Court Opinion

ID: 9831962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:30:26.60658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:40.081112
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
On rehearing appellant presents the following points:
First. “The facts in this case control its disposition. Findings of fact not supported by evidence, conclusion of law, and discussions of authorities, do not bind appellant or appellees. They are bound by the (acts before Your Honors.” This proposition does not have support in our jurisprudence. On appeal, the appellant is bound by the fact conclusions of the trial court, unless he has assigned error against these conclusions. Jefferson County Drainage District No. 6 v. Southwell (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.(2d) 895. Appellant made no attack against the trial court’s conclusions of fact brought forward in our original opinion; therefore, it is bound by the court’s findings. But it 'can also be said that every fact found by the court has support in the record.
 Second. As the basis of its argument on rehearing, appellant submits the following definition of “a mortgagee lawfully in possession”: “The possession of \a mortgagee is lawful when taken under *686actual title to an interest in the property; under. foreclosure or other legal proceedings in some way defective; or when acquit ed peaceably without stratagem or deceit. The holder of a lien is not ‘a mortgagee in possession’ when such possession was obtained through some wholly unlawful and wrongful, unconscionable act, such as might be effected by deliberate fraud, by force and arms. But the lienholder is always a mortgagee lawfully in possession when he has the right, either with or without the consent of the debtor, to enter upon the property, such as claiming under a foreclosure in some manner defective (Browne v. King, 111 Tex. 330, 235 S.W. 522) ; or owning as a tenant in common (Duke v. Reed, 64.Tex. 705); or finding the property vacant peaceably enters (Baker v. Collins, 4 Tex.Civ.App. 520, 23 S.W. 493).” Appellant’s definition does not control the facts of this case. The entry of the mortgagee, not under a foreclosure, must .be that of a “friend” and not of an “enemy”; he . cannot claim title adversely to his mortgagor and in repudiation of his rights. Where the mortgagor is compelled to be diligent to keep his mortgagee from perfecting against him a limitation title, the entry is not “lawful” as that term is defined in equity.
Third. Appellant asserts that it had-the right of entry as a tenant in common with appellees. True, appellant was in fact a tenant in common with appellees in all the property in controversy. Appellant had the option to enter and take possession of all the property as a tenant in common,, in which event it would have held the possession subject to an accounting with appellees when called upon by them. It also had the option to enter, not as a tenant in common, but as an adverse claimant to all the property, and that option it. exercised. That a tenant in common can mature a title by limitation against his cotenants is the unquestioned law of this state. Appellant could not hold as “a mortgagee in possession” until the last day of the five-year limitation period and then the next day assert title: by limitation under the limitation statutes, which is the position it takes in this case.
 The court found facts making appellant a limitation claimant to the land, sufficient to mature in it a limitation title at the end of five years. It now says that, though holding under the facts found by the court, it had the rights of a mortgagee in possession. The cold logic of the law denies that contention. Appellant’s relation to this property was a fact question, not a law question resting upon the naked fact that it held against the property an unsatisfied mortgage owed it by appellees. It is no answer to say, as appellant suggests, that it did not plead limitation. Of course, it did not plead limitation because it had not had possession for five years. The determinative issue was not a title by limitation in appellant, not raised either by the pleadings or the proof, but whether appellant held possession as a limitation claimant or as a mortgagee in possession, and that issue the court found against it by unquestioned fact conclusions.
Fourth. As we understand appellant’s motion, it advances the proposition that a limitation claimant, holding a mortgage against the property, cannot mature against his mortgagor a limitation title but can hold only — and that without relation to the character of his holding — as a mortgagee in possession. In support of this contention appellant cites Duke v. Reed, 64 Tex. 705 and Browne v. King, 111 Tex. 330, 235 S.W. 522. Neither of these cases is in point on the facts of this case, nor do they support appellant’s proposition. In Duke v. Reed the appellants, the Dukes, had been in possession a sufficient length of time to mature title by limitation against the interveners, Nix and Storey, and were adjudged to have limitation title against them. As against their cotenants, the defendants, Mrs. Reed and Mrs. Burleson, appellants claimed adversely as they did against the other defendants, and in repudiation of the relation of cotenancy. But — and this is the point of distinction— because of the marital status of their co-tenants, Mrs. Reed and Mrs. Burleson, the Dukes could not mature title against them by limitation; the court said: “No limitation can affect the plaintiffs, Mrs. Burleson and Mrs. Reed, as they have been continuously under coverture from a date previous to the adverse possession of the defendants.” Therefore, the law, in order that justice might be done, decreed that the Dukes were mortgagees in possession against their cotenants; otherwise their cotenants would have gained an unconscionable advantage because of their marital status. The holding of that opinion is to the effect that, but for the marital status of Mrs, Reed and Mrs. Burleson, the Dukes would have matured against them a title by limitation, notwithstanding they held against them an unsatisfied mortgage cover*687ing the very property in issue. In Browne v.. King, appellant asserts that both the pleadings and the evidence put in issue The statutes of limitation, and that our Supreme Court decreed that Mrs. King’s relation to the land in controversy was that of a mortgagee lawfully in possession and not that of a limitation claimant. Writing the opinion, Judge ’ Phillips did not state why the statutes of limitation were not available to Mrs. King. Certainly, it was ■not his purpose to announce as the law of Texas that, because a deed of trust was in her chain of title, she could not hold adversely to one asserting an adversé interest, burdened with the deed of trust. The foreclosure in her chain of title was 'irregular and insufficient to invest in her the title asserted by Browne, but as between Tier and Browne she was in possession under the foreclosure. For some reason not disclosed by the opinion she was not entitled to the benefits of the statutes of limitation — possibly because of the doctrine ■of Deaton v. Rush, 113 Tex. 176, 252 S.W. 1025. Not having the rights of a limitation claimant, being in peaceful possession under foreclosure, she was given relief as a mortgagee lawfully in possession. As we understand the decisions of our Supreme Court, a mortgagee in possession •under color of a foreclosure proceeding, ■entering under and claiming his possession under the foreclosure, can retain possession until his mortgagor pays his debt.
But in the case at bar, as between appellant and appellees, appellant did not take possession of the land in controversy under its foreclosures, for the simple reason that appellees were not parties to the foreclosure, and by the foreclosure appellant acquired no color of right against them. Were the Ortons appellees in this case, ■claiming title’ to the land in repudiation ■of their foreclosure sale, Browne v. King would be in point and would make appellant “a mortgagee in possession.” Had •appellant entered as a tenant in common •and not as a limitation claimant, Duke v. Reed would be in point, and appellant ■could have held possession until its. debt was paid.
Would appellant say it could ■not, under the law, have matured a limitation title against appellees? Would appellant say that the facts found by the ■court, if they had continued for five full years, would not have matured a limitation title in its favor against appellees? Having matured a limitation title- — that is, having held the possession under all the conditions of the statute of limitation of five years — would appellant say that the law would deny it the benefits of the statute and force it to the relation of a mortgagee lawfully in possession? Under the facts as they existed from the day of its entry, as found by - the court, would appellant say that, prior to the expiration of the five-year period of limitation, it could claim. the rights and benefits of a mortgagee in possession and, at the end of the five-year period, claim title as a limitation claimant? These questions are answered against appellant by the following proposition from our original opinion, which we believe is an accurate statement of the law: “To be a mortgagee in lawful possession the mortgagee must hold under his mortgage, in recognition of the rights of his mortgagor. Not only must he be ready and willing at all times to render an accounting to his mortgagor of the profits of his possession, but his ^claim and possession must be of such a nature that his mortgagbr can compel an accounting, and that without relation to the bar of the statutes of limitation. A mortgagee in lawful possession holds as trustee for his mortgagor, both as to his claim and possession of the property, and as to the profits of his possession, and limitation in his favor can run only after a repudiation by him of his original entry with notice to his mortgagor of his hostile claim.”
We think Duke v. Reed and Browne, v. King, supra, deny appellees’ contention that the mortgagee must enter with the consent of the mortgagor in order to claim the rights of a mortgagee lawfully in possession, for in these cases the mortgagees did not enter with permission of the mortgagor, except in so far as that permission can be legally inferred from the facts of the mortgage and its- execution; but' that is not the. character of permission contended for by appellees. If Galloway v. Kerr (Tex.Civ.App.) 63 S.W. 180, 185, and Williams v. Connor Bros. (Tex.Civ.App.) 83 S.W.(2d) 692 (writ granted), ap-pellees’ principal cases, rest on t-heir proposition, then, as we understand the law, these cases do not have support in the decisions of our Supreme Court.
It is our reasoned conclusion that, in affirming the judgment of the lower court and in announcing the' propositions of law upon which we base our affirmance, we are not in conflict with any holding by our Supreme Court.
*688We overrule appellant’s motion to certify this case to the Supreme Court. If we are in- conflict with anything said by our Supreme Court or if the point at issue is of sufficient importance to our jurisprudence, our Supreme Court can grant a writ of error and submit this case at an early date with Williams v. Connor.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.