Court Opinion

ID: 9958448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 14:13:41.815664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:22.559287
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Huff, Malveaux and Chaney
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Lexington, Virginia

              ROBIN MICHELLE NESTER
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1762-22-3                                   JUDGE VERNIDA R. CHANEY
                                                                                  APRIL 9, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY
                                               Charles N. Dorsey, Judge

                               Anthony F. Anderson (Anderson Legal, on briefs), for appellant.

                               John Beamer, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a bench trial, Robin Michelle Nester appeals her convictions for robbery and

              malicious wounding.1 Nester was convicted as a principal in the second degree for her

              participation in crimes committed by her daughter, Michelle Nester (Michelle), and others.

              Nester challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her convictions. Nester also

              contends that the trial court erred in admitting call logs and text messages between her and

              Michelle over her objections that (i) the Commonwealth failed to lay a sufficient foundation

              connecting these logs and text messages to Nester and (ii) the text messages from Michelle were

              inadmissible hearsay. For the following reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                         The trial court found Nester not guilty of abduction.
                                            BACKGROUND

       A. The Robbery and Malicious Wounding

       “On appeal, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

prevailing party below.” Sarka v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 56, 59 (2021).

       On the evening of September 11, 2020, Michelle Nester invited Forrest Williams to her

home under the pretense of an overnight date so that she could recover marijuana that he allegedly

stole from her earlier that month. Williams had visited Michelle’s home several times after meeting

her on a dating app. That night, unbeknownst to Williams, Michelle had arranged for a small group

of people—including Nester—to assist her in recovering the marijuana from Williams.

       Michelle sold marijuana from her house, which was next door to Nester’s house on Apache

Road in Roanoke County. In early September 2020, when Michelle noticed that some of her

marijuana was missing, she informed Nester by text message that she “lost a qp of gd weed and I

thinking somebody took it. I need cameras and I need a fucking safe.”2 Nester replied, “Yeah.”

Michelle asked, “Can daddy buy me a safe next time he’s at Walmart? I need a big safe.” Nester

inquired, “How big,” and Michelle responded, “enough to fit [] several mason jars in.” Nester

agreed to help Michelle procure the safe.

       At 4:46 p.m. on September 11, Michelle texted Nester, “Does daddy still have that pistol set

aside for me? I want it.” Nester responded, “I know before he said he wanted you to take a safety

class and go with him to go shoot.”

       After Williams arrived at Michelle’s house on September 11, he and Michelle eventually

went upstairs and retired to her bedroom. While Michelle and Williams were upstairs, Michelle’s

housemate, Joshua Dodson, left to pick up Khairajhn “Taz” Sims (Taz) and bring him to Michelle’s

house. Earlier that evening, Michelle directed Dodson to bring Taz to her house that night and

       2
           Detective VanPatten explained that “qp” was generally an abbreviation for quarter pound.
                                                -2-
threatened Dodson with a gray pistol if he refused. After Dodson returned to Michelle’s house with

Taz, they waited downstairs for others to arrive.

       At 1:03 a.m. on September 12, while Michelle and Williams were in bed and Williams was

asleep, Nester and Michelle had the following conversation via text message:

                [Nester:] You ok.

                [Michelle:] Oh yes. T minus 10 minutes until shit goes down. Guess
                what he did when he saw I had a gun.

                [Nester:] What

                [Michelle:] Checked and made sure I didn’t have it loaded

                [Nester:] Wow

                [Michelle:] He got scared. Lololololol. I’m excited. Bill almost
                here. Tazz is downstairs.

                [Nester:] Where’s his car.

                [Michelle:] Josh picked him up. He’s car broke down. But I called
                and he dropped everything. I love Tazz.

                       ....

                [Nester:] So where’s the gun

                [Michelle:] Beside me, next to my pillow. But I acted like I was
                taking his advice and protected myself. Sounds like they’re arriving.
                Fun.

                [Nester:] Yeah

                [Michelle:] I’m fucking shaking with excitement hahahahahaha.

(CW Ex. 5-7).

       As Michelle was in bed exchanging text messages with Nester, William Fiedler (Bill),

Anjelique Glovier (Glovier), and Steven Moses (Moses) arrived together at Michelle’s house.

Dodson let them in. Then, the entire group went upstairs to Michelle’s bedroom where Williams

was sleeping.
                                                    -3-
       Upon entering the bedroom, Taz struck Williams on the side of his head, causing his head to

bleed. Williams woke up to “guns and different things being pointed at” him. Taz repeatedly

demanded of Williams, “Where is the weed at?” Williams denied that he had any marijuana.

Williams tried to leave the room, but someone shut the door. Williams backed into the bathroom as

Taz repeatedly hit him, demanding the location of the marijuana.

       Williams insisted that he had no marijuana but volunteered that he had other things: money,

a car, electronics, and clothing. While held at gunpoint, Williams gave his assailants his phone and

wallet, including his bank ATM card. Michelle and Moses left to withdraw money from Williams’s

bank account while Bill threatened to cut off Williams’s fingers if he refused to provide his banking

card information. Fearing for his life, Williams provided his PIN. Michelle and Moses returned to

Michelle’s house after discovering that Williams’s bank account had insufficient funds for

withdrawal.

       Taz continued to question Williams about the stolen marijuana’s location. Eventually,

Williams said that the marijuana was at his house. Taz, disbelieving Williams, continued beating

and questioning him for an hour after Michelle and Moses returned from the ATM. Williams did

not change his answer.

       While Taz interrogated Williams, Michelle searched Williams’s vehicle for the stolen

marijuana. She found a bag of marijuana in the vehicle’s console. At that time, Nester and Glovier

were on the driveway with Michelle. Michelle directed Nester to “[g]o get a jar of marijuana so

they could match it.” Subsequently, Michelle texted Nester, “You find it?” Nester, by text

message, responded, “I think it’s the right one. Looks and smells [i]dentical.” Michelle replied,

“Thank you momma.”

       Nester returned to the driveway with a jar of marijuana. Upon returning, Nester asked

Glovier “how everything was going.” Glovier responded, “I guess ok.” Michelle visually inspected

                                                -4-
the marijuana in both containers and determined that they matched. Michelle then returned the jar

of marijuana to Nester.

       After Michelle found the marijuana in Williams’s vehicle, Moses tied Williams up with a

wire and placed him in the trunk of his vehicle. Michelle and Taz then drove to Williams’s home in

Lynchburg. They left Williams at his house and drove away in his vehicle.

       In the mid-morning hours of September 12, Dodson observed Michelle and Nester in the

living room at Michelle’s house. Nester appeared “anxious and real jittery.” She reported seeing a

vehicle pass by the house and feared it was the police. Michelle was initially dismissive of Nester’s

concerns, but became upset when she saw the same vehicle pass by her house. Then Nester wrote

down a list of answers for Michelle to give the police if they questioned her. Michelle and Nester

then threw clothing into a trash bag, and Nester left the house with the bag.

       Around 10:30 a.m. on September 12, Detective VanPatten observed Nester drive a vehicle

out of Michelle’s driveway and around the block before parking in her own driveway next door to

Michelle’s house. Nester then exited the vehicle and entered her house. Nester had parked in her

driveway behind a car that appeared to be Williams’s missing vehicle. Detective VanPatten left to

obtain search warrants for Nester’s and Michelle’s residences. When the detective returned several

hours later, Williams’s vehicle was gone.

       When Detective VanPatten asked Nester about the missing vehicle, Nester stated that “a guy

with red hair and a beard had come to the house earlier in the day and picked it up” and she assumed

the car belonged to him. Nester asserted that she knew nothing about the incident involving

Williams. She admitted, however, that she knew Williams was staying with Michelle. During a

second conversation with Detective VanPatten, Nester stated that she and Michelle previously had a

disagreement and had not communicated until the day before the incident.

                                                 -5-
       B. Objections to Text Messages

       Detective VanPatten seized Michelle’s mobile phone when she was arrested, and the

detective searched the phone’s contents pursuant to a search warrant. Without objection, the

detective testified at trial that she examined the record of text communications on Michelle’s

phone and took a photo showing a contact identified as Michelle’s mother, with Nester’s photo

above the contact’s identification and phone number.

       Nester objected to the admission of photos of Michelle’s phone identifying Nester as a

contact and showing text messages between Michelle and Nester. The photos were taken by

Detective VanPatten, who read some of the contact information and text messages into evidence

at trial. Nester objected that the photos of contact information and text messages were

inadmissible because (1) the Commonwealth failed to establish a foundation showing that (a) the

phone number alleged to be Nester’s phone number was, in fact, her phone number and (b) the

messages alleged to be from Nester were, in fact, from her; (2) the messages from Michelle were

hearsay; and (3) Michelle’s messages in CW Exhibits 3-8 are irrelevant. The trial court

overruled Nester’s evidentiary objections.

       C. Motion to Strike

       After the Commonwealth rested its case-in-chief,3 Nester moved to strike and argued that

the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was insufficient to prove

that she acted as a principal in the second degree, “a person who is present, aiding and abetting

by helping in some way in commission of the crime.” Nester contended that her “momentary

presence on the driveway” was insufficient “to show that she was intending to encourage, advise

or urge [Michelle] to abduct or maliciously wound Mr. Williams.” Nester contended that the

       3
        Before the Commonwealth rested, the trial court took judicial notice, without objection,
that Michelle and “Taz” Sims had pleaded guilty to crimes arising from the incident involving
Williams. The trial court did not identify their offenses of conviction.
                                                -6-
evidence that she was on the driveway comparing different samples of marijuana was

insufficient to show that she knew this marijuana came from Williams’s vehicle.

       Nester acknowledged that her text messages to Michelle showed her own suspicious

conduct throughout the evening of the crime. But she contended that her messages to Michelle

were “inquisitive in nature” and did not show that she “knew or should have been aware that

there was such a violent assault occurring against Mr. Williams.” Nester admitted that the

evidence “indicate[d] her knowledge and her awareness that her daughter believed that there was

marijuana stolen, that there was going to be some type of obviously confrontation about the

stealing of the marijuana[.]” But Nester argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that

she knew Williams would be violently assaulted and abducted. Nester further contended that

although she apparently sent Michelle a text message asking about the location of a gun, there

was no evidence that she gave Michelle a firearm. In support of this argument, Nester stated that

the evidence showed that a BB gun was found in Michelle’s closet during the execution of the

search warrant.

       Nester argued that the evidence showed she was not physically present and did not

witness any of the violent assaults against Williams, “and certainly her actions were not in

furtherance of the commission of a malicious wounding and/or abduction.” Regarding the

robbery charge, Nester argued that evidence of her suspicious conduct may result in suspicion of

guilt but was insufficient to support a conviction.

       The trial court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to prove Nester’s participation in the

charged offenses as a principal in the second degree and denied the motion to strike.

                                                -7-
        D. Convictions and Sentences

        After closing arguments, the trial court acquitted Nester of abduction but convicted her, as a

principal in the second degree, of malicious wounding and robbery. For each conviction, the court

sentenced Nester to incarceration for five years with four years and ten months suspended. This

appeal followed.

                                             ANALYSIS

        I. Admission of Cell Phone Information and Text Messages

        A. Standard of Review

        Nester asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted an image from

Michelle’s phone depicting an emergency contact labeled “mom” as well as text messages between

Michelle and the contact “mom.” “[T]he determination of the admissibility of relevant evidence

is within the sound discretion of the trial court subject to the test of abuse of that discretion.”

Adjei v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 727, 737 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Beck v.

Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 384-85 (1997)). “This bell-shaped curve of reasonability

governing our appellate review rests on the venerable belief that the judge closest to the contest

is the judge best able to discern where the equities lie.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App.

104, 111-12 (2013) (quoting Hamad v. Hamad, 61 Va. App. 593, 607 (2013)). A reviewing

court can conclude that “an abuse of discretion has occurred” only in cases in which “reasonable

jurists could not differ” about the correct result. Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 197

(2015) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)). “[B]y definition,”

however, a trial court “abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Coffman v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 163, 166 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Greer, 63 Va. App.

561, 568 (2014)).

                                                 -8-
        B. Contact Labeled “Mom”

        Nester contends that the image of the emergency contact information lacked an adequate

foundation to be admissible. Nester asserts that Detective VanPatten’s testimony was insufficient to

authenticate that the contact labeled “mom” in Michelle’s phone referred to Nester or that she was

the person who responded to Michelle’s text messages.

        “The requirement of authentication or identification is a condition precedent to

admissibility that is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the thing in question

is what the proponent claims.” Va. R. Evid. 2:901. “This principle holds true universally and

applies equally to statements made over the telephone, through text messages, by emails, or

using social media.” Atkins v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 1, 8 (2017); see Bloom v.

Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 364, 369-70 (holding that internet conversations conducted through

instant messaging are in some respects “analogous to telephone conversations”), aff’d, 262 Va.

814 (2001).

        “The measure of the burden of proof with respect to factual questions underlying the

admissibility of evidence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bloom v.

Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821 (2001) (quoting Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 674

(1975)). “Although the type of evidence used to prove the identity of the person making the

statement may vary based in part upon the medium used to convey the message, the governing

legal standard is the same—proof by a preponderance of direct evidence, circumstantial

evidence, or a combination of both.” Atkins, 68 Va. App. at 9; see also Charles E. Friend & Kent

Sinclair, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 17-1, at 1164 (7th ed. 2012) (“[A]uthentication does

not set a high barrier to admissibility, and is generally satisfied by any form of proof that

supports a finding that it is what it purports to be.”). “Further, it is well established that ‘[t]he

completeness of the identification goes to the weight’ afforded ‘the evidence rather than its

                                                  -9-
admissibility,’ with the responsibility of determining the threshold question of admissibility

resting with the trial court.” Atkins, 68 Va. App. at 9 (quoting Armes v. Commonwealth, 3

Va. App. 189, 193 (1986)).

       The record supports the trial court’s finding that the emergency contact labeled “mom” in

Michelle’s phone referred to Nester and that Nester composed the text messages sent to

Michelle’s phone. Several witnesses testified that Nester was Michelle’s mother. Detective

VanPatten testified that she took photographs of Michelle’s contacts and recent text messages

when she seized Michelle’s phone while executing a valid search warrant. The detective

testified—without objection, before the objected-to image was introduced—that she took a photo

of a contact on Michelles’s phone, “show[ing] her mother’s identification and phone number”

below a picture of Nester. The contact “mom” was designated in the phone as an emergency

contact. Additionally, text messages from Michelle to the contact “mom” referred to the

recipient as “momma.” Nester did not contest that the photographs Detective VanPatten took

were from Michelle’s phone. Upon review of the evidence, this Court holds that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the challenged image of the contact “mom” referred to

Nester and that Nester sent the text messages to Michelle.

       C. Michelle’s Text Messages

       Nester further asserts that even if her text messages were properly authenticated and

admissible as admissions of a party opponent, the messages from Michelle were inadmissible

hearsay and not subject to any exception. The Commonwealth asserts that the text messages from

Michelle were not offered for the truth of the matters asserted but simply provided context for

Nester’s text messages.

       “Hearsay is ‘a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial

or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’” Atkins, 68 Va. App. at

                                                - 10 -
9 (quoting Va. R. Evid. 2:801(c)). Hearsay evidence “‘is inadmissible unless it falls within one

of the recognized exceptions’ to the rule against hearsay.” Id. at 7-8 (quoting Robinson v.

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 6 (1999)).

       Nevertheless, “[w]e have recognized that words offered solely to give context to party

admissions are not hearsay and are admissible.” Swain v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 555, 560

(1998). “Words which constitute a question or accusation that result in a party admission are not

barred by the hearsay evidence rule. It is only when the prompting statements have the quality of

evidence (offered for the truth of the matter asserted) that they become inadmissible hearsay.”

Id. (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 365, 368 (1991)).

       The Commonwealth offered Michelle’s statements to give meaning to Nester’s often

single-word responses. When Michelle told her mother that marijuana had been stolen from her

and that she needed cameras and a safe, Nester replied, “yeah.” When Michelle asked Nester to

help her get a safe large enough to fit several mason jars, Nester asked, “how big” and stated,

“ok.” The relevancy and evidentiary value of Nester’s responses would be lost without

Michelle’s statements. In context, Nester’s responses indicate that she knew Michelle’s

marijuana had been stolen and that she agreed Michelle needed cameras and a safe to continue

her drug dealing operation. Further, Nester agreed to obtain a safe to fit Michelle’s needs.

       When Michelle asked Nester if her father still had a pistol set aside for her and said she

wanted it, Nester responded, “I know before he said he wanted you to take a safety class and go

with him to go shoot.” Again, the evidentiary value of Nester’s response would be missed

without Michelle’s statements. Given the context of Nester’s answer to Michelle’s question,

Nester demonstrated she would provide Michelle with the firearm if she met the prerequisites.

       Nester’s statements “you ok,” “what,” and “wow” to Michelle lack meaning without

Michelle’s responses to provide context regarding the imminent attack on Williams. Nester’s

                                              - 11 -
responses to Michelle’s assertions—that the planned event would start in a few minutes, that she

was armed, that Williams knew she was armed, and that she was excited that Bill was almost

there—tend to illustrate that Nester knew of Michelle’s plan and encouraged her to continue.

       Michelle’s responses to Nester’s questions, “where’s his car,” and “where’s the gun,”

show that Nester was observing Michelle’s home because she was aware Taz’s car was not

outside Michelle’s home. Furthermore, Nester’s questions illustrate that Nester knew Michelle

had a gun and she wanted to know Williams’s identity. Because the Commonwealth did not

offer Michelle’s statements for the truth of the assertions, they were not hearsay and the trial

judge did not err in admitting them.

       II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       In challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion to strike the malicious wounding and

robbery charges, Nester necessarily asserts that the fact finder should not have been allowed to

even consider the charge because “[a] motion to strike challenges whether the evidence is

sufficient to submit the case to the [fact finder].” Linnon v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 92, 98

(2014) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 223 (2013)). As a result, her challenge

raises the questions of whether the evidence adduced sufficiently presented “a prima facie case

[of malicious wounding and robbery as a principal in the second degree] for consideration by

the” fact finder. Vay v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 236, 249 (2017) (quoting Hawkins v.

Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 650, 657 (2015)).

       “What the elements of the offense are is a question of law that we review de novo.”

Linnon, 287 Va. at 98. “Whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to prove each of those

elements is a factual finding, which will not be set aside on appeal unless it is plainly wrong.”

Id. “In reviewing that factual finding, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth and give it the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.”

                                               - 12 -
Id. “After so viewing the evidence, the question is whether any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In sum, if there is

evidence to support the conviction, the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its

judgment, even if its view of the evidence might differ from the conclusions reached by the

finder of fact at the trial.” Id.

        Nester asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she knowingly committed an

overt act in furtherance of Williams’s malicious wounding and robbery or that she shared

Michelle’s criminal intent to maliciously wound or rob Williams. Nester asserts that there is no

evidence that she provided Michelle with a gun. Additionally, she was not present when Williams

was maliciously wounded and robbed. She further claims that even if she provided Michelle with a

gun, there is no evidence that she did so knowing Michelle would use it to maliciously wound and

rob Williams. Nester asserts that, at best, the evidence supports a conclusion that she “knew

Michelle was upset that Williams had stolen marijuana from her and that Michelle planned to

confront him in some way about the theft.” She claims that, in any event, she did not know how

Michelle planned to confront Williams.

        “If any person maliciously shoot, stab, cut, or wound any person or by any means cause him

bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill, he shall . . . be guilty of a Class 3

felony.” Code § 18.2-51. “A conviction for robbery requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant alone, or acting in concert with others, took property from the victim by force, threats,

or violence, and that the intent to steal co-existed with the act of force.” Pugliese v.

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 92 (1993).

        “In the case of every felony, every principal in the second degree and every accessory before

the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in the first

degree,” except in certain homicide offenses. Code § 18.2-18. “A principal in the first degree is the

                                                   - 13 -
actual perpetrator of the crime. A principal in the second degree, or an aider or abettor as [s]he is

sometimes termed, is one who is present, actually or constructively, assisting the perpetrator in the

commission of the crime.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 131, 156 (2010) (quoting

Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 482 (2005)).

        “In order to convict an accused as a principal in the second degree, the Commonwealth

must prove ‘that the defendant procured, encouraged, countenanced, or approved the criminal

act.’” Lebron v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 540, 553-54 (2011) (quoting McMorris v.

Commonwealth, 276 Va. 500, 505 (2008)). “It is a well-settled rule that a defendant is guilty as a

principal in the second degree if he is guilty of some overt act done knowingly in furtherance of

the commission of the crime, or if he shared in the criminal intent of the principal committing the

crime.” McMorris, 276 Va. at 505; Code § 18.2-18. To share the criminal intent has been

interpreted to mean that “the accused must either know or have reason to know of the principal’s

criminal intention and must intend to encourage, incite, or aid the principal’s commission of the

crime.” Goode v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 380, 386 (2008) (quoting McGhee v.

Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422, 427 (1980)).

        “Mere presence when a crime is committed is, of course, not sufficient to render one guilty

as aider or abettor.” Pugliese, 16 Va. App. at 93 (quoting Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 99

(1942) (citations omitted)). However, “proof that a person is present at the commission of a crime

without disapproving or opposing it, is evidence from which, in connection with other

circumstances,” a fact finder could infer “that [s]he assented thereto, lent to it [her] countenance and

approval, and was thereby aiding and abetting the same.” Id. at 93-94.

        “The Commonwealth can, and most often must, present circumstantial evidence to prove

that a defendant aided or abetted in the commission of a crime.” McMorris, 276 Va. at 506; see

Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 123 (1983); Spradlin v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 523,

                                                 - 14 -
527 (1954). “However, when the Commonwealth relies on circumstantial evidence, all

circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and exclude

all reasonable conclusions inconsistent with guilt.” McMorris, 276 Va. at 506. “When the

alleged accomplice is actually present and performs overt acts of assistance or encouragement,

he has communicated to the perpetrator his willingness to have the crime proceed and has

demonstrated that he shares the criminal intent of the perpetrator.” Carr v. Commonwealth, 69

Va. App. 106, 114 (2018) (quoting Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 539 (1991)).

       Here, the facts and circumstances preceding, during, and after the crimes were sufficient

for a reasonable fact finder to conclude Nester aided and abetted Michelle in maliciously

wounding and robbing Williams. In the afternoon before the incident, Michelle informed Nester

that she lost a quarter pound of marijuana, that she needed cameras and a safe, and asked Nester

to facilitate buying a safe. Nester agreed that Michelle needed cameras and a safe and asserted

that she would help Michelle get one. Later Michelle asked Nester, “does daddy still have that

pistol set aside for me? I want it.” Nester told Michelle, “I know before he said he wanted you to

take a safety class and go with him to go shoot.” From this conversation a reasonable fact finder

could conclude that Nester knew about Michelle’s drug dealing operation and that she was

willing to help Michelle acquire cameras, a safe, and a pistol to facilitate the operation.

       At 1:03 a.m. on September 12, minutes before the incident, Nester asked Michelle if she

was “ok.” That Nester initiated a text conversation with Michelle late at night mere minutes

before the incident implies knowledge that her daughter might be distressed at that moment

concerning what was about to happen. Michelle informed Nester that it was “T minus 10

minutes until shit goes down,” that Taz was downstairs, and that Bill was on his way to her

home. Nester did not respond by asking what Michelle meant by the comment. Rather, Nester

asked Michelle, “[w]here [Taz’s] car” was, indicating that Nester was looking out and had not

                                                - 15 -
observed Taz’s car. Michelle said that Dodson had collected Taz because Taz’s car was not

working. After learning Williams’s identity, Nester asked Michelle, “so where’s the gun,” thus

revealing Nester’s knowledge that Michelle had a firearm. Michelle explained that the gun was

next to her pillow and that Williams knew she had it. Finally, when Michelle’s accomplices

arrived and Michelle expressed excitement, Nester validated Michelle’s eagerness and did not

discourage Michelle from carrying through with her plan. From this exchange, a reasonable fact

finder could infer that Nester knew about Michelle’s plans to confront Williams using a gun and

that other people were going to be involved.

          When Michelle found a bag of marijuana in the center console of Williams’s vehicle,

Glovier testified that Nester appeared in Michelle’s driveway. Familiar with Nester, Dodson heard

her in the driveway through the bedroom window while he was with Williams in Michelle’s

bedroom. When Michelle instructed Nester to retrieve a mason jar of her marijuana, Nester did

so. Upon returning with the marijuana jar, Nester asked Glovier, “how is it going?” From this

question, and Nester’s actions just prior to it, a reasonable fact finder could infer that Nester was

aware of what was happening to Williams and that she was complicit.

          The next morning, Dodson observed that Nester was “anxious and jittery” because “she had

seen a car go up and down the road” and believed it was a police vehicle. Once Michelle observed

the vehicle, Nester provided Michelle with a list of things to say to the police if they questioned her.

Nester and Michelle then loaded clothing into a trash bag, and Nester left with the bag. Such

conduct supports a conclusion that Nester wanted to avoid police contact because of her

involvement in the incident involving Williams. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 52, 57

(2010).

          When viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and granting to it all

reasonable inferences, a reasonable fact finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

                                                 - 16 -
Nester knew about the planned confrontation of Williams before it occurred, knew that Michelle

had a gun, was at Michelle’s house during at least part of the attack on Williams, and assisted

Michelle in identifying the marijuana in Williams’s car as Michelle’s. Thus, Nester assented and

lent her countenance and approval to the operation, “thereby aiding and abetting the same.”

Pugliese, 16 Va. App. at 94. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding Nester guilty as a

principal in the second degree in the malicious wounding and robbery of Williams.

                                           CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                             Affirmed.

                                                - 17 -