Court Opinion

ID: 9635921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:10:21.168673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:38.918682
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Judge,
dissenting.
The question presented is whether we shall now overrule a holding in Marras v. State, 741 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) — a holding to which there was no dissent — and reinterpret Article 35.16(b)(3) to mean that a venireperson is not challengeable for cause by the State even though the venire-person indicates he could never, under any circumstances, answer “yes” to the second punishment issue based solely upon the evidence of the capital offense. Because the majority’s answer to that question subverts the doctrine of stare decisis, creates the potential for absurd situations, and effectively overrules not only the Marras holding but parallel holdings in several other cases, I must respectfully dissent.

Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law

Article 35.16(b)(3) provides broadly that “[a] challenge for cause may be made by the State [if a venireperson] has a bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which the State is entitled to rely for conviction or punishment.” (Emphasis added.) In Marras, 741 S.W.2d at 401-403, we interpreted that statute in what we thought was a commonsense manner to allow the State to challenge a venireperson for cause if the venireperson indicated “that he could not answer yes to the second special issue based solely upon the evidence of the capital offense.”1 As is apparent from the Marras opinion, we interpreted the statute as we did because of the longstanding principle that the facts of a capital crime, if severe enough, are sufficient to support a jury’s affirmative answer to the punishment issue on future dangerousness. See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 82 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Muniz v. State, 573 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). Our interpretation was guided by our belief that the statute’s broad language was in*862tended to allow, in the capital murder context, for the selection of jurors who would not pose insurmountable barriers to the assessment of the death penalty for capital murder. It seemed to us that in the context of capital murder prosecutions, the statute guaranteed that society, acting through its officials, would have a fair opportunity to exact the ultimate punishment for the ultimate crime. To interpret the statute otherwise would allow for paradoxical situations in which, before a capital trial even started, the State would know it was absolutely precluded from obtaining the death penalty. This is especially evident in cases in which the State is seeking an affirmative answer to the second punishment issue armed with nothing more than the heinousness of the crime. See, e.g., O’Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.Cr. App.1979).
The situation presented in Marras was factually and legally identical to the situation presented in the case at bar. Thus, our opinion in Marras is, by traditional standards, controlling precedent. Why, then, do we not follow that precedent?
The traditional rule requiring respect for precedent, usually referred to as the rule of stare decisis (“let the prior decision stand”), has at least four rationales. First, if courts adhere to past decisions, direction is provided to all who labor in the legal enterprise. Lower courts know how they should and should not decide cases; lawyers know how to frame their arguments, devise their strategies, and advise their clients in accord with the lessons of past cases; the Legislature and Governor know what they may and may not do, and so forth. “[SJtare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 447, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting). Second, the labor of judges would be increased to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case. Third, “the very concept of the rule of law ... requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.” Planned Parenthood v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). Fourth, the continuity of the law helps preserve public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments.
Of course, as every first-year law student knows, the rule of stare decisis is not an inexorable command. Courts must be free, at certain times, to overrule their past decisions. But we have recognized that the rule of stare decisis “creates a strong presumption in favor of established law.” Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332, 345 (Tex.Cr. App.1987). We have also recognized that the rule “has its greatest force in the area of statutory construction,” id., because if the construction of a statute is unacceptable to the Legislature, a simple remedy is available by the process of legislative amendment. State v. Hall, 829 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Lockhart v. State, 200 S.W.2d 164, 167-168 (Tex.Cr. App.1947); accord, James v. Vernon Calhoun Packing Co., 498 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.1973); Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex.1968); Moss v. Gibbs, 370 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Tex.1963). In agreement with this position, the United States Supreme Court recently stated:
[T]he burden borne by the party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory construction. Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2370, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989).
When may a precedent be properly overruled? This is a difficult question to answer, but we may be confident in the assumption that a precedent may not properly be overruled simply because a majority of the Court believes it to be error. If the rule were otherwise, then no precedent would be safe and our law could change *863after every change in Court personnel. “The situation would ... be intolerable if the [periodic] changes in the composition of the court were accompanied by changes in its rulings. In such circumstances there is nothing to do except to stand by the errors of our brethren of the [time] before, whether we relish them or not.” B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 150 (1921).
In my view, when a court contemplates overruling an established precedent, especially a prior statutory interpretation which has been left undisturbed by the Legislature, the court must carefully balance the reasons proffered for rejecting the precedent against the very weighty considerations — discussed previously — underlying stare decisis. Such an analysis will preclude rejection of precedent absent the strongest reasons for doing so.
This case, like Marras, is a case of statutory interpretation. The rule of stare deci-sis, therefore, has special force. Nevertheless, the majority fails even to mention stare decisis and gives no justification for overruling the Marras Court’s interpretation of Article 35.16(b)(3) except to claim that that interpretation is erroneous. Significantly, the majority does not claim that our prior interpretation has become unworkable or has otherwise led to injustice.

Effective Overruling of Parallel Cases

As noted previously, in Marras we interpreted the phrase “any phase of the law” in Article 35.16(b)(3) to include the principle that the facts of a capital offense, if severe enough, are sufficient to support a jury’s affirmative answer to the punishment issue on future dangerousness. Remarkably, the majority today dismisses that principle of law as merely an “appellate standard of review” and proceeds to hold that, under Article 35.16(b)(3), “a venireman is not subject to challenge for cause merely because he indicates he would [always] require more evidence than the legal minimum in order to answer special issue two affirmatively.” Op. at 860. What the majority fails to explain, however — whether by accident or design, I cannot say — is that the logic of its holding will lead ineluctably to the overruling of several precedents other than Marras. This is not idle speculation; rather, it is hard reality.
I need only explicate four recent holdings that are flatly incompatible with the majority's holding today. (1) In Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 199-201 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), we held, after a long discussion, that under Article 35.16(b)(3), the State may challenge a venireperson for cause if the venireper-son indicates he could never answer punishment issue two “yes” unless the defendant was a serial killer. We explained that jurors “may not wholly refuse, before hearing any evidence, to consider an accused for the death penalty unless he has been convicted of murder before.” In other words, in Fuller we held that a venireper-son is challengeable for cause if he indicates he would require more than the legal minimum in order to answer punishment issue two affirmatively. How the majority intends to square today’s holding with Fuller is beyond my understanding.
(2) In Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790, 797 (Tex.Gr.App.1991), we held that a veni-reperson was challengeable for cause under Article 35.16(b)(3) if he indicated he could never find the defendant guilty based only on the testimony of one witness. We explained that “the venireperson was properly challengeable for cause since he would have held the State to a higher burden of proof than that required by law.” Stated differently, the venireperson was chal-lengeable because he indicated he would require more than the legal minimum in order to make a finding of guilt.
(3) In Barnard v. State, 730 S.W.2d 703, 712-714 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), we held a veni-reperson challengeable under Article 35.-16(b)(3) because he indicated he could never find a defendant guilty based only on circumstantial evidence. That is, again, the venireperson was challengeable because he indicated he would require more than the legal minimum in order to make a finding of guilt.
(4) In Phillips v. State, 701 S.W.2d 875, 883-884 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), we held a veni-reperson challengeable under Article 35.-*864-86616(b)(3) because he indicated he could never answer punishment issue two affirmatively if the defendant was a non-triggerman. In other words, again, the venireperson was challengeable because he indicated he would require more than the legal minimum in order to answer punishment issue two affirmatively.
All these holdings — and no doubt there are others just like them lurking in the recesses of the digest — are flatly inconsistent with the majority’s holding today. If the majority insists upon detouring around these sound precedents interpreting Article 35.16(b)(3), they should do so with their eyes wide open. I, for one, will not be going along.
I respectfully dissent.
McCORMICK and WHITE, JJ., join.

. See also McCoy v. State, 713 S.W.2d 940, 954 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), a capital murder case which presaged the Marras decision. In McCoy, Judge MILLER, writing for the Court, noted that "the State may have been entitled to ... a challenge fer cause under Article 35.16(b)(3)” when a ven-ireperson indicated that he "would require more proof than that of the offense in order to respond affirmatively to the special issues.”