Court Opinion

ID: 9793942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:55:32.074581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:08:29.102351
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION OF
MARUMOTO, J.,
IN WHICH ABE, J., JOINS
I concur in the decision to affirm the judgment appealed from, but I disagree with the court’s reasoning in arriving at the decision.
I think that this case is governed solely by HRS § 103-25, without regard to any statement contained in the Special Notice to Bidders.
*667HRS § 103-25 disqualifies any prospective bidder, who has not given his written notice of intention to bid to the contracting officer not less than six days before the designated bid opening date, from submitting a bid for the contract for public work solicited in the published call for tenders.
I do not think that there is any question that the words “give written notice to the officer charged with letting such contract” means actual delivery of the notice to the contracting officer. It makes no difference whether the delivery is made personally or by mail. What is crucial is that the notice be before the contracting officer. St. Louis Printing Co. v. Aufderheide, 226 Mo. App. 680, 45 S.W.2d 543 (1932); United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (1916).
Here, the bid opening date designated in the call for tenders was May 18, 1972. So, appellant’s notice of intention to bid should have been delivered to appellee on or before May 12. The notice was delivered on May 17. The delivery was five days late. Consequently, appellant was not entitled to submit its bid. That is all there is to this case.
Appellant raised two points on this appeal. One was based on the mailed notices provisions of the Special Notice to Bidders. The other was based on the waiver provision of HRS § 103-27.
With regard to the point based on the Special Notice to Bidders, appellant could not have relied solely on the provision regarding mailed notices stamped with commercial meter. That provision would have required that appellant’s notice be before appellee on or before May 12. So, appellant attempted to equate that provision with the provision relating to mailed notices bearing the hour of posting stamped by the postal authorities, I do not think that it is necessary to discuss appellant’s involved, if not tortuous, argument in this regard, for it may be disposed of with a short answer.
The short answer is that the provision regarding mailed notices stamped by the postal authorities is invalid. That provision recognizes a mailed notice of intention to bid as timely if the hour of posting stamped thereon by the postal authorities is before midnight of the sixth day before the *668bid opening date even though the notice is delivered to appellee less than six days before such date. The provision is clearly in conflict with the plain language of HRS § 103-25. There is no provision in HRS § 103-25, or elsewhere in the statutes, which authorizes appellee to waive or change the time for the giving of the notice of intention to bid.
To have the force and effect of law, an administrative action “must not conflict with, alter or amend, or enlarge or impair the scope of the provisions of legislative enactment.” In the Matter of Carlson, 38 Haw. 9, 13 (1948). An administrative action in conflict with a statute does not become valid merely by remaining unchallenged for a long time. In re Thompson, 27 Haw. 221 (1923); Rogers v. City and County of Honolulu, 32 Haw. 722 (1932); Frank Nichols, Ltd. v. Vannatta, 33 Haw. 602 (1935).
On the point based on the waiver provision of HRS § 103-27, I think that the provision is not applicable to this case because it is concerned only with defects in bids, not with the qualification of prospective bidders to submit bids. Here, the issue is whether appellant was entitled to submit its bid, not whether there was any defect in the bid which appellant attempted to submit. Appellant clearly failed to qualify as a bidder under HRS § 103-25.
*674Howard K. Hoddick and John A. Hoskins (Anthony Hod-dick Reinwald & O’Connor of counsel) for defendants- appellees, for the petition.
*676Joseph A. Ryan and Edward Y. N. Kim, attorneys for plaintiff-appellant, for the motion.