Court Opinion

ID: 9558665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:15:07.643745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:30.562788
License: Public Domain

HODGES, J.
¶ 1 The issue in this case is whether the Workers’ Compensation Court’s order on which this appeal is based, in so far as it purports to adjudicate the amount of attorney fees, is an appealable order subject to this Court’s review. We find that the issue of the proper amount of attorney fees remains pending before the Workers’ Compensation Court and, as such, is not ripe for review by the appellate courts.
I. Facts
¶ 2 On April 2, 1992, the Workers’ Compensation Court found Willie B. Rowland (Rowland) to be permanently totally disabled and awarded Rowland $208.27 per week in compensation and back compensation of $2,707.51. Wilson Jones (Jones), the respon*1283dent in this appeal and Rowland’s attorney at the time of the award, was paid a twenty percent lump sum fee of $20,827.00 by Rowland’s employer, the City of Tulsa (City). The City was to recoup the lump-sum attorney fee payment by deducting ten percent of Rowland’s weekly award until the total was recovered.
¶ 3 On February 16, 1996, Rowland and the employer entered into an agreement whereby Rowland was paid $135,000.00 in exchange for releasing the City from the remainder of the payments under the 1992 order. The agreement provided for a reduction of the $135,000.00 by twenty percent for attorney fees. The settlement worksheet, signed by both Rowland and Jones, shows that Jones was paid attorney fees of $22,-840.00 out of the $135,000.00 settlement. The $22,840.00 represents the amount of $27,000.00, which is twenty percent of $135,-000.00, less the amount that Rowland had reimbursed the City of the $20,827.00 lump-sum fee previously paid to Jones.
¶ 4 Before the order approving the agreement was filed of record, Rowland sent a letter to the administrator and the presiding judge for the Workers’ Compensation Court. The letter was received by both the judge and the administrator on March 6, 1996. In his letter, Rowland alleged that under the agreement his attorney would receive more than the statutorily allowed twenty percent of the award. On March 12, 1996, an order was filed approving the joint settlement agreement.
¶ 5 Rowland’s letter was treated as a motion to modify the order approving the joint settlement, and a hearing was held on May 30, 1996. Four months later, on September 27, the trial tribunal ruled that it did not have authority to modify the order approving the settlement more than twenty days after the order was mailed to the parties. The Court of Civil Appeals sustained the trial court’s decision denying Rowland relief. This Court granted certiorari.1
II. Analysis
¶ 6 The Workers’ Compensation Court treated Rowland’s letter as a motion to modify its order approving the settlement agreement. Neither the fact that the request for relief was in the form of a letter nor the treatment given it by the Workers’ Compensation Court is determinative of its true nature. Rowland states in the letter that he is asking for a hearing on the amount of attorney fees and stating that under the agreement his attorney would receive more than the statutory maximum. The letter not only requests a hearing but revokes Rowland’s consent to the amount of attorney fees as recited in the joint agreement.
¶ 7 The basis of a joint petition settlement is the parties’ agreement to its terms. After Rowland suspected that the settlement allowed an attorney fee in excess of the statutory maximum,2 he withdrew his consent to the amount of attorney fees and requested review of the matter. After he withdrew his consent to the amount of attorney fees, the joint petition settlement in so far as it settled the amount of attorney fees was no longer before the trial tribunal for its approval.
¶ 8 In cases such as this where the issue of attorney fees is in controversy, a judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court must hear and consider all the evidence pertaining to the issue.3 After the hearing, the judge enters an order determining the proper amount of attorney fees.4 Only after an order adjudicating the issue is entered does the matter become ripe for appeal.5 Because, in the present case, the amount of attorney fees was never properly presented for approval to or adjudicated by the Workers’ Compensation Comí, the order of March 12, 1996, was a nullity as to attorney fees, and this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction of the matter.
¶ 9 The trial tribunal and the Court of Civil Appeals both found that the Workers’ Compensation Court was without authority to modify the order under section 3.6 of title 85. Section 3.6 states that an order of the Workers’ Compensation Court becomes final twen*1284ty days after a copy is mailed to the parties.6 Because Rowland revoked the part of the joint petition settlement addressing attorney fees before an approval order was filed, the twenty day time period did not begin to run as to the matter of the amount of attorney fees.7 Thus, the Workers’ Compensation Court and the Court of Civil Appeals erred.
III. Conclusion
¶ 10 Because the order appealed from in the present ease was not ripe for review by the appellate courts as to the amount of attorney fees, the Court of Civil Appeal was without jurisdiction to determine the merits of the appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion is vacated. The appeal is dismissed for lack of an appealable order. The letter seeking review should be treated as revoking the joint petition settlement as to the amount of attorney fees, leaving the issue pending before the Workers’ Compensation Court.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS’ OPINION VACATED; APPEAL DISMISSED FOR LACK OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION; MATTER REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
¶ 11 SUMMERS, C.J., HARGRAVE, V.C.J., LAVENDER, SIMMS, KAUGER, WATT, JJ. — concur.
¶ 12 OPALA, J. — dissents.

. The City was named as a respondent in the Petition for Review but filed a pleading disclaiming an interest in the appeal and asserting that the controversy is between Rowland and Jones.

. Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 30 (Supp.1992).

. Id. at §§ 3.6, 30.

. Id. at § 3.6.

. Id.

. Id.

. Higley v. Schlessman, 1956 OK 18, ¶ 0, 292 P.2d 411, 412, provides:
1.The State Industrial Commission may vacate, set aside, modify or change any order or award within 20 days after such order or award has been entered and a copy thereof sent to the parties and this rule applies to awards entered by the Commission on approval of joint petition settlement....