Court Opinion

ID: 9684695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:08:32.626936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:58.930450
License: Public Domain

ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ROBERTS, Judge.
In its motion for rehearing, the State maintains that appellant’s plea of former conviction was properly overruled by virtue of Art. 28.13, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., and our holding in the case of Harrison v. State, 409 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Cr.App.1966). The State contends that the holding in Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1969) does not affect Art. 28.13 or our holding in Harrison v. State, supra, because Waller only overruled the “dual sovereignty” fiction which had been followed by a number of states, not including Texas.
Article 28.13, V.A.C.C.P., provides:
“A former judgment of acquittal or conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction shall be a bar to any further prosecution for the same offense, but shall not bar a prosecution for any higher grade of offense over which said court had not jurisdiction, unless such judgment was had upon indictment or information, in which case the prosecution shall be barred for all grades of the offense.”
In essence, the statute provides that a conviction or acquittal in a lower court is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution in a higher court unless the first prosecution was had upon indictment or information. A conviction or acquittal had upon a complaint only is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for a higher grade of offense if the court which tried the first case lacked jurisdiction to try the higher offense, e. g., Allen v. State, 389 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Cr.App.1965).
The double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution are applicable to the states. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). In Waller v. Florida, supra, the United States Supreme Court overruled a Florida rule which held that a conviction in a municipal court could not bar a subsequent prosecution in a state court for the same offense, and in doing so, the court pointed out that the judicial power of both municipal and state courts sprang from the same organic law. Since the power of both courts came from the same source, the Federal-State analogy was not applicable.
Upon consideration of the issue, we are of the opinion that the mode of procedure used in commencing a criminal prosecution (i. e. whether upon complaint or information or indictment) does not affect the fact that it is state action. Complaints are brought “In the name and by authority of the State of Texas.” Art. 45.01, V.A. C.C.P. Therefore, that the prosecution was commenced by a complaint rather than by an information or indictment does not lessen the fact that the accused has been subjected to a prosecution brought about by the authority of the State. Whether the prosecution in the municipal court is had on information or by complaint, the possible penalties upon conviction are the same.
In its argument, the State contends that since a complaint may be made by any per*430son without the knowledge of the district or county attorney or the grand jury,1 a prosecution by complaint cannot act as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for a higher grade of offense, apparently because the State has not acted affirmatively through either its counsel or grand jury. This contention is not compelling in the constitutional sense, nor in terms of our existing State procedure.
That the State has chosen to permit certain prosecutions to be commenced in its name by complaint made by a private citizen does not make the prosecution a private action, and the person so prosecuted should not suffer a loss of his protection against double jeopardy merely because of the State’s choice of manner of commencing the prosecution.
Even under our existing procedure, a prosecution upon complaint acts as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same crime in all cases except where the subsequent prosecution is for a higher degree of offense over which the first court lacked jurisdiction. Thus, a judgment» rendered on a complaint is a valid bar in certain instances, notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution was not commenced by a state officer. Art. 28.13, V.A.C.C.P. See Ex parte Hernandez, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 303, 71 S.W.2d 289 (1934). Thus, it appears that a prosecution had on complaint has never been regarded as a nullity for purposes of serving as a bar to a subsequent prosecution, but rather, has failed to serve as a bar in certain circumstances only. We conclude that this is impermissible. In our opinion, the State, having chosen a particular mode of commencing a prosecution, is bound by its choice.
The State contends that if a prosecution on complaint can act as a bar to a higher grade of offense in a higher court, then many serious crimes may be disposed of by complaints and guilty pleas to lesser offenses had without the knowledge of the county or district attorney. This may well be the case. However, under the law as it exists now, the State, having authorized prosecutions in a particular manner, may not thereafter seek to avoid the effect of such prosecutions. We see no reason why the State could not limit prosecutions to those commenced with the knowledge and approval of a proper authority, but since the State has not done so, it is bound by the methods currently authorized.
We do not mean to hold that a void proceeding (as opposed to one which is merely voidable) can serve as a bar to a subsequent prosecution. It is generally recognized that a void proceeding has no effect in support of a plea of former conviction or acquittal. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); Barnes v. State, 79 Tex.Cr.R. 395, 185 S.W. 2 (1916); State v. Howell, 220 S.C. 178, 66 S.E.2d 701 (1951); State v. Haye, 72 Wash.2d 461, 433 P.2d 884 (1967). See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 244, Anno. 75 A.L.R.2d 683, 696, § 5.
Likewise, we do not hold that the State, in response to a plea of former conviction, may not show that the former conviction was obtained by fraud or collusion on the part of the accused and his accusers in the former proceeding. A conviction obtained by fraud or collusion or obtained at the instigation of the defendant will not support a plea of former conviction, e. g,, Richardson v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 403, 5 S.W.2d 141 (1928) ; Edwards v. Commonwealth, 233 Ky. 356, 25 S.W.2d 746 (1930) ; Smith v. State, 219 Miss. 741, 69 So.2d 837 (1954); Howell v. State, 104 Miss. 295, 61 So. 314 (1913); State v. Howell, 220 S.C. 178, 66 S.E.2d 701 (1951). See generally Anno. 75 A.L.R.2d 683, 691, § 4; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 245.
*431We hold only that, in light of Waller v. Florida, supra, a judgment of acquittal or conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a further prosecution for the same offense, regardless of whether the first prosecution was had upon complaint, information or indictment, and regardless of whether the court in which the first prosecution was had was without jurisdiction to try the higher grade of the offense.2
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
MORRISON and DOUGLAS, JJ., concur in the result.

. An indictment is the written statement of a grand jury. Art. 21.01, V.A.C.C.P. An information is a written statement presented in behalf of the State by the district or county attorney. Art. 21.20, V.A.C.C.P.

. Prior to Waller v. Florida, supra, there had been a split of authority as to whether a conviction or acquittal of a lesser offense in a court which has jurisdiction to try the offense acts as a bar to a subsequent prosecution in another court for a higher grade of offense which the first court lacked jurisdiction to try. See Anno. 4 A.L.R.Sd 874, § 3-8. The “majority” rule was that the first judgment in such cases was not a bar to a subsequent prosecution. Texas ad-liered to the majority rule only if the first prosecution was had upon a complaint. If the prosecution was had upon an information (which is possible, but very unusual, in justice and corporation courts), then the first prosecution would serve as a bar. Art. 28.13, V.A.C.C.P. In light of Waller v. Florida, we believe that the majority view is no longer tenable, and that a prosecution in any state court is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.