Court Opinion

ID: 9585779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:03:49.051522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:14.730002
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent based substantially on the same reasons outlined and contained in the dissent of Judge Smith and my dissent in Williams v. State, 145 Ga. *830App. 81 (243 SE2d 614). See also State v. Wood, Okla. Ct. of Crim. App., decided February 21, 1978, where the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals holds "that the implied consent statute is properly construed as meaning that a person driving on the public roads gives his implied consent to a blood test in the event that he is rendered unconscious as a result of an automobile collision, and the police have probable cause to believe that he was driving while intoxicated. However, in order to secure to such a person the same rights guaranteed to other drivers upon Oklahoma’s highways, it is necessary that where a person has his blood drawn and tested pursuant to his implied consent he must be given the opportunity, when he regains consciousness, to revoke his consent. In such a case, evidence of the blood test and its result would not be admissible. However, a person revoking his consent after he regains consciousness then becomes liable to suspension of his driver’s license pursuant to 47 O.S. Supp. 1975, § 753.”
I am authorized to state that Judge Smith joins in this dissent.