Court Opinion

ID: 9778239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:56:41.150255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:05.543742
License: Public Domain

DAUPHINOT, Judge,
concurring.
As the majority opinion correctly points out, the State in this case introduced no evidence whatsoever. The record contains no testimony, document, stipulation, or other evidence tending to show Santallan’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or even that a crime was committed. While any evidence produced by the State would have made Santal-lan’s appeal an insufficiency appeal and thus barred,1 the State, in the case before us, *311offered absolutely no evidence to prove San-tallan’s guilt. Consequently, the judgment was not rendered pursuant to Article 1.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.2 Article 1.15 is very clear that “in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same.”3 Thus, although Rule 40(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure establishes the prerequisites for appealing an article 1.15 guilty plea, these requirements do not apply in this case because Santallan’s plea was not made pursuant to article 1.15.4
Moreover, where there is no evidence upon which to base a conviction, a violation of due process has occurred.5 Because error is fundamental when an accused is convicted without any evidence whatsoever to support a key element of the offense,6 justice requires our review even when the Appellant fails to assign a “no evidence” point.7 Although in Helms v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals held that “where a plea of guilty is voluntarily and understanding^ made, all nonjurisdictional defects including claimed deprivation of federal due process are waived,” 8 due process is inherent to the vol-untariness of a confession. In other words, without due process requiring that the State put on some evidence of the defendant’s guilt, there has not been a “knowing and voluntary” plea.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the ability to appeal is limited by rule 40(b)(1) even when the State fails to provide sufficient evidence to support the plea of guilty or nolo contendere as required by article 1.15.9 In so doing, the Court of Criminal Appeals has decided to elevate a rule of appellate procedure above the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process and Due Course of Law provisions of both the federal and state constitutions.
Because we are merely an intermediate appellate court we are bound by the decisions of the highest state court. We may, nevertheless, inquire whether an appellate rule of procedure should displace existing law espousing the concept of fundamental fairness which requires some evidence to support each element of the offense alleged when a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere. Because current caselaw requires this course, I reluctantly concur.

. See Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732, 734-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).

. TexCode Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon Supp. 1996).

. Id. (emphasis added).

. TexR.Apf.P. 40(b)(1).

. Ex parte Coleman, 599 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978).

. Gonzalez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 574, 575 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (op. on reh’g).

. Cruz v. State, 629 S.W.2d 852, 858 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, pet. ref d).

. 484 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).

. See Rhem v. State, 873 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).