Court Opinion

ID: 9964000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 18:10:16.229136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.763336
License: Public Domain

J-S02003-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L.L., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: R.J., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1714 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered June 7, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000004-2023

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.:                              FILED APRIL 26, 2024

       R.J. (Mother) appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, involuntarily terminating her parental rights to

her child, J.L.L. (Child) (born 5/18).1 Counsel has filed a petition to withdraw

pursuant     to   Anders      v.    California,    386   U.S.   738   (1967),   and

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother mistakenly filed two separate notices of appeal in an effort to comply

with the holding of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 960 (Pa. 2018).
However, because the trial court’s June 7, 2023 order does not change Child’s
permanency goal from reunification to adoption, but rather schedules a future
goal change hearing, her appeal at 1713 EDA 2023 was properly quashed.
See Order, 6/7/23; see also Order, 8/4/23. But see Walker, 185 A.3d at
976 (“Where . . . one or more orders resolves issues arising on more than one
docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeals
must be filed.”); see also In re M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 981 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(applying Walker holding to children’s fast track appeals).
J-S02003-24

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).2 Due to Child’s

removal from Mother’s care more than twelve months ago and the persistence

of the conditions which led to Child’s removal, we affirm.       We also grant

counsel’s petition to withdraw.

       The trial court set forth the relevant history leading to Child’s

adjudication of dependency and placement into the custody of DHS as follows:

       On September 24, 2018, DHS received a General Protective
       Services [(GPS)] report alleging that [Mother] presented herself
       to her primary care physician’s office and expressed that she
       wanted help with housing, drug and alcohol treatment, and mental
       health treatment. Mother admitted to using phencyclidine [(PCP)]
       while Child slept at night. The report stated that Mother disclosed
       that she was recently in an inpatient program at Gaudenzia[, a
       substance abuse and co-occurring disorders treatment provider,]
       with Child, but she did not complete the program; that Mother was
       attempting to get back into an inpatient program, but her
____________________________________________

2  See In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders
briefing requirements to termination of parental rights appeals involving
indigent parents represented by court-appointed counsel).

This matter returns to us following our previous denial of counsel’s petition to
withdraw. See In the Int. of J.L.L., No. 1714 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. filed
Feb. 12, 2024) (unpublished memorandum decision). Upon review, we found
that counsel failed to make a conscientious examination of the record and
failed to present potential issues in support of Mother’s appeal. Accordingly,
we denied counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw and directed counsel to
either file (1) an Anders brief that conforms to the requirements set forth in
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009); or (2) an
advocate’s brief on Mother’s behalf within 30 days from the date of our
decision.

Pursuant to our direction, counsel filed a second Anders brief on March 3,
2024. On March 14, 2024, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services
(DHS) filed a letter with our Prothonotary notifying this Court that it would not
be filing a brief in this matter.

                                           -2-
J-S02003-24

       insurance would not cover it; that Mother had a lot of insight into
       her addiction and was aware that she needed support with staying
       sober; and that Mother was participating in an outpatient program
       at Drexel Medicine. The report alleged that Mother was supervised
       by an adult probation officer and was subject to random urine
       tests; that Mother was attempting to move out of the home of
       [D.L. (Father)3], Child’s [f]ather; that Mother was residing with a
       friend at the time of the report; that Mother wanted ongoing
       assistance with housing and[,] potentially, a dual diagnosis
       treatment program she could attend with Child. The report was
       substantiated.

       On September 26, 2018, DHS met with Child, Mother, and Father
       at Father’s home and Child appeared happy, healthy, and with all
       of his needs met. Mother stated that she attended [t]he Caring
       Together program at Drexel to address her history of substance
       abuse. Mother requested that DHS assist her with housing.
       Mother denied using drugs around Child. Mother further stated
       that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and depression.
       Father denied knowing that Mother was using drugs again. Father
       was aware that Mother was attending therapy for substance abuse
       and that he provided care for Child while Mother attended her
       program. Father had a history of substance abuse and attended
       Sobriety Through Out-Patient, Inc.[,] to address his drug and
       alcohol concerns. DHS found the home to be appropriate.

       On November 7, 2018, DHS visited the family and Child appeared
       happy and was safe. Mother reported she had [neither] used
       drugs recently[,] nor thought about using drugs. Father stated
       that he supported Mother and ensured she attended her drug
       treatment program daily. Father stated that he was moving into
       a larger home and told Mother that she was welcome to reside
       there. DHS subsequently closed the case for Child.

       On December 27, 2018, DHS received a GPS report alleging that
       Mother had five children who resided with various family members
       and foster families; that on December 26, 2018, Mother left
       Interim House West[, a residential treatment program,] and
       returned under the influence of PCP, which she admitted using;
       that Mother had Child in her care the whole time she was away
____________________________________________

3 Father is not a party to the present appeal.At the time of the termination
hearing, Mother and Father did not live together and Father testified that he
barely sees Mother. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 71-72.

                                           -3-
J-S02003-24

     from Interim House West; and that the staff supervised Child until
     Mother seemed to be able to care for herself. The report stated
     that Child had bronchitis and [] had been taken to a hospital for
     medical care several times. The report[] further stated that
     Mother [had] mental health concerns and suffered from bipolar
     disorder, severe depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder
     [(PTSD)]. The report was substantiated.

     On December 28, 2018, DHS met with Mother and Child at Interim
     House West. DHS noted that Child appeared lethargic and had a
     runny nose. Mother admitted that she used PCP at a friend’s
     house while Child was in her care. Mother stated that she had
     learned that her former paramour was being released from prison,
     which caused her distress. Mother stated that she was fearful of
     her former paramour[,] with whom she experienced domestic
     violence. Mother stated that she did not want Child removed from
     her care and would remain drug free and follow the facility rules.
     DHS spoke to an Interim House West Administrator, who stated
     that Mother had been in the program for less than 30 days and
     had not complied with the rules of the program. The administrator
     stated that Mother had returned to the facility under the influence
     of drugs multiple times. DHS transported Mother and Child to a
     hospital. Child was later discharged to Father’s care.

     On May 17, 2019, DHS met with Child, Mother, and Father at the
     Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia [(CHOP)]. Child had an upper
     respiratory infection and needed to be monitored. CHOP staff
     further stated that Father appeared [] agitated and was
     aggressive towards the staff. DHS interviewed Father, who denied
     having current substance abuse or mental health issues. Father
     stated that he last attended treatment at Wedge Recovery Centers
     and was not currently in treatment. Father stated that he was
     interested in caring for Child when Child was discharged from the
     hospital.

     DHS subsequently learned that Father is the perpetrator of an
     indicated Child Protective Services [(CPS)] report dated
     September 24, 2015[,] concerning Child’s half-sibling[.] Father
     exposed [the then] three-year[-]old [c]hild to PCP[,] which
     resulted in [the child’s] hospitalization. DHS further learned that
     Mother was Father’s paramour at the time and was in the home
     during the incident. On May 17, 2019, DHS obtained an [o]rder
     for [p]rotective [c]ustody [(OPC) [] for Child and [Child] remained
     at CHOP. On May 19, 2019, Child was discharged from CHOP and

                                    -4-
J-S02003-24

       transported to his foster care placement with Turning Points for
       Children, where he currently remains.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/23, at 1-4 (citations and footnote omitted); see

also DHS Petition, 05/23/19, Ex. A ¶¶ f-q.

       Pursuant to OPC, Mother was to have weekly supervised visits with

Child, and Mother was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for

immediate drug screening, monitoring, and three random drug screens prior

to the next court date. See Order, 5/28/19. In addition, Mother’s DHS case

plan objectives included taking parenting classes, undergoing substance

abuse treatment, and securing employment and appropriate housing. See

N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 42. Throughout the time Child has been

in placement, Mother has attempted drug and alcohol treatment programs at

least three times but has not been consistent or successful in completing a

program.     Id. at 43-44.      Makeda Hunter, a case manager supervisor with

Turning Points for Children, Community Umbrella Agency-5 (CUA-5),4 also

testified that Mother has been unable to secure safe and stable housing while

Child has been in DHS’ care. Id. at 44. Regarding employment, Caseworker

Hunter testified that Mother has a job for which she was able to provide pay

stubs. Id. Mother has generally appeared for weekly visits with Child but is

____________________________________________

4 Philadelphia DHS works alongside neighborhood organizations, called CUAs,

to ensure the provision of services within a neighborhood when possible.
There are ten CUA regions within Philadelphia. See Department of Human
Services Who’s involved          in  your    case?, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,
https://www.phila.gov/departments/department-of-human-services/whos-
involved-in-your-case/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2024).

                                           -5-
J-S02003-24

often late.    Id. at 44-45 (case manager testifying visitation records show

several instances of Mother arriving at end of visit between January and June

of 2023). Over the lifetime of Child’s placement, Mother’s compliance with

her case plan objectives was determined to be minimal.5 Id. 48-49.

       Since May of 2019, Child has remained in the same foster home, in

kinship placement.6       Id. at 37-38.        Child lives with foster parent, foster

parent’s adopted niece, and Child’s older half-sister, who was adopted by

foster parent. Id. at 38-39. Child is very bonded to foster parent, refers to

her as “Mommy,” and the two appear to have an “affectionate relationship.”

Id. at 40-41.

       On January 6, 2023, DHS filed petitions seeking to terminate Mother’s

and Father’s parental rights.          On June 7, 2023, the trial court held a

termination hearing7 at which Mother, Father, two CUA case workers, a CEU

evaluator, and a social worker testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

trial court held in abeyance its decision with respect to Father but found clear

____________________________________________

5 We note that Mother’s case plan compliance was initially substantial or
complete, but that her compliance level appeared to decrease at the end of
2020 and was minimal by the Fall of 2021.

6 Child was temporarily in respite care following allegations of abuse by foster

parent’s spouse. CUA case manager Makeda Hunter testified that foster
parent and spouse were separated and that foster parent was pursuing a
divorce. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 40.

7 At the termination hearing, Harry Levin, Esquire, represented Child’s legal

interests, and Jane Marie Morrissey, Esquire, guardian ad litem (GAL),
represented Child’s best interests. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a).

                                           -6-
J-S02003-24

and convincing evidence to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights

with respect to Child. On that same date, the trial court entered a decree

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1),

(2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act.8

       Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.   Thereafter, on November 29,

2023, counsel filed a petition to withdraw, as well as an accompanying Anders

brief.9   As stated earlier, we ordered counsel to file either a conforming

Anders brief or an advocate’s brief on Mother’s behalf. See In the Interest

of: J.L.L., 1714 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 12, 2024) (unpublished

memorandum decision). On March 3, 2024, counsel filed a second application

to withdraw and Anders brief with our Court.

       In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992), our Court stated:

       Counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first
       appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating his or her parental
       rights, may, after a conscientious and thorough review of the
____________________________________________

8 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.

9 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4):

       If counsel intends to seek to withdraw in a criminal case pursuant
       to Anders/Santiago . . ., counsel shall file of record and serve
       on the judge a statement of intent to withdraw in lieu of filing a
       [Rule 1925(b)] Statement.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (c)(4). See In the Interest of J.T., 983 A.2d 771 (Pa. Super.
2009) (where Anders procedure from criminal proceedings has been applied
to parental termination cases, parent’s counsel acted appropriately by
following Rule 1925(c)(4) in appeal from decision terminating parental rights
to child).

                                           -7-
J-S02003-24

      record, petition this court for leave to withdraw representation if
      he or she can find no issues of arguable merit on which to base
      the appeal. Given the less stringent standard of proof required
      and the quasi-adversarial nature of a termination proceeding in
      which a parent is not guaranteed the same procedural and
      evidentiary rights as a criminal defendant, the court holds that
      appointed counsel seeking to withdraw representation must
      submit an Anders brief.

Id. at 1275. Moreover, we held that “any motion to withdraw representation,

submitted by appointed counsel, must be accompanied by an advocate’s brief,

and not the amicus curiae brief delineated in McClendon[].” Id. (emphasis

in original); see also In re Adoption of R.I., 312 A.2d 601, 602 (Pa. 1973)

(The logic behind an individual in a criminal case being “entitled to counsel at

any proceeding which may lead to the deprivation of ‘substantial rights’ . . . .

is equally applicable to a case involving an indigent parent faced with the loss

of her child.”).

      In her Anders brief, counsel raises the following issues for our

consideration:

      1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
      involuntary terminated Mother’s parental rights where such
      determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence
      under     the     Adoption      Act,   23     Pa.C.S.A.     §[§]
      2511(a)(1)[,](2)[,](5)[, and] (8).

      2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
      involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights without giving
      primary consideration to the effect that the termination would
      have on the developmental, physical, and emotional needs of the
      child as required by the Adoption Act, 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Anders Brief, at 7.

      Before reaching the merits of the appeal, we must first address counsel’s

application to withdraw. To withdraw under Anders, counsel must:

                                     -8-
J-S02003-24

      (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
      making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
      determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy
      of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and (3) advise the
      [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
      or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
      of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc) (citations omitted); see also In re Adoption of V.G., 751 A.2d 1174

(Pa. Super. 2000) (reiterating requirements counsel must satisfy before being

permitted to withdraw in termination appeals).

      With respect to the third Anders requirement, that counsel inform the

appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has

held that counsel must “attach to [his or her] petition to withdraw a copy of

the letter sent to [the] client advising him or her of their rights.”

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

      An Anders brief must also comply with the following requirements:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record;

      (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
      supports the appeal;

      (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

      (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
      frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
      controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
      conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Finally, this

Court must “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there

                                     -9-
J-S02003-24

are   any     additional,    non-frivolous     issues   overlooked   by   counsel.”

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(footnote omitted).

       Here, in her second attempt, counsel for Mother filed a petition with this

Court and requested leave to withdraw as counsel in the instant appeal.10

Counsel also attached to the petition a copy of the letter sent to Mother

advising her of her rights to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise issues

in response to the brief. See Millisock, supra. Additionally, counsel filed an

Anders/McClendon brief, in which she complies with the procedures of

Santiago, supra.          Accordingly, we find that counsel has substantially

complied11 with the requirements of Anders, McClendon, and Santiago, and

we proceed with an independent review of the merits. See Flowers, supra.

____________________________________________

10 Counsel has not, in her application to withdraw as counsel, represented that

she made “a conscientious examination of the record[ and] has determined
that the appeal would be frivolous[,]” as required by Cartrette, supra, which
we also stated in our prior memorandum, denying her petition to withdraw.
See In the Int. of J.L.L., supra. However, counsel has stated in her Anders
brief that she has made a “conscientious examination of the record . . . and
[] concluded that the record does not support [an] appeal.” Anders Brief, at
18-19. Nevertheless, we have previously determined that we may proceed to
the merits of the appeal if counsel substantially complies with the Anders
requirements. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super.
2007).

11 While we conclude that counsel substantially complied with the above
requirements, we note that counsel’s revisions to her Anders brief, following
our previous denial of her petition to withdraw, are limited, particularly
considering the extent to which we detailed our concerns in In the Int. of
J.L.L., No. 1714 EDA 2023, (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 12, 2024) (unpublished
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 10 -
J-S02003-24

       The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
       requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
       credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
       by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
       courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
       or abused its discretion. [A] decision may be reversed for an
       abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
       unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
       court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
       the record would support a different result. We have previously
       emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
       observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

       A court must conduct a bifurcated analysis when faced with a petition

to involuntarily terminate parental rights:

       Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
       seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
       that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
       termination delineated in [s]ection 2511(a). Only if the court
       determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
       or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
       the analysis pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b): determination of the
       needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
       of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
       concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
       parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
       of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

       Instantly, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the
____________________________________________

memorandum decision). However, the revised brief is minimally sufficient,
and we conclude that counsel has made the requisite conscientious
examination of the record, attempted to frame any arguments in support of
Mother’s appeal, and concluded that the instant appeal is frivolous.

                                          - 11 -
J-S02003-24

termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with the trial court’s

findings under any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843

A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). After review, we conclude that

the record supports termination under subsections 2511(a)(5) and (8).

       Pursuant to subsections (a)(5) and (8), parental rights may be

terminated, after the filing of a petition, when:

       (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
       the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a
       period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the
       removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
       cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
       period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
       the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the
       removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of
       time[,] and termination of the parental rights would best serve
       the needs and welfare of the child.

                                  *      *     *
       (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
       the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
       months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
       placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement
       of the child continue to exist[,] and termination of parental rights
       would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(5), (8).

       Here, Child has been in care for over four years,12 during which time

Mother’s goals have remained the same: attend parenting classes, undergo

substance abuse treatment, and secure employment and housing. See N.T.

____________________________________________

12It is undisputed that Child has been out of Mother’s care for more than
twelve months, as required by section 2511(a)(8).

                                          - 12 -
J-S02003-24

Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 42-43. Mother completed parenting classes

and obtained verifiable employment, see id. at 44; however, she was unable

to successfully complete substance abuse treatment or secure appropriate

housing during the entirety of Child’s time in care.         See id. at 43-44

(Caseworker Hunter testifying Mother has not successfully completed program

over life of case); id. at 63 (Caseworker Hunter testifying CUA could not offer

housing assistance because Mother using drugs); id. at 91-92 (Mother

testifying current housing not appropriate for reunification and she is on

waitlist for housing).

       In addition, Mother has not progressed with her visits with Child. After

initially being ordered to have supervised visits, in 2020 the court found that

Mother could have unsupervised weekly visits, see Permanency Review Order,

1/17/20, and could progress to unsupervised overnight visits once Covid

restrictions were lifted. See Permanency Review Order, 6/10/20. However,

at the end of 2020, the court reverted to weekly supervised visits and this

visitation schedule continued until DHS filed its termination petition in 2023.13

See Permanency Review Order, 11/2/20; Permanency Review Order,

1/23/23. Finally, Mother’s compliance with her permanency plan was initially

substantial or moderate, but declined and was noted to be minimal during the
____________________________________________

13 Moreover, Mother’s visits with Child were noted to be inconsistent and
testimony indicated that Mother would, on occasion, arrive late or not appear
at all. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 44. Mother disputed this
characterization, testifying that visits were cancelled by CUA and never
rescheduled. Id. at 93.

                                          - 13 -
J-S02003-24

latter half of Child’s placement.14 See N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at

48-49.

       The trial court noted the significance of Mother consistently failing to

“submit negative drug screens[,] even though drug abuse was a major

concern since the [beginning] of this case due to Mother using PCP while Child

was in her care.”       Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/23, at 14-15.    Additionally,

“Mother’s latest drug screen reviewed during [the termination] hearing was

positive for marijuana[,]” and Mother did not have a medical marijuana card.

Id. at 15. Finally, the court stated that “Mother has not remedied any of the

concerns [that] brought the Child into care[,] which presents a concern

regarding her ability to safely parent the Child on a full-time basis.” Id. It is

clear that the conditions which led to Child’s removal from Mother’s care

continue to exist. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa.

Super. 2008) (termination proper where record supported trial court’s finding

that Mother could not provide adequate housing and parenting); id. at 1006-

08 (Mother’s drug use part of original reason for removal and subsequent

related issues were direct consequence of drug use, which supported

termination).

____________________________________________

14 The court held permanency review hearings on June 10, 2020, November

2, 2020, March 22, 2021, August 2, 2021, October 25, 2021, May 16, 2022,
September 2, 2022, November 28, 2022, December 19, 2022, January 23,
2023, and April 12, 2023.

                                          - 14 -
J-S02003-24

       Importantly, Child appears to have a close and established bond with

foster parent, with whom Child has resided since May of 2019.15 As we noted

above, Child is very bonded to foster parent, refers to her as “Mommy,” and

the two appear to have an “affectionate relationship.”         N.T. Termination

Hearing, 6/7/23, at 40-41. In addition, Roya Paller, a social worker,16 testified

that when she spoke with Child in respite care, he expressed his desire to “go

home” and be adopted by “Mommy,” his foster parent. Id. at 8-9. Paller

testified that Child views foster parent and his sister “as his family.” Id. at 8.

Accordingly, based on the record, we conclude that the trial court properly

terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to sections 2511(a)(5) and (8).

See In re C.B., 230 A.3d 341, 348 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“Termination of

parental rights under [s]ection 2511(a)(5) requires that: (1) the child has

been removed from parental care for at least six months; (2) the conditions

which led to removal and placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

child.”) (citation omitted); In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-

76 (Pa. Super. 2003) (to terminate parental rights under section 2511(a)(8),

petitioner must show: (1) child has been removed from parental care for 12

____________________________________________

15 See supra, n.7.

16 No testimony was elicited as to Paller’s credentials; however, her report
states that she holds a Bachelor of Social Work and is employed by Forensic
Social Work Services. Paller was called as a witness by Attorney Levin,
representing Child’s legal interests.

                                          - 15 -
J-S02003-24

months or more from date of removal; (2) conditions which led to removal or

placement of child continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights

would best serve needs and welfare of child); see also In re M.E., 283 A.3d

820, 832 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“[Section] 2511(a)(8) does not require the court

to evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led

to the placement of the children. . . .            [Further] the third prong of []

2511(a)(8) specifically accounts for the needs of the child.”) (citations

omitted).

       We further conclude that the court properly determined that termination

of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests pursuant to section

2511(b).17 The determination of the best interests of a child is a separate

consideration from a finding that a statutory ground for termination has been

met under section 2511(a) and is “the paramount consideration in deciding

____________________________________________

17 Section 2511(b) states as follows:

       (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
       of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
       physical[,] and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The
       rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
       environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
       income, clothing[,] and medical care if found to be beyond the
       control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
       to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
       efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
       which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
       filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

                                          - 16 -
J-S02003-24

whether to terminate parental rights.” In re S.D.T., Jr., 934 A.2d 703, 706

(Pa. Super. 2007). As we have stated, the needs and welfare of a child include

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability[.]” In re C.P.,

901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006). “The court must also discern the nature

and status of the parent-child bond, paying close attention to the effect on the

child of permanently severing the bond.” Id. Although the text of section

2511(b) does not expressly require a statement or conclusion by the trial

court, the case law calls for interpretation of any parent-child bond.       If,

however, “there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it

is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis,

therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008).

      Our review of Mother’s claim that the court erred with respect to

termination of parental rights as it applies to section 2511(b) is well-

established:

      In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope
      of review is broad and comprehensive, but our standard of review
      is narrow. We consider all the evidence, along with the legal
      conclusions and factual findings of the trial court. We reverse only
      if we find an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient
      evidentiary support. With respect to evidentiary support, we
      determine only whether the trial court’s findings are supported by
      competent evidence. We accord the hearing judge’s decision the
      same deference that we would give to a jury verdict.

C.P., 901 A.2d at 520.

      Testimony at the termination hearing demonstrated that Mother does

not meet Child’s emotional, educational, developmental, or daily needs.

                                     - 17 -
J-S02003-24

Testimony suggested that during Mother’s weekly visits with Child, Mother and

Child would primarily have a snack and watch a movie. See N.T. Termination

Hearing, 6/7/23, at 51. In addition, Caseworker Hunter testified that she did

not believe it would cause irreparable harm to Child to terminate Mother’s

parental rights and that Child looks to foster parent to meet his daily, medical,

and emotional needs. Id. at 50. Child has lived with foster parent since May

2019 and expressed that he would like to be adopted by foster parent. Id. at

8-9. Although Mother testified that she is “very close” with Child and that

they have a “mother and son” relationship, see id. at 93-94, the court did not

find Mother’s testimony credible.18 Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/23, at 16. The

trial court stated the following with respect to section 2511(b):

       In the instant matter, this Court determined the Child would not
       suffer irreparable emotional harm if Mother’s parental rights were
       terminated. There was compelling testimony that the Child would
       not suffer harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated[,] and
       that Child was significantly bonded with her resource parent [with
       whom] he has lived . . . the past four years. (N.T. [Termination
       Hearing,] 06/07/2023[,] at 38). Child calls his resource parent
       “mom” and wants to be adopted by her. (Id. at 8, 40-41). []
       Mother believes Child is bonded to her, but she failed to offer any
       evidence establishing the existence of a parent-child bond. (Id.
       at 93-94). The testimony demonstrated that Child’s primary bond
       is with his resource parent. (Id. at 7-8). Additionally, the
____________________________________________

18 As we noted in our previous decision denying counsel’s petition to withdraw,

we found counsel’s questioning of Mother with respect to parent-child bonding
to be particularly lackluster. See generally N.T. Termination Hearing,
6/7/23, at 93-94. Mother’s counsel asked her a total of six questions
regarding her relationship with Child, during which Mother expressed a close
relationship with Child, stating that they are bonded like “a mother and a son.”
Id. Mother’s counsel did not ask her to expand on her testimony, nor did
representatives from DHS, the GAL, or the child advocate. See id.

                                          - 18 -
J-S02003-24

      testimony demonstrated that Child’s resource parent meets all of
      his medical and emotional needs. (Id. at 50). In determining
      that termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the
      Child, this Court considered that Mother has not been able to meet
      the Child’s emotional, physical, and developmental needs for over
      four years prior to the termination hearing.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/23, at 16.

      Where a parent’s continued inability to remedy the conditions leading to

Child’s   removal   is   a   critical   consideration   in   determining   Child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, we have held that

termination of parental rights under section 2511(b) is proper. See In re

Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Clearly, it

would not be in Child’s best interest for his life to remain on hold indefinitely

in hopes that Mother will one day be able to act as his parent.”) (citation

omitted).

      As noted by the trial court, the record is clear that Child has been in

placement for more than four years, most of which has been in the same home

with foster parent and two other adopted children, one of whom is Child’s half-

sibling. Child needs permanency and Mother has been unable to care for Child

given her ongoing drug use and inability to secure appropriate housing.

Mother’s compliance with her reunification goals has been minimal since the

fall of 2021 and the record leading up to the termination hearing does not

suggest that Mother would be able to reunify with Child in a reasonable

amount of time. As such, we conclude that the trial court properly terminated

Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(b).

                                        - 19 -
J-S02003-24

      Finally, after an independent review of the record, we conclude that the

appeal is frivolous and unsupported in law or in fact.      There is sufficient,

competent evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings and the court’s

conclusions are not a result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. See

T.S.M., supra. Thus, we grant counsel’s application to withdraw. See In re

V.E., supra.

      Order affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Date: 4/26/2024

                                     - 20 -