Court Opinion

ID: 9665200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:42:34.602333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:13.889740
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S motion for rehearing.
DAVIDSON, Judge.
At appellant’s insistence we have again examined the complaints registered against the indictment, and we remain convinced of the correctness of our original opinion.
We do not agree with appellant in his contention that a variance exists between the allegations of the indictment and the proof — that is, that the indictment alleged interference with á lawful vocation at Weaver Iron Works, Inc., while the proof shows' interference with a lawful vocation at Lawrence Warehouse Company. We again call attention to the testimony of the injured party, Fennell, to the effect that he was employed and paid by the Weaver Iron Works. This testimony supported the allegations of the indictment and was authorized to be accepted and believed by the jury.
Appellant contends that the statute (1621b, Vernon’s P. C.), *555as here applied, constitutes a denial to him of equal protection of the law. This contention is based upon the proposition that a discrimination is made between a union and a non-union man under the same state of facts or circumstances.
This prosecution is based upon Sec. 1. of Art. 1621b, P. C., which has no reference to labor unions or members thereof or to labor disputes. By that statute, all persons violating its provisions are guilty. No exception is contained in the statute. The fact that this prosecution arose out of a labor dispute or involved union and non-union individuals could not affect the constitutionality of the statute or render the application here made a denial of equal protection of the law.
In Ex Parte Frye, 143 Tex. Cr. R. 9, 156 S. W. 2d 531, we held that the intent to prevent one from engaging in a lawful vocation is an essential element of the offense for which appellant has been here convicted — and this, notwithstanding the fact that such intent is not expressly written into the statute. The correctness of that conclusion finds support by the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case of Morisette v. United States, 96 L. Ed. (advance opinion), 180, where in a Federal statute, intent was held to be an essential element although not specifically set forth therein.
We held, originally, the allegation of intent to be sufficiently alleged in the indictment by the use of the words, “attempted to prevent the said Henry Fennell from engaging in a lawful vocation.” In addition to what was there said, the conclusion reached finds support in the case of Fowler v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. R. 500, 148 S. W. 2d 576, where a conviction for assault with intent to rape was sustained upon an indictment alleging that the accused did “attempt to ravish and have carnal knowledge of the said” female. It was there held that the use of the word, “attempt,” in lieu of the word, “intent,” was sufficient to charge assault with intent to rape, upon the theory that the only distinction between an “intent” and an “attempt” to do a thing is that the former implies the purpose only, while the latter implies both purpose and actual effort to carry that purpose into execution.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion approved by the court.