Court Opinion

ID: 9470652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:12:17.990718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:02.131988
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, we should not direct the district judge on remand to set aside the foreclosure, but rather to determine whether the appellants were, in fact, misled to their material prejudice by the erroneous implication of the foreclosure notice that payment of the entire note balance was required to avoid foreclosure.*
*858The government argues appellants were not prejudiced in that they never tendered even the amount of the delinquency, and at least a week before the foreclosure were specifically informed in person that tender of that amount would prevent foreclosure. The majority rejects these contentions because appellants may have been misled by the wording of the foreclosure notice into believing they faced what for them would have been the practically impossible task of paying off the entire note balance prior to the scheduled foreclosure date, and hence may have made insufficient efforts to raise the delinquency amount until a week before foreclosure, when there was no longer enough, time for them to raise even that. As the majority observes, “[t]he district court wholly failed to address this issue.” However, on oral argument appellants admitted there was no evidence that they were misled by the wording of the foreclosure notice and, at least inferentially, that there was no evidence that they ever forbore efforts to raise the delinquency amount. The majority does not construe the record to be otherwise. In this posture of the case, I believe we should not simply assume, as matter of law, that appellants were actually either misled or prejudiced by the notice’s potentially misleading wording.

 Wholly apart from constitutional requirements, which I do not reach and do not understand the majority to definitively rule on, it is apparent, and indeed not seriously disputed, that the foreclosure would be invalid under both Mississippi law and applicable FmHA regulations if the appellants were actually misled to their material prejudice by the potentially misleading wording of the notice.
I agree with the majority that appellants received adequate notice of the availability of a temporary moratorium and of their right to an administrative appeal. As the district court did not address, and the majority opinion pretermits, the issue of whether appellants were given such notice as they were entitled to respecting their right to request a stay pending administrative appeal, there is no occasion for this dissent to reach that issue. There may have been- no prejudice in this respect to appellants, as they at all times remained in their home. If necessary, the issue could be addressed by the district court on remand.