Court Opinion

ID: 9771247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:37:49.00809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:27.510475
License: Public Domain

*299O’CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent because of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In point of error one, the appellant argues he was denied a fair trial because the State peremptorily struck prospective jurors because of their race.
The appellant complains that the State used its peremptory strikes to remove four prospective jurors who were African-American from the jury. Because the State’s overall conduct in jury selection is relevant in proving discrimination, we must review the voir dire for each African-American prospective juror who was struck by the State and the State’s explanation for each. Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 727 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).
By way of introduction, the panel of 50 was composed of 41 whites and nine African-Americans. Three of the African-Americans were excused for cause. Of the remaining six African-Americans who could have served on the jury, the State struck four. One African-American served on the jury and one was an alternate.
Alma Simmons
I agree that the prosecutor had a legitimate reason to strike Simmons — she indicated that she would need more than one witness before she could vote for conviction, and only after being repeatedly told by the trial judge did Simmons agree to follow the one-witness rule.
The majority overrules the point of error as to Simmons, and then bolsters the prosecutor’s explanation by noting that Simmons had a relative convicted of a crime. The prosecutor did not state that as her reason at the Batson hearing, thus we cannot assume that it was one of her reasons for striking the prospective juror. The additional explanation for the strike — that Simmons had a relative who has been convicted of a crime — becomes critical in the review of another African-American prospective juror struck by the prosecutor.
It is not the role of the appellate courts to supplement the prosecutor’s reasons for striking a prospective member of the jury. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in discussing the role of the appellate court, did not suggest that the courts can supplement the prosecutor’s reasons on appeal. See Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 869-70 (Tex. Crim.App.1988).
Cynthia Ross
During the voir dire, the prosecutor did not ask Ross any questions. At the Batson hearing, the prosecutor explained that Ross had stared at her from the moment she entered the courtroom; that no other member stared at her to that degree. The prosecutor noticed Ms. Ross worked at Target, where the prosecutor shops. The prosecutor explained:
I shop [at Target’s], so I don’t know if she recognized me and that’s why she was staring at me or if she’s been a witness or a member of the Defendant’s family before. But based on that, I did not feel like she could be a good juror in one of my cases.
We must deal with whether the prosecutor’s two explanation for striking Ross: (1) the prosecutor thought Ross might be either a witness or a member of the appellant’s family; and (2) Ross stared at the prosecutor. In considering the two explanations, we must also consider that the prosecutor did not question Ross.
Recall that Keeton instructs us that the trial judge cannot merely accept the reasons given by the prosecutor at face value; the judge must consider whether the facially neutral explanations are contrived to avoid admitting discrimination. Keeton, 749 S.W.2d at 868. Keeton identified two factors that weigh heavily against the legitimacy of a racially neutral explanation: no examination or only a perfunctory examination of the juror, and a reason given for the challenge that is unrelated to the facts of the case. Id. at 866.
The prosecutor’s first explanation seemed to be that Ross might have been a witness to the crime or a member of the appellant’s family. Nothing in this record supports the prosecutor’s suggestion that the juror might have been a witness or *300might be related to the appellant. If the prosecutor had any real suspicion that Ross was either a witness or was a member of the appellant’s family, the prosecutor could have struck Ross for cause. I would hold that the prosecutor’s reason for the challenge — that Ross might be witness or a member of the appellant’s family — is not supported by the record and is unrelated to the facts elicited in voir dire. Keeton, 749 S.W.2d at 868.
In Hill v. State, 787 S.W.2d 74, 78-79 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990), aff'd, 827 S.W.2d 860 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), the prosecutor said he struck a juror because the prosecutor thought the juror would identify with the defendant and he did not like the way the juror responded to questions. The only questions the prosecutor had asked the juror were where he worked and if he could be fair. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the reasons given by the prosecutor for challenging the juror were based on assumptions of the prosecutor and were unrelated to evidence in the case. Thus, the court concluded the reason for the strike could not be considered race-neutral. Id.; see also Reich-Bacot v. State, 789 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990), pet. dism’d per curiam, 815 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (the prosecutor’s explanation that the juror worked with people involved with criminal activities, when juror actually said she worked with people with disabilities, was not supported by the evidence and thus was not a race-neutral explanation); Chivers v. State, 796 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref’d) (the prosecutor’s unverified assumption that a juror who worked for DART did not indicate a sufficient level of intelligence, was not a race-neutral explanation); Lewis v. State, 779 S.W.2d 449, 455 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, pet. ref’d) (lack of meaningful examination of an African-American juror who said she knew one of the State’s witnesses from another case, did not rebut presumption of racial discrimination).
Here, the prosecutor had nothing on which to base her assumption that the prospective juror knew her or was related to of the defendant. That should lead us to consider the prosecutor’s lack of interrogation: If the prosecutor had any real suspicion that the prospective juror knew her or was related to the appellant, the prosecutor should have questioned the juror. The prosecutor did not ask Ross any questions. Under Keeton and other cases, the failure to question a juror weighs heavily against the prosecutor’s stated reason. Keeton, 749 S.W.2d at 868; see also Daniels v. State, 768 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1988, pet. ref'd) (the explanation that two jurors were inattentive, coupled with lack of questioning, held not to present racially plausible reasons for striking African-American jurors). If a prosecutor makes an assumption about a juror but does not question the juror to verify the assumption, it is some indication that the strike was not race-neutral. Woods v. State, 801 S.W.2d 932, 936-37 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, pet. ref’d) (the prosecutor said he struck the juror because he had a punk rock haircut which he associated with liberals, radicals, and the drug culture, but did not question to a juror to verify his assumption). Here, the prosecutor had no excuse not to question the juror because, if the suspicions were verified, the prosecutor could have challenged Ross for cause.
Once we reject the “witness or member of the family” reason to strike Ross, the only reason left is that the prosecutor said Ross stared at her. Most alert jurors watch the prosecutor during the prosecutor’s voir dire. If the prosecutor had said Ross seemed hostile to her, and had verified it with questions, that might have been a reason to strike Ross. But, staring alone is not any justification. See Woods, 801 S.W.2d at 937 (prosecutor’s explanation that juror did not appear interested and did not react as other jurors, coupled with abbreviated questioning of the. juror, was not race neutral explanation).
I would hold that the sum of the two reasons — staring plus the “witness or relative” — in addition to the lack of questioning amounts to failure to provide a race-neutral reason to strike Ross.
I would sustain the Batson point as to Ross.
*301Ruby Reed
The prosecutor said she struck Reed because she was not responsive to the questions she asked the panel. The prosecutor did not ask Reed any direct questions. In addition, the prosecutor said another prosecutor noted that Reed had yawned throughout the voir dire proceedings. The defense attorney identified two white jurors who had yawned during voir dire, yet had not been struck by the State.
When the prosecutor offers race-neutral explanations for strikes, it becomes the defendant’s burden to persuade the court that such challenges were racially motivated. Lewis v. State, 815 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Jones v. State, 781 S.W.2d 415, 417-18 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d). As stated earlier, one factor that weighs against the State, particularly when the charge of pretext excuse is raised, is that the State did not pose any individual questions to the challenged juror. Keeton, 749 S.W.2d at 868. Here, the State did not question the juror and the defense pointed out another white juror who was not struck for the same behavior.
In Lewis v. State, 779 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, pet. ref'd), the prosecutor said he struck an African-American juror who wore a mustache. The prosecutor admitted that he regularly struck jurors with mustaches or beards. The record revealed that the prosecutor did not strike a white juror with a beard. Lewis, 779 S.W.2d at 455. The court held the explanation for the strike was but a sham or pretext to avoid admitting racial discrimination. Hence, the court concluded, the explanation was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of racial discrimination. Id.
The majority faults the appellant for not offering rebuttal. The appellant did everything he could — he made the point that the prosecutor did not strike whites who behaved similarly to Reed. The evidence that the majority wants the appellant to rebut is the prosecutor’s opinion. It is not possible to rebut it any more than the appellant did.
I would sustain the Batson challenge as to Reed.
Bernita Harrison
The prosecutor said she struck Harrison because she has an uncle who is serving time after he was convicted for sexual assault of a child. In response to that reason, the appellant’s lawyer pointed out that the prosecutor did not strike a white juror who had a nephew in prison for armed robbery. In reply, the prosecutor explained she did not strike the white juror because the juror explained he was not close to his nephew and had completely forgotten about his nephew’s Louisiana conviction until he was questioned during voir dire.
There are two things that are noteworthy about the prosecutors justification: (1) the white juror volunteered the information that he was not close to his nephew; and (2) the prosecutor could have asked Harrison if she was close to her uncle, but did not. In other respects, the two jurors seemed to give similar response — they did not know if their relative had been treated fairly.
The prosecutor’s conversation with the prospective jurors should be contrasted. After the white juror remembered he had a relative who had been charged with an offense, the following exchange took place:
White juror: Something just occurred to me. It happened a long time ago. A nephew had an armed robbery conviction a long time ago, in New Orleans.
Prosecutor: Do you feel like your nephew was treated fairly by the system? Do you have an opinion about it?
White juror: As far as I know. I really wasn’t that close to him.
Prosecutor: Was there anything about that that would cause you not to be fair in this case?
White juror: No.
A few minutes later, the prosecutor interrogated Ms. Harrison on the same subject:
Prosecutor: Ms. Harrison?
Harrison: A relative.
Prosecutor: Was it someone in your immediate family?
Harrison: An uncle.
*302Prosecutor: Do you know what kind of case it was?
Harrison: I think it was child molesting.
Prosecutor: Would that cause you not to not to be fair in this case? Do you think your uncle was treated fairly by the DA’s office or by the court system?
Harrison: Well, I don't know. I think he’s still in jail.
Nothing in this record supports the prosecutor’s explanation that she struck Ms. Harrison because she was close to her uncle. In fact, by saying she did not know if her uncle was still in jail (“I think he is still in jail”), it shows that she probably was not close to him.
I would sustain the Batson challenge as to Ms. Harrison and hold that the prosecutor’s reason for striking her evidenced disparate treatment of the prospective jurors because she did not strike the white juror, Keeton, 749 S.W.2d at 868; Miller-El v. State, 790 S.W.2d 851, 357 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref’d) (when prosecutor struck an African-American for the stated reason that she had only recently held her job, but did not strike a white juror for the same reason, the excuse constituted a sham or pretext); Vann v. State, 788 S.W.2d 899, 905 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref’d) (prosecutor’s reason for striking two African-American men, that they were conservative, was a sham because he did not strike conservative white men).
I would sustain appellant’s point of error one.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
The majority twice overrules appellant’s points of error challenging the effectiveness of counsel with the rubric that an “isolated failure” of counsel does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Ewing v. State, 549 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). If counsel makes two mistakes, they are not isolated failures. I do not believe we can repeatedly overrule points of error that challenge different omissions of the lawyer with that statement.