Court Opinion

ID: 9602862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:00:58.751244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:48:40.026285
License: Public Domain

*509McGraw, Justice,

dissenting:

In good conscience and in the interest of administration of justice, I must dissent from the majority opinion in this ease. Point one of the syllabus holds that a defendant testifying at his criminal trial “may have his credibility impeached by showing prior convictions of perjury or false swearing, but it is impermissive to impeach his credibility through any other prior convictions.” In the body of the opinion a broader rule is announced by holding “that the rule permitting the use of prior convictions to impeach the credibility of a defendant in a criminal trial is henceforth not permissible.” In conclusion the opinion states that the new rule “is not to be given retroactive application, except as to those cases in the trial courts or in the appellate process where the point has been specifically preserved.”
The rule announced in the opinion is unsettling, is judicial legislation, and is inconsistent with the recently adopted Federal Rules of Evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence proposed for state courts, and the rule accepted and applied generally in many states. The opinion cites State v. McGee, _ W. Va. _, 230 S.E.2d 832 (1976), which imposed a limitation on cross-examination of the defendant as a witness in his own criminal trial. The syllabus in that case holds that “When the State seeks to cross-examine a defendant in a criminal case regarding previous convictions for the purpose of testing his credibility, the trial court is required to consider the probative value thereof measured against the risk of substantial danger of undue prejudice to the accused ....” Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Rule 609(a) of the proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence, a product of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, reads as follows:
“(a) General Rule. - For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court *510determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party or a witness, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.”
This proposed Rule relates to witnesses generally, as does Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The West Virginia statute, W. Va. Code, 57-3-6, provides that the accused in a criminal case “shall be subject to cross-examination as any other witness.” He is not accorded special consideration or insulated from cross-examination for purposes of testing his credibility.
When the Federal Rules of Evidence were being drafted and promulgated, consideration was given to several alternatives to the language finally chosen relating to testing the credibility of witnesses. See, 3 Weinstein’s Evidence, 609-14 (1976). Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, relating to witnesses generally, provides:
“(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.”
The majority opinion does not persuade me that State v. Friedman, 124 W. Va. 4, 18 S.E.2d 653 (1942), embraces a misconception of the meaning and purpose of W. Va. Code, 57-3-6. See, IIIA Wigmore on Evidence, § § 889-892 (Chadbourn Ed. 1970).
The legal profession is being obliged to deal with and apply an ever-increasing number of rules. The majority opinion would add still another variable and depart from the greatly settled and accepted procedure for testing the credibility of a defendant appearing as a witness at *511his own trial. The opinion notes that “This nagging suspicion of the inherent prejudice involved in permitting a defendant to have his credibility attacked or impeached by cross-examination as to prior convictions has haunted this Court to the present day.” This factor in the administration of criminal justice has been carefully examined and considered incident to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence, and rules of evidence adopted in several states. It is not something new or novel in West Virginia. The McGee case, supra, considered this factor and brought the West Virginia law greatly in line with the Federal Rules of Evidence on this issue. But the majority opinion in the present case distorts the law on this point, breaks with the generally accepted practice and rules across the country, and invades an area in the administration of criminal justice more properly left to the legislative process.