Court Opinion

ID: 9634455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:13:30.991191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:03.352927
License: Public Domain

BOIS, J.
dissenting:
The majority read RSA 269-C:24 IV in isolation. They conveniently ignore RSA 626:8 (Criminal Liability for Conduct of Another), which provides in subsection II that “[a] person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (b) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the law defining the offense. . . .” RSA 269-C:24 IV is such a law. Imposing criminal liability based on status for certain violations of a mala prohibitum nature does not offend constitutional requirements. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
Even if I were to accept the majority’s conclusion that the vicarious imposition of criminal liability on parents of children who have committed an OHRV violation under RSA ch. 269-C is constitutionally impermissible, I would still uphold the validity of RSA 269-C:24 IV. A closer reading of this State’s Criminal Code belies the majority’s reasoning that RSA 269-C :24 IV holds parents of minor offenders criminally responsible for their children’s offenses solely on the basis of their parental status. RSA 626:1 I, enunciating the fundamental principle of the Criminal Code, states that all criminal liability must be based on a “voluntary act” or “voluntary omission.” When RSA 269-C:24 IV is read in conjunction with RSA 626:1 I, a parental conviction can result only when the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt that a minor child has committed a violation under a provision of chapter 269-C, and that his parent voluntarily performed or omitted to perform an act such as participating in the minor’s conduct, or entrusting, or negligently allowing his minor child to operate an OHRV.
When RSA 269-C:24 IV is construed to require a voluntary act or voluntary omission in accordance with RSA 626:1 1, there are no due process infirmities, either under N.H. Const, pt. I, art. 15 or U.S. *165Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Culpable intent is not required to impose criminal penalties for minor infractions. “It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the Legislature may declare criminal a certain actor omission to act without requiring it to be done with intent.” State v. Sullivan, 101 N.H. 429, 431, 146 A.2d 1, 3 (1958); accord, Mclntire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 176, 59 A.2d 471, 473 (1948).
When the legislature imposes criminal responsibility without requiring intent, we will override it only when such imposition violates concepts of fundamental fairness. In the present case, there is a demonstrable public interest to assure the safe operation of OHRVs, and the penalties imposed upon violators of RSA 269-C:24 IV are insubstantial. In such circumstances, we will not second guess the wisdom of the legislature. See Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 68-69, 174 A. 193, 196 (1934).
Public welfare offenses requiring no criminal intent have also been held consistent with the due process requirements of U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. E.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). “There is wide latitude in the lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition.” Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). “In vindicating its public policy ... a State in punishing particular acts may provide that ‘he who shall do them shall do them at his peril . . . Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238 (1945).
LAMPRON, C.J., concurs in this dissent.