge on whether the possession was held by the arrestee or

was elsewhere in their vicinity.        Instead, Chadwick focused on the

nature of containers as "repositor[ies] of personal effects."7 Id.

     7 Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to agree that the result in
Chadwick would not have been different had the arrestee been
"drag[ging] [the trunk] behind them." Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373, 394 (2014) (acknowledging the difference between the
trunk in Chadwick -- which could hold a large number of personal
items and required a warrant to search -- and "a container the
size of [a] cigarette package" at issue in Robinson). In my view,
Riley lends support for the very line-drawing about different
carried containers that Eatherton believed it was unable to make.
The majority appears to suggest that Riley distinguishes between
personal property that is difficult to carry, either due to its
size or weight, and personal property that is commonly carried,

                                 - 48 -
at 13.     Thus, although the Eatherton panel was understandably

influenced by the then-recent cases of Edwards, Robinson, and

Gustafson when assessing an arrestee's privacy interests, Chadwick

would    have   provided   the   additional   context   that   "possessions

within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any

reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest."            433 U.S.

at 16 n.10 (emphasis added).

            Given this understanding and Gant's refined framework

for "immediate control" searches, the Eatherton panel would have

centered    its   analysis   around   "immediate   control"    rather   than

shoehorning the search of a closed container into being "of the

person."    Specifically, I believe this modern authority would have

led the Eatherton panel to the conclusion, under Chadwick and Gant,

that searches of visible containers held or carried by an arrestee

-- like the briefcase in Eatherton -- must be treated as "immediate

such as a briefcase. See Majority at 30. I do not think this was
the Riley Court's intent. Riley notes that "[m]ost people cannot
lug around every piece of mail they have received for the past
several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or
article they have read -- nor would they have any reason to attempt
to do so." Id. at 393-94. But, the Riley Court then states that
the only way for a person to carry personal property like that
(prior to the existence of cell phones) would be to "drag behind
them a trunk of the sort held to require a search warrant in
Chadwick."    Id. at 394.     In my view, the Riley Court was
differentiating between certain containers that may be receptacles
for other personal property and small containers like those the
size of a cigarette package, while emphasizing that a container
like the trunk in Chadwick would have required a search warrant
just as a cell phone would. Id. at 394.

                                   - 49 -
control" searches.          See Knapp, 917 F.3d at 1167 (limiting Robinson

searches      to   "searches        of   an    arrestee's       clothing,       including

containers concealed under or within her clothing" and holding

that "visible containers in an arrestee's hand . . . are best

considered to be within the area of an arrestee's immediate

control").

              Further,      the    parties      here     have      not   identified    any

post-Gant      published      circuit         opinions      that    adopted     the   same

approach taken in Eatherton.              Indeed, we have found the opposite:

circuits    that     once    took    an    Eatherton-like           approach     to   cases

involving carried containers now applying the "immediate control"

analysis in similar circumstances.                  Cf. United States v. Lewis,

963 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2020) (adhering to the law-of-the-circuit

doctrine where three sister circuits retained allegiance to this

Circuit's reasoning despite a recent Supreme Court decision);

Sanchez v. United States, 740 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding

that just two circuits' decisions contrary to our precedent "hardly

paint a picture of a rush to the exit so as to allow us to overrule

our   own     controlling         precedent").         In    short,      the    continued

application of Eatherton simply "runs counter to the strong modern

trend in the caselaw."             United States v. Guerrero, 19 F.4th 547,

557 (1st Cir. 2021).

              Accordingly, I find "that the gloss added by the Supreme

Court"   to    the   search-incident-to-arrest                exception        requires   a

                                          - 50 -
different approach than that taken by the Eatherton panel.            United

States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 2008).              Had the

Eatherton panel had the benefit of viewing that case "through the

prism of" Chadwick and Gant, I believe that they would have come

to a different result.       Id. at 226; see Guerrero, 19 F.4th at 559

("The bottom line [] is that given the Supreme Court cases in vogue

after [our prior decision], we believe [that] panel would (if it

had the chance) reverse its view of the . . . issue 180 degrees.").

           For these reasons, I would find that Eatherton is no

longer the law of the circuit. Instead, the appropriate rule under

Chadwick   and   Gant   is   that   the   searches   of   visible,    closed

containers held or carried by an arrestee should be analyzed as

"immediate control" searches.

                   II. Fourth-Amendment Violation

           Because I would hold that Eatherton is no longer the law

of the circuit and that the search of the backpack here should be

treated as an immediate control search, the next step is to

determine whether the search was nonetheless justified under the

circumstances presented.      Appropriate factors to be considered in

that inquiry are: "(1) whether the arrestee is handcuffed; (2) the

relative number of arrestees and officers present; (3) the relative

positions of the arrestees, officers, and the place to be searched;

. . . (4) the ease or difficulty with which the arrestee could

gain access to the searched area"; and (5) "the degree to which

                                    - 51 -
arresting officers have separated an article from an arrestee at

the time of the search."     Knapp, 917 F.3d at 1168-69.

          The district court made the necessary factual findings

to support a conclusion that the search of Perez's backpack was

violative of his Fourth-Amendment rights. The district court found

that "Perez was secured in handcuffs on the ground under [one

officer's] supervision as [another officer] was searching the

backpack on the hood or roof of [one of the officer's] vehicle,

not within reaching distance of Perez, so destruction of evidence

or access to weapons was not at stake."8       Accordingly, I would find

that under the immediate control analysis, the search of Perez's

backpack was in contravention with the warrant requirement of the

Fourth    Amendment    and      did      not      fall    within    the

search-incident-to-arrest exception.

                           III. Good Faith

          Finding that the search of Perez's backpack violated the

Fourth Amendment, however, is not the end of the inquiry.           The

     8 The government has argued before us that the backpack was
near Perez at the time of the search and that "there was a
reasonable possibility that he could access the bag," and the
search was therefore justified under the immediate control
analysis. However, it has not pointed us to any support to find
that the district court's determinations regarding Perez's
inability to reach the backpack at the time of the search were
clearly erroneous. See United States v. Oquendo-Rivas, 750 F.3d
12, 16 (1st Cir. 2014) ("We assess questions of fact . . . for
clear error."). I also do not surmise any support in the record
to find a clear error in the district court's factual findings.

                                - 52 -
Fourth Amendment "says nothing about suppressing evidence obtained

in violation of [its] command."    Davis v. United States, 564 U.S.

229, 236 (2011).    I must thus determine if the exclusionary rule

is applicable here.    "The rule's sole purpose . . . is to deter

future Fourth[-]Amendment violations" and not to redress prior

violations.   Id. at 236-37.      "Our cases have thus limited the

rule's operation to situations in which this purpose is 'thought

most efficaciously served.'"   Id. at 237 (quoting United States v.

Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).

          "When the police exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or

'grossly negligent' disregard for Fourth[-]Amendment rights, the

deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the

resulting costs."   Id. at 238 (quoting Herring v. United States,

555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)).     On the other hand, "when the police

act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their

conduct is lawful . . . or when their conduct involves only simple,

isolated negligence[,] . . . the deterrence rationale loses much

of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way."      Id. (internal

quotations omitted).   "The government bears the burden of showing

that its officers acted with objective good faith."   United States

v. Sheehan, 70 F.4th 36, 51 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States

v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2001)).

          The good-faith exception may be triggered "when the

police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on

                               - 53 -
binding    judicial   precedent."      Davis,    564   U.S.   at   239.   But

importantly, this "exception is available only where the police

rely on precedent that is clear and well-settled."             United States

v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).             "[W]here

judicial    precedent   does   not    clearly    authorize     a   particular

practice, suppression has deterrent value because it creates an

'incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior.'" United

States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Sparks,

711 F.3d at 64).

            Had this case fallen within the first exception to the

law-of-the-circuit doctrine -- where "the holding of a previous

panel is contradicted by subsequent controlling authority" -- the

good-faith exception would plainly not apply.             See Barbosa, 896

F.3d at 74.     For example, imagine a scenario where, post-Gant,

officers searched a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest

after the occupant was secured and not within reaching distance of

the passenger compartment and without probable cause that the

vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest.               Regardless

of whether prior circuit law allowed this practice, that search

would be unlawful post-Gant, and the officers could not rely on

good faith.

            Admittedly,    when      the     second    exception     to   the

law-of-the-circuit doctrine applies, as I believe it does here,

there is a much closer question as to whether the good-faith

                                    - 54 -
exception applies.        Ultimately, given the deterrent value of

enforcing a regime where officers err on the side of constitutional

conduct in the face of unclear or eroded precedent, I would not

permit good faith to bar exclusion in this case.

            First and foremost, for the same reasons that I find the

second exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine applies here,

I am of the view that Eatherton was not the kind of "clear and

well-settled" precedent that officers could reasonably rely on.

See Sparks, 711 F.3d at 64. At the very minimum, Gant -- a landmark

case in our Fourth-Amendment jurisprudence -- called into question

the continued vitality of Eatherton.              It would be untenable to

require that Supreme Court holdings address virtually identical

factual   scenarios     before    we    consider       our    circuit     precedent

undermined and reject application of the good-faith exception.

Such a requirement would be contrary to the requirement that the

precedent   officers    rely     upon   "be    unequivocal"      when     shielding

unlawfully obtained evidence from exclusion.                 Sparks, 711 F.3d at

64.

            Second,    this   conclusion       aptly   aligns     with    the   very

purpose of the exclusionary rule: to deter future Fourth-Amendment

violations.     Davis, 564 U.S. at 236-37.                   If we do not strip

precedent     that    falls    within    the     second       exception    to   the

law-of-the-circuit doctrine of its weight as forcefully as we do

in cases under the first exception, officers would be encouraged

                                    - 55 -
to adhere to shaky precedent (no matter how potentially abrogated)

until those cases are formally and explicitly overruled.                     Because

suppression is intended to create the "incentive to err on the

side     of   constitutional        behavior,"     I     think   the    appropriate

conclusion is that when opinions authored by the Supreme Court,

particularly landmark cases like Gant, call into question our prior

precedent,      officers     must    conform     their    conduct      to   the   more

protective reading of the Fourth Amendment laid out by the Supreme

Court.    See Bain, 874 F.3d at 20 (quoting Sparks, 711 F.3d at 64).

              Finally, this is not a case where "the police engage[d]

in conduct that complie[d] with existing precedent, and the law

later change[d]."       United States v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30, 33 (1st

Cir. 2014).      Gant was decided a decade before the search at issue

here occurred, and Chadwick's guidance on closed containers has

been binding precedent for over forty years.                Cf. Sparks, 711 F.3d

at 67 (finding good faith applied where the applicable Supreme

Court    case   came   out    three    years     after    the    search     at    issue

occurred); United States v. Moore-Bush, 36 F.4th 320, 359 (1st

Cir. 2022) (mem.) (Barron, C.J., concurring) (concurring opinion

finding that good faith applied when the applicable Supreme Court

decision was published over one year after the search began).

Given my view of the impact of these cases on Eatherton, the

officers were required to follow the logic supplied by Gant and

Chadwick.

                                       - 56 -
           For these reasons, I would conclude that the good-faith

exception is not available under the circumstances and suppression

is the proper outcome to deter future Fourth-Amendment violations.

                              IV. Conclusion

           For the above stated reasons, I would abrogate Eatherton

to the extent it is inconsistent with this analysis, reverse the

district court's decision on the motion to suppress, vacate the

judgment   of   conviction,    and   remand    for   further   proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

                                 - 57 -