Court Opinion

ID: 9907528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 17:08:09.029631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:18.292007
License: Public Domain

J-S30006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :           PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 RAHEEM HUTCHINSON                       :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :      No. 1391 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 4, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0003617-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED DECEMBER 6, 2023

      Appellant, Raheem Hutchinson, appeals from the aggregate judgment

of sentence of six to fifteen years’ incarceration, imposed after he was

convicted of possession with intent to deliver (PWID), 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(30), possession of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16),

possession of a firearm, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106, possession of a firearm by a

person prohibited, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, carrying a firearm on a public street in

Philadelphia, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108, carrying a loaded weapon, 18 Pa.C.S. §

6106.1, and possessing an instrument of crime (PIC), 18 Pa.C.S. § 907. On

appeal, Appellant challenges the court’s denial of his pretrial motion to

suppress, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain several of his

convictions. After careful review, we affirm.
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       We detail the facts underlying Appellant’s convictions in detail, infra. At

this point, we need only note that Appellant was convicted of the above-stated

offenses on February 17, 2022. Just prior to his trial, the court heard evidence

on Appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress and denied the same. On May 4,

2022, the court sentenced Appellant to the aggregate term set forth supra.

He filed a timely notice of appeal, and complied with the trial court’s order to

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on November 1, 2022. Herein,

Appellant states three issues for our review:

       1. Whether police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry[1]
       stop of Appellant, who was never seen driving the car in question
       but had it registered in his name, because that car had driven by
       a police patrol car at a high rate of speed and with tinted windows
       about half an hour before the police tried to stop Appellant?

       2. Whether the search warrant contained probable cause to search
       the car, which was registered to Appellant, where the only
       allegations were that the car drove by police at a high rate of
       speed and with tinted windows half an hour before police tried to
       stop Appellant, police did not try to stop the car at that time, and
       when police tried to stop Appellant, he ran and dropped a firearm?

       3. Whether the Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence to
       prove that Appellant committed the offenses of possession with
       the intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance,
       possessing an instrument of crime, and carrying loaded weapons
       where the evidence showed only that he owned the car in question
       but not that he was ever in it and that the gun was not a long gun
       as required for the carrying loaded weapons statute?

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

____________________________________________

1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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      Appellant’s first two issues challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion

to suppress evidence on the grounds that the police lacked reasonable

suspicion or probable cause to stop and detain him, and that a search warrant

issued for his vehicle was unsupported by probable cause. We begin by setting

forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law issued by the trial court at the

close of the suppression hearing:

      The defense brought a motion to suppress, in other words, to
      suppress all physical evidence, asserting the lack of probable
      cause for [Appellant’s] arrest and seizure and lack of reasonable
      suspicion for the same.

      [Appellant] also brings, among others, a four corners motion
      challenging the veracity of the contents of the affidavit of probable
      cause supporting a warrant that was later used to search the
      vehicle that he was allegedly driving.

      Pursuant to which the Commonwealth called Police Officer Brian
      Smith, … who testified that on 4/5/2021 at approximately seven
      p.m., he was on routine patrol in uniform and in a marked vehicle
      with his partner, Officer [William] Kolb, in the area of 57th and
      Locust Street wearing body cams.

      He testified that he had patrolled that area more than 70 percent
      of his time during his six years as a police officer at the time. He
      testified that[,] in the immediate area, he participated in five to
      ten arrests for guns, [and] responded to over 12 shootings in the
      three to four-block area.

      He indicated that he was in a patrol car, stationary, facing
      northbound on 57th Street[,] when he saw a vehicle drive past
      them with heavy tint. It was a blue Honda Accord.

      The officers then indicated that the patrol vehicle then made a[]
      U-turn to pursue that car. [Officer Smith d]id not recall if the
      lights and sirens were activated. His partner was driving. [He
      i]ndicated that the vehicle … fled at a high rate of speed. He did
      not pursue the vehicle, but did call in the tag number to other
      officers. [Officer Smith d]id not recall if lights and sirens were
      activated at any point.

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     About a half an hour later[,] on the north corner of 58th and
     Spruce, they laid eyes on the same blue Honda Accord, stationary,
     parked at the corner. They testified that at that particular point,
     he didn’t see anyone in or near the vehicle.

     He did hear [that other] officers were engaged in foot pursuit of
     the person later identified as [Appellant,] and he joined the foot
     pursuit. He also assisted in the apprehension of [Appellant].

     During this apprehension[,] or somewhere during the pursuit
     and/or apprehension, a gun was recovered. Police Officer … Kolb
     testified that on 4/5/21 at approximately seven p.m.[,] he was
     working on routine patrol with Officer Smith in the 18th District
     and in the area of 57th and Locust.

     He indicated that he was the driver, that he had been assigned
     almost seven years as a patrol officer[,] and therefore he patrolled
     that area daily. He described that four-block radius as a place
     where he conducted approximately 12 arrests for firearms,
     approximately 12 arrests for narcotics[,] and had responded to
     approximately 20 shootings. He testified that he saw the [same]
     blue Honda travel westbound … while they were parked. He
     indicated that [as] the vehicle turned southbound on 52nd Street,
     [the officer] made a U-turn behind the vehicle.

     In flight from the officers, the vehicle went around several cars
     that were stationary waiting for the light to change and went
     through the red light. He indicated that at no time did he activate
     lights and sirens[,] and that he did not pursue the blue Honda but
     called in over radio to other officers.

     When he called in the plate, he also indicated that the vehicle
     came back as registered to [Appellant]. Police Officer Kolb
     testified that half an hour later, he saw the vehicle again at 5800
     Spruce Street where it was parked at the corner[,] and he saw
     [Appellant] running with plainclothes officers in hot foot pursuit.

     He further testified that his partner, Officer Smith, joined the
     pursuit while he, himself, Officer Kolb, stayed with the vehicle. He
     was there for approximately 20 to 30 minutes. After [Appellant]
     was apprehended, he transported the vehicle to the 18th District.

     He had been holding the vehicle, but he testified that the vehicle
     was moved for concerns of police officer safety because it was
     what he described as a gang area and at least one person asked
     about the vehicle or asked to enter the vehicle and he was

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       concerned that while pulling[2] the vehicle there might be an
       incident.

       He further testified that he drove the car to the 18th District
       wearing the body cam and that he was not present [during,] nor
       did he participate in[,] any search of the car.

       Police Officer Eric Leary testified that on 4/5/2021 at
       approximately seven p.m., he was serving Criminal Intelligence
       Unit for the Southwest Detectives Division in plainclothes, that he
       was in the area of 58th and Spruce within the 18th District, that
       he had … [made,] within the 18th District[,] arrests for firearms,
       [and] more than ten arrests for drugs, and had responded to more
       than ten shootings. He testified that he first saw [Appellant] at
       60th and Pine walking westbound.

       He had been alerted that [Appellant] was there by a brother officer
       who saw him on camera footage. He testified that he saw the
       vehicle he had been alerted about, that the video showed
       [Appellant] on the sidewalk[, but his view was] blocked by a truck
       from showing [Appellant] enter the vehicle.

       He had followed the vehicle eastbound and confirmed from the tag
       while he was in the unmarked vehicle that this was the vehicle
       that he had been alerted about. He testified that moments later
       when he saw the vehicle on the 5800 block of Spruce Street, he
       saw [Appellant] running while holding his front waistband. When
       they [had] seen [Appellant] previously, he was walking, but at this
       point, he saw [Appellant] running while holding his front
       waistband[. Appellant] ran through the rec center[,] and he ran
       to cut [Appellant] off.

       He also testified that he received training in firearms recovery
       since 2012 and pursuant to his training and experience, people
       carry guns in their waistband. He testified that he yelled “police”
       to [Appellant], who continued to flee.

       He did not apprehend [Appellant,] nor did he make any recoveries.
       He indicated that during the chase, at some point[, Appellant] had
       run towards him because of the path of flight. He also testified
       that he didn’t know if any of the other officers had his gun out and
       that he himself did not at that point.

____________________________________________

2 We assume by “pulling” the court meant towing the vehicle.

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     Police Officer Vincent Ficchi testified … that[, as] part of the FBI
     Task Force[,] … on 4/5/21[,] he was assigned to the Southwest
     Task Force and was then in plainclothes in an unmarked vehicle,
     along with Police Officers Leary, Allen[,] and Devine.

     He indicated that when he was in the area of 58th and Spruce
     Street that day around seven p.m., he had already received a
     radio call about a vehicle that had fled from police within the 18th
     District and the direction and the description of the vehicle.

     He saw that vehicle on the 5800 block of Spruce Street[,] and he
     saw [Appellant] walking away from that vehicle at a fast pace
     when he first saw him. He also observed a marked police vehicle
     parked in the same corner. He exited the car. Even though he
     was out of uniform, he was wearing the badge.

     He announced himself by saying[, “]police, stop, come here,[”] to
     which [Appellant] grab[bed] his waistband and [ran].          He
     engage[d] in pursuing [Appellant], who climbed over a fence.

     While he was climbing over the fence, he observed a gun fall from
     [Appellant’s] body and [Appellant got] over the fence and [ran]
     toward uniformed police that were coming from the other side of
     the field, at which point [Appellant] turned around, ran back
     towards Police Officer Ficchi, but before reaching him, then made
     a left….

     In any event, it’s a perpendicular turn away from Officer Ficchi,
     which took him to a parking lot which is where [Appellant was]
     eventually apprehended by multiple officers. He [testified] that
     he did not recall whether or not he pulled the firearm while he was
     chasing [Appellant,] and that he chased [Appellant] about 30 or
     40 feet before he got to the fence.

     There was a stipulation that a search and seizure warrant was
     prepared and executed … for the vehicle that was removed from
     5800 Spruce Street [at] three a.m., on 4/6/21, which was
     approximately eight hours after the initial sighting of [Appellant].

     The Commonwealth bears a burden to prove by a preponderance
     of the evidence that all police activity was lawful. This [c]ourt
     finds that the initial sighting of [Appellant’s] car, in this case, the
     blue Honda Accord, there was reasonable suspicion [to stop the
     car]: First, by the tint of the car; and, second, by the car’s flight
     from the marked vehicle.

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       This [c]ourt also finds that the flight was unprovoked and in a
       high[]crime area. Therefore, at that initial point[,] there was
       probable cause to stop the vehicle, if not more, given the flight.

       This [c]ourt finds that approximately half an hour later when
       [Officer Smith] saw the vehicle again and [Appellant] took flight
       on foot, again, in the same immediate area, there was, at the very
       least, reasonable suspicion, very likely probable cause for his
       seizure.

       During this event is when [Appellant’s] firearm dropped[,] and by
       then there is undoubtedly probable cause justifying his seizure.
       This [c]ourt finds that the circumstantial and direct evidence
       combined establish that [Appellant] was either the driver of the
       vehicle or associated with the vehicle, justifying this stop.

       This [c]ourt finds that the removal of the car from the scene was
       justified by safety concerns as they were holding the vehicle. It
       follows that probable cause existed to search the vehicle from all
       of the events that transpired and provided ample support for the
       search and seizure warrant that was prepared for the search.

       Therefore, the car was legally seized and searched and the seizure
       of anything in the vehicle, which I don’t know what it is, those
       items are not to be excluded because they were legally obtained.

       Therefore, the motion to suppress physical evidence is denied and
       the four corners motion is also denied.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/1/22, at 2-5 (quoting N.T., 2/17/22, at 128-

38).

       In Appellant’s first issue, he contends that the police lacked reasonable

suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention. We begin by recognizing that,

       [t]he Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
       Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee the
       right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
       and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures. To
       secure the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable search
       and seizure, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement
       officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify
       their interactions with citizens to the extent those interactions
       compromise individual liberty. Because interactions between law

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      enforcement and the general citizenry are widely varied, search
      and seizure law looks at how the interaction is classified and if a
      detention has occurred.

      The law recognizes three distinct levels of interaction between
      police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an
      investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop…; and (3)
      a custodial detention.

      A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction
      between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry
      by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that
      it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond and therefore
      need not be justified by any level of police suspicion.

      In contrast, an investigative detention carries an official
      compulsion to stop and respond. Since this interaction has
      elements of official compulsion[,] it requires reasonable suspicion
      of unlawful activity.

      Finally, a custodial detention occurs when the nature, duration and
      conditions of an investigative detention become so coercive as to
      be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.
      This level of interaction requires that the police have probable
      cause to believe that the person so detained has committed or is
      committing a crime.

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 289 A.3d 1078, 1086–87 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(internal citations omitted).

      In this case, Appellant claims that he was seized at the moment Officer

Ficchi got out of his police car, identified himself as a police officer, and said

to Appellant, “‘police, don’t move, come here’ in a loud voice.” Appellant’s

Brief at 20 (quoting N.T. at 81 (Officer Ficchi’s testifying about his initial

interaction with Appellant)).   Appellant insists that any “reasonable person

would not have felt free to leave” at this moment and, thus, “this was a stop.”

Id. at 20-21. We agree.

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       In next determining whether Officer Ficchi had reasonable suspicion to

initiate Appellant’s investigative detention,

       the fundamental inquiry is an objective one, namely, whether the
       facts available to police at the moment of the intrusion warrant a
       man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
       appropriate. Reasonable suspicion is dependent on both the
       quantity and quality of the information police possess prior to
       detaining an individual. In order to assess the facts available to
       police, we must consider the totality of the circumstances. While
       reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable
       cause, the detaining officer must be able to articulate something
       more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.

       A consideration [of] the totality of the circumstances includes such
       factors as tips, the reliability of any tips, location and suspicious
       activity.

Muhammad, 289 A.3d at 1087 (internal citations omitted).

       Instantly,   according     to   the     trial   court’s   findings   of   fact,   the

circumstances known to Officer Ficchi at the moment he stopped Appellant

were the following: he received a radio call that a vehicle had fled from police;

the location was a high crime area where his fellow officers had made arrests

for drugs, guns, and shootings;3 he had a description of that vehicle; he saw
____________________________________________

3 We recognize that Officer Ficchi did not testify to his knowledge of the area

as being high crime.         However, our Supreme Court “recognized in
Commonwealth v. Queen, 639 A.2d 443, 445–46 and n. 4 (Pa. 1994), [that]
an officer responding to a police radio bulletin is justified in conducting a Terry
stop, even if that officer is not in possession of enough facts to meet the
reasonable suspicion requirement, provided the officer who requests the first
officer to make the stop has the requisite facts at his or her disposal.”
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 574 (Pa. 1997). Officers Smith
and Kolb both testified that, in their experience, the area in which they first
encountered Appellant and from which he fled was a high crime area. They
then called in the description of Appellant’s vehicle and reported that he had
fled from them over the police radio. See TCO at 3.

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a parked vehicle matching that description; he observed Appellant “walking

away from that vehicle at a fast pace[;]” and a “marked police vehicle parked

[at] the same corner.” TCO at 4.

      Our Supreme Court has stated that, “it is evident that unprovoked flight

in a high crime area is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion to justify a

Terry stop under the Fourth Amendment.” In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1164

(Pa. 2001). Appellant, however, claims that the record does not support the

court’s conclusion that he fled from Officers Smith and Kolb “because the

officers testified repeatedly that they did not pursue the car or attempt to stop

it.” Appellant’s Brief at 24. Appellant also stresses that no officer testified to

seeing him actually driving that vehicle at any point and, therefore, reasonable

suspicion to stop him was lacking.

      We disagree. First, regarding the court’s conclusion that Appellant fled

from Officers Smith and Kolb, Officer Smith testified as follows:
      [Officer Smith:] We first saw the vehicle at 57[th] and Locust. We
      were facing north on 57th Street. The vehicle was passing us,
      headed west on Locust and then making a left-hand turn
      southbound on 57th Street.

      [The Commonwealth:] And at this time, was your vehicle
      traveling, or were you stationary?

      [Officer Smith:] We were stationary as it was passing us.

      [The Commonwealth:] What, if anything, did you do in response
      to seeing this vehicle?

      [Officer Smith:] Initially, we saw the vehicle had tint. We made a
      U-turn to further investigate and the vehicle fled at a high rate
      of speed further south on 57th, [and] made a right-hand turn
      onto Spruce, and we did not pursue it.

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N.T. at 14-15 (emphasis added).

      Additionally, Officer Kolb testified that he and Officer Smith were parked

in a marked patrol car at the intersection of 57th and Locust Streets when he

first observed Appellant’s vehicle traveling “westbound on 5600 Locust” with

windows and a “front windshield” that were “heavily tinted.” Id. at 27, 30.

As the officer pulled out and made a U-turn to follow the car, he saw the

vehicle “traveling at a high rate of speed at this point….” Id. at 31. The car

went around three vehicles stopped at a traffic light and “went through a red

light….” Id. Although both officers testified that they did not continue to

pursue Appellant’s vehicle, it is clear that Appellant initially fled from them

after they made a U-turn in their marked police vehicle to follow him. Thus,

the record supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant fled from police.

      Moreover, we conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence

that Appellant was driving the car both when it fled from Officers Smith and

Kolb, and just before Officer Ficchi stopped him, to establish that Officer Ficchi

had reasonable suspicion to do so. Officer Smith called in the license plate of

the blue Honda Accord and discovered that it was registered to Appellant. The

United States Supreme Court has held that it is reasonable to assume that the

registered owner of a vehicle is the person driving it, absent any information

negating that inference. See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 1186 (2020)

(holding that “when the officer lacks information negating an inference that

the   owner   is   the   driver   of   the   vehicle,   the   stop   is   reasonable”);

Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en

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banc), appeal denied, 268 A.3d 1071 (Pa. 2021) (holding that, under Glover,

police had reasonable suspicion to stop Jefferson’s vehicle based solely on the

inference that Jefferson, who had an outstanding warrant for his arrest and

was the registered owner of the vehicle, would be found in the vehicle).

Moreover, when Officer Ficchi observed Appellant, he was close to his parked

vehicle and was walking quickly away from it, while a marked police cruiser

was parked nearby.         It was reasonable for Officer Ficchi to suspect that

Appellant had alighted from the vehicle and was attempting to distance

himself therefrom, as that same vehicle had fled from other officers not long

before. Accordingly, Officer Ficchi had reasonable suspicion to order Appellant

to stop so the officer could further investigate.4

       In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the search warrant issued

for his vehicle was not supported by probable cause.

       When reviewing a magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant
       based upon an affidavit of probable cause, our scope of review is
       narrow, and our standard of review is restrained. We review only
       “the information within the four corners of the affidavit submitted
       in support of probable cause….” Commonwealth v. Rogers, …
       615 A.2d 55, 62 ([Pa. Super.] 1992); see also Pennsylvania Rule
       of Criminal Procedure 203(D). The “duty of a reviewing court is
       simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
       concluding that probable cause existed.” Illinois v. Gates, 462
       U.S. 213, 238–39 … (1983) (some punctuation omitted). Thus,
       we “may not conduct a de novo review of the issuing authority’s
       probable    cause    determination.”        Commonwealth         v.

____________________________________________

4 The Commonwealth also contends that there was probable cause to stop
Appellant based on the window tint vehicle violation observed by Officers
Smith and Kolb. We need not address this argument, as Officer Ficchi had
reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant for the reasons stated supra.

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     Huntington, 924 A.2d 1252, 1259 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis
     added).

Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2019).

     Here, Appellant sets forth the information contained in the affidavit of

probable cause, which we reproduce verbatim:

     On 4/5/21 approximately 6:55 pm, 18th District Officers
     Smith#2457 and Kolb# 9807, were working parked at the
     Southeast corner of 57th & Locust Street doing paperwork when
     they observed a blue Honda Accord, PA tag# LKV1056, traveling
     Westbound on Locust Street then turn Southbound on 57th Street.
     The vehicle was being operated with dark heavy tint on the
     windows in violation of PA MVC 4524-E (sunscreen prohibited).
     The officers know, Raheem Hutchinson, 21/B/M, to operate the
     vehicle. Hutchinson is a known member of the ‘Sitzzy/Southside
     gang’ which operates from 62nd Street to 57th Street. Locust St.
     to Osage Avenue. The officers performed a Uturn and got behind
     the vehicle. When they got behind the vehicle, it accelerated at a
     high rate of speed traveling Southbound on 57th Street. It went
     around three parked cars and disregarded a steady red signal at
     57th & Spruce Street. The vehicle continued at a high rate of
     speed Northbound on 58th Street, then Westbound on Walnut
     Street. The officers lost sight of the vehicle as it was going
     Westbound on Walnut Street from 59th Street. The officers
     notified police radio that the vehicle took off from them and they
     provided the description and tag number of the vehicle and the
     direction it was last seen traveling. They also advised police radio
     that the car was registered to Raheem Hutchinson. PA BMV
     records show that the vehicle is registered to Hutchinson at 245 S
     Cecil Street, Phila., PA 19139.

     Approximately thirty minutes later, Officers Leary# 6804, Ficchi#
     5296, Allen# 1384 and Devine# 1700, detailed to the Criminal
     Intelligence Unit, were working in a plainclothes capacity and
     operating a marked vehicle in the area of 245 S. Cecil Street.
     While surveying the area, they observed Raheem Hutchinson on
     foot at 60th & Pine Street. The officers parked their vehicle nearby
     in a strategic location and P/O Leary pulled up the live video feed
     from the PPD RTCC pole camera at 60th & Pine Street.
     Approximately 7:23 pm, P/O Leary observed Hutchinson get into
     a dark colored Honda Sedan on the 6000th block of Pine Street.
     The vehicle then pulls out of a parking spot and makes a U-Turn

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     to head East on Pine Street and then turns North onto 58 th Street.
     The officers get behind the vehicle on 58th Street and P/O Leary
     confirmed the tag number over police radio. P/O Leary then
     requested to have a marked police unit stop the vehicle and
     provide back up. As the officers were waiting for a marked unit
     to arrive, the vehicle pulled over into a parking spot on the North
     side of Spruce Street. Marked units started to pull up to the
     location. The plainclothes officers proceeded to go Westbound on
     Spruce Street to preserve the integrity of the investigation. As
     they got a half a block away, they observed Raheem running
     Westbound on Spruce Street. As he was running, he was holding
     the front of his waistband. P/O Ficchi exited the unmarked police
     vehicle and identified himself as a police officer. He ordered
     Hutchinson to stop, but he continued to run. P/O Ficchi pursued
     him on foot. Hutchinson ran to the corner of the playground and
     as he hopped over a fence he discarded a firearm. Hutchinson
     continued to run but was cut off by additional units. Hutchinson
     then fled across the football field and into a parking lot where he
     was taken into custody by P/O Ficchi# 5296 and P/O Smith#
     2457. P/O Ficchi returned to the area where he observed
     Hutchinson discard the firearm and recovered a black and tan,
     9mm, Glock 43x, semi-automatic handgun. The firearm has a
     serial number on the lower receiver which is BMDK701. The serial
     number on the slide is BPLN700. It was loaded with an extended
     magazine that contained sixteen live rounds. There was one live
     round loaded in the chamber.          P/O Devine recovered keys
     belonging to the Honda Accord approximately five to ten feet from
     where the gun was recovered.

     Raheem Hutchinson does not have a permit to carry and is
     prohibited from possessing firearms.     He was arrested and
     transported to Southwest Division Booking Center for processing.
     The Honda Accord belonging to Raheem Hutchinson was driven to
     the 18th District Headquarters and secured. The firearm was
     swabbed for potential DNA evidence.

     Based on the above facts and circumstances, your affiant is
     requesting that a search warrant be issued in order to conduct a
     search of the blue 2006 Honda Accord, PA tag# LKV-1056 (VIN#
     1HGCM56356A108764) belonging to Raheem Hutchinson, for any
     firearms, ammunition, ballistic evidence, holsters, gun boxes,
     photographs and any other items of evidentiary value.

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Appellant’s Brief at 25-27 (citing Commonwealth’s Suppression Exhibit 4).

      Initially, Appellant notes that “the events described in the warrant are

wildly different from the events described by the officers at the motion to

suppress….” Id. at 27. However, he acknowledges that his trial counsel did

not challenge the warrant on this basis and, therefore, he did not preserve

this issue for appeal. Id. at 27 n.3. We agree. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues

not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time

on appeal.”).     Therefore, we do not address the differences between the

affidavit of probable cause and the officers’ testimony but, instead, focus

solely on whether the information contained in the affidavit was sufficient for

the issuing authority to determine that probable cause existed to support a

search warrant.

      Appellant challenges the validity of the warrant on the basis that “the

affidavit of probable cause for the search warrant contains no information

whatsoever as to why police wanted to search the car, what they expected to

find, or why they expected to find additional evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at

27 (footnote omitted). Appellant claims that “[t]he warrant suggests only that

[he] was in the car at one point, parked and exited on his own prior to being

stopped, and then ran and discarded a gun when the police tried to stop him.”

Id. at 30.      He argues that there had to be “some nexus” between his

“possession of a firearm outside of the car” and the vehicle itself to

demonstrate that there was likely contraband therein. Id. Finally, Appellant

maintains that because “the warrant contained information regarding the

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recovery of the firearm, the search of the car was also based on the fruit of

the poisonous tree[,]” as he contends that his stop, which led to the recovery

of that firearm, was illegal. Id. at 31.

        Appellant’s arguments are meritless. We have concluded that his stop

was lawful and, therefore, the inclusion of information regarding the firearm

in the warrant application was not error.             Moreover, the circumstantial

evidence made it reasonable to assume that Appellant was driving the vehicle

when he fled from Officers Smith and Kolb in a high crime area known for

drugs and guns. Additionally, it was reasonable to suspect that Appellant had

just exited his parked vehicle when Officer Ficchi later saw Appellant in close

proximity to the vehicle and quickly walking away from it. Appellant then fled

from Officer Ficchi when he attempted to stop him, and he dropped the firearm

during that flight.

        We agree with the Commonwealth that that these facts make “this case

… analogous to Commonwealth v. Bartee, 868 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Super.

2005),” where “the affidavit of probable cause asserted that the appellant

[had]    recently   driven   a   specific   vehicle   and   possessed   a   firearm.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 14; see also Bartee, 868 A.2d at 1221. “Based on

those facts, this Court found probable cause was established to issue a warrant

to search the vehicle for ammunition, magazines, and evidence related to the

appellant’s unlawful firearm possession.” Id. Similarly, here, “the warrant

was based on … probable cause to believe there would be firearms-related

evidence in the vehicle [Appellant] had just been driving.” Id. Therefore, the

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trial court did not err in concluding that probable cause existed to support the

issuance of the search warrant for Appellant’s vehicle based on the totality of

these circumstances.

       In Appellant’s third and final issue, he contends that the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his convictions. First, he challenges his convictions of

PWID    and   possession   of   a   controlled   substance,   arguing   that   the

Commonwealth failed to prove that he constructively possessed the narcotics

that were found in the vehicle.      Appellant further contends that, “without

evidence that [he] possessed the drugs in the car, there is no evidence in the

record of the mens rea necessary to uphold a conviction of [PIC].” Appellant’s

Brief at 35. Last, Appellant maintains that the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction under section 6106.1, as that statute “applies to long

guns like rifles that are longer than those described in [section] 6102” and,

here, the firearm “was clearly a handgun of normal length….” Id. at 36.

       Initially, we are compelled to conclude that Appellant waived his

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions for

possession of a controlled substance and carrying a loaded weapon under

section 6106.1. Appellant did not mention either of these convictions in his

Rule   1925(b) statement.       See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),        8/12/22, at 1-3

(unnumbered); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in

the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this

paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) Order, 6/6/22, at 1

(warning that “[a]ny issue not properly included in the statement timely filed

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and served[]shall be deemed waived”) (unnumbered); see also Greater Erie

Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (en banc) (“[I]n determining whether an appellant has waived

his issues on appeal based on non-compliance with [Rule] 1925, it is the trial

court’s order that triggers an appellant’s obligation[. T]herefore, we look first

to the language of that order.”) (citations omitted; some brackets added).5

       In regard to Appellant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain his PWID and PIC convictions, which he raised in his Rule 1925(b)

statement, we conclude that his arguments are meritless.            Initially, we

observe that,

____________________________________________

5 We observe that, although the Commonwealth notes Appellant failed to raise

his challenge to his section 6106.1 conviction in his concise statement, it
concedes that his conviction for that offense “was returned in error.”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 16. The Commonwealth explains that “[t]he trial
court mischaracterized the statute as prohibiting the carrying of a loaded
firearm, but [section] 6106.1 criminalizes the possession of a loaded weapon
‘other than a firearm.’” Id. See also 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.1 (“Except as
provided in Title 34 (relating to game), no person shall carry a loaded pistol,
revolver, shotgun or rifle, other than a firearm as defined in section 6102
(relating to definitions), in any vehicle.”) (emphasis added); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102
(“Any pistol or revolver with a barrel length less than 15 inches, any shotgun
with a barrel length less than 18 inches or any rifle with a barrel length less
than 16 inches, or any pistol, revolver, rifle or shotgun with an overall length
of less than 26 inches. The barrel length of a firearm shall be determined by
measuring from the muzzle of the barrel to the face of the closed action, bolt
or cylinder, whichever is applicable.”). Instantly, the parties do not dispute
that the gun Appellant possessed met the definition of “firearm” set forth in
section 6102. Thus, it would appear that the Commonwealth is correct that
Appellant should not have been convicted of an offense under section 6106.1,
even though the court imposed no further penalty for that conviction.
However, as Appellant has waived this claim for our review, we are unable to
afford him relief.

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     “[w]hether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charge
     presents a question of law.” Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d
     29 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Our standard of review is de
     novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v.
     Walls, 144 A.3d 926 (Pa. Super. 2016). In conducting our
     inquiry, we examine[,]

        whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences
        derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable
        to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, [is] sufficient to
        establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
        doubt. We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our
        judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the
        evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of
        innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts
        regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so weak
        and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
        fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When
        evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the
        fact-finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
        For purposes of our review under these principles, we
        must review the entire record and consider all of the
        evidence introduced.

     Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super.
     2014) (quotation omitted).

Commonwealth       v.   Rojas-Rolon,     256    A.3d   432,   436   (Pa.    Super.

2021), appeal denied, 285 A.3d 879 (Pa. 2022).

     Presently, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his PWID and PIC convictions because the Commonwealth failed to

prove that he constructively possessed the drugs recovered from his vehicle.

We have explained:

     Where a defendant is not in actual possession of the prohibited
     items, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant had
     constructive possession to support the conviction. Constructive
     possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to deal with the
     realities of criminal law enforcement.           We have defined
     constructive possession as conscious dominion, meaning that the

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     defendant has the power to control the contraband and the intent
     to exercise that control. To aid application, we have held that
     constructive possession may be established by the totality of the
     circumstances.

     It is well established that, as with any other element of a crime,
     constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial
     evidence. In other words, the Commonwealth must establish
     facts from which the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the
     defendant exercised dominion and control over the contraband at
     issue. … [A] defendant’s mere presence at a place where
     contraband is found or secreted is insufficient, standing alone, to
     prove that he exercised dominion and control over those items.
     Thus, the location and proximity of an actor to the contraband
     alone is not conclusive of guilt.      Rather, knowledge of the
     existence and location of the contraband is a necessary
     prerequisite to proving the defendant’s intent to control, and,
     thus, his constructive possession. If the only inference that the
     fact finder can make from the facts is a suspicion of possession,
     the Commonwealth has failed to prove constructive possession.
     It is well settled that facts giving rise to mere association,
     suspicion or conjecture, will not make out a case of constructive
     possession.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36–37 (Pa. Super. 2018) (cleaned

up; spacing altered).

     Instantly, Appellant compares his case to the facts of Commonwealth

v. Boatwright, 453 A.2d 1058 (Pa. Super. 1982). There,

     [t]he Commonwealth’s evidence disclosed that, shortly after
     10:00 p.m. on April 10, 1979, Officers Charles Roller and Annette
     Roebuck responded to a radio call concerning three “suspicious”
     men in an automobile parked in front of a residence in the
     Hazelwood section of Pittsburgh. Upon arriving at the location,
     Officer Roller observed [Boatwright], who was seated in the front
     passenger seat of the vehicle, “moving towards his left rear.” The
     officer could not see [Boatwright’s] hand or arm, only a movement
     of his body. Officer Roller then opened the door of the automobile
     and asked [Boatwright] to get out. He shined a light onto the left
     rear floor of the vehicle and saw a gun.           In addition to
     [Boatwright], the car was occupied by the driver and another
     passenger who was seated in the left rear seat. The car was

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      registered to the driver’s girlfriend and the gun to one Darlene
      Simpson.

Id. at 1058-59. The Boatwright panel concluded that these facts failed to

demonstrate Boatwright’s constructive possession of the gun, as

      [t]he only evidence other than mere presence was Officer Roller’s
      testimony that [Boatwright] made a movement toward the left
      rear of the vehicle. This evidence cannot provide proof beyond a
      reasonable doubt that [Boatwright] possessed the firearm in
      question. Therefore, the conviction cannot be sustained.

Id. at 1059.

      In the case sub judice, Appellant claims that,

      just as in Boatwright, the evidence produced at trial was
      insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
      constructively possessed the contraband that was found in a bag
      in the car because the testimony at trial was that police never saw
      Appellant driving the car. The car was registered to him, and he
      was walking near it, but a box truck blocked the officer from
      seeing whether Appellant actually went in the car. Earlier in the
      day, officers were unable to see into the vehicle because of the
      vehicle’s window tint. Further, even the gun that Appellant
      dropped while running had someone else’s DNA on it. He was only
      a minor contributor, and it has someone else’s DNA on it as the
      major contributor. Accordingly, the Commonwealth’s evidence
      showed that Appellant owned and was near a car that had
      contraband in it, but it failed to show that he was ever in that car
      or knew it had the contraband in it. The evidence also showed
      that he ran because he had a gun on him without a license to carry
      and with a record that prohibited him from possessing a gun.
      Therefore, even if the Court were to approve of the search of the
      car, the Court should find insufficient evidence that Appellant
      possessed the contraband in the car as the Commonwealth failed
      to show that he had exclusive access to it or was ever even in it.

Appellant’s Brief at 34-35.

      Appellant’s arguments are unconvincing.          First, we have already

concluded, for the reasons set forth supra, that there was sufficient

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circumstantial evidence that Appellant was driving the car when it fled from

Officers Smith and Kolb, and when Officer Ficchi stopped him, as nothing

negated the reasonable inference that Appellant was driving the vehicle he

owned. See Glover, 140 S.Ct. at 1186; Jefferson, 256 A.3d at 1249. The

fact that Appellant owned the vehicle, was driving the vehicle, and was the

only individual in or near the car in which the drugs were found, makes this

case easily distinguishable from Boatwright. Furthermore, it was reasonable

for the fact-finder to conclude that Appellant knew about the drugs inside the

car, and exercised dominion and control over that contraband, due to the fact

that he fled from police while driving the vehicle, and then parked the car and

attempted to distance himself from the vehicle by quickly walking away from

it. The totality of these circumstances were sufficient to prove that Appellant

constructively possessed the drugs recovered from inside his vehicle to

support his conviction for PWID. Additionally, as Appellant’s only challenge to

his PIC conviction is premised on his argument that he did not possess the

drugs in the car, that claim fails, as well.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 12/06/2023

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