Court Opinion

ID: 9786999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:07:56.860002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.064992
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
dissenting.
The majority concedes that eriminal defendants have no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, but it finds a statutory right, at least for indigent defendants, to the assistance of constitutionally effective counsel in those proceedings. Because I not only disagree with the majority's statutory interpretation but also consider it substantially more problematic than does the majority, I briefly register my dissent.
Unlike the majority, I believe section 21-1-104(1)(b) C.R.S. (2006), which falls within a section entitled, "Duties of public defender," authorizes the public defender to represent indigent defendants under specified cireum-stances but creates no right of representation that does not already exist. The authorization is expressly couched in terms of the state public defender's own assessment of the interests of justice and, at most, gives the public defender the discretion to act on behalf of indigent defendants in certain situations in which they lack any right to the assistance of counsel. I take issue with the majority's interpretation apparently limiting the exercise of this discretion to claims that are objectively meritorious, as judged by the trial court, and by its conclusion that the extension of such discretion to the public defender actually creates a statutory right of representation in the defendant.
Even if the possibility of assistance from the public defender could be described in some way as a statutory right to counsel, I find it extremely problematic to expand that "right" into a guaranty of constitutionally effective assistance. Although the majority looks for support from Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 887, 105 S.Ct. 830, 88 LEd.2d 821 (1985), the Supreme Court has more recently, and directly, said that "where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (paraphrasing Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982)). It also seems clear that ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during a state post-conviction proceeding is not a cognizable claim in federal post-conviction proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(D(2006). Whether a statutory duty has been fulfilled is more appropriately determined by considering the nature and scope of the duty contemplated by the statute creating it. See, eg., People v. Davis, 156 TIL2d 149, 189 IllDec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750, 757 (1998) (state statutory right to appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in post-conviction proceedings contemplates only that appointed counsel will ascertain the bases of the post-conviction petitioner's complaints, shape those complaints into appropriate legal form, and present them to the court).
Finally, I do not consider the effect of the majority's holding to be so straightforward.
*1171It is unclear to me whether the majority's rationale contemplates a right to constitutionally effective assistance only for indigent defendants, or if it would extend the same right to non-indigent defendants who hire their own counsel for post-conviction proceedings, even without a corresponding statutory right to counsel. Moreover, I do not consider the specter of post-conviction proceedings ad infinitum as insignificant or bur-denless as the majority suggests.
Unless the motion, files, and record of the case clearly establish that the alleged acts or omissions of counsel were either immaterial or were reasonable strategic choices or otherwise within the range of reasonably effective assistance, the defendant is entitled to a hearing to prove his allegations. See Ardoli-mo v. People, 69 P.3d 78, Ti-78 (Colo.2003). And with the majority's opinion today, it appears that a challenge to the effectiveness of a defendant's post-conviction counsel, taken with reasonable expedition following an unsuccessful appeal of the trial court's denial, will virtually always justify an extension of time limitations, regardless of the number of post-conviction motions previously advanced by the defendant.
Because I do not believe the defendant had any statutory right to counsel during post-conviction proceedings, I do not believe even an actual conflict of interest with the public defender would be a cognizable claim. I therefore respectfully dissent.