Court Opinion

ID: 9658897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:21:23.69389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:01.468372
License: Public Domain

Wilkie, J.
(dissenting). The majority and the concurring opinions work at cross purposes. The majority opinion builds up the authority of the district attorney to decide whether or not a coroner’s inquest should be called. In effect, it strips the courts of any review of the district attorney’s decision not to order an inquest, provided that he demonstrates that he exercised his discretion in reaching that decision. However, the concurring opinion would hold that under sec. 966.15, Stats., the district attorney in Milwaukee county has no function in the ordering of inquests, that function having been assigned to the medical examiner (which office for Milwaukee county takes the place of coroner in the other 71 counties).
In my view, both the majority and concurring positions are incorrect. All agree that we are concerned here with construing and applying the provisions of ch. 966, Stats., and in particular, sec. 966.01, which spells out the responsibility and authority of the district attorney in the ordering of coroner’s inquests. As pertinent, that section provides:
“966.01 Inquests. Whenever the district attorney has notice of the death of any person and from the circumstances surrounding the same there is any reason to believe that murder, manslaughter, homicide resulting from negligent control of vicious animal, homicide by reckless conduct, homicide by negligent use of vehicle or firearm, or homicide by intoxicated user of vehicle or firearm may have been committed, or that death may have been due to self-murder or unexplained or suspicious circumstances, and the venue of such offense is in his county, excepting in cases where a criminal warrant or warrants have been issued, he shall forthwith order and require the coroner, deputy coroner, or in the event of the absence or dis*387ability of the coroner or deputy coroner, some municipal justice to take an inquest as to how such person came to his death. . . .”
It could be argued that the majority has put the word “good” back in the statute. In 1957 the legislature changed the wording of sec. 966.01, Stats., by changing the word “good” in the phrase “good reason to believe” to the word “any” in the statutory section as it now provides: “any reason to believe.” 1 If this were all that the majority opinion did, then the court would have to hold that the district attorney was required to order an inquest if there was any “good reason to believe” that circumstances existed calling for an inquest. In that situation, the court could review the evidence to determine whether there was, in fact, good reason to believe that circumstances existed which would require the district attorney to order an inquest. But this is not what the majority opinion has held. It has reached the conclusion that the district attorney’s decision as to whether there is “any reason to believe” is a matter entirely within the discretion of the district attorney. In reaching this conclusion the majority has held that there can be no abuse of discretion so long as there is a “record of the exercise of discretion.” In other words, there can be no abuse of discretion under this statute as long as there is a record of the district attorney’s investigation concluding that there is “no reason to believe” that circumstances exist under which an inquest should be called.
Thus, the majority does not review the circumstances surrounding the death, but merely determines whether the district attorney made an investigation. In so doing, the majority would provide no review by a court of law of the matter of whether, in fact, the district attorney has failed to order an inquest when there is “any reason to believe” that circumstances listed in the statute exist which require the calling of an inquest. The statute does *388not give the district attorney the sort of discretion spelled out by the majority. The district attorney has wide discretion on matters affecting coroner’s inquests, but that discretion comes into play after the inquest has been held. The district attorney is not obligated to prefer the charges recommended by the inquest. There are other examples in which the district attorney is vested with wide discretion in the decisions he reaches. One is provided by sec. 52.23, Stats., which provides that “. . . the district attorney, if he determines it to be to the best interest of the child” shall prosecute the paternity proceedings commenced by the mother of such child.
The concurring opinion misreads sec. 966.15, Stats. It fails to note that the medical examiner is “invested with the exclusive jurisdiction and power to take inquests” in Milwaukee county. (Emphasis added.) We are not concerned with taking inquests, but ordering them. The purpose of sec. 966.15 is clearly to provide that the functions normally vested in a coroner in the other 71 counties are assumed by the medical examiner in Milwaukee county. The function of the district attorney under sec. 966.01 in investigating and ordering inquests remains unchanged and the provisions of sec. 966.01 are just as binding as to the district attorney of Milwaukee county as to the district attorneys in other counties. The concurring opinion would substitute the words “medical examiner” for the words “district attorney” in sec. 966.01. Thus the medical examiner would be authorized to order himself to take an inquest. This cannot be what was intended by the legislature.2
For the reasons indicated, I would affirm the lower court’s decision directing the district attorney to hold an inquest into the death of Jerome Kurkierewicz, as pro*389vided for by sec. 966.01, Stats. Even though the shooting might have been in self-defense, unless under all of the circumstances surrounding the death it is apparent that no other reason for the death could exist, the district attorney is obligated by sec. 966.01 to order an inquest. As petitioner contends, the fact that the deceased was using a table knife with a round edge, the fact that no other attempt was made to stop the deceased, and the fact that the officer did not shoot Jerome in the arm or leg, but shot him in the head and chest, indicate that self-defense is not the only reason which might be attributed to the shooting. These argued facts indicate that the statutory standard, set forth in sec. 966.01, was not followed by the district attorney, and that an inquest should have been ordered.
Of course, the mere holding of an inquest under sec. 966.01, Stats., does not imply that a crime has been committed. It merely indicates that there may be reason to believe that one has been committed. The whole purpose of the inquest is to inquire into all of the circumstances surrounding the death with a view to ascertaining whether a crime has been committed. As the majority correctly states, the office of district attorney is invested with wide discretion in the performance of its numerous duties. But, also as the majority correctly notes: “There is ... no basis for holding that his duties in representing the state are not subordinate to legislative direction as to the cases in which he shall proceed.” 3 The legislature has precisely spelled out the duties of the district attorney in connection with the ordering of coroner’s inquests. The district attorney in this case has not carried out these functions in accordance with the statute and has been correctly directed to order an inquest.

 Ch. 128, sec. 1, Laws of 1967.

 In fact, sec. 59.466 (6), Stats., provides, as to counties of more than 500,000 population, “It is the responsibility of the district attorney ... to perform all appropriate duties and appear whenever he may be designated in matters within chs. 292, 958, 964, 965, and 966.” Enacted by ch. 271, Laws of 1965.

 State v. Coubal (1946), 248 Wis. 247, 257, 21 N. W. 2d 381.