Court Opinion

ID: 9532115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:18:19.477201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:40.763154
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). We agree with our colleagues that the standard "necessity” in the context of the highway condemnation act1 is a sufficient standard and a constitutional delegation of authority.2 .
We further agree that Const 1963, art 4, § 52 does not create a mandatory duty on the part of the Legislature to specifically provide for the protection of natural resources in the highway condemnation act and, for all intents and purposes, in every other pertinent act.
We discern ho need in the context of this case to address questions — not briefed, argued, or in any way dispositive of the issues before us — concerning the construction of the Environmental Protection Act of 19703 and the scope of judicial review under that act. We are also concerned that the Court’s language may encourage litigants and judges to structure even routine litigation under the high*192way condemnation act and the Environmental Protection Act in constitutional terms.
Vanderkloot has not commenced an action under the Environmental Protection Act seeking relief from the proposed taking of his property.4 His pleadings in this highway condemnation proceeding do not constitute a "prima facie showing” that the Highway Commission’s proposals have or are likely to "pollute, impair or destroy” any aspect of the environment.5 The Highway Commis*193sion has not been afforded the opportunity, or even been apprised of the necessity, to rebut the environmental claim Vanderkloot is seen as having lodged in his pleadings.
It is premature to delineate the parameters of judicial review of EPA actions in general, or of such actions if consolidated with highway condemnation proceedings. Neither party argues for or against this Court’s apparent pronouncement that every condemnation proceeding involves environmental issues or its explicit holding that the EPA is "a source of substantive environmental law” (emphasis in original) and therefore the act’s "fea*194sible and prudent alternative” language is incorporated into the "necessity” standard for purposes of judicial review.
This Court’s statement that there is a "mandatory legislative duty imposed by art 4, §52” implies that during the period between EPA’s enactment in 1970 and the effective date of the 1963 Constitution, the Highway Commission and other state agencies and government units whose actions may affect the environment were operating in derogation of the constitution. This language also suggests that repeal or significant alteration of EPA by the Legislature would violate art 4, § 52.
We would await a case in which these weighty EPA issues are litigated before attempting to resolve them.6
We concur in the affirmance of the Court of Appeals.
T. G. Kavanagh and M. S. Coleman, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
J. W. Fitzgerald, J., did not sit in this case.

 MCLA 213.361 et seq.; MSA 8.261(1) et seq.

 See People v Fields, 391 Mich 206, 224; 216 NW2d 51 (1974) (Levin, J., dissenting).

 MCLA 691.1201 et seq.; MSA 14.528(201) et seq.

 A person may assert environmental objections by bringing an action under the Environmental Protection Act (MCLA 691.1202; MSA 14.528[202]) "in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief * * * for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction”.
A nonparty may intervene in a pending proceeding "as a party on the filing of a pleading asserting that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct which has, or which is likely to have, the effect of polluting, impairing or destroying the air, water or other natural resources or the public trust therein”. MCLA 691.1205; MSA 14.528(205).
If, in an EPA action, Vanderkloot made a "prima facie showing that the conduct of the [Highway Commission] has, or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the public trust therein”, the Highway Commission would be obliged either to rebut the prima facie showing or to present evidence in support of an affirmative defense that there is "no feasible and prudent alternative to [its] conduct and that such conduct is consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light of the state’s paramount concern for the protection of its natural resources from pollution, impairment or destruction”. MCLA 691.1203; MSA 14.528(203).

 Asserting that the Highway Commission abused its discretion in determining that there was a "necessity” to take his property, Vanderkloot alleged: "The property petitioner seeks to take * * * is a swamp area having increasingly rare or even unique ecological characteristics * * * .”
These bare allegations do not constitute the prima facie showing required by MCLA 691.1203; MSA 14.528(203).
In Freeborn County v Bryson, — Minn —; 210 NW2d 290, 293 (1973), landowners commenced an action under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act following the commencement of condemnation proceedings against their property. The two actions were consolidated for trial.
The Minnesota environmental statute, like Michigan’s, places upon *193the plaintiff the burden of making "a prima facie showing that the conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to cause the pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air, water, land or other natural resources”.
The landowners in the Minnesota case presented the Court "[e]x-pert witnesses [who] testified that marshes or wetlands provide a unique natural ecosystem or environment because they are capable of supporting a greater diversity of life than other habitats such as woodlands, tundra, desert, or grasslands. This particular marshland was regarded by the experts as an integrated unit with the larger slough complex. Because of its natural attributes, it was considered a desirable waterfowl habitat and production area. * * *
"The expert witnesses all stated their opinion that the construction of the proposed highway would have a significant detrimental effect on the marsh area’s value as a wildlife area because it would eliminate some of the area’s natural assets, destroy the quietness and solitude of the marsh, increase animal and bird fatalities, and have other adverse effects.”
On the basis of that evidentiary showing, the Minnesota Court reversed the trial court’s finding that the landowners had not made a prima facie showing.
We refer to the Minnesota case to illustrate the kind of prima facie showing deemed sufficient under a similar statute. We recognize that expert witness fees often run high and that no unnecessary financial burden should be imposed on persons seeking relief under the Environmental Protection Act. Nevertheless, we cannot join our colleagues in saying that it is "[without question [that] the planning and construction of the state’s highway system” is by definition "any conduct * * * likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the public trust therein” and that, therefore, apparently, any person who opposes a particular highway condemnation makes a prima facie showing under the EPA on bare allegations.

 In his 26-page brief, Vanderkloot’s discussion of EPA is limited to less than one paragraph. The Attorney General’s 40-page response adverts to EPA for less than 3 pages. Neither brief discusses the EPA issues decided by this Court or requests the relief granted.