Court Opinion

ID: 9957731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 06:05:09.93266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:36.803419
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

TOOLES CONTRACTING GROUP, LLC,                                         UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       April 4, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                      No. 363005
                                                                       Washtenaw Circuit Court
WASHTENAW COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,                                      LC No. 17-000765-CZ

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff, Tooles Contracting Group, LLC, appeals as of right the trial court’s opinion and
order ruling that it was entitled to attorney fees of $11,396.68 and expenses of $129.54 from
defendant, Washtenaw County Road Commission, as a result of defendant’s failure to comply with
a particular request for records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq.
On appeal, plaintiff primarily argues that the trial court erred by refusing to award it attorney fees
for fees that were incurred after defendant’s disclosure, but incurred as a result of seeking fees
relating to that disclosure. In other words, plaintiff is seeking “fees for fees.” Plaintiff also argues
that, even if the trial court correctly concluded that the cutoff date for attorney fees was the date
of disclosure, the amount awarded by the trial court was erroneously low. We conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

                                              I. FACTS

        This is the third time that this case has been appealed to this Court. Briefly stated, in March
2017, plaintiff submitted several FOIA requests to defendant. One of the requests, Request 5, was
allegedly unclear, and defendant did not provide responsive records to that request. Plaintiff sued
defendant in August 2017, claiming, in relevant part, that defendant violated FOIA with respect to
Request 5. After a few months of litigation, defendant understood the scope of the request and
provided responsive records to plaintiff in April 2018. The trial court denied plaintiff’s request
for attorney fees under MCL 150.240(6) of FOIA and, following plaintiff’s appeal, this Court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of the attorney-fees claim. Thus, this
Court remanded the case to the trial court to address the parties’ competing motions for summary

                                                  -1-
disposition and then, if necessary, to consider the merits of plaintiff’s request for attorney fees.
Tooles Contracting Group, LLC v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm’n, unpublished per curiam opinion of
the Court of Appeals, issued October 3, 2019 (Docket No. 345182) (Tooles I). On remand, the
trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant, concluding, in relevant part, that
defendant did not violate FOIA with respect to Request 5. Plaintiff appealed, and this Court
reversed that conclusion and remanded to the trial court to award plaintiff attorney fees with
respect to Request 5. Tooles Contracting Group, LLC v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm’n, unpublished
per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 27, 2021 (Docket No. 354045) (Tooles
II). The trial court did so, and plaintiff has once again appealed, now arguing that the amount
awarded was insufficient.

       In Tooles II, this Court set forth the following facts:

               Tooles Group is a minority-owned contractor engaged in the business of
       preconstruction and construction services. In January 2017, the Road Commission
       submitted a request for bids on a project to construct a new service center. Tooles
       Group bid on the project and was the lowest bidder. After the Road Commission’s
       architect interviewed the four lowest bidders, the Road Commission awarded the
       $7 million contract to another contractor.

               In March 2017, counsel for Tooles Group submitted a FOIA request to the
       Road Commission. Tooles Group listed nine different requests. Request 5 asked
       for “[a]ny documents related to the Washtenaw County Road Commission’s hiring
       or utilization of Minority-owned and/or Disadvantaged Business Entities on
       Washtenaw County Road Commission Projects.” In Request 6, Tooles Group
       asked for [a]ny documents or communications that reference Tooles Contracting
       Group as a Minority-owned company.”

               The Road Commission acknowledged the request in an e-mail sent the next
       day. It stated that the request involved an “extensive amount of information” that
       would take “an extended period of time to gather.” It also anticipated that cost
       would exceed $50 and, for that reason, asserted that it would require an up-front
       payment of 50%. The Road Commission indicated that it would notify Tooles
       Group when the information was ready.

              On April 5, 2017, the Road Commission sent an e-mail indicating that it had
       completed Tooles Group’s request. It further provided the following “overview of
       information to be provided” in satisfaction of the request:

               Items 1 thru 4 – 158 pages – complete

               Item 5 – These documents do not exist

               Item 7 – 7 banker boxes of information that can be reviewed

               Item 8 – Not applicable, documents do not exist

               Item 9 – HR Manager – complete

                                                 -2-
        The Road Commission did not mention Request 6. The Road Commission
included invoices for the work and stated that Tooles Group must pay 50% of the
fees up front before it would release the requested information.

        In August 2017, Tooles Group sued the Road Commission for violating the
requirements of FOIA. Tooles Group moved for summary disposition in February
2018, and the Road Commission moved for summary disposition in March 2018.
The trial court held a hearing later in March. During the hearing, Tooles Group
identified documents that the Road Commission had to submit to the federal
government—referred to as subrecipient forms—that it obtained from the Michigan
Department of Transportation (MDOT), which, it argued, the Road Commission
should have disclosed under Request 5. The Road Commission took the position
that Request 5 did not clearly apply to the subrecipient forms. It stated that, had
Tooles Group asked for those forms, it would have provided a copy of them.

        The trial court inquired about what Tooles Group would have had to have
said if wanted those forms. The Road Commission replied:

       Well the exact same thing they said to MDOT. But—we have no
       issue with them having those forms, they already have them. The
       real issue is they’re here having filed a lawsuit, which isn’t
       necessary saying that we asked for something that they didn't ask
       for, and MDOT agrees with us, and they want all their attorneys’
       fees. . . .

       The trial court at that point clarified that it would not be awarding attorney
fees. It was only trying to be sure that Tooles Group got the documents that
everyone agreed it was legally entitled to get. The Road Commission again stated
that Tooles Group already had the documents from MDOT, but it agreed that it
could “provide them again.” The court instructed the parties to go discuss what
they wanted and come back for an order; it again related that it just wanted to get
Tooles Group any documents that it was legally entitled to get.

         In May 2018, the trial court signed an order requiring the Road Commission
to provide the subrecipient forms to Tooles Group. The order provided that the
court had taken the motions for summary disposition under advisement and that it
did not resolve any of the matters in dispute. Later that same month, Tooles Group
moved for an award of more than $90,000 in attorney fees. Tooles Group argued
that it had prevailed because the trial court ordered the Road Commission to provide
the subrecipient forms as requested in Request 5, and so was entitled to its fees.

        The trial court held a hearing in July 2018 and indicated [that] it was going
to deny the motion for attorney fees. It entered an order to that effect in August
2018. Tooles Group appealed the trial court’s decision to deny its request for
attorney fees in this Court. This Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction
to hear Tooles Group’s appeal as an appeal of right because the trial court never
entered an order resolving the parties’ competing motions for summary disposition.

                                        -3-
This Court treated the appeal as though on leave granted, but for the limited purpose
of vacating the trial court’s order denying Tooles Group’s motion for attorney fees.
This Court then remanded the case back to the trial court to address the motions for
summary disposition and conduct any further proceedings that might be necessary.
See [Tooles I].

        In April 2020, the Road Commission renewed its motion for summary
disposition. The Road Commission incorporated its arguments and documentary
support from its previous motion. The Road Commission specifically asked the
trial court to order that it did not violate FOIA by failing to turn over the
subrecipient forms because the request did not describe the public record
sufficiently to enable the Road Commission to find it. The Road Commission also
stated that it was not required to turn over any documents until the FOIA fee for the
documents that it had collected had been paid.

       In May 2020, Tooles Group renewed its motion for summary disposition.
It argued that it was entitled to summary disposition in its favor because the
undisputed evidence showed that the Road Commission failed to disclose the
subrecipient forms, which were clearly encompassed under its Request 5, and
completely failed to respond to Request 6. Tooles Group asked the trial court to
grant summary disposition in its favor and schedule an evidentiary hearing to
determine the amount of its attorney fees.

        The trial court held a hearing on the renewed motions in June 2020. Tooles
Group argued that its FOIA request sufficiently described the documents requested
to include the subrecipient forms. For that reason, it maintained that it was
undisputed that the Road Commission violated FOIA by failing to disclose the
subrecipient forms. Tooles Group also argued that its decision not to pay the fee
request did not absolve the Road Commission of its liability. It explained that the
fee request did not apply to the subrecipient forms; it only applied to the documents
responsive to Requests 1 through 4.

        The Road Commission argued that Request 5 was vague and implied that
Tooles Group wanted only documents related to programs for disadvantaged
businesses that the Road Commission itself administered. Because it did not
administer any such programs, its answer that those documents did not exist was
accurate. The Road Commission also argued that paying a fee request is also a
prerequisite that must be met before a governmental body has any duty to provide
any documents, even if the governmental entity denied in part and granted in part
the request. For that reason, it maintained that it ultimately complied with the FOIA
request, even though it initially denied that the documents existed, because it
eventually provided copies of the subrecipient forms.

        After hearing arguments, the trial court stated that it did not believe “that
this request, FOIA request, was sufficiently described to enable the Washtenaw
County Road Commission to respond about something that they don’t have, that
didn’t exist.” The court characterized the request as a “huge fishing net.” Because

                                        -4-
       the request was not “sufficient for them to respond,” the trial court determined that
       the Road Commission's initial response that the documents did not exist did not
       violate FOIA. Finally, the trial court agreed that the payment of the FOIA deposit
       was a prerequisite to the Road Commission’s obligation to disclose. Because
       Tooles Group did not pay the fee, it explained, the Road Commission could not be
       liable for its determination that there were no documents that fell under Tooles
       Group's Request 5, and the Road Commission timely rectified its error. On the
       same day, the trial court entered an order denying Tooles Group's motion for
       summary disposition, and granting the Road Commission’s motion for summary
       disposition. . . . [Tooles II, unpub op at 1-4.]

         This Court affirmed the trial court with regard to Request 6—an issue that is not relevant
for this appeal—but reversed the trial court with regard to Request 5, reasoning, in relevant part:

               As noted, Tooles Group asked the Road Commission in Request 5 to
       provide “[a]ny documents related to the Washtenaw County Road Commission's
       hiring or utilization of Minority-owned and/or Disadvantaged Business Entities on
       Washtenaw County Road Projects.” The language of the request was not
       ambiguous: it asked the Road Commission to disclose any document that has some
       relation to the Road Commission’s “hiring or utilization” of minority-owned
       businesses or businesses that are classified as disadvantaged business entities. The
       request was also sufficiently particular to limit the Road Commission’s search to a
       narrow set of documents, which should have been readily identifiable by those
       persons familiar with the hiring and utilization of minority-owned or disadvantaged
       businesses.

               The subrecipient forms identified during the litigation clearly included
       information about the Road Commission’s “hiring or utilization” of disadvantaged
       business entities. Indeed, Question 8 on the form asked the Road Commission to
       list the number of contracts that it entered into with disadvantaged business
       enterprises during the reporting period and for each period the Road Commission
       wrote that it did not enter into any such contracts. It explained that MDOT handled
       its administration of disadvantaged business entities. The fact that the Road
       Commission did not contract with disadvantaged business entities directly plainly
       implicated its utilization of such businesses.

               The trial court misapplied the law when it determined that Request 5 did not
       sufficiently describe the records sought. Consequently, it erred when it dismissed
       Tooles Group’s claim premised on the failure to disclose the subrecipient forms;
       rather, because it was undisputed that the Road Commission failed to disclose the
       subrecipient forms until after Toole Group sued, the trial court should have granted
       summary disposition in Tooles Group’s favor on that claim. [Id. at 8-9 (citations
       omitted).]

       This Court also concluded that because “Tooles Group should have prevailed as a matter
of law” with respect to Request 5, “an award of attorney fees is mandatory as to that claim.” Id.
at 10. We added: “Although the award is mandatory, Tooles Group would not be entitled to its

                                                -5-
fees associated with those other claims; instead, it may only recover its reasonable attorney fees
that it incurred litigating Request 5.” Id. Accordingly, this Court affirmed the trial court in part,
reversed in part, and remanded to that court for further proceedings. Id.

         On remand, the parties acknowledged that the trial court was required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing as to the amount of attorney fees to which plaintiff is entitled relating to
Request 5. Plaintiff asserted that its fees totaled “$230,385.02, of which $176,271.03 relate ‘to
the litigation of Request 5.’ ” Specifically, plaintiff argued that it was entitled to all attorney fees
incurred throughout this case, including on appeal, that involved Request 5. Plaintiff explained
that its attorneys billed about 568.9 hours in this case, and of that total, 433.6 hours were spent
litigating Request 5.

        Defendant responded that plaintiff could not recover attorney fees incurred after April 13,
2018, the date on which it received the records in question. Defendant noted that plaintiff did not
prevail on most issues involved in this case, including issues related to Request 6, allegedly
improper FOIA fees, failure to provide a FOIA response date, improper FOIA extension, and
objections to form of proposed orders. Defendant also argued that the attorney fees claimed by
plaintiff were excessive and unreasonable. According to defendant, “[f]or all the litigation, Tooles
obtained only 7 pages of documents which WCRC immediately provided when Tooles first raised
the issue and which confirmed what WCRC said from the beginning. This is a very humble result.”
(Emphasis in original.)

        The trial court held a hearing on the matter on April 12, 2022. At the hearing, the trial
court entertained arguments from the parties regarding the April 13, 2018 possible cutoff date for
attorney fees and concluded as follows:

              So temporally, this issue of the trial court awarding appellate fees I have
       addressed over and over for decades, and I have been instructed as such. If you
       wish to seek fees for litigation in the appellate courts, the forum to do that is the
       appellate court.

               . . . I’ve been around long enough. I’ll – sometimes the very same issue I
       will get an opinion within the same month from one panel of the Court of Appeals
       affirming the way I handled it, and another panel saying, no. You should do it a
       different way. I accept that.

                                                 ***

                The time period that I will consider in the argument and I will make a
       decision on is fees incurred on or before April 13th, 2018 when the documents in
       question were provided. You may preserve your arguments that I should have
       looked beyond that, but the Court of Appeals is certainly I think in a better position
       to determine based on their view of the application of the mandatory attorney fees
       to this particular case to enter their own award of attorney fees under the statute and
       case law.

      After the hearing, plaintiff submitted a brief arguing that it was entitled to attorney fees of
$66,760.00, which represented 169.2 hours litigating the Request 5 issue before April 13, 2018.

                                                  -6-
Defendant responded that plaintiff failed to prevail on 10 of 11 issues that it litigated before April
13, 2018, and “a discount of 60% is appropriate for Tooles’ failure to prevail on these ten issues.”

        On August 29, 2022, the trial court entered its 10-page opinion and order.1 First, the trial
court stated that April 13, 2018, is the appropriate cutoff date for attorney fees because MCL
15.240(6) only allows for attorney fees related to achieving production of the public records.
Second, the trial court concluded that attorney Schenk was entitled to an hourly rate of $301.67
per hour, as that was the average median hourly rate for an attorney with his experience, practice
area, and location. Similarly, the trial court concluded that attorney Kwiecien was entitled to an
hourly rate of $282.33, given the same factors. This established a baseline total of $45,586.71.

     Third, the trial court applied the factors identified in Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573; 321
NW2d 653 (1982), to determine a reasonable fee:

       (1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney/attorneys

       This factor is analyzed above and the hourly rate was determined using data from
       the 2020 Economics of Law Practice report . . . .

       (2) the skill, time, and labor involved;

       Per Plaintiff’s summary of the work experience of Mr. Schenk, a FOIA request and
       the filing of motions to secure the information from the denial of a FOIA request
       would not be deemed novel or difficult. Any increased degree of difficulty is offset
       by the higher fees charged for Mr. Schenk due to his experience. . . .

       (3) the amount in question and the results achieved;

       The total amount of fees requested by Plaintiff is $66,760.00. Many tasks were
       billed by both attorneys assigned to the case. Plaintiff received the information
       requested from Defendant through FOIA on April 13, 2018. It should be noted that
       Plaintiff also received the requested information via a FOIA request submitted to
       the Michigan Department of Transportation prior to receiving the information from
       Defendant. . . .

       (4) the difficulty of the case;

       Per Plaintiff’s summary of the work experience of Mr. Schenk, a FOIA request and
       the filing of motions to secure the information from the denial of a FOIA request

1
 The original opinion and order was entered on August 29, 2022, and the trial court entered an
amended opinion and order on January 13, 2023, which corrected a couple of minor mistakes. We
quote from the latter opinion and order.
We note that, contrary to defendant’s argument, we have jurisdiction over this appeal because the
trial court was permitted to amend its original opinion and order to correct minor mistakes under
MCR 7.208(C).

                                                  -7-
       would not be deemed novel or difficult. Any increased degree of difficulty is offset
       by the higher fees charged for Mr. Schenk due to his experience. . . .

       (5) the expenses incurred,

       Plaintiff claims expenses totaling $518.15 through April, 2018. . . . The Court feel
       the same reduction of 75% of the fees is representation of the costs related to the
       litigation of Request 5 pursuant to the directive set out in the Court of Appeals
       opinion. . . .

       (6) the nature of the professional relationship with the client;

       The attorney-client relationship began in December, 2015. This case was filed less
       than two years later. Plaintiff testified at the evidentiary hearing that their client
       will not be impacted by any decision or award of fees in this case due to the
       agreement between the client and the firm that attorney fees are limited to the
       recovery in this action. . . .

       The trial court also discussed the eight factors identified in MRPC 1.5, which overlapped
with the Wood factors quoted above.

       The trial court then provided its analysis of the overall issue, stating as follows:

               Plaintiff litigated eleven different arguments for reimbursement of attorney
       fees. However, the Court of Appeals found a violation only as to Request 5. The
       Court of Appeals specifically limited the recovery of attorney fees in this case the
       FOIA Request 5. Plaintiff argues that – even considering the directive of the Court
       of Appeals that the fees be limited to work done as to FOIA Request 5 – that there
       is only a slight reduction in the attorney fees claimed by Plaintiff. Per Plaintiff’s
       Fee Analysis, a mere reduction of 18 hours (or 9.6% of the claimed 169.2 hours
       billed from June 15, 2017 through April 13, 2018) is appropriate.

                This Court does not agree. Defendant correctly establishes that Plaintiff
       dedicated a considerable amount of time to the remaining ten issues articulated by
       Plaintiff. Considerable time was dedicated to all the requests as established by the
       arguments contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motion for Summary
       Disposition. Plaintiff clearly dedicated a large and measurable amount of time to
       litigating numerous other claims then subsequently failed to clearly and concisely
       separate work done for the advancement of Request 5. Instead, Plaintiff believes
       this Court should disregard the obvious and award full fee reimbursement on all
       hours worked by attributing a majority of the hours to litigation relating to Request
       5.

                                               ***

               Per the billing records presented by Plaintiff, Mr. Kwiecien worked 123.1
       hours on this case and Mr. Schenk worked 36 hours on this case. Defendant argues
       that a 60% reduction in the billable hours established by Plaintiff seems reasonable.

                                                 -8-
       This Court finds this calculation generous. After evaluating the records presented
       regarding the billable hours in this case, this court finds that a reasonable number
       of hours should be reduced by 75% given the multiple issues argued by Plaintiff in
       this case and the directive from the Court of Appeals that reimbursement be limited
       to Request 5.

        Accordingly, the trial court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to $11,396.68 in attorney fees,
which it calculated by multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours expended in
this case ($45,586.71), and then reducing that figure by 75%. Finally, the trial court concluded
that plaintiff was not entitled to additional damages under MCL 15.240(7) because defendant did
not arbitrarily and capriciously violate FOIA.

       Plaintiff now appeals.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “[T]he proper interpretation and application of FOIA is a question of law that we review
de novo.” Rataj v City of Romulus, 306 Mich App 735, 747; 858 NW2d 116 (2014). “We review
for clear error the trial court’s factual findings underlying its application of the FOIA.” Mich Open
Carry, Inc v Dep’t of State Police, 330 Mich App 614, 621; 950 NW2d 484 (2019). “A finding is
clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was made.” Id. “We review an award of attorney fees to a prevailing
plaintiff in an action under the FOIA for an abuse of discretion.” Messenger v Ingham Co Pros,
232 Mich App 633, 647; 591 NW2d 393 (1998). See also Mich Tax Mgt Servs Co v City of Warren,
437 Mich 506, 507; 473 NW2d 263 (1991) (“When awarding attorney fees under the FOIA, the
trial court must determine the amount that is reasonable. The standard for reviewing the trial
court's determination is whether the court abused its discretion.”). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the decision results in an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.” Jilek v
Stockson (On Remand), 297 Mich App 663, 665; 825 NW2d 358 (2012) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

                                       III. CUTOFF DATE

       Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by ruling that it was not entitled to attorney fees
incurred after April 13, 2018. We conclude that, although the trial court could have ruled
otherwise, it was not an abuse of discretion to limit recovery to that date.

        “Under the FOIA, an individual has the right to inspect, copy, or receive copies of a public
record after providing the public body’s FOIA coordinator with a ‘written request that describes a
public record sufficiently to enable the public body to find the public record . . . .’ ” Detroit Free
Press, Inc v City of Southfield, 269 Mich App 275, 280-281; 713 NW2d 28 (2005), quoting MCL
15.233(1). “Consistent with the FOIA’s underlying policies, a public body is required to grant full
disclosure of its records, unless they are specifically exempt under MCL 15.243.” Id. at 281. “In
court, the burden is on the public body to justify its denial.” Id.

        When a public body denies a request for records, the requesting person may file a civil
action under MCL 15.240, which provides, in relevant part:

                                                 -9-
             (1) If a public body makes a final determination to deny all or a portion of
      a request, the requesting person may do 1 of the following at his or her option:

                                              ***

              (b) Commence a civil action in the circuit court, or if the decision of a state
      public body is at issue, the court of claims, to compel the public body’s disclosure
      of the public records within 180 days after a public body’s final determination to
      deny a request.

                                              ***

              (6) If a person asserting the right to inspect, copy, or receive a copy of all
      or a portion of a public record prevails in an action commenced under this section,
      the court shall award reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements. If the
      person or public body prevails in part, the court may, in its discretion, award all or
      an appropriate portion of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements. The
      award shall be assessed against the public body liable for damages under subsection
      (7).

              (7) If the court determines in an action commenced under this section that
      the public body has arbitrarily and capriciously violated this act by refusal or delay
      in disclosing or providing copies of a public record, the court shall order the public
      body to pay a civil fine of $1,000.00, which shall be deposited into the general fund
      of the state treasury. The court shall award, in addition to any actual or
      compensatory damages, punitive damages in the amount of $1,000.00 to the person
      seeking the right to inspect or receive a copy of a public record. The damages shall
      not be assessed against an individual, but shall be assessed against the next
      succeeding public body that is not an individual and that kept or maintained the
      public record as part of its public function.

        At issue here is MCL 15.240(6). Our Supreme Court recently summarized the well-
established caselaw concerning this subsection as follows:

             [U]nder MCL 15.240(6), when a party “prevails,” the court is required to
      award the party reasonable attorney fees. On the other hand, when a party only
      “prevails in part,” then the court may, in its discretion, award all or an appropriate
      portion” of a reasonable fee.

              We have explained that to “prevail” under MCL 15.240(6), a court must
      conclude that the action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of
      public records, and that the action had a substantial causative effect on the delivery
      of the information to the plaintiff. Courts should also consider whether the party
      obtained everything it initially sought. Thus, a court’s analysis of whether the
      plaintiff prevailed considers three fundamental questions: (1) Was the action
      reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the records? (2) Did the action
      actually have the causative effect of delivering the information? And (3) did the
      plaintiff obtain everything it initially sought? [Woodman v Dep’t of Corrections,

                                               -10-
       ___ Mich ___, ___; ___NW2d ___ (Docket Nos. 163382 & 163383); slip op at 10-
       11 (cleaned up).]

        In other words, “a plaintiff ‘prevails’ in the action so as to be entitled to a mandatory award
of costs and fees where he is forced into litigation and is successful with respect to the central issue
that the requested materials were subject to disclosure under the FOIA . . . .” Thomas v City of
New Baltimore, 254 Mich App 196, 205; 657 NW2d 530 (2002) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

        Release of the requested records by the public body during litigation renders the substantive
FOIA claim moot. See State News v Mich State Univ, 481 Mich 692, 704 n 25; 753 NW2d 20
(2008) (“Of course, release of the requested public record by the public body would render the
FOIA appeal moot because there would no longer be a controversy requiring judicial resolution.”).
“However, the mere fact that [a] plaintiff’s substantive claim under the FOIA was rendered moot
by disclosure of the records after plaintiff commenced the circuit court action is not determinative
of [the] plaintiff’s entitlement to fees and costs under MCL 15.240(6).” Amberg v City of
Dearborn, 497 Mich 28, 33; 859 NW2d 674 (2014) (cleaned up). “Although a party may be
entitled to attorney fees when his or her action is rendered moot by subsequent disclosure, such
entitlement is still based on proof of an underlying FOIA violation.” Cramer v Village of Oakley,
316 Mich App 60, 70; 890 NW2d 895 (2016) (citations omitted), vacated in part on other grounds,
500 Mich 964 (2017).

        The underlying question here is whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees incurred after
April 13, 2018, the date on which the requested records were disclosed, to litigate whether attorney
fees are warranted under FOIA.

         Neither this Court nor our Supreme Court has directly answered that question. In Meredith
Corp v City of Flint, 256 Mich App 703; 671 NW2d 101 (2003), which was relied upon by the
trial court in this case, this Court stated that “as long as an action for disclosure of public records
is initiated pursuant to the FOIA, the prevailing party’s entitlement to an award of reasonable
attorney fees, costs, and disbursements includes all such fees, costs, and disbursements related to
achieving production of the public records.” Id. at 715. The most straightforward implication of
this statement is that attorney fees incurred after disclosure are not related to “achieving
production” of records and, thus, are not recoverable. However, the statement also may be
reasonably understood as requiring an award of attorney fees for litigation that is, in a broad sense,
“related to” production of records. And, in this case, the post-production litigation was “related
to” that production of records identified in Request 5.

        In Swickard v Wayne Co Med Examiner, 196 Mich App 98; 492 NW2d 497 (1992), the
plaintiff filed a delayed motion for attorney fees after prevailing on appeal as to the merits of his
FOIA claim, which the trial court granted. Id. at 100. The defendant appealed, and this Court
affirmed, reasoning that MCL 15.240 “does not impose a time limit upon a prevailing party’s
request for attorney fees.” Id. at 102. In addition, this Court reasoned as follows:

              Plaintiff requests that this Court remand the case to the trial court for a
       determination of the additional amount of attorney fees and costs incurred in this
       appeal. Plaintiff has belatedly filed an affidavit in connection with those attorney

                                                 -11-
       fees, which we ordered stricken as an expansion of the record below. We decline
       to remand, because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that prosecution of this appeal
       was necessary to, and had a causative effect on, the delivery of or access to the
       documents that were the substantive material obtained. Further, we find that the
       appeal was not a continuation of the process started below that had any causative
       effect on the disclosure. This appeal would have been unnecessary had the more
       appropriate course of action been pursued with regard to the attorney fees and costs
       during the preceding circuit court, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court litigation
       in the underlying action. [Id. at 102-103 (citation omitted).]

        Swickard includes language that may support either party in this case. On one hand, the
sentence, “We decline to remand, because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that prosecution of
this appeal was necessary to, and had a causative effect on, the delivery of or access to the
documents that were the substantive material obtained,” supports defendant because none of the
post-April 2018 proceedings had a causative effect on delivery of the documents identified in
Request 5. On the other hand, the sentence, “Further, we find that the appeal was not a continuation
of the process started below that had any causative effect on the disclosure,” supports plaintiff
because at least some of the post-April 2018 proceedings were a continuation of the process that
resulted in disclosure.

        In In re Sloan Estate, 212 Mich App 357; 538 NW2d 47 (1995), this Court concluded that
under the since-repealed Revised Probate Code, a trial court was not authorized to allow
“compensation for the ordinary fees and costs arising out of the need to establish and defend a
petition for attorney fees.” Id. at 364. This Court reasoned that “the ordinary fees and costs
incurred in establishing and defending a fee petition are inherent in the normal course of doing
business as an attorney, and the estate may not be diminished to pay those fees and costs.” Id. at
363. In re Sloan Estate thus suggests that “fees for fees” may not be awarded. In other words, In
re Sloan Estate suggests that attorney fees incurred to establish statutory entitlement to attorney
fees may not themselves be awarded. However, that case involved the Revised Probate Code, not
a public-interest statute such as FOIA.

         The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that
“fees for fees” are recoverable in a federal FOIA action. See Hardy v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, 293 F Supp 3d 17, 32 (D DC, 2017) (“The law is settled in this circuit
that hours reasonably devoted to a request for fees are compensable.”) (cleaned up). However,
courts in that circuit “must . . . withhold fees on fees where the plaintiff needlessly prolongs
litigation.” Electronic Privacy Info Ctr v Dep’t of Homeland Security, 197 F Supp 3d 290, 297 (D
DC, 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Rosenfeld v United States Dep’t of
Justice, 903 F Supp 2d 859, 866 n 5 (ND Cal, 2012) (explaining that, in a FOIA case, “a court may
reduce the amount of hours used to calculate a fee award . . . if the hours expended are deemed
excessive or otherwise unnecessary”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). These cases suggest
that the trial court in this case was not statutorily prohibited from awarding such fees, or even that
it generally was required to award such fees. But see Weatherhead v United States, 112 F Supp
2d 1058 (ED Wash, 2000) (explaining that the FOIA plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees
incurred post-disclosure, given that “[a] district court has the discretion to disallow any fees for
time spent litigating the case after the last benefit won from the defendant, because the expenditure

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of such time is equivalent to expending time litigating particular claims that are unrelated to the
relief ultimately obtained”) (cleaned up).2

        We need not resolve whether MCL 15.204(6) presumptively requires or prohibits an award
of attorney fees incurred post-disclosure to establish entitlement to fees in the first instance. Even
applying the standard established by the D.C. Circuit, which is more clearly favorable to plaintiff
than the cases cited by plaintiff on appeal, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this
particular case. Plaintiff’s post-disclosure presentation of the issues to the trial court and this Court
has, in our view, needlessly protracted this litigation. Tooles I remanded the case to the trial court
to resolve “the parties’ competing motions for summary disposition and [award] any further relief
that may be warranted.” Tooles I, unpub op at 1. At that point, on remand, the trial court should
have ruled that the competing motions for summary disposition were moot and simply decided the
attorney-fees issue. See Amberg, 497 Mich at 33.3 Instead, the parties argued the merits of the
motion for summary disposition, and the trial court, understandably, resolved the merits of the
motion. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court, arguing that the trial court erred by denying its
motion for summary disposition. This Court consequently issued Tooles II, which affirmed the
trial court’s denial of the motion with respect to Request 6 but reversed with respect to Request 5.
Tooles II, unpub op at 4-9. Arguably, the Tooles II panel could have ruled that the motion was
moot, rather than addressing the merits.4 Simply put, plaintiff has repeatedly presented a moot
issue to the trial court and this Court.

         Moreover, the focus on whether defendant violated FOIA largely misses the mark as to
plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney fees. In Woodman, as noted, our Supreme Court recently
addressed entitlement to attorney fees under MCL 15.240(6). Nowhere in that opinion did the
Court reference a violation of FOIA as being a requirement for a recovery of attorney fees under
that statute. While the absence of a FOIA violation might suggest that “the action [did not] actually
have the causative effect of delivering the information,” see Woodman, ___ Mich at ___; slip op
at 11, it simply is part of the “prevailing party” analysis required by MCL 15.240(6). For example,
in Arabo v Mich Gaming Control Bd, 310 Mich App 370; 872 NW2d 223 (2015), this Court
concluded that the defendant did not violate FOIA because the plaintiff failed to pay the statutory
deposit, and then concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees: “In light of
plaintiff's nonpayment, a lawsuit was not reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the

2
  “In contexts where Michigan and federal statutory law track one another, this Court has found
federal precedent to be persuasive.” Wilcox v Wheatley, 342 Mich App 551, 560; 995 NW2d 594
(2022). 5 USC 552(a)(4)(E)(i) of the federal FOIA provides that “[t]he court may assess against
the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any
case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.” This language is
similar to MCL 15.240(6).
3
 Plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition concerned Requests 5 and 6, as well as other relatively
minor issues. As this Court explained in Tooles II, plaintiff’s complaint did not plead a FOIA
violation with respect to Request 6, and Request 5 was satisfied in 2018. Tooles II, unpub op at
2-5. Thus, there was nothing left to resolve as to the motion for summary disposition.
4
    See Cramer v Village of Oakley, 500 Mich 964, 964 (2017).

                                                  -13-
required documents, and, therefore, plaintiff could not maintain an action for damages under [MCL
15.240] of the FOIA.” Id. at 406. In other words, whether a public body violated FOIA may be
part of the analysis for determining whether a requesting person is a “prevailing party” under MCL
15.240(6), but it is not an independent consideration. Accordingly, whether defendant violated
FOIA in 2017 may be a relevant consideration for determining whether plaintiff is entitled to
attorney fees under MCL 150.240(6), but that issue has obscured the underlying analysis required
by statute.

        To summarize, the standard of review for an award of attorney fees under FOIA is abuse
of discretion. See Messenger, 232 Mich App at 647; Mich Tax Mgt Servs Co, 437 Mich at 507.
There is no Michigan caselaw providing that the trial court is either required to award “fees for
fees” or prohibited from awarding such fees, which suggests that the default principle is that an
award of such fees remains within the trial court’s discretion. Here, given the extended procedural
history of this case described above, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to award plaintiff attorney fees incurred after April 13, 2018, because plaintiff was largely
responsible for prolonging the litigation. See Electronic Privacy Info Ctr, 197 F Supp 3d at 297.5

                              IV. ATTORNEY-FEES REDUCTION

        Plaintiff briefly argues that the trial court erred by reducing its attorney-fee award by 75%.
According to plaintiff, “[t]he trial court failed to consider that FOIA 5 was the dominant issue in
this case, and the most complex, and that the vast majority of the complaint and motion practice
was spent on that issue.”6 We disagree.

       In Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269; 884 NW2d 257 (2016), our Supreme
Court set forth the following framework to determine an award of attorney fees under the no-fault
act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.:

5
  Plaintiff observes that in Tooles II, this Court stated that plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees
incurred “to litigate whether the Road Commission wrongfully denied Request 5.” Tooles II,
unpub op at 9. Plaintiff argues that under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the trial court was required
to follow this ruling and award its attorney fees incurred at least through the Tooles II appeal, when
it was finally decided that defendant violated FOIA with respect to Request 5. In our view, plaintiff
overemphasizes a single statement in Tooles II to elevate it to “law of the case” status. The law-
of-the-case doctrine provides that “if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and
remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate
court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts
remain materially the same.” Rott v Rott, 508 Mich 274, 286; 972 NW2d 789 (2021) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Here, the “legal question” that Tooles II decided was that plaintiff is
a “prevailing party” under MCL 15.240(6) and entitled to attorney fees. The scope of the amount
of attorney fees to be awarded to plaintiff was not addressed or decided by Tooles II.
6
 Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court’s analysis of the Wood and MRPC 1.5 factors for
determining a “reasonable” attorney fee.

                                                -14-
       [W]e hold that when determining the reasonableness of attorney fees awarded under
       [MCL 500.3148(1)], a trial court must begin its analysis by determining the
       reasonable hourly rate customarily charged in the locality for similar services. The
       trial court must then multiply that rate by the reasonable number of hours expended
       in the case to arrive at a baseline figure. Thereafter, the trial court must consider
       all of the remaining Wood and MRPC 1.5(a) factors to determine whether an up or
       down adjustment is appropriate. [Id. at 281 (footnotes omitted).]

        “These factors are not exclusive, and the trial court may consider any additional relevant
factors.” Id. at 282.

         In this case, the trial court followed the Pirgu framework and determined that the awardable
attorney fees should be reduced by 75%. After reviewing the lower-court record of the proceedings
before April 13, 2018, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
It is true that the primary legal issue identified in the seven-page complaint concerned Request 5.
Further, most of the March 29, 2018 motion hearing concerned Request 5. On the other hand,
however, in plaintiff’s 20-page brief in support of its February 7, 2018 motion for summary
disposition, only about 3½ pages were dedicated to Request 5. Six-and-a-half pages were
dedicated to other legal issues, and the remaining pages addressed other aspects of the filing, such
as a statement of facts and a request for relief. Briefs exchanged by the parties shortly thereafter
reflected similar ratios of the issues discussed. Moreover, on April 4, 2018, plaintiff filed a couple
of relatively minor objections to a proposed order submitted by defendant. Those objections were
rejected by the trial court at a later motion hearing.

        Simply put, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that plaintiff “dedicated a
considerable amount of time” to issues beyond Request 5. The trial court’s determination that a
reduction of 75% is warranted was supported by the record and did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.

                                        V. CONCLUSION

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award plaintiff attorney fees
incurred after April 13, 2018, the date of disclosure. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by
awarding plaintiff attorney fees of $11,396.68. We affirm.

                                                              /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                              /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

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