Court Opinion

ID: 9654665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:46:39.536409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:12.361706
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
I am in general agreement with the majority’s determination that whether or not Cobarrubio error is fundamental must be assayed in light of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). We must look to see whether we agree with the trial court’s assessment that sudden passion was raised by the evidence.1 If so, then the failure of the court to charge in accordance with Cobarrubio would “precipitate[ ] a denial of due process of law in the most fundamental sense,” 675 S.W.2d at 752, and perforce, constitute “egregarious harm” under Almanza, supra.
In this context I wish to amplify on the majority’s observation that “[ajppellant testified that he was in fear of the deceased.” (at p. 580.)
The fear about which appellant testified did not arise at the moment of the killing. Rather, appellant testified that throughout the evening he had been afraid for his life.
On direct, appellant testified as to one of his encounters with the deceased, after the deceased had seized his money, thus:
“... I called him outside. I said, Buddy, I say, I need my money. I got to pay my bills. I need my money, you know, why you want to do me like this and at that time he threatened to kill me if I kept on harrassing [sic] him about my money so — [2]
Q: Ronnie, at that point why didn’t you reach across and strum his head or something and take your money back?
A: Well, if a man tells you he is going to kill you and he’s known to pack a weapon, you know, I feared for my life.”
Appellant insisted that throughout the evening leading up to the killing he was angry and afraid, presumably while fetching his “rabbit gun” from his home and ultimately confronting the deceased. When he came to address the incident itself appellant testified:
“Q: I want you to tell us at the time you saw the movement did you believe that he was going to take a weapon from some concealed place?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: So in that split second that you had to react you shot him?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: At that point were you afraid for your own life?
A: I was still afraid.” [Emphasis supplied.]
There is no indication that the incremental provocation, if such it was, of the deceased’s reaching for a weapon caused appellant any new or sudden consternation. Rather, he testified that he was “still afraid.” The record is clear that appellant acted determinedly, and maintained his composure throughout. Thus, even at the moment at which he pulled the trigger appellant seemed capable of cool reflection. In short, I do not see that any “sudden passion” arose in this case. See Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
With these further observations I join the Court’s opinion.

. Whenever the trial court determines that the evidence raises an issue as to sudden passion it is incumbent that it give a proper charge to the jury. This is true regardless of whether an appellate or discretionary review court subsequently finds fault in that determination. Accordingly, our inquiry here is not whether the trial court erred; it did. Rather, it now must be assayed whether on the record as a whole the error committed was such as to deprive the accused of a fair and impartial trial. Almanza, supra. It is in this context that it is relevant to consider, as a matter of appellate review, whether the evidence was sufficient to require that the authorization paragraph on murder place on the State its burden of proving the lack of sudden passion.

. Incredibly, the majority fails to find this to constitute "heated words.”