Court Opinion

ID: 9595172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:36:40.721559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:26.273083
License: Public Domain

Brailsford, Justice
(concurring).
I agree that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. However, the opinion of Justice Littlejohn seems to overrule Exceptions 2 and 3 upon the ground that the record fails to sho.w that either Section 1571, Title 7, U. S. C. A. or Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations of the Georgia Department of Agriculture was invoked by the defendant at the trial. In my judgment, the statement of the case sufficiently identifies this statute and regulation as the subject matter of the requests to charge which were refused by the court.
I would overrule Exception 2 on the ground that the statute, which the court refused to charge, imposed no duty upon Wren. The statute applies only to- one who transports *183or delivers for transportation in interstate commerce any agricultural seed. Wren’s delivery o,f seed to Kirkland in Georgia was not for transportation to South Carolina. Instead, the delivery was in partial execution of the Georgia contract of sale between the parties. After delivery, Wren had no interest in what disposition should be made of the seed by Kirkland.
I would overrule Exception 3 upon the ground that the defendant failed to either plead or prove the regulation which the court refused to charge. Hence, it was not entitled to the requested instruction.
While I do not dissent from the proposition that Exception 1 is so vague and indefinite that defendant is not entitled to have it considered by this court, I would prefer to o.verrule the exception on the merits. This can soundly be done by pointing out that the record is barren of evidence tending to establish that defendant sustained any damage as alleged in the counterclaim.