Court Opinion

ID: 9811667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:27:06.087742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:02.064218
License: Public Domain

DAVID GAULTNEY, Justice,
concurring.
I concur. I agree with the majority’s resolution of issues 1, 3, and 4. On issue 2, I agree the trial court erred by not following section 152.204 in exercising its author*203ity to make an emergency temporary custody determination. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 152.204 (Vernon 2002). The trial court apparently did not consider Chapter 152 applicable to this Title 4 protective order proceeding. However, this proceeding involved, in part, a child custody determination, and the court was required by section 152.204 to communicate with the Michigan court “to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.”
The trial court signed a final protective order disposing of all parties and issues before the trial court without regard to section 152.204. I agree this Court has jurisdiction to review that order. See Ulmer v. Ulmer, 130 S.W.3d 294, 296-97 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). But see Saavedra v. Schmidt, 96 S.W.3d 533, 550 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
However, I differ from the majority’s view of the scope of the applicability of section 152.204 to a Title 4 protective order. I read section 152.204 as governing the Texas court’s authority to make a temporary emergency child custody determination in the interstate context, not as governing all aspects of the Texas court’s protective order authority. The Family Code has a provision governing child support jurisdiction in the context of a simultaneous support proceeding in the child’s home state. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 159.204 (Vernon Supp.2005). I believe that section would govern the support order jurisdiction here, not section 152.204; but the applicability of section 159.204 is not briefed by the parties. Apart from these restrictions concerning custody and support order jurisdiction, the trial court has broad jurisdiction under Title 4 to protect Corrine and the children. I would not declare the remaining provisions of the protective order void solely because of section 152.204.
The Family Code recognizes a court may have authority over some portions of a suit and not others. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 102.012(a) (Vernon 2002). The Code provides:
(b) The court’s authority to resolve all issues in controversy between the parties may be restricted because the court lacks:
(1) the required personal jurisdiction over a non-resident party;
(2) the required jurisdiction under Chapter 152[Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act]; or
(2) the required jurisdiction under chapter 159[Uniform Interstate Family Support Act].
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 102.012(b) (Vernon 2002). All three restriction provisions may apply to this proceeding. Even so, the Code contemplates that a Title 4 protective order may be issued on. behalf of a child who is subject to the jurisdiction of another court. See generally In re Salgado, 53 S.W.3d 752, 760-62 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding)(two Texas Courts).5 Section 152.204 does not restrict the broad power of a trial court, beyond the interstate custody issues governed by the section, to enter a protective order under Title 4.
*204Nevertheless, I concur with the reversal and remand for further proceedings consistent with the Family Code.

. Though the parties have not cited a conflicting order from the Michigan court, section 83.005 of Title 4, addressing ex parte temporary protective orders, provides: "During the time the order is valid, a temporary ex parte order prevails over any other court order made under Title 5 to the extent of any conflict between the orders.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 83.005 (Vernon 2002). This is a final order, of course.