Court Opinion

ID: 9583907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:01.362546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:40.266569
License: Public Domain

*588McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of summary judgment in favor of defendant Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc. in plaintiff Paul Hagan’s tort action to recover for personal injuries received when he slipped in vomit on the floor of defendant’s premises. At his deposition, plaintiff testified that, after he fell, “one of the employees!, a saleswoman,] came over and told us at this time that some kid, he came in the store with his parent and his mother had been trying on clothes and this kid had got sick and vomited in the floor and they had done exited the store. . . .” “And so they finally got the manager out and . . . they were all telling this same story about this kid had been in the store, but there was no barricades up around this vomit; there was nobody standing there telling anybody to watch their step. They knew of it, but for what reason [plaintiff did not] know, that anybody didn’t clean it up.”
In my view, these statements by defendant’s unidentified employees in the presence of the manager investigating the incident are admissible under OCGA § 24-3-3 as part of the res gestae and indicate prior actual knowledge of the existence, location, and nature of the hazardous foreign substance in this case.
“Declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.” OCGA § 24-3-3. “That part of the [Code] section which admits declarations so nearly connected with [an] act as ‘to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought’ in evidence is but a statement of the ‘spontaneous-declaration doctrine’ which is an exception to the rule against hearsay.” Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Gottlieb, 80 Ga. App. 634, 635 (1), 636 (1) (a) (56 SE2d 799). “The identity of a person making an extrajudicial statement need not be established by the testimony of the witness who establishes the existence of the statement. It may be established by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of other witnesses.” Lundy v. Tucker, 34 Ga. App. 721, hn. 1 (130 SE 924). “Hearsay statements made to an investigating officer shortly after the incident are part of the res gestae and are admissible at trial. Powell v. Jackson, 142 Ga. App. 34, 35 (234 SE2d 837) (1977); Land v. McClure, 135 Ga. App. 243, 244 (2) (217 SE2d 600) (1975).” Brown v. City of Fitzgerald, 177 Ga. App. 859, 861 (3), 862 (341 SE2d 476).
“The employee[s’] declarations [here], in essence, sprang from [plaintiff’s] revelation about his accident and [purportedly] explained why the employees had not [cleaned up the 18-inch patch of vomit]. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the statements] [were] voluntarily made and that there was no time for afterthought or design by the employee[s] prior to making [them].” Quiktrip Corp. v. Childs, *589220 Ga. App. 463, 465 (3), 466 (469 SE2d 763). My review of the case sub judice reveals admissible evidence indicating defendant’s prior actual knowledge of the alleged hazardous substance, thereby rendering summary judgment inappropriate. See Brooks v. Sessoms, 47 Ga. App. 554 (1) (171 SE 222); Lundy v. Tucker, 34 Ga. App. 721, hn. 3, supra. Compare Collins v. S. H. Kress & Co., 114 Ga. App. 159 (1), 160 (150 SE2d 373). In Collins, there was absolutely no “evidence showing affirmatively that such [extrajudicial] statement was in fact made by an agent of the defendant, and that it was in fact made in reference to [that] plaintiff’s fall.” Id. As my colleague's in the majority would nevertheless affirm the unwarranted grant of summary judgment in the case sub judice, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Beasley and Judge Eldridge join in this dissent.