Court Opinion

ID: 9374021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:13:39.635292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.603166
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed February 22, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1826
                       Lower Tribunal No. 17-16674
                          ________________

                           Arlene J. Delgado,
                                 Petitioner,

                                     vs.

                              Jason Miller,
                                Respondent.

     A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.

     Velegal PLLC, and Laline Concepcion-Veloso, for petitioner.

     Nancy A. Hass P.A., and Nancy A. Hass (Fort Lauderdale), for
respondent.

Before HENDON, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.

     MILLER, J.
      Through this proceeding, petitioner, the mother, seeks a writ of

prohibition to prevent the assigned trial judge from further presiding over the

case. For the reasons articulated below, we deny relief.

      Tracing its origins to a petition to establish the paternity of a child

conceived and born outside of marriage, this high-conflict, heavily litigated

dispute is familiar to this court. See, e.g., Delgado v. Miller, 264 So. 3d 1040

(Fla. 3d DCA 2019); Delgado v. Miller, 290 So. 3d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019);

Delgado v. Miller, 290 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019); Delgado v. Miller, 314

So. 3d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020); J.M. v. A.J.D., 349 So. 3d 281 (Fla. 3d DCA

2021); Delgado v. Miller, 349 So. 3d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021); J.M. v. A.J.D.,

337 So. 3d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022); Delgado v. Miller, No. 3D22-0118, 2022

WL 17156671 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 31, 2022); Delgado v. Miller, No. 3D22-

0341, 2022 WL 2816552 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 6, 2022), review dismissed, No.

SC22-879, 2022 WL 2508583 (Fla. July 7, 2022), reinstatement denied, No.

SC22-879, 2022 WL 2720518 (Fla. July 14, 2022); A.J.D. v. J.M., No. 3D22-

1280, 2022 WL 17128822 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 4, 2022), reh’g denied (Aug.

24, 2022). A succession of disqualifications and recusals have stymied the

progress of the case for the past five and a half years, rendering finality an

elusive goal.

                                       2
      The instant petition follows the denial of the mother’s eighth motion for

disqualification. The mother has successfully disqualified at least one prior

judicial officer. Observing that limited judicial resources demand vigilance in

thwarting any potential misuse of disqualification motions for strategic

reasons, we review the denial of disqualification of a successor judge under

a slightly different framework than that applicable to an initially assigned

judge. Our review is guided by several separate, but overlapping, principles

of law.

      It is well-settled under Florida law that “[a] motion to recuse or

disqualify a trial judge is legally sufficient when the alleged facts would create

in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair

and impartial trial.” Valdes-Fauli v. Valdes-Fauli, 903 So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla.

3d DCA 2005).       The fear of prejudice must of course be “reasonably

objective.” Se. Bank, N.A. v. Capua, 584 So. 2d 101, 103 (Fla. 3d DCA

1991).

      It is axiomatic, however, that “a judge’s adverse rulings or factual

findings following an evidentiary hearing cannot ordinarily serve as a basis

for a party to seek to disqualify the trial judge.” Samra v. Bedoyan, 299 So.

3d 1138, 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020); see also Aquasol Condo. Ass’n v. HSBC

Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 312 So. 3d 105, 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018); Pilkington

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v. Pilkington, 182 So. 3d 776, 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). Indeed, to impute a

contrary presumption would render the judge incapable of weighing the

credibility of competing evidence.

      Regarding successor judges, section 38.10, Florida Statutes (2022),

provides, in pertinent part:

      [W]hen any party to any action has suggested the disqualification
      of a trial judge and an order has been made admitting the
      disqualification of such judge and another judge has been
      assigned and transferred to act in lieu of the judge so held to be
      disqualified, the judge so assigned and transferred is not
      disqualified on account of alleged prejudice against the party
      making the suggestion in the first instance, or in favor of the
      adverse party, unless such judge admits and holds that it is then
      a fact that he or she does not stand fair and impartial between
      the parties.

§ 38.10, Fla. Stat. Similarly, Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial

Administration 2.330(i) states:

      If a judge has been previously disqualified on motion for alleged
      prejudice or partiality under subdivision (e), a successor judge
      cannot be disqualified based on a successive motion by the
      same party unless the successor judge rules that he or she is in
      fact not fair or impartial in the case. Such a successor judge may
      rule on the truth of the facts alleged in support of the motion.

Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(i).

      Consistent with these sources of authority, an order denying the

disqualification of a successor judge is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

King v. State, 840 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 2003). Prohibition does not lie

                                      4
unless “the record clearly refutes the successor judge’s decision to deny the

motion.” Kokal v. State, 901 So. 2d 766, 774 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Pinfield v.

State, 710 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)).

      Here, the grounds asserted below in furtherance of disqualification are

all derived from findings made by the trial court in a fifty-six-page order

granting the mother attorney’s fees. The order was rendered following an

evidentiary hearing and significantly reduced the amount of fees sought by

the mother. In the order, the court characterized the parties’ historically

acrimonious relationship, described the mother’s writing style as “histrionic,”

and found the mother was directing the litigation strategy. 1

      The mother argues these findings reveal gender bias by the judge, in

large part because the word “histrionic” is derived from the Greek term

“hysteria,” meaning uterus.     Putting aside the etymology of the word

“histrionic,” its contemporary definition is not suggestive of gender, and the

complained-of findings are all tethered to factual and legal determinations

regarding the disputed authorship of documents and the ensuing

1
  The mother asserts the assigned trial judge adopted wording used by the
father in prior filings. We reiterate the well-settled principle that such
submissions should not “substitute for a thoughtful and independent analysis
of the facts, issues, and law by the trial judge.” Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875
So. 2d 383, 390 (Fla. 2004).

                                      5
compensability of fees. 2 Viewed as a whole, the order merely recounts the

protracted case history and takes both parties equally to task for their

participation in years of purported scorched earth litigation.

      Under these circumstances and informed by our more stringent

standard of review, the record does not clearly refute the decision by the trial

judge to deny disqualification. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of

prohibition.

      Petition denied.

      LOBREE, J., concurs.

2
  “Histrionic” has two definitions: “Of or relating to actors or acting,” and
“[e]xcessively dramatic or emotional; affected.” Histrionic, The American
Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2019).

                                       6
      HENDON, J., dissenting.             Arlene Delgado v. Jason Miller
                                          Case No. 3D22-1826
      On de novo review of the record, I conclude that the record presents a

reasonable basis to believe that the trial judge would be unable to impartially

consider the evidence in the case. The trial judge's comments established

objectively reasonable grounds for the Mother’s subjective fear of not

receiving a fair hearing. Accordingly, I would grant the Petition for Writ of

Prohibition.

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