Court Opinion

ID: 9899964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 00:03:37.255573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:57.719634
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 P. v. Sims CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B323570

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BA179907)
         v.

JERMAINE LEE SIMS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
      Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Nicholas J.
Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                     I.     INTRODUCTION

      Defendant Jermaine Sims filed a petition to vacate his
sentence and for resentencing of his first degree murder
conviction pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95.1 The
trial court judge, who had presided over defendant’s trial, denied
the petition, ruling that defendant was ineligible for resentencing
because he was properly convicted as an aider and abettor and
because he was a major participant in the underlying robbery
and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant
appeals, challenging only the court’s reckless indifference finding.
We affirm.

                      II.   BACKGROUND

       The following background is taken from our prior
unpublished opinion concerning defendant’s section 1172.6
petition (People v. Sims (Mar. 22, 2021, B300244 [nonpub. opn.]
(Sims I)) which recited the facts from the unpublished opinion in
the direct appeal from defendant’s underlying conviction (People
v. Turner (Dec. 16, 2002, B152074, B157289 [nonpub. opn.])2:

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature
renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 with no change in
text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Further references will be to the
statute’s current section number only.

2     Neither party contends the facts as recited in the prior
appellate opinions do not accurately reflect the facts in the trial
record in this matter. At the outset of the trial court’s
evidentiary hearing on defendant’s section 1172.6 petition, the

                                  2
“A.   Robbery/Murder[]

      ‘The Nguyen family owned Wit’s Liquor Store in Lawndale.
During the afternoon of December 25, 1998, [S.] Nguyen was
working at the cash register, while her father, Alan Nguyen,
napped on a pillow and blanket set up behind the counter.
      ‘At 2:30 p.m., defendant . . . entered the store, [purchased] a
can of soda . . . , and left the store. A few minutes later,
defendant . . . re-entered the store accompanied by [codefendant
Moses Lee Turner]. Defendant . . . held a gun to [Ms.] Nguyen’s
head and demanded money from the cash register.
Simultaneously, . . . Turner circled to the back of the counter
where [Mr.] Nguyen slept, picked up the still-sleeping man, and
violently beat him on the head with his fists and the butt of a
handgun. At one point, . . . Turner smashed [Mr.] Nguyen’s head
against a shelf of bottles. While watching the assault on her
father, [Ms.] Nguyen attempted to comply with defendant[’s]
demand to empty the cash register’s contents into a paper bag.
Defendant . . . set his soda on the counter, grabbed the bag from
[Ms.] Nguyen and put in more money from the register, as well as

parties, citing section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), and the court
agreed that the court could not rely on the factual summary of
defendant’s offenses contained in the nonpublished opinion in
People v. Turner, supra, B152074, B157289. Nevertheless, the
parties and the court agreed that the opinion’s factual
characterizations were accurate although defense counsel
believed there were “more details in the record of the transcripts
than what’s in the appellate decision or really what was
necessary to be in the appellate decision . . . .” Accordingly, we
set forth facts from the prior opinion as context for defendant’s
claims.

                                 3
some credit card receipts. Defendant . . . ordered [Ms.] Nguyen to
lie on the floor, which she did. Defendants then left the store,
leaving behind both the paper bag full of money ($200) and credit
card receipts, and defendant[’s] . . . soda. A surveillance camera
had captured the entry of both defendants into the store and
defendant[’s] robbery of [Ms.] Nguyen, although the quality of the
videotape was not clear.
        ‘[Mr.] Nguyen died at the scene from severe brain trauma.
He had suffered multiple head injuries caused by “moderate to
severe force.”
        ‘Defendant[’s] fingerprints were found on several items
inside the store, including the soda can and one of the credit card
receipts in the paper bag. In argument to the jury, defendant[’s]
. . . attorney conceded defendant[’s] presence in the store and
robbery at gunpoint of [Ms.] Nguyen.’

“B.   Underlying Conviction

      “On May 18, 2001, a jury found defendant guilty of: first
degree murder in violation of section 187, subdivision (a)
(count 1); and two counts of second degree robbery in violation of
section 211 (counts 2 and 3). The jury also found true, as to all
three counts, the allegations that defendant personally used a
firearm in the commission of the offenses within the meaning of
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) and that a principal was armed
with a firearm in the commission of the offenses in violation of
section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).
      “On March 13, 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant to
a term of 25 years to life on count 1, plus an additional
consecutive 10-year term pursuant to section 12022.53,

                                 4
subdivision (b), for an aggregate base term of 35 years to life.
The court also imposed, but stayed, a 15-year sentence on count 2
and imposed a concurrent 15-year sentence on count 3.
      “On December 16, 2002, a panel of this Division affirmed
defendant’s conviction. (People v. Turner, [supra, B152074,
B157289].)

“C.   Petition for Resentencing

       “Defendant filed his initial petition for resentencing under
section [1172.6] on December 17, 2018. Without defendant being
present or represented by counsel, the court denied the motion,
concluding that ‘[t]he new legislation restricts accomplice liability
for felony murders to those who harbor a specific intent to kill
and therewith aid, abet, counsel, command or assist the actual
killer, along with those who were “major participants in the
underlying felony” who act with “reckless indifference” to human
life. Petitioner does not claim to fall outside of these criteria [nor]
does he otherwise recite any facts to demonstrate his entitlement
to relief under the new law. His request for a modification of
sentence is therefore denied.’
       “On March 7, 2019, defendant filed a supplemental petition
for appointment of counsel and resentencing under section
[1172.6], arguing that he was entitled to resentencing on his first
degree murder conviction because neither the trial court nor the
jury found that he acted with reckless indifference to human life
or that he was a major participant in the robbery.
       “On March 14, 2019, the trial court again summarily
denied the petition, reasoning that defendant was a major

                                  5
participant who acted with an intent to commit a crime that
carried ‘“a grave risk of death.”’” (Sims I, supra, B300244.)
       Defendant appealed from the summary denial of his
petition and we reversed and remanded. We held that, based on
the record, “the trial court could not determine at the initial stage
of the process—as a matter of law and without resort to
factfinding—that the jury did not base its first degree murder
finding on a felony murder theory without proof of malice.” (Sims
I, supra, B300244.)
       The following background is from the trial court
proceedings following remand:
       The trial court issued an order to show cause why
defendant’s petition should not be granted.3 The court held an
evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution introduced into
evidence all the transcripts from the underlying criminal
conviction, including the transcript from defendant’s sentencing
hearing at which defendant said, “‘I just wanted to state I’m sorry
to the Nguyen family, and I did not kill Mr. Nguyen. And just
make it clear to you that we have eternal life. It’s going to be
judgment day for everybody, and I don’t feel I should be punished
for that. I feel I should be punished for what I’ve done. And it’s
clear, you know, if I knew he was going to kill that man, I would

3     The record on appeal contains a copy defendant’s
December 17, 2018, section 1172.6 petition but not his
March 7, 2019, petition. The trial court’s order denying
defendant section 1172.6 relief indicates that it concerns
defendant’s March 7, 2019, petition. On our own motion, we take
judicial notice of the copy of the March 7, 2019, petition contained
in the record in Sims I. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d) & 459,
subd. (a).)

                                 6
have just killed her. I had no intention or idea that he was back
there asleep.’”
       At the sentencing hearing, the trial court observed,
“‘[Defendant] said something, of course, that has piqued my
curiosity here. And that is had he known his confederate,
Mr. Turner, was going to kill Mr. Nguyen, he would have killed
her. And I presume that he was referring to Ms. Nguyen.’”
       Trial defense counsel responded to the court, “‘I
understand. That’s not what he meant. He didn’t express
himself properly. He’s discussed this with me at least five times.
I know—I know the way he thinks, and that’s what he thinks.’”
The trial prosecutor responded, “‘For what it’s worth, I took it the
same way [defense counsel] said. In other words, look, if I went
in there to kill somebody, if that was the plan, then he was killing
Ms. [sic.] Nguyen, I would have been killing her. And therefore
you can see, because I didn’t kill her, that wasn’t my intent. So I
understand it the same way.’”
       During the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution also
pointed out testimony from the trial that Ms. Nguyen was five
feet tall and weighed 100 pounds and Mr. Nguyen was five feet
three inches tall and of small build.
       After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
defendant’s petition, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was properly convicted as an aider and abettor and
“was a major participant in the underlying felony offense of
robbery, and acted with a reckless disregard for human life.” The
court explained:
       “[T]he evidence clearly established it was not [defendant]
but instead Turner who actually killed Mr. Nguyen.
[Defendant’s] conviction for murder was therefore premised on

                                 7
aiding and abetting, felony murder, or on both theories. Under
then-existing law, aiding and abetting was a viable theory of
culpability and continues to be under . . . § 189, subd. (e)(2). The
issue presented therefore concerns the applicability of felony
murder as a basis upon which to premise [defendant’s] criminal
liability for murder in view of recent legislative changes to penal
statutes that govern its use.
       “On June 24, 2022, the court conducted an evidentiary
hearing as provided by . . . § [1172.6]. By stipulation of the
parties, the record of conviction as noted includes, among other
things, the information, jury instructions, trial exhibits received
into evidence at the hearing, trial transcripts, and the appellate
decision. For reasons that will be discussed, the court will deny
the petition not only because [defendant’s] guilt was premised on
aiding and abetting, which remains a viable theory of culpability
following recent changes to . . . §§ 188 and 189, but also because
the record of conviction supports his conviction for murder
beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the current iteration of
the felony murder [sic].
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
       “It is not clear to what extent [defendant] participated in
the actual planning of the underlying robbery, or whether he was
the supplier of the guns he and his cohort used. However, many
of the other factors articulated in [People v. ]Banks [(2015) 61
Cal.4th 788 (Banks)] establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was a major participant in the underlying robbery. For example,
[defendant] was not, as he claims in his response, some
uninformed confederate waiting in isolation a considerable
distance away from the crime scene. He instead was
continuously present and actively involved in the underlying

                                 8
crime from start to finish. He casually posed as a customer at the
outset in order to case the liquor store, leaving the store and
returning only moments later with his crime partner to commit
the robbery. His initial reconnaissance was undoubtedly
designed to guarantee no customers or other potential witnesses
would be present. Further, [defendant] was aware of the actual
dangers inherent in entering the store armed with a gun along
with an accomplice he knew was also armed. He held his gun at
Ms. Nguyen’s head to prevent her from seeking help or otherwise
interfer[ing] with the crime plan, and ultimately by this means
also prevented her from assisting her elderly father during the
fatal assault. [Defendant] was positioned within a few feet away
to witness all of this and was aware of the grave risk of death
these circumstances presented. He nonetheless made no attempt
to restrain his crime partner from beating Mr. Nguyen to death
even though neither victim offered any resistance. [Defendant]
opted instead to turn a blind eye to his cohort’s violence, viewing
it an acceptable means to consummate the robbery.4 In addition,
as he thereafter left the scene, [defendant] made no effort to
assist Mr. Nguyen, who laid on the floor bloodied and dying.
Thus, even if he actually intended neither the beating nor the
homicide that resulted, [defendant] knowingly continued to
participate in the crime without objection or hesitation, and in
doing so realized this presented an ever-increasing, grave risk of
death. [Citation.]

“4    That [defendant] possessed no objection to killing as a
means of furthering his criminal objectives is arguably further
demonstrated by his comment at sentencing that he would have
considered killing Ms. Nguyen had he known Mr. Nguyen would
succumb to his injuries.

                                9
         “For each of the foregoing reasons, the prosecution has also
proved beyond a reasonable doubt [defendant] acted with a
reckless disregard for human life. In brief, these reasons include
[defendant’s] awareness about the guns and intended robbery; his
presence at the murder scene, from beginning to end; the fact he
could see his cohort was not peaceable or cautious, yet he failed to
take any steps before, during or after the robbery to minimize
risk (e.g. ensuring the guns were unloaded, suggesting Turner
behave in such a way as to reduce risks, or demonstrate even a
passing regard for his victims, such as taking care not to point
his gun recklessly at Ms. Nguyen’s head or by presenting aid or
comfort to Mr. Nguyen after he had been severely injured).
[Citations.]
         “Consequently, on the basis of the record, the court finds
beyond a reasonable doubt as follows: (1) [defendant] was
properly convicted as an aider and abettor to the murder of
Mr. Nguyen in that he provided comfort, support, and assistance
to his accomplice, the actual killer, with the intent of facilitating
the commission of murder in the first degree; (2) in addition,
[defendant] was a major participant in the underlying felony
offense of robbery, and acted with a reckless disregard for human
life. . . .”

                       III.   DISCUSSION

       Defendant contends that insufficient evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that the prosecution proved beyond a doubt
that he acted with reckless disregard for human life in the
robbery. We disagree.

                                 10
A.    Standard of Review

      “We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence. [Citations.] ‘[W]e review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the [trier of fact] could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘“We
resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts . . . .”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1015, 1022.)

B.    Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437)

      “Senate Bill 1437 was enacted to ‘amend the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Substantively, Senate Bill 1437
accomplishes this by amending section 188, which defines malice,
and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder, and as now
amended, addresses felony murder liability. Senate Bill 1437
also adds . . . section [1172.6], which allows those ‘convicted of
felony murder or murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory . . . [to] file a petition with the court that
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts . . . .’ (§ [1172.6], subd. (a).)

                                 11
       “An offender may file a petition under section [1172.6]
where all three of the following conditions are met: ‘(1) A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine[;] [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted
a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be
convicted for first degree or second degree murder[;] [¶] [and]
(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree
murder because of changes to [s]ection[s] 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.’ (§ [1172.6], subd. (a)(1)–(3).)” (People
v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.)

C.    Reckless Indifference to Human Life

         “‘[T]he culpable mental state of “reckless indifference to
life” is one in which the defendant “knowingly engag[es] in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death” [citation]
. . . .’ (People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 577.) ‘The
defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent
manner in which the particular offense is committed,
demonstrating reckless indifference to the significant risk of
death his or her actions create.’ (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 801.) ‘[I]t encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist
another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant
does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his
actions.’ ([People v. ]Clark [(2016)] 63 Cal.4th [522,] 617
[(Clark)].)” (In re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 51–52.)

                                 12
       Among the relevant factors to consider in determining
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life are: (1) knowledge of weapons, and use and number of
weapons; (2) physical presence at the crime and opportunities to
restrain the crime and/or aid the victim; (3) duration of the
felony; (4) the defendant’s knowledge of a cohort’s likelihood of
killing; and (5) the defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of the
violence during the felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–
623.) No one of the factors for determining reckless indifference
“‘is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 618.)

      1.    Knowledge of weapons, and use and number of
            weapons

       Defendant was armed with a gun. The jury found that
defendant personally used a gun—at a minimum, he pointed the
gun at Ms. Nguyen’s head. Defendant’s cohort Turner also was
armed with and used a gun, beating Mr. Nguyen to death with it.
Based on how the robbery transpired, it is reasonable to infer
that defendant knew that Turner was armed with a gun. This
factor therefore supports the trial court’s finding of reckless
indifference to human life.

      2.    Physical presence at the crime and opportunities to
            restrain the crime and/or aid the victim

     Presence is important to culpability because it allows a
defendant to observe his cohorts’ actions and demeanor and
determine whether their behavior tends to suggest a willingness

                                 13
to use lethal force. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) Presence
also provides a defendant opportunities to act as a restraining
influence on his cohorts and to render aid to a wounded victim.
(Ibid.)
       Defendant entered and surveilled the liquor store prior to
exiting and returning with his cohort Turner. Defendant
therefore knew that Ms. Nguyen was of small build such that it
would be easy to rob the store without the use of two guns.
Moreover, as the trial court found, defendant “was continuously
present and actively involved in the underlying crime from start
to finish.” Defendant was in close proximity to Turner as Turner
beat Mr. Nguyen and was thus in a position to restrain Turner
and/or aid Mr. Nguyen. Defendant did not try to restrain Turner
or aid Mr. Nguyen. Instead, he pointed his gun at Ms. Nguyen’s
head thus preventing her from helping her father or from
escaping in order to obtain other aid.
       The evidence concerning defendant’s physical presence and
actions at the scene strongly weighs in favor of the trial court’s
finding of reckless indifference to human life.

      3.    Duration of the felony

     “Where a victim is . . . restrained in the presence of
perpetrators for prolonged periods, ‘there is a greater window of
opportunity for violence’ [citation], possibly culminating in
murder.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620.) Ms. Nguyen
testified that the robbery and murder lasted about six minutes.5

5     In her opening statement, the trial prosecutor stated that
the incident lasted six minutes from the time defendant entered

                                14
The evidence of duration does not support the trial court’s
conclusion that defendant exhibited reckless indifference to
human life.

      4.    Defendant’s knowledge of cohorts’ likelihood of killing

      The prosecution did not present evidence that defendant’s
cohort Turner had a propensity for violence or that defendant
was aware of such a propensity in advance of the offenses. The
evidence concerning this factor neither increases nor decreases
defendant’s culpability.

      5.    Defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of the
            violence during the felony

       There is no evidence that defendant took steps to minimize
the risks of violence during the robbery. Rather, defendant stood
in close proximity to his cohort Turner as Turner beat Mr.
Nguyen to death and facilitated that beating by pointing his gun
at Ms. Nguyen’s head thus preventing her from coming to her
father’s aid. Accordingly, this factor supports the trial court’s
conclusion that defendant exhibited reckless indifference to
human life.
       Considering the totality of the circumstances from the
evidence presented at defendant’s trial (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at pp. 801–802) and the factors identified in Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pages 618 through 623, we conclude there was

the store until he and Turner departed. She stated Mr. Nguyen’s
beating lasted about one minute, 20 seconds.

                                15
sufficient evidence that defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life.

                      IV.      DISPOSITION

      The order is affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                          KIM, J.

I concur:

            MOOR, J.

                                 16
The People v. Jermaine Lee Sims
B323570

BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring

       I do not join the majority opinion, but I do agree we should
affirm the trial court’s order. The trial court denied section
1172.6 relief on two independently sufficient grounds: (1) because
it found defendant and appellant Jermaine Sims (defendant) was
a direct aider and abettor in the malice murder of Alan Nguyen,
and (2) because defendant was a major participant in the crime
who acted with reckless indifference to human life and, thus,
could be found guilty of felony murder under current law.
Defendant’s opening brief challenges only the second of these
determinations. The Attorney General’s brief notes defendant
does not argue the trial court’s direct aiding and abetting finding
was erroneous, and defendant’s reply brief does not dispute this.
That means we have an uncontested finding that independently
justifies the trial court’s ruling. And because we do, affirmance is
obviously required.

                       BAKER, Acting P. J.