Court Opinion

ID: 9562216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:23:48.714082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:15.129883
License: Public Domain

Oxner, Justice
(concurring in result).
I agree with Mr. Justice Legge that the exception extends to statements against the penal interest of the declarant. Our decisions so hold and I think properly so. But I do not think that the facts bring the instant case within the exception.
Where the declarant seeks not only to implicate himself but a third party, I am doubtful whether such declaration may be used as substantive evidence against such third party. Closely analogous is the doctrine of admissions and confessions which permits such statement to be considered only against the person making it. In Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wash. (2d) 35, 129 P. (2d) 813, 823, the Court said: “A statement which under some circumstances may be against the interest of the declarant may not be used to prove matters as to which the statement is not against his interest.” Here the declaration is not being offered for the purpose of showing that Martin committed the crime of bribery, a fact against his interest, but to show that McClain committed bribery. Assuming, however, that a declaration of this kind may under proper circumstances be used against a third party, it should be closely scrutinized so as to avoid an unjust result.
It is essential that we keep in mind the ground for this exception to the hearsay rule. It is based upon the principle of experience that a statement asserting a fact distinctly *468against one’s interests is entirely unlikely to be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect, and is thus sufficiently guaranteed, though oath and cross-examination are wanting. It is upon the assumption that no man will speak falsely to his own hurt and will not make a declaration against his interest unless truth compels it. Therefore, to be admissible, there should be a circumstantial guarantee of the trustworthiness of the declaration.
The declarations offered in evidence were statements alleged to have been made by Frank Martin to relatives and friends. It is not reasonable to suppose that he thereby intended to expose himself to prosecution, or that he made these statements under any belief that he should do so. Instead of being in the nature of a confession, they were merely loose statements heedlessly made by a braggadocio. They were so characterized by a number of these witnesses. One of them testified that “Frank Martin loved to brag a little”, and another said that knowing Frank Martin as he did, he didn’t “pay any attention to the conversation.” It also may be reasonably inferred that the remarks to some of the witnesses were made to deter them from reporting Martin to the Sheriff for bootlegging.
Of course, the truth of the declaration itself, as well as the credibility of the witness who undertakes to repeat it, must ordinarily be left to the jury. However, it is the duty of the Court in the first instance to determine whether the circumstances are such as to reasonably warrant an inference that the declarations are of a trustworthy nature. In the instant case, I do not think they are.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result of the opinion of Mr. Justice Moss.