Court Opinion

ID: 9893615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 21:05:31.378802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:38.014286
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (3d) 220024

                                Opinion filed October 27, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                     APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                               THIRD DISTRICT

                                                      2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                         )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                          )       of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
                                                         )       Du Page County, Illinois,
              Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                         )       Appeal No. 3-22-0024
              v.                                         )       Circuit No. 18-CF-2506
                                                         )
      STEPHAN J. FILIPIAK,                               )       Honorable
                                                         )       Michael W. Reidy,
              Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      __________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
            Justices McDade and Albrecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.
      __________________________________________________________________________

                                                  OPINION

¶1          Defendant, Stephan J. Filipiak, appeals from his convictions for predatory criminal sexual

     assault of a child against two child victims. Defendant argues initially that his conviction as to one

     of the victims must be reversed because he was denied his right to a unanimous verdict where the

     indictments, jury instructions, and verdict forms failed to differentiate between the two counts that

     related to that same victim, rendering it impossible to ascertain on which of the two offenses the

     jury acquitted defendant. Arguing that double jeopardy then precludes retrial as to these unanimity

     of verdict counts, defendant asks that we vacate the unauthorized sentence of mandatory natural
     life as to the unrelated victim’s count and remand for resentencing. We reverse in part, vacate in

     part, and remand for resentencing.

¶2                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶3          Defendant was charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child

     (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)) for acts alleged to have been committed on October 6,

     2018, during a sleepover at defendant’s house. Counts I and III were alleged to have been

     committed against Br.G., and count II was alleged to have been committed against Br.G.’s sister,

     Be.G. Counts I and III were charged identically, except count III stated it was “a different act than

     alleged in Count [I].”

¶4          The case proceeded to a jury trial on October 5, 2021. Br.G.’s videotaped victim sensitive

     interview from October 17, 2018, was admitted at trial pursuant to section 115-10 of the Code of

     Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2020)). During the interview, Br.G. was

     asked if she knew why she was being interviewed. Br.G. pointed to her pelvis, indicating that

     defendant had touched her there. Br.G. explained how, on the night of the sleepover, she was

     sleeping on the couch when defendant woke her, placed his finger under her shirt, and touched

     inside her vagina. She was not wearing any underwear at the time. She also stated that, before the

     couch incident, she took a shower with defendant’s assistance and defendant also digitally

     penetrated her vagina.

¶5          The parties stipulated that during a subsequent recorded interview on August 5, 2021, Br.G.

     stated that defendant did not enter the shower and did not touch her on the couch.

¶6          At the time of her trial testimony, Br.G. was eight years old. She testified at trial that during

     a sleepover at defendant’s home, she was changing in the bedroom after showering when defendant

     entered the room and digitally penetrated her vagina. Later that night, Br.G. fell asleep on a couch

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       and was awakened by defendant and digitally penetrated again. Br.G. further testified she did not

       remember recanting her statements during the August 5, 2021, interview.

¶7             Be.G. was 10 years old at the time of trial and testified that defendant digitally penetrated

       her in the shower the night of the sleepover.

¶8             Defendant testified that he did wake Br.G. to take a shower but did not inappropriately

       touch her. Br.G. and Be.G. were showering together when defendant realized they did not have

       clean clothes or towels. Defendant entered the bathroom with permission from their father. When

       he entered, he noticed the children were not standing under the water spray, so he pointed the

       showerhead to spray them before leaving. After they finished their shower, they went to watch

       television in the bedroom. Eventually, Br.G. returned to the living room, and defendant went to

       his bedroom. Defendant testified that he did not touch either Br.G. or Be.G. inappropriately.

¶9             The jury was given forms for all three counts, indicating that it could find defendant guilty

       or not guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The verdict form for count I stated,

       “finger in vagina-1-[Br.G.],” and the verdict form for count III stated, “finger in vagina-2-[Br.G.].”

       No jury instructions were given as to the difference between the two counts, and the jury was not

       instructed that they needed to be unanimous as to specific conduct for each count. The State

       referred to the alleged post-shower and couch conduct in its closing argument but did not clarify

       which count related to which conduct. The jury found defendant guilty as to counts I and II but not

       guilty as to count III.

¶ 10           Defendant filed several posttrial motions, including a motion to vacate the finding of guilt

       notwithstanding the verdict, but did not specifically raise an unanimity of verdict argument. The

       court denied the posttrial motions and sentenced defendant to natural life in prison, pursuant to

       section 11.1.40(b)(1.2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(b)(1.2) (West 2014)

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       (mandating natural life sentence where defendant convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault

       of two or more persons)). Defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence was denied.

¶ 11                                            II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12           On appeal, defendant argues he was denied his right to a unanimous jury verdict.

       Specifically, defendant contends that, because the State failed to adequately distinguish between

       counts I and III, his acquittal on count III makes it impossible to tell if the jury unanimously

       convicted him of specific conduct. Defendant acknowledges that he did not preserve this issue for

       appeal and asks that we review the matter pursuant to the plain error doctrine. “[T]he plain-error

       doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider

       unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error,

       or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill.

       2d 167, 186-87 (2005). It is necessary to determine first whether the verdict forms created a jury

       unanimity issue, as there can be no plain error if there is no error. See People v. Johnson, 218 Ill.

       2d 125, 139, 141-42 (2005).

¶ 13           “The test of the sufficiency of a verdict is whether the jury’s intention can be ascertained

       with reasonable certainty from the language used.” People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 537 (1995).

       “In determining the meaning of a verdict, all parts of the record will be searched and interpreted

       together.” People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 121 (2001). The parties have not provided us with, and

       we are not aware of, any controlling case law directly addressing this situation. However, we find

       People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1 (2009), People v. Scott, 243 Ill. App. 3d 167 (1993), and cases from

       other jurisdictions instructive.

¶ 14           In Scott, defendant was charged with three counts of delivering a controlled substance to

       three different undercover officers at separate times, but only a single verdict form was presented

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       to the jury. Scott, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 168-69. The court determined this was error because it was

       possible

                      “that only four jurors believed that defendant was guilty of delivering a controlled

                      substance to one of the officers, four other jurors believed that defendant was

                      guilty of delivering a controlled substance to another officer and the remaining

                      four jurors believed that defendant was guilty of delivering a controlled substance

                      to the third officer.” Id. at 169.

       That possibility permitted “a unanimous guilty verdict to have been rendered without all 12 jurors

       agreeing that defendant delivered a controlled substance to a particular recipient as set forth in

       each count of the indictment.” Id.

¶ 15          In Smith, a general verdict form was provided to the jury, allowing them to find defendants

       guilty of murder if they found any one of the theories alleged in the indictment, which included

       intentional, knowing, and felony murder. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 26-27. The court concluded that

                      “where *** it is impossible to tell from the general verdict whether defendant was

                      actually convicted on each count in the indictment, it is error for the trial courts to

                      make that presumption. Therefore, *** because defendants were sentenced based

                      on the presumption that they were found guilty of intentional murder, defendants

                      were prejudiced ***.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 27.

¶ 16          Here, we cannot reasonably ascertain the jury’s intention from the verdicts and record.

       Defendant was indicted for two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child as to Br.G.

       The indictments alleged identical acts of sexual penetration, describing them as follows. Count I

       alleged that defendant “placed his finger in the vagina of [Br.G].” Count III alleged that defendant

       “placed his finger in the vagina of [Br.G], said act being a different act than alleged in Count [I].”

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       At trial, the State presented evidence that defendant digitally penetrated Br.G twice on the evening

       of October 6, 2018: once proximate to taking a shower, and once while on the couch. Two sets of

       identical verdicts forms were submitted to the jury pertaining to the predatory criminal sexual

       assault charges for Br.G., which were not differentiated, except with parentheticals indicating (“1”)

       and (“2”). Nor did the State in any way suggest to the jury at closing which of the verdict forms

       pertained to which of the alleged acts of penetration. We are therefore incapable of ascertaining

       with reasonable certainty whether the jury intended to convict defendant of the shower conduct

       while acquitting him of the couch conduct or vice versa. See Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 537. Indeed, just

       as with the concern raised in Scott, the jury could have rendered a guilty verdict without actual

       unanimity.

¶ 17           The State does not argue on appeal that the record somehow informs which of the verdict

       forms apply to the specific acts testified to at trial. Instead, the State argues that the jury presumably

       understood that each verdict was for a specific offense and knew they needed to be unanimous in

       rendering a verdict as to a specific offense. We reject this argument for the reasons outlined above

       and, in addition, note that here the jury was not instructed that it needed to be unanimous as to

       specific conduct. See, e.g., Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Ky. 2008) (“ ‘[W]hen

       the evidence is sufficient to support multiple counts of the same offense, the jury instructions must

       be tailored to the testimony in order to differentiate each count from the others.’ ” (quoting Bell v.

       Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Ky. 2008))). Moreover, while the State correctly observes

       that general verdict forms are permitted and do not require the jury to agree upon a specific incident

       to sustain a conviction, general verdict forms were not submitted to the jury here. The State cannot

       submit multiple nongeneral verdict forms, exposing defendant to increased criminal liability, and

       then claim the jury was not required to agree upon a specific act to sustain the conviction. See,

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       e.g., State v. Marcum, 480 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (“Having charged three separate

       acts, [the State] was bound to prove *** each charge. It could not use the volitional act of one

       charge as an alternative means for a guilty verdict on another charge.”).

¶ 18          To avoid the unanimity issue here, the State could have specified in the verdict forms which

       count related to which specific conduct, e.g., (“couch”) and (“shower”). The failure to somehow

       distinguish the two charges for the jury’s deliberation, however, makes it impossible to reasonably

       ascertain whether the jury unanimously decided whether either offense was committed by

       defendant.

¶ 19          As indicated previously, though the jury unanimity issue was not preserved, the plain-error

       doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of

       the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.

       Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186-87. An error under the second prong of the plain error doctrine has been

       equated with structural error or a “systemic error which serves to ‘erode the integrity of the judicial

       process and undermine the fairness of the defendant’s trial.’ ” People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173,

       197-98 (2009) (quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186). “[T]he right to a unanimous verdict is among

       the most fundamental of rights in Illinois.” People v. McGhee, 2012 IL App (1st) 093404, ¶ 24.

       “[A] verdict lacking juror unanimity is ‘structural error subject to automatic reversal.’ ” People v.

       Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 47 (quoting People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 610 (2010)).

¶ 20          The parties agree that our holding on the unanimity issue necessitates the reversal of

       defendant’s conviction on count I and remand of the cause for resentencing as to count II. Double

       jeopardy precludes the State from retrying either count I or III. The double jeopardy clause of the

       fifth amendment provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

       jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const., amend. V; see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10. “The

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       prohibition against double jeopardy ‘protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second

       prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after

       conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” People v. Henry, 204 Ill. 2d 267,

       283 (2003) (quoting People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 376-77 (1998)). “[T]he law attaches

       particular significance to an acquittal.” United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978). Because

       defendant was tried and acquitted on count III under circumstances where we cannot ascertain

       which offense the acquittal pertains to, retrying defendant for either offense would violate the

       double jeopardy clause.

¶ 21                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22          The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County as to count I is reversed; the sentence

       as to count II is vacated and remanded for resentencing.

¶ 23          Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

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                         People v. Filipiak, 2023 IL App (3d) 220024

Decision Under Review:        Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 18-CF-
                              2506; the Hon. Michael W. Reidy, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                     James E. Chadd, Santiago A. Durango, Thomas A. Karalis, and
for                           Amber Hopkins, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa,
Appellant:                    for appellant.

Attorneys                     Robert B. Berlin, State’s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne
for                           Hoffman and Kristin M. Schwind, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of
Appellee:                     counsel), for the People.

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