Court Opinion

ID: 9909186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 18:01:01.258887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:19.555512
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 12 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.   22-10199

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                4:21-cr-01119-SHR-DTF-1
  v.

ONOVUGHE IGHORHIOHWUNU,                         MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                    Scott H. Rash, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted December 8, 2023 **
                            San Francisco, California

Before: BRESS and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges, and MOSKOWITZ, *** District
Judge.

       Onovughe Ighorhiohwunu appeals the district court’s restitution order under

the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, arguing that

       *     This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
       ***  The Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
the court erred in imposing $500,000 in restitution for losses suffered by victim T.M.

We review a district court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion, provided it is

within the bounds of the statutory framework, and its factual findings for clear error.

United States v. Lawrence, 189 F.3d 838, 846 (9th Cir. 1999). However, because

Ighorhiohwunu did not object to the restitution order below, he must demonstrate

plain error. United States v. Yijun Zhou, 838 F.3d 1007, 1010–12 (9th Cir. 2016).

Under that standard, Ighorhiohwunu “must demonstrate: (1) error; (2) that is clear

or obvious; (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that the error

seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

United States v. Jaimez, 45 F.4th 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States

v. Macias, 789 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2015)). We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      The district court did not err, let alone plainly err, in ordering Ighorhiohwunu

to pay restitution to T.M. for the actual losses she suffered as a result of the online

romance scam in which Ighorhiohwunu participated. Because Ighorhiohwunu was

convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering, it is undisputed that he was

subject to the MVRA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (applying to certain

“offense[s] committed by fraud or deceit”). Under the MVRA, restitution is owed

to “any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of

the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” Id. § 3663A(a)(2). However, “if someone is

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convicted of a conspiracy, the court can order restitution for damage resulting from

any conduct that was part of the conspiracy.” United States v. Reed, 80 F.3d 1419,

1423 (9th Cir. 1996). In that event, “[t]he harm to the victim must . . . be closely

related to the scheme, rather than tangentially linked.” In re Her Majesty the Queen

in Right of Canada, 785 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 2015). The government must

prove the loss amount by a preponderance of the evidence. Lawrence, 189 F.3d at

846.

       The government met its burden here.       The district court did not err in

concluding that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Ighorhiohwunu

participated in the same conspiracy that caused T.M.’s loss. The conspiracy featured

men in the United States and Nigeria who worked together to create online personas,

develop fake romantic relationships with women in the United States, convince the

women to transfer money to specified bank accounts, and launder the money by

moving funds from the women between multiple accounts. In addition, victims were

directed by conspirators to deposit funds into the account of either Ighorhiohwunu’s

company or, in the case of T.M., a company that shared the address of

Ighorhiohwunu’s company. T.M.’s experience was virtually identical to those of

other victims who were directed to pay funds directly into Ighorhiohwunu’s account.

Ighorhiohwunu argues that, unlike with the other victims of the conspiracy, he did

not directly cause T.M.’s losses. But Ighorhiohwunu’s conspiracy “was, in fact, the

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same scheme as, or was related to, the scheme” that caused T.M.’s losses. United

States v. Thomsen, 830 F.3d 1049, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016). It is therefore irrelevant

whether Ighorhiohwunu himself interacted with T.M. or whether T.M. paid funds

directly into one of Ighorhiohwunu’s accounts. See Reed, 80 F.3d at 1423.

      Nor did the district court order restitution for intended loss, as Ighorhiohwunu

contends. The evidence at sentencing showed that the conspiracy caused T.M. to

sustain $500,000 in actual losses, which is the amount the district court ordered as

restitution to T.M. And Ighorhiohwunu does not challenge the fact that T.M.

actually lost $500,000 as a result of the fraudulent scheme.

      AFFIRMED.

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