Court Opinion

ID: 9753867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:33:42.311351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:44.402569
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge PELLEGRINI.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that a passenger of one bus *78injured crossing the street to transfer to another bus is not covered by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act.1
In Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. Contrisciane, 504 Pa. 328, 473 A.2d 1005 (1984), our Supreme Court held that a person was “occupying” his insured vehicle when he was struck and killed by an uninsured vehicle after leaving his car to walk over to a patrol car with his driver’s information as directed by a police officer. In doing so, our Supreme Court adopted a four-prong test to determine whether a claimant “occupies” a vehicle so that he is covered by uninsured motorist coverage. The test is whether:
(1) there is a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of the insured vehicle;
(2) the person asserting coverage must be in a reasonably close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle, although the person need not be actually touching it;
(3) the person must be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at the time; and
(4) the person must also be engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle at the time.
Contrisciane, 504 Pa. at 335, 473 A.2d at 1009.
In Adeyward-I v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan, 167 Pa.Cmwlth. 450, 648 A.2d 589 (1994), a case on point with this one, a plaintiff was transferring from one bus to another on a street and was struck and injured by an uninsured car. This Court adopted the trial court’s opinion upholding uninsured motorist benefits as well as first party benefits against SEPTA. In Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority v. Dunham, 668 A.2d 272 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), we explained our reasoning in Adeyward-I stating that there was geographical and temporal proximity of the first SEPTA bus from which the passenger Adeyward exited to go to the second SEPTA bus which he intended to transfer en route home. We stated that Adeyward was still “vehicle rather than highway or sidewalk oriented” at the time he was injured. In applying the Contrisciane rationale, we found an unbroken causal connection and continuum between Adeyward’s act of disembarking from the first vehicle and attempting to board the second vehicle, thereby rendering Adeyward still an “occupant” of SEPTA vehicles when injured.2
The majority reverses Adeyward-I finding that it is distinguishable from Contris-ciane because Contrisciane had left his vehicle, planned on returning to the same vehicle, and had a legal duty to leave to cooperate with the police while Adeyward was not required to do so. However, planning on returning to the same vehicle or the reason that a person left the vehicle is not part of the Contrisciane test. Applying the Contrisciane test to the facts in this case:
(1) there is a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of *79the insured vehicle because Jones-Molina was crossing the street from one insured vehicle to another;
(2) there is no dispute there is a reasonably close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle;
(3) Jones-Molina was vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at the time of the injury because she was crossing the street to get on the bus; and
(4) in crossing the street, Jones-Molina was engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle at the time.
Because Adeyward-I is an accurate application of Contrisciane and is indistinguishable from that case, I would affirm the trial court and hold that Jones-Molina is entitled to first party benefits under the MVFRL.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. Act of Feb. 12, 1984, P.L. 26, No. 11, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701-1799.7 (the "MVFRL”).

. See also Frain v. Keystone Insurance Company, 433 Pa.Super. 462, 640 A.2d 1352 (1994) (holding that Mrs. Frain was "occupying” her friend's parked car when she stumbled over flowerbeds and sustained injuries to avoid being run over by oncoming tractor trailer before entering friend’s car); Fisher v. Harleysville Insurance Company, 423 Pa.Super. 362, 621 A.2d 158 (1993), allocator denied, 536 Pa. 624, 637 A.2d 285 (1993) (minor was "occupant” of friend's truck while minor was unloading hunting rifle in front of truck in preparation to enter truck and was struck by oncoming vehicle).