Court Opinion

ID: 9647960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:56:44.196641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:54.953822
License: Public Domain

Avery, Presiding Judge (W. S.)
(dissenting).
In dissenting from the majority Opinion, I am unable to agree that there was any evidence from which bad faith could be inferred justifying the submission of such issue to the jury:
(1) It was not bad faith on the part of counsel for defendant in the original damage suit to rely upon what *89defendant said to them ahont how the accident occurred and their investigation which this record shows they made in order to determine whether to accept the face value of the statement made by the defendant Hammond, relative to a sudden failure of his brakes.
(2) It was not bad faith nor any evidence of had faith, for counsel, after the verdict had been rendered and judgment pronounced thereon in the original damage suit wherein Walter Wayne Mansfield as Administrator of his deceased mother, had been awarded $500, his wife had been awarded $17,000, and he had been awarded $3,000, and while Mansfield as Administrator and upon his own claim for damages with respect to the injuries to his wife, medical expenses, etc. had a motion for a new trial pending at the same time that Hammond had a motion for a new trial pending, to explain to Hammond the whole legal and factual situation, as they saw it, after hearing all the proof and after such full explanation, framing the letter which Hammond signed.
(3) It was not bad faith nor any evidence of bad faith on the part of counsel or representative of the insurer to fail to discover the testimony later given by the Heed child, to the effect that after Hammond turned into the school grounds, he increased the speed of his car.
(4) It was not bad faith nor any evidence of bad faith on the part of counsel to file the Chancery suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act referred to in the majority Opinion. The Court so held that it was not competent to show bad faith.
(5) It was not bad faith nor any evidence of bad faith on the part of counsel, when Hammond had said to Heatheock and Elam that he could have “probably” *90avoided the accident by continuing on around the schoolyard drive, and when Mr. Elam said to him in substance that he did not want to hear him say that any more.
(6) In my opinion, the Trial Judge was not satisfied with the verdict of the jury nor did he agree to it as a 13th juror.
Looking generally at item (1) above, in the majority Opinion this statement is made:
“In doing this, however, we may ignore the testimony of defendant’s witnesses, except to the extent that same tended to support the plaintiff’s theory of the case.”
In my opinion, that is not the rule that governs our examination of the record on appeal in this case. If there is material testimony of a reputable defendant undisputed, uncontradicted, or given by a reputable witness for either party, it is not countervailing evidence, but stands as a truth; and unless such evidence is contradicted by some evidence or circumstances from which a reasonable inference otherwise can be drawn, we have no right to exclude it. We consider all the evidence and only disregard countervailing evidence. In my opinion, there is no such evidence in this case.
I do not agree with the statement in the majority opinion:
“It was the theory of defendant in this cause that the defendant did not have an opportunity to settle the claims of Mrs. Helen Mansfield and of Walter Wayne Mansfield within the limits of the policy because their claims were tied in with that of the administrator of Mrs. Eva Mae Mansfield.”
*91I find no such argument in the record from which such a conclusion could be drawn. On the contrary, there appears all through the record by the admission of Mr. White, counsel for the Mansfields, that Mr. Heatheock said to him many times: “You may break the proposed settlement down any way you want to”. In the statement of the case by learned counsel for defendant, the Hon. John M. Drane, who presented the principal argument in this Court for the defendant, beginning on p. 11, he says:
“We make no claim that there was not some proof in this record that the defendant had an opportunity, although not a clear opportunity, to settle Mrs. Mansfield’s claim and her husband’s for her injuries within the policy limits, but we urge however upon the Court that this is as far as the proof in the case goes and that there was no proof from which it could be reasonably inferred that defendant acted in bad faith even though there was an opportunity to settle within the policy limits.”
In my opinion, the only theory upon which the defendant rested his case is properly stated in the majority opinion, where it is said that it was the theory of defendant that—
“* * * they handled the claims with due care and consideration for the rights of W. N. Hammond, the insured, and that, in any event, they acted with complete good faith and fairness.”
Mr. White was asked if he had personal conversations with Mr. Heatheock. He answered:
*92“Yes, I did. Mr. Heathcock and I had several casual conversations relative to it both on the street and on the phone.” (R. 147)
******
“And we discussed it pro and con — the possibility of his defense and the injury and general details about the whole matter over a period of — I can’t actually pinpoint how many times, but several conversations.” (R. 147)
He discussed the amount on more than one occasion, and after he was employed, he was told by Mr. Heath-cock that he would pay $9,000 for injuries in all three cases and he said that Heathcock said:
“ * * * you can break it down any way you want to but you might consider * * *”
and again:
“'* * $6,750.00 and $2,250.00; that is $6750.00 for the two cases; that is Walter Wayne Mansfield for expenses and loss of services and for the injuries— pain and suffering — of Helen Mansfield; $6750.00 and $2250.00 on the Walter Wayne Mansfield, administrator, case.” (R. 152)
He told Mr. Heathcock that he would settle Mrs. Mansfield’s case and her husband’s case for $9,750 on the day of the trial, after the first day’s hearing when his witnesses had been on the stand, he wrote Naul Hammond a letter and sent a copy of it to Mr. Heathcock, offering to settle the two cases for $9,999 and the Administrator’s case for $5,000. He stated that he did not tie them together. Copy of that letter is shown in the record. (R. 154)
*93On one occasion, Mr. Heathcock said to him:
“* * * there is no reason for ns to settle this case •with yon. * * * You are demanding the policy limits; we have nothing to lose by trying it.” (R. 155)
On another occasion, he said:
“* * * we can’t lose; yon are asking all the coverage.” (R. 155)
He filed a letter dated February 18, 1954, addressed to Mr. Hammond, in which he offered to settle the Mansfield claims for $9,750 and the Administrator’s claim for $2,750. He sent both the original and the copy by registered mail, return receipt requested. (R. 157, 158) No express or implied withdrawal of this offer is shown by any evidence or circumstance.
On the second morning of the trial, they offered to pay $12,500 for all the cases, but at no time did they ever offer any breakdown of the three cases in separate amounts. Mr. White was informed on many occasions to the effect that he could break the proposed figures down in any way he desired. On one occasion he told Mr. Elam that he would settle all three of the eases for $12,500. (R. 161, 162) In discussing it with them, they would say:
“* * * why, you can break it down any way you want to, we have just got a loss and you can break it down like you want to”. (R. 162)
Mr. Heathcock offered $11,000 to settle all three of the cases shortly after White was employed as counsel. That offer was made before he made the' offer of $12,500. (R. 168)
*94There was some time that they stood — White agreeing to take $12,500 and Heathcoek offering to pay $11,000. Each time he discussed it with Heathcoek, he would say:
“I don’t care how you divide it.” (R. 169)
He admits that he made a proposition of $12,500 to settle all the cases, hut that his offer wasn’t broken down as to the different cases. He stated that Mr. Heathcoek, during all the negotiations, maintained that he had a good legal defense in the cases but that he, himself, did not think so. He was asked:
“Q. That’s not unusual! A. That’s always true, but the jury agreed with me.” (R. 176)
He stated that his offer of $12,500 had no been withdrawn when they went to trial. (R. 176)
We must remember that the jury in this case is being called upon to determine whether or not bad faith existed on the part of a professional person, in which profession the jurors had no experience whatever. It is a far more tedious matter for determination than the ordinary civil suit for damages, as the issue relates to facts from which bad faith is to be inferred. An examination of the real facts in the case, and the law applicable to such a case, and the issues to be determined, clearly justifies us in looking at the evidence given by Mr. Heathcoek which is undisputed, and we are also justified in giving consideration to his qualifications, experience, and practice.
Mr. Fenner Heathcoek is a graduate of Columbia University Law School. He began to practice law in Union City in 1921. He has been associated as a partner in the practice of law with some of the distinguished *95lawyers of West Tennessee, one of wliom was a Judge of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The firm presently is composed of Mr. Heathcoek, as senior partner, and Mr. Elam and Mr. Cloys, and represents locally and territorially, some 35 insurance companies. He is well versed in the law with reference to liability insurance and the rights of the insurer and the insured. His firm is general counsel for the involved defendant company. Claims in which the defendant insurance company is involved, arising in the general vicinity of West Tennessee, are referred to this firm by the “Claims- Superintendent”. (R. 213)
Certain representatives of the Claims Department of defendant company, who made some investigation in connection with the involved accident and injuries, notified Mr. Heathcoek of this accident. A Mr. Rogers who was then stationed at Trenton in G-ibson County, made a preliminary investigation and furnished Mr. Heathcoek with a copy. Mr. Heathcoek instructed him about making future investigations in connection with the involved injury which he did. The file was turned over to Mr. Heathcoek by Mr. Pumphrey, Claims Superintendent of the Company, and from that time on he had official charge of the case. He generally had official charge of investigations in regard to this particular company client.
On March 14,1953, he wrote Mr. Hammond, the plaintiff in this case, the following letter:
“Our firm has been employed by the Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company to represent you in connection with any claims which may be made or suits which may be filed against you by Mrs. *96Eva Mansfield and Mrs. Walter Wayne Mansfield for injuries growing out of accident at the Linden-wood School on October 21, 1952. (It is the 21st here but it should be the 31st)
“We have discussed the claims several times with Mr. Keith Rogers, adjustor for the company, so that we are fairly familiar with the facts. Since the accident was caused by a failure of the hydraulic brakes upon your car of which you had no previous knowledge, you would not be liable under the law for any damages growing out of the accident, since you were not guilty of any negligence.
“However, the company is disposed to take a very liberal attitude in regard to these claims and try to work out a settlement of the claims, if a settlement can be made upon a fair and reasonable basis.
“In order that we may have a complete understanding of all facts surrounding the facts, we would like, at your first opportunity, to go over the matter with you in detail here in our office. If you would call us sometime during the middle of next week when you have an opportunity to do so, we would like to have you come in to see us and discuss these claims.” (R. 215, 216)
Mr. Hammond responded to that letter by coming into his office personally, and related just what had occurred or, at least, his theory of what occurred:
“I spent sometime there in the office reviewing just how the accident happened. He undertook to go over the accident with me and tell me just how it happened. He told me that it was an unavoidable *97accident; that he was not conscions of any negligence whatsoever; there was nothing he could, have done to avoid the accident. He said that the brakes had never given him any trouble on the car and had given no member of the family any trouble to his knowledge. He said on the night of the accident the brakes worked perfectly on several occasions before he reached the sehoolhouse; he and his wife had set out from home to attend a Halloween party; he used the brakes as he backed the car there in the front yard; he used the brakes again as he made the very sharp turn at the Lindenwood Sehoolhouse. He said that he was going very slowly toward the sehoolhouse, the car. just barely rolling, the ground sloping a little bit south toward the sehoolhouse, and he was looking for a place to park and at first he thought he saw one near the school, but he saw he couldn’t get in that one. He determined to let his wife out and park his car in the yard. He said as he was about a car length from the sehoolhouse steps— he was back on the drive with the front end of the car pointed at an angle toward the sehoolhouse steps — he undertook to apply his brakes; that at the same time he put his foot on the clutch and to his consternation the brake pedal went to the floor; that he had absolutely no brakes; that he had time to do nothing but shout a warning, ‘look out, my brakes failed’ or something like that; and the car rolled down and up the steps and against the two Mrs. Mansfields who had, with Walter Wayne Mansfield, come out from behind cars parked near the steps, causing the injury in question. That was the explanation he made of the accident. He said that *98he didn’t have time to do anything in a space of only 10 to 12 feet at the time he undertook to apply the brakes; he just rolled down and up the steps.” (E. 217, 218)
Mr. Hammond testified in the original trial and in this trial, in substance, exactly what Mr. Heatheock says he related to him about how the accident occurred. If This Statement Is True, and Hammond is shown to be a reputable citizen, Mr. Heatheock had a right to assume that Hammond had a complete defense to any action filed against him. In substance, that defense was that—
There was a sudden failure of hydraulic brakes on his automobile, which were in a good state of repair and had never failed before, as he started into the curb around the school building and all he could do was to shout a warning: “look out, my brakes failed”. (E. 218)
All members of the Hammond family who were in the car with Mr. Hammond were interrogated and corroborated Hammond’s statement. The ear had been sold to Mr. Hammond by his son who informed Mr. Heatheock that such brake failure had never occurred, before. The son, immediately after the accident, drove the car into the yard of O’Neal Johnson. He then carried it to Bob Ingram, a mechanic, with instructions to fix the brakes. The brakes again gave trouble and he carried it back to that same mechanic who put on a new master cylinder. Thereafter, it gave no trouble. The daughter of the plaintiff Hammond, who had driven the car and worked at Eeelfoot Packing Company in Union City, said that she had never had any trouble, whatever, with the brakes on this car prior to the accident. Mrs. Hammond, who had also driven the car, made the same statement. The *99day the car was carried to the mechanic, Bob Ingram, this daughter of the plaintiff got it after it had been examined by Ingram, started home, and the brakes suddenly failed. Hammond was informed about that and he drove the car around “a square mile”, and he said that on three of those corners, as he was making the turn, the brakes functioned all right but on the 4th corner the brakes failed, he ran into a ditch, and the next day he sent it in to be repaired.
Mr. Heathcock investigated the matter with the mechanic, Bob Ingram, and was informed by Ingram that the first time he examined it, he could find nothing wrong with the brake, and when the car came back to him with the explanation from the Hammond family that the brake had again failed, he simply changed the master cylinder and put in a new one, and no trouble was ever experienced after that time.
Mr. Heathcock stated that he had interviewed everybody that he thought might know anything whatever of the accident or could shed any light on it, and no information was received inconsistent with the statement Hammond had made to him about the sudden failure of the brakes. He states that he investigated from several other mechanics, telling them just what Hammond had said about the failure of the brakes, and sought information whether that could have happened and each of the mechanics said that it could easily happen. He was informed by each mechanic that “a little piece of grit that would get under this rubber diaphragm or valve in the master cylinder which would permit the air or fluid to go by, would cause them to fail, and they said it was entirely possible a set of hydraulic brakes would *100function perfectly, fail, and tlien the line would later function perfectly again.” (R. 222) Mr. Heathcock stated that he was advised by the claim agents of the insurance company that they had tested the brakes while the car set out in Johnson’s yard and he put his foot on the brake pedal and it went clean to the floor, showing no braking power whatever. These claim agents were not used as witnesses in the original trial, as explained by Mr. Heathcock, for the reason that it was not proper or common practice to put representatives of insurance companies on the stand to testify in such cases. He made his report to the company, giving his legal opinion as'well as the facts revealed by his investigation, and he stated that he advised the company that in his opinion there was no liability. His legal opinion submitted says that:
‘ ‘ The owner of an automobile is not guilty of negligence if the hydraulic brakes of his ear suddenly fail without previous warning and if the automobile was being driven at the time with reasonable care and caution.” (R. 228)
In support of that proposition, he cited both text law and case law, giving style, etc. of several cases.
His next proposition, he stated as follows:
“An injury is not actionable if it could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated.”
In support of that proposition, he properly cited several Tennessee cases.
He testified that he advised the Company that under the law of Tennessee known as the “Emergency Doc*101trine”, when applied to this case, he could see no liability.
The record reveals that he talked to every witness whom he conld find that was present at the time of the accident, and while none of them advised him or told him that one Beverly Reed was present, he learned that she had been subpoenaed. He went to see her on one or two occasions. She refused to talk and on instructions from her grandfather, she would tell him nothing. This is verified by the testimony of plaintiff Hammond and Beverly Reed.
In giving consideration to the matter of settlement, of course his Opinion with respect to legal liability, or the care exercised by Hammond in driving his automobile at the time of the accident, naturally and properly and with no bad faith toward either Hammond or the insurance company, influenced him in making recommendations of settlement. The severity of the injuries were taken into consideration, but having first assumed that there was no legal liability, upon fair and unbiased opinion, naturally his offers of settlement were influenced to a great extent.
This record to me reveals the undisputed fact that the law firm representing the insurance company and Hammond, the insured, were honestly and fairly of the opinion that there was no liability on the part of Mr. Hammond, based upon everything that had transpired from the moment they had called Mr. Hammond into the office and he consented that they represent him. as well as the insurance company.
*102As to item (2) above, it seems that the majority Opinion rests its conclusions on the right of the jury to find bad faith on the part of the defendant because of the letter written by counsel and signed by Hammond after the original trial, the verdict of the jury, and the judgment of the Court thereon, and while motion was pending for new trial. This letter is carried in full in the original Opinion 306 S. W. (2d) 22. Following the quotation of that letter into the majority Opinion, it is stated:
“In that situation, the insurance company was certainly gambling with the insured’s money, or liability, in an attempt to save its own. It is apparent to us, also, that in that situation, where Messrs. Heathcock & Elam were acting in the dual capacity of attorneys for the insurance company and for W. N. Hammond, they gave priority to the interests of the insurance company, rather than to those of Mr. Hammond. This situation, therefore, falls within the spirit if not the letter of language used by Judge Caruthers in the case of Tisdale v. Tisdale, 34 Tenn. 596, 608, 64 Am. Dec. 775, part of which is quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Samuel Cole Williams in Pemiscot County Bank v. Central State National Bank, 132 Tenn. 152, 158, 177 S. W. 74.”
Then follows the statement referred to in the Opinion of Mr. Justice Williams in Pemiscot County Bank v. Central State Nat. Bank, supra.
I can see no similarity whatever in the Opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Daugherty v. Stuyvesant Insurance Co., 169 Tenn. 300, 86 S. W. (2d) 1095, wherein the Supreme Court permitted a bad faith penalty *103against the insurance company because its only contention was that the transfer of notes secured by a lien on the property destroyed operated as a transfer of title in violation of the provisions of the policy.
Furthermore, this letter was written after the verdict and judgment, and the declaration in this case nowhere alleges that bad faith existed in connection with the action of counsel or agents of the Company after the original verdict and judgment. The letter, to me, does not represent negligence on the part of counsel, nor is it any evidence of bad faith in connection with the activities of counsel occurring at any time prior to the original verdict and judgment. Certainly, in view of the fact that the jury had returned a verdict of only $500 in favor of Mansfield as Administrator of the estate of his mother, whose leg was broken in the same accident, and counsel feeling that they had acted fairly toward both Hammond, the insured, and the insurance company, it could not be said that the letter was any evidence of prior bad faith. At most, it could only be said that it was an error of judgment to withdraw that part of the motion for a new trial which dealt with the question of the misconduct of the jury.
As to item (3) above, it is necessary to remember that the gathering on that occasion at the Lindenwood Community school building where this accident occurred, was on the night of Halloween. Some of the parties present were wearing masks. Beverly Reed was asked:
“Q. What kind did you have on? A. It was black. I was a witch — I was dressed as one rather.
*104“Q. "Well, now, how much of your eyes did that cover — that mask? A, It didn’t cover my eyes, it has openings and I saw through them. I saw with my eyes out of the openings.” (E. 137)
Beverly Eeed did not know the name of the child, or rather she had never seen her before, who said she was sitting by her on.the banister of the steps at the school building at the time of the accident. In that regard she was asked and answered:
“Q. Did she live there in the community? A. I don’t know who she was; I don’t know where she lived; I don’t remember who she was.
“Q. Did you tell Mr. White about her? A. I did. He asked me if anyone was sitting there and. I said, “yes, but I don’t remember who”. (E. 136)
******
“ Q. I thought you might have seen her after that whether you knew who she was or not. A. She was dressed up and had a false face on.” (E. 137)
With reference to the visit made to interview her by Mr. Heathcock and others, she was asked:
“Q. You knew Mr. Heathcock and Mr. Elam came out to talk to you? A. Yes.
“Q. And your grandfather declined to let them talk to you? A. Yes. He was afraid they would get me mixed up and I was going to say what I said on the witness stand.
“Q. How long before Mr. White came out was it Mr. Heathcock came out? A. I don’t know.
*105“Q. Was it before Mr. White came out? A, It was not before.
“Q. Was it after Mr. White came? A. Yes.” (E. 139)
This child positively swore that Mrs. Mansfield, at the time she was hit by the car, was on the third step, facing the car, and said: “Don’t hit me!” (E. 140) Hammond, the plaintiff, testified that he went with Heathcock and Elam to interview the child, Beverly Eeed. On direct examination, he was asked and answered :
“Q. Did they interview the little girl, Beverly Eeed? A. No, we went to see her and her grandfather wouldn’t let her talk to them.” (E. 49)
Under the circumstances revealed by the testimony of the Eeed child and Hammond, is it possible to find any lack of diligence that could be evidence of bad faith on the part of the lawyers or the agents of the insurance company with respect to this witness?
As to item (4) above, I do not agree with the majority Opinion that there was considerable doubt respecting the issues of bad faith on the part of counsel, because of the Chancery suit by the same Insurance Company against the same Hammond, reported in 290 S. W. (2d) 860. That case was disposed of on plea in abatement without any proof being offered. The Supreme Court rested its decision in that case upon the statement made by it in the case of Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bellos, 158 Tenn. 554, 13 S. W. (2d) 795, 797, 14 S. W. (2d) 961, wherein that Court said:
*106“In tlie instant case we find no ground on which, complainant can force defendant into a forum, and at a time, of complainant’s choosing, and thus compel defendant to litigate the issue of the suicide of her husband.”
And further it was said:
“The case in this aspect is not one for a declaratory judgment, even were the bill with its prayer framed to this end. The principles governing declaratory judgment proceedings, announced in Newsum v. Interstate Realty Co., 152 Tenn. [302] at pages 304, 305, 278 S. W. 56, 57, apply here. Disputed facts would here be determinative issues, rather than ‘construction of definitely stated rights, status, and other relations, commonly expressed in written instruments,’ etc.”
Following that reference in disposing of the case then before it, the Supreme Court said [290 S. W. (2d) 863]:
“The foregoing statement is clearly applicable to the case at bar. The complainant by this suit anticipates that a tort action will be instituted against it based upon its alleged lack of good faith in negotiating a settlement, to Hammond’s damage. In seeking a declaratory judgment the complainant would force the defendant into a forum, and at a time of complainant’s own choosing and compel him to litigate his tort action in the Chancery Court. For this reason the Chancellor toas right in dismissing the complainant’s bill. Moreover, it cannot be said, under the admitted facts of this case, that the learned Chancellor abused his discretion or failed to act with *107proper caution in exercising the discretion which'the law imposed upon him.” (Emphasis added.)
With that statement from, the Supreme Court in that case, it seems to me unfortunate that the majority Opinion in the instant case, with which I do not agree, makes the following reference and recitation:
“Evidently able counsel for defendant in the instant case must have thought that there was considerable doubt about the issues involved in the instant case, because they undertook to forestall this litigation by trying to obtain a declaration of their rights and liabilities in a suit hied in the Chancery Court of Obion County under provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Law of this State. In that suit the learned Chancellor refused to- entertain the suit, because of disputed issues of fact which were determinative of the rights of the parties. This ruling of the Chancellor was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hammond, 200 Tenn. 106, 290 S.W. (2d) 860. The parties in that case were the same as the parties in the instant case. The disputed issues of fact which caused the Chancellor, in that case, to refuse a declaratory judgment, have, in the instant case, been resolved by the jury’s verdict against the defendant, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company.”
I can see no reason whatever for a reference to that ease when all the Chancellor had before him at the time he decided it on the pleadings was the original bill and pleadings, and of course the pleadings were all the Supreme Court had before it except the Opinion and *108Decree of the Chancellor based upon the pleadings. Besides, the Trial Judge in the case at bar held that evidence concerning the Chancery suit was incompetent. With respect thereto, Hammond was asked:
“Q. I believe, Mr. Hammond, that after these judgments were obtained by you and sometime around August, 1955, the Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company filed a bill against you in the Chancery Court of Obion County, Tennessee? A. That’s right.
‘ ‘ Q. I hand you what purports to be a copy of that bill and ask you to examine it and see if that is a copy of the proceeding filed against you in the Chancery Court of Obion County, Tennessee?”
There was an objection to the introduction of that bill and after considerable argument, the Court ruled on the objection as follows:
“The Court holds that it is something that occurred after the judgments in these cases and could not shed light on the question of good faith.”
As to item (5) above, in an effort to show that Mr. Hammond had made some statements which would convey the inference that he knew he was negligent in the operation of his automobile at the time of the injuries on which the Mansfield suits were based, to Heathcock and Elam when he gave them a statement as to how the accident occurred, which were not actually put into his statement and in his testimony, he was asked:
“Q. Did you state to either one of them something not placed in the statement and which was not testified about on the original trial? A. I. did.
*109“Q. When was that? A. I made the statement that I could have just kept going and not turned in and probably avoided the accident. (Emphasis added.)
“Q. You mean kept going straight? A. Straight ahead and not turned into the steps.
“Q. What did they say? A. Mr. Elam told me never to let him hear me say that again.” (R. 58)
The majority Opinion on page 6, referring to the failure of the brakes, states:
“In any event, there was ample evidence in the damage suit case, to sustain the jury’s verdict in that case, even if it be assumed that the brakes did suddenly and unexpectedly fail to work. On that theory, this Court affirmed the verdicts of Mrs. Helen Mansfield and of Walter W. Mansfield. See Hammonds v. Mansfield, 41 Tenn. App. 515, 296 S. W. (2d) 652. One example of this character of evidence is the testimony of W. N. Hammond, himself, given at both trials, — that he might have avoided the accident by steering his automobile into other parked cars. In the instant case, he testified that in making his original statement to Messrs. Heathcock and Elam who, as attorneys for the Tenn. Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., represented him in the damage suit case, that he made this observation but was told by Mr. Tom Elam not to let him hear him say that again.”
On page 58 of the record in the instant case, I have quoted the above statement. I find no such statement in the testimony as attributed to Mr. Hammond, and to which Mr. Elam replied: “Never let me hear you say *110that again”, — except that which is quoted in question and answer form above. It goes without saying that there is absolutely nothing in that statement which indicates negligence on the part of Hammond or bad faith on the part of Heathcock & Elam. Certainly if Hammond had not turned into the steps, but gone straight ahead, the accident would not have occurred, but he does not say that the idea occurred to him at the time of the accident, and such statement affords no inference that it did. The construction placed on what Hammond said in that regard, in the majority Opinion, as I construe it, is far from what the man meant, and Mr. Elam’s response to it is nothing more than saying to Mr. Hammond that such expression was meaningless, because it was foolish. Certainly Mr. Elam knew that if Hammond had gone straight on, no accident would have happened.
On cross-examination, he said he never gave any statement about the ease to Mr. Elam at all, but that all of his statements were made to Mr. Heathcock, “except this statement I made in there”. (R. 59) Again on cross-examination, Mr. Hammond was asked about this statement and replied:
“A. I made the statement that I might have kept driving on and avoided the accident — straight on instead of turning into the steps.” (R. 59)
In this same connection, when he was cross-examined about when such statement was made, he was asked if he was not under oath when he gave the statements in writing to Heathcock & Elam, he said:
*111“Q. You were under oath when you testified in this case on the trial of it? A. Yes.
“Q. Did you tell the truth? -A. I did.
“Q. The whole truth and nothing hut the truth? A. I did.
“Q. Did you testify that on your examination in the trial of this case? A. Not here.
“Q. Did you testify on the trial of the case that you thought this might have been avoided — you might have avoided the accident by going a little further down? A. No.
“Q. You did testify in the case that was an unavoidable accident; that you couldn’t help it? A. Yes.
“Q. And it was, wasn’t it? A. Yes.’’ (B. 60, 61)
As to item (6) above, I do not agree with the majority Opinion in overruling Assignment of Error NY by defendant. This Court weighs the statements made by trial judges relative to verdicts and judgments thereon, in order to determine whether a trial judge actually exercised his function as a 13th juror. The language used by the learned Trial Judge clearly indicates a dissatisfaction with the verdict of the jury, because of the fact that this record is clear that all of the alleged bad faith, if it could be said any existed, can only be found in the action of counsel Heathcock as he dealt *112with, defendant in the dnal capacity of Ms counsel and counsel for Ms insurer. Taking the entire statement of the Trial Judge together, hut particularly the statement—
“* * * I thought of it at various times and I come to the conclusion that this matter should be determined by the appellate courts. I appreciate the fact that what a judge says in passing on these motions is considered by the Appellate Court but I only have one remark to make for whatever it may be considered or not considered, I think this case should be determined by them in this record but I will make this one affirmative statement that Mr. Heathcock, in my opinion, was in no way dishonest and I do not think this record discloses that. So, the motion will be overruled so that the Appellate Court may be able to determine this matter,”
It is clear that the Trial Judge was dissatisfied with the verdict of the jury. The learned Trial Judge did not say —may be able to determine this matter without another trial before me — for he well knew that a wayside bill of exceptions could be preserved and then the Appellate Court would determine this very matter. To me his expression is clear that he was dissatisfied with the verdict. Had he said nothing, we of course could assume that he was satisfied with the verdict.
The Trial Judge in the case of McLaughlin v. Broyles, 36 Tenn. App. 391, 396, 255 S. W. (2d) 1020, 1023, said:
“In these cases where the evidence is in sharp conflict the Court does not feel that he has a right to interfere with the verdict of the jury, and overrules the motions.”
*113When proper interpretation is given to what the learned Trial Judge in the case at bar stated, to me it is clear that his intention, in making that statement, is identical with what the Trial Judge said in the case of McLaughlin v. Broyles, supra. To me it is as plain as if the Trial Judge had said: No dishonesty has been proven on the part of Mr. Heathcock and the issues of bad faith are so sharply in conflict, that they should be determined by the appellate courts upon the verdict of the jury without interference upon the part of the Trial Court.
In my opinion there is nothing in the case of Aycock Hosiery Mills v. Maryland Casualty Co., 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S. W. (2d) 889, which affords any basis for the reasoning in the majority Opinion in this case. The majority Opinion in the case at bar fairly sets out what occurred in that case and quotes what appears to be the crux upon which the Supreme Court held the Insurance Company liable in the common law civil action growing out of the workmen’s compensation case. When suit was brought under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Opinion says:
“It (the insurance company) assumed the defense of the suit brought by the employee under the Compensation Act to the exclusion of the defendant.”
That statement followed the statement that it was “the duty of the casualty company to exercise, not only good faith, but ordinary care.” (Emphasis added.) Counsel for the company in that case, from the statement made by the father of the injured employee on the stand as a witness, learned that the father claimed that his son was employed in violation of the child labor law because, he *114contended, no Employment Certificate liad been procured. At that point, counsel who represented the insurance company and also the insured, completely abandoned the rights of the insured by amending the defense to show illegal employment of the son. The case was continued and before being tried, the father brought suit in a common law action for injury to his son. In the meantime, the court house burned and the insured was unable to prove that the injured employee was legally employed. The claim could have been settled as provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act which fixes the amount of the coverage.
There is no comparison, in my opinion, in the action of counsel in the instant case and the action of counsel in the Hosiery Mills case, who represented the Insurance Company and the insured. No statute fixed the amount of recovery in the instant case, so it was a matter of judgment with respect to the severity of the injury. In the instant case, there was no statute which deprived the defendant of the right to show there was no negligence on his part. The reverse was true in the Hosiery Mills case. There, counsel for the insurer and the insured requested the continuance when the above referred to proof was offered by the father, or acquiesced in it, so the Opinion says,—
“to enable it to plead and set up this new fact. The effect of its establishment would have been to absolve the insurance company of liability measured by the schedules of the Compensation Act and to fasten an absolute liability upon the insured employer measured by rules of the common law.” [157 Tenn. 559, 11 S. W. (2d) 891]
*115The Opinion further says:
“At that time witnesses were available to contradict the statement of the petitioner that his son was not legally employed by complainant.”
The Opinion then sets out the fact that the Superintendent of the Hosiery Mills, hearing of such action by the Casualty Company, protested to its attorney at that very time and charged bad faith in handling the claim. The Casualty Company then—
“abandoned this new defense, but retained control of the case for the purpose of having judicial interpretation of the meaning of section 2(d) of the Compensation Act.”
It can clearly be seen that counsel for the Company assumed an absolutely inconsistent and unfaithful attitude toward his client, the insured, in that case. No such situation existed in the instant case. Furthermore, Mr. Aycock, President of the Hosiery Mills, testified about a conversation he had with Mr. Hitzfield, in which he said:
“I told him (referring to Mr. Hitzfield) that it was cheaper to settle the case than to continue the fight and if he would not pay it I would, and he insisted on continuing the fight in order to establish a precedent.”
In other words, it simply showed the bulldog determination and unreasonably assumed position of counsel for the Insurance. Company. Not so in the instant case.
I do not think the case of Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S. W. (2d) 785,
*116furnishes authority for the majority Opinion in the instant case. In the Southern Fire & Casualty Co. case, 35 Tenn. App. at page 662, 250 S. W. (2d) at page 787, it is said with approval of the charge in the Lower Court, that:
“It will be noted that the charge placed the burden on the insured of establishing bad faith and a dishonest motive before recovery could be allowed.”
In that case it is shown that no effort was made toward a settlement until shortly before the trial. It is said:
“A day or two before the case was set for trial plaintiff, upon inquiry made by counsel of his own selection, was told for the first time that the claim could have been settled for $9,500.”
In discussing what was said and done, the Opinion of the Court further recites the fact that:
“It is clearly shown that when defendant declined to accept the offer to settle for $9,500 or to pursue the offer to recommend such a settlement if it so understood the offer, it had before it evidence that Davis would be able to show on the trial a condition of total and permanent disability and that a great preponderance of the evidence would show a case of liability(Emphasis added.)
That Opinion further states:
“Defendant had neglected to learn Davis’ true condition until a trial was imminent and had failed to learn of the existence of a most material witness. It had declined to accept an offer of compromise within the limits of its policy liability and, failing *117to advise plaintiff of the offer, had authorized a counter offer of such an amount that Davis , apparently considered it a rejection of his own offer which he promply 'increased to $12,000. Although then fully aware of the seriousness of its insured’s position both on the issue of liability and the probable amount of the recovery and although willing to pay $10,000 it made no further effort to compromise and proceeded to trial suggesting that plaintiff pay $2,000 and settle on the basis of Davis ’ last offer. ”
Such was not the circumstance in the case at bar. Counsel for the Mansfields admits that he offered to settle the claims — that is, the claim of Mrs. Mansfield, her husband, and the claim of Mansfield as Administrator of his mother’s estate (all three of the cases) for $12,500.
The Reed girl witness would not tell counsel for the insurance company and Hammond, what her version of the situation was, and during the first day of the trial when it was known, (that is, what the testimony of the Reed child would be), they offered to pay $12,500, which offer was declaimed by letter directed to Hammond, copy of which was turned over to Heathcock & Elam, but before that date the offer to settle at $12,500 had not been withdrawn by plaintiff’s counsel
It seems to me that if the Company in the instant case is to be held liable for this excess judgment over and above $10,000 single injury liability, bad faith must be assumed only from the fact that the same attorneys represented the insurer and the insured in accord with the contract of insurance. To me it is a dangerous precedent to set to be followed in such cases. Counsel *118are not infallible. They are not all-wise. Attorneys who have tried cases before civil juries and who are on opposite sides of the case have a right to assume that, after a careful examination, investigation of both law and fact, and experience as trial lawyers, their respective positions are correct, without being charged with bad faith when a jury returns a verdict against their honest opinion as to results.
In the case of Hammonds v. Mansfield, 41 Tenn. App. 515, 296 S. W. (2d) 652, 657, heard by this Court, the learned Opinion being prepared by Judge Carney, we said:
“In the case at bar, we cannot say that the evidence is so uncontroverted that all reasonable men must come to the conclusion that the defendant was not guilty of any negligence causing the plaintiff’s injuries and in our opinion the case was properly submitted to the jury and Assignments of Error I through IY must be respectfully overruled.”
We also said:
“If we concede for the purpose of this discussion that the defendant Hammonds’ hydraulic brakes did fail just as he testified; to wit, that he headed directly toward the steps slowly and applied his clutch pedal and his brake pedal simultaneously and the brake pedal went all the way to the floor showing that he had no brakes at all; we still think there was ample evidence from which the jury could find that he was guilty of proximate negligence in heading his car straight into the steps instead of following the regular course of the circular driveway and also in *119•failing to make any effort to avoid striking the plaintiffs after he discovered that he had no brakes.” (Emphasis added.)
It is very clear from a reading of onr Opinion in those consolidated cases, that if the jury had found in favor of the defendant there would have been ample evidence to have supported such a verdict.
In the case of Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Smith, 51 Ga. App. 122, 179 S. E. 744, the Court of Appeals of Georgia said:
“ ‘The terms “bad faith” are not the equivalent of actual fraud, but they mean any frivolous or unfounded (italics ours) refusal in law or in fact to comply with the requisition of the policyholder to pay according to the terms of his contract and the conditions imposed by statute.’ Cotton States Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 74 Ga. 220. ‘Probable cause for refusing payment will negative the imputation of bad faith, and without such probable cause refusal will be at the company’s peril.’ Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 751, 12 S. E. 18; Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. McCranie, 12 Ga. App. 855, 860, 78 S. E. 1115.”
In that case of Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Smith, supra, there was a jury verdict in favor of Smith. Commenting upon the facts of the case, that Court further said:
“Under the above principles, the evidence in the ease at bar was amply sufficient to show lack of bad faith on the part of the insurance company in refusing payment of the insured’s claim. There was ample evidence upon which the jury might have *120based a verdict in favor of the defendant’s contention. Judgment is therefore affirmed upon the condition that the damages and attorney’s fees be stricken. Otherwise the judgment is reversed.” (Emphasis added.)
A careful reading of our Opinion by Judge Carney shows very clearly that there was ample evidence in the case “upon which the jury might have based a verdict in favor of the defendant’s contention.” Just as was said in the Georgia case.
In the case of Life & Casualty Co. of Tenn. v. Freemon, 80 Ga. App. 443, 56 S. E. (2d) 303, 304, there was a verdict in favor of Freemon upon the policy of insurance, plus interest, plus attorney’s fee. This interest and attorney’s fee is based upon the bad faith statute in the State of Georgia. The suit was brought by the mother of the deceased to recover the life insurance policy proceeds which contained a provision that there was no liability in the event the insured came to his death by reason of operating a motorcycle. It was the contention of the defendant that such had caused his death. The Court said:
‘ ‘ The jury would have been authorized, under the evidence, to have found that under all the facts and circumstances of the case the insured came to his death by reason of riding or operating a motorcycle. On the other hand, however, the jury were authorized under all the facts and circumstances of the case, to find that the insured did not come to his death by reason of riding or operating a motorcycle. This being true, the verdict of the jury was authorized by the evidence. The trial court approved the *121verdict. This court is •without authority to set it aside, insofar as the principal amount of the policy and interest thereon of the recovery are concerned.
“"We come next to consider whether the portion of the judgment for attorney’s fees should stand under the record in this case. The burden was on the plaintiff to show had faith on the part of defendant in refusing to pay the claim within sixty days after demand. In Pearl Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Nichols, 73 Ga. App. 452, 37 S. E. (2d) 227, 230, this Court held in ‘Refusal’ of an insurance company in “bad faith” to pay means in Georgia a frivolous and unfounded denial of liability. If there is any reasonable ground for contesting the claim, there is no bad faith. Though ordinarily these are questions for the jury, if there is no evidence of such frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay, or if the question of liability is a close one, the court for the furtherance of justice should see to it that a verdict ivhich illegally carries a penalty for bad faith is not allowed to stand.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
That Court thereupon held no bad faith to exist and reversed the verdict of the jury in that respect.
It should be said that bad faith is a state of mind which is evident by acts inconsistent with acts of good faith. In other words, bad faith is the opposite of good faith. Good faith on the part of counsel for the Insurance Company and for Hammond, required them to make an investigation of the facts and apply their knowledge of the law thereto and their experience as lawyers in the trial of such cases, without partiality to either the insurer or the insured. When we view the evidence in *122this case, giving consideration to the positive testimony and the circumstances related by the witnesses, discarding evidence where there is any countervailing evidence whatsoever, I cannot bring myself to conclude that there is any evidence upon which it could be said that counsel, or the agents of the insurer, acted in bad faith toward the insured.
I have not mentioned in this Opinion, the extent of the injuries of Mrs. Helen Mansfield, for I do not think we get to that point. This case turns upon the proof, conclusive to my mind and uncontradicted, that upon the diligent investigation shown to have been made, counsel had a right to assume that there was great probability that the jury 'would return a verdict in favor of Hammond.
It is my Opinion, therefore, that the two Assignments of Error, one with respect to the failure of the Trial Judge to exercise the function of a 13th juror, and the other with respect to the fact that there is no evidence to support bad faith, should have been sustained, the judgment of the Court thereon set aside, and this case dismissed.
On Petition for Certiorari
Certiorari denied by Supreme Court. Concur in result.