Court Opinion

ID: 9699901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:55:45.732757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:42:27.797658
License: Public Domain

Speziale, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the result because 1 agree that “the trial court should correctly have denied the petition without reaching the merits of the defendant’s federal constitutional claims in the absence of allegation and proof that the defendant did not deliberately bypass the orderly procedure of a direct appeal.” (Majority opinion, p. 369.) I agree that this conclusion should be dispositive of the appeal.
I strongly disagree, however, with the majority’s discussion of the merits of the appeal. Two separate determinations must be made in assessing the validity of a guilty plea: (1) Was there a valid waiver of several constitutional rights, and (2) did the defendant possess an understanding of the law (including all the elements of the offense) in relation to the facts. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418. These are entirely distinct determinations, and if either is negative the plea cannot stand.
With regard to the first determination, “[i]n order for a plea of guilty to withstand appellate or postconviction review, the record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant entered such a plea voluntarily and intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274; State v. Bugbee, 161 Conn. 531, 533, 290 A.2d 332.” *380(Emphasis added.) State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469, 473, 365 A.2d 1100. The majority’s opinion cites LaReau v. Warden, 161 Conn. 303, 288 A.2d 54, bnt LaReau was expressly before the leading case of Boykin v. Alabama, supra, and this court declined to apply Boykin retroactively. Id., 307. The issue on the merits is not, as stated in the majority’s opinion, whether the “guilty plea was invalid because the trial court did not expressly warn the defendant” of the rights he was waiving. The issue is whether the mandate of Boykin has been met — there is no mention anywhere in the record (and the majority opinion refers to none) of the constitutional rights waived by the defendant when he entered his guilty plea. These rights are not even summarily referred to by the defendant, counsel, or the court. The record is empty. Neither we nor the United States Supreme Court can “presume a waiver of these three important federal rights [the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right of confrontation] from a silent record.” Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 243. The United States Supreme Court has just recently stressed again that the “strict” standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver is a “matter of federal constitutional law.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424. The state must prove “ An intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst [304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461].” The record of a guilty plea must affirmatively reflect this valid waiver of constitutional rights, according to Boykin. The majority opinion finds significant the fact that the defendant does not assert that he was unaware of his constitutional rights, but Boykin itself was a case involving a peti*381tioner who had “never at any time alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary or made without knowledge of the consequences.” Boykin v. Alabama (Harlan, J., dissenting), supra, 245. Again, in the present case, there is not a single word in the record about the constitutional rights which the defendant was waiving. Clearly there has been no affirmative disclosure of a waiver, nor are we constitutionally permitted to presume such a waiver.
If the record is silent regarding any discussion of waiver of rights, then the mandate of Boykin has not been met; and we need not even reach the issue of whether the defendant understood the law and the elements of the offense in relation to the facts of his case. This second and distinct determination is the one discussed in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108. The majority states that the defendant mistakenly seeks a judicial inquiry by ritualistic litany at the time of sentencing. The “totality of circumstances — ritualistic litany” language appears in dicta in Henderson only with respect to an explanation of the elements of the charge against the accused. The record just does not support the conclusion that the defendant understood the nature of the charge against him, especially the fact that he was pleading guilty to a crime involving the intent to cause the death of another person.1 Furthermore, the record *382reflects an absence of any explanation of the charge, and the court’s remarks at sentencing virtually amount to a judicial finding that the defendant lacked the requisite intent. Absent such intent, the defendant may have been guilty of a lesser offense, but not of attempted murder; in fact, the trial court apparently was convinced that the defendant had committed another crime when it stated: “But in the course of committing another crime, he was armed with a deadly weapon and fired it at a police officer, which in itself is a serious offense.” The majority places heavy reliance on North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162. This cannot be a North Carolina v. Alford situation unless there is before the judge “strong evidence of actual guilt.” Id., 37. On the contrary, in the present case the defendant through his counsel claimed that the crucial element of intent was lacking and the judge agreed.
In summary, (1) the record contains no mention at all of constitutional rights, let alone an affirmative disclosure of a constitutionally valid waiver thereof, and (2) the record does not indicate that the defendant understood the law and the elements of the offense with which he was charged — rather, it reflects an absence of the crucial element of intent. *383It is clear that sentence was imposed by the trial court upon a mistaken set of facts. In my opinion, the proceedings were contrary to the spirit of the cases discussed, the entry of the plea was invalid, and sentence should not have been imposed.

 The reeord of the sentencing proceeding reflects both the court’s virtual admission that the defendant lacked the requisite intent to cause the death of either Officer Klein or anyone else, and the fact that sentence was indeed imposed on a mistaken set of facts, contrary to the majority’s assertion. First, the defendant through his counsel disclaimed any intent to cause death: “He was there attempting to take a car. And when the policeman or security guard approached, he fled. . . . [H]e doesn’t feel or he tells me that he never meant to harm anyone. ... He tells me he really never pointed *382it at the policeman or security guard. That there was never any intention in his mind to actually commit any harm in any way. . . . [I]t is not really an attempted murder case.” (Emphasis added.)
This protestation of innocence does not stand alone. It must be read with the court’s admission that “I take him at his word that he didn’t intend to hurt anybody or he didn’t intend to kill anyone in that sense.” This necessarily means that the court did not determine that there was “strong evidence of actual guilt” of attempted murder (which requires intent to cause death).
The defendant’s failure to disavow the shooting itself is irrelevant; it does not carry with it an admission of intent to cause death, which intent was found lacking by the court.