Court Opinion

ID: 9914951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 20:01:03.654438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:43.787855
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11315    Document: 19-1     Date Filed: 01/03/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11315
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       IVETTE ARCE,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-14097-KMM
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11315      Document: 19-1      Date Filed: 01/03/2024     Page: 2 of 6

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11315

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Ivette Arce appeals the district court’s order affirming the
       Commissioner’s denial of her Social Security disability insurance
       benefits (“DIB”) claim. Arce makes three arguments on appeal.
       First, she argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in
       assessing her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) because the ALJ
       did not state how her non-severe mental limitations affected her
       RFC. Second, she argues that the ALJ erred by not explicitly stating
       how persuasive the ALJ found a state agency psychologist’s opin-
       ion. Third, she argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the state
       agency psychologist’s opinion that failed to include a func-
       tion-by-function analysis.
              Where an ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council de-
       nies review, we review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s
       final decision. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001).
       The Commissioner’s decision is reviewed to determine whether it
       is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal
       standards were applied. Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245,
       1257 (11th Cir. 2019).
             The Social Security regulations outline a five-step process
       the ALJ must use to determine whether a claimant is disabled:
       (1) whether she is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
       whether she has a severe impairment or combination of impair-
       ments; (3) if so, whether that impairment, or combination of
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       23-11315              Opinion of the Court                        3

       impairments, meets or equals the medical listings; (4) if not,
       whether she can perform her past relevant work in light of her
       RFC; and (5) if not, whether, based on her age, education, RFC,
       and work experience, she can perform other work found in the na-
       tional economy. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178
       (11th Cir. 2011); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
              An ALJ must assess a claimant’s RFC, which is defined as the
       most a claimant can still do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R.
       § 404.1545(a). In determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider all
       of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including
       those that are not “severe.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(2). The Regulations
       provide that
             [t]he RFC assessment must ﬁrst identify the individ-
             ual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess
             his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-func-
             tion basis, including the functions in paragraphs (b),
             (c), and (d) of 20 CFR 404.1545 and 416.945. Only af-
             ter that may RFC be expressed in terms of the exer-
             tional levels of work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy,
             and very heavy.
       Titles II & XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial
       Claims, SSR 96-8P (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). Paragraph (c) of 20 C.F.R.
       § 404.1545 addresses mental abilities, and provides that
             [w]hen we assess your mental abilities, we ﬁrst assess
             the nature and extent of your mental limitations and
             restrictions and then determine your residual func-
             tional capacity for work activity on a regular and
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11315

              continuing basis. A limited ability to carry out certain
              mental activities, such as limitations in understand-
              ing, remembering, and carrying out instructions, and
              in responding appropriately to supervision, co-work-
              ers, and work pressures in a work setting, may reduce
              your ability to do past work and other work.

       20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(c); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(c).
              Consideration of all impairments—severe and non-severe—
       is required when assessing a claimant’s RFC. Schink, 935 F.3d at
       1268.
               In Schink, we discussed what an ALJ must consider when as-
       sessing a claimant’s RFC. Schink, 935 F.3d at 1268-70. In Schink,
       the ALJ stated that he had “considered all symptoms” when as-
       sessing the claimant’s RFC, but the content of his decision only
       mentioned that the claimant had bipolar disorder without discuss-
       ing how that disorder affected the RFC, and the ALJ’s findings only
       concerned physical capacities. Id. at 1269. We explained that even
       if the ALJ had considered the mental conditions implicitly in deter-
       mining the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ had failed to provide sufficient
       reasoning to show that he had done so, and thus we could not af-
       firm. Id. We observed that, although at step 2 the ALJ had found
       Schink’s bipolar disorder to be a non-severe impairment under the
       four broad functional areas known as “paragraph B” criteria, this
       was insufficient because consideration of Schink’s RFC “require[d]
       a more detailed assessment.” Id. As a result, the ALJ’s assessment
       was “inadequate.” Id. at 1270. Accordingly, we remanded the case
       to the district court, instructing it to vacate the Commissioner’s
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       23-11315                  Opinion of the Court                                5

       decision and remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
       Id.
              Here, as in Schink, the ALJ did not apply the correct legal
       standards, and remand to the Commissioner for further proceed-
       ings is necessary. Although the ALJ found mild mental impair-
       ments in her step 2 analysis, her RFC assessment at step 4 appar-
       ently was limited to Arce’s physical abilities and impairments and
       erroneously omitted considering her mental ones. To support her
       conclusion that Arce could perform work in the national econ-
       omy—including that of order clerk, telephone information clerk,
       and charge account clerk—the ALJ had to consider all the duties of
       that work and evaluate Arce’s ability to perform those duties de-
       spite all her impairments, severe and non-severe. Accordingly, a
       remand is necessary for the ALJ to consider how Arce’s non-severe
       mental limitations affected her RFC.1
             Because remand is necessary, we do not reach Arce’s re-
       maining arguments and offer no opinion as to whether the ALJ
       erred with respect to those issues. On remand from the district

       1 Although the ALJ here said in her step 4 analysis of the RFC that she consid-

       ered all of Arce’s symptoms, the same was true in Schink, but here as in Schink,
       the content of the ALJ’s decision with respect to the RFC only indicated con-
       sideration of Arce’s physical limitations. Also, as in Schink, 935 F.3d at 1268-
       70, we decline to simply assume—because the ALJ considered Arce’s mental
       limitations at step 2 and found them to be non-severe—that the ALJ did in fact
       consider whether Arce’s mental limitations affected her RFC, and just con-
       cluded sub silencio that they imposed insufficient limitation on her ability to
       work to warrant mention of them in Arce’s RFC.
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11315

       court, the ALJ is to consider how Arce’s non-severe mental limita-
       tions affected her RFC. In remanding this case, we express no opin-
       ion on whether Arce can ultimately establish that she is disabled
       within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
              For the foregoing reasons, we remand to the district court
       with instructions to vacate the Commissioner’s decision and re-
       mand to the Commissioner for further proceedings not incon-
       sistent with this opinion.
             Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
             VACATED AND REMANDED.