Court Opinion

ID: 9541375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:24:55.088413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:48.072262
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
Although I concur in that portion of the Court’s opinion which affirms the appellant’s conviction in the O’Connor case, I do not join in the remainder of the opinion. The appellant’s conviction in the Boyd case should be reversed, primarily on the ground that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to allow the court reporter to testify on rebuttal as to the incriminating statement which she allegedly heard the appellant make to his counsel during the preliminary hearing.
As in the recent case of State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 286-287, 647 P.2d 734, 742-43 (1982) (Bistline, J., dissenting), the “rebuttal” testimony offered in this case by the court reporter can only be properly characterized as an admission by the appellant. As such, the offered testimony was clearly a material part of the State’s case which, if admissible and if accurate, would properly have been introduced to establish the appellant’s guilt.1 The views which I expressed in Olsen were sound and, seeing no reason to discard them to fit this case, I would hold (1) that the court reporter’s testimony should not have been allowed upon rebuttal,2 and (2) it should have been excluded on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the appellant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. Despite what the majority opinion might bring one to believe, *166this is not at all a case in which the appellant chose to make a communication to his attorney in the presence of third parties.
Most practicing attorneys of more than limited experience would, I feel certain, entertain the view that a court reporter is the right arm of the trial judge himself, and usually the darling of the jury as well. The court reporter, for instance, will be relied upon to read back stenographic or steno-type notes where the court is in need of knowing what has been testified to in order to make a ruling. And, although there may at trial be argumentative exchanges between counsel, and sometimes even with the judge, the court reporter is no part of such goings-on. In short, the court reporter is in the court room to serve the important function of recording all that is said — and by that I mean all that is said at the trial —which has to do with the trial, to wit, the questions of counsel, answers of the witnesses, objections of counsel, arguments thereon, and rulings by the court.
A person, other than that she or he is a court reporter, does not get to sit where court reporters sit. Court reporters sit where they do so that they can hear questions of counsel, the answers of witnesses, and the remarks and rulings of the court. Court reporters are thus placed in close proximity to the attorneys and their clients. They are so placed in the furtherance of the business of the court. They are not placed there with any thought in mind that they are or can be privy to conversations of attorney and client. In short, in such history as I have known of the customs, practices, and habits of court reporting — which is a lifetime in excess of 60 years, all of which but the early years being within recollection — court reporters hear nothing, see nothing, and do nothing other than that which is the obligation of their duties to hear, see, or do. A court reporter so positioned near counsel benches necessarily has to so understand; otherwise the judicial process will have to come to a standstill when an attorney would speak to his client, or the client would speak to his attorney. A court reporter will not be a surrepititious listening device for either party, either intentionally or inadvertently.
Compounding the instant situation, it would seem to me that if the court reporter, while attending to duty, did hear that which was testified to, and thought it pertinent to the trial, the remarks should have been stenographically taken down — but that did not happen, conclusively establishing the reporter’s understanding that the alleged conversation later reported to the prosecutor was not any part of the trial. Then, too, if the reporter as a citizen felt duty-bound to inform others of the conversation, it would seem that if it was worth the hearing, then surely it was worth the writing. It is indeed that in such manner court records are made and relied upon, nothing being left to recollection.
The majority is willing to assume without deciding that the court reporter’s testimony was inadmissible. From this, however, the jump is quickly made to a holding that “because there is, beyond a reasonable doubt, overwhelming and conclusive proof of this defendant’s guilt, the admission of the court reporter’s testimony was harmless error.” This is made possible by resorting to what I fear in many courts has now become the trite cliche that “there is an abundance of other evidence upon which a conviction could be based.” I cannot agree. Nor can I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the testimony was harmless error.3
The “abundance of other evidence” upon which the Court relies, primarily consists of Boyd’s and Fuller’s identification of the appellant (or his photograph) as the assailant. In addition, the Court relies on the fact that *167the appellant fit what was a rather general description of the assailant given by the two women shortly after the incident. To my mind this hardly constitutes an “abundance.” This is especially true when one considers the great potential for misidentification in situations such as this and the fact that the identifications of the appellant in this case occurred under what can be best characterized as highly questionable circumstances. As the court noted in United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1066 (6th Cir.1976):
“There is a great potential for misidentification when a witness identifies a stranger based solely upon a single brief observation, and this risk is increased when the observation was made at a time of stress or excitement. Since this danger is inherent in every identification of this kind, courts should be especially vigilant to make certain that there is no further distortion of the possibly incomplete or mistaken perception of a well-meaning witness by suggestive or other unfair investigatory techniques. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932-33, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1158 (1967); see F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti 30 (1927), W. Ringel, Identification and Police Lineups 10 (1968), P. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases (1965), Eisenberg & Fenstel, ‘Pre-Trial Identification; An Attempt to Articulate Constitutional Criteria,’ 58 Marquette L.Rev. 659 (1975), Grano, ‘Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?’ 72 Mich.L.Rev. 717 (1974).”
The Court in this case concludes that although the out-of-court identification procedures used by the police were suggestive “the aspects of reliability with regard to Boyd’s and Fuller’s identification of the defendant far outweigh any suggestiveness that may have been present .... ” I cannot agree. While the Court’s analysis of the issue may appear to be sound, my review of the record reveals that this result is achieved by the convenient omission of several important facts. Nowhere does the Court mention that detective Spears testified he believed that at the time he showed the photographic lineup to Boyd and Fuller, he told them “that one of the photos was a suspect.” Nor does the Court mention that with regard to the show-up of the two eight by ten glossies of the appellant, detective Spears testified: “I advised [Boyd and Fuller] that I had a picture of the person that they had identified on the picture lineup. Explaining to them that the picture displayed the individual with longer hair.” Spears also testified that he had stated at that time that the man in the photograph “was a suspect.” The Court also neglects to consider that Boyd and Fuller were shown the glossies of the appellant shortly after a story had been published in the local newspaper that a rapist had been arrested in the O’Connor case. In fact, Tracy Boyd admitted that at the time she was shown the glossies, she knew from reading the newspaper that an arrest had been made in a local rape case. More suggestive circumstances, in my opinion, cannot be imagined. Thus, I cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion that the aspects of reliability of the identification outweigh the suggestiveness of the procedures used. I would hold that the suggestive identification procedures denied the appellant due process and that the in-court identification of the appellant should have been excluded.
Because I believe that the out-of-court identifications were improper and necessarily had to result in tainted in-court identifications, I certainly cannot agree with a Court which succumbs to the State’s argument that there is an abundance of evidence other than the court reporter’s improper testimony which sustains the conviction. In State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396, 630 P.2d 674, 683 (1981), the Court stated that the question to be answered regarding the error in that case was: “Is the appellate court convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached had the evidence been *168properly excluded?”4 In this case I must answer, “no.” The court reporter, as an official of the court, carried an aurora of authority, her testimony, without a doubt, as any practicing trial attorney will agree, in the eyes of a jury would be most persuasive and here that evidence was an admission by the appellant that he had in fact committed the crime. The very fact that the prosecutor held back any mention of that testimonial evidence until he was in the final seconds of his closing argument clearly demonstrates its importance in the case. It is impossible for me to see how anyone, but especially an appellate court, can so easily declare itself convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached had the reporter’s testimony be excluded. By no stretch of the most elastic of harmless error doctrines can it be said that such evidence was harmless. The appellant’s conviction in the Boyd case should be reversed.
APPENDIX
JEAN GERSTENBERGER called on behalf of the State, first duly sworn, testified as follows:
REBUTTAL EXAMINATION BY MR. PETRIE:
Q For the record will you state your full name please.
A Jean Gerstenberger.
Q And what do you do for a living? A I am a court reporter.
Q How long have you been a court reporter?
A Four years.
Q And where did you receive your training?
A At a school called the Academy of Stenographic Arts in San Francisco, California.
Q And how long does that training take?
A Two years.
Q And did you successfully complete that training?
A I did not graduate from the school, no sir.
Q Okay. How long have you been a court reporter in this area?
A Two and a half years.
Q And what towns do you report in?
A I cover the Second Judicial District which would be anywhere from Grangeville up to Moscow.
Q What special training, if any, do you receive to become a court reporter?
A I don’t know how to answer that. You learn to operate the machine and to take everything down verbatim and to listen carefully.
Q Listen carefully to whom?
A To whoever is speaking.
Q I see. Did you have an occasion to take a preliminary hearing on the 27th of December, 1977?
*169A Yes sir, I did.
Q And what preliminary hearing were you taking at that time?
A It was State of Idaho versus Monte Hoisington.
Q And did that involve the Traci Boyd rape?
A Yes sir.
Q Do you recall when Traci Boyd was testifying at that preliminary hearing?
A Yes sir.
Q And were you the reporter at that preliminary hearing?
A Yes sir.
Q Where was that taken?
A In courtroom three in the Nez Perce County Courthouse.
Q This same building?
A Yes sir.
Q Do you recall of anything unusual being said during that preliminary hearing while Traci Boyd was testifying?
A Yes sir.
Q And do you recall when this unusual item was said — do you recall what the topic was when Traci Boyd was testifying?
A Yes sir.
Q And what topic was she testifying to at that time?
MR. AHERIN: If the Court please, I am going to object. I don’t know where counsel is headed. If he is having her testify as to what was recorded, that is part of her official duties as the court reporter. If he is trying to impeach some testimony, there is a recorded statement.
MR. PETRIE: I am not, your Honor. I merely want to get the topic of the conversation that the witness was testifying to.
THE COURT: Yes, the objection is overruled.
MR. PETRIE: Thank you.
Q Do you recall the topic of conversation — or the topic of testimony at that time?
A Yes sir.
Q And what did that entail — not the precise testimony, but what was the topic about?
A The topic was about a pillow.
Q And what about the pillow?
A I don’t understand if you want me to say what she was saying or what.
Q Well, basically what was she testifying to concerning the pillow?
A She was testifying to the pillow behind her head.
Q Okay. And at that time did the defendant — did you hear the defendant say anything?
A Yes sir.
Q What did you hear him say?
MR. AHERIN: If the Court please, I am going to object to that. Is this to something she recorded or an unrecorded statement?
THE COURT: This is something — the question was directed as to something she heard. I don’t know whether it was recorded or whether it wasn’t, that she heard the defendant — the question, as I understand it, is something she heard the defendant say while Miss Boyd was testifying regarding the pillow.
MR. AHERIN: If the Court please, I am going to move to — object to the testimony on the basis that it is improper impeachment if that is an attempt to impeach the testimony of someone that has already testified. I think it is an improper form of rebuttal.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
MR. PETRIE: Thank you, your Honor.
Q To clarify the record, was the defendant testifying at that time?
A No sir.
Q Where was the defendant at that time?
A At counsel table.
Q And about how far away from you was he?
*170A Five feet. I am not too good at distance.
Q Okay. And at that time when Traci Boyd was testifying to the position of the pillow what did the defendant say, if you recall?
A I do not recall his exact words.
Q Do you recall the effect of those words?
A Yes sir.
Q What are they?
A That he had not placed the pillow that way, or that was not how the pillow was placed.
Q And to whom did he say that to?
A Mr. Aherin.
MR. PETRIE: No further questions.
CROSS-REBUTTAL EXAMINATION BY MR. AHERIN:
Q How close was I to Mr. Hoisington?
A You were seated next to him.
Q Closer than you?
A Yes sir.
Q And you are absolutely sure that that is what he said?
A Not to his exact words but that was the idea, yes sir.
Q How do you know that was the idea if you don’t know the exact words?
A Because I remember when he made the statement that it indicated to me that he had been there because he knew what he was talking about.
Q Could you have been mistaken since you didn’t hear it exactly?
MR. PETRIE: Objection, your Honor. That is an improper question.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. PETRIE: Thank you.
A I heard it exactly but I do not remember what the words are now.
Q Do you think I would have heard that statement if it was made?
A Yes sir, you heard it because you asked him to be quiet.
Q At the time — what was the date of this statement?
A It was during the preliminary hearing which was on December 27th, 1977.
Q Was that the only thing you ever heard the defendant say during that time?
A That is the only thing I understood.
Q You don’t remember what was said right before that?
A As I recall, Mr. Aherin, nothing.
Q You are saying that he never said anything to me up to that time?
A No sir, I am just saying that right before that he was sitting there saying nothing.
Q Was there a witness testifying at this time?
A Traci Boyd.
Q Do you remember what Traci Boyd— do you remember what page that was on the transcript?
A No sir, I haven’t looked at the transcript since I — I believe it is in the first part but I am not sure.
THE COURT: Do you want a recess, Mr. Aherin?
MR. AHERIN: Yes.
THE COURT: All right, we’ll take a short recess.
(RECESS TAKEN AT 10:50 O’CLOCK A.M. RECONVENED AT 11:15 O’CLOCK A.M.)
THE COURT: Mr. Aherin.
MR. AHERIN: If the Court please, at this time I would move for a mistrial on the grounds that the impeachment attempts by the prosecutor was improperly done in that the defendant was never confronted with this statement, if they are trying to make an inconsistent statement, and it has results ed in highly prejudicial matters being before the jury. It also puts me in the position of an ethical problem and for those reasons I would move for mistrial.
*171THE COURT: The motion is denied.
Q You indicated that the witness was testifying about a pillow?
A Yes sir.
Q Do you recall at that time the materials that were on counsel table at that particular time?
A Your table?
Q Correct.
A The only thing I recall would be your file, nothing else.
Q Do you recall a stack of papers, police reports?
A I have no idea. I do not recall them.
Q You have no idea then?
A I remember your file being there but I do not know what else.
Q Now you answered the question in the alternative. Your answer was at least an or answer. At the time do you recall if I had a note pad or anything and was writing?
A I believe so.
Q Do you recall if Mr. Hoisington had any papers before him?
A I do not recall.
Q Do you have any knowledge whether Mr. Hoisington had read the statements and the material that was in my file?
A I have no knowledge.
Q Then you don’t know if he was making reference to another statement, do you?
A No sir.
MR. AHERIN: I have no further questions.
REDIRECT REBUTTAL EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETRIE:
Q Mrs. Gerstenberger, you were subpoenaed to testify here today, weren’t you?
A Yes sir.
MR. PETRIE: No further questions.
THE COURT: You may step down.
MR. PETRIE: The State calls Dennis Garnet.

. The court reporter’s complete testimony is set forth in the Appendix.

. Because this witness was not a proper rebuttal witness, the state was required to disclose her name to the appellant pursuant to his request. I.C.R. 16(b)(6). Although the state argues that it “offered its files to the defendant,” this is not sufficient. I.C.R. 16(b)(6) requires the prosecuting attorney to provide a defendant with “a written list of the names and addresses of all persons ... who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial.”

. Constitutional “harmless error,” created by the United States Supreme Court, is fast becoming the most destructive tool which prosecutors and appellate courts use to guard against awarding a new and error-free trial to a defendant who on appeal has established prejudicial error. Professor Steven Goldberg’s article on Constitutional Harmless Error is an absolute must for defense counsel who would prevail on appeal but for its creation. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 421, 427 (1980).

. The harmless error question to be answered in LePage was fashioned for that particular case, and was not a paraphrasing of the rule as stated in State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 111, 594 P.2d 146, 149 (1979), and also applied in State v. Stewart, 100 Idaho 185, 187, 595 P.2d 719, 721 (1979). Both Garcia and Stewart relied upon similar language in State v. Smoot, 99 Idaho 855, 590 P.2d 1001 (1978). The LePage harmless error rule was recently erroneously misapplied in State v. LeMere, 103 Idaho 839, 655 P.2d 46 (1982), where four members of the Court regardless of being advised that the State was relying on a different and proper standard, insisted on using it, finding itself “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would still have arrived at the same verdiet,” even had the prosecutor’s statement been excluded. It would seem to me that such a rule, which is clearly a usurpation of the jury function, should never be applied unless the court which applies it is a unanimous court. How can a court, as distinguished from a mere majority of a court, be convinced of anything beyond a reasonable doubt when constituently it is only 80 percent so convinced or 60 percent so convinced? So viewed it is a rather monstrously dangerous doctrine. In deciding criminal guilt, on a cold record, and excluding evidence erroneously allowed or inflammatory prosecutorial comment, a court of five members should be as unanimous as is required of a jury. The Garcia, Smoot, Stewart and LePage courts were unanimous.