Court Opinion

ID: 9399664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 00:00:37.791246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:50.720823
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60098        Document: 00516775500             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/05/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                     June 5, 2023
                                      No. 22-60098                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Thaddeus L. Jarvis,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Pelicia Hall, Mississippi Department of Corrections Commissioner, in her
   official capacity ; Tommy Taylor, Interim Commissioner, in his official
   capacity; Unknown Turner, M.S.P. Superintendent, in his official
   capacity; Unknown Morris, M.S.P. Warden, Camp 29, in his
   individual and official capacity; Unknown Simon, Warden, Camp 29, in
   individual and official capacity; Unknown Muford, Captain, Camp 29,
   in individual and official capacity; Unknown Cannon, Correctional
   Officer, in individual and official capacity; Unknown Meeks, Captain
   Camp 29,in individual and official capacity,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 4:20-CV-193
                     ______________________________

   Before Jones, Clement, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60098      Document: 00516775500          Page: 2    Date Filed: 06/05/2023

                                    No. 22-60098

          Thaddeus L. Jarvis, a Mississippi prisoner proceeding pro se and in
   forma pauperis, sued several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
   violations of his constitutional rights. The district court sua sponte dismissed
   three of Jarvis’s claims and later granted summary judgment on the
   remaining two. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
                              I.   Factual Background
          Jarvis is an inmate at the Mississippi State Penitentiary (“M.S.P.”).
   In January 2020, a violent dispute broke out in the prison between rival gangs,
   resulting in the death of multiple inmates.        To regain control of the
   penitentiary, prison officials temporarily transferred Jarvis and other inmates
   to another section of the facility, “Unit 32.” The inmates remained in Unit
   32 for the next seven days. Jarvis alleges that, during this period, prison
   officials denied him food, water, clothing, bedding, and personal hygiene
   items, including properly functioning toilets. In particular, he asserts that
   they failed to provide him with meals containing at least 2,900 calories and
   that they did not permit him to shower. He also pleads that he was not
   allowed to bring his personal belongings with him to Unit 32.
          Jarvis contends that, at some point during this time, an emergency
   response team of over “fifty cars” of Mississippi State Troopers arrived at
   the prison to help regain control of M.S.P. Although his allegations on this
   point are not abundantly clear, he seems to aver that one officer used
   excessive force against him. Per Jarvis, the officer slammed him to the
   ground while his hands were restrained, bruising his back and chipping his
   tooth. He alleges that he subsequently requested—but was denied—medical
   treatment for four days.

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           Based on these events, Jarvis filed this § 1983 suit against various
   prison officials 1 (collectively, “Defendants”). His complaint avers that
   Defendants violated his constitutional rights by: (1) failing to protect him
   from the threat of gang violence; (2) subjecting him to unconstitutional
   conditions of confinement; (3) using excessive force against him; (4) denying
   him medical treatment; and (5) depriving him of his personal property
   without due process.
           The district court scheduled a Spears 2 hearing on Jarvis’s claims, but
   later cancelled the hearing without explanation. Though the district court’s
   order does not say so explicitly, it appears the court reviewed Jarvis’s
   complaint under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
   1915A. In doing so, it sua sponte dismissed Jarvis’s claims for failure to
   protect, denial of medical treatment, and deprivation of property without due
   process. However, it permitted Jarvis’s remaining claims to proceed.
           Defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment. They urged
   that the official-capacity claims were barred by sovereign immunity, and they
   were entitled to qualified immunity on the individual-capacity claims. In
   support, they attached to the motion a copy of Jarvis’s administrative
   grievances.     Many of the statements contained in the administrative
   grievances directly contradicted the allegations in Jarvis’s complaint. Jarvis
   responded to the motion but did not submit any evidence in support. The

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           1
             His complaint names: the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of
   Corrections, the Interim Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, the
   M.S.P. Superintendent, an M.S.P. Warden, two M.S.P. Captains, and an M.S.P.
   Correctional Officer. He sues all Defendants in their official capacities, and the Warden,
   Captains, and Correctional Officer in their individual capacities.
           2
            Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181–82 (5th Cir. 1985), overruled on other
   grounds by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).

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   district court subsequently granted summary judgment, dismissing the
   remaining claims. Jarvis timely appealed.
                           II.   Jurisdiction & Discussion
          The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we
   have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We address the district
   court’s sua sponte dismissal and summary judgment, in turn, below.
              A. Sua Sponte Dismissal
          The district court first screened and dismissed Jarvis’s claims for
   failure to protect, denial of medical treatment, and deprivation of property
   without due process. Where, as here, a prisoner is proceeding in forma
   pauperis, §§ 1915(e) and 1915A require a court to dismiss an action or claim
   against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity
   that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
   granted. We review a district court’s dismissal under these provisions de
   novo. Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 2016).
          To determine whether a complaint fails to state a claim in this context,
   we apply the same standard we use to review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).
   Id. at 209–10. Accordingly, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual
   matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted). Alternatively, “[a] claim may be dismissed as frivolous if
   it does not have an arguable basis in fact or law.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d
   764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). It lacks an arguable basis in fact or law
   if it is predicated “on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Samford v.
   Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).
          Generally, a district court must offer a pro se plaintiff an opportunity
   to remedy perceived errors in his complaint before it dismisses those claims

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   with prejudice. 3 See Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per
   curiam); Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994). But a district court
   need not afford such an opportunity (1) if the plaintiff’s claims are clearly
   frivolous, see Eason, 14 F.3d at 9, or (2) if the plaintiff “has already pleaded
   his best case,” Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 982 F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (quotation omitted).
           Here, Jarvis does not dispute the district court’s determination that
   he failed to state a claim for failure to protect, denial of medical treatment, or
   deprivation of property. Rather, his sole argument on appeal is that the
   district court erred in dismissing his claims without a Spears hearing. The
   problem with this argument is that Jarvis’s appellate brief fails to identify how
   his “insufficient factual allegations” could “be remedied by more specific
   pleading.” Eason, 14 F.3d at 9.
           Jarvis does not, for instance, explain what additional details a Spears
   hearing would have revealed, nor does he “state any material facts he would
   have included in an amended complaint” if afforded the opportunity.
   Brewster, 587 F.3d at 768; see also Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th
   1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (noting that movants must provide
   “some notice of what his or her amendments would be and how those
   amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects” to be entitled to
   leave to amend). He simply maintains that his claims “[a]re supported by
   the complaint” and rests on the allegations contained within. We liberally
   construe pro se briefs, Mapes v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
   curiam), but—even so—we conclude Jarvis has failed to brief any argument
   establishing his entitlement to a Spears hearing. This failure constitutes

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           3
             A district court typically offers this opportunity through a “questionnaire or in a
   Spears dialog.” Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994).

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   abandonment on appeal. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir.
   1993); see also Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
   plaintiff remains the master of his complaint and is, in the end, the person
   responsible for articulating the facts that give rise to a cognizable claim.”).
           Because Jarvis does not address whether or how he failed to plead his
   best case before the district court, Mendoza-Tarango, 982 F.3d at 402, we
   conclude the district court did not err by failing to hold a Spears hearing and
   sua sponte dismissing Jarvis’s claims.
               B. Summary Judgment
           We next consider the district court’s summary judgment on Jarvis’s
   claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement and excessive force.
   As an initial matter, Defendants moved for summary judgment on Jarvis’s
   official-capacity claims, asserting that they were barred by sovereign
   immunity. Jarvis does not contest that on appeal, so we deem the issue
   waived. 4 See Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 613 (5th Cir. 1999); Yohey, 985
   F.2d at 224–25; Brinkmann v. Dall. Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744,
   748 (5th Cir. 1987). Defendants next moved for summary judgment on
   Jarvis’s individual-capacity claims, asserting that they were entitled to
   qualified immunity. 5

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           4
             To the extent that Jarvis claims on appeal that Defendants are liable on a
   supervisory liability theory, Jarvis’s pleadings do not make such an allegation. We generally
   do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Leverette v. Louisville
   Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Accordingly, we decline to
   address that argument here.
           5
            We observe that the district court did not make its reasons for granting summary
   judgment abundantly clear, and as a result, it did not explicitly conclude that Defendants
   were entitled to qualified immunity. Nevertheless, Defendants moved for summary
   judgment on that basis, and we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.
   Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. All., Inc., 123 F.3d 301, 307 (5th Cir. 1997).

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          We review “a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
   applying the same standards as the trial court.” Griffin v. UPS, Inc., 661 F.3d
   216, 221 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows
   that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
   entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). However,
   a good-faith assertion of qualified immunity “alters the usual summary
   judgment burden of proof.” Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (quotation omitted). Once a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden
   shifts to the plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
   alleged conduct violated a clearly established right. Id.; Cole v. Carson, 935
   F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
          With this framework in mind, we address whether Defendants are
   entitled to qualified immunity on Jarvis’s claims for unconstitutional
   conditions of confinement and excessive force.
                     1. Conditions of Confinement
          First, Jarvis contends that the conditions during his seven days of
   confinement in Unit 32 were so inadequate that they violated his Eighth
   Amendment rights.          The Eighth Amendment “does not mandate
   comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Hinojosa v.
   Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
   Accordingly, to establish his conditions-of-confinement claim, Jarvis must
   satisfy two prongs. First, he must show that his confinement resulted in an
   “objectively, sufficiently serious” deprivation that “constitutes a ‘denial of
   the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.’” Coleman v. Sweetin,
   745 F.3d 756, 764 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
   834 (1994)). Second, Jarvis must demonstrate that Defendants acted with
   deliberate indifference to his health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

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              We need not reach the second prong because Jarvis cannot satisfy the
   first. 6   Jarvis argues that Defendants deprived him of five main needs: food,
   water, clothing, bedding, and personal hygiene items (including showers and
   functioning plumbing). But, as we explain below, Jarvis failed to submit
   summary judgment evidence demonstrating that any of these deprivations
   were sufficiently serious to create a constitutional violation. Hudson v.
   McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (noting that “extreme deprivations are
   required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”).
              Jarvis’s most extreme claims are that prison officials denied him water
   and food. But according to the administrative grievances he filed following
   these events, he did receive both. As to the former, Jarvis admitted that he
   received many bottles of water during the seven-day period, and, as to the
   latter, he similarly conceded that he was provided meals—just not the 2,900
   calories a day in three meals like he usually received.                    But even that
   interruption was temporary. Prison officials provided inmates one meal the
   day after the riot and two meals the next day. Within three days, they had
   resumed the regularly scheduled routine. On these facts, we conclude that
   Jarvis did not suffer a deprivation of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s
   necessities.” Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 214 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (quotation
   omitted); see also Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 1999)
   (recognizing that missing one meal “does not rise to the level of a cognizable

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              6
             However, even assuming arguendo Jarvis could establish he suffered a severe
   deprivation, his claim would still fail at the second prong. To establish that Defendants
   acted with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety, Jarvis needed to demonstrate
   that they were “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
   risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and they actually “dr[e]w the inference” to that effect.
   Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. But deliberate indifference “is an extremely high standard to
   meet,” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted), and Jarvis
   has simply failed to raise a genuine fact issue as to the prison official’s subjective intent.
   Therefore, his Eighth Amendment claim fails on this basis, too.

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   constitutional injury”); Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770–71 (5th Cir. 1986)
   (concluding that the provision of only two, as opposed to three, nutritionally
   adequate meals daily does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
          Jarvis’s remaining claims regarding the deprivation of clothing,
   bedding, and personal hygiene items fare no better. In assessing these alleged
   deprivations, we consider both their duration and their severity. See Taylor
   v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 n.2 (2020); Talib, 138 F.3d at 214 n.3 (considering
   deprivations in context of duration); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–87
   (1978) (observing that “the length of confinement cannot be ignored”;
   indeed “[a] filthy, overcrowded cell . . . might be tolerable for a few days and
   intolerably cruel for weeks or months.”).
          As to duration, none of the deprivations Jarvis complains of lasted
   more than a week. According to Jarvis’s administrative grievances, he
   received proper bedding within three days, toiletries within four days, and
   access to showers and properly functioning plumbing within seven days.
   What’s more, nothing in the record suggests that prison officials subjected
   inmates to these conditions longer than needed to restore order in the main
   penitentiary; this was an emergency situation and not one where Jarvis was
   being penalized or the like. This is particularly important. As instructed by
   the Supreme Court, we will not second-guess prison officials’ decisions—
   even “restrictive and [] harsh” ones, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
   (1981),—that are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,”
   Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). As to severity, none of these
   temporary deprivations rose to the level of extreme, inhumane conditions,
   particularly in light of their short duration. See Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661,
   665–66, 69 (5th Cir. 1971) (short-term solitary confinement without full
   bedding not severe); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 106 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996)
   (short-term lack of showers and sheets not severe); Davis, 157 F.3d at 1006

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   (same as to unsanitary cell); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 & n.5 (5th
   Cir. 1989) (similar).
          Because Jarvis has failed to establish that the conditions of
   confinement violated the Constitution, we conclude that Defendants are
   entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on this claim.
                     2. Excessive Force
          Jarvis next contends that the emergency response team used excessive
   force against him. To determine whether Jarvis has established a claim in
   this context, we ask whether the Defendants used force “in a good-faith
   effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
   cause harm.” Byrd v. Harrell, 48 F.4th 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting
   Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). In answering this question, we assess the Defendants’
   subjective intent by considering the well-known Hudson factors: (1) “the
   extent of the injury suffered” by the plaintiff; (2) the need for force; (3) the
   relationship between the force needed and the amount of force ultimately
   employed; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by prison officials; and
   (5) “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Byrd,
   48 F.4th at 347 (quotation omitted).
          Jarvis alleges one incident of excessive force. His pleadings and the
   limited summary judgment evidence provide little context, but viewing the
   facts in the light most favorable to Jarvis, we discern the following events: At
   some point after the riot, “more than fifty cars” of Mississippi State
   Troopers and Mississippi Special Response Team officers arrived at M.S.P.
   Once there, the officers bound all inmates’ hands behind their backs “using
   physical force.” An unidentified officer then slammed Jarvis into the ground,
   bruising his back and chipping his tooth.
          We need not address whether the use of force as Jarvis describes
   violates the Eighth Amendment. Even assuming arguendo Jarvis could

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   establish the officers violated a constitutional right, he has failed to
   demonstrate that “right was clearly established.” Cunningham v. Castloo,
   983 F.3d 185, 190–91 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (observing
   that we may resolve the case on a single prong). To satisfy the clearly
   established prong in a situation that is not obvious, Jarvis must cite to caselaw
   that provides officials with “reasonable warning that the conduct then at
   issue violated [his] constitutional rights.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501–
   02 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). But Jarvis has simply failed to do so
   here. He does not cite to any authority establishing that the use of force in
   this context violates the Eighth Amendment. Given the facts here, in the
   absence of any precedent, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and
   summary judgment on this claim. 7
                                      III.      Conclusion

       For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM.

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           7
           Finally, we note that Jarvis asks us to assign this case to a different district judge.
   Because we are affirming, this request is moot.

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