Court Opinion

ID: 9454300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:42:34.421681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:03.783022
License: Public Domain

KERNER, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result).
I agree with my brethren that the mere filing of regulations with a state does not convert private action under such regulations into action under color of state law. Nor would it be sufficient to show color of state law to say that an action was performed by a person who functions under a state license, e. g., barbers, doctors, horseshoers or polygraph operators. Nor is color of state law shown by the fact that a corporation or other group functions by virtue of a *628state charter of incorporation, registration as a foreign corporation or a certificate of doing business under an assumed name. Something more is required; whether it be action in concert with state or local officials, as in United States v. Guest, 388 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966), and United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966), or something such as a business whose operation is so intertwined with the state as to be inseparable from it, as in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961) and Meredith v. Allen Cnty. War Mem’l. Hospital Comm’n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968).
However, I do believe that, under appropriate circumstances, it may be possible to demonstrate that a privately-owned publicly-regulated utility or carrier or similar entity has a sufficient nexus with or dependence on a state as to make some of its actions under color of law. Some of the factors which should be considered are whether 1) the entity is subject to close regulation by a statutorily-created body (such as the Illinois Commerce Commission), 2) the regula-' tions filed with the regulatory body are required to be filed as a condition of the entity’s operation, 3) the regulations must be approved by the regulatory body to be effective, 4) the entity is given a total or partial monopoly by the regulatory body, 5) the regulatory body controls the rates charged and/or specific services offered by the entity, 6) the actions of the entity are subject to review by the regulatory body, and 7) the regulation permits the entity to perform acts which it may not otherwise perform without violating state law. There may be other factors to be considered besides those here enumerated. The enumeration here of particular factors means that less than all may be sufficient to show color of law in some cases and that nothing less than all may be required in other cases. Each case will depend on its facts. For example, the Public Utilities
Comm’n of District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 72 S.Ct. 813, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (1952), the Court held (343 U.S. at 462, 72 S.Ct. at 820):
We find in the reasoning of the court below a sufficiently close relation between the Federal Government and the radio service to make it necessary for us to consider those Amendments. In finding this relation we do not rely on the mere fact that Capital Transit operates a public utility on the streets of the District of Columbia under authority of Congress. Nor do we rely upon the fact that, by reason of such federal authorization, Capital Transit now enjoys a substantial monopoly of street railway and bus transportation in the District of Columbia. We do, however, recognize that Capital Transit operates its service under the regulatory supervision of the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia which is an agency authorized by Congress. We rely particularly upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to protests against the radio program, ordered an investigation of it and, after formal hearings ordered its investigation dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and convenience were not impaired thereby. 81 P.U.R. (N.S.), at 126. [Note omitted.]
See also cases cited in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra 365 at 725, n. 2, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 and United States v. Price, supra 383 at 794-795, n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267.
In order to prevail against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a- cause of action, a complaint which relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must affirmatively show that the acts complained of were done under color of law. The amended complaint before us lacks the specific allegations (as set forth above) which would show this necessary statutory element. Because, this complaint fails at the threshold, it is not necessary to decide *629the issues relating to the alleged unconsented entry of defendant on plaintiffs’ premises or the termination of service without notice and hearing.
For these reasons, I concur in the result reached by the majority.