Court Opinion

ID: 9624297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:57:21.918253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:38.734801
License: Public Domain

Collins, J.,
dissenting:
This is a case in which some relief may be justified. But I think that relief has already been accorded by the lower court and should judicially restrain us from establishing another constitutional precedent.
When petitioner pleaded guilty to the lesser crime of forcible rape, without extreme violence or great bodily injury, arising out of the same facts which supported the earlier conviction of rape with extreme violence and great bodily injury he received a substantially and markedly lesser sentence than the court could have given him. He could have been sentenced to a term of not less than 5 years nor more than life. True the record does not reflect the reasons why the trial court exercised its discretion in fixing a maximum of 10 years instead of life. But the reason, though not stated, leaps out of the record with clarity. The maximum sentence of less than life reflected a concession made by the trial judge for the time served by petitioner under the previous void sentence. Such conclusion is a fair one in light of the entire record before us. To put it another way had the lower court fixed the maximum sentence of life on the second conviction, instead of 10 years, then perhaps the relief accorded here could be constitutionally justified.
In such respect this case differs materially from Gray v. Hocker, 268 F.Supp. 1004 (1967) where the maximum time under the second sentence was previously served under the void first sentence.
This, like most problems arising under the criminal law, is not a black or white situation. The problem, with its constitutional overtones, is one for the legislature after we call attention to it. For example, how much of the previous time served should be credited on the new sentence? All of it or only a part? Should only straight time be credited or, in addition work time, blood donation time and good conduct time as well? Suppose *331the defendant had been a recalcitrant prisoner and had credits revoked for violation of prison rules, regulations and discipline. Should he be allowed or denied that time as credit on the new sentence? Likewise, should time spent in jail prior to sentence and conviction be credited? If the theory is that “social interests are brutalized” by such imprisonment then imprisonment prior to a void conviction is just as brutal as imprisonment afterwards. We cannot by court rule establish such a comprehensive plan. The legislature if willing, could.
In declaring unconstitutional NRS 176.410(3), at least as to this petitioner, it narrows the area within which the legislature might otherwise operate if it undertakes consideration of the problem. This is not one of those situations where we are obligated to follow a binding opinion of the United States Supreme Court, but a constitutional decision of our own. I fear by premising too many decisions of this type upon constitutional authority we are building a legal wall of protection around the criminal which hinders terribly society’s right to protect itself effectively and adequately against criminals. This court is now telling the legislature its statutory scheme for punishment of criminals is void and violates due process because it is fundamentally unfair and shocking to the universal sense of justice. That sense of justice is not so universal or shocked as the court indicates. Many other federal courts have upheld a denial of credit for time served on a void judgment. See Newman v. Rodriquez, 375 F.2d 712 (1967); Meyers v. Hunter, 160 F.2d 344 (1947); Watson v. Commonwealth, 260 F.Supp. 474 (E. D. Penn. 1966); Ex parte Ferrell, 406 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.App. 1966); Moore v. Buchko, 144 N.W.2d 670 (Mich.App. 1966). They say, as we should, sentencing is a matter of legislative prerogative. We should be careful in invading that prerogative absent a compelling necessity.
Sadly again, this court seems concerned only with petitioners rights against society and that unless he is granted full credit for time served under the void judgment “legitimate social interests would be brutalized.” I think we should be equally as concerned in protecting society from petitioners brutality and the young girl he offended by forcibly raping her.
He has offended society, not the reverse. Society has already accorded him valuable relief in setting aside his first conviction (on a technicality — lack of counsel on the first conviction) which in no way lessened the fact of his crime against society. He pleaded guilty again to a lesser degree of the same crime and even then received further considration from the court when it reduced the maximum sentence from life to 10 years.
*332The practical realities of this case do not justify, in my opinion, constitutional relief.
I dissent.