Court Opinion

ID: 9520806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:50:34.08482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:57.931256
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: The decree entered by the trial court makes no findings of fact, or of a sum certain or even approximate as to the needs of the wife. There is no determination by decree of the husband’s ability to pay other than that he received a salary and was a corporate officer. The decree provides in part: “1. That the respondent pay or caused to be paid to the petitioner as maintenance 25 per cent of all net income hereafter received by him. 2. For purposes of this order the word ‘income’ shall be interpreted to include all income from any source in the form of money or property that becomes available to the respondent for his support, including, but not limited to, salary, wages, interest, distributions of corporate income, capital gains and income tax refunds, state and federal.” Section 503(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 503(a)(3)) provides that “property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation” shall be nonmarital property. Subparagraph 5 also provides that the “increase in value of property acquired before the marriage” shall be nonmarital property. The last provision contemplates appreciation in value or capital gains as to nonmarital property. It is difficult to find a rational reason for determining that such appreciation as to nonmarital property acquired after dissolution should have a different status or standing. The terms of the decree effects that result. By its terms, the amount of maintenance is permanently measured by a percentage of income received by the husband. Thereafter, if he acquires nonmarital property any capital gains automatically increases the maintenance without regard to the financial resources or the needs of the wife. The same is true as to income developed after the dissolution and without regard to the standard of living established during the marriage. The issue should not be disregarded or minimized by the wife’s argument that under the present circumstances the husband is only required to pay $75 per week. The point is that there is no established bench mark determining the needs of the wife as measured by the standard of section 504(b) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 504(b). The wife’s argued analogy to the authority of Robbins v. Robbins (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 653,353 N.E.2d 110, and Smith v. Smith (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 80, 397 N.E.2d 50, is not complete. In each, the percentage formula was directed to child support. The term of the obligation created is limited by the minority of the child, rather than permanent. In Robbins, the quantum of need was established at $175 per week. The husband was directed to pay $80 per week plus 15 per cent of earnings in excess of an established amount. In Smith, the needs for child support were established at $630 per month. The husband was directed to pay the greater of $250 per month, or 20 percent of his net income. Upon the evidence, the latter requirement would call for payments of $268 per month. It is apparent that the income and prospects of each party is uncertain and unpredictable and that it may be difficult to meet the present needs of each. The wife has been awarded somewhat more than one-half of all that which was accumulated during the marriage. Each party starts anew from the decree date. Such facts produce the necessity that as to nonmarital income and property there be a bench mark which determines the needs and standard of living to which the wife is entitled under the provisions of section 504(b) of Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 504(b). By its terms, I would hold the decree to be an abuse of discretion.