Court Opinion

ID: 9779116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:36:47.375368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:29.152882
License: Public Domain

HENRY, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot conscientiously concur in the conclusions reached by my colleagues.
I.
In the totality of the facts and circumstances of this tragic case, I am impelled to the view that this demented and tormented defendant was not legally responsible for his acts at the time he shot and killed his sister. I reach this conclusion on the basis of the State’s proof which I regard as being conclusive on the matter. Had a motion for an acquittal been made at the conclusion of the State’s proof in chief it would have been well grounded. The proof offered by the defendant merely served to bolster that which the State had already established beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty by the massive weight of its own proof.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the State’s proof and a documentation of the foregoing conclusions it should be pointed out that a substantial portion of the prosecution’s proof came from members of a family torn by tragedy and demoralized by domestic difficulties. It must be analyzed in that light.
It should also be borne in mind that prior to the trial all concerned had certain knowledge that the sole issue would be insanity at the time of the offense. The record shows that on 8 December 1972, a hearing was conducted on defendant’s request for a bond. At this hearing the court heard testimony from Dr. G. H. Aivazian, Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Tennessee Medical College. He testified that defendant suffered from schizo-affected schizophrenia, a very serious mental malady requiring continuous observation and treatment. The State’s attorney represented to the court that he had talked with defendant’s wife and she was apprehensive that, if released, he would harm her, or the children, or even his own parents. Viewed from any angle this constituted an admission by the State that defendant was not of sound mind.
Pursuant to this hearing he was released on bond but upon the condition that he not leave the Shelby County Jail until admitted to a suitable hospital for treatment and not leave the hospital without leave of the court. An order was entered to that effect. Thus defendant’s insanity became the pri-ma facie law of the case. The State with this obvious knowledge, from its first witness forward, anticipated the defense and sought to rebut the presumption of insanity. This distinguishes this case from the normal prosecution wherein there is no prejudgment of the issue of sanity.
It should further be pointed out that this case was tried in the context of the ancient and archaic M’Naghten Rule:1
*651[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. (Emphasis supplied). 8 Eng.Rep. at 722
Tennessee follows the M’Naghten Rule. Spurlock v. State, 212 Tenn. 132, 368 S.W.2d 299 (1962).
It is important, as we analyze the proof, to recognize, and keep firmly in mind that the rule is in the conjunctive, and notwithstanding cases which short-cut the rule and put it on the basis of knowing right from wrong only, the rule requires the all important additional element of knowledge of the nature and quality of the act. This distinction was blurred throughout the trial of this criminal action. Moreover, the majority opinion ignores this critical element of M’Naghten.
It should further be borne in mind that the testimony of lay witnesses must be based on “facts and acts”, but “their conclusion from these facts does not necessarily create an issue or prevent the Court from finding the true condition as a matter of law.” Hammond v. Union Planters Nat. Bank, 189 Tenn. 93, 105, 222 S.W.2d 377, 382 (1949). The expression of an opinion, absent facts, is not evidence. Melody v. Hamblin, et al., 21 Tenn.App. 687, 115 S.W. 237 (1937).
With these preliminary statements of applicable legal principles in mind, we proceed to an analysis of the State’s testimony.
n.
The State first called the defendant’s wife. She unfolded the story of defendant’s gradual but progressive deterioration over a two-year period. She painted a picture of a man who was a “loner”, whose personality was characterized by insecurity, hostility and resentment. During the latter part of 1971, after a series of bizarre incidents, she consulted with the minister of the church she and defendant attended with regularity. He advised that defendant seek psychiatric care. Subsequently she conditioned the continuation of their marital relationship upon his doing so.
Accordingly, he was first seen by Dr. Parks Walker, a practicing psychiatrist, in November 1971, some seven months before this tragedy. Dr. Walker prescribed medication designed to elevate his spirits from the moods and depressions from which he suffered. Several weeks before the tragedy, defendant, without medical advice, stopped taking the medication.
The events leading up to the consultations with Dr. Walker were indeed bizarre. His wife had a mastectomy in May 1971. There was subsequently a recurrence and her prognosis is poor. This distressed him and he began to talk of suicide and to talk generally about death.
While he apparently was worried to the point of distraction over his wife’s condition, simultaneously he seemed determined to agitate her and keep her in a state of mental turmoil. He would alternate between being kind or solicitous and cruel or sadistic. He seemed to take pleasure in tormenting his children.
While his wife, who emerges in this record as an anguished but strong and gracious lady, was gallantly trying to live but bravely facing the virtual certainty of her eminent death, he bought a cemetery lot, forced her to go see where he proposed to bury her, and chattered incessantly on the details of her funeral.
Some time after she returned from the hospital there was a horrible scene in her bedroom one night after she had changed into night clothing. He cursed and abused her, broke an ash tray, broke his eye glasses, broke part of the facing off one of the doors and damaged the bannister on the stairway. Then came an incident so vile and repulsive as to be foreign to the conduct of any sane person. He took his hand and scratched the scar area on the breast upon which she had had the mastectomy, and then grabbed the other breast, bruising *652it and telling her that she did not deserve to have that one. She testified that he was in “a wild state.”
It was following this incident that she imposed as a condition of reconciliation that he seek psychiatric care.
As aforesaid he discontinued taking his medication about three weeks before the tragedy.
For three or four months before the tragedy he had “a very strange smile . at very inappropriate times ... a very silly kind of a grin”; at times he had “a mad state” and “one eye would get larger than the other.” In the two or three weeks immediately preceding the tragedy he was in a state of deep depression, neglected his work, withdrew completely from his family, and did nothing but eat and sleep. His wife testified that he was “completely out of touch with reality” and “he did rather seem to be in another world.”
When she was next door immediately following the shooting, she told her neighbor, “that man is crazy.” The first person she called was her husband’s psychiatrist.
Notwithstanding this proof positive of mental derangement, she testified, by affirmative response to counsel’s questions, that he appeared to know what he was doing and to know the difference between right and wrong. I would reject these conclusions since they are wholly and utterly inconsistent with and repugnant to her entire testimony. Moreover, she did not testify to the first part of the M’Naghten equation, i. e., knowledge of the “nature and quality” of his acts.
Her testimony may not fairly be equated with any conclusion except mental derangement and abnormality amounting to insanity-
The State next called six policemen whose cumulative testimony further cemented the proof of insanity. Upon their arrival he told them, “My wife shot herself.” This notwithstanding the fact that the body of his dead sister, Betty, was in plain view. Next he told one of the officers that his sister shot herself. Next he signed a statement admitting that he shot his sister “because she sinned too much.” En-route to the police department, he said he did not know who shot his sister — all this within a span of approximately thirty minutes.
As to his appearance, one or more said that his eyes were dilated and glassy and he was almost at the point of crying. One said he did. not seem upset and he appeared to know what was going on; another said he showed no remorse, didn’t seem upset and “seemed like he was kind of proud of what he had done; seemed sort of happy about it; sort of sick grin.” One of them said he “had kind of a small grin on his face; kind of seemed like he was happy.”
Next the State called Phyllis Worthy, sister of defendant’s wife. Without reciting any facts or circumstances, she testified that he appeared normal on the afternoon of the tragedy.
Then Michael Richardson, husband of Mrs. Edwards’ sister testified. By affirmative response he testified that on the afternoon of the tragedy defendant knew the nature and quality of his acts and had the ability to tell the difference between right and wrong. He too observed the “silly grin” as defendant sat in the squad car after the killing.
Mrs. Michael Richardson testified by affirmative response that during all the years she knew him he knew right from wrong.
Neither of the Richardsons detailed “facts and acts” upon which they based their opinion.
The State’s final, and we think conclusive, proof of insanity came from Mrs. Ben Edwards, mother of the defendant.
This tortured and tormented lady, required by the State to testify as a witness against her son for the murder of her daughter, unfolded a story of human misery.
She established that this defendant’s ancestors and relatives on both sides of his family, had been plagued by mental instability. On his mother’s side, an uncle died while a patient at Western State Hospital. *653One of his first cousins suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and spent a year in a sanitarium in Dallas. Another suffered from the same malady. His mother was unstable and at one time had had a drinking problem. She had attempted suicide on two occasions.
His father’s grandmother had died at Whitfield, the Mississippi Insane Asylum. His great uncle died while a mental patient at the Veterans’ Administration Hospital at Murfreesboro. His grandfather had undergone mental treatment at Wallace Sanitarium in Memphis. His father also had a drinking problem at one time.
It is a matter of common experience and universal knowledge that insanity tends to run in families.2
This deeply troubled mother told of her son’s return from Vietnam and how his personality began to degenerate and how his condition grew progressively worse. She told of how extremely close defendant and his sister, Betty, had always been.
She told of his telephone call to her on the night of the murder and of hearing him say:
Mama, I am sorry. I have just shot Betty-
She told of going by to see him on the late afternoon of the tragedy. She had become increasingly concerned over his condition. He had progressively become more withdrawn and depressed. She says that he looked very strange, very withdrawn and had a glassy stare.
And yet she testified by affirmative response to questions, that he appeared to know what he was doing, was conscious of his actions and appeared to know the difference between right and wrong.
This was her testimony, but it was not based on “facts and acts.” These affirmative responses were non-sequiturs since the tone and tenor of her whole testimony was to the contrary.
This concluded the State’s proof.
In view of the defendant’s plea, the statements of counsel on voir dire, and the admission by counsel for defendant in open court that defendant shot his sister,3 the whole viable and .triable issue was the sanity of the defendant. The State could have relied upon the presumption of sanity, and made out its case solely by the police officers with no allusion to defendant’s sanity. Instead, and for reasons I cannot fathom, the State elected to raise the issue and, through its witnesses, sought to establish that defendant was sane.
This trial strategy boomeranged. Instead of establishing sanity, the totality of the State’s proof established insanity beyond any reasonable doubt.
III.
Since defendant’s proof was merely cumulative it would serve no useful purpose to comment on it in great detail.
Defendant’s father told of the steady decline in defendant’s career, his loss of interest in his job, the loss of part of his marketing territory, the mounting depression from which he suffered, and complete withdrawal from his family and friends; and of his own deep concern over his son’s condition.
The Vice-President for Sales and Marketing of the Company for which defendant worked, elaborated on the deterioration of his job performance and of coming to Memphis to see about him.
Two ministers testified and told of his condition. One of them had seen him the *654day before the tragedy and he was withdrawn, anxious, tense, had a “beady” stare and a “smirk” or “funny” smile. The other had referred him to a psychiatrist.
Doctor Parks Walker, a Memphis Psychiatrist, described defendant as being introverted, hypersensitive, inhibited, seclusive, withdrawn and as having a paranoid type personality with all the major symptoms of schizophrenia. Among other things he stated:
[Schizophrenia is a major mental disorder where a person has a loss of good contact with reality, where his judgment becomes impaired and where his behavior may be such that legally he would engage himself in what might be called insane behavior.
Initially he treated him with Navane, a major tranquilizer used primarily for people with psychotic conditions. Subsequently he treated him with other anti-depressants.
Doctor Walker prescribed four (4) major symptoms of schizophrenia:
1) Ambivalence (e. g., love and hate)
2) Disturbance in expression or emotions (silly grin)
3) Failure to show emotions (e. g. blank stare, glassy look)
4) Disturbance of thought processes (e. g., chain of thought, allusions, hallucinations, paranoid thinking)4
Doctor Walker further testified that it was typical of schizophrenia that it would flare up and subside, or come and go.
He last saw defendant on May 31, 1972, one week before the tragedy. At this time, he had discontinued the use of his medication, was deeply depressed, had stopped work, and was lying around the house in a morose and deeply disturbed state. The doctor put him back on medication and advised him to return in two weeks and that, if he was not better he would be hospitalized.
He further testified that at the time of the killing the defendant was laboring under such a defect of reasoning from disease of mind as not to know the nature and quality of his act, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
Defendant next called Dr. Garó H. Aiva-zian, a Diplómate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in psychiatry, a Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at the UT Medical College in Memphis.
Doctor Aivazian saw him on June 12, 1972, five days after the murder and treated him through August 14, 1972.
He diagnosed his condition as schizophrenia. He testified:
My opinion is that at the time of the shooting (defendant) was psychotic to a degree whereby his ability to recognize what was around him as the environment and to test the environment and its realities was impaired to a degree whereby he was not capable of deciding between right or wrong and was not capable of adhering to any decision because he could not decide between right and wrong.
IV.
The State, over the vigorous and repeated objection of the defense, called Nona Ow-ensby, a psychological examiner, or tester, to testify to the mental capacity of the defendant, at the time of the murder.
Permitting her to testify, as a rebuttal witness, was prejudicial error. The court, in its discretion, permitted her to testify after observing that “this evidence would have been and possibly should have been submitted by the State in its proof in chief.” In the peculiar posture of this case with the State going forward with the proof on the issue of sanity, to permit it to hold back a portion of its proof, was both unfair and prejudicial. Her testimony was not' rebuttal in any sense. She rebutted nothing. Her testimony was simply a continuation of the State’s proof in chief. We cannot brush this aside, as does the majority opinion, by chanting the old cliche that *655this “lies in the discretion of the trial judge” and asserting that “the order of proof is more or less the accepted order in cases such as this.” I agree with these general propositions but they apply in a case wherein the normal procedure is followed, i. e., a case wherein the State proves the murder, the defendant offers evidence of insanity and the State counters with rebuttal proof designed to show sanity.5 But this case did not fit into this conventional pattern. The majority asserts that “no conceivable prejudice to the defense has been demonstrated.” Any lawyer who has ever announced “ready” in a criminal case knows that this was an unmitigated disaster. Inter alia it permitted the case to go to the jury with the testimony fresh on its minds from an unqualified “expert” who misstated her qualifications (see infra) with no reasonable opportunity to rebut.
After giving her name, the first words she uttered were false:
I am the psychologist at the Forensic Services Division of Central State Psychiatric Hospital. (Emphasis supplied).
After the trial of this lawsuit, in a commendable and lawyerlike display of candor and forthrightness, Honorable Robert H. Roberts, the distinguished Advocate General, addressed a letter to counsel for the defendant in which he advised:
General Ashley and I have discussed this case and have concluded that we have a responsibility to the Court to advise them concerning the misrepresentation of qualifications by Mrs. Nona Ow-ensby at the trial, and would suggest that even though the material you have filed in that regard is de hors the record, that the Court, because of the unusual circumstances, should consider it. If you have no objection, I would like to make that announcement to the Court prior to your opening argument on the merits. (Emphasis supplied).
Among the “material” filed was a news story of an investigation of certain personnel at Central State Hospital wherein Nona Owensby is quoted as admitting that she had been “sloppy” in her use of the term “psychologist.”
The Findings of the Investigative Committee were also filed. Inter alia the Committee found:
1. That she exceeded her authority in testifying before courts regarding matters of probation, parole, suspension of sentence, leniency, and insanity-
* * * * * *
4. That she flagrantly exceeded the authority of her license as a Psychological Examiner.
5. That she failed or refused to pursue clarification of the extent of her licensed authority when brought to her attention and continued her activities.
6. That she furnished courts, attorneys for patients and district attorneys with “Qualifications as an Expert Witness” containing information that was inaccurate and misleading, inferring that her professional education and capabilities exceeded those actually possessed.
* * * * * *
10. That she held herself out to be a psychologist by using her “working title” as an indication of professional qualifications tending to mislead courts before whom she gave testimony, attorneys representing patients, district attorneys, patients, and staff at FSD.
Section 63-1105 T.C.A. recognizes two (2) levels of psychological practice, viz.: “(a) ‘psychological examiner’ and (b) ‘psychologist’ ”.
Section 63-1106 T.C.A. defines the “practice of psychological examiner” and provides as follows:
A person practices as a “psychological examiner” within the meaning of this chapter when he holds himself to be a *656psychological examiner and/or renders to individuals or to the public for remuneration any service involving the application of recognized principles, methods and procedures of the science and profession of psychology, such as interviewing or administering and interpreting tests of mental abilities, aptitudes, interests and personality characteristics, for such purposes as psychological evaluation or for educational or vocational selection, guidance or placement. The psychological examiner practices the following only under qualified supervision; over-all personality appraisal or classification, personality counseling, psychotherapy or personality readjustment techniques.
The ensuing section defines the “practice of psychologist.” Section 63-1111 states the qualifications of a psychological examiner and the next section those of a psychologist. Clearly Nona Owensby is not a psychologist, and does not have the requisite educational qualifications. The majority opinion so treating her is in error.
This, of course, does not preclude her from testifying but she does so only as a layman, albeit a well-informed one. But when she represents to a jury that she is a psychologist, it materially and adversely affects their evaluation of her testimony.
Irrespective of her qualifications or the lack thereof, her testimony is suspect in substantial particulars.
1. She had never seen defendant until after the murder and did not possess the requisite professional qualifications to make an evaluation on the basis of reports and information which she had.
2. Dr. Jacob Norman Fidelholtz, is the head of the Forensic Services Division at Central State Hospital. Nona Owensby is a member of his staff. He testified in substance that neither he nor any of his staff had formed or expressed any opinion as to defendant’s sanity at the time of the murder.
3. She made no notes of any interviews with defendant and was unable even to give the date of a single interview.
4. Defendant was being treated with major tranquilizers during his stay at Central State and, therefore, was under the influence of them during each interview.
5. Dr. Fidelholtz testified that Drs. Walker and Aivazian were in a substantially better position to diagnose defendant’s condition than was he.
6. She was under the erroneous impression that one of the psychiatrists who testified in this case had diagnosed defendant’s disorder as being manic-depressive, an entirely different type mental disorder.
7. The examination at Central State was designed to determine present sanity and not that at the time of the murder.
I cannot conclude from a careful study of the record that her testimony was worthy of credible acceptation. I reject it.
It is my opinion, after a concentrated study of the record in this ease, that the evidence massively preponderates in favor of a finding that George Edwards, on June 7,1972 was “laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” If George Edwards was sane on the date of the killing, he was guilty of a brutal murder and should have been found guilty of murder in the first degree. The jury obviously accepted his plea of insanity but refused to bring in a not guilty verdict. (See infra).
I am fully cognizant of the rule of McBee v. State, 213 Tenn. 15, 372 S.W.2d 173 (1963), and, therefore, agree that the verdict of the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony and theory of the State. There were no conflicts, and I accept the testimony of all the witnesses at full value (except Owensby) and in so doing “accredit the testimony” of the State’s witnesses. The fair import of the collective testimony of the State in chief validates the plea of insanity. If we follow McBee we should reverse.
The State’s ease, in the last analysis, must stand or fall upon the testimony of *657Nona Owensby. McBee does not require that we accept testimony when she knowingly deceived the jury as to her qualifications. Critical to the jury’s acceptation of her testimony was the belief that she was the psychologist at the Forensic Division. We cannot accredit that which we know was based, in substantial part, on false testimony.
Our task on appellate review is to determine that the State carried its heavy burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidence is evenly balanced, or in equipoise, there is reasonable doubt and defendant must be acquitted. King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 648, 20 S.W. 169 (1892); Dove v. State, 50 Tenn. 348 (1871); Covey v. State, supra.
V.
I would sustain the first three assignments, reverse and remand for a new trial.
I am not content with the M’Naghten Rule. I regard it as being at variance with current medical theories of mental illness. The assessment of mental capacity should be left to those trained in the behavioral sciences. The concept of “right and wrong” is essentially moral and ethical and operates to force witnesses (lay and expert), juries, and judges to make moral rather than medical, social and legal judgments. It is the present policy of our law that “[ujntil a definitely superior rule of law” comes into being we will “trudge along the now well-traveled pike blazed more than a century ago by M’Naghten.” Spurlock v. State, supra, 212 Tenn. at 140, 368 S.W.2d at 303. While I do not agree to trudge along with M’Naghten, I recognize that such is not an issue in this controversy.
There is a glaring deficiency in Tennessee statutory law as it relates to the disposition of criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. All will agree that such a criminal defendant, acquitted by a jury, should not be released to return to society, and, I think all will agree that confinement in a penal institution is inappropriate restraint for the mentally ill. Our law gives the jury no alternative. Either it sends a mentally ill defendant to the penitentiary or it releases him upon society. Given this choice societal instincts of preservation demand confinement in the penitentiary.
The Law Revision Commission came to grips with this problem. § 40-2321, of its proposed criminal code, provides that in certain designated cases (including homicide), if a defendant is found guilty by reason of insanity:
[T]he Court shall order him to be committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health to be placed in an appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment.
The Commission’s comment under this proposed section reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Tennessee is now the only state not having statutory procedures for the treatment of criminal defendants acquitted on the defense of insanity. The resulting uncertainty as to the disposition of the incompetent offender has resulted in an unreasonable resistence to the proper use of the insanity defense in this state.6 (Emphasis supplied)
This proposed Code provision now pends before the Legislature. The adoption of some procedure for proper disposition in such cases is a matter of urgent public concern. Tennessee desperately needs some mechanism for providing the public with protection and simultaneously insuring that the unfortunate victims of mental disease are dealt with in a humane manner. Their restoration to useful and productive citizenship is a matter of compelling state interest.
*658Trial and appellate judges and jurors labor under the difficulty arising from the State’s failure to act in this area of vital public concern. Twelve jurors and nine judges have now considered George Edwards’ case. I am persuaded that if they had a choice each of these twenty-one Tennesseans would say without a moment’s hesitation that he should be placed in a mental institution for care and treatment. I believe all would agree that sending him to the penitentiary would be inhumane. Time was when the lame, the halt, the physical misfits and the mentally diseased were thrown over a cliff because they were a threat to the security of the group. George Edwards is such an outcast. We are throwing him over the cliff because there is a void in our law.
I am convinced that this defect in our law accounts for this conviction and, while I deplore a result that releases him from all restraint, this is the legal result to which I am impelled.
This lawsuit was ably and vigorously tried by skillful prosecutors and astute defenders. The trial judge presided with meticulous fairness and in a completely judicious manner. The comments I have made are not intended to be critical of their actions. Quite to the contrary, I applaud all of them and regard this as a model trial from a standpoint of trial decorum.
I am authorized to state that Justice Fones concurs in this dissent.

. M’Naghten’s Case, 1 C. & K., 130; 10 CL. & F. 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (H.L.1843).

. See, e. g., B. Maloy, Nervous and Mental Diseases 443 (1935); G. Smoot, The Law of Insanity 73 (1929). In subsequent testimony, Dr. Parks Walker stated that a predisposition to schizophrenia is or can be hereditary.

. At an early stage of the trial, counsel for the defendant stated, in open court, and in the presence of the jury:
The identity of George Edwards is not in dispute. The fact that he did shoot his' sister is not in dispute. The corpus delicti is established. The offense did occur in Shelby County and within the jurisdiction of the Court, and the weapon that has been exhibited is the weapon that was used. So we don’t have to prove any of that.

. The State proved conclusively that he had all these symptoms.

. The State is not bound to establish defendant’s sanity but if its proof, or the proof of defendant raises a reasonable doubt the burden of proof shifts to the State. Covey v. State, 504 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn.Crim.App.1973).

. The Legislature, by Chapter 464, Acts of 1974 (Adj. S.), carried into the Code as Sec. 33-709, provided a limited procedure for the judicial hospitalization of persons adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity. In summary form, this statute provides that when a criminal defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity, the district attorney general may seek hospitalization if he determines hospitalization to be justified. Neither the trial judge nor the jury has any power; the matter is left solely to the discretion of the attorney general. The ensuing procedure is cumbersome and awkward, and, in my view is inadequate.