Court Opinion

ID: 9606765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:52:26.016893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:35.389079
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, J.,
dissenting.
Once again, we witness the minor phenomenon that occurs when the result of our analysis is dictated primarily by the way in which we define the issue or focus our inquiry. What is at stake here is whether BOLI’s rule can survive as a curb on conduct by an employer where a special relationship of power and necessary subservience exists. Conduct is not always protected merely because someone chooses to invoke constitutional guarantees of expression or religion.
Freedom from religious harassment exists for atheists, agnostics and the nonobservant, as well as for the demonstrably religious. For many, freedom from religion is as important as freedom to practice religion. I believe freedom from religion is entitled to the same level of constitutional, statutory and administrative protection in the workplace. I also do not agree with the lead opinion that an intent element is essential in order to uphold BOLI’s rule from a facial or an as-applied attack. I am not sure how intent could ever be shown in this context.
While it is true that Oregon’s guarantees of religious freedom are intended to permit minorities to engage in religious practices that the majority might find objectionable, what occurred here went far beyond the mere providing of religious information. I would therefore hold that the intensity of uninvited religious proselytizing by the employer in this case constituted common harassment and religious discrimination within the meaning of the rule and the statute, and that such conduct is not constitutionally protected.
With our proper focus on the rule’s legitimate purpose of implementing ORS 659.030(l)(b) and preventing religion from interfering with the employment relationship through discrimination, I would uphold the rule and affirm the order.
I dissent.