Court Opinion

ID: 9588653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:37.445132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:39.630657
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I concur fully with the dissent of Presiding Judge Banke. However, the points made by the majority opinion provoke additional comments.
1. The United States Supreme Court has devised a tripartite test in considering establishment clause questions. Under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (91 SC 2105, 29 LE2d 745) (1971), (a) any governmental action affecting religion must have a secular purpose; (b) the principal or primary effect of that governmental action must be one that neither advances one religion nor inhibits another religion; and (c) the governmental action must not constitute an excessive entanglement of government with religion. A minimal intrusion by the government into the affairs of religion, if it passes all three prongs of the Lemon test, is constitutionally permissible.
In the instant case, the trial court’s and this appellate court’s consideration and enforcement of the employment relationship between the appellant and the appellee had a purely secular purpose of resolving an employment contract dispute that just so happened to involve a church and a minister. In no way can it be said that enforcement of the employment contract here either advances or inhibits religion. Likewise, resolution of contract disputes of this nature hardly constitutes an excessive entanglement of government and religion. It is important to note that no religious dogma, doctrine, creed, tenet, or theological issue is involved in resolving this contract law dispute. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U. S. 595 (99 SC 3020, 61 LE2d 775) (1979).
2. In cases of this nature, it should also be remembered that the establishment clause discussed above calls for the separation of state and religion, not church and state; separation of church and state is misnamed, misunderstood, and mistaken nomenclature. The establishment clause’s prohibition and restriction actually is addressed to the state, and concerns forbidding the government’s favoring or inhibiting or singling out any one religion for special treatment over another; the original idea was that the government should be substantially neutral as to religion. The restriction and prohibition is against state action, not any religious action. “[T]he Constitution . . . affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 673 (104 SC 1355, 79 LE2d 604) (1984). The concept of religion has expanded from its original theistic definition to its present theis*179tic and sometimes nontheistic definitions, particularly as far as the free-exercise clause is concerned. See Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of WICCA, 249 Ga. 348 (292 SE2d 657) (1982). Historically, up until recent years, in matters involving the establishment and free exercise clauses, a uniform definition of religion was used (“In God We Trust”; “Creator Endowed Rights”; a notion of theism). Today a narrower definition of religion is employed in establishment clause considerations, as compared to use of a broad definition when the free exercise clause is invoked. When the latter clause is used, nontheism is also considered a religion. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (81 SC 1680, 6 LE2d 982) (1961). With the expansion of the definition of religion, the sphere of possible governmental intrusion likewise is bound to increase. It thus becomes imperative and increasingly important to remember that the determinative emphasis is whether the governmental action is substantially neutral while being accommodating, rather than becoming hostile, to religion. In this case, the bottom line is that the courts are concerned merely with a secular employment contract dispute, which is neither plus nor minus to any religion, and certainly no excessive entanglement of government and religion.
Several examples of cases (a) denoting permissible intervention and intrusion and (b) impermissible intervention and intrusion, with religious implications and into religious controversies, are set forth below, so that a difference and distinction may be clearly seen:
A. (1) Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (25 LE 244) (1878). (Government permission to intrude, in criminal convictions of polygamy over religious claim that more than one spouse was a religious practice, was approved. Religious beliefs may not be regulated by government, but religious actions may be reviewed.) (2) Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U. S. 664 (90 SC 1409, 25 LE2d 697) (1970). (Government’s intervention in approving tax exemptions for religious property was permissible, and did not constitute an excessive, entanglement with religion.) (3) McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (81 SC 1101, 6 LE2d 393) (1961). (Sunday legislative government closing laws did have a secular purpose as a uniform day of rest. While it was consistent with religious practice, it was a minimal permissible intrusion into religion.) (4) Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (103 SC 3330, 77 LE2d 1019) (1983). (A state legislature had paid a chaplain who began sessions with a prayer. This minimal intrusion into religion was permissible under the sometimes-used historical test, rather than the most-time used tripartite test — the same as “In God We Trust” — used on government coins.)
B. (1) Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696 (96 SC 2372, 49 LE2d 151) (1976). (Here, the government or court was prohibited from intruding into who controlled the “Diocese’s Assets,” and reorganization of the diocese into three dioceses. *180Decisions regarding church doctrine, tenets and assets was an impermissible intervention.) (2) Presbyterian Church v. Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 U. S. 440 (89 SC 601, 21 LE2d 658) (1969). (Governmental or court determinations of ecclesiastical questions are impermissible intrusions.) (3) National Labor &c. Bd. v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U. S. 490 (99 SC 1313, 59 LE2d 533) (1979). (Use of compulsory bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act to parochial schools poses as a hostility or threat to religion and is impermissible entanglement.) (4) Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (101 SC 192, 66 LE2d 199) (1980). (Posting the “Ten Commandments” on schoolroom walls had an impermissible religious, rather than a secular, purpose.) (5) Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (82 SC 1261, 8 LE2d 601) (1962). (A prayer worded by the Board of Education and required to be recited daily had a religious, rather than a secular, purpose and would be an impermissible entanglement between government and religion.)
It is clear the facts of the instant case fit like a glove the former examples under (a) rather than (b).
3. In Lyons v. Planters’ Loan &c. Bank, 86 Ga. 485 (12 SE 882) (1890), one issue was whether church property could be applied to satisfy a debt a church owed its former pastor for services as a clergyman. Chief Justice Bleckley was at his most eloquent in analyzing the case:
“Here then is a debtor having some property, perhaps sufficient property, to discharge the debt. Why should it not be so applied? If any debt ought to be paid, it is one contracted for the health of souls — for pious ministrations and holy services. If any class of debtors ought to pay as matter of moral as well as legal duty, the good people of a Christian church are that class. No church can have any higher obligation resting upon it than that of being just. The study of justice for more than forty years has impressed me with the supreme importance of this grand and noble virtue. Some of the virtues are in the nature of moral luxuries, but this is an absolute necessary of social life. It is the hog and hominy, the bacon and beans of morality, public and private. It is the exact virtue, being mathematical in its nature. Mercy, pity, charity, gratitude, generosity, magnanimity, etc., are the liberal virtues. They flourish partly on voluntary concessions made by the exact virtue, but they have no right to extort from it any unwilling concession. They can only supplicate or persuade ... On the credit side of justice we can make any sacrifice of it that we will, but on the debit side we can make none whatever. I may burn as an offering my own bull or lamb, but not that which rightfully belongs to another owner. There is nothing more exalted than a strict duty and its performance. What we freely give cannot be better bestowed than what we pay in discharge of a perfect obligation. The law grants ex*181emptions of property to families, but none to private corporations or collective bodies, lay or ecclesiastical. These must pay their debts if they can. All their property legal and equitable is subject. Atlanta v. Grant &c. Co., 57 Ga. 340. We think a court may well constrain this church to do justice. In contemplation of law, justice is not only one of the cardinal virtues, it is the pontifical virtue.” Id. at 490-491. (Emphasis supplied.) Bleckley received nationwide recognition for the latter expression of acknowledging and confirming justice as the pontifical virtue.
A similar analysis is appropriate in the instant case to reach the conclusion that the church can be constrained to do justice in this simple and secular employment contract dispute. The majority opinion fails to meet the requirement of accommodating religion even though we deal here only with a secular purpose. Not even a minimum of entanglement with religion, much less an excessive entanglement, is here involved. This results in hostility and discrimination toward religion inasmuch as our courts usually monitor all employment contracts of others, but here the majority turns its back on aiding resolution of contracts of religious groups. With this unfair, hostile, and discriminatory treatment by government toward religion I cannot agree.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke joins in this dissent.