Court Opinion

ID: 9737515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:27:34.748573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.503259
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, with whom MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI joins, dissenting: Mr. Justice Kluczynski and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. We would affirm the judgment of the appellate court for the reason that the circuit court, in entering judgment for the defendants, failed to follow the established rule that the right of the moving party to summary judgment must be free from doubt and the motion denied if there are triable issues of fact which, if decided favorably to the opponent of the motion, will entitle him to the relief sought in his pleadings. It is true, as stated by the majority, that the rule is generally accepted that an “ordinary” vendor of real estate is not liable for personal injuries sustained subsequent to his transfer of possession and control. The majority, however, recognize a well-defined exception to that rule that when there is a concealed dangerous or defective condition liability on the part of the vendor continues beyond discovery of the defective condition, and until there has been a reasonable “opportunity to remedy it.” Whether there has been an opportunity to remedy the defect is, of course, a question of fact. In this case the vendors sold a building, apparently in a state of disrepair and dilapidation, as evidenced by a total price of $3,000, a down payment of $100, and “rotten and loose” porch and stair railings in “bad condition.” The sale was made on May 1, 1963, and the plaintiff was injured on May 7. The same rationale which imposes liability upon one who sells property with a concealed, defective, dangerous condition until discovery, and until there has been an opportunity to repair, compels the conclusion that a vendor who sells property with a visibly dangerous defect should be held liable until a reasonably sufficient time has elapsed to permit the vendee to repair it. The only difference between the two situations is that in the case of the concealed defect the reasonable period of time commences to run from discovery, and in the case of the patently dangerous defect, from the time of relinquishment of the right to possession and control. In either instance, whether there has been a reasonable opportunity to repair is a question of fact. The majority seek to distinguish the New York case on the ground that it “involved an unusual situation.” In that case, unlike this one, it could at least be determined from the record what repairs were necessary and the length of time required to make them. Here, the majority, for reasons not apparent from this record, conclude as a matter of law that the time between May 1 and May 7 “could not reasonably be found inadequate for the simple repairs here involved.” For all this record reflects it could well be that the “rotten” condition was so extensive as to require extensive reconstruction, not merely replacement of a rail. We agree with the majority that this case need not be decided on the issue of whether a contract seller should be treated as an owner or lessor, but it should clearly be affirmed upon application of the rules governing summary judgment. We point out that the effect of the appellate court decision is not, as stated by the majority, to exonerate the vendee, but to hold the vendors in the case until the fact issues can be decided upon the evidence. In contrast, the majority opinion serves to exonerate these vendors, sellers of property in a dangerously defective condition, without a determination of the key issue of whether there was a reasonably adequate period of time after the sale to permit the repairs to be made.