Court Opinion

ID: 9705669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:15:27.056506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:13.339681
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Senior Judge *
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I believe our court, in State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Iowa 1977), correctly interpreted our statute defining “delivery” of a controlled substance. The case should not be overruled. In 1977, when Lott was decided, “delivery” was defined by the legislature as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance.” See Iowa Code § 204.101(8) (1977). The same wording is still used to define “delivery.” See id. § 124.101(7) (1999).
In Lott, we said the principal whose crime is defined is a person who participates in the delivery of a controlled substance. A customer is not guilty of delivery because by definition the recipient is not the deliverer. “Moreover, because the deliverer is not the transferee, one who aids only the transferee cannot be guilty of delivery.” Lott, 255 N.W.2d at 107.
The legislature has not changed this statute since our interpretation of it in 1977. It is irrelevant that other state courts in viewing their statutory scheme have reached other interpretations. The meaning of Iowa’s statutory definition of “delivery” is crystal clear, as shown by our holding in Lott.
I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

 Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).