Court Opinion

ID: 9714552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:40:21.708017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:27.068136
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WOLFSON, dissenting: The majority’s misreading of section 115 — 10.1(c)(2)(B) poses a grave danger to the integrity of the fact-finding process in criminal cases. If the majority is correct, police officers will have acquired a new and unjustified power to put words in the mouths of purported eyewitnesses. Until July 1, 1984, a nonparty witness’ prior inconsistent statement was allowed in a criminal case only for impeachment, to attack the witness’ believability, not as substantive evidence. See People v. Spicer (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 173, 402 N.E.2d 169. That changed, in certain circumstances, with the passage of section 115 — 10.1. The relevant portion of the statute provides: "In all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if (a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or trial, and (b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and (c) the statement— (2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the witness had personal knowledge, and (B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making of the statement either in his testimony at the hearing or trial in which the admission into evidence of the prior statement is being sought, or at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding.’’ (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/115 — 10.1 (West 1992). The purpose of the statute is to break free from the limitations courts had placed on prior inconsistent statements. Section 115 — 10.1 allows the trier of fact to consider a witness’ inconsistent statements made closer in time to the events at issue. Turncoat witnesses, wilful or inspired by fear, cannot completely frustrate the fact-finding process. The operative word in section 115 — 10.1(c)(2)(B) is "acknowledge.” The witness must "acknowledge” the words attributed to him by the police officer, not that he made some unspecified statement. Otherwise, the witness’ statement would be whatever the police officer says it is. The majority says "Wakefield’s attention was directed to the substance of the remarks ***.” (276 Ill. App. 3d at 476.) No it wasn’t. The entire examination on the subject, conducted by defense counsel, was: "DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you recall any statements that you may have given to anyone either — anyone from the Chicago Police Department or from the State’s Attorney’s Office with regard to the shooting of Aaron Ranson on September TO, 1990? WAKEFIELD: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you recall that you gave those statements? WAKEFIELD: Yeah. DEFENSE COUNSEL: When did you give those statements, sir? WAKEFIELD: September 10th. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Who did you give those statements to? WAKEFIELD: Detective Weiss or — and McWile. (Phn. spelling.) DEFENSE COUNSEL: Where were you when you gave those statements, sir? WAKEFIELD: 51st and Wentworth. DEFENSE COUNSEL: How was that that you came to 51st and Wentworth? WAKEFIELD: By arrest. * * DEFENSE COUNSEL: Is the statement that you gave to the Detectives Weiss and McQuire [szc], was that statement true? WAKEFIELD: No.” Based on that foundation, Detective Weiss was allowed to testify that Wakefield told her: on the morning of September 10, 1990, at about 11:30 a.m., he and Anton Hamilton were at the north end of the building located at 2320 South State in an area they commonly refer to as the sprinklers. Wakefield and Hamilton saw Ranson and an individual named Sean Holman sitting and talking on a nearby bench. After a short while, Ranson and Holman entered the building. About five minutes later, the defendant, whom he identified as Sam McDonald, and codefendants walked through the fire lanes toward the building. Each of the defendants was armed with a handgun. Me-Donald carried a .357 magnum in his right, front pocket. McDonald and codefendants ran up the back stairway of the building. Shortly thereafter, Wakefield heard shots and took cover behind a dumpster. Wakefield asked where Ranson was, and he was told he was on a second-floor gallery. Wakefield ran upstairs and saw Ranson lying on the floor, bleeding from the head as a result of a bullet wound. Wakefield, at trial, had not acknowledged uttering a single word contained in Detective Weiss’ account of his statement. Yet, the statement was used by the trial judge to connect the defendant to the crime. That cannot be harmless error. It is plain error, "marked by fundamental unfairness,” obviating the need for a more specific objection in this closely balanced case. See People v. Keene (1995), 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17. It does not take much imagination to picture the mischief the majority opinion could cause if taken seriously. I suspect the author of the statute would be disturbed by today’s holding. He has written: [I]f the witness under voir dire examination denies that he ever made the statement to the officer, then his prior inconsistent statement could not be used by the prosecutor ***. Because the witness had not acknowledged the statement under oath, the requirements of subsection (B) were not met.” R. Steigmann, Prior Inconsistent Statements As Substantive Evidence in Illinois, 72 Ill. B.J. 638, 642 (1984). True, Wakefield admitted he made a "statement” to Detective Weiss. But there is no way to know Wakefield and Weiss were talking about the same statement. The only way to find out is to ask the witness if he said those words to the detective. If he says he did, the statement may come in as substantive evidence. He has "acknowledged” the statement. Detective Weiss would not be needed. It doesn’t matter that he now says the words are untrue. If he says he did not say the words, the purported oral statement cannot become substantive evidence, although it arguably can be introduced to impeach the believability of the witness. I believe that is the purpose and spirit of section 115 — 10.1(c)(2)(B). I am not urging a hypertechnical or hairsplitting reading of the statute. If out-of-court statements, hearsay until July 1, 1984, are to be used as substantive evidence in criminal cases, safeguards against abuse must be in place. It should be clear that the prior inconsistent oral statement actually was made. By requiring that the witness "acknowledge” the words of his or her oral statement, the drafters of the statute sought to ensure the integrity of the evidence. The traditional impeachment foundation requires the questioner to direct the witness’ attention to the time, place, circumstances, and substance of the prior inconsistent statement. (People v. Bradford (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 492, 500, 478 N.E.2d 1341.) That foundation avoids unfair surprise and gives the witness an opportunity to explain the inconsistency. People v. Henry (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 312, 265 N.E.2d 876. Subsection (c)(2)(B) goes further. Not only must the witness be asked if he made the prior oral inconsistent statement, he must acknowledge that he did. People v. Denny (1991), 221 Ill. App. 3d 298, 302, 581 N.E.2d 839; People v. Posedel (1991), 214 Ill. App. 3d 170, 177, 573 N.E.2d 256. Professor Graham, whose work inspired the statute (Steigmann, 72 Ill. B.J. at 638), agrees: "While prior oral statements acknowledged by the witness to have been made during her current testimony or at an earlier trial, hearing, or other proceeding are also included, subsection (c)(2)(B) [citations], unacknowledged oral statements are not. Unacknowledged oral statements are most likely not to have been made and the most likely, if made, to have been unfairly obtained.” See M. Graham Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 801.9, at 662 (6th ed. 1994). Section 115 — 10.1 "does not excuse the need for a proper foundation prior to the admission of an inconsistent statement.” (People v. Hallbeck (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 59, 63, 590 N.E.2d 971.) The foundational requirement takes on more importance when the prior statement is being elevated to the level of substantive evidence. The integrity and reliability of the hearsay should not be in doubt. The risk of misuse is highest when the purported prior statement is oral. That is why the statute exacts a higher foundational standard before oral statements can be considered as substantive evidence. Justice Steigmann: "Accordingly, the rules severely restricting the use of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes only ought to be more strictly adhered to — not less. To do otherwise would reward sloppy investigative practices and would remove the incentive to comply with the new statute.” Steigmann, 72 Ill. B.J. at 643. In People v. Redd (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 252, 313-14, 553 N.E.2d 316, the court was asked to judicially amend section 115 — 10.1 by adding a catchall residual exception to the hearsay rule. The court declined, saying: "If a prior inconsistent statement is to be admitted in Illinois *** as substantive evidence against a defendant, the statement must meet the requirements set out by the General Assembly in section 115 — 10.1. If the prior statement fails to meet these requirements, it is not admissible as substantive evidence.” Detective Weiss’ testimony about Wakefield’s prior statement did not meet the requirements of the statute. It was reversible error to admit the evidence. I respectfully dissent.