Court Opinion

ID: 9955542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 18:03:01.326131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:04.636351
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Delray CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                B320282

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. 20HWMH00232)
         v.

ELI TONEY DELRAY,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. James M. Dabney, Judge. Affirmed.
     Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                 _______________________
      Eli Toney Delray appeals from a judgment of commitment
declaring him a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 6600 et seq., known as the
Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). Delray argues many of
the prosecution’s trial exhibits should not have been admitted,
and if those exhibits had not been admitted, then case-specific
hearsay related by expert witnesses would not have been
admissible. To the extent he failed to preserve these issues on
appeal, he contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
We affirm the judgment.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In 2020, the People filed a petition for Delray’s commitment
as an SVP. In advance of Delray’s jury trial, the People described
and marked nine exhibits, several of which the prosecutor stated
he had redacted. Delray’s counsel did not object to any of these
exhibits.
      At trial, the People presented the testimony of two
percipient witnesses who described a 1982 incident in which
Delray watched two young children while he masturbated and
then unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap one of them. The People
also presented expert testimony from two forensic psychologists,
each of whom had evaluated Delray and concluded he had a
diagnosed mental disorder that made him likely to engage in
sexually violent predatory acts without appropriate treatment
and custody. Delray’s trial counsel did not object to any of the
testimony.

1     Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references
are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                2
       Delray presented one forensic psychologist expert witness
and the testimony of several individuals who found him friendly,
cooperative, and non-threatening when they interacted with him
in various capacities at the state hospital where he was confined.
Delray’s expert witness diagnosed him with pedophilic disorder
and antisocial personality disorder, but opined he did not have
difficulty controlling his sexual impulses.
       At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the court
instructed the jury and then met with the parties to finalize the
exhibits. The court asked for any specific objections to the
prosecution’s exhibits and acknowledged Delray’s personal
concern about privacy in his hospital records under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Pub.L. No.
104–191 (Aug. 21, 1996) 110 Stat. 1936 (HIPAA)). The
prosecutor advised the court he had redacted portions of Exhibit
9, a compilation of subpoenaed documents, where they “did not
qualify as business records, conclusions about experts, multiple
level hearsay, medical data, future activities or events.” He said
he “tried to go through and take out everything that did not meet
the definition.”
       The court asked Delray’s counsel if she had any objection.
Counsel indicated Delray’s concern about HIPAA had been
resolved, “but the objection would be under [People v.] Sanchez
[(2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez)] as well.”
       The court noted this objection and said it would examine
the affidavits accompanying the subpoenaed documents. It
continued, “As long as the affidavit complies with the Evidence
Code and sets out the exceptions for business or official records,
then I don’t believe that Sanchez would apply because it’s
admissible hearsay. [¶] And it’s not getting inadmissible hearsay

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in through the experts who relied on those portions of the
People’s exhibits in forming their opinions.” The court observed
that while the expert witnesses were testifying, no objection was
made to the content of their testimony. The court said it
assumed Delray had not objected because “there was some stuff
they testified to that was in the medical records that they were
relying on which would have been responsive to these
subpoenas.”
       The court asked if its assumption was correct, and the
prosecutor responded, “Yes, and also statements by Mr. Delray—
otherwise would be admissible.” The prosecutor stated he had
attempted to remove all “second level hearsay.”
       The court said that unless Delray objected to specific items
as not being as described by the prosecutor, it would accept a
general objection, but the court would admit the documents over
that objection as long as the affidavit set out the requirements of
the Evidence Code and the foundation for the hearsay exception
involved. The court asked Delray’s counsel if it was correct in its
understanding that Delray was “raising an objection as to the
sufficiency of the three affidavits that were submitted” with the
subpoenaed documents. Delray’s counsel confirmed that was her
objection.
       After addressing Delray’s contention that it was a HIPAA
violation for his personal medical records to be received as
evidence and sent to the jury room, and his displeasure that
documents pertaining to qualifying offenses would be provided to
the jury, the court asked counsel if there were any further issues.
Both attorneys responded no. The court said it assumed counsel
had already gone through the evidence, but that if defense
counsel discovered anything before the next court date that she

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believed was outside the scope of the petition, she should alert
the court, which would rule on any issues before exhibits were
sent into the jury room. Counsel raised no evidentiary issues on
the next court date.
      The jury found Delray to be an SVP, and the court ordered
him committed to the Department of State Hospitals. Delray
appeals.
                          DISCUSSION
I.    Applicable Law
      A.    SVPA
       The SVPA “allows for the involuntary civil commitment of
certain offenders following the completion of their prison terms
who are found to be sexually violent predators.” (People v. Yates
(2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 474, 477 (Yates).) Section 6600,
subdivision (a)(1) defines an SVP as “a person who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims
and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person
a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that
he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”
(§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).)
       “An alleged SVP is entitled to a jury trial, at which the
People must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) the person has suffered a conviction of at least one qualifying
‘sexually violent offense,’ (2) the person has ‘a diagnosed mental
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety
of others,’ and (3) the mental disorder makes it likely the person
will engage in future predatory acts of sexually violent criminal
behavior if released from custody.” (Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th
at p. 477; see also §§ 6600, 6603, 6604.)

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      If the court or jury finds the person is an SVP, then they
are committed for an indeterminate term to the custody of the
State Department of State Hospitals. (§ 6604.) Following
commitment, the SVP is subject to annual mental examinations
to determine whether they continue to meet the definition of an
SVP. (§ 6604.9, subds. (a), (b).)
      B.    Sanchez
      Under Sanchez, expert witnesses may relate matters
within their own personal knowledge and information acquired
through their training and experience when they testify, but
generally they may not “supply case-specific facts about which
[they have] no personal knowledge.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at pp. 675–676.) “Case-specific facts are those relating to the
particular events and participants alleged to have been involved
in the case being tried.” (Id. at p. 676.) “If an expert testifies to
case-specific out-of-court statements to explain the bases for his
opinion, those statements are necessarily considered by the jury
for their truth, thus rendering them hearsay. Like any other
hearsay evidence, it must be properly admitted through an
applicable hearsay exception.” (Id. at p. 684.)
II.   Forfeiture of Evidentiary Objections
      Delray argues the trial court erroneously admitted
documents and portions of documents that should have been
excluded as inadmissible hearsay or on other grounds. While it is
not always clear whether Delray is objecting to documents in
their entirety or only to some of their content, it appears he
objects to Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9A, 9KK, and 9LL in their
entirety, and to portions of Exhibits 4, 5, 9B, 9C, 9E, 9F, 9G, 9S,
9T, 9V, 9W, 9Y, 9Z, 9RR, and 9UU. In the trial court Delray did

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not raise any of the issues he complains of on appeal. He did not
object to any evidence or testimony as it was presented, and after
the prosecution had concluded its case, counsel objected, without
explanation or argument, to the documents under Sanchez.
Counsel confirmed she objected to the sufficiency of the three
affidavits that had been submitted with the subpoenaed
documents and she had no further issues to raise. Although
given another opportunity to raise evidentiary issues before the
jury received the exhibits, Delray made no further objections.
       “A defendant who fails to make a timely objection or motion
to strike evidence may not later claim that the admission of the
evidence was error [citations] or that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by adducing it [citation].” (People v. Abel (2012)
53 Cal.4th 891, 924.) When a litigant objects to evidence, they
must state the specific ground for the objection, and under
Evidence Code section 353, an “ ‘appellate court’s review of the
trial court’s admission of evidence is then limited to the stated
ground for the objection.’ ” (Ibid.) The objection must “ ‘fairly
inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence,
of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the
evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence
can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully
informed ruling.’ ” (Ibid.)
       We find counsel’s vague reference to Sanchez, supported by
no argument or identification of the evidence claimed to be
inadmissible, was insufficient to present any timely or coherent
objection to the exhibits or to preserve the issues he argues on
appeal. Counsel needed to object to any problematic exhibits on
ordinary evidentiary grounds, not under Sanchez: as Delray
admits, the holding of Sanchez made it important for counsel to

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object to inadmissible hearsay, “but the exhibits were not
themselves inadmissible under Sanchez.” Not only was counsel’s
Sanchez objection undeveloped and insufficient, it was far too
late. The time for Delray to object under Sanchez to expert
testimony that he believed related case-specific hearsay not
supported by independently admissible evidence was when that
testimony was presented, not after the prosecution had rested its
case.
       Nor was counsel’s objection to the three affidavits
supporting the subpoenaed documents that are Exhibit 9
sufficient to preserve the evidentiary issues he now raises on
appeal. As Delray acknowledges, “the declarations were facially
valid.” Moreover, Delray’s objection to the affidavits impacts only
Exhibit 9, and it therefore could not have preserved his
challenges to other exhibits. Finally, for those documents Delray
contends were partially inadmissible and should have been
redacted (or further redacted), “ ‘where evidence is in part
admissible, and in part inadmissible, “the objectionable portion
cannot be reached by a general objection to the entire [evidence],
but the inadmissible portion must be specified.” ’ ” (People v.
Burroughs (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 378, 408–409.)
       Delray argues the trial court “did not do its job properly
because in addition to making sure that there was a correct and
facially valid affidavit, it was supposed to exclude inadmissible
opinions, information about offenses that were not qualifying
offenses, and acts, conditions, or events that did not occur at or
near the time the document purportedly describing them was
created.” Delray provides no citation to authority to support his
contention that when a party objects to documents on Sanchez
grounds and to the sufficiency of the affidavits submitted to lay

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the foundation for a subset of the exhibits, the court nonetheless
must sua sponte review all the documents and their redactions
for other evidentiary issues. This is not the law. “Although a
more nuanced analysis of the proffered evidence might have been
beneficial, it was not incumbent on the trial court to undertake
such an endeavor absent a specific objection and request from
counsel.” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 366.)
“ ‘A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an
analysis it was not asked to conduct.’ ” (Id. at p. 367.)
       In this case, defense counsel’s reference to Sanchez and her
objection to the affidavits supporting subpoenaed records did not
fairly inform the People or the trial court of the arguments
Delray now raises on appeal. Delray’s failure to make timely,
specific objections on the various grounds he asserts on appeal,
and to request redaction of the statements he now argues were
inadmissible, constitutes a forfeiture.
III.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Delray argues that to the extent his attorney forfeited any
of the claims raised in this appeal by failing to properly object at
trial, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Generally,
“[o]n direct appeal, a [judgment] will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel
had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or
omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide
one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All
other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately
resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009; see also People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th
142, 188 [when ineffective assistance of counsel claim involves
choices that may have been tactical in nature on a silent

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appellate record, the claim is “better evaluated” in a petition for
habeas corpus].)
       Delray’s briefing on this issue is superficial and conclusory:
he simply asserts there could have been no valid tactical reason
for not raising the hearsay objections presented in the opening
brief. There is no evidence in the record that Delray’s counsel
was ever asked why she did not object to the evidence Delray now
claims should have been excluded. Nor can we conclude on this
record that defense counsel had no conceivable tactical reason for
declining to object to the evidence at issue. “The decision
whether to object to the admission of evidence is ‘inherently
tactical,’ and a failure to object will rarely reflect deficient
performance by counsel.” (People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1292, 1335, abrogated on other grounds as recognized in People v.
Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 100.) “Although trial counsel may
have the duty to protect the record when their client’s trial
interests are truly at stake, they have no duty to object simply to
generate appellate issues. Sometimes, the best action an
attorney can take regarding an available objection is not to make
it.” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1202.)
       Because the record does not demonstrate the absence of
any rational tactical purpose for trial counsel’s failure to make
the evidentiary objections he asserts on appeal, Delray’s claim is
more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding and
must be denied on direct appeal. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997)
15 Cal.4th 264, 266–267 [a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel relating to “ ‘ “why counsel acted or failed to act in the
manner challenged . . .” ’ is more appropriately decided in a
habeas corpus proceeding”].)

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                         DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                       STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             WILEY, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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