Court Opinion

ID: 9677622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:56:23.962028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:57.139960
License: Public Domain

TATE, Justice
(concurring).
The writer concurs in the majority opinion. He feels, however, that such opinion grounds too broadly its decision of the zoning issue. He further feels that it may be appropriate to discuss more fully the question of the interest or standing of the Parish of Jefferson to question the constitutionality of the statute authorizing the state agency to purchase the “House of the Good Shepherd” in Jefferson Parish and to establish juvenile correctional facilities on the site.
As to the zoning issue, I do not feel it appropriate for this court to hold that a state statute, ipso facto, displaces a local zoning ordinance. It may well be that, by virtue of a statute with this specific intent, local zoning may be set aside to permit operation of a state institution in the vicinity. I doubt, however, that, here, the legislature specifically intended to set aside zoning ordinances of the locality, where it merely authorized purchase of the institution in question. However, the operation of these facilities by the state for continued similar non-conforming use as permitted the predecessor in title is not prohibited by the local zoning ordinance. The zoning issues should be decided on such basis, not the broader grounds relied upon by the majority.
The Parish has sufficient interest or standing to sue to prevent a violation of its zoning ordinance. La.R.S. 33:4728; 3 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, Section 66-1 (3d ed. 1971).
The question was raised sua sponte whether the parish also had sufficient “real *1093and actual interest”, La. CCP Art. 681, to bring this action to enjoin the purchase on the grounds of the unconstitutionality of the enabling act. This latter is a more difficult issue.
A taxpayer has been held to have sufficient interest or right of action as to authorize his bringing suit to enjoin payment of funds under an allegedly unconstitutional statute. Carso v. Board of Liquidation, 205 La. 368, 17 So.2d 358 (1944). A local government entity has enough interest to bring suit to enjoin as unconstitutional the enforcement of a statute changing its form of government. City of Gretna v. Bailey, 141 La. 625, 75 So. 491. See also State ex rel Tulane Homestead Ass’n v. Montgomery, 185 La. 777, 171 So. 28 (1936), and Annotation 116 A.L.R. 1037 (1938). Here, however, we have a parish bringing suit on behalf of its taxpayers, Art. XIII (but not the taxpayers themselves), to enjoin as unconstitutional the enforcement of a statute that affects its citizens (but not the parish government, aside from zoning).
Under all of the present circumstances, in my opinion, the plaintiff parish does have sufficient “real and actual interest” to assert its demand, on behalf of its citizens, that the statute in question be enjoined as unconstitutionally affecting the property and people of the parish. In this determination, I take into consideration: (a) that the parish does admittedly have sufficient interest to bring the related cause of action concerning the local zoning ordinance ; (b) that the statute in question (Act 452 of 1970) specifically affected Jefferson Parish alone, in that it authorized a state agency to purchase the present juvenile detention facilities in Jefferson Parish and to establish “on said site” the juvenile correctional institution; (c) that, by such holding, we permit speedy review of the substantial contentions of an active and justiciable controversy, thus avoiding a multiplicity of actions and further litigation by artificial parties raising the same contentions we can decide here. See: 17 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section 49.57 (3d Ed. 1968); 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 2186b(2) and 2190; Jaffe, Standing in Public Actions, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 1265 (1961) and Standing in Private Actions, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 255, 305 (1961).
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.