Court Opinion

ID: 9514103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:44:23.330582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:11.851809
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
concurring.
[¶ 17] The most consequential of this Court’s disagreements relating to N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(4) has related to the type of evidence required to establish a prima facie case. I have strongly advocated that the evidence must be competent and admissible. See Frueh v. Frueh, 2008 ND 26, ¶ 6, 745 N.W.2d 362; Lagro v. Lagro, 2005 ND 151, ¶¶ 15, 18, 703 N.W.2d 322; Tank v. Tank, 2004 ND 15, ¶¶ 53, 55, 673 N.W.2d 622 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). In other words, the person must normally have personal, firsthand knowledge. This has had an effect in cases, and without this requirement, cases would have been decided differently. See, e.g., Lagro, 2005 ND 151, ¶¶ 23, 24, 703 N.W.2d 322 (“The lack of detail and competency in Leah Lagro’s allegations make them insufficient on their face to establish a prima facie case for custody modification. We affirm the district court’s order[J”).
[¶ 18] The standard of review for this Court’s evaluation of a district court’s determination of whether a prima facie case has been established has been the subject of more esoteric debate. Some have contended that the standard should be de novo review of a question of law, and others have contended that the standard should be an abuse of discretion. Of course, a court abuses its discretion if it misinterprets or misapplies the law. I have previously advocated for an abuse of discretion standard. In none of our prior cases has a majority of this Court signed an opinion establishing an abuse of discretion standard.
[¶ 19] Before Lagro, a majority of this Court had clearly said that whether a pri-ma facie case has been made is a matter of law subject to de novo review. Hawley v. LaRocque, 2004 ND 215, ¶4, 689 N.W.2d 386; O’Neill v. O’Neill, 2000 ND 200, ¶ 8, *618619 N.W.2d 855; Quarne v. Quarne, 1999 ND 188, ¶ 12, 601 N.W.2d 256.
[¶ 20] In Logro, 2005 ND 151, 703 N.W.2d 322, a case with only four justices participating, the opinion that I authored, and in which Justice Maring joined, advocated and sought to establish abuse of discretion as the standard of review for the Court. One justice dissented, and Chief Justice VandeWalle — without explanation — concurred in the result, withholding a third vote for a new standard. The result would have been the same in the case under either standard.
[¶21] In Lausen v. Hertz, 2006 ND 101, 714 N.W.2d 57; Dietz v. Dietz, 2007 ND 84, 733 N.W.2d 225; and Kourajian v. Kourajian, 2008 ND 8, 744 N.W.2d 274, the Court noted the divided view on the standard of review and said the result would be the same under either standard.
[¶ 22] In Frueh, 2008 ND 26, 745 N.W.2d 362, I again wrote an opinion that would have established abuse of discretion as the standard. While the result would have been the same under either standard, two justices dissented from the standard. This time, Chief Justice VandeWalle— again without explanation — signed the opinion I authored. But this time it was Justice Maring who concurred specially, denying the opinion majority status. Justice Maring did cite Lagro as having established that “[t]he question of whether to grant an evidentiary hearing rests in the discretion of the trial court.” Frueh, 2008 ND 26, ¶ 20, 745 N.W.2d 362 (Maring, J., specially concurring in the result). But this statement was in error because Lagro was only a plurality opinion and not a majority opinion, and I believe the statement was not a fair summary of what I had written in Lagro. I had thought the question should have been largely a question of law with a thin layer of discretion coming into play in only a few cases, remembering that a court abuses its discretion when it misinterprets or misapplies the law. I have never thought the granting of an evidentiary hearing should be a matter of unfettered discretion.
[¶ 23] On reflection, I believe the de novo review of a question of law standard in applications under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(4) brings us much closer to the intent of the legislation and certainly closer than the largely unfettered discretion suggested.
[¶ 24] DALE V. SANDSTROM