Court Opinion

ID: 9683366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:27:28.323209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:47.426371
License: Public Domain

GILBERT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the court of appeals. I believe that Peterson and Anoka Hennepin Independent School District 11 should not be entitled to official immunity and vicarious official immunity because the specific conduct alleged to be negligent in this case — the decision to instruct respondent to make rip cuts with the blade guard disengaged — does not involve the type of activity protected by official immunity. The majority uses a circular analysis to conclude that Peterson’s conduct, though ministerial, should be entitled to official immunity because it was “required by a protocol established through the exercise of discretionary judgment that would itself be protected by official immunity.” This new approach empowers a small group of government employees at any level of management to create official immunity for their behavior without any accountability. This analysis will also cause needless confusion with our traditional official immunity analysis and extends official immunity into an area in which we have held that the special status of immunity does not apply — alleged negligence arising from the routine teaching decisions of a .teacher. See Larson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 314 Braham, 289 N.W.2d 112, 123 (Minn.1979). Official immunity should not be utilized to protect government officials at the operational level for claims of negligence based on activities of this nature.
The majority begins its analysis by concluding that Peterson’s actions were ministerial because there was a “protocol” in place that governed his conduct. Traditionally, when an official’s conduct is ministerial, official immunity does not apply. Here, however, the majority reverses the effect of “ministerial” duties and concludes that official immunity applies. In the process, it elevates what is no more than a common practice to allow government officials to clothe themselves with immunity because the “decision adopting the protocol involved sufficient judgment and discretion to qualify for official immunity.” There is no cite to authority by the majority to support this novel official immunity doctrine. A brief examination of our jurisprudence on the use of the terms “ministerial” and “discretionary” in our official immunity analysis points out the error in the majority’s reasoning.
We have frequently stated that official immunity does not protect government officials charged with the- execution of ministerial functions; that is, charged with duties .that are “ ‘absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.’ ” Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn.1998) (quoting Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 224, 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937)). What we have unfortunately failed to make clear, however, is that ministerial duties are generally duties that are charged by law; that is, duties tied to a statute, ordinance, rule *666or other official action. As we stated in Cook, when we adopted the definition of ministerial duties that we have continued to follow:
A ministerial duty is one in which nothing is left to discretion, a simple, definite duty arising under and because of stated conditions and imposed by law. The idea has been put in this language. “Official duty is ministerial, when it is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.”
200 Minn, at 224, 274 N.W. at 167 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 253 Wis.2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314, 321 (2002) (“a duty is regarded as ministerial when it has been ‘positively imposed by law, and its performance required at a time and in a manner, or upon conditions which are specifically designated * * *.’ ”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Generally, when we have concluded that officials duties were ministerial, we have done so only where they were tied to a statute, ordinance, rule or other official action. See Sletten, et al. and Brzinski v. Ramsey County, 675 N.W.2d 291, 307-08 (Minn.2004) (concluding officials engaged in ministerial duties where removal of grass clippings was required by city-imposed conditional use permit and volume of yard waste deposited regulated by Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Permit-by-Rule); Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn.1998) (concluding sidewalk inspector’s duty to immediately repair sidewalk was ministerial where city ordinance required “immediate repair”). We have in some circumstances, however, broadened the concept of ministerial functions to include duties not specifically tied to a statute, ordinance, rule or other official action. In Larson, for example, we held that official immunity did not apply to a case of alleged teacher negligence in providing instructions in a physical education class because teaching “essentially involved a ministerial function.” 289 N.W.2d 112,120 (Minn.1979). Similarly, in Olson v. Ramsey County, we held that an official’s implementation of a written case plan, which outlined the actions required of the official, involved the execution of assigned tasks and was therefore ministerial in nature and not entitled to immunity. 509 N.W.2d 368, 372-73 (Minn. 1993); see also Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 61, 245 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1976) (concluding that actions in demolishing a building were ministerial in nature without discussion of a statute, ordinance, rule or other official action). Crucially, however, in all these cases we broadened the concept of ministerial functions in order to prevent defendants from having the special status of immunity because, as we reasoned in Larson, “the level of judgment [the teacher] exercised was not intended to be covered under the doctrine of discretionary immunity.” 289 N.W.2d at 121.
Even under this broadened concept of ministerial duties that we have established through our jurisprudence, however, Peterson’s actions here cannot be labeled ministerial. The “protocol” that the majority relies on, which is also referred to as the “best practice” and the “best ‘policy and procedure,’ ” was supposedly informally established years ago by the Coon Rapids High School Technology Department staff as an unwritten policy. It does not appear that Anoka Hennepin Independent School District 11 ever even considered this “protocol,” much less made it part of its official or unofficial policy, rules or standards. Moreover, appellants have not challenged the court of appeals’ denial of statutory immunity on this appeal, which is a near concession that this “protocol” was not made at the policy-making level. The *667majority, nonetheless, describes an in-house, unwritten policy of one department in one school within the entire school district, which was not adopted or ratified by appellant Anoka Hennepin Independent School District 11 in any manner, as creating ministerial duties for Peterson.
The focus of our official immunity analysis is on the nature of Peterson’s conduct and not on this “protocol.” See Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988). The majority concludes, with no support from precedent, that the fact that Peterson acted in accordance with duties created by this “protocol” makes his conduct entitled to official immunity. The majority’s reasoning empowers government employees at any level to establish their own policy to create immunity for their behavior. In Olson, cited by the majority, county social workers were under a duty to design a suitable case plan. We held that a social worker’s implementation of this plan was ministerial and her self-created ministerial duties caused her to lose any possibility of having official immunity. 509 N.W.2d at 372. We continued in Olson to hold that the defendant’s actions in carrying out her responsibilities under the case plan made her not negligent as a matter of law. Id. at 373. Here, if Peterson’s conduct were in fact ministerial, I might agree that his conduct was not negligent as a matter of law. However, Peterson’s conduct based on the “best practice” was not ministerial and the majority should not extend official immunity to cover his actions. We should not grant a governmental employee special immunity based on complying with an unaccountable, in-house, unwritten “protocol.”
The majority also relies on our reasoning in Nusbaum v. County of Blue Earth, 422 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn.1988), that a challenge to conduct that follows a policy should be treated as a challenge to the policy, but this reliance is misplaced. First, as the majority recognizes, Nusb-aum addressed this issue in the context of statutory immunity, which is an important difference because statutory immunity is concerned with policy judgments. See supra majority at n. 4 (citing Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 104 (Minn.1991)). Second, and more importantly, the conduct that was challenged was the implementation of a policy set forth in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devises that was “adopt[ed] by the state” as a policy decision. Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 722. Here, in contrast, the “protocol” that Peterson was to follow was an in-house, unwritten policy of one department in one school within the entire school district, which was not adopted or ratified by appellant Anoka Hennepin Independent School District 11 in any manner. Respondent’s claim of negligence is not a “challenge to a policy” deserving of protection.
Peterson’s conduct should be analyzed under our traditional official immunity analysis. The specific conduct at issue here — the decision to instruct respondent to make rip cuts with the blade guard disengaged — -is a routine decision of a teacher. The key issue in determining whether to apply official immunity is whether the alleged negligent conduct involves the type of discretionary judgment protected by official immunity. This determination is the first step in an official immunity analysis, which should be made before determining whether the conduct was ministerial or not. See Terwilliger v. Hennepin County, 561 N.W.2d 909, 913-14 (Minn.1997) (holding that official immunity does not apply; ease does not discuss whether the conduct was ministerial). The fact that conduct is not ministerial does not make it discretionary for purposes of official immunity. Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 582 N.W.2d *668216, 220-21 (Minn.1998); Terwilliger, 561 N.W.2d at 913-14 (Minn.1997). The exercise of some degree of judgment or discretion -will not necessarily confer immunity— the crucial focus for official immunity is always on the nature of the act. Terwilliger, 561 N.W.2d at 913.
The purpose of official immunity is to protect public officials from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties in situations that require significant independent judgment. Watson v. Metro. Transit Comm’n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 414 (Minn.1996); Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988). Accordingly, we have applied official immunity to such conduct as a police officer’s split-second decision whether to engage in a high speed chase, Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn.1992); paramedics’ driving in response to an emergency in an emergency medical vehicle, Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn.1998); and a bus driver’s decision not to use an intercom system or stop the bus during an altercation, Watson, 553 N.W.2d at 415. The majority cites to no case where we have applied official immunity to prevent a negligence suit for the routine decisions of a teacher.
In fact, our eases suggest that immunity should not apply to the type of conduct at issue in this case. In Terwilliger, a unanimous decision issued by this court in 1997, we held that official immunity did not apply to a case of alleged negligence of government employees in treating a depressed patient — specifically, in failing to hospitalize the patient and instead treating his condition with medication and consultation. 561 N.W.2d at 913-14. We reasoned that “decisions of this kind — no matter how difficult and no matter how much professional judgment is required' — do not involve the discretion protected by official immunity; they only implement [the county’s] established public policy of providing treatment for its mentally ill citizens.” Id. at 913. Importantly, the employees were implementing “public policy,” not a specific policy requiring established duties. Id. Similarly, in Gleason, we followed the reasoning of Terwilliger to hold that official immunity is not intended to protect such conduct as a bus driver’s alleged harassing comments and actions toward a passenger because the discretion required to do so was not the discretion that official immunity considers. 582 N.W.2d at 221.
The majority simply dismisses Larson, our only case to consider official immunity for the teaching decisions of a teacher. In Larson, we held that official immunity did not apply to a case of alleged teacher negligence in providing instructions in a physical education class. 289 N.W.2d at 121. Crucially, we reasoned in Larson that official immunity should not apply because “the level of judgment [the teacher] exercised was not intended to be covered under the doctrine of discretionary immunity.” Id. We also cautioned that official immunity must be narrowly construed in light of the fact that it is an exception to the general rule of liability. Id. This is the same reasoning that we used in Terwilli-ger. As in Larson, the routine teaching decisions of Peterson should not be covered by official immunity.1
I would affirm the court of appeals, which, although it concluded that Peterson’s actions were ministerial, correctly reasoned that official immunity does not apply because “the nature and complexity of [Peterson’s decisions] does not entitle him to official immunity.” Anderson v. *669Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 655 N.W.2d 847, 854 (Minn.App.2003). The specific conduct at issue in this case— Peterson’s decision to instruct respondent to make rip cuts with the blade guard disengaged — is not discretionary in the sense of being a decision in which significant independent judgment is desired. In Tenvilliger, we reasoned that it would be improper to stretch the scope of official immunity to the routine decisions of mental health professionals because those decisions were “based on the same elements and subject to the same risks as are the treatment decisions of psychiatrists and other mental health professionals engaged in the private practice of medicine.” 561 N.W.2d at 913. Here, the majority ignores our principle of narrow construction and provides 'no good reason for why we should expand official immunity to cover the routine decisions of a teacher who just happens to be a government employee. Therefore, official immunity and vicarious official immunity should not apply to this case.
If the case proceeded to trial, substantial factual issues would need to be resolved as to whether the conduct complained of was negligent. We need not and should not decide whether Peterson’s conduct was negligent on this appeal. The majority’s analysis forces the determination that the conduct set forth in the unwritten “protocol” was “correct” (i.e., not negligent), which is a determination that has no place in our official immunity analysis. The fact that Peterson complied with an unwritten “protocol” may be relevant in the context of determining negligence, but the court here should not summarily conclude that the conduct was immune just because the teacher happens to be a government employee.

. The majority states: "[[Importantly, this holding preserves existing case law * * However, the majority ignores our case law based on a distinction — complying with a duty — that simply does not make a difference for official immunity purposes.