Court Opinion

ID: 9387999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 16:08:10.328952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.863450
License: Public Domain

J-A03039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: R.M., A                     :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: R.M., A MINOR                        :         No. 1159 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered March 8, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-JV-0000127-2022

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                         FILED APRIL 19, 2023

        Appellant, R.M., appeals from the dispositional order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, finding that

Appellant committed the offenses of receiving stolen property (“RSP”),

conspiracy,      unauthorized     use   of     an       automobile   (“UUA”),   and   false

identification    to   law   enforcement       authorities,1     and   adjudicating   him

delinquent. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate and remand for

further proceedings.

        The Juvenile Court set forth the relevant facts of this case as follows:

           At the adjudicatory hearing on March 8, 2022, this [c]ourt
           heard the testimony of three (3) witnesses, and the
           stipulated testimony of one (1) additional witness, and
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*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3925; 903; 3928; and 4914, respectively.
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       viewed two (2) videos. The first witness, Harriet Gibbs, a
       resident of the State of Delaware, testified that in the
       evening of January 30, 2022, she had started her car to
       warm it up, while she waited for her colleague to relieve her
       of duty at her place of employment. At the time, her car, a
       2016 Chevy Malibu with Delaware plate number 331136,
       was parked outside Ms. Gibb’s place of employment. There
       had been a snowstorm and Ms. Gibbs went back into her
       workplace to wait and when she looked back outside, she
       observed her car backing out; once she arrived back
       outside, the car was pulling off. Ms. Gibbs observed one
       individual inside the vehicle.       The occurrence was
       immediately reported to the police.

       The second witness to testify was Police Officer Mark Dial,
       Badge Number 6130, assigned to the Philadelphia Police
       Department’s 19th Police District. Officer Dial testified that
       on the evening of January 30, 2022, around 6:38 p.m., he
       was on duty near the area of 1500 North 50th Street. Officer
       Dial testified that a radio call was received indicating a
       stolen 2016 Chevy Malibu, with a Delaware plate of 331136,
       was being pinged by OnStar. The Officer surveyed the area
       for twenty minutes and then located the vehicle in a Lowes
       parking lot around 7 p.m., unoccupied, and confirmed the
       plate and [vehicle identification number].       Officer Dial
       testified that he then entered the Lowes to view the CCTC
       footage of the parking lot and gave out flash information of
       the suspects. Officer Dial provided flash of “two males, one
       a black male wearing a baby blue hoody with a dark block
       in the center chest of it, and dark colored pants with white
       shoes” and a second offender, [Appellant], being a “black
       jacket with a gray hoody underneath and black pants.”
       Surveillance footage of the [Lowes] parking lot showed two
       males exiting the vehicle. On cross-examination, Officer
       Dial testified that [Appellant] exited the passenger side of
       the vehicle, and while he did enter the driver’s seat at one
       point during the video, the vehicle was not moved.

       The third witness to testify was Police Officer Raymond
       Jastrzebski, Badge Number 2445, assigned to the
       Philadelphia Police Department’s 19th District.       Officer
       Jastrzebski testified that he was on patrol in the area and
       received a radio call of the 2016 Chevy Malibu with Delaware
       plate 331136 being located in the Lowes parking lot by

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          Officer Dial, and the subsequent flash information of
          [Appellant] and [the] other suspect. Officer Jastrzebski was
          surveying the area with his partner, and observed
          individuals matching the flash information in the area of
          Lindenwood and Columbia streets. The officers stopped the
          individuals in the surveillance footage. Body-worn camera
          footage of the stop showed [Appellant] in the clothing from
          the flash information.      At this point, [Appellant] was
          arrested, and charged with three offenses, with the fourth
          added the day of adjudication. Ms. Gibbs was able to
          receive her vehicle back on February 2nd or 3rd, 2022.

          A third officer did not provide testimony, but there was a
          stipulation by and between counsel that if called to testify,
          Officer Ozdemir would testify “that he was brought to the
          scene to transport two juveniles. He was initially not given
          a name by [Appellant], and at some point that the video
          would show, the initial name given to Officer Ozdemir was
          the name of Adan Jones…by [Appellant]” and [Appellant]
          was “aware of what the investigation was.”[2]

(Juvenile Court Opinion, filed 7/14/22, at 5-7) (internal citations omitted).3

       On March 8, 2022, at the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the

court found that Appellant committed RSP, conspiracy, UUA, and false

identification to law enforcement authorities. The court further decided that

Appellant was in need of treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation, and

adjudicated him delinquent. The court placed Appellant on probation.

       On March 28, 2022, Appellant filed a motion seeking leave to file a post-

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2 Additionally, the parties stipulated at the adjudicatory hearing that if
Appellant’s mother were called to testify, she would testify that Appellant has
a character for law-abidingness. (N.T. Hearing, 3/8/22, at 36).

3This Court was able to review both the surveillance video footage from Lowes
and the body-worn camera footage.

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dispositional motion nunc pro tunc and attached the proposed post-

dispositional motion. The court granted nunc pro tunc relief the next day.

The court denied the post-dispositional motion on April 8, 2022. On May 2,

2022, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On May 4, 2022, the court

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).       Appellant filed a preliminary Rule 1925(b)

statement on May 31, 2022, and supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement on

June 9, 2022, with leave of court.

      Appellant raises three issues for our review:

         Was not the evidence insufficient to sustain a finding that
         [Appellant] committed the offenses of receiving stolen
         property, unauthorized use of automobiles and conspiracy
         where the prosecution failed to prove that he acted with
         guilty mens rea or entered into any conspiratorial
         agreement?

         Was not the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction for
         false identification to law enforcement where the police
         officers never informed Appellant that he was the subject of
         an official investigation?

         Did not the juvenile court err and abuse its discretion in
         adjudicating [Appellant] delinquent based solely on the
         commission of delinquent acts where the evidence as a
         whole did not support a finding that [Appellant] was in need
         of treatment, supervision or rehabilitation?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

      In his first issue, Appellant asserts that he was merely a passenger in

the stolen vehicle.   Appellant argues that the Commonwealth provided no

evidence of the relationship between Appellant and the driver of the stolen

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vehicle. Appellant contends there were no physical manifestations of theft on

the vehicle such that Appellant should have known it was stolen. Appellant

claims there was no evidence of traffic violations or any other behavior by the

driver which might have given Appellant cause to suspect the vehicle was

stolen or that the driver did not have the owner’s permission to drive it.

Appellant avers that the complainant observed the theft of her vehicle and

only saw one person who stole the car.         Appellant emphasizes that the

complainant did not identify Appellant as the person who stole her vehicle.

Appellant claims that he did not enter the vehicle until after someone else

stole it. Appellant maintains there was no evidence that Appellant was aware

that the driver did not know the owner of the vehicle. Appellant maintains he

did not give a false name until after he was arrested. Appellant submits that

his post-arrest false identification does not establish guilty mens rea at the

time he was in the car.

      Appellant further argues that no evidence showed he was acting in

concert with the driver.    Appellant does not dispute that he transitorily

possessed and operated the car for a brief time in which he sat in the driver’s

seat with the keys, during which the rear lights of the car turned off and on.

Nevertheless, Appellant insists that his presence inside a recently stolen car

is insufficient on its own to establish that Appellant should have known the car

was stolen. Appellant insists the court disregarded the unrebutted evidence

of Appellant’s good character, which should have tipped the scales in

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Appellant’s favor. Appellant also argues that the Commonwealth introduced

no evidence of the relationship between Appellant and the driver of the

vehicle, of Appellant’s participation in the theft of the vehicle, or any

suspicious conduct by Appellant to prove Appellant and the driver were

engaged in a conspiracy. Appellant concludes the evidence was insufficient to

prove he committed RSP, UUA, and conspiracy, and this Court must grant

relief. We disagree.

     This Court has explained:

           When a juvenile is charged with an act that would
           constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the
           Commonwealth must establish the elements of the
           crime by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. When
           considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
           evidence following an adjudication of delinquency, we
           must review the entire record and view the evidence
           in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. In
           determining whether the Commonwealth presented
           sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof, the
           test to be applied is whether, viewing the evidence in
           the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and
           drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, there is
           sufficient evidence to find every element of the crime
           charged. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden
           of proving every element of the crime beyond a
           reasonable doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence.

           The facts and circumstances established by the
           Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible
           with a defendant’s innocence. Questions of doubt are
           for the hearing judge, unless the evidence is so weak
           that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be
           drawn from the combined circumstances established
           by the Commonwealth.

        In re V.C., 66 A.3d 341, 348–349 (Pa.Super. 2013)[,
        appeal denied, 622 Pa. 762, 80 A.3d 778 (2013)] (quoting

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           In re A.V., 48 A.3d 1251, 1252-1253 (Pa.Super. 2012)).
           The finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of the
           evidence presented. Commonwealth v. Gainer, 7 A.3d
           291, 292 (Pa.Super. 2010)[, appeal denied, 611 Pa. 631, 23
           A.3d 1055 (2011)].

In Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa.Super. 2016).

      “A person is guilty of [RSP] if he intentionally receives, retains, or

disposes of moveable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or

believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received,

retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

3925(a).     “As used in this section the word ‘receiving’ means acquiring

possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the property.” 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(b).       Thus, the elements of RSP are: “(1) intentionally

acquiring possession of the moveable property of another; (2) with knowledge

or belief that it was probably stolen; and (3) the intent to deprive

permanently.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 128 A.3d 261, 265 (Pa.Super.

2015) (en banc).

      Regarding the “guilty knowledge” second element of the crime, “[a]

person ‘knows’ that goods are stolen if he is ‘aware’ of that fact.” Id. Guilty

knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Id. This Court has

explained:

           [M]ere possession of stolen property, without more, is not
           sufficient circumstantial evidence to support an inference of
           guilty knowledge. … Proof that the goods were recently
           stolen, however, may provide the jury with sufficient
           circumstantial evidence to support an inference of guilty
           knowledge, since the circumstances of possession as

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        presented by the Commonwealth (the recency of the theft)
        suggest an explanation for the possession (that the accused
        was the thief…). In other words, a jury may infer guilty
        knowledge from evidence of recency, which in turn may
        require the appellant to offer an alternative explanation of
        his possession of the stolen item. It is the Commonwealth’s
        circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge (recency) that
        compels the need for an explanation, since in the absence
        of an explanation the jury may infer guilty knowledge
        beyond     a   reasonable      doubt     based   upon     the
        Commonwealth’s evidence. Even if the accused offers an
        explanation, the jury may nevertheless find it unsatisfactory
        and reach a finding of guilty knowledge based upon the
        recency of the theft.

Id. at 267-68 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Additional

circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge may include:

        [T]he place or manner of possession, alterations to the
        property indicative of theft, the [offender’s] conduct or
        statements at the time of arrest (including attempts to flee
        apprehension), a false explanation for the possession, the
        location of the theft in comparison to where the [offender]
        gained possession, the value of the property compared to
        the price paid for it, or any other evidence connecting the
        [offender] to the crime.

Id. at 268.

     “A person is guilty of [UUA as] a misdemeanor of the second degree if

he operates the automobile, airplane, motorcycle, motorboat, or other moto-

propelled vehicle of another without consent of the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

3928(a). “In order to establish the mens rea element of the crime of [UUA],

the Commonwealth must prove that the accused was at least reckless with

respect to the owner’s lack of consent to the accused’s operation of the

vehicle.” Interest of K.G., 278 A.3d 934, 939 (Pa.Super. 2022). “The mens

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rea burden under the [UUA statute] is not as strict as the one for [RSP]. It,

therefore, follows that the Commonwealth necessarily [satisfies] its burden

for the lesser mens rea required for” UUA if it satisfies the higher burden for

RSP. Commonwealth v. Carson, 592 A.2d 1318, 1322 (Pa.Super. 1991),

appeal denied, 529 Pa. 616, 600 A.2d 533 (1991) (explaining that if

unexplained possession of recently stolen property will support inference of

guilty knowledge for RSP, it will support with even greater strength inference

of recklessness with respect to owner’s lack of consent to operate recently

stolen automobile for purposes of UUA statute). Further, “an offender need

not actually be driving a vehicle to be [guilty] of [UUA].” Id. at 1323.

      A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person if with the intent of

promoting or facilitating the commission of a crime he: “(1) agrees with such

other person…that they or one of more of them will engage in conduct which

constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person…in the planning or commission of such

crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

903(a). “No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime unless

an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have

been done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

903(e).

      “Because it is difficult to prove an explicit or formal agreement to

commit an unlawful fact, such an act may be proved inferentially by

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circumstantial evidence, i.e., the relations, conduct or circumstances of the

parties or overt acts on the part of the co-conspirators.” Commonwealth v.

Thomas, 65 A.3d 939, 943 (Pa.Super. 2013). “Circumstantial evidence can

include, but is not limited to, the relationship between the parties, the

knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the circumstances and

conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal episode.” Id.

     Instantly, the Juvenile Court explained:

        [Regarding the RSP finding, Appellant] argues that he was
        merely a passenger and did not establish possession or
        control over the vehicle. These are not the requirements of
        this charge.      Here, the surveillance footage shows
        [Appellant] in possession of the car keys to the stolen
        vehicle, shortly after it was reported stolen, without a
        satisfactory explanation. [Appellant] also argues that the
        Commonwealth did not prove [Appellant] knew or should
        have known the car was stolen or he lacked the owner’s
        consent to drive it. Circumstantial evidence can be used to
        prove guilty knowledge…. The owner of the vehicle testified
        she had not given [Appellant], or anyone else, permission
        to use her vehicle. Additionally, [Appellant] provided a false
        name to the police after being arrested near the location of
        the stolen vehicle. Together, this evidence proved to this
        [c]ourt beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant
        committed RSP].

                                 *     *      *

        [Regarding the UUA finding, Appellant] argues the
        Commonwealth did not prove [Appellant] operated the
        vehicle or established possession or control of the vehicle,
        or that he knew or should have known the vehicle was
        stolen. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the
        Commonwealth proved by direct evidence that the vehicle
        was stolen, and the owner had not given [Appellant]
        permission to operate the vehicle. The owner of the vehicle,
        Ms. Gibbs, provided testimony explaining that she had not
        given [Appellant] permission to operate her vehicle, nor did

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         she even know [Appellant], and her vehicle had been stolen.
         It is true that the evidence presented to this [c]ourt does
         not show [Appellant] driving the vehicle, but exiting the
         passenger side of the vehicle, entering the driver’s seat, and
         then exiting the vehicle again. Additionally, the video
         surveillance footage demonstrates [Appellant] in possession
         of the car keys, opening the trunk of the car, and starting
         and stopping the vehicle multiple times before exiting.
         While no direct evidence proved that [Appellant] knew the
         vehicle was stolen, the circumstantial evidence can be
         inferred to prove guilty knowledge. No explanation was
         offered as to possession of the recently stolen vehicle, and
         the body-worn camera footage was stipulated by counsel to
         show [Appellant] providing a false name to law
         enforcement. Both facts are circumstantial evidence that
         this [c]ourt believes establishes [Appellant] had exercised
         control and had the requisite knowledge of the stolen status
         of the vehicle. This [c]ourt found the testimony of the
         [c]omplainant Ms. Gibbs and the multiple officers credible,
         and combined with the circumstances of the arrest, found
         the Commonwealth had established [Appellant committed
         UUA].

                                  *     *      *

         [Regarding the conspiracy finding, Appellant] argues the
         Commonwealth did not prove he entered into an agreement
         or had a common understanding to commit an unlawful act.
         In the instant case, this [c]ourt found the Commonwealth
         presented ample evidence to sustain a finding of guilt on the
         charge of conspiracy. The surveillance footage showed two
         individuals, one being [Appellant], both entering and exiting
         the stolen vehicle, and passing the car keys between
         themselves.     The two individuals were also arrested
         together near where the stolen car was located, and both
         provided false names to police when asked. The direct and
         circumstantial evidence together proved beyond a
         reasonable doubt that [Appellant] had engaged in a criminal
         conspiracy.

(Juvenile Court Opinion at 8-11) (internal citations and footnote omitted).

      We agree with the court’s analysis. Here, the surveillance footage from

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Lowes showed Appellant and other male in possession of the stolen vehicle

approximately three hours after it was stolen. See Carson, supra at 1321

n.5 (classifying three hours as recent for purposes of inferring guilty

knowledge). Although the video footage did not show Appellant driving the

vehicle, it showed Appellant sitting in the driver’s seat at one point, activating

the lights of the vehicle, and passing the keys to the other male at another

point. Appellant had no explanation for his possession of the stolen car. Thus,

the court was free to infer that Appellant knew the car was stolen to satisfy

the guilty knowledge element of RSP. See Robinson, supra. Additionally,

the fact that Appellant supplied a false name to police upon his arrest is further

evidence of Appellant’s guilty knowledge. See id. Because Appellant had the

requisite mens rea for RSP, he necessarily had the lesser mens rea required

to prove UUA. See Carson, supra.

      Regarding conspiracy, we reiterate that the surveillance footage from

Lowes showed that Appellant and his companion occupied the stolen vehicle

together while turning it on and off, exchanging the car keys, and taking turns

sitting in the driver’s seat. The video further showed Appellant and the other

male initially exiting the vehicle, walking off together, and returning to the

vehicle together. Upon their return to the vehicle, Appellant released the latch

on the trunk and looked around the parking lot while his companion searched

the bags in the trunk.       After they closed the trunk, Appellant handed

something to his companion. While the video does not readily depict what

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Appellant handed over, the companion clicked a button on the item that

Appellant had handed over which activated the lights of the vehicle,

demonstrating that Appellant had given the car keys back to his companion.

When police apprehended Appellant and his companion several blocks away,

they no longer possessed the keys, suggesting they had abandoned them.

The parties stipulated that Appellant gave a false name to police upon his

arrest. The body-worn camera footage further shows Appellant stating that

he resides in Delaware, which is where the vehicle had been stolen.        The

circumstantial evidence of Appellant’s joint conduct with his companion

demonstrates that the two acted in concert, and provided a sufficient basis

from which the court could infer the existence of a conspiracy between

Appellant and his companion. See Thomas, supra. Viewed in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, the evidence was sufficient

to prove Appellant committed RSP, UUA, and conspiracy. See In Interest of

J.G., supra.

      In his second issue, Appellant argues that the Juvenile Court

misinterpreted the stipulation regarding what Officer Ozdemir would have

testified to if called as a witness. Appellant asserts that the Juvenile Court

interpreted the stipulation as stating that the officer would testify that

Appellant was informed he was the subject of an investigation and

subsequently provided a false name to the police officers. Appellant claims

this is a misstatement of the actual stipulation. Rather, Appellant insists the

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stipulation was that Appellant gave a false name when he was aware of what

the investigation was about.    Appellant claims this is a crucial distinction

because the crime of false identification to law enforcement requires that the

police have affirmatively informed the suspect that he is the subject of an

official investigation.   Appellant claims that whether he had awareness

through surrounding circumstances of what the investigation was about is

irrelevant to the notice requirement mandated by the statute. Because there

was no evidence that police told Appellant he was under investigation,

Appellant concludes the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed false

identification to law enforcement. We agree relief is due.

      The Crimes Code defines the offense of false identification to law

enforcement authorities as follows:

         § 4914.     False identification to law enforcement
         authorities

         (a) Offense defined.—A person commits an offense if he
         furnishes law enforcement authorities with false information
         about his identity after being informed by a law
         enforcement officer who is in uniform or who has identified
         himself as a law enforcement officer that the person is the
         subject of an official investigation of a violation of law.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914(a) (emphasis added). To “be informed” for purposes of

the statute requires the Commonwealth to “prove that the individual was told

that he or she was under investigation, and that must occur prior to the

individual’s presentment of false identity information.” Commonwealth v.

Kitchen, 181 A.3d 337, 345 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc) (emphasis in

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original) (expressly rejecting Commonwealth’s argument that person could be

“informed” by “surrounding circumstances”).

      Instantly, the Juvenile Court stated:

         [Appellant] argues that the Commonwealth did not prove
         [Appellant] was informed he was the subject of an
         investigation.    There was a stipulation between the
         Commonwealth and [Appellant’s c]ounsel that a third police
         officer would testify that [Appellant] was informed he was
         the subject of an investigation and subsequently provided a
         false name to the police officers. (See N.T. 3/8/22, pg. 28).
         [Appellant’s c]ounsel did not object to this characterization
         by the Commonwealth at trial, and so this [c]ourt believed
         that there was ample evidence to sustain a finding of guilt
         on the charge of False Identification.

(Juvenile Court Opinion at 11-12) (emphasis added).

      Nevertheless, the Commonwealth concedes that neither the stipulation

nor any other piece of evidence established that an officer told Appellant that

he was under official investigation. (See Commonwealth’s Brief at 22-23).

The record confirms the Commonwealth’s position.         Here, the stipulation

provided that the officer “was initially not given a name by [Appellant], and

at some point” was given “the name Adan Jones” from Appellant.           (N.T.,

3/8/22, at 27). The prosecutor then clarified that at the time Appellant gave

the false identification, Appellant and his companion “were both aware of what

the investigation was[.]” (Id. at 28). Thus, we agree with Appellant and the

Commonwealth that the Juvenile Court appears to have misinterpreted the

stipulation at issue.

      Further, as the    Commonwealth points out, “awareness” of an

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investigation due to the “surrounding circumstances” is insufficient to satisfy

the statutory language of being “told” by an officer that the suspect is the

subject of an investigation. (Id. at 23). See also Kitchen, supra. Because

the only evidence relevant to Appellant’s presentation of a false identification

was via the stipulation which the Juvenile Court misinterpreted, we agree with

the Commonwealth and Appellant that the evidence was insufficient to find

that Appellant committed false identification to law enforcement, and

Appellant is entitled to relief on this claim.

      In his final issue, Appellant argues that a determination that a minor

has committed delinquent acts does not, on its own, warrant an adjudication

of delinquency.    Appellant asserts that it is reversible error for a court to

adjudicate a minor delinquent without hearing evidence as to his need for

treatment, supervision or rehabilitation. Appellant insists the court summarily

adjudicated him delinquent without giving any party the opportunity to be

heard. Appellant acknowledges that his commission of felonious delinquent

acts created a presumption in favor of Appellant’s adjudication of delinquency.

Nevertheless, Appellant contends that the court was required to allow

Appellant a meaningful opportunity to rebut the presumption before

adjudicating him delinquent. Appellant claims the court failed to do so.

      Appellant insists that he was 14 years old and in eighth grade at the

time of the adjudicatory hearing.      Appellant contends that he was earning

good grades in school, playing on two sports teams, working as a mentor at

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his mother’s church, and obeying an 8:00 p.m. curfew. Appellant maintains

that these facts demonstrate that Appellant was not in need of treatment,

supervision or rehabilitation. Appellant suggests the court had only “vague

concerns” about “difficulties” with Appellant’s supervision and alleged

“reckless behavior.”      Appellant insists that any concern about a lack of

supervision when Appellant was with his non-custodial parent was remedied

when Appellant returned to his mother’s supervision. Appellant suggests the

court’s vague assertions did not support a finding that he was in need of

treatment, supervision or rehabilitation. Appellant concludes the court abused

its discretion in adjudicating him delinquent, and this Court must grant relief.

We agree relief is due.

      “The Juvenile Act grants broad discretion to juvenile courts in

determining appropriate dispositions. In addition, this Court will not disturb

the juvenile court’s disposition absent a manifest abuse of discretion.”     In

Interest of J.G., supra at 1184. Pursuant to the Juvenile Act: “If the court

finds on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the acts

by reason of which he is alleged to be delinquent it shall enter such finding on

the record and shall specify the particular offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §6341(b).

Further, if the court determines that the child committed the acts alleged in

the delinquency petition, the court must “hear evidence as to whether the

child is in need of treatment, supervision or rehabilitation and make and file

its findings thereon.” Id. Thus, “the Juvenile Act requires a juvenile court to

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find that a child has committed a delinquent act and that the child is in need

of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation, before the court may enter an

adjudication of delinquency.” Commonwealth v. M.W., 614 Pa. 633, 642,

39 A.3d 958, 964 (2012) (emphasis in original).             In other words, “[a]

determination that a child has committed a delinquent act does not, on its

own, warrant an adjudication of delinquency.” Id. at 646, 39 A.3d at 966.

“This is so even where the delinquent act constitutes a felony because, while

the commission of such an act presumptively supports a finding that the

juvenile is in need of treatment and supervision (and thus can be adjudicated

delinquent), the juvenile court must still make that finding after allowing for

other evidence.” Id. at 646 n.9, 39 A.3d at 966 n.9 (emphasis added).

      Instantly, the record shows that the Juvenile Court found that Appellant

committed the offenses at issue and immediately adjudicated him delinquent.

(See N.T., 3/8/22, at 43).        After the adjudication, Appellant’s counsel

attempted to offer evidence that mitigated against adjudicating Appellant

delinquent. After hearing argument from counsel, the court stated that it was

“still comfortable adjudicating him” delinquent. (Id. at 47). Significantly, the

court did not “hear evidence as to whether the [Appellant was] in need of

treatment,    supervision   or   rehabilitation”   before    making   the   initial

adjudication. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(b); M.W., supra. In its opinion, the

Juvenile Court reasoned:

         Here, [Appellant] argues that the court erred and abused its
         discretion in adjudicating delinquent, as in [his] view,

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        evidence was insufficient to establish need for treatment,
        rehabilitation, or supervision, and the court did not comply
        with the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. [Appellant] was
        found to have committed two felonies, which provides
        sufficient evidence that the juvenile is in need of treatment,
        rehabilitation, or supervision.      The court also learned
        additional information about reckless behavior and out of
        state charges.       The court also heard evidence about
        difficulties in supervision, as [Appellant] apparently got into
        trouble while visiting his non-custodial parent, not while in
        his permanent residence.           The court believed that
        adjudication and the disposition were appropriate in the
        interest of aiding [Appellant] in developing his
        competencies,       [to]   provide    additional   supervision
        assistance, and in considering community protection. The
        court did not err or abuse its discretion in adjudicating
        [Appellant] delinquent because the evidence proved by a
        preponderance that [Appellant] was in need of treatment,
        rehabilitation, or supervision. Additionally, the court did
        comply with the Juvenile Procedure Rules and stated the
        findings of fact and conclusions, with the disposition in open
        court and on the record.

(Juvenile Court Opinion at 12-13).

     Notably, the Commonwealth concedes on appeal:

        [T]he felonies provided only for a presumption of
        delinquency that had to be evaluated in light of the “other
        evidence.” Neither the hearing nor the opinion indicate that
        the juvenile court juxtaposed [Appellant’s] offenses with
        other evidence.

        The [J]uvenile [C]ourt also cited “additional information
        about reckless behavior and out of state charges.” The
        record is bare about this “additional information.” The brief
        discussion of “reckless behavior” cited by the [J]uvenile
        [C]ourt appeared to concern the underlying delinquent acts
        in this case. The only evidence of out-of-state charges came
        from      an   unsubstantiated      statement     from    the
        Commonwealth.       The Commonwealth is constrained to
        acknowledge that this evidence is too undeveloped to
        support the adjudication of delinquency. Moreover, it still
        related solely to [Appellant’s] criminal activity, which is

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           insufficient, alone, to merit an adjudication of delinquency.

(Commonwealth’s Brief at 25).

      The record supports the Commonwealth’s position on this issue. See

M.W., supra. See also Interest of K.G., supra at 941 (reversing order

adjudicating appellant delinquent because court failed to consider other

evidence     regarding    juvenile’s   need     for   treatment,   supervision   or

rehabilitation; “[i]nstead, the…court merely inquired about the status of other

open criminal matters related to Appellant and, immediately thereafter,

adjudicated Appellant delinquent”). Under these circumstances, and in light

of the Commonwealth’s concessions on appeal, Appellant is entitled to a new

hearing at which time he can present evidence regarding his need for

treatment, supervision or rehabilitation. See M.W., supra (remanding for

new hearing to determine whether juvenile was in need of treatment,

supervision or rehabilitation).    Accordingly, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s

findings that Appellant committed the offenses of RSP, UUA, and conspiracy;

we reverse the court’s finding that Appellant committed the offense of false

identification to law enforcement authorities; and we vacate the adjudication

of delinquency and remand for a new hearing to determine whether Appellant

is in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation.

      Dispositional order affirmed in part; reversed in part. Adjudication of

delinquency vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is

relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/19/2023

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