Court Opinion

ID: 9721166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:50:10.370757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.771832
License: Public Domain

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge, dissenting. I would reverse the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress because appellant was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his Miranda rights. This constituted a clear violation of his right to be free from self incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The majority would affirm on the ground that the search was incident to a lawful arrest because the officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. The majority does not address the issue of whether appellant was entitled to Miranda warnings and indeed, would be hard-pressed to argue that he was not entitled to such warnings. Our law is clear that a person is entitled to Miranda warnings when he is deprived of freedom of action by formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. A suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings when he is interrogated while in custody or when his freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). Here, appellant was subject to custodial interrogation without benefit of Miranda warnings; yet, neither the trial court nor the majority determined that appellant waived his Miranda rights. The fact that the officers may have had probable cause to arrest appellant does not mean that they were authorized to arrest him without issuing Miranda warnings. In denying appellant’s motion to suppress, the trial judge stated that once the vehicle was stopped, events transpired that gave the officers “probable cause to go further than they initially thought.” The judge further stated that the circumstances did not constitute an in-custody interrogation, noting that the subjects were still at liberty and that they were not under arrest, were not in an interrogation room at the police station, and were not in the back seat of a police car. These statements are inaccurate statements of the law and are doubly erroneous. First, they suggest that simply because someone is in a police station or a police car, that he is automatically subject to custodial interrogation if he is being questioned. This is incorrect. See Manatt v. State, 311 Ark. 17, 842 S.W.2d 845 (1992) (holding that where officer issued offender a citation in lieu of arrest after a routine traffic stop, the accused was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda warnings); Day v. State, 306 Ark. 520, 816 S.W.2d 852 (1991) (holding statements made at a police station were not the result of custodial interrogation); Berkemer v. McCarty, supra (holding that keeping an individual inside of a police car, after a routine traffic stop, does not constitute custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes). Second, the statements suggest that unless someone is in a police station or a police car, he is free to leave. This is also untrue. See, e.g., Keenom v. State, 349 Ark. 381, 80 S.W.3d 743 (2002) (holding a reasonable person would have not felt free to leave his yard and return to his home where the officers continued to question the defendant, who was partially clothed, under the glare of the officers’ headlights). Rather, the law is clear that a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Keenom v. State, supra. A suspect who has not been formally arrested is entitled to Miranda warnings when he is interrogated while in custody or when his freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. See Berkemer v. McCarty, supra. The applicability of Miranda to traffic stops was discussed by our supreme court in Manatt v. State, supra. The Manatt court held: In Berkemer v. McCarthy, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that persons temporarily detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop are not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. The Court reasoned that Miranda warnings were not required in such cases because the stop was temporary, it was public, and the atmosphere on a public street is not comparable to the “police dominated” custodial interrogation. The Court held that a motorist who is detained pursuant to a traffic stop is entitled to recitation of his rights only when the stop becomes such that he is “subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes.” Mannatt, 311 Ark. at 26, 842 S.W.2d at 849. Thus, a person who is questioned during a routine traffic stop is not subjected to custodial interrogation. Conway v. State, 62 Ark. App. 125, 969 S.W.2d 669 (1998). Further, Miranda warnings are not required if the questioning by police is simply investigatory. Shelton v. State, 287 Ark. 322, 699 S.W.2d 728 (1985). In this case, the facts demonstrate appellant was subject to custodial interrogation. Three uniformed officers were present. A fourth officer stood near the subjects in case anyone tried to escape. In addition, three police cars were parked behind Smith’s car and had it blocked. Compare Bohannon v. State, 72 Ark. App. 422, 38 S.W.3d 902 (2001) (holding the defendant was not in custody where an officer blocked the defendant in by parking behind him, but the defendant was blocked in only because he decided to park in front of a locked gate). Also on the scene was a 110-115 pound bite-and-hold dog. The subjects originally stood at the back of the car, then after about fifteen minutes, were moved to a wall by the front of the store. They were searched for weapons two times by two different officers, in addition to the search that resulted in the seizure of marijuana. No reasonable person in appellant’s position would have felt free to leave after the encounter plainly went beyond a routine traffic stop. In addition, after the canine search was concluded and evidence of drugs was found, the questioning was no longer “simply investigatory” because at that point, the officer had probable cause to believe a crime had been committed and, moreover, had probable cause to believe that appellant, as an occupant of the vehicle in which the evidence of drugs was found, had committed that crime. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (December 15, 2003). Terry testified that, from his experience, if a drug dog gives a positive alert, and drugs are not found in the vehicle, they are usually on the person of an occupant of the car, and that shoes are a common hiding place. After the dog alerted in this case, the officers were no longer asking routine questions or performing routine tasks related to a stop for the display of fictitious tags. The officers were not simply trying to ascertain whether a crime had been committed, but which of the three occupants had possession of the marijuana that the drug dog had detected. Only after another pat-down revealed no drugs were the men asked or ordered to remove their shoes. It is farcical to suggest that a person would reasonably believe that he was free to leave after an officer found evidence of narcotics in a vehicle in which that person was a passenger when precisely those same facts gave the officer probable cause to arrest. In asserting that the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant, the majority relies upon Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 60 S.W.3d 464 (2001). The Laime court discussed the detention associated with a valid traffic stop as follows: [Hjaving made a valid traffic stop, the police officer may detain the offending motorist while the officer completes a number of routine but somewhat time-consuming tasks related to the traffic violation, such as computerized checks of the vehicle’s registration and the driver’s license and criminal history, and the writing up of a citation or warning. See United States v. Carrazco, 91 F.3d 65, 66 (8th Cir. 1996). During this process, the officer may ask the motorist routine questions such as his destination, the purpose of the trip, or whether the officer may search the vehicle, and he may act on whatever information is volunteered. 347 Ark. at 157-58, 60 S.W.3d at 474-75 (quoting United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, in relying on Laime, supra, the majority confuses the issue of whether the officers had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search with a defendant’s rights to have Miranda warnings issued. Laime, supra, did not involve an officer’s failure to issue Miranda warnings. Moreover, Laime does not stand for the proposition that allowing an officer to act on information received during a routine traffic stop means that the officer’s conduct thereafter never rises to the level of a custodial interrogation. Further, Laime does not relieve an officer of his duty to inform a suspect of his Miranda rights when the routine traffic stop becomes a custodial investigation. The stop in this case began as a routine traffic stop; after the canine sniff was conducted and yielded evidence of narcotics, the traffic stop bloomed into a custodial interrogation. Finally, the State asserts that the trial court found that appellant consented to the search by removing his shoes. The record does not support that the court found that appellant consented; rather, the court found that the officers had probable cause to conduct the search. Unsurprisingly, the majority does not address the issue of consent, which would be relevant to a determination of whether appellant waived the right to receive his Miranda warnings. The record does not support the premise that appellant consented to the search. Even if Officer Terry merely requested that appellant remove his shoes instead of ordering him to do so, that activity was not voluntary but constituted interrogation. “Interrogation” includes express questioning or its functional equivalent, including words or actions on the part of a police officer, other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody, that the officer should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The crucial point is that, regardless of whether Terry asked or ordered appellant to remove his shoes, Terry did so knowing that his words and actions were likely to elicit an incriminating response. Appellant did not consent to be searched by spontaneously removing his shoes; he removed his shoes only at the officer’s request or direction. The fact that the officer had probable cause to effect a search did not nullify appellant’s right to be free from self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. I respectfully dissent.