Court Opinion

ID: 9644825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:05:47.143567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:31.793159
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge
(dissenting).
The problem of resolving claims of convicts that trial counsel were “ineffective” has vexed the courts since Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). The books are full of futile attempts by judges to formulate objective standards by which to determine the question in cases involving different facts and situations. In my opinion, the search has been misdirected because it has lost sight of the ultimate goal in any criminal case, which is “that persons accused of crime be accorded a 'fair trial.' ” Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw U.L.Rev. 289, 305, 341, 342; Mitchell v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, 794 [7].
I would abandon the quest for objective standards of lawyer conduct as tests to be generally applied when questions of ineffectiveness of counsel are raised.
It is well-established in Missouri that a defendant may, after sentence, file a motion to vacate asserting that his counsel at trial was ineffective; and that he shall be given an evidentiary hearing if issues of fact are raised in the motion. S.Ct. Rule 27.26(e).
I would require the trial judge to review the transcript of the trial, to consider the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing, and, on the basis of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, decide the question by stating only whether, in his opinion, the defendant was denied a fair trial. On appeal, the entire record would again be reviewed and a decision rendered as to whether the conclusion of the trial judge was “clearly erroneous.”
There is authority by analogy for my proposal: (1) in considering assertions of error under V.A.M.R. 27.20(c), our “plain error” rule, we “review all the facts and circumstances in each case and determine on a case-to-case basis whether manifest injustice has resulted from the alleged error.” (State v. Ellifrits, Mo.Sup., 459 S.W.2d 293, 297); and (2) we are authorized by the United States Supreme Court to hold a federal constitutional error harmless if we are “able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284.)
I submit that in each of these judge-made determinations a subjective evaluation as to whether the accused was denied a fair trial is intrinsically involved. Inevitably, “fair trial” is the essential consideration. I would apply this concept to claims of ineffectiveness of counsel.
I would reverse and remand this case for the review suggested, with directions *120that the trial court permit appellant to again appeal if the conclusion of the trial court is adverse to him.