Court Opinion

ID: 9483118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:11:35.428895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:26.005327
License: Public Domain

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s holding that a district court must grant an evidentiary hearing whenever the government so requests. With this ruling, the majority snatches away the last bit of discretion district court judges possess in the sentencing process. I also have many additional *1129concerns regarding the issue before this court, this court’s jurisdiction, and the government’s activities in this case.
I.The Issue
The majority states the issue as “whether a district court may prevent the government from fulfilling its obligations under a plea agreement after that court has accepted the agreement and consequently not provided the defendants an opportunity to withdraw their guilty pleas.” Because the majority poses the wrong question, it announces the wrong answer. The issue is simply whether a district court must grant an evidentiary hearing at the government’s request. The majority says, “Yes”; I say, “No.”
II.Jurisdiction
My first concern is the jurisdictional basis for this appeal. After posing the wrong issue, the majority states that the defendants and the government appeal the failure of the district court to grant an eviden-tiary hearing. Obviously, a party may no more appeal the denial of an evidentiary hearing than it may appeal an objection overruled. If this court does have jurisdiction from the denial of an evidentiary hearing, I still question the wisdom of allowing an appeal from every denial of an eviden-tiary hearing in a sentencing context — especially a government appeal. It has long been established that in a criminal case, the government may only appeal pursuant to the grounds provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3731.1
As to Deppe, sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines, no appeal is possible because the sentence has not been “imposed in violation of law,” or “as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines,” or “imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)-(b). No appealable order exists in this case.
III. The Offenses and Sentences
These appellants are drug felons.2 As to Yesil and Golan, a grand jury returned a five count indictment charging them and two co-conspirators with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and distribution of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. After entering into written plea agreements, Yesil and Golan entered guilty pleas to one count of the indictment. The district court sentenced them to six years imprisonment, a three year special parole term, a fine of $150,000, and a $50 special assessment.
As to Deppe, a grand jury returned a one count indictment charging him and a co-conspirator with conspiracy to import into the United States, from a place outside thereof, approximately 10,445 pounds of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 963, and 18 U.S.C. § 3238. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Deppe entered a plea of guilty. The court originally sentenced Deppe to 188 months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, assessed $500 per month as costs of imprisonment, and a $50 special assessment. The majority finds no error in the sentences. The district court was correct on the merits of the rule 35 motions.
IV. The Government’s Activities
It is difficult to understand what more the government wanted the district court to do in this case — other than let the government control the entire sentencing process including the terms of the sentences. For example, the government wanted to delay sentencing, and although the district court would not delay sentencing, the district court did delay the prison reporting date for the exact length of time *1130that the government requested — six months. The district court also noted that after the reporting date, it would still entertain a rule 35 motion. True to its promise, the district court did entertain a rule 35 motion.
It is not difficult to determine what the government did not do in this case. It did not comply with the plea agreements. The government boldly states in its brief that it did not put into its motions seeking a reduction of the sentences to the full extent of the appellants’ cooperation. Likewise, the majority just as boldly states in its opinion the same thing, but faults the district court for not knowing all of the facts. If a plea agreement violation occurred in this case, it occurred when the government chose to place before the district court less than all of the evidence regarding cooperation.
In the Deppe case, the government refused to file a U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 motion when the district court invited it to do so. In spite of the government’s failure to accept the invitation, the district court left the door open for the government to file such a motion. No 5K1.1 motion was ever filed. Moreover, for some unexplainable reason, even when the government filed its rule 35(b) motion, it only included “some” of the facts regarding cooperation. Again, if a breach of the plea agreement occurred, the government willfully caused the breach— not the district court.3 According to the majority, the government could have kept the district court from imposing the sentences for as long as the government desired through the calculated ruse of withholding facts.
This case comes down to nothing more than the government insisting that the district court conduct an evidentiary hearing. The law regarding evidentiary hearings is clear. The decision to grant an evidentiary hearing is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Nerrin, 613 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.1980). In accordance with existing law, the district court in this case properly denied the government an evidentiary hearing. The majority now bootstraps that denial of an evidentiary hearing up to an error of constitutional dimensions.
Y. The Reach of this Ruling
Not only does the majority allow an appeal from a failure to grant an evidentiary hearing and hold that a district court must grant government requests for evidentiary hearings, but the majority goes on to allow an appeal from a rule 35 motion which the district court granted. As to Deppe, the district court granted the rule 35 motion and reduced the sentence. Even though the district court granted the motion, the government and Deppe have convinced the majority that they have been harmed. The truth is that the government wanted a greater reduction. On this issue, the majority simply accepts the government’s position that the one-year reduction in sentence was not a great enough reduction. As to Deppe, sentenced under the guidelines, the guidelines make clear that no appeal may be taken to adjust a sentence that is properly imposed. The problem with the majority’s position is that under the guidelines, an appellate court may not reverse a sentence because it believes the sentence is too harsh or too lenient. Similarly, the length of sentences is not appeal-able in non-guideline cases.
VI. The Remand
The most surprising aspect of the majority’s opinion is its direction that “a different *1131district court judge” reconsider the sentences. Even if one were to agree with the majority’s holding that failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing results in a breach of a plea agreement and a rule 11 violation, one would not conclude that the remand of the ease must be to a different district court judge. If this case must go for re-sentencing to a different district court judge, then every case which results in a sentencing error must be remanded to a different district court judge.4 The criminal justice system of the United States has existed for more than 200 years with the judges who make trial errors correcting them. Nothing in the majority opinion indicates why a different result must apply in this case.
I end where I began. Prior to this opinion, district court judges had little discretion left in the sentencing process. With this opinion, district court judges are prohibited from even deciding when to set sentencing hearings and what kind of hearings to conduct. The government, through this opinion, has become more than a litigant in the courts of this circuit.

. The government takes a strange position in this case. Its position is that the district court caused it to breach its plea agreements. If the government is right, then these appellants should have the right to withdraw their guilty pleas and go to trial. The remedy would not necessarily be merely to have the appellants resentenced.

. This case illustrates the frustration district court judges are experiencing when forced to impose tough mandatory sentences on minor role felons and are unable to impose fair sentences on major role felons due to the government's manipulations.

. I do not understand why the government was willing to give the full details of the cooperation in an open courtroom in an evidentiary hearing, but unwilling to put the details in the motions. The majority suggests that the government wanted an in camera evidentiary hearing. Obviously, the government could have presented the motions, with full details, for in camera examination. The government simply insisted on an evidentiary hearing, and attempted to force the district court to conduct such a hearing through the wilful withholding of facts. Thus, the government makes the argument: the plea agreement has been breached and the district court made me to it.
Likewise, the majority seems to find some significance in the fact that the district court judge rubber stamped the rulings rather than writing "denied” with his own hand.

. Of course, resentencing is not necessarily the right remedy for the violation the majority finds.