Court Opinion

ID: 9373235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:37.132111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.347936
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SEAN C. HIGGINS,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        AT-0752-15-0282-X-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: November 10, 2022
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Joree Gunn Brownlow, Cordova, Tennessee, for the appellant.

           Bradley Flippin, Nashville, Tennessee, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision granting the
     appellant’s petition for enforcement and finding the agency in partial
     noncompliance with the Board’s October 20, 2015 Order, which directed the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

     agency to cancel the appellant’s removal and to retroactively restore him to duty,
     effective August 8, 2014.    Higgins v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB
     Docket No. AT-0752-15-0282-C-1, Compliance File, Tab 22, Compliance Initial
     Decision (CID). The matter was referred to the Board for consideration. See
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.183. For the reasons discussed below, we now find the agency in
     compliance and DISMISS the petition for enforcement.

        DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE
¶2        In the compliance initial decision, the administrative judge found that the
     agency established that it paid the appellant back pay, including the appropriate
     amounts of interest; that the appellant was not entitled to overtime pay; and that
     the agency did not violate the Board’s status quo ante order when it failed to
     provide the appellant evidence that it had repaid the State of Tennessee for
     unemployment compensation payments. CID at 3-7. The administrative judge
     further found that the agency did not violate the status quo ante order when it
     failed to modify the appellant’s W-2 statements, or when it assigned him to the
     position he currently holds. CID at 8-9. Specifically, the administrative judge
     found that the agency had attempted to return the appellant to the position from
     which he was removed, but that the appellant objected to this. Therefore, the
     agency placed him in another position. CID at 9.
¶3        The administrative judge found that the agency had not established
     compliance with two other aspects of the Board’s order, and therefore held that
     the agency must explain its withholding rate for Federal income tax and its back
     pay calculations. CID at 9-11.

     Initial Responses
¶4        In response, the agency explained the changes in the ap pellant’s hourly rate
     of pay as follows:    the back pay period ran from the pay period beginning
     August 10, 2014, through the pay period ending on December 12, 2014. Higgins
     v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-15-0282-X-1,
                                                                                      3

     Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tab 1 at 5. On January 12, 2014, the appellant
     received a general adjustment increasing his annual salary.      Id. at 5.     The
     appellant received another general adjustment on January 11, 2015.       Id.   He
     received a within-grade increase from GS-5, Step 5 to GS-5, Step 6 on
     October 18, 2015. Id.
¶5        Regarding income-tax withholding, the agency indicated that the gross back
     pay awarded to the appellant totaled $49,968.00 and was offset by interim
     earnings of $5,844.73, unemployment earnings of $7,150.00, and a lump sum
     payment for unused annual leave of $962.08. Id. at 6. The adjusted gross back
     pay amount was therefore $36,011.19. Id. The taxable amount for the pay period
     also included current pay period earnings of $1,445.60 and interest of $1,014.65,
     for total earnings of $38,471.43. Id. The agency stated that the amount of taxes
     withheld on the back pay award was calculated by the Defense Finance and
     Accounting Service (DFAS). Id. at 7. Because the back pay award was included
     in the appellant’s regular pay stub for the pay period ending March 19, 2016, and
     was identified as a separate payment, DFAS used method 1b of the withholding
     guidance contained in section 7 of Circular E, resulting in a withholding amount
     of $15,405.39. Id.
¶6        The appellant submitted a response on May 10, 2017, alleging that his back
     pay award was “taxed twice” and that benefits were deducted from the award
     twice. CRF, Tab 4 at 5. He also reiterated his claims that he should have been
     granted overtime during the back pay period; that the agency failed to return him
     to work by the deadlines set by the Board; and that the agency had not reimbursed
     the State of Tennessee for his unemployment compensation. Id. at 4-5, 8-10. He
     further alleged that the wrong entry-on-duty date was entered into his electronic
     official personnel file. Id. at 11-12. Finally, he alleged that the agency placed
     him on leave without pay status without his knowledge and that this constituted a
     constructive termination. Id. at 16.
                                                                                      4

¶7        The Board issued an order on July 24, 2017, directing the agency to provide
     an explanation of taxes withheld from the appellant’s back pay award, including
     resulting overpayments and garnishments; an explanation of the pay rates used to
     calculate the back pay award, including an explanation of whether scheduled
     within-grade increases were granted; confirmation of the entry-on-duty date used;
     and a response to the appellant’s allegations that the agency had subjected him to
     reprisal. CRF, Tab 7.

     Subsequent Responses
¶8         The agency submitted a response on August 8, 2017, stating that initially
     DFAS had mistakenly included the appellant’s interim earnings as taxable income
     for tax-withholding purposes. CRF, Tab 8 at 5. That mistake was corrected, and
     a corrected Wage and Tax statement for 2016 was sent to the appellant in
     April 2017.   Id. at 6.    The agency also stated that there were no wage
     garnishments related to tax withholding; however, the appellant was subject to a
     tax levy by the Internal Revenue Service, apparently due to unpaid Federal
     income taxes or related penalties. Id. at 6. The agency further identified three
     “debts” that resulted from the following errors in DFAS’s back pay calculations:
     (1) an incorrect double payment for the pay period ending August 19, 2014,
     resulting in an overpayment of $1,374.40; (2) the failure to initially withhold
     Thrift Savings Plan deductions from the appellant’s back pay award in
     March 2016, resulting in a debt of $308.57; and (3) payment for time not actually
     worked during the pay period ending March 18, 2017, resulting in an
     overpayment of $541.62. Id. at 6-7.
¶9         Concerning the issue of within-grade pay increases, the agency stated that,
     when he was removed on August 8, 2014, the appellant was a GS-5, Step 5. Id.
     at 9. After the Board reversed the removal, the agency reinstated the appellant
     and retroactively promoted him to Step 6 effective October 18, 2015, which was
     the date he would have been eligible for the increase to Step 6 had the removal
                                                                                        5

      not occurred. Id. The appellant would not be eligible for another step increase
      until October 2017. Id.
¶10        The agency stated that the appellant’s entry-on-duty date is not incorrect in
      his official personnel file, as alleged. Id. at 10. Rather, the agency maintained
      that there is an incorrect entry-on-duty date in his internal electronic time and
      attendance system, known as VISTA, which does not reflect the date contained in
      his official personnel file. Id. The agency stated that the date shown in VISTA
      has no effect on the appellant’s salary or other benefits of employment. Id. The
      agency explained this discrepancy as follows: when the 2014 removal action was
      cancelled, the appellant had to be re-entered into the VISTA system as a “new”
      employee, effective August 8, 2014, which resulted in that date being entered as
      his start date. Id. The agency added that it has been unable to alter this date in
      the system. Id.
¶11        The agency denied engaging in reprisal against the appellant, noting that the
      supervisor that the appellant alleged was retaliating against him has not worked at
      the Memphis VA Medical Center since early 2016 and has not been the
      appellant’s supervisor since that time. CRF, Tab 8 at 11.
¶12        The appellant responded on August 22, 2017, again reiterating that the
      agency did not provide an adequate explanation of its back -pay figures; that he
      had been “double taxed” on his back pay; that his entry-on-duty date was
      incorrect; and that he was returned to a position in Logistics rather than his
      previous position. CRF, Tab 9. The appellant further asserted that he was not
      returned to work by the deadlines set forth in the Board’s order, that he was
      subject to a “tax levy,” and that his leave was not properly restored. Id. at 10-11.
      Finally, the appellant asserted that he was subject to unspecified reprisal by the
      agency and that he was subsequently subjected to termination. Id. at 11.
                                                                                          6

                                          ANALYSIS
¶13         When the Board finds a personnel action unwarranted or not sustainable, it
      orders that the appellant be placed, as nearly as possible, in the situation he would
      have been in had the wrongful personnel action not occurred.               House v.
      Department of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 530, ¶ 9 (2005). The agency bears the
      burden to prove its compliance with a Board order. An agency’s assertions of
      compliance must include a clear explanation of its compliance actions supported
      by documentary evidence. Vaughan v. Department of Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R.
      319, ¶ 5 (2011). The appellant may rebut the agency’s evidence of compliance by
      making “specific, nonconclusory, and supported assertions of continued
      noncompliance.” Brown v. Office of Personnel Management, 113 M.S.P.R. 325,
      ¶ 5 (2010).
¶14         We find that the agency has submitted sufficient evidence to establish its
      compliance with the Board’s order. As discussed above, the agency submitted
      evidence indicating that the initial errors in the back pay calculations have been
      resolved and that the appellant has now received the appropriate amount of back
      pay. The agency also has explained the discrepancies in tax withh olding, as well
      as the appellant’s entry-on-duty date.       The appellant has not convincingly
      countered the agency’s evidence and explanations.          Rather, he has merely
      reiterated the same objections he made previously, without substantively
      addressing the additional evidence and explanations submitted by the agency. As
      the appellant has not made any specific allegations of reprisal, we find that no
      such reprisal has occurred. If the appellant intended to raise claims of reprisal
      going beyond the compliance process, he can file a new appeal addressing those
      claims. Likewise, if the appellant is attempting to appeal his termination, he must
      file a new appeal with the Board to do so, as this allegation is beyond the scope
      of this enforcement proceeding.
¶15         In light of the agency’s evidence of compliance, we find the agency in
      compliance and dismiss the petition for enforcement. This is the final decision of
                                                                                      7

the Merit Systems Protection Board in this compliance proceeding. Title 5 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.183(c)(1) (5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c)(1)).

                 NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                       YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                      ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at Title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable t ime
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

2
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         8

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
                                                                                  9

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     10

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 3 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:

3
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              11

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided b y any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.