Court Opinion

ID: 9832390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:52:27.737242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:46.296387
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Our attention is directed to the omission in our original opinion to discuss appellant’s fifth proposition presenting the contention that there was no competent evidence of timely notice of injury or filing of claim for compensation with the Industrial Accident Board, because the only evidence consisted of a rubber stamp notation reading “Industrial Accident Board State of Texas Received August 17, 1933.” The opinion seems to be subject to the criticism made. We regard the question presented as having been determined by this court in the cases of Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Neatherlin, 31 S.W.(2d) 673, and Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Teel (Tex. Civ. App.) 40 S.W.(2d) 201, 203. By reference to those decisions, it will be seen that, in our opinion, the notation in question amounts to evidence of a filing of the instrument, and is evidentiary of the date of such filing.
Upon the question of the right of the compensation insurance claimant to repudiate the compromise agreement before the formal order of approval by the Industrial Accident Board in addition to the authority of Petroleum Casualty Co. v. Lewis (Tex. Civ. App.) 63 S.W.(2d) 1066, we cite also Smith v. Pet. Casualty Co., 72 S.W.(2d) 640 by the Galveston Court of Civil Appeals, which indicates an independent conclusion of that court not referable to the decision of the El Paso court in the first case mentioned, since it does not cite same.
It is earnestly argued upon this point that it is unreasonable to make the final order of the Industrial Accident Board approving a compromise agreement conditioned upon payment by the insurance carrier of the amount to be paid according to the compromise agreement. As a practice or policy of the Industrial Accident Board, it occurs to us that this criticism is not without merit. That fact, however, we think: would not militate against the correctness of our conclusion that no final or irrevocable order had been entered prior to the one that was entered in accordance with that practice.
Being of the opinion that the motion for rehearing should be overruled, it is accordingly so ordered.