Court Opinion

ID: 9856488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:48:18.015023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:50.493855
License: Public Domain

Foster, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — While I agree that the appellants are entitled to a new trial against the respondent bank, I cannot agree that it was proper to submit the issue of contributory negligence of the appellant Larry Albin and his deceased father. Nor can I agree that the case was properly dismissed as to the respondent Columbia County.
The court correctly decides that
“A county is obligated to keep its roads in a reasonably safe condition for ordinary travel. ...”
In my view, it is contrary to public policy to decide that one is contributorily negligent in using a dedicated public highway. Such was the decision in Osborne v. Galusha, 143 Wash. 127, 254 Pac. 1086. That accident occurred during a storm in a mountainous region which was heavily timbered. Judge Bridges, for the court, said:
“We think the court was right when he informed the jury that the owner of the stage had a right to assume that the highway was reasonably safe for travel. . . .
“. . . It certainly cannot be held that one driving on the highway, even though he be driving a bus carrying passengers for hire, must be active in looking out for trees off of the right of way which might fall, or go off of the road to investigate any such trees to determine their character. If that duty rests upon any person, it is upon the authorities whose duty it is to maintain the road, and not upon those who travel it. . . . ”
Neither the state nor the county can avoid liability for the fall of the tree because it stood upon private property abutting the highway when the tree falls on the highway under the conditions shown by this record. Inabinett v. State Highway Department, 196 S. C. 117, 12 S. E. (2d) 848; Messinger v. State, 183 Misc. 811, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 506.
*756Nor can I agree that the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in O’Brien v. United States, 275 F. (2d) 696, is authority' for anything. State law is decided by state courts only. Even in diversity cases, the United States courts are bound by the decisions of the state courts on questions of state law. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817, 114 A. L. R. 1487. And when there is no authoritative state decision, as was the circumstance in O’Brien v. United States, supra, United States courts only guess at what the state law might be. In re Stoddard’s Estate, ante p. 263, 373 P. (2d) 116.
O’Brien sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), which provides in substance that the United States shall be liable for negligence if a private person would be liable according to the law of the place where the accident occurred. Oregon law controlled. The opinion states that there is no Oregon case in point. Consequently, the court was only speculating as to what the Supreme Court of Oregon would declare the law of that state to be. But here, we are not left to speculate as to the liability of an owner, after the lateral support afforded by the forest in its natural state is removed, because that is settled by Sullivan v. Mountain States Power Co., 139 Ore. 282, 9 P. (2d) 1038, in which the Supreme Court of Oregon declared the Oregon law to be as follows:
“The defendant argues that a rule of law which would require power companies to fell all trees within striking distance of their transmission lines would work a great hardship in a state like ours where trees grow 200 feet tall. But the situation before us does not demand consideration of such a possible rule because it will be observed that the tree which caused this fire is readily distinguishable from the ordinary tree which is likely to be found adjacent to transmission lines. It was a sapling which, having grown tall when surrounded by other trees, was left exposed to the prevailing high wind. Its supporting trees had been removed by logging operations two years previously; in fact, before the high tension line was installed. Moreover, according to the defendant’s answer, this tree ‘had been greatly weakened’ by the logging operations and was ‘likely *757to fall.’ Its distance from the wires was somewhere between 20 and 50 feet. These being the circumstances, it appears to us that the evidence presented a proper basis for a finding that the exercise of due care demanded that the defendant should trim this tree, insulate its adjacent wires, set another pole for the support of its wires, or take some other precaution to protect the property of adjoining owners from danger. We have not overlooked the fact that the defendant’s superintendent testified that he inspected the right of way every time he passed along this road, but even this testimony did not demand a ruling in its favor upon the motion for a directed verdict. The jury heard the testimony of the defendant’s witnesses wherein they swore it was the practice of power companies to remove trees that endangered their lines wherever it was possible to do so. The degree of diligence which this practice demanded, and which was necessary to constitute the exercise of due care, was, partially at least, a question of fact for settlement by the jury’s verdict: Shearman and Redfield on the Law of Negligence (6th Ed.), § 53.”
Accord: Beresford v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 45 Cal. (2d) 738, 290 P. (2d) 498, 54 A. L. R. (2d) 910; Irelan-Yuba Gold Quartz Mining Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 18 Cal. (2d) 557, 116 P. (2d) 611.
Nor can I assent to the dismissal of respondent Columbia County. The liability of the county under the evidence presented a question for the jury’s determination. There is both evidence of actual notice to the county, and a jury would be justified in inferring in addition that the county had constructive notice.
There was evidence that the wind velocity at the time and place in question averaged from 30 to 35 miles per hour with gusts from 40 to 50 miles per hour and that such winds could be expected every winter. Heavy forests reduce the ground velocity of the wind, but the removal of lateral support by clear-cut logging increases the exposure of isolated trees to higher wind velocities, and when snags are left standing adjacent to public highways a man-made hazard to the lawful users of such highways is created. Safety standards for logging operations require the removal of snags when the merchantable timber is logged.
*758The tract had been logged, and the logging had been completed three weeks prior to the fatal occurrence. Three dead trees or snags were left standing. The tree in question was 95 feet in height and stood only 43 feet from the center of the roadway and but 23 feet from the right of way. There is abundant proof that it was dead. County road crews worked in the vicinity during the logging operations. A deputy sheriff cut wood there in that interval and knew that the tract had been logged and that the tree in question was dead.
During the hunting season, Nimrods from far and near are attracted to the Blue Mountains because of the elk. Annually, news dispatches of hunters being trapped in this area are commonplace. There is abundant evidence that the Skyline Drive is well traveled, especially so during the open season for elk.
Under the tests laid down by the court, the evidence of actual notice to the county of the hazard created by recent logging presented a question for the jury and not for the court to decide. The completion of extensive logging operations three weeks prior to the accident was a sufficient circumstance to present a jury question on the constructive notice test.
Appellants are entitled to a new trial against Columbia County.
Finley, C. J., Rosellini, and Hunter, JJ., concur with Foster, J.
December 13, 1962. Petition for rehearing denied.