Court Opinion

ID: 9734464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:35:41.513639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:48.917255
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). These two cases, consolidated for appeal, involve challenges to zoning ordinances which effectively prevented the strip mining operations contemplated by the plaintiffs. The Ottawa Silica Company wants to remove silica sand from an area in Brownstown Township zoned single-family residential; the Silvas would like to mine gravel in an area of Ada Township zoned for specialized farming and single-family residences. Upon failing in their efforts to obtain rezoning, the landowners filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the respective zoning ordinances. While the circuit courts upheld the Ada Township ordinance and partially invalidated the Brownstown ordinance, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of both zoning ordinances.
The applicable standard for judicial review is clearly set forth in a number of fairly recent decisions by this Court. Ed Zaagman, Inc v City of Kentwood, 406 Mich 137; 277 NW2d 475 (1979); Kirk v Tyrone Twp, 398 Mich 429; 247 NW2d 848 (1976); and Kropf v Sterling Heights, 391 Mich 139; 215 NW2d 179 (1974). In a successful challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance, the plaintiff has the burden of proving:
"[F]irst, that there is no reasonable governmental interest being advanced by the present zoning classification itself * * * or secondly, that an ordinance may be unreasonable because of the purely arbitrary, capricious and unfounded exclusion of other types of legiti*164mate land use from the area in question.” Kropf, supra, p 158.
The four rules for applying these principles were also outlined in Kropf, supra:
1. " '[T]he ordinance comes to us clothed with every presumption of validity.’ ” Kropf, p 162, quoting Brae Burn, Inc v Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425; 86 NW2d 166 (1957).
2. " '[I]t is the burden of the party attacking to prove affirmatively that the ordinance is an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction upon the owner’s use of his property. * * * It must appear that the clause attacked is an arbitrary fiat, a whimsical ipse dixit, and that there is no room for a legitimate difference of opinion concerning its reasonableness.’ ” Id.
3. "Michigan has adopted the view that to sustain an attack on a zoning ordinance, an aggrieved property owner must show that if the ordinance is enforced the consequent restrictions on his property preclude its use for any purposes to which it is reasonably adapted.” Kropf, pp 162-163.
4. " 'This Court, however, is inclined to give considerable weight to the findings of the trial judge in equity cases.’ ” Kropf, p 163, quoting Christine Building Co v City of Troy, 367 Mich 508, 518; 116 NW2d 816 (1962).
While not purporting to overrule the above-cited cases, my brother’s opinion effectively does so by holding, for the first time, "that zoning regulations which prevent the extraction of natural resources are invalid unless 'very serious consequences’ will result from the proposed extraction”. This holding reverses the presumption of validity accorded zoning ordinances and creates a "preferred use” doctrine in favor of removing natural resources, contrary to our decision in Kropf, supra, which specifically abolished the preferred use doctrine. Therefore, I cannot join my brother’s opinion.
Even a cursory examination of this Court’s opinions in Certain-teed Products Corp v Paris Twp, *165351 Mich 434; 88 NW2d 705 (1958), and City of North Muskegon v Miller, 249 Mich 52; 227 NW 743 (1929), reveals that the supposed "rule” favoring the removal of natural resources unless "very serious consequences” would result was merely obiter dictum in each case. In Miller, supra, the Court affirmed an injunction against oil drilling under a city ordinance requiring a drilling permit; therefore, the supposed policy in favor of exploiting natural resources was not followed in that case. In Certain-teed the Court reversed the law case based on the zoning ordinance, but remanded the chancery case in contemplation of continuing judicial supervision and control over the mining project; the plaintiffs in that suit were not given carte blanche to develop natural resources, and the Court’s opinion explicitly contemplated that in the future an injunction shutting down the mining operation might be proper.
It is particularly inappropriate to elevate dictum to holding when the dictum embodies the public policy of 1929 and 1958, not 1982. We have long since abandoned the illusion that our scarce natural resources are infinite and renewable and therefore should be quickly exploited to the fullest extent. See Michigan Oil Co v Natural Resources Comm, 406 Mich 1; 276 NW2d 141 (1979); MCL 691.1201 et seq.; MSA 14.528(201) et seq.
If there was error in either of these cases, it was the failure of the Court of Appeals in Ottawa to give adequate deference to the factual findings of the trial judge in this equity case. On this basis, I agree with the remand in that case but would affirm in the Silva case.
Coleman, J., concurred with Ryan, J.
Riley, J., took no part in the decision of this case.