Court Opinion

ID: 9844218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:59:06.846821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:29.891479
License: Public Domain

KNUDSON, Justice,
with whom Mc-QUADE, Justice concurs (dissenting).
For many years prior to 1957, I.C. § 13-201 provided that an appeal from a judgment rendered on an appeal from an order, decision or action of a Board of County Commissioners could be taken within ninety days after the entry of such judgment.
I.C. § 33-519 was originally enacted as a part of S.L.1947, Ch. Ill, known as “Act for Reorganization of School Districts”. This section, as originally amended, limited the right of appeal to “any question of adjustment of property, debts and liabilities among the districts involved, and in which the power to make such adjustments has been conferred by this act”. S.L.1949, Ch. 94, amending I.C. § 33-519, not only deleted the limitations hereinbefore mentioned, but it also provided that the appeal could be taken from the orders referred to “or any part thereof”. It is significant to note that this amendment also added the following language: “This review procedure shall be exclusive as to any order of the board of county commissioners issued under the provisions of this Act”..
*114The order here appealed was made under the provisions of I.C. § 33-510. It will also be noted that the procedure to be followed upon such appeal as directed by I.C. § 33-519 shall be in all respects the same as prescribed under I.C. §§ 31-1510, 31-1511 and 31-1512.
At the time I.C. § 33 — 519 was enacted (1947) and last amended (1949), there was no conflict with I.C. § 13-201 relating to the time within which an appeal could be taken from a judgment on appeal from an order, decision or action of a Board of County Commissioners. Both the original enactment of said sec. 33-519 and the amendment thereto were declared to be emergency measures.
Respondents contend that since the amendment (1957) of I.C. § 13-201 reduced the appeal time to sixty days, the two statutes are irreconcilable and therefore the last expression of the legislature must prevail.
The legislature has enacted many statutes prescribing the time within which appeals may be taken and various periods have been specified limiting the time in particular actions, judgments, orders and proceedings. It is essential to the jurisdiction of the appellate court that the appeal proceedings be taken within the time limited. Patrick v. Finch, 51 Idaho 538, 8 P.2d 776. Special provisions as to the time for taking or perfecting appeals from particular orders, judgments, or decrees, or in particular actions or proceedings, control as to any case falling within their terms while as to any case not embraced therein, the general provisions apply, it being in each case a matter of construction whether the particular situation at hand is within the operation of any special statute or rule. 4A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 431, p. 77. See also In re Brewer’s Estate, 156 Cal. 89, 103 P. 486; Levers v. Houston, 49 N.M. 169, 159 P.2d 761.
I.C. § 13-201 may properly be referred to as a general statute prescribing the time in which appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court from a district court. However, it does not follow that the legislature is estopped to prescribe a different time for appeals in a special or particular proceeding, or relative to a particular subject. In this connection, attention is called to the fact that the legislature in providing for an appeal from an order of the Board of County Commissioners relative to the organization of a hospital district under the provisions of S.L.1955, Ch. 184, the identical statute here involved is also designated as specifying the manner of taking such appeal. Said chapter provides in part as follows :
“Sec. 4. * * * Any person aggrieved by said order, or any taxpayer within said proposed district may take an appeal from said order establishing the boundaries of said district, in the *115manner provided by Sections 31-1509, 31-1510, 31-1511, and 31-1512, Idaho Code, on questions of both law and fact.”
It is presumed that the legislature is acquainted with the laws of its state which apply to or affect the subject upon which it legislates. It is also presumed the legislature does not intend to make any changes in the existing law beyond that which it expressly declares. Clover Valley Land & Stock Co. v. Lamb, 43 Nev. 375, 187 P. 723; Uzzell v. Lunney, 46 Colo. 403, 104 P. 945; In re Wilson’s Estate, 102 Mont. 178, 56 P.2d 733, 105 A.L.R. 367. In the instant case there is no intimation that by the enactment of S.L.1957, Ch. 105, a repeal of any statute was intended, nor is there any reason to suppose that the 1957 legislature was unfamiliar with the provisions which are here contended by respondents to be in conflict therewith.
The suggestion of respondents that the amendment (1957) of I.C. § 13-201 repealed by implication I.C. §§ 33-519 and 31-1512 is not persuasive when we consider the disfavor with which courts look upon repeals by implication. In State ex rel. Good v. Boyle, 67 Idaho 512, 186 P.2d 859, 866, this Court said:
“ * * * The repeal of statutes by implication is not favored. In the absence of express terms, it will be presumed that the legislature did not intend by a later act to repeal a former one, if by a fair and reasonable construction, effect can be given to both. To overcome such presumption, the two acts must be irreconcilable, i. e. clearly repugnant, as to vital matters to which they relate, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation. * * * ” (Citing cases.)
In arriving at the legislative intent as to an act alleged to have impliedly repealed or superseded another or other statutes, the nature of the several acts involved, including their respective titles, the history of such enactments, the state of the law when the acts were passed, and the history of the times, as well as the objects and purposes sought to be attained, are proper matters for consideration. State v. Martinez, 43 Idaho 180, 250 P. 239; Storseth v. State, 72 Idaho 49, 236 P.2d 1004. It is a general rule of law that in construing a statute, the court should take into consideration the reason for the law, that is, the object and contemplation of the legislative body in enacting the same. Wood v. Independent School Dist. No. 2, 21 Idaho 734, 124 P. 780; Rural High School Dist. No. 1 v. School D. No. 37, 32 Idaho 325, 182 P. 859.
From the language used in I.C. § 33-519, it is clear that the legislature not only specifically authorized and provided for appeals from the orders of the Board of *116County Commissioners relating, to reorganization of school districts, but it directed that the review procedure as prescribed therein shall be exclusive as to such orders. Here is an express declaration that as concerns appeals from orders relating to the reorganization of school districts, they shall be governed by I.C. § 31-1512, and in effect declares that notwithstanding the fact that a review procedure may be prescribed by other statutes, if such procedure is inconsistent with the provisions of this enact'ment, the provisions of this enactment will prevail.
In the instant case, not only does the language of secs. 33-519 and 31-1512, I.C., clearly disclose the legislative intent and purpose, but in the title of the “Act for Reorganization of School Districts” (S.L. 1947, Ch. Ill) it specifically states that among the objects and purposes of the act is “providing for appeals from order of county commissioners with respect to reorganized school districts and the procedure for appeal.” (Emphasis supplied.) Unquestionably, I.C. § 33-519 and the statutes referred to therein, were intended to and did provide a special review procedure relative to reorganizing of school districts. Being so, it is not to be held repealed by implication by a later general statute concerned with appeals unless it is impossible so to hold in order to give the latter act effect. Here, it is readily possible to give effect to both acts. I.C. § 13-201, as amended, is applicable to appeals in all cases where special provisions are not prescribed by statute. Where two statutes treat the same subject, one being special and the other general, unless they are irreconcilably inconsistent, the latter, although latest in date, will not be held to have repealed the former, but the special act will prevail in its application to the subject matter as far as coming within its particular provisions. In re Brewer’s Estate, supra; People ex rel. Board of State Harbor Com’rs v. Pacific Imp. Co., 130 Cal. 442, 62 P. 739.
Appellant has called special attention to paragraph 3 of respondent’s original notice of appeal, which provides:
“That this appeal is authorized by Section 33-519 Idaho Code, as amended, being an appeal from an Order made pursuant to Section 33-510 Idaho Code, as amended and under procedures prescribed in Sections 31-1510, 31-1511, and 31-1512, Idaho Code.”
Although in conflict with respondents’ present contention, it is, in my opinion, a correct statement.
This Court has recognized that appeals from orders of the Board of County Commissioners under the Act for reorganization of school districts are authorized and provided for under secs. 33-519 and 31-1512, I.C. See Common School Dist. No. 58 of *117Kootenai County v. Lunden, 71 Idaho 486, 233 P.2d 806.
The motion to dismiss the appeal should be denied.