Court Opinion

ID: 9948367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 21:03:43.667962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:29.408144
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/6/24 Sattley v. Mirisch CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

JOSH SATTLEY et al.,                                      B325969

         Plaintiffs and Appellants,                       (Los Angeles County
                                                          Super. Ct. No. 21STCV45066)
         v.

JOHN MIRISCH,

     Defendant and
Respondent.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Barbara M. Scheper, Judge. Affirmed.

      JW Howard/Attorneys, John W. Howard and Scott J. Street
for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

      Richards, Watson & Gershon, Jennifer Petrusis, Ginetta L.
Giovinco and Garen N. Bostanian for Defendant and Respondent.
       Josh Sattley and Ettore Berardinelli, Jr., (collectively
appellants) sued Muntu Davis, an individual acting in his official
capacity as the Health Officer of Los Angeles County; the County
of Los Angeles; the City of Beverly Hills (City); and John Mirisch
(respondent).1 Appellants’ complaint against these individuals
and entities involved events surrounding appellants’ requests for
exemption from Los Angeles County’s 2021 vaccine mandate,
which required healthcare workers, including paramedics and
emergency workers, to get the COVID-19 vaccine. Respondent
was sued in his individual capacity but was acting as a member
of the city council during the relevant time.
       Appellants appeal from an order sustaining respondent’s
demurrers to their third and fourth causes of action against
respondent for violation of title 42 United States Code section
1983 and Civil Code section 52.1 (section 52.1 or the Bane Act),
respectively. Appellants also challenge the trial court’s order
granting respondent’s special motion to strike the same causes of
action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section
425.16 or “anti-SLAPP” statute) and resulting order that
appellants pay respondent nearly $13,000 in legal fees.
       We affirm the orders.

                  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      Appellants’ complaint contains the following allegations:
On August 12, 2021, Davis, the Health Officer of the County of
Los Angeles, issued an order requiring certain healthcare
workers to get a COVID-19 vaccination by September 30, 2021.
The order provided for exemptions based on religious beliefs or
qualifying medical reasons. The City required its firefighters to

1     Mirisch is the sole respondent in this appeal.

                                 2
ask for an exemption and then required those who asked for an
exemption to submit to an interview to justify his or her
objections.
       On September 30, 2021, the final day to comply with the
health order, respondent posted a statement on Twitter that was
then published in the Beverly Hills Courier. The text of the
statement was attached as exhibit B to appellants’ complaint.2
The statement reads, in full:
       “One month ago I sent the Beverly Hills Firefighters
Association (BHFA) a letter expressing my surprise and
disappointment that the union asked for the City Council’s help
in allowing their members to circumvent the County’s vaccine
mandate.
       “I wrote: ‘Vaccine mandates are legal and they serve to
protect both the employees and our Community members. While
employees can make decisions for themselves, they cannot and
should not be allowed to make a decision which would
unnecessarily expose a Community member to Covid-19 as a
matter of both policy and ethics.’
       “While the Council rejected the BHFA’s overtures and was
and is unwilling to help the firefighters get around the County
mandate, it seems that a large number of anti-vaxxer Beverly
Hills firefighters are trying to take things into their own hands.

2     “‘Where written documents are the foundation of an action
and are attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by
reference, they become a part of the complaint and may be
considered on demurrer.’” (Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 184,
191.)

                                3
       “This morning we received word from our Chief that 25
firefighters—close to 30% of the entire force—have submitted
exemption requests to the City’s Human Relations department.
Two of the applications cited medical exemptions, while 23 of the
firefighters want to be granted ‘religious exemptions’ from the
vaccination mandate.
       “This seems to be nothing short of an attempt to
manipulate the system on a massive scale. Religious exemptions
are meant for deeply held and sincere religious convictions[;] they
are not hall passes for those who don’t want to take the vaccine,
however strong those feelings are or whatever conspiracy theories
they may believe.
       “As I stated in my Aug. 30 letter, I felt the BHFA’s request
for the Council’s complicity in avoiding the vaccination
requirement was both surprising and disappointing. If any of the
firefighters who applied for exemptions on an unprecedented
scale are gaming the system[—]and it seems highly likely that
many, if not most of them are—[it] is nothing short of outrageous.
       “The firefighters applying for an exemption will be
interviewed under penalty of perjury to ascertain whether their
refusal to get vaccinated is medically necessary or rises to the
level of a bona fide religious conviction. That they would go to
such an extent to avoid taking an action which protects our entire
Community is bad enough, if any of them are caught perjuring
themselves in their attempt to circumvent the vaccination
mandate, then there should be serious consequences.
       “In many police departments, there is a well-known axiom:
‘You lie, you die.’
       “The average total compensation of a Beverly Hills
firefighter is $[illegible] annually. Our firefighters are not only
paid extremely well, they have also always been treated

                                4
extremely well by our entire Community. It is so terribly sad
that some 30% of them are unwilling to reciprocate their
treatment by taking the safe, sane and simple measure of getting
a Covid-19 vaccination to protect the Community, not to mention
themselves and the other employees.
       “It feels like a sacred trust has been broken. From my
perspective any firefighter caught lying under oath trying to
avoid this protective measure should be terminated for cause, as
beyond showing a willingness to expose our Community to
unnecessary risk, they would be unfit in my eyes to represent
Beverly Hills.
“John Mirisch
“Beverly Hills City Councilmember”
       At the time of respondent’s statement, appellants were
firefighters for the City, and subject to the health order. Both
requested religious exemptions.
       Berardinelli’s interview in connection with his request for
religious exemption took place on September 29, 2021.
Berardinelli received a temporary religious exemption. However,
while extending his religious exemption, he was moved to a
different job that receives fewer calls. He was also not allowed to
respond to certain calls. He has claimed to have been
discriminated against because of his religious views and thus
deprived of opportunities to advance his career.
       Sattley’s interview in connection with his request for a
religious exemption took place on September 28, 2021. The City
denied Sattley a religious exemption. Sattley did not get the
vaccination and was placed on unpaid leave effective October 1,
2021. Sattley was ultimately terminated.
       Sattley received right-to-sue letters from state and federal
regulators and thus exhausted the administrative process.

                                 5
                   PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The complaints
       Appellants filed their case in December 2021. After
dismissing the county defendants, the trial court allowed
appellants to file the operative second amended complaint (SAC)
in August 2022, which alleged claims only against the City and
respondent. The SAC alleged 11 causes of action. Only the third
and fourth causes of action, alleged against respondent, are at
issue in this appeal.
       Appellants’ third cause of action alleged a violation of title
42 United States Code section 1983, First Amendment
retaliation.3 Specifically, appellants alleged that respondent
“retaliated” against appellants when “he publicly accused them
and other city employees who asserted a religious objection to
vaccination of lying and of being ‘anti-vaxxers’ who wanted to
circumvent the County Health Mandate.” Appellants alleged
that in his official capacity, respondent acted “with the specific
intent to coerce” them “into violating their conscience and getting
the Covid shot to save their jobs.” Appellants characterized
respondent’s speech as “threats,” and alleged that “a government
official’s threat of invoking legal sanctions . . . can violate the
First Amendment, even if done through speech.” Appellants also
alleged that an individual of ordinary firmness would be chilled
from exercising his First Amendment rights when accused of

3      Title 42 United States Code section 1983 provides, in part,
that “[e]very person who, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . .”

                                  6
lying and threatened with prosecution by a government official
such as respondent.
      Appellants’ fourth cause of action against respondent
alleged a violation of section 52.1.4 Appellants alleged that
respondent intentionally interfered with, or attempted to
interfere with, their civil rights by threats, intimidation, or
coercion, including by publicly accusing them and other city
employees of lying and of being “anti-vaxxers” who would be
prosecuted if they continued asserting a religious objection to the
COVID-19 vaccination under oath. Appellants claimed
respondent’s comments led them to reasonably believe they
would be fired or prosecuted if they continued to assert religious
objections. Appellants alleged “[respondent’s] comments violated
the Bane Act as they constituted a nonviolent threat with severe
consequences that [respondent] intended to deter the Individual
Plaintiffs from asserting their constitutional and statutory
rights.”
Respondent’s demurrer and anti-SLAPP motion
      Respondent filed both a demurrer and an anti-SLAPP
motion to dismiss challenging the third and fourth causes of
action in appellants’ SAC, which we review individually, as they
have separate and distinct requirements and result in different
remedies.

4      Section 52.1 provides, in part, that an individual may bring
a suit for damages against any person who “interferes by threat,
intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat,
intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any
individual or individuals of the rights secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of this state.” (§ 52.1, subds. (b); see id.,
subd.(c).)

                                 7
      The September 26, 2022 demurrer argued the third and
fourth causes of action should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim. As to the third cause of action for First Amendment
retaliation, respondent asserted that respondent’s speech alone
could not constitute a threat, that perjury is not protected speech,
and that Berardinelli could not plead damages. As to the fourth
cause of action for violation of the Bane Act, respondent argued
he did not threaten appellants, but only firefighters who perjured
themselves. In addition, he argued his speech alone was
insufficient to support a Bane Act cause of action because it was
not violent and did not threaten violence.
      In the October 7, 2022 anti-SLAPP motion, respondent
claimed his comments regarding the vaccine requirement for
healthcare workers constituted free speech concerning an issue of
public interest. Respondent also claimed appellants did not have
a probability of prevailing on their claims, as his speech did not
constitute a threat against appellants or an adverse employment
action. He further contended lying is not protected speech, and
Berardinelli could not prove he suffered damages.
      As to the Bane Act claim, respondent argued appellants
could not prevail because respondent did not threaten them, but
only stated there should be serious consequences for firefighters
who perjured themselves in an attempt to circumvent the
vaccination requirement. Further, respondent argued that
speech itself is insufficient to support a Bane Act cause of action
unless the speech threatens violence against a specific person or
group of persons, and such person or group of persons reasonably
believes violence will be committed against them or their
property. Respondent asserted that appellants’ fourth cause of
action did not come close to alleging the facts necessary for a

                                 8
cause of action under the Bane Act. Respondent sought fees and
costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c).
Trial court rulings
       The trial court sustained the demurrer and granted the
anti-SLAPP motion.
       In ruling on the demurrer, the trial court found
respondent’s statements were insufficient as a matter of law to
state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, emphasizing that
respondent “stated that ‘if’ a firefighter perjured themselves, they
should face ‘serious consequences.’” The court stated,
“Committing perjury is not protected conduct, and the statement
that one who commits perjury should face consequences does not
constitute a threat of legal sanctions that would support a claim
for First Amendment retaliation.” Further, allowing a First
Amendment retaliation claim based on respondent’s comments
would ignore the competing First Amendment rights of
respondent as a public official. Respondent’s motion to dismiss
the two causes of action was granted. The October 21, 2022
ruling was stayed until November 17, 2022, the date of the
hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion.
       At the November 17, 2022 hearing the trial court granted
respondent’s anti-SLAPP motion and struck the third and fourth
causes of action in the SAC pursuant to section 425.16. As to the
first prong of the required test, the court found respondent’s
statements were protected as the speech of a public official on a
matter of public concern. The court specified that respondent’s
statements were “directly concerned with the implementation of
the vaccine mandate and the related religious exemption process,
clear matters of public interest.”
       The court further found appellants failed to demonstrate a
probability of prevailing on the two causes of action. As to the

                                 9
First Amendment retaliation claim, the court found respondent’s
comments would not chill a person of ordinary firmness from
future First Amendment activities. Respondent did not make a
threat “intimating that punishment, sanction, or adverse
regulatory action will imminently follow.” Furthermore, allowing
a First Amendment retaliation claim would ignore respondent’s
competing First Amendment rights as a public official. As to the
cause of action for Bane Act violation, the court found appellants
had failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing because they
did not allege respondent “made any threat of violence against
any person or group of people.”
      The court found respondent was entitled to his attorney
fees pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), and ordered
appellants to pay respondent’s attorney fees and costs in the
amount of $12,958.65.
      The October 21, 2022 order staying the earlier rulings was
then lifted.
Notice of appeal
      On December 20, 2022, appellants filed their notice of
appeal from the orders sustaining the demurrer and granting the
anti-SLAPP motion.

                         DISCUSSION
I.    Demurrer
      A.     Legal standards
      We apply de novo review to an order sustaining a
demurrer. (SI 59 LLC v. Variel Warner Ventures, LLC (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 146, 152.) We exercise our independent judgment to
determine whether, as a matter of law, the complaint states a
cause of action on any legal theory. (Ortega v. Contra Costa
Community College Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1080.) In

                               10
doing so, we “must assume the truth of the complaint’s properly
pleaded or implied factual allegations.” (Schifando v. City of Los
Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081 (Schifando).) We must also
consider judicially noticed matters. (Ibid.)
        “If the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend, as here, we must decide whether there is a reasonable
possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an
amendment.” (Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.)
Appellants’ request for leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (Ibid.) Appellants bear the burden of proving that an
amendment would cure the defect. (Ibid.)
        B.     Third cause of action for First Amendment
               retaliation
               1. Applicable law
        “A plaintiff may bring a Section 1983 claim alleging that
public officials, acting in their official capacity, took action with
the intent to retaliate against, obstruct, or chill the plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights.” (Arizona Students’ Assn. v. Arizona
Board of Regents (9th Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 858, 867.) “To bring a
First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff must allege that
(1) it engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) the
defendant’s actions would ‘chill a person of ordinary firmness’
from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) the
protected activity was a substantial motivating factor in the
defendant’s conduct—i.e., that there was a nexus between the
defendant’s actions and an intent to chill speech.” (Ibid.) To
prevail, a plaintiff must show “that the defendant ‘intended to
interfere’ with the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and that it
suffered injury as a result.” (Ibid.)
        “‘Retaliation claims involving government speech warrant a
cautious approach by courts,’ because ‘[r]estricting the ability of

                                 11
government decisionmakers to engage in speech risks interfering
with their ability to effectively perform their duties’ and ‘ignores
the competing First Amendment rights of the officials
themselves.’” (Greisen v. Hanken (9th Cir. 2019) 925 F.3d 1097,
1113 (Greisen).) A “‘balance must be struck between the citizen’s
right to exercise his First Amendment rights and the public
official’s personal First Amendment rights, as well as his duty to
the public to speak out about matters of public concern.’” (Ibid.)
Thus, courts have rejected retaliation claims based exclusively on
retaliatory speech, noting that “‘[i]t would be the height of irony,
indeed, if mere speech, in response to speech, could constitute a
First Amendment violation.’” (Ibid.) “Not only do public officials
have free speech rights, but they also have an obligation to speak
out about matters of public concern.” (Goldstein v. Galvin (1st
Cir. 2013) 719 F.3d 16, 30.)
       Retaliatory government speech may serve as a basis for
liability for a First Amendment retaliation claim under two
circumstances. First, retaliatory speech may form the basis of a
First Amendment retaliation claim “when that speech is part of a
campaign of harassment designed to burden the plaintiff’s
protected expression.” (Greisen, supra, 925 F.3d at pp. 1113-
1114.) In Allen v. Scribner (9th Cir. 1987) 812 F.2d 426, 429, for
example, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, who were
officials of the California Department of Food and Agriculture
and the United States Department of Agriculture, intimidated
him, threatened him, harassed him and “made defamatory
statements to the media with the intent of discrediting him.”
       Second, “even when it is not part of a campaign of
harassment designed to burden the plaintiff’s protected
expression, retaliatory speech may serve as the basis for a First
Amendment retaliation claim when it ‘intimat[es] that some form

                                12
of punishment or adverse regulatory action would follow.’”
(Greisen, supra, 925 F.3d at p. 1114.)
              2. Appellants have failed to state a claim
       As to the first element of this cause of action, appellants
alleged that in seeking reasonable accommodations under the
City’s vaccine policy, they were exercising their First Amendment
right to religious freedom and their right to seek accommodation
from their employer for their religious practices. Respondent
does not contest the general proposition that an individual’s
decision to seek religious accommodations is a constitutionally
protected activity.
       Nevertheless, appellants have failed to meet the second
element of their cause of action for First Amendment retaliation.
Specifically, the speech of public officials may only form the basis
of a First Amendment retaliation claim if “when that speech is
part of a campaign of harassment designed to burden the
plaintiff’s protected expression” or “‘intimat[es] that some form of
punishment or adverse regulatory action would follow’” if
appellants continued to engage in the protected activity.
(Greisen, supra, 925 F.3d at pp. 1113-1114.)
       No allegations of either situation were made here.
Appellants do not allege that respondent engaged in a campaign
of harassment against them; instead their allegations are
centered around a single speech. While appellants assert
respondent’s comments were made as part of a campaign of
harassment, they fail to cite to portions of the SAC showing such
a campaign.5 Despite the position appellants take on appeal, the
allegations do not exist in the SAC.

5    Appellants cite to pages 115-116 and 121 of the Appellants’
Appendix (or pages 6-7 and page 12 of the SAC), which contain no

                                13
       Further, the speech itself shows that respondent did not
suggest some form of punishment or adverse action would arise
from protected activity. Instead, respondent directed his
comments to those firefighters who might be “gaming the
system.” Respondent confirmed the importance of constitutional
rights, stating, “Religious exemptions are meant for deeply held
and sincere religious convictions.” Respondent directed no
threatening words toward anyone holding such sincere religious
convictions, but towards those who might lie, stating: “if any of
them are caught perjuring themselves in their attempt to
circumvent the vaccination mandate, then there should be
serious consequences” and “[f]rom my perspective any firefighter
caught lying under oath trying to avoid this protective measure
should be terminated for cause . . . .” Respondent’s “[y]ou lie, you
die” quote was also directed at individuals being dishonest, not
individuals exercising a protected right to express their religious
freedom through an exemption. Committing perjury is not a
protected activity. (See United States v. Alvarez (2012) 567 U.S.
709, 720 [“It is not simply because perjured statements are false
that they lack First Amendment protection. Perjured testimony
‘is at war with justice’ because it can cause a court to render a
‘judgment not resting on truth.’”].)
       The cases cited by appellants on this point are
distinguishable because they involve threats seeking to chill
protected conduct. In Watison v. Carter (9th Cir. 2012) 668 F.3d

allegations of a campaign of harassment. In a footnote appellants
observe that Sattley has obtained “even more evidence” of
respondent’s campaign of harassment against him. Yet there is
no citation to any such evidence. We therefore disregard this
statement.

                                 14
1108, 1114-1115 (Watison), the appellant alleged he was
retaliated against for the filing of an inmate grievance, which is
protected conduct. In Schleig v. Borough of Nazareth (3d Cir.
2017) 695 Fed.Appx. 26, 27 (Schleig), an unpublished case, a
police officer stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation
against a fellow police officer who threatened him with
“termination, physical violence, and even death, in retaliation for
Schleig’s active involvement in a police union.” “Speech that is
critical of unlawful labor practices qualifies as speech on matters
of public concern” (ibid.), and “‘activities on behalf of a union
faction that necessarily entail a substantial criticism of
management raise matters of public concern’” (ibid., quoting Clue
v. Johnson (2d Cir. 1999) 179 F.3d 57, 61). Thus, as in Watison,
the threats in Schleig involved protected conduct, not perjury.
       Appellants argue that even implied threats of harm are
sufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim, citing
foreign federal District Court cases to support this claim, which
are unpersuasive. Further, the acts in question constituted
speech protected by the First Amendment. (See Woolsey v. Ojeda
(S.D.W.Va. 2019) 363 F.Supp.3d 688 [posting of video criticizing a
state senator and candidate for U.S. Congress]; Perez v. Tedford
(W.D.Tex., Oct. 22, 2013, SA-13-CV-429-XR) 2013 WL 5740256
[2013 U.S.Dist. Lexis 151149] [Facebook post criticizing police
officers].)6 Because perjury does not constitute a form of speech
protected by the First Amendment, we need not discuss the
threat level.7

6    Perez v. Tedford, supra, 2013 WL 5740256 is an
unpublished case.
7       In appellants’ reply brief, they cite several cases for the
first time, thus depriving respondent of an opportunity to discuss

                                15
       Appellants argue the trial court erred in failing to construe
their allegations in the light most favorable to them. (Citing
Noonan v. Kane (3d Cir. 2017) 698 Fed.Appx. 49, 53-54 [finding
pleadings sufficient where they alleged “at least three specific
instances in which Defendants (or associates at their direction)
threatened them”]; Van Deelen v. Johnson (10th Cir. 2007) 497
F.3d 1151, 1157 [“If accepted as credible by a jury, Mr. Van
Deelen’s allegations of physical and verbal intimidation,
including a threat by a deputy sheriff to shoot him if he brought
any more tax appeals, would surely suffice under our precedents
to chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to seek
redress for (allegedly) unfair property tax assessments”].) No
amount of favorable interpretation can change respondent’s

these cases. However, the cited cases are distinguishable for the
same reason as Watison, Schleig, and the district court cases
discussed above. MacIntosh v. Clous (6th Cir. 2023) 69 F.4th 309,
313-314, involved threats of violence directed at an attendee of a
meeting of a county commission who spoke at the meeting
against the Proud Boys group and the behaviors the group
endorses. In McMaster v. Spearman (E.D.Cal., Sept. 5, 2014,
No. 1:10-cv-01407-AWI-SKO(PC)) 2014 WL 4418104 [2014
U.S.Dist. Lexis 124466], a prison official asked an inmate to
withdraw his appeal of a grievance involving an incident in which
he had been beaten. In Okwedy v. Molinari (2d Cir. 2003) 333
F.3d 339, 344, a public official sent a letter to a media company
asking the company to remove a billboard condemning
homosexuality. And in National Rifle Assn. of America v. Cuomo
(N.D.N.Y. 2018) 350 F.Supp.3d 94, 106, the plaintiff alleged
“‘backchannel threats’ to banks and insurers with ties to the NRA
that they would face regulatory action if they failed to terminate
their relationships with the NRA.” All cases discussed in
appellants’ reply brief involved threats against protected activity,
not perjury.

                                 16
words, which are memorialized in the record and were attached
as an exhibit to appellants’ SAC. Those words contained no
threat to any individual making a legitimate request for
accommodation—only to those who intended to perjure
themselves to avoid the vaccination. Such perjury is not
protected by the First Amendment. Appellants have thus failed
to meet the second element of their cause of action for First
Amendment retaliation.
       C.    Fourth cause of action for violation of the Bane
             Act
             1. Applicable law
       To state a cause of action for violation of the Bane Act,
appellants must show “(1) intentional interference or attempted
interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right,
and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats,
intimidation or coercion.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 41, 67.) However, speech alone “is insufficient to
establish the requisite threat unless it includes threat of
violence.” (Julian v. Mission Community Hospital (2017) 11
Cal.App.5th 360, 395 (Julian).) As set forth in section 52.1,
subdivision (k): “Speech alone is not sufficient to support an
action brought pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c), except upon a
showing that the speech itself threatens violence against a
specific person or group of persons; and the person or group of
persons against whom the threat is directed reasonably fears
that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against
them or their property and that the person threatening violence
had the apparent ability to carry out the threat.”
             2. Appellants have failed to state a claim
       As set forth above, to state a cause of action under section
52.1, “‘there must first be violence or intimidation by threat of

                                17
violence.’” (Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 1268, 1290.) Appellants have failed to allege a
threat of violence. Respondent’s speech, attached to appellants’
SAC, contained no threat of violence against appellants.
       Appellants argue the law is not fully settled regarding the
requirement that the speech must threaten violence against a
specific person or group of persons. Yet they cite no authority
that contradicts the plain language of section 52.1, subdivision
(k), even though such authority would not be persuasive. (See
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959
[“the multiple references to violence or threats of violence in the
statute serve to establish the unmistakable tenor of the conduct
that section 52.1 is meant to address”]; City and County of San
Francisco v. Ballard (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 381, 408 [affirming
dismissal of § 52.1 claim on demurrer because plaintiff failed to
allege “any conduct that rises to the level of a threat of violence
or coercion”].)8
       Appellants point to the “[y]ou lie, you die” language,
arguing that a reasonable jury could find this statement to be a
threat of violence that would deter somebody from exercising his
rights. As discussed above, while the statement could potentially
be interpreted to incorporate violence, there is no protected right
to lie. Further, appellants did not include an allegation that they
reasonably feared such violence would be committed against

8     We decline to address Gifford v. Hornbook Fire Protection
District (E.D.Cal., Sept. 14, 2021, No. 2:16-CV-0596-JAM-DMC)
2021 WL 4168532 [2021 U.S.Dist. Lexis 174806]. It is an
unpublished case consisting only of findings and
recommendations by a magistrate judge. Furthermore the case is
not helpful to appellants.

                                18
them or that anyone threatening such violence had the apparent
ability to carry out the threat, as required by section 52.1,
subdivision (k).
       Because appellants failed to allege that respondent made a
threat of violence against them, or that they reasonably feared
that violence would be committed against them or their property,
their claim under the Bane Act fails as a matter of law.
       The trial court committed no error in sustaining
respondent’s demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action in
the SAC.
II.    Anti-SLAPP motion
       A.    Legal standards
       “[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect
defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise
of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.”
(Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883-
884.) An anti-SLAPP motion is analyzed in two steps. First,
“‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the
challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity
in which the defendant has engaged.’” (Id. at p. 884.) Second, if
the first burden is met, “‘the plaintiff must then demonstrate its
claims have at least “minimal merit.”’” (Ibid.)
       B.    Issue of public interest
       We need not address whether respondent’s statements
concerned an issue of public interest because even if they did, as
set forth above, the third and fourth causes of action did not have
minimal merit and were subject to dismissal at the pleading
stage. However, because the parties have debated the issue at
length and because the award of attorney fees rests upon the
denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, we discuss it briefly.

                                19
       Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) and (4) provides that a
party has engaged in protected activity when he makes “(3) any
written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest,” or engages in “(4) any other conduct in furtherance of
the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest.”
       We must “consider the context as well as the content of [the
statements]” in determining whether the statements “further[]
the exercise of constitutional speech rights in connection with a
matter of public interest.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149 (FilmOn).) In doing so, “First, we ask
what ‘public issue or . . . issue of public interest’ the speech in
question implicates—a question we answer by looking to the
content of the speech. [Citation.] Second, we ask what functional
relationship exists between the speech and the public
conversation about some matter of public interest. It is at the
latter stage that context proves useful.” (Id. at pp. 149-150.)
       There must be “‘some degree of closeness’ between the
challenged statements and the asserted public interest.”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.) “‘[T]he statement must in
some manner itself contribute to the public debate.’” (Ibid.) We
examine “whether [the] defendant—through public or private
speech or conduct—participated in, or furthered, the discourse
that makes an issue one of public interest.” (Id. at p. 151.)
       Respondent’s statements concerning the Beverly Hills
firefighters’ requests for accommodation in the face of the vaccine
mandate unquestionably concerned an issue of public interest.
The statements, made in respondent’s role as a public
representative of the community, concerned the vaccine mandate,

                                20
certain firefighters’ attempts to circumvent the mandate, and the
impact that behavior would have on the community. The
statements were made in a public setting and were purposely
directed to the community at large to address an issue of public
concern.
       Appellants’ arguments to the contrary are not well taken.
Appellants argue they were not public figures but should be
viewed as individual employees seeking accommodation. They
further argue that a City employee’s individual request for
accommodation should not be treated as a matter of public
concern. However, we are required to broadly construe the anti-
SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (a) [“this section shall be
construed broadly”].) Respondent’s comments did not single out
any particular firefighter but instead spoke broadly about the
large number of firefighters seeking accommodation. Neither
appellant (nor any other firefighter) is mentioned by name, thus
respondent does not address any single individual’s request for
accommodation. Instead, respondent referenced the Beverly
Hills firefighters as a whole and noted how the actions of this
group of firefighters, if disingenuous, would be harmful to the
community.
       The cases cited by appellants are distinguishable. In
Workman v. Colichman (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1039, an
individual sent a private e-mail to a real estate broker indicating
that the individual was going to make renovations to his home
that would decrease the value of a home the broker was selling.
This private dispute did not translate into a matter of public
concern just because a “‘broad and amorphous public interest’”
exists in protecting consumers from fraudulent real estate
brokers. (Id. at pp. 1052-1053.) Respondent’s statements here
were different, as they were made in a public forum and

                                21
addressed policy surrounding a public health mandate during a
global pandemic.
       Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913 is
also distinguishable. In Rivero, a public employee sued his union
for distributing allegedly false information that he had been
suspended from his job for soliciting bribes and practicing
nepotism. The trial court denied the union’s anti-SLAPP motion,
and the Rivero court affirmed, holding that statements about an
individual personnel dispute do not warrant First Amendment
protection. (Rivero, at pp. 928-929.) However, as set forth above,
respondent did not address individual personnel matters and did
not refer to any firefighter by name. He did not violate the
confidentiality of any individual firefighter, but instead spoke
about the actions of a group of public employees as a whole.
Respondent’s generalized statements regarding the vaccine
mandate and public health cannot be characterized as private
personnel matters.
       C.    Appellants’ claims do not have minimal merit
       As discussed above, appellants’ claims lack minimal merit.
The third cause of action for First Amendment retaliation is
subject to dismissal because respondent’s statements were not
designed to chill protected conduct—only perjury. The fourth
cause of action for violation of the Bane Act is subject to dismissal
because appellants failed to allege a threat of violence or that
they reasonably feared such a threat.
       Because respondent’s speech involved an issue of public
concern, and appellants’ claims lack merit, the anti-SLAPP
motion was properly granted.

                                 22
III.  Leave to amend
      Appellants claim the trial court should have granted them
leave to amend the SAC, since they have obtained additional
evidence of respondent’s animosity towards Sattley in the form of
private messages. Without citation to such evidence, and without
providing any specificity as to the timing or content of such
private messages, appellants merely assert this evidence would
support their constitutional retaliation claims against
respondent.
      The trial court’s decision to deny appellants’ request for
leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Jo Redland
Trust, U.A.D. 4-6-05 v. CIT Bank, N.A. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
142, 162.) “To show an abuse of discretion, the plaintiff has the
burden of demonstrating that ‘there is a reasonable possibility
the plaintiff could cure the defect with an amendment.’” (Ibid.)
To meet this burden, the plaintiff “‘must show in what manner he
can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change
the legal effect of his pleading.’” (Rakestraw v. California
Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Abstract
assertions are insufficient. Instead, the plaintiff must “set forth
factual allegations that sufficiently state all required elements” of
the relevant cause of action. (Ibid.) “Allegations must be factual
and specific, not vague or conclusionary.” (Id. at p. 44.)
      Appellants have failed to meet this burden. Their vague
allegations of new evidence do not show that such evidence could
cure the defects in their allegations. There was no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s denial of appellants’ request for
leave to amend.9

9    The trial court did not address the parties’ competing
arguments concerning Berardinelli’s standing to pursue a First

                                 23
                         DISPOSITION
      The orders are affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs
of appeal.

                                     ________________________
                                     CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

Amendment retaliation claim. Because we have affirmed the
trial court’s orders sustaining respondent’s demurrer to the third
and fourth causes of action and granting respondent’s anti-
SLAPP motion involving the same claims, we decline to address
this issue.

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