Court Opinion

ID: 9939337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 20:02:58.355605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:59.836233
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/24 P. v. Pal CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097506

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 22FE006693)

           v.

 VINESH PAL,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Vinesh Pal contends the trial court made three errors in sentencing him
for second degree burglary, driving a stolen rental truck without consent, and receiving
the stolen rental truck: (1) the trial court abused its discretion under Penal Code section
1385, subdivision (c) by imposing two alleged sentence enhancements; (2) the court
ordered defendant to pay an unauthorized amount of restitution for repairing damage that
was not caused by defendant’s conduct; and (3) an error in the abstract of judgment must
be corrected (statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated).
         We conclude: (1) the prosecution alleged and the trial court imposed only one
enhancement, so the mitigating circumstance in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) does
not apply; (2) defendant forfeited the argument that his conduct did not cause the damage

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for which the court ordered restitution; and (3) the trial court has already corrected the
error defendant identified in the abstract of judgment.
       In our review of the case, however, we have determined that defendant’s sentence
is unauthorized because the trial court stayed punishment for the wrong offense under
section 654. We will modify the judgment to correct the error and order the trial court to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the correction. As modified, we
affirm the judgment.

                       FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
       A jury found defendant guilty of second degree burglary, driving a stolen rental
truck without consent, and receiving the stolen rental truck. In a bifurcated court trial, the
trial court found that defendant had previously been convicted of taking or driving a
vehicle without consent and had received the stolen rental truck while released from
custody prior to trial on the burglary charge. In considering an appropriate sentence, the
trial court also found three aggravating circumstances applied.
       The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years for driving the
rental truck without consent, two years for the section 12022.1 enhancement, and eight
months for the second degree burglary, for a total sentence of six years eight months in
jail. The court also imposed an upper term sentence of four years for receiving stolen
property and stayed this portion of the sentence pursuant to section 654. The court
suspended execution of the final four years of defendant’s sentence, ordering mandatory
supervision for that time period. The court also ordered $2,508.21 of restitution to the
rental truck company, including $1,979.01 for repairs, as recommended in the probation
officer’s report. We discuss the sentencing hearing in more detail below, where relevant
to our analysis.
       Defendant timely appealed from the judgment.

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                                       DISCUSSION

                                              I

                                  Multiple Enhancements

       Defendant contends the trial court failed to properly apply section 1385,
subdivision (c), which requires trial courts to “dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) This subdivision provides further
guidance to trial courts, explaining: “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to
prove” that certain mitigating circumstances are present. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) “Proof
of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) As relevant here, one such
mitigating circumstance is that “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).)
       Defendant contends the trial court imposed multiple enhancements in this case
without finding that dismissal of one of the enhancements would endanger public safety.
The People respond that: (1) defendant forfeited this argument by not raising it in the
trial court, (2) in any event, the trial court only imposed one enhancement, and (3) even
assuming the court imposed two enhancements, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in doing so. We disagree with the People’s first argument, agree with their second
argument, and need not reach their third argument.

       A.     Additional Background

       The trial court began the sentencing hearing by confirming that the defendant had
received the probation officer’s sentencing recommendation and had sufficient time to
review it with his attorney. The court then asked defense counsel to “make a statement
regarding the sentence.” Defense counsel began by contending “that [the p]robation

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[officer] is recommending the Court essentially impose two enhancements, one for the
out on bail [enhancement in section 12022.1] and then one enhancing the penalty for the
[Vehicle Code section] 10851 or [section] 496d [offense] because of [defendant]’s prior
conviction.” Defense counsel then argued, “as the Court knows, with the change in the
sentencing law, multiple enhancements are disfavored and so the Court should stay one
of those enhancements.” Finally, defense counsel suggested the court should “do that by
either striking the out on bail enhancement or if not wanting to do that, it could instead
sentence [defendant] to the midterm on the [Vehicle Code section] 10851 and [section]
496d [offenses] of three years rather than the recommended upper term of four years.”
       The prosecution responded: “in terms of the [the p]robation [officer]’s
recommendation, I would ask the Court not to strike the enhancements.” The prosecution
contended defendant had been recently convicted of another instance of driving or taking
a vehicle without consent and had committed the current vehicle offenses only one month
after being released on bail for the burglary charge. Accordingly, the prosecution
considered it “appropriate” for the court to impose both enhancements.
       The trial court agreed with the prosecution, explaining: “This is not a first offense.
Your pattern and practice of criminal behavior hasn’t changed as a result of any prior
disposition. You’re still taking the risks and there are consequences to that. The Court is
going to decline to strike one of the enhancements as requested by the defense.
       “Under the facts and circumstances of this case and the criminal history of this
[d]efendant and the quickness by which being out on bail another crime was committed,
the Court finds that applying two enhancements in this case is not only reasonable but
appropriate.
       “So I am adopting [the p]robation [officer]’s recommendations as drafted.” The
trial court then imposed the upper term sentence under section 666.5 for both driving the
rental truck without consent and for receiving the stolen rental truck and imposed the
two-year enhancement under section 12022.1.

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       B.     Forfeiture

       As an initial matter, we reject the People’s argument that defendant forfeited this
issue because defense counsel did not specifically ask the trial court to determine whether
dismissing one of the enhancements would “endanger public safety,” pursuant to section
1385, subdivision (c)(2).
       “A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise ‘claims involving the trial
court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ if the
party did not object to the sentence at trial.” (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745,
751.) Such an objection must fairly inform the trial court and the prosecution of the basis
for the objection so that the prosecution can respond appropriately and the court can
make an informed ruling. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434-435
[interpreting the objection requirement in Evidence Code section 353]; cf. People v. De
Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [claim forfeited where defendant “raised no specific
objections at the time of sentencing,” so trial court lacked “a genuine opportunity to
correct any errors it may have made”].)
       Here, defense counsel did object to the recommended sentence in the probation
report and even did so specifically on the ground that a recent “change in the sentencing
law” had made “multiple enhancements . . . disfavored.” While defense counsel did not
cite section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) or ask for precisely the relief offered by the
statute, the forfeiture rule is not so strict that a defendant must ask for every factual
finding individually. Defense counsel did enough for the prosecution to respond and for
the trial court to recognize the decision it had to make and give due consideration to the
relevant facts. Accordingly, we conclude defendant has preserved the issue for appeal.

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       C.     Analysis

       On the merits, we conclude the prosecution did not allege and the trial court did
not impose multiple enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), so the trial
court could not have abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss an enhancement.
       Defendant contends that section 666.5, which establishes an elevated triad from
which the trial court selected the base term for defendant’s sentence for both driving the
rental truck without consent and receiving the stolen rental truck, also counts as an
“enhancement” under section 1385, subdivision (c). Whether section 666.5 is an
enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c) is a question of statutory interpretation
that we review de novo. (See People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242.) Though
the trial court believed it was imposing two enhancements, “[o]ur task is to review the
trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning.” (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 807.)
       “We start with the statute’s words, which are the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent.” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 627.) These words are generally
given their ordinary meanings, but “[i]t is a venerable principle that when a word or
phrase appearing in a statute ‘has a well-established legal meaning, it will be given that
meaning in construing the statute.’ ” (Brown v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 335,
351; § 7, subd. 16; accord Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 850, fn. 3 [“ ‘[W]hen
the Legislature uses a term of art, a court construing that use must assume that the
Legislature was aware of the ramifications of its choice of language’ ”].)
       The term “enhancement” has a well-established meaning in California law: “A
sentence enhancement is ‘an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.’ ”
(People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101; accord People v. Burke, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243; People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 695, fn. 9; Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.405(5); People v. Guilford (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 406, 411.)

                                             6
       As defendant forthrightly acknowledges, the courts that have considered this
question have determined that “[s]ection 666.5 imposes not an enhancement but a greater
base term for certain recidivists.” (People v. Demara (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 448, 452;
accord People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 869; People v. Garcia (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165-1166.) We agree with these courts. Under the established
definition, “enhancement” means additional imprisonment added to the base term. The
“ ‘[b]ase term’ is the determinate or indeterminate sentence imposed for the commission
of a crime, not including any enhancements that carry an additional term of
imprisonment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(2).) Section 666.5 establishes a new set
of three possible base terms for the sentencing court to choose from—two, three, or four
years—replacing the three possible base terms in section 1170, subdivision (h)(1)—16
months, two years, or three years—for both driving and receiving the stolen rental truck.
(See Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a).)
       In other words, when sentencing under section 666.5, the trial court disregards the
base terms in section 1170, subdivision (h) prescribed by Vehicle Code section 10851
and Penal Code section 496d; it does not add anything to those terms. The fact that the
base terms in section 666.5 are greater than the base terms in section 1170, subdivision
(h) does not mean the sentencing court is adding an enhancement to those base terms.
Rather, the court is choosing from a different set of base terms.
       Here, the trial court chose a base term of four years imprisonment from section
666.5 for both driving and receiving the stolen rental truck and then added one two-year
enhancement from section 12022.1. Accordingly, the court imposed just one
enhancement and the mitigating circumstance in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) does
not apply.

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                                               II

                                           Restitution

         Defendant next contends the trial court was not authorized to impose a portion of
the restitution for repairs to the rental truck because the damage was not caused by
defendant’s conduct. Defendant forfeited this issue by not asking the trial court to make
the factual determination of whether his conduct caused certain damage.

         A.     Additional Background

         At trial, the people who rented the truck reported that when they last drove it, the
key started the truck and the ignition was undamaged. When the truck was found after
defendant had been driving it, the ignition was damaged so it would not start with a key.
Defendant admitted he had been using a screwdriver inserted into the damaged ignition to
start the truck, but claimed the ignition had already been damaged when he first drove the
truck.
         At the sentencing hearing, the trial court asked the parties to discuss the probation
officer’s recommendations as to restitution, and they agreed the trial court could not order
defendant to pay restitution to the burglary victim for stolen catalytic converters when
defendant had not been charged with their theft. But defendant did not object to any
portion of the proposed restitution to the rental truck company, which included detailed
receipts and line item expenses for parts and labor to repair the stolen rental truck.
         The trial court then ordered defendant to pay restitution, as detailed in the
probation officer’s report, for (1) tightening fasteners on interior wooden rails loosened
by vibration and time; (2) rebuilding the ignition, which had been drilled out to permit the
truck to be started with a screwdriver; (3) replacing the damaged steering column; and (4)
disinfecting the interior of the truck, among other repairs.

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       B.     Forfeiture

       Defendant claims these four types of damage cannot be “attributed to the conduct
for which [he] was actually convicted.” Defendant further claims he has not forfeited this
issue because the improper restitution makes his sentence “unauthorized.” Defendant
misunderstands the “unauthorized sentence” rule.
       “Although the cases are varied, a sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’ where it
could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. Appellate
courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and
correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.”
(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) On the other hand, it is well-established that
“[a] defendant wishing to argue on appeal that there is no factual basis for a restitution
order must object on that ground in the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal.”
(People v. Mays (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1232, 1237.)
       Here, defendant could have caused each of these types of damage while driving
and possessing the stolen rental truck. Defendant contends the evidence introduced at
trial does not support such an inference, “[b]ut by his failure to object, defendant forfeited
any claim that the order was merely unwarranted by the evidence, as distinct from being
unauthorized by statute.” (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075; accord
People v. Mays, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1237 [“(1) this is not a question of law and
(2) defendant could have, but did not, challenge the factual basis for the restitution order
in the trial court”].) “As the order for restitution was within the sentencing court’s
statutory authority, and defendant neither raised an objection to the amount of the order
nor requested a hearing to determine it (see § 1202.4, subd. (f)(1)), we do not decide
whether the court abused its discretion in determining the amount.” (Brasure, at
p. 1075.) Defendant has forfeited this issue.

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                                             III

                                   Abstract of Judgment

       Defendant next contends the trial court mistakenly switched the count numbers of
two of the offenses in the abstract of judgment. Specifically, the original abstract of
judgment listed count 1 as a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) and
count 2 as second degree burglary, but the counts were charged in the opposite order.
The trial court has already corrected this error nunc pro tunc and issued an amended
abstract. Accordingly, we need not address this contention.

                                             IV

                                  Unauthorized Sentence

       Finally, though the trial court made clear its intent to sentence defendant to six
years eight months in jail, following the probation officer’s recommendation, it did so in
an unauthorized manner. The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four
years in jail for both driving the rental truck without consent and receiving the stolen
rental truck. It then correctly determined it needed to stay the punishment for one of
those offenses pursuant to section 654, but the court stayed punishment for the wrong
offense.
       The trial court imposed the two-year sentence enhancement under section 12022.1,
which was attached to count 3, receiving the stolen rental truck in violation of section
496d, subdivision (a). The enhancement was attached only to count 3, though defendant
did not dispute the enhancement applied to both counts, because the trial court found the
enhancement true only with respect to count 3. The trial court could not stay the sentence
for count 3 without staying the enhancement because “an enhancement must necessarily
be stayed where the sentence on the count to which it is added is required to be stayed”
under section 654. (People v. Guilford, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 411.)

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       Neither party noticed this issue, but “ ‘[e]rrors in the applicability of section 654
are corrected on appeal regardless of whether the point was raised by objection in the trial
court or assigned as error on appeal.’ ” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.)
Accordingly, we will modify defendant’s sentence to vacate the stay on count 3 and to
stay execution of the sentence for count 2 instead. This will not change the duration of
defendant’s sentence.

                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is modified to: (1) vacate the stay and execute the four-year jail
sentence for count 3, the violation of section 496d, subdivision (a); and (2) stay execution
of the four-year jail sentence for count 2, the violation of Vehicle Code section 10851,
subdivision (a). As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy of the amended
abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

                                                  HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MESIWALA, J.

WISEMAN, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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