Court Opinion

ID: 9762371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:21:14.224018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:33.522503
License: Public Domain

KERN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
While the longevity of litigation in this case will never rival the mark set by Jarn-dyce and Jarndyce in the High Court of Chancery more than one hundred years ago, see Charles Dickens, Bleak House, Chap. I, the chronology of the instant case etched upon the docket and contained in the file makes for melancholy reading. Consider, for example, that almost 12 years have elapsed since the injury complained of by appellant in her complaint allegedly occurred — damage to her backyard by erosion as a result of the excavation by appellees in reshaping their lot next door to hers. Almost five years have elapsed since appellant filed her complaint. When the case came on for trial on October 7, 1980, neither appellant nor her counsel appeared. The trial court granted appellees’ motion to dis*934miss appellant’s complaint for failure to prosecute.1
Now almost 15 months later we are asked to reverse the court’s action of dismissal with prejudice and to return the case for trial. The appeal we consider is from the trial court’s denial of appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration and Reinstatement filed pro se. In such motion appellant asserts that she received notice of the court’s dismissal “through the Mail October 7, 1980, the same morning of the dismissal”2 and that when she contacted her attorney the next day he “acted very surprised [and] said he thought the case was to be heard November or December 1980.” (Record at 6.)
Appellees asserted in opposition to appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration that both she and her attorney “had notice of the trial date of October 7, 1980, and failed to appear” and that the trial date of October 7, 1980 “was agreed upon by all counsel and parties before Calendar Control Judge.” (Emphasis added.) (Record at 8.)3
The trial court denied appellant’s motion on February 13, 1981, without explanation and, insofar as can be determined from the record, without a hearing. If the court were to have concluded that appellant herself knew, as appellees assert, that her trial was set for October 7, 1980, and had not appeared on that date, I would be disposed, in light of the unusual length of time during which the suit has been pending, to uphold the court’s refusal to reconsider and to reinstate for trial. On the other hand, were the court to have found that only appellant’s attorney knew of the trial date on October 7,1980, and then had mistakenly put down a November or December date, then such attorney’s neglect could not be fairly imputed to his client, the appellant.
Accordingly, I would remand to the trial court for further proceedings to determine promptly whether or not appellant herself was aware of her trial date and hence should have been held accountable for her failure to appear and prosecute her action ten years after the occurrence underlying the complaint.

. The record does not reveal the contents of appellees’ motion to dismiss, if any.

. This assertion seems unlikely given the time required for mail to be posted and delivered.

.The case jacket in the trial court bears an entry under date of February 25, 1980, that the case “by consent” was continued to “10/7/80” with “priority.” There is also a written prae-cipe, apparently bearing the signature of appellant’s attorney, which continued the case until October 7, 1980.