Court Opinion

ID: 9771929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:00:33.503479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:39.744423
License: Public Domain

Todd, Judge
(dissenting).
Tennessee authorities cited in the majority opinion involved negligence in maintenance or defective condition of premises, sometimes called passive negligence; where-: as the present case involves active negligence of the de*583f endant in pulling an overhead door down upon the head of plaintiff. There was no defect in the door, the injury was caused by the negligent operation of the door, rather than by its negligent maintenance or defective condition.
As stated in Westborne Coal Co. v. Willoughby, 133 Tenn. 257, 180 S.W. 322 (1915), there is no useful distinction between “active negligence” and “passive negligence”' in judging liability of the defendant for injuries which occur upon his premises. A much more valid and useful distinction may be made between the terms, “condition of premises” and “conduct of defendant at time of injury.”
Each Tennessee case cited in the majority opinion involved “condition of premises.” In Walker v. Williams, 215 Tenn. 195, 384 S.W.2d 447 (1964), the “condition” was a broken spring on a screen door. In Anthony v. Anthony, 60 Tenn.App. 143, 444 S.W.2d 714 (1969), the “condition” was a. concrete step. In Westborne Coal Co. v. Willoughby, supra, the “condition” was a defective mine car or track which produced a spark and explosion merely by the non-negligent operation of a switch.
Thus it is seen that none of the cited Tennessee opinions were concerned with the ‘ ‘ conduct of the defendant, ’ ’ but rather with the “condition of the premises.”
Candor requires the recognition of Hatcher v. Cantrell, 16 Tenn.App. 544, 65 S.W.2d 247 (1934), wherein “conduct of the defendant” was involved. Hatcher was standing in the driveway of Miss Cantrell when she drove her automobile over him. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, and this Court reversed and remanded for a new trial because there was evidence that Hatcher was an invitee rather than a licensee.
*584In the case of Heaton v. Kagley, 198 Tenn. 530, 281 S.W.2d 385 (1954), the distinction urged herein was recognized by our Supreme Court. The minor plaintiff was riding on the fender of a tractor without the knowledge or consent of the farmer when he fell under the wheel of the tractor and was injured. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant and the Supreme Court affirmed, saying:
“ (3) In the instant case the injured boy was a lone visitor upon the defendant’s land, either by permission, consent or acquiescence of the owner. He was a licensee under the law, and the only duty devolving upon the defendant was ‘To use a reasonable care to discover him and avoid injury to him in carrying on activities upon the land’. Prosser on Torts, p. 625.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The common law has not been abrogated by Tennessee decisions on this subject. It has merely been interpreted as to the degree of care required in the maintenamce of the condition of premises for the presence of invitees, licensees, or trespassers.
In Volume 15, Tennessee Digest, pp. 316, 317, the subject “Negligence” is divided as follows:
“A. Personal Conduct
B. Dangerous Substances, etc.
C. Condition and Use of Land, Buildings and Other Structures. ’ ’
Other collections of decisions have similar separate treatment of “condition” and “conduct” under the subject of “Negligence.”
*585The present ease of conduct may be distinguished from previous Tennessee eases of condition without doing violence or disrespect to previous Tennessee decisions.
In 65 C.J.S. Negligence sec. 63(36), pp. 707, 709, is found the following:
“While not recognized in some jurisdictions (citing authority from Florida only), many of them follow the rule that the owner or occu/pant of property owes to a licensee thereon a duty to~ use reasonable care not to injure him through affirmative and active negligence. (Citing authorities from 18 states and the District of Columbia, including numerous federal cases.)
“Active or affirmative negligence may be defined broadly as that occurring in connection with activities conducted on the premises, and passive negligence as that which causes danger by reason of the physical condition of the premises. The fáilure to warn of danger, unaccompanied by affirmative conduct, is negative in its nature and not active negligence. (Citing numerous authorities)
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“Under Restatement, Second, Torts, a possessor of land is subject to liability to his licensees for physical harm caused to them by his faMure to carry on his activities ivith reasonable care for their safety if, but only if, he should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, and they do not know or have reason to know of the possessor’s activities and of the risk involved.
*586“Where the presence of a licensee on the premises is known, the owner or occupant owes the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring him, at least by any affirmative or positive acts of negligence, * * *. (Citing numerous authorities) (Emphasis supplied.)
In 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, sec. 104, pp. 766, 767 is found the following:
‘ ‘ The fact that a licensee is upon the premises with the consent, at least the tacit consent, of the owner or occupant should have some hearing upon the liability of the owner or occupant for an injurjr sustained by the licensee upon the premises. Undoubtedly the authorities are inclined to impose a greater obligation upon an owner or occupant than that of merely not setting a trap for persons who are properly at the place at which they are injured. Theoretically, the degree of diligence owing to the licensee by the proprietor of premises on which there is a pitfall is less than that to invited guests; yet after the presence of the licensee is known, exactly the same caution may be required of the proprietor to satisfy his duty to such person as would be required if he had invited the latter to come upon the premises. In several cases, a person guilty of ‘active,’ as distinguished from ‘passive,’ negligence has been held to be liable for a resulting injury to a bare licensee, while in many cases an owner or occupant has been held free from liability in respect of an injury sustained by a licensee, upon the ground that the negligence, if any, of the owner or occupant was ‘passive.’ Thus, if, while a licensee is upon premises of another in the exercise of the due care, the owner is affirmatively and actively negligent in the management of the property or business, as a result of which the licensee *587is subjected to increased hazard or danger, the owner will be liable for injuries sustained as a result of such negligence.
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“* * * According to some authority, the only duty which is owed by an owner or occupant to a licensee in a position on the premises where he would not reasonably be expected- is to abstain from tvilfully injuring him.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the supplement to the above text is found the following :
“* * * And it is submitted that the true test of the prop-perty owner’s liability is whether he has acted as a reasonably prudent man would act in view of the probability of injuries to others. It must be remembered that a trespasser is not denied the right to recover because a trespass is a wrongful act, but because, since his presence is not to be anticipated, the property oiuner owes him no duty to take precautions for his safety. That anticipation of the presence of a trespasser or licensee is the basis of liability for injury is demonstrated by the exception from the general rule of nonliability made by the common law in the case of mantraps and spring guns.
“The suggestion above named, that the test of liability is not the nature of the landowner’s conduct, but the existence of grounds for anticipating another’s presence, so as to require the taking of reasonable precautions for his safety, is not without judicial support. ’ ’ (Emphasis supplied.)
*588In Cochran v. Abercrombie, Fla.App., 118 So.2d 636, 79 A.L.R.2d 986 (1960), cited by the majority, the Florida court said:
“The duty owed by the owner or occupant of premises to each class of persons is also distinct. The duty owed by the owner or occupant to the trespasser is to refrain from committing a wilful or wanton injury against him tuith the rule being softened after discovery by the landowner of peril to the trespasser. Byers v. Gunn, Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 723.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The A.L.R. annotation headed by the f oregoing opinion (79 A.L.R.2d 986) reviews the decisions on liability of host to guest for injury other than by condition of the premises, and contains six decisions favorable to the host and 12 decisions favorable to the guest. Subsequent to said article, the Supreme Court of Washington has decided the case of Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash.2d 777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963), which is cited in the majority opinion and which is contrary to Abercrombie, supra.
In a prior article in 156 A.L.R. 1221, the lead case is Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944), wherein is found the following:
“ Moreover, the instructions as to licensees contain an incorrect statement of the law. The jury was told that: ‘An “Invitee” who enters upon portions of the premises where she has no right to enter becomes a “Licensee” and the only duty to her then is to refrain from wilful or wanton injury.’ (Italics added.) There has been some confusion in the authorities as to the duty of care owed by a landowner or possessor to a licensee. The courts have frequently made general statements to the effect that the only duty to a licensee. *589is to abstain from willful or wanton injury. See, for example, Powers v. Raymond, 197 Cal. 126, 131, 239 P. 1069; (Citing authorities) On their facts, however, all of these cases involved injuries resulting from a defective condition of the premises, as distinguished from active conduct of the possessor or his employees. In other cases it has been suggested that a duty of ordinary care is not owed to a licensee even though injury resulted from active conduct rather than mere passive condition of the premises. (Citing authorities) The prevailing view is to the contrary, however, and it is now generally held that in cases involving injury resulting from active conduct, as distinguished, from condition of the premises, the landowner or possessor may be liable for failure to exercise ordinary care toward a licensee whose presence on the land is known or should reasonably be known to the owner or possessor. Rest., Torts, sec. 341; Prosser on Torts [1941], 630; 45 CJ 803-801. In Prosser on Torts, supra, the author explains: ‘ ‘ Some courts have gone so far as to say that there is no duty to a licensee other than to refrain from inflicting wilful or wanton injury upon him. As in the case of trespassers, however, an increasing regard for human safety has led to a retreat from this position. It is now generally held that as to any active operations which the occupier carries on, there is an obligation to exercise reasonable care for the protection of a licensee. He must run his train, operate his machmery! or back his truck with due regard for the possibility that the permission given may have been accepted and the guest may be present/ The more recent California decisions have adopted this rule. (Citing authorities) The cases cited herein suggesting that a lesser standard of care is applicable where injury re-*590suits from active conduct of the landowner or possessor are inconsistent with the later decisions and must he disapproved.
“In the present case it is apparent that plaintiff’s presence on the premises was known to defendant at the time of the accident and that the accident did not result from a defective condition of the premises. Accordingly, even if plaintiff were a licensee rather than a business visitor, it is clear that defendant had a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring her, and the trial court should not have given the criticized instruction. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the article following said case in A.L.E. is found the following:
“The courts in a number of jurisdictions have held that it is improper to charge an owner or occupier with the duty merely to refrain from injuring a licensee through wanton or wilful acts, and that a licensor owes the licensee the higher degree of duty to refrain from ‘active negligence,’ at least after the latter’s presence is known or should have been anticipated, although the licensor may not be held responsible for ‘passive negligence ’ arising because of the condition of the premises. ’ ’ (Citing cases from California, North Carolina, District of Columbia, Illinois, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, and Pennsylvania.)
The same annotation quotes Houston Belt & T. R. Co. v. O’Leary, Tex.Civ.App., 136 S.W. 601 (1911) as follows:
“In no case that we have examined or to which our attention has been called has it been held that the pro*591prietor cannot be held liable to a licensee who while upon the premises is injured, not by conditions then existing on the premise's, but by some affirmative, negligence of the proprietor or his servants. * * * It has been often held that where a person is rightfully upon the premises of another, even as licensee, he has the right to- require of the proprietor that he so conduct himself as not to injure him through his active negligence.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Other cases recognizing liability to a licensee for negligent actions of the host are Olderman v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 121 Conn. 177, 4 A.2d 646 (1939); Garstka v. Republic Steel Corp., 294 Mich. 387, 293 N.W. 691 (1940) and Ridley v. National Casket Co., 161 N.Y.S. 444 (Sup.1916).
Said A.L.R. article further states:
* * Thus, it has been held in New Hampshire that while there is no duty to provide safe conditions for a known trespasser, there is a duty to refrain from negligent conduct toward such a person, or, in other words, the owner or occupier of property is liable for negligent or careless acts of intervening force after the presence of the trespasser becomes known.” (Citing authorities) (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing is sufficient to demonstrate the predominance of decisions which, under one theory or another, recognize a real distinction between liability for maintaining safe premises and liability for overt acts of negligence during the known presence of a licensee on the premises.
Reason and logic call for such a distinction in order to promote consistency with rulings in other similar and *592related matters. For example, in Tennessee an autoist lias the same duty to a social guest in his automobile as to a stranger. Should the rule be otherwise merely because the automobile is on the premises of the autoist?
If an autoist negligently closes a door upon the hand of a guest in his automobile, should his liability be any different whether the automobile is situated in the owner’s driveway or a few feet away at the curb outside his premises ?
If the owner or controller of premises is to-~be immune to liability for his negligent conduct which injures his guest, is the immunity to extend to the family of the host, or his other guests'? What moral or reasonable ground can be found to permit a host to negligently injure his guest with impunity while others on the premises, who have no responsibility as a host are held to stricter liability for their conduct ?
The great volume of judicial rationalization on the subject should be simply and briefly summarized in the rule that every human being is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring his fellow man, and that ordinary care varies with the circumstances of each case. Such a rule would free the jury to judge the conduct of the defendant and his liability therefor in the light of each case, under general instructions from the court.
Reason and logic also call for a recognition of a distinction between trespassers, licensees by acquiescence, licensees by general or implied invitation, licensees by specific invitation, and licensees who by invitation enter the premises in the company of the host. Surely, a social guest who is led into the premises by his host is entitled to a higher degree of consideration from the host and the *593co-nrts, than an unwanted trespasser or one who has acquired a license by passive acquiescence.
In Worsham v. Dempster, 148 Tenn. 267, 251 S.W. 52 (1923), the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of invitation and contributory negligence, but said:
“It is not claimed that the plaintiff was there by invitation, either express or implied, from the defendants, or Clark & Jones, and they were the only persons who had the possession and control of said building.
“The rules of law applicable in such a case and approved by this court are thus stated in Chattanooga Warehouse & Cold Storage Co. v. Anderson, 141 Tenn. 288, 293, 210 S.W. 113, 154.
‘The general rule is succinctly, but accurately, stated by Mr. Cooley in his work on Torts (pages 604, 607), and approved by the supreme court of the United States in Bennett v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 102 U.S. 577, 26 L.Ed. 235, 236 as follows:
“ ‘ “When one expressly or by implication invites others to come upon Ms premises, whether for business or for any other purpose, it is his duty to be reasonably sure that he is not inviting them into danger, and to that end he must exercise ordinary care and prudence to render the premises reasonably safe for the visit.” ’ ” 148 Tenn., p. 275, 255 S.W., p. 54 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Clapp v. La Grill, 103 Tenn. 164, 52 S.W. 134 (1889), plaintiff fell through a grating on defendant’s property adjoining a sidewalk. The Supreme Court said:
“ * * * Where the owner of land expressly or by implication invites a person to come upon his land, he can *594not permit anything in the nature of a snare to exist thereon which results in injury to the person who avails himself of the invitation, and who at the time is exercising ordinary care, without being answerable for the consequences. If, however, he gives but a bare license or permission to cross his premises, the licensee takes the risk of accident in using the premises in the condition in which they are. * * * ” 103 Tenn., pp. 171-173, 52 S.W., p. 136.
In Clapp v. La Grill, the question of whether plaintiff was an invitee was held to be for the jury.
In Frederick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 136, 10 A.2d 576 (1940), the reasonable and humane rule is well stated thus:
“Even a trespasser, however, is not a pariah. It is true that, unless and until the property owner or the operator * * * becomes apprised of his presence, no duty in regard to the trespasser’s safety arises * * * but when the owner or operator is put on guard as to the presence of the trespasser, the latter immediately acquires the right; to proper protection under the circumstances. ” (citing authorities)
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“The legal obligation to trespassers has been traditionally stated to be the avoidance of wilful or wanton negligence. ‘Wilful negligence’ is an obvious misnomer. ‘Wanton negligence’, as distinguished from ordinary negligence, is characterized by a realization on the part of the tortfeasor — or at least what would cause such a realization to a reasonable man — of the probability of injury to another, and by a reckless disregard never*595theless, of the consequences. As applied to the type of cases of which the present, is an example, it is not wanton negligence to fail to use care to discover the presence of an unanticipated trespasser, but it is ant on negligence, within the meaning of the law, to fail to use ordinary and reasonable care to avoid injury to a trespasser after bis presence has been ascertained,” (Citing authorities) 10 A.2d, p. 578 (Emphasis supplied.)
There is one more reason why the decision of this Court should be otherwise. The act of the defendant in operating an overhead door where it would strike her guest might, under the circumstances, amount to such wilful conduct as would render her liable under all of the decisions. The determination of such wilfulness was properly for the jury.
In all deference and respect to the majority, the disposition of this appeal should not follow the single Florida decision in Abercrombie, supra, but should follow the Washington decision of Potts v. Amis, supra, and the considerable number of other decisions in agreement therewith. This case should be reversed and remanded for submission of the issues to a jury.