Court Opinion

ID: 9826780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 16:37:35.844261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:49:45.614634
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION TO REHEAR.
This cause was disposed of on December 3d, and on December 10th a petition was filed to rehear, which was presented to the writer on January 5th.
We have carefully examined the petition, and find no cause to reverse our former opinion and holding. In the main the petition is but a rehash of what has already been considered. Petitioner thinks that there was some evidence to sustain the judgment of the court below and, therefore, that we were not authorized to do anything else but affirm. There was some evidence, it is true, establishing cei’tain necessary phases of the case, but there was an entire lack of evidence we think on some other phases, equally essential to be shown in the attitude the case assumed to prevent a recovery in the sum, stated. Such essentials were left entirely to conjecture, and the court below was therefore not authorized to presume their existence so as to defeat the plaintiff’s claim entirely.
Recurring to the opinion, it will appear that the infirmity of petitioner’s proof attached after the automobile was taken into his possession for purposes of sale, and though he now thinks that under certain waiver it was not necessary to sell at all, he yet attempted to show that he complied with the statute; and to show that he did it was necessary to make it appear that he complied with every condition of the statute with reference to the advertise*539ment and sale, wherein we think he failed, the particulars of which failure appear in our former opinion and need not be restated here.
Neither does any waiver in the conditional sales contract avail to excuse the want of proper advertisement and proof of same. “The waiver of the advertisement and sale as required in this statute made in the contract of conditional sale before default in payment by the purchaser and the reclamation of the property by the vendor, is not binding upon the purchaser; for the waiver contemplated in the statute is one to be made after such default and reclamation, and not before.” Note 5 under see. 3666, Shannon’s Code, citing — Massillon Engine & Thresher Co. v. C. R. Wilkes, 82 S. W. Rep., 316, 317, 318, 319. See also Ward v. Sharpe, 139 Tenn., 347; Russell v. Clinton Motor Co., 147 Tenn. 57.
As stated in Ward v. Sharpe, supra, plaintiff was a minor when said contract was made, and if the waiver had been otherwise valid, that against advertisement would have been void as against his interest.
We think the suit itself, instituted after he came of age, sufficient to claim a right of recovery upon any ground available, including the invalidating, by reason of minority, any agreement that might stand in the way of such recovefy, and that the assignment, as indicated in the opinion, was broad enough to cover the results reached. Dismissed at cost of petitioner.
Portrum and Thompson, JJ., concur.