Court Opinion

ID: 9556957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 01:03:33.8593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:44.544530
License: Public Domain

SUPERIOR COURT
                                      OF THE
                            STATE OF DELAWARE

CRAIG A. KARSNITZ,                             SUSSEX COUNTY COURTHOUSE
       RESIDENT JUDGE                                      1 THE CIRCLE, SUITE 2
                                                         GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
                                                        TELEPHONE (302) 856-5263

                                 August 18, 2023

Rodolfo Martinez
SBI# 00452236
James T. Vaughn Correctional Center
1181 Paddock Road
Smyrna, DE 19977

Re: State of Delaware v. Rodolfo Martinez, Def. ID Nos. 1904013653 and
      1904003476 (R-1)

Dear Mr. Martinez:

      On February 19, 2020, after a colloquy with me, you pled guilty to Drug

Dealing Tier 4, Racketeering, and Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a

Person Prohibited. You were sentenced that same day to five years at Level 5 for

the Drug Dealing Charge and two years at Level 5 for the Racketeering Charge.

      On August 24, 2022, I received your first pro se Motion for Postconviction

Relief under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (the “Motion”), dated

August 17, 2022, with respect to the above-referenced cases, together with a Brief

in Support of the Motion (the “Brief”). You state six grounds for relief. The first
four grounds assert that your constitutional rights were violated under the Sixth

Amendment to the Unites States Constitution1 and the Delaware Supreme Court case

Reed v. State2 by the failure of Zachary George, Esquire, your defense counsel at

trial (“Trial Counsel”) to consider a motion to withdraw your guilty plea in order to

pursue several suppression motions and a potential trial defense under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution,3 or to allow another lawyer to do so.

Your fifth ground asserts cumulative error under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution4 and the Delaware Constitution.5 Your sixth ground

asserts that any of the first four claims, standing alone, warrants withdrawal of your

guilty plea. Your Motion did not request the appointment of postconviction counsel,

nor was I obligated to appoint one.6

       I first address the four procedural bars of Rule 61.7 If a procedural bar exists,

as a general rule I will not address the merits of the postconviction claim.8 A Rule

1
  U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2
  258 A.3d 807 (Del. 2021). The Reed case was heard by me.
3
  U.S. Const. amend. IV.
4
  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
5
  Del. Const. Art. I, § 12.
6
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3).
7
  Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del.2002) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del.
1990).
8
  Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del 2016); State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at*13 (Del. Super.
April 28, 2009).
                                               2
61 Motion can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, failure to raise

claims below, or former adjudication.9

       First, a motion for postconviction relief exceeds time limitations if it is filed

more than one year after the conviction becomes final.10 In this case, your conviction

became final for purposes of Rule 61 30 days after I imposed sentence; i.e., March

19, 2020.11 You filed the Motion on August 24, 2022, long after the one-year

deadline. Therefore, consideration of the Motion would ordinarily be barred by the

one-year limitation.

       Second, second or subsequent motions for postconviction relief are not

permitted unless certain conditions are satisfied.12 Since this is your first motion for

postconviction relief, consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.

       Third, grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the

judgment of conviction” are barred unless certain conditions are satisfied.13 Your

grounds for relief are based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It is well-

settled Delaware law that, as collateral claims, ineffective assistance of counsel claims

9
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
10
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
11
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1).
12
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
13
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
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are properly raised for the first time in postconviction proceedings.14 Therefore,

consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.

       Fourth, grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including

“proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction

proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred.15 In the Motion, you

seek to relitigate issues you have already asserted in the case in various suppression

motions and a potential trial defense based on the seizure of certain items, all of which

motions I previously denied. Therefore, consideration of the Motion would ordinarily

be barred by this provision.

       However, none of these four procedural bars apply either to a claim that a new,

retroactively applied rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.16 You

argue that Reed created a new, retroactively applied rule of constitutional law that

apples to your case and renders your conviction invalid. You further argue that, as a

result, the two procedural bars under Rule 61, which would otherwise apply, do not

apply, and I should consider the Motion on its merits.

14
   State v. Schofield, 2019 WL 103862, at *2 (Del. Super. January 3, 2019); Thelemarque v. State,
2016 WL 556631, at *3 (Del. Feb. 11, 2016) (“[T]his Court will not review claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal.”); Watson v. State, 2013 WL 5745708, at
*2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not consider a claim of ineffective
assistance that is raised for the first time in a direct appeal.”).
15
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
16
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).
                                                 4
       On August 31, 2022, I directed that, because of this constitutional argument,

postconviction counsel be appointed to represent you as soon as practicable.17 I also

requested a response from the State to your Motion.18

       Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, was appointed as your postconviction counsel

(“PCC”). However, when you conferred with Mr. Collins, you informed him that

you wished to proceed pro se, and thus his appointment as PCC was rescinded.

       On April 19, 2023, I entered a Scheduling Order giving you until June 20,

2023 to file an amended Rule 61 Motion. I never received this amended Motion from

you, and therefore deem it waived. After an extension of the deadline, the State’s

Response, dated July 31, 2023, was received on August 1, 2023.

       You assert that Trial Counsel failed to consider a motion to withdraw your

guilty plea, or to allow another lawyer to do so, in violation of Reed, and that this

failure constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the dual standards of

Strickland v. Washington19 and Ploof v. State.20 Reed was decided after your case,

so the threshold legal question is whether Reed established a new, retroactively

applied rule of constitutional law that applies to your case.

       This Court resolved that issue in State v. Wonnum,21 in which it held:

17
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3).
18
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(f)(1).
19
   466 U.S. 668 (1984).
20
   75 A.3d 840 (2013), which applied Strickland in Delaware.
21
   2022 WL 681951 (Del. Super. March 8, 2022).
                                              5
          Reed established no new constitutional right and to the extent that it
          does, the facts of this case make Reed inapplicable to it.22

I am persuaded by the State’s argument that Reed does not expand the protections

of the Sixth Amendment, but rather clarifies the existing rules and applies existing

precedent. As such, it does not meet the Rule 61 requirement that would allow it to

defeat the procedural bars of Rule 61.

          Even if Reed were deemed to apply a retroactively applicable constitutional

rule to your case, the facts of your case are different from those in Reed. In Reed,

the defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing, The defendant’s

counsel did not believe that there were grounds to justify withdrawal of the guilty

plea. I declined to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea sua sponte, since

he was represented by counsel. In your case, you pled and were sentenced

immediately. There is no evidence whatsoever in your case that you had any issue

with your plea, or any disagreement with Trial Counsel about your guilty plea, until

you filed your Rule 61 Motion. Then the Reed decision came down and offered you

a convenient escape from the procedural bars of Rule 61.

          For the reasons discussed above, there is no need for me to hold an evidentiary

hearing23 to consider your constitutional argument. Your Rule 61 Motion is

procedurally barred and is DENIED.

22
     Id. at *3.
23
     Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g)(3).
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      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                               Very truly yours,

                                               /s/ Craig A. Karsnitz

cc:   Prothonotary
      Georgia C. Pham, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General
      Zachary George, Esquire

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