Court Opinion

ID: 9761123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:32:02.348714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.224558
License: Public Domain

Gibson, J.
The State of Vermont appeals from a post-conviction relief order vacating petitioner’s conviction for attempted sexual assault and granting a new trial, based on the bias of a juror. We reverse.
I.
Following his conviction on October 15, 1982, petitioner moved for post-conviction relief, contending that a juror at his trial “did withhold information [during the voir dire proceedings], and the information withheld was ‘capable of producing prejudice.’ ” At the voir dire the juror in question, Pamela Corcoran, testified in open court that her knowledge about the crime was limited: “All I heard, was that it happened. I didn’t hear of any particulars.” When she was asked whether it would be “fair to say, that you really don’t know anything about the case, other than a charge was brought,” she answered, “Right.” *461During subsequent voir dire in chambers, the prospective juror testified that “[a]ll I heard, was that an incident had happened on Main Street in an apartment. That was it.”
After conviction, petitioner learned that Corcoran had heard of the events in question through a conversation with Donna Bailey, a State’s witness. Depositions were taken of both Corcoran and Bailey at the Bennington County Courthouse. Asked about any conversation with Bailey, Corcoran testified:
Okay. As a matter of fact she said to me as I was walking down the street — did you hear that somebody tried to get raped last night and I said no. She said they did next door and that was the end of the conversation.
Bailey’s account of the brief conversation was:
Q: [C]an you just tell us basically what you said and what she said to you, what you told her and — ?
A: [Corcoran] just asked me — she heard a lot of screams— and she asked me what went on and I told her what I saw and that I heard a lot of loud screams and stuff.
Q: Okay. Did you tell her that you were a witness to some of this?
A: Yeah I told her I saw everything.
Q: [Corcoran] said that she heard screams?
A: Yes. I said yes it was the tenant right next door and that I saw everything from my bedroom window, what went on, the screams and everything. I thought at first it was screams from the Villager [sic] because you hear all kinds of noises and I just let it go and it just kept getting louder hollering and yelling.
At the conclusion of her deposition, Bailey was asked:
Q: And when you say you saw everything did you tell [Corcoran] what you saw?
A: No I didn’t say anything — what I just told you — I didn’t say anything.
Q: So you didn’t say I saw the man doing this and the girl doing that?
A: No.
*462Based on these depositions, the trial court concluded that Corcoran “did -withhold information [during voir dire], and the information withheld was ‘capable of producing prejudice.’” The court also relied on the additional factors that “[t]here is even an indication that [Corcoran] heard the victim’s screams during the actual commission of the crime” and that Corcoran testified in the deposition that Bailey had a way of “stretching things” and was a “gossip” and “busybody,” despite stating at voir dire that there was nothing that would cause her to give greater or lesser weight to Bailey’s testimony at trial. The court ruled in petitioner’s favor on his motion for post-conviction relief, vacated the conviction, and granted a new trial. The present appeal ensued.
The State argues on appeal that Corcoran truthfully answered every question put to her, and that her failure to reveal the identity of the person who told her of the incident in question was the result of defense counsel’s failure to inquire. Petitioner counters that the reviewing court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and that they reasonably support the court’s conclusions.
II.
 Initially, we address whether the reviewing court’s findings are adequately supported by the record. In order to address the issue, we must ascertain the appropriate standard of review. Normally, the trial court is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and its factual findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See In re Fadden, 148 Vt. 116, 119, 530 A.2d 560, 562 (1987) (post-conviction court’s findings of fact will be upheld unless clearly erroneous); State v. Leavitt, 133 Vt. 35, 41, 329 A.2d 627, 631 (1974) (in ruling on claim that juror failed to disclose information in response to voir dire question, evaluation of credibility is within the “exclusive province” of the trial court). Further, the trial court is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony it receives.
This standard is appropriate in the typical case because the trial court sees and hears the witnesses as they testify, and is able to observe their body language and hear the inflections of their voices. The court’s vantage point enables it to evaluate the nuances that do not appear in the appellate record.
*463But this is not a typical case. There was no live testimony before the trial court in the post-conviction proceeding. By stipulation of the parties, the entire evidence consisted of transcripts of the depositions of Pamela Corcoran, Donna Bailey and attorney David Howard, plus a partial transcript of the voir dire of the jury at petitioner’s 1982 trial. The stipulation provided that “[n]o further evidence shall be submitted by the parties.” Under these circumstances, the trial court is in no better position than we to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, and the question arises as to whether we should defer to its judgment.
There is a divergence of views on this issue. The federal courts were split on the question for years, to the point where the authorities were described as being “indescribably confused.” 9 C. Wright & A. Miller,. Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2587, at 740 (1971). This confusion in the federal arena was swept away in 1985 by two nearly concurrent strokes: the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), and an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
In Anderson, the Court held that the clearly erroneous standard applied even when the court’s findings did not rest on credibility determinations, but were based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts. 470 U.S. at 574-75. The Court, however, did not elevate documentary evidence to quite the same plane as testimonial evidence, stating:
When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court’s findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.
Id. at 575. Shortly thereafter, Federal Rule 52(a) was amended to read, in pertinent part: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” (Underlined portion added.)
State appellate courts remain divided on this issue. Some courts follow the federal standard, see, e.g., Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321, 324-25, 658 P.2d 992, 995-96 *464(Ct. App. 1983); Admiral Builders Savings & Loan Ass’n v. South River Landing, Inc., 66 Md. App. 124, 128-29, 502 A.2d 1096, 1098-99 (1986), while others will not accord deference to findings that are based solely on documentary evidence. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1278 (Del. 1989); Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. 1, 8, 413 N.E.2d 1099, 1104 (1980); In re Rosier, 105 Wash. 2d 606, 616, 717 P.2d 1353, 1359 (1986).
Vermont has not amended V.R.C.P. 52 to follow the amendment to the federal rule, nor has this Court addressed the question of whether to apply a different standard to findings dealing with documentary, as opposed to testimonial, evidence. In considering this matter, we believe the better policy is to apply the “clearly erroneous” test to all trial court findings whether based on live testimony or on documentary evidence. This approach is less likely to encourage appeals designed merely to elicit a second opinion, and it accords with the plain language of V.R.C.P. 52 that “[findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Further, it is consistent with the roles generally considered appropriate for trial and appellate courts.
In determining whether a trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous, we noted recently that “[u]nder the classic formulation, a finding is ‘ “clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” In re Quechee Lakes Corp., 154 Vt. 543, 554 n.10, 580 A.2d 957, 963 n.10 (1990) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)) (emphasis in Quechee). In the instant case, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous in certain key respects. In its decision, the court found that Corcoran stated at voir dire that she did not know the witness, Bailey, but that later during voir dire she admitted she did know her through their children, who had attended the same school. The transcript does not corroborate the court’s finding. In fact, at the first mention of Bailey’s name during voir dire, Corcoran immediately identified her as an acquaintance, and she never thereafter denied knowing her. The trial court’s erroneous finding could well have led it to misjudge Corcoran’s credibility.
*465Of greater concern is the court’s finding that Bailey “testified that she had related to Ms. Corcoran everything she had seen and heard that night.” Corcoran testified in her deposition, however, that Bailey did not discuss the details of her observations with her, and Bailey later corroborated this statement in her own deposition. As previously mentioned, at the conclusion of her deposition, Bailey was asked:
Q: And when you say you saw everything did you tell [Corcoran] what you saw?
A: No I didn’t say anything — what I just told you — I didn’t say anything.
Q: So you didn’t say I saw the. man doing this and the girl doing that?
A: No.
It is readily apparent that Bailey was clarifying an answer given earlier by her regarding her discussion with Corcoran. The trial court, however, ignored or overlooked this more precise explanation, and read into the brief encounter between the two women more than the evidence warranted. Thus, although there is some evidence to support the court’s finding that “Corcoran received a detailed account of the attempted rape before she was selected as a juror,” the entire evidence leaves us with the “definite conviction” that the court’s finding was clearly erroneous. This finding, therefore, cannot serve as the underlying basis for the court’s ultimate conclusion.
Although we conclude that several of the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous, we must still determine whether there is reversible error, in light of the evidence and remaining findings. The controlling issue is whether the evidence establishes a bias on the part of Corcoran or whether she could decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial. See State v. Hohman, 138 Vt. 502, 510, 420 A.2d 852, 857 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Shea, 148 Vt. 307, 308-09, 532 A.2d 571, 572 (1987). If bias is-established, Corcoran must be disqualified, and the case retried. Id. at 511, 420 A.2d at 858. But the case law recognizes that there is a difference between knowledge and bias; “the mere fact that a juror has knowledge of a prior verdict or other fact relating to the defendant does not disqualify her as a matter of law.” Id. at 511-12, 420 A.2d at 858; *466see also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (“It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.”); State v. Doleszny, 146 Vt. 621, 622, 508 A.2d 693, 694 (1986) (per curiam) (“Knowing a witness does not automatically require removal of a prospective juror, particularly where there is no reason for the court to doubt the juror’s belief that [s]he will be impartial.”). “There must be a demonstrable showing of prejudice or of the existence of circumstances capable of producing prejudice and not mere speculation.” State v. Dragon, 135 Vt. 168, 170, 376 A.2d 12, 13-14 (1977) (citations omitted). To warrant a new trial, “a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984).
In the instant case, the evidence does not demonstrate that Corcoran failed to answer honestly any of the questions that were put to her, nor does it show bias on her part. Corcoran stated during voir dire that she could treat Bailey’s trial testimony the same as that of other witnesses without giving it more credibility than the others’, that she had formed no opinion about the case, and that she could come to an impartial verdict based on the evidence. If there were any predisposition by Corcoran with respect to Bailey’s testimony, it could only have been to view it with some skepticism because of Bailey’s tendency, in Corcoran’s words, “to tell people everybody’s business” and to be a “busybody.”1 This is a far cry from being prejudiced against petitioner, and does not warrant the retrial of an eight-year-old case where the evidence for conviction “was strong on all three [subdivisions of the statute].” State v. Nash, 144 Vt. *467427, 434, 479 A.2d 757, 761 (1984).2 There was no valid basis for a challenge for cause. Accordingly, we are unable to hold that petitioner met his burden of showing that the jury (and Corcoran, in particular) was unable to decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial, or that there were circumstances capable of prejudicing the deliberative function of the jury. See State v. Onorato, 142 Vt. 99, 106-07, 453 A.2d 393, 396-97 (1982).
III.
 In any event, the record discloses that petitioner waived any objection he had to Corcoran as a juror. It is the obligation of counsel to examine jurors on voir dire in order to ascertain their qualifications and bias, if any, and then seasonably raise any objection to any member of the panel. State v. Percy, 156 Vt. 468, 480, 595 A.2d 248, 255 (1990); V.R.Cr.P. 24(a), (b). The right to challenge a juror is waived by a failure to object before the jury is impaneled if the basis for the objection is known or might, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered during voir dire. See Robinson v. Monsanto Co., 758 F.2d 331, 335 (8th Cir. (1985); Commonwealth v. Fudge, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 382, 389, 481 N.E.2d 199, 204, rev. denied, 396 Mass. *4681102, 484 N.E.2d 102 (1985); Commonwealth v. Shirey, 333 Pa. Super. 85, 105, 481 A.2d 1314, 1325 (1984), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Anderson, 379 Pa. Super. 589, 594-98, 550 A.2d 807, 810-11 (1988); see also McKinstry v. Collins, 74 Vt. 147, 162, 52 A. 438, 442 (1902) (new trial denied on ground attorney waived right to object to possible juror bias by going ahead with trial without objection after learning about association of juror with opposing party); Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt. 590, 606 (1869) (verdict will not be set aside on ground that one of jurors had a cause of his own pending for trial by jury at the same term, where counsel made no motion to discharge him).
In the instant case, petitioner was put on notice at the voir dire that Corcoran had talked with “someone” about the alleged rape the day following the incident. In response to inquiries from the state’s attorney as to whether any of the jurors had heard anything about the incident, Corcoran said that “someone” had mentioned it to her, but all she had heard was that it had happened and she didn’t hear any of the particulars. She further answered, “No,” when questioned whether she was told anything that supposedly factually occurred, a position she has consistently maintained. While it might have been better had Corcoran volunteered that Bailey was the “someone” who had talked with her on the street, nevertheless, counsel for petitioner made no effort to follow up on the details of the encounter. Reasonable inquiry would have disclosed the name of the person and the extent of the conversation. The record, including her deposition testimony, does not justify a supposition that Corcoran would not have answered such questions honestly and truthfully. She answered truthfully and readily enough when asked whether she knew Bailey. By failing to pursue this line of inquiry and learn what could readily have been discovered, petitioner waived his right to object to the seating of Corcoran as a juror.

Reversed.

 The dissent theorizes that Bailey’s testimony was “not entirely pro-State” because in Corcoran’s deposition she stated that Bailey told her “somebody tried to get raped last night.” The dissent interprets this statement as suggesting that Bailey believed the victim was partially responsible for the attempted rape, influencing Corcoran to discount that viewpoint to the prejudice of petitioner. Yet, the dissent makes no mention of the colloquy immediately following between petitioner’s attorney and Corcoran:
*467Q: Do you remember [Bailey’s] exact words? If you can’t remember the exact words then give your best recollection.
A: A girl almost got raped last night, and that was it.
Q: This is what she said to you on the sidewalk?
A: Yes.
By ignoring or overlooking the entire testimony of Corcoran, the dissent imports a meaning to it that clearly is not there.

 This is petitioner’s third petition for post-conviction relief. See In re Nash, 149 Vt. 63, 539 A.2d 989 (1987); In re Nash, 146 Vt. 259, 499 A.2d 785 (1985). Following the trial court’s decision herein, the court granted petitioner’s motion for release pending appeal, conditioned on his reporting regularly to the Bennington Police Department and his residing and remaining in Bennington County. Petitioner never reported to the Bennington Police Department after his release, however, but instead took up residence in the State of New Hampshire. These actions, of course, have no bearing on the issues raised in this appeal, but they do reveal an attitude of contempt for the law of this state that is difficult to ignore. The record further shows that in December of 1988 the trial court granted the State’s motion for stay of judgment, and in February of 1989, an arrest warrant was issued.