Court Opinion

ID: 9494224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:32:31.862281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:17.544497
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I do not disagree with the majority’s presentation of the facts at issue before us. The state of Indiana plans to erect a monument on Indiana Statehouse grounds that is to be engraved on various sides with the Ten Commandments, the Bill of Rights, and the Preamble to the Indiana Constitution (“Preamble”) on its sides. The plan to erect the monument originated after vandals destroyed a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments, which had previously stood on the Statehouse grounds since 1958. I respectfully dissent because I believe that applying Lemon and its progeny should lead us to the conclusion that the proposed monument by the State *774of Indiana is not constitutionally prohibited under the Establishment Clause.
I. Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurizman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test for analyzing Establishment Clause cases. Initially, the government’s challenged practice must have a secular purpose. Second, the principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the government’s practice must not create an excessive entanglement of religion. Because the third prong is not at issue, the discussion focuses on the first two prongs.
The Lemon test continues to be criticized. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 2284-85, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671, 100 S.Ct. 840, 63 L.Ed.2d 94 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the Lemon test remains the framework under which we analyze an Establishment Clause issue, I believe it helpful to always bear in mind the text of the First Amendment, which is fundamental and clear:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
U.S. Const., amend. I (emphasis added).
The Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit the establishment of a national church and also to prohibit the Federal Government from preferring one religious denomination over others. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It was never intended to “build a wall of separation” between government and religion. See id. at 98, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The wholesome neutrality guaranteed by the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses does not dictate the obliteration of all the nation’s religious traditions. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted, “no significant segment of our society and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from government.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984). The Constitution does not “require complete separation of church and state; it affinna-tively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.” Id. (emphasis added).1
Judges and legal scholars agree that the Lemon test has led to inconsistent results. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110-11, 105 S.Ct. *7752479 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (discussing inconsistencies brought about by the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence). It is possible to pick and choose from the myriad of case law dealing with the Establishment Clause to find case law to suit each and every position on any given factual situation. For example, public monuments invoking the deity offend the Constitution, but mottos emblazoned on coins or religious language contained in Constitutions or in the Bill of Rights do not. Teenagers may not participate in school-organized prayer at football games, but Congress, the courts, and state legislatures may open sessions with a prayer. In the end, the Court annually picks the winners and losers in a game of free-exercise roulette, expanding or contracting the Establishment Clause as it sees fit to permit or deny the claimed exemption in a given term. Nevertheless, I acknowledge without hesitation that we are bound to apply Lemon, though I contend that no matter how the test is applied in the factual situation before us, the proposed monument can withstand constitutional scrutiny.

A. Secular Purpose

Under Lemon, the government’s challenged practice must have a secular purpose. In determining whether a secular purpose exists, the Supreme Court merely requires that the displays not be “motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. 1355. This monument consists of three sides— two of which are completely secular in nature. Simply because some religious meaning is conveyed by a monument does not destroy a state’s valid secular purposes for its display. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. 1355; Bridenbaugh v. O’Bannon, 185 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir.1999).
The majority concludes that “[t]he Ten Commandments is still an inherently religious text, and ... that the State [of Indiana] has not articulated a valid secular justification for planning to erect the monument.” The Commandments are a “sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths,” concerning, in part, the “religious duties of believers.” Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980). But neither Stone, nor any other Supreme Court decision for that matter, even suggests that the Ten Commandments are without a secular significance. Indeed, Stone noted that “integrated into the school curriculum” the Commandments “may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, [or] ethics.” Id. at 42, 101 S.Ct. 192.
The text of the Ten Commandments “no doubt has played a role in the secular development of our society and can no doubt be presented by the government as playing such a role in our civic order.” Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 302 (7th Cir.2000). Six of the Ten Commandments are, in fact, wholly secular, and form the basis of much of our modern codes of criminal conduct. The historic, secular nature of the Ten Commandments is recognized inside the walls of the United States Supreme Court, one of which is adorned with a frieze that contains Moses holding the Ten Commandments, alongside other historic figures, both religious and secular. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 652, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in -part). Justice Stevens stated that the placement of these historic figures together on the frieze signals a respect for great lawgivers, not great proselytizers, which is a fitting message for the wall of a courtroom. See id. at 652-53, 109 S.Ct. 3086. If the Ten Commandments properly convey a secular message when adorning the wall of a Federal Courtroom, I cannot *776understand how the State of Indiana’s proposed placement of the three-sided monument amidst twelve other secular symbols of the nation’s legal and cultural history fails to similarly convey a secular message. I do not understand why the majority reasons that but four lines on the monument (those four Commandments that reference God) so overshadow the remainder of the monument (which includes the Bill of Rights and the Preamble to the Indiana Constitution) such that the majority concludes the monument has no secular purpose whatsoever.
Here, the State of Indiana has architecturally blended the text of the Ten Commandments with two other important legal texts — the United States Bill of Rights and the Preamble to the Indiana Constitution (not to mention the twelve other secular monuments with which it would share the Statehouse lawn). The explicit language of the Preamble further reflects the secular message of the monument. The Preamble to the Indiana constitution states three goals: 1) for “justice [to] be established”; 2) for “public order [to be] maintained”; and 3) for “liberty [to be] perpetuated”. The three goals espoused by the Preamble, reinforced by the freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights, clearly serve to secularize the monument, memorializing the cornerstones of our civilization’s law.
The majority somehow suggests that the design and construction of the monument belies any intention to convey a secular message. Respectfully, I am forced to disagree. It seems to me that the majority is overly concerned with the design of the monument. This court, nor any other court, should not be in the business of monument design. If the State of Indiana believes that it is aesthetically pleasing (or more conducive to conveying a historical message) to erect the monument as designed, it should be permitted to do so without the court making the assumption based only on a foundation of quicksand that a reasonable observer will glance only at a single side or glance only at the side bearing the larger letters. I believe that a court’s inquiry should focus on the reasonable observer viewing the display in its entirety, and not on an observer’s potential misperception of an isolated aspect of the display. When any person focuses on only one particular aspect of a monument or display to the exclusion of the other aspects it will distort even the most reasonable observer’s opinion. It seems far more reasonable to assume that a person taking the time to gaze .upon the beautiful edifice will look at all three sides, and draw conclusions from the whole — which presents three important steps in the development of the law as they affect 1) the people of the world; 2) the citizens of the United States; and 3) the citizens of the State of Indiana.
Further, because the Preamble to the Indiana Constitution would occupy the smaller side of the monument between the Ten Commandments and the Bill of Rights, its message, “that justice be established, public order maintained, and liberty peiyetuMted,” would link the Ten Commandments with the Bill of Rights and convey a secular message of the fundamental legal principles which form the basis of our national history and culture.
Indiana Governor O’Bannon explicitly articulated the secular purpose of the monument, stating that it was to be “an integral part of the Statehouse setting, which honors the history of our state and our nation.” The Governor’s March 14, 2000, press release further stated that the Ten Commandments “stood on the Statehouse lawn as a reminder of some of our nation’s core values ... [and that] [s]oon those words will stand alongside the abiding principals of our form of government, es*777pecially its protections of individual rights. They’re ideals we all need to be reminded of from time to time.”
We are “normally deferential” to “artie-ulation[s] of secular purpose,” so long as they are “sincere and not a sham.” Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987). “This is in keeping with the well settled maxim that courts are ‘reluctanft] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the State’s program may be discerned....’” Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 489 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983)).
The majority attempts to downplay Governor O’Bannon’s press release, stating that reminding society of its “core values” is akin to the purpose of providing a “code of conduct” rejected in Books. But this is not the same case as Books, and “[ejvery government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances.... ” Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595, 109 S.Ct. 3086. In Books, the only text set forth on the single monument at issue was that of the Ten Commandments. In the factual situation before us, the Ten Commandments stands joined with the Bill of Rights and the Preamble to the Indiana Constitution, thus linking the three texts and conveying a secular message regarding our nation’s legal history. The Governor’s well-reasoned message in his press release cannot and should not be construed as shallow words without meaning or sincerity.
Nevertheless, the majority here, partially based on the recent decision in Books, 235 F.3d at 303-04, seems to go out of its way to second guess Governor O’Bannon’s stated purpose for the proposed monument in an attempt to discredit that purpose. The Governor (and also the Elkhart City Council, in Books) should be presumed to have fulfilled the duties of his office with honesty and integrity. There is not one iota of evidence of insincerity here, and in my opinion no justification for the majority’s refusal to give credit to the state’s articulated purpose. See, e.g., American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 127 (7th Cir.1987) (relying on affidavit from mayor’s chief of staff stating secular reasons to attract visitors to downtown businesses and to take official note of Christmas to find a secular reason behind a nativity display and noting “the absence of any evidence that the city’s stated purposes behind the display of the nativity scene are merely a sham”); Bridenbaugh, 185 F.3d at 799 (relying on testimony offered during litigation as to Indiana’s purpose for giving employees a Good Friday holiday).
I believe that the proposed monument conveys a secular message that honors and pays due homage to our nation’s legal history. Accordingly, I would hold that the monument satisfies the first prong of the Lemon test requiring a valid secular purpose.

B. Principal or Primary Effect

The second prong of Lemon focuses on whether the government’s practice has the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir.2000). Under this prong we ask only in the case before us whether an “objective observer” would perceive the display as a state endorsement of religion. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000). The appropriate inquiry is thus, whether a citizen knowing the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the placement of the proposed monument would believe that the State of Indiana and its *778officials seek to endorse, rather than merely respect and tolerate, religion by placing it on the Statehouse lawn. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). “A policy which tolerates religion, [however], does not improperly endorse it.” Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasis in original).
Even recent decisions of the Supreme Court have looked favorably upon the constitutionality of government displays of purely religious symbols — a creche and a menorah — when those symbols were part of a larger display, as in the factual situation before us. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 1355; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 617-18, 109 S.Ct. 3086; see also Books, 235 F.3d at 316-18 (Manion, J., dissenting) (discussing Lynch and Allegheny). The Court’s guidance appears to be that where the religious display — the creche in Allegheny — stood alone, it violated the Establishment Clause. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-99, 109 S.Ct. 3086.
As Lynch and Allegheny teach, the inquiry into whether the display of a religious symbol violates the Establishment Clause turns upon the "context in which the symbol appears. In this case, the Ten Commandments is not the only text to be inscribed on the monument, but instead is only one portion of the display, to be accompanied the Bill of Rights and the Preamble to the State of Indiana’s Constitution.
The majority curiously suggests, however, that an observer who views the entire display may reasonably believe that it links religion and law since the Bill of Rights and the Preamble are near the Commandments. The cases the majority cites for this proposition are distinguishable. In Books, 235 F.3d 292, and Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1999), the religious symbol was directly linked to a governmental symbol — an American Eagle gripping the national colors atop a plaque inscribed with the Ten Commandments and a Latin cross surrounded by other symbols of city life on a municipality’s corporate seal. Here the monument does not join government symbols (such as the American Eagle or a municipality’s seal) with religious symbols or text.
Moreover, the layout of monuments that adorn the Statehouse lawn also serves to diminish any perceived endorsement of religion that may allegedly flow from the monument at issue. The proposed monument would share the Statehouse lawn with twelve other monuments — all wholly secular in nature, thereby emphasizing the secular aspects not only of the proposed monument but of the entire designated area. For instance, among the twelve other monuments are busts and statues of historic figures — Christopher Columbus, George Washington, and Robert Dale Owen. There are statues of former Indiana Governors Thomas A. Hindricks and Oliver H.P. Morton. There are monuments commemorating historic events and ideals of liberty — two Civil War friezes and two monuments dedicated to the National Road. There is also a statue of a coal miner to honor Indiana’s coal mining history and a marker honoring the Statehouse itself. In short the Statehouse lawn is an area dedicated to monuments that pay due homage to both the state’s and the nation’s history that serves to situate the monument in an appropriate cultural and historical context.
As the Supreme Court clearly noted in Lynch, in applying the second prong of the Lemon test a court should not focus exclusively on the religious symbol, but within the context in which the symbol appears. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. 1355. In *779Lynch, the Court allowed the city of Paw-tucket, Rhode Island to erect a holiday display that included a creche depicting the nativity scene where that creche was surrounded with other secular symbols, such as reindeer, Santa Claus, candy-striped poles, teddy bears, among others. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 104 S.Ct. 1355. Here, the context of the proposed monument, placed amongst the twelve other secular markers honoring Indiana’s and the nation’s history, only serves to reinforce the secular nature of the monument in question as set forth and clearly delineated in Governor O’Bannon’s press release. The twelve secular monuments that would share the Statehouse lawn with the proposed monument create a museum-like setting that effectively and persuasively does away with any conceivable endorsement of religion that would flow from the proposed monument.
The majority suggests that the other monuments would be too far away to contribute to the secular message of the proposed monument. I fail to see what effect the distance between the monuments upon the very beautiful plot of land has upon our analysis. Indeed the proposed monument is not given a special place on the Statehouse lawn any more than any of the other memorial edifices. Instead, it would be merely just one of a number (12) of monuments on the lawn. In my view, the vastness of the grounds, coupled with the number and diversity of the subject matter of the monuments, dilutes even the slightest perceived endorsement of religion flowing from the proposed monument. Accordingly, I conclude that the proposed monument does not constitute an endorsement of religion. Because it also satisfies and fits within the parameters of the other prongs of Lemon, I would further hold that it does not violate the Establishment Clause.
II. Historical Practices
Even if the proposed monument was found not to satisfy the requirements of Lemon, which I am convinced it does, I still would dissent from the majority’s opinion. Where a religious symbol has a landmark foundation and meaning in the history of our country the Supreme Court has side-stepped the strictures of Lemon to avoid a result contrary to the clear intent of the Framers of the Constitution. Then-Justice Rehnquist discussed at length the history and intent of the Framers who crafted the First Amendment in Wallace, 472 U.S. at 95-114,105 S.Ct. 2479 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). I share in the view that the First Amendment was never intended to be read in a wholly secular fashion, as if its objective were to remove all religious expression from the public square and to prefer irreligión over religion.
Our Nation’s history is replete with religious symbols “linked” in some way to the government. Indeed, George Washington, at the request of the Congress that passed the Bill of Rights, proclaimed, Thanksgiving to be a day of “prayer to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God.” See id., 472 U.S. at 113, 105 S.Ct. 2479. Washington further declared Thanksgiving “to be devoted by the people of these states to the service of that great and glorious Being who is the beneficial author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be ... [and] that we may all unite in rendering unto Him our sincere and humble thanks for his kind care and protection of the people of this country ... and, in general, for all the great and various favors which He has been pleased to confer upon us ... and beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions ... to promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue ... and to grant *780all mankind a degree of temporal prosperity as He alone knows best.” George Washington, Proclamation: A National Thanksgiving (reprinted in 5 Founders’ Constitution 94). Similarly, Thomas Jefferson signed treaties with Indian tribes that provided annual cash support in order for a Roman Catholic priest to provide services for the tribes. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 103,105 S.Ct. 2479.
Washington’s and Jefferson’s examples have been followed as the practice of Congressional prayer has continued uninterrupted since the very first Congress. Moreover, each Congress elects (and pays a salary to) a Chaplain to preside over this practice. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788-89 & n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). The Supreme Court (and this court) open their sessions with an declaration that states “God save the United States and this Honorable Court.” Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786, 103 S.Ct. 3330; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952). Numerous other governmental practices pay homage to our religious heritage, including national holidays such as Christmas and Thanksgiving, military chaplains, the motto, and the Pledge of Allegiance. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674-75, 104 S.Ct. 1355. Our currency bears the motto “In God We Trust.” “Because of their history and ubiquity, those practices are not understood as conveying government approval of particular religious beliefs,” id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 1355, but instead as part of the richness of the very fabric of our Judeo-Chris-tian heritage which comprises an integral part of our Nation’s history and culture.2
The proposed monument’s reference to the Ten Commandments is much like other references (that have been deemed not to violate the Constitution) to God as set forth in the Christian history of our country — not an endorsement of religion, but merely an'acknowledgment of the historical fact 'that the Ten Commandments served as an integral part of the foundation for our counti’y’s legal system. Because of the Ten Commandments’ history and ubiquity, I believe that even if the monument would somehow fail the strictures of Lemon, Indiana’s proposed monument as determined herein does not violate the Establishment Clause.
III. Conclusion
The majority’s decision, similar to that in Books, 235 F.3d 292, leads us further away from the mainstream — and to a point where irreligión is favored over religion. The Constitution does not require complete separation of church and state, but instead “it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, and forbids hostility toward any,” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673, 104 S.Ct. 1355, and the appropriate question to ask is whether an “objective” observer would believe that the display constitutes a government endorse*781ment of religion, Santa Fe. Indep. Sch. Dist, 120 S.Ct. at 2278. After all, “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313, 72 S.Ct. 679.
In my view, the proposed three-subject monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments, the Bill of Rights, and the Preamble to the Indiana Constitution, does not offend the Constitution. Instead, it serves as a well-deserved recognition of our country’s legal, historical, and religious roots. Any possible endorsement of religion is diluted by the monument’s placement on the Statehouse lawn with at least twelve other secular monuments memorializing and honoring the state’s and nation’s history.
Samuel Smith wrote My Country, ’Tis of Thee in 1831 and concluded his epic with the following lines:
Our fathers’ God, to thee, Author of liberty, To thee we sing;
Long may our land be bright, With freedom’s holy light.
Protect us by thy might, Great God, our King!
Does Samuel Smith’s song no longer represent the very values upon which this country was founded, and indeed, where government officials are forbidden to sing of the liberty about which Smith cherished above all else, simply because it refers to religion?
I therefore respectfully Dissent from the court’s holding that Indiana’s proposed monument violates the Establishment Clause or constitutes an establishment of religion, and thus would ReveRse the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction.

. While I obviously recognize the constitutional distinction between state and private action, I am surprised that the First Amendment has been used at times to protect pornography (and those who distribute and possess it) and private religious proselytization, while at the same time also been used to prohibit well-intentioned communities from expressing their understanding of our nation’s history and culture and from making any reference to God. Indeed, people can receive pornography through the mail, over the internet, on their televisions because of the simple premise that one may turn it off. But wouldn't a person passing the proposed monument also be free to believe whatever he or she wants, to pass it by and thereby turn it off? In my opinion, the pornography available on the internet (often sent unsolicited) and religious proselytizers who come to people’s homes seems far more invasive and difficult to “turn off” than a monument that sits passively among a beautiful grassy lawn adorned with monuments that honor the history of our nation and also the State of Indiana.

. Indeed, if one extends plaintiffs' theory of the case to its logical extreme, not only must every public monument be shorn of religious reference, but many of the nation’s most revered documents must be cleansed as well. If the Ten Commandments are deemed constitutionally offensive, how can one justify the rich religious traditions of our nation established in government practices including the opening of a Congressional session or the opening of this court with a prayer; similarly, how can one justify the religious references as found in innumerable public documents, including the Declaration of Independence (which declares God as the source of our rights) or the Constitutions to 46 out of the 50 states (which include references to "God,” "Almighty God,” and the "Supreme Ruler of the Universe,” and with notable frequency refer to God as the author or source of human rights and liberties). A policy that tolerates religion does not improperly endorse it. See Chandler, 230 F.3d at 1317 (writing about the intersection of the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause).