Court Opinion

ID: 9845632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:25:28.655925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:16.696537
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
While I concur in the result of the majority opinion, I do not feel comfortable joining fully in an opinion that skims quickly over a number of important points, enumerated below.
First, the majority opinion does not recognize that this is a criminal case, and that all criminal cases have a distinct and separate set of standards of review. For that simple reason, the citation to civil cases for the standard of review is wrong (sec 118 Idaho at 236, 796 P.2d at 113), and must be corrected before I consider throwing in my vote for the majority opinion’s rationale.
Second, the majority characterizes the sentence received by the defendant as “fairly severe.” At 238, 796 P.2d at 115. This characterization is not accurate; the sentence is quite severe, and deserves at least the attention the Court of Appeals gives to each and every case of sentence review. Instead, this Court, in a somewhat rambling and informal manner, affirms the judgement of the district court. I would not be so quick to dispense with this sentence review.
Third, I do not understand why the majority takes the time to relate anecdotal evidence of the victim’s appearance in court in order to support the district court’s determination that the victim could not legally consent. See 118 Idaho at 238, 796 P.2d at 115. If I did not know better, I would have thought that the day was long gone when a person’s intelligence was judged by a person’s appearance.
Fourth, the analysis of the victim’s consent to both the termination of parental rights, and her consent to be married is central to this appeal, yet it is not given the attention which it deserves. The opinion points out that a court terminated the victim’s parental rights precisely because the victim was an incompetent mother. This evidence is highly pertinent to determining whether the victim was able to consent to the acts at issue. The fact that the victim consented to marriage means nothing, because there is no provision for the independent determination whether such consent exists, unless the bride-to-be is underage. See I.C. § 32-202.