Court Opinion

ID: 9663770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:50:18.391375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:56.299761
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). A French minister of education was quoted as saying, “At this moment, *569all over France, all children in grade so-and-so have hook so-and-so open to page so-and-so.” The majority does not take the standardization concept that far, hut it does blend a constitutional construction and a public policy conclusion to hold that, while a school board need not have a kindergarten at all, if it does have one, its age-admission policies cannot be tailored to fit the local situation.
The writer agrees with the statement in the majority opinion that: “. . . No provision in the constitution or of the statutes directly and expressly sets the age limit for admission to kindergarten.”
As to the constitutional requirement “. . . for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable, ...” 1 this provision has been construed to apply only “. . . to the character of the instruction given, — rather than to the means by which they are established . ...” 2 Thus, when it was argued that the uniformity provision required a uniform school *570calendar so that children would go to school at the same times and for the same periods of time in all schools, this court said, “. . . Nor do we believe that constitutional uniformity requires the school calendar shall be identical in every city, town and hamlet.” 3 It would appear to the writer that the age at which children are to begin kindergarten is farther removed from “the character of the instruction” than the days and times when school is to be open for all grades. Viewing the constitutional provision “. . . in the light of its express terms as well as of the purpose which actuated those who drafted it, ...” 4 the writer sees no applicability whatsoever to the area of kindergarten age-admission policies.
As the majority opinion notes, there is no statute which legislatively establishes a minimum or uniform age for children going to kindergarten. By statute, each school board has full discretion as to whether it will or will not establish a kindergarten.5 A minimum age for entry into first grade is statutorily fixed,6 but none for kindergarten. The statute, as to when state aids are to be paid for kindergarten pupils,7 cannot be made *571over into some mandatory inclusion of children reaching a certain age by the beginning of a school term. In the statutes and in the state constitution the writer finds no basis for setting or requiring a uniform Kindergarten age-admission policy in all schools.
Where neither the constitution nor the statutes establish a mandatory age-admission policy for kindergartens, there is no reason to go further to find an area of school board discretion in determining at what age children may or must be admitted to kindergartens.
The majority opinion does go further to the public policy involved, stating: “. . . Families in our mobile society who move about within the state should not be confronted with a patchwork of age-admission dates for school.” This states the case for uniformity, but there is strong support among educators, school administrators and teachers for a “patchwork” approach that permits creative and imaginative local experimentation both in adapting to special situations and in learning by trying different approaches. Here, where the majority agrees that a school district need not have a kindergarten at all, what is seen as appropriate public policy is that school boards need not don the garment, but, if they do, they may not alter or patch it to make it fit. What they need not wear, they must not alter. The writer is unimpressed by such result or reasoning, but objects the most to a judicial selection of the particular public policy to be followed. Where there is no constitutional mandate, it is for the legislative branch of our government, not the judicial, to listen to both sides of the discussion and to determine the appropriate public policy in the particular area of concern. Of age limits for commencing kindergarten, the writer would say, as was said of time limits for commencing legal actions, “. . . the balancing [of public policy factors] and deciding is part of the legislative, not the judicial, process. ...” 8 Until *572the legislature decides they may not, local school boards may decide the age at which children may attend kindergarten classes in their school district. So concluding, the writer would reverse.

 Art. X, see. 3, Wis. Const.

 Larson v. State Appeal Board (1973), 56 Wis. 2d 823, 827, 202 N. W. 2d 920, citing and quoting State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer (1928), 197 Wis. 284, 289, 290, 221 N. W. 860, 223 N. W. 123, where this court said: “An examination of the debates in the conventions that framed our present constitution and the constitution of 1846 (which contained a similar provision) discloses that the members of those conventions, when they were framing the article relating to schools, were concerned, not with the method of forming school districts, but with the character of instruction that should be given in those schools after the districts were formed, — with the training that these schools should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin.
“Viewing the terms of this constitutional provision in the light of its express terms as well as of the purpose which actuated those who drafted it, we conclude that the requirement as to uniformity applies to the districts after they are formed, — to the character of the instruction given, — rather than to the means by which they are established and their boundaries fixed.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also: Joint School District v. Sosalla (1958), 3 Wis. 2d 410, 88 N. W. 2d 357.

 Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 483, 492, 155 N. W. 2d 78.

 Larson v. State Appeal Board, supra, at page 827.

 Sec. 120.13 (14), Stats., made applicable to city school districts by sec. 120.49 (1).

 See. 118.14, Stats., providing:
“Age of pupils. No child may be admitted to the 1st grade unless he is 6 years old on or before December 1 in the year he proposes to enter school. . . .”

 Sec. 121.07 (1) (b), Stats., states:
“General provisions; state aid computation. In this subchapter:
“(b) A pupil enrolled in kindergarten may be counted only if he attains the age of 5 years on or before December 1 of the school year in which he. enrolls. A kindergarten pupil shall be counted as one-half pupil.”

 See: Estate of Kohls, ante, p. 141, 145, 203 N. W. 2d 666.