Court Opinion

ID: 9449571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:15:40.55436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:53.316185
License: Public Domain

BOYD, District Judge
(dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent. The majority opinion invokes as controlling in this ease the principle that an arrest may be neither pretext nor subterfuge for a search without a warrant. With this legal principle in mind the instant case is quite different on its facts from any of the eases cited for the principle by the majority. Most of the cited cases were featured by one of four characteristics. There was either a general exploratory search as evidenced by ruthless and indiscriminate seizure of unoffending items, United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877 and Go-Bart *743Importing Company v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374; or an arrest for one offense with a search for evidence of another, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683; 4 L.Ed.2d 668, and Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (C.A.9); or an arrest without probable cause, Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (C.A.6); or a search preceding the arrest, Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 28 L.Ed.2d 154. None of these situations is here presented. The two remaining cases cited by the majority are Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399, and Henderson v. United States, 12 F.2d 528 (C.A.4). In the Harris case the principle was recognized, but the search in that case was found to be a valid search, specific in nature and incidental to a lawful arrest. I so view the search in this case. The Court, in the Henderson case, finding the arrest therein a mere pretext, relied to some extent upon the failure of the officers to procure an arrest warrant although there was ample time for such procurement. My brethren do not seriously question the presence of probable cause for the within arrest. It also appears to be by them recognized that the arrest was made in an atmosphere of emergency, calling for prompt action by the law enforcement officers. The District Judge assailed the subjective intent of the arresting officers upon grounds unacceptable to the majority. The majority here affirms, however, supplanting the District Judge’s reasons for discountenancing the intent and purpose of the officers with new cloth, which I consider to be as porous as the old.
If judicial scrutiny is exercised with sufficient ardor, a sinister coloration can usually be found to attend an arrest without a warrant when a search incident thereto discloses the means by which the offense warranting arrest was committed and the offense is possession of offending property. Without discovery of the offending item or items there is no case. I am persuaded that there has been an excess of judicial scrutiny in this instance.
In a case such as this where there is no evidence of a general exploratory search, no evidence of an arrest for one offense and search for evidence of another, and no evidence of a search preceding arrest, the most readily available and most reasonable indication of sham arrest is the absence of probable cause for the arrest. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at p. 43, 83 S.Ct. at p. 1634, Note 14. I detect no lack of probable cause under the undisputed facts of this case. The search here complained of was in my opinion clearly valid as incident to a lawful arrest. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327.