Court Opinion

ID: 9384697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 18:02:36.666352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.735350
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/4/23 In re O.V. CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

 In re O.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court                                          C095935
 Law.

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. JJC-JV-DE-
                                                                                        2022-0000008)
                    Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 O.V.,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         O.V. (the minor) appeals a dispositional order after the juvenile court sustained
allegations that the minor had committed second degree robberies. The minor contends
(1) there is insufficient evidence that he participated in the robberies, and (2) a probation

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condition requiring the minor to submit to photographing as directed by any probation
officer or police officer is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
       Finding no merit in the contentions, we will affirm the dispositional order.
                                    BACKGROUND
       A Monterey County District Attorney’s wardship petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602 alleged that the minor committed three counts of second
degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211) At the jurisdictional hearing, the People called
Danny Hamilton, a security officer. At approximately 4:40 p.m., Hamilton was in a
walkway between the watch and jewelry retail stores he guarded in Carmel. He heard a
loud noise and went to investigate. He heard a second boom and the sound of breaking
glass. Hamilton saw three people dressed in dark clothing and masks running from the
watch store. Hamilton yelled for them to stop and pursued them. He saw them enter a
black SUV driven by a fourth person, which sped away. The SUV was missing license
plates and had tinted windows. In the store, Hamilton observed broken showcases. Two
sledgehammers were left behind.
       Carrie A., Audrey H., and Keira C. had been inside the store and saw people in
black with masks, hoods, and gloves smashing showcases and trying to get items out of
them. Carrie A. ran to get Mr. Hamilton, who she met in the doorway and then continued
to the other store to warn them. Audrey H. and Keira C. were in the vault. They heard
loud noises and saw, on the surveillance feed, three people sledgehammering showcases.
Videos showing the robbers entering the store, smashing the showcases, attempting to
remove items, and depicting the damage were admitted into evidence.
       Brandon O. was in a car at a stop sign when he saw three people in dark clothing,
masks, and carrying sledgehammers run into a store. Brandon jumped out of the car and
called 911. He then saw the individuals exit the store and enter a 2016 to 2020 “dark
black Toyota Highlander with blacked-out windows” that was missing plates and was

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driven by a fourth person. The Highlander drove through two stop signs and Brandon
suspected it was headed for Highway 1.
       Corporal Rachelle Lightfoot responded to the store’s panic button alert. Witnesses
described the robbers as “three slim kids” in black hoodies and masks. Corporal
Lightfoot contacted dispatch, who set up monitoring of highway entrances and exits
looking for the black Highlander with tinted windows and missing plates. At
approximately 5:15 p.m., Lightfoot learned the California Highway Patrol (CHP) had
pulled over a similar Highlander, and she sent video footage to Officer Joe Martis who
responded to the stop.
       Officer Martis testified a black Highlander had been stopped at approximately
5:17 p.m. He responded to the stop, which was on north Highway 1, just south of Imjin
Road. The minor was one of two people who had been pulled over. The minor wore a
black t-shirt, dark gray sweatpants, and black and white Nike Air Max shoes. His
clothing, body type, and height matched that of the robbers as described by eyewitnesses
and seen on surveillance video. The minor had a fresh abrasion on his right arm
consistent with scraping a sharp edge, which he blamed on a previous fight. Officer
Martis arrested him, believing he was one of the people in the surveillance video.
       Officer Martis said officers did not find the missing property or other
incriminating evidence in the Highlander when it was impounded, but the vehicle
matched the Highlander from the surveillance video with the exception of the missing
license plates. He opined that given the time of day and the time that had elapsed since
the robbery, it would be reasonable for an individual fleeing Carmel to be in the
approximate location where the CHP had stopped the Highlander.
       Officer Eric Dutra of the CHP had been tasked with helping to locate the black
Highlander. He testified to his involvement in the matter. Dutra cleared the first
Highlander that had been stopped because the occupants did not match the suspect
description. Shortly thereafter, Officer Dutra noticed a second black Highlander, which

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he followed noting that the rear plate was badly bent and did not look securely attached.
The Highlander was registered to a rental company, and Officer Dutra thought the state
of the license plate was unusual because a rental company would normally have the
license plates securely attached and in good condition.
       Officer Dutra followed the Highlander until the exit where his partner was
waiting, and he effectuated a traffic stop. The minor, who was a passenger, was
extremely nervous and initially refused to answer questions about the injury to his arm.
The minor told officer Dutra they “had just come from somewhere far away.” Officer
Dutra said the minor and the driver matched the suspect description in that they were
“thinly built younger males.” The rear license plate was being held on by mismatched
screws that had been hand tightened.
       Following argument from the parties, the juvenile court sustained the allegations
that the minor had committed three counts of second degree robbery against Carrie A.,
Audrey H., and Keira C.
       Because the minor resided in San Joaquin County, the matter was transferred there
for disposition. On February 1, 2022, the San Joaquin County juvenile court adopted the
probation department’s recommendation (with some modifications not relevant here),
adjudged the minor a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602), and placed him on
formal probation with a commitment to juvenile hall for 360 days and with 58 days of
custody credit. The minor’s request that he be allowed to contact a coparticipant in the
crime was denied. The minor did not otherwise object to any of his conditions of
probation.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                             I
       The minor contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
determination that he was one of the three individuals who committed the robberies.
We disagree.

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       In sustaining the People’s allegations, the juvenile court said that with regard to
identification, the juvenile court was relying on the make and model of the vehicle at the
scene which was consistent with the vehicle stopped on Highway 1; the body types and
ages of the perpetrators inside and outside the store; the time elapsed between the
incident and the traffic stop; the similarity of clothing of the minor and the participant in
the robbery, including distinctive shoes; the lack of a license plate on the vehicle at the
scene and a license plate on the vehicle at the stop that was not securely attached and
looked like two mismatched screws had been hand tightened; the injury and blood on the
minor’s hand that the CHP officer said was consistent with being cut by glass; the
observations of the CHP officer that the minor was very nervous; the minor’s demeanor
when questioned; and the minor’s responses to the questions. The juvenile court said that
based on all that, identification had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
       We review this finding using the same standard we would in an adult proceeding.
(In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540.) In determining a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge, we “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment . . . to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980)
26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “The focus of the substantial evidence test is on the whole record of
evidence presented to the trier of fact, rather than on ‘isolated bits of evidence.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261, italics omitted.) “Reversal on
this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) In other words, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055, italics omitted (Nguyen).)

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The standard is the same in cases in which the People rely primarily on circumstantial
evidence. (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932.) “ ‘ “If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 933.)
       The minor argues “[a] factual review of the presented evidence, taken as a whole,
fails to provide substantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that O.V. was a
perpetrator of these crimes.” But having reviewed the record in the light most favorable
to the prosecution (Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1055), we conclude substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination.
       The minor argues too much time had elapsed between the robberies and arrest for
the minor’s presence in the Highlander to be probative of the minor’s involvement. He
further argues too little time had elapsed for the robbers to have reattached the license
plate and offloaded occupants and incriminating evidence. But approximately 30 minutes
passed between the robbery and the stopping of the Highlander. That was enough time
for the robbers to have quickly reattached the rear license plate and to have offloaded two
people and evidence implicating them in the robbery, but not so much time that it cannot
be inferred that the minor was involved.
       There was other evidence of identity, including the minor’s clothing, body type,
and height, which matched descriptions of the robbers as relayed by eyewitnesses and
seen on surveillance. The surveillance footage shows a person in gray sweatpants and a
long-sleeved hooded sweatshirt using his right arm to reach into a sledgehammered glass
showcase. When officers apprehended him, the minor was nervous and had an injury

                                              6
to his right arm consistent with scraping a sharp edge. In addition, the traffic stop
occurred at a location consistent with fleeing the robbery.1
       Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination.
                                              II
       The minor also challenges the juvenile court’s imposition of probation condition
No. 33 (condition 33), which states: “The minor shall submit to photographing as
directed by any probation officer or police officer.” Although the minor’s counsel did
not object to condition 33 in the juvenile court, the minor asserts a facial challenge
arguing condition 33 is both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The minor also
urges us to forgive his forfeiture and conduct an as-applied review of the condition’s
constitutionality. We limit our review to the facial challenge.
       A defendant may raise for the first time on appeal a facial constitutional defect in a
probation condition if the question can be resolved as a matter of law without reference to
the sentencing record. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 886-889 (Sheena K.).)
Thus, we can consider facial challenges to the constitutionality of probation conditions
not objected to below, as such challenges do not require scrutiny of individual facts and
circumstances but instead require review of legal concepts. (Id. at p. 885.) By contrast, a
constitutional defect that is “correctable only by examining factual findings in the record
or remanding to the trial court for further findings” is subject to forfeiture if the claim
was not raised in the trial court. (Id. at p. 887.) Our review is de novo. (Id. at pp. 889-
892 [conducting de novo review]; In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261.)

1 We decline to take judicial notice of the distance between the store where the robbery
occurred and the location of the traffic stop. The request was not brought by motion
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(1)) and it is not necessary to the resolution of this
appeal.

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        The minor argues condition 33 is unconstitutionally vague because its specific
meaning and context are inadequate to provide fair warning of what is required or
prohibited. As explained in Sheena K., a probation condition must be sufficiently precise
for the probationer to know what is required and for the court to determine whether the
condition has been violated. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) Here, condition 33
instructs the minor to submit to photographing as directed by any probation officer or
police officer. Because it tells the minor exactly what to do in order to comply with the
condition, it is not facially void for vagueness.
        The minor further argues condition 33 infringes on his right to privacy and is not
carefully tailored or reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and
rehabilitation. He asks us to strike or modify it to address its shortcomings.
        “ ‘The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions,’ but ‘[a]
probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must
closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated
as unconstitutionally overbroad.’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118
[quoting Sheena K.].) “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the
closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it
imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights -- bearing in mind, of course, that
perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some
infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) It is only if the
probation condition is incapable of a constitutional application under any circumstances
that it will be found facially invalid. (People v. Gonzalez (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 960,
975.)
        Here, although the minor retains a right of privacy, as a probationer it is a reduced
one. (In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 136-137.) This is balanced with the State’s
countervailing interests in rehabilitating the minor and protecting the public. (In re
Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1118.) The State’s interests are furthered by the

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photographing requirement found in condition 33, which could facilitate identification in
the event of contact with law enforcement. Defendant’s facial overbreadth challenge
lacks merit.
                                       DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s dispositional order is affirmed.

                                                      /S/
                                                   MAURO, J.

We concur:

    /S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

    /S/
MCADAM, J.*

* Judge of the Yolo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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