Court Opinion

ID: 9894405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 18:04:19.8457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:42.865224
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/1/23 In re N.W. CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

    In re N.W. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile                                       C097459
    Court Law.

    SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES                                            (Super. Ct. No. STK-JD-DP-
    AGENCY,                                                                            2020-0000156)

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

    D.P. et al.,

                    Defendants and Appellants.

          A.D. (mother) and D.P. (father), the parents of minors N.W. and M.W., appeal
from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minors for
adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)1 They contend the juvenile court erred

1         Undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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in failing to find the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption applied and
that we must remand for further compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; § 224.2.)
      We will conditionally affirm subject to full compliance with the ICWA on remand,
as described in this opinion.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On May 28, 2020, the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (the Agency)
filed a section 300 petition on behalf of minors N.W. (then age two years) and M.W.
(then age nine months), after the near drowning of M.W. Mother had been intoxicated
and left M.W. unsupervised in a kiddie pool. The petition further alleged that mother did
not immediately seek medical attention for M.W., the parents were uncooperative with
hospital personnel and social workers, mother had a substance abuse problem, the parents
had a history of engaging in severe domestic violence, father lacked suitable housing, and
the parents had previously left N.W. with an unsuitable caretaker. The juvenile court
ordered the minors detained and took jurisdiction over them.
       Mother had informed the social worker that she and father were no longer in a
relationship but had agreed to co-parent the minors. Both parents had completed the
“Positive Parenting Program.” Mother’s participation was described as satisfactory.
Mother also had participated in individual counseling sessions. The parents visited the
minors weekly at the foster family agency and had two additional virtual visits each
week. The Agency had difficulty increasing in-person visits due to the COVID-19
pandemic. The parents were always on time for visits, maintained regular attendance,
and were “always engaging and attentive to the minors’ needs.” There were no reported
concerns about the visits.
       The juvenile court adjudged the minors dependent children of the court and
ordered reunification services for the parents. Mother’s reunification case plan consisted
of compliance with court orders, substance abuse treatment, personal counseling, and

                                             2
parenting education. Father’s reunification case plan consisted of the completion of a
psychological evaluation to tailor services, parenting education, personal counseling, and
compliance with court orders.
       The Agency’s March 19, 2021, status report noted that father had submitted to a
psychological evaluation and had been found able to demonstrate adequate functioning.
Father was participating in his services. Mother had completed her individual counseling
and a Dependency Drug Court assessment, which had recommended inpatient treatment.
Mother did not attend the inpatient treatment and she was terminated from drug court.
The Agency recommended termination of her reunification services because she would
not be able to reunify within 12 months of the minors’ removal.
       Although the parents represented that they were permitted to be around each other
to participate in services, the social worker learned that there was an active stay-away
order between the parents, requiring father to refrain from all contact with mother, which
was in place until May 2023. The social worker arranged for parents to visit the minors
separately, which they attended twice weekly as scheduled. Mother visited first, with
father visiting immediately thereafter. The parents were appropriate with the minors and
engaged in age-appropriate activities. Other than having to be repeatedly instructed to
stop bringing unhealthy snacks that upset the minors’ digestive systems, there were no
concerns about the visits. The Agency, however, confirmed the parents were having
contact with each other in violation of the stay-away restraining order. On April 21,
2021, the juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification services. The juvenile court
continued services for father and gave the Agency discretion to lift supervision of father’s
visits and arrange for them to take place outside the visit center.
       In its May 2021 12-month review report, the Agency recommended reunification
services for father also be terminated. The Agency reported that father had completed
parenting education and an individual therapy psychological evaluation, completed over
half of his domestic violence sessions, and he visited the minors regularly, but father was

                                              3
not honest with the Agency and had refused to sign the releases for the minors to be
assessed by the Valley Mountain Regional Center (VMRC), even though they had been
referred back in March 2021. The Agency had moved father from in-home visits to a
monitored visitation setting after he was found to be dishonest about where he was
residing. He also had refused to participate in the “parent-partner” program, despite the
recommendation in his psychological evaluation and the urging of the social worker. It
also appeared the parents were still in a relationship and had shared activities. Father was
appointed a guardian ad litem and the juvenile court continued his reunification services
and ordered him to participate in the parent-partner program. It also ordered father’s
visits be monitored with discretion to return visits to a community setting.
       In its November 2021 18-month review report, the Agency again recommended
the termination of father’s reunification services. Father continued to refuse to
participate in the parent-partner program. The minors were placed together and doing
well, but they were in a nonconcurrent foster home so the Agency noted it would need to
locate an adoptive home. An earlier adoption assessment had concluded that both minors
were adoptable, and an update would be ordered. M.W. was receiving VMRC services
but N.W. was still waiting to be assessed.
       Father did not appear at the January 25, 2022, 18-month review hearing. The
Agency informed the juvenile court that father had smelled of marijuana during seven of
his visits since October 2021. The juvenile court terminated father’s reunification
services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
       The Agency filed a status report on May 2, 2022, indicating it would be requesting
the termination of parental rights at the upcoming section 366.26 hearing. There had
been no significant changes in the family circumstances. The parents continued to visit
separately, twice a week, at the visitation center. Father’s visits were monitored and
mother’s were supervised. The parents and minors were observed to play in age-
appropriate ways during these visits. At the beginning of March 2022, the visitation

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center called the social worker because father was attending his visits smelling of
marijuana. The smell was so strong that the other visiting parents complained. The staff
reported the smell lingered in the center hours after father’s departure. Father did not,
however, appear to be under the influence of marijuana. The social worker was able to
address and resolve the issue by speaking to father. The minors were doing well in foster
care and the Agency was continuing to search for a concurrent home.
       The section 366.26 report, recommending the termination of parental rights, was
filed on May 10, 2022. The minors were reported to be doing well and were adoptable.
Regarding their relationship with the parents, the minors were reported to know who their
parents are and have a relationship with them but did not have a significant bond with
either of them. The caregiver did not report any struggles in behavior surrounding visits.
The visitation notes indicate the minors enjoy their visits, the visits go smoothly, and they
are both able to leave visits without any issues. Neither minor presented with any
emotional or mental distress as a result of the separation from the parents after visits.
       A supplemental report was filed on September 30, 2022, reporting that the Agency
located and placed the minors in a concurrent placement on July 22, 2022. The minors
had developed a healthy bond with the caregiver and the caregiver was capable and
committed to adoption. The minors were jointly assessed as adoptable.
       By the time of the November 15, 2022, contested section 366.26 hearing, the
minors were three and five years old, and had been in foster care for two and a half years.
Both parents and the social worker testified at the hearing. There was no bonding study.
Mother was opposed to the termination of parental rights and believed the minors were
very bonded to her. She had attended, or made up, every visit. During visits, she would
play, talk, and watch shows that interested the minors. She testified M.W. often cried at
the end of visits, N.W. would hold on to her phone and be sad, and they would ask her if
they could go with her.

                                              5
       Father testified that he, too, had a bond with the minors, as he had provided care
for them before their removal. He believed that bond continued to exist. He consistently
visited twice a week and testified that the minors appeared “sad and depressed” after their
initial excitement at the beginning of visits and would cry and get upset at the end of
visits. He said he told the minors that they would get to return to him someday when
they would ask—which was approximately three times a month. Father testified that he
was unaware that the visitation monitor and transportation worker had not reported any
emotional distress shown by the minors at the end of visits.
       The social worker testified that the minors had not reported any concerns, did not
appear sad or depressed, and had a happy demeanor. The social worker testified that the
minors appeared to have a loving relationship with the parents but that the reports she
received from the visits did not contain any instances in which the minors screamed or
cried at the end of the visit. There was, however, a report from the transportation worker
about an incident wherein father was frustrated with the minors and grabbed N.W. by the
arm.
       At the conclusion of testimony, the juvenile court heard argument from the parties.
The juvenile court then stated that the burden fell on the parents to prove that an
exception to adoption applied and that, “in applying Caden C.,[2] there was a need to look
at the [minors] and the impact on them.” The juvenile court then found that the effect of
terminating parental rights did not outweigh the benefits of adoption, that the termination
of parental rights was in the best interest of the minors, and that none of the exceptions to
adoption applied. It found the minors adoptable and terminated parental rights.
       Parents appealed. This matter was fully briefed on September 11, 2023.
       Additional facts related to the ICWA issue are contained in our discussion infra.

[2]    In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden. C.).

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                                       DISCUSSION
                                               I
                  Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception to Adoption
       Mother contends the juvenile court erred by failing to find the beneficial parental
relationship exception to adoption applied. She claims the Agency focused too heavily
on an improper factor in making its recommendation and the juvenile court’s finding that
she does not have a beneficial relationship with the minors is not supported by substantial
evidence.
       Father filed a notice of joinder in mother’s argument on July 5, 2023. In the
notice, he requested to join in the argument made in mother’s opening brief, pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5). In the body of his notice, as well as in his
reply brief, however, he also purports to apply mother’s arguments, although with scant
analysis of the facts, to his relationship with the minors—which was not argued by
mother in her opening brief. In his reply brief, father also argues for the first time that the
juvenile court failed to follow the guidance of Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614 by failing
to consider or to engage in any analysis regarding whether terminating parental rights
was in the minors’ best interests.
       Contentions raised for the first time in a reply brief, without good cause, are
forfeited. (Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8.)
Although the inclusion of the new argument in his notice of joinder was improper,
respondent the Agency, had notice of the contention and, in fact, included a response in
its respondent’s brief. We will, therefore, consider father’s cursory argument that his
visitation and relationship with the minors met the requirements necessary to establish the
exception to adoption. We will not, however, develop his argument or search the record
for facts not included by father in his brief to support his claim of error. (Mansell v.
Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545 [“We are not required to search
the record to ascertain whether it contains support for [appellant’s] contentions”].) Nor

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will we consider the new arguments father raised for the first time in his reply brief and
shall consider them forfeited. (American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified
School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258, 275-276 [fairness concerns militate against
consideration of issues raised for the first time in a reply brief, as “consideration of the
issue deprives . . . respondent of the opportunity to . . . rais[e] opposing arguments about
the new issue”].)
       At the section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, a juvenile court must
choose one of the several “ ‘possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . .
The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] If
the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent
circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) There are only limited circumstances that permit the court
to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would
be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such circumstance is the
so-called beneficial parental relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)
[beneficial parental relationship exception]; Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 629.)
       The party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of
any circumstances that constitute an exception to the termination of parental rights.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636-637; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243,
1252; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(d)(2).) The parent “must show regular visitation
and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted.
Moreover, the parent must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship. And the parent must show that terminating that
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., at p. 636.)

                                               8
       The beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption “must be examined on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child
bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody,
the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s
particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.”
(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The factual predicates of the
exception must be supported by substantial evidence, but the juvenile court exercises its
discretion in weighing that evidence and determining detriment. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) We do not substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile
court as to what is in the child’s best interests. (Id. at pp. 640-641.)
       Here, the fact that mother and father maintained consistent visitation with the
minors was undisputed. However, it is not enough for a parent to show frequent and
loving contact during pleasant visits. (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.)
They must establish that the minors have a significant, positive, emotional attachment
with them and that the harm the minors would experience if the parental relationship
were terminated outweighs the benefits that would be provided by an adoptive home.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634.)
       The parents contend that the Agency’s section 366.26 report suggests the Agency
based its recommendation on improper factors such as mother’s failure to address her
substance abuse issues and the parents’ inability to adequately parent the minors. While
the section 366.26 report included information about the parents’ failure to remedy the
concerns giving rise to jurisdiction and inability to demonstrate adequate parenting skills,
the Agency did not reference this information in arguing that the beneficial parental
relationship exception to adoption should not apply. Nor did the juvenile court give any
indication it based its findings on such information. In fact, it expressly stated that it was
focusing on applying Caden C. and looking at the impact termination of parental rights

                                               9
would have on the minors. Thus, we reject the parents’ suggestion that the juvenile court
considered improper factors in making its findings.
       Mother also contends the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding
that she does not have a beneficial relationship with the minors and therefore erred in not
applying the exception. Father appears to join in this argument but with respect to his
relationship with the minors. But it does not appear from the record that the court found
the parents failed to prove the second element or that the minor would not benefit at all
from continuing a relationship with them. Instead, the record shows that the court
expressly found the parents had not proven the third element of the exception—
specifically stating, “The court is [going to] find that the effect of termination of parental
rights would not outweigh the benefits of adoption.” The juvenile court then said it was
going to proceed, found notice had been given, found the minors adoptable and no
exception to apply, and terminated parental rights. Thus, we reject the parents’
contention that the juvenile court erred in failing to find they did not meet their burden to
prove the second element of the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption.
       Finally, to the extent father complains the juvenile court did not independently
consider guardianship as an alternative, we again emphasize that the permanent plan
preferred by the Legislature is adoption. If the juvenile court finds the child is adoptable
at the section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, it must terminate parental
rights unless the parents can establish termination would be detrimental to the child under
one of the statutory exceptions. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631; In re Ronell A.,
supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368.) Since the juvenile court found the minors adoptable
and found none of the statutory exceptions to adoption applied, guardianship was not an
alternative.

                                              10
                                               II
                                    The ICWA Compliance
       Father contends we must remand for further ICWA compliance because the
Agency did not provide his complete ancestral information to the relevant tribes. In
making his argument, he notes that the juvenile court failed to make a final finding on the
applicability of the ICWA. Mother joins in father’s argument. We agree that remand is
necessary.
       As this court recently explained: “ ‘The ICWA protects the interests of Indian
children and promotes the stability and security of Indian tribes by establishing minimum
standards for removal of Indian children from their families, and by permitting tribal
participation in dependency proceedings. [Citations.] A major purpose of the ICWA is
to protect “Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe.” [Citation.]’ (In re A.W. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 655, 662.) The ICWA
defines an ‘ “Indian child” ’ as a child who ‘is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or
(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member
of an Indian tribe.’ (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) The juvenile court and the social services
department have an affirmative and continuing duty, beginning at initial contact, to
inquire whether a child who is subject to the proceedings is, or may be, an Indian child.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a); § 224.2, subd. (a).)” (In re G.A. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 355, 360, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276056.)
       “[S]ection 224.2 creates three distinct duties regarding [the] ICWA in dependency
proceedings. First, from the Agency’s initial contact with a minor and his [or her] family,
the statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all involved persons whether the child may be
an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) Second, if that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason
to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as
practicable.’ (Id., subd. (e), italics added.) Third, if that further inquiry results in a

                                               11
reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section
224.3 apply. (See § 224.2, subd. (c) [court is obligated to inquire at the first appearance
whether anyone ‘knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child’]; id.,
subd. (d) [defining circumstances that establish a ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian
child]; § 224.3 [ICWA notice is required if there is a ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian
child as defined under § 224.2, subd. (d)].)” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052.)
         Here, mother reported she did not have any Native American ancestry. Father
reported, however, that both his parents had Blackfeet and Cherokee ancestry, although
neither were enrolled members, and that he might be eligible for membership in one of
the tribes. The Agency sent notice to the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana and three Cherokee
tribes. The notice indicated father’s asserted Blackfeet and Cherokee heritage, but
indicated only that it came through the paternal grandmother. Although the notice also
provided the name, birthdate, and address of the paternal grandfather, it did not specify
that the paternal grandfather might also have Blackfeet, Cherokee, or other Indian
heritage. Each of the four tribes responded that the minors were not Indian children.
Two of the tribes’ responses included consideration of blood quantum.
         The parents contend that, although the Agency’s notice to the tribes included the
paternal grandfather’s birthdate and address, it did not also note that he had Blackfeet
and/or Cherokee heritage and, without this additional information, the tribes did not
consider that heritage in their calculations of blood quantum. Parents did not, however,
raise this argument in the juvenile court.
         Parents’ counsel were aware of the alleged deficiencies in ICWA compliance, as
demonstrated by father’s February 2022 writ petition which raised this identical ICWA

                                              12
argument now raised on appeal.2 Nonetheless, over the course of the following 10
months, counsel did not ask that the juvenile court order the Agency to provide updated
information to the tribes about the paternal grandfather. (See § 224.2, subd. (e)(3)
[contact with tribe must, at minimum, include telephone, facsimile, or email and sharing
of information identified as necessary by tribe].) While the juvenile court and the
Agency are charged with making the appropriate inquiry under the ICWA, it is equally
the obligation of the parents’ and minors’ counsel to promptly bring such matters to the
attention of the juvenile court. Counsel cannot remain idle, aware of alleged deficiencies
in ICWA inquiry and notice (or concede ICWA compliance), and then complain about
omissions in ICWA inquiry or notice on appeal.
       The juvenile court, the Agency, and counsel involved in this case also were aware
that the juvenile court had yet to make final findings on the applicability of the ICWA
because this fact was noted in father’s writ petition, and in our order denying the petition,
in which we expressly found that the ICWA claim was premature, “as there [was] no
ICWA finding at this time.” Nonetheless, the juvenile court did not make, nor did
counsel request it make, final ICWA findings.

2      On our own motion, we take judicial notice of father’s writ petition filed on
March 14, 2022, contained in this court’s file in Third District Court of Appeal case
No. C095643 (case No. C095643). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.) We note that a reviewing
court may give the parties to an appeal an opportunity to comment on the propriety of
judicial notice taken on the reviewing court’s own motion, if the matter is of substantial
consequence to the appellate opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d) [judicial notice of
court records], 459, subd. (c) [reviewing court may take judicial notice but must give
parties the opportunity to comment under Evidence Code section 455 if the matter is of
substantial consequence].) The validity of taking judicial notice of the matters in case
No. C095643 is clear. However, if the parties are aggrieved by this judicial notice, we
will entertain a motion for rehearing to give them an opportunity to address the matter
before the decision becomes final. (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (d).)

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       “ ‘The notice requirements serve the interests of the Indian tribes “irrespective of
the position of the parents” and cannot be [forfeit]ed by the parent.’ ” (In re Justin S.
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1435; but see In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 798
[“The purposes of the ICWA are indeed commendable, but we do not believe Congress
envisioned or intended successive or serial appeals on ICWA notice issues when, given a
proper objection, they could easily be resolved during proceedings on remand for the
specific purpose of determining whether proper notice was given”]; In re Z.W. (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 54, 63-68 [“A line has to be drawn. At some point, there must be
finality to the ICWA noticing process. Balancing the minor’s interest in permanency and
stability against the tribes’ rights under the ICWA, we draw the line in this case”].)3 But
“ ‘[c]ounsel should not forget that they are officers of the court, and while it is their duty
to protect and defend the interests of their clients, the obligation is equally imperative to
aid the court in avoiding error and in determining the cause in accordance with justice
and the established rules of practice.’ ” (Williams v. Superior Court (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 320, 330.) The juvenile court did not receive such aid here, resulting in
an unreasonable delay in achieving permanence for these young minors. (See, e.g., In re
Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 993 [noting “the pointed and concrete harm that the child
may suffer” from prolonged proceedings]; In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 249
[“dependent children have a critical interest in avoiding unnecessary delays to their long-
term placement”]; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 [children have a
“compelling right[] . . . to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the
caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child”].)

3       Because we must remand for the juvenile court to enter ICWA findings and
orders, we will not consider here whether parents have forfeited their claim of error by
failing to raise it in the juvenile court after our denial of the writ petition.

                                              14
       The juvenile court was required to make findings as to the applicability of the
ICWA and its failure to do so here was an error. (In re Jennifer A. (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 692, 704-705, 709.) However, we do not, as father characterizes it,
reverse “faulty ICWA inquiries.” We reverse the ICWA findings and orders not
supported by substantial evidence. (See In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.)
Because the juvenile court did not make a finding on the subject, we have no ICWA
findings and orders to review and any remarks we would make on the adequacy of the
Agency’s inquiry and notice would be advisory. (See People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th
658, 693 [“We . . . abide by . . . a ‘ “cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not
necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more” ’ ”].) Accordingly, we
remand the matter for further ICWA compliance and for the juvenile court to enter an
ICWA finding based on the Agency’s demonstration of inquiry and notice.

                                               15
                                     DISPOSITION
      The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally affirmed subject only to
full compliance with the ICWA as described in this opinion. If, on remand, the juvenile
court determines the ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its previous orders terminating
parental rights and conduct further proceedings consistent with the ICWA, including a
new section 366.26 hearing. (25 U.S.C. § 1914; § 224, subd. (e).)

                                                     \s\                    ,
                                                Krause, J.

We concur:

    \s\                    ,
Robie, Acting P. J.

     \s\                   ,
Boulware Eurie, J.

                                           16